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BOSTOISI 
PUBLIC 
UBRARY 


SIPERiNTENDENT  OF  DOCUME^^^ 
DEPOSITORY 


AUG  1  4  1985 

.S9§^^^  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 
GOVERNMENT  DOCUMENTS  DEPARTMENT 


MANHATTAN: 
THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Maj.  Gen.  Leslie  R.  Groves,  Officer  in  Gharge,  Manhattan  Project 


UNITED  STATES  ARMY  IN  WORLD  WAR  II 


Special  Studies 


MANHATTAN: 

THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


by 
Vincent  C.  Jones 


CENTER  OF  MILITARY  HISTORY 

UNITED  STATES  ARMY 

WASHINGTON  D.C.,  1985 


U.S.  Army  Center  of  Military  History 

Brig.  Gen.  Douglas  Kinnaid,  USA  (Ret.),  Chief  of  Military  History 

Chief  Historian  David  F.  Trask 

Chief,  Histories  Division  Col.  James  W.  Dunn 

Editor  in  Chief  John  W.  Elsberg 


Library  of  Congress  Cataloging  in  Publication  Data 

Jones,  \'incent  C,  1915- 

Manhattan,  the  Army  and  the  atomic  bomb. 

(United  States  Army  in  World  War  II)  (Special 
studies  /  Center  of  Military  History,  United  States 
Army) 

Bibliography:  p. 

Includes  index. 
1.  United  States.  Army.  Corps  of  Engineers. 
Manhattan  District — History.  2.  Atomic  bomb — 
United  States — History.  I.  Title.  II.  Series. 
III.  Series:  Special  studies  (Center  of  Military 
History) 

QC773.3.U5J65         1985        355.8'251 19'0973        84-12407 


First  Printing— CMH  Pub    11-10 


For  salt-  bv   the  Supcrintc-iulcm   of  Docunic-nts,   l!.S.   (.overniiK-nt   Priming  Offl 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 


.  .  to  Those  Who  Served 


Foreword 


The  U.S.  Army  played  a  key  role  in  the  formation  and  administra- 
tion of  the  Manhattan  Project,  the  World  War  II  organization  which 
produced  the  atomic  bombs  that  not  only  contributed  decisively  to 
ending  the  war  with  Japan  but  also  opened  the  way  to  a  new  atomic 
age.  This  volume  describes  how  the  wartime  Army,  already  faced  with 
the  enormous  responsibility  of  mobilizing,  training,  and  deploying  vast 
forces  to  fight  a  formidable  enemy  on  far-flung  fronts  in  Europe  and 
the  Pacific,  responded  to  the  additional  task  of  organizing  and  adminis- 
tering what  was  to  become  the  single  largest  technological  project  of  its 
kind  undertaken  up  to  that  time. 

To  meet  this  challenge,  the  Army — drawing  first  upon  the  long-time 
experience  and  considerable  resources  of  its  Corps  of  Engineers — 
formed  a  new  engineer  organization,  the  Manhattan  District,  to  take 
over  from  the  Office  of  Scientific  Research  and  Development  adminis- 
tration of  a  program  earlier  established  by  American  and  refugee  scien- 
tists to  exploit  the  military  potentialities  of  atomic  energy.  Eventually, 
however,  the  rapidly  expanding  project  turned  for  support  and  services 
to  a  much  broader  spectrum  of  the  Army,  including  the  War  Depart- 
ment, the  Ordnance  Department,  the  Signal,  Medical,  Military  Police, 
and  Women's  Army  Corps,  the  Military  Intelligence  Division  of  the 
War  Department  General  Staff,  and  the  Army  Air  Forces.  These  and 
other  Army  elements  worked  together  in  close  collaboration  with 
American  industry  and  science  to  win  what  was  believed  to  be  a  des- 
perate race  with  Nazi  Germany  to  be  first  in  producing  atomic  weap- 
ons. For  both  soldiers  and  civilians  this  history  of  the  Army's  earlier 
experience  in  dealing  successfully  with  the  then  novel  problems  of 
atomic  science  seems  likely  to  offer  some  instructive  parallels  for  find- 
ing appropriate  answers  to  the  problems  faced  in  today's  ever  more 
technologically  complex  world. 

DOUGLAS  KINNARD 
Washington,  D.C.  Brigadier  General,  USA  (Ret.) 

1   March   1984  Chief  of  Military  History 


The  Author 


Vincent  C.  Jones,  after  graduating  from  Park  College  (Parkville, 
Missouri)  with  a  B.A.  in  history,  earned  an  M.A.  degree  at  the  Universi- 
ty of  Nebraska  with  a  thesis  on  German  public  opinion  in  World  War  I 
and  spent  a  year  as  a  Sanders  Fellow  in  History  at  George  Washington 
University.  Moving  to  the  University  of  Wisconsin,  he  began  work  on  a 
doctoral  degree  in  modern  European  history  just  before  the  outbreak 
of  W^orld  War  II  in  Europe.  During  the  war,  he  was  a  noncommis- 
sioned officer  in  a  heavy  weapons  company  of  the  81st  Infantry  Divi- 
sion, participating  in  the  Peleliu-Angaur  and  Leyte  campaigns  in  the 
Pacific  Theater.  He  was  in  training  in  the  Philippines  in  August  1945, 
preparing  for  the  impending  invasion  of  Kyushu,  when  the  Army  Air 
Forces  dropped  atomic  bombs  on  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki.  Following 
the  surrender  of  Japan,  he  served  in  the  American  occupation  forces  in 
that  country  before  returning  to  the  University  of  Wisconsin  as  an 
instructor  in  history. 

Completing  his  doctorate  at  W'isconsin  in  1952,  Dr.  Jones  served  a 
year  as  a  research  associate  in  American  history  at  the  State  Historical 
Society  of  Wisconsin  and  as  an  assistant  professor  of  history  at  the 
Central  State  College  of  Connecticut.  Since  January  1955  he  has  been  a 
historian  on  the  staff  of  the  U.S.  Army  Center  of  Military  History, 
where  he  has  been  a  major  contributor  to  The  Army  Almanac  and  the 
ROTC  textbook  American  Military  History.  In  addition  to  the  present 
volume.  Dr.  Jones  is  author  of  articles  and  reviews  in  professional 
journals  and  of  biographical  sketches  of  military  figures  in  a  number  of 
encyclopedias. 


Preface 


During  the  nearly  four  decades  since  the  atomic  bombings  of  Hiro- 
shima and  Nagasaki  in  August  1945,  much  has  been  written  about  the 
developments  leading  up  to  that  climactic  moment  in  world  history. 
Within  days  of  that  event,  the  War  Department  released  its  official  ac- 
count, the  well-known  semitechnical  report  by  Professor  Henry  D. 
Smyth  of  Princeton  University.  Soon  popular  histories  also  appeared, 
and  with  the  gradual  opening  of  the  archival  records  relating  to  the  top 
secret  World  War  II  program  known  as  the  Manhattan  Project,  scholars 
began  examining  in  detail  the  scientific,  technological,  strategic,  and 
diplomatic  story  of  atomic  energy  and  the  atomic  bomb  (see  Biblio- 
graphical Note).  Yet  amid  this  outpouring  of  books,  none  has  provided 
an  adequate  and  full  account  of  the  United  States  Army's  participation 
in  the  atomic  program  from  1939  to  the  end  of  1946.  It  is  the  purpose 
of  this  volume  to  tell  that  story. 

Stated  in  its  simplest  terms,  the  achievement  of  an  atomic  bomb  re- 
sulted from  the  highly  successful  collaboration  of  American  science  and 
industry  carried  out  under  the  direction  and  guidance  of  the  U.S. 
Army.  This  triad — scientists,  industrialists  and  engineers,  and  sol- 
diers— was  the  product  of  a  decision  in  early  1942  by  America's  war- 
time leaders  to  give  to  the  Army  the  task  of  administering  the  atomic 
program.  Convinced  that  the  Allies  were  in  a  race  with  Germany  to  be 
the  first  to  develop  an  atomic  weapon,  they  decided  that  only  the  Army 
could  provide  the  administration,  liaison  services,  security,  and  military 
planning  essential  to  the  success  of  a  program  requiring  ready  access 
to  scarce  materials  and  manpower,  maximum  protection  against  espio- 
nage and  sabotage,  and,  ultimately,  combat  utilization  of  its  end 
product. 

In  telling  how  the  Army  met  the  challenge  of  its  unique  assignment, 
eventually  achieving  results  that  would  have  the  most  profound  impli- 
cations for  the  future  of  mankind,  I  have  taken  a  broadly  chronological 
approach  but  with  topical  treatment  of  detailed  developments.  The 
focus  of  the  narrative  is  from  the  vantage  point  of  the  Manhattan 
Project  organization,  which  functioned  under  the  able  direction  of  Maj. 
Gen.  Leslie  R.  Groves  and  such  key  scientific  administrators  as  Vanne- 
var  Bush,  James  B.  Conant,  Arthur  Compton,  and  J.  Robert  Oppen- 
heimer  in  compliance  with  policies  established  at  the  highest  levels 
of  the    Washington    wartime    leadership,    fhe    volume    begins    with    a 


prologue,  designed  to  provide  the  reader  with  a  brief  survey  of  the  his- 
tory of  atomic  energy  and  to  explain  in  layman's  terms  certain  technical 
aspects  of  atomic  science  essential  to  an  understanding  of  the  major 
problems  occurring  in  the  development  of  an  atomic  weapon.  Early 
chapters  describe  the  beginning  of  the  Army's  atomic  mission,  includ- 
ing the  formation  of  the  Manhattan  District,  the  first  steps  in  acquiring 
the  means  to  produce  atomic  weapons,  and  the  appointment  of  Gener- 
al Groves.  Subsequent  topical  chapters  trace  the  building  and  oper- 
ation of  the  large-scale  process  plants  for  the  production  of  fissionable 
materials;  the  administration  of  a  broad  range  of  support  activities, 
such  as  security  and  community  management;  and  the  fabrication,  test- 
ing, and  combat  employment  of  atomic  bombs.  A  concluding  section 
describes  how  the  Army  dealt  with  the  difficult  problems  arising  during 
its  unexpectedly  prolonged  postwar  trusteeship  of  the  project  until  De- 
cember 1946,  when  the  newly  created  civilian  agency — the  United 
States  Atomic  Energy  Commission — assumed  responsibility  for  atomic 
energy  matters. 

The  Army  did  not  program  a  volume  on  the  Manhattan  Project  in 
its  multivolumed  historical  series,  the  U.S.  Army  in  World  War  II,  until 
1959.  Two  developments  in  the  late  1950's  had  made  available  the  es- 
sential records  for  research  by  Army  historians:  the  instituting  of  a  his- 
torical program  by  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  with  the  objective 
of  preparing  an  unclassified  account  of  its  own  origins;  and  the  open- 
ing of  access  to  the  Manhattan  District  records,  the  so-called  General 
Groves  collection,  then  located  in  the  Departmental  Records  Branch  of 
the  Adjutant  General's  Office  but  subsequently  retired  to  the  National 
Archives  and  Records  System. 

A  great  many  individuals  are  deserving  of  mention  for  their  assist- 
ance and  support  in  the  preparation  of  this  volume.  For  aiding  me  in 
my  task  of  researching  the  voluminous  and  widely  scattered  records 
controlled  by  the  Department  of  Energy,  I  wish  to  thank  Mr.  Roger 
Anders,  Dr.  Richard  G.  Hewlett,  and  Mr.  Thomas  J.  Pugliese  in  Ger- 
mantown,  Maryland;  Mr.  Floyd  F.  Beets,  Jr.,  Mr.  William  J.  Hatmaker, 
Mr.  Frank  Hoffman,  and  Mr.  James  R.  Langley  in  Oak  Ridge,  Tennes- 
see; Mr.  Ralph  V.  Button  and  Mr.  Milton  R.  Cydell  in  Richland,  Wash- 
ington; Mr.  King  Derr,  Mr.  David  A.  Heimbach,  Mrs.  Lucille  McAn- 
drew,  and  Mr.  Robert  Y.  Porton  in  Los  Alamos,  New  Mexico; 
Mrs.  Eleanor  Davisson  in  Berkeley,  California;  and  Mr.  E.  Newman 
Pettit  in  Lemont,  Illinois.  For  facilitating  my  use  of  the  Manhattan 
Project  records  at  the  National  Archives,  I  wish  to  thank  Mr.  Sherrod 
East,  Dr.  Lee  Johnson,  Dr.  Herman  Kahn,  Mr.  Wilbert  B.  Mahoney,  Mr. 
Wilbur  J.  Nigh,  Dr.  Benjamin  Zobrist,  and,  especially,  Mr.  Edward 
Reese,  who  on  countless  occasions  rendered  expert  assistance  in  using 
the  indispensable  General  Groves  collection.  And  for  making  available 
interviews  and  photographs  which  they  assembled  for  use  in  their  own 
excellent  account  of  the  construction  aspects  of  the  Manhattan  Project, 


I  wish  to  thank  Miss  Lenore  Fine  and  Dr.  Jesse  F.  Remington,  formerly 
of  the  Historical  Division,  Corp  of  Engineers. 

Adding  another  dimension  to  my  understanding  of  the  atomic 
project  were  my  visits  to  several  Manhattan  research,  production,  and 
community  sites,  arranged  by  Mr.  Tom  Cox  and  Mr.  William  McCluen 
at  Oak  Ridge,  Mr.  R.  M.  Plum  and  Mr.  James  W.  Travis  at  Richland, 
Mr.  Charles  C.  Campbell  at  Los  Alamos,  and  Mr.  P.  M.  Goodbread  at 
Berkeley. 

Many  others  gave  generously  of  their  time  in  reading  and  critiquing 
all  or  parts  of  the  manuscript:  Dr.  James  B.  Conant,  Col.  William  A. 
Consodine,  Lt.  Col.  John  A.  Derry,  Mr.  Julian  D.  Ellett,  Mr.  Joseph  R. 
Friedman,  Dr.  Crawford  H.  Greenewalt,  Lt.  Gen.  Leslie  R.  Groves,  Dr. 
Walter  G.  Hermes,  Col.  John  E.  Jessup,  Jr.,  Dr.  Richard  G.  Hewlett, 
Col.  John  Lansdale,  Jr.,  Dr.  Maurice  Matloff,  Col.  Franklin  T.  Matthias, 
Maj.  Gen.  Kenneth  D.  Nichols,  Mrs.  Jean  O'Leary,  Mr.  Robert  R. 
Smith,  Maj.  Harry  S.  Traynor,  and  Col.  Gerald  R.  Tyler.  To  each  of 
them,  I  extend  a  special  note  of  thanks. 

At  each  stage  in  the  preparation  of  this  volume,  I  also  benefited 
from  the  unique  combination  of  talents  available  among  my  colleagues 
in  the  Army's  historical  office.  Fellow  staff  historians — Dr.  Stanley  F. 
Falk,  Dr.  Maurice  Matloff,  and  Dr.  Earl  F.  Ziemke — helped  expedite  ini- 
tial research  into  the  atomic  project  records,  serving  with  me  as  mem- 
bers of  a  team  under  the  direction  of  Dr.  Stetson  Conn,  the  chief  histo- 
rian; in  addition.  Dr.  Falk  conducted  a  number  of  interviews  and  wrote 
the  first  draft  of  the  Prologue,  Chapters  I-IV,  and  Chapter  X.  Miss 
Carol  Anderson,  in  the  library,  and  Miss  Hannah  Zeidlik,  in  the  records 
branch,  cheerfully  and  expertly  dealt  with  my  many  requests  and  kept 
me  abreast  of  newly  available  records  and  publications  on  atomic 
energy.  Mr.  Arthur  S.  Hardyman  designed  the  graphically  handsome 
maps,  some  of  them  in  color,  and  oversaw  the  layout  of  the  photo- 
graphs. His  colleague,  Mr.  Roger  D.  Clinton,  provided  the  clearly 
drawn  charts,  which  will  help  the  reader  understand  the  complex  orga- 
nization of  the  Manhattan  Project,  and  assisted  in  the  selection  of  pho- 
tographs. The  skillful  typing  of  Mrs.  Joyce  Dean,  Mrs.  Margaret  L 
Fletcher,  Mrs.  Edna  Salsbury,  and  Miss  Lajuan  R.  Watson,  the  eagle- 
eyed  proofreading  of  Mrs.  Rae  T.  Panella,  and  the  meticulous  indexing 
of  Mrs.  Muriel  Southwick  contributed  to  the  efficient  preparation  of  my 
technically  difficult  and  heavily  documented  manuscript.  Lt.  Col.  John 
R.  Pipkin  shepherded  the  draft  manuscript  through  clearance  by  several 
government  agencies  in  record  time,  considering  the  potential  sensi- 
tiveness of  its  subject  matter.  Finally,  Miss  Joanne  M.  Brignolo  edited 
the  volume.  She  demonstrated  a  remarkable  capacity  for  quickly  grasp- 
ing the  intricacies  of  atomic  science,  enabling  her  to  make  read- 
able my  oftentimes  obscure  text  and  to  give  order  and  consistency  to 
its  complex  documentation.  I  am  obliged  to  her  for  whatever  literary 
merit  my  book  may  have. 


For  her  understanding  and  unremitting  support  during  the  many 
years  this  volume  was  in  preparation,  I  wish  to  thank  my  wife,  Kay  Cox 
Jones,  who,  as  an  employee  at  the  Argonne  National  Laboratory  in  Chi- 
cago in  the  immediate  post-World  War  II  period,  first  brought  my  at- 
tention to  the  history  of  the  atomic  bomb. 

For  the  many  others  not  here  mentioned  who,  over  the  years  this 
volume  has  been  in  the  making,  have  contributed  in  some  way  to  its 
ultimate  completion,  I  express  my  gratitude.  The  author  alone,  of 
course,  takes  responsibility  for  the  facts  presented  and  the  conclusions 
reached  in  this  volume. 

Washington,  D.C.  VINCENT  C.  JONES 

1  March   1984 


Contents 


Page 

PROLOGUE:  A  HISTORY  OF  ATOMIC  ENERGY  TO  1939 3 

I  'ranium  and  Fission 8 

Efforts  To  Enlist  Support  of  the  U.S.  Government 12 

Part  One:  Beginnings  of  the  Atomic  Mission 

Ctjapter 

I.  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM, 

1939-1942 19 

Origins  of  the  Army's  Role 19 

Decision  To  Develop  Atomic  Weapons 21 

Establishment  of  the  NDRC  and  OSRD 26 

New  Advances  in  Atomic  Research,  1940-1941 28 

Top  Policy  Group:  Preparing  for  Army  Take  Over 30 

Progress  in  Research  and  Development:  The  Xuclear  Steeplechase 35 

II.  ESTABI  T^HING  THE  MANHATTAN  DISTRICT 40 

Organizing  the  District 41 

Army-OSRD  Planning  Meeting  25  June  1942 .-. 46 

Progress  in  Research  and  Development 50 

III.  FIRST  STEPS  FOR  WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT 55 

Securing  an  Architect-Engineer-Manager 55 

Obtaining  Funds 56 

Securing  a  Priority  Rating 57 

Procuring  Essential  Materials 61 

Site  Selection 67 

Reaching  Decisions:  The  Meeting  at  Bohemian  Grove 70 

IV.  GENERAL  GROVES  TAKES  COMMAND 73 

Reorganization  and  the  Selection  of  Groves 73 

First  Measures 78 

Establishment  of  Los  Alamos 82 

Manhattan  Project  Organization  and  Operation 88 


Chapter  Page 

Part  Two:  Producing  Fissionable  Materials 

V.  ORGANIZING  FOR  PRODUCTION 95 

Plutonium  Project 95 

Reassessment  of  Processes  To  Produce  a  Bomb 101 

Contract  Xegotiations 105 

Hanford  Engineer  Works 108 

Plutonium  Semiworks:  Argonne  vs.  Tennessee Ill 

Program  Funding 1 15 

VI.  THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 117 

Electromagnetic  Research  and  the  Army,  1 942- 1943 118 

Research  and  Development,  1943-1945:  Radiation  Laboratory 120 

Design  and  Engineering,  1943-1945 126 

Building  the  Electromagnetic  Plant 130 

Plant  Operation 140 

MI.  THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 149 

Gaseous  Diffusion  Research  and  the  A rmy,  1942-1943 149 

Design  and  Engineering 150 

Building  the  Gaseous  Diffusion  Plant 159 

Plant  Operation 165 

\  III.  THE  LIQUID  THERMAL  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 172 

Research  and  Development:  The  Role  of  the  Xavy 172 

Reassessment:  Decision  for  Full-scale  Development 174 

Plant  Design,  Engineering,  and  Construction 178 

Plant  Operation 180 

IX.  THE  PILE  PROCESS 184 

Research  and  Development:  Metallurgical  Laboratory 185 

Organization  for  Plutonium  Production 198 

The  Semiworks:  Clinton  Laboratories 204 

The  Hanford  Production  Plant 210 


Part  Three:  Support  Activities 

X.  ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 227 

Breakdown  of  Interchange 227 

The  Quebec  Agreement 232 

Implementing  the  Agreement 242 

Xe-w  Partnership  Strains:  Repatriation  of  French  Scientists 248 


Chapter  Page 

XI.  SECURITY 253 

Early  Aspects 253 

The  District's  Security  System 254 

Counterintelligence  Activities 259 

Safeguarding  Military  Information 268 

XII.  FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  OPERATIONS 280 

Organization  of  the  ALSOS  Mission 280 

ALSOS  Operations  in  Italy 281 

Manhattan  's  Special  Intelligence  Activities,  1944 282 

ALSOS  Operations  m  Western  Europe,  1944-1945 285 

XIII.  THE  RAW  MATERIALS  PROGRAM 292 

Geographic  Search  and  Field  Exploration 292 

Ore  Control  Agency:  Combined  Development  Trust 295 

Ore  Acquisition  in  Foreign  Areas 299 

XIV.  THE  FEED  MATERIALS  PROGRAM 307 

Program  Organization  and  Support  Activities 307 

Feed  Materials  Procurement 310 

Feed  Materials  Production 314 

Quality  Control  Program 317 

XV.  LAND  ACQLHSITION 319 

Clinton  Engineer  IVorks 319 

Los  Alamos 328 

Hanford  Engineer  IVorks 331 

Other  Sites 342 

XVI.  MANPOWER  PROCUREMENT 344 

Personnel  Organization 345 

Scientific  and  Technical  Personnel 348 

Industrial  Labor 350 

Civilian  and  Military  Personnel 355 

XVII.  MANPOWER  CONSERVATION 363 

Labor  Turnover:  The  Problem  and  Its  Cure 363 

Special  Problems  With  the  Selective  Service  System 366 

Labor  Relations:  Union  Activities  and  Work  Stoppages 369 

XVIII.  ELECTRIC  POWER 377 

Power  Requirements  and  Sources 377 

Implementation  of  the  Power  Program  386 

Distribution:  Clinton  Engineer  Works 388 

Distribution:  Hanford  Engineer  IVorks 39 1 


Chapter  Page 

XIX.  COMMUNICATIONS  AND  TRANSPOR  lATION 394 

Communications 394 

Transportation 397 

XX.  HEALTH  AND  SAFETY 410 

The  Health  Program 41 1 

The  Safety  Program 426 

XXI.  THE  ATOMIC  COMMUNITIES  IN  TENNESSEE 432 

Oak  Ridge:  The  Operating  Community 432 

The  Construction  Camps 440 

Community  Management 443 

XXII.  THE  ATOMIC  COMMUNITIES  IN  WASHINGTON  SI  A  IE...  450 

Selecting  Sites 450 

Hanford:  The  Construction  Camp 452 

Richland:  The  Operating  Community 456 

Community  Management 460 

XXIII.  THE  ATOMIC  COMMUNITIES  IN  NEW  MEXICO 465 

Los  Alamos:  The  Operating  Community 465 

Trinity:  The  Base  Camp 478 


Part  Four:  The  Bomb 

XXIV.  THE  LOS  ALAMOS  WEAPON  PROGRAM 485 

Planning  Phase 485 

Laboratoiy  Administration 491 

Post  Administration 496 

XXV.  WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT  AND  TESTING 503 

Building  the  Bomb 503 

Project  Trinity:  The  Test  of  the  Bomb 511 

XXVI.  THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 519 

Preparations  for  an  Atomic  Bombing  Mission 519 

The  Decision  To  i-se  the  Bomb 530 

Dropping  the.  Bomb 534 

The  Surrender  of  Japan 541 

Survey  of  the  Bombing  Effects 543 


Chnfjtey  Page 

Part  Five:  Completing  the  Atomic  Mission 

XX\  II.  THE  ATOMIC  AGE  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS 553 

The  Atomic  Story:  Informing  the  Public 553 

Atomic  Energy:  Planning  for  Postwar  Control 562 

XX\  III.   IHE  ARMY  AND  IHE  A  lOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM, 

1945-1947 579 

A  Postwar  Trusteeship 579 

The  Final  Act:  Transfer' to  Civilian  Control 596 

EPILOGUE:  AN  ATOMIC  LEGACY 602 

APPENDIX— EINSTEIN'S  LETTER 609 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 611 

GUIDE  TO  ARCHIVAL  COLLECTIONS 627 

LIST  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 631 

INDEX 643 


Tables 

Xo. 

1.  Stone  and  Webster  Engineering  and  Design  Personnel 127 

2.  Land  Acquisition  at  CEW,  1942-1944 321 

3.  Comparative  Estimates  of  Atomic  Bombing  Casualties 

in  World  War  II 547 


Charts 

1.  Organization  of  the  Manhattan  Project,  April  1943 88 

2.  Organization  of  the  Manhattan  District,  August  1943 90 

3.  Organization  of  the  Manhattan  District,  January  1945 166 

4.  Feed  Materials  Network,  January  1945 309 

5.  Estimated  Officer  Personnel  Requirements  for  the 

Manhattan  District,  January  1943 356 


Maps 


1.  Projected  Site  for  Atomic  Production  Plants,  Tennessee,  1942 48 

2.  Manhattan  Project,  1942-1946 63 

3.  Clinton  Engineer  Works,  Tennessee,  1943-1945 131 

4.  Hanford  Engineer  Works,  Washington,  1943-1945 213 


No.  Page 

5.  Los  Alamos  Site,  New  Mexico,  1943-1945 330 

6.  Trinity  Test  Site,  1945 479 

7.  The  Atomic  Bombing  of  Japan,  August  1945 525 


Illustrations 

Maj.  Gen.  Leslie  R.  Groves Frontispiece 

Ernest  O.  Lawrence,  Arthur  H.  Compton,  Vannevar  Bush, 

and  James  B.  Conant 29 

Secretary  of  War  Henry  L.  Stimson 32 

Brig.  Gen.  Wilhelm  D.  Styer 41 

Brig.  Gen.  James  C.  Marshall 42 

Col.  Kenneth  D.  Nichols 43 

Silver-wound  Magnet  Coils  for  the  Electromagnetic  Process 68 

Approach  Road  to  the  Los  Alamos  Ranch  School  for  Boys 85 

Manhattan  Project  Emblem 89 

Mrs.  Jean  O'Leary  and  General  Groves 90 

Col.  E.  H.  Marsden 113 

Excavation  at  the  Tennessee  Site 135 

Alpha  I  Racetrack,  Electromagnetic  Plant,  CEW 137 

Electromagnetic  Plant  Under  Construction 140 

CEW  Training  Facilities 143 

Electromagnetic  Plant  in  Full  Operation 147 

Gaseous  Diffusion  Plant  Under  Construction,  CEW 162 

K-25  Steel-frame  Construction 163 

Completed  Plant  Section 168 

Completed  Gaseous  Diffusion  Plant 170 

Richard  C.  Tolman 177 

Liquid  Thermal  Diffusion  Plant,  CEW 181 

Billboard  at  the  S-50  Plant  Site 182 

University  of  Chicago  Physics  Building 186 

Argonne  Laboratory  Near  Chicago 187 

124th  Field  Artillery  Armory  in  Chicago 188 

New  Chemistry  Building,  Metallurgical  Laboratory,  Chicago 189 

Heavy  Water  Plant  at  the  Wabash  River  Ordnance  Works 192 

Maj.  Arthur  V.  Peterson 195 

Clinton  Laboratories  Pilot  Pile,  CEW 207 

Clinton  Laboratories 211 

300  Area,  HEW 215 

100  B  Pile  Area,  HEW 216 

Chemical  Separation  Plant  Under  Construction,  HEW 219 

Completed  Chemical  Separation  Plants 220 

Sir  James  Chadwick,  General  Groves,  and  Richard  Tolman 244 


Changing  of  the  Guard,  CEW 259 

Security  Sign  at  the  Tennessee  Site 269 

Farm  at  the  Tennessee  Site 322 

Typical  Terrain  of  the  Los  Alamos  Site 329 

Military  and  Civilian  Workers,  CEW 355 

Women's  Army  Corps  Detachment,  CEW 359 

Enlisted  Men  at  CEW  During  Off-Duty  Hours 360 

Large  Troop  Contingent  at  Los  Alamos  on  Parade 361 

Power  Plant,  HEW 379 

K-25  Power  Plant,  CEW 384 

Unimproved  Santa  Fe-Los  Alamos  Road 399 

Improved  Santa  Fe-Los  Alamos  Road 400 

Oak  Ridge  Bus  Terminal 402 

Gallaher  Bridge  Road  at  the  Tennessee  Site 405 

Col.  Stafford  L.  Warren 414 

Hazardous  Materials  Storage  Area,  Los  Alamos 421 

Oak  Ridge  Hospital 423 

Oak  Ridge  Shopping  Mall  and  District  Headquarters 437 

Black  Workers,  CEW 438 

Prefabricated  Houses  and  Apartment  Dwellings,  CEW 440 

Enlisted  Men's  Barracks,  CEW 441 

Gamble  Valley  Trailer  Camp,  CEW 442 

Oak  Ridge  Elementary  School 444 

Main  Post  Office  and  Theater  in  Oak  Ridge 445 

CEW  Reservation  Entry  Point 447 

Chapel-on-the-Hill  in  Oak  Ridge 448 

Hanford  Construction  Camp,  HEW 452 

Camp  Administrative  and  Residential  Areas,  HEW 453 

Richland  Village,  HEW 456 

Typical  Building  at  the  Los  Alamos  Ranch  School 467 

Family  Apartment  Units  at  Los  Alamos 470 

Military  Mess  Facility  at  Los  Alamos 471 

Los  Alamos  Ranch  Trading  Post 472 

Street  Scene  in  Los  Alamos 473 

Pupils  at  the  Los  Alamos  Community  School 474 

Trinity  Base  Camp 480 

J.  Robert  Oppenheimer 486 

Lt.  Col.  Curtis  A.  Nelson 501 

Technical  Area  at  Los  Alamos 505 

Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  A.  Farrell  and  General  Groves 512 

Trinity  Control  Dugout  and  Observation  Post 515 

The  Atomic  Explosion  at  Trinity,  16July  1945 516 

Little  Boy 522 

Fat  Man. 523 

Col.  Elmer  E.  Kirkpatrick,  Jr 527 

General  Groves  Checking  Location  of  Bombing  Targets 531 


Page 

Col.  Paul  W.  Tibbets,  Jr.,  and  Ground  Crew  at  Tinian  535 

Enola  Gay  at  Tinian 537 

Mushroom  Cloud  Over  Hiroshima 539 

Physical  Damage  at  Hiroshima 546 

Atomic  Bombing  Casualties  at  Nagasaki 548 

Survivors  of  the  Nagasaki  Bombing 549 

General  Groves  Holding  a  Press  Conference 557 

Henry  D.  Smyth  and  Richard  Tolman 559 

Oppenheimer  Congratulating  the  Troops 582 

Secretary  of  War  Robert  P.  Patterson  and  General  Groves 585 

Transfer  of  Control  to  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission 600 


Illustrations  courtesy  of  the  following  sources:  p.  89  from  Typogra- 
phy and  Design  Division,  Government  Printing  Office;  pp.  361,  474,  and 
582  from  Col.  Gerald  T.  Tyler;  and  p.  600  from  Wide  World  Photos.  All 
other  illustrations  are  from  the  files  of  the  Department  of  Defense  and 
the  Department  of  Energy. 


MANHATTAN: 
THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


PROLOGUE 


A  History  of  Atomic  Energy 
to  1939 


The  concept  of  the  atomic  structure 
of  matter  first  emerged  in  the  fifth 
century  B.C.  with  the  Greek  theory  of 
minute  particles,  or  atoms,  as  the  un- 
changeable and  indivisible  units  com- 
prising all  material  things.^  This  new 
idea,  however,  lay  dormant  for  nearly 
two  thousand  years  because  Aris- 
totle's view  that  all  matter  is  continu- 
ous and  composed  of  four  elements — 
fire,  earth,  air,  and  water — prevailed 
in  the  minds  of  men.  Following  the 
Renaissance  in  Europe  such  philoso- 
phers and  scientists  as  Galileo,  Des- 
cartes, Bacon,  Boyle,  and  Newton 
supported  the  early  concept,  and  in 
the  nineteenth  century  chemists 
(somewhat  later,  physicists)  trans- 
formed this  atomic  theory  into  a  ma- 
terial reality. 

One  of  the  first  and  important 
steps  was  the  theory  proposed  by 
English  chemist  John  Dalton  in  1803 
that  each  element  is  composed  of  like 


'  A  simple  but  excellent  explanation  of  the  atomic 
concept,  including  a  good  historical  summary,  is 
Selig  Hechl,  Explaining  the  Atom,  2d  ed.  (New  York: 
Viking  Press,  1954).  The  already  classic,  semitechni- 
cal  history  is  H.  D.  Smyth,  A  General  Account  of  the  De- 
velopment of  Methods  of  Using  Atomic  Energy  for  Military 
Purposes  Under  the  Auspices  of  the  United  States  Goi'em- 
ment,  1940-194'y  (Washington,  D.C.:  Government 
Printing  Office,  1945),  hereafter  cited  as  Smyth 
Report.  See  Bibliographical  Note. 


atoms,  distinguishable  from  the  atoms 
forming  other  elements  primarily  by 
differences  in  mass.  He  thus  provided 
a  practical  and  specific  standard  for 
nineteenth  century  scientists'  descrip- 
tions of  ninety-two  chemical  elements 
(substances  that  cannot  be  broken 
down  or  transformed  by  chemical 
means).  By  the  end  of  the  century,  all 
known  elements  had  been  arranged  in 
a  table,  with  similar  properties  in  re- 
lated positions,  in  numerical  order  ac- 
cording to  atomic  mass;  it  ranged 
from  element  1,  hydrogen,  which  was 
the  lightest,  to  element  92,  uranium, 
the  heaviest.  This  "periodic  table" 
not  only  enabled  scientists  to  predict 
the  properties  of  undiscovered  ele- 
ments but  also  became  the  basis  of 
chemical  and  physical  knowledge  of 
the  elements. 

Beginning  in  the  last  decade  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  scientific  discov- 
eries by  those  European  and  Ameri- 
can physicists  who  sought  to  explain 
the  phenomenon  of  radioactivity 
opened  the  way  for  the  modern  de- 
velopment of  atomic  energy.  This 
phenomenon  is  a  property  possessed 
by  some  elements  to  spontaneously 
emit    radiation    that    ionizes    gas    and 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


makes  it  capable  of  conducting  elec- 
tricity. Investigating  electrical  dis- 
charges in  gases  in  1895,  German 
physicist  Wilhelm  Roentgen  observed 
radiation  emissions  that  penetrated 
opaque  objects  and  also  produced  flu- 
orescence. Roentgen's  discovery  of 
these  radiations,  which  he  called 
X-rays,  led  French  physicist  Henri 
Becquerel  to  test  fluorescent  salts  of 
uranium  to  see  if  they  also  would 
produce  penetrating  rays.  In  1896, 
Becquerel  demonstrated  that  uranium 
emits  penetrating  radiations  that 
would  ionize  gas,  proof  that  it  was 
radioactive. 

In  England,  physicist  J.  J.  Thomson 
and  a  young  student  from  New  Zea- 
land, Ernest  Rutherford,  used  X-rays 
to  ionize  gases,  providing  further  evi- 
dence that  the  penetrating  rays  were 
charged  particles  much  smaller  than 
atoms.  In  1897,  Thomson  published 
data  proving  the  existence  of  these 
particles,  each  having  a  mass  of  about 
one  two-thousandth  of  a  hydrogen 
atom.  The  following  year  he  suggest- 
ed that  these  particles,  subsequently 
designated  electrons,  formed  one  of 
the  basic  building  blocks  comprising 
all  atoms. 

Rutherford's  succeeding  investiga- 
tions showed  that  the  penetrating 
streams  of  emitted  particles  are  com- 
posed of  at  least  three  different  kinds 
of  rays — alpha,  beta,  and  gamma. 
Alpha  ray  particles  are  heavy,  high- 
speed, positively  charged  bodies,  later 
shown  to  be  nuclei  of  helium  atoms; 
beta  ray  particles  are  electrons;  and 
gamma  rays  are  similar  in  composi- 
tion to  X-rays.  In  1911,  Rutherford 
proposed  the  theory  of  the  nuclear 
atom,  with  its  mass  and  positive 
charge  at  the  center.  The  work  of 
Rutherford,     Niels     Bohr,     a     Danish 


physicist,  and  others  led  to  the  con- 
cept of  the  atom  as  a  miniature  solar 
system,  with  a  heavy  positive  nucleus 
orbited  by  much  lighter  electrons. 

Rutherford  finally  achieved,  in 
1919,  what  man  had  been  attempting 
unsuccessfully  for  centuries:  the  artifi- 
cial transmutation  of  an  element. 
Since  the  discovery  of  natural  radi- 
ation, scientists  had  known  that  disin- 
tegration of  radioactive  elements  in 
nature  caused  them  to  change  sponta- 
neously into  other  elements.  Bom- 
barding nonradioactive  nitrogen  with 
high-energy  alpha  particles  given  off 
by  naturally  radioactive  radium,  Ruth- 
erford caused  the  nitrogen  to  disinte- 
grate and  change  into  what  subse- 
quently proved  to  be  a  form  of 
oxygen.  His  achievement,  although 
somewhat  removed  from  the  ancient 
alchemist's  dream  of  transmuting 
base  metals  into  gold,  was  far  more 
valuable  and  important.  It  was  not 
only  the  first  artificially  induced  trans- 
mutation; it  was  also  the  first  con- 
trolled artificial  disintegration  of  an 
atomic  nucleus. 

A  further  Rutherford  achievement 
was  isolation  and  identification  of  yet 
another  basic  building  block  of 
atomic  structure.  In  addition  to 
oxygen,  nitrogen  transmutation  had 
produced  a  high-energy  particle  with 
characteristics  similar  to  the  positively 
charged  nucleus  of  the  hydrogen 
atom.  Later  study  showed  it  was  a  hy- 
drogen nucleus,  and  scientists  gave  it 
the  name  proton.  Such  a  positively 
charged  particle  as  a  fundamental 
unit  in  the  structure  of  all  atoms  had 
long  been  hypothesized;  demonstra- 
tion of  its  presence  in  nitrogen  and 
other  elements  confirmed  its  identity. 


A  HISTORY  OF  ATOMIC  ENERGY  TO   1939 


Discovery  of  the  proton  pointed 
toward  the  existence  of  a  third  parti- 
cle. In  1932,  James  Chadwick,  Ruther- 
ford's co-worker  at  Cambridge  Uni- 
versity, discovered  this  third  particle, 
the  neutron,  an  uncharged  body  ap- 
proximately equal  in  weight  to  the 
proton. 

Now  the  atom  was  viewed  as  com- 
posed of  a  positively  charged  nucleus, 
containing  protons  and  neutrons,  or- 
bited by  negative  electrons  equal  in 
number  to  the  protons.  The  number 
of  protons  determined  the  atomic 
number,  or  numerical  position,  of  the 
parent  element  in  the  periodic  table. 
Thus  hydrogen,  element  I,  has  but  a 
single  proton;  helium,  element  2,  two 
protons;  and  uranium,  element  92, 
ninety-two  protons.  For  each  proton 
there  is  a  balancing  electron.  The 
mass,  or  atomic  weight,  of  an  element 
is  the  sum  of  its  protons  and  neu- 
trons; the  electrons,  with  negligible 
weight,  do  not  materially  affect  the 
mass  of  the  atom.  The  weight  of  each 
element  is  stated  in  relation  to  that  of 
hydrogen,  the  lightest.  Hydrogen, 
with  a  single  proton  and  no  neutrons, 
has  an  atomic  weight  of  1;  helium, 
with  2  protons  and  2  neutrons  of 
equal  weight,  a  mass  of  4;  and  urani- 
um, with  92  protons  and  146  neu- 
trons, a  mass  of  238.  The  chemical 
symbols  for  these  elements  are  writ- 
ten iH\  zHe^  and  92U238. 

Thus  far,  three  characteristics  of 
elements  had  been  identified:  chemi- 
cal uniqueness,  atomic  number,  and 
atomic  weight.  But  scientists  also  dis- 
covered that  many  elements  exist  in 
more  than  one  form,  differing  solely 
in  the  number  of  neutrons  that  each 
contains.  For  example,  there  are  two 
forms  of  helium,  each  with  two  pro- 
tons   and    two    electrons.    Thev    are 


chemically  identical  but  one  form  has 
a  single  neutron,  thus  an  atomic  mass 
of  3,  and  the  other,  more  prevalent 
form  two  neutrons,  thus  an  atomic 
mass  of  4.  These  substances  are 
called  isotopes  (from  the  Greek  words 
ISO,  meaning  alike  or  same,  and  topos, 
meaning  place)  because  they  occupy 
the  same  place  in  the  periodic  table. 
The  chemical  symbols  for  the  helium 
isotopes  are  written  2He^  and  2He\  or 
simply  He-3  and  He-4;  or  they  may 
be  spelled  out,  helium  3  and  helium 
4.  Many  other  isotopes  exist,  either 
naturally  or  through  scientific  trans- 
mutations, and  they  are  important  in 
the  story  of  atomic  energy. 

James  Chadwick's  discovery  of  the 
neutron  was  not  the  only  significant 
development  in  1932.  That  same  year 
British  scientist  J.  D.  Cockcroft  and 
Irish  scientist  E.  T.  S.  Walton,  work- 
ing together  at  Cambridge  Universi- 
ty's Cavendish  Laboratory,  used  a 
particle  accelerator  to  bombard  lithi- 
um with  a  stream  of  protons,  causing 
the  element  to  disintegrate.  Unlike 
Rutherford,  who  experimented  with 
alpha  particles  from  natural  sources, 
Cockcroft  and  Walton,  in  effect,  pro- 
duced their  own  protons  through  arti- 
ficial means. 

This  artificially  induced  nuclear  dis- 
integration, however,  was  only  one 
aspect  of  Cockcroft  and  Walton's  ac- 
complishment. As  a  hydrogen  nucle- 
us, or  proton,  struck  a  lithium  nucle- 
us, the  latter  body  disintegrated  into 
two  alpha  particles  of  helium  nuclei. 
The  hydrogen  atom  with  a  mass  of  I 
united  with  a  lithium  nucleus  having  a 
mass  of  7,  thereby  making  a  total 
mass  of  8,  and  then  this  body  imme- 
diately divided  into  two  helium 
nuclei,  each  with  a  mass  of  4.  Thus, 


MANHAIT^AN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


the  two  scientists  were  also  the  first 
to  bring  about  atomic  fission — or,  in 
the  popular  phrase,  to  split  the  atom.^ 

Still  another  result  of  the  Cock- 
croft-Walton  experiment,  and  at  the 
time  considered  most  important,  was 
its  confirmation  of  Einstein's  theory 
of  relativity,  proposed  in  1905,  that 
matter  and  energy  are  merely  differ- 
ent forms  of  the  same  thing.  The 
atomic  weights  of  the  lithium,  hydro- 
gen, and  helium  nuclei  expressed  by 
Cockcroft  and  Walton  in  their  experi- 
ment were  only  approximate.  The 
combined  mass  of  a  lithium  nucleus 
and  a  hydrogen  nucleus  is,  in  fact, 
very  slightly  more  than  the  combined 
mass  of  two  helium  nuclei.  Thus,  the 
formation  of  two  helium  nuclei  had 
resulted  in  a  loss  of  mass.  This  lost 
mass  was  converted  into  energy  in  an 
amount  that  could  be  calculated  by 
the  Einstein  equivalence  formula 
E  =  mc^  (energy  is  equal  to  mass  multi- 
plied by  the  square  of  the  velocity  of 
light)  or  derived  from  the  speed  of 
the  helium  nuclei  as  they  flew  apart 
from  the  lithium.  Because  the  two  cal- 
culations provided  answers  in  very 
close  agreement,  they  confirmed  Ein- 
stein's theoretical  projection  and 
opened  the  prospect  of  using  atomic 
fission  as  a  major  new  source  of 
energy. 

In  the  experiments  conducted  so 
far,  however,  the  total  energy  re- 
quired to  bombard  the  atomic  nucle- 
us and  produce  fission  was  much 
greater  than  the  energy  released.  This 
initially  high  input  of  energy  enabled 
the  charged  particle  to  approach  and 
penetrate   the  atom,   overcoming   the 


^Sir  John  Cockcroft,  "The  Development  and 
Future  of  Nuclear  Energy,"  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Sa- 
entuts  6  (Nov  50):  326. 


repulsion  of  their  mutual  electrical 
charges.  Furthermore,  even  when 
high-speed  particles  were  used,  only 
one  in  a  million  succeeded  in  hitting 
its  target.  This  inefficiency  led  Ruth- 
erford to  describe  using  nuclear  fis- 
sion as  an  energy  source  as  practical 
as  "moonshine,"  ^  and  so  it  indeed 
appeared  to  many. 

But  Chadwick's  discovery  of  the 
neutron  provided  the  solution.  The 
neutron,  because  it  was  an  uncharged 
particle,  would  not  be  repelled  and 
therefore  could  penetrate  a  nucleus 
even  at  relatively  slow  speeds.  Proof 
was  to  come  from  Italy,  where  in 
1934  Enrico  Fermi  and  his  co-workers 
set  about  systematically  bombarding 
the  atoms  of  all  known  elements  with 
neutrons.  They  soon  demonstrated 
that  the  nuclei  of  several  dozen  ele- 
ments could  be  penetrated  by  neu- 
trons and  thereby  broken  down  and 
transmuted  into  nuclei  of  other  ele- 
ments. Their  best  results  were  ob- 
tained when  the  bombarding  neu- 
trons were  first  slowed  down  by  pass- 
ing them  through  such  moderators  as 
carbon  or  hydrogen. 

The  most  important  result  of 
Fermi's  work  was  not  fully  under- 
stood for  another  four  years.  Among 
the  substances  he  had  bombarded 
with  slow  neutrons  was  uranium, 
which  was  naturally  radioactive  and 
the  heaviest  of  all  known  elements. 
Theory  and  chemical  analysis  seemed 
to  indicate  that  the  substance  pro- 
duced by  uranium  transmutation  was 
nothing  hitherto  known,  but  was  in 
fact  a  new  and  heavier  element.  Ura- 
nium is  element  92;  this  new  element 
appeared  to  be  element  93,  or  possi- 


Ibid. 


A  HISTORY  OF  ATOMIC  ENERGY  TO  1939 


bly  even  element  94.  Fermi,  so  it 
seemed,  had  created  transuranic  ele- 
ments not  present  in  nature,  and  the 
popular  press  hailed  his  achievement 
as  a  major  advance  in  science.^ 

Yet  many  scientists  were  skeptical, 
and  Fermi  himself  was  uncertain.  The 
properties  exhibited  by  the  new  sub- 
stances were  not  those  they  had  ex- 
pected to  find  in  transuranic  ele- 
ments. For  the  next  four  years,  physi- 
cists and  chemists  were  hard  at  work 
attempting  to  identify  exactly  what 
Fermi  had  produced.  Progress  was 
slow,  exacerbated  by  the  uncertainty 
of  the  times;  fearing  the  advancing 
wave  of  political  oppression,  many 
scientists  in  Germany,  Austria,  and 
Italy  fled  to  havens  elsewhere  in 
Europe  and  in  the  United  States.  Nev- 
ertheless, out  of  Nazi  Germany,  the 
answer  finally  came.  Just  before 
Christmas  of  1938,  the  radiochemists 
Otto  Hahn  and  Fritz  Strassmann  con- 
cluded that  one  of  the  products  of 
Fermi's  experiment  was  not  a  trans- 
uranic element  at  all.  It  was,  rather, 
the  element  barium,  with  an  atomic 
weight  approximately  half  that  of 
uranium.^ 

When  Hahn  informed  his  former 
co-worker,  Lise  Meitner,  of  the  con- 


"  Laura  Fermi,  Atoms  in  the  Family:  My  Life  With 
Ennco  Fermi  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press, 
1954),  Ch.  6  and  passim;  Enrico  Fermi,  United  States. 
1939-1954,  The  Collected  Papers  of  Enrico  Fermi, 
ed.  Emilio  Segre  et  al..  Vol.  2  (Chicago:  University 
of  Chicago  Press,  1965). 

^See  Charles  Weiner,  "A  New  Site  for  the  Semi- 
nar: The  Refugees  and  American  Physics  in  the 
Thirties,"  in  The  Intellectual  Migration:  Europe  and 
America,  1930-1960,  Perspectives  in  American  Histo- 
ry, Vol.  2  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  Charles  Warren 
Center  for  Studies  in  American  History,  Harvard 
University,  1968),  pp.  190-234;  Norman  Bentwich, 
The  Rescue  and  Achieiiement  of  Displaced  Scholars  and  Sci- 
entists, 1933-1952  (The  Hague:  Martinus  NijhofF, 
1953). 


elusions  that  he  and  Strassmann  had 
reached,  the  Austrian  physicist — who 
had  recently  escaped  from  Germany 
to  Sweden — quickly  comprehended 
the  significance  of  the  findings.  Work- 
ing with  her  nephew,  British  (Austri- 
an-born) physicist  Otto  Frisch,  she 
concluded  that  the  bombardment  of 
uranium  by  slow  neutrons  produced 
two  elements  of  roughly  half  the 
weight  of  uranium.  In  the  splitting 
process  there  was  a  tremendous  re- 
lease of  energy,  far  more  than  neces- 
sary to  cause  fission.  Without  delay 
she  passed  this  exciting  information 
on  to  Niels  Bohr,  who  was  about  to 
leave  Denmark  for  an  extended  stay 
at  the  Institute  for  Advanced  Study  at 
Princeton  University.  Thus,  even  as 
Hahn  and  Strassmann  published  the 
results  of  their  work  in  Europe,  Bohr 
carried  news  of  their  conclusions  to 
the  United  States.^ 

Further  experiments  confirmed  the 
discovery  of  atomic  fission  and  raised 
the  possibility  that  a  practical  means 
of  obtaining  atomic  energy  could  at 
last  be  realized.  Splitting  the  uranium 
atom  released  not  only  energy  but 
also  two  or  three  additional  neutrons. 
Perhaps,  under  the  right  conditions, 
these  neutrons  might  smash  other 
atoms,  releasing  more  neutrons  to 
bombard  more  atoms  while  simulta- 
neously generating  a  continuous 
emission  of  energy.  This  process,  or 
chain  reaction,  would  be  self-sustain- 
ing and  would  continue  for  as  long  as 
uranium  atoms  were  present  to  be 
split. 


^  Lise  Meitner,  "Looking  Back,"  Bulletin  of  the 
Atomic  Scientists  20  (Nov  64):  2-7;  S.  Rozental,  ed., 
Xieh  Bohr:  His  Life  and  Work  as  Seen  by  Friends  and  Col- 
leagues (Amsterdam:  North-Holland  Publishing  Co., 
1967). 


8 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


During  1939,  scientists  in  America, 
England,  France,  Germany,  the  Soviet 
Union,  Japan,  and  other  countries 
worked  intensively  to  extend  both  the 
theoretical  and  experimental  knowl- 
edge of  atomic  fission.  By  the  end  of 
the  year,  nearly  one  hundred  papers 
on  the  subject  had  been  published.^ 
In  the  United  States,  native  Ameri- 
cans and  a  group  of  European  refu- 
gees combined  their  energies  and  sci- 
entific talents  to  investigate  various 
aspects  of  the  complex  problem,  car- 
rying on  their  work  at  such  institu- 
tions as  Columbia,  Johns  Hopkins, 
Princeton,  the  University  of  California 
at  Berkeley,  and  the  Carnegie  Institu- 
tion in  Washington,  D.C.® 

Uranium  and  Fission 

Uranium  is  considered  a  rare  ele- 
ment, although  it  is  a  thousand  times 
more  prevalent  than  gold.  Uranium  is 
more  widely  dispersed  and  occurs  in- 
frequently in  a  relatively  concentrated 
form.  Found  always  with  radium,  pri- 
marily as  uranium  oxide,  it  occurs 
mainly  in  pitchblende  and  in  carnotite 
ores.  Before  World  War  II  the  main 
value  of  these  ores  lay  in  their  radium 


^  Summarized  in  Louis  A.  Turner,  "Nuclear  Phys- 
ics," Rnnews  of  Modem  Physics  12  (Jan  40):  1-29. 

^  Among  the  many  scientists  at  work  in  the 
United  States  on  fission  research  were  Herbert  L. 
Anderson,  John  R.  Dunning,  Enrico  Fermi,  George 
B.  Pegram,  Leo  Szilard,  and  Walter  Zinn  at  Colum- 
bia, Edwin  M.  McMillan  at  the  University  of  Califor- 
nia, Berkeley;  Edward  Teller  at  George  Washington 
University;  and  John  A.  Wheeler  and  Eugene 
Wigner  at  Princeton.  In  France  were  Frederic  Joliot- 
Curie,  Hans  von  Halban,  and  Lew  Kowarski;  in  Eng- 
land, George  P.  Thomson,  James  Chadwick,  Ru- 
dolph Peierls,  and  others;  and  in  Germany,  Otto 
Hahn,  Fritz  Strassmann,  and  Werner  Heisenberg. 
The  Soviet  Union,  too,  had  a  number  of  able  and 
active  physicists  in  fission  research.  See  Arnold  Kra- 
mish.  Atomic  Energy  in  the  Soviet  I'nion  (Stanford: 
Stanford  University  Press,  1959).  Chs.  1-3. 


content,  although  uranium  was  also 
used  for  coloring  glassware  and  ce- 
ramics, for  tinting  photographic  film, 
and  for  making  certain  steel  alloys. 
Uranium  was  rarely  produced  as  a 
metal;  metallurgists  had  not  yet  meas- 
ured its  melting  point  accurately. 

Substantial  radium-uranium  con- 
centrations in  the  Shinkolobwe  mine 
in  Katanga  Province  of  the  Belgian 
Congo  were  owned  by  the  Union 
Miniere  du  Haut  Katanga,  a  Belgian 
firm  that  completely  dominated  the 
world  market.  So  rich  were  the  Shin- 
kolobwe concentrations  that  in  1937 
the  company,  having  stockpiled  suffi- 
cient ore  to  satisfy  the  anticipated 
world  demand  for  radium  and  urani- 
um for  the  next  thirty  years,  ceased 
mining  operations. 

Important  but  less  productive  de- 
posits were  located  in  the  Eldorado 
mine  at  Great  Bear  Lake  in  northern 
Canada,  and  ores  of  much  lower 
grade  were  found  in  the  Colorado 
Plateau  region  in  the  western  United 
States;  however,  Colorado  Plateau 
radium  and  uranium  producers  were 
forced  to  close  down  because  they 
could  not  compete  commercially  with 
those  in  the  Congo  and  Canada.  In 
addition,  other  uranium  deposits  of 
varying  quality  were  located  in 
Czechoslovakia,  Portugal,  England, 
Madagascar,  and  elsewhere.^ 

Natural  uranium  is  composed  of 
three  isotopes:  U-238,  about  99.28 
percent;   U-235,   about  0.71    percent; 


^  "The  Distribution  of  Uranium  in  Nature,"  Bulle- 
tin of  the  Atomic  Scientists  1  (Feb  46):  6;  Ms,  Office  of 
the  Historian,  Armed  Forces  Special  Weapons 
Project,  "Manhattan  District  History"  (hereafter 
cited  as  MDH),  ed.  Gavin  Hadden,  8  bks.,  36  vols. 
(Dec  48),  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  "Feed  Materials  and  Special 
Procurement,"  pp.  1.1-1.7,  2.1-2.2,  3.1-3.2.  4.1- 
4.2,  DASA, 


A  HISTORY  OF  ATOMIC  ENERGY  TO   1939 


and  U-234,  just  a  trace.  Experiment- 
ing with  the  isotopic  properties  of 
uranium,  scientists  eventually  proved 
that  U-235  was  fissionable  by  both 
slow  and  fast  neutrons,  although 
more  controUably  so  by  the  former. 

When  U-235  fissions,  it  emits  fast 
neutrons,  which  are  captured  by  the 
U-238.  The  U-238  does  not  fission 
but  becomes  radioactive  and  disinte- 
grates. For  a  chain  reaction  to  be  self- 
sustaining,  at  least  one  neutron  emit- 
ted by  the  U-235  has  to  penetrate 
another  U-235  atom.  Because  the  fast 
neutrons  are  most  easily  absorbed 
bv  the  U-238,  the  140-to-l  ratio  of 
lT-238  to  U-235  in  natural  uranium 
makes  it  even  more  improbable  that 
the  neutrons  can  escape  the  U-238 
and  be  captured  by  U-235  atoms. 
Many  neutrons,  moreover,  escape  al- 
together from  the  uranium  and  others 
are  absorbed  by  impurities  within  it. 
This  is  why  uranium  does  not  fission 
in  its  natural  state  and  why  an  emis- 
sion of  neutrons  does  not  occur  in 
any  ordinary  lump  of  uranium. 

Proper  conditions  for  achieving  a 
chain  reaction  required  that  the 
number  of  neutrons  absorbed  by  im- 
purities in  uranium  and  the  number 
of  neutrons  lost  through  its  surface  or 
captured  by  its  U-238  isotope  be  kept 
to  a  minimum.  Neutron  absorption 
could  be  decreased  by  using  a  careful 
chemical  process  to  remove  the  impu- 
rities, although  the  technique  was  dif- 
ficult and  posed  major  problems.  Be- 
cause the  number  of  neutrons  lost 
from  a  piece  of  uranium  depends  on 
the  area  of  the  surface  and  because 
the  number  of  neutrons  captured  de- 
pends on  its  mass  or  volume,  neutron 
escape  or  capture  could  be  reduced 
by  using  a  suitable  shape  and  size. 
The  greater  the  amount  of  uranium. 


the  smaller  would  be  its  surface  area 
relative  to  volume  and  thus,  propor- 
tionately, the  fewer  neutrons  that 
could  be  lost  through  the  surface  or 
captured  by  the  U-238.  During  fis- 
sion, production  of  at  least  one  neu- 
tron in  excess  of  those  lost  or  cap- 
tured would  cause  the  uranium  to 
reach  its  critical  mass  and  possibly 
trigger  a  chain  reaction. 

The  dilemma  researchers  faced  in 
1939  was  ascertaining  the  exact  size 
of  this  critical  mass.  The  consensus 
was  that  a  tremendous  amount  of  ura- 
nium— far  more  than  had  ever  been 
produced  and  concentrated — would 
be  necessary.  A  practical  solution  to 
the  supposed  enormity  of  the  prob- 
lem therefore  was  to  reduce  the  size 
of  the  critical  mass  by  decreasing  the 
number  of  neutrons  captured  by  the 
U-238.  The  U-235  could  be  separat- 
ed from  the  U-238,  or  the  ratio  of 
U-235  to  U-238  could  be  increased 
artificially. 

Theories  about  what  should  be 
done,  however,  did  not  quite  coincide 
with  what  could  be  done  at  this  stage 
of  the  research.  Because  the  two  ura- 
nium isotopes  were  chemically  identi- 
cal, their  separation  by  chemical 
means  was  impossible.  And  the  about 
1 -percent  difference  in  mass  between 
U-235  and  U-238  meant  that  separa- 
tion by  physical  means  would  be  most 
difficult.  Although  producing  a  suffi- 
cient amount  of  pure  U-235  or 
U-235-enriched  natural  uranium  to 
maintain  a  chain  reaction  in  a  critical 
mass  of  practical  proportions  ap- 
peared only  barely  possible,  there 
were  those  who  continued  to  work  on 
the  multistage  problem  of  separating 
what     were     considered,     in     Fermi's 


10 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


words,  "almost  magically  inseparable" 
isotopes.  ^° 

All  separation  methods  deemed 
possible  were  based  on  the  difference 
in  atomic  weight.  One  process,  the 
electromagnetic  method,  employed  a 
mass  spectrometer  or  spectrograph. 
In  this  process  a  stream  of  charged 
particles  of  a  given  element  is  project- 
ed through  a  magnetic  field,  which 
deflects  them  from  their  original  path. 
Because  the  atoms  of  a  heavier  iso- 
tope will  be  more  strongly  affected  by 
the  magnetic  field  than  those  of  a 
lighter  isotope,  the  stream  of  particles 
will  be  separated  into  two  or  more 
streams,  each  containing  a  different 
isotope,  which  can  then  be  collected 
in  different  receivers.  Alfred  O.  Nier 
of  the  University  of  Minnesota  did  the 
initial  work  on  this  process.  At  this 
time,  the  electromagnetic  method 
proved  to  be  not  only  ridiculously 
slow  but  also  quantitatively  insuffi- 
cient. It  would  have  taken  twenty- 
seven  thousand  years  for  each  mass 
spectrometer  to  produce  a  single 
gram  of  U-235  or  27  million  spec- 
trometers a  whole  year  to  separate  a 
kilogram  of  the  isotope. 

Another  process,  the  gaseous  diffu- 
sion method,  was  based  on  the  princi- 
ple that  if  two  gases  of  different 
atomic  weights  are  passed  through  a 
porous  barrier,  the  lighter  gas  will 
diffuse  through  more  readily.  First, 
uranium  would  have  to  be  trans- 
formed from  its  naturally  solid  state 
into  a  gas;  then,  because  of  the  140- 
to-1  ratio  of  U-238  to  U-235,  the  dif- 
fusion process  would  have  to  be  re- 
peated  in   order  to   produce  any  ap- 


preciable amount  of  U-235  or  U-235- 
enriched  uranium.  Scientists  in  Great 
Britain  performed  most  of  the  early 
theoretical  and  experimental  work  on 
this  method.  In  the  United  States,  it 
was  not  until  late  1940  that  physicist 
John  R.  Dunning  and  a  small  group 
of  collaborators  at  Columbia  Univer- 
sity began  intensive  research  into  the 
technical  problems  of  gaseous 
diffusion.  ^^ 

A  third  method  was  the  centrifuge 
process,  in  which  uranium  in  a  gase- 
ous form  is  rotated  rapidly  in  a  cylin- 
der. Because  centrifugal  force  causes 
the  atoms  of  the  heavier  isotope  to 
amass  along  the  outer  walls  and  those 
of  the  Hghter  isotope  to  concentrate 
around  the  axis  of  rotation,  the  de- 
sired isotope  can  then  be  drawn  off. 
Jesse  W.  Beams  at  the  University  of 
Virginia  and  others  in  the  United 
States  seemed  to  offer  the  best  initial 
promise  for  separating  uranium  iso- 
topes, but  the  magnitude  of  the  engi- 
neering problem  was  such  that,  as 
with  the  other  separation  methods, 
the  centrifuge  process  offered  no 
quick  or  easy  solution. 

The  avenues  of  research  were  not 
solely  Hmited  to  isotope  separation 
methods.  At  Columbia  University, 
Enrico  Fermi  and  Leo  Szilard,  a 
refugee  physicist  from  Hungary,  ex- 
perimented with  the  possibility  of 
achieving  a  chain  reaction  in  urani- 
um without  separating  its  isotopes — 
research  that  in  the  not  too  distant 
future  would  culminate  in  the  world's 
first  chain  reaction.  Basing  their  in- 
vestigations on  research  that  Fermi 
had  carried  out  five  years  earlier  on 


'°  Enrico  Fermi,  "Physics  at  Columbia  University: 
The  Genesis  of  the  Nuclear  Energy  Program,"  Phys- 
ics Today  8  (Nov  55):  14. 


i»  For  Cunning's  work  see  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  2, 
"Research,"  pp.  3.1-3.2,  DASA. 


A  HISIORY  OF  AlOMIC  ENERGY  TO   1939 


11 


ihc  use  of  moderators  to  slow  down 
neutrons,  they  explored  the  likelihood 
that  a  moderating  substance  might  be 
mixed  with  natural  uranium  in  such  a 
way  that  the  high-speed  fission-pro- 
duced neutrons  could  be  sufficiently 
slowed  before  meeting  other  uranium 
atoms  so  as  to  escape  capture 
by  U-238  and  remain  free  to  pene- 
trate the  U-235. 

The  two  most  promising  modera- 
tors were  hydrogen  and  carbon. 
Water  might  make  a  good  moderator; 
however,  because  hydrogen  exists  in 
two  natural  isotopes  (light  hydrogen, 
the  more  prevalent,  with  a  mass  of  1, 
and  heavy  hydrogen,  or  deuterium 
with  a  mass  of  2),  "heavy  water,"  con- 
taining deuterium,  should  make  an 
even  better  one.  Scientists  in  France 
and  England  had  investigated  the  use 
of  heavy  water,  but  it  was  extremely 
costly  to  produce  and  was  highly  vola- 
tile. Feeling  that  heavy  hydrogen  was 
in  some  ways  less  efficient  as  a  mod- 
erator, Fermi  and  Szilard  turned  their 
attention  to  carbon,  which  was  readily 
available  in  the  form  of  graphite. 
Proving  its  feasibility  through  theoret- 
ical investigation  and  experimentation 
would  take  time,  energy,  and  money, 
but  the  two  scientists  were  confident 
they  could  achieve  a  chain  reaction.  ^^ 

Because  such  a  chain  reaction  could 
provide  a  tremendous  amount  of 
energy  in  a  form  that  might  be  con- 
verted into  power,  this  uranium- 
graphite  system  promised  to  have 
ready  military  application  for  driving 


'^  For  the  activities  of  Fermi  and  Szilard  during 
1939  see  Enrico  Fermi,  "Physics  at  Columbia,"  pp. 
12-16:  Ms,  Leo  Szilard,  "Documents  Relating  to 
Period  March  1939  to  July  1940"  (hereafter  cited  as 
Szilard  Documents),  Incl  to  Ltr,  Compton  to 
Groves,  13  Nov  42,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201 
(Szilard),  MDR. 


large  ships  or  aircraft  but  seemed  im- 
practical for  use  as  a  bomb.  A  bomb 
would  have  to  be  so  large  that  the 
sudden  release  of  energy  in  an  un- 
controlled nuclear  explosion  would 
blow  it  apart  before  more  than  a 
small  amount  of  energy  was  freed; 
that  amount  was  not  worth  the  great 
effort  necessary  to  detonate  it. 

Yet,  if  it  were  possible  to  separate 
U-235  from  the  naturally  more  preva- 
lent U-238  or  to  enrich  natural  urani- 
um greatly  in  its  U-235  isotope,  then 
a  fast-neutron  chain  reaction  might  be 
achieved  and  extremely  powerful 
bombs,  far  smaller  than  any  explosive 
uranium-graphite  system,  could  prob- 
ably be  built.  Controlled  energy  from 
a  fast-neutron  chain  reaction  could,  of 
course,  be  used  as  a  power  source; 
but,  uncontrolled,  it  would  provide  a 
far  more  powerful  explosion  than 
ever  before  attained  by  man.  Though 
perhaps  too  heavy  for  a  conventional 
bomber,  a  U-235  bomb  could  be 
brought  by  ship  into  an  enemy  port 
and  exploded  with  devastating  effect. 

In  early  1939,  however,  the  chances 
of  constructing  a  bomb  of  U-235  ap- 
peared far  less  certain  than  those  of 
building  a  power-producing  uranium- 
graphite  system.  To  use  Fermi's 
words,  there  seemed  "little  likelihood 
of  an  atomic  bomb,  little  proof  that 
we  were  not  pursuing  a  chimera."  ^^ 

Nevertheless,  possible  military  ap- 
plication of  atomic  energy  was  of  in- 
creasing interest  to  a  group  of  for- 
eign-born physicists  now  living  and 
working  in  the  United  States.  These 
men — including  Enrico  Fermi  from 
Italy;  Leo  Szilard,  Eugene  Wigner, 
and    Edward    Teller    from    Hungary; 


'^  Laura  Fermi,  Atoms  in  the  Family,  p.  164. 


12 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


and  Victor  Weisskopf  from  Austria — 
knew  that  government-supported  nu- 
clear research  was  under  way  at  the 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  Institute  in  Berlin, 
and  the  likely  military  consequences 
of  a  German  breakthrough  worried 
them  very  much.  As  most  of  them  had 
only  recently  fled  their  homelands  to 
escape  fascist  tyranny,  they  had  no 
wish  to  see  Nazi  Germany  acquire  a 
means  of  dominating  the  whole 
world.  Indeed,  if  any  nations  were  to 
exploit  atomic  energy  for  mihtary 
purposes,  they  believed  the  democra- 
cies would  do  well  to  be  first. 

These  physicists  therefore  directed 
their  energies  toward  two  ends:  keep- 
ing all  advances  in  nuclear  research  a 
secret  to  discourage  an  all-out 
German  effort,  and  obtaining  support 
from  the  American  government  for 
further  nuclear  research.  The  group 
almost  achieved  one  of  its  goals  in 
early  1939,  when  leading  physicists  in 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
pledged  not  to  publish  the  results  of 
their  work  in  the  field.  However,  in 
France,  Frederic  Joliot-Curie  refused, 
and  his  determination  to  publish  his 
own  research  led  to  continued  publi- 
cation by  scientists  in  other  countries. 
It  was  not  until  late  1940,  after  a 
large  number  of  articles  had  appeared 
in  scientific  journals  and  the  popular 
press,  that  publication  on  atomic 
energy  generally  ceased. 

Efforts  To  Enlist  Support  of  the 
U.  S.   Government 

The  atomic  scientists'  first  attempt 
to  gain  support  from  the  U.S.  govern- 
ment for  their  atomic  energy  research 
came  in  March  of  1939,  even  as 
German  troops  were  completing  the 
occupation  of  Czechoslovakia.  Sched- 


uled to  give  a  lecture  in  Washington, 
D.C.,  on  the  sixteenth,  Enrico  Fermi 
arrived  in  the  national  capital  with  a 
letter  of  introduction  from  Dean 
George  B.  Pegram  of  Columbia  to 
Rear  Adm.  Stanford  C.  Hooper,  di- 
rector of  the  Technical  Division, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Oper- 
ations. On  the  morning  of  the  seven- 
teenth, Fermi  met  with  Admiral 
Hooper  and  other  individuals,  includ- 
ing Ross  Gunn,  a  physicist  and  techi- 
cal  adviser  of  the  Naval  Research  Lab- 
oratory. Pegram,  who  was  also  a  phys- 
icist, had  explained  in  his  letter  what 
Fermi  discussed  in  his  lecture, 
namely,  the  importance  of  atomic 
energy  and  its  possible  uses  for  man- 
kind, although  both  men  were  pru- 
dent about  making  predictions. 

Gunn  and  his  associates  at  the 
Naval  Research  Laboratory  already 
were  aware  of  the  potentialities  of 
atomic  energy;  however,  they  were 
more  interested  in  the  prospects  for 
nuclear  ship  propulsion  than  in  devel- 
oping an  atomic  bomb.  Now  Fermi's 
visit  spurred  them  on  to  continue 
their  own  investigations,  but  it  did 
not  lead  to  any  naval  support  for  the 
scientists  working  at  the  universi- 
ties.^^ A  second  approach  to  Gunn, 
made  by  Szilard  in  June,  was  no  more 
successful.  While  the  Navy  pursued  its 
own  program  of  research  on  uranium 
isotope  separation,  Gunn  indicated  to 
Szilard  in  July  that  "it  seems  almost 
impossible,  in  the  light  of  the  restric- 


i*  Ibid.,  pp.  162-65;  Testimony  of  Gunn  in  U.S. 
Congress,  Senate,  Special  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy,  Atomic  Energy:  Hearings  on  S.  Res.  179,  79th 
Cong.,  1st  and  2d  Sess.,  27  Nov  45-15  Feb  46 
(Washington,  D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office, 
1945-46),  pp.  365-67.  Gunn  testified  that  Army  of- 
ficers were  present  at  the  17  March  conference,  but 
this  does  not  appear  to  have  been  the  case. 


A  HISTORY  OF  ATOMIC  ENERGY  TO   1939 


13 


tions  which  are  imposed  on  Govern- 
ment contracts  for  services,  to  carry 
through  any  sort  of  agreement  that 
would  be  really  helpful  to  you."  ^^ 

By  mid-July,  then,  Szilard,  Teller, 
and  Wigner  concluded  that  another 
channel  had  to  be  found.  The  results 
of  ongoing  nuclear  research  indicated 
that  a  chain  reaction  could  very  prob- 
ably be  achieved  in  a  uranium-graph- 
ite system,  "and  that  this  possibility 
had  to  be  considered  as  an  imminent 
danger."  ^^  There  was,  moreover, 
ominous  news  from  Europe  of  contin- 
ued German  interest  and  progress  in 
nuclear  research.  American  scientists 
returning  from  visits  to  Germany  re- 
ported a  growing  emphasis  on  the  in- 
vestigation of  isotope  separation,  with 
the  apparent  objective  of  achieving  a 
fast-neutron  chain  reaction  in  U-235, 
the  basis  of  an  atomic  bomb.^^  After 
moving  into  Czechoslovakia,  the  Ger- 
mans closed  the  door  on  the  coun- 
try's uranium  ore  exports.  Convinced 
that  the  need  to  keep  other  uranium 
deposits  from  falling  into  German 
hands  required  action  at  the  highest 
level,  Szilard,  Teller,  and  Wigner  ap- 
proached Einstein.  At  first,  Szilard 
thought  to  have  Einstein  approach 
the  Department  of  State  and  use  his 
acquaintance  with  the  royal  family  in 
Belgium  as  a  means  for  stopping  ura- 
nium ore  shipments  to  the  Germans. 
But,  after  further  discussion,  he  de- 
cided a  direct  approach  to  the  White 
House  was  necessary.  Through  a  ref- 
ugee journalist  friend,  Szilard  secured 
an  introduction  to  Alexander  Sachs,  a 


Wall  Street  economist  and  student  of 
international  affairs  who  had  long 
been  an  informal  adviser  of  President 
Franklin  D.  Roosevelt.  Sachs  was  fa- 
miliar with  the  subject  of  atomic 
energy,  having  read  avidly  Hahn  and 
Strassmann's  first  report  and  having 
followed  subsequent  publications  on 
atomic  fission.  Also,  he  had  become 
acutely  aware  of  the  possible  military 
applications  of  atomic  energy  during 
Niels  Bohr's  visit  to  the  Institute  of 
Advanced  Study  at  Princeton.  Indeed, 
the  growing  tensions  in  Europe  and 
Germany's  increasing  threat  to  world 
peace  eventually  led  him  to  discuss 
the  Hahn-Strassmann  report  and  its 
possible  effect  on  the  international 
situation  in  a  brief  session  with 
Roosevelt  early  in  March. 

Sachs  agreed  to  help,  and  he  and 
Szilard  concluded  that  a  letter  from 
Einstein  to  Roosevelt  would  empha- 
size the  importance  of  their  message. 
The  letter,  primarily  the  work  of  Szi- 
lard, was  drafted  in  Sachs's  office.  Szi- 
lard and  Teller  took  it  to  Einstein, 
who  was  vacationing  on  Long  Island, 
on  2  August.  Sources  disagree  over 
whether  Einstein  rewrote  the  Sachs- 
Szilard  draft  or  merely  put  his  name 
to  it;  but,  in  any  event,  Szilard  re- 
turned to  Sachs  with  a  signed  letter 
from     Einstein     to     the     President.^® 


>^  Ltr,  Gunn  to  Szilard,  10  Jul  39,  Szilard  Docu- 
ments, MDR. 

'«  Szilard  Documents,  p.  7,  MDR. 

'^  Arthur  Holly  Compton,  Atomic  Qiiest:  A  Personal 
S'arrative  (New  York;  Oxford  University  Press, 
1956).  p.  118. 


'^  Account  of  approach  to  President  Roosevelt 
through  Sachs  based  on  Interv,  Stanley  L.  Falk  with 
Sachs,  18  Jul  60,  CMH;  Ms,  Alexander  Sachs,  "Early 
History  [of]  Atomic  Project  in  Relation  to  President 
Roosevelt,  1939-40"  (hereafter  cited  as  Sachs  Histo- 
ry), 8-9  Aug  45,  pp.  1-6,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
201  (Sachs),  MDR;  Testimony  of  Sachs  in  Atomic 
Energy  Hearings  on  S.  Res.  179.  pp.  2-11  and  553-59; 
Szilard  Documents,  p.  7,  MDR;  Otto  Nathan  and 
Heinz  Norden,  eds.,  Einstein  on  Peace  (New  \'ork: 
Simon  and  Schuster,  1960).  pp.  291-97;  Nat  S, 
Finnev,  "How  FDR.  Planned  To  Use  the  A-Bomb," 


14 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


This  letter,  a  milestone  in  the  Ameri- 
can atomic  energy  program,  states 
that  "it  is  almost  certain  that  this  [a 
chain  reaction  in  a  large  mass  of 
uranium]  could  be  achieved  in  the  im- 
mediate future"  and  that  this  phe- 
nomenon could  possibly  lead  to  the 
construction  of  a  new  type  of  an  ex- 
tremely powerful  bomb.^^ 

To  this  letter,  Szilard  himself  added 
a  careful  memorandum.  In  it  he  ex- 
plained in  more  detail  the  scope  and 
effects  of  research  on  atomic  fission, 
the  unproved  nature  of  its  conclusion, 
and  the  need  for  financial  support  for 
further  investigation.  He  pointed  out 
that  atomic  energy  released  through  a 
chain  reaction  achieved  with  slow 
neutrons  could  be  utilized  for  ship  or 
aircraft  propulsion,  and  also  raised 
the  possibility  that  a  fast-neutron 
chain  reaction  would  result  in  a  pow- 
erful explosive.  Szilard  also  reempha- 
sized  the  need  for  acquiring  large 
stocks  of  uranium  ore  from  the  Bel- 
gian Congo  and  suggested  that  an- 
other attempt  to  arrange  for  the  with- 
holding of  publications  on  the  subject 
of  nuclear  research  might  be  neces- 
sary. ^°  Included  with  the  letter  and 
memorandum  were  reprints  of  two  ar- 
ticles from  the  Physical  Review  that 
provided  documentation  of  the  scien- 
tific points  raised  by  Einstein  and 
Szilard. 

Look,  14  Mar  50.  pp.  25-27;  Geoffrey  T.  Hellman. 
"A  Reporter  at  Large:  Contemporaneous  Memoran- 
da of  Dr.  Sachs,"  \eu'  Yorker,  1  Dec  45,  pp.  73-76; 
Edward  Shils,  "Leo  Szilard — A  Memoir,"  Encounter 
23  (Dec  64):  35-41;  Eugene  Rabmowitch,  "1882- 
1964"  and  "1898-1964"  (obituaries  on  James 
Franck  and  Leo  Szilard,  respectively).  Bulletin  of  the 
Atomic  Scientists  20  (Oct  64):  16-20. 

^*  Ltr,  Einstein  to  Roosevelt,  2  Aug  39,  repro- 
duced in  the  Appendix  to  this  volume. 

2°  Memo,  Szilard  to  Roosevelt,  15  Aug  39,  Szilard 
Documents,  MDR. 


Despite  the  agreed  upon  necessity 
for  haste,  almost  two  months  passed 
before  Sachs  was  able  to  bring  Ein- 
stein's letter  and  its  inclosures  to  the 
White  House.  "Mere  delivery  of 
memoranda  was  insufficient,"  he 
felt.^^  In  the  hectic  days  of  August 
and  September  1939,  with  war  in 
Europe  first  an  imminent  danger  and 
then  a  frightening  actuality,  there 
seemed  little  likelihood  that  Roosevelt 
could  spare  Sachs  more  than  a  few 
moments.  Not  until  early  October  did 
Sachs  find  a  time  he  felt  was  suitable 
to  approach  the  President. 

The  story  of  Sachs's  visit  to  the 
White  House  has  been  told  frequently 
and  with  several  variations.  Suffice  it 
to  say  that  Sachs  met  with  Roosevelt 
for  over  an  hour  on  1 1  October. 
Reading  aloud,  Sachs  prefaced  Ein- 
stein's letter  and  Szilard's  memoran- 
dum with  a  letter  of  his  own  in  which 
he  summarized  and  amplified  the 
other  material,  emphasizing  German 
nuclear  research,  the  danger  of 
German  seizure  of  Belgian  uranium, 
and  the  "urgent"  need  to  arrange  for 
American  access  to  the  uranium  ore 
of  the  Belgian  Congo.  He  stressed  the 
necessity  of  enlarging  and  accelerat- 
ing experimental  work,  which  could 
not  be  done  on  limited  university 
budgets,  and  seconded  the  suggestion 
made  in  Einstein's  letter  for  liaison 
between  the  government  and  the 
scientists. ^^ 

The  President's  initial  reaction  was 
one  of  skeptical  interest.  He  was 
doubtful  about  the  availability  of 
funds  to  support  nuclear  research  and 


^'Testimony  of  Sachs  in  Atomic  Energy  Hearings  on 
S.  Res.  179,  p.  556. 

"Ltr,  Sachs  to  Roosevelt.  11  Oct  39,  Exhibit  3, 
Sachs  Historv,  MDR. 


A  HISTORY  OF  ATOMIC  ENERGY  TO   1939 


15 


felt,  moreover,  that  there  were  other 
aspects  of  national  defense  with  a 
higher  claim  for  attention.  Neverthe- 
less, he  invited  Sachs  to  breakfast  the 
next  morning  and,  at  this  second 
meeting,  was  convinced  of  the  neces- 
sity for  action. 

President    Roosevelt's    12    October 


decision  to  explore  the  potentialities 
of  atomic  energy  eventually  led  to 
complete  governmental  direction  of 
nuclear  research  in  the  United  States. 
And,  in  the  early  years  of  its  develop- 
ment, no  single  government  agency 
was  to  play  a  more  important  role 
than  the  United  States  Army. 


PART  ONE 
BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ATOMIC  MISSION 


Chapter  I 


The  Army  and  the  Atomic  Energy 
Program,  1939-1942 


At  eight  o'clock  on  the  evening  of 
17  June  1942,  Col.  James  C.  Marshall 
received  a  teletype  message  from 
Washington,  D.C.,  to  report  to  Maj. 
Gen.  Eugene  Reybold,  chief  of  the 
Corps  of  Engineers,  "for  temporary 
duty,"^  thus  interrupting  his  present 
assignment  as  commanding  officer  of 
the  Syracuse  (New  York)  District.  Ar- 
riving at  General  Reybold's  office  the 
next  day,  Marshall  received  further 
instructions  to  report  to  Brig.  Gen. 
Wilhelm  D.  Styer,  chief  of  staff  to  the 
commanding  general  of  the  War  De- 
partment's Services  of  Supply,  a 
major  division  newly  created  to  over- 
see Army  logistics.  Late  in  the  after- 
noon. Colonel  Marshall  learned  from 
General  Styer  the  precise  nature  of 
his  new  assignment:  General  Reybold 
had  chosen  him  to  form  a  new  engi- 
neer district  "for  construction  of  a 
new  manufacturing  plant."  ^   The  lo- 


'  Col  James  C.  Marshall,  Chronology  of  District  X 
(hereafter  cited  as  Marshall  Diary),  17  Jun  42-31 
Oct  42,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Misc 
Recs  Sec,  behind  Fldr  5,  MDR.  On  Marshall's  earlier 
career  see  George  W.  Cullum,  Biogiaplucal  Register  of 
the  Officers  and  Graduates  of  the  U.S.  Military  Academy.  9 
vols.  (1-3,  3d  rev.  ed.  and  enl.,  Boston:  Houghton, 
Mifflin  and  Co.,  1891;  4-9,  aegis  of  Association  of 
Graduates,  U.S.  Military  Academy,  1901-50), 
6B:1978,  7:1298,8:366,9:258. 

2  Marshall  Diary,  18  Jun  42,  MDR. 


cation  had  not  been  selected  but, 
Styer  explained,  the  plant  would  be 
part  of  a  project  already  in  progress 
to  develop  atomic  energy  for  military 
purposes.  Thus  the  Army  became  di- 
rectly involved  in  a  project  in  which  it 
had  been  playing  a  minor  and  some- 
what intermittent  role  since  the  fall  of 
1939. 

Oyigins  of  the  Army 's  Role 

The  Army's  expanded  role  in  the 
American  atomic  energy  program  in 
mid- 1942  grew  out  of  developments 
that  had  occurred  as  a  result  of  the 
outbreak  of  World  War  II  and  the 
subsequent  involvement  of  the  United 
States  in  that  conflict.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  12  October  1939,  persuaded  by 
Alexander  Sachs's  urgent  arguments. 
President  Roosevelt  agreed  to  investi- 
gate the  desirability  of  providing 
some  preliminary  support  for  inde- 
pendent and  private  research. 
Roosevelt's  military  aide,  Maj.  Gen. 
Edwin  M.  Watson,  immediately  re- 
quested that  the  Army  and  the  Navy 
send  officers  to  the  White  House  to 
talk  to  an  "inventor"  about  a  new  ex- 
plosive. At  two  o'clock  that  same 
afternoon,    the    Armv    sent    Lt.    Col. 


20 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Keith  F.  Adamson,  chief  of  the  Am- 
munition Division,  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment, and  his  chief  civiHan  assistant, 
Arthur  Adelman;  the  Navy  sent 
Comdr.  Gilbert  C.  Hoover,  also  an 
ordnance  specialist.  In  General  Wat- 
son's office,  Sachs  repeated  much  of 
his  earlier  presentation  to  the  Presi- 
dent. After  some  discussion,  the 
group  broke  up  with  the  understand- 
ing that  Watson  would  advise  them 
what  specific  action  the  President 
desired.^ 

The  Army's  Chemical  Warfare 
Service  (CWS)  also  received  Sachs's 
material  on  atomic  energy.  Lt.  Col. 
Haig  Shekerjian,  the  CWS  executive 
officer,  and  another  chemical  warfare 
officer  may  have  been  present  at  the 
meeting  in  the  White  House,  or  they 
may  have  been  briefed  later  in  the 
afternoon.  General  Watson's  objective 
was  to  test  Sachs's  information 
against  the  knowledge  and  experience 
of  the  technical  services  most  likely  to 
be  concerned  with  development  of 
nuclear  research  and  bombs.  Ironical- 
ly, the  technical  service  that  eventual- 
ly had  the  most  to  do  with  develop- 
ment of  the  atomic  bomb,  the  Corps 
of  Engineers,  was  not  consulted.'* 

The  first  reaction  of  the  Army 
representatives  to  the  military  poten- 
tialities of  atomic  energy  was  not  gen- 
erally enthusiastic.  Colonel  Adamson 
displayed  a  cool  skepticism,  although 


3  Intervs,  Stanley  L.  Falk  with  Adamson,  22  Apr 
60,  and  with  Sachs,  18  Jul  60;  Ltr,  Adamson  to  Maj 
Gen  Levin  H.  Campbell,  Jr.  (Chief  of  Ord),  26  Jun 
44;  Memo,  Arthur  Adelman,  sub:  Fission  Explosives 
(hereafter  cited  as  Adelman  Fission  Memo),  30  Jun 
44,  p.  4.  All  in  CMH. 

■*  Adamson  and  Sachs  Intervs,  22  Apr  60  and 
18  Jul  60;  Interv,  Falk  with  Shekerjian,  27  Oct  59; 
Ltr,  Adamson  to  Campbell,  26  Jun  44;  Adelman  Fis- 
sion Memo,  pp.  4-5;  Ltr,  Shekerjian  to  Falk,  1 1  Sep 
59.  All  in  CMH. 


he  later  warmed  to  the  subject.  He 
apparently  questioned  whether  nucle- 
ar research  had  advanced  far  enough 
for  the  government  to  support  it  with 
any  reasonable  hope  of  success. 
Moreover,  with  an  eye  to  Sachs's  Wall 
Street  background,  he  was  suspicious 
of  the  financier's  motives  in  urging 
purchase  of  Belgian  Congo  uranium.^ 

A  similar  response  came  from  the 
Chemical  Warfare  Service.  Despite 
Colonel  Shekerjian's  favorable  reac- 
tion, Maj.  Maurice  E.  Barker,  chief  of 
the  CWS  Technical  Division,  ex- 
pressed a  decidedly  negative  view. 
After  studying  Einstein's  letter  and 
Szilard's  memorandum.  Major  Barker 
concluded  that  there  was  "no  basis" 
for  believing  that  the  bombardment 
of  uranium  by  neutrons  would 
produce  an  explosion.  While  conced- 
ing that  the  proposed  nuclear 
research  "would  be  extremely  inter- 
esting, and  might  have  considerable 
scientific  value,"  he  thought  that  "the 
chance  of  anything  of  military  value 
being  developed  ...  so  slight  that  it 
would  not  justify  the  expenditure  of 
funds  available  for  research  for  that 
purpose."  ^ 

The  Army's  initial  skepticism  may 
be  attributed  to  a  number  of  factors. 
For  all  of  Alexander  Sachs's  enthusi- 
asm, even  the  group  of  American  and 
foreign-born  physicists  still  regarded 
the  potentialities  of  atomic  energy  as 
only    a    "reasonable    possibility,"  ^    as 


5  Adamson  and  Sachs  Intervs,  22  Apr  60  and 
18  Jul  60,  CMH;  Ltr.  Adamson  to  Campbell,  26  Jun 
44,  CMH;  IVashmgton  Post.  26  Mar  46. 

^  Quotation  from  Memo  for  File,  Barker,  sub: 
Uranium  Activated  bv  Neutrons  as  an  Explosive  and 
Source  of  Power  (Proj  A  10),  13  Oct  49,  Incl  G  to 
Adelman  Fission  Memo.  Shekerjian  Interv,  27  Oct 
59.  Ltr,  Shekerjian  to  Falk,  1 1  Sep  59.  All  in  CMH. 

''  Louis  A.  Turner,  "Nuclear  Phvsics,"  Rei'iews  of 
Modem  Physics  12  (Jan  40):  21. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1939-1942 


21 


the  tentative  tone  of  Einstein's  letter 
and  Szilard's  memorandum  readily 
showed.  Unlike  the  Navy,  in  1939  the 
Army  had  no  central  research  organi- 
zation that  might  have  seized  upon 
the  abstract  possibilities  of  atomic 
energy.  Consequently,  budget-minded 
Army  officers,  who  had  served 
through  a  period  of  extremely  re- 
stricted military  expenditures  in  the 
1930's,  were  not  likely  to  lose  their 
restraint  over  new  and  possibly  far- 
fetched ideas.  They  had  witnessed 
drastic  cuts  in  funds,  especially  for 
Army  research  and  development, 
which  was  allotted  only  1.1  percent  of 
military  expenditures  in  fiscal  year 
1939.  Army  policy  called  for  immedi- 
ate development  of  critical  items 
rather  than  eventual  production  of 
better  weapons  and  equipment 
through  prolonged  research.  Ord- 
nance and  chemical  officers  were,  of 
course,  particularly  aware  of  this  situ- 
ation. Thus,  it  was  hardly  surprising 
that  Sachs's  proposals  failed  to  trans- 
late their  scientific  conservatism  into 
military  enthusiasm.®  Not  until  civil- 
ian research  and  development  had 
buttressed  the  theoretical  predictions 
of  the  physicists  with  undisputable 
scientific  evidence  and  the  nation  was 
involved  in  war  would  the  Army 
assume  a  principal  role  in  developing 
the  military  potentialities  of  atomic 
energy. 


®  Mark  S.  Watson,  Chief  of  Staff:  Prewar  Plans  and 
Preparatwm  (Washington,  D.C.:  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  1950),  pp.  31-32  and  42-44;  Constance 
McLaughlin  Green,  Harr\  C.  Thomson,  and  Peter 
C.  Roots,  The  Ordnance  Department:  Planning  Munitiom 
for  War  (Washington,  D.C.:  Government  Printing 
Office,  1955),  pp.  204-08;  Leo  Brophy  and  George 
J.  B.  Fisher,  The  Chemical  Warfare  Sennce:  Organizing 
for  War  (Washington,  DC.:  Government  Printing 
Offiice,  1959).  pp.  37-38.  All  in  the  series  U.S.  Armv 
m  World  War  IL 


Decision   To  Develop  Atomic  Weapons 

Through  the  President's  Advisory 
Committee  on  Uranium,  established 
on  12  October  1939,  the  Army  had 
an  opportunity  to  express  its  general- 
ly negative  reaction  to  the  military 
potentialities  of  atomic  energy.  This 
small  group,  charged  with  making 
recommedations  on  the  ideas  and  ma- 
terials submitted  by  Sachs,  was  com- 
prised of  Colonel  Adamson,  Com- 
mander Hoover,  and,  as  chairman, 
Lyman  J.  Briggs.  Briggs  was  director 
of  the  National  Bureau  of  Standards, 
which  was  one  of  the  principal  gov- 
ernment agencies  of  the  pre-World 
War  II  period  concerned  with  re- 
search in  the  physical  sciences.^ 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Uranium 
Committee,  as  it  came  to  be  called, 
took  place  on  the  morning  of  21  Oc- 
tober at  the  Bureau  of  Standards. The 
committee  had  invited  Alexander 
Sachs  and,  at  his  suggestion,  also  Leo 
Szilard,  Edward  Teller,  Eugene 
Wigner,  and  Albert  Einstein  to  attend 
its  session.  Einstein  was  unable  to  be 
present  but  two  other  physicists,  Fred 
L.  Mohler  of  the  Bureau  of  Standards 
and  Richard  B.  Roberts  of  the  Carne- 
gie Institution,  attended  to  provide 
the  committee  with  technical  guid- 
ance. Szilard,  Teller,  and  Wigner  out- 
lined the  steps  they  believed  neces- 
sary to  attain  a  chain  reaction  in  the 
uranium-graphite  system  proposed  by 
Fermi  and  Szilard.  During  their  pre- 


9  Smyth  Report,  p.  32;  Ltr,  Sachs  to  Wigner,  17 
Oct  39;  Exhibit  4,  Sachs  History,  MDR;  Ltr,  Roose- 
velt to  Einstein,  19  Oct  39,  President's  Secy's  Files, 
Sachs  Fldr,  FDR;  Sachs  Interv,  18  Jul  60,  CMH; 
Rexmond  C.  Cochrane,  Measures  for  Progress:  A  Histo- 
ry of  the  Xational  Bureau  of  Standards  (Washington, 
D.C.:  National  Bureau  of  Standards,  U.S.  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce,  1966),  p.  362. 


22 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


sentadon,  the  three  scientists  request- 
ed $6,000  to  purchase  the  graphite 
and  emphasized  the  need  for  secrecy 
about  ail  activities  relating  to  nuclear 
research. 

In  the  discussion  that  followed, 
three  schools  of  thought  became  ap- 
parent. Colonel  Adamson  and  Com- 
mander Hoover,  generally  skeptical, 
stated  their  belief  that  several  years  of 
further  research  would  be  needed 
even  to  determine  whether  the  mili- 
tary possibilities  of  atomic  energy 
were  sufficient  to  justify  government 
support.  In  contrast,  Sachs,  Briggs, 
and  Teller  were  almost  enthusiastic 
about  the  chances  of  success.  Main- 
taining a  more  conservative  approach, 
Szilard  and  Wigner  portrayed  the 
great  possibilities  of  their  work  but 
also  stressed  the  as  yet  tentative 
nature  of  their  conclusions.  ^° 

In  spite  of  the  cautious  attitude  of 
Adamson  and  Hoover,  the  Uranium 
Committee's  report  to  the  White 
House  on  1  November  gave  the  scien- 
tists in  effect  what  they  wanted.  While 
conceding  that  the  harnessing  of 
atomic  energy  for  power  or  bombs 
was  still  only  a  theoretical  possibility, 
the  committee  nevertheless  recom- 
mended that  "in  view  of  the  funda- 
mental importance"  and  "potential 
military  value"  of  nuclear  research, 
"adequate  support  for  a  thorough  in- 
vestigation of  the  subject  should  be 
provided."  This  support  should  in- 
clude funds  for  immediate  purchase 
of  4  metric  tons  of  pure  graphite  and, 


if  the  results  of  initial  experiments 
warranted  continuing  the  program, 
additional  funds  to  obtain  50  tons  of 
uranium  oxide.  ^^ 

The  Uranium  Committee  submitted 
its  report  and  recommendations  to 
President  Roosevelt  through  General 
Watson.  Apparently  viewing  the 
report  as  preliminary,  Watson  asked 
Chairman  Briggs  for  a  special  recom- 
mendation before  he  advised  the 
President.  Until  then,  no  executive 
action  could  be  expected. 

Consequently,  the  members  of  the 
Uranium  Committee  kept  in  touch 
with  the  nuclear  research  program  at 
Columbia  University,  awaiting  word 
of  progress  from  the  scientists.  In  the 
interim,  the  Naval  Research  Laborato- 
ry continued  its  interest  in  university 
research  that  pertained  to  its  own  in- 
vestigations into  isotopic  separation. 
At  this  stage,  however,  neither  the 
Navy  nor  the  Uranium  Committee 
made  any  effort  to  coordinate  or  link 
the  various  nuclear  research  programs 
in  progress.  Such  attempts  as  were 
made  came  from  the  scientific  com- 
munity and  from  Sachs  rather  than 
from  any  governmental  agency.  ^^ 

Then,  in  January  1940,  Briggs  took 
the  first  concrete  step  to  obtain  gov- 
ernment funds  for  the  university  sci- 
entists. From  the  Navy,  up  to  now 
more  interested  in  nuclear  research 
than    the    Army,    Briggs    obtained    a 


*°  Sachs  History,  pp.  6-7,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  201  (Sachs),  MDR;  Adamson  and  Sachs  In- 
tervs.  22  Apr  60  and  18  Jul  60,  CMH;  Washiriglon 
Post,  26  Mar  46;  Memo,  Szilard,  sub:  Mtg  of  21  Oct 
39  m  Washington,  D.C.,  26  Oct  39,  Inci  H  to  Adel- 
man  Fission  Memo,  CMH;  Szilard  Documents,  p.  7, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Szilard),  MDR. 


^'Quoted  words  from  Memo,  Briggs,  Adamson, 
and  Hoover  to  President,  sub:  Possible  Use  of  Ura- 
nium for  Submarine  Power  and  High  Destructive 
Bombs,  1  Nov  39,  Exhibit  5,  Sachs  History,  MDR 
(also  in  Adelman  Fission  Memo,  following  p.  5, 
CMH).  Testimony  of  Sachs  in  Atomic  Energy  Heanngs 
on  S.  Res.  179.  p.  560. 

'2  Sachs  History,  pp.  10-11,  MDR;  Ltr,  Adamson 
to  Campbell,  26  Jun  44,  CMH;  Adamson  Interv, 
22  Apr  60,  CMH;  Testimony  of  Gunn  in  Atomic 
Energy  Heanngs  on  S.  Res  179,  p.  367. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1939-1942 


23 


promise  of  $3,000.  On  15  January,  he 
called  on  Maj.  Gen.  Charles  M. 
Wesson,  the  chief  of  Army  Ordnance, 
and  asked  him  to  match  this  sum. 
Briggs  outlined  the  potentialities  of 
atomic  fission.  "It  appears,"  reads  the 
account  of  the  conversation  in  Gener- 
al Wesson's  office  diary,  "that  this  de- 
velopment has  possibilities  from  an 
explosive  viewpoint."  These  "possi- 
bilities" and  Briggs's  reference  to  the 
fact  that  the  President  was  "interested 
in  this  project"  were  enough  to  make 
the  Ordnance  chief  agree  to  advance 
$3,000  out  of  Picatinny  Arsenal  funds 
for  the  development  of  explosives.  ^^ 

The  Army  and  Navy  funds  went  to 
the  Bureau  of  Standards,  which  allot- 
ted them  to  Columbia  University  in 
mid-February.  Fermi  and  his  col- 
leagues used  the  money  to  purchase 
graphite  in  quantities  that,  at  the 
time,  seemed  huge.  They  needed  a 
sufficient  amount  of  the  highly  puri- 
fied carbon  substance  to  determine  its 
capture  cross  section,  that  is,  its  ca- 
pacity to  absorb  neutrons.  With  this 
information  they  could  then  ascertain 
the  practicability  of  achieving  a  slow- 
neutron  chain  reaction  in  a  uranium- 
graphite  system.  ^^ 

Meanwhile,  Alexander  Sachs  and 
the  scientists  exerted  increasing  pres- 
sure on  the  President  and  the  Army 
and  Navy.  Einstein  wrote  to  Sachs  on 
7  March,  summarizing  the  situation 
and  suggesting  that  the  information 
concerning  new  evidence  of  German 
interest   in   atomic   energy   be   passed 


'^Min,  Wesson  Confs:  Jan-Jun  40,  15  Jan  40,  Ord 
Historical  Files,  Hist  Br,  OCO. 

'''Memo,  Briggs  to  Watson,  sub:  Your  Memo  of 
Feb  8ih,  20  Feb  40,  Exhibit  6b,  Sachs  History, 
MDR;  Min.  Wesson  Confs,  15  Jan  40,  OCO;  Enrico 
Fermi,  "Phvsics  at  Columbia,"  Physics  Today  8  (Nov 
55):  15. 


on  to  President  Roosevelt.  This  Sachs 
did,  including  also  Einstein's  recom- 
mendations that  steps  be  taken  to  halt 
publication  of  articles  on  atomic  sub- 
jects and  that  a  "general  policy  .  .  . 
[be]  adopted  by  the  Administration 
with  respect  to  uranium."  But  Ein- 
stein's views  brought  no  immediate 
response  from  the  White  House.  In 
fact,  after  discussion  with  Colonel  Ad- 
amson  and  Commander  Hoover  in 
late  March,  General  Watson  accepted 
Adamson's  suggestion  that  no  further 
action  be  taken  until  an  official  report 
on  the  research  at  Columbia  was 
available.  ^^ 

The  official  report  was  not  ready, 
however,  when  the  Uranium  Commit- 
tee held  its  second  meeting  on  27 
April  1940.  The  meeting  took  place 
as  a  result  of  several  factors,  includ- 
ing Sachs's  continued  urgings  for 
greater  support,  the  reports  of  prom- 
ising progress  in  the  nuclear  experi- 
ments at  Columbia  and  elsewhere, 
and  an  ominous  turn  of  events  in  the 
war  of  Europe.  Since  the  first  meeting 
in  October  1939,  the  atomic  scientists 
had  proven  definitely  that  fission  oc- 
curred only  in  the  U-235  isotope  and, 
in  experiments  with  the  centrifuge 
system  of  isotopic  separation  at  the 
University  of  Virginia,  had  been  suc- 
cessful in  enriching  a  gram  of  urani- 
um to  10  percent  U-235.  In  Europe, 
the  Germans  had  successfully  invaded 
Norway  in  early  April  and,  as  a  result, 
secured  control  of  the  Norsk  Hydro 
plant,  the  only  large  facility  in  the 
world    producing   heavy   water.   Thus 


>^  Sachs  History,  pp.  11-12;  Etrs.  Einstein  to 
Sachs  (source  of  quotation),  7  Mar  40,  Exhibit  7a, 
Sachs  to  President,  15  Mar  40,  Exhibit  7b,  Watson 
to  Sachs.  27  Mar  40,  Exhibit  7c,  ibid.;  Szilard  Docu- 
ments, pp.  8-9.  MDR. 


24 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


they  had  obtained  a  ready  source  of 
the  substance  they  were  suspected  of 
using  as  a  moderator  to  achieve  a 
slow-neutron  chain  reaction. 

Chairman  Briggs,  Colonel  Adam- 
son,  and  Commander  Hoover  now  lis- 
tened more  sympathetically  to  the  ar- 
guments presented  by  Alexander 
Sachs,  Enrico  Fermi,  George  Pegram, 
Leo  Szilard,  Eugene  Wigner,  and 
Rear  Adm.  Harold  G.  Bowen,  director 
of  the  Naval  Research  Laboratory. 
While  the  committee  still  did  not 
make  any  formal  recommendations,  it 
reached  general  agreement  that  nu- 
clear research  should  be  vigorously 
pursued,  even  if  this  required  large 
sums  of  money,  and  that  steps  should 
be  taken,  as  Szilard  strongly  urged,  to 
halt  further  publications  on  atomic 
matters.  ^^ 

Developments  in  May  1940  in  the 
laboratory  and  on  the  war  front 
brought  further  justification  for  pro- 
viding additional  funds  for  nuclear  re- 
search. Promising  results  at  Columbia 
led  scientists  there  to  propose  a  plan 
to  study  methods  of  uranium  isotope 
separation,  hopefully  with  Navy  sup- 
port, and  to  establish  a  large-scale  ex- 
perimental program  that  would  dem- 
onstrate beyond  any  doubt  that  a 
chain  reaction  could  be  maintained  in 
a  uranium-graphite  system.  The  Ger- 
mans' successful  invasion  of  Belgium 
and  Holland  in  mid-May  and  new  re- 
ports on  their  interest  in  uranium  re- 


'* Smyth  Report,  p.  33,  errs  in  giving  the  date 
of  the  Uranium  Committee's  second  meeting  as 
28  April.  Sachs  History,  pp.  12-20,  MDR;  Szilard 
Documents,  pp.  9-10,  MDR;  Testimony  of  Gunn  in 
Atomic  Energy  Hearings  on  S.  Res.  179,  pp.  367  and 
370;  Ltr,  Pegram  to  Bowen,  7  Apr  40,  Incl  I  to 
Adelman  Fission  Memo,  CMH;  William  L.  Laurence, 
Men  and  Atoms:  The  Discovery,  the  i'ses.  and  the  Future  of 
Atomic  Energy  (New  York:  Simon  and  Schuster, 
1959),  pp.  73-74. 


search  underlined  Sachs's  efforts  to 
secure  action  on  control  of  Belgian 
uranium  and  to  obtain  financial  and 
administrative  support  for  atomic  re- 
search in  the  United  States.  ^'^ 

New  funds  came  from  a  variety  of 
sources.  On  23  May,  the  Carnegie  In- 
stitution of  Washington  allotted 
$30,000  for  research  on  uranium  by 
members  of  its  own  staff.  A  short 
time  later.  Colonel  Adamson  fur- 
nished $20,000  from  Army  Ordnance 
funds  to  combine  with  a  substantially 
larger  contribution  from  the  Navy  and 
some  money  from  the  Bureau  of 
Standards,  making  a  total  of  more 
than  $100,000.  This  amount  was 
more  than  sufficient  to  underwrite 
contracts  at  Columbia  and  the  Univer- 
sity of  Virginia  and  to  increase  sup- 
port of  the  work  at  the  Naval  Re- 
search Laboratory.^® 

German  occupation  of  Belgium 
gave  urgency  to  the  question  of  how 
the  United  States  could  control  and 
acquire  the  rich  uranium  ore  in  the 
Congo.  Seeking  a  solution,  Alexander 
Sachs  met  with  President  Roosevelt  at 
the  end  of  May  and,  a  few  days  later, 
also  with  Uranium  Committee  Chair- 
man Briggs,  Professor  Harold  C. 
Urey,  a  chemist  on  the  staff  at  Colum- 
bia University,  and  Admiral  Bowen  of 
the    Naval    Research    Laboratory.    At 


'''  Sachs  History,  pp.  20-25,  MDR;  Szilard  Docu- 
ments, p.  10,  MDR;  Ltr,  Pegram  to  Briggs,  6  May 
40,  Incl  K  to  Adelman  Fission  Memo,  CMH;  Lau- 
rence, Men  and  Atoms,  p.  41. 

'^  James  Phinnev  Baxter  3rd,  Scientists  Against 
Time,  Science  in  World  War  II  (Boston:  Little, 
Brown  and  Co.,  1946),  p.  423;  Adelman  Fission 
Memo,  p.  6  and  Incls  A-E,  CMH;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol. 
4,  "Auxiliary  Activities,"  pp.  12.2-12.3,  DASA;  Ad- 
amson Interv,  22  Apr  60,  CMH;  Ltr,  Adamson  to 
Campbell,  26  Jun  44,  CMH;  Testimony  of  Gunn  in 
Atomic  Energy  Hearings  on  S.  Res.  179,  pp.  367-71; 
Smyth  Report,  p.  33;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  29. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1939-1942 


25 


Briggs's  suggestion,  Sachs  began 
looking  into  the  possibility  of  getting 
uranium  directly  from  the  Congo. 

For  some  time  Sachs  had  been 
aware  that  Edgar  Sengier  was  in  New 
York.  Managing  director  of  Union 
Miniere  du  Haut  Katanga,  the  Belgian 
firm  that  controlled  the  Shinkolobwe 
mine  in  Katanga  Province  of  the 
Congo,  Sengier  had  come  to  New 
York  from  Brussels  in  the  fall  of 
1939,  aware  of  the  rising  importance 
of  uranium  from  conversations  with 
French  and  British  scientists.  He  had 
ordered  shipped  to  America  all 
radium  held  by  his  firm  in  Belgium — 
some  120  grams  worth  nearly  $2  mil- 
lion. At  the  same  time,  he  had  direct- 
ed that  uranium  ores  stocked  by 
Union  Miniere  at  Oolen,  Belgium, 
also  be  shipped  to  the  United  States, 
but  little  or  none  was  sent  before  the 
German  invasion  made  it  impossible. 

Sachs  and  Urey  went  to  see  Sengier 
in  New  York  in  early  June  1940.  Sen- 
gier gave  them  considerable  informa- 
tion on  the  status  of  Congo  uranium 
but  would  not  agree  to  Sachs's  pro- 
posal that  Union  Miniere  ship  ore  to 
the  United  States,  even  with  the  stipu- 
lation that  U.S.  officials  would  not  re- 
export the  ore  without  special 
permission.  ^^ 

Failure  to  achieve  an  agreement 
with  Sengier  left  the  uranium  re- 
search program  dependent  upon  Ca- 


'»  Sachs  History,  pp.  25-26,  MDR;  Ltrs,  Sachs  to 
Watson,  23  May  40,  Exhibit  11a,  and  Briggs  to 
Sachs,  5  Jun  40,  Exhibit  18,  ibid.;  Eeslie  R.  Groves, 
\ow  It  Can  Be  Told:  The  Story  of  the  Manhattan  Project 
(New  York:  Harper  and  Brothers,  1962),  pp.  33-34; 
Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  96;  Smyth  Report,  p.  33; 
Richard  G.  Hewlett  and  Oscar  E.  Anderson,  Jr.,  The 
\eu'  World.  1939-1946.  A  History  of  the  United 
States  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Vol.  1  (Universi- 
ty Park,  Pa.:  Pennsylvania  State  University  Press, 
1962),  p.  26. 


nadian  sources.  Fortunately,  by  the 
end  of  1940,  small  amounts  of  Cana- 
dian uranium  were  available  as  a 
result  of  arrangements  based  on  earli- 
er conversations  between  Dean 
George  B.  Pegram  of  Columbia  Uni- 
versity and  a  representative  of  Eldora- 
do Gold  Mines,  Ltd.,  owner  of  the 
Canadian  deposits. 2° 

Funds  contributed  in  the  summer 
of  1940  began  a  two-year  period  of 
rapid  growth  in  the  program  to  ex- 
ploit atomic  energy  for  military  pur- 
poses. During  this  time,  American 
governmental  leaders  left  develop- 
ment of  the  new  energy  source  to  ci- 
vilian organizations,  in  spite  of  its  ob- 
vious application  to  military  objec- 
tives and  its  close  relationship  to  the 
expanding  conflict  in  Europe  and 
Asia.  Army  participation  ceased 
almost  completely,  and  the  Navy  con- 
tinued only  a  relatively  small  isotope 
separation  project.  Under  civilian 
guidance,  the  work  on  atomic  energy 
became  a  major  component  in  the 
federal  government's  greatly  broad- 
ened program  to  apply  the  achieve- 
ments of  American  science  to  the  re- 
quirements of  modern  warfare.  Thus, 
by  early  1942,  when  the  Army 
renewed  its  participation  in  the  devel- 
opment of  atomic  energy,  the  pro- 
gram had  evolved  into  a  large 
research  and  development  enterprise, 
with    civilian    scientists    carrying    on 


2°  Memo,  Szilard  to  Briggs,  sub:  Possibility  of 
Large-scale  Experiment  in  Immediate  Future,  26 
Oct  39,  Incl  to  Szilard  Documents,  MDR;  Supreme 
Court  of  the  State  of  New  York,  Eldorado  Mining  and 
Refining  (formerly  Eldorado  Gold  Mines)  vs.  Bons 
Pregel  et  al..  Statement  to  Pregel,  18  Oct  46,  Investi- 
gation Files,  Gen  Corresp  (Boris  Pregel),  MDR; 
MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  "Feed  Materials  and  Special 
Procurement,"  pp.  3.1-3.3,  DASA. 


26 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


program    activities    at    a    number    of 
sites  across  the  country. 

Establishment  of  the  NDRC  and  OSRD 

The  organizational  framework  of 
the  American  atomic  energy  program 
first  began  to  take  shape  in  the 
summer  of  1940.  In  June,  a  number 
of  the  scientific  leaders  took  the  initi- 
ative in  providing  a  more  effective  ad- 
ministrative organization.  At  Leo  Szi- 
lard's  suggestion  and  with  the  backing 
and  approval  of  Admiral  Bowen  and 
Lyman  Briggs,  Harold  Urey  organized 
a  committee  of  scientists  to  advise 
Briggs  on  atomic  energy  and  to  study 
the  question  of  security.  This  group, 
the  Advisory  Committtee  on  Nuclear 
Research,  met  for  the  first  time  on 
the  thirteenth  under  Urey's  chairman- 
ship. One  of  its  first  actions  was  to 
formulate,  with  support  of  American 
scientific  journals,  a  policy  on  secrecy 
that  eventually  halted  publication  of 
scientific  papers  on  atomic  energy  in 
the  United  States.  Thus,  a  beginning 
was  made  in  solving  what  was  to 
become  another  major  and  persistent 
problem — how  to  maintain  a  level  of 
secrecy  hitherto  never  attempted  in 
so  large  and  diverse  a  project. ^^ 

Even  as  the  Advisory  Committee  on 
Nuclear  Research  was  meeting,  events 
were  taking  place  that  would  increase 
effective  leadership  and  direction  for 
the  entire  American  scientific  war 
effort,  including  the  atomic  energy 
program.  Since  the  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium, Sachs  had  been  urging 
Roosevelt  to  establish  a  "Scientific 
Council  of  National  Defense"  to  ad- 
minister "the  testing  and  execution  of 


technical  projects  of  utility  for  nation- 
al defense."  Another  strong  advocate 
for  such  a  council  was  Vannevar 
Bush,  president  of  the  Carnegie  Insti- 
tution of  Washington  since  1939. ^^ 
For  some  time  he  had  discussed  his 
ideas  with  several  of  the  nation's  fore- 
most scientists  and  had  gained  their 
support  for  the  project.  In  addition, 
the  country's  military  leaders,  includ- 
ing both  Army  Chief  of  Staff  General 
George  C.  Marshall  and  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations  Admiral  Harold  R. 
Stark,  strongly  favored  the  proposal. 
Consequently  on  15  June  1940,  the 
President  established  the  National  De- 
fense Research  Committee  (NDRC), 
with  Bush  as  chairman,  to  direct,  co- 
ordinate, and  carry  out  a  national 
program  of  military  research  and  de- 
velopment. Membership  was  drawn 
from  the  National  Academy  of  Sci- 
ences, with  Brig.  Gen.  George  V. 
Strong,  chief  of  the  War  Plans  Divi- 
sion, representing  the  Army  and  Rear 
Adm.  Harold  G.  Bowen,  director  of 
the  Naval  Research  Laboratory,  repre- 
senting the  Navy. 

With  establishment  of  the  NDRC, 
the  President  made  provision  for  con- 
tinuation of  the  atomic  energy  pro- 
gram. He  asked  Vannevar  Bush  to 
reconstitute  the  original  Uranium 
Committee  as  a  subcommittee  of  the 
NDRC.  The  new  Committee  on  Ura- 
nium, reporting  to  Bush  and  with 
Briggs  continuing  as  its  chairman,  in- 
cluded six  other  scientists  but  lacked 
the    service    representation    that    the 


21  Szilard  Documents,  pp.  10-11,  MDR;  Ltr,  Urey 
to  Sz.laid.  7  Jun  40,  Incl  to  ibid. 


22  Sachs  History,  p.  24,  MDR;  Ltr,  Sachs  to 
Watson  (source  of  quotation),  15  May  40,  Exhibit 
15a,  ibid.  Bush  enjoyed  a  distinguished  career  in  ap- 
plied mathematics  and  electrical  engineering  at  MIT 
in  the  two  decades  following  WW  I  and  achieved  a 
reputation  as  a  scientific  administrator  of  great  skill. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1939-1942 


27 


original  committee  had.  Briggs  was 
authorized  "to  maintain  close  and 
direct  contact  with  those  officers  of 
the  Army  and  Navy  most  directly  in- 
terested," but  only  Ross  Gunn  of  the 
Naval  Research  Laboratory  continued 
to  serve  on  the  new  committee. ^^ 

On  1  July,  Briggs  reviewed  for 
Bush  the  earlier  activities  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Uranium.  At  the  same  time, 
he  requested  the  $140,000  that  he 
and  Urey's  Advisory  Committee  had 
agreed  was  necessary  for  purchasing 
uranium  metal  and  pure  graphite  and 
for  making  further  measurements  of 
the  fundamental  nuclear  constants.  At 
its  first  formal  meeting  the  next  day, 
the  NDRC  considered  Briggs's  re- 
quest, but  its  members  found  them- 
selves in  a  dilemma.  The  basic  NDRC 
mission  was  research  and  develop- 
ment of  weapons  and  equipment  with 
direct  application  to  the  war.  NDRC 
scientists  still  regarded  the  chances  of 
an  atomic  weapon  as  "very  remote," 
in  Bush's  words,  and  even  the  possi- 
bility of  nuclear  power  for  battleships 
or  submarine  propulsion  seemed  a 
distant  eventuality  at  best.  Given  the 
need  for  funds  and  trained  scientists 
in  other  areas,  there  was  grave  doubt 
as  to  the  wisdom  of  allocating  money 
and  energy  to  "what  might  eventually 
appear  to  have  been  wild  research." 
Yet,  there  was  a  danger  that  German 
nuclear  research  might  prove  success- 
ful. Committee  members  concluded, 
therefore,  that  prudence  demanded 
acquisition  of  knowledge  of  the  fun- 
damental physics  of  atomic  energy. 
Accordingly,     the     NDRC     approved 


Briggs's  request  in  principle  and 
asked  him  for  further  definite  propos- 
als for  "a  careful,  but  not  elaborate  or 
expensive  program."  ^'* 

Promise  of  NDRC  funds  opened 
the  way  for  the  future  rapid  expan- 
sion on  atomic  research  in  the  United 
States.  But  until  these  new  funds 
became  available,  the  atomic  program 
had  to  continue  to  draw  upon  money 
supplied  earlier  by  the  Army  and  the 
Navy.  Even  the  $40,000  for  the  first 
NDRC  contract  for  atomic  research, 
an  agreement  signed  with  Columbia 
University  in  early  November,  came 
out  of  the  remaining  Army-Navy 
funds. 

Beginning  with  the  NDRC's  allot- 
ment on  25  October  of  the  $140,000 
requested  by  Briggs  on  1  July,  there 
followed  a  series  of  contracts  and 
transfer  agreements  arranging  for  nu- 
clear research  by  various  institutions. 
By  the  spring  of  1941,  the  NDRC  had 
committed  nearly  $500,000  for  work 
at  Columbia,  Harvard,  Princeton,  the 
University  of  Minnesota,  the  Standard 
Oil  Development  Company,  Iowa 
State  College,  Cornell,  the  University 
of  Chicago,  Johns  Hopkins,  the  Car- 
negie Institution  of  Washington,  the 
University  of  California  (Berkeley), 
the  University  of  Virginia,  the  Bureau 
of  Standards,  and  the  Department  of 
Agriculture.  While  the  NDRC's  ex- 
penditure for  atomic  energy  was  small 
compared    with    amounts    allotted    to 


"Quoted  words  from  Ltr,  Roosevelt  to  Briggs, 
15  Jun  40,  Exhibit  19,  Sachs  History,  MDR.  Baxter, 
Snenlists  Against  Time.  pp.  12-16;  Ltr,  Roosevelt  to 
Bush,  15  Jun  40,  HLH;  Watson,  Chief  of  Staff,  pp. 
49-59;  Smyth  Report,  p.  34. 


^^  Quoted  words  from  National  Defense  Research 
Committee  Report  for  First  Year  of  Operation,  27 
Jun  40-28  Jun  41  (hereafter  cited  as  NDRC  Rpt, 
1940-41)  pp.  34-35,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Bush  to  President, 
16  July  41,  FDR.  Szilard  Documents,  pp.  10-11, 
MDR;  Irvin  Stewart,  Organizing  Scientific  Research  for 
War.  Science  in  World  War  II  (Boston:  Little,  Brown 
and  Co.,  1948),  pp.  120-21  and  230;  Baxter,  Scien- 
tists Against  Time,  pp.  423-24. 


28 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


other  wartime  scientific  research,  it 
represented  a  significant  financial 
boost  for  the  American  program.  As 
Alexander  Sachs  observed  a  few  years 
later,  the  program  had  become  "in- 
vested with  the  importance,  the  re- 
sources and  the  secrecy  available  to 
the  Government  of  the  United  States 
.  .  .  for  the  translation  of  the  idea 
into  a  reality.  .  .  ."  ^^ 

While  the  NDRC  was  able  to  focus 
the  energy  and  capabilities  of  civilian 
scientists  on  many  aspects  of  military 
technology,  it  left  certain  gaps  in  the 
program  to  mobilize  American  sci- 
ence for  war.  Hence,  at  the  end  of 
June  1941,  President  Roosevelt  estab- 
lished the  Office  of  Scientific  Re- 
search and  Development  (OSRD), 
with  the  NDRC  as  one  of  its  subordi- 
nate agencies.  Bush  became  OSRD 
director  and  James  B.  Conant,  presi- 
dent of  Harvard  University,  succeed- 
ed Bush  as  NDRC  chairman.  In  this 
reorganization  the  Committee  on 
Uranium  under  Briggs  remained 
within  the  NDRC,  but  it  was  some- 
what enlarged  and  was  renamed  the 
Section  on  Uranium.  Again  it  includ- 
ed no  Army  or  Navy  representatives, 
and  even  Ross  Gunn  of  the  Naval  Re- 
search Laboratory  was  no  longer  a 
member.  ^^ 

New  Advances  in  Atomic  Research, 
1940-1941 

In  mid-July  1941,  enthusiastic  over 
reports  that  atomic  scientists  in  Amer- 
ica   and    Great    Britain    were    making 


^^ Quoted  words  from  Sachs  History,  p.  27,  MDR. 
Smyth  Report,  pp.  34-35;  Stewart,  Organizing  Scientific 
Research  for  War,  pp.  121  and  123;  Baxter,  Scientists 
Against  Time,  p.  424;  Testimony  of  Gunn  in  Atomic 
Energy  Hearings  on  S.  Res.  179,  pp.  367  and  371. 

^^  Stewart,  Organizing  Scientific  Research  for  War.  pp. 
34-40  and  121;  Smyth  Report,  p.  35. 


significant  progress  in  atomic  re- 
search, Vannevar  Bush  reported  to 
the  President  that  "new  knowledge" 
made  "it  probable  that  the  produc- 
tion of  a  super-explosive  may  not  be 
as  remote  a  matter  as  previously  ap- 
peared." ^^  At  Columbia,  supported 
by  investigations  at  Princeton  and  the 
Universities  of  Chicago  and  California 
(Berkeley),  researchers  produced  suf- 
ficient favorable  data  on  the  capture 
cross  sections  for  the  neutrons  of 
U-235  and  U-238  and  on  the  ab- 
sorption qualities  of  graphite  to  justi- 
fy construction  in  July  1941  of  the 
first  lattice  pile — a  large  graphite  cube 
in  which  containers  of  uranium  oxide 
were  distributed  at  equal  intervals. 
The  research  results  also  convinced 
many  more  scientists  that  a  chain  re- 
action in  a  uranium-graphite  system 
eventually  would  be  achieved. 

At  Berkeley,  physicists  working  with 
Ernest  O.  Lawrence  on  the  bombard- 
ment of  uranium  with  neutrons 
discovered  that  the  capture  of  fast 
neutrons  by  U-238  transmuted  that 
isotope  first  into  element  93  and  then 
into  element  94,  which  they  named 
neptunium  and  plutonium,  respective- 
ly. After  further  investigation  of  these 
transuranium  elements,  neither  of 
which  was  then  known  to  exist  in 
nature,  Lawrence's  group  concluded 
that  plutonium  had  the  same  fission 
characteristics  as  U-235;  it  could  be 
split  by  neutrons  and  would,  in  turn, 
release  more  neutrons.  U-238,  hither- 
to regarded  as  worthless  for  energy 
purposes,  was  in  fact  a  prime  source. 


2  7  NDRC  Rpt.  1940-41,  p.  35,  Incl  to  Ltr.  Bush 
to  President,  16  Jul  41,  FDR.  Except  as  indicated, 
following  section  on  progress  of  atomic  research  in 
the  United  States  during  1940-41  based  on  Smyth 
Report,  pp.  26,  36,  38-41,  47-49. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC 

ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1939-1942 

29 

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M^    •     2_i        ^^g^              .^iV^i^M 

Ddl 

^^^^           '^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  IB^^^^^^^I 

^^j/Sj^^ 

1 

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^^^^^^^P^HjI^^^^^^^^Hfv'^ 

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^^^^L     ^^^^W^J 

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^^■991^^1 

1 

Ernest  O.  Lawrence,  Arthur  H.  Compton,  Vannevar  Bush,  and  James  B. 
CoNANT  (left  to  right),  four  of  the  Manhattan  Project  5  scientific  leaders  (1940  photograph) 


Furthermore,  as  there  was  reason  to 
believe  that  chemical  separation  of 
plutonium  from  uranium  might  prove 
more  practicable  than  isotopic  separa- 
tion of  U-235  from  U-238,  chances 
that  an  atomic  bomb  based  on  a  fast- 
neutron  chain  reaction  could  be  built 
were  tremendously  increased. 

American  atomic  scientists  learned 
of  encouraging  British  developments 
on  isotopic  separation  by  gaseous  dif- 
fusion and  on  heavy  water  as  a  mod- 
erator in  a  slow-neutron  chain  reac- 
tion system  through  a  scientific  infor- 
mation exchange  program,  begun  in 
the  fall  of  1940.  With  the  support  of 
the     War     and     Navy     Departments, 


NDRC  members  conferred  informally 
with  British  scientific  representatives, 
both  in  the  United  States  and  in  Eng- 
land, achieving  a  limited  exchange  of 
data  about  the  progress  of  nuclear  re- 
search in  each  country. ^^ 


28  See  Ch.  X  for  discussion  of  a  formal  program 
of  information  interchange  with  Great  Britain  on 
nuclear  matters.  Margaret  Gowing,  Britain  and  Atomic 
Energy,  1939-1945  (London:  Macmillan  and  Co.,  St. 
Martin's  Press,  1946),  pp.  115-26;  J.  G.  Crowther 
and  R.  Whiddington,  Science  at  War  (London:  His 
Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  1947),  pp.  143-46;  H. 
Duncan  Hall  and  C.  C.  Wrigley,  Studies  of  Ch'erseas 
Supply.  History  of  the  Second  World  War  (London: 
His  Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  1956).  pp.  358-85 
and  405-13;  Sir  George  Thomson,  "Anglo-U.S.  Co- 
operation on  Atomic  Energy,"  American  Snenttst  41 
(Jan  53):  78. 


30 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


In  the  summer  of  1941,  a  special 
reviewing  committee  of  the  National 
Academy  of  Sciences  supported 
Bush's  optimism.  The  committee,  es- 
tablished at  Briggs's  suggestion  that 
an  impartial  evaluation  of  the  atomic 
program  was  needed,  first  met  in  May 
under  the  chairmanship  of  Arthur  H. 
Compton,  head  of  the  physics  depart- 
ment and  dean  of  the  Division  of 
Physical  Sciences  at  the  University  of 
Chicago.  The  committee's  initial 
report  was  buttressed  by  supporting 
remarks  from  Briggs,  and  on  18  July 
the  NDRC  approved  contracts  and 
transfers  amounting  to  nearly 
$400,000  for  chain  reaction,  nuclear 
power,  and  isotope  separation  re- 
search. While  the  NDRC  remained 
cautious  in  its  estimate  of  whether 
atomic  energy  could  be  harnessed  in 
time  to  affect  the  outcome  of  the  war, 
it  recognized  that  continued  progress 
in  nuclear  research  would  eventually 
require  establishment  of  a  long-range 
program  so  vast  and  expensive  that  in 
wartime  only  the  Army  or  Navy  could 
carry  it  out.^^ 

The  pressure  of  an  all-out  attack  on 
the  problem  of  atomic  energy  grew 
rapidly.  At  the  University  of  Califor- 
nia, Lawrence  was  more  and  more 
convinced  of  the  feasibility  of  using 
plutonium  to  make  an  atomic  bomb 
and  he  communicated  his  enthusiasm 
to  both  Compton  and  Conant.  Comp- 
ton was  especially  interested  and  he, 
in  turn,  talked  with  other  nuclear  re- 
searchers. From  Urey  and  physicist 
John  Dunning,  who  also  was  on  the  staff 
at  Columbia,  he  learned  of  progress  on 


isotope  separation,  and  from  Fermi 
he  received  encouraging  news  of  the 
results  of  experiments  with  the  lattice 
pile.  Most  of  the  scientists  now  in- 
volved felt  that  the  atomic  energy 
program  should  be  pushed,  and  in 
mid-October,  at  Conant's  suggestion, 
Compton  reconvened  his  reviewing 
committee,  now  somewhat  enlarged, 
to  prepare  another  report. ^° 

On  3  October,  Bush  received  the 
first  official  copy  of  a  British  review  of 
atomic  energy  that  had  been  complet- 
ed in  mid-July,  but  he  was  not  yet  at 
liberty  to  disclose  its  contents  to  the 
NDRC.  The  British  scientists  had  op- 
timistically concluded  that  a  uranium 
bomb  could  be  built  with  an  explosive 
power  of  1,800  tons  of  TNT.  They  in- 
dicated a  rough  idea  of  its  critical 
mass  and  possible  methods  of  assem- 
bly and  fusing.  They  thought  the  gas- 
eous diffusion  method  offered  the 
best  answer  to  the  problem  of  separat- 
ing a  sufficient  amount  of  U-235  and 
the  uranium-heavy  water  system  gave 
promise  as  a  means  for  producing 
power  and  plutonium.^ ^ 

Top  Policy  Group:  Preparing  for 
Army  Take  Over 

Increasing  conviction  that  atomic 
bombs  were  feasible  prompted  Bush 
to  take  immediate  steps  to  obtain  the 
high-level  policy  decisions  he  had 
foreseen  would  be  necessary  to  assure 
aggressive  pursuit  of  the  uranium 
program.  On  9  October  1941,  almost 


^^  Baxter,  Scientists  Against  Time.  pp.  424-26; 
Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  45-49;  Smyth  Report,  pp. 
35  and  49;  Stewart,  Organizing  Scientific  Research  for 
War,  p.  121;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New  World,  pp. 
36-43. 


30  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  6-9  and  53-56; 
Smyth  Report,  p.  36;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New 
World,  pp.  45-49. 

3»  Smyth  Report,  p.  36;  Crowther  and  Whidding- 
ton,  Science  at  War,  pp.  144-45;  Thomson,  "Anglo- 
U.S.  Cooperation,"  pp.  78-79;  Cowing,  Bnlain  and 
Atomic  Energy,  pp.  83-86  and  116-17. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1939-1942 


31 


two  years  to  the  day  on  which  Alexan- 
der Sachs  first  informed  the  President 
about  atomic  energy,  Bush  had  a  long 
conversation  with  Roosevelt  and  Vice 
President  Henry  A.  Wallace.  In  late 
July,  Bush  and  Wallace  had  discussed 
the  progress  of  the  American  pro- 
gram; now,  supported  with  more  con- 
crete evidence  of  possible  success  at 
hand,  they  were  considering  what  the 
President  could  do  to  further  develop 
the  program.  The  OSRD  director  out- 
lined the  current  status  of  research  in 
both  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  pointing  up  the  general  opti- 
mism of  the  scientists  in  both  coun- 
tries but,  at  the  same  time,  emphasiz- 
ing that  their  predictions  could  not  be 
guaranteed.  He  indicated,  too,  that 
much  work  would  be  required  before 
success  could  be  anticipated. 

President  Roosevelt  agreed  that  the 
atomic  energy  program  must  be  pro- 
vided with  a  better  organization  and 
more  funds  and  that  arrangements 
should  be  made  for  a  complete  inter- 
change of  information  with  the  Brit- 
ish. He  directed  formation  of  what 
was  informally  designated  the  Top 
Policy  Group,  to  be  headed  by  him- 
self— although  he  never  actually  par- 
ticipated in  its  proceedings — and  to 
consist  of  Vice  President  Henry  A. 
Wallace,  Secretary  of  War  Henry  L. 
Stimson,  Army  Chief  of  Staff  General 
George  C.  Marshall,  Vannevar  Bush, 
and  James  B.  Conant.^^  Thus  the 
President  took  the  first  step  in  imple- 
menting a  maximum  effort  to  develop 
an  atomic  bomb  as  soon  as  possible. 
He  also  decided  that  the  Army,  and 
not  the  Navy,  would  be  given  the  pri- 


mary responsibility  for  attaining  this 
goal. 

The  NDRC  had  concluded  that  no 
private  institution  or  relevant  govern- 
ment agency  had  the  means  or  per- 
sonnel to  carry  out  the  extraordinarily 
large  tasks  of  plant  construction  and 
administering  development  of  a  nu- 
clear weapon.  The  choice,  then,  was 
the  Army  or  the  Navy.  When 
Roosevelt  appointed  Secretary  Stim- 
son and  General  Marshall  to  the  Top 
Policy  Group  that  had  no  naval  rep- 
resentation, he  decided  in  effect  that 
the  Army  was  to  manage  the  job. 
Why  had  the  President  selected  the 
Army  when  the  Navy  had  exhibited 
much  greater  interest  in  nuclear  re- 
search? Indications  are  that  Bush  and 
his  associates  had  decided  that  the 
Army  was  the  more  appropriate 
choice  for  the  project.  The  end  prod- 
uct was  to  be  a  bomb,  presumably  de- 
livered by  an  Army  bomber.  Also  the 
Army,  judged  on  the  basis  of  its  past 
experience  and  its  organization,  ap- 
peared better  fitted  to  undertake  the 
vast  construction  program. ^^ 

The  President  also  had  agreed  to 
establish  an  effective  exchange  of  in- 
formation with  the  British.  On  1 1  Oc- 
tober he  communicated  with  Prime 
Minister  Winston  S.  Churchill,  sug- 
gesting that  they  correspond  or  talk 
about   atomic   developments,    inaugu- 


^^  Baxter,  Scientists  Against  Time,  p.  427;  Smyth 
Report,  p.  37;  Ltr,  Bush  to  President,  9  Mar  42,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  58,  MDR. 


^^  Col.  James  C.  Marshall,  who  would  head  the 
new  Army  engineer  district  that  would  administer 
the  atomic  bomb  program,  reported  that  Bush,  in 
the  fall  of  1942,  told  him  and  other  Army  officers 
that  the  Navy  "had  been  left  out  of  the  present 
project  at  the  explicit  direction  of  the  President." 
See  Marshall  Diary,  21  Sep  42,  MDR.  The  Navy, 
nevertheless,  would  continue  to  support  research  al- 
readv  under  way  on  liquid  thermal  diffusion.  See 
Ch.  VIII. 


32 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Secretary  of  War  Henry  L.Stimson 

rating  a  period  of  regular  interchange 
between  the  two  countries.^'* 

The  President's  efforts  to  strength- 
en the  American  atomic  energy  pro- 
gram were  reinforced  a  few  weeks 
later  by  Compton's  National  Academy 
reviewing  committee.  On  6  Novem- 
ber, the  committee  issued  another  re- 
port that,  while  not  as  optimistic  as  the 
earlier  British  study,  nevertheless  con- 
stituted a  strong  endorsement  of  an 
expanded  atomic  bomb  program.  Be- 
cause Compton's  group  had  prepared 
its  report  without  access  to  the  British 
conclusions — Bush    up    to    now    had 


^^Ltr.  Roosevelt  to  Churchill.  11  Oct  41,  FDR; 
Churchill's  reply  quoted  in  Msg,  Prime  Minister  to 
Harry  L.  Hopkins,  27  Feb  43,  HLH;  Crovvlher  and 
Whiddington,  Science  o I  l\'ar\  p.  146;  Smyth  Report,  p. 
37.  For  detailed  discussion  of  efforts  to  establish  ef- 
fective interchange  in  late  1941  see  Ch.  X. 


been  bound  not  to  disclose  them — its 
findings  consisted  of  both  a  further 
verification  of  the  British  views  and  an 
independent  recommendation. 

The  committee  report  stated  that 
"within  a  few  years  .  .  .  military  supe- 
riority" might  be  determined  by 
U-235  bombs  and  that  building  these 
bombs  seemed  "as  sure  as  any  un- 
tried prediction  based  upon  theory 
and  experiment  can  be."  The  amount 
of  U-235  needed  for  each  bomb 
would  be  between  2  and  100  kilo- 
grams, producing  an  explosive  energy 
per  kilogram  of  U-235  equal  to  that 
of  about  300  tons  of  TNT  and  a  de- 
structive effect  equivalent  to  about  30 
tons  of  TNT.  Atomic  bombs  could 
thus  be  of  "decisive  importance"  in 
defeating  Germany  and,  based  on  an 
estimate  that  military  and  industrial 
targets  in  Germany  could  be  devastat- 
ed with  500,000  tons  of  TNT  bombs, 
from  1  to  10  tons  of  U-235  would  be 
needed  to  do  the  same  job.  This 
much  U-235  could  be  obtained,  con- 
tinued the  report,  by  one  or  more 
methods  of  isotope  separation,  of 
which  the  gaseous  diffusion  and  cen- 
trifuge methods  appeared  to  be  fur- 
thest along  in  development.  In  ac- 
cordance with  instructions  from  Bush, 
the  committee  did  not  discuss  pluto- 
nium  and  it  purposely  played  down 
the  expense  of  producing  U-235 
bombs  to  avoid  arousing  government 
fears  of  excessive  costs.  "If  all  possi- 
ble effort  is  spent  on  the  program," 
the  report  concluded,  "fission 
bombs"  might  "be  available  in  signifi- 
cant quantity  within  three  or  four 
years."  ^^ 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1939-1942 


33 


This  prediction  came  at  a  time 
when  only  infinitesimal  amounts  of 
plutonium  had  been  produced  and 
when  no  appreciable  quantity  of 
U-235  had  been  separated  from 
U-238,  no  large  amounts  of  uranium 
metal  or  moderators  produced,  and, 
as  yet,  no  chain  reaction  achieved. 
Nevertheless,  the  committee  report, 
as  had  its  British  counterpart,  reflect- 
ed the  substantial  progress  that  had 
been  made  in  research.  Although 
some  scientists  were  still  no  more 
convinced  that  atomic  weapons  were 
imminently  possible  than  they  had 
been  a  year  earlier,  the  threat  of 
American  involvement  in  war  now 
seemed  far  stronger,  with  the  result 
that  large  expenditures  of  money  and 
effort  were  no  longer  seen  as  ex- 
travagances but  rather  as  necessary 
precautions. 

Bush's  first  action  after  receiving 
Compton's  committee  report  was  to 
show  it  to  Secretary  of  War  Stimson. 
Whether  the  6  November  meeting 
was  Stimson's  first  word  of  his  ap- 
pointment to  the  Top  Policy  Group  is 
not  clear,  but  there  is  no  doubt  about 
his  reaction  to  the  awesome  possibili- 
ties of  an  atomic  bomb.  "A  most  ter- 
rible thing,"  he  called  it,  sensing  the 
grave  responsibility  falling  upon  those 
who  would  unleash  the  power  of  such 


^^Bolh  quotations  from  Rpt,  Academy  Committee 
on  Uranium,  sub:  Rpt  to  President  of  the  Natl  Acad- 
emy of  Sciences,  6  Nov  41,  OSRD.  Portions  of  the 
report  are  reproduced  in  the  following  sources: 
Smyth  Report,  pp.  49-52;  Smyth  Ms  (containing 
some  material  not  included  in  final  version).  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Smyth  Rpt),  MDR; 
Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  56-59;  Baxter,  Scientists 
Against  Time.  pp.  426-28. 


a  devastating  weapon.^® 

During  the  next  few  weeks,  Bush 
apparently  reviewed  the  entire  Ameri- 
can atomic  energy  program  and,  in 
compliance  with  the  President's  in- 
structions, devised  a  plan  for  an  ad- 
ministrative reorganization  designed 
to  expedite  efforts  "in  every  possible 
way."  ^'  Finally,  on  27  November, 
Bush  forwarded  the  report  of  Comp- 
tion's  reviewing  committee  to  Roose- 
velt and,  presumably,  his  own  rec- 
ommendations for  the  new  organi- 
zation. The  NDRC  endorsed  these 
recommendations  on  the  twenty- 
eighth.  Then  on  6  December  1941, 
the  day  before  the  Japanese  attack  on 
Pearl  Harbor,  Conant — speaking  for 
Bush — announced  the  details  of  the 
new  organization  to  those  persons 
who  would  now  join  together  in  a 
maximum  effort  to  develop  an  atomic 
bomb. 

Under  the  new  organization,  the 
atomic  energy  program  was  divorced 
from  the  NDRC  and  placed  under  the 
immediate  supervision  of  Bush  as  the 
OSRD  director.  Bush  reported  direct- 
ly to  the  President,  at  the  same  time 
keeping  Vice  President  Wallace  and 
Secretary  Stimson  fully  informed.  The 
scientific  group  under  Bush  was  now 
called  the  OSRD  S-1  Section,  drop- 
ping the  word  uranium  for  security 
reasons.  Its  function  was  to  recom- 
mend and  coordinate  action  on  nucle- 
ar research,  ensure  that  authorized  as- 
signments were  carried  out,  and, 
within    six    months,    prepare    a    final 


^®  Diary  of  Henry  L.  Stimson  (hereafter  cited  as 
Stimson  Diary),  6  Nov  41,  HLS;  Henry  L.  Stimson, 
"The  Decision  To  Use  the  Bomb,"  Harper's  194 
(Feb  47):  98-99;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  59. 

"Ltr,  Bush  to  President,  9  Mar  42,  MDR. 


34 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


report  on  the  feasibility  of  building 
atomic  bombs. 

Conant,  acting  as  Bush's  represent- 
ative, had  oversight  of  the  whole  pro- 
gram. Briggs  stayed  on  as  chairman 
of  the  S-1  Section,  with  Dean  Pegram 
of  Columbia  as  vice  chairman  and  a 
number  of  outstanding  scientists  serv- 
ing as  consultants.  In  addition,  three 
program  chiefs,  each  a  Nobel  Prize 
winner,  were  in  charge  of  three  dis- 
tinct programs  in  physics.  Arthur  H. 
Compton  of  the  University  of  Chicago 
headed  the  program  of  basic  physics 
studies  and  measurements  of  nuclear 
properties  pertinent  to  the  chain  reac- 
tion. His  program  also  included  ex- 
ploring the  problem  of  plutonium 
production  by  means  of  the  con- 
trolled fissioning  of  uranium.  Ernest 
O.  Lawrence  of  the  University  of  Cali- 
fornia, Berkeley,  had  responsibility 
for  producing  the  first  small  samples 
of  fissionable  elements,  isotope  sepa- 
ration by  the  electromagnetic  method, 
and  experimental  work  on  the  prop- 
erties of  plutonium.  Finally,  Harold 
C.  Urey  of  Columbia  University  had 
charge  of  isotope  separation  by  the 
diffusion  and  centrifuge  methods,  as 
well  as  research  on  heavy  water 
production. 

To  supervise  engineering  procure- 
ment and  production  plant  construc- 
tion— activities  that  Bush  and  his  as- 
sociates knew  must  shortly  be  turned 
over  to  the  Army — the  OSRD  director 
set  up  a  planning  board,  headed  by 
Eger  V.  Murphree,  vice  president  of 
the  Standard  Oil  Development  Com- 
pany, an  affiliate  of  Standard  Oil 
Company  (New  Jersey).  The  OSRD 
would  enter  into  and  finance  all  con- 
tracts negotiated  in  support  of  the  re- 
organized atomic  energy  program. 
The  board  would  make  recommenda- 


tions to  Bush  concerning  those  con- 
tracts for  engineering,  for  develop- 
ment of  the  diffusion  and  centrifuge 
processes,  and  for  the  heavy  water 
program.  Briggs  and  Conant,  with  the 
interested  program  chiefs,  would  rec- 
ommend all  other  contracts.  When 
the  Army  took  over  administration  of 
much  of  the  atomic  energy  program, 
many  OSRD  contracts  had  to  be 
renegotiated.^^ 

America's  entry  into  World  War  II 
hastened  the  move  for  the  Army  to 
take  over  the  primary  direction  and 
control  of  the  bomb  development 
project.  Concrete  steps  to  bring  about 
this  change  came  up  for  discussion  at 
a  meeting  of  the  Top  Policy  Group 
called  by  Vice  President  Wallace  on 
16  December.  In  attendance  were 
Secretary  Stimson,  Bush,  Wallace, 
and,  in  addition,  Harold  D.  Smith,  di- 
rector of  the  Budget  Bureau.  Conant 
and  General  Marshall  were  unable  to 
attend.  According  to  Secretary  Stim- 
son, that  meeting  was  significant.  The 
group  discussed,  he  recorded,  "some 
of  the  new  inventions,  many  of  them 
diabolical,  that  are  coming  out  of  the 
Scientific  Research  Commission" 
[NDRC]  and  "decided  to  go  ahead 
with  certain  experiments."  Bush  him- 
self noted  the  group's  strong  opinion 
"that  OSRD  should  press  as  fast  as 
possible  on  the  construction  of  pilot 
plants."  ^^  He  estimated  this  aspect  of 


^*Ibid.  and  Incl;  Smyth  Report,  pp.  53-55;  Baxter, 
Snentuts  Against  Time.  p.  428;  Compton,  Atomic  Qimt, 
pp.  62-63  and  68-78;  Stewart,  Organizing  Scientific 
Research  for  War,  pp.  121-22;  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 
Xeu'  World,  pp.  40-51;  Charles  Sterling  Popple, 
Standard  Oil  Company  (Xew  Jersey)  in  World  War  II 
(New  York:  Standard  Oil  Co.,  1952),  p.  295. 

^^  Stimson  Diary,  16  Dec  41,  HLS;  Bush  quoted  in 
Smyth  Report,  p.  55. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1939-1942 


35 


the  work  would  cost  $4  to  $5  million 
and  stated  that  the  Army  should  take 
over  when  full-scale  construction 
began,  presumably  when  the  pilot 
plants  were  ready.  He  recommended 
that  a  suitably  trained  Army  officer 
should  familiarize  himself  with  the 
general  nature  of  the  program. 

The  Top  Policy  Group  then  ap- 
proved Bush's  reorganization  of  the 
atomic  energy  program  and  his  plans 
and  recommendations  for  action. 
They  also  agreed  that  the  internation- 
al aspects  were  clearly  a  presidential 
responsibility,  with  Bush's  function 
limited  to  liaison  solely  on  technical 
matters. *° 

Progress  in  Research  and  Development: 
The  Xuclear  Steeplechase 

Two  days  later,  on  18  December, 
the  new  OSRD  S-1  Section  held  its 
first  meeting,  a  session  "pervaded  by 
an  atmosphere  of  enthusiasm  and  ur- 
gency." *^  Conant  explained  again 
the  decision  to  proceed  with  the  de- 
velopment of  the  bomb  and  stressed 
the  necessity  of  a  maximum  effort. 
His  words  were  seconded  by  Urey 
and  Pegram,  recently  returned  from 
England,  who  described  British 
progress  on  the  gaseous  diffusion 
method  of  isotope  separation  and  in 
experiments  with  heavy  water.  They 
also  emphasized  that  Britain  greatly 
feared  Germany  might  produce 
atomic  bombs  before  the  Allies.  Prob- 
ably the  most  enthusiastic  presenta- 
tion was  Lawrence's  description  of  his 
success  in  testing  the  electromagnetic 
method  as  a  possible  process  for  sep- 


arating uranium  isotopes.  As  a 
member  of  Compton's  reviewing 
committee  the  previous  summer,  Law- 
rence had  become  convinced  of  the 
great  potentialities  of  this  method  in 
spite  of  the  widely  prevailing  belief 
among  scientists  that  the  so-called 
space  charge  limitation — mutual  re- 
pulsion of  ions,  making  sharp  focus  of 
a  beam  of  particles  impossible — made 
it  impractical  for  large-scale  separa- 
tion. Lawrence  asserted  that  experi- 
ments at  his  Berkeley-based  Radiation 
Laboratory  with  the  mass  spectro- 
graph proved  that  the  technical  diffi- 
culties that  tended  to  reduce  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  electromagnetic  process 
could  be  overcome. ^2 

A  184-inch  cyclotron  magnet, 
nearly  five  times  wider  than  the  37- 
inch  magnet  used  for  previous  experi- 
ments, had  been  under  construction 
at  the  University  of  California,  Berke- 
ley, funded  by  the  Rockefeller  Foun- 
dation. Work  had  stopped  because  of 
the  war,  but  now  an  extra  appropria- 
tion from  the  foundation  permitted 
Lawrence  to  complete  the  project  by 
the  end  of  May  1942,  providing  a 
means,  as  Lawrence  wrote  later,  that 
"made  it  seem  possible  that  we  might 
be  able  to  get  somewhere  ...  in  time 
to  be  of  value  in  this  war."  '*^ 

With  the  Radiation  Laboratory  re- 
searchers concentrating  increasingly 
on    electromagnetic    separation,    most 


*°  Smvth  Report,  p  55;  Ltr,  Bush  to  President, 
9  Mar  42,  MDR;  Hewleii  and  Anderson,  Xew  IVorld. 
pp.  51-52. 

*'  Smvth  Report,  p.  55. 


*^  Rpt,  W.  M  Brobeck  and  W.  B.  Reynolds,  sub: 
On  Future  Development  of  Electromagnetic  System 
of  Tube  Alloys  Isotope  .Separation,  15  Jan  45,  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Fldr  10,  MDR; 
Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  76-77;  Hewlett  and  An- 
derson, \eu>  Worlri,  pp.  56-57. 

■•^  I.tr,  Lawrence  to  Warren  Weaver  (Natural  Sci- 
ences Div  Dir,  Rockefeller  Foundation),  20  Aug  45, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (W),  MDR;  Smvth 
Report,  pp.  46,  49,  55,  136-40;  Compton.  Atomic 
Quest,  pp.  73-74. 


36 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


of  the  work  on  plutonium  was  left  to 
Compton's  University  of  Chicago 
group  that  was  investigating  the  feasi- 
bility of  achieving  a  chain  reaction.  In 
January  1941,  Compton  decided  to 
move  the  scientists  working  under  his 
supervision  at  Columbia  and  Prince- 
ton to  the  University  of  Chicago.  By 
early  February,  he  concentrated  the 
various  research  and  development  ac- 
tivities under  what  was  called,  for  se- 
curity reasons,  the  Metallurgical  Lab- 
oratory. Compton's  group  devoted 
itself  henceforth  to  three  main  tasks: 
achievement  of  a  chain  reaction;  study 
of  the  chemistry  of  plutonium,  includ- 
ing development  of  a  means  for  sepa- 
rating it  from  uranium;  and  the 
design  of  plutonium-producing  piles. 
Because  these  tasks  depended  upon 
an  adequate  supply  of  uranium  and 
graphite,  representatives  of  the  Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory  also  actively  sup- 
ported the  S-1  Section's  planning 
board  in  the  procurement  program, 
contributing  much  to  its  success.** 

At  the  same  time,  research  on  the 
gaseous  diffusion  process  and  on  the 
production  of  heavy  water  went  for- 
ward under  Harold  Urey's  direction 
at  Columbia,  and  investigations  on 
the  centrifuge  method  of  separation 
progressed  under  the  general  supervi- 
sion of  Eger  Murphree  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Virginia,  where  physicist  Jesse 
W.  Beams  directed  the  program,  and 
at  the  Standard  Oil  Development 
Company  in  New  Jersey,  where  re- 
search begun  earlier  at  Columbia  was 
continued. 

Work  was  also  proceeding  on  still 
another  separation  method,  liquid 
thermal  diffusion,  based  on  the  tend- 


ency of  one  of  two  isotopes  in  a  fluid 
to  concentrate  near  the  hotter  of  two 
opposing  surfaces.  Philip  H.  Abelson 
had  started  research  on  this  process 
at  the  Carnegie  Institution  but  later 
moved  to  facilities  at  the  Naval  Re- 
search Laboratory.  While  develop- 
ment of  the  thermal  diffusion  process 
was  not  a  part  of  the  OSRD  program, 
it  would  prove  highly  useful  to  the 
atomic  project  at  a  later  date.*^ 

Thus  the  OSRD  was  at  work  simul- 
taneously on  five  methods  of  pro- 
ducing fissionable  materials — three 
isotope  separation  processes  (electro- 
magnetic, gaseous  diffusion,  and 
centrifuge)  for  producing  U-235  and 
two  pile  processes  (uranium-graphite 
and  uranium-heavy  water)  for  manu- 
facturing plutonium — projects  Conant 
referred  to  as  five  "horses"  in  a 
race.*^  Choosing  a  favorite  and  pre- 
dicting an  outcome,  however,  were 
almost  impossible  because  any  one  of 
the  horses  might  encounter  insur- 
mountable obstacles.  Although  con- 
centrating all  resources  on  the  most 
promising  horse  would  have  been 
more  efficient  and  economic,  playing 
this  odd  just  might  have  enabled  Ger- 
many to  be  the  first  to  build  an 
atomic  bomb. 

In  support  of  this  nuclear  steeple- 
chase, the  OSRD,  by  early  February 
1942,  had  entered  into  ten  contracts 
with  twelve  institutions  totaling  more 
than  $1  million,  figures  that  roughly 
doubled   in   the   next   month.   On   the 


*'' Smyth    Report,    pp.    56    and    63-65;    Compton, 
Atomic  Quest,  pp.  80-98. 


*^  Smvth  Report,  pp.  47  and  56;  Testimony  of 
Gunn  in  Atomic  Energy  Heanngs  on  S.  Res.  1 79,  pp. 
367-68. 

*^  In  his  account  of  the  development  of  aUernate 
methods  for  producing  fissionable  materials  in  early 
1942,  Compton  counted  only  four  "horses"  in  the 
race,  perceiving  the  two  pile  processes  as  a  single 
method.  See  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  77-78. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1939-1942 


37 


twentieth,  Conant  recommended  that 
all  five  methods  "be  pushed  vigorous- 
ly" until  1  July,  by  which  time  he 
hoped  many  of  the  contracts  could  be 
dropped  or  revised  in  accordance 
with  whatever  progress  had  been 
made.  Indeed,  Conant  continued,  if 
by  then  the  electromagnetic  method 
of  separation  demonstrated  a  clear  ca- 
pability "of  producing  grams  per 
day,"  work  on  other  methods  of  pro- 
ducing fissionable  materials  might  be 
dropped  or  at  least  continued  at  a 
slower  pace.  Furthermore,  even  if  all 
five  horses  had  to  be  kept  running  "at 
full  speed  down  the  course"  until  the 
beginning  of  1943,  the  OSRD  re- 
search program  might  still  be  com- 
pleted for  between  $10  and  $17 
million.*^ 

The  "intense  scientific  research  and 
engineering  planning  now  underway" 
was  the  subject  of  a  guardedly  opti- 
mistic progress  report  that  Bush  sub- 
mitted to  the  President  on  9  March. 
"The  possibility  of  actual  production 
appears  more  certain,"  he  wrote,  but 
"the  way  to  full  accomplishment  is 
still  exceedingly  difficult."  A  full-scale 
effort  might  achieve  completion  of 
the  project  in  1944,  or  possibly  six 
months  sooner,  and  success  for  either 
the  Allies  or  the  enemy  could  "be  de- 
termining in  the  war  effort."  Bush 
pointed  out  that  the  work  was  "rapid- 
ly approaching  the  pilot  plant  stage," 
with  selection  of  the  best  methods  of 
production  not  too  far  off.  The 
summer  of  1942,  he  believed,  would 
"find  the  matter  ready  to  turn  over  to 
Army   control,    for   actual    production 


plant  construction."  A  further  reason 
for  transferring  "the  whole  matter  .  .  . 
to  the  War  Department,"  Bush 
added,  was  the  necessity  for  institut- 
ing tight  security  measures  once 
actual  production  began.*® 

With  the  Army's  entrance  into  the 
atomic  energy  program  only  a  few 
months  off,  it  was  time  to  assign  a 
suitable  officer  to  follow  nuclear  de- 
velopments. For  this  mission.  General 
Marshall  personally  chose  Brig.  Gen. 
Wilhelm  D.  Styer,  chief  of  staff  of  the 
Services  of  Supply  (SOS).  A  graduate 
of  the  U.S.  Military  Academy,  with  an 
additional  degree  in  civil  engineering 
from  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Tech- 
nology and  two  decades  of  experience 
as  a  Corps  of  Engineers  officer  super- 
vising various  kinds  of  construction 
projects,  Styer  was  well  qualified  to 
lay  the  groundwork  for  Army  partici- 
pation in  the  atomic  energy  program. 
He  immediately  began  an  intensive 
study  of  the  project,  in  close  coordi- 
nation with  Bush  and  the  S-1  Section. 
Despite  the  demands  of  his  SOS 
duties,  from  this  point  until  his  depar- 
ture for  an  overseas  assignment  late 
in  the  war.  General  Styer  would  play 
an  important  part  in  the  Army's  effort 
to  produce  an  atomic  bomb.*^ 


■'■'  Conant's  words  as  quoted  in  Baxter,  Scientists 
Against  Time.  p.  433;  Smyth  Report,  p.  56;  Rpt  to 
President,  sub:  Status  of  Tube  Alloys  Development, 
9  Mar  42,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Bush  to  President,  same  date, 
MDR. 


■»«  Ltr,  Bush  to  President,  9  Mar  42,  MDR. 

■»«  1st  Ind,  Stver  to  Chief  of  Mil  Hist,  15  Aug  61, 
to  Ltr,  Chief  of  Mil  Hist  to  Styer,  17  Jul  61,  CMH; 
Memo,  Bush  and  Conant  to  Wallace,  Stimson,  and 
Marshall,  sub:  Atomic  Fission  Bombs,  13  Jun  42, 
Incl  to  Ltr,  Bush  to  President,  17  Jun  42,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  6,  MDR  (cf.  Ltr.  Bush  to  President,  9  Mar  42, 
and  Incl,  MDR).  On  Styer,  see  John  D.  Millett,  The 
Organization  and  Role  of  the  Ar7ny  Serince  Forces.  U.S. 
Armv  in  World  War  II  (Washington,  D.C.:  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  1954).  pp.  5,  32.  369.  and 
passim;  Cullum,  Biographical  Register.  6B:1806, 
7:1121-22.8:306,9:207. 


38 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Meanwhile,  the  five  horses  were  in 
the  running,  four  of  them  neck  and 
neck,  with  a  fifth  one  now  bidding  to 
join  the  race.  This  was  the  alternate 
method  of  producing  plutonium  by 
using  heavy  water  instead  of  graphite 
as  the  moderator  in  a  chain  reaction 
pile,  a  process  strongly  championed 
by  Urey.  As  work  approached  the 
pilot  plant  stage,  the  need  to  concen- 
trate on  one  or  more  of  these  horses 
was  becoming  increasingly  apparent. 
To  conserve  time,  design  and  con- 
struction of  actual  production  plants 
should  begin  even  before  the  pilot 
plants  were  finished.  However, 
Conant  believed  there  was  "a  desper- 
ate need  for  speed"  to  build  the 
bombs  before  the  Germans  could  and 
he  only  solution  was  to  go  ahead  on 
all  five.50 

On  23  May,  S-1  Section  Chairman 
Lyman  Briggs  met  with  Compton, 
Lawrence,  LIrey,  and  Murphree  to 
make  final  recommendations  on  the 
program.  In  a  report  submitted  to 
Bush  two  days  later,  the  group  con- 
cluded that  practical  atomic  bombs  of 
either  U-235  or  plutonium,  with  an 
energy  release  equal  to  that  of  several 
thousand  tons  of  TNT,  were  definite- 
ly feasible.  Underestimating  the 
amount  of  fissionable  material  later 
found  necessary  for  each  bomb,  as 
well  as  the  time  required  for  develop- 
ment and  construction,  they  believed 
the  bombs  would  be  available  in  small 
quantities  by  about  July  1944.  They 
recommended  funding  of  all  five 
methods,  although,  for  reasons  ad- 
vanced primarily  by  Compton,  they 
gave  the  uranium-graphite  pile  a  defi- 
nite priority  over  the  heavy  water  pile. 
They  also  proposed  a  pilot  diffusion 


plant  and  preparation  of  complete  en- 
gineering designs  for  a  full-scale  dif- 
fusion installation.  They  advised  con- 
structing a  centrifuge  plant  by  Janu- 
ary 1944,  an  electromagnetic  plant  by 
late  1943,  a  plutonium-producing 
atomic  power  installation  by  early 
1944,  and,  as  an  auxiliary  to  the 
latter,  heavy  water  plants  by  May 
1943. 

Bush,  Conant,  and  General  Styer 
approved  these  recommendations 
and,  on  13  June,  Bush  and  Conant 
submitted  them  to  the  Top  Policy 
Group  with  detailed  plans  to  expand 
the  atomic  energy  program.  They  un- 
derlined the  danger  of  German  suc- 
cess in  building  an  atomic  bomb  and 
endorsed  the  proposal  to  continue 
work  on  all  major  methods  of  produc- 
tion. At  the  same  time,  they  warned 
that  such  a  course  would  interfere 
with  other  military  research  and 
called  for  careful  judgment,  when  fur- 
ther study  made  it  possible,  to 
achieve  a  better  balance.^ ^ 

Importantly,  Bush  and  Conant  rec- 
ommended that  construction  of  the 
separation  plants  and  development  of 
the  power  project  be  turned  over  to 
the  Army,  specifically  "to  be  in  [the] 
charge  of  a  qualified  officer  designat- 
ed by  the  Chief  of  Engineers  and  re- 
porting to  him.  .  .  ."  They  also  sug- 
gested that  this  officer  be  assisted  on 
a  full-time  basis  by  leading  civilian 
scientists  and  engineers,  "preferably 
in  the  status  of  officers."  ^^  Funds  for 


Quoted  in  Baxter,  Scienlists  Agonist  Time.  p.  434. 


^1  Ibid.,  pp.  434-35;  Memo,  Bush  and  Conant  to 
Wallace,  Stimson,  and  Marshall,  13  Jun  42,  Incl  to 
Ltr,  Bush  to  President,  17  Jun  42,  MDR;  Smvth 
Report,  pp.  56-57;  Compton,  Atomic  Qimt.  pp.  98- 
103. 

^2  Memo,  Bush  and  Conant  to  Wallace,  Stimson, 
and  Marshall.  13  Jun  42,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Bush  to  Presi- 
dent, 1 7  Jun  42,  MDR. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1939-1942 


39 


this  work — $54  million  in  fiscal  year 
1943 — should  be  made  available  to 
the  Engineers  chief  who,  to  avoid 
delay,  should  be  authorized  to  spend 
or  overobligate  any  money  under  his 
control  with  the  understanding  that 
he  would  be  reimbursed  later.  After 
consulting  with  the  S-1  Section's 
planning  board,  the  Engineers  chief 
should  also  begin  immediately  to  let 
contracts  for  the  detailed  design  of  all 
plants. 

Under  the  Bush-Conant  proposals, 
the  OSRD  would  continue  to  direct 
and  control  research  and  develop- 
ment, with  $31  million  directly 
available  for  this  purpose  and  an  ad- 
ditional $5  million  held  in  reserve  for 
contingencies  in  the  next  fiscal  year. 
There  would  be  frequent  meetings 
between  representatives  of  the  OSRD 
and  the  Corps  of  Engineers  in  order 
to  coordinate  and  report  on  research, 
development,  and  construction.  Re- 
search and  development  on  the  actual 
military  uses  of  atomic  energy  would 
be  under  the  Joint  Committee  on 
New  Weapons  and  Equipment  of  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.  In  addition. 
Bush  and  Conant  suggested  that  sites 
be  selected,  priorities  established,  and 
close  security  regulations  imposed  on 
the  entire  project. 

With  the  approval  of  Vice  President 
Wallace,  Secretary  Stimson,  and  Gen- 
eral Marshall,  Bush  forwarded  the 
proposed  program  to  the  President 
on    17  June    1942.    "If  you   also   ap- 


prove," he  wrote,  "we  will  proceed 
along  these  lines  immediately."  The 
President's  initials — "OK  FDR" — 
were  affixed  that  day,  signaling  the 
decision  to  go  ahead. ^^ 

The  United  States  was  now  firmly 
and  fully  committed  to  an  all-out 
effort  to  build  an  atomic  bomb.  From 
initial  skepticism  and  only  casual  in- 
terest, the  attitude  of  the  government 
had  changed  gradually  to  one  of 
active  support.  The  ultimate  decision 
to  build  the  bomb  was  a  presidential 
one  and,  as  such,  had  been  made  at 
the  meeting  with  Wallace  and  Bush 
on  9  October  1941.  But  laying  the 
groundwork  for  that  far-reaching  de- 
cision were  the  intermediate  steps 
taken  by  Bush  and  his  scientific  asso- 
ciates in  early  December  1941,  rein- 
forced by  Stimson  and  Wallace  later 
that  month,  and  confirmed  by  mem- 
bers of  the  S-1  Section  and  the  Top 
Policy  Group  in  the  spring  of  1942. 
As  for  the  Army,  the  President's  deci- 
sion on  17  June  brought  it  back  into 
the  atomic  bomb  program,  this  time 
to  participate  on  a  far  broader  scale. 
Within  hours  of  that  decision,  the 
Army  designated  Col.  James  C.  Mar- 
shall, who  had  nearly  twenty-five 
years  as  a  regular  in  the  Corps  of 
Engineers,  to  begin  the  task  of  orga- 
nizing and  carrying  out  its  vast  new 
assignment  as  administrator  of  all 
construction  work  for  that  program. 


>3  Ltr,  Bush  to  President,  17  Jun  42,  MDR. 


CHAPTER  II 


Establishing  the  Manhattan  District 


Undeterred  bv  the  unusual  nature 
of  the  atomic  energy  program,  the 
Army  Corps  of  Engineers  in  June 
1942  prepared  to  carry  out  its  new 
wartime  construction  assignment. 
After  his  initial  conference  with  Brig. 
Gen.  Wilhelm  D.  Styer  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  eighteenth,  Col. 
James  C.  Marshall  experienced  a  cer- 
tain restlessness  as  he  tried  to  com- 
prehend the  scope  of  the  new  task  at 
hand.  The  next  day,  he  received  some 
of  the  answers  to  his  many  questions 
when  Styer  took  him  to  the  Office  of 
Scientific  Research  and  Development 
to  call  on  V'annevar  Bush,  fhe  OSRD 
director  gave  the  two  officers  several 
documents,  among  them  a  copy  of 
the  program  for  continued  develop- 
ment of  atomic  energy  that  President 
Roosevelt  had  approved  on  the  seven- 
teenth. From  these  papers  Marshall 
learned  that  the  Army  was  now 
charged  with  "all  large-scale  as- 
pects," ^  as  Bush  put  it,  of  the  atomic 
energy  program,  with  the  OSRD  re- 
taining responsibility  for  scientific  re- 
search and  pilot  plant  experimenta- 
tion. The  Army's  mission  included 
building  both  pilot  and  full-scale 
plants  for  producing  fissionable  mate- 
rials to  be  used  in  the  manufacture  of 


atomic  bombs,  letting  contracts  for 
these  plants  and  others  to  be  under 
OSRD  direction,  and  extensive  site 
selection,  acquisition,  and  develop- 
ment— all  to  be  carried  out  in  close 
coordination  with  the  OSRD. 

That  afternoon,  again  in  General 
Styer's  office.  Colonel  Marshall  re- 
ceived formal  orders  on  the  Army's 
phase  of  the  atomic  energv  project. 
On  the  covering  letter  of  the  ap- 
proved program,  Styer  wrote  the  fol- 
lowing endorsement  to  Marshall: 
"This  is  referred  to  you  for  informa- 
tion and  appropriate  action  in  accord- 
ance with  our  discussion  of  this  sub- 
ject with  Dr.  Bush  this  morning."  ^ 
This  simple  statement  constituted  the 
basic  directive  to  the  C>orps  of  Engi- 
neers for  its  work  on  development  of 
the  atomic  bomb.  Styer  also  empha- 
sized that  the  orders  had  come  direct- 
ly from  the  War  Deparment's  Services 
of  Supply  (SOS)  and  that  Colonel 
Marshall  would  furnish  all  details  of 
the  new  project  to  the  Engineers 
chief,  Maj.  Gen.  Eugene  Reybold. 

hi  the  weeks  that  followed  the  hur- 
ried orientation  of  the  past  two  days, 
Colonel  Marshall  became  more  famil- 
iar with  the  current  status  of  the  pro- 


'  Memo.    Bush   K)  (onaiii.   sub: 
All<)%s|  I'lf^m,  19  |un  42.  HB  Fik-s, 


luhcallov    11 
Fl(ir  (i.  MDR 


2   Isi    lud,    StNC-l 

Bush     lo    SIMM,     sa 


Marshall.    19    |un   42,    lo    I.ir, 
date,  HB  Flics,  FIdi    (.,  MDR. 


ESIABLISHING    IHE  MANHAIIAN  DISTRICT 


41 


Brig.  Gen.  W  ilhelm  D.  St\er 

{1941  photograph) 

gram  and  what  the  Army's  role  was  to 
be  in  the  months  ahead.  He  was  to 
have  broad  authority  to  use  engineer 
facilities,  choose  personnel,  and  take 
whatever  steps  were  necessary  to 
carry  out  his  assignment.  Marshall 
soon  realized,  however,  that  he  was 
going  to  need  all  the  assistance  he 
could  muster  in  order  to  have  any 
hope  of  success  in  achieving  his 
mission.^ 

Organizing  the  District 

1  he  Engineers  chief  normally  over- 
saw construction  projects  through  an 
engineer  district,  the  basic  unit  of  the 


engineer  field  organization  for  super- 
vising construction  work.  The  district 
engineer  customarily  was  responsible 
to  a  division  engineer,  who  headed 
one  of  the  eleven  geographical  divi- 
sions in  the  United  States  (which,  in 
1942,  constituted  regional  administra- 
tive headquarters  of  the  Engineer  De- 
partment of  the  Corps).  Because  of 
the  special  character,  scope,  and  im- 
portance of  Colonel  Marshall's  mis- 
sion, however,  the  new  district  to 
oversee  atomic  energy  construction 
would  be  directly  subordinate  to  the 
Engineers  chief  and,  unrestricted  by 
geographical  limitations,  its  field  of 
operations  would  extend  into  other 
districts  and  divisions.  Furthermore, 
although  designated  a  district  engi- 
neer, Marshall  was  to  have  all  the  au- 
thority, responsibility,  and  independ- 
ence regularly  granted  to  a  division 
engineer.  Indeed,  in  many  respects, 
he  was  to  have  far  more.^ 

While  Marshall's  responsibility  was 
to  the  Engineers  chief,  in  practice  he 
worked  with  Reybold's  assistant.  Brig. 
Gen.  Thomas  M.  Robins,  who  was  in 
charge  of  construction,  and  particu- 
larly with  his  deputy.  Col.  Leslie  R. 
Groves.  During  the  summer  of  1942, 
Robins  and  Groves  reviewed  Mar- 
shall's plans  and  furnished  him  with 
the  support  and  assistance  necessary 
to  get  the  project  started.  Appropri- 
ate agencies  of  the  chief's  staff  also 
cooperated  fully  with  Marshall,  who 
was  able  to  make  good  use  of  other 
engineer  facilities  and  War  Depart- 
ment assistance.  On  all  important  de- 


3  Marshall  Diarv,  19  jun  42,  OCCi  Files.  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  Ciroves  Files,  Misc  Recs  Sec,  behind  Fldi  5, 
MDR, 


"AR  100-20,  l«  Sep  42;  Paul  W.  Ihonipson, 
What  You  Should  Know  About  the  Army  Engineers  (New 
York.  W.  W.  Norton  and  Co.,  1942),  pp.  194-96. 
Subsection  based  primarily  on  Marshall  I)iar\,  MDR, 
and  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  11-18. 


42 


jftmKKi^^ 


^^      ^>^ 


Brig.  Gen.  James  C.  Marshall 

( 19-f6  photograph) 

cisions,  Marshall  consulted  with  Gen- 
erals Reybold  and  Styer;  the  latter,  in 
addition  to  his  many  duties  as  SOS 
chief  of  staff,  kept  well  abreast  of  cur- 
rent nuclear  developments.  To  en- 
force strict  secrecy,  Army  Chief  of 
Staff  General  George  C.  Marshall 
originally  had  forbidden  Styer  to 
reveal  to  the  SOS  commander,  Lt. 
Gen.  Brehon  B.  Somervell,  anything 
about  the  atomic  energy  program.  In 
June,  however,  with  the  entrance  of 
the  Army  into  an  active  role  in  the 
project.  General  Marshall  directed 
Styer  to  brief  Somervell  and  to  enlist 
his  support.^ 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  IHE  AI OMIC:  BOMB 


In  late  June,  Colonel  Marshall 
opened  a  liaison  office  in  Washing- 
ton, D.C.,  in  the  New  War  Depart- 
ment Building  at  21st  Street  and  Vir- 
ginia Avenue,  NW.  At  the  same  time, 
he  set  up  temporary  district  head- 
quarters at  270  Broadway  in  New- 
York,  where  he  had  ready  access  not 
only  to  the  colocated  administrative 
facilities  of  the  Engineer  Depart- 
ment's North  Atlantic  Division  but 
also  to  the  Manhattan  office  of  the 
Stone  and  Webster  Engineering  Cor- 
poration, soon  to  become  a  major 
contractor  for  the  atomic  project.  To 
staff  the  district.  Colonel  Marshall  re- 
ceived authorization  from  the  Engi- 
neers chief  to  draw  on  officers  and  ci- 
vilians who  had  served  under  him  in 
the  Syracuse  District,  among  them  Lt. 
Col.  Kenneth  D.  Nichols,  whom  he 
appointed  assistant  district  engineer. 
The  Syracuse  District  recently  had 
completed  the  major  part  of  its  war- 
time construction  program  and,  as  the 
volume  of  work  decreased  during  the 
summer,  Marshall  was  able  to  draw 
more  and  more  personnel  from  his 
former  command.  Soon  over  a  dozen 
men  had  transferred  to  the  new  dis- 
trict. Several  who  were  civilians  at  the 
time  subsequently  received  reserve 
commissions  and  went  on  active  duty. 
To  provide  still  more  officers.  Gener- 
al Robins  directed  other  districts  to 
give  Marshall  a  priority  on  any  sur- 
plus personnel  they  might  have.® 


^  Styer's  recollection  is  that  he  was  not  aiithoii/ed 
to  bring  in  Somervell  until  September,  but  contem- 
porary evidence  indicates  Somervell  was  participat- 
ing in  late  June.  1st  Ind,  Stver  to  Chief  of  Mil  Hist, 
\r>  Aug  (il,  to  I.tr.  Chief  of  Mil  Hist  to  Stver,   17  Jul 


61,  CMH  (cf.  Marshall  Diary,  26  Jun  and  10  Jul  42, 
MDR).  On  the  I-Lngineers  organization  in  earlv  1942 
see  Blanche  D.  C-oll,  Jean  E.  Keith,  and  Herbert  H. 
Rosenthal,  Thf  Corps  oj  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equip- 
ment. r.S.  Arniv  in  World  War  II  (Washington,  D.C.: 
Government  Printing  Office,  1958),  pp.  1,S2-:U). 

^  Details  on  the  engagement  of  Stone  and  Web- 
ster as  a  major  contractor  for  the  atomic  project  are 


ESIABLISHINC;    IHK  MANHA  1  IAN  DIS  IRId 


43 


Col.  Kenneth  D.  Nichols  { 1945 photograph} 


Engineer  districts  normally  took 
their  names  from  the  city  where  they 
were  located,  bnt  Colonel  Marshall's 
new  district  lacked  a  permanent  head- 
quarters. Some  convenient  designa- 
tion was  needed,  however,  that  would 
conceal  the  real  nature  of  the  project. 
On  26  June,  Generals  Somervell, 
Styer,  and  Reybold  agreed  on  the 
elaborate  cover  name  of  Laboratory 
for  the  Development  of  Substitute 
Materials,    or   DSM.    Within    the   next 


discussed  laid  on  m  this  chapter.  Interv,  Slanlc\  L. 
Palk  and  Author  with  Clharles  \'anden  Bulck  (former 
S\racusc  District  civihan  emplo\ee  before  serving  as 
Chief.  Admin  I)iv,  MD)  and  his  assistant  Capt  VV.  R. 
McCaulev.  22  Jun  60.  CMH;  MDH.  Bk.  1.  \'ol.  1. 
■•(ieneral."  p.  3.13.  DASA.  See  also  I.tr,  Marshall  to 
Robins.  Hi  Nov  42,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp. 
231.2,  MDR,  in  which  Marshall's  procurement  prior- 
it  \  was  extended  to  supplies  and  equipment  as  well 
as  personnel,  and  the  word  surplus  was  dropped. 


two  weeks  Marshall's  plans  and  orga- 
nization for  a  new  district  were  ap- 
proved and  he  submitted  to  Colonel 
Groves  the  draft  of  a  general  order 
establishing  a  DSM  District.  To 
Groves,  the  term  DSM  seemed  likely 
to  arouse  attention  and  curiosity.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  two  officers  reached 
agreement  that  the  name  Manhattan, 
where  Marshall  had  established  his 
temporary  headquarters,  would  be  a 
better  name.  On  13  August,  General 
Reybold  issued  a  general  order  (effec- 
tive on  the  sixteenth)  officially  estab- 
lishing "a  new  engineer  district,  with- 
out territorial  limits,  to  be  known  as 
the  Manhattan  District,  .  .  .  with 
headquarters  at  New  York,  N.V.,  to 
supervise   projects   assigned    to    it    by 


44 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


the  Chief  of  Engineers."  ^  The  term 
DSM  continued  in  use  as  an  official 
code  name  for  the  entire  project,  but 
the  word  Manhattan — symbolically 
representing  the  Army's  contribution 
in  the  development  of  the  atomic 
bomb — gradually  superseded  it.^ 

Meanwhile,  Vannevar  Bush  carried 
out  the  necessary  changes  in  the 
OSRD  organization.  Under  the  provi- 
sions of  the  newly  approved  program, 
the  OSRD  retained  responsibility  for 
pilot  plants  for  the  centrifuge,  diffu- 
sion, and  electromagnetic  separation 
processes,  as  well  as  for  further  re- 
search and  development  on  the  latter 
method,  for  the  heavy  water  project, 
and  for  additional  miscellaneous  re- 
search. Acting  upon  a  suggestion  of 
James  B.  Conant,  based  upon  his 
review  of  past  operating  procedures 
of  the  uranium  project.  Bush  abol- 
ished the  S-1  Section  and  its  planning 
board  and,  in  their  place,  established 
the  S-1  Executive  Committee.  Mem- 
bership of  the  new  committee  includ- 
ed most  of  the  individuals  who  had 
previously  served  in  the  S-1  Section: 
Conant,  as  chairman;  Lyman  J. 
Briggs;  Ernest  O.  Lawrence;  Arthur 
H.  Compton;  Harold  C.  Urey;  and 
Eger  V.  Murphree,  with  the  addition 
of  Irvin  Stewart,  the  OSRD  executive 
secretary.  H.  T.  Wensel,  formerly  of 
the  planning  board,  became  technical 
aide.  Only  Dean  George  B.  Pegram  of 
Columbia  dropped  out. 

Bush  charged  the  new  S-1  Execu- 
tive Committee  with  recommending 
contracts  and  supervising  contract  op- 
erations and  enjoined  its  members  to 


begin  work  immediately,  in  close  co- 
ordination with  the  Army  Corps  of 
Engineers.  Bush  particularly  cau- 
tioned them  on  the  importance  of 
maintaining  the  "greatest  secrecy"  on 
all  phases  of  the  project,  and  stated 
that  "we  will  continue  ...  to  adhere 
to  the  principle  that  confidential  in- 
formation will  be  made  available  to  an 
individual  only  insofar  as  it  is  neces- 
sary for  his  proper  functioning  in 
connection  with  his  assigned 
duties."  ^ 

An  additional,  though  temporary, 
responsibility  of  the  S-1  Executive 
Committee  was  overseeing  experi- 
mentation on  the  military  applications 
of  atomic  energy.  As  outlined  in  the 
atomic  energy  program  approved  by 
the  President,  the  Joint  Committee  on 
New  Weapons  and  Equipment  of  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  had  primary  re- 
sponsibility for  this  administrative 
mission.  Vannevar  Bush  also  headed 
this  committee.  Serving  with  him 
were  Brig.  Gen.  Raymond  G.  Moses, 
chief  of  the  Supply  Division  (G-4)  of 
the  Army  General  Staff,  and  Rear 
Adm.  Willis  A.  Lee,  Jr.,  who  held  a 
similar  position  as  Assistant  Chief  of 
Staff  (Readiness),  U.S.  Fleet.  With 
these  officers  Bush  raised  the  ques- 
tion of  establishing  a  subcommittee  to 
consider  military  uses  of  atomic 
energy — formed,  not  hastily,  but  with 
"great  care."  Pending  organization  of 
this  new  group.  Bush  directed  the  S-1 
Executive  Committee  to  continue  its 
work  on  military  applications.  ^° 


'WD,  (K.K,  GO  33,  13  Aug  42.  While  the  legal 
designation  of  the  new  district  was  Manhattan  Dis- 
trict, it  was  often  referred  to  as  the  Manhattan  Engi- 
neer District. 

*Smvth  Ri-port.  p.  59. 


^Qiioted  words  from  Memo,  Bush  to  Conant, 
19  Jun  42,  MDR.  See  also  Stewart,  Organizing  Scien- 
lific  Research  fm  War.  p.  122;  Smyth  Report,  p.  59. 

'"Ltr,  Bush  to  Stver,  19  Jun  42,  and  Memo,  Bush 
to  Conant,  19  Jun  42.  MDR;  Min,  6th  Mtg  of  JNW, 
16  Jun  42,  334,  JCS:  Ms,  Vernon  E.  Davis,  "Organi- 


ESTABLISHING   IHE  MANHA ITAN  DISTRICT 


45 


The  relationship  between  the  Man- 
hattan District  and  the  OSRD  S-1 
Committee  during  the  summer  of 
1942  can  best  be  described  as  a  coop- 
erative one.  While  each  agency  had  its 
assigned  functions  within  the  overall 
atomic  energy  program,  they  coordi- 
nated either  formally  or  informally  on 
all  major  decisions.  But  they  did  not 
act  together  as  a  joint  directorate,  for 
each  organization  was  free  to  proceed 
as  it  wished  to  carry  out  decisions,  or 
other  activities,  strictly  within  its  own 
area  of  competence. 

Periodic  meetings  of  the  S-1  Com- 
mittee with  Colonel  Marshall  and  one 
or  more  other  officers  of  the  Manhat- 
tan District  provided  the  formal  link 
between  the  two  organizations.  Rep- 
resentatives of  the  principal  engineer- 
ing or  industrial  firms  connected  with 
the  project  also  attended  frequently. 
During  this  period,  the  S-1  Commit- 
tee met  at  least  once  a  month,  usually 
in  executive  session  in  the  morning — 
while  Marshall  was  conferring  with  his 
military  superiors — and  then  opened 
the  meeting  to  the  Manhattan  repre- 
sentatives. These  joint  meetings  en- 
couraged a  free  exchange  of  views, 
provided  scientific  briefings  for  Mar- 
shall and  his  colleagues,  enabled  the 
scientists  to  seek  Army  assistance 
where  necessary,  and  generally  en- 
hanced coordination.^^ 


zalional  I^evelopmciit:  Development  of  the  JCS 
Committee  Structure,"'  The  History  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  in  World  War  II,  Vol.  2  (Washington, 
DC:  Historical  Division,  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff, 
1972),  pp.  308-12,  NARS. 

"In  addition  to  material  from  the  Marshall  Diary, 
MDR,  detailed  sunmiaries  of  the  S-1  Committee 
meetings  are  included  in  the  DSM  Chronology, 
OROO.  The  latter  is  a  rough  first-draft  summary  of 
events  relating  to  the  Manhattan  District,  covering 
most  developments  in  some  detail  through  .April 
1943  and  for  the  single  month  of  July  1944,  leaving 
a  gap  from  May  1943  through  June  1944.   The  chro- 


Army-OSRD  links  were  further 
strengthened  by  cooperation  between 
Manhattan  officers  and  civilian  scien- 
tists working  together  on  specific 
projects.  In  the  beginning  these  ties 
were  kept  inconspicuous,  especially  to 
conceal  the  Army's  interest.  In  their 
visits  to  university  or  industrial  lab- 
oratories. Army  officers  usually  wore 
civilian  clothing,  and  every  effort  was 
made  to  hide  the  relationship  be- 
tween the  Corps  of  Engineers  and 
OSRD-directed  projects.  This  effort 
was  sometimes  frustrated  when  a  few 
scientists,  unaccustomed  to  working 
under  rigid  security  conditions,  talked 
more  freely  than  they  should  have 
about  the  Army's  interest  in  their 
work.  And  despite  Bush's  warnings, 
even  the  S-1  Committee  was  careless 
on  occasion.  In  mid-August,  for  ex- 
ample, Colonel  Marshall  had  to  point 
out  that  highly  classified  material 
should  not  be  sent  to  him  through 
the  regular  mail.  In  general,  however, 
the  good  relationship  between  the 
Manhattan  District  and  the  S-1  Com- 
mittee helped  to  keep  such  occur- 
rences to  a  minimum. 

Details  of  the  Army-OSRD  meet- 
ings reached  the  Top  Policy  Group 
through  twin  channels:  scientific  and 
military.  Conant  reported  to  Bush 
and  Colonel  Marshall  to  his  superiors 
in  General  Reybold's  office,  or  some- 
times directly  to  General  Styer.  The 
latter  then  passed  on  information 
about  the  atomic  project  to  Generals 
Somervell  and  Marshall.  Secretary  of 
War    Henry    L.    Stimson    appears    to 


nology,  apparently  prepared  in  late  1944  bv  Maj. 
Harrv  S.  Iravnor,  a  Manhattan  staff  officer,  is  based 
not  onlv  on  sources  cited  in  this  volume  but  also  on 
certain  other  materials  not  available  to  the  present 
author. 


46 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


have  received  only  limited  data  on  de- 
velopments during  the  summer  of 
1942;  Vannevar  Bush  submitted  only 
one  formal  report  to  Harvey  Bundy, 
the  Secretary's  special  assistant  for 
scientific  affairs.  To  what  extent  Vice 
President  Henry  A.  Wallace  received 
information  on  atomic  developments 
is  unclear;  the  Top  Policy  Group  did 
not  meet  during  this  period  and  there 
is  no  other  indication  that  reports 
were  sent  to  Wallace.  Even  the  Presi- 
dent's information  and  activities  were 
evidently  limited  to  the  question  of 
nuclear  collaboration  with  Great  Brit- 
ain, and  he  seems  to  have  discussed 
that  only  with  Bush.  In  effect,  then, 
the  S-1  Executive  Committee  and 
Manhattan  District  were  free  to  act  on 
any  mutually  approved  decision. 
Their  scientific  or  military  superiors 
could  always  exercise  the  right  of 
veto,  but  in  the  summer  of  1942  they 
apparently  did  not  do  so.  Only  later, 
when  major  changes  were  to  be  made 
in  the  atomic  energy  program,  would 
they  once  more  actively  enter  the 
picture.  ^^ 

Army-OSRD  Planning  Meeting, 
23  June  1942 

On  the  occasion  of  the  first  meet- 
ing of  the  S-1  Executive  Committee, 
convened  at  the  Carnegie  Institution 
in  Washington,  D.C.,  on  25  June 
1942,  General  Styer,  Colonels  Mar- 
shall and  Nichols,  Vannevar  Bush, 
and  the  regular  members  of  the  com- 
mittee reached  several  important  de- 
cisions  regarding  site   selection,   con- 


tracting with  engineering  firms,  and 
obtaining  government  priorities  for 
needed  materials  and  equipment.  ^^ 

War  Department  policy  normally 
required  location  of  new  munitions 
plants  out  of  range  of  enemy  carrier- 
based  planes,  in  a  great  inland  zone 
between  the  Appalachian  and  Rocky 
Mountains  and  approximately  200 
miles  from  the  nation's  borders  with 
Canada  and  Mexico.^*  General  Styer 
stated  that  the  main  atomic  energy  in- 
stallations should  be  placed  within 
this  zone  and  that,  to  ensure  secrecy, 
all  manufacturing  plants  should  be 
built  at  a  single  site.  The  group  gen- 
erally agreed  with  Styer  on  plant  con- 
centration, which  would  enable  rapid 
and  economical  construction  and  fa- 
cilitate control  over  the  work.  To  sup- 
port the  extensive  facilities,  a  continu- 
ous supply  of  approximately  150,000 
kilowatts  of  electricity  would  be 
needed  by  the  end  of  1943  and  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  gallons  of 
water  per  minute.  There  would  have 
to  be  a  climate  suitable  for  construc- 
tion in  winter,  a  ready  supply  of 
labor,  an  accessibility  to  transporta- 
tion, a  relative  immunity  from  enemy 
attack,  and  a  terrain  cut  up  by  ridges 
that  would  limit  the  effects  of  any  ac- 
cidental explosion. 

Some  steps  for  finding  a  satisfac- 
tory site  already  had  been  taken.  An 
OSRD-directed  study  group  in  early 
April  had  picked  out  an  area  near 
Knoxville,  close  to  the  region  under 
intensive  development  by  the  Tennes- 


'^  Smyth  Report,  pp.  58-60;  Stimson  Diary  for 
summer  of  1942,  HI.S;  Memo,  Bush  to  Bundy,  29 
Aug  42.  HB  Files,  Fldr  58,  Mi:)R;  1st  Ind,  Styer  to 
Chiel  of  Mil  Hist,  15  Aug  61,  to  l.tr,  Chief  of  Mil 
Hist  to  Slver,  17  Jul  61,  CMH. 


"Subsection  based  primarily  on  Marshall  Diary, 
25  Jun  42,  MDR,  and  DSM  Chronology,  25  Jun  42, 
Sec.  2(e),  OROO. 

14  Lenore  Fme  and  Jesse  A.  Remington,  The  Corps 
of  Engineers:  Conslruclwn  m  the  United  States,  L'.S.  Army 
in  World  War  II  (Washington,  D.C.:  Governmenl 
Printmg  OflKe,  1972),  pp.  134-35. 


ESTABLISHING  THE  MANHATTAN  DISTRICT 


47 


see  Valley  Authority,  as  suitable  for 
the  full-scale  centrifuge  and  diffusion 
separation  plants.  (See  Map  1.)  About 
the  same  time,  members  of  Arthur 
Compton's  team  at  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  in  Chicago  had  been  seek- 
ing a  site  for  the  full-scale  plutonium 
production  plant.  They  seriously 
weighed  the  possibilities  of  two  loca- 
tions near  Chicago,  but  finally  con- 
cluded that  the  Tennessee  Valley  was 
also  the  best  area  for  their  purposes. 
In  mid-June,  Bush  expressed  his  liking 
for  the  Tennessee  site  to  General 
Styer,  and  Colonel  Marshall,  in  one  of 
his  first  moves  as  district  engineer, 
also  discussed  its  merits  with  Colonel 
Groves.  Groves  made  a  quick  survey  of 
the  electric  power  situation  and  indi- 
cated his  approval  of  the  Knoxville 
area.  Thus,  Army  representatives  rec- 
ommended the  Tennessee  Valley  loca- 
tion for  all  the  large-scale  production 
plants.  ^^ 

All  scientific  leaders  at  the  25  June 
planning  meeting  accepted  this  rec- 
ommendation save  Lawrence,  who 
maintained  that  the  electromagnetic 
separation  plant  ought  to  be  located 
closer  to  his  research  operations  in 
California.  Bowing  to  his  objections, 
the  conferees  agreed  to  postpone  a 
decision  on  location  of  the  electro- 
magnetic plant,  pending  further 
progress  in  basic  research  on  this 
process.  Even  though  research  for  the 
centrifuge  and  diffusion  methods  was 
still  at  a  stage  where  firm  planning 
for  production  installations  was  im- 
practical, the  group  decided  that  the 


plants  for  these  processes  as  well  as 
for  the  plutonium  process  would  be 
located  on  a  200-square-mile  site  in 
the  Tennessee  Valley.  The  Army,  the 
planning  group  agreed,  should  begin 
steps  at  once  to  select  and  acquire 
this  site. 

The  planners  also  considered  sites 
for  two  other  operations.  The  first 
was  a  pilot  plutonium  plant  required 
by  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory.  This 
plant  needed  to  be  within  commuting 
distance  of  the  laboratory;  but,  for 
reasons  of  safety  and  security,  it  could 
not  be  built  in  heavily  populated  Chi- 
cago. Consequently,  Compton  and  his 
colleagues  selected  an  isolated  area 
known  as  the  Argonne  Forest,  a  part 
of  the  Cook  County  Forest  Preserve 
about  20  miles  southwest  of  the  city. 
This  selection  was  tentatively  ap- 
proved on  25  June  and  the  next  day 
Compton  and  Colonel  Nichols 
reached  final  agreement  on  the  gen- 
eral plan  for  the  Argonne  site.^^ 

In  1941,  the  OSRD  had  sponsored 
laboratory  tests  at  Princeton  Univer- 
sity, under  the  direction  of  British 
chemist  Hugh  S.  Taylor,  to  develop  a 
technique  for  large-scale  production 
of  heavy  water  by  a  hydrogen-water 
exchange  process.  Taylor  had  found 
that  this  process  operated  most  effi- 
ciently when  using  the  electrolytic 
method  to  produce  hydrogen.  The 
Consolidated  Mining  and  Smelting 
Company,  a  Canadian  firm,  operated 
an  ammonia  plant  at  Trail  on  the  Co- 
lumbia   River,    situated    a    few    miles 


15MDH.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  "Clinton  Engineer 
Works,"  pp.  2.1-2.6  and  Apps.  A140-A142,  DASA; 
Compton,  Atomic  Qitesl.  pp.  154-55;  Ltr,  Bush  to 
Stver,  15  Jun  42,  Admin  Files,  Cen  Corresp,  600.3, 
MDR;  Marshall  Diary,  19  Jun  42,  MDR;  Croves,  Xoiv 
It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  13-14. 


'^  Ms,  Arthur  C-ompton,  "Mr.  Fermi,  the  .Argonne 
Laboratory  and  the  University  of  Chicago,"  28  Jul 
44,  p.  1,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Conesp,  080  (Argonne- 
Univ  of  Chicago),  MDR;  Maishall  Diarv,  26  Jul  42, 
MDR;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  110-11;  MDH, 
Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  p.  2.5,  DASA. 


MAP  1 


ESTABLISHING  THE  MANHATTAN  DISTRICT 


49 


north  of  the  Canadian-U.S.  border, 
that  was  the  largest  producer  of  hy- 
drogen by  the  electrolytic  method  in 
North  America.  In  an  effort  to  tap 
this  resource  for  heavy  water,  Taylor 
met  with  company  officials  to  discuss 
the  possibility  of  Consolidated  Mining 
allowing  its  plant  to  be  altered  so  that 
heavy  water  could  be  extracted  from 
the  hydrogen  supply  without  using  up 
any  appreciable  quantities  of  the  hy- 
drogen. The  reaction  was  favorable. 
The  OSRD  therefore  made  the  final 
arrangements  and,  in  May  of  1942, 
engaged  the  Boston  construction  firm 
of  E.  B.  Badger  and  Sons  to  proceed 
with  the  engineering  and  design  work 
on  plant  alterations.  During  the  25 
June  meeting,  Army-OSRD  represent- 
atives approved  the  plan  for  Trail 
and,  on  the  twenty-sixth,  shifted  re- 
sponsibility for  construction  to  the 
Army  but  left  the  financing  and  direc- 
tion of  research  with  the  OSRD.^^ 

A  few  days  before  the  meeting. 
Colonel  Marshall  had  talked  with 
Groves  about  his  urgent  need  for 
competent  engineering  advice  in  or- 
ganizing the  atomic  project  and 
Groves  had  recommended  Stone  and 
Webster.  The  well-known  Boston  firm 
already  was  involved  in  an  OSRD 
project  on  the  diffusion  method  and 
was  currently  maintaining  a  good 
record  on  several  contracts  for  the 
Corps  of  Engineers.  Marshall  pro- 
posed to  the  Army-OSRD  group  that 
it  engage  Stone  and  Webster  as  archi- 
tect-engineer-manager for  the  atomic 


project,  to  monitor  site  development 
and  major  construction.^® 

The  Army-OSRD  conferees  ap- 
proved Marshall's  proposal  and 
agreed  that  Stone  and  Webster  would 
be  primarily  concerned  with  site  de- 
velopment and  housing  construction 
in  Tennessee  and  with  engineering 
and  building  the  centrifuge  and  elec- 
tromagnetic plants.  In  addition,  the 
firm  would  build  the  Argonne  pilot 
plant  and,  eventually,  the  full-scale 
plutonium  production  plant.  The 
group  also  decided  to  engage  the 
M.  W.  Kellogg  Company  of  New 
Jersey.  This  firm  had  extensive  expe- 
rience in  the  design  and  construction 
of  petroleum  refineries  and  chemical 
installations  and  was  already  assisting 
the  scientific  team  at  Columbia  on 
diffusion  research  under  an  OSRD 
contract.  Kellogg  would  take  respon- 
sibility for  the  diffusion  plant  and 
Badger  and  Sons  would  continue  on 
the  job  at  Trail.  ^^ 

The  Army-OSRD  group  decided 
that  a  substantial  number  of  OSRD 
research  contracts  already  in  oper- 
ation should  be  extended  at  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  S-1  Executive  Commit- 
tee. To  continue  these  contracts 
beyond  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year — 
less  than  a  week  away — the  atomic 
program  urgently  needed  $15  million. 
Marshall  promised  to  obtain  the 
money  immediately  from  engineer 
funds.  This  sum  represented  slightly 
less  than  half  of  the  $31  million  in- 
cluded for  the  OSRD  in  the  program 


'^  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew  World,  pp.  66-67; 
MDH,  Bk.  3,  "The  P-9  Project,"  Sees.  1-2,  passim. 
DASA;  Marshall  Diarv,  26Jun  42,  MDR;  DSM  Chro- 
nology, 25  Jun  42,  .Sec.  2(e).  OROO. 


18  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  12-13;  Marshall 
Diarv,  25,  27,  and  29  June  42,  MDR. 

19  DSM  Chronology,  25  Jun  42.  Sec.  2(a).  OROO; 
Stephane  GrouefT,  Manhattan  Project:  The  Untold  Story 
of  the  Making  of  the  Atomic  Bomb  (Boston:  Little. 
Brown  and  Co.,  1967),  pp.  22-23. 


50 


MANHAITAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  IHE  AIOMIC  BOMB 


approved  by  President  Roosevelt  on 
17  June.  Yet  it  sufficed,  for  the  Army 
gradually  took  over  most  OSRD  func- 
tions in  the  field  of  atomic  energy 
and  the  $15  million  proved  to  be 
more  than  enough  to  finance  all  fur- 
ther OSRD  expenditures  for  the 
atomic  program. ^^ 

The  final  subject  at  the  Army- 
OSRD  meeting  was  the  urgent  need 
to  obtain  government  priorities  suffi- 
ciently high  to  ensure  a  ready  supply 
of  critical  materials  and  equipment. 
Some  required  items  were  in  ex- 
tremely short  supply  and  the  OSRD 
was  having  little  success  obtaining 
them.  What  was  needed,  OSRD  rep- 
resentatives told  Colonel  Marshall, 
was  some  means  of  coordinating  their 
requirements  and  gaining  the  neces- 
sary priorities  to  satisfy  them.  They 
requested  that  the  Army  designate  a 
priorities  officer  to  meet  with  them 
and  to  establish  an  office  in  Washing- 
ton, D.C.  Marshall  agreed  and  indi- 
cated that,  as  a  first  step,  he  would 
eliminate  obvious  competition  by  co- 
ordinating Army  and  OSRD  procure- 
ment on  the  atomic  project. 

The  decisions  of  the  Army  and 
OSRD  representatives  had  served  to 
inaugurate  officially  a  new  phase  in 
the  atomic  energy  program,  a  period 
of  Army-OSRD  cooperation  that 
would  last  until  late  spring  of  1943. 

Progress  in  Research  and  Development 

For  Colonel  Marshall  and  his  Man- 
hattan District  associates,  the  summer 
of  1942  was  a  period  of  organization 
and  planning  to  lay  groundwork 
for     developing     an     unprecedented 


2°  Marshall  Diary,  29-30  Jun  42,  MDR;  Stewart, 
Organizing  Scientific  Research /or  War,  p.  123. 


weapon.  The  scope  of  the  problem 
was  broad.  To  the  normal  administra- 
tive headaches  of  setting  up  a  very 
large  construction  and  manufacturing 
project  were  added  the  problems  of 
expediting  and  coordinating  research, 
experimentation,  industrial  applica- 
tion, and  design  of  a  weapon  based 
on  materials  that  in  all  probability 
would  not  be  available  for  testing 
until  the  weapon  itself  had  been  built. 
Of  all  the  problems  to  be  dealt  with — 
the  execution  of  engineering,  con- 
struction, and  operating  contracts;  the 
selection  and  acquisition  of  sites;  the 
obtaining  of  large  sums  of  money  and 
of  adequate  priorities;  the  procure- 
ment of  materials;  the  maintenance  of 
security — the  first  and  most  basic  to 
the  success  of  the  whole  project  was 
that  of  continued  progress  in  scien- 
tific development.  On  this  rested  the 
outcome  of  the  entire  atomic  enter- 
prise. And,  in  mid- 1942,  Marshall 
found  that  nearly  all  problems  he 
faced  were  connected  in  one  way  or 
another  with  the  vital  task  of  research 
and  experimentation. 

The  program  adopted  on  17  June 
called  for  backing  all  five  methods  of 
producing  fissionable  materials — until 
one  or  more  proved  most  certain  of 
success.  Thus,  each  process  was  sub- 
ject to  intensive  research  efforts  that 
summer.  Objectives  for  the  centrifuge 
process  were  a  pilot  plant  and,  by 
January  1944,  a  full-scale  plant  pro- 
ducing 100  grams  of  U-235-enriched 
uranium  per  day.  A  low-yield  pilot 
plant  and  a  1-kilogram-per-day  pro- 
duction plant  were  planned  for  the 
diffusion  process  and  a  5-gram-per- 
day  pilot  plant  and,  by  late  1943,  a 
100-gram-per-day  production  plant 
for  the  electromagnetic  process.  The 


ESI  ABLISHING  1  HE  MANHA  I  I  AN  DISTRICT 


51 


plutonium  project  needed  a  100- 
gram-per-day  production  plant,  as 
well  as  heavy  water  plants  producing 
0.5  tons  per  month  by  May  1943.^^ 
The  diffusion  and  centrifuge  meth- 
ods, which  had  seemed  most  promis- 
ing the  previous  autumn,  now  ap- 
peared less  certain  than  the  others. 
And  of  the  pile  and  electromagnetic 
processes,  the  latter  appeared  to  offer 
the  best  immediate  hope. 

Although  the  feasibility  of  the  gase- 
ous diffusion  method  had  been  dem- 
onstrated, two  major  problems  stood 
in  the  way  of  achieving  large-scale 
separation  of  uranium  isotopes.  First 
was  development  of  a  material  that 
would  be  sufficiently  porous  to  permit 
passage  of  uranium  hexafluoride 
through  thousands  of  stages,  as  well 
as  be  resistant  to  the  exceptional  cor- 
rosiveness  of  this  gas  and  suitable  for 
fabrication  by  mass  production  meth- 
ods. The  second  was  to  design  and 
manufacture  corrosion-resistant  me- 
chanical equipment — a  variety  of 
pumps,  valves,  seals,  and  instru- 
ments— to  move  the  gas  through 
miles  of  pipe,  maintaining  required 
vacuum  conditions,  temperatures,  and 
pressures. 

These  problems  were  being  studied 
mainly  at  Columbia  University  under 
John  Dunning  and  Harold  Urey,  but 
also  by  the  M.  W.  Kellogg  Company, 
whose  chief  concern  was  major  pro- 
duction of  diffusion  equipment  and, 
eventually,  construction  of  a  full-scale 
plant.  At  a  meeting  of  the  OSRD  S-1 
Executive  Committee  on  30  July 
1942,  Urey  reported  his  hope  that  the 
diffusion  method  would  be  producing 
enough  enriched  uranium  by  the  fall 


of  1944  to  begin  using  that  material 
in  an  atomic  weapon. ^^ 

Work  on  the  centrifuge  process  was 
going  equally  slow.  Under  the  general 
direction  of  Eger  Murphree,  theoreti- 
cal and  experimental  research  contin- 
ued at  Columbia  University  and  the 
University  of  Virginia,  respectively; 
design  and  development  at  the  Wes- 
tinghouse  Research  Laboratories,  a 
subsidiary  of  the  Westinghouse  Elec- 
tric and  Manufacturing  Company;  and 
engineering  studies  at  the  Standard 
Oil  Development  Company.  Feasibili- 
ty of  the  method  had  long  been  dem- 
onstrated, but  major  technical  and 
mechanical  difficulties  prevented 
rapid  progress.  Nevertheless,  a  pilot 
plant  had  been  designed  at  Standard 
Oil  and  actual  production  of  parts 
and  models  for  the  pilot  plant  was 
under  way  at  Westinghouse.  Like  the 
diffusion  process,  the  centrifuge  proc- 
ess would  require  many  hundreds  of 
stages  to  achieve  large-scale  separa- 
tion. Also  by  Murphree's  estimate,  the 
centrifuge  method  could  not  produce 
a  sufficient  amount  of  enriched  urani- 
um for  use  in  atomic  weapons  before 
autumn  of  1944. ^^ 

Of  all  the  programs  in  progress 
that  summer,  perhaps  the  most  exten- 
sive was  the  pile  process  for  manufac- 
turing plutonium  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Arthur  Compton  at  the 
University  of  Chicago.  The  objectives 
of  the  Chicago  program  were  to 
prove  experimentally  that  a  chain  re- 


2>  I.tr,  Bush  to  President,  17  Jun  42,  and  Ind,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  6,  MDR. 


22  Smvth  Report,  pp.  125-35;  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  3, 
"Design!"  pp.  2.1-2.2.  DASA;  DSM  Chronology, 
30  Jul  42,  Sec.  2(e),  OROO;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest, 
p.  152. 

23  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  "Auxiliary  Activities,"  pp. 
14.1-14.24,  DASA;  DSM  Chronology,  30  Jul  and 
26  Aug  42,  each  Sec.  2(e),  OROO;  Marshall  Diary, 
24-26  and  28  Aug  42,  MDR. 


52 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


action  was  actually  possible,  then  to 
devise  a  means  to  produce  plutonium 
on  a  large  scale  and  extract  it  chemi- 
cally from  uranium,  to  work  out  the 
necessary  data  for  bringing  about  an 
explosive  chain  reaction  with  either 
plutonium  or  U-235,  and,  finally,  to 
design  the  atomic  bomb  itself.  Investi- 
gations into  all  of  these  problems 
were  being  conducted  simultaneously 
by  large  research  staffs  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Chicago  and  other  institu- 
tions.^'* One  particularly  important 
group  at  the  University  of  California 
(Berkeley)  had  been  organized  in 
June  by  J.  Robert  Oppenheimer,  then 
widely  regarded  as  "the  leader  of  the- 
oretical aspects  of  atomistics  and 
similar  subjects  of  physics."  ^^  Under 
Oppenheimer's  direction  a  number  of 
the  nation's  ablest  theoretical  physi- 
cists undertook  a  study  that,  in  Op- 
penheimer's words,  "for  the  first  time 
really  came  to  grips  with  the  physical 
problems  of  atomic  bombs,  atomic 
explosions  to  initiate  thermonuclear 
reactions."  By  the  latter  he  meant  the 
possibility  of  a  hydrogen  bomb,  a 
matter  that  he  raised  with  Compton 
and  Bush  that  summer  and  that  was 
to  lie  heavy  on  his  mind  for  many 
years  to  come.^^ 

The  University  of  Chicago's  Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory  staff  also  devoted 
most    of   its    energies    to    theoretical 


**  Account  of  work  carried  out  at  Chicago  based 
on  Compton's  book  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  80-98;  Smyth 
Report,  pp.  63-74;  Testimony  of  Oppenheimer  in 
Atomic  Energy  Commission,  In  the  Matter  of  J.  Robert 
Oppenheimer:  Transcript  of  Hearing  Before  Personnel  Secu- 
rity Board  (Washington,  D.C.:  Government  Printing 
Office,  1954),  pp.  11-12  and  27-28. 

^*  Testimony  of  Bush  in  Oppenheimer  Hearing,  p. 
563. 

^®  Quotation  from  Ltr,  Oppenheimer  to  Nichols, 
4  Mar  54,  Oppenheimer  Heanng,  p.  11.  See  also 
Memo,  Bush  to  Bundv,  29  Aug  42,  HB  Files,  Fldr 
58,  MDR. 


studies.  Lack  of  basic  materials — ura- 
nium, plutonium,  highly  purified 
graphite,  and  heavy  water — made  any 
extensive  experimentation  program 
impossible.  Nevertheless,  at  the 
30  July  meeting  of  the  S-1  Commit- 
tee, Compton  estimated  that  plutoni- 
um would  be  ready  for  use  in  an 
atomic  weapon  by  fall  of  1944.^'  The 
process  that  appeared  to  offer  the 
best  hope  for  producing  fissionable 
materials  was  the  electromagnetic 
method  under  study  at  Princeton  and 
at  the  University  of  California  (Berke- 
ley), where  Lawrence's  work  with  the 
giant  184-inch  magnet  attracted  the 
most  attention.  As  with  other  ap- 
proaches, this  method  had  been  faced 
with  major  technical  difficulties,  but 
as  the  months  passed  Lawrence  en- 
thusiastically reported  success  in 
meeting  and  overcoming  these  prob- 
lems. Most  important,  he  had  actual- 
ly achieved  the  separation  of  small 
amounts  of  U-235,  even  though  only 
in  milligram  quantities. ^^ 

A  visit  in  late  July  to  Berkeley  by 
Colonel  Marshall  and  Stone  and 
Webster  representatives  convinced 
them  that,  in  Marshall's  words,  "Law- 
rence's method  is  ahead  of  the 
other[s]  .  .  .  and  should  be  exploited 
to  the  fullest  without  delay."  The 
colonel  was  anxious  that  work  on  "a 
sizeable  pilot  plant,"  as  well  as  a  full- 
scale  production  plant,  begin  as  soon 
as  possible.  ^^  The  S-1  Committee  ap- 


"  Smyth  Report,  p.  67;  DSM  Chronology,  30  Jul 
42,  Sec.  2(e)  OROO. 

^*  Discussion  of  electromagnetic  process  based  on 
Marshall  Diary,  9,  20,  30-31  Jul  and  5,  17-19,  22 
Aug  42,  MDR;  Smyth  Report,  pp.  136-41  and  143- 
45;  DSM  Chronology,  9  and  30  Jul  42,  each  Sec. 
2(e),  OROO. 

"Marshall  Diary,  20  Jul  42,  MDR. 


ESTABLISHING    I  HE  MANHAITAN  DISTRICT 


53 


proved  Colonel  Marshall's  recommen- 
dation on  30  July  and  decided  that 
the  Army,  rather  than  the  OSRD, 
would  be  responsible  for  building  the 
pilot  plant  on  land  rented  from  the 
University  of  California.  Lawrence  es- 
timated that  material  from  the  elec- 
tromagnetic process  would  be  ready 
to  go  into  an  atomic  weapon  by  the 
spring  of  1944. 

In  mid-August,  Colonel  Nichols  vis- 
ited Berkeley  and  gave  his  tentative 
approval  to  plans  for  the  pilot  plant. 
With  him  was  Maj.  Thomas  T.  Cren- 
shaw, whose  job  it  was  to  set  up  the 
new  California  Area  Engineers  Office 
of  the  Manhattan  District,  to  support 
and  assist  Lawrence,  and  to  represent 
Colonel  Marshall  during  construction 
and  operation  of  the  pilot  plant.  Nich- 
ols felt  that  Lawrence  was  "making 
great  progress  and  that  the  whole 
project  should  be  pushed  into  full- 
scale  production  as  fast  as  possible," 
an  opinion  with  which  Lawrence 
agreed  wholeheartedly.  Indeed,  be- 
cause Lawrence's  only  question  con- 
cerned the  actual  efficiency  of  the 
separation  units,  he  felt  that  construc- 
tion of  the  full-scale  production  plant 
should  be  started  concurrently  with 
that  of  the  pilot  installation. ^° 

At  the  26  August  meeting  of  the 
S-1  Committee,  both  August  C. 
Klein,  Stone  and  Webster's  chief  me- 
chanical engineer,  and  Colonel  Mar- 
shall supported  Lawrence's  proposal, 
and  there  was  general  agreement, 
based  upon  Lawrence's  optimistic 
report,  that  the  electromagnetic 
method    would    probably    be    first    to 


^"Qiiotation  from  Marshall  Diarv.  17-18  Aug  42, 
MDR.  See  also  Memo,  Crenshaw  to  Hist  Engr,  sub: 
Weeklv  Progress  Rpt,  22  Aug  42,  Admin  Piles,  Cien 
Corresp,  001  (Mtgs),  MDR. 


yield  material  in  substantial  amounts. 
The  plutonium  process,  though  pro- 
gressing satisfactorily,  was  still 
months  awa\  from  even  the  pilot 
plant  stage  and  the  other  methods 
lagged  even  further  behind.  Had  a 
decision  been  made  at  this  time  to 
back  a  single  horse  in  the  nuclear 
race  and  to  scratch  the  others,  Law- 
rence very  likely  would  have  been  the 
one  rider  left  on  the  course. 

Yet  no  one  was  certain  that  the 
electromagnetic  method  would  prove 
to  be  the  best  process  in  the  long 
run.  In  fact,  the  group  conjectured 
that  the  ultimate  full-scale  plant 
would  probably  have  several  times  the 
capacity  of  the  contemplated  electro- 
magnetic production  plant  and  was 
likely  to  be  comprised  of  a  combina- 
tion of  methods,  with  one  process 
producing  enriched  uranium  and  the 
electromagnetic  method  providing  the 
final  stage  of  separation.  They 
thought  a  decision  to  proceed  with  an 
electromagnetic  production  plant  was 
unrealistic  and  might  be  interpreted 
as  a  final  decision  in  favor  of  the  elec- 
tromagnetic process,  causing  the  de- 
velopment of  the  other  methods  to  be 
slowed  down — or  even  eliminated. 

At  last  the  conferees  at  the  26  Au- 
gust meeting  agreed  to  continue  work 
as  rapidly  as  possible  on  the  four 
pilot  plants  and  on  the  production  of 
heavy  water  at  Trail.  A  start  on  a  full- 
scale  plutonium  production  plant 
would  be  delayed,  pending  the  out- 
come of  experiments  at  the  Argonne 
pilot  plant.  Design  and  construction 
of  an  electromagnetic  production 
plant  would  be  postponed  until  mid- 
September,  when  the  S-1  Committee 
was  to  visit  the  Berkeley  project  and 
make  further  recommendations.  Van- 


54 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


nevar  Bush  approved  these  conclu- 
sions and  passed  them  on  to  Secreta- 
ry Stimson  with  the  warning  that  the 
time  would  soon  be  at  hand  for  a 
major  decision   on   the  extent   of  the 


effort  the  United  States  should  make 
on  the  atomic  energy  program. ^^ 


31  Marshall  Diary,  26  Aug  42,  MDR;  DSM  Chro- 
nology, 26  Aug  42,  Sec.  2(e),  OROO;  Memo,  Bush 
to  Bundy,  29  Aug  42,  HB  Files,  Fldr  58,  MDR. 


CHAPTER  III 


First  Steps  for  Weapon 
Development 


In  those  incredibly  busy  two 
months  following  the  planning  meet- 
ing of  25  June  1942,  the  military  lead- 
ers— working  closely  with  project  sci- 
entists and  technicians — energetically 
set  about  not  only  to  organize  the 
operational  requirements  for  the 
Army's  administration  of  the  project 
but  also  to  carry  out  the  specific  steps 
for  development  of  an  atomic 
weapon.  On  the  twenty-sixth  Maj. 
Gen.  Eugene  Reybold,  chief  of  the 
Corps  of  Engineers,  held  a  briefing 
with  Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  M.  Robins, 
the  assistant  chief;  Col.  Leslie  R. 
Groves,  the  deputy  assistant;  Col. 
James  C.  Marshall,  the  new  district 
engineer;  and  Lt.  Col.  Kenneth  D. 
Nichols,  the  deputy  district  engineer. 
During  the  session  Reybold  reviewed 
some  of  the  immediate  problems  of 
the  atomic  project,  placing  special 
emphasis  on  two  that  required 
prompt  action:  selection  and  acquisi- 
tion of  a  site  for  atomic  production 
facilities  in  the  1  ennessee  Valley,  and 
securing  a  contract  with  the  Stone 
and  Webster  Engineering  Corpora- 
tion to  serve  as  architect-engineer- 
manager  (AEM). 


Securing  an  Architect-Engineer-Manager 

Consistent  with  Army  policy  that 
the  industrial  operator  of  a  proposed 
installation  should  have  a  strong  voice 
in  selection  of  the  specific  site,  the 
district  engineer  gave  his  first  atten- 
tion to  securing  a  working  agreement 
with  Stone  and  Webster,  which  was 
slated  to  have  the  chief  responsibility 
for  the  Tennessee  plants.^  Following 
Colonel  Marshall's  orders.  Colonel 
Nichols  went  to  New  York  on  Satur- 
day, 27  June,  to  visit  Stone  and  Web- 
ster President  John  R.  Lotz.  Nichols 
outlined  the  role  projected  for  the 
firm  and  Lotz  responded  enthusiasti- 
cally. The  following  Monday,  Lotz 
and  other  company  officials  met  with 
Robins,  Groves,  Marshall,  and  Nichols 
in  Washington,  D.C.  Lotz  assured 
them  the  AEM  job  would  not  serious- 
ly interfere  with  the  firm's  work  on 
other  important  Corps  of  Engineers 
contracts  and  that  the  firm  could 
meet  the  strict  security  requirements 
of  the  atomic  project.  The  group  then 
drew  up  a  letter  of  intent,  which  Lotz 


»  Marshall  Diary,  26  Jun  42,  OCC;  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp.  Groves  Files,  Misc  Recs  Sec,  behind  Fldr  5, 
MDR;  Fine  and  Remington,  Corps  of  Enginens:  Con- 
struction, p.  135. 


56 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


and  Marshall  signed,  authorizing 
Stone  and  Webster  to  begin  work  im- 
mediately on  preliminary  investiga- 
tions and  surveys,  procurement  of 
supplies,  and  initiation  of  design.  The 
following  afternoon,  Vannevar  Bush, 
director  of  the  Office  of  Scientific  Re- 
search and  Development  (OSRD), 
gave  the  Stone  and  Webster  repre- 
sentatives a  thorough  explanation  of 
the  technical  processes  involved  in 
the  atomic  project.  This  completed 
the  preliminary  discussions. 

Stone  and  Webster  now  became  the 
Army's  agent  for  managing  the 
atomic  energy  project,  charged  with 
overseeing  and  subcontracting  all  re- 
search and  development,  procure- 
ment, engineering,  and  construction 
that  fell  within  the  Army's  sphere  of 
responsibility.  Company  officials  es- 
tablished a  separate  engineering 
group  to  operate  with  the  utmost  se- 
crecy under  the  direct  control  of  the 
firm's  senior  engineers.  Project  lead- 
ers had  hoped  that  a  single  company 
could  perform  all  AEM  tasks;  howev- 
er, by  the  time  Stone  and  Webster 
signed  the  formal  contract  (backdated 
to  29  June)  several  months  later,  the 
Army  had  to  seek  the  assistance  of 
other  major  firms  to  share  with  Stone 
and  Webster  the  vast  and  complex 
job.2 

Obtaining  Funds 

The  Stone  and  Webster  agreement 
required  immediate  funds.  The  ap- 
proved program  had  allotted  $85  mil- 


lion— $54  million  for  the  Army  Corps 
of  Engineers  and  $31  million  for  the 
OSRD — but  had  not  indicated  the 
source  of  this  money. ^  An  effort  in 
early  June  to  obtain  this  sum  from  the 
President's  Emergency  Fund  was  un- 
successful. Marshall's  pressing  finan- 
cial obligations  totaled  $38  million: 
$10  million  to  cover  the  letter  of 
intent  issued  to  Stone  and  Webster, 
$15  million  to  repay  the  sum  ad- 
vanced to  the  OSRD,  $6  million  for 
site  acquisition,  $2  million  for  the 
projected  Argonne  pilot  plant,  and  $5 
million  for  the  purchase  of  materials. 
He  also  required  "practically  unlimit- 
ed authority,"  as  he  put  it,  to  spend 
it.4 

By  16  July,  Marshall  was  able  to  ar- 
range for  an  allotment  from  the 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  spe- 
cifically from  the  Engineer  Service- 
Army  category  of  available  funds.  The 
$15  million  for  the  OSRD  had  already 
been  provided,  $5  million  was  fur- 
nished immediately,  and  the  remain- 
der became  available  a  few  weeks 
later  at  the  time  of  the  formal  alloca- 
tion of  the  total  sum.  Marshall  also 
received  assurances  from  the  War  De- 
partment's budget  officer  that  all  re- 
strictions on  the  use  of  these  funds 
that  could  legally  be  removed  had 
been  set  aside.  These  included  regu- 
lations on  establishing  title  to  proper- 
ty, the  placing  of  government  con- 
tracts, employment  in  the  United 
States    and    abroad,    rentals    and    im- 


2  Marshall  Diary,  27,  29-30  Jun  and  1  Jul-23  Oct 
42,  MDR;  Completion  Rpt,  Stone  and  Webster,  sub: 
Clinton  Engr  Works,  Contract  W'-7401-eng-13, 
1946,  pp.  6  and  143,  OROO;  Stone  and  Webster,  A 
Report  to  the  People:  Stone  and  Webster  Engineering  Corpo- 
ration in  World  War  II  (| Boston]:  Stone  and  Webster, 
1946),  pp.  9-13;  Smyth  Report,  p.  28. 


3  Ltr.  Bush  to  President,  17  Jun  42,  and  Incl,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  6,  MDR. 

•*  Marshall  Diary,  10  Jul  42,  MDR.  Section  on 
funds  based  on  entries  in  ibid,  for  29-30  Jun,  9-11 
and  16  Jul  42;  Memo,  Marshall  to  Groves,  sub:  Al- 
lotment of  Additional  Funds  to  MD,  29  Sep  42, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  110  (Appropriations), 
MDR;  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  15-16. 


FIRST  STEPS  FOR  WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT 


57 


provements  of  property,  and  several 
other  controls.  Colonel  Marshall  ap- 
peared to  be  well  on  the  way  to  at- 
taining the  fiscal  means  and  inde- 
pendence that  the  atomic  project 
required. 

Securing  a  Priority  Rating 

Even  as  fiscal  problems  eased,  the 
atomic  project  encountered  serious 
difficulties  on  the  matter  of  priorities. 
In  the  summer  of  1942,  competition 
for  critical  materials  was  strong  and 
unremitting  as  America  prepared  to 
halt  the  worldwide  Axis  offensive. 
With  these  conditions  prevailing. 
Colonel  Marshall  soon  realized  that 
access  to  the  scarce  supplies  and 
equipment  needed  for  atomic  re- 
search, construction,  and  production 
might  be  blocked  unless  he  could 
secure  a  high-priority  rating  for  the 
project. 

In  the  wartime  economy,  the  estab- 
lishment of  priorities  for  military  and 
civilian  demands  was  the  responsibil- 
ity of  the  War  Production  Board 
(WPB),  succinctly  characterized  by 
one  World  War  II  historian  as  "the 
supreme  industrial  mobilization  con- 
trol agency."  ^  The  Army  and  Navy 
Munitions  Board  (ANMB)  adminis- 
tered the  priority  system  for  military 
and  related  agencies,  theoretically 
subject  to  WPB  approval,  but  in  1942 
the  War  Department's  Services  of 
Supply  (SOS)  gradually  began  to  take 
over  the  ANMB's  responsibilities  re- 


^  R.  Elberton  Smith,  The  Army  and  Economic  Mobili- 
zation, U.S.  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington, 
D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office,  1959),  p.  517. 
Discussion  of  DSM  priority  problems  based  primari- 
Iv  on  Marshall  Diary,  25  Jun-16  Sep  42,  MDR;  DSM 
Chronology,  Jun-Sep  42,  Sec.  18,  OROO;  Memo, 
Bush  to  Bundy,  29  Aug  42,  HB  Files,  Fldr  58.  MDR; 
Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  16  and  22-23. 


lating  to  the  Army.  The  SOS,  particu- 
larly through  its  staff  divisions  for  re- 
quirements and  resources  that  formed 
the  ANMB's  Army  Section,  controlled 
and  coordinated  all  War  Department 
procurement  activities.  SOS  officers, 
moreover,  served  on  WPB  commit- 
tees. For  example.  Brig.  Gen.  Lucius 
D.  Clay,  the  SOS  deputy  chief  of  staff 
for  requirements  and  resources,  had 
an  important  voice  in  the  establish- 
ment of  policy  and  would  play  a  key 
role  in  the  matter  of  assigning  prior- 
ities to  the  atomic  project. 

Major  programs  received  ratings  of 
AA-1  through  AA-4,  in  decreasing 
order  of  precedence,  whereas  lesser 
projects  received  ratings  in  a  more 
extensive  category,  the  highest  desig- 
nation of  which  was  A-l-a.  A  special 
top  rating  of  AAA,  reserved  for  emer- 
gencies, could  not  be  assigned  to  an 
entire  program  but  was  limited  to 
expediting  delivery  of  small  quanti- 
ties of  critical  items.  Although  the 
program  approved  by  President 
Roosevelt  did  not  mention  a  specific 
priority  designation  for  the  new 
project,  it  did  imply  that  the  program 
should  be  given  a  relatively  high 
rating,  which  was  to  be  balanced 
against  the  needs  of  other  critical 
projects.^  When  Colonels  Marshall 
and  Nichols  met  with  General  Clay  on 
30  June,  they  requested  only  an  AA 
rating — without,  apparently,  asking 
for  a  specific  classification  within  that 
category.  Marshall  assured  Clay  that 
the  project  "would  issue  such  lower 
ratings  as  were  possible  whenever  we 
did  not  need  the  A."  "^  General  Clay, 


^  Ltr,    Bush   to   President,    17  Jun   42,   and   Incl, 
MDR. 

7  Marshall  Diarv,  30  Jun  42,  MDR. 


58 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


who  had  known  Marshall  since  their 
days  as  West  Point  classmates,  told 
Marshall  and  Nichols  that  all  DSM  re- 
quests would  be  given  prompt  atten- 
tion and  the  highest  preference  in 
processing,  and  that  he  personally 
would  take  immediate  steps  to  obtain 
an  AA  rating  for  the  project  and 
would  be  available  at  any  time  for  any 
specific  request. 

Despite  Clay's  assurances,  nearly 
two  weeks  passed  with  no  priority 
rating  forthcoming.  Finally,  on  13 
July,  following  some  persistent  prod- 
ding by  Colonel  Nichols,  the  ANMB 
approved  a  rating  of  AA-3  for  the 
atomic  project.®  This  rating,  with 
which  Clay  concurred,  came  as  a 
grave  disappointment.  It  was  based, 
however,  on  an  ANMB  directive  that 
limited  AA-1  and  AA-2  ratings  to  the 
most  essential  and  urgently  needed 
weapons  and  equipment — airplanes, 
ships,  guns,  and  tanks  scheduled  for 
production  in  1942.  Even  AA-3  rat- 
ings were  reserved  for  those  items  of 
military  equipment  and  construction 
that  constituted  an  essential  part  of 
the  1942  program  or  were  required  in 
1942  for  the  1943  program.  Under 
the  circumstances,  a  rating  of  AA-3 
was  the  highest  the  atomic  project 
could  have  received.  Indeed,  given 
the  as  yet  unproved  nature  of  the 
project,  the  cautious  estimates  of  how 
long  it  might  take  to  produce  atomic 
weapons,  and  the  absence  of  a  specif- 
ic presidential  directive  assigning  it  a 
high  priority,  the  wonder  is  that  the 


^Written  confirmation  came  ten  days  later.  1st 
Ind,  Col  Joseph  L.  Phillips  (Priorities  Br  chief.  Re- 
sources Div,  SOS)  to  Chief  of  Engrs,  23  Jul  42,  to 
Ltr,  Nichols  to  Priorities  Div,  ANMB,  Attn:  Col  Phil- 
lips, sub:  Preference  Rating  [for]  DSM  Proj,  23  Jul 
42,  in  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  9,  "Priorities  Program," 
App.  A3,  DASA. 


atomic  program  fared  as  well  as  it 
did.  Because  the  ANMB  was  limiting 
AA-1  and  AA-2  ratings.  Clay  told  the 
protesting  Nichols  that  an  AA-3 
should  be  adequate  for  the  atomic 
project.  If  difficulties  did  arise,  he 
promised  the  project  could  obtain  an 
AAA  priority  to  pry  loose  certain 
critical  items.  With  this  assurance, 
the  atomic  project  leaders  had  to  be 
satisfied. 

The  anticipated  problems  were  not 
long  in  appearing.  Badger  and  Sons 
soon  reported  that  the  heavy  water 
reconversion  work  on  the  Trail  plant 
was  coming  into  competition  with  its 
commitments  in  the  synthetic  rubber 
program.  Both  projects  had  an  AA-3 
rating,  with  the  rubber  program 
having  first  choice  on  materials  and 
skilled  workmen  because  of  its  earlier 
start.  By  mid-August  1942,  Badger  of- 
ficials estimated  the  Trail  plant  would 
probably  not  go  into  operation  until 
August  1943,  although  an  AA-1 
rating  might  better  this  date  by  at 
least  two  or  three  months.  This,  how- 
ever, would  cause  a  delay  in  the 
rubber  program  and,  as  S-1  Commit- 
tee Chairman  James  B.  Conant  point- 
ed out  to  Colonel  Nichols,  it  would 
be  bad  politics  to  push  for  a  higher 
priority  at  Trail  at  the  expense  of 
such  a  critical  project  as  synthetic 
rubber.  As  a  matter  of  fact.  General 
Clay  had  already  indicated  his  opposi- 
tion to  such  a  move.  Thus,  for  the 
moment,  the  best  policy  seemed  to  be 
to  go  ahead  at  Trail  under  the  AA-3 
rating. 

Procurement  was  generally  an  S-1 
Executive  Committee  responsibility, 
and  only  when  the  OSRD  was  unable 
to  secure  the  necessary  priorities  did 
it  turn  to  the  Army  for  help.  During 


FIRST  STEPS  FOR  WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT 


59 


July,  difficulties  in  obtaining  small  but 
essential  quantities  of  scarce  materials 
held  back  progress  on  important  ex- 
perimental work.  Two  much-needed 
nickel  shipments  totaling  less  than  85 
pounds,  for  example,  were  threatened 
with  a  delay  of  several  months  and 
were  only  cleared  for  delivery  after 
two  weeks  of  effort  by  OSRD  mem- 
bers, General  Clay,  and  Maj.  Gen. 
Wilhelm  D.  Styer,  the  SOS  chief  of 
staff.  9 

On  30  July,  the  S-1  Committee 
raised  this  problem  with  Colonels 
Marshall  and  Nichols,  and  the  group 
decided  to  urge  OSRD  Director  Van- 
nevar  Bush  to  ask  WPB  Chairman 
Donald  Nelson  for  a  blanket  AA-1 
priority  for  all  atomic  project  orders 
below  a  value  of  $1,500  or  $2,000,  to 
eliminate  bottlenecks  without  interfer- 
ing unduly  with  other  wartime  pro- 
grams. The  next  day  Marshall,  accom- 
panied by  Nichols,  went  again  to  see 
General  Clay,  making  one  last  at- 
tempt to  secure  the  desired  rating 
before  going  over  his  head.  Clay  re- 
peated that  the  atomic  project  was  en- 
titled to  no  higher  rating  than  AA-3, 
except  in  very  few  specific  instances, 
and  said  he  would  oppose  any  effort 
to  secure  a  blanket  AA-1  rating.  That 
afternoon,  Marshall,  Nichols,  Conant, 
and  others  met  with  Bush,  emerging 
with  an  agreement  that  the  OSRD  di- 
rector would  confer  with  the  WPB 
chairman.  Receptive  to  Bush's  pro- 
posal. Nelson  promised  to  discuss  the 
matter  further  with  Army  Chief  of 
Staff  General  George  C.  Marshall,  but 
whether  or  not  he  actually  did  is  un- 
clear. In  the  end,  the  matter  was  re- 


^  Correspondence  relating  to  this  incident,  begin- 
ning with  Ltr,  Styer  to  Dr.  H.  T.  Wensel  (Natl  Bur 
of  Standards),  26  Jun  42,  filed  in  AG  313.3  (22  Aug 

47). 


ferred  back  to  the  ANMB,  which  still 
refused  to  grant  a  higher  rating  but 
worked  out  a  procedure  that  eliminat- 
ed the  bottleneck  on  small  orders. 

Meanwhile,  the  priorities  situation 
worsened.  Securing  materials  became 
progressively  more  difficult.  Steel,  for 
example,  would  soon  be  virtually  un- 
obtainable with  less  than  an  AA-2 
rating.  Without  access  to  this  basic 
material,  the  atomic  project  would 
come  to  a  standstill.  Marshall  was  al- 
ready receiving  reports  of  delays  in 
plant  construction  and,  in  mid- 
August,  the  ANMB  questioned  con- 
tinued assignment  of  even  an  AA-3 
priority  to  the  Trail  project.  Prompt 
action  by  General  Clay  ended  that 
threat,  however. 

On  26  August,  Marshall,  Nichols, 
and  Stone  and  Webster  representa- 
tives met  with  the  S-1  Executive 
Committee,  and  again  priorities  were 
a  major  topic.  Most  small  orders  were 
now  being  handled  without  undue 
delay,  but  there  was  serious  general 
concern  about  the  large-scale  pro- 
curement soon  to  be  required  for  the 
production  plants.  A  limited  number 
of  firms  had  the  organization  and  ex- 
perience needed  to  build  and  operate 
the  major  facilities,  and  they  were  all 
heavily  engaged  on  other  AA-3  pro- 
grams for  which  orders  had  been 
placed  before  atomic  project  orders. 
The  only  way  to  push  ahead  of  other 
programs  was  to  get  a  higher  priority. 
With  an  AA-1  priority,  the  electro- 
magnetic separation  pilot  plant  would 
probably  be  ready  by  April  instead  of 
August  1943  and  earlier  completion 
dates  for  other  plants  would  also  be 
assured.  The  effect  of  achieving  this 
end,  however,  would  be  that  of  delay- 
ing    the     progress     of     other     vital 


60 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


projects.  Clearly  a  decision  was 
needed,  perhaps  from  the  President 
himself,  on  the  relative  importance  of 
the  atomic  project  and  other  war  pro- 
grams. Either  atomic  energy  should 
be  pushed  with  a  higher  priority,  or  it 
should  remain  an  experimental 
project  for  postwar  application,  with  a 
lower  priority. 

As  a  result  of  these  conclusions,  on 
29  August  Colonel  Nichols  again 
called  on  General  Clay.  With  concur- 
rence from  General  Styer,  Nichols 
now  outlined  the  status  of  the  atomic 
energy  program  and  presented  the 
unanimous  opinion  of  its  Army  and 
OSRD  leaders  that  a  higher  priority 
was  necessary.  If  Clay  would  indicate 
exactly  what  procedure  must  be  taken 
to  secure  an  AA-1  priority  from  the 
ANMB  and  WPB,  Bush  would  obtain 
a  letter  signed  by  the  President  and 
addressed  to  whomever  Clay  thought 
necessary.  Clay  suggested  that  a  letter 
go  from  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  to 
the  ANMB  and  that  it  simply  state 
that  the  atomic  project  should  be 
granted  a  higher  priority.  But  he  him- 
self opposed  this  course.  He  did  not 
believe  that  the  presidential  approval 
of  17  June  ever  implied  the  granting 
of  an  overall  AA-1  rating  and  he  was 
convinced  that  the  project  was  less 
important  than  "tanks  and  other  mu- 
nitions of  war."  Clay  would  support 
the  AA-3  priority,  but  nothing  higher. 
In  Nichols's  presence,  he  telephoned 
Brig.  Gen.  Theron  D.  Weaver — direc- 
tor of  the  SOS  Resources  Division 
and,  thus,  the  ANMB's  senior  Army 
representative — and  directed  that  the 
AA-3  rating  assigned  to  the  atomic 
project  should  not  be  questioned.  ^° 


On  the  same  day,  Vannevar  Bush 
wrote  to  Harvey  Bundy,  Stimson's 
special  assistant  who  served  as  the 
Secretary's  personal  agent  in  scientific 
affairs.  Bush  knew  that  his  memoran- 
dum would  come  to  Stimson's  atten- 
tion. He  summarized  the  current 
status  of  the  atomic  energy  project 
and  its  plans  and  hopes  for  the  future 
in  relation  to  the  problem  of  prior- 
ities. He  emphasized  that  if  the 
ANMB  persisted  in  its  view  that  Man- 
hattan did  not  need  a  higher  priority 
rating,  the  entire  atomic  bomb  pro- 
gram would  be  delayed.  The  time  had 
come,  he  continued,  for  weighing  the 
relative  importance  of  the  atomic  pro- 
gram against  other  wartime  programs 
with  which  it  might  interfere  and,  on 
that  basis,  deciding  the  best  way  to 
expedite  its  development.  "From  my 
own  point  of  view,"  he  concluded, 
"faced  as  I  am  with  the  unanimous 
opinion  of  a  group  of  men  that  I  con- 
sider to  be  among  the  greatest  scien- 
tists in  the  world,  joined  by  highly 
competent  engineers,  I  am  prepared 
to  recommend  that  nothing  should 
stand  in  the  way  of  putting  this  whole 
affair  through  to  conclusion,  on  a  rea- 
sonable scale,  but  at  the  maximum 
speed  possible,  even  if  it  does  cause 
moderate  interference  with  other  war 
efforts."  ^^ 

Bundy  showed  Bush's  memoran- 
dum to  the  Secretary  a  few  days  later. 


'"Marshall  Diary,  29  Aug  42.  MDR.  Quoted 
phrase  in  Nichols's  recollection,  recorded  in  the 
diary,  of  what  Clay  told  him. 

»i  Memo,  Bush  to  Bundy,  29  Aug  42,  MDR.  On 
Harvey  Bundy's  position  in  Stimson's  office  see 
Henry  L.  Stimson  and  McGeorge  Bundy,  On  Active 
Sennce  m  Peace  and  War  (New  York:  Harper  and 
Brothers,  1947),  pp.  343-44.  Harvey  Bundy,  a 
Boston  lawyer,  served  as  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
under  Stimson,  from  1929  to  1933. 


FIRST  STEPS  FOR  WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT 


61 


but  there  is  no  indication  that  Stim- 
son  took  any  immediate  action.  ^^ 
Meanwhile,  Stone  and  Webster  repre- 
sentatives reported  that  steel  compa- 
nies had  reacted  negatively  to  their 
attempts  to  place  orders  and  the 
ANMB  warned  Manhattan  officers 
that  the  rating  was  scarcely  sufficient 
to  secure  the  steel  needed  for  the 
projected  electromagnetic  pilot  plant. 

Stone  and  Webster  experienced  a 
similar  response  to  its  effiDrts  to 
obtain  copper  required  for  the  Trail 
project.  Capt.  Allan  C.  Johnson,  as- 
signed in  August  to  head  the  project's 
liaison  office  in  Washington,  D.C., 
found  that  WPB  and  ANMB  officials 
viewed  the  AA-3  rating  as  indicating 
that  the  atomic  bomb  program  was, 
as  he  phrased  it,  "an  unimportant 
miscellaneous  type."^^  On  12  Sep- 
tember, Marshall  asked  the  ANMB  for 
an  AAA  rating  for  the  Trail  copper. 
Three  days  later,  backed  by  Colonel 
Groves,  the  district  engineer  went  to 
see  General  Weaver  of  the  ANMB 
and  the  following  day  the  board  as- 
signed the  rating,  but  only  with  the 
understanding  that  the  metal  would 
be  drawn  from  the  normal  quota  of 
the  Corps  of  Engineers.  Unfortunate- 
ly this  delayed  other  engineer 
projects,  but  Marshall  had  no  alterna- 
tive. His  action  opened  the  way  for 
the  work  at  Trail  to  proceed  on 
schedule. 

Despite  the  victory  on  copper  pro- 
curement for  Trail,  there  was  univer- 
sal agreement  among  those  con- 
cerned with  the  atomic  energy  pro- 
gram that  improvement  in  the  whole 
priorities  picture  was  an  absolute  ne- 


cessity if  the  entire  project  was  not  to 
founder.  Groves  felt  that  DSM  leaders 
would  be  able  to  justify  a  higher  pri- 
ority rating  only  after  sites  were  defi- 
nitely selected,  plans  were  firmly 
adopted,  and  actual  construction  was 
under  way.  He  urged  Marshall  to 
move  ahead  on  these  matters  with  all 
possible  speed.  As  chairman  of  the 
S-1  Executive  Committee,  Conant 
had  concluded  that  nuclear  develop- 
ments had  become  more  important 
than  the  highly  rated  synthetic  rubber 
program  and  now  believed  that  they 
should  be  given  preference.  Bush, 
too,  saw  the  immediate  need  and 
called  for  assignment  of  a  higher  pri- 
ority. The  problem  in  mid-September 
1942,  as  Groves  later  recalled  it,  was 
"quite  simple."  If  atomic  energy  "was 
really  the  most  urgent  project,  it 
should  have  the  top  priority."  ^*  The 
solution  to  this  problem  was  not  far 
off,  but  it  would  not  come  before  the 
atomic  project  itself  had  undergone 
major  organizational  changes. 

Procuring  Essential  Materials 

Certain  materials  essential  to  the 
program  had  never  been  in  sufficient 
demand  for  industrial  or  commercial 
use  to  have  been  produced  in  quanti- 
ties. At  the  time  the  Army  entered  the 
atomic  project,  three  such  materials 
were  urgently  required:  processed 
uranium  feed  material  (chemical  com- 
pounds and  metal),  highly  purified 
graphite,  and  heavy  water.  The  Man- 
hattan District  had  to  develop  its  own 
sources  of  supply  for  these  essential 
materials. 


12  Stimson  Diary,  1  Sep  42,  HLS. 

13  Marshall  Diary,  2  Sep  42,  MDR 


^*  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  22. 


62 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Uranium 

In  early  1942,  the  OSRD  S-1  Sec- 
tion's planning  board  had  located  suf- 
ficient raw  uranium  ore  in  North 
America  to  satisfy  the  anticipated  re- 
quirements of  the  project  for  many 
months  to  come.  But  the  means  for 
converting  this  uranium  into  the  vari- 
ous kinds  of  feed  materials  needed 
for  the  different  methods  of  produc- 
ing fissionable  materials  were  almost 
wholly  lacking.  While  the  OSRD  had 
taken  some  steps  to  secure  these  ma- 
terials, the  major  task  of  procurement 
remained  to  be  carried  out  by  the 
Army. 

The  most  immediate  demand  was 
for  processed  uranium  in  the  form  of 
metal  for  the  Metallurgical  Laborato- 
ry. Raw  uranium  ore  is  customarily 
refined  either  as  uranium  oxide,  com- 
monly termed  black  oxide,  or  as  ura- 
nium salts.  The  oxide  or  the  salts  can 
be  converted  into  metal  by  additional 
processing;  however,  at  the  beginning 
of  1942,  this  was  still  complicated  and 
expensive  and  only  a  limited  quantity 
was  available  in  the  United  States — 
several  grams  of  good  quality  pro- 
duced experimentally  by  the  Wes- 
tinghouse  Electric  and  Manufacturing 
Company  and  a  few  pounds  in  the 
form  of  pyrophoric  powder  manufac- 
tured by  Metal  Hydrides,  Inc.,  of  Bev- 
erly, Massachusetts.  Both  Westing- 
house  and  Metal  Hydrides  had  ob- 
tained the  black  oxide  from  the  Cana- 
dian Radium  and  Uranium  Corpora- 
tion of  New  York. 

Canadian  Radium's  source  was  the 
mine  owned  by  Eldorado  Gold  Mines, 
Ltd.,  at  Great  Bear  Lake  in  Northwest 
Canada  (Map  2).  Eldorado  processed 
the  ore  in  its  refinery  at  Port  Hope, 
Ontario,  and  then  marketed  it  in  the 


United  States  through  Canadian 
Radium.  The  mine  itself  had  been 
closed  and  allowed  to  fill  with  water 
in  the  summer  of  1940,  because  suffi- 
cient ore  had  been  stockpiled  to  satis- 
fy anticipated  demand  for  five  years. 
The  uranium  for  early  atomic  re- 
search in  the  United  States  had  come 
from  these  stockpiles.  When  the 
OSRD  placed  a  sizable  order  in  1941, 
it  obtained  additional  equipment  and 
supplies  for  getting  the  mine  back 
into  operation  and,  meanwhile,  Cana- 
dian Radium  continued  to  supply 
amounts  of  black  oxide  refined  from 
the  stockpiled  ores.^^ 

As  deliveries  increased  during  the 
spring  of  1942,  project  scientists  in- 
tensified their  efforts  to  develop 
better  methods  of  purifying  the  mate- 
rial and  transforming  it  into  metal. 
Experiments  at  the  National  Bureau 
of  Standards  demonstrated  that  an 
ether  process,  long  known,  could 
remove  all  impurities  by  a  single  ex- 
traction method,  greatly  simplifying 
the  conversion  of  black  oxide  into 
uranium  dioxide,  or  brown  oxide,  the 
starting  point  for  uranium  metal  pro- 
duction. Arthur  Compton  arranged 
with  Edward  Mallinckrodt,  an  old 
friend  who  owned  the  Mallinckrodt 
Chemical  Works  in  St.  Louis,  to  de- 
velop large-scale  production  of  brown 
oxide,  using  the  ether  process.  To 
ensure  an  adequate  supply  of  urani- 
um oxide,  Colonel  Nichols  directed 
Stone  and  Webster  to  buy  350  tons 
from  Canadian  Radium  to  cover  the 
project's  needs  for  the  year  ahead. ^^ 


*^  Smyth  Report,  pp.  65-66;  Hewlett  and  Ander- 
son, Vw  iVorld.  p.  65;  MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  "Feed 
Materials  and  Special  Procurement,"  p.  3.1,  DASA. 

>«  MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  App.  F2,  DASA;  Marshall 
Diary,  7  Jul  42;  MDR;  DSM  Chronology,  7  Jul  42, 

Continued 


MAP  2 


64 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Thanks  to  these  measures,  by  the  fall 
of  1942  Mallinckrodt's  production  of 
brown  oxide  from  Eldorado's  ore  had 
increased  sufficiently  to  supply  the 
project's  requirements.  Mallinckrodt 
and  other  chemical  firms  converted 
the  brown  oxide  into  uranium  tetra- 
fluoride,  or  green  salt,  the  feed  mate- 
rial employed  in  most  uranium  metal- 
making  processes.  Westinghouse  had 
abandoned  a  photochemical  method 
in  favor  of  a  faster  process  using 
green  salt  and  soon  was  producing  at 
a  satisfactory  rate.  At  first  Metal  Hy- 
drides was  less  successful,  failing  to 
provide  a  metal  of  sufficient  purity 
with  pyrophoric  powder. 

Intensive  research  during  the 
summer  at  Massachusetts  Institute  of 
Technology,  Iowa  State  College,  and 
the  Bureau  of  Standards  had  devel- 
oped new  and  improved  metal- 
making  techniques.  Most  important 
was  a  steel-bomb  process  for  reduc- 
ing green  salt  to  metal,  employing 
highly  purified  calcium — and  later 
magnesium — as  a  reduction  agent.  By 
early  1943,  using  this  method,  Iowa 
State  had  developed  a  manufacturing 
program  and  Metal  Hydrides  had  sig- 
nificantly increased  its  output.  New 
Army  contracts  with  the  Electro  Met- 
allurgical Company  of  Niagara  Falls, 
New  York,  a  subsidiary  of  Union  Car- 
bide and  Carbon  Corporation,  and 
with  E.  I.  du  Pont  de  Nemours  and 
Company  further  increased  produc- 
tion, and  the  acute  metal  shortage 
was  largely  relieved  by  1944.^"^ 

Sec.  20,  OROO;  Memo,  [RuhofT]  to  Groves,  sub: 
Summary  of  Ore  Contracts,  15  Feb  44,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  161  (African  Metals),  MDR;  Compton, 
Atomic  Qimt.  pp.  93-95. 

i^MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  pp.  10.1-10.9,  DASA; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Neu^  World,  pp.  87-88  and 
293-94;    Memo,    Nichols    to    Groves,    21    Dec    44, 


In  September  1942,  Colonel  Mar- 
shall placed  Capt.  John  R.  Ruhoff  in 
charge  of  all  uranium  metal  produc- 
tion. Ruhoff  had  been  a  chemical  en- 
gineer at  Mallinckrodt,  assisting  in  the 
uranium  oxide  program,  and  when  he 
was  inducted  into  the  Army  that 
summer,  Manhattan  officials  had  ar- 
ranged his  assignment  to  the  District 
as  its  area  engineer  in  St.  Louis,  with 
headquarters  at  the  Mallinckrodt  firm. 
Then  in  October,  Marshall  formed  a 
Materials  Section  in  the  District  office 
to  administer  the  whole  feed  materi- 
als program.  He  selected  Lt.  Col. 
Thomas  T.  Crenshaw  of  the  Califor- 
nia Area  Engineers  Office  to  head  the 
section  and  had  Ruhoff  transferred  to 
New  York  to  serve  as  Crenshaw's 
assistant.^® 

Meanwhile,  project  leaders  knew 
the  reopened  Eldorado  mine  would 
probably  not  be  able  to  produce  and 
ship  ore  for  at  least  another  year  and 
that  stockpiles  at  the  Port  Hope  refin- 
ery were  insufficient  for  the  350  tons 
of  oxide  ordered  for  the  project  in 
July.  They  urgently  needed  a  source 
that  could  provide  high-grade  urani- 
um on  short  notice.  Such  a  source,  in 
fact,  had  long  been  close  at  hand. 
Late  in  1940,  when  German  seizure  of 
much  of  Africa  appeared  likely,  Edgar 
Sengier — head  of  Union  Miniere  with 
whom  Alexander  Sachs  of  Wall  Street 
and  Harold  Urey  of  Columbia  had 
earlier  conferred — had  ordered  ship- 
ment of  approximately  1,200  tons  of 
high-grade  ore  from  the  Shinkolobwe 
stockpile  in  the  Congo  via  Portuguese 
West  Africa  to  New  York.  Storing  the 


Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1,  MDR;  DSM  Chro- 
nology. 4  Sep  42,  Sec.  20,  OROO. 

18MDH,    Bk.    7,   Vol.    1,   pp.    1.16-1.17,    DASA; 
Compton,  Atomic  Qufst,  pp.  95-96. 


FIRST  STEPS  FOR  WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT 


65 


ore  in  a  warehouse  in  Port  Richmond 
on  Staten  Island,  Sengier  apparently 
made  no  effort  to  call  it  to  the  atten- 
tion of  American  government  officials 
until  after  the  United  States  entered 
the  war.  Attending  a  meeting  in 
Washington,  D.C.,  in  March  1942,  he 
mentioned  his  Staten  Island  cache  to 
Thomas  K.  Finletter  and  Herbert 
Feis,  State  Department  officials  con- 
cerned with  international  economic 
affairs,  but  neither  state  nor  defense 
officials  indicated  any  immediate  in- 
terest in  the  ore — why  is  not  entirely 
clear.  Nevertheless,  it  was  soon 
common  knowledge  in  trade  circles 
that  Sengier  was  interested  in  selling 
the  ore.^^ 

It  was  early  September  1942,  how- 
ever, before  word  of  the  Congo  ore 
reached  Manhattan  District  officials. 
The  Standard  Oil  Development  Com- 
pany, working  on  the  centrifuge  proc- 
ess, had  opened  negotiations  with 
Sengier  for  procurement  of  the  ura- 
nium oxide  it  needed.  Through 
Standard  Oil,  Metallurgical  Laborato- 
ry staff  members  learned  of  the 
Staten  Island  ore  and  sought  to  pur- 
chase additional  quantities.  Through 
his  Union  Miniere  outlet  in  New 
York,  the  African  Metals  Corporation, 
Sengier  had  submitted  a  request  to 
the  State  Department  for  a  license  to 
ship  ore  from  Port  Richmond  to  El- 
dorado's refinery  in  Ontario,  for 
processing  into  black  oxide.  On  7 
September,  Colonel  Nichols  received 
a  query  from  Finletter  concerning  the 
request  from  African  Metals — his  first 
inkling  of  the  existence  of  the  Congo 
ore.   Nichols  acted  promptly;  he  met 


with  Finletter  and  Feis  at  the  State 
Department  on  12  September  and 
then  dispatched  Captain  Ruhoff  to 
consult  with  Stone  and  Webster  in 
Boston  and  Sengier  in  New  York, 
while  he  himself  hurried  to  California 
for  the  meeting  of  the  OSRD  S-1  Ex- 
ecutive Committee  on  the  thirteenth 
and  fourteenth.  The  committee  rec- 
ommended that  all  Sengier's  ore  be 
acquired. 2°  Thus,  at  just  the  time 
when  an  acute  shortage  of  uranium 
threatened  to  seriously  delay  the 
atomic  project,  the  store  of  rich 
Congo  ore  became  available  to  pro- 
vide most  of  its  wartime 
requirements. 

Graphite,   Heavy   Water,  and  Silver 

Either  highly  purified  graphite  or 
heavy  water  to  use  as  a  moderator  in 
the  atomic  pile  was  essential  for  the 
plutonium  program  and  the  other 
work  under  way  at  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory.  Ample  graphite  was  al- 
ready being  produced  commercially 
in  the  United  States;  the  question  was 
one  of  "purity  and  priority."  The 
main  quality  required  in  the  graphite 
was  low-neutron  absorption,  which 
was  directly  dependent  on  its  purity. 
Unfortunately,  the  standard  product 
had  too  many  impurities,  particularly 
boron.  Scientists  at  the  National 
Bureau  of  Standards  traced  the  boron 
in  commercial  graphite  to  the  coke 
used  for  its  production.  By  substitut- 
ing petroleum  for  coke  and  altering 
certain  manufacturing  techniques, 
both  National  Carbon  Company  and 
Speer    Carbon    Company    were    soon 


•9  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  fif  Told.  pp.  33-35;  Hewlett 
and  Anderson,  Xnf  World,  pp.  85-86;  Lewis  L, 
Strauss,  Mm  and  Den.sions  (Garden  Citv.  N.\ '.:  I^ou- 
bleday  and  Co.,  1962),  pp.  181-82. 


2°  Groves,  A'oir  //  Can  Be  Told.  p.  36;  Marshall 
Diar^.  7  and  12-13  Sep  42,  MDR;  DSM  Chronology, 
13  Sep  42,  Sees.  2(e)  and  20,  OROO. 


66 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


producing  highly  purified  graphite 
that  absorbed  20  percent  fewer  neu- 
trons and  satisfied  the  stringent  re- 
quirements of  the  Metallurgical  Labo- 
ratory. With  the  WPB's  cooperation 
in  arranging  the  necessary  priorities, 
the  OSRD  was  able  to  place  large 
orders  with  these  firms,  essentially 
solving  the  atomic  energy  program's 
graphite  problem. ^^ 

Heavy  water  was  another  matter. 
Scientific  leaders  knew  that  heavy 
water  could  not  be  available  in  large 
quantities  for  many  months  or  even 
years.  Researchers  at  the  Metallurgi- 
cal Laboratory  had  directed  their  pri- 
mary interest  toward  developing  a 
uranium-graphite  pile,  viewing  heavy 
water  as  an  alternate  solution  should 
the  problems  with  graphite  prove 
insuperable.  Meanwhile,  the  OSRD 
moved  ahead  with  its  plans  for  a 
heavy  water  plant  at  Trail  (see  Map  2), 
but  priority  difficulties  delayed  con- 
struction and  the  plant  did  not  begin 
operating  until  June  1943. ^^ 

A  store  of  approximately  400 
pounds — almost  all  the  heavy  water  in 
the  world  outside  of  that  being  pro- 
duced by  the  German-controlled 
Norsk  Hydro  plant  in  southern 
Norway — was  in  the  hands  of  British 
scientists.  This  heavy  water  had  an  in- 
teresting history.  Nuclear  research  in 
France  by  Frederic  Joliot-Curie  and 
his  collaborators,  Hans  von  Halban 
and  Lew  Kowarski,  had  concentrated 
on  using  heavy  water  as  a  moderator 
to  achieve  a  slow-neutron  reaction.  In 


'^  Smyth  Report,  pp.  65-68  (quotation  from  p. 
68);  Compton,  Alomir  Qimt,  pp.  97-98;  MDH,  Bk.  1, 
Vol.  4,  "Auxiliary  Activities,"  pp.  12.7-12.9,  DASA. 

22  Smyth  Report,  p.  65;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp. 
79  and  98-99;  Marshall  Diary,  MDR,  and  DSM 
Chronology,  OROO,  for  the  summer  of  1942, 
passim;  MDH,  Bk.  3,  "The  P-9  Project,"  pp.  4.1-4.7 
and  5.4,  DASA. 


March  1940,  just  before  the  German 
attack  on  Norway,  Joliot-Curie  had  se- 
cured about  160  to  165  liters  (169  to 
174  quarts)  of  heavy  water  from 
Norsk  Hydro.  Shortly  before  the  fall 
of  Paris  in  mid-June,  he  sent  von 
Halban  and  Kowarski  with  most  of 
this  precious  store  to  England,  where, 
after  a  hazardous  trip,  the  two  men 
joined  the  growing  team  of  British 
and  refugee  scientists  doing  atomic 
research.  Work  with  this  stock  of 
heavy  water  had  contributed  to  the 
optimistic  British  reports  on  a  urani- 
um-heavy water  system.  When  the 
group  relocated  to  Canada  at  the  end 
of  1942,  the  heavy  water  went 
along. 2^ 

The  need  for  large  quantities  of 
silver  had  not  been  anticipated.  At 
the  Army-OSRD  meeting  on  9  July, 
Ernest  Lawrence  of  the  University  of 
California,  Berkeley,  pointed  out  that 
he  needed  several  thousand  tons  of 
copper  for  magnet  coils.  Because 
copper  was  high  on  the  list  of  critical 
materials  and  might  be  impossible  to 
obtain,  he  thought  that  silver,  a  good 
electrical  conductor  and  not  on  the 
critical  materials  list,  would  do  as 
well.     Accordingly,     Colonel     Nichols 


23  H.  D.  Smyth,  "British  Information  Service 
Statement,  'Britain  and  and  the  Atomic  Bomb,' 
August  12,  1945,"  in  Atomic  Energy  for  Military  Pur- 
poses, 8th  ed.  (Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton  University 
Press,  1948),  p.  276;  Cowing,  Britain  and  Atomic 
Energy,  pp.  49-51;  Crowther  and  Whiddington,  Sci- 
ence at  War,  pp.  144-45  and  148;  Sir  George  Thom- 
son, "Anglo-U.S.  Cooperation  on  Atomic  Energy," 
American  Scientist,  41  (Jan  53):  77-78  and  80;  Glas- 
stone.  Sourcebook  on  Atomic  Energy,  3d  ed.  (Princeton, 
N.J.:  D.  Van  Nostrand  Co.,  1967),  n.  on  p.  513.  The 
figure  given  for  the  amount  of  heavy  water  that  the 
French  secured  from  Norsk  Hydro  varies  somewhat 
in  the  different  accounts.  Most  state  that  there  were 
about  160  to  165  liters,  an  amount  that  would  have 
weighed  about  176  to  182  kilograms  (388  to  410 
pounds). 


FIRST  STEPS  FOR  WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT 


67 


visited  Under  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury Daniel  W.  Bell  to  find  out  if  silver 
would  be  available.  Although  Nichols 
did  not  provide  specific  details  of  the 
DSM  project,  Bell  appeared  receptive. 
"How  much  silver  do  you  want?"  he 
asked.  "About  fifteen  thousand  tons," 
answered  Nichols.  Visibly  startled, 
Bell  exclaimed:  "Young  man,  ...  I 
would  have  you  know  that  when  we 
talk  of  silver  we  speak  in  terms  of 
ounces."  ^'* 

Ounces  or  tons,  that  the  DSM 
project  would  get  what  it  wanted  was 
soon  clear.  With  relatively  good 
speed,  considering  the  need  for  secre- 
cy and  the  number  of  clearances  re- 
quired, the  Department  of  the  Treas- 
ury, the  ANMB,  and  the  WPB  ap- 
proved the  necessary  arrangements. 
On  29  August,  in  a  letter  to  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  Henry  Morgenthau, 
drafted  jointly  by  Manhattan  and 
Treasury  representatives,  Secretary  of 
War  Stimson  requested  the  transfer 
of  175  million  fine  troy  ounces  (about 
6,000  tons  of  silver)  "to  the  War  De- 
partment to  be  used  as  a  substitute 
for  copper"  for  an  "important 
project"  that  was  "highly  secret."  "At 
this  time,"  read  Stimson's  letter,  "the 
interests  of  the  Government  do  not 
permit  my  disclosing  the  nature  of 
the  use."  ^^ 


**As  related  by  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  157. 
Subsection  based  on  Marshall  Diary,  9  Jul-29  Aug 
42,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  4,  "Silver  Program," 
DASA;  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  107-09. 
Groves  gives  the  impression  that  Marshall  himself 
visited  Under  Secretary  Bell,  but  Marshall  s  3  Aug 
42  entry  in  his  diary  indicates  that  he  sent  Nichols 
to  confer  with  Bell  on  the  question  of  securing 
silver  for  the  Manhattan  Project. 

^*Ltr,  Stimson  to  Secy  Treas,  29  Aug  42,  in 
MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  4,  App.  B-1,  DASA. 


The  endorsement  of  the  Treasury 
Department  on  a  second  letter  that 
day  constituted  an  agreement  be- 
tween the  two  agencies  for  the  trans- 
fer. It  provided  that  the  silver  would 
remain  in  the  United  States;  would  be 
returned  to  the  Treasury  in  five  years, 
or  sooner  if  required;  would  be  uti- 
lized in  government-owned  plants  es- 
sential to  the  war  effort;  and  would 
be  protected  against  loss.  Subsequent 
agreements  in  1943  and  1944  would 
raise  the  quantity  involved  to  roughly 
14,700  tons,  worth  about  $304  mil- 
lion. ^^  Under  constant  heavy  guard, 
the  bars  of  silver  were  transferred — 
after  being  melted,  cast  in  cylindrical 
billets,  rolled  into  strips,  and  finally 
fabricated  into  magnet  coils.  Because 
the  electromagnetic  process  seemed 
the  most  promising  in  the  summer  of 
1942,  this  turn  of  events  was  indeed 


encouragmg. 


Site  Selection 


Project  leaders  in  the  summer  of 
1942  were  well  aware  that  acquisition 
of  suitable  sites  was  as  important  to 
the  success  of  the  atomic  program  as 
obtaining  adequate  priorities.  At  the 
Army-OSRD  meeting  of  25  June,  they 
had  confirmed  an  earlier  decision  to 
build  a  heavy  water  plant  at  the  Trail 
site  and  approved  location  of  the  pro- 
posed plutonium  pilot  plant  in  the 
Argonne  Forest  near  Chicago.  The 
Army  delayed  actual  acquisition  of  a 
specific  area  in  the  Argonne  Forest 
preserve    pending   receipt    of  further 


^^The  Atomic  Energy  Commission  did  not  return 
the  last  of  the  14,700  tons  of  silver  to  the  U.S. 
Treasury  until  May  1970,  a  quarter  of  a  century 
later.  See  news  item  in  Washington  Post,  29  May  70. 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Silver-wound  Magnet  Coils  for  the  Electromac.np.tk:  Process 


information  from  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  concerning  the  size  of  site 
needed  for  the  plutonium  pilot  plant. 
In  early  July,  Colonel  Nichols  ob- 
tained clarification  of  the  specific  Ar- 
gonne  requirements  in  discussions 
held  in  Chicago  with  Stone  and  Web- 
ster officials  and  Compton  and  his 
staff,  opening  the  way  for  lease  in 
August  of  1,000  acres  from  Cook 
County.  At  the  same  time,  the  Univer- 
sity of  Chicago  agreed  to  provide  an 
additional  acre  on  the  campus  for 
future  construction  of  additional  labo- 
ratory space.  To  administer  the  site 
acquisitions  and  oversee  construction 
activities,  Colonel  Marshall  estab- 
lished   the    Chicago    Area    Engineers 


Office  in  August  and  assigned  Capt. 
James  F.  Grafton  as  area  engineer.  ^^ 

For  the  main  production  plants, 
Colonels  Marshall  and  Nichols  and 
representatives  of  Stone  and  Webster 
and  the  Tennessee  Valley  Authority 
(TVA)  began  a  survey  of  possible 
sites  in  the  Knoxville  area  on  I  July.^® 


"Marshall  Diarv,  6-7,  10,  13,  17  Jul  and  13  Aug 
42,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  "Research,"  Pt.  1, 
pp.  2.5-2.7  and  7.2,  DASA. 

^*  Paragraphs  on  Tennessee  site  based  on  Mar- 
shall Diarv,  1-3,  9,  10,  14.  15.  23,  29,  31  Jul  and  3, 
17-19,  26-27  Aug  and  2-5,  10  Sep  42,  MDR;  MDH, 
Bk.  1,  Vol.  10.  "Land  Acquisition  CEW."  pp.  2.3- 
2.4  and  2.20-2.21,  and  Vol.  12,  "Clinton  Engineer 
Works,"  pp.  2.2-2.4,  DASA;  DSM  Chronology,  9, 
30  Jul  and  26  Aug  42,  each  Sec.  2(e),  OROO; 
Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  15;  Memo,  Crenshaw 
to  Dist  Engr,  sub:  Weekly  Progress  Rpt,  22  Aug  42, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  001  (Mtgs),  MDR. 


FIRST  STEPS  FOR  WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT 


69 


{See  Map  1.)  Requisite  conditions  for 
the  site  were  a  nearby  source  of  a 
large  amount  of  continuous  electric 
power,  enough  for  a  fair-sized  city; 
availability  of  a  very  large  quantity  of 
water  for  cooling  and  processing  as 
well  as  construction  and  operating  re- 
quirements; and  proximity  to  a  main 
line  railroad  and  good  access  roads, 
to  ensure  delivery  of  heavy  construc- 
tion materials  and  supplies.  Topogra- 
phy, too,  was  important.  An  area 
bounded  by  natural  barriers,  such  as 
rivers  and  hills,  would  be  securer  and 
individual  plant  sites  separated  by 
ridges  far  safer  in  case  of  an  explo- 
sion, although  the  slopes  of  these 
ridges  should  be  gentle  enough  for 
easy  construction.  The  substratum 
should  provide  adequate  foundation, 
yet  not  be  so  full  of  rocks  as  to  make 
excavation  unnecessarily  difficult  and 
time-consuming.  Finally,  there  should 
be  adequate  and  suitable  space  for  a 
town  with  facilities  for  housing  and 
serving  thousands  of  workmen  and 
technicians  and  their  families. 

The  survey  and  subsequent  investi- 
gations filled  nearly  three  days, 
during  which  Colonel  Marshall  and 
his  colleagues  examined  several  possi- 
ble sites.  None  seemed  at  first  glance 
exactly  right,  but  one,  at  least,  had 
possibilities.  TVA  officials  seemed 
certain  that  the  150,000-kilowatt 
power  requirement  of  the  plants 
could  be  met  if  Marshall  could  hasten 
the  delivery  of  some  badly  needed 
heavy-generating  equipment.  As 
project  priorities  were  indefinite  at 
this  time,  Marshall  agreed  to  look 
into  the  matter;  however,  he  empha- 
sized that  because  an  entirely  suitable 
site  had  not  been  found,  he  would 
have  to  consider  an  area  near  Spo- 
kane, Washington,  where  the  Bonne- 


ville Power  Administration  might 
more  easily  meet  his  requirements. 

Site  problems  were  a  key  issue  at 
the  next  Army-OSRD  meeting  on 
9  July.  John  R.  Lotz,  head  of  Stone 
and  Webster,  reported  that  his  firm 
had  surveyed  the  Spokane  area  and 
concluded  that  it  lacked  sufficient 
transmission  lines  to  supply  the  re- 
quired power.  The  group  reaffirmed 
in  principle  its  earlier  decision  for  a 
site  in  Tennessee.  Also,  Marshall  and 
the  Stone  and  Webster  engineers 
agreed  that  half  of  the  200  square 
miles  previously  believed  necessary 
would  be  adequate,  and  even  a  site  of 
this  size  would  not  be  required  were 
it  not  for  the  plutonium  plant.  The 
danger  of  highly  radioactive  fission 
products  escaping,  or  even  of  a  nucle- 
ar explosion,  dictated  building  this 
plant  2  to  4  miles  from  any  other  in- 
stallation and  an  equal  distance  in 
from  the  boundaries  of  the  site. 

The  9  July  Army-OSRD  meeting 
ended  without  a  decision  on  a  specific 
Tennessee  site  or  any  indication  of 
when  one  might  be  made.  Nor  was 
there,  for  that  matter,  any  clear  fore- 
cast of  scientific  developments  that 
might  help  determine  the  choice. 
Only  a  tentative  and,  as  soon  became 
clear,  excessively  optimistic  construc- 
tion schedule  emerged.  As  Colonel 
Groves  pointed  out  to  Colonel  Mar- 
shall that  afternoon,  a  general  air  of 
vagueness  seemed  to  pervade  the 
whole  atomic  project,  with  the  start- 
ing dates  for  development  of  many  of 
its  phases  still  too  indefinite.  He 
urged  Marshall  first  to  insist  upon  the 
prompt  and  complete  programming 
of  all  contemplated  steps  and  then  to 
see  that  this  schedule  was  adhered  to 
as  far  as  possible.  An  obvious  neces- 


70 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


sity  was  a  swift  decision  on  the  major 
production  site. 

Shortly  thereafter,  Marshall  and 
Stone  and  Webster  officials  agreed  to 
try  to  obtain  a  site  in  Tennessee  by 
10  August  so  that  construction  on  the 
project  administration  building  and 
some  housing  facilities  could  begin, 
even  if  plant  construction  could  not. 
Stone  and  Webster  drew  up  a  formal 
site  report  on  the  most  promising 
area,  about  12  miles  west  of  Knox- 
ville,  and  prepared  maps  indicating 
the  exact  tracts  of  land  to  be  ac- 
quired. To  avoid  having  a  public 
highway  run  through  the  site,  an  ob- 
vious security  hazard,  the  firm  also 
studied  the  possibility  of  relocating 
Tennessee  61,  which  then  crossed  the 
northern  portion  of  the  area.  The 
Ohio  River  Division  of  the  Engineer 
Department  then  prepared  an  ap- 
praisal of  the  cost  of  acquiring  the  ap- 
proximate 83,000  acres  in  the  area, 
comprised  of  land  in  the  Roane, 
Loudon,  Knox,  and  Anderson  Coun- 
ties of  Tennessee.  On  30  July,  at  the 
next  Army-OSRD  meeting,  Colonel 
Marshall  reviewed  the  steps  taken 
toward  acquisition  of  the  site  and  the 
entire  group  agreed  that  the  Tennes- 
see Valley  seemed  the  best  location, 
although  some  of  the  scientists  felt 
that  a  site  farther  east  in  the  Great 
Smoky  Mountains,  where  the  climate 
was  not  as  warm,  might  prove  more 
desirable  in  the  future  for  a  proposed 
permanent  central  laboratory. 

Hardly  had  the  way  been  cleared 
for  immediate  acquisition  of  the  Ten- 
nessee site  when  Colonel  Marshall, 
with  the  approval  of  General  Robins, 
decided  to  postpone  carrying  it  out. 
He  knew  that  the  site  and  making  the 
necessary  pre-construction  changes 
and  improvements,  not  including  re- 


location of  Tennessee  61,  would  cost 
an  estimated  $4.25  million  and 
require  resettlement  of  some  400 
families  living  in  the  area.  Marshall 
reasoned  there  could  be  no  harm  in 
delaying  acquisition  until  more  defi- 
nite information  on  the  plutonium 
process  was  available.  At  worst,  a 
postponement  would  cause  only  a  few 
weeks  delay,  for  the  Engineers'  Real 
Estate  Branch  was  sure  that  the  land 
could  be  acquired  to  the  point  of 
right  of  entry  within  ten  days  of  his 
order  to  proceed.  Meanwhile,  he 
would  try  to  get  the  TVA  the  needed 
priorities  and,  when  scientific  devel- 
opments warranted,  order  acquisition 
of  the  site. 

Although  Ernest  Lawrence  indicat- 
ed he  was  now  willing  to  have  the 
full-scale  electromagnetic  separation 
plant  built  in  Tennessee,  locating  the 
plants  in  the  Shasta  Dam  area  of  Cali- 
fornia was  seriously  studied  and  the 
proposal  was  not  completely  aban- 
doned until  early  September.  Never- 
theless, Colonel  Marshall  felt  he  was 
"about  ready  to  recommend  purchase 
of  at  least  part  of  the  Tennessee  site" 
by  26  August,  the  next  S-1  Executive 
Committee  meeting.  When  the  com- 
mittee, however,  delayed  a  decision 
on  production  facilities,  acquisition  of 
the  site  was  postponed,  despite  the 
urgings  of  Robins  and  Groves  to  the 
contrary.  ^^ 

Reaching  Decisions:   The  Meeting  at 
Bohemian  Grove 

About  10-12  miles  northwest  of 
San  Francisco,  across  the  Golden 
Gate   and   amidst   the   giant   redwood 


=>« Marshall  Diary,  26  Aug  42,  MDR. 


FIRST  STEPS  FOR  WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT 


71 


trees  of  the  Muir  Woods  National 
Monument,  there  is  a  beautiful  area 
known  as  the  Bohemian  Grove.  In 
this  impressive  setting,  not  too  far 
from  Lawrence's  laboratory  at  the 
University  of  California,  Berkeley,  the 
S-1  Executive  Committee  met  on  13 
and  14  September  1942  to  consider 
at  length  and  in  detail  the  major 
problems  of  the  DSM  project.  ^° 
Present  along  with  the  committee  at 
this  fifth  Army-OSRD  meeting  were 
Colonel  Nichols  and  the  California 
area  engineer,  Maj.  Thomas  T.  Cren- 
shaw— both  in  civilian  clothes  to  mask 
from  casual  observers  the  Army's  in- 
terest in  the  work  at  Berkeley — as  well 
as  J.  Robert  Oppenheimer  and  two 
other  scientific  consultants. 

The  first  major  decision  was  to  ac- 
quire the  Tennessee  site  immediately. 
But  on  which  plants  could  construc- 
tion begin?  The  gaseous  diffusion  and 
centrifuge  separation  methods  still 
appeared  feasible  and  promising,  but 
neither  had  produced  any  appreciable 
amounts  of  U-235  and  both  would  re- 
quire hundreds  or  thousands  of  pro- 
cess stages  for  large-scale  separation. 
The  plutonium  process  had  yet  to  see 
a  self-sustaining  chain  reaction,  much 
less  production  and  separation  of  plu- 
tonium. Thus  far,  only  the  electro- 
magnetic method  had  achieved  signif- 
icant production.  Because  one  elec- 
tromagnetic unit  could  separate  10 
miUigrams  of  U-235  per  day,  it  was 
not  inconceivable  that  fifty  thousand 
units  could  separate  a  pound,  and,  in 
the  same  period,  a  billion  units  could 
separate  a  ton.  To  design  and  build 


'"Section  on  Bohemian  Grove  meeting  based  on 
Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  150-54  and  photograph 
facing  p.  140;  Marshall  Diary,  13  Sep  42,  MDR; 
DSM  Chronology,  13-14  Sep  42,  Sec.  2(e),  OROO; 
Smyth  Report,  pp.  140-41. 


these  units  would  be  difficult  and  ex- 
pensive, and  the  full-scale  plant 
would  require  considerably  more  re- 
search and  engineering  development 
as  well  as  the  training  of  large  num- 
bers of  skilled  operators.  But  the 
process  appeared  sufficiently  feasible 
to  justify  starting  work  on  a  produc- 
tion plant.  After  a  visit  to  Lawrence's 
laboratory,  where  the  Executive  Com- 
mittee viewed  experimental  separa- 
tion units  in  actual  operation,  the 
group  agreed  to  proceed  with  the 
construction  of  a  large-scale  electro- 
magnetic plant. 

This  100-gram-per-day  (the  output 
specified  in  the  17  June  program) 
electromagnetic  installation  would  be 
erected  in  Tennessee  at  an  estimated 
cost  of  $30  million.  Design  and  pro- 
curement for  the  plant  were  to  begin 
immediately,  subject  to  cancellation  at 
any  time  before  New  Year's  Day  of 
1943  if  further  developments  so  war- 
ranted. On  that  date,  the  group 
hoped,  design  would  be  frozen  and 
construction  could  begin.  At  the  same 
time,  a  small  electromagnetic  pilot 
plant  was  projected  for  Tennessee; 
however,  at  a  later  date,  this  plan  was 
dropped. 

The  experimental  plutonium  plant 
planned  for  the  Argonne  Forest  site 
was  now  switched  to  Tennessee.  This 
change  was  necessitated  by  growing 
evidence  that  operations  at  this 
plant — including  chemical  studies  on 
extracting  the  plutonium,  training  of 
operators,  and  testing  of  equipment 
and  processes — would  be  on  a  scale 
too  large  for  the  Argonne  site.  Stone 
and  Webster  would  arrange  a  subcon- 
tract with  a  chemical  company  to 
develop  and  operate  the  chemical  en- 
gineering equipment  needed  for  plu- 


72 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


tonium  separation.  Now  the  experi- 
mental pile  from  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  could  be  relocated  from 
the  heart  of  south  Chicago  to  the 
safer  Argonne  location.  In  further 
support  of  the  plutonium  project, 
construction  of  the  heavy  water  plant 
at  Trail  would  be  pushed  as  rapidly  as 
necessary  to  complete  this  work  by 
I  May  1943. 

The  meetings  on  13  and  14  Sep- 
tember brought  an  end  to  much  of 
the  indecision  that  the  course  of 
events  had  imposed  on  the  atomic 
energy  program   during  the  summer 


of  1942.  The  decisions  reached  at  the 
Bohemian  Grove,  in  the  words  of  one 
participant,  "were  destined  to  shape 
the  entire  future  development  of  the 


project. 


Indeed,  even  as  these  de- 


cisions were  taking  form,  changes 
were  under  way  that  would  have  a 
profound  effect  on  the  organization 
and  direction  of  the  atomic  bomb 
program.  The  early  period  of  Army 
participation,  marked  by  a  slow  and 
deliberate  entrance  into  the  project, 
was  coming  to  an  end. 


^'Compton,  Atomic  Qiml,  p.  150. 


CHAPTER  IV 


General  Groves  Takes  Command 


As  the  son  of  an  Army  chaplain, 
Leslie  R.  Groves  spent  many  of  his 
boyhood  years  on  different  military 
posts  in  the  western  United  States. 
During  these  formative  years,  young 
Groves  often  listened  to  the  old  Indian 
fighters  who  frequented  the  posts 
recount  many  a  stirring  tale  of  how 
the  West  was  won.  Their  tales  fired 
the  boy's  imagination,  yet  he  lament- 
ed that  those  days  were  past  and  that 
there  were  no  more  frontiers  left  for 
him  to  conquer.  He  could  not  know, 
of  course,  that  the  opportunity  to  re- 
alize his  youthful  dreams  to  lead  in 
the  exploration  and  conquest  of  a 
new  frontier — his  to  be  a  scientific 
and  technical  one  whose  develop- 
ments would  have  a  decisive  impact 
on  the  future  and  fate  of  all  man- 
kind— would  come  as  the  result  of  the 
administrative  reorganization  of  the 
American  atomic  energy  program  in 
the  summer  and  fall  of  1942  and  his 
selection  as  a  46-year-old  career  Army 
officer  to  be  officer  in  charge  of  the 
project.^ 

Reorganization  and  the  Selection 
of  Groves 

On  17  June  1942,  President 
Roosevelt  had  approved  the  propos- 


Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  415. 


als,  made  by  Vannevar  Bush  and 
James  B.  Conant  to  the  Top  Policy 
Group,  that  the  Army  assume  overall 
direction  of  the  atomic  program  and 
that  the  Joint  Committee  on  New 
Weapons  and  Equipment  (JNW)  es- 
tablish a  special  subcommittee  to  con- 
sider the  military  application  of 
atomic  energy.  Bush,  however,  who 
served  as  JNW  chairman,  did  not  see 
any  need  for  immediate  appointment 
of  the  subcommittee  and  thus  waited 
until  10  September  to  propose  to 
Secretary  of  War  Stimson  that  a  small 
group  of  officers  be  assigned  the  task 
of  considering  possible  strategic  and 
tactical  uses  of  atomic  energy.  When 
Stimson  informed  Army  Chief  of  Staff 
General  George  C.  Marshall  of  Bush's 
request,  the  general  indicated  that  he 
felt  it  was  premature  and  expressed 
grave  concern  about  the  increasing 
problem  of  security  as  more  and 
more  people  became  aware  of  the  ex- 
istence of  the  atomic  energy  program. 
Despite  Marshall's  reservations,  it 
soon  became  evident  that  a  special 
committee  was  needed  not  only  to 
consider  the  ultimate  uses  of  atomic 
energy  but  also  to  determine  general 
policies  and  supervise  the  growing 
project.  The  sequence  of  events  in 
September  1942  that  led  to  formation 


74 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


of  a  policymaking  committee  and  to 
strengthening  the  mihtary  leadership 
of  the  project  seems  to  have  been 
about  as  follows.  ^ 

Early  that  month — almost  certainly 
before  learning  the  results  of  the  Bo- 
hemian Grove  meeting  and  possibly 
even  before  Bush  made  his  recom- 
mendations to  Stimson — General 
Styer  discussed  the  status  of  the 
atomic  energy  program  with  his  com- 
mander, Lt.  Gen.  Brehon  B.  Somer- 
vell, Services  of  Supply  (SOS)  com- 
manding general,  and  then  with 
General  Marshall.  In  outlining  devel- 
opments in  the  program,  he  empha- 
sized that  the  Army's  responsibilities 
were  now  becoming  increasingly 
large.  Then  on  the  sixteenth,  or  pos- 
sibly a  day  or  so  earlier.  Bush,  Styer, 
and  Somervell  met  to  discuss  the  top- 
level  organization  of  the  atomic 
project.  Under  Secretary  of  War 
Robert  P.  Patterson  also  may  have 
been  present,  or  perhaps  Somervell 
saw  him  separately.  At  any  rate,  two 
decisions  were  reached:  A  policy  com- 


^  Description  of  events  through  22  Sep  42  recon- 
structed from  Memo,  Bush  and  Conant  to  Wallace, 
Stimson,  and  Marshall,  sub:  Atomic  Fission  Bombs, 
13  Jun  42,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Bush  to  President,  17  Jun  42; 
Ltr,  Bush  to  Styer,  19  Jun  42.  Both  m  HB  Files,  Fldr 
6,  MDR.  Stimson  Diary,  10  Sep  42,  HLS.  Memo, 
Bundy  to  Stimson,  10  Sep  42,  HB  Files,  Fldr  5, 
MDR.  1st  Ind,  Styer  to  Chief  of  Mil  Hist,  15  Aug 
61,  to  Ltr,  Chief  of  Mil  Hist  to  Styer,  17  Jun  61, 
CMH.  Groves,  AW  //  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  3-5  and  21- 
23.  Marshall  Diary,  16-21  Sep  42,  OCG  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Misc  Recs  Sec,  behind  Fldr  5, 
MDR.  Memo  (penciled  note),  VB  [Bush]  to  Bundy, 
in  envelope  marked  9/17,  HB  Files,  Fldr  7,  MDR. 
Diary  of  Lt  Gen  Leslie  R.  Groves  (hereafter  cited  as 
Groves  Dairy),  17-22  Sep  42,  LRG.  The  diary  was 
an  office  record  maintained  by  Groves's  secretaries 
to  list  visits,  telephone  calls,  etc.  It  covers  the 
period  from  1  Jan  42  to  7  Nov  45.  Entries  of  later 
years  are  more  complete  than  for  the  early  period  of 
the  Manhattan  Project.  No  entry  was  written  by 
Groves,  nor  was  each  one  necessarily  seen  by  him. 
It  appears  to  be  accurate,  although  incomplete. 


mittee  would  be  formed  to  oversee 
the  program,  and  an  Army  officer 
would  be  chosen  to  carry  out  the 
policies  established  by  this  committee. 

Anxious  to  counteract  General  So- 
mervell's tendency  to  favor  giving  the 
Army  dominant  control  of  the 
project,  thus  relegating  the  scientists 
to  a  lesser  role.  Bush  proposed  that 
the  committee  should  be  organized 
first.  Styer  and  Somervell,  however, 
wanted  to  choose  an  officer  immedi- 
ately. The  obvious  choice  was  Styer 
himself,  but  the  job  was  a  full-time 
one  and  Somervell  was  unwilling  to 
lose  his  chief  of  staff.  Styer  then, 
without  hesitation,  proposed  Colonel 
Groves,  a  recommendation  readily  ap- 
proved by  Generals  Somervell  and 
Marshall. 

In  addition  to  his  impressive  gener- 
al qualifications,^  another  factor  made 


^  Leslie  R.  Groves  entered  the  U.S.  Military  Acad- 
emy in  1916  following  three  years  as  a  student  at 
the  LJniversity  of  Washington  (1913-14)  and  the 
Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology  (1914-16). 
His  class  at  West  Point  did  not  graduate  until  No- 
vember 1918,  too  late  for  him  to  see  active  duty  in 
World  War  I.  Assigned  to  the  Corps  of  Engineers, 
for  more  than  a  decade  after  the  war  he  held  a  vari- 
ety of  engineer  positions  in  the  United  States, 
Hawaii,  and  Nicaragua.  During  the  1930's,  he  at- 
tended the  Command  and  General  Staff  School  at 
Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas,  and  the  Army  War  Col- 
lege in  Washington,  D.C.,  and  also  served  in  the 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  (OCE),  on  the  Mis- 
souri River  Division  staff,  and  on  the  War  Depart- 
ment General  Staff.  Beginning  in  1940,  he  held  im- 
portant administrative  posts  in  the  rapidly  expand- 
ing military  construction  program,  moving  quickly 
from  the  rank  of  captain  to  full  colonel.  As  chief  of 
the  Operations  Branch,  Office  of  the  Quartermaster 
General  (OQ_MG),  he  acted  as  special  assistant  to 
the  quartermaster  general  for  Army  construction. 
When  the  Construction  Division  was  transferred 
from  OQMG  to  OCE  at  the  end  of  1941,  he  became 
deputy  chief  of  the  division  under  Brig.  Gen. 
Thomas  M.  Robins.  Having  an  excellent  background 
of  experience  on  a  variety  of  major  construction 
projects,  the  best  known  being  the  huge  Pentagon 

Continued 


GENERAL  GROVES  TAKES  COMMAND 


75 


Groves  the  logical  choice  to  head  the 
atomic  project:  As  deputy  chief  of  the 
Engineers'  Construction  Division,  he 
had  spent  considerable  time  advising 
District  Engineer  Marshall  in  his 
quest  for  power  resources  and  in  his 
selection  of  sites  for  the  Manhattan 
District  facilities.  Furthermore,  with 
military  construction  in  the  United 
States  past  its  wartime  peak,  Groves 
was  seriously  considering  taking  an- 
other assignment,  probably  overseas. 

On  the  morning  of  17  September, 
Groves  had  to  testify  on  a  military 
housing  bill  before  the  House  Military 
Affairs  Committee.  When  he  left  the 
hearing  room,  he  encountered  Gener- 
al Somervell  and  learned  of  his  new 
assignment.  Groves  later  recalled  that 
his  first  reaction  was  one  of  great  dis- 
appointment at  the  prospect  of  miss- 
ing overseas  duty.  Somervell,  un- 
doubtedly sensing  Groves's  lack  of 
enthusiasm  for  his  new  job,  expressed 
the  opinion  that  a  successful  conclu- 
sion to  the  atomic  energy  program 
could  well  have  a  decisive  impact  on 
winning  the  war.'* 

Shortly  after  leaving  Capitol  Hill, 
Groves,  accompanied  by  Colonel 
Nichols  (Colonel  Marshall  was  on  the 
West  Coast),  reported  to  General 
Styer  for  orders.  Styer  explained  the 

building,  Groves  earned  the  reputation  among  his 
professional  colleagues  as  an  able,  aggressive,  and 
industrious  ofTicer  who  repeatedly  demonstrated  su- 
perior engineering,  administrative,  and  organiza- 
tional abilities.  See  1st  Ind,  Styer  to  Chief  of  Mil 
Hist,  15  Aug  61,  to  Ltr,  Chief  of  Mil  Hist  to  Styer, 
17  Jul  61,  CMH;  WD  Press  Release,  Oct  46,  CMH; 
Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  465;  Fine  and  Rem- 
ington, Corps  of  Engineers:  Construction,  pp.  158-59 
and  254-55.  A  detailed  listing  of  Groves's  military 
assignments  may  be  found  in  Cullum,  Biographical 
Register,  6B:2010,  7:1338,  8:382,  9:271. 

■•  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  3-4;  Fine  and 
Remington,  Corps  of  Engineers:  Construction,  pp.  586- 
603. 


new  high-level  organization  of  the 
project  and  Groves's  role  in  it. 
Groves  was  to  be  relieved  of  his  posi- 
tion in  the  Construction  Division.  He 
was,  however,  to  continue  to  exercise 
control  over  construction  of  the 
nearly  completed  Pentagon.  In  this 
way  he  would  avoid  arousing  public 
curiosity  at  his  sudden  absence  from 
this  project,  which  was  viewed  with 
great  interest  by  Congress.  After  the 
Pentagon  job  was  finished  in  a  few 
months.  Groves  was  to  devote  himself 
entirely  to  the  atomic  energy 
program. 

The  directive  for  Groves's  new  as- 
signment— Styer  had  consulted  with 
him  on  its  wording — ordered  the  En- 
gineers chief,  General  Reybold,  to  re- 
lieve him  "for  special  duty  in  connec- 
tion with  the  DSM  project."  ^  The  di- 
rective emphasized,  however,  that 
Groves  was  to  operate  closely  with 
the  Construction  Division  and  other 
elements  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers. 
He  was  to  have  full  responsibility  for 
administering  the  entire  project  and 
to  make  immediate  arrangements  for 
priorities,  for  formation  of  a  commit- 
tee to  formulate  military  policy  gov- 
erning use  of  the  project's  product 
output,  and  for  procurement  of  the 
Tennessee  site  as  the  location  for  its 
major  activities.  He  was  also  instruct- 
ed to  make  plans  for  the  organization, 
construction,  operation,  and  security 
of  the  project  and,  after  they  had 
been  approved,  to  undertake  the 
measures  necessary  to  carry  them  out. 


^  Memo,  Somervell  to  Chief  of  Engrs,  sub:  Re- 
lease of  Groves  for  Special  Assignment,  17  Sep  42, 
OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  B, 
MDR.  Directive  to  Groves  reprinted  in  his  book  Now 
It  Can  Be  Told,  App.  I.  pp.  417-18. 


76 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Styer  also  informed  Groves  that 
General  Marshall  had  directed  that  he 
be  promoted  to  the  grade  of  brigadier 
general.  As  the  list  of  new  promo- 
tions would  be  out  in  a  few  days. 
Groves  suggested  (and  Styer  agreed) 
that  he  should  not  take  over  the 
project  officially  until  he  had  received 
his  star.  "I  thought  that  there  might 
be  some  problems  in  dealing  with  the 
many  academic  scientists  involved  in 
the  project,"  he  wrote  later,  "and  I 
felt  that  my  position  would  be  strong- 
er if  they  thought  of  me  as  a  general 
instead  of  a  promoted  colonel."  The 
new  military  chief  of  the  atomic 
project,  however,  seems  not  to  have 
considered  that  for  several  months 
Colonel  Marshall  and  other  officers 
had  been  dealing  successfully  with 
project  scientists  in  spite  of  their  rela- 
tively low  military  rank.^ 

Following  the  conference  with 
Styer,  Groves  delivered  the  directive 
covering  his  new  assignment  to  Gen- 
eral Reybold  and  also  stopped  in  the 
office  of  his  erstwhile  chief.  General 
Robins,  to  brief  him  on  its  contents. 
He  then  sat  down  with  Colonel  Nich- 
ols to  learn  from  the  deputy  district 
engineer  more  about  the  actual  status 
of  the  project.  He  was  not  very 
pleased    with    what    he    learned.    "In 


*  Groves  received  the  grade  of  brigadier  general 
on  23  Sep  42  and,  subsequently,  the  grade  of  major 
general  on  9  Mar  44,  a  rank  he  continued  to  hold 
for  the  rest  of  the  time  he  served  as  commander  of 
the  Manhattan  Project.  He  moved  up  to  the  rank  of 
lieutenant  general,  effective  24  Jan  48,  but  shortiv 
thereafter  (29  Feb  48)  retired  from  active  dutv  on 
his  own  application.  .At  the  time  of  his  retirement. 
Congress  enacted  a  special  measure  giving  him  the 
honorary  rank  of  lieulcnanl  general,  effective  16  Jul 
43,  in  recognition  of  his  services  in  directing  the 
atomic  bomb  project.  .See  C.ullum,  Bwgtophiral  Regis- 
ter. 9:27 1 .  Quotation  is  from  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be 
Told.  p.  5 


fact,"  he  recalled  subsequently,  "I 
was  horrified.  It  seemed  as  if  the 
whole  endeavor  was  founded  on  pos- 
sibilities rather  than  probabilities."  "^ 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day 
(17  September),  Groves  and  Nichols 
called  on  Bush.  Unfortunately,  no  one 
had  yet  officially  informed  the  OSRD 
director  of  Groves's  assignment  to  the 
project.  Furthermore,  Bush  was  dis- 
turbed that  this  action  was  additional 
evidence  that  Somervell  was  intent  on 
having  the  Army  take  over  control  of 
the  atomic  energy  program  to  the 
complete  exclusion  of  the  scientists. 
Consequently,  he  was  most  reluctant 
to  answer  Groves's  questions  and  the 
whole  conversation  was  somewhat 
one-sided,  relatively  brief,  and,  in 
Groves's  words,  "far  from  satisfactory 
for  both  of  us."  ® 

As  soon  as  Groves  departed,  Bush 
hurried  over  to  see  Styer.  He  repeat- 
ed his  views  that  the  proposed  policy 
committee  should  choose  its  own 
agent;  he  "doubted  whether  he 
[Groves]  had  sufficient  tact  for  such  a 
job."  Bush  recollected  later  that  Styer 
disagreed  with  him  on  the  first  point 
and,  while  acknowledging  that  Groves 

was  "blunt  etc [he]  thought  his 

other  qualities  would  overbalance." 
Styer  went  on  to  explain  that  Groves's 
assignment  already  had  been  approved 
by  General  Marshall.  Returning  to  his 
office.  Bush  wrote  to  Harvey  Bundy, 
Stimson's  assistant  for  scientific  mat- 
ters: "I  fear  we  are  in  the  soup."  ® 


^  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  19. 

*Ibid.,  p.  20.  See  also  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  \eu< 
World  p.  81. 

'Paragraph  on  Bush's  reaction  to  Groves's  assign- 
ment based  on  Memo.  Bush  to  Bundv,  in  envelope 
marked  9/17,  MDR 


GENERAL  GROVES  TAKES  COMMAND 


77 


For  the  next  few  days,  Groves  was 
busy  preparing  for  his  new  assign- 
ment, including  conferences  with 
Colonel  Marshall  and  Generals  Styer 
and  Robins.  Robins  made  a  point  that 
the  Engineer  Department  of  the 
Corps  of  Engineers  would  have  no 
further  responsibility  for  the  program 
and  that  the  Manhattan  District  would 
henceforth  report  to  Groves  rather 
than  to  the  Engineers  chief. 

On  21  September,  Colonels  Groves 
and  Marshall  called  on  Bush.  This 
time  the  OSRD  director  was  cordial 
and  open.  He  explained  his  earlier  re- 
luctance to  talk  freely,  then  briefed 
Groves  thoroughly  on  the  scientific 
and  historical  background  of  the 
project  and  cautioned  him  on  the 
need  for  tightening  security  measures. 
Thus,  from  what  Groves  himself  later 
termed  an  "inauspicious  beginning," 
relations  between  the  two  leaders  of 
the  atomic  project  soon  grew  into  a 
firm  and  fruitful  friendship,  with  each 
expressing  the  greatest  respect  for 
the  other's  capabilities.^*^ 

On  the  afternoon  of  23  September, 
a  few  hours  after  Groves  had  been 
sworn  in  as  a  brigadier  general  and 
had  taken  official  charge  of  the 
atomic  project,  he  went  to  a  meeting 


'"Qiioted  phrase  from  Groves,  \oit<  It  Can  be  Told. 
p.  21.  Bush  acknowledges  in  his  memoirs  that  Styer 
"was  right  when  he  insisted  that  Groves  was  the 
man  for  the  job"  [see  \'annevar  Bush,  Pieces  of  the 
Action  (New  York:  W'illliam  Morrow,  1970),  p.  61]. 
Groves  implies  in  his  account  (pp.  21-22)  that  his 
second  meeting  with  Bush  occurred  on  19  Septem- 
ber, whereas  the  Marshall  Diary,  21  Sep  42,  MDR, 
indicates  that  the  meeting  actually  took  place  on  the 
twentN-fiist.  Groves  saw  Styer  again  on  the  twenty- 
second,  but  he  fails  to  mention  this  meeting  in  his 
book.  Curiously  enough,  however,  the  two  pages  de- 
scribing the  events  of  that  date  are  missing  from 
both  copies  of  the  Marshall  Diary,  and  although  the 
Groves  Diary,  22  Sep  42,  LRG,  records  the  fact  that 
the  meeting  took  place,  no  other  details  are  given. 


convened  by  Secretary  Stimson  at  the 
War  Department.  Present  also  were 
Bush,  Conant,  Bundy  and  Generals 
Marshall,  Somervell,  and  Styer.  The 
group  agreed  to  establish  a  small 
Military  Policy  Committee,  responsi- 
ble to  the  Top  Policy  Group,  to  for- 
mulate project  policies  on  research 
and  development,  construction  and 
production,  and  strategic  and  tactical 
matters.  Bush  was  chosen  chairman, 
with  Conant  as  his  alternate;  the 
other  members  were  General  Styer 
and  Rear  Adm.  William  R.  Purnell, 
who  had  replaced  Rear  Adm.  Willis 
A.  Lee,  Jr.,  on  the  JNW  Committee. 
General  Groves  was  to  sit  with  the 
committee  and  to  act  as  its  executive 
officer  in  carrying  out  its  policies. 
The  new  committee  was  directed  to 
report  periodically  to  the  Top  Policy 
Group.  The  OSRD  S-1  Executive 
Committee  was  to  continue  to  advise 
on  scientific  aspects  of  the  program, 
with  most  of  the  research  activities 
under  OSRD  direction.  ^^ 

As  soon  as  the  Military  Policy  Com- 
mittee had  received  written  approval 
from  the  Top  Policy  Group  and  the 
JNW  Committee,  it  assumed  virtually 
complete  control  of  all  aspects  of  the 
atomic  energy  program,  acting 
through  General  Groves  as,  to  use 
Stimson's  phrase,  "the  executive  head 
of  the  development  of  the 
enterprise."  ^^ 


''Rpt,  Bundv,  sub:  S-1  Mtg  at  Secv  War's  Ofiice, 
23  Sep  42;  Memo  A,  signed  bv  all  lOp  Policy  Group 
(except  President)  and  JNW  members,  23  Sep  42, 
Ltr,  Bush  to  Patterson,  13  Oct  45.  All  in  HB  Files, 
Fldr  6,  MDR.  DSM  Chronologv,  26  Sep  42,  Sec. 
2(e),  OROO.  Smvth  Report,  pp.  59-60. 

'2 Stimson  Diarv,  23  Sep  42,  HI.S. 


78 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


First  Measures 

Acquiring  the  Tennesssee  Site 

Making  a  hurried  departure  from 
the  23  September  meeting  at  the  War 
Department,  Groves  went  directly  to 
Union  Station  and  caught  an  over- 
night train  for  Knoxville,  Tennes- 
see.^^ {See  Map  1.)  The  next  morning 
he  met  Colonel  Marshall,  who  had 
been  rechecking  the  proposed  site  for 
the  project.  Groves  and  Marshall 
spent  the  day  going  over  the  site  as 
carefully  and  thoroughly  as  was  prac- 
ticable on  existing  roads.  "It  was  evi- 
dent that  it  was  an  even  better  choice 
than  .  .  .  [he]  had  anticipated."  ^^ 
Well  satisfied  that  the  site  would  meet 
all  requirements,  and  knowing  that 
preliminary  steps  for  acquisition  were 
under  way.  Groves  telephoned  Col. 
John  J.  O'Brien  of  the  Engineers' 
Real  Estate  Branch  to  proceed  at 
once  with  formal  acquisition. 

The  roughly  rectangular  site,  about 
16  miles  long  and  7  miles  wide,  cov- 
ered substantial  portions  of  both 
Roane  and  Anderson  Counties.  It  was 
located  approximately  midway  be- 
tween the  two  county  seats,  Kingston 
and  Clinton,  and  about  12  miles  west 
of  Knoxville,  the  nearest  citv.  Bound- 


•^  Subsection  based  on  Marshall  Diarv,  29-31  Jul 
and  19,  23,  24,  26  Sep  42,  MDR;  Ur,  Robins  (Act 
Chief  of  Engrs)  to  CG  SOS,  sub:  Acquisition  in  Fee 
of  Approx  56,200  Acres  of  Land  for  Demolition 
Range  Near  Kingston,  Tenn.,  and  Inds,  29  Sep  42, 
Incl  to  Memo,  O'Brien  to  Lt  Col  Whitney  Ashbridge 
(CE  Mil  Constr  Br),  sub:  Land  Acquisition  in  Con- 
nection With  MD,  17  Apr  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  601  (Santa  Fe),  MDR;  Groves,  Sow  It  Can 
Be  Told,  pp.  24-26;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  10,  "Land  Ac- 
quisition CEW,  "  p.  2.21  and  App.  Fl,  and  Vol.  12, 
"Clinton  Engineer  Works,"  pp.  2.6-2.8,  DASA; 
George  O.  Robinson,  Jr.,  The  Oak  Ridge  Story  (Kings- 
port,  Tenn.:  Southern  Publishers,  1950),  p.  27. 

'*Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  25. 


ed  on  three  sides  by  the  meandering 
Clinch  River  and  on  the  northwest  by 
Black  Oak  Ridge,  the  terrain  of  the 
site  was  typical  of  the  region. 
Wooded  ridges,  running  more  or  less 
parallel  to  its  long  axis,  rose  generally 
about  200  feet  above  narrow  valleys. 
Of  the  approximately  one  thousand 
families,  most  resided  on  farms  or  in 
one  of  several  small  hamlets. 

On  29  September,  Under  Secretary 
of  War  Patterson  authorized  the  Engi- 
neers to  acquire  the  some  56,000 
acres  at  an  estimated  cost  of  $3.5  mil- 
lion. Subsequent  additions  brought 
the  total  to  about  59,000  acres.  On 
7  October,  a  court-approved  condem- 
nation for  the  whole  area  went  into 
effect,  and  within  a  month  the  first 
residents  began  to  leave.  Construc- 
tion began  almost  immediately.  Ulti- 
mate acquisition  of  the  entire  site 
would  not  be  completed  without 
many  problems,  but  now,  at  least,  the 
first  essential  step  toward  building  the 
great  plants  for  producing  fissionable 
materials  had  been  taken.  ^^ 

For  security  reasons  earliest  public 
references  to  the  site  indicated  it  was 
an  artillery  and  bombing  practice 
area,  and  for  several  weeks  it  was 
known  as  the  Kingston  Demolition 
Range.  The  official  designation,  how- 
ever, and  the  name  that  was  released 
to  the  public  in  late  January  1943, 
was  the  Clinton  Engineer  Works. 
Project  leaders  chose  the  name  of  the 
town  located  a  few  miles  northeast  of 
the  site  as  being  least  likely  to  draw 
attention  to  the  atomic  energy  activi- 
ties at  the  site.  The  Clinton  Engineer 
Works  continued  to  be  the  Tennessee 


Land  acquisition  problems  are  dealt  with  in  Ch. 


GENERAL  GROVES  TAKES  COMMAND 


79 


area's  official  designation  as  long  as  it 
remained  under  Army  control.  In 
mid- 1943,  when  permanent  housing 
for  the  site's  growing  population  was 
erected  along  Black  Oak  Ridge,  the 
townsite  became  known  as  Oak 
Ridge,  and  this  name  was  used  as  the 
post  office  address.  ^^ 

Procuring  Uranium 

Whether  the  Manhattan  Project  had 
sufficient  uranium  ore  to  fulfill  its 
mission.  Groves  felt,  was  of  para- 
mount importance.  ^^  Immediately 
after  his  17  September  departure 
from  the  Corps  and  before  he  official- 
ly assumed  his  new  position  as  Man- 
hattan commander,  he  took  steps  to 
ascertain  the  availability  of  uranium 
to  the  project.  Informed  by  Colonel 
Nichols  of  the  contracts  already  made 


^^  KnoxvUle  Joimial.  31  Jan  43;  Groves,  \ou>  It  Can 
Be  Told,  pp.  25-26.  Groves  notes  that  not  until  es- 
tablishment of  the  AEG  in  1947  did  the  name  Oak 
Ridge  become  the  official  designation  of  the  Tennes- 
see project. 

'''Subsection  based  on  Memo  for  File,  Merritt, 
sub:  Foreign  Sources  of  Material  Which  Should  Be 
Further  Investigated,  23  Feb  43;  Memo,  Merritt  to 
Nichols,  sub:  Resume  of  Production  of  Uranium 
Products  for  MD  in  Golorado  Plateau  Area,  26  Jan 
45.  Both  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  410.2  (I'ra- 
nium),  MDR.  Rpt,  Military  Policy  Committee  to  Top 
Policy  Group,  sub:  Present  Status  and  Future  Prgm 
(hereafter  cited  as  MPC  Rpt),  15  Dec  42,  Incl  to  Ftr, 
Bush  (for  MPC)  to  President,  16  Dec  42,  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Gorresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Fab  B  (original  of 
covering  letter,  with  Roosevelt's  approval,  filed 
herein),  MDR.  Marshall  Diary,  14  Sep-15  Oct  42, 
MDR.  Ltr,  Bush  to  Styer,  11  Sep  42,  OSRD.  Memo, 
[RuhofT]  to  Groves,  sub:  Summary  of  Ore  Contracts, 
15  Feb  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp.  161  (African 
Metals),  MDR.  Contract  W'-7405-eng-4  (signed  by 
Nichols  and  Sengier),  19  Oct  42,  OROO.  Kenneth 
D.  Nichols,  Comments  on  Draft  Hist  "Manhattan: 
The  Army  and  the  Atomic  Bomb,"  Incl  to  Ltr,  Nich- 
ols to  Chief  of  Mil  Hist,  25  Mar  74,  CMH.  MDH, 
Bk.  7,  Vol.  1.  "Feed  Materials  and  Special  Procure- 
ment," passim,  DASA.  Smyth  Report,  p.  66.  Comp- 
ton.  Atomic  Qiiest.  pp.  96-97.  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be 
Told.  pp.  33-37. 


with  Edgar  Sengier  of  Union  Miniere 
and  of  the  Bohemian  Grove  decision 
to  acquire  the  company's  reserve  of 
ore  on  Staten  Island,  Groves  directed 
Nichols  to  press  the  negotiations  with 
the  mining  executive. 

During  the  previous  week  Colonel 
Nichols,  Capt.  John  R.  Ruhoff,  assist- 
ant chief  of  the  District's  Materials 
Section,  and  officials  of  the  Standard 
Oil  Development  Company  and  the 
Stone  and  Webster  Engineering  Cor- 
poration had  agreed  that  Ruhoff 
should  arrange  for  a  test  of  the  Staten 
Island  ore  to  determine  the  percent- 
age of  recoverable  UaOs  (uranium 
oxide)  and,  on  the  fifteenth,  Ruhoff 
had  secured  Sengier's  release  of  100 
tons  for  shipment  to  Eldorado  Gold 
Mines'  Port  Hope  refinery.  In  the 
meantime,  Nichols  had  obtained  the 
necessary  export  licenses  through  the 
State  Department. 

In  follow-up  negotiations  with  Sen- 
gier on  18,  23  and  25  September, 
Nichols  arranged  for  procurement  of 
the  Staten  Island  ore.  The  time  re- 
quired to  work  out  the  necessary 
arrangements  with  both  Eldorado 
Gold  Mines  and  its  marketing  agent, 
the  Canadian  Radium  and  Uranium 
Corporation,  delayed  signing  of  the 
contract  until  19  October.  It  called 
for  purchase  by  the  United  States  of 
the  uranium  content  of  100  tons  of 
ore,  with  Union  Miniere's  African 
Metals  retaining  ownership  of  the 
radium  in  the  ore.  Also,  the  United 
States  was  to  have  an  option  to  pur- 
chase the  remaining  1,100  tons  of 
uranium  ore  on  Staten  Island,  assayed 
at  65  percent  uranium  oxide,  as  well 
as  about  twice  that  amount  of  ap- 
proximately 20  percent  ore  in  storage 
in  the  Belgian  Congo.  Except  for  that 


80 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


ore  shipped  immediately  to  Port 
Hope  for  processing  (the  first  100 
tons  reached  there  in  November),  all 
Staten  Island  ore  was  to  be  trans- 
ferred to  Seneca  Ordnance  Depot  at 
Romulus,  New  York,  for  safekeeping. 
Subsequent  contracts  covered  pur- 
chase of  additional  Congo  uranium 
on  terms  similar  to  those  set  forth  in 
the  19  October  agreement. 

Working  in  close  consultation  with 
Maj.  Gen.  Charles  P.  Gross,  the 
Army's  Transportation  chief,  Manhat- 
tan officials  arranged  for  shipping  the 
ore  from  Africa  by  the  safest  and 
swiftest  means  available.  Based  upon 
Sengier's  recommendations,  fast 
motor  ships  traveling  out  of  convoy 
were  employed  to  traverse  the  subma- 
rine-infested South  Atlantic.  Because 
the  ore  arrived  at  the  port  of  New 
York  considerably  faster  than  it  could 
be  refined,  it  was  assayed  and  stored 
in  a  warehouse  at  Middlesex,  New 
Jersey,  especially  leased  by  the  Army 
for  that  purpose.^® 

In  a  move  to  further  expedite  the 
uranium  progam  and,  at  the  same 
time,  to  relieve  overburdened  Stone 
and  Webster  of  part  of  its  extensive 
assignment,  the  Manhattan  District  as- 
sumed responsibility  for  procurement 
and  preliminary  refining  of  the  ore. 
Capt.  Phillip  L.  Merritt,  a  trained  ge- 
ologist who  was  already  on  the  staff, 
was  assigned  to  monitor  these  activi- 
ties. Working  under  the  general  guid- 
ance of  Colonel  Nichols,  Merritt  gave 
special     attention     to     the     project's 


worldwide    search    for    possible    addi- 
tional sources  of  uranium. 

Toward  the  end  of  1942,  the  Eldo- 
rado mine  in  Canada  resumed  oper- 
ations. Meanwhile,  the  District  made 
arrangements  for  uranium  extraction 
from  tailings  of  Colorado  Plateau  car- 
notite  ores  mined  originally  for  their 
radium  and  vanadium  content.  In  Jan- 
uary 1943,  the  War  Production  Board 
(WBP)  issued  orders  (subsequently 
amended  in  August)  that  future  sale 
or  purchase  of  uranium  compounds 
was  limited  to  the  atomic  program, 
except  for  essential  military  and  in- 
dustrial applications.  Even  before  the 
board  acted,  Manhattan's  Military 
Policy  Committee  had  reported  opti- 
mistically to  the  President  that  the 
project  had  "either  in  hand  or  on  the 
way,  sufficient  uranium  for  the  entire 
program  up  to  and  including  military 
use.     ^^ 

Obtaining  Prionty  Ratings 

In  June  1942,  President  Roosevelt 
had  endorsed  a  recommendation  by 
the  Top  Policy  Group  that  the  atomic 
energy  program  should  be  assigned 
the  highest  priorities  to  facilitate  pro- 
curement of  the  tools  and  materials 
required  to  produce  an  atomic 
bomb. 2°      Yet,      by      September,      as 


^*  During  the  war  only  two  shipments  of  ore,  to- 
tahng  200  tons,  failed  to  reach  the  United  States- 
one  aboard  a  vessel  torpedoed  in  late  1942  and  the 
other  on  a  ship  that  sank  as  a  result  of  a  marine  ac- 
cident in  earlv  1943.  See  MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  p.  2.5, 
D.AS.A. 


19  MFC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42,  MDR. 

20  Except  where  indicated,  discussion  of  priorities 
based  on  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  9,  "Priorities  Program," 
D.\SA,  with  many  of  the  basic  documents  relating  to 
the  priorities  problem  reproduced  in  •A.pp.  A.  Ibid., 
p.  2.5  and  App.  Bl,  DASA;  Ltr,  Weaver  (Resources 
Div  Dir,  SOS)  to  Groves,  sub:  Special  Priorities  Au- 
thoritv  for  Dist  Engr,  26  Sep  42,  copy  in  ibid.,  App. 
A5,  DAS.^;  Memo,  Marshall  to  All  Area  Engrs,  sub: 
Requests  for  Out-of-line  Ratings,  16  Oct  42,  copy  in 
ibid.,  App.  A 12,  DASA:  Marshall  Diarv,  17,  19,  26 
Sep  and  1  Oct  42,  MDR;  Memo,  Johnson  to  Groves, 
sub:  Current  Events,  30  Sep  42,  Admin  Files,  Gen 

Coniinued 


GENERAL  GROVES  TAKES  COMMAND 


81 


Groves  assumed  overall  administra- 
tive leadership  of  the  project,  it  was 
evident  that  the  AA-3  base  rating 
Colonel  Marshall  had  secured  in  July 
was  not  going  to  be  adequate  to 
ensure  the  uninterrupted  develop- 
ment of  the  atomic  program.  Conse- 
quently, following  consultation  with 
General  Styer,  Groves  moved  imme- 
diately to  obtain  for  the  project  the 
priority  rating  he  believed  was  essen- 
tial for  its  successful  continuation. 

Both  generals  had  decided  to  seek 
broad  authority  for  the  District  to 
issue  an  AAA  priority  whenever  there 
was  a  need  to  break  a  bottleneck. 
When  Groves  called  on  WPB  Chair- 
man Donald  Nelson  on  19  Septem- 
ber, he  had  with  him  the  draft  of  a 
brief  letter — addressed  to  himself  and 
to  be  signed  by  Nelson — in  which  he 
had  incorporated  the  idea  of  assign- 
ing the  desired  AAA  authority  to  the 
project.  As  Groves  later  recalled.  Nel- 
son's first  reaction  was  negative;  how- 
ever, when  the  general  threatened  to 
take  the  matter  to  the  President,  the 
chairman  changed  his  mind.  Whether 
or  not  other  pressure  already  had 
been  brought  to  bear  on  Nelson  is 
not  known,  but  he  did  agree  to  sign 
the  letter  as  Groves  had  written  it. 

I  am  in  full  accord  [it  read]  with  the 
prompt  delegation  of  power  by  the  Army 

Corresp,  319  1.  MDR;  DSM  Chronology.  26  Sep  42, 
Sec.  2(e),  OROO;  Groves,  Xoiv  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp. 
22-23;  MPC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42,  MDR;  Groves.  S-1  Ex 
Committee  Mtg  (hereafter  cited  as  MPC  Min — actual 
summaries  of  actions  required  and  decisions 
reached  at  MPC  meetings),  5  Feb  43,  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A,  MDR; 
Memo,  Weaver  to  C^hief  of  Engrs,  sub:  Priority 
Rating  for  MD,  22  Mar  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp, 322.011  (LC),  MDR;  Memo,  Denton,  ASF,  to 
Chief  of  Engrs,  Attn:  Groves,  sub:  MD,  1  Jul  44, 
.■\dmin  Files,  Gen  C-orresp,  400.1301  (Priority), 
MDR. 


and  Navy  Munitions  Board  [ANMB] 
through  you  to  the  District  Engineer, 
Manhattan  District,  to  assign  an  AAA 
rating,  or  whatever  lesser  rating  will  be 
sufficient,  to  those  items  the  delivery  of 
which,  in  his  opinion,  cannot  otherwise 
be  secured  in  time  for  the  successful 
prosecution  of  the  work  under  his 
charge.^  ^ 

On  26  September,  the  ANMB 
issued  the  District  a  blank  check  to 
assign  the  AAA  priority.  But  General 
Weaver,  senior  Army  representative 
on  the  ANMB,  warned  Groves  that 
use  of  this  AAA  authority  must  not 
interfere  unnecessarily  with  other 
high-priority  programs  and  that,  with 
each  use  of  the  rating,  a  written 
report  must  be  submitted  within  a  24- 
hour  period.  That  same  day,  at  his 
first  meeting  with  the  S-1  Executive 
Committee,  Groves  explained  to  the 
group  that  the  AAA  priority  would 
not  be  used  for  the  entire  project,  but 
only  when  progress  would  be  unduly 
delayed  by  employment  of  any  lower 
rating.  And  to  ensure  retention  of 
AAA  authority,  an  AA-3  or  lesser  pri- 
ority would  be  utilized  whenever  pos- 
sible. Before  adjourning,  the  confer- 
ees agreed  that  the  OSRD  would  con- 
tinue to  deal  with  its  own  priority 
problems  as  far  as  possible,  with  the 
Army  lending  assistance  when  neces- 
sary, and  that  the  Washington  Liaison 
Office  of  the  Manhattan  District 
would  handle  the  general  administra- 
tion and  coordination  of  priorities  for 
all  future  procurement  for  the  atomic 
project. 

Now  that  the  District  had  AAA  au- 
thority as  a  backup  to  overcome  pro- 
curement obstacles,  both  Groves  and 


2'Etr,  Nelson  to  Groves,    19  Sep  42,  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  B,  MDR. 


82 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Styer  believed  that  development  of 
the  atomic  program  could  continue 
with  the  AA-3  base  rating.  By  1943, 
however,  the  project's  unfolding  re- 
quirements revealed  that  for  even 
routine  procurement  the  AA-3  rating 
was  inadequate  and  the  AAA  rating 
unnecessarily  high.  To  remedy  this 
situation,  Groves  wrote  to  General 
Weaver  in  early  February  and  re- 
quested that  the  District's  priority 
"authority  given  in  [the]  letter  of  Sep- 
tember 26,  1942  be  amplified  to  in- 
clude use  of  AA-1  and  AA-2  rat- 
ings." ^^  Although  the  Nelson  letter 
had  referred  to  the  use  of  lesser  rat- 
ings than  AAA  whenever  these  would 
suffice,  the  fact  that  the  Joint  Chiefs 
of  Staff  had  forbidden  use  of  AA-1  or 
AA-2  for  construction  projects  had 
ruled  out  their  earlier  use  by  the  Dis- 
trict. Weaver  officially  responded  on 
22  March,  upgrading  the  rating  of 
AA-3  to  AA-2X — a  new  priority  cre- 
ated to  provide  supplies  and  services 
for  urgent  foreign  and  domestic  in- 
dustrial programs. 

Groves,  however,  still  was  not  satis- 
fied and,  in  the  months  that  followed, 
continued  to  press  ANMB  officials  to 
assign  the  maximum  AA-1  base 
rating.  Time  passed,  but  the  general 
persisted  in  order  to  achieve  his  ob- 
jective. Finally,  on  1  July  1944,  the 
District  received  AA-1  authority. 

Following  District  policy,  the  Wash- 
ington Liaison  Office  was  to  use  the 
lowest  rating  that  would  bring  about 
the  required  delivery  of  materials.  But 
to  counter  the  threat  from  other 
urgent  wartime  programs  during  the 
District's    massive    procurement    and 


"Ltr,  Groves  to  Weaver,  sub:  Out-of-line  Ratings, 
7  Feb  43,  copy  in  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  9,  App.  7, 
DASA. 


construction  phase  between  1943  and 
early  1945,  the  officer  assigned  emer- 
gency priorities  at  the  AAA  level  for 
more  than  $77  million  worth  of 
orders.  At  times,  the  Manhattan 
Project  was  using  more  AAA  ratings 
than  the  combined  total  for  all  other 
Army  and  non-Army  programs.  Yet, 
through  the  exercise  of  discretion, 
Groves  and  his  staff  were  able  to 
avoid  not  only  strong  criticism  of 
their  actions  but  also  attempts  to 
revoke  the  District's  AAA  authority. 
Groves's  success  in  obtaining  the  suc- 
cessive advances  in  the  priority  status 
of  the  Manhattan  Project  ensured 
that,  despite  occasional  problems  and 
annoyances,  procurement  needs  for 
the  atomic  program  were  met. 

Establishment  of  Los  Alamos 

In  the  late  summer  of  1942, 
J.  Robert  Oppenheimer,  the  Univer- 
sity of  California  physicist  who  was  di- 
recting the  theoretical  aspects  of  de- 
signing and  building  an  atomic  bomb, 
became  convinced  a  change  was 
needed.  Studies  under  his  direction 
had  been  going  on  in  various  institu- 
tions that  were  equipped  for  fast-neu- 
tron studies.  Now  Oppenheimer  and 
his  associates  felt  that  further 
progress  could  be  best  achieved  by 
concentrating  everything  in  one  cen- 
tral laboratory  devoted  exclusively  to 
this  work.  Taking  this  step  would  not 
only  eliminate  waste  and  duplication, 
but  it  would  also  permit  a  freer  ex- 
change of  ideas  and  provide  for  the 
centralized  direction  of  all  work,  in- 
cluding studies  of  chemical,  engineer- 
ing,     metallurgical,      and      ordnance 


GENERAL  GROVES  TAKES  COMMAND 


83 


problems    that    so    far    had    received 
little  or  no  attention. ^^ 

Groves  first  met  Oppenheimer  in 
early  October  while  on  his  initial  trip 
to  familiarize  himself  with  the  atomic 
programs  at  the  Universities  of  Chi- 
cago and  California  (Berkeley).  The 
general  heard  a  report  from  Oppen- 
heimer on  the  eighth  and  the  two 
men  hit  it  off  at  once.  Groves  was  in- 
terested in  Oppenheimer's  proposed 
central  laboratory  and,  a  week  later 
when  the  two  met  again  with  Marshall 
and  Nichols  on  a  Chicago-New  York 
train,  Groves  asked  Oppenheimer  to 
come  to  Washington,  D.C.,  to  explore 
the  idea.  There,  they  talked  with 
Arthur  Compton  and  Vannevar  Bush, 
and  on  19  October  Groves  approved 
the  decision  to  establish  a  separate 
bomb  laboratory.  Pleased  with  what 
had  been  accomplished  and  confident 
that  Groves's  support  in  this  step 
would  "bear  good  fruit  in  the  future," 
Oppenheimer  left  immediately  for 
Boston  to  brief  Conant  at  Harvard, 
where  the  latter  held  the  post  of  uni- 
versity president.^* 

Oppenheimer  and  Compton  had 
spoken  of  placing  the  laboratory  at 
the  Tennessee  site,  or  possibly  in 
Chicago,  but  neither  they  nor  General 
Groves  were  satisfied  with  these 
choices.  For  this  most  secret  part  of 
the  secret  Manhattan  Project  isolation 
and  inaccessibility  were  most  essen- 
tial, and  neither  the  Clinton  Engineer 


^'Testimony  of  Oppenheimer  in  Oppenheimer  Hear- 
ing, pp.  12  and  28;  Smyth  Report,  p.  74. 

^"Quotation  from  Ltr,  Oppenheimer  to  Groves, 
19  Oct  42,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  322  (Los 
Alamos),  MDR.  See  also  Testimony  of  Oppen- 
heimer in  Oppenheimer  Hearing,  p.  28;  Nichols,  Gom- 
ments  on  Draft  Hist  "Manhattan,"  Incl  to  Ltr,  Nich- 
ols to  Chief  of  Mil  Hist,  25  Mar  74,  CMH;  Marshall 
Diary,  15-16  Oct  42,  MDR;  Groves  Diary,  Oct  42, 
LRG;  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  61. 


Works  nor  Chicago  offered  these.  In 
addition  to  the  obvious  requirements 
of  a  climate  that  would  permit  year- 
round  construction,  safety  from 
enemy  attack,  ready  transportation, 
and  access  to  power,  fuel  and  water, 
there  were  several  other  important 
considerations.  The  site  would  have 
to  provide  an  adequate  testing 
ground;  it  should  be  in  a  sparsely 
populated  area,  for  reasons  of  safety 
as  well  as  security;  the  land  should  be 
relatively  easy  to  acquire;  and  it 
should  already  have  sufficient  build- 
ings to  house  most  of  what  was  antici- 
pated would  be  a  comparatively  small 
staff.  2  5 

Groves  briefly  considered  two  other 
sites.  One  near  Los  Angeles,  he  re- 
jected on  security  grounds;  the  other, 
near  the  California-Nevada  border,  on 
the  east  side  of  the  Sierra  Nevada  in 
the  vicinity  of  Reno,  he  found  unsatis- 
factory because  it  was  too  inaccessible 
and  heavy  snows  would  interfere  with 
winter  operations.  He  agreed  with 
Oppenheimer  that  the  region  around 
Albuquerque,  New  Mexico,  seemed  to 
offer  the  most  attractive  possibilities. 
Oppenheimer  owned  a  ranch  in  this 
vicinity,  and  his  general  knowledge  of 
the  countryside  contributed  consider- 
ably to  making  an  accurate  appraisal 
of  the  area.  Air  and  rail  service  to  Al- 
buquerque were  excellent;  the  climate 
was    moderate    throughout    the    year; 


2^  Paragraphs  on  selection  of  bomb  laboratory 
site  based  on  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  be  Told,  pp.  63-67; 
MDH.  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  "General,"  Sec.  2,  DASA;  Rpt, 
U.S.  Engrs  Office,  Albuquerque  Dist.  sub:  Proposed 
Site  for  Mil  Proj  at  Los  Alamos  Ranch  School, 
Otowi,  N.Mex.,  23  Nov  42,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp, 600.03,  MDR;  Groves  Diary,  Nov  42,  LRG; 
Testimony  of  Oppenheimer  in  Oppenheimer  Hearing. 
pp.  12  and  28;  Inlerv,  Author  with  Edwin  M.  McMil- 
lan (Rad  Lab,  Univ  of  Calif  at  Berkelev),  8  Jul  64. 
CMH. 


84 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


and  the  area  was  not  only  isolated  but 
also  sufficiently  far  inland  from  the 
West  Coast  to  be  beyond  any  serious 
danger  from  the  by  now  remote  pos- 
sibility of  Japanese  interference. 

At  the  end  of  October,  Maj.  John 
H.  Dudley,  one  of  Colonel  Marshall's 
assistants  who  was  familiar  with  the 
general  area,  made  some  preliminary 
surveys.  He  recommended  a  site  at 
Jemez  Springs,  about  50  miles  north 
of  Albuquerque.  {See  Map  2.)  Engi- 
neers from  the  Albuquerque  District 
surveyed  the  site  and,  on  16  Novem- 
ber, Groves  met  Oppenheimer  and 
several  others  for  a  personal  inspec- 
tion of  the  area.  They  soon  conclud- 
ed, however,  that  the  Jemez  Springs 
site  would  not  do;  the  land  would  be 
difficult  to  acquire  and  the  nature  of 
the  terrain  would  prevent  later  expan- 
sion of  the  installation.^® 

Stiil  hoping  to  find  a  suitable  loca- 
tion in  this  general  area,  Groves  and 
the  others  drove  east  and  slightly 
north  toward  the  tiny  settlement  of 
Los  Alamos.  This  community,  atop  a 
high,  level  tableland,  actually  consist- 
ed of  little  more  than  the  Los  Alamos 
Ranch  School  for  Boys.  Otherwise  the 
area  was  virtually  uninhabited,  with 
the  nearest  town  located  some  16 
miles  away.  The  school  buildings  and 
the  complete  isolation  of  the  site  were 


^**  Account  of  inspection  of  sites  in  Los  Alamos 
area  based  primarily  on  Groves,  S'ow  It  Can  Be  Told, 
pp.  65-67,  and  Testimony  of  Oppenheimer  in  Op- 
penheimer Heanng,  p.  28.  Another  member  of  the  in- 
spection party  was  Edwin  M.  McMillan,  a  physicist 
on  the  faculty  at  the  University  of  California,  Berke- 
ley, and  a  long-time  associate  of  Oppenheimer.  As 
McMillan  recalled,  he,  Oppenheimer,  and  Dudley 
had  gone  on  horseback  to  the  Jemez  Springs  area 
earlier  in  the  day  and  then  had  been  joined  by 
Groves  in  the  afternoon.  McMillan  had  been  a  guest 
at  Oppenheimer's  ranch  on  «.;;rlier  occasions  and 
was  therefore  generally  familiar  with  the  Los 
Alamos  area.  See  McMillan  Interv,  8  Jul  64,  CMH. 


arguments  in  its  favor.  There  ap- 
peared to  be  sufficient  water,  if  the 
supply  were  carefully  used,  and  all 
other  characteristics  seemed  satisfac- 
tory. The  only  question  was  how  will- 
ing the  owners  of  the  school  would 
be  to  give  it  up  to  the  Army.  If  they 
seriously  opposed  government  acqui- 
sition, the  resultant  publicity  would 
run  counter  to  the  secrecy  desired  by 
the  project  leaders. 

While  Groves  and  Oppenheimer 
headed  back  to  Washington,  D.C., 
Dudley  and  engineers  of  the  Albu- 
querque District  began  a  formal 
survey  of  a  proposed  site  at  Los 
Alamos.  The  desired  area  consisted  of 
about  54,000  acres  in  Sandoval 
County,  somewhat  more  than  20 
miles  airline  distance  northwest  of 
Santa  Fe,  of  which  all  but  about  8,000 
acres  was  in  national  forest  land  al- 
ready owned  by  the  United  States 
government.  Grazing  lands  and  the 
Los  Alamos  Ranch  School  comprised 
the  rest  of  the  area.  Because  the 
school  was  having  some  difficulty  get- 
ting instructors  during  the  war  and 
was  in  serious  financial  trouble,  the 
owners  were  willing  to  sell.  As  for  the 
grazing  lands,  there  appeared  to  be 
no  problem  in  acquiring  them. 

Even  before  the  reports  of  this 
survey  came  in.  General  Groves  had 
called  a  meeting  in  Washington  to 
confer  about  the  site  with  Oppen- 
heimer, as  well  as  with  two  of  his  sci- 
entific colleagues  from  California, 
Ernest  Lawrence  and  Edwin  McMil- 
lan, and  with  Arthur  Compton.  Then, 
on  23  November,  with  the  reports  in 
hand,  Oppenheimer,  Lawrence,  and 
McMillan  again  inspected  the  area 
with  Major  Dudley  and  made  recom- 
mendations on  possible  locations  for 


GENERAL  GROVES  TAKES  COMMAND 


85 


#.  ^ 


-A 


Approach  Road  to  the  Los  Alamos  Ranch  School  for  Boys 


laboratories  and  housing.  "Lawrence 
was  pleased  by  the  site,"  Oppen- 
heimer  reported  to  Groves,  "and  so, 
again,  were  we."  ^"^ 

And  so,  again,  was  Groves.  Two 
days  later  he  approved  the  Los 
Alamos  site  and  began  steps  to  ac- 
quire the  land.  Right  of  entry  to  the 
heart  of  the  site  had  already  been  ob- 
tained from  the  school  director  and, 
although  the  actual  legal  acquisition 
would  take  several  months,  Groves 
was  able  to  authorize  the  Albuquer- 
que District  to  proceed  with  construc- 
tion on  30  November.  The  whole 
business  was  carried  out,  to  use  Op- 
penheimer's  words,  "with  unbeliev- 
able dispatch."  ^® 


^^  Llr,  Oppenheimcr  to  Groves,  23  Nov  42, 
Admin  Files,  Cien  Corresp,  600.1   (Santa  Fe),  MDR. 

^*  Memos,  Groves  to  Albuquerque  Dist  Engr,  sub: 
Proj  Gonstr  at  Los  Alamos,  N.Mex.,  30  Nov  42,  and 
Groves  to  SWD  Div  Engr,  sub:  Gonstr  in  Vic  of  Al- 
buquerque, N.Mex.,  30  Nov  42,  Admin  Files,  Gen 


As  with  the  Clinton  Engineer 
Works,  the  Los  Alamos  site  in  the  be- 
ginning also  was  referred  to,  for  secu- 
rity reasons,  as  a  demolition  range — a 
somewhat  ironic  reference  for  a  labo- 
ratory where  an  atomic  bomb  would 
be  built.  The  site  also  had  several 
names,  the  most  common  being  Site 
Y,  Project  Y,  Zia  Project,  Santa  Fe,  or 
simply,  Los  Alamos,  its  official  title 
and  the  name  by  which  it  would  be 
most  widely  known  in  the  future. ^^ 


Corresp,  600.1  (Santa  Fe),  MDR;  Ltr,  Robins  (Act 
Chief  of  Engrs)  to  CG  SOS,  sub:  Acquisition  of 
Land  for  Demolition  Range  at  Los  Alamos,  N.Mex., 
25  Nov  42,  Incl  to  Memo,  O'Brien  to  Ashbridge, 
sub:  Land  Acquisition  in  Connection  with  MD,  17 
Apr  43.  MDR:  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  Sees.  2-3, 
passim,  DASA.  Quoted  words  from  Testimony  of 
Oppenheimer  in  Oppenhemer  Hearing,  p.  28.  For  de- 
tailed account  of  land  acquisition  at  Los  Alamos  see 
Ch.  XV. 

2^  Memo,  Groves  to  CG  SOS,  sub:  Activation  and 
Administration  of  Los  Alamos,  27  Feb  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.2  (Los  Alamos),  MDR. 


86 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Once  the  choice  of  Los  Alamos  had 
been  made,  events  moved  swiftly. 
"The  last  months  of  1942  and  early 
1943,"  recalled  Oppenheimer  later, 
"had  hardly  hours  enough  to  get  Los 
Alamos  established."  ^°  Vigorously 
supported  by  Groves,  Compton, 
Conant,  and  others,  Oppenheimer 
launched  an  extensive  recruitment 
program.  He  traveled  all  over  the 
country,  urging  scientists  of  recog- 
nized ability  to  join  the  new  laborato- 
ry. Restricted  to  revealing  only  what 
was  absolutely  necessary  about  the 
project,  Oppenheimer  faced  no  easy 
task  trying  to  arouse  the  interest  of 
scientists,  technicians,  and  mechanics 
in  the  program,  in  indicating  its  sense 
of  urgency,  and  in  persuading  them 
to  sign  up  for  work  at  a  military  post 
in  the  middle  of  the  New  Mexico 
desert,  where  they  and  their  families 
might  have  to  remain  isolated  for  the 
duration  of  the  war.  Nevertheless,  he 
was  highly  successful  in  these  efforts. 
Recruits  from  Princeton,  Chicago, 
California,  Minnesota,  Wisconsin,  and 
other  universities  joined  the  program, 
the  first  contingent  arriving  at  Los 
Alamos  with  Oppenheimer  in  March 
1943,  long  before  construction  at  the 
site  was  completed. 

With  the  university  scientists  came 
their  equipment:  a  cyclotron  from 
Harvard,  two  more  particle  accelera- 
tors from  Wisconsin,  another  from  Il- 
linois. Locating  and  securing  this  es- 
sential equipment  was  difficult 
enough;  shipping  it  to  New  Mexico 
was  an  additional  problem.  "Every- 
body," Oppenheimer  later  recalled, 
"arrived  with  truckloads  of  junk  and 


equipment."  Under  a  contract  with 
the  University  of  Cahfornia,  erection 
of  the  first  cyclotron  began  at  Los 
Alamos  in  mid-April,  and  the  first  ex- 
periment was  performed  early  in  July. 
Already,  Oppenheimer  continued, 
"we  were  finding  out  things  that 
nobody  knew  before."  ^^ 

Los  Alamos  was  officially  activated 
as  a  military  establishment  on  1  April 
1943,  with  Oppenheimer  as  its  scien- 
tific chief  and  Col.  John  M.  Harman 
as  its  military  head.  It  was  unique 
among  Manhattan  Project  installa- 
tions in  that  it  was  established  as  a 
separate  organization,  directly  re- 
sponsible to  General  Groves.  It  came 
under  the  district  engineer  only  for 
routine  administrative  matters.  As  its 
civilian  director,  Oppenheimer  had 
broad  authority  and  administrative  re- 
sponsibility. In  charge  of  all  scientific 
work  as  well  as  "the  maintenance  of 
secrecy  by  the  civilian  personnel 
under  his  control,"  ^^  he  was  respon- 
sible only  to  Groves  and  Conant.  This 
arrangement  relieved  Compton  and 
the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  of  the 
responsibility  for  bomb  design  and 
construction  and  left  them  free  to 
concentrate  on  plutonium  production. 
The  relations  between  Oppenheimer 
and  Colonel  Harman  were  based  on 
close  cooperation,  rather  than  con- 
trol. Harman,  who  also  reported  to 
Groves,  had  little  or  nothing  to  do 
with  scientific  matters.  His  primary 
responsibility     was     to     oversee     Los 


^°  Testimony  of  Oppenheimer  in  Oppenheimer 
Hearing,  p.  12.  This  and  following  paragraph  based 
on  ibid.,  pp.  12-13  and  28-29;  Smyth  Report,  p.  151; 
Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  130. 


*'  Quoted  words  from  Testimony  of  Oppenheimer 
in  Oppenheimer  Hearing,  p.  29.  See  also  Memo,  Op- 
penheimer to  Groves,  7  Nov  42,  and  Styer  corre- 
spondence with  Univs  of  111  and  Wis,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  400.12  (Equipment),  MDR. 

*^Ltr,  Conant  and  Groves  to  Oppenheimer,  25 
Feb  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Los 
Alamos),  MDR. 


GENERAL  GROVES  TAKES  COMMAND 


87 


Alamos  as  a  military  reservation,  in- 
cluding those  housekeeping  and 
guard  functions  necessary  to  support 
Oppenheimer's  program. ^^ 

The  other  major  element  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  Los  Alamos  was  the 
prime  contractor,  the  University  of 
California.  Under  a  War  Department 
contract,  its  role  was  largely  to 
provide  business  management  and 
technical  procurement.  For  reasons  of 
security,  the  university  had  no  repre- 
sentative at  Los  Alamos  with  authority 
comparable  to  that  of  Oppenhcmier 
or  Colonel  Harman. 

Project  leaders  wanted  to  make  the 
work  and  the  living  conditions  at  Los 
Alamos  as  attractive  as  possible;  how- 
ever, for  reasons  of  security  and 
safety.  General  Groves  wished  to 
maintain  as  much  control  as  he  could 
over  the  scientists.  One  idea  he  fa- 
vored was  to  put  key  civilians  in  uni- 
form as  army  officers.  This  plan 
seemed  attractive  to  Oppenheimer 
but  aroused  strong  opposition  from 
many  of  the  other  scientists.  The  Mili- 
tary Policy  Committee  finally  agreed 
to  drop  the  idea  for  the  period  of  ini- 
tial experimental  studies,  but  insisted 
that  the  scientific  and  engineering 
staff  be  composed  entirely  of  commis- 
sioned officers  when  final  experi- 
ments and  the  construction  of  the 
bomb  began.  Yet,  when  this  time  ar- 


"  Except  where  noted,  this  and  following  para- 
graphs based  on  ibid.;  Memo,  Groves  to  CG  SOS, 
sub:  Activation  and  Administration  of  Los  Alamos, 
25  Feb  43,  MDR;  Testimony  of  Oppenheimer  and 
Groves  in  Oppenheimer  Hearing,  pp.  28  and  171-72; 
Compton,  Atomic  Qitest.  pp.  129-30;  Memo,  Marshall 
to  Groves,  sub:  Major  MD  Contracts,  27  Apr  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  161,  MDR  (also  see 
WD-Univ  of  Calif  Contract  W-7405-eng-36, 
20  Apr  43,  LASL);  MDH.  Bk,  8,  Vol.  2,  "Techni- 
cal," pp.  1. 5-1.6,  III.6,  App.  7,  DASA;  MPC  Min,  5 
Feb  43,  MDR.  See  Ch.  XXIII  for  further  discussion 
of  the  administrative  organization  at  Los  Alamos. 


rived.  Project  Y  had  grown  so  large 
that  the  plan  was  dropped  as  being 
impractical  and  unnecessary. 

The  most  important  personnel 
problem  at  Los  Alamos  was  choice  of 
a  scientific  director,  and  Oppen- 
heimer's appointment  was  no  simple 
matter.  While  he  had  been  the  leader 
of  the  group  studying  the  theoretical 
aspects  of  constructing  atomic  bombs, 
the  Los  Alamos  program  was  to  be  a 
practical  operation,  and  carrying  it 
out  would  require  considerable  ad- 
ministrative and  organizational  abili- 
ties. The  chiefs  of  the  three  other 
major  Manhattan  laboratories — 
Compton,  Lawrence,  and  Urey — were 
all  Nobel  Prize  winners.  Oppenheimer 
was  not,  and  there  was  some  feeling 
among  the  scientists  that  this  might 
disqualify  him  as  head  of  the  Los 
Alamos  Laboratory.  General  Groves, 
while  impressed  with  Oppenheimer's 
great  intellectual  capacity,  also  was 
not  entirely  certain.  Bush  and  Conant 
shared  his  hesitation;  Lawrence, 
Compton,  and  Urey  all  indicated 
some  reservations. 

Nevertheless,  a  tentative  decision  in 
favor  of  Oppenheimer  appears  to 
have  been  made  quite  early,  because 
neither  Lawrence  nor  Compton — the 
only  other  candidates — could  be 
spared  from  his  own  vital  project.  Op- 
penheimer's appointment  as  "Scien- 
tific Director  of  the  special  laboratory 
in  New  Mexico"  was  formalized  on  25 
February  in  a  letter  to  him  from 
Groves    and    Conant;  ^''    it    did    not. 


^'' Quotation  from  Ltr,  Conant  and  Groves  to  Op- 
penheimer, 25  Feb  43,  MDR.  See  also  Groves,  Sow 
It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  60-64;  Compton,  Atomic  Qitest.  p. 
129;  Testimony  of  Bush  in  Oppenheimer  Hearing,  pp. 
560-61;  Ltr,  Conant  to  Groves,  21  Dec  42,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  334  (Postwar  Policy  Committee- 

Coniinued 


88 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


however,  become  final  until  mid-July 
because  of  security  clearance  prob- 
lems. As  was  well-known  to  most  of 
the  project  leaders,  Oppenheimer  had 
an  extended  history  of  supporting 
Communist-front  organizations  and 
causes  and  of  association  with  Com- 
munists and  fellow-travelers.  Only 
through  direct  action  by  Groves  was 
Oppenheimer,  who  was  already  at 
work  in  Los  Alamos,  finally  cleared. ^^ 

Manhattan  Project  Organization 
and  Operation 

With  the  establishment  of  Los 
Alamos  on  1  April  1943,  the  basic 
structure  of  the  Army's  organization 
for  administering  the  atomic  bomb 
program  was  essentially  completed.  In 
the  months  that  followed,  detailed 
and  sometimes  substantial  changes 
were  made  in  that  organization.^®  For 
example,  in  mid-August,  the  Manhat- 
tan District  moved  from  its  temporary 
location  in  New  York  to  permanent 
quarters  at  Oak  Ridge,  and  Colonel 

Chicago),  MDR;  Leslie  R.  Groves,  Comments  on 
Draft  Ms  "Now  It  Can  Be  Told:  The  Story  of  the 
Manhattan  Project,"  LRG;  Interv,  British  writer 
Hailey  with  Groves,  13  Dec  57,  LRG. 

*^See  Ch.  XI  for  full  story  of  the  security  investi- 
gation and  clearance  of  Oppenheimer. 

^^ Subsection  based  on  Org  Charts,  U.S.  Engrs 
Office,  MD,  27  Jan,  1  and  30  Apr  43,  OROO;  Org 
Charts,  U.S.  Engrs  Office,  MD,  15  Aug  and  1  Nov 
43,  15  Feb,  1  Jun,  28  Aug,  and  10  Nov  44,  and 
26  Jan  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  020  (MED- 
Org),  MDR;  Gen  Corresp,  Dist  Engr  to  MD  Subor- 
dinates. Sep  42-late  43,  OROO  [e.g.,  see  Memo,  Lt 
Col  Thomas  T.  Crenshaw  (Mat  Sec  chief)  to  Dist 
Engr,  sub:  Org  Chart,  13  Nov  42,  and  Memo,  Lt 
Col  Robert  C.  Blair  (Ex  Off,  Engr  and  Opns,  MD) 
to  Dist  Engr,  sub:  Proposed  Org  for  Maint  and  Opn 
of  Gen  Facilities,  22  Jan  43];  Interv,  Fine  and  Rem- 
ington (Hist  Div,  OCE)  with  Marshall,  19  Apr  68, 
CMH;  Interv,  Stanley  L.  Falk  and  Author  with 
Charles  Vanden  Bulck  and  Capt  W.  R.  McCaulev, 
22  Jun  60,  CMH;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  1.  "General," 
pp.  3.13-3.21,  DASA;  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told. 
pp.  2  and  27-32. 


Nichols,  the  deputy  district  engineer, 
replaced  Colonel  Marshall  as  district 
engineer  when  the  Corps  of  Engi- 
neers reassigned  Marshall  to  a  post 
where  he  might  receive  his  long  over- 
due promotion  to  the  rank  of  briga- 
dier general.^'  But  these  subsequent 
changes  in  key  personnel  and  in  the 
location  of  certain  elements  would 
not  significantly  affect  the  basic  struc- 
ture of  the  Manhattan  Project,  the  term 
that  by  mid- 1943  most  accurately  de- 
scribed the  Army's  overall  administra- 
tive organization  for  the  atomic  bomb 
program. 

The    administrative    elements    that 
comprised     the     Manhattan     Project 


'' Marshall's  new  assignment  was  as  commanding 
officer.  Engineer  Replacement  and  Training  Center, 
Camp  Sutton,  N.C.,  with  the  rank  of  brigadier  gen- 
eral. He  remained  in  this  assignment  only  until  No- 
vember 1943,  when  he  went  overseas  to  the  South- 
west Pacific  Area  to  serve  in  a  variety  of  positions  in 
Australia,  New  Guinea,  and  the  Philippines  (Decem- 
ber 1943  to  February  1945).  Marshall  had  first  sug- 
gested to  Groves  that  he  be  relieved  as  district  engi- 
neer of  the  Manhattan  District  at  the  end  of  1942, 
after  realizing  that  Groves  was  not  going  to  function 
simply  as  a  liaison  officer  in  Washington,  DC,  but 
intended  to  take  a  very  direct  and  active  role  in  the 
detailed  administration  of  the  District.  Marshall  later 
recalled  he  thought  having  two  senior  and  experi- 
enced engineer  officers  exercising  the  command 
function  was  unnecessary  duplication.  Furthermore, 
Marshall,  who  was  senior  to  Groves  in  permanent 
Regular  Army  rank,  realized  his  own  chances  of  pro- 
motion to  general  officer  rank  were  remote  as  long 
as  he  remained  in  a  subordinate  position  under 
Groves.  Groves,  however,  responded  negatively  to 
Marshall's  request,  stating  he  felt  that  he  must  have 
an  officer  of  Marshall's  experience  and  capabilities 
in  the  key  district  engineer  position.  Thus,  Marshall 
resigned  himself  to  serve  as  district  engineer  for  the 
duration  of  the  project;  however,  in  August  1943, 
Groves  unexpectedly  informed  him  that  his  request 
for  relief  had  been  approved.  For  further  details  on 
Marshall's  relief  and  reassignment  see  Marshall 
Interv,  19  Apr  68,  CMH;  Marshall  Diary,  19  Sep  42, 
MDR;  and  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  29.  In  his 
account  of  Marshall's  reassignment.  Groves  errs  in 
stating  that  Marshall  was  relieved  for  an  immediate 
"key  assignment  overseas,"  overlooking  Marshall's 
intervening  assignment  to  command  Camp  Sutton. 


Chart  1 — Organization  of  the  Manhattan  Project,  April  1943 


CHIEF  OF  STAFF 


SECRETARY  OF  WAR 


OFFICE  OF  SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH  &  DEVELOPMENT 


OFFICER  IN  CHARGE,  MANHATTAN  PROJECT 


DISTRICT  ENGINEER,  MANHATTAN  DISTRICT 
DEPUTY  DISTRICT  ENGINEER 

EXECUTIVE  ASSISTANT 


CONTRACTORS 


TECHNICAL  STAFF 


m:^ 


NIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


PROJECT  DIRECTOR 


'■9  UINT  CHIEF 


MORGANTOWN 


COLUMBIA  (LIAISON) 


SPECIAL  MATERIALS 


X-10  UNIT  CHIEF 


HANFORD 
ENGINEER  WORKS 


CHICAGO  (LIAISON) 


CLINTON 
ENGINEER  WORKS 
X-IOSEMIWORKS 


PROJECT  DIRECTOR 


Y-12  UNIT  CHIEF 


CLINTON 
ENGINEER  VI/ORKS,  Y-12 


SPECIAL  ACCOUNTS  _ 


CLINTON  AREA 

DEPUTY  DISTRICT  ENGINEER 

EXECUTIVE  ASSISTANT 


ADMINISTRATIVE 
DIVISION 


CALIFORNIA  (LIAISON)       ^- 


ALL  SPECIAL 
MATERIAL  AREAS 


K-25  UNIT  CHIEF 


NEW  YORK  AREA 


MILWAUKEE  AREA 


COLUMBIA  (LIAISON) 


INTELLIGENCE 


PROTECTIVE  SECURITY 


LABOR  RELATIONS 


CLASSIFIED  FILES 


MILITARY  PERSONNEL 


AUDITS  ACCOUNTING 


OFFICE  ADMINISTRATION 


PRIORITIES  &  MATERIALS      - 


WASHINGTON  LIAISON         — 


Sources:  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12.  App.  C21.  DASA;  Org  Charts,  U.S.  Engrs  OfTice.  MD,  27  Jan  and  1  Apr  43,  OROO. 


GENERAL  GROVES  TAKES  COMMAND 


89 


Manhattan  Project  Emblem 

{unofficial  circa  1946) 

were  divided  into  two  major  catego- 
ries: those  that  functioned  as  integral 
elements  of  the  Manhattan  District 
and  those  that  operated  outside  the 
structure  of  the  District,  mostly  in  the 
area  of  high-level  policymaking  or  in 
the  executive  direction  of  the  atomic 
project  (Chart  1 ).  The  central  element 
in  the  high-level  administrative  hierar- 
chy of  the  Manhattan  Project  was 
General  Groves's  personal  headquar- 
ters. The  headquarters  organization 
consisted  of  only  a  very  small  group: 
Groves;  Mrs.  Jean  O'Leary,  his  secre- 
tary who  served  as  his  administrative 
assistant  in  lieu  of  an  executive  offi- 
cer; and  several  clerical  employees.^® 
Shortly  after  becoming  Manhattan 
commander,  and  knowing  from  expe- 
rience that  any  effort  on  his  part  to 
expedite  important  project  activities 
would  require  access  or  negotiations 
with  government  agencies  and  offi- 
cials. Groves  decided  to  locate  his 
personal  headquarters  in  rooms  adja- 
cent to  those  already  occupied  by  the 
Manhattan  District's  Washington  Liai- 


^*  Through  most  of  the  war,  the  headquarters  or- 
ganization remained  small.  Then  in  1945,  in  antici- 
pation of  employment  of  atomic  bombs  against 
Japan,  Groves  enlarged  it  to  include  a  public  infor- 
mation group. 


son  Office  in  the  New  War  Depart- 
ment Building  on  Virginia  Avenue,  a 
few  blocks  from  the  White  House. 
Considered  at  first  to  be  temporary, 
time  proved  that  location  especially 
well  suited  to  the  project's  need,  and 
Groves's  office  remained  there  for  the 
duration  of  the  Army's  administration 
of  the  atomic  bomb  program. 

When  Groves  replaced  Marshall  as 
the  Army's  project  director,  the  Engi- 
neers chief  pointedly  removed  himself 
from  any  further  administrative  re- 
sponsibility for  the  program.  Although 
the  Corps  of  Engineers  continued  to 
assist  the  project,  the  latter  functioned 
as  a  basically  independent  organiza- 
tion, with  the  Manhattan  commander 
having  responsibility  to  the  Army 
Chief  of  Staff  and  Secretary  of  War 
and  through  them  to  the  President. 

Committees  continued  to  play  an 
important  role  in  guiding,  advising, 
and  instructing  the  Army  administra- 
tors of  the  project  and,  to  some 
extent,  limiting  their  authority.  Begin- 
ning in  late  1942,  the  group  most  in- 
volved in  providing  guidance  for  the 
day-to-day  administration  was  the 
MiHtary  PoHcy  Committee,  which  de- 
rived its  authority  for  policymaking 
from  the  Top  Policy  Group.  Although 
the  group  never  formally  convened,  it 
continued,  as  during  the  OSRD 
period,  to  review  and  ratify  all  major 
policies  and  decisions  relating  to  de- 
velopment and  employment  of  atomic 
energy  for  military  purposes  in  World 
War  II.  The  OSRD  S-1  Executive 
Committee  also  continued  to  function 
as  an  advisory  group  until  the  transfer 
of   most    atomic    activities    from    the 


90 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Mrs.  Jean  O'Leary  Reviewing  Project  Reports  With  General  Groves 


OSRD  to  the  Army  was  completed  in 
mid-1943.39 

Responsibility  for  execution  of  the 
plans,  policies,  and  decisions  made  by 
the  various  advisory  groups  of  the 
Manhattan  Project  devolved  first 
upon    General    Groves    and    through 


^^  Subsequently,  three  other  advisory  groups  con- 
tributed significantly  to  administration  of  the 
project.  These  were  the  Combined  Policy  Commit- 
tee (CPC),  formed  in  late  1943,  which  was  con- 
cerned with  collaboration  and  exchanges  of  infor- 
mation on  atomic  matters  with  the  British  and  Cana- 
dian governments;  the  Combined  Development 
Trust  (CDT),  established  in  June  1944,  which  was 
involved  in  the  international  aspects  of  procure- 
ment, supply,  and  control  of  uranium  and  thorium 
ores;  and  the  Interim  Committee  (IC),  organized  in 
May  1945  by  the  Secretary  of  War  with  approval  of 
the  President  to  advise  on  postwar  control  of  atomic 
energy  at  home  and  abroad,  on  release  of  informa- 
tion to  the  public,  and  on  employment  of  the  bomb 
against  Japan.  See  Ch.  X  for  a  detailed  discussion 
on  the  establishment  and  work  of  the  CPC,  Ch.  XIII 
on  the  CDT,  and  Ch.  XXVI  on  the  IC. 


him  upon  the  Manhattan  District. 
Groves,  as  officer  in  charge  of  the 
atomic  bomb  program  for  the  Army, 
exercised  command  authority  over 
the  District,  but  he  was  not  its  chief 
executive  officer.  That  position  was 
held  by  the  district  engineer,  who  re- 
ported to  Groves. 

The  district  engineer  presided  over 
an  organization  that  was,  as  it 
emerged  in  mid- 1943,  similar  in  many 
respects  to  the  engineer  districts  that 
had  been  formed  by  the  Corps  of  En- 
gineers in  the  past  to  carry  out  special 
assignments  (Chart  2).  Its  administra- 
tive elements  were  grouped  into  two 
major  categories:  operating  units, 
which  were  involved  primarily  in  the 
day-to-day  monitoring  of  contractor 
operations;  and  staff  units,  which 
were  engaged  in  overseeing  and  pro- 


OPERATING  UNITS 


Chart  2 — Organization  of  the  Manhattan  District.  August  1943 

district  engineer 
special  assistant 
executive  officer 


MEDICAL  SECTION 


LEGAL  SECTION 


MADISON  SQUARE  AREA 


SPECIAL  PRODUCTS 


NEW  YORK  AREA 


TECHNICAL  DIVISION 


CALIFORNIA  AREA 


CONSTRUCTION 

DIVISION 
(Y.12,  K-?5,  X-10) 


COLORADO  AREA 


BEVERLY  AREA 


CHICAGO  AREA 


COLORADO  AREA 


LEGAL  SECTION 


ROCHESTER  AREA 


JRRAY  HILL  AREA 


LMINGTON  AREA 


ST.  LOUIS  AREA 


EM  DETACHMENT 


TONAWANDA  AREA 


WILMINGTON  AREA 


IOWA  AREA 


WILMINGTON  AREA 


BOSTON  AREA 


SPECIAL  ACCOUNTS 


WAC  DETACHMENT 


-i 


Some.  Org  Chan.  I'.S.  Kngrs  Olficc.  MI),  1.5  Aug  43.  Adniiu  Files.  Gen  Corrcsp.  020  (MED-Org).  MDR. 


GENERAL  GROVES  TAKES  COMMAND 


91 


viding  services.  In  both  types  of  units, 
military  personnel  headed  virtually  all 
administrative  elements  down  to  the 
section  level,  although  many  of  the 
District  employees  filling  positions 
that  required  special  knowledge  or 
training  were  civil  service  workers. 
The  chiefs  of  each  of  these  units  re- 
ported directly  to  the  district  engi- 
neer, who  functioned  with  the  assist- 
ance of  a  small  headquarters  group 
comprised  of  an  executive  officer,  two 
administrative  assistants,  and  legal 
and  medical  advisers. 

Operating  units,  each  headed  by  a 
unit  chief  or  an  area  engineer,  were 
formed  to  monitor  each  of  the  major 
contractor-operated  activities.  The 
number  and  precise  character  of  these 
operating  units  varied  considerably 
due  to  the  quantity  and  type  of  con- 
tract operations  under  District  super- 
vision. Thus,  in  the  early  period  of 
the  District's  operation  the  units  con- 
formed to  the  emphasis  on  construc- 
tion activities,  whereas  later  they  re- 
flected the  shift  to  plant-operating  ac- 
tivities. By  the  time  of  the  District 
headquarters  move  in  August  1943 
from  New  York  City  to  Oak  Ridge, 
five  major  operating  units — Madison 
Square  Area,  Hanford  Engineer 
Works,  Clinton  Engineer  Works,  New 
York  Area,  and  Special  Products — had 
been  established. 

The  elements  concerned  with  over- 
seeing project  operations  and  services 
were  divided  among  seven  major  staff 
components:  the  Y-12  (electromag- 
netic), K-25  (gaseous  diffusion),  X-10 
(plutonium),  and  P-9  (heavy  water) 
unit  chiefs;  and  the  Technical,  Service 
and  Control,  and  Administrative  Divi- 
sions. The  four  unit  chiefs  were  re- 
sponsible for  the  overall  supervision 
of   the    construction    and    operations 


phases  of  the  production  processes. 
The  Technical  Division  had  responsi- 
bility for  the  major  contractor-operat- 
ed research  and  development  pro- 
grams at  Columbia  and  the  Universi- 
ties of  California  (Berkeley),  Chicago, 
and  Rochester;  *°  the  Service  and 
Control  Division,  for  control  func- 
tions, intelligence  and  security  mat- 
ters, labor  relations,  safety,  and  mili- 
tary personnel;  and  the  Administra- 
tive Division,  for  procurement  and 
contracts,  fiscal  matters,  civilian  per- 
sonnel, priorities  and  materials,  corre- 
spondence and  the  library,  classified 
files  and  mail  and  records,  and  the 
District's  Washington  Liaison  Office. 
Additionally,  the  latter  division  pro- 
vided the  Los  Alamos  Laboratory  with 
specified  routine  services. 

With  the  rounding  out  of  the 
Army's  organization  for  administra- 
tion of  the  American  atomic  energy 
program  in  mid- 1943,  General 
Groves  and  his  District  staff  were  in  a 
much  firmer  position  to  convert  the 
OSRD-inherited  research  and  devel- 
opment organization  into  an  industri- 
al complex  for  producing  fissionable 
materials  for  atomic  weapons.  During 
the  months  that  followed,  the  Army 
had  to  make  further  internal  reorgani- 
zations to  meet  the  new  requirements 
resulting  from  the  shift  from  plant 
construction  to  plant-operating  activi- 
ties and  the  addition  of  new  facili- 
ties.'*^ But  with  Groves  at   the  helm, 


^^  In  early  1943,  Groves  selected  Professor  Staf- 
ford L.  Warren  of  the  University  of  Rochester  to 
direct  a  medical  research  program  on  the  effects  of 
radiation.  See  Ch.  XX. 

''While  from  mid-1943  until  the  end  of  World 
War  II  the  basic  pattern  of  the  Manhattan  District's 
administrative  organization  remained  relatively 
fixed,  the  district  engineer  in  1944  established  new 

C.onlinued 


92 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


carrying  out  the  Military  Policy  Com-     seemingly    insurmountable    obstacles, 
mittee's     decisions     and     overcoming     the  atomic  project  moved  ahead. 


operating  units  for  specific  functions — for  example, 
to  administer  divisions  charged  with  supervising  op- 
eration of  community  and  site  facilities  in  Tennes- 
see, to  supervise  construction  and  operation  of  the 
third  major  production  plant  (thermal  diffusion), 
and  to  expedite  production  in  all  of  the  project's 
major  plants.  He  also  abolished  the  staff  unit's  Serv- 
ice and  Control  and  Technical  Divisions,  placing 
part  of  their  functions  in  the  Administrative  Division 
(for  example,  labor  relations)  and  shifting  the  rest 
into  special  staff  elements  that  reported  directlv  to 


him.  Thus,  by  late  1944,  the  special  staff  included 
control,  research  control,  safety,  and  historical 
record  sections,  medical  and  naval  detachment  ele- 
ments, a  public  relations  and  special  services  office, 
a  legal  adviser,  a  district  inspector,  and  a  special  as- 
signments officer  (cover  designation  for  officer  re- 
sponsible for  liaison  with  Canadian  atomic  program 
officials).  Not  on  the  special  staff  but  functioning  as 
units  in  the  District  headquarters  were  intelligence 
and  security,  patents,  fire  protection,  and  liaison 
elements  in  Washington,  D.C. 


PART  TWO 
PRODUCING  FISSIONABLE  MATERIALS 


CHAPTER  V 


Organizing  for  Production 


In  June  1942,  the  Army  took  its 
first  step  to  form  a  production  organi- 
zation for  the  manufacture  of  fis- 
sionable materials  with  negotiation  of 
an  AEM  (architect-engineer-manager) 
agreement  with  the  Stone  and  Web- 
ster Engineering  Corporation  of 
Boston;  however,  as  the  complexity  of 
the  AEM  job  became  evident  in  the 
following  months,  attempts  were 
made  to  involve  a  number  of  other 
leading  American  industrial  and  con- 
struction firms.  The  Army's  task  of 
getting  the  skilled  manpower  and 
technical  know-how  required  to 
produce  fissionable  materials  in  quan- 
tities sufficient  to  fabricate  atomic 
weapons  was  not  easy.  It  was  compli- 
cated greatly  by  the  absolute  necessity 
for  speed,  which  meant  that  contracts 
had  to  be  let  before  the  customary 
preliminary  plans  and  technical  data 
were  available.  This  lack  of  specific 
information — blueprints,  specifica- 

tions, and  similar  data — was  an  added 
handicap  because  many  of  the  scien- 
tific and  technical  processes  involved 
were  virtually  unknown  in  industrial 
circles.  Also,  because  many  industrial 
organizations  already  had  committed 
most  of  their  resources  to  war  pro- 
duction, the  managers  and  engineers 
of  these  organizations  were  reluctant 
to  take  on  additional  responsibilities 


for  a  project  of  such  unusual  and  un- 
certain character.  The  Army  therefore 
was  faced  with  the  problem  of  some- 
how convincing  them  that  the  success 
of  the  program  was  so  crucial  to  the 
outcome  of  the  war  they  simply  could 
not  refuse  to  participate. 

Plutonium  Project 

The  question  of  who  should  have 
responsibility  for  carrying  through  the 
plutonium  program  to  the  production 
stage  had  been  a  matter  of  contro- 
versy for  some  time  at  the  Metallurgi- 
cal Laboratory.^  Some  of  the  scien- 
tists had  proposed  that  they  them- 
selves direct  the  design,  development 
and  engineering,  and  construction  of 
the  plutonium  plant.  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  Director  Arthur  Compton, 
who  early  in  his  career  had  worked  as 
an  employee  and  consultant  for  large 
electrical  companies,  knew  that  this 
proposal  ran  counter  to  the  proce- 
dure customarily  followed  in  Ameri- 
can industry,  namely,  the  assigning  of 
research,  development,  and  produc- 
tion to  separate  departments — a  prac- 


*  Paragraphs  on  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
based  on  Compton,  Atomic  Qiiesl.  pp.  108-10; 
Groves,  \ou>  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  44-46;  DSM  Chro- 
nology, 25  Jun  42,  Sec.  2(e),  OROO;  Hewlett  and 
Anderson,  Xeiv  World,  p.  184. 


96 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


tice  that  experience  had  shown  gener- 
ally brought  the  most  efficient  results. 
He  suggested  that  time  would  be 
saved  by  securing  an  experienced  in- 
dustrial firm  already  accustomed  to 
carrying  out  large-scale  projects,  leav- 
ing the  research  to  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  staff. 

The  staff's  reaction,  he  recalled 
later,  "was  a  near  rebellion."  ^  The 
younger  scientists  pointed  out  that 
they  had  demonstrated  their  ability  to 
supervise  development  of  processes 
to  the  stage  of  large-scale  production 
by  the  success  they  had  so  recently 
achieved  in  increasing  the  output  of 
pure  uranium  metal  and  graphite. 
After  having  contributed  so  much  to 
its  initiation  and  development,  they 
wanted  to  see  the  plutonium  program 
through  to  final  fulfillment.  And  sol- 
idly backing  them  were  those  labora- 
tory scientists  who  had  been  born  and 
educated  in  Europe.  Most  of  them 
were  inclined  to  suspect  the  motives 
of  large  industrial  firms.  Also,  most 
had  a  more  extensive  knowledge  of 
engineering  techniques  than  their 
American  counterparts  learned  as  a 
regular  part  of  their  scientific 
training. 

By  early  summer  of  1942,  progress 
in  research  required  that  a  decision 
soon  be  reached.  Compton  assembled 
some  seventy-five  members  of  his  re- 
search and  administrative  staff  to 
agree  on  a  plan  of  organization.  It 
soon  became  apparent  they  were  not 
going  to  reach  a  consensus,  so  Comp- 
ton announced  he  would  proceed 
without  their  approval.  At  the  OSRD 
S-1  Executive  Committee  meeting  of 
25  June,  Compton  supported  the  de- 
cision   to    assign    AEM    responsibility 


Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  109. 


for  the  plutonium  as  well  as  the  other 
processes  to  Stone  and  Webster. 

Although  the  S-1  Committee  had 
suggested  that  the  University  of  Chi- 
cago might  operate  the  pilot  facility 
to  be  built  in  the  Argonne  Forest  area 
southwest  of  the  city,  no  action  had 
yet  been  taken.  In  mid-August, 
Compton  urged  Colonel  Marshall  that 
an  operator  should  be  selected 
promptly  as  construction  of  this  unit 
was  about  to  begin.  He  also  pointed 
out  that  the  operator  of  the  Argonne 
chemical  facility  probably  would  have 
responsibility  for  the  separation  works 
of  the  main  plutonium  plant;  there- 
fore, the  operator's  engineering  and 
design  personnel  should  have  an  op- 
portunity to  observe  construction  of 
the  plant  at  Argonne. 

As  possible  operators,  Compton 
recommended  that  Marshall  approach 
E.  I.  du  Pont  de  Nemours  Company, 
Standard  Oil  Development  Company, 
or  Union  Carbide  and  Carbon  Corpo- 
ration. For  reasons  of  security,  Mar- 
shall wanted  to  hold  to  a  minimum 
the  number  of  firms  to  be  brought  in 
to  build  and  operate  project  facilities. 
He  proposed  that  for  the  time  being 
Stone  and  Webster  add  operation  of 
the  Argonne  separation  plant  to  its 
other  responsibilities.  Both  Compton 
and  the  engineering  firm  promptly  ac- 
cepted this  arrangement — the  latter, 
however,  with  a  proviso  that  it  be  per- 
mitted to  secure  technical  assistance 
from  other  organizations. 

At  the  Bohemian  Grove  meeting  in 
early  September,  the  S-1  Committee 
recommended  that  Stone  and  Web- 
ster get  the  technical  assistance  it  re- 
quired. General  Groves,  newly  ap- 
pointed as  Manhattan  commander, 
and    Stone    and    Webster    agreed    on 


ORGANIZING  FOR  PRODUCTION 


97 


26  September  that  Du  Pont  should 
be  approached  and  the  S-1  Commit- 
tee accepted  their  decision.  Two 
weeks  later,  Du  Pont  assented  to 
design  and  procure  not  only  the 
chemical  separation  equipment  but 
also  part  of  the  pile  equipment  for 
the  plutonium  pilot  plant.  At  first  Du 
Pont  had  resisted  taking  on  any  re- 
sponsibility for  the  piles,  pleading 
lack  of  experience  and  strain  on  its  fa- 
cilities as  a  result  of  its  other  govern- 
ment projects.  But  Groves  and  Comp- 
ton  finally  persuaded  the  company 
that  this  was  the  logical  solution  to  a 
difficult  problem.^ 

Because  Du  Pont's  contract  covered 
only  design  and  procurement  of 
equipment  and  because  Stone  and 
Webster  would  operate  only  the  Ar- 
gonne  separation  installation,  the 
most  important  plutonium  production 
problem — securing  an  operator  for 
the  other  pilot  facilities  and  the  pro- 
duction plant — remained  to  be  solved. 
Both  Groves  and  Compton  were 
moving  rapidly  toward  the  view  that 
the  size  and  complexity  of  this  task 
required  the  selection  of  a  company 
other  than  Stone  and  Webster.  The 
Manhattan  chief  paid  his  first  visit  to 
the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  in  early 
October  1942.  Reviewing  the  plutoni- 
um program  with  Compton  and  his 
senior  staff.  Groves  quickly  concluded 
that  to  bring  this  process  into  produc- 
tion was  going  to  be  a  far  greater 
project  than  anyone  had  anticipated. 
After     further     consultation.     Groves 


=»  Marshall  Diary,  14,  18,  26  Sep  and  2,  9  Oct  42, 
OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp.  (iroves  Files,  Misc  Recs 
Sec,  behind  Fldr  5,  MDR;  DSM  Chronolog\,  14-15 
Aug  42.  Sec.  16,  13  Sep  42,  Sec.  2(e),  and  26  Sep 
42,  Sec.  15(b).  OROO:  Ms,  Leslie  R.  Groves,  "Now 
It  Can  Be  Told:  The  Story  of  the  Manhattan 
Project"  (hereafter  cited  as  (iroves  Ms),  pp.  95-96, 

c;mh 


and  Compton  decided  that  Stone  and 
Webster  should  be  relieved  of  all  re- 
sponsibility for  the  plutonium  project, 
a  decision  concurred  in  by  both  Van- 
nevar  Bush  and  James  B.  Conant.* 

As  General  Groves  learned  more 
about  the  plutonium  process,  he  also 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would 
be  preferable  to  turn  the  entire 
project  of  design,  engineering,  con- 
struction, and  operation  over  to  a 
single  firm.  If  the  proper  organization 
were  chosen,  the  gain  in  efficiency  of 
operation  would  ease  his  own  task  of 
coordination.  One  Du  Pont  policy,  in 
particular,  impressed  Groves.  Unlike 
most  American  industrial  firms,  the 
company  had  a  long-established  prac- 
tice of  building  its  own  plants.  Hence, 
Du  Pont  had  the  resources  and  expe- 
rience necessary  to  carry  out  all  as- 
pects of  the  plutonium  production 
plant,  an  advantage  from  the  stand- 
point of  both  security  and  speed  of 
getting  into  production. 

When  Groves  proposed  to  Comp- 
ton, Bush,  Conant,  and  other  leaders 
that  Du  Pont  be  asked  to  assume  sole 
responsibility  for  the  plutonium  pro- 
duction project,  replacing  Stone  and 
Webster,  he  received  a  generally  fa- 
vorable response.  But  the  Manhattan 
chief  was  fully  aware  that  several  key 
members  of  the  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory, with  whom  Du  Pont  engineers 
would  have  to  work  quite  closely,  re- 
mained unreconciled  to  any  course 
that  would  take  plutonium  production 
out     of     their     hands.     Furthermore, 


■*  .Account  of  negotiations  with  Du  Pont  drawn 
primarily  from  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  46- 
52;  Memo,  sub:  Prelim  Negotiations  .  .  .  Between 
I'nited  States  of  America  and  Du  Pont  .  .  .  ,  Incl  to 
Ltr,  R.  E.  DeRight  (Du  Pont)  to  Groves.  30  Oct  43, 
OCG  Files.  Gen  Corresp.  MP  Files,  Fldr  2F,  MDR; 
DSM  Chronology,  10  Nov  42,  Sec.  23(b),  OROO. 


98 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


some  members  of  this  dissatisfied 
group  would  be  especially  upset  over 
the  selection  of  Du  Pont,  which  in 
many  ways  seemed  to  them  to  epito- 
mize big  industry. 

Groves,  nevertheless,  decided  to 
take  immediate  steps  to  negotiate  an 
agreement  with  Du  Pont.  On  30  Oc- 
tober, he  invited  Willis  Harrington, 
senior  vice  president  of  the  firm,  to 
meet  with  him  and  Conant,  who  him- 
self once  had  served  as  a  consultant 
to  Du  Pont.  Harrington  came  the  next 
day,  accompanied  by  chemist  Charles 
Stine,  also  a  vice  president  of  Du 
Pont  and  a  friend  of  Conant.  Groves 
and  Conant  gave  the  two  Du  Pont  ex- 
ecutives data  on  the  pile  program  and 
general  information  about  the  other 
processes  and  the  military  objectives 
of  the  project,  emphasizing  the  ur- 
gency of  the  program  and  frankly  ad- 
mitting there  were  serious  questions 
as  to  its  feasibility. 

Harrington  and  Stine  were  appalled 
at  the  idea  that  their  company  should 
assume  major  responsibility  for  this 
phase  of  the  atomic  program.  As  they 
perceived  it,  the  technical  require- 
ments were  formidable,  the  operating 
conditions  unorthodox,  and  the  scien- 
tific field  one  in  which  Du  Pont  had 
no  special  experience  and  compe- 
tence. Faced,  however,  with  Groves's 
insistence  that  Du  Pont  was  the  only 
industrial  organization  in  America 
with  the  capacity  to  build  the  plutoni- 
um  plant,  they  reluctantly  indicated 
the  company  might  be  able  to  do  the 
job.  But  a  final  decision  could  only  be 
made  by  Du  Pont  President  Walter  S. 
Carpenter,  Jr.,  and  other  members  of 
the  firm's  executive  committee  follow- 
ing an  investigation  by  company 
chemists  and  engineers.  Consequent- 
ly, a  day  or  two  later.  Groves  granted 


the  company  permission  to  send  a 
team  of  experts  to  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  to  see  the  work  in 
progress. 

On  10  November,  General  Groves, 
Colonel  Nichols,  the  deputy  district 
engineer,  Arthur  Compton,  and 
Norman  Hilberry,  who  was  associate 
director  of  the  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory, went  to  Wilmington,  Delaware, 
to  plead  further  for  Du  Pont's  assist- 
ance. Groves  emphasized  to  Carpen- 
ter that  the  project  was  of  utmost  im- 
portance to  the  war  effort,  adding 
that  President  Roosevelt,  Secretary  of 
War  Stimson,  and  Chief  of  Staff  Mar- 
shall also  shared  this  opinion.  Fur- 
thermore, he  continued,  there  was 
reason  to  believe  the  Axis  states 
might  soon  be  producing  fissionable 
materials  in  quantities  sufficient  to 
manufacture  atomic  weapons.  The 
only  known  defense  against  such 
weapons  was  "fear  of  their  counter- 
employment."  ^  If  the  United  States 
could  develop  such  weapons  before 
the  enemy,  it  could  materially  shorten 
the  war  and  potentially  reduce  Ameri- 
can casualties  by  the  tens  of 
thousands. 

Following  his  conference  with  Car- 
penter, Groves  went  to  a  meeting  of 
the  Du  Pont  executive  committee. 
There,  he  was  joined  by  Nichols, 
Compton,  and  Hilberry.  With  Car- 
penter presiding  at  the  meeting. 
Groves  repeated  what  he  had  said 
earlier  to  the  Du  Pont  president. 
Some  committee  members  expressed 
reservations,  many  of  them  traceable 
to  the  report  of  the  team  of  company 
chemists  and  engineers  who  had  just 
returned  from  a  visit  to  the  Metallur- 


^  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  49. 


ORGANIZING  FOR  PRODUCTION 


99 


gical  Laboratory.  The  team  had  re- 
ported that  the  laboratory  scientists 
had  neither  demonstrated  a  self-sus- 
taining chain  reaction  nor  furnished 
adequate  information  concerning  the 
basic  problem  of  controlling  and  re- 
moving the  tremendous  amount  of 
heat  that  would  be  generated  in  a  pile 
operation.  And  though  they  were  at 
work  on  three  different  pile  designs, 
none — at  least  when  judged  in  terms 
of  practical  engineering — seemed 
likely  to  provide  a  prototype  for  a 
large-scale  production  pile.  Progress 
on  the  plutonium  separation  process 
did  not  appear  much  more  encourag- 
ing. The  scientists  had  yet  to  demon- 
strate a  method  that  would  separate 
more  than  microscopic  amounts  of 
plutonium  from  radioactive  fission 
products.  On  the  basis  of  its  observa- 
tions, the  Du  Pont  team  estimated 
that  only  minute  amounts  of  plutoni- 
um could  be  produced  in  1943,  not 
much  more  in  1944,  and  only 
enough,  possibly,  in  1945  to  fulfill  the 
planned  rate  of  production  for 
weapon  purposes. 

The  pessimistic  tone  of  the  Du 
Pont  executive  committee's  evaluation 
was  not  surprising;  they  concluded, 
nevertheless,  that  the  pile  method  was 
probably  feasible.  To  be  certain  of 
this,  however,  they  felt  Du  Pont  must 
have  control  over  all  aspects  of  the 
project.  Furthermore,  the  government 
should  guarantee  the  company 
against  loss  from  the  obviously  great 
hazards  inherent  in  the  process.  Car- 
penter informed  General  Groves  on 
12  November  that  Du  Pont  would 
take  the  job,  and  the  Manhattan  com- 
mander immediately  directed  Colonel 
Nichols  to  draft  the  terms  of  a 
contract. 


With  Du  Pont's  participation  appar- 
ently assured,  the  Military  Policy 
Committee  cautiously  endorsed  going 
ahead  with  plans  to  build  a  plutonium 
plant  capable  of  producing  1.0  kilo- 
gram of  fissionable  material  per  day. 
It  also  directed  that  Du  Pont  take 
over  from  Stone  and  Webster  at  Chi- 
cago, relieving  the  Boston  firm  of  vir- 
tually all  of  its  AEM  responsibilities 
for  plutonium  project  activities.^ 

Hardly  had  that  question  been  set- 
tled when  important  new  data  cast  se- 
rious doubt  on  the  explosive  charac- 
teristics of  plutonium.  Wallace  A. 
Akers,  technical  chief  of  the  British 
Directorate  of  Tube  Alloys  (corre- 
sponding to  the  S-1  Executive  Com- 
mittee), was  in  Washington,  D.C.,  on 
14  November  to  discuss  information 
exchange  with  Conant.  During  a 
luncheon  conversation,  Akers  re- 
vealed that  British  atomic  scientists 
had  discovered  that  plutonium  had 
premature  fissioning  tendencies  that 
might  make  it  unsuitable  for  use  in  a 
weapon.  Greatly  disturbed,  Conant 
checked  with  Ernest  Lawrence  and 
Arthur  Compton.  When  they  told  him 
that  both  Oppenheimer  and  Glenn 
Seaborg,  a  chemist  who  had  done  ex- 
tensive research  on  plutonium  at  the 
University  of  California,  Berkeley,  ex- 
pressed some  concern  about  the  pos- 
sibility of  obtaining  material  of  suffi- 
cient purity  to  ensure  the  fissioning 
qualities  in  a  weapon,  Conant  got  in 
touch  with  General  Groves.  The  Man- 
hattan chief  responded  immediately 
by  setting  up  an  investigating  team 
composed     of    Lawrence,     Compton, 


«  MPC  Min,  12  Nov  42,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
MP  Files,  Fidr  23,  Tab  A,  MDR. 


100 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


and  Oppenheimer,  as  well  as  physicist 
Edwin  McMillan."^ 

On  18  November  the  four  scientists 
reported  back  to  Groves  in  optimistic 
terms.®  Basing  their  recommenda- 
tions on  the  conclusion  that  despite 
"many  difFicult  but  solvable  problems 
it  should  be  possible  to  produce  a  sat- 
isfactory bomb  .  .  .  from  49  [plutoni- 
um]  probably  during  1945,"  they 
urged  maximum  speed  in  building  a 
plutonium  production  plant.  The  sci- 
entists supported  their  recommenda- 
tions with  Oppenheimer's  estimate  of 
the  degree  of  plutonium  purity  re- 
quired for  a  bomb. 

Instead  of  convincing  Conant  and 
Du  Pont  of  the  feasibility  of  plutoni- 
um, Oppenheimer's  data  had  the  op- 
posite effect.  By  chance,  the  Harvard 
University  president  had  just  received 
figures  on  plutonium  purity  require- 
ments from  British  scientist  Sir  James 
Chadwick,  and  when  he  compared 
these  with  Oppenheimer's,  he  was 
shocked  to  find  that  the  latter's  esti- 
mates allowed  for  a  degree  of  impuri- 
ty ten  times  as  great.  This  discrepancy 
was  so  large  that  Conant  momentarily 
suspected  American  scientists  had 
erred  seriously  in  their  calculations. 
Not  until  he  received  additional  data 
and  written  assurances  from  Compton 
and  Lawrence  was  his  confidence  in 
the  feasibility  of  plutonium  fully 
restored.^ 


^  DSM  Chronology,  14  Nov  42.  Sec.  2(a),  and  19 
Nov  42,  Sec.  23,  OROO;  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 
Xeu'  World,  pp.  109-10.  See  Ch.  X  for  details  on 
problems  with  information  interchange  between  the 
British  and  American  atomic  programs. 

*  Team's  report  in  Memo  (for  File),  Lawrence, 
Compton,  Oppenheimer,  and  McMillan,  18  Nov  42, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  401.1-410.2  (Materials), 
MDR. 

^  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xeu>  World,  pp.  109-10; 
Llr,  Lawrence  to  Conant,  23  Nov  42,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  201  (Conant),  MDR;  Ltr,  Compton  to 


As  for  Du  Font's  engineers,  Oppen- 
heimer's estimate  appeared  so  exact- 
ing that  it  would  be  unattainable  in 
any  reasonable  period  of  time.  In 
Groves's  office  on  18  November, 
Charles  Stine  and  Crawford  H. 
Greenewalt,  a  chemical  engineer  serv- 
ing as  chemical  director  of  Du  Font's 
Grasselli  Chemicals  Department,  com- 
plained with  some  feeling  that  the 
Manhattan  commander  was  asking  the 
firm  to  undertake  the  most  difficult 
and  unpromising  of  the  processes  for 
producing  fissionable  materials  and 
suggested  the  company  might  be 
better  qualified  to  carry  out  one  of 
the  other  processes.  Greenewalt's  lack 
of  enthusiasm  at  this  juncture  can  be 
traced  to  his  pessimistic  interpretation 
of  some  information  he  had  received 
a  short  time  before,  leading  him  to 
conclude  that  there  was  only  about  a 
60-percent  chance  that  a  sustained 
chain  reaction  would  be  achieved.  ^° 

Compton,  who  was  also  present, 
was  shocked  by  Stine's  assertion  that 
the  odds  were  100  to  1  against 
achieving  plutonium  production  in 
time  to  be  of  any  value  to  the  war 
effort.  For  the  Metallurgical  Laborato- 
ry chief  this  marked  the  beginning  of 
a  gradual  disillusionment  with  Du 
Font.  By  the  end  of  December  he 
would  be  seriously  suggesting  that 
some  other  firm  be  brought  in  to 
build  the  production  plants.  Compton 
later  recalled  that  he  "probably  took 
Stine's  words  much  more  seriously 
than  they  were  intended."  Neverthe- 


Conant,  8  Dec  42,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1, 
MDR. 

10  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told  p.  52;  Ltr.  Law- 
rence to  Conant,  23  Nov  42,  MDR;  Compton,  Atomic 
Quest,  pp.  132-34.  Du  Pont  purchased  the  Grasselli 
Chemical  Company  of  Cleveland  in  1928  and  incor- 
porated it  as  a  separate  department  in  the  firm. 


ORGANIZING  FOR  PRODUCTION 


101 


less,  under  those  immediate  circum- 
stances, he  felt  that  he  could  not 
"have  drawn  such  a  conclusion  with- 
out considering  the  task  a  waste  effort 
as  far  as  the  present  war  was  con- 
cerned." Therefore,  Compton  deter- 
mined immediately  to  try  to  change 
"their  [Du  Font's]  point  of  view  to 
one  of  optimism."  ^^ 

Reassessment  of  Processes  To 
Produce  a  Bomb 

At  the  meeting  on  10  November, 
the  Du  Pont  executive  committee  sug- 
gested that  a  reappraisal  of  all  aspects 
of  the  project  would  help  the  compa- 
ny in  determining  the  precise  role  it 
should  play  in  the  atomic  energy  pro- 
gram. Seeing  the  logic  of  this  sugges- 
tion. Groves  and  Conant  thought  the 
time  was  appropriate  for  a  reassess- 
ment because  project  emphasis  was 
shifting  from  research  and  develop- 
ment in  scientific  principles  to  practi- 
cal application  on  an  industrial  scale. 
Furthermore,  the  Military  Policy 
Committee  shortly  was  going  to  have 
to  prepare  a  progress  report  to  the 
President  on  the  project.  ^^ 

Leu'is  Reviewing  Committee 

Groves  acted  promptly  to  imple- 
ment reassessment  of  the  project.  On 
18  November,  following  close  con- 
sultation with  Conant,  he  appointed 
a  five-man  reviewing  committee, 
headed  by  Warren  K.  Lewis,  a  highly 
respected  professor  of  chemical  engi- 


"  Quotations  from  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  134. 
See  also  ibid.,  pp.  132-33,  and  Groves,  Now  It  Can 
Be  Told.  pp.  55-57. 

12  MPC  Min,  12  Nov  42,  MDR;  MPC  Rpt,  15  Dec 
42,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab 
B,  MDR. 


neering  at  Massachusetts  Institute  of 
Technology  (MIT).  Groves  made  cer- 
tain that  Du  Font  was  well  represent- 
ed on  the  committee,  appointing 
Crawford  H.  Greenewalt,  who  had 
been  a  student  under  Lewis  at  MIT 
and  was  an  expert  on  research;  Tom 
C.  Gary,  manager  of  the  Design  Divi- 
sion in  the  Engineering  Department 
and  a  specialist  in  construction;  and 
Roger  Williams,  chemical  director  of 
the  Ammonia  Department,  who  was 
an  expert  on  plant  operations.  The 
fifth  member,  Eger  V.  Murphree  of 
Standard  Oil  Development  Company 
and  former  head  of  the  OSRD  S-1 
Section's  planning  board,  became  ill  at 
the  last  minute  and  was  unable  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  committee's  activities. ^^ 
The  committee's  mission  was  to  re- 
view the  entire  project  from  a  manu- 
facturing standpoint.  To  accomplish 
this,  committee  members  would  visit 
Harold  Urey's  project  at  Columbia 
University,  investigate  Arthur  Comp- 
ton's  research  on  the  pile  process  at 
the  Metallurgical  Laboratory,  and  as- 
sess Ernest  Lawrence's  work  on  the 
electromagnetic  process  at  the  Radi- 
ation Laboratory.  They  would  not 
evaluate  the  centrifuge  method.  The 
consensus  was  that  this  process  was 
unlikely  to  produce  U-235  in  suffi- 
cient quantities  to  be  of  use  during 
the  war.  The  Military  Policy  and  S-1 
Executive  Committees  agreed  that  all 
work,  including  that  on  a  pilot  plant, 
should  be  reduced  to  the  minimum 
necessary  to  establish  the  feasibility  of 
the  method.  Although  some  support 
for   the   centrifuge   process    still   per- 


'^DSM  Chronolog>',  19  Nov  42,  Sec.  23,  OROO; 
Groves  Diary,  18,  19,  21  Nov  42,  LRG;  Groves,  Xow 
It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  52;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp. 
134-35. 


102 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


sisled,  in  lime  it  would  be  dropped  as  a 
major  method  for  producing  fission- 
able material  for  the  bomb. 

After  conferring  briefly  with  Groves 
and  Conant  in  Washington,  D.C.,  on 
21  November,  the  Lewis  reviewing 
committee  began  its  toiir  in  New 
York.  There,  committee  members  met 
with  leaders  of  the  gaseous  diffusion 
project  and  inspected  the  experimen- 
tal equipment  in  the  laboratories  at 
Columbia  University,  as  well  as  con- 
ferred with  respresentatives  of  the 
M.  W.  Kellogg  Company  which  had 
been  assigned  work  on  the  diffusion 
process.  Leaving  New  York  by  train, 
the  committee  reached  Chicago  on 
the  twenty-sixth.  Thanksgiving  Day.^'* 

Compton  had  first  heard  about  the 
committee's  impending  visit  on  the 
nineteenth.  Sensing  that  the  occasion 
would  afford  him  the  chance  to  con- 
vince Du  Pont  and  the  leaders  of  the 
Manhattan  Project  that  plutonium 
could  be  produced  in  quantity,  and 
also  that  the  rest  of  the  atomic  pro- 
gram was  feasible  and  of  great  impor- 
tance for  the  war,  he  and  his  scientific 
staff  immediately  had  directed  all  pos- 
sible resources  into  a  twofold  effort: 
completing  as  soon  as  possible  the 
chain  reaction  experiment  under  way 
since  October,  and  preparing  a  report 
to  demonstrate  conclusively  the  feasi- 
bility of  the  plutonium  project.  ^^ 

Unfortunately  the  experiment  was 
still  in  progress  when  the  committee 
arrived,  but  a  hundred-page  feasibility 
report  was  ready  for  study.  This  care- 
fully organized  and  documented 
report  presented  a  most  optimistic  es- 
timate   of    the    situation.     Plutonium 


could  be  produced  in  one  or  more  of 
several  types  of  chain-reacting  piles, 
of  which  a  uranium-graphite  system 
cooled  with  helium,  preferably,  or 
with  ordinary  pure  water  seemed  to 
offer  the  most  practical  solution. 
Also,  chemical  extraction  of  plutoni- 
um in  a  sufficiently  pure  state  to  be 
used  successfully  in  a  bomb  was  feasi- 
ble. Moreover,  this  bomb  would  prob- 
ably be  more  effective  than  previous 
estimate  had  indicated.  Provided  the 
plutonium  project  received  adequate 
support,  the  goal  to  produce  suffi- 
cient fissionable  material  in  1944  and 
to  attain  the  production  stage  in  1945 
should  be  possible.  Report  in  hand, 
the  committee  left  for  Berkeley 
Thanksgiving  evening.  ^^ 

Achievement  of  the  Chain  Reaction 

The  Lewis  reviewing  commitee  re- 
turned from  the  West  Coast  via  Chi- 
cago on  2  December.  Stopping  over 
between  trains,  they  consulted  further 
with  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
staff.  "Lm  sorry,"  Compton  ex- 
plained, "but  Enrico  Fermi  has  an  im- 
portant experiment  in  hand  in  the 
laboratory  and  has  asked  to  be 
excused."  ^^ 

The  "important  experiment"  was, 
of  course,  the  continuing  attempt  to 
achieve  a  controlled  chain  reaction  in 
the  experimental  pile  then  under  con- 
struction at  the  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory. In  October,  after  laboratory  sci- 
entists had  accumulated  a  sufficient 
amount  of  uranium  metal  and  graph- 


'^MPC  Min.  12  Nov  42.  MDR;  DSM  Chronology, 
14  Nov  42,  Sec.  2(0,  and  19  Nov  42,  Sec.  23, 
OROO. 

^^Compion,  Atomic  Qiust,  p.  135. 


"^Ibid.,  pp.  135-36;  Rpt,  Compton,  sub:  Feasibili- 
ty of  "49"  Proj,  26  Nov  42,  OSRD;  Smyth  Report, 
Ch.  6,  especially  pp.  64-65  and  74-76.  Smyth  based 
this  chapter  largely  on  the  feasibility  report. 

"Compton,  Atomic  Qiiest,  p.  140. 


ORGANIZING  FOR  PRODUCTION 


103 


ite  of  requisite  purity,  two  alternating 
teams  began  piling  graphite  blocks  in- 
termixed with  lumps  of  uranium  in  a 
carefully  devised  pattern  atop  a 
timber  framework  on  the  floor  of  a 
squash  court  under  the  West  Stands 
of  Stagg  Field,  the  University  of  Chi- 
cago football  stadium.  When  news  of 
this  ongoing  experiment  reached 
Groves  and  Conant  during  the  14  No- 
vember S-1  meeting,  both  men  ex- 
pressed great  alarm;  however,  but- 
tressed with  evidence  from  several 
tests  carried  out  while  the  pile  was 
under  construction  and  supported  by 
the  senior  scientists  on  his  staff, 
Compton  assured  Groves  and  Conant 
that  the  experiment  posed  no  great 
hazard  to  the  heavily  populated  area 
adjacent  to  the  university.  Although 
Groves  decided  not  to  interfere,  he 
nevertheless  alerted  the  area  engineer 
at  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  to 
inform  him  immediately  of  any  signs 
or  developments  that  indicated  the 
Chicago  scientists  were  underestimat- 
ing the  element  of  danger.  ^^ 

Based  on  the  results  of  earlier  ex- 
periments, the  scientists  constructing 
the  pile  knew  that  when  it  reached  a 
certain  size  it  would  become  critical, 
thus  initiating  what  was  hoped  would 
be  a  self-sustaining  chain  reaction.  To 
prevent  the  possibility  of  premature 
fission  and  also  to  be  able  to  control 
the  reaction  once  it  began,  the  scien- 
tists inserted  several  neutron-absorb- 
ing cadmium  strips  as  control  rods. 
Removal  of  these  control  rods  would 
release  the  flow  of  neutrons  in  the 
lumps  of  uranium  and  permit  the 
chain  reaction  to  begin;  their  reinser- 
tion would  halt  the  process.  Various 
measuring   instruments   also   were   at- 


'» Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  53-54. 


tached  to  or  placed  in  the  pile,  and 
the  whole  setup  was  watched  over  by 
Fermi  and  his  colleagues  with  all  the 
care  and  nervous  intensity  that  so 
unique  and  critical  an  experiment 
inspired. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  1  Decem- 
ber, Fermi's  crew  placed  the  last  lump 
of  uranium  and  layer  of  graphite 
blocks  on  the  pile,  by  now  a  massive 
structure,  essentially  square  in  shape 
and  solid-appearing  from  the  floor  up 
to  about  two-thirds  of  its  height,  and 
from  that  point  to  its  top  near  the 
high  ceiling,  a  series  of  setbacks. 

On  the  morning  of  2  December, 
the  entire  experimental  group  assem- 
bled for  the  crucial  test.  Most  of 
those  present  were  on  the  balcony  of 
the  court,  either  as  observers  or  oper- 
ators of  the  instrument  control  cabi- 
net located  there.  Norman  Bilberry, 
equipped  with  an  axe,  was  prepared 
to  sever  a  rope  tied  to  the  balcony 
rail,  which  would  drop  into  place  an 
emergency  safety  rod  suspended  over 
the  pile.  A  young  scientist  from  the 
laboratory  staff,  George  Weil,  re- 
mained on  the  floor  of  the  court  to 
handle  the  final  control  rod.  On  a 
platform  above  the  pile,  three  men 
stood  ready  to  flood  it  with  a  cadmi- 
um salt  solution,  which  would  absorb 
sufficient  neutrons  to  halt  a  runaway 
reaction  if  the  pile's  other  control 
mechanisms  should  fail.  A  hundred 
feet  away,  behind  two  concrete  walls, 
another  group  monitored  the  test  by 
means  of  instruments  and  an  inter- 
communication system.  Should  any- 
thing go  wrong  on  the  squash  court, 
incapacitating  the  group  there,  the 
"remote  control"  men  could  throw  a 
switch  to  activate  electrically  operated 


104 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


safety  rods  and  halt  the  chain 
reaction. 

In  midmorning,  Fermi  sent  word  to 
Compton  that  the  test  was  about  to 
begin  and  the  Metallurgical  Laborato- 
ry chief,  accompanied  by  Crawford 
Greenewalt,  whom  he  had  selected  as 
the  representative  of  the  Lewis  re- 
viewing committee,  hastened  from 
nearby  Eckhart  Hall  to  the  stadium. 
As  they  arrived,  Fermi  was  testing  the 
pile  systematically.  As  Weil  slowly 
withdrew  the  final  control  rod,  Fermi 
carefully  checked  the  recording  in- 
struments. With  each  foot  the  rod  was 
pulled  out,  the  pile  came  closer  to 
criticality,  and  the  instruments  meas- 
uring the  neutron  activity  clicked 
faster.  By  about  11:30  a.m.  the  grow- 
ing tension  among  the  scientists  in 
the  squash  court  had  become  obvi- 
ous. "I'm  hungry,"  said  Fermi,  sud- 
denly breaking  the  spell.  "Let's  go  to 
lunch." 

Shortly  after  2:00  p.m.  the  tests 
were  resumed.  Faster  and  faster 
clicked  the  neutron  counters  as  the 
control  rod  was  slowly  withdrawn.  At 
about  3:25,  Weil  moved  the  rod  an- 
other foot.  Fermi  made  a  rapid  com- 
putation with  his  slide  rule  and,  turn- 
ing to  Compton,  exclaimed:  "This  is 
going  to  do  it."  As  the  neutron  count 
ran  faster,  it  was  obvious  Fermi  was 
right.  The  rate  of  rise  of  the  count 
was  now  constant.  "The  reaction  is 
self-sustaining,"  announced  Fermi, 
meaning  that  the  slow  fissioning  of 
uranium  atoms  in  the  pile  would  con- 
tinue to  produce  enough  neutrons  to 
keep  the  process  going. 

After  nearly  half  an  hour  of  oper- 
ation, when  the  radiation  around  the 
pile  began  to  rise  to  dangerous  levels, 
Fermi  ordered  the  control  rods  rein- 
serted. The  world's  first   self-sustain- 


ing nuclear  reaction  had  been  initiat- 
ed, allowed  to  run,  and  then  stopped. 
Man  had  accomplished  the  controlled 
release  of  atomic  energy.  ^^ 

Lewis  Reviewing  Committee  Report 

While  practical  demonstration  of  a 
chain  reaction  did  much  to  relieve  the 
hesitancy  of  Du  Pont,  the  company's 
management  was  perhaps  even  more 
encouraged  by  the  report  of  the 
Lewis  reviewing  committee,  submitted 
on  4  December.  On  the  premise  that 
"production  must  be  substantially  25 
kilos  of  '25'  [U-235]  or  15  kilos  of 
'49'  [plutonium]  per  month,"  the 
committee  felt  that  the  diffusion  pro- 
cess had  the  best  chance  of  producing 
enough  fissionable  material  of  the  de- 
sired quality  and,  equally  important, 
that  it  would  probably  be  the  first  to 
attain  full-scale  production.  They 
agreed  that  the  electromagnetic  pro- 
cess was  probably  the  most  immedi- 
ately feasible  of  all  methods  under 
consideration,  but  it  seemed  least 
likely  to  produce  U-235  in  the  quanti- 
ty that  would  be  needed.  Despite 
problems,  the  pile  process  now  had  a 
much  better  chance  of  success  and 
might  even  provide  "the  possibility  of 
earliest  achievement  of  the  desired 
result."  Accordingly,  the  committee 
recommended  construction  of  a  diffu- 


'' Quotations  from  WD  Press  Release,  "Back- 
ground Material  for  L'se  in  Connection  With  Ob- 
servance of  the  Fourth  Anniversary,  December 
Second,  of  the  Scientific  Event  of  Outstanding  Sig- 
nificance in  the  United  States  Program  of  Develop- 
ment of  Atomic  Energv,"  1  Dec  46,  pp.  10-11, 
CMH.  See  also  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  136-43; 
Smyth  Report,  pp.  70  and  177-81;  Enrico  Fermi, 
"The  First  Pile,"  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists  18 
(Dec  62):  19-24.  Many  of  the  other  published  works 
cited  in  this  volume  also  contain  lengthy  descrip- 
tions of  this  event. 


ORGANIZING  FOR  PRODUCTION 


105 


sion  plant,  of  a  pile  pilot  plant  and 
several  full-scale  production  piles, 
and  of  facilities  for  producing  heavy 
water.  It  urged  continued  develop- 
mental work  on  the  electromagnetic 
process,  including  building  a  pilot 
plant  to  produce  small  quantities  of 
U-235  for  use  in  experiments.  Finally, 
the  committee  recommended  that 
companies  with  appropriate  experi- 
ence be  given  the  responsibility  nec- 
essary for  operating  all  these  projects. 
There  no  longer  seemed  any  doubt 
concerning  the  feasibility  of  produc- 
ing sufficient  quantities  of  fissionable 
material.  ^° 

When  the  Military  Policy  Commit- 
tee met  on  10  December  in  General 
Groves's  office,  it  had  before  it  the 
report  of  the  Lewis  reviewing  commit- 
tee. The  effect  of  this  report  and  the 
events  that  had  taken  place  in  Chicago 
a  week  earlier  were  evident.  At  its 
meeting  on  12  November,  the  Mili- 
tary Policy  Committee  had  agreed  to 
proceed  with  the  construction  and  op- 
eration of  a  small  electromagnetic 
separation  plant;  a  pilot  diffusion 
plant  and,  if  practicable,  a  small  pro- 
duction plant;  and  a  plutonium 
plant. ^^  Now  a  month  later,  the  com- 
mittee's decisions  were  far  more  opti- 
mistic. The  pile  method  for  produc- 
ing plutonium,  it  decided,  would  "be 
carried  forward  full  blast."  Design  for 
the  pilot  diffusion  plant  was  well  ad- 
vanced and  construction  of  test  units 
was  already  under  way  at  Columbia 
University.  But  rather  than  await  com- 


pletion of  the  pilot  plant,  the  commit- 
tee decided  that  work  on  the  design 
and  construction  of  a  full-scale  pro- 
duction plant  should  begin  at  once. 
The  electromagnetic  plant  would  be 
comprised  of  only  500  tanks  "in 
order  to  get  the  earliest  possible  pro- 
duction of  material,  even  though  it 
may  be  in  small  quantities."  ^^  Thus, 
the  Military  Policy  Committee  had 
opened  the  way  to  rapid  development 
of  those  processes  that  seemed  most 
likely  to  provide  large-scale  produc- 
tion of  fissionable  materials. 

Contract  Negotiations 

In  rapid  sequence  during  the  next 
few  weeks.  Groves  and  the  Manhattan 
staff  oversaw  negotiation  of  construc- 
tion and  operation  contracts.  The 
first  of  these  was  a  letter  contract  for 
Du  Pont  on  21  December  (effective  as 
of  1  December  1942),  pending  com- 
pletion of  negotiations  for  a  formal 
contract.  It  provided  that  the  com- 
pany secure  designs,  procure  equip- 
ment, and  erect  facilities  for  a  large- 
scale  plutonium  production  plant, 
which  it  would  also  operate.  Although 
the  agreement  of  I  December  super- 
seded the  letter  contract  of  3  Octo- 
ber, which  had  provided  that  Du  Pont 
design  and  procure  equipment  for 
plutonium  pilot  installations,  it  did 
not  specify  that  the  firm  would  build 
a  pilot  plant.  New  location  problems 
had  made  temporary  postponement 
of  settling  this  aspect  expedient. ^^ 


^°  Conclusions  of  Reviewing  Committee,  4  Dec  42, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  334  (Special  Reviewing 
Committee),  MDR.  These  conclusions,  but  without 
the  statistical  analysis  portion,  are  also  in  the  MPC 
Rpt,  15  Dec  42,  MDR.  See  also  Compton,  Atomic 
Quest,  p.  145. 

2>  MPC  Min,  12  Nov  42,  MDR;  Groves  Diarv, 
10  Dec  42,  LRG. 


"  MPC  Mm,  10  Dec  42,  MDR;  MPC  Rpt,  15  Dec 
42,  MDR. 

23  Ltr  Contract  W-7412-eng-l,  1  Dec  42  (accept- 
ed 21  Dec  42),  Tab  B;  Ltr,  E.  B.  Yancey  (Gen  Mgr, 
Explosives  Dept,  Du  Pont)  to  Lt  Col  J.  M.  Harman, 
21  Dec  42,  Incl  to  Memo,  Maj  A.  Tammaro  to  Maj 

Continued 


106 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Du  Pont  did  not  want  to  manufac- 
ture plutonium  after  the  war  and 
made  ckar  it  was  agreeing  to  do  so 
now  only  because  of  the  expressed 
desire  of  the  Army.  Accordingly,  in 
the  cost-plus-fixed-fee  contract,  Du 
Pont  waived  all  profits  and  accepted 
the  assignment  on  the  basis  of  reim- 
bursement for  the  company's  ex- 
penses on  the  project,  plus  a  fixed  fee 
of  $1.00.  However,  arrangements 
were  made  to  protect  the  firm  from 
financial  losses  that  might  arise,  be- 
cause the  hazards  concomitant  to  the 
new  process  were  not  yet  fully  known 
or  understood  and  conceivably  could 
result  in  catastrophic  losses  for  the 
company.  Du  Pont  requested  that  the 
contract  be  submitted  to  the  comp- 
troller general  of  the  United  States 
for  approval,  particularly  the  sections 
covering  reimbursement  and  indemni- 
fication, which  the  company  feared 
might  otherwise  be  upset  by  a  future 
ruling.  General  Groves  agreed  and,  as 
further  assurance  to  Du  Pont,  Vanne- 
var  Bush  also  forwarded  a  letter  to 
President  Roosevelt,  explaining  the 
basis  upon  which  the  government  was 
assuming  responsibility  for  the  unique 
hazards  involved  in  the  project. ^^ 

The  Army  had  to  negotiate  with  a 
number  of  companies  for  design,  con- 
struction, and  operation  of  the  gase- 

Claude  C.  Pierce,  Jr.  (Washington  Liaison  OfTice), 
sub:  Du  Pont  Contract  W-7412-eng-l,  5  Dec  44, 
Tab  G.  Both  in  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves 
Files,  Fldr  19,  MDR.  Copies  of  formal  contract, 
completed  on  8  Nov  43,  on  file  in  OROO.  See  also 
amendments  and  amplifications  to  this  contract, 
same  file,  and  Du  Pont,  Stockholders  Bulletin,  13  Aug 
45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  161  (Du  Pont), 
MDR. 

2*  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  46-59;  Memo, 
sub:  Prelim  Negotiations  .  .  .  ,  Incl  to  Ltr,  De- 
Right  to  Groves,  30  Oct  43,  MDR;  DSM  Chronolo- 
gy, 10  Nov  42,  Sec.  23(b),  OROO;  Compton,  Atomic 
Quest,  pp.  131-34. 


ous  diffusion  plant.  Because  the  M.  W. 
Kellogg  Company  had  been  work- 
ing for  nearly  a  year  on  research  and 
design  for  a  pilot  plant,  the  Military 
Policy  Committee  decided  at  its 
10  December  meeting  that  this  firm 
should  also  design  and  engineer  the 
production  plant.  Hence,  on  the 
twelfth.  General  Groves  requested 
Kellogg  to  act  as  architect-engineer 
for  the  diffusion  project  and,  two  days 
later,  the  company  signed  the  neces- 
sary letter  contract.  To  simplify  oper- 
ations and  for  reasons  of  security, 
Kellogg  created  a  wholly-owned  sub- 
sidiary, the  Kellex  Corporation, ^^  for 
the  project.  After  consulting  with 
Kellex  representatives,  the  Manhattan 
commander  asked  Union  Carbide  and 
Carbon  Corporation  to  operate  the 
plant.  By  late  January,  the  Carbide 
and  Carbon  Chemicals  Corporation — 
a  subsidiary  of  Union  Carbide — had 
signed  a  Manhattan  letter  contract 
and  its  engineers  had  begun  working 
closely  with  Kellex  on  difficult  design 
problems. 

While  earlier  plans  had  called  for 
Stone  and  Webster  to  build  the  diffu- 
sion plant,  it  soon  became  clear  this 
job  would  overburden  the  engineer- 
ing firm's  already  heavily  taxed  re- 
sources. Some  consideration  also  was 
given  to  having  Kellex  construct  the 
plant,  but  Groves  decided  that  organi- 
zation would  have  its  hands  full  with 
the  design  and  engineering  problems. 
Groves  remembered  that  he  had  been 
favorably  impressed  by  the  manage- 
ment, skill,  and  integrity  of  the  J.  A. 
Jones  Construction  Company  of 
Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  which  had 


25  The  name  Kellex  was  derived  from  "Kell"  for 
Kellogg  and  "X"  for  secret. 


ORGANIZING  FOR  PRODUCTION 


107 


built  several  large  camps  for  the 
Army.  The  company  accepted  a  letter 
contract  covering  this  assignment  on 
18  May  1943.26 

Arrangements  already  had  been 
made  for  Stone  and  Webster  to  build 
the  electromagnetic  plant;  however, 
because  project  leaders  had  decided 
that  the  task  of  operating  the  plant 
would  be  beyond  the  firm's  practical 
capabilities,  Groves  offered  the  job  to 
the  Tennessee  Eastman  Corporation, 
a  subsidiary  of  the  Eastman  Kodak 
Company,  which  had  considerable  ex- 
perience in  chemical  processes.  On 
5  January  1943,  Tennessee  Eastman 
informed  Groves  that  it  would  accept 
the  job  and  the  next  day  signed  a 
letter  of  intent,  pending  negotiation 
of  a  formal  contract.  Within  a  few 
days  key  personnel  of  the  company 
went  to  the  Radiation  Laboratory  at 
Berkeley  to  familiarize  themselves 
with  Lawrence's  experimental  electro- 
magnetic separation  units. ^^ 


26MPC  Min,  10  Dec  42  and  21  Jan  43.  MDR; 
DSM  Chronology,  12  Dec  42,  Sec.  4,  28  Dec  42, 
Sec,  15(b),  30  Dec  42,  Sec.  16,  14  Jan  43,  Sec.  2(f). 
OROO;  Groves,  \ow  It  Cati  Be  Told.  pp.  111-12; 
MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  3,  "Design,"  Sec.  3,  Vol.  4,  "Con- 
struction," Sec.  3.  and  Vol.  5,  "Operation,"  pp.  2.1- 
2.4,  DASA.  Copies  of  formal  CPFF  contracts  execut- 
ed with  M.  W.  Kellogg  Co.  on  1 1  Apr  44  (Contract 
W-7405-eng-23,  efTective  14  Dec  42),  with  Carbide 
and  Carbon  Chemicals  Corp.  on  23  Nov  43  (Con- 
tract W-7405-eng-26,  efTective  18  Jan  43),  and  with 
J.  A.Jones  Construction  Co.  on  2  Mar  44  (Contract 
W-7421-eng-ll,  effective  18  May  43)  on  file  in 
OROO.  See  also  l.ist.  sub:  Signed  Prime  and  Sub- 
contracts Over  $100,000,  Incl  to  Memo,  1.1  Col  K. 
H.  Marsden  (Ex  Off,  MD)  to  Groves,  31  Aug  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  161,  MDR. 

"  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  96-97;  DSM 
Chronology,  28  Dec  42,  Sec.  2(e),  OROO;  MDH, 
Bk  5,  Vol.  6,  "Operation,"  Sec.  2,  DASA.  Groves 
Diarv,  30-31  Dec  42  and  5  Jan  43,  l.RG.  Copv  of 
formal  CPFF  contract  executed  with  Tennessee 
Kastman  Corp.  on  7  Jun  43  (Contract  W-7401-eng- 
23,  effective  6  Jan  43)  on  file  in  OROO. 


Upon  examining  the  plans  for  vari- 
ous types  of  piles  at  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  in  early  November  1942, 
Du  Pont  engineers  had  rated  the  pile 
with  a  heavy  water  moderator  second 
only  to  the  helium-cooled  graphite 
pile.  It  now  appeared  to  be  the  logical 
choice  "as  a  second  line  of  defense" 
in  case  the  graphite  pile  should  fail. 
Accordingly,  Du  Pont  recommended 
that  the  Manhattan  commander  take 
immediate  steps  to  increase  the 
monthly  production  of  heavy  water  to 
approximately  3  tons  per  month:  0.5 
tons  to  be  produced  by  the  electrolyt- 
ic process  at  the  Trail  plant  already 
under  construction,  and  2.5  tons  by 
the  distillation  process  at  new  plants 
to  be  built  by  Du  Pont  as  adjuncts  to 
ammonia-producing  facilities  already 
under  construction  by  the  company  at 
government-owned  ordnance  plants. 
(At  the  request  of  the  S-1  Committee, 
Du  Pont  earlier  had  investigated  and 
ascertained  the  practicability  of  em- 
ploying the  distillation  process  to 
produce  heavy  water.)  ^^ 

Both  the  Military  Policy  and  S-1 
Committees  endorsed  Du  Pont's  rec- 
ommendations. Under  the  terms  of  a 
letter  contract  of  16  November,  Du 
Pont  agreed  "to  select  a  process  and 
provide  facilities  for  the  production  of 
heavy  water  in  order  to  make  avail- 
able a  supply  of  this  material  at  the 
earliest  possible  date."  ^^  Groves  au- 
thorized the  company  to  expand  fa- 
cilities under  construction  at  Morgan- 
town  Ordnance  W'orks,  near  Morgan- 


's DSM  Chronologv,  10  Nov  42.  Sec.  23(i),  and 
14  Nov  42.  Sec.  2(0(k-m),  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  3, 
"The  P-9  Project,"  p.  2.4,  DASA. 

29  Copv  of  I.tr  Contract  W-74  12-eng-4,  16  Nov 
42,  on  file  in  OROO.  See  also  MPC  Min,  12  Nov 
42.  MDR. 


108 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


town,  West  Virginia;  the  Wabash 
River  Ordnance  Works,  adjacent  to 
Newport,  Indiana;  and  the  Alabama 
Ordnance  Works,  near  Sylacauga, 
Alabama.  {See  Map  2.)  Du  Pont  would 
build  and  operate  the  facilities, 
making  as  extensive  use  as  possible  of 
existing  steam  plants  and  other  instal- 
lations. Because  Du  Pont  already  had 
contracts  with  the  Army's  Ordnance 
Department  for  construction  and  op- 
eration of  munitions-making  facilities 
at  each  of  these  ordnance  plants,  it 
was  agreed  the  additional  work  could 
be  covered  by  supplements  to  these 
contracts,  thus  eliminating  the  need 
for  the  Manhattan  chief  to  negotiate 
new  agreements.  Nevertheless,  for 
reasons  of  security,  each  heavy  water 
plant  was  to  be  built  and  operated 
almost  entirely  under  the  immediate 
supervision  of  the  local  area  engineer 
and  general  supervision  of  the  Man- 
hattan District.  The  Ordnance  De- 
partment, in  Colonel  Marshall's 
words,  was  "not  to  be  involved  in  the 
design  or  knowledge  of  use  of  the 
product."  ^° 

Hanford  Engineer  Works 

Until  November  1942,  project  lead- 
ers had  assumed  that  the  main  pluto- 
nium     production     plant     would     be 


30Di.st  Engr,  Monlhlv  Rpt  on  DSM  Proj,  21  Jan 
43,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  28,  Tab 
A,  MDR,  DSM  Chronolog>,  29  Dec  42,  Sec.  4, 
OROO;  Memo,  Brig  Gen  R.  F.  Handy  (Asst,  OCO) 
to  Maj  G.  W.  Boush  (Ord  Ammo  Prod  Office),  sub; 
New  Goustr  at  Alabama  Ord  Works  .  .  .  ,  13  Jan  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  161  (Du  Ponl),  MDR; 
Memos,  Handy  to  Alabama,  Morgantown,  and 
Wabash  River  Ord  Works  CO's,  sub:  New  Constr  at 
Alabama  [and  other]  Ord  Works,  1  Jan  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp.  600.1  (Constr),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk. 
3,  Sees.  2-3.  DA.SA;  Groves  Ms,  pp.  214-15,  CMH. 


located  at  the  Tennessee  site.^^  How- 
ever, Du  Pont  was  greatly  concerned 
about  the  hazards  of  manufacturing 
plutonium  on  a  large  scale.  An  atomic 
explosion  might  devastate  an  area 
surrounding  a  plant  and  send  a  lethal 
cloud  of  radioactive  dust  and  gases 
over  a  much  larger  zone.  Such  an  ex- 
plosion less  than  20  miles  from  Knox- 
ville  could  be  a  catastrophic  disaster. 
Groves  himself  already  had  qualms 
about  placing  a  hazardous  operation 
adjacent  to  electromagnetic  and  gase- 
ous diffusion  plants  and  near  other 
important  war  production  facilities  in 
the  Tennessee  Valley  Authority 
(TVA)  region.  Even  if  the  physical  ef- 
fects were  limited,  an  explosion 
would  compromise  the  security  of  the 
whole  project.  If  the  plant  were  to  be 
built  at  the  Tennessee  site,  more  land 
than  originally  contemplated  would 
have  to  be  acquired,  a  time-consum- 
ing process.  Furthermore,  there  was  a 
strong  possibility  that  a  power  and 
labor  shortage  in  the  TVA  area  might 


*'  Section  based  on  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be  Told, 
pp.  69-77:  DSM  Chronology,  Nov  42-Jan  43, 
passim,  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  3,  "Design,"  Sec. 
2,  and  Vol.  4,  "Land  Acquisition,"  Sees.  1-2,  DASA. 
Diary  of  Col  Franklin  T.  Matthias  (hereafter  cited  as 
Matthias  Diary),  prior  to  1  Feb  43,  OROO;  Rpt,  Du 
Pont,  sub:  Special  Investigation  of  Plant  Site  Loca- 
tion, 2  Jan  43,  Incl  to  Ltr,  E.  G.  Ackart  (Engr  Dept 
chief,  E)u  Pont)  to  Groves,  sub:  Pio  9536.  5  Jan  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.03,  MDR;  Rpt,  OCE, 
sub:  Basic  Data  on  Hanford  Engr  Works,  19  May 
43,  same  files,  601  (Hanford),  MDR;  Ltr,  Robins 
(Act  Chief  of  Engrs)  to  CG  SOS,  sub:  Acquisition  of 
Land  for  Cable  Proj,  Pasco.  Wash.,  8  Feb  43,  Incl  to 
Memo,  O'Brien  to  I.t  Col  Whitney  Ashbridge  (CE 
Mil  Constr  Br),  sub:  Land  Acquisition  in  Connection 
With  MD,  17  Apr  43,  same  files,  601  (Santa  Fe), 
MDR;  Smyth  Report,  p.  81;  MPC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42, 
MDR;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  166;  Ltr,  Groves  to 
Herbert  S.  Marks  (Power  Div,  WPB),  7  Feb  43,  and 
related  correspondence.  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
675,  MDR. 


ORGANIZING  FOR  PRODUCTION 


109 


interfere  with  construction  and  oper- 
ation of  the  plutonium  plant. 

All  of  these  factors  entered  into  the 
decision  of  the  Military  Policy  Com- 
mittee on  10  December  that  "a  new 
plant  site  [for  plutonium  production] 
will  have  to  be  selected  in  an  isolated 
area,  but  near  power  and  water."  ^^ 
Groves  sent  Colonel  Nichols  and  Lt. 
Col.  Franklin  T.  Matthias  to  Wilming- 
ton on  the  fourteenth  to  discuss 
choice  of  a  new  site  with  Du  Pont  of- 
ficials and  with  Compton  and  other 
representatives  of  the  Chicago 
project.  Matthias,  an  experienced  civil 
engineer  in  civilian  life,  had  been 
working  with  Groves  on  various  prob- 
lems, including  the  atomic  energy 
program,  and,  while  he  had  not  yet 
been  officially  assigned  to  the  Man- 
hattan District,  he  was  Groves's  tenta- 
tive choice  for  the  key  position  of 
area  engineer  on  the  plutonium 
project.  The  Wilmington  conference 
concentrated  on  developing  guide- 
lines, with  the  main  emphasis  on 
safety  limitations,  for  the  new  site. 
When  Matthias  returned,  Groves  di- 
rected him  to  make  an  inquiry  con- 
cerning sites  where  sufficient  electrici- 
ty would  be  available. 

Matthias  consulted  first  with  those 
Corps  of  Engineers  officials  whom 
Groves  had  indicated  would  know  a 
great  deal  about  the  wartime  power 
situation.  As  a  result,  when  he  sat 
down  with  Groves  and  two  Du  Pont 
officials  on  16  December  to  draw  up 
more  specific  plans,  he  had  consider- 
able information  about  potential  sites. 
The  precise  criteria  that  emerged 
from  this  discussion  indicated  that  the 
site  selected  would  have  to  be  rela- 
tively large,  isolated  from  centers  of 


32MPC  Min,  10  Dec  42.  MDR. 


population,  easily  acquired,  and  with 
access  to  a  large  amount  of  water  and 
power.  Based  on  the  estimated  space 
needed  for  six  atomic  piles  and  three 
separation  plants,  an  area  12  by  16 
miles  would  be  necessary  for  the  pro- 
duction facilities  alone.  This  amount 
of  space  would  allow  for  contingen- 
cies well  beyond  the  then  anticipated 
requirements.  It  would  permit  a  dis- 
tance of  1  mile  between  each  of  the 
piles  and  4  miles  between  each  of  the 
separation  plants.  Laboratories  would 
have  to  be  at  least  8  miles  away  from 
these  separation  plants,  and  the  work- 
ers' village  and  nearest  railroad  or 
highway  at  least  10  miles  away.  About 
100,000  kilowatts  of  continuous 
power  would  be  required,  as  well  as 
25,000  gallons  of  water  (preferably 
soft)  per  minute  for  use  in  cooling 
the  piles.  A  relatively  mild  climate, 
level  terrain,  a  ready  supply  of  sand 
and  gravel,  and  ground  and  subsur- 
face conditions  favorable  for  heavy 
construction  were  also  desirable  for 
speed  and  economy  in  building  the 
various  facilities.  And  finally,  along 
with  other  considerations,  an  area  of 
comparatively  low  land  values  would 
reduce  costs  and  facilitate  acquisition. 
As  Groves,  Matthias,  and  the  two 
Du  Pont  representatives  visualized  it, 
the  site  would  contain  at  least  700 
square  miles,  with  no  main  highway 
or  railroad  traversing  it.  This  central 
area  would  consist  of  a  restricted 
zone,  24  by  28  miles  in  size,  in  the 
center  of  which  would  be  a  12-  by  16- 
mile  plant  area.  If  possible,  the  site 
should  be  centered  in  a  sparsely  pop- 
ulated area,  44  by  48  miles  in  size, 
with  no  towns  of  more  than  one  thou- 
sand inhabitants.  The  outer  10  miles 
of  this  last-named  area  would  consti- 


110 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


tute  a  buffer  zone  from  which  all  resi- 
dents would  be  removed,  although  it 
would  not  necessarily  have  to  be  pur- 
chased by  the  government. 

Groves  favored  the  Pacific  North- 
west, convenient  to  the  growing 
power  resources  of  the  great  Bonne- 
ville Power  Administration  (BPA)  on 
the  Columbia  River.  {See  Map  2.)  In 
this  he  was  supported  by  Brig.  Gen. 
Thomas  M.  Robins,  the  assistant  chief 
of  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  and  Carl 
H.  Giroux,  the  Corps'  chief  power 
expert,  who  also  suggested  possible 
sites  in  the  southwest  as  alternate 
choices. 

Matthias  and  the  Du  Pont  repre- 
sentatives investigated  possible  site 
locations  from  the  California-Arizona 
border  near  Hoover  Dam  to  the  great 
Grand  Coulee  Dam  in  northeast  cen- 
tral Washington.  They  checked  a 
score  of  potential  locations  and  stud- 
ied maps  and  detailed  reports  pre- 
pared by  the  Los  Angeles,  Sacramen- 
to, and  Seattle  district  engineers. 
Four  sites  appeared  promising:  two  in 
Washington — one  near  Grand  Coulee 
Dam  and  the  other  in  the  vicinity  of 
Hanford,  a  community  in  the  south 
central  part  of  the  state;  a  third  on 
the  Pit  River,  near  the  almost  com- 
pleted Shasta  Dam  in  northern  Cali- 
fornia; and  the  last  on  the  California- 
Arizona  border  in  the  Needles-Blythe 
area,  easily  accessible  to  power  from 
Hoover  Dam.  Because  Matthias  and 
his  colleagues  strongly  favored  the 
Hanford  location.  General  Groves 
directed  Col.  John  J.  O'Brien,  head  of 
the  Engineers'  Real  Estate  Branch,  to 
begin  a  preliminary  appraisal  of  the 
site.  Meanwhile,  Groves  also  made  a 
personal  inspection  of  the  area  on 
16  January  1943  and  gave  it  his 
approval. 


Before  asking  for  War  Department 
authorization  for  acquisition  of  the 
Hanford  site.  Groves  sought  and  re- 
ceived the  BPA's  assurance  that  it 
could  provide  adequate  power  when 
needed.  The  site  selection  team  had 
found  that  the  BPA's  only  recently 
completed  trunk  transmission  line 
running  between  Grand  Coulee  and 
Bonneville  Dams  traversed  the  west- 
ern portion  of  the  projected  Hanford 
site,  with  a  major  substation  located 
at  Midway,  just  outside  the  site  area. 
This  meant  that  a  connection  into  the 
BPA  system  could  be  made  quickly, 
guaranteeing  an  initial  power  supply 
for  plant  operations  as  soon  as 
needed. 

The  Hanford  Engineer  Works,  as 
the  plutonium  production  site  was 
designated  officially,  comprised  about 
670  square  miles  (slightly  smaller 
than  contemplated)  in  an  isolated  part 
of  the  south  central  Washington 
region  near  the  confluence  of  the  Co- 
lumbia and  Yakima  Rivers.  It  lay  pri- 
marily in  Benton  County,  but  also  in- 
cluded parts  of  Yakima,  Grant, 
Adams,  and  Franklin  Counties.  Very 
sparsely  settled,  the  site  included  only 
three  tiny  communities:  Hanford, 
White  Bluffs,  and  Richland.  A  few 
miles  to  the  southeast  was  the  larger 
town  of  Pasco,  an  important  rail 
center.  Yakima,  some  20  miles  to  the 
west,  was  a  small  city  serving  as  a 
trade  center  for  a  surrounding  rich 
agricultural  area. 

The  major  population  centers  of 
Seattle,  Tacoma,  Portland,  and  Spo- 
kane were  all  more  than  100  miles 
distant.  The  Columbia  River  provided 
ample  cold  water  of  unusually  high 
purity  for  cooling;  the  terrain  and  cli- 
mate  were    close    to    ideal.    Bounded 


ORGANIZING  FOR  PRODUCTION 


111 


generally  on  the  south  by  the  Yakima 
River,  on  the  east  and  north  by  the 
Columbia,  and  on  the  west  and  south- 
west by  a  steep  3,500-foot  ridge  line, 
the  site  was,  for  the  most  part,  flat  or 
slightly  rolling,  with  only  the  1,000- 
foot-high  Gable  Mountain  rising  to 
the  north  from  the  otherwise  unbro- 
ken terrain.  Excellent  rail  transporta- 
tion lines  ran  nearby  and  a  fairly  ex- 
tensive, existing  road  system  could  be 
extended  without  much  difficulty  over 
the  level  terrain. 

The  shape  of  the  site  was  irregular, 
but  roughly  circular,  extending  on  a 
north-south  line  about  37  miles  at  its 
widest  point  and  with  a  maximum 
east-west  breadth  of  about  26  miles. 
The  tentative  plan  called  for  purchase 
of  a  little  less  than  half  of  the  land 
and  for  lease  of  the  remainder.  The 
outer  10-mile  security  buffer  zone  was 
no  longer  considered  necessary,  but 
two  smaller  areas  totaling  some  60 
square  miles,  adjacent  to  an  impor- 
tant sector  of  the  site,  were  to  be 
leased  for  security  purposes.  The  esti- 
mated cost  of  acquiring  the  entire  site 
was  slightly  over  $5  million. 

With  Under  Secretary  of  War  Pat- 
terson's approval  on  9  February,  ac- 
quisition began  immediately.  By  late 
spring  much  had  been  acquired,  but 
gaining  control  of  the  entire  site 
would  be  a  long  process.  Had  Gen- 
eral Groves  been  able  to  foresee  the 
troubles  that  lay  ahead,  he  might  well 
have  selected  another  site.^^ 


Plutonium  Semiworks:  Argonne 
vs.    Tennessee 

The  decision  to  shift  the  site  of  the 
main  plutonium  production  plant 
from  Tennessee  to  the  Pacific  North- 
west threw  open  to  question  once 
again  the  location  of  the  semiworks 
for  the  pile  process.^'*  In  December 
1942,  after  learning  that  the  main 
production  facilities  probably  would 
not  be  built  at  the  Tennessee  site, 
Arthur  Compton  and  his  Metallurgi- 
cal Laboratory  staff  favored  going 
back  to  the  original  plan  of  centering 
plutonium  experimentation,  testing, 
and  pilot  plant  production  of  fission- 
able material  at  the  conveniently  situ- 
ated Argonne  Forest  site.^^  {See  Map  2.) 
But  Du  Pont,  having  full  respon- 
sibility for  the  plutonium  program, 
strongly  opposed  this  alternative.  Du 
Pont  engineers  placed  considerable 
emphasis  on  the  hazards  involved  in 
setting    up    operations    near    a    large 


^^  See  Ch.  XV  for  a  detailed  account  of  land 
quisition  at  the  Hanford  site. 


^^  A  semiworks  is  a  developmental  plant  in  which 
the  equipment  and  the  amounts  of  materials  used 
are  larger  than  those  employed  in  regular  laboratory 
research.  In  the  context  of  this  discussion,  the  term 
semiworks  refers  to  the  intermediate  stage  for  trans- 
forming research  data  into  a  large-scale  production 
process.  See  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  1,  "General  Fea- 
tures," App.  A3,  and  Vol.  2,  "Research,"  Pt.  2,  pp. 
2.1-2.3,  DASA. 

^^  Subsection  based  on  Compton,  Atomic  Quest, 
pp.  150-52  and  170-72;  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told, 
pp.  68-69;  DSM  Chronology,  13-14  Sep  42,  each 
Sec.  2(a),  OROO;  ibid.,  6,  8-9  Jan  43,  each  Sec.  3. 
OROO;  ibid.,  16  Jan  43,  Sec.  5,  OROO;  Min.  Tech 
Council,  10  and  28  Dec  42  (Rpt  CS-371),  ANL; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Aw  World,  pp.  190-91; 
Supp.  No.  1,4  Jan  43.  to  Ltr  Contract  W-7412- 
eng-1,  1  Dec  42,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves 
Files,  Fldr  19,  Tab  B,  MDR;  Completion  Rpt,  Du 
Pont,  sub:  Clinton  Engr  Works,  TNX  Area,  Contract 
W-7412-eng-23,  1  Apr  44,  p.  2,  OROO;  Ltr,  Wil- 
liams to  Yancey,  12  Jan  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp, 337  (Univ  of  Chicago),  MDR;  Groves  Diary,  9- 
11  and  16  Jan  43,  LRG;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  2, 
pp.  3.1-3.2,  DASA. 


112 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


metropolitan  area;  they  did  not  think 
there  would  be  enough  room  at  the 
Argonne  site;  and  they  also  saw  cer- 
tain disadvantages  in  having  the 
semiworks  readily  accessible. 

Du  Pont  also  objected  to  the  Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory  staff  assuming  it 
could  dictate  plans  and  policies  on 
matters  that  the  company  held  to  be 
its  own  prerogatives.  Compton  had 
already  detailed  physicist  Martin  D. 
Whitaker,  who  had  worked  with  Fermi 
on  the  first  pile,  and  other  staff  mem- 
bers to  supervise  development  of  re- 
search facilities  that  would  operate  in 
connection  with  the  semiworks.  Du 
Pont,  however,  had  a  long-established 
policy  that  a  research  staff  must  not 
be  permitted  to  exert  too  much  con- 
trol over  the  design  and  construction 
phases  of  a  project.  When  this  hap- 
pened, the  company  had  found,  the 
staff  had  a  tendency  to  keep  making 
changes  that  seriously  interfered  with 
construction  progress.  In  the  world  of 
industry,  Du  Pont  felt,  the  research 
laboratory  was  the  servant  of  manage- 
ment, not  its  master. 

General  Groves  realized  that  if  the 
differences  between  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  scientists  and  the  Du  Pont 
industrial  engineers  could  not  soon 
be  resolved,  there  was  serious  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  they  would  ever 
function  efficiently  as  a  team.  From 
the  Army's  point  of  view,  achievement 
of  a  harmonious  working  agreement 
on  the  design,  construction,  and  loca- 
tion of  the  semiworks  was  crucial,  not 
only  for  present  operations  but  also 
for  future  plans  regarding  the  main 
production  plant.  Now  that  Du  Pont 
had  made  significant  progress  on  its 
design  and  procurement  of  essential 
equipment  for  the  works,  both  Groves 
and  Du  Pont  officials  felt  that  no  fur- 


ther delays  could  be  tolerated.  Fur- 
thermore, the  efforts  of  Crawford 
Greenewalt,  Du  Pont's  liaison  repre- 
sentative, to  establish  an  agreement 
with  the  Chicago  scientists  had  not 
been  too  successful.  Consequently,  on 
4  January  1943,  Du  Pont  accepted  the 
Army's  alternative  solution  that  the 
company  design  and  construct  the 
buildings  to  house  the  pilot  pile  and 
chemical  separation  facilities. 

The  Army-Du  Pont  agreement, 
however,  still  left  the  question  of  the 
location  of  the  semiworks  unsettled, 
and  this  issue  was  the  main  item  on 
the  agenda  of  a  conference  held  in 
Wilmington  on  6  January.  Hoping  to 
get  a  prompt  decision.  General 
Groves  sent  two  of  his  ablest  officers 
from  District  headquarters — Colonel 
Nichols  and  Lt.  Col.  E.  H.  Marsden — 
to  assist  the  area  engineer  at  Wilming- 
ton, Maj.  William  L.  Sapper,  in  pre- 
senting the  Army's  views  to  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Du  Pont  and  the  Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory.  The  Manhattan 
chief's  strategy  succeeded;  the  meet- 
ing closed  with  a  tentative  agreement 
that  the  semiworks  be  erected  at  the 
Tennessee  site. 

The  tentative  agreement  almost, 
but  not  quite,  settled  the  issue.  Under 
a  previous  agreement  governing  rela- 
tions between  Du  Pont  and  the  Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory,  all  important  de- 
cisions had  to  receive  final  approval 
from  both  Compton  and  Greenewalt. 
Greenewalt's  assent  was  a  foregone 
conclusion,  but  Groves  knew  that 
Compton  was  not  likely  to  give  in 
without  at  least  an  effort  to  salvage 
something  for  the  Argonne  site.  In 
anticipation  of  this,  he  sent  Colonel 
Nichols  to  Chicago. 


ORGANIZING  FOR  PRODUCTION 

■.Mtm 


113 


Col.  E.  H.  Marsden  ( 1946  photograph).  Marsden  became  executive  officer  of  the 
Manhattan  District  in  July  1943. 


Conferring  with  Compton  and  his 
assistant,  Norman  Hilberry,  Colonel 
Nichols  stressed  the  greater  safety  of 
the  Tennessee  site.  Nichols's  argu- 
ment, however,  failed  to  alter  Comp- 
ton's  conviction  that  the  Argonne  site 
was  adequately  safe  and  eminently 
suitable.  Furthermore,  he  contended, 
to  shift  to  Tennessee  now  would  be  a 
severe  blow  to  the  morale  of  his  labo- 
ratory staff.  The  Metallurgical  Labo- 
ratory did  not  have  enough  scientists 
and  technicians  to  staff  another  major 
research  center  in  addition  to  those  at 
Chicago  and  Argonne.  If  the  decision 
was  going  to  be  to  erect  the 
semiworks  in  Tennessee,  Compton 
concluded,  then  the  Argonne  Labora- 
tory should  be  authorized  to  build  for 
its  own  use  a  pile  of  sufficient  size  to 


produce  the  supply  of  plutonium  it 
needed  for  experimental  purposes. 

Nichols  suggested  to  Groves  that  a 
meeting  between  Compton  and  Roger 
Williams,  head  of  Du  Font's  TNX  Di- 
vision (the  company's  special  organi- 
zation for  carrying  out  its  atomic 
energy  program  commitments),  might 
pave  the  way  to  an  agreement.  Sens- 
ing that  the  time  had  arrived  for  deci- 
sive action  on  his  part.  Groves  imme- 
diately arranged  to  meet  with  Wil- 
liams, Compton,  Hilberry,  and  Fermi 
on  11  January  in  Chicago.  Colonel 
Marshall  also  came  from  District 
headquarters  in  New  York  to  assist  in 
pressing  for  a  decision. 

The  meeting  opened  with  Williams 
reiterating  Du  Font's  opposition  to 
Argonne.  Then  the  group  considered 


114 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


alternative  sites.  Williams  warned  that 
a  site  other  than  Tennessee  or  Ar- 
gonne  would  result  in  a  further  seri- 
ous delay.  Location  at  Hanford,  for 
example,  would  require  too  much 
time,  would  very  likely  interfere  with 
construction  of  the  production  facili- 
ties, and  would  place  the  installation 
too  far  away  from  Wilmington  and 
Chicago.  Finally,  with  Compton  still 
reluctant,  the  group  agreed  that  the 
semiworks  should  be  built  in 
Tennessee. 

The  question  of  who  would  operate 
the  semiworks  also  came  up  for  dis- 
cussion at  the  Chicago  meeting. 
Taking  advantage  of  Williams's  pres- 
ence, both  Groves  and  Compton  pro- 
posed that  Du  Pont  operate  as  well  as 
build  the  semiworks.  But  Williams, 
pleading  lack  of  authority,  avoided 
making  a  commitment. 

The  next  opportunity  for  discussing 
the  semiworks  problem  came  at  a 
conference  on  pile  project  policies, 
held  in  Wilmington  on  16  January. 
General  Groves  was  away  on  an  in- 
spection trip  at  the  Hanford  site,  but 
Colonel  Nichols  and  Maj.  Arthur  V. 
Peterson,  the  Chicago  area  engineer, 
were  on  hand.  Compton,  accompa- 
nied by  Hilberry  and  Whitaker,  came 
determined  to  persuade  Du  Pont  that, 
as  builder  and  operator  of  the  main 
production  plant,  it  logically  should 
also  perform  both  these  functions  for 
the  semiworks.  But  Williams,  acting 
again  as  spokesman  for  a  strong  Du 
Pont  delegation,  had  ready  some  ef- 
fective counterarguments.  In  perfect- 
ing any  new  technical  process,  he 
pointed  out,  Du  Pont  always  left  op- 
eration of  the  experimental  plant 
stage  to  the  research  staff.  Further- 
more, WiUiams  continued,  Du  Pont 
felt  especially  unqualified  to  operate 


the  semiworks  because  it  involved 
major  processes  entirely  outside  the 
field  of  chemistry,  the  company's 
normal  area  of  specialization.  Wil- 
liams thus  proposed  that  the  Universi- 
ty of  Chicago  operate  the  semiworks 
and  Du  Pont  furnish  the  university 
with  engineers,  accountants,  and  simi- 
lar personnel. 

Compton  obviously  was  profoundly 
shocked  by  Williams's  proposal.  Nei- 
ther in  terms  of  its  fundamental  pur- 
pose nor  of  its  proper  function,  he 
said,  could  a  university  operate  an  es- 
sentially industrial  enterprise  at  a  lo- 
cation some  500  miles  from  its 
campus.  The  Du  Pont  representatives 
countered  with  the  observation  that 
the  university  would  be  performing  at 
least  one  appropriate  function:  edu- 
cating company  personnel  in  the  spe- 
cial art  of  making  plutonium.  Comp- 
ton knew  that  the  Army  would  prefer 
not  having  Du  Pont  take  on  operation 
of  the  semiworks  because  it  believed 
the  firm's  resources  would  be  taxed 
to  the  limit  in  building  and  operating 
the  plutonium  production  plant  and 
in  carrying  out  its  other  war  con- 
tracts. He  agreed  to  consult  with 
Conant  in  Washington,  D.C.,  and 
with  the  administration  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Chicago. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that 
Compton  still  held  serious  reserva- 
tions on  the  task  of  operating  the 
semiworks.  He  was  even  more  dubi- 
ous that  the  University  of  Chicago  ad- 
ministration could  be  persuaded  to 
agree  to  the  task.  Conant  gave  him  no 
encouragement;  the  Harvard  presi- 
dent took  a  dim  view  of  a  university 
running  an  industrial  plant.  Hence, 
perhaps  no  one  was  more  relieved 
than  Compton  when  the  University  of 


ORGANIZING  FOR  PRODUCTION 


115 


Chicago  agreed  to  accept  a  contract 
for  operation  of  the  plutonium 
semiworks.  An  exchange  of  letters  be- 
tween Groves  and  University  of  Chi- 
cago President  Robert  Maynard 
Hutchins  in  March  1943  provided  the 
necessary  formal  agreement  for  nego- 
tiation of  a  War  Department  contract. 
Hutchins,  who  happened  to  be  absent 
from  the  campus  at  the  time  the 
actual  decision  was  made,  remarked 
to  Compton  the  next  time  he  saw  him 
on  the  street:  "I  see,  Arthur,  that 
while  I  was  gone  you  doubled  the  size 
of  my  university."  ^^ 

For  General  Groves,  successful  res- 
olution of  the  plutonium  semiworks 
problem  was  a  major  administrative 
achievement.  As  the  program  devel- 
oped, this  accompHshment  set  the 
standard  for  future  cooperation  be- 
tween Du  Pont  and  Compton's  pluto- 
nium research  and  development  ac- 
tivities— a  key  factor  in  working  out 
the  far  more  complex  problems  of 
building  and  operating  the  great  plu- 
tonium production  works  at  Hanford. 

Program  Funding 

As  the  size  and  complexity  of  the 
atomic  energy  program  increased,  the 


^®  Quoted  in  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  172-74. 
See  also  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpt  on  DSM  Proj,  21 
Jan  43,  MDR.  In  his  report  the  district  engineer  al- 
ready refers  to  the  University  of  Chicago  as  the  "op- 
erator" of  the  plutonium  semiworks,  more  than  six 
weeks  before  the  university  had  formally  agreed  to 
take  this  responsibility.  Other  items  pertinent  to 
negotiation  of  the  semiworks  operation  contract  are 
Ltr,  Conant  to  Compton,  4  Mar  43,  OSRD;  Ltrs, 
Groves  to  Hutchins,  10  Mar  43,  and  Hutchins  to 
Groves,  16  Mar  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  161, 
MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  1,  p.  2.3,  and  Ft.  2, 
pp.  3.1-3.2,  DASA;  WD-Univ  of  Chicago  Contract 
W-7405-eng-39,  1  May  43,  OROO,  with  pertinent 
extracts  found  in  Cert  of  Audit  MDE  179-46,  E.  I. 
du  Pont  de  Nemours  and  Co.,  30  Jun  46,  Fiscal  and 
Audit  Files,  Cert  of  Audit  (Sup),  MDR. 


Army  had  to  face  the  problem  of  ad- 
ditional funding.  The  decision  to  de- 
velop four  processes  was  obviously 
going  to  cost  a  great  deal  more  than 
could  be  covered  by  the  original  fi- 
nancial commitment.  A  few  days  after 
Groves  took  command  of  the  Manhat- 
tan Project  in  September  1942,  Colo- 
nel Marshall  discussed  with  him  the 
necessity  for  speed  in  appropriating 
the  remainder  of  the  $85  million  ear- 
lier approved  for  the  program.  Only 
$38  million  had  actually  been  allocat- 
ed during  the  summer,  and  the  rest 
would  soon  be  needed.  Groves,  how- 
ever, did  not  take  any  immediate 
action.  In  early  November,  Marshall 
again  raised  this  question  but  now  re- 
ported that  future  needs  would  total 
around  $400  milHon.  Agreeing  with 
this  estimate.  Groves  earmarked  the 
remainder  of  the  $85  million  for  the 
Manhattan  Project  and  laid  the 
groundwork  for  a  drastic  increase  in 
its  funding. 

On  15  December,  the  Military 
Policy  Committee  forwarded  the  $400 
million  estimate  to  the  President,  rec- 
ommending that  the  necessary  addi- 
tional funds  be  made  available  early 
in  1943.  Also,  the  committee  urged 
that  General  Reybold,  the  Engineers 
chief,  be  authorized  to  enter  into  con- 
tractual obligations  beyond  the  funds 
then  under  his  control,  should  obsta- 
cles arise  to  prevent  an  early  appro- 
priation of  additional  money. 

Roosevelt  approved  the  commit- 
tee's recommendations,  and  prepara- 
tions were  begun  to  secure  the  funds 
confidentially  within  regular  Army  ap- 
propriations. By  April  1943,  the  need 
for  General  Reybold  to  exercise  his 
authority  to  spend  additional  money 
was  clear.  Some  $50  million  would  be 


116 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


required  by  the  end  of  June  and  an 
additional  $286  million  within  an- 
other six  months.  In  late  May,  Gener- 
al Somervell,  the  Army  Service  Forces 
commander, ^"^  authorized  Reybold  to 
make  available  to  the  Manhattan 
Project  $300  million  from  engineer 
funds;  however,  by  this  time,  an  addi- 
tional $400  million  was  needed  to 
carry  the  project  through  to  the  end 
of  1944.  This  sum,  too,  was  soon 
made  available  under  disguised  pur- 
poses in  the  Military  Appropriations 
Act  of  1944.  At  least  for  the  immedi- 
ate future,  it  appeared  fiscal  require- 
ments had  been  met.  When  the  prob- 
lem rose  again  in  the  following  year, 
new  means  would  have  to  be  devised 
to  solve  it.^® 

By  spring  of  1943,  approximately 
six  months  after  General  Groves's  as- 
signment to  the  Manhattan  Project, 
major  advances  in  the  atomic  pro- 
gram provided  more  promise  than  at 
any    time   in    the   past    of  success    in 


^^  Initially  called  the  Services  of  Supply  (SOS), 
the  name  was  changed  to  Army  Service  Forces 
(ASF)  by  WD  GO  14,  12  Mar  43. 

^^  Correspondence  (Sep  42-May  43)  on  this  sub- 
ject filed  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  110  (Appro- 
priations), MDR.  See  also  MPC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42, 
MDR;  ibid,  12  Aug  43,  Incl  to  Memo,  Groves  (for 
MPC)  to  Chief  of  Staff,  same  date,  OCG  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  E,  MDR;  MPC  Min, 
5  May  43,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  5,  "Fiscal  Proce- 
dures," App.  B2,  DASA. 


building  an  atomic  bomb.  These  in- 
cluded achievement  of  a  self-sustain- 
ing chain  reaction  in  the  pile  method; 
assurance  of  an  adequate  supply  of 
uranium  ore;  selection  of  plant  sites 
and  work  on  their  acquisition;  letting 
of  contracts  for  construction  and 
plant  operation;  and  appropriation  of 
requisite  funding  through  1944.  Work 
on  the  design  of  a  bomb  was  pro- 
gressing, bolstered  by  satisfactory 
progress  in  the  research  and  develop- 
ment of  methods  to  isolate  a  suffi- 
cient quantity  of  U-235  and  of  the  ap- 
parent feasibility  of  obtaining  and 
using  plutonium  as  a  fissionable  ex- 
plosive. Project  officials  now  believed 
there  was  a  good  chance  that  the  pro- 
duction of  bombs  on  a  one-per- 
month  basis  would  begin  in  the  first 
half  of  1945.  By  mid-1943,  the  Man- 
hattan District  had  taken  over  admin- 
istration of  most  of  the  OSRD  re- 
search contracts  and  was  preparing  to 
assume  responsibility  for  the  rest  in 
short  order. ^^  Now  that  the  period  of 
joint  Army-OSRD  administration  of 
the  program  was  coming  to  an  end, 
all  work  on  the  development  of  the 
atomic  bomb  would  continue  under 
the  direction  of  the  Army. 


39  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpt  on  DSM  Proj,  23  Apr- 
24  May  43,  MDR. 


CHAPTER  VI 


The  Electromagnetic  Process 


Considered  from  the  viewpoint  of 
basic  mihtary  objectives,  the  single 
most  important  problem  of  the  Man- 
hattan Project  was  how  to  produce 
fissionable  materials  in  the  quantity 
and  of  the  quality  required  to  make 
an  atomic  bomb.  By  the  end  of  1942, 
because  project  leaders  were  reason- 
ably certain  that  a  considerably  great- 
er amount  of  fissionable  materials 
than  had  been  previously  estimated 
would  be  needed,  the  Military  Policy 
Committee  decided  to  proceed  with 
full-scale  development  of  three  pro- 
duction methods:  for  plutonium,  the 
pile  process;  for  U-235,  the  gaseous 
diffusion  and  electromagnetic  proc- 
esses. Of  the  three,  project  leaders 
agreed  that  the  electromagnetic 
method  most  likely  would  be  the  first 
to  produce  an  appreciable  quantity  of 
fissionable  material,  although  not 
nearly  enough  for  an  atomic  weapon. 

There  remained,  however,  some 
major  reservations  concerning  the 
feasibility  of  the  electromagnetic 
method  as  a  large-scale  production 
process.  In  its  recommendation  that 
the  Army  initiate  construction  of  a 
1 00-grams-per-day  electromagnetic 
plant,  the  S-1  Executive  Committee 
indicated  that  all  contractual  arrange- 
ments should  be  drawn  up  so  that 
they  could  be  readily  canceled  should 


"subsequent  developments  warrant 
...  a  change  of  plans."  ^  Similarly, 
following  its  fact-finding  tour  of  the 
project's  research  laboratories,  the 
Lewis  reviewing  committee  reported: 
"We  do  not  see  that  the  electromag- 
netic method  presents  a  practical  so- 
lution to  the  military  problem  at  its 
present  capacity.  .  .  ."  ^  An  electro- 
magnetic plant  capable  of  producing 
1  kilogram  of  fissionable  material  per 
day  would  require  at  least  twenty-two 
thousand  separation  tanks,  whereas 
the  same  output  could  be  achieved  by 
a  diffusion  plant  of  only  forty-six  hun- 
dred stages  or  three  250,000-kilowatt 
plutonium  piles.  These  figures  im- 
plied that  an  electromagnetic  plant 
would  take  longer  to  build,  use  up  far 
more  scarce  materials  and  manpower, 
require  more  electrical  power  to  op- 
erate, and  cost  a  much  greater  sum 
than  either  a  gaseous  diffusion  or  plu- 
tonium plant  with  equivalent  produc- 
tion capabilities.^ 

In    spite   of  the   drawbacks    of  the 
electromagnetic    method    as    a    large- 


»  DSM  Chronology,  13  Sep  42,  Sec.  2(e),  GROG. 

2  Rpt  of  Lewis  Reviewing  Committee,  in  MPC 
Rpt,  15  Dec  42.  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files, 
Fldr  25,  Tab  B,  MDR. 

^  Conclusions  of  Reviewing  Committee,  4  Dec  42, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  334  (Special  Reviewing 
Committee),  MDR. 


118 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


scale  industrial  process,  each  of  the 
three  committees  concluded  that  the 
method  presented  advantages  which 
outweighed  its  obvious  defects.  Based 
on  a  proven  laboratory  tool,  the  mass 
spectrograph,  the  electromagnetic 
method  was  the  most  certain  of  the 
processes  to  produce  at  least  some 
fissionable  material,  albeit  not  very  ef- 
ficiently. Also,  a  mass  production 
level  could  be  more  rapidly  attained 
because  an  electromagnetic  plant 
could  be  built  in  relatively  small,  self- 
sufficient  sections,  each  of  which 
could  begin  producing  material  as 
soon  as  it  was  completed.  Neither  the 
gaseous  diffusion  nor  pile  methods 
had  this  advantage.  Finally,  too,  Gen- 
eral Groves  and  S-1  Chairman  James 
B.  Conant,  as  well  as  several  of  the 
other  project  leaders,  perceived  the 
leadership  of  Ernest  Lawrence  as 
giving  a  distinct  advantage  to  the 
electromagnetic  process.  The  Univer- 
sity of  California  scientist  repeatedly 
had  demonstrated  an  ability  to  find 
quick,  practical  solutions  to  even  the 
most  difficult  technical  problems  that 
had  arisen  in  development  of  the 
process.* 

Electromagnetic  Research  and  the  Army, 
1942-1943 

Only  weeks  after  Colonel  Marshall's 
assignment  as  district  engineer,  the 
Army  began  to  take  over  administra- 
tion of  engineering,  construction, 
procurement,  and  related  aspects  of 
the  electromagnetic  program,  leaving 
to  the  Office  of  Scientific  Research 
and  Development  (OSRD)  continued 


supervision  of  research  and  develop- 
ment activities  and  fiscal  and  budget- 
ary matters.  In  August,  Marshall 
opened  the  California  Area  Engineers 
Office  at  Berkeley  and  assigned  Maj. 
Thomas  T.  Crenshaw  as  area  engi- 
neer and  Capt.  Harold.  A.  Fidler  as 
his  assistant.  Crenshaw  soon  estab- 
lished himself  in  the  university's 
Donner  Laboratory,  adjacent  to  Law- 
rence's office.^ 

During  the  fall  and  winter  of  1942- 
43,  Major  Crenshaw's  office  became 
increasingly  involved  in  procurement 
of  materials  and  equipment  for  the 
research  and  development  program 
and  with  providing  liaison  between 
the  Berkeley  program  and  other  ele- 
ments of  the  atomic  project.  In  this 
period,  an  important  phase  of  the 
staff's  liaison  function  was  arranging 
visits  to  the  Radiation  Laboratory  for 
the  various  individuals  and  groups  in- 
volved in  trying  to  decide  what  the 
role  of  the  electromagnetic  process 
should  be.^ 


*MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2,  "Research."  pp.  1.6-1.8, 
DASA;  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  96;  Smyth 
Report,  pp.  145-46;  Stone  and  Webster,  A  Report  to 
the  People,  p.  18. 


5  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2,  pp.  2.1-2.2,  DASA;  Memo, 
Crenshaw  to  Dist  Engr,  sub:  Weekly  Progress  Rpt, 
22  Aug  42,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  001  (Mtgs), 
MDR;  Interv,  Author  with  Fidler,  6  Jul  64,  CMH. 

^Subsection  based  on  DSM  Chronology,  13-14 
Sep  42,  Sec.  2(e),  11  Nov  42,  Sec.  2(d),  14  Nov  42, 
Sec.  2,  OROO;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New  World, 
pp.  96,  112,  141-47,  157-58;  Rpt,  Capt  Arthur  V. 
Peterson,  sub:  Visit  to  Berkeley  Proj,  17  Oct  42, 
Admm  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  680.2  (Berkeley),  MDR; 
Groves  Diary,  1-9  Nov  42,  LRG;  Rpt,  sub:  R  &  D  at 
Univ  of  Calif  Rad  Lab,  24  Apr  45  (prepared  as  Bk. 
5,  Vol.  2,  of  MDH),  Figs.  6  and  7,  SFOO;  MDH,  Bk. 
5,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1.4,  3.9-3.10,  4.1-4.3,  and  Vol.  3, 
"Design,"  pp.  2.6-2.10,  3.5-3.6,  App.  C6,  DASA; 
MPC  Min,  10  Dec  42,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP 
Files,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A,  MDR;  Memo,  Lawrence  to 
Fidler,  8  Mar  43,  LRL.  For  a  detailed  discussion  of 
the  electromagnetic  process,  see  the  appropriate 
volumes  in  Division  1,  Electromagnetic  Separation 
Project,  of  the  National  Nuclear  Energy  Series  (see 
Bibliographical  Note). 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


119 


These  visitors  came  to  learn  first- 
hand more  about  Lawrence's  method 
and  how  it  was  progressing.  After 
clearances  by  Crenshaw's  staff  and 
the  laboratory's  security  officials, 
Lawrence  and  his  technical  staff 
showed  them  the  impressive  physical 
facilities  and  equipment.  They  toured 
the  conventional  laboratories  on  the 
university  grounds  and  then  the  great 
domed  cyclotron  building  with  its  ad- 
jacent shops  and  facilities  located  in 
the  hilly  area  east  of  the  main 
campus.  There  they  observed  the  in- 
tensive investigations  under  way  into 
the  physics  and  chemistry  of  separat- 
ing U-235  from  ordinary  uranium  by 
the  electromagnetic  method.  Law- 
rence had  committed  the  largest  part 
of  his  staff  and  resources  to  the  phys- 
ics or  physical  aspects  of  the  separa- 
tion process,  centering  this  research 
in  two  buildings,  one  housing  a  37- 
inch  magnet  and  the  other  a  184-inch 
magnet.  The  availability  of  these  cy- 
clotron magnets,  which  were  excep- 
tional in  size  and  strength,  was  the 
single  most  important  factor  in 
making  possible  research  into  the  fea- 
sibility of  the  electromagnetic  method 
as  a  production  process.  Research 
into  the  chemical  aspects  of  the  sepa- 
ration process  under  Lawrence's  di- 
rection was  a  much  smaller  program, 
with  laboratory  investigations  in 
progress  at  both  the  Berkeley  and 
Davis  campuses  of  the  University  of 
California.'^ 


''  Not  all  research  into  the  chemistry  of  the  elec- 
tromagnetic process  was  located  at  the  University  of 
California,  Berkeley.  The  OSRD  also  had  contracted 
with  Brown,  Purdue,  and  Johns  Hopkins  to  investi- 
gate some  aspects.  Subsequently,  too,  the  electro- 
magnetic production  plant  operator,  the  Tennessee 
Eastman  Corporation,  carried  on  chemical  research 
for  the  process  in  Eastman  Kodak  laboratories  in 
Rochester,   N.Y.,   and   near   the   plant   site   in   Oak 


Lawrence  and  his  scientist  col- 
leagues repeatedly  emphasized  to  visi- 
tors that  their  ultimate  success  or  fail- 
ure depended  on  development  of  the 
calutron — a  name  derived  from  the 
words  California,  university,  and  cyclo- 
tron, ff  they  could  redesign  the  calu- 
tron, a  novel  hybridization  of  two 
well-known  laboratory  tools — the 
mass  spectrograph  and  the  cyclotron 
magnet — so  that  it  would  operate  not 
only  intermittently,  as  in  the  labor- 
atory, but  also  on  an  around-the- 
clock,  day-after-day,  month-after- 
month  basis  without  breakdown,  then 
they  would  have  the  means  for  pro- 
ducing a  significant  amount  of  en- 
riched uranium  for  an  atomic  weapon. 

Lawrence  had  made  some  design 
modifications  in  the  first  calutron,  in- 
stalled in  the  37-inch  magnet,  follow- 
ing successful  experiments  in  Febru- 
ary 1942.  He  found,  however,  that  he 
was  unable  to  test  the  validity  of  these 
changes  until  he  had  access  to  a  more 
powerful  magnetic  field.  This  became 
available  in  the  spring  with  comple- 
tion of  the  184-inch  magnet.  The  re- 
designed calutron  became  the  proto- 
type for  the  first  production  units  at 
the  Tennessee  plant.  Mounted  on  a 
metal  door,  this  calutron  could  be 
taken  out  of  its  vacuum  tank  as  a 
single  unit,  which  greatly  facilitated 
recovery  of  any  of  the  valuable  urani- 
um feed  material  adhering  to  compo- 
nents and  also  expedited  reloading 
and  maintenance. 

At  the  same  time,  Lawrence's  group 
had  also  developed  the  essential 
supporting  components — magnet, 

vacuum  pumps,  cooling  systems,  and 


Ridge,  Tenn.  See  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2.  pp.   1.1-1.2, 
3.1,4.1,  DASA. 


120 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


electrical  power  and  control  equip- 
ment. While  these  components  were 
more  conventional  in  design  and 
function,  they  still  had  to  be  adapted 
to  conform  to  the  requirements  of  the 
electromagnetic  process.  The  design 
engineers,  for  example,  decided  that 
the  most  efficient  layout  for  the  mag- 
nets and  tanks  was  in  an  oval-shaped 
pattern,  thus  creating  the  racetrack 
configuration  that  characterized  each 
major  element  of  the  production 
plant.  A  special  system  of  pumps 
achieved  and  maintained  the  required 
vacuum  equivalent  of  one  one-hun- 
dred-millionth  of  normal  atmospheric 
pressure  in  hundreds  of  calutron 
tanks. 

Involving  less  space,  fewer  person- 
nel, and  mainly  conventional  proce- 
dures, the  chemical  aspects  of  the 
electromagnetic  process  must  have 
appeared  far  less  important;  neverthe- 
less, both  the  first  and  final  stages  of 
the  process  were  essentially  chemical 
operations  and  required  new  tech- 
niques and  chemical  substances  about 
which  relatively  little  was  known.  For 
the  first  stage  the  chemists  had  to  de- 
velop a  method  of  large-scale  produc- 
tion of  uranium  tetrachloride,  the 
most  promising  feed  material  for  the 
calutrons.  For  the  last  stage  they  had 
to  devise  an  efficient  method  to  ex- 
tract the  enriched  uranium  produced 
by  the  calutrons  and  prepare  it  for 
use  by  the  Los  Alamos  Laboratory 
scientists  in  developing  an  atomic 
bomb.  By  early  1943,  the  chemists 
had  made  substantial  progress  on 
both  the  feed  material  and  extraction 
techniques. 

Virtually  all  who  visited  the  Radi- 
ation Laboratory  at  Berkeley  came 
away  impressed  with  the  feasibility  of 
the  electromagnetic  research  program 


and  with  the  eminently  empirical 
approach  of  Lawrence  and  his  staff. 
This  approach,  characterized  by  a 
frequently  demonstrated  talent  for 
finding  practical  solutions  to  every 
problem,  inspired  project  leaders  with 
further  confidence  in  Lawrence's 
process  as  they  prepared  to  transform 
the  research  data  and  devices  into  an 
industrial  production  plant  at  the 
Tennessee  site. 


Research  and  Development,   1943-1945: 
Radiation  Laboratory 

As  the  electromagnetic  program 
shifted  from  basic  research  to  the 
problems  of  designing,  building,  and 
operating  a  major  production  plant, 
the  Army  brought  the  project  more 
directly  under  its  administrative  juris- 
diction. Replacing  OSRD  contracts 
with  War  Department  contracts  was 
an  important  step  in  attaining  this 
goal. 

The  University  of  California  accept- 
ed a  letter  contract  from  the  district 
engineer,  effective  1  April  1943, 
pending  the  working  out  of  details  of 
a  formal  War  Department  contract. 
Then  on  the  sixteenth,  representa- 
tives of  the  Manhattan  District, 
OSRD,  and  the  university's  Board  of 
Regents  reached  final  agreement  on 
terms  of  a  new  prime  contract  cover- 
ing most  aspects  of  the  atomic  re- 
search program  in  progress  at  the  Ra- 
diation Laboratory.  The  new  contract 
went  into  effect  on  1  May,  bringing  to 
an  end  the  OSRD's  formal  connection 
with  the  California  project.  Hence- 
forth, until  the  Army  terminated  con- 
trol of  the  atomic  energy  program  at 
the  end  of  1946,  this  new  agreement, 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


121 


renewed  annually,  provided  the  con- 
tractual basis  for  continuing  the  re- 
search and  development  activities  req- 
uisite to  construction  and  operation 
of  the  electromagnetic  plant  in  Ten- 
nessee. In  recognition  of  the  overrid- 
ing requirements  of  security,  the  re- 
gents assented  to  leaving  all  details  of 
managing  the  program  as  they  related 
to  the  university  to  their  secretary, 
Robert  M.  Underbill,  and  to  Law- 
rence. Some  subsequent  modifica- 
tions in  the  prime  contract  relating  to 
health  and  chemistry  activities  did  not 
result  in  major  changes  in  the  Radi- 
ation Laboratory  program,  nor  in  the 
Army's  relationship  to  it.^ 

In  general,  fiscal  arrangements  re- 
mained the  same  as  they  had  been 
under  the  OSRD  contract,  with  one 
significant  exception.  The  War  De- 
partment contract  provided  that  an 
amount  equal  to  25  percent  of  the 
total  funds  allotted  for  salaries  and 
wages  could  be  used  by  the  university 
to  defray  its  overhead  expenses  in  op- 


*  Ltr  Contract  W-7405-eng-48,  Marshall  to  Univ 
of  Calif,  Attn:  R.  M.  Underbill,  1  Apr  43,  copy  in 
MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2,  App.  C3,  also  see  pp.  2.1-2.3, 
DASA;  Historical  Summary  of  Contract  W-7405- 
eng-48,  May  43-Aug  47,  comp.  by  Russell  H.  Ball, 
Jan  48,  witb  significant  correspondence  on  subcon- 
stracts  W-7405-eng  48A  (health)  and  W-7405-eng 
48B  (chemistry)  under  Tab  6,  pp.  35-49  and  50-60, 
SFOO;  NDRC  and  OSRD  Contracts  with  Univ  of 
Calif,  Jun  41-Sep  42,  SFOO;  Rpt,  sub:  R  &  D  at 
Univ  of  Calif  Rad  Lab,  24  Apr  45,  pp.  19-28,  SFOO; 
Fidler  Interv,  6  Jul  64,  CMH.  The  Radiation  Labo- 
ratory health  reseach  program,  directed  by  J.  D. 
Hamilton,  functioned  as  a  part  of  the  project-wide 
health  program  of  the  Manhattan  District,  which  was 
centered  at  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  in  Chicago. 
A  chemistry  program,  directed  by  W.  M.  Latimer, 
had  grown  out  of  the  participation  of  the  University 
of  California's  chemistry  department  in  the  early 
phases  of  atomic  research  at  Berkeley.  When  the 
OSRD  contracts  for  these  programs  came  up  for  re- 
newal in  June  1943,  the  Army  continued  them  as 
separate  projects  operating  under  the  prime 
contract. 


erating  the  Radiation  Laboratory;  the 
OSRD  contract  had  provided  30  per- 
cent for  this  purpose.  Partly  in  reac- 
tion to  this  reduction  in  overhead  al- 
lotment, in  November  1943  business 
representatives  of  the  University  of 
California,  University  of  Chicago,  and 
Columbia  University  requested  the 
Manhattan  District  to  include  a  provi- 
sion in  prime  contracts  guaranteeing 
the  universities,  in  view  of  their  non- 
profit status,  against  a  profit  or  loss 
in  administering  atomic  research  pro- 
grams. Following  several  months  of 
negotiation  with  the  universities,  the 
District  agreed  in  May  1944  that  the 
government  would  compensate  them 
if  their  overhead  costs  should  exceed 
their  25  percent  allowance  and,  con- 
versely, they  would  return  to  the  gov- 
ernment any  surplus  that  might  result 
from  this  allowance. 

At  the  same  time,  the  District 
added  a  provision  in  the  prime  con- 
tracts with  California,  Chicago,  and 
Columbia  for  a  so-called  welfare  fund. 
Thus,  in  the  case  of  California,  the 
government  established  a  fund  of 
$500,000,  which  was  to  continue  in 
existence  for  a  period  of  ten  years 
after  termination  of  its  contract  with 
the  War  Department.  Any  claims 
made  by  Radiation  Laboratory  em- 
ployees or  their  relatives  during  that 
time  because  of  death  or  disability  re- 
sulting from  a  specified  list  of  unusual 
hazards  in  atomic  research  activities — 
for  example,  radioactivity,  high  vol- 
tages, and  movement  of  objects  by 
magnetic  forces — would  be  paid  from 
this  fund.  The  government  provided 
the  money  for  the  fund  and  the  uni- 
versity administered  it  with  assistance 
of  a  private  insurance  company.  The 
welfare    fund    took    the    place   of  the 


122 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


OSRD's  private  indemnification  insur- 
ance, which  the  District  had  contin- 
ued only  until  such  time  as  a  gov- 
ernment-financed system  could  be 
established.^ 

The  Army's  first  major  administra- 
tive task  after  the  formal  contract 
became  effective  was  to  supervise 
preparation  of  the  program's  fiscal 
year  (FY)  1944  budget.  As  of  mid-1943, 
cost  of  the  program  had  reached  about 
$500,000  a  month,  and  was  following 
an  upward  trend.  District  and  univer- 
sity officials  agreed  upon  a  request  for 
$7.5  million  (an  average  of  $625,000 
per  month)  for  FY  1944.  By  November, 
however.  Regents  Secretary  Underbill 
was  warning  Captain  Fidler,  who  had 
replaced  Major  Crenshaw  as  area  engi- 
neer, that  even  this  increased  sum  was 
not  likely  to  be  enough  to  meet  mush- 
rooming costs.  Underbill  estimated 
that  the  university  would  need  an  addi- 
tional $1.5  to  $2  million  in  the  remain- 
ing months  of  FY  1944.  Consequently, 
the  District  approved  a  supplementary 
appropriation,  bringing  total  cost  to 
$9.5  million. 

The  Army's  negotiations  with  the 
University  of  California  for  the  FY 
1944  budget  set  the  pattern  for  sub- 
sequent years.  Even  after  the  electro- 
magnetic production  plant  began  op- 
erations in  the  spring  of  1944,  the 
electromagnetic  research  program 
continued  to  require  a  large  staff  to 
solve  production  problems  and  make 
improvements  in  plant  operations. 
Thus,  for  the  FY  1945  budget,  the 
Army     scheduled     $8.5     million,     al- 


though only  $6.5  million  was  actually 
expended.  By  the  time  the  war  ended 
in  August  1945,  total  outlay  for  the 
electromagnetic  research  program 
had  reached  about  $20  million — some 
$3.7  million  under  OSRD  con- 
tracts before  1  May  1943  and  the 
remainder  under  the  War  Department 
contract.  ^° 

Increases  in  cost  reflected  the  very 
rapid  expansion  of  the  Radiation  Lab- 
oratory, both  in  terms  of  personnel 
and  physical  facilities.  In  May  1943, 
when  the  Army  assumed  full  responsi- 
bility for  the  research  program,  the 
laboratory  was  occupying  a  number  of 
buildings  in  two  different  locations  on 
the  Berkeley  campus.  Starting  out 
modestly  in  1941  in  the  prewar  Radi- 
ation Laboratory  building,  atomic  re- 
search activities  gradually  had  spread 
into  four  adjacent  structures,  includ- 
ing the  new  Donner  Laboratory,  and, 
by  mid- 1942,  to  the  new  184-inch- 
cyclotron  building  in  Berkeley  Hills. 
Soon  the  circular-shaped  cyclotron 
building,  standing  on  the  slope  of  a 
hill  some  900  feet  above  the  campus 
proper,  was  ringed  with  smaller  addi- 
tional structures  housing  a  machine 
shop,  chemistry  laboratories,  ware- 
houses, and  other  facilities  essential 
to  operating  and  testing  calutrons 
and  other  equipment  prototypes  de- 
signed   for    the    production    plant    in 


9  Rpt,  sub:  R  &  D  at  Univ  of  Calif  Rad  Lab,  24 
Apr  45,  pp.  24-27,  SFOO;  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2,  p. 
2.3,  DASA;  Ltr,  Underbill  lo  Nichols,  13  Mar  44, 
Tab  6,  Historical  Summary  of  Contract  W-7405- 
eng-48,  SFOO;  Ltr  and  Incl,  Nicbols  to  Lawrence, 
15  Apr  44,  Tab  9,  ibid. 


10  Rpt,  Underbill,  sub:  Hist  of  Contract  W-7405- 
eng-48,  [probably  1948],  Tab  1;  Ltr,  Underbill  to 
Fidler.  10  Nov  43,  Tab  5b;  Ltr,  Fidler  to  Underbill, 
16  Feb  44,  Tab  5e;  Memo,  Fidler  to  Dist  Engr,  sub: 
Contract  W-7405-eng-48,  18  Feb  44,  Tab  5d; 
Memo,  Priestly  to  O.  Lundberg,  sub:  Budgets  for 
1944-45  for  Projs  48,  48A  and  48B,  29  Jun  44,  Tab 
7;  Ltr,  Nichols  to  Univ  of  Calif  Regents,  Attn:  Un- 
derbill. 20  Mar  45,  Tab  8a.  All  in  Historical  Summa- 
ry of  Contract  W-7405-eng-48,  SFOO.  See  also 
Ltr,  Lawrence  to  Nichols,  24  Mar  44,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  001  (Mtgs),  MDR. 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


123 


Tennessee.  Part  of  the  chemistry  pro- 
gram, too,  had  overflowed  facihties 
on  the  Berkeley  campus  and  been 
moved  to  the  University  of  Califor- 
nia's School  of  Agriculture  at  Davis. 

For  each  new  structure  or  renova- 
ton,  Lawrence  and  his  staff  laid  out 
preliminary  plans  and  estimates, 
which  went  to  the  area  engineer's 
office  for  approval  and  checking.  De- 
tailed supervision  of  construction  was 
left  to  Radiation  Laboratory  business 
manager  Kenneth  Priestly.  To  expe- 
dite the  work  and  minimize  security 
problems.  Priestly  let  contracts  to  the 
local  firms  that  the  university  had  em- 
ployed extensively  in  the  past.  For  the 
same  reasons,  most  contracts  were  of 
the  fixed-fee  or  lump-sum  type.  By 
mid- 1945,  Priestly  had  allocated  for 
various  types  of  construction  more 
than  $300,000  from  funds  allotted 
under  the  University  of  California's 
War  Department  contract.  ^^ 

By  far,  the  largest  expenditures 
were  for  salaries  and  wages  of  the  re- 
search staff  and  for  the  laboratory 
equipment  and  materials  they  needed. 
Annual  payroll  costs  were  running  at 
a  level  of  nearly  $3  million  in  May 
1943,  when  the  Army  assumed  full 
control  of  the  Manhattan  Project,  and 
had  reached  a  high  point  of  about 
$3.7  million  a  year  later.  Equipment 
and  other  expenses,  although  some- 
what less   than  personnel,  attained  a 


*^  Constr  Completion  Rpt,  Univ  of  Calif  Rad  Lab, 
sub:  Contract  W-7405-eng-48,  1  May  43-1  Aug  46, 
comp.  by  Calif  Area  Engrs  Office,  1  Sep  46,  SFOO 
(with  maps  of  the  two  campus  areas  where  major 
laboratory  facilities  were  located  and  with  selected 
photographs  of  important  buildings);  Rpt,  W.  B. 
Reynolds  (Rad  Lab  Man  Engr),  sub:  Notes  on  184- 
inch  Cyclotron,  16Jun  45,  SPOO;  "Domed  Building 
Fitted  to  Research  Needs,"  Engineering  News-Record,  9 
Apr  42,  pp.  64-66;  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2.  pp.  2.7-2.8, 
DASA. 


maximum  of  nearly  $300,000  a  month 
in  November  1943. ^^ 

Starting  in  1941  with  personnel  of 
the  University  of  California's  Radi- 
ation Laboratory,  which  Lawrence 
had  been  building  up  since  the 
1930's,  the  staff  at  Berkeley  grew  rap- 
idly. By  May  1943,  as  primary  empha- 
sis began  to  shift  from  basic  research 
to  engineering  and  developmental 
problems  and  training  of  operational 
personnel  for  the  Tennessee  plant,  it 
numbered  almost  nine  hundred  scien- 
tists, technicians,  engineers,  mechan- 
ics, clerks,  skilled  workers,  and  others. 
By  mid- 1944,  there  were  nearly 
twelve  hundred  on  the  Radiation  Lab- 
oratory payroll,  and  total  employment 
remained  well  above  one  thousand 
until  the  end  of  the  war.^^ 

The  basic  organization  of  the  Radi- 
ation Laboratory  had  taken  shape 
under  Lawrence's  guidance  in  the 
years  immediately  preceding  the  out- 
break of  World  War  II  and  con- 
formed, more  or  less,  to  the  conven- 
tional pattern  for  peacetime  academic 
research  programs,  with  a  major  divi- 
sion into  research  and  administrative 
staffs.  While  Lawrence,  as  director, 
theoretically  exercised  equal  control 
over  both  divisions,  he  devoted  his 
energies  to  the  research  staff,  delegat- 
ing to  the  OSRD  and  then  the  Army 
the  administration  of  nonscientific  ac- 
tivities. Major  responsibilities  for 
these  activities  devolved  upon  Cap- 
tain Fidler,  the  area  engineer.  Fidler 
worked  closely  with  Regents  Secretary 
Underbill,  and  also  with  Priestly  who. 


12  Chart,  Proj  48  Expenses  Estimated  by  Months 
to  Nearest  $5,000,  in  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2,  App.  Bl  1, 
DASA. 

13  Chart,  Lab  Personnel  by  Months  (UCRL),  in 
MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2,  App.  B2,  DASA. 


124 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


as  the  laboratory's  business  manager, 
supervised  administration  of  finances 
and  personnel. ^^ 

In  providing  personnel,  security, 
and  other  administrative  services  for 
the  research  staff,  the  area  engineer 
dealt  with  teams  of  scientists  and 
technicians  organized  along  function- 
al lines  under  three  broad  areas  of  in- 
vestigation. The  physics  division,  by 
far  the  largest,  worked  on  the  experi- 
mental calutrons,  vacuum  problems, 
mechanical  and  electrical  design,  reas- 
sembly of  equipment,  and  fundamen- 
tal physical  research.  The  chemistry 
division,  much  smaller,  investigated 
problems  of  preparing  feed  material 
for  the  calutrons  and  recovery  and 
purification  of  their  output  of  U-235 
and  ordinary  uranium.  The  biological 
group  constituted  a  subsidiary  ele- 
ment of  the  Manhattan  District's  med- 
ical research  program  that  had  its 
headquarters  at  the  Metallurgical  Lab- 
oratory in  Chicago.  The  area  engi- 
neer provided  its  director  with  admin- 
istrative support  in  coordinating  the 
activities  of  his  group  with  Lawrence's 
program,  based  upon  primary  guid- 
ance from  the  Chicago  medical  scien- 
tists. The  Army  was  helpful,  too,  in 
assisting  the  laboratory  in  recruitment 
and  maintenance  of  a  staff  of  several 


**  Paragraphs  on  the  Radiation  Laboratory  based 
on  Rpt,  Peterson,  sub:  Visit  to  Berkeley  Proj,  17  Oct 
42,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  680.2  (Berkeley), 
MDR;  Directory  of  Personnel,  MD  and  Univ  of  Calif 
Personnel  of  R  &  D  Group,  20  May  43,  SFOO;  Rpt, 
sub:  R  &  D  at  Univ  of  Calif  Rad  Lab,  24  Apr  45,  pp. 
30-46,  SFOO;  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2,  pp.  5.2-5.4,  and 
Vol.  3,  pp.  5.1-5.3  and  App.  B5  (Org  Chart,  Univ  of 
Calif  Lab  Proj),  DASA;  Interv,  Author  with  Reyn- 
olds, 6  Jul  64,  CMH;  Visitors  Permits  [Rad  Lab], 
Oct  43  through  1946,  Visitors  Info  File,  SFOO; 
Fidler  Interv,  6  Jul  64,  CMH;  Min,  Coordination 
Committee  Mtgs,  Oct  42-Mar  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  337  (Mtgs  and  Confs-Univ  of  Calif),  MDR; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New  World,  p.  150. 


hundred  technicians  and  skilled  work- 
men, who  supported  the  work  of  the 
scientists  and  engineers. 

Adding  to  the  complexity  of  admin- 
istering the  Radiation  Laboratory 
were  the  periodic  influxes  of  scien- 
tific, engineering,  and  other  technical 
delegations  not  only  from  the  major 
American  contractors  but  also  those 
from  abroad.  Such  firms  as  the  Stone 
and  Webster  Engineering  Corpora- 
tion, Westinghouse  Electric  and  Man- 
ufacturing Company,  and  especially 
the  Tennessee  Eastman  Corporation 
sent  their  personnel  to  Berkeley  to 
assist  in  plant  development,  or  for 
orientation  and  training  in  the  elec- 
tromagnetic process.  And  in  Novem- 
ber 1943,  Australian  physicist  Marcus 
L.  E.  Oliphant,  who  had  played  a  sig- 
nificant role  in  the  development  of 
radar,  and  thirty  of  the  British  scien- 
tists who  had  come  to  the  United 
States  to  aid  in  the  atomic  project 
were  assigned  to  the  laboratory — 
some  until  the  end  of  the  war — to 
work  on  various  aspects  of  electro- 
magnetic research. 

The  arrival  and  processing  of  each 
of  these  groups  presented  special 
problems  to  the  area  engineer  in  se- 
curity and  safety,  to  the  laboratory 
business  manager  in  personnel  and  fi- 
nance, and  to  the  laboratory  director 
in  program  and  staff  coordination. 
These  problems  were  further  multi- 
plied and  magnified  by  their  high 
turnover  rate,  the  result  of  the 
project's  need  for  scientific  expertise 
at  other  facilities.  As  early  as  1943, 
the  Army  had  begun  to  send  many  of 
the  contractors'  specialists  to  the 
Clinton  Works  to  assist  Tennessee 
Eastman  in  preparing  to  operate  the 
electromagnetic  plant.  The  area  engi- 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


125 


ncer's  staff  facilitated  their  transfer, 
eventually  permanently  reassigning  a 
sizable  number.  Again,  in  September 
1944,  the  staff  oversaw  the  move  of 
one-third  of  the  British  scientists  to 
the  Tennessee  site. 

For  the  most  part,  the  area  engi- 
neer's staff  was  not  directly  involved 
in  the  many  meetings  of  committee 
and  group  leaders  who  planned 
research,  assessed  the  results  of  ex- 
perimental work,  and  advised  on  reas- 
signment of  technical  and  scientific 
personnel.  But  the  area  engineer  and 
other  Manhattan  representatives  did 
participate  in  one  key  group,  the  Co- 
ordination Committee.  Business  and 
scientific  leaders  of  the  laboratory 
and  representatives  of  the  major  con- 
tracting firms  attended  the  weekly 
meetings  of  this  committee,  which 
Lawrence  had  established  to  ensure 
coordination  of  effort  between  his 
program  and  the  many  outside  orga- 
nizations collaborating  on  design  and 
construction  of  the  electromagnetic 
production  plant.  After  each  session 
Captain  Fidler,  who  had  extensive 
training  and  experience  in  both  engi- 
neering and  science,  prepared  a  writ- 
ten report  of  the  entire  proceedings 
to  keep  General  Groves,  and  other 
District  personnel,  up  to  date  on  the 
progress  of  research  and  development 
activities  at  Berkeley.  Whenever 
Groves  visited  the  laboratory,  usually 
once  a  month  during  the  crucial 
period  from  October  1942  to  Novem- 
ber 1943,  Lawrence  convened  the 
weekly  committee  meeting  to  coincide 
with  the  commander's  itinerary.  Feel- 
ing that  the  meetings  provided  an  ex- 
cellent means  of  communication  with 
the  key  members  of  the  laboratory 
staff,  Groves  took  an  active  role  in  the 


free-for-all  discussions  of  electromag- 
netic problems. 

The  area  engineer's  staff  also  car- 
ried on  a  number  of  other  activities, 
most  of  them  of  a  routine  character. 
It  took  part  in  the  negotiation  and  in- 
terpretation of  contracts  and  the 
review  of  fiscal  plans  and  policies;  as- 
sisted in  those  aspects  of  personnel 
administration  involving  military 
problems,  especially  the  obtaining  of 
deferments  for  key  scientific  and  tech- 
nical employees;  expedited  procure- 
ment of  equipment  and  materials, 
particularly  those  in  scarce  supply; 
and  supervised  the  more  ordinary  as- 
pects of  security.  For  example,  to 
avoid  any  possibility  of  revealing  the 
connection  of  the  University  of  Cali- 
fornia with  the  Army  and  the  atomic 
project,  Groves  always  conducted  his 
inspections  of  the  laboratory  in  civil- 
ian clothes.  When  he  arrived  at  the 
San  Francisco  airport,  Fidler  met 
Groves  clandestinely  and  whisked  him 
off  to  his  own  house  so  that  the  gen- 
eral could  change  from  military  into 
civilian  attire  before  going  to  the 
university. 

Even  the  remarkably  smooth  course 
of  the  collaboration  between  the  Uni- 
versity of  California,  Berkeley,  and 
the  Manhattan  District — a  testimony 
to  the  success  of  Captain  Fidler's  liai- 
son efforts,  Groves's  strenuous  en- 
deavors to  keep  himself  fully  in- 
formed, and  Lawrence's  exceptional 
administrative  capabilities — on  occa- 
sion was  punctuated  with  a  few  prob- 
lems, primarily  because  the  university 
administration  had  to  accept  Manhat- 
tan's substantial  requirements  largely 
on  faith  for  reasons  of  security.  In 
mid-January  1943,  sensing  a  disrup- 
tion   to    normal    university    activities. 


126 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


William  J.  Norton,  the  university  busi- 
ness manager,  complained  to  Groves 
in  no  uncertain  terms:  "To  date  I 
have  not  seen  the  scratch  of  a  pen — 
one  written  word  setting  forth  the 
suggestions  or  directives  of  the  gov- 
ernment representatives  in  regard  to 
the  conduct  of  the  Radiation  Labora- 
tories on  the  Berkeley  campus.  .  .  ." 
Noting  that  he  was  aware  that  in  the 
past  half  year  several  Army  officers, 
including  Groves,  had  visited  the 
campus,  Norton  continued  that  "in- 
variably, after  one  of  these  visits,  .  .  . 
[my]  office  is  deluged  with  requests 
by  numerous  persons  for  more  office 
space,  laboratory  space,  entire  build- 
ings, shops,  more  guards,  more  of 
this  and  that — all  in  the  name  of  the 
General  or  the  colonel,  or  the  captain 
who  has  just  visited  the  various 
plants.  But  for  some  reason  I  am 
never  in  on  the  discussions  at  the 
start."  Norton  then  assured  Groves 
that  he  wished  to  have  the  project  run 
smoothly,  an  objective  that  could  be 
much  more  easily  achieved,  he  said,  if 
the  general  would  only  let  him  know 
the  importance  of  the  project  and 
who  on  the  campus  officially  repre- 
sented the  Manhattan  District.  ^^ 

Groves  wrote  to  University  of  CaH- 
fornia  President  Robert  G.  Sproul, 
carefully  explaining  the  reasons  for 
the  secrecy  of  the  project  and  for  the 
complicated  and  sometimes  confusing 
relationships  that  existed  between  the 
Army,  the  university,  and  the  con- 
tracting firms.  He  then  outlined  brief- 
ly the  anticipated  requirements  for 
further  space  in  university  buildings. 
"Captain  Fidler  has  been  instructed," 
he    stated,    "to    keep    you    [President 


Sproul]  fully  informed  ...  at  all 
times"  concerning  the  physical  needs 
of  the  project.  ^^  Groves  also  had  re- 
quested that  the  War  Department  ex- 
plain to  Sproul  the  importance  of  the 
work  in  progress  at  the  Radiation 
Laboratory.  "[Its]  energetic  prosecu- 
tion .  .  .  ,"  Secretary  of  War  Stimson 
wrote,  "is  a  vital  military  necessity, 
for  it  is  one  of  the  foundation  stones 
of  an  extremely  important,  probably 
the  most  important,  development 
project  in  our  war  activities."  ^' 

Not  all  basic  research  for  the  elec- 
tromagnetic process  was  done  under 
the  University  of  California  contract. 
In  June  1943,  District  representatives 
arranged  with  Tennessee  Eastman  to 
carry  out  research  on  certain  aspects 
of  process  chemistry,  using  laboratory 
facilities  (leased  from  Eastman  Kodak) 
in  Rochester,  New  York,  and  at  the 
plant  site  in  Tennessee.  Cost  of  these 
research  contracts,  as  well  as  those 
for  process  improvement  in  1944  with 
Johns  Hopkins  and  Purdue  Universi- 
ties, were  small  by  comparison  with 
the  expenditures  at  the  University  of 
California,  totaling  considerably  less 
than  $2  million.  ^« 

Design  and  Engineering,   1943-1945 

At  its  25  June  1942  meeting,  the 
S-1  Executive  Committee  decided 
that  Stone  and  Webster  would  have 
primary  responsibility  for  basic  design 
and    engineering    of    both    buildings 


'5  Ltr,  Norton  to  Groves,  14  Jan  43,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  161  (Univ  of  Calif).  MDR. 


'«Ltr,  Groves  to  Sproul,  27  Jan  43,  Tab  2,  Histor- 
ical Summary  of  Contract  W-7405-eng-48,  SFOO. 

*'Ltrs,  Stimson  to  Sproul,  27  Jan  43,  and  Groves 
to  Fidler,  8  Feb  43,  Tab  2,  Historical  Summary  of 
Contract  W-7405-eng-48,  SFOO. 

'«MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1.1,  2.5-2.10,  Apps. 
B4,  B6-B9,  B12-B15,  DASA;  Hewlett  and  Ander- 
son, New  World,  p.  158. 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 

Table  1 — Stone  and  Webster  Engineering  and  Design  Personnel 


127 


Date 


At  Boston 


At  Berkeley 


In  the 
Field" 


Total 


1  January  1943 

1  July  1943 

1  January  1944 

1  July  1944 

1  January  1945 

1  July  1945 

'  Clinton  and  elsewhere. 

Source:  MDH.  Bk.  5.  Vol.  3,  "Design,"  p.  3.52 


239 
738 
743 
685 
463 
338 


277 
770 
789 
772 
520 
381 


and  equipment  at  the  Tennessee 
site.^^  For  security,  the  company 
formed  a  separate  design  organiza- 
tion, which  by  mid- 1944  had  nearly 
750  employees  occupying  thirteen 
floors  in  four  buildings  in  Boston 
and,  in  addition,  a  subordinate  unit  at 
the  Berkeley  campus  and  a  liaison 
office  at  the  Tennessee  site  {Table  1). 
To  monitor  the  Stone  and  Webster 
design  group,  the  district  engineer  es- 
tablished in  August  1942  the  Boston 
Area  Engineers  Office  and  assigned 
Maj.  Benjamin  K.  Hough,  Jr.,  to  head 
a  relatively  small  staff.  From  the  be- 
ginning, one  of  Major  Hough's  most 
important  responsibilities  was  to 
ensure  that  the  Stone  and  Webster 
design  group  functioned  under  maxi- 
mum security  conditions.  The  special 
group  thus  worked  separately  from 
other  company  employees,  and  over- 
all knowledge  of  the  electromagnetic 
project  was  limited  to  a  few  key  offi- 
cials and  to  August  C.  Klein,  the  com- 
pany's chief  mechanical  engineer  and 


newly  appointed  project  engineer  for 
the  electromagnetic  plant.  The  area 
engineer's  staff  also  assisted  the  com- 
pany in  developing  special  security 
control  measures  in  distribution  of 
thousands  of  drawings  to  General 
Electric,  Westinghouse,  and  other 
firms  providing  equipment  and  mate- 
rials. The  designs  reflected  the  em- 
phasis on  security  and  speed  in  every 
phase  of  development.  Wherever  fea- 
sible. Stone  and  Webster  designers 
planned  to  use  standard  items  of 
equipment  and  customary  methods  of 
construction,  primarily  to  save  time. 
There  was,  however,  a  limit  to  the 
extent  that  standardization  would  be 
possible  because  of  the  special  char- 
acter of  the  processes;  the  need  for 
exceptionally  close  tolerances  and 
performance  capabilities;  and,  as 
proven  by  experience,  inevitable 
changes  in  equipment  design.^® 


'^In  addition  to  the  main  production  facilities. 
Stone  and  Webster  also  designed  most  of  the  elec- 
tromagnetic plant  auxiliary,  service,  and  support  fa- 
cilities— including   experimental    racetracks    to    tram 


plant    operators,    shops,    steam    plants,    a    foundry, 
warehouses,  cafeterias,  and  community  utilities. 

20 Cert  of  Audit  MDE  177-46,  Boston  Area, 
26  Apr  46,  Fiscal  and  Audit  Files,  Cert  of  Audit 
Registers.  MDR;  Org  Charts.  I'.S.  Engrs  Office, 
MD,  15  Aug  43,  28  Aug  and  10  Nov  44,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  020  (MED-Org),  MDR;  List  of 

Continued 


128 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


By  the  turn  of  the  year,  Lawrence 
and  his  staff  at  the  Radiation  Labora- 
tory had  made  significant  progress 
not  only  in  their  electromagnetic  re- 
search but  also  in  the  areas  of  prelim- 
inary design  and  engineering  of  plant 
facilities,  the  results  of  which  they  for- 
warded to  Stone  and  Webster.  But 
before  design  of  the  plant  could  pro- 
ceed very  far,  company  engineers 
needed  answers  to  two  important 
questions:  How  rich  in  U-235  must 
the  final  product  be  and  would  a 
single-stage  electromagnetic  plant 
achieve  that  degree  of  enrichment? 
On  4  January  1943,  Oppenheimer 
furnished  Lawrence  with  a  tentative 
answer.  The  goal,  he  wrote  Lawrence, 
must  be  near-perfect  separation,  that 
is,  production  of  practically  pure  U- 
235  as  the  final  product.  Any  lesser 
enrichment,  Oppenheimer  believed, 
would  require  such  a  large  amount  of 
the  very  heavy  uranium  that  its  weight 
would  make  it  unacceptable  for  a 
weapon. 2^  The  degree  of  enrichment 
possible  with  a  single-stage  plant  was 
not  definitely  known,  but  it  would  not 
be  enough  to  meet  such  stringent 
standards.  A  second-stage  facility 
might  take  uranium  processed  in  the 
original  500-tank  plant  and  bring  it  to 
the  required  higher  degree  of 
enrichment. 


Key  Personnel,  MD  Area  OfFices  (ca.  Nov  44), 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  231.001  (LC),  MDR; 
MDH.  Bk.  5,  Vol.  3,  pp.  3.51-3.52,  DASA;  Tables 
(Employment  by  MD  on  Design,  Research  and 
Constr  as  of  31  May,  31  Jul,  and  31  Oct  43)  in  Rpt, 
sub:  MD  Proj  Data  as  of  1  Jun  43  (most  items  as  of 
1  Jun  43,  but  tables  appear  to  have  been  added  at 
later  date).  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Projs 
and  Prgms),  MDR;  Completion  Rpt,  Stone  and 
Webster,  sub:  Clinton  Engr  Works,  Contract  W- 
7401-eng-13,  1946,  p.  143,  OROO. 

2*  I.tr,    Oppenheimer    to    Lawrence,    4    Jan    43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Lawrence),  MDR. 


At  the  Coordination  Committee 
meeting  in  early  February,  Lawrence 
expressed  the  view  that  design  of  the 
second-stage  might  reasonably  be  de- 
layed for  another  two  months,  pend- 
ing receipt  of  data  on  the  degree  of 
enrichment  attained  in  the  experi- 
mental XA  calutrons  nearing  comple- 
tion at  Berkeley.  If  this  data  indicated 
eventual  achievement  of  70-  to  80- 
percent  enrichment,  no  second  stage 
would  be  necessary.  Groves  dis- 
agreed. There  always  had  been  the 
possibility  that  the  electromagnetic 
process  would  be  coordinated  with 
some  other  isotopic  separation  proc- 
ess (he  probably  had  in  mind  the  gas- 
eous diffusion  plant),  and  he  believed 
the  second-stage  facility  would  be 
necessary  either  as  a  supplement  to 
the  first  stage  of  the  electromagnetic 
plant  or  as  part  of  a  plant  for  enhanc- 
ing the  slightly  enriched  product  from 
another  plant. 

As  Groves  departed  from  Berkeley 
on  14  February,  he  urged  that  prompt 
decision  should  be  reached  on  the 
Beta  process,  as  it  now  came  to  be 
called  to  distinguish  it  from  the  first 
stage,  or  Alpha  process.  The  Radi- 
ation Laboratory  staff  had  convinced 
him  that  the  Beta  tanks  could  prob- 
ably be  designed  to  make  maximum 
use  of  Alpha-type  equipment,  but  he 
needed  further  assurance  from  Stone 
and  Webster  that  a  second  stage 
would  not  delay  completion  of  the 
first  stage. 

General  Groves  and  Colonel  Mar- 
shall conferred  with  Stone  and  Web- 
ster on  17  March.  Marshall  took  the 
initiative  in  securing  a  firm  agreement 
that  the  first  five  Alpha  racetracks  at 
the  Clinton  Engineer  Works  (CEW) 
would    be    identical     in    design    and 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


129 


equipment,  to  guarantee  their  com- 
pletion at  the  earliest  possible  date. 
When  the  company  assured  Groves 
that  Beta  construction  would  not 
delay  the  Alpha  units,  he  gave  his  ap- 
proval for  the  second  stage. ^^ 

By  late  spring,  design  development 
for  both  stages  was  in  full  swing.  The 
Berkeley,  CHnton,  and  Boston  design 
staffs  worked  under  constant  pressure 
from  Groves  and  other  project  lead- 
ers to  produce  thousands  of  blue- 
prints for  five  Alpha  and  two  Beta 
racetracks.  The  emphasis  on  speed 
took  its  toll.  Frequently,  General 
Electric,  Westinghouse,  and  the  other 
firms  manufacturing  components  for 
the  racetracks  had  to  incorporate  es- 
sential design  changes  after  equip- 
ment was  fabricated  and  installed, 
and  inevitably  some  equipment  fail- 
ures occurred.  Everyone  connected 
with  the  electromagnetic  project  soon 
realized  design,  redesign,  and  process 
improvement  would  continue  long 
after  the  first  major  units  of  the  plant 
began  production  operations. ^^ 


^^  Min,  Coordination  Committee  Mtgs,  3  and  13 
Feb  43,  MDR;  Excerpt  from  Memo,  M.  P.  O'Brien 
(Rad  Lab  Ex  Engr)  to  Fidler,  14  Feb  46,  quoted  in 
par.  Id  of  Memo,  Fidler  to  Groves,  sub:  Initiation  of 
Work  on  Y-12  Beta  Process,  22  Oct  46,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1,  MDR;  Hewlett  and  An- 
derson, New  World,  pp.  151-52. 

2^  This  and  following  paragraphs  on  electromag- 
netic design  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vols.  2-3, 
DASA;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New  World,  pp.  149- 
67;  Ltr,  Lawrence  to  Groves,  14  Jun  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  440.17  (Mfg-Prod-Fab),  MDR; 
Lawrence  to  Groves,  3  Aug  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  095  (TEC  LC),  MDR;  Memo,  Maj  Wilbur 
E.  Kelley  (Y-12  Opns  Div  chief,  CEW)  to  Lt  Col  E. 
H.  Marsden  (Ex  Off,  MD),  sub:  Summary  of  Y-12 
Proj  as  of  9  Aug  43,  same  date.  Admin  F'iles,  Gen 
Corresp,  Misc  File,  MDR;  Min,  Coordination  Com- 
mittee Mtgs,  2,  9,  30  Sep  and  17  Nov  43,  MDR; 
MPC  Min,  13  Aug  43,  MDR;  Rpt,  sub:  R  &  D  at 
Univ  at  Calif  Rad  Lab,  24  Apr  45,  pp.  17  and  23, 
SFOO;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Sep 


By  summer,  with  most  blueprints 
for  Alpha  I  completed  and  procure- 
ment contracts  for  plant  equipment 
arranged.  Groves  approved  design 
changes  in  the  fifth  Alpha  I  racetrack. 
In  September,  he  authorized  con- 
struction of  Alpha  II,  comprised  of 
four  additional  racetracks  incorporat- 
ing the  improved  design  (a  step  rec- 
ommended earlier  by  the  Military 
Policy  Committee).  He  also  approved 
two  more  Beta  racetracks,  to  process 
the  additional  output  from  Alpha  II. 

Thanks  to  experience  gained  on  the 
Alpha  racetracks,  design  of  the  Beta 
racetracks  posed  fewer  problems. 
Beta  chemical  equipment,  however, 
was  quite  a  different  story,  because  of 
the  small  quantities  of  material  under- 
going processing  and  the  fantastically 
high  value  of  U-235.  To  prevent  even 
a  minimum  loss  of  output,  the  design- 
ers made  the  equipment  as  small  as 
possible  and  used  corrosion-resistant 
materials  and  special  devices  to  recov- 
er the  last  traces  of  U-235. 

With  the  start  of  plant  construction, 
continuing  design  activities  assumed  a 
secondary  role.  Lawrence  and  his  col- 
leagues continued  to  propose  innova- 
tions and  design  alterations  in  the 
racetracks,  but  General  Groves  con- 
sistently followed  a  policy  of  approv- 
ing only  changes  that  clearly  would 
speed  up  progress.  Hence,  Radiation 
Laboratory  scientists,  in  1944  and 
1945,  were  relegated  largely  to  the 
role  of  consultants  to  Stone  and  Web- 
ster, Tennessee  Eastman,  and  the 
other  contractors,  assisting  them  to 
improve  design  and  operation  of  the 
existing  plant  facilities. 


and   Nov  43,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,   MP  Files, 
Fldr  28,  Tab  A,  MDR. 


130 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Building  the  Electromagnetic  Plant 

Actual  construction  began  in  Febru- 
ary 1943  on  a  tract  of  825  acres  locat- 
ed in  Bear  Creek  Valley,  some  dis- 
tance southwest  of  the  rapidly  grow- 
ing community  of  Oak  Ridge  (Map  3). 
Project  engineers  had  selected  this 
location  because  they  hoped  the 
wooded  ridges  paralleling  the  valley 
would  limit  possible  lethal  effects  of  a 
major  explosion  or  similar  accident. 
There  was  more  than  ample  room  be- 
tween ridges  to  permit  adequate  spac- 
ing of  the  numerous  plant  facilities 
that,  at  the  height  of  plant  operations, 
would  include  nine  main  process 
buildings  and  some  two  hundred  aux- 
iliary structures,  comprising  nearly  80 
acres  of  floor  space. ^'^ 

Construction  Procurement 

Stone  and  Webster  had  primary  re- 
sponsibility for  procuring  the  materi- 
als, equipment,  and  field  construction 
force  needed  for  building  the  produc- 
tion plant;  however,  the  Army  had  di- 
rected that  the  firm  consult  regularly 
with  the  Radiation  Laboratory  and 
with  the  major  manufacturing  con- 
tractors in  carrying  out  materials  and 
equipment  procurement.  ^^  Both 
Stone  and  Webster  and  Manhattan  of- 
ficials had  agreed  that,  because  of  the 
special  nature  of  much  of  the  equip- 
ment required  for  the  electromagnetic 
process,  only  the  leading  manufactur- 
ing firms  in  the  electrical  equipment 
field  were  likely  to  have  the  resources 
and  capabiHties  necessary  to  supply  it. 


Consequently,  in  early  1943  Stone 
and  Webster,  with  considerable  assist- 
ance from  District  officials,  negotiated 
subcontracts  with  General  Electric, 
Westinghouse,  Allis-Chalmers,  and 
several  smaller  firms  to  design  and 
manufacture  such  items  as  regulators, 
rectifiers,  calutron  tanks,  diffusion 
pumps,  magnet  coils,  and  vacuum 
valves  that  would  meet  the  project's 
high  standards  for  workmanship  and 
performance  and,  at  the  same  time, 
comply  with  its  stringent  procurement 
deadlines.  2^ 

As  Stone  and  Webster  negotiated 
contracts,  it  also  developed  an  elabo- 
rate purchasing  organization  at  its 
Boston  office.  This  organization 
worked  closely  with  the  Boston  Area 
Engineers  Office  and,  through  a  pro- 
curement unit  established  at  the  Ten- 
nessee site,  with  the  CEW  Construc- 
tion Division.  In  addition  to  the  150 
persons  employed  in  Boston  and 
Tennessee,  Stone  and  Webster  main- 
tained another  250  representatives  in 
the  field  at  contractor  plants  and  in 
major  industrial  areas.  These  field 
workers  checked  equipment  for  con- 
formity to  specifications,  expedited 
deliveries,  and  assisted  in  locating 
scarce  materials  for  subcontractors. 
Stone  and  Webster's  procurement  or- 
ganization also  worked  closely  with 
the  Washington  Liaison  Office,  espe- 
cially  in   obtaining   critical   materials, 


^*  A  detailed  discussion  of  most  aspects  of  elec- 
tromagnetic plant  construction  may  be  found  in 
MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  5,  "Construction,"  DASA. 

^*  A  detailed  discussion  of  the  procurement  of 
manpower  for  the  electromagnetic  project  appears 
in  Ch.  XVI. 


26  Subsection  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2,  pp. 
3.3,  3.9,  4.6,  Vol.  3,  pp.  4.1  and  4.3-4.24,  and  Vol. 
5,  pp.  6.1-6.2,  DASA;  Completion  Rpt,  Stone  and 
Webster,  sub:  CEW,  Contract  W-7401-eng-13, 
1946,  pp.  19,  21-23,  146-48,  OROO;  Org  Charts, 
U.S.  Engrs  Office,  MD,  15  Aug  and  1  Nov  43,  MDR; 
Fine  and  Remington,  Corps  of  Engineers:  Construction, 
p.  678;  Min,  Coordination  Committee  Mtgs,  23  Dec 
42  and  23  Jan,  6  and  13  Feb,  29  Apr,  21  Oct  43, 
MDR. 


MAP  3 


132 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


on  which  it  achieved  an  excellent 
record  of  placing  most  orders  within 
a  few  days  of  construction  authoriza- 
tion. Maj.  Wilbur  E.  Kelley,  a  young 
engineer  from  Indiana  who  was  re- 
sponsible for  overseeing  electromag- 
netic activities  for  the  Manhattan  Dis- 
trict, and  Lt.  Col.  Warren  George, 
head  of  the  CEW  Construction  Divi- 
sion, also  kept  a  watchful  eye  on  pro- 
curement. (5^^  Chart  2. ) 

The  sheer  quantity  and  variety  of 
materials  and  equipment  that  rolled 
in  by  the  trainload  over  a  recently 
built  spur  track  to  the  construction 
site  taxed  the  monitoring  capabilities 
of  the  CEW  Construction  Division. 
Starting  in  the  spring  of  1943,  the 
builders  of  the  plant  moved  into  the 
site  more  than  2,157  carloads  of  elec- 
trical equipment;  1,219  of  heavy 
equipment;  5,389  of  lumber;  1,407  of 
pipe  and  fittings;  1,188  of  steel;  257 
of  valves  of  all  sizes;  and  1 1  of  weld- 
ing electrodes.  The  Construction  Di- 
vision was  responsible  for  seeing  that 
all  of  this  material  was  brought  to  the 
site  as  nearly  on  schedule  as  possible. 
If  items  arrived  early,  the  division  had 
to  help  find  storage  space — not 
always  an  easy  task  because  of  limited 
warehousing  facilities. 

Because  parts  and  machinery  could 
not  be  fabricated  on  schedules  that 
dovetailed  precisely  with  construction 
progress,  much  had  to  be  accepted  as 
the  manufacturers  were  able  to  turn  it 
out.  Those  items  that  arrived  ahead 
of  schedule  had  to  be  closely  guard- 
ed; protected  from  dirt,  corrosion, 
and  other  kinds  of  damage;  and  care- 
fully inventoried  so  that  they  would 
be  immediately  available  as  needed. 
Chemical  equipment  posed  problems 
because  of  special  manufacturing  and 
handling      requirements,       and       the 


equipment  often  arrived  late  or  just 
barely  on  time. 

Schedules  had  to  be  adapted  to 
last-minute  changes  in  design  and  to 
many  uncertainties.  Discouragingly 
few  items  were  commercially  avail- 
able. Tanks,  magnets,  vacuum  pumps, 
cubicles,  and  most  of  the  chemical 
equipment,  for  example,  were  either 
completely  new  in  design  or  so  much 
larger  or  so  much  greater  in  capacity 
that  nothing  of  the  kind  previously 
had  been  manufactured.  Many  less 
obvious  items  also  carried  perform- 
ance specifications  that  far  exceeded 
anything  ever  attempted  on  a  com- 
mercial scale.  For  instance,  the  calu- 
trons  required  electrical  cable  that 
could  carry  a  high-voltage  load  con- 
tinuously. The  only  commercial  prod- 
uct that  came  near  meeting  this  speci- 
fication was  the  heaviest  X-ray  cable, 
and  it  was  designed  to  operate  inter- 
mittently. Even  when  the  commercial 
equipment  could  be  used,  suppliers 
often  had  to  add  to  their  productive 
capacity  or  build  entire  new  plants  to 
furnish  the  items  required  in  the 
enormous  quantities  they  were 
needed.  Thus,  in  the  first  equipping 
of  the  racetracks  some  eighty-five 
thousand  vacuum  tubes  were  re- 
quired. In  the  case  of  one  type  of 
tube,  procurement  officials  ordered  in 
advance  the  entire  national  output  for 
1943  as  well  as  that  from  a  plant  still 
under  construction.  In  the  early 
months  of  plant  operation,  when 
tubes  burned  out  faster  than  predict- 
ed, some  feared  the  racetracks  might 
prove  inoperable  simply  through  in- 
ability to  maintain  the  tube  supply. 

New  methods  had  to  be  developed 
for  machining  and  shaping  the  graph- 
ite in  those  parts  of  the  calutron  sub- 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


133 


ject  to  intense  heat.  No  standard  ma- 
terial would  endure  the  high  poten- 
tials, mechanical  strain,  and  tempera- 
ture changes  to  which  bushings  in  the 
high-voltage  elements  in  the  sources 
were  continuously  subjected.  After 
months  of  investigation,  Stone  and 
Webster  found  an  insulator  made  of 
zirconium  oxide,  a  new  and  still  very 
expensive  substance.  Similarly,  use  of 
large  quantities  of  liquid  nitrogen  to 
condense  moisture  created  a  demand 
for  a  substance  hitherto  not  produced 
on  a  commercial  scale  anywhere  in 
the  country. 

Nowhere  were  Manhattan  District 
personnel  more  spectacularly  in- 
volved in  procurement  than  in  the 
project's  need  for  vast  amounts  of 
silver.  ^^  Because  copper  was  in  great 
demand  for  all  kinds  of  wartime  uses 
and  because  silver  could  serve  as  a 
substitute  in  electrical  equipment. 
Colonel  Marshall  in  the  summer  of 
1942  had  detailed  Nichols  to  negotiate 
an  agreement  with  the  Treasury  for 
withdrawal  of  silver  from  the  United 
States  Bullion  Depository  in  West 
Point,  New  York. 

District  officials  arranged  to  have 
the  silver  processed  through  the  De- 
fense Plant  Corporation,  which  was 
conducting  a  silver  program  of  its 
own  in  connection  with  other  war  in- 
dustries. The  silver,  in  1,000-ounce 
bars,  was  moved  by  guarded  truck  to 


^■'  Paragraphs  on  silver  procurement  based  on 
MDH.  Bk.  5.  Vol.  4,  "Silver  Program,"  DASA.  For 
details  on  Nichols's  role  in  the  silver  negotiations, 
see  Ch.  III.  Groves  presents  a  good,  brief  account  in 
his  own  book  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  107-09.  Dis- 
trict officials  had  to  account  for  and  protect  nearlv 
one-third  billion  dollars  of  silver  ultimately  with- 
drawn from  the  Treasury  for  the  use  in  the  electro- 
magnetic plant. 


Carteret,  New  Jersey,  where  it  was 
cast  into  billets,  and  then  to  Bayway, 
New  Jersey,  where  it  was  extruded 
into  strips  %'s  of  an  inch  thick,  3 
inches  wide,  and  40  to  50  feet  long. 
From  Bayway,  under  the  protection  of 
Manhattan  District  guards,  the  coiled 
strips  were  moved  by  rail  freight  to 
the  Allis-Chalmers  plant  in  Milwau- 
kee. There,  some  258  carloads  of 
silver  were  fabricated  into  coils  and 
bus  bars,  then  sealed  into  welded  cas- 
ings, and  finally  shipped  on  open,  un- 
guarded flatcars,  by  various  routes 
and  on  irregular  schedules,  to  the 
Clinton  Works. 

A  central  control  section  in  the 
New  York  Area  Engineers  Office  ad- 
ministered the  silver  program,  but  as 
a  double  check  the  District  retained 
the  services  of  a  firm  of  auditors  and 
a  metallurgical  concern.  Some  precau- 
tions taken  to  avoid  unnecessary  loss 
included  weighing  the  silver  each 
time  it  entered  or  left  one  of  the 
plants,  storing  the  pieces  in  stacks 
that  would  permit  minimum  handling 
during  each  eight-hour  accountability 
check,  and  painstakingly  collecting 
the  scrap — even  the  minute  amounts 
that  might  accumulate  on  a  worker's 
clothing  or  shoe  soles. ^® 


2*  When  the  time  came  to  return  the  silver  to  the 
Treasurv  after  the  war  was  over,  Manhattan  District 
workmen  disassembled  and  cleaned  part  by  part  the 
machines  where  it  had  been  used,  dismantled  the 
furnaces  in  which  it  had  been  melted,  and  even  took 
up  the  burned  wooden  floors  to  recover  every  trace 
possible.  As  a  result,  in  the  final  accounting,  less 
than  one  thirty-six-thousandth  of  1  percent  of  the 
more  than  14.700  tons  borrowed  by  the  District  for 
the  atomic  project  was  missing,  most  of  which  was 
an  unavoidable  melt  loss.  See  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  4, 
pp.  4.1-4.5,  DASA;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p. 
109;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  .V^i  World,  p.  153. 


134 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Playit  Construction 

As  work  crews  began  excavating 
building  sites  and  laying  foundations 
early  in  the  summer  of  1943,  Stone 
and  Webster  foremen  knew  plant  con- 
struction must  move  ahead  with  maxi- 
mum speed  during  the  prime  summer 
building  season,  to  meet  the  extreme- 
ly short  deadlines  projected  by  the 
Army.  Reluctantly,  Stone  and  Web- 
ster officials  agreed  to  have  the  first 
Alpha  racetrack  building  ready  to  turn 
over  to  Tennessee  Eastman,  the  plant 
operator,  by  November  and  the  re- 
maining Alpha  units  at  approximately 
monthly  intervals  thereafter.  Project 
leaders  were  convinced  that  only  ad- 
herence to  this  rigorous  schedule 
would  produce  sufficient  fissionable 
materials  to  fulfill  the  requirements 
for  design  and  fabrication  of  an 
atomic  weapon  in  time  to  affect  the 
outcome  of  the  war. 

Stone  and  Webster  had  little  diffi- 
culty in  maintaining  force-draft  con- 
struction schedules  for  the  plant 
buildings,  mainly  designed  along  the 
lines  of  structures  in  common  use  by 
industry.  The  only  unexpected  delay 
was  the  discovery  of  unfavorable  sub- 
soil conditions;  excavation  crews  thus 
had  to  do  some  extra  blasting  and 
mucking  and  laying  of  6-foot-thick 
concrete  mats  to  ensure  firm  founda- 
tions for  the  enormously  heavy  elec- 
tromagnetic machines.  Through  use 
of  more  thorough  soil-sampling  tech- 
niques, Stone  and  Webster  was  able 
to  minimize  the  time  lost  in  providing 
adequate  footings  for  the  later  race- 
track buildings. 

Internal  construction  of  the  plant, 
however,  was  characterized  by  uncon- 
ventional methods  and  unorthodox 
problems     that     seemed     certain     to 


cause  delays  and  setbacks  in  working 
schedules.  Project  leaders  had  antici- 
pated some  problems.  They  knew,  for 
example,  that  installing  equipment 
while  the  building  shells  were  under 
construction  was  likely  to  lead  to 
complications  because  riggers,  pipe 
fitters,  and  mechanics  were  not  ordi- 
narily accustomed  to  working  elbow 
to  elbow  with  concrete  pourers,  form 
builders,  and  other  building  construc- 
tion workers.  Also,  security  measures 
and  the  need  to  maintain  extreme 
cleanliness  in  certain  areas  would  re- 
quire guards  and  a  pass  system  to 
limit  access  to  some  parts  of  the 
buildings.  And  they  well  understood 
that  assembling  the  complex  racetrack 
and  other  production  units  involved 
demanding  and  time-consuming 
measures. ^^ 

Consequently,  Manhattan  District 
officials  were  pleasantly  surprised 
when  Colonel  Nichols,  who  had  re- 
placed Marshall  as  district  engineer, 
reported  to  General  Groves  in 
September  that  the  electromagnetic 
construction  was  about  34  percent 
completed,  including  the  turnover  to 
Tennessee  Eastman  of  the  first  oper- 
ational facilities.  These  were  the  two 
tanks  and  three  magnet  coils  of  the 
XAX  development  plant  with  auxiliary 
supporting  units  to  be  used  for  train- 
ing production  plant  workers.  At  the 
same  time.  Colonel  Nichols  noted 
that  construction  on  the  crucial  main 
Alpha  equipment  was  no  more  than  a 
few  weeks  behind  the  ambitious 
schedules  set  up  by  Groves  earlier  in 
the  year.  Stone  and  Webster  engi- 
neers had  reported  to  him  that  they 


29MDH,    Bk.    5.    Vol.    5,    pp.    3.1    and    3.9-3.10, 
DASA. 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


135 


Excavation  of  Typical  Rocky  Substratum  at  the  Tennessee  Site 


expected  the  first  Alpha  racetrack  to 
be  operational  by  1  December  1943. 
The  only  disquieting  note  in  Nichols's 
optimistic  September  estimate  was 
mention  of  discovery  of  some  "bugs" 
when  the  XAX  tanks  underwent  their 
initial  test  operation. ^° 

Partly  on  the  basis  of  this  impres- 
sive progress,  General  Groves  author- 
ized start  of  work  on  four  of  the  im- 
proved Alpha  Il-type  racetracks  and 
two  additional  Beta  units  in  Septem- 
ber. Stone  and  Webster  organized  a 
whole  new  field  force  and  the  district 
engineer  reorganized  the  CEW  Con- 
struction Division,  enlarging  its  per- 
sonnel and  establishing  separate  con- 


30  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpt  on  DSM  Proj,  Sep  43, 
MDR,  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  5,  p.  3.16  and  .App.  Dll 
(Chart.  Employees  on  Stone  and  Webster's  Payroll). 
DASA;  Memo,  Kellev  to  Marsden,  sub:  Summary  of 
V-12  Proj  as  of  9  Aug  43,  same  date,  MDR. 


struction  divisions  to  monitor  the 
three  major  building  projects  in 
progress  at  the  Tennessee  site:  the 
electromagnetic,  gaseous  diffusion, 
and  plutonium  semiworks  facilities. 
Colonel  George  continued  as  head  of 
the  newly  formed  Electromagnetic 
Construction  Division,  but  with  addi- 
tional officers  assigned  to  branches  to 
monitor  Stone  and  Webster's  nine 
construction  subunits  and  a  special 
expediting  section.  Thus,  as  Stone 
and  Webster's  engineers  prepared  to 
carry  out  a  test  run  of  the  nearly  com- 
pleted Alpha  I  unit,  District  officials 
were  confident  that  the  electromag- 
netic project  was  well  on  the  way  to 
successful  completion.  Had  they  taken 
more  careful  note  of  the  "bugs"  that 
persisted  in  the  XAX  calutron  test  op- 
erations, they  might  have  been  better 


136 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


prepared  for  setbacks  the  project  was 
to  suffer  in  the  months  ahead. ^^ 

The  first  of  the  unanticipated  prob- 
lems with  the  newly  completed  Alpha 
I  racetrack  was  reported  to  Colonel 
Nichols  in  early  November.  A  few 
days  after  they  had  started  test  runs, 
plant  engineers  discovered  that  the 
14-ton  calutron  tanks,  which  stood 
back  to  back  between  the  coils,  had 
moved  apart  as  much  as  3  inches, 
causing  a  tremendous  strain  on  the 
piping  used  to  maintain  a  vacuum  in 
the  tanks.  After  investigation  they  de- 
termined that  the  powerful  magnetic 
field  set  up  in  the  racetrack  had  cre- 
ated such  a  force  between  the  tanks 
that  they  "walked"  away  from  each 
other  when  they  were  jarred,  as 
during  installation  or  removal  of  a 
door.  Following  a  few  days  study  of 
the  phenomenon.  Stone  and  Webster 
reported  that  the  adverse  effects  of 
the  magnetic  field  could  be  overcome 
by  installing  heavy  steel  tie  straps  to 
hold  the  tanks  firmly  in  place. ^^ 

No  such  simple  solution  was  possi- 
ble, however,  for  the  second  major 
problem  that  the  November  test  oper- 
ations revealed.  The  symptoms  were 
intermittent  electrical  shorts  with 
wide  fluctuations  in  magnetic  field 
strength  as  successive  magnet  coils 
were  energized.  Colonel  Nichols  re- 
ported the  problem  to  General 
Groves  in  early  December,  by  which 
time  the  complete  failure  of  several 
coils  seemed  to  threaten  the  whole 
future  of  the  process.  Plant  engineers 
indicated  that  dirt  in  the  oil  coolant 


inside  the  coils  was  probably  the 
major  cause  of  the  malfunction  and 
the  only  sure  cure  was  to  drain  the  oil 
and  dry  out  the  coils.  Very  much 
upset  by  the  ominous  developments, 
the  Manhattan  commander  directed 
Nichols  to  take  all  measures  neces- 
sary, pending  his  own  arrival  at  the 
site  to  discuss  such  other  steps  as 
might  be  required,  including  "a  reor- 
ganization of  personnel  in  charge  of 
the  Y-12  [electromagnetic]  construc- 
tion work  so  that  similar  occurrences 
[would]  be  avoided  in  the  future."  ^^ 

Groves  arrived  at  the  Clinton 
Works  on  14  December  for  a  hurried 
two-day  inspection  visit.  On  hand  al- 
ready were  project  engineer  August 
Klein  from  Stone  and  Webster  and  a 
team  of  experts  from  Allis-Chalmers, 
where  the  unsatisfactory  coils  had 
been  manufactured.  Their  further 
checking.  Groves  learned,  had  re- 
vealed that  the  trouble  stemmed  not 
only  from  mill  scale  and  rust  in  the 
cooling  oil  but  also  from  moisture  in 
the  cloth  and  fiberboard  insulation, 
and  too  close  winding  of  wire.  Groves 
set  in  motion  a  thorough  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  Clinton  electromagnetic 
administrative  team  and  reemphasized 
his  earlier  directive  to  Lawrence  that 
he  concentrate  Radiation  Laboratory 
resources  on  finding  a  solution  for 
the  defects  in  the  racetrack 
equipment.^'* 


3>Org  Charts,  U.S.  Engrs  Office,  MD,  15  Aug 
and  1  Nov  43,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  5,  pp.  6.1- 
6.4  and  Apps.  D7  and  DIO,  DASA. 

^^Min,  Coordination  Committee  Mtg,  11  Nov  43, 
MDR;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpt  on  DSM  Proj,  Nov- 
Dec  43,  MDR. 


"Msgs.  Nichols  to  Groves  and  reply.  6  Dec  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp.  412.41   (Motors),  MDR. 

^''Msg,  Nichols  to  Groves  (at  Hanford),  6  Dec  43; 
Msg,  Lt  Col  Thomas  T.  Crenshaw  (Ex  Off,  CEW)  to 
Groves,  [probably  7  or  8  Dec  43];  Memo,  Peterson 
to  Groves,  9  Dec  43.  All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp, 412.41  (Motors),  MDR.  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  5, 
pp.  3.10-3.11,  DASA.  Groves  Diary,  14-15  Dec  43, 
LRG. 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


137 


Alpha  I  Racetrack,  Electromagnetic  Plant,  CEW 


A  new  administrative  hierarchy  re- 
sulted from  the  reorganization  of  the 
eletromagnetic  team,  which  took 
effect  in  January  1944.  Lt.  Col.  John 
S.  Hodgson,  who  had  considerable 
experience  as  a  civilian  contractor,  re- 
placed Colonel  George  as  chief  of  the 
Electromagnetic  Construction  Divi- 
sion; Maj.  William  A.  Bonnett  moved 
up  from  a  position  as  a  liaison  officer 
with  Stone  and  Webster  field  units  to 
be  Hodgson's  assistant;  and  Maj. 
Walter  J.  Williams,  who  had  had  as- 
signments on  a  number  of  ordnance 
plant  construction  projects,  took  over 
responsibility  for  completion  of  the 
original  electromagnetic  plant.  Only 
Maj.  Mark  C.  Fox,  who  had  served  as 
area  engineer  on  other  Corps  of  En- 
gineers projects,  continued  in  his  re- 
cently   assigned    task    of    overseeing 


construction  of  extensions  to  the 
original  electromagnetic  plant.  At  the 
same  time.  Stone  and  Webster 
brought  in  Frank  R.  Creedon  from 
the  synthetic  rubber  progam  to  be 
general  manager  of  all  the  company's 
operations  at  the  Clinton  Works. 
Creedon  had  had  an  earlier  associa- 
tion with  General  Groves,  having 
worked  as  a  civilian  employee  of  the 
Army's  Construction  Division  on  ord- 
nance projects  before  1942. 

The  first  big  task  facing  the  new 
team  was  how  to  solve  the  technical 
defects  in  the  Alpha  I  electrical  equip- 
ment. Project  technicians  decided  the 
only  sure  remedy  was  to  return  the 
malfunctioning  magnet  coils  to  Allis- 
Chalmers'  Milwaukee  plant  for  clean- 
ing and  rewinding,  as  well  as  to  have 
equipment     crews     disassemble     and 


138 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


clean  all  oil  lines  in  the  racetrack 
building.  It  took  about  three  months 
to  complete  these  corrective  meas- 
ures, and  thus  the  first  Alpha  I  race- 
track was  not  hilly  operative  again 
until  early  March  1944.^^ 

With  the  distressing  days  of  techni- 
cal problems  in  the  past,  by  spring 
the  somber  mood  of  Manhattan  and 
Stone  and  Webster  officials  concern- 
ing the  electromagnetic  method  had 
dissipated,  and  they  were  enjoying  a 
revived  sense  of  optimism.  One  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  the  process  had  been 
that  the  production  plant  could  be 
built  in  segments  which  would 
become  operational  as  soon  as  they 
were  completed,  making  possible  the 
early  detection  of  defects  and  the  ad- 
dition of  indicated  improvements. 
And  now,  because  the  trying  experi- 
ences of  Stone  and  Webster  engi- 
neers with  the  first  Alpha  I  racetrack 
had  enhanced  their  understanding  of 
the  problems  and  the  reasons  for 
them,  they  were  able  to  make  changes 
in  equipment  handling  and  installa- 
tion techniques  for  subsequent  race- 
tracks. On  the  second  Alpha  I  race- 
track, for  example,  the  engineers  in- 
troduced much  more  rigid  standards 
of  cleanliness,  including  such  meas- 
ures as  drying  out  pipe  lines  by  circu- 
lating preheated  oil  through  them 
and  adding  filters  for  each  coil.^^ 


»^Org  Chart,  U.S.  Engrs  OfTice,  MD,  15  Feb  44, 
MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  5,  pp.  3.10-3.11  and  6.1, 
DASA;  Fine  and  Remington,  Corps  of  Engineers:  Con- 
struction, pp.  684-86;  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  be  Told,  p. 
102  and  427;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpt  on  DSM  Proj, 
Mar  44,  MDR. 

'«MDH.  Bk.  5,  Vol.  5,  pp.  3.11,  DASA;  Memo,  E. 
W.  SeckendorfT  (Y-12  Process  Engr)  to  T.  R. 
Thornburg  (Gen  Supt,  V'-12,  Stone  and  Webster), 
sub:  Detailed  Method  ot  Cleaning  and  Altering  Pipe 
at  Racetrack  B-Bldg  9201-1,  CEW,  Area  V-12,  30 
Dec  43,  Incl  to  Memo,  Crenshaw  to  Groves,   1  Jan 


Initial  failure  of  Alpha  I  also  reaf- 
firmed a  cardinal  principle  of  General 
Groves's  administrative  policy  for  the 
atomic  project.  For  months,  the  Man- 
hattan commander  had  been  empha- 
sizing that  the  major  resources  and 
personnel  at  the  atomic  research  lab- 
oratories should  be  concentrated  on 
the  single  objective  of  securing  pro- 
duction of  militarily  significant 
amounts  of  fissionable  materials  in 
time  to  be  of  use  during  the  war.  On 
more  than  one  occasion  during  his 
visits  to  the  Radiation  Laboratory  in 
the  fall  of  1943,  Groves  had  reminded 
Lawrence's  scientific  staff  that  the 
Army  was  not  interested  in  advancing 
pure  science.  Their  mission,  he 
stated,  once  the  research  and  devel- 
opment for  the  production  plant  was 
completed,  was  to  support  in  what- 
ever way  was  necessary  the  design, 
construction,  and  operation  of  that 
plant.  The  natural  tendency  of  the 
Radiation  Laboratory  scientists  was  to 
resist  limiting  themselves  solely  to  so- 
called  debugging  activities  for  the 
Tennessee  plant,  but  the  crisis  caused 
by  Alpha  I's  failure  forced  Lawrence 
to  push  new  research  entirely  into  the 
background  and,  in  December,  to 
completely  redefine  laboratory  prior- 
ities in  terms  of  two  objectives:  in- 
creasing the  output  and  efficiency  of 
the  electromagnetic  plant;  and  devel- 
oping new  ideas,  methods,  and  engi- 
neering designs  for  expanding  that 
plant. ^"^ 


44.    Admm    Files,    Gen    Corresp,    337    (Kellex    LC), 
MDR. 

^^  Min,  Coordination  Committee  Mtg,  17  Nov  43, 
MDR;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpt  on  DSM  Proj,  Nov- 
Dec  43  and  Feb  44,  MDR;  Ltr,  Lawrence  to  Nichols, 
22  Mar  44.  MDR. 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


139 


The  Army's  prompt  administrative 
measures  to  counter  the  adverse  con- 
sequences of  Alpha  I's  failure  proved 
to  be  highly  effective.  The  engineers 
were  successful  in  making  the  second 
Alpha  I  operational  by  the  end  of  Jan- 
uary 1944,  the  first  Beta  and  the  first 
and  third  Alpha  I  in  March,  and  the 
fourth  Alpha  I  in  April.  Impressed 
with  the  rapid  progress  being 
achieved,  Colonel  Nichols  reported  to 
Groves  that  he  was  now  convinced 
that  the  prediction  given  to  President 
Roosevelt  in  December  1942 — com- 
pletion of  an  atomic  weapon  by  early 
1945 — would  be  realized  if  persisting 
manpower  shortages  could  be 
overcome.^® 

Meanwhile,  Stone  and  Webster  had 
been  moving  ahead  with  construction 
of  other  major  elements  of  the  elec- 
tromagnetic plant.  Construction  time 
for  building  the  extension  units — the 
Alpha  II  racetracks — was  far  less  in 
comparison  to  that  required  for 
Alpha  I.  The  Stone  and  Webster 
crews'  rapid  progress  was  in  part  due 
to  certain  design  modifications,  such 
as  using  cement  asbestos  brick  for  the 
outer  siding  of  buildings  and  making 
the  racetrack  shape  rectangular  rather 
than  oval.  Also,  the  experience  gained 
on  Alpha  I  expedited  installation  of 
equipment  in  Alpha  II.  The  first  race- 
track in  the  extension  plant  began  op- 
erating in  July  1944  and  all  four  were 
ready  for  operation  by  1  October. ^^ 

At  the  same  time.  Stone  and  Web- 
ster and  its  subcontractors  construct- 
ed the  Beta  units,  where  the  Alpha- 


^^  Disi  Kngr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Jan  and 
Mar  44,  MDR,  Rpt,  Nichols,  sub:  Info  for  Groves,  8 
Apr  44,  OCX;  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  28, 
Tab  A,  MDR. 

39MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  5,  pp.  3.17-3.20,  3.22,  5.2, 
DASA. 


processed  material  would  be  further 
enriched,  and  built  the  facilities  for 
chemical  preparation  and  recovery  for 
both  Alpha  and  Beta  plants.  In  spite 
of  several  changes  in  plans,  resulting 
in  considerable  expansion  of  the  Beta 
and  chemical  facilities,  the  Electro- 
magnetic Construction  Division  kept 
the  work  on  or  even  ahead  of  sched- 
ule, avoiding  delays  in  processing  ma- 
terial from  the  Alpha  plants.  From 
original  plans  in  1943  for  only  a 
single  Beta  unit  to  process  Alpha  I 
output,  the  number  grew  to  four:  one 
for  Alpha  II;  another  to  handle  addi- 
tional output  from  Alphas  I  and  II 
that  resulted  from  using  partially  en- 
riched feed  material  from  the  gaseous 
diffusion  plant;  and  still  another  in 
1945  so  that  there  would  be  enough 
Beta  facilities  to  process  enriched  ma- 
terial coming  directly  from  the  diffu- 
sion plants.  Similarly,  each  expansion 
of  the  Alpha  and  Beta  units  required 
an  increase  in  the  number  of  chemical 
and  other  processing  facilities,  giving 
the  division  additional  work  in  expe- 
diting procurement,  monitoring  revi- 
sion in  contracts,  and  inspecting  com- 
pleted construction.  This  continuing 
high-level  of  construction  activity  oc- 
casioned Colonel  Hodgson  to  reorga- 
nize his  division  in  late  1944  and  to 
establish  five  separate  branches 
(structures,  electrical,  expediting, 
process  piping,  and  mechanical).  Not 
until  early  1945,  when  the  Military 
Policy  Committee  decided  that  the  in- 
dicated successful  operation  of  the 
gaseous  diffusion  and  plutonium 
plants  would  make  further  large-scale 
expansion  of  electromagnetic  produc- 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Electromagnetic  Plant  Under  Construction 


tion  facilities  unnecessary,  did  the  di- 
vision's workload  ease  significantly. ^° 

Plant  Operation 

Terms   of  the  June    1943    contract 
for  operation   of  the  electromagnetic 


*°Ibid..  pp.  3.13-3.15,  3.20-3.23,  App.  D6  (Tab- 
ulation of  Bldg  Statistics),  DASA;  Dist  Engr,  Month- 
ly Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Oct  43  and  Aug  and  Nov  44, 
MDR;  MPC  Min,  10  May  44  and  25  Feb  45,  MDR; 
Completion  Rpts,  Stone  and  Webster,  sub:  CEW, 
Contract  W-7401-eng-13,  1946,  pp.  49-50,  and 
Contract  W-14-108-eng-60,  1946,  pp.  6-8,  OROO; 
Rpt,  W.  M.  Brobeck  and  W  B.  Reynolds,  sub:  On 
Future  Development  of  Electromagnetic  System  of 
Tube  Alloys  Isotope  Separation,  15  Jan  45,  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Fldr  10,  MDR. 


plant  provided  that  Tennessee  East- 
man operate  it  on  a  cost-plus-fixed- 
fee  basis,  serve  as  a  consultant  on 
plant  design,  obtain  and  train  operat- 
ing personnel,  and  carry  on  research 
to  improve  the  process  and  its  prod- 
uct. For  performing  these  services, 
the  government  agreed  to  pay  the 
firm  a  basic  operating  fee  of  $22,500 
each  month  plus  $7,500  for  each 
racetrack  up  to  seven  and  $4,000  for 
each  one  over  that  number.*^ 


"»  WD  Contract  W-7401-eng-23,  7  Jun  43,  with 
supps.,  OROO;  MDH,  Bk,  5,  Vol.  6.  "Operation," 
pp.  2.2-2.5  and  3.1-3.5,  DASA. 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


141 


Preparations 

In  early  1943,  when  Tennessee 
Eastman  initiated  preliminary  oper- 
ational activities  at  the  Tennessee  site 
and  at  the  Berkeley  and  Rochester  re- 
search facilities,  the  district  engineer 
formed  a  CEW  Division  in  the  New 
York  office  and  assigned  Major  Kelley 
as  division  chief  to  supervise  electro- 
magnetic operations.  Kelley's  division 
not  only  monitored  the  contractor's 
activities  relating  to  administration, 
chemical  processes,  electrical  process- 
es and  plants,  and  special  accounts 
but  also  established  liaison  with  its 
Berkeley  and  Boston  administrative 
units  that  coordinated  with  the  Radi- 
ation Laboratory  and  Stone  and  Web- 
ster. Tennessee  Eastman's  Boston 
staff,  however,  moved  to  the  Tennes- 
see site  in  August,  in  keeping  with  the 
firm's  frequently  expressed  desire  to 
center  its  plant  operations  activities 
there. *2 

During  construction  Major  Kelley 
and  his  operating  unit  staff  were  busy 
assisting  Tennessee  Eastman  in  re- 
cruiting and  training  personnel  to  op- 
erate the  Alpha,  Beta,  and  chemical 
process  equipment.  Early  estimates  of 
the  number  of  employees  needed 
were  far  too  low  and  requirements 
were  repeatedly  revised  upward.  Al- 
though recruiting  was  carried  on  in 
all  sections  of  the  country  through  re- 


*^  Subsection  based  on  Org  Chart,  U.S.  Engrs 
Office,  MD,  1  Nov  43,  MDR,  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  5, 
Sec.  3,  and  Vol.  6,  pp.  3.3-3.5  and  8.1-8.3,  DASA; 
Min,  Coordination  Committee  Mtgs,  23  Jan,  6  Mar, 
and  24  Jun  43,  MDR;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on 
DSM  Proj,  Sep  43  and  Mar  44,  MDR;  Min,  Special 
Progress  Mtg,  5  Aug  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
337  (Mtgs  and  Confs-Univ  of  Calif),  MDR;  Hewlett 
and  Anderson,  S'eu<  World,  p.  162;  Rpt,  F.  T. 
Howard,  sub:  The  DSM  Proj,  Synthetic  Catalyst  Diy, 
22  Apr  43,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr 
28,  Tab  A,  MDR. 


gional  offices  of  the  United  States 
Employment  Service,  the  best  results 
were  attained  in  Knoxville  and  vicini- 
ty. For  the  many  jobs  requiring  tech- 
nical knowledge  and  background,  the 
electromagnetic  project  had  to  resort 
to  procurement  through  military 
channels.  Many  of  the  scientifically 
trained  personnel  in  the  Manhattan 
District's  Special  Engineer  Detach- 
ment (SED)  at  the  Clinton  Works 
were  assigned  to  work  in  the  plant, 
reaching  a  total  of  450  SED  enlisted 
personnel  by  August  1945.  The  Dis- 
trict also  assisted  in  the  temporary  as- 
signment of  technically  trained  Navy 
officers  to  the  plant  in  1944,  their 
number  reaching  a  maximum  of  143 
in  July  of  that  year.*^ 

Tennessee  Eastman  made  a  major 
effort  to  develop  a  training  program 
for  the  thousands  of  operators  who 
would  be  required  when  the  plant  was 
ready  for  full-scale  operation.  Work- 
ing closely  with  Radiation  Laboratory 
scientists,  the  firm's  Berkeley  staff  laid 
the  groundwork  for  systematic  train- 
ing of  workers  and  supervisory  per- 
sonnel. While  many  practiced  with 
the  Alpha  experimental  equipment  at 
Berkeley,  others  went  to  the  Univer- 
sity of  California's  Davis  campus  to 
learn  chemical  processing  techniques. 
Radiation  Laboratory  scientists  and 
Manhattan  District  representatives 
carefully  reviewed  all  training  materi- 
al, the  latter  group  giving  special 
attention  to  the  security  problem. 
Tennessee  Eastman  technicians  delib- 
erately compiled  the  training  material 
to  give  the  would-be  operator  only 
the    information    needed    to    perform 


*^  For  a  more  detailed  account  of  manpower  re- 
cruitment, and  the  SED's  formation  and  organiza- 
tion, see  Ch.  XVI. 


142 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


the  job,  without  reveaHng  the  true 
character  or  purpose  of  the  end  prod- 
uct. Experimentation  demonstrated 
that  trainees  with  prehminary  orienta- 
tion in  the  nature  of  the  electromag- 
netic process  made  the  most  rapid 
progress.  Meanwhile,  by  September 
1943,  intensive  recruiting  efforts  by 
the  company  had  resulted  in  the 
hiring  of  some  eighteen  hundred  op- 
erator trainees,  most  of  them  from 
the  Knoxville  area. 

Some  preliminary  instruction  took 
place  in  facilities  of  the  University  of 
Tennessee,  because  the  large-scale 
training  program  at  the  plant  site  did 
not  start  until  early  fall.  By  that  time 
hundreds  of  trainees  were  on  hand  to 
begin  training  on  two  experimental 
XAX  electromagnetic  production 
tanks  that  had  started  operating  in 
the  development  plant.  Tennessee 
Eastman  moved  all  but  a  few  of  its 
personnel  from  Berkeley  to  the  Ten- 
nessee site  to  participate  in  training 
the  twenty-five  hundred  operators 
deemed  necessary  for  the  five  Alpha  I 
racetracks.  With  the  addition  of  the 
Alpha  II  and  Beta  buildings,  the  train- 
ee program  expanded  to  provide  sev- 
eral times  that  many  operators.  By 
early  1944,  Tennessee  Eastman's  pay- 
roll had  increased  to  ten  thousand 
and  by  mid- 1945  it  would  rise  to 
more  than  twenty-five  thousand. 

The  typical  operator  trainee  was  a 
woman,  recently  graduated  from  a 
nearby  Tennessee  high  school,  with 
no  scientific  training  whatsoever. 
Using  one  of  the  XAX  electromagnet- 
ic tanks  in  the  development  plant,  the 
instructional  staff  taught  her  how  to 
operate  complex  control  panels  in  the 
calutron  cubicles  adjacent  to  the  race- 
tracks. They  gave  her  only  informa- 
tion essential  to  her  task  as  an  opera- 


tor and,  for  security  reasons,  actually 
mislead  her  as  to  the  real  purpose 
and  character  of  the  product.  The 
training  program  was  surprisingly 
successful,  supplying  operators  on 
schedule  for  each  Alpha  and  Beta 
racetrack  as  it  went  into  operation. 

Production  Activities 

Starting  up  in  late  1943,  the  elec- 
tromagnetic chemical  units  eventually 
were  producing  thousands  of  pounds 
of  the  charge  material  necessary  for 
the  production  operation  of  the  race- 
tracks. The  first  really  effective  pro- 
duction of  the  U-235-enriched  final 
product  came  in  late  January,  when 
the  second  Alpha  I  racetrack  began 
operating.  In  the  five-month  period 
following,  as  the  remaining  three 
Alpha  I  and  the  first  two  Beta  tracks 
became  fully  operational,  production 
steadily  increased.  And  by  mid- 1944, 
the  Army  could  view  the  electromag- 
netic start-up  operations  as,  in  the 
main,  successful.'*'* 

Manhattan  District  officials,  howev- 
er, were  unprepared  for  the  almost 
continuous  problems  that  arose  as  the 
electromagnetic  plant  moved  into  the 
sustained  production  phase  of  its  op- 
eration. One  mechanical  or  equip- 
ment failure  after  another  plagued 
plant  operations;  short  circuits  and 
shortages,  breakdowns  and  breakages 
cropped  up  on  all  sides.  In  spite  of 
the  best  efforts  of  Tennessee  Eastman 
and  District  procurement  officials,  the 
spare  parts  situation  skirted  the  edge 
of  chaos  for  months.  Lack  of  experi- 
ence, of  standardization,  and  of  a  suf- 


""MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  6,  pp.  4.2  and  4.4-4.5, 
DASA;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Jan- 
Jun  44,  passim,  MDR. 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


143 


CEW  Training  Facilities  (background ),  where  electromagnetic  plant  employees  received 
preliminary  instruction.  District  headquarters  buildings  are  in  the  foreground. 


ficicnt  number  of  suppliers  all  con- 
tributed to  the  severe  parts  procure- 
ment difficulties.  Nevertheless,  the 
District's  electromagnetic  staff  and 
Tennessee  Eastman — working  in  close 
coordination — managed  sufficiently  to 
overcome  the  adverse  effects  of  these 
many  problems  so  that  in  March  1944 
plant  workers  shipped  the  first  of  sev- 
eral hundred  grams  of  Alpha  product, 
containing  13  to  15  percent  U-235,  to 
Los  Alamos.  Three  months  later  the 
first  shipment  of  the  much  more 
highly  enriched  Beta  product  reached 
the  New  Mexico  laboratory.*^ 

But  Manhattan  and  Tennessee 
Eastman  officials  were  well  aware  that 
this  output  of  sample  quantities  rep- 
resented only  the  first  steps  in  bring- 


*s  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  6,  pp.  4.2  and  4.4-4.5, 
DASA;  Memo,  J.  C.  White  (Gen  Mgr,  Tenn  East)  to 
Groves,  28  Jun  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  095 
(TEC),  MDR. 


ing  the  electromagnetic  plant  up  to  a 
maximum  rate  of  production,  a  com- 
plicated undertaking  with  pitfalls  at 
every  turn.*^  They  readily  perceived 
that  part  of  the  difficulty  was  inherent 
in  the  basic  nature  of  the  process  that 
used  large  complex  machines  and  sig- 
nificant quantities  of  electric  power 
and  raw  materials  to  isolate  an  infin- 
itesmally  small  amount  of  final  prod- 
uct. The  basic  feed  material,  orange- 
colored  uranium  oxide  shipped  in 
from  refineries  operating  under  direc- 
tion of  Manhattan's  Madison  Square 
Area  Engineers  Office,  moved 
through  a  series  of  very  complex 
steps.  A  chemical  preparation  process 
converted  it  into  a  gaseous  form,  ura- 
nium tetrachloride,  which  plant  work- 


*®  Paragraphs  on  electromagnetic  plant  oper- 
ations based  primarily  on  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  6,  Sec. 
4,  DASA. 


144 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


ers  then  fed  into  the  Alpha  racetracks. 
Here  part  of  the  feed  material  sepa- 
rated, while  the  rest  adhered  to  vari- 
ous parts  of  the  interior  of  the  calu- 
tron,  where  it  had  to  be  recovered  for 
recycle.  The  separated  portion  went 
to  the  Beta  chemical  preparation 
stage  and  then  into  the  Beta  race- 
tracks for  further  separation.  That 
separated  portion  emerged  as  U-235 
final  product  and,  after  concentration, 
workers  shipped  it  to  the  Los  Alamos 
Laboratory.  The  rest  had  to  be  re- 
covered, recycled  through  the  Beta 
racetracks,  and  concentrated  for 
shipment. 

Only  1  in  5,825  parts  of  charge  ma- 
terial fed  into  the  Alpha  racetracks 
emerged  as  final  product;  90  percent 
of  the  charge  material  was  left  in  the 
feed  bottles  or  scattered  around  the 
tanks.  Of  the  10  percent  that  passed 
into  the  ion  beams,  only  a  very  small 
quantity  entered  the  receivers.  The 
amount  reaching  the  receivers  was 
limited  by  the  capacity  of  the  calu- 
trons.  It  could  not  be  increased 
except  through  use  of  enriched 
charge  material,  or  by  construction  of 
more  racetracks.  Furthermore,  the 
amount  actually  recovered  from  the 
receivers,  because  of  its  minute  quan- 
tity and  the  essentially  violent  nature 
of  the  process,  could  not  be  made  to 
reach  100  percent  even  by  the  most 
practicable  methods. 

Because  of  the  high  intrinsic  value 
of  the  final  product,  recovery  had  to 
be  as  complete  and  thorough  as  pos- 
sible, yet  with  no  undue  holdup  time 
in  the  chemical  apparatus  to  slow 
down  the  process.  The  Beta  chemistry 
facilities  included  a  salvage  depart- 
ment which  used  batteries  of  extrac- 
tors, reactors,  filters,  centrifuges, 
evaporators,    and    driers    so    that    the 


very  last  traces  of  enriched  uranium 
might  be  recovered.  Justification  for 
these  intensive  efforts  was  demon- 
strated when  worn-out  carbon  receiv- 
er parts  from  the  calutrons  were 
burned.  They  yielded  enough  en- 
riched uranium  to  raise  the  January 
1945  production  a  full  10  percent.*"^ 
Even  under  the  best  of  conditions, 
a  small  amount  of  U-235-enriched 
product  always  remained  in  solutions, 
or  bound  in  solids,  or  adhered  to 
costly  and  scarce  equipment  parts; 
however,  it  was  economically  unfeasi- 
ble for  this  material  to  be  recovered. 
A  certain  percentage  also  remained  in 
that  part  of  the  uranium  feed  matter 
which  passed  through  the  ion  beam 
but  did  not  enter  the  receivers.  It  was 
imperative  that  this  material — consti- 
tuting nine-tenths  of  the  uranium  fed 
into  the  Alpha  calutrons  and  seven- 
eighths  of  that  going  into  the  Beta 
racetracks — be  prevented  from  con- 
taminating the  enriched  uranium  and 
be  recovered  and  stored  for  possible 
future  reprocessing.  To  keep  losses  at 
a  minimum  and  to  prevent  theft,  Ten- 
nessee Eastman  instituted  a  strict  ma- 
terial accounting  system.  Stock  room 
employees  inventoried  the  Alpha 
stocks  every  four  weeks,  the  Beta 
every  two  weeks.  In  spite  of  this  care- 
ful check,  surprisingly  large  amounts 
of  material  (17.4  percent  of  Alpha 
product  by  September  1945  and  5.4 
percent  of  Beta  product  by  December 
1946)  were  lost  unavoidably  in  the 
various  kinds  of  wastes  created  by  the 
separation  process  itself.*® 


*''  Memo,  Kelley  to  Groves,  sub:  Present  Status  of 
Beta  Chemistry  Opns,  8  Sep  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  600.1  (Constr  CEW),  MDR;  Hewlett  and 
Anderson,  Xew  World,  pp.  295-96. 

^^  Data  concerning  losses  of  feed  materials  and 
recovery  problems  is  derived  from  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol. 

Continued 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


145 


The  most  crucial  phase  of  the  re- 
covery operation  took  place  in  Beta 
chemistry.  Alpha  workers  moved  the 
final  Alpha  product,  stored  in  receiver 
pockets  on  the  removable  doors  of 
the  Alpha  calutrons,  to  the  Beta 
chemistry  buildings.  After  dismantling 
the  pockets.  Beta  workers  first 
scraped,  bleached,  and  burned  the 
graphite  parts  and  then  leached  and 
electrostripped  the  metal  parts.  Final- 
ly, chemists  processed  the  resulting 
solutions  and  solids  to  extract  all  en- 
riched uranium.  They  then  purified 
this  enriched  uranium  and  converted 
it  into  Beta  feed  material. 

The  Beta  preparatory  chemical 
process  proved  to  be  one  of  the  most 
persistently  troublesome  operations 
in  the  electromagnetic  plant.  The 
process  was  slow,  requiring,  even 
under  optimum  conditions,  about 
three  weeks.  More  worrisome,  howev- 
er, only  about  60  percent  of  the  en- 
riched uranium  brought  from  Alpha 
was  showing  up  as  an  end  product  of 
the  Beta  chemical  process,  causing  a 
serious  shortage  of  feed  material  for 
the  Beta  racetracks.  In  July  1944, 
Groves  himself  went  to  the  Clinton 
Works  to  discuss  the  problem  with 
plant  and  District  officials.  As  a  result, 
Tennessee  Eastman  temporarily  shut 
down  all  Beta  production  in  August 
so  that  company  engineers  and  out- 
side consultants  could  thoroughly 
analyze  the  process  and  equipment. 
Their  investigations  revealed  that  the 
trouble  lay  in  the  overly  complex 
piping  and  equipment  and  in  the 
tendency  of  certain  materials  in  this 
equipment  to  absorb  too  much 
uranium. 


6,    pp.    4.16-4.17    and    App.    C    (with    illustrations), 
DAS  A. 


District  and  Tennessee  Eastman  of- 
ficials immediately  instituted  changes 
in  equipment,  techniques,  and  organi- 
zation to  overcome  these  weaknesses 
in  Beta  chemistry.  Project  engineers 
set  about  removing,  cleaning,  and  re- 
designing piping;  replaced  glass-lined 
tubes  with  pyrex;  put  in  more  parts 
made  of  graphite  from  which  ab- 
sorbed uranium  could  be  recovered 
by  burning;  and  made  other  changes 
to  speed  up  the  process.  For  varying 
periods  during  the  fall  of  1944,  ex- 
perts like  Frank  H.  Spedding,  the 
metallurgist  who  headed  Manhattan's 
research  program  at  Iowa  State  Col- 
lege, and  John  P.  Baxter,  one  of  the 
British  scientists  assisting  in  the  bomb 
development  program,  came  to  the 
Clinton  Works  to  study  Beta  chemis- 
try with  an  eye  to  improving  tech- 
niques employed  in  the  process.  And, 
in  December,  District  officials  negoti- 
ated contracts  with  Johns  Hopkins 
and  Purdue  Universities  to  study 
methods  for  increasing  recovery  and 
reducing  holdup  time  in  the  Beta 
process.  Tennessee  Eastman,  now 
more  fully  aware  of  the  chemical  diffi- 
culties of  isotopic  separation,  com- 
pletely reorganized  its  Clinton  chem- 
istry division  and  greatly  increased 
the  number  of  personnel. 

In  spite  of  the  difficulties  with  Beta 
chemistry  operations,  in  January  1945 
the  district  engineer  reported  to  the 
Manhattan  commander  that  there  had 
been  a  dramatic  increase  in  Beta  pro- 
duction during  the  second  half  of 
1944,  with  output  being  about  60 
percent  greater  at  the  close  of  De- 
cember. This  increase  was  attributa- 
ble primarily  to  the  much  higher  pro- 
ductive capacity  of  Alpha  II  calutrons, 
and  the  fact  that  all  Alpha  II's  were 


146 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


fully  operational  by  November.  Con- 
sequently, Beta  output  in  November 
was  more  than  ten  times  the  July  rate, 
increasing  even  more  in  December  to 
twice  the  November  rate.  The  Alpha 
II's,  however,  were  far  from  trouble- 
free.  The  major  problem  experienced 
had  to  do  with  the  insulators  burning 
out  at  a  high  rate,  but  the  engineers 
quickly  corrected  this  defect  by  rec- 
ommending that  zircon  be  substituted 
for  the  less  durable  material  in  the 
bushings. ^^ 

Not  all  of  the  production  problems 
of  the  electromagnetic  project  were 
mechanical  or  technical  in  nature. 
When  the  spare  parts  crisis  occurred 
in  June  1944,  Groves  looked  into 
project  management  by  Tennessee 
Eastman  and  District  officials.  Follow- 
ing a  visit  to  the  plant,  he  wrote  to 
Conant  that  he  had  observed  a 
number  of  ways  in  which  he  thought 
production  might  be  increased.  Su- 
pervisors ought  to  make  more  fre- 
quent inspections,  especially  in  instal- 
lation and  servicing  of  calutrons. 
More  should  be  done  to  build  up  and 
maintain  employee  morale.  Lack  of 
sufficient  organization  charts  and  the 
presence  of  "too  many  people"  in  the 
operating  rooms  gave  Groves  the  im- 
pression that  the  plant  managers  were 
not  making  the  most  efficient  use  of 
personnel.  Also,  he  wondered  if  Fred- 
erick R.  Conklin,  the  Tennessee  East- 
man works  manager,  and  Major 
Kelley,  chief  of  the  District's  Electro- 
magnetic   Operations    Division,    were 


*^  Memos  for  File,  Kelley,  sub:  Notes  on  3  and  14 
Jul  Confs,  4  and  15  Jul  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  337  (LC),  MDR;  Memo,  Kelley  to  Groves,  sub: 
Present  Status  of  Beta  Chemistry  Opns,  8  Sep  44, 
MDR;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Jul 
44-Jan  45,  passim,  MDR;  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 
Xeu'  World,  pp.  295-96;  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  6,  pp.  4.9- 
4.10  and  5.3,  DASA. 


"too  similar  in  disposition,"  noting 
that  neither  Conklin  nor  Kelley  was  a 
"hard  driving,  optimistic  executive. 
Instead  of  setting  an  impossible  goal 
and  then  breaking  their  hearts  to 
almost  achieve  it,  they  set  a  nice, 
comfortable  goal  making  plenty  of  al- 
lowances for  difficulties  and  then  feel 
very  proud  of  themselves  for  having 
been  proven  right  in  their  pessimistic 
outlook."  ^° 

General  Groves  took  no  immediate 
steps  to  institute  major  changes  in 
management.  He  could  not  overlook 
the  fact  that  Major  Kelley  got  along 
extremely  well  with  the  key  executives 
of  Tennessee  Eastman  and  also  was 
held  in  very  high  regard  by  Lawrence 
and  the  staff  of  the  Radiation  Labora- 
tory. It  was  not  until  September,  with 
the  spare  parts  problem  partially  re- 
lieved and  the  Beta  chemistry  bottle- 
neck on  the  way  to  solution,  that  the 
Manhattan  commander  directed  the 
district  engineer  to  replace  Kelley. 
Colonel  Nichols  selected  Lt.  Col. 
John  R.  Ruhoff,  a  chemical  engineer 
by  profession,  because  of  his  familiar- 
ity with  electromagnetic  problems;  he 
had  been  assistant  chief  of  the  Dis- 
trict's Materials  Section  and,  since 
1943,  chief  of  the  Madison  Square 
Area  Engineers  Office  where  he  was 
responsible  for  overseeing  the  provi- 
sion of  feed  materials  for  the  electro- 
magnetic process.  In  early  1945, 
Ruhoff  assumed  responsibility  for 
overseeing  all  electromagnetic  activi- 
ties at  the  Clinton  Works  and  contin- 
ued in  that  post  until  the  end  of  the 
war.   Major  Kelley  did   not   leave   the 


^°  Ltr,  Groves  to  Conant,  5  Jun  44,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  400.17  (Mfg-Prod-Fab),  MDR;  Ltr, 
White  to  Groves,  28  Jun  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp, 095  (TEC  LC),  MDR. 


THE  ELECTROMAGNETIC  PROCESS 


147 


Electromagnetic  Plant  in  Full  Operation 


Manhattan  Project,  but  replaced 
Ruhoff  as  head  of  the  Madison 
Square  Office. ^^ 

Although  there  was  a  gradual,  but 
not  spectacular,  improvement  in  elec- 
tromagnetic production,  intermittent 
expressions  of  dissatisfaction  with  the 
way  the  plant  was  operating  contin- 
ued. For  example,  British  scientists 
working  at  the  Radiation  Laboratory 
came  away  from  a  visit  to  the  plant 
highly  critical  of  certain  design  fea- 
tures of  process  equipment  and  of  the 
alleged  gross  inefficiency  of  the  serv- 
ice crews.  Marcus  Oliphant,  head  of 
the  British  group,  also  found  serious 
fault  with  personnel  and  organization. 


He  wrote  to  Sir  James  Chadwick  in 
November  1944,  expressing  concern 
at  the  "poor  quality  of  the  higher 
grade  personnel  in  TEC  [Tennessee 
Eastman  Corporation]  .  .  .  [and]  the 
clumsiness  of  the  army  organization, 
which  neither  controls  nor  checks  the 
operation  except  in  a  very  desultory 
and  inefficient  manner."  ^^ 

Partially  as  a  reaction  to  this  con- 
tinuing criticism,  but  chiefly  as  a  re- 
flection of  frayed  nerves  under  the 
long  strain,  Tennessee  Eastman  ex- 
ecutives complained  bitterly  in  April 
1945  to  Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  F.  Farrell, 


^'  Llr,  Lawrence  to  Nichols,  12  Jul  44,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  020  (MED-Org),  MDR;  MDH, 
Bk.  5,  Vol.  6,  p.  8.1,  DASA. 


"Ltr,  Oliphant  to  Chadwick,  2  Nov  44,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Chadwick,  J),  MDR; 
Baxter,  Notes  on  Alpha  and  Beta  Output,  6  Nov  44, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  {V-12),  MDR. 
See  also  Interv,  Author  with  Dr.  Elkin  Burckhardt 
(physicist,  V-12),  CMH. 


148 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


who  had  been  serving  as  Groves's 
deputy  since  February,  that  the  firm 
was  not  getting  the  recognition  it  de- 
served for  what  it  had  accompHshed 
at  the  CHnton  Works.  Operation  of 
the  electromagnetic  plant  should  be 
viewed  for  what  it  actually  was,  a 
huge  pilot  plant,  not  a  normal  indus- 
trial operation.  While,  undoubtedly, 
there  were  deficiencies  that  the  firm 
could  correct,  there  were  also  handi- 
caps which  it  could  not  possibly  over- 
come. The  plant  had  been  designed 
with  few  interchangeable  parts;  the 
damage  to  equipment  had  been 
greater  than  projected;  and  the  pro- 
gram had  been  constantly  changing, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  recent  shifts  to 
thermal  and  gaseous  diffusion  feed 
materials.  In  the  light  of  all  these 
mitigating  factors,  they  were  especial- 
ly disturbed  by  the  implication  of 
General  Groves's  remark  to  the  oper- 
ating supervisors  that  "they  should 
work  until  they  fell  into  their  graves 
just  as  the  war  was  over."  ^^ 

The  criticisms  and  complaints 
began  to  lose  some  of  their  sting  by 
late  spring  of  1945  as  rapidly  increas- 
ing production  provided  concrete  evi- 
dence that  the  plant  was  going  to  be 
a    success.    In  January,    all    the    race- 


tracks had  demonstrated  their  ability 
to  perform  at  predicted  capacity,  even 
though  delays  in  servicing,  chemistry, 
and  procurement  of  parts  still  im- 
posed a  drag  on  full  production.  In 
February,  the  first  slightly  enriched 
(1.4  percent)  uranium  feed  had  come 
from  the  new  thermal  diffusion  plant, 
and  in  March  the  first  enhanced 
(5  percent  and  up)  material  from 
the  gaseous  diffusion  plant.  In  April, 
the  gaseous  plant  began  turning  out 
uranium  sufficiently  enriched  to  go 
directly  into  the  Beta  racetracks, 
gradually  increasing  product  enrich- 
ment until  it  reached  23  percent  on 
5  August:  the  day  before  the  first 
bomb  was  dropped  on  Japan. 

Because  of  the  higher  enrichment 
of  the  Beta  feed  material,  the  Alpha 
stage  was  no  longer  necessary.  In 
early  September  1945,  with  the  occu- 
pation of  Japan  going  forward  suc- 
cessfully, plant  officials  ordered  the 
Alpha  racetracks  shut  down.  They 
had  produced  more  than  88  kilo- 
grams of  final  product  with  average 
enrichment  of  84.5  percent.  Beta  con- 
tinued in  operation  until  the  end  of 
the  year,  producing  an  additional  953 
kilograms  of  final  product  with  an  en- 
richment of  about  95  percent.  ^"^ 


"Memo,  Farrell  to  Groves,  sub:  Apr  18th  Conf  at 
Clinton,  19  Apr  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  337 
(CEW),  MDR, 


5''MDH,   Bk.   5,   Vol.   6,   pp.   4.13-4.14   and  Top 
Secret  App.,  DASA. 


CHAPTER  VII 


The  Gaseous  Diffusion  Process 


By  late  1942,  atomic  project  leaders 
had  authorized  development  of  four 
technically  and  theoretically  different 
processes — the  electromagnetic,  gase- 
ous and  liquid  thermal  diffusion,  and 
gas  centrifuge — as  potential  methods 
for  producing  sufficient  U-235  of  a 
quality  to  be  militarily  useful  in 
World  War  II.  Work  on  these  proc- 
esses had  been  in  progress  for  about 
two  years,  long  enough  to  make  appar- 
ent the  relative  advantages  and  disad- 
vantages of  each. 

Because  no  single  method  appeared 
capable  by  itself  of  producing  the 
badly  needed  U-235,  Manhattan  lead- 
ers conceived  the  possibility  of  em- 
ploying two  or  more  of  the  processes 
in  combination.  They  readily  en- 
dorsed the  electromagnetic  as  one  of 
the  methods;  unlike  the  other  three,  it 
could  begin  producing  adequately  en- 
riched U-235  from  an  only  partially 
completed  plant.  Selection  of  the 
other  process  for  full-scale  develop- 
ment in  tandem  with  the  electromag- 
netic came  in  early  December.  The 
Lewis  reviewing  committee  gave  the 
gaseous  diffusion  process  a  solid  en- 
dorsement, recommending  construc- 
tion of  a  4,600-stage  plant  capable  of 
producing  90  percent  U-235  in  sub- 
stantial quantities.  Meeting  on  the 
tenth,  the  Military  Policy  Committee 


then  approved  this  recommendation, 
basing  its  decision  upon  the  conclu- 
sion that  even  though  project  scien- 
tists had  yet  to  satisfactorily  design 
the  key  components  for  a  gaseous  dif- 
fusion plant,  the  process  was,  never- 
theless, more  likely  to  produce  a  suffi- 
cient quantity  of  fissionable  material 
suitable  for  an  atomic  weapon  than 
either  the  liquid  thermal  diffusion  or 
centrifuge  processes.^ 

Gaseous  Diffusion  Research  and  the 
Army,   1942-1943 

Research  and  development  on  the 
diffusion  process,  which  had  started 
in    1940,   centered  at  Columbia  Uni- 


1  The  Military  Policy  Committee  approved  contin- 
ued but  limited  support  for  research  and  develop- 
ment of  the  liquid  thermal  diffusion  and  centrifuge 
processes.  The  detailed  arguments  for  and  against 
full-scale  development  of  these  processes  may  be 
found  in  Memo,  Richard  C.  Tolman  (Groves's  scien- 
tific adviser)  to  Groves,  sub:  Visit  to  Centrifugal 
Plant  at  Bayway,  N.J.,  20  Dec  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  201  (Tolman),  MDR;  Draft  Rpt,  Lt  Col 
John  R.  Ruhoft",  sub:  Summary  on  Atomic  Energy, 
17  Jun  46.  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12 
(Atomic),  MDR;  MPC  Min,  12  Nov  and  10  Dec  42, 
OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A, 
MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  3,  "Design,"  pp.  3.1-3.2, 
DASA;  Conclusions  of  Reviewing  Committee,  4  Dec 

42,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  334  (Special  Review- 
ing Committee),  MDR;  Ltr,  Urey  to  Conant,  4  Sep 

43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201    (Urey),  MDR. 
See  also  Chs.  VI  and  VIII. 


150 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


versity  under  the  direction  of  two 
members  of  the  faculty,  Harold  C. 
Urey,  an  eminent  physical  chemist 
and  Nobel  Prize  winner  (1934),  and 
John  R.  Dunning,  a  young  physicist. 
Supported  since  1941  by  funds  from 
the  Navy  and  an  OSRD  contract,  dif- 
fusion research  by  December  1942 
had  made  substantial  progress  toward 
development  of  a  large-scale  expan- 
sion of  the  process.  On  the  basis  of  a 
theory  provided  by  Karl  P.  Cohen,  a 
young  mathematician  on  the  Colum- 
bia staff,  the  Columbia  research 
group  had  built  Pilot  Plant  No.  1,  a 
small  twelve-stage  apparatus,  in  the 
university's  Pupin  Hall.  And  oper- 
ation of  this  unit  in  the  fall  of  1942 
had  furnished  valuable  data  on  the 
major  elements  of  a  diffusion  plant, 
most  significantly,  the  material  for  the 
barrier  component  that  filtered  the 
process  gas  in  each  separating  stage.  ^ 
When  the  Army  began  taking  over 
direction  of  the  atomic  bomb  project 
in  the  summer  of  1942,  the  Columbia 
diffusion  research  program  continued 
to  operate  under  OSRD  contracts. 
Beginning  in  the  fall,  the  Manhattan 
District  gradually  extended  its  control 
over  administration  of  the  program, 
culminating  with  Columbia's  accept- 
ance of  a  War  Department  contract 
on  1  May  1943.  Shortly  thereafter 
university  and  District  representatives 
reorganized  the  diffusion  research 
program,  redesignating  it  as  the  SAM 
(for  Special  Alloyed  Materials)  Lab- 
oratories and  appointing  Urey  as  di- 
rector. (See  Map  2.)  Maj.  Benjamin  K. 
Hough,  Jr.,  who  had  come  to  Colum- 
bia in  the  spring  as  area  engineer  for 


the  program,  reorganized  his  office  to 
conform  to  the  SAM  organization  and 
moved  with  most  of  the  rapidly  ex- 
panding research  activities  from 
campus  laboratories  to  more  spacious 
facilities  in  the  university's  Nash 
Building,  a  few  blocks  north  of  the 
campus.^ 

Design  and  Engineering 

The  Military  Policy  Committee, 
after  deciding  to  give  priority  to  full- 
scale  development  of  the  gaseous  dif- 
fusion process,  selected  the  M.  W. 
Kellogg  Company  to  design  and  engi- 
neer the  production  plant,  designated 
K-25  for  security  reasons.  The  choice 
was  a  logical  one,  for  the  firm  was  al- 
ready extensively  involved  in  diffusion 
research  under  OSRD  contracts,  in- 
cluding design  of  a  ten-stage  pilot 
plant  for  barrier  development.  On  14 
December  1942,  Kellogg  accepted  a 
letter  contract  from  the  Manhattan 
District,  with  some  unusual  provisions 
that  reflected  the  unique  character  of 
the  project.  The  Army  required  no 
guarantees  from  the  firm  that  it  could 
successfully  design,  build  and  put  into 
operation  a  gaseous  diffusion  produc- 
tion plant.  For  reasons  of  security,  the 
company  agreed  to  set  up  a  separate 
corporate  entity,  the  Kellex  Corpora- 
tion, to  function  as  a  self-sustaining 
and  autonomous  organization  for  car- 
rying out  the  project.  Because  of  the 
great  uncertainty   regarding  the  pre- 


2  Smyth  Report,  pp.  125-26  and  132-33;  Hewlett 
and  Anderson,  New  World,  pp.  97-101;  MDH,  Bk.  2, 
Vol.  2,  "Research,"  pp.  4.11-4.12,  4.14-4.15,  7.2- 
7.3,  DASA. 


3  Cert  of  Audit  MDE  103-46,  Columbia  Area, 
27  Feb  46,  Fiscal  and  Audit  Files,  Cert  of  Audit 
Registers,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  2.  Vol.  2,  pp.  2.1-2.2, 
11.1-11.3,  App.  B  (Org  Chart,  Columbia  Area, 
4  Aug  43),  DASA;  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  111. 
Groves  remembered  the  code  name  SAM  as  stand- 
ing for  Substitute  Alloy  Materials  rather  than  Spe- 
cial Alloyed  Materials. 


THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


151 


cise  scope  and  cost  of  the  project,  the 
District  and  Kellogg  also  agreed  to 
defer  fixing  any  financial  terms  until 
later  execution  of  a  formal  fixed-fee 
contract.  (This  was  not  actually  ac- 
complished until  April  1944,  when 
Kellogg  accepted  payment  of  about 
$2.5  million  for  its  work.)  * 

Kellogg  provided  the  Kellex  Corpo- 
ration with  its  own  research,  engi- 
neering, expediting,  accounting,  and 
service  divisions.  It  designated  one  of 
its  own  vice  presidents,  Percival  C. 
Keith,  a  Texas-born  chemical  engi- 
neer and  graduate  of  Massachusetts 
Institute  of  Technology,  to  be  execu- 
tive in  charge  at  Kellex.  Keith,  who 
had  already  gained  considerable  fa- 
miliarity with  the  atomic  bomb 
project  through  his  service  on  the 
OSRD  S-1  Section's  planning  board, 
not  only  drew  upon  managerial  and 
technical  employees  of  Kellogg  but 
also  borrowed  personnel  from  other 
firms  in  order  to  staff  Kellex.  Kellex 
employees — some  thirty-seven  hun- 
dred at  the  height  of  the  firm's  activi- 
ties in  1944 — worked  in  the  New  York 
area  at  Kellex's  headquarters  in  the 
downtown  Manhattan  Woolworth 
Building,  at  Columbia  University's 
laboratory  facilities  in  the  Nash  Build- 
ing, and  at  Kellogg's  Jersey  City 
plant;  and  in  Tennessee  at  the  Clin- 
ton Engineer  Works. ^ 


*  Ltr  Contract  W-7405-eng-23,  14  Dec  42,  and 
Formal  Contract  W-7405-eng-23,  1 1  Apr  43,  both 
in  Contract  Files,  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  2,  pp. 
3.4-3.6  and  App.  A,  DASA;  Memo,  Nichols  to  Car- 
roll L.  Wilson  (Ex  Asst  to  Bush),  sub:  Background 
on  P.  C.  Keith,  10  Jan  47,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  201  (Keith),  MDR;  Ltr,  Keith  to  WD.  Attn: 
Groves,  25  Jan  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  167, 
MDR. 

*Memo,  Nichols  to  Wilson,  sub:  Background  on 
P.  C.  Keith,  10  Jan  47,  MDR;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be 
Told,  pp.  112  and  428;  Ltr,  M.  W.  Kellogg  to 
Groves,    9    May    45,    Admin    Files,    Gen    Corresp, 


To  oversee  the  work  of  Kellex,  as 
well  as  to  handle  the  administrative 
details  relating  to  the  large  number  of 
Special  Engineer  Detachment  person- 
nel assigned  to  the  firm  (nearly  one 
hundred  by  mid- 1944),  the  district 
engineer  in  January  1943  established 
the  New  York  Area  Engineers  Office 
in  the  conveniently  located  Wool- 
worth  Building  and  assigned  Lt.  Col. 
James  C.  Stowers  not  only  as  the  new 
area  engineer  but  also  as  the  unit 
chief  for  the  entire  K-25  project.  At 
the  start  Stowers  supervised  a  military 
and  civilian  staff  of  less  than  twenty; 
it  remained  small,  never  numbering 
more  than  seventy.  While  monitoring 
performance  on  the  Kellogg  contract, 
this  New  York  staff  also  coordinated 
the  unusually  complex  developmental 
diffusion  research  of  numerous  con- 
tractors— including  Princeton  Univer- 
sity working  on  barrier  corrosion; 
Ohio  State  University  on  chemical 
compounds  as  feed  materials  and  proc- 
ess gas;  and  Union  Carbide's  Carbide 
and  Carbon  Chemicals  Corporation, 
Linde  Air  Products  Company,  and 
Bakelite  Corporation,  Western  Elec- 
tee's Bell  Telephone  Laboratories, 
and  Interchemical  Corporation,  all  on 
suitable  barrier  fabrication.^ 


231.21  (Kellex),  MDR;  Ltr,  Keith  to  WD,  25  Jan  44, 
MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  3,  pp.  18.5-18.7  and  Apps. 
C14-C15  (Org  Charts),  DASA. 

^Ltr,  R.  B.  Van  Houten  (Asst  Proj  Mgr,  Kellex)  to 
John  H.  Arnold  (Kellex  R&D  Dir),  sub:  SED  Per- 
sonnel Assigned  to  Nash  Bldg  (with  attached  ros- 
ters), 28  Jun  44,  Army  Personnel  Files,  Box  73A  (1- 
A),  Kellex,  OROO;  Cert  of  Audit  MDE  202-46,  New 
York  Area,  1  Nov  45,  MDR;  Memo,  Groves  to  Dist 
Engr,  sub:  List  of  Personnel,  27  Sep  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Gen),  MDR;  Org  Chart, 
Kellex  Corp.,  8  Apr  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
231.21  (Kellex),  MDR;  Org  Charts,  U.S.  Engrs 
Office,  MD,  15  Aug  and  1  Nov  43,  10  Nov  44, 
26  Jan  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  020  (MED- 

Conlinued 


152 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Theoretical  and  Practical  Problems 

The  complexities  and  difficulties  in 
gaseous  diffusion  plant  design  arose 
from  the  nature  of  the  process  itself, 
which  required  a  stable  compound  of 
uranium  that  would  exist  as  a  fluid  at 
ordinary  temperatures,  and  also  from 
the  almost  total  lack  of  any  adequate 
data  on  what  would  happen  when  the 
process  was  transformed  from  a  labo- 
ratory phenomenon  into  a  mass  pro- 
duction operation.'  In  1941,  Karl  P. 
Cohen  had  worked  out  the  fundamen- 
tal theory  of  the  gaseous  diffusion 
process  by  applying  the  well-estab- 
lished Graham's  Law  to  the  only 
known  gaseous  compound  of  urani- 
um, the  highly  corrosive  uranium 
hexafluoride.  Briefly  stated,  Graham's 
Law  holds   that   if  a   mixture  of  two 

Org),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  2,  pp.  2.2-2.5,  Vol.  3, 
pp.  18.2-18.5  and  Apps.  C7-C13  (Org  Charts),  and 
Vol.  4,  "Construction,"  App.  C16  (Org  Chart), 
DASA;  Ltr,  Keith  to  Nichols,  6  Aug  43.  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  Misc  File  (unmarked  fldr),  MDR;  Ltr, 
Tolman  to  Groves,  sub:  Visit  to  Bell  Tel  Labs  To 
Discuss  Work  on  Barrier  Problem,  9  Oct  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Rpts),  MDR. 

^Subsection  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  2  (espe- 
cially pp.  2.4  and  8.5-8.6)  and  Vol.  3,  and  Bk.  7, 
Vol.  1,  'Teed  Materials  and  Special  Procurement," 
pp.  9.6-9.9,  DASA;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  \eu< 
World,  pp.  125-131;  Gowing,  Bntain  and  Atomic 
Energy,  pp.  57-58  and  218-25;  Completion  Rpt,  M. 
W.  Kellogg  Co.  and  Kellex  Corp.,  sub:  K-25  Plant. 
Contract  W'-7405-eng-23,  31  Oct  45,  pp.  5  (re- 
vised)-6,  OROO;  Interv,  Author  with  Cohen,  8  Jul 
82,  CMH;  Karl  Cohen,  The  Theoiy  of  Isotope  Separation 
as  Applied  to  the  Large-scale  Production  of  U-235,  ed. 
George  M.  Murphy,  in  Division  IH,  Special  Separations 
Project.  National  Nuclear  Energy  Series,  Vol.  3  (New 
York:  McGraw-Hill  Book  Co.,  1951),  pp.  5-29; 
Memo,  Dunning  to  George  T.  Felbeck  (K-25  Proj 
Mgr,  Kellex),  Albert  L.  Baker  (Kellex  Chief  Engr), 
and  Keith,  sub:  Importance  of  Low  Humidity  at  K- 
25  Plant  Site,  17  Apr  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
601  (CEW),  MDR;  Safety  Committee.  Bull  SM-2, 
Safety  Committee  Regulations  for  Handling  C-126 
(Fluorine),  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  729.31, 
MDR.  On  the  question  of  cooler  design,  see  Calen- 
dar of  Events,  Internal  vs.  External  Coolers,  6  Mav 
44,  Admin  Files.  Gen  Corresp.  001,  MDR. 


gases  of  unequal  densities  is  placed  in 
a  porous  container  surrounded  by  an 
evacuated  space,  the  lighter  gas  will 
tend  to  escape  at  a  more  rapid  rate 
than  the  heavier.  If  the  process  can  be 
controlled,  separation  can  be  carried 
forward  by  stages  until  an  almost 
pure  concentration  of  the  hghter 
component  is  achieved.  How  much 
more  of  the  lighter  than  the  heavier 
component  passes  through  a  single 
stage  depends  upon  the  density  of  the 
gases  and  the  difference  in  their  mo- 
lecular weights.  In  the  case  of  urani- 
um hexafluoride,  the  difference  is 
very  small  indeed,  the  lighter  U-235 
constituting  only  0.85  percent. 
Hence,  the  highest  enrichment  of  the 
lighter  isotope  in  a  single  stage  is 
1.0043  times  that  of  the  heavier. 

In  practice,  the  degree  of  single- 
stage  separation  actually  attainable  is 
affected  by  the  size,  number,  and  dis- 
tribution of  the  apertures,  or  pores, 
in  the  barrier  through  which  the  proc- 
ess gas  passes  and  the  variations  in 
the  pressure  of  the  gas  itself.  After  in- 
vestigating whether  these  limiting  fac- 
tors could  be  overcome  sufficiently  to 
make  possible  construction  of  an  effi- 
cient plant  in  terms  of  time  and 
output,  Cohen  proposed  building  a 
plant  of  forty-six  hundred  stages  to 
produce  90  percent  U-235.  This 
plant  would  operate  as  a  single  cas- 
cade, with  each  stage  feeding  en- 
riched material  to  the  next  higher 
stage  and  depleted  material  to  the 
stage  below.  Operating  at  a  relatively 
high  pressure,  the  plant  would  have  a 
low  holdup  of  material  in  the  barrier, 
thus  reducing  the  equilibrium  time — 
that  is,  the  time  required  to  complete 
the  process. 


THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


153 


The  single  cascade  design  contrast- 
ed with  the  diffusion  plant  design  on 
which  British  atomic  scientists  had 
been  working  since  1940.  Their  pro- 
posed plant  would  employ  a  cascade- 
of-cascades  arrangement  with  low 
pressure  and  high  holdup.  Such  a 
plant  had  certain  advantages  over  the 
American  design;  its  lower-operating 
pressure  and  temperature  made  the 
solution  to  the  barrier  problem  easier 
and  reduced  the  corrosive  effect  of 
the  process  gas.  The  British  scientists 
also  claimed  their  cascade-of-cascades 
plant  would  have  greater  operating 
stability  and  present  fewer  mainte- 
nance problems,  but  American  engi- 
neers rejected  the  design  because  its 
high  holdup  would  increase  the  equi- 
librium time  substantially. 

With  the  results  of  Cohen's  studies 
and  the  British  experiments  at  hand, 
SAM  scientists  and  Kellex  engineers 
worked  as  a  team  to  design  the  basic 
gaseous  diffusion  production  unit. 
This  unit,  designated  the  stage,  had 
three  main  elements:  a  converter, 
control  valve,  and  centrifugal  pumps. 
The  converter  consisted  of  a  barrier, 
its  most  central  feature,  and  a  cooler. 
The  highly  porous  metallic  barrier, 
initially  comprised  of  flat  plates  but  in 
final  design  made  up  of  annular  bun- 
dles of  small  tubes  arranged  and  sup- 
ported in  much  the  same  fashion  as 
the  conventional  shell-and-tube  heat 
exchanger  long  employed  in  steam- 
powered  engines,  filtered  the  process 
gas  to  separate  uranium  isotopes;  the 
cooler,  a  circular  bundle  of  finned 
copper  tubes  in  the  head  of  the  con- 
verter, removed  the  process-generat- 
ed heat  and  controlled  the  stage  tem- 
perature. The  system's  control  valve, 
an  adaptation  of  the  conventional 
butterfly    valve,     maintained    the    re- 


quired stage  pressure,  and  its  centrif- 
ugal pumps,  consisting  of  a  booster 
and  blower,  transported  and  fed  the 
process  gas  from  one  stage  to 
another. 

The  Columbia-Kellex  designers 
considered  combining  the  stage's  con- 
verter, control  valve,  and  pumps  in  a 
completely  sealed  unit.  This  design 
offered  certain  advantages,  especially 
with  respect  to  maintaining  a  vacuum 
and  preventing  leaks.  The  unit,  how- 
ever, would  be  bulky  and  its  compo- 
nents difficult  to  service.  And,  more 
importantly,  its  fabrication  would  re- 
quire more  time  than  separate  fabri- 
cation of  its  component  parts.  To 
overcome  these  disadvantages,  the 
designers  modified  their  original  dif- 
fusion stage  concept.  Final  equipment 
designs  called  for  the  control  valve 
and  the  pumps  and  its  motors  to  be 
outside  the  converter.  Although  Car- 
bide and  Carbon  engineers  had  sug- 
gested that  the  cooler  be  removed 
from  the  converter  and  manufactured 
as  a  separate  unit,  the  Columbia- 
Kellex  team  rejected  this  proposal, 
feeling  that  such  a  change  would  slow 
down  delivery  of  the  converters. 

This  modified  stage  design,  never- 
theless, forced  the  Columbia-Kellex 
designers  to  contend  with  another 
mechanical  problem — how  to  prevent 
leakage.  After  extensive  testing  they 
proposed  that  both  pumps  and 
motors  be  encased  in  a  vacuum-tight 
enclosure  containing  inert  gas,  there- 
by eliminating  the  primary  obstacle  in 
centrifugal  pump  design:  the  need  for 
seals.  The  Westinghouse  Electric  and 
Manufacturing  Company  built  several 
models  of  this  design,  which  Colum- 
bia scientists  later  successfully  em- 
ployed in  laboratory  tests.  But  before 


154 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Columbia  could  develop  a  production 
model,  researchers  at  the  Elliott  Com- 
pany in  Pennsylvania  had  invented  a 
radically  different  type  of  seal  for  cen- 
trifugal pumps.  When  tested  at  Co- 
lumbia in  early  1943,  the  designers 
determined  that  this  new  type  of  seal 
met  all  the  requirements  for  the  K-25 
plant. 

Some  of  the  most  difficult  design 
problems  arose  from  the  necessity  of 
using  the  highly  corrosive  uranium 
hexafluoride  as  the  process  gas.  Be- 
cause earlier  efforts  by  the  OSRD  to 
find  a  substitute  for  uranium  hexa- 
fluoride had  failed,  the  Army  expand- 
ed research  by  SAM,  Princeton,  and  Du 
Pont  scientists  in  an  effort  to  devise 
ways  to  cope  with  the  corrosive  char- 
acter of  the  gas.  These  investigations 
established  that  the  adverse  effects  of 
corrosion  could  be  inhibited  through 
pre-installation  conditioning  of  the 
process  equipment  and  contributed  to 
the  design  of  treatment  methods. 

The  Barrier  Problem 

The  heart  of  the  gaseous  diffusion 
system  was  the  barrier,  the  compo- 
nent that  proved  most  difficult  to 
design  and  fabricate.®  Two  objectives 


» Subsection  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  2,  pp. 
4.1-4.30  and  4.32-4.33,  DASA;  DSM  Chronology, 
16  Jun  44,  Sec.  10,  OROO;  MPC  Min,  13  Aug  43, 
MDR;  Ltr,  Tolman  to  Groves,  sub:  Visit  to  Bell  Tel 
Labs  To  Discuss  Work  on  Barrier  Problem,  9  Oct 
43,  MDR;  Ltr,  Edward  Mack,  Jr.  (SAM  Labs),  to 
Urey,  31  Mar  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1 
(Kellex  and  Others),  MDR;  Ltrs,  Urey  to  Groves, 
10  May  43,  and  Urey  to  Hough,  10  Nov  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Urey),  MDR;  Ltrs,  Keith  to 
Groves,  23  Oct  43,  and  W.  A.  Akers  (British  group) 
to  Stowers,  26  Jun  44,  and  Min,  Follow-up  Review 
Conf  (K-25),  5  Jan  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
001,  MDR;  Memo,  Stowers  to  Groves,  7  Jan  44, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  095  (Kellex),  MDR; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  \ew  World,  p.  139;  Memo, 
Tolman    to   Grove,    sub:    Status    of  Work   on    Pilot 


guided  barrier  research  and  develop- 
ment at  Columbia  University,  as  well 
as  at  Kellex:  find  a  material  that 
would  efficiently  separate  U-235  and 
U-238  in  a  hexafluoride  compound, 
and  develop  mass  production  meth- 
ods for  making  the  material  into  bar- 
riers. Ongoing  tests  soon  revealed 
that  this  material  had  to  have  certain 
essential  characteristics,  namely,  be 
highly  porous;  resistant  to  the  reac- 
tive nature  of  uranium  hexafluoride; 
capable  of  withstanding  the  stresses 
of  fabrication,  installation,  and  utili- 
zation; and  suitable  for  mass 
production. 

Columbia  research  had  experiment- 
ed with  a  great  variety  of  metals  and 
alloys  over  a  two-year  period  (1941- 
42),  testing  many  of  them  in  Pilot 
Plant  No.  1,  but  with  repeated  disap- 
pointment. Finally,  in  December 
1942,  the  experiments  of  researchers 
Edward  Norris  and  Edward  Adler 
with  a  form  of  corrosion-resistant 
nickel  revealed  the  material's  highly 
promising  characteristics  for  satisfying 
the  exacting  and  rigorous  barrier  re- 
quirements. To  manufacture  the 
Norris-Adler  barrier  material  in  a 
continuous  process,  as  well  as  to  test 
other  equipment  under  conditions  ap- 
proaching those  anticipated  in  a 
large-scale  diffusion  plant,  the  re- 
search team  at  Columbia  in  January 
1943  started  building  Pilot  Plant 
No.  2,  a  six-stage  cascade  unit,  in  the 


Plants,  Barriers,  etc.,  in  N.Y.,  13  Mar  44,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Tolman),  MDR;  Memo, 
Nichols  to  Groves,  sub;  Requirement  for  Nickel 
Powder,  2  Mar  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
600.12  (Research),  MDR.  In  response  to  the  atomic 
program's  need  for  large  quantities  of  powdered 
nickel.  International  Nickel  Company  built  addition- 
al manufacturing  facilities  in  West  Virginia,  New 
Jersey,  and  New  York. 


THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


155 


Nash  Building.  In  early  summer,  this 
pilot  plant  began  producing  the 
Norris-Adler  barrier  material.  Initial 
tests,  however,  revealed  distressing 
structural  weaknesses  and  production 
deficiencies;  the  nickel  material's  brit- 
tleness  made  fabrication  into  tubes 
difficult  and  the  complex  character  of 
the  manufacturing  techniques  created 
problems  in  achieving  uniform  quality 
of  production. 

Manhattan  leaders,  nevertheless, 
continued  to  be  confident  that  the 
barrier  problem  would  be  solved  sat- 
isfactorily. They  intensified  barrier  re- 
search and  testing  efforts  of  the  Co- 
lumbia team,  as  well  as  those  of  the 
Kellex-Bell-Bakelite  barrier  research 
group  experimenting  with  a  powdered 
nickel  barrier.  The  progress  and  re- 
sults of  these  ongoing  barrier-develop- 
ment experiments  were  reviewed  and 
discussed  in  August,  when  the  Military 
Policy  Committee  convened  on  the 
thirteenth.  With  cautious  optimism, 
the  committee  concluded  that  a  suita- 
ble— if  not  ideal — barrier  would  soon 
be  designed  and  fabricated,  an  im- 
proved version  of  either  the  Norris- 
Adler  or  Kellex  barrier.  But  ensuing 
results  from  months  of  testing  dashed 
the  Columbia  scientists'  hopeful  ex- 
pectations of  producing  good-quality 
barrier  material;  their  Norris-Adler 
prototype,  though  much  improved, 
was  still  too  brittle  and  lacking  in  uni- 
form quality.  The  Kellex-Bell-Bakelite 
team's  experiments,  however,  particu- 
larly those  with  a  material  that  com- 
bined some  of  the  best  features  of  the 
Norris-Adler  and  the  powdered  nickel 
barriers,  demonstrated  that  its  new 
barrier  achieved  good  separation  char- 
acteristics and  presented  fewer  fabrica- 
tion problems. 


In  early  November,  Groves  endeav- 
ored to  reach  a  workable  solution  as 
to  the  direction  barrier  development 
should  proceed.  After  listening  to  ar- 
guments from  Urey  and  the  Columbia 
scientists  in  support  of  the  latest  bar- 
rier they  had  devised  and  to  Keith 
and  the  Kellex  group  concerning  the 
advantages  of  their  improved  pow- 
dered nickel  barrier,  Groves  decided 
that  the  most  feasible  policy  was  to 
continue  work  on  both  types,  the 
Kellex  barrier  providing  insurance 
against  the  possible  failure  of  the  Co- 
lumbia barrier.  Predictably,  this  com- 
promise was  unpopular  with  both 
sides.  Urey,  in  particular,  who  from 
the  start  had  resented  the  diversion  of 
effort  from  his  own  project  to  the 
Kellex  group  to  accelerate  barrier  de- 
velopment, saw  it  as  further  indica- 
tion of  Groves's  intention  to  exclude 
Columbia  from  all  useful  work  on  the 
atomic  project,  and  he  reminded  the 
Manhattan  commander  that  he  had  al- 
ready transferred  both  the  pile  ex- 
periments and  the  heavy  water  re- 
search from  Morningside  Heights  to 
Chicago. 

Contributing  to  Urey's  harsh  judg- 
ment of  the  intent  of  Groves's  action 
was  his  awareness  of  the  discourage- 
ment felt  by  many  of  those  working 
on  the  barrier  problem.  In  fact,  by 
the  end  of  1943,  morale  had  plum- 
meted to  a  very  low  point.  Not  the 
least  of  the  factors  causing  this  pre- 
vailing pessimism  was  adverse  criti- 
cism of  the  Columbia-Kellex  plant 
design  by  some  members  of  the  Brit- 
ish delegation  of  scientists  assigned  to 
the  atomic  project.  The  British  ex- 
pressed decided  preference  for  the 
cascade-of-cascades  design  of  their 
own  plant,  arguing  that  the  single  cas- 


156 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


cade  design  of  the  American  plant 
would  not  eliminate  the  "surges" — 
sudden,  sharp  variations  in  gas  pres- 
sure— that  might  well  make  the  Ten- 
nessee plant  inoperable.  While  also 
stating  a  preference  for  Kellex's  im- 
proved powdered  nickel  barrier  over 
Columbia's,  the  British  considered 
even  the  Kellex  barrier  to  be  far  from 
perfected.  Finally,  too,  the  visiting  sci- 
entists indicated  great  skepticism  that 
Kellex  would  have  the  production 
plant  in  operation  by  the  projected 
date,  1  July  1945.  Groves  sharply  dis- 
agreed with  the  British  on  this  last 
point,  holding  that,  if  Kellex  was  rea- 
sonably certain  the  plant  would  be 
operating  by  that  date,  it  probably 
would  be  in  production  even  sooner. 

Keith  and  his  Kellex  colleagues  par- 
ticularly resented  the  visit  of  the  Brit- 
ish scientists.  In  January  1944,  the 
Kellex  chief  asserted  that  the  British 
had  set  progress  back  a  month  be- 
cause of  time  spent  answering  ques- 
tions and  assisting  them  in  making 
studies,  many  duplicating  studies 
made  by  his  own  engineers  months 
earlier.  At  the  same  time,  he  com- 
plained to  the  New  York  area  engi- 
neer that  Groves  appeared  to  be 
avoiding  a  decision  on  the  barrier 
question  and  also  seemed  to  be  trying 
to  push  back  the  plant  completion 
date.  Colonel  Stowers  wrote  hurriedly 
to  General  Groves,  expressing  anxiety 
at  the  alarming  decline  of  enthusiasm 
he  noted  in  the  normally  ebullient 
and  confident  Kellex  chief. 

But  much  of  the  gloom  prevailing 
at  Kellex  and  Columbia  was  dispelled 
by  developments  in  the  early  months 
of  1944.  On  16  January,  Groves  met 
with  representatives  of  Kellex,  Car- 
bide and  Carbon,  SAM  Laboratories, 
and   the  Houdaille-Hershey  Corpora- 


tion to  discuss  progress  on  the  bar- 
rier. The  group  convened  at  Decatur, 
Illinois,  where  Houdaille-Hershey  was 
building  a  new  plant  for  the  manufac- 
ture of  barriers  of  the  Norris-Adler 
type.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  meet- 
ing Groves  announced  that  the  Deca- 
tur plant  would  be  converted  immedi- 
ately so  that  it  could  produce  Kellex's 
improved  powdered  nickel  barrier, 
because  it  was  considerably  easier  to 
fabricate  and  manufacture  than  the 
Norris-Adler.  Fortunately,  a  lot  of 
precious  production  time  was  not  lost 
during  the  conversion  process.  Most 
of  the  equipment  and  many  of  the 
procedures  for  producing  the  Norris- 
Adler  barrier  were  readily  adapted  for 
producing  the  Kellex  type. 

An  important  factor  in  Groves's  de- 
cision to  go  ahead  with  mass  produc- 
tion of  the  Kellex  barrier  was  his 
knowledge  of  the  International  Nickel 
Company's  successful  production  of  a 
high-quality  powdered  nickel,  thus 
providing  a  ready  source  of  the  type 
of  nickel  out  of  which  the  Kellex  bar- 
rier could  be  best  fabricated.  In  what 
proved  to  be  a  most  fortuitous  move, 
the  Manhattan  commander  had  di- 
rected Colonel  Nichols  in  the  spring 
of  1943  to  have  the  company  build  fa- 
cilities for  the  manufacture  of  barrier 
material.  And  because  of  this  early 
start,  company  technicians  by  early 
1944  had  developed  a  process  for 
producing  powdered  nickel  of  a  type 
and  quality  especially  suitable  for  fab- 
ricating the  Kellex  barrier.  In  fact,  by 
April,  the  firm  had  accumulated  in  its 
storage  facility  some  80  tons,  more 
than  enough  for  immediate  shipment 
to  the  diffusion  pilot  plants  in  New 
York. 


THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


157 


Meanwhile,  barrier  developments  at 
Columbia  also  provided  more  reason 
for  optimism.  Pilot  Plant  No.  2  had 
begun  turning  out  sizable  amounts  of 
a  good-quality  Norris-Adler  barrier. 
Thus,  before  receipt  of  the  District's 
orders  in  April  to  convert  No.  2  to 
manufacture  Kellex's  improved  pow- 
dered nickel  barrier,  Columbia  scien- 
tists had  the  satisfaction  of  being  the 
first  to  achieve  quantity  production  of 
their  material. 

Pilot  plant  testing  and  production 
of  barrier  materials  continued  apace 
into  the  summer  of  1944.  While  pro- 
viding the  first  opportunity  to  ascer- 
tain the  separation  qualities  of  the 
Kellex  barrier  under  conditions  simu- 
lating large-scale  plant  operations, 
these  pilot  plant  tests  demonstrated 
the  need  for  more  improvements. 
But,  at  this  juncture,  with  the  con- 
tinuing lack  of  barrier  components 
threatening  to  hold  up  further 
progress  in  design  and  construction 
of  the  main  diffusion  plant  at  the 
Clinton  site,  Manhattan  Project  lead- 
ers knew  the  time  for  experimentation 
was  at  an  end.  They  now  felt  the  ur- 
gency of  directing  all  of  their  efforts 
to  expediting  Houdaille-Hershey's 
mass  production  of  the  less  than  ideal 
Kellex  barrier  in  sufficient  quantity  to 
equip  each  of  the  thousands  of  stages 
of  the  Tennessee  plant. 

Plant  Design 

In  the  early  stages  of  planning,  ev- 
eryone had  assumed  that  the  objec- 
tive was  to  design  and  build  a  gaseous 
diffusion  plant  capable  of  producing 
a  90-percent-enriched  product.  But 
data  that  became  available  to  the 
design  teams  from  ongoing  research 
and  pilot  plant  studies  indicated  that 


considerable  time  in  design  and  engi- 
neering would  be  saved  if  the  cascade 
equipment  were  limited  to  that  pro- 
ducing a  product  of  lower  enrich- 
ment. Theoretically,  a  cascade  con- 
structed with  tubular  barriers  would 
be  efficient  up  to  the  point  of  a  36.6- 
percent  concentration;  for  higher 
product  enrichment,  quite  differently 
designed  barriers  would  be  necessary. 
Furthermore,  the  plant  designers 
soon  discovered  that,  because  of  the 
greater  capacities  required,  the  cen- 
trifugal pumps  under  development 
for  the  lower  stages  could  not  be 
used  above  the  36.6-percent  level.  In 
other  respects,  too — for  instance,  in- 
creased likelihood  of  critical  product 
accumulation — the  design  of  the 
upper  stages  presented  special 
problems. 

General  Groves,  as  early  as  Febru- 
ary 1943,  cited  an  alternative  solution 
that  would  save  much  time  and 
seemed  certain  to  work:  Why  not  take 
the  output  from  the  lower  stages  of 
the  gaseous  diffusion  plant  and  feed 
them  into  the  Beta  phase  of  the  elec- 
tromagnetic plant?  By  mid-year,  elec- 
tromagnetic plant  construction  was 
going  so  well  that  this  solution 
seemed  all  the  more  feasible.  Groves 
therefore  asked  Kellex  to  submit  esti- 
mated completion  dates  for  5-,  15-, 
36.6-,  and  90-percent  plants.  On  the 
basis  of  these  estimates,  he  then  in- 
structed Keith  and  the  Kellex  design 
teams  to  draw  up  plans  for  a  36.6- 
percent  plant.  Meanwhile,  research  on 
the  upper  stages  continued  on  a  re- 
duced scale. 

As  a  consequence,  by  late  1943, 
project  design  was  making  substantial 
progress  in  most  directions.  The 
knottier  aspects  of  pump  design  and 


158 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


procurement  appeared  to  be  solved; 
soon,  the  Allis-Chalmers  Manufactur- 
ing Company  and  several  smaller 
firms  would  be  able  to  satisy  all  of  the 
District's  requests  for  pumps  in  what- 
ever quantities  needed.  Also,  the 
pump  seal  problem  appeared  to  be 
well  on  the  way  to  solution.^ 

Although  lack  of  a  really  suitable 
barrier  had  prevented  development  of 
adequate  equipment  for  testing  the 
diffusion  operation  on  something  ap- 
proaching production  plant  scale,  it 
had  not  held  up  completion  of  Kellex 
designs  for  the  overall  plant.  These 
designs  projected  as  the  main  gaseous 
diffusion  production  unit  a  cascade  of 
2,892  stages,  connected  in  a  single 
series.  Ideally,  Kellex  engineers  might 
have  incorporated  into  the  plant 
design  a  requirement  for  a  converter 
and  pumps  of  slightly  smaller  size  at 
each  successive  stage  in  the  cascade. 
Because  this,  however,  would  have  re- 
sulted in  extremely  complicated  and 
costly  manufacturing  and  installation 
problems,  they  compromised.  They 
provided  for  five  different-sized 
pumps  and  four  different-sized  con- 
verters, thus  dividing  the  whole  cas- 
cade into  nine  variably  pressurized 
sections.  The  sections  normally  would 
function  as  a  single  cascade,  although 
each  could  be  operated  individually. 
Within  each  section  the  smallest  oper- 
able unit  was  the  cell,  containing  6 
stages  enclosed  in  a  sheet  metal  cubi- 
cle  that   would  be  supplied   with   dry 


^Min,  Coordination  Committee  Mtg,  13  Feb  43, 
and  Ltrs,  S.  B.  Smith  (Kellex)  to  Stowers,  7  Sep  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  337  (Univ  of  CaliO  and 
(Kellex),  respectively,  MDR;  Ltr,  Oppenheimer  to 
Nichols,  1  Jul  43,  and  Memo,  Arnold  and  Dunning 
to  Keith,  sub:  The  Diffusion  Plant,  28  Apr  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Projs  and 
Prgms:  K-25),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  2,  pp.  5.1- 
5.28,  and  Vol.  3,  pp.  7.1-7.3  and  8.12-8.14,  DASA. 


air  and  kept  heated  to  a  uniform 
temperature.  ^° 

Design  of  the  cascade  unquestion- 
ably constituted  the  single  most  im- 
portant and  difficult  feature  of  the 
gaseous  diffusion  production  plant. 
But  for  the  Kellex  engineers  it  was 
only  a  small  part  of  the  job.  Working 
in  cooperation  with  numerous  equip- 
ment and  supply  contractors,  they 
also  had  to  prepare  blueprints  and 
specifications  for  a  vast  array  of  sup- 
port and  control  facilities.  Cascade 
operation,  for  example,  required 
purge  cascades,  process  gas  recovery, 
surge  and  waste,  and  product  removal 
systems,  as  well  as  a  large  number  of 
instruments  for  maintaining  a  con- 
stant check  on  all  conditions  through- 
out the  plant.  Plant  instrumentation 
had  to  be  extremely  reliable,  for  even 
slight  variations  in  such  factors  as 
pressure  or  temperature  could 
produce  adverse  effects. 

To  house  the  main  cascade  and  its 
auxiliary  facilities,  Kellex  engineers 
designed  a  huge  structure  of  fifty-four 
contiguous  units,  or  buildings,  ar- 
ranged in  a  gigantic  U-shaped  pat- 
tern more  than  half  a  mile  long  on 
each  side  and  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
wide.  They  laid  out  the  interior  of 
these  buildings  on  four  different 
levels:  a  basement  housing  lubricating 
and  cooling  equipment,  ventilating 
fans  and  ducts,  and  transformers  and 
electrical  switchgear;  a  cell  floor  con- 
taining the  steel-encased  cells  lined 
up  in  two  parallel  rows  extending  the 
length  of  a  building;  a  pipe  gallery 
carrying  the  main  process  lines  and 
numerous  auxiliary  lines;  and  an  op- 


'OMDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  3,  Sees.  8  and  9,  DASA;  Com- 
pletion Rpt,  Kellex  Corp.,  sub:  K-25  Plant,  31  Oct 
45,  pp.  5(revised)-8,  OROO. 


THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


159 


crating  floor,  the  location  of  most  of 
the  control  devices  and  meters  for 
cascade  operation.  At  the  operating 
floor  level  they  placed  a  central  con- 
trol room  at  the  base  of  the  U ,  with 
instruments  to  keep  track  of  the 
whole  process  and  remote  controls 
for  all  motorized  valves. 

After  completion  of  the  cascade 
design  for  the  plant  at  the  Clinton 
Engineer  Works  (CEW),  most  of  the 
research  and  development  teams  at 
Columbia  and  Kellex,  and  elsewhere, 
turned  their  primary  energies  to  engi- 
neering and  testing  equipment  and 
support  facilities.  With  Groves's  per- 
mission, however,  a  few  SAM  and 
Kellex  researchers  and  engineers  con- 
tinued work  on  developing  diffusion 
equipment  that  could  achieve  a 
higher  product  enrichment.  In  sup- 
port of  this  investigation,  in  late 
summer  of  1944  Kellex  placed  a  10- 
stage  pilot  plant  in  operation.  By  mid- 
January  1945,  Kellex  was  ready  to 
begin  engineering  and  procurement 
for  an  extension  to  the  upper  stages 
of  the  K-25  plant  that  would  bring 
the  level  of  its  product  to  an  enrich- 
ment of  approximately  85  percent. 
Groves  authorized  Kellex  to  proceed, 
but  canceled  the  extension  when  data 
showed  a  greater  product  output 
could  be  achieved  by  increasing  the 
amount  of  uranium  of  a  lower  per- 
centage of  enrichment  for  feeding 
into  the  electromagnetic  plant.  To 
achieve  this  goal.  Groves  directed 
Kellex  to  design  and  engineer  a  540- 
stage  side-feed  unit  (later  designated 
K-27)  in  which  the  waste  output  from 
the  main  K-25  cascade  could  be  com- 
bined with  natural  uranium  to 
produce  a  slightly  enriched  product. 
By  feeding  the  K-27  output  into  the 
higher  stages  of  K-25,  plant  designers 


estimated  the  total  production  of 
U-235  could  be  increased  by  35  to 
60  percent.  Kellex  hoped  to  get  the 
K-27  extension  into  operation  early  in 
1946.11 

Building  the  Gaseous  Diffusion  Plant 

The  Tennessee  site  for  the  gaseous 
diffusion  plant  consisted  of  a  tract  of 
5,000  acres  in  the  northwest  corner  of 
the  CEW  reservation,  approximately 
15  miles  southwest  of  the  town  of 
Oak  Ridge.  12    {See  Map  3.)   Enclosed 


i^Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Mar- 
Apr  45  to  Mar  46,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP 
Files,  Fldr  28,  Tab  A,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  3, 
Sec.  14,  DASA;  Completion  Rpt,  M.  W.  Kellogg  Co. 
and  Kellex  Corp.,  sub:  K-27  Extension,  31  Jan  46, 
p.  3  (revised),  OROO. 

^2  Subsection  based  on  Completion  Rpt,  Kellex 
Corp.,  sub:  K-25  Plant,  31  Oct  45,  pp.  4,  8-10,  14- 
28,  30-31,  33  (revised),  and  maps  following  p.  40, 
OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  4,  pp.  2.6-2.7,  3.3-3.9. 
3.46-3.51,  3.73-3.75,  5.1-5.4,  7.1,  and  Apps.  CI 
(Chart,  Actual  K-25  Constr  Progress),  C7  (Chart, 
Process  Area  Constr  Progress),  C16  (Org  Chart), 
C25  (Chart,  Daily  K-25  Constr  Forces),  and  Vol.  5, 
"Operation,"  pp.  6.3-6.4,  DASA;  Memo,  Dunning 
to  Felbeck,  Baker,  and  Keith,  sub:  Importance  of 
Low  Humidity  at  K-25  Plant  Site,  17  Apr  43,  MDR; 
Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  12  and  116-17; 
Completion  Rpt,  Kellex  Corp.,  sub:  K-27  Extension, 
31  Jan  46,  p.  21  (p.  2  of  attached  cost  statement), 
OROO;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj, 
1  Jul-9  Aug  and  Sep  43,  Apr,  Jun,  Aug  and  Oct  44, 
and  Mar  and  Sep  45,  MDR;  Org  Charts,  U.S.  Engrs 
Office,  MD,  15  Aug  and  1  Nov  43,  and  15  Feb  44, 
MDR;  Maj  William  T.  St.  Clair  (MD  officer  who 
monitored  K-25  plant  construction).  Daily  Diary, 
9  Nov  43-13  Sep  45,  passim,  Kellex  Records,  Box 
748,  OROO;  Draft  Article,  Maj  Gen  Leslie  R.  Groves, 
"Development  of  the  Atomic  Bomb,"  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  000.74  (Mil  Engr),  MDR;  Ltrs,  Keith 
to  Stowers,  6  Oct  44,  Stowers  to  Dist  Engr,  sub: 
Change  of  Estimate  Opn  Date  of  Case  I,  10  Oct  44, 
and  Groves  to  Dist  Engr,  1  Nov  44,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Projs  and  Prgms:  K-25), 
MDR;  Ltr,  Tolman  to  Groves,  sub:  Status  of  Case  V, 
1  Feb  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp.  319.1  (Rpts). 
MDR. 


160 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


on  the  north,  south,  and  east  by  thick- 
ly wooded  ridges  and  on  the  west  by 
the  Clinch  River,  the  site  had  few 
roads,  no  railroads  (although  a  main 
line  was  located  a  few  miles  to  the 
north),  and  only  one  substantial  struc- 
ture (a  country  schoolhouse).  Project 
engineers  would  have  preferred  a  dif- 
ferent location,  especially  one  with 
lower  average  humidity;  however,  be- 
cause the  land  at  Clinton  had  been 
available  for  immediate  purchase  in 
early  1943,  Manhattan  leaders  did  not 
perceive  the  engineers'  concern  as 
critical  as  their  own  desire  to  get 
plant  construction  under  way.  Fur- 
thermore, they  felt  that  the  site  satis- 
fied other  major  requirements.  It  had 
a  readily  available  water  supply  and  a 
relatively  level  area  of  about  1,000 
acres  for  the  plant  facilities,  and  its 
location  was  distant  from  the  other 
production  plants  and  the  densely 
populated  areas. 

Under  terms  of  the  prime  contract 
with  M.  W.  Kellogg,  Kellex  was  to  not 
only  design  and  engineer  the  K-25 
plant  but  also  supervise  its  construc- 
tion, using  its  own  large  field  forces 
plus  numerous  contractors  and  sub- 
contractors. The  prime  construction 
contractor  was  the  J.  A.  Jones  Con- 
struction Company  of  Charlotte, 
North  Carolina,  whose  reputation  on 
other  Army  projects  had  impressed 
Groves.  Typical  of  the  more  than 
sixty  subcontractors  were  the  D.  W. 
Winkleman  Company  for  grading  and 
drainage  of  the  site,  the  Bethlehem 
Steel  Corporation  for  steel  work,  and 
the  Interstate  Roofing  Company  for 
installation  of  heating  and  ventilating 
systems. 

Wherever  possible,  Kellex  delegat- 
ed to  Jones  and  the  other  contractors 
specific    procurement    of    equipment 


and  supplies  needed  in  construction. 
Similarly,  it  contracted  out  thousands 
of  orders  for  process  and  auxiliary 
equipment.  Major  equipment  manu- 
facturers were  AUis-Chalmers  for  cen- 
trifugal pumps  and  motors  of  all 
kinds;  the  Chrysler  Corporation  for 
converters;  and  Houdaille-Hershey, 
Linde  Air  Products,  and  Bakelite  for 
barrier  material.  Some  of  these 
firms — for  example,  Allis-Chalmers, 
Chrysler,  and  Houdaille-Hershey — 
had  to  build  entirely  new  plants  or 
undertake  extensive  conversion  of  ex- 
isting facilities. 

Through  its  rapidly  expanding 
Manhattan  District  organization,  the 
Army  monitored  and  reviewed  the 
many  hundreds  of  agreements  negoti- 
ated by  Kellex,  Jones,  and  other  firms 
in  late  1943.  During  the  first  few 
months  of  relatively  limited  oper- 
ations at  the  building  site,  District  En- 
gineer Nichols  exercised  control  over 
the  project  through  the  New  York 
Area  Engineers  Office,  whose  staff 
maintained  constant  contact  with  the 
Kellex  and  Columbia  University 
groups,  and  through  the  CEW  Con- 
struction Division.  But  rapid  expan- 
sion of  construction  and  procurement 
activities  eventually  compelled  Colo- 
nel Nichols  to  reorganize  his  Tennes- 
see headquarters  staff,  establishing 
construction  and  operations  divisions 
for  each  major  production  project.  In 
his  capacity  as  the  K-25  unit  chief, 
and  in  keeping  with  normal  Corps  of 
Engineers  practice,  Colonel  Stowers 
organized  the  new  K-25  Construction 
Division  to  parallel  the  organizational 
structure  set  up  by  the  principal  con- 
struction contractors — Unit  I  for  the 
power  plant.  Unit  II  for  the  condi- 
tioning facilities,  and  Unit  III  for  the 


THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


161 


the  process  plant — and  assigned  Maj. 
William  P.  Cornelius  as  division 
chief.  13 

Actual  construction  started  on  the 
day  after  Memorial  Day  1943,  when  a 
survey  party  began  laying  out  the 
power  plant  site  at  an  area  adjacent  to 
the  east  bank  of  the  Clinch  River. 
Two  months  later  grading  began  in 
the  area  for  the  conditioning  facili- 
ties— a  large  structure  to  house  the 
treatment  apparatus  for  coating  proc- 
ess equipment  with  fluorine  gas,  thus 
providing  protection  against  the  ex- 
tremely corrosive  action  of  the  urani- 
um hexafluoride  process  gas,  and  a 
number  of  smaller  buildings  for  the 
generation  and  storage  of  fluorine, 
production  of  gaseous  nitrogen,  and 
neutralization.  To  ensure  these  facili- 
ties would  be  ready  in  time  so  that 
K-25  workers  could  treat  the  process 
equipment  before  installation  in  the 
main  production  plant,  Kellex  and 
District  authorities  decided  to  engage 
a  second  major  construction  contrac- 
tor— the  firm  of  Ford,  Bacon,  and 
Davis — to  build  them. 

Ground  preparation  on  the  main 
plant  site  did  not  start  until  20  Octo- 
ber 1943.  Although  relatively  level  by 
comparison  with  the  surrounding  ter- 
rain, the  site  was  broken  into  ridges 
and  valleys  that  required  cuts  up  to 
50  feet  and  fills  averaging  25  feet. 
The  great  weight  of  the  buildings  that 
would  house  the  cascade  and  its  com- 
plicated, interconnected  equipment 
made  exceptionally  stable  foundations 
necessary.    Ordinarily,    such    founda- 


tions would  have  been  carried  down 
to  bedrock,  a  procedure  that  would 
have  required  thousands  of  concrete 
columns  of  different  lengths.  But,  to 
save  time,  Kellex  used  the  then  novel 
method  of  compacted  fill.  Foundation 
workers  put  down  earth  in  6-inch 
layers,  constantly  checking  in  a  field 
laboratory  for  proper  moisture  con- 
tent and  soil  mixture.  Then  they  com- 
pacted the  fill  with  sheepsfoot  rollers 
to  a  density  slightly  greater  than  that 
of  undisturbed  soil.^"*  Next  they 
poured  the  foundation  footings  di- 
rectly on  top  of  the  undisturbed  earth 
in  the  cut  sections  and  on  the  com- 
pacted fill  in  the  filled-in  sections.  In 
spite  of  the  abnormally  rainv  weather 
in  the  fall  of  1943,  the  K-25  workers' 
use  of  innovative  construction  tech- 
niques enabled  them  to  complete 
laying  down  the  foundations  far  more 
quickly  than  would  have  been  possi- 
ble with  more  traditional  methods. 

Kellex  engineers  also  employed 
other  time-saving  methods,  consistent 
with  their  basic  goal  of  completing 
the  production  plant  as  rapidly  as 
possible.  Thus,  wherever  feasible, 
they  overlapped  activities  normally 
carried  out  separately.  The  day  grad- 
ing began,  J.  A.  Jones  crews  also 
poured  concrete  for  the  first  building. 
And,  as  soon  as  the  foundations  had 
hardened,  crews  moved  in  heavy 
gooseneck  cranes  (the  foundations 
had  been  deliberately  designed  to 
carry  their  weight)  and  began  lifting 
the  structural  steel  frames  of  build- 
ings into  place. 


*^The  conditioning  area  was  comprised  of  facili- 
ties for  preparing  process  equipment  for  installation 
in  the  process  buildings.  See  Ch.  XVIII  for  a  fuller 
description  of  the  design  and  construction  of  the 
K-25  power  plant. 


*■*  Used  to  compact  clay  soil,  a  sheepsfoot  roller  is 
a  towed  roller  with  a  large  number  of  4-inch-long 
steel  bars  welded  radially  to  the  surface  of  the  roller 
drum.  See  Diclwnary  of  Civil  Engineering,  s.v.  "sheeps- 
foot roller." 


162 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Gaseous  Diffusion  Plant  Under  Construction  at  CEW 


Another  objective  of  Kellex's 
speedup  techniques  was  to  get  some 
sections  of  the  huge  plant  into  oper- 
ation as  soon  as  possible.  The  firm's 
initial  construction  schedule,  adopted 
in  August  1943,  provided  for,  first, 
completing  one  cell  for  testing; 
second,  finishing  one  building  as  a 
so-called  54-stage  pilot  plant;  and 
third,  completing  enough  of  the  plant 
to  produce  an  enriched  product  con- 
taining 0.9  percent  U-235.  The 
schedule  designated  this  first  produc- 
tion section.  Case  I.  Three  additional 
cases,  with  outputs  of  5-,  15-,  and  36- 
percent  product   enrichment,  ^^  would 


be  finished  as  of  1  June,  15  July,  and 
23  August  1945,  respectively.  As  con- 
struction progressed,  Kellex  engi- 
neers revised  the  original  schedule  to 
conform  to  changing  conditions. 
Thus,  the  schedule  of  August  1944 
called  for  completion  in  1945  of  Case 
I  (0.9  percent)  on  1  January,  Case  II 
(5  percent)  on  10  June,  Case  III  (15 
percent)  on  1  August,  Case  IV  (23 
percent)  on  13  September,  and  a  new 
Case  V  (36  percent)  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble thereafter. 

To  ensure  adherence  to  this  highly 
complex  and,  in  many  respects  unor- 
thodox construction  schedule,  Kellex 


'^  In  their  projections  of  estimated  output  the 
Kellex  design  engineers  reduced  the  original  36.6- 
percent  level  of  product  enrichment  to  36  percent. 


See  Completion  Rpt,  Kellex  Corp.,  sub:  K-25  Plant, 
p.  3,  OROO. 


THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


163 


K-25  Steel-frame  Construction 


adopted  a  variety  of  rigid  control 
measures.  Typical  were  the  two  com- 
plete and  identical  charts  the  firm 
maintained,  one  in  its  New  York 
office  and  the  other  at  the  construc- 
tion site,  on  which  it  recorded  the 
current  manufacturing  and  delivery 
status  of  the  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  items  required  for  building  the 
plant. 

There  were  times,  however,  when 
labor  shortages,  especially  in  the 
skilled  categories,  were  acute.  The 
contractors  endeavored  to  overcome 
some  of  the  shortages  by  on-the-job 
training  and  simplifying  construction 
tasks  wherever  possible.  Fortunately, 
too,  because  each  stage  of  the  plant 


was  comprised  of  similar  basic  com- 
ponents, construction  crews  gained 
skill  and  speed  from  the  repetitive- 
ness  of  their  work.  With  the  Army's 
support,  J.  A.  Jones  and  Ford,  Bacon, 
and  Davis  also  sought  to  improve 
living  conditions  and  undertook  other 
ameliorative  steps  for  their  workers, 
which  reduced  labor  turnover  and 
limited  work  stoppages  to  about  0.1 
percent  of  total  man-hours.  ^^ 

One  unusual  feature  of  the  con- 
struction work  on  the  K-25  plant  was 
the   exceptionally   stringent   emphasis 


16  See  Chs.  X\'I  and  XVII  for  a  more  detailed  dis- 
cussion of  manpower  problems.  See  Ch.  XXI  for  a 
description  of  efforts  to  improve  living  conditions 
for  K-25  construction  employees. 


164 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


on  cleanliness.  Because  even  minute 
amounts  of  foreign  matter  would  have 
highly  deleterious  effects  on  process 
operations,  construction  workers  had 
to  cleanse  all  pipes,  valves,  pumps, 
converters,  and  other  items  of  equip- 
ment thoroughly  before  installation. 
Workmen  in  a  special  unit  performed 
this  vast  operation  in  the  large  condi- 
tioning building,  using  equipment  for 
solvent  degreasing,  alkaline  cleaning, 
acid  pickling,  scratch  brushing,  sur- 
face passivation,  and  a  variety  of 
other  procedures.  When  they  fin- 
ished, they  sealed  all  openings  to  in- 
terior surfaces  and  kept  them  sealed 
until  installation  teams  put  the  equip- 
ment into  place. 

To  make  certain  no  dust  or  other 
foreign  matter  polluted  the  system 
during  installation,  J.  A.  Jones  insti- 
tuted a  rigid  schedule  of  surgical 
cleanliness  in  installation  areas.  Iso- 
lating these  areas  with  temporary  par- 
titions, the  workers  installed  pressure 
ventilation,  using  filtered  air.  Then 
they  cleaned  the  areas  thoroughly, 
and  inspectors  carefully  checked  all 
personnel  and  material  that  entered 
them.  Maintenance  crews  with  mops 
and  vacuum  cleaners  continued  to 
remove  any  foreign  substances  that 
seeped  in.  When  trucks  had  to  enter, 
workers  hosed  them  down  at  the 
entrances. 

Workers  wore  special  clothes  and 
lintless  gloves.  Because  certain  work 
on  equipment  to  be  used  in  plant  in- 
stallations could  not  be  done  in  the 
dirt-free  areas,  such  as  welding  pipes 
and  other  small  jobs,  J.  A.  Jones  in- 
stalled special  inflatable  canvas  bal- 
loons and  the  work  was  done  inside 
them.  The  cleanliness  control  meas- 
ures required  many  additional  guards, 
inspectors,  and  supervisors,  but  they 


did  not  appreciably  slow  down  the 
work.  In  fact,  in  some  ways  the  good 
housekeeping  actually  facilitated  the 
progress  of  construction. 

Even  more  painstaking  was  the  in- 
stallation of  more  than  100  miles  of 
pipe  without  flanged  joints,  and  with 
welds  that  had  to  meet  tightness  spec- 
ifications more  severe  than  any  ever 
encountered  before  in  commercial 
construction.  Pipe-fitting  crews  devel- 
oped fourteen  special  welding  tech- 
niques. Individual  welders  then  learn- 
ed the  techniques,  each  specializing  in 
those  required  for  a  particular  type  of 
installation.  At  the  height  of  construc- 
tion, there  were  some  twelve  hundred 
welding  machines  in  use.  All  of  the 
work  required  rigid  control  and  tedi- 
ous inspection  to  ensure  joints  were 
tight  and  no  internal  scale  formed 
that  might  later  find  its  way  into  the 
process  system 

At  last,  on  17  April  1944,  the  first 
6-stage  cell  of  the  main  plant  was 
ready  for  test  runs.  Brief  trial  oper- 
ations of  this  unit  continued  in  May. 
During  the  summer  months,  as  con- 
stuction  crews  finished  additional 
stages,  technicians  put  them  through 
trial  runs.  Although  barrier  tubes 
were  not  available  (installation  of  the 
first  did  not  begin  until  fall  of  1944), 
these  tests  permitted  assembly  of  val- 
uable data  concerning  performance  of 
other  plant  components  and  detection 
of  mechancial  defects,  such  as  leaks 
and  sealant  failures.  Approximately 
two  months  behind  schedule,  equip- 
ment contractor  workmen  completed 
Case  I  (402  stages)  to  the  point  where 
processing  of  feed  material  could 
begin,  but  at  least  another  month 
passed  before  the  unit  attained  the 
0.9-percent    level.    The    other    cases 


THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


165 


were  completed  either  on  time  or 
ahead  of  schedule.  Kellex  and  J.  A. 
Jones  transferred  the  last  K-25  plant 
unit  to  Carbide  and  Carbon,  the  op- 
erating contractor,  on  1 1  September 
1945.  Total  construction  cost,  includ- 
ing the  540-stage  side-feed  extension 
(K-27)  unit  completed  after  the  war, 
was  $479,589,999. 

Plant  Operation 

In  late  1942,  when  the  atomic 
project  leaders  were  considering  po- 
tential operators  for  the  gaseous  dif- 
fusion plant,  Kellex's  Percival  Keith 
expressed  a  strong  preference  for  the 
Union  Carbide  and  Carbon  Corpora- 
tion.^'^ In  this  leading  chemical  firm 
Keith  saw  a  versatile  organization 
with  skilled  personnel  who  would  be 
able  to  not  only  operate  the  complex 
diffusion  production  process  but  also 
provide  design,  engineering,  and  con- 
struction assistance  to  hard-pressed 
Kellex  engineers.  Satisfied  with 
Keith's  opinion.  Groves  directed  Man- 
hattan representatives  to  commence 
negotiations  with  Union  Carbide  offi- 


"  Subsection  based  on  DSM  Chronology,  12  Dec 
42,  Sec.  4,  OROO;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  \eu< 
World,  pp.  120-22,  298-302,  374,  624-25;  Dist 
Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Dec  44  and  Jan- 
Sep  45,  MDR,  MDH,  Bk.  2.  Vol.  1,  "General  Fea- 
tures," pp.  4.6  and  5.7,  Vol.  2,  pp.  2.2-2.3,  and  Vol. 
5,  pp.  2.1-2.7.  3.1-3.6,  4.3-4.4,  8.1-8.16  (especially 
table  following  8.3),  10.1-10.5,  12.1-12.2,  and 
Apps.  Bl  (Chart,  K-25  Vacuum  Testing  Opns  and 
Progress),  B22  (Org  Chart,  Ford,  Bacon,  and  Davis, 
31  Mar  44),  F2  (Key  Personnel,  Carbide  and 
Carbon),  DASA,  Sm\\h'  Report,  p.  133;  Org  Charts, 
U.S.  Engrs  Office,  MD,  15  Feb  44,  1  Jun  44,  28  Aug 
44,  10  Nov  44,  26  Jan  45,  MDR;  Memo  for  File,  Maj 
Wilbur  E.  Kelley  (V-12  Opns  Div  chief),  23  Sep  44, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Projs  and 
Prgms:  K-25),  MDR;  Completion  Rpt,  Kellex  Corp., 
sub:  K-25  Plant,  p.  3,  OROO;  Memo  for  File,  Brig 
Gen  Thomas  F.  Farrell  (Grovess  Dep),  sub:  Jul  12th 
Confs  in  New  York,  N.Y.,  13  Jun  45,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  337  (LC),  MDR. 


cials.  Finally,  in  January  1943,  Union 
Carbide  agreed  to  become  the  prime 
operating  contractor — but  through  its 
subsidiary,  the  Carbide  and  Carbon 
Chemicals  Corporation — and  selected 
one  of  its  vice  presidents,  physical 
chemist  and  engineer  George  T.  Fel- 
beck,  as  project  manager  in  charge  of 
K-25  operations. 

In  the  letter  contract  with  Carbide 
and  Carbon,  Keith  made  certain  that 
there  was  a  provision  for  Kellex  to 
obtain  help  in  plant  construction. 
Later  modifications  in  the  formal  con- 
tract, signed  in  November  1943,  ex- 
tended the  operating  contractor's 
area  of  responsibility  to  include  co- 
ordination of  barrier  research  and  de- 
velopment, construction  and  oper- 
ation of  a  plant  for  producing  nickel 
powder,  conversion  of  Bakelite  facili- 
ties to  produce  special  barrier  materi- 
al, and  assumption  in  February  1945 
of  the  SAM  Laboratories  research 
program,  hitherto  operated  by  Co- 
lumbia University. 

Under  terms  of  the  prime  contract, 
Carbide  and  Carbon  was  to  receive  an 
operator's  fee  of  $75,000  per  month 
for  full  plant  operation,  and  addition- 
al payments  as  warranted.  Although  it 
would  shoulder  principal  responsibil- 
ity for  production  activities,  it  did  not 
agree — as  did  Du  Pont  with  the 
plutonium  plant  and  the  Tennessee 
Eastman  Corporation  with  the  elec- 
tromagnetic plant — to  serve  as  sole 
operator  of  the  gaseous  diffusion 
plant.  Carbide  officials  did  not  want 
responsibility  for  conditioning  the 
process  equipment  against  the  corro- 
sive nature  of  the  uranium  hexafluor- 
ide  process  gas,  nor  did  they  want  the 
potentially    hazardous    task    of  manu- 


166 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


facturing    the    volatile     fluorine     gas 
used  for  conditioning. 

As  an  alternative,  District  officials 
had  arranged  with  Chrysler,  already 
under  contract  for  manufacturing  the 
converter  component  of  the  diffusion 
system,  to  do  the  conditioning.  But 
when  Kellex  and  Army  authorities 
came  to  working  out  details  of  the 
equipment  contract  with  the  automo- 
bile firm,  they  learned  that  it  lacked 
the  necessary  facilities  for  fluorine 
conditioning  in  its  Detroit  plant.  Fol- 
lowing months  of  delay,  Manhattan 
and  Carbide  officials  resolved  the 
problem  in  November  1943.  Based  on 
recommendations  by  Union  Carbide, 
Carbon  and  Carbide  officials  tempo- 
rarily assigned  responsibility  for  oper- 
ating the  conditioning  facilities  to  the 
building  contractor.  Ford,  Bacon,  and 
Davis,  and  building  and  operating  re- 
sponsibility for  the  fluorine  produc- 
tion facilities  to  the  Hooker  Electro- 
chemical Company.  Up  until  early 
1945,  when  Carbide  and  Carbon  as- 
sumed full  operational  control  of 
these  facilities,  this  arrangement  per- 
mitted the  prime  operating  contractor 
to  concentrate  its  efforts  on  the  proc- 
ess and  power  plants. 

Preparations 

During  1943,  with  gaseous  diffu- 
sion plant  production  activities  on  a 
limited  scale,  the  Manhattan  District 
monitored  the  work  of  the  several  op- 
erating contractors  through  its  K-25 
Construction  Division.  When  oper- 
ations began  to  expand  rapidly  in  early 
1944,  the  district  engineer  established 
a  K-25  Operations  Division,  headed 
by  Maj.  John  J.  Moran  (Chart  3). 
For  months  Moran's  division  func- 
tioned   with    only    eight    officers    and 


five  civil  service  employees.  Then  as 
the  main  diffusion  plant  became  oper- 
ational in  1945,  the  division  acquired 
some  additional  personnel  and,  by 
the  fall  of  that  year,  was  operating 
with  fourteen  officers,  nine  enlisted 
men,  and  twenty  civil  service  employ- 
ees. But  this  was  a  relatively  small 
staff  to  oversee  the  multifarious  activi- 
ties of  a  production  plant  that  at  the 
peak  of  its  operations  employed  more 
than  eleven  thousand  workers.  It 
proved  adequate,  however,  because 
Colonel  Stowers,  the  K-25  unit  chief, 
employed  the  staff  of  the  New  York 
Area  Engineers  Office,  which  he  also 
continued  to  head,  to  assume  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  load  of  maintain- 
ing liaison  among  the  major  compa- 
nies involved  in  gaseous  diffusion 
operations. 

In  the  spring  of  1944,  about  the 
time  construction  crews  were  com- 
pleting the  first  cell  in  the  main  proc- 
ess building.  Carbide  and  Carbon 
began  setting  up  its  production  orga- 
nization at  the  plant  site.  The  firm 
had  been  recruiting  personnel  for  an 
operating  force  since  late  1943,  but 
with  only  limited  success.  And  be- 
cause recruitment  difficulties  also  ex- 
tended to  supervisory  and  technical 
positions,  the  district  engineer  even- 
tually had  to  augment  the  K-25 
technical  staff  with  skilled  personnel 
from  the  District's  Special  Engineer 
Detachment.^® 


'®  On  specific  problems  in  recruitment  of  supervi- 
sory and  technical  personnel  see  Memo,  Stowers  to 
Marshall,  sub:  K-25  Proj  Requirements,  21  Jan  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600  12  (Projs  and 
Prgms:  K-25),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  5,  pp.  2.1- 
2.4,  DASA. 


Chart  3— Organization  of  the  Manhattan  District,  January  1945 


DISTRICT  ENGINEER 

DEPUTY  DISTRICT  ENGINEERS 

EXECUTIVE  OFFICERS 


SPECIAL  PROJECTS 


EXECUTIVE  ASSISTANT 


WASHINGTON  LIAISON 


REPORTS  S  STATISTICS 


SPECIAL  STUDIES 


SPECIAL  STAFF 


EXECUTIVE  ASSISTANT 


INTELLIGENCE  S  SECURITY 


INTELLIGENCE.  SAFEGUARDING 
MILITARY  INFORMATION  t 
\  BRANCH  OFFICES 


NAVAL  DETACHMENTS 


COORDINATOR 


PRODUCTION 


MADISON  SOUARE  AREA 


Colorado 
H3  S.  St    Lo 


Alabama  Ordnance  Works 
Morgantown  Ordnance  Works 
Wabash  River  Ordnance  Works 


Delroit 
Milwaukee 


HANFORD  ENGINEER  WORKS 


EXECUTIVE  ASSISTANT 


ADMINISTRATION 


FISCAL  BRANCH 


ADMINISTRATIVE  BRANCH 


CONTRACTS  S  CLAIMS 


Contracts  &  Procurement 
Engmeenng 


PRIORITIES  S  EXPEDITING 


I  GENERAL  ACCOUNTING  OFFICE  ^ 


EXECUTIVE  ASSISTANT 

FOR 

OPERATIONS 


SAFETY  BRANCH 


MAINTENANCE  t,  UTILITIES 

BRANCH 
CLINTON  ENGINEER  WORKS 


SERVICE  BRANCH 


Redistribution  t,  Salvage 
Clinton  Engineer  Works 
Redistribution  &  Salvage 

Classified  Material 


Clinton  Engineer  Works 


EXECUTIVE  ASSISTANT 

FOR 

PERSONNEL 


MILITARY  PERSONNEL 


Hanford  Engineer  Works 


WASHINGTON  REPRESENTATIVE 


,  US.  Engrs  OHice.  Ml).  26  Jan  45.  AcJniin  Files. 


iirrcsp.  020  (MED-Org).  MDR. 


THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


167 


As  newly  recruited  workers  report- 
ed in,  Carbide  and  Carbon  made 
preparations  for  their  orientation  and 
training.  By  October  1944,  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  instructors  and  train- 
ees were  on  hand  to  establish  an  op- 
erations training  center  in  a  building 
formerly  occupied  by  the  local  public 
school.  At  the  start,  the  center's  cur- 
riculum consisted  of  two  major  cours- 
es: process  training  and  vacuum  test 
training.  Later,  courses  were  added 
for  process  maintenance  men  and  in- 
strument mechanics.  In  the  begin- 
ning, only  men  were  enrolled,  but  the 
continuing  shortage  of  workers  com- 
pelled Carbide  and  Carbon  to  recruit 
a  large  number  of  women  as  process 
operators.  After  employees  had  re- 
ceived more  than  eighty  hours  of 
formal  classroom  training,  they  un- 
derwent a  period  of  on-the-job  train- 
ing before  final  assignment  to  an  op- 
erating position. 

In  August  1944,  some  new  workers 
had  the  opportunity  to  acquire  practi- 
cal experience  on  the  operation  of  the 
54-stage  pilot  plant,  an  experimental 
unit  located  at  the  base  of  the  U  in  the 
main  process  building.  The  barrier 
tubes  were  not  yet  available,  so  the 
cell  stages  were  fitted  with  steel  ori- 
fices instead  of  converters.  This 
meant,  of  course,  that  no  isotope  sep- 
aration could  occur.  But,  using  either 
nitrogen  or  "test  fluid,"  ^^  the  opera- 


^^  "Test  fluid,"  the  chemical  compound  n-per- 
fluoroheptane  (CtFis)  project  chemists  had  devel- 
oped for  process  building  test  runs,  was  a  nonhy- 
drogenous  gaseous  material  with  characteristics 
similar  to  the  process  gas,  uranium  hexafluoride, 
except  that  it  was  noncorrosive.  During  test  oper- 
ations in  the  first  three  buildings,  however,  C7F16 
exhibited  a  number  of  technical  deficiencies.  Conse- 
quently, in  February  1945,  project  chemists  decided 
to  discard  it  in  favor  of  using  the  process  gas  in 
final  test  runs,  realizing  that  the  latter — although 
highly  corrosive — would  provide  the  same  test  infor- 


tor  trainees  simulated  actual  plant  op- 
erations and  plant  managers  were 
able  to  develop  operating  techniques, 
provide  realistic  training  for  foremen 
and  key  operators,  and  test  perform- 
ance of  seals,  pumps,  and  valves.  In 
January  1945,  Carbide  moved  all 
training  activities  from  outlying  build- 
ings to  the  54-stage  pilot  plant. 

Production  Activities 

By  the  end  of  1944,  J.  A.  Jones 
construction  crews  were  ready  to  turn 
over  the  first  60  of  the  402  stages  of 
Case  I — the  first  major  section  of  the 
production  plant.  Jones  employees 
tested  pumps,  instruments,  and  other 
equipment  for  operability  in  the  pres- 
ence of  Carbide  and  Carbon  repre- 
sentatives, noting  in  an  acceptance 
report  all  deficiencies  that  would  re- 
quire adjustment,  repair,  or  replace- 
ment. Witnesses  from  both  firms  then 
had  to  approve  the  report  before  a 
completed  plant  section  could  be 
turned  over  to  the  operating  staff  for 
another  series  of  tests  preliminary  to 
actual  production. 

A  typical  preoperation  test  was  to 
make  certain  no  leaks  existed  in  the 
process  system,  because  the  separa- 
tion process  would  operate  effectively 
only  under  conditions  approaching  an 
absolute  vacuum,  with  an  infinitesi- 
mally  small  pressure  buildup.  SAM 
Laboratories  vacuum  technicians  and 
Carbide  and  Carbon  employees,  all 
specially  instructed  in  detecting  leaks, 
worked  together  to  carry  out  the  deli- 
cate preoperation  test.  The  test  teams 
pumped  down  the  process  equipment 


mation  with  a  considerable  savings  in  both  time  and 
labor.  See  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  5,  pp.  3.4-3.5,  DASA. 


168 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Completed  Plant  Section  with  corrugated  steel  sheathing 


to  a  high  vacuum  and  then  played  a 
stream  of  helium  water  over  every 
welded  joint,  instrument,  and  valve.  If 
there  were  leaks,  helium  would  enter 
the  system,  where  a  mass  spectrome- 
ter would  detect  it.  Some  four  hun- 
dred to  six  hundred  test  personnel  ul- 
timately had  to  devote  about  eight 
months  to  complete  a  check  of  the 
whole  gaseous  diffusion  plant. 

As  soon  as  a  unit,  or  building,  suc- 
cessfully passed  the  leak-test  require- 
ments, plant  operators  prepared  it  for 
a  test  run  with  regular  process  gas. 
Before  they  could  do  this,  however, 
they  had  to  make  a  thorough  check 
and  calibration  of  all  instruments  and 
carry  out  final  conditioning  of  equip- 
ment. The  130,000  instruments  in  the 
main  process  area — probably  up  to 
that  time  the  largest  number  ever  in- 


stalled in  a  single  production  plant — 
included  many  that  were  of  special 
design  and  development  and  some 
that  (for  example,  the  mass  spectrom- 
eters) were  extremely  delicate  and 
complicated.  Many,  too,  never  before 
had  been  used  routinely  in  a  commer- 
cial-scale plant.  Consequently,  months 
of  painstaking  testing,  calibrating,  and 
checking  were  necessary  before  the 
final  steps  to  put  the  plant  into 
operation. 

Units  in  the  production  plant  cas- 
cade began  operating  for  the  first 
time  on  regular  process  gas  in  Febru- 
ary 1945,  testing  procedures  that  sub- 
sequently were  employed  throughout 
the  plant.  The  initial  step  was  vapori- 
zation of  the  feed  material — solid  ura- 
nium hexafluoride  from  the  Harshaw 
Chemical  Company  in  Cleveland — by 


THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


169 


subjecting  it  to  a  series  of  hot  baths 
to  convert  it  into  a  gas.  The  feed  ma- 
terial then  entered  the  process  stream 
in  its  gaseous  form  at  any  convenient 
feed  intake  point  and  flowed  through 
the  cascade  of  enriching  stages. 
Emerging  from  these  stages,  the  proc- 
ess gas  went  through  a  stripping  sec- 
tion that  carried  depleted  gas  from 
the  higher  enrichment  stages  back  to 
the  lower  part  of  the  cascade  for 
recirculation. 

By  early  March,  construction  crews 
had  completed  sufficient  additional 
cells  to  permit  start-up  of  a  two-build- 
ing cascade.  Unfortunately,  on  the 
ninth,  as  the  actual  start-up  procedure 
began,  nitrogen  flooded  the  two- 
building  cascade,  because  a  worker 
had  failed  to  close  a  valve  in  a  bypass 
line.  But  quick  purging  action  by 
plant  crews  soon  cleared  the  system 
and,  by  the  twelfth,  they  not  only  had 
the  two-building  cascade  in  partial 
production  but  also  had  connected 
two  more  buildings  to  the  system.  On 
the  twenty-fourth,  the  whole  of  Case  I 
went  on  stream.  In  the  months  fol- 
lowing, Cases  II  through  IV  were  fin- 
ished at  the  rate  of  a  case  per  month, 
until  in  mid-August  the  full  plant  cas- 
cade of  2,892  stages  was  in  operation. 

From  the  start,  production  results 
were  much  better  than  anticipated, 
despite  occasional  minor  interrup- 
tions because  of  equipment  failures 
and  operational  errors. ^°  By  May 
1945,  Cases  I  and  II  were  turning 
out  a  product  containing  1  percent 
U-235.  In  the  following  month,  using 
slightly  enriched  material  from  the 
liquid  thermal  diffusion  plant  as  feed. 


^°  For  a  detailed  listing  of  these  interruptions 
during  the  period  of  getting  the  K-25  plant  into  full 
operation  in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1945  see 
ibid.,  pp.  8.4-8.7,  DASA. 


operators  drew  off  some  product  con- 
taining nearly  7  percent  U-235.  After 
the  full  plant  cascade  went  on  stream, 
product  concentration  increased  to  23 
percent.  During  the  fall,  the  plant 
demonstrated  a  productive  capacity 
far  higher  than  its  designers  had  pre- 
dicted. Contributing  to  this  increased 
rate  of  output  was  a  cell  stream  effi- 
ciency and  barrier  performance  great- 
er than  expected. 

In  early  1945,  the  District's  Produc- 
tion Control  Committee,  appointed 
earlier  by  Colonel  Nichols  to  coordi- 
nate production  by  the  diffusion  proc- 
esses and  the  electromagnetic  proc- 
ess, had  worked  out  a  plan  to  achieve 
the  maximum  feasible  output  of 
U-235.  Based  upon  a  careful  analysis 
of  each  process,  the  committee  direct- 
ed that  K-25  would  not  be  brought 
into  the  production  chain  until  it 
demonstrated  a  capability  of  produc- 
ing a  product  enrichment  of  1.1  per- 
cent. The  K-25  plant  attained  the  1.1- 
percent  level  in  April,  and  project 
workers  began  sending  the  output  to 
the  electromagnetic  plant  for  final  en- 
richment. At  the  same  time,  thermal 
diffusion  plant  workers  who  had  been 
sending  the  plant's  output  to  the  rela- 
tively inefficient  Alpha  I  stage  of  the 
electromagnetic  plant  now  began  de- 
livering the  entire  product  output  to 
K-25.  Thus,  the  gaseous  diffusion 
process  became  an  integral  part  of 
the  U-235  production  chain  and, 
during  the  spring  and  summer  of 
1945,  contributed  substantially  to 
the  manufacture  of  the  fissionable 
material  used  in  the  fabrication  of 
atomic  weapons  at  the  Los  Alamos 
Laboratory. 

The  Army's  success  in  bringing  the 
vast    and    complex    gaseous    diffusion 


170 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Completed  Gaseous  Diffusion  Plant.  The  K-27  extension  unit  subsequently  was 
erected  adjacent  to  Poplar  Creek,  at  the  upper  right. 


plant  into  full-scale  production  was  to 
a  considerable  extent  due  to  its 
having  formed  in  the  union  of  Kellex 
and  Carbide  and  Carbon  an  effective 
organization  with  the  requisite  re- 
sources, industrial  knowledge,  and 
skilled  personnel.  Fortunately,  during 
most  of  the  1943-45  period  when 
first  the  K-25  plant  and  then  its  K-27 
extension  were  being  brought  from 
the  draftsman's  table  to  fully  operat- 
ing production  units,  the  various 
Kellex-Carbide  elements  functioned 
together  surprisingly  smoothly  and  ef- 
ficiently considering  the  unrelenting 
pressure  of  time  and  the  frustrations 
created  by  all  kinds  of  wartime  short- 
ages in  material  and  manpower. 

Inevitably,  however,  there  were  oc- 
casional  misunderstandings   and   per- 


sonality conflicts  that  threatened  to 
disrupt  the  teamwork  of  the  organiza- 
tion. One  such  incident  occurred  in 
June  1945,  when  Kellex  was  phasing 
out  participation  in  the  project  and 
leaving  primary  responsibility  for 
plant  operation  to  Carbide  and 
Carbon.  At  this  time,  a  dispute  arose 
over  the  role  of  Kellex's  strong- 
minded  executive  in  charge,  Percival 
Keith.  The  problem  seemed  to  be 
that  Carbide  officials  thought  Keith 
was  no  longer  devoting  as  much  time 
to  gaseous  diffusion  as  he  should, 
whereas  Keith  felt  that  he  should  be 
the  judge  of  how  much  of  his  time 
should  be  spent  on  the  project.  After 
exceptional  effort  on  the  part  of  Gen- 
eral Groves  and  his  staff,  Keith  yield- 
ed to  persuasion  and  agreed  to  stay 


THE  GASEOUS  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


171 


on  in  an  advisory  capacity  to  assist 
Carbide  and  Carbon  in  operating  the 
production  plant. 

Considered  in  terms  of  its  ultimate 
production  capabilities,  the  gaseous 
diffusion  plant  did  not  attain  a  signifi- 
cant level  of  output  until  the  fall  of 
1945,  after  World  War  II  had  ended. 
This  was  not  the  result  of  poor  plan- 
ning or  a  failure  to  fulfill,  in  the  main, 
established  construction  and  produc- 
tion schedules.  Rather  it  stemmed 
from  the  fact  that  when  Groves  and 
the  other  leaders  of  the  atomic  energy 
program  were  working  out  the  plans 
for  the  plant  in  1943,  the  consensus 
of  opinion  was  that  the  war  against 
Japan  would  last  at  least  until  mid- 
1946.  Had  this  been  the  case,  the 
K-25  plant  would  have  attained  the 
level  of  maximum  output  at  the  time 
when  U-235  would  be  needed  in 
large  quantities  for  the  weapons  fabri- 
cation program.  Events,  of  course,  did 
not  unfold  quite  as  the  atomic  project 
planners  had  anticipated,  and  the  war 
ended  in  August  1945.  Consequent- 
ly, full-scale  operation  of  K-25  and  its 
K-27  extension  constitutes  an  episode 
in   the  immediate  postwar  history  of 


the  Manhattan  Project  rather  than  its 
wartime  aspect.  In  this  postwar  period, 
the  great  industrial  complex  so  hur- 
riedly designed,  erected,  and  placed  in 
operation,  employing  largely  inexperi- 
enced personnel  working  under  far 
from  favorable  conditions,  demon- 
strated that  it  was  the  most  efficient 
and  productive  of  all  the  process 
plants  built  to  manufacture  U-235. 

Shortly  after  the  war  was  over,  the 
Manhattan  District  shut  down  the 
liquid  thermal  diffusion  plant  and  the 
Alpha  units  of  the  electromagnetic 
plant.  But  the  gaseous  diffusion  plant 
continued  in  operation  as  the  basic 
source  of  U-235  for  the  entire  atomic 
project.  And  in  the  postwar  era,  the 
great  plant  at  the  bend  of  the  Clinch 
River  became  the  prototype  for  new 
facilities  built  elsewhere  in  the  United 
States  to  increase  output  of  U-235, 
and  also  for  the  production  units  built 
in  other  countries  to  manufacture  fis- 
sionable uranium  for  atomic  energy 
programs.  ^^ 


^'See  Ch.  XXV'III  on  the  closing  down  of  the 
liquid  thermal  diffusion  plant  and  the  Alpha  units  of 
the  electromagnetic  plant. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


The  Liquid  Thermal  Diffusion 
Process 


Leaders  of  the  atomic  energy  pro- 
gram had  decided  against  large-scale 
development  of  the  liquid  thermal 
diffusion  process  in  early  1943,  partly 
because  they  judged  the  process  in- 
feasible  and  partly  because  transfer  of 
a  Navy  project  to  the  Army-directed 
Manhattan  Project  was  likely  to  result 
in  major  administrative  and  security 
problems.  By  the  spring  of  1944, 
however,  significant  progress  in  ther- 
mal diffusion  research — coupled  with 
the  threat  of  not  reaching  the  requi- 
site production  level  of  fissionable 
uranium  because  of  delays  in  getting 
the  electromagnetic  and  gaseous  dif- 
fusion plants  into  full  operation — 
opened  the  way  for  serious  reconsid- 
eration of  this  method  as  a  means  for 
providing  a  supplementary  supply  of 
partially  enriched  material  for  the  Los 
Alamos  Laboratory  weapon  program. 

Research  and  Development: 
The  Role  of  the  Navy 

One  advantage  of  the  liquid  ther- 
mal diffusion  method  of  separating 
isotopes  was  its  relative  simplicity. 
When  a  liquid  containing  isotopes  of 
a  given  element  is  placed  in  the  annu- 
lar  space   between    two   vertical   con- 


centric receptacles,  the  inner  one 
heated  and  the  outer  one  cooled, 
thermal  diffusion — that  is,  the  passage 
of  heat  from  the  hot  to  the  cold 
wall — tends  to  concentrate  lighter  iso- 
topes near  the  hot  wall  and  heavier 
isotopes  near  the  cold  wall  and,  si- 
multaneously, because  of  convection, 
to  carry  the  hotter  liquid  upward  and 
the  cooler  fluid  downward.  The  result 
is  accumulation  of  lighter  isotopes  at 
the  top  of  the  receptacle  and  heavier 
isotopes  at  the  bottom,  thus  permit- 
ting extraction  of  both  fractions. 

This  method,  first  tested  in  the  late 
1930's  by  German  scientists  using 
zinc  salts  dissolved  in  water,  had  pro- 
duced a  small  amount  of  separation; 
however,  the  phenomenon  remained 
a  little-known  scientific  curiosity  until, 
in  1940,  wartime  events  precipitated 
intensive  research  by  American  scien- 
tists to  secure  the  fissionable  materi- 
als necessary  for  the  atomic  project. 
In  Washington,  D.C.,  chemist  Philip 
H.  Abelson  of  the  Carnegie  Institu- 
tion and  physicist-technical  adviser 
Ross  Gunn  of  the  Naval  Research 
Laboratory  simultaneously  sought  fi- 
nancial support  from  the  government 
for  a  liquid  thermal  diffusion  research 


THE  LIQ.UID  THERMAL  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


173 


program.  Abelson,  who  had  worked 
with  chemist  Glenn  Seaborg  on  pluto- 
nium  chemistry  at  the  University  of 
California,  Berkeley,  wrote  to  Urani- 
um Committee  Chairman  Lyman 
Briggs  at  the  National  Bureau  of 
Standards  and  described  how  urani- 
um isotopes  might  be  separated  by 
thermal  diffusion,  and  Gunn,  also  a 
member  of  the  Uranium  Committee, 
passed  on  to  other  committee  mem- 
bers his  own  interest  in  the  potentiali- 
ties of  the  process.  Acting  on  Briggs's 
suggestion,  the  Navy  decided  to  sup- 
port research  in  hopes  that  it  might 
provide  fuel  for  a  nuclear  power  plant 
suitable  for  submarines. 

Abelson  started  his  research  at  the 
Carnegie  Institution,  but  in  October 
1940  moved  his  experiments  to  the 
Bureau  of  Standards.  Then  in  June 
1941,  at  Gunn's  suggestion,  Abelson 
became  an  employee  at  the  Naval  Re- 
search Laboratory,  which  had  been 
providing  funds  for  his  experiments 
since  September  1940,  and  shifted  his 
equipment  to  that  institution.  Using 
36-foot  columns  consisting  of  two 
vertical  concentric  pipes,  the  inner 
carrying  hot  steam  and  the  outer 
process  liquid,  Abelson  began  actual 
tests  with  uranium  hexafluoride,  a 
compound  so  little  known  at  the  time 
that  he  had  to  devise  his  own  method 
for  producing  the  substance  in  quan- 
tity. Results  were  disappointing  at 
first;  however,  by  changing  the  spac- 
ing between  the  hot  and  cold  walls  of 
the  columns,  Abelson  was  able  to 
demonstrate  that  a  separation  factor 
as  high  as  21  percent  could  be 
achieved   and   an   equilibrium   separa- 


tion could  be  attained  in  about  two 
days.^ 

In  August  1942,  when  Abelson's  re- 
search had  progressed  to  the  stage 
where  he  needed  a  pilot  plant  to  as- 
certain the  feasibility  of  operating  a 
large-scale  plant,  the  Navy  undertook 
the  task  of  building  the  first  thermal 
diffusion  pilot  plant  at  its  Anacostia 
Station  near  the  Naval  Research  Lab- 
oratory facilities.  Completed  by  No- 
vember, the  original  pilot  plant  con- 
sisted of  five  (later  others  were 
added)  36-foot  columns  and  the  req- 
uisite pumps,  piping,  and  other 
equipment;  a  recently  installed  20- 
horsepower  gas-fired  boiler  provided 
the  necessary  steam.  From  the  start  of 
operations  in  December,  the  plant 
proved  amazingly  reliable,  running 
for  days  at  a  time  with  scarcely  any  at- 
tention from  the  operating  staff. 
Then  in  early  1943,  the  staff  discov- 
ered that  greater  operational  efficien- 
cy resulted  from  increasing  the  tem- 
perature of  the  hot  wall.  Although  the 
higher  temperature  complicated 
design  because  of  the  high  pressures 
required  for  hotter  steam,  it  largely 
overcame  the  excessively  long  equilib- 
rium time  required  for  the  plant  to 
reach  the  stage  of  producing  signifi- 
cant amounts  of  U-235. 


'  On  the  early  history  of  the  Hquid  thermal  difTu- 
sion  method  see  Progress  Rpt,  Philip  H.  Abelson, 
sub:  Liq  Therm  DifT  Research  (Rpt  0-1977),  5  Jan 
43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600  12  (Therm  DifT 
Proj),  MDR:  MI^H,  Bk.  6,  Sec.  2,  "Research  and  De- 
velopment," pp.  2.1-2.4,  DASA,  Hewlett  and  An- 
derson, \eu'  World,  pp.  32  and  168-70;  Smyth 
Report,  p.  47. 


174 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Reassessment:  Decision  for  Full-scale 
Development 

For  a  time  in  late  1942,  the  liquid 
thermal  diffusion  method  appeared  to 
have  been  eliminated  from  further  se- 
rious consideration  for  the  atomic 
weapon  program.  In  September,  Gen- 
eral Groves  and  Colonel  Nichols  had 
visited  the  Naval  Research  Laboratory 
and  had  talked  to  Gunn,  but  the  small 
size  of  the  project  and  the  apparent 
lack  of  urgency  of  its  developmental 
program  had  left  the  Manhattan  com- 
mander unimpressed.  Groves,  too,  re- 
called that  Vannevar  Bush,  director  of 
the  Office  of  Scientific  Research  and 
Development,  had  just  told  him  that 
in  March  President  Roosevelt  had  di- 
rected that  the  Navy  be  excluded 
from  the  S-1  program.  Yet  in  late  No- 
vember, the  S-1  Executive  Committee 
reassessed  all  of  the  more  promising 
methods  for  mass  production  of  fis- 
sionable materials  and,  at  the  last 
moment,  decided  to  include  Abel- 
son's  project  in  its  review.^ 

General  Groves  and  the  S-l's  reas- 
sessment group,  the  Lewis  reviewing 
committee  headed  by  MIT  Professor 
Warren  K.  Lewis,  visited  the  Naval 
Research  Laboratory  on  10  December 
and  were  sufficiently  impressed  with 
Abelson's  progress  to  recommend 
continued  support  of  the  thermal  dif- 
fusion project.  Bush  took  steps  to  get 
continued  support  from  the  Navy, 
channeling  his  efforts  through  Rear 
Adm.  William  R.  Purnell  of  the  Mili- 
tary Policy  Committee   to  avoid  con- 


flict with  the  President's  directive  to 
keep  the  Navy  out  of  the  S-1  project. 
Purnell  had  Abelson's  latest  scientific 
reports  sent  to  S-1  Committee  Chair- 
man James  B.  Conant,  who  turned 
them  over  to  the  S-1  Executive  Com- 
mittee. An  S-1  subcommittee,  com- 
prised of  Lyman  Briggs,  Eger  V. 
Murphree,  and  Harold  C.  Urey,  re- 
viewed the  reports  and  visited  the 
Navy  project.  On  23  January  1943, 
they  informed  Conant  that  "the  Naval 
Research  Laboratory  .  .  .  [had]  made 
excellent  progress  in  the  separation 
of  isotopes  by  liquid  thermal  diffu- 
sion .  .  .  ,"  ^  but  expressed  concern 
over  the  lack  of  solid  production  data 
and  the  excessive  length  of  the  equi- 
librium time.  Consequently,  the  sub- 
committee limited  its  recommenda- 
tion to  suggesting  that  a  commercial 
organization  be  invited  to  prepare 
preliminary  designs  for  a  production 
plant,  a  stage  of  development  that  the 
gaseous  diffusion  and  centrifuge 
projects  had  attained  nearly  a  year 
earlier.  But  two  days  later  Murphree 
reviewed  his  own  estimate  of  Abel- 
son's project  and  proposed  that  the 
Manhattan  leaders  consider  substitut- 
ing liquid  thermal  diffusion  for  gase- 
ous diffusion  in  the  lower  stages  of  a 
U-235  separation  plant.  ^ 

At  the  beginning  of  February,  Gen- 
eral Groves  submitted  the  various 
proposals  concerning  thermal  diffu- 
sion and  the  reports  from  Abelson  to 
the  Lewis  reviewing  committee.  After 
due  consideration  the  committee  sug- 


^Ltr,  Briggs,  Murphree,  and  L'rev  to  Conant, 
23  Jan  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12 
(Therm  Diff  Proj),  MDR;  Marshall  Diary,  21  Sep  42, 
OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Misc  Recs 
Sec,  behind  Fldr  5,  MDR;  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be 
Told.  p.  23;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Sew  World,  pp. 
169-70. 


^Ltr,  Briggs,  Murphree,  and  Urey  to  Conant, 
23Jan43.  MDR. 

■•Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves,  20  Jan  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Liq  Therm  DifT),  MDR; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew  World,  p.  171  (based  on 
Ltr,  Murphree  to  Briggs,  25  Jan  43,  OSRD). 


THE  LIQUID  THERMAL  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


175 


gested  continuing  with  a  limited  pro- 
gram of  research  and  preliminary  en- 
gineering designs.  The  S-1  Executive 
Committee  accepted  this  recommen- 
dation on  the  tenth,  and  another 
review  by  Lewis,  Briggs,  Murphrec, 
and  Urey  toward  the  end  of  the 
summer  resulted  in  essentially  the 
same  recommendation.^ 

From  September  1942  until  April 
1943,  there  was  an  almost  complete 
loss  of  contact  between  the  Navy  pro- 
gram and  the  Manhattan  Project.  This 
temporary  exclusion  from  the  main 
arena  of  atomic  energy  activities  did 
not,  in  the  long  run,  seriously  impede 
continued  development,  although 
Groves's  refusal  in  October  to  ap- 
prove Abelson's  request  for  addition- 
al supplies  of  uranium  hexafluoride 
momentarily  threatened  the  program. 
Groves  soon  relented,  however,  when 
Navy  officials  reminded  him  that 
Abelson  was  the  scientist  who  had  de- 
vised the  process  for  producing  large 
quantities  of  uranium  hexafluoride. 
Abelson  needed  the  increased  quanti- 
ties of  the  compound  for  the  three- 
hundred-column  high-pressure  pilot 
plant  he  planned  to  build  at  the  Phila- 
delphia Navy  Yard,  where  there  was 
an  adequate  supply  of  steam  avail- 
able. The  Navy  finally  authorized  con- 
struction of  the  new  plant  in  Novem- 
ber and  work  started  on  a  one-hun- 


n.tr,  C.  H.  Greenewalt  (TNX  Tech  Div  chief.  Du 
Pont)  to  Groves.  8  Feb  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  600.12  (Therm  DifT  Proj).  MDR;  Hewlett  and 
Anderson,  Xeu'  World,  pp.  171-72;  Rpt,  Murphree 
and  Urey,  sub:  Prgm  for  Experiments  To  Be  Car- 
ried Out  on  Therm  Diff  Method,  19  Feb  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Liq  Therm  Difi).  MDR; 
Ltrs,  Briggs,  Urey,  Murphree,  and  Lewis  to  Conant, 
8  Sep  43,  and  Conant  to  Purnell,  15  Sep  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  334  (Mil  Policv),  MDR. 


dred-column      segment      in     January 
1944.6 

The  final  impetus  for  full-fledged 
development  did  not  come  from  the 
Army  or  the  S-1  Committee,  but 
from  that  element  most  vitally  con- 
cerned with  obtaining  an  early  and 
adequate  supply  of  fissionable  mate- 
rials: the  Los  Alamos  Laboratory. 
In  particular.  Laboratory  Director 
J.  Robert  Oppenheimer  was  constantly 
on  the  alert  for  any  means  that  gave 
promise  of  speeding  up  large-scale 
production  of  fissionable  materials.  At 
a  time  when  the  electromagnetic  plant 
at  the  Clinton  Engineer  Works  was 
just  beginning  to  produce  a  sizable 
amount  of  enriched  uranium  and 
completion  of  the  gaseous  diffusion 
and  plutonium  production  plants  still 
was  many  months  away,  Oppen- 
heimer reviewed  certain  fragmentary 
data  received  earlier  on  the  thermal 
diffusion  project.  His  information  in- 
cluded two  nearly  year-old  reports  by 
Abelson  and  some  oral  reports  re- 
ceived from  Capt.  William  S.  Parsons, 
the  naval  officer  in  charge  of  ord- 
nance at  Los  Alamos. 

Parsons  had  just  returned  from  a  trip 
to  the  East,  during  which  he  had  made 
inquiries  about  the  pilot  plant  under 
construction  at  Philadelphia.  He  had 
learned  that  the  plant  was  scheduled 
to  begin  operating  on  1  July,  using 
one  hundred  columns  to  produce  an 
estimated  5  grams  per  day  of  an  en- 
riched product  containing  5  percent 
U-235.  Oppenheimer  knew  that  par- 
tially enriched  material  in  such  small 
quantities  would  not  begin  to  fulfill 
the      requirements      of     the     atomic 


^Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xnt'  World,  pp.  171-72; 
MDH,  Bk.  6,  Sec.  2,  pp.  2.4  and  2.9,  DASA;  Smvth 
Report,  p.  147 


176 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


project;  however,  the  thought  oc- 
curred to  him  that  if  the  one  hundred 
columns  of  the  plant  could  be  con- 
nected in  parallel  rather  than  as  a 
fractionating  pyramid,  they  might  be 
made  to  produce  something  like  12 
kilograms  a  day  of  an  enriched  prod- 
uct containing  about  1  percent  U-235. 
And  this  output  would  be  tripled 
if  Abelson  carried  out  his  plan  to 
erect  a  total  of  three  hundred  col- 
umns, the  number  that  could  be  oper- 
ated on  the  steam  available  at  the 
Philadelphia  Yard.  On  28  April,  Op- 
penheimer  wrote  to  Groves  that  de- 
velopment of  the  thermal  diffusion 
process  to  provide  partially  enriched 
uranium  feed  for  the  electromagnetic 
process  would  give  "hope  that  the 
production  of  the  Y-12  [electromag- 
netic] plant  could  be  increased  by 
some  30  or  40  percent,  and  its  en- 
hancement somewhat  improved,  many 
months  earlier  than  the  scheduled 
date  for  K-25  [gaseous  diffusion] 
production."  ^ 

Groves  did  not  reply  immediately. 
In  later  years  he  stated  he  did  not 
know  why  he  or  someone  else  had 
not  suggested  thermal  diffusion  as  a 
feeder  process  for  the  electromagnet- 
ic plant  at  least  a  year  before;  per- 
haps, he  conjectured,  this  occurred 
because  everyone  at  first  had  thought 
of  using  a  single  process  to  achieve  a 
final  product  enrichment  and,  as  a 
single  production  system,  thermal  dif- 
fusion had  certain  technical  draw- 
backs. But  by  August  1943,  Manhat- 
tan leaders  had  adopted  the  feeder 
concept  for  the  gaseous  diffusion 
plant,  proposing  to  use  its  output  to 


feed  the  Beta  cycle,  and  in  this  new 
context  they  were  then  able  to  per- 
ceive the  potentialities  of  thermal 
diffusion.® 

Unquestionably,  too,  development 
by  an  organization  outside  the  Army- 
administered  Manhattan  District  was 
an  important  factor  contributing  to 
the  delay.  For  this  reason  it  did  not 
attract  the  active  interest  of  most  of 
the  scientists  and  engineers  who  orga- 
nized the  bomb  project,  and  the  Army 
administrators  feared  security  prob- 
lems from  bringing  outside  agencies 
into  the  Manhattan  Project.  That  the 
latter  consideration  created  at  least 
some  reservation  in  Groves's  mind  as 
to  the  feasibility  of  Oppenheimer's 
suggestion  seems  borne  out  by  the 
fact  that  the  Manhattan  commander, 
who  was  not  characteristically  a  man 
to  allow  grass  to  grow  under  his  feet, 
let  a  whole  month  pass  before  acting 
upon  it.  Finally,  on  31  May  1944, 
Groves  appointed  a  committee  con- 
sisting of  Lewis  and  Murphree,  who 
had  previously  investigated  the  Navy 
project,  and  physicist  Richard  C. 
Tolman,  who  was  serving  as  his  scien- 
tific adviser.  This  committee  con- 
firmed Oppenheimer's  information, 
except  they  found  his  prediction  re- 
garding the  potential  output  of  the 
one-hundred-column  plant  overly  op- 
timistic. Groves  informed  Oppen- 
heimer  that  he  did  not  know  yet 
whether  the  Manhattan  District  would 
avail  itself  of  the  Navy's  facilities  but 
that  "arrangements  have  been  made 
for  this  eventuality  if  it  should  be 
desirable."  ^ 


'  Ltr,  Oppenheimer  to  Groves,  28  Apr  44,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Therm  DifTProj).  MDR; 
Oppenheimer  Hearing,  pp.  164-65. 


^  Oppenheimer  Hearing,  pp.  119-20. 
^  Ltr,  Groves  to  Oppenheimer,  3  Jun  44.  See  also 
Memos,  Groves   to  Lewis,   Murphree,  and  Tolman, 

Continued 


THE  LIQIHD  THERMAL  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


177 


•  \      F       .  .^ 

Richard  C.  Tolman  {1945  photograph) 

On  5  June,  Groves  sent  Conant  and 
Lewis  to  District  headquarters  to 
confer  with  Colonel  Nichols  concern- 
ing the  practical  feasibility  of  using 
the  Navy  pilot  plant  at  Philadelphia 
and  constructing  a  thermal  diffusion 
plant  at  the  Tennessee  site,  employ- 
ing steam  available  from  the  K-25 
powerhouse.  The  two  scientific  lead- 
ers ultimately  concluded  the  thermal 
diffusion  plant  "would  probably  be  a 
feasible  [and]  desirable  adjunct  to  the 
Y-12  process."  ^« 

Then  on  the  twelfth.  Groves  re- 
quested that  Murphree,  who  had  ex- 
tensive industrial  experience,  make  a 

sub:  Possible  Utilization  of  Navy  Pilot  Therm  DifT 
Plant,  31  May  44,  and  Lewis,  Murphree,  and 
Tolman  to  Groves,  same  sub.  3  Jun  44.  All  in 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp.  600.12  (Therm  DifT 
Proj),  MDR. 

'"Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves,  11  Oct  44,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  600.12  (Projs  and  Prgms), 
MDR.  See  Ch.  XV'III  for  a  detailed  description  of 
the  K-25  powerhouse. 


Study  to  determine  the  cost,  construc- 
tion time,  and  amount  of  high-pres- 
sure steam  needed  for  a  thermal  dif- 
fusion plant  capable  of  producing  50 
kilograms  a  day  of  enriched  uranium 
with  concentrations  of  U-235  ranging 
from  0.9  to  3.0  percent.  Murphree 
asked  Tolman  and  the  scientists  Karl 
P.  Cohen  and  W.  L  Thompson,  both 
of  whom  had  participated  in  previous 
investigations  of  the  Navy  project,  to 
assist  him  in  making  the  study.  They 
concluded  that  the  1.25-million 
pounds  per  hour  of  steam  that  the 
K-25  powerhouse  (with  some  modifica- 
tions) could  supply  would  be  approxi- 
mately sufficient  to  operate  a  thermal 
diffusion  plant  of  sixteen  hundred 
tubes,  costing  about  $3.5  million,  and 
capable  of  enriching  50  kilograms  of 
uranium  a  week  to  slightly  less  than 
0.9-percent  concentration.^^ 

Groves  decided  on  24  June  to  go 
ahead  with  construction.  Such  a  plant 
promised  to  be  relatively  cheap.  It 
could  use  the  already  available  steam 
capacity  at  the  gaseous  diffusion  plant 
site  at  least  for  several  months,  pend- 
ing completion  of  the  K-25  cascade. 
While  its  product  would  contain  only 
about  20  percent  more  U-235  than 
natural  uranium,  this  enrichment 
would  be  translated  into  a  vital  20- 
percent-greater  output  by  the  electro- 
magnetic plant.  But  Groves  decided 
against  the  recommendation  to  in- 
clude the  existing  Navy  facilities,  be- 


*'Ltr,  Murphree  to  Groves,  22  Jun  44.  See  also 
Rpt,  Thompson  and  Cohen,  sub:  Process  Design  for 
Liq  DifT  Plant.  17  Jun  44;  Rpt,  Thompson  and 
Cohen,  Sub:  Rough  Prelim  Estimate  of  Plant  Cost, 

19  Jun  44;  Ltrs,  Tolman  to  Groves,  subs:  Further 
Info  as  to  Steam  C^apacitv  at  Tenn.,  19  Jun  44,  and 
Still    Later    Info    as    to    Steam    Capacity    at     lenn., 

20  Jun  44.  All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1 
(Liq  Therm  Difl),  MDR. 


178 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


cause  the  Navy  installation  would  not 
be  under  direct  control  of  the  Army 
and  because  he  was  convinced  that 
the  Manhattan  District  would  build 
the  thermal  diffusion  plant  more 
quickly  if  it  were  not  diverted  by  the 
problems  of  operating  the  Navy  plant. 
Both  Groves  and  Nichols  held  to  the 
view  that  the  key  factor  was  getting 
the  plant  into  operation  at  the  earliest 
possible  date  to  fill  the  anticipated 
gap  between  the  time  the  electromag- 
netic plant  reached  full  capacity  and 
the  gaseous  diffusion  plant  began 
producing  large  quantities  of  en- 
riched uranium  feed.^^ 

Plant  Design,   Engineering,  and 
Construction 

The  need  for  exceptional  speed  in 
both  design  and  construction  of  the 
thermal  diffusion  plant,  designated 
S-50  for  security  reasons,  was  an  im- 
portant consideration  in  Groves's  se- 
lection of  the  H.  K.  Ferguson  Com- 
pany as  the  prime  contractor.  In  earlier 
defense  projects,  the  Manhattan  com- 
mander had  been  greatly  impressed 
with  the  Cleveland  firm's  ability  to 
complete  a  job  on  schedule.  Against 
the  advice  of  his  advisers,  who 
thought  six  months  was  an  optimistic 
schedule,  Groves  determined  that  the 
plant  must  be  in  full  operation  in  four 
months.  Furthermore,  the  first  pro- 
duction unit  should  begin  operating 
only  seventy-five  days  after  start  of 
construction.  Groves  offered  the 
high-pressure  services  of  Manhattan's 
Washington  Liaison  Office  for  expe- 
diting procurement;  instructed  the 
company   to  place  its  orders  without 


competition  and  by  wire  or  tele- 
phone, using  wherever  practicable  the 
same  manufacturers  who  had  supplied 
equipment  for  the  Navy  pilot  plant; 
and  ordered  that  plant  components 
be  identical  copies  of  those  developed 
for  Abelson's  project.  ^^ 

To  further  ensure  that  Ferguson 
would  have  access  to  all  available  as- 
sistance the  Army  could  provide, 
Colonel  Nichols  in  June  1944  estab- 
lished an  S-50  Division  in  the  Man- 
hattan District  office.  {See  Chart  3)  He 
assigned  Lt.  Col.  Mark  C.  Fox  as  unit 
chief  for  the  thermal  diffusion  project 
and  Maj.  Thomas  J.  Evans,  Jr.,  as  his 
assistant,  with  special  responsibility 
for  overseeing  plant  construction.  In 
anticipation  of  the  need  for  special 
measures  to  enable  Ferguson  and  its 
subcontractors  to  successfully  carry 
out  the  extraordinarily  demanding 
terms  of  the  S-50  contract.  Colonel 
Fox  organized  an  Expediting  Branch 
in  the  division,  which  functioned 
through  District  procurement  officers 
in  industrial  centers  throughout  the 
United  States.^'' 

With  only  a  few  weeks  in  which  to 
complete  blueprints  and  let  procure- 
ment contracts,  the  Ferguson  Com- 
pany had  no  alternative  but  to  adhere  as 
closely  as  practicable  to  the  Naval  Re- 
search Laboratory  design.  Ferguson 
engineers  visited  the  laboratory  and 
the  Navy  turned  over  to  them  all  of 
the   drawings   and   blueprints    needed 


^^Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves,  11  Oct  44,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Projs  and  Prgms), 
MDR;  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  120-21. 


"Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  121;  MDH,  Bk.  6, 
Sec.  3,  "Design  and  Construction,"  pp.  3.15-3.17, 
DASA. 

'■•MDH,  Bk.  6,  Sec.  6,  "Organization  and  Person- 
nel," p.  6.2,  DASA;  Org  Chart,  U.S.  Engrs  Office, 
MD,  28  Aug  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  020 
(MED-Org),  MDR.  When  Colonel  Fox  was  assigned 
to  another  part  of  the  Manhattan  Project  in  March 
1945,  Major  Evans  replaced  him  as  S-50  unit  chief. 


THE  LIQUID  THERMAL  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


179 


for  construction  of  the  columns  and 
racks.  They  modified  Navy  designs 
and  developed  new  ones  for  certain 
elements  of  the  auxiliary  equipment 
only  to  the  extent  necessary  to  meet 
the  different  conditions  existing  at  the 
Tennessee  location.  To  save  time 
they  based  much  of  the  construction 
on  simple  field  sketches,  postponing 
completion  of  detailed  drawings  until 
after  the  plant  was  built.  ^^ 

As  laid  out  in  the  Ferguson  engi- 
neers' designs,  the  plant  consisted  of 
2,142  columns,  each  48  feet  in  height, 
distributed  in  twenty-one  racks.  ^^ 
Each  of  the  columns  had  three  con- 
centric tubes,  comprised  of  a  1  Vi-inch 
nickel  pipe  inside;  a  slightly  larger 
copper  pipe  in  the  middle;  and  a 
4-inch  galvanized  iron  jacket  on  the 
outside.  In  the  small  (one  one-hun- 
dredth of  an  inch)  annular  space  be- 
tween the  outer  wall  of  the  nickel 
pipe  and  inner  wall  of  the  copper 
pipe  the  diffusion  process  would 
occur.  Steam,  under  a  pressure  of  100 
pounds  per  square  inch  and  at  a  tem- 
perature of  545  degrees  Fahrenheit, 
would  circulate  downward  through 
the  nickel  pipe  while  water  at  155  de- 
grees Fahrenheit  would  flow  upward 
through  the  iron  jacket;  simultaneous- 
ly, uranium  hexafluoride  would  flow 
into  the  base  of  each  column  from  a 
reservoir,  specially  designed  to  main- 
tain at  the  bottom  of  each  column  a 
concentration  of  LI-235  approximat- 
ing that  in  natural  uranium.  Designed 
into  the  top  of  each  column  was  a 
system  of  freezing  coils;  this  feature 
eliminated  the  need  for  complicated 
mechanical  valves,  and  would  permit 


'^MDH,  Bk.  6,  Sec.  3,  p.  3.6.  DASA. 

'®Thi.s  and  following  paragraph  based  on  MDH, 
Bk.  6,  Sec.  4,  "Description  of  Plant,"  pp.  4.1-4.5, 
DASA. 


plant  employees  to  draw  off  small 
amounts  of  the  enriched  product  at 
frequent  intervals. 

All  the  racks,  each  with  102  col- 
umns, occupied  a  single  main  process 
building,  a  huge  black  structure  522 
feet  long,  82  feet  wide,  and  75  feet 
high.  Running  the  full  length  of  the 
west  side  of  this  building  was  a  mez- 
zanine partitioned  into  eleven  control 
rooms,  one  for  each  two  racks,  and  an 
equal  number  of  transfer  rooms  con- 
taining process  equipment  for  supply- 
ing feed  material  and  removing  en- 
riched product  and  depleted  uranium 
hexafluoride  from  the  columns.  The 
engineers  designed  the  final  rack  with 
separate  control  and  transfer  rooms 
so  that  it  could  be  used  for  employee 
training  and  experimental  work. 

On  9  July  1944,  Ferguson  workers 
began  clearing  the  S-50  plant  site  in 
the  area  adjacent  to  the  K-25  power- 
house. In  less  than  three  weeks  they 
had  completed  foundations  for  the 
main  process  building  and  by  mid- 
August  were  installing  the  process 
equipment.  Pipe  fitters  and  welders 
concentrated  on  the  major  task  of 
erecting  the  twenty-one  racks  of  col- 
umns during  September  and  October. 
Test  operations,  however,  soon  re- 
vealed that  many  of  the  columns 
leaked  at  the  top  and  bottom  and 
would  require  additional  welding;  yet 
in  spite  of  this  delay,  all  racks  were 
ready  for  start-up  operations  by  Janu- 
ary 1945  and  became  fully  operation- 
al by  mid-March.  In  the  meantime, 
the  District  had  closed  out  the  Fergu- 
son construction  contract,  assigning 
completion  of  subcontracts  for  re- 
maining insulation  and  electrical  sys- 
tem work  to  other  firms  available  in 
the   Clinton   area.   These   subcontrac- 


180 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


tors  also  completed  auxiliary  build- 
ings, including  a  new  S-50  steam 
plant  to  supplement  the  K-25 
powerhouse.  ^^ 

Plant  Operation 

Because  time  was  so  short,  and  to 
avoid  endangering  security  by  bring- 
ing in  yet  another  outside  firm.  Gen- 
eral Groves  insisted  that  the  H.  K. 
Ferguson  Company  also  operate  the 
plant.  ^^  At  first  Ferguson  officials  ob- 
jected, stating  that  as  an  engineering 
construction  company  it  maintained  a 
closed  shop  and,  therefore,  could  an- 
ticipate union  trouble  on  its  other 
wartime  jobs  if  it  attempted  to  carry 
on  a  nonunion  operation  at  the  Clin- 
ton Engineer  Works,  where  security 
regulations  prohibited  employee 
unions.  But  District  representatives 
soon  overcame  this  objection  by  re- 
sorting to  a  corporate  fiction  similar 
to  that  which  had  worked  so  well  with 
the  M.  W.  Kellogg  Company  on  the 
gaseous  diffusion  project.  They  per- 
mitted Ferguson  to  form  a  wholly 
owned  subsidiary,  designated  the  Fer- 
cleve  (from  the  words  Ferguson  and 
Cleveland)  Corporation.  Fercleve  then 
accepted  a  letter  contract  on  1  July 
(and  a  formal  contract  in  late  1944), 
according  to  which  it  would  procure 
supplies  and  materials;  train  person- 
nel; and  inspect,  supervise,  and  oper- 
ate   the    thermal    diffusion    plant    in 


"Ibid.,  Sec.  3,  pp.  3.18-3.20,  DASA.  To  equip 
this  boiler  plant,  the  District  acquired  twelve  surplus 
boilers  from  the  Navy,  fabricated  for  use  in  destroy- 
er escort  vessels,  and  the  Washington  Liaison  Office 
secured  a  number  of  25,000-  and  482,000-gallon 
tanks  from  excess  Army  stocks. 

^* Except  as  otherwise  indicated,  section  based  on 
ibid..  Sec.  5,  "Operations,"  DASA;  Org  Chart,  U.S. 
Engrs  Office,  MD,  10  Nov  44,  MDR.  See  also 
Groves,  \'ow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  120,  n.  8. 


return  for  a  fee  of  $11,000  a  month. 
To  monitor  the  Fercleve  contract, 
Colonel  Fox  established  an  Oper- 
ations Branch  in  the  S-50  Division. 

While  Fercleve  wasted  no  time  in 
taking  steps  to  set  up  an  operating 
organization,  its  late  start  presented  it 
with  some  difficult  problems.  When 
company  personnel  officials  attempt- 
ed to  recruit  an  operating  force,  they 
found  the  other  plants  had  already 
cut  deep  into  the  local  labor  market. 
And  they  could  not  offer  housing  on 
the  reservation,  a  main  inducement 
used  by  the  other  operating  compa- 
nies. Problems  also  arose  in  Fer- 
cleve's  efforts  to  train  operators.  As  a 
beginning  step,  the  company  sent 
four  of  its  own  employees  and  ten  en- 
listed men  from  the  Manhattan  Dis- 
trict's Special  Engineer  Detachment 
to  Philadelphia  to  receive  training 
from  Abelson.  This  group  acquired 
some  experience  in  conditioning  tech- 
niques but  learned  little  about  oper- 
ations because  the  Navy  plant  was  not 
yet  completed.  Then,  on  2  Septem- 
ber, an  explosion  wrecked  a  large 
part  of  the  Navy  pilot  plant,  injuring 
several  of  the  trainees.  This  unfortu- 
nate incident  not  only  ended  the  ini- 
tial training  program  but  also  raised 
for  a  time  some  severe  doubts  con- 
cerning the  design  of  the  Clinton 
plant.  Subsequently,  however,  Abel- 
son  and  fifteen  of  his  experienced 
staff  moved  to  the  Tennessee  site, 
where  they  gave  valuable  assistance, 
first  in  conditioning  the  production 
plant  and  then  in  getting  it  into 
operation.  ^^ 

In  spite  of  recruiting  difficulties, 
Fercleve  by  April  1945  had  an  operat- 


'9 Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  122. 


THE  LIQUID  THERMAL  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


181 


Liquid  Thermal  Diffusion  Plant  (long,  dark  building)  at  CEW.  The  adjacent  K-25 
power  plant  drew  water  from  the  Clinch  River. 


ing  force,  exclusive  of  military  per- 
sonnel, of  about  1,600  at  the  Clinton 
Engineer  Works.  In  addition,  Special 
Engineer  Detachment  enlisted  per- 
sonnel, comprised  primarily  of  men 
trained  in  engineering  or  science, 
served  as  operators  and  supervisors 
in  the  plant,  their  number  reaching 
a  total  of  126  at  the  height  of 
operations. 

While  plant  construction  was  still  in 
progress,  Fercleve  crews  began  condi- 
tioning Rack  21  for  start-up  oper- 
ations. When  they  opened  the  valves 
to  let  high-pressure  steam  from  the 
K-25  power  plant  flow  into  the  rack, 
great  quantities  escaped  with  an  ear- 
splitting  noise,  and  parts  of  the  rack 
were  soon  shrouded  in  hot  vapor. 
Under  ordinary  conditions  such  clear- 
ly demonstrated  indications  of  defec- 


tive equipment  would  have  resulted  in 
an  immediate  shutdown.  But  faced 
with  Groves's  insistence  that  the  first 
units  must  be  in  operation  by  early 
fall,  Fercleve's  plant  manager  had  no 
choice  but  to  proceed  with  start-up 
activities.  Consequently,  in  the  last 
months  of  1944,  operating  personnel 
pressed  ahead  with  start-up  of  addi- 
tional racks,  and  soon  plant  employ- 
ees came  to  accept  the  noise  of  escap- 
ing steam,  accompanied  by  great 
clouds  of  vapor,  as  almost  normal  op- 
erating conditions. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the 
haste  to  get  into  production  increased 
already  inherent  operating  hazards  in 
the  thermal  diffusion  plant.  In  the 
confined  spaces  of  the  diffusion  col- 
umns, high-pressure  steam  and  urani- 
um hexafluoride,  which  expanded  35 


182 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


«  FERCLEVE  FIREPOWER^ 


Billboard  at  the  S-50  Plant  Site 

percent  in  passing  from  a  solid  to  a 
liquid,  created  highly  explosive 
forces.  During  the  period  of  full  oper- 
ation, the  plant  did  have  a  somewhat 
higher  accident  rate  than  the  other 
Manhattan  production  units,  but  the 
incidence  of  really  serious  accidents 
was  not  as  great.  Most  were  attrib- 
utable to  lack  of  training  and  the 
inevitable  confusion  occasioned  by 
construction  and  operating  crews  hav- 
ing to  work  in  the  same  area 
simultaneously.  ^° 

During  the  first  months  there  were 
times  when  results  scarcely  seemed  to 
justify  the  risks.  The  combined  disad- 
vantages of  largely  inexperienced  per- 
sonnel and  numerous  equipment  defi- 
ciencies seemed  to  forebode  many 
months  of  low  output  and  work  stop- 
pages before  the  plant  attained  an  ac- 
ceptable level  of  production.  Thus, 
Colonel  Nichols  reported  to  General 


Groves  that  total  output  in  October 
1944  was  only  a  token  10.5  pounds  of 
uranium  containing  0.852  percent 
U-235.  While  production  increased  to 
171.8  pounds  in  November,  it  fell 
back  to  20  pounds  the  following 
month,  when  steam  leaks  forced  nu- 
merous shutdowns.  With  six  racks  in 
operation  during  the  first  half  of  Jan- 
uary 1945,  production  for  the  first 
time  approached  predicted  levels,  but 
shutdown  of  some  of  the  K-25  steam 
units  for  repairs  in  the  last  half  of  the 
month  reduced  output  again.  Febru- 
ary production  reached  a  total  of 
3,158  pounds  in  spite  of  an  inad- 
equate steam  supply — an  anticipated 
deficiency  eventually  overcome 
through  the  prompt  construction  of 
the  S-50  steam  plant.  In  the  spring 
and  early  summer  of  1945,  plant 
output  went  up  rapidly,  reaching  a 
peak  of  12,730  pounds  in  June.  It 
dropped  back  briefly  in  July  because 
of  the  changeover  to  the  S-50  steam 
plant,  but  by  that  time  the  thermal 
diffusion  process  had  served  its  pur- 
pose for  the  wartime  program.  The 
slightly  enriched  material  it  pro- 
duced— sent  first  to  the  electromag- 
netic plant  for  further  enrichment  and 
then,  beginning  in  late  April  1945,  di- 
rectly to  the  gaseous  diffusion  plant — 
added  enough  to  the  total  output  of 
U-235  to  guarantee  a  sufficient 
amount  for  one  bomb  of  an  appropri- 
ate design  by  the  end  of  July. ^^ 

Operational  studies  made  after  the 
surrender  of  Japan  in  August  1945 
showed  that,  except  in  an  emergency, 
the  gaseous  diffusion  plant,  which  was 


^°  For  data  on  injury  rates  on  the  thermal  diflu- 
sion  project  as  compared  with  those  on  the  other 
CHnton  projects  see  MDH.  Bk.  6.  App.  D8,  DASA. 
See  also  Ch.  XX. 


2  1  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Jul  44- 
Jul  45,  passim,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files, 
Fldr  28,  Tabs  A  and  B,  MDR;  Smvth  Report,  p.  147; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Sew  HorW,  pp.  299-301. 


THE  LIQUID  THERMAL  DIFFUSION  PROCESS 


183 


just  approaching  full  production, 
could  henceforth  handle  the  lower  de- 
grees of  enrichment  alone  and  do  it 
more  economically  than  the  thermal 
diffusion  plant.  Consequently,  operat- 
ing crews  made  preparations  for  shut- 
ting down  the  thermal  plant.  After 
continuing  in  production  long  enough 
to  extract  the  last  product  from  mate- 


rial remaining  in  the  columns,  the 
plant  ceased  operating  on  9  Septem- 
ber 1945,  less  than  a  year  after  its 
first  unit  had  started  up  in  the  fall  of 
1944.22 


22  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpt  on  DSM  Proj,  Sep  45, 
OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  28,  Tab  B, 
MDR. 


CHAPTER  IX 


The  Pile  Process 


Of  the  three  fissionable  materials 
production  processes  (electromag- 
netic, gaseous  diffusion,  and  pile) 
endorsed  by  the  Military  Policy  Com- 
mittee in  1942  for  full-scale  develop- 
ment, the  greatest  gamble  of  all 
appeared  to  be  the  pile  method,  pri- 
marily because  of  a  number  of  diffi- 
cult technical  problems  facing  project 
scientists.^  Experimentation  with  re- 
search piles  at  the  University  of  Chi- 
cago's Metallurgical  Laboratory  had 
revealed  that  plutonium  production 
on  a  large  scale  would  require  the 
design  and  engineering  of  special 
process  techniques  and  equipment  to 
cope  with  radioactivity  and  energy, 
mostly  in  the  form  of  heat,  more  in- 
tense and  pervasive  than  ever  before 
encountered  in  an  industrial  process. 
Similarly,  investigations  into  the 
chemical  separation  of  plutonium 
from  the  transmutation  residual  of 
natural   uranium   and   highly   radioac- 


1  MPC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  B,  MDR.  The  original  nucle- 
ar reactor  that  Fermi  and  his  scientific  colleagues 
constructed  at  the  University  of  Chicago's  Stagg 
Field  in  late  1942  consisted  of  a  cubic  lattice  of 
lumps  of  uranium  and  graphite  piled  one  layer  upon 
another.  Hence,  the  structure  came  to  be  called  a 
pile,  a  convenient  designation  for  reasons  of  securi- 
ty because  it  did  not  reveal  the  purpose  of  a  chain- 
reacting  system.  The  term  nuclear  reactor  did  not 
come  into  general  use  until  after  the  end  of  World 
War  II. 


tive  fission  products  had  demonstrat- 
ed that  there  were  still  many  unan- 
swered questions  as  to  the  best  way 
to  carry  out  this  ancillary  phase  of 
plutonium  production. 

The  Military  Policy  Committee  had 
taken  these  problems  into  account 
when  it  decided  in  December  to  pro- 
ceed with  mass  production  of  plutoni- 
um. Several  factors  contributed  to 
this  affirmative  decision.  The  commit- 
tee was  much  impressed  by  the 
progress  of  research  and  development 
in  the  plutonium  process  at  the  Met- 
allurgical Laboratory  and  elsewhere, 
and  also  was  convinced  that  the  vast 
potential  of  the  process  warranted  the 
undoubted  risks  inherent  in  its  devel- 
opment. From  a  military  standpoint, 
project  scientists  told  the  committee, 
the  process  would  produce  not  only 
fissionable  material  for  an  atomic 
weapon  but  also,  as  a  by-product,  ra- 
dioactive fission  materials  that  prob- 
ably could  be  utilized  as  an  exception- 
ally deadly  chemical  warfare  weapon. 
Even  if  the  scientists  and  engineers 
failed  to  develop  the  process  in  time, 
the  plutonium  pile  with  its  enormous 
capabilities  for  producing  heat  could 
become  a  major  source  of  power  for 
peacetime  uses.  Given  all  of  these 
considerations,     the     Military     Policy 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


185 


Committee  could  see  no  alternative  to 
continuing  full-scale  development  of 
the  process. 

Research  and  Development:  Metallurgical 
Laboratory 

Following  consolidation  of  most 
plutonium  research  and  development 
at  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  in 
February  1942,  Director  Arthur 
Compton  formed  an  organization  that 
consisted  of  an  engineering  council, 
headed  by  chemical  engineer 
Thomas  V.  Moore  from  industry, 
and  nine  major  divisions — physics, 
theory,  technical,  chemistry,  pilot 
plant,  fast  neutron,  clinical-biological 
(subsequently  health)  physics,  defense 
measures,   and   engineering.^  One   of 


^Section  on  Metallurgical  Laboratory  based  on 
Org  Chart  attached  to  Rpt,  Capt  Arthur  V.  Peter- 
son, sub:  Visit  to  Chicago  Proj,  29  Sep  42,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (misfiled  under  Therm 
DifT  Proj),  MDR;  Memo,  Maj  Peterson  to  Groves, 
sub:  Met  Proj  Org  Chart,  14  Oct  43,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  201  ((^en),  MDR;  Smvth  Report,  pp. 
63-65  and  92;  Interv,  Author  with  Norman  Hil- 
berrv,  3  Jan  63,  CMH;  MDH.  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  "Re- 
search." Pi.  1,  pp.  2.5-2.8,  7.1-7.3,  Apps.  B3,  B5- 
B7,  D2  (Constr  Rpt  Extracts),  DASA;  Completion 
Rpt,  Stone  and  Webster,  sub:  Clinton  Engr  Works, 
Contract  W-7401-eng-13,  1946,  pp.  6-11,  OROO; 
Rpt,  Compton,  sub:  Opn  of  Met  Proj,  by  Univ  of 
Chicago,  and  Ms,  Compton,  sub:  "Mr.  Fermi,  the 
Argonne  Laboratory  and  the  University  of  Chica- 
go," both  28  Jul  44,'  .Admin  Files,  (k-n  Corresp,  080 
(Argonne-L'niv  of  Chicago),  MDR;  Tables  (Employ- 
ment by  MD  on  Design,  Research  and  Constr  as  of 
31  May,  31  Jul,  and  31  Oct  43)  in  Rpt,  sub:  MD  Proj 
Data  as  of  1  Jun  43  (most  items  as  of  1  Jun  43,  but 
tables  appear  to  have  been  added  at  a  later  date). 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Projs  and 
Prgms),  MDR;  DSM  Chronologv,  13-14  Sep  42, 
Sec.  2(a),  OROO;  Compton,  Alonuc  Quest,  pp.  82-86, 
110-11,  114-15,  151-52,  157,  170-71,  185-86;  Mar- 
shall Diarv,  25  Jun-5  Sep  42,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp, Groves  Files,  Misc  Recs  Sec,  behind  Fldr  5, 
MDR;  Interv,  Author  with  J.  M.  McKinley,  4  Jan  63, 
CMH.  Captain  McKinley  served  as  deputy  area  engi- 
neer at  Chicago  from  about  November  1943  to  July 
1945  and  as  area  engineer  until  about  November 
1945. 


these  divisions,  fast  neutron,  was  ac- 
tually located  at  the  University  of 
California,  Berkeley,  with  work  in 
progress  at  several  other  institutions. 
Other  divisions,  too,  had  some  as- 
pects of  their  work  under  way  at 
other  sites  (for  example,  chemistry,  at 
Iowa  State,  where  metallurgist  Frank 
Spedding  was  testing  the  metallurgi- 
cal properties  of  uranium;  and  at 
California,  where  chemist  Glenn  Sea- 
borg  was  investigating  the  virtually 
unknown  chemistry  of  plutonium). 

Under  Compton's  supervision  and 
direction,  the  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory scientific  staff  moved  ahead  effec- 
tively with  devising  and  testing  pile 
and  chemical  separation  designs  for  a 
large-scale  plutonium  production 
plant.  With  this  experimental  activity 
proceeding  apace,  Compton  reported 
to  District  Engineer  Marshall  the 
pressing  need  for  additional  research 
facilities.  Marshall  immediately  con- 
tacted Stone  and  Webster  and  had 
the  firm  draw  up  plans  to  expand  the 
laboratory's  physical  facilities,  direct- 
ing that  subcontracts  be  let  to  Chi- 
cago area  construction  companies.  At 
the  same  time.  Deputy  District  Engi- 
neer Nichols  worked  out  with  Comp- 
ton the  land  and  building  require- 
ments for  the  Argonne  Forest  pilot 
plant  site,  located  southwest  of  the 
city,  and  cleared  the  way  for  its  acqui- 
sition by  the  Corps  of  Engineers' 
Great  Lakes  Real  Estate  Office. 

By  the  fall  of  1942,  the  Army  had 
become  an  active  partner  in  the  Chi- 
cago program.  To  provide  liaison 
with  the  Manhattan  District,  as  well  as 
to  assist  Compton  in  procurement 
and  personnel  matters,  Marshall 
opened  the  Chicago  Area  Engineers 
Office  in  the  University  of  Chicago's 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


University  of  Chicago  Physics  Building 


physics  building,  which  was  adjacent 
to  Compton's  own  headquarters  and 
the  laboratory's  administrative  and 
business  offices,  and  assigned  Capt. 
James  F.  Grafton  as  area  engineer. 
Shortly  thereafter,  the  decision  to 
reduce  Stone  and  Webster's  responsi- 
bilities for  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
construction  to  limited  architectural 
and  engineer  services  shifted  much  of 
the  burden  of  administering  the  ex- 
pansion program  upon  Captain  Graf- 
ton and  his  modest  staff.  The  in- 
creased work  load  of  letting  and  over- 
seeing the  great  number  of  University 
of  Chicago  subcontracts  forced  Graf- 
ton to  enlarge  his  staff,  which  gradu- 
ally increased  in  size  from  nearly  100 
in  the  summer  of  1943 — when  the 
Army  took  over  all  OSRD-sponsored 


research  and  development  contracts — 
to  a  total  of  approximately  250  in  July 
1945.  To  provide  additional  space  for 
the  expanding  Chicago  area  staff,  the 
Manhattan  District  leased  the  state  of 
Illinois'  massive  grey  124th  Field  Ar- 
tillery Armory,  located  only  a  short 
distance  from  the  university  campus. 
Sharing  the  quarters  with  the  area  en- 
gineer's staff  were  the  laboratory's 
administrative  personnel,  an  arrange- 
ment that  facilitated  closer  coordina- 
tion between  the  two  groups  in  such 
matters  as  security,  labor  and  materi- 
als procurement,  personnel,  prior- 
ities, patents,  and  finances. 

During  the  Metallurgical  Laborato- 
ry building  and  remodeling  program, 
which    continued    uninterrupted    until 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


187 


Argonnl  LABOKAroR\  Near  C^hicago,  one  of  the  Metallurgical  Project's 
research  facilities. 


late  1944,  the  Chicago  Area  Engi- 
neers Office  oversaw  construction 
that  provided  the  Chicago  program 
with  more  than  500,000  square  feet 
of  space,  including  an  entirely  new 
chemistry  building  with  an  annex, 
several  new  buildings  at  the  Argonne 
site,  and  extensively  remodeled  facili 
ties  in  existing  structures,  all  at  an  ul- 
timate total  cost  of  about  $2.15  mil- 
lion. In  carrying  out  this  expansion, 
the  Army  received  the  constant  and 
effective  support  of  the  University  of 
Chicago's  administrative  staff,  which 
consistently  adhered  to  the  policy  set 
forth  at  the  beginning  of  the  program 
in  1942,  namely,  that  it  would  "turn 
the  University  inside  out  if  necessary 
to  help  win  the  war.  Victory  is  much 


more  important   than   survival   of  the 
University."  ^ 

Pile  Design 

In  late  1942,  as  Army  leaders 
gradually  became  more  familiar  with 
the  plutonium  phase  of  the  atomic 
bomb  project,  they  realized  that 
progress  in  pile  development  at  the 
Metallurgical  Laboratory  was  likely  to 
be  the  key  factor  determining  how 
soon  large-scale  production  of  fission- 
able material  would  be  possible. **  In 


^Rpt,  Compton,  sub:  Opn  of  Met  Proj  bv  l'ni%  of 
Chicago,  28  Jul  44,  MDR. 

■*  Subsection  on  pile  designs  based  on  Rpt,  Peter- 
son, sub:  Visit  to  Chicago  Proj,  29  Sep  42,  MDR; 
Min,  Conf  at  Met  Lab,  15  Oct  42,  Admin  Files,  Gen 

Continued 


188 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


124th  Field  Artillery  Armory  in  Chicago 


September,  General  Groves,  newly 
appointed  as  Manhattan  commander, 
sent  Capt.  Arthur  V.  Peterson,  a  civil 
engineer  by  profession,  to  visit  the 
Chicago  scientists.  Then  using  the  de- 
tailed information  in  Peterson's 
report  as  a  guide,  Groves  arranged  a 
series  of  personal  visits  to  Chicago  in 


early  October,  during  which  he  at- 
tended the  policymaking  meetings  of 
the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  Techni- 
cal Council  and  conferred  with  mem- 
bers of  its  engineers  and  scientific 
staff. 

The  Manhattan  commander  was  im- 
pressed with  the  way  in  which  Comp- 


Corresp,  337  (Univ  of  Chicago),  MDR;  Min,  Tech 
Council,  5  Oct  42  (Rpt  CS-286),  12  Oct  42  (Rpt 
CS-294),  13  Oct  42  (Rpt  CS-306),  15  Oct  42  (Rpts 
CS-309  and  -311),  23  Dec  42  (Rpt  CS-397),  22  Jan 
43  (Rpt  CS-414),  ANL;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  1, 
pp.  3.1-3.16,  and  Pt.  2,  pp.  4.2-4.7,  and  Vol.  3, 
"Design,"  pp.  5.14-5.35,  DASA;  Hewlett  and  An- 
derson, New  World,  pp.  174-82  and  193-98;  Smyth 
Report,  pp.  42,  75,  81-83;  Groves  Diary,  5,  10,  15 
Oct  42,  LRG;  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  40-41 
and  80-81;  DSM  Chronology,  Nov-Dec  42,  passim, 
OROO;  Memo,  Peterson  to  Nichols,  sub:  Reassess- 
ment Sess  at  Chicago  (12/2/42),  4  Dec  42,  Admin 


Files,  Gen  Corresp,  410.2  (Uranium),  MDR;  MPC 
Rpt,  15  Dec  42,  MDR;  Rpt.  Mtg  with  Grccnewalt,  24 
Feb  43  (Rpt  CS-2644),  ANL;  Ltr,  Greenewalt  to 
Groves,  8  Jul  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  080 
(Argonne-Univ  of  Chicago),  MDR;  Compton,  Atomic 
Qiirsl.  pp  161-63  and  167-70;  Completion  Rpt,  Du 
Pont,  sub:  CEW,  TNX  Area,  Contract  W-7412-cng- 
23,  1  Apr  44,  p.  303,  OROO;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpt 
on  DSM  Proj,  23  Mar  43.  OCC;  Files,  Gen  Corresp. 
MP  Files,  Fldr  28,  Tab  A.  MDR.  For  a  detailed 
discussion  of  the  plutonium  production  process,  see 
appropriate  volumes  in  Division  4,  Plutonium  Project, 
of  the  National  Nuclear  Energy  Series. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


189 


New  Chemistry  Building,  Metallurgical  Laboratory,  on  the  University  of  Chica- 
go campus.  Barely  visible  is  the  gothic  tower  (at  far  left)  of  the  football  stadium  where  Ennco 
Fermi  achieved  the  first  chaw  reaction  in  a  graphite  pile. 


ton  had  organized  the  laboratory  and 
with  the  exceptional  capabilities  of 
the  scientific  staff.  He  indicated  his 
general  approval  of  the  research  pro- 
gram, expressing  but  one  major  criti- 
cism: The  program  was  not  moving 
fast  enough  to  permit  a  decision  on 
which  proposed  pile  design  should  be 
adopted  for  full-scale  development.  If 
necessary,  he  said,  the  research  scien- 
tists should  develop  more  than  one 
design,  regardless  of  the  cost,  be- 
cause the  earliest  start  possible  on  de- 
tailed design  and  construction  was 
tremendously  important.  Groves  re- 
called later  that  he  had  quickly  con- 
cluded that  "the  plutonium  process 
[of  all  the  methods  proposed]  seemed 
to     offer  .   .   .  the     greatest     chances 


for      success      in      producing      bomb 
material."  ^ 

At  the  time  of  Groves's  first  visits. 
Metallurgical  Laboratory  scientists 
had  achieved  only  limited  progress  in 
transforming  the  results  of  pile  re- 
search into  concrete  blueprints  for 
pile  design.  Seriously  handicapped  by 
the  lack  of  pure  uranium  metal  in  the 
quantities  needed  for  essential  experi- 
ments, the  research  teams  barely  had 
made  a  start  on  a  program  for  pile 
development  that  called  for  pile 
design  and  engineering  in  three 
stages:  a  10,000-kilowatt  experimental 
unit,  to  ascertain  whether  a  chain  re- 
action could  be  sustained;  a  100,000- 
kilowatt  pilot  pile,  to  test  helium  cool- 

^  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  41. 


190 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


ing  and  the  mechanical  techniques  of 
loading  and  discharging;  and  a 
second  100,000-kilowatt  pile,  also 
helium  cooled,  to  be  the  first  unit  of 
the  large-scale  production  plant.  Each 
of  these  piles  would  employ  graphite, 
now  available  in  ample  quantities 
from  commercial  sources,  as  a  moder- 
ator. The  pile  designers  would  have 
preferred  heavy  water,  which  com- 
bined in  a  single  element  the  moder- 
ating and  cooling  factor  required,  but 
its  continuing  scarcity  made  design  of 
a  pile  employing  that  hydrogen  iso- 
tope impractical. 

Groves  found,  too,  that  project  sci- 
entists had  not  reached  agreement  on 
what  was,  in  some  respects,  the  most 
crucial  problem  in  pile  design — how 
safely  and  efficiently  to  disperse  the 
intense  heat  that  would  be  produced 
by  the  fissioning  process  in  a  high- 
wattage  pile.  Under  the  three-stage 
plan,  Compton  had  given  helium 
cooling  a  priority  position.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  physicists 
Eugene  Wigner  and  Leo  Szilard,  as 
well  as  other  staff  scientists,  were  still 
giving  serious  consideration  to  a 
number  of  other  coolants,  including 
diphenyl  and  bismuth.^  Even  water, 
with  its  corrosive  reaction  to  uranium 
and  high-neutron  absorption,  could 
not  be  discounted. 

Groves  and  the  Manhattan  District 
officers  who  visited  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  in  the  fall  of  1942  quickly 
learned  that  the  feasibility  of  all  pile 
designs  would  have  to  remain  in 
doubt  until  physicist  Enrico  Fermi 
and    his    colleagues    had    completed 


construction  of  an  experimental  pile 
capable  of  a  sustained  chain  reaction 
and  also  had  accurately  measured  the 
neutron-absorbing  characteristics  of 
each  pile  component  (lattice,  controls, 
loading  and  unloading  mechanism, 
shielding,  and  coolant).  At  this  stage 
the  pile  researchers  felt  that  attaining 
a  state  of  criticality  was  possible  with 
a  properly  designed  and  assembled 
lattice  of  sufficiently  pure  graphite 
and  uranium  metal.  But  what  they 
were  uncertain  of,  and  could  not  as- 
certain until  a  chain  reaction  was  set 
going,  was  the  actual  size  of  the 
multiplication  factor  k — the  excess 
number  of  neutrons  above  unity  re- 
quired to  barely  sustain  fissioning  in  a 
critical  pile.  And  lacking  this  data, 
design  engineers  found  themselves 
not  knowing  how  much  leeway  they 
had  in  selecting  the  materials  for  the 
mechanical  structure  and  coolant 
system  of  the  large-scale  production 
piles. "^ 

Spurred  by  the  Army's  insistence 
on  moving  into  engineering  and  con- 
struction as  rapidly  as  possible  and  by 
the  impending  participation  of  E.  L 
du  Pont  de  Nemours  and  Company  as 
a  full-time  partner  of  the  Metallurgi- 
cal Laboratory,  Compton  and  the  pile 
researchers  decided  to  modify  earlier 
plans.  Under  the  revised  program, 
Fermi  and  his  staff  were  to  complete 
as  quickly  as  possible  a  low-powered 
pile,  to  demonstrate  the  feasibility  of 
a  chain  reaction  and  furnish  the 
much-needed  data  about  the  k  factor; 


®  Diphenyl  is  a  white  crystalline  hydrocarbon  that 
melts  at  160  degrees  Fahrenheit  and  readily  con- 
ducts heat.  Bismuth  (Bi-83)  is  a  grayish  white  metal, 
with  a  reddish  tinge,  that  absorbs  relatively  few  neu- 
trons and,  like  diphenyl,  has  a  low  melting  point. 


^  Criticality;  or  critical  size,  in  a  pile  fueled  with 
uranium  may  be  defined  as  the  condition  in  "which 
the  number  of  neutrons  produced  in  the  fission 
process  just  balances  those  lost  by  leakage  and  by 
capture."  See  Glasstone,  Sourcebook  on  Atomic  Energy, 
p.  518,  par.  14.45. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


191 


and  another  team  was  to  begin  work 
on  a  second  pile  of  low  wattage  at  the 
Argonne  site,  to  provide  project 
chemists  with  the  additional  small 
quantities  of  plutonium  they  urgently 
needed  to  test  methods  and  equip- 
ment for  separating  the  element.  Pile 
designers  now  would  design  only  a 
single  100,000-kilowatt  helium-cooled 
pile  capable  of  producing  an  estimat- 
ed 100  grams  of  plutonium  daily;  this 
pile,  they  hoped,  would  function  as 
both  the  testing  unit  and  the  first  unit 
of  the  full-scale  production  plant.  Fi- 
nally, they  were  to  continue  testing 
designs  for  piles  cooled  by  water,  di- 
phenyl,  and  bismuth. 

Fermi,  achieving  the  historic  first 
sustained  chain  reaction  on  2  Decem- 
ber,® found  that  the  k  factor  was  con- 
siderably larger  than  he  had  anticipat- 
ed. This  discovery  removed  a  chief 
objection  to  water,  diphenyl,  or  even 
air  as  a  coolant  in  high-powered  piles, 
since  the  greater  margin  of  k  would 
permit  more  neutron  absorption  with- 
out reducing  the  efficiency  of  pile 
operation.  Also,  the  larger  k  factor 
indicated  a  much  greater  choice  in 
materials  of  coolant  pipes,  the  control 
mechanism,  and  for  load  and  dis- 
charge equipment. 

Nevertheless,  in  view  of  the  ad- 
vanced status  of  the  helium-cooled 
pile  design,  both  Du  Pont  and  the 
Army  continued  to  favor  its  develop- 
ment as  the  prototype  for  the  produc- 
tion units,  even  though  Fermi's  new 
data  and  other  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory scientists'  encouraging  research 
into  alternate  methods  had  made 
liquid   or  air  cooling   seem   far  more 


^  See  Ch.  V  for  a  fuller  description  of  the  historic 
first  sustained  chain  reaction  on  2  I^ec  42. 


feasible.  By  the  time  the  Military 
Policy  Committee  decided  on  10  De- 
cember to  shift  the  location  of  the 
large-scale  plutonium  production 
plant  from  the  Clinton  Engineer 
Works  in  Tennessee  to  a  more  isolat- 
ed area,  preliminary  designs  for  the 
100,000-kilowatt  helium-cooled  pile 
were  sufficiently  complete  to  provide 
the  Army  with  the  requisite  criteria 
not  only  for  determining  the  safety, 
power,  water,  and  other  site  require- 
ments but  also  for  compiling  the 
specifications  list  of  materials. 

An  unresolved  point  of  concern  to 
project  engineers,  especially  those 
from  Du  Pont,  was  the  feasibility  of 
operating  a  graphite-moderated  pile 
on  an  industrial  scale,  whether  cooled 
by  helium  or  any  other  type  of  cool- 
ant. Because  so  many  technical  uncer- 
tainties still  remained,  Du  Pont  scien- 
tists emphasized  to  Groves  the  need 
for  developing  an  alternate  pile 
design,  as  insurance  against  total  fail- 
ure, and  expressed  particular  interest 
in  the  technical  and  engineering  ad- 
vantages of  a  pile  that  could  be  both 
moderated  and  cooled  with  heavy 
water.  The  Military  Policy  Committee, 
therefore,  decided  to  continue  the 
heavy  water  research  already  in 
progress,  recommending  the  expan- 
sion of  heavy  water  facilities.  Some 
weeks  earlier,  Du  Pont  had  suggested 
that  the  manufacture  of  heavy  water 
by  the  distillation  method  could  be 
carried  out  by  modifying  certain  fa- 
cilities at  the  Morgantown  (West  Vir- 
ginia), Wabash  River  (Indiana),  and 
Alabama  Ordnance  Works,  where  the 
company  was  manufacturing  muni- 
tions for  the  government.  Conse- 
quently, in  late  December,  Groves  ap- 
proved  negotiation   of  contracts   with 


192 


W^ 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


-..  ,^^^ 


-L,^ 


-  '  .^  .if  ^' 

Heavy  Water  Production  Plant  at  the  Wabash  River  Ordnance  Works 


Du  Pont  to  build  and  operate  heavy 
water  plants  at  these  facilities.  {See 
Map  2.) 

From  the  standpoint  of  pile  engi- 
neering development,  completion  of  a 
pile  design  as  quickly  as  possible  was 
a  matter  of  considerable  importance 
to  Du  Pont.  In  January  1943,  Du  Pont 
was  still  giving  first  priority  to  the 
helium-cooled  pile  for  the  production 
plant,  even  though  company  design- 
ers were  experiencing  little  success  in 
resolving  complex  technical  prob- 
lems.   A    hopeful    portent,    however. 


was  Fermi's  latest  research  finding 
into  the  value  of  k,  which  revealed 
that  the  margin  of  neutrons  in  a  ura- 
nium-graphite pile  was  probably  suffi- 
cient to  make  either  liquid  or  air  cool- 
ing feasible  on  a  large  scale.  Encour- 
aged by  Fermi's  data,  Wigner  and  his 
research  team  had  pushed  ahead  on 
designs  for  a  water-cooled  production 
pile  and  were  able  to  complete  ac- 
ceptable preliminary  blueprints  by 
early  January.  At  the  same  time,  also 
partly  in  response  to  Fermi's  revela- 
tion, a  team  of  Du  Pont  and  Metallur- 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


193 


gical  Laboratory  engineers  and  scien- 
tists began  intensive  work  on  design 
of  an  air-cooled  pilot  pile  of  moderate 
wattage.  In  spite  of  minor  difficulties, 
the  team  completed  virtually  all  pile 
engineering  designs  and  specifications 
by  the  end  of  April.  That  same 
month,  in  accordance  with  the  earlier 
decision  to  move  the  location  of  the 
plutonium  semiworks  from  Chicago 
to  Clinton,  Du  Pont  commenced  pile 
construction  at  the  Tennessee  site. 

Meanwhile,  Wigner's  group  submit- 
ted the  preliminary  designs  for  the 
water-cooled  production  pile  to  Du 
Pont.  Du  Pont  engineers  at  first  were 
skeptical  about  the  feasibility  of  the 
water-cooled  pile,  because  they  seri- 
ously doubted  the  problems  of  leak- 
age and  the  water's  corrosiveness 
could  be  overcome;  however,  continu- 
ing problems  with  the  helium-cooled 
pile  designs  finally  persuaded  them 
that  Wigner's  pile  might  be  the 
answer  for  the  plutonium  produc- 
tion plant.  Terminating  all  helium 
pile  research  in  mid-February,  Du 
Pont  design  teams  worked  at  an  accel- 
erated pace  through  the  spring, 
summer,  and  early  fall  to  complete 
blueprints  for  a  water-cooled  pile.  In 
October,  as  the  early  stages  of  build- 
ing the  plant  at  the  Hanford  site  in 
south  central  Washington  State  were 
rapidly  nearing  completion,  delivery 
of  the  design  specifications  precluded 
serious  delays  in  meeting  pile  con- 
struction schedules. 


Chemical  Separation  Process  Design 

In  the  fall  of  1942,  the  problems  of 


developing  the  second  stage  of  the 
plutonium  production  process — the 
chemical  separation  of  the  new  ele- 
ment from  irradiated  uranium — ap- 
peared less  formidable  to  General 
Groves  and  Du  Pont  officials  than 
those  relating  to  development  of  the 
pile  and  separating  the  isotope  U-235 
from  LI-238,  because  chemical  sepa- 
ration generally  involved  techniques 
already  familiar  to  chemists  and 
chemical  engineers.  But  time  proved 
this  optimism  was  not  warranted; 
project  scientists  and  engineers  spent 
almost  as  long  developing  an  indus- 
trial-scale separation  process  as  they 
did  to  complete  design  and  engineer- 
ing of  a  pile  production  process. 
Since  the  beginning  of  the  year,  re- 
search teams  at  the  Universities  of 
Chicago  and  California,  Berkeley,  and 
at  Iowa  State  College  had  worked 
without  letup  to  design  a  suitable  sep- 
aration process.  Handicapped  at  first 
by  the  unavailability  of  more  than  mi- 
crogram quantities  of  plutonium,  the 
teams  had  tested  a  variety  of  meth- 
ods, all  of  which  had  required  han- 
dling the  intensely  radioactive  by- 
products by  remote  control.  Deciding 
finally  in  favor  of  a  precipitation  proc- 
ess employing  lanthanum  fluoride  in 
solution  as  the  carrier,  project  chem- 
ists convened  in  Chicago  on  15  Octo- 
ber to  present  the  results  of  their  re- 
search to  representatives  of  the  Army, 
Du  Pont,  and  Stone  and  Webster.^ 


^  For  a  fuller  account  of  development  of  a  process 
for  the  chemical  separation  of  plutonium  consult 
Met  Lab  Monthly  Rpts,  CN-I14,  -239,  -250,  -261, 
-299,  -343,  -359,  -419,  -421,  mostly  1942,  ANL; 
Min,  Lab  Council  (Met  Lab),  31   Mav  43  (Rpt  CS- 


194 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


General  Groves,  Colonels  Marshall 
and  Nichols,  and  Captain  Grafton 
joined  with  officials  from  the  two 
firms  serving  as  prime  contractors  on 
the  plutonium  project  and  members 
of  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  staff 
to  hear  leaders  of  the  separation 
process  research  teams  describe  why 
they  believed  the  lanthanum  fluoride 
method  was  feasible  for  a  large-scale 
production  plant.  Impressed  by  the 
practicality  of  the  research  teams' 
proposed  separation  process  based  on 
the  precipitation  method,  both  Army 
and  industry  representatives  approved 
going  ahead  with  further  tests.  They 
also  were  duly  impressed  by  the  evi- 
dence of  intense  radioactivity  in  the 
separation  process,  a  fact  that  subse- 
quently contributed  to  the  Military 
Policy  Committee's  decision  in  De- 
cember to  shift  the  plutonium  pro- 
duction plant  from  Tennessee  to  an- 
other location. 

As  further  research  in  the  winter 
and  spring  of  1943  revealed  that  lan- 
thanum fluoride  presented  certain 
chemical  problems  not  previously  dis- 
cerned, project  scientists  began  test- 
ing other  substances  and  found  that 
bismuth  phosphate  gave  the  best  re- 
sults. In  May,  Du  Pont  managers  de- 
cided in  favor  of  designing  the  chemi- 
cal   separation    units    at    the    Clinton 


694)  and  3  Jul  43  (Rpt  CS-749),  ANL;  Min,  Conf  at 
Met  Lab,  15  Oct  42,  MDR;  DSM  Chronology,  14 
Dec  42,  Sec.  25,  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  1, 
pp.  6.1-6.8,  and  Pt.  2,  5.2,  and  Vol.  3,  pp.  6.5-6.6 
and  6.9,  DASA;  Smyth  Report,  pp.  71-73,  86-88,  97- 
100;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  50-52,  55-56,  100- 
101,  175-76;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  41-42; 
Glenn  Seaborg,  The  Transuranium  Elements  (New 
Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  1958),  pp.  20-27; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew  World,  pp.  182-85  and 
204-05. 


semiworks  and  the  Hanford  produc- 
tion plant  to  employ  bismuth  phos- 
phate, with  the  possibility  of  lantha- 
num fluoride  as  a  backup  choice, 
because  both  chemicals  could  be 
employed  in  the  same  type  of 
equipment. 

Du  Pont  Collaboration  and 
Other  Problems 

Steady  progress  on  development  of 
pile  and  chemical  separation  process 
designs  in  early  1943  demonstrated 
the  basic  validity  of  the  Army-orches- 
trated arrangements  for  collaboration 
between  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
and  Du  Pont.  On  occasion,  however, 
some  differences  surfaced  between 
the  two  organizations  that  posed  a 
possible  threat  to  fully  effective  joint 
cooperation.  When  such  instances  oc- 
curred, the  Army  promptly  intervened 
and  endeavored  to  provide  the  direc- 
tion and  guidance  essential  to  main- 
taining viable  collaboration.  In  Janu- 
ary, for  example.  Major  Peterson, 
who  recently  had  replaced  Captain 
Grafton  as  the  Chicago  area  engineer, 
joined  with  Compton  in  developing  a 
plan  to  move  the  first  chain-reacting 
pile  from  the  University  of  Chicago's 
West  Stands  squash  court  to  the  Ar- 
gonne  site.  Fermi  and  his  fellow  sci- 
entists wanted  to  keep  the  pile  on 
campus;  however,  Army  and  Du  Pont 
officials  considered  pile  operation  in 
the  heavily  populated  university  dis- 
trict much  too  hazardous.  A  short 
time  later,  the  Army  also  acted  as  ar- 
bitrator for  Du  Pont  and  the  Univer- 
sity of  Chicago,  securing  an  agreement 
from  the  latter  that  it  would  operate 
the  Clinton  semiworks. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


195 


/ 


Maj.  Arthur  V.  Peterson 

While  collaboration  between  the 
Metallurgical  Laboratory  and  Du  Pont 
proceeded  harmoniously  on  most 
matters,  the  emergence  of  seemingly 
innocuous  misunderstandings  in  Feb- 
ruary portended  more  serious  dis- 
agreement in  the  future.  ^°  One  of  the 
first  "minor"  disputes  erupted  over  a 
question  on  the  extent  the  physicists 
who  had  designed  the  water-cooled 
pile  at  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
should  participate  in  drawing  up  the 


^"Memo,  Compton  to  Groves,  sub:  Opn  of  Piles 
I,  II,  and  III,  19  Jan  43;  Memo,  Compton  to  Groves, 
sub:  Chain-reacting  Unit  on  Univ  of  Chicago 
Campus,  2  Feb  43;  Rpt,  Compton,  Fermi,  and 
Robert  S.  Stone  (Clinical-Biological  Physics  Div 
chief.  Met  Lab),  sub:  Public  Hazards  at  West  Stands, 
3  Feb  43.  All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12 
(Projs  and  Prgms),  MDR.  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 
Sew  World,  pp.  200-201.  Ltr.  (Compton  to  Groves,  5 
Feb  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600  12  (misfiled 
under  Therm  Diff  Proj),  MDR. 


detailed  engineering  blueprints  and 
specifications  for  the  production 
plant.  Crawford  H.  Greenewalt,  Du 
Pont's  liaison  representative  to  the 
Metallurgical  Laboratory,  pointed  out 
that  Du  Pont's  customary  policy  was 
to  rely  primarily  upon  its  own  staff 
for  detailed  design  and  that,  while  Du 
Pont  would  want  to  have  continued 
access  to  the  Chicago  scientists  for 
occasional  assistance,  the  initiative  in 
requesting  such  help  should  come 
from  the  company.  Eugene  Wigner, 
who  had  considerable  training  in  en- 
gineering as  well  as  physics,  dis- 
agreed. He  contended  that  his  team 
was  entitled  to  an  active  role.  When 
Wigner  learned  Du  Pont  did  not  plan 
to  invite  his  group  to  Wilmington,  he 
concluded  that  his  own  earlier  ex- 
pressed opposition  to  having  the  firm 
participate  in  the  plutonium  project 
was  the  reason.  He  offered  to  resign 
as  group  leader,  hoping  that  would 
clear  the  way  for  the  rest  of  his  team 
to  go  to  Wilmington.  Compton  ex- 
plained that  Du  Pont's  action  was  cus- 
tomary practice  and  not  motivated  by 
any  personal  objection  to  the  scien- 
tist. While  Wigner's  suspicions  were 
not  entirely  allayed,  he  agreed  to  con- 
tinue with  the  project.  He  stayed  only 
briefly  in  Wilmington,  however,  and 
then  returned  to  Chicago,  where 
Compton  diverted  him  to  the  expand- 
ing heavy  water  pile  program.  ^^ 

The  Wigner  incident  pointed  up  a 
major  problem  for  the  Army  in  ad- 
ministering the  Manhattan  Project.  As 
development  of  a  process  moved 
from  basic  research  into  engineering. 


''Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  168-69;  Ltr,  Wigner 
to  Compton,  5  Aug  43,  Incl  to  Memo,  Peterson  to 
Groves,  sub:  Dissatisfaction  at  Met  Lab,  13  Aug  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  080  (Labs),  MDR. 


196 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


construction,  and  operations,  many  of 
the  scientists  were  no  longer  needed. 
Yet  Manhattan  leaders  had  to  have 
ready  access  to  the  fundamental 
knowledge  and  skills  of  these  scien- 
tists. For  security  reasons,  too,  scien- 
tists who  had  become  privy  to  impor- 
tant aspects  of  the  program  could  not 
simply  be  released  and  sent  back  to 
the  colleges  and  universities.  One  so- 
lution was  to  transfer  them  to  labora- 
tory positions  at  Clinton,  Hanford, 
Los  Alamos,  or  to  the  staff  of  indus- 
trial firms  under  contract  to  the 
project.  But  for  the  majority  who 
must  be  retained  on  the  staff  of  basic 
research  organizations  like  the  Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory,  there  had  to  be 
continuing  programs  of  meaningful 
research  and  development.  In  such  a 
novel  and  relatively  undeveloped 
field,  devising  useful  research  projects 
was  not  difficult;  the  problem  was  to 
keep  the  always  limited  resources  in 
manpower  and  materials  channeled 
into  those  projects  that  would  con- 
tribute most  directly  to  the  ultimate 
production  of  atomic  weapons. 

By  spring,  Compton  found  a  good 
compromise  solution  in  the  project 
for  design  of  a  heavy  water  pile,  al- 
ready under  way  on  a  limited  scale 
and  acceptable  to  both  Du  Pont  offi- 
cials and  Groves  because  they  viewed 
it  as  an  essential  backup  for  the  Han- 
ford plant.  Furthermore,  it  was  of  in- 
terest to  many  of  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  scientists.  The  promise  of 
increasing  supplies  of  heavy  water 
from  both  Trail  (British  Columbia) 
and  the  Du  Pont-operated  distillation 
plants  prompted  Compton  to  work 
out  an  agreement  with  Greenewalt 
and  Colonel  Nichols  that  provided  for 
centering   all   future   heavy   water   re- 


search at  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
under  the  direction  of  Professor 
Henry  D.  Smyth,  head  of  the  physics 
department  of  Princeton  University.  ^^ 

But  Major  Peterson  reported  that, 
in  spite  of  the  initiation  of  the  heavy 
water  pile  program,  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  scientists  continued  to  be 
discontented  with  Du  Pont's  methods 
and  procedures.  Many  disliked  the  te- 
dious work  of  reviewing  the  detailed 
blueprints  for  the  Hanford  plant,  a 
chore  made  necessary  because  the 
Metallurgical  Laboratory  had  to  ap- 
prove all  process  designs.  When  they 
found  errors,  they  concluded  Du  Pont 
was  mismanaging  pile  development. 
Wigner,  too,  again  complained  that 
Du  Pont  was  not  consulting  sufficient- 
ly with  its  Chicago  counterpart  on 
heavy  water  pile  design,  thus  delaying 
its  development. 

In  late  June,  Groves  decided  the 
time  had  come  to  deal  with  what  he 
termed    the    "scientist    problem."    In 


*^  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  Manhattan 
Project's  heavy  water  program  and  heavy  water  pile 
development  see  MDH,  Bk.  3,  "The  P-9  Project," 
and  Bk.  4.  Vol.  2,  Pt.  1,  pp.  3.3-3.14.  DASA.  Brief 
discussion  in  this  and  following  paragraph  on  the 
heavy  water  pile  program  at  Chicago  based  on 
Notes  on  Conf  Held  at  Wilmington,  Del.,  on  April 
16th,  Incl  to  Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves,  19  Apr  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  337  (Wilmington),  MDR; 
Ltr,  Greenewalt  to  Compton,  12  Jun  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  441.2  (Polymer),  MDR;  Trans- 
mittal Ltr,  Compton  to  P-9  Reviewing  Committee 
Members,  sub:  Memo  on  Transmittal  of  P-9  Rpt, 
1 1  Aug  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  334  (P-9  Re- 
viewing Committee),  MDR;  Memo,  Capt  Lawrence 
L.  Grotjan  (Columbia  Univ  Area  Engr)  to  Nichols, 
17  Apr  46,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Urey), 
MDR;  MPC  Min,  9  Sep  43,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp, MP  Files,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A,  MDR;  DSM  Chro- 
nology, 10  Nov  42,  Sec.  23(i),  OROO;  Hewlett  and 
Anderson,  Neui  World,  pp.  201-04;  Smyth  Report,  pp. 
101-02;  Compton,  Atomic  Qufst.  pp.  99-100;  Groves, 
Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  15,  n.  8. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


197 


line  with  a  suggestion  from  the  MiH- 
tary  Policy  Committee,  he  arranged 
with  President  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt 
to  write  a  letter,  addressed  to  him  but 
actually  intended  for  the  atomic 
project  scientists.  Emphasizing  first 
the  need  for  strictest  adherence  to  se- 
curity in  atomic  matters  (there  had 
been  incidents  involving  scientists, 
particularly  at  Los  Alamos),  the  Presi- 
dent went  on  to  say  that  he  had 
placed  Groves  in  complete  charge  of 
carrying  out  "all  development  and 
manufacturing  aspects  of  the  work." 
He  concluded  that  "whatever  the 
enemy  may  be  planning,  American 
Science  will  be  equal  to  the 
challenge."  ^^ 

The  Manhattan  commander  made 
certain  this  letter  received  wide  circu- 
lation among  project  scientists.  In 
Wigner's  group,  it  appears  to  have 
elicited  an  unfavorable  response. 
"They  felt,"  Peterson  reported  to 
Groves,  "that  it  was  unfair  for  the 
President  to  give  authority  to  you  and 
that  his  closing  sentence  concerning 
American  Scientists  being  equal  to 
any  challenge  was  a  farce  since  he  al- 
lowed them  neither  responsibility  nor 
authority."  In  the  opinion  of  some 
members  of  the  group,  "the  presence 
of  Du  Pont  and  the  Army  slows  the 
project.   .  .  ."  ^* 

In  early  August,  General  Groves 
appointed  a  committee  to  review  the 


^^  Ltr  (source  of  quotations),  Roosevelt  to 
Groves,  29  Jun  43,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP 
Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  D,  MDR;  MPC  Min,  24  Jun  43, 
MDR. 

**  Memo,  Peterson  to  Groves,  sub:  Dissatisfaction 
at  Met  Lab,  13  Aug  43,  MDR.  Peterson  erred  in 
paraphrasing  from  the  President's  letter,  stating 
"American  Scientists"  instead  of  "American 
Science." 


role  the  heavy  water  program  should 
have  in  the  atomic  bomb  project,  a 
step  that  was,  at  least  in  part,  also  in- 
tended to  allay  dissatisfaction  among 
the  Chicago  scientists.  Headed  by 
MIT  Professor  (chemical  engineering) 
Warren  K.  Lewis,  with  Standard  Oil 
Vice  President  Eger  V.  Murphree, 
physicist  Richard  C.  Tolman,  who  was 
Groves's  scientific  adviser,  and  Har- 
vard Professor  (chemistry)  E.  Bright 
Wilson,  Jr.,  as  members,  the  group 
upheld  the  Army,  Du  Pont,  and 
Compton's  earlier  objectives.  They 
recommended  continuation  of  a  rela- 
tively modest  heavy  water  pile  re- 
search program  at  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  "as  insurance  against  a 
possible  failure  of  the  Hanford  graph- 
ite piles  to  produce  49  [plutonium]  at 
their  rated  capacity,  and  secondarily 
to  explore  the  possibilities  of  a 
method  for  producing  49  which  might 
utilize  uranium  more  efficiently  than 
graphite  piles."  ^^ 

By  early  fall,  the  scientists'  dissatis- 
faction had  declined  substantially, 
partly  as  a  result  of  the  chance  they 
had  had  to  unburden  their  grievances 
to  members  of  the  committee  and 
partly  because  the  major  design  phase 
of  pile  development  was  nearing  an 
end.  Even  Wigner,  acceding  to  Comp- 
ton's wishes,  agreed  somewhat  reluc- 
tantly to  continue  to  oversee  work  on 
the  heavy  water  pile.  Nevertheless, 
Compton  later  recalled  that,  although 
the  collaboration  had  achieved  basic 
design  of  the  plutonium  semiworks 
and  production  plant  by  late  1943, 
there  remained  in  the  relationship  "a 


1*  Rpt,  Committee  on  Heavy  Water  Work,  19  Aug 
43,  Att.  2  to  MPC  Min,  9  Sep  43,  MDR. 


198 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


state  of  tension  that  caused  continual 
concern  to  those  responsible  for  the 
success  of  the  undertaking."  ^^ 

Organization  for  Plutonium  Production 

In  early  1943,  General  Groves  and 
the  Military  Policy  Committee  devot- 
ed considerable  attention  to  assisting 
Du  Pont  and  the  Metallurgical  Labo- 
ratory staff  in  forming  a  plutonium 
production  organization.  In  this  orga- 
nization Du  Pont  was  to  have  primary 
responsibility  for  design,  construc- 
tion, and — except  for  the  semiworks — 
operation  of  the  plutonium  facilities. 
Because  of  the  uniqueness  of  the 
processes  involved,  the  firm's  limited 
experience  in  dealing  with  them,  and 
the  overall  urgency  of  the  bomb 
project,  Du  Pont  felt  its  scientists  and 
engineers  would  need  assistance  from 
the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  staff  in 
all  phases  of  the  plutonium  program. 
Thus,  as  the  setting  for  collaboration 
was  about  to  shift— although  in  a 
somewhat  altered  form — from  the 
design  to  the  construction  and  pro- 
duction phases,  the  Army  once  again 
had  the  primary  administrative  task  of 
preventing  fundamental  differences  in 
the  two  organizations'  modus  operandi 
from  interfering  with  the  progress  of 
the  program. 

Du  Pont's  TNX  Division 

At  the  end  of  1942,  after  analyzing 
the  unusual  nature  of  the  problems 
involved  in  the  plutonium  production 
process  and  weighing  the  District's 
stringent  requirements  for  security 
and  safety,  Du  Pont  established  a  spe- 


cial organization  for  plutonium  activi- 
ties within  the  company  itself.  ^'^ 
Given  the  designation  TNX  Division, 
this  new  unit  functioned  as  a  subordi- 
nate element  of  the  company's  Explo- 
sives Department,  which  already  had 
designed  and  was  operating  a  number 
of  government-owned  munitions 
plants.  Locating  the  TNX  Division  in 
a  regular  company  department  was 
consistent  with  Du  Pont's  decision  to 
organize  and  administer  its  plutonium 
program  in  accordance  with  its  stand- 
ard operating  procedures,  and,  con- 
comitantly, because  this  arrangement 
helped  to  conceal  the  true  character 
of  TNX  operations,  it  fully  satisfied 
the  District's  requirements  for  project 
security. 

Du  Pont's  operating  procedures  dif- 
fered somewhat  from  comparable  in- 
dustrial firms  in  the  early  1940's.  The 
company  did  not  have  a  highly  cen- 
tralized organizational  structure  and 
method  of  operation  but  was  a  kind 
of  industrial  confederation  of  semiau- 
tonomous  departments,  each  with 
many  of  the  characteristics  of  an  inde- 
pendent business  enterprise.  Guided 
by  broad  policies  laid  down  by  top 
executives,  a  general  manager  admin- 
istered each  department  very  much  in 
the  same  fashion  as  the  president  of  a 
company,  operating  under  his  own 
budget  and  making  most  of  the  rou- 
tine decisions.  When  additional  assist- 


Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  169. 


'^  Except  as  otherwise  noted,  subsection  on  Du 
Pont's  plutonium  organization  based  on  E.  I.  du 
Pont  de  Nemours  and  Company,  Du  Pont 's  Part  m  the 
Xatwnal  Security  Program.  1940-1945  (Wilmington, 
Del.:  Du  Pont,  1946),  pp.  8-9;  Rpt,  Du  Pont,  sub: 
Constr  at  Hanford  Engr  Works,  Contract  W-7412- 
eng-1,  Du  Pont  Proj  9536,  Proj  Hist  (hereafter  cited 
as  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist),  9  Aug  45,  Vol.  1,  pp.  22- 
39,  HOO;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  3,  pp.  10.2-10.3  and 
App.  B7,  DASA;  Groves  Diary,  16  Dec  42,  LRG; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Sew  World,  pp.  187-88. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


199 


ance  was  needed,  the  manager  could 
get  it  from  Du  Font's  permanent  aux- 
iliary departments — the  Engineering 
Department,  for  example — that  fur- 
nished regularly  required  services, 
such  as  plant  construction  and  per- 
sonnel recruitment. 

Consistent  with  these  operating 
procedures,  Du  Font's  management 
turned  over  to  the  general  manager 
of  the  Explosives  Department,  E.  B. 
Yancey,  overall  responsibility  for  most 
of  the  company's  plutonium  program. 
Yancey,  already  extensively  involved 
in  other  wartime  projects,  delegated 
direct  authority  over  the  program  to 
his  assistant  general  manager,  Roger 
Williams.  A  chemical  engineer  with 
extensive  experience  in  wartime  con- 
struction for  the  government,  Wil- 
liams's introduction  to  the  atomic 
project  had  been  as  a  member  of  the 
Lewis  reviewing  committee.  He  now 
became,  in  effect,  the  active  head  of 
the  TNX  Division,  with  responsibility 
for  Du  Pont  plutonium  activities  at 
Wilmington,  Clinton,  and  Hanford. 

Drawing  personnel  from  most  of 
the  departments  of  Du  Font,  as  well 
as  from  company-operated  war  plants 
and  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory, 
Williams  organized  TNX  into  two 
major  subdivisions:  the  Technical  Di- 
vision, which  carried  out  design  de- 
velopment in  close  collaboration  with 
the  Chicago  and  Clinton  researchers; 
and  the  Manufacturing  Division, 
which  advised  the  Engineering  De- 
partment on  construction  of  the  plu- 
tonium facilities  and  planned  and  su- 
pervised production  plant  operations. 
From  the  Grasselli  Chemicals  Depart- 
ment, Williams  selected  chemical  en- 
gineer Crawford  Greenewalt  to  head 
the  Technical  Division.  Serving,  as 
General  Groves  perceived  it,  "as  the 


bridge  between  the  hard-driving, 
thoroughly  competent,  industrial- 
minded  engineers  and  executives  at 
Wilmington  and  the  highly  intelligent 
but  theoretically  inclined  scientists  at 
Chicago,"  Greenewalt  spent  much  of 
his  time  at  the  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory and  Clinton  semiworks  and  thus 
left  his  assistant,  George  Graves,  in 
charge  of  routine  administration.^^ 
Williams's  choice  to  head  the  Manu- 
facturing Division  was  R.  Monte 
Evans,  a  production  manager  of  long 
experience,  most  recently  with  the 
company's  Ammonia  Department. 

The  extensive  involvement  of  Du 
Font's  Engineering  Department  in  the 
atomic  project  came  about  as  a  result 
of  the  company's  policy  of  building  its 
own  plants  rather  than  contracting 
them  out  to  regular  construction 
firms.  E.  G.  Ackart,  Du  Font's  chief 
engineer  and  Engineering  Depart- 
ment head,  assigned  to  his  deputy, 
Granville  M.  Read,  primary  responsi- 
bility for  the  construction  aspects  of 
the  plutonium  program  and  to  John 
N.  Tilley  the  vital  role  of  liaison  offi- 
cer to  the  Explosives  Department. 
Eventually,  the  Engineering  Depart- 
ment committed  more  than  90  per- 
cent of  its  personnel  and  resources  to 
plutonium  construction. 

Metallurgical  Project 

In  1943,  shortly  after  Du  Font  had 
established  its  TNX  Division,  Arthur 
Compton,  faced  with  the  rapid 
growth  of  the  plutonium  research 
program,  extensively  restructured  and 
expanded  its  administrative  organiza- 
tion. By  October,  the  plutonium  orga- 


**  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  79. 


200 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


nization,  now  designated  the  Metal- 
lurgical Project,  ^^  comprised  the  Met- 
allurgical and  Argonne  laboratories 
at  Chicago;  the  newly  designed  Clin- 
ton Laboratories  (cover  name  for  the 
plutonium  semiworks)  at  the  Tennes- 
see site;  and  the  many  research  pro- 
grams under  way  at  other  institu- 
tions— eventually  seventy — in  the 
United  States. 

Giving  up  his  dual  position  as 
chairman  of  the  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory and  its  Executive  Committee 
(which  he  abolished),  Compton 
became  director  of  the  Metallurgical 
Project  and  appointed  three  associate 
directors:  Norman  Hilberry,  his 
former  student  and  longtime  personal 
assistant,  as  associate  director  for  re- 
search; ^°  Robert  S.  Stone,  from  the 
University  of  California  at  Berkeley, 
as  associate  director  for  health  mat- 
ters; and  Wilbur  C.  Munnecke,  from 
the  University  of  Chicago,  as  associate 
director  for  administration.  At  the 
same  time,  using  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  Technical  Council  as  a 
basis,  he  established  the  policy- 
making Metallurgical  Project  Council 


'^Subsection  on  Metallurgical  Project  based  on 
Org  Chart  attached  to  Rpt,  Peterson,  sub:  Visit  to 
Chicago  Proj,  29  Sep  42,  MDR;  Memo,  Peterson  to 
Groves,  sub:  Met  Proj  Org  Chart,  14  Oct  43,  MDR; 
Rpt,  Compton,  sub:  Opn  of  Met  Proj  by  Univ  of 
Chicago,  28  Jul  44,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  1, 
"General  Features,"  pp.  9.2-9.3,  and  Vol.  2,  Pt.  1, 
pp.  2.1-2.2,  7.1,  App.  B5,  DASA;  Smyth  Report,  pp. 
63-65  and  92;  Compton,  Atomic  Qtmt,  pp.  82-86 
(quotations  from  p.  84),  157,  170-71,  185-86;  Hil- 
berry Interv,  3  Jan  63,  CMH. 

^"Hilberry,  who  served  as  Compton's  personal 
representative  on  those  occasions  when  the  latter 
could  not  carry  out  some  of  his  many  professional 
commitments,  became,  in  effect,  associate  director 
of  the  entire  Metallurgical  Project  in  late  1943, 
when  Compton  moved  his  headquarters  to  Oak 
Ridge.  Hilberry  remained  at  the  Metallurgical  Labo- 
ratory in  Chicago,  where  he  had  his  office.  See 
Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  185. 


and,  as  council  members,  selected 
twenty-five  leading  staff  scientists 
from  the  subordinate  laboratories. 

The  Metallurgical  Project  was  from 
its  initiation  "a  novel  enterprise"  for 
Arthur  Compton,  who,  even  before 
the  reorganization  of  the  plutonium 
program,  had  realized  that  its  ulti- 
mate success  in  producing  some  hun- 
dreds of  pounds  of  plutonium  for  the 
wartime  needs  of  the  atomic  project 
was  dependent  on  coordinating  the 
resources  and  talents  of  literally  thou- 
sands of  scientists  and  technicians.  He 
had  made  a  substantial  beginning 
toward  attaining  the  program  objec- 
tive in  1942  through  the  organization 
and  operation  of  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory,  and  now  he  endeavored 
to  assure  its  success  by  providing  in 
the  Metallurgical  Project  the  organiza- 
tion with  the  means  to  carry  through 
to  completion  the  research,  develop- 
ment, design,  and  engineering  of  the 
plutonium  facilities. 

District  Area  Offices 

Starting  in  late  1942,  as  the  scien- 
tific and  industrial  elements  of  the 
plutonium  program  rapidly  expanded, 
the  Army  responded  by  enlarging  its 
own  organization  for  overseeing  the 
program.  As  each  major  element 
began  to  function,  the  Manhattan  Dis- 
trict established  an  area  office  for  it. 
By  early  1943,  area  offices  were  oper- 
ating in  Chicago,  Clinton,  and  Han- 
ford;  at  Du  Pont  headquarters  in  Wil- 
mington, Delaware;  at  the  heavy  water 
plants  in  British  Columbia,  West  Vir- 
ginia, Alabama,  and  Indiana;  and  at 
the  larger  research  programs  in 
progress    elsewhere    in    the    country. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


201 


such    as    at    Iowa    State    College    in 
Ames.^^  {See  Chart  1.) 

In  the  early  phases  of  plutonium 
development,  the  Chicago  and  Wil- 
mington area  offices  were  the  largest 
and  most  important.  And  once  Du 
Pont  started  construction  of  the  plu- 
tonium semiworks  in  Tennessee,  the 
district  engineer  enlarged  Major  Pe- 
terson's Chicago  area  responsibilities 
to  include  the  Clinton  installation. 
After  visiting  the  site,  Peterson  set  up 
a  Clinton  branch  of  his  Chicago  area 
office,  designating  it  the  TNX  Oper- 
ating Division.  In  August  1943,  when 
the  District  headquarters  moved  from 
New  York  City  to  Oak  Ridge,  this  di- 
vision became  the  Clinton  Laborato- 
ries Division  as  a  result  of  a  major  ad- 
ministrative reorganization.  Peterson, 
while  continuing  as  the  Chicago  area 
engineer,  assumed  additional  respon- 
sibilities as  the  new  division  chief  but 
turned  over  immediate  supervision  of 
the  plutonium  semiworks  to  his  new 
assistant.  Captain  Grafton,  who  had 
been  with  the  recently  abolished  Clin- 
ton Area  Engineers  Office,  until  he 
(Peterson)  could  relocate  to  the  Ten- 
nessee site.  To  handle  most  of  the 
routine  administrative  services  for  the 
Chicago  area  office,  the  District  head- 
quarters furnished  the  area  office's 
new    division    with    a    token    staff   of 


2^  Except  as  indicated,  subsection  on  area  offices 
based  on  Org  Charts,  U.S.  Engrs  Office,  MD,  15 
Aug  43,  1  Nov  43,  15  Feb  44,  1  Jun  44,  28  Aug  44, 
and  26  Jan  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  020 
(MED-Org),  MDR;  Ltr,  Groves  to  Styer,  sub:  Pro- 
motion of  Lt  Col  Franklin  T.  Matthias,  25  Oct  44, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  210.2  (Off  Promo), 
MDR;  Matthias  Diary,  Jan-Sep  43,  passim,  OROO; 
Du  Pont,  In  Xatwnal  Secimty  Program.  App.  3B  (origi- 
nally issued  as  Stockholdns  Bulletin.  24  Aug  45),  p. 
61;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  "Construction,"  Apps. 
B57-B58,  and  Vol.  6,  "Operations,"  pp.  18.1-18.6 
and  Apps.  B8-B10,  DAS  A;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest, 
pp.   107-08;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  72-73. 


three  District  officers,  five  (later  nine) 
technically  trained  enlisted  men,  and 
five  civil  service  employees.  By  late 
1943  and  early  1944,  with  the  shift 
from  research  and  development  to 
construction  and  operation  of  the 
large-scale  production  plant,  the  area 
office  at  Hanford  expanded  rapidly 
while  those  at  institutional  research 
centers  reduced  their  activities  and 
staffs. 

The  precise  character  of  the  admin- 
istrative relationships  between  the 
Chicago,  Wilmington,  Hanford  area 
offices  and  the  Manhattan  District 
headquarters  in  Oak  Ridge  varied 
considerably.  Certain  factors,  howev- 
er, tended  permanently  to  influence 
this  relationship.  One  of  these  was 
geography.  The  stringencies  of  war- 
time travel  and  communications  and 
Hanford's  relatively  isolated  location 
resulted  in  the  area  engineer,  Lt.  Col. 
Franklin  T.  Matthias,  having  a  good 
deal  more  administrative  autonomy, 
at  least  in  routine  matters,  than  Peter- 
son in  Chicago  or  Maj.  William  L. 
Sapper  in  Wilmington.  Matthias  main- 
tained a  permanent  liaison  official, 
Mr.  H.  J.  Day,  in  the  Oak  Ridge  office 
to  keep  him  informed  on  current 
Manhattan  developments  and  to  serve 
as  a  channel  for  expediting  action  on 
Hanford  requests.  By  way  of  contrast, 
the  Chicago  office  always  maintained 
a  much  closer  day-to-day  relationship 
with  the  District  headquarters,  par- 
ticularly after  Peterson  began  spend- 
ing a  major  part  of  his  time  in 
Tennessee  as  of  late  1943. ^^ 


22  On  charts  showing  the  organization  of  the  U.S. 
Engineers  Office,  Manhattan  District.  Oak  Ridge,  in 
late  1943.  H.  L.  Day  is  listed  as  the  liaison  officer 
for  the  plutonium  project.  See  Org  Charts,  15  Aug 

Continued 


202 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


While  the  Chicago  area  engineer 
supervised  plutonium  research  and 
development  activities,  the  Wilming- 
ton area  engineer  had  primary  re- 
sponsibility for  monitoring  plutonium 
engineering  and  design,  with  a  sec- 
ondary assignment  of  supervising  Du 
Font's  feed  materials  program  at  the 
company's  Chambers  Chemical  and 
Dye  Works  in  Deep  Water,  New 
Jersey.  Design  activities  centered  in 
Wilmington,  where  the  Du  Pont 
design  staff  and  visiting  Metallurgical 
Project  scientists  collaborated  on  the 
engineering  blueprints  and  specifica- 
tions for  the  plutonium  facilities  in 
Tennessee  and  Washington  State. 
Review  and  approval  of  these  designs 
before  their  dispatch  to  company  en- 
gineers at  the  Clinton  and  Hanford 
sites  constituted  the  most  important 
tasks  of  Major  Sapper's  Wilmington 
staff,  which,  much  of  the  time,  re- 
ceived assistance  from  personnel  who 
were  temporarily  detailed  from  the 
Hanford  area  office.  Because  close  co- 
ordination between  the  Wilmington 
and  Hanford  area  offices  was  essential 
on  all  matters  relating  to  construction 
and  operation  of  the  production 
plant,  Sapper  reported  to  the  district 
engineer  through  Colonel  Matthias. 

A  civil  engineer  with  considerable 
experience  in  civilian  construction. 
Colonel  Matthias  recruited  both  mili- 
tary and  civilian  personnel,  many 
from  other  Corps  of  Engineers 
projects,  to  form  the  operating  nucle- 
us (more  than  five  hundred  personnel 
by  1944)  of  a  burgeoning  office  orga- 
nization.  To   complement   Du   Pont's 

and  1  Nov  43,  MDR.  Matthias  noted  in  his  diary  on 
2  Aug  43  that  Day  was  going  to  be  located  at  the 
Oak  Ridge  headquarters  after  14  August.  On  the 
relative  autonomy  of  the  Hanford  area  engineer  see 
Matthias  Diary,  12  Sep  and  28  Oct  43,  OROO. 


field  construction  organization  at  the 
Hanford  site,  Matthias  established 
major  divisions  to  monitor  the  many 
construction-related  activities  of  the 
prime  contractor  and  its  numerous 
subcontractors.  Similarly,  to  reflect 
the  reorientation  of  plant  activities 
when  Du  Pont  converted  its  construc- 
tion organization  into  one  for  plant 
operations,  he  revamped  the  Hanford 
area  office  by  expanding  the  produc- 
tion division;  by  forming  a  new  engi- 
neering and  maintenance  operations 
division;  and,  to  the  extent  necessary, 
by  reorganizing  the  security,  safety, 
labor  relations,  fiscal  audits,  and  com- 
munity affairs  sections. ^^ 

Army-Du  Pont  Administration 

The  Army-Du  Pont  plan  for  coordi- 
nating and  controlling  project  activi- 
ties at  the  Hanford  Engineer  Works 
(HEW)  illustrates  the  way  in  which 
District  and  TNX  officials  went  about 
jointly  administering  the  plutonium 
production  program.^'*  On  matters  of 
general  policy,  TNX  executives  could 
consult  with  Colonel  Nichols,  to 
whom  Groves  had  given  broad  re- 
sponsibility for  plutonium  construc- 
tion and  production,  or,  if  necessary, 
directly  with  Groves — but  only  after 
informing  Nichols.  On  nonpolicy  mat- 
ters, TNX  officials  were  to  communi- 
cate with  Colonel  Matthias  (or,  where 


^^  On  the  area  engineer  and  Du  Pont  construc- 
tion and  operations  organization  at  Hanford  Engi- 
neer Works  see  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vols.  5  and  6,  each 
App.  B,  DASA;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  HOO; 
Intro  to  Rpt,  Du  Pont,  sub:  Memoranda  for  File  on 
HEW  Opns,  1944-46  (hereafter  cited  as  Du  Pont 
Opns  Hist),  Sep  46,  HOO. 

^"•Ltr.  E.  B.  Yancey  to  Dist  Engr,  Attn.:  Nichols, 
sub:  Corps  of  Engrs-Du  Pont  Corresp  and  Con- 
tracts of  HEW,  4  May  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp, 161  (Du  Pont),  MDR. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


203 


appropriate,  with  Lt.  Col.  H.  R. 
Kadlec,  his  construction  chief);  or 
Major  Sapper  at  Wilmington;  or  Maj. 
James  E.  Travis  at  District  headquar- 
ters, who  in  1943  headed  the  Service 
and  Control  Division  at  Oak  Ridge. 

On  questions  relating  to  nonpolicy 
matters  submitted  by  Matthias, 
Kadlec,  and  other  staff  members,  Du 
Font's  officials  at  the  Hanford  site 
could  make  decisions,  furnish  infor- 
mation, or  provide  recommendations 
as  they  saw  fit;  when  necessary,  they 
could  consult  with  their  department 
or  division  in  Wilmington  by  teletype. 
In  those  instances  when  the  Hanford 
area  engineer  or  his  staff  members 
were  dissatisfied  with  results  of  in- 
quiries directed  to  the  Du  Pont  field 
staff,  they  were  authorized  to  commu- 
nicate directly  with  Roger  Williams  or 
Granville  Read  or  with  Major  Sapper. 

Inevitably,  many  problems  arose 
that  could  not  be  readily  resolved  by 
the  local  area  engineer,  or  even  by 
the  district  engineer,  and  the  majority 
of  these  ended  up  on  General 
Groves's  desk  in  Washington,  D.C. 
Most  often  they  involved  important 
policy  decisions  or  required  extensive 
negotiations  with  other  wartime  agen- 
cies. For  example,  during  the  design 
and  construction  phases  of  the  pluto- 
nium  project.  Groves  had  to  deal  with 
problems  of  electric  power  supply  at 
Hanford,  acute  shortages  of  essential 
workers  at  both  the  Hanford  Engi- 
neer Works  and  Clinton  Laboratories, 
deferment  of  key  civilian  scientific 
and  technical  personnel,  and  procure- 
ment of  a  great  variety  of  materials 
and  equipment.  Groves  and  his  small 
liaison  staff  frequently  intervened  per- 
sonally to  expedite  solutions.  In  a 
comparatively  few  cases,  problems 
had    to    be    resolved    by    the    Military 


Policy  Committee  or  by  special  re- 
viewing committees  that  Groves  ap- 
pointed. Typical  was  the  heavy  water 
research  and  experimentation  pro- 
gram, which  required  an  investigation 
by  a  reviewing  committee  and  a  deci- 
sion by  the  Military  Policy  Committee 
to  determine  the  scope  of  this 
program  and  the  extent  of  inter- 
change with  the  Canadians  that  was 
permissible.^^ 

Beginning  in  late  1942,  the  com- 
bined efforts  of  Groves,  Compton, 
Greenewalt,  and  Williams  facilitated 
effective  Metallurgical  Project-Du  Pont 
collaboration  through  an  interchange 
of  both  expert  personnel  and  scientific 
and  technical  information  of  all 
kinds. ^^  To  explain  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  scientists'  preliminary  heli- 
um- and  water-cooled  pile  designs  to 
Du  Pont's  TNX  staff,  Compton  dis- 
patched the  respective  pile  research 
teams  to  Wilmington.  While  most  of 
the  Chicago  scientists  stayed  at  Wil- 
mington only  for  a  limited  time,  at  least 
one  young  physicist,  John  A.  Wheeler, 
who  was  an  expert  on  pile  develop- 
ment, became  a  permanent  member  of 
the  Du  Pont  design  staff.  The  design 
teams  from  Wilmington  that  visited 
the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  in  No- 
vember were  the  vanguard  of  many 
others  who,  in  subsequent  months,  fol- 


^^  For  examples  of  problems  relating  to  power 
and  labor  see  correspondence  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  51, 
MDR.  The  extent  of  Groves's  involvement  in  solv- 
ing such  problems  can  be  traced  in  Groves  Diary, 
Apr-Jun  43,  passim,  LRG.  On  the  heavy  water  prob- 
lem see  MFC  Min.  9  Sep  43,  MDR. 

^^  Discussion  of  development  of  the  means  for 
collaboration  between  the  Metallurgical  Project  and 
Du  Pont  based  on  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp. 
48  and  79-80;  Smyth  Report,  pp.  92-93;  Compton, 
Atomic  Quest,  pp.  164-65;  DSM  Chronolog>',  25  Nov 
42,  Sec.  23(a),  OROO;  Rpt,  Whitaker,  sub:  Conf  at 
Wilmington,  17-18  Dec  42  (Rpt  CS-406),  ANL. 


204 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


lowed  periodically  to  confer  with  the 
Chicago  scientists  about  the  latest  de- 
velopments in  the  pile  process. 
Greenewalt,  too,  regularly  spent  ex- 
tended periods  in  Chicago  (and,  later, 
at  Clinton)  and  assigned  Du  Pont 
physicist  J.  B.  Miles  as  his  permanent 
representative  at  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory.  Both  Greenewalt  and 
Miles,  when  they  were  in  Chicago, 
attended  meetings  of  the  Metallurgical 
Project  Council  and  regularly  con- 
ferred with  the  laboratory  group 
leaders. 

The  frequent  interchange  of  expert 
personnel  gradually  became  a  key  fea- 
ture of  the  collaboration,  extending 
eventually  to  include  not  only  ex- 
changes between  the  Chicago  scien- 
tists and  Wilmington  designers  but 
also  between  the  Wilmington  design- 
ers and  the  Clinton  researchers,  and 
among  the  Clinton,  Chicago,  and 
Hanford  scientific  staffs.  While  Metal- 
lurgical Project  scientists  on  occasion 
complained  bitterly  that  the  Du  Pont 
design  staff  was  not  consulting  ade- 
quately with  them  on  some  matters, 
on  the  whole  the  interchange  appears 
to  have  been  one  of  the  most  essen- 
tial and  profitable  aspects  of  the 
collaboration. 

Consistent  with  the  plan  to  em- 
ploy the  Metallurgical  Project  essen- 
tially as  a  Du  Pont  research  and  de- 
velopment division,  the  plutonium 
project  leaders  incorporated  into  the 
Metallurgical  Project-Du  Pont  work 
relations  agreement  certain  special 
provisions  to  ensure  a  continuous  and 
adequate  exchange  of  scientific  and 
technical  information.  The  Metallurgi- 
cal Project  scientists  regularly  sent 
copies  of  pertinent  reports  to  the  Du 
Pont  design  team;  in  turn,  the  Wil- 
mington designers  kept  the  Chicago 


and  Clinton  researchers  fully  in- 
formed on  current  layout  and  process 
design  decisions,  all  of  which  then 
had  to  be  approved  by  appropriate 
members  of  the  Metallurgical  Project 
staff.  A  further  interchange  occurred 
when  Du  Pont  submitted  completed 
blueprints  and  process  drawings  to 
the  district  engineer  for  the  usual 
contract  review.  The  district  engineer, 
in  compliance  with  the  work  agree- 
ment, then  sent  the  completed  de- 
signs to  the  Metallurgical  Project  staff 
for  final  approval  of  the  scientific  and 
technical  aspects. 

The  Semiworks:  Clinton  Laboratories 

In  the  early  months  of  1943,  while 
design  groups  were  still  developing 
pile  process  designs  and  engineering 
specifications,  Du  Pont  construction 
workers  began  building  the  plutoni- 
um semiworks — in  April,  for  security 
reasons,  officially  designated  CHnton 
Laboratories — at  the  Clinton  Engi- 
neer Works  in  Tennessee.  The 
semiworks  site,  consisting  of  112 
acres  and  officially  named  the  X-10 
area,  lay  between  two  ridges  along  a 
small  creek  in  the  isolated  Bethel 
Valley,  some  20  miles  southwest  of 
the  town  of  Clinton  and  about  10 
miles  southwest  of  the  planned  com- 
munity of  Oak  Ridge.  Tentative  plans 
for  the  semiworks  (they  would  be  al- 
tered and  expanded  several  times 
during  the  period  of  construction) 
called  for  an  air-cooled  uranium- 
graphite  pilot  pile  and  chemical  sepa- 
ration plant,  2'^  as  well  as  an  extensive 


2^  Plutonium  project  officials  conceived  the  Clin- 
ton pilot  pile  and  separation  plant  as  a  true 
semiworks  for  the  Hanford  production  plant;  how- 

Continued 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


205 


research  laboratory  and  a  number  of 
support,  training,  and  administrative 
facilities. 

Construction 

In  his  February  1943  progress 
report  to  General  Groves,  District  En- 
gineer Marshall  set  1  July  as  the  con- 
struction completion  date  for  the  plu- 
tonium  semiworks.^®  The  X-10  pile 
and  separation  plant  had  to  be  put 
into  operation  as  quickly  as  possible, 
to  provide  not  only  the  design  and 
operational  data  for  the  Hanford  pro- 
duction plant  but  also  the  small  quan- 
tities of  plutonium  so  urgently 
needed  for  ongoing  research  and  test- 
ing. Furthermore,  the  facilities  were 
required  to  train  key  Du  Pont  em- 
ployees in  the  techniques  of  plant 
operation. 

Pending  completion  of  engineering 
designs  for  the  permanent  installa- 
tions, and  less  than  a  month  after 
Du  Pont  had  signed  the  letter  con- 
tract (8  January  1943),  company  con- 
struction crews  began  building  the 
temporary,  service,  and  utility  facili- 
ties. In  March,  other  Du  Pont  crews 
began  work  on  the  permanent  instal- 
lations, starting  with  the  chemical 
separation       plant.       Even       though 

ever,  with  the  decision  to  use  water  to  cool  the  Han- 
ford piles,  the  air-cooled  pilot  pile,  strictly  speaking, 
lost  its  function.  The  officials  weighed  the  possibili- 
ty of  converting  the  Clinton  pile,  but  finally  decided 
that  early  production  of  small  quantities  of  plutoni- 
um was  more  important.  Hence,  only  the  separation 
plant  functioned  as  a  true  pilot  facility.  See  Smyth 
Report,  p.  76;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  2,  p.  4.1, 
DASA. 

^^  Subsection  on  semiworks  construction  based 
primarily  on  Completion  Rpt,  Du  Pont,  sub:  CEW, 
TNX  Area,  1  Apr  44,  OROO;  Disl  Engr.  Monthly 
Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Jan-Sep  43,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  4, 
Vol.  2,  Pt.  2,  pp.  2.1-2.10,  DASA;  Hewlett  and  An- 
derson, Xeu'  World,  pp.  207-10. 


Greenewalt,  who  was  supervising 
design  of  this  plant,  had  not  yet 
reached  a  decision  on  which  of  sever- 
al chemical  processes  would  be  em- 
ployed in  it,  the  Wilmington  design 
teams  had  accumulated  sufficient  en- 
gineering data  to  permit  a  start  on  its 
basic  components.  As  these  neared 
completion  in  the  late  summer, 
Greenewalt  decided  to  employ  the 
bismuth  phosphate  separation 

method,  which  required  installation  of 
miles  of  pipe  as  well  as  other  process 
apparatus.  By  early  fall  the  chemical 
plant  was  ready  for  test  operations, 
but  these  could  not  be  carried  out 
until  the  pilot  pile  produced  irradiat- 
ed uranium  slugs. 

Construction  work  on  the  pilot  pile 
did  not  progress  as  swiftly  and  expe- 
ditiously as  that  on  the  separation 
plant,  because  the  Du  Pont  design 
staff  did  not  complete  the  engineer- 
ing blueprints  for  the  air-cooled  pile 
until  the  end  of  April  and  crews  exca- 
vating the  pile  site  unexpectedly 
struck  a  large  bed  of  soft  clay,  neces- 
sitating installation  of  much  more 
foundation  work  than  had  been  antici- 
pated. It  was  June  before  construction 
crews  started  pouring  concrete  for 
the  7-foot-thick  walls  of  the  pile's 
great  outer  shell,  which  would  pre- 
vent escape  of  radioactive  emissions, 
and  late  summer  before  they  complet- 
ed them.  Thousands  of  holes  pierced 
the  front  facing  of  the  shell,  to  permit 
insertion  of  uranium  fuel  slugs.  The 
side  and  rear  walls  and  the  massive 
top  also  had  numerous  openings  of 
varying  sizes  and  shapes,  to  accom- 
modate experimental  and  operating 
equipment  built  into  the  pile.  The 
outer  shell  finished,  technicians  began 
to    assemble    the    pile    itself,    putting 


206 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


into  place  hundreds  of  carefully  ma- 
chined graphite  bars  to  form  its  inner 
core — a  structure  measuring  24  feet 
square  and  weighing  an  estimated 
1,500  tons.  In  the  meantime,  other 
workmen  constructed  the  four-story 
concrete  and  wood  building  to  house 
the  pile  and  its  auxiliary  facilities — a 
control  room,  a  small  "hot"  labora- 
tory equipped  to  handle  radioactive 
materials,  and  a  core  removal  area. 

In  spite  of  constant  pressure  by 
General  Groves  on  Du  Font's  Engi- 
neering Department,  completion  of 
the  Clinton  Laboratories  was  slow, 
primarily  because  of  the  extent  of  the 
support  and  training  facilities  the 
semiworks  required.  Because  of  the 
isolation  of  the  Bethel  Valley  X-10 
site  from  the  Y-12  (electromagnetic), 
K-25  (gaseous  diffusion),  and  S-50 
(liquid  thermal  diffusion)  areas,  Du 
Pont  had  to  provide  the  semiworks 
with  its  own  machine  shops,  water 
supply  and  treatment  installations,  a 
steam  plant,  storage  areas,  and  class- 
rooms and  laboratories  for  training.  A 
number  of  other  factors  beyond  the 
control  of  company  officials  also  con- 
tributed to  serious  delays.  The  addi- 
tion of  installations  not  included  in 
the  original  engineering  designs  and 
major  alterations  in  building  plans 
doubled  the  amount  of  construction. 
Furthermore,  building  schedules 
could  not  be  maintained  in  the  face  of 
persistent  shortages  in  both  common 
and  skilled  labor  in  the  region  adja- 
cent to  the  Tennessee  site  that,  de- 
spite efforts,  grew  worse  in  late  1943. 
Unsatisfactory  housing  and  commut- 
ing conditions  aggravated  these  short- 
ages by  increasing  absenteeism  and 
worker  turnover.  Finally,  there  were 
the    chronic    wartime    difficulties    in 


procurement  of  essential  building 
materials.^® 

The  Army,  endeavoring  to  assist 
Du  Pont  in  overcoming  specific  bot- 
tlenecks, achieved  its  greatest  success 
in  expediting  materials  and  equip- 
ment procurement.  For  example, 
when  Du  Pont  found  that  its  standard 
5-cubic-yard  trucks  for  hauling  ready- 
mixed  concrete  were  too  heavy  for 
the  poor  condition  of  the  entrance 
road  at  the  construction  site,  the  Clin- 
ton area  engineer  obtained  on  short 
notice  enough  lighter  trucks  from  the 
St.  Louis  District  to  do  the  job.  Simi- 
larly, the  area  engineer's  procurement 
staff  arranged  for  the  transfer  of 
steam  boilers,  an  item  in  extremely 
short  supply,  from  a  Du  Pont  plant 
near  Nashville  to  the  X-10  site.  In  an- 
other instance,  when  the  quarry  at  the 
site  failed  to  supply  all  the  crushed 
stone  needed,  the  area  engineer  se- 
cured authorization  for  Du  Pont  to 
pay  a  higher  rate  for  material  re- 
quired in  road  construction,  thus  ena- 
bling the  company  to  purchase  addi- 
tional amounts  from  sources  available 
outside  the  reservation.^^ 

The  Army's  resolution  of  procure- 
ment problems  enabled  Du  Pont  to 
meet  the  District's  revised  schedule 
for  completion  and  start-up  oper- 
ations of  the  semiworks,  which  Gen- 
eral Groves  optimistically  predicted 
in  his  October  construction  progress 
report  to  Maj.  Gen.  Wilhelm  D.  Styer, 


29  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  78;  Ltrs,  Read  to 
Groves,  15  Apr  43,  and  Groves  to  Read,  22  Apr  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Projs  and 
Prgms),  MDR;  Completion  Rpt,  Du  Pont,  sub:  CEW, 
TNX  Area,  1  Apr  44,  pp.  44-72,  OROO.  See  Ch. 
XVII  for  details  on  measures  taken  to  try  to  solve 
the  CEW  labor  shortage. 

30  Completion  Rpt,  Du  Pont,  sub:  CEW,  TNX 
Area,  1  Apr  44,  pp.  70-71  and  203-04. 


Clinton  Laboratories  Pilot  Pile  at  CEW.  Workers  are  inserting  a  uranium  slug  in 
the  east  loading  face  of  the  graphite  pile. 


208 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


the  Army  Service  Forces  chief  of 
staff,  ^^  could  be  expected  by  mid-De- 
cember. Events  in  the  ensuing 
months  bore  out  Groves's  optimism. 
CHnton  Laboratories  workers  began 
"charging"  the  pile  in  early  Novem- 
ber and,  before  the  end  of  the  year, 
were  processing  the  first  batch  of  irra- 
diated slugs  in  the  chemical  separa- 
tion plant  and  sending  the  resulting 
product  to  the  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory for  use  in  further  experiments. 
And  by  early  1944,  only  weeks  later 
than  Groves  had  estimated,  the  Man- 
hattan commander  had  the  satisfac- 
tion of  knowing  the  semiworks  was 
largely  completed  and  well  on  the 
way  to  full  operation.  ^^ 

Operation 

As  director  of  the  plutonium  pro- 
gram, Compton  began  to  develop 
plans  for  operating  pile  facilities  at 
the  Tennessee  site  as  early  as  Sep- 
tember 1942.  He  asked  physicist 
Martin  D.  Whitaker,  who  had  taken 
part  in  the  early  planning  for  a  labo- 
ratory at  the  site,  to  select  Metallurgi- 
cal Laboratory  staff  members  to  serve 
as  the  nucleus  of  the  X-10  operating 
organization.  While  witnessing  the 
ongoing  planning  and  construction  of 
the  Clinton  Laboratories  in  the  ensu- 
ing months,  Whitaker  and  his  staff 
made  the  necessary  preparations  for 
its  future  operation,  giving  a  high  pri- 


^*The  Army  Service  Forces,  formerly  the  Services 
of  Supply,  became  the  official  designation  with  the 
issue  of  WD  GO  14  on  12  March  1943. 

^^Memo,  Groves  to  Styer,  sub:  Constr  Progress, 
MD,  19  Oct  43,  AG  313.3  (22  Aug  47);  Dist  Engr, 
Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Apr,  May,  Sep,  Oct, 
Dec  43  and  Feb  44,  MDR;  Completion  Rpt,  Du 
Pont,  sub:  CEW,  TNX  Area,  1  Apr  44,  pp.  303  and 
313,  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  2,  pp.  4.7  and 
5.3,  DASA. 


ority  to  manpower  recruitment.^^ 

To  obtain  the  requisite  number  of 
operating  personnel  to  perform  both 
industrial  and  managerial  functions, 
Whitaker's  staff  relied  heavily  on  the 
resources  of  the  Metallurgical  Project 
laboratories  and  Du  Pont.  The  first 
permanent  operating  personnel  ar- 
rived from  the  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory in  April,  at  which  time  Du  Pont 
began  to  transfer  its  technicians.  The 
number  of  employees  increased  rap- 
idly during  the  months  that  followed, 
peaking  in  March  1944  at  fifteen  hun- 
dred, which  included  the  first  ten  of  a 
contingent  of  one  hundred  enlisted 
men  from  the  District's  newly  formed 
Special  Engineer  Detachment  (SED). 
From  March  until  the  end  of  January 
1945,  which  was  the  period  of  full 
semiworks  operation,  total  personnel 
(that  is,  permanent  employees,  train- 
ees for  Hanford,  and  the  SED 
contingent)  averaged  about  thirteen 
hundred.  ^"^ 

As  the  pilot  pile  attained  full-scale 
operation  in  January  1944,  Whitaker 
and  Compton  submitted  to  Major  Pe- 
terson, now  chief  of  the  Clinton  Lab- 
oratories Division,  a  projected  re- 
search and  development  program.  In 
it  they  outlined  a  specific  schedule  for 
plutonium  production  through  March 
'and,  in  some  detail,  emphasized  that 
more  than  75  percent  of  the  laborato- 
ries' 160-man  technical  staff  would 
concentrate  on  product  isolation  stud- 
ies, which  were  essential  for  Hanford 


^'Hewlett  and  Anderson,  A'ra-  World,  pp.  210-12. 

='^MDH,  Bk,  4,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  2,  pp.  8.2-8.4  and  App. 
B7  (Summary,  Total  Employees  of  Clinton  Labs), 
DASA;  Stanley  L.  Falk  and  Author,  Notes  on  Intervs 
of  X-10  Personnel  at  Oak  Ridge,  22-24  Jun  60, 
CMH.  See  Ch.  XVI  for  details  on  the  formation  of 
special  military  units,  such  as  the  SED,  and  on  other 
aspects  of  personnel  recruitment. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


209 


operations,  and  only  12  percent  on 
product  production.  Peterson  ap- 
proved the  program,  without  major 
changes,  as  the  basis  for  semiworks 
operation  that  would  contribute  most 
effectively  to  the  continued  de- 
velopment of  large-scale  plutonium 
production. ^^ 

Soon  after  the  pilot  pile  began  op- 
erating, the  Clinton  Laboratories  op- 
erating staff  introduced  certain  design 
modifications  with  the  goal  of  achiev- 
ing greater  pile  productivity.  Month 
by  month,  as  the  staff  raised  the  effi- 
ciency of  pile  operation,  Colonel 
Nichols  kept  General  Groves  in- 
formed of  the  increased  output.  By 
May,  the  pile  was  operating  at  a 
power  level  of  1,800  kilowatts,  almost 
double  that  conceived  by  its  design- 
ers, and  the  addition  of  two  large  fans 
in  June  and  July  significantly  raised 
the  level  to  4,000  kilowatts. ^^ 

These  increases  would  have  been  to 
no  avail,  however,  had  the  separation 
plant  failed  to  perform  as  anticipated. 
The  operating  staff  remained  very  un- 
certain about  the  success  of  the  chem- 
ical plant,  because  process  design- 
ers— lacking  more  than  minute 
amounts  of  plutonium — had  not  been 
able  to  make  adequate  laboratory 
tests  of  either  the  bismuth  phosphate 
or  alternate  lanthanum  fluoride  sepa- 
ration method,  so  by  early  1944  plu- 
tonium project  officials  were  greatly 
relieved  when  the  separation  plant 
produced  a  small  amount  of  relatively 
pure  plutonium  out  of  the  first  batch 


of  slugs  from  the  pile.  In  February, 
with  the  pilot  pile  producing  irradiat- 
ed uranium  at  a  rate  of  one-third  of  a 
ton  each  day,  the  district  engineer  es- 
timated that  plutonium  production 
for  the  first  month  of  the  separation 
plant's  operation  would  total  over 
500  milligrams.  During  the  next  five 
months  of  operation,  the  operating 
staff  introduced  occasional  modifica- 
tions that  eventually  increased  the  ef- 
ficiency of  the  separation  plant  from 
40  to  over  90  percent.  The  plant  op- 
erated as  a  production  unit  until  Jan- 
uary 1945,  when  enough  plutonium 
had  been  produced  to  meet  project 
needs.  The  Clinton  Laboratories  then 
undertook  experiments  with  other  ir- 
radiated materials  as  fissionable  fuel. 
At  this  stage  the  separation  process 
was  no  longer  required  and  the  plant, 
which  had  processed  a  total  of  299 
batches  of  uranium  slugs,  ceased 
operations. ^"^ 

In  addition  to  testing  and  operating 
the  pilot  pile  and  separation  plant, 
the  Clinton  Laboratories  technical 
staff  supplemented  the  Metallurgical 
and  Argonne  laboratories  staffs'  ef- 
forts to  find  solutions  to  the  many 
day-to-day  problems  that  arose  direct- 
ly out  of  the  design,  construction,  and 
operation  of  the  Hanford  plants.  For 
example,  the  Clinton  staff  had  an 
active  role  in  improving  the  canning 
of  uranium  slugs,  including  develop- 
ment of  techniques  to  detect  failure 
and   tests   to   ascertain   the  effects   of 


'^Memo,  Whitaker  and  Compton  to  Peterson, 
sub:  Clinton  Labs  Prgm  as  of  1  Dec  43,  25  Jan  44, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Projs  and 
Prgms),  MDR. 

36MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  2,  pp.  4.1  and  4.8-4.9, 
DASA;  Disl  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Jan 
and  Aug  44,  MDR. 


^^Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Jan, 
Mar-Jun,  Oct  44  and  Jan  45,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  4, 
Vol.  2,  Pt.  2,  pp.  5.1-5.5,  DASA;  Smyth  Repnrl.  pp. 
76  and  102-04;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Sew  World, 
pp.  211-12;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  190.  The 
Clinton  Laboratories  technical  stafFs  recommenda- 
tions for  the  separation  process  are  in  the  Rpt  CN- 
2021,  1  (Xt  44,  OROO. 


210 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


water  corrosion.  They  also  studied 
high-neutron  absorption  by  certain 
fission  products  produced  in  pile  op- 
eration, a  phenomenon  that  might 
cause  the  pile  to  become  inoperative. 
But  from  a  study  of  two  of  these 
products,  samarium  and  gadolinium, 
they  concluded  that  these  rare  elements 
would  not  lead  to  shutdown  of  the  pile. 
They  failed,  however,  to  observe  that 
another  of  the  neutron-absorbing 
products,  a  radioactive  isotope  of 
the  rare  gaseous  element  xenon,  was  a 
far  more  potent  poisoning  agent.  The 
Clinton  staff  used  the  pile,  too,  for 
testing  materials  to  be  employed  in 
construction  of  the  Hanford  piles,  in- 
cluding aluminum,  graphite,  brass,  neo- 
prene,  bakelite,  concrete,  and  masonite 
(for  shielding).^* 

With  completion  of  the  essential  as- 
pects of  the  Clinton  Laboratories  pro- 
gram, which  ran  for  more  than  two 
years  (1  March  1943-30  June  1945) 
and  cost  approximately  $12.3  million 
($6.8  million  just  for  salaries),  the 
University  of  Chicago  was  anxious  to 
be  relieved  of  its  responsibility  as  op- 
erator of  the  plutonium  semiworks — a 
role  it  had  accepted,  but  with  the 
greatest  reluctance.  Acceding  to  the 
university's  request.  General  Groves 
discussed  with  Compton  the  question 
of  transferring  operations  of  the  lab- 
oratories to  an  industrial  firm.  Their 
choice  was  the  Monsanto  Chemical 
Company  of  St.  Louis.  Groves  dele- 
gated to  Charles  A.  Thomas,  a  com- 
pany official  who  had  been  associated 
with  the  atomic  project  in  various  ca- 
pacities and  was  currently  coordinator 
of  chemical  and  metallurgical  work  at 
Los  Alamos,  the  task  of  carrying  out 
negotiations.      On      2      May      1945, 


Thomas  and  Groves  met  with  other 
company  representatives  to  approve 
an  agreement  under  which  Monsanto 
would  take  over  operations  of  the 
Clinton  Laboratories  from  the  Univer- 
sity of  Chicago  on  1  July.  On  this 
date,  Monsanto  activated  a  special  di- 
vision to  handle  general  administra- 
tion, appointing  Thomas  as  division 
head,  and  Martin  Whitaker  assented 
to  stay  on  as  director  of  the  laborato- 
ries, now  to  oversee  operations  for 
the  production  of  experimental  mate- 
rials, such  as  radioactive  isotopes,  and 
the  conduct  of  radiation  research. ^^ 


The  Hanford  Production  Plant 

While  Du  Pont  was  building  the 
semiworks,  its  TNX  Division  was 
moving  ahead  with  plans  and  prelimi- 
nary preparations  for  construction  of 
the  production  plant.  As  soon  as  the 
Army  acquired  the  site,  both  the  TNX 
chief  and  Hanford  area  engineer  set 
up  field  organizations  that  promptly 
began  overseeing  the  formidable  task 
of  establishing,  in  the  vast  and  remote 
semidesert  region  along  the  Colum- 
bia River,  the  support  facilities  essen- 
tial to  construction  and  operation  of  a 
highly  complex  industrial  enterprise. 
Except  for  railroads  and  power  trans- 
mission lines,  these  facilities  were 
almost  entirely  lacking,  and  Du  Pont 
and  the  Army  had  to  devote  many 
months  and  considerable  manpower 
and  materials  to  providing  them 
before  construction  could  begin  on 
the  plant's  permanent  structures.'**' 


MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  1.  pp.  6.2-6.8,  DASA. 


39lbicl.,  Pt.  2,  pp.  3.5-3.6,  DASA;  Groves  Diary, 
23-25  Apr  and  2  May  45,  LRG;  Compton,  Atomic 
Quest,  p.  197;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New  World,  p. 
627. 

*°  Paragraphs   on   preliminary   measures    that   Du 

Continued 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


211 


Clinton  Laboratories,  consisting  of  the  large  pilot  pile  building,  the  chemical  separation 
plant  (structure  directly  to  the  rear),  and  other  support  facilities 


Consequently,  during  much  of 
1943,  Du  Pont  and  its  subcontractors 
extended  and  improved  existing 
roads  and  railroads,  power  and  tele- 
phone lines  and  sewer  and  water  sys- 
tems. They  built  temporary  facilities 
that,  because  of  the  remoteness  of  the 
site  and  also  the  safety  and  security 


Pont  and  the  Army  had  to  carry  out  in  preparation 
for  construction  of  the  Hanford  plutonium  plant 
based  on  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  Sees.  1-5,  DASA;  Du 
Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vols.  1-2,  HOO;  Matthias  Diary, 
1943,  passim,  OROO;  Memo,  Travis  to  Marsden 
(Ex  Off,  MD),  sub:  Status  of  HEW  as  of  2  Jun  43, 
same  date,  in  Rpt,  sub:  MD  Proj  Data  as  of  1  Jun 
43,  MDR.  See  Chs.  XIII-XIV  and  XVI  for  detailed 
account  of  measures  taken  to  solve  the  problems  in 
materials  and  manpower  procurement  for  Hanford. 


requirements,  had  to  be  unusually  ex- 
tensive, including  the  Hanford  camp  for 
construction  workers,  numerous  build- 
ings to  house  Du  Pont  and  Army  ad- 
ministrative personnel  in  the  field, 
and  a  variety  of  shops.  Thus,  at  White 
Bluffs,  adjacent  to  the  site  selected 
for  the  plutonium  separation  plants, 
they  built  shops  to  fabricate  concrete 
pipes,  masonite  panels,  and  steel 
plate  sections;  at  Hanford,  near  the 
construction  camp,  erected  a  shop 
to  shape,  cut,  bore,  face,  and  test 
graphite;  and  at  strategic  points  in 
the  plant  construction  area,  installed 
five  concrete  plants.  In  addition,  they 
provided     repair     and     maintenance 


212 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


shops,  including  those  for  railroad, 
automotive,  electrical,  and  construc- 
tion equipment. 

Du  Pont  and  the  Army  also  were 
able  to  begin  some  work  that  related 
directly  to  the  construction  of  the 
production  plant.  For  example,  the 
Army's  Seattle  district  engineer  su- 
pervised soil  tests  and  borings  at  the 
sites  selected  for  the  permanent  plant 
facilities.  These  tests  and  soil  samples 
provided  Du  Pont  field  engineers  with 
essential  data  on  the  weight-carrying 
capacities  of  the  ground,  especially 
significant  because  many  of  the  plant 
installations  were  enormously  heavy; 
on  rock  formations  likely  to  cause  dif- 
ficulties in  excavation  work;  and  on 
the  availability  of  aggregate  for 
making  concrete.  Field  survey  teams 
inspected  existing  transmission  lines 
and  road  nets  in  the  plant  areas, 
reaching  the  conclusion  that  these  fa- 
cilities were  adequate  to  meet  the  re- 
quirements for  the  earliest  phases  of 
plant  construction.  The  area  engineer 
and  Du  Pont  were  able  to  agree  on 
optimum  locations  for  most  of  the 
major  plant  installations,  taking  into 
account  also  safety,  security,  transpor- 
tation, availability  of  river  water,  and 
other  related  factors."*^ 

Construction 

Decisions  on  the  character  and  lo- 
cation of  various  plant  installations 
deviated  surprisingly  little  from  the 
general  layout  of  the  production  plant 
developed  back  in  mid-December 
1942  to  serve  as  a  guide  in  site  selec- 
tion. These  early  plans  had  projected 


initial  construction  of  at  least  three 
pile  and  two  separation  units,  with 
provision  made  for  the  addition,  if 
need  be,  of  three  more  piles  and  an- 
other separation  unit.  In  the  main, 
such  changes  as  the  Du  Pont  design 
team  did  make  reflected  the  subse- 
quent decisions  to  employ  water  cool- 
ing rather  than  helium  for  the  graph- 
ite piles  and  a  bismuth  phosphate 
precipitation  method  in  the  separa- 
tion units.  ^^ 

The  specific  layouts  provided  for 
seven  separate  process  areas,  six  of 
them  located  generally  in  the  north- 
ern half  of  the  400,000-acre  Hanford 
reservation  and  the  seventh  in  a 
sector  directly  north  of  the  operating 
village  of  Richland  in  the  southeast- 
ern corner  of  the  reservation  (Map  4). 
The  three  production  piles  were  lo- 
cated at  the  points  of  a  triangle 
formed  by  a  bend  in  the  Columbia 
River  near  White  Bluffs.  Designated 
as  the  100  B  (West),  100  D  (North), 
and  100  F  (East)  Pile  Areas,  each  was 
about  1  mile  square  and,  for  reasons 
of  safety,  about  6  miles  distant  from 
any  neighboring  installation.  About 
10  miles  directly  south  of  the  pile 
sites  were  the  three  separation  pro- 
cess areas:  200  W  (West),  200  E  (East), 
200  N  (North).  In  the  West  Area 
there  were  two  separation  plants,  with 
a  mile  of  open  desert  between  them; 
in  the  East  Area,  only  a  single  separa- 
tion   plant;    and    in    the    North    Area, 


*'MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  pp.  2.1-2.7,  DASA;  Matth- 
ias Diary.  24  Feb  43,  OROO.  See  Chs.  XVIII  and 
XIX  for  more  details  on  development  of  process 
support  facilities  for  the  production  plant. 


"^This  paragraph  and  the  several  that  follow 
based  on  DSM  Chronology,  14  Dec  42,  Sec.  25, 
OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  3,  pp.  2.1-2.2.,  3.1-3.7. 
Apps.  A2  and  A4  (Maps,  Location  of  Major  Instls), 
and  Vol.  6,  pp.  2.1-2.5,  DASA;  Du  Pont  Constr 
Hist,  Vols.  3-4,  HOO;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New 
World,  pp.  214-22  and  map  opposite  p.  225.  See  Ch. 
XV  for  general  layout  of  the  plant  in  relation  to  site 
acquisition. 


MAP  4 


214 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


only  the  lag-storage  facilities  for  hold- 
ing the  pile-processed  uranium  metal 
until  natural  decay  reduced  its  radio- 
activity to  a  point  where  it  could  be 
sent  to  the  separation  plants.  In  the 
seventh  process  site — the  300  Area — 
were  the  metal  testing  and  fabricating 
facilities  for  preparing  uranium  to  be 
charged  into  the  piles. 

In  scheduling  construction  of  the 
various  permanent  installations,  Du 
Pont  gave  priority  to  the  300  Area, 
for  it  included  many  installations  that 
were  essential  both  to  building  and 
operating  the  rest  of  the  plant.  Here, 
for  example,  were  facilities  for  testing 
many  of  the  building  materials  to  be 
incorporated  into  the  piles  and  sepa- 
ration units,  for  preparing  uranium 
metal  to  be  charged  into  the  piles, 
and  for  assembly  and  calibration  of 
instruments  to  control  production  op- 
erations and  protect  workers  against 
radiation.  One  of  the  buildings 
housed  an  operating  test  pile.  An- 
other held  the  machines  that 
"canned"  uranium  in  metal  contain- 
ers to  be  inserted  for  processing  in 
the  piles. 

In  spite  of  the  high  priority,  how- 
ever, Du  Pont  experienced  great  diffi- 
culty in  meeting  building  schedules  in 
the  300  Area.  Stabilizing  designs  was 
the  most  frequent  cause  of  delay,  at- 
tributable primarily  to  the  lack  of  pre- 
vious experience.  Related  to  the 
design  problem  was  the  frankly  exper- 
imental character  of  many  of  the  fa- 
cilities. Other  factors  slowing  con- 
struction were  the  shortage  of  skilled 
labor  and  the  classified  nature  of 
much  of  the  work,  requiring  restric- 
tion of  access  to  the  300  Area.  Yet 
construction  crews  pressed  forward 
during  the  summer  and  fall  of  1943, 
turning   to   the  area  engineer  for  as- 


sistance. Through  Army  intervention 
with  wartime  labor  officials,  the  com- 
pany secured  permission  for  double 
work  shifts  of  nine  hours  on  urgently 
required  buildings.  It  also  obtained 
special  handling  in  procurement  of 
certain  materials.  It  let  subcontracts, 
which  the  area  engineer  approved,  to 
firms  with  specially  qualified  person- 
nel and  equipment  and  speeded  up 
procedures  for  approval  and  issue  of 
designs.  These  various  expedients, 
however,  were  never  quite  sufficient 
to  overcome  the  bottlenecks,  and 
work  in  the  300  Area  remained  con- 
sistently behind  schedule.*^ 

In  the  three  pile  areas  and  the  300 
Area,  Du  Pont  faced  the  problem  of 
erecting  a  great  variety  of  facilities. 
Each  pile  area  comprised  an  industrial 
complex  made  up  not  only  of  a  pro- 
duction unit  but  also  of  support  ele- 
ments. The  latter  included  equipment 
for  pumping  vast  amounts  of  water 
from  the  nearby  river  and  subjecting 
it  to  treatment  to  make  it  suitable  for 
cooling  the  piles.  It  also  included  re- 
frigeration and  helium-purification 
units  and  extensive  storage  facilities. 
Each  area,  too,  had  its  own  facility  to 
provide  steam  and  some  electricity. 
Most  of  the  support  elements  had  to 
be  housed  in  large  industrial-type 
buildings,  some  of  them  with  tall 
stacks  and  water  storage  tanks  on 
high  steel-frame  towers. 

For  the  experienced  Du  Pont  engi- 
neers and  foremen,  much  of  the  work 
was  sufficiently  conventional  to 
present    no    serious    problems    other 


43  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Nov- 
Dec  43  and  Dec  44,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  pp. 
6.1-6.4  and  Apps.  B35-B37  (Tables  and  Charts, 
Constr  Progress  and  Subcontracts  for  Metal  Fab  and 
Test  Area),  DASA. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


215 


The  300  Area  at  HEW,  where  Du  Pont  workers  manufactured  uranium  slugs  and  tested 
materials  for  the  piles.   The  slogan  on  the  water  tower  reads,    "Silence  Means  Security.  " 


than  those  attributable  to  geographic 
isolation  and  wartime  conditions.  The 
exception  was  the  production  piles. 
Housed  in  concrete  structures  rising 
more  than  120  feet  from  the  flat 
desert  floor,  these  great  machines  for 
transmuting  uranium  into  plutonium 
presented  construction  problems 
never  encountered  before,  even  by 
Du  Font's  highly  competent  field 
forces.  As  in  the  300  Area,  but  on  a 
far  vaster  scale,  the  construction 
crews  not  only  had  to  cope  with 
almost  day-to-day  changes  in  design 
and  specifications  but  also  to  adopt 
many  expedients   based   upon  results 


of  tests,  construction  experience,  and 
limitations  of  materials. 

Using  water  as  a  coolant  required 
installation  of  a  complex  system  of 
river  pumps;  purification,  aeration, 
and  distillation  units;  and  retention 
basins  for  holding  radioactive  water 
until  natural  decay  permitted  its 
return  to  the  Columbia.  Because 
keeping  the  piles  at  a  proper  temper- 
ature was  crucial,  plant  designers  in- 
cluded a  refrigeration  unit  in  both  the 
North  (100  D)  and  East  (100  F)  Areas 
as  a  precautionary  measure  to  cool 
river  water  during  the  summer 
months;  however,   to  save  time,  they 


216 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


The  100  B  Pile  Area  at  HEW,  consisting  of  the  production  pile  (building  with  single 
stack),  the  steam-electnc  plant  (building  with  twin  stacks),  the  pump  house  (on  the  Columbia 
River),  and  other  support  facilities 


did  not  provide  this  unit  in  the  West 
(100  B)  Area,  gambling  on  the  chance 
it  might  not  be  necessary.'** 

Completion  of  at  least  one  pile  and 
a  separation  unit  would  start  produc- 
tion of  urgently  needed  plutonium. 
Accordingly,  Du  Pont  and  Army  offi- 
cials agreed  to  give  the  West  Pile 
Area  priority,  concentrating  the  limit- 
ed materials  and  manpower  available 
to  expediting  its  construction.  Late  in 
1943,    they   scheduled   the  West   Pile 


**  Paragraphs  on  construction  of  production  piles 
based  on  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  pp.  3.2-3.5,  6.5-6.22, 
Apps.  B38-B42,  and  Vol.  6,  pp.  2.5-2.18,  DASA; 
Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  3,  pp.  636-811,  HOO; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew  World,  pp.  216-18;  Dist 
Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Jan-Mar  44,  MDR. 


for  operation  by  June  1944,  but  by 
February,  with  the  plant  only  27  per- 
cent complete,  they  rescheduled  the 
start-up  date  to  mid-August.  At  the 
same  time,  they  established  later  com- 
pletion dates  for  the  North  and  the 
East  Pile  Areas. 

The  pace  of  construction,  however, 
was  disappointing.  In  general,  the  fac- 
tors that  slowed  construction  in  the 
300  Area  also  adversely  affected  the 
pile  areas — the  isolated  location  of 
the  Hanford  reservation,  aggravating 
shortages  of  manpower  and  essential 
materials,  the  uniqueness  of  much  of 
the  construction,  and  the  continuing 
need  for  alterations  in  orginial  de- 
signs and  specifications. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


217 


As  in  the  300  Area,  the  Army  gave 
its  approval  to  Du  Font's  various  ex- 
pedients to  speed  up  construction. 
The  company  instituted  shift  work  in 
September  1943,  at  the  same  time  ex- 
tending the  regular  work  week  to  six 
nine-hour  days  (in  some  cases, 
manual  labor  temporarily  put  in  ten 
hours  a  day,  seven  days  of  the  week). 
It  let  more  than  thirty  subcontracts  to 
firms  that  would  carry  out  specialized 
aspects  of  the  job — for  example, 
boiler  and  elevated  tank  erection, 
pipe  work,  concrete  block  and  cement 
brick  construction,  channel  excava- 
tion— and  thus  gained  access  to  des- 
perately needed  manpower  and 
equipment.  And  Du  Pont  repeatedly 
turned  to  District  procurement  per- 
sonnel in  Hanford,  Oak  Ridge,  and 
Washington,  D.C.,  for  assistance  in 
obtaining  a  great  variety  of  scarce  ma- 
terials and  equipment,  including  such 
items  as  solenoid  valves,  synthetic 
cable,  and  stainless  steel  fittings  and 
valves.  The  Army  also  expedited  ship- 
ment of  many  crucial  items  from  sup- 
pliers distant  from  the  isolated  site, 
authorizing  use  of  air  and  rail  ex- 
press, trucks,  and  even  the  Army  Air 
Forces'  Air  Transport  Command 
planes.  The  Army,  too,  allowed  Du 
Font's  TNX  Division  to  ease  the  per- 
sistent design  bottlenecks  by  sending 
out  special  personnel  to  work  in  the 
division  engineer's  office  at  the  West 
File  site,  authorizing  them  to  make 
on-the-spot  minor  alterations  without 
clearing  them  with  the  home  office. 

By  spring  of  1944,  these  expedients 
and  a  gradual  easing  of  manpower 
problems  brought  a  decided  improve- 
ment in  the  progress  of  pile  area  con- 
struction. The  district  engineer  esti- 
mated that  the  West  File  Area  was 
nearly  half  completed,  and  in  Septem- 


ber he  pronounced  it  ready  to  go  into 
operation.  Du  Font  construction 
crews  failed  to  meet  the  scheduled 
October  completion  date  for  the 
North  File,  requiring  an  additional 
two  months.  Then,  with  the  advan- 
tage of  experience  and  a  far  more 
adequate  supply  of  labor,  they  man- 
aged to  finish  the  East  File  Area  on 
10  February,  five  days  earlier  than  the 
projected  completion  date.  Weeks 
earlier,  the  West  File  had  discharged 
its  first  batch  of  "active  metal,"  and 
plant  workers  immediately  sent  it  to 
the  West  Separation  Area  for 
processing.'*^ 

In  building  the  chemical  separation 
facilities,  Du  Font  crews  encountered 
many  of  the  same  problems  they 
faced  in  construction  of  the  produc- 
tion piles;  however,  for  the  most  part, 
the  problems  were  never  quite  as 
severe.  There  was  more  time  to  build 
the  separation  units,  as  no  irradiated 
slugs  would  be  ready  for  processing 
until  weeks  or  months  after  the  first 
pile  began  to  operate,  and  there  were 
fewer  installations  to  build,  with  a 
total  of  thirty-two  process  buildings  in 
the  three  separation  areas  (200  E,  W, 
and  N)  as  compared  with  fifty-three  in 
the  three  pile  areas.  Also,  there  was 
less  need  for  changes  in  specified 
design,  construction  materials,  and 
equipment.*^ 


45  See  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  Apps.  B41  (List.  Sub- 
contractors for  Pile  Area  Constr)  and  B42  (List,  Ma- 
terials Used),  DASA;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on 
DSM  Proj,  Apr,  Jun,  Nov,  Dec  44  and  Feb  45,  MDR. 

*^  Paragraphs  on  construction  of  plutonium  sepa- 
ration units  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  pp.  3.5- 
3.7,  6.22-6.31,  Apps.  B43-B46,  and  Vol.  6,  pp. 
2.18-2.26,  DASA;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  3.  pp. 
812-983,  HOO:  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew  World. 
pp.  219-22:  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpt  on  the  DSM 
Proj,  Jan  44,  MDR. 


218 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Design  problems  were  a  significant 
factor  in  delaying  the  construction  of 
the  separation  plants.  Du  Pont  design 
teams  could  do  little  toward  provid- 
ing detailed  blueprints  and  specifica- 
tions until  project  scientists  and  engi- 
neers reached  a  decision  on  the  exact 
chemical  process  to  be  employed. 
Even  after  the  decision  to  use  the  bis- 
muth phosphate  method,  designers 
had  to  await  additional  data  from  the 
Clinton  separation  plant,  still  under 
construction.  Consequently,  in  1943, 
Du  Pont  had  accomplished  little 
beyond  site  preparation  and  excava- 
tion in  the  separation  plant  areas. 

Detailed  blueprints  and  specifica- 
tions, finally  ready  by  early  1944,  pro- 
jected construction  of  four  separation 
plants — two  in  the  East  Area  and  two 
in  the  West  Area  (in  June,  project  of- 
ficials canceled  one  East  Area  unit 
when  performance  data  at  the  Clinton 
separation  plant  indicated  it  probably 
would  not  be  needed).  Completed 
layouts  provided  for  a  variety  of  pro- 
cess buildings  and  supporting  facilities. 
The  dominant  feature  of  each  plant 
area  was  a  "cell  building,"  an  en- 
largement of  the  six-cell  unit  in  the 
Clinton  plant.  Viewed  from  a  dis- 
trance  across  the  level  desert,  this 
massive  (800  feet  long,  65  feet  wide, 
and  80  feet  high)  concrete  structure 
resembled  an  ancient  mausoleum.  A 
railroad  system  interconnected  the 
various  facilities  and  provided  the 
means  for  transporting  the  thick- 
walled  portable  casks  that  brought  ir- 
radiated slugs  from  the  pile  areas  for 
temporary  storage  in  the  North  Area 
and  final  processing  in  the  East  or 
West  Separation  Areas. 

Insufficient  manpower  proved  a 
major  problem  never  fully  solved,  but 
partially     alleviated     by     Army-sanc- 


tioned reallocation  of  workers  from 
other  parts  of  the  project,  very  fre- 
quent use  of  shift  and  Sunday  work, 
and  extended  hours.  Materials  short- 
ages, most  notably  of  stainless  steel, 
resulted  in  serious  delays.  With  Dis- 
trict assistance,  Du  Pont  saved  three 
to  four  months  in  obtaining  stainless 
steel  for  more  then  700,000  feet  of 
piping;  150,000  bolts;  and  other 
equipment.  The  company  saved  time, 
too,  by  subcontracting  (with  approval 
of  the  area  engineer)  work  on  struc- 
tural steel,  railroads,  pipe  and  tank 
installation,  and  other  aspects  of 
construction. 

The  disappointing  progress  in  con- 
struction reported  by  the  district  en- 
gineer at  the  end  of  December  1943 
clearly  indicated  that  his  earlier  pro- 
jections had  been  far  too  optimistic. 
Thus  in  February  1944,  Du  Pont 
issued  new  start-up  dates  for  various 
elements  of  the  pile  and  separation 
areas,  which  became  the  basis  for 
subsequent  building  schedules.  Al- 
though plagued  by  continuing  delays 
in  delivery  of  stainless  steel,  Du  Pont 
completed  the  two  West  Area  separa- 
tion plants  and  the  North  Area  lag- 
storage  facilities  in  December,  in  time 
to  accept  the  first  irradiated  slugs 
from  the  West  Pile.  Finally,  in  early 
February  1945,  with  the  East  Separa- 
tion Area  ready  to  be  turned  over  to 
operating  crews.  Colonel  Nichols  re- 
ported to  General  Groves  that  the 
Hanford  Engineer  Works  was  sub- 
stantially completed.'*'^ 


*''  Dist    Engr,    Monthly   Rpts   on    DSM    Proj,  Jan, 
Apr,  Jun,  Dec  44  and  Jan  45,  MDR. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


219 


Chemical  Separation  Plant  Under  Construction  at  HEW 


Operation 


Although  construction  crews  were 
months  away  from  completing  all  of 
the  major  elements  of  the  plant,  Du 
Pont  operating  crews  took  the  first 
step  in  starting  plant  operations  when 
they  began  charging  the  West  Pile 
with  aluminum-covered  uranium  slugs 
on  13  September  1944.^^  As  with  the 
electromagnetic  and  diffusion  plants 
at  the  Clinton  Engineer  Works,  pro- 
duction of  plutonium  at  Hanford  was 
a  highly   technical   operation,   carried 


**^  Except  as  indicated,  subsection  on  production 
plant  operation  based  primarily  on  MDH,  Bk.  4, 
Vol.  6,  DASA;  Du  Pont  Opns  Hist,  HOO;  Matthias 
Diary,  Sep  44-Aug  45,  OROO;  Hewlett  and  Ander- 
son, Xeu'  World,  pp.  304-10.  The  Army's  activities 
in  providing  essential  services  are  described  in  sub- 
sequent chapters,  especially  XVI-XX. 


out,  for  the  most  part,  by  an  operat- 
ing force  comprised  of  Du  Pont  engi- 
neers, technicians,  and  trained  plant 
personnel.  The  Army  had  only  a  lim- 
ited role  in  plant  operations,  its  pri- 
mary function  being  to  maintain  those 
conditions  in  the  plant  areas  and 
Richland  village  community  that 
would  enhance  in  every  way  possible 
production  of  plutonium.  To  this  end, 
the  Hanford  Area  Engineers  Office 
continued  to  provide  most  of  the 
services  instituted  in  the  period  of 
site  development  and  plant  construc- 
tion, including  security,  safety,  trans- 
portation and  communications,  per- 
sonnel and  materials  procurement, 
fiscal  and  contract  review,  and  com- 
munity support. 


220 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Completed  Chemical  Separation  Plants  (foreground  and  background),  sennced  by 
the  twin-stacked  steam-electnc facility 


In  mid-August,  Du  Pont  operating 
personnel  began  taking  over  the  West 
Pile  building,  although  construction 
crews  continued  to  work  in  the  area. 
On  the  seventeenth,  Colonel  Matthias 
notified  Colonel  Nichols  at  Oak  Ridge 
that  he  thought  "anytime  after  the 
27th  of  August  would  be  a  good  time 
to  come  out  for  the  initial  starting  op- 
erations." Both  Nichols  and  Groves 
found  reasons  for  visiting:  ostensibly, 
as  project  officials,  to  confer  on  labor 
and  safety  problems;  tacitly,  as  engi- 
neers, undoubtedly  drawn  by  the  nat- 
ural desire  to  see  near  completion  a 
project  to  which  they  both  had  devot- 
ed many  months  of  effort.  Groves  ar- 
rived on  1  September  and  Nichols  on 


the  following  day.  Matthias  took  each 
on  a  personal  inspection  tour.  Both 
gave  special  attention  to  the  crucial 
preparation  of  the  uranium  fuel.  They 
were  pleased  to  learn  that  a  welding 
process  had  largely  eliminated  leaks 
in  the  cans,  or  slugs  that  held  the  ura- 
nium fuel,  a  problem  that  for  many 
months  had  posed  a  threat  to  the 
whole  process.'*^ 

Neither  Groves  nor  Nichols  could 
be  present  on  13  September,  when 
the  plant  workers  started  up  the  West 


''^  Matthias  Diary,  1-2  Sep  44  and  17  Aug  45 
(source  of  quotation),  OROO;  Groves  Diary,  1  Sep 
44,  LRG.  On  uranium  canning  problem  see  MDH, 
Bk.  4,  Vol.  6,  pp.  4.7-4.9  and  5.7-5.8,  DASA;  Hew- 
lett and  Anderson,  Xew  World,  pp.  223-26  and  303- 
04. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


221 


Area  production  pile  for  the  first 
time.  But  Colonel  Matthias  was  on 
hand,  as  were  Compton  and  Fermi 
from  the  Metallurgical  Project  and 
Greenewalt  and  Williams  from  Du 
Pont.  In  a  scene  somewhat  reminis- 
cent of  that  dramatic  occasion  when 
Fermi  had  achieved  the  first  con- 
trolled chain  reaction,  the  redoubta- 
ble Italian  physicist  inserted  the  initial 
uranium  fuel  can  into  the  production 
pile  at  5:43  p.m.  Thus  began  the  slow 
procedure,  interrputed  by  many  tests 
that  would  bring  the  pile,  on  the  fif- 
teenth, to  that  level  of  reactivity 
known  as  dry  critical.  At  this  stage, 
without  cooling  water  present  in  the 
fuel  tubes,  the  pile  contained  enough 
uranium  to  sustain  a  chain  reaction. 
Up  to  this  point  the  pile  was  perform- 
ing precisely  as  anticipated. ^° 

For  the  next  few  days  the  loading 
crews,  under  Fermi's  guidance,  insert- 
ed additional  slugs,  building  up  to  the 
number  he  estimated  would  be  re- 
quired for  the  pile  to  be  reactive  with 
cooling  water  in  the  tubes.  They 
reached  this  number — actually  838 
tubes  loaded — late  in  the  afternoon  of 
18  September  and  began  final  tests  of 
the  cooling  system.  These  tests  and 
other  measurements  continued  for 
several  days,  until  shortly  before  mid- 
night on  the  twenty-sixth.  At  10:48 
P.M.,  with  more  than  900  of  the  2,004 
tubes  loaded,  they  started  withdrawl 
of  the  control  rods  to  begin  for  the 
first  time  plutonium  manufacture  on  a 
production  scale.  But  to  their  sur- 
prise, when  they  tried  to  increase  the 
power    level,    the    level    of   reactivity 


began  to  decline  and,  by  6:30  p.m.  on 
the  twenty-seventh,  the  pile  shut 
down  completely.  Colonel  Matthias 
immediately  informed  General 
Groves,  who  was  visiting  the  Radi- 
ation Laboratory  in  Berkeley.  Arriving 
in  San  Francisco  on  the  thirtieth, 
Matthias  explained  to  Groves  that  the 
pile  operators  at  first  believed  that 
water,  or  some  other  neutron-absorb- 
ing substance,  had  leaked  into  the 
pile.  Yet  when  they  found  no  evi- 
dence of  this,  they  concluded  that  un- 
anticipated buildup  of  a  fission  by- 
product had  inhibited  reactivity 
of  the  pile.  Matthias  suggested  to 
Groves  "that  certain  of  the  high-ranking 
scientists  come  out  to  Hanford  immedi- 
ately to  supervise  corrective  action."  ^^ 
Meanwhile  at  Hanford,  Greenewalt 
had  turned  to  the  Metallurgical 
Project  scientists  for  an  explanation. 
Nothing  in  the  Clinton  operations 
seemed  to  provide  an  answer,  but  the 
Argoime  staff  discovered  that  when 
they  ran  the  heavy  water  pile  at  its 
highest  power  level  for  a  period  of 
twelve  hours  (which  they  had  not  pre- 
viously done),  its  reactivity  first  rose 
and  then  declined  following  a  pattern 
similar  to  that  observed  at  Hanford. 
The  data  from  the  Argonne  pile  also 
confirmed  that  the  "poisoning"  of  the 
pile  was  caused  by  one  of  the  fission 
by-products,  a  radioactive  isotope  of 
the  rare  gaseous  element  xenon.  At  a 
meeting  with  Compton  and  Metallur- 
gical Project  scientists  in  Chicago  on 


50  Matthias  Diary,  13-14  Sep  44,  OROO;  Rpt, 
Matthias  to  Dist  Engr,  sub:  Monthly  Opns,  30  Sep 
44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  SIQIi  (Misc),  MDR; 
Du  Pont  Opns  Hist,  Intro,  p.  22,  and  Bk.  4,  HOO. 


5'  Quotation  from  Matthias  Diary,  30  Sep  44 
OROO.  See  also  ibid.,  16-17,  19-21,  25-29  Sep  44, 
OROO;  Groves  Diary,  29-30  Sep  44,  LRG;  Dist 
Engr,  Monthly  Rpt  on  DSM  Proj,  Sep  44,  MDR; 
Memo,  Matthias  to  Groves,  sub:  Status  of  100  B 
Area  Opns,  18  Sep  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
319.1  (Misc),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  6,  pp.  4.9- 
4.10  and  App.  Dl  (Xenon  Poisoning),  DASA. 


222 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


3  October,  Groves  was  highly  critical 
of  the  scientists  for  not  having  discov- 
ered a  phenomenon  that  might  well 
prevent  production  of  sufficient  plu- 
tonium  in  time  to  be  used  in  the  war. 
Sensing  the  gravity  of  Groves's 
words,  Compton  left  immediately  for 
Hanford  so  that  he  could  take  direct 
action. ^^ 

By  the  time  Compton  reached  Han- 
ford on  the  fourth,  operating  person- 
nel working  under  Greenewalt,  Hil- 
berry  and  others  had  found  that  by 
adding  more  uranium  slugs  to  the 
pile  charge  they  could  increase  the 
power  level  without  inducing  a  de- 
cline in  reactivity.  This  demonstrated 
that  pile  operation  at  a  higher  power 
level  overcame  the  dampening  effects 
of  xenon  poisoning,  but  it  still  did 
not  tell  the  pile  operators  how  much 
more  uranium  they  would  have  to 
load  into  the  pile  to  raise  the  power 
level  to  that  point  where  it  would  effi- 
ciently produce  plutonium.  Nor  did  it 
indicate  whether  the  existing  controls 
and  instrumentation  of  the  pile  were 
adequate  for  such  operation. 

For  answers  to  these  critical  ques- 
tions they  had  to  carry  out  a  time- 
consuming  series  of  tests.  They 
gradually  increased  the  uranium  load, 
carefully  checking  and  adjusting  the 
complicated  control  devices  and  in- 
struments of  the  pile.  By  late  Novem- 


^^  Memo,  Compton  to  Groves,  sub:  Oscillation 
EfTect  of  W  Pile,  30  Oct  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  400.12  (Experiments),  MDR;  Memos,  Walter 
Zinn  (Argonne  Lab  scientist)  to  Compton,  3  Oct  44, 
Compton  to  Groves,  sub:  Draft  Notes  to  Mtg  at  Chi- 
cago, 3  Oct  44,  and  Matthias  to  Groves,  sub:  Start- 
up Opns  of  100  B  Area,  3  Oct  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  319.1  (Misc),  MDR;  Oppenheimer  Heanng,  p. 
174;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  1,  pp.  3.13-3.14  and 
5.2-5.3,  and  Pt.  2,  pp.  6.4-6.5,  DASA;  Hewlett  and 
Anderson,  Xew  World,  pp.  306-07;  Dale  F.  Babcock, 
"The  Discovery  of  Xenon-135  as  a  Reactor  Poison," 
Sudear  Sews  7  (Sep  64):  38-42. 


ber,  they  showed  conclusively  that  by 
fully  loading  the  pile,  including  slugs 
in  the  extra  tubes  that  Du  Font's  con- 
servative designers  had  installed 
against  the  advice  of  the  scientists, 
the  pile  would  operate  at  its  designed 
power  level.  As  a  final  precaution,  the 
operating  personnel  tried  operating 
the  100  D  pile  (completed  in  Novem- 
ber) with  uranium  in  all  tubes,  but 
without  cooling  water.  The  success  of 
this  dry  critical  test  clearly  demon- 
strated that  the  100  B  pile,  with  the 
added  protection  of  cooling  water, 
was  likely  to  function  as  designed.  On 
28  December,  the  100  B  pile,  with  all 
its  2,004  tubes  loaded  went  into  oper- 
ation, marking  at  last  the  start  of  full- 
scale  production  of  plutonium. ^^ 

Xenon  poisoning  and  uranium  can- 
ning problems  were  not  the  only 
technical  difficulties  faced  by  Du 
Font's  operating  personnel  as  they 
took  over  control  of  the  other  units  of 
the  plutonium  production  plant.  But 
none  of  the  other  start-up  problems 
posed  so  serious  a  threat  to  the  effec- 
tive operation  of  the  plant,  and  Du 
Pont  engineers  found  solutions  ade- 
quate to  eliminate  or  counteract  their 
adverse  effects  upon  the  plutonium 
production  process.^* 


^^  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Nov- 
Dec  44,  MDR;  Memo,  Compton  to  Mrs.  O'Leary, 
Attn:  Groves,  7  Oct  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
400.17  (Mfg-Prod-Fab),  MDR;  Groves,  Notes  on 
Conf  with  Greenewalt  in  New  York,  18  Oct  44, 
Admm  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  337  (Confs),  MDR; 
Memos,  Matthias  to  Groves,  sub:  Start-up  Opns  of 
100  B  Area,  17  and  20  Oct  44,  Admm  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  319.1  (Misc),  MDR;  Matthias  Diary,  Oct- 
Dec  44,  passim,  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  6,  pp. 
4.10-4.12  and  App.  Dl,  DASA;  Compton,  Atomic 
Quest,  pp.  191-94;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  \eui 
IVorld.  pp.  307-08. 

^^  For  a  more  detailed  account  of  some  of  the 
other  operating  problems  that  developed  in  Han- 
ford pile  operations  see  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  6,  pp. 
4.12-4.19,  DASA. 


THE  PILE  PROCESS 


223 


With  attainment  in  March  1945  of 
full-scale  production  at  Hanford,  the 
plutonium  project  leaders  turned  with 
renewed  energy  to  establishing  firm 
production  schedules  and  to  reaching 
agreement  on  final  specifications  for 
the  product.  General  Groves,  aware 
that  the  war  in  Europe  was  rapidly  ap- 
proaching an  end  and  knowing  that 
the  scientists  at  Los  Alamos  would 
soon  need  substantial  quantities  of 
plutonium,  arranged  with  Du  Pont  to 
run  the  two  refrigerated  production 
piles  above  their  rated  operational 
level  during  the  spring  and  summer 
of  1945.  Carried  out  at  some  risk,  this 
procedure  substantially  increased 
product  output  and  thus  provided  the 
plutonium  for  an  atomic  device  in 
July  and  for  one  of  two  bombs  in 
August.  Through  these  events,  vindi- 


cation finally  came  to  the  atomic 
project  leaders  on  their  late- 1942  de- 
cision to  go  ahead  with  the  develop- 
ment of  the  pile  process — a  decision 
that,  in  the  intervening  years,  when 
the  plutonium  program  experienced 
repeated  setbacks,  may  well  have  ap- 
peared to  many  to  have  been  a  seri- 
ous error  in  judgment. ^^ 


^^The  correspondence  concerning  speeding  up 
plutonium  production  at  Hanford  is  in  two  separate 
MDR  files.  Ir  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  400.17 
(Mfg-Prod-Fab):  Ltrs,  Groves  to  Williams,  13  Jan  45, 
and  Williams  to  Groves,  16  Jan  45.  In  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Fldr  5:  Ltrs,  Williams  to 
Groves,  14  Feb  45,  and  Groves  to  Williams,  15  Feb 
45,  both  Tab  I;  Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves,  sub:  Site 
W  Prod  Schedule,  9  Mar  45,  Tab  J;  Ltr,  Groves  to 
Oppenheimer,  22  Mar  45,  Tab  L;  Ltr,  Groves  to 
Williams,  22  Mar  45,  Tab  J;  Ltr,  Williams  to  Groves, 
9  Apr  45,  1  ab  M;  Memo,  Groves  to  Nichols,  20  Jul 
45,  Tab  S.  See  Ch.  XXIV  on  the  relationship  be- 
tween the  development  of  the  implosion  bomb  at 
Los  Alamos  and  the  rate  of  plutonium  production  at 
Hanford. 


PART  THREE 
SUPPORT  ACTIVITIES 


CHAPTER  X 


Anglo-American  Collaboration 


On  15  December  1942,  the  Military 
Policy  Committee  submitted  its  first 
report  to  the  Top  Policy  Group  on 
the  "present  status  and  future  pro- 
gram" of  the  Manhattan  Project.  The 
report  dealt  at  length  with  such  mat- 
ters as  scientific  progress,  the  organi- 
zation of  the  project,  the  need  for 
funds,  the  availability  of  raw  materi- 
als, and  the  status  of  the  Anglo-Amer- 
ican atomic  partnership.  The  latter, 
reported  the  committee  in  something 
of  an  understatement,  needed  "clarifi- 
cation." ^  In  effect,  at  the  urging  of 
OSRD  Director  Vannevar  Bush,  S-1 
Chairman  James  B.  Conant,  and 
General  Groves,  the  Military  Policy 
Committee  was  proposing  a  reconsid- 
eration of  American  policy  on  the  ex- 
change of  information  and  a  presi- 
dential decision  not  only  on  the  im- 
mediate problem  but  also  on  the  far- 
reaching  one  of  postwar  relations  in 
the  field  of  atomic  energy.^ 

This  call  to  reevaluate  Anglo-Amer- 
ican collaboration  on  atomic  energy 
research  and  development  was  a 
result  of  the  extensive  and  rapid  ex- 


»  MPC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp. 
MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  B,  MDR. 

2  Memo,  Stimson,  29  Oct  42,  HB  Files,  Fldr  47. 
MDR;  MPC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42,  MDR.  This  theme  is  de- 
veloped at  length  in  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New 
World,  pp.  256-67. 


pansion  of  the  Manhattan  Project 
during  the  past  six  months.  Until  then 
the  American  effort  had  faced  serious 
problems  and  its  leaders  had  been 
willing,  even  eager,  to  compare  notes 
with  their  British  counterparts.  But, 
by  the  fall,  with  both  the  scientific 
and  engineering  programs  moving 
ahead,  the  project's  military  and  civil- 
ian administrators  had  made  an  im- 
pressive start  at  cutting  away  red 
tape,  thus  assuring  the  atomic  pro- 
gram a  strong  and  solidly  backed  po- 
sition in  the  American  war  effort.  As 
the  need  for  British  assistance  seemed 
less  urgent,  a  new  attitude  about  in- 
terchange took,  hold,  and  in  Decem- 
ber project  leaders  voiced  their  in- 
creasing reluctance,  reinforced  by 
growing  security  considerations,  to 
give  the  British  the  fruits  of  American 
labors. 

Breakdown  of  Interchange 

The  atomic  partnership  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
which  the  allies  had  begun  on  a 
small  scale  in  the  fall  of  1940  and 
developed  into  a  full  exchange  pro- 
gram by  late  1941,  first  underwent 
a  slight  modification  in  the  early 
summer   of    1942.    Meeting   at    Hyde 


228 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Park  on  20  June,  President  Franklin  D. 
Roosevelt  and  Prime  Minister  Winston 
S.  Churchill  agreed  that  the  United 
States  should  take  the  major  role  in 
atomic  weapons  production  and  that 
Great  Britain  should  devote  its  al- 
ready severely  limited  resources  to 
the  more  immediate  problems  of 
fighting  the  war.  In  spite  of  this 
somewhat  qualified  yet  carefully  con- 
sidered arrangement,  which  would 
permit  the  British  to  avoid  the  risk 
that  large-scale  atomic  installations 
might  be  damaged  or  destroyed  by 
German  air  raids,  Churchill  left  the 
conference  with  the  "understanding 
.  .  .  that  everything  was  [still]  on  the 
basis  of  fully  sharing  the  results  as 
equal  partners,"  and  shortly  thereaf- 
ter Roosevelt  reported  to  Bush  that 
he  and  Churchill  were  "in  complete 
accord."  ^ 

It  appeared  that  the  two  wartime 
leaders  had  reaffirmed  continuation 
of  the  free  and  open  exchange  of 
atomic  information;  however,  devel- 
opments in  the  months  following  the 
Hyde  Park  summit  clearly  illustrate 
the  slow  waning  of  Anglo-American 
collaboration.  On  5  August,  six  weeks 
after  the  Roosevelt-Churchill  talks, 
the  British  Cabinet  officer  in  charge 
of  atomic  energy,  Sir  John  Anderson, 
Lord  President  of  the  Council — who 
was  to  the  Tube  Alloys  program  what 
Secretary  Stimson  was  to  the  DSM 
program — wrote  to  Bush.  He  pro- 
posed integrating  the  British  gaseous 
diffusion    project    into    the    American 


program  and,  as  a  consequence,  pro- 
viding British  representation  for  the 
OSRD  S-1  Executive  Committee.* 
Thus,  with  the  simultaneous  transfer 
of  the  British  heavy  water  research 
group  to  Canada,  which  Sir  John  con- 
currently was  suggesting  to  Canadian 
authorities,  most  Tube  Alloys  activi- 
ties would  be  removed  beyond  the 
danger  of  German  air  attacks.  Sir 
John  also  made  reference  to  the 
broader  question  of  controlling 
atomic  energy,  both  during  the  war 
and  afterwards.  For  this,  he  recom- 
mended immediate  implementation  of 
a  joint  policy  on  patents  and  raw  ma- 
terials and  the  early  establishment  of 
an  Anglo-American  commission  on 
atomic  energy. 

Anderson's  proposals  reached  Bush 
at  a  time  when  the  Manhattan  Project 
still  was  beset  with  major  difficulties; 
scientific  problems  loomed  large,  ade- 
quate priorities  were  lacking,  no  deci- 
sion had  been  reached  on  site  ques- 
tions, and  even  the  basic  matter  of 
organization  remained  unresolved. 
Bush,  accordingly,  was  in  no  position 
to  commit  himself  to  anything  far- 
reaching,  no  matter  how  much  he  still 
desired  British  assistance.  Finally  on 
1  September,  after  checking  with 
Stimson's  assistant,  Harvey  Bundy, 
Bush  replied  to  Anderson,  expressing 
general  approval  of  close  Anglo- 
American  collaboration  but  putting 
off  for  the  moment  any  specific  im- 
plementation  of  this   principle.    Only 


^  Quotations  from  Msg,  Prime  Minister  to  Harry 
L.  Hopkins,  27  Feb  43,  HLH,  and  Memo,  Roosevelt 
to  Bush,  11  Jul  42,  FDR.  See  also  Ltr,  Bush  to 
Styer,  19  Jun  42,  HB  Files,  Fldr  6,  MDR;  Ltr,  Bush 
to  President,  19  Jun  42,  FDR;  Winston  S.  Churchill, 
The  Second  World  War:  The  Hinge  of  Fate  (Boston: 
Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1950),  pp.  374-81. 


■*  The  terms  Tube  Alloys  and  DSM  (Development  of 
Substitute  Materials)  were  the  official  code  names 
for  the  British  and  American  atomic  energy  projects 
in  WW  II.  See  Ltrs,  Anderson  to  Bush,  5  Aug  42, 
HB  Files.  Fldr  47,  MDR;  Cowing,  Britain  and  Atomic 
Energy,  pp.  188-89;  Ceorge  C.  Laurence,  "Canada's 
Participation  in  Atomic  Energy  Development,"  Bulle- 
tin of  the  Atomic  Scientists  3  (Nov  47):  326. 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


229 


the  transfer  of  the  heavy  water 
group  to  Canada — an  action  subse- 
quently taken — elicited  his  immediate 
concurrence.  For  the  rest,  he  said,  he 
would  reply  "somewhat  later  when 
other  broad  phases  have  been 
resolved."  ^ 

Within  the  next  few  weeks,  Manhat- 
tan leaders  were  successful  in  over- 
coming many  of  the  uncertainties.  Yet 
a  strong  desire  for  the  kind  of  close 
partnership  Anderson  had  suggested 
still  was  lacking;  indeed,  when  Gener- 
al Groves  raised  the  question  of 
Anglo-American  relations  at  the  S-1 
Committee  meeting  in  Stimson's 
office  on  23  September,  no  one 
pressed  for  immediate  action.  Be- 
cause some  members  felt  working 
closely  with  the  British  might  even 
slow  down  American  research,  the 
committee  agreed  to  delay  any  deci- 
sion until  Stimson  had  talked  with  the 
President.  When  Bush  wrote  to  An- 
derson a  week  later,  he  outlined  the 
new  American  organization  and  urged 
continued  close  contact,  but  he  pur- 
posely avoided  a  precise  commitment, 
pending  word  from  the  President.^ 

It  was  the  end  of  October  before 
Stimson  was  able  to  discuss  the  issue 
with  Roosevelt,  for  this  was  a  period 
when  relations  between  the  Secretary 
of  War  and  the  President  were  some- 
what strained  by  disagreement  over 
the  forthcoming  North  African  oper- 
ations and  Stimson  saw  Roosevelt  in- 
frequently.  Finally,  following  a  Cabi- 


5  Ltr,  Bush  to  Anderson,  1  Sep  42,  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  16,  Tab  A,  MDR.  See 
also  Memo,  Bush  to  Bundy,  1  Sep  42,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  47,  MDR. 

6  Rpt,  Bundy,  sub:  S-1  Mtg  at  Secy  War's  OfTice, 
23  Sep  42,  HB  Files,  Fldr  6,  MDR;  Groves,  Xow  It 
Can  Be  Told,  p.  128;  Ltr,  Bush  to  Anderson,  1  Oct 
42,  HB  Files,  Fldr  47,  MDR;  Ltr,  Bush  to  Bundy, 
1  Oct  42,  HB  Files,  Fldr  7,  MDR. 


net  meeting  on  the  twenty-ninth,  he 
seized  the  opportunity  to  talk  with 
Roosevelt  alone.  After  pointing  out 
that  the  United  States  was  doing  most 
of  the  work  on  atomic  energy,  the 
Secretary  added  that  Manhattan  lead- 
ers wanted  to  learn  what  commit- 
ments the  President  had  made  to  the 
British.  When  the  President  assured 
him  his  conversation  with  Churchill 
had  been  "of  a  very  general  nature," 
Stimson  suggested  going  "along  for 
the  present  without  sharing  anything 
more  than  we  could  help."  The  Presi- 
dent agreed  but  indicated  that  he, 
Churchill,  and  Stimson  had  better  talk 
over  the  whole  problem  before  too 
long.  And  there  the  matter  rested."^ 

Meanwhile,  as  the  American  Army 
took  over  management  of  more  as- 
pects of  the  atomic  project,  the  Brit- 
ish were  becoming  disturbed  at  the 
trend  toward  an  independent  course 
that  minimized  Anglo-American  coop- 
eration. Hence,  no  one  was  surprised 
when  Anderson  proposed  that 
Wallace  A.  Akers,  the  engineer  who 
headed  the  British  Directorate  of 
Tube  Alloys  (which  was  comparable 
to  Conant's  position  as  chairman  of 
the  S-1  Executive  Committee)  should 
visit  Washington,  D.C.  During  the 
weeks  that  followed  Akers'  arrival  in 
early  November,  he  assiduously  con- 
sulted with  Bush,  Conant,  and 
Groves,  seeking  ways  to  link  more 
closely  the  American-British  atomic 
energy  programs  but  achieving  only 
an  agreement  on  steps  to  set  up  and 
support  the  British  heavy  water  re- 
search group  in  Canada. 


■'  Memo,  Stimson,  29  Oct  42,  MDR.  See  Stimson 
Diary,  HLS,  for  the  state  of  Stimson's  relations  with 
the  President  during  this  period. 


230 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


What  Akers  wanted,  based  on  his 
understanding  of  agreements  reached 
"at  the  highest  levels,"  was  a  "really 
cooperative  effort  between  the  two 
countries."  ®  This  would  include  joint 
research,  development,  and  produc- 
tion efforts,  and  complete  interchange 
of  information  on  all  aspects.  British 
scientists  and  engineers  would  work 
in  American  plants  and  their  Ameri- 
can counterparts  would  do  the  same 
in  England.  Each  country  would  make 
available  to  the  other  all  atomic  data 
in  its  possession,  including  theoretical 
and  developmental  information,  plant 
designs,  and  operational  details.  This 
approach,  insisted  Akers,  was  the 
most  efficient  way  of  assuring  success 
for  the  program  and,  moreover, 
would  be  in  harmony  with  the  under- 
standing between  the  President  and 
the  Prime  Minister. 

The  position  taken  by  Bush, 
Conant,  and  Groves — as  worked  out 
among  themselves  and  at  meetings  of 
the  Military  Policy  and  S-1  Executive 
Committees — fell  considerably  short 
of  Akers'  view.  They  were  still  uncer- 
tain about  what  Roosevelt  had  told 
Churchill,  and  especially  about  what 
he  now  desired,  and  because  they 
were  not  convinced  that  complete  co- 
operation on  all  phases  of  the  pro- 
gram would  necessarily  build  an 
atomic   bomb   any   sooner,    they   pre- 


*  Quotation   from   I.tr,   Akers   to  Conant,    15   Dec 

42,  HB  Files,  Fldr  47.  MDR.  See  also  Draft  Memo, 
sub:  Interchange  With  British  and  Canadians  on 
S-1,  15  Dec  42,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Conant  to  C.J.  Macken- 
zie  (Canada's   Natl   Research  C^ouncil   head),   2  Jan 

43.  HB  Files,  Fldr  47,  MDR;  MPC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42, 
MDR;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xeiv  World,  pp.  264- 
67;  Groves.  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  128-29;  MPC 
Min,  12  Nov  and  10  Dec  42.  OCG  Files.  Gen  Cor- 
resp.  MP  Files,  Fldr  23.  Tab  A.  MDR;  DSM  Chro- 
nology, 14  Nov  42,  Sec.  2(0,  OROO;  Groves  Diary, 
13  Nov  and  8  Dec  42,  LRG;  Cowing.  Bnlaw  and 
Atomtc  Energy,  pp.  148-54. 


ferred  that  cooperation  and  inter- 
change of  information  be  restricted  to 
matters  that  would  be  of  use  to  each 
partner  in  the  successful  prosecution 
of  the  war.  The  three  Americans 
also  shared  the  suspicion  that  Akers' 
arguments  most  probably  were  "influ- 
enced by  an  undue  regard  for  possi- 
ble postwar  commercial  advan- 
tages." ^  Another  serious  concern  was 
the  growing  problem  of  security, 
which  would  increase  if  British  scien- 
tists were  permitted  access  to  all 
project  developments.  Finally,  too, 
joint  Anglo-American  production  cer- 
tainly would  complicate  production 
efforts  in  the  United  States  and  might 
actually  impede,  rather  than  speed 
up,  the  manufacture  of  atomic  bombs. 

From  the  American  view,  the  extent 
of  atomic  cooperation  that  would  be 
desirable  varied  according  to  the  spe- 
cific phase  of  the  program  concerned. 
Bush,  Conant,  and  Groves  felt  there 
should  be  no  interchange  whatsoever 
on  the  electromagnetic  separation 
process,  because  the  British  were  not 
working  on  this  method  and  presum- 
ably had  no  "need  to  know."  Akers 
replied  with  the  argument  that  com- 
plete cooperation  had  been  agreed 
upon,  regardless  of  which  country  de- 
veloped the  idea  or  of  where  the  pro- 
duction plants  were  to  be  built. 
Progress  on  one  method  had  a  direct 
bearing  on  work  being  done  on  other 
methods,  he  insisted,  and  there  ought 
to  be  full  interchange  on  the  electro- 
magnetic process. 

On  the  gaseous  diffusion  process, 
where  the  British  had  done  consider- 
able work,  the  American  project  lead- 
ers were  willing  to  permit  unrestrict- 


' Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  129. 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


231 


ed  interchange  on  experimental  and 
design  problems,  but  felt  that  ex- 
change of  information  beyond  this 
was  unnecessary.  Akers  argued  that 
limiting  exchange  on  gaseous  diffu- 
sion to  these  aspects  was  not  accepta- 
ble. The  British  should  be  given  full 
information  on  construction  and  op- 
eration of  the  production  plant,  and 
British  engineers  and  scientists  actual- 
ly should  be  employed  in  it.  Not  only 
did  this  fall  within  his  understanding 
of  the  Churchill-Roosevelt  agreement, 
but  also,  as  he  emphasized,  the  Brit- 
ish were  already  working  on  a  diffu- 
sion plant. 

As  for  production  data  on  LI-235, 
Bush,  Conant,  and  Groves  held  that 
none  should  be  given  to  the  British 
because  of  the  fact  that  their  interest 
in  uranium  production  was  only  for 
experimental  purposes.  The  same  ap- 
plied to  plutonium.  The  three  Ameri- 
cans were  willing  to  exchange  infor- 
mation about  scientific  findings,  but 
not  about  the  design,  construction,  or 
operation  of  production  plants.  Heavy 
water,  which  might  be  used  to  manu- 
facture plutonium,  fell  into  the  same 
category.  Akers  continued  to  argue, 
although  in  vain,  for  full  British  par- 
ticipation in  American  efforts. 

Regarding  the  work  at  Los  Alamos, 
Bush,  Conant,  and  Groves  proposed 
that  there  should  be  no  interchange 
with  the  British  on  information  per- 
taining to  weapon  research  and  devel- 
opment. Once  again  Akers  urged  full 
reciprocity  of  information,  and  again 
his  arguments  were  without  effect. 

As  a  direct  result  of  these  extended 
discussions,  the  Military  Policy  Com- 
mittee prepared  a  comprehensive 
progress  report  on  its  views  on  future 
U.S. -British  relations  in  the  field  of 
atomic    energy.     The    report,     dated 


15  December,  identified  "only  one 
reason  for  free  interchange  of  secret 
military  information  between  allied 
nations — namely,  to  further  the  pros- 
ecution of  the  war  in  which  both  are 
engaged."  ^°  The  consensus  of  the 
committee  was  that,  because  the  Brit- 
ish had  now  given  up  any  intention  of 
manufacturing  atomic  bombs  or  sig- 
nificant amounts  of  fissionable  materi- 
als during  the  war,  making  produc- 
tion data  available  to  them  would  not 
increase  their  military  capabilities.  Al- 
though the  work  of  British  scientists 
on  diffusion  and  heavy  water  was  well 
along,  the  results  of  their  research 
was  not  essential  to  the  Manhattan 
Project;  American  efforts  in  these 
areas  were  considerably  advanced.  A 
complete  halt  of  interchange  on  diffu- 
sion and  heavy  water  would  be  an  in- 
convenience, but  it  would  not  serious- 
ly hinder  progress  of  the  American 
program. 

Nor  did  the  committee  see  any 
moral  objections  to  halting  inter- 
change. Both  countries  had  worked 
on  the  basic  concept,  as,  indeed,  had 
the  Germans.  British  studies  on  diffu- 
sion probably  had  benefited  from 
American  research,  and  vice  versa. 
Heavy  water  had  been  used  in  a  ura- 
nium pile  first  in  France  and  then  in 
Britain  at  the  instigation  of  refugee 
French  scientists.  But  only  after  the 
discovery  in  the  United  States  that 
plutonium  was  fissionable  by  fast  neu- 
trons had  the  British  given  a  high  pri- 
ority to  the  heavy  water  program. 
And,  as  Conant  emphasized,  the  Brit- 
ish had  not  followed  a  policy  of  unre- 


lOMPC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42,  MDR.  Hewlett  and  An- 
derson (Xeui  World,  p.  266)  state  that  the  section  on 
interchange  in  this  report  was  drafted  by  Conant 
with  the  concurrence  of  Groves  and  Bush. 


232 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


stricted  interchange  in  the  past.  They 
had  been  unwiUing  to  share  with 
American  scientists  information  about 
several  of  their  own  developments — a 
secret  bomb  disposal  method  for 
one — because  they  would  not  help  the 
American  military  effort.  ^^ 

The  committee  concluded  that  halt- 
ing interchange  would  not  unduly 
hinder  the  Manhattan  Project,  could 
hardly  be  regarded  as  unfair,  and  had 
obvious  security  advantages.  Howev- 
er, complete  cessation  certainly  would 
cause  friction  with  the  British  and 
might  adversely  affect  the  flow  of  ura- 
nium from  Canada  and  other  areas. 
Thus,  in  its  report  the  committee  rec- 
ommended that  a  policy  of  limited  in- 
terchange, confined  to  information 
that  could  be  used  to  win  the  war, 
should  be  adopted  as  national  policy. 

With  the  approval  of  three  mem- 
bers of  the  Top  Policy  Group,  the 
Military  Policy  Committee  report,  a 
copy  of  a  letter  from  Akers  to  Conant 
restating  the  British  position,  and  a 
separate  summary  by  Bush  of  both 
British  and  American  views  reached 
the  White  House  on  23  December. 
Two  days  after  Christmas,  Stimson 
went  to  see  Roosevelt.  The  British,  he 
had  just  learned,  had  signed  a  treaty 
with  the  Soviet  Union  in  September 
to  exchange  information  on  new 
weapons,  including  any  that  might  be 
developed  in  the  future.  The  treaty, 
said  Stimson,  came  as  a  complete  sur- 
prise and  had  a  direct  bearing  on  any 
Anglo-American  exchange  of  informa- 


tion. Obviously,  it  posed  the  possibil- 
ity that  weapons  development  data 
passed  on  to  the  British  eventually 
would  reach  the  Russians.  This  news 
apparently  reinforced  the  arguments 
set  forth  by  the  Military  Policy  Com- 
mittee, and  the  next  day,  28  Decem- 
ber, the  President  told  Bush  that  he 
approved  the  committee's  recommen- 
dations. ^^  In  so  doing,  he  adopted 
for  the  United  States  a  new  policy  of 
limited  interchange  with  its  atomic 
partner  across  the  Atlantic — one  that 
restricted  collaboration  to  informa- 
tion of  use  during  the  war. 

The  Quebec  Agreement 

With  the  United  States'  position  on 
limited  atomic  partnership  soHdly  af- 
firmed, Conant  undertook  the  task  of 
informing  both  the  British  and  the 
Canadians.  The  day  after  New  Year's 
(2  January  1943),  he  wrote  to  Dean  C. 
J.  Mackenzie,  head  of  Canada's  Na- 
tional Research  Council,  and  ex- 
plained how  the  new  American  policy 
would  affect  the  work  on  heavy  water 
under  way  in  Montreal.  ^^  Then  on  the 
seventh,  he  prepared  a  lengthy 
memorandum  in  which  he  outlined 
the  specific  regulations  for  Anglo- 
American  cooperation.  Because  Co- 
nant never  officially  presented  this 
memorandum  to  the  British,  it  was  in 
effect  only  a  working  paper.  Its  con- 
tents,   however,    generated    consider- 


"Note  by  Conant,  in  Ms,  "Diplomatic  History  of 
the  Manhattan  Project,"  p.  7n,  HB  Files,  Fldr  111, 
MDR.  That  the  British  were  unwilling  to  provide  in- 
formation on  certain  of  their  own  developments  was 
not  mentioned  in  the  final  version  of  the  report  sub- 
mitted to  the  President.  See  also  Memo,  Bush  to 
Hopkins,  26  Feb  43,  HLH. 


'2  Ltrs,  Bush  to  President,  16  Dec  42,  with  added 
note  of  23  Dec  42,  and  President  to  Bush,  28  Dec 
2,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25, 
MDR;  Ltr,  Akers  to  Conant,  and  Draft  Memo,  sub: 
Interchange  With  British  and  Canadians  on  S-1, 
both  15  Dec  42,  HB  Files,  Fldr  47,  MDR;  Stimson 
Diary,  26-27  Dec  42,  HLS;  Cowing,  Britain  and 
Atomic  Energy,  pp.  154-55. 

'3  Ltr,  Conant  to  Mackenzie,  2  Jan  43,  MDR. 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


233 


able  controversy,  and  Churchill  later 
complained  to  presidential  aide  Harry 
Hopkins  that  Conant's  memorandum 
"drastically  [limits]  interchange  of 
technical  information  and  entirely  de- 
stroys [Roosevelt's]  .  .  .  original  con- 
ception" of  a  "  'coordinated  or  even 
jointly  conducted  effort  between  the 
two  countries.'  "  ^^ 

Although  Akers  had  read  Conant's 
memorandum,  he  apparently  had 
elected  to  keep  his  thoughts  to  him- 
self. But  on  the  twelfth,  he  ran  head- 
long into  the  practical  effects  of  the 
new  policy  at  a  meeting  with  Colonel 
Nichols  of  the  District  staff  and  Perci- 
val  C.  Keith  of  Kellex.  When  Akers 
asked  for  full  exchange  of  information 
and  access  for  British  scientists  to  the 
American  diffusion  production  plant, 
Nichols  informed  him  that  such  re- 
quests would  be  "subject  to  General 
Groves'  decision,"  the  outcome  of 
which  the  British  representative  could 
by  now  undoubtedly  guess.  ^^ 

The  problem  came  to  a  head  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  twenty-sixth  at  a 
meeting  with  Groves  and  Conant. 
Akers  protested,  argued,  and  bar- 
gained, largely  in  vain,  for  a  relax- 
ation of  the  American  attitude.  All  he 
achieved  was  Groves's  statement  that 
America  probably  would  be  willing  to 
reopen  information  exchange  on 
heavy  water  production  if  Great  Brit- 
ain would  make  significant  use  of  it 


**  Quotation  from  Msg,  Prime  Minister  to  Hop- 
kins, 27  Feb  43,  HLH.  Memo,  Conant,  sub:  Inter- 
change With  British  and  Canadians  on  S-1,  7  Jan 
43,  OSRD;  the  essential  points  in  this  memorandum 
are  reprinted  in  Cowing,  Britain  and  Atomic  Energy,  p. 
156.  See  also  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Mew  World,  p. 
268.  Churchill  was  quoting  the  letter  he  received 
from  Roosevelt,  dated  1 1  Oct  41,  FDR. 

'^Memo  for  File,  Nichols,  sub:  Mtg  With  Akers  on 
Jan  12th,  13  Jan  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  001 
(Mtgs),  MDR. 


before  the  end  of  the  war  and  would 
indicate  a  willingness  to  make  slight 
adjustments  regarding  interchange  on 
the  diffusion  process.  On  other  mat- 
ters— electromagnetic  separation,  the 
use  of  heavy  water  in  a  chain  reaction, 
the  furnishing  of  uranium  metal  and 
purified  graphite  to  the  Canadian 
group,  the  chemistry  of  plutonium, 
and  the  design  and  construction  of  a 
weapon — the  American  project  lead- 
en; remained  adamant.  Unsuccessful 
in  his  mission,  Akers  returned  home 
to  England  a  few  days  later.  ^^ 

Meanwhile,  word  had  reached  the 
Moroccan  town  of  Casablanca,  where 
Churchill  and  Roosevelt  were  meeting 
to  discuss  Anglo-American  strategy. 
During  the  mihtary  talks  the  subject 
of  atomic  energy  was  not  even  men- 
tioned; but,  in  confidence,  the  Prime 
Minister  asked  the  President  about 
the  American  position  on  Tube 
Alloys.  Roosevelt's  reply,  as  the  Prime 
Minister  related  it  to  Bundy,  was  to 
assure  Churchill  again  that  atomic 
energy  was  a  joint  enterprise.  Hop- 
kins, also  present  during  the  ex- 
change, quickly  added  that  the  prob- 
lem could  be  easily  straightened  out 
as  soon  as  the  President  returned  to 
the  White  House.  ^' 


'^Note  by  Akers  and  attached  extract  of  his  cable, 
26  Jan  43,  Incls  to  Ltr,  Akers  to  Groves,  29  Jan  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  091  (British),  MDR; 
Groves  Diary,  26  Jan  43,  LRG;  Msg,  Prime  Minister 
to  Hopkins,  27  Feb  43,  HLH. 

'^  Dates  of  Casablanca  Conf:  14-24  Jan  43. 
Msg,  Prime  Minister  to  Hopkins,  16  Feb  43,  and 
Memo,  J.  M.  Martin  (principal  private  secretary  for 
Churchill  at  Casablanca)  to  Hopkins,  23  Jan  43, 
HLH;  Memo,  Bundy,  sub:  22  Jul  43  Mtg  at  10 
Downing  Street,  HB  Files,  Fldr  47,  MDR;  Richard 
C.  Tolman,  sub:  Diary  of  Trip  to  England,  29  Oct 
43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  334  (British  Inter- 
change), MDR;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew  World, 
p.  270.  While  Hewlett  and  Anderson  accept  Bundy's 

Continued 


234 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


The  two  leaders  parted,  Roosevelt 
to  Washington  and  Churchill  to 
London  via  the  Middle  East.  Soon 
after  returning  home  in  early  Febru- 
ary, the  Prime  Minister  apparently  re- 
ceived a  thorough  briefing  on  Akers' 
disturbing  experience  in  the  United 
States  and,  on  the  sixteenth,  he 
cabled  Hopkins  to  remind  him  of  his 
assurances  given  at  Casablanca.  "The 
American  War  Department,"  com- 
plained Churchill,  "is  asking  us  to 
keep  them  informed  of  our  experi- 
ments while  refusing  altogether  any 
information  about  theirs."  ^^ 

That  Churchill  had  expressed  his 
perturbation  to  Hopkins  rather  than 
directly  to  Roosevelt  indicates  the  im- 
portance he  attached  to  the  problem. 
The  Prime  Minister  was  well  aware 
of  Hopkins's  close  relationship  with 
Roosevelt  and  regarded  him  as  a 
"most  faithful  and  perfect  channel  of 
communication."^^  A  personal  repre- 
sentation by  "Lord  Root  of  the 
Matter,"  as  he  once  called  Hopkins, 
would  be  more  effective  than  a  simple 
cable  direct  to  the  President.  Yet,  cu- 
riously enough,  Hopkins  apparently 
knew  little  about  atomic  energy  mat- 
ters. Certainly  his  ready  assurances  at 
Casablanca  indicated  his  unfamiliarity 
with  the  complexities  of  the  problem. ^° 


statement  in  his  memorandum  of  22  Jul  43  that  at 
Casablanca  Churchill  spoke  directly  to  both  Roose- 
velt and  Hopkins  on  Tube  Alloys,  Margaret  Cowing 
{Britain  and  Atomic  Energy,  p.  159)  suggests  that  the 
discussion  may  have  been  only  between  Churchill 
and  Hopkins. 

1^  Msg,  Prime  Minister  to  Hopkins,  16  Feb  43, 
HLH. 

19  Winston  S.  Churchill,  The  Second  World  War:  The 
Grand  Alliance  (Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1950), 
pp.  24-25. 

2°  Robert  E.  Sherwood,  Roosevelt  and  Hopkins:  An 
Intimate  History  (New  York:  Harper  and  Brothers, 
1948),  p.  5.  The  first  reference  to  atomic  energy  in 


But  in  the  weeks  that  followed 
Churchill's  cable,  Hopkins  set  about 
familiarizing  himself  with  the  problem 
of  Anglo-American  interchange.  Now 
well  briefed  by  Conant  and  Bush,  and 
perhaps  by  Lt.  Gen.  Brehon  B. 
Somervell,  the  Army  Service  Forces 
(ASF)  commander,  he  replied  to 
Churchill's  continued  prodding  with 
cables  that  avoided  a  direct  answer 
and  thus  left  the  American  position 
unchanged.  Bush,  in  turn,  reviewed 
the  policy  separately  with  Conant  and 
Stimson  and  collectively  with  fellow 
members  of  the  Military  Policy  Com- 
mittee at  its  30  March  meeting. 
"None  of  us,"  he  reported  to  Hop- 
kins on  31  March,  "can  see  that  the 
present  policy,  which  was  approved 
by  the  President  after  it  had  had  the 
careful  review  and  approval  of  Gener- 
al Marshall,  Secretary  Stimson,  and 
Vice  President  Wallace,  is  in  any  way 
unreasonable,  or  such  as  to  impede 
the  war  effort  on  this  matter.  Neither 
can  we  see  that  the  application 
is  at  present  unwise."  Supporting  a 
strongly  worded  memorandum  from 
Conant,  which  he  enclosed.  Bush 
stressed,  as  had  Conant  also,  the 
growing  American  belief  that  British 
desire  for  information  about  the 
American  program  was  not  for  war- 
time weapons  development  but, 
rather,  for  postwar  commercial  and 
industrial  application.  This  might  per- 
haps be  considered  in  another  con- 
text, said  Bush,  but  it  should  in  no 
way  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  the 
Manhattan  Project  or  with  the 
"proper  conduct  of  the  secure  devel- 
opment   of    a    potentially    important 


the  Hopkins  papers  (HLH)  appears  on  23  Jan  43, 
during  the  Casablanca  Conference. 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


235 


weapon."  ^^  Apparently  convinced  of 
the  correctness  of  the  American 
policy,  Hopkins  allowed  the  matter  to 
drag  on  through  April  without  resolu- 
tion. Even  though  he  had  promised 
British  Foreign  Secretary  Anthony 
Eden  a  telegram  that  would  give  his 
"views  fully,"  he  never  sent  it.^^ 

Except  for  limited  exchange  be- 
tween the  Montreal  and  Chicago 
groups,  Anglo-American  collaboration 
slowed  almost  to  a  standstill.  Sir  John 
Anderson,  fearing  a  weakening  of 
Churchill's  negotiating  position,  re- 
fused an  American  request  that  chem- 
ist Hans  von  Halban,  a  refugee  from 
the  French  atomic  program,  be  per- 
mitted to  come  to  New  York  to  confer 
with  Fermi  and  Urey  on  heavy  water 
problems,  and  in  partial  reaction  the 
Military  Policy  Committee  reduced 
American  support  of  the  heavy  water 
project  at  Montreal.  Hopkins's  pro- 
crastination did  nothing  to  improve 
the  steadily  deteriorating  situation, 
and  British  scientists  began  thinking 
seriously  of  building  their  own  U-235 
plant.  During  this  time,  the  only 
answer  the  British  received  to 
Churchill's  protests  was  an  indirect 
one:  an  explanation  of  the  American 
position  by  Bush  and  Conant  to  Dean 
Mackenzie  of  the  Canadian  project  as 
he  passed  through  Washington,  D.C., 
on  his  way  to  London  to  discuss  the 
problem   with   his    British    colleagues. 


^*  Quoled  phrases  from  Memo,  Bush  to  Hopkins, 
31  Mar  43  (enclosed  is  Memo,  Conanl  to  Bush,  25 
Mar  43),  HLH.  See  also  Msgs,  Prime  Minister  to 
Hopkins,  16  Feb,  27  Feb  (two),  20  Mar,  1  Apr  43, 
and  Hopkins  to  Prime  Minister,  24  Feb  and  20  Mar 
43,  Memos,  Bush  to  Hopkins,  26  Feb  43,  and  Hop- 
kins to  Lord  Halifax  (British  ambassador  to  U.S.), 
13  Apr  43.  All  in  HI.H.  See  also  MPC  Min,  30  Mar 
43.  MDR 

22  Memo.  Halifax  to  Hopkins,  14  Apr  43;  Msg, 
Hopkins  to  Kden,  15  Apr  43  (source  of  quotation). 
Memo,  Hopkins  to  Halifax.   15  Apr  43.  All  in  HI.H. 


By  then,  however,  Churchill  had 
decided  to  pay  a  personal  call  on 
Roosevelt. ^^ 

The  Trident  Conference,  as 
Churchill  dubbed  his  third  major  war- 
time meeting  with  Roosevelt,  began 
in  Washington  on  12  May;  however,  it 
was  not  until  the  twenty-fifth,  his  last 
day  in  the  national  capital,  that  he 
raised  the  problem  of  atomic  inter- 
change. Hopkins  telephoned  Bush, 
and  that  afternoon  the  two  Americans 
met  with  Professor  Frederick  Linde- 
mann  (Lord  Cherwell),  the  British 
physicist  who  was  one  of  Churchill's 
closest  advisers.  An  able  negotiator, 
Lord  Cherwell  had  already  formed 
some  strong  opinions  about  who  was 
responsible  for  the  new  American  po- 
sition. The  whole  situation,  he  had 
told  Canadian  Prime  Minister  William 
Lyon  Mackenzie  King  a  week  earlier, 
was  the  fault  of  the  American  Army, 
which  had  taken  over  the  atomic 
energy  program  from  the  scientists. 
"They  are  as  difficult  about  it  in  their 
relation  with  Britain,"  King  noted  in 
his  diary,  "as  Stalin  had  been  in  tell- 
ing of  what  was  being  done  in 
Russia."  ^^ 


23  Memo,  Bush  to  Hopkins,  27  Apr  43,  HLH; 
Churchill,  Hinge  of  Fate,  pp.  782-83;  Cowing,  Bntam 
and  Atomic  Energy,  pp.  157-64. 

2"*  Qiioted  from  J.  W.  Pickersgill,  The  Mackenzie 
King  Record.  1939-19-f-t.  Vol.  1  (Toronto:  University 
of  Toronto  Press,  1960),  p.  503.  For  Trident,  see 
Churchill,  Hinge  of  Fate.  Ch.  20,  and  Maurice  Mat- 
loff.  Strategic  Planning  for  Coalition  Warfare.  1943- 
1944.  U.S.  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington, 
D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office,  1959),  Ch.  VI. 
For  Cherwell,  see  R.  F.  Harrod,  The  Prof:  A  Personal 
Memoir  of  Lord  Cherwell  (London:  Macmillan  and  (^o., 
1959).  A  less  sympathetic  view  is  C.  P.  Snow,  Science 
and  Government  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  Univer- 
sity Press,  1961).  This  account  of  the  meeting  at 
Hopkins's  oflice  is  based  on  Memo  for  File,  Bush, 
sub:  Conf  With  Harry  Hopkins  and  Lord  Cherwell 
at  White  House,  25  Mav  43,  Ind  to  Memo,  Bush  to 

Continued 


236 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


The  meeting  resulted  in  an  im- 
passe, although  it  did  clarify  matters 
to  some  extent.  After  Bush  restated 
the  American  position  and  explained 
the  reasons,  Lord  Cherwell  pressed 
for  a  change.  He  denied  Great  Britain 
was  aiming  at  any  postwar  commer- 
cial advantage,  but  admitted  the  Brit- 
ish wanted  to  be  in  a  position  to  build 
atomic  weapons  once  the  war  was 
over.  During  the  war,  he  added,  his 
government  was  willing  to  depend  on 
the  United  States  for  these  weapons, 
but  in  the  postwar  period  it  could  not 
afford  to  rely  on  any  other  power  for 
military  security.  Bush  and  Hopkins 
immediately  pointed  out  this  was  a  far 
different  question  than  had  been  pre- 
viously discussed.  It  concerned  broad- 
er problems  of  postwar  international 
relations,  the  solutions  to  which, 
Hopkins  noted,  the  Roosevelt  admin- 
istration constitutionally  could  not 
commit  its  successor.  Lord  Cherwell 
indicated  that  if  the  United  States  re- 
fused to  provide  the  desired  informa- 
tion on  atomic  production,  the  British 
might — to  guarantee  their  own  future 
security — have  to  undertake  an  imme- 
diate production  program  of  their 
own,  diverting  whatever  was  neces- 
sary from  the  main  war  effort.  But  he 
did  not  put  this  in  the  form  of  an  out- 
right threat. 

The  main  question  had  at  last  been 
isolated:  Was  it  necessary  for  America 
to  provide  Britain  with  production 
data  during  the  war  to  ensure  her 
military  security  in  the  postwar  era?  It 
was  clear  to  Hopkins  where  the  prob- 
lem lay  and  he  told  Bush  to  do  noth- 
ing   further    on    the    matter.    Presum- 


Hopkins,  26  May  43,  HLH.  A  copy  of  Bush's  memo- 
randum of  25  Mav  is  also  in  Ms,  "Diplomatic  Hist  of 
Manhattan  Proj,'  Ann.  9,  HB  Files,  Fldr  111,  MDR. 


ably,  Hopkins  would  take  it  up  with 
the  President. 

That  evening,  Churchill  apparently 
discussed  the  problem  privately  with 
Roosevelt.  There  is  no  record  of  this 
meeting.  Indications  are  that  the 
President  was  not  informed  of  the 
Bush-Hopkins-Cherwell  conference. 
Once  again  he  showed  his  earlier  will- 
ingness to  cooperate  fully  with  the 
British.  The  next  morning  Churchill 
cabled  Sir  John  Anderson  that  the 
President,  foreseeing  that  the  general 
agreement  on  wartime  interchange 
would  be  fulfilled  by  the  almost  cer- 
tain use  of  the  bomb  in  the  war,  had 
"agreed  that  the  exchange  of  infor- 
mation on  Tube  Alloys  should  be  re- 
sumed and  that  the  enterprise  should 
be  considered  a  joint  one."  ^^ 

Whatever  Roosevelt  told  Churchill, 
he  did  not  pass  it  on  to  Bush  or  Stim- 
son.  How  much  Hopkins  knew  is  not 
clear,  but  he  was  at  least  aware  that 
Roosevelt  had  promised  Churchill 
something.  A  month  after  Trident, 
Bush  had  his  first  opportunity  to  brief 
the  President  on  this  talk  with  Lord 
Cherwell.  Roosevelt  seemed  im- 
pressed, but  he  said  nothing  about 
any  arrangements  he  might  have 
made  with  the  Prime  Minister  and 
simply  told  Bush  to  "sit  tight"  on  in- 
terchange.^® 


2^  Msg,  Prime  Minister  to  Lord  President  (Sir 
John  Anderson),  26  May  43,  quoted  in  Churchill, 
Hitige  of  Fate.  p.  809.  See  also  Ltr,  Roosevelt  to 
Bush,  20  Jul  43;  Ltr,  Cherwell  to  Hopkins,  30  May 
43;  Msg,  Prime  Minister  to  Hopkins,  lOJun  43.  All 
in  HLH.  The  latter  message  implies  that  Hopkins 
may  have  been  present  at  the  Churchill-Roosevelt 
discussion.  On  Roosevelt's  ignorance  of  the  Bush- 
Hopkins-Cherwell  conference,  see  Hewlett  and  An- 
derson, Xew  World,  p.  274. 

2  6  Memo  for  File,  Bush,  sub:  Conf  With  Presi- 
dent, 24  Jun  43,  quoted  in  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 

Continued 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


237 


Meanwhile,  the  British  had  sent 
Akers  to  Ottawa,  and  during  his  stay 
in  the  Canadian  capital,  Churchill  had 
cabled  Roosevelt  once  again,  seeking 
to  implement  their  agreement  on 
atomic  energy.  He  received  no  satis- 
factory reply.  Finally  in  mid-July,  the 
President  asked  Hopkins  what  to  do 
about  interchange.  Hopkins  replied 
that  he  [Roosevelt]  had  "made  a  firm 
commitment  to  Churchill  in  regard  to 
this  when  he  was  here  and  there  is 
nothing  to  do  but  go  through  with 
it."  ^'  Accepting  this  fact,  on  the  twen- 
tieth the  President  cabled  Churchill 
that  he  had  arranged  matters  "satis- 
factorily." The  same  day  he  wrote 
Bush,  who  was  in  London  attending 
to  other  scientific  matters,  that  be- 
cause "our  understanding  with  the 
British  encompasses  the  complete  ex- 
change of  all  information,"  he  should 
"renew  .  .  .  the  full  exchange  of  in- 
formation with  the  British  Govern- 
ment regarding  the  Tube  Alloys."  ^® 
The  President's  letter  should  have 
settled  the  matter.  Yet,  by  one  of 
those  peculiar  quirks  of  fate,  the  new 
directive  did  not  reach  the  OSRD  di- 
rector in  time  to  be  effective. 

On  the  fifteenth,  an  unexpected 
confrontation  by  an  agitated  Prime 
Minister,  who  daily  was  becoming 
more  and  more  disturbed  over  the  in- 

Xew  World,  p.  274.  Stimson's  diary  does  not  indicate 
that  he  discussed  interchange  with  Roosevelt  during 
this  period.  Hopkins's  probable  knowledge  may  be 
inferred  from  Msg,  Prime  Minister  to  Hopkins,  10 
Jun  43;  Msg,  Hopkins  to  Prime  Minister,  17  Jun  43; 
Ltr,  Cherwell  to  Hopkins,  30  May  43.  All  in  HLH. 

"Memo,  Hopkins  to  President,  20  Jul  43,  HLH. 
See  also  Msg,  Former  Naval  Person  (Churchill)  to 
Roosevelt,  9  Jul  43,  FDR;  Memo,  Roosevelt  to  Hop- 
kins, 14  Jul  43,  FDR;  Cowing,  Britain  and  Atomic 
Energy,  pp.  164-65. 

"Msg,  President  to  Former  Naval  Person,  20  Jul 
43,  and  Ltr,  Roosevelt  to  Bush,  20  Jul  43,  HLH; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  \ew  World,  p.  275. 


terchange  problem,  had  occasioned 
Bush  to  refer  him  to  Secretary  Stim- 
son,  who,  with  Bundy,  also  was 
visiting  England.  Two  days  later, 
Churchill  asked  Stimson  to  "help  him 
by  intervening  in  the  matter."  ^^  Har- 
boring strong  feelings  about  the  value 
of  close  Anglo-American  collabora- 
tion on  all  wartime  activities,  Stimson 
arranged  for  a  conference  on  the 
twenty-second.  Shortly  before  the 
meeting,  the  Secretary  met  with  Bush 
and  Bundy.  Particularly  concerned 
about  the  need  for  careful  interna- 
tional cooperation  under  the  new 
world  conditions  that  atomic  energy 
would  create,  Stimson  questioned 
Bush  carefully  and  forcefully,  and  at 
times  the  OSRD  director  felt  almost 
as  if  he  were  being  cross-examined  by 
the  distinguished  lawyer.  When 
Bundy  suggested  constitutional  limita- 
tions on  the  President's  power  to 
make  long-term  commitments,  Stim- 
son dismissed  this  as  "the  argument 
of  a  police-court  lawyer."  But  in  the 
end,  he  agreed  that  Bush  should 
present  the  American  position  to  the 
British  as  he  saw  it.^° 

That  afternoon,  the  three  Ameri- 
cans sat  down  with  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter, Anderson,  and  Lord  Cherwell. 
Because  Churchill,  for  reasons 
that  are  not  known,  had  not  yet 
received  Roosevelt's  cable,  none  of 
the    participants    were    aware    of  the 


^'Quotation  from  Stimson  Diary,  17  Jul  43,  HLS. 
See  also  Rpt,  Stimson  to  Roosevelt,  sub:  Trip  to 
United  Kingdom,  attached  to  entrv  of  10  Aug  43, 
HLS. 

^"Quotation  from  Elting  E.  Morison,  Turmoil  and 
Tradition:  A  Study  of  the  Life  and  Times  of  Henry  L  Stim- 
son (Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  I960)',  p.  617. 
See  also  ibid.,  p.  618;  Stimson  Diary,  22  Jul  43, 
HLS;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xeu>  World,  pp.  275- 
76. 


238 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


President's  decision  to  reaffirm  a 
policy  of  full  interchange.  Churchill 
opened  the  session  with  a  vigorous 
defense  of  the  British  position,  em- 
phasizing his  fear  that  unless  Great 
Britain  had  the  means  and  knowledge 
of  how  to  develop  atomic  weapons, 
Germany  or  Russia  might  "win  the 
race  for  something  which  might  be 
used  for  international  blackmail."  He 
seemed  particularly  concerned  about 
the  possible  atomic  threat  from 
Russia,  which  appeared  to  be  at  the 
root  of  his  worries  about  the  postwar 
world.  If  the  United  States  would  not 
"interchange  fully,"  he  said.  Great 
Britain  would  have  to  undertake  its 
own  development  "parallel"  to  that  of 
the  Manhattan  Project,  no  matter  how 
this  might  affect  the  rest  of  the  war 
effort.  31 

As  diplomatically  as  possible,  Bush 
attempted  to  restate  the  American 
view  and  to  point  out  that  the  main 
U.S. -British  differences  lay  in  the  area 
of  "postwar  matters."  Stimson  sec- 
onded this  approach  by  reading  aloud 
a  short,  clear  analysis  of  the  situation 
he  had  written  in  preparation  for  the 
meeting. 3^  The  Prime  Minister  then 
proposed  a  five-point  agreement  to 
be  signed  by  Roosevelt  and  himself. 
Under  this  agreement,  there  would  be 
"free  interchange"  of  atomic  informa- 
tion within  a  "completely  joint  enter- 
prise"; neither  government  would 
"use  this  invention  against  the  other"; 
neither  would  "give  information  to 
any  other  parties  without  the  consent 


of  both";  neither  would  use  atomic 
weapons  "against  any  other  parties" 
without  the  other's  consent;  and,  fi- 
nally, "in  view  of  the  large  additional 
expense  incurred  by  the  U.S.,"  British 
commercial  or  industrial  use  "should 
be  limited"  in  whatever  way  the  Presi- 
dent deemed  "fair  and  equitable."  ^^ 
Stimson  agreed  to  pass  these  pro- 
posals on  to  the  President.  He  could 
not  comment  officially,  but  he  was 
obviously  pleased.  "Satisfactory  at- 
mosphere produced,"  ^^  he  noted  in 
his  diary.  Bush,  too,  felt  somewhat 
better,  for  while  the  Prime  Minister's 
proposed  free  interchange  still 
seemed  dangerous  from  a  security 
viewpoint,  Churchill  had  made  a  con- 
vincing disclaimer  of  any  postwar 
commercial  motivations.  When 
Churchill  received  Roosevelt's  20  July 
message  several  days  after  the  confer- 
ence, he  was  unable  to  determine 
from  the  general  terms  of  the  mes- 
sage that  the  President,  in  fact,  had 
completely  reversed  the  American  po- 
sition. Only  Roosevelt's  explicit  in- 
structions in  his  20  July  letter  to  Bush 
would  have  indicated  this  shift  in 
policy.  But  the  letter  of  instructions, 
which  the  OSRD  cabled  to  Bush  on 
the  twenty-eighth,  was  somehow  gar- 
bled in  transmission  or  decoding;  it 
ordered  Bush  to  review,  rather  than 
renew,  full  interchange.  Even  this  mild 
wording  gave  Bush  some  concern,  but 
not  nearly  as  much  as  the  original 
version  would  have.^^ 


3  1  Memo  for  File,  Bundy,  sub:  22  Jul  43  Mtg  at  10 
Downing  Street,  MDR.  See  also  Bundy's  penciled 
notes  written  at  the  meeting,  same  file.  On  the  Rus- 
sian threat  see  Pickersgill,  Mackenzie  King  Record,  pp. 
532  and  543. 

3^  Stimson's  penciled  notes  are  filed  in  HB  Files, 
Fldr  47,  MDR. 


33  Memo  for  File,  Bundy,  sub:  22  Jul  43  Mtg  at  10 
Downing  Street,  MDR. 

34  Stimson  Diary,  22  Jul  43,  HLS.  See  also  draft 
of  Msg,  Stimson  to  Marshall,  unsigned  but  written 
m  the  Secretary's  hand,  HB  Files,  Fldr  47,  MDR. 

35  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New  World,  p.  277;  Msg, 
President  to  Former  Naval  Person,  20  Jul  43,  HLH; 

Conlinued 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


239 


On  the  same  day  Churchill  ap- 
proved a  formal  draft  of  the  British 
proposal,  which  he  forwarded  to 
Stimson  on  the  thirtieth.  This  version, 
drafted  by  Anderson  and  revised  by 
Churchill,  was  basically  the  same  as 
the  one  the  Prime  Minister  had  pre- 
sented orally.  It  eliminated  the  specif- 
ic references  to  'Tree  interchange" 
within  a  "completely  joint  enter- 
prise," substituted  a  general  state- 
ment about  pooling  "all  available 
British  and  American  brains  and  re- 
sources," and  made  even  more  explic- 
it the  British  disclaimer  on  "industrial 
and  commercial  aspects."  Sir  John 
Anderson  would  go  to  Washington 
at  once,  said  Churchill,  to  help  ar- 
range "for  the  resumption  of 
collaboration."  ^^ 

Back  in  Washington,  Bush  learned 
the  actual  wording  of  the  President's 
instructions.  He  also  found  awaiting 
him  a  strong  memorandum  from 
Conant,  which  reiterated  the  Harvard 
president's  "conviction  .  .  .  that  a 
complete  interchange  with  the  British 
is  a  mistake"  and  authorized  Bush,  if 
he  saw  fit,  to  quote  him  "on  this 
point  to  those  in  higher  authority."  ^'^ 
This  proved  unnecessary,  for  the  Brit- 
ish remained  unaware  of  Roosevelt's 


Msgs.  Bush  to  Bundv,  27  and  28  Jul  43,  HB  Files, 
Fidr  47,  MDR;  Ltr,  Carroll  L.  Wilson  (Ex  Asst  to 
Bush)  to  Roosevelt,  28  Jul  43,  FDR. 

36  Ltr,  Churchill  to  Stimson,  [30]  Jul  43  (date  de- 
rived from  internal  evidence),  and  Ind  (draft  heads 
of  agreement  between  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  Prime  Minister  of  Great  Brit- 
ain, 28  Jul  43),  HB  Files,  Fldr  47,  MDR.  See  also 
Cowing,  Britain  and  Atomic  Energy,  p.  168;  Msgs, 
Roosevelt  to  Churchill,  26  Jul  43,  and  Churchill  to 
Roosevelt,  29  Jul  43,  FDR. 

^■'Memo,  Conant  to  Bush,  sub:  Exchange  of  Info 
on  S-1  Proj  With  British,  30  Jul  43,  HB  Files,  Fldr 
47,  MDR. 


actual  position  and  continued  negoti- 
ating on  the  basis  of  American  policy 
as  explained  by  Bush  in  London. 

With  the  approval  of  Secretary 
Stimson,  Bush  carried  out  final  nego- 
tiations with  Anderson.  He  kept  in 
close  touch  with  the  Secretary, 
Bundy,  and  General  Marshall — Vice 
President  Wallace  and  General 
Groves  were  out  of  town — and  espe- 
cially with  Conant,  who  participated 
in  the  opening  talks  with  Anderson 
on  3  August.  Stimson  and  Marshall 
also  had  lunch  with  the  British  repre- 
sentative, but  their  conversation  ap- 
pears to  have  been  more  of  a  general 
discussion  than  a  bargaining  session. 

On  the  sixth,  after  an  exchange  of 
letters.  Bush  and  Anderson  came  to  a 
meeting  of  minds  on  a  proposed 
agreement  to  be  signed  by  Roosevelt 
and  Churchill.  This  agreement  was 
based  on  the  four-point  draft 
Churchill  had  sent  Stimson  a  week 
earher,  but  added  a  fifth  section  "to 
ensure  full  and  effective  collabora- 
tion." This  section  provided  for  es- 
tablishment of  the  Combined  Policy 
Committee,  which  would  determine 
the  role  of  each  country,  maintain  an 
overall  review  of  the  project,  allocate 
critical  supplies,  and  have  the  final 
say  in  interpreting  the  joint  agree- 
ment. There  would  be  interchange  on 
all  sections  of  the  project.  Details 
would  be  regulated  by  ad  hoc  agree- 
ments, subject  to  committee  approval, 
and  Bush  stipulated  that  information 
made  available  to  committee  mem- 
bers would  be  general  in  nature.  An- 
derson also  agreed  that  the  commit- 
tee    would     not     interfere     with     the 


240 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Army's  control  of  the  Manhattan 
Project.^® 

The  next  day,  Bush  forwarded  the 
draft  agreement  and  copies  of  his  cor- 
respondence with  Anderson  to  the 
President.  He  acknowledged  the  de- 
layed directive  of  20  July  sent  to  him 
by  Roosevelt,  but  then  went  on  to 
state  his  conviction  that  his  under- 
standing with  Anderson  "provided 
adequately  for  appropriate  inter- 
change, with  due  regard  to  the  main- 
tenance of  security,  and  with  the 
object  of  providing  the  British  with  all 
of  the  information  they  can  utilize  in 
this  connection  in  the  prosecution  of 
the  war,  in  return  for  the  benefit  of 
the  deliberations  of  their  own  scientif- 
ic and  technical  groups."  ^^  In  a  sepa- 
rate note  to  Bundy,  Bush  urged  that 
Secretary  Stimson  "impress  upon  the 
President"  the  desirability  of  limiting 
agreements  to  wartime  objectives  and 
the  dangers  of  making  commitments 
for  the  postwar  period. "^^ 

General  Marshall,  too,  urged  cau- 
tion, and  Bundy  strongly  recommend- 
ed to  Stimson  that  the  President  talk 
with  Bush,  or  at  least  carefully  read 
the  Bush-Anderson  correspondence, 
before    signing    any    agreement    with 


**Ltrs,  Anderson  to  Bush,  4  (source  of  quotation) 
and  6  Aug  43,  and  Bush  to  Anderson,  6  Aug  43, 
HB  Files,  Fldr  47,  MDR;  Ltr,  Bush  lo  Anderson, 
3  Aug  43,  and  IncI  (extracts  from  report  dated  15 
Dec  42),  copy  in  U.S.  Department  of  State,  Confer- 
ences at  Washington  and  Quebec,  19-43.  Foreign  Rela- 
tions of  the  United  States,  [Diplomatic  Papers], 
1943  (Washington,  D.C.:  Government  Printing 
Office,  1970),  pp.  640-41;  Memo,  Conant  to  Bush, 
sub:  Exchange  of  Info  on  S-1  Proj  With  British,  6 
Aug  43,  HB  Files,  Fldr  47,  MDR;  Ltr,  Bush  to  Presi- 
dent, 7  Aug  43,  FDR;  Stimson  Diary,  5  Aug  43. 
HLS;  Groves  Diary,  3-6  Aug  43,  LRG.  See  also 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New  World,  pp.  277-79; 
Gowing,  Bntam  and  Atomic  Energy,  pp.  168-71. 

3»  Ltr,  Bush  to  President,  7  Aug  43.  FDR. 

*°  Ltr,  Bush  to  Bundy,  6  Aug  43,  HB  Files,  Fldr 
47,  MDR. 


Churchill.  He  emphasized  to  the  Sec- 
retary that  Bush  and  Conant  were 
trying  to  protect  Roosevelt  from  any 
possible  charges  that  he  was  exceed- 
ing his  legal  authority  or  acting  from 
any  other  motivation  than  a  desire  to 
win  the  war.  Strongly  impressed  by 
Bundy's  urging,  Stimson  went  to  the 
White  House  on  10  August,  deter- 
mined to  make  these  points.  Whether 
or  not  he  did  is  unclear,  but  he  did 
describe  the  negotiations  with 
Churchill  and  raise  at  least  one 
caveat.  He  asked  the  President  wheth- 
er a  problem  might  arise  from 
Churchill's  proposal  that  neither 
country  would  use  atomic  energy 
against  third  parties  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  other.  Roosevelt  indicated 
he  saw  no  danger  in  the  provision. '^^ 
Even  as  Stimson  met  with 
Roosevelt,  the  Prime  Minister  was  set- 
tling himself  in  Quebec,  in  prepara- 
tion for  meeting  with  the  President  at 
the  Quadrant  Conference  that  would 
begin  in  a  few  days.  Only  then  did 
General  Groves,  who  had  been  busy 
on  inspection  trips  to  the  West  Coast 
and  New  York,  learn  of  the  forthcom- 
ing conference  and  realize  the  pro- 
posed agreement  would  be  discussed. 
More  than  half  a  year  had  passed 
since  the  President  had  had  a  report 
on  the  Manhattan  Project  from  the 
Military  Policy  Committee,  and 
Groves  felt  Roosevelt  should  have  an 
up-to-date  summary  before  his  meet- 
ing with  Churchill.  Groves  drew  up  a 
twenty-page  report;  cleared  it  with  the 
committee;  and,  on  21   August,  with- 


■'^  Memo,  Bundy  to  Stimson,  6-7  Aug  43,  and  at- 
tached penciled  notes  by  Stimson;  Memo,  Bundy  to 
Marshall,  6  Aug  43,  and  penned  comment  by  Mar- 
shall. Both  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  47,  MDR.  See  also 
Stimson  Diary,  10  Aug  43.  HLS. 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


241 


out  showing  it  to  Wallace  or  Stimson, 
directed  Colonel  Nichols  to  hand 
carry  it  to  General  Marshall  in 
Quebec,  where  Quadrant  was  already 
under  way.  The  report,  which  covered 
all  Manhattan  activities,  included  a 
brief  summary  of  relations  with  the 
British  and,  in  the  light  of  the  Bush- 
Anderson  negotiations,  asked  the 
President  for  further  instructions.  But 
when  Colonel  Nichols  arrived  in 
Quebec  with  the  document.  General 
Marshall  informed  him  that  Roosevelt 
and  Churchill  had  already  signed  an 
agreement  on  atomic  energy. '^^ 

The  two  leaders  had  approved  the 
proposed  agreement  at  Hyde  Park, 
where  Churchill  had  visited  Roosevelt 
from  12  to  14  August.*^  But  it  was 
not  until  the  nineteenth,  in  Quebec's 
historic  fortress  known  as  The  Cita- 
del, that  they  actually  affixed  their 
signatures  to  the  "Articles  of  Agree- 
ment Governing  Collaboration  Be- 
tween the  Authorities  of  the  U.S.A. 
and  the  U.K.  in  the  Matter  of  Tube 
Alloys,"  or,  simply,  the  Quebec 
Agreement.  It  called  for  the  earliest 
possible  completion  of  the  Tube 
Alloys  project,  ruled  out  "duplicate 
plants  on  a  large  scale  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic,"  and  acknowledged 
the  "far  greater  expense"  borne  by 
the  United  States.  It  agreed  "never" 
to  "use  this  agency  against  each 
other"  and  "not  to  use  it  against  third 
parties  without  each  other's  consent," 
and  it  prohibited  giving  "any  informa- 
tion about  Tube  Alloys  to  third  par- 
ties except  by  mutual  consent."  In 
view  of  the  heavier  burden  carried  by 


*2  MPC  Rpt,  21  Aug  43,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  E,  MDR;  Groves,  AW  It  Can 
Be  Told,  p.  135;  Groves  Diary,  4-23  Aug  43,  LRG; 
MPC  Min,  13  Aug  43,  MDR. 

"  Pickersgill,  Mackenzie  King  Record,  p.  543. 


the  United  States,  "any  post-war  ad- 
vantages of  an  industrial  or  commer- 
cial character"  would  be  "dealt  with 
...  on  terms  to  be  specified  by  the 
President  .  .  .  ,"  and  the  Prime  Min- 
ister specifically  disclaimed  "any  in- 
terest" in  them  "beyond  what  may  be 
considered  by  the  President  ...  to 
be  fair  and  just  and  in  harmony  with 
the  economic  welfare  of  the  world." 
Finally,  using  the  Bush-Anderson  ar- 
rangement for  interchange  as  the 
basis,  the  Quebec  Agreement  estab- 
lished the  Combined  Policy  Commit- 
tee in  Washington,  D.C.,  and  desig- 
nated six  members. 

On  the  choice  of  members, 
Roosevelt  apparently  did  not  consult 
any  of  his  advisers,  except  possibly 
Hopkins.  American  members  were 
Stimson,  Bush,  and  Conant;  British 
members  were  Field  Marshal  Sir  John 
Dill,  head  of  the  British  Joint  Staff 
Mission  in  Washington,  and  Col.  John 
J.  Llewellin,  Washington  representa- 
tive of  the  British  Ministry  of  Supply. 
The  sixth  member  was  Canada's  Min- 
ister of  Munitions  and  Supply,  Clar- 
ence D.  Howe,  an  American-born  en- 
gineer whose  appointment  Churchill 
had  cleared  earlier  with  Mackenzie 
King.  The  British  had  felt  that  the  Ca- 
nadians, even  though  they  were  not 
a  party  to  the  Quebec  Agreement, 
should  have  representation  on  the 
high-level  committee  because  they 
would  be  making  important  contribu- 
tions to  the  atomic  energy  project 
in  Montreal. 

The  Quebec  Agreement  set  the  of- 
ficial basis  for  Anglo-American  atomic 
relations  for  the  rest  of  the  wartime 
period.  It  did  not  establish  the  free 
and  open  interchange  the  British  had 
desired      and      that      the      President, 


242 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


indeed,  had  offered  in  his  letter  of 
20  July.  It  called  for  "full  and  effec- 
tive collaboration,"  and  both  Roose- 
velt and  Churchill  believed  they  had 
provided  the  basis  for  it;  however,  in 
reality,  collaboration  would  comprise 
only  what  was  necessary  for  the  war 
effort,  avoiding  any  form  of  inter- 
change that  might  conceivably  hinder 
progress  of  the  Manhattan  Project/^ 

Implementing  the  Agreement 

Combined  Policy  Committee 

Despite  pressure  by  Bush  and  Gen- 
eral Marshall,  and  the  presence  in 
Washington  of  Akers  and  four  leading 
British  scientists  who  were  anxious  to 
implement  interchange,^^  two  weeks 
passed  before  the  President  revealed 
the  details  of  the  Quebec  Agreement 
to  Manhattan  officials,  including  par- 
ticulars on  the  Combined  Policy  Com- 
mittee. With  Churchill  visiting  at  the 
White  House,  the  President  first 
wanted  the  Prime  Minister's  concur- 
rence in  the  contents  of  the  Military 
Policy  Committee's  report  before  any 
meeting  of  the  new  committee  took 
place. '^^ 


"■•The  American  original  of  the  Qiiebec  Agree- 
ment is  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  49.  MDR.  The  full  text 
was  published  in  the  Xew  York  Times,  6  Apr  54.  A 
copy  of  the  agreement  is  also  in  U.S.  Department  of 
State,  Conferences  at  Washington  and  Quebec.  1943,  pp. 
1117-19.  Available  records  do  not  indicate  that 
Roosevelt  discussed  the  Quebec  Agreement  with 
any  American  from  the  time  of  his  conference  with 
Stimson  on  10  August  until  after  the  document  was 
signed. 

"^Sir  Francis  Simon  of  Oxford  University,  Sir 
James  Chadwick  of  Cambridge  University,  and  Sir 
Rudolph  E.  Peierls  and  Marcus  L.  f2.  Oliphant,  both 
working  at  the  University  of  Birmingham. 

*«MPC  Rpt  21  Aug  43,  MDR;  Memo,  Bush  to 
President,  sub:  Tube  Alloys-Interchange  With  Brit- 
ish, 23  Aug  43,  HLH;  Memo,  Marshall  to  President, 
6  Sep  43,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr 


On  8  September,  after  lunch  at  the 
White  House,  Stimson  discussed  the 
Quebec  Agreement  with  Roosevelt 
and  Churchill.  Having  learned  only 
that  morning  that  he  was  to  be  chair- 
man of  the  Combined  Policy  Commit- 
tee, he  asked  permission  to  name  ASF 
chief  of  staff,  Maj.  Gen.  Wilhelm  D. 
Styer,  as  his  deputy — a  request  the 
President  and  Prime  Minister  readily 
approved. ^"^ 

An  hour  or  so  later,  the  first  infor- 
mal meeting  of  the  Combined  Policy 
Committee  took  place  in  the  Penta- 
gon. One  reason  for  the  hasty  con- 
vening was  to  accommodate  the  four 
British  scientists,  waiting  impatiently 
to  exchange  data.  Bush  was  out  of 
town  and  Howe  had  not  yet  arrived 
from  Canada,  but  Stimson,  Conant, 
Dill,  and  Llewellin  proceeded  without 
them.  General  Styer  was  also  present, 
as  was  Bundy,  acting  as  secretary. 
They  formed  a  technical  subcommit- 
tee, with  Styer  as  chairman,  to  make 
recommendations  on  the  American 
and  British  programs,  to  prepare  di- 
rectives for  interchange  of  research 
and  development  data,  and  to  pro- 
pose ad  hoc  arrangements  for  inter- 
change in  the  area  of  plant  design, 
construction,  and  operation.  The  sub- 
committee consisted  of  three  scien- 
tists who  had  a  thorough  knowledge 
of  the  American,  British,  and  Canadi- 
an projects — Richard  C.  Tolman,  who 


25E,  MDR;  Memo,  Col  Frank  McCarthy  (Gen  Staff 
Secy,  OCS)  to  Marshall,  6  Sep  43  (with  Marshall's 
penned  endorsement  to  Bundy),  and  Ltr,  Dill  to 
Marshall.  7  Sep  43,  HB  Files,  Fldr  7,  MDR;  Stimson 
Diary,  7  Sep  43,  HLS;  Ltr,  Bush  to  Styer,  20  Aug 
43.  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Bush),  MDR; 
paraphrase  of  Msg,  Lord  President  to  Prime  Minis- 
ter, 28  Aug  43,  HLH. 

*7  Stimson  Dairy,  8  Sep  43,  HLS:  Memo,  J.  M.  M. 
[Martin]  to  Prime  Minister,  sub:  1  ube  Alloys,  9  Sep 
43,  HLH. 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


243 


was  General  Groves's  scientific  advis- 
er; Sir  James  Chadwick,  the  eminent 
British  physicist;  and  C.  J.  Mackenzie 
of  the  Canadian  National  Research 
Council.  Despite  some  hesitation  by 
Dill  and  Llewellin  about  delegating 
their  authority,  the  Combined  Policy 
Committee  authorized  the  subcom- 
mittee to  act  independently  on  inter- 
change whenever  there  was  unan- 
imous agreement  among  its  four 
members.'*^ 

Working  Out  Interchange  Arrangements 

Styer's  subcommittee  met  on  10 
September,  to  consider  a  plan  drafted 
by  General  Groves  and  submitted  by 
the  Military  Policy  Committee.  Be- 
cause this  plan  hewed  fairly  closely  to 
the  earlier  American  proposals  on  in- 
terchange, it  fell  considerably  short  of 
what  the  British  desired.  On  weapon 
development  it  recommended  assign- 
ment of  two  British  scientists  to  Los 
Alamos  under  the  same  security  re- 
strictions governing  American  scien- 
tists there.  On  the  gaseous  diffusion 
and  heavy  water  pile  processes  it  sug- 
gested interchange  of  scientific  infor- 
mation through  a  joint  committee.  On 
the  centrifuge  and  thermal  diffusion 
processes,  which  would  probably  soon 
be  dropped,  Styer's  subcommittee 
should  decide  whether  interchange 
"might  affect  this  decision."  As  for 
the  electromagnetic  and  graphite  pile 
processes,  on  which  the  British  had 
done  little  work,  interchange  would 
serve  no  useful  purpose,  for  these 
methods  had  reached  the  stage  where 


changes     "would     result     in     serious 
delay  in  completion.'"*^ 

The  subcommittee,  largely  at  the 
insistence  of  Chadwick,  recommended 
some  modifications  to  the  plan  favor- 
able to  the  British  view.  On  the  gase- 
ous diffusion  and  heavy  water  pile 
processes,  interchange  should  extend 
to  some  aspects  of  development  and 
production.  There  should  be  ex- 
change of  scientific  data  on  the 
graphite  pile  to  the  extent  it  might  be 
helpful  in  the  Anglo-Canadian  devel- 
opment of  the  heavy  water  pile  pro- 
cess. Chadwick's  contention  that  the 
British  might  be  able  to  contribute  to 
development  of  the  electromagnetic 
process  should  be  explored  by  a  com- 
mittee consisting  of  Groves,  Tolman, 
and  Australian  physicist  Marcus  L.  E. 
Oliphant.  In  keeping  with  the  Military 
Policy  Committee's  recommendations, 
the  subcommittee  reached  agreement 
on  possible  personnel  for  other  com- 
mittees or  representation  needed  to 
carry  out  interchange  on  the  various 
processes.  Chadwick  and  Sir  Rudolph 
E.  Peierls,  the  University  of  Birming- 
ham physicist,  would  serve  as  British 
representatives  at  Los  Alamos;  von 
Halban  with  Metallurgical  Project  Di- 
rector Arthur  Compton,  or  one  of  his 
principal  assistants,  as  a  committee  to 
exchange  data  on  the  heavy  water  pile 
process;  Sir  Francis  E.  Simon,  physi- 
cist at  Oxford's  Clarendon  Laborato- 
ry, and  Peierls  with  Keith,  the  Kellex 
head,  and  Urey  on  a  gaseous 
diffusion  committee;  and  Oliphant, 
Simons,  and  Peierls  on  a  committee 
with  American  representatives  desig- 


ns cpc  Min,  8  Sep  43,  and  Ltr,  Llewellin  to 
Bundy,  10  Sep  43,  HB  Files,  Fldr  9,  MDR.  See  also 
earlier  draft  of  Bundy's  minutes,  same  file.  Stimson 
Diary,  8  Sep  43,  MDR. 


"^MPC  Min,  9  Sep  43  (source  of  quotation), 
MDR;  Tech  Subcommittee  Min,  10  Sep  43,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  28,  MDR.  See  also  MFC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42, 
MDR. 


244 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Sir  James  Chadwick  (left)  consulting  with  General  Groves  and  Richard  Tolman  on 
Anglo-American  interchange 


nated  by  Bush  or  Conant  to  decide 
the  extent  of  interchange  on  the 
centrifuge  and  thermal  diffusion 
processes. ^° 

Despite  the  considerable  progress 
made  by  the  subcommittee,  there  was 
little  specific  interchange  in  the  weeks 
that  followed.  Part  of  the  difficulty  lay 
in  the  lack  of  specific  working  proce- 
dures. To  set  these  up,  Tolman  went 
to  England  in  October  to  consult  with 
Chadwick  and  other  British  scientists 
and  with  Sir  John  Anderson.  General 
Groves,  who  was  becoming  increas- 
ingly impatient  to  implement  inter- 
change in  those  areas  where  it  was 
sanctioned,  closely  monitored  Tol- 
man's  negotiations  from  his  Washing- 
ton office  and  attempted  to  facilitate 


Anglo-American  coordination  by  keep- 
ing members  of  the  Military  and  Com- 
bined Policy  Committees  regularly 
informed.^  ^ 


50  Tech  Subcommittee  Min,  10  Sep  43,  MDR. 


5^  In  Admin,  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MDR,  see  fol- 
lowing files:  334  (British  Interchange),  for  informa- 
tion on  Tolman's  trip;  201  (Conant)  for  Memo, 
Groves  to  Conant,  2  Nov  43;  680.2  for  Ltrs,  Llewel- 
lin  to  Groves,  10  Nov  43,  with  enclosed  draft,  and 
Groves  to  LleweUin,  12  Nov  43;  371.2  (Scty)  for 
Ltrs,  Capt  Horace  K.  Calvert  (Intel  and  Scty  Sec 
chief)  to  Lt  Col  John  Lansdale  (Groves's  Spec  Asst 
for  Scty),  sub:  Visit  of  British  Natls  to  DSM  Proj 
7  Oct  43,  and  Maj  Robert  S.  Furman  (Groves's  Spec 
Proj  Off)  to  Calvert,  same  sub,  21  Oct  43.  See  also 
MPC  Min,  14  Dec  43  (with  Memo,  Groves  to  MPC, 
10  Dec  43,  as  Att.  1),  MDR;  Memo,  Styer  to  CPC, 
14  Dec  43,  HB  Files,  Fldr  28,  MDR;  CPC  Min,  17 
Dec  43,  HB  Files,  Fldr  10,  MDR;  MPC  Rpt,  4  Feb 
44,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Groves  (for  MPC)  to  President,  same 
date,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25, 
Tab  C,  MDR;  Groves  Diary,  27  Oct,  2  and  4  Nov 
43,  LRG.  For  the  British  perspective  on  drawing  up 

Continued 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


245 


When  Groves  received  word  that 
another  team  of  British  scientists 
soon  would  be  arriving  in  the  United 
States,  the  need  for  a  speedy  proce- 
dural agreement  on  interchange 
became  even  more  critical  to  him.  Yet 
not  until  mid-December  were  the 
British  and  Americans  able  to  com- 
plete interchange  procedures.  With 
the  approval  of  the  Military  and  Com- 
bined Policy  Committees,  the  new 
procedures  went  into  effect  on  the 
fourteenth.  Naming  Chadwick  as  the 
"immediate  scientific  adviser  to  the 
British  members"  of  the  Combined 
Policy  Committee,  the  terms  of  this 
agreement  permitted  that  he  have 
"access"  to  all  work  on  "research  and 
plant  scale"  on  both  sides  of  the  At- 
lantic. The  slight  and  unassuming 
Cambridge  professor,  who,  surpris- 
ingly enough,  got  along  exceptionally 
well  with  the  robust  and  outspoken 
Groves,  would  also  help  guide  experi- 
mental work  at  Los  Alamos,  where  he 
would  be  joined  by  a  small  number  of 
other  British  scientists.  Peierls,  and 
one  or  two  others,  would  work  with 
Kellex  on  the  diffusion  process  and 
also  would  discuss  theoretical  prob- 
lems of  bomb  construction  with 
American  scientists;  he  could  not, 
however,  visit  Los  Alamos.  Oliphant 
and  six  assistants  would  work  with 
Ernest  Lawrence  at  Berkeley  on  re- 
search and  design  and  then  move  to 
Los  Alamos  to  assist  on  ordnance 
problems.  Oliphant  would  continue 
his  close  contacts  with  the  electro- 
magnetic project  during  production 
and  would  be  free  to  visit  England  to 

interchange  arrangenienls  see  Cowing,  Britain  and 
Atomic  Enngy,  pp.  23S-S4.  Colonel  Llewellin  was  re- 
placed on  the  CPC  bv  Sir  Ronald  I.  Campbell,  a  vet- 
eran member  of  the  British  embassy  stafT  in 
Washington. 


supervise  any  similar  research  there. 
About  fifteen  British  scientists  and  in- 
dustrialists, led  by  Akers,  would  ex- 
change information  on  diffusion  at 
Columbia  University  and  Kellex.  Re- 
search on  heavy  water  piles  at  Mon- 
treal would  be  continued  under  a 
joint  program  to  be  worked  out  with 
those  doing  similar  work  in  the 
United  States. ^^ 

This  arrangement  was,  in  effect,  the 
implementation  of  the  Quebec  Agree- 
ment. While  it  did  not  actually  pro- 
vide full  information  exchange,  it 
went  further  than  most  members  of 
the  Manhattan  Project  administrative 
staff  would  have  preferred.  Certainly 
the  arrangements  were  more  liberal 
than  Groves  would  have  wished,  al- 
though he  later  claimed  full  credit  for 
having  drawn  up  these  "rules  regulat- 
ing the  .  .  .  British  scientists."  ^^ 
While  anxious  to  get  any  British  help 
that  might  speed  the  progress  of  the 
American  program,  he  was  generally 
opposed  to  providing  Great  Britain 
with  anything  more  than  was  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  gain  this  aid.  "I 
was  not  responsible  for  our  close  co- 
operation with  the  British,"  he  assert- 
ed a  decade  later.  "I  did  everything  to 
hold  back  on  it."  ^^ 

By  the  end  of  January  1944,  eigh- 
teen British  scientists  had  reached 
New  York,  Washington,  D.C.,  Berke- 
ley, and  Los  Alamos,  and  more  were 
expected.  Only  one  problem  re- 
mained outstanding,  namely,  arrange- 
ments for  cooperation  between  the 
Montreal    and    Chicago    scientists    on 


52  Memo,  Croves  to  MPC,  10  Dec  43,  Att.  1, 
MDR;  MPC  Min,  14  Dec  43,  MDR;  Cowing,  Britain 
and  Atomic  Energy,  pp.  234  and  236-37. 

*3  Croves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  136-37. 

**  Oppenheimer  Hearing,  p.  175. 


246 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


pile  research.  Around  the  middle  of 
the  month,  senior  members  of  both 
groups  had  discussed  a  joint  program 
of  research  that  would  lead  to  the 
construction  of  a  heavy  water  pile. 
Yet  to  Manhattan  leaders  in  Washing- 
ton, it  seemed  doubtful  the  venture 
would  be  of  significant  value  during 
the  war,  and  Groves  and  Conant,  at 
least,  preferred  that  it  should  not 
begin. ^^ 

On  17  February,  however,  at  the 
next  meeting  of  the  Combined  Policy 
Committee,  Chadwick  pressed  for  ap- 
proval of  a  Canadian  heavy  water  pile 
to  undertake  large-scale  production  of 
plutonium.  Great  Britain  and  Canada 
would  provide  the  funds,  the  United 
States  the  heavy  water,  and  the  three 
nations  would  exercise  joint  control 
over  the  project.  Neither  Groves,  who 
was  not  a  committee  member,  nor 
Styer  was  present,  but  Bush  and 
Conant  apparently  raised  some  ques- 
tions. Would  the  project  result  in  mili- 
tarily significant  production  before  the 
end  of  the  war?  Was  it  advisable  to  use 
up  resources,  especially  ore?  The  com- 
mittee turned  the  problems  over  to  a 
subcommittee  composed  of  Groves, 
Chadwick,  and  Mackenzie. ^^ 

The  subcommittee  discussed  a 
heavy  water  pile  with  Compton, 
Fermi,  and  others  at  Chicago  and 
with  von  Halban  and  his  colleagues  at 
Montreal.  Then,  on  6  April,  it  submit- 
ted its  report  to  the  Combined  Policy 
Committee.    The    Hanford    Engineer 


ss  MPC  Rpt,  4  Feb  44,  MDR;  Laurence,  "Can- 
ada's Participation  in  Atomic  Energy  Development," 
p.  325;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  \ew  World,  p.  282. 

56  CPC  Min,  17  Feb  44,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp. 
MP  Files,  Fldr  9,  Tab  B,  MDR;  Stimson  Diary, 
17  Feb  44,  HLS;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xerv  World, 
pp.  282-83. 


Works,  the  subcommittee  concluded, 
would  produce  enough  plutonium  to 
satisfy  "essential  military  needs"  for 
the  war,  and  production  at  the  pro- 
posed Canadian  plant  could  not  begin 
in  time  "to  have  an  appreciable  influ- 
ence on  the  outcome  of  the  present 
war."  On  the  other  hand,  the  poten- 
tialities of  the  heavy  water  pile  were 
so  great  that  its  development  could 
not  be  "wholly  neglected."  Accord- 
ingly, it  recommended  continued  re- 
search and  development  at  both  Chi- 
cago and  Montreal,  with  an  increased 
staff  and  the  appointment  of  a  direc- 
tor for  the  Canadian  project;  the 
design  and  construction  of  a  heavy 
water  pilot  pile  in  Canada  by  the 
United  States,  Great  Britain,  and 
Canada;  and  future  consideration  of  a 
small  production  pile  when  the  exper- 
imental stage  was  further  advanced.  A 
week  later  the  Combined  Policy  Com- 
mittee adopted  this  program,  and  in 
the  ensuing  months  Groves,  Chad- 
wick, and  Mackenzie  continued  to 
keep  an  eye  on  the  project  for  the 
committee  and  see  to  it  that  the  ap- 
proved recommendations  were  car- 
ried out.^''^ 

The  new  Montreal  director  was 
physicist  John  D.  Cockcroft,  and  his 
staff  was  rapidly  reinforced  with  Brit- 
ish and  Canadian  scientists.  In  early 
May,  as  plans  for  construction  of  the 
pilot  plant  matured.  General  Groves 
approved  an  isolated  site  previously 
selected  by  the  Canadians,  near  Chalk 
River,  Ontario,  on  the  south  bank  of 
the  Ottawa  River  and  about  1 10  miles 


^''  Rpt,  Groves,  Chadwick,  and  Mackenzie  to  CPC, 
sub:  Joint  Development  of  Heavy  Water  Pile,  6  Apr 
44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  28  (also  in  Fldr  103),  MDR.  See 
also  CPC  Min,  13  Apr  44,  DS,  and  pertinent  docu- 
ments in  HB  Files,  Fldrs  12  and  105,  MDR. 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


247 


northwest  of  the  Canadian  capital. 
{See  Map  2.)  Late  in  the  month,  Cock- 
croft,  von  Halban,  and  others  from 
Montreal  visited  Chicago.  A  second 
meeting  was  held  in  Montreaf  two 
weeks  later.  Discussion  was  limited  by 
the  rules  governing  interchange  that 
Groves,  Chadwick,  and  Mackenzie 
were  in  the  process  of  drafting.  These 
regulations,  which  the  Combined 
Policy  Committee  approved  formally 
on  19  September,  limited  interchange 
to  information  necessary  for  the 
design,  construction,  and  operation  of 
the  Chalk  River  pilot  plant.  Scientists 
at  Montreal  could  learn  about  the 
pilot  pile  at  Clinton  and  the  research 
piles  at  Argonne,  and  receive  basic 
scientific  data  essential  to  the  heavy 
water  pile.  They  were  not  to  be  fur- 
nished with  information  about  pro- 
duction plant  construction  at  Hanford 
or  the  chemistry  of  plutonium  or  the 
method  of  separating  that  element, 
because  these  developments  were  not 
necessary  for  work  at  Chalk  River.  Fi- 
nally, the  regulations  directed  that  the 
Montreal  group  should  establish  strict 
security  in  the  transmittal  of  all  data. 
General  Groves  designated  Maj. 
Horace  S.  Benbow  as  his  liaison  offi- 
cer at  Montreal,  or  Evergreen,  to  use 
its  code  name,  and  directed  that  the 
Chicago  area  engineer  handle  all  Ev- 
ergreen requests.  For  scientific  liai- 
son. Groves  assigned  physicist  Wil- 
liam W.  Watson  and  chemical  engi- 
neer J.  R.  Huffman  to  report  directly 
to  him  rather  than  the  Metallurgi- 
cal Laboratory  director.^® 


The  policy  established  in  the  spring 
of  1944  for  interchange  on  the  Cana- 
dian project  completed  the  arrange- 
ments approved  the  previous  Decem- 
ber for  Anglo-American  information 
exchange  on  atomic  energy  and  ful- 
filled the  terms  of  the  Quebec  Agree- 
ment of  August  1943.  British  scien- 
tists were  now  working  with  Ameri- 
cans in  the  United  States  on  several 
phases  of  the  overall  program  and 
were  reviewing  a  limited  amount  of 
information.  In  the  remaining  months 
of  the  war,  Anglo-American  relations 
steadily  improved,  although,  inevita- 
bly, minor  problems  arose.  ^^ 

Patent  Problems 

One  of  the  problems  relating  to  in- 
terchange with  which  the  Combined 
Policy  Committee  had  to  concern 
itself  periodically  during  1943  and 
1944  was  patent  rights.  The  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  in  August 
1942  had  concluded  an  executive 
agreement  on  exchange  of  patent 
rights  that  provided  a  general  basis 
for  negotiating  more  specific  arrange- 
ments applicable  to  particular  areas  of 
interchange.^^  At  the  time  of  this  agree- 


58  Rpt,  A.  W.  Nielson  and  W.  H.  Sullivan,  sub: 
Review  of  Liaison  Activities  Between  Canadian  and 
United  States  Atomic  Energy  Projs,  19  Feb  47,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  103,  MDR;  Rpt  (to  CPC),  sub:  Progress 
on  Canadian  NRX  Proj,  24  Aug  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr 
103,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.   1,  Vol.  4,  "Auxiliary  Activi- 


ties," Ch.  9,  DASA;  MPC  Min,  10  May  44,  MDR; 
DSM  Chronology,  7  and  15  Jun  44,  each  Sec.  15, 
8  Jun  44,  Sec.  2(b),  and  12  Jun  44,  Sec.  7,  OROO; 
CPC  Min,  19  Sep  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  13,  MDR; 
Groves  Diary,  May-Jun  44,  LRG;  Ltr,  Howe  to  W. 
L.  Webster  (British  Supply  Council  in  North  Amer- 
ica), 29  Apr  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  12,  MDR.  See  also 
Evergreen  progress  reports,  etc.,  HB  Files,  Fldr  32, 
MDR. 

*'For  details  on  British  implementation  of  inter- 
change see  Cowing,  Britain  and  Atomic  Energy,  pp. 
239-44. 

^"U.S.  Department  of  State,  Interchange  of  Patent 
Rights,  Information,  Inventions,  Designs,  or  Processes: 
Agreement  Between  the  United  States  of  America  and  Great 
Britain,  Signed  at  Washington,  August  24,  1942,  Execu- 
tive Agreement  Series  268,  Pub  1803. 


248 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


ment,  Sir  John  Anderson  had  suggest- 
ed to  Bush  the  adoption  of  a  joint 
patent  policy  relating  specifically  to 
atomic  energy  as  an  important  aspect 
of  international  control.  Bush,  howev- 
er, did  not  think  the  time  was  propi- 
tious for  establishing  such  a  policy; 
instead,  he  recommended  that  partici- 
pating countries  could  facilitate  even- 
tual estblishment  of  controls  by 
seeing  to  it  that  most  patent  rights 
concerning  atomic  energy  within  their 
own  borders  were  publicly  owned.  ^^ 

The  need  for  patent  arrangements 
became  even  more  obvious  after  the 
signing  of  the  Quebec  Agreement. 
With  scientists  of  both  countries 
working  together,  a  common  policy 
was  necessary  to  protect  both  individ- 
ual and  national  rights.  Secrecy  and 
security  aspects  further  complicated 
the  difficult  technicalities  inherent  in 
all  patent  matters. 

In  the  fall  of  1943,  Arthur  Blok, 
patent  expert  in  the  British  Depart- 
ment of  Scientific  and  Industrial  Re- 
search, and  Capt.  Robert  A.  Laven- 
der, retired  American  naval  officer 
who  advised  Bush  and  later  Groves 
on  patent  questions,  attempted  to 
reach  some  agreement.  They  conclud- 
ed that  the  1942  agreement  did  not 
apply  to  atomic  developments  and 
drew    up    a    new    proposal. ^^    When 


"  Ltr,  Anderson  to  Bush.  5  Aug  42,  MDR;  Hew- 
lett and  Anderson,  New  World,  pp.  262-63. 

*^Ltr,  Blok  and  Lavender  to  CPC  Subcommittee, 
1  Oct  43  (recommendations  were  shown  to  Chad- 
wick  but  submitted  directly  to  the  CPC,  because 
Styer's  group  was  not  familiar  enough  with  patent 
problems  to  add  anything  to  basic  suggestions); 
Memo,  Webster  to  Bundy,  sub:  Memo  on  Patents 
Signed  by  Arthur  Blok  and  Capt  Robert  A.  Laven- 
der, 7  Mar  44.  Both  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  18,  MDR. 
Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  418-20. 


Bush  pointed  out  certain  inadequacies 
in  the  Blok-Lavender  proposal  at 
the  Combined  Policy  Committee  on 
13  April  1944,  the  committee  referred 
the  problem  to  its  recently  appointed 
joint  secretaries,  Harvey  Bundy  and 
W.  L.  Webster  of  the  British  Supply 
Council.  During  the  summer  the  two 
men  studied  the  question,  conferring 
frequently  with  Lavender,  Blok,  Bush, 
and  others;  and  in  September,  they 
drew  up  a  lengthy  administrative  pro- 
cedure, which  the  committee  ap- 
proved at  its  meeting  on  the  nine- 
teenth. But  project  lawyers  found  that 
the  procedure  was  in  conflict  with  the 
United  States  patent  law,  and  not 
until  February  1945  was  it  properly 
amended.  As  finally  approved  at 
the  8  March  committee  meeting,  the 
arrangement  was  still  an  ad  hoc  proce- 
dure, neither  final  nor  complete,  leav- 
ing the  negotiation  of  a  permanent 
settlement  to  the  future.®^ 

New  Partnership  Strains:  Repatriation 
of  French  Scientists 

The  liberation  of  France  following 
the  Allied  invasion  of  Western 
Europe  in  the  summer  of  1944  placed 
new  strains  upon  the  British-Ameri- 
can atomic  partnership.®'*  The  imme- 


"In  HB  Files,  MDR,  see  followmg  files:  Fldr  18 
for  Memo,  Bundy  and  Webster  to  CPC,  sub:  Certain 
Aspects  of  Patent  Matters  Arising  from  Special  Proj, 
18  Sep  44  (containing  drafts  and  related  corre- 
spondence); Fldr  47  for  Ltrs,  Webster  to  Howe, 
26  Aug  44,  and  Howe  to  Webster,  29  Aug  44;  Fldr 
13  for  CPC  Min,  19  Sep  44;  Fldr  18  for  Memo, 
Bundy  to  Lavender,  sub:  Annex  A  to  CPC  Memo,  2 
Apr  45  (containing  drafts  and  related  correspond- 
ence); and  Fldr  46  (copy  in  Fldr  105)  for  CPC  Min, 
8  Mar  45. 

^■^  Except  as  indicated,  section  on  problem  with 
French  scientists  based  on  HB  Files,  Fldr  36  (French 
Situation)    and    Fldr   55    (S-1    U.S.    Cables),   MDR; 

Continued 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


249 


diate  source  of  the  dispute  was  the 
repatriation  of  five  French  scientists — 
Hans  von  Halban,  Pierre  Auger,  Lew 
Kowarski,  Jules  Gueron,  and  Bertrand 
Goldschmidt — who  had  fled  to  Eng- 
land from  France  after  the  German 
invasion  in  1940  and  then  gone  on  to 
Montreal  in  1943  to  work  in  the  Ca- 
nadian atomic  program.  When  they 
began  to  apply  for  permission  to  visit 
or  return  permanently  to  their  home- 
land, American  atomic  leaders  con- 
tended such  visits  posed  too  great  a 
security  risk,  particularly  because 
physicist  Frederic  Joliot-Curie,  head 
of  the  French  atomic  program,  was 
known  to  be  a  member  of  the  Com- 
munist Party. 

The  Americans,  and  especially  Gen- 
eral Groves,  took  the  view  that  the 
French  should  not  be  allowed  to  go 
back  to  France  until  the  war  was  over. 
In  May  1944,  when  Pierre  Auger  ter- 
minated his  employment  with  the  Ca- 
nadian project,  citing  a  desire  to 
return  to  France  to  assist  Joliot-Curie 
in  rebuilding  French  science,  Groves 
and  the  British  representatives  in 
America  agreed  that  neither  he  nor 
any  of  the  other  French  scientists  in 
Canada  should  be  permitted  to  do  so 
and  that  measures  should  be  taken  to 
prevent  any  atomic  information  from 
reaching  that  country.  Nevertheless, 
when  Auger  went  to  London  in 
August  to  become  a  full-time  member 

OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  12  (Intel 
and  Scty),  Fldr  16  (Special  Rpts),  and  Fldr  26, 
MDR;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew  World,  pp.  331- 
35;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  224-29;  Ber- 
trand Goldschmidt,  The  Atomic  Adventure:  Its  Political 
and  Technical  Aspects,  trans.  Peter  Beer  (Oxford,  Eng- 
land, and  New  York:  Pergamon  Press  and  Macmillan 
Co.,  1964),  pp.  12-43;  Wilfrid  Eggleston,  Canada's 
Xuclear  Story  (London:  Harrap  Research  Publica- 
tions, 1966),  pp.  29-181;  Gowing,  Britain  and  Atomic 
Energy,  pp.  289-96  and  343-46. 


of  the  French  Scientific  Mission  in 
that  city,  British  authorities  permitted 
him  to  visit  France. 

In  October,  Gueron  requested  per- 
mission to  visit  France  on  personal 
matters.  Groves,  who  had  learned  that 
Gueron  planned  to  see  Joliot-Curie, 
opposed  the  visit  because  Gueron 
knew  a  great  deal  about  the  atomic 
project  and  was  reputed  to  be  an 
"ardent  Free  Frenchman"  and  sup- 
porter of  General  Charles  de  Gaulle. 
But  British  authorities  indicated  they 
had  agreed  to  let  Gueron  go.  When 
Groves  learned  this,  he  determined  to 
have  the  French  scientist  kept  under 
surveillance  by  Manhattan  security 
personnel  while  in  France.  The  Brit- 
ish objected  strongly.  Gueron  was  "a 
man  of  integrity,"  they  asserted,  and 
ought  not  to  be  treated  as  if  he  were 
a  prisoner.  ^^ 

Manhattan  leaders  interpreted 
these  British  actions  to  be  a  clear  vio- 
lation of  the  terms  of  the  Quebec 
Agreement,  which  forbade  communi- 
cation of  atomic  information  to  third 
parties  without  mutual  consent,  and 
requested  the  American  ambassador 
in  London,  John  G.  Winant,  to  secure 
an  explanation.  Sir  John  Anderson  re- 
plied that  the  British  had  made  agree- 
ments with  the  French  scientists 
before  they  went  to  Canada.  The  first 
to  come  to  England — von  Halban  and 
Kowarski — had  negotiated  an  agree- 
ment for  exchange  of  patent  rights  re- 
lating to  atomic  energy  between 
France  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
Later  when  Auger,  Gueron,  and 
Goldschmidt  reached  England,  they 
had  worked  out  employment  arrange- 


^^  Quotations  from  General  Groves's  memoran- 
dum (26  Dec  44)  to  Secretary  of  War  on  French  sit- 
uation, HB  Files.  Fldr  36.  Tab  K,  MDR. 


250 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


mcnts  that  assured  them  their  right  to 
return  to  France  as  soon  as  the  war 
made  it  feasible  and  also  their  status 
as  French  civil  servants  and  as  adher- 
ents of  General  de  Gaulle  and  the 
Free  French.  Because  the  French  sci- 
entists had  made  a  "very  special  con- 
tribution" to  the  Tube  Alloys  project, 
in  the  form  of  "research  already  start- 
ed by  Joliot  and  by  his  action  at  the 
time  when  France  was  over-run,"  Sir 
John  contended  the  French  had  "a 
better  claim  than  any  other  fourth 
country  to  participate  in  any  post-war 
T.  A.  arrangements,"  and  he  did  not 
think  it  wise  to  embark  on  a  course  of 
action  that  would  "lead  the  French 
authorities  to  raise  the  matter  prema- 
turely and  with  a  sense  of  grievance 
already  established."  ^^ 

Anderson's  revelation  came  as  a 
shock  to  leaders  of  the  American  pro- 
gram. Except  for  some  information 
on  British  acquisition  of  rights  under 
von  Halban's  patents  that  Vannevar 
Bush  had  learned  about  earlier,  they 
had  known  nothing  about  the  agree- 
ments between  the  British  and  French 
scientists.  Sir  John  had  not  mentioned 
them  during  negotiations  for  the 
Quebec  Agreement,  yet,  as  Groves 
saw  it,  these  third-party  obligations 
were  in  obvious  contradiction  to  that 
agreement.  He  also  thought  Sir  John 
was  wrong  to  feel  he  had  to  placate 
Joliot-Curie  and  furnish  him  with  in- 
formation about  the  American 
project. 


*^  Sir  John  Anderson's  reply  was  sent  in  the  form 
of  an  aide-memoire,  a  copy  of  which  is  in  HB  Files, 
Fldr  18,  Tab  J,  MDR.  See  also  at  Tab  J,  Memo, 
Groves  to  Winant,  31  Oct  44,  and  Incl  (comments 
by  Maj  William  A.  Consodine,  a  Manhattan  security 
officer).  Consodine  explains  how  he  obtained  a  copy 
of  the  aide-memoire  for  the  Manhattan  commander  in 
Memo  (extract),  Consodine  to  Groves,  received  on 
28  Oct  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  107,  MDR. 


Consequently,  Groves  expressed 
some  reluctance  in  consenting  to  a 
British  request  in  November  1944 
that  von  Halban  be  allowed  to  visit 
London,  with  the  understanding  that 
the  French  scientist  would  not  be  al- 
lowed to  go  to  France.  But  as  soon  as 
von  Halban  arrived  in  England,  Sir 
John  went  to  Ambassador  Winant 
with  the  plea  that  von  Halban  should 
be  permitted  to  see  Joliot-Curie  to 
ensure  preservation  of  the  status  quo 
with  France.  Faced  with  Sir  John's  in- 
sistent request,  Winant  asked  Groves 
to  come  to  London  to  talk  with  the 
Chancellor,  but  Groves  did  not  go  be- 
cause he  was  too  involved  in  urgent 
atomic  project  matters.  Under  con- 
tinuing pressure  from  Sir  John, 
Winant  finally  consented  to  von  Hal- 
ban's  visit  to  Paris.  The  British  pro- 
vided the  French  scientist  with  an 
agenda  establishing  limits  for  infor- 
mation about  the  American  atomic 
project  that  he  was  to  give  to  Joliot- 
Curie,  but  Manhattan  intelligence 
agents  learned  subsequently  that  von 
Halban  had  furnished  the  French 
atomic  chief  with  much  additional 
highly  secret  data  about  the  American 
project.  There  were  strong  indica- 
tions, too,  that  Joliot-Curie  himself 
was  shortly  going  to  request  assign- 
ment to  work  on  the  Manhattan 
Project.  ^^ 

When  Groves  learned  of  von  Hal- 
ban's  visit  more  than  a  week  after  it 


®^  See  correspondence  relating  to  von  Halban 
case  in  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  MDR.  In 
Fldr  26,  Tab  I,  especially  Memo,  Lansdale  to 
Groves,  2  Dec  44;  Draft  Transcription  of  Lansdale 
Notes  and  Rpt,  Hans  [von]  Halban  to  Akers,  sub: 
Nov  24-Dec  5  Visit  to  France,  5  Dec  44.  In  Fldr  16, 
Tab  A,  Ltr,  Richard  W.  Perrin  to  W.  L.  Gorell 
Barnes  (both  British  Foreign  Svc  officials),  8  Dec 
44. 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  COLLABORATION 


251 


had  taken  place,  he  determined  to 
bring  an  end  to  what  he  perceived  as 
a  deliberate  British  policy  to  secure 
postwar  commercial  advantage  in  the 
atomic  energy  field  largely  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  United  States.  As  Groves 
saw  it,  Anderson  was  continuing  to 
permit  disclosure  to  the  French  of  im- 
portant information  relating  to  atomic 
research  that  had  been  "developed  by 
Americans  with  American  money,  and 
given  to  the  British  pursuant  to  inter- 
change agreements  subsidiary  to  the 
Quebec  Agreement."  ^® 

On  14  December,  Groves  wrote  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  stating  that 
"pending  the  receipt  of  instructions 
from  you,  1  will  take  steps  to  safe- 
guard the  security  of  the  DSM  project 
by  delaying  insofar  as  practicable  the 
passing  of  vital  information  concern- 
ing it  to  the  representatives  of  any 
government  other  than  our  own."  ^^ 
Stimson  met  with  Groves,  Bundy,  and 
Harrison  the  next  day.  He  informed 
them  he  would  take  the  matter  up 
with  the  President  at  the  earliest  op- 
portunity. He  instructed  Groves  to 
prepare  a  complete  resume  of  the 
French  situation  and  requested  Bundy 
to  notify  Ambassador  Winant  that, 
until  the  Combined  Policy  Committee 
met  to  discuss  the  situation,  he 
should  refer  to  Washington  "any  fur- 
ther British  proposals  for  disclosures 
or  contacts  which  might  lead  to  dis- 
closures to  the  French.   .   .   ."  "^^ 


^^  Memo,  Groves  to  Secy  War,  26  Dec  44,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  36.  Tab  K,  MDR;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be 
Told.  pp.  226-27. 

«9  Ltr,  Groves  to  Secy  War,  14  Dec  44,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  36,  Tab  I.,  MDR. 

'^°  Msgs,  Bundy  (sent  by  Groves)  to  Winant, 
26  Dec  44  (source  of  quotation),  and  Winant  to 
WD,  27  Dec  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  55,  MDR;  Stimson 
Diary,  15  Dec  44,  HI.S.  Groves's  rcsuinc  is  in 
Memo,  Groves  to  Secy  War,  26  Dec  44,  MDR. 


It  was  not  until  30  December  that 
Stimson  was  able  to  see  the  President. 
Groves  accompanied  the  Secretary  to 
the  White  House  and  the  two  re- 
viewed for  Roosevelt  the  entire 
French  problem,  emphasizing  that 
Anderson  appeared  to  have  deliber- 
ately deceived  Winant  and  other 
American  representatives  in  England 
regarding  Britain's  commitments  on 
atomic  energy  matters  to  France. 
Roosevelt's  reaction  was  that  Winant 
had  been  "hoodwinked."  What,  he 
wished  to  know,  were  the  French 
after?  Stimson  and  Groves  said  they 
believed  France  wanted  to  secure  a 
full  partnership  in  the  tripartite 
atomic  agreement.  Roosevelt  indicat- 
ed that  France  in  its  current  unstable 
political  situation  was  not  a  suitable 
partner  and,  even  if  it  were,  he  saw 
no  justification  for  letting  it  share  in 
the  partnership.  The  discussion  then 
turned  to  other  matters  relating  to 
the  atomic  energy  program.'^ 

With  the  backing  of  the  President, 
Stimson  and  Groves,  assisted  by 
Bundy,  endeavored  to  prevent  further 
disclosures  of  atomic  secrets  to  the 
French  during  the  winter  and  spring 
of  1945.'^ They  had  a  statement  ap- 


"  Memo,  StiiTison,  sub:  Conf  With  President, 
30  Dec  44;  Memo  for  File,  Groves,  30  Dec  44; 
Memo,  Groves  to  Chief  of  Staff,  30  Dec  44;  Notes 
by  Stimson  To  Aid  in  Preparation  of  Agenda  for 
Mtg  of  President  and  Secy  War  with  Groves.  All  in 
OCG  Files.  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  24,  MDR. 
Stimson  and  Groves  Diaries,  30  Dec  44,  HLS  and 
I.RG. 

'2  In  HB  Files,  MDR,  see  the  following  files:  Fldr 
14  (copies  in  Fldrs  22  and  105)  for  CPC  Min,  22  Jan 
45;  Fldr  46,  Tab  C,  for  Memo,  Howe  to  CPC,  6  Mar 
45;  Fldr  103  for  Ltr,  Mackenzie  to  Stimson,  8  Mar 
45;  and  Fldr  107  for  Memo,  Groves  to  Secy  War,  13 
May  45,  and  Incl,  Ltr,  Chadwick  to  Groves,  8  May 
45.  See  also  Stimson  Diary,  19  and  22  Jan  45,  HLS. 
The  Secretary  of  War  makes  no  mention  in  his  diary 
of  later  developments  in  the  French  situation  in  the 
spring  and  summer  of  1945. 


252 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


proved  by  the  Combined  Policy  Com- 
mittee for  Sir  John  Anderson  to  use 
if,  as  anticipated,  the  French  request- 
ed full  participation  in  the  atomic 
energy  program.  The  gist  of  this 
statement  was  that,  for  reasons  of 
security,  all  detailed  discussion  of 
atomic  matters  with  the  French  must 
be  postponed  until  the  end  of  the 
war,  when  the  British  would  guaran- 
tee "fair  treatment  of  any  claims 
.  .  .  relating  to  commercial  or  indus- 
trial applications  of  nuclear  sources  of 
power."  ^^ 

When  Sir  John  met  with  Joliot- 
Curie  on  23  February  in  London,  he 
did  not  present  the  formal  statement, 
but  he  did  adhere  generally  to  the 
policy  set  forth  in  it.  He  indicated 
that,  because  of  the  continuation  of 
the  war  and  because  British  leaders 
could  not  readily  get  together  with 
their  French  counterparts,  progress 
on  shaping  postwar  policies  had  not 
been  possible.  Anderson  found  that 
Joliot  had  concluded  from  the  favor- 
able British  actions  with  regard  to 
von  Halban  and  Gueron,  and  the 
other  French  scientists,  that  Great 
Britain  recognized  the  interests  of 
France  in  atomic  energy  matters  and, 
in  the  postwar  period,  would  strongly 
support  her  in  the  pursuit  of  these 
interests. 

Fear  that  there  might  be  another 
breakdown  in  Anglo-American  inter- 
change if  he  persisted  in  his  strong 
support  of  French  atomic  interests 
appears  to  have  engendered  a  modi- 
cum of  moderation  in  Sir  John;  how- 
ever, he  persisted  in  efforts  to  have 
British     leaders     propose     that     the 


French  be  assured  of  greater  partici- 
pation in  atomic  matters  as  soon  as 
security  considerations  made  this  fea- 
sible. Two  pressing  concerns  motivat- 
ed Sir  John's  actions:  his  belief  that 
Britain  owed  this  support  to  the 
French  atomic  scientists  for  their  con- 
tribution to  the  British  and  Canadian 
atomic  programs,  and  his  fear  that 
any  policy  that  offended  France  might 
drive  her  into  the  Russian  camp  in 
the  postwar  period. 

In  March  1945,  Bundy  and  Groves 
worked  out  an  acceptable  arrange- 
ment with  the  British  and  Canadian 
authorities  for  keeping  the  French 
atomic  scientists  (except  Auger  who 
was  now  in  Paris  working  with  Joliot) 
in  the  United  States  or  Canada  until 
the  war  was  over.  In  early  May, 
Auger's  status  temporarily  gave  cause 
for  concern  when  word  reached 
Groves  through  Chadwick  that  Joliot, 
under  pressure  from  one  of  the  min- 
isters in  the  French  government,  felt 
compelled  to  begin  an  active  atomic 
energy  program,  including  a  survey  of 
French  territories  for  uranium  and 
the  start  of  research  projects  for  the 
preparation  of  pure  uranium  metal 
and  graphite.  But  Auger  assured  Brit- 
ish scientists  he  would  take  no  active 
part  in  the  proposed  program,  and  by 
summer  of  1945  atomic  developments 
in  the  United  States  had  reached  a 
point  where  the  French  problem  no 
longer  constituted  a  major  threat  to 
the  security  of  the  Manhattan 
Project.'^ 


"Paper,  [Bundy],  sub:  Problems  With  Respect  to 
the  French,  19  Jan  45,  HB  Files,  Fldr  36,  Tab  I, 
MDR. 


"•Memo,  Groves  to  Secy  War,  13  May  45,  and 
Incl;  Ltr,  Chadwick  to  Groves,  8  May  45,  MDR;  Rpt, 
sub:  Summary  [of  French  Situation],  Incl  to  Memo, 
Groves  to  Secy  State  James  F.  Byrnes,  13  May  45, 
OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  12,  Tab  D, 
MDR. 


CHAPTER  XI 


Security 


The  leaders  of  the  American  atomic 
energy  program,  aware  of  the  tremen- 
dous military  potentiality  of  atomic 
weapons  and  reports  of  German 
atomic  research,  recognized  almost 
from  the  beginning  the  need  for 
maintaining  a  high  degree  of  secrecy. 
An  important  factor  in  their  decision 
in  early  1942  to  turn  over  administra- 
tion of  the  program  to  the  Army  was 
their  conviction  that  it  was  the  organi- 
zation best  prepared  during  wartime 
to  enforce  a  foolproof  system  of  secu- 
rity. Such  a  system  would  ensure  that 
the  Axis  powers  remained  ignorant  of 
Allied  interest  in  developing  atomic 
weapons;  reduce  the  likelihood  that 
the  Axis  states,  particularly  Germany, 
would  accelerate  their  own  efforts  to 
produce  atomic  weapons  and  under- 
take espionage  and  sabotage  activities 
against  the  American  program;  and, 
most  significantly,  from  the  stand- 
point of  military  effectiveness,  aliow 
the  Allies  to  employ  these  weapons 
against  the  Axis  nations  with  maxi- 
mum surprise.^ 


'  Knowledge  of  the  progress  of  the  Germans,  or 
the  other  .Axis  states,  in  atomic  research  and  devel- 
opment was  not  based  upon  precise  and  accurate  in- 
telligence information,  for  such  was  not  available  to 
the  Allies.  Nevertheless,  because  the  Allies  lacked 
specific  information  to  the  contrary,  they  had  to 
assume  that  at  least  Germany  would  make  a  serious 
attempt    to    develop    atomic    weapons.    See    Rpt    to 


Early  Aspects 

First  efforts  to  estabhsh  security  in 
atomic  matters  had  occurred  in  1939, 
when  refugee  physicists  in  the  United 
States  attempted  to  institute  a  volun- 
tary censorship  on  publication  of 
papers  concerning  uranium  fission. 
American  scientists  did  not  accept 
this  suggestion  initially,  but  the  out- 
break of  World  War  II  brought  home 
to  many  of  them  the  need  for  control 
over  publications  relating  to  atomic 
fission.  To  formalize  a  censorship 
program,  the  Division  of  Physical  Sci- 
ences of  the  National  Research  Coun- 
cil in  April  1940  established  a  com- 
mittee that  succeeded  in  getting  most 
scientists  to  withhold  publication  of 
papers  on  sensitive  subjects,  particu- 
larly those  concerned  with  uranium 
fission.  2 

In  June,  when  the  government- 
sponsored    Committee    on    Uranium 


President,  sub:  Status  of  Tube  Alloys  Development, 
9  Mar  42,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Bush  to  President,  same  date, 
HB  Files,  Fldr  58,  MDR;  DSM  Chronolog>,  26  Sep 
42,  Sec.  2(e),  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14,  "Intelli- 
gence &  Security,"  p.  1.1,  DASA;  Groves,  \ow  It 
Can  Be  Told,  140-41;  MPC  Rpt,  7  Aug  44,  Incl  to 
Memo,  Groves  to  Chief  of  Staff,  same  date,  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  K,  MDR. 
2  On  the  early  efforts  to  establish  a  voluntary  cen- 
sorship program  see  the  Prologue  to  this  work  and 
the  Smvth  Report,  pp.  331-32. 


254 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


became  a  subcommittee  of  the  newly 
constituted  National  Defense  Re- 
search Committee  (NDRC),  it  also 
became  subject  to  the  security  meas- 
ures currently  in  efTect  for  federal 
agencies.  The  NDRC,  knowing  that  it 
was  to  be  concerned  chiefly  with 
projects  for  the  Army  and  Navy, 
adopted  security  regulations  that  con- 
formed to  those  of  the  two  military 
services.  Under  these  regulations 
NDRC  subcommittees  were  required 
to  adhere  to  a  policy  of  strict  com- 
partmentalization  of  information,  to 
classify  all  sensitive  materials,  and  to 
obtain  security  clearances  for  all 
employees. 

Transfer  of  the  NDRC  uranium 
program  to  the  Office  of  Scientific 
Research  and  Development  (OSRD) 
in  November  1941  did  not  significant- 
ly alter  existing  security  arrange- 
ments, because  the  OSRD  patterned 
its  own  security  system  largely  along 
the  lines  of  the  NDRC  program.  As 
the  OSRD  became  more  involved  in 
negotiation  and  administration  of 
contracts  with  industrial  and  research 
organizations,  however,  it  expanded 
its  security  controls  to  provide  a  more 
adequate  coverage,  adding  security 
measures  for  personnel  administra- 
tion, classified  information,  and  plant 
protection.^ 

The  modest  OSRD  security  system 
sufficed  until,  in  the  spring  of  1942, 
the  start  of  the  uranium  program's 
rapid  expansion — the  letting  of  nu- 
merous contracts  with  industrial 
firms;  the  employment  and  interac- 
tion of  ultimately  tens  of  thousands  of 
workers,  scientists,  and  engineers; 
and  the  formation  of  complex  organi- 


zations to  construct  and  operate  the 
large-scale  production  plants  and 
their  atomic  communities — enor- 
mously complicated  the  problems  of 
security  just  at  the  time  the  Army  un- 
dertook its  new  role  as  project  admin- 
istrator. Although  these  measures 
were  necessary  for  the  more  rapid 
achievement  of  a  successful  fission 
weapon,  they  also  tended  to  weaken 
security."*  Consequently,  the  Army 
almost  immediately  undertook  a  reor- 
ganization and  expansion  of  the  exist- 
ing OSRD  security  system  and,  even- 
tually, also  endeavored  to  bring  the 
system  more  directly  under  control 
of  the  Manhattan  District.  The  sys- 
tem that  finally  evolved  was  in  many 
respects  unique  and  introduced 
a  number  of  innovations  in  tech- 
nique and  organization  that  subse- 
quently would  be  adopted  as  standard 
features  of  government  security 
programs. 

The  District's  Security  System 

The  security  system,  as  it  took  form 
in  the  newly  established  Manhattan 
District,  resembled  that  already  in  ex- 
istence in  most  other  engineer  dis- 
tricts. Under  Army  regulations  in 
force  in  1942,  the  security  program  of 
an  engineer  district  was  hmited  to 
routine  local  security  requirements. 
When    broader    problems    arose,    the 


^  Stewart,  Organizing  Scientific  Research  for  War,  pp. 
27-31  and  246-55. 


Mbid.,  pp.  246-47;  Ltr,  Compton  to  Conant, 
8  Dec  42,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Rpts), 
MDR.  Compton's  letter  to  Conant  complained  that 
the  security-inspired  policy  of  compartmentaiization 
was  delaying  determination  of  the  purity  standards 
that  must  be  met  for  the  plutonium  to  be  employed 
in  an  atomic  weapon.  This  well  illustrates  the  recur- 
ring conflict  in  the  Manhattan  Project  between  the 
demands  of  the  program  and  the  requirements  of 
security. 


SECURITY 


255 


district  engineer  or  security  officer 
could  call  upon  the  resources  of  the 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  in  the 
War  Department.  Since  June  1939, 
under  provisions  of  a  presidential 
proclamation,  the  War  Department's 
Military  Intelligence  Division  (MID) 
had  shared  responsibility  for  matters 
of  espionage,  counterespionage,  and 
sabotage  in  the  United  States  with  the 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI) 
and  the  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence. 
In  the  latest  revision  (February  1942) 
of  this  Delimitations  Agreement — so 
designated  because  it  set  forth  the 
area  of  jurisdiction  of  each  agency — 
the  MID's  assignment  was  to  cover 
the  military  establishment,  including 
War  Department  civilian  employees 
and  civilians  on  military  reservations 
or  under  military  control,  plus  a  large 
part  of  the  munitions  industry.^ 

Organization  and  Scope 

Colonel  Marshall,  in  organizing  the 
Manhattan  District  security  program 
soon  after  becoming  district  engineer 
in  June  1942,  formed  the  Protective 
Security  Section.  Under  direction  of  a 
member  of  Marshall's  staff,  this  sec- 
tion emphasized  such  aspects  as  per- 
sonnel, plant,  and  military  informa- 
tion security.  At  the  same  time,  to 
provide  the  District  security  staff  with 
counterintelligence     assistance,     Mar- 


niDH.  Bk.  1.  \ol  14.  p.  7.1.  DAS.A,  OCE  Cir 
1070.  sub:  Org  for  Protective  Sctv  Svc  in  OCE 
(>onstr  Div  and  in  OfTire  of  I)iv  and  Area  Engrs, 
15  Jun  42.  CE  025.1  CXP.  Engrs  Eibrary,  Fort  Bel- 
voir,  \'a.;  Ms,  Capt  (".  |.  Bernardo,  "Counterintelli- 
gence Corps  Histor\  and  Mission  in  World  War  11" 
(Fort  Holabird,  Baltimore,  Md.:  CIC  School,  n.d.), 
pp.  4  and  13,  NARS;  Ms,  Army  Service  Forces,  In- 
telligence Division,  "History  of  the  Intelligence  Divi- 
sion," 4  vols.  (Armv  Service  Forces,  ca.  1946), 
1(2):13-14,  l(8):l-2,  l(9):10-n,  NARS;  Groves, 
Sow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p    138. 


shall  arranged  with  the  Assistant 
Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  Maj.  Gen.  George 
V.  Strong,  for  security  liaison  with  the 
MID's  operating  element,  the  Military 
Intelligence  Service  (MIS).  From  his 
staff.  General  Strong  assigned  coun- 
terintelligence responsibility  for  the 
atomic  project  to  Maj.  John  Lansdale, 
Jr.,  who  had  been  a  lawver  in  civilian 
life. 

Because  effective  security  oper- 
ations required  maximum  secrecy, 
Major  Lansdale  personally  visited  the 
Western  Defense  Command  G-2  and 
each  service  command  and  requested 
that  they  each  select  an  officer  to 
report  directly  to  him,  bypassing  both 
the  G-2  and  the  commanding  general 
of  each  service  command.^  To  further 
facilitate  carrying  out  the  internal  se- 
curity functions  for  the  atomic 
project,  Lansdale  also  organized  a 
quasi-clandestine  counterintelligence 
group.  This  group  operated  under 
cover  of  the  Investigation  Review 
Branch,  Assistant  Chief  of  MIS  for  Se- 
curity, which  Lansdale  headed.  He  re- 
ported directly  to  General  Groves, 
and  his  group  in  effect  was  answer- 
able to  the  Manhattan  Project  com- 
mander in  all  substantive  respects, 
even  though  it  functioned  from  the 
G-2  office  in  the  Pentagon."^ 


^  An  organization  formerly  called  a  corps  area, 
serving  as  a  field  agency  of  the  Army  Service  Forces 
in  a  specified  area.  Under  the  reorganization  of  the 
War  Department  on  9  Mar  42,  there  were  nine  geo- 
graphical service  commands  throughout  the  L'nited 
States,  each  providing  services  (including  adminis- 
trative, financial,  legal,  statistical,  medical,  welfare, 
etc.,  for  Army  elements),  constructing  facilities,  fur- 
nishing fixed  communication  services,  and  procur- 
ing, storing,  maintaining,  and  distributing  supplies 
and  equipment  for  Army  use.  See  WD  TM  20-205, 
Diclionarv  of  United  States  Armv  Terms,  1944,  p. 
249. 

^MDH,  Bk.  1,  \ol.  14,  pp.  7.1-7.2,  DASA; 
Groves.  \ow  It  Can   Be   Told,   pp.    138-39;   Marshall 

Continued 


256 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  1  HE  AlOMIC  BOMB 


By  early  1943,  the  pace  of  the  Dis- 
trict's growth — both  geographically 
and  in  terms  of  personnel — and  its  in- 
creasing security  requirements  em- 
phasized the  need  for  a  more  compre- 
hensive counterintelligence  program. 
In  February,  General  Strong  trans- 
ferred Capts.  Horace  K.  Calvert  and 
Robert  J.  McLeod  to  the  District 
headquarters,  where  they  formed  the 
District's  new  Intelligence  Section.  To 
ensure  that  this  section,  which  Cap- 
tain Calvert  headed,  had  full  access  to 
the  intelligence  and  security  facilities 
of  the  Army  service  commands. 
Strong  requested  that  each  command 
designate  a  staff  officer  to  act  as  a 
point  of  liaison  with  the  Manhattan 
District  and,  to  guarantee  secrecy,  au- 
thorized that  each  correspond  directly 
with  Calvert's  section.  At  the  same 
time.  Groves  continued  his  earlier 
practice  of  meeting  with  G-2  officers 
to  make  certain  that  District  security 
problems  were  brought  to  the  atten- 
tion of  appropriate  Army  officials.® 

The  counterintelligence  program 
became  the  foundation  for  a  country- 
wide permanent  organization  of  this 
aspect  of  the  District's  security 
system.  During  the  course  of  the  year, 
the  District  organized  its  own  Coun- 
terintelligence Corps  (CIC)  and,  as  its 
staff  increased  in  size,  assigned  new- 
personnel  to  those  areas  where  there 
was  the  greatest  concentration  of 
project  activities.  Ultimately,  the 
project  had  a  total  of  eleven  branch 
intelligence  offices  at  key  points 
across   the  United   States,   from   New 

Diary,  20  Jul  42,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  Groves 
Files.  Misc  Recs  Sec,  behind  Fldr  5,  MDR;  Ltr,  Lans- 
dale  to  Col  R.  W.  Argo.  Jr.  (Dep  Chief  of  Mil  Hisi), 
3Jan75,  CMH. 

»MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14,  p.  7.2,  DASA;  Groves,  \ow 
II  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  138-39. 


York  to  Pasadena  (Calilbrnia).  An  of- 
ficer assigned  to  a  branch  usually 
worked  out  of  an  area  engineer's 
office  and,  in  addition  to  his  intelli- 
gence duties,  served  as  security  offi- 
cer on  the  engineer's  stafi.  While  in 
matters  of  command  these  officers 
came  under  control  of  the  Manhattan 
District  intelligence  and  security  offi- 
cer and  reported  to  him,  they  also 
maintained  a  direct  liaison  channel 
with  the  director  of  mtcUigence  of  the 
service  command  that  had  jurisdiction 
over  their  area.^ 

Expansion  and  Centralization 

Rapid  growth  also  necessitated  ex- 
pansion of  other  aspects  of  the  Man- 
hattan Project's  security  system.  In 
1942,  the  District's  relatively  modest 
internal  security  organization  had 
served  well  enough  for  a  program 
that  consisted  primarily  of  administer- 
ing research  and  development  activi- 
ties carried  on  in  university  and  in- 
dustrial laboratories;  but,  by  summer 
of  1943,  a  vast  program  of  plant  con- 
struction and  operation  had  begun. 

The  move  of  the  District  headquar- 
ters from  New  York  to  Oak  Ridge  in 
August  provided  an  opportune  time 
for  reorganization.  {See  Chart  2.)  The 
first  step  was  consolidation  in  July  of 
the  Protective  Security  and  Intelli- 
gence Sections.  Captain  Calvert  took 
over  responsibility  for  the  combined 
unit,  designated  the  Intelligence  and 
Security  Section.  Although  this 
change  was  relatively  minor  from  an 
administrative  standpoint  (the  section 
continued  in  a  distinctly  subordinate 
position  in  the  District's  Service  and 


MDH.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14,  pp.  7.2-7.4,  DASA. 


SECURITY 


257 


Control  Division),  it  represented  a 
significant  shift  towards  centralization 
in  security  matters.  This  change  was 
consistent  with  General  Groves's  con- 
viction that  only  through  a  high 
degree  of  centralized  control  could  he 
and  his  administrative  staff  maintain  a 
close  and  constant  scrutiny  over  the 
security  program.  ^° 

Shortly  after  the  District  had  com- 
pleted its  move  to  Oak  Ridge,  a  reor- 
ganization in  the  Army's  administra- 
tion of  counterintelligence  operations 
in  the  zone  of  interior  (ZI)  posed  a 
threat  to  Groves's  control  and  cogni- 
zance over  the  project's  internal  secu- 
rity functions.  To  economize  on  inter- 
nal investigative  operations  and  to 
concentrate  G-2  efforts  on  expanding 
counterintelligence  operations  over- 
seas, the  War  Department  directed 
the  transfer,  effective  1  January  1944, 
of  the  WDGS  (War  Department  Gen- 
eral Staff)  G-2  counterintelligence  ac- 
tivities in  the  ZI  to  the  Office  of  the 
Provost  Marshal  General.  The  effect 
was  to  decentralize  even  further  the 
Army's  ZI  counterintelligence  func- 
tions to  the  service  commands,  in- 
cluding maintenance  of  data  files  on 
individuals  which  Manhattan  intelli- 
gence officials  considered  essential  to 
their  operations.  The  change  also 
seemed  certain  to  enhance  the  diffi- 
culties the  atomic  project  already  was 
experiencing  in  coordinating  its  inter- 
nal security  operations  with  the  serv- 
ice commands.  ^^ 


'"Org  Chans,  U.S.  Engrs  Offire,  MD,  \5  .'Vug 
and  1  Nov  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  (.orresp,  020 
(MED-Org),  MDR;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p. 
139. 

i>  Ms,  ASF,  "Hisl  Intel  Div,  •  1(9):  10-1  1;  Ms,  Ber- 
nardo. "CIC  Hist,"  pp.  14-15.  Both  in  NARS.  WD 
Cir  324,  sub:  Transfer  of  CI  Functions  Within  the 
ZI,  14  Dec  43.  Memos,  CG  OIG  (Maj  Gen  VirgilL. 
Peterson)  to  Dep  Chief  of  Staff  (Lt  Gen  Joseph  T. 


From  his  vantage  point  as  head  of 
the  atomic  project's  counterintelli- 
gence group  inside  G-2,  Colonel 
Lansdale  endeavored  to  have  the 
group  exempted  from  the  reorganiza- 
tion requirements.  When  his  efforts 
failed,  General  Groves  decided  that 
the  only  acceptable  solution  was  to 
move  Lansdale's  unit  into  the  Man- 
hattan District.  The  G-2  sanctioned 
this  change  in  December,  and  Lans- 
dale secured  authorization  to  estab- 
lish a  special  counterintelligence  de- 
tachment. Groves  arranged  for  Lans- 
dale's transfer  to  the  Manhattan  Dis- 
trict; however,  instead  of  placing  him 
in  charge  of  the  new  CIC  Detach- 
ment, he  brought  Lansdale  into  his 
Washington  office  as  his  special  as- 
sistant for  security  affairs.  Lansdale's 
assignment  was  to  keep  the  Manhat- 
tan chief  abreast  of  problems  and  de- 
velopments affecting  internal  security 
and  foreign  intelligence  wherever 
they  might  arise  in  the  project.  ^^ 

The  shift  of  all  project  counterintel- 
ligence activities  to  the  District  re- 
quired major  changes  in  its  security 
organization.  {See  Chart  3.)  The  Intel- 
ligence and  Security  Section  in  Febru- 
ary 1944  became  a  full-fledged  divi- 
sion   and,    in    keeping   with    Groves's 


McNarney),  sub:  Intel  Activities  in  Svc  Cmds,  6  Nov 
43,  and  Col  O.  L.  Nelson  (Asst  to  McNarney)  to  CG 
ASF  and  to  ACS  G-2,  same  sub,  25  Nov  43,  repro- 
duced in  Monograph,  Office  of  the  Provost  Marshal 
General,  'The  Lovaltv  Investigations  Program," 
Tab  45,  CMH  (see  also  pp.  52-58  for  details  on  the 
elimination  of  unnecessary  investigations).  Millett, 
Anny  Sennce  Forces,  pp.  358-59.  Ltr,  Strong  to  CG 
4th  Svc  Cmd,  sub:  Personnel  on  DSM  Proj,  27  Dec 
43,  reproduced  in  MDH.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14,  App.  .\2, 
DASA.  Ibid.,  pp  7.5-7.7,  DASA.  WD  Bur  of  Pub 
Rels,  sub:  Script  for  Radio  Broadcasts,  12  Aug  45, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  000.73  (Radio  Broad- 
casts), MDR. 

'^Ltr,  Lansdale  to  Argo,  3  Jan  75,  CMH;  Testimo- 
ny of  Lansdale  in  Oppenlmmer  Hearing,  pp.  259-60. 


258 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


centralization  policy,  moved  from  the 
Service  and  Control  Division  into  the 
district  engineer's  own  office.  To  re- 
place Captain  Calvert,  whom  Groves 
had  selected  for  a  special  intelligence 
mission  in  London,  Colonel  Nichols — 
the  district  engineer  since  August 
1943 — brought  in  an  experienced  in- 
telligence officer,  Lt.  Col.  William  B. 
Parsons,  to  head  the  new  division.  In 
this  capacity  Parsons  administered  the 
District's  security  program  with  the 
assistance  of  Major  McLeod,  the 
deputy,  and  Capt.  Bernard  W.  Menke, 
the  executive  officer,  and  with  sup- 
port from  a  large  operating  staff  of 
military  and  civilian  personnel.  Al- 
though Parsons  officially  reported  to 
Nichols,  he  personally  kept  General 
Groves  appraised  of  all  developments. 
Expanding  intelligence  and  security 
activities  necessitated  procurement  of 
additional  personnel  to  carry  out  sup- 
portive security  functions,  such  as 
plant  inspections  and  technical  and 
undercover  investigations.  Colonel 
Parsons  drew  25  officers  and  137  en- 
listed men  from  the  War  Depart- 
ment's counterintelligence  manpower 
pool  and  the  District's  personnel  spe- 
cialists recruited  a  large  number  of  ci- 
vilians. In  May  1944,  to  provide  ad- 
ministrative services  for  the  expand- 
ing security  force,  Nichols  activated 
the  13th  Special  Engineer  Detach- 
ment (Provisional)  and  assigned  Par- 
sons the  additional  duty  of  unit  com- 
mander. Concerned  about  achieving 
greater  efficiency  in  security  oper- 
ations. Parsons  requested  and  re- 
ceived permission  in  January  1945  to 
combine  the  13th  with  the  CIC 
Detachment.  ^^ 


By  this  time,  Parsons'  Intelligence 
and  Security  Division  had  become  a 
highly  centralized  unit,  organization- 
ally divided  into  six  separate 
branches:  Clinton  Engineer  Works 
(CEW),  Security,  Administration, 
Safeguarding  Military  Information 
(SMI),  Branch  Offices,  and  Evaluation 
and  Review.  The  CEW,  Security,  and 
Administration  Branches,  for  which 
McLeod  had  direct  responsibility, 
dealt  primarily  with  security  matters 
at  the  Tennessee  site.  The  CEW 
Branch  administered  the  local  civilian 
guard  force  and  the  military  police 
contingent  that  protected  the  Tennes- 
see reservation;  coordinated  subordi- 
nate security  offices  in  the  K-25  (gas- 
eous diffusion),  Y-12  (electromag- 
netic), and  X-10  (pile)  process  areas; 
and,  through  a  board  established  for 
the  purpose,  reviewed  security  cases. 
The  Security  Branch  chiefly  moni- 
tored activities  related  to  security  of 
project  manufacturing  plants,  espe- 
cially at  the  Clinton  site,  and  the  ship- 
ping of  classified  materials  and  equip- 
ment. The  Administration  Branch  was 
concerned  primarily  with  personnel 
security  problems,  both  military  and 
civilian,  but  also  provided  facilities  for 
the  special  handling  of  the  division's 
mail  and  records  and  administered 
certain  confidential  funds. 

The  SMI,  Branch  Offices,  and  Eval- 
uation and  Review  Branches,  for 
which  Captain  Menke  had  direct  re- 
sponsibility,   eventually   evolved   as   a 


•3 Org  Charts,  U.S.  Engrs  OfTice,  MD.  15  Feb  44, 
MDR;    MDH,    Bk.    1.   Vol.    14,   pp.    7.7-7.8,    DASA; 


Memo,  Strong  to  CG  ASF,  sub:  CIC  Detachment  for 
MD,  18  Dec  43,  reproduced  in  ibid.,  App.  B3, 
DASA;  Ltr,  Col  Donald  E.  Antes  (Spec  Insp  for 
Fiscal  Procedures)  to  Groves,  sub:  Investigation  of 
Promotions.  MD  Intel  Br,  13  Jul  45,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Recs  Insp:  Hanford,  1945-46), 
MDR. 


SECURITY 


259 


Changing  of  the  Guard:  Military  Police  Contingent  at  CEW 


central  clearinghouse  for  intelligence 
and  security  matters  that  related  not 
only  to  the  Tennessee  site  but  also  to 
the  various  project  operations  else- 
where. The  principal  responsibility  of 
the  SMI  Branch  was  that  of  project- 
wide  monitoring  of  programs  in  secu- 
rity education,  censorship,  and  the 
handling  of  classified  materials.  The 
Branch  Offices  Branch,  as  its  name 
would  indicate,  was  responsible  for 
coordinating  field  security  operations 
in  the  eleven  geographical  areas 
where  atomic  energy  activities  were  in 
progress  and  for  reporting  the  area 
engineers'  security  problems  to  the 
division's  Evaluation  and  Review 
Branch.  The  latter  branch  concentrat- 
ed in  one  office  functions  hitherto 
performed   by    several   of  the   branch 


intelligence  offices — most  notably, 
those  concerned  with  the  conduct  of 
subversive  investigations  and  the 
preparation  of  special  reports  on  Dis- 
trict security  matters  for  higher 
echelons.  ^^ 

Counterintelligence  Activities 

Counterintelligence  activities  con- 
stituted one  of  the  most  significant 
aspects  of  the  District's  security  pro- 
gram. Through  effective  counterintel- 
ligence measures,  the  District  sought 
to  provide  the  shroud  of  secrecy  nec- 


'^MDH.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14.  pp.  7.2-7.13  and  App.  A7 
(Org  Chart),  DASA;  Memo,  Col  Elmer  E.  Kirkpat- 
rick,  Jr.  (Dep  Dist  Engr)  to  Groves,  sub:  Insp  of 
Intel  Div,  Oak  Ridge,  15  Dec  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  319.1  (Insp  of  Intel  Div),  MDR. 


260 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


essary  to  forestall  all  attempts  by  the 
enemy  not  only  to  gain  information 
about  the  American  atomic  energy 
program  but  also  to  sabotage  it. 

Yet  by  its  very  nature,  the  Manhat- 
tan Project  remained  vulnerable  to  es- 
pionage and  sabotage.  The  District's 
recruitment  of  thousands  of  individ- 
uals with  almost  every  conceivable 
kind  of  background  and  from  all  parts 
of  the  country  made  likely  the  em- 
ployment of  some  potential  spies  and 
saboteurs,  no  matter  how  efficient  its 
clearance  procedures  might  be,  and 
its  widely  scattered  installations  made 
implementation  and  maintenance  of 
uniform  security  procedures  through- 
out the  project  very  difficult.  The  re- 
ality of  these  conditions  forced 
project  leaders  to  assume  that,  sooner 
or  later,  Germany  and  Japan — and 
even  the  Soviet  Union — would  learn 
of  the  atomic  energy  program  and, 
more  importantly,  use  espionage  to 
expand  their  knowledge  of  it  and  sab- 
otage to  destroy  America's  military 
advantage.  ^^ 

1  o  detect  and  counter  potential  es- 
pionage and  sabotage  activities,  the 
District's  GIG  Detachment  relied  pri- 
marily upon  extensive  intelligence  in- 
vestigations. The  majority  of  these  in- 
vestigations were  of  a  preventive 
character,  designed  to  minimize  the 
likelihood  that  security  might  be 
breached.  Of  this  type,  for  example, 
were  the  many  security  checks  into 
the  unauthorized  transmission  of  clas- 
sified information.  In  most  instances, 
GIG  personnel  found  that  the  infor- 
mation leaks  thus  uncovered  were  the 
result  of  carelessness  or  ignorance  on 


the  part  of  the  employee  or  individual 
with  knowledge  of  the  project.  But 
because  it  was  always  possible  such 
leaks  were  surface  ramifications  of 
much  more  dangerous  espionage  ac- 
tivity, all  cases  of  careless  handling  of 
classified  data  received  prompt  and 
rigorous  corrective  action. 

A  second  type  of  preventive  investi- 
gation was  the  supplementary  and 
more  thorough  check  into  the  back- 
ground of  employees  earlier  subject- 
ed to  routine  clearance  procedures. 
Most  supplementary  investigations 
were  made  because  preliminary  data 
indicated  an  employee  might  be  a  po- 
tential security  risk  or  routine  proce- 
dures had  not  produced  adequate  in- 
formation about  the  person's  back- 
ground. Typical  cases  were  those  in- 
volving scientists  or  technicians  who 
recently  had  come  from  abroad,  espe- 
cially those  who  had  come  from  areas 
under  control  of  the  Axis  powers. 
Faced  with  a  continuing  shortage  of 
scientifically  and  technically  trained 
personnel,  project  leaders  early  had 
adopted  the  policy  of  weighing  the 
degree  of  risk  against  the  contribu- 
tions an  employee  with  security  clear- 
ance problems  could  make  in  devel- 
opment of  atomic  weapons.  "All 
procedures  and  decisions  on  security, 
including  the  clearance  of  personnel," 
Groves  recalled,  "had  to  be  based  on 
what  was  believed  to  be  the  overrid- 
ing consideration — completion  of  the 
bomb.  Speed  of  accomplishment  was 
paramount."  ^^ 

Perhaps  the  most  notable  example 
of  the  application  of  Groves's  dictum 
on     employing     talented     individuals 


'*Rpt  to  President,  sub:  Status  of  Tube  Alloys 
Development,  9  Mar  42,  Incl  to  I.tr,  Bush  to  Presi- 
dent, same  date,  MDR. 


'6  Groves,   Xow  It  Can  Be   Told,   pp.    141-42.   See 
also  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14,  pp.  2.1-2.2,  DASA. 


SECURITY 


261 


who  were  security  risks  was  the  case 
of  J.  Robert  Oppenheimer.  When  the 
Manhattan  commander  decided  to  ap- 
point Oppenheimer  as  head  of  the 
Los  Alamos  Laboratory  in  February 
1943,  he  did  so  with  full  knowledge 
that  the  theoretical  physicist,  who  had 
worked  on  the  project  since  late 
1941,  had  only  an  interim  security 
clearance  from  the  OSRD.  OSRD  Di- 
rector V^annevar  Bush,  S-1  Commit- 
tee Chairman  James  B.  Conant,  and 
the  other  scientific  leaders  were  gen- 
erally aware  of  Oppenheimer's  past 
record  of  association  with  Commu- 
nist-related organizations  and  individ- 
uals. They  knew  that  during  the 
1930's  he  had  been  attracted  to  a 
number  of  Communist-front  organiza- 
tions and,  while  never  a  member  of 
the  party  itself,  made  fairly  regular 
contributions  to  Communist-support- 
ed causes.  Communist  fellow-travel- 
ers, including  his  former  fiancee,  were 
among  his  friends,  and  his  wife  and 
brother  and  sister-in-law  were  former 
Communists.  With  the  signing  of  the 
Nazi-Soviet  pact  in  1939,  Oppen- 
heimer had  begun  to  have  serious 
doubts  about  the  Communists;  how- 
ever, he  continued  to  contribute  to 
the  Spanish  War  Relief  through  party 
channels  until  the  spring  of  1942  and 
to  maintain  a  casual  contact  with  his 
former  friends.  ^"^ 

Despite  his  record  of  past  Commu- 
nist associations.  Groves  decided  Op- 
penheimer   was    the    best    choice    to 


'^  Discussion  of  Oppenheimer  security  clearance 
based  on  Oppenheimer  Heating,  especially  testimony  of 
Oppenheimer,  Groves,  Pash,  and  Bush;  Memo, 
Groves  to  Secy  War,  sub:  Loyalty  Clearance  of  J.  R. 
Oppenheimer,  24  Mar  47,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  333.5  (Clearance  Ltrs),  MDR;  Groves,  Com- 
ments on  Draft  Ms  "Now  It  Can  Be  Told,"  LRG; 
Intcrv,  British  writer  Hailey  with  Groves,  13  Dec  57, 
LRG. 


direct  the  bomb  laboratory  at  Los 
Alamos,  for  since  1941  he  had  been 
involved  in  this  aspect  of  research 
and  development  under  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  Director  Arthur  Compton 
and  in  the  summer  of  1942  had 
become  head  of  the  project  team  con- 
centrating on  that  work.  Hardly  had 
Oppenheimer  arrived  at  Los  Alamos 
in  the  spring  of  1943  when  the  ques- 
tion of  his  clearance  arose  in  a  new 
form.  At  the  request  of  the  Manhattan 
commander,  Lt.  Col.  Boris  T.  Pash, 
chief  of  the  Counterintelligence 
Branch  of  the  Western  Defense  Com- 
mand, began  an  investigation  of  sus- 
pected Soviet  espionage  in  the  Radi- 
ation Laboratory  at  Berkeley.  Several 
men  known  or  thought  to  be  associat- 
ed with  Oppenheimer  came  under 
suspicion  and,  as  a  result,  so  did  Op- 
penheimer himself.^®  On  29  June, 
Pash  submitted  his  conclusion  that 
Oppenheimer  "may  still  be  connected 
with  the  Communist  Party."  He  of- 
fered three  possible  courses:  to  re- 
place Oppenheimer  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble; to  train  a  second-in-command  at 
Los  Alamos  as  a  possible  replace- 
ment; and,  Pash's  recommendation, 
to  have  Oppenheimer  meet  with  Gen- 
erals Groves  and  Strong  in  Washing- 
ton so  that  they  could  brief  him  on 
"the  Espionage  Act  and  its  ramifica- 
tions" and  also  instruct  him  that  the 
government  was  fully  aware  of  his 
Communist  "affiliations,"  that  no 
"leakage  of  information"  would  be 
tolerated,  and  that  the  entire  project 
would  be  held  under  "rigid  control." 
In     recommending     this     procedure. 


'®  See  Rpt,  MID,  sub:  Investigations  of  Federa- 
tion of  Architects,  Engineers,  Chemists,  and  Techni- 
cians, Local  25,  13  Aug  43,  Incl  to  Memo,  Groves  to 
Bundy,  17  Aug  43,  HB  Files,  Fldr  61,  MDR. 


262 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Pash  was  of  the  opinion  that  Oppen- 
heimer's  "personal  inchnations  would 
be  to  protect  his  own  future  and  rep- 
utation and  the  high  degree  of  honor 
which  would  be  his  if  his  present 
work  is  successful,  and,  consequently, 
.  .  .  that  he  would  lend  every  effort 
to  cooperating  with  the  Government 
in  any  plan  which  would  leave  him  in 
charge."  In  any  event,  he  suggested, 
Oppenheimer  should  be  told  that  two 
bodyguards  were  being  assigned  to 
protect  him  against  violence  from 
Axis  agents.  These  bodyguards 
should  be  specially  trained  counterin- 
telligence agents  who  would  not  only 
serve  as  bodyguards  but  also  keep  a 
check  on  Oppenheimer.^^ 

Colonel  Pash's  report  did  not 
change  Groves's  opinion.  After  a 
quick  visit  to  Los  Alamos,  during 
which  he  presumably  discussed  mat- 
ters with  Oppenheimer,  Groves  di- 
rected on  15  July  that  he  be  cleared. 
On  his  return  to  Washington  a  few 
days  later,  he  directed  "that  clearance 
be  issued  for  the  employment  of 
Julius  Robert  Oppenheimer  without 
delay,  irrespective  of  the  information 
which  you  have  concerning  Mr.  Op- 
penheimer. He  is  absolutely  essential 
to  the  project."  ^^  As  he  wrote  the 
Secretary  of  War  four  years  later,  "it 
was  apparent  to  me  that  [Oppen- 
heimer] would  not  be  cleared  by  any 
agency  whose  sole  responsibility  was 
military  security.  Nevertheless,  my 
careful  study  made  me  feel  that,  in 
spite   of  [his]    record,   he   was   funda- 


mentally a  loyal  American  citizen  and 
that,  in  view  of  his  potential  over- 
all value  to  the  project,  he  should  be 
employed."  ^^ 

Most  security  cases  investigated  by 
the  District's  CIC  Detachment  in- 
volved breaches  of  classified  informa- 
tion or  allegations  against  employees 
handling  classified  work  of  disloyalty 
to  the  United  States  or  of  affiliation 
with  organizations  espousing  subver- 
sive ideologies.  While  many  such 
cases  presented  the  possibility  of  espi- 
onage, in  fact,  investigations  turned 
up  only  about  one  hundred  instances 
of  such  activity.  When  suspected  cases 
appeared  on  the  increase  in  1943,  the 
Manhattan  commander  selected  a 
number  of  the  District's  own  CIC  per- 
sonnel to  serve  as  special  undercover 
agents.  They  occupied  strategically  lo- 
cated positions  in  project  offices,  lab- 
oratories, and  plants,  set  up  listening 
posts,  checked  intensively  into  per- 
sonnel and  other  records  of  individ- 
uals under  suspicion,  and  took  other 
measures  designed  to  solve  espionage 
cases. ^^ 

The  appointment  of  special  agents 
was  a  move  towards  greater  formali- 
zation of  the  procedure  for  dealing 
with  espionage,  which  continued  to 
increase  as  the  project  grew  in  size 
and  scope.  Another  constructive 
measure  was  the  establishment  of  a 
group      of     permanent      surveillance 


'^  Memo,  Pash  to  Lansdale,  sub:  J.  R.  Oppen- 
heimer, 29  Jun  43,  reproduced  in  Oppenheimer  Hear- 
ing, pp.  821-22. 

2°  Memo  (source  of  quotation).  Groves  to  Dist 
Engr,  sub:  J.  R.  Oppenheimer,  20  Jul  43,  repro- 
duced in  Oppenheimer  Heanng,  p.  170;  Groves  Diary, 
14-20  Jul  43,  LRG. 


2'  Memo,  Groves  to  Secy  War,  sub:  Loyalty  Clear- 
ance of  J.  R.  Oppenheimer,  24  Mar  47,  MDR. 

22  Details  on  appointment  of  special  agents  and 
surveillance  squads  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14, 
pp.  2.3-2.4,  DASA;  Ltr,  Lansdale  to  Argo,  3  Jan  75, 
CMH;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  139;  MPC  Rpt, 
21  Aug  43,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr 
25,  Tab  E,  MDR.  The  section  on  Russian  activities, 
which  deals  with  espionage  incidents  at  Berkeley, 
provides  a  good  example  of  Groves's  reports  to  the 
Top  Policy  Group  on  intelligence  developments. 


SECURITY 


263 


squads  to  carry  out  supplemental  and 
nonroutine  personnel  investigations. 
Members  of  these  squads,  as  well  as 
other  District  security  agents,  soon 
became  adept  in  employing  profes- 
sional counterespionage  techniques 
and  in  using  such  surveillance  equip- 
ment as  cameras  with  special  lenses 
(telephoto  and  other  types)  and  con- 
cealable  listening  and  recording  de- 
vices. During  their  investigations  of 
persons  suspected  of  espionage  activi- 
ties, either  District  employees  or  indi- 
viduals who  had  contact  with  project 
personnel,  the  agents  operated  in  the 
guise  of  diverse  roles — to  mention 
only  a  few,  hotel  clerks,  bell  captains, 
tourists,  electricians,  painters,  con- 
tractors, and  gamblers. 

To  ensure  effective  functioning  and 
control  of  the  surveillance  squads  and 
other  special  security  agents  on  a 
countrywide  basis.  District  security  of- 
ficials developed  new  channels  of 
coordination  and  communication. 
Through  Colonel  Lansdale's  counter- 
intelligence staff  at  Groves's  Washing- 
ton headquarters,  field  security  teams 
at  the  various  branch  intelligence  of- 
fices had  access  to  information  from 
the  FBI  and  other  government  securi- 
ty agencies.  These  field  teams  also 
had  to  file  written  reports  of  their 
findings  and  activities  on  a  regular 
basis  with  the  Evaluation  and  Review 
Branch  of  the  Intelligence  and  Securi- 
ty Division.  As  these  reports  accumu- 
lated in  the  files  at  District  headquar- 
ters, they  became  an  important  source 
of  information  for  operation  of  the 
whole  counterintelligence  program. 
General  Groves,  in  particular,  made 
use  of  the  data  garnered  from  these 
reports  in  concert  with  information 
acquired      from      other      government 


agencies  in  preparing  his  periodic 
Military  Policy  Committee  and  Top 
Policy  Group  briefings  on  intelligence 
developments  affecting  the  atomic 
program. 

Espionage  Incidents 

The  most  serious  espionage  activity 
came  not  from  the  enemy  but  from 
America's  wartime  ally:  Soviet  Russia. 
Having  in  the  United  States  a  large 
diplomatic  and  consular  staff  as  well 
as  other  officials  for  overseeing  lend- 
lease  and  other  assistance  programs, 
the  Russians  had  a  more  than  ade- 
quate reservoir  of  personnel  for  main- 
taining an  extensive  espionage  appa- 
ratus in  this  country.  Soviet  agents, 
masking  as  diplomatic  and  consular 
officials,  turned  to  members  of  the 
Communist  Party  of  the  United  States 
and  to  party  sympathizers  for  assist- 
ance in  penetrating  American  wartime 
institutions  and  projects.  The  Rus- 
sians, making  the  plea  that  the  Ameri- 
can government  was  withholding  im- 
portant information  and  thus  unnec- 
essarily delaying  Allied  victory,  re- 
cruited many  native  Communists  and 
fellow-travelers  to  assist  them  in  ob- 
taining vital  secrets  about  wartime 
activities. ^^ 

As  early  as  February  1943,  counter- 
intelligence agents  of  the  FBI  and 
Western  Defense  Command  became 
aware  that  the  Russians  were  obtain- 
ing data  concerning  activities  of  the 
Radiation  Laboratory  at  the  Universi- 
ty of  California.  Further  investigation 
revealed  that,  in  October  1942,  a 
leading  member  of  the  American 
Communist  Party  on  the  West  Coast 


23  Ms.  ASF,  "Hist  Intel  Div,"  1(7):8-10,  NARS. 


264 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


had  advised  a  fellow  party  member 
employed  at  the  Radiation  Laboratory 
to  retain  his  position  so  he  could 
obtain  knowledge  of  the  secret  work 
under  way  there.  This  employee  and 
other  Communists  or  Communist 
sympathizers  working  at  the  laborato- 
ry were  passing  on  information  about 
the  atomic  project  at  Berkeley  to 
Communist  Party  members,  who 
promptly  turned  it  over  to  the  Soviet 
vice  consul  in  San  Francisco.  Evi- 
dence came  to  light  in  early  April  that 
a  high  official  in  the  Soviet  embassy 
in  Washington  had  recently  given 
money  to  a  West  Coast  Communist 
leader,  to  be  used  for  espionage.  In- 
tensive investigation  by  Western  De- 
fense Command  counterintelligence 
agents  resulted  in  prompt  identifica- 
tion of  those  Radiation  Laboratory 
employees  who  were  engaging  in  es- 
pionage activities.  The  laboratory  dis- 
charged the  suspects  and,  where  fea- 
sible, the  Army  inducted  them  into 
service,  placing  them  in  nonsensitive 
assignments  in  which  they  could  be 
kept  under  regular  observation.^'* 

The  District's  CIC  Detachment 
scarcely  had  completed  breaking  the 
original  espionage  chain  at  Berkeley 
when,  in  late  August,  Oppenheimer 
reported  his  suspicion  that  new  leaks 
apparently  had  developed  in  the  lab- 
oratory's security  system.  On  the  oc- 
casion of  a  visit  to  Berkeley,  Oppen- 
heimer met  with  Colonel  Pash  and 
told     him     he    had     learned     that     a 


24MPC  Rpt.  21  Aug  43,  MDR;  MPC  Min,  29  i:)ec 
44,  Exhibit  F  (summary  of  L'.S. -based  counterintelli- 
gence developments  affecting  Manhattan  Proj), 
OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A. 
MDR;  Rpt,  sub:  Siunmary  [of]  Russian  Situation, 
Incl  to  Memo,  Groves  to  Secy  State  James  F. 
Byrnes,  13  May  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP 
Files,  Fldr  12,  tab  D,  MDR. 


member  of  the  University  of  Califor- 
nia staff,  a  man  who  had  been  a  close 
friend,  was  acting  as  an  intermediary 
for  transmission  of  data  from  certain 
Radiation  Laboratory  employees  to 
representatives  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
By  Oppenheimer's  account,  his  friend 
had  been  recruited  by  an  official  of 
the  Federation  of  Architects,  Engi- 
neers, Chemists,  and  Technicians,  a 
CIO  (Congress  of  Industrial  Organi- 
zations) union  currently  trying  to  or- 
ganize employees  of  the  Radiation 
Laboratory.  In  subsequent  question- 
ing, Oppenheimer  refused  to  disclose 
the  name  of  his  friend  on  the  grounds 
that  he  was  certain  the  friend  was  no 
longer  passing  information  to  Soviet 
representatives.  Oppenheimer's  un- 
cooperativeness  at  this  juncture  re- 
sulted in  the  Manhattan  commander 
taking  personal  action.  Groves 
promptly  met  with  the  Los  Alamos 
Laboratory  chief  and,  because  the  se- 
curity of  the  atomic  project  was  at 
stake,  ordered  him  to  reveal  the  name 
of  his  friend.  Faced  with  Groves's  in- 
sistence in  the  matter,  Oppenheimer 
named  Haakon  Chevalier,  a  professor 
of  romance  languages  at  the  Universi- 
ty of  California.  A  short  time  later, 
the  university  dismissed  Chevalier 
from  his  teaching  post  and  he  left 
Berkeley.  In  retrospect,  the  likelihood 
that  Chevalier  passed  any  classified 
information  about  the  project  to  the 
United  States  seems  remote. ^^ 


2^  In  1954,  Oppenheimer  testified  before  the 
AEC's  Personnel  Security  Board,  which  was  holding 
hearings  to  consider  serious  charges  against  the 
former  director  of  the  Los  Alamos  Laboratory  that 
would  lead  ultimately  to  the  withdrawal  of  his  gov- 
ernment security  clearance.  Oppenheimer  admitted 
that  he  had  fabricated  the  story  about  Chevaliers 
espionage  activities;  however,  he  never  adequately 

C.oniinued 


seciirhv 


265 


rhc  (Ihcvalier  case  was  not  the 
final  incident  of  espionage  at  the  Ra- 
diation Laboratory.  Less  than  a  year 
later,  another  serious  security  leak 
had  developed  there.  With  assistance 
from  Communist  Party  members 
living  in  the  San  Francisco  area,  a  key 
scientist  from  the  laboratory  met  with 
officials  from  the  local  Soviet  consul- 
ate. The  scientist  passed  on  informa- 
tion concerning  the  pile  process,  cer- 
tain chemical  data,  and  the  recently 
arrived  British  scientists.  The  Dis- 
trict's CIC  Detachment  was  able  to 
end  this  espionage  activity  effectively 
by  securing  immediate  discharge  of 
the  offending  scientist,  after  which,  as 
far  as  is  known,  representatives  of  the 
Soviet  Union  made  no  further  at- 
tempts to  get  information  from  the 
Berkeley  project.  ^^ 

Meanwhile,  probably  acting  on  the 
l)asis  of  information  gained  at  the  Ra- 
diation Laboratory,  the  Russians  had 
assigned  one  of  their  best  men  to  the 
Chicago  area,  with  the  task  of  estab- 
lishing an  espionage  channel  at  the 
Metallurgical  Laboratory.  By  early 
1944,    this   Soviet    agent,   who   was   a 

explained  whv  he  had  done  so.  Oppcnheinier's  testi- 
mony in  1954  and  documents  relating  to  it  are  in 
Oppenheimer  Heunng,  passim.  For  fuller  accounts  of 
the  Oppenheimer  case  sec  Strauss,  Men  and  Deci- 
sions, pp.  267-95,  and  Philip  M.  Stern,  The  Oppen- 
heimer Case:  Serunty  on  Trial  (New  \'ork:  Harper  and 
Row,  1969).  For  further  details  on  espionage  activi- 
ties at  the  Radiation  Laboratory  and  the  Oppen- 
heimer case  see  MPC  Rpt.  4  Feb  44,  OCG  Files, 
(;en  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25.  Tab  C.  MDR;  Rpt. 
sub:  Summary  [of]  Russian  Situation,  Incl  to  Memo, 
Cirovcs  to  Byrnes.  13  May  45,  MDR;  Intcrv,  Author 
with  Lt  Col  Peer  de  Silva  (former  (^IC  staff  member, 
(i-2.  West  Def  Cmd,  with  special  assignment  to 
Rad  Lab),  8  Apr  75.  CMH;  Diary  of  Lt  Col  E.  H. 
Marsden  (hereafter  cited  as  Marsden  Diary),  20  July 

43,  OROO.  Marsden  was  the  District's  executive 
olluer. 

-'^MPC  Mm,    10  Mav  44,  MDR;  MPC  Rpt,  7  Aug 

44,  MDR;  Rpt,  sub:  SunmiarN  |oi|  Russian  Situ;.li<)n. 
hid  to  Memo,  Cioves  to  BMurs.   13  Mav  45,  MDR. 


highly  trained  engineer  with  working 
experience  in  both  Russian  and 
American  industry,  had  made  contacts 
with  several  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
employees.  By  the  time  the  FBI 
learned  of  his  activities  in  April,  the 
Soviet  agent  had  obtained  consider- 
able technical  information,  which  he 
had  passed  on  to  the  Russian  consul- 
ate in  New  York.  Once  identified,  the 
laboratory  summarily  dismissed  the 
suspected  employees.  Subsequently, 
the  District's  CIC  Detachment  discov- 
ered that  one  of  the  discharged  work- 
ers— a  reserve  officer  who  had  been 
called  to  active  duty  and  assigned  to 
the  Northwest  Territory  in  Canada — 
had  taken  highly  classified  material 
with  him  when  he  left  the  Metallurgi- 
cal Laboratory.  Fortunately,  District 
security  officials  were  able  to  arrange 
for  confiscation  of  this  material  (it 
was  located  in  the  officer's  baggage) 
and  for  transfer  of  the  officer  to  a 
post  in  the  Pacific  Theater  of  Oper- 
ations where  he  would  have  no  op- 
portunity to  pass  on  his  knowledge  to 
Russia  or  the  Axis  powers. ^^ 

Judged  in  terms  of  the  ultimate  util- 
ity of  the  information  gained,  Russian 
efforts  at  espionage  at  the  Los 
Alamos  Laboratory  in  late  1944  and 
early  1945 — the  crucial  period  of 
bomb  development — were  the  most 
successful  of  the  wartime  period.  But 
project  counterintelligence  agents  did 
not  learn  of  this  activity  until  the  late 
summer  of  1945,  after  the  war  was 
over.  In  a  sensational  postwar  trial, 
Julius  and  Ethel  Rosenberg  and 
Morton  Sobell  were  convicted  of  steal- 
ing classified  data  from  the  laboratory 


^'Rpt,  sub:  Summarv  |ofl   Russian  Situation,   Incl 
to  Memo,  Cloves  to  Bvtnes,  13  Mav  45.  MDR. 


266 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


with  the  assistance  of  Mrs.  Rosen- 
berg's brother,  David  Greenglass,  an 
Army  sergeant  at  Los  Alamos,  and  of 
transmitting  it  to  Russian  agents.  Los 
Alamos,  too,  was  the  place  where  the 
German  refugee  scientist,  Klaus 
Fuchs,  while  serving  as  a  member  of 
the  British  team  sent  to  the  United 
States  under  the  interchange  pro- 
gram, gained  a  substantial  part  of  the 
technical  knowledge  of  the  bomb  that 
he  subsequently  passed  on  to  the 
Russians,  first  in  June  1945  and 
thence  periodically  until  his  arrest  by 
British  authorities  in  early  1950.^^ 

Project  leaders  also  had  antici- 
pated that,  as  the  Russians,  the 
Axis  powers — particularly  Germany — 
would  launch  an  equally  vigorous  es- 
pionage campaign,  but  they  uncov- 
ered no  evidence  of  such  activity 
during  the  war.  In  early  1944,  at  a 
time  when  available  Allied  intelli- 
gence indicated  that  the  Germans 
might  well  have  attained  an  advanced 
stage  in  the  development  of  atomic 
weapons,  the  Military  Policy  Commit- 
tee reported  to  the  Top  Policy  Group 
that  "no  espionage  activities  by  the 
Axis  nations  with  respect  to  this 
project  have  been  discovered,  al- 
though there  have  been  suspicious 
indications."  ^^ 

Measures  Against  Sabotage 

In  a  project  where  the  ultimate  goal 
depended   upon   continuous   progress 


^*  Postwar  revelations  of  espionage  activities  at 
Los  Alamos  during  Worid  War  II  may  be  traced  in 
Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  143-45,  and  in  Rich- 
ard G.  Hewlett  and  Francis  Duncan,  Atomic  Shield. 
1947-1952.  A  Histon,-  of  the  United  States  Atomic 
Energy  Commission,  Vol.  2  (University  Park,  Pa.: 
Pennsvlvania  State  University  Press,  1969),  pp.  312- 
14,415,472. 

29MPC  Rpt,  4  Feb  44,  MDR. 


in  intricate  and  closely  related  pro- 
duction processes,  unscheduled 
delays  or  interruptions  of  any  kind 
could  be  disastrous.  Sabotage  in  any 
form,  whether  perpetrated  by  outsid- 
ers or  insiders  bent  upon  slowing 
down  or  disrupting  a  particular  pro- 
cess, constituted  an  ever-present 
hazard.  Recognizing  the  seriousness 
of  this  threat.  General  Groves  direct- 
ed that  any  suspicion  of  sabotage  be 
reported  to  him  immediately.  In  keep- 
ing with  Groves's  policy  of  constant 
vigilance  to  detect  any  hint  of  sabo- 
tage, the  District's  CIC  Detachment 
thoroughly  investigated  every  instance 
of  mechanical  failure,  equipment 
breakdown,  fire,  accident,  or  similar 
occurrence  not  readily  attributable  to 
normal  causes,  and  kept  under  con- 
stant observation  all  processes  and  ac- 
tivities that  might  attract  the  efforts  of 
saboteurs.  In  addition,  other  security 
personnel  regularly  inspected  the  se- 
curity systems  and  personnel  clear- 
ance procedures  at  the  project's  vari- 
ous installations,  with  the  objective  of 
detecting  and  correcting  possible 
weaknesses  that  might  invite 
sabotage.  ^° 

Illustrative  of  Groves's  policy  was 
the  investigation  into  the  mystifying 
failure  of  the  first  great  magnets  in- 
stalled in  the  electromagnetic  plant  at 
the  Clinton  Engineer  Works.  Follow- 
ing a  brief  period  of  operation,  the 
magnets  began  to  malfunction.  After 


aoMDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14,  pp.  2.5-2.6,  DASA.  For  a 
detailed  discussion  of  typical  measures  undertaken 
to  provide  for  the  physical  and  personnel  security  of 
a  specific  project  installation — in  this  instance,  the 
gaseous  diffusion  project  at  Clinton — see  MDH, 
Bk.  2,  Vol.  1,  "General  Features,"  pp.  6.2-6.3,  Vol. 
2.  "Research,"  pp.  9.2-9.4,  Vol.  3,  "Design,"  pp. 
16.2-16.6,  Vol.  4,  "Construction,"  p.  4.2,  and  \'oI. 
5,  "Operation,"  pp.  9.2-9.10,  DASA. 


SECURITY 


267 


disassembling  one  of  the  magnets 
piece  by  piece,  Kellex  engineers 
found  that  in  its  oil  circulation  and 
cooling  system  rust  and  dirt  particles 
were  bridging  the  gaps  between  the 
silver  bands  forming  the  coil  compo- 
nent, which  they  attributed  to  the 
manufacturer's  failure  to  maintain 
sufficiently  rigid  standards  of  cleanli- 
ness. The  significance  of  this  incident 
was  that  it  revealed  the  inherent  vul- 
nerability of  the  electromagnetic  in- 
stallations and  the  need  for  constant 
surveillance  in  order  to  thwart  possi- 
ble sabotage.  ^^ 

The  district's  continuous  and  thor- 
ough efforts  to  protect  the  project's 
installations  and  operations  against 
sabotage  were  signally  successful. 
During  the  war  years,  there  were  no 
definitely  established  incidents  of  sab- 
otage traceable  to  enemy  agents.  In 
most  cases  where  breakdowns  or 
other  failures  occurred  under  suspi- 
cious circumstances,  investigations  re- 
vealed they  were  probably  the  result 
of  causes  other  than  enemy  sabotage. 
For  example,  during  construction  of 
the  original  gaseous  diffusion  plant  at 
the  Tennessee  site,  inspectors  discov- 
ered someone  had  driven  nails 
through  the  rubber  coverings  of  vital 
electric  cables  leading  underground 
from  the  power  plant  to  the  main 
production  plant.  The  perpetrators  of 
this  act  were  never  found,  although 
the  evidence  indicated  strongly  it  was 
the  work  of  disgruntled  employees. ^^ 


3' Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  104-05;  MDH, 
Bk.  5,  Vol.  3,  "Design,"  p.  4.6,  and  Vol.  5,  "Con- 
struction," pp.  3.10-3.11,  DASA. 

32  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  112-13;  Com- 
pletion Rpt,  M.  W.  Kellogg  Co.  and  Kellex  Corp., 
sub:  K-25  Plant,  Contract  W-7405-eng-23,  31  Oct 
45,  p.  12,  OROO. 


A  quite  different  type  of  interfer- 
ence with  plant  operation  briefly 
threatened  the  Hanford  Engineer 
Works  in  early  1945.  Groves  reported 
to  the  Military  Policy  Committee  in 
February  that  Army  and  Navy  intelli- 
gence had  recorded  more  than  fifty 
incidents  of  Japanese  balloons  at  vari- 
ous sites  along  the  Pacific  Coast, 
some  of  them  carrying  incendiary  and 
fragmentation  bombs.  While  none  of 
these  appears  to  have  been  directed 
specifically  against  the  Hanford  instal- 
lations, on  10  March  a  balloon  of  this 
type  struck  a  high-tension  transmis- 
sion line  running  between  the  Grand 
Coulee  and  Bonneville  generating  sta- 
tions and  caused  an  electrical  surge 
through  the  interconnecting  Hanford 
line  that  carried  power  to  the  produc- 
tion piles.  Automatic  safety  devices  at 
the  three  piles  were  activated,  briefly 
shutting  down  their  operation.  For- 
tunately, the  bombs  attached  to  the 
balloon  did  not  explode  and  the 
transmission  line  was  not  seriously 
damaged. ^^ 

Other  Functions 

One  of  the  most  unusual  duties  as- 
signed to  the  District's  CIC  Detach- 
ment was  that  of  furnishing  body- 
guards for  key  Manhattan  scientific 
leaders.  CIC  personnel  accompanied 
J.  Robert  Oppenheimer,  Ernest  Law- 
rence, Arthur  Compton,  and  Enrico 
Fermi  almost  continuously.  They  ac- 
companied other  scientists  at  inter- 
vals, when  they  were  at  work  on 
projects    that    required    their    special 


^^MPC  Min,  24  Feb  45,  MDR;  Memo,  Matthias  to 
Groves,  sub:  10  Mar  45  Power  Outage,  29  Mar  45, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  675,  MDR;  Matthias 
Diary,  25  Feb  and  10-1 1  Mar  45,  OROO. 


268 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


protection.  Colonel  Marshall  had 
originated  the  idea  of  bodyguards, 
suggesting  that  they  serve  also  as 
drivers,  to  conceal  their  true  function 
and  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  acci- 
dents. Compton's  bodyguard,  a 
former  Chicago  policeman,  traveled 
with  him  in  the  guise  of  a  special  as- 
sistant. When  Compton  was  in  resi- 
dence at  Oak  Ridge,  his  guard  served 
as  a  member  of  the  local  police  force. 
District  security  officials  exercised 
considerable  care  in  selecting  individ- 
uals for  bodyguards,  seeking  those 
who  had  demonstrated  ability  to 
adapt  themselves  readily  to  the  kind 
of  situations  in  which  scientists  were 
likely  to  be  involved. ^^ 

Safeguarding  Militayy  informatwn 

Even  though  District  security  offi- 
cials had  planned  and  implemented  a 
multi-faceted  security  system  to  pro- 
tect all  aspects  of  project  operations 
and  developments,  they  fully  realized 
that  maintenance  of  total  secrecy  in 
such  a  vast  project  was  unlikely.  What 
was  more  feasible,  they  believed,  was 
to  prevent  leakage  of  any  useful 
knowledge  of  the  program's  special 
scientific  concepts,  industrial  tech- 
niques, and  military  objectives — or,  in 
Army  parlance,  "safeguarding  military 
information."  ^^ 


s-'MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14,  pp.  2.10-2.11,  DASA: 
Marsden  Diary,  20  Jul  43,  OROO;  Nichols,  Com- 
ments on  Draft  Hist  "Manhattan,"  Incl  to  I.tr,  Nich- 
ols to  Chief  of  Mil  Hist,  25  Mar  74.  CMH:  Comp- 
ton, ,4/om/f  Q««/,  pp.  183-84. 

35  AR  380-5,  28  Sep  42.  The  War  Department 
issued  a  substantially  revised  version  ot  AR  380-5 
on  15  Mar  44,  adding  the  category  Top  Secret  to 
the  previously  existing  categories  Secret,  Confiden- 
tial, and  Restricted.  See  Sec.  1,  par.  3. 


Compartmentalization  Policy 

Under  the  provisions  of  Army  secu- 
rity regulations,  the  basic  responsibil- 
ity for  the  protection  of  classified  in- 
formation rested  upon  "all  military 
personnel,  civilian  employees  of  the 
War  Department,  and  .  .  .  the  man- 
agement and  employees  of  all  com- 
mercial firms  engaged  in  classified 
work  or  projects  for  the  War  Depart- 
ment." ^^  In  applying  this  principle  to 
the  atomic  program.  District  security 
officials  placed  particular  emphasis 
upon  limiting  the  amount  of  classified 
information  permitted  to  any  single 
individual  or  group  of  individuals. 
District  security  regulations  estab- 
lished two  basic  rules  which  were  to 
"govern  the  right  to  possess  classified 
information";  a  person  must  need  the 
information  in  order  to  carry  out  his 
job  and  have  access  only  to  the 
amount  of  information  "necessary  for 
him  to  execute  his  function."  To 
make  doubly  certain  an  individual  em- 
ployee was  restricted  to  "the  mini- 
mum necessary  for  the  proper 
performance  of  his  duties,"  District 
regulations  further  directed  that  "em- 
ployees .  .  .  shall  be  organized  into 
small  working  groups  or  teams  so  far 
as  possible,  each  working  on  its  own 
phase  of  the  job  and  not  being  per- 
mitted to  inspect  or  discuss  the  work 
being  done  by  others."  ^"^ 

This  compartmentalization  policy 
became  a  far  more  pervasive  influ- 
ence in  the  project  after  the  Army  as- 


36  Ibid.,  Sec.  1.  par.  9. 

3' Qiiotations  from  MD,  Intel  Bull  5,  Safeguard- 
ing Mil  Info  Regs,  27  Nov  43  (revised  1  Sep  44), 
Sec.  3,  reproduced  hi  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14,  App. 
B7.  DASA. 


SECURITY 


269 


Security  Sign  at  the  Tennessee  Site 


sumed  full  responsibility  for  its  ad- 
ministration. Where  the  OSRD  had 
applied  compartmentalization  primar- 
ily to  research  and  development  orga- 
nizations, the  Army  incorporated  it 
into  virtually  every  type  of  activity  un- 
dertaken by  the  project.  Typical  was 
the  District's  insistence  that  produc- 
tion plant  blueprints  be  broken  down 
and  distributed  in  such  a  way  as  to 
reveal  as  little  as  possible  to  any  one 
individual  about  the  overall  character 
of  the  project.  Similarly,  the  District 
required  that  equipment  orders  to 
commercial  firms  specify  that  an  item 
not  be  manufactured  and  assembled 
at  the  same  location.  And  when  the 
production  plants  reached  the  point 
of  start-up  operations,  plant  managers 
received  instructions  to  split  up 
orders    for    raw    materials    among    a 


number  of  suppliers  so  that  the  pur- 
pose for  which  they  were  being  used 
could  not  be  readily  ascertained. 

While  project  leaders  agreed  that 
some  compartmentalization  of  infor- 
mation was  necessary,  considerable 
difference  of  opinion  prevailed  on  the 
extent  of  limiting  scientific  and  tech- 
nical interchange,  both  between  sec- 
tions functioning  within  a  laboratory 
or  plant  and  between  the  various  in- 
terrelated installations  of  the  project. 
Military  administrators,  in  contrast  to 
their  civilian  counterparts,  favored  the 
enforcement  of  stricter  controls. 
These  generally  took  the  form  of 
written  agreements  covering  those  or- 
ganizations and  installations  that 
needed  to  exchange  data.  The  agree- 
ments specified  in  detail  how  and 
what     information     could     be     inter- 


270 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


changed.  Inevitably  occasions  arose 
when  developments  required  inter- 
change of  classified  information  not 
covered  in  agreements.  In  such  in- 
stances, project  leaders  applied  di- 
rectly to  the  district  engineer  or  to 
General  Groves  for  special  permission 
to  exchange  the  data  needed.^® 

One  of  the  most  important  inter- 
change arrangements  formed  oc- 
curred in  June  1943,  when  General 
Groves  met  with  Compton  and  Op- 
penheimer  for  the  purpose  of  estab- 
lishing "the  principles  which  should 
govern  the  interchange  of  information 
between  the  Chicago  [Metallurgical 
Laboratory]  and  Los  Alamos  proj- 
ects. .  .  ."  As  a  basic  criterion  deter- 
mining what  information  should  be 
interchanged,  they  set  up  the  test  that 
only  data  that  would  "benefit  work  at 
both  Chicago  and  Los  Alamos" 
should  be  exchanged.  The  agreement 
that  resulted  spelled  out,  in  consider- 
able detail,  exactly  what  information 
could  and  could  not  be  interchanged 
(the  latter  included  those  categories 
relating  to  production  piles,  military 
weapons,  and  the  time  schedules  of 
various  developments);  designated  by 
name  those  individuals  at  each  instal- 
lation who  were  qualified  to  carry  on 
interchange;  and  outlined  exact  pro- 
cedures of  exchange — by  formal  re- 
ports, secret  correspondence,  or  visits 
and  conferences.  On  the  most  sensi- 
tive matters,  or  where  there  was  seri- 
ous doubt  about  interchange,  the  only 


38  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  80  and  140; 
Govving,  Britain  and  Atomic  Energy,  p.  150;  Talk, 
Groves  to  Women's  Patriotic  Conf  on  Natl  Def  (25- 
27  Jan  46),  sub:  "The  Atomic  Bomb,"  Admin  Files. 
Gen  Corresp,  337  (Women's  Patriotic  Conf  on  Natl 
DeO.  MDR;  Memo,  Marshall  to  Only  Those  Con- 
cerned, sub:  DSM  Proj-Clinton  Engr  Works,  18  May 
43.  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  28,  Tab 
A,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.   1,  Vol.   14,  pp.  6.3-6.4,  DASA. 


channel  of  exchange  was  through  a 
visit  to  the  Chicago  laboratory  by 
either  Oppenheimer  or  a  specifically 
designated  group  leader.  Although 
negotiators  of  the  agreement  must 
have  been  aware  of  the  generally  re- 
strictive character  of  its  provisions, 
they  nevertheless  emphasized  that  its 
major  objective  was  "to  maintain  as 
rapid  and  effective  interchange  of  in- 
formation as  possible."  ^^ 

Compartmentalization  of  informa- 
tion probably  aroused  more  adverse 
criticism — both  from  participants  in 
the  atomic  program  and  from  some  of 
those  who,  in  retrospect,  have  re- 
viewed its  history — than  any  other 
single  aspect  of  the  project's  security 
system.  Among  the  participants,  the 
most  vociferous  critics  were  the  scien- 
tists, accustomed  to  working  in  col- 
lege and  university  laboratories  where 
they  could  freely  interchange  the  re- 
sults of  their  work  with  scientific  col- 
leagues in  all  parts  of  the  world. 
Project  scientists,  such  as  Leo  Szilard, 
held  that  overcompartmentalization 
was  a  primary  cause  of  extended 
delays  in  achievement  of  scientific  and 
technical  objectives  of  the  program. 
Testifying  before  a  committee  of 
Congress  after  the  war,  he  asserted, 
for  example,  that  "compartmentaliza- 
tion of  information  was  the  cause  for 
.  .  .  failure  to  realize  that  light  urani- 
um [U-235]  might  be  produced  in 
quantities  sufficient  to  make  atomic 
bombs.  .  .  .  We  could  have  had  it 
eighteen  months  earlier.  .  .  .  We  did 
not  put  two  and  two  together  because 
the  two  two's  were  in  a  different  com- 


^^  Memo,  Groves  to  Compton  and  Oppenheimer, 
sub:  Interchange  of  Info  Between  Chicago  and  Los 
Alamos,  17  Jun  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201 
(Tolman),  MDR. 


SECURITY 


271 


partment.  .  .  ."  *°  On  another  occa- 
sion he  contended  also  that  compart- 
mentalization  was  not  really  "too  suc- 
cessful" because  "significant  matters 
gradually  leak  through  anyway."  "^^ 

Joining  Szilard  in  condemning  com- 
partmentalization  in  the  strongest 
possible  terms  was  Edward  U. 
Condon,  the  prominent  American 
physicist  who  had  come  to  the  atomic 
project  from  the  Westinghouse  Re- 
search Laboratories.  In  fact,  after 
spending  only  a  month  at  Los 
Alamos,  Condon  came  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  he  would  be  of  more  use  to 
the  war  effort  at  Westinghouse  than 
at  the  New  Mexico  laboratory.  The 
project's  security  policy,  he  asserted, 
had  a  morbidly  depressing  effect  on 
him.  "I  feel  so  strongly,"  he  contin- 
ued, "that  this  policy  puts  you  in  the 
position  of  trying  to  do  an  extremely 
difficult  job  with  three  hands  tied 
behind  your  back  that  I  cannot  accept 
the  view  that  such  internal  compart- 
mentalization  ...  is  proper."  ^^ 

Most  other  contemporary  critics 
took  a  somewhat  less  extreme  posi- 
tion. Concerned  about  insufficient  in- 
terchange of  data  among  atomic 
project  scientists  causing  delays  in  the 
solutions  of  problems  related  to 
bomb  development,  Compton  sug- 
gested to  the  OSRD  S-1  Committee 
in   December    1942    that   it   might   be 


'"'  Excerpts  from  Szilard's  statements  before  Sen- 
ate Special  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  given  in 
Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves,  12  Jan  46,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  201  (Szilard),  MDR. 

■**  Memo  for  File,  William  S.  Shurcliff,  sub:  Tran- 
script of  Notes  Taken  on  8-11  Oct  44  Trip  to  Chi- 
cago, 14  Oct  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  001 
(Mtgs),  MDR.  Shurcliff,  a  liaison  official  with  the 
OSRD,  talked  to  Szilard  about  security  measures 
and  recorded  his  comments  in  this  memorandum. 

''^  Ltr,  Condon  to  Oppenheimer,  26  Apr  43,  In- 
vestigation Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Personnel  Scty  In- 
vestigations (Condon),  MDR. 


wise  to  increase  the  number  of  "re- 
sponsible persons  who  are  free  of 
compartmentalization.  .  .  ."  *^  Simi- 
larly, in  June  1943,  physicist  Richard 
C.  Tolman,  in  his  role  as  Groves's  sci- 
entific adviser,  expressed  concern  that 
the  "proposed  regulations  [to  govern 
interchange  between  the  Chicago  and 
Los  Alamos  scientists  were]  perhaps 
not  quite  as  liberal  as  may  later  prove 
warranted."  In  the  weeks  following 
the  institution  of  these  regulations, 
both  Oppenheimer  and  Edward 
Teller,  who  was  working  on  a  part- 
time  basis  at  Los  Alamos,  were  trou- 
bled by  what  they  viewed  as  inad- 
equate liaison  channels  between  the 
New  Mexico  laboratory  and  the  other 
installations  where  related  work  was 
in  progress.'*'* 

When  British  officials  and  scientists 
came  to  the  United  States  in  late 
1942,  they  were  surprised  to  learn 
that  General  Groves  planned  further 
compartmentalization,  which  many  of 
them  viewed  as  already  having  been 
applied  to  an  extent  that  made  effi- 
cient operation  impossible.  Further- 
more, the  British  soon  found  that  the 
Americans  used  the  policy  as  a  con- 
venient excuse  for  withholding  infor- 
mation. Thus,  the  policy  became  in- 
termeshed  with  the  whole  question  of 
interchange  with  the  British,  a  prob- 
lem that  was  resolved  only  after  many 
months  of  negotiation.^^ 


'^^  Ltr,  Compton  to  Conant,  8  Dec  42,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1,  MDR. 

*■*  Ltr,  Tolman  to  Groves,  1 1  Jun  43,  Admin  F"iles, 
Gen  Corresp,  000.71  (Releasing  Info),  MDR.  See 
also  Ltr,  Teller  to  LIrey,  Incl  to  Memo,  Nichols  to 
Groves,  1 1  Aug  43,  and  Ltr,  Oppenheimer  to 
Groves,  sub:  Liaison  With  Site  X,  4  Oct  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  001,  MDR. 

''^  Gowing,  Bntain  and  Atomic  Energy,  pp.  150-51. 
See  Ch.  X. 


272 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


By  early  1944,  most  project  person- 
nel had  come  to  accept  the  policy  as  a 
fact  of  life.  In  looking  back  after  the 
war  was  over,  even  some  scientists 
who  had  found  compartmentalization 
so  distasteful  grudgingly  conceded  it 
had  probably  been  necessary.  The 
eminent  American  (German-born) 
physicist  James  Franck,  for  example, 
while  speaking  at  a  conference  on 
atomic  energy  at  the  University  of 
Chicago  in  September  1945,  conclud- 
ed that  "so  far  as  secrecy  is  con- 
cerned, they  [Army  officers]  were  un- 
relenting and,  in  all  honesty,  we  have 
to  admit  that  they  had  to  be."  But,  he 
went  on  to  remind  his  listeners  that 
the  policy  had  exacted  a  "stiff  price" 
in  the  "wasting  of  talent  and  scientific 
manpower  and  the  loss  of  precious 
time.  .  .   ."  "^^ 

From  the  military  point  of  view, 
compartmentalization  was  precisely 
what  was  required,  both  for  security 
and  for  achieving  the  most  efficient 
functioning  of  scientists  and  technolo- 
gists. As  (reneral  Groves  expressed 
his  conviction  in  retrospect: 

Compartmeniaiization  of  knowledge,  to 
me,  was  the  very  heart  of  security.  My 
rule  was  simple  and  not  capable  of  misin- 
terpretation— each  man  should  know  ev- 
erything he  needed  to  know  to  do  his  job 
and  nothing  else.  Adherence  to  this  rule 
not  only  provided  an  adequate  measure 
of  security,  but  it  greatly  improved  over- 
all efficiency  by  making  our  people  stick 
to  their  knitting.  And  it  made  quite  clear 
to  all  concerned  that  the  project  existed 
to  produce  a  specific  end  product — not  to 
enable  individuals  to  satisfy  their  curi- 
osity and  to  increase  their  scientific 
knowledge.'*' 


PoUcy  Exception:  Informing  Congress 

The  District's  policv  of  compart- 
mentalization of  information  on  the 
atomic  project,  in  Groves's  words,  ap- 
plied "to  everyone,  including  mem- 
bers of  the  Executive  Department, 
military  personnel  and  members  of 
Congress."  No  one  was  to  have  access 
"solely  by  virtue  of  his  commission  or 
official  position."  Adherence  to  this 
policy  was  possible  as  long  as  Man- 
hattan's funding  came  from  sources 
already  earmarked  for  the  War 
Department.  But  project  leaders 
anticipated  considerable  trouble  in 
the  future,  because  securing  new 
funds  would  entail  congressional 
authorization.^^ 

By  early  1944,  the  compartmentali- 
zation policy  was  becoming  less  and 
less  feasible  with  Congress  because  of 
the  increasing  size  of  the  program,  its 
rapidly  rising  cost,  and  the  need  to 
begin  planning  for  its  postwar  admin- 
istration. Under  the  original  directive 
from  the  President,  the  atomic  pro- 
gram obtained  funds  from  the  money 
appropriated  under  the  Engineer 
Service-Army  budgetary  category. 
Funds  from  this  source  sufficed  as 
long  as  Manhattan's  budgets  re- 
mained relatively  modest.  But  when 
project  leaders  estimated  that  the 
program  would  need  at  least  $600 
million  for  fiscal  year  (FY)  1945,  they 
decided  they  would  have  to  find  a  way 
to  provide  some  information  to  se- 
lected members  of  Congress  who  had 
a  need  to  know.  They  consulted  with 
President   Roosevelt,    who   thereupon 


■•^As  quoted  by  Alice  Kimball  Smith  in  A  Peril  and 
a  Hope:  The  Scientists'  Movement  in  America,  1945-47 
(Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1965),  p.  95. 

"'Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  140. 


■"Ibid,  (source  of  first  quotation),  p.  360;  MD, 
Intel  Bull  5,  Safeguarding  Mil  Info  Regs  (source  of 
second  quotation),  27  Nov  43  (revised  1  Sep  44), 
Sec.  3,  DASA. 


SECURITY 


273 


directed  that  Stimson,  Bush,  and 
General  Marshall  brief  the  leaders  of 
both  parties  in  the  House  and  the 
Senate."*® 

On  18  February,  Stimson,  Bush, 
and  Marshall  went  to  the  office  of 
Speaker  of  the  House  Sam  Rayburn, 
where  they  were  joined  by  Majority 
Leader  John  W.  McCormack  and  Mi- 
nority Leader  Joseph  W.  Martin,  Jr. 
Stimson  outlined  the  history  of  the 
atomic  project,  including  its  cost  to 
date,  and  estimated  the  total  amount 
needed  to  complete  it;  Bush  de- 
scribed the  project's  scientific  back- 
ground and  indicated  the  likely  de- 
structive power  of  an  atomic  weapon; 
and  Marshall  discussed  the  potential 
role  of  atomic  bombs  in  the  Allied 
strategy  for  winning  the  war.  The  leg- 
islators pledged  their  unreserved  sup- 
port, stating  that  they  viewed  its  high 
cost  as  well  worth  the  price.  They 
promised  to  work  out  a  system  for 
handling  the  Manhattan  appropria- 
tions in  committee  so  that  there 
would  be  no  danger  of  disclosure  of 
their  purpose.  Bush  found  that  the 
"entire  meeting  was  most  reassuring, 
as  it  was  quite  evident  the  three 
congressmen  were  exceedingly  anx- 
ious to  be  of  aid  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment in  carrying  a  very  heavy 
responsibility."  ^° 

In  June,  Stimson,  Bush,  and  Maj. 
Gen.  George  J.  Richards,  the  War  De- 
partment budget  officer  who  was  sub- 
stituting for  Marshall  while  he  was 
out  of  town,  repeated  the  briefing  for 


"^MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  "Auxiliary  Activities," 
Ch.  1,  pp.  2.4-2.5,  DASA.  Groves,  \'ow  It  Can  Be 
Told.  pp.  360-62;  Stimson  Diary,  14-15  Feb  44, 
HI.S. 

^°Memo,  Bush  to  Bundv,  24  Feb  44.  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  14,  Tab  A,  MDR; 
Stimson  Diary,  18  Feb  44,  HI.S. 


the  leaders  of  the  Senate.  Present 
were  Majority  Leader  Alben  W.  Bar- 
kley  and  Minority  Leader  Wallace  H. 
White,  as  well  as  Chairman  Elmer 
Thomas  and  Senior  Minority  Member 
Styles  Bridges  of  the  military  subcom- 
mittee of  the  Senate  Appropriations 
Committee.  Stimson  recalled  that 
"the  four  gentlemen  who  met  with  us 
were  very  much  impressed.  They  .  .  . 
promised  that  they  would  help  and 
keep  absolute  silence  about  it  and 
prevent  discussion  in  public  as  to 
what  it  was  about."  ^^ 

During  the  remaining  months  of 
1944,  congressional  leaders  succeed- 
ed in  keeping  the  vast  majority  of  the 
members  of  Congress  ignorant  of  the 
atomic  project.  Accustomed  to  war- 
time restrictions,  most  members  were 
willing  to  accept — without  protest — 
the  assurance  of  their  leaders  that  the 
work  was  secret  and  that  the  needed 
apropriations  were  essential  to  the 
war  effort.  But  for  a  few  members  this 
policy  was  unacceptable,  and  they  di- 
rected individual  inquiries  to  the  War 
Department  about  rumored  develop- 
ments at  the  atomic  sites. 

A  case  in  point  was  Congressman 
Albert  J.  Engel  of  Michigan,  a 
member  of  the  House  Appropriations 
Committee,  who  in  February  1945 
was  unwilling  to  accept  automatically 
the  War  Department's  request  for  FY 
1946  funding  from  money  appropri- 
ated under  the  Expediting  Production 
budgetary  category.  In  a  visit  to 
Under  Secretary  Patterson  on  the 
twenty-fourth,  the  Michigan  repre- 
sentative   stated    that    he    had    heard 


*' Stimson  Diary  (source  of  quotation),  lOJun  44, 
HLS;  Memo  lor  File,  Bush,  10  Jun  44,  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  14,  Tab  A,  MDR; 
MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  Ch.  1.  pp.  2.8-2.11.  DASA. 


274 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


rumors  of  extravagance  and  waste 
and  that  he  wanted  more  information 
before  approving  the  War  Depart- 
ment's FY  1946  funds.  Remembering 
that  in  late  1943  War  Department  of- 
ficials had  dissuaded  him  from 
making  a  proposed  trip  to  the  Clinton 
site,  this  time  he  firmly  insisted  that 
Patterson  allow  him  to  inspect  the 
atomic  installations.  When  Stimson 
heard  from  Patterson  of  Engel's  in- 
sistence upon  visiting  project  facili- 
ties, he  sought  assistance  from  the 
leaders  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives. As  Speaker  Rayburn  was  away, 
Stimson  turned  to  Congressman  John 
Taber  of  New  York,  another  member 
of  the  Appropriations  Committee.  He 
and  Taber  sat  down  with  Engel  and 
persuaded  him  to  forgo  objections  to 
funds  on  the  floor  of  the  House,  but 
only  after  promising  him  an  opportu- 
nity to  visit  some  "outside  installa- 
tions" of  the  project. ^^ 

This  experience  convinced  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  and  the  Manhattan 
commander,  as  well  as  other  project 
leaders,  that  more  and  more  members 
of  Congress  would  be  demanding 
current  information  about  Manhat- 
tan's activities.  Consequently,  they  ar- 
ranged to  have  a  selected  delegation 
from  each  House  visit  Clinton  and,  if 
they  wished,  also  Hanford.  With  the 
President's  approval  for  this  plan. 
Groves  and  Stimson,  accompanied  by 
the  Secretary's  aide.  Col.  William  H. 
Kyle,  visited  Clinton  on  10  April  to 
prepare  "for  future  trouble  with 
Congressmen."  ^^ 


Upon  the  unexpected  death  of 
Roosevelt  on  the  twelfth,  the  inspec- 
tion trip  to  Clinton  was  delayed,  but 
only  temporarily.  In  May  after  Presi- 
dent Truman  had  given  his  assent. 
Speaker  Rayburn  helped  select  five 
members  from  the  House  Appropria- 
tions Committee — Clarence  Cannon, 
the  chairman,  George  H.  Mahon, 
J.  Buell  Snyder,  Engel,  and  Taber. 
Under  the  careful  guidance  of  the 
Manhattan  commander  and  the  dis- 
trict engineer,  the  five  congressmen 
spent  two  days  inspecting  the  Clinton 
Engineer  Works.  The  legislators  re- 
turned to  Washington  convinced  that 
public  funds  had  been  well  spent  and 
prepared  to  support  the  project's 
budgetary  requests  for  FY  1946.  A 
visit  by  a  comparable  Senate  delega- 
tion to  inspect  atomic  facilities  was 
not  feasible  until  after  V-J  Day,  when 
a  group  from  the  upper  house  toured 
the  Hanford  Engineer  Works. ^* 

Administrative  Aspects 

As  security  requirements  increased, 
the  Army  established  a  variety  of 
units  to  administer  its  highly  compart- 
mentalized information  security  pro- 
gram. By  necessity,  the  program  from 
about  late  1942  up  until  the  District's 
major  intelligence  and  security  reor- 
ganization in  early  1944  was  limited 
in  scope.  Faced  with  a  rapid  influx  of 
new  personnel,  both  civilian  and  mili- 


*^  Stimson  Diary,  26  (source  of  quoted  words)  and 
28  Feb  45,  HLS;  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  363; 
MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  Ch.  1,  pp.  2.5-2.6,  DASA. 

S3  Stimson  Diary,  31  Mar  45,  HLS. 


54  Ibid.,  15  Mar,  2,  6-11,  and  25  Apr,  4  and  30 
May  45,  HLS.  Groves  Diary,  22-24  May  45,  LRG. 
Notes  on  Trip  to  Knoxville,  Tenn.,  10  Apr  45,  Incl 
to  Memo,  Kyle  to  Bundy,  1 1  Apr  45;  Ltrs,  Stimson 
to  Bush,  31  Mar  45,  and  Bush  to  Stimson,  2  Apr  45. 
All  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  7,  MDR.  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4, 
Ch.  1,  pp.  2.12-2.13,  DASA.  Groves,  AW  //  Ca?i  Be 
Told,  pp.  363-65.  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew  World, 
pp.  302  and  339-40. 


SECURIIY 


275 


tary,  the  District's  Protective  Security 
Section  concentrated  chiefly  on  devel- 
oping ways  for  instructing  them  in  the 
meaning  of  classified  information  and 
the  correct  methods  for  handling  it. 
To  facilitate  this  education  process, 
the  small  staff  hurriedly  prepared  and 
distributed  a  manual  that  provided  a 
"statement  of  District  policy  regard- 
ing Protective  Security  proce- 
dures .  .  .  ,"  including  an  extensive 
section  on  safeguarding  classified 
information.^^ 

An  intensification  of  protective 
measures  during  the  first  half  of  1943 
resulted  in  the  establishment  in 
August  of  the  Plant  Security  Section 
for  Safeguarding  Military  Informa- 
tion. In  an  effort  to  assure  attainment 
of  the  desired  security  objectives,  the 
SMI  staff  developed  a  new  intelli- 
gence bulletin.  This  bulletin,  issued 
in  November,  set  forth  in  detail  the 
requirements  and  procedures  for 
safeguarding  military  information, 
emphasizing  that  "matters  of  vital  im- 
portance to  the  government  must  be 
protected  at  all  times  whether  at  war 
or  at  peace  .  .  .  [and  thus]  great  cau- 
tion [must]  be  exercised  in  the  han- 
dling and  in  the  dissemination  of  all 
information — written  or  oral — relative 
to  this  Project  at  any  time."  ^^ 

By  early  1944,  consolidation  of  the 
District's  intelligence  and  security  fa- 
cilities opened  the  way  for  a  more 
comprehensive  information  security 
program,  and  the  establishment  in 
May  of  a  separate  SMI  Section  (redes- 
ignated SMI  Branch  in  1945,  when 
organizationallv  restructured  as  a  sub- 


ordinate unit  of  the  District's  Intelli- 
gence and  Security  Division).  Under 
the  expanded  program,  security  offi- 
cials launched  studies  of  all  aspects  of 
the  atomic  project — equipment,  mate- 
rial, products,  processes,  operations, 
administrative  matters — to  determine 
the  appropriate  classification  for  their 
mention  in  correspondence  and  other 
documents.  They  set  up  code  names 
(some  already  in  use)  for  major  sites, 
important  materials,  items  of  equip- 
ment, and  even  for  the  more  widely 
known  scientists  working  on  the 
project.  Under  this  scheme,  for  exam- 
ple, Los  Alamos  became  Site  Y,  pluto- 
nium  became  94,  the  implosion  bomb 
became  Fat  Man,  and  scientist  Arthur 
H.  Compton  became  A.  H.  Comas. 
Using  the  staff  and  resources  of  the 
SMI  Section,  District  authorities  di- 
rected attention  to  those  areas  where 
security  leaks  were  most  likely  to 
occur.  Thus,  the  section  regularly  re- 
viewed project  correspondence  with 
other  government  agencies,  such  as 
the  Selective  Service  concerning  de- 
ferment of  key  personnel,  and  advised 
on  the  security  classification  that 
should  govern  each  of  the  thousands 
of  contracts  that  the  District  negoti- 
ated with  outside  individuals  and 
firms.  ^"^ 

The  establishment  and  maintenance 
of  effective  adherence  to  security  re- 
quirements among  the  project's  thou- 
sands of  contractor  organizations 
comprised  one  of  the  most  challeng- 
ing and  complex  aspects  of  the  infor- 


"WD,  VS.  Kngrs  onkc,  MD,  Protective  Sctv 
Manual.  1  Feb  43.  reproduced  in  MDH,  Bk.  1,  X'ol 
14,  App.  (;5,  DASA. 

5«  MD,  Intel  Bull  5.  Safeguarding  Mil  Info  Regs, 
27  Nov  43  (revised  1  Sep  44).  Sec.  3,  DASA. 


"MDH.  Bk.  1.  Vol.  14,  pp.  6.3-6.5,  DASA 
Memo,  Marshall  to  Onlv  Those  Concerned,  sub 
DSM  Pioj-Clinton  Kngr  Works,  18  May  43,  MDR 
Ltr.  Oppenheimer  to  Oroves,  sub:  [L'se  of  Cover 
Names],  2  Nov  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp.  680.2 
(Visits),  MDR;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  182. 


276 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


mation  security  program.  District  au- 
thorities oversaw  contractors'  security 
activities  through  several  channels. 
The  branch  intelligence  offices  in 
principal  cities  throughout  the  United 
States  provided  a  convenient  point  of 
contact,  and  periodic  checks  of  con- 
tractor facilities  and  operations  by  se- 
curity inspectors  from  District  head- 
quarters constituted  a  second  avenue 
of  control.  These  inspectors  particu- 
larly observed  methods  of  handling 
classified  materials  and  storing  docu- 
ments. District  security  officials  also 
investigated  contractors'  personnel 
recruitment  programs,  written  corre- 
spondence, stock  registration  state- 
ments to  the  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission,  and  similar  activities  in 
which  security  leaks  were  likely  to 
occur.  Finally,  when  a  contractor  ter- 
minated his  contract  with  the  atomic 
program.  District  security  officials 
made  certain  that  all  classified  materi- 
als were  returned  to  project  control 
or  that  the  contractor  provided  for 
their  adequate  protection.^® 

Security  problems  involving  firms 
under  contract  most  frequently  arose 
where  these  organizations  were  carry- 
ing out  large-scale  development  of 
project  facilities.  Such  development, 
as  at  the  Clinton  and  Hanford  sites, 
inevitably  brought  overcrowding  of 
local  housing,  acute  labor  shortages, 
greatly  increased  road  traffiic,  and 
other  adverse  changes  that  placed  a 
severe  strain  on  normal  community 
activities.  The  resulting  public  resent- 
ment, generally  focused  on  the  con- 
tractor firms,  created  an  environment 
in  which  threats  to  security  were  more 
likely  to  occur.  In  the  spring  of  1943, 
for  example,   Du   Font's  effort   to  ar- 


range for  housing  and  other  facilities 
for  the  thousands  of  employees  who 
would  work  on  the  Hanford  project 
stirred  up  resentment  in  surrounding 
communities,  already  aroused  by  the 
Army's  land  acquisition  program.  The 
spread  of  rumors,  adverse  criticism  in 
the  local  newspapers,  and  unfounded 
statements  by  local  officials  tended  to 
draw  widespread  public  attention  to 
the  project,  posing  a  serious  threat  to 
security.  Lt.  Col.  Franklin  T.  Matthias, 
the  Hanford  area  engineer,  and  mem- 
bers of  his  staff  spoke  at  meetings  of 
service  clubs  in  communities  adjacent 
to  the  project,  in  an  endeavor  to 
counter  the  rumors  and  misinforma- 
tion concerning  Du  Font's  role  in  the 
project.  By  these  and  similar  efforts 
they  laid  the  groundwork  for  obtain- 
ing the  support  and  good  will  of  the 
local  citizenry — an  absolute  essential 
to  maintaining  the  security  of  the 
project.  ^^ 

Efforts  to  maintain  good  communi- 
ty relations  was  an  important  aspect 
of  the  District's  information  security 
program,  which  had  as  its  prime  ob- 
jective the  forestalling  of  security 
breaks,  first  by  anticipating  them  and 
second  by  teaching  project  personnel 
how  to  be  "instinctively  alert-minded 
and  security-wise."  ^°  Although  the 
SMI  Section  had  primary  responsibil- 
ity for  carrying  out  the  program,  em- 
ployee education  in  security  matters 
devolved  chiefly  to  the  SMI  staffs  at 
the  branch  intelligence  offiices.  Each 
staff,  for  example,  conducted  orienta- 


ls MDH.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14.  pp.  6.7-6.8.  DA.SA. 


^^  Memo,  MaUhias  to  Groves,  sub:  Public  Mtgs  in 
Which  Du  Ponl  Participated,  23  Apr  4?>.  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  001  (.Mtgs),  MDR;  Matthias 
Diary,  20  and  28  Apr  43,  OROO. 

«OMD,  Intel  Bull  3,  Sctv  Plducational  Prgm, 
1.^  Sep  4,3,  reproduced  in  MDH,  Bk.  1,  \'()l.  14, 
App    B8,  DA.SA. 


SECURITY 


277 


tion  and  refresher  sessions  for  Corps 
of  Engineers  personnel;  provided 
each  contractor  with  instructional  ma- 
terials for  in-house  security  education 
briefings  for  its  personnel;  and  used  a 
variety  of  media — training  films,  cir- 
culars and  handbills,  payroll  inserts, 
telephone  stickers,  and  editorials  in 
project  newspapers — to  remind  Dis- 
trict employees  of  the  importance  of 
unremitting  attention  to  the  demands 
of  security.  ^^ 

Because  of  the  policy  of  compart- 
mentalization,  the  quantity  and  varie- 
ty of  educational  subject  matter  avail- 
able for  training  purposes  was  limit- 
ed. Most  workers  had  knowledge  of 
only  the  project  activity  under  way  at 
the  site  where  they  were  employed, 
and  most  generally  did  not  even  know 
exactly  what  was  being  made  in  the 
facility  where  they  worked.  And  even 
in  some  instances,  project  officials 
had  concocted  for  employees — those 
working  at  the  electromagnetic 
plant — a  plausible  but  inaccurate  and 
misleading  explanation  of  the  process 
involved  and  the  product  produced, 
with  the  warning  that  this  information 
was  given  to  them  only  to  help  them 
carry  out  their  jobs.  Lacking  concrete 
data  on  which  to  base  an  appeal  to 
employees,  security  officials  had  to 
request  that  they  accept  the  necessity 
for  strict  adherence  to  secrecy  largely 
on  faith  and  out  of  a  sense  of  patriot- 
ism and  loyalty  to  the  men  on  the 
fighting  fronts. 

As  did  most  wartime  agencies  in- 
volved in  secret  work,  the  Manhattan 
District  resorted  to  censorship  of  vari- 
ous kinds  as  a  means  of  safeguarding 
classified  information.  In  the  first  few 
months   after   the  Army  assumed   re- 


sponsibility for  the  atomic  program, 
the  District  and  branch  security  staffs 
began  a  cursory  review  of  a  few  lead- 
ing daily  newspapers  and  periodicals 
and  gradually  enlarged  this  check  of 
publications  until  it  covered  some  370 
newspapers  and  70  magazines.  The 
censors,  several  of  whom  were 
Women's  Army  Corps  members,  were 
particularly  on  the  lookout  for  publi- 
cation of  anything  that  would  reveal 
classified  information,  attract  atten- 
tion to  the  project,  or  furnish  an 
enemy  agent  or  anyone  else  with 
knowledge  sufficient  to  determine  the 
nature  of  the  project. ^^ 

While  review  of  newspapers,  peri- 
odicals, and  other  publications  pro- 
vided some  protection  against  damag- 
ing revelations  about  the  project,  the 
fact  remained  that  once  such  informa- 
tion appeared  in  print  an  element  of 
secrecy  was  lost.  Much  more  effective 
was  a  system  that  prevented  publica- 
tion of  sensitive  information.  Under 
the  Office  of  Censorship's  "Codes  of 
Wartime  Practices  for  the  American 
Press  and  American  Broadcasters," 
newspapers,  periodicals,  and  radio 
broadcasters  voluntarily  agreed  to  re- 
frain from  discussing  certain  specified 
subjects  and  mentioning  certain 
terms.  In  February  1943,  Vannevar 
Bush  proposed  that  the  atomic  energy 
program  be  brought  under  this  volun- 
tary censorship.  At  first,  both  General 
Strong,  the  Army  intelligence  chief, 
and  General  Groves  had  serious  res- 
ervations about  making  the  atomic 
energy  project  subject  to  this  censor- 
ship arrangement,  fearing  that  the  re- 


Ibid.,  pp.  6.10-6.11,  DASA. 


62  Ibid.,  pp.  6, 12-6. 15.  and  Bk.  5,  Vol.  6,  "Oper- 
ation," p.  6.1  and  App.  Bl,  DASA;  Groves,  Xow  It 
Can  Be  Told.  p.  146. 


278 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


suits     "might     be     more     detrimental 
than  otherwise."  ^^ 

Finally,  military  leaders  reluctantly 
agreed  to  the  voluntary  press  censor- 
ship plan,  persuaded  primarily  by  the 
insistence  of  Nathaniel  R.  Howard,  as- 
sistant director  of  the  Office  of  Cen- 
sorship and  a  former  editor  of  the 
Cleveland  News,  that  this  was  the  only 
way  to  maintain  press  security  of  the 
project.  On  28  June  1943,  Byron 
Price,  director  of  the  Office  of  Cen- 
sorship, sent  out  a  special  request  to 
all  editors  and  broadcasters  that  they 
extend  the  previously  issued  precau- 
tion not  to  publish  or  broadcast  any- 
thing about  "new  or  secret  military 
weapons  .  .  .  [or]  experiments"  to 
include: 

Production  or  utilization  of  atom 
smashing,  atomic  energy,  atomic  fission, 
atomic  splitting,  or  any  of  their 
equivalents. 

The  use  for  military  purposes  of 
radium  or  radioactive  materials,  heavy 
water,  high  voltage  discharge  equipment, 
cyclotrons. 

The  following  elements  or  any  of  their 
compounds:  polonium,  uranium,  ytterbi- 
um, hafnium,  protoactinium,  radium,  tho- 
rium, deuterium.^'* 

The  aim  of  censorship  was  to  pre- 
vent all  mention  of  the  atomic  pro- 
gram in  the  American  press;  however, 
on  the  advice  of  the  Office  of  Censor- 


^^  Strong's  reaction  to  the  proposal  during  a  dis- 
cussion with  General  Styer,  who  later  reported  the 
discussion  to  Groves  in  Memo,  Styer  to  Groves, 
18  Feb  43,  AG  313.3  (22  Aug  47),  copy  in  CMH.  See 
also  Memo,  Bush  to  Styer,  13  Feb  43,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  000.73  (Censorship),  MDR;  Groves, 
Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  146. 

^*  Price,  sub:  Note  to  Editors  and  Broadcasters — 
Confidential — Not  for  PubHcation,  28  Jun  43,  Incl  to 
Ltr,  Howard  to  Groves,  28  Jun  43,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  000.73  (Censorship),  MDR.  See  also 
Groves,  Now  It  Cmi  Be  Told,  p.  146;  MFC  Min, 
24  Jun  43,  MDR. 


ship,  the  District  permitted  a  limited 
amount  of  information  about  certain 
aspects  of  the  project  to  appear  in 
newspapers  published  in  communities 
near  the  Clinton  and  Hanford  sites. 
Office  of  Censorship  officials  pointed 
out  that  complete  suppression  of  in- 
formation about  activities  at  these  lo- 
cations would  actually  draw  more  at- 
tention than  a  policy  of  judicious  re- 
lease of  news  of  local  interest,  careful- 
ly controlled  so  as  not  to  reveal  any 
vital  secrets.  They  cited  as  an  exam- 
ple the  land  acquisition  at  Hanford, 
which  required  relocation  of  many 
people  and  resulted  in  court  proceed- 
ings. Stories  on  these  events  in  news- 
papers of  the  Washington-Oregon 
region  would  not  violate  essential  se- 
curity as  long  as  they  did  not  reveal 
the  purpose  of  the  acquisition  or 
the  interconnection  of  the  Hanford 
project  with  other  parts  of  the  atomic 
program.  General  Groves  assented  to 
this  policy  but  took  the  added  precau- 
tion, suggested  by  Office  of  Censor- 
ship officials,  of  having  Manhattan 
District  representatives  visit  the  edi- 
tors or  publishers  of  local  newspapers 
and  operators  of  local  radio  stations 
to  request  their  cooperation  in  main- 
taining the  security  of  the  project.  ^^ 

At  Los  Alamos,  security  authorities 
endeavored  to  keep  all  mention  of  the 
site  and  its  activities  out  of  the  press. 
Total  exclusion  was  more  feasible  at 
the  New  Mexico  installation  because 
of  its  military  administration  and  geo- 
graphic isolation  from  surrounding 
communities.  The  policy  was  rein- 
forced in  late  1943  through  the  use  of 


^^  Ltr,  Howard  to  Lt  Col  Whitney  Ashbridge 
(Asst,  Opns  Br,  Constr  Div,  OCE),  1  Apr  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  000.73  (Censorship),  MDR; 
Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  146-47. 


SECURITY 


279 


regular  mail  censorship  and  other 
measures  to  minimize  the  likelihood 
that  knowledge  of  the  site  would 
come  to  the  attention  of  the  press. ^^ 
It  was  inevitable  that  a  voluntary 
censorship  system  would  not  be  total- 
ly effective,  and  on  those  occasions 
when  some  reference  to  the  project 
or  atomic  energy  occurred  in  the 
press  or  on  the  radio,  the  District  se- 
curity office  and  the  Office  of  Censor- 
ship took  immediate  steps  to  limit  its 
circulation  and  to  run  down  it  origins. 
A  rash  of  censorship  violations  oc- 
curred in  late  1943.  A  columnist  in 
the  Washington  Post  announced  that 
the  Senate's  Truman  Committee  was 
about  to  investigate  a  "half-a-billion 
dollar"  War  Department  project  in 
the  state  of  Washington  that  was  "re- 
ported to  be  one  of  the  largest  single 
projects  that's  to  be  built  from  scratch 
in  the  Nation's  history."  On  the  same 
day  the  Post  article  appeared  in  the 
Spokane   Spokes  man- Review,    and    soon 


®®  Ltr,  Groves  to  Oppenheimer,  1  Nov  43;  Ltr, 
Capt  Peer  de  Silva  (Santa  Fe  Area  Intel  Ofl)  to 
Lansdale,  sub:  Censorship  at  Los  Alamos,  8  Nov  43; 
Memo,  Lansdale  to  Groves,  same  sub,  10  Nov  43. 
All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  311.7  (Santa  Fe), 
MDR.  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  147. 


thereafter  the  wire  services  picked  up 
the  news  item.  Almost  simultaneously, 
several  newspapers  in  Tennessee  ran 
a  story  on  the  state's  Selective  Service 
that  contained  a  passing  reference  by 
the  head  of  the  service,  Brig.  Gen. 
Thomas  A.  Frazier,  to  "the  Clinton 
Engineer  Works  in  secret  war  produc- 
tion of  a  weapon  that  possibly  might 
be  the  one  to  end  the  war."  In  both 
instances,  prompt  action  by  the  Office 
of  Censorship  led  to  withdrawal  of 
the  articles  before  they  had  received 
wide  circulation.  Subsequent  action 
by  the  War  Department  resulted  in 
tracing  down  the  sources  of  the  leaks 
and  in  implementing  improved  secu- 
rity measures  to  prevent  such  oc- 
currences in  the  future. ^"^ 


®^  Memo  (source  of  first  quotation).  Groves  to 
Secy  War,  sub:  Publicity  Concerning  DSM  Proj, 
15  Dec  43;  Memo  (source  of  second  quotation). 
Groves  to  Secy  War,  sub:  Violation  of  Vital  Scty 
Provs  by  Brig  Gen  Thomas  A.  Frazier,  10  Jan  44, 
and  Incl;  Rpt,  Lansdale,  sub:  Publicity  Concerning 
Clinton  Engr  Works,  3  Jan  44.  All  in  HB  Files,  Fldr 
62,  MDR.  References  to  atomic  energy  and  the 
atomic  project — some  intentional,  some  accidental — 
occurred  many  times  in  the  public  media  during  the 
war.  Examples  of  those  investigated  by  Manhattan 
District  security  officials  may  be  found  in  HB  Files, 
Fldr  7,  MDR,  and  in  .Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
000.73  (Censorship),  MDR. 


CHAPTER  XII 


Foreign  Intelligence  Operations 


The  Manhattan  Project's  security 
system  involved  the  conduct  of  not 
only  domestic  but  also  foreign  intelli- 
gence operations,  for  in  terms  of  mili- 
tary strategy  gaining  all  possible  in- 
formation about  atomic  activities  in 
the  Axis  nations — especially  Germa- 
ny— was  as  important  as  safeguarding 
state-of-the-art  information  on  Ameri- 
can nuclear  research  and  develop- 
ments. Hitler's  recurring  claims  that 
Germany  had  devised  secret  weapons, 
as  well  as  existing  intelligence  reports 
on  both  German  interest  in  the  nucle- 
ar research  of  French  physicist  Fred- 
eric Joliot-Curie  and  German  produc- 
tion of  heavy  water  at  the  Rjukan 
(Norway)  plant,  convinced  project  ad- 
ministrators of  the  likelihood  that 
Germany  had  under  way  a  well-devel- 
oped atomic  energy  program.  In 
order  to  carry  out  necessary  counter- 
measures  against  these  presumed 
enemy  efforts  to  produce  atomic 
weapons.  Allied  military  leaders  in 
1943  and  1944  intensified  their  for- 
eign intelligence  operations  in  the 
European  Theater  of  Operations 
(EFO),  giving  a  high  priority  to  se- 
curing more  information  about  enemy 
atomic  activities.  Manhattan  Project 
officials  initiated  much  of  this  intelli- 
gence effort,  but  eventually  the  War 
Department    General    Staff,    General 


Marshall,  Secretary  Stimson,  and  a 
number  of  other  military  leaders  con- 
tributed directly  to  its  success.^ 

Organization  of  the  ALSOS  Mission 

Upon  receipt  of  any  intelligence  in- 
formation on  atomic  developments  in 
enemy  nations,  the  Army  G-2,  the 
Office  of  Naval  Intelligence,  and  the 
Office  of  Strategic  Services,  as  well  as 
other  existing  intelligence  agencies, 
dispatched  a  current  intelligence 
report  to  the  Manhattan  District  for 
the  attention  of  General  Groves.  Until 
the  fall  of  1943,  this  reporting  system 
had  served  to  keep  the  Manhattan 
commander  and  other  project  leaders 
apprised  of  at  least  the  accessible 
areas  of  enemy  atomic  activities.  But 
in  September,  after  the  Fifth  Army 
had  landed  in  southern  Italy,  Groves 
perceived  a  unique  opportunity  for 
the  Army  to  exploit  new  sources  of 
information,  especially  about  the 
German  atomic  program,  as  U.S. 
forces  moved  up  the  Italian  penin- 
sula. With  the  firm  support  of  OSRD 
Director  Vannevar  Bush,  Groves  met 
with  Maj.  Gen.  George  V.  Strong,  the 
Army  G-2,  to  explore  ways  of  achiev- 


'MPC  Min,  13  Aug  43,  OCG  Files.  Gen  Corresp, 
MP  Files,  Fldr  23,  lab  A.  MDR. 


FOREIGN  INIELLIGKNCE  OPERATIONS 


281 


ing  this  objective.  The  proposed 
course  of  action,  with  which  Bush 
coiK  urred,  was  tlie  eslabhshmeiU  of  a 
special  intelligence  mission  in  Italy. 

Shortly  thereafter,  Strong  met  with 
General  Marshall  and  suggested  that 
a  small  group  of  civilian  scientists,  as- 
sisted by  military  personnel,  be  sent 
to  Italy  to  conduct  inquiries  into  sci- 
entific projects  in  that  country,  with 
the  hope  that  they  might  reveal  some- 
thing about  German  developments. 
Marshall  promptly  approved  the  plan 
and  asked  Groves  to  take  responsibil- 
ity for  foreign  intelligence  related  to 
atomic  energy.  Apparently  the  Chief 
of  Staff  was  convinced  that  Manhattan 
Project  personnel  and  direction 
would  result  in  better  coordination, 
coverage,  and  less  risk  to  security.^ 

Manhattan,  OSRD,  Army  G-2,  and 
the  Navy  all  furnished  personnel  for 
the  newly  designated  Alsos  mission,^ 
which  completed  its  organization  by 
late  fall  of  1943.  As  chief  of  Alsos 
General  Strong  appointed  Lt.  Col. 
Boris  T.  Pash,  an  intelligence  officer 
whose  earlier  competence  in  the  Man- 
hattan District's  espionage  investiga- 
tions at  the  Radiation  Laboratory  had 
impressed  Groves.  When  the  new 
mission  reached  Italy  in  late  Decem- 
ber, it  had  fourteen  members,  includ- 


2  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  18.5  and  189-90; 
Ms,  Col  Bruce  W.  Bidwell,  "History  of  the  Military 
Intelligence  Division,  Department  of  the  Army  Gen- 
eral Staff"  (Washington,  D.C.:  Department  of  the 
Army,  n.d),  Pt.  5,  p.  6.25,  copy  in  NARS. 

^  Inadvertently,  the  letters  of  the  code  name 
Alsos  form  the  Greek  word  meaning  "grove."  Gen- 
eral Groves's  first  reaction,  when  a  scholarly  col- 
league informed  him  of  the  meaning  of  the  word, 
was  to  request  the  G-2  to  adopt  a  more  innocuous 
name.  After  further  consideration,  however,  he  de- 
cided against  making  the  change  because  he  feared 
that  to  do  so  would  create  an  even  greater  security 
hazard  because  of  the  attention  it  would  draw  to  the 
mission.  See  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  191. 


ing  Pash,  an  administrative  officer, 
four  scientists — two  OSRD,  one 
Army,  one  Navy — four  interpreters, 
and  four  attached  counterintelligence 
agents.  Opening  the  Alsos  field 
headquarters  near  Naples  on  the  sev- 
enteenth, Pash  established  liaison 
with  the  Fifth  Army  Intelligence 
Section  and  representatives  of  Mar- 
shal Pietro  Badoglio's  Italian  civil 
government. 

ALSOS  Operations  in  Italy 

Alsos  teams  in  the  early  weeks  of 
1944  interviewed  Italian  scientists  and 
examined  captured  technical  docu- 
ments in  Naples,  Taranto,  and  Brindi- 
si,  and  elsewhere  in  the  zone  of  occu- 
pation.* They  soon  realized  that  little 
data  on  scientific  developments  in 
Germany  and  northern  Italy  was  avail- 
able in  southern  Italy,  but  discovered 
that  Rome  held  more  promise.  To 
gain  access  to  the  Italian  capital, 
Alsos  officials  prepared  two  alternate 
plans:  the  first,  have  Alsos  personnel 
enter  Rome  with  the  Fifth  Army  as 
soon  as  the  city  fell;  the  second,  bring 
Italian  scientists  out  of  Rome  and 
northern  Italy  even  before  this  oc- 
curred. Neither  plan  succeeded,  how- 
ever, because  of  the  unexpectedly 
slow  advance  of  the  Allies.  Alsos 
teams  also  had  little  success  securing 
information  from  Italian  scientists 
behind    enemv    lines,    and    bv    March 


*  Except  as  otherwise  indicated,  section  based  on 
Ms,  Bidwell,  "Hist  Mil  Intel  Div, "  Pt.  5,  pp.  6.25- 
6.26,  NARS;  MDH,  Bk.  1.  Vol.  14,  "Intelligence  and 
Security,"  Foreign  Intel  Supp.  1,  pp.  1.1-3.6,  DASA; 
Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  190-94;  Lincoln  R. 
Thiesmeyer  and  John  E.  Burchard,  Combat  Scientists, 
Science  in  World  War  II  (Boston:  Little,  Brown  and 
Co  ,  1947),  pp.  164-65;  Boris  T.  Pash,  The  ALSOS 
Mission  (New  York:  Award  House,  1969). 


282 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


most  team  members  had  returned  to 
the  United  States. 

From  the  information  secured  in 
southern  Italy,  Alsos  scientists  con- 
cluded that  the  Germans  were  carry- 
ing on  little,  if  any,  experimental  ac- 
tivity with  atomic  energy.  From  their 
reports  Groves  estimated  that  the 
German  program  was  at  about  the 
same  stage  the  American  program 
had  been  when  the  Army  assumed  re- 
sponsibility for  its  further  develop- 
ment. But  the  evidence  was  not  suffi- 
cient. For  this  reason  and  with  an  eye 
to  the  coming  invasion  of  Western 
Europe,  Alsos  scientists  recommend- 
ed that  measures  be  undertaken  to 
secure  knowledge  of  scientific  de- 
velopments in  new  theaters  of 
operation.^ 

When  Colonel  Pash,  who  was  in 
London  preparing  the  Alsos  mission 
to  accompany  the  invasion  of  Western 
Europe,  received  word  that  Allied 
troops  had  entered  Rome  on  4  June, 
he  immediately  left  for  Italy.  Arriving 
in  Rome  on  the  fifth,  he  helped  to 
identify  a  number  of  important  scien- 
tific intelligence  objectives,  including 
questioning  of  the  members  of  the 
physics  laboratory  at  the  University  of 
Rome.  A  reconstituted  Alsos  group 
for  Italy  carried  out  this  and  other 
tasks.  Two  Manhattan  officers,  Maj. 
R.  C.  Ham,  who  took  charge  of  the 
group  when  Pash  returned  to  Eng- 
land, and  Maj.  Robert  R.  Furman,  a 
special  projects  officer  from  Groves's 
Washington  staff,  played  an  important 
part  in  its  work.  The  results  of  the 
group's  investigations  tended  to  reaf- 
firm those  of  the  earlier  Alsos  mis- 


sion   that    German    atomic    activities 
were  on  a  very  limited  scale.® 

Manhattan  's  Special  Intelligence 
Activities,   1944 

Anticipating  that  Alsos  would  con- 
tinue its  operations  in  Western 
Europe,  Groves  established  a  liaison 
office  in  London.  In  December  1943 
he  sent  Major  Furman  to  make  pre- 
liminary arrangements  with  the  Brit- 
ish government,  and  in  January  1944 
he  assigned  Capt.  Horace  K.  Calvert, 
chief  of  the  Manhattan  District's  secu- 
rity program,  to  head  the  new  office. 
Calvert  quickly  established  working 
relations  with  G-2,  European  Theater 
of  Operations,  U.S.  Army  (ETOUSA), 
with  the  American  embassy,  and  with 
the  British  atomic  energy  organiza- 
tion, and  also  assembled  a  small  staff 
of  researchers  and  investigators. 

In  the  early  months  of  1944,  Cal- 
vert's group  concentrated  on  collect- 
ing further  background  data  on 
German  atomic  activities,  seeking  es- 
pecially to  obtain  more  information 
on  the  number  of  atomic  scientists 
and  technicians  at  work,  on  the  loca- 
tion of  physics  laboratories  and  indus- 
trial facilities  engaged  in  operations 
related  to  atomic  energy,  and  on  the 
mining  and  stockpiling  of  ores  con- 
taining fissionable  materials  (uranium 
and  thorium).  For  example,  by  perus- 
ing German  physics  journals  and 
questioning  refugee  European  scien- 
tists, they  learned  the  names  and 
likely  whereabouts  of  the  most  impor- 
tant German  atomic  scientists;  and  by 
periodic     aerial     surveillance     of    the 


*  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,   p.    194;  MPC  Min, 
28  Jul  44  and  24  Feb  45,  MDR. 


«  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told.   pp.  208-10;  Pash, 
ALSOS  Mission,  pp.  30-32. 


FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  OPERA!  IONS 


283 


mines  at  Joachimsthal  (Jachymov), 
Czechoslovakia,  they  maintained  a 
check  on  the  production  of  uranium 
ore,  an  indicator  of  the  extent  of 
German  atomic  activities.  Thus  by  the 
time  a  revived  Alsos  mission  pre- 
pared to  follow  the  Allied  invasion 
that  summer,  the  London  group  had 
ready  a  promising  list  of  matters  to 
be  investigated.' 

At  the  same  time,  other  representa- 
tives of  the  American  program  were 
in  England  to  advise  the  Allied  mili- 
tary leaders  on  development  of  de- 
fense measures  against  atomic  weap- 
ons. There  had  been  a  growing  con- 
viction among  a  number  of  the  ad- 
ministrative and  scientific  leaders  of 
the  Manhattan  Project  that  the  Ger- 
mans might  employ  some  type  of 
atomic  weapon,  cither  in  attack  upon 
Great  Britain  or  in  defense  against  an 
Allied  landing  in  Western  Europe. 
Most  American  scientists  believed  that 
if  the  Germans  did  attempt  to  employ 
nuclear  materials  on  the  battlefield, 
they  would  use  radioactive  fission 
products  in  the  form  of  some  kind  of 
poison  gas.  The  Germans,  the  Ameri- 
can scientists  reasoned,  were  most 
likely  to  have  concentrated  their  ef- 
forts on  development  of  a  plutonium- 
producing  pile,  because  this  was  the 
method  that  promised  to  produce  the 
most  active  material  with  the  least  in- 
vestment in  plants  and  fissionable  ma- 
terials. The  Americans  knew  from 
their  own  experience  that  pile  oper- 
ation produced  not  only  plutonium 
but  also  a  large  amount  of  radioactive 
by-products.  If  the  Germans  had  suc- 
ceeded in  developing  and  operating  a 
pile — and  no  one  was  certain  they  had 
not — they  would  have  built  up  a  con- 


siderable supply  of  these  radioactive 
materials.^ 

General  Groves,  very  much  aware 
of  the  possibility  of  radioactive  war- 
fare, took  specific  measures  to  inform 
American  and  British  military  leaders 
of  how  to  deal  with  the  threat.  In  late 
1943,  he  directed  that  a  project  team 
prepare  an  instruction  manual  on  the 
use  of  radioactive  materials  in  war- 
fare, for  distribution  to  the  military 
leaders,  and  in  December,  with  the 
concurrence  of  General  Marshall,  he 
authorized  a  briefing  of  four  officers 
from  the  ETOUSA  staff  temporarily 
on  duty  in  the  United  States.  Maj. 
Arthur  V.  Peterson,  a  chemical  engi- 
neer long  associated  with  the  pile 
program,  conducted  the  briefing  at 
the  Metallurgical  Laboratory,  includ- 
ing information  on  probable  uses  of 
the  materials,  their  effects  and  how 
they  could  be  treated,  and  possible 
defense  measures.  He  also  instructed 
the  four  officers  to  inform  key  officers 
in  ETOUSA,  suggesting  they  report 
any  unusual  or  unexplained  symp- 
toms observed  by  medical  personnel 
and  fogging  of  films  detected  by 
signal  or  air  personnel.  Headquarters, 
ETOUSA,  took  the  recommended  ac- 
tions promptly,  but  in  the  early 
months  of  1944  found  no  evidence  of 


'Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  194-98. 


8MPC  Mill,  14  Dec  43,  MDR;  MPC  Rpt.  4  Feb  44. 
OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  C, 
MDR;  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  199-200.  See 
also  the  several  reports,  memorandums,  and  other 
documents  pertaining  to  how  the  Germans  might 
use  radioactive  materials  for  military  purposes  in 
Admin  Files,  (ien  Corresp,  319.1,  MDR.  Because  of 
this  threat,  the  Manhattan  District  during  the 
summer  of  1943  supplied  its  area  offices  in  Boston, 
Chicago,  New  York,  and  San  Francisco,  as  well  as 
Groves's  headquarters  in  Washington,  D.C.,  with 
Geiger  counters  as  a  means  to  detect  the  presence 
of  radioactivity  in  the  event  of  an  air  raid. 


284 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


the  use  of  radioactive  materials  by  the 
Germans.^ 

As  time  for  the  AUied  invasion  of 
Western  Europe  approached,  General 
Groves  turned  his  attention  to  the 
possibility  that  the  Germans  would 
employ  radioactive  warfare  to  disrupt 
the  landings  on  the  Continent.  He 
consulted  with  a  number  of  Manhat- 
tan Project  leaders  but  did  not  get 
any  information  or  helpful  advice, 
except  from  James  B.  Conant.  He  de- 
cided, nevertheless,  to  warn  General 
Dwight  D.  Eisenhower,  Commanding 
General,  Supreme  Headquarters, 
Allied  Expeditionary  Force  (SHAEF), 
directly  of  the  danger  of  radioactive 
poisoning.  With  approval  from  Gen- 
eral Marshall,  he  sent  Major  Peterson 
to  England  to  brief  Eisenhower  and 
his  chief  of  staff,  Lt.  Gen.  Walter 
Bedell  Smith,  and  other  members  of 
the  SHAEF  and  ETOUSA  staffs.  Ei- 
senhower's reaction  was  restrained. 
"Since  the  Combined  Chiefs  of  Staff 
have  not  brought  this  information  of- 
ficially to  my  notice,"  he  wrote  to 
Marshall,  "I  have  assumed  that  they 
consider,  on  the  present  available  in- 
telligence, that  the  enemy  will  not  im- 
plement this  project.  Owing  to  the 
importance  of  maintaining  secrecy  to 
avoid  a  possible  scare,  I  have  passed 
this  information  to  a  very  limited 
number  of  persons;  moreover,  I  have 
not  taken  those  precautionary  steps 
which  would  be  necessary  adequately 


^  Memo,  Maj  Peterson  to  Groves,  sub:  Special  In- 
struments, 14  )un  43;  Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves, 
30  Oct  43;  Manual  on  Use  of  Radioactive  Materials 
in  Warfare,  no  author.  All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  319.1,  MDR.  Memo,  Groves  to  Chief  of  Staff, 
23  Jul  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  020  (Chief  of 
Staff),  MDR.  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14,  Foreign  Intel 
Supp.  2  (by  Lt  Col  Arthur  V.  Peterson),  pp.  4-6, 
DASA.  Groves.  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  200. 


to     counter     enemy     action     of    this 
nature."  ^° 

Nevertheless,  Eisenhower  did  take 
several  measures  to  alert  his  com- 
mand. Briefings  on  radioactive  war- 
fare were  held  for  the  chiefs  of  the 
American  Navy,  Army  Air  Forces,  and 
logistical  commands  in  Europe,  as 
well  as  for  a  limited  number  of  their 
staff  members.  He  also  informed  Lt. 
Gen.  Sir  Hastings  L.  Ismay,  Chief  of 
Staff  to  Prime  Minister  Churchill.  At 
the  request  of  the  Supreme  Head- 
quarters, ETOUSA  prepared  a  plan  of 
operation  for  the  American  forces 
under  the  code  name  Peppermint, 
which  provided  that  detection  equip- 
ment be  readied  for  quick  dispatch  to 
the  Continent,  if  needed,  and  made 
arrangements  for  obtaining  more 
equipment  and  the  technical  person- 
nel required  to  use  it.  The  plan  also 
called  for  briefing  of  specified  staff 
officers  and  again  requested  reports 
of  unexplained  fogging  of  photo- 
graphic film  and  certain  types  of  clini- 
cal symptoms  and  medical  cases.  The 
British  subsequently  devised  a  similar 
plan.  A  short  time  before  the  invasion 
of  Normandy,  Headquarters,  Chemi- 
cal Warfare  Service,  ETOUSA,  car- 
ried out  rehearsals  of  Operation  Pep- 
permint to  test  the  plan  and  equip- 
ment. Aerial  and  ground  surveys 
checked  for  presence  of  radioactivity 
in  bombed  areas  along  the  coast  of 
England  and  at  troop-  and  supply- 
concentration  centers.  Survey  results 
indicated  that  the  Germans  had  not 
used   radioactive  materials,   so  Oper- 


'°  Qiiotation  from  Ltr,  Eisenhower  to  Marshall, 
1 1  May  44.  See  also  Memo,  Groves  to  Chief  of 
Staff,  22  Mar  44.  Both  in  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
Groves  Files,  Fldr  18,  Tab  A,  MDR. 


FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  OPERATIONS 


285 


ation    Peppermint    never    went    into 
effect.  ^^ 

ALSOS  Operations  in  Western  Europe, 
194^-1945 

In  early  1944,  while  planning  its 
special  intelligence  objectives,  the 
Manhattan  Project  also  took  the  initia- 
tive to  reestablish  an  even  larger 
Alsos  mission  in  Western  Europe. 
Groves  and  Bush  in  March  requested 
the  newly  assigned  Army  G-2,  Maj. 
Gen.  Clayton  L.  Bissell,  to  form  a 
new  Alsos  group  along  the  same 
lines  as  the  earlier  Italian  mission. 
Bissell  agreed  a  new  high-level  scien- 
tific organization  was  needed  to  ex- 
ploit intelligence  opportunities  in  the 
wake  of  the  invasion  armies,  but  there 
was  indecision  in  the  War  Department 
General  Staff  as  to  what  kind  of  orga- 
nization should  be  used.  Concerned 
by  the  delay.  Groves  personally  inter- 
vened with  the  G-2.  As  a  result,  the 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff,  Lt.  Gen.  Joseph 
T.  McNarney,  approved  a  reorganiza- 
tion plan  on  4  April,  with  Groves  and 
Bush  selecting  the  military  and  civil- 
ian scientific  personnel  and  General 
Bissell  the  intelligence  and  adminis- 
trative staff.  ^2 

The  new  Alsos  mission  had  its  own 
advisory  committee,  a  scientific  direc- 
tor, and  an  enlarged  staff  of  military 


' '  Ltr,  Eisenhower  to  Marshall,  1 1  May  44;  Admin 
Memo  58,  Office  of  Chief  Surg,  ETOUSA,  sub:  Rpt 
of  Epidemic  Disease,  3  Mav  44,  Both  in  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Fldr  18,  Tab  A,  MDR. 
Admin  Memo  60,  Office  of  Chief  Surg,  ETOUSA, 
sub:  Rpt  on  Fogging  or  Blackening  of  Photographs 
or  X-rav  Film,  3  May  44,  reprinted  in  Groves,  Sow  It 
Can  Re  Told,  pp.  203-04  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14, 
Supp.  2,  pp.  6-10,  DASA. 

'2  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  207;  Ms,  Bid- 
well,  "Hist  Mil  Intel  Div, "  Pt.  5,  pp.  6.26-6.27, 
NARS;  Groves  Diary,  2.  6,  10  Mar  and  3  Apr  44, 
LRG. 


and  civilian  personnel.  The  advisory 
committee  was  comprised  of  the  di- 
rectors of  Naval  Intelligence  and  the 
OSRD,  the  commanding  general  of 
the  Army  Service  Forces,  and  the 
Army  G-2,  each  of  whom  appointed  a 
deputy  to  carry  out  the  actual  work  of 
supervising  the  mission.  The  commit- 
tee members  and  their  deputies 
shared  responsibility  with  the  scientif- 
ic director,  Samuel  A.  Goudsmit,  a 
physicist  from  the  University  of  Michi- 
gan, who  had  been  on  leave  to  work 
at  MIT's  Radiation  Laboratory. 

Born  in  the  Netherlands  and  edu- 
cated in  European  universities, 
Goudsmit  had  a  first-rate  scientific 
reputation  and  a  command  of  several 
languages.  As  a  student  and  later  a 
frequent  visitor  to  many  of  the  scien- 
tific centers  of  Europe,  he  had 
become  personally  acquainted  with 
many  of  the  leading  physicists  on  the 
Continent.  That  he  had  not  been  em- 
ployed on  the  Manhattan  Project  was 
an  advantage,  because,  in  the  event  of 
his  capture  by  the  enemy,  he  could 
not  be  forced  to  reveal  secret  infor- 
mation about  the  atomic  program.  ^^ 


'^Except  as  otherwise  indicated,  account  of 
second  phase  of  the  Alsos  mission  based  on  MDH, 
Bk.  1,  Vol.  14,  Supp.  1,  pp.  2.2-2.4  and  4.1-4.50, 
DASA;  Ms,  Bidwell,  "Hist  Mil  Intel  Div,"  Pt.  5,  pp. 
6.26-6.41,  NARS;  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp. 
207-49;  Thiesmeyer  and  Burchard,  Combat  Scientists. 
pp.  165-79;  Pash,  ALSOS  Mission,  pp.  52-248; 
Samuel  A.  Goudsmit,  ALSOS  (New  York:  Henry 
Schuman,  1947),  pp.  14-127.  Data  on  the  German 
atomic  program  in  World  War  II  drawn  from  David 
Irving,  The  I'lnts  House  (London:  William  Kimber, 
1967),  subsequently  published  in  an  American  edi- 
tion under  the  title  The  German  Atomic  Bomb:  The  His- 
tory of  Xuclear  Research  m  Xazi  Germany  (New  York: 
Simon  and  Schuster,  1968);  Albert  Speer,  Inside  the 
Third  Reich — Memoirs,  trans,  from  the  German  by 
Richard  and  Clara  Winston  (New  York:  Macmillan 
Co.,  1969),  pp.  269-72;  Michel  Bar-Zohar,  The  Hunt 
of  German  Scientuts.  trans,  by  Len  Ortzen  from  the 
French  La  Chasse  aia  Sai'anls  allemands  (New  York: 
Hawthorn  Books,  1967). 


286 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


With  assistance  from  the  OSRD, 
Goudsmit  expanded  the  civihan  scien- 
tific staff  until,  by  the  end  of  August, 
it  included  more  than  thirty  scientists. 
Colonel  Pash,  after  establishing  a 
London  office,  recruited  additional 
military  personnel  required  for  the  in- 
creased administrative  and  operation- 
al duties  of  a  larger  mission.  For  pur- 
poses of  military  administration  and 
supply,  Alsos  was  attached  to  the 
Office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff, 
G-2,  ETC.  In  spite  of  direct  support 
from  Eisenhower's  headquarters,  Pash 
experienced  some  difficulties  in  se- 
curing adequate  counterintelligence 
personnel  and  in  making  other  orga- 
nizational arrangements.  Part  of  the 
problem  was  that  Alsos's  high  securi- 
ty classification  limited  knowledge  of 
its  purpose  and  activities  to  only  a 
few  high-ranking  Allied  officers. 

While  the  directive  establishing  the 
new  Alsos  stated  its  mission  in  very 
broad  terms  (it  was  to  secure  "all 
available  intelligence  on  enemy  scien- 
tific research  and  development,  par- 
ticularly with  reference  to  military 
application"),  both  its  military  and 
scientific  leaders  viewed  its  primary 
purpose  to  be  uncovering  and  analyz- 
ing German  atomic  activities.  Further- 
more, the  limited  size  of  its  staff 
(there  were  never  more  than  slightly 
over  one  hundred  military  and  civilian 
personnel)  precluded  any  extensive 
investigations  outside  the  nuclear 
physics  field,  although  it  did  give 
some  attention  to  bacteriological  war- 
fare, aeronautical  research,  proximity 
fuses,  guided  missiles,  and  similar 
developments. 

The  first  Alsos  operations  in 
France  were  largely  unproductive  in- 
vestigations at  the  University  of 
Rennes     and     at     L'Arcouest,     where 


Joliot-Curie's  summer  home  was  lo- 
cated. Joliot  was  not  in  L'Arcouest, 
but  Colonel  Pash,  Major  Calvert,  and 
two  counterintelligence  agents  found 
him  in  his  laboratory  at  the  College 
dc  France  when  they  accompanied  the 
2d  French  Armored  Division  as  it  led 
the  forces  liberating  Paris  in  late 
August  1944.  After  receiving  news  of 
the  French  physicist's  whereabouts, 
the  Alsos  scientific  director  proceed- 
ed to  Paris  to  interview  Joliot.  Goud- 
smit subsequently  learned  that  the 
German  scientists  had  used  Joliot's 
cyclotron  and  other  laboratory  facili- 
ties; however,  he  failed  to  obtain 
enough  data  during  the  interview  to 
determine  the  extent  of  enemy 
progress  in  atomic  matters.^* 

Alsos  investigative  efforts  became 
much  more  productive  following  relo- 
cation of  its  headquarters  from 
London  to  Paris  in  mid-September 
1944.  Alsos  teams  established  con- 
tact with  officials  of  the  Belgian  urani- 
um mining  firm.  Union  Miniere  du 
Haut  Katanga,  and  obtained  informa- 
tion on  the  shipments  of  uranium 
products  that  had  gone  into  Germa- 
ny. They  also  learned  that  there  were 
still  uranium  materials  in  Belgium  and 
that  other  stock  had  been  shipped  to 
France.  Groves  undertook  immediate 
measures  to  bring  these  materials 
under  control  of  the  Manhattan 
Project  agency  that  had  been  formed 
for  that  purpose,  the  Combined  De- 
velopment Trust,  and  dispatched 
Major  Furman,  who  had  taken  part  in 
the  Italian  Alsos  mission,  to  locate  all 
uranium  stocks  in  areas  under  Allied 
control. 


'"•Key  provisions  of  the  Alsos  directive  are 
quoted  in  Ms,  Bidwell,  "Hist  Mil  Intel  Div,"  Pt.  5,  p. 
6.29,  NARS. 


FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  OPERATIONS 


287 


Soon  Alsos  teams  had  tracked 
down  and  secured  68  tons  of  uranium 
materials  in  Belgium  and  about  30 
tons  at  Toulouse,  France.  Groves  di- 
rected prompt  shipment  of  these 
stocks  to  England  and  thence  later  to 
the  United  States  for  safekeeping.  A 
subsequent  Alsos  mission  located 
and  eventually  secured  substantial 
uranium  stock  in  storage  near  Stass- 
furt  in  central  Prussia.  ^^ 

As  Allied  armies  moved  eastward 
toward  the  Rhine  in  the  fall  of  1944, 
Alsos  teams  gained  considerable 
knowledge  about  the  probable  loca- 
tions of  German  atomic  activities.  Re- 
search had  begun  at  the  Kaiser  Wil- 
helm  Institute  in  Berlin  but  had  been 
moved  near  the  small  towns  of  He- 
chingen  and  Bissingen  in  Wuerttem- 
berg,  located  in  the  Black  Forest 
region  of  southwest  Germany,  when 
heavy  bombing  of  the  German  capital 
started  in  1943.  Aerial  photo  surveil- 
lance instituted  by  the  Manhattan  in- 
telligence office  in  England  that 
summer  had  concluded  new  construc- 
tion there  was  not  an  atomic  plant, 
but  other  Allied  intelligence  sources 
indicated  the  Germans  had  some  kind 
of  atomic  operations  in  progress  in 
the  area.  Questioning  of  German  pris- 
oners, too,  had  cast  suspicion  on  the 
town  of  Oranienburg,  18  miles  north 
of  Berlin,  as  a  possible  location  of  a 
processing  plant  for  thorium  and 
other  ores  related  to  atomic  energy 
research. 

Finally,  in  late  November  1944, 
Alsos    representatives    were    able    to 


'^On  the  Combined  Development  Trust  see  Ch. 
XIII.  For  further  details  on  the  seizure  and  handling 
of  captured  stock  see  Ms,  "Diplomatic  Hist  of  Man- 
hattan Proj,"  pp.  31-32,  HB  Files,  Fldr  111,  MDR, 
and  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14,  Supp.  1,  pp.  4.36-4.37, 
DASA. 


question  German  atomic  scientists  at 
the  University  of  Strasbourg.  The  6th 
Army  Group's  special  unit,  the  Stras- 
bourg T-Force,  and  Alsos  teams  en- 
tered the  city  with  the  first  Allied  ele- 
ments. From  the  scientists  and  the 
documents  they  found  there,  they 
learned  that  Germany's  wartime 
atomic  research  program  had  begun 
in  early  1942.  It  had  not,  however, 
gotten  beyond  the  research  and  de- 
velopment stage.  When  the  Nazi  lead- 
ers had  learned  of  the  possibility  of 
producing  atomic  weapons,  they  had 
offered  to  provide  the  atomic  pro- 
gram with  more  money.  But  the 
German  scientists  had  turned  down 
the  funds  as  premature.  By  1944,  they 
still  had  not  discovered  an  effective 
way  to  separate  U-235  from  ordinary 
uranium,  although  they  had  succeed- 
ed in  manufacturing  uranium  metal 
for  use  in  the  piles  they  had  built. 
They  had  not,  however,  attained  a 
chain  reaction  in  these  piles. ^® 

While  the  Strasbourg  data  indicated 
strongly  that  the  Nazis  had  not 
achieved  significant  progress  toward 
the  fabrication  of  atomic  weapons,  it 
was  not  sufficient  to  convince  General 
Groves,  Allied  military  leaders,  and 
Allied  scientists.  Some  argued,  for  ex- 
ample, that  the  Strasbourg  evidence 
might  have  been  planted  deliberately. 
In  fact,  some  Alsos  military  members 
advocated  bombing  raids  on  suspect- 
ed German  atomic  sites  in  the  Black 
Forest  region,  but  Alsos  scientists 
dissuaded  them  from  this  course. 

The  latter  group,  however,  raised 
no  objections  to  Groves's  request  for 


'^  For  a  description  of  the  efforts  of  the  Nazi  gov- 
ernment to  provide  support  for  the  German  atomic 
program  see  Speer,  Inside  the  Third  Reich,  pp.  269- 
71,  and  Stimson  Diarv,  13  Dec  44,  HLS. 


288 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


bombing  of  installations  at  Oranien- 
burg.  The  town  was  in  the  projected 
Russian  occupation  zone  and  there- 
fore could  not  be  investigated  by 
Alsos.  Groves  dispatched  an  officer 
from  his  staff  to  explain  the  mission 
to  General  Carl  A.  Spaatz,  command- 
er of  the  United  States  Army  Strategic 
Air  Forces  in  Europe,  who  on  15 
March  1945  ordered  Eighth  Air  Force 
bombers  to  drop  almost  1,300  tons  of 
bombs  and  incendiaries  on  the  facili- 
ties at  Oranienburg.  ^  "^ 

Preparing  to  follow  the  Allied 
armies  into  Germany  in  early  1945, 
Alsos  corrected  certain  organization- 
al weaknesses  revealed  during  the 
Strasbourg  operations.  Full-time  as- 
signment of  German-speaking  scien- 
tists helped  ensure  their  prompt  avail- 
ability when  they  were  most  needed. 
Establishment  of  close  liaison  with 
SHAEF  and  ETOUSA  headquarters, 
in  Paris,  and  with  the  21st,  12th,  and 
6th  Army  Groups  headquarters  en- 
abled Colonel  Pash  to  keep  more 
abreast  of  front-line  military  develop- 
ments, and  hence  in  a  better  position 
to  exploit  intelligence  opportunities. 

The  reorganized  Alsos  units  dem- 
onstrated their  greater  effectiveness 
as  they  followed  the  Allied  armies 
toward  the  Rhine  in  February  1945. 
Establishing  another  advance  base  at 
Aachen,  they  investigated  scientific  in- 
telligence objectives  in  the  university 
cities  of  Cologne  and  Bonn,  at  metal- 
making    plants    in    Frankfurt,    and,    a 


^'  Wesley  Frank  Craven  and  James  Lea  Gate,  eds., 
Europe:  Argument  to  V-E  Day,  January  19-4-4  to  May 
1945,  The  Army  Air  Forces  in  World  War  II,  Vol.  3 
(Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1951),  pp.  53 
and  753.  The  account  of  the  bombing  of  Oranien- 
burg  on  15  Mar  45  indicates  that  the  town  was  a 
railroad  center  and  site  of  aircraft  plants,  but  does 
not  mention  atomic  facilities.  See  also  Groves,  Now 
It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  230-31. 


short  time  later,  at  the  IG  Farben  In- 
dustries plants  in  Ludwigshafen.  As 
Alsos  scientists  had  anticipated,  none 
of  these  investigations  turned  up  sig- 
nificant information  on  German 
atomic  developments.  But  they 
helped  to  prepare  the  way  for 
effective  exploitation  of  the  impor- 
tant atomic  objectives  in  southwest 
Germany. 

The  first  of  these  to  become  acces- 
sible in  the  spring  of  1945  was  Hei- 
delberg. There  an  Alsos  team  cap- 
tured several  leading  German  atomic 
scientists;  nuclear  equipment,  includ- 
ing a  cyclotron;  and  many  valuable 
documents.  Data  uncovered  in  Hei- 
delberg also  further  substantiated  ear- 
Her  evidence  that  most  of  the  other 
important  German  atomic  scientists 
and  their  research  installations  were 
in  the  region  south  and  east  of  Stutt- 
gart. But  Alsos  penetration  of  this 
area  posed  a  problem  because  of  the 
decision  by  the  Allied  leaders  in  early 
1945  that  it  fell  within  the  French 
zone  of  operations. 

In  April  1945,  while  American 
atomic  leaders  endeavored  to  work 
out  a  solution  to  the  French  zone 
problem,  Alsos  teams  operating  out 
of  advanced  base  headquarters  at 
Heidelberg  and  Aachen  investigated  a 
variety  of  atomic  targets  at  other 
points  in  west  and  southwest  Ger- 
many. Northeast  of  Frankfurt,  at  the 
town  of  Stadtilm  in  Thuringia,  where 
the  German  government  had  relo- 
cated a  part  of  the  physics  branch  of 
the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Institute,  Alsos 
found  many  technical  documents  relat- 
ing to  the  atomic  program,  parts  for  a 
low-temperature  pile,  heavy  water 
equipment,  and  8  tons  of  uranium 
oxide.    The    Gestapo    had    evacuated 


FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  OPERATIONS 


289 


the  most  important  laboratory  staff 
members,  but  Alsos  scientists  inter- 
viewed a  number  of  lesser  status  who 
had  remained  in  Stadtilm.  At  the  uni- 
versity town  of  Goettingen,  located 
south  of  the  city  of  Hannover,  and  at 
the  adjoining  village  of  Lindau,  an- 
other Alsos  team  found  several  scien- 
tists and  technicians  who  had  consid- 
erable knowledge  of  German  wartime 
scientific  programs.  Most  notable 
among  this  group  was  the  chief  of  the 
planning  board  of  the  Reichsforschungs- 
rat  (National  Research  Council),  the 
central  German  agency  for  scientific 
research  for  military  purposes.  From 
Goettingen,  an  Alsos  team  pushed 
north  to  Celle,  located  22  miles 
northeast  of  Hannover,  where,  ac- 
cording to  information  obtained  at 
Stadtilm,  the  Germans  had  installed 
an  experimental  centrifuge  for  sep- 
arating uranium  isotopes.  On  the 
seventeenth,  the  team  found  the  cen- 
trifuge in  a  laboratory  located  in  a 
spinning  mill  guarded  by  British 
troops. 

These  various  findings  by  Alsos 
teams  appeared  further  to  confirm 
that  the  German  wartime  atomic 
energy  program  was  of  relatively 
modest  character  and  had  made  little 
progress  toward  producing  atomic 
weapons.  But  the  American  atomic 
leaders  could  not  be  fully  satisfied 
that  this  was  the  case  until  Alsos 
teams  had  investigated  the  reported 
atomic  facilities  relocated  by  the  Ger- 
mans from  the  Berlin  area  to  the 
Black  Forest  region  in  Wuerttemberg 
and  had  captured  the  principal 
German  atomic  scientists  believed  to 
be  residing  in  that  area.  They  also 
agreed  that,  for  reasons  of  security, 
American  troops  must  be  the  first  to 
occupy    and    inspect    these    facilities. 


Their  first  hope  was  that  zone  bound- 
aries in  southwest  Germany  could  be 
adjusted  to  exclude  the  atomic  facili- 
ties from  the  French  zone.  But  by 
early  April,  the  State  Department's  in- 
sistence upon  having  full  knowledge 
of  the  reasons  for  making  readjust- 
ments— a  request  incompatible  with 
Manhattan's  security  requirements — 
convinced  Groves  that  other  means 
must  be  found  to  assure  American 
penetration  ahead  of  the  French  in 
the  crucial  Wuerttemberg  region.  On 
the  fifth.  Groves,  Marshall,  and  Stim- 
son  agreed  that  the  Manhattan  com- 
mander should  implement  his  own 
proposal  that  Alsos  teams,  accompa- 
nied by  American  troops,  move  into 
the  Wuerttemberg  region,  question 
German  atomic  scientists  found  there, 
remove  appropriate  records,  and  de- 
stroy the  atomic  installations.^® 

Marshall  directed  Groves  to  coordi- 
nate with  the  Operations  Division  of 
the  War  Department  and  SHAEF  in 
developing  a  plan  for  what  came  to 
be  known  as  Operation  Harbor- 
age.^^ Groves  sent  his  special  assist- 
ant for  security  affairs,  Lt.  Col.  John 
Lansdale,  Jr.,  to  Europe  to  assist  the 
SHAEF  planners.  They  first  consid- 
ered carrying  out  a  combined  para- 
chute and  ground  operation,  but  by 
20  April  the  rapidly  shifting  tactical 
situation  had  eliminated  the  need  for 
the  air  phase  of  the  operation.  In- 
stead, SHAEF  ordered  Colonel  Pash 
to  undertake  a  conventional  intelli- 
gence operation,  with  the  objective  of 
seizing  appropriate  persons,  docu- 
ments,  buildings,   and   materials.   For 


isstimson  Diary.  4-5  Apr  45,  HLS. 

1^  General  Groves  gives  a  detailed  account  of  his 
role  in  the  planning  of  Operation  Harborage  in 
Xow  II  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  233-36. 


290 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


this  purpose,  the  Supreme  Headquar- 
ters created  a  new  special  task  force, 
designated  T-Force.  Comprised  of 
fourteen  American  and  seven  British 
officers,  five  scientists,  eight  counter- 
intelHgence  agents,  and  fifteen  enhst- 
ed  men,  T-Force  was  attached  to  the 
6th  Army  Group  and  reinforced  by 
the  1269th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion (less  Company  B),  all  under  the 
command  of  Pash.  When  French 
forces  appeared  to  be  on  the  verge  of 
moving  in  to  the  Wuerttemberg  area 
in  late  April,  SHAEF  gave  Pash  per- 
mission to  launch  Operation  Harbor- 
age. On  the  twenty-second,  Pash,  ac- 
companied by  Brig.  Gen.  Eugene  L. 
Harrison,  G-2  of  the  6th  Army 
Group,  led  T-Force  across  a  bridge- 
head at  Horb,  on  the  Neckar  River, 
about  56  miles  east  of  Strasbourg. 
They  moved  south  and  east  20  miles 
to  Haigerloch,  which  they  seized  on 
the  twenty-third.  In  the  next  two 
days,  T-Force  elements  also  occupied 
Hechingen,  9  miles  east  of  Haiger- 
loch, and  Bissingen,  a  few  miles 
southwest,  and  Tailfingen,  a  few  miles 
southeast  of  Hechingen,  thus  com- 
pleting a  sweep  of  the  Black  Forest 
villages  suspected  of  having  atomic 
installations  or  personnel. 

What  the  Alsos  scientists  found  in 
these  communities  finally  and  defi- 
nitely confirmed  the  limitations  of  the 
wartime  German  atomic  program.  "It 
was  so  obvious,"  Samuel  Goudsmit 
later  recalled, 

that  the  whole  German  uranium  set  up 
was  on  a  ludicrously  small  scale.  Here  [at 
Hechingen]  was  the  central  group  of  lab- 
oratories, and  all  it  amounted  to  was  a 
little  underground  cave,  a  wing  of  a  small 
textile  factory,  a  few  rooms  in  an  old 
brewery.  To  be  sure,  the  laboratories 
were  well-equipped,  but  compared  to 
what  we  were  doing  in  the  United  States 


it  was  still  small-time  stuff.  Sometimes  we 
wondered  if  our  government  had  not 
spent  more  money  on  our  intelligence 
mission  than  the  Germans  had  spent  on 
their  whole  project. ^° 

Besides  laboratories  and  equip- 
ment, Alsos  teams  found  concealed 
supplies  of  heavy  water,  1.5  tons  of 
metallic  uranium  cubes,  10  tons  of 
carbon,  and  miscellaneous  other  nu- 
clear materials.  They  also  located  im- 
portant scientific  and  technical 
records,  but  most  significant  were  the 
German  scientists  they  took  into  cus- 
tody. These  included  Otto  Hahn, 
who,  with  Fritz  Strassmann,  had  con- 
ducted in  1938  the  experiments  that 
resulted  in  the  fissioning  of  uranium 
by  neutrons,  subsequently  confirmed 
by  Lise  Meitner  and  Otto  R.  Frisch. 

Not  all  of  the  known  remaining 
leaders  of  German  atomic  science 
were  found  in  the  Black  Forest 
region,  but  information  uncovered 
there  led  to  capture  in  May  1945  of 
those  still  at  large  by  other  Alsos 
teams  operating  in  Bavaria.  These  in- 
cluded the  world-famous  Werner  Hei- 
senberg,  a  Nobel  Prize  winner,  and 
Walther  Gerlach  and  Kurt  Diebner, 
two  of  the  chief  administrative  offi- 
cials in  the  German  atomic  program. 
After  preliminary  interviews  by  Alsos 
field  teams.  Allied  authorities  re- 
moved the  captured  scientists  by  easy 
stages  to  rear  areas — first  to  Ver- 
sailles, then  Belgium,  and  finally  in 
July  to  England — where  they  were 
subjected  to  further  intensive  interro- 
gation. Although  the  enemy  scientists 
were  under  British  administrative 
control  during  their  extended  intern- 
ment   in    England,    representatives    of 


20  Goudsmit,  .4L50S,  pp.  107-08. 


FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  OPERATIONS 


291 


the  Manhattan  Project  exercised  a 
consultative  role  in  determining  their 
intelligence  exploitation  and  ultimate 
disposal.  Unwilling  to  see  the  German 
scientists  come  under  Russian  con- 
trol, both  British  and  American 
atomic  authorities  insisted  on  detain- 
ing them  in  England  until  there  was  a 
reasonable  assurance  that  when  they 
returned  to  Germany  they  would 
reside  and  work  in  either  the  British 
or  American  occupation  zone,  a  con- 
dition that  was  not  finally  met  until 
the  end  of  1945.21 

Alsos  continued  operating  in  the 
wake  of  the  Allied  armies  in  the 
summer  and  fall  of  1945,  seeking  ad- 
ditional evidence  of  German  atomic 
developments.  Penetrations  to  Ham- 
burg, Berlin,  Vienna,  and  elsewhere 
resulted  in  the  capture  of  a  few  more 
scientists  but  provided  little  addition- 
al new  information  or  facilities.  When 
the  Alsos  mission  finally  disbanded 
in  November,  it  had,  as  General 
Groves  later  assessed  its  results, 
"only  confirmed  what  we  already 
knew  and  it  was  quite  clear  that  there 
was  nothing  in  Europe  of  further  in- 
terest to  us."  22 

When  the  interned  German  scien- 
tists learned  that  the  United  States 
had  dropped  atomic  bombs  on  Japan 
in  August  1945,  they  endeavored  to 
explain  why  Germany  failed  to  devel- 
op an  atomic  weapon.  Their  explan- 
tion  coincided  generally  with  the 
picture  that  Alsos  teams  had  pieced 
together  from  the  evidence  they  had 
gathered  in  Germany.  Although 
German  scientists  had  begun  research 
on  the  practical  application  of  atomic 


energy  in  1939,  they  soon  had  come 
to  the  conclusion  that,  because  of  lim- 
ited resources  and  facilities  available 
to  them,  production  of  atomic  explo- 
sives was  not  feasible  and  had  con- 
centrated on  developing  an  atomic 
engine  as  an  alternate  source  of 
power.  They  had  persisted  along 
these  limited  lines  even  after  Albert 
Speer,  the  Nazi  Minister  of  Arma- 
ments, had  offered  in  1942  to  in- 
crease financial  support  for  the 
atomic  program.  Speer  later  recalled 
that  Heisenberg  and  other  German 
atomic  scientists  had  given  him  the 
distinct  "impression  that  the  atom 
bomb  could  no  longer  have  any  bear- 
ing on  the  course  of  the  war."^^ 
Administrative  problems,  too,  had 
plagued  the  program;  a  partial  con- 
solidation in  1942  had  not  ended  the 
fragmentation  and  duplication  that  had 
developed  when  atomic  research  had 
been  divided  among  three  different 
and  competing  governmental  agen- 
cies. In  the  estimate  of  the  historian 
of  the  German  program,  the  com- 
bined effect  of  these  negative  factors 
was  that  "after  the  middle  of  1942, 
Germany  virtually  marked  time  until 
the  end  of  the  war,  gaining  in  those 
three  years  knowledge  that  could 
have  been  won  in  as  many  months 
had  the  will  been  there.  .  .  .  Ger- 
many's nuclear  scientists  failed  to  win 
the  confidence  of  their  government, 
and  were  left  stranded  on  the  shores 
of  the  atomic  age."  2"* 


^'  On  the  internment  and  treatment  of  the 
German  scientists  in  England  see  Groves,  Xow  It 
Can  Be  Told.  pp.  333-40. 

"Ibid.,  p.  248. 


"Speer,  Inside  the  Third  Retch,  p.  27L 

"Irving,  The  I'mis  House,  p.  274.  See  also  Alan  D. 
Beyerchen,  Saentisls  Under  Hitler:  Politics  and  the  Phys- 
ics Community  m  the  Third  Reich  (New  Haven:  Yale 
University  Press,  1977),  pp.  188-89,  193-97,  201- 
02. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


The  Raw  Materials  Program 


From  the  very  beginning  of  the 
atomic  energy  project,  one  of  the 
most  important  activities  was  procure- 
ment of  basic  raw  materials,  many  of 
them  never  before  in  great  demand. 
The  Office  of  Scientific  Research  and 
Development  had  begun  acquiring  a 
number  of  these  materials  through 
the  planning  board  of  its  S-1  Section 
and  through  Stone  and  Webster,  and 
in  mid- 1942,  when  the  project  was 
placed  under  the  direction  of  the 
Army,  the  Manhattan  District  as- 
sumed responsibility  for  the  ongoing 
materials  program.  With  the  long- 
range  objective  of  ensuring  America's 
control  of  the  world's  more  signifi- 
cant deposits  of  uranium  and  thori- 
um,^ the  District  almost  immediately 
became  involved  in  acquisition  efforts 
at  an  international  level.  This,  project 
leaders  felt,  was  critical  to  national  se- 
curity and  would  prevent  unfriendly 
nations  from  securing  these  supplies. 

'When  thorium  232  captures  a  slow  neutron,  it 
converts  into  thorium  233.  The  thorium  then  disin- 
tegrates quickly  into  protoactinium  233,  which  then 
decomposes,  but  more  slowlv,  into  uranium  233. 
Uranium  233  is  fissionable  by  slow  neutrons  and 
thus  potentially  a  material  for  sustaining  a  chain 
reaction.  Thorium,  like  uranium,  occurs  widely  in  the 
earth's  crust,  but  similarly  not  often  in  sufficient 
concentration  to  provide  economically  workable  de- 
posits. Before  World  War  II,  it  was  most  commonly 
used  in  the  manufacture  of  gas  mantles. 


Geographic  Search  and  Field  Exploration 

In  October  1942,  shortly  after  Gen- 
eral Groves  became  executive  officer 
of  the  Manhattan  Project,  Deputy  Dis- 
trict Engineer  Nichols  and  Union 
Miniere  Director  Edgar  Sengier  suc- 
cessfully completed  negotiations  for 
the  District's  acquisition  of  the  com- 
pany's remaining  stocks  of  mined  ura- 
nium ore,  stored  on  Staten  Island  and 
in  the  Congo, ^  thus  assuring  the 
atomic  program  a  sufficient  supply  to 
meet  its  wartime  requirements.  Yet  in 
the  ensuing  months,  project  leaders 
gradually  came  to  realize  that  raw  ma- 
terials procurement  could  not  be  lim- 
ited to  meeting  only  the  immediate 
wartime  demands.  First,  by  their  deci- 
sion to  build  and  operate  several 
large  production  plants,  they  had  es- 
tablished a  requirement  for  a  continu- 
ing supply  of  uranium,  not  only  for 
the  wartime  weapons  program  but 
also  for  postwar  armaments  and  de- 
velopment of  atomic  energy  as  a  great 
new  source  of  power.  Second,  they 
became  increasingly  aware  of  impor- 
tant strategic  considerations  as,  be- 
ginning in  1943,  the  United  States  ne- 
gotiated interchange  agreements  with 


'See  Ch.  W  for  details  on  acquisition  of  Belgian 


THE  RAW  MATERIALS  PROGRAM 


293 


Great  Britain.  Both  the  American  and 
British  leaders  concluded  that  the 
best  future  interest  of  the  two  coun- 
tries would  be  served  by  a  joint  effort 
to  seek  out  and  gain  control  over  as 
much  of  the  world's  uranium  and  tho- 
rium deposits  as  possible;  this  policy, 
they  reasoned,  would  ensure  their 
governments  ready  access  to  major 
new  resources  of  inestimable  value 
and  would  keep  these  resources  out 
of  the  hands  of  their  potential  en- 
emies. Furthermore,  project  leaders 
perceived  that,  strictly  from  the  view- 
point of  national  interest,  it  would  be 
better  for  the  United  States  to  con- 
serve its  own  apparently  limited  do- 
mestic resources  and  use  whatever 
raw  materials  it  could  acquire  from 
other  countries  instead.^ 

Although  occupied  with  a  myriad  of 
other  matters  relating  to  plant  con- 
struction in  early  1943,  General 
Groves  took  time  to  develop  an  orga- 
nization for  carrying  out  the  project's 
long-range  raw  materials  objectives. 
He  presented  his  ideas  to  the  Military 
Policy  Committee  at  its  5  February 
meeting,  emphasizing  that  he  wanted 
to  have  "a  competent  mining  expert 
examine  the  possibility  of  developing 
in  the  United  States  a  suitable  source 
of  supply  of  the  crucial  ores."  By  late 
March,  the  Manhattan  commander 
was  discussing  the  possibility  of  en- 
gaging the  Union  Carbide  and 
Carbon  Corporation,  already  under 
contract  to  operate  the  gaseous  diffu- 
sion plant  at  Clinton,  to  undertake  a 


3MPC  Rpt,  21  Aug  43,  Fidr  25,  Tab  E;  MPC  Mm, 
24  Jun  43,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A.  Both  in  OCG  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  MDR.  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be 
Told,  p.  180.  Ms  (unsigned),  "Atomic  Bombs,"  Apr 
45,  HB  Files,  Fldr  15,  MDR. 


broad  program  of  ore  exploration  for 
the  Manhattan  Project.* 

Groves's  selection  of  Union  Car- 
bide rather  than  some  other  compa- 
ny, or  the  Manhattan  District,  or  an- 
other government  agency  was  due  to 
a  number  of  considerations,  with  the 
security  aspect  of  primary  importance. 
Because  Union  Carbide  made  regular 
foreign  purchases  of  many  uranium 
minerals,  he  felt  it  was  highly  unlikely 
that  the  chemical  firm's  ore  explora- 
tion activities  for  the  District  would 
attract  any  undue  attention.  Also  es- 
pecially attractive  was  the  fact  that  the 
company,  because  of  its  long  experi- 
ence in  mineral  surveys  and  explora- 
tions, currently  had  an  organized — 
although  inactive — subsidiary,  the 
Union  Mines  Development  Corpora- 
tion, to  administer  the  ore  program. 
Following  negotiations,  Union  Car- 
bide agreed  to  activate  Union  Mines, 
and  on  24  May,  Union  Mines  Presi- 
dent J.  R.  Van  Fleet  accepted  a  letter 
contract.  Under  terms  of  this  con- 
tract. Union  Mines  would  carry  out  a 
worldwide  search  for  new  sources  of 
uranium,  evaluate  its  findings,  and 
make  recommendations  as  to  the  best 
way  for  the  United  States  to  explore 
them;  the  government  would  pay  all 
costs;  and  Union  Mines  would  work 
without  a  fixed  fee  or  profit. 

For  reasons  of  security,  and  to 
avoid  duplication  of  administrative 
overhead  operation.  Union  Mines  lo- 
cated its  headquarters  in  the  New 
York  City  office  building  already  oc- 
cupied by  other  elements  of  Union 
Carbide.  Security  also  was  the  main 
consideration     in     the    administrative 


*  MPC    Min,    5    Feb    (source    of    quotation)    and 
30  Mar  43,  MDR. 


294 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


decision  to  set  up  a  separate  Manhat- 
tan unit  for  monitoring  Union  Mines 
survey  and  exploration  activities,  as 
well  as  to  maintain  liaison  with  Dis- 
trict headquarters  and  its  major  pro- 
curement office  at  Madison  Square. 
On  15  June,  in  rooms  adjacent  to 
those  of  Union  Mines,  the  district  en- 
gineer established  the  Murray  Hill 
Area  Engineers  Office  and,  as  area 
engineer,  assigned  Maj.  Paul  L. 
Guarin.^ 

While  Major  Guarin  was  organizing 
a  small  staff  of  technical  experts  and 
clerks.  Union  Mines  started  recruiting 
trained  personnel  for  its  staff  By 
mid- 1944,  the  company  had  assem- 
bled approximately  130  individuals, 
assigning  half  of  them  to  the  New 
York  office  and  the  rest  to  field 
projects  in  the  United  States  and 
abroad.  To  achieve  its  program  objec- 
tives. Union  Mines  organized  staff 
functions  along  several  lines.  The 
New  York-based  geologists,  transla- 
tors, and  clerks  concentrated  on  a 
thorough  search  of  available  technical 
literature  on  world  mineral  resources, 
in  all  languages.  Field  teams  of 
mining  engineers  and  geologists  in- 
vestigated known  or  suspected 
sources  of  uranium  and  thorium.  A 
small  group  in  New  York  studied 
ways  to  improve  the  methods  and 
equipment  for  ore  exploration,  and 
another  small  unit  at  Union  Mines 
headquarters  oversaw  research  on 
beneficiation  and  metallurgical  pro- 
cesses that  might  be  suitable  for  con- 


centration of  uranium  ores.  Making 
maximum  use  of  the  nearby  facilities 
of  Union  Carbide,  Union  Mines  was 
able  to  administer  the  entire  ore  pro- 
gram with  a  relatively  small  overhead 
staff  and  at  a  cost  of  approximately 
$600,000  a  year.6 

During  the  period  of  its  wartime 
operations.  Union  Mines  supplied 
Manhattan  leaders  with  a  variety  of 
reports.  After  studying  the  various  in- 
struments and  techniques  for  area 
surveying  and  ore  testing.  Union 
Mines  research  staff  compiled  data  on 
the  latest  or  improved  devices  for  de- 
tecting uranium  and  thorium  deposits 
and  for  testing  ore  samples.  It  also 
examined  some  sixty-five  thousand 
volumes  and,  based  on  its  findings, 
produced  fifty-six  reports  covering 
occurrences  of  uranium  and  thorium 
in  about  fifty  different  countries,  in- 
cluding not  only  enemy-controlled 
lands  such  as  Czechoslovakia  and 
Thailand  but  also  areas  as  remote  as 
Greenland  and  Madagascar.  And  from 
the  company's  field  exploration  pro- 
gram, field  teams  prepared  a  total  of 
fifty-seven  reports  of  investigations 
carried  out  in  thirty-six  states  and  the 
territory  of  Alaska  and  about  forty- 
five  reports  of  investigations  conduct- 
ed in  some  twenty  foreign  countries."^ 


5  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  180;  First  Annual 
Rpt,  Murray  Hill  Area  Engrs  Oflice,  sub:  Proj  S-37, 
30  Jun  44,  pp.  1-2,  OROO;  Memo,  Guarin  to 
Groves,  sub:  Union  Mines  Proj,  6  Jul  44,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  095  (Union  Mines),  MDR; 
MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  2,  "Geographical  Exploration," 
pp.  1.1-1.3,  DASA. 


6  Rpt,  Murray  Hill  Area  Engrs  Office,  30  Jun  44, 
pp.  2-8,  12-13,  42-44  (Charts  2-4),  OROO; 
Groves,  sub:  Union  Mines  Proj,  6  Jul  44,  MDR; 
MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1.2-1.3  and  3.2-3.5,  DASA. 

^  MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1.4-1.16  and  Apps.  Bl 
(list  and  summary  of  all  reports  by  Literature  Re- 
search Div-B5),  DASA.  Rpt,  Murray  Hill  Area  Engrs 
Office,  30  Jun  44,  pp.  22-34,  OROO.  Memo,  Mer- 
ritt  to  Nichols,  sub:  Resume  of  Prod  of  Uranium 
Products  for  MD  in  Colorado  Plateau  Area,  26  Jan 
45,  410.2  (Uranium);  Rpt,  Union  Mines,  sub:  Sum- 
mary of  Investigations  to  1  Feb  44,  same  date,  095 
(Union  Mines).  Both  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
MDR.  Ltr.  Stimson  to  MacArthur  (Cdr  in  Chief.  SW 

Conlinucd 


THE  RAW  MAITRIALS  PROGRAM 


295 


Beginning  in  early  1944,  the 
Murray  Hill  area  engineer  used  the 
Union  Mines  data  to  provide  the  dis- 
trict engineer  with  comprehensive 
lists  appraising  uranium  production 
possibilities  in  various  countries.  A 
typical  list,  for  example,  rated  occur- 
rences in  the  Belgian  Congo  as  excel- 
lent; those  in  the  United  States, 
Canada,  and  Sweden  as  good;  those 
in  Czechoslovakia,  Portugal,  and 
Union  of  South  Africa  as  fair;  and 
those  in  Madagascar,  Australia,  Brazil, 
and  England  as  poor.  By  1945,  the 
area  engineer  was  also  including  re- 
ports on  thorium.  Brazil  and  India 
were  rated  excellent,  while  the  United 
States,  Korea,  Netherlands  East 
Indies,  Malaya,  and  Siam  were  judged 
fair.  In  this  manner,  the  Union  Mines 
data  provided  the  essential  guidelines 
for  reaching  the  long-range  objective 
of  the  ore  program.® 

Ore  Control  Agency:  Combined 
Development  Trust 

By  the  summer  of  1943,  the  Ameri- 
can atomic  project's  supply  require- 
ments for  sufficient  raw  materials  had 
convinced  its  leaders  of  the  impor- 
tance of  establishing  adequate  control 
over  the  world's  more  significant  de- 
posits of  uranium  and  thorium.  In  its 
21  August  report  to  the  President,  the 
Military    Policy    Committee    advanced 

Pacific  Area).  31  Mar  44.  HB  Files,  Fidr  25.  MDR. 
.Stimson  wrote  to  MacArthur  requesting  clearance 
for  a  visit  by  a  L'nion  Mines  representative  interest- 
cA  in  "inlormation  |on|  certain  natural  resources 
which  might  be  founcJ  in  vour  theater." 

»  Rpt.  Murrav  Hill  Area  Kngrs  OfTice.  .SO  jun  44, 
pp.  8-11,  OROO.  MDH.  Bk  7,  Vol.  2.  pp.  1.16- 
1.21.  DASA.  Rpt,  Union  Mines,  sub:  .Summary  of 
Investigations  to  1  Feb  44,  same  date;  Memo, 
(iuarin  to  Groves,  sub:  I  nion  Mines  Proj,  6  Jul  44. 
Both  in  Admin  Files,  Cien  Corresp,  095  (I'nion 
Mines),  MDR. 


this  idea,  warning  that  "the  major 
world  supply  [is]  in  the  Belgian 
Congo  [and]  not  under  our  control  in 
any  way.^  This  situation,  the  commit- 
tee felt,  did  not  bode  well  for  the 
United  States,  especially  in  the  post- 
war era:  America's  knowledge  and 
technical  capability  to  fabricate  atomic 
weapons  would  be  of  no  avail  without 
the  raw  materials  to  do  the  job. 

How  to  secure  these  raw  materials 
became  a  priority  issue  for  project 
leaders,  who  felt  one  way  was  to  gain 
control  over  the  Congo  supply. 
During  the  fall.  Colonel  Nichols  at- 
tempted to  convince  Union  Miniere 
Director  Edgar  Sengier  that  the  flood- 
ed Shinkolobwe  mine  should  be  re- 
opened and  its  entire  future  output 
sold  to  the  United  States;  however, 
Sengier,  who  understood  the  poten- 
tial of  atomic  power,  did  not  wish  to 
make  any  commitments  that  he  could 
not  later  justify  to  the  Belgian  gov- 
ernment as  having  been  based  upon 
military  requirements. 

The  American  failure  to  secure  a 
long-term  contract  from  Sengier  for 
future  production  of  Congo  ore  came 
up  for  discussion  at  the  14  December 
meeting  of  the  Military  Policy  Com- 
mittee. The  consensus  of  the  commit- 
tee was  that,  with  the  Belgian  govern- 
ment in  exile  in  London  and  British 
commercial  interests  apparently  hold- 
ing or  having  direction  over  nearly  a 
third  of  Union  Miniere  stock.  Great 
Britain  was  likely  to  gain  control  of 
the  Congo  uranium.  So  from  the 
American  point  of  view,  the  commit- 
tee concluded,  the  best  move  would 
be    to    secure   joint    control.    Conse- 


9  MPC  Rpt,  21  Aug  43,  MDR.  Although  signed  by 
Bush,  Groves  had  drafted  this  report. 


296 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


quently,  on  the  seventeenth,  the 
American  and  British  members  of 
the  Combined  PoHcy  Committee,  ^"^ 
agreed  to  begin  studies  preparatory 
to  recommending  joint  action.  ^^ 

Speaking  for  the  Mihtary  PoHcy 
Committee,  General  Groves  recom- 
mended to  the  President  in  February 
1944  that  the  Belgians  be  "strongly 
encouraged"    to   reopen    the   Shinko- 


'"  Churchill  and  Roosevelt's  signing  of  the 
Quebec  Agreement  on  19  Aug  43  established  the 
Combined  Policy  Committee  in  Washington,  D.C., 
with  membership  as  follows:  Secretary  Henry  L. 
Stimson  (United  States),  as  chairman,  Dr.  Vannevar 
Bush  (United  States),  Dr.  James  B.  Conant  (United 
States),  Field  Marshal  Sir  John  Dill  (Ignited  King- 
dom), Col.  John  J.  Llewellm  (llnited  Kingdom),  and 
Mr.  Clarence  D.  Howe  (Canada).  Field  Marshal  Dill 
was  head  of  the  British  Joint  Staff  Mission  in  Wash- 
ington, Colonel  Llewellin  was  the  Washington  rep- 
resentative of  the  British  Ministry  of  Supply,  and 
Mr.  Howe  was  Canada's  Minister  of  Munitions  and 
Supplv.  See  Cowing,  Britain  and  Atomic  Energy,  pp. 
170-72,  and  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told  pp.  133-37. 

'•MPC  Min,  14  Dec  43,  MDR;  CPC  Min,  17  Dec 
43,  HB  Files.  Fldr  10,  MDR;  Ms,  "Diplomatic  Hist 
of  Manhattan  Proj."  p.  18,  HB  Files,  Fldr  111, 
MDR;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  170.  After  the 
breakdown  of  Anglo-American  collaboration  on 
atomic  matters  in  early  1943,  Great  Britain  devel- 
oped a  strong  interest  in  securing  a  reliable  source 
of  uranium  for  its  future  needs.  Two  actions  by  the 
United  States,  however,  caused  leaders  of  the  Brit- 
ish atomic  project  to  feel  genuinely  alarmed:  in  the 
spring,  when  the  United  States  contracted  to  pur- 
chase practically  the  entire  output  of  the  (Canadian 
Eldorado  mine  (hitherto  the  chief  source  of  uranium 
for  the  British  program)  through  the  end  of  1945; 
and  in  the  fall,  when  the  United  States  attempted  to 
buy  the  entire  output  of  the  Belgian-owned  Shinko- 
lobwe  mine  in  the  Congo.  The  first  incident  was 
sufficient  impetus  for  the  British  to  seek  a  resump- 
tion of  Anglo-American  cooperation,  and  in  August 
the  two  allies  signed  the  Quebec  Agreement.  The 
signing  of  this  agreement  opened  the  way  for  the 
two  atomic  partners  to  pursue  a  joint  program  to 
obtain  control  of  the  world's  uranium  resources.  Al- 
though the  fall  incident  seemed  threatening  to  Brit- 
ish interests,  the  United  States  realized  by  the  end 
of  the  year  that  Great  Britain  occupied  a  better  van- 
tage point  and  thus  took  the  initiative  to  implement 
joint  cooperation  and  control  measures.  For  an  ac- 
count of  Anglo-American  problems  and  coordina- 
tion on  uranium  supplies  see  Ciowing,  Bntain  and 
Atomic  Energy,  pp.  179-85. 


lobwe  mine  and  that  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  take  what- 
ever steps  were  necessary  to  ensure 
"joint  control"  of  uranium  in  the 
Congo.  The  two  countries  also  should 
collaborate  to  secure  all  accessible 
supplies  elsewhere,  "not  only  for  the 
period  of  the  war,  but  for  all  time  to 
come."  The  Top  Policy  Group  en- 
dorsed these  recommendations  and, 
on  the  fifteenth.  Secretary  Stimson 
and  OSRD  Director  Vannevar  Bush 
lunched  with  Roosevelt  and  secured 
his  approval.  ^^ 

Following  these  recommendations, 
the  Combined  Policy  Committee  gave 
its  tentative  approval  to  a  draft  plan 
for  American-British-Canadian  col- 
laboration on  17  February.  The  com- 
mittee would  establish  a  Washington- 
based  business  corporation,  or  similar 
agency,  headed  by  a  board  of  six  di- 
rectors (three  to  be  chosen  by  the 
United  States,  two  by  Great  Britain, 
and  one  by  Canada),  and  the  United 
States  would  pay  half  the  cost  of  the 
organization.  Great  Britain  and 
Canada  the  rest.  As  directed  by  the 
committee,  the  new  organization 
would  give  first  consideration  to  ob- 
taining control  of  the  Congo  ore 
deposits.  ^^ 


'2  Quotations  from  MPC  Rpt,  4  Feb  44,  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  C,  MDR. 
See  also  Memo,  Bush  to  Bundy,  14  Feb  44,  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  MDR;  Stim- 
son Diary,  15  Feb  44,  HLS;  Cowing,  Bntain  and 
Atomic  Energy,  pp.  298-99. 

"CPC  Min,  17  Feb  44,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp. 
MP  Files,  Fldr  9,  Tab  B,  MDR;  Stimson  Diary, 
17  Feb  44,  HLS;  Articles  of  Agreement  Governing 
Collaboration  Between  the  Authorities  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  the  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain, 
and  the  Dominion  of  Canada  in  the  Matter  of  Urani- 
um Ore,  draft  of  14  Feb  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  23. 
MDR.  The  draft  adopted  on  the  seventeenth  does 
not  appear  to  have  differed  substantiallv  from  that 


THE  RAW  MATERIALS  PROGRAM 


297 


Final  negotiations  on  this  wartime 
agreement  took  place  in  London  be- 
tween Sir  John  Anderson,  now  Chan- 
cellor of  the  Exchequer,  and  Ameri- 
can Ambassador  John  G.  Winant. 
This  arrangement  made  for  a  some- 
what ticklish  stituation,  for  neither 
Secretary  of  State  Cordell  Hull  nor 
anyone  else  in  the  Department  of 
State  knew  anything  about  the  exist- 
ence of  the  Manhattan  Project.  In  the 
interest  of  continued  secrecy,  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  took  the  view  that 
Ambassador  Winant  was  his  repre- 
sentative, not  Secretary  Hull's,  and 
that  negotiations  could  be  conducted 
through  Winant  without  recourse  to 
the  Department  of  State.  He  designat- 
ed Secretary  Stimson  to  oversee  the 
negotiations,  and  instructions  reached 
Winant  over  Stimson's  rather  than 
Hull's  signature.  For  these  delicate 
negotiations  then,  the  War  Depart- 
ment assumed  a  role  normally  accord- 
ed to  the  State  Department.  Although 
highly  irregular,  the  War  Department 
continued  to  play  this  role  in  subse- 
quent quests  for  overseas  uranium 
and  thorium  resources. 

Winant's  instructions  were  carried 
by  Maj.  Harry  S.  Traynor,  a  highly 
trusted  officer  on  the  Manhattan  Dis- 
trict staff,  whom  General  Groves  de- 
tailed to  brief  and  assist  the  ambassa- 
dor.^'* Traynor  arrived  in  London  in 

dated  on  the  fourteenth  (cf.  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 
Xew  World,  p.  286).  The  arrangement  was  strictly  for 
wartime  purposes.  Following  the  end  of  hostilities, 
it  was  subject  to  review  and  such  revisions  as  might 
be  necessary  to  meet  postwar  conditions. 

''•  Description  of  London  negotiations  based  on 
voluminous  collection  of  memorandums,  reports, 
cables,  drafts,  and  similar  materials  in  HB  Files, 
Fldrs  48,  54,  56,  60,  65,  and  99,  MDR.  See  especial- 
ly narrative  reports  by  Major  Traynor  in  Fldr  89  and 
an  account  by  him  reproduced  in  Groves,  Xow  It 
Can  Be  Told,  pp.  171-74.  See  also  Stimson  Diary, 
Mar-Jun  44,  passim,  HLS. 


mid-March,  armed  with  a  letter  from 
the  President,  a  copy  of  the  draft 
agreement,  and  instructions  to  do 
everything  in  his  power  to  assist 
Winant  in  completing  the  accord  as 
quickly  as  possible.  "Any  delay  in  ne- 
gotiations," wrote  Roosevelt  to  his 
ambassador,  "might  prejudice  a  suc- 
cessful conclusion."  ^^ 

Despite  this  admonition  for  speed, 
nearly  three  months  passed  before 
the  London  conferees  were  able  to 
resolve  the  intricate  problems  associ- 
ated with  preparing  the  so-called 
Agreement  and  Declaration  of  Trust. 
Some  of  these  problems  were  legal  in 
nature,  and  to  aid  in  their  solution 
Winant  requested  the  assistance  of 
Brig.  Gen.  Edward  C.  Betts,  judge  ad- 
vocate general  of  General  Eisenhow- 
er's European  Theater  of  Operations 
headquarters,  and  Secretary  Stimson 
complied.  Betts,  whom  Winant  trust- 
ed implicitly,  also  enjoyed  the  confi- 
dence of  Sir  Thomas  Barnes,  Sir  John 
Anderson's  legal  adviser,  and  the  two 
men  worked  well  and  easily  with  each 
other. 

One  legal  question  that  arose  even 
before  Traynor  left  for  England  was 
raised  by  the  President  himself:  If 
the  proposed  organization  was  es- 
tablished as  a  corporation,  could  its 
existence  and  transactions  be  kept 
a  secret  under  United  States  law? 
There  was  general  agreement  that 
Roosevelt's  concern  for  security  was 
justified,  and  after  considerable  legal 
study.  Sir  Thomas  suggested  and 
General  Betts  agreed  that  the  best  so- 
lution was  to  make  the  organization  a 
common  law  trust. 


'n.tr,  Roosevelt  to  Winant,  3  Mar  44,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  60.  MDR. 


298 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


A  second  legal  problem  was  wheth- 
er the  President  had  the  authority  to 
enter  into  the  type  of  agreement  con- 
templated. Two  briefs  were  prepared 
on  this  question — the  first,  at  the  di- 
rection of  Secretary  Stimson,  by  Brig. 
Gen.  Boykin  C.  Wright,  the  Army 
Service  Forces'  International  Division 
director,  who  as  a  civilian  had  headed 
a  New  York  law  firm;  and  the  second, 
on  General  Groves's  orders,  by  three 
lawyers  on  the  Manhattan  staff:  Lt. 
Col.  John  Lansdale,  Jr.,  Maj.  William 
A.  Consodine,  and  Pvt.  Joseph  Volpe, 
Jr.  Both  briefs  agreed  that  the  pro- 
posed arrangement  was  within  the 
power  of  the  President  to  make  exec- 
utive agreements  without  recourse  to 
Congress,  but  both  also  questioned 
the  legality  and  practicability  of  estab- 
lishing a  corporation.  General  Betts 
seconded  these  conclusions,  which 
further  supported  the  recommenda- 
tion that  the  organization  be  estab- 
lished as  a  trust. 

There  were  also  other  questions. 
Should  Canada  be  a  signatory  to  the 
trust  agr«"'"ment?  Should  thorium  be 
included  with  uranium  as  a  valuable 
source  of  fissionable  material?  The 
question  concerning  Canada  arose  be- 
cause it  was  not  a  party  to  the 
Quebec  Agreement.  The  conferees 
decided  to  drop  all  references  to  the 
country  from  the  trust  agreement,  but 
Winant  and  Anderson  stipulated  in  an 
exchange  of  letters  that  one  of  the  six 
directors  of  the  trust  would  be  a  Ca- 
nadian.^®   As    for    thorium,    because 


Metallurgical  Laboratory  scientists  in 
the  spring  of  1944  had  concluded 
that  it  might  eventually  prove  to  be 
the  best  fuel  for  atomic  piles,  the  con- 
ferees in  London  decided  to  include 
it  with  uranium  in  the  Declaration  of 
Trust. 

The  negotiations  were  monitored 
carefully  from  Washington,  where 
Secretary  Stimson,  Harvey  Bundy,  as 
Stimson's  special  assistant  for  scientif- 
ic affairs,  and  General  Groves  kept  in 
close  communication  with  Winant. 
Drafts  of  the  proposed  trust  agree- 
ment were  sent  back  and  forth  be- 
tween the  two  capitals,  and  in  the 
midst  of  the  London  talks  Traynor 
traveled  to  Washington  to  confer  with 
his  superiors.  This  coordination,  how- 
ever, did  not  result  in  a  timely  resolu- 
tion of  the  discussions,  which  were 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  Ambassa- 
dor Winant,  Major  Traynor,  Sir  John 
Anderson,  and  W.  L.  Gorell  Barnes,  a 
representative  of  the  British  Foreign 
Office,  simultaneously  were  involved 
in  quite  lengthy  negotiations  with 
Belgian  officials  in  London  regarding 
an  agreement  on  future  control  and 
development  of  the  rich  Congo  ore — 
the  primary  reason  for  establishing 
the  trust.  ^"^ 

It  was  early  June  before  the  confer- 
ees had  coordinated  and  affirmed  in 
final  form  all  aspects  of  the  Decla- 
ration of  Trust.  Prime  Minister 
Churchill  signed  first,  affixing  his  sig- 
nature  on   two   copies   of  the   agree- 


'^  Earlier  the  British  and  Americans  had  agreed 
that  Canada  should  share  in  controlling  the  Congo 
uranium  supplv.  Sec  Ltr,  Field  Marshal  Dill  to 
Bundv,  6  Mar  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  48,  MDR. 


'■^  Copies  of  various  drafts  of  trust  agreement  and 
related  work  papers  m  HB  Files,  Fldr  48,  MDR. 
Drafts  and  fmal  text  of  Belgian  Agreement  in  HB 
Files,  Fldr  57,  MDR.  See  also  Major  Traynor's 
Notes  on  [First]  Trip  to  London,  England,  12  Apr 
44,  and  Rpt  on  Second  Trip  to  London,  22  May  44, 
submitted  to  Bundv,  Attn:  Secy  War.  Both  in  HB 
Files,  Fldr  99,  MDR. 


THE  RAW  MATERIALS  PROGRAM 


299 


ment.  Forthwith,  a  special  courier  car- 
ried the  documents  to  Washington, 
where,  on  the  thirteenth.  President 
Roosevelt  also  signed  them.  This 
trust  agreement  established  the  Com- 
bined Development  Trust  which, 
under  the  general  direction  of  the 
Combined  Policy  Committee,  would 
supervise  the  acquisition  of  raw  mate- 
rials in  "certain  areas"  outside  of 
American  and  British  territory.^*  The 
individuals  named  as  trustees,  whom 
the  committee  approved  at  its  next 
meeting  in  September,  were:  for  the 
United  States,  Charles  K.  Leith,  a  dis- 
tinguished mining  engineer,  George 
L.  Harrison,  a  businessman  and  spe- 
cial assistant  to  Stimson  who  had 
been  helping  out  on  Manhattan  prob- 
lems, and  General  Groves;  for  Great 
Britain,  Sir  Charles  J.  Hambro,  head 
of  the  British  Raw  Materials  Mission, 
and  Frank  G.  Lee,  a  British  Treasury 
representative;  and  for  Canada, 
George  C.  Bateman,  a  deputy  minis- 
ter and  member  of  the  Combined  Re- 
sources Board  in  that  country.  At  the 
first  meeting  of  the  Trust  on  the  four- 
teenth, Groves  was  elected  chairman 
and  Sir  Charles  deputy  chairman  of 
the  group.  ^^ 

Ore  Acquisition  in  Foreign  Areas 

For    the    leaders    of   the    American 
atomic  energy  project,  the  much  en- 


'*Onc  of  two  originals  of  Agreement  and  Declara- 
tion of  Trust,  dated  13  Jun  44,  the  day  Roosevelt 
signed,  filed  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  49,  MDR.  The  term 
certain  areas  was  introduced  so  as  not  to  offend  Rus- 
sian sensibilities  when  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
became  public.  Msg,  Stimson  to  W'inant,  17  Apr  44, 
HB  Files,  Fldr  106,  MDR. 

'^CPC  Min  (draft  version  of  minutes  prepared  by 
Bundv  and  Webster,  the  CPC's  joint  secretaries), 
19  Sep  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  13,  MDR;  CDT  Prov 
Min,  14  Sep  44,  OCG  Files,  (,en  Corresp,  MP  Files, 
Fldr  9.  Tab  B,  MDR. 


larged  program  of  exploration,  con- 
trol, and  acquisition  of  radioactive 
ores  in  foreign  areas  represented  the 
logical  continuation  and  expansion  of 
the  ongoing  ore  program  in  the 
United  States  and  Canada.  ^°  Because 
the  deposits  would  be  in  countries 
not  under  American  or  British  con- 
trol, they  left  the  problem  of  acquisi- 
tion to  the  Combined  Policy  Commit- 
tee and  the  Combined  Development 
Trust.  Operating  at  the  international 
level,  these  joint  American-British 
groups  were  technically  outside  the 
direct  control  of  the  Manhattan  Dis- 
trict; however,  their  activities  inevita- 
bly were  influenced  greatly  and  relat- 
ed closely  to  those  of  the  American 
project,  not  only  because  in  the  fore- 
seeable future  the  latter  would  have 
the  greatest  need  for  fissionable  ma- 
terials but  also  because  two  of  its  in- 
fluential personalities  held  key  posts 
in       both       organizations.       General 


^^  In  July  1943,  Union  Mines  surveyed  the  Great 
Bear  Lake  region  in  Canada  through  a  Canadian 
subcontractor.  Ventures,  Ltd.  This  firm  was  author- 
ized to  make  purchases  for  Union  Mines,  but  the 
project  was  barely  under  way  when  in  September 
the  Canadian  government  decided  to  take  control  of 
all  radioactive  substances  in  the  Yukon  and  North- 
west Territories,  promising  to  keep  the  L'nited 
States  fully  informed  concerning  all  ore  discoveries 
and  to  exploit  them  for  the  mutual  benefit  of  both 
countries.  In  the  spirit  of  the  Quebec  Agreement, 
General  Groves  subsequently  arranged  to  have 
Union  Mines  terminate  its  contract  with  Ventures 
and  transfer  all  of  its  claims  to  the  Canadian  gov- 
ernment. Union  Mines  settled  its  contract  with  Ven- 
tures in  late  1944,  agreeing  to  a  lump-sum  pavment 
to  cover  all  costs  incurred  bv  the  Canadian  firm.  See 
MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  2,  pp.  2.2-2.4,  DASA.  Memo, 
Groves  to  Bush,  Purnell,  and  Styer,  27  Sep  44; 
Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves,  17  Oct  44,  Incl  to  Memo, 
Nichols  to  Groves,  sub:  Agreement  With  Canadian 
Govt,  8  Nov  44.  All  in  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP 
Files,  Fldr  2,  MDR.  Stanley  U \  Dziuban,  Militaiy  Re- 
lations Between  the  l'nited  States  and  Canada.  1939- 
1945.  U.S.  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington, 
D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office,  1959),  pp.  287- 
88. 


300 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  1  HE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Groves,  as  chairman  of  the  Combined 
Development  Trust,  tended  to  domi- 
nate its  activities.  And  in  the  Com- 
bined PoHcy  Committee,  Maj.  Gen. 
Wilhelm  D.  Styer  headed  the  impor- 
tant technical  subcommittee,  whose 
reports  furnished  much  of  the  data 
for  the  parent  committee's  decisions 
on  matters  relating  to  Manhattan's 
production  and  weapons  development 
program.  ^^ 

The  first  important  achievement  for 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
was  final  agreement  with  the  Belgians 
in  early  fall  of  1944.  As  soon  as  the 
two  countries  had  reached  agreement 
in  June  on  establishment  of  the  Trust, 
General  Groves  and  Sir  Charles 
Hambro,  acting  on  behalf  of  the 
Trust,  began  direct  negotiations  with 
Edgar  Sengier  to  expedite  arrange- 
ments with  the  African  Metals  Corpo- 
ration for  reopening  Union  Miniere's 
Shinkolobwe  mine.  The  diplomatic 
negotiations  finally  culminated  in  the 
Belgian,  or  Tripartite,  Agreement  of 
26  September,  effected  by  an  ex- 
change of  letters  among  Foreign  Min- 
ister Paul  H.  Spaak  of  Belgium,  Chan- 
cellor Anderson,  and  Ambassador 
Winant.22 


2'CPC  Min,  8  Sep  43,  HB  Files,  Fldr  9,  MDR; 
CDT  Prov  Min,  14  Sep  44,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp.  MP  Files,  Fldr  9,  Tab  B,  MDR. 

22  Ltrs,  Spaak  to  Winant  and  Anderson,  both  26 
Sep  44,  and  Incl  (Memo  of  Agreement);  Ltrs,  An- 
derson and  Winant  to  Spaak,  both  26  Sep  44.  All  m 
HB  Files,  Fldr  49,  MDR.  Extensive  materials,  includ- 
ing copies  of  correspondence,  cables,  notes  of  meet- 
ings, cirafts  and  texts  of  agreements,  relating  to  the 
Belgian  Agreement  and  the  arrangement  with  the 
African  Metals  Corporation  are  in  HB  Files,  Fldrs 
17,  54,  55,  57,  106,  MDR.  and  m  OCG  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  16,  MDR.  A  brief  descrip- 
tion of  the  negotiations  and  an  analysis  of  the 
agreements  made  mav  be  found  in  Ms,  "Diplomatic 
Hist  of  Manhattan  Proj,"  pp.  17-18  and  25-26,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  111,  MDR. 


Under  terms  of  the  agreement,  Bel- 
gium granted  the  United  States  and 
the  United  Kingdom  an  option  on  all 
of  its  uranium  and  thorium  resources 
in  recognition  of  the  fact  that  "the 
protection  of  civilization"  required 
"effective  control  of  said  ores.  .  .  ." 
The  option  was  to  continue  in  effect 
for  the  period  needed  to  carry  out 
ore  contract  arrangements  set  up 
under  the  agreement,  as  well  as  for 
an  additional  ten-year  period.  Bel- 
gium reserved  the  right  to  retain  such 
ore  as  might  be  needed  for  "her  own 
scientific  research  and  .  .  .  industrial 
purposes.  .  .  ."  ^^ 

But  the  two  atomic  partners  did  not 
secure  this  control  over  the  Congo 
ore  deposits  without  making  some 
major  concessions.  President  Roose- 
velt had  approved  the  concessions  in 
August  1944,  harking  to  the  advice  of 
Stimson,  who  monitored  the  negotia- 
tions, that  if  they  were  not  granted 
the  Belgians  might  delay  indefinitely 
reopening  the  Shinkolobwe  mine.  Of 
particular  importance  was  the  two 
allies'  agreement  to  enter  into  a  con- 
tract between  the  Trust  and  African 
Metals  for  purchase  of  3.44  million 
pounds  of  uranium  oxide  under  terms 
acceptable  to  the  Belgian  govern- 
ment. In  addition,  they  also  assented 
to  furnish  Union  Miniere  with  the 
new  equipment  and  materials  it  would 
require  to  reopen  and  operate  the 
Shinkolobwe  mine.  Finally,  they 
granted  the  Belgians  the  right  to  par- 
ticipate in  any  future  utilization  that 
might  be  made  of  the  Congo  ores  "as 


23  Memo   of  Agreement,    Incl    to   Ltrs,    Spaak 
Winant  and  Anderson,  both  26  Sep  44,  MDR. 


THE  RAW  MATB:RIALS  PROGRAM 


301 


a    source    of  energy    for    commercial 
purposes.  .  .  ."  ^4 

Meantime,  representatives  of  the 
Trust  and  African  Metals,  conferring 
in  New  York,  had  worked  out  the 
terms  of  the  contract  to  cover  the 
procurement  of  the  3.44  million 
pounds  of  uranium  oxide.  On  17  Oc- 
tober, they  signed  the  formal  con- 
tract. It  provided  that  the  Trust 
would  purchase  only  the  oxide  in  the 
uranium  ore,  letting  African  Metals 
retain  the  radium  and  other  precious 
metals  contained  in  the  concentrate. 
Reaching  agreement  on  a  fair  price 
was  difficult,  for  its  value  had  never 
been  determined  on  the  open  market 
and  depended  ultimately  upon  the 
success  of  the  atomic  bomb  project. 
They  finally  settled  upon  a  price 
based  primarily  on  known  cost  fac- 
tors— $1.45  a  pound  for  high-grade 
material,  five  cents  less  for  low  grade, 
free  on  shipboard  at  the  port  of 
Africa  (Lobito  in  Angola  or  Matadi  in 
the  Belgian  Congo).  Perhaps  partly  to 
compensate  for  any  losses  likely  to 
result  from  the  uncertainty  as  to  a  fair 
price,  the  Trust  agreed  to  reimburse 
Union  Miniere  for  costs  it  incurred  up 
to  $550,000  in  reopening  Shinko- 
lobwe  mine,  and  also  to  assist  it  in 
procuring  materials,  equipment,  and 
skilled  labor.  With  this  assistance, 
Union  Miniere,  which  already  had 
taken  preliminary  steps  for  resump- 
tion of  uranium  mining  operations  in 
the  Congo,  estimated  that  it  could 
begin  delivery  of  new  oxide  to  the 
Manhattan  Project  bv  late  1945  or 
early  1946.2  5 


In  anticipation  of  the  heavy  finan- 
cial obligations  that  the  Trust  would 
have  to  meet  under  terms  of  the  Afri- 
can Metals  contract,  as  well  as  under 
other  ore  acquisition  contracts  that  it 
expected  to  negotiate  in  the  future, 
the  American  trustees  had  already 
taken  steps  to  secure  funds  for  pay- 
ment of  the  United  States'  share  of 
the  cost  of  Trust  operations.  This  had 
turned  out  to  be  a  fairly  complex 
problem,  because  the  Trust's  require- 
ment for  extreme  secrecy  and  for 
continuous  access  to  funds  without 
time  limitations  to  meet  contractual 
obligations  tended  to  run  counter  to 
legally  established  governmental  fiscal 
procedures.  General  Groves  had  un- 
dertaken responsibility  for  coming  up 
with  a  plan  that  would  circumvent 
these  legal  barriers  without  impairing 
the  contractual  capabilities  or  security 
of  Trust  operations.  Groves  present- 
ed his  plan  to  the  Combined  Policy 
Committee  on  19  September  1944, 
emphasizing  that  the  objectives  of  the 
agreement  under  which  the  Trust  had 
been  set  up  in  the  previous  June 
made  absolutely  necessary  an  access 
to  adequate  funds.  The  committee 
unanimously  endorsed  the  plan  and 
Groves  set  about  immediately  to  put 
it  into  effect. 26 

The  essential  feature  of  Groves's 
plan  was  a  special  fund  to  be  deposit- 
ed with  the  Department  of  the  Treas- 
ury, from  which  he  or  other  designat- 


2*  Ibid.;  Memo,  Slimson  to  President.  25  Aug  44, 
HB  Files,  Fldr  49.  MDR. 

26  Ltr,  Groves  to  Stimson,  24  Nov  44,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  27,  MDR;  CPC  Min.  19  Sep  44,  MDR;  Croves, 
\ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  177-78. 


26  Groves  had  in  mind  paragraph  2  of  the  Agree- 
ment and  Declaration  of  Trust,  dated  13  Jun  44, 
which  directed  that  the  CDT  should  "gain  control 
of  and  develop  production  of  Uranium  and  Thori- 
um supplies  in  certain  areas  .  .  .  and  for  that  pur- 
pose .  .  .  take  such  steps  as  it  may  in  the  common 
interest  think  fit"  to  accomplish  this  objective.  1  he 
original  of  this  agreement  is  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  13, 
MDR. 


302 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


ed  American  members  of  the  Trust 
could  draw  money  as  needed,  without 
further  authorization  being  required. 
Money  from  this  fund  would  be 
placed  in  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  in 
New  York  City  to  cover  the  United 
States'  share  of  payments  on  Trust 
contracts.  On  21  September,  Under 
Secretary  of  War  Robert  P.  Patterson 
directed  allocation  to  Groves  of  an 
initial  sum  of  $12.5  million  from 
funds  already  appropriated  for  na- 
tional defense  purposes.  By  the  time 
Groves  received  the  check,  however, 
his  legal  staff  had  found  that  funds 
deposited  with  the  Treasury  were 
subject  to  handling  and  processing  by 
many  employees  in  both  the  Treasury 
and  the  General  Accounting  Office, 
too  great  a  security  risk  for  the  Man- 
hattan Project.  A  possible  alternative 
was  to  deposit  the  money  directly  in 
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  in  New 
York  City  or  in  a  private  banking  in- 
stitution in  that  city.  But  after  further 
consultation  with  War  Department 
lawyers  and  with  Secretary  Stimson 
and  George  Harrison,  a  fellow  trust- 
ee, Groves  concluded  that  probably 
not  even  this  step  could  be  taken 
without  first  informing  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  Henry  Morgenthau. 

On  17  October,  Groves  and  Harri- 
son met  with  Stimson  in  his  office  to 
try  to  resolve  the  Trust's  quandary 
over  its  funds.  There  appeared  to  be 
no  legal  way  around  the  requirement 
that  the  Trust  must  secure  the  con- 
sent of  Secretary  Morgenthau  before 
depositing  the  $12.5  million  with  the 
Treasury.  Yet  Stimson  was  convinced 
Morgenthau  would  insist  on  having 
full  knowledge  of  the  atomic  bomb 
project  before  giving  his  consent. 
This,  Stimson  felt,  he  could  not  do 
without    permission    from    the    Presi- 


dent, whom  he  did  not  wish  to  bother 
concerning  such  a  relatively  unimpor- 
tant matter.  Stimson  finally  was  per- 
suaded to  attempt  to  get  Morgen- 
thau's  sanction  of  the  special  fund 
without  telling  him  the  reason  for  its 
existence;  but,  as  the  Secretary  of 
War  had  predicted,  he  refused.  Fortu- 
nately, however,  further  negotiations 
between  Manhattan  District  and 
Treasury  officials  revealed  that  Secre- 
tary Morgenthau  maintained  several 
accounts  in  his  office  which  were  not 
subject  to  the  usual  auditing  and  ac- 
counting procedures  and  that  Trust 
funds  might  be  placed  in  one  of  them 
without  danger  of  exposure.  Groves 
visited  the  Treasury  Secretary  on 
27  October  and,  still  without  reveal- 
ing the  purpose,  received  permission 
to  place  Trust  money  in  one  of  the 
special  accounts.  Henceforth,  Groves 
made  withdrawals  from  the  account, 
depositing  them  in  the  Bankers  Trust 
Company  of  New  York  to  cover  pay- 
ments on  the  African  Metals  and 
other  contracts.  In  the  period  from 
late  1944  until  he  resigned  from  the 
Trust  at  the  end  of  1947,  the  Manhat- 
tan commander  deposited  a  total  of 
$37.5  million  in  the  Trust's  Treasury 
account. ^^ 


2  7  The  complex  history  of  CDT  financing  may  be 
traced  in  the  following  documents.  Except  as  other- 
wise indicated,  all  items  are  in  MDR,  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  9,  Tab  B:  CDT  Prov 
Min,  14  Sep  44;  Memos,  Und  Secy  War  to  WD 
Budg  Off,  21  Sep  44  and  4  Aug  45;  Memos  for  File, 
Groves,  both  17  Oct  44;  Memo,  Groves  to  Secy 
War,  27  Oct  44;  Ltr,  Daniel  W.  Bell  (Act  Secy 
Treas)  to  Groves,  30  Oct  44;  Ltr,  Groves,  Harrison, 
and  Leith  to  Sloan  Colt  (Bankers  Trust  Co.  presi- 
dent), 15  Nov  44;  Memo,  Groves  to  Secy  War,  6  Jun 
45,  HB  Files,  Fldr  37,  MDR;  Memo,  Groves  to  Und 
Secy  War,  4  Aug  45;  Ltr,  Groves  to  Fred  M.  Vinson 
(Secy  Treas),  14  Aug  45;  Memo,  Groves  to  WD 
Budg  Off,  24  Aug  45;  Memo,  Col  Ernest  C.  Bomar 

Continued 


THE  RAW  MAI  ERIALS  PR()(,RAM 


303 


In  late  1944,  the  British  were  inter- 
ested in  devising  a  more  comprehen- 
sive plan  for  a  long-range  procure- 
ment program  for  raw  materials. 
They  expressed  a  particular  need  for 
a  study  that  would  provide  informa- 
tion on  developing  radioactive  ore 
sources  within  British  areas  outside  of 
Canada.  At  its  19  September  meeting, 
the  Combined  Policy  Committee 
agreed  unanimously  that  the  Trust 
should  undertake  a  worldwide  survey 
of  current  and  potential  sources  of  ra- 
dioactive materials.  Committee  mem- 
bers also  acknowledged  the  need  for 
more  data  on  requirements,  but  they 
emphasized  the  theoretical  nature  of 
scientific  and  technical  information 
and  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  accu- 
rate estimates.  Nevertheless,  the  com- 
mittee directed  its  technical  subcom- 
mittee to  investigate  and  report  on 
the  uranium  required  for  a  "unit  ex- 
plosive of  specified  energy  ..."  and 
for  the  next  stage  in  development  of 
atomic  weapons,  as  well  as  scientific 
and  technical  factors  that  might  have 
an  important  effect  on  future  ore  re- 
quirements for  atomic  explosives.^® 

The  technical  subcommittee  com- 
pleted its  report  in  mid-November; 
however,    after    hearing    a    brief  oral 

(Act  WD  Budg  Off)  to  CG  ASF,  Attn:  Office  of 
Fiscal  Dir  (Col  Foster),  sub:  CDT,  28  Aug  45,  and 
1st  Ind.  HQ.  ASF,  Office  of  Fiscal  Dir,  fwd  to  Und 
Secy  War,  Attn:  Col  Freidlich,  30  Aug  45,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  51,  MDR;  Ltr,  (iroves  to  Secy  Treas,  sub:  Ter- 
mination of  Account,  5  Dec  47;  Ltr,  E.  F.  Bartlet 
(Fiscal  Asst  Secy,  I  reas)  to  Groves,  8  Dec  47;  Ltr, 
Groves  to  Secy  Armv,  8  Dec  47.  See  also  Groves, 
Xoiv  It  Can  Be  fold.  pp.  1 76-77. 

28  Quoted  phrase  from  CPC  Min,  19  Sep  44, 
MDR.  Memo,  Sir  Ronald  L  CamplK-ll  (British  CPC 
member)  to  CPC  Joint  Secys,  sub:  Development  of 
Coordinated  Prgms  for  Procurement  of  Raw  Materi- 
al for  T(ube)  A(lloys)  Proj,  24  Aug  44;  Ltr,  Bundy 
and  Webster  to  Stver,  2  Oct  44.  Both  in  HB  Files, 
Fldr  27,  MDR. 


summary  of  its  contents  in  January 
1945,  the  Combined  Policy  Commit- 
tee laid  it  aside  without  further 
action.  The  committee  followed  a 
similar  course  with  the  Trust's  ore 
survey,  which  Groves  had  sent  to 
Stimson  on  24  November.  Although 
based  upon  more  complete  data  from 
the  Murray  Hill  Area  Engineers  Office 
sources  compiled  by  Union  Mines  and 
from  the  British  Directorate  of  Tube 
Alloys,  the  survey  did  not  substan- 
tially alter  the  overall  picture  that  Union 
Mines  had  depicted  in  its  earlier  re- 
ports submitted  to  the  district 
engineer. ^^ 

As  chairman  of  the  Trust,  General 
Groves  made  some  specific  recom- 
mendations based  on  data  from  the 
Trust's  ore  survey.  The  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  should  continue  in- 
vestigation into  uranium  and  thorium 
resources,  organizing  permanent 
survey  groups  in  England  and  Canada 
similar  to  the  Union  Mines  teams  op- 
erating in  the  United  States;  every 
effort  should  be  made  to  build  up 
stockpiles  in  territories  controlled  by 
the  two  countries;  major  ore  deposits 
outside  these  territories  (for  example, 
uranium  in  the  Congo  and  thorium  in 
Brazil)  should  be  purchased  and 
shipped  for  storage  to  areas  under 
control  of  the  two  atomic  powers;  and 
lesser  deposits  (for  example,  in  Portu- 
gal, Czechoslovakia,  and  Madagascar) 


29  CPC  Min,  22  Jan  45,  HB  Files,  Fldr  14,  MDR; 
Memo,  Tech  Subcommittee  to  CPC,  sub:  Ore  Re- 
quirements for  Prod  of  Explosives,  16  Nov  44,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  27,  MDR;  Chart  (analvsis  of  estimated  re- 
quirements of  uranium  ore  for  each  of  several  pro- 
posed tvpes  of  atomic  weapons),  OC-G  Files,  Cien 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  2,  MDR;  Rpt,  CDT,  sub: 
Survey  of  W  orld's  Resources  of  Uranium  and  Thori- 
um, 26  Oct  44,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Groves  to  Stimson, 
24  Nov  44,  MDR. 


304 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


should  be  brought  under  control  by 
purchase  or  by  political  agreements. 
The  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
endeavored  to  carry  out  most  of 
these  recommendations.  Where  politi- 
cal or  diplomatic  negotiations  were 
required,  action  was  taken  through 
appropriate  government  channels. 
Where  commercial  agreements 
would  suffice,  the  Trust  initiated 
negotiations. ^° 

The  quest  for  other  sources  contin- 
ued in  1945.  Early  in  the  year  British 
officials  began  negotiations  with  the 
British  and  Portuguese  owners  of  ura- 
nium mining  properties  in  Portugal, 
preparing  the  way  for  their  purchase 
by  the  Trust.  At  the  end  of  January, 
Colonel  Guarin,  Manhattan's  raw  ma- 
terials expert,  returned  from  an  ex- 
tended inspection  trip  to  the  Congo 
with  new  information  on  the  progress 
being  made  by  Union  Miniere  in  re- 
opening the  mines  there,  and  as  a 
result  of  his  report,  the  Trust  negoti- 
ated with  African  Metals  for  the  pur- 
chase of  more  Congo  ores  that 
summer.  Even  the  advancing  Allied 
forces  in  Belgium,  France,  and  Ger- 
many furnished  additional  small 
quantities  of  captured  uranium  ore 
stores.^  ^ 

These  seized  stocks  became  a 
matter  of  slight  disagreement  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain.  The  Declaration  of  Trust  pro- 
vided that  all  uranium,  or  thorium, 
secured  from  whatever  source  was  to 
be  held  jointly,   but  it  was   generally 


3°  Ltr,  Groves  to  Stimson,  24  Nov  44,  MDR. 

31  CPC  Min,  22  Jan  45,  Fldr  14;  CPC  Min,  8  Mar 
45,  Fldr  46  (copy  in  Fldr  105);  CPC  Min,  4  Jul  45, 
Fldr  37  (copy  in  Fldr  105);  Ltr,  Stimson  to  Secy 
State,  29  Jul  44,  Fldr  7;  Ms,  "Diplomatic  Hist  of 
Manhattan  Proj",  pp.  31-32,  Fldr  111.  All  in  HB 
Files,  MDR.  Groves  Diary,  29  Jan  45,  LRG.  Cowing, 
Britain  and  Atomic  Energy,  pp.  313-14. 


understood  that  the  first  objective  of 
the  atomic  program  in  both  countries 
must  be  to  supply  the  American 
project  with  the  raw  materials  it 
needed  to  develop  and  build  suffi- 
cient atomic  weapons  to  win  the  war. 
However,  some  British  scientists  felt 
that  at  least  a  part  of  the  captured 
ore,  which  had  been  shipped  from  the 
Continent  to  England  for  temporary 
storage,  ought  to  remain  there  to 
ensure  that  the  British  Tube  Alloys 
project  would  have  adequate  supplies 
on  hand.  Groves  disagreed.  When  he 
learned  in  June  1945  that  ore  cap- 
tured in  Germany  was  being  held  in 
Great  Britain,  he  wrote  Secretary 
Stimson  and  asked  that  the  Combined 
Policy  Committee  request  its  prompt 
shipment  to  the  United  States  "to  in- 
crease our  margin  of  safety  of  raw 
material."  British  committee  members 
expressed  concern  that  allocation  of 
all  of  the  ore  to  the  United  States 
would  leave  Great  Britain  with  virtual- 
ly no  reserves  at  the  end  of  the  war. 
The  committee,  nevertheless,  reaf- 
firmed the  policy  that  while  the  war 
lasted  all  raws  materials  received  by 
the  Trust,  including  that  captured, 
should  go  to  the  United  States  for 
weapon  production.  At  the  same 
time,  to  placate  British  fears,  the  com- 
mittee stated  that  if  the  Trust  should 
acquire  more  than  needed  for  the 
manufacture  of  weapons,  it  should 
hold  it  in  reserve  to  be  shared  jointly 
after  the  war.^^ 


3^  Quoted  phrase  from  Memo,  Groves  to  Stim- 
son, 23  Jun  45,  HB  Files,  Fldr  37.  MDR.  Agreement 
and  Declaration  of  Trust,  13  Jun  44,  Fldr  49;  Rpt, 
CDT,  sub:  Survey  of  World's  Resources  of  Uranium 
and  Thorium,  26  Oct  44,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Groves  to 
Stimson,  24  Nov  44,  Fldr  27;  CPC  Min,  8  Mar  45, 
Fldr  46.  All  in  HB  Files,  MDR. 


THE  RAW  MATERIALS  PROGRAM 


305 


Incoming  mineral  survey  reports  in- 
dicated that  kolm,  a  coal-like  material 
intermixed  yvith  oil  shale  deposits 
mined  in  Sweden,  contained  uranium. 
In  early  1944,  a  British  team  and  a 
group  of  Swedish  mineral  experts 
concluded  that  kolm's  potentialities 
were  sufficient  to  warrant  denying 
other  powers  access  to  the  mineral. 
At  the  request  of  the  Combined 
Policy  Committee,  the  American  min- 
ister in  Stockholm,  Herschel  V.  John- 
son, opened  negotiations  with  the 
Swedes.  The  negotiations,  conducted 
with  the  knowledge  of  the  British 
minister  in  Stockholm,  ended  without 
a  formal  agreement.  The  Swedish 
government,  however,  prohibited 
export  of  uranium-bearing  ores  and 
agreed  to  inform  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  if  in  the  future  it 
should  decide  to  permit  their 
export.  ^^ 

While  the  British  gave  full  support 
to  the  program  for  control  and  acqui- 
sition of  uranium,  they  were  much 
less  enthusiastic  about  a  similar  pro- 
gram for  thorium.  On  27  January 
1945,  British  committee  member  Sir 
Ronald  I.  Campbell,  who  had  re- 
placed Col.  John  J.  Llewellin,  wrote  to 
Stimson,  expressing  doubt  as  to  the 
wisdom  of  Groves's  suggestion  that 
the  Trust,  without  direct  committee 
approval,  should  undertake  measures 
that  would  likely  require  political 
agreements  and  trade  options.  In  Sir 
Ronald's  view,  both  the  Combined 
Policy  Committee  and  the  two  gov- 
ernments ought  to  have  time  to  ex- 


amine the  implications  of  such  negoti- 
ations before  the  Trust  proceeded. 
Sir  John  Anderson  advanced  similar 
views,  emphasizing  that  widespread 
occurrence  of  thorium  limited  the 
possibility  that  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  could  effectively  prevent 
other  nations  from  acquiring  and  pur- 
chasing substantial  quantities  of  the 
material.  He  also  suggested  that,  be- 
cause limited  amounts  of  thorium 
were  needed  in  the  immediate  future, 
the  two  allies  should  rely  upon  the 
rather  ample  commercial  production 
available  from  the  Indian  state  of 
Travancore. 

The  United  States,  however,  did 
not  want  to  rely  solely  on  British 
controlled  thorium  supplies  and  in 
mid-February  proceeded — without  in- 
forming the  British  government — to 
investigate  acquisition  of  supplies  out- 
side of  British-American  control.  In 
the  meantime.  Sir  John  had  read 
Colonel  Guarin's  report  on  the  obsta- 
cles to  a  rapid  increase  in  uranium 
ore  production  from  the  Congo  and 
also  had  learned  of  new  information 
that  emphasized  the  potential  of  tho- 
rium. Because  of  these  developments, 
he  agreed  in  early  March  to  go  along 
with  a  more  vigorous  policy  on  thori- 
um. But  he  was  overtaken  by  events, 
for  the  United  States  was  already 
engaged  in  secret  unilateral  negotia- 
tions with  Brazil  to  gain  access  to  its 
thorium  resources.^'* 

Playing  a  significant  role  in  laying 
the  groundwork  of  these  negotiations 


"CPC  Min.  4  Jul  45.  Fldr  'M:  Draft  of  Proposed 
Agreement  With  Swedish  (iovt  and  Related  Papers, 
Jul-Aug  45,  Fldr  53;  Ms,  "Diplomatic  Hist  of 
Manhattan  Proj,"  pp.  29-30,  Fldr  111.  All  in 
HB  Files,  MDR.  Oowing,  Bnlnin  and  Atomic  Energy 
p.  314. 


^''Ftr,  (irovcs  to  Stimson,  24  Nov  44;  I.tr,  Camp- 
bell to  Stimson,  27  Jan  45;  Memo,  sub:  Supplies  and 
Requirements  for  liube)  A(llovs),  3  Mar  45  (adden- 
dum to  memo  giving  Sir  John  Anderson's  views, 
dated  3  Feb  45).  All  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  27,  MDR. 
(iowing,  Bntani  and  .iloniic  Eiiergy.  p.  316. 


306 


MANHATIAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


was  General  Groves,  who  was  very 
much  aware  that  most  atomic  scien- 
tists, including  those  in  Germany  and 
the  Soviet  Union,  recognized  that 
thorium  might  soon  have  to  replace, 
or  supplement,  scarce  uranium.  When 
he  learned  Secretary  of  State  Edward 
R.  Stettinius,  Jr.,  would  be  passing 
through  Brazil  in  mid-February,  en 
route  from  the  Yalta  Conference 
(3-11  February)  to  attend  an  inter- 
American  meeting  in  Mexico  City,  he 
saw  an  opportunity  to  approach  the 
Brazilians  secretly.  Taking  advantage 
of  a  conference  with  the  President  on 
other  matters,  Groves  requested  and 
received  permission  to  brief  Stettinius 
on  the  atomic  project.  He  subse- 
quently talked  with  Stettinius  and  also 
arranged  to  have  an  officer  from  the 
Manhattan  staff,  Maj.  John  E.  Vance, 
accompanv  the  Secretarv  of  State  to 
Brazil.  ^^ 

On  17  February,  Stettinius  con- 
ferred with  President  Getulio  Vargas 
on  the  question  of  thorium  and  the 
Brazilian  chief  executive  approved  the 
opening  of  negotiations.  In  the  ensu- 
ing months,  specially  appointed  Bra- 
zilian and  American  delegations — the 
United  States  representatives  includ- 
ed three  Manhattan  officers:  Col. 
John  Lansdale,  Jr.,  Major  Vance,  and 
1st  Lt.  Joseph  Volpe,  Jr. — worked  out 
details  of  an  agreement,  signed  on  6 
July  1945.  It  provided  that  the  United 
States  would  purchase  each  year  for 
three  years  at  least  3,000  tons  of  tho- 
rium-bearing monazite  ore.  In  addi- 
tion, the  United  States  would  have  an 


option  to  buy  all  other  thorium-bear- 
ing compounds  Brazil  might  produce 
in  the  initial  three-year  period,  with 
the  right  to  renew  this  option  for  ten 
more  successive  three-year  periods. 
The  British  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
agreement,  but  in  September  the 
United  States  agreed  to  the  under- 
standing reached  earlier  in  March  by 
the  Combined  Policy  Committee  that 
each  country  should  have  equal  privi- 
leges in  any  arrangement  for  thorium 
acquisition  and  control  made  with 
Brazil. 36 

When  the  committee  approved  the 
start  of  negotiations  with  Brazil,  it 
also  endorsed  taking  steps  to  obtain 
control  of  thorium  in  India  and  in  the 
Netherlands  East  Indies.  The  British 
began  discussions  with  Travancore 
authorities  in  the  summer  of  1945, 
but  the  negotiations  proved  difficult 
and  not  until  1947  was  a  less  than 
satisfactory  agreement  reached.  Nego- 
tiations conducted  at  the  same  time 
with  the  Dutch  concerning  the  East 
Indian  sources  were  more  successful, 
and  in  August  1945  an  agreement 
granted  thorium  purchase  options  to 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain. ^"^ 


3^  Memo,  Groves  to  Bundv,  6  Feb  45,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  27,  MDR;  Ciroves,  .\'oiv' II  Can  Be  Told.  p.   184. 


36  Memo,  Groves  to  Bundy,  6  Feb  45.  MDR; 
Memo,  Groves  to  MPC,  23  Feb  45,  OCG  Files.  Gen 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A.  MDR;  Ltr, 
Groves  to  Secy  War,  8  Mar  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  9,  Tab  B,  MDR;  CPC  Min, 
8  Mar  45,  HB  Files,  Fldr  46,  MDR;  Ms,  "Diplomatic 
Hist  of  Manhattan  Proj,"  pp.  27-28  and  Anns.  24- 
25,  HB  Files,  Fldr  111,  MDR;  Gowing,  Bntairi  and 
Atomif  Energy,  p.  317. 

"CPC  Min,  8  Mar  45,  Fldr  46;  CPC  Min,  4  Jul 
45,  Fldr  37;  Memo,  Groves  to  Stimson,  7  Jun  45, 
Fldr  37.  All  in.HB  Files,  MDR.  Gowing,  Bntam  and 
Atomic  Energy,  pp.  317-18.  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be 
Told.  p.  184. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


The  Feed  Materials  Program 


The  Manhattan  District's  acquisi- 
tion of  uranium-  and  thorium-bearing 
ores  was  only  the  initial  step  in  pro- 
viding the  essential  materials  for  the 
large-scale  electromagnetic,  diffusion, 
and  pile  processes.^  The  District  also 
had  to  bring  under  contract  and  to 
monitor  the  operation  of  a  complex 
network  of  processing  plants  for  re- 
fining and  converting  the  ore,  first 
into  pure  concentrates  of  uranium 
oxide  (black  oxide)  or  sodium  uranate 
(soda  salt)  and  then  into  the  chemical 
feed  forms  of  uranium  dioxide  and 
trioxide,  uranium  tetrafiuoride  and 
hexafluoride,  and  uranium  metal. 
Thus  for  the  Army,  development  and 
management  of  the  feed  materials 
program,  begun  by  the  Office  of  Sci- 
entific Research  and  Development 
(OSRD)  and  Stone  and  Webster  in 
1941-42,  proved  to  be  one  of  its 
most  challenging  and  difficult  tasks 
in  administering  the  atomic  bomb 
project.^ 


'  Because  thorium  has  fissionable  properties  simi- 
lar to  uranium,  Manhattan  Project  leaders  vigorous- 
ly pushed  a  program  to  locate  and  control  world  re- 
sources of  this  heavy  element.  But  existence  of  ade- 
quate supplies  of  uranium  for  the  atomic  bomb 
project  made  unnecessary  procurement  and  process- 
ing of  thorium  during  World  War  II. 

2MDH,  Bk.  7,  \'ol.  1,  Feed  Materials  and  Special 
Procurement,  "  pp.  1.1-1..T,  DASA. 


Program  Organization  and 
Support  Activities 

With  ore  acquisition  activities  pro- 
ceeding apace.  District  Engineer  Mar- 
shall in  October  1942  formed  a  Mate- 
rials Section  to  monitor  the  shipment 
of  uranium-bearing  ores  and  other 
materials  from  mines,  tailing  piles, 
storage  depots,  and  processing  plants, 
as  well  as  their  treatment  through 
various  stages  of  refinement  and  con- 
version into  feed  materials.  He  select- 
ed Lt.  Col.  Thomas  T.  Crenshaw  as 
section  head  and  assigned  several  Dis- 
trict officers  already  familiar  with 
some  aspect  of  materials  procurement 
to  assist  him — including  Capt.  Phillip 
L.  Merritt,  a  geologist  by  training, 
and  Capt.  John  R.  Ruhoff,  a  chemical 
engineer  who,  when  serving  as  the  St. 
Louis  area  engineer,  had  overall  re- 
sponsibility for  the  District's  uranium 
metal  production.  Also,  because  of 
Colonel  Nichols's  deep  involvement 
in  the  earlier  OSRD  acquisition 
progam,  Marshall  had  his  deputy  con- 
tinue to  give  his  special  attention  and 
expertise  to  the  District's  feed  mate- 
rials program.^ 


^  I'nless  otherwise  indicated,  details  on  the  ad- 
ministrative and  personnel  aspects  of  the  feed  mate- 
rials program  are  based  on  ibid.,  pp.   1.15-1.22  and 

(.oiiiimiod 


308 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


The  relocation  of  District  head- 
quarters from  New  York  to  Oak 
Ridge  in  mid-August  1943  occasioned 
a  complete  reorganization  of  the  Ma- 
terials Section.  (See  Chart  2.)  Colonel 
Nichols,  now  the  district  engineer,  de- 
cided to  leave  the  materials  group  in 
New  York  City,  close  by  the  ports  of 
entry  and  storage  points  for  ores 
coming  from  overseas  and  also  con- 
venient to  the  headquarters  of  many 
of  the  firms  under  contract  to  supply 
feed  materials.  He  redesignated  the 
section  as  the  Madison  Square  Area 
Engineers  Office  and,  with  transfer  of 
Colonel  Crenshaw  to  Oak  Ridge  as 
the  officer  in  charge  of  all  Clinton  op- 
erations, assigned  Ruhoff,  recently 
promoted  to  lieutenant  colonel,  to  be 
the  Madison  Square  area  engineer. 
Colonel  Ruhoff  took  over  administra- 
tion of  a  burgeoning  materials  group, 
numbering  nearly  four  hundred  by 
early  1944,  and  an  indication  of  its 
key  role  during  the  period  of  the 
project's  greatest  activity,  from  late 
1943  to  the  fall  of  1944,  was  Nichols's 
practice  of  coming  to  New  York  for 
weeklv  meetings  with  Ruhoff  and  his 
staff.  4' 


Apps.  B1-B4  {Org  Charts),  DASA;  Rpts,  Mat  Sec 
(later  Mad  Sq  Area  Engrs  Office),  Oct  42-Aug  45, 
passim.  MD-319.1  (Rpts  MSA),  OROO.  The  period 
covered  in  these  reports  on  the  materials  program 
varies  from  a  single  week  to  two  months.  The  newlv 
organized  Materials  Section  on  28  Oct  42  submitted 
its  first  report  to  the  district  engineer  for  Colonel 
Nichols's  attention,  and  the  reconstituted  Madison 
Square  Area  Engineers  Office  on  6  Aug  43  submit- 
ted its  first  report  through  Lt.  Col.  E.  H.  Marsden, 
executive  officer  at  the  new  District  headquarters  in 
Tennessee,  for  the  attention  of  the  district  engineer. 
*Rpt,  Mad  Sq  Area  Engrs  Office,  29  Apr  44,  App. 
3,  OROO;  Nichols,  Comments  on  Draft  Hist  "Man- 
hattan," Incl  to  Ltr,  Nichols  to  Chief  of  Mil  Hist, 
25  Mar  74.  CMH.  Nichols  arrived  at  the  new  desig- 
nation of  the  area  office  because  of  its  location  near 
Madison  Square,  at  Eiflh  Avenue  and  Iwenty-third 
Street. 


The  Madison  Square  staff,  three- 
quarters  of  which  worked  in  the  New 
York  City  area  and  the  rest  at  various 
points  in  the  field,  oversaw  a  program 
comprised  essentially  of  four  oper- 
ations: a  search  for  additional  raw  ma- 
terials; their  procurement  in  whatever 
form  might  be  available;  their  refine- 
ment; and  their  conversion  into  feed 
materials.  To  ensure  a  steady  flow  of 
raw  and  semirefined  materials  to  the 
project's  processing  plants,  staff 
members  closely  monitored  the 
scheduling  of  ore  shipments  from 
Africa  to  the  port  of  New  York;  made 
or  expedited  arrangements  for  their 
storage;  approved  procurement  of 
partially  processed  uranium-contain- 
ing materials;  and  assisted  in  con- 
tracting with  crude  ore  refining  firms 
(African  Metals  Corporation,  Eldo- 
rado Mining  and  Refining  Company, 
and  Vitro  Manufacturing  Company) 
to  obtain  uranium  oxide,  uranium 
sludge,  radium  and  radioactive  lead, 
and  similar  products.  They  also  over- 
saw various  research  programs 
(Princeton  and  Yale  Universities,  Mas- 
sachusetts Institute  of  Technology, 
and  National  Bureau  of  Standards), 
supplying  them  with  an  ever-increas- 
ing variety  of  other  chemicals  and 
special  materials. 

Staff  members  in  the  field  provided 
liaison  between  the  Madison  Square 
office  and  seven  area  offices  reporting 
to  Ruhoff  (Chart  4).  Of  these,  two— 
the  Murray  Hill  Area  Engineers  Office 
in  New  York  and  the  Colorado  Area 
Engineers  Office  in  Grand  Junction — 
monitored  materials  procurement, 
while  five — Iowa  (in  Ames),  St.  Louis, 
Wilmington,  Beverly  (near  Boston), 
and  Tonawanda  (near  Buffalo) — over- 
saw  feed   materials    processing   oper- 


Chart  4 — Feed  Materials  Network,  January  1945 


MANHATTAN  DISTRICT 


MADISON  SQUARE  AREA 


MURRAY  HILL  AREA 


u 


UNION  MINES  DEVELOPMENT  CORPORATION 


COLORADO  AREA 


UNITED  STATES  VANADIUM  CORPORATION 
M  VANADIUM  CORPORATION  OF  AMERICA 
METALS  RESERVE  CORPORATION 


AFRICAN  METALS  CORPORATION 


ELDORADO  MINING  AND 
REFINING  COMPANY 


VITRO  MANUFACTURING  COMPANY 


IOWA  AREA 


D 


IOWA  STATE  COLLEGE 


ST.  LOUIS  AREA 


MALLINCKRODT  CHEMICAL  WORKS 


WILMINGTON  AREA 


Lj 


E.  I.  DU  PONT  DE  NEMOURS  AND  COMPANY 


BEVERLY  AREA 


D 


METAL  HYDRIDES,  INC. 


TONAWANDA  AREA 


LINDE  AIR  PRODUCTS  COMPANY 
ELECTRO  METALLURGICAL  COMPANY 
HOOKER  ELECTROCHEMICAL  COMPANY 
HARSHAW  CHEMICAL  COMPANY 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 


YALE  UNIVERSITY 


MASSACHUSETTS 
INSTITUTE  OF  TECHNOLOGY 


NATIONAL  BUREAU  OF  STANDARDS 


Somre:  MDH,  Bk.  7.  \'ol.  1.  App.  B4,  DASA. 


310 


MANHATTAN:  1  HE  ARMY  AND  THE  AlOMIC  BOMB 


ations.  A  single  area  engineer  admin- 
istered the  Iowa  and  St.  Louis  offices, 
traveling  between  the  headquarters 
located  at  Iowa  State  College  and  the 
Mallinckrodt  Chemical  Works.  In  Wil- 
mington, the  busy  area  engineer  at 
Du  Pont  kept  a  check  on  that  firm's 
production  of  feed  materials  in  addi- 
tion to  overseeing  its  plutonium  pro- 
gram. In  Beverly,  the  area  engineer 
supervised  the  District's  contract  for 
uranium  metal  production  with  Metal 
Hydrides,  Inc.  And  in  Tonawanda, 
the  area  engineer  had  responsibility 
for  contracts  with  the  Linde  Air  Prod- 
ucts Company,  a  subsidiary  of  the 
Union  Carbide  and  Carbon  Corpora- 
tion, for  production  and  chemical 
processing  of  uranium  oxide  into  its 
dioxide  and  salt  forms  and  with  the 
Electro  Metallurgical  Company  for 
production  of  uranium  metal;  later  he 
supervised  contracts  with  the  Har- 
shaw  Chemical  Company  of  Cleve- 
land, which  made  uranium  tetrafluor- 
ide  and  uranium  hexafluoride,  and 
with  the  Hooker  Electrochemical 
Company  of  Niagara  Falls,  New  York, 
which  reclaimed  uranium  from  slag 
produced  in  the  mining  of  carnotite 
and  other  ores.^ 

Feed  Materials  Procurement 

Raw  Materials 

From  1943  to  the  end  of  the  war 
the  Manhattan  Project  steadily  in- 
creased its  supplies  of  uranium  ore, 
to  ensure  sufficient  stores  for  conver- 


sion into  the  black  oxide  needed  for 
the  feed  materials  processing  plants. 
Ore  procurement  activities,  which 
reached  a  high  point  in  1944  and 
then  leveled  off  somewhat  in  early 
1945,  were  concentrated  in  three 
major  areas:  Africa,  Canada,  and  the 
United  States.  Project  leaders  were 
aware  in  1943  that  the  wartime  needs 
of  the  bomb  program  were  likely  to 
exhaust  both  the  immediately  avail- 
able domestic  and  Canadian  deposits, 
and  the  security  implications  of  this 
situation  ultimately  led  to  a  District 
policy  of  using,  to  the  greatest  extent 
possible,  ore  from  foreign  sources.^ 

The  most  significant  foreign  source 
of  natural  uranium  was  the  Belgian 
Congo,  where  the  Belgian  mining 
firm.  Union  Miniere  du  Haut  Katan- 
ga, controlled  all  mineral  rights.  Fol- 
lowing negotiations,  the  District  pro- 
cured the  African  ore  through  Union 
Miniere's  subsidiary,  the  African 
Metals  Corporation.  For  the  period 
October  1942  to  December  1944,  cost 
of  30,000  tons  of  Congo  ore  contain- 
ing 3,800  tons  of  black  oxide  totaled 
more  than  $9  million,  based  on  the 
price  of  oxide  averaging  about  $1.12 
per  pound.  The  District's  Washington 
Liaison  Office  arranged  for  purchase 
of  additional  Congo  ore,  containing 
more  than  3,100  tons  of  oxide  and 
costing  more  than  $10  million.^ 

All  Canadian  ore,  procured  through 
the  Eldorado  Mining  and  Refining 
Company  (formerly,  until  June   1943, 


^MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  pp.  2.1-6.3  and  App.  II, 
DASA.  List,  sub:  MD  Contracts  With  Various  Univs, 
Incl  to  Memo,  Marsden  to  Groves,  2  Nov  43;  List, 
sub;  Signed  Prime  and  Subcontracts  Over  $100,000, 
Incl  to  Memo,  Marsden  to  Groves,  31  Aug  43.  Both 
in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  161,  MDR. 


6  MPC  Rpt,  21  Aug  43,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
MP  Files,  Fldr  25.  Tab  E,  MDR;  U.S.  Engrs  Office, 
Mad  Sq  Area,  sub:  Notes  on  .  .  .  Ltr  to  Sen  [Edwin 
C]  Johnson  [Colo.],  5  Dec  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  312.1.  MDR. 

^  Data  on  uranium  ore  purchases  in  this  and  sub- 
sequent paragraphs  based  on  charts  in  MDH,  Bk.  7, 
Vol.  1,  Apps.  F1-F3,  DASA. 


THK  FEED  MA  lERIALS  PR()C;RAM 


311 


Eldorado  Gold  Mines),  came  from  the 
Great  Bear  Lake  area.  In  May  1943, 
with  completion  of  Stone  and  Web- 
ster's initial  purchase  order  (15  July 
1942),  the  District  negotiated  another 
contract  with  a  representative  of  El- 
dorado's sales  agency  in  the  United 
States.  But  procurement  officials  soon 
experienced  serious  difficulties  in  im- 
plementing this  contract  and  decided 
to  terminate  it.  Colonel  Ruhoff, 
acting  in  his  capacity  as  chief  of  the 
newly  constituted  Madison  Square 
Area  Engineers  Office,  agreed  in  Sep- 
tember to  the  terms  of  a  new  contract 
with  Eldorado;  he  approved  a  second 
agreement  in  December  1944.  For  the 
period  July  1942  to  December  1944, 
cost  of  4,200  tons  of  Canadian  ore 
containing  1,137  tons  of  black  oxide 
was  slightly  over  $6.6  million,  based 
on  the  price  of  oxide  varying  from 
about  $1.95  to  over  $4.00  per 
pound. ^ 

Domestic  sources  of  natural  urani- 
um were  in  the  Colorado  Plateau 
region  of  the  states  of  Colorado, 
Utah,  and  New  Mexico.  The  uranium 
in  this  region  occurred  in  carnotite 
ores,  which  also  contained  vanadi- 
um— an  element  urgently  needed  in 
the  war  effort  because  of  its  use  as  a 
hardening  agent  in  the  manufacture 
of  steel.  District  procurement  officials, 
learning  in  late  1942  that  those  firms 
actively  mining  carnotite  ores  and  re- 
fining vanadium  did  not  extract  the 
relativelv  small  amount  of  uranium  in 


»  Ibid.,  pp.  3.1-3.3  and  App.  F2,  DASA;  MPC  Min 
(and  attached  documents),  24  Feb  45,  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fidr  23,  lab  A,  MDR; 
Memo,  1st  Lt  Winston  H.  Pickett  (Intel  &  Scty  Div) 
to  Groves,  sub:  Contract  Disclosure  in  Current  Ca- 
nadian Case  (Relating  to  Ore  Supply  Prgm  in  WW 
II),  15  Mar  46,  Investigation  Files,  (k-n  Corresp, 
Boris  Pregel,  MDR. 


the  refuse  materials,  began  negotia- 
tions in  early  1943  to  acquire  these 
tailings.  Because  these  tailings  were 
in  the  form  of  sand,  and  thus  too 
heavy  for  economical  shipment,  they 
arranged  contracts  with  several  vana- 
dium operators — the  government- 
owned  and  -financed  Metals  Reserve 
Corporation,^  the  privately  owned 
and  operated  Vanadium  Corporation 
of  America,  and  the  United  States  Va- 
nadium Corporation,  a  Union  Car- 
bide subsidiary — and  proposed  they 
convert  the  tailings  into  concentrates 
(sludges).  The  advantage  of  the  con- 
centrates was  that  they  would  yield  a 
higher  percentage  of  uranium  for 
conversion  into  black  oxide  and  that, 
in  this  form,  shipment  to  the  Buffalo- 
area  processing  firms  would  be  a  less 
costly  operation.  For  the  period  No- 
vember 1942  to  February  1945,  cost 
of  380,000  tons  of  carnotite  sands 
containing  1,350  tons  of  black  oxide 
was  more  than  $2.1  million,  based  on 
the  price  of  oxide  averaging  about 
$0.80  per  pound. 10 

Uranium  ore  from  North  America 
yielded  considerably  less  black  oxide 
than   that   from   Africa,   primarily   be- 


^  The  Metals  Reserve  Corporation,  a  subsidiary  of 
the  Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation,  was  estab- 
lished under  legislation  enacted  by  Congress  in 
1940,  with  the  objective  of  providing  for  purchases 
of  strategic  and  critical  materials.  By  late  1944, 
Metals  Reserve,  which  Congress  had  supplied  with 
adequate  funds  and  power  to  procure  items  needed 
by  war  industries  and  for  stockpiling,  had  spent 
some  $1.7  billion  for  19  million  tons  of  materials. 
See  Smith,  The  Army  and  Economic  Mobilization,  pp. 
203-04. 

lOMDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  pp.  4.1-4.8,  7.8-7.13, 
App.  F3,  DASA;  Memo,  Merritt  to  Nichols,  sub: 
Resume  of  Production  of  Uranium  Products  for  MD 
in  (Colorado  Plateau  Area,  26  Jan  45,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  410.2  (Uranium),  MDR;  Rpis,  Mat  Sec 
(later  Mad  Sq  Area  Engrs  Office),  3  Jul- 13  Aug  43. 
OROO. 


312 


MANHAITAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


cause  of  the  much  greater  oxide  con- 
tent of  the  latter.  The  African  ore 
from  the  Belgian  Congo  contained  an 
estimated  average  of  over  2-percent 
black  oxide,  whereas  Canadian  ore 
from  the  Great  Bear  Lake  area  as- 
sayed at  somewhat  more  than  0.5  per- 
cent and  domestic  ore  from  the  Colo- 
rado Plateau  region  at  0.25  percent. 
For  this  reason,  the  combined  quanti- 
ty of  estimated  black  oxide  in  urani- 
um ore  purchased  from  the  North 
American  sources  accounted  for  only 
one-third  of  the  total  contracted  for 
the  entire  project.  ^^ 

Special  Materials 

So  tremendously  important  to  the 
success  of  the  atomic  project  was  se- 
curing and  processing  raw  ores  that 
this  operation  tended  to  obscure  an- 
other significant  activity  of  the  Dis- 
trict's feed  materials  program:  pro- 
curement of  special  materials.  A 
number  of  these  materials  were  diffi- 
cult to  obtain  in  the  quantities  needed 
or  completely  unavilable  from  com- 
mercial sources.  Hence,  their  pro- 
curement was  often  not  simply  a 
matter  of  District  officials  approving  a 
purchase  order  or  letting  a  contract, 
but  required  planning  and  imple- 
menting means  for  the  radical  expan- 
sion of  such  limited  sources  as  existed 
or  for  even  approving  construction  of 
entirely  new  plants.  Two  separate  sec- 
tions in  the  Madison  Square  Area 
Engineers  Office  had  responsibility 
for  special  procurement — the  Special 
Materials  Branch  and  the  Special 
Projects  Branch.  ^^ 


' »  MDH,  Bk.  7,  \'ol.  2,  "Geographical  Explora- 
tion," pp.  1.6-1.7,  DASA. 

12  MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  pp.  1.9,  6.1,  Apps.  B  and 
G-K  (see  charts),  DASA. 


Demands  for  special  chemicals  and 
other  materials  of  the  project's  re- 
search and  production  facilities  in- 
creased rapidly  in  1943  and  1944.  For 
testing  and  operating  atomic  piles 
there  was  need  for  radium  and  radio- 
active lead  as  a  neutron  source, 
graphite  and  beryllium  as  neutron 
moderators,  and  helium  as  a  coolant; 
for  the  heavy  water  project  at  Trail, 
nickel  chromium  for  a  catalyst;  for  the 
gaseous  diffusion  project,  elemental 
flourine  and  a  variety  of  fluorinated 
chemicals,  including  those  suitable  for 
cleaning,  cooling,  lubricating,  and 
sealing;  for  the  manufacture  of  urani- 
um metal,  magnesium  and  calcium; 
and  for  the  design  and  test  of  the 
bomb  at  Los  Alamos,  a  seemingly 
endless  list  of  materials — bismuth, 
tungsten,  boron,  beryllium,  and  many 
others. 

The  quantity  and  variety  of  special 
materials  needed  by  the  project  pre- 
sented the  Madison  Square  staff  with 
a  whole  spectrum  of  challenging 
problems.  Some  proved  to  be  rela- 
tively simple.  For  example,  radium 
and  radioactive  lead,  which  were  by- 
products of  uranium  processing, 
could  be  obtained  from  the  same 
firms  that  refined  the  ore.  In  the  early 
period,  project  officials  purchased 
most  of  the  radium  required  through 
the  New  York  firm,  Canadian  Radium 
and  Uranium  Corporation,  which  pro- 
cured most  of  its  supply  from  Eldora- 
do Mining  and  Refining.  In  1943, 
however,  difficulties  in  reaching 
agreement  on  contractual  terms  and 
prices  caused  them  to  turn  to  Joseph 
A.  Kelly,  who  acted  as  agent  for  the 
Radium  Chemical  Company  of  New 
York.  After  1943,  Kelly  supplied  most 


THE  feb:d  materials  program 


31: 


of  the  radium  required  by  the  project. 
As  for  radioactive  lead,  the  District 
obtained  most  of  its  requirement  for 
this  material  from  Eldorado  Mining's 
ore-refming  operations  at  Port  Hope, 
Ontario.  ^^ 

Acquisition  of  a  suitable  pile  mod- 
erator was  one  of  the  most  difficult 
procurement  problems  in  the  early 
months  of  the  project's  plutonium 
program.  Pile  designers  finally  decid- 
ed to  employ  graphite  rather  than 
heavy  water  or  beryllium,  because  it 
was  the  only  one  of  these  neutron-ab- 
sorbing substances  available  in  quan- 
tity from  commercial  sources  and 
because  Metallurgical  Laboratory  sci- 
entists and  researchers  at  the  National 
Carbon  and  Speer  Carbon  Companies 
recently  had  devised  a  process  that 
would  produce  an  adequate  supply  of 
high-grade  graphite  for  the  program 
This  success  with  graphite  did  not 
however,  end  interest  in  obtaining  be 
ryllium  and  heavy  water  for  experi 
mental  purposes.  Project  scientists 
particularly  those  at  Los  Alamos 
showed  an  increasing  interest  in  be- 
rvllium  metal  in  the  later  years  of  the 
war.  Only  a  single  American  firm, 
Brush  Beryllium  Company  of  Lorain, 
Ohio,  produced  beryllium  commer- 
ciallv  for  the  fabrication  of  certain 
alloys.  From  1943  to  1946,  the 
Madison  Square  staff  concentrated  its 
efforts  on  increasing  the  production 
capacity  of  this  firm,  assisting  it  in  ob- 
taining priorities  on  new  equipment 
and  other  materials  from  the  War 
Production  Board  and  also  in  expand- 
ing its  plant.  By  1945,  these  measures 
had  led  to  a  substantial  increase  in 
production  of  beryllium  metal.  ^"^ 


Generally  speaking.  District  pro- 
curement officials  had  to  cope  with 
no  more  than  the  usual  stringencies 
of  the  tight  wartime  economy  in  ob- 
taining moderate  quantities  of  such 
elements  as  magnesium,  calcium,  bis- 
muth, tungsten,  boron,  and  helium. 
Because  early  decisions  for  helium- 
cooled  production  piles  appeared  to 
forecast  a  future  need  for  very  large 
amounts  of  the  gaseous  element,  they 
arranged  with  the  Bureau  of  Mines, 
which  controlled  helium  distribution, 
for  large-scale  procurement,  including 
transfer  directly  of  funds  from  the 
War  Department  to  Interior  to  pay 
the  costs.  In  1943,  they  also  assisted 
in  negotiation  of  a  contract  with  the 
General  American  Transportation 
Company  of  Chicago  for  purchase  of 
special  tank  cars  to  ship  the  helium  to 
Hanford.  But  the  decision  by  pile  de- 
signers later  that  year  to  use  water  as 
the  primary  coolant  greatly  reduced 
the  need  for  helium,  and  the  District 
materials  group  sharply  cut  back  the 
earliest  procurement  schedules  for 
the  element.  ^^ 

Another  material  that  presented 
special  procurement  problems  was 
elemental  fluorine,  to  include  its 
chemical  derivatives.  This  highly  cor- 
rosive, and  therefore  hazardous-to- 
handle,  element  was  the  choice  of  the 
project  designers  for  combining  with 
uranium  to  make  the  gaseous  feed 
material  (uranium  hexafluoride)  for 
operating  several  of  the  main  produc- 


'3  Ibid.,  pp.  6.1-6.3  and  Apps.  F5-F6,  DASA. 
'Mbid.,  App.  K,  DASA;  Rpt,  Ruhofl,  .sub:  Mat  De- 


velopments for  1 1-27  Oct  42,  27  Oct  42,  MD-319.1 
(Rpts  MSA),  OROO;  Rpls,  Mat  Sec  (later  Mad  Sq 
Area  Kngrs  Office),  9  Nov  42,  6  and  13  Aug  43, 
OROO:  Smvth  Report,  p.  65. 

'^MDH.  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  App.  I,  DASA:  List,  sub: 
Signed  Prime  and  Subcontracts  Over  $100,000,  Incl 
to  Memo.  Marsden  to  (iroves,  31  Aug  43,  MDR. 


314 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


tion  plants.  Because  of  the  huge  re- 
quirements of  just  the  gaseous  diffu- 
sion plant,  as  well  as  the  problems  of 
shipment,  the  designers  decided  to 
build  a  fluorine  gas  production  plant 
right  at  the  diffusion  plant  site.  The 
District's  materials  group  also  played 
a  significant  role  in  letting  contracts 
and  overseeing  the  activities  of  a 
number  of  private  research  institu- 
tions (Johns  Hopkins,  MIT,  Purdue) 
and  chemical  firms  (American  Cyna- 
mid,  Du  Pont,  General  Chemical, 
Harshaw  Chemical,  Hooker  Electro- 
chemical, Kinetic  Chemicals,  Penn 
Salt)  in  the  development  and  supply 
of  the  numerous  fluorinated  hydro- 
carbon chemical  compounds — in  the 
form  of  coolants,  sealants,  and  lubri- 
cants— needed  to  operate  the  plants 
safely  and  efficiently  with  the  highly 
corrosive  feed  material.  ^^ 

Feed  Materials  Production 

The  initial  phase  of  the  feed  mate- 
rials production  network  was  conver- 
sion of  the  uranium-bearing  crude 
ore  into  pure  concentrates  of  black 
oxide  and  soda  salt  by  various  indus- 
trial firms  under  contract  to  the  Dis- 
trict. In  each  case  the  refining  treat- 
ment was  quite  similar  and  involved 
subjecting  the  crude  ore  to  the  suc- 
cessive processes  of  pulverization  into 
a  sandlike  material,  acid  immersion, 
precipitation  to  eliminate  impurities, 
and  roasting  (drying). 

Eldorado  Mining  at  its  Port  Hope 
refinery   processed    all    Canadian    ore 


and  some  Congo  ore  into  black  oxide, 
whereas  the  Vitro  Manufacturing 
Company  at  its  Cannonsburg  (Penn- 
sylvania) refinery  processed  only 
Congo  ore  into  soda  salt.  Designed 
only  for  treating  the  higher-grade 
Congo  and  Canadian  ores,  neither  the 
Eldorado  nor  Vitro  plants  could 
properly  process  the  carnotite  con- 
centrates from  the  Colorado  Plateau 
region.  Aware  that  the  Linde  Air 
Products  Company  had  produced  for 
the  OSRD  a  satisfactory  grade  of 
black  oxide  from  carnotite  concen- 
trates, the  District's  Materials  Section 
at  the  end  of  1942  made  arrange- 
ments with  Linde  to  refine  new  stocks 
of  concentrates  at  its  plant  in  Tona- 
wanda.  New  York,  as  well  as  to 
produce  other  feed  materials  for  the 
project.  With  assistance  of  the  Tona- 
wanda  area  engineer,  Linde  expanded 
its  black  oxide  production  facilities, 
but,  by  late  1943,  was  phasing  out  do- 
mestic ores  and  using  its  facilities  to 
refine  higher-yielding  African  ores.^"^ 

Figures  compiled  by  the  Madison 
Square  Area  Engineers  Office,  begin- 
ning in  September  1943,  show  that 
the  amount  of  uranium  from  all 
sources  available  for  refinement  in 
the  United  States  and  Canada,  and 
the  quantity  of  black  oxide  and  soda 
salt  extracted  from  this  ore,  grew  dra- 
matically from  1943  to  1945.  Thus,  at 
the  end  of  September  1943,  the  Man- 
hattan District  had  available  2,920 
tons  of  uranium  ore  and  produced 
1,660  tons  of  black  oxide  and  soda 
salt.  A  year  later,  the  quantities  rose 


'«MDH.  Bk.  7,  \()l  1.  App.  K,  DASA;  List,  sub: 
Contracts  To  Be  laktii  Over  bv  MD,  Incl  to  Ltr.  W. 
1.  W'ensel  (lech  Aide,  OSRD)  to  Marshall,  20  Mar 
43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  161,  MDR;  List,  sub: 
MD  Contracts  With  \arious  Univs,  Incl  to  Memo, 
Marsden  to  Groves.  2  Nov  43,  MDR. 


'^MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  pp.  1.20,  7.1-7.8,  Apps. 
C-IA  and  F7,  DASA.  Details  of  earlv  development 
of  black  oxide  production  bv  Linde  in  1942-43  may 
be  followed  in  Rpts,  Mat  Sec  (later  Mad  Sq  Area 
Kngrs  Office),  Oct  42-Aug  43,  30  Oct.  30  Nov,  and 
31  Dec  43,  29  jan  44,  OROO. 


THE  FEED  MATERIALS  PROGRAM 


315 


to  5,640  tons  available  and  3,500  tons 
of  black  oxide  and  soda  salt  pro- 
duced. And  at  the  close  of  September 
1945,  the  figures  stood  respectively  at 
6,600  tons  of  ore  and  5,150  tons  of 
black  oxide  and  soda  salt.^^ 

The  final  phase  in  the  feed  materi- 
als production  network  was  the  con- 
version of  black  oxide  and  soda  salt, 
through  a  series  of  chemical  treat- 
ments, into  one  of  the  several  chemi- 
cal feeds  suitable  for  processing  in 
the  electromagnetic,  diffusion,  and 
pile  plants.  The  first  step  changed 
black  oxide  or  soda  salt  into  brown 
oxide  (uranium  dioxide)  or  orange 
oxide  (uranium  trioxide),  the  latter  an 
important  feed  material  for  the  elec- 
tromagnetic process  in  its  early  stages 
of  development.  The  second  step 
transformed  brown  oxide  into  green 
salt  (uranium  tetrafluoride).  The 
third,  and  final,  step  converted  green 
salt  into  one  of  a  number  of  uranium 
compounds — for  example,  gaseous 
uranium  hexafluoride  for  the  gaseous 
and  liquid  diffusion  processes  and  the 
electromagnetic  process  in  its  last 
stage  of  development — or  into  urani- 
um metal,  the  prime  feed  material 
for  the  pile  process. ^^ 

Because  the  OSRD  had  made  con- 
siderable progress  in  arranging  con- 
tracts with  industrial  firms  to  provide 
for  each  of  the  different  chemical 
treatments  required  to  produce  feed 
materials,  the  principal  task  remaining 
for  Manhattan  leaders  was  that  of 
shaping  the  project's  feed  materials 
processors  into  a  production  network 
capable    of    supplying    most    of    the 


feeds  for  the  Clinton  and  Hanford 
production  plants,  regardless  of  the 
adverse  effects  of  sabotage,  technical 
failures,  or  other  inhibiting  factors. 
By  early  1943,  having  extended 
OSRD  contracts  and  negotiated  new 
agreements,  they  organized  and  ex- 
panded this  network  so  that,  in  effect, 
it  comprised  three  parallel  chemical- 
processing  chains,  the  first  link  in 
each  chain  consisting  of  processors  of 
both  brown  and  orange  oxide;  the 
second,  those  of  green  salt;  and  the 
third,  those  of  uranium  metal. ^^ 

Mallinckrodt,  Du  Pont,  and  Linde 
comprised  the  brown  and  orange 
oxide  links.  Mallinckrodt,  which  had 
pioneered  in  development  of  the 
highly  efficient  ether  process  for  re- 
fining uranium  under  the  leadership 
of  Ruhoff,  provided  the  most  impor- 
tant link.  During  the  course  of  the 
wartime  project,  it  produced  nearly 
4,200  tons  of  brown  and  orange 
oxide,  nearly  twice  the  output  of  the 
other  two  firms,  and  including  almost 
all  of  the  oxide  used  by  the  electro- 
magnetic project.  In  cooperation  with 
Yale  University,  it  continued  research 
that  culminated  in  design  and  con- 
struction of  a  plant  for  continuous  ex- 
traction of  brown  oxide  from  raw  ore 
(pitchblende),  not  completed  until 
1946.  The  Du  Pont  plant,  built  adja- 
cent to  the  company's  big  Chambers 
Chemical  and  Dye  Works  across  the 
Delaware  River  from  Wilmington  in 
Deep   Water,    New  Jersey,   processed 


»8Rpts,  Mad  Sq  Area  Engrs  Office,  30  Oct  43, 
31  Oct  44,  29  Nov  45,  OROO. 

19  Ibid.,  Sep-Dec  43,  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1, 
pp.  8.1-10.10,  DASA. 


^°  See  Ch.  I  on  the  origins  in  the  atomic  bomb 
program  of  the  idea  of  parallel  production  chains, 
characterized  as  a  nuclear  steeplechase  involving 
various  methods  for  producing  fissionable  materials. 
List,  sub:  S-1  Contracts,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Irvin  Stewart 
(Ex  Secy,  OSRD)  to  Groves,  14  Dec  45,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  161  (S-1  Contracts),  MDR; 
MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  I,  pp.  S10-S13  and  App.  F8, 
DASA. 


316 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


mainly  scrap  and  by-products  material 
to  produce  almost  2,000  tons  of 
brown  oxide.  Linde,  operating  the 
third  plant,  processed  black  oxide 
from  its  own  refinery  to  produce  a 
total  of  about  300  tons  of  brown 
oxide. ^^ 

Four  chemical  firms  comprised  the 
green  salt  links.  Fhree  were  the  same 
firms  that  produced  brown  oxide  and 
the  fourth  was  the  Harshaw  Chemical 
Company  of  Cleveland,  which  the 
OSRD  had  originally  brought  under 
contract  to  produce  green  salt  in  the 
summer  of  1942.  District  procure- 
ment officials  drew  up  new  contracts 
for  a  substantially  enlarged  output  in 
the  fall  of  1942 — with  Harshaw  in 
September  and  the  other  three  com- 
panies in  November.  These  contracts, 
except  for  that  with  Harshaw,  re- 
mained in  effect  for  the  duration  of 
the  war  and  resulted  in  production  of 
more  than  7,200  tons  of  green  salt: 
2,926  by  Mallinckrodt,  2,060  by 
Linde,  1,640  by  Harshaw,  and  608  by 
Du  Pont.  When  more  uranium  hexa- 
fluoride  was  needed  for  the  diffusion 
plants,  the  Madison  Square  Area  En- 
gineers Office  renegotiated  the  con- 
tract with  Harshaw,  providing  in  a 
new  agreement  that  the  Cleveland 
firm  convert  black  oxide  into  green 
salt  and  then  into  uranium  hexafluor- 
ide.  At  the  same  time,  the  Madison 
Square  office  also  arranged  to  have 
Harshaw  raise  its  output  of  uranium 
tetrachloride,  which  it  had  been  pro- 
ducing in  small  quantities  since  early 
1943,  to  meet  a  sudden  increase  in 
demand  for  the  electromagnetic  pro- 
duction plan.^^ 


Four  commercial  firms  and  a  col- 
lege formed  the  uranium  metal  links. 
Mallinckrodt,  Du  Pont,  Electro  Metal- 
lurgical, Metal  Hydrides  and  Iowa 
State,  at  one  time  or  another,  were 
involved  in  metal  production  for  the 
wartime  atomic  project,  although  only 
the  first  three  firms  constituted  the 
permanent  links  in  the  parallel  feed 
materials  chains.  Uranium  metal  pro- 
curement dated  back  to  the  earliest 
days  of  the  atomic  energy  program, 
because  the  material  was  required  for 
laboratory  research  and  experimenta- 
tion. Both  the  National  Bureau  of 
Standards  and  the  OSRD  had  let  con- 
tracts to  university  research  laborato- 
ries and  commercial  chemical  firms  to 
develop  a  process  for  mass  produc- 
tion of  uranium  metal  of  a  high 
degree  of  purity.  The  processes  de- 
vised by  Metal  Hydrides  proved  to 
have  serious  drawbacks.  Iowa  State, 
however,  had  developed  a  method  for 
reducing  green  salt  with  calcium 
(later,  magnesium  proved  more  effec- 
tive) at  high  temperatures  inside  a 
steel  bomb  and  recasting  the  end 
product  into  metal  in  an  induction- 
heated  furnace.  So  successful  was  this 
method  that  Iowa  State  itself  em- 
ployed it  to  manufacture  a  consider- 
able amount  of  metal  for  the  project. 
Subsequently,  the  Army  let  contracts 
to  Mallinckrodt,  Du  Pont,  and  Electro 
Metallurgical  to  produce  metal  using 
the  steel  bomb  method. ^^ 

When  the  Army  took  over  direction 
of  materials  procurement,  it  contin- 
ued   the    metal-production    contracts 


2»  MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  pp.  8,1-8.7,  DASA. 

22  Ibid.,   pp.   9.1-9.9  and  App.   F8,   DASA;   Rpts, 


Mad  Sq  Area  Engrs  Office,  31  Oct  and  30  Dec  44, 
31  Jan  4.5,  OROO. 

23  MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  pp.  10.1-10.9,  DASA.  See 
al,so  Ch.  III. 


THE  FEED  MATERIALS  PROGRAM 


317 


with  Metal  Hydrides  and  Iowa  State 
and  negotiated  new  contracts  with 
Electro  Metallurgical  and  Du  Pont.  In 
several  instances,  District  officials  had 
to  monitor  construction  of  additional 
plant  buildings,  at  government  ex- 
pense, to  expedite  the  production  of 
uranium  metal  under  these  contracts. 
Metal  Hydrides  and  Du  Pont  had  seri- 
ous operating  problems  that  limited 
their  output  of  metal,  although  Metal 
Hydrides  subsequently  developed  a 
highly  successful  metal-recasting  op- 
eration. Nevertheless,  by  the  time  Dis- 
trict officials  shut  down  most  produc- 
tion of  new  metal  in  late  1943 — Iowa 
State  continued  its  output  until  late 
1944 — the  various  contractors  had 
manufactured  several  thousand  tons. 
By  late  August  1944,  the  Madison 
Square  area  engineer  reported  deliv- 
ery of  nearly  3,500  tons  of  metal  to 
Hanford  and  Clinton,  comprised  of 
1,000  tons  from  Electro  Metallurgical, 
900  from  Iowa  State,  650  from  Mal- 
linckrodt,  610  from  Metal  Hydrides, 
and  lesser  amounts  from  other 
processors.  These  deliveries  included 
both  new  metal  and  metal  recast 
into  ingots  from  turnings  and  other 
scraps  from  machining  and  fabricating 
operations. ^^ 

Quality  Control  Program 

One  factor  that  made  materials  pro- 
curement difficult  was  the  almost  uni- 
versal requirement  for  previously  un- 
heard of  standards  of  quality.  In  the 
feed  materials  program,  for  example, 
procurement  schedules  required  that 


uranium  metal  contain  no  more  than 
0.1  of  1  percent  of  impurities  that 
would  affect  its  efficiency  in  the  pile- 
operating  process.  Similarly  stringent 
standards  were  established  for  graph- 
ite, fluorinated  chemicals,  and  other 
materials.  Because  most  of  the  com- 
mercial contractors  who  furnished 
these  materials  were  unprepared  to 
carry  out  the  physical  and  analytical 
tests  necessary  to  maintain  these  high 
standards,  the  materials  group  had  to 
build  up  its  own  quality  control 
organization.^^ 

In  February  1943,  Colonel  Cren- 
shaw's staff  began  negotiations  with 
Princeton,  MIT,  the  chemical  section 
of  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory,  and 
the  National  Bureau  of  Standards, 
with  the  objective  of  forming  these 
research  institutions  into  a  central 
quality  control  laboratory  group.  The 
plan  was  to  have  the  scientists  at  each 
institution  analyze  and  test  samples 
from  the  uranium  metal  production 
plants,  as  well  as  to  devise  more  ef- 
fective methods  of  metal  analysis,  to 
furnish  personnel  and  facilities  when 
needed  to  supplement  those  of  the 
manufacturing  plants,  to  investigate 
other  materials,  and  to  provide  gener- 
al guidance  for  the  control  program. 
In  addition,  the  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory was  to  carry  out  physical  tests  of 
brown  oxide  and  finished  metal  for 
the  pile  process.  Because  all  of  these 
institutions  already  were  engaged  in 
some  aspect  of  analysis  and  testing  of 
uranium,  the  Materials  Section  simply 
supplemented  or  revised  existing  con- 
tracts with  them  to  provide  the  neces- 


24  Ibid.,  pp.  10.2-10.9  and  .\pp.  F8,  DASA;  Rpt.s, 
Mat  Sec  (later  Mad  Sq  Area  Kngrs  ORice),  Sep-Dec 
42  and  31  Aug  45,  OROO. 


25MDH,  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  pp.  12.1  and  App.  G, 
DASA;  Rpts,  Mat  Sec,  15  Feb  and  4  Mar  43, 
OROO. 


318 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


sary  organization  of  the  central  qual- 
ity control  laboratory  group. ^^ 

By  spring,  the  Materials  Section 
had  completed  satisfactory  arrange- 
ments with  Princeton,  MIT,  and  the 
Bureau  of  Standards.  Colonel  Cren- 
shaw reported  in  May  that  these  three 
institutions  were  "doing  an  excellent 
job,  and  have  attacked  the  problem  as 
a  job  of  commercial  analysis,  which  is 
the  case."  ^^  The  Metallurgical  Labo- 
ratory expressed  a  preference  for  car- 
rying out  its  part  of  the  analytical 
work  under  its  existing  overall  re- 
search contract,  but  Crenshaw  op- 
posed this,  because  he  knew  it  would 
prevent  the  Materials  Section  from 
exercising  direct  control  over  the  lab- 
oratory's part  in  the  analytical  pro- 
gram. The  reasons  why  the  laboratory 
did  not  want  such  a  contract  soon 
became  apparent:  The  scientists  did 
not  relish  performing  routine  analysis 
and  testing  of  metal  samples  because 
it  took  time  and  used  facilities  they 
would  rather  devote  to  more  original 
and  challenging  research  and  devel- 
opment activities.^® 

Colonel  Crenshaw  arranged  a  meet- 
ing with  Richard  L.  Doan,  associate 
director  of  the  University  of  Chicago's 
Clinton  Laboratories  in  Tennessee, 
and  George  E.  Boyd,  chief  of  the  ana- 
lytical chemistry  group  at  the  Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory.  The  two  scien- 
tists agreed  that  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  would  continue  to  per- 
form routine  chemical  analysis  and 
testing  of  brown  oxide  and  uranium 


26MDH.  Bk.  7,  Vol.  1,  pp.  12.1-12.2,  D.A,S.A: 
Rpts,  Mat  Sec,  15  Feb  and  3  Apr  43,  OROO;  Coch- 
rane, Measures  for  Progress,  p.  383. 

"  Rpt,  Mat  Sec,  18  Mav  43,  OROO. 

28  Ibid.,  3  Apr,  4  and  18  Mav,  5  Jun  43,  OROO. 


metal  until  the  workload  in  this  area 
declined.  This  would  occur  shortly, 
they  knew,  when  Iowa  State  complet- 
ed facilities  for  quality  testing  its  own 
metal  output.  By  fall  of  1943,  the 
other  institutions  had  taken  over  most 
of  the  routine  chemical  analytical 
work  that  the  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory had  been  doing.  The  Madison 
Square  area  engineer  attested  to  the 
effectiveness  of  the  quality  control 
program  when,  at  the  end  of  Novem- 
ber, he  reported  to  Colonel  Nichols 
that  the  feed  materials  program  was 
making  metal  of  a  higher  degree  of 
purity  than  any  previously  produced 
by  the  atomic  energy  project. ^^ 

Development  of  the  feed  materials 
program  ahead  of  the  fissionable  ma- 
terials production  and  weapon  pro- 
grams was  a  matter  of  necessity,  for 
the  latter  were  completely  dependent 
upon  an  adequate  supply  of  the  feed 
and  other  materials  essential  to  their 
operation.  In  less  than  two  years,  the 
Manhattan  District's  materials  organi- 
zation was  able  to  expand  the  already 
existing  OSRD  program,  solving  seri- 
ous technical  problems  and  securing 
the  requisite  priorities  to  meet  on 
schedule  the  requirements  for  the  re- 
search and  development,  testing,  and 
start-up  in  operations  of  the  major 
production  plants  for  the  manufacture 
of  fissionable  materials.  By  late  1944 
and  in  1945,  the  District  could  begin 
to  phase  out,  or  reduce,  some  aspects 
of  the  program  and  to  give  some  at- 
tention to  the  postwar  requirements 
of  the  atomic  energy  program. 


29MDH,  Bk.  7.  \'ol.  1.  pp.  12.2-12.4,  DASA;  Rpts, 
Mat  Sec  (later  Mad  Sq  Area  Engrs  Office),  18  jun 
and  30  Nov  43,  OROO. 


CHAPTER  XV 


Land  Acquisition 


During  the  war  the  Manhattan  Dis- 
trict assembled  extensive  real  estate 
holdings  for  its  principal  installations 
in  Tennessee,  New  Mexico,  and 
Washington  State,  as  well  as  smaller 
tracts  for  its  support  facilities  in  other 
places,  totaling  more  than  500,000 
acres.  Manhattan  acquired  most  of 
this  land,  at  least  up  to  the  point  of 
occupancy,  during  the  period  Septem- 
ber 1942  to  August  1943;  however, 
because  of  unavoidable  legal  delays  in 
closing  out  procurement  of  original 
sites  and  recurring  demands  for  addi- 
tional space,  it  continued  to  be  in- 
volved in  some  acquisition  activities 
through  September  1945.^ 

Land  acquisition  for  the  atomic 
energy  project  presented  special 
problems  hitherto  never  encountered 
by  War  Department  agencies  in  their 
World  W^ar  II  real  estate  procurement 
programs.  The  Manhattan  Project  re- 
quired absolute  secrecy  and  unheard 
of  speed  in  acquiring  the  needed 
sites.  Yet  these  essential  objectives 
were,  in  fact,  inherently  self-defeat- 
ing, for  land  acquisition  activities 
tended  to  attract  widespread  public 
attention  and  measures  to  expedite 
quick  settlements  tended  to  conflict 
with     those     for     maximum     secrecv. 


Nonetheless,  convinced  that  the  ulti- 
mate success  of  the  project  was  at 
stake,  Manhattan  officials  persisted  in 
enforcing  strict  security  measures, 
even  though  the  latter  produced  a 
far-reaching  tide  of  local  opposition 
at  the  Tennessee  and  Washington 
sites. 2 

Clinton  Engineer  Works 

The  District's  acquisition  program 
in  Tennessee  officially  began  on 
29  September  1942,=^  when  Under 
Secretary  of  War  Robert  P.  Patterson 
approved  Maj.  Gen.  Eugene  Rey- 
bold's  letter  directive  requesting  pro- 
curement of  land  for  the  Kingston 
Demolition  Range,  so-called  for  secu- 
rity reasons  but  in  January  1943  offi- 
cially redesignated  the  Clinton  Engi- 


'  Site  selection  for  the  major  Manhattan  installa- 
tions is  discussed  in  detail  in  C.hs.  III-\'. 


^  Smith,  The  Army  and  Economic  Mobilization,  pp. 
441-42;  U.S.  Statutes  at  Large.  1942,  \ol.  36,  Pt.  1. 
Second  War  Powers  Act,  Title  II,  p.  177;  MDH,  Bk. 
4,  \'ol.  4,  'Land  Acquisition,  Hanford  Engineer 
Works,"  pp.  4.19-4.20,  DASA. 

^  Except  as  otherwise  indicated,  facts  and  figures 
pertaining  to  the  Tennessee  land  acquisition  pro- 
gram are  drawn  from  MDH,  Bk.  1,  \'ol.  10,  "Land 
Acquisition  CEW,"  and  from  the  appendices  to  that 
volume.  Figures  on  the  total  acreage  of  the  site  and 
other  statistics  relating  to  the  acquisition  program 
are  summarized  on  pp.  2.47-2.49.  Many  of  the  doc- 
uments pertinent  to  the  program  are  reproduced  in 
App.  B. 


320 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


neer  Works  (CEW).*  (See  Map  3.) 
Under  terms  of  this  directive,  the  En- 
gineers chief  had  official  authorization 
to  purchase  approximately  56,200 
acres ^  {Table  2),  primarily  in  eastern 
Tennessee's  Roane  and  Anderson 
Counties,  using  money  appropriated 
from  the  Engineer  Service-Army  cate- 
gory of  available  funds. 

In  anticipation  of  approval  of  this 
directive,  the  Engineers'  ORD  (Ohio 
River  Division)  Real  Estate  Branch  on 
28  September  had  opened  a  project 
office,  designated  the  CEW  Land  Ac- 
quisition Section,  at  Harriman,  a 
Roane  County  town  a  few  miles  west 
of  the  site.  The  ORD  staff  began  im- 
mediately to  secure  for  the  section 
the  services   of  some  fifty  appraisers 


4  Ltr,  Robins  (Act  Chief  of  Engrs)  to  CG  SOS, 
sub:  Acquisition  in  Fee  of  Approx  56,200  Acres  of 
Land  for  Demolition  Range  Near  Kingston,  Tenn., 
and  2d  Ind  (directive  approval),  Col  Marion  Rush- 
ton  (Asst  Ex,  Office  of  Und  Secy  War)  to  Chief  of 
Engrs,  both  29  Sep  42,  Incls  to  Memo,  Col  John  J. 
O'Brien  (CE  Real  Estate  Br  chieO  to  Lt  Col  Whitney 
Ashbridge  (CE  Mil  Constr  Br),  sub:  Land  Acquisi- 
tion in  Connection  With  MD,  17  Apr  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  601  (Santa  Fe),  MDR.  The  town 
of  Kingston  was  located  about  7  miles  southwest  of 
the  site  area. 

^  Acquisition  of  ten  additional  parcels  of  land,  au- 
thorized in  subsequent  directives  issued  from  June 
1943  through  August  1944,  brought  the  District's 
real  estate  holdings  to  a  total  of  approximately 
58,900  acres.  These  parcels  of  land  were  mostly 
small  tracts  required  for  the  adequate  development 
and  protection  of  the  original  site.  (See  Map  3. )  Sev- 
eral tracts  were  secured  to  facilitate  development  of 
the  transportation  network,  notably  70  acres  in  July 
1943  for  the  right  of  way  of  a  spur  track  built  from 
the  Southern  Railway  at  Blair  south  along  Oxier 
Creek  to  the  north  boundary  of  the  original  site. 
The  largest  additions  were  made  in  1944,  when  the 
gaseous  diffusion  plant  on  the  Clinch  River  at  the 
western  end  of  the  reservation  needed  more 
ground.  In  April  of  that  year  the  TVA  granted  the 
District  a  temporary-use  permit  for  some  279  acres, 
and  in  August  the  CEW  Land  Acquisition  Section 
acquired  another  2,800  acres,  consisting  chiefly  of 
an  elevated  area  along  Black  Oak  Ridge  needed  to 
improve  perimeter  security  near  the  gaseous  diffu- 
sion plant. 


for  the  job  of  appraising  an  estimated 
800-850  separate  tracts.  The  fact  that 
division  personnel  currently  were  in- 
volved in  another  large-scale  acquisi- 
tion program  for  the  Dale  Hollow 
Dam  and  Reservoir,  situated  on  a 
branch  of  the  Cumberland  River  near 
the  Tennessee-Kentucky  border,  com- 
pounded the  difficulty  of  their  new 
task;  however,  they  resolved  the  prob- 
lem by  arranging  to  borrow  the  ap- 
praisers, on  a  short-term  basis,  from 
several  regional  Federal  Land  Banks 
and  from  the  Tennessee  Valley  Au- 
thority (TVA)  real  estate  staff  In 
keeping  with  War  Department  prac- 
tices of  basing  appraisals  mainly  on 
an  estimate  of  prevailing  property 
values  as  determined  by  a  review  of 
comparable  sales,  on  interviews  with 
owners,  and  on  actual  physical  inspec- 
tion of  each  tract,  the  appraisers  were 
able  to  complete  most  of  the  work  on 
the  original  site  by  the  end  of  1942.^ 
The  directive  of  29  September  had 
authorized  procurement  of  the  origi- 
nal site  by  condemnation.  This  per- 
mitted not  only  immediate  acquisition 
of  those  parts  of  the  area  needed  for 
preliminary  construction  but  also  ex- 
pedited acquisition  of  properties  with 
defective  titles.  On  6  October  (effec- 
tive 7  October),  the  U.S.  District 
Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of  Ten- 
nessee, Northern  Division,  issued  an 
order  of  possession  at  the  request  of 
ORD  Real  Estate  Branch  attorneys. 
The  court  took  cognizance  of  the 
hardship  to  landowners  facing  remov- 


*  Ltr,  Fred  Morgan  (CEW  Land  .Acquisition  Sec 
Proj  Mgr)  to  Joseph  G.  Colgan  (House  Mil  Affairs 
Committee  investigator),  6  Aug  43,  copy  in  MDH, 
Bk.  1,  Vol.  10,  App.  B2i,  DASA;  Memo,  Marshall  to 
Groves,  sub:  Major  MD  Contracts,  27  Apr  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  161,  MDR;  Knoxville  Jour- 
nal, 4  Feb  43. 


LAND  ACQUISITION 

Table  2 — Land  Acquisition  at  CEW,  1942-1944 


321 


Date  of 
Directive 

Acreage  To 
Be  Acquired  * 

Estimated 
Cost 

Type  of  Control 
Acquired 

Use  or  Purpose 

29  Sep  42 

56,200 
15.1 
70 
3.73 

47.7 
62 
17 
279 

.89 

.3 

.32 

425 

2,375 

$3,500,000 

1,750 

14,107 

400 

3,740 
14,600 
5.100 

200 
100 

170,000 

Outright  purchase 
Outright  purchase 
Outright  purchase 
Outright  purchase 

Outright  purchase 
Perpetual  easement 
Outright  purchase 
Temporary-use  permit 

from  TVA 
Perpetual  easement 
Outright  purchase 
Temporary-use  permit 

from  TVA 
Temporary-use  permit 

from  TVA 
Lease  or  outright 

purchase 

Original  site 

For  protection  and  security 
Spur  track  right  of  way 
Channel    diversion    of   Poplar 

Creek 
Borrow  pit 
Access  road 

14 Jun  43 

3  Jul  43 

15  Jul  43 

25  Sep  43 

5  Feb  44 

3  Mar  44 

19  Apr  44 

Expansion  of  facilities 

2  Mav  44 

4  Aug  44 

Access  road 

28  Aug  44 

Security 

^  Figures  given  here  represent  the  amounts  estimated  in  the  real  estate  directive,  the  sum  totaling  about 
59,500  acres.  The  actual  acreage  finally  acquired  was  less,  approximately  58,900  acres. 
Source:  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  10,  pp.  1.3-1.4,  2.21-2.26,  App.  Bl,  DASA 


al  on  short  notice  by  limiting  the  gov- 
ernment's right  of  immediate  exclu- 
sive possession  to  those  sections 
where  it  was  "essential  to  full  and 
complete  development  of  the 
project.  .  .  ."  ' 

The  Manhattan  District  did  not  take 
exclusive  possession  of  any  tracts  for 
construction  purposes  before  15  No- 
vember, although  it  had  exercised 
right  of  entry  at  many  points  before 
that  date.  The  CEW  Land  Acquisition 
Section  requested  that  owners  and 
tenants,  most  of  whom  were 
farmers,  be  prepared  to  vacate  at 
various  times  between  1  December 
1942  and  15  February  1943.  In  some 


''Copies  of  the  condemnation  petition,  6  Oct  42, 
filed  by  U.S.  Atty  James  B.  Prexier,  Jr.  et  al.,  and  the 
order  of  possession  (source  of  quotation),  6  Oct  42, 
signed  by  Judge  George  C.  Taylor,  in  MDH, 
Bk.  1,  Vol.  10,  App.  G7,  DASA. 


instances,  where  immediate  vacating 
would  cause  undue  hardship,  the  Dis- 
trict permitted  landowners  to  stay  on 
even  beyond  the  15  February  date. 
The  effectiveness  of  this  lenient 
policy  is  attested  to  by  the  fact  that 
project  officials  never  had  to  resort  to 
a  court  order  to  secure  eviction  of  an 
owner  from  the  Clinton  site. 

As  soon  as  the  ORD  Real  Estate 
Branch  had  assembled  sufficient  data 
to  meet  legal  requirements  concern- 
ing areas  needed  immediately  for 
military  construction,  branch  attor- 
neys filed  declarations  of  taking.  They 
filed  the  first  declaration  on  20  No- 
vember 1942,  covering  a  segment 
comprised  of  13  tracts.  By  mid-Janu- 
ary 1943  declarations  were  on  file  for 
184  tracts  covering  9,614  acres  and, 
by    May,    for    742    tracts    constituting 


322 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Earm  at  the    1  ennessek  Site,  typical  of  those  acquired  by  the  Manhattan  District 


53,334  acres — or  nearly  all  privately 
owned  property  of  the  original  site. 
Meanwhile,  during  the  winter  and 
spring  of  1943,  CEW  Land  Acquisi- 
tion Section  negotiators  had  succeed- 
ed in  obtaining  stipulation  agree- 
ments on  more  than  half  the  tracts  in 
litigation.  By  the  end  of  May,  agree- 
ments of  this  type  had  been  worked 
out  on  416  tracts  comprising  21,742 
acres.  In  those  cases  where  the  nego- 
tiators failed  to  secure  stipulation 
agreements,  branch  attorneys  con- 
sented to  submit  them  to  a  jury  of 
view,  an  institution  provided  for 
under  lennessee  law  to  assist 
litigants  in  reaching  agreement  on 
settlement  prices  for  expropriated 
property.  The  jury,  comprised  of  five 


persons  named  by  the  Federal  District 
Court,  visited  each  of  the  tracts  in 
contention  and  then  advised  new  set- 
tlement prices  uniformly  higher  than 
those  established  by  War  Department 
appraisers.  When  the  owners  were 
unwilling  to  accept  even  these  higher 
prices,  the  government  stopped  using 
this  method  of  settlement.® 

The  rise  of  local  opposition  to  the 
acquisition  program  seriously  threat- 
ened to  delay  efforts  by  Department 
of  Justice  special  attorneys  to  quickly 
bring  the  remaining  unsettled  cases  to 
trial.    Contributing   to   the   opposition 


^  Knoxville  Journal.  9  Jan  43;  Remarks  of  Congress- 
man John  Jennings,  Jr.  ( I  enn.),  U.S.  Congress, 
House,  Congressional  Record.  78th  Cong.,  1st  Sess., 
22  Apr  43,  Vol.  89,  Pt.  10,  pp.  A 1 197-99. 


LAND  ACQllSITION 


323 


was  the  Federal  District  (Court's  late- 
1942  publication  in  its  registry  of  the 
amounts  placed  on  deposit  for  ad- 
vanced payment  to  landowners,  in 
compliance  with  the  declaration-of- 
taking  procedure.  Because  these 
amounts  represented  a  percentage  of 
the  total  valuation  of  the  tracts,  the 
landowners  easily  deduced  the  War 
Department's  appraised  valuation  on 
the  various  tracts.  The  coincidence  of 
a  local  political  campaign  provided 
candidates  with  an  opportunity  to 
promise,  if  elected,  to  secure  higher 
prices  than  those  established  by  gov- 
ernment appraisers.  Area  newspapers 
publicized  widely  the  appraised  prices 
and  the  local  politicians'  comments 
and,  in  general,  were  hostile  to  the 
acquisition  program  and  its 
methods.^ 

By  the  end  of  November,  many 
landowners  were  thoroughly  aroused. 
On  the  twenty-third,  a  delegation  of 
property  holders  petitioned  the 
project  manager  of  the  CEW  Land 
Acquisition  Section,  protesting  the 
low  appraisal  prices.  That  evening 
more  than  two  hundred  owners  met; 
they  formed  a  landholders  investiga- 
tion committee  and  made  arrange- 
ments to  hire  lawyers  and  appraisers 
so  that  committee  members  could  re- 
ceive expert  assistance.  Taking  note 
of  these  developments,  a  Knoxville 
newspaper  commented  that  "the 
public  of  course  actually  knows  noth- 
ing in  detail  of  the  justice  of  the  pro- 
tests       being        made        by        these 


citizens.  .  .  .  We  do  know  that  since 
everybody  else  is  getting  a  fair  price 
for  the  material  and  labor  which  will 
go  into  this  Federal  project,  there  is 
certainly  no  justification  for  these 
farmers  being  singled  out  for  an 
economy  slaughter."  ^° 

Dissatisfaction  with  appraised 
values  was  not  the  only  cause  for  op- 
position. Relocation  of  more  than  one 
thousand  landowners  and  tenants 
with  their  families  proved  difficult. 
Recent  TVA  acquisition  of  much  of 
the  good  river  bottom  farmland  in  the 
vicinity  had  created  a  shortage  of 
available  vacant  farms,  enhanced  local 
land  values,  and  forced  many  farm 
people  to  move.  Some  of  the  dis- 
placed farmers  who  had  moved  to  the 
Clinton  site  naturally  resented  having 
to  move  again.  Even  vacant  houses  in 
nearby  towns  were  at  a  premium  be- 
cause of  the  influx  of  construction 
workers  for  the  new  project.  Many 
landowners  lacked  sufficient  ready 
cash  to  move  on  short  notice.  The 
War  Department  had  no  funds  to  aid 
them  and  adequate  assistance  was  not 
immediately  obtainable  from  other 
government  agencies,  such  as  the 
Farm  Security  Administration.  Even 
owners  with  financial  resources  found 
that  the  District's  deadlines  on  vacat- 
ing did  not  give  them  sufficient  time 
to  hire  moving  vehicles,  which  were 
in  short  supply  in  the  local  area.^^ 


9MI^H.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  10,  pp.  2.9  and  2.42-2.43, 
DAS.A;  Knnxville  Journal  1,  20,  and  25  Nov  42;  Fine 
and  Remington,  Corps  of  Engineers:  Construction,  pp. 
174-84.  Numerous  examples  of  local  opposition  to 
War  Department  land  acquisition  are  presented  in 
the  last-named  source. 


^°  Knoxville  Journal.  24  Nov,  25  Nov  (source  of 
quotation),  30  Dec  42;  Remarks  of  Jennings,  Congres- 
sional Record.  78th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  22  Apr  43,  Vol. 
89,  Ft.  10.  pp.  Al  197-99. 

I'MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  10,  pp.  2.40-2.42,  DASA; 
Iclg,  Jennings  to  Secy  War,  24  Oct  42,  copy  in 
ibid.,  App.  B2b,  DASA;  Robinson,  Oak  Ridge  Story, 
pp.  2()  and  28. 


324 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Rumors  contributed  considerably  to 
fomenting  local  opposition.  One  per- 
sistent rumor  was  that  the  Clinton 
site  was  being  acquired  for  the  benefit 
of  a  large  private  corporation  in  fla- 
grant abuse  of  the  right  of  eminent 
domain.  But  overriding  security  re- 
quirements prevented  District  officials 
from  providing  the  public  with  a  gen- 
eral explanation.  Thus,  in  an  attempt 
to  abate  public  criticism.  Col.  John  J. 
O'Brien,  chief  of  the  CE  (Corps  of 
Engineers)  Real  Estate  Branch,  re- 
quested that  the  Department  of  Agri- 
culture investigate  the  appraisal  pro- 
gram. The  department's  factfinders 
later  stated  in  their  report  that  "the 
general  management  of  the  project, 
the  appraisal  of  the  land  and  the  ap- 
proach to  the  landowners  have  been 
fair  and  just,  and  we  do  not  see  what 
would  be  accomplished  by  a  reap- 
praisal of  the  land."  The  Engineers' 
resurvey  of  the  area  had  revealed, 
they  continued,  that  in  many  in- 
stances the  tracts  were  actually  small- 
er than  recorded  in  existing  property 
deeds;  that  the  owners  had  tended  to 
overvalue  their  land  because  they 
were  prone  to  exaggerate  its  produc- 
tivity; and,  because  many  were  veter- 
ans of  one  or  more  of  the  five  previ- 
ous TVA  land  acquisition  projects 
within  70  miles  of  the  Clinton  site, 
that  they  had  developed  "a  technique 
of  complaining"  that  had  proved  to 
be  very  effective  in  securing  higher 
prices  for  their  property.  ^^ 

Meanwhile,  disaffected  farmers 
sought  the  assistance  of  their  con- 
gressman, John  Jennings,  Jr.,  a  Re- 
publican from  Knoxville.  As  early  as 


October  1942,  Jennings  had  written 
to  Secretary  Stimson  on  behalf  of  his 
constituents:  "I  realize  the  necessity 
of  the  step  taken  but  I  do  hope  ade- 
quate steps  will  be  taken  to  safeguard 
these  people,  that  they  speedily  be 
paid  for  their  farms,  and  every  step 
possible  be  taken  to  see  that  they  are 
relocated  on  farms."  ^^  Although  the 
War  Department  promptly  had  as- 
sured him  "that  every  effort  will  be 
made  to  preserve  the  interests  of  the 
landowners  concerned,"  ^"^  the  pro- 
tests continued  to  increase.  Feeling 
the  futility  of  his  earlier  efforts,  Jen- 
nings submitted  a  resolution  to  the 
House  of  Representatives  on  1  Febru- 
ary 1943,  requesting  creation  of  a 
select  committee  to  investigate  the 
prices  offered  landowners.  "A  large 
number  of  owners  .  .  .  ,"  the  resolu- 
tion read,  "assert  that  the  War  De- 
partment has  had  the  land  appraised 
by  nonresidents  of  the  State  of  1  en- 
nessee  who  are  totally  unfamiliar  with 
the  value  of  such  land.  .  .  .  Inexpert 
and  unfair  appraisals  .  .  .  are  result- 
ing in  the  forced  sale  of  such  land 
...  at  prices  totally  inadequate  to 
enable  the  former  owners  to  acquire 
homes  and  farms  of  comparable 
value."  ^^ 

The  House  took  no  immediate 
action  on  Jennings'  resolution,  and  he 
continued  to  seek  relief  for  his  con- 
stituents    through     War    Department 


'^Mcmo,  George  K.  Fairell  (Agri  Dept  specialist) 
to  O'Brien,  sub:  Kingston  Demolition  Range, 
19  Feb  43,  topv  in  MDU,  Bk  1,  Vol.  10,  App.  B2e, 
DASA. 


"Ltr,  Jennings  to  Secv  War,  17  Oct  42,  copy  in 
ibid.,  App.  B2a,  DASA. 

'"Ltr  (source  of  quotation),  John  W.  Martyn 
(Admin  Asst  to  Secy  War)  to  Jennings,  27  Oct  42, 
App.  B2a;  Telgs,  Jennings  to  Secy  War,  24  Oct  42, 
and  I'nd  Secv  War  to  Jennings,  ,S  Nov  42,  App. 
B2b.  Copies  in  ibid.,  DASA. 

'^Quotation  from  //.  Res.  91.  Congressional  Record, 
78th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1  Feb  43.  Vol.  89,  Ft.  1,  p. 
508.  See  also  Remarks  of  Jennings  on  //.  Res.  91. 
ibid.,  2  Feb  43,  p.  509;  Knoxville  Journal.  4  Feb  43. 


LAND  ACQUISITION 


325 


channels.  In  late  February,  he  in- 
formed Under  Secretary  of  War  Pat- 
terson that  he  was  receiving  numer- 
ous complaints  of  destruction  of 
buildings  and  other  facilities  on  the 
site  before  providing  owners  the 
usual  opportunity  to  salvage  them. 
Patterson  replied  that  such  salvage 
was  not  feasible  because  it  would  take 
too  long  and  interfere  with  construc- 
tion activities  already  in  progress. 
Furthermore,  he  assured  Jennings,  no 
waste  was  involved  because  Manhat- 
tan District  engineers  were  converting 
existing  buildings  on  the  site  for  use 
by  the  project  wherever  this  was  pos- 
sible. Again  in  April,  Jennings  com- 
plained to  Corps  of  Engineers  offi- 
cials that  improper  statements 
concerning  landowners  were  being 
made  by  their  personnel  in  testimony 
before  the  jury  of  view.  Corps  observ- 
ers who  had  attended  the  jury  hear- 
ings said  the  congressman's  allega- 
tions were  not  true.  Finally,  on  9  July, 
Chairman  Andrew  J.  May  of  the 
House  Military  Affairs  Committee,  to 
which  the  resolution  had  been 
referred  for  review,  appointed  Re- 
presentative Clifford  C.  Davis,  a 
Democrat  from  the  Tenth  District  of 
lennessee,  to  carry  out  an  inquiry. 
Davis  selected  Representatives  Dewey 
Short,  a  Republican  from  Missouri, 
and  John  Sparkman,  a  Democrat  from 
Alabama,  as  members  of  an  investi- 
gating subcommittee  and  also  invited 
Jennings  to  be  present  at  the  subcom- 
mittee's public  hearings.  ^^ 


Announcement  of  the  pending  in- 
vestigation came  while  the  Justice  De- 
partment special  attorneys  were  push- 
ing ahead  with  trial  of  condemnation 
cases  on  the  Clinton  tracts.  The  fed- 
eral court  juries,  almost  without  ex- 
ception, substantially  increased  pay- 
ments to  property  holders.  This 
seemed  to  further  confirm  the  pre- 
vailing local  view  that  the  original  ap- 
praisals were  far  too  low  and  farmers 
who  had  accepted  payment  ought  to 
be  entitled  to  supplementary  compen- 
sation. After  consulting  with  Manhat- 
tan officials,  the  Justice  Department 
decided  to  suspend  further  trials,  at 
least  temporarily,  as  the  congressional 
investigation  might  result  in  a  major 
revision  of  the  appraisal  data  upon 
which  the  government  was  basing  its 
prosecution  of  condemnation  cases.  ^"^ 

The  War  Department  determined 
to  adhere  to  a  policy  of  full  coopera- 
tion with  the  congressional  investiga- 
tors. The  ORD  division  engineer  in- 
structed the  CEW  project  manager  to 
take  "extreme  care  ...  to  prevent 
adverse  reaction  because  of  any 
claims  being  made  that  the  War  De- 
partment is  pursuing  a  non-coopera- 
tive policy."  ^®  Manhattan  officials  did 
not  interfere  when  a  subcommittee 
investigator  interviewed  landowners 
who  had  written  letters  of  complaint. 
The  CEW  project  manager  responded 
promptly  to  a  written  request  from 
the  House  Military  Affairs  Committee 
general  counsel  for  a  comprehensive 


'*I.tis,  Jennings  to  Und  Secv  War,  27  Feb  43, 
t'nd  Secy  War  to  Jennings,  13  Apr  43,  and  Lt  Col 
C.  C.  Fletcher  (Act  Real  Estate  On  for  ORD  Div 
Engr)  to  Rev  bold,  sub:  l.tr  of  Jennings  Re  Alleged 
Improper  Statements  of  J.  H.  McKenzie  (Just  Depi 
Spec  Altv),  15  Apr  43,  copies  in  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol. 
10,   App.    B2d-e.   DASA.   See   also   ibid.,   pp.    2.11- 


2.12,  DASA;  Knoxville  Journal.  10-11  Jul  and  13  Aug 
43. 

I''  1st  Ind,  Fletcher  to  Morgan,  13  Jul  43,  to  I.tr, 
Morgan  to  ORD  Div  Engr,  sub:  Investigation  of  Ap- 
praisals bv  (^{jngressional  Investigating  Committee, 
12  Jul  43,  copies  in  MDH,  Bk.  I,  Vol.  10,  App.  B2h, 
DASA. 

'«  Ibid. 


326 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


statement  of  its  functions  and  activi- 
ties, including  a  list  of  the  appraisers 
who  had  worked  on  the  project,  to- 
gether with  a  description  of  their 
qualifications;  however,  he  did  not  re- 
lease any  records  to  the  subcommit- 
tee without  approval  of  the  ORD  divi- 
sion engineer.  ^^ 

The  subcommittee  held  two  public 
hearings:  on  1 1  August  at  Clinton,  for 
the  benefit  of  Roane  County  resi- 
dents; and  the  following  day  at  Kings- 
ton, for  Anderson  County  residents. 
About  three  hundred  persons,  mostly 
land  owners  and  their  families,  at- 
tended at  Clinton,  but  considerably 
fewer  were  present  in  Kingston.  The 
CE  Real  Estate  Branch  head  sent  his 
chief  appraiser  and  an  officer  to  rep- 
resent the  Engineers  chief.  General 
Reybold,  at  the  hearing;  the  ORD  di- 
vision engineer,  also  his  chief  apprais- 
er; and  the  district  engineer,  the  CEW 
project  manager. 2° 

At  Clinton,  Congressman  Jennings 
reviewed  the  history  of  the  acquisi- 
tion, emphasizing  particularly  the 
landowners'  complaints  that  they  had 
been  underpaid  for  properties  taken 
over  by  the  government  and,  as  a 
final  comment,  declaring  that  all  of 
his  own  efforts  to  have  the  War  De- 
partment reconsider  appraisals  had 
been  turned  down  "as  cold  as  ice."  ^^ 
In  subsequent  testimony.  War  Depart- 
ment officials,  disgruntled  landown- 
ers, and  project  appraisal  staff  mem- 


'^  Ibid.;  Ltrs,  Colgan  (for  H.  Ralph  Burton, 
House  Mil  Affairs  Committee  general  counsel)  to 
Morgan,  3  Aug  43,  and  Morgan  to  Colgan,  6  Aug 
43,  copies  in  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  10,  App.  B2i,  DASA. 

2°  The  town  of  Clinton  was  located  4  miles  north- 
west of  the  site.  Ltr.  Col  R.  G.  West  (Ex  OIT,  ORD) 
to  Reybold,  sub:  Investigation  of  C^KW  Land  Acqui- 
sition at  Harriman,  Tenn.,  30  Aug  43,  copy  in 
MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  ip,  App.  B2m,  DASA. 

2>  Ibid. 


bers  asserted  that  appraisers  had 
greatly  undervalued  most  properties, 
failed  to  interview  owners,  and  used 
coercion  in  getting  stipulations.  Some 
witnesses  charged  that  the  CEW 
project  manager  had  promised 
owners  they  would  have  an  opportu- 
nity to  salvage  their  buildings  and 
equipment,  but  they  were  not  permit- 
ted to  do  this.  The  ORD  chief  ap- 
praiser took  the  tack  in  his  testimony 
that  if  the  appraisers  and  negotiators 
had  done  all  that  was  alleged  by  the 
landowners,  they  were  acting  contrary 
to  all  instructions  issued  by  General 
Reybold.  He  urged  that  the  apprais- 
ers and  negotiators  be  given  a  hear- 
ing, but  only  two  witnesses  represent- 
ing this  group  were  called  to  testify, 
and  they  both  vehemently  denied 
most  of  the  charges  that  had  been 
made  against  them.  The  subcommit- 
tee adjourned  on  12  August,  after 
hearing  testimony  from  Anderson 
County  owners  at  Kingston. ^^ 

Ihe  congressional  committee  did 
not  make  its  report  public  until  De- 
cember. The  report  consisted  chiefly 
of  ten  recommendations  for  improv- 
ing War  Department  real  estate  acqui- 
sition practices,  only  two  of  which  re- 
lated specifically  to  the  CEW  pro- 
gram, ihe  first  stated  that  the  War 
Department  should  review  and  make 
adjustments  in  all  those  cases  at  the 
Clinton  site  where  "the  landowner 
was     persuaded,     against     his     better 


22  Ltrs,  Morgan  to  Fletcher,  subs:  Rpt  on  Hearing 
Before  House  Mil  Affairs  Subcommittee  in  Connec- 
tion With  Land  Acquisition  at  Harriman,  lenn., 
1 1  Aug  43,  and  Rpt  of  House  Mil  Affairs  Subcom- 
mittee—CEW,  13  Aug  43;  Ltr,  West  to  Reybold, 
sub:  Investigation  of  CEW  Land  Acquisition  at  Har- 
riman, 30  Aug  43.  Copies  of  all  in  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol. 
10,  App.  B2q  and  m,  DASA.  Knoxmlle  Xeit's-Sentmel, 
12-13  Aug  43.  Knoxxnlle  Journal,  12-13  Aug  43. 


LAND  ACQLJISI I  ION 


327 


judgment,  by  coercion,  threat,  or 
promise,  for  whatever  reason  or  rea- 
sons, to  accept  less  than  the  true 
vakie  of  his  property."  Ihe  second 
recommended  that  "landowners  who 
suffered  losses  on  standing  crops 
.  .  .  for  any  reason  not  attributable 
to  the  landower,  should  be  properly 
compensated  for  said  losses."  The 
rest  of  the  recommendations,  taken  as 
a  group,  constituted  a  critique  of  War 
Department  acquisition  policies  in 
general.  More  care  should  be  taken  to 
ensure  protection  of  landowners'  con- 
stitutional rights  as  guaranteed  under 
the  Fifth  Amendment.  In  ascertaining 
fair  prices  on  land,  the  government 
real  estate  appraisers  should  give 
more  attention  to  determining 
comparable  land  values  and  take  into 
consideration  all  factors  relating  to 
relocation  of  the  owner  on  property 
similar  to  that  he  had  given  up.  To 
make  sure  that  these  objectives  were 
achieved.  War  Department  real  estate 
agencies  should  employ  only  fully 
qualified  appraisers  and  negotiators. 
The  Corps  of  Engineers'  real  estate 
manual  should  be  revised  to  cover 
unusual  conditions,  such  as  those 
found  at  the  Clinton  site.  Finally,  no 
promises  or  commitments  should  be 
made  to  property  holders,  except 
where  they  could  be  made  a  matter  of 
written  official  record. ^^ 

Save  for  a  brief  delay  in  prosecut- 
ing the  condemnation  cases,  the  con- 
gressional investigation  interfered 
very  little  with  land  acquisition 
progress  and  not  at  all  with  construc- 


tion of  the  U-235  production  facili- 
ties. Nothing  came  of  the  committee's 
rather  severe  criticism  of  appraisal 
prices,  as  neither  Congress  nor  the 
War  Department  took  steps  to  give 
additional  compensation  to  landown- 
ers whose  property  had  been  acquired 
under  stipulation  agreements.  By 
August  1944,  all  of  the  original 
56,700-acre  site  had  been  acquired. 
As  finally  constituted,  it  consisted  of 
806  tracts  secured  by  purchase,  38 
tracts  held  under  easements,  and  4 
tracts  obtained  under  TVA  tempo- 
rary-use permits.  In  September,  three 
months  after  closing  down  oper- 
ations, the  CEW  Land  Acquisition 
Section  reopened  its  Harriman  office 
to  monitor  the  additional  acquisition 
of  approximately  2,800  acres.  Needed 
to  ensure  greater  security  of  the  gase- 
ous diffusion  plant,  this  acquisition 
involved  negotiations  on  41  separate 
tracts  and  was  not  completed  until 
March  1945.^4 

Total  cost  of  the  CEW  real  estate 
acquisition  program  cannot  be  deter- 
mined, because  project  records  list 
administrative  charges  as  part  of  the 
overall  expenditures  for  engineer 
military  activities.  The  actual  sum 
paid  out  for  purchase  of  land  and  im- 
provements, for  severance  damages, 
and  for  certain  other  nonadministra- 
tive  costs  totaled  slightly  more  than 
$2.6  million,  substantially  less  than 
the  estimated  cost  of  $3.5  million  in 
the  original  directive  of  29  September 
1942.  Of  the  total,  the  Army  expend- 
ed the  largest  part,  $2.58  million,  in 


2^  The  recommendations  were  printed  in  the 
Kno.willf  /oiirnal  on  6  Dec  4!3.  Comments  deiending 
War  Department  procedures  as  they  related  to  each 
of  the  recommendations  are  given  in  MDH,  Bk.  1, 
Vol.  10,  pp.  2.12-2.16  and  App.  F5,  DASA.  See  also 
I  .S.  Armv  CE  Real  Estate  Manual.  1942. 


24  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  10  pp.  2.45-2.46  and  App. 
E1-E4,  DASA;  Ltr,  Robins  (Dep  Chief  of  Engrs)  to 
CG  ASF,  sub:  Acquisition  of  Additional  Land  for 
Sctv  Purposes  in  K-25  Area,  28  Aug  44,  copy  in 
ibid.,  .App.  Blf,  DASA. 


328 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


outright  acquisition  of  slightly  more 
than  55,000  acres,  purchased  at  an 
average  cost  of  about  $47  per  acre.^^ 

Los  Alamos 

Although  the  size  of  the  Los 
Alamos  site  approached  that  of  the 
Clinton  site,  its  acquisition  presented 
far  fewer  problems  for  the  CE  Real 
Estate  Branch.  Federal  agencies  al- 
ready owned  and  controlled  90  per- 
cent of  the  land  needed  for  the  site, 
and  for  this  the  War  Department  had 
only  to  negotiate  a  comparatively 
simple  transfer  agreement  with  each 
agency.  Furthermore,  because  a  rela- 
tively small  number  of  private  owners 
held  title  to  the  remaining  parcels, 
branch  officials  anticipated  that  nego- 
tiations with  individual  owners  would 
be  a  far  less  time-consuming  oper- 
ation than  at  the  Tennessee  site.^^ 

On  25  November  1942,  Under  Sec- 
retary of  War  Patterson  approved  a 
directive  to  acquire  a  site  at  Los 
Alamos  "for  establishment  of  a  Dem- 
olition range."  In  support  of  his  re- 
quest for  approval  of  this  acquisition, 
the  Engineers  chief  had  submitted 
data  derived  from  two  comprehensive 
preliminary  reports — one  prepared  by 
the   division    engineer   of  the   South- 


25  Ibid.,  p.  2.47,  DASA:  Ltr.  W.  T.  Brooks  (State 
of  Tenn  Hwv  Engr)  to  ORD  Div  Engr,  8  Jul  43;  Ltr, 
West  to  Brooks,  3  Sep  43;  Ltr,  J.  W.  Love  (Harri- 
man  Power  Dept  Mgr)  to  Sen  Tom  Stewart  (Tenn.). 
10  Jan  44;  Ltr,  Robins  to  Sen  Kenneth  D.  McKellar 
(Tenn.),  11  Feb  44;  1st  Ind,  O'Brien  to  ORD  Div 
Engr,  25  Jul  44,  to  Ltr,  Fletcher  to  Revbold,  sub: 
Edgemoor  Bridge  and  Solway  Bridge,  Tenn.,  17  Jul 
44.  Copies  of  all  in  ibid.,  App  B2f  and  n-o,  DASA. 
Robinson,  Oak  Ridge  Story,  pp.  26  and  28.  Some 
3,720  of  the  total  58,900  acres  brought  under  CEW 
control  already  were  owned  by  the  government  or 
were  acquired  bv  lease,  easement,  or  use  permit. 

26MDH,  Bk,  8,  Vol.  1,  "General,"  pp.  3.5-3.6, 
DASA.  Selection  of  the  Los  Alamos  site  is  discussed 
in  detail  in  Ch.  IV. 


western  Division  (SWD)  at  Dallas, 
Texas,  and  the  other  by  that  divi- 
sion's district  engineer  at  Albuquer- 
que, New  Mexico.  These  reports  indi- 
cated that  the  Manhattan  Project  re- 
quired approximately  54,000  acres, 
most  of  it  semiarid  forest  and  grazing 
lands  located  on  the  east  slopes  of  the 
Jemez  Mountains  in  Sandoval  County. 
Cost  of  acquisition,  the  reports  esti- 
mated, would  be  small,  because  all 
but  about  8,900  acres  were  federally 
owned  and  the  grazing  and  forest 
lands  were  of  relatively  low  value. 
The  directive  set  the  approximate 
cost  at  $440,000  and  authorized  the 
Engineers  chief  to  finance  the  acquisi- 
tion from  available  engineer  funds. ^'^ 
Because  the  process  of  acquiring 
the  Los  Alamos  site  promised  to  be 
relatively  uncomplicated  and  speedy, 
there  was  little  need  for  establishing  a 
special  real  estate  project  office.  The 
SWD  Real  Estate  Branch  in  Albuquer- 
que had  sufficient  staff  and  resources 
to  oversee  the  myriad  details  and  the 
district  engineer  had  assigned  one  of 
his  assistants,  Maj.  John  H.  Dudley,  to 
coordinate  and  supervise  all  phases. 
Working  closely  with  Lt.  Col.  John  M. 
Harman,  the  Los  Alamos  post  com- 
mander designate,  the  Albuquerque 
real  estate  staff  took  immediate  steps 
to    implement    the    plan    to    purchase 


2^  Quoted  phrase  from  Ltr,  Robins  (for  Chief  of 
Engrs)  to  CO  SOS,  sub:  Acquisition  of  Land  for 
Demolition  Range  at  Los  Alamos,  N.Mex.,  and  2d 
Ind  (directive  approval),  Patterson  to  Chief  of 
Engrs,  both  25  Nov  42,  Incls  to  Memo,  O'Brien  to 
Ashbridge,  sub:  Land  Acquisition  in  Connection 
With  MD,  17  Apr  43,  MDR.  See  also  Prelim  Real 
Estate  Rpt,  SWD  Div  Engr,  sub:  Los  Alamos  Proj, 
21  Nov  42,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Rpts), 
MDR;  Rpt,  L.S.  Engrs  Office,  Albuquerque  Dist, 
sub:  Proposed  Site  for  Mil  Proj  at  Los  Alamos 
Ranch  School,  Otowi,  N.Mex.,  23  Nov  42,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.03,  MDR. 


LAND  ACQL  ISniON 


:529 


^■^1 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^           ■     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

"  ^^B^^^^HHI^^^^H 

u....->^.-    '  ^ 

BHB^^'' 

'^k.  *  -■'  ■    "i  >  k.  ■" 

"■•i^L    '                          ..*.  '*■  - 

Typical  1  errain  of  the  Los  Alamos  Site 


the  site  in  five  separate  sections  (A,  B, 
C,  D,  and  E),  which  ensured  comph- 
ance  with  the  War  Department's 
pohcy  of  taking  possession  of  prop- 
erty only  as  it  was  actually  needed.^® 
{See  Map  3.) 

Area  A  comprised  a  large  block  of 
land  at  the  center  of  the  site,  which 
include  the  fifty-odd  buildings  and  ex- 
pansive campus  grounds  (several  hun- 
dred acres)  of  the  Los  Alamos  School 
that  the  Army  acquired  first  and  had 
full  title  to  by  early  1943  under  terms 
of  a  $350,000  direct-purchase  con- 
tract. The  other  areas — Area  E  to  the 
north  of  Area  A  and  Areas  B,  C,  and 
D  to  the  south — formed  a  kind  of  se- 
curity belt  to  protect  the  central  facili- 
ties planned  for  Area  A,  and  also  as- 
sured    the    Armv     control     over     the 


scarce  existing  water  sources. ^^  The 
largest  tract  in  these  areas  comprised 
a  part  of  the  Santa  Fe  National  Forest 
under  jurisdiction  of  the  Department 
of  Agriculture's  Forest  Service.  In  re- 
sponse to  Secretary  Stimson's  re- 
quest. Agriculture  Secretary  Claude 
Wickard  authorized  the  War  Depart- 
ment "to  occupy  and  use  for  so  long 
as  the  military  necessity  continues 
.  .  ."  an  area  of  some  45,667  acres. 
Colonel  Harman  and  the  Forest  Serv- 
ice's regional  forester  at  Albuquerque 
worked  out  the  details  of  the  transfer, 
including  administration  or  termina- 
tion of  any  rights  and  privileges 
granted  local  residents  and  provision 
for   management    and    fire   protection 


MDH,  Bk.  8,  \()l    1.  pp   7  11-7.12,  DASA. 


2^  Detailed  data  pertaining  to  the  water  supply 
problem  at  I.os  Alamos  can  be  found  in  Admin 
Files,  (kn  Clorresp.  671.1  (Water  Supplv),  VIDR. 


LOS  ALAMOS  SITE 
New  Mexico 

1943  -  1945 

Contour  Interval  In  feet 

0  2 

MILES 


MAP  5 


AND  ACQlISniON 


331 


of  the  forests.  Subsequently,  the  SWD 
Real  Estate  Branch  secured  several 
additional  small  tracts  of  public  land 
to  meet  the  project's  needs  for  a  25- 
mile  power  line  right  of  way,  bringing 
the  total  acquisition  at  Los  Alamos 
during  the  war  to  45,737  acres.  Final 
cost  of  all  property  at  Los  Alamos 
purchased  outright,  leased,  secured 
bv  easement,  and  otherwise  acquired 
dunng  the  war  was  $414,971.3° 

Hanford  Engineer  Works 

Although  the  District's  real  estate 
acquisition  program  in  south  central 
Washington  started  in  February  1943, 
adjudication  of  land  cases  resulting 
from  it  ran  on  for  many  months  after 
the  war  was  over.^^   Legal  complica- 


^°  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p.  129;  Groves,  Xow  It 
Can  Be  Told,  p.  67;  Memo,  Dudlev  to  (iroves,  sub: 
Cooperative  Arrangements  With  Other  Govt  Agen- 
cies, 13  Jan  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  380.01, 
MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  8.  Vol.  1,  pp.  2.7,  3.3-3.6,  5.15- 
5.21,  DASA;  CE  Constr  Div,  Map  of  Los  Alamos 
Demolition  Range,  6  Aug  43,  copy  in  ibid.,  App. 
A3,  DASA;  Ltrs,  Secy  War  to  Secy  Agri,  22  Mar  43, 
and  Secy  Agri  to  Secy  War,  8  Apr  43  (source  of 
quotation),  and  Memo  of  I'nderstanding  Between 
Harman  and  Frank  C-.  W.  Pooler  (Region  3  forester, 
Albuquerque),  22  Mar  43,  copies  in  ibid.,  Apps.  D2- 
D8  and  F,  DASA.  See  Ch.  XVIII  on  the  acquisition 
of  a  right  of  way  for  a  connection  with  the  Berna- 
lillo-Santa  Fe  line  of  the  New  Mexico  Power  Com- 
panv  and  SWD  map  of  power  transmission  line  in 
ibid,.  App.  5,  DASA. 

^^  For  detailed  accounts  of  land  acquisition  at 
Hanford  see  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  4,  DASA;  Du  Pont 
Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  pp.  11-13.  HOO;  Groves,  Xow 
It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  75-77;  I.tr,  Gavin  Hadden 
(Constr  Div,  OCE)  to  O'Brien,  sub:  Hist  of  Land 
Acquisition,  HEW,  30  Jul  45,  and  Incls,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  601  (Hanford),  MDR;  Ltr, 
Robins  (Act  Chief  of  Engrs)  to  CG  SOS,  sub:  Acqui- 
sition of  Land  for  Gable  Proj,  Pasco,  Wash.,  8  Feb 
43,  and  2d  Ind  (directive  approval),  Patterson  to 
Chief  of  Engrs,  9  Feb  43,  Incls  to  Memo,  O'Brien  to 
Ashbridge,  sub:  Land  Acquisition  in  (connection 
With  MD,  17  Apr  43,  MDR.  The  term  Cable,  men- 
tioned in  the  above  directive,  referred  to  one  of  the 
most  prominent  topographical  features  of  the  Han- 
ford site.  Gable  Mountain.  On  a{)j)roval  of  the  site 


tions,  unfavorable  publicity,  adminis- 
trative difficulties,  the  possibility  of 
congressional  inquiries,  and  the  usual 
local  opposition  all  threatened  to 
frustrate  the  combined  efforts  of  Gen- 
eral Groves  and  the  Hanford  Area 
Engineers  Office  and  CE  Real  Estate 
Branch  staffs.  Only  by  instituting  the 
most  vigorous  countermeasures,  both 
at  the  Hanford  Engineer  Works 
(HEW)  and  in  Washington,  D.C., 
were  they  able  to  prevent  serious 
delays  in  Du  Font's  construction  ac- 
tivities and  major  violations  of  project 
security. 

On  9  February,  Under  Secretary  of 
War  Patterson  approved  a  letter  di- 
rective (dated  8  February)  authorizing 
acquisition  of  more  than  400,000 
acres  at  the  Hanford  site.  {See  Map  4.) 
Shortly  thereafter,  the  PD  (Pacific  Di- 
vision) Real  Estate  Branch  established 
a  local  project  office,  designated  the 
HEW  Land  Acquisition  Office,  in 
Prosser,  county  seat  of  Benton 
County.  Branch  attorneys  immediately 
requested  an  order  of  possession 
from  the  U.S.  District  Court  for  the 
Eastern  District  of  Washington  State, 
Southern  Division,  and  District  Court 
Judge  Lewis  B.  Schwellenbach  on  the 
twenty-third  issued  the  order,  open- 
ing the  way  for  the  project  real  estate 
office  to  begin  collection  of  specific 
appraisal  data  and  to  gain  right  of 
entry  to  the  site.  Almost  all  of  the 
land  was  being  used  for  crops  or 
grazing.  More  than  88  percent  (about 


bv  Du  Pont  and  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  see 
Ltr,  Roger  Williams  (TNX  Div  chief,  Du  Pont)  to  Lt 
Col  Franklin  I.  Matthias  (Hanford  Area  Engr), 
2  Feb  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  601.1  (Han- 
ford), MDR,  and  Memo,  Complon  to  Maj  Arthur  V. 
Peterson  (Chicago  Area  Engr),  sub:  Safe  Distance  at 
Area  100,  1  Feb  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
600.12  (Projs  and  Prgms),  MDR. 


332 


MANHATIAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  IHE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


378,000  acres)  was  sagebrush  range 
land  interspersed  with  volcanic  out- 
croppings,  where  some  eighteen 
thousand  to  twenty  thousand  sheep 
grazed  during  winter  and  spring. 
Some  1 1  percent  (almost  49,000 
acres)  was  farmland,  much  of  it  irriga- 
ble but  not  all  under  cultivation.  Less 
than  1  percent  (under  2,000  acres) 
consisted  of  town  plots,  rights  of  way, 
school  sites,  cemeteries,  and  similarly 
used  land,  most  of  it  in  or  near  the 
three  small  communities  of  Richland, 
Hanford,  and  White  Bluffs. ^2 

More  than  one-third  of  the  Hanford 
area  was  government  owned:  federal 
government,  nearly  71,000  acres; 
Washington  State,  over  45,000  acres; 
and  five  local  counties  (Benton, 
Yakima,  Grant,  Franklin,  and  Adams), 
about  41,000  acres.  Railroad  compa- 
nies (chiefly  the  Chicago,  Milwaukee, 
St.  Paul  and  Pacific)  owned  almost 
46,000  acres.  More  than  225,000 
acres  belonged  to  private  individuals 
or  to  corporate  organizations,  includ- 
ing over  6,000  acres  owned  by  several 
irrigation  districts. 

The  overall  plan  called  for  division 
of  the  site  into  five  areas.  The  PD 
Real  Estate  Branch  chief  designated 
areas  A,  B,  C,  D,  and  E  in  accordance 


^2  Statistics  in  this  paragraph  and  the  one  that  fol- 
lows on  the  classification  and  utiHzation  of  land 
making  up  the  Hanford  site  have  been  drawn  from 
MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  4,  pp.  2.4-2.8,  3.1-3.3,  Apps.  A 
and  C,  DASA.  The  figures  cited  appear  to  be  based 
upon  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  various  sources  re- 
lating to  real  estate  acquisition,  including  Corps  of 
Engineers  maps,  the  real  estate  directives,  and  a 
summary  of  land  acquisition  issued  in  December 
1946.  Other  sources  consulted,  most  of  them  based 
on  data  collected  while  the  acquisition  program  was 
in  progress,  reveal  considerable  discrepancy  in  the 
statistics  given  for  ownership  and  utilization  of  the 
Hanford  area  in  1943  as  compared  with  the  data 
given  in  the  MDH.  See,  for  example,  OCK,  Basic 
Data  on  HEW,  Pasco,  Wash.,  19  May  43,  pp.  1-9, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  601.1   (Hanford),  MDR. 


with  their  anticipated  use  and  in  rela- 
tion to  how  they  would  be  ac- 
quired.^^  Area  A,  a  tract  averaging 
about  14  miles  in  diameter  at  the 
center  of  the  site,  would  be  the  loca- 
tion of  the  main  production  facilities 
and  would  be  purchased  outright  be- 
cause, for  safety  and  security,  all  per- 
sons not  involved  in  plant  operations 
would  eventually  have  to  be  cleared 
from  the  area.  Area  B,  a  safety  belt 
averaging  4  miles  in  width,  surround- 
ed Area  A  and  would  be  leased,  with 
any  owners  who  remained  on  it  sub- 
ject to  eviction  on  short  notice.  Area 
C,  two  narrowly  connected  parcels  in 
the  southeast  corner  of  the  site  con- 
stituting a  protective  zone  for  Rich- 
land, the  operating  village,  and  for 
the  nearby  support  installations  for 
the  plutonium  production  plants  in 
Area  D,  would  be  leased  or  purchased 
as  necessary.  Most  of  Area  D,  lying 
immediately  west  of  the  Columbia 
River  and  adjacent  to  the  village  site, 
would  be  purchased.  Finally  Area  E, 
two  small  appendages  athwart  the 
river  at  the  northwest  corner  of  the 
site  and  comprised  principally  of 
lands  in  an  irrigation  district,  would 
be  acquired  only  to  the  extent  nec- 
essary for  project  security  and 
operations. 

In  one  very  important  respect  the 
Hanford  acquisition  program  differed 
from     those     at     Clinton     and     Los 


^^  Analysis  of  the  plan  based  on  Ltr,  Robins  to 
CG  SOS,  sub:  Acquisition  of  Land  for  Gable  Proj, 
Pasco,  Wash.,  8  Feb  43,  Incl  to  Memo,  O'Brien  to 
Ashbridge,  17  Apr  43,  MDR;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be 
Told.  pp.  75-76;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  4,  p.  2.2  and 
App.  A  (maps),  DASA;  Memo,  Norman  G.  Fuller 
(Act  HEW  Real  Estate  Proj  Mgr)  to  Landowners  in 
Hanford  Engr  Proj,  23  May  43,  copy  in  ibid.,  App. 
Cll,  DASA;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  pp.  11- 
12,  HOO. 


LAND  ACQl'ISniON 


333 


Alamos.  PLxcept  for  procuicnicnl  of 
certain  Icey  tracts  rccjiiircd  for  prelimi- 
nary construction  activities,  the  PD 
Real  Estate  Branch  had  considerably 
more  time  in  which  to  acquire  the 
site.  In  February  1943,  research, 
design,  and  procurement  activities  for 
the  plutonium  production  facilities 
barely  had  begun,  and  both  the  Army 
and  Du  Pont  considered  large-scale 
construction  before  summertime 
highly  unlikely.  Ihis  meant  that  clear- 
ing construction  areas  would  not  have 
to  begin  for  a  period  of  nearly  six 
months.  Project  officials  therefore  de- 
cided to  follow  an  acquisition  proce- 
dure that  they  hoped  might  help  limit 
the  inevitable  rise  of  local  opposition. 
Branch  attorneys  delayed  issuance  of 
the  usual  declarations  of  taking,  while 
HEW  Land  Acquisition  Office  nego- 
tiators endeavored  to  secure  as  many 
tracts  as  possible  by  direct  purchase, 
the  procedures  for  which  had  been 
made  easier  in  January  as  a  result  of 
changes  in  the  regulations  authorizing 
higher  initial  payments  to  landowners. 
Both  Justice  Department  attorneys  as- 
signed to  the  acquisition  project  and 
HEW  officials  were  hopeful  that  the 
direct  purchase  procedure  would 
result  in  more  settlements  out  of 
court.  They  were  also  hopeful  that, 
because  direct  purchase  would  allow 
farmers  more  time  to  harvest  mature 
crops,  it  would  counter  the  public 
criticism  bound  to  arise  from  the  ap- 
parent adverse  effects  of  acquisition 
on  the  current  national  program  for 
production  of  more  "food  for 
victorv".^"* 


34MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  4.  pp.  4.2  and  ,5.1.  DASA; 
droves,  Xmv  ll  Can  Bi-  lold.  pp.  7(")-77;  Matthia.s 
Diarv,  12  Mar  4.S.  OROO. 


Bv  earlv  March,  the  HEW  Land  Ac- 
(juisition  Office  was  ready  to  com- 
mence with  site  acquisition.  In  coop- 
eration with  the  PD  Real  Estate 
Branch  and  the  Hanford  area  engi- 
neer, Lt.  Col.  Franklin  \ .  Matthias, 
the  office  hired  a  large  staff  of  ap- 
praisers and  negotiators  from  nearby 
states,  many  previously  employed  by 
the  Federal  Land  Bank  at  Spokane, 
and  in  April  opened  a  branch  office  at 
Richland  to  ensure  closer  liaison  with 
the  area  engineer's  staff  and  Du  Pont 
officials.  Matthias  kept  a  careful  eye 
on  the  office's  activities,  keeping  in 
close  touch  through  the  PD  Real 
Estate  Branch  liaison  officer  in  his 
headquarters.  He  worked  zealously 
for  more  efficient  management  of  the 
acquisition  process,  adherence  to 
proper  procedures  in  transfer  of  land 
to  the  area  office  before  occupancy  by 
Du  Pont  personnel,  and  just  treat- 
ment for  the  landowners.  Whenever 
practicable,  he  approved  the  requests 
from  those  individual  farmers  who 
had  to  vacate  but  who  wanted  to 
remain  on  their  farms  past  the  im- 
posed deadlines  so  that  they  could 
harvest  the  matured  crops. 

The  HEW  Land  Acquisition  Office 
acquired  the  first  tract  on  10  March 
1943.  During  the  spring  and  summer, 
acquisition  and  vacating  of  specified 
areas  progressed  reasonably  well,  al- 
though in  early  July  the  area  engineer 
had  to  arrange  for  court  eviction  of 
seven  holdout  landowners  whose  con- 
tinued presence  in  Area  A  threatened 
project  security  and  obstructed  land 
needed  immediately  by  Du  Pont.  In 
early  August,  General  Groves,  Colo- 
nel Matthias,  and  CE  Real  Estate 
Branch  officials  met  with  representa- 
tives  of  the  Justice   Department   and. 


334 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


seeking  to  avoid  prolonged  litiga- 
tions, agreed  upon  certain  changes  in 
acquisition  plans,  including  a  revision 
in  procedures  for  procuring  lands 
held  by  irrigation  districts. ^^ 

But  the  early  progress  was  decep- 
tive, and  the  holdout  and  irrigation 
district  litigation  problems  were 
straws  in  the  wind  of  rising  opposi- 
tion. After  two  of  the  irrigation  dis- 
tricts had  initiated  legal  steps  to 
secure  compensation  for  their  bonded 
indebtedness,  they  became  rallying 
points  for  other  dissatisfied  elements. 
United  in  a  common  cause,  the  pro- 
testers joined  together  to  complain 
that  the  government's  real  estate 
valuations  were  much  too  low  and  its 
advance  allowances  to  owners 
inadequate. ^^ 

The  crucial  point  of  disagreement 
between  the  Hanford  farmers  and 
project  appraisers  was  the  question  of 
how  much  compensation  the  land- 
owners should  receive  for  the  crops 
(cherries,  apples,  pears,  peaches,  and 
other  kinds  of  fruits,  as  well  as  aspar- 
agus, mint,  and  alfalfa)  on  their  land 
at     the     time     of    acquisition.     Many 


^^  Memos,  Matthias  to  Groves,  sub;  Crop  Control 
and  Disposal,  HEW,  21  Aug  43,  and  O'Brien  to 
Groves,  sub:  Revision  of  Boundaries  of  Area  A, 
3  Aug  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  601.1  (Han- 
ford), MDR;  Matthias  Diarv,  5  Jul  and  7  Aug  43, 
OROO. 

^^  Memo,  Hadden  to  Groves,  sub:  Rpt  on  Trip  to 
HEW  (21  Nov-4  Dec  44),  4  Dec  44,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  601.1  (Hanford),  MDR.  This  memo, 
with  its  accompanying  inclosures,  constituted  a  de- 
tailed report  on  the  historv  and  status  of  the  pro- 
gram. MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  4,  pp.  4.1-4.2,  DASA.  Res- 
olution of  John  Lindblad  Post  No.  71,  American 
Legion,  White  Bluffs,  Wash.,  21  Apr  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  601.1  (Hanford),  MDR.  Copies 
of  this  resolution,  which  was  typical  of  the  form  that 
protests  against  the  acquisition  took,  were  sent  to  all 
members  of  the  Washington  State  delegation  in 
Congress  and  to  the  national  headquarters  of  the 
American  Legion. 


owners  contended  that  if  they  were 
not  to  be  permitted  to  stay  on  their 
land  until  crops  could  be  harvested, 
they  should  be  compensated  for 
them,  as  well  as  for  the  land  itself. 
Because  the  growing  season  for  1943 
proved  to  be  one  of  the  most  bounti- 
ful on  record,  the  farmers'  claims 
were  greatly  strengthened.  By  late 
spring,  no  longer  able  to  ignore  the 
crop  question,  the  PD  Real  Estate 
Branch  agreed  to  a  proposal  made  by 
Justice  Department  attorneys  that  all 
tracts  not  yet  acquired  be  reappraised 
to  include  crop  values  at  the  date  of 
their  taking.  ^^ 

Project  security  and  construction 
requirements  made  necessary  the 
clearing  of  many  of  the  farms  before 
their  crops  could  be  harvested.  Fur- 
thermore, on  all  the  farms  eventually 
taken  over  by  the  project,  the  Han- 
ford area  engineer  had  to  provide  for 
continued  maintenance  of  the  or- 
chards and  the  preservation  of  the  ir- 
rigation systems.  For  this  purpose 
Matthias  was  able  to  work  out  ar- 
rangements for  bringing  prisoners 
from  the  McNeil  Island  Penitentiary,  a 
federal  institution  located  near 
Tacoma,  to  serve  as  a  semipermanent 
agricultural  work  force.  While  this 
saved  many  crops,  it  did  not  fully  pla- 
cate the  landowners'  frustration,  pri- 
marily because  the  government 
agency  supervising  the  prisoners,  the 
Federal  Prison  Industries,  had  no 
means  to  pay  the  owners  the  addi- 
tional compensation  many  hoped  to 
receive  as  a  result  of  the  exceptional 
abundance  of  the  harvest.^® 


^''  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  76-77:  MDH, 
Bk.  4,  Vol.  4,  pp.  4.20-4.21,  DASA. 

38  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  76-77;  MDH, 
Bk.  4,  Vol.  4,  pp.  4.2,  4.13,  and  4.20-4.21,  DASA; 

Conlinued 


LAND  ACQLISniON 


335 


Adding  to  the  discontent  were 
rumors  that  the  War  Department  was 
using  the  right  of  eminent  domain  for 
the  special  benefit  of  Du  Pont  and 
was  circulating  information  that  cast 
doubt  on  the  value  of  farmlands  in 
the  area.  News  of  controversy  over 
the  Hanford  acquisition  program 
reached  Washington  just  at  the  time 
the  administration  was  greatly  con- 
cerned about  the  likelihood  of  severe 
food  shortages  in  the  country.  In  re- 
sponse to  an  inquiry  from  the  Presi- 
dent, the  War  Department  replied 
that  the  Army  was  doing  everything 
possible  to  protect  agricultural  inter- 
ests at  Hanford  and  anticipated  sal- 
vaging more  than  three  quarters  of 
the  crops. ^^ 

The  Military  Policy  Committee, 
meeting  on  30  March,  discussed  the 
President's  concern  over  the  possible 
adverse  effects  of  the  Hanford  acqui- 
sition on  the  administration's  food 
production  campaign  and  decided  to 
address  the  issue.  Acting  on  behalf  of 
the  committee,  OSRD  Director  Van- 
nevar  Bush  shortly  thereafter  commu- 
nicated   with    Roosevelt    "as    to    the 

Matthias  Diarv,  30  Mar,  10  Juii,  7  Jul,  17  and  22 
Aug,  3  Sep  43,  OROO;  Memo,  Matthias  to  (irovcs, 
sub:  C^rop  Control  and  Disposal,  HKVV,  21  Aug  43, 
MDR:  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  4,  pp.  1348-49, 
HOO. 

^^  Memo,  Matthias  to  Ciroves,  sub:  Public  Mtg  in 
Which  Du  Pont  Participated,  23  Apr  43,  Admin 
Files,  (ien  Corresp,  600.1  (Constr-Hanford),  MDR; 
MDH,  Bk.  4,  \ol.  4,  pp.  4.23-4.24.  DASA;  Matthias 
Diarv,  1(3  Mar  and  27-28  Apr  43,  OROO;  Memo. 
Revbold  to  .Maj  (ien  Edwin  M.  Watson  (Mil  Aide  to 
Roosevelt),  sub:  (iable  Proj,  and  Ind  (draft  of  letter 
lor  President's  reply  to  letter  from  A.  ,S.  Cioss,  chair- 
man of  The  National  (irange),  8  Apr  43,  .\dmin 
Files.  Gen  Corresp.  601.1  (Hanford),  Mi:)R;  Croves 
Ms,  pp.  175-76,  CMH;  Bureau  of  the  Budget,  The 
United  Stales  at  War:  Development  and  Administration  of 
the  War  Program  oj  the  lederal  Viovernment  (Washing- 
ton, D.C.:  (Committee  of  Records  of  War  Adminis- 
tration No.  1 ,  War  Records  Section,  Bureau  of  the 
Budget,  1946),  pp.  324-2(")  and  36.5. 


need  for  so  much  land,  the  need  for 
taking  the  town  site  in  Richland  and 
the  effect  on  agriculture."  '*°  Bush  did 
not  succeed  in  ending  the  President's 
disquietude,  and  when  the  matter 
came  up  again  at  a  Cabinet  meeting 
on  17  June,  Roosevelt  raised  the 
question  as  to  whether  the  leaders  of 
the  atomic  bomb  project  might  not 
consider  moving  the  plutonium  pro- 
duction installation  to  another  site. 
The  President's  query  was  just  that, 
and  not  a  directive.  Political  consider- 
ations may  have  been  the  pressing 
motivation.  At  the  time,  the  Truman 
Committee,"*^  alerted  by  letters  from 
Hanford  area  residents,  was  making 
inquiries  to  the  War  Department  con- 
cerning the  government's  acquisition 
of  so  much  agricultural  land,  and  con- 
gressmen from  W'ashington  State 
were  channeling  the  complaints  they 
had  received  on  the  matter  to  both 
the  War  and  Justice  Departments. 
Faced  with  having  to  answer  to  the 
President,  Stimson  looked  to  the 
Manhattan  commander  for  an  expla- 
nation of  the  Hanford  situation.  Late 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  seventeenth. 
General  Groves  explained  to  the  Sec- 
retary that  representatives  of  Du  Pont 
and  Manhattan,  including  himself, 
had  weighed  most  carefully  the  fac- 
tors favoring  selection  of  Hanford 
and  concluded  that  it  was  the  only 
place  in  the  Ignited  States  "where  the 


"o  MPC  Min,  30  Mar  43,  OCG  Files.  Gen  Cor- 
resp, MP  Files,  Fldr  23.  1  ab  A,  MDR. 

'"  1  he  I  ruinan  (>)mmittee  was  a  special  commit- 
tee of  the  U.S.  Senate,  formed  in  1943  at  the  insti- 
gation of  Democratic  Senator  Harry  S.  Truman  of 
Missouri  to  investigate  the  conduct  of  the  national 
defense  program.  Ihe  committee  continued  its 
hearings  until  June  1948  under  the  successive  chair- 
manship of  Senators  I  rumaii,  James  M.  Mead,  and 
Owen  Brewster. 


336 


MANHATTAN:  1  HE  ARMY  AND  IHE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


work  could  be  done  so  well."  Reas- 
sured, Stimson  called  the  President 
and  "satisfied  his  anxiety."  ^^ 

Stimson's  assurance  to  the  Presi- 
dent by  no  means  ended  the  threat  of 
interference  in  the  project  by  other 
interested  agencies,  especially  Con- 
gress and  the  Department  of  Justice. 
When  Representative  Hal  Holmes, 
the  Republican  congressman  in  whose 
district  the  site  was  located,  had  re- 
quested information  from  the  War 
Department  about  the  project.  Groves 
directed  Colonel  Matthias  to  supply 
the  congressman  with  data  sufficient 
to  answer  questions  from  his  constitu- 
ents. After  conferring  with  Matthias, 
Holmes  agreed  to  cooperate  fully 
with  the  acquisition  program,  al- 
though he  emphasized  that  he  did  not 
wish  the  impression  to  be  given  to 
local  landowners  that  he  favored  loca- 
tion of  the  project  at  Hanford.  While 
he  frequently  interceded  thereafter 
with  Matthias  and  the  War  Depart- 
ment on  behalf  of  his  constituents  in 
the  Hanford  area,  Holmes  abided  by 
his  pledge  of  cooperation  with 
Manhattan. ^^ 

Washington's  junior  senator,  Mon 
C.  Wallgren,  a  Democrat,  proved  to 
be  more  of  a  problem.  In  April  1943, 
he  forwarded  to  the  Department  of 
Justice  correspondence  that  he  had 
received  from  an  attorney  represent- 
ing a  group  of  dissatisfied  Hanford 
landowners.  This  correspondence,  as 
Wallgren  undoubtedly  knew  it  would. 


*^  Stimson  Diar\  (source  of  quotation),  17  Jun  43, 
HLS;  Groves  Diarv,  17  Jun  43,  LRG;  Ltr^  Hugh 
Fulton  (Truman  Gommiltee  chief  counsel)  to  Julius 
M.  Amberg  (Spec  Asst  lo  Secy  War),  15  Jun  43,  in 
Senate  Gommiiiee  Investigating  Natl  Del  Prgm,  Ord 
Plants  Recs,  Ord  Kstaljlishment,  Hanford  Ord 
Plants.  USS. 

"Matthias  Diarv,  5  and  8-9  Mar,  21  Apr,  3-4  Aug 
43,  OROO. 


came  to  the  attention  of  Norman  M. 
Littell,  assistant  attorney  general  in 
charge  of  the  Lands  Division,  the  sec- 
tion of  the  Justice  Department  re- 
sponsible for  prosecution  of  all  court 
cases  arising  from  War  Department 
condemnation  procedures  in  land  ac- 
quisition projects.  Littell,  who  had 
practiced  law  in  Seattle  before  his  ap- 
pointment to  the  Justice  Department 
in  1940,  was  currently  interested  in 
promoting  enactment  of  a  bill  he  had 
drafted  "that  would  provide  for 
speedy  and  summary  notice  in  pro- 
ceedings to  condemn  property  for 
war  purposes,  and  to  accelerate  distri- 
bution of  deposits  and  awards  to  per- 
sons entitled  thereto  in  such 
cases.  .  .   ."  '*'* 

Littell  used  the  opportunity  to  pro- 
mote support  among  members  of  the 
Washington  State  congressional  dele- 
gation for  his  bill,  which  Harry  F. 
Byrd  of  Virginia  had  introduced  into 
the  Senate  on  7  April.  On  the  twenty- 
sixth,  he  sent  a  long  letter  to  all 
members  of  the  delegation,  giving  ex- 
tensive details  about  the  Hanford  ac- 
quisition and  expressing  skepticism 
that  the  War  Department  could  keep 
the  project  secret  in  view  of  the 
public  character  of  condemnation 
proceedings.  Littell  also  enclosed  a 
copy  of  his  bill,  outlining  reasons  why 
it  should  be  enacted.  Lhe  Military 
Policv  Committee  considered  the  se- 


■*■' Quotation  from  title  of  S.  975.  Congressional 
Record.  78th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  7  Apr  43,  Vol.  89, 
Pt.  3,  p.  3029.  For  details  on  Littell's  pre- 1940  ac- 
tivities see  the  biographical  sketch  in  Who's  Who  in 
Amenra.  194.6-47,  Vol.  24,  pp.  141(5-17,  and  Memo, 
MD  Intel  and  Scty  Div  to  OIG,  sub:  Littell's  Request 
for  Delay  in  Setting  Hanford  (.ondemnation  Gases 
lo  Permit  Reappraisal,  10  Nov  44,  .Admin  Files, 
(ien  Gorresp,  601,1  (Hanford),  MDR.  I'his  memo 
was,  in  fact,  the  intelligence  report  Lansdale  submit- 
ted to  Groves. 


LAND  ACQUISniON 


337 


curity  aspects  of  Litlcll's  letter  but  ac- 
ceded to  a  request  from  General 
Styer,  who  undoubtedly  was  express- 
ing Groves's  wishes,  "that  in  view  of 
the  general  situation  no  action  be 
taken  on  the  matter."  '^^ 

A  short  time  later  the  Truman 
Committee,  of  which  Wallgren  was  a 
member,  exhibited  an  interest  in  the 
Hanford  acquisition,  which  Littell  well 
may  have  encouraged.  In  early  June, 
the  committee  sent  inquiries  to  the 
president  of  Du  Pont  and  to  Julius  M. 
Amberg,  special  assistant  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  War.  Amberg  was  asked  to 
supply  the  committee  with  data  on 
"the  factors  governing  the  choice  of 
this  location,  the  estimated  cost  of  the 
project,  the  status  of  construction  at 
present,  and  [with]  suitable  comment 
with  respect  to  the  need  for  such  an 
extensive  tract  of  farm  land."  *^  Re- 
sponding to  these  inquiries.  General 
Groves,  Harvey  Bundy,  Stimson's  as- 
sistant, and  Brig.  Gen.  Wilton  B.  Per- 
sons, the  War  Department's  congres- 
sional liaison  officer,  reached  agree- 
ment that  the  Secretary  of  War 
should  request  Senator  Truman  to 
eliminate  Hanford  from  his  investiga- 
tion for  reasons  of  military  security. 
Truman  heard  from  Stimson  on  the 
seventeenth  and,  with  the  understand- 
ing that  the  Secretary  would  assume 
full  responsibility  for  project  activ- 
ities, agreed  to  stop  further 
investigation.*"^ 


"Ltrs.  Littell  to  Wallgren  and  to  Holmes,  both 
26  Apr  43,  Admin  Piles,  Gen  Corresp,  601.1  (Han- 
ford), MDR;  MFC:  Min  (source  of  quotation),  5  Mav 
43,  MDR. 

"^Ltr,  Fulton  to  Amberg,  1,5  Jun  43,  USS. 

■•'Ltr,  Rudolph  Halley  (Fulton's  Ex  Asst)  to 
Walter  ,S.  Carpenter,  Jr.  (Du  Pont  president),  8  Jun 
43;  Outline  of  |  Proposed]  Felecon  with  Sen 
Iruman,  1  1  Jun  43;  Memo,  Bundv  to  .Secv  War, 
1  1    Jun  43,  and  attached   note  bearing  initials   FCH 


In  preparation  for  the  condemna- 
tion trials  scheduled  for  early  fall, 
Colonel  Matthias  arranged  a  meeting 
with  Judge  Schwellenbach  and  Justice 
Department  officials  on  27  August  in 
Spokane.  Participants  included,  be- 
sides the  area  engineer  and  Schwel- 
lenbach, representatives  of  the  CE 
Real  Estate  Branch  and  Department 
of  Justice  lawyers  assigned  to  pros- 
ecute the  cases.  The  group  discussed 
a  number  of  problems,  including  the 
possibility  of  arranging  for  partial 
payments  to  landowners  and  giving 
the  Justice  Department  attorneys 
more  authority  to  increase  appraised 
values  in  pretrial  conferences.  Appar- 
ently no  firm  agreement  was  reached 
on  either  of  these  matters,  but  Mat- 
thias found  the  meeting  with  Judge 
Schwellenbach  worthwhile,  "as  it 
cleared  up  a  number  of  misunder- 
standings concerning  the  Judge's  phi- 
losophy and  the  decisions  which  he 
had  been  making  in  connection  with 
the  project."  Following  the  meeting, 
the  HEW  Land  Acquisition  Office 
also  sought  permission  from  authori- 
ties in  Washington,  D.C.,  to  increase 
allowances  for  a  large  number  of 
tracts  still  in  litigation. ^^ 

In  October,  the  first  condemnation 
trial  by  jury  began  at  Yakima,  and  ad- 
ditional cases  followed  at  regular  in- 
tervals through  the  winter  season, 
until  early  March  1944.  Complying 
with  the  regular  court  procedure  in 
Washington  State,  the  selected  jury 
for  each  case  visited  the  Hanford  site 


(Miss  Neaiv),  17  Jun  43.  All  m  HB  Files,  Fldr  62, 
MDR.  See  also  Ltrs,  Carpenter  to  Halley,  14  Jun  43, 
and  Amberg  to  Halley,  24  Jun  43,  I'SS;  Groves 
Diaiv,  11  Jun  43,  FRG;  Stimson  Diarv,  17  Jun  43, 
Hi.S. 

"*  Matthias    Diarv,    27    (source   of    cjuotation)    and 
31   Aug  43,  OROO. 


338 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


to  inspect  the  particular  tract(s)  under 
adjudication  before  the  trial  proceed- 
ing. The  trial  results  indicate  that  the 
juries  found  the  landowners'  claims  to 
be  just  and  that  they  consistently 
awarded  payments  greatly  in  excess  of 
project  appraisals.  An  official  observ- 
er for  the  project  attributed  the 
higher  payments  to  a  general  rise  in 
land  values  in  the  months  since  the 
appraisals  had  been  made,  to  the  pre- 
vailing local  prejudice  against  Federal 
Land  Bank  appraisers,  and  to  the 
widely  held  belief  that  the  project 
had  no  connection  with  the  war 
emergency."*® 

While  the  Army  opposed  excessive 
payments  to  the  owners,  of  greater 
concern  was  the  slow  progress  of  land 
acquisition  during  the  trials.  Settle- 
ments on  more  than  1,200  tracts  aver- 
aged no  more  than  seven  cases  per 
month.  If  this  slow  pace  continued. 
Groves  feared  the  essential  secrecy  of 
the  project  would  be  jeopardized,  be- 
cause of  jury  inspections  in  areas 
where  construction  was  beginning 
and  the  inevitable  public  attention  fo- 
cused on  the  trials.  As  a  way  of 
speeding  up  the  process,  he  arranged 
with  the  Justice  Department  for  the 
assignment  of  more  judges  and  re- 
quested an  end  to  jury  inspections. ^° 

On  24  April  1944,  General  Groves, 
Colonel  Matthias,  and  CE  Real  Estate 
Branch  officials  conferred  with  Assist- 


"^Memo,  Matthias  to  OCE  (Attn:  Groves),  sub: 
Real  Estate  Appraisals,  18  Oct  43;  Rpt,  sub:  Results 
of  Trials — HEW  (no  date  and,  although  no  signa- 
ture, appears  to  have  been  prepared  by  the  HEW 
Land  Acquisition  Office  at  Prosser  for  the  Office  of 
the  Division  Engineer,  Seattle,  Wash.).  Both  in 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  601.1  (Hanford),  MDR. 
Matthias  Diary,  1  Nov  43,  OROO. 

^"Memo,  Groves  to  Revbold  and  to  CG  ASF,  sub: 
HEW,  23  Mar  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  601.1 
(Hanford),  MDR. 


ant  Attorney  General  Littell  in  a 
meeting  at  Yakima,  arranged  by  Army 
Service  Forces  commander,  Lt.  Gen. 
Brehon  B.  Somervell,  at  Groves's  in- 
stigation. They  agreed  that  the  Justice 
Department  special  attorney  and  the 
HEW  Land  Acquisition  Office  manag- 
er together  could  make  adjustments 
in  the  appraised  value  of  tracts  to  fa- 
cilitate settlement  of  cases  out  of 
court.  They  also  detailed  the  special 
attorney  and  the  manager  to  work  out 
means  for  closer  coordination  be- 
tween the  project  real  estate  office 
and  Justice  Department  officials  in 
Yakima.  Finally,  Littell  assented  to  es- 
tablishment of  a  second  court  and  ad- 
ditional judges. ^^ 

LInder  Secretary  of  War  Patterson 
made  the  formal  request  for  addition- 
al judges  to  Attorney  General  Francis 
Biddle,  who  agreed  to  the  plan  as 
worked  out  by  Littell  and  Groves.  Pat- 
terson pointed  out  to  Biddle  that 
soon,  because  of  security  require- 
ments, the  Army  could  no  longer 
permit  jury  inspections  of  tracts.  In 
late  May,  Littell  informed  Patterson 
that  he  had  arranged  for  extra  judges 
and,  provided  the  Under  Secretary 
could  expedite  the  securing  of  parts 
needed  for  the  Yakima  courtroom  air 
conditioning    system,    that    the    trials 

would  continue  through  June  and 
July.^2 

In  spite  of  these  efforts  to  speed  up 
the    acquisition    process,    the    results 


^'Ibid.  Colonel  O'Brien,  chief  of  the  CE  Real 
Estate  Branch,  refers  to  the  memorandums  of  un- 
derstanding in  a  letter  to  Littell,  13  May  44,  same 
files.  Matthias  Diarv,  24  Apr  44,  OROO. 

"Ltrs,  Und  Secy  War  to  Biddle,  2  Mav  44,  and 
Biddle  to  Und  Secv  War,  10  Mav  44,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  601.1  (Hanford),  MDR;  1  elg,  Littell 
to  Und  Secv  War,  24  Mav  44.  HB  Files,  Fldr  80, 
MDR;  MDH;  Bk.  4,  X'ol.  4,  p.  4.4,  IX\SA. 


LAND  ACQlHSn  ION 


339 


were  disappointing.  Toward  the  end 
of  the  summer  Littell  seems  to  have 
decided  that  fauhy  War  Department 
appraisal  work  was  at  the  root  of  the 
acquisition  difficulties  at  Hanford. 
Consequently,  he  directed  an  experi- 
enced appraiser  on  his  own  staff  to 
make  a  sample  reappraisal  of  some  of 
the  more  than  700  tracts  remaining 
unsettled.  According  to  Littell,  the 
appraiser  found  many  cases  of  "inad- 
equate and  faulty  appraisal  work."  ^^ 

After  a  conference  with  Patterson 
on  1  September,  Littell  took  another 
step,  apparently  on  his  own  initiative, 
to  expedite  the  condemnation  trials. 
He  appointed  C.  U.  Landrum  as  a 
special  assistant  to  the  U.S.  attorney 
to  conduct  those  cases  coming  up  for 
trial  in  September.  Littell  described 
Landrum  as  "one  of  the  outstanding 
trial  lawyers  of  the  country  .  .  .  ," 
but,  at  the  same  time,  emphasized 
that  Landrum's  assignment  was  not  to 
be  interpreted  as  an  indication  that 
the  previously  assigned  special  attor- 
ney had  not  done  a  good  job  in  the 
earlier  cases.  Verdicts  in  the  Septem- 
ber trials,  however,  were  even  less 
satisfactory  than  those  handed  down 
in  the  preceding  cases.  Juries  awarded 
payments  to  landowners  that  consti- 
tuted an  even  greater  percentage  of 
increase  over  original  government  ap- 
praisals than  those  previously  grant- 
ed. In  some  instances,  the  payments 
were  higher  than  the  largest  amounts 


demanded  by  attorneys  for  the 
owners.  ^"^ 

At  this  juncture,  Littell  wrote  di- 
rectly to  Patterson,  outlining  the  un- 
favorable trend  in  the  recent  trials. 
"It  has  been  clear  for  some  time  that 
either  the  appraisals  of  the  War  De- 
partment were  too  low  or  the  jury 
verdicts  on  the  trial  of  condemnation 
cases  were  too  high.  ...  I  am  having 
a  further  and  more  extensive  recheck 
[made]  of  valuations  in  this  project 
and  will  be  guided  by  the  outcome  of 
this  work  in  the  disposal  of  future 
cases  in  the  Hanford  Project."  In 
reply,  General  Groves  and  CE  Real 
Estate  Branch  officials  prepared  a  de- 
fense of  the  Army's  role  in  the  acqui- 
sition at  Hanford  for  the  attention  of 
Attorney  General  Biddle;  however, 
before  it  was  dispatched,  Littell  took 
direct  action. ^^ 

On  13  October,  in  Washington  to 
participate  in  the  Democratic  cam- 
paign for  the  1944  presidential  elec- 
tion, Littell  suddenly  appeared  before 
the  district  court  in  Yakima  and  made 
a  request  to  Judge  Schwellenbach  that 
no  more  condemnation  cases  be 
brought  to  trial  until  the  Justice  De- 
partment had  an  opportunity  to  reap- 
praise all  tracts  upon  which  suits  were 
pending.  Although  Groves  had  been 
alerted  to  the  fact  that  Littell  was 
making  a  trip  to  the  Hanford  area,  his 
appearance  before  the  court  came  as 
a  complete  surprise  to  project  officials 


^^Ltr  (source  ol  quotation),  Littt-ll  to  Ind  Secy 
War,  28  Sep  44;  Draft  Memo,  Groves  to  I'nd  Secy 
War,  sub:  HEW,  13  Oct  44.  Both  in  Admin  Files, 
(.en  Corresp,  601.1  (Hanford),  MDR;  MDH  .  Bk.  4, 
\ol.  4,  pp.  4.14.  5.2,  App.  Bl,  DASA;  Matthias 
Diarv,  24  Nov  44,  OROO. 


^''Ltr  (source  of  quotation),  I.ittell  to  Und  Secv 
War,  28  Sep  44,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  4,  pp.  4.4- 
4.5,  DASA. 

"I.tr  (source  of  quotation),  Littell  to  Und  Secy 
War,  28  Sep  44,  MDR;  Draft  Memo.  Groves  to  Und 
Secy  War,  sub:  HEW,  13  Oct  44,  and  attached  Draft 
Etr,  Und  Secy  War  to  Atty  Gen,  MDR  (memo  and 
letter  never  dispatched);  Gloves  Diarv.  11-13  Oct 
44,  ERG. 


340 


MANHA  riAN:    IHE  ARMY  AND    IHE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


and  Schwellenbach,  none  of  whom 
had  been  notified  of  his  intentions. 
Littell  reviewed  the  history  of  the 
land  acquisition  at  Hanford,  criticiz- 
ing the  War  Department  for  the 
piecemeal  fashion  in  which  it  had 
taken  possession  of  many  of  the 
tracts.  This  practice,  he  asserted, 
caused  confusion  and  resentment 
among  the  owners  so  that  an  unusual- 
ly large  proportion  of  the  cases  had 
to  be  brought  to  trial  for  settlement. 
He  reiterated  that  the  major  cause  of 
difficulty  was  the  inadequate  appraisal 
work  by  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  a 
fact  uncovered  by  his  own  appraisal 
expert  during  an  investigation.  He 
promised  Judge  Schwellenbach  that 
he  would  expedite  reappraisals  and 
settlements  at  once,  optimistically 
predicting  that  a  majority  of  cases 
would  be  ready  for  final  settlement 
within  a  month.  Schwellenbach  stated 
that  he  had  not  anticipated  Littell's 
motion  but  would  take  it  under 
advisement. ^^ 

Littell's  remarks  before  the  district 
court  received  wide  publicity  in  area 
newspapers,  which  played  up  the  ob- 
vious political  overtones  of  his  state- 
ment. The  local  press  also  published 
a  considerable  number  of  editorials 
and  letters  from  readers,  as  well  as 
additional  reports  on  the  condemna- 
tion cases,  during  the  latter  part  of 
October  and  earlv  November,  and  a 


56  Memo.  MD  Intel  and  Sctv  Div  to  QIC,  sub:  Lit- 
tell's Request  for  Delav  in  Setting  Hanford  Con- 
demnation erases  To  Permit  Reappraisal,  10  No\  44, 
MDR.  Newspaper  stories  reporting  Littell's  state- 
ment to  the  court  were  published  in  two  Spokane 
dailies  on  14  Oct  44:  the  Spokesman- Review  and  the 
Daih  Chronicle.  Copies  in  Adiniii  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
601.1  (Hanford),  MDR.  See  also  MDH,  Bk.  4. 
Vol.  4.  pp.  4.14-4.15,  D.ASA;  Matthias  Diarv,  14 
Oct  44,  OROO,  Groves  Diarv,  I  1  Oct  44,  LRC;. 


major  news  service  picked  up  at  least 
one  story. ^"^ 

Groves,  who  was  not  informed  of 
Littell's  court  appearance  until  16  Oc- 
tober, saw  the  action  as  "obviously  in- 
compatible with  essential  military  se- 
curity, the  need  for  which  had  been 
carefully  explained  to  him  [LittellJ. 
His  statement  to  the  court  has  result- 
ed in  a  considerable  amount  of  unde- 
sirable publicity  concerning  a  project 
which  the  President  has  personally  di- 
rected should  be  blanketed  with  the 
utmost  secrecy."  A  further  unfortu- 
nate aspect  of  the  incident.  Groves 
noted,  was  that  it  gave  the  public  the 
false  impression  that  the  War  and  Jus- 
tice Departments  were  at  odds  on 
land  acquisition  policies,  when,  in  re- 
ality, any  differences  that  arose  could 
be  quickly  settled  by  conference,  as 
had  been  done  at  Yakima  for  the 
Hanford  project  in  April  1944.^® 

Groves,  now  determined  to  take  de- 
cisive action,  worked  closely  with  CE 
Real  Estate  Branch  officials  and  Julius 
Amberg  in  preparing  a  new  statement 
of  the  War  Department's  position, 
w  hich  Under  Secretary  of  War  Patter- 
son sent  to  Attornev  General  Biddle 


5^  Memo,  MD  Intel  and  Sctv  Div  to  OIC,  sub:  Lit- 
tell's Request  for  Delay  in  Setting  Hanford  Con- 
demnation Cases  To  Permit  Reappraisal,  10  Nov  44, 
MDR:  Msgs,  Matthias  to  Dist  Kngr,  Attn:  Lt  C^ol 
William  B.  Parsons  (Intel  and  Sctv  Div  chicO. 
20  and  24  Oct  44;  Msgs,  Matthias  to  Wash  Liaison 
Office  and  Dist  Engr,  Attn:  Lansdale  and  Parsons, 
1-3  Nov  44;  Memo,  Maj  Claude  C.  Pierce,  Jr.  (Wash 
Liaison  Oflice)  to  Groves,  sub:  Editorial  in  Spoks- 
man's  \sic\  Review.  2  Nov  44.  All  in  Admin  Files,  Cien 
Coiresp,  601.1  (Hanford),  MDR.  Fhis  file  also  con- 
tains copies  of  many  of  the  stories  appearing  in  the 
local  press. 

58  Ltr  (source  of  quotation),  I'nd  Secy  War  to 
Attv  Gen  (prepared  for  Patterson's  signature  by 
Ciroves  and  the  CE  Real  Estate  Br),  7  Nov  44, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  601.1  (Hanford),  MDR; 
Groves  Diarv,  16  Oct  44,  LRG. 


LAM)  Ac:(^i  isnioN 


341 


on  7  November.  This  stalcnicnl  em- 
phasized Litlell's  utter  disregard  of 
essential  security  and  the  one-sided 
character  of  much  of  his  criticism  of 
appraisal  policies.  It  pointed  out  fur- 
ther that  the  War  Department  consist- 
ently had  tried  to  cooperate  with  the 
Department  of  Justice  and  therefore 
could  see  no  justification  for  Litlell's 
"public  airing  of  alleged  differences 
between  the  Departments  in  contra- 
vention of  expressed  executive 
policy."  At  the  same  time.  Groves 
launched  a  thoroughgoing  investiga- 
tion of  the  Littell  incident  and  its 
aftermath  of  publicity.  He  sent  his 
staff  security  officer,  Lt.  Col.  John 
Lansdale,  Jr.,  to  the  Hanford  area  to 
survey  the  situation.  Lansdale  submit- 
ted a  comprehensive  intelligence 
report  to  Groves  on  10  November 
and  took  measures  to  curb  newspaper 
publicity,  particularly  by  Justice  De- 
partment special  attorneys. ^^ 

On  21  November,  Groves  dis- 
patched a  special  three-man  investiga- 
tion team  to  Hanford.  Heading  the 
team  was  Gavin  Hadden,  a  long-time 
civil  employee  in  the  Engineers'  Con- 


^^  Ltr  (source  of  quotation),  I'nd  Secy  War  to 
Attv  (}en,  7  Nov  44,  and  covering  Memo,  (irovcs  to 
t'nd  Secy  War,  2  Nov  44.  Both  in  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  601.1  (Hanford),  MDR.  Copies  of  the 
letter  are  also  in  HB  Files,  Fldrs  51  and  80,  MDR. 
Memo,  Patterson  to  Roosevelt,  9  Dec  44,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  51,  MDR,  indicates  that  a  copy  of  the  7  Nov  44 
letter  was  sent  to  the  President  on  that  date.  Memo, 
Amberg  to  I'nd  Secy  War,  sub;  Condemnation  Pro- 
ceedings With  Respect  to  HEW  Land,  7  Oct  44.  HB 
Files,  Fldr  51,  MDR.  Groves  Diarv,  16,  19.  23  Oct 
and  3,  4,  6  Nov  44,  LRG.  Msg,  Matthias  to  Wash  Li- 
aison Office  and  Dist  Fngr,  1  Nov  44;  Background 
Paper  (no  title  or  signature,  but  probably  written  in 
Groves's  olFice  as  preparation  for  the  7  Nov  44 
letter  to  Atty  Gen  Biddle),  3  Nov  44;  Memo,  MD 
Intel  and  Scty  Di\,  Littell's  Request  for  Delav  in  Set- 
ling  Hanford  Condemnation  Cases  Fo  Permit  Reap- 
praisal, 10  Nov  44.  All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
601.1  (Hanford),  MDR. 


struction  Division  whom  (iroves  had 
used  on  previous  occasions  as  a  trou- 
bleshooter.  The  team's  instructions 
were  to  secure  "a  firsthand  knowl- 
edge of  conditions  which  influenced 
the  problems  of  acquisition  of  Real 
Estate  at  .  .  .  [the  Hanford  site]  from 
February  1943  to  date."  ^°  Vet  before 
Hadden  could  submit  a  preliminary 
report,  developments  in  the  Justice 
Department  contributed  substantially 
to  resolving  the  acquisition  problems 
at  Hanford.  A  feud  of  long-standing 
between  Biddle  and  Littell  over  ad- 
ministration of  the  Lands  Division 
had  culminated  on  the  eighteenth 
with  the  Attorney  General's  formal 
request  that  Littell  resign.  Instead  of 
resigning  promptly,  however,  Littell 
procrastinated  and  took  advantage  of 
his  delay  to  submit  to  the  Mead  (for- 
merly Truman)  Committee  a  list  of 
grievances  against  Biddle,  expressly 
charging  maladministration  of  certain 
land  cases.  Finally,  when  Littell  ig- 
nored a  second  request  for  his  resig- 
nation on  the  twenty-second,  the 
Attorney  General  solicited  the  direct 
assistance  of  President  Roosevelt  to 
remove  Littell  from  office,  which  oc- 
curred on  the  twenty-sixth.  At  the 
same  time,  Biddle  dissuaded  the 
Mead  Committee  from  taking  further 
interest  in  the  controversy.  Littell 
thus  was  prevented  from  making  po- 
litical capital  out  of  his  charge  that  he 
had  been  dismissed  for  testifying 
before  the  Senate  committee,  and  fur- 
ther congressional  inquiries  into  War 
Department  land  policies,  which  un- 
doubtedly   would    have    exposed    the 


®°  Memo,  Hadden  to  (iroves,  sub:  Rpl  on  I  rip  to 
HEW,  4  Dec  44,  MDR. 


342 


MANHAIIAN:  IHE  ARMY  AND  THE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


Hanford  project  to  widespread  pub- 
licity, were  avoided.®^ 

With  the  departure  of  Littell  there 
was  a  rapid  return  to  normal  relations 
between  the  War  Department  and  De- 
partment of  Justice  in  the  land  acqui- 
sition program  at  Hanford.  The  secu- 
rity problem  posed  by  the  legal  right 
of  juries  to  inspect  properties  in  liti- 
gation was  resolved  in  negotiations 
between  Judge  Schwellenbach  and 
Colonel  Matthias  in  March  1945. 
Henceforth,  juries  would  be  denied 
the  right  to  inspect  tracts  subject  to 
acquisition,  because  visits  to  the 
project  site  would  be  personally 
hazardous.®^ 

By  spring  of  1945,  settlement  of 
those  cases  where  outright  purchase 
of  land  was  necessary  again  attained 
an  average  rate  of  more  than  one 
hundred  each  month  and  continued 
at  this  pace  until  the  end  of  the  war 
in  Europe  in  May  brought  a  general 
slowing  down  of  all  acquisition  activi- 


®'The  main  developments  in  the  Littell-Biddle 
controversy  may  be  traced  in  the  following  docu- 
ments: Memo,  Littell  to  Charles  Fahy  (Act  Atty 
Gen),  21  Aug  44;  Ltr,  Fahy  (I'.S.  Solicitor  (;cn)  to 
Mead,  1  Jan  45;  Ltr,  Littell  to  Rudolph  Halley 
(Mead  Committee  chief  counsel),  21  Nov  44  (which 
contains  Littell's  statement  to  the  Yakima  District 
Court  concerning  Hanford  land  cases);  Memo,  Lit- 
tell to  Mead  Committee,  sub:  Issues  Between  Biddle 
and  Littell  .  ...  21  Nov  44;  Ltr,  Biddle  to  Mead, 
27  Nov  44;  Ltr,  Littell  to  Mead,  30  Nov  44;  Press 
Release,  Mead  Committee,  29  Nov  44;  Atty  Gen's 
Statement  to  Senate  Committee  on  Immigration, 
9  Dec  44  (in  which  Biddle  further  defended  his  dis- 
missal of  Littell);  Memo,  Sen  Harley  M.  Kilgore 
(Mead  Committee  member),  4  Dec  44;  Ltr,  Littell  to 
Mead  Committee,  sub:  Answering  Biddies  9  Dec  44 
Statement  Re  Reasons  for  Requesting  Writer's  Res- 
ignation as  Asst  Atty  Gen,  8  Jan  45;  Mead's  State- 
ment to  L'.S.  Senate,  6  Dec  44.  All  in  Senate  C.om- 
mittee  Investigating  the  Natl  Def  Prgm,  Minor  In- 
vestigations, Subject  File,  Norman  Littell  Controver- 
sy, USS.  See  also  \ew  York  Tunes.  30  Nov  44; 
Spoke.sman-Revifw.  1  Dec  44;  Groves  Diary,  23  Nov 
44,  LRG. 

62  Matthias  Diarv,  16  Mar  45,  OROO. 


ties.  Vhe  land  acquisition  program  at 
Hanford  remained  uncompleted  at 
the  end  of  December  1946,  when  the 
Army  transferred  control  of  the  Man- 
hattan Project  to  the  newly  created  ci- 
vilian agency,  the  United  States 
Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Total 
cost  of  real  estate  secured  at  Hanford 
by  direct  purchase  and  condemnation 
procedures  up  to  that  time  had 
amounted  to  more  than  $5  million. ^^ 

Other  Sites 

Land  acquisition  was  not  a  major 
activity  at  the  many  other  sites  occu- 
pied by  Manhattan  Project  facilities. 
In  most  cases  where  acquisition  was 
necessary,  the  Army  usually  was  not 
as  directly  involved  as  at  the  Clinton, 
Hanford,  and  Los  Alamos  sites,  al- 
though on  occasion  the  local  area  en- 
gineer or  the  CE  Real  Estate  Branch 
provided  key  assistance  to  project 
contractors  seeking  more  land  for 
their  operations.  Generally  speaking, 
the  major  research  and  development 
programs  located  at  universities  em- 
ployed existing  facilities  and  expand- 
ed them  on  land  already  available  on 
the  campus  or  in  nearby  areas.  This 
was  true  of  most  of  the  University  of 
Chicago  facilities  for  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory,  although,  for  reasons  of 
safety  and  security,  the  Army  assisted 
the  university  in  acquiring  use  of  a 
small  site  in  the  forest  preserve  south- 
west of  the  city  for  the  Argonne  Lab- 
oratorv.  1  he  Universitv  of  California, 


63MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  4,  pp.  5.2-5.4,  6.1-6.4,  7.1- 
7.2,  Apps.  B1-B2,  DASA.  Cost  figures  are  based  on 
Military  Acquisition  Reports,  CR  Form  5  and  FNG 
Form  ioiO,  28  Feb  43  to  15  Dec  46,  and  on  Land 
Acquisition  Summarv  as  of  31  Dec  46,  cited  in  ibid., 
Apps.  ElO-Ell,  IMSA. 


LAND  ACQlIISri  ION 


343 


operating  under  an  OSRD  contract, 
had  acquired  an  8.3-acre  tract  2  miles 
north  of  the  Berkeley  campus  as  the 
site  of  most  Radiation  Laboratory  ac- 
tivities. Other  research  centers,  such 
as  the  SAM  Laboratories  at  Columbia 
University  and  the  Ames  project  at 
Iowa  State  College,  used  existing  fa- 
cilities and  leased  needed  additional 
space  adjacent  to  their  campuses.  P'or 
the  three  heavy  water  plants  built  in 
the  United  States  at  the  Morgantown, 
Wabash  River,  and  Alabama  Ord- 
nance Works,  the  Army's  Ordnance 
Department  made  available  land  al- 
ready previously  acquired  for  muni- 
tions facilities.  In  the  case  of  the  Trail 
heavy  water  plant  in  Canada,  the  War 
Department  leased  an  area  of  less 
than  an  acre  from  the  operating  con- 
tractor. Similarly,  at  the  many  other 
places  where  the  atomic  bomb  pro- 
gram sponsored  activities  of  some 
type,  the  project  or  its  contractors  ac- 
quired use  of  whatever  land  and  fa- 
cilities were  necessary  to  their 
operations.^"* 


For  the  more  than  500,000  acres  of 
land  that  the  Manhattan  Project  pur- 
chased, leased,  rented,  or  otherwise 
acquired  during  W'orld  W^ar  II,  it  paid 
out  a  sum  of  about  $7.5  million. 
There  were  no  major  instances  where 
failure  to  acquire  land  seriously  de- 
layed progress  of  the  bomb  project, 
primarily  because  of  the  vigorous  and 
alert  administrative  actions  on  the 
part  of  General  Groves  and  a  great 
many  Manhattan  District  and  Corps 
of  Engineers  real  estate  staff  members 
and,  when  needed,  the  strong  support 
from  Secretary  Stimson  and  other  key 
War  Department  officials.  Their  co- 
ordinated and  effective  efforts  directly 
contributed  to  the  Army's  achieve- 
ment of  the  essential  goal  of  its  land 
program:  rapid  acquisition  of  needed 
areas  without  compromising  project 
security. 


***  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  "Auxiliary  Activities,"  pp. 
11.3-11.5;  Bk.  2,  X'ol.  2,  "Research,"  pp.  2.1-2.5 
and   11.1-11.2;  Bk.  3,  "the  P-9  Project,"  pp.  3.3, 


3.11,  3.13,  3.15;  Bk.  4,  Vol.  1,  "General  Features," 
p.  2.4  and  App.  B3;  Bk.  4,  Vol.  2,  "Research,"  pp. 
2.6  and  2.8;  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2  "Research,"  pp.  2.7-2.8, 
DASA.  See  C>h.  V  (Argonne  I.ab  and  heavy  water 
plants);  Ch.  VI  (Rad  Lab);  Ch.  VII  (SAM  Labs);  and 
Ch.  IX  (Met  Lab). 


CHAPTER  XVI 


Manpower  Procurement 


The  Manhattan  Project  in  its  man- 
power requirements  and  problems,  as 
in  so  many  other  respects,  was  unique 
among  wartime  programs.  Its  work 
force,  for  example,  was  notable  for  its 
great  diversity,  running  the  gamut 
from  completely  unskilled  manual  la- 
borers to  the  most  highly  trained  sci- 
entists and  technicians  from  all  parts 
of  the  United  States  and  from 
Canada,  Great  Britain,  and  many 
other  countries.  While  the  majority  of 
its  employees  were  civilians,  repre- 
sentatives from  all  the  military  serv- 
ices were  assigned  to  it.  And  in  terms 
of  total  number  of  workers  employed, 
Manhattan  was  one  of  the  single  larg- 
est wartime  enterprises. 

Less  than  two  years  after  the  Army 
took  over  active  administration  of  the 
project,  Manhattan  was  employing 
nearly  129,000  persons  in  its  various 
operations.  This  peak  figure,  reached 
at  the  end  of  June  1944  when  con- 
struction activity  on  the  fissionable 
materials  production  plants  was  at  a 
height,  included  contractor  employ- 
ment of  84,500  construction  workers 
and  40,500  operating  employees.  In 
addition,  there  were  slightly  fewer 
than  1,800  military  personnel  as- 
signed to  the  project  and  an  equal 
number  of  civil  service  employees.  Al- 
though construction  activity  gradually 


declined  after  the  summer  of  1944, 
total  employment  on  the  atomic 
project  would  continue  at  more  than 
100,000  into  the  summer  of  1945, 
with  military  personnel  reaching  a 
peak  of  about  5,600  in  the  fall  of  that 
year.^ 

In  recruiting  and  holding  this  vast 
work  force,  especially  during  the 
midwar  period  when  competition  for 
manpower  from  other  important  war- 
time programs  was  intense,  Manhat- 
tan had  to  contend  with  a  number  of 
serious  difficulties.  Many  of  the  skills 
the  atomic  project  required  were  in 
chronic  short  supply;  location  of  the 
major  production  plants  in  relatively 
remote  areas  with  limited  housing,  in- 
adequate transportation,  and  sparse 
population  compounded  existing 
manpower  procurement  obstacles; 
and  the  increasingly  stringent  require- 
ments of  the  Selective  Service  System 
threatened  to  take  away  virtually  irre- 
placeable technically  trained  workers 
at  the  most  critical  juncture  in  project 
operations.  Even  Manhattan's  eventu- 
al attainment  of  the  highest  priority 
among  wartime  programs  recruiting 
personnel    with    scarce   skills    did    not 


'  MDH,  Bk.  1.  \'ol.  8,  "Personnel,"  pp.  1.1-1.2 
and  Apps.  Al,  A  1.1,  A13  (Chart,  Mil  Personnel 
Strength,  MD,  Jul  42-Dec  46),  IMSA. 


MANPOWER  PROCAREMENT 


345 


completely  compensate  for  the  many 
problems. 2 

The  Manhattan  Project,  as  other 
World  War  II  employers,  operated  in 
general  compliance  with  existing 
labor  laws,  regulations,  and  policies, 
modified  in  certain  instances  to  meet 
the  exigencies  of  wartime  conditions. 
Among  those  most  affecting  the  pro- 
gram were  the  Davis-Bacon  Act,  the 
Convict  Labor  Law,  the  Eight-Hour 
Law,  the  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act, 
the  National  Labor  Relations  Act,  the 
Selective  Training  and  Service  Act, 
the  Building  and  Construction  Irades 
Wage  Stabilization  Agreement,  and 
the  "Little  Steel"  Formula.  There 
were  also  the  various  modifications  of 
these  basic  statutes  and  regulations 
embodied  in  executive  orders  and  en- 
gineer directives.  The  single  most  im- 
portant modifying  factor  in  the 
project's  adherence  to  existing  man- 
power laws  and  regulations  was  its  re- 
quirement for  the  most  rigid  security 
in  all  of  its  operations.  Thus,  for  ex- 
ample, the  Manhattan  District  placed 
strict  limitations  on  union  activities, 
established  special  grievance  proce- 
dures in  lieu  of  public  hearings  by  the 
National  Labor  Relations  Board,  and 
provided  its  own  internal  administra- 
tion of  the  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act.^ 


2  Ibid.,  pp.  1.1-1.2,  DASA;  Memo,  Groves  lo  t'nd 
Sec  War,  sub:  MDs  Labor  Problems,  1  Nov  43,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  80,  MDR;  (;roves,  A'ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp. 
98-101;  Llr,  Arthur  I..  Hughes  (Personnel  Dir,  Los 
Alamos  Lab)  to  .Samuel  I .  Arnold  (MI)  (".onsultanl 
for  lech  Personnel),  15  Jan  44,  Admin  Files,  Cien 
Corresp,  201  (Gen),  MDR.  Ihe  subject  of  the  letter 
concerned  the  effect  of  the  changes  in  the  Selective 
Service  regulations  on  the  laboratorv's  scientific 
staff. 

'For  an  analvsis  ol  applicable  statutes,  regula- 
tions, and  policies  relating  to  manpower  in  World 
War  II  see  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8,  App.  Bl,  DASA.  For 
an  example  of  a  District  modification  of  an  existing 
policy  on  grievance  procedures  see  Ltr,  Dist  Kngr  to 


Ferso/mel  Organization 

Until  mid- 1942,  Manhattan's  man- 
power problems  were  limited  primari- 
ly to  recruiting  scientific  and  technical 
personnel.  The  National  Research 
Council,  under  its  contract  with  the 
National  Defense  Research  Commit- 
tee (NDRC),  had  established  the 
Office  of  Scientific  Personnel  in  the 
spring  of  1941,  primarily  to  assist 
those  wartime  programs  requiring  sci- 
entifically trained  persons.  But  as  the 
demand  rapidly  increased,  more  dras- 
tic measures  were  needed  to  ensure 
an  efficient  and  equitable  employ- 
ment of  scientific  manpower.  Accord- 
ingly, Vannevar  Bush,  as  head  of  the 
Office  of  Scientific  Research  and  De- 
velopment (OSRD),  had  appointed 
the  Committee  on  Scientific  Person- 
nel. This  committee,  which  held  its 
first  meeting  in  June  1942,  not  only 
recommended  measures  for  securing 
scientific  personnel  but  also  actively 
assisted  OSRD  contractors  in  such 
matters  as  determining  proper  rates 
of  compensation  for  scientific  employ- 
ees, securing  deferments  from  mili- 
tary service  for  them,  and  recruiting 
additional  scientists.'* 

The  decision  to  proceed  with  con- 
struction of  the  production  plants 
brought  a  major  change  in  the  atomic 
program's  manpower  requirements. 
Henceforth,  the  emphasis  became  one 
of  fulfilling  requirements  for  a  com- 
plex industrial  enterprise.  Project  re- 
cruiters now  had  to  procure  many 
engineers  and  technicians,  tens  of 
thousands    of    skilled    and    unskilled 


All  Operating  Contractors,  CEW,  27  Sep  44,  copy 
m  ibid,  App.  B 11,  DASA. 

"Stewart,  Organizing  Siientifu   Resmidi  for  War.   pp. 
256-57. 


346 


MANHATTAN:  1  HE  ARMY  AND  THE  AEOMIC  BOMB 


workers  from  the  ranks  of  American 
labor,  and  the  additional  administra- 
tive personnel,  both  civilian  and  mili- 
tary, requisite  to  managing  the  far- 
flung  activities  of  this  vast  new  army 
of  atomic  employees.^ 

The  Army  continued  the  OSRD 
practice  of  delegating  most  recruit- 
ment activities  to  project  contractors. 
Generally  speaking,  Manhattan  re- 
cruited only  the  District  headquarters 
staff  of  specialists,  whose  primary  role 
in  manpower  procurement  was  to 
assist  project  contractors  and  the 
hundreds  of  firms  that  supplied  es- 
sential equipment  and  services  to  the 
project.  The  District  personnel  staff 
devoted  considerable  time  to  such 
measures  as  wage  adjustments  and 
improvement  of  working  conditions 
that  contributed  to  procurement  and 
maintenance  of  an  adequate  work 
force.  More  often  than  not  the  Dis- 
trict's role  was  to  serve  as  the  liaison 
channel  through  which  project  con- 
tractors and  suppliers  could  commu- 
nicate with  various  governmental 
agencies,  with  labor  unions,  and  with 
other  wartime  organizations  that 
could  provide  assistance  in  the  solu- 
tion of  manpower  problems.^ 

Under  the  original  organization  of 
the  district  engineer's  office,  various 
personnel  activities  were  distributed 
among  several  divisions.  (See  Chart  1.) 
The  Military  Personnel  Section,  which 
also  carried  on  liaison  with  the  Selec- 
tive Service,  constituted  a  part  of  the 
District's  Administrative  Division.  1  he 


^Snivth  Reporl.  p.  8!^;  Memo,  Bush  to  C.onant. 
sub:  lube-  Allovs  Pigm,  19  Jun  42.  HB  Filt-s,  Fldr  6. 
MDR. 

^Marshall  Diary.  19  and  27  Jun  42,  (XXi  Files, 
(.en  (.orresp,  Ciroves  Files,  Misc  Rccs  Sec,  behind 
Fldr  3,  MDR;  Ciroves,  Sow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  12-1  .'5; 
DSM  Chronologv,  26  Sep  42,  .Set.  15(b),  OROO. 


Labor  Relations  Section,  which  was 
concerned  mostly  with  wage  and 
salary  schedules,  formed  part  of  the 
Service  and  Control  Division  and  op- 
erated in  combination  with  the  Safety- 
Accident  Prevention  Section.  Other 
departments  administered  routine 
personnel  matters.  Personnel  prob- 
lems from  area  engineers  in  the  field 
were  similarly  distributed  to  the  ap- 
propriate headquarters  office  for 
disposition.^ 

Following  the  move  of  the  Manhat- 
tan District  headquarters  from  New 
York  to  Oak  Ridge  in  August  1943, 
the  district  engineer  took  steps  to 
centralize  the  administration  of  many 
functions,  including  those  relating  to 
manpower.  {See  Chart  2.)  He  shifted 
the  Military  Personnel  Section,  in- 
cluding its  Selective  Service  functions, 
from  the  Administrative  to  the  Service 
and  Control  Division.  This  left  the 
Administrative  Division  with  supervi- 
sion chiefly  over  civil  service  and 
other  civilian  personnel  of  the  District 
and  of  the  Clinton  Engineer  Works 
(the  District  headquarters  had  ab- 
sorbed most  functions  of  the  Clinton 
Area  Engineers  Office  when  it  moved 
to  Oak  Ridge).  Finally,  in  P^ebruary 
1944,  the  district  engineer  created  a 
separate  Personnel  Division,  placing 
in  it  all  those  manpower  functions 
hitherto  carried  out  by  the  Service 
and  Control  Division.  To  provide 
more  assistance  to  area  engineers  and 
contractors  as  manpower  problems 
reached  a  peak,  both  the  Selective 
Service  and  the  Labor  Relations  Sec- 
tions of  the  new  Personnel  Division 
opened    field    offices    in    New    York, 


'MDH,  Bk.  1,  \()1.  8,  App.  A2,  DASA;  Org  Chart. 
t'.S.  Engrs  OfFue,  Ml),  Aug  43,  Admin  Files.  Gen 
Corresp',  020  (MFD-Org).  MDR. 


MANPOWKR  PROClRKMKNr 


347 


Chicago,  and  Oak  Ridge,  and  at 
Pasco,  Washington,  near  the  Hanfoid 
Engineer  Works. ^ 

Organizational  arrangements  at 
field  installations  did  not  conform  to 
any  set  pattern.  PLach  area  engineer  or 
post  commander  set  up  the  type  of 
organization  required  for  the  kind  of 
personnel  needed  to  perform  the 
work  in  progress  at  his  installation.  At 
the  Hanford  Engineer  Works,  for  ex- 
ample, where  manpower  require- 
ments resembled  those  at  the  Clinton 
Engineer  Works,  the  area  engineer 
established  an  organization  similar  to 
that  in  Oak  Ridge.  A  large  labor  rela- 
tions section  worked  in  close  coordi- 
nation with  Du  Pont  and  local  labor 
officials  in  the  recruitment  and  em- 
ployment of  thousands  of  construc- 
tion and  production  workers.  A  small- 
er personnel  section  dealt  with  prob- 
lems relating  to  employees  of  the  area 
engineer's  office.^ 

At  the  Los  Alamos  Laboratory  and 
the  University  of  Chicago's  Metallur- 
gical Laboratory,  the  work  force  con- 
sisted primarily  of  civilian  scientists 
and  technicians  employed  under  uni- 
versity contracts,  a  few  civil  service 
employees,  some  military  personnel, 
and  a  varying  number  of  workers 
brought  in  by  construction  and  serv- 
ice contractors.  Because  there  were 
no  large  production  plants  at  either 
site,  labor  relations  with  construction 
and  production  workers  constituted 
only  a  minor  administrative  problem. 
At  Los  Alamos,  which  the  Army  ad- 
ministered as  a  military  post,  the  post 
commander  established  a  small   civil- 


ian personnel  section  in  his  adminis- 
trative office  to  deal  with  nonmilitary 
manpower  problems  and  to  assist 
J.  Robert  Oppenheimer,  the  civilian 
project  cfirector,  in  recruiting  scien- 
tists, technicians,  and  otfier  special- 
ists. At  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory, 
manpower  problems  were  similar  to 
those  at  Los  Alamos,  except  that 
there  were  fewer  military  personnel. 
Ihe  area  engineer  for  the  laboratory 
designated  the  personnel  staff  in  his 
office  as  the  Deferments  Branch, 
which  was  indicative  of  its  primary 
function.  ^° 

Neither  the  district  engineer  nor 
the  area  engineers  by  themselves 
could  solve  some  of  the  most  crucial 
manpower  problems.  Procurement  of 
industrial  workers  with  scarce  skills, 
recruitment  of  scientific  and  technical 
specialists,  and  obtaining  deferments 
for  key  personnel  were  examples  of 
manpower  problems  so  vitally  related 
to  the  entire  war  effort  that  they 
could  not  be  adequately  dealt  with 
except  through  officials  who  con- 
trolled the  nationwide  recruitment 
and  employment  of  manpower.  Con- 
sequently, General  Groves  made  his 
personal  headquarters  in  Washington, 
D.C.,  available  as  a  liaison  point 
through  which  project  personnel  offi- 
cials at  District  headquarters  and  in 
the  field  installations  could  channel 
manpower  problems  to  appropriate 
Washington  officials  or  agencies. 
More  often  than  not,  the  Manhattan 
commander  himself  would  take  the 
initial  steps.  ^^ 


»Org  Charts,  I'.S.  Engrs  OIIkc.  MI),  Aug  4:{-I..n 
45,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk  1,  Xol.  8.  p|>  1.4-1.5  and  .\pp. 
A3.  DASA. 

niDH,  Bk.  4,  \ol.  5,  •Construction."  pp.  4.1- 
4.26.  12.3-12.4,  App.  B57,  DASA. 


'"Ibid.,  \'ol.  2,  "Research,"  pp.  7.1-7.3  and 
Apps.  B5  and  B8,  and  Bk.  8,  \ol.  1,  "(ieneral," 
Apps.  B2  and  B3,  DA.SA. 

' '  For  examples  of  Croves's  Irccjueni  personal  in- 
volvement in  manpower  procurement  prcjblems  see 

(!<>iilinued 


348 


MANHAITAN:    1  HE  ARMY  AND    IHE  AIOMIC  BOMB 


General  Groves  was  able  to  deal  ef- 
fectively with  the  problems  of  wartime 
manpower  without  building  up  a  com- 
plex organization  in  his  own  office 
because  he  could  secure  assistance 
whenever  he  needed  it  from  manpow- 
er specialists  in  the  Office  of  the 
Under  Secretary  of  War,  the  Army 
Service  P'orces'  (ASF)  Industrial  Per- 
sonnel Division,  and  the  Office  of  the 
Chief  of  Engineers  (OCE).  Also,  in 
matters  pertaining  to  military  person- 
nel, he  could  channel  project  requests 
directly  to  Lt.  Gen.  Brehon  B.  Somer- 
vell, the  ASF  commander.  P^urther- 
more,  through  these  various  War  De- 
partment channels  Groves  had  ready 
access  to  union  leaders,  manpower  of- 
ficials in  federal  agencies,  and  others 
who  controlled  important  elements  of 
the  country's  manpower  pool.^^ 

Manpower  procurement  activities  of 
the  atomic  project  generally  fell  into 
three  major  categories:  the  quest  for 
scientific  and  technical  personnel,  na- 
tionwide recruitment  of  industrial 
labor,  and  securing  military  and  civil- 
ian administrative  personnel.  Each 
aspect  of  manpower  procurement 
presented  its  own  special  problems 
and  the  Army  administrators  of  the 
project  would  devote  a  considerable 
amount  of  time  and  energy  to  their 
resolution.  ^^ 

correspondence  in  HB  Files.  Fldr  80,  MDR.  and  Ltr, 
Tolman  to  Ciroves,  26  Jul  43,  Admin  Files,  Oen 
Corresp,  231.2  (Physicists),  MDR. 

12  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  99-101;  Ltr, 
Marshall  to  Robins,  16  Nov  42,  Admin  Files,  (kn 
Corresp,  231.2,  MDR.  Typical  examples  of  (iroves's 
employment  of  manpower  specialists  in  the  Under 
Secretary  of  War's  office  to  expedite  solution  of 
personnel  problems  on  the  Manhattan  Project  ma\ 
be  found  in  HB  Files,  Fldrs  51,  79,  and  80,  MDR. 

13MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  pp.  2.1-2.2  and  7.1-7.2, 
DASA. 


Scientific  and  Technical  Personnel 

P^ven  though  there  was  a  decrease 
in  research  and  development  activities 
after  mid- 1942,  the  need  for  more  sci- 
entists and  technicians  did  not  decline 
proportionately.  Because  of  the  highly 
technical  and  unusual  character  of  the 
laboratory-devised  methods  for  pro- 
ducing fissionable  materials,  the  firms 
engaged  in  building  the  production 
plants  had  to  rely  upon  the  project's 
research  organizations  for  the  techno- 
logical knowledge  to  design,  engi- 
neer, test,  and  operate  the  plants.  Not 
only  did  these  research  organizations 
have  to  solve  many  crucial  technical 
problems  of  plant  construction  and 
operation,  they  also  had  to  supply 
from  their  own  staffs  on  a  more  or 
less  permanent  basis  many  of  the  ex- 
perts who  supervised  the  equipping 
and  operation  of  the  plants.^'* 

hi  addition  to  maintaining  the  staffs 
of  these  existing  research  organiza- 
tions at  a  reasonable  level  of  efficien- 
cy during  1943,  Manhattan  recruiters 
had  to  find  scientists  and  technicians 
to  staff  an  entire  new  research  and 
development  center  operating  under 
a  University  of  California  contract, 
the  Los  Alamos  Laboratory  in  New- 
Mexico.  At  the  peak  of  its  activities  in 
1945,  this  installation  required  more 
than  seven  hundred  scientifically 
trained  persons  on  its  staff.  While 
many  of  the  division  and  group  lead- 
ers came  from  the  project's  other  re- 
search organizations,  many  of  the 
technicians   and  junior   scientists   and 


'■*See    Chs.    \I-1\.    Sec    also    C^omplon,    Alomu 
Qjtnl.  pp.  170-74  and  184-85. 


MANPOWER  PROCLRKMKM 


349 


sonic  of  the  most  iniporlant  senior 
personnel  were  newly  recruiled.^'' 

By  1943  junior  scientists,  typically 
graduate  students  with  little  or  no 
practical  experience,  were  about  the 
only  available  scientifically  educated 
manpower,  and  many  of  them  were 
subject  to  the  draft.  In  (act,  a  large 
number  of  the  young  scientists  who 
came  to  work  for  the  project  after 
1943  were  already  in  uniform  or, 
shortly  after  joining  the  atomic  pro- 
gram, were  called  into  service  and  as- 
signed to  the  project's  Special  Engi- 
neer Detachment.  ^^ 

During  the  OSRD's  administration, 
each  research  and  development  orga- 
nization had  recruited  its  personnel 
with  assistance  and  guidance  from  the 
OSRD's  Committee  on  Scientific  Per- 
sonnel. The  Army  continued  essen- 
tially the  same  policy,  with  General 
Groves  and  the  project's  Washington 
Liaison  Office  replacing  the  Commit- 
tee on  Scientific  Personnel  as  the 
chief  channel  throtigh  which  the  di- 
rectors of  Manhattan's  research  orga- 
nizations could  obtain  assistance  in 
difficult  cases.  The  Manhattan  com- 
mander, for  example,  often  inter- 
vened directly  with  government  or 
academic  manpower  officials  to 
ensure  an  adequate  staff  for  the  new 
Los    Alamos    Laboratory,    or    to    aid 


J^MDH.  Bk.  8.  Vol.  2,  "Technical  (Project  V  His- 
tory)."  App.  (iiaph  No.  2,  DASA;  I.tr,  Groves  to 
Bush.  20  .Apr  44,  .Admin  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  231.2 
(Scientists).  MDR:  Memo,  Maj  I'eer  de  .Silva  (Mil 
Intel  Br  chief,  I>os  .Alamos  I.ab)  to  (iroves,  sub:  Pro- 
curement of  .Scientific  Personnel,  27  Sep  44.  .\dmm 
Files,  (;en  Gorresp.  201  (Gen).  MDR. 

>6MDH.  Bk.  8.  \ol.  2.  p.  III. 17,  DASA.  On  pro- 
curement oi  scientists  from  other  wariime  projects 
see  .MDR,  HB  Files.  Fldr  24.  correspondence  relat- 
ing to  radar  specialist  Norman  F.  Ramsev,  and  I.tr, 
Styer  to  W.  M.  Peirce  (New  jersev  Zinc  Go.,  Palmer- 
ion.  Pa.),  probablv  Sep  4.3.  MI).  1942-4.5.  Somervell 
Desk  File.  ASF. 


Manhattan  contractors  in  obtaining 
technical  personnel.  Because  most 
personnel  in  these  categories  already 
were  employed  on  other  important 
wariime  projects.  Groves  frequently 
had  to  seek  assistance  at  the  highest 
levels  to  secure  their  transfer  to  the 
Manhattan  Project. ^^ 

One  method  that  proved  to  be 
most  effective  was  a  direct  communi- 
cation— usually  a  letter — from  Groves 
to  the  appropriate  university  adminis- 
trator, corporation  president,  or  gov- 
ernment agency  head,  pointing  out 
the  vital  character  of  the  atomic  pro- 
gram and  requesting  the  release  or 
loan  of  scientists  to  the  Manhattan 
Project.  In  other  instances.  Groves 
enlisted  the  aid  of  OSRD  Director 
\'annevar  Bush  or  Harvey  Bundy, 
special  assistant  to  Secretary  Stimson, 
and,  through  Bundy,  of  the  Secretary 
himself.  Stimson,  for  example,  was  in- 
strumental in  recruiting  Norman  F. 
Ramsey,  the  radar  specialist  who 
helped  design  the  atomic  bomb.^® 


'^I.lr.  Oppenheimer  to  Isidor  I.  Rabi  (Rad  I,ab, 
Mil  ),  26  Feb  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  161 
(t'niv  of  GaliO,  MDR.  See  also  Grovcs's  letters  in 
.Admin  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  231.2  (Scientists).  MDR. 

'*  Numerous  examples  of  the  extensive  corre- 
spondence by  Groves  and  others  on  the  procure- 
ment of  scientists  for  the  Manhattan  stafT  are  in 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  231.2  (Scientists),  MDR. 
On  the  recruiting  of  Ramsev  see  HB  Files,  Fldr  24, 
MDR,  for  .Memo,  Fdward  L.  Bowles  (consultant  to 
Secy  War)  to  Bundy,  sub:  Dr.  Norman  F.  Ramsey, 
12  jun  43;  Memo,  Groves  to  Bundy.  sub:  Need  for 
Dr.  Norman  F.  Ramsev,  5  Jul  43;  Memos,  Bundv  to 
Bowles,  7  Jul  and  19  Aug  43;  Memo,  Bundv  to  Scc\ 
War,  10  Sep  43;  Memo  for  File,  unsigned  (probabh 
Bundv),  14  Sep  43.  Sec  MD,  1942-45,  Somervell 
Desk  File,  .ASF,  for  Memos,  Stver  to  Groves,  18  and 
23  Sep  43.  In  the  same  file  is  General  Siver's  corre- 
spondence on  the  recruitment  of  scientists  alreadv 
in  militarv  service.  See  Memo,  Styer  to  Brig  Gen 
Joseph  N.  Dalton  (.Act  Ghief  of  Staff,  Personnel. 
SOS),  9  Feb  43;  Memo,  Groves  to  Stver,  sub:  .As- 
sigmncni    of  Gapl    O.    H.    Gieager.    GWS.    lo    MD. 


350 


MANHAI  I  AN:  IHE  ARMY  AND  IHE  AIOMIC  BOMB 


Groves  also  turned  often  to  his 
military  and  scientific  advisers.  Both 
Maj.  Gen.  Wilhelm  D.  Styer  and  Rear 
Adm.  William  R.  Purnell  of  the  Mili- 
tary Policy  Committee  assisted  in  se- 
curing scientists  and  technicians  in 
active  military  service.  Richard  C. 
Tolman  and  James  B.  Conant  were 
instrumental  in  procuring  a  number 
of  key  scientists  for  the  Los  Alamos 
project.  Tolman  drew  up  for  Groves  a 
comprehensive  list  of  all  atomic  scien- 
tists in  the  United  States  and  had 
them  rated  by  scientists  already  as- 
signed to  the  atomic  project  as  to 
their  ability,  experience,  qualities  of 
leadership,  and  availability.  Conant 
played  an  important  part  in  persuad- 
ing George  B.  Kistiakowsky,  an  explo- 
sives expert  on  the  NDRC  staff,  to 
leave  this  position  for  one  at  Los 
Alamos  and  then  in  assisting  him  to 
secure  additional  scientists  for  his  im- 
plosion research  team  at  the  labora- 
tory. Supplementing  the  efforts  of 
Tolman  and  Conant  was  Dean 
Samuel  T.  Arnold  of  Brown  Univer- 
sity, a  chemist  by  training,  engaged 
in  1943  as  a  consultant  to  recruit 
technical  personnel  at  educational 
institutions.^^ 

9  Feb  43;  Memo,  (".roves  (for  Rcvbold)  to  Slvei, 
sub:  Transfer  of  2d  Lt  Rollin  D'Arcv  Morse,  5  Mar 
43. 

'^  On  Kistiakowsky  see  I.trs,  Capt  William  S.  Par- 
sons (Ord  Div  chief,  Los  Alamos  Lab)  to  ("-onant. 
19  Feb  44.  Groves  to  Bush,  20  Apr  44,  and  Kistia- 
kowsky to  (iroves,  1  May  44,  Admin  Files,  Oen  Cor- 
resp,  231.2  (Scientists),  MDR.  On  other  aspects  of 
the  program  to  recruit  scientists  see  Memo,  Parsons 
to  Li  Col  Whitnev  Ashbridge  (CO,  Los  Alamos 
Lab),  23  Jun  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  620 
(Santa  Fe),  MDR,  and  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew 
World,  p.  247.  Two  versions  of  Folman's  list  appear 
in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MDR:  the  first,  undat- 
ed (probablv  Jul  43),  is  in  201  (Gen);  the  second, 
Incl  to  Ltr,  Tolman  to  Groves,  26  Jul  43,  is  in  231.2 
(Phvsicists).  On  Dean  Arnold  see  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol. 
8,  p.  2.3,  DASA. 


By  late  1944,  the  Manhattan  Project 
was  employing  virtually  all  available 
specially  trained  personnel.  Hence, 
the  only  solution  to  answering  the 
specific  needs  of  the  various  project 
installations  was  to  transfer  scientists 
from  one  area  to  another  area  of  the 
atomic  program.  For  example,  when 
Oppenheimer  requested  approximate- 
ly fifty  scientists  holding  a  doctor  of 
philosophy  degree  in  physics,  or  its 
equivalent,  to  staff  a  major  new  divi- 
sion at  the  laboratory,  he  suggested 
that  this  number  was  available  in  the 
Metallurgical  Project,  serving  as 
standby  crews  for  the  Hanford  plant. 
After  consultations  with  Metallurgical 
Project  Director  Arthur  Compton, 
Groves  directed  him  to  release  the 
fifty  physicists  from  his  program.  By 
December  1944,  Compton  had  com- 
plied, but  only  by  placing  on  a  virtual 
standby  all  research  and  development 
activities  related  to  physics  at  the 
Clinton,  Argonne,  and  Metallurgical 
laboratories.  ^° 

Industrial  Labor 

As  in  the  procurement  of  scientific 
and  technical  personnel,  the  Manhat- 
tan Project  employed  a  variety  of 
methods  and  drew  upon  many 
sources  in  recruiting  both  skilled  and 
unskilled  labor.  For  assistance  in  pro- 
curing skilled  construction  workers 
and  some  maintenance  personnel 
(carpenters,    bricklayers,    electricians, 


^"Memo,  de  Silva  to  Groves,  sub:  Procurement  of 
Scientific  Personnel,  27  Sep  44;  Llrs,  Groves  to 
Compton,  31  Oct  44,  and  Compton  to  Groves, 
7  Dec  44.  All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201 
(Gen),  MDR.  See  also  Ltr,  Compton  to  Groves,  sub: 
Transfer  of  Physicists  to  Proj  Y,  6  Oct  44,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  230.35  (Changes  of  Station  and 
Transfer),  MDR. 


MANPOWER  PROCLREMKNI 


351 


pipe  fitters,  mechanics,  and  related 
trades),  Manhattan  turned  to  the 
unions  comprising  the  Building  and 
Construction  Trades  Department  of 
the  American  Federation  of  Labor. 
For  unskilled  or  common  labor  and 
some  semiskilled  personnel  (cafeteria 
employees,  plant  operation  trainees, 
and  similar  job  categories),  it  depend- 
ed primarily  upon  recruiters  hired  by 
project  contractors  or  by  the  Army, 
who  followed  regular  routes  estab- 
lished by  the  War  Manpower  Com- 
mission in  their  search  for  available 
workers.  Supplementing  these  recruit- 
ers, but  a  far  less  productive  source, 
were  the  offices  of  the  United  States 
Employment  Service  in  each  impor- 
tant employment  center.  Finally,  for 
much  of  the  manpower  that  super- 
vised work  forces  for  both  plant  con- 
struction and  operation,  the  project 
relied  upon  personnel  furnished  di- 
rectly by  the  major  contractors.^^ 

Manhattan's  multifaceted  and  far- 
ranging  quest  for  workers  was  neces- 
sary because,  by  1943,  when  the 
project  was  beginning  its  large-scale 
procurement  of  construction  labor, 
the  nation  had  used  up  the  large  pool 
of  unemployed  carried  over  from  the 
Depression  and  was  experiencing  an 
actual  labor  shortage.  Project  recruit- 
ers had  anticipated  problems  at  the 
Hanford  Engineer  Works  because  it 
was  located  in  Region  XII  of  the  War 


='MI)H.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8,  pp.  2.2-2.5,  DASA.  For 
specific  accounts  of  contractor  participation  in  labor 
recruitment  see  Completion  Rpt,  Du  Pont,  sub: 
Clinton  Engr  Works,  I'NX  Area,  Contract  W'-7412- 
eng-23,  1  Apr  44.  pp.  73-93,  OROO;  Completion 
Rpt,  Stone  and  Webster,  sub:  (>linion  Kngr  Works, 
Contract  VV-7401-eng-13,  1946,  pp.  144-45, 
OROO;  Du  Pont  Conslr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  pp.  .50-67, 
HOO.  See  also  I.tr,  M.  W.  Kellogg  (Kellogg  Co. 
president)  to  Croves,  9  Mav  45,  .\dmin  Files,  Cen 
Corresp,  231.21  (Kellex).  .\11)R. 


Manpower  Commission,  an  area  that 
long  had  had  serious  labor  shortages. 
But  they  were  surprised  when  a 
severe  shortage  of  common  labor  de- 
veloped at  the  Clinton  PLngineer 
Works  where  contractors  were  re- 
cruiting from  Region  \1I  (Alabama, 
Florida,  Ceorgia,  Mississippi,  South 
(Carolina,  and  lennessee),  an  area 
that  still  had  a  labor  surplus.  Never- 
theless, by  June,  lack  of  some  three 
hundred  laborers  was  jeopardizing 
the  construction  schedule  at  Clinton, 
and  the  indications  were  that  neither 
the  common  laborers'  union  nor  the 
regular  itinerant  recruiters  working 
through  the  U.S.  Employment  Service 
were  going  to  be  able  to  procure  the 
additional  numbers  needed. ^^ 

For  a  solution,  General  Groves 
looked  to  manpower  agencies  in 
Washington,  D.C.  Using  War  Depart- 
ment channels,  specifically  Under 
Secretary  of  War  Robert  P.  Patter- 
son's office  and  the  ASF's  Industrial 
Personnel  Division,  he  negotiated 
with  officials  of  the  War  Manpower 
Commission.  His  objective  was  to 
secure  a  change  in  certain  commis- 
sion practices.  One  such  practice  was 
the  reluctance  of  its  field  organization 
to  permit  Manhattan  recruiters  to  in- 
terview   prospective    workers    in    re- 


^^  Byron  Pairchild  and  Jonathan  Grossman,  The 
Army  and  Industrial  Manpower.  U.S.  Army  in  World 
War  II  (Washington,  D.C:  Government  Printing 
Ofllce,  1959),  pp.  55  and  255-56;  Robert  R.  Palmer, 
Bell  I.  Wiley,  and  William  R.  Keast,  The  Procurement 
and  Training  of  Ground  Combat  Troops,  I'.S.  Army  in 
World  War  II  (Washington,  D.C.:  Government 
Printing  Office,  1948),  pp.  36-37,  45,  503;  MDH, 
Bk.  1,  Vol.  8,  pp.  2.3-2.4  and  App.  Al.  D.AS,\; 
Memo,  Maj  Warren  (ieorge  (Clinton  .Area  Fngr)  to 
Dist  Fngr,  sub:  Labor  Supply-Apparent  Inability 
lo  Supplv  Required  Labor,  25  Mar  43.  OROO; 
Memo  for  File,  Labor  Rels  Sec,  same  sub,  22  Mar 
43.  OROO;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  \'ol.  1,  p.  50. 
HOO. 


352 


MANHAITAN:  THE  ARMY  AND    IHE  A  lOMIC:  BOMB 


gions  other  than  those  in  which 
atomic  facihties  were  located  until  all 
local  and  regional  employment  needs 
in  those  other  regions  had  been  met. 
Another  was  what  Groves  claimed  was 
its  tendency  to  route  Manhattan's  itin- 
erant recruiters  to  small  towns  where 
few  prospective  workers  were  avail- 
able, rather  than  to  the  cities  where 
there  was  a  surplus  of  labor.  Du  Pont 
officials  at  Hanford  also  had  com- 
plained to  Groves  about  this  incon- 
sistency in  policy,  "necessitating  re- 
cruitment in  a  certain  manner  in  one 
town  and  in  a  different  manner  in  a 
similar  nearby  town."  ^^ 

As  an  immediate  result  of  Groves's 
negotiations  with  the  Manpower 
Commission,  the  Manhattan  Project 
in  late  summer  of  1943  received  a 
very  limited  and  temporary  priority 
for  recruiting  common  labor.  laking 
care  to  maintain  very  strict  control 
over  what  was  to  be  the  first  wartime 
instance  of  establishing  a  system  of 
priorities  in  manpower  recruitment, 
the  commission  assigned  a  special 
representative  to  the  Manhattan  Dis- 
trict, giving  him  authority  to  issue 
certificates  of  availability  to  potential 
recruits  for  the  project's  common 
labor  force.  The  representative  could 
issue  the  certificates  only  to  workers 
employed  in  nonessential  jobs.  Armed 
with  these  certificates,  workers  could 
leave  their  nonessential  employment 
and  go  to  work  for  Manhattan  even 
though  their  employers  were  opposed 
to   the   move.   At   the   same   time,   the 


2^  Du  Pont  Cxinstr  Hist  (source  of  quotation), 
\ol.  1,  p.  67,  HOO;  Memo,  Groves  to  Und  Secv 
War,  sub:  MD's  Labor  Problems,  1  Nov  43,  MDR; 
Memo,  W.  D.  S.  (undoubtedly  Maj  Gen  W.  D.  Styer) 
to  IJames]  Mitchell  (Industrial  Personnel  Div  Dir. 
ASF),  7  Dec  43,  MD,  1942-45,  Somervell  Desk  File, 
ASF;  Memo,  Patterson  to  Groves,  14  Feb  44,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  80,  MDR. 


Manpower  Commission  directed  that 
all  workers  in  the  common  labor  cate- 
gory who  had  looked  for  employment 
through  the  U.S.  Employment  Service 
should  be  referred  first  to  interview- 
ers of  Manhattan  District  contractors. 
When  even  these  priority  arrange- 
ments failed  to  secure  all  the  common 
laborers  needed,  the  commission  au- 
thorized Manhattan  recruiters  to  seek 
workers  on  a  temporary  basis  in  areas 
immediately  adjacent  to  Region  VII. 
The  manpower  priority  system  ap- 
plied initially  only  to  recruiting  for 
the  Clinton  Engineer  Works,  but  in 
September  1943  the  commission  also 
granted  similar  privileges  to  recruiters 
seeking  common  labor  for  the  Han- 
ford Engineer  Works  in  Region  XII. ^* 
The  Manpower  Commission's  spe- 
cial concession  only  temporarily  re- 
lieved the  project's  labor  recruiting 
problems.  In  late  1943  and  early 
1944,  when  requirements  for  both 
construction  and  production  workers 
mushroomed,  the  atomic  installations 
developed  new  manpower  shortages. 
By  April  1944,  General  Groves  esti- 
mated that  the  project  required  an 
additional  ten  thousand  construction 
workers  at  the  main  production  plants 
and  more  than  eighteen  hundred  re- 
search personnel  at  the  research  lab- 
oratories. He  noted  that  the  major 
deficiencies  were  a  shortage  of  four 
thousand  common  laborers  and 
twelve  hundred  operating  personnel 
at  Clinton  and  Hanford,  respectively, 
and,  in  addition,  of  eight  hundred 
millwrights  at  the  latter  site.  The 
chief  of  the  Labor  Branch  of  ASF's 
Industrial  Personnel  Division,  Lt.  Col. 


24MDH.   Bk.    1.  \'ol.   8,   pp.   2.3-2.4,   DASA;   Du 
Pont  Constr  Hist,  \ol.  1,  p.  52,  HOO. 


MANPOWER  PR()C:i  RKMENT 


353 


John  K.  CA)llins,  confirmed  (irovcs's 
figures  for  the  CHnton  Engineer 
Works  after  an  inspection  trip  there 
in  May,  adding  the  further  observa- 
tion that,  as  a  result  of  the  shortage, 
some  seventeen  hundred  carpenters 
were  doing  laborers'  work  at  carpen- 
ters' wage  rates.  Colonel  Collins 
cited,  loo,  the  need  for  electricians, 
estimating  the  requirements  to  be 
twenty-five  hundred — more  than  twice 
the  number  Croves  had  mentioned. ^^ 
In  spite  of  these  shortages.  General 
Groves  remained  optimistic  that  the 
atomic  program  had  a  good  chance  to 
produce  a  bomb  during  the  first  part 
of  1945,  provided  that  the  project 
continued  to  have  the  "highest  priori- 
ty in  supplies,  personnel,  and  equip- 
ment." ^^  When  the  Manhattan  com- 
mander expressed  this  view  at  a  meet- 
ing of  the  Combined  Policy  Commit- 
tee, Secretary  Stimson,  who  was  pre- 
siding, assured  him  that  the  project 
would  continue  to  have  first  priority 
in  manpower  recruitment.  In  March 
1944,  the  War  Production  Board 
placed  Manhattan  at  the  top  of  its  list 
of  the  twelve  most  urgent  programs 
currently  in  progress.  Then  in  No- 
vember 1944,  the  War  Manpower 
Commission  further  strengthened 
Manhattan's  top-priority  position  by 
awarding  the  project  the  highest  cate- 
gory under  its  system  for  pric^rity  re- 


2^  Table  (Schtdule  oi  Eslinialed  Labor  Require- 
ments for  All  Constr  Contractors,  1  Dec  43-1  Jul 
44,  CEW),  Incl  to  Memo,  Lt  Col  Ihomas  I .  Cren- 
shaw (Ex  Ofl.  (>EW')  to  Groves,  sub:  Labor  P'orecast, 
11  Dec  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Gen), 
MDR:  Memo,  Li  Col  John  K.  Collins  (Labor  Br 
chief.  Industrial  Personnel  Div,  ASF)  to  Groves,  sub: 
N'isii  to  Clinton  Engr  Works  (16-17  Mav  44).  22 
Mav  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  79  (Jack  Madigan),  MDR:  l)u 
Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  pp.  .57-61,  HOC). 

^^  Memo,  unsigned  (undoubtedlv  Groves),  after 
13  Apr  44.  HB  Files.  Fldr  109.  MDR. 


ferral  of  workers  seeking  jobs  through 
the  U.S.  Employment  Service. ^^ 

Manhattan,  however,  did  not  rely 
solely  upon  a  high-priority  rating. 
Working  in  close  coordination  with 
labor  officials  in  Under  Secretary  of 
War  Patterson's  office,  the  District 
arranged  for  assignment  of  special  re- 
cruiting teams  to  Clinton  and  Han- 
ford,  composed  of  eight  or  nine  mili- 
tary officers  from  the  Manpower 
Commission,  the  ASF's  Industrial 
Personnel  Division,  and  the  Corps  of 
Engineers.  Special  representatives 
designated  by  the  commission  and  the 
War  Department  coordinated  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  teams  and  provided 
them  with  a  direct  channel  of  commu- 
nication to  Washington  manpower 
agencies.  Because  of  the  success  of 
these  special  military  teams,  Manhat- 
tan continued  to  use  them  well  into 
1945.  In  late  1944,  for  example,  the 
Los  Alamos  Laboratory  desperately 
needed  190  additional  machinists  and 
toolmakers,  a  category  of  skilled 
workers  always  difficult  to  recruit. 
The  District  organized  several 
teams — each  composed  of  an  Army 
officer,  a  professional  recruiter,  and  a 
security  agent — and  dispatched  them 
into  six  manpower  areas  (Regions  I, 
II,  III,  \\  VI,  and  VII).  In  less  than  a 
month  they  had  procured  all  of  the 
machinists  and  toolmakers  required 
bv  the  New  Mexico  installation.^® 


27  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8.  pp.  2.4-2. .5  and  App.  B6 
(WMC  Field  Instruction  No.  416.  .Supp.  No.  2.  to 
.All  Regional  Manpower  Dirs,  sub:  Establishment  of 
C>ategories  of  Emplover  Orders  for  Prioritv  Referral 
and  Factors  To  Be  Considered  in  Detcrmming  Eligi- 
bilitv  of  Orders  for  Prioritv.  27  Nov  44),  DA.SA; 
CPC  Min.  13  Apr  44,  D.S:  Fairchild  and  Grossman, 
.Irnn  ami  Induslnal  Manpower,  pp.  30,  146-49,  200. 

28  Outline  for  VVD-WMC  Mtg  Re  MD  Projs, 
2.5  Apr  44.  HB  Files.  Fldr  79  (Jack  .Madigan).  .MDR: 

ConliniuH 


354 


MANHAIl  AN:  IHE  ARMY  AND  IHE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


Procurement  of  certain  types  oi  es- 
sential skilled  labor,  such  as  pipe  fit- 
ters and  electricians,  defied  efforts  of 
even  special  recruiting  teams,  and 
other  measures  had  to  be  instituted. 
When  construction  at  Hanfbrd  in  the 
summer  of  1944  required  several 
hundred  additional  pipe  fitters,  Du 
Pont,  the  prime  contractor,  and  the 
International  Association  of  Plumbers 
and  Pipe  Fitters  jointly  launched  a 
major  recruiting  effort,  even  though 
the  absolute  unavailability  of  pipe  fit- 
ters in  the  civilian  labor  market  fore- 
doomed them  to  failure.  4  here  were, 
however,  many  soldiers  with  this  skill 
in  Army  units  stationed  in  the  United 
States.  Consequently,  Secretary  Stim- 
son  directed  Army  Chief  of  Staff  Mar- 
shall to  transfer  200  enlisted  men 
with  pipe  fitting  skills  into  the  Enlist- 
ed Reserve  Corps  for  a  period  of  90 
days  (subsequently  extended  to  180 
days).  The  soldiers  had  to  be  in  limit- 
ed service  status,  that  is,  not  qualified 
for  overseas  duty,  and  willing  to  work 
at  Hanford.  By  early  September,  the 
first  of  an  eventual  total  of  198  mili- 
tary pipe  fitters  were  reporting  for 
duty  at  the  plutonium  site.^^ 

About  the  same  time,  a  shortage  of 
some  twenty-five  hundred  electricians 
was  seriously  jeopardizing  meeting 
construction  schedules  at  both  Han- 
ford and  Clinton,  and  project  recruit- 
ers indicated  to  General  Groves  that 
there  was  little  likelihood  of  obtaining 

VIi:)H,  Bk.  1,  \'()l.  8,  pp.  2.6-2.7,  DASA;  Memos, 
Brig  Gen  Edward  S.  Creenbaum  (Ex  Off  for  L'nd 
Secv  War)  lo  C>apt  Walker  E.  Stagg  et  al.,  13  and 
18  Nov  44  and  20  Apr  45,  HB  Eiles,  Eldr  80,  MDR. 
Ihese  memos,  prepared  by  the  District  and  ap- 
proved by  Groves,  detailed  the  specified  individuals 
to  undertake  a  special  recruitment  program. 

29MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  pp.  4.8-4.9,  DASA; 
(Woves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  101;  Du  Pont  Constr 
Hist,  \'ol.  1,  pp.  64-65,  HOO. 


them  through  normal  employment 
channels.  In  this  emergency  the  Man- 
hattan commander  once  again  turned 
to  Under  Secretary  of  War  Patterson's 
office  for  assistance.  Patterson  imme- 
diately got  in  touch  with  Edward  J. 
Brown,  president  of  the  International 
Brotherhood  of  Electrical  Workers, 
and  Laurence  W.  Davis,  manager  of 
the  National  Electrical  Contractors 
Association,  as  well  as  officials  at  the 
War  Manpower  Commission.  In  due 
course  he  and  Groves  worked  out  an 
agreement  with  these  organizations, 
the  so-called  Patterson-Brown  Plan, 
by  which  Manhattan  had  authority  to 
borrow  for  a  ninety-day  period  elec- 
tricans  already  employed  on  jobs  not 
essential  to  the  war.  To  make  _  the 
plan  attractive,  there  was  provision 
for  payment  of  travel  expenses  and  a 
guarantee  that  the  individuals  would 
not  lose  their  seniority  rights  and 
could  return  to  their  previous  place 
of  employment  after  completing 
ninety  days  of  service  on  the  atomic 
project.  To  encourage  cooperation  of 
employers,  the  plan  provided  that  all 
organizations  that  released  electri- 
cians to  work  at  Hanford  or  Clinton 
would  receive  official  recognition.  A 
news  release  from  Patterson's  office 
gave  the  plan  wide  publicity  in  the 
newspapers,  and  General  Styer  re- 
quested the  appropriate  Army  service 
commands  to  furnish  whatever  assist- 
ance they  could.  In  a  few  months,  this 
novel  solution  supplied  the  electri- 
cians needed  to  meet  both  Hanford 
and  Clinton  construction  deadlines. ^° 


30  MDH,  Bk.  1,  \'<)l.  8,  p.  2.6  and  App.  B7;  Bk.  4, 
Vol.  5,  pp.  4.7-4.8:  and  Bk.  5,  Vol.  5,  "Gonstruc- 
tion,"  pp.  5.1-5.2.  DASA.  Ltrs,  Patterson  to  Brown 
and  to  Davis,  21  Jun  44,  and  Patterson  to  GG's  of 

Continued 


MANPOWKR  PR(K:i'REMENr 


355 


After  the  fashion  of  the  fringe  ben- 
efits of  tfie  Patterson-Brown  Plan, 
project  recruiters  frequently  offered 
special  inducements  to  attract  persons 
with  critical  skills,  usually  in  the  form 
of  payment  of  all  or  part  of  a  worker's 
transportation  costs  in  traveling  to 
Hanford  or  Clinton,  a  guarantee  of 
housing  (but  usually  not  for  family), 
and  furnishing  recreational  and  other 
community  facilities.  On  occasion, 
Manhattan  applied  to  the  National 
War  Labor  Board  for  modification  or 
adjustment  of  the  prevailing  wage 
rates.  Thus,  in  July  1943,  Under  Sec- 
retary of  War  Patterson  secured  a 
wage  rate  increase  ($0.50  to  $0,575 
an  hour)  for  common  labor  at  the 
Clinton  Engineer  Works  and,  a  year 
later,  one  for  skilled  maintenance 
workers,  especially  electrical  repair- 
men and  machinists.  The  latter  in- 
crease was  necessary  because  these 
workers  could  earn  a  higher  wage  at 
construction  jobs,  at  IVA  installa- 
tions, and  at  some  of  the  major  war 
industries  in  the  local  area  than  as 
employees  of  the  atomic  plants.^ ^ 

Civilian  and  Military  Personnel 

Although  most  Manhattan  workers 
were  employees  of  project  contrac- 
tors, two  important  groups  were  not: 

2d,  5ih.  (ith,  and  7ih  Svc  Cmds,  5  Jul  44,  HB  Files, 
Fldi  :A.  MDR.  I.tr,  Maj  (.en  Ihomas  G.  lerry  (CXi 
2d  .Svt  Cmd)  to  Ad  Secv  War  Palterson,  10  Jul  44, 
HB  Files,  Fldr  «(),  MDR.  (iroves.  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told, 
p.  99.  Du  Pout  Constr  Hist.  Vol.  1,  p.  65,  HOG. 

3'  .MDH,  Bk,  1,  \oi.  8,  p.  3.4.  DASA;  Memo,  Pat- 
terson to  (iroves,  14  Feb  44,  and  Ftr,  Patterson  to 
William  H.  Davis  (WVI.B  chairman),  12  Jun  44,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  SO,  MDR;  l.ir,  (ireenbaum  to  Fred  M. 
\  inson  (Ollite  oi  Ftonomie  Stabilization  Dir), 
26  May  44,  and  Statement  on  Requested  Increase 
in  Operating  Rates  at  (IFW,  .itt.ulied  to  covering 
Memo,  14  Jun  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  .51,  MDR;  Du  I'oni 
Opns  Hist,  Bk.  I.  pp.  I  and  4,  H(K). 


Military  and  Civilian  Workers  at  CEW 

civil  service  employees  at  District 
headquarters  and  in  the  several  area 
offices,  and  military  personnel  serving 
on  the  District  staff,  in  the  area  of- 
fices, and  in  the  various  military  units. 
Combined  numbers  of  these  two 
groups,  even  at  the  height  of  project 
activities,  amounted  to  considerably 
less  than  10  percent  of  the  Manhattan 
Project's  total  manpower.  But  because 
many  members  of  these  grouj^s  held 
key  positions  in  administration  and 
operations,  they  exercised  an  infiu- 
ence  over  the  course  of  the  atomic 
bomb  program  far  out  of  proportion 
to  their  relatively  small  numbers. 

From  the  start  of  its  administration 
of  the  project,  the  Army  employed  ci- 
vilians in  staff  positions  at  both  the 
District  and  area  levels.  Cenerally, 
they  served  in  positions  requiring 
special  administrative  or  technical 
knowledge    and    experience,    such    as 


356 


MANHATl  AN:  THP:  ARMY  AND    I  HE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


those  relating  to  finance,  insurance, 
safety,  contracts,  and  office  manage- 
ment, as  well  as  in  jobs  that  women 
could  fill.  Most  were  recruited 
through  regular  civil  service  channels 
or  were  transferred  to  the  Manhattan 
Project  from  other  government  agen- 
cies. When  Colonel  Marshall  formed 
the  original  Manhattan  District  head- 
quarters organization,  he  primarily  re- 
cruited civilian  employees  who  were 
members  of  his  former  Syracuse  (New 
York)  District  staff  Included  in  this 
group  were  a  number  of  veteran 
Corps  of  Engineers  civilians  who,  as 
the  District  headquarters  expanded, 
received  military  commissions.  The 
District  continued  to  hire  additional 
civil  service  employees,  securing 
many  from  other  engineer  projects, 
from  other  government  agencies,  and 
from  the  civilian  staffs  of  the  other 
military  services.  Project  area  engi- 
neers also  followed  similar  policies  in 
forming  their  local  administrative 
staffs.  ^2 

For  reasons  of  security  and  for  con- 
venience, the  District  carried  its  civil- 
ian workers  on  its  employment  roles 
as  if  they  were  regular  engineer  em- 
ployees. While  this  arrangement  fa- 
cilitated administrative  aspects,  it  sub- 
jected the  District  to  all  wartime  man- 
power regulations.  For  example,  the 
presidental  proclamation  of  Decem- 
ber 1942  suspended  the  eight-hour 
day  and  that  of  February  1943  estab- 
lished a  48-hour  workweek  for  all 
full-time  workers  in  areas  of  labor 
shortage.  Consistent  with  these  regu- 
lations, the  War  Department  provided 


in  May  that  its  civilian  employees 
could  work  a  six-day,  48-hour  week, 
receiving  overtime  pay  for  work  on 
Sunday  or  beyond  eight  hours  on  a 
weekday,  and  the  District  adopted  this 
policy  in  June,  including  in  it  a  provi- 
sion for  overtime  work  up  to  sixty- 
four  hours  a  week  when  specific 
emergency  situations  required  it.  In 
actual  practice,  only  lower-salaried 
employees  received  overtime  pay. 
Higher-paid  employees,  such  as  sec- 
tion and  division  chiefs,  who  put  in 
overtime  did  so  voluntarily,  without 
additional  compensation.^^ 

An  unforeseen  disadvantage  of  this 
administrative  arrangement  was  that 
the  District  also  had  to  conform  with 
OCE  manpower  ceilings,  as  required 
by  the  ASF  or  the  War  Department. 
Thus  in  the  hectic  summer  of  1943, 
when  the  project  was  on  the  thresh- 
old of  rapid  expansion,  OCE  person- 
nel officials  notified  General  Groves 
that  the  District  must  reduce  its  per- 
sonnel by  some  13  percent.  The  Man- 
hattan commander  immediately  regis- 
tered vigorous  objection.  General 
Styer  interceded  with  OCE  officials, 
who  then  arranged  to  have  other 
engineer  agencies  absorb  the  staff  re- 
ductions prescribed  for  the  Manhat- 
tan District.  A  year  later,  OCE  per- 
sonnel authorities  again  informed  the 
District  that  substantial  reduction  in 
both    civilian    and    military    personnel 


32  List  of  Kt'v  Personnel,  MD  Area  Offices  (ca. 
Nov  44),  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  231.001  (I.C), 
MDR;  Marshall  i:)iarv.  21-23  Jun  42,  MDR;  Org 
Charts,  VS.  P.ngrs  Office,  MD,  1  Nov  43,  15  Feb 
and  10  Nov  44,  MDR. 


'^Presidental  Proclamation,  sub:  Suspension  of 
Fight-Hour  Faw  as  to  Laborers  and  Mechanics  Em- 
ployed by  WD  on  Public  Works  in  the  United 
States,  28  Dec  42;  WD  Orders  H,  sub:  Hours  of 
Work  and  Overtime  (compensation  for  Civilian  Em- 
plovees,  14  May  43;  MD  Cir  Ltr,  sub:  Hours  of 
Work  and  Overtime  Compensation  for  Civilian  Em- 
plovees,  1 1  Jun  43;  Memo,  Lt  Col  E.  H.  Marsden 
(Ex  Offi  Ml3)  to  Groves,  24  Aug  43.  All  in  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Gen).  MDR. 


Chart  5 — Estimated  Officer  Personnel  Req^uirements  for  the 
Manhattan  District,  January  1943 


DISTRICT  ENGINEER 
Colonel 


DEPUTY  DISTRICT  ENGINEER 
Colonel 


INTELLIGENCE 
1  Major 
3  Captains 
3  Lieutenants 

EXECUTIVE  ASSISTANT 
Lieutenant  Colonel 

" 

CONTROL 

1  Lieutenant  Colonel 

2  Majors 

3  Captains 

EXECUTIVE  OFFICER 

(Engineering  and  Operations) 

Lieutenant  Colonel 


TECHNICAL  STAFF 
6  Colonels 

3  Lieutenant  Colonels 
2  Majors 


MATERIALS    PRODUCTION 
1  Lieutenant  Colonel 

4  Majors 

5  Captains 

4  Lieutenants 


SPECIAL  ACCOUNTS 
1  Major 
1  Captain 
5  Lieutenants 


LABOR  RELATIONS 

1  Major 

2  Captains 

1  Lieutenant 


EXECUTIVE  OFFICER 
(Administration) 
Lieutenant  Colonel 


PROTECTIVE  SECURITY 
1  Lieutenant  Colonel 

1  Major 

5  Captains 

2  Lieutenants 


ENGINEERING  AND  OPERATIONS 
1  Lieutenant  Colonel 

1  Major 

2  Captains 


UNIT  CHIEFS 
3  Lieutenant  Colonels 
3  Majors 
6  Captains 


DESIGN  AND  RESEARCH  AREAS 

2  Lieutenant  Colonels 

6  Majors 

11  Captains 

5  Lieutenants 

CONSTRUCTION  AREAS 
9  Lieutenant  Colonels 
22  Majors 
27  Captains 
25  Lieutenants 


PRIORITIES  AND  ALLOCATION 

1  Major 

2  Captains 

2  Lieutenants 


LEGAL  AND  CONTRACT 

1  Lieutenant  Colonel 

2  Majors 

4  Captains 


"  Also  one  majoi 

'Also  one  captain  as  assistant. 

Soiirre:  Org  Chan,  U.S.  Engrs.  Ollicc.  Ml).  2:i  Jan  43.  OROO. 


ADMINISTRATION  AND  FINANCE 
1  Lieutenant  Colonel 

1  Maior 

2  Captains 

1  Lieutenant 


Total  Estimated  Officer  Person 
8  Colonels 
26  Lieutenant  Colonels 
49  Majors 
74  Captains 
48  Lieutenants 


MANPOWER  PROCUREMENT 


357 


were  necessary.  Lt.  Col.  Charles 
Vanden  Bulck,  head  of  the  District's 
Administrative  Division,  instructed 
area  office  and  division  and  section 
heads  to  initiate  appropriate  meas- 
ures, such  as  reassignment  or  separa- 
tion of  unsatisfactory  workers  and 
elimination  of  duplication  of  func- 
tions. By  this  time  some  personnel  re- 
duction in  those  staffs  primarily  con- 
cerned with  site  development  and 
design  and  building  of  production  fa- 
cilities was  possible,  but  operational 
activities  were  expanding  rapidly,  re- 
quiring enlargement  of  District  and 
area  staffs  overseeing  plant  oper- 
ations and  bomb  development.  The 
net  result  was  continued  growth  in 
total  personnel,  a  trend  that  was  to 
persist  until  the  fall  of  1945. ^"^ 

Militarization  of  the  atomic  project 
did  not  begin  until  the*  summer  of 
1942  (Chart  5).  The  first  group  of 
military  personnel  came  to  the  newly 
activated  Manhattan  District  as  part  of 
an  OCE  authorization  of  sixty-two  of- 
ficers, assigned  primarily  to  fill  key 
supervisory  and  administrative  posts 
in  the  District  headquarters  and  area 
offices.  For  many  months,  however, 
the  number  of  active  duty  personnel 
remained  small  (as  late  as  December 
1943,  no  more  than  four  hundred). 
Subsequently,  additional  authoriza- 
tions from  OCE,  ASF,  and,  in  certain 
special  cases,  the  Secretary  of  War 
himself,  furnished  a  continuing  inflow 


3"  Memo.  F.  M.  S.  [Col  Frank  M.  Smith,  Asst  to 
ASF  chief  of  stafT]  to  Styer,  29  Jul  43,  MD,  1942-45, 
Somervell  Desk  File,  ASF.  MD  Bull,  Vanden  Bulck 
(for  Dist  Kngr)  to  OHicc,  Div,  and  Sec  Heads,  sub: 
Decrease  in  Personnel,  19  Aug  44,  Admin  Files,  MD 
Directives,  MDR.  MDH,  Bk,  1,  Vol.  12,  "Clinton  En- 
gineer Works,"  App.  C2  (Chart,  Kmployment  at 
CEW);  Bk.  4,  Vol.  6,  "Operation,"  App.  B8  (C:hart, 
Employment  at  HEW);  and  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  App.  B7 
(Chart,  Employment  at  Eos  .Alamos  Lab),  D.ASA. 


of  officers  and  warrant  officers.  4  he 
majority  came  under  a  series  of  sup- 
plementary bulk  allotments,  but  some 
were  also  included  in  personnel  au- 
thorizations for  military  police,  coun- 
terintelligence. Women's  Army  Corps 
(WAC),^^  and  other  units  assigned  to 
the  project.  The  District  procured 
some  hard-to-secure  specialists — for 
example,  patent  attorneys,  engineers, 
chemists,  and  physicists — by  obtaining 
authorization  to  have  naval  officers 
assigned  to  Manhattan  and  to  com- 
mission qualified  civilians  directly. 
The  District's  Military  Personnel  Sec- 
tion in  Oak  Ridge  remained  in  charge 
of  the  procurement  and  central  ad- 
ministration of  all  project-commis- 
sioned personnel  throughout  the  war, 
numbering  more  than  six  hundred  by 
the  summer  of  1945  and  stationed  in 
many  different  parts  of  the  United 
States  as  well  as  in  several  overseas 
areas. ^® 


^^On  30  Sep  43,  the  Women's  Army  Auxiliary 
Corps  became  a  part  of  the  Army  of  the  United 
States  and  received  its  new  official  designation. 
Women's  Army  Corps.  See  Mattie  E.  Treadvvell,  The 
Women's  Army  Corps,  U.S.  Army  in  World  War  II 
(Washington,  D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office, 
1954)  pp.  218-30. 

36  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8.  pp.  7.3-7.4,  7.8,  8.1-8.3, 
App.  A13,  and  \'ol.  14,  "Intelligence  &  Security," 
pp.  7.5-7.7,  DASA;  Org  Charts,  U.S.  Engrs  Office, 
MD,  Aug  43-Jan  45,  MDR;  List,  sub:  MD  Offs  on 
Duty  at  Los  Alamos  and  Their  Duties,  6  May  44, 
Incl  to  Memo,  Ashbridge  to  Groves,  14  Jun  44, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Gen),  MDR:  Memo, 
Groves  to  CG  SOS,  sub:  Org  and  .Assignment  of  Mil 
Orgs,  28  Jan  43,  Admin  Files.  Gen  Corresp,  322 
(Los  Alamos),  MDR;  Memo,  Groves  to  CG  ASF, 
sub:  Spec  W.AAC  Det,  MD,  31  Mav  43,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  323.42  (LC),  MDR;  Memo,  (iroves  to 
CG  ASF,  sub:  Prov  MP  Det  No.  1,  17  Mar  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  231.001,  MDR;  Memos, 
Greenbaum  to  Bundy,  sub:  Patent  OfTs,  21  Feb  44, 
Groves  to  Bundy,  same  sub,  and  Personnel  Div,  Gl, 
to  LAG,  sub:  Procurement  Objective  for  (>hief  of 
Engrs,  13  Apr  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  24,  MDR;  Memo, 
Bundy  to  Maj  Gen  Stephen  G.  Henry,  G-1  (approv- 
ing direct  commissioning  of  second  lieutenants  for 
MD),  1  Sep  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  8,  MDR. 


358 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Beginning  in  1943,  the  District  reg- 
ularly requisitioned  military  personnel 
to  carry  out  functions  that,  for  rea- 
sons of  security  or  lack  of  civilian 
manpower,  could  not  be  performed 
by  civilian  employees.  In  January, 
General  Groves  requested  the  Serv- 
ices of  Supply  (ASF's  earlier  designa- 
tion) to  allot  military  police,  medical, 
and  veterinary  personnel  for  a  special 
military  police  company  to  protect 
and  service  the  highly  secret  oper- 
ations at  Los  Alamos.  In  March,  he 
asked  for  additional  military  person- 
nel to  form  provisional  military 
police,  medical,  and  engineer  detach- 
ments to  be  used  at  the  other  major 
project  sites.  The  ASF  promptly  au- 
thorized the  requested  military  man- 
power, providing  for  their  activation 
and  training  at  appropriate  training 
centers  of  the  6th  and  8th  Service 
Commands. ^"^ 

When  rapid  expansion  created  an 
urgent  need  for  additional  military 
personnel  to  handle  classified  mail 
and  records.  Groves  requested  the 
ASF  to  provide  Manhattan  with  a  de- 
tachment from  the  Women's  Army  Aux- 
iliary Corps  (WAAC)  to  perform  that 
type  of  clerical  work.  The  processing 
of  mail  and  records  at  District  head- 
quarters, as  well  as  at  the  Clinton, 
Hanford,  and  Los  Alamos  installa- 
tions. Groves  pointed  out,  provided 
such  a  broad  view  of  project  activities 
that  it  must  be  kept  in  the  hands  of 
personnel  under  strict  military  con- 
trol. The   1st  Provisional  WAAC  De- 


tachment was  activated  at  Fort  Sill, 
Oklahoma,  on  17  April,  and  a  few 
days  later  an  officer  and  six  auxiliaries 
reported  to  Los  Alamos.  In  June,  the 
ASF  authorized  Manhattan's  request 
for  a  total  of  three  WAAC  officers 
and  seventy-five  enlisted  women,  and 
in  subsequent  months  granted  the 
District  substantial  WAG  allotments. 
In  the  period  from  1943  through 
1945,  those  WAG  members  assigned 
to  units  at  Clinton,  Hanford,  Los 
Alamos,  and  other  project  installa- 
tions worked  not  only  as  handlers  of 
classified  material  but  also  at  a  great 
variety  of  other  jobs,  some  of  them 
highly  technical  and  scientific. ^^ 

By  spring  of  1943,  project  leaders 
were  anticipating  problems  in  recruit- 
ing and  holding  younger  technicians 
and  scientists  who  were  subject  to 
military  service.  The  obvious  solution 
was  to  constitute  a  military  organiza- 
tion within  the  Manhattan  Project  to 
which  these  technicians  and  scientists 
could  be  assigned.  Accordingly,  in 
May,  the  District  established  a  Special 
Engineer  Detachment  (SED)  and  re- 
quested ASF  authorization  for  an  al- 
lotment of  675  men  to  form  a  head- 
quarters element  and  four  separate 
companies.  Recruiting  began  in  late 
1943  through  the  Army  Specialized 
Training  Program,  the  National 
Roster  of  Scientific  and  Specialized 
Personnel   in   Washington,    D.G.,   and 


^^  Memos,  Groves  to  CG  SOS,  subs;  Org  and  As- 
signment of  Mil  Orgs,  28  Jan  43,  and  Prov  Engr  Det 
No.  1,  11  Mar  43,  322  (Los  Alamos)  and  200.3,  re- 
spectively; Memos,  Groves  to  CG  ASF,  subs;  Prov 
Engr  Det  No.  1,  29  Jul  43,  and  Prov  Med  Det  No.  1, 
12  and  17  Mar  43,  200.3  and  231.001,  respectively. 
All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MDR. 


'« Memo,  Groves  to  CG  ASF,  sub;  Special  WAAC 
Det,  MD,  31  May  43  (and  appended  note,  dated  2 
Jun  43  and  signed  by  Col  F.  M.  Smith);  Ind  to  ibid., 
Brig  Gen  Russel  B.  Reynolds  (Mil  Personnel  Div 
chief,  ASF)  to  Chief  of  Engrs,  3  Jun  43;  Memo, 
Marsden  to  Groves,  sub;  Spec  WAC  Det,  MD, 
29  Dec  43.  All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
323.42  (LC),  MDR.  Marsden  Diary,  29  May  and  3, 
9,  17  Jun  43,  OROO.  Treadwell,  Women's  Arrny 
Corps,  pp.  327-29,  Unit  Hist,  WAC  Det,  9812th 
Tech  Svc  Unit,  CE,  MD,  copy  in  WAC  Files,  CMH. 


MANPOWER  PROCUREMENT 


359 


Women's  Army  Corps  Detachment  at  CEW 


universities  and  colleges  in  all  parts 
of  the  country.  Personnel  officials  also 
screened  and  interviewed  qualified  in- 
dividuals in  Army  camps  and  directed 
inquiries  to  other  government  agen- 
cies and  private  industrial  firms  con- 
cerning former  employees  who  were 
in  the  military  service.  ^^ 

The  District  assigned  most  of  its 
scientific  and  technical  enlisted  per- 
sonnel to  the  SED  unit.  In  those  in- 
stances, however,  when  the  District 
had  to  place  enlisted  men  on  duty 
with  private  contractors  or  in  small 
communities,  it  transferred  them  to 
the  Enlisted  Reserve  Corps.  This  per- 
mitted the  men  to  work  in  an  incon- 
spicuous civilian  status  yet  to  remain. 


'HIDH,  Bk.  1,  \()l.  «.  pp.  7.:^-7.4  and  App.  CIS. 
DASA:  Msg,  Marshall  to  Nichols.  18  Mav  4:5,  Admin 
Files.  C;en  Corresp.  200.3  (SKI)),  MDR. 


for  reasons  of  security,  under  military 
control.  It  also  reduced  the  cost  of 
military  administration  for  small  num- 
bers of  enlisted  personnel  stationed 
in  outlying  areas. '*° 

In  providing  for  the  efficient  and 
adequate  administration  of  Manhattan 
Project  enlisted  personnel,  whether 
in  scientific  and  technical,  clerical, 
housekeeping,  or  military  intelligence 
and  security  units,  the  District  en- 
countered special  problems.  Some  of 
these  stemmed  from  the  rapidity  of 
increase  in  enlisted  personnel — from 
several  hundred  in  early  1944,  to 
twenty-six  hundred  by  year's  end,  and 
continuing  up  to  a  maximum  total  of 


^niDH.  Bk.  1,  \'ol.  8.  p.  7.4,  DASA;  Minio,  I.i 
Col  Curtis  A.  Nelson  (Personnel  Div  chief.  Ml))  to 
(movcs.  siih:  Knlistcd  Reservists,  29  Aug  45,  Admin 
Files,  Ck-n  Corresp,  220. .S,  MDR. 


360 


MANHA  riAN:    IHE  ARMY  AND    IHK  AIOMIC  BOMB 


■^■1  ...                         \ 

m 

N 

1  ; 

1 

f                     .     ^1  ,  i  1   :. 

^arr^   ^ 

Enlisted  Men  at  CEW  During  Off-Duty  Hours,  studying  I'.S.  Aniwd  Forces 
Institute  courses 


about  five  thousand  by  the  fall  of 
1945.  Other  problems  arose  from  the 
wide  geographical  distribution  of  en- 
listed personnel,  making  any  effort  to 
achieve  effective  centralized  adminis- 
trative control  from  District  head- 
quarters in  Oak  Ridge  impracticable/^ 
Under  normal  circumstances,  a  so- 
lution would  have  been  attachment  of 
the  District's  scattered  military  units 
to  the  various  area  service  commands 
for  purposes  of  administration,  but 
such  arrangements  presented  a  secu- 
rity risk.  Consequently,  the  district 
engineer  assigned  responsibility  for 
administering    enlisted    personnel    to 


"'  Ihe  organizaiion,  procurement,  and  administra- 
tion of  the  project's  military  intelligence  and  seciiri- 
tv  units  are  discussed  in  detail  in  i.h.  XI.  MDH, 
Bk.  1.  \'ol.  8,  pp.  7.6-7.8  and  App.  AKl  DASA. 


the  commissioned  officers  at  the 
larger  sites  and  to  the  experienced 
noncommissioned  officers  at  the  re- 
maining project  locations,  making 
them  directly  responsible  to  the  Dis- 
trict's Military  Personnel  Section  in 
Oak  Ridge.  Administrative  policies 
varied,  depending  upon  conditions 
prevailing  at  each  particular  location. 
The  policy  on  rations  and  quarters 
for  enlisted  personnel  is  illustrative. 
Enlisted  men  at  all  areas  except  Oak 
Ridge,  Los  Alamos,  and  Richland  re- 
ceived a  rental  allowance  in  lieu  of 
quarters.  The  same  was  true  for  ra- 
tions, except  at  Los  Alamos  and  Rich- 
land. Similarly,  WAC  enlisted  person- 
nel received  a  monetary  allowance  in 
lieu    of    both    quarters    and    rations. 


MANPOWER  PROCUREMENr 


361 


^sm^^'^^^^^^ 


The  Large  Troop  Contingent  at  Los  Alamos  on  Parade 


except  at  Oak  Ridge,  Richland,  Los 
Alamos,  and  New  York;  those  at  Oak 
Ridge  and  in  New  York  lived  in  gov- 
ernment quarters  and  received  a  daily 
monetary  allowance  in  lieu  of 
rations. ^^ 

In  early  1945,  the  OCE,  which  had 
been  serving  the  project  as  a  higher- 
echelon  channel  for  manpower  pro- 
curement and  organization,  provided 
the  Manhattan  District  with  a  military 
designation:  9812th  Technical  Service 
Unit,  Corps  of  Engineers,  Manhattan 
District.  Effective  on  1  February,  most 
of  the  uniformed  personnel,  including 
SED  units  at  Clinton,  Hanford,  and 
Los    Alamos,    were    assigned    to    the 


"Ibid.,  pp.  7.6-7.10,  DASA;  Memo,  Col  Elmer  K. 
Kirkpatrick,  Jr.  (Dep  I)i.sl  Kngr),  to  Groves,  .sub:  Mil 
Personnel  at  Oak  Ridge,  19  Oct  44,  Admin  Piles, 
(;en  Corresp,  319.1  (Rpts),  MDR. 


9812th.  At  Los  Alamos,  however, 
military  police,  WAC,  and  other  serv- 
ice elements  continued  to  be  assigned 
to  the  4817th  Service  Command  Unit, 
an  element  of  the  8th  Service 
Command. ''^ 

Success  in  the  procurement  of  tens 
of  thousands  of  new  employees  with  a 
variety  of  skills  and  talents,  perhaps 
unmatched  by  any  other  World 
War  II  program,  was  directly  attribut- 
able to  the  personnel  policies  and  or- 
ganization developed  by  the  Army  for 
the  Manhattan  Project  in  late  1942 
and  1943.  General  Groves  and  the 
District  personnel  staff  had  perse- 
vered   during    the    period    of   severe 


"MDH,  Bk.  1,  \'ol.  8,  p.  7.7,  and  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1, 
pp.  7.3.-7.8,  DASA;  Memo,  Nelson  to  Groves 
(through  his  assistant.  Brig  Gen  Thomas  F.  Farrell), 
22  May  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  200.3,  MDR. 


362 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


manpower  shortages  and — by  com- 
bining effective  use  of  existing  man- 
power procurement  facilities  in  the 
OSRD,  the  War  Department,  and  the 
War  Manpower  Commission  with 
those  developed  for  the  Manhattan 
District — were  able  to  meet  substan- 
tially all  of  the  atomic  program's  re- 
quirements for  scientific  and  technical 
workers,   skilled  and  unskilled  indus- 


trial labor,  and  civil  and  military  per- 
sonnel on  schedule.  Consequently,  by 
late  1944,  with  most  of  the  manpower 
piocurement  needs  attained,  project 
officials  could  shift  their  primary 
focus  to  conservation  of  the  work 
force  in  face  of  such  potentially  erod- 
ing factors  as  the  demands  of  Selec- 
tive Service  and  labor  union  organiz- 
ing activities. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


Manpower  Conservation 


In  a  wartime  environment  of  per- 
sistent labor  shortages  and  extensive 
labor  turnover  on  most  jobs,  the 
Manhattan  Project's  problems  of 
maintaining  an  adequate  work  force 
almost  matched  those  of  manpower 
procurement.  In  fact,  for  a  variety  of 
reasons,  the  District  had  to  contend 
with  an  above-average  rate  of  employ- 
ee turnover,  Selective  Service  de- 
mands, and  work  stoppages.  Fortu- 
nately, many  of  the  measures  adopted 
to  recruit  scarce  workers,  such  as 
granting  special  fringe  benefits  and 
paying  above-average  wage  rates, 
also  helped  retain  employees  on 
the  job.  These  did  not  solve  all 
the  manpower-depleting  problems, 
however,  and  the  Army  had  to  under- 
take a  number  of  special  measures  to 
conserve  the  work  force. 

Labor  Turnover:  The  Problem 
and  Its  Cure 

Turnover  of  construction  workers 
at  the  Clinton  and  Hanford  sites 
during  the  first  half  of  1944,  a  period 
of  peak  employment  of  this  type  of 
labor,  averaged  about  one-fifth  of  the 
total  construction  work  force,  a  rate 
considerably  above  that  at  compara- 
ble wartime  projects  elsewhere  in  the 
United    States.   Ihe   rate   was    slightly 


higher  at  Hanford  than  at  Clinton — 
some  20  percent  as  compared  with  17 
percent.  Turnover  was  less  serious 
among  plant-operating  employees, 
but  still  sufficiently  high  to  constitute 
a  continuing  manpower  problem. 
Thus  at  the  period  of  peak  operations 
during  the  summer  of  1945,  the  gase- 
ous diffusion  plant  had  an  average 
turnover  of  about  13  percent  a  month 
and  the  electromagnetic  and  plutoni- 
um  production  plants  each  a  little 
over  6  percent  a  month.  ^ 

Seeking  to  reduce  excessive  labor 
turnover,  Manhattan  administrators 
undertook  aggressive  countermeas- 
ures.  As  a  first  step,  the  District  estab- 
lished exit  interview  offices  at  its  area 
employment  centers  near  Manhattan 
installations.  Each  employee  leaving 
the  project — whether  voluntarily,  for 
cause,  or  as  a  result  of  reductions-in- 
force — was  encouraged  to  have  an 
exit  interview  with  District  personnel 
officials.  Through  this  means  they 
were  able  not  only  to  gain  an  insight 


'MDH,  Bk.  1.  \<)1.  8,  ■Personnel."  p.  3.1  and 
Apps.  A5  ((Jhail,  MD  Labor  rurno%er)-A6  (Ciraphic 
Experience  of  Principal  MD  Projs  in  Labor  lurnov- 
er.  Absenteeism,  etc.),  DASA;  Fairchild  and  Gross- 
man, Arms  and  Induslrial  Manpower,  p.  141  (Table  2, 
Monlhiv  Labor  lurnover  Rate  Per  100  Kmployees 
in  Aircraft,  Munitions,  and  Nonmunitions  indus- 
tries: 1943-44). 


364 


MANHAIIAN:  IHE  ARMY  AND  1  HE  AIOMIC  BOMB 


into  the  nature  of  the  employees' 
major  complaints  but  also,  in  many 
instances,  to  persuade  them  to  stay 
on  the  job. ^ 

Ranking  high  on  the  employees'  list 
of  complaints  was  their  dissatisfaction 
with  employment  conditions,  includ- 
ing inadequate  wages,  excessive 
hours,  and  lengthy  commuting  dis- 
tance to  and  from  the  job  site.  For 
example,  in  mid- 1944,  13  percent  of 
the  construction  workers  voluntarily 
leaving  jobs  at  Hanford  and  14  per- 
cent of  those  at  Clinton  cited  some 
aspect  of  employment  conditions  as 
the  reason  for  their  departure.  An- 
other recurring  complaint  concerned 
living  conditions,  with  more  workers 
in  1944  finding  these  unsatisfactory  at 
Clinton  than  at  Hanford.  Surprisingly 
large  numbers  of  workers  also  left  to 
take  jobs  they  viewed  as  better  than 
the  ones  they  had  held  on  the  atomic 
project.  That  so  many  workers  could 
do  this  was  indicative  of  a  major  un- 
derlying problem  in  maintaining  a 
work  force — the  fact  that  for  much  of 
the  time  in  1943  and  1944  there  were 
more  jobs  available  in  the  areas  near 
the  atomic  installations  than  there 
were  qualified  workers  to  fill  them.^ 

Analysis  of  data  accumulated  in  the 
exit  interviews  indicated  that  most 
project  employees  were  interested 
primarily  in  earning  the  highest 
hourly  wages  possible.  Accordingly, 
District  manpower  authorities  took 
steps  to  make  Manhattan  wage  rates 
competitive,  if  not  better,  than  those 
on  other  wartime  projects.  Working 
through  the  War  Manpower  Commis- 
sion, the  National  War  Labor  Board, 
and    other   manpower   agencies,    they 


secured  significant  adjustments  in 
Manhattan  wage  scales,  bringing  them 
up  to  the  pay  levels  of  competing 
projects.  Exit  interview  data  also  re- 
vealed that  project  workers  did  not 
object  to  long  hours  if  they  received 
overtime  pay  for  time  put  in  beyond 
the  regular  workweek.  For  example, 
when  Du  Pont  in  the  summer  of  1943 
reduced  the  workweek  on  construc- 
tion jobs  at  Hanford  from  fifty-eight 
to  forty-eight  hours,  eliminating  most 
overtime,  workers  began  leaving  at  a 
greatly  accelerated  rate.  Only  when 
General  Groves  personally  inter- 
vened, directing  Du  Pont  to  extend 
the  workweek  to  fifty-four  hours,  did 
employee  turnover  decline  to  an  ac- 
ceptable rate.'* 

4  he  frequency  of  complaints  about 
living  conditions  made  it  evident  that 
new  community  facilities  were  needed 
at  Clinton  and  Hanford.  District  offi- 
cials began  with  a  renewed  emphasis 
on  securing  greater  cooperation  from 
the  leaders  of  existing  communities 
adjacent  to  the  sites  in  the  provision 
of  housing,  commercial  and  recre- 
ational facilities,  transportation,  and 
the  other  more  urgent  requirements 
of  project  workers  temporarily  resid- 
ing in  those  communities.  At  the 
same  time,  the  District  made  every 
effort  to  speed  up  construction  of 
housing  and  other  facilities  in  the 
towns  of  Oak  Ridge  and  Richland.^ 

While  the  District  could  overcome 
some  glaring  deficiencies  in  employ- 
ment  and   living  conditions,   it   could 


2MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8.  pp.  3.1-:i2.  DASA. 
3  Ibid.,  App.  A5.  DASA. 


^Sialcnitnt  on  Requested  Increase  in  Operating 
Rales  at  C^linton  Engineer  Works,  attached  to  cover- 
ing Memo.  14  )un  44,  HB  Files.  Fldr  51,  MDR; 
MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8,  p.  3.3,  DASA. 

•\See  Chs.  XXI  and  XXII  for  a  more  detailed  dis- 
cussion on  the  development  of  community  facilities 
and  relations. 


MANPOWER  CONSERVATION 


365 


not  hope  to  provide  the  comforts  and 
conveniences  available  in  long-estab- 
lished, thickly  populated  communi- 
ties. District  officials,  however,  tried 
to  inculcate  great  toleration  and  ac- 
ceptance among  project  workers  for 
the  unavoidable  hardships  and  incon- 
veniences. This  was  the  goal,  for  ex- 
ample, of  an  extensive  campaign 
begun  in  the  summer  of  1944  to  raise 
the  morale  of  the  work  force. 
Through  public  media — stories  in 
company  newspapers,  strategically  lo- 
cated billboards  and  posters,  and  film 
trailers  shown  in  local  theaters — the 
District  personnel  office  circulated 
materials  designed  to  appeal  to  the 
workers'  sense  of  patriotism  and  their 
pride  in  contributing  to  the  comple- 
tion of  a  difficult  job  under  adverse 
conditions.^ 

Despite  these  countermeasures,  ab- 
senteeism and  labor  turnover  contin- 
ued to  rise  in  1944.  After  consultation 
with  officials  of  the  War  Manpower 
Commission,  District  manpower  au- 
thorities decided  to  dispatch  special 
investigative  teams  to  Clinton  and 
Hanford.  These  teams — each  com- 
prised of  a  representative  of  the  Man- 
power Commission,  a  labor  officer 
from  the  Army  Service  Forces  (ASF) 
headquarters,  and  an  officer  from  the 
District  staff— conducted  thoroughgo- 
ing labor  surveys  of  several  weeks' 
duration.'^ 

Rather  surprisingly,  the  Clinton 
team  came  up  with  a  recommendation 
that  no  special  efforts  be  made  to 
solve  the  turnover  problem.  They  re- 
ported that  the  amount  of  absentee- 
ism    and     trirnover    at     Clinton     was 


indeed  high;  in  fact,  much  higher 
than  at  Hanford.  Nevertheless,  the 
team  members  felt  that  District  man- 
power authorities  had  progressed  so 
far  in  developing  good  labor  relations 
and  in  providing  suitable  living  condi- 
tions and  community  facilities  that  the 
problems  with  the  work  force  no 
longer  posed  a  threat  to  completion 
of  the  project.  Further  confirmation 
of  the  optimistic  report  came  from 
the  chief  of  the  Labor  Branch  of  the 
ASF's  Industrial  Personnel  Division, 
Lt.  Col.  John  K.  Collins.  Wishing  to 
consult  with  the  team  members  on 
their  findings  and  to  assess  the  situa- 
tion firsthand,  Collins  made  an  in- 
spection visit  in  mid-May.  He  con- 
curred that  facilities  for  workers  were 
"uncommonly  good,"  and  discovered 
that  the  high  rate  of  absenteeism  and 
turnover  indicated  in  the  team's  sta- 
tistics was  not  primarily  the  result  of 
the  construction  workers'  dissatisfac- 
tion with  working  and  living  condi- 
tions but  more  directly  attributable  to 
the  fact  that  many  of  them  came  from 
nearby  farms  and  periodically  had  to 
take  time  off  to  do  farm  work.^ 

While  lacking  the  glowing  optimism 
of  the  labor  survey  reports  on  Clin- 
ton, the  report  from  the  Hanford 
team  was  highly  commendatory  of 
efforts  made  to  achieve  the  best  facili- 
ties feasible  under  rugged  circum- 
stances. The  team  considered  em- 
ployment conditions  comparable  with 
those  on  similar  heavy  construction 
projects  in  progress,  and  pointed  out 


«MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8,  pp.  3.3-3.4  and  App.  B8 
(Documents  Illustrative  of  Use  of  Public  Media  lo 
Curtail  Job  Turnover  and  Absenteeism),  DASA. 

'  Ibid.,  Bk.  I,  Vol.  8,  pp.  3. .5,  DASA. 


8  Lir,  Maj  L.  Dale  Hill  (MD  member  of  labor 
survev  team)  to  Dist  Kngr,  sub:  Labor  Survey  at 
CEW,  23  May  44,  copy  in  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8,  App. 
BIO,  DASA;  Memo,  Collins  to  Ciroves,  sub:  Visit  to 
CEW  (16-17  May  44),  22  May  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  79 
(Jack  Madigan),  MDR. 


366 


MANHATTAN:  1  HE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


the  various  ways  in  which  manage- 
ment had  endeavored  to  ehminate  the 
more  trying  and  irritating  inconven- 
iences. Chief  causes  for  absenteeism 
and  labor  turnover,  the  team  conclud- 
ed, were  rumors  that  misrepresented 
conditions  at  Hanford  and  the  recruit- 
ment of  many  older,  inexperienced, 
and  less  physically  able  employees 
who  could  not  readily  adjust  to  the 
demands  of  the  work.  The  team  rec- 
ommended that  both  the  War  Man- 
power Commission  and  the  United 
States  Employment  Service  could 
assist  in  reducing  labor  turnover  by 
taking  steps  to  curb  unsubstantiated 
rumors  and  making  greater  efforts  to 
screen  out  poor  risks  among  job 
applicants.^ 

As  building  of  the  Clinton  and 
Hanford  plants  neared  completion, 
the  project's  need  for  construction 
workers  declined.  Concerned  about 
the  disrupting  effect  of  large-scale  re- 
ductions-in-force,  the  District  imple- 
mented a  policy  of  recruiting  the  op- 
erating staffs  from  among  employees 
on  the  construction  work  force.  Be- 
cause these  jobs  were  more  secure 
and  employment  and  living  condi- 
tions had  greatly  improved,  the  rate 
of  turnover  and  absenteeism  among 
plant-operating  employees  was  much 
less  than  among  construction  work- 
ers. The  District,  nevertheless,  contin- 
ued a  vigorous  program  of  manpower 
conservation  into  the  postwar  period. 
The  most  crucial  period  of  plant  op- 
eration came  in  the  first  half  of  1945, 
and  personnel  supervisors  constantly 
had      to      counteract      the      tendency 


among  employees  to  relax  their  ef- 
forts as  Allied  victory  over  the  Axis 
powers  seemed  assured.  ^° 

Special  Problems   With  the  Selective 
Service  System 

Operation  of  the  Selective  Service 
System  created  special  problems  in 
manpower  conservation  for  the  Man- 
hattan Project.  Although  other  major 
wartime  industrial  enterprises  experi- 
enced similar  problems,  certain  fac- 
tors made  Manhattan  less  able  to  tol- 
erate losses  from  its  civilian  work 
force  to  military  service.  Because  of 
the  unique  and  complex  technology 
involved  in  many  of  its  operations, 
the  project  employed  a  higher  per- 
centage of  workers,  especially  among 
its  scientists  and  technicians,  who  had 
indispensable  and  often  irreplaceable 
skills.  Also,  because  of  the  enormous 
urgency  of  the  bomb  development 
program,  the  project  faced  an  almost 
continuous  series  of  construction  and 
production  deadlines  that  could  be 
met  only  if  key  employees  at  all  levels 
could  be  kept  on  the  job.  Finally,  be- 
cause of  the  highly  secret  nature  of 
project  activities,  Army  administrators 
had  to  exercise  great  care  that  com- 
pliance with  Selective  Service  regula- 
tions did  not  result  in  serious 
breaches  of  security.  ^  ^ 

Faced  with  these  unusual  problems, 
the  Manhattan  District  had  to  develop 
special  measures  for  dealing  with  the 
Selective  Service  System  to  prevent 
an  unacceptable  erosion  of  its  civilian 


9  Rpt,  Spec  W'MC-WD  I  earn  Assigned  to  HEW 
Proj  (prepared  by  Ned  McDonald,  W'M(-,  Maj  I.  B. 
Cross,  Jr.,  ASF,  and  Maj  R.  I.  NewccMTib,  CE), 
20  Jun  44,  copy  in  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8,  App.  B9, 
DAS  A. 


10  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8,  pp.  3.5-3.6  and  .Apps.  Al, 
All,  A6,  DASA. 

1 '  Selective  Service  System,  Industnal  Deferment, 
Special  Monograph  No.  6,  \'ol.  1  (Washington. 
D.C.:  Government  Printing  Oflice,  1948),  pp.  1-2. 


MANPOWER  CONSERVAIION 


367 


employees.  The  civilian  force  was 
comprised  of  those  employed  by 
project  contractors  and  civil  servants 
assigned  to  the  District  headquarters 
or  area  offices.  The  first  category  of 
workers  constituted  the  greater  prob- 
lem in  terms  of  Selective  Service  poli- 
cies, because  this  group  far  outnum- 
bered their  federal  counterparts;  the 
second  category  of  workers  was  sub- 
ject to  the  somewhat  modified  Selec- 
tive Service  regulations  that  governed 
all  civil  service  employees  in  World 
War  II.  Because  Selective  Service  reg- 
ulations generally  prohibited  group 
deferments,  the  Manhattan  Project,  as 
did  every  other  wartime  employer, 
dealt  with  its  draft  problems  in  terms 
of  the  case  of  each  individual  worker 
and  mostly  at  the  level  of  the  local 
Selective  Service  Board.  From  the  ad- 
ministrative standpoint,  especially  that 
of  security,  this  approach  greatly  com- 
plicated the  draft  problem  for  District 
manpower  authorities  because  it 
meant  they  had  to  negotiate  with  hun- 
dreds of  different  local  boards.  And 
in  each  case  they  had  to  decide 
whether  to  permit  a  particular  em- 
ployee to  be  inducted  into  service,  to 
request  a  delay  in  his  induction  until 
he  could  be  replaced,  to  seek  his  tem- 
porary or  permanent  deferment,  or  to 
have  him  inducted  and  then  assigned 
to  a  Manhattan  military  unit,  such  as 
the  Special  Engineer  Detachment.  ^^ 

Until  late  in  1943,  when  major 
changes  occurred  in  draft  regulations, 
manpower  requirements  of  the  Selec- 
tive Service  System  did  not  present  a 
serious  threat  to  the  project.  Conse- 
quently, the  District  placed  a  priority 
on   maintaining   security,    rather   than 


obtaining  deferments  for  its  person- 
nel. Instead  of  setting  up  a  special 
staff,  the  District  delegated  to  project 
contractors  the  task  of  resolving  the 
draft  problems  of  their  employees 
and  limited  its  intervention  in  Selec- 
tive Service  problems  to  the  relatively 
few  cases  involving  its  own  govern- 
ment employees.  This  policy  was  gen- 
erally feasible  as  long  as  Selective 
Service  regulations  exempted  a  large 
body  of  manpower  for  family  depend- 
ency. Project  contractors  hired  most 
of  their  workers  from  this  group  and 
also  could  usually  secure  replacement 
for  those  employees  who  were  drafted 
from  this  reservoir  of  manpower.  In- 
evitably, there  were  some  exceptions. 
For  example,  uniquely  qualified  scien- 
tists and  technicians  could  not  be  re- 
placed by  members  of  any  exempted 
class.  In  these  instances.  District  man- 
power officials,  with  strong  support 
from  Secretary  Stimson,  intervened 
with  Selective  Service  authorities  to 
obtain  deferments. ^^ 

After  the  Japanese  attack  on  Pearl 
Harbor  and  America's  entry  into  the 
war,  the  Selective  Service  had  moved 
steadily  toward  inducting  men  from 
hitherto  deferred  classes.  By  late 
1943,  the  need  for  additional  man- 
power for  the  armed  forces  was  so 
critical  that  the  Selective  Service  in- 
formed local  boards  to  consider  draft- 
ing fathers  as  of  1  October.  Within 
two  months,  following  passage  of 
congressional     legislation     extending 


'2  MDH,  Bk.  I.  Vol.  8,  pp.  6.6-6.15.  DASA;  Indus 
Irial  Deferment,  pp.  231-32. 


'3  MDH,  Bk.  1.  Vol.  8,  pp.  6.6-6.15,  DASA;  Se- 
lective Service  System,  [)ependency  Deferment,  Special 
Monograph  No.  8  (Wa.shington,  D.C.:  Ciovernment 
Printing  Office,  1947),  pp.  33-51;  Ltrs.  Secy  War  to 
Chairman,  WD  Central  Deferment  Board,  8  Mar  43, 
and  Secy  War  to  Maj  Cen  Lewis  B.  Her.shey  (Selec- 
tive Sv(  Sv.stem  Dir),  1  Mav  43,  Admin  File.s,  Gen 
Corre.sp,  231.1.  MDR. 


368 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


and  ratifying  this  policy,  the  atomic 
project  faced  the  prospect  of  losing 
thousands  of  key  employees  at  the 
very  time  when  its  own  manpower 
needs  were  reaching  a  peak.  The 
draft  regulations  also  placed  in  ques- 
tion the  occupational  deferments  of 
many  younger  scientists,  technicians, 
and  skilled  workers  who  had  no  de- 
pendents, for  public  opinion  consist- 
ently favored  selection  of  younger 
men  without  family  responsibilities.^'* 
To  avert  the  deleterious  effects  of 
any  manpower  losses,  the  District 
abandoned  its  earlier  hands-off  policy 
and  assumed  a  more  decisive  role  in 
draft  matters  by  reorganizing  Selec- 
tive Service  functions.  In  late  1943, 
control  over  deferment  procedures 
through  the  District  was  centralized  at 
the  Oak  Ridge  headquarters  under 
administration  of  a  newly  formed  Se- 
lective Service  Section.  In  December, 
the  section  took  over  the  Selective 
Service  functions  of  the  former  Clin- 
ton Area  Engineers  Office.  Shortly 
thereafter,  in  support  of  its  more 
active  participation  in  draft  matters, 
the  District  established  branch  offices 
in  New  York  City  and  Chicago  and  at 
the  Hanford  Engineer  Works,  where 
the  area  engineer  subsequently 
formed  a  separate  section  to  process 
deferments  for  operating  personnel  in 
the  plutonium  facilities.  Finally,  to 
assist  the  District's  Selective  Service 
Section  in  review  of  draft  cases  in- 
volving project  civil  service  employ- 
ees, the  Secretary  of  War  appointed  a 
regional  deferment  committee  that 
was     comprised     of    three     commis- 


sioned   officers    from    the    Manhattan 
District.  ^^ 

Organized  and  functioning  much 
like  a  state  Selective  Service  head- 
quarters, the  District's  Selective  Serv- 
ice Section  instituted  a  variety  of 
measures  that  facilitated  the  prompt 
resolution  of  draft  problems.  It  re- 
viewed each  draft  case  and  advised 
the  district  engineer  on  procedures  to 
be  followed  in  its  resolution,  and  also 
regularly  issued  to  project  contractors 
and  area  engineers  circular  letters 
containing  all  pertinent  Selective 
Service  information  allowable  within 
the  security  requirements  of  the 
project.  Then  in  early  1944,  under 
the  so-called  West  Coast  Plan  that 
provided  for  deferment  of  workers  in 
critical  war  industries,  the  section  suc- 
cessfully obtained  for  project  contrac- 
tors at  thirteen  Manhattan  estab- 
lishments (including  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory,  Clinton  Laboratories, 
Hanford  Engineer  Works,  and  the 
Kellex  Corporation)  authorization  to 
defer  those  employees  essential  to 
maintain  construction  and  production 
schedules.  These  measures  contribut- 
ed to  the  relief  of  state  Selective 
Service  directors  from  personal  re- 
sponsibility for  Manhattan  District  de- 
ferments granted  earlier — deferments 
that,  under  the  pressure  of  manpower 
shortages  in  1944,  state  directors,  not 
really  understanding  why  atomic 
project  workers  were  essential,  were 
more  and  more  prone  to  question.  ^^ 


i*MDH,  Bk.   1,  Vol.  8,  pp.  6.6-6.11,  DASA;  De- 
pendency Deferment,  pp.  53-58. 


15  Org  Charts,  U.S.  Engrs  Office,  MD,  1  Jun, 
28  Aug,  10  Nov  44  and  26  Jan  45,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  020  (MED-Org),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  1, 
Vol.  8,  pp.  6.15-6.17,  and  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  "Construc- 
tion," pp.  4.18-4.19,  DASA;  Industrial  Deferment,  pp. 
243-45. 

'«MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8,  pp.  6.6-6.11  and  Apps. 
A9-A11,  DASA;  Industrial  Deferment,  pp.  112-13  and 
166-69. 


MANPOWER  CONSERVATION 


369 


A  new  threat  to  project  manpower 
needs  arose  in  January,  when  the  Se- 
lective Service  began  enforcing  a 
more  stringent  pohcy  on  occupational 
deferments  for  younger  men  (general- 
ly under  age  thirty).  Administrators  at 
Los  Alamos,  for  example,  predicted 
that  such  a  policy  would  be  disastrous 
for  the  entire  project.  Wasting  no 
time,  the  District's  Selective  Service 
Section  began  providing  local  draft 
boards  with  detailed  data  on  the  edu- 
cational background,  work  experi- 
ence, and  contributions  to  the  project 
of  thousands  of  its  younger  employ- 
ees. At  the  same  time,  it  also  urged 
project  contractors  to  actively  sup- 
port continued  deferment  of  workers 
classified  as  disqualified  for  military 
service  (4-F)  or  for  limited  service 
(LA-1).  By  the  time  the  war  ended, 
the  District  had  approved  and  for- 
warded to  the  Selective  Service 
System  more  than  thirty-eight  thou- 
sand original  deferment  cases  and  re- 
newed more  than  ten  thousand  of 
these  cases.  In  addition,  area  engi- 
neers had  directly  processed  thou- 
sands more.^"^ 

In  the  period  after  the  war,  some 
critics  asserted  that  the  Selective 
Service  System  had  "greatly  crippled" 
the  atomic  project.  Manhattan  admin- 
istrators disagreed,  however.  Accord- 
ing to  Colonel  Nichols,  for  example, 
in  the  approximately  sixty  thousand 
deferment  actions  handled  up 
through  June  1946,  "no  one  has  been 
lost    to    the    project    whose    services 


i^MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8,  pp.  6.11-6.13  and  App. 
A 12,  DASA;  Ltrs,  Arthur  L.  Hughes  (Personnel  Dir, 
Los  Alamos  Lab)  to  Samuel  T.  Arnold  (MD  Con- 
sultant for  Tech  Personnel),  15  Jan  44,  and  Oppen- 
heimer  to  Groves,  8  Apr  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  201  (Gen),  MDR.  Sec  also  Memo,  unsigned 
(probably  Groves),  ca.  Apr  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  105, 
MDR, 


were  essential."  ^®  Certain  Selective 
Service  measures  had  threatened  key 
project  operations,  but  the  District's 
effective  policy  of  energetic  counter- 
action had  enabled  Manhattan  offi- 
cials to  avert  any  serious  interference 
with  the  progress  of  the  bomb  devel- 
opment program. 

Labor  Relations:   Union  Activities 
and  Work  Stoppages 

Employer-employee  relations  was 
an  important  factor  in  the  conserva- 
tion of  the  Manhattan  Project  work 
force.  ^^  Given  the  industrial  character 
of  its  activities,  these  relations  natu- 
rally centered  on  questions  of  union- 
ization and  unions.  But  unusually 
stringent  security  requirements  great- 
ly circumscribed  the  extent  to  which 
normal  labor  activities  could  be  pur- 
sued. Nevertheless,  consistent  with 
the  War  Department  policy  estab- 
lished in  the  early  months  of  the  war, 
the  Army  permitted  workers  on  the 
atomic  project  to  carry  on  union  ac- 
tivities as  long  as  they  did  not  inter- 
fere  with   achievement    of  the   major 


^*  Statement  by  Nichols,  7  Jun  46,  Admin  Piles, 
Gen  Corresp,  201  (Gen),  MDR. 

1^  Section  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8.  pp.  4.1- 
4.14  and  Apps.  A2  (Table,  Manhattan  Proj  Contrac- 
tors' Employment,  Aug  42-Dec  45)  and  A7  (Table, 
Analysis  of  Work  Stoppages-Constr  Contractors); 
Bk.  4,  Vol.  6,  "Operations,"  p.  13.3;  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1, 
"General,"  p.  6.62.  All  in  DASA.  Fairchild  and 
Grossman,  Army  and  Industrial  Manpower,  pp.  72  and 
129-30.  Rpt,  John  H.  Ohly,  sub:  Formulation  of 
Labor  Policies  To  Govern  Opn  of  CEW,  10  Nov  44; 
Memo,  Ohlv  to  Brig  Gen  Edwin  S.  Greenbaum 
(Und  Secv  War's  labor  adviser),  ca.  11  Nov  44; 
Memos  for  File,  Ohly.  sub:  MD,  13,  18,  and  21  Dec 
44;  Ltr,  A.  C.  Joy  (Act  Dir,  Tenth  Region,  NLRB, 
Atlanta,  Ga.)  to  Und  Secv  War,  sub:  Roane-Ander- 
son Co.,  Case  lO-R-1369,  28  Nov  44.  All  in  HB 
Files,  Fldr  80,  MDR.  Memos,  Und  Secv  War  to 
Bvrnes,  27  and  30  Nov  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  51,  MDR. 
Marsden  Diary,  29  Nov  44,  OROO. 


370 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


objectives  of  the  program.  This  pohcy 
excluded,  of  course,  resorting  to 
strikes  and  any  other  labor  activities 
that  would  interrupt  war  production 
or  compromise  security. 

To  deal  with  Manhattan  Project 
labor  relations  problems,  the  Army 
relied  extensively  on  experience 
gained,  starting  with  the  period  of 
emergency  preparedness  in  1940-41, 
as  an  employer  of  thousands  of  work- 
ers in  arsenals  and  depots  and  on 
Corps  of  Engineers  construction 
projects  and  as  administrators  of  gov- 
ernment-owned, contractor-operated 
(GOCO)  plants  that  produced  muni- 
tions of  war.  From  this  experience 
the  Army  learned  that  the  most  effi- 
cient means  for  recruiting  workers 
was  through  those  unions  affiliated 
with  the  Building  and  Construction 
Trades  Department  of  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor  (AFL).  This 
method  minimized  union-organizing 
and  -recruiting  activities  on  the  job, 
because  the  Army  and  the  AFL  had 
agreed  that  contractors  must  main- 
tain a  closed-shop  policy. 

In  the  event  that  unions  would  be 
unable  to  satisfy  Manhattan's  quotas 
for  skilled  and  unskilled  workers,  the 
Army-AFL  agreement  permitted  con- 
tractors to  procure  them  elsewhere, 
with  the  provision  that  they  join  the 
appropriate  union  before  starting 
their  employment.  When  the  AFL  la- 
borers union  could  supply  only  a 
fraction  of  the  quota  needed  at  the 
CHnton  Engineer  Works,  the  contrac- 
tors— working  with  District  manpower 
authorities — turned  to  the  War  Man- 
power Commission  and  federal  em- 
ployment agencies  for  recruitment  as- 
sistance. Recruitment  of  workers 
through  government  channels,  how- 
ever,   obviated    compliance    with    the 


existing  policy  of  union  membership. 
To  have  required  it.  General  Groves 
pointed  out  to  District  personnel 
monitoring  labor  problems,  would 
mean,  in  effect,  that  the  government 
was  subsidizing  recruitment  for  a 
labor  organization. 

The  District's  efforts  to  minimize 
those  union  activities  likely  to  impact 
negatively  on  construction  and  pro- 
duction schedules,  as  well  as  pose  a 
threat  to  security,  generally  were  ef- 
fective. But  work  stoppages — for  the 
most  part,  of  very  brief  duration — did 
occur.  The  largest  number  resulted 
from  jurisdictional  disputes  between 
crafts.  In  April  1943,  for  example, 
when  electricians  and  ironworkers  at 
Clinton  disagreed  over  the  handling 
of  heavy  electrical  equipment,  they 
walked  off  the  job.  The  walkout  lasted 
two  days,  during  which  522  man- 
hours  were  lost.  Some  work  stop- 
pages occurred  over  discharge  or 
transfer  of  employees.  Typical  was  a 
case  in  February  1944,  when  mem- 
bers of  the  welders  union  at  Hanford 
struck  briefly  to  protest  transfer  of 
one  of  their  members  to  the  night 
shift,  allegedly  because  of  a  grudge 
between  the  area  superintendent  and 
the  employee.  Time  lost  totaled  171 
man-hours. 

Dissatisfaction  with  wage  rates  and 
employment  conditions  caused  a  few 
work  stoppages.  Plumbers  at  Clinton 
walked  off  the  job  briefly  in  Decem- 
ber 1943  in  protest  against  a  rule  re- 
quiring that  they  use  a  parking  lot 
more  than  half  a  mile  from  the  point 
where  they  punched  their  timecards, 
and  millwrights  engaged  in  construc- 
tion of  a  plant  for  the  atomic  project 
at  Decatur,  Illinois,  ceased  work  for  a 
few  hours  in  August   1944  in  dispute 


MANPOWER  CONSERVAIION 


371 


over  payment  of  sliifl  time.  In  one  or 
two  instances  where  a  large  number 
of  key  construction  employees  were 
involved  (for  example,  electricians  at 
C.linton  in  December  1944),  the  loss 
of  man-hours  was  considerable  (in 
this  case  some  forty  thousand  hours). 
But  quick  settlement  of  most  disputes 
averted  any  disastrous  slowdown  in 
the  building  program. 

The  District  faced  far  more  novel 
and  complex  labor  relations  problems 
in  administering  the  project's  operat- 
ing employees.  Many  operating  em- 
ployees had  to  be  made  privy  to 
highly  classified  data  and  equipment, 
whereas  most  construction  employees 
had  no  need  for  secret  information. 
Typically,  too,  the  atomic  project's 
unique  operating  processes  were  far 
more  vulnerable,  and  labor  activity 
that  interfered  with  operations  simply 
could  not  be  tolerated.  Furthermore, 
most  operating  employees  were  not 
union  members  and  their  work  did 
not  fit  nicely  into  any  of  the  usual  job 
categories. 

Most  of  the  commercial  and 
in  dustrial  firms  and  the  research  in- 
stitutions that  accepted  operating 
contracts  with  the  atomic  project  cus- 
tomarily adhered  to  an  open-shop 
policy.  Du  Pont,  with  major  oper- 
ational responsibilities  at  various 
project  installations,  had  never  been 
unionized  in  its  private  commercial 
operations.  The  same  was  true  of  the 
Tennessee  Eastman  Corporation,  op- 
erator of  the  electromagnetic  plant  at 
Clinton.  Similarly,  most  of  the  univer- 
sity contractors  were  nonunion  em- 
ployers. Ihere  were  a  few  exceptions. 
1  he  University  of  Chicago  had  a  writ- 
ten agreement  with  the  State,  County, 
and  Municipal  Workers  of  America,  a 
CIO   (Congress  of  Industrial   Organi- 


zations) union,  but  it  had  little  effect 
on  employee  relations  at  the  Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory.  The  University  of 
California  recognized  the  right  of  the 
Alameda  County  Building  Trades 
Council  unions  to  establish  pay  rates 
and  conditions  of  employment  for  all 
maintenance  employees  hired  by  the 
university. 

There  were  exceptions,  too,  among 
the  commercial  and  industrial  con- 
tractors. The  primary  business  of 
the  community  service  contractors 
(Robert  E.  McKee  at  Los  Alamos,  the 
Morrison-Knudsen  Company  in  the 
Hanford  area,  and  the  Oak  Ridge- 
based  Roane-Anderson  Company,  a 
subsidiary  of  the  Turner  Construction 
Company  of  New  York)  was  construc- 
tion work.  They  were  accustomed  to 
dealing  with  the  construction  unions 
and  found  that  they  could  secure 
most  of  the  employees  needed  for 
community  operation  and  mainte- 
nance through  the  AFL  Building 
Trades  unions.  A  number  of  the  op- 
erators of  smaller  project  plants  also 
normally  employed  union  labor  and 
continued  to  do  so  in  carrying  out 
their  Manhattan  contracts.  The  Hou- 
daille-Hershey  Corporation  of  Deca- 
tur, Illinois,  for  example,  which  made 
barrier  material  for  the  gaseous  diffu- 
sion process,  signed  an  agreement 
with  the  Building  Trades  unions. 
Also,  many  of  the  firms  manufactur- 
ing equipment  and  materials  for  Man- 
hattan— such  as  the  Allis-Chalmers 
Manufacturing  Company,  Chrysler 
Corporation,  and  Hooker  Electro- 
chemical Company — already  were 
unionized. 

For  reasons  of  security.  District 
manpower  authorities  frequently  had 
to     substitute     for    government     and 


372 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


union  officials  in  carrying  on  labor  re- 
lations with  nonunion  operating  em- 
ployees. In  cases  of  alleged  violations 
of  the  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act  and 
the  Walsh-Healey  Act  and  in  the  con- 
duct of  inquiries  made  by  the  Fair 
B^mployment  Practices  Committee, 
they  served  in  lieu  of  government 
representatives;  in  the  few  instances 
when  operating  employee  elections 
were  necessary,  they  supervised  the 
balloting;  and  when  federal  agencies 
took  the  initiative  in  requesting  an  in- 
vestigation of  employees  or  when  na- 
tional labor  unions  sought  to  hold 
elections,  they  endeavored  to  per- 
suade the  agencies  or  unions  to  waive 
the  security-threatening  procedure 
and,  failing  in  this,  to  let  Manhattan 
carry  out  whatever  procedure  was 
deemed  necessary. 

Several  unions  pressed  District 
manpower  authorities  for  recognition 
as  bargaining  agents  for  plant-operat- 
ing employees  at  the  major  produc- 
tion sites.  To  mediate  the  issue,  each 
union  filed  a  petition  with  the  Nation- 
al Labor  Relations  Board  and  re- 
quested a  formal  hearing.  The  Inter- 
national Brotherhood  of  Firemen  and 
Oilers  filed  the  first  petition  in 
August  1944,  seeking  to  represent  the 
Carbide  and  Carbon  Chemicals  Cor- 
poration employees  who  worked  at 
the  gaseous  diffusion  power  plant, 
and  subsequently  the  International 
Brotherhood  of  Electrical  Workers 
joined  with  the  Firemen  and  Oilers 
union  in  its  petition.  When  the  Na- 
tional Labor  Relations  Board  sched- 
uled a  hearing  (or  24  October,  Dis- 
trict authorities  promptly  intervened 
to  prevent  a  serious  security  threat. 
They  negotiated  with  board  officials, 
who,  in  the  end,  agreed  to  postpone 
the  hearing.   Fhe  postponement,  how- 


ever, was  only  a  temporary  victory  for 
the  District,  as  the  mediators  indicat- 
ed an  ultimate  hearing  on  the  petition 
was  mandatory. 

General  Groves,  determined  to  find 
a  permanent  solution  to  the  labor 
problems  of  plant-operating  employ- 
ees, turned  to  War  Department  l^bor 
experts  for  advice  and  assistance.  As 
Groves  saw  it,  the  atomic  program 
had  to  achieve  three  objectives:  It  had 
to  maintain  production  schedules;  its 
operations  had  to  be  protected  from 
sabotage  and  subversive  interference 
and  from  disclosure  of  information 
useful  to  a  foreign  power;  and  it  had 
to  maintain  maximum  efficiency  and 
economy.  I  he  Manhattan  commander 
felt  strongly  that  District  labor  poli- 
cies must  be  formulated  to  further 
these  objectives,  which,  he  frankly 
stated,  might  best  be  achieved  by  for- 
bidding unions  among  plant-operat- 
ing employees  who  worked  in  restrict- 
ed areas.  This  policy,  as  he  visualized 
it,  would  mean  exclusion  of  all  out- 
side agencies  (including  the  National 
Labor  Relations  and  the  National  War 
Labor  Boards)  and  a  ban  on  all  types 
of  union  activities.  Groves  immediate- 
ly granted,  however,  that  so  restric- 
tive a  labor  policy  was  probably  not 
feasible  and  the  District  undoubtedly 
would  have  to  be  satisfied  with  a  com- 
promise arrangement.  He  suggested  a 
policy  that  would  permit  unions,  lim- 
iting membership  in  them  to  employ- 
ees of  those  contractors  who  had 
signed  a  secrecy  agreement,  would 
forbid  outside  union  representatives, 
and  would  require  Army  inspection 
and  control  of  all  union  activities.  If 
disputes  should  arise  that  could  not 
be  settled  in  negotiations  between  the 
contractor  and  the  union,  thev  would 


MANPOWER  CONSER\'ATION 


373 


have  to  be  submitted  to  the  Secretary 
of  War  for  arbitration. 

War  Department  labor  officials 
were  in  agreement  with  General 
Groves  that  there  was  no  feasible  way 
for  the  Army  to  deny  to  the  project's 
plant-operating  employees  all  rights 
to  organize.  Their  views  were  summa- 
rized in  a  report  prepared  in  Novem- 
ber 1944  by  John  H.  Ohly  of  the 
ASF's  Industrial  Personnel  Division. 
After  conferring  with  Groves  and  sev- 
eral other  District  representatives, 
Ohly  concluded  that  labor  problems 
at  Clinton  were  similar  to  those  of  the 
Army's  GOCO  plants,  but  there  were 
significant  differences:  the  overall  ur- 
gency of  the  atomic  project,  its  em- 
ployment of  several  major  contractors 
at  one  site,  its  unusually  strict  security 
requirements,  the  sensitivity  of  its 
processes  to  stoppage,  and  the  ex- 
ceptionally large  percentage  of  its 
workers  residing  within  a  military  res- 
ervation. Yet  these  differences, 
Ohly  reported,  did  not  justify  deny- 
ing plant-operating  employees  the 
right  to  organize.  "The  right  to  join 
or  associate  with  others  in  establish- 
ing a  union  of  his  own  choosing  with- 
out interference  from  his  employer," 
Ohly  noted,  was  a  basic  right  pos- 
sessed by  the  American  working  man, 
and  the  War  Department  consistent- 
ly had  adhered  to  the  policy  of  per- 
mitting employees  in  war  industries 
to  continue  to  exercise  that  right  to 
the  maximum  extent  practicable 
under  wartime  conditions,  ^o  The 
extent  to  which  workers  at  the  (Clin- 
ton plant  would  try  to  organize,  Ohly 


2°  Rpt,  Ohiv.  sub:  Formulalion  ol   Labor  Folic it-s 
lo  (iovern  Opn  of  CKVV  .  10  Nov  44.  MDR. 


believed,  depended  largely  on  the  at- 
titude of  the  national  union  leaders — 
William  Green,  Philip  Murray,  John  L. 
Lewis,  and  their  chief  subordinates — 
toward  these  efforts.  If  these  leaders 
should  encourage  unionization  of  the 
atomic  plants,  Ohly  was  confident 
that  this  labor  activity  could  be  ac- 
commodated without  unduly  imperil- 
ing the  major  objectives  of  the 
project. 

General  Groves  was  willing  to  go 
along  with  the  view  that  production 
workers  should  be  permitted  some  or- 
ganizing activities,  but  he  opposed 
admission  of  outside  union  represent- 
atives to  project  areas  and  the  con- 
duct of  public  hearings  on  petitions 
by  labor  board  officials.  He  did  not 
succeed,  however,  in  the  time  gained 
through  several  postponements  of  the 
union  hearings,  in  attaining  an  agree- 
ment for  withdrawal  of  the  petition. 
Finally,  on  24  November,  representa- 
tives of  the  National  Labor  Relations 
Board  notified  the  District  that  under 
the  law  they  must  act  on  the  petition 
and  thus  scheduled  a  hearing  for 
19  December.  The  Manhattan  com- 
mander immediately  wrote  to  Lender 
Secretary  of  War  Robert  P.  Patterson: 
"We  can  no  longer  merely  delay 
action  by  NLRB.  A  definite  position 
must  now  be  taken.  If  the  cooperation 
of  the  unions  could  be  secured,  the 
problem  would  be  solved.  ...  In 
view  of  the  nature  and  importance 
of  the  project,  it  is  not  too  much 
to  ask  them  in  furtherance  of  the 
national  interest  to  refrain  from  union- 
izing the  Clinton  Engineer  Works  for 
the  duration.  This  is  the  only  fea- 
sible   approach    to    the    problem.    No 


374 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


rights  are  denied  and  no  security  is 
sacrificed."  ^^ 

Groves  had  expressed  his  views  to 
Patterson  in  the  course  of  responding 
favorably  to  the  Under  Secretary's 
proposal  that  Manhattan  should  seek 
the  assistance  of  James  F.  Byrnes,  di- 
rector of  the  Office  of  War  Mobiliza- 
tion, in  securing  the  cooperation  of 
the  unions.  When  Byrnes  assented  to 
applying  his  well-known  persuasive 
powers  to  securing  an  understanding 
with  the  Electrical  Workers  and  Fire- 
men and  Oilers  unions,  Patterson 
made  the  necessary  arrangements  for 
a  meeting  on  5  December.  To  ensure 
the  support  of  the  major  operating 
contractors  at  Clinton  for  any  agree- 
ment reached  at  this  meeting.  Groves, 
Nichols,  and  Lt.  (jg.)  JohnJ.  Flaherty, 
a  Navy  officer  serving  as  special  as- 
sistant for  labor  matters  on  the  dis- 
trict engineer's  staff,  conferred  in 
New  York  on  30  November  with  rep- 
resentatives of  Carbide  and  Carbon, 
Tennessee  Eastman,  and  the  Fercleve 
Corporation. 

The  meeting  on  5  December  in 
Byrnes's  office  at  the  White  House 
laid  the  groundwork  for  the  eventual 
establishment  of  a  satisfactory  policy 
governing  labor  activities  of  operating 
employees  at  the  Clinton  Engineer 
Works — and,  by  extension,  to  those 
working  at  the  other  major  atomic  in- 
stallations— for  the  duration  of  the 
war.  With  Byrnes's  assistance.  Groves, 
Patterson,  and  Edward  McGrady,  the 
Under  Secretary's  labor  adviser  ob- 
tained a  tentative  agreement  from 
A.  L;  Wegener,  head  of  the  Electrical 
Workers,    and  Joseph    P.    Clark,    who 


2*  Memo,  Groves  to  Und  Secy  War  ,  28  Nov  44, 
Incl  to  Memo,  Und  Secv  War  to  Byrnes,  30  Nov  44, 
HB  Files,  FIdr  51,  MDR. 


served  in  a  similar  capacity  for  the 
F'iremen  and  Oilers,  to  postpone  in- 
definitely the  labor  hearings  with  the 
proviso  that  the  two  unions  be  per- 
mitted to  represent  their  membership 
in  the  handling  of  any  grievances  that 
might  arise.  In  the  days  immediately 
after  the  White  House  meeting,  the 
Firemen  and  Oilers  and  the  Electrical 
Workers  unions  confirmed  this  agree- 
ment, as  did  the  International  As- 
sociation of  Machinists,  which  had 
petitioned  for  bargaining  rights  on 
28  November  with  Roane-Anderson. 

The  Machinists  union  also  filed  a 
petition  to  organize  the  thousands  of 
workers  employed  by  Tennessee  East- 
man in  the  electromagnetic  plant  at 
Clinton,  but  held  it  in  abeyance  in 
keeping  with  the  agreement.  Some 
local  labor  leaders,  particularly  those 
in  the  Electrical  Workers  union,  were 
reluctant  to  forego  organizing  activi- 
ties, for  they  were  convinced  that  the 
operating  contractors  simply  had  used 
the  Army  to  push  through  the  ban  on 
union  organization  which  they  de- 
sired. Only  through  the  combined 
efforts  of  War  Department-District 
labor  officials  and  national  union  rep- 
resentatives were  the  skeptical  local 
labor  leaders  finally  persuaded  to  give 
the  District's  alternative  grievance 
procedures  a  chance  to  be  tested 
before  renewing  their  organizational 
activities. 

The  procedures  adopted  for  hear- 
ing grievances  were  patterned  on 
those  used  in  GOCO  plants.  In  Sep- 
tember 1944,  the  district  engineer  di- 
rected that  all  operating  contractors 
at  Clinton  institute  their  own  griev- 
ance procedures,  requiring  only  that 
the  latter  conform  to  general  stand- 
ards laid  down  by  District  manpower 


MANPOWER  CONSKR\'Al  ION 


375 


authorities.  These  procedures  guaran- 
teed each  operating  employee  equal 
access  to  "a  fair  and  complete  review 
of  his  grievance."  ^^  They  also  en- 
sured him  a  hearing  without  delay 
and  resolution  of  his  case  within 
thirty  days.  The  employee  could  take 
his  grievance  through  the  various 
levels  of  plant  supervision — foreman, 
superintendent,  and  so  forth — up  to  a 
final  hearing  by  a  representative  of 
the  district  engineer.  In  this  final 
review,  the  aggrieved  worker  could  be 
represented  by  a  union  steward,  who, 
for  reasons  of  security,  must  be  an 
employee  of  the  same  contractor  as 
the  worker. 

1  he  question  of  unions  and  imion 
activities  among  operating  employees 
at  the  other  two  major  atomic  installa- 
tions— Hanford  and  Los  Alamos — 
never  became  a  serious  problem. 
Workers  at  Hanford,  many  of  them 
already  members  of  construction 
unions,  briefly  attempted  to  organize 
operating  employees  in  the  produc- 
tion plants  administered  by  Du  Pont. 
But  Lt.  Col.  Franklin  T.  Matthias,  the 
area  engineer,  promptly  intervened. 
Similarly,  outside  unions  requested 
permission  to  organize  Hanford  work- 
ers, but  agreed  to  postpone  their 
effort  as  long  as  it  would  constitute  a 
threat  to  security.  Occasionally  indi- 
vidual AFL  members  in  the  plutoni- 
um  production  plants  endeavored  to 
recruit  members,  but  achieved  little 
success. 

Most  operating  workers  at  Los 
Alamos  were  either  civil  service  or 
contractor  employees,  some  of  whom 
belonged    to    unions.    By    late    1944, 


22  Ltr,  Dist  Engl  to  All  Ojjcratiiig  Contractors 
C.KW,  27  Sep  44.  copv  in  MDJt.  Bk.  I,  \ol.  8.  App 
Bll.  DASA. 


there  were  indications  that  union 
members  generally  opposed  employ- 
ment of  nonunion  workers  in  civil 
service  positions.  In  November,  a  rep- 
resentative from  the  Office  of  the 
Chief  of  Engineers  in  Washington, 
D.C.,  meeting  in  Santa  Fe  with  the  di- 
rector of  the  Thirteenth  U.S.  Civil 
Service  Region  (which  now  included 
New  Mexico)  and  local  labor  leaders, 
stated  that  there  would  be  no  discrim- 
ination between  union  and  nonunion 
members  in  the  hiring  of  civil  service 
employees  for  Los  Alamos.  In  the 
case  of  union  workers  employed  at 
Los  Alamos  by  project  contractors,  no 
labor  relations  problems  of  conse- 
quence occurred  during  the  period  of 
the  war. 

The  modifications  required  by  the 
Army  in  the  normal  labor  activities  of 
Manhattan's  operating  employees 
proved  to  be  both  workable  and  effec- 
tive. In  the  period  of  maximum  plant 
operations  from  late  1944  until  Sep- 
tember 1945,  there  was  no  compro- 
mise of  security  or  interruption  of 
production  schedules  that  could  be 
charged  to  labor  activities  among 
operating  employees.  Furthermore, 
most  production  workers  came  to 
accept  the  limitations  on  their  em- 
ployee rights  as  being  necessary 
under  the  circumstances.  Consequent- 
ly, these  limitations  did  not  seriously 
affect  employee  morale  or  result  in 
large-scale  defections  from  the  job. 
Perhaps  the  most  concrete  evidence 
of  the  effectiveness  of  the  project's 
labor  policies  was  the  almost  com- 
plete absence  of  work  stoppages  from 
late  1944  to  the  end  of  the  war. 
Among  the  tens  of  thousands  of  oper- 
ating employees  at  Clinton  in  this 
period,  there  was  only  one  instance  of 


376 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


stoppage — a  brief  walkout  of  general 
repairmen  in  May  1945  at  the  Car- 
bide and  Carbon  installations.  Work 
stoppages  of  somewhat  greater  length 
did  occur  at  several  plants  producing 
essential  materials  for  the  project  in 
Detroit,  in  Decatur  (Illinois),  and  in 
Uravan  (Colorado),  but  none  caused 
serious  interference  with  production 
schedules.  Even  in  the  immediate 
postwar  period,  when  restraints  on 
union  activities  inevitably  were  weak- 
ened, work  stoppages  traceable  to 
employee  organizations  or  grievances 
were  remarkably  low.  As  of  the  end  of 
December  194(),  when  the  Army  was 
preparing  to  turn  over  control  of  the 
atomic  project  to  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission,  Manhattan  production 
plants  had  lost  only  about  eighty-six 
thousand  man-hours,  or  about  0.028 
percent  of  their  potential  working 
time,  as  a  result  of  work  stoppages. 

From  1943  through  early  1945,  the 
Manhattan  Project  faced  relentless 
construction  and  production  sched- 
ules that  could  only  be  met  if  the  ade- 
quacy and  efficiency  of  its  large  and 


heterogeneous  work  force  could  be 
maintained.  Consequently,  the  mili- 
tary and  civilian  leaders  of  the  project 
early  realized  that  they  must  take 
strong  countermeasures  against  such 
prevalent  manpower-eroding  tenden- 
cies in  the  American  wartime  environ- 
ment as  high  labor  turnover,  the  de- 
mands of  military  conscription,  and 
labor  union  activities.  Making  use  of 
many  of  the  same  War  Department 
and  other  governmental  channels  ear- 
lier employed  for  procuring  workers 
for  the  project,  General  Groves,  the 
Manhattan  District's  manpower  staff 
at  Oak  Ridge,  and  the  area  engineers 
at  the  field  installations  were  able  to 
secure  approval  for  such  labor  turn- 
over antidotes  as  higher  wages  and 
improved  housing,  to  work  out  spe- 
cial arrangements  for  retaining  criti- 
cally needed  workers  with  the  Selec- 
tive Service  System,  and  to  obtain  the 
cooperation  of  American  union  lead- 
ers in  postponing  labor  activities  that 
would  have  jeopardized  the  produc- 
tion goals  and  security  of  the  project. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


Electric  Power 


Reasonable  access  to  the  essential 
process  support  elements  of  electric 
power,  water,  communications,  and 
transportation  was — as  the  safety  and 
security  of  geographic  isolation — a 
critical  factor  in  Manhattan's  selection 
of  suitable  sites.  Attainment  of  both 
of  these  desired  features  was  a  diffi- 
cult challenge,  for  often  they  were  not 
compatible  with  each  other.  Yet  with- 
out compromising  project  require- 
ments, the  Army  resolved  the  dilem- 
ma by  choosing  sites  that  were  in 
comparatively  isolated  regions  of 
Tennessee,  Washington  State,  and 
New  Mexico  and  by  developing  those 
process  support  resources  available  in 
neighboring  and  adjacent  areas. 

Overseeing  process  support  devel- 
opment, particularly  when  the  nation 
was  experiencing  a  chronic  shortage 
of  electric  generators,  boilers,  copper 
wire,  water  pipes,  and  other  equip- 
ment and  materials,  became  one  of 
the  most  important  activities  under- 
taken by  the  Army  in  administering 
the  Manhattan  Project.  Illustrative  of 
this  fact  was  that  Army  personnel  at 
every  level  participated  in  some 
aspect  of  these  activities:  General 
Groves  and  the  Washington  Liaison 
Office  coordinated  with  appropriate 
Washington  agencies  to  secure  essen- 
tial   procurement    priorities;    the    dis- 


trict engineer  and  area  engineers  su- 
pervised process  support  activities  at 
field  installations  and  major  procure- 
ment centers;  and  the  Army  Engi- 
neers and  the  Signal  and  Transporta- 
tion Corps  contributed  substantially 
in  their  respective  fields  of  expertise. 
And  while  the  problems  were  most 
pressing  in  the  early  months  of  site 
development.  Army  personnel  from 
the  project  and  other  War  Depart- 
ment agencies  continued  to  be  in- 
volved in  their  solution  on  a  lesser 
scale  throughout  the  war. 

Power  Requirements  and  Sources 

Of  all  the  aspects  of  process  sup- 
port required  for  the  atomic  project, 
none  was  more  vital  than  electric 
power.  Electricity  constituted,  so  to 
speak,  the  very  lifeblood  of  almost 
every  important  production  process, 
as  well  as  of  many  other  project  ac- 
tivities. In  planning  and  developing 
the  project's  electric  power  program, 
the  Army  faced  three  basic  problems. 
The  first  was  how  to  procure  large 
amounts  of  electricity  from  a  wartime 
economy  that  was  only  beginning  to 
overcome  chronic  shortages.  Project 
leaders  initially  had  estimated  a  need 
for  approximately  150,000  kilowatts, 
but  the  decision  to  relocate  the  pluto- 


378 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


nium  production  facilities  at  a  sepa- 
rate site  had  upped  the  requirement 
to  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  milHon 
kilowatts,  an  amount  of  electricity  that 
at  the  time  would  have  met  the  needs 
of  a  typical  American  city  with  a  pop- 
ulation of  half  a  million.  As  large  as 
these  early  estimates  of  power  re- 
quirements for  the  project  were,  time 
would  prove  them  to  have  been  far 
too  low.^ 

A  second  problem  was  to  ensure 
electric  service  that  would  never  be 
interrupted.  This  requirement  for  vir- 
tually unparalleled  transmission  reli- 
ability arose  from  the  peculiarly  haz- 
ardous character  of  the  industrial 
processes.  Only  continuous  operation 
of  pumps,  fans,  and  refrigeration 
equipment  would  dissipate  heat  and 
remove  radioactive  gases  adequately. 
Also,  in  the  electromagnetic  and  dif- 
fusion processes,  almost  any  interrup- 
tion in  the  progressive  purification 
stages  would  play  havoc  with  closely 
coordinated  production  schedules.^ 


1  Marshall  Diary,  25  Jun  42,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp.  Groves  Files,  Misc  Recs  Sec,  behind  Fldr  5, 
MDR;  Ltr,  Groves  to  Herbert  S.  Marks  (Act  Dir, 
Power  Div,  WPB),  7  Feb  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  675,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  "Clinton  En- 
gineer Works,"  p.  12.2  and  App.  C7,  and  Bk.  4, 
\'ol.  3,  "Design,"  p.  7.1,  and  Vol.  6,  "Operations," 
p.  2.17,  DASA;  Memos,  Brig  Gen  Thomas  F.  Farrell 
(Groves's  Dep)  to  Groves,  sub:  Power  Require- 
ments, 5  Jun  45,  and  Carl  H.  Giroux  (OCE  power 
expert)  to  P'arrell,  sub:  Power  Requirements  for 
CEW,  8  Jun  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  675 
(CEW),  MDR.  A  watt,  as  used  in  this  context,  is  a 
unit  of  power  equal  to  the  rate  of  work  represented 
by  a  current  of  one  ampere  (one  coulomb  per 
second)  under  a  pressure  of  one  volt.  Thus,  project 
leaders  in  1942  were  predicting  that  150  million 
watts  of  power  would  have  to  be  available  on  a  con- 
stant basis  to  fulfill  the  operating  needs  of  the 
atomic  production  plants. 

2  Memo,  Lt  Col  James  C.  Stowers  (?>Iew  York  Area 
Engr)  to  Marshall,  sub:  K-25  Proj  Requirements, 
21  Jan  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Projs 
and  Prgms:  K-25),  MDR;  Ltr,  Percival  C.  Keith 
(Kellex    Corp.    chief)    to    Stowers,    sub:    K-25    Proj 


The  third  problem  was  a  matter  of 
security,  and  related  not  to  supply  but 
to  distribution  of  electric  power.  Be- 
cause the  quantity  of  power  required 
could  not  be  produced  by  generating 
plants  located  within  the  confines  of 
the  atomic  reservations,  much  of  it 
had  to  be  brought  over  extended 
transmission  lines  running  through 
areas  beyond  the  reach  of  effective  se- 
curity protection.  Project  engineers, 
therefore,  had  to  devise  special  tech- 
niques that  would  thwart  the  efforts 
of  potential  saboteurs.^ 

During  the  early  period  of  project 
development,  Manhattan's  administra- 
tive and  engineering  staffs  devoted 
considerable  attention  to  procuring 
electric  power  for  the  proposed 
atomic  installations,  especially  for  the 
site(s)  that  would  house  the  major 
production  plants.  Preliminary  site  in- 
vestigations in  Tennessee  and  later  in 
Washington  State  occasioned  talks 
with  the  Tennessee  Valley  Authority 
(TVA)  and  the  Bonneville  Power  Ad- 
ministration (BPA).  The  objective  of 
these  talks  was  to  obtain  assurances 
from  the  power  agencies  that  suffi- 
cient power  would  be  available  when 
needed,  or  could  be  developed  from 
new  generating  facilities  under  con- 
struction.^   The    Army    succeeded    in 


Power  Supply  and  Requirements,  25  Mar  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  675  (CEW),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  4, 
Vol.  3,  pp.  5.1  and  7.1,  DASA. 

3  Ltrs,  Groves  to  J.  A.  Krug  (OWTI  Dir),  sub:  MD, 
CEW',  2  and  30  Jun  43.  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
675  (CEW),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  3,  pp.  7.1-7.3, 
DASA;  Memo,  WTB  (by  Joseph  Whelan,  Rec  Secy) 
to  BPA.  sub:  Power  Svc  for  WD,  HEW,  1 1  May  44, 
.\dmin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  675,  MDR;  Groves,  Xow 
It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  112. 

'"'Ihe  TVA,  which  in  1942  had  twelve  new  dams 
and  a  large  coal-steam  power  plant  under  construc- 
tion, anticipated  raising  its  capacity  from  approxi- 
matclv  1.4  to  over  2.5  million  kilowatts  by  mid- 
Continued 


ELECIRIC  POWER 


379 


•••"'! 


mi 


,\ 


, '  '^ 


PowF.R  Plant  {foreground)  at  HPLW,  o;?^  of  several  facilities  providing  steam  and  backup 
electricity  for  the  production  piles  and  separation  plants 


getting  these  assurances,  but  at  best 
they  were  tentative  and  did  not  in  any 
sense  constitute  a  firm  guarantee  to 
deliver  power  to  a  specified  point  on 
a  given  date.  In  fact,  at  the  time  nei- 

1945 — an  incrcast-  more  than  adequate  to  meet  re- 
qmremenls  at  (lintoii.  I  he  BPA  anticipated  gener- 
ating some  800. 000  kilowatts  at  the  new  (irand 
Coulee  Oani  by  mid- 1944,  in  addition  to  the  86,000 
kilowatts  it  was  producing  at  the  Bonneville  I^am. 
See  Tennessee  \'allev  Authority,  Aniuuit  Report  of  tlip 
7'rnnessef  Valtey;  .iiitliorily  /nr  Fi\<al  )'enr  F.ndtuii  JO  pnie 
42  (Washington,  !).(.  :  (Government  Printing  Oflice, 
1946),  pp.  8  and  19-2,S;  ibid.,  Annmit  Refwrt  of  Itic 
Teutiessee  I'oltn  Antlioril^  fir  Fi\(at  Year  Ending  30 June 
4')  (Washington.  !).(.:  (.overnmeni  Printing  Oilke. 
194,T).  p.  .58;  l'..S.  Depaitmeni  ol  Inieiioi,  Bonne- 
ville Power  Adminisiiaiion.  liefoil  on  Colnmhia  Run 
l>ou<n  S\s/fw.  Fiscal  Van  ton  (Washington,  D.C: 
Covernmeni  Printing  Ollice.  1945),  p.  8.  The  BPA 
report  adualh  toveis  opeialions  Irom  1  Jul  ,S8  lo 
30  Jun  45. 


ther  the  TVA  nor  BPA  had  an  appre- 
ciable amount  of  surplus  power.  Most 
of  their  output  was  committed  to  war 
industries,  particularly  producers  of 
aluminum,  and  to  the  many  communi- 
ties located  in  their  service  areas. ^ 


^Marshall  Diarv,  21  -Sep  42,  MDR.  Backgiound  in- 
formation on  \\\  and  BP.A  activities  may  be  found 
in  the  following  sources;  Roscoc  C  Martin,  ed., 
Fl'A:  I'tie  First  Tirentx  Years  (Knoxville;  I'niversitv  of 
Tennessee  Press,  1956),  p.  86;  "Bonneville  Dam, 
Oregon"  and  "Tennessee  \'alley  .\uthorilv."  in  Tlie 
World  AlmaiKK  and  Bool;  of  Fads  for  lOfh,  cd.  Harrv 
Hansen  (New  York  World  Telegram,  1946),  pp.  2.'i4 
and  70!M)4;  t  .S.  F.ngmeers  Ofiice  (Poitland.  Oreg.) 
and  t'..S.  Department  of  Interior,  Bonneville  Power 
.Administration,  Flie  Bonnevdte  /'ro/ert:  Imfrovemenl  of 
the  Columbia  River  at  lionnevilte.  ()res;on  (Washington, 
DC:  CoNemmeiil  Prmimg  Oflice.  1941).  p.  .'V 


380 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Manhattan  leaders'  early  recogni- 
tion that  a  very  high  priority  must  go 
to  securing  firm  commitments  for  an 
adequate  supply  of  electric  power  for 
the  atomic  production  plants  led 
them  to  seek  immediate  assistance 
from  several  agencies  in  the  War  De- 
partment, especially  the  Office  of  the 
Under  Secretary  of  War  and  the 
Corps  of  Engineers,  that  had  devel- 
oped the  organization  and  personnel 
prerequisite  to  negotiating  priorities 
and  arranging  procurement  for  elec- 
tric power  and  scarce  electrical  equip- 
ment in  the  wartime  economy.  Gener- 
al Groves,  for  example,  frequently 
drew  extensively  upon  the  vast 
amount  of  data  on  the  nation's  elec- 
trical resources  in  engineer  files,  ac- 
cumulated since  1920  in  carrying  out 
a  continuous  survey  for  War  Depart- 
ment mobilization  planning  purposes. 
Groves  also  borrowed  expert  person- 
nel from  the  engineer  staff,  including 
Carl  H.  Giroux,  who  became  chief 
adviser  on  power  matters  for  the 
Manhattan  District.^ 

Groves  and  Capt.  Allan  C.  Johnson 
of  the  District's  Washington  Liaison 
Office  handled  most  of  the  many  mat- 
ters that,  in  the  tightly  controlled  war- 
time economy,  required  clearance 
through  the  Power  Division  (later 
called  the  Office  of  War  Utilities)  of 
the  War  Production  Board.  They  also 
took  responsibility  for  those  aspects 
of  the  Hanford  negotiations  with  the 
BPA  that  required  approval  from  the 
Department  of  Interior.  Keeping  in 
close  touch  with  Groves  and  Johnson, 


District  headquarters  officials  assisted 
in  many  aspects  of  the  Clinton  negoti- 
ations with  the  TVA,  which  had  its 
headquarters  in  Knoxville,  conven- 
iently near  the  Tennessee  site.' 

Because  of  the  tentative  nature  of 
earlier  TVA  power  commitments, 
Groves  directed  Captain  Johnson  to 
visit  the  War  Production  Board.  In- 
quiring about  the  status  of  these  com- 
mitments, the  board  assured  Johnson 
that  more  than  sufficient  power  would 
be  available  at  the  Tennessee  site 
when  needed.  These  commitments, 
however,  were  based  on  Manhattan's 
original  power  assessment  for  the  site, 
which,  by  October  1942,  project  engi- 
neers had  determined  was  too  low. 
New  electric  power  projections  were 
calculated,  and  on  the  nineteenth 
Deputy  District  Engineer  Nichols  in- 
formed Herbert  S.  Marks,  acting  di- 
rector of  the  Power  Division,  that  a 
maximum  of  75,000  instead  of  60,000 
kilowatts  would  be  required  by  mid- 
summer of  1943,  increasing  to 
125,000  kilowatts  by  October  of  that 
year.  Upon  reviewing  the  estimated 
power  requirement  of  150,000  kilo- 
watts for  early  1944,  Nichols  re- 
marked that  this  figure  was  probably 
too  high  and  suggested  the  total  be 
reduced  to  about  130,000  kilowatts.  A 
final  concern  was  if  this  requirement 
would  absorb  the  extra  power  re- 
sources the  TVA  was  accumulating 
for  emergency  use,   but   Marks   reas- 


^  Smith,  The  Army  and  Economic  Mobilization,  pp.  95- 
96.  Evidence  of  the  many  occasions  when  Office  of 
the  Under  Secretary  of  War  and  Corps  of  Engineers 
personnel  were  involved  in  Manhattan  Project 
power  negotiations  may  be  found  in  MDR,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  675  (CEW). 


■'Donald  M.  Nelson,  Arsenal  of  Democracy:  The  Story 
of  American  IVar  Production  (New  York:  Harcourt, 
Brace  and  Co.,  1946),  p.  365.  See  also  WPB  Org 
Chart  in  Civilian  Production  Administration,  Bureau 
of  Demobilization,  Industrial  Mobilization  for  War:  His- 
tory of  the  War  Production  Board  and  Predecessor  Agencies, 
19-40-45,  Program  and  Administration,  Vol.  1  (Wash- 
ington, D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office,  1947),  p. 
593  (henceforth  cited  as  History  of  WPB). 


ELECTRIC  POWER 


sured  Nichols  that  all  power  require- 
ments for  Clinton  would  be  met.^ 

Yet  sweeping  changes  under  way  in 
the  War  Production  Board's  policy  re- 
lating to  nonmilitary  government  con- 
struction threatened  the  l\'A's  pro- 
gram for  expanding  its  generating 
facilities.  On  20  October,  WPB  Chair- 
man Donald  Nelson  directed  all  fed- 
eral agencies  involved  in  large-scale 
building  programs  to  cease  nonmili- 
tary construction  not  directly  essential 
to  the  war  effort.  When  news  of  the 
directive  reached  Captain  Johnson,  he 
conferred  at  once  with  Groves,  Nich- 
ols, and  board  officials.  Meanwhile, 
General  Styer  sent  word  that  T\'A 
Chairman  David  E.  Lilienthal  already 
had  asked  Under  Secretary  of  War 
Patterson  to  resolve  this  dilemma  in 
face  of  increasing  War  Department 
demands  for  TVA  power. 

Johnson  interpreted  these  develop- 
ments to  mean  that  Manhattan  should 
await  the  outcome  of  Lilienthal's  con- 
sultations with  Patterson  before  sub- 
milting  a  protest,  thereby  avoiding 
any  contretemps.  Patterson  subse- 
quently intervened  with  the  War  Pro- 
duction Board  and  obtained  permis- 
sion for  the  T\'A  to  complete  one  of 
its  largest  projects — the  Fontana  Dam 
on  the  Little  Tennessee  River  in  west- 
ern North  Carolina — on  the  grounds 
that  it  was  essential  to  the  war  effort. 
And  to  give  additional  support  to  the 
TVA's  case  for  continuing  work  on 
the  dam.  Groves  had  the  Engineers 
deputy  chief  inform  the  agency  that 
the  Manhattan  District's  maximum 
power  requirements  would  be  be- 
tween 125,000  and  150,000  kilowatts. 


Bottlenecks  removed,  direct  action  as- 
sured completion  of  the  major  Fon- 
tana generating  facilities  by  early 
1945,  in  time  to  furnish  the  (Clinton 
installations  with  the  additional  power 
they  would  need.^ 

The  Military  Policy  Committee's 
December  1942  decision  to  shift  loca- 
tion of  the  plutonium  production  fa- 
cilities from  Tennessee  to  another 
site  presented  project  leaders  with  an- 
other major  problem  in  power  pro- 
curement. Project  engineers  estimated 
that  the  plutonium  installations  would 
require  approximately  140,000  kilo- 
watts of  electricity  by  early  1944.  Al- 
though General  Groves  was  aware  of 
this  requirement,  he  had  not  obtained 
a  preliminary  commitment  from  the 
War  Production  Board  and  the  BPA 
when  Hanford  was  selected  as  the 
plutonium  site.  Groves  was  apparently 
relying  on  ample  evidence  that  major 
units  of  the  great  Grand  Coulee  Dam 
hydroelectric  plant,  which  would  have 
an  operating  capacitv  of  more  than 
800,000  kilowatts  by  mid- 1944,  were 
nearing  completion.  He  knew  from 
site  reports  that  the  BPA's  existing 
Midway  Substation  was  strategically 
located  at  the  western  edge  of  the 
area,  where  project  transmission  lines 
could  readily  tap  the  BPA  system. 
Also,  lines  owned  by  the  Pacific 
Power  and  Light  Company,  a  private- 
ly owned  utility  that  supplied  most  of 
the  electricity  to  local  communities  in 
the    area,    crisscrossed    the    Hanford 


^Marshall  Diarv,  2  Jul.  21  Sip,  19  Oct  42.  MDR; 
('hart.  Site  X  Wectric  Power  Rtciuircments,  24  Oct 
42.  Admin  Files.  Gen  Corresp.  675  (CKW),  MDR 


9  I.tr,  Nelson  to  Lilienthal,  20  Oct  42,  Admin 
Files,  (;en  Corresp,  675  (CEW),  MDR;  Hislon  of 
IVPB.  p.  401;  Marshall  Diarv,  22  Oct  42,  MDR; 
Memo,  Lt  Col  R.  H.  latlow  (WD  Rep,  WPB  Facility 
Review  (.ommittee)  to  I  nd  Secy  War,  sub:  lA'A 
Projs,  22  Oct  42,  Admin  Files,  C>en  (".orresp,  675 
(CFW),  MDR:  Martiti,  '/I.L  The  First  Tirenl\  )Wirs.  p. 
8(i:  D.SM  Chronologv.  2  Nov  42,  Sec.  26.  OROO. 


382 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


reservation  at  several  points,  provid- 
ing an  immediately  available  source 
of  power  for  early  construction 
activities. ^° 

As  early  as  mid-January  1943,  the 
War  Production  Board  learned  that 
the  Manhattan  Project  would  be  seek- 
ing a  large  block  of  electric  power 
somewhere  in  the  Pacific  Coast  area, 
but  it  did  not  hear  officially  from 
Groves  until  early  February.  On  the 
seventh  of  that  month.  Groves  sub- 
mitted a  brief  description  of  Han- 
ford's  anticipated  requirements  to  the 
Power  Division.  Beginning  in  April, 
he  indicated,  the  plutonium  project 
would  need  about  10,000  kilowatts 
for  construction  purposes.  By  Decem- 
ber, this  requirement  would  grow  to 
40,000  kilowatts  and  then  rise  in  reg- 
ular increments  to  a  maximum  load  of 
approximately  140,000  kilowatts  in 
1944.  Meanwhile,  Groves  noted,  pre- 
liminary studies  were  already  under 
way  to  determine  what  electrical 
equipment  must  be  procured  for  the 
plutonium  plants  and  their  power  dis- 
tribution system.  ^^ 

The  War  Production  Board 
promptly  notified  Groves  that  the 
BPA  could  meet  Hanford's  power  re- 
quirements from  its  Midway  Substa- 
tion and  stated  its  general  agreement 
with  the  preliminary  plans  for  electri- 
cal equipment  and  distribution  for  the 
plutonium  site.  With  this  confirma- 
tion. Groves   turned  over  to  Giroux, 


10  Matthias  Diary,  7  Feb  43,  OROO;  Groves,  Now 
It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  74,  89,  207-09;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol. 
3,  p.  7.1,  and  Vol.  4,  "Land  Acquisition,  Hanford 
Engineer  Works,"  pp.  2.11-2.12,  DASA;  Du  Pont 
Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  p.  10,  and  Vol.  4,  pp.  1059-67 
and  1072,  HOO;  Data  on  BPA  in  World  Almanac  for 
1946,  p.  234. 

>i  Ltrs,  Marks  to  Groves,  18  Jan  43,  and  Groves 
to  Marks,  7  Feb  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  675, 
MDR. 


his  power  consultant,  the  detailed 
task  of  reserving  blocks  of  power  to 
be  available  on  specified  dates.  In  ne- 
gotiations with  the  BPA  office  in 
Washington,  D.C.,  Giroux  paved  the 
way  for  a  firm  agreement  on  power 
reservations,  which  project  officials 
reached  in  mid-March  with  the  BPA 
administrator.^^ 

Because  of  the  urgent  need  for 
speed,  Manhattan  had  to  go  ahead 
with  preliminary  arrangements  for 
power  at  both  Clinton  and  Hanford 
on  the  basis  of  only  a  minimum  of  in- 
formation concerning  precise  design 
and  operating  characteristics  of  the 
production  plants.  Consequently,  as 
construction  and  operation  processes 
were  developed  in  greater  detail, 
project  engineers  frequently  had  to 
revise  estimated  power  require- 
ments— usually  upward.  New  surveys 
conducted  at  Clinton  in  March  1943 
revealed  that  total  power  needs  by 
May  1944  would  be  about  285,000 
kilowatts  (electromagnetic  plant, 
114,000;  gaseous  diffusion  plant, 
160,000;  plutonium  semiworks,  1,200; 
the  town  of  Oak  Ridge  and  other  in- 
stallations, 9,500),  nearly  twice  the 
original  estimate.  Faced  with  the  con- 
siderable increase  in  previously  pro- 
jected requirements.  General  Groves 
dispatched  Giroux  to  the  War  Pro- 
duction Board.  Following  negotia- 
tions with  the  TVA,  the  board  report- 
ed back  to  Giroux  that  the  TVA  could 
furnish  the  indicated  285,000  kilo- 
watts  of  firm   power   without   unduly 


> 2  Ltrs,  Marks  to  Groves,  8  Feb  43,  and  Paul  J. 
Raver  (BPA  Admin)  to  Chief  of  Engrs,  Attn.:  Giroux, 
17  Mar  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  675,  MDR. 


ELEC/IRIC  POWER 


383 


interfering  with  its  commitments  to 
other  users.  ^^ 

At  about  the  same  time,  important 
new  information  came  from  Keflex 
Corporation  designers  on  plans  for 
the  gaseous  diffusion  (K-25)  pfant: 
Totaf  dependence  upon  outside 
power  resources  woufd  not  be  practi- 
cable or  safe.  Ihe  diffusion  process 
required  a  vast  system  of  motor- 
driven  pumps  and  blowers  and  the 
Kellex  studies  showed  that  even  the 
briefest  interruption  in  power  supply 
would  cause  an  unacceptable  reduc- 
tion in  productivity.  "For  manv 
months  .  .  .  ,"  Groves  later  recalled, 
"we  labored  imdcr  the  belief  that  if 
the  plant  was  shut  down  through 
power  failure  or  for  anv  other 
reason — for  as  much  as  a  fraction  of  a 
second — it  would  take  many  days, 
some  said  seventy,  to  get  back  into 
full  operation."  ^* 

Ihe  obvious  solution  was  to  pro- 
vide the  gaseous  diffusion  facility  with 
its  own  electric  generating  unit,  and 
Kellex  designers  advanced  a  number 
of  reasons  for  favoring  an  on-site  lo- 
cation for  this  power  source.  An  on- 
site  plant  could  be  designed  to 
produce  the  variable-frcquencv  cur- 
rent required  for  the  diffusion  pro- 
cess, thus  eliminating  the  need  for 
expensive,  complicated,  and  difficult- 
to-procure  equipment  to  transform  the 
T\'A's  fixed-frequency  current.  And, 
a  power  plant  on  the  reservation 
would  be  far  less  exposed  to  sabotage 
than  the  lA'A's  off-site  facilities,  espe- 


cially its  extended  transmission  lines 
running  miles  across  open  country  to 
the  (Clinton  site.  Furthermore,  there 
was  always  the  chance  that  the  1  \'A, 
with  so  many  wartime  industries  de- 
pendent upon  its  resources,  might 
not  be  able  to  supply  iminterrupted 
power.  With  these  arguments,  Kellex 
officials  persuaded  project  engineers 
that  a  steam-electric  plant  capable  of 
generating  the  basic  power  load  for 
the  diffusion  process  should  be  built 
innnediately  adjacent  to  the  main 
K-25  works.  Groves,  in  particular, 
was  impressed  by  the  highly  positive 
security  and  engineering  advantages 
of  an  on-site  power  plant.  ^^ 

Kellex's  persuasive  arguments  led 
to  the  Distiict's  decision  in  mid-April 
1943  to  build  the  steam-electric  plant 
and,  shortly  thereafter,  to  contract 
with  the  prime  construction  contrac- 
tor for  K-25,  the  J.  A.  Jones  Con- 
struction Company,  for  its  erection. 
By  early  summer  work  was  under  way 
on  the  generating  unit,  one  of  the 
largest  of  its  type  to  be  built  up  to 
that  time.  Its  original  design  called 
for  nine  tuibogenerators,  operating 
with    coal-heated    steam    from    three 


'3  Memo,  1.1  Col  Robert  C.  Blair  (Kx  Oil,  Ml))  to 
Marshall,  sub:  CP-\V  Pouer  Requirements,  30  Mar 
4.3;  Draft  Ltrs,  unsigned  to  J.  K.  Moore  (Power  Prod 
Br  chief,  VVPB).  30  Mar  43;  Memo.  C.iroux  to 
Cloves,  15  Mar  43.  All  m  Admin  Files.  Cen  Coi- 
lesp,  (37.5  (C:EW).  MDR. 

'•*  Croves,  Xnir  ll  Can  Br  Told.  p.   1  I'J. 


'^MDH,  Bk.  2,  \ol.  3,  "Design,"  pp.  12.1-12.3. 
DAS.A.  Memo,  Stowers  to  Marshall,  sub:  K-25  Proj 
Requirements,  21  Jan  43.  MDR.  l.tr,  Keith  to 
Stowers,  sub:  K-25  Pioj  Power  Supply  and  Require- 
ments. 25  Mar  43:  lelecon.  Groves  and  Albert  L. 
Baker  (Kellex  Chid  Engr),  sub:  Separate  Power 
Plant  Instead  of  Using  lA'.A.  26  Jun  43:  Llr.  Groves 
to  Krug,  30  Jun  43.  All  in  .Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp.  675  (CFVV),  MDR.  Gioves  Diarv.  26  Jun  43, 
LRCi.  Cwoves,  Notes  [in]  Black  Notebook.  OCG 
Files,  Gen  C-orresp,  Groves  Files.  MDR.  Ihe  notes 
are  in  a  small  (10"  x  7"),  loose-leaf,  three-ringed 
binder  and  were  maintained  pcrsonallv  bv  Groves  as 
an  aid  to  memory  and  as  a  repositorv  of  data  on  vir- 
luallv  all  aspects  of  atomic  project  activities  from 
Mav  1943  through  Ma\  1045.  Data  on  power  at 
Clinton  are  in  the  section  tabbed  "Permanent 
Notes."  See  also  Groves.  Wnr  It  Can  Br  Told.  p.   112. 


384 


MANHATIAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  IHE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


K-25  Power  Plant  at  CEW 


750,000-pound  boilers,  to  produce  a 
maximum  of  238,000  kilowatts  of 
variable-frequency  power.  With  this 
anticipated  output,  project  engineers 
could  reduce  estimates  of  fixed-fre- 
quency power  needed  from  the  TVA 
for  K-25's  "nonvital  requirements"  to 
approximately  35,000  kilowatts.  ^^ 


•6  Dist  Engr,  Monthlv  Rpt  on  DSM  Proj,  23  Mar- 
22  Apr  43,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr 
28,  Tab  A,  MDR;  Completion  Rpt,  M.  W.  Kellogg 
Co.  and  Kellex  Corp.,  sub:  K-25  Plant,  Contract  W- 
7405-eng-23,  31  Oct  45.  p.  11,  OROO;  Telccon, 
Groves  and  Baker,  sub:  Separate  Power  Plant  In- 
stead of  Using  TVA,  26Jun  43,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  1, 
Vol.  12,  pp.  12.4-12.6,  12.19,  12.2,3-12.26,  and  Bk. 
2,  Vol.  3,  pp.  12.1-12.4,  DASA.  Fhe  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  675  (CEW),  MDR,  contains  a  series  of 
progress  charts  on  construction  of  the  K-25  power 
plant  through  September  1943.  General  Groves 
used  the  terms  mtal  and  nonvital  to  distinguish  be- 
tween the  kinds  of  power  required  for  basic  plant 


Building  a  major  power  plant 
added  substantially  to  Manhattan's 
procurement  problems  during  K-25 
construction,  so  District  procurement 
officials  frequently  turned  to  the  War 
Production  Board's  Office  of  War 
Utilities  for  aid  in  obtaining  a  variety 
of  scarce  equipment.  The  utilities 
agency,  for  example,  persuaded  a 
Chicago  firm  to  cancel  its  order  for 
two  already  partly  fabricated  750,000- 
pound  boilers  and  also  reassigned 
priorities  previously  granted  to  other 
war  projects,  thus  enabling  Manhattan 
to  obtain  not  only  the  essential  boil- 
ers but  also  eight  25,000-kilowatt  tur- 
bogenerators. Manhattan  subsequent- 
ly sought  a  ninth  generator  to  meet 


operation  and  for  other  uses  on  the  K-25  project. 
See  Groves  Ms,  p.  364,  CMH. 


ELPX:  IRIC  POWER 


385 


peak  demands  to  protect  against  sab- 
otage, but  War  Utilities  Director  J.  A. 
Krug  balked  at  the  request,  pointing 
out  to  Groves  that  power  from  out- 
side sources  could  be  brought  to  the 
plant  over  two  separate  transmission 
circuits.  Each  would  carry  electricity 
from  a  different  power  source,  but 
each  would  be  capable  of  transmitting 
the  entire  power  load  available  in  the 
area.  Furthermore,  the  two  TVA  cir- 
cuits were  of  lightningproof  construc- 
tion and  there  was  a  third  independ- 
ent circuit  that  could  be  tied  in  with 
them  if  necessary.  "Except  for  simulta- 
neous sabotage  of  all  circuits,"  Krug 
concluded,  "a  failure  of  external 
power  supply  is  virtually  inconceiv- 
able. Certainly  the  combined  reliabil- 
ity of  several  such  circuits  is  incompa- 
rably higher  than  that  of  a  ninth 
generator  unit."  ^^ 

Krug's  arguments  failed  to  budge 
Groves,  who  countered  with  the  state- 
ments that  the  gaseous  diffusion  pro- 
cess simply  could  not  afford  to 
depend  upon  outside  sources  for  any 
part  of  its  power  and  that  there  would 
be  technical  difficulties  converting  the 
TVA's  current  to  variable  frequency. 
Groves  was  willing,  however,  to  con- 
sider a  compromise  solution  suggest- 
ed by  Kellex,  the  substitution  of  two 
small  turbogenerators  capable  of  pro- 
ducing almost  as  much  current  as  one 
large  generator.  Krug  agreed,  but  the 
two  small  units  did  not  suffice  and 
eventually    three    more    turbogenera- 


tors were  added,  bringing  the  total  to 
fourteen.^** 

While  solving  the  huge  electric 
power  requirements  of  the  major  pro- 
duction plants  at  Clinton  and  Han- 
ford,  Manhattan's  administrative  and 
engineering  staffs  also  took  care  of 
the  lesser  power  needs  of  the 
project's  research  and  development 
installations,  including  those  of  Los 
Alamos.  Expanding  facilities  in  Chica- 
go were  typical.  The  Metallurgical 
and  Argonne  laboratories  required  a 
comparatively  small  but  reliable 
source  of  electricity  to  operate  their 
many  research  and  development 
projects,  and  Captain  Johnson  negoti- 
ated with  the  W^ar  Production  Board 
for  allocation  of  adequate  power  from 
existing  local  sources.  The  Los 
Alamos  Laboratory,  because  of  its  ge- 
ographic isolation,  presented  different 
problems.  There,  the  Army  post  com- 
mander assisted  project  engineers  in 
procuring  several  small,  easily  obtain- 
able diesel  generators  capable  of  pro- 
ducing the  relatively  small  amount  of 
current  required  to  meet  initial 
needs.  ^^ 


'^  Ltrs.  Krug  to  (iioves,  sub:  MI),  CtW,  11  Jun 
43  (source  of  quote,  Krug's  italics),  and  Groves  to 
Krug,  same  sub,  2  Jun  43,  Draft  Ltr,  unsigned 
(probably  Baker  to  Stowers),  sub:  Power  Supply 
Equipment,  30  Mar  43,  and  appended  data.  All  in 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  675  (GEW),  MDR. 
MDH,  Bk.  2,  \ol.  3.  pp.  12.5-12.6,  DASA. 


18  Ltr,  Groves  to  Krug,  30  Jun  43,  MDR;  MDH, 
Bk.  2,  Vol.  3,  pp.  12.6  and  12.20,  DASA.  In  Septem- 
ber 1945,  a  K-25  power  plant  operator  accidentally 
threw  a  wrong  switch,  briefly  cutting  oil  the  electri- 
cal supply.  The  damage  to  equipment  and  loss  in 
production  proved  much  less  than  had  been  predict- 
ed by  Kellex  m  1943.  For  further  details  on  this 
power  outage  see  Memo,  Gol  Walter  J.  Williams 
(K-25  unit  chief)  to  Nichols,  sub:  Power  Failure  to 
Section  2b  on  16  Sep,  25  Oct  45;  Ltr,  Baker  to 
Stowers,  sub:  Rpl  of  K-25  Power  Failure  on  16  Sep, 
19  Oct  45,  and  Ind.  Both  in  Admin  Files,  C.en  Gor- 
resp, 675  (GKW),  MDR.  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told. 
pp.  112-13.  Sec  Gh.  XI  for  a  description  of  an  at- 
tempt to  sabotage  the  K-25  supply  of  electrical  cur- 
rent. 

>9  Marshall  Diarv,  27  Oct  42,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  3, 
"The  P-9  Project,"  pp.  3.2,  4.6-4.7,  4.13,  4.19.  and 
Bk.  8,  Vol.  1.  "General,"  pp.  5.14-5.15,  DASA. 


386 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Implementation  of  the  Power  Program 

Manhattan  had  largely  completed 
the  acquisition  phase  of  its  power 
program  by  mid- 1943.  Its  next  task 
was  to  bring  these  resources  to  bear 
upon  achievement  of  basic  program 
objectives  through  negotiation  of 
complex  purchase  contracts  and  oper- 
ating agreements  with  the  TVA,  BPA, 
and  other  outside  suppliers;  through 
design  and  construction  of  distribu- 
tion systems;  and  tlirough  procure- 
ment of  materials  and  equipment. 

Manhattan's  general  purchase  con- 
tract for  power  service  to  Clinton  was 
based  on  policy  agreement  that  TVA 
Chairman  Lilienthal  and  Under  Secre- 
tary of  War  Patterson  had  drafted  in 
the  fall  of  1942.  Under  terms  of  this 
agreement,  the  TVA  would  supply  all 
War  Department  projects  at  its  lowest 
primary  rate,  that  is,  the  rate  normally 
granted  only  to  purchases  made 
under  long-term  contracts;  the  War 
Department  could  terminate  any  pur- 
chase contract  on  thirty-days'  notice 
without  penalty;  and,  as  needed,  the 
TVA  would  construct  additional 
transmission  lines  while  the  War  De- 
partment would  build  substations  and 
connecting  lines. ^° 

The  earlier  view  that  War  Depart- 
ment purchases  would  constitute  a 
relatively  small  part  of  the  TVA's 
total  power  production  came  under 
close  scrutiny  in  1944,  because  power 
requirements  at  Clinton  had  multi- 
plied greatly.  Consequently,  when  Lil- 
ienthal prepared  to  approve  Manhat- 
tan's power  contract  in  April,  he 
began  to  have  serious  qualms  about 
the    long-range    impact    of   its    future 


purchases  upon  the  economy  of  the 
TVA  system.  He  pointed  out  to  Pat- 
terson that  if,  under  the  terms  of  the 
1942  agreement,  Manhattan  should 
suddenly  decide  to  terminate  its  pur- 
chases of  electricity  on  thirty-days' 
notice,  the  TVA  would  face  the  pros- 
pect of  excessive  financial  loss.  Under 
normal  commercial  purchase  agree- 
ments, the  TVA  protected  itself  by 
long-term  contracts  and  higher  rates. 
Lilienthal  requested  that  the  War  De- 
partment provide  that  "the  contem- 
porary record  make  it  clear  that  the 
loss,  should  it  occur,  is  one  of  the 
costs  of  the  war  and  therefore  not 
one  that  the  consumers  of  electricity 
in  the  Tennessee  Valley  should  be 
singled  out  to  bear."  ^^ 

The  Under  Secretary  of  War  ac- 
knowledged that  the  TVA  was  indeed 
likely  to  suffer  substantial  losses 
should  Manhattan  elect  to  exercise 
the  right  of  thirty-days'  cancellation 
of  service  and  therefore  agreed  that, 
if  the  TVA  did  not  at  once  find  other 
purchasers  for  the  power  it  was  fur- 
nishing the  Clinton  site,  the  War  De- 
partment would  support  the  agency  in 
claiming  that  such  losses  were  com- 
pensable. Manhattan's  basic  power 
supply  contract  for  Clinton  was 
signed  on  25  April  1944  (effective 
1  October  1943),  with  supplemental 
provisions  for  a  variety  of  other  elec- 
trical services  subsequently  added. 
Because  the  TVA  viewed  all  Clinton 
activities  as  being  for  a  single  con- 
sumer, it  billed  Manhattan  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  other  large  com- 
mercial users  of  power  on  the  TVA 
system. ^^ 


20  Ltr,    Lilienthal    to    Patterson,    26   Apr   44,    HB 
Files,  Fldr  80,  MDR. 


21  Ibid. 

^^  Ltr,  Patterson  to  Lilienthal,  1  May  44,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  80,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  pp.  12.1,  12.9, 

Continued 


KLKCIRIC:  POVVKR 


387 


The  BPA's  general  purchase  con- 
tract for  power  service  to  Ilanlord,  al- 
though agreed  upon  in  Februar\ 
1944,  was  not  completed  in  final  form 
until  November.  The  primary  cause  of 
delay  was  General  Groves's  conviction 
that  the  purchase  contract  did  not 
provide  sufficient  guarantees  for  reli- 
able service.  Patterson  requested  the 
Office  of  War  Utilities  to  grant  addi- 
tional priorities  that  would  give  Han- 
ford  first  claim  on  Bonneville  power 
resources  under  all  circumstances  and 
would  expedite  procurement  of  mate- 
rials and  equipment  needed  to  make 
its  distribution  svstem  more  reliable. 
To  establish  Hanfbrd's  prior  claim  to 
power  from  the  Bonneville  system, 
the  War  Utilities  director  had  his  staff 
prepare  a  draft  priorities  directive, 
rhis  directive,  to  become  effective 
when  the  plutonium  facilities  began 
actual  operations,  indicated  that  the 
War  Production  Board  had  approved 
all  requests  for  materials  and  equip- 
ment for  the  BPA-Hanford  electrical 
distribution  system  to  date  and  that  it 
would  continue  to  do  so  in  the 
future.-^ 

l.S  and  App.  A  (Nos.  80.  H:\-HH.  *)(),  9'J,  <).5-9(i,  209. 
211-12.  217),  DA.SA.  The  original  contract  provided 
that  .Manhattan  could  not  resell  current  to  commer- 
cial users,  but  a  1  Jul  45  supplement  granted  the 
|)rojcct  permission  to  resell  limited  amounts  to  con- 
cessionaires located  within  the  site  boundaries.  This 
su[)|)lement  also  contained  a  provision  that  any  sur- 
plus electricity  produced  by  the  K-2.5  power  plant 
uas,  il  requested,  to  be  made  available  to  the  l\.\ 
svstcni. 
■  23MnH.  Bk.  4.  \ol.  5.  ■■Consiruciion."  p.  7.1  and 
App.  (:23.  DA.SA.  Du  Pont  Consir  Hist.  Vol.  4,  p, 
I().i9.  HOO.  Du  Pont  Opus  Hist.  Bk.  ,3,  "Electrical 
Power  Distribution  Kxperieiue  lo  July  1.  194.5,"  p.  3 
nOO.  Ltrs.  Patterson  to  Krug,  sub:  Power  Svc  lor 
HKW,  22  Feb  44,  and  Krug  to  Patterson,  same  sub, 
:}1  Mar  44;  Ltr,  Kdward  Fakk  (OWf  Dir  as  of  Apr 
44)  to  Raver,  sub:  Power  ,Svc  lor  WD,  WV.W  .  6  Mav 
44;  Ltrs,  Faick  to  Palieison,  s.mie  sub,  1  I  Mav  44. 
and  Patterson  to  Fah  k.  .'Vjiil  44.  and  liid  (I)iall   l)i- 


Belore  gi\ing  ilanlord  prior  claim 
to  BPA  power,  the  Office  of  War  lUil- 
ities  required  negotiation  of  a  satisfac- 
tory operating  agreement.  Precise 
terms,  however,  were  not  completed 
until  August  1944.  when  Manliattan 
finally  forwarded  a  completed  draft  to 
the  BPA  administrator.  The  latter 
took  strong  objection  to  certain  key 
provisions,  especially  those  ensuring 
maximum  reliability  of  electrical  serv- 
ice to  Hanford.  Such  provisions,  the 
administrator  contended,  not  only 
would  place  unreasonable  restrictions 
on  the  BP.A's  generating  and  trans- 
mission facilities,  resulting  in  serious 
financial  losses,  but  also  would  pre- 
vent the  BPA  from  meeting  the  full 
demands  of  its  other  customers  and 
from  securing  new  users. 

Faced  with  the  prospect  of  further 
delay  in  negotiating  a  satisfactory 
agreement  with  the  BPA,  General 
Groves  once  again  turned  to  Under 
Secretary  of  War  Patterson.  The  Man- 
hattan commander  explained  to  Pat- 
terson that  the  BPA  administrator's 
objections  were  essentially  the  same 
as  those  earlier  advanced  by  Lilienthal 
concerning  the  terms  of  T\'A  service. 
On  1  1  August  1944,  acting  on  behalf 
of  Patterson,  Assistant  Secretary  of 
War  John  J.  McCloy  informed  the 
BPA  administrator  that  if  the  Bonne- 
ville system  should  incur  losses  be- 
cause of  "the  particular  conditions 
necessarilv  imposed  by  the  war  effort 
in  this  instance  [service  in  Hanford], 
such  losses  would  be  one  of  the  costs 
of  the  war."  -^ 


leciive).    .\11   m    I  IB   Files.    Fldr   51.    .MDR.    .Matthias 
Diarv.  29  Jul  44,  OKOO. 

'-■' (Quoted  words  from  Ltr,  McCIon   (for  Patterson) 
to  BPA  Admin,  I  I  Aug  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  51,  MDR. 


388 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


As  soon  as  the  BPA  received  solid 
assurances  from  the  War  Department 
that  such  losses  would  be  covered,  it 
notified  the  Under  Secretary  that  it 
would  promptly  approve  the  agree- 
ment. Under  terms  of  the  agreement, 
the  BPA  guaranteed  Hanford  150,000 
kilowatts  of  electricity  and  agreed  to 
supervise  the  remodeling,  equipping, 
maintenance,  and  repair  of  the  exist- 
ing transmission  system  to  ensure  a 
stable  and  uninterrupted  flow  of 
power  under  all  predictable  condi- 
tions. The  BPA's  approval  of  the  op- 
erating agreement  cleared  the  way  for 
the  Office  of  War  Utilities  to  issue  the 
long-delayed  priorities  directive,  thus 
removing  the  last  obstacle  to  the 
development  of  Hanford's  power 
service.  ^^ 

Implementation  of  the  power  re- 
sources to  meet  the  relatively  modest 
needs  of  Manhattan's  other  installa- 
tions presented  few  problems.  In 
most  instances,  these  facilities  simply 
established  whatever  hookups  were 
required  into  the  already  existing 
transmission  systems.  No  special  pri- 
orities or  operating  agreements  were 
necessary  as  long  as  the  demands  of 
the  project  did  not  place  an  undue 
burden  on  the  supply  of  power  avail- 
able. Atomic  laboratories  on  the  cam- 
puses of  universities  (for  example,  at 
Chicago,  California-Berkeley,  and  Co- 
lumbia) tapped  into  available  facili- 
ties. The  heavy  water  plants  at  Trail, 
British  Columbia,  and  at  the  Army's 

See  also  Memo,  Groves  to  Patterson,  1 1  Aug  44. 
HB  Files,  Fldr  80,  MDR;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpt  on 
DSM  Proj,  Sep  44.  MDR. 

2^  Ltrs,  S.  E.  Schultz  (Act  BPA  Admin)  to  Patter- 
son, 24  Aug  44,  J.  J.  Gendron  (Act  BPA  Admin)  to 
11  Oct  44,  Patterson  to  BPA  Admin,  17  Oct  44,  and 
Raver  to  Patterson.  28  Oct  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  51, 
MDR;  Du  Pont  Opns  Hist,  Bk.  3,  pp.  3-4,  HOO. 


three  munitions  installations  likewise 
drew  upon  existing  sources  of  power. 
The  situation  differed  somewhat  at 
Los  Alamos,  where  the  nearest  high- 
power  transmission  line  was  almost 
25  miles  distant  from  the  installation 
site.  For  more  than  a  year,  small 
diesel-powered  generators  supplied 
the  bomb  laboratory  with  sufficient 
electricity.  But  in  August  1944,  when 
power  demands  increased  beyond  the 
maximum  load  that  could  be  safely 
generated  over  an  extended  period 
by  existing  units,  project  engineers 
recommended  securing  additional 
sources  of  electricity.  Based  on  their 
investigation  that  procurement  of  an 
additional  generator  would  take 
longer  and  provide  less  flexibility 
than  constructing  a  high-voltage  line 
to  tie  in  to  the  New  Mexico  Power 
Company's  nearest  transmission  line, 
the  Army  authorized  the  connecting 
line.  Projected  power  requirements 
for  1945,  however,  surpassed  the 
supply  available  from  the  new  source. 
To  overcome  this  shortfall,  two  more 
diesel  generating  units  were  procured 
and,  in  1946,  began  providing  the  ad- 
ditional power  needed  by  the  bomb 
laboratory. 2^ 

Distribution:  Clinton  Engineer  Works 

Both  the  Clinton  and  Hanford  sites 
were  selected  in  part  because  of  their 
location  near  major  power  transmis- 
sion lines,  but  neither  had  within  its 
boundaries  a  well-developed  local 
electrical  distribution  system.  Of  the 
two  major  sites,  Clinton  was  more  de- 
ficient in  this  respect.  The  thinly  pop- 


2^MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  "General,"  pp.  5.14-5.17. 
DASA. 


ELECTRIC  POWER 


389 


ulated,  largely  rural  Tennessee  coun- 
tryside had  only  the  low-voltage  dis- 
tribution facilities  required  to  provide 
local  farmers  and  villagers  with 
modest  amounts  of  electricity.  Hence, 
an  immediate  task  for  Manhattan  en- 
gineers in  the  fall  of  1942  was  to 
plan,  design,  and  build  a  complex  and 
elaborate  system  capable  of  meeting 
the  substantial,  highly  diversified,  and 
ever-changing  power  needs  for  con- 
structing and  operating  large-scale 
production  plants  and  their  support- 
ing community  facilities.  Preliminary 
studies  established  that  such  a  system 
required  two  major  tvpes  of  construc- 
tion: a  net  of  connecting  and  tie  lines 
to  carry  current  from  the  TVA's  high- 
voltage  transmission  systems,  and  a 
number  of  substations  to  receive,  step 
down,  and  distribute  the  high-voltage 
electricity. 2"^ 

Getting  the  electrical  distribution 
system  at  Clinton  built  and  in  oper- 
ation was  a  matter  of  high  priority, 
for  site  development  hinged  on  a 
supply  of  adequate  electricity.  As 
soon  as  Manhattan  had  assurances 
from  the  War  Production  Board  and 
the  TVA  that  sufficient  power  would 
be  available,  it  began  negotiating  a 
series  of  contractual  agreements  with 
the  TVA.  These  agreements,  most  of 
them  completed  in  early  1943,  pro- 
vided for  construction  of  various 
transmission  line.  At  the  same  time, 
the  District  assisted  Stone  and  Web- 
ster and  Du  Pont  in  making  arrange- 
ments with  the  TVA  to  furnish  elec- 
tricity for  preliminary  construction 
work  via  the  existing  low-voltage 
transmission  svstem. 


lo  ensure  that  the  system's  com- 
plex substations  would  be  ready  when 
needed,  the  District  arranged  for  the 
construction  contractors  to  build 
these  units.  In  supplemental  contracts 
negotiated  in  early  1943,  Stone  and 
Webster  agreed  to  build  two  substa- 
tions in  the  electromagnetic  (V-12) 
plant  area  that  would  serve  that  in- 
stallation and  the  Oak  Ridge  commu- 
nity. Similarly,  the  A.  S.  Schulman 
Electrical  Company,  working  with 
Kellex  on  the  gaseous  diffusion  plant, 
assented  to  construct  the  substation 
that  would  give  that  installation 
access  to  TVA  power.  ^^ 

As  1943  unfolded,  the  TVA  and  the 
construction  contractors  moved  ahead 
rapidly  with  the  distribution  system — 
a  system  that  would  continue  to 
expand  and  change  throughout  the 
war  as  new  demands  were  made  upon 
it.  The  availability  to  Manhattan  of 
the  TVA's  large  staff  of  experienced 
electrical  engineers  and  of  subcon- 
tractors with  the  necessary  equipment 
and  line  crews  helped  to  expedite 
construction.  To  keep  abreast  of  all 
developments,  the  district  engineer 
maintained  close  supervision  over  the 
work  through  his  unit  chiefs  in  charge 
of  construction  on  Y-12,  K-25,  and 
the  Oak  Ridge  community. ^^ 

The  first  part  of  the  Clinton  electri- 
cal distribution  net  to  take  shape  was 
the  basic  transmission  line,  a  154-kilo- 
volt  loop,  to  supply  electricity  to  the 
electromagnetic  plant  and  the  first 
section  of  the  town  of  Oak  Ridge 
The  TVA,  under  terms  of  a  subcon- 


2Mbid..  Bk.  1.  Vol.  12.  pp.  12.9-12.11,  DASA; 
C.ompletion  Rpt,  Stone  and  Websler,  sub;  Clinton 
Engr  Works,  Contract  W'-7401-eng-13,  1946,  p.  56, 
OROO. 


28MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12  pp.  12.1-12.2,  12.9- 
12.11,  12.19-12.27.  DASA. 

29  Org  Chart,  U.S.  Engrs  OfTice,  MD.  1  Nov  43, 
Admin  Files,  Ccn  Corresp,  020  (MKD-Org),  MDR; 
MDH.  Bk.  1.  Vol.  12,  pp.  12.14-12.27,  DASA. 


390 


MANHAI  IAN:    IHE  ARMY  AND  THE  A 1  OMIC:  BOMB 


tract  with  Stone  and  Webster,  de- 
signed and  built  this  loop,  completing 
it  in  June  1943.  At  a  point  some  dis- 
tance northeast  of  the  Tennessee  site 
the  loop  cut  into  an  existing  154-kilo- 
volt  TVA  line,  which  carried  current 
generated  in  hydroelectric  plants  on 
the  Tennessee  River  at  Norris  Dam, 
northeast  of  the  Clinton  site,  and 
Watts  Bar  Dam,  southwest  of  the  site, 
and  ran  a  distance  of  3.6  miles  to 
substation  Elza  Number  1,  built  by 
Stone  and  Webster  adjacent  to  the 
electromagnetic  plant. ^° 

That  summer,  when  electrical  serv- 
ice from  the  TVA's  existing  rural  12- 
kilovolt  line  to  the  plutonium  (X-10) 
semiworks  became  unsatisfactory,  the 
TVA,  with  District  authorization,  built 
a  new  13.8-kilovolt  connecting  line. 
This  line,  which  extended  some  6 
miles  from  the  switch  house  at  the 
K-25  power  plant  to  the  X-10  area, 
ensured  the  comparatively  small  re- 
quirements— never  more  than  1,000 
kilowatts — of  the  semiworks  and  its 
laboratory  facilities. ^^ 

By  fall,  expansion  of  the  electro- 
magnetic plant  and  rapid  growth  of 
the  town  of  Oak  Ridge  created  a 
demand  for  more  electricity.  To 
supply  additional  power,  the  TVA, 
again  operating  under  a  Stone  and 
Webster  subcontract,  designed  and 
built  a  new  154-kilovolt  line.  Com- 
pleted in  mid- 1944,  this  14-mile  line 
ran  from  the  TVA's  Fort  Loudoun 
Dam  generating  facilities  on  the 
Clinch  River  south  of  the  site  to  sub- 


station Elza  Number  2,  built  by  Stone 
and  Webster  at  the  west  end  of  the 
extended  electromagnetic  plant  area. 
It  also  included  a  1.3-mile  tie  line 
from  Elza  1  to  Elza  2,  making  possi- 
ble the  interchange  of  power  between 
the  two  switching  points. ^^ 

The  reliability  and  efficiency  of  the 
distribution  system  was  further  in- 
creased with  the  addition  of  a  154- 
kilovolt  line  between  the  electromag- 
netic plant  in  the  eastern  sector  of  the 
reservation  and  the  gaseous  diffusion 
facilities  in  the  western  sector.  The 
TVA,  with  District  authorization,  de- 
signed and  built  this  additional  trans- 
mission line,  which  ran  between 
Elza  1  and  a  step-down  transformer 
at  the  K-25  site.  When  finished  in 
late  1943,  this  line  not  only  gave  the 
K-25  area  a  temporary  source  of 
power,  pending  completion  of  its  own 
substation,  but  also  furnished  the 
means  for  satisfying  unanticipated 
power  requirements  from  surpluses 
available  elsewhere  in  the  TVA 
system. ^^ 

An  increasing  demand  for  TVA 
power  was  a  corollary  to  the  rapidly 
expanding  atomic  production  facilities 
at  Clinton,  but  precisely  where  it 
would  occur  and  in  what  quantities 
was  difficult  to  predict.  This  was  par- 
ticularly the  case  in  the  gaseous  diffu- 
sion plant  area,  where  the  decision  in 
1944  to  use  steam  from  the  K-25 
power  plant  for  operating  the  thermal 
diffusion  (S-50)  process  and  in  1945 
to  build  a  side-feed  extension  (K-27) 


30MI)H,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  pp.  12.13-12.14  and 
12.20-12.22,  DASA;  Completion  Rpt,  Stone  and 
Webster,  sub:  CEW,  pp.  61-62,  OROO. 

*' Completion  Rpt,  Du  Pont,  sub:  Clinton  Engr 
Works,  TNX  Area,  Contract  W-74  12-eng-23,  I  Apr 
44,  pp.  32-33,  36-37,  535,  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  1, 
Vol.  12,  pp.  12.18-12.19,  DASA. 


^^C>ompletion  Rpt.  Stone  and  Webster,  sub: 
CKW,  pp.  61-62,  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  pp. 
12.3-12.4  and  12.14-12.15.  IMSA. 

33  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  pp.  12.4-12.5  and  12.23- 
12.26,  DASA:  Completion  Rpt,  Kellex  Corp.,  sub: 
K-25  Plant,  p.  12,  OROO. 


ELECIRIC  POWER 


391 


unit  made  further  lapping  ol  the  I'X'A 
system  mandatory,  ro  compensate 
for  the  lower  electrical  output  of  the 
K-25  powerhouse,  the  r\'A  agreed  to 
build  a  154-kilovolt  line  from  its  Fort 
Loudoun  Dam  to  the  K-25  substa- 
tion, adjacent  to  the  main  gaseous 
diffusion  plant,  and  a  supplementary 
connection  from  its  Norris-Watts  Bar 
line  to  the  newly  erected  K-27  and 
existing  K-25  substations.  A  number 
of  other  connections  were  in  the  plan- 
ning, but  the  end  of  the  war  obviated 
their  construction.^" 

By  mid- 1945,  transmission  facilities 
and  power  sources  at  the  1  ennessee 
site  were  capable  of  providing  current 
at  a  peak  demand  rate  of  310,000 
kilowatts,  distributed  as  follows:  Y-12, 
200,000;  town  of  Oak  Ridge,  23,000; 
K-25,  80,000;  S-50,  6,000;  and  X-10, 
1,000.  Actual  peak  demand  during 
the  wartime  period  never  quite 
reached  the  maximum  figure  of 
310,000  kilowatts.  The  highest 
demand  rate  recorded  was  298,800 
kilowatts  on  1  September  1945.  Peak 
consumption  for  any  extended  period 
during  the  war  occurred  in  August 
1945,  when  the  electricity  used  by  all 
facilities  for  the  month  totaled  about 
200  million  kilowatt  hours. ^^ 

Distribution:  Hanford  Engineer  Works 

As  at  the  Tennessee  site,  the  nucle- 
us of  the  electrical  distribution  svstem 
for  the  Hanford  site  was  the  existing 


'mi)H,  Bk.  1,  \()l.  12,  pp.  12.4-12.5,  12.16- 
12.18.  12.2.S-12.27,  DA.S.X;  Dist  Eiigr.  .MoiuliK  Rpt 
on  DSM  I'roj,  Apr  45.  .MDR;  C;ompkti(.n  Rpt,  .\1. 
\V.  Kellogg  Co.  and  Kellex  C^orp.,  .sub:  K-27  Flxtcn- 
sion,  .^1  Jan  46,  pp.  9-10,  OROO.  Sec  Ch.  VIII  for 
a  detailed  flescriptioii  of  the  lliemial  diflusioTi  plant 
and  its  deiii.inds  on  the  K-25  |)ovver  |)lant. 

3\M1)H,  Bk.  I,  Vol.  12.  pp.  12.5-12.6  and  App. 
C:7.  DASA. 


net  of  transmission  lines  and  substa- 
tion facilities,  built  and  operated  by 
local  utility  firms,  including  the  Pacif- 
ic Power  and  Light  Company.  While 
awaiting  outcome  of  the  prolonged 
negotiations  with  the  BPA,  the  Corps 
of  Engineers'  Real  Estate  Branch 
moved  ahead  with  acquiring  these  ex- 
isting facilities.  At  the  same  time,  Lt. 
Col.  Franklin  T.  Matthias,  the  area 
engineer,  and  his  staff,  joined  with 
BPA,  Pacific  Power,  and  Du  Pont  en- 
gineers in  drawing  up  plans  for  the 
extensive  alteration  and  addition  to 
the  existing  distribution  system,  and 
expediting  procurement  of  materials 
to  carry  these  out.^^ 

Project  engineers  surveying  the  ex- 
isting electrical  distribution  facilities 
at  the  Hanford  site  found  that  trans- 
mission lines  crisscrossed  the  area  at 
a  number  of  points,  constituting  a 
basic  power  net  that  could  be  readily 
adapted  to  project  requirements.  The 
BPA  had  built  two  115-kilovolt  lines 
through  the  area  that  hooked  in  to 
the  main  Bonneville-Coulee  twin  230- 
kilovolt  high  line  at  the  Midway  Sub- 
station, located  near  the  western 
boundary  of  the  site.  One  of  these 
115-kilovolt  lines  extended  through 
site  territory  east  to  Hanford  village, 
and  thence  southeast  to  Walla  Walla, 
Washington,  where  it  terminated;  the 
other  ran  generally  west  from  Midway 
across  the  western  boundary  of  the 
site  and  then  northwest  to  Ellensburg, 
Washington.  Pacific  Power's  utility 
lines  in  the  area  had  been  built  to 
serve  the  small  local  communities  and 

3«Ihid.,  Bk.  4,  \ol.  4.  pp.  2.11-2  12,  DA.SA; 
Matthias  Diaiv.  16-17,  26  and  31  Mai  4;i.  OROO: 
0(.K  Basic  Data  on  HKW,  Pasco,  Wash..  19  Mav  V.S. 
pp.  10-1  1,  .\dniin  Files,  Gen  Corrcsp,  601.1  (Han- 
ford), MDR. 


392 


MANHAITAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  AEOMIC  BOMB 


some  individual  farms.  Its  main  line, 
carrying  66  kilovolts,  ran  north  from 
Pasco  through  Richland,  Hanford, 
and  White  Bluffs,  thence  west  to  the 
Priest  Rapids  Irrigation  District's  hy- 
droelectric plant  on  the  Columbia 
River  at  the  northwest  corner  of  the 
site;  this  66-kilovolt  line  tied  into  the 
BPA's  115-kiiovolt  line  at  Hanford, 
thus  making  it  possible  for  Pacific 
Power  to  secure  current  as  needed 
from  the  Bonneville  system.  Short 
sections  of  additional  66-kilovolt 
lines,  which  provided  service  to  com- 
munities in  the  vicinity  of  the  site, 
also  traversed  the  project  area.  To 
ensure  effective  control  and  avoid  un- 
necessary duplication  of  facilities, 
Manhattan  eventually  acquired  all  of 
Pacific  Power's  lines  and  substations 
within  the  site.^^ 

While  the  existing  transmission  net 
at  Hanford  proved  to  be  more  than 
adequate  for  initial  construction  ac- 
tivities, it  was  not  capable  of  bringing 
the  high-voltage  loads  required  for 
the  production  plants.  For  this  pur- 
pose, BPA  engineers  designed  a  230- 
kilovolt  loop,  approximately  52  miles 
long,  that  tapped  the  Bonneville- 
Coulee  lines  at  the  Midway  Substation 
and  then  ran  eastward  in  a  circular 
configuration  that  brought  it  near 
each  pile  and  separation  plant.  To 
ensure  complete  reliability  of  service, 
the  BPA  built  this  loop  so  that  cur- 
rent might  be  fed  in  from  either  end 
and  also  constructed  two  additional 
230-kilovolt  feeder  lines  to  supple- 
ment those  already  running  between 
the  Bonneville  and  Grand  Coulee  hy- 
droelectric plants.  Substations  erected 


in  the  plant  areas  reduced  the  high- 
voltage  current  to  the  levels  required 
for  the  different  plant  operations. ^^ 

rhe  lines  acquired  from  Pacific 
Power  also  became  an  integral  part  of 
the  Hanford  power  network.  Electrici- 
ty for  the  metal  fabrication  and  test- 
ing area,  the  administration  area,  and 
Richland  village — all  located  in  the 
southeastern  corner  of  the  site — was 
fed  in  through  the  existing  BPA  115- 
kilovolt  line  from  Midway  to  Hanford, 
and  thence  carried  southward  over 
the  power  company's  66-kilovolt  Han- 
ford-Pasco  line.  This  latter  section 
was  the  only  part  of  the  company's 
original  system  retained  as  part  of  the 
permanent  distribution  net  after  Du 
Pont  completed  construction.  Experi- 
enced Pacific  Power  crews,  under  sub- 
contract to  the  Hanford  Engineer 
Works,  did  much  of  the  construction 
and  modification  work  on  the  trans- 
mission system. 

On  25  February  1944,  Du  Pont 
took  over  complete  responsibility  for 
operation  and  maintenance  of  all 
electrical  facilities  that  were  not  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  BPA  system.  The 
only  exception  was  the  Priest  Rapids 
plant,  which  Pacific  Power  operated 
under  a  separate  government  contract 
with  technical  assistance  from  Du 
Pont.  This  plan  was  consistent  with 
the  Army's  stringent  security  policy  of 
reducing  to  a  minimum  the  number 
of  firms  involved  in  operational 
phases  of  producing  fissionable  mate- 
rials. Even  though  BPA  crews  contin- 
ued to  maintain  and  repair  its  lines  in 
the    project    area,    the   area    engineer 


"MIDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  4,  pp.  2.11-2.12  and  App,  A5 
(Map,  Transmission  Systems  at  HEW),  DASA;  Du 
Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  p.  10,  and  Vol.  4,  p.  1059, 
HOO. 


38  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  3,  pp.  7.1-7.3,  and  Vol.  5,  p. 
7.3.  DASA;  Matthias  Diary,  22  and  27  Jul  43, 
OROO;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  4,  pp.  1059-63, 
HOO;  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  89. 


ELEC/IRIC  POWER 


393 


kept     them    under    constant    security 
surveillance.^^ 

In  developing  Hanford's  complex 
transmission  facilities,  the  BPA  and 
Pacific  Power  found  that  procurement 
of  electrical  equipment — in  particular, 
wire,  generators,  and  utility  poles — 
was  one  of  their  most  difTicull  prob- 
lems and  repeatedly  sought  assistance 
from  Manhattan.  1  he  BPA,  for  exam- 
ple, had  to  prepare  extensive  data  to 
justify  its  many  priorities  requests  for 
electrical  equipment,  and  Colonel 
Matthias  assigned  an  electrical  engi- 
neer from  his  staff  to  the  BPA's  engi- 
neering office  in  Portland  to  assist 
with  this  task.  A  typical  problem  for 
the  Hanford  distribution  system  was 
procurement  of  cable  for  the  230- 
kilovolt  loop  in  the  production  plant 
area.  When  Manhattan  applied  for  an 
allotment  of  scarce  copper  for  this 
purpose,   the  War  Production   Board 


39  MI^H,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  3,  p.  7.3,  and  Vol.  5,  pp.  7.2- 
7.5.  D.ASA;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  4,  pp.  1061- 
62  and  1065-67,  HOO;  Ltr,  Robins  (Act  Chief  of 
Plngrs)  to  CG  SO.S,  sub;  Acquisition  of  Land  for 
Gable  Proj,  Pasco,  Wash..  8  Feb  43,  Incl  to  Memo. 
Col  John  J.  O'Brien  (CE  Real  Estate  Br  chief)  to  Lt 
Col  Whitney  Ashbridge  (CE  Mil  Constr  Br),  sub: 
Land  .Acquisition  in  Connection  With  MD.  17  .Apr 
43,  .Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  601  (Santa  Fe), 
MDR:  Matthias  Diary,  21  and  27  Apr  43,  OROO; 
Memo.  G.  P.  Church  (Du  Ponts  Field  Proj  Mgr)  to 
T.  W.  Brown,  R.  E.  Burton  et  al.  (Du  Pont  and  Han- 
ford area  office  staff  members),  17  Apr  43,  Incl  to 
Ltr.  Matthias  to  Dist  Engr.  sub:  Proposed  Policy  for 
HEW,  23  .Apr  43.  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  161 
(Du  Pont),  MDR. 


recommended  that  it  use  aluminum 
cable.  Project  engineers  assented  to 
using  aluminum,  but  then  experi- 
enced both  difficulty  and  delay  in  se- 
curing the  board's  sanction  for  the 
substitution.  As  a  result,  Hanford 
could  not  begin  procurement  of  the 
cable  until  July  1943.  Fortunately, 
continuing  and  vigorous  expediting 
efforts  by  the  Army  enabled  the  BPA 
to  complete  the  loop  in  time  to  fur- 
nish the  electrical  energy  essential  for 
initial  operations  of  the  plutonium 
production  piles  in  late  1944.*° 

When  considered  against  the  back- 
ground of  severe  shortages  of  both 
electric  power  and  equipment  in  a 
wartime  economy,  securing  an  ade- 
quate supply  and  distribution  of  elec- 
tric power  for  the  atomic  installations 
was  a  significant  achievement  for  the 
Manhattan  Project  and  its  Army  ad- 
ministrators. Their  early  recognition 
of  the  need  for  firm  priorities  com- 
mitments and  skillful  use  of  War 
Department  resources  for  obtaining 
them  guaranteed  Manhattan  contin- 
uous access  to  the  electric  power 
essential  for  all  of  its  wartime 
operations. 


40  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  3,  pp.  7.1-7.2,  and  Vol.  5,  p. 
7.3.  DASA;  Matthias  Diary,  15  Jun,  19,  22-23  and 
28-30  Jul,  and  6  Aug  43,  OROO;  Groves  Diarv,  29- 
30  Jun  and  1,  7,  9,  12-16,  20  Jul  43,  LRC;;  Du  Pont 
Const  Hist,  Vol.  4,  p.  1062,  1400;  Groves,  Xow  It 
Can  Be  Told.  p.  89. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


Communications  and 
Transportation 


Along  with  electric  power,  commu- 
nications and  transportation  constitut- 
ed vital  process  support  elements  for 
the  Manhattan  Project's  laboratories, 
production  plants,  and  atomic  com- 
munities. With  the  major  sites  located 
in  widely  separated  regions  of  the 
country,  successful  project  operations 
were  dependent  on  achieving  effective 
coordination  via  an  efficient  commu- 
nications network  and  on  timely  pro- 
curement of  materials  from  suppliers 
in  all  parts  of  the  United  States  via 
readily  accessible  rail  and  highway 
transport.  Because  preliminary  sur- 
veys of  the  Tennessee,  Washington 
State,  and  New  Mexico  sites  revealed 
that  existing  local  communications 
and  transportation  facilities  were  rela- 
tively rudimentary,  the  Army — under 
conditions  demanding  extraordinary 
measures  of  safety  and  security — 
faced  the  large  task  of  developing 
them  into  the  complex  and  sophisti- 
cated systems  required  by  the  atomic 
installations. 

Communications 

A  common  sight  in  and  around  the 
Clinton,  Hanford,  and  Los  Alamos  in- 
stallations during  their  developmental 


phase  was  linemen  busily  stringing 
and  connecting  miles  of  wire  or  cable, 
in  some  instances,  across  great 
stretches  of  mostly  open  and  uninha- 
bited countryside.  While  much  of  this 
was  for  power  transmission,  a  consid- 
erable part  was  for  complex  and 
highly  integrated  communications 
systems. 

Communications  at  each  of  the 
atomic  installations,  for  all  practical 
purposes,  had  to  be  constructed  from 
the  ground  up,  because  none  of  them 
had  more  than  the  minimum  facilities 
normally  found  in  rural,  sparsely  pop- 
ulated regions  in  the  United  States 
before  World  War  II.  Of  the  three 
sites,  Hanford  had  the  most  complete 
existing  system  with  telephone  service 
being  furnished  to  the  towns  and 
farms  in  the  area  by  five  independent 
companies  and  the  Pacific  Telephone 
and  Telegraph  Company.  Further- 
more, the  Bonneville  Power  Adminis- 
tration maintained  for  its  own  use  a 
two-way  radio  network  in  the  vicinity 
of  its  115-kilovolt  lines  in  the  Han- 
ford area.  In  contrast,  Clinton  had 
only  one  telephone  line,  a  6-mile  sec- 
tion of  the  Clinton-Harriman  toll  line, 
that  served  a  few  of  the  farmers  who 


COMMl'NICAIIONS  AND    IRANSPOR  1  A  HON 


395 


lived  in  the  area  and  Los  Alamos  had 
only  a  government -owned  Forest 
Service  line,  operated  by  the  Moun- 
tain States  Telephone  and  Telegraph 
Company  and  providing  service  to  the 
boys'  school  located  on  the  site.  With 
respect  to  all  of  the  privately  owned 
communications  facilities  found  on 
the  atomic  sites,  the  War  Depart- 
ment's policy  was  to  acquire  them 
and,  wherever  feasible,  to  integrate 
them  into  the  extensive  systems  be- 
ing planned  for  Manhattan's  atomic 
installations.^ 

At  each  of  the  major  sites,  Manhat- 
tan worked  closely  with  the  Army 
Signal  Corps,  with  local  telephone 
and  telegraph  companies,  and  with 
prime  contractor  organizations  to 
install  the  most  up-to-date  communi- 
cations available  under  wartime  pro- 
curement conditions.  Because  of 
unusual  safety  and  security  require- 
ments, these  communications  includ- 
ed such  specialized  instruments  as 
alarm  devices,  to  warn  of  fire  and 
other  hazardous  conditions  in  time  to 
guarantee  evacuation  of  dangerous 
areas,  and  two-way  radio  networks 
and  radio-monitoring  devices.  Con- 
nections into  the  nationwide  Army 
Command      Administrative      Network 


'  MD»,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  "Clinton  Engineer  Works, 
Central  Facilities,"  p.  15.1;  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  "Construc- 
tion," pp.  7.7-7.8;  and  Bk.  8,  Vol.  I,  "Ceneral,"  pp. 
5.2,S-.^).L'4,  IMSA.  Matthias  Diarv.  12  Mar  and  7  Apr 
43,  OROO.  In  Admin  Files.  Gen  Corresp,  MDR.  see 
601.1  (Hanlord)  for  OCE,  Basic  Data  on  HP:VV, 
19  May  43,  p.  11,  and  Ltr,  Robins  (Dep  Chief  of 
Engrs)  to  CG  ASF,  sub:  Acquisition  of  Land  for 
HKW  Proj,  5  Jun  44;  and  601  (Santa  Fc)  for  Etrs, 
Robins  (Act  Chief  of  Kngrs)  to  (X;  SOS,  subs:  Ac- 
quisition in  Fee  of  Approx  56,200  Acres  of  Land  for 
Demolition  Range  Near  Kingston,  Fenn.,  29  Sep  42, 
and  Acquisition  of  Land  for  Gable  Proj,  Pasco, 
Wash.,  8  Feb  43,  Inds  to  Memo,  Col  John  J. 
O'Brien  (CF  Real  Estate  Br  chief)  to  Lt  Co!  Whitney 
.Ashbridge  (CE  Mi!  Constr  Br),  sub:  Land  Acquisi- 
tion in  Connection  With  MI),  17  Apr  43. 


teletype  (ircuit  with  codification 
equipment  provided  rapid  and  secure 
communication  between  the  various 
facilities  of  the  Manhattan  District,  in- 
cluding Ceneral  Croves's  personal 
headquarters  in  Washington,  D.C. 
Other  rWX  equipment  furnished 
direct  teletype  service  between  prime 
contractors'  field  organizations  and 
their  home  offices.  An  example  was 
Du  Font's  private  teletypewriter 
service  between  its  Hanford  and 
Richland  offices  and  head  office  in 
Wilmington.^ 

Ihe  Army  was  more  directly  con- 
cerned with  details  of  designing, 
building,  and  operating  communica- 
tions than  in  most  other  process  sup- 
port activities,  partly  because  its 
Signal  Corps  had  the  necessary  exper- 
tise to  furnish  communications  speed- 
ily and  the  Army  Command  Adminis- 
trative Network  was  an  established 
communications  system  that  could 
serve  the  specialized  needs  of  the 
project.  Also,  the  Army  wished  to 
maintain  close  control  over  all  aspects 
of  the  project's  security  system  in 
which  all  forms  of  communications 
played  a  vital  role. 

The  extent  of  the  Signal  Corps' 
participation  in  development  of 
atomic  project  communications  varied 
from  site  to  site.  At  Clinton,  the  4th 
Service  Command  signal  officer 
served  chiefly  in  an  advisory  capacity 
to  the  district  engineer,  participating 
most  actively  in  the  period  before  the 
establishment  of  a  communications 
unit    in    the    Clinton    Area    Engineers 


2MDH,  Bk.  1,  \'ol.  12.  pp.  15.5-15.6;  Bk.  4. 
Vol.  5,  p.  7.8;  and  Bk.  4,  \'ol.  6,  "Operations,"  pp. 
12.2-12.3,  DASA.  Matthias  Diarv,  16  Mar,  7  Apr, 
6  May  43,  OROO.  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  4.  pp. 
1357-60,  HOO. 


396 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Office  in  April  1943.  At  Los  Alamos, 
the  Signal  Corps'  contribution  was 
limited  to  furnishing  technical  advice 
and  some  items  of  equipment.  But  at 
Hanford,  planning  and  overseeing 
construction  of  the  telephone  system 
was  one  of  the  largest  single  jobs  un- 
dertaken by  the  Signal  Corps  in  the 
United  States  during  the  war.^ 

In  early  1943,  after  the  Signal 
Corps  had  agreed  to  Colonel  Mar- 
shall's request  to  assist  Manhattan  in 
building  the  Hanford  telephone 
system,  9th  Service  Command  signal 
officers  participated  in  a  series  of 
planning  meetings  with  representa- 
tives of  the  State  of  Washington 
Public  Utilities  Commission,  local 
telephone  companies,  Du  Pont,  and 
the  Hanford  Area  Engineers  Office.  A 
problematic  issue  was  the  division  of 
responsibilities  for  design  and  con- 
struction of  the  Hanford  system:  Du 
Pont  and  the  Signal  Corps  both 
wanted  the  task.  Apprised  of  this  situ- 
ation in  June,  Groves  immediately 
conferred  with  officials  in  the  Office 
of  the  Chief  Signal  Officer  in  Wash- 
ington, D.C.,  and,  after  emphasizing 
the  project's  requirement  for  com- 
plete secrecy,  successfully  worked  out 
an  arrangement  with  them  for  Du 
Pont  to  design  the  system  in  conform- 
ity with  standard  specifications  of 
Army  telephone  installations.  Accord- 
ing to  this  working  agreement,  the 
Signal  Corps'  Plant  Engineering 
Agency  of  Philadelphia  would  provide 


3MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  pp.  15.1,  and  Bk.  8, 
Vol.  1,  "General,"  pp.  5.23-5.24,  DASA;  George 
Raynor  Thompson,  Dixie  R.  Harris,  Pauline  M. 
Oakes,  and  Dulany  Terrett,  The  Signal  Corps:  The 
Test,  United  States  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washing- 
ton, D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office,  1957),  pp. 
440-41;  Matthias  Diary,  7,  9,  24  Apr  43,  OROO;  Du 
Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  2,  pp.  513-15,  and  Vol.  4, 
pp.  1067-68,  HOO. 


Du  Pont  with  its  technical  expertise,  if 
needed;  Pacific  Telephone  and  Tele- 
graph Company  crews,  under  supervi- 
sion of  the  9th  Service  Command 
signal  officer,  would  construct  the 
system;  both  the  Signal  Corps  and 
area  engineer  would  take  responsibil- 
ity for  procuring  equipment  and  ma- 
terials; and  Du  Pont  would  give  Pa- 
cific Telephone  and  Telegraph  any 
assistance  it  needed  in  handling  mate- 
rials and  securing  workmen.* 

The  division  of  responsibilities  for 
design  and  construction  of  the  Clin- 
ton and  Hanford  communications  fa- 
cilities followed  a  similar  pattern;  the 
prime  contractors  had  responsibility 
for  overseeing  the  task  and  the  local 
telephone  company  for  actual  con- 
struction. At  Clinton,  Stone  and  Web- 
ster designed  the  system  in  consulta- 
tion with  the  4th  Service  Command 
signal  officer  and  erected  the  tele- 
phone buildings,  but  shared  the  line 
construction  work  with  the  Southern 
Bell  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Com- 
pany. At  Los  Alamos,  the  Mountain 
States  Telephone  and  Telegraph 
Company  performed  whatever  con- 
struction was  necessary.^ 

As  Manhattan's  production  installa- 
tions reached  the  operations  stage, 
the  Army  increased  security  by  tight- 
ening up  its  administrative  machinery 
for  control  and  supervision  of  com- 
munications. At  Clinton,  for  example, 
the   administrative   element    supervis- 


"  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  pp.  7.5-7.7,  DASA;  Mat- 
thias Diary,  20  May  43,  OROO;  Du  Pont  Constr 
Hist,  Vol.  4,  pp.  1068-71,  HOO;  Groves  Diary.  10- 
1 1  Jun  43,  LRG. 

5  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  pp.  15.1-15.3,  and  Bk.  8, 
Vol.  1,  pp.  5.23-5.24,  DASA;  Completion  Rpt, 
Stone  and  Webster,  sub:  Clinton  Engr  Works,  Con- 
tract W-7401-eng-13,  1946,  pp.  63,  68-69,  87-89, 
116,  OROO. 


COMML  NICAl  IONS  AND    1  RANSPOR  lAI  ION 


397 


ing  communications — at  first  only  a 
unit  in  the  Clinton  area  office,  then 
later  part  of  a  section  under  the  Dis- 
trict's executive  officer — became  in 
early  1945  a  separate  branch  of  the 
Operations  Division  at  District  head- 
quarters in  Oak  Ridge.  Similarly,  at 
Hanford,  when  the  area  engineer  en- 
larged his  communications  staff,  he 
requisitioned  Women's  Army  Corps 
personnel  because  they  were  more 
readily  subject  to  close  security  con- 
trol than  civilian  employees.® 

During  the  war,  however,  the  Army 
never  actually  took  over  operation  of 
project  communications  facilities 
except,  of  course,  those  that  were 
used  to  carry  on  the  business  of  the 
District  itself  and  those  at  Los 
Alamos,  which  operated  as  a  military 
post.  Completed  installations  were 
turned  over  to  the  operating  contrac- 
tors. At  Hanford,  where  Du  Pont  was 
both  the  construction  and  operations 
contractor,  the  company's  operational 
staff  continued  to  hire  and  supervise 
employees  who  manned  the  switch- 
boards, operated  teletype  machines, 
and  kept  the  lines  in  repair.  Similarly, 
at  Clinton,  the  Roane-Anderson  Com- 
pany assumed  responsibility  for  oper- 
ating the  Oak  Ridge  community  facili- 
ties, built  by  Stone  and  Webster,  and 
also  arranged  with  the  Western  Union 
Company  to  provide  telegraphic  serv- 
ice for  the  town.  And  the  operating 
contractors  took  over  plant  communi- 
cations facilities  in  the  production 
areas  and  employed  Southern  Bell 
Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company 
crews,  under  supervision  of  the  Dis- 
trict's Communications  Branch,  to  do 


maintenance,   repair,   and   installation 
work."^ 

Transportation 

Transportation  problems  for  the 
Clinton,  Hanford,  and  Los  Alamos 
sites  were  similar  to  those  of  furnish- 
ing electric  power  and  communica- 
tions. Project  site  selection  teams  had 
chosen  locations  near  well-established 
railroad  lines  and  highways,  but  the 
requirement  for  relative  isolation 
meant  that  the  sites  themselves  gener- 
ally lacked  adequate  access  to  these 
nearby  facilities.  Clinton's  primarily 
rural  acreage  had  only  one  major 
highway  and  no  rail  line,  although 
main  lines  of  the  Southern  Railway 
and  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Rail- 
road ran  close  by  the  reservation. 
Hanford's  semiarid  farming  and 
ranching  country  had  a  highway 
system  adequate  only  to  serve  its 
sparse  agricultural  population  and,  in 
its  northern  area,  a  single-tracked, 
second-class  branch  rail  line.  Los 
Alamos  was  the  most  isolated  of  all, 
with  only  a  few  secondary  roads  and  a 
branch  of  the  Atchison,  Topeka  and 
Santa  Fe  Railroad  some  25  miles  dis- 
tant.^ 

Transportation  problems  fell  into 
two     categories:     those     within     the 


«  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  p.  15.1,  and  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5, 
App.  B57,  DASA;  Org  Charts,  U.S.  Kngrs  Office, 
MD,  1  Nov  43  and  26  Jan  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  020  (MED-Org),  MDR. 


^  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  pp.  15.1  and  15.5-15.6; 
Bk.  4.  Vol.  6,  p.  12.1;  and  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1.  pp.  5.23- 
5.24,  DASA.  History  of  Roanc-.Anderson  Company 
(henceforth  cited  as  Roane-Anderson  Hist),  Con- 
tract VV-7401-eng-l  15,  30  Nov  51,  p.  63  and  ,App. 
D.  OROO. 

*  Historv  of  Passenger  Transportation  at  Clinton 
Engineer  Works  (henceforth  cited  as  CEW  Passen- 
ger Irans  Hist),  Jul  45,  pp.  1-2.  OROO.  OCE. 
Basic  Data  on  HEW.  19  Mav  43.  pp.  9-12,  MDR. 
MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12.  pp.  16.1,  17.1-17.2.  18.1;  Bk. 
4,  Vol.  3.  "Design,"  p.  7.4:  and  Bk.  8.  \'ol.  1,  pp. 
2*4-2.6,  DASA.  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist.  Vol.  1,  pp.  9- 
10,  HOO. 


398 


MANHATTAN:  IHE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


boundaries  of  a  site,  where  Manhattan 
could  exercise  a  great  deal  of  control 
over  their  solution;  and  those  within 
the  region  immediately  surrounding 
the  site,  where  control  was  much 
more  tenuous.  The  Army's  objective 
was  to  achieve  a  coordinated  system 
that  would  adequately  serve  the  trans- 
portation needs  in  both  the  on-  and 
off-site  areas.  In  the  interests  of  econ- 
omy, both  in  time  and  money,  the 
Army  followed  a  consistent  policy  of 
using,  to  the  maximum  extent  feasi- 
ble, all  available  means  of  transporta- 
tion and  adding  new  facilities  only 
where  project  requirements  made 
them  absolutely  necessary. 

In  those  instances  where  the  Army 
had  to  provide  new  transportation  fa- 
cilities, it  delegated  as  much  of  the 
task  as  possible  to  nonmilitary  agen- 
cies. Development  of  transportation 
means  within  the  boundaries  of  each 
site  became  the  responsibility  of  the 
construction  contractors.  At  Clinton, 
the  three  major  construction  contrac- 
tors— Stone  and  Webster,  Du  Pont, 
and  the  J.  A.  Jones  Construction 
Company — designed  and  built  the  rail 
and  road  system,  respectively,  for  the 
town  of  Oak  Ridge  and  the  electro- 
magnetic plant,  for  the  plutonium 
semiworks,  and  for  the  diffusion 
plants;  at  Hanford,  Du  Pont  expanded 
the  existing  road  network  and  built  an 
on-site  rail  system;  and  at  Los 
Alamos,  the  M.  M.  Sundt  and  A.  O. 
Peabody  construction  companies,  with 
assistance  from  post  work  crews,  im- 
proved the  existing  road  system  and 
built  many  road  extensions. 

To  the  extent  feasible,  the  Army 
also  assigned  transportation  as  a  func- 
tion of  the  operating  contractors. 
Roane-Anderson,  for  example,  pro- 
vided  transportation   for  the   town  of 


Oak  Ridge,  the  Tennessee  Eastman 
Corporation  for  the  electromagnetic 
plant  area,  the  University  of  Chicago- 
operated  Clinton  Laboratories  for  the 
plutonium  semiworks,  and  the  Car- 
bide and  Carbon  Chemicals  Corpora- 
tion for  the  diffusion  plants  area.  At 
Hanford,  Du  Pont  and  the  Army 
shared  responsibility  for  the  on-site 
railroad  net,  but  the  area  engineer 
maintained  the  roads,  controlled 
highway  traffic,  and  operated  the  bus 
service  within  the  site.  At  Los  Alamos, 
where  security  was  an  overriding  con- 
sideration, the  Army  retained  almost 
exclusive  control  over  operation  of  all 
forms  of  transportation,  limiting  ve- 
hicular traffic  within  the  reservation 
to  trucks,  buses,  and  cars  driven  by 
military  personnel.® 

Except  for  certain  aspects  that  re- 
quired negotiations  with  federal  agen- 
cies, resolution  of  most  transportation 
problems  was  the  responsibility  of  the 
Army  officer  in  charge  of  each  of  the 
sites.  He  had,  for  example,  to  reach 
agreement  with  state  and  local  offi- 
cials on  building  access  roads  and  im- 
proving existing  highways,  to  negoti- 
ate with  local  bus  companies  to  in- 
crease service  between  nearby  towns 
and  the  site  bus  depots,  to  arrange 
with  the  Transportation  Corps'  zone 
officer  for  vehicle  procurement,  and 
to  supervise  the  construction  and  op- 
erating contractors.  Each  officer  in 
charge  had  to  set  up  an  appropriate 
organization  within  his  staff  for  this 
particular  purpose. 


^MDH.  Bk.  1.  Vol.  12,  pp.  16.1-16.21,  17.1-17.7. 
18.1,  pas.sim;  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  pp.  7.8-7.13,  and  Vol.  6, 
pp.  8.1-8.3;  and  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  pp.  3.1 -.5. 3  and  5.13- 
.5.14,  DAS.A.  CKW  Passenger  Trans  Hisi,  p.  1, 
passim,  OROO.  Du  Fonl  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  pp. 
14.5-53,  HOC). 


COMMLINICATIONS  AND    IRANSPOR  lA  HON 


399 


Unimproved  Santa  Fe-Los  Alamos  Road 


During  the  period  when  construc- 
tion was  the  dominant  activity  at 
CHnton,  the  district  engineer  ad- 
ministered day-to-day  transportation 
matters  through  a  section  in  the  Con- 
struction Branch  of  the  District's  Clin- 
ton Engineer  Works  (CEW)  Central 
Facilities  Division.  He  formed  a  CEW 
Iransportation  Board  in  December 
1943,  comprised  of  representatives  of 
the  prime  contractors,  to  assist  him  in 
formulating  area-wide  policies  and 
procedures  concerning  passenger 
transport,  traffic  regulations,  licenses 
and  regulatory  activities,  and  govern- 
ment-owned vehicles.  In  mid- 1944,  he 
reorganized  the  administration  of 
transportation,  forming  in  the  Serv- 
ices Branch  of  the  Facilities  Division 
two      separate     sections — Automotive 


and  Bus  Transportation — to  monitor 
automotive,  rail  and  motor  freight, 
and  bus  operations.  At  the  same  time, 
he  transferred  the  CEW  Transporta- 
tion Board's  functions  to  his  policy- 
making operational  group,  the  Cen- 
tral F'acilities  Advisory  Committee.  ^° 

At  Hanford,  the  area  engineer  es- 
tablished in  March  1943  a  Transpor- 
tation Department  in  his  office  to 
maintain  and  operate  all  transporta- 
tion except  railroads,  which  Du  Pont 
operated,  and  to  oversee  all  vehicular 
procurement — usually  surplus  stocks 
from  other  Corps  of  Engineers 
projects      or      from      Transportation 


'»M1)H.  Bk.  1,  \()1.  12,  pp.  18.4-18.3.  DASA; 
CKW  Passenger  Irans  Hist,  pp.  9-10,  OROO;  Org 
Charts,  l^.S.  Kngrs  OHice,  Ml),  1  Nov  43,  1  Jun, 
28  Aug,  and  10  Nov  44,  2()  )an  4,3,  MDR. 


400 


MANHATl  AN:  1  HE  ARMY  AND  1  HE  AlOMIC  BOMB 


Improved  Santa  Fe-Los  Alamos  Road,  ascending  to  the  Pajanto  Plateau  from  the  Rio 
Grande  valley 


Corps  sources.  Burgeoning  transpor- 
tation requirements  resulted  in  a  de- 
partmental reorganization  in  late 
1944,  first  as  the  Transportation 
Office  under  the  chief  of  operations 
and  finally  as  the  Transportation 
Branch  in  the  Administrative  Division. 
These  requirements  gradually  de- 
clined in  early  1945  with  the  comple- 
tion of  major  construction  at  the  site, 
making  possible  a  substantial  reduc- 
tion of  employees  in  the  branch.  ^^ 

Primarily  for  security  reasons,  but 
also  consistent  with  its  administration 
as  a  military  post,  the  Army  furnished 
and     operated     almost     all     types     of 


"MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  p.  9.1  and  App.  B57,  and 
\oi.  6.  pp.  8.1,  18.2,  App.  38.  DAS  A;  Matthia.s 
Diaiv,  6  Mav  and  23  Jun  43.  OROO. 


transportation  at  Los  Alamos.  In  mid- 
1943,  the  post  commander  assigned 
responsibility  for  transportation  to  a 
supply  and  transportation  officer  in 
the  Supply  Division,  who,  in  turn,  del- 
egated actual  operation  of  the  Motor 
Pool  and  Motor  Maintenance  Section 
to  an  assistant  transportation  officer. 
This  administrative  arrangement,  with 
only  minor  changes,  continued  for 
the  duration  of  the  war.  ^^ 

Motor  I'ehicles  and  Roads 

Manhattan's  transportation  require- 
ments were  out  of  the  ordinary,  even 
for  a   wartime   activity.    For   example, 


■2MDH,  Bk.  8,  \-. 
DASA. 


1.  pp.  6.22-6.27  and  App.  B3, 


COMMUNICATIONS  AND  TRANSPORTATION 


401 


the  project  was  unusually  dependent 
upon  the  motor  vehicle  for  transport- 
ing its  employees  relatively  long  dis- 
tances from  the  communities  where 
they  lived.  Primarily  for  safety  and  se- 
curity, major  installations  at  both 
Hanford  and  Clinton  were  not  only 
miles  apart  but  also  a  considerable 
distance  from  their  operating  commu- 
nities. Oak  Ridge  and  Richland,  and 
from  off-site  towns  where  many  other 
project  employees  lived.  Plant-operat- 
ing employees  residing  at  Richland 
had  a  round  trip  of  from  58  to  76 
miles  each  day.  Workers  coming  from 
Knoxville  by  bus  rode  some  17  to  20 
miles  to  the  Oak  Ridge  terminal  and 
then  transferred  to  other  means  of 
transportation  to  get  to  specific  site 
locations,  including  the  gaseous  diffu- 
sion plant  nearly  10  miles  west  of  the 
terminal.  Even  at  Los  Alamos,  where 
the  need  for  exceptional  security  dic- 
tated housing  as  many  employees  as 
possible  on  the  site,  hundreds  of  con- 
struction and  service  personnel  com- 
muted long  distances  from  off-site 
communities.  Typical  was  the  35-  to 
45-mile  trip  from  Santa  Fe  over 
mountainous  and  generally  poorly 
maintained  state  highways.  ^^  (See 
Maps  5,  4,  and  5.) 

Manhattan  relied  primarily  upon 
motor  buses  to  cope  with  its  huge 
commuter  problem.  At  Hanford,  the 
Transportation  Department  regularly 
maintained,  scheduled,  dispatched, 
and  operated  more  than  900  buses, 
making  it  probably  the  world's  largest 


motor  bus  operator  in  a  given  area 
during   World   War   II. ^'^    From   April 

1943  to  March  1945,  a  total  of  20 
million  passengers  rode  some  340 
million  miles  on  the  Hanford  system. 
The  I  ennessee  bus  system,  which  was 
maintained  and  operated  by  civilian 
firms  under  government  contract,  was 
considerably  smaller.  Nevertheless,  by 
the  end  of  1944,  more  than  350  buses 
were  in  off-area  service.  In  addition,  a 
substantial  number  more,  operated  by 
Roane-Anderson's  CEW  Bus  Author- 
ity formed  in  December  1943,  provid- 
ed service  within  the  boundries  of  the 
site  (as,  for  example,  for  the  towns- 
people living  in  Oak  Ridge).  Manhat- 
tan regularly  received  assistance  from 
the  Transportation  Corps,  acting 
through  its  appropriate  zonal  com- 
mands, in  procurement  of  most  of  the 
buses  used  at  Clinton  and  Hanford 
and  in  the  operation  of  its  various  bus 
systerris.^^ 

As  on  countless  other  war  projects, 
thousands  of  Manhattan  workers  com- 
muted in  private  automobiles.  At 
Clinton,  this  was  the  major  means  of 
passenger  transportation  in  the  early 
stages    of  the    project,    and    by    early 

1944  nearly  twenty-five  thousand 
automobiles  were  passing  through  the 
reservation  gates  each  day.  The  Army 
took   steps    to   supervise   and   control 


■Mb.d..  Bk.  4.  \ol.  5.  App.  Bl  (Area  Mileage 
lahs).  and  Bk.  8.  \'ol.  1,  pp.  2.4-2.5  and  6.2-6.3, 
1).\SA;  I)u  Pont  Opns  Hist.  Bk.  16,  "Transportation 
Department:  Automotive  Operations  to  Julv  1, 
1945,"  pp.  1-2.  IKK):  (,F.W  Passenger  1  rans  Hist, 
pp.  2  and  7,  OROO:  (Completion  Rpi.  Stone  and 
Webster,  sub:  CKW.  pp.   12-13,  OKOO. 


'*  Chicago,  for  example,  with  the  largest  city  bus 
svstem  in  the  I'nited  States,  had  some  800  buses  in 
regular  operation  during  the  war.  See  MDH,  Bk.  4. 
\'ol.  4,  "I.and  Acquisition,  Hanfoid  Engineer 
Works,"  p.  9.5,  DASA. 

iMbid.,  pp.  9.1-9.5.  DASA;  CEW  Passenger 
Erans  Hist,  pp.  11-39  and  Exhibits  B  and  D, 
OROO;  Matthias  Diarv,  30  Oct  43,  OROO:  Du  Pont 
Opns  Hist,  Bk.  16,  pp.  1  and  7,  HOO.  At  Hanford, 
Du  Pont  had  responsibility  for  operation  and  main- 
tenance of  all  projed  automotive  equipment  in 
plant  areas  and  of  thai  in  Richland  that  was  not 
under  direi  I  Ariin  (onlrol. 


402 


MANHA  riAN:    IHK  ARMY  AND    IHE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


Oak  Ridge  Bus  Terminal 


this  heavy  traffic,  encouraging  share- 
the-ride  programs;  assisting  employ- 
ees in  procurement  of  rationed  tires 
and  gasoHne;  and  trying,  without  too 
much  success,  to  provide  automobile 
repair  and  maintenance  facilities. ^^ 

Manhattan's  heavy  dependence 
upon  buses  and  automobiles  placed 
further  strain  upon  existing  road  net- 
works, which  already  were  disintegrat- 
ing under  the  pounding  they  received 
from  the  hundreds  of  trucks  and 
other  vehicles  operated  by  the  con- 
struction contractors.  While  the  Armv 
itself  did  not  undertake  to  build  and 
maintain  roads  for  the  project,  area 
engineer  personnel  at  each  of  the 
sites  devoted  much  time  to  supervis- 
ing the  efforts  made  by  the  major 
construction  firms  to  improve  original 


's  CEVV  Passenger  Irans  Hist,  pp.  44-51,  OROO. 


roads,  design  and  build  efficient  new 
plant  road  networks  and  connecting 
routes,  and  maintain  all  road  and 
highway  facilities  essential  to  project 
operations.  In  most  instances,  the 
major  contractors  followed  the  prac- 
tice of  subcontracting  road  work  to 
local  construction  firms  that  had 
equipment  and  working  crews  for  the 
job. 

Road  development  at  Hanford  will 
serve  as  an  example  of  what  in  gener- 
al was  done  at  all  the  major  sites.  In 
January  1943,  the  site  selection  team 
had  reported  to  General  Groves  that 
the  road  system  of  the  Washington 
site  consisted  essentially  of  two  main 
state  highways:  one  running  east  from 
Yakima  through  what  would  become 
the  heart  of  the  production  plant 
area,    thence    to    Hanford   and    on    to 


COMMl'NICAIIONS  AND    IRANSPOR  1  A  HON 


403 


Spokane;  and  the  otlier  running  ironi 
Richland  to  Hanford  by  way  of  the 
Vakinia  River  horn.  This  major  exist- 
ing axis,  plus  a  few  secondary  roads, 
eventually  became  the  nucleus  for  a 
system  ot  350  miles  oi  roads  of  all 
types,  most  of  them  asphalt  surfaced, 
including  two  four-lane  divided  high- 
wa\s  running  from  the  vicinit\  of  the 
pile  and  separation  plants  southeast- 
ward to  Richland.  When  critics  later 
questioned  the  wisdom  of  building 
these  broad  thoroughfaies  across 
miles  of  arid  sagebrush  grazing  lands. 
Groves  pointed  out  that  they  were 
consistent  with  the  Army's  policy  of 
preparing  for  every  forseeable  contin- 
gency. Manhattan  had  to  provide  for 
the  quick  evacuation  of  thousands  of 
woikers  in  the  event  of  an  explosion, 
or  similar  accident,  in  the  production 
area  that  conceivably  might  spread 
deadly  radiation  over  a  wide  zone. 
Under  the  day-to-day  supervision  and 
inspection  of  the  area  engineer's  staff, 
Du  Pont  planned  and  built  the  Han- 
ford road  system,  employing  two  Cali- 
fornia road-building  firms  to  do  most 
of  the  actual  earth  moving,  grading, 
and  paving.  ^"^ 

Existing  access  roads  near  the  Man- 
hattan reservations  were  generally  in- 
adequate and  poorly  maintained.  The 
Army  improved  the  original  off-site 
road  networks  to  keep  them  in  usable 
condition  and  arranged  for  construc- 
tion of  certain  new  connecting  routes. 
Whenever     and     wherever     possible. 


"  t'rtliiii  Rpi.  sub:  HF.W  Site  Investigation,  2  Jan 
4;^.  Adniin  Fiks,  Ckn  Clorresp.  (iOO.OS,  MDR;  Mat- 
thias I)iar\,  7  and  17  Apr.  <>  Mav,  27  Jul.  9  Nov  43, 
()R(K):  MDH,  Bk.  4,  \'ol.  3.  pp.  7.4-7.5,  and  Bk.  4, 
\'ol.  5.  pp.  7.9-7.11  and  App.  B4  (.Summary  of  Con- 
tracts and  Subcontracts).  I).AS,\;  I)u  I'ont  C.onstr 
Hist.  \<)i.  1,  pp.  5  and  9-10.  and  \'ol.  4,  pp.  484- 
H.5.  1089-92.  1094-96.  1101-06.  1111-12.  IKK); 
Du  Pont  Opns  Hist,  Bk.  16,  pp.  1-2,  HOC). 


Manhattan  tried  to  secure  agreements 
with  county,  state,  and  federal  high- 
way officials  for  sharing  the  work  of 
carrying  out  improvements  on  access 
roads.  For  example,  in  November 
1943,  District  representatives  met 
with  officials  of  the  state  of  Tennes- 
see, the  Public  Roads  Administration, 
Roane  and  Anderson  Counties,  and 
the  principal  contractors  to  work  out 
an  overall  access  road  program, 
agreeing  to  assignment  of  priorities 
so  that  each  project  would  be  under- 
taken in  order  of  its  urgency.  In  car- 
rying out  the  program,  however, 
Manhattan  found  that  while  state  and 
local  highway  officials  endeavored  to 
plan  and  build  the  sorely  needed 
routes,  they  were  unable  in  most 
cases  to  provide  them  in  time  to  meet 
project  requirements.  Consequently, 
much  access  road  work  had  to  be 
done  by  Manhattan  itself.^* 

Typical  was  the  case  of  the  Gallaher 
Bridge  and  Blair  Roads.  Manhattan 
submitted  plans  and  specifications  for 
these  new  roads  to  the  Public  Roads 
Administration  in  November  1943  as 
a  basis  for  approval  and  allotment  of 
the  necessary  funds,  but  the  normal 
procedures  of  the  Public  Roads  Ad- 
ministration and  the  Tennessee  De- 
partment of  Highways  and  Public 
W'orks  preliminary  to  construction  of 
a  new  road  were  so  complicated  and 
time-consuming  that  a  start  on  build- 
ing of  the  two  access  routes  was  not 
likely  to  be  made  until  April  1944. 
Because  the  roads  were  needed  ur- 
gentlv  to  provide  good  access  from 
the  west  and  north  to  the  gaseous  dif- 
fusion area,   the  Armv  built   them  as 


'8. MDH.  Bk.  1.  \()1.  12.  pp.  16.10-16.11,  DASA; 
Matthias  DiaiN.  17  Apr  and  9  Nov  43.  OROO;  Du 
Pom  Constr  Hist,  \ol.  4,  p.   1096,  HOG. 


404 


MANHAIIAN:  IHE  ARMY  AND  IHK  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


quickly  as  possible.  Fhc  Real  Estate 
Branch,  Ohio  River  Division,  Corps  of 
Engineers,  acquired  the  rights  of  way 
and  the  district  engineer  contracted 
with  two  road-building  firms  to  do 
the  actual  construction.  Work  on  the 
Gallaher  Bridge  Road  started  in  mid- 
January  and  on  the  Blair  Road  at  the 
beginning  of  February.  Both  roads 
were  in  use  by  May  1944.^^ 

In  spite  of  vigorous  efforts,  the 
Army  experienced  considerable  diffi- 
culty in  maintaining  project  road  net- 
works, especially  those  outside  the 
reservations.  Constant  and  heavy  use 
of  roads  originally  designed  to  carry 
only  secondary  traffic  was  one  of  the 
factors  that  contributed  to  mainte- 
nance headaches.  Another  was  the 
problem  of  coordinating  the  activities 
of  state,  county,  and  local  authorities 
who  had  responsibility  for  repair  and 
upkeep  of  many  of  the  off-area  access 
roads.  State  and  county  maintenance 
crews  were  handicapped  by  lack  of 
equipment,  workmen,  and  funds.  At 
Clinton,  the  Army  employed  its  own 
project  personnel  and  equipment  for 
road  maintenance,  financing  the  work 
from  funds  allotted  for  the  purpose 
by  the  Public  Roads  Administration. 
It  followed  a  similar  policy  at  Han- 
ford,  where  the  Public  Roads  Admin- 
istration provided  money  to  the 
Washington  State  Highway  Depart- 
ment and  local  county  highway  de- 
partments. At  the  Los  Alamos  reser- 
vation, the  Army  hired  road-building 
contractors  to  assist  state  and  local 
highway  crews  in  maintenance  of  off- 
site  roads. ^° 


'«MDH,  Bk.   1,  Vol.   12,  pp.  16.11-16.12,  DASA. 

20  Ibid.,  pp.  16.16-16.17,  DASA;  Du  Pont  Constr 
Hist,  Vol.  4,  p.  1096,  HOO;  Matthias  Diary,  6  May 
and  9  Nov  43,  OROO.  Los  Alamos  project  records 
available  to  the  author  did  not  reveal  whether  the 


Railroads 

While  Manhattan  made  extensive 
use  of  motor  vehicles  to  transport 
manpower,  it  shipped  most  materials 
and  equipment  by  rail.  This  meant 
construction  of  miles  of  spur  lines 
and  plant  rail  nets  to  connect  installa- 
tions with  main-line  railroads.  Ihe 
expense  and  effort  could  be  justified 
because  they  eliminated  costly  and 
time-consuming  shipment  by  truck 
from  off-site  railheads.  Relatively  few 
rail  transport  problems  arose  for  the 
Army  in  Tennessee.  But  at  the  Wash- 
ington site,  Groves  and  the  Hanford 
area  engineer  became  involved  in  a 
prolonged  controversy  with  some  of 
the  western  railroads  concerning  both 
the  quality  and  extent  of  service  to  be 
provided  for  the  plutonium  works. 

The  rail  net  at  Clinton  consisted  of 
two  separate  and  unconnected  sys- 
tems. Stone  and  Webster  built  and 
operated  the  eastern  rail  net — or  Cen- 
tral System,  the  popular  designation 
until  Roane-Anderson  took  over  in 
1944 — which  provided  service  from 
the  Louisville  and  Nashville's  Cincin- 
nati-Knoxville  line  to  the  town  of  Oak 
Ridge  and  the  electromagnetic  plant 
area.  {See  Map  1.)  The  western  rail 
net,  built  and  operated  by  J.  A.Jones, 
provided  the  gaseous  diffusion  plant 
area  with  direct  service  from  the 
Southern  Railway's  Cincinnati-Chatta- 
nooga line.  The  only  plant  area  not 
directly  served  by  rail  was  the  plutoni- 
um semiworks.  To  cope  with  an  early 
shortage  of  transportation  for  workers 
commuting  from  off-area  towns,  the 
Army  obtained  an  order  from  the 
Office  of  Defense  Transportation  for 


state  of  New  Mexico  received  funds  from  the  Public 
Roads  .Administration. 


COMMUNICATIONS  AND    IRANSPORTA HON 


405 


Gallaher  Bridge  Road  at  the  Tennessee  Site 


the  Louisville  and  Nashville  to  oper- 
ate passenger  trains  between  Knox- 
ville  and  Oak  Ridge.  This  service,  un- 
wanted by  the  railroad  company  and 
never  popular  with  the  patrons, 
ended  in  the  summer  of  1944  when 
off-area  bus  service  had  increased 
sufficiently.^^ 

One  important  feature  of  the  Rich- 
land-Hanford  area  was  its  proximity 
to  four  main  railroad  lines:  the  Union 
Pacific;  the  Northern  Pacific;  the  Spo- 
kane, Portland,  and  Seattle;  and  the 
Chicago,  Milwaukee,  St.  Paul  and  Pa- 
cific. {See  Map  4.)  Only  the  Milwaukee 


2»  MDH,  Bk.  1.  Vol.  12,  pp.  17.1-17.7  and  18.21, 
DASA;  CEW  Passenger  Trans  Hist,  pp.  1 1  and  40- 
41,  OROO;  Completion  Rpt,  Stone  and  Webster, 
sub:  CEW,  pp.  20  and  167  (map),  OROO. 


Railroad's  Priest  Rapids  Branch  pro- 
vided direct  service  into  the  site.  This 
branch  ran  from  the  main  line  at  Bev- 
erly Junction,  located  north  of  the 
site,  some  46  miles  (25  of  them  within 
the  project  area)  south  and  east  along 
the  Columbia  River  to  White  Bluffs 
and  Hanford,  where  it  terminated. 
The  other  main-line  railroads  inter- 
connected at  Pasco,  about  14  miles 
down  river  from  Richland.  Pasco  was 
the  location  of  a  large  Transportation 
Corps  holding  and  reconsignment 
point  with  extensive  warehouse  facili- 
ties and  a  railroad  siding.  In  February 
1943,  the  Hanford  area  engineer  ar- 
ranged through  the  Corps  of  Engi- 
neers' Pacific  Division  and  the  9th 
Service  Command  for  transfer  of  the 


406 


MANHATTAN:    IHE  ARMY  AND    IHK  A  rOMIC  BOMB 


warehouses  to  the  Manhattan  District. 
Combined  with  expert  assistance  from 
Corps  of  Engineers  officers  assigned 
to  the  holding  point,  these  facihties 
proved  invakiable  in  handhng  the  nu- 
merous shipments  made  to  Hanford 
while  the  Priest  Rapids  Branch  under- 
went extensive  reconditioning.^^ 

Working  closely  with  the  area  rail- 
roads, Du  Pont  drew  up  a  rail  service 
improvement  plan  for  Hanford,  with 
provisions  for  a  thorough  overhaul  of 
the  second-class  Priest  Rapids  Branch 
and  its  extension  from  Hanford 
southward  to  Richland;  for  building 
of  a  complex  access  rail  system  in  the 
plant  area;  and  for  construction  of  a 
southern  rail  connection  to  link  Rich- 
land with  the  three  major  lines  run- 
ning out  of  Pasco  to  the  south  of  the 
site.  Consistent  with  this  plan,  the 
Milwaukee  Railroad  began  recondi- 
tioning and  extending  the  Priest 
Rapids  Branch  in  the  spring  of  1943. 
Its  objectives  were  strengthening  the 
existing  track  bed  and  numerous  tres- 
tle bridges  so  that  heavier  trains 
could  be  run  over  the  line  and,  at  the 
point  where  the  branch  entered  the 
installation,  constructing  a  large  clas- 
sification yard  to  serve  as  a  switching 
point  for  cars  entering  the  plant  rail 
system. ^^ 


"OCE.  Basic  Data  on  HKW,  19  May  43,  p.  12 
and  enclosed  map,  MDR;  Matthias  Diary,  23-25  Feb 
and  3  Mar  43,  OROO;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1, 
pp.  9  and  16,  HOC);  Department  of  the  Army,  The 
Army  Almanac:  A  Book  of  Facts  Concerning  the  Army  oj 
the  United  States  (Washington,  D.C.:  Government 
Priming  OfTice,  1950),  p.  153. 

23  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  3,  pp.  7.5-7.7,  and  Vol.  5 
pp.  9.2-9.3,  DASA;  Matthias  Conf  Notes,  1  Apr  43 
Wilmington,  Admin  Piles,  Gen  Coresp,  337  (W 
mington),  MDR;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  p 
152,  and  Vol.  4,  pp.  1087-88,  HOO;  Matthias  Diarv 
23  Apr  43,  OROO. 


Although  the  Hanford  Area  Engi- 
neers Office  closely  supervised  the 
Milwaukee  Railroad's  work,  actively 
assisting  in  procurement  of  scarce 
rails,  ties,  rolling  stock,  and  other 
items,  there  were  interminable  delays 
in  deliveries  and  a  general  inability  to 
cope  with  the  ever-growing  traffic.  At 
Groves's  request,  Lacey  Moore,  a 
Corps  of  Engineers  rail  transportation 
expert  serving  as  an  adviser  to  the 
Hanford  area  engineer,  inspected  the 
branch  in  September.  He  noted  seri- 
ous defects  in  design  of  the  line,  in- 
cluding its  excessive  vulnerability  to 
sabotage.  Corrective  measures  by  late 
November  had  somewhat  improved 
conditions  on  the  branch,  leading 
Colonel  Matthias  to  observe  that 
"there  is  no  question  that  the  Milwau- 
kee R.R.  is  now  making  every  effort 
to  meet  the  requirements  of  our  serv- 
ice, and  to  expedite  freight  shipments 
as  much  as  possible."  ^*  Yet  systemic 
deficiencies  continued  to  be  a  prob- 
lem and  were  a  cause  of  grave  con- 
cern for  several  more  months  as  con- 
struction activities  at  Hanford  moved 
into  high  gear.^^ 

The  access  rail  system  in  the  plant 
area  comprised  125  miles  of  track, 
mostly  in  the  northwest  part  of  the 
site,  and  served  the  pile  and  separa- 
tion plants,  the  metal  fabrication  and 
testing  areas,  and  the  administrative 
center  at  Richland.  The  Guy  F.  Atkin- 
son Company  of  San  Francisco,  sub- 
contracted by  Du  Pont,  had  responsi- 
bility for  actual  construction,  with  the 
Hanford  area  office  providing  consid- 
erable procurement  assistance  for 
hard-to-get    rails,    ties,    rolling    stock. 


24  Matthias  Diarv,  26  Nov  43,  OROO. 

25  Matthias   Diarv,    1943-44,   passim,   OROO;   Du 
Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  p.  152,  HOO. 


COMMUNICATIONS  AND    IRANSPOR  lAIION 


407 


and  other  equipment.  Once  complet- 
ed, the  Hanford  area  office  and  Du 
Pont  jointly  supervised  operation  of 
the  plant  rail  net,  with  the  latter  pro- 
viding operating  personnel.^® 

Strong  support  existed  for  con- 
struction of  the  proposed  southern 
rail  connection,  which  involved  recon- 
ditioning existing  lines  and  building 
several  miles  of  new  tracks  and  a 
bridge  across  the  Yakima  River.  The 
major  railroads  in  the  area  whole- 
heartedly favored  its  construction,  be- 
cause of  obvious  benefits  to  them. 
Manhattan  supported  the  connection 
not  only  as  a  shorter  route  than  the 
Priest  Rapids  line  for  freight  coming 
from  suppliers  in  the  central  plains 
and  southern  Midwest  states  but  also 
as  an  alternate  rail  access  in  the  event 
of  sabotage.  And  Du  Pont  endorsed 
the  connection  because  it  was  not  at 
all  certain  that  the  Priest  Rapids  line 
would  be  able  to  move,  on  sched- 
ule, the  undetermined — but  obviously 
large — amount  of  construction  mate- 
rials that  would  have  to  be  shipped  by 
rail  at  the  height  of  the  construction 
period. 

But  the  unsettled  question  over 
who  should  bear  the  burden  of  cost 
of  new  construction  delayed  any 
prompt  action.  When  lengthy  negotia- 
tions in  the  spring  and  summer  of 
1943  failed  to  produce  an  agree- 
ment. General  (iroves — determined 
to  get  a  firm  decision — personally  vis- 
ited Union  Pacific  President  William 
Jeffers,  who  was  in  Washington  serv- 
ing as  the  War  Production  Board's 
rubber    administrator.     The    informal 


understanding  that  resulted  provided 
for  construction  of  the  southern  con- 
nection by  the  Union  Pacific  and 
Northern  Pacific  Railroads,  with  the 
government  bearing  the  entire  cost  of 
any  new  construction  and  the  rail- 
roads agreeing  to  pay  a  user's  fee.^"^ 

Despite  the  Groves-Jeffers  under- 
standing, the  participating  railroads 
were  unable  to  break  a  stalemate  over 
financial  terms,  and  new  legal  bottle- 
necks loomed  up  suddenly.  At  the 
end  of  August,  the  Great  Northern 
Railroad,  joint  owner  with  the  North- 
ern Pacific  of  the  Spokane,  Portland, 
and  Seattle  Railroad,  began  a  formal 
investigation  to  ascertain  why  its  area 
railroad  had  not  been  included  in  ne- 
gotiations concerning  the  southern 
connection.  Meanwhile,  the  Office  of 
Defense  Transportation  informed 
Union  Pacific  that  it  would  not  ap- 
prove a  contract  between  the  War  De- 
partment and  the  railroads  for  con- 
struction of  the  southern  connection 
and  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission wrote  to  General  Groves  that 
the  connection  could  not  be  built 
without  its  approval  because  it  would 
constitute  a  link  in  an  interchange  be- 
tween the  through  lines  of  the  Mil- 
waukee and  the  Union  Pacific  and 
Northern  Pacific,  which  made  it  sub- 
ject to  ICC  jurisdiction.^^ 

When  the  Office  of  Defense  1  rans- 
portation  issued  an  order  in  October 
prohibiting  construction,  in  spite  of  a 
direct    approach    bv    Groves    and    the 


26  MDH.  Bk.  4,  \<)1.  :<,  |)|)  7.(i-7.7,  and  Xol.  5. 
pp.  5.30.  7.11-7.12,  App.  B4.  DASA;  Du  Poni 
Consir  Hist,  \ol.  4,  pp.  l()H.5-8()  and  1092-94, 
HOC):  Matthias  Dian ,  !!>  Apr  and  19-21,  31  Mav 
43,  OROO. 


"  MDH.  Bk.  4.  \  <)!.  .'i,  pp.  9.2-9.3.  DASA;  Mat- 
thias Diaiv,  Apr-Jiil  43.  passim,  OROO:  Oroves 
Diarv,  21  and  29  Jul  43,  I.RCi;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist, 
\'<)1.  4.  p.  1091,  HOO.  Because  ihc  Priest  Rapids 
line  ran  through  mountainous  terrain  and  across 
several  rivers,  it  was  more  than  usualh  susteptihle 
to  both  land  slides  and  sabotage. 

28  Matthias  Diai\ .  jul-Aug  43,  passim,  OROO. 


408 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  I  HE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


Under  Secretary  of  War  to  ODT 
Chairman  Joseph  T.  Eastman,  the 
southern  connection  seemed  doomed. 
At  this  juncture,  Groves  and  the  Han- 
ford  area  engineer  worked  through 
channels  in  the  Office  of  the  Secreta- 
ry of  War  to  get  the  agency  to  recon- 
sider the  case.  The  area  engineer 
achieved  partial  success  in  this  direc- 
tion in  mid-November  1943,  when 
ODT,  9th  Service  Command,  and 
Transportation  Corps  representatives 
visited  the  Hanford  installation. 
These  officials,  who  were  assessing 
traffic  density  on  transcontinental  rail 
systems,  expressed  the  view  "that  the 
railroad  connection  was  not  only  de- 
sirable but  essential  .  .  .  [for  dealing 
with]  the  great  activity  on  the  trans- 
continental lines  which  is  due  in  the 
near  future"  and  promised  to  re- 
commend that  it  be  given  serious 
reconsideration.^^ 

Manhattan  used  the  possibility  that 
the  alternate  connection  might  be 
constructed  as  a  powerful  lever  to 
pressure  the  Milwaukee  Railroad  to 
improve  the  still  far  from  satisfactory 
service  over  its  Priest  Rapids  Branch. 
Thus,  in  December,  General  Groves 
told  the  railroad  representatives  that 
if  they  could  maintain  adequate  serv- 
ice, "we  [will]  take  no  further  act- 
ion towards  developing  the  connec- 
tion. .  .  .  We  will,  however,  .  .  .  con- 
tinue our  design  and  layout  and  other 
plans  to  insure  their  being  ready  to 
construct  the  Southern  Connection  if 
and  when  it  is  required."  The  strategy 
worked;  service  on  the  Priest  Rapids 
Branch  steadily  improved  in  early 
1944.  But  by  mid-year,  the  plutonium 


works  had  reached  its  operational 
phase  and  rail  service  declined  appre- 
ciably, thus  obviating  construction  of 
the  southern  connection. ^° 

Air  Transport 

Ever  in  a  race  against  time,  Manhat- 
tan frequently  utilized  air  transport 
services  to  speed  up  movement  of 
materials  and  personnel  over  the 
great  distances  separating  its  research 
and  development  centers,  procure- 
ment facilities,  and  plant  production 
areas.  For  the  most  part,  Manhattan 
relied  upon  the  services  of  commer- 
cial airfreight  companies  for  shipment 
of  such  items  as  blueprints,  parts, 
tools,  and  chemicals  and  on  the  Army 
Air  Forces'  Air  Transport  Command 
for  movement  of  key  personnel. 

Because  of  the  rough  character  of 
the  terrain,  neither  Clinton  nor  Los 
Alamos  had  airfields  within  the  reser- 
vation. Clinton  used  the  Knoxville 
Airport,  accessible  over  good  roads 
some  25  miles  southeast  of  the  site; 
Los  Alamos  had  to  depend  upon  the 
Air  Command's  shuttle  service  into 
Kirtland  Field  at  Albuquerque,  some 
114  miles  by  highway,  parts  of  which 
were  mountainous  and  often  poorly 
maintained.    At    Hanford,    where    the 


^®  Ibid.,  28  |ul-16  Nov  43  (quotation  from 
16  Nov  entrv),  OROO;  MFC  Miii,  9  Sep  43,  OCG 
Files,  MP  Files,  Fldi  23,  lab  A,  MDR;  Groves  Diarv, 
2  Aug,  6,  21  and  2«  Sep.  8  Oct  43,  LRG. 


^°  Matthias  Diarv,  Sep-Dec  43  (quotations  from 
23  Dec  43  and  12  Jan  44  entries),  OROO.  Further 
evidence  of  the  Milwaukee  Railroad's  intention  of 
exploiting  its  control  of  the  sole  rail  access  line  into 
the  Hanford  reservation  was  its  application  to  the 
Interstate  (Commerce  Commission  to  have  the  line 
from  Beverlv  Junction  to  the  project  boundary  aban- 
doned as  a  common  carrier.  Fortunately,  the  com- 
mission did  not  approve  this  request,  which  would 
have  required  the  District  to  move  freight  from  Bev- 
erlv Junction  to  the  site  or  pay  the  railroad  special 
switching  charges  for  doing  it.  After  further  negotia- 
tions with  railroad  representatives  in  November, 
Groves  and  Matthias  were  able  to  reach  a  reasona- 
ble agreement  on  freight  charges. 


COMMUNICATIONS  AND    IRANSPOR  lA  I  ION 


409 


terrain  was   relatively   ilat,   Manhattan     of  the  Hanford  security  air  patrol,  pi- 
loted bv  civilians,  were  used  to  trans- 


port    passengers    and    small     freight 
items. ^^ 


maintained  a  small  airfield  near  the 
construction  camp.  In  early  1943,  the 
area  engineer  arranged  with  the  Air 

Command  to  fly  critical  items  to  the     

Spokane    Armv    Air    Field,    where    a  3' mi:)H.  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5.  pp.  9.3-9.4,  and  Vol.  6,  p. 

shuttle   service    picked    them    up    and  ^'^•  ^'"'^  '^"^   i.^'"',.  V  '^f  ^^^ofL^^'^^J^.P." 

„             ,                       ITT        r        ir-iJT  P""l    Const!    Hist,    Vol.    2,    pp.    498-99    and    551, 

flew  them  to  the  Hanford  airfield.  In  „oo.   Matthias  D.atv.  30  Apr  and  8  Mav  43, 

emergencies,   the   six  Army   airplanes  OROO. 


CHAPTER  XX 


Health  and  Safety 


The  health  and  safety  of  Manhattan 
Project  personnel  were  essential  to 
the  success  of  the  atomic  bomb  pro- 
gram. But  in  ensuring  the  workers' 
health  and  safety,  the  Army  faced  one 
of  its  most  challenging  administrative 
tasks  because  of  the  many  unique  and 
little  understood  hazards  inherent  in 
bomb  development.  Among  these 
were  the  potentially  deadly  rays  emit- 
ted by  radioactive  elements,  the  toxic- 
ity of  a  variety  of  chemical  com- 
pounds and  agents,  the  danger  of 
high-voltage  electricity  employed  in 
novel  ways,  the  possibility  of  explo- 
sions in  experimental  work  that  in- 
volved the  use  of  gas  and  liquids 
under  great  pressure  and  of  high  ex- 
plosives as  propellants,  or  even  the 
likelihood  of  serious  injury  from 
metal  objects  cast  about  by  tremen- 
dous magnetic  forces.^ 

The  Army  knew  that  these  unusual 
hazards  must  be  properly  controlled, 
for  the  lives  of  thousands  of  atomic 
workers  were  at  stake.  Although  the 


*  Rpl,  H.  1  .  Wenscl  (lech  Secy,  S-1  Ex  Commit- 
tee), sub:  List  of  Hazards,  Admin  Files,  Gen  C;or- 
resp.  600.12  (Projs  and  Prgms),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  1, 
Vol.  7,  "Medical  Program,"  p.  3.1,  and  \ol.  11, 
"Safety  Program,"  p.  1.1,  and  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  "Genet - 
al,"  Sec.  6,  and  Vol.  2,  "Technical"  (Project  '\"  His- 
tory), pp.  III. 38  and  IX.  19,  D.AS.A.  Where  not  other- 
wise indicated,  discussion  of  health  and  safety  prob- 
lems and  practices  in  the  Manhattan  District  is 
based  on  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vols.  7  and  11,  DASA. 


Army  had  a  long  and  outstanding 
record  of  carrying  out  public  con- 
struction projects  under  extremely 
adverse  and  hazardous  conditions, 
two  factors  peculiar  to  Manhattan 
made  its  task  of  devising  and  adminis- 
tering appropriate  health  and  safety 
measures  unsually  complicated.  One 
was  the  unrelenting  urgency  that  pre- 
vailed in  almost  every  aspect  of  the 
nuclear  steeplechase  to  produce  an 
atomic  weapon  before  the  enemy 
could  do  so,  with  the  unfortunate 
result  that  project  managers  often 
were  tempted  to  resort  to  shortcuts 
and  speedy  solutions  that  imposed 
greater  health  and  safety  risks.  The 
other  was  the  strict  policy  of  compart- 
mentalization,  which  prevented  any 
widespread  sharing  of  information 
and  experience  gained  in  dealing  with 
special  hazards.  Fortunately,  however, 
the  Army  was  able  to  rely  on  its  past 
experience  on  other  projects  and  to 
build  on  the  early  measures  of  its 
predecessor,  the  Office  of  Scientific 
Research  and  Development  (OSRD), 
to  establish  highly  effective  health 
and  safety  programs.^ 


2  The  OSRD  policy  permitted  each  research  pro- 
gram to  develop  its  own  health  and  safety  measures. 
For  example,  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  em- 
ployed medical  scientist  Robert  S.  Stone,  who  had 


HEALTH  AND  SAFETY 


411 


The  Health  Program 

Manhattan's  health  program  devel- 
oped slowly  but  steadily  during  the 
first  months  of  District  operation. 
Health  matters  originally  were  the 
sole  responsibility  of  a  single  medical 
officer,  Capt.  Hymer  L.  Friedell,  who 
devoted  most  of  his  time  to  urgent 
pile  process  health  problems  at  the 
Metallurgical  Laboratory.  But  in  early 
1943,  when  the  Army  implemented 
measures  to  take  over  most  OSRD 
contracts,  Manhattan's  modest  admin- 
istrative arrangements  for  health  mat- 
ters came  under  close  review.  As  a 
consequence,  pressed  by  a  lack  of 
adequately  trained  medical  personnel, 
the  District  began  its  quest  for  expert 
assistance  to  monitor  not  only  the  ex- 
isting OSRD  programs  but  also  those 
to  be  established  by  the  Army  in  the 
future.^ 

Aware  that  few  American  medical 
scientists  had  the  special  knowledge 
needed  to  understand  and  solve  the 
unique  problems  of  the  atomic  pro- 
gram. General  Groves  launched  a  na- 
tionwide search  for  qualified  medical 
personnel.  The  search  revealed  that  a 
professor  in  the  department  of  radiol- 

extensi\c  knowledge  and  experience  with  radioactiv- 
ity, and  radiologist  Simeon  T.  Cantril  to  develop  a 
system  to  protect  workers  from  the  hazards  of  radi- 
ation in  pile  experiments.  Similarly,  the  Radiation 
Laboratory  launched  a  research  program  to  investi- 
gate the  best  method  for  detecting  the  presence  of 
phosgene,  the  highh  poisonous  gas  that  would  be 
used  in  the  electromagnetic  plant's  separation  pro- 
cess. See  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  176-78;  Staf- 
ford L.  Warren,  "The  Role  of  Radiology  in  the  De- 
velopment of  the  Atomic  Bomb,"  in  Radiolo^'  in 
World  War  II.  Medical  Department,  I'nited  States 
Armv,  ed.  Kenneth  D.  A.  Allen  (Washington,  DC: 
(ioverment  Printing  Office,  1966),  pp.  832  and  845- 
46;  MDH,  Bk.  5,  Vol.  2,  "Research,"  pp.  4.10-4.11. 
and  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  pp.  6.43-6.44,  IMSA. 

3  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vols.  7  and  11,  each  p.  6.1,  DASA; 
DSM  Chronology,  1 1  Feb  43,  Sec.  2(b),  OROO. 


ogy  at  the  LIniversity  of  Rochester, 
Stafford  L.  Warren,  was  mentioned 
most  frequently  as  the  best  in  his 
field.  Professor  Warren,  Groves  de- 
cided in  February,  was  the  medical 
scientist  who,  with  the  aid  of  the  Dis- 
trict staff,  should  coordinate  the  ac- 
tivities of  all  the  individual  health 
groups  established  and  to  be  estab- 
lished by  project  contractors.  Under 
the  guise  of  discussing  the  radiologi- 
cal aspects  of  work  to  be  done  for  the 
government  by  the  Eastman  Kodak 
Company  of  Rochester,  Groves  and 
the  district  engineer  met  with  Warren 
at  company  headquarters.  During  the 
meeting  they  asked  him  to  direct  an 
important  University  of  Rochester  re- 
search program  presumably  related  to 
the  Eastman  project,  and  also  to  serve 
part  time  as  a  medical  consultant. 
When  he  indicated  he  was  already 
fully  involved  in  other  wartime 
projects,  including  one  for  the  OSRD, 
they  asked  him  to  take  some  time  to 
think  over  the  proposal.* 

Meanwhile,  Groves  weighed  the 
possibility  of  appointing  either  Major 
Friedell  or  medical  scientist  Robert  S. 
Stone,  who  was  working  at  the  Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory  on  pile  radiation 
hazards,  but  concluded  that  neither 
had  the  outstanding  qualifications  of 
Professor  Warren.  By  giving  Warren 
more  specific  information,  the  Man- 
hattan commander  reasoned,  he 
might  be  persuaded.  Groves  immedi- 
ately arranged  for  Warren  to  confer 
with  other  District  officials  concerning 
contractual  provisions  for  the  pro- 
posed research  program  at  the  Uni- 
versity of  Rochester  and  to  go  on  an 


"MDH,  Bk.  1.  \ol.  7,  p.  6.1,  DASA;  Memo  for 
File,  X'inccnt  (".  Jones,  sub:  Telecon  With  Groves, 
7  Jul  70,  CMH. 


412 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


inspection  trip  to  some  of  the  other 
atomic  installations,  including  a  visit 
to  Oak  Ridge  to  view  a  site  for  a  hos- 
pital. Impressed  greatly  with  what  he 
saw,  and  now  convinced  of  the  crucial 
importance  of  the  project,  Warren 
agreed  in  March  1943  to  become  a 
full-time  consultant  to  Groves  with  a 
view  to  eventual  assignment  as  chief 
of  the  District's  health  program.^ 

Program  Organization 

At  the  end  of  June,  Professor 
Warren  became  chief  of  a  provisional 
medical  section  at  District  headquar- 
ters, with  Major  Friedell  assigned  as 
his  executive  officer  and  another 
Army  doctor  as  his  assistant.  During 
the  summer,  as  the  section  found 
itself  overwhelmed  with  new  health 
problems,  W^arren  repeatedly  asked 
for  more  personnel  but  his  requests 
proved  to  be  of  little  avail,  resulting 
in  employment  of  only  two  civilian 
physicians  for  the  Clinton  Engineer 
Works.  Furthermore,  the  district  engi- 
neer's announcement  of  the  Medical 
Section's  formal  organization  in 
August  failed  to  include  any  provision 
for  the  much-needed  additional 
personnel.^ 

Adequate  staffing  for  the  Medical 
Section  awaited  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem of  how  to  recruit  and  hold  medi- 


' Radiology-  in  IVorlci  Uar  II.  pp.  841-42  and  848- 
49;  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  421;  Memo  for 
File,  Jones,  sub:  Telecon  With  Groves,  7  Jul  70, 
CMH. 

^Radiology  in  IVorld  War  II,  pp.  841-42:  MD  Cir 
Ltr,  sub:  Establishment  of  Med  Sec,  29  Jun  43, 
Admin  Files,  MD  Directives,  Ser.  43,  Declassification 
and  Procedure,  MDR;  Memo,  Nichols  (for  Dist 
Engr)  to  Warren,  sub:  Responsibilities  of  Med  Sec, 
10  Aug  43.  copy  in  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  7,  App.  Al, 
DASA;  Marsden  Diary,  19  Jun  43,  OROO.  Colonel 
Marsden  states  that  Warren  sought  authorization  for 
an  allotment  of  1 10  medical  officers. 


cal  personnel  for  at  least  as  long  as 
security  and  program  continuity  re- 
quired. Medical  personnel  brought  in 
to  staff  project  medical  facilities  had 
to  be  privy  to  considerable  secret  data 
in  order  to  perform  their  jobs  proper- 
ly. Manhattan's  proposed  solution  was 
to  militarize  the  medical  staff,  a  step 
that  would  require  collaboration  with 
the  Office  of  the  Surgeon  General 
(OSG).' 

Following  extended  negotiations, 
Manhattan  completed  details  of  a 
working  agreement  with  the  OSG  in 
September  1943.  This  agreement 
provided  that  the  OSG,  giving  full 
cognizance  to  both  the  continuity  and 
security  required  for  the  District 
health  program,  would  furnish  a 
broad  range  of  medical  assistance — 
for  example,  commission  key  District 
civilian  medical  personnel,  provide 
additional  trained  personnel  from  the 
Army  Medical  Department,  supply 
funds  for  the  medical  and  dental  care 
of  District  military  personnel,  and  fur- 
nish medical  supplies  through  Medi- 
cal Department  facilities  for  District 
use.  To  ensure  that  project  security 
would  not  be  compromised,  the  OSG 
appointed  Col.  Arthur  B.  Welsh  as  a 
liaison  officer  on  its  staff,  giving  him 
authority  to  approve  all  incoming  re- 
quests from  the  District.  The  OSG 
also  granted  permission  to  the  Dis- 
trict's Medical  Section  to  retain  in  its 
own  files  all  reports  that  might  reveal 
the  nature,  scope,  or  military  signifi- 
cance of  the  project  and  agreed  to 
secure  approval  from  the  district  en- 
gineer for  all  transfers  of  Medical  De- 
partment personnel  from  the  project. 


'MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  7,  pp.  6.2-6.3,  DASA;  Ltr, 
Groves  to  CG  ASF,  sub:  MD  Med  Facilities,  21  Sep 
43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  371.2  (Scty),  MDR. 


HEALIH  AND  SAFETY 


413 


These  unusual  arrangements  with  re- 
spect to  security  were  consistent  with 
the  Manhattan-OSG  agreement  tliat 
responsibihly  for  project  health  mat- 
ters resided  with  the  district  engineer. 
The  OSG  had  protested  this  provi- 
sion, but  the  District  had  secured  an 
order  from  General  Somervell  that 
upheld  it,  and  it  remained  in  effect 
for  the  duration  of  the  Manhattan 
Project.® 

On  2  November,  shortly  after  the 
agreement  became  effective,  Warren 
received  his  commission  as  a  colonel 
in  the  Medical  Corps  and  official  ap- 
pointment as  chief  of  the  Medical 
Section.  One  of  his  first  actions  was  a 
reorganization  of  the  section,  to  re- 
flect the  major  areas  of  activity  in  the 
District's  health  program.  He  divided 
the  unit  into  three  branches:  medical 
research,  industrial  medicine,  and 
clinical  medicine  services;  a  fourth 
branch  to  oversee  the  Hanford  health 
program  never  materialized,  because 
Du  Pont,  the  prime  contractor,  took 
over  almost  all  responsibility  for  this 
activity.  Another  of  Warren's  concerns 
was  to  expand  his  staff  by  recruiting 
civilian  physicians  to  serve  in  clinical 
assignments  as  commissioned  officers. 
Warren's  basic  organization  contin- 
ued with  little  change  up  until  July 
1945  (except  for  the  clinical  branch, 
which  then  achieved  the  status  of  a 
separate  division);  however,  in  order 
to  keep  pace  with  the  rapid  growth  of 
the  project,  he  had  to  greatly  expand 


®  Ltr,  Groves  lo  CG  ASF,  sub:  MD  Mt-d  Facilitit-s, 
21  Sep  4.S,  MDR;  Blanche  B.  Armfield,  Organizdlnw 
and  Admitiishalion  in  World  IlV/r  //,  Medical  Depart- 
ment, Inited  Slates  Army  (Washington,  D.C.:  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Ofllcc,  196;^),  p.  229;  Radiolotry  in 
World  War  II.  pp.  846-47:  Marsden  Diary.  8  Oct  and 
2  Nov,  OROO;  Nichols,  Comments  on  Draft  Hist 
"Manhattan,"  Incl  lo  Ltr,  Nichols  to  (^hief  ol  Mil 
Hist,  25  Mar  74.  CMH. 


its  si/e — the  original  three-man  staff 
eventually  numbering  eighty  medical 
personnel.^ 

Active  and  continuing  support  not 
only  from  the  OSG  but  also  from  a 
number  of  civilian  medical  organiza- 
tions made  possible  the  District's 
rather  remarkable  success  in  recruit- 
ing a  relatively  large  and  specialized 
medical  staff  in  a  period  of  the  war 
when  medically  trained  personnel 
were  in  extremely  short  supply.  Espe- 
cially valuable  was  the  assistance  pro- 
vided by  the  national  office  and  some 
local  branches  of  the  Procurement 
and  Assignment  Service.  ^°  State 
boards  of  medical  and  dental  examin- 
ers, particularly  those  in  Tennessee 
and  Washington,  granted  concessions 
on  licensing  requirements.  Numerous 
universities,  medical  schools,  and  bio- 
logical institutes  agreed  to  provide  on 
a  continuing  basis  medical  specialists 
and  technicians  for  District  research 
laboratories  and  industrial  hygiene 
teams.  ^^ 


9MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  7,  p.  6.2  and  Apps.  C12a- 
CI2c  (Org  Charts,  MD  Med  Sec,  Mav  43-Jul  45), 
DASA;  Radiology  in  World  War  II.  p.  843:  Armfield, 
Organization  and  Administration  in  World  War  II.  p.  229; 
Marsden  Diary,  29-30  Oct  and  2  Nov  43,  OROO. 
Warren's  eighty-man  stafT  was  comprised  of  seventy- 
iwo  officers  from  the  Medical  Corps,  three  from  the 
Dental  Corps,  three  from  the  Medical  .Administra- 
tive Corps,  one  from  the  \  eterinary  Corps,  and  one 
from  the  Sanitary  Corps. 

'"This  was  an  agency  established  in  November 
1941  in  the  Office  for  Emergency  Management,  Ex- 
ecutive OfTice  of  the  President,  to  coordinate  war- 
time allocation  and  employment  of  medical,  dental, 
and  veterinary  personnel  for  all  federal  services,  in- 
cluding the  War  Department.  For  further  details  on 
its  organization  and  acti\ities  see  John  H.  MtMinn 
and  Max  Le\in.  Personnel  m  World  War  II.  Medical 
Department,  Inited  States  Armv  (Washington,  D.C.: 
(iovernment  Printing  Office,  1963),  pp.  73-74  and 
169-73 

"  MDH,  Bk,  I,  \<)1.  7,  pp.  I. .5- 1. 6.  DA.SA. 


414 


MANHATTAN:  IHE  ARM^  AND  IHE  ATOMIC  BOMB 

"f^  1 

REGISIRAIION 


Col.  Stafford  L.  Warren  briefing  the  Oak  Ridge  hospital  staff 


The  unique  opportunities  present- 
ed by  the  District's  health  program 
also  faciHtated  procurement  of  medi- 
cal personnel.  Medical  scientists  were 
quick  to  recognize  that  research  in  ra- 
diation had  significant  applications  in 
the  investigation  of  cancer,  metabo- 
lism, and  many  other  aspects  of  medi- 
cine. Fortunately,  too,  many  had  not 
been  recruited  for  military  service  be- 
cause their  specialty  did  not  relate  di- 
rectly to  military  medical  require- 
ments; Colonel  Warren  and  a  number 
of  members  of  his  staff  were  in  this 
category.  Others  came  from  the  field 
of  internal  medicine  and  from  the 
basic  biological  sciences.  Colonel 
Warren  noted  in  retrospect  that  what 
these  men  all  had  in  common,  with- 
out reference  to   their  specialty,  was 


an  interest  "in  using  radiation  or  iso- 
topes as  tools  to  explore  basic  mecha- 
nisms in  biologic  systems."  ^^  The 
atomic  bomb  program  promised  an 
unexcelled  chance  to  pursue  this 
interest. 

Medical  Research 

The  basic  objective  of  Manhattan's 
medical  research  program  was  collec- 
tion of  data  on  potentially  damaging 
effects  of  radioactive  and  highly  toxic 
materials  so  that  measures  and  instru- 
mentation could  be  incorporated  into 
plant  design  and  operations  for  the 
protection  of  atomic  workers.  An  im- 
portant    corollary    objective    was     to 


12  Radiology  in  World  War  II,  p.  846. 


HKALI  H  AND  SAFE  IT 


415 


learn  more  about  how  to  treat  cases 
of  overexposure  to  radiation  and  poi- 
soning from  toxic  substances.  Re- 
sponsibility for  the  medical  research 
projects  at  Manhattan  laboratories 
and  a  number  of  universities  and  bio- 
logical institutes  under  contract 
rested  with  the  District's  Medical  Re- 
search Branch,  headed  by  Major  Frie- 
dell.  Colonel  Warren,  too,  with  broad 
expertise  in  the  areas  under  investiga- 
tion, gave  a  great  deal  of  attention  to 
the  various  research  projects.  ^^ 

Collection  of  medical  hazards  data 
was  a  direct  outgrowth  of  expanding 
scientific  investigations  into  the  pile 
and  electromagnetic  methods  of  pro- 
ducing fissionable  materials.  More 
adequate  data  became  essential  as  the 
number  of  workers  involved  in  re- 
search activities  increased  and  as 
planning  began  for  large-scale  pro- 
duction. For  example,  with  the  goal 
of  establishing  safety  and  health  pro- 
tection standards  and  developing  safe 
operating  procedures  for  the  pile 
process,  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
at  the  L^niversity  of  Chicago  formed  a 
health  physics  research  group.  Under 
direction  of  medical  scientist  Robert 
Stone,  this  group  (numbering  more 
than  two  hundred  by  mid- 1945)  con- 
ducted extensive  investigations  into 
the  toxicity  of  radioactive  materials, 
giving  particular  attention  to  their 
chemistry  and  pathology;  designed 
monitoring  instruments  and  pile 
shielding;  and  developed  treatment 
programs  for  clinical  medicine  prob- 
lems related  to  pile  hazards.  ^'^ 


'••'MDH,  Hk.  1.  \(>l.  7,  pp.  5.2  and  ,5.1(i-5.17, 
DASA. 

'Mbid.,  pp.  5.1-5.23,  DASA;  Coiiipion,  Alo?iiir 
Qiirsl.  pp.  177-79;  Ciroves,  Xow  It  Can  lit-  Told.  pp. 
4LM-2'J. 


The  University  of  Chicago-operated 
Clinton  Laboratories  in  Lennessee 
had  a  similar  research  program.  Al- 
though Stone  had  administrative  re- 
sponsibility for  the  Clinton  program, 
he  left  actual  direction  to  radiologist 
Simeon  T.  Cantril,  who  had  worked 
under  Stone  at  the  Metallurgical  Lab- 
oratory for  more  than  a  year.  Using 
the  pile  semiworks,  the  Clinton  team 
of  scientists,  physicians,  and  techni- 
cians tested  the  effects  of  radiation  on 
animals  and  developed  monitoring  in- 
struments for  the  Hanford  production 
piles.  Further  investigations  into  the 
toxicity  of  radiation  were  carried  out 
by  other  institutions  under  subcon- 
tract. For  example,  researchers  at  Co- 
lumbia University  in  New  York  inves- 
tigated the  effects  of  fast-neutron  dos- 
ages on  mice,  those  at  the  Franklin 
Institute  in  Newark  (Delaware)  con- 
ducted similar  tests  on  dogs,  and 
those  at  the  University  of  Washington 
in  Seattle  studied  the  exposure  of 
X-rays  and  fission  products  on  fish 
and  fish  eggs.^^ 

Investigations  at  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  and  Clinton  Laboratories 
were  supported  and  supplemented  by 
the  large  University  of  Rochester 
medical  research  program.  Under  di- 
rection of  Stafford  Warren,  scientists 
at  Rochester  pursued  research  in  radi- 
ology, pharmacology,  and  instrumen- 
tation. The  radiology  section  experi- 
mented with  exposing  animals  to 
high-voltage  X-rays  and  conducted 
beta  radiation  studies  and  genetic  ex- 
periments relative  to  the  effects  of  ra- 
diation on  mice  and  fruit  flies.  The 
pharmacology    group    tested    radioac- 


■^^MDH.  Bk.  1.  \'ol.  7.  pp.  5.4-5.8,  5.1:^-5.14, 
5.16-5.17,  DA.SA;  Cirovcs,  .\V)j/'  //  Can  lie  Told.  n.  on 
p.  421;  (^ompton,  Aloniu  Qtti-sl.  p.  177. 


416 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


live  and  potentially  toxic  chemical 
substances.  Two  groups  concentrated 
on  instrumentation  problems,  includ- 
ing the  design  of  standard  meters  for 
measuring  alpha  and  beta  particles 
and  gamma  rays  and  the  development 
of  film  and  instrument  monitoring 
methods  and  protective  devices.  To 
ascertain  under  actual  operating  con- 
ditions the  validity  of  measuring  in- 
struments and  protective  devices, 
Rochester  scientists  tested  them  in 
the  plants  at  Clinton,  Hanford,  and 
elsewhere  in  the  project.  ^^ 

The  Army  believed  these  various 
research  efforts  would  furnish  all  the 
data  and  instrumentation  the  Los 
Alamos  Laboratory  would  need  for  its 
health  program.  But  unique  require- 
ments of  the  bomb  development  pro- 
gram forced  laboratory  groups  to 
launch  separate  medical  research 
projects.  In  the  spring  of  1944,  for 
example,  essential  monitoring  appara- 
tus was  still  not  available,  so  members 
of  the  health  and  electronics  groups 
combined  their  talents  to  develop  the 
necessary  instruments.  Similarly,  the 
industrial  medicine  group,  faced  with 
handling  large  quantities  of  fission- 
able plutonium,  were  dissatisfied  with 
the  available  data  on  detecting  over- 
doses, so  they  established  their  own 
research  project,  employing  scientists 
from  the  health  group  and  the  metal- 
lurgical and  chemistry  division.  These 
ad  hoc  research  activities,  born  of  ne- 
cessity, contributed  much  to  the  suc- 
cess of  other  health  and  safety  pro- 
grams at  the  laboratory.  ^^ 


i^MDH.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  7,  pp.  5.4,  5.6-5.8.  5.10, 
5.15-5.16,  5.20-5.22,  DASA;  Radiology  in  World  War 
II,  pp.  852-53  and  862;  Groves,  \ow' It  Can  Be  Told. 
pp. 421-23. 

^•'MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  III.39-III.41  and 
IX.15-IX.16,  DASA. 


Industrial  Medicine 

The  major  objective  of  Manhattan's 
industrial  medicine  research  program 
was  to  identify  and  control  the  indus- 
trial hazards  associated  with  the 
atomic  processes.  Effective  applica- 
tion of  the  knowledge  and  techniques 
developed  from  this  research  was  the 
responsibility  of  the  District's  Indus- 
trial Medicine  Branch,  headed  by 
Capt.  John  L.  Ferry.  To  monitor  the 
project's  various  industrial  hygiene 
activities,  Ferry  organized  his  staff 
from  officers  drawn  from  the  Corps 
of  Engineers  and  the  Medical  Corps. 

Beginning  with  one  specialized 
group  to  monitor  the  University  of 
Rochester's  industrial  medicine  re- 
search program.  Ferry  subsequently 
formed  other  groups  to  oversee  the 
hazards  program  in  materials  pro- 
curement at  the  Madison  Square  Area 
Engineers  Office,  to  deal  with  special 
problems  wherever  they  might  arise, 
to  provide  consultation  on  first  aid 
and  other  aspects  of  operations  medi- 
cine as  needed,  and  to  carry  on  liai- 
son with  the  programs  at  the  electro- 
magnetic and  diffusion  production 
plants.  Because  of  the  special  exper- 
tise of  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory's 
health  physics  research  group  in  deal- 
ing with  pile  process  hazards,  that 
group  was  given  broad  authority  to 
monitor  the  industrial  hygiene  pro- 
grams at  the  Clinton  Laboratories, 
Hanford  Engineer  Works,  and  Mon- 
santo Chemical  Company  plant  in 
Dayton,  Ohio.  Ferry's  branch  did  not 
have  responsibility  for  the  Los 
Alamos  Laboratory's  industrial  hy- 
giene program,  which  was  under  the 
direction  of  Washington  University 
internal   medicine  specialist   Louis   H. 


HEALIH  AND  SAFETY 


417 


Hempelman,  for  the  Army  maintained 
oversight  of  the  bomb  development 
program  through  General  (iroves's 
Washington  headquarters.^^ 

Because  of  the  shifting  and  unpre- 
dictable character  of  plant  design, 
construction,  and  operational  require- 
ments, the  Industrial  Medicine 
Branch  adopted  a  broad  and  flexible 
approach  to  its  difficult  task  of  moni- 
toring the  development  of  effective 
industrial  hygiene  measures.  To  as- 
certain the  precise  nature  of  industrial 
hazards,  the  branch  had  medical  re- 
search scientists  supplement  their  lab- 
oratory experiments  with  extensive 
observations  in  the  field.  The  scien- 
tists gave  medical  examinations  to 
plant  employees  to  determine  the  po- 
tentially dangerous  effects  of  handling 
large  quantities  of  uranium  and  fluo- 
rine; they  took  dust  counts  in  produc- 
tion plants  to  ascertain  the  amount  of 
radioactive  dust  present  in  the  differ- 
ent processes;  and  they  detected  areas 
where  exposure  to  radiation  was  likely 
by  having  production  workers  wear 
X-ray  film  badges. ^^ 

As  soon  as  sufficient  information 
was  in  hand,  the  Industrial  Medicine 
Branch  drew  up  industrial  hygiene 
standards       and       procedures       that 


'*  Memo,  Nichols  to  Warren,  sub:  Responsibilities 
of  Med  Sec,  10  Aug  43,  copv  in  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  7, 
App.  Al,  DASA.  See  also  ibid.,  pp.  3.51-3.65  and 
Apps.  (;i2a-(>12e,  DAS.A.  The  organization  charts 
in  the  appendices  indicate  (hat  medical  personnel 
trained  and  indoctrinated  at  the  Metallurgical  Labo- 
ratory eventually  occupied  kev  positions  in  the  hv- 
giene  programs  at  (".linlon  Laboratories,  Hanford, 
and  Monsanto.  On  the  aijpomtment  of  Hempelman 
see  ibid.,  Bk.  8,  Xol.  2.  III.38-III.39,  DASA.  and 
Ltr,  Oppenheimcr  to  (iroves,  25  Jan  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  231  2  (Scientists),  MDR. 

'«MDH,  Bk.  1.  Vol  7,  pp.  3.1-3.3  and  6.1. 
DASA;  Rndmlo^  in  IVotld  War  II.  pp.  868-70;  Memo, 
Nichols  to  Warren,  sub:  Responsibilities  of  Med  Sec, 
10  Aug  43,  DASA. 


became  the  basis  for  recommenda- 
tions to  project  contractors,  who  were 
responsible  for  their  implementation. 
Ihese  recommendations  generally 
took  the  form  of  bulletins  or  instruc- 
tional materials.  Typical  were  bulle- 
tins originally  prepared  by  Kellex  en- 
gineers and  Ferry's  staff  for  the  firm's 
employees.  They  outlined  approved 
methods  for  working  with  fluorine, 
uranium  hexafluoride,  hydrofluoric 
acid,  and  similar  hazardous  com- 
pounds, and  included  first  aid  proce- 
dures. The  branch  eventually  gave 
these  bulletins  wide  circulation  wher- 
ever these  substances  were  being  em- 
ployed. On  occasion,  when  the  Los 
Alamos  health  group  requested  sup- 
plemental training  data  for  its  educa- 
tional program  on  plutonium-related 
hazards,  the  branch  furnished  the 
technical  information. 2° 

Through  periodic  inspections,  the 
Industrial  Medicine  Branch  main- 
tained a  check  on  contractors'  compli- 
ance with  its  recommendations.  Often 
the  local  area  engineer  would  accom- 
pany branch  inspectors  on  their 
rounds,  exercising  his  authority  to  in- 
stitute immediate  changes  when  nec- 
essary. Frequency  and  thoroughness 
of  inspections  varied.  Where  the  War 
Department  had  complete  financial 
responsibility  for  all  costs,  as  in  cost- 
plus-fixed-fee  contracts,  the  operating 
practices  of  the  contractor — regard- 
less of  his  industrial  expertise  or  lack 
thereof — were  likely  to  receive  very 
close  scrutiny.  Where  the  industrial 
firm  had  primary  liability,  as  under 
other   types   of  contracts,    inspections 


20  MDH.  Bk.  1.  \ol.  7,  pp.  3.1-3.3,  DASA;  Safety 
(".ommitlee.  Bull  SM-2,  Safety  Committee  Regula- 
tions for  Handling  C-126  (Fluorine),  Admm  Files, 
C;en  Corresp,  729.31,  Ml). 


418 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


were  more  infrequent  and  less  rigor- 
ous because  of  the  firm's  already 
proven  record  for  controlling  hazards. 
Branch  inspection  teams  rated  haz- 
ards control  primarily  upon  results 
from  more  or  less  continuous  checks 
upon  employee  health  and  from  mon- 
itoring hazardous  work  areas,  com- 
paring the  collected  data  with  estab- 
lished standards.^  ^ 

Chronologically  speaking,  among 
the  District's  first  industrial  hygiene 
problems  were  those  in  procurement 
and  processing  of  uranium  ore  and  in 
production  of  special  chemicals 
(fluorine,  fluorocarbons,  and  boron) 
required  to  manufacture  fissionable 
materials.  As  industrial  hygiene  meas- 
ures, the  Industrial  Medicine  Branch 
recommended  periodic  physical  ex- 
aminations for  workers  exposed  to 
hazardous  conditions,  use  of  protec- 
tive clothing  and  masks,  and  instal- 
lation of  more  effective  ventilation 
systems. ^^ 

The  principal  hazard  in  the  diffu- 
sion processes  arose  from  the  em- 
ployment of  highly  toxic  substances, 
including  uranium  in  its  oxide  and 
hexafluoride  forms,  radium,  and  sev- 
eral fluorocarbons.  While  their  use  in 
small  quantities  for  pilot  plant  testing 
presented  little  danger,  their  employ- 
ment in  enormously  increased 
amounts  in  the  production  plants 
posed  much  greater  hazards.  To  pro- 


2'  MDH.  Bk.  1,  \ol.  7.  p.  3.1,  DASA;  Radioloiry  m 
World  War  II.  pp.  869-70;  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be 
Told,  pp.  71-73. 

22  MDH.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  7,  pp.  3.3-3.16,  DA.SA; 
.Safety  Committee.  Bull  SM-2,  Rev  2,  MDR;  Memo. 
Nichols  to  Brig  (ien  Thomas  V.  Parreil  (Groves's 
Dep),  sub:  Shipment  Scty,  20  Jun  45,  Admin  Piles, 
Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Insp  of  Facilities  at  Rochester, 
N.V.),  MDR;  First  Annual  Rpt,  Murray  Hill  Area 
Engrs  Office,  sub:  Proj  S-37,  30  Jun  44,  p.  19, 
OROO. 


tect  diffusion  workers  from  these  haz- 
ards, such  as  burns,  lung  irritation,  or 
even  kidney  failure,  the  Industrial 
Medicine  Branch  collaborated  with 
construction  and  operating  contrac- 
tors to  install  closed  ventilation  sys- 
tems and  to  develop  special  handling 
techniques.  The  Carbide  and  Carbon 
Chemicals  Corporation,  for  example, 
had  its  gaseous  diffusion  plant  work- 
ers use  protective  clothing  and  Army- 
type  gas  masks  when  they  repaired 
the  hundreds  of  pumps  that  were 
cooled  and  lubricated  with  toxic 
fluorinated  hydrocarbons.  Similarly, 
the  Fercleve  Corporation  had  its  ther- 
mal diffusion  plant  workers  apply  dry 
ice  to  solidify  the  highly  volatile  ura- 
nium hexafluoride  gas  before  trans- 
ferring it  in  or  out  of  the  system. ^^ 

The  considerable  hazards  present 
in  the  research  and  development 
phases  of  the  electromagnetic  process 
were  magnified  during  the  production 
phase,  thus  proportionately  increasing 
the  control  problem.  Ironically,  the 
most  serious  hazard,  phosgene  gas, 
was  a  deadly  by-product  of  the  most 
effective  method  of  preparing  charge 
materials  for  the  production  race- 
tracks; other  hazards  included  toxic 
dusts,  radiation,  carbon  dusts,  and 
toxic  chemicals  (principally  carbon 
tetrachloride  and  trichloroethylene), 
and  the  use  of  high-voltage  sources  of 
electricity  to  operate  the  racetrack  cal- 
utrons.  As  the  operating  contractor, 
the  Tennessee  Eastman  Corporation 
collaborated  with  the  District's  Indus- 
trial Medicine  Branch  to  institute  a 
hazards  control  program.  Protective 
measures  developed  included  devices 


23  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  7,  pp.  3.19-3.27,  and  Bk.  2, 
\'ol.  1,  "General  Features,"  p.  6.2,  DASA;  Radiology 
w  World  War  II.  pp.  836  and  859. 


HEALIH  AND  SAFE  IT 


419 


lor  detecting  phosgene  gas  and  moni- 
toring dust  concentration  and  toxic 
chemicals,  as  well  as  the  requirement 
for  physical  examination  ol  employ- 
ees— particularly  those  who  would  have 
an  above-average  exposure  to  radia- 
tion emanations,  uranium  compounds, 
and  other  hazardous  conditions. ^'^ 

Of  all  the  processes,  hazards  in  the 
pile  process  were  potentially  the  most 
dangerous,  for  there  was  little  previ- 
ous industrial  experience  on  which  to 
draw  to  devise  adequate  protective 
measures  for  atomic  workers.  Perils 
existed  in  each  step  of  the  process.  In 
preparing  uranium  metal  as  fuel  for 
the  pile,  there  was  radioactivity,  ura- 
nium dust,  and  employment  of  highly 
acid  cleaning  substances;  in  pile  oper- 
ations, radiation  and  poisonous  radio- 
active fission  products;  and  in  extrac- 
tion and  concentration  of  the  end 
products,  radioactive  uranium  slugs 
and  very  poisonous  plutonium.  To 
counter  these  hazards,  project  scien- 
tists and  technicians  worked  with  the 
Industrial  Medicine  Branch  to  devel- 
op a  variety  of  control  measures. 

One  of  the  most  effective  measures 
was  the  heavy  shielding  built  into  the 
production  piles.  Others  included  ra- 
diation-monitoring instruments  with 
automatic  alarms,  which  were  placed 
in  all  exposed  areas;  periodic  finger- 
printing and  physical  examinations 
for  workers;  portable  detection  equip- 
ment, such  as  pocket  ionization 
meters,  film  badges,  and  ring-type 
film  meters;  and  protective  clothing. 


respirators,  and  goggles.  In  those 
plant  areas  known  to  have  radioactive 
beta  or  gamma  emissions  above  the 
established  tolerance  level  of  0.1 
roentgen  per  24-hour  day,^^  plant 
health  teams  maintained  a  constant 
check  of  clothing  and  equipment  for 
contamination.  And  in  those  situa- 
tions where  every  possible  protective 
measure  still  did  not  prevent  expo- 
sure above  the  tolerance  level,  em- 
ployees rotated  in  and  out  of  the  dan- 
gerous zones. ^^ 

Of  the  dangers  facing  employees  at 
Los  Alamos  in  bomb  development 
operations,  including  exposure  to  ra- 
diation, work  with  high-voltage  cur- 
rent, testing  with  high  explosives,  and 
handling  of  toxic  materials  and  vola- 
tile gases,  the  single  most  serious 
hazard  was  work  with  fissionable  plu- 
tonium. When  the  first  shipments  of 
plutonium  began  arriving  in  the 
spring  of  1944,  the  Los  Alamos 
health  group  exploited  resources 
within  the  laboratory's  own  organiza- 
tion  and   formed   special   committees 


24  MDH.  Bk.  5,  \'ol.  2,  "Research,"  pp.  4. 2-4. .'5 
and  4.10-4.11.  and  Bk.  1.  Vol.  7,  pp.  3.31-3.35, 
DASA:  Radiolo^-y  in  llorlfl  War  II.  pp.  H55-56;  Qiies- 
tions  and  .An.swers  Taken  Prom  Senate  Atomic 
Energy  Manual,  ca.  late  194.5,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  032.1   (l.egislalion).  MDR. 


25  In  May  1943,  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
adopted  the  National  Bureau  of  Standards  radiation 
tolerance  dose  of  0.1  roentgen  per  24-hour  day. 
This  was  only  one-half  of  the  so-called  international 
tolerance  dose,  established  in  1934  by  an  interna- 
tional agreement,  and  it  remained  the  standard  for 
the  atomic  program  until  the  end  of  the  war.  See 
Radiology  in  World  War  II.  p.  853;  Memos,  Stone  to 
Compton,  10  Apr  and  15  Mav  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  600.12  (Projs  and  Prgms),  MDR. 

26  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  7,  pp.  3.43-3. ,50.  DASA; 
Memos,  Roger  Williams  ( TNX  Div  chief,  Du  Pont) 
to  Groves  et  al.,  sub:  Radioactivity  Health  Hazards 
at  Hanford,  26  jun  44,  and  Warren  to  Nichols,  sub: 
Radiation  Hazaids,  1  Sep  44,  Admin  Files,  (ien  Gor- 
resp,  700  (Med  Rpts.  Health  Prgm,  etc.),  MDR;  Rpt, 
Gantril  and  Parker,  sub:  Status  of  Health  and  Pro- 
tection at  HFW,  24  Aug  45,  .Admin  Files,  (len  Cor- 
resp, 729.31  (Safety  Prgm),  MDR;  Qiiestions  and 
Answers  Taken  From  Senate  Atomic  Fnergy 
Manual,  MDR;  Groves,  \ou>  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  422- 
23. 


420 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


to  devise  and  enforce  the  necessary 
controls  for  handling  plutonium. 
While  the  committees  concentrated 
on  developing  monitoring,  decon- 
tamination, and  other  technical  con- 
trols, the  health  group  compiled  and 
circulated  appropriate  health  stand- 
ards; established  requirements  for 
pre-employment  and  job-termination 
physical  examinations;  instituted  tests 
for  detecting  overexposure  of  work- 
ers; improved  the  statistical  records  it 
maintained  on  individual  employees; 
and  carried  out  an  educational  pro- 
gram to  instruct  workers  in  the  par- 
ticular problems  of  plutonium.  These 
efforts  notwithstanding,  laboratory 
operations  with  plutonium  were 
plagued  with  a  series  of  accidents. ^"^ 

Clinical  Medicine  Services 

The  primary  objective  of  Manhat- 
tan's clinical  medicine  services  pro- 
gram was  to  provide  the  thousands  of 
project  workers  living  on  the  closed 
and  isolated  atomic  reservations  with 


"MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  III.39-III.42  and 
IX.15-IX.18,  DASA.  For  a  list  of  major  hazards  at 
Los  Alamos  see  Ltr,  Oppenheimer  to  Robert  M.  Un- 
derbill (Board  of  Regents  Secy,  Univ  of  CaliO. 
15  Jan  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Y- 
12),  MDR.  Tbe  shortage  of  certain  types  of  safety 
equipment,  the  general  lack  of  knowledge  about 
plutonium,  the  rapid  expansion  of  personnel  and 
operations,  and  insufficient  control  over  many  tech- 
nical procedures  directly  contributed  to  a  series  of 
accidents  at  Los  Alamos,  culminating  in  early  1945 
in  acute  radiation  exposure  of  four  technical  work- 
ers and  the  death  of  another  during  experimenta- 
tion on  critical  assembly  of  fissionable  material  for 
the  bomb.  For  a  description  of  an  accident  during  a 
bomb  assembly  test  at  Los  Alamos  see  Ltr,  Rudolph 
E.  Peierls  to  James  Chadwick,  7  Jun  45,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Chadwick),  MDR.  On  a 
subsequent  accident  in  1946,  resulting  in  the  death 
of  Louis  Slotin,  an  atomic  scientist,  see  Robert 
Jungk,  Bnghter  Than  a  Thousand  Suns:  A  Personal  Ilisto- 
rs  of  the  Atomic  Scientists,  trans,  by  James  Cleugh  (New 
York:  Harcourt,  Brace  and  Co.,  1958),  pp.  193-94 
and  228-29. 


comprehensive  on-site  medical  facili- 
ties. Providing  full  medical  services, 
the  Army  felt,  would  enhance  not 
only  manpower  recruitment  but  also 
work  force  retention.  Another  impor- 
tant benefit  would  be  increased 
project  security,  for  attending  to  the 
resident  employees'  personal  medical 
needs  on  the  reservation  would  obvi- 
ate their  having  to  seek  treatment  in 
the  surrounding  communities  where 
services  were  often  inadequate  and 
limited.  Accordingly,  overseeing  the 
establishment  and  operation  of  ade- 
quate on-site  medical  facilities — first 
aid  stations,  field  dispensaries,  outpa- 
tient and  dental  clinics,  and  full- 
service  hospitals — became  an  impor- 
tant feature  of  the  District's  medical 
activities. 

Unlike  the  medical  research  and  in- 
dustrial medicine  programs,  the  clini- 
cal medicine  program  at  each  of  the 
major  atomic  sites  functioned  with  a 
minimum  of  external  supervision.  At 
Clinton,  the  Medical  Section's  Clinical 
Medicine  Services  Branch,  headed  by 
Lt.  Col.  Charles  E.  Rea,  administered 
medical  facilities  provided  by  con- 
struction and  operating  contractors 
and  the  District.  At  Hanford,  Du  Pont 
established  and  monitored  its  own 
clinical  medicine  program,  with  the 
Medical  Section  exercising  only  a 
general  supervisory  role  through  a 
small  liaison  unit  in  the  area  engi- 
neer's office.  And  at  Los  Alamos,  the 
post  surgeon,  Capt.  James  F.  Nolan,  a 
specialist  in  radiology  and  obstetrics 
and  gynecology,  administered  the 
community  medical  services  program 
under  supervision  of  the  post  com- 
mander, who  reported  any  medical 
problems  directly  to  General  Groves. 
The  Manhattan  commander,  in  turn. 


HEALIH  AND  SAFE  IT 


421 


Hazakdois  Materials  Storage  Area  at  Los  Alamos.  Technicians  are  removing 
lead-lined  container. 


consulted  with  Colonel  Warren,  who, 
in  addition  to  being  the  Medical 
Section  chief,  also  served  as  Groves's 
personal  adviser  on  medical 
matters. 2® 

Planning  for  the  medical  resources 
of  the  Oak  Ridge  community  began  in 
the  spring  of  1943,  when  Professor 
Warren  and  his  University  of  Roches- 
ter staff  developed  a  broadly  con- 
ceived clinical  medicine  program. 
I  hey  recommended  that  the  residents 
of  Oak  Ridge  have  access  to  a  full 
range  of  medical  services,  to  include 


28MDH,  Bk.  1,  \()I.  7.  pp.  4.1-4.;^.  4.'J:i-4.27. 
App.  CI 2.  D.ASA:  (;r()\fs.  Xow  ll  Can  /if  lold.  pp. 
423-24;  Ltr,  Ciiovt-s  lo  CIC.  ASF,  sub:  Ml)  Mid 
Facilities,  21  Sep  43.  MDR.  On  the  appoinliiuiit  of 
Nolan  see  MDH,  Bk.  8.  \ol.  1.  p.  0.43.  D.VSA,  and 
R(idinloi>r,  in  IVorM  Uai  II.  p.  879. 


surgery,  medicine,  pediatrics,  obstet- 
rics and  gynecology,  eye,  ear,  nose, 
and  throat,  psychiatry,  proctology, 
neurology,  urology,  orthopedics,  and 
dermatology.  They  also  suggested  the 
need  for  supporting  X-ray  and  labora- 
tory facilities. 

Responding  to  these  recommenda- 
tions. District  medical  officials,  work- 
ing closely  with  both  construction  and 
operating  contractors,  took  steps  to 
provide  for  adequate  medical  facilities 
in  the  town  of  Oak  Ridge.  For  work- 
ers requiring  hospitalization  they  ini- 
tially had  planned  to  use  off-site  hos- 
pitals, but  a  survey  of  the  surround- 
ing communities,  including  Knoxville, 
revealed  that  the  number  of  hospital 
beds  available  was  well  below  the  na- 


422 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  IHE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


tional  average  of  3.4  per  thousand 
population.  Because  of  the  survey 
findings,  the  Medical  Section  decided 
to  build  a  hospital  in  Oak  Ridge  that 
was  substantially  larger  than  required 
by  the  national  average.  A  confluence 
of  other  factors  also  had  entered  into 
this  decision.  Of  particular  concern 
was  the  fact  that  more  than  an  aver- 
age number  of  workers  were  likely  to 
require  hospitalization  in  cases  of  se- 
rious illness  or  contagious  disease, 
because  they  resided  in  dormitory- 
style  dwellings  or  were  members  of 
families  where  everyone  was  em- 
ployed. Compounding  this  concern 
was  the  consensus  that  there  would 
not  be  enough  physicians  available  to 
make  home  visits. ^^ 

Construction  began  on  a  fifty-bed 
hospital,  as  well  as  a  medical  service 
building,  in  late  1943.  But  before 
either  was  ready  for  service,  rapid 
population  expansion  had  made  both 
inadequate.  With  population  figures 
revised  from  as  many  as  ten  thousand 
to  fifty  thousand  in  early  1944,  the 
Medical  Section  authorized  two  addi- 
tional wings,  each  with  one  hundred 
beds,  and  a  fully  equipped  outpatient 
clinic.  Again,  however,  community 
growth  outstripped  estimates,  reach- 
ing seventy-two  thousand  in  early 
1945,  and  made  necessary  an  addi- 
tional sixty-bed  wing.  Even  with  the 
completion  of  this  latter  unit  the  hos- 
pital resources  of  the  community  were 
greatly  strained  in  the  spring  of  1945, 
when  there  was  an  epidemic  of  severe 
upper  respiratory  infections  among 
Oak  Ridge  residents. ^° 


The  pool  of  doctors,  nurses,  den- 
tists, and  other  specialists  to  staff  the 
Oak  Ridge  medical  facilities  bur- 
geoned with  the  mushrooming  popu- 
lation. To  maintain  the  national  war- 
time ratio  of  1  physician  to  each 
1,500  persons,  the  Clinical  Medicine 
Services  Branch  procured  Army  Medi- 
cal Corps  personnel  from  the  OSG 
and  some  civilians.  From  8  doctors 
and  4  nurses  in  July  1943,  the  staff 
was  increased  to  25  doctors  and  72 
nurses  in  July  1944  and  to  52  doctors 
and  144  nurses  a  year  later,  with  anal- 
ogous increases  in  outpatient  treat- 
ments totaling  1,890  in  Julv  1943, 
10,403  a  year  later,  and  19,599  in  July 
1945.  Similarly,  the  branch  enlarged 
the  dental  staff  at  Oak  Ridge.  From  2 
dentists  and  1  assistant  in  September 
1943,  the  staff  was  increased  to  29 
full-time  dentists  and  23  assistants  by 
March  1945.  Most  of  the  dentists 
were  civilians,  because  their  work  did 
not  require  them  to  have  access  to 
classified  information.^^ 

The  Oak  Ridge  clinical  medicine 
services  program  also  provided  for 
the  public  health  needs  of  the  com- 
munity. In  the  early  months  of  com- 
munity development.  Army  veterinar- 
ians cared  for  government-owned  ani- 
mals of  various  kinds — horses,  sentry 
dogs,  test  animals — in  use  on  the  res- 
ervation and  assisted  community  offi- 
cials   in    meat    and    milk    inspections. 


"MDH.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  7,  pp.  4.1-4.4  and  4.13-4.14, 
DASA. 

="'Ibid.,  pp.  4.1-4.7,  and  Vol.  12,  "Clinton  Kngi- 
neer  Works,"  pp.  10.1-10.4  and  10.9-10.10,  DASA; 
Completion  Rpt,  Skidmore,  Owings  and  Merrill  (ar- 


chitect-engineer), sub:  Portion  of  Townsile  Planning 
of  Oak  Ridge,  Contract  W-7401-eng-69,  9  Sep  44, 
pp.  V.IO,  V.25-V.28,  V.30-V.31,  OROO;  Robinson, 
Oak  Ridge  Story,  p.  56;  Groves,  Xoiv  It  Can  Be  Told,  p. 
423. 

3>MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  7,  pp.  4.14-4.19,  and  Vol. 
12,  pp.  10.5-10.7,  DASA;  Completion  Rpt,  Skid- 
more,  Owings  and  Merrill,  sub:  Portion  of  Townsite 
Plannmg  of  Oak  Ridge,  9  Sep  44.  p.  \.29,  OROO; 
Croves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  424;  Radiology  in 
World  nVir  II.  p.  874. 


HEALIH  AND  SAFE  IT 


423 


Oak  Ridge  Hospital  {multiwinged  structure  m  foreground) 


With  the  estabhshment  of  a  formal 
pubHc  health  service  in  January  1944, 
they  also  oversaw  rabies  inoculation 
of  pets  and  maintained  the  dog 
pound  and  an  animal  hospital.  The 
public  health  service,  which  func- 
tioned very  much  as  did  that  in  a  pri- 
vate civilian  community  of  compara- 
ble size  to  Oak  Ridge,  devoted  de- 
tailed attention  to  food  production 
and  handling,  inspection  of  water  and 
sewage  facilities,  and  control  of  com- 
municable diseases.  And  with  films, 
newspaper  articles,  and  special 
schools,  it  kept  community  residents 
and  plant  workers  informed  concern- 
ing the  latest  developments  and  most 
effective  means  for  maintaining  suita- 


ble public  health  conditions. ^^ 

Two  aspects  of  the  Oak  Ridge  clini- 
cal medicine  program  were  unusual 
for  the  times:  a  psychiatric  and  social 
welfare  consultation  service,  available 
to  both  civilian  and  military  residents; 
and  a  low-cost  medical  and  dental  in- 
surance plan  (the  Oak  Ridge  Health 
Association),  which  was  patterned 
after  the  California  Physicians  Service. 
Both  contributed  significantly  to  re- 
ducing the  turnover  of  trained  work- 
ers, a  persistent  problem  throughout 
the  war.  Dental  coverage  subsequent- 
ly proved  financially  unworkable  and 
was    abandoned,    but    comprehensive 


32MDH,   Bk.    1.  Vol.   7,  pp.  4.20-4.23,  and  Vol. 
12,  pp.   10.7-10.9,  DASA;  Radiology  in  World  War  II, 


424 


MANHATl  AN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


medical  care  continued  as  a  perma- 
nent feature.  ^^ 

The  Hanford  clinical  medicine  serv- 
ices program  was  essentially  civilian 
in  character.  Du  Pont,  not  the  Army, 
had  primary  responsibility  for  its  di- 
rection, which  was  consistent  with 
Manhattan's  larger  policy  of  granting 
the  company  the  maximum  autonomy 
possible  with  efficient  operation.  Few 
Army  personnel  were  directly  in- 
volved, and  there  was  no  effort  to 
militarize  the  civilian  medical  staff. 
Also,  as  at  Clinton  and  Los  Alamos, 
the  District  did  not  maintain  special 
medical  facilities  at  Hanford  for  mili- 
tary personnel.  Instead,  the  relatively 
small  military  contingent  depended 
upon  the  contractor-administered 
services  for  its  medical  and  dental 
needs. ^* 

In  early  1943,  Army  leaders  had 
few  precedents  for  entrusting  medical 
care  of  tens  of  thousands  of  atomic 
workers  to  a  private  industrial  firm. 
From  1943  through  1945,  Du  Pont 
had  to  cope  with  problems  similar  to 
those  in  Tennessee,  including  a  rapid- 
ly expanding  population,  the  necessity 
for  maximum  secrecy,  and  a  remote 
location.  In  certain  respects,  however, 
its  problems  were  more  difficult  be- 
cause of  the  greater  isolation  of  the 
site  and  the  much  larger  proportion 
of  workers  living  on  it.  Nevertheless, 
the    Hanford    clinical    medicine    pro- 


33  MDH,  Bk.  1.  Vol.  7,  pp.  4.7-4.13,  and  Vol.  12, 
pp.  10.5  and  10.8,  DASA;  Radiology  in  World  War  II. 
pp.  874-75;  Robinson,  Oak  Ridge  Story,  p.  56. 

34  This  and  the  following  paragraphs  are  based 
on  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  7,  pp.  4.23-4.25,  4.28,  4.30- 
4.31,  4.37-4.39,  and  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  "Con.struction," 
App.  B66  (Org  Chart.  Constr  Div,  HEW),  and  Vol. 
6,  "Operation,"  App.  BIO  (HEW  Org  Charts,  Con- 
tractors), DASA;  Ms,  Rov  C.  Hageman,  "Hanford: 
Threshold  of  an  Era,"  1946,  pp.  26-27,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  461  (Hanford),  MDR;  Radiology 
m  World  War  II.  pp.  875-78. 


gram — including  regular  medical  serv- 
ices, emergency  dental  care,  and 
public  health — was  a  success.  A  close 
observer  of  the  program,  the  director 
of  health  of  the  state  of  Washington, 
commented  in  1944  that  he  knew  of 
"no  industry  in  this  state  doing  a 
more  adequate  and  as  thorough  a  job 
as  is  being  done  at  the  Hanford  Engi- 
neer Works."  ^^ 

Residents  of  Los  Alamos,  as  did 
residents  of  Manhattan's  other  atomic 
reservations,  had  access  to  complete 
medical  services.  Provision  of  these 
services  was  perhaps  even  more  es- 
sential at  the  bomb  laboratory  than  at 
Clinton  and  Hanford.  The  location  of 
the  New  Mexico  site  was  more  than 
50  miles  via  a  tortuous  mountain  road 
to  the  nearest  hospital.  The  highly 
secret  nature  of  the  work  made  it  im- 
perative, from  the  security  standpoint, 
that  all  travel  away  from  the  post — in- 
cluding that  for  medical  purposes — be 
limited  to  an  absolute  minimum.  A 
final  factor,  and  one  of  central  impor- 
tance, was  maintenance  of  high  em- 
ployee morale,  for  so  many  members 
of  the  scientific  and  technical  staffs 
who  had  to  work  at  a  forced-draft 
pace  would  find  little  opportunity  for 
relief  from  the  unremitting  pressure 
of  trying  to  solve  extremely  difficult 
problems.  ^^ 

In  the  first  year  of  Los  Alamos 
operations,  medical  facilities  were 
extremely  limited.  For  civilian  pa- 
tients there  was  only  a  five-bed  in- 
dustrial infirmary  (eventually,  through 


3  5  Ltr,  Dr.  Eee  Powers  (Wash  State  Health  Dir)  to 
E.  L.  Plenninger  (HEW  Proj  Supt),  25  Sep  44, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  700  (Diseases,  Cancer 
Research),  MDR. 

3«MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  pp.  2.4-2.6,  and  Vol.  2,  pp. 
in.l2-III.13,  DASA;  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp. 
l(i4-66. 


HKALIH  AND  SAFE  IV 


425 


severe  overcrowding,  it  accommodated 
ivventy-four  bed  cases),  staffed  by  two 
physicians  and  three  civiHan  nurses. 
For  mihtary  personnel  (he  Armv  pro- 
vided a  separate  three-bed  infirmary, 
staffed  by  a  Medical  C.orps  officer  and 
seven  enlisted  men.  With  the  Army's 
Bruns  General  Hospital  in  Santa  Fe 
available  for  civilian  residents  requir- 
ing lengthy  hospitalization  or  special 
treatment,  these  modest  facilities  suf- 
ficed as  long  as  the  population  of  the 
site  remained  relatively  small.  De- 
pendence upon  Bruns  Hospital,  how- 
ever, presented  some  serious  draw- 
backs. The  time-consuming  trip  to 
Santa  Fe  resulted  in  a  loss  of  man- 
hours,  which  the  project  could  ill 
afford.  There  also  was  the  inherent 
risk  to  security  in  having  personnel 
leave  the  reservation,  even  though  the 
trips  were  carried  out  under  military 
supervision. 

A  reassessment  of  the  post's  limited 
medical  facilities  occurred  in  late 
1943  in  order  to  meet  the  increased 
health  needs  of  a  rapidly  expanding 
population,  which  had  not  only  more 
than  doubled  in  size  but  also  had 
changed  in  composition.  Beginning  in 
January  with  only  fifteen  hundred 
construction  workers,  the  population 
by  the  end  of  the  year  had  expanded 
to  over  thirty-five  hundred  and  now- 
included  scientists,  technicians,  Uni- 
versity of  California  and  civil  service 
employees,  military  personnel,  and 
dependents.  Providing  them  with 
proper  medical  care  was  essential,  es- 
pecially for  the  larger  proportion  of 
individuals  who  were  likely  to  require 
hospitalization.  Several  factors  occa- 
sioned this  situation:  An  increasing 
number  of  workers  had  been  rejected 
for  military  service  for  medical  rea- 
sons;   a   higher   percentage   of  young 


married  couples  were  likely  to  need 
obstetrical  services  and  medical  care 
for  small  children;  and  a  sizable  ele- 
ment of  the  civilian  population  lived 
in  barracks  or  dormitories.  Hence, 
Captain  Nolan  recommended  to  Lt. 
Col.  Whitney  Ashbridge,  commanding 
officer  of  the  post,  that  the  industrial 
infirmary  be  expanded  into  a  60-bed 
hospital,  to  include  a  30-bed  conva- 
lescent ward  for  use  by  both  civilian 
and  military  patients.  Nolan  did  not 
get  all  that  he  requested,  but  with 
Colonel  Warren's  support  he  secured 
authorization  for  expansion  of  the  in- 
firmary into  a  54-bed  unit.  Because 
civilian  medical  personnel  were  virtu- 
ally unobtainable  by  mid- 1944,  most 
of  the  additional  staff  had  to  come 
from  the  Army  Medical  Corps. ^' 

By  late  1944,  the  New  Mexico  com- 
munity had  reasonably  complete  clini- 
cal medicine  facilities.  Most  services 
were  available  to  permanent  residents 
at  little  or  no  cost,  the  only  excep- 
tions being  that  civilian  in-patients  at 
the  hospital  paid  a  subsistence  fee  of 
$1  a  day  and  construction  contractors 
paid  at  established  rates  for  emergen- 
cy treatment  of  their  personnel.  Until 
early  1944,  periodic  visits  by  dentists 
from  Bruns  General  Hospital  provid- 
ed the  only  on-site  dental  care,  but  in 
March  a  full-time  dentist  became 
available  at  the  Los  Alamos  hospital. 
Veterinary  services  had  come  much 
earlier,  when  the  military  police  de- 
tachment   at    the    post    brought    in    a 


"MDH.  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  pp.  6.43-6.47  and  7.15, 
DASA.  Memo,  Warren  to  Groves,  sub:  Hospital  Re- 
quirements at  "\\"  22  Jun  44;  Memo.  Warren  to 
Groves,  sub:  Insp  of  Med  Facilities  at  "Y"  (24-28 
Oct  44),  16  Nov  44;  Memo,  Nolan  to  Ashbridge, 
sub:  Med  Facilities  and  Activities  in  the  Year  1943- 
44,  9  Jun  44.  All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
319.1  (Hospital).  MDR. 


426 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


medical  officer  in  April  1943  to  look 
after  the  horses  and  war  dogs  used  on 
security  patrols.  Under  direction  of 
Captain  Nolan,  the  post  veterinarian 
and  his  staff  cooperated  with  the  clin- 
ical medicine  staff  to  establish  and 
maintain  public  health  services  for  the 
community.^* 

As  a  major  factor  in  maintaining 
community  morale,  the  clinical  medi- 
cine services  program  was  perhaps 
more  significant  at  Los  Alamos  than 
at  any  of  the  other  atomic  sites.  This 
was  particularly  the  case  during  the 
hectic  months  of  bomb  development 
and  testing  in  late  1944  and  early 
1945.  In  this  period,  the  strain  of 
working  long  hours  on  extremely  dif- 
ficult technical  problems  in  the  face 
of  pressing  deadlines  combined  with 
the  stress  of  other  factors — geograph- 
ic isolation  of  the  site,  limited  recre- 
ational opportunities,  strict  security 
requirements  including  censorship  of 
mail,  and  not  always  adequate  living 
conditions — to  place  a  severe  burden 
on  both  individual  and  community 
morale. 

In  August  1944,  Colonel  Warren 
sent  a  psychiatrist  to  the  New  Mexico 
site  to  survey  the  situation.  The  psy- 
chiatrist found  that  "dissatisfactions 
were  expressed  by  every  category  of 
resident  interviewed."  He  recom- 
mended that  a  psychiatric  social 
worker  would  help  ease  tensions  and 
remove  frictions  in  the  civilian  popu- 
lation and  more  intensive  efforts  by 
the  post  chaplain  and  the  WAC  com- 
manding officer  would  improve  rela- 
tionships among  the  diverse  military 
groups.  Warren  acted  promptly  to  put 
these  recommendations  into  effect.  In 


the  follow-up  survey  made  in  April 
1945,  the  psychiatrist  found  commu- 
nity morale  greatly  improved.  And  in 
the  final  hectic  weeks  of  bomb  assem- 
bly and  testing  in  the  summer  of 
1945,  no  key  scientists  or  technicians 
were  lost  to  the  effort  because  of  ill- 
ness or  mental  breakdown. ^^ 

The  Safety  Program 

Start  of  large-scale  project  con- 
struction activities  in  the  spring  of 
1943  brought  the  first  big  upsurge  in 
safety  problems  for  the  Manhattan 
District.  Anticipating  this  increase, 
Colonel  Marshall  had  transferred  the 
only  safety  engineer  on  his  headquar- 
ters staff  to  the  Clinton  Engineer 
Works.  Consequently,  in  early  1943, 
he  began  to  look  for  a  replacement, 
this  time  seeking  an  engineer  with  the 
ability  and  experience  to  organize  and 
direct  a  project-wide  safety  program. 
Not  until  June  did  he  find  the  man  he 
wanted.  James  R.  Maddy  was  a  veter- 
an in  the  safety  field,  with  broad  ex- 
perience and  an  outstanding  record 
of  achievement  on  other  government 
projects.  Marshall's  instructions  to  his 
new  safety  engineer  were  to  form 
from  the  District's  existing  safety  staff 
a  separate  section  with  sufficient  per- 
sonnel and  expertise  to  oversee  all 
Manhattan  safety  activities. *° 


38MDH,    Bk.    8,    Vol.    1,    pp.    6.47-6.49,    DASA; 
Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  166. 


^^  Quotation  from  Memo,  Dr.  Eric  Kent  (Marke 
(consultant  to  MD)  to  Warren,  sub:  Mental  Hygiene 
Survey  at  "Y"  (23-27  Aug  44),  29  Aug  44.  See  also 
Memo  for  File,  Clarke,  sub:  Psychiatric  Problems  in 
Community  at  "Y,"  2  May  45.  Both  in  Admin  Files, 
(ien  Corrcsp,  700  (Disease,  Cancer  Research), 
MDR. 

*o  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  11,  pp.  6.1-6.6  and  App. 
C:i5,  DASA;  Marsden  Diary,  2  Jun  43,  OROO. 


HEALIH  AND  SAFETY 


427 


Progra m  Orgn niiatwu 

Maddy's  program  organization  co- 
incided with  the  move  of  District 
headquarters  from  New  "^'ork  to  Oak 
Ridge.  The  newlv  estabhshed  Safety- 
Accident  Prevention  Section  (in  late 
1944  it  became  a  branch)  henceforth 
became  responsible  not  only  for  the 
project-wide  safety  program  but  also 
for  the  Clinton  program.  At  the  same 
time,  however,  the  policy  of  granting 
Hanford  greater  administrative  auton- 
omy relieved  the  section  of  all  but 
very  general  supervision  of  its  safety 
program.*^ 

By  the  end  of  1943,  Maddy  had  a 
staff  of  fifty  full-time  employees  as- 
signed to  five  subsections  (construc- 
tion, industrial,  training,  traffic,  and 
community  safety).  In  subsequent  re- 
organizations he  consolidated  the 
construction  and  industrial  units  to 
form  an  Occupational  Safety  Section 
and  the  traffic  and  community  units 
to  create  a  Public  Safety  Section. 
Maddy's  headquarters  section  super- 
vised the  program  through  resident 
safety  engineers,  one  of  whom  was  as- 
signed to  each  field  activity  where  ex- 
posure to  hazards  amounted  to  at 
least  eighty  thousand  man-hours  per 
month  and,  beginning  in  May  1945, 
one  to  the  staff  of  each  officer  in 
charge  of  a  major  operating  division 
at  Clinton.  The  resident  engineer  was 
usually  a  member  of  the  area  engi- 
neer's stafl,  performing  the  dual  func- 
tion of  advising  the  area  engineer  on 
safetv  matters  and  maintaining  liaison 


between  his  area  and  the  safetv  office 
in  Oak  Ridge. ^2 

Maddy  managed  the  District's  safety 
program  with  only  modest  additions 
to  the  personnel  of  the  Safety-Acci- 
dent Prevention  Section.  This  he  was 
able  to  do  by  close  adherence  to  Gen- 
eral Groves's  basic  policy  of  making 
maximum  use  of  available  assistance 
from  existing  outside  organizations 
operating  in  the  safety  field.  Thus, 
wherever  feasible,  he  relied  upon  the 
existing  safety  organizations  of  the 
prime  contractors,  such  as  Du  Pont 
and  Kellex,  who  employed  full-time 
safety  engineers.  Similarly,  in  commu- 
nity safety  matters  he  encouraged  vol- 
untary safety  committees,  although 
these  were  not  always  as  effective  as 
relying  on  professional  safety  engi- 
neers. This  was  the  case  in  Oak 
Ridge,  for  example,  where  the  col- 
laborative efforts  of  Roane- Anderson 
and  a  volunteer  committee  for  a  com- 
munity safety  program  proved  less  ef- 
ficient than  the  expertise  of  Maddy's 
office.'*^ 

The  safety  program  also  received 
indispensable  assistance  from  the 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers 
(OCE).  Groves  had  established  an  ef- 
fective liaison  with  the  OCP7s  Safety 
and  Accident  Prevention  Division,  en- 
abling Manhattan  safety  personnel  to 
secure  materials  on  standards  and  re- 
quirements, special  sttidies,  and  even 
personnel.  Similar  liaison  arrange- 
ments with  the  Department  of  Labor 
and  the  Bureau  of  Mines  provided  a 
source  of  training  materials  and,  from 
the    Bureau    onlv,    safetv    instructors. 


"'  MDH.    Bk.     1.    \ol      11,    |)|)     ().l-().2.    DASA; 
Matthias  Diarv,  12  and  L'4  Sep  },S,  OROO 


"•■^MDH.  Bk.  I.  \()l  II,  pi>  f).2-<i,."i  and  Apps. 
Af)-A9  (Or^  Chans.  MI)  .Salt-tv  Or^.  1943-45), 
DA.SA 

"■'  Ihul.,  pp.  (1.2-()..S  and  (>. 7-0.8.  DA.SA. 


428 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Also  many  nongovernmental  organi- 
zations— most  notably  the  National 
Safety  Council,  American  Red  Cross, 
and  International  Association  of 
Chiefs  of  Police — supplied  technical 
data  and  special  training.  With  this 
extensive  outside  assistance.  District 
safety  employees  could  devote  most 
of  their  time  to  solving  urgent  current 
problems.*'* 

Occupational  and  Community  Aspects 

At  the  Tennessee  and  Washington 
sites,  separate  staffs  administered  oc- 
cupational safety  for  the  worker  on 
the  job  and  community  safety  for  resi- 
dents of  the  atomic  communities.  In 
each  production  plant  at  Clinton,  a 
resident  engineer  coordinated  safety 
measures  with  the  appropriate  con- 
struction and  operating  contractors. 
At  Hanford,  Du  Font's  own  safety  de- 
partment, assisted  by  a  central  safety 
committee  comprised  of  all  depart- 
ment heads  and  with  advice  from  the 
area  engineer's  safety  office,  adminis- 
tered occupational  safety.  Community 
safety  at  Oak  Ridge  was  the  responsi- 
bility of  a  full-time  safety  director 
functioning  under  supervision  of  the 
resident  engineer  for  the  central  fa- 
cilities and  at  Richland,  of  the  area 
engineer's  safety  office.  At  the  New 
Mexico  site,  where  the  production  or- 
ganization and  community  were  much 
more  closely  integrated,  a  safety  com- 
mittee oversaw  both  occupational  and 
community  safety  until  early  1945. 
That  year  the  Los  Alamos  administra- 
tive board  employed  a  full-time  pro- 
fessional   safety    director,    who    later 


divided  safety  activities  between  a  com- 
munity program  and  a  technical  area 
program.*^ 

Manhattan's  occupational  safety 
program  came  to  resemble  that  found 
in  many  large-scale  wartime  industrial 
enterprises.  The  District  safety  staff 
promulgated  a  great  variety  of  regula- 
tions intended  to  minimize  job-relat- 
ed injuries  and  illnesses.  These  re- 
quired contractors  to  provide  workers 
with  safe  drinking  water,  goggles, 
hard  hats,  safety  shoes,  and  similar 
items;  to  submit  monthly  reports  on 
all  accidents;  and  to  incorporate  thou- 
sands of  safety  features  in  plant  build- 
ings and  equipment.  Compliance  with 
established  safety  codes  and  stand- 
ards was  verified  through  on-the-spot 
inspections.  To  support  the  efforts  of 
resident  safety  engineers  and  contrac- 
tors, the  safety  staff  developed  a  pro- 
gram of  safety  indoctrination  for  all 
employees,  provided  materials  for 
special  courses,  issued  safety  rule 
books,  and  carried  out  a  continuing 
program  to  publicize  safety  matters  in 
community  and  plant  newspapers,  in 
films  shown  in  local  theaters,  and  in 
widely  displayed  posters.*^ 

On  the  whole,  the  community 
safety  program  was  more  convention- 
al.   Oak    Ridge,    Richland,    and    Los 


4-*  Ibid.,  pp.  6.9-6.10,  DASA;  Rpt,  Natl  Safety 
Council,  sula:  Community  Safety  Prgm,  Oct  43  (for 
CEW)  and  Nov  43  (for  HEW),  with  supplementary 
reports  made  at  each  site  in  1944,  OROO. 


45MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  11,  pp.  6.4-6.5  and  Apps. 
A6-A9;  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  Sec.  10,  and  Vol.  6,  Sec.  7; 
and  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  p.  6.63,  and  Vol.  2,  III. 38  and 
IX.  19,  DASA.  Most  other  Manhattan  installations 
having  more  than  eighty  thousand  man-hours  of  ex- 
posure to  hazards  per  month  had  a  full-time  safety 
engineer.  The  exceptions  were  Boston,  where  Stone 
and  Webster's  work  was  not  sufficiently  hazardous 
to  require  special  safety  measures,  and  Berkeley, 
where  the  University  of  California  accepted  com- 
plete responsibilitv  for  safetv  matters. 

46  Ibid.,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  11,  pp.  2.1-2.11  and  Apps. 
Cll  and  H4  (Safety  Progress  Rpts),  Fl  and  F4 
(Safety  Tng  Bulls),  F6  (Safety  Films),  DASA. 


HEALIH  AM)  SAFETY 


429 


Alamos  required  essentially  the  same 
provisions  for  the  safety  of  their  resi- 
dents as  most  normal  American  towns 
of  comparable  size  and  population, 
but  with  certain  significant  differ- 
ences. One  was  their  unusually  great 
dependence  upon  automobile  trans- 
portation, creating  special  traffic 
problems.  Another  was  security, 
making  it  necessary  for  the  military  to 
perform  certain  safety  functions  usu- 
ally assigned  to  civilian  agencies,  as, 
for  example,  fire  safety  and  the  en- 
forcement of  traffic  regulations.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  programs  for 
safety  in  public  places  (theaters, 
recreation  centers,  playgrounds),  in 
schools,  and  in  the  home  were  not 
unlike  those  in  effect  in  most  Ameri- 
can communities. 

District  traffic  engineers  carefully 
studied  various  statistical  reports  on 
road  congestion  and  accidents  and 
devised  corrective  measures,  includ- 
ing institution  of  such  advanced  con- 
cepts as  radio  control  of  traffic  fiow, 
unbalanced  lanes  for  inbound  and 
outbound  rush-hour  traffic,  and  inge- 
nious layouts  to  expedite  turns.  They 
also  drew  up  traffic  regulations  based 
on  the  Uniform  \'ehicle  Code  in  force 
in  many  states,  and  therefore  familiar 
to  most  of  the  residents  in  the  atomic 
communities,  and  distributed  copies 
of  these  regulations  widely  among 
District  drivers.*^ 

As  a  check  on  the  public  safety 
standards  and  as  an  additional  source 
of   professional    expertise,    the    Army 


requested  National  Safety  Council  ex- 
perts on  home,  school,  and  traffic 
safety  to  make  periodic  surveys.  After 
each  survey  the  council  issued  recom- 
mendations, most  of  which  the  district 
adopted.  Thus,  in  early  1944,  Maddy 
reported  to  the  district  engineer  that 
of  the  sixty-nine  recommendations 
the  council  had  made  in  a  survey  of 
Oak  Ridge,  the  District  had  adopted 
thirty-two  and  was  in  the  process  of 
adopting  twenty-one  others,  more 
than  a  third  of  them  relating  to  traffic 
problems. 

A  continuing  problem  for  the  Dis- 
trict safety  staff  was  how  to  maintain  a 
high  level  of  adherence  to  project 
safety  regulations.  Among  the  factors 
that  tended  to  reduce  attention  to 
safety  requirements  below  an  opti- 
mum level  were  inadequate  knowl- 
edge of  current  regulations  or  a  gen- 
eral decline  in  morale,  which  oc- 
curred among  atomic  workers  in  1944 
and  early  1945.  One  effective  means 
was  to  hold  a  safety  exposition,  pre- 
senting a  combination  of  entertain- 
ment and  exhibits  designed  to  build 
up  morale  and  at  the  same  time  teach 
safety  measures.  In  the  hectic  last 
months  of  the  war,  thousands  of 
project  employees  at  Clinton  and 
Hanford  viewed  highly  successful 
safety  expositions  on  industrial,  off- 
the-job,  and  home  safety.*^ 

A  precise  assessment  of  the  Man- 
hattan District's  relative  success  in  its 
public  safety  program  is  difficult  be- 
cause of  a  lack  of  detailed  statistical 


■*Mbid..  Bk.  1.  \()l.  11.  pp.  .S.l-:5.7  and  Apps. 
(-.12  (  riafFic  Regs  lor  CKW)  and  I):i-n4,  and  Bk.  «. 
\<)I.  1.  pp.  6.:i:^-6.:i5.  DAS.A.  in  adrinion  to  nistiui 
ifgulati()n.s,  government  drivers  operating  in  the 
atomic  communities  had  to  comply  with  sitki  (.or|)s 
of  Kngineers  requirements  for  vehicle  mspcttion, 
dn\ci  iiaining.  and  driver  records  maintenance 


^«MnH.  Bk.  1.  \ol.  11.  p.  3.H  and  Apps.  K7-K9 
(Photos  o(  .Safetv  Kxhihiis).  DA.SA;  Memo,  (".roves 
to  OlYnc  of  the  Fiscal  Dir.  IKl  A.SF.  Attn:  K.  F. 
Navlor  (.Spec  Asst).  sub:  HFVV  .Saletv  Exposition 
(24-29  Jul  44),  24  Sep  43.  Admin  Files.  Gen  Cor- 
res|).  729.:?  1  (SaletN  and  Kvaciialion.  Hanford), 
M1)K 


430 


MANHA  n  AN:    IHE  ARMY  AND    IHE  A  lOMIC:  BOMB 


records.  Nevertheless,  there  is  some 
evidence  that  by  1944  the  atomic 
communities  were  achieving  a  public 
safety  record  at  least  equal  to  that  in 
long-established  civilian  towns  of 
comparable  size.  Traffic  safety  was  a 
specific  case.  Workers  commuting 
from  Oak  Ridge  and  Richland  to  the 
atomic  plants  were  abnormally  de- 
pendent upon  motor  vehicles  driven 
unusually  long  distances  over  roads 
often  poorly  built  and  maintained. 
Vet  their  record  of  traffic  safety  was 
as  good  as  that  of  war  workers  in 
comparable  civilian  communities  com- 
muting under  far  less  hazardous  con- 
ditions. And  in  fact  during  one  specif- 
ic period  in  1944,  Oak  Ridge  drivers 
had  fewer  fatalities  per  10,000  vehi- 
cles in  operation  than  towns  of 
similar  size  in  other  parts  of  the 
country.  ^^ 

In  December  1945,  the  National 
Safety  Council  presented  the  Manhat- 
tan Project  with  the  Award  of  Honor 
for  Distinguished  Service  to  Safety  in 
recognition  of  its  unusually  low  inci- 
dence of  occupational  accidents  from 
January  1943  through  June  1945,  re- 
sulting in  62  fatalities  and  3,879  dis- 
abling injuries  during  548  million 
man-hours.  This  record,  statistically 
speaking,  gave  the  District  an  occupa- 
tional injury  rate  62  percent  below 
that  for  equivalent  private  industry. 
\'iewed  in  another  way.  District  safety 
programs,  compared  with  the  national 
average,  could  be  credited  with 
having  saved  94  lives,  prevented 
9,200  disabling  injuries,  and  contrib- 
uted an  additional  814,000  employee- 
days-of-work  to  the  project.   In  some 


respects,  a  more  important  achieve- 
ment was  that  effectiveness  increased 
during  the  thirty-month  period,  as 
demonstrated  by  the  steady  decline 
of  the  frequency,  fatality,  and  severity 
rates  of  injury  among  District 
workers.  ^° 

Insurance  Plans 

Acqusition  of  normal  insurance 
coverage  for  the  atomic  project  was 
virtually  impossible.  Even  if  complete 
disclosure  to  a  group  of  insurance 
companies  had  been  possible,  they 
would  have  been  unable  to  write  cov- 
erage because  of  the  lack  of  knowl- 
edge and  understanding  of  the  haz- 
ards involved,  the  extent  and  duration 
of  the  effects  these  hazards  might 
cause,  and  the  ramifications  of  any 
large-scale  nuclear-related  accident 
that  might  occur.  Consequently, 
where  normal  insurance  was  not  pos- 
sible, the  government  had  to  assume 
full  responsibility  for  any  claims  that 
might  result. 

Consistent  with  provisions  relating 
to  insurance  in  the  First  War  Powers 
Act  of  1941  and  to  procurement  of 
coverages  in  War  Department  Regula- 
tion 4,  Manhattan  developed  an  insur- 
ance plan  to  protect  the  interests  of 
the  government  and  project  contrac- 
tors and  employees.  The  number  of 
insurance  carriers  was  limited  deliber- 
ately   to    prevent    knowledge    of    the 


^niDH,  Bk  1.  \ol.  11,  pp.  5.7-5.8  and  Apps.  B2 
(  Ira f Fit  Sui\e\  al  lenn.  Site)  and  VA2  (Traffic  Regs 
for  CKW),  DASA. 


^"Ltr,  Ned  H.  Dearborn  (Natl  Safety  Council 
president)  to  (.roves,  18  Sep  45,  Admin  Piles,  C.en 
Corresp,  200.6  (Natl  Safety  Award),  MDR;  Rpt, 
C.antril  and  Parker,  sub:  Status  of  Health  and  Pro- 
tection at  HKW,  24  Aug  45,  MDR.  See  also  MDH, 
Bk.  1.  Vol.  11,  pp.  5.1-5.(3  and  Apps.  A2-A5 
(graphs  showing  occupational  injurv  rates  (or  MD) 
and  B3  (tables  showing  occupational  injurv  experi- 
ence for  MD),  DASA. 


HP.ALIU  AM)  SAFKIY 


431 


project  from  becoming  loo  widely 
known  in  the  insurance  industry,  and 
District  officials  often  had  to  perform 
investigations,  determine  merits  of 
claims,  conduct  inspections,  and  ex- 
amine contractors  books  on  behalf  of 
the  insuring  companies.  I'he  District's 
Insurance  Section,  organized  in 
August    1942,  supervised  these  activi- 


ties and  helped  administer  a  variety  of 
insurance  rating  plans  and  types  of 
insurance  for  project  contractors,  in- 
cluding guaranteed  costs,  industrial 
accident  and  health,  employees  bene- 
fits, and  group  insurance.  ^^ 


■■'MDH.    Bk.     I,    \()1.    (•).    "Insurance    Program, 
DASA;  (Moves,  \ow  II  Can  Ki'  Told.  p.  57. 


CHAPTER  XXI 


The  Atomic  Communities  in 
Tennessee 


Those  mid-twcnticth  century  Amer- 
icans who  came  by  the  thousands  to 
hve  in  the  burgeoning  atomic  commu- 
nities of  the  Chnton  Engineer  Works 
(CEW)  in  east  lennessee  moved  into 
a  region  with  deep  roots  in  the  na- 
tion's history.  European  settlers  had 
been  coming  from  the  eastern  sea- 
board colonies  for  two  hundred  years, 
many  by  way  of  the  much-traveled 
trail  thiough  the  Cumberland  Gap,  to 
live  in  the  valleys  beneath  the  heavily 
wooded  ridges  forming  the  foothills 
of  the  Cumberland  Mountains.  But 
their  numbers  had  remained  small, 
limited  to  the  few  farm  families  that 
the  relatively  poor  soil  would  support. 
Then  in  the  1930's,  the  arrival  of  the 
Tennessee  Valley  Authority  (TVA) 
presaged  the  establishment  of  the 
"Government  village"  that  in  the  next 
decade  would  tremendously  alter  the 
quiet  rural  countryside.^  Indeed,  as 
the  Manhattan  Project  got  under  way 
in   earlv    1943,    the   sudden   influx   of 


'  Manhattan  and  Stone  and  Webster  engineers 
regularly  used  the  term  (iovniuuent  villagi-  to  desig- 
nate the  community  they  envisioned  would  be  built 
at  the  Clinton  Kngineer  Works  as  an  administrative 
headquarters  and  residence  for  construction  and  op- 
erating workers.  See  reference  in  Marshall  Diary, 
9  Jun  and  24  Jul  42,  OCG  Files,  Cien  Corresp, 
Groves  Files,  Misc  Recs  Sec,  behind  Fldr  5,  \\Y)R 


the  atomic  workers  soon  created  a 
unique  industrial  community  along 
the  south  slopes  of  that  prominent 
terrain  feature  known  for  many  years 
as  Black  Oak  Ridge. ^ 

Oak  Ridge:   The  Operating  CoiNt/noiity 

Of  necessity,  planning  for  commu- 
nity facilities  related  directly  to  the 
construction  and  operation  of  the 
production  plants  and  hence  was  sub- 
ject to  frequent  revision,  usually 
toward  expansion.  Rather  than  adher- 
ing to  long-range  blueprints,  Manhat- 
tan was  compelled  to  adopt  a  policy 
of  expediency,  responding  as  prompt- 
ly as  possible  to  each  new  major 
change  in  industrial  development, 
with  the  hope  that  it  could  provide  at 
all  times  for  at  least  a  minimum  of 
community  requirements.  Achieve- 
ment of  even  this  minimum  goal 
often  was  difficult,  because  the 
Army's  general  policy  gave  first  prior- 
ity to  materials,  equipment,  and  man- 


2  Robinson,  Oak  Ridge  Stoiy.  pp.  32-41;  U.S. 
.Atomic  Energy  Commission,  AEC  Handbook  on  Oak 
Ridge  (Oak  Ridge,  Tenn.:  Oak  Ridge  Operations 
Office.  19.58),  p.  11. 


IHK  AlOMIC  COMMIMUKS  in    IKNNKSSKK 


433 


powcM      lor     plant     ( onstruclion     and 
operation.^ 

FnsI  Phasr,    1942-1943 

Organization  and  planning  for  Oak 
Ridge  began  in  lale  June  1942,  after 
Stone  and  Webster  had  agreed  to  in- 
clude site  development  and  housing 
construction  in  its  responsibilities  as 
architect-engineer-manager  of  the 
atomic  project.  Meeting  with  Manhat- 
tan leaders  on  the  twenty-ninth,  com- 
pany officials  indicated  a  special  engi- 
neering group  at  their  Boston  office 
would  begin  design  work  for  the  per- 
manent operating  community  imme- 
diately. During  the  weeks  that  fol- 
lowed. Stone  and  Webster  and  Army 
engineers  collaborated  closely  on  pre- 
liminary plans  for  the  community. 
Using  such  previously  built  govern- 
ment villages  as  Ocala,  Florida  (for 
the  Florida  ship  canal  project),  and 
Fastport,  Maine  (for  the  Passama- 
quoddy  project),  as  a  basis,  they  envi- 
sioned an  operating  village  of  some 
i\\Q  thoiLsand  inhabitants. 

Following  a  visit  to  the  Tennessee 
site,  the  engineers  tentatively  decided 
that  the  best  location  for  the  village 
would  be  in  the  northeastern  corner 
because  Tennessee  61,  the  best  high- 
way traversing  the  site,  ran  northeast- 
ward to  Clinton  and  then  connected 
with  good  roads  to  Knoxville,  and 
also  because  main  lines  of  the  Lou- 
isville and  Nashville  Railroad  and 
the  Southern  Railway  were  nearby. 
{See  Map  3.)  The  topography,  too,  met 
their  requirements.  Fhe  stream  valley 
formed    b\    the    Fast    Fork    of  Poplar 


Creek,  a  iribularx  of  the  Clinch  River, 
was  relatively  flat — if  somewhat 
narrow — and  extended  ab(nit  7  miles 
southwestward  from  the  northeast 
boundary  of  the  reservation.  And  par- 
alleling the  valley  on  the  north  and 
south  were  Black  Oak  Ridge  and  Pine 
Ridge,  foothills  that  would  provide 
the  necessary  protection  for  the 
future  community  from  possible  dis- 
astrous explosions  at  the  nearby  pro- 
duction plants  and  from  unauthorized 
observation  from  outside  the  reserva- 
tion. The  gentle  slope  of  Black  Oak 
Ridge  also  promised  to  be  suitable 
for  residential  construction.'* 

Because  the  site  under  construction 
was  remote  and  all  personnel,  for 
safety  and  security,  would  have  to  live 
in  one  place,  the  village  would  need 
numerous  housing  units  and  facilities 
to  provide  atomic  workers  with  mini- 
mum standards  of  comfort  and  ser- 
vice. But  wartime  restrictions  on  the 
amount  and  cost  of  any  kind  of  com- 
munity construction  and  the  difficulty 
in  procuring  building  materials  made 
it  seem  unlikely  that  adequate  facili- 
ties could  be  provided.  Fhus,  both 
Brig.  Gen.  Lucius  D.  Clay,  in  his  ca- 
pacity as  the  Services  of  Supply's 
deputy  chief  of  staff  for  requirements 
and  resources,  and  Colonel  Groves, 
who  was  still  serving  as  the  Corps  of 
Fngineers'  deputy  chief  for  Army 
construction,  took  occasion  to  remind 
District   officials   of  these   restrictions 


3  MDH.  Bk.  1,  \()l.  12,  •Clinton  Knginc-t-r 
Works,  "  pp.  1.4-1.5;  Bk.  4,  \'ol.  .5,  "Consiruction," 
pp.  ,5.1-5.2:  and  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  "C.cncral,"  pp,  5,7- 
5.8,  D.A.S.A.  (irovcs,  \ou<  ll  Can  Br  Told.  p.  424. 


••Marshall  l)iai\,  25  and  29  Jnn.  14  and  24  Jul, 
2  and  2:5-24  .Sep  42,  MDR;  DSM  Chronologv,"  25 
|un  42.  .Sec.  2(c).  29  Jun  42,  Sec.  15,  24  Jul  and  2 
Sep  42,  each  Sec.  9,  OROC);  Completion  Rpt,  Stone 
and  Webster,  sub:  Clinton  Kngr  Works,  (Contract 
VV-74()l-eng-i:i,  194(3,  pp.  12-14,  OR(K):  Groves, 
Xoxf  It  Can  Br  Told.  pp.  25-2(').  See  V.h.  '^  for  a  more 
detailed  discussion  of  the  selection  of  the  Tennessee 


434 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


and  to  caution  them  against  overly 
elaborate  plans  for  village  construc- 
tion. Clay  told  Colonels  Marshall  and 
Nichols  that  he  saw  little  hope  that 
there  would  be  any  relaxation  in 
these  restrictions  for  the  atomic 
project.  Groves  reaffirmed  this  view 
and  made  a  point  of  reminding  Mar- 
shall of  the  $7,500-dollar  cost  limita- 
tion on  individual  quarters;  he  also 
told  Captain  Johnson,  the  District  liai- 
son officer  in  Washington,  D.C.,  that 
he  thought  patterning  the  atomic 
community  after  Ocala  or  Eastport 
would  be  a  mistake,  for  these  two 
towns  were  built  under  peacetime 
conditions.  Nevertheless,  when 
Groves — as  the  new  officer  in  charge 
of  the  project — personally  inspected 
the  East  Fork  Valley  section  of  the 
Tennessee  site  in  late  September,  he 
shifted  his  position  to  concur  with 
Marshall's  view  "that  primitive  hous- 
ing could  not  be  expected  to  meet 
family  requirements  of  the  class  of 
personnel  to  be  employed  on  this 
particular  project."  ^ 

General  Groves's  approval  of  East 
Fork  Valley  cleared  the  way  for  devel- 
opment of  the  atomic  community.  In 
early  October,  Stone  and  Webster 
construction  crews  started  work  on 
the  first  phase.  Bulldozers  and  grad- 
ers cleared  away  existing  structures, 
grubbed  out  trees  and  shrubs  from  the 
slopes  of  Black  Oak  Ridge,  laid  out 
rights  of  way  for  roads,  and  provided 
for  a  drainage  system.  At  the  same 
time.  Captain  Johnson  conferred  with 
the  Corps'  Construction  Division 
housing  specialists,  seeking  data  on 
designs   appropriate   for   the  Tennes- 


see site;  Colonel  Marshall  visited  the 
Ocala  village,  coming  away  convinced 
that  its  buildings,  "with  slight  modifi- 
cation, would  be  ideal  types  for  our 
village  at  Clinton";  and  Stone  and 
Webster  worked  closely  with  the 
Boston  Area  Engineers  Office  to  com- 
plete the  general  layout  plans  for  the 
village.^ 

Stone  and  Webster  submitted  its 
general  plan  for  the  atomic  communi- 
ty to  the  Manhattan  area  office  on 
26  October.  What  had  begun  as  a 
projected  village  of  five  thousand 
people  emerged  as  the  blueprint  for  a 
town  of  some  thirteen  thousand.  Con- 
sistent with  the  Manhattan  objective 
that  townsite  construction  remain  sec- 
ondary to  plant  construction,  general 
design  specifications  were  based  on 
utility,  on  minimizing  costs,  and  on 
maximizing  use  of  noncritical  materi- 
als. Housing  and  other  community  fa- 
cilities had  only  to  furnish  sufficient 
accommodations  and  services  so  that 
the  majority  of  project  workers  would 
live  on  the  reservation.  Employees 
who  did  not  have  to  commute  daily  to 
off-site  communities  would  perform 
more  efficiently  in  plant  construction 
and  operations  and  would  be  much 
less  of  a  risk  to  the  security  of  the 
project."^ 

Under  terms  of  the  Army's  original 
contract.  Stone  and  Webster  was  re- 
sponsible for  preparing  detailed  blue- 
prints of  not  only  the  atomic  commu- 
nity but  also  the  large-scale  electro- 
magnetic plant.  By  November,  howev- 


^  Qiiotation  from  Marshall  Diary,  24  Sep  42, 
MDR.  See  also  ibid.,  30Jun,  24  Jul,  2  Sep  42,  MDR, 
and  DSM  Chronology,  30  Jun  and  24  Jul  42,  each 
Sec.  9,  and  2  Sep  42,  Sec.  25,  OROO. 


6  Marshall  Diary,  7  Oct  42,  MDR. 

^  MDH,  Bk.  I,  Vol.  12,  pp.  2.9,  4.1,  4.4-4.5, 
DASA;  Marshall  Diary,  1  and  17  Oct  42,  MDR;  DSM 
Chronology,  1  and  7  Oct  42,  each  Sec.  9,  and 
17  Oct  42,  Sec.  16,  OROO;  Groyes,  Xow  It  Can  Be 
Told.  p.  425. 


IHK  AIOMK;  COMMl  NI  riKS  IN    IKNNKSSKE 


435 


cr,  as  (lie  vast  scope  of  |)lant  design 
became  apparent,  Manhattan  realized 
that  Stone  and  Webster  siniplv  did 
not  have  enough  design  personnel  to 
execute  both  facets  and  meet  the 
project's  stiingcnt  time  limits  as  well. 
So  on  the  twentv-firsi  it  relieved 
Stone  and  Webster  of  town  design 
iunctions,  leaving  the  firm  with  re- 
sponsibilitv  for  o\erseeing  construc- 
tion, operating  utilities,  and  maintain- 
ing the  roads  of  the  town.  To  replace 
Stone  and  Webster  in  town  design, 
Manhattan  in  early  1943  negotiated 
contracts  with  the  John  B.  Pierce 
Foundation  of  New  York,  nationally 
known  for  its  work  on  low-cost  hous- 
ing projects,  and  with  Skidmore, 
Owings  and  Merrill  of  Chicago,  a 
leading  architectural  firm.  Fhe  two 
organizations  were  to  function  as  a 
team,  with  the  Pierce  Foundation, 
which  was  primarily  a  research  group, 
providing  advice  and  plans  on  village 
housing  and  with  Skidmore,  Owings 
and  Merrill  furnishing  architect-engi- 
neer services.^ 

Following  the  engagement  of  Skid- 
more, Owings  and  Merrill  and  the 
Pierce  Foundation,  Colonel  Marshall 
established  a  new  administrative 
unit — the  4own  Management  Divi- 
sion— to  monitor  the  work  of  these 
two  contractors.  Fhis  division,  howev- 
er, was  abolished  in  a  major  reorgani- 
zation of  the  District  in  April,  at 
which  time  the  district  engineer  de- 
cided  to  se))arate  the  division's   town 


*  CJoniplriion  Rpts,  Sione  and  Webster,  siih: 
CEVV.  ]).  14.  and  Skidmore.  Owings  and  Merrill, 
sub:  Poiiion  ol  lounsitc  Planning  oi  Oak  Ridge, 
Contract  \V-74()l-eng-69,  9  .Sep  44,  p.  I.l,  OROO; 
I.ir,  Dist  F.iigr  to  .Stone  and  Webster,  sub:  Scojje  of 
Work  ai  (.K\V,  21  .Nov  42,  OROO;  DSM  Chronolo- 
g\.  'i  and  2.')  Nov  42,  each  Sec.  2.5,  and  9  Dee  42, 
Sec.  4.  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Nol.  12.  pp.  2.9  and 
4. 5-4. 7.  I).\S.A. 


planning  and  management  functions. 
Two  elements  replaced  the  division,  a 
Central  Facilities  Planning  Unit  and  a 
Central  Facilities  Operating  Division. 
Fhe  function  of  the  Planning  Unit 
was  to  coordinate  the  design  work  of 
Skidmore,  Owings  and  Merrill  with 
Stone  and  Webster  constiuction  ac- 
tivities at  the  townsite,  whereas  the 
function  of  the  Operating  Division 
was  to  provide  management  continui- 
ty to  a  developing  community.  Mar- 
shall also  assigned  two  officers  on  his 
staff  special  responsibilities  for  com- 
munity matters — Capt.  Samuel  S. 
Baxter  for  town  planning  and  1st  Lt. 
Paul  F.  O'Meara  for  town 
management.^ 

Initial  townsite  construction  was  in 
the  section  of  Oak  Ridge  eventually 
known  as  East  Fown,  completed  in 
early  1944.  Centered  on  an  adminis- 
tration building,  located  just  south  of 
lennessee  61  and  about  3  miles 
southwest  of  the  Flza  entrance  to  the 
Fennessee  site,  the  East  Fown  com- 
munitv  comprised  more  than  three 
thoirsand  familv-type  housing  units. 
Adjacent  to  the  administration  build- 
ing was  a  town  center  of  stores,  ser- 
vice and  recreation  buildings,  a  guest- 
house, several  men's  and  women's 
dormitories,  cafeterias,  and  a  hospital. 
Overhead  electrical  and  telephone 
lines  and  a  sewer  and  water  system 
built    along    main    street,    paralleling 


mi)H,  Bk.  1,  \()1.  12,  pp.  3.5-'^.7.  5.(i-5.9.  .Apps. 
C.17  (C:hari,  Central  Facilities  Org,  Mar  43)  and  C21 
(Chart.  MD  Org,  dated  1  Apr  43  but  efleclive 
1  Mav),  DAS.A;  Memo,  Blair  to  Marshall,  sub:  Pro- 
posed Org  lor  Maim  and  Opn  oi  (ien  Facilities, 
22  Jan  43,  and  attached  organization  chart.  OROO; 
Completion  Rpt,  I)u  Pont,  sub:  Clinton  Kngr  Works, 
INX  Area.  Contract  VV-74  l2-eng-23,  I  Apr  44,  fol- 
lowing p.  17  (("hart,  Clinton  .Area  Kngrs  Odice  Org, 
.11   Mai    };i),  OROO. 


436 


MANHATIAN:    IHE  ARXn    AND  THE  AlOMIC  BOMB 


Tennessee  61  and  the  house-lined 
residential  streets,  provided  East 
Towners  with  complete  public  utility 
services.  ^^ 

Construction  of  the  East  Town  sec- 
tion of  Oak  Ridge  established  the  pat- 
tern for  subsecjuent  expansions  in  the 
atomic  community  at  the  Tennessee 
site.  As  in  virtually  every  other  aspect 
of  project  construction,  the  primary 
emphasis  was  on  speed.  This  was  par- 
ticularly true  with  housing,  because 
throughout  the  wartime  period  there 
was  never  enough  of  it.  The  two  most 
important  obstacles  to  speedy  con- 
struction were  shortages  of  building 
materials  and  construction  workers, 
and  District  and  contractor  officials 
devoted  much  effort  to  trying  to  over- 
come these  problems.  Building  plans, 
wherever  feasible,  specified  employ- 
ment of  available  substitute  materials, 
such  as  the  use  of  fiber  or  gypsum 
board  instead  of  wood  for  walls  and 
cement  blocks  instead  of  poured  con- 
crete for  foundations.  Building  de- 
signs emphasized  standardization  and 
simplicity  of  construction.  When  ex- 
perience demonstrated  that  trailers 
and  prefabricated  hutments,  both  in 
reasonably  good  supply,  would  suffice 
as  homes  for  most  plant  workers, 
town  designers  substituted  them  in 
later  expansions.  With  District  ap- 
proval. Stone  and  Webster  let  out 
many  lump-sum  subcontracts  for 
much  of  the  town  construction.  Not 
only  did  these  subcontractors  speed 
up   construction,    they   also   furnished 


'"('.oiiiplction  Rpt,  Stone  and  Webster,  snb: 
CEW,  pp.  13-15,  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  1.  \ol.  12,  pp. 
2.9,  4.2,  4.5,  DASA;  Robinson,  Oak  Ridge  Stoty.  pp. 
48-49.  F"or  the  layout  of  East  I  own  see  architectural 
maps  in  Completion  Rpt,  Skidmore,  Owings  and 
Merrill,  sub:  Portion  of  Townsite  Planning  of  Oak 
Ridse,  pp.  1.8-1.10,  OROO,  and  aerial  phcuographs 
in  Robinson.  Oak  Ridi^r  Slon.  following  p.  5(). 


many  additional  employees  who  oth- 
erwise would  not  have  been  available 
for  the  project.  ^^ 

Concurrently  with  construction  of 
East  Town,  Stone  and  Webster  built  a 
separate  self-contained  community 
designated  East  \'illage,  adjacent  to 
Tennessee  61  east  of  the  center  of 
Oak  Ridge  near  the  Elza  gate.  Com- 
pleted in  late  1943  to  house  black 
workers,  this  community  comprised 
fifty  permanent  family  dwellings,  four 
dormitories,  a  cafeteria,  and  a  church. 
Black  workers  and  their  families  never 
took  up  residence  in  East  Village  be- 
cause of  a  pressing  need  of  more 
housing  for  white  employees.  Black 
families  were  housed  elsewhere  in 
segregated  hutment  areas  in  Oak 
Ridge  and  in  the  vicinity  of  the  gase- 
ous diffusion  plant.  ^^ 

Second  Phase,    1943-1945 

41ie  second  phase  of  the  Oak  Ridge 
community  development  program, 
which  began  in  the  fall  of  1943  and 
continued  until  late  summer  of  1944, 
grew  out  of  Manhattan's  need  to  pro- 
vide additional  housing  and  support 
services  for  a  much  larger  population; 
the  original  estimate  of  thirteen  thou- 
sand had  more  than  tripled  to  a  new 
high  of  forty-two  thousand.  Skidmore, 
Owings  and  Merrill  again  provided 
the  principal  architect-engineer  ser- 
vices, establishing  a  field  office  where 
personnel       worked       with       Captain 


"MDH.  Bk.  1.  \ol.  12,  pp.  5.2-5.5,  llASA;  Com- 
pielion  Rpt.  .Stone  and  Webster,  sub:  CEW,  pp.  30- 
44.  OROO:  I)S.\I  Chionologv.  25  Nov  42,  Sec.  25, 
OROO. 

'-Completion  Rpt.  Skidmore.  Owings  and  Merrill, 
sub:  Portion  of  1  ownsite  Plaiuiing  of  Oak  Ridge,  p. 
II.  1.  OROO:  .MDH.  Bk.  1,  \ol.  12,  pp.  4.2-4.3^  7.8- 
7.9.  7.20,  DASA. 


THE  ATOMIC  COMMUNITIES  IN  TENNESSEE 


437 


Oak  Ridge  Shopping  Mall  (foregroinid)  and  District  Headq^liarters  (background) 


Baxter.  Stone  and  Webster  oversaw 
the  construction,  most  of  it  contract- 
ed out  to  other  building  firms,  nota- 
bly John  A.  Johnson,  Foster  and 
Creighton,  A.  Farnell  Blair,  O'Driscoll 
and  Grove,  and  Clinton  Home  Build- 
ing, and  to  manufacturers  of  trailers 
and  prefabricated  houses,  including 
Schult  Trailers,  Alma  Trailers,  Na- 
tional Homes,  Gunnison  Housing, 
and  E.  L.  Bruce.  ^^ 

To  keep  pace  with  the  increasing 
requirements  of  the  growing  commu- 
nity of  Oak  Ridge,  the  District  re- 
organized and  greatly  expanded  its 
central  facilities  administration.  Effec- 


*' Robinson,  Oak  Ridge  Sinn,  pp.  48-49;  Marsden 
Diarv,  13  Sep  43,  OROO;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12.  pp. 
4.2-4.3,  4.6-4.7,  5.2-5.3,  7.10-7.14,  App.  C5, 
DASA;  Completion  Rpts,  Skidmore,  Qwings  and 
Merrill,  sub:  Portion  of  Townsite  Planning  of  Oak 
Ridge,  pp.  1. 1-1.3,  and  Stone  and  Webster,  sub: 
CEW,  pp.  14  and  103-2(3,  OROO;  Dist  Engr, 
Monthv  Rpt  on  DSM  Proj,  Sep  43,  OCX)  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  28,  Tab  A,  MDR. 


tive  1  November,  Colonel  Nichols  es- 
tablished the  CEW  Central  Facilities 
Division  under  the  direction  of  Lt. 
Col.  Thomas  T.  Crenshaw.  To  facili- 
tate the  construction  and  operation  of 
the  new  community,  Crenshaw  set  up 
within  the  division  six  specialized 
branches:  town  planning,  town  man- 
agement, recreation  and  welfare,  utili- 
ty maintenance,  engineering,  and  cen- 
tral facilities  construction.  The  Town 
Planning  Branch,  directed  by  Captain 
Baxter,  coordinated  the  work  of  the 
architect-engineer  and  construction 
contractors  and  assisted  in  formulat- 
ing plans  for  new  additions  to  the 
community.  The  Town  Management 
Branch,  headed  by  Captain  O'Meara, 
had  responsibility  for  forming  an  or- 
ganization to  manage  the  community; 
its  five  sections  dealt  with  such  mat- 
ters as  liaison  with  federal  agencies, 
commercial         concessions,         public 


438 


MANHA'l  IAN:  I  HE  ARMY  AND  i  HE  AlOMIC  BOMB 


Black  Workers  at  CEW 


health,  and  operation  of  dormitories 
and  a  guesthouse.  The  Recreation 
and  Welfare  Branch,  under  Capt. 
Thomas  W.  Taylor,  oversaw  the  con- 
struction and  operation  of  theaters, 
playing  fields,  and  other  recreational 
facilities  in  Oak  Ridge.  The  Utility 
Maintenance  Branch,  headed  by  Maj. 
Melvin  O.  Swanson,  oversaw  the 
broader  aspects  of  ensuring  the  effi- 
cient operation  of  the  town's  electri- 
cal and  communications  facilities,  fhe 
Engineering  Branch,  directed  by  Maj. 
Paul  F.  Rossell,  monitored  the  public 
services  required  by  the  community 
on  a  continuing  basis;  its  eight  sec- 
tions handled  transportation,  mechan- 
ical repairs,  water  and  sewerage,  elec- 
trical and  telephone  service,  and  re- 
lated   activities.    Finallv,    the    Central 


Facilities  C>onstruction  Branch,  under 
Capt.  Edward  J.  Bloch,  monitored 
community  development  through 
seven  sections;  five  oversaw  the  con- 
struction of  dwellings  and  other  struc- 
tures (stores,  schools,  and  churches), 
while  two  supervised  the  installation 
of  utilities  and  the  building  of  roads.  ^^ 
F'or  the  second  phase  of  community 
development,  Skidmore,  Owings  and 
Merrill's  original  plans  called  for 
9,250  more  family  units  and  enough 
additional  dormitories  to  house  sev- 
enty-six hundred  persons.  Reviewing 
this   proposal   in   November,   Manhat- 


'H)rg  Charts,  U.S.  Engrs  Office,  Mi:).  1  Nov  43, 
15  Feb  and  1  Jun  44,  Admin  Files,  Cien  C.oiiesp, 
020  (MED-Org),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  pp. 
3.5-.3.7  and  .5.6-.5.9,  DASA;  Dist  Engr,  Monthly  Rpt 
on  DSM  Pro),  [ul  44,  MDR. 


rnK  AioMK,  (.ommimuks  in  ikwksskk 


439 


Ian  acccj)tccl  llie  ligurcs  lor  dormiioiA 
space  but  decided  6, ()()()  family  units 
would  sunice  lor  construction  on 
available  sites  in  Kasi  Town  and  P^ast 
X'illage  and  in  an  undeveloj)ed  area 
along  Tennessee  (H,  about  2  miles 
west  of  East  lown.  Only  some  4,800 
ol  the  planned  6,000  family  units 
were  built  before  completion  of 
second-pfiase  construction.  I'he  new 
housing  included  many  piefabricaled 
units,  based  upon  a  design  used  suc- 
cessfulh  by  the  lA'A,  and  some  de- 
mountable types  procured  from  other 
government  projects  in  Indiana  and 
West  \'irginia.  Both  met  project  re- 
cjuirements  and  were  easily  remov- 
able. 1  he  second-phase  program  also 
{produced  more  than  50  new  dormi- 
tories, with  a  total  capacity  of  seventy- 
five  hundred,  and  a  number  of 
prefabricated  barracks  to  fiouse  the 
rapidly  increasing  military  population. 
Stone  and  Webster  also  supervised 
construction  of  the  additional  cafete- 
rias, shopping  centers,  schools,  laun- 
dries, utilities,  and  other  facilities  re- 
quired for  the  expanding  population 
of  Oak  Ridge.  1^ 

Third  Phase.    1945 

By  late  1944,  employment  figures 
were  again  outstripping  all  earlier  es- 
timates. On  the  basis  that  at  least  a 
part  of  the  increase  was  temporary 
and  would  decline  as  production 
j)lants  were  built.  District  and  con- 
tractor officials  at  first  agreed  to  try 
to  cope  with  the  new  demand  by  max- 


imum utili/ation  of  a\ailable  housing. 
But  further  expansion  of  both  the 
electromagnetic  and  diffusion  plants 
rendered  this  expedient  infeasible.  By 
early  1945,  with  new  estimates  pro- 
jecting the  ultimate  resident  popula- 
tion of  Oak  Ridge  at  sixt\-six  thou- 
sand, Manhattan  had  no  alternative 
but  to  undertake  a  third  phase  of 
community  development.  ^^ 

This  new  phase  of  community  ex- 
pansion added  some  1 ,300  family 
units,  20  dormitories,  about  750  trail- 
ers, as  well  as  the  necessary  commer- 
cial and  service  facilities.  Again  em- 
phasis was  on  demountable  housing. 
Skidmore,  Owings  and  Merrill  served 
not  only  as  architect-engineer  but  also 
as  inspector  of  completed  construc- 
tion for  the  government,  replacing 
Stone  and  Webster  in  this  function, 
and  the  CEW  Central  Facilities 
Division  directly  oversaw  third-phase 
construction  carried  out  by  various 
subcontractors.  ^  "^ 

With  completion  of  the  third  phase 
in  the  summer  of  1945,  the  Clinton 
site  had  community  facilities  that 
more  than  adequately  met  the  needs 
of  the  resident  population  in  the  town 
of  Oak  Ridge  (sixty-one  thousand) 
and  in  the  nearby  temporary  con- 
struction camps  (fourteen  thotisand). 
These  facilities  included  10,000 
family  units,  4,000  trailers,  3,000  hut- 
ments, 89  dormitories,  and  a  variety 
of  other  types  of  units  in  lesser  quan- 


'■■^Cloniplclion  Rpts,  Skidinort-,  Ouings  and  Mer- 
rill, sub:  Portion  of  I  owiisitc  Planning  of  Oak 
Ridge,  pp.  1. 3-1. 7  and  1.8-1.10  (arehiteei's  maps  of 
Oak  Ridge),  and  .Stone  and  VVebslei,  sub:  Cl.W,  pp. 
i:i-18  and  72-84.  OROO;  Disi  Kngi,  Montlilv  Rpt 
on  D.SM  Pioj.  .Sep  and  Nov  43.  MDR. 


'«M1)H,  lik.  1,  \()1.  12,  pp.  1.1-1.6  and  4.3-4.4, 
D.AS.A;  Completion  Rpt,  Stone  and  Webster,  sub: 
(.KW,  pp.  1.3- 1.5,  OROO;  Dist  Ilngi,  Moniblv  Rpt 
on  DSM  l'i<)|.  |un  44,  MDR;  Robinson,  Oak  Rnlf^r 
Slon.  J))).  48-49. 

'^MDH,  lik.  1,  \ol.  12,  pp.  1.3-1.4,  4.3-4.4,  .').l- 
.5.3,  D.AS.A;  Croves,  .\mr  It  Can  lie  Told.  p.  42.5;  MPC 
Min,  22-23  Ian  44,  OCO  Files,  (.en  Corrcsp.  MP 
Files,  Fldr  23,    lab  A.  MDR. 


440 


MANHATIAN:    IHE  ARMY  AND    IHK  A  lOMK,  BOMB 


Prefabricated  Houses  (Joreground)  and  Apartment  Dwellings  {center)  at  CEW 


titles.  Total  cost  of  the  three-phase 
community  development  program  was 
more  than  $100  million,  over  half  for 
housing  and  the  rest  for  support 
facilities.  ^^ 


The  Construction   Camps 

Manhattan  made  other  provisions 
to  accommodate  its  plant  construction 
workers,  because  the  major  portion  of 
the  permanent  housing  facilities  being 
built  was  intended  for  plant-operating 


'^MDH,  Bk.  \,  Vol.  12,  pp.  1..S-1.4,  5.3-5.("). 
Apps.  CI  (Chart,'  CEW  Population),  C3b,  and  C4, 
and  Bk.  2,  Vol.  4,  "Con.struction,"  pp.  3.61-3.62, 
DASA;  Robinson,  Oal<  Ridge  Stnn\  p.  49.  For  a  de- 
tailed account  of  the  proxision  of  comniunitv  .serv- 
ices see  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  Sees.  8-17  and  Apps. 
B6-B11  and  B13-B14,  DASA. 


personnel.  As  the  construction  work- 
ers would  have  only  a  temporary  con- 
nection with  the  project,  the  Army 
initially  planned  for  them  to  live  off 
the  atomic  reservation  and  to  com- 
mute to  their  jobs.  But  both  District 
officials  and  construction  contractors 
recognized  early  that  the  local  econo- 
my, already  strained  with  an  influx  of 
workers  for  other  nearby  war  plants, 
would  not  be  able  to  absorb  the  new 
wave  of  Manhattan  workers.  Further- 
more, the  deplorable  condition  of 
many  local  roads,  the  distance  from 
the  site  of  towns  where  housing  was 
available,  and  the  shortage  of  ade- 
quate transportation  made  commut- 
ing time-consuming  and  difficult.  Ac- 
cordingly,   most    Manhattan   contracts 


IHK  AIOMIC  COMMI'MIIKS  IN    i  KNNKSSKK 


441 


^    ^    ^    ^    %^ 


Enlisted  Men's  Barracks  at  CEW 


provided  that,  where  necessary,  the 
major  construction  contractors  would 
furnish  temporary  housing  for  their 
employees  in  on-site  construction 
camps.  ^^ 

Housing  in  the  construction  camps 
usually  consisted  of  five-man  prefabri- 
cated hutments  (a  type  used  with 
great  success  on  other  wartime  con- 
struction projects),  house  trailers, 
and,  in  a  few  instances,  dormitory- 
tvpe  structures.  Surplus  hutments  and 
trailers  were  available  at  locations 
near  the  Tennessee  site.  Contractors 
had  only  to  arrange  for  transportation 


'3  For  a  dflailc'fl  aiialvsis  ol  the  wpc  ol  i)i()l)lcms  a 
contractor  laccci  in  |)ro\i(lini;  adcxju.ilf  Iniiii;  latili- 
tics  for  its  consiriulion  (■m|)lo\ccs  al  the-  rcnncsst'c 
site  sec  Completion  Rpi,  Dii  Font,  sub:  CV.W .  INX 
Area.  pp.  l(i()-7().  OROO. 


to  the  site,  where,  with  the  addition 
of  a  few  hastily  erected  buildings  to 
house  essential  community  services, 
they  sufficed  to  meet  the  minimum 
needs  of  construction  workers. 

During  late  1943  and  early  1944, 
Stone  and  Webster  and  its  subcon- 
tractors established  a  number  of  hut- 
ment camps  and  seven  trailer  camps 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  Oak  Ridge  town- 
site.  Skidmore,  Owings  and  Merrill 
helped  design  the  largest  of  Stone 
and  Webster's  trailer  camps  in 
(lamble  Valley,  south  and  west  of  Oak 
Ridge,  which  had  more  than  four 
thousand  spaces,  with  seclions  for 
both  while  and  black  workers.  Du 
Pont  housed  some  of  its  construction 
emplovees  working  on  the  plulonium 


442 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  IHE  AFOMIC  BOMB 


Gamblk  Valley  Trailkr  Camp  at  CEW 


semivvorks  in  Stone  and  Webster  hut- 
ments and  others  in  an  existing 
school  building,  remodeled  to  serve 
as  a  dormitory. 

Contractors  established  four  more 
camps  for  thousands  of  diffusion 
workers  at  the  confluence  of  Poplar 
Creek  and  the  Clinch  River,  about  15 
miles  southwest  of  Oak  Ridge.  In 
June  1943,  the  J.  A.  Jones  Construc- 
tion Company  began  building  hut- 
ments in  the  Happy  Valley  area,  di- 
rectly southeast  of  the  gaseous  diffu- 
sion plant,  to  house  the  first  of  some 
fifteen  thousand  workers.  Later  trail- 
ers, dormitories,  and  so-called  Victorv 
Houses  supplemented  the  hutments 
and  cafeterias;  a  shopping  center  and 
a  school  supplied  essential  community 
services.  An  overflow  of  diffusion 
workers  occupied  two  smaller  camps 
directly  west  of  Happy  Valley.  And 
when   Ford,   Bacon,   and  Davis  began 


construction  on  the  plant-condition- 
ing area  in  1944,  the  contractor  built 
a  separate  camp  for  its  workers  a 
short  distance  east  of  the  plant  site. 
After  the  peak  of  construction  had 
passed,  population  of  the  camps  de- 
clined, but  they  continued  to  be  par- 
tially occupied  for  many  months  after 
the  war  was  over."'' 


■'OMDFL  Bk.  1.  \'(.I.  12.  pp.  7.7-7.9;  Bk.  2.  Xol.  4. 
pp.  3.()l-.S.(i(i  and  App.  B.S  ((kMi  La\()Ut  ol  K-23 
Plant,  iiuludiiii-  K-27),  and  Bk.  3.  Xol.  5,  "Con- 
simclion."  p.  ,3..S.  DA.SA.  Disi  Knt>r.  Monthlv  Rpts 
on  DSM  Pro),  Mai-.\Ia\  4:?.  MDR.  Conipk-tion  Rpts. 
.Stone  and  VVchMii,  sub:  (.KW.  |).  17;  Skidnioif, 
Ouings  and  Merrill,  sub:  Poition  ol  lownsile  Plan- 
ning of  Oak' Ridge,  p.  11.12;  l)n  Pom,  .sub:  CKW. 
INX  Area,  p.  160;  and  M.  \\ .  Kellogg  Co.  and 
Kellex  Corp..  sub:  K-2.5  Plant.  Contract  W-7405- 
cng-23.  31  Oct  45,  Sec.  1,  pp.  31-32  and  map  of 
K-25  area  and  aerial  photograph  of  labor  camps 
following  p.  40.  OROO. 


IHE  AIOMIC  COMMl Ml  lES  IN    IKNNKSSPLE 


443 


Cofinnuuit\  M(/)ia^r)nni/ 

Manhattan's  conmuinilx  manage- 
ment program  aimed  to  maintain  ade- 
cjnate  commiinit\  facilities  but  with  a 
maximum  economy  of  manpower  and 
materials  and  minimum  risk  to  project 
security.  To  attain  these  objectives, 
tfie  District's  town  management  staff 
instituted  and  experimented  with  a 
variety  of  specific  measures.  For  ex- 
ample, it  turned  over  to  the  profes- 
sional employees  of  civilian  contrac- 
tors the  detailed  administration  of 
community  operations;  it  subsidized 
dormitory  rents  and  bus  fares;  and  it 
secured  assistance  from  existing  out- 
side civilian  organizations,  such  as  the 
American  Red  Cross,  the  TVA,  and 
certain  governmental  agencies  of  the 
state  of  Tennessee.  The  test  for  all 
such  measures  was  the  extent  to 
which  they  contributed  to  the  princi- 
pal objective  of  the  Tennessee  site: 
production  of  sufficient  fissionable 
materials  in  time  to  fulfill  the  de- 
mands of  the  bomb  development  pro- 
gram at  Los  Alamos. ^^ 

To  the  casual  visitor  driving  down 
Tennessee  61  from  the  Elza  gate  in 
the  spring  of  1943,  the  rapidly  grow- 
ing clusters  of  buildings  on  the  slopes 
of  Black  Oak  Ridge  gave  every  ap- 
pearance of  being  an  already  thriving 
village  of  some  size.  On  closer  exami- 
nation, however,  the  visitor  would 
have  found  that  most  of  the  houses 
were  unfmished,  the  shopping  centers 
still  under  construction,  and  utilities 
not  yet  operating.  For  Oak  Ridge  did 
not  begin  to  function  as  an  organized 
communitN  until  the  summer  of  1943, 
when  the  first  families  began  to  move 


in  and  some  of  the  commercial  and 
service  facilities  opened  their  doors 
for  business.  In  fact,  the  town  had  no 
name  imtil  Marshall's  executixe  offi- 
cer, Lt.  Col.  Robert  C.  Blair,  re- 
(juested  employee  suggestions.  Dis- 
trict officials  finally  chose  "Oak 
Ridge,"  appropriate  because  of  the 
location  and  because  "its  rural  conno- 
tation held  outside  curiosity  to  a 
minimum."  ^^ 

With  the  opening  of  the  first  cafete- 
ria and  dormitories  in  P^ast  Fown  in 
mid-June,  the  C^entral  Facilities  Oper- 
ating Division — with  Captain  Baxter 
serving  for  a  time  as  town  manager — 
began  active  management  of  the  com- 
munity. But  direct  administration  of 
the  community  by  the  Army  lasted 
only  a  few  months.  The  Army  had 
never  been  enthusiastic  about  having 
District  military  personnel  directly  in- 
volved in  the  time-consuming  day-to- 
day administration  of  Oak  Ridge. 
Groves  and  Nichols  concluded  that 
direct  military  operation  of  the  town 
would  recjuire  not  only  a  large  mili- 
tary staff  but  also  much  of  the  time 
and  energy  of  the  district  engineer 
himself.  ^^ 

The  September  1943  decision  to 
further  enlarge  the  town  of  Oak 
Ridge  precipitated  a  search  for  a  civil- 
ian organization  to  manage  it.  Stone 
and  Webster  and  J.  A.  Jones  were 
likely  candidates,  but  a  study  showed 
that  those  firms  had  fully  committed 
most  of  their  available  supervisory 
personnel   to  overseeing  construction 


2'M1)H.  Bk.  1,  \<.l.  12,  \>\).  r).l-().2,  7.11- 
9.1-9.2.  11.1-11.9,  18.11-1812,  I).\.S.\;  i.u 
Xoiv  ll  (Mil  Br  Told.  pp.  42,"i-2(). 


-■^  (Quotation  from  Robin.son,  Oak  Hiflire  Slory.  p. 
.50.  .Sec  also  (irove.s,  Xo'w  It  Can  Ik  Told.  pp.  42.0-26; 
MDH,  Bk.  1.  Vol.  12.  p.  .5.6.  DAS.\. 

•■^3M1)H.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12.  p.  5.8  and  .\pp.  C21. 
D.A.SA;  Org  Chart,  I'.S,  Kiigr.s  Office,  MD,  15  Aug 
V.\.  MDR. 


444 


MANHATIAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  IHE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


Tiiiiiiiir^m««rT»n"'"'^"-''-""' . 


ppr-'Timraii  •  iiHiinii  -  niiiMi 


j^jt^fe^dp* 


^w^^'^m 


Ml 


Oak  Ridge  Elementary  School 


of  the  electromagnetic  and  diffusion 
plants.  So  Manhattan  decided  to  ap- 
proach the  Turner  Construction 
Company  of  New  York.  Groves  knew 
that  the  company  had  established  a 
fine  record  on  other  important  war 
projects,  and  Nichols  recently  had 
worked  closely  with  Turner  officials 
in  his  capacity  as  area  engineer  in 
charge  of  construction  of  the  Rome 
(New  York)  Air  Depot. ^^^ 

By  mid-month,  Manhattan  and 
Turner  representatives  reached  an 
agreement  that  the  company  would 
establish  a  wholly  owned  but  com- 
pletely separate  organization — desig- 
nated the  Roane-Anderson  Company, 
after   the   two  Tennessee   counties   in 


2-*MI){I,  Bk.  1,  \()1.  12,  pp.  6.3-6.4,  DASA; 
(iroves.  Sow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  425;  Cullum,  Bio- 
iyraphual  Rrfrislh.  9:593;  Marshall  IDiarv,  18  Jun  42, 
MDR. 


which  the  atomic  site  was  located — to 
administer  the  town  under  a  cost- 
plus-fixed-fee  contract.  According  to 
its  provisions,  Roane-Anderson  would 
manage,  operate,  and  maintain  the 
government-owned  facilities  and  ser- 
vices at  the  Clinton  reservation,  exclu- 
sive of  restricted  plant  areas.  For  this 
service  the  company  was  to  receive  a 
fee  of  $25,000  a  month,  or  slightly 
less  than  1  percent  of  $2.8  million — 
the  estimated  total  monthly  cost  of 
operating  the  facilities.  The  terms  of 
the  final  contract  were  sufficiently 
flexible  to  permit  Manhattan  to  assign 
a  broad  range  of  facilities  and  activi- 
ties to  the  company's  administration. 
Faced  with  the  unexpectedly  rapid 
growth  of  Oak  Ridge,  which  brought 
an  immediate  need  for  a  multiplicity 
of  new  community  services,  District 
authorities   found   a  readv  and   effec- 


rHK  AlOMK.  COMMLMIIKS   IN    IKNNKSSKK 


445 


UNITED    STATI   S    POST   OFFI 


Main  Post  Office  and  Theater  in  Oak  Ridge 


ti\c  solulion  in  a  policy  oi  "give  it  to 
Roane-Anderson."  ^^ 

Roane-Anderson  gradually  took 
over  responsibility  for  administration 
of  most  community  functions  from 
the  Town  Management  Branch  of  the 
C>EW  Central  Facilities  Division.  In 
certain  respects  its  role  was  compara- 
ble to  that  of  the  municipal  adminis- 
tration of  a  civilian  community,  but 
there  were  also  some  major  differ- 
ences. It  provided  Oak  Ridgers  with 
the  usual  publicly  owned  utilities  and 
also  with  steam  heat  and  telegraph 
service.  It  paid  the  policemen,  fire- 
men, and  medical  personnel,  but  the 
District  retained  administrative  con- 
trol   of  the   police,    fire   departments, 


^■■^  Roanc-AndcTsoii  Hist.  Coiuiact  W-74()l-en!,f- 
115,  'M)  Nov  51.  j)j).  1  and  5  (source  of  (juoiatioii), 
OROO.  See  also  MDH.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  12,  p.  (i.4, 
DA.S.A.  The  Roaiie-Aiuleison  (ontrarl  was  fortnalK 
signed  on  14  Feb  44,  effeMive  15  Sep  4,'i. 


and  hospital.  I  he  company  provided 
physical  maintenance  for  the  schools, 
but  the  District  delegated  their  actual 
operation  to  Anderson  County  educa- 
tional officials.  In  recreation,  Roane- 
Anderson  had  no  part  at  all.  Instead, 
the  District,  in  July  1943,  permitted 
organization  of  a  Recreation  and  Wel- 
fare Association,  comprised  of  resi- 
dents of  the  community,  to  operate 
theaters,  bowling  alleys,  athletic 
fields,  taverns,  library  services,  and  a 
weekly  newspaper.  ^^ 

Where  Roane-Anderson's  role  dif- 
fered most  greatly  from  that  of  an  or- 
dinary municipality  was  in  its  assump- 
tion of  many  of  the  activities  normally 
carried  out  by  private  enterprise  in 
American  society.  1  hus,  the  company 
managed  and  maintained  virtualh   all 


^6  R<,;,ne-Anderson  Hist,  pp.  2.V()2,  OROO: 
MDH.  Hk.  1,  \ol.  12,  pp.  6.5,  6.7,  9.1,  10.1,  11.2, 
DAS  A. 


44G 


MANHA  riAN:    IHK  ARMY  AM)    1  HK  AIOMIC  BOMB 


of  the  real  estate  of  the  community — 
housing  of  all  kinds,  farmlands  (some 
ot  which  it  actually  cultivated),  forest- 
ed areas,  public  grounds,  and  some 
fifty-four  private  cemeteries.  It  oper- 
ated cafeterias  (there  were  twenty  at 
the  period  of  peak  employment  in 
May  1945),  laundry  and  dry  cleaning 
establishments,  and  cold  storage  and 
warehouse  facilities.  It  delivered  coal, 
fuel  oil,  and  wood  to  community  resi- 
dents in  winter  and  ice  in  summer.  A 
company  concessions  department 
rented  space  and  granted  licenses  to 
private  enteiprise  for  grocery,  drug, 
and  department  stores;  clothing,  shoe 
repair,  and  barber  shops;  and  ga- 
rages, service  stations,  and  other 
commercial  establishments  in  the 
town  centers  and  neighborhood  shop- 
ping areas.  It  operated  a  transporta- 
tion system  that  included  both  on-site 
and  off-site  bus  service,  the  35-mile 
CEW  Railroad,  and  the  CEW  Motor 
Pool. 2^ 

By  February  1945,  Roane-Anderson 
had  more  than  ten  thousand  employ- 
ees, recruited  from  among  people 
living  both  on  and  off  the  reservation. 
From  the  start,  the  Army  viewed 
direct  operation  of  so  many  functions 
by  a  single  contractor  as  a  temporary 
arrangement.  Consequently,  when 
community  growth  began  to  level  off, 
it  assisted  Roane-Anderson  in  trans- 
ferring many  community  activities  to 
more  efficient  specialized  operators. 
By  granting  concessions,  letting  sub- 
contracts, returning  certain  oper- 
ations to  District  control,  and  termi- 
nating activities,  the  company  re- 
duced its  direct  employment  to  about 
five      thousand      by      August       1945. 


Among  the  major  activities  gi\en  up 
by  Roane-Anderson  were  bus  oper- 
ations (taken  over  by  the  American 
Industrial  I  ransit.  Inc.),  most  housing 
operations,  trash  and  garbage  collec- 
tion, and  distribution  of  ice,  fuel,  oil, 
and  coal.^^ 

Ihrough  the  CEW  Central  Facili- 
ties Division,  the  Army  exercised 
close  supeivision  over  Roane-Ander- 
son and  the  various  community  sub- 
contractors and  concessionaires.  Be- 
ginning in  the  fall  of  1943,  several 
reorganizations  of  that  division  were 
at  least  partially  designed  to  realign 
its  various  administrative  sections  so 
that  they  would  refiect  the  shift  from 
community  construction  to  operations 
and  more  nearly  complement  those  of 
the  Roane-Anderson  organization. 
These  organizational  changes  culmi- 
nated finally  in  November  1944  in  es- 
tablishment of  a  Roane-Anderson 
Branch  within  the  division,  through 
administrative  service,  maintenance, 
utilities,  transportation,  and  oper- 
ations sections,  this  branch  supervised 
counterpart  sections,  in  the  compa- 
ny's community  management  organi- 
zation. Fhe  chief  of  the  branch,  Maj. 
Henry  C  Hoberg,  shared  executive 
direction  of  the  community  with 
Roane-Anderson's  project  manager, 
Clinton  N.  Hernandez.  In  addition,  a 
Central  Facilities  Advisory  Commit- 
tee, comprised  of  representatives  of 
all  the  major  contractors  (including 
Roane-Anderson),  assisted  the  divi- 
sion chief  in  coordinating  community 
operations.  ^^ 


Roane-Anderson  Hist,  pp.  2:Mi2,  OROO. 


28  Ibid.,  pp.  A-5.  22-(kS,  ,App.  F  (Cn-aphic  Ret  of 
Roane-.Anderson),  OROO:  .MDH,  Bk.  1,  \ol.  12,  p. 
1.5,  D.AS.A. 

29  Org   Charts,    I'.S.    Kngrs    Ollke,    MI),    Nov    43 


THE  ATOMIC  COMMIM  IIKS  IN  TENNESSEE 


447 


I 


rARY  ARI 

iltlDOtASSeS-llfltWM  i 

f::   RAMO  TftMSMITTERS  { 

'HOHiBITEO  < 

:    ■Ci.ESiWkSStlWCRS  ! 

J&JECr  TO  SSAKH  j 


^r 


CEW  Rp:ser\  ATioN  Entry  Point 


Limited  reorganizations  in  1945  did 
not  change  the  basic  relationship  be- 
tween the  CEW  Central  Facilities  Di- 
vision and  Roane-Anderson.  In  Janu- 
ary, the  district  engineer  transferred 
some  of  this  staffs  functions — safety, 
special  services  (chiefly  recreational 
activities),  and  public  relations — to  Lt. 
Col.  John  S.  Hodgson,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Colonel  Crenshaw  as  division 
chief  in  May  1944,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  changed  Hodgson's  tide  to  ex- 
ecutive assistant  (to  the  district  engi- 
neer) for  operations.  Roane- Anderson 
also  made  some  changes  in  its  organi- 
zation to  adjust  to  its  divestiture  of 
certain  major  activities. ^° 


and  15  I-cb,  1  jun.  2.S  Au^.  10  Nov  44,  MDR; 
Roane- Anderson  Hisi.  Apps.  KI-K4  (Org  C-hans. 
20  Apr.  1  Sep.  and  1  Nov  44),  OROO:  MI)H,  lik.  1. 
\ol.  12.  p.  .3.8  and  App.  C]H  iCharl.  (eniral  Fadli- 
iRsOrg,  Mar  44).  DA.SA. 

•'"Org  Chart.  U.S.   Kngrs  Ollue.   Ml),  20  |an  A^i. 
MDR;    Roane-Anderson    lliM,   .\\)\>.   V.n   (Ori;   (.lian. 


Ihe  average  civilian  resident  of 
Oak  Ridge  had  most  of  the  essential 
community  facilities  and  services  that 
would  have  been  available  in  other 
comparable  wartime  communities. 
What  he  chiefly  lost  as  long  as  he  re- 
sided on  the  Clinton  reservation  were 
some  of  his  civic  rights.  The  War  De- 
partment had  declared  the  Tennessee 
site  a  closed  militarv  reservation  ef- 
fective 1  April  1943,  with  strict  con- 
trol of  entry,  guards  at  the  gates, 
fences  at  strategic  points,  and  mount- 
ed patrolmen  regularly  checking  un- 
fenced  sections  of  its  boundaries.  The 
Armv  did  not  permit  residents  to 
establish  and  participate  in  normal 
municipal  and  township  governments, 
although  it  did  allow  them  to  form 
certain  social  welfare  organizations.^^ 


()  Feb  4.-)),  OROO:  MDH.  lik.   1.  \ol.  12.  App,  C.\9 
(Chan.  Central  Faeiliiies  Org,  .Mar  43).  D.A.SA, 

■"  MDH,  Hk.    1.  \ol.    12,  pp.    l.."i-l.r),  D.A.SA,  .Sec 

also  WD  Cir  ,57,  20  Feb  l.'V  See.  .'i. 


448 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  I  HE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


mr  K 

. 

1 

f. 

K4|p,t 

n  -:  . 

,-Ht  1 

1 
1 

Ett,  ■  t 

} 

:'  ^ 

i 

C".HAPKL-{)N-i he-Hill  in  Oak  Ridge 

But  residents  were  not  entirely 
without  state  and  local  civic  rights, 
ihe  legislature  of  Tennessee,  con- 
cerned over  the  loss  of  state  lands 
and  taxes  in  earlier  large  cessions  to 
the  federal  government,  declined  the 
War  Department's  request  in  early 
1943  to  cede  sovereignty  over  the 
Tennessee  site:  Oak  Ridge's  legal 
status  was  that  of  a  federal  area,  not  a 
federal  reservation.  Hence,  its  resi- 
dents legally  were  citizens  of  either 
Roane  or  Anderson  County  and  of 
the  state  of  Tennessee,  subject  to 
their  criminal  and  civil  laws  and  enti- 
tled to  the  civic  privileges  of  those  ju- 
risdictions. They  could,  for  example, 
vote  in  state  and  county  elections.  If 
they  violated  the  law,  they  were  sub- 
ject to  arrest  bv  Oak  Ridge  police- 
men, deputized  bv  the  sheriff  of  An- 
derson County,  and  trial  in  local  or 
state  courts.  The  schools  for  their 
children,  too,  remained  legally  a  part 


ot  the  Anderson  County  system,  al- 
though they  were  built  and  operated 
largely  with  federal  funds.  Because 
the  District,  for  reasons  of  security, 
limited  school  attendance  to  the  chil- 
dren of  residents,  the  attorney  gener- 
al of  Tennessee  ruled  that  the  schools 
were  nonpublic  and  therefore  not 
ehgible  for  state  aid.^^^ 

Residing  in  the  atomic  communities 
in  Tennessee  during  the  war  years 
was  in  many  respects  similar  to  living 
in  frontier  settlements  or  boomtowns: 
mud  in  winter  and  dust  in  summer; 
houses  partially  built  and  incomplete- 
Iv  furnished;  the  stores  with  essential 
items  missing  from  their  shelves; 
overcrowded  schools,  churches,  and 
theaters;  inadequate  recreational  ac- 
tivities, at  least  in  the  early  months; 
and  countless  other  deficiencies  asso- 
ciated with  communities  that  have 
grown  too  fast.  Nevertheless,  many 
Oak  Ridgers  would  later  recall  with 
pleasure  the  prevailing  sense  of  cama- 
raderie and  democracy  among  resi- 
dents drawn  from  all  walks  of  life — 
Nobel  Prize-winning  scientists,  corpo- 
rate executives,  plant  managers, 
skilled  workers,  officers  and  enlisted 
servicemen,  manual  laborers,  and 
housewives — as  they  shared  together 
the  many  hardships  of  life  and 
worked  together  to  solve  the  prob- 
lems of  da\-to-day  living  under  diffi- 
cult circumstances.  And  for  many 
residents,  the  excitement  and  satisfac- 
tion   of   being    part    of   a    great    and 


32Ml)n,  Bk.  I.  \()l.  12,  pp.  9.1-9.9  and  11.1- 
11.1:5.  i:)AS.A:  Robinson,  Oak  Ridge  Slon:  pp.  60-61 
and  6,'5-64;  Completion  Rpt,  Skidmoie,  Owings  and 
Merrill,  sub:  Portion  of  Townsite  Planning  of  Oak 
Ridge,  pp.  \l-\-..S,  OROO. 


IHK  AIOMIC:  COMML  Ml  IKS  IN  TENNESSEE  449 

unique     enterprise     that     might     well      for  the  many  drawbacks. ^^ 
prove   to   be   the   kev   to   winning   the      '~~:      T" 

„^         ,  •  ^  ■'s  Robinson,  Oak  Ridnf  Slon.   pp.  46-47  and  51- 

war  sutticed  to  more  than  compensate      r,i:  Compton,  Ammu  Q_uni.  pp.  i,58-go. 


CHAPTER  XXII 


The  Atomic  Communities  in 
Washington  State 


The  atomic  communities  of  the 
Hanford  Engineer  Works  (HEW)  in 
south  central  Washington  State  were 
in  the  vicinity  of  one  of  the  great  his- 
torical routes  of  immigration  to  the 
Northwest  United  States.  In  1805 
Lewis  and  Clark  had  covered  a  por- 
tion of  the  famed  Oregon  Trail  as 
they  made  their  way  down  the  Snake 
River  to  the  Columbia,  and  a  genera- 
tion later  thousands  of  settlers  had 
traversed  it  as  they  forged  westward. 
Indian  wars,  however,  delayed  settle- 
ment in  central  and  eastern  Washing- 
ton until  the  1850's  and,  thereafter, 
the  general  aridity  of  the  semidesert 
sagebrush  country  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  confluence  of  the  Yakima  and  Co- 
lumbia Rivers  discouraged  attempts  at 
agriculture,  except  for  some  sheep 
raising,  finally,  in  the  early  1900's, 
limited  development  of  irrigation  at- 
tracted a  few  farmers,  who  planted 
orchards  and  raised  crops  of  mint  and 
alfalfa.  It  was  they  who,  in  the  early 
spring  of  1943,  suddenly  faced  dis- 
jjlacement  from  their  homes  in  three 
tiny  rural  hamlets — W^hite  Bluffs, 
Hanford,  and  Richland — to  make  way 
for  thousands  of  construction  and  op- 
erating employees  of  the  plutonium 
project.  Events  remote  from  the 
peaceful  agriculture  piusuits  of  these 


modern  pioneers  were  to  bring  this 
hitherto  bypassed  region  into  the 
mainstream  of  American  history.^ 

Selecting  Sites 

Eaced  with  development  of  an  area 
isolated  from  any  sizable  city,  Du 
Pont  and  Army  engineers  began  plan- 
ning early  for  large  on-site  communi- 
ties. Because  of  the  onmipresence  of 
radioactivity  in  the  plutonium  pro- 
cesses, they  could  not  follow  the 
normal  practice  of  having  construc- 
tion and  plant-operating  employees 
live  adjacent  to  the  production  plants. 
Scientists  had  indicated  that  it  would 
not  be  safe  for  plant-operating  em- 
ployees to  reside  within  10  miles  of 
the  pile  and  separation  production 
units.  And  because  these  units  would 
have  to  be  tested  during  the  later 
phases  of  plant  construction,  even 
construction  employees  would  have  to 
live  some  distance  from  them. 

Saving  time  was  another  urgent 
consideration     in     location     planning. 


'  Dirlio/uin  (i/  Aiucnidu  IIisloi^.  w\ .  cd.,  s.\. 
■'Oregon  irail"  bv  Robert  Moullon  Clalkc;  MDH, 
Bk.  4,  Vol.  4,  "Land  Acquisition,  Hanlord  Knginccr 
Works,"  pp.  2.1-2.9,  D.ASA;  Du  Pont  (.onsti  Hist, 
\ol.  1,  pp.  2-(),  8-9.  and  maps  (pp.  .S  and  3).  HOO, 
•Sfc  also  Cb.  I\-. 


IHK  AlOMK.  COMNUMUKS   I\  W  ASHINC;  ION  SIAIK 


451 


Project  engineers  laxored  sites  al- 
ready oeenpied  1)\  rural  villages, 
where  diey  would  be  able  to  lake  ad- 
vantage of  existing  grading,  buildings, 
road  networks,  and  utilities.  Fo  facili- 
tate the  selection  process,  they  drew 
up  three  alternate  site  plans.  The  first 
proposed  a  combined  construction 
and  operating  community  at  Benton 
City  on  the  Yakima,  a  few  miles  west  of 
Richland  and  about  24  air  miles  from 
the  main  process  area.  {See  Map  4.) 
The  second  proposed  three  separate 
communities:  Camp  A,  about  2.5 
miles  south  of  the  existing  \illage  of 
Hanford;  Camp  B,  about  2  miles 
north  of  Richland;  and  Camp  C,  in 
the  hamlet  of  White  Bluffs.  Under 
this  plan,  when  the  time  came  for 
startup  of  the  process  plants,  the 
three  camps  would  be  consolidated  to 
form  an  operating  village  at  the  Camp 
A  site.  Ihe  third  plan  called  for  locat- 
ing all  construction  and  plant-operat- 
ing employees  at  the  Camp  A  site.^ 

After  giving  due  consideration  to 
each  plan,  Du  Pont  and  Army  engi- 
neers agreed  to  establish  two  separate 
communities:  a  construction  camp  at 
Hanford  and  an  operating  village  at 
Richland.  Reasons  of  safety  and  effi- 
ciency dictated  that  all  construction 
employees  should  reside  in  a  single 
community,  and  Hanford  appeared 
best  to  meet  such  requirements.  Its 
distance  of  about  6  miles  from  the 
nearest  process  areas  was  sufficient 
not  only  to  ensure  the  workers'  safet\ 
during  startup  testing  but  also  to  pro- 
vide them  easy  access  to  all  the  major 
work  sites.  Its  location  at  the  intersec- 
tion of  the  Connell-Vakima  state  high- 
way   and     Pasco-White     Bluffs     road 


and  on  a  brandi  line  of  the  Chicago, 
Nfilwaukee,  St.  Paul  and  Pacific  Rail- 
road gave  it  the  necessary  road  and 
rail  access.  Water  was  available  irom 
existing  wells  and  the  river  and  elec- 
tricity from  a  Pacific  Power  and  Light 
Company  substation.  The  natural 
contour  of  the  land  at  the  village  site 
made  grading  for  construction  unnec- 
essary and  simplified  sewerage  and 
drainage  problems,  and  the  existing 
buildings  provided  the  temporary 
housing  that  would  be  needed  bv  the 
first  construction  crews. ^ 

Safety  was  the  determining  factor  in 
the  decision  to  locate  the  operating 
community  at  a  separate  site.  Project 
engineers  found  that  two  locations — 
Benton  City  and  Richland — both  met 
the  basic  criteria:  Each  was  about  25 
miles  from  the  pioduction  plant  sites, 
and  each  had  adequate  road  and  rail 
access,  a  sufficient  source  of  water 
and  electricit} ,  and  a  number  of  exist- 
ing buildings.  But  Benton  Cit\  had 
not  been  included  in  the  original  land 
acquisition  and  project  officials  be- 
lieved that,  for  reasons  of  security, 
the  operating  village  must  be  within 
the  reservation.  They  could  have 
taken  steps  to  acquire  the  Benton 
City  area,  but  serious  opposition  had 
arisen  among  local  residents  be- 
cause of  the  extent  of  the  govern- 
ment's original  land  acquisition.  Seek- 
ing to  avoid  additional  acquisitions 
likely  to  inflame  public  opinion, 
project  community  planners  chose 
Richland  as  the  site  for  the  operating 
communitv.* 


2  MDH,  Bk.  4,  \<)l.  5.  "Coiisinu  lioii."  pp.  5.2-5.;5 
and  App.  DKi  (Altcrn;.ic  Siiv  I'Li.is  for  Ft.uilon] 
Camp),  DASA;  Du  I'oni  (oiisir  Hisi,  Xol.  1,  pp.  41- 
42,  HOC). 


='  MDH,  lik.  4,  \()1.  .'i,  pp.  ,5.2-."i..S,  DA.SA:  Mal- 
ihia.s  Diarv,  2.5  Feb  and  24-2,5  Mar  V.S.  OROO:  Du 
I'oni  Con.slr  Hi.st,  X'ol.  1,  pp.  9-10  <m<l  42-4.'},  and 
\()1.  2,  pp.  :M8-49.  HOC). 

•»  MDH,  Bk.  4.  \'()1.  ;},  •Dtsii.ii,-  pp.  S. 1-8.2, 
DA.SA:  Matthias  Diarv.  8  and  10  Mar  4:i,  OROO; 
Du  I'ont  Consti  Hist,  Xol.  1,  p.  102.  HOC).  .See-  al.so 
Ch.  \\  . 


452 


MANHAll  AN:  THE  ARMY  AND  IHE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


Hanford  Construction  Camp  at  HEW.  Aerial  view  slunvs  its  veist  sizt 


Ilaiijonl:   The  Coiistruetion   Camp 

Once  the  planners  had  reached  a 
final  decision  concerning  location,  Du 
Pont  immediately  began  work  on  both 
the  construction  camp  and  the  oper- 
ating community,  with  Du  Pont  and 
Army  personnel  at  the  Hanford  site 
and  Wilmington  headcjuarters  work- 
ing in  close  cooperation.  Planning 
and  design  of  the  two  communities 
proceeded  more  or  less  simultaneous- 
ly in  early  1943,  but  the  construction 
camp  which  had  to  be  ready  for  occu- 
pancy as  soon  as  possible  had  first 
priority. 

At  the  outset,  Du  Pout's  construc- 
tion camp  planning  and  design  efforts 
were  handicapped  by  the  tenuousness 


of  essential  quantitative  data.  Only 
indeterminate  figures  were  available 
on  how  many  workers  were  likely 
to  reside  in  the  camp,  because 
the  Metallurgical  Laboratory-Du  Pont 
design  team  had  not  progressed  far 
enough  with  plans  for  the  plutonium 
production  facilities  to  provide  an  ac- 
curate estimate.  A  similar  problem  ex- 
isted with  figures  on  how  many  con- 
struction workers  could  live  in  off-site 
housing,  because  more  urgent  mat- 
ters had  delayed  the  Hanford  area  en- 
gineer, Lt.  Col.  Franklin  T.  Matthias, 
from  making  a  survey  of  the  Hanford 
area. 

Lacking  this  statistical  data,  Du 
Pont  had  no  choice  but  to  go  ahead 
with  plans  and  designs  on  the  basis  of 


THE  AIOMIC  CX)MMUNiriKS   IN  VVASHINC,  ION  S  lA  IK 


453 


Camp  Administrative  Area  {foregound)  and  Residential  Area  (background) 
AT  HEW 


hurricdlv  prepared  estimates  that  pro- 
jected a  total  construction  work  force 
of  twenty-five  thousand  to  twenty- 
eight  thousand,  half  of  whom,  the 
company  hoped,  would  live  in  off-site 
housing.  \o  circumvent  inevitable  re- 
visions, Du  Pont  developed  a  plan- 
ning strategy  of  adopting  easily  ex- 
pansible layouts  and  building  designs 
and  of  learning  the  experience  of 
other  firms  that  had  built  construc- 
tion camps  in  isolated,  semiarid  re- 
gions with  adverse  climatic  condi- 
tions. This  circumspect  approach 
proved  fortuitous,  especially  in  view 
of  subsecjuent  developments  that  re- 
vealed earlier  projections  on  the  size 
of  the  construction  force  were  grosslv 


inaccurate  (nearly  twice  as  many 
workers  would  be  required  as  origi- 
nally estimated)  and  that  very  little 
off-site  housing  was  available.  Mean- 
while, General  Groves  made  a  thor- 
ough inspection  of  the  Washington 
site  in  March,  after  which  he.  Colonel 
Matthias,  and  other  Army  representa- 
tives sat  down  with  Du  Font's  field 
staff  and  worked  out  basic  steps  for 
getting  construction  started.^ 

Field  work  began  at  the  Hanfbrd 
campsite  in  early  April.  On  the 
fourth,    Du    Pont    and    Ilanford    area 


•■^MDH,  Bk.  4,  \<)1.  b.  pp.  .5.1-5.2.  DA.SA:  Rpi. 
sub:  Iinc'sligalions  ol  Proj.s  Ha\ini>  Similar  Climatic 
CoiHliiioMs.'.a.  194.S.  HOC):  Mail'hias  Diarv,  24-23 
Mar  4.H.  OROO;  C.rovis  Diarv,  24-2,5  Mar  V^,  I-RCi. 


454 


MANHAI  IAN:  THE  ARMY  AND    IHE  AIOMIC  BOMB 


office  personnel — with  plans  in  hand 
for  the  first  barracks,  mess  hall,  and 
service  buildings  in  the  construction 
camp — carried  out  a  general  recon- 
naissance of  the  area  and  reached 
agreement  that  work  should  begin  im- 
mediately on  facilities  adequate  to 
house  and  feed  a  starting  work  force 
of  two  thousand.  They  also  agreed  to 
proceed  with  orders  for  materials  and 
equipment  in  quantities  sufficient  to 
provide  units  for  four  thousand  work- 
ers and,  at  the  same  time,  established 
a  construction  schedule  looking  to 
completion  of  the  whole  camp  by 
1  December.  On  6  April,  workers 
began  erection  of  the  first  barracks.^ 

Du  Pont  officials  responsible  for 
Hanford  construction  met  biweekly 
(later  weekly).  They  drew  up  procure- 
ment schedules  for  critical  building 
materials,  establishing  a  policy  of 
keeping  on  order  equipment  for  ten 
barracks  and  one  mess  hall  to  fore- 
stall the  inevitable  delays  in  delivery, 
hi  late  July,  Du  Pont  commissioned 
the  architect-engineer  firm  of  Jones, 
Couillan,  Ihery,  and  Sylliassen  to 
review  all  plans  for  the  campsite  and 
assist  in  development  of  further  lay- 
outs. The  recommendations  of  the  ar- 
chitect-engineer, combined  with  jjcri- 
odic  subsequent  studies  of  particular 
problems  by  Du  Pout's  field  engi- 
neers, provided  the  basis  for  the  fur- 
ther development  and  operation  of 
the  construction  camp."^ 

In  September,  on  the  basis  of 
the  Metallurgical  Laboratory-Du  Pont 


design  team's  new  report  that  con- 
struction of  the  plutonium  production 
plants  would  require  a  considerably 
larger  work  force  than  previously 
anticipated,  the  Army  and  Du  Pont 
moved  to  firmer  ground  in  their  pro- 
jections of  peak  population  recjuire- 
ments  for  Hanford.  Actually,  the  peak 
of  construction  came  in  November, 
when  for  a  period  of  more  than  a 
month  some  fifty-three  hundred 
workers  were  employed  in  building 
the  camp,  including  some  diverted 
temporarily  from  the  plant  construc- 
tion work  force.  But  it  was  not  until 
July  1944  that  Du  Pont  announced 
that  construction  was  98  percent  com- 
plete, with  nearly  twelve  hundred  new 
and  remodeled  buildings  and  suffi- 
cient support  facilities  to  house,  feed, 
and  supply  the  daily  necessities  of  the 
fifty-one  thousand  people  who,  by 
that  time,  were  living  at  the  construc- 
tion camp.® 

Completion  of  the  camp  facilities  in 
time  to  meet  the  peak  population  re- 
quirements was  possible  only  because 
of  the  close  cooperation  of  the  Han- 
ford area  engineer  with  Du  Pont  and 
its  subcontractors  in  overcoming 
chronic  labor  shortages  and  procur- 
ing a  variety  of  critical  building  mate- 
rials. Du  Pont  benefited  greatly  from 
Manhattan's  countrywide  recruiting 
efforts  in  1943  and  1944  and  from 
the  Army's  approval  of  its  use  of  sub- 
contractors who  had  access  to  local 
labor.  P\)r  example,  the  Walla  Walla 
(Washington)    firm    of  A.    A.    Durand 


6M1)H,  Bk.  4  \()1.  5.  pp.  3.4-5.5  and  5.2()-5.'Jl . 
DASA;  Du  I'oni  C.onstr  Hisi.  \()1.  2.  p.  ,174.  HOC). 

^  MDH,  IM.  4.  \'()1.  5.  pp.  5.5-5.7  .md  5.1',), 
DASA;  Rpl,  Jones,  Couillan,  11km  v,  and  .Svlliasstii 
(aixhitt'ct-cngint'cr).  sub:  Housing  and  1  rairu  .\nal- 
vsis  of  the  lianlord  Camp  Area,  17  Aug  4:i,  HOO; 
Du  Font  Consii  Hisi,  \  ol.  2,  p.  .182.  HOO. 


8MDH.  Bk.  4,  \ol.  5,  pp.  5.21  and  .\|)p.  B19 
(Hanford  Camp  Bldg  Conslr  Dates),  1).\.S.\;  Disi 
Kngr,  Monthlv  Rpt  on  D.SM  Proj,  Jun  44.  OCXi 
Flics.  {,cn  CoiTcsp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  28,  Fab  A,  MDR; 
Du  Font  Constr  Hist,  \ol.  2,  pp.  351  and  380-83, 
HOO. 


THK  AlOMIC  COMMIMUKS   IN   VVASHINC;  ION  S  T  A  IK 


455 


and  Sons  drilled  wells  and  the  Seattle 
firm  of  McManama  and  Company 
erected  boilers.  Matthias  and  his  staff 
expedited  procurement  of  many  items 
in  short  supply,  including  Army  tents, 
boilers,  hot  water  heaters,  toilet  fix- 
tures, fans,  cooling  and  refrigeration 
units,  heating  coils,  and  mess  hall 
equipment.  Through  Army  channels 
the  area  engineer  arranged  for  trans- 
fer from  other  government  projects  of 
many  materials  otherwise  virtually  un- 
obtainable, riie  Army  also  actively 
supported  Du  Pout's  various  meas- 
ures to  shorten  construction  time  and 
save  materials,  including  employment 
of  prefabrication  and  preassembly 
wherever  feasible.  An  outstanding  ex- 
ample was  the  decision  by  Groves  and 
Du  Pont  to  substitute  prefabricated 
hutments  for  barracks.^ 

Because  of  the  persistent  problems 
of  procuring  and  conserving  an  ade- 
quate construction  work  force  at  the 
Washington  site,  the  Army  stressed 
those  aspects  of  the  Hanford  camp 
that  would  make  living  conditions 
more  tolerable  for  the  average  em- 
ploxee.  An  example  was  its  effort  to 
ensiue  that  Du  Pont  incorporate  ef- 
fectixe  means  for  heating,  cooling, 
and  ventilating  housing  units  and  hut- 
ments— a  very  important  consider- 
ation in  view  of  area  climatic  condi- 
tions characterized  b\  extremes  in 
heat  and  cold,  rapid  changes  in  tem- 
perature, and  occasional  severe  dust 
storms.      Ihe     svstem     eventuallv     in- 


9  MDH,  Bk.  4.  \()1.  5,  p.  5.18-5.21  and  Apps.  B4 
(Siiminan  of  Siibcontiat  Is),  B23  (Hanford  C,amp 
Subcoiuracls),  and  B24  ((;<)mplcli()n  Forccast-Han- 
ford  Camp),  D.A.S.A;  Matthias  Dnuy.  .Apr  4:^-Iul  44 
(sec  entries  of  22  .Apr,  18  Mav,  and  11  Jnn  4:i). 
OROO;  Ms,  Hageman,  "Hanlord:  Ihreshold  of  an 
Kra,"  H)4(i,  p.  71.  .Adniin  Files,  (len  Corresp,  4(il 
(Hanford).  MDR;  Du  Poni  Constr  Hisi,  \ol.  1,  pj,. 
51-r>8,  21S-.S5,  282-.S2.S,  IIOO. 


stalled  employed  hot  air  heated  by 
steam  from  a  central  plant.  Although 
this  method  was  more  costly  than 
having  coal  heaters  in  each  individual 
housing  unit  or  hutment,  it  provided 
a  means  for  circulating  air,  cooled  by 
water  evaporation,  in  the  hot  summer 
months.  ^° 

Newly  recruited  w(jrkers  found 
themsehes  in  what  must  certainly 
have  been  one  of  the  largest  tem- 
porary communities  ever  erected. 
Hundreds  of  one-story  structures, 
standing  in  evenly  spaced  rows  along 
freshly  graded  streets,  filled  the  gen- 
eralh  fiat  terrain  west  of  the  broad 
Columbia  Ri\er.  The  majority  of 
these  structures  were  housing  units. 
At  the  center  were  row  upon  row  of 
wing-type  barracks.  To  the  south 
were  hundreds  of  much  smaller  hut- 
ments. On  the  north  and  west  stood 
thousands  of  family-sized  trailers, 
each  positioned  on  its  individual  plot. 
Interspersed  at  conveniently  located 
intervals  were  cafeteria  buildings.  In  a 
triangular-shaped  area  near  the  river 
and  between  the  barracks  and  the 
north  trailer  camp  were  most  of  the 
commercial  and  administrative  build- 
ings, some  remodeled  from  existing 
structures.  Here  also  were  many  of 
the  conmumilv  and  recreational  facili- 
ties— a  theater,  church,  school,  hospi- 
tal, library,  and  an  auditorium-gymna- 
sium. Rising  here  and  there  above  the 
low  level  of  most  structures  were  the 
smoke  slacks  of  heating  plants,  water 


'o  Matthias  I)iar\,  (),  S,  and  15  Apr  4.S,  OROO. 
For  a  \i\id  des(ri|)tion  of  (he  periodic  dust  storms 
that  oteiirred  al  the  Hanford  camp  see  led  \an 
.Arsdol,  Ihinfotd:  I'lic  Bin,  Sirret  (Richland,  Wash.:  Co- 
Itnnbia  Rmm  \rws.  1958),  pp  50-51.  Du  I'ont  Consir 
llisi.  \ol.  1,  pp.  87-<.»l.  HOO. 


456 


MANHAIIAN:  THE  ARM\'  AND    IHK  AlOMIC  BOMB 


Richland  Village  at  HEW.  Aerinl  view  shows  the  coiiniu'rcKil  renter  {foreground), 
buildings  of  the  administrative  headquarters  (middle  ground),  and  the  residential  area 
( background). 


and  oil  storage  tanks,  and  a  few  trees. 
Utility  lines  strung  on  tall  poles  lined 
every  street,  seeming  to  bind  together 
the  scattered  segments  of  the  Han- 
ford  camp.^  ^ 


Rtfhlaiid:   The  Operating  Community 

Richland,  with  a  population  of  250, 
was  in  early  1943  the  center  of  an  ag- 
ricultural community  of  some  600 
persons  who  derived  their  livelihood 
from  farming  the  irrigated  bottom- 
lands near  the  junction  of  the  Yakima 
and  Columbia  Rivers.  Most  of  the 
commercial  and  civic  structures  of  the 


village  and  some  of  its  homes  were 
built  along  the  axis  of  a  state  high- 
way, providing  a  ready  route  of  access 
eastward  to  the  important  communi- 
cation centers  of  Kennewick  and 
Pasco  and  northward  to  Hanford  and 
White  Bluffs.  Hie  original  buildings 
of  Richland  were  of  substantial  con- 
struction, many  of  them  cement  or 
brick.  Community  services  included 
an  underground  water  system  (but  no 
central  sewerage  system),  electricity, 
and  telephones.  The  roads  were 
chiefly  gravel  or  packed  earth,  but 
some  had  asphalt  surfacing.  Sur- 
rounding the  village  center  were  nu- 
merous small  farms,  planted  with  or- 
chards or  other  irrigated  corps.  ^^ 


"  MDH,  tik.  4,  \'ol.  5,  pp.  .''i.(i-5.18  and  App.  A4 
(Map,  Hanford  Camp  Layout),  DA.SA;  Du  Poiil 
Const!  Hist,  \'oL  2,  p.  386  and  392-,512,  HOO. 


'2  MDH,   Bk.   4,   \<>1.   ;5,   pp.   8.2-8.:5,   D.A.SA;   Dn 
Pont  C.onsii    Hisl,  \ol.    1,  pp.  (")  and   I()l-()(i,  HOO. 


THK  AlOMIC  COMMINII  IKS  IN  WASHINC/ION  S  lA  IK 


457 


As  with  the  Hanforcl  construction 
camp,  the  Army  turned  ()\er  to  Du 
Pont  the  task  of  converting  this  farm 
community  into  suitable  lieadquarters 
for  the  massive  pkitonium  production 
project  and  a  home  for  tiiou- 
sands  of  plant-operating  employees. 
The  Army's  aim  was  to  enable  the 
prime  contractor  to  achieve  maximum 
operating  efficiency  in  accomplishing 
its  task  by  combining  recjuirements 
and  services  needed  for  both  the  pro- 
duction plants  and  the  village,  and 
thus  from  the  outset  General  Groves 
and  Colonel  Matthias  emphasized  the 
importance  of  making  the  most  eco- 
nomic use  of  project  resources.  Illus- 
trative of  this  policy  was  the  size  of 
permanent  houses  for  the  supervisory 
and  technical  operating  personnel.  Du 
Pont  believed  that  such  personnel 
would  rccjuire  at  least  three-bedroom 
homes,  but  the  Army  disagreed  and 
assigned  most  of  them  only  one-  or 
two-bedioom  homes.  Po  ensure  com- 
pliance with  Army  policy,  the  Han- 
ford  Area  Engineers  Office  monitored 
all  housing  activities. ^^ 

Colonel  Matthias  had  considerable 
authority    as    area    engineer    and    uti- 


'3MDH,  lik.  4.  Vol.  6,  "Operations,  "  p.  9.1, 
D.A.S.A;  Lti  Contract  W-7412-cng-l,  1  Dec  42  (ac- 
cepted 21  Dec  42),  OCG  Files,  (ien  (]orresp, 
('.roves  Files,  Fldr  19,  Tab  B,  MDR;  Contract  \V- 
7412-eng-l  (Du  Pont),  8  Nov  4.1,  ORCK);  Matthias 
Diarv,  2-1^  Mar.  16-17  and  21  Apr,  20  Mav,  29  Nov 
43  and  4  Jan  44,  OROO.  .See  also  I.tr,  H.  i.  i:)aniels 
(Design  Proj  Mgr,  I  NX  Div,  Du  Pont)  to  Croves, 
sub:  Proj  9536-\'illage,  2.5  Apr  43,  and  Msgs, 
Matthias  to  K.  B.  Yancey  ((ien  Mgr,  Kxplosivcs 
Dcpl,  Du  Pont).  23  .Apr  43,  and  Yancey  to  Matthias, 
24  .\pr  43:  I.tr,  Daniels  to  (Iroves,  sub:  Proj  9.536- 
HKW  and  1100  Area- lovvnsite,  28  Apr  43,  and 
Msgs,  Matthias  to  Yancey  and  \ancey  to  Matthias, 
both  26  Apr  43;  Memo,  Matthias  to  (Proves,  4  Sep 
43.  All  in  Admin  Files,  (ien  Corresp,  620  (Ilanlord), 
MDR. 


lized  several  channels  to  exercise 
direct  control  over  design  and  con- 
struction of  Richland.  Through  his 
legal  officer,  he  re\iewed  and  ap- 
proved Du  Pout's  subcontracts  and 
other  legal  arrangements  relating  to 
the  building  of  the  village.  Phrough 
his  construction  chief's  so-called  Rich- 
land Division,  he  maintained  a  more 
specific  check  on  construction  activi- 
ties. In  addition,  Matthias  made  fre- 
quent personal  inspections  of  the  vil- 
lage and  conferred  regularly  with  Du 
Pont  headquarters  officials  and  field 
representatives.^'* 

With  virtuallv  all  of  its  own  design 
and  engineering  personnel  committed 
to  woik  on  the  production  facilities  or 
other  wartime  projects,  Du  Pont  had 
few  employees  to  spare  for  the  village 
project.  Hence,  with  permission  of 
the  Army,  it  opened  negotiations  with 
several  architect-engineer  firms  in  the 
Pacific  Northwest.  G.  A.  Pehrson  of 
Spokane  was  the  low  bidder  and,  in 
mid-March,  Du  Pont  signed  a  contract 
with  the  firm.^^ 

Pehrson  started  work  immediatelv 
on  layout  plans  for  the  village  com- 
munity, using  as  a  guide  the  Du  Pont- 
Army  population  projections  that  as- 
sumed a  40-  to  5()-percent  occupancy 
in  off-site  housing.  Because  these  pnj- 
jections  forecasted  a  population  of 
6,500  with  possible  expansion  to 
7,500,  Pehrson  drafted  plans  for  980 


"»  MDH,  Bk.  4,  \'()1.  5,  Apps.  B57-B58  (Org 
Charts,  Hanlord  Area  Fngrs  OfFue  and  Du  Pout's 
HFW  Field  Pioj),  DASA;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hi.st, 
\ol.  1,  pp.  23-139  (Org  Charts,  Hanlord  Area 
Fngrs  Office  and  Du  Pont's  HEW  Field  Proj),  HOO; 
■Matthias  Diaiv,  Feb  43-Dec  45,  passim,  OROO. 

'5  MDH,  Bk.  4.  \ol.  3,  pp.  8.4-8.5  and  App.  B4 
(.Suininaiv  of  Subcontracts),  DASA;  Matthias  Di.ir\, 
2,  5,  9,  12.  15.  and  17  Mar  43,  OROO;  Disi  Fngi. 
Monthly  RjjIs  on  DSM  Proj,  Feb-Mar  43.  MDR;  i)ii 
Pont  Constr  Hisl,  X'ol.  1,  pp.  IOC)  ;md  28.5-8r), 
HOO. 


458 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


conventional  family  units  of  relatively 
permanent  construction  and  also  for  a 
few  dormitories  to  house  single  men 
and  women.  But  Du  Pont  and  Mat- 
thias soon  discovered  from  incoming 
employees  that  suitable  places  to  live 
in  the  surrounding  communities  were 
extremely  scarce.  Consequently,  in 
June  they  revised  initial  estimates  of 
Richland's  ultimate  population  to 
7,750  with  potential  growth  to  12,000 
and  instructed  Pehrson  to  increase 
the  number  of  conventional  family 
dwellings  to  2,000.  Pehrson  had 
barely  started  on  the  expanded  pro- 
gram when  new  calculations  indicated 
the  Richland  population  was  likely  to 
escalate  to  at  least  16,000  (later  re- 
vised to  17,500).  Following  consulta- 
tion with  Matthias,  Du  Pont  directed 
Pehrson  to  add  another  1,000  family 
units,  bringing  the  total  to  3,000. ^^ 

Faced  with  a  vastly  larger  housing 
program  than  anticipated,  Du  Pont 
and  Matthias  began  looking  for  ways 
to  expedite  development  of  the  Rich- 
land community.  Aware  that  General 
Groves  had  spoken  quite  enthusiasti- 
cally of  the  advantages  of  portable 
prefabricated  housing  being  installed 
at  the  Tennessee  site,  Colonel  Mat- 
thias in  late  October  went  to  Oak 
Ridge's  East  Village  to  inspect  the 
units.  Following  his  return  to  Han- 
ford,  the  area  engineer  coordinated 
with  District  officials  to  procure 
sample  prefab  units  and  to  arrange 
for  an  on-site  inspection  visit  by  a 
Tennessee  Valley  Authority  portable 


housing  specialist.  The  decision  to 
use  portable  dwellings  as  supplemen- 
tal housing  at  Richland  came  in  late 
December,  at  which  time  Manhattan 
selected  the  Prefabricated  Engineer- 
ing Company  of  Portland,  Oregon,  to 
supply  the  units.  Du  Pont  negotiated 
the  initial  contract  for  500  prefabs, 
which  Matthias  approved  in  early  Jan- 
uary 1944,  and  subsequently  ordered 
an  additional  1,300,  increasing  the 
total  of  new  and  existing  units  to 
4,410.  Coincident  with  this  activity 
was  Du  Pont's  expanded  construction 
of  other  facilities,  such  as  dormitories 
(eventually  25  to  house  more  than  a 
thousand  persons)  and  commercial 
and  service  buildings  (stores,  schools, 
churches,  recreational  areas,  and 
utilities).  ^''^ 

To  further  facilitate  community  de- 
velopment, the  Army  approved  Du 
Pont's  subcontracting  of  most  con- 
struction to  two  firms  familiar  with 
building  problems  in  the  Pacific 
Northwest — Twaits,  Morrison,  and 
Knudsen  of  Los  Angeles  and  Smith, 
Hoffman,  and  Wright  of  Portland. 
They  specified  village  layouts  that 
took  advantage  of  natural  terrain  and 
that  preserved  existing  buildings,  or- 
chards, shade  trees,  roads,  and 
streets.  They  endorsed  house  plans 
that  included  basic  furnishings,  recog- 
nizing the  great  difficulty  workers 
from  other  parts  of  the  country  would 


16MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  3,  pp.  8.3-8.8,  DASA;  Ms, 
Hageman,  "Hanford:  Threshold  of  an  Era,"  1946, 
p.  34,  MDR;  Dist  Engr  Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj, 
Oct-Nov  43,  MDR;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p. 
89;  Matthias  Diarv,  18  May,  3  and  24-25  Sep  43, 
OROO;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  pp.  108-10, 
and  Vol.  4,  pp.  1223-25,  HOO. 


1^  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  3,  pp.  8.5-8.28,  passim,  and 
Vol.  5,  App.  B51  (Chart,  Richland  Village  Constr 
Progress),  DASA;  Ms,  Hageman,  "Hanford:  Thresh- 
old of  an  Era,"  1946,  pp.  34-35,  MDR;  Ltr,  Matthias 
to  TVA,  Attn:  Gordon  Clapp,  1 1  Dec  43,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  620  (Hanford),  MDR;  Dist  Engr, 
Monthly  Rpts  on  DSM  Proj,  Jan  and  May-Jun  44, 
MDR;  Matthias  Diarv,  26  and  28-29  Oct,  8,  14,  16, 
23-24  Nov  43  and  12  Jan  44,  OROO;  Du  Pont 
Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  pp.  109-10  and  116-46,  and 
Vol.  2,  pp.  1226-29,  HOO. 


IHE  AlOMIC  (X)MMUNHIES  IN  \VASHIN(;  1  ON  S  lA  IK 


459 


liavc  in  getting  their  hoiiseliold  goods 
moved  in  a  wartime  economy  and  the 
limited  avaihibility  of  home  furnish- 
ings in  stores  in  towns  near  the  site.^® 

Ihese  timesaving  measures,  for  the 
most  part,  were  effective.  Construc- 
tion of  the  village  moved  ahead  on 
schedule,  and  the  district  engineer  re- 
ported to  (leneral  Groves  in  February 
1944  that  the  village  was  more  than 
half  finished.  41iere  were  occasions, 
nevertheless,  when  serious  delays 
were  avoided  onh  as  a  result  of  direct 
and  vigorous  efforts  of  the  Hanford 
area  engineer.  A  typical  case  was  Pre- 
fabricated Engineering's  problem  of 
transporting  its  portable  housing 
units  to  the  village  site.^^ 

Prefabricated  Engineering  lacked 
the  ecjuipment  necessary  to  truck  its 
portable  housing  units  to  Richland 
from  its  manufacturing  plant  in 
I'oledo,  Oregon.  So,  in  early  1944,  it 
subcontracted  the  job  to  a  Chicago- 
based  trucking  firm  and  arranged  for 
routine  clearances  from  the  Office 
of  Defense  Transportation  and  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 
Shortly  thereafter,  unforeseen  compli- 
cations developed.  As  soon  as  the 
trucker  began  assembling  his  equip- 
ment in  Oregon,  both  government 
agencies  raised  strong  objections  to 
the  fact  that  Prefabricated  Engineer- 
ing was  not  conforming  to  established 
rules,  stating  that  wartime  regulations 
on    conseivation    of  scarce    resources 


'«  MDH.  Bk.  4,  \"<)1.  3.  pp.  8.8-8.9  and  8.12-8.13. 
and  \()1.  5,  pp.  8.3-8.5  and  .\pp.  B4.  D.\.S.\:  Dm 
I'ont  (:on.str  Hi.st.  \'ol.  1.  pp.  111-12.  288.  292-93, 
301-02.  317.  and  \()1.  4.  p.  1228.  HOO. 

13  Di.st  Engr,  Monthlv  Rpt.s  on  D.SM  Pioj.  Feb  44. 
Mi:)R;  Matthias  i:)iaiv.  Dt-c  43-Fcb  44.  passim  (tspe- 
tiallv  28  Dc(  43  and  1  and  2:)-2ti  Jan  44).  OROO; 
Dn  Pont  Consii  Hist.  \ol.  4.  |)p.  1223-2.5  (Chan. 
Ridilaiui  \illai>c-  Consii  Proiricss).  HOO. 


recjuired  the  company  to  employ  local 
truckers.  At  the  same  time,  Pacific 
Northwest  representatives  of  the  In- 
ternational Brotherhood  of  4'eamsters 
threatened  to  forbid  use  of  union 
drivers,  claiming  that  the  trucking 
firm's  ecjuipment  did  not  meet  union 
safety  standards. 

Apprised  of  this  thi  eatened  delay  in 
the  shipment  of  the  portable  housing 
units.  Colonel  Matthias  took  immedi- 
ate action.  As  a  first  step,  in  an  effort 
to  relieve  Piefabiicated  Engineering's 
overtaxed  storage  facilities  and  to 
prevent  any  serious  disruption  of  the 
Richland  construction  schedule,  he 
arranged  to  have  the  prefab  units 
transported  by  rail — a  much  more 
costly  procedure — until  such  time  as 
the  obstacles  to  trucking  could  be 
overcome.  He  then  assumed  the  role 
of  a  mediator  in  ongoing  union-gov- 
ernment negotiations,  which  dragged 
on  until  April  1944.  Matthias  was  suc- 
cessful in  overcoming  the  objections 
of  the  Teamsters  union,  but  not  those 
of  the  government  agencies.  Conse- 
quently, Prefabricated  Engineering 
was  left  with  no  alternative  but  to 
engage  the  services  of  a  local  trucking 
firm,  even  though  the  latter's  per-unit 
hauling  cost  was  considerably  higher 
than  that  of  the  (Chicago  company. ^° 

By  late  spring  of  1945,  transforma- 
tion of  the  little  rural  hamlet  of  Rich- 
land   into   a    bustling   industrial    com- 


■^°  Matthias,  sub:  Chionological  Rpi  on  Hauhng 
Piffab  Houses  iioni  1  oledo,  Oreg..  to  HKW.  Hi  |nl 
45;  I.tr,  Matthias  to  (iroves.  sub:  (lost  of  Hauling 
Prefab  Houses  to  Richland,  19  Jul  45;  OOke  Menici. 
(iavin  Hadden  (Oroves's  .Asst)  to  (iroves.  sub: 
Matthias  Rj)!  (1()  Jul  45)  and  I.tr  (19  Jul  45)  on  Cost 
of  Hauling  Prefab  Houses  to  Richland.  26  Jul  45; 
Memo,  (lioxes  lo  Matthias,  sub:  Chronological  Rpt 
on  HauHng  Prefab  Houses  from  1  oledo.  Oreg..  lo 
HF.W,  31  Jul  45.  .Ml  m  .Admin  Files.  C.en  Corresp. 
()20  (llanfoi(l).  MDR 


460 


MANHAI  I  AN:  THE  ARMY  AND  IHE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


munity  of  scientists,  engineers,  mili- 
tary administrators,  and  skilled  work- 
men and  their  collective  families  was 
very  nearly  complete.  In  a  fenced-in 
area  at  the  center  of  the  operating  vil- 
lage were  the  wood-frame  buildings 
of  varying  size  that  housed  the  HEW 
administrative  headquarters.  Immedi- 
ately to  the  east  and  southeast  of  the 
headquarters  and  toward  the  low- 
lying  Columbia  River  was  "down- 
town" Richland,  built  around  the 
original  commercial  center  of  the  vil- 
lage. Here  were  stores  and  a  variety 
of  service  facilities,  a  hotel  for  visi- 
tors, a  theater,  churches,  a  cafeteria, 
and  the  dormitories  for  single  men 
and  women.  Surrounding  downtown 
on  the  south,  west,  and  northwest 
were  residential  areas,  with  neighbor- 
hood stores  and  service  facilities. 
Most  of  the  conventional  houses  were 
clustered  in  two  large  sections — one 
directly  south  of  the  village  center, 
the  other  to  the  northwest — with  here 
and  there  shade  and  fruit  trees  re- 
maining from  the  farms  that  had  oc- 
cupied the  area.  On  the  outer  fringes 
of  the  conventional  housing  sections 
were  a  few  of  the  flat-roofed  prefabri- 
cated houses,  but  most  of  the  homes 
of  this  type  were  concentrated  in  a 
roughly  rectangular  zone  directly  west 
of  the  administration  buildings.  Sev- 
eral main  streets,  which  interconnect- 
ed with  the  many  new  residential 
streets,  carried  motor  traffic  north- 
ward from  the  village  to  the  produc- 
tion plant  area  and  south  and  cast  to 
Kennewick  and  Pasco.  A  newh  built 
railroad  spur  line  gave  Richland  a 
direct  connection  with  the  Union  Pa- 
cific and  Northern  Pacific  Railroads  a 


few     miles     to     the     south     of     the 
village.^  ^ 

Conun unity  Management 

Du  Pont  had  complete  responsibil- 
ity for  community  management  func- 
tions. The  Hanford  area  engineer's 
role  was  largely  supervisory  except  on 
certain  matters,  such  as  controls  over 
rents  and  real  estate  transactions. 
Colonel  Matthias  established  a  Com- 
munity Management  Branch  in  the 
Engineering  and  Maintenance  Divi- 
sion of  his  office  to  exercise  these 
controls;  review  contracts;  maintain 
records  on  facilities,  leases,  and  finan- 
cial statements;  and  work  with  Du 
Pout's  HEW  Service  Department.  The 
company  assigned  overall  community 
management  to  one  of  the  two  assist- 
ant superintendents  in  this  depart- 
ment. Division  supervisors  managed 
housing,  commercial  concessionaires, 
community  services,  public  buildings, 
and  other  facilities. ^^ 

Hanford  Camp 

For  the  Army  and  Du  Pont,  admin- 
istration of  the  Hanford  camp  pre- 
sented almost  as  many  problems  as 
building  it.  lo  ensure  its  efficient  op- 
eration, Du  Pont,  with  Army  approval. 


2  1  MDH,  Bk.  4,  \'ol.  5.  Apps.  A  (Map,  Richland 
Area)  and  B51  (Chart,  Richland  Village  Constr 
Progress),  DASA;  Ms,  Hageman,  "Hanford:  Thresh- 
old'of  an  Era,"  1946,  Map  Annex  (HEW),  MDR; 
Matthias  Diarv,  29  Nov  4,'^  OROO;  (movcs,  \ow  II 
Can  Br  fold.  p.  H9:  Du  Pont  C.onstr  Hist,  \'ol.  1,  pp. 
105  and  107-4(),  and  \oi.  4.  pp.  rj:i;?-1318  (photo- 
graphs of  area  and  sinutures  with  descriptions), 
HOC). 

-2  Contract  W-74  12-eng-l  (l)ii  Pont),  8  .Nov  43, 
OROO:  MDH.  Bk.  4.  \'oi.  ti,  p.  9.1  and  .Apps.  B8 
(Org  Chart,  Hanford  Area  Engrs  Office)  and  B12- 
Bl.'5  (Oig  Chart,  Du  Ponts  HEW  .Svc  Dept),  DASA; 
Du  Pont'Opns  Hist,  Bk.   17.  Pt.   1,  pp.   1-14.  HOO. 


IHE  ATOMIC  COMMl^NniES  IN  WASHING  ION  STATE 


461 


obtained  in  April  1943  the  services  of 
the  Olympic  Commissary  Company  of 
Chicago,  a  professional  management 
organization.  Olympic  assumed  re- 
sponsibility under  its  contract  for  op- 
eration and  maintenance  of  housing 
(except  trailer  plots,  which  Du  Pont 
rented  directly),  mess  hall,  and  recre- 
ational facilities.  Du  Pont  also  ar- 
ranged leases  with  private  operators 
for  stores,  garages,  a  laundry,  a  bank, 
and  similar  commercial  services.  It 
left  administration  of  the  schools  in 
the  hands  of  the  Washington  State 
Department  of  Education.  Du  Pont, 
however,  retained  direct  responsibility 
for  fire  protection  and  maintained  a 
Hanford  Patrol  to  police  the  camp.^^ 
The  Army  kept  close  check  on  the 
performance  of  the  various  organiza- 
tions providing  services  for  Hanford. 
On  his  periodic  inspection  trips  to  the 
camp.  General  Groves  gave  close  at- 
tention to  Olympic's  management  of 
mess  halls  and  housing.  As  a  result  of 
his  complaints  concerning  certain  de- 
ficiencies, Du  Pont  directed  a  reorga- 
nization of  the  company's  operations 
in  June  1943.  Again  in  December,  the 
area  engineer  reported  to  Du  Pont 
that  management  practices  still 
needed  some  reinforcing  in  the  opin- 
ion of  the  Manhattan  commander, 
who  felt  "there  is  no  reason  why  the 
large  losses  recently  being  incurred  in 
camp  operations  could  not  be  re- 
duced." Finally,  in  February  1944, 
after  further  changes  in  Olympic's 
methods  of  operation.  Groves  indicat- 


es mdh.  Bk.  4.  \ol.  5.  pp.  5.12-5.18,  .Apps.  B4 
and  B23,  D.ASA:  Matthias  Diarv,  25  Mar  43,  OROO; 
Dii  Pom  Conslr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  pp.  91  and  154-62, 
HOO. 


ed  satisfaction  with  its  management  of 
the  camp. 2* 

Because  of  the  temporary  character 
of  the  Hanford  camp,  Manhattan 
sacrificed  comfort  and  convenience 
and  provided  only  minimum  amen- 
ities in  the  housing  facilities.  This 
policy  caused  considerable  dissatisfac- 
tion among  Hanford  residents,  some 
of  whom  filed  complaints  with  the 
War  Manpower  Commission.  In  re- 
sponse to  inquiries  from  commission 
officials  investigating  these  com- 
plaints. Groves  explained  that  the 
Army  had  to  avoid  overelaboration 
and  overexpenditure  because  of  the 
wartime  shortages  of  construction 
materials  and  labor  and  the  need  to 
adhere  to  rigid  construction  sched- 
ules. Subsequently,  a  project  survey 
determined  that  the  unsatisfactory 
living  conditions  at  the  camp  were  a 
chief  factor  in  the  continual  turnover 
of  construction  personnel,  which  ap- 
proached an  unacceptable  rate  of  21 
percent  in  the  crucial  summer  of 
1944. 

Other  factors  contributing  to  the 
discontent  were  the  demoralizing 
sandstorms,  the  lack  of  sizable  towns 
to  visit  outside  the  reservation,  over- 
taxed commercial  facilities,  and  the 
segregated  housing  policy.  The  latter 
policy  precluded  families,  even  hus- 
bands and  wives,  from  living  together 
and  restricted  occupancy  on  the  basis 
of  sex  and  race.  Recognizing,  howev- 
er, that  some  needed  workers  would 
accept  jobs  on  the  project  only  if  they 
could  bring  their  families,  Du  Pont 
and  the  Arm\  decided  reluctantly  to 
permit  them  in  the  trailer  camps  and 


24Maithia.s   Dian.    18  and  2,3   Juii  and   7   Dec    43 
(source  of  quotation)  and  18  Feb  44.  OROO. 


462 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  IHE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


provided  schools  for  their  children, 
but  the  policy  remained  to  discourage 
family  groups. ^^ 

Unfortunately,  neither  the  Army 
nor  Du  Pont  could  do  very  much 
about  most  of  these  problems  in  the 
few  months  that  were  still  required  to 
complete  the  production  plants.  What 
was  feasible,  they  decided,  was  to 
pursue  more  intensively  all  available 
means  to  raise  and  maintain  the 
morale  of  the  workers,  with  the  aim 
of  making  them  more  willing  to 
accept  the  unavoidable  hardships. 
Manhattan  officials,  including  General 
Groves,  spoke  to  assembled  groups 
and  the  camp  newspaper,  "The  Sage 
Sentinel,"  carried  stories  emphasizing 
the  importance  of  the  project  to  the 
war  effort.  Du  Pont,  with  consider- 
able assistance  from  the  area  engi- 
neer, greatly  expanded  the  recreation- 
al facilities.  They  brought  nationally 
known  entertainers  and  popular  or- 
chestras to  the  auditorium-gymnasi- 
um, which  also  doubled  as  a  gigantic 
dance  hall;  they  encouraged  regular 
use  of  recreation  halls  for  men  and 
women;  they  arranged  for  nightly 
motion  pictures  in  a  quickly  erected 
tent  theater;  and  they  provided  tav- 
erns, bowling  alleys,  a  four-thousand- 
seat  baseball  stadium,  nine  softball 
diamonds,  and  many  tennis,  badmin- 
ton, volleyball,  and  horseshoe  courts. 
Groves  himself  directed  that  beer  be 
sold  in  whatever  quantities  needed 
and  the  Hanford  Works  Employees 
Association  licensed  a  concessionaire 


to  install  150  pinball  machines.  The 
program  was  effective  and  wartime 
residents  of  Hanford  would  later 
recall  that  the  camp  came  to  have  "a 
kind  of  gaiety,  a  temporary  feeling, 
the  mood  of  a  fair  or  carnival  or 
circus,"  ^^  all  enhanced  by  the  contin- 
uous playing  of  music  over  a  public 
address  system.  Job  terminations  de- 
clined and  in  the  hectic  months  of 
late  1944  and  early  1945  the  con- 
struction work  force  brought  to  com- 
pletion, on  schedule,  the  great  pro- 
duction units  of  the  plutonium 
plant.  2'^ 


Richland  J'lllage 

For  Du  Pont  and  the  area  engineer, 
management  of  the  Richland  village 
entailed  all  the  usual  problems  of  a 
rapidly  expanding  wartime  communi- 
ty, as  well  as  the  special  problems 
arising  from  the  unique  character  of 
the  atomic  project.  From  1943 
through  early  1945,  provision  of  ade- 
quate housing  for  the  work  force  was 
certainly  one  of  the  most  challenging 
problems  for  the  village  managers. 
Lacking  reliable  guidelines  to  allocate 
housing  to  the  three  major  groups  of 
employees  that  made  up  the  work 
force — construction,  operations,  and 
government  personnel — managers 

frequently  had  to  shift  percentages, 
depending  upon  current  need.  Before 
January     1944,     they    allocated    most 


25  Matthias  Diary,  6  and  18  Mav,  3-4  and  18  Jun, 
21  Aug,  26  Oct,  14  Nov  43,  OROO;  Ltrs,  Lawrence 
A.  Appley  (Dep  Chairman  and  Ex  Dir,  WMC)  to 
Groves,  23  Dee  43,  and  Groves  to  Appley,  7  Jan  44, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  620  (Hanford),  MDR; 
Du  Pont  Constr  Hist,  Vol.  1,  pp.  86-91,  and  Vol.  4, 
pp.  1361-65,  HOO. 


2«Van  Arsdol,  Hanford:  The  Big  Senel.  p.  29.  See 
also  pp.  50-53. 

"MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  5,  pp.  5.13-5.14.  DASA; 
Matthias  Diary,  6  May  43  and  18  Feb  44,  OROO; 
Groves  Diary,  10  and  18  Feb  44,  LRG;  Groves,  \ow 
It  Can  Be  fold,  pp.  89-93;  Du  Pont  Constr  Hist, 
Vol.  1,  pp.  163-72,  Vol.  2,  pp.  409-11  and  415-17, 
and  Vol.  4,  pp.  1342-44,  HOO. 


THE  ATOMIC  COMMUNITIES  IN  WASHINGTON  STATE 


463 


housing  to  construction  and  govern- 
ment personnel,  gradually  altering 
the  basis  until  by  March  50  percent 
was  going  to  operating  employees,  40 
percent  to  construction,  and  10  per- 
cent to  government.  After  the  peak  of 
construction  passed,  the  population 
of  Richland  declined  to  the  extent 
that  some  prefabricated  houses  were 
vacated.  Occupants  of  houses  in  Rich- 
land paid  rentals  of  between  $27.50 
and  $80.00  a  month,  the  amount 
varying  in  relation  to  the  size  and 
type  of  unit,  and  whether  or  not  it 
was  furnished.  The  rent  included  all 
utilities.  Dormitorv  occupants  paid 
from  $15.00  to  $22.50  per  month.^s 

As  in  the  Hanford  construction 
camp,  concessionaires  operated  most 
of  the  commercial  facilities  in  the  vil- 
lage under  contracts  negotiated  by  Du 
Font's  HEW  Service  Department.  The 
department  employed  competitive  bid- 
ding in  selecting  the  concessionaries, 
choosing  those  offering  maximum 
service  to  the  village  and  the  highest 
monetary  return  to  the  government. 
These  commercial  operators  made 
available  to  residents  of  the  communi- 
ty all  normal  items  and  services  essen- 
tial to  daily  living,  such  as  food,  drugs, 
clothing,  and  entertainment,  and  de- 
partment officials  periodically  checked 
prices  in  order  to  maintain  them  at 
levels  comparable  to  those  at  stores  in 
nearby  towns.  In  most  cases  the  gov- 
ernment provided  building  space,  in- 
cluding stationary  fixtures,  for  the 
concessionaire  and  the  latter  furnished 
any  mobile  equipment  required.  ^^ 


28MDH.  Bk.  4,  Vol.  6,  pp.  9.1-9.7  and  App.  B5, 
DASA;  Du  Pont  Opns  Hist,  Bk.  17,  Pt.  2,  pp.  1-31, 
HOO. 

2«MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  6.  pp.  9.14-9.16  and  App.  B4, 
DASA;  Du  Pont  Opns  Hist,  Bk.  18,  Pt.  2,  pp.  1-2 
and  5.6,  HOO. 


During  World  War  II  the  Richland 
community  had  no  formally  constitut- 
ed institutions  of  local  government. 
Du  Pont,  through  its  HEW  Service 
Department,  provided  Richlanders 
with  most  normal  community  ser- 
vices— utilities,  street  maintenance, 
trash  and  garbage  pickup,  and  fire 
and  police  protection.  A  division  of 
the  company's  Plant  Patrol,  deputized 
by  the  sheriff  of  Benton  County, 
served  as  the  village  police  force,  en- 
forcing traffic  regulations,  investigat- 
ing accidents,  and  overseeing  a  pro- 
gram of  crime  prevention.  One  ex- 
ception to  this  pattern  of  Du  Pont 
control  was  the  public  schools:  The 
federal  government  furnished  and 
maintained  the  buildings,  and  the  in- 
structional staff  functioned  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  local  county  super- 
intendent of  schools.  Du  Pont  and 
Hanford  Area  Engineers  Office  repre- 
sentatives served  as  advisory  members 
of  the  Richland  school  board,  com- 
prised of  local  residents.  Most  of  the 
money  for  operating  the  schools  came 
from  the  federal  government  under 
provisions  of  the  Lanham  Act.  An- 
other exception  was  public  transpor- 
tation, including  a  government-owned 
bus  system  that  the  area  engineer 
administered.  ^° 

Of  the  District's  three  operating 
communities,  Richland  village  most 
nearly  resembled  the  typical  American 
company  town,  owned  and  dominated 
by  a  great  industrial  concern.  This 
was  so  partly  because  the  Army's 
presence  was  not  nearly  so  apparent 
as  at  Oak  Ridge,  with  its  District 
headquarters  and  numerous  technical 


3°MDH.  Bk.  4,  Vol.  6,  pp.  9.7-9.14  and  Apps 
B4-B5  and  B12-B13,  DASA;  Du  Pont  Opns  Hist, 
Bk.  17,  Pt.  1,  pp.  4-5,  HOO. 


464 


MANHA  r  I  AN:  IHE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


emplovecs  in  uniform,  nor  as  at  Los 
Alamos,  with  its  very  substantial  mili- 
tary population.  Richland  also  had 
fewer  outward  ramifications  of  physi- 
cal security,  such  as  the  high  encir- 
cling fence  patrolled  frequently  by 
military  police  and  dogs  at  the  New- 
Mexico   site   and    the   similar   barriers 


erected  at  crucial  points  along  the 
boundary  of  the  Tennessee  site.  To 
the  uninformed  casual  visitor,  the  plu- 
tonium  connnunity  appeared  to  be 
just  one  more  wartime  boomtown 
where  the  average  employee  and  his 
family  had  to  endure  the  usual  minor 
hardships  and  inconveniences. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 


The  Atomic  Communities  in 
New  Mexico 


Manhattan  Project  leaders'  choice 
of  isolated  and  remote  sections  of 
central  New  Mexico  for  developing 
and  testing  the  atomic  bomb  trans- 
formed two  hitherto  sparsely  populat- 
ed regions  into  two  unique  scientific 
communities.  Some  20  miles  west  of 
the  famous  Santa  Fe  Trail,  the  rugged 
Pajarito  Plateau  became  the  site  of 
the  Los  Alamos  reservation,  the  oper- 
ating community  comprising  the 
bomb  development  laboratory  with 
technical  installations  and  a  residen- 
tial area;  and  some  160  miles  south  of 
Los  Alamos,  the  desolate  Jornada  del 
Muerto  valley  provided  the  location  for 
the  Trinity  base  camp,  the  temporary 
community  comprising  a  bomb  test 
area  with  technical  facilities  and  a 
campsite.  Because  of  the  geographic 
inaccessibility  and  arid  climate  of 
these  regions,  few  of  the  thousands  of 
persons  who  came  into  the  South- 
west— either  over  the  trail  or  the  rail- 
road that  replaced  it — chose  to  settle 
there,  further  enhancing  their  suit- 
ability for  the  highly  secret  activities 
of  the  bomb  development  project.^ 


Los  Alamos:   The  Operating  Community 

With  the  often  snow-capped  peaks 
of  the  Sangre  de  Cristo  Mountains 
looming  in  the  distance,  the  broad  ex- 
panse of  the  Pajarito  Plateau  ex- 
tended westward  from  an  altitude  of 
7,300  feet  at  Los  Alamos  to  the  heavi- 
ly wooded  slopes  of  the  9,000-foot 
Jemez  Mountains  and  eastward  to  the 
wide  Rio  Grande  valley.  Bypassed  by 
the  mainstream  of  settlement  and  de- 
velopment, there  were  only  a  few 
scattered  ranches  on  the  great  plateau 
by  the  early  years  of  the  twentieth 
century.  Of  these  ranches,  the  one  sit- 
uated atop  the  Los  Alamos  mesa — lo- 
cally referred  to  as  the  Hill — attracted 
the  interest  of  two  different  purchas- 
ers, each  with  a  different  objective.  In 
1917,  to  realize  a  long-standing 
dream,  former  Detroit  businessman 
Ashley  Pond  had  bought  the  ranch  as 
the  location  for  his  Los  Alamos  Ranch 
School  for  Boys.  A  quarter  of  a  centu- 


'  Lansing  Lamoni  in  his  history  of  the  atomic 
bomb  {Day  of  Tnnily  [New  York:  Atheneum,  1965], 
p.  70)  suggests  that  Oppenheimer,  pressed  by  Bain- 
bridge    for   a    suitable    code    name    for    the    desert 


site,  selected  "Trinity,"  having  just  read  the  open- 
ing lines  of  John  Donne's  Holy  Sonnet  XIV:  "Batter 
my  heart,  three-person'd  God;  for  you  /  As  yet  but 
knock,  breathe,  shine,  and  seek  to  mend."  On  the 
Santa  Fe  Trail  see  Dictionary  of  Amenran  History,  rev. 
ed.,  s.v.  "Santa  Fe"  by  Francis  Borgia  Sleek  and 
"Santa  Fe  Trail"  bv  Bliss  Iselv. 


466 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


ry  later,  to  meet  Manhattan  Project 
goals,  the  Army  acquired  this  same 
ranch  as  the  location  for  one  of  its 
atomic  reservations.^  (See  Map  5.) 

Planning 

On  a  wintry  day  in  early  November 
1942,  a  small  group  of  Army  engineer 
officers  visited  the  Los  Alamos  Ranch 
School.  Of  the  several  possible  sites 
they  had  examined,  this  one  im- 
pressed them  most  as  nearly  meeting 
all  their  criteria  for  security,  safety, 
ease  of  acquisition,  and  conversion 
into  a  scientific  research  and  develop- 
ment community.  There  was  a  large 
enough  area  cleared  of  timber  to 
permit  an  immediate  start  on  the 
erection  of  technical  structures  and 
the  buildings  of  the  school  would 
provide  more  than  sufficient  housing 
for  the  relatively  small  group  of  scien- 
tists who  would  staff  the  bomb  labo- 
ratory. Following  Groves  and  Oppen- 
hcimer's  inspection  and  approval  a 
few  days  later,  the  War  Department 
notified  the  owners  of  the  school  that 
the  government  was  starting  condem- 
nation proceedings  to  acquire  the 
property  and  that  they  had  until  mid- 
February  1943  to  vacate,  time  enough 
for  members  of  the  small  student 
body  to  complete  their  academic 
studies  for  the  year.^ 

Weeks  before  the  students  finally 
departed  from  the  Hill,  plans  to 
secure  a  construction  contractor  and. 


^  "The  First  20  \'ears  at  Los  Alamos,  January 
1943-January  1963,"  LiSL  News  5,  no.  1  (Jan  63): 
8-13. 

^  See  Ch.  X\'  for  details  on  acquisition  of  the  Los 
Alamos  site.  See  also  "First  20  Years  at  Los 
Alamos,"  pp.  12-13,  and  James  W.  Kunetka,  City  of 
Fire:  Los  Alamos  and  the  Atomic  Age,  19-(3-1945,  rev. 
ed.  (Albuquerque:  University  of  New  Mexico  Press, 
1979).  pp.  10-16. 


as  Stone  and  Webster's  replacement, 
a  new  architect-engineer  for  the  Los 
Alamos  community  development  pro- 
gram were  already  under  way.  The 
Albuquerque  District  surveyed  con- 
struction firms  in  the  region  and,  as 
the  construction  contractor,  chose  the 
M.  M.  Sundt  Company  of  Tucson,  Ar- 
izona, which  was  just  completing  a 
job  for  the  Army  at  a  camp  near  Las 
Vegas,  New  Mexico.  The  firm  ap- 
peared attractive  for  the  task  not  only 
because  it  had  available  nearby  equip- 
ment and  manpower  but  also  be- 
cause, unlike  many  construction  com- 
panies, it  had  its  own  fleet  of  trucks 
and  operated  its  own  plumbing,  elec- 
trical, and  painting  departments.  This 
meant  that  Sundt  would  have  to 
employ  fewer  subcontractors,  a  plus 
from  the  standpoint  of  project 
security. 

When  the  Army  signed  its  lump- 
sum contract  with  Sundt  in  mid-De- 
cember, company  representatives 
were  already  in  Santa  Fe  securing 
office  quarters  and  initiating  procure- 
ment for  workmen  and  building  mate- 
rials. These  expeditious  efforts  per- 
mitted Sundt  crews  to  begin  clearing 
the  site  by  the  end  of  the  month, 
when  the  Army  also  completed  nego- 
tiations with  Willard  C.  Kruger  and 
Associates  of  Santa  Fe  to  be  the  new 
architect-engineer.  Kruger's  location 
near  the  newly  established  Santa  Fe 
Engineers  Office  and  the  area  office 
of  the  construction  contractor  facili- 
tated the  firm's  ability  to  cope 
promptly  with  changes  and  expan- 
sions in  the  communitv.* 


■»  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  "General,"  p.  4.1-4.2,  5.1- 
5.2,  App.  D12  (Major  Contracts  Supervised  by  Albu- 
querque Dist  to  Mar  44),  and  Vol.  2,  "Technical," 

Continued 


THE  ATOMIC  COMML  NHIES  IN  NEW  MEXICO 


467 


I  VFICAL  Building  at  the  Los  Alamos  Ranch  School  for  Boys 


Kruger  used  Stone  and  Webster's 
original  plans  for  Los  Alamos,  which 
incorporated  the  ideas  and  specifica- 
tions of  Oppenheimer  and  other 
project  scientists,  as  the  basis  of  its 
initial  blueprints  for  the  community. 
In  these  early  plans,  drawn  up  in  late 
1942  and  approved  by  the  prime  con- 
tractor, the  University  of  California, 
the  fifty-four  school  buildings  formed 
the  nucleus  of  the  community,  with 
the  new  houses,  dormitories,  bar- 
racks, service,  and  other  buildings  of 
the  nontechnical  area  located  to  the 
northeast  and  with  the  installations  of 
the  technical  area,  enclosed  by  a  high 
chain  link  fence,  located  to  the  south 

pp.  I.5-L6,  DASA;  "Firsi  20  Years  at  Los  Alamos." 
p.  36;  Fine  and  Remington,  Corps  of  Engineers:  Con- 
slructwn.  p.  694. 


along  the  precipitous  rim  of  Jemez 
Canyon.  But  these  early  plans  consti- 
tuted only  a  rudimentary  beginning 
for  construction  on  the  Hill.  Further 
planning  in  early  1943  by  Groves  and 
scientific  leaders  of  the  project,  espe- 
cially Oppenheimer  and  James  B. 
Conant,  revealed  that  the  bomb  de- 
velopment program  was  going  to  be  a 
far  larger  enterprise  than  originally 
anticipated  and  that  precise  answers 
to  questions  concerning  the  size  of 
the  laboratory,  its  staff,  technical  fa- 
cilities, and  supporting  community 
would  become  available  only  after  a 
great  deal  more  study  and  research.^ 


^MDH-,  Bk.  8.  \oL  1.  Apps.  A6  (Post  Plan)  and 
A7  (Tech  Area  Plot  Map),  and  \'ol.  2,  p.  III. 47, 
D.AS.\;  .Second  Memo  on  Los  .Alamos  Proj  (by  J.  H. 

Continued 


468 


MANHAl  IAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  Al  OMIC  BOMB 


As  at  Clinton  and  Hanford,  there 
was  the  same  urgency  at  Los  Alamos 
to  complete  facilities  in  the  shortest 
possible  time  and  at  the  lowest  cost  in 
terms  of  manpower  and  critical  mate- 
rials. Hence,  wherever  feasible,  design 
and  layout  procedures  were  stream- 
lined. On  nontechnical  community 
structures  (housing,  service,  and  rec- 
reational buildings),  the  Albuquerque 
District  submitted  requirements  di- 
rectly to  Kruger  without  going 
through  the  University  of  California. 
Kruger  then  outlined  the  job  specifi- 
cations to  each  subcontractor,  who  in 
turn  provided  a  cost  estimate.  Once 
Kruger  and  the  subcontractor  had 
agreed  on  a  reasonable  cost,  the  pro- 
posal was  submitted  in  the  form  of  a 
lump-sum  contract  to  the  Albuquer- 
que District.  The  latter  office  re- 
viewed the  document  and  calculated 
the  profit  made,  and  if  this  appeared 
excessive,  it  required  the  subcontrac- 
tor to  return  the  overage.^ 

Plans  for  the  New  Mexico  establish- 
ment followed  the  general  pattern  of 
those  for  Clinton  and  Hanford:  highly 
tentative  and  subject  to  repeated  and 
drastic  vicissitudes.  Nevertheless,  on 
one  project  requirement — that  of  se- 
curity— Manhattan  remained  vigilantly 
uncompromising.  Because  the  need 
for  secrecy  was  so  crucial,  Los 
Alamos,  unlike  Clinton  and  Hanford, 
was  planned  as  a  military  post,  with  a 

Stevenson,  Proj  Mgi),  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
322  (Los  Alamos),  MDR;  "First  20  Years  at  Los 
Alamos,"  pp.  15-19  (photographs  of  terrain  features 
and  buildings);  Rpt,  sub:  Complications  of  the  Los 
Alamos  Proj,  12  Nov  46,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
322  (Los  Alamos),  MDR.  Daniel  Lang  provides  a  de- 
tailed description  of  Los  Alamos  as  he  observed  it 
in  the  immediate  postwar  period  (1945-48)  in  his 
Early  Tales  of  the  Atomic  Age  (New  \'ork;  Doublcday 
and  Co.,  1948),  pp.  208-10. 

«MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  pp.  4.2-4.3  and  5.1,  DASA. 


military  commander  and  staff  and  var- 
ious military  units  to  perform  post  en- 
gineer and  security  functions,  tor  the 
same  reason,  project  planners  decid- 
ed to  provide  on-site  accommodations 
and  community  services  (commissary, 
medical  care,  and  recreation)  for  all 
military  personnel  and  civilian  scien- 
tists and  technicians,  and,  in  many 
cases,  their  families  as  well,  because 
of  their  respective  post  functions  and 
secret  job  assignments.  As  nontechni- 
cal civilian  employees  working  in  un- 
classified jobs  did  not  pose  a  security 
risk,  Manhattan  recommended  that 
they  reside  in  the  neighboring  small 
towns  and  use  Army  bus  transporta- 
tion to  commute  to  and  from  the  job. 
They  would,  however,  have  access  to 
on-site  housing  based  on  its  availabil- 
ity and  their  family  need."^ 

Construction  and  Operation 

Because  of  the  unpredictable  ex- 
pansion in  the  size  of  the  bomb  de- 
velopment program,  community  con- 
struction tended  to  be  an  open-ended 
process,  with  each  new  influx  of  civil- 
ian and  military  personnel  requiring 
additional  facilities.  Housing  consti- 
tuted by  far  the  largest  part  of  com- 
munity construction,  reflecting  a  rap- 
idly expanding  population.  From  an 
estimated  fifteen  hundred  persons  in 
January  1943,  comprised  mostly  of 
Sundt  construction  employees,  the 
population  increased  to  almost  thirty- 
five  hundred  a  year  later,  although 
most  Sundt  personnel  had  departed, 
and  approached  fifty-seven  hundred 
at  the  beginning  of  1945.® 


'Ibid.,  pp.  5.1-6.3,  DASA. 

*  All  statistics  on  the  population  of  Los  Alamos  in 
wartime  represent  rough  estimates,  because  project 


THE  AIOMIC  (X)MMl'NHIES  IN  NEW  MEXICO 


469 


With  {\)c  complclion  of  ihc  fust 
major  phase  of  conmuinily  construc- 
tion in  the  fall  of  1943,  the  Sundt 
Company  withdrew  its  personnel  and 
equipment  from  the  site  and  the  post 
commander  prepared  to  take  over 
primary  responsibility  for  community 
maintenance  as  well  as  any  further 
minor  construction.  General  Groves 
had  been  concerned  about  having  an 
outside  contractor  and  the  Albuquer- 
que District  involved  in  the  bomb 
program  and  he  now  took  steps  to 
tighten  security.  In  early  1944,  the 
Manhattan  District  assumed  full  re- 
sponsibility for  supervising  all  further 
construction.  Lt.  Col.  Whitney  Ash- 
bridge,  the  post  commander,  recruit- 
ed additional  carpenters,  plumbers, 
and  .other  workers  and  assigned  them 
to  the  Operations  Division,  which  he 
reorganized  into  two  sections:  one  for 
community  maintenance  and  con- 
struction, the  other  for  technical  area 
work.  Work  crews  from  the  division, 
often  comprised  of  both  civilians  and 
enlisted  men  from  the  Provisional  En- 
gineer Detachment  (PED),  undertook 
many  minor  construction  jobs  ordi- 
narily carried  out  by  construction 
contractors. 

Division  crews,  however,  could  not 
handle  all  the  work,  and  occasionally 
outside  contractors  were  brought  in 
through  the  Albuquerque  District.  An 
increase  in  the  number  of  outside 
contractors  employed  by  Manhattan 
occurred  in  March  1944,  when  both 
the  technical  and  community  facilities 

officials,  for  reasons  of  security,  did  nol  undertake 
an  ofTicial  census  until  April  1946.  However,  some 
indication  of  population  trends  can  be  derived  from 
payroll  figures  maintained  for  the  various  categories 
of  workers  employed  at  I.os  Alamos.  See  ibid.,  p. 
7.15  and  App.  B7  (Payroll  C>ensus  Graph,  Dec  42- 
Dec  46),  DASA. 


had  to  be  expanded  substantially.  Ehe 
Army  once  again  had  to  risk  calling 
upon  the  Albucjuerque  District  to 
begin  a  search  for  additional  contrac- 
tors. 4his  time  two  El  Paso,  I'exas, 
firms  were  chosen:  J.  E.  Morgan  and 
Sons,  to  install  prefabricated  apart- 
ment buildings;  and  Robert  E. 
McKee,  to  undertake  the  new  phase 
of  technical  construction.^ 

The  unpredictable  expansion  of  the 
bomb  program  consistently  outran 
available  housing.  With  on-site  hous- 
ing still  under  construction  in  the 
spring  of  1943,  the  first  laboratory 
staff  members  had  to  stay  at  guest 
ranches  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Hill.  By 
June,  these  accommodations  were  so 
overtaxed  by  the  influx  of  technical 
personnel  that  the  Army  had  to  ac- 
quire the  National  Park  Service's  Fri- 
joles  Lodge  in  Bandelier  National 
Monument,  14  miles  south  of  Los 
Alamos.  From  June  to  October  1943 
and  again  for  a  brief  period  in  July- 
August  1944,  overflow  laboratory  per- 
sonnel resided  at  the  Frijoles  Canyon 
lodgings  amid  the  ruins  of  ancient 
Indian  dwellings.  In  1944  and  1945, 
the  unavailability  of  sufficient  dormi- 
tory housing  for  married  enlisted  men 
of  the  Special  Engineer  Detachment 
(SED)  and  the  strict  enforcement  of 
security  regulations  that  forbade 
bringing  wives  to  live  in  nearby  civil- 
ian communities  severely  strained  the 
morale  of  many  junior  scientists  and 
technicians.  The  continuing  shortage 
of  family-type  facilities  resulted  not 
only  from  the  unexpectedly  rapid  in- 
crease in  personnel  and  the  wartime 


9  Ibid.,  pp.  5.4-5.9  and  Apps.  B3-B4  (Org  Charts, 
4  Feb  44  and  1  Feb  45)  and  D12,  DA.SA;  Fine  and 
Remington,  Corps  of  Engineers:  Construction,  pp.  697- 
98. 


470 


MANHATTAN:  THK  ARMY  AND  IHE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


KOIIR-FAMIIA   APAKIMKN  1    I  NHS  Al   LoS  Al.AMOS 


limitations  on  labor  and  materials  but 
also  from  the  deliberate  policy  of 
holding  to  a  minimum  the  construc- 
tion of  family  housing,  except  where 
it  contributed  to  recruiting  personnel 
and  security.  The  Army  persisted  in 
this  policy  because  the  addition  of 
each  new  family  placed  further  strain 
upon  the  limited  number  of  service 
personnel  available,  the  supply  of 
water,  electricity,  and  fuel,  the  sewer- 
age system,  and  other  community 
services.  ^° 


'°MDH.  Bk.  8.  \()1  I,  pp.  BLMi.a,  and  Vol.  2, 
pp.  1.9.  III. 19.  IX. 11.  DASA;  'First  20  Years  at  Los 
Alamos."  pp.  16-17;  Dorothv  McKibbin,  "109  East 
Palace  Avenue,"  L4SL  Xeu's  5,  no.  14  (Jun  63):  6. 
Mrs.  McKibbin  was  in  charge  of  Los  Alamos'  Santa 
Fe  ofTice.  located  at  the  above-mentioned  address, 
which  served  as  the  first  point  of  contact  for  most 
incoming  visitors  and  luwK  assigned  personnel. 


Housing  units  at  Los  Alamos  com- 
prised numerous  conventional 
houses,  apartments,  and  duplexes, 
which  the  Army  felt  were  of  particular 
value  for  recruiting  essential  person- 
nel and  for  ensuring  security.  There 
were  also  winterized  hutments.  Pacific 
and  National  Hut  apartments,  govern- 
ment- and  privately  owned  trailers, 
and  sixteen  remodeled  ranch  houses 
at  various  places  on  the  reservation. 
Eventually  the  combined  capacity  of 
these  various  types  of  housing  was 
sufficient  to  accommodate  more  than 
six  hundred  families. 

Single  individuals  resided  in  bar- 
racks or  dormitories,  with  the  best- 
equipped  dormitories  reserved  for 
unmarried  scientific  personnel.  Fire- 
men, janitors,  hospital  attendants, 
and    other    civilian    service    personnel 


THE  ATOMIC  COMMUNHIES  IN  NEW  MEXICO 


471 


Military  Mess  Facility  at  Los  Alamos 


occupied  more  cheaply  built  units. 
Most  enlisted  men  had  quarters  in 
theater  of  operations-type  barracks 
and  enlisted  women  in  modified 
mobilization-style  units.  Construction 
workers  occupied  temporary  housing 
built  by  their  employers;  Sundt  crews 
resided  in  more  than  100  hutments, 
subsequently  used  to  house  other 
construction  workers  after  the  Tucson 
contractor  had  completed  its  phase  of 
the  work,  and  McKee  crews  lived  in  a 
specially  built  93-unit  dormitory.  Visi- 
tors to  the  site  and  some  senior  scien- 
tific personnel  were  given  quarters  in 
the  well-built  stone-and-log  structures 
of  the  Ranch  School.  ^^ 


'1  MDH,  Bk.  H.  \()1.  1.  pp.  6.2-6.5.  DASA;  I.ASI., 
Per.sonncl  Dcpt,  Housing  Manual  for  Laboratory 
PLmplovees    and    Supervisors,    pp.    21-24:    Barbara 


As  an  antidote  to  the  admittedly 
unsatisfactory  housing  conditions,  the 
isolation  of  the  site,  and  the  stringent 
security  regulations,  the  Army  devot- 
ed considerable  effort  to  providing 
Los  Alamos  residents  with  efficient, 
low-cost,  and  attractive  food  and  serv- 
ice facilities.  Meals  were  available  to 
civilians  at  cost  in  several  convenient- 
ly located  messes  and  at  Fuller 
Lodge — the  latter  intended  primarily 
for  guests  and  transients.  Army  per- 
sonnel ate  at  regular  military  messes. 
Limited  food  service  was  available  in 
the  post  exchanges.  In  March  1945, 
the  post  opened  a  new  cafeteria  spe- 
cifically designed  and  operated  to  im- 
prove   community    morale.    Open    to 


Storms,  "Western  Area,"  Thr  Alom  :^1  (Mar  66):  19- 
23  and  36;  Lang,  Tnln  of  the  Atomu  Age.  p.  207. 


472 


MANHAl  IAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THP:  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


Los  Alamos  Ranch  Trading  Post 


everyone,  it  was  better  equipped,  fur- 
nished, and  decorated  than  the  regu- 
lar messes  and  served  a  more  elabo- 
rate menu  offered  on  an  a  la  carte 
basis  at  approximate  cost. 

Commissary  facilities  began  oper- 
ations in  March  1943,  with  only  Los 
Alamos  residents  having  privileges. 
But  experience  demonstrated  that  the 
majority  of  employees  who  lived  off 
the  site  had  little  opportunity  to  do 
their  shopping  in  nearby  communities 
because  of  commuting  distances. 
Consequently,  the  post  commander 
ordered  extension  of  commissary 
privileges  to  all  who  worked  at  the 
reservation.  One  unusual  commissary 
service  was  check  cashing  for  contrac- 
tor employees,  who,  for  security  rea- 
sons, were  not  permitted  to  maintain 
bank  accounts  in  Santa  Fe  or  other 
communities  adjacent  to  the  site.  An- 


other ameliorative  measure,  as  of 
August  1944,  was  the  sale  of  many 
additional  items  not  ordinarily  au- 
thorized under  Army  regulations.^^ 

Supplementing  commissary  service 
were  the  post  exchange  facilities, 
which  were  open  to  everyone  on  the 
reservation.  The  Army  set  up  the  first 
"trading  post"  in  a  small  log  building 
of  the  Ranch  School  in  early  1943, 
but  eventually  opened  outlets  in  sev- 
eral   other    locations,    including    one 


'2MI)H,  Bk.  8,  \()l  1,  pp.  (i.9-(i.l4.  DASA; 
Memo,  Ashbiidge  to  1st  Ll  William  Rice  (Commis- 
sai\  Oil,  I.os  Alamos),  12  Aug  44,  and  Memo  for 
File,  Ashbridge,  12  Aug  44,  copies  in  ibid.,  App. 
D24,  DASA;  Ltr,  Col  Gerald  R.  Tyler  (CO,  Los 
Alamos)  to  Dist  Kngr,  Attn.:  Col  F.Imer  Y..  Kiikpat- 
ri(k,  Jr.  (Dep  Dist  Engr),  sub:  Request  for  Authoritv 
to  Cash  Checks  at  Commissaiv,  and  1st  Ind,  Kirk- 
paiiuk  to  CO,  U.S.  Engrs  Office,  Santa  Fe,  N.Mex., 
both  12  Feb  45,  copies  in  ibid.,  App.  D27,  DASA; 
I.ASF,  Housing  Manual  for  Laboratory  Employees 
and  Supervisors,  p.  23. 


1  HE  AIOMIC  COMMLNiriES  IN  NEW  MEXICX) 


473 


Street  Scene  in  Los  Alamos.  The  fence  separates  the  techuual  uistallattons  from  the 
residential  area. 


near  the  entrance  of  the  technical 
area  and,  as  of  June  1944,  one  con- 
venient to  the  quarters  of  the  SED 
unit.  The  Army,  however,  discour- 
aged the  practice  extensively  em- 
ployed at  Oak  Ridge,  Hanford,  and 
Richland  of  granting  commercial  con- 
cessions to  outside  civilian  business- 
men. There  were  a  few  exceptions. 
The  post  exchange  manager  let  con- 
tracts for  a  cleaning  and  pressing 
shop  and  a  combination  garage  and 
filling  station.  Whenever  feasible,  the 
Army  employed  civilians  to  operate 
the  various  service  establishments. 
But,  because  of  the  labor  scarcity,  it 
had  to  supplement  civilian  staffs  with 
Women's  Army  C>orps  (WAC-)  mem- 
bers and  PED  enlisted  men.^^ 


Other  community  services  were 
comparable  to  those  found  at  most 
zone-of-interior  military  posts.  Mili- 
tary and  civilian  crews  under  the  di- 
rection of  the  post  engineer  officer 
maintained  and  repaired  all  buildings 
and  were  capable  of  undertaking  new 
construction  on  a  limited  scale.  Other 
post  crews  tended  furnaces  in  winter, 
delivered  ice  in  summer,  and  col- 
lected the  community's  garbage  and 
trash.  The  post  motor  pool  operated 
the  community's  transportation 
system,  which  was  completely  de- 
pendent upon  motor  vehicles.  It  pro- 
\ided  a  free  bus  service  for  the  hun- 
dreds of  commuting  employees  from 
nearby   towns   and   a   trucking   service 


'3  MDH,  Bk.  8,  \()1.  1.  pp.  (■).! (■)-(■). 20  aiui  App.  Wi 


(Org  Chart,   I'.S.   Kngrs   Oifuc-.   Saiit.i   Fc,    N.VUx.. 
5  Feb  44),  DAS  A. 


474 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Pupils  at  the  Los  Alamos  Communit\'  School  viewing  thejemez  Mountains 


to  the  nearest  railheads  in  Santa  Fe 
and  Albuquerque.^^ 

Management 

The  local  government  of  the  Los 
Alamos  community,  which,  legally 
speaking,  was  a  federal  reservation 
within  the  state  of  New  Mexico,  func- 
tioned through  a  composite  of  civilian 
and  military  institutions.  Although  ci- 
vilian Sundt  Company  guards  per- 
formed internal  security  functions  in 
the  earliest  months  of  post  operation, 
the  Army  provided  the  community 
with  most  of  its  protective  and  law 
enforcement  services.  A  Military 
Police  (MP)  Detachment,  assigned  in 
late    April     1943     from     the  '4817th 


••*  Ibid.,  pp.  6.22-6.29,  DAS.\;  'First  20  Years  at 
Los  Alamos."  pp.  18-20;  List,  sub:  MD  OtTs  on 
Duty  at  Los  Alamos  and  Lheir  Duties,  6  May  44, 
Incl  to  Memo,  Ashbridge  to  Groves,  14  Jun  44, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Gen),  MDR. 


Service  Command  Unit,  8th  Service 
Command,  operated  under  the  post 
provost  marshal's  direction  and  was 
responsible  for  guarding  all  points  of 
entry  and  patrolling  the  perimeters  of 
both  the  technical  area  and  the  reser- 
vation itselL  Fire  protection  also 
began  as  a  civilian  function,  first  pro- 
vided by  Sundt  Company  employees 
and  later  by  its  construction  crews 
quartered  on  the  post.  Then  in  Octo- 
ber, the  Army  decided  to  save  scarce 
housing  by  replacing  civilian  firemen 
with  enlisted  PED  soldiers,  who  could 
live  in  the  fire  station.  They  retained 
only  a  civilian  chief  ^^ 


'^  See  Ch.  XV  for  a  further  discussion  of  the  legal 
status  of  Los  Alamos.  See  also  copies  of  the  corre- 
spondence between  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the 
governor  of  New  Mexico  in  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1, 
Apps.  D9,  DASA.  Because  Los  Alamos  was  a  federal 
reservation,  oflkials  of  New  Mexico  held  that 
people  residing  there  were  not  legal  residents  of  the 

(;orHinued 


THE  ATOMIC  COMMl MI  lES  IN  NEW  MEXICO 


47J 


Civil  law  administration  was  the  re- 
sponsibility of  a  town  council,  com- 
prised of  six  members  whom  the  resi- 
dents elected  to  serve  a  six-month 
term  of  office.  Operating  at  first 
under  a  joint  directive  issued  by  Ash- 
bridge  and  Oppenheimer  in  August 
1943,  the  council  ultimately  func- 
tioned under  a  constitution  approved 
by  the  post  commander  in  April  1944. 
With  this  authority  the  council  had  ju- 
risdiction over  enforcement  of  local 
civil  regulations,  but  it  had  to  depend 
upon  the  residents'  voluntary  compli- 
ance because  there  was  no  legally 
constituted  civil  court  on  post  to 
which  cases  might  be  remanded.  The 
council,  which  met  regularly  with  rep- 
resentatives of  the  laboratory  and  the 
post  commander,  also  submitted  rec- 
ommendations on  community  affairs 
and  devoted  considerable  time  to 
problems  of  community  welfare.  It 
gave  particular  attention  to  measures 
that  would  improve  living  conditions, 
including  establishment  and  oper- 
ation of  self-help  laundries,  more 
convenient  hours  of  operation  at  post 
exchanges  and  messes,  provision  of 
extra  storage  and  living  space  in 
apartments,  reduction  in  rental  rates, 
and  development  of  children's  recre- 
ational facilities.  Viewing  the  work  of 
the  council  in  retrospect.  General 
Groves  recalls  that,  though  "it  was  a 
thorn  in  the  side  of  the  station  com- 
mander .  .  .  ,  on  the  whole  it  was  a 
valuable  adjunct,  for  it  not  only  im- 
proved the  morale  of  the  communitv. 


state.  Hence,  in  the  presidential  election  of  1944, 
they  could  vote  only  by  absentee  ballot.  Neverthe- 
less, New  Mexico  did  require  that  I.os  Alamos  resi- 
dents pav  the  state  income  tax.  See  ibid.,  pp.  6.33- 
6.43  and  6.55,  DAS.A. 


but    kept    the   post    administration   on 
its  toes."  ^^ 

As  operating  contractor,  the  Uni- 
versity of  California  had  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  often  difficult  and  deli- 
cate task  of  administering  civilian 
housing — establishing  rental  rates  and 
other  charges,  determining  housing 
assignment  quotas,  and  providing  for 
additional  facilities.  The  university  set 
up  an  on-site  housing  office,  where  an 
Army  liaison  officer  maintained  day- 
to-day  familiarity  with  developments 
in  this  crucial  area  of  community  ad- 
ministration. Following  the  guidance 
of  General  Accounting  Office  regula- 
tions, the  university  determined  rates 
in  accordance  with  the  annual  salary 
of  the  renter  and  then  the  district  en- 
gineer, in  compliance  with  Orders  B 
issued  by  the  War  Department  in 
1943,  reviewed  and  approved  these 
rates.  The  university  established 
charges  for  utilities  on  the  basis  of  a 
study  of  rates  assessed  tenants  in 
other  projects  where  the  government 
furnished  housing  and  then  submitted 
its  rate  schedule  to  the  District  for  ap- 
proval. Although  an  investigation  in 
the  spring  of  1944  revealed  that  these 
charges  were  far  less  than  actual 
costs,  the  Army  decided  not  to  in- 
crease them  and  further  aggravate  an 
already  restive  civilian  community.  ^^ 

No  effort  received  more  careful  at- 
tention and  wider  support  from  the 
highly  educated  scientists  and  techni- 
cians than  establishment  of  a  free 
public  school  system.  In  the  spring  of 


'^Quotation  from  (iroves.  Xow  It  Can  Bf  Told,  p. 
164.  See  also  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  I,  pp.  6.59-6.60, 
DASA. 

"MDH.  Bk.  8,  \()1.  1,  pp.  6.5-6.9  and  Apps.  CI 
(Utilitv  Charjres   at    I.os   Alamos),   IIASA;   I.tr.   Ash- 

Continucd 


476 


MANHAII  AN:  IHE  ARMY  AND  IHE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


1943,  because  existing  school  facili- 
ties were  inadequate  to  accommodate 
a  burgeoning  school-age  population, 
the  post  commander  and  laboratory 
director  acted  jointly  to  appoint  a  six- 
man  school  committee  (later,  a  per- 
manent eight-man  school  board)  to 
supervise  the  construction  of  a  new 
school  building,  plan  a  curriculum, 
and  employ  a  teaching  staff.  As  a  con- 
sultant, the  committee  hired  Walter 
W.  Cook,  professor  of  education  at 
the  University  of  Minnesota.  Assisted 
by  B.  E.  Brazier,  the  laboratory's  con- 
struction and  maintenance  division 
chief.  Cook  developed  plans  for  a 
combined  elementary  and  high  school 
building  incorporating  all  the  newest 
features  in  school  construction.  The 
school  opened  in  the  fall  with  140 
pupils,  and  enrollment  by  1945  rose 
to  more  than  300.  Later,  a  partially 
self-supporting  nursery  school,  pri- 
marily intended  for  the  preschool  age 
children  of  working  mothers,  supple- 
mented the  regular  school  system. 
Except  for  the  nursery  school,  attend- 
ance for  Los  Alamos  residents  was 
completely  free  of  charge,  with  the 
government  paying  all  expenses  (di- 
rectly for  maintenance  and,  through 
the  University  of  California  contract, 
for  teachers'  salaries). ^^ 

bridge  to  Dist  Engr,  sub:  Rent  Reduction  for  Impro- 
vised Qiiarlers,  7  Jan  44,  copy  in  ibid.,  App.  D18, 
DASA;  I.tr,  Lt  Col  J.  M.  Harman  (CO,  Los  Alamos) 
to  Dist  Engr.  sub:  Establishment  of  Rates  for  Qiiar- 
ters  for  the  Operating  Contractors'  Employees  on 
the  Zia  (Los  Alamos)  Proj,  10  Eeb  43,  copy  in  ibid., 
App.  D20,  DASA;  Ltr,  Tyler  (CO,  Los  Alamos)  to 
Oppenheimer,  Attn.:  Charles  D.  Shane,  sub:  Rental 
Rates  for  Familv  Qiiarters,  10  Mar  45,  copy  in  ibid., 
App.  D22,  DASA;  WD  Orders  B,  15  Jan  43;  Second 
Memo  on  the  Los  Alamos  Proj  (by  Stevenson,  Proj 
Mgr),  MDR. 

'»MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  pp.  6.65-6.67  and  Apps. 
C2  (Chart,  Total  Cost  to  Govt  of  Maintainmg 
Schools  for  Los  Alamos  During  School  Years,  1945- 


POr  military  personnel  at  Los 
Alamos,  the  Army  provided  the  stand- 
ard information  and  education  pro- 
gram authorized  for  military  posts. 
The  post  chaplain,  Capt.  Mathew 
Imrie,  who  also  served  as  the  infor- 
mation and  education  officer,  advised 
MP,  WAC,  PED,  SED,  and  other  unit 
commanders  on  educational  matters, 
arranged  regular  night  school  cours- 
es, and  administered  the  U.S.  Armed 
Forces  Institute  correspondence 
course  program.  ^^ 

Strong  support  for  the  best  educa- 
tional facilities  was  at  least  partially 
motivated  by  continuing  concern  over 
community  morale.  Not  only  did  it 
eliminate  one  dissatisfaction,  but 
after-hours  educational  opportunities 
were  a  well-tested  means  for  engaging 
servicemen  in  a  personally  satisfying 
activity  during  nonduty  hours.  The 
causes  for  declining  morale  at  Los 
Alamos  in  1944  and  early  1945  were 
many.  Such  irritants  as  censorship  of 
mail,  alleged  and  real  inequities  in 
wages,  differences  in  social  back- 
ground, restrictions  on  access  to  serv- 
ice and  recreational  facilities,  and 
shortages  of  housing  tended  to  be 
magnified.  Some  of  these  factors,  too, 
enhanced  the  conflicts  that  often  arise 
between  civilians  and  the  military,  es- 
pecially where,  as  at  Los  Alamos, 
most  civilian  scientists  and  technicians 
came  from  an  academic  and  social 
background  quite  different  from  that 
of  manv  of  the  servicemen. ^^ 


46  and  1946-47)  and  D13  (Data  on  Misc  Post 
Bldgs),  and  Vol.  2,  pp.  III.9-III.10,  DASA;  Memo, 
Oppenheimer  to  Groves,  sub:  Rpt  of  Spec  Review- 
ing Committee  on  Los  Alamos  Proj,  27  May  43, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  C.orresp,  600.12  (Development), 
MDR;  (Proves,  Xozv  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  166. 

'HIDH,  Bk.  8.  Vol.  1,  pp.  6.56-6.57,  DASA. 

2oibid.,   Vol.   2,   pp.   III. 11,   III.13-IIL14,   III. 19- 

Continued 


IHK  AIOMIC  COMMIMI  II  .S  IN  NKW  MKXICX) 


477 


lypical  of  morale  problems  was  a 
custodial  employee's  complaint  of 
racial  discrimination  (in  this  case, 
against  a  person  of  Spanish  ancestry) 
in  assignment  of  housing.  The  em- 
ployee wrote  to  both  of  New  Mexico's 
I'nited  States  senators  that  post  hous- 
ing authorities  had  forced  him  to 
move  out  of  an  apartment  that  he  had 
occupied  for  some  time  into  inferior 
quarters,  in  order  to  make  room  for 
newly  arrived  scientific  and  technical 
personnel.  The  Army  informed  the 
two  senators  that  the  District  had 
built  the  housing  in  question  for  oc- 
cupancv  by  highly  paid  staff  members 
of  the  laboratory.  Pending  arrival  of 
this  professional  personnel  in  Los 
Alamos,  housing  officials  had  permit- 
ted custodial  employees  to  live  in  it 
on  a  temporary  basis.  Now  these  em- 
ployees were  being  reassigned,  with- 
out regard  to  race  or  nationality,  to 
other  quarters  that  were  in  every  re- 
spect adequate  for  their  needs.  To 
make  certain  that  the  rather  large 
number  of  other  Spanish-Americans 
living  on  the  post  fully  understood 
the  reasons  for  reassignment  of  hous- 
ing units.  Colonel  Ashbridge  met  with 
representatives  of  the  group,  assur- 
ing them  that  the  Army  was  continu- 
ing its  efforts  to  relieve  the  housing 
shortage. ^^ 

To  check  the  erosion  of  morale,  the 
Armv,  through  its  Special  Services  or- 

111.22,  DASA;  Rpt,  sub;  ClomplKations  oi  l.os 
Alamos  Proj,  12  Nov  4(").  MDR;  (woves,  Xmv  It  Can 
Br  Told.  pp.  164-66  and  l()8-69. 

^' See  corrcspondeiKc  in  Admin  Files.  Cicn  (^or- 
resp,  330.14  (l.os  Alamos).  MDR  tspcciallv  I.ir,  Sen 
Carl  A.  Hatch  (N.Mcx.)  to  Sc-(\  War,  6  Mar  44,  and 
attached  suggested  lepK  prepared  in  (iroves's 
olFice;  I.tr,  Col  R.  R.  Nevland  (I)iv  Kngr,  Dallas, 
lex.)  to  .Sen  Dennis  Chavez  (N.Mex.),  18  Mar  44; 
and  Memo,  Ashbridge  to  (iroves,  20  Mar  44. 


gani/ation  on  the  post,  pursued  a  vig- 
orous program  of  countermeasures  in 
other  areas  of  community  activity. 
Special  Services  greatly  expanded  a 
limited  civilian  program,  begun  by  a 
former  teacher  of  the  Ranch  School. 
It  added  tennis  courts,  softball  fields, 
a  golf  course,  and  a  bowling  alley;  as- 
sisted residents  in  taking  advantage  of 
the  unexcelled  opportunities  for  out- 
door recreation  (camj)ing,  hiking, 
skiing,  and  mountain  climbing);  pro- 
vided motion  pictures  and  other  pro- 
grams in  the  two  post  theaters;  and 
encouraged  residents  to  sponsor  such 
activities  as  lectures,  dances,  art 
shows,  and  monthlv  musicals.  The 
Army  also  encouraged  residents  to 
organize  and  participate  in  those 
typical  groups  found  in  most  Amer- 
ican communities — Boy  Scouts,  a 
chess  club,  a  little  theater  group, 
and  so  on — and  assigned  the  post 
chaplain  responsibility  for  arrang- 
ing religious  services  after  the  part- 
time  services  by  priests  and  ministers 
from  Santa  Fe  had  proved  generally 
unsatisfactory.^^ 

Given  the  inherent  character  of 
many  of  the  factors  that  adversely  af- 
fected morale,  the  Army,  of  course, 
could  never  hope  to  find  completely 
satisfactory  solutions  for  all  the  prob- 
lems of  the  Los  Alamos  community. 
Nevertheless,  it  was  largely  successful 
in  preventing  any  of  these  factors 
from  seriously  disrupting  the  life  of 
the  operating  community  and  thereby 
impeding  or  dela\ing  development  of 
the  atomic  bomb. 


"MDH.  Bk.  8,  \ol.   1,  pp.  6.5,5-6.56.  6.57-6..58, 
App.  D12.  DA.S,\:  (;r<)ves  Diaiv,  24  Jul  44,  I.RC;. 


478 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Trinity:   The  Base  Camp 

The  establishment  of  the  Trinity 
base  camp  in  the  Jornada  del  Muerto 
valley  east  of  the  Rio  Grande  in  New 
Mexico  brought  suddenly,  albeit  for  a 
very  brief  time,  a  great  influx  of  men 
and  machines  to  a  region  hitherto 
home  for  only  a  few  hardy  farmers 
and  ranchers. ^^  Unlike  the  residents 
of  the  temporary  Hanford  construc- 
tion camp  in  the  sagebrush  wilderness 
west  of  the  Columbia  River  in  Wash- 
ington State,  the  men  of  Trinity  were 
highly  trained  scientists  and  techni- 
cians from  the  parent  community  of 
Los  Alamos  who  had  trekked  from 
the  Pajarito  Plateau  to  the  desolate 
Jornada  to  complete  their  unique 
military-scientific  mission:  the  test  of 
an  atomic  device.  Dedicated  in  their 
commitment  to  science,  they  now 
turned  to  preparing  the  Trinity  site 
for  this  dramatic  event,  which,  in  an 
instant,  would  alter,  decisively,  the 
course  of  human  history. 

Flanked  by  low-lying  mountains 
that  added  a  certain  primitive  beauty 
to  the  otherwise  drab  sameness  of  the 
seemingly  endless  desert  landscape, 
the  Trinity  site  comprised  an  18-  by 
24-mile  tract  of  land  in  the  northwest 
corner  of  the  Jornada,  which  itself 
formed  the  northern  portion  of  the 
huge  Alamogordo  Army  Air  Field 
{Map  6).  In  the  summer  of  1944,  Ken- 
neth Bainbridge,  the  Harvard  physi- 
cist assigned  by  Oppenheimer  to 
oversee  preparations  for  the  bomb 
test  and  the  base  camp,  chose  this  ex- 
panse of  New  Mexico  desert  over  sev- 
eral other  locations  because  he  felt  it 


^'Section  on  the  Trinity  site  based  on  MDH,  Bk. 
8,  Vol.  1,  pp.  6.30  and  7.10-7.11,  and  Vol.  2,  pp. 
XV11I.2-XVIII.4,  DASA;  Lamont,  Day  of  Tn,u!\.  pp. 
73-76  and  94-95;  Kunetka,  City  of  Fire.  pp.   14.5-49. 


best  met  the  criteria  established  by 
Los  Alamos  scientists:  flat  terrain  for 
minimizing  extraneous  blast  effects 
and  for  construction  of  roads  and 
communications  lines;  sufficient  dis- 
tance from  populated  areas  but  close 
enough  to  Los  Alamos  to  avoid  an 
undue  loss  of  time  in  travel  by  labora- 
tory staff  members;  clear  and  sunny 
weather,  on  the  average,  that  would 
permit  the  extensive  collection  of  op- 
tical data;  and  convenience  to  good 
transportation  by  rail  (main  line  of 
the  Atchison,  Topeka  and  Santa  Fe 
Railroad)  and  by  highway  (U.S.  85  and 
380). 24 

Beginning  in  the  fall,  Bainbridge 
and  his  Project  Trinity  group  worked 
closely  with  Capt.  Samuel  P.  Davalos, 
post  engineer  at  Los  Alamos  in 
charge  of  the  Operations  Division's 
Technical  Area  Section,  to  develop 
plans  for  a  base  camp  at  the  Trinity 
site,  to  include  a  bomb  test  area  with 
technical  facilities  and  a  campsite  that 
would  serve  the  needs  of  at  least  160 
men.  Meanwhile,  to  expedite  con- 
struction at  the  camp,  the  Army  ar- 
ranged a  contract  with  a  Lubbock, 
Texas,  construction  firm,  which  soon 
dispatched  workmen  to  Trinity  to 
build  barracks,  officers  quarters,  a 
mess  hall,  and  other  support  facilities. 
At  the  end  of  December,  when  these 
basic     facilities     were     completed,     a 

^■•The  choice  of  the  Trinity  site  came  after  Bain- 
bridge's  group  had  considered  seven  other  possible 
locations  for  the  test:  three  in  New  Mexico  (the  Tu- 
larosa  valley  northwest  of  the  town  of  Alamogordo, 
the  lava  region  south  of  Grants,  and  the  plateau 
southwest  of  Cuba  and  northeast  of  Thoreau);  two 
in  California  (the  Army's  desert  training  area  in  the 
southeast  part  of  the  state,  near  Rice,  and  San  Nico- 
las Island  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  southwest  of  Los  An- 
geles); one  in  Texas  (the  sandbars  off  the  south 
coast);  and  one  in  Colorado  (the  San  Luis  Vallev 
region  near  the  Great  Sand  l^unes  National  Monu- 
ment). See  MI^H,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  p.  X\in.2,  DASA. 


TRINITY  TEST  SITE 

1945 

Contour  interval  in  feet 


MILES 


MAP  6 


480 


MANHAIIAN:  I  HE  ARMY  AND  THE  AIOMIC  BOMB 


Trinity  Base  Camp 


small  MP  detachment  under  the  com- 
mand of  Lt.  Harold  C.  Bush  arrived 
from  Los  Alamos  to  provide  securitv 
for  the  satellite  community.  This  van- 
guard was  soon  followed  by  a  much 
larger  group  of  scientists,  technicians, 
medics,  civil  service  personnel,  and 
construction  workers. 

As  1945  unfolded,  the  activity  of 
the  more  than  two  hundred  camp 
residents  intensified  in  a  concerted 
effort  to  ready  all  technical  facilities 
for  the  bomb  test,  tentatively  sched- 
uled for  early  summer.  Under  the  su- 
pervision of  the  Project  Trinity 
group,  civilian  construction  crews — 
aided  by  additional  construction  per- 
sonnel brought  down  from  Los 
Alamos — built  warehouses;  repair 
shops;  bomb-proof  structures;  an  ex- 
plosives   magazine;    a    stockroom    to 


house  equipment  shipped  from  the 
Hill;  an  unloading  platform  on  the 
railroad  siding  at  Pope,  which  was 
some  25  miles  west  of  the  site;  a  com- 
missary; and  more  barracks.  4  hey  also 
constructed  more  than  20  miles  of 
blacktopped  roads  for  a  fleet  of  some 
one  hundred  motor  vehicles,  erected 
200  miles  of  telephone  wire,  and  in- 
stalled electric  water  pumps  and  port- 
able generators. 

As  at  Los  Alamos,  sustaining  com- 
munity morale  among  the  residents  of 
I  rinity  was  a  continuing  problem.  Be- 
cause of  strict  security  requirements, 
no  one  could  leave  the  base  camp 
except  on  official  missions.  And  as 
the  time  for  the  test  approached,  in- 
creasingly long  hours  of  work  under 
conditions  of  extreme  heat  and  expo- 
sure to  a  variety  of  poisonous  reptiles 


THE  AlOMIC  COMMIM  riES  IN  NEW  MEXICO 


481 


and  insects  added  to  the  stress,  strain, 
and  fatigue.  Hence,  project  leaders  at 
Trinity  made  a  special  effort  to  supplv 
good  food,  reasonably  comfortable 
cjuarters,  and  a  variety  of  recreational 
sports  and  activities.  Lieutenant  Bush, 
in  particular,  took  a  personal  interest 
in  improving  morale  in  the  communi- 
t\.  He  assumed  the  additional  duty  of 
making  certain  that  adec^uate  housing 
and  feeding  facilities  were  available 
for  the  expanding  population,  and  he 
also  provided  organized  athletics, 
local  hunting  trips,  a  game  room,  and 
nightly  movies.  The  success  of  these 
measures  is  evidenced  by  the  fact 
that,  by  mid-summer  1945,  the  essen- 
tial technical  facilities  at  Trinity  were 
all  ready  for  the  crucial  test  of  man- 
kind's first  atomic  explosion. 

While  many  times  in  the  past  the 
Army  had  to  establish  communities 
for  special  and  unusual  purposes  in 
remote  and  often  inhospitable  places, 
nothing  had  quite  prepared  it  for  Los 
Alamos  and   Irinity.  For  a  number  of 


reasons,  the  parent  community  and  its 
satellite  were  unicjue  in  the  American 
experience:  They  assembled,  for  the 
first  time,  a  small  army  c^f  scientists 
and  technicians  in  a  central  laboratory 
to  achieve  a  single  objective;  they  iso- 
lated this  group  for  many  months 
under  difficult  living  conditions  and 
grueling  work  schedules;  iind  they 
functioned  as  a  military  reservation  in 
compliance  with  strict  security  regula- 
tions. Ihese  circumstances  inevitably 
produced  some  serious  stresses  and 
strains  on  the  fabric  of  community  life 
for  the  civilians,  who  were  unaccus- 
tomed to  the  strong  military  direction 
over  their  civic  activities.  But  the 
Army  administration,  working  patient- 
ly and  skillfully  through  Oppenheimer 
and  other  civilian  leaders,  clealt  effec- 
tively with  each  potentially  disruptive 
situation  and  succeeded  in  maintain- 
ing a  community  environment  that 
sustained  the  large-scale  collaborative 
effort  between  the  government  and 
science  to  design  and  test  an  atomic 
weapon. 


PART  FOUR 
THE  BOMB 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


The  Los  Alamos  Weapon  Program 


The  ultimate  focus  of  the  Manhat- 
tan Project's  manifold  activities — 
production  of  fissionable  materials; 
procurement  of  raw  materials,  man- 
power, and  process  support;  estab- 
lishment of  security,  health,  and 
safety  programs;  and  construction  of 
atomic  communities — was  the  Los 
Alamos  Laboratory  weapon  program. 
Actively  under  way  by  the  spring  of 
1943,  its  major  objectives,  as  General 
Groves  succinctly  summarized  them, 
were  "to  carry  on  research  and 
experiment[s]  necessary  to  the  final 
purification  of  the  production  materi- 
al, its  fabrication  into  suitable  active 
components,  the  combination  of  these 
components  into  a  fully  developed 
usable  weapon,  and  to  complete  the 
above  in  time  to  make  effective  use  of 
the  weapon  as  soon  as  the  necessary 
amount  of  basic  material  has  been 
manufactured."  ^ 

Planning  Phase 

Whether  the  Army  could  attain  the 
objectives  of  the  Los  Alamos  weapon 
program  greatly  depended  on  its  abil- 


'  Quotation  from  I.tr,  Ciroves  to  Oppenheimer, 
26  Jan  44,  Admin  Piles,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12 
(\-12),  MDR.  This  description  of  the  objectives  of 
the  I.os  Alamos  program  was  a  slightly  amended 
statement  taken  from  MP('  Rpl,  21  Aug  43,  OCX". 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  2."i,   I  ab  F,  MDR. 


ity  to  build  and  operate  a  major  sci- 
entific and  engineering  organization 
at  the  isolated  New  Mexico  site.  Be- 
cause the  technical  problems  corollary 
to  bomb  development  were  in  many 
respects  unique,  few  precedents  exist- 
ed to  guide  Manhattan's  military 
and  civilian  scientific  leaders  in  orga- 
nizing and  staffing  the  bomb  labora- 
tory. Hence,  in  carrying  out  these  first 
steps  of  the  weapon  program,  they 
adopted  a  generally  pragmatic  and  ad 
hoc  approach. 

Efforts  of  Groves  and  Oppenheimer 

Because  of  the  need  for  maximum 
security,  the  atomic  leaders  concluded 
that  a  normal  Corps  of  Engineers  ad- 
ministrative organization — district  en- 
gineer supervision  and  control,  area 
engineer  liaison  and  support — was 
not  feasible  at  Los  Alamos.  For  this 
reason.  Groves  himself  assumed  many 
functions  of  both  offices.  Working 
closely  with  the  civilian  head  of  the 
bomb  laboratory,  J.  Robert  Oppen- 
heimer, the  Manhattan  commander 
not  only  exercised  broad  policy  con- 
trol over  the  weapon  program  but 
also  regularly  intervened  in  day-to- 
day operations,  using  telephone  and 
teletype  means  of  communications 
and  frequent  personal  visits  to  main- 


486 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


J.  Robert  Oppenheimer 

tain  surprisingly  dose  supervision. 
Though  his  most  important  contact 
was  through  Oppenheimer,  he  also 
acted  through  the  facilities  of  the  Al- 
buquerque District  and  the  Los 
Alamos  military  organization,  as  well 
as  through  certain  individual  Army 
and  Navy  liaison  officers  assigned  to 
the  weapon  program.  With  this  ad- 
ministrative arrangement  in  effect,  the 
role  of  the  prime  contractor,  the  Uni- 
versity of  California,  was  narrowly 
confined  to  the  details  of  business 
management  and  procurement  for  the 
laboratory.^ 

The  personal  leadership  of  Groves 
and  Oppenheimer  was  particularly 
evident  in  some  of  their  early  admin- 
istrative actions.  In  late  January  1943, 


^For  a  record  of  Groves's  frequent  personal  inter- 
ventions in  Los  Alamos  operations  see  Groves 
Diary,  Nov  1942-Aug  1945,  LRG.  On  the  limited 
role  of  the  Universitv  of  California  see  MDH,  Bk.  8, 
Vol.  2,  "Technical,  ■  p.  III.6,  DASA;  Interv,  Fine, 
Remington,  and  Ralph  F.  Weld  with  Groves,  1 1  Feb 
64,  CMH  and  OCEHD. 


Groves  selected  Lt.  Col.  John  M. 
Harman,  a  Corps  of  Engineers  officer 
with  a  degree  in  civil  engineering,  as 
the  first  commanding  officer  of  the 
Los  Alamos  post.  At  the  same  time, 
he  requested  the  War  Department's 
Services  of  Supply  to  furnish  and 
train  military  personnel  for  the  post, 
specifying  allotment  of  military  police, 
engineer,  and  medical  troops  in  time 
for  activation  of  Los  Alamos  as  a 
Class  IV  installation  on  1  April  1943. 
In  consultation  with  James  B.  Conant, 
he  drew  up  a  statement  on  the  orga- 
nization, function,  and  responsibilities 
of  the  various  elements  that  would  be 
located  at  Los  Alamos,  clearly  delin- 
eating the  division  of  local  responsi- 
bilities between  Oppenheimer,  the 
scientific  director,  and  Colonel 
Harman,  the  post  commander.  In 
meetings  with  LIniversity  of  California 
officials  during  February  and  March, 
Groves  worked  out  business  and  pro- 
curement arrangements  for  Los 
Alamos,  including  establishment,  for 
reasons  of  security,  of  the  laboratory's 
main  procurement  office  in  Los 
Angeles.^ 


'^  Official  Army  Register,  1  Jan  44  (Barman's  promo- 
tion to  colonel,  effective  15  Feb  43);  Groves  Diary, 
27  and  29  Jan,  1,  13,  22-25,  27  Feb,  8,  10-12,  14- 
15  and  19  Mar  43,  LRG;  Ltr,  Conant  and  Ciroves  to 
Oppenheimer,  25  Feb  43,  copv  in  MDH.  Bk.  8, 
\'ol.  2,  App.  1,  DASA;  Memos,  Groves  to  CG  SOS, 
sub:  Org  and  Assignment  of  Mil  Org,  28  Jan  and 
22  Feb  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  322  (Los 
Alamos),  MDR;  Memo,  Groves  to  CG  SOS,  sub:  Ac- 
tivation and  Administration  of  Los  Alamos, 
27  Feb  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.2  (Los 
Alamos),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  "General,"  p. 
7.1,  \'ol.  2,  pp.  1,5  and  1.9,  and  \'oI.  3,  "Auxiliary 
Activities,"  pp.  1.1-1.4  and  App.  Al,  DASA.  All 
Army  installations  in  the  zone  of  interior  were  clas- 
sified into  four  categories.  Class  IV  installations 
were  technical  in  nature,  such  as  government-owned 
manufacturing  plants,  proving  grounds,  and  the 
Signal    Corps    Photographic    Center    in    New    York. 

Conlinued 


THE  LOS  ALAMOS  WEAPON  PROGRAM 


487 


Meanwhile,  Oppenheimer  was  visit- 
ing various  universities  and  institu- 
tions to  enlist  a  cadre  of  scientists  for 
his  laboratory.  But  the  shortage  of 
scientific  manpower,  caused  by  the 
special  needs  of  other  war  projects, 
and  certain  misgivings  about  the  re- 
strictive military  character  of  the  new 
laboratory  hindered  his  initial  efforts. 
To  alleviate  the  scientists'  doubts  on 
this  score,  Oppenheimer  reassured 
prospective  recruits  with  a  promise 
from  Conant  and  Groves  that,  for  at 
least  the  first  phase  of  the  program, 
the  laboratory  would  function  on  a 
strictly  civilian  basis  and  that  the  staff 
would  not  be  militarized  until  actual 
fabrication  of  a  weapon  began. 

This  approach  improved  Oppen- 
heimer's  recruiting  efforts,  especially 
among  scientists  already  engaged  in 
some  aspect  of  atomic  research.  Start- 
ing with  members  of  Manhattan's 
fast-neutron  team — it  included  univer- 
sity scientists  from  California  (Berke- 
ley), Minnesota,  Wisconsin,  Stanford, 
and  Purdue — Oppenheimer  added 
other  scientists  from  the  University  of 
Chicago's  Metallurgical  Laboratory, 
among  them  the  Hungarian-refugee 
physicist  Edward  Teller,  and  from 
Princeton  University's  now  discontin- 
ued program  for  isotopic  separation 
of  uranium.  In  addition,  he  attracted 
a  scattering  of  scientists  from  other 
universities — Rochester,  Illinois,  Co- 
lumbia, and  Iowa  State — and  from 
other  research  organizations,  includ- 
ing the  Geophysics  Laboratory  at  the 
Carnegie  Institution,  the  Radiation 
Laboratorv  at  the  Massachusetts  Insti- 


I  he  duties  of  ronimanding  generals  of  ser\ice  com- 
mands to  Class  IV  installations  were  limited  to  spec- 
ified services.  See  Millelt,  Army  Senncc  Forres,  pp. 
314-15. 


tute  of  Technology  (MIT),  the  Army's 
Ballistic  Research  Laboratory  at  Aber- 
deen, Maryland,  the  National  Bureau 
of  Standards,  and  the  Westinghouse 
Research  Laboratories  in  Pittsburgh.'* 
Oppenheimer  and  a  skeleton  staff 
of  scientists  arrived  at  Los  Alamos  in 
mid-March,  despite  the  unfinished 
state  of  the  community  and  technical 
facilities.  In  the  ensuing  months,  how- 
ever, there  was  a  rapid  increase  in  the 
influx  of  personnel,  both  military  and 
civilian.  By  early  June,  Los  Alamos 
had  more  than  300  officer  and  enlist- 
ed personnel  and  almost  460  civilians 
(160  civil  service  employees  and  300 
scientists  and  technicians  on  the  Uni- 
versity of  California  payroll).  Finally, 
with  sufficient  personnel  on  hand, 
both  the  new  post  commander,  Lt. 
Col.  Whitney  Ashbridge — Groves  had 
relieved  Colonel  Harman  in  May  be- 
cause of  his  inability  to  get  along  with 
some  of  the  scientific  leaders — and 
Oppenheimer  turned  to  the  many 
problems  of  completing  their  respec- 
tive organizations,  especially  those  re- 
lating to  establishment  of  essential 
coordination  between  the  laboratory 
and  post  administrations.  To  guide 
them  in  this  task,  they  had  at  least  the 
initial  outlines  of  the  unfolding 
weapon  program.^ 


"MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1. 7-1. 8  and  App.  1, 
DASA;  Ltr,  Conant  to  Groves.  26  Mar  43.  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files.  Fldr  23,  MDR;  Smyth 
Report,  pp.  143-44  and  151;  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 
Xew  World,  p.  231. 

*MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  p.  7.2  and  Apps.  B2  (Org 
(>hart,  I.OS  Alamos  Post  Administration,  5  Jun  43) 
and  B7  (Graph,  Payroll  Census  Data  of  I.os  Alamos, 
1942-46),  and  Vol.  2,  p.  111.  DASA;  Groves  Diary, 
29  May  43,  LRG;  Fine  et  al.  Interv,  II  Feb  64, 
CMH  and  OCEHD. 


488 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


The  April  Conferences 

Basic  planning  for  developing  and 
testing  an  atomic  weapon  was  the  re- 
sponsibility of  a  formal  steering 
board,  set  up  by  Oppenheimer  in  late 
March.  The  board  began  its  work  in 
early  April  and  conducted  a  series  of 
orientation  and  planning  conferences 
throughout  the  month.  During  the 
orientation  conferences,  held  in  the 
first  half  of  the  month,  the  board  pro- 
vided the  newly  arriving  laboratory 
staff  members  with  state-of-the-art  in- 
formation on  atomic  energy  as  a 
weapon  of  war.  During  the  planning 
conferences,  held  in  the  last  half  of 
the  month,  the  board  and  a  group  of 
scientific  professionals  reviewed  the 
nuclear  physics  background  and  es- 
tablished research  objectives  for  the 
weapon  program.  Taking  part  is  these 
meetings  were  selected  laboratory 
staff  members,  visiting  consultants 
(Isidor  I.  Rabi  from  MIT's  Radiation 
Laboratory  and  Samuel  K.  Allison 
and  Enrico  Fermi  from  the  Metallur- 
gical Laboratory),  and  members  of  a 
special  reviewing  committee.^ 

The  April  conferences  made  it  very 
clear  that  what  was  known  about  the 
explosibility  of  uranium  and  plutoni- 
um  and  the  design  of  an  atomic 
weapon  was  still  highly  theoretical. 
The  one  area  in  which  nuclear  re- 
search had  progressed  significantly 
beyond  the  theoretical  was  in  the 
chemistry  and  metallurgy  of  uranium 
and  plutonium,  and  this  had  occurred 
only  because  project  scientists  had 
had  to  conduct  extensive  research 
into  this  aspect  of  the  two  elements  to 
provide  the  necessary  developmental 


data  for  the  fissionable  materials  pro- 
duction processes  at  Clinton  and 
Hanford.  In  virtually  every  other 
aspect  essential  to  bomb  develop- 
ment— the  experimental  physics  re- 
search; the  design,  engineering,  and 
fabrication  of  bomb  components;  and 
the  assembly  and  testing  of  a 
weapon — the  essential  work  remained 
to  be  accomplished.  What  then  pre- 
cisely was  known  in  April  1943?'^ 

Theoretical  research  had  estab- 
lished that  a  single  kilogram  of  U-235 
has  a  potential  energy  release  of  up 
to  17,000  tons  of  TNT.  To  achieve 
this  release  of  energy  there  had  to  be 
a  fast-neutron  chain  reaction,  which 
was  theoretically  possible  in  uranium, 
plutonium,  and  certain  other  ele- 
ments, but  most  feasible  in  active  ma- 
terial composed  largely  of  the  iso- 
topes U-235  or  Pu-239.  A  fast  chain 
reaction  could  occur  only  with  the  as- 
sembly of  a  sufficient  quantity  of 
active  material  in  a  configuration  in 
which  natural  leakage  of  neutrons  did 
not  occur  at  so  high  a  level  that  the 
chain  reaction  was  quenched.  An 
important  step  was  to  design  a 
mechanism  that  would  provide  the 
proper  configuration  for  attaining 
criticality  upon  detonation.  Theoreti- 
cal research  had  already  given  consid- 
erable attention  to  weapon  design, 
but  the  major  problem  still  to  be 
solved  was  how  to  avoid  prefission- 
ing,  or  predetonation. 

Addressing  this  problem,  the  con- 
ferees reviewed  and  discussed  several 


«MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2.  p.  Ml,  DASA;  Hewlett  and 
Anderson,  \'ew  World,  pp.  235-36. 


'  Discussion  on  the  state  of  knowledge  in  April 
1943  is  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1. 11-1.12, 
DASA;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew  World,  pp.  232- 
35;  Rpt,  Spec  Reviewing  Committee  on  Los  Alamos 
Proj,  10  May  43,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12 
(Development),  MDR;  Memo,  Tolman,  sub:  Los 
Alamos  Proj  as  of  Mar  43,  OSRD. 


IHK  LOS  ALAMOS  WEAPON  PROGRAM 


489 


weapon  assembly  methods  as  possible 
solutions,  rhev  immediately  discount- 
ed those  methods  that  required  either 
too  much  active  material  (as  in 
the  autocatalytic,  or  self-assembling, 
method)  or  employment  of  an  atomic 
explosion  to  trigger  fusion  (as  in  a 
thermonuclear  bomb  using  a  mass  of 
deuterium  as  the  source  of  its 
energy).  In  their  estimation  the  most 
feasible  design  was  the  gun-assembly 
method,  comprised  of  a  cannon  in 
which  an  explosive-propelled  projec- 
tile containing  one  portion  of  active 
material  is  shot  through  a  second 
target  containing  another  portion  of 
material — thus  achieving  criticality. 

The  conferees  were  confident  that 
the  gun-assembly  method,  if  properly 
engineered,  would  work  with  the  iso- 
tope L'-235,  because  of  its  properties; 
however,  they  were  considerably  less 
certain  about  its  feasibility  for  Pu- 
239,  partly  because  the  continued 
scarcity  of  this  isotope  had  limited  the 
amount  of  study  that  could  be  made 
of  its  chemical  and  metallurgical 
properties.  Realizing  the  pile  method 
of  producing  Pu-239  made  that  sub- 
stance most  likely  to  be  the  active  ma- 
terial available  in  the  largest  quanti- 
ties, the  conferees  were  especially 
anxious  to  find  a  design  suitable  for 
its  employment.  Continued  discus- 
sions indicated  that  the  implosion 
concept  offered  the  best  promise  of 
success  for  plutonium.  In  a  weapon  of 
this  design,  a  quantitv  of  active  mate- 
rial in  a  subcritical  shape  would  be 
surrounded  with  layers  of  ordinary 
explosive  in  such  a  way  that,  upon 
detonation,  the  active  material  would 
be  compressed  into  a  critical  configu- 
ration and  the  last  chain  reaction 
would  take  place.  Later  research  re- 
vealed    that     the     implosion     design 


would  produce  an  effective  atomic  ex- 
plosion using  considerably  less  active 
material  than  the  gun  method — a  fact 
especially  appealing  to  Manhattan 
leaders. 

1  he  April  conferences  provided 
Groves,  Oppenheimer,  and  other 
Manhattan  leaders  with  new  insight 
into  what  the  immediate  emphasis 
and  direction  of  the  weapon  program 
must  be  by  identifying  the  specific  re- 
search objectives  that  would  produce 
the  necessary  data  not  only  for  timely 
design  and  fabrication  of  an  atomic 
weapon  but  also  for  an  understanding 
of  its  destructive  effect.  First,  because 
information  on  the  amount  of  damage 
that  would  result  from  an  atomic  blast 
was  almost  totally  lacking,  the  confer- 
ees prescribed  the  collection  of  sys- 
tematic data  on  the  likely  physical, 
psychological,  and  mechanical  effects 
of  an  explosion  of  the  magnitude  of 
an  atomic  bomb — realizing,  of  course, 
that  part  of  that  data  would  have  to 
await  an  actual  test  of  an  atomic 
device.  Second,  they  outlined  a  sched- 
ule of  theoretical  studies,  experimen- 
tal physics,  and  research  in  chemistry 
and  metallurgy  that  hopefully  would 
furnish  the  data  needed  to  substanti- 
ate what  was  already  known  concern- 
ing the  explosive  potential  of  U-235 
and  Pu-239,  to  measure  preciselv  the 
critical  mass  of  each,  and  to  prepare 
the  fissionable  and  other  materials  to 
be  used  in  an  atomic  weapon. 

Reliable  estimates  by  the  scientists 
in  the  uranium  and  plutonium  pro- 
duction programs  at  Clinton  and 
Hanford  indicated  that  sufiicient  fis- 
sionable material  ior  an  atomic 
weapon  would  be  available  in  about 
two  years.  Would  the  Los  Alamos 
Laboratorv    be    able     to    fabricate    a 


490 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  AIOMIC  BOMB 


weapon  within  that  time?  Because  the 
April  conferences  had  failed  to  pro- 
vide, except  in  very  limited  terms, 
concrete  proposals  for  the  organiza- 
tion and  work  of  an  ordnance  pro- 
gram to  carry  out  the  actual  design 
and  fabrication  of  the  weapon,  it  was 
to  this  subject  that  the  special  review- 
ing committee  particularly  addressed 
itself.^ 

Groves  had  established  this  com- 
mittee in  late  March  to  ensure  that 
the  program  and  organization  of  Los 
Alamos  were  sound.  Conant,  acting  as 
Groves's  scientific  adviser  in  organiz- 
ing the  bomb  project,  had  persuaded 
the  Manhattan  chief  of  its  appropri- 
ateness by  pointing  out  that  scientists 
were  accustomed  to  having  such  com- 
mittees at  universities  and  research 
institutions  to  help  plan  and  evaluate 
research  projects.  Conant  and  Rich- 
ard C.  Tolman,  vice  chairman  of  the 
National  Defense  Research  Commit- 
tee (NDRC),  had  helped  Groves  select 
the  committee  members:  as  chairman, 
chemist  Warren  K.  Lewis  of  MIT;  en- 
gineer Edwin  L.  Rose,  who  was  direc- 
tor of  research  for  the  Jones  and 
Lamson  Machine  Company;  theoreti- 
cal physicist  John  H.  Van  V'leck  and 
chemist  E.  Bright  Wilson,  Jr.,  both 
from  Harvard;  and  Tolman,  who  had 
agreed  to  serve  as  secretary.  It  was  an 
experienced  group,  with  all  members 
except  Rose  already  well  informed  on 
the  atomic  project.  Lewis  earlier  had 
served  as  chairman  of  both  the  heavy 
water  and  DSM  reassessment  review- 
ing committees;  Wilson  and  Tolman 
had  been  members  of  the  heavy  water 
group;  and  Van  Vleck  had  participat- 


ed as  far  back  as   1941   in  reviews  of 
the  uranium  program.^ 

In  its  report  issued  on  10  May,  the 
special  reviewing  committee  endorsed 
most  of  the  program  discussed  in  the 
April  conferences,  outlining  what  it 
believed  must  be  done  in  the  way  of 
theoretical  and  experimental  work  on 
the  critical  mass,  efficiency  of  an  ex- 
plosion, and  damage  potentialities. 
Placing  primary  emphasis  on  the  ord- 
nance and  engineering  aspects  of 
bomb  development,  the  committee 
recommended  that  the  laboratory 
expand  the  personnel  and  facilities 
needed  to  design  and  fabricate  a 
weapon;  it  foresaw  that  the  engineer- 
ing program  would  more  than  double 
the  personnel  of  the  laboratory  and 
require  extensive  facilities  to  test 
weapon  components,  and  also  that  ar- 
rangements would  have  to  be  made 
with  the  Army  Air  Forces  for  assist- 
ance in  bomb  design  and  tests.  The 
committee  further  recommended  that 
the  purification  of  Pu-239  "be  made 
a  responsibility  of  the  Los  Alamos 
group,  not  only  because  they  must  be 
responsible  for  the  correct  function- 
ing of  the  ultimate  weapon,  but  also 
because  repurification  will  be  a  neces- 
sary consequence  of  experimental 
work  done  at  the  site."  This  activity, 
hitherto  centered  at  the  Metallurgical 
Laboratory,     would     require     a     sub- 


8MDH,  Bk  8.  \„l.  2.  pp.  111-112.  DASA; 
Groves  Diaiv.  :>,{)  Apr  and  1  Mav  4:^  l.RC,;  Hewlett 
and  Anderson,  Xexv  World,  pp.  2:^!^-:^6. 


9  Memo,  Maj  Harry  S.  Traynor  (MD  HQ)  to 
Groves,  28  Apr  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  334 
(List  of  Committees),  MDR.  Ltr,  Tolman  to  Groves, 
20  Mar  43;  Duplicate  Ltrs,  Groves  to  L.evvis,  Rose, 
Wilson,  and  \'an  Vleck,  21  Mar  43;  Rpt,  Spec  Re- 
viewing C.ommittee  on  Los  Alamos  Proj,  10  Mav  43. 
All  in  Admin  Piles,  Gen  (Corresp,  600  12  (l^evelop- 
ment),  MDR.  MPG  Min,  30  Mar  43,  0C:G  Files,  (ien 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A,  MDR.  Hevslelt 
and  Anderson,  Sew  World,  pp.  36,  104.  110,  235-36. 
See  also  Ch.  W 


THE  LOS  ALAMOS  WEAPON  PROGRAM 


491 


stantial  increase  in  personnel  and 
facilities. 

Consistent  with  its  recommenda- 
tions for  expansion  of  the  program, 
the  reviewing  committee  also  pro- 
posed appropriate  organizational  and 
administrative  changes.  While  it  was 
highly  commendatory  of  Oppen- 
heimer,  it  recommended  that  he 
should  be  provided  with  more  admin- 
istrative assistance  in  his  immediate 
staff.  It  suggested  appointing  an  asso- 
ciate director,  capable  of  taking  over 
direction  of  the  project  when  Oppen- 
heimer  was  absent,  and  establishing 
an  administrative  office,  headed  by  a 
civilian  who  could  maintain  good 
working  relations  with  the  military 
administration. 

1  he  only  aspect  of  the  program's 
administrative  arrangements  receiving 
severe  criticism  was  procurement. 
While  the  Los  Alamos  procurement 
office  appeared  to  be  functioning  rea- 
sonably efficiently,  the  key  office  in 
Los  Angeles,  under  Army  direction 
but  manned  largely  by  University  of 
California  personnel,  was  following 
procedures  that  were  "unduly  slow 
and  cumbersome."  The  delays  could 
not  be  allowed  to  continue,  because 
"not  only  the  satisfactory  progress  of 
the  work,  but  also  the  morale  of  the 
organization  is  dependent  on  an  effi- 
ciently functioning  procurement 
system."  A  partial  solution,  the  com- 
mittee suggested,  would  be  to  estab- 
lish a  procurement  office  in  New  York 
for  obtaining  supplies  and  equipment 
from  firms  in  the  eastern  part  of  the 
Ignited  States. ^^ 


'"  All  quotations  in  discussion  of  coniinitlcc's  rec- 
ommendations from  Rpt.  Spec  Reviewing  (.onmiit- 
tee  on  I.os  Alamos  Proj.  10  Ma\  43.  MDR.  Ihe  Mili- 
tary Policy  Committee  heard  an  oral  sununar\ 
(probably  by  Groves)  of  the  principal  recommenda- 


Loboratory  Administration 

The  recommendations  of  the  April 
conferences  and  the  special  reviewing 
committee  did  not  alter  the  basic  plan 
for  operation  of  Los  Alamos,  as 
worked  out  by  Croves,  Conant,  and 
Oppenheimer  in  early  1943,  but  en- 
tailed a  considerable  expansion  of  the 
weapon  program  and  support  person- 
nel. With  these  new  guidelines, 
Groves  and  Oppenheimer  set  about 
to  complete  the  organization  of  the 
laboratory  and  its  administrative  and 
technical  staffs. 

Administrative  Organization 

A  number  of  factors  complicated 
Oppenheimer's  task  of  forming  a  lab- 
oratory administration  capable  of 
maintaining  the  required  liaison  with 
the  post  administration,  the  necessary 
communication  with  other  Manhattan 
District  organizations,  and  effective 
control  over  the  increasingly  complex 
engineering  activities  of  the  bomb  de- 
velopment program.  One  was  securi- 
ty, particularly  the  requirement  for 
compartmentalization,  which  placed 
severe  limitations  on  communication 
within  the  laboratory,  between  the 
scientific  and  military  organizations 
and  between  the  laboratory  and  out- 
side agencies.  Another  was  the  acute 
shortage  of  professional  personnel 
experienced  in  dealing  with  the  broad 
administrative  problems  of  a  research 
laboratory.  A  third  factor  was  the  lack 
of  precedents  to  follow  in  organizing 
a  laboratory  staff  for  a  program  that 
ran  the  gamut  from  pure  scientific  re- 
search  to   the   actual   performance   of 


tions  of  the  report  at  its  meeting  on  5  Ma%  43.  See 
MPC  Min,  5  Mav  43.  MDR. 


492 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


ordnance  manufacturing  operations. 
The  combined  effect  of  these  factors 
was  to  place  an  unusually  heavy  ad- 
ministrative burden  on  the  laboratory 
director  and  his  immediate  supervi- 
sory staff.  ^^ 

Both  Groves  and  Oppenheimer  had 
been  aware  of  the  need  for  a  strong 
administrative  group  in  the  director's 
office,  but  their  efforts  in  that  direc- 
tion had  not  been  very  successful. 
Their  first  choice  for  associate  direc- 
tor was  physicist  Edward  U.  Condon 
from  Westinghouse.  Condon  came  in 
April  1943,  but  left  almost  imme- 
diately when  he  found  himself  in 
complete  disagreement  with  security 
arrangements.  As  an  experienced  sci- 
entific administrator,  he  perceived  the 
fundamental  difficulty  of  trying  to 
maintain  essential  liaison  within  the 
laboratory  and  with  outside  agencies 
under  the  project's  security  system.  ^^ 

With  the  strongly  worded  rec- 
ommendations of  the  reviewing  com- 
mittee still  very  much  on  his  mind, 
Oppenheimer  immediately  sought  to 
replace  Condon,  as  well  as  to  fill  the 
other  key  positions  on  his  administra- 
tive staff.  He  was  generally  frustrated, 
however,  in  his  efforts  to  recruit  pro- 
fessionally trained,  experienced  scien- 
tific administrators.  They  simply  were 
not  available.  He  appointed  a  staff  as- 
sistant to  carry  on  the  absolutely  es- 
sential day-to-day  liaison  with  the 
post  administration,  pending  recruit- 
ment of  a  new  associate  director,  but 


i»MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1.33  and  III.8-III.9, 
DASA. 

^^  Ltr,  Condon  to  Oppenheimer,  26  Apr  43,  In- 
vestigation Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Personnel  Scty  In- 
vestigations (Condon),  MDR;  Groves,  AW  It  Can  Be 
Told,  pp.  154-55  (see  reprint  of  26  April  letter  on 
pp.  429-32);  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  III.7-III.8, 
DASA.  See  Ch.  XI  for  more  details  on  Condon's  de- 
parture from  Los  Alamos. 


this  position  as  originally  conceived 
was  destined  never  to  be  filled.  In 
other  key  positions,  he  had  to  be  sat- 
isfied with  either  scientists  with  little 
previous  administrative  experience  or 
administrators  with  appropriate  expe- 
rience in  nonscientific  fields  (for  ex- 
ample, construction  or  business  ad- 
ministration). Two  of  his  appointees 
were  physicists  Dana  P.  Mitchell  and 
Arthur  L.  Hughes,  both  of  whom  had 
no  administrative  experience  in  indus- 
try. Mitchell,  selected  to  be  procure- 
ment director,  had  been  in  charge  of 
procurement  for  the  physics  depart- 
ment at  Columbia  University; 
Hughes,  selected  to  be  personnel  di- 
rector, previously  served  as  chairman 
of  the  physics  department  at  Wash- 
ington University  in  St.  Louis. 

To  assist  Hughes  with  the  ever-con- 
stant manpower  problem,  Oppen- 
heimer enlisted  the  services  of  Brown 
University  Dean  Samuel  T.  Arnold, 
who  was  serving  as  a  technical  per- 
sonnel consultant  for  the  project,  to 
recruit  senior  scientists  and  M.  H. 
Trytten  of  the  National  Roster  of  Sci- 
entific and  Specialized  Personnel  to 
recruit  junior  scientists  and  techni- 
cians. But  the  very  nature  of  Los 
Alamos  personnel  requirements 
seemed  to  resist  all  attempts  at  a  sat- 
isfactory solution,  and  Groves  became 
convinced  by  the  summer  of  1944 
that  Hughes  was  not  capable  of  solv- 
ing the  problem.  The  Manhattan 
commander  took  immediate  action: 
He  offered  the  position  of  personnel 
chief  to  Dean  Arnold.  Arnold  de- 
murred but  agreed  to  go  on  a  tempo- 
rary basis  until  a  replacement  could 
be  found.  Eventually,  on  the  basis  of 
Arnold's  recommendation,  Hughes 
was  replaced  with  astronomer  Charles 


THE  LOS  ALAMOS  WEAPON  PROGRAM 


493 


D.  Shane,  who  had  been  working  at 
the  Radiation  Laboratory  in  Berkeley. 
It  was  mid- 1944  before  Oppen- 
heimer  had  found  suitable  personnel 
for  all  positions — an  administrative 
officer;  heads  of  personnel,  procure- 
ment, business,  and  patent  offices,  as 
well  as  of  a  health  group,  a  mainte- 
nance section,  and  a  library-docu- 
ments room;  and  also  an  editor.  He 
finally  rounded  out  his  administrative 
staff  with  appointment  of  a  shops  sec- 
tion chief  in  late  1944  and  a  safety 
group  head  in  early  1945.^^ 

Technical  Organization 

The  technical  organization  of  the 
laboratory  took  shape  along  the  lines 
of  the  expanded  program  of  research 
and  development,  as  recommended  in 
the  April  conferences  and  reviewing 
committee  report.  There  were  sepa- 
rate divisions  for  theoretical  physics, 
experimental  physics,  chemistry  and 
metallurgy,  and  ordnance.  Within 
each  division  were  a  number  of  work- 
ing groups  or  teams,  each  devoted  to 
a  particular  aspect  of  bomb  research 
or  development.  For  example,  the 
theoretical  division  had  a  diffusion 
problems  group;  the  ordnance  divi- 
sion had  an  implosion  experimenta- 
tion group;  and  the  chemistry  and 
metallurgy  division  had  a  uranium 
and  plutonium  purification  group. 
Leaders  of  the  groups  reported  to 
their  division  leaders  and  the  division 
heads    reported    directly    to    Oppen- 


>='MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  II.4,  III.7-III.9.  III.  17, 
III. 57,  IX.  10,  IX.19-IX.23,  DASA;  Ltr,  Hughes  to 
Arnold,  15  Jan  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201 
(Gen),  MDR;  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  154, 
n.  2;  Defense  Atomic  Support  Agency  (DASA)  Hist, 
App.  B  (List  of  Manhattan  Proj  Committees),  CMH; 
Groves  Diary,  18  May,  14,  16-17,  20,  23,  26,  29-30 
Jun,  3-5  and  10  Jul  44,  LRG. 


heimer.  As  the  work  of  the  laboratory 
progressed,  groups  completed  their 
projects  and  disbanded,  and  new 
groups  formed  to  take  up  investiga- 
tion of  new  problems.  ^'^ 

To  direct  the  complex  activities  of 
the  laboratory's  technical  divisions, 
Oppenheimer  relied  chiefly  upon  the 
assistance  and  advice  of  a  governing 
board  and  a  coordinating  council. 
The  governing  board,  comprised  of 
seven  to  ten  administrative  and  tech- 
nical staff  heads,  began  as  an  advisory 
group  but  gradually  evolved  as  a 
policy  and  decision-making  body,  its 
primary  function  being  to  assist  Op- 
penheimer in  coordinating  the  vari- 
ous scientific  and  engineering  facets 
of  the  weapon  program.  Unlike  the 
governing  board,  the  coordinating 
council  did  not  ordinarily  concern 
itself  with  policy.  Comprised  of  scien- 
tists and  technicians  who  were  group 
leaders  or  higher,  the  council  provid- 
ed a  channel  of  communication  be- 
tween the  second-level  staff  and  the 
governing  board  and  primarily  func- 
tioned as  a  forum  for  interchange 
of  information  and  opinion  on  cur- 
rent developments  in  the  various 
divisions.  ^^ 

Keeping  the  staff  scientists  abreast 
of  the  work  going  on  in  the  various 
technical  divisions,  in  Oppenheimer's 
opinion,  was  indispensable  to  the  suc- 
cess of  the  weapon  program.  To  fa- 
cilitate this  situation,  Oppenheimer, 
with  approval  of  the  governing  board, 
established  in  May  1943  a  weekly  col- 


'^MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  III.l  and  IX.  1,  DASA; 
DASA  Hist,  App.  B,  CMH;  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 
New  World,  pp.  237  and  310-12. 

'^MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  III.1-III.3  and  IX.1-IX.7, 
DASA;  DASA  Hist,  App.  B,  CMH;  Hewlett  and  An- 
derson, New  World,  pp.  237-38  and  310-12;  Groves, 
Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  159-61. 


494 


MANHATl  AN:  THE  ARMY  AND    IHE  AlOMIC:  BOMB 


loquium  for  all  laboratory  staff  mem- 
bers. General  Groves  had  accepted 
the  coordinating  council  as  a  neces- 
sary risk  to  security,  but  when  he 
heard  of  the  colloquium,  he  immedi- 
ately protested  to  Oppenheimer  that 
he  considered  it  to  be  a  "major 
hazard."  Oppenheimer  defended  the 
colloquium  as  an  effective  tool: 
Giving  the  scientific  staff  adequate  in- 
formation, he  believed,  would  actually 
enhance  security,  for  the  scientists 
would  achieve  a  better  understanding 
of  the  necessity  for  secrecy.  Groves 
decided  to  defer  to  Oppenheimer's 
wishes  and  let  the  colloquium  contin- 
ue, having  concluded  that  the  most 
important  reason  Oppenheimer 
wanted  a  colloquium  was  not  to  pro- 
vide information  but  "to  maintain 
morale  and  a  feeling  of  common  pur- 
pose" in  his  scientific  staff.  ^^ 

The  Military  Policy  Committee  sup- 
ported Groves's  views  concerning  the 
potential  security  risk  of  the  Los 
Alamos  colloquium.  Seeking  a  solu- 
tion to  the  broader  issue  of  which  the 
colloquium  was  symptomatic — -how  to 
bolster  the  morale  of  all  project  scien- 
tists by  getting  them  to  accept  the  ne- 
cessity for  security  restrictions — the 
committee  decided  that  the  problem 
was  sufficiently  serious  to  warrant 
using  its  trump  card,  a  letter  from  the 
President  himself  to  the  scientists.  In 
late  June,  OSRD  Chairman  Vannevar 
Bush  took  advantage  of  an  appoint- 
ment with  Roosevelt  to  secure  his  ap- 
proval for  the  proposed  letter.  The 
President  agreed  enthusiastically,  and 


Conant  drafted  an  appropriate  com- 
munication for  Roosevelt's  signature.  ^  ^ 

At  the  July  meeting  of  the  collo- 
quium, Oppenheimer  read  the  Presi- 
dent's letter  to  the  assembled  scien- 
tists. The  scientists,  as  a  staff  member 
subsequently  recalled,  seemed  much 
encouraged  by  the  President's  expres- 
sion of  satisfaction  with  their  "excel- 
lent work"  thus  far,  his  assurance  that 
the  atomic  project  was  of  great  sig- 
nificance to  the  war  effort,  and  his  in- 
dication of  confidence  in  their  "con- 
tinued wholehearted  and  unselfish 
labors"  toward  successful  completion 
of  the  project.  They  also  appeared  to 
listen  attentively  to  the  President's  ex- 
planation of  why  "every  precaution 
[must]  be  taken  to  insure  the  security 
of  your  project,"  and  his  assumption 
that  they  were  "fully  aware  of  the  rea- 
sons why  their  endeavors  must  be  cir- 
cumscribed by  very  special  restric- 
tions." Although  the  presidential 
letter  undoubtedly  achieved  its  two- 
fold purpose,  Oppenheimer  chose  not 
to  regard  it  as  a  directive  to  discon- 
tinue the  colloquium.  But  he  did  care- 
fully screen  those  permitted  to  attend 
it  and  otherwise  tightened  security  ar- 
rangements for  its  sessions.^® 

Manhattan's  original  concept  that 
Los  Alamos  should  function  in  com- 
plete isolation  obviated  the  laborato- 


'* Quoted  words  from  Ciroves,  Xoiv  It  Can  Be  Told. 
p.  167.  See  also  MDH.  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  III.3-III.4, 
DAS  A;  Oppenheimer  Hearing,  pp.  166-67;  Hewlett  and 
Anderson.  \eu<  Woild.  p.  2,S8. 


'^MPC  Min.  24  Jun  43,  MDR;  Memo  for  File, 
Bush,  sub:  Cxjnf  With  President,  24  Jun  43,  OSRD; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  .\eu>  World,  pp.  238-39.  The 
President's  letter  recei\ed  mixed  reactions  from 
Metallurgical  Laboratory  scientists.  See  Ch.  IX. 

'8  Qiioted  phrases  from  Ltr,  Roosevelt  to  Oppen- 
heimer, 29  Jun  43,  OCC.  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP 
Files,  Fldr  25,  lab  D,  MDR.  See  also  MDH,  Bk.  8, 
Vol.  2,  pp.  III. 7.  DASA.  David  Hawkins,  the  author 
of  this  account  of  the  wartime  history  of  the  Los 
■Alamos  Laboratory,  regularly  attended  meetings  of 
the  colloquium  as  a  special  assistant  on  Oppen- 
heimer's staff. 


IHE  LOS  ALAMOS  WEAPON  PROGRAM 


495 


ry's  having  any  regularly  established 
channels  of  communication  with  other 
Manhattan  District  or  outside  organi- 
zations. Consequently,  whenever  the 
laboratory  required  technical  informa- 
tion from  these  sources,  it  had  to 
obtain  special  permission  from  Gen- 
eral Groves's  Washington  office.  This 
ad  hoc  system  remained  the  basic 
policy  throughout  the  war,  although 
Groves  had  to  grant  some  limited  ex- 
ceptions to  it.  For  example,  in  June 
1943,  he  allowed  Los  Alamos  scien- 
tists not  only  to  correspond  but  also 
to  visit  certain  members  of  the  Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory  to  secure  speci- 
fied data  on  fissionable  materials  and 
other  chemicals.  And  again  in  Novem- 
ber, he  consented  to  let  Oppenheimer 
make  a  one-time  visit  to  the  Clinton 
plants  after  the  governing  board  at 
Los  Alamos  had  indicated  repeatedly 
that  there  were  going  to  be  serious 
delays  if  someone  at  the  laboratory 
did  not  secure  information  on  the 
production  schedules  for  fissionable 
materials.  ^^ 

The  project's  security  system  was 
again  severely  tested  in  early  1944, 
when  a  reorientation  of  the  weapon 
program  from  theoretical  and  experi- 
mental research  to  ordnance  and  en- 
gineering problems  necessitated  in- 
creased liaison  between  Los  Alamos 
and  outside  agencies.  W'ith  strict  com- 
partmentalization  still  in  effect,  many 
of  the  laboratory  staff  members  who 
required  liaison  with  civilian  agencies 
resorted  to  a  variety  of  clandestine 
devices,  such  as  using  blind  addresses 
and  NDRC  identifications  and  re- 
questing    technical     reports     through 


Tolman's  NDRC  office  in  W'ashing- 
ton,  D.C.  Security  barriers  were  less 
formidable  with  other  military  ele- 
ments, including  the  Army's  Ord- 
nance Department,  the  Navy's  Bureau 
of  Ordnance,  and  the  Army  Air 
Forces.  ^° 

The  weapon  program  reorientation 
provided  Oppenheimer  with  an  op- 
portunity to  form  a  more  effective 
laboratory  administration  and  orga- 
nization in  mid- 1944.  Aware  of 
Groves's  general  dissatisfaction  with 
the  existing  organization,  Oppen- 
heimer realigned  the  administrative 
and  technical  components  of  the  labo- 
ratory to  reflect  the  new  emphasis  on 
engineering  and  ordnance  develop- 
ment of  atomic  devices  and,  more 
particularly,  on  solution  of  the  still 
formidable  problems  of  implosion.^  ^ 

One  goal  of  the  reorganization  was 
to  realign  the  scientific  leadership  of 
the  laboratory  so  that  its  efforts  were 
brought  to  bear  on  the  most  urgent 
phases  of  bomb  development.  By 
abolishing  the  governing  board  and 
dividing  its  functions  between  an  ad- 
ministrative and  a  technical  board, 
Oppenheimer  eliminated  unnecessary 
diversion  of  scientific  leadership  into 
housekeeping  activities.  A  series  of 
special  conferences  and  committees 
to  supervise  particular  aspects  of 
bomb  fabrication  and  testing  ensured 
concentration  of  effort  on  key  prob- 
lems. The  intermediate  scheduling 
conference,  which  began  meeting  in 
August     1944,    coordinated    work    of 


19  UY)H,  Bk.  8,  \  ()1.  2.  pp.  111.4-111,5,  DASA; 
Memos,  Groses  to  C.oniplon  and  Oppenheimei, 
17  Jun  43,  and  Oppenheimer  to  (irovcs,  4  Oct  43, 

osi^D. 


20  MDH,  Bk.  8,  \  ol.  2,  pp.  III..5-III.(i,  DASA. 

2*  Except  as  otherwise  stateci,  discussion  of  I.os 
Alainos  reorganization  is  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  8, 
\ol.  2,  pp.  IX.  1 -IX. 7,  DASA;  DASA  Hist,  App.  B. 
CMH;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  .\>;/'  World,  pp.  310- 
12  and  317-19. 


496 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


those  laboratory  groups  primarily 
concerned  with  the  implosion  bomb. 
The  technical  and  scheduling  confer- 
ence, organized  in  December,  under- 
took responsibility  for  programing  ex- 
periments, use  of  shop  time,  and  em- 
ployment of  active  materials.  The 
cowpuncher  committee,  so  designated 
by  laboratory  officials  because  it  was 
established  to  "ride  herd"  on  implo- 
sion, met  for  the  first  time  in  March 
1945.  Other  committees  supervised 
weapon  testing,  procurement  of  deto- 
nators, scheduling  of  experiments 
with  U-235,  and  development  of  ini- 
tiators for  implosion  devices. 

Both  Conant  and  Groves  realized 
that  Oppenheimer  was  faced  with 
complex  industrial  problems,  yet  he 
lacked  an  industrial  expert  on  his  staff 
to  advise  him  on  these  problems. 
Consequently,  in  November  1944, 
Groves  recruited  the  services  of  Hart- 
ley Rowe  of  the  United  Fruit  Compa- 
ny, an  outstanding  industrial  engineer 
who  also  had  served  with  the  NDRC 
and  as  a  technical  adviser  to  General 
Eisenhower,  Supreme  Commander, 
Allied  Expeditionary  Force.  Rowe 
spent  considerable  time  at  Los 
Alamos  in  late  1944  and  early  1945, 
guiding  the  technical  divisions  in  the 
development  of  the  procedures  by 
which  laboratory  models  could  be 
converted  into  production  units — the 
final  phase  in  the  weapon  program. ^^ 

Oppenheimer's  reorganization  di- 
rectly impacted  on  the  makeup  and 
character  of  the  laboratory's  technical 
divisions,  transforming  their  focus 
from   problems    of  research    and    ex- 


perimentation to  those  relating  to  en- 
gineering and  fabrication  of  the 
bomb.  When  measurement  of  the  fis- 
sion rate  of  plutonium  indicated  it 
could  not  be  used  in  a  gun-type 
bomb,  technical  activities  shifted  to 
development  of  an  implosion-type 
bomb.  Oppenheimer  created  new  di- 
visions and  reduced  the  size  of  sev- 
eral of  the  older  divisions.  The  theo- 
retical and  research  divisions  were 
retained,  but  most  personnel  and  fa- 
cilities were  funneled  into  the  ord- 
nance, weapon  physics,  explosives, 
and  chemistry  and  metallurgy  divi- 
sions. In  the  spring  of  1945,  with  fab- 
rication of  atomic  devices  proceeding 
apace,  Oppenheimer  established  new 
off-site  testing  divisions:  Project  Al- 
berta, to  carry  out  all  activities  related 
to  combat  delivery  of  both  the  gun 
assembly  and  implosion  bombs;  and 
Project  Trinity,  to  test-fire  the  first 
implosion  bomb.  While  the  new  divi- 
sions comprised  integral  parts  of  the 
laboratory  organization,  division  field 
teams  from  Los  Alamos  assembled 
and  tested  the  various  components  of 
the  weapons  at  other  sites. ^^ 

Post  Administration 

The  wartime  character  of  the  Los 
Alamos  post  administration — its  orga- 
nization and  personnel  composition — 
directly  reflected  the  course  of  the 
bomb    development    program.    Thus, 


22  Groves  Diary,  12,  26  Oct,  9  Nov  44  and  11,  20 
Jan  45,  LRG;  Rowe  to  Capt  John  A.  Derry  (of 
Groves's  office),  13  Nov  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  201  (Hartlev  Rowe),  MDR;  Oppenheimer  Heanng. 
pp.  508-09. 


23  For  further  details  on  the  organization  and  lo- 
cation of  Project  Trinity  see  final  section  of  Ch. 
XXV.  Lansing  Lamont's  Day  of  Tnnity  pro%ides  a 
popular  account.  On  Project  Alberta  see  MDH,  Bk. 
8,  Vol.  2.  pp.  IX.6-IX.7  and  XIX.1-XIX.13,  DASA. 
The  account  in  MDH  is  based  upon  Ms,  Norman  F. 
Ramsey,  "History  of  Project  A[lberta],"  Incl  to  I.tr, 
Ramsev  to  Brig  Gen  Ihonias  F.  Farreli  (MD  Dep 
Cdr),  27  Sep  45,  LASL. 


THE  LOS  ALAMOS  WEAPON  PROGRAM 


497 


when  Colonel  Harman  began  to  orga- 
nize the  post  in  the  spring  of  1943, 
he  was  guided  by  the  then  existing 
plans  for  a  small  technical  laboratory 
with  a  supporting  community  of  no 
more  than  a  few  hundred  civilian 
and  military  personnel,  but  requiring 
an  extraordinary  degree  of  protective 
security  and  self-sufficiency.  The 
modest  organization  he  formed  for 
this  purpose  was  comprised  of  three 
major  divisions.  The  Administrative 
Divison  looked  after  civilian  person- 
nel matters,  provided  various  means 
for  internal  and  external  communica- 
tions, maintained  essential  records, 
and  audited  post  accounts.  The  Pro- 
tective Security  Division  furnished 
post  security  and  administered  the 
military  units  assigned  to  Los  Alamos, 
including  Military  Police  (MP)  and 
Provisional  Engineer  Detachments 
(PED).  The  Operations  Division  pro- 
vided and  maintained  most  of  the 
community  services — housing,  utili- 
ties, commissary,  and  education  and 
recreation  facilities — in  cooperation 
with  the  laboratory's  community 
council.  Finally,  a  small,  semiautono- 
mous  procurement  group  performed 
quartermaster  functions;  monitored 
contracts;  and  supervised  property 
and  warehouse  operations,  including 
the  important  Santa  Fe  receiving  facil- 
ity for  laboratory  shipments  from  the 
Los  Angeles  procurement  office. ^^ 

Personnel  for  the  original  post  or- 
ganization began  arriving  on  the  Hill 
in  late  April  1943.  By  early  June, 
Colonel  Ashbridge,  who  had  just  re- 
placed Harman  as  post  commander, 
had  a  staff  of  18  officers  (including  1 


WAAC  officer).  This  staff  directed  the 
activities  of  slightly  over  450  military 
and  civilian  personnel.  There  were 
more  than  200  enlisted  men  in  the 
MP  unit,  including  attached  medical 
and  veterinary  personnel;  85  enlisted 
men  in  the  PED  unit;  7  WAAC  enlist- 
ed women;  and  somewhat  fewer  than 
160  civil  service  employees.  To  meet 
increased  demands  for  post  services 
and  support  in  the  ensuing  months, 
Ashbridge  obtained  additional  PED 
and  MP  personnel  from  the  8th  Serv- 
ice Command  headquarters  in  Dallas. 
And  with  General  Groves's  assistance, 
additional  civil  service  and  military 
personnel  were  procured  through 
Corps  of  Engineers  and  other  chan- 
nels— for  example,  the  Army  Special- 
ized Training  Program  (ASTP),  which 
furnished  enlisted  men  with  scientific 
and  technical  skills. ^^ 

Military  personnel  with  scientific 
and  technical  training  were  assigned 
to  the  Manhattan  District's  Special 
Engineer  Detachment  (SED),  9812th 
Technical  Service  Unit;  the  latter  unit 
was  a  special  engineer  organization 
formed  at  District  headquarters  to 
retain  scientific  and  technical  employ- 
ees subject  to  the  draft  and  to  recruit 
additional  technically  trained  person- 
nel for  the  project.  Los  Alamos  began 


24MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  pp.  6.1-6.2  and  App.  B2, 
DASA.  See  Ch.  XXIII  for  a  detailed  discussion  of 
the  administration  of  community  affairs  at  Los 
Alamos. 


^^  Statistics  in  this  and  the  following  paragraphs 
on  military  and  civilian  personnel  assigned  to  the 
Los  Alamos  post  in  1943  are  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  8, 
Vol.  1,  pp.  7.3-7.15  and  Apps.  B2-B3  (Org  Charts, 
Los  Alamos,  5  Jun  and  5  Dec  43),  and  Vol.  2,  p. 
III.  18  and  App.  Graph  No.  2  (Number  of  Persons 
Employed:  Distribution  Among  Civilians,  W'AC,  and 
SED),  DASA;  List,  sub:  MD  Offs  on  Duty  at  Los 
Alamos  and  Iheir  Duties,  6  May  44,  Incl  to  Memo, 
Ashbridge  to  Groves,  14  Jun  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  201  (Gen),  MDR;  Groves  Diary,  25  Aug 
and  3  Sep  43,  LRG.  See  Ch.  XVI  for  information  on 
the  8th  Service  Command's  provision  of  troops  for 
the  atomic  project  and  on  the  ASTP,  as  well  as  on 
the  formation  of  the  9812th  and  the  SED. 


498 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


receiving  SED  personnel  in  August 
1943  and,  because  of  Groves's  per- 
sonal intervention,  periodically  there- 
after. SED  members  worked  at  techni- 
cal jobs  for  the  laboratory,  but  were 
assigned  to  the  post  administration 
for  rations  and  quarters. 

By  the  end  of  the  year,  total  per- 
sonnel assigned  to  the  post  adminis- 
tration approached  1,100.  The  largest 
numerical  increase  was  in  civil  service 
employees,  nearly  450  as  compared 
with  some  160  in  June.  Increases  in 
the  military  complement  were  more 
moderate.  The  number  of  MP's  grew 
from  190  to  300  and  that  of  PED's 
from  85  to  around  200.  With  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  regular  WAG  De- 
tachment at  Los  Alamos,  the  number 
of  enlisted  women  was  increased  from 
7  to  90.  And  because  of  the  assign- 
ment of  recent  ASTP  graduates  to 
Los  Alamos,  SED  strength  figures  in- 
creased from  300  to  about  475. 

Even  with  expansion  of  bomb  de- 
velopment activities  and  its  concomi- 
tant increases  in  post  personnel,  the 
basic  structure  of  the  post  administra- 
tion remained  essentially  the  same, 
with  only  the  Operations  Division  un- 
dergoing a  moderate  reorganization. 
In  early  1944,  when  Manhattan  as- 
sumed responsibility  for  all  further 
construction  and  maintenance  activi- 
ties at  Los  Alamos,  Golonel  Ash- 
bridge  strengthened  the  operating  ca- 
pability of  the  Operations  Division  by 
reorganizing  it  into  two  major  sec- 
tions— one  for  community  construc- 
tion and  maintenance,  the  other  for 
technical  area  work — and  by  recruit- 
ing more  carpenters,  bricklayers, 
plumbers,  painters,  electricians,  and 
common  laborers. 

Increased  demands  for  new  techni- 
cal-type construction  soon  outran  the 


capabilities  of  the  division,  so  Man- 
hattan engaged  another  professional 
construction  contractor,  Robert  E. 
McKee  of  El  Paso.  In  spite  of  this 
major  change,  Golonel  Ashbridge  de- 
cided to  retain  the  dual  organization 
of  the  division,  which  had  the  security 
advantage  of  limiting  access  to  the 
sensitive  technical  area  to  one  group 
of  workmen.  But  in  early  1945,  with 
the  decision  to  retain  McKee  on  a 
permanent  basis  to  perform  construc- 
tion services  at  Los  Alamos,  the  new 
post  commander,  Gol.  Gerald  R. 
Tyler,  rejected  the  dual  organization 
and  reverted  to  a  unified  structure.  In 
this  reorganization,  which  remained 
in  effect  until  after  completion  of  the 
wartime  program,  Tyler  set  up  sepa- 
rate sections  for  contractor  construc- 
tion and  administration,  post  con- 
struction and  maintenance,  and  post 
engineer  services. ^^ 

The  Army's  principal  role  at  Los 
Alamos,  as  well  as  elsewhere  in  the 
Manhattan  Project,  was  ensuring  ef- 
fective administration  and  operational 
efficiency.  In  the  main,  this  was 
achieved  through  the  personal  cogni- 
zance and  direct  action  of  the  post 
commander.  As  the  military  adminis- 
trator, the  post  commander  played  a 
key  role  in  arranging  military  defer- 
ments for  technical  employees  of  the 
University  of  Galifornia,  which  includ- 
ed most  of  the  scientists  and  techni- 
cians, and  in  monitoring  the  ship- 
ments of  fissionable  materials  to  Los 


26MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1.  pp.  5.6-5.11,  7.2,  7.13- 
7.14,  App.  B4  (Org  Chart,  I  Feb  45),  DASA;  Fine 
and  Remington,  Corps  of  Engineers:  Construction,  pp. 
697-700.  Tyler  replaced  Ashbridge  in  late  1944, 
when  the  latter's  health  began  to  fail  under  the 
strain  of  the  demands  placed  upon  him  as  Los 
Alamos  post  commander  (see  Groves  Diarv,  28  Oct 
and  2,  14,  25  Nov  44,  LRG). 


THE  LOS  ALAMOS  WEAPON  PROGRAM 


499 


Alamos  and  the  transmission  of  docu- 
ments containing  technical  informa- 
tion from  other  parts  of  the  Manhat- 
tan District.  Coincident  with  his  gen- 
eral supervision  of  post  procurement 
and  construction  and  maintenance  ac- 
tivities, he  consulted  with  key  mem- 
bers of  the  laboratory  administration, 
especially  Oppenheimer  and  Capt. 
William  S.  Parsons,  the  naval  gunnery 
officer  in  charge  of  the  laboratory's 
ordnance  group.  These  consultations 
increased  in  frequency  as  program 
emphasis  shifted  from  theoretical  and 
experimental  research  to  ordnance 
and  engineering  problems  and  re- 
quirements expanded  for  construction 
of  new  technical  facilities  and  pro- 
curement of  additional  materials  and 
equipment. 2"^  Praetors  endemic  to  the 
atomic  project,  however,  presented 
major  obstacles  to  achievement  of  an 
efficient  procurement  system  at  Los 
Alamos.  Among  these  were  the 
atomic  reservation's  location,  more 
than  a  thousand  miles  from  any  major 
market  and  distribution  center;  secu- 
rity requirements  that  necessitated 
time-consuming,  roundabout  routing 
of  the  bulk  of  procurement  through 
Los  Angeles  and  elsewhere;  and  the 
highly  technical  and  often  unique 
character  of  many  of  the  items  to  be 
procured.  Another  factor  was  the  Uni- 
versity of  California's  insistence  that 
all  matters  of  purchasing  and  pay- 
ments must  be  administered  directly 
by  members  of  the  university  business 
staff.  But  because  the  Army  would 
not  permit  university  employees  at 
Los    Alamos,    the    project    located    its 


"  List,  sub:  MI)  Otis  on  l)iii\  at  Los  Alamos  and 
Lht'ir  Duties,  6  Mav  44,  Iiul  to  Mtmo,  Ashbiidge  to 
Crovcs,  14  Jun  44,  MDR;  DASA  Hist,  App.  B, 
(;MH;  Fine  and  Renunjj;lon.  ('.nipy  a/  Enninrns:  C.oii- 
slriiftion.  pp.  697-700. 


main      purchasing      office      in      Los 
Angeles.^® 

In  the  face  of  these  obstacles, 
Groves,  Lt.  Col.  Stanley  L.  Stewart  of 
the  Los  Angeles  procurement  office, 
and  Army  procurement  personnel  at 
Los  Alamos  worked  with  University  of 
California  officials  to  increase  pro- 
curement efficiency.  Groves  main- 
tained direct  and  frequent  contact 
with  the  Los  Angeles  Area  Engineers 
Office,  established  in  early  1943  to 
supervise  University  of  California  pro- 
curement personnel.  He  sanctioned 
the  opening  of  branch  purchasing  of- 
fices in  New  York  and  Chicago  to 
provide  the  laboratory  with  direct 
access  to  eastern  markets,  saving  time 
and  reducing  paperwork  for  the  Los 
Angeles  office.  Army  and  laboratory 
procurement  officials  at  Los  Alamos 
worked  out  an  arrangement  for  requi- 
sition of  certain  available  items  locally 
through  the  post  supply  organization. 

As  the  volume  of  required  materials 
increased  dramatically  in  late  1944, 
Groves  authorized  a  request  by  the 
laboratory's  ordnance  division  to  set 
up  a  separate  procurement  group. 
The  Army  officer  supervising  this  new 
procurement  channel  maintained  an 
office  in  Detroit,  which  was  an  impor- 
tant source  for  many  of  the  bomb 
components.  He  also  made  frequent 
use  of  the  California  Institute  of 
Technology's  experienced  procure- 
ment personnel  at  its  Project  Camel 
site.  In  spite  of  all  these  efforts,  the 
flood  of  last-minute  requisitions  for 
the  implosion  weapon  test  in  the 
spring  of  1945  created  threatening 
delays.     Oppenheimer    convened     an 


28  MDH.  Bk.  8,  \ol.  2,  pp.  IIL27-IIL34,  and  \()l. 
:i  "Auxiliai\  Activities, "  pp.  1.1-3.:^  and  Apps.  Al- 
A2,  I>A.SA 


500 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


emergency  meeting  of  project  pro- 
curement officials  at  Los  Alamos,  and 
they  agreed  to  increase  procurement 
personnel  and  salaries,  to  establish 
direct  communications  between  the 
New  York  and  Chicago  offices,  and  to 
require  improved  drawings  and  spec- 
ifications in  requisitions  from  the 
laboratory.  2^ 

The  reorientation  and  expansion  of 
bomb  development  activities  eventu- 
ally created  more  and  more  opportu- 
nities for  a  surprisingly  large  number 
of  the  military  personnel  assigned  to 
the  post  administration  to  contribute 
directly  to  the  technical  side  of  the 
weapon  program.  A  number  of  WAC 
enlisted  personnel,  for  example, 
moved  from  strictly  clerical  jobs  in 
the  laboratory  to  technical  work, 
when  scientists  found  they  had  the 
requisite  skills  or  training.  Similarly, 
several  officers  on  the  post  command- 
er's staff  came  to  devote  most  of  their 
time  to  essentially  scientific  and  tech- 
nical work.  The  post  legal  officer  in 
the  Administrative  Division,  Capt. 
Ralph  C.  Smith,  found  that  his  princi- 
pal assignment  was  solution  of  patent 
problems,  and  several  engineer  offi- 
cers who  happened  to  have  the  neces- 
sary training  or  background  in  chem- 
istry, metallurgy,  or  physics  worked 
extensively  with  scientists  and  techni- 
cians in  the  laboratory.  Other  post 
staff  officers  worked  full  time  in  the 
development  and  administration  of 
outlying  test  areas.  Maj.  Wilber  A. 
Stevens,  for  example,  who  began  in 
1943  as  head  of  the  Operations  Divi- 
sion, eventually  was  spending  all  his 


time  supervising  projects  at  outlying 
sites;  acting  as  a  liaison  officer  be- 
tween technical  and  military  person- 
nel; and  assisting  in  coordinating  the 
work  of  group  leaders  in  the  laborato- 
ry. Stevens's  subordinate.  Captain  Da- 
valos,  the  post  engineer  heading  the 
division's  Technical  Area  Section, 
also  became  deeply  involved  in  the 
complexities  of  the  technical  program 
in  the  course  of  helping  to  plan  and 
carry  out  construction  and  mainte- 
nance for  the  laboratory. ^° 

The  post  commander,  too,  tended 
to  be  drawn  into  more  and  more 
direct  concern  with  technical  prob- 
lems. In  the  earliest  period,  lack 
of  adequate  liaison  and  General 
Groves's  policy  of  dealing  personally 
with  the  technical  program  had  ex- 
cluded the  post  commander  from 
knowledge  or  participation.  Gradual- 
ly, however.  Colonel  Ashbridge  and 
members  of  the  laboratory  staff  devel- 
oped avenues  for  more  effective  liai- 
son. Oppenheimer's  May  1943  ap- 
pointment of  a  special  assistant  on  his 
staff  to  take  responsibility  for  liaison 
with  the  post  administration  had 
opened  one  avenue  of  communica- 
tion, and  Ashbridge's  assignment  to 
membership  on  the  laboratory's  ad- 
ministrative board  in  July  1944  pro- 
vided further  opportunity  for  the  post 
commander  to  keep  informed  of  de- 
velopments in  the  technical  program. 

General  Groves,  with  the  support 
of  his  Washington  staff,  continued 
throughout  the  war  to  be  perhaps  the 
single  most   effective   liaison   channel 


2Mbid„  Vol.  2.  pp.  III.29-III.35.  IX.8-IX.9, 
IX.13-IX.14,.and  \ol.  3,  pp.  2.8-2.9,  DASA;  Groves 
Diarv,  Jul  44,  2  Nov  44,  26  Apr-May  45,  LRG;  Llr, 
Oppenheimer  to  Bu.sh,  21  Nov  44,  Admin  Files, 
(;cn  Corresp,  600  12  (Research),  MDR. 


30  List,  sub:  MD  Oils  on  Dutv  at  I.os  Alamos  and 
Iheir  Duties.  6  Mav  44,  Ind  to  Memo,  .\shbiidge  to 
Groves,  14  Jan  44,  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol. 
1,  pp.  7.5  and  7.12,  and  \ol.  2.  pp.  \'II.l,  \'II.9, 
XV1.1-XVI.2,  DASA. 


THE  LOS  ALAMOS  WEAPON  PROGRAM 


501 


Lt.  Col.  Curtis  A.  Nelson 

between  the  laboratory  and  post  ad- 
ministrations at  Los  Alamos.  By  fre- 
quent telephone  calls  to  Oppen- 
heimer,  Ashbridge  (later  Tyler),  and 
Parsons,  as  well  as  to  Colonel  Stewart 
in  Los  Angeles,  the  Manhattan  com- 
mander kept  in  close  touch  with  both 
community  and  technical  develop- 
ments. As  with  other  key  installations 
of  the  Manhattan  Project,  Groves  sup- 
plemented his  telephone  calls  with 
teletype  messages,  memorandums, 
and,  about  once  every  two  or  three 
months,  an  inspection  and  consulta- 
tion visit  lasting  two  or  three  days.  In 
addition.  Parsons  visited  Groves  in  his 
Washington  office  about  once  a 
month  and  Oppenheimer,  Ashbridge, 
and  Stewart  less  frequently.^ ^ 


^^  Groves  Diary,  Jan  44-JuI  45,  LRCi.  For  exam- 
ple, see  specifically  entries  for  14  Mar  and  18  and 
24-26  May  44  (visits  by  Oppenheimer  and  Parsons 
lo  see  Groves  in  Washington,  D.G.)  and  1  1  Dec  43, 
lor  his  involvement  in  details  of  administration.  For 
Groves's  correspondence  with  Oppenheimer  on  the 
more   technological   aspects   of    the   bomb   develop- 


To  facilitate  overall  administration 
and  operation  of  the  weapon  pro- 
gram. Groves  took  special  interest  in 
matters  of  security,  construction,  and 
materials  and  manpower  procure- 
ment. Of  note  are  his  personal  efforts 
to  expedite  manpower  recruitment  for 
Los  Alamos.  In  October,  for  example, 
following  Conant's  expression  of 
alarm  at  the  continuing  deficiencies  in 
the  senior  scientific  staff.  Groves 
worked  out  with  a  reluctant  Compton 
for  the  transfer  of  about  fifty  Metal- 
lurgical Project  physicists.  At  the 
same  time,  he  brought  pressure  upon 
the  District's  Personnel  Division  chief, 
Lt.  Col.  Curtis  A.  Nelson,  to  maintain 
a  flow  of  junior  scientists  for  the  lab- 
oratory's SED  unit.  His  prodding  of 
Nelson  proved  effective,  for  by  early 
1945  nearly  half  the  working  person- 
nel on  the  Hill  was  in  uniform. 
Groves's  frequent  pleas  to  manpower 
authorities  in  Washington  to  supply 
the  New  Mexico  installation  with 
more  skilled  workmen,  especially  ma- 
chinists, were  less  productive.  Hence, 
when  Oppenheimer  uncovered  an  op- 
portunity in  late  1944  to  establish  a 
liaison  with  the  California  Institute 
of  Technology's  well-manned  Navy 
rocket  development  group  in  Pasade- 
na, Groves  personally  intervened  to 
expedite  an  arrangement  with  the 
Navy's  Bureau  of  Ordnance  that 
made,  under  a  newly  created  Project 
Camel,  both  skilled  workers  and  sur- 
plus facilities  available  to  the 
laboratorv.^^ 


ment  program  see  MDR,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
400.17  (Mfg-Frod-Fab)  lor  entries  during  the  No- 
vember 1943-Augusi  1944  period. 

32MnH.  lik.  8,  \'ol.  2,  p.  IX.ll.  DASA;  Groves 
Diarv,  Hi  Oct,  25.  28  Nov.  1.  .5-6,  12.  27,  30  Dec  44 
and   1,  3,  5,  25-26  Jan,  .5-9  Feb,  3  Aug  45.  LRG; 


502 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  Al  OMIC  BOMB 


Although  manpower  conditions  re- 
mained less  than  satisfactory  through- 
out the  war,  the  Manhattan  com- 
mander's efforts  directly  contributed 
in  some  measure  to  relieving  person- 
nel deficiencies  at  Los  Alamos.  Thus 
in  the  summer  of  1945,  the  number 
of  post  personnel  continued  to  in- 
crease, though  not  at  a  significant 
rate.  The  SED  unit  had  about  1,400 
enlisted  personnel  by  July.  Others  in 
the  post  administration  numbered 
1,260   8th   Service   Command    troops 

Ltr,  Conant  to  Bush.  20  Oct  44.  OSRD;  Ltrs,  Op- 
penheimer  to  Bush,  21  Nov  44,  and  Groves  to  Stew- 
art {I.OS  Angeles),  sub:  Assignment  of  L^iaison  Off 
for  OSRD  Contract  OEM  sr-418  vv/CIT,  Pasadena. 
Calif.,  16  Jan  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12 
(Research),  MDR;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  \eu' 
World,  p.  315.  See  Ch.  XVI  on  transfer  of  physicists 
from  the  Metallurgical  Project. 


(500  MP's,  500  PED's,  260  WAC's) 
and  more  than  2,000  civilian  employ- 
ees. This  total  of  more  than  4,900 — 
with  1,300  scientists  and  technicians 
at  the  laboratory  and  some  500  con- 
struction contractor  personnel — gave 
Los  Alamos  a  total  working  popula- 
tion of  approximately  6,700.  At  this 
juncture,  as  the  bomb  development 
program  moved  rapidly  toward  the 
actual  test  of  an  atomic  device,  all  at 
Los  Alamos  were  concentrating  their 
efforts  on  the  technical  preparations 
for  this  climactic  event. ^^ 


^^  See  Ch.  XVI  for  the  basis  of  these  population 
statistics.  An  official  historical  account  of  the  project 
written  in  1947  estimated  total  population  of  Los 
Alamos  in  December  1944  as  5.675  and  at  the  end 
of  1945  as  8,200.  See  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1,  p.  7.15 
and  App.  B7,  and  Vol.  2,  App.  Graph  No.  2,  DASA, 
and  Groves  Diarv,  17  Jan  44,  LRG. 


CHAPTER  XXV 


Weapon  Development  and  Testing 


A  watershed  in  the  development  of 
nuclear  science  was  the  Army's  build- 
ing and  testing  of  the  atomic  bomb. 
In  early  1943,  with  America  engaged 
in  what  was  believed  to  be  a  desper- 
ate race  with  Germany,  American  and 
foreign-born  physicists,  chemists,  me- 
tallurgists, and  engineers,  as  well  as 
military  technical  experts,  came  to- 
gether at  Los  Alamos  to  devise  a 
weapon  with  a  power  hitherto  un- 
matched by  man.  This  practical  objec- 
tive melded  with  the  larger  scientific 
challenge  of  turning  atomic  theory 
into  a  material  reality  and  resulted  in 
a  unity  of  purpose  that  sustained  the 
assembled  scientists  in  their  unique 
atomic  adventure. 

Organized  by  Oppenheimer  into 
specialized  research  and  technical  di- 
visions and  groups,  the  Los  Alamos 
scientists  divided  their  efforts  be- 
tween two  fundamental  tasks:  solving 
the  theoretical  and  experimental 
problems    of    a    fission    bomb,^    and 


'  Bv  laic  ScplfmbcM  1943,  OppfiiluMmer  and  his 
scienlitic  stafi  dfiimlclv  had  decided  to  concentrate 
the  laboratory's  major  resources  on  developing  a 
fission  bomb,  relegating  work  on  the  "super"  (or 
lusion)  bomb  to  theoretical  investigations  by  a  small 
group  of  scientists  under  the  leadership  of  physicist 
Kdward  Teller  and  then,  in  1944,  phvsitist  Knrico 
Fermi.  Both  C.roves  and  Richard  {"..  I  olman,  the 
Manhattan  commander's  chief  ad\iser  on  weapon 
development,  supported  this  adion  to  c  arr\  on 
super  bomb  research  e\cn  in  the  most  he(ti(   peiiod 


working  out  the  complex  ordnance 
and  engineering  problems  of  weapon 
design  and  fabrication.  Their  concen- 
trated activity  over  a  two-year  period, 
from  1943  to  1945,  transformed  the 
laboratory,  for  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, into  a  weapon  assembly  and 
test  plant.  The  climax  was  Project 
Trinity,  the  crucial  test  of  their  cre- 
ation: the  first  atomic  bomb. 

Building  the  Bomb 

By  the  fall  of  1943,  with  the  labora- 
tory's administrative  organization 
largely  worked  out  and  the  scientists' 
talents  and  energies  channeled  into 
various  research  programs,  Oppen- 
heimer, Groves,  Conant,  and  the 
other  project  leaders  turned  their  at- 
tention to  the  problem  of  determin- 
ing the  most  suitable  design  of  an 
atomic     device.^     During     inspection 


of  fission  bomb  development,  primarily  because 
thev  could  not  forget  the  known  interest  of  the  Ger- 
mans in  deuterium  (heavy  water) — the  active  materi- 
al for  the  super  bomb.  See  Groves  Diary.  29-30  Sep 
43,  LRG:  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be  fold.  p.  158; 
Kdward  Feller  and  Allen  Brown,  The  Legacy  of  Hiro- 
shima (Garden  Citv,  N.V.:  Doubledav  and  Co., 
1962),  pp.  38-40:  MDH,  Bk.  8,  \'ol.  2,  "technical." 
pp.  XIIFI-XIII.IO.  DASA. 

^Except  as  otherwise  indicated,  the  discussion  on 
weapon  development  is  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  8.  \'ol. 
2.  pp.  I\'.1-\'IIF32  and  X.1-X\I1.22,  DA.SA,  and 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  .Vnc  Worhi.  pp.  240-54  and 
3 1 0-2 1 . 


504 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


visits  to  Los  Alamos,  Groves  found 
that  some  of  the  scientific  staff  mem- 
bers, including  Captain  Parsons, 
strongly  favored  the  gun  rather  than 
the  implosion  principle  as  more 
feasible  for  developing  a  usable  fis- 
sion weapon.  They  pointed  out  that 
the  well-established  mechanical  tech- 
niques of  the  gun  made  this  weapon 
type  almost  certain  to  work  if  proper- 
ly designed  and  that  the  design  and 
engineering  of  the  outer  configura- 
tion and  mechanics  of  the  gun  were 
already  well  advanced.  Furthermore, 
once  the  physicists,  chemists,  and  me- 
tallurgists could  provide  the  precise 
nuclear  specifications  for  the  active 
material— whether  U-235,  Pu-239,  or 
even  U-233  from  thorium — develop- 
ment of  a  workable  gun-type  weapon 
would  be  only  a  matter  of  time. 

Assessment  of  precise  nuclear  spec- 
ifications for  a  fission  weapon  was  the 
responsibility  of  the  laboratory's  ex- 
perimental physics  division.  Through 
intensive  research,  the  division's 
physicists  gathered  considerable  data 
on  the  effect  of  cosmic  rays  on  fis- 
sioning, on  measurement  of  nuclear 
cross  sections,  on  scattering  phenom- 
ena, and  on  other  aspects  of  the  fis- 
sion process  that  related  to  bomb 
specifications  and  efficiency.  With  this 
data  they  were  able  to  calculate  by  the 
summer  of  1944  that  the  destructive 
effect  of  either  an  implosion-  or  gun- 
type  bomb  would  justify  the  effort  re- 
quired to  fabricate  it.  They  still  lacked 
an  answer,  however,  to  the  question 
on  which  the  success  of  the  entire 
project  hinged:  How  much  fissionable 
material  would  be  needed  for  an  ef- 
fective weapon?  Whether  or  not 
atomic    weapons    would    be    available 


for  use  in  the  war  depended  on  the 
answer  to  that  question.^ 

One  way  to  increase  the  efficiency 
of  a  fission  bomb  was  to  achieve  max- 
imum purity  in  the  active  materials. 
Hence,  a  major  program  of  the  lab- 
oratory's chemistry  and  metallurgy  di- 
vision was  to  improve  the  methods 
for  purifying  U-235  and  Pu-239.  Be- 
cause purity  requirements  for  urani- 
um were  about  one-third  less  than 
those  for  plutonium  and  because, 
until  early  1944,  there  was  not 
enough  Pu-239  available  to  permit  ef- 
fective work  on  its  purification,  the 
chemists  experimented  with  uranium 
but  with  the  purpose  of  developing 
techniques  that  might  also  be  used 
with  plutonium.  When  sufficient 
amounts  of  Pu-239  arrived  from  the 
Clinton  pile,  the  chemists  developed 
both  wet  and  dry  purification  process- 
es. Subsequently,  they  employed  the 
more  satisfactory  wet  process  in  final 
purification  of  most  plutonium  for  the 
bomb. 

Before  U-235  or  Pu-239  could  be 
used  in  a  fission  bomb,  they  had  to  be 
converted  into  metal  of  the  proper 
configuration  and  purity.  Metallur- 
gists at  Los  Alamos  faced  a  number 
of  problems  in  making  uranium  or 
plutonium  metal  of  the  desired  qual- 
ity, including  the  tendency  of  uranium 
to  catch  fire  during  processing  and 
the  difficulty  of  handling  the  highly 
reactive  and  poisonous  plutonium. 
For  forming  uranium  into  metal,  they 
experimented  with  electrolytic  and 
centrifuge  processes  but  finally  settled 
upon  a  modification  of  the  stationary 


niPC  Rpt,  21  Aug  43,  OCG  Files,  Gt-n  Corresp, 
MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  E.  MDR;  ibid.,  4  Feb  44, 
OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  C, 
MDR. 


WEAPON  DP:VEL0PMEN  1    AND  TESTING 


505 


Technical  Area  at  Los  Alamos,  built  around  Ashley  Pond  and  along  Trinity  Avenue 


bomb  method,  devised  earlier  at  Iowa 
State.  For  plutonium,  the  metal- 
lurgists were  as  handicapped  as  the 
chemists,  with  only  microscopic  quan- 
tities available.  Fortunately,  many  of 
the  methods  they  developed  for  ura- 
nium proved  adaptable  to  plutonium. 
Again  like  the  chemists,  the  metallur- 
gists had  to  devote  considerable 
effort  to  devising  improved  recovery 
methods  so  that  virtually  none  of  the 
precious  metal  would  be  lost  in  pro- 
cessing it  for  use  in  a  weapon.^ 

While  awaiting  the  physical  and  nu- 
clear specifications  for  the  active  ma- 
terials, the  laboratory's  ordnance  divi- 
sion worked  on  the  development  and 


^Ltrs,  (irovcs  to  Oppcnheimcr,  19  Jvui  44,  and 
Oppenheimei  to  Groves,  27  Jun  44,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  729.31,  MDR;  Ltr,  Oppenheimer  to 
Groves,  31  Aug  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
400.17  (Mfg-Prod-Fab),  MDR. 


proving  of  the  mechanical  compo- 
nents for  the  first  experimental  guns. 
First  priority  was  design  and  fabrica- 
tion of  a  plutonium-projectile  gun. 
This  gun  type  posed  more  problems 
than  a  uranium  gun,  because  of  Pu- 
239's  higher  propensity  to  predetona- 
tion,  but  the  division's  theory  that  a 
gun  with  sufficient  muzzle  velocity  to 
avoid  predetonation  with  Pu-239  was 
certain  to  be  suitable  for  U-235  justi- 
fied the  concentration  of  effort. 

Using  standard  ordnance  and  inte- 
rior ballistics  data  obtained  from  the 
National  Defense  Research  Commit- 
tee (NDRC),  the  ordnance  division 
had  its  design  engineers  complete  the 
drawings  for  a  high-velocity  gun  and, 
with  subsequent  approval  from  the 
Navy's  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  ordered 
forgings  for  two  guns  from  the  Naval 


506 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Gun  Factory  in  Washington,  D.C.  In 
the  meantime,  while  the  guns  were 
being  manufactured.  Captain  Parsons 
arranged  for  construction  of  the 
Anchor  Ranch  Proving  Ground,  some 
8  miles  east  of  the  central  laboratory 
facilities,  where,  by  September  1943, 
the  division's  proving  ground  group 
began  testing  and  perfecting  gun  per- 
formance techniques  on  a  limited  and 
then  increased  basis. 

By  early  1944,  gun  research  was  ad- 
vancing smoothly,  despite  a  constant 
shortage  of  experienced  personnel 
and  difficulties  in  materials  procure- 
ment. The  division's  design  engineers 
had  established  the  exact  specifica- 
tions of  a  low-velocity  gun,  to  be  used 
with  U-235.  Hence,  because  these 
specifications  were  considerably  less 
stringent  than  previously  anticipated 
for  a  U-235  gun,  the  engineers  were 
able  to  reduce  the  original  muzzle  ve- 
locity requirements.  This  achievement 
made  it  possible  for  the  division  to 
place  a  March  order  with  the  Naval 
Gun  Factory  for  three  of  these  urani- 
um guns,  which  was  much  earlier  than 
expected  and  just  days  after  the  facto- 
ry had  delivered  the  first  two  plutoni- 
um  prototypes  to  Los  Alamos.^ 

Primarily  because  of  the  undevel- 
oped state  of  the  art,  interest  in  im- 
plosion research  for  a  time  ranked 
second  to  that  in  gun  assembly  re- 
search. Since  April  1943,  physicist 
Seth  H.  Neddermeyer  from  the  Cali- 
fornia Institute  of  Technology  had 
been  conducting  laboratory  experi- 
ments with  high  explosives,  designed 
to  test  the  feasibility  of  the  implosion 


^  Rpt,  Parsons,  sub:  Summarv  of  Ord  Div,  15  Apr 
44,  OCG  Files.  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files.  Fldr  19,  lab 
A,  MDR;  Memo,  Tolman  to  (probably  Groves),  sub: 
Org  of  Ord  Div  at  V  (Los  Alamos),  1  Mar  44,  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  1  ab  G,  MDR. 


principle.  Handicapped  by  the  short- 
age of  experienced  personnel  and  by 
the  general  lack  of  enthusiasm  for  im- 
plosion among  his  colleagues,  Ned- 
dermeyer's  project  had  definitely  re- 
mained a  "dark  horse"  in  the  race  for 
completion  of  a  workable  atomic 
device. 

But  all  of  this  changed  with  the  ar- 
rival of  John  von  Neumann  in  mid- 
summer 1943.  The  widely  respected 
Hungarian-born  mathematician  from 
the  Institute  for  Advanced  Study  at 
Princeton  had  been  carrying  out  work 
on  shock  waves  for  the  NDRC.  Apply- 
ing knowledge  of  explosives  gained  in 
his  work  with  shaped  charges,  he 
theorized  the  likely  effects  of  increas- 
ing the  velocity  of  convergingly  fo- 
cused active  material  in  the  implosion 
bomb.  His  calculations  convinced  him 
that  if  the  mechanical  problems  of 
achieving  higher  velocity  could  be 
solved,  an  implosion  bomb  would 
attain  criticality  using  less  active  ma- 
terial of  a  considerably  lower  level  of 
purity  than  hitherto  believed  possible. 
If  he  were  correct,  implosion  offered 
a  means  to  save  precious  months  in 
developing  a  weapon — provided,  of 
course,  that  ways  could  be  devised  to 
avoid  predetonation  and  achieve  sym- 
metry in  the  imploding  shock  wave 
inside  the  bomb. 

By  early  fall  Oppenheimer,  Groves, 
Conant,  and  the  other  project  leaders 
were  reevaluating  implosion.  Groves 
conferred  with  George  B.  Kistiakow- 
sky,  the  distinguished  Harvard  chem- 
ist who  was  an  expert  on  explosives, 
and  with  Oppenheimer  and  members 
of  the  laboratory's  implosion  study 
group.  This  led  to  a  decision  by  Op- 
penheimer and  the  laboratory's  gov- 
erning board  to  expand  the  implosion 


WEAPON  DEX'ELOPMENl    AND    EESFINC; 


507 


program  immediately,  beginning  with 
construction  of  an  on-site  plant  for 
casting  and  trimming  test  components 
and  installation  of  the  unusual  facili- 
ties required  for  testing  implosion  de- 
vices. In  early  November,  Groves  and 
Conant  outlined  the  advantages  of 
implosion  to  the  Military  Policy  Com- 
mittee, rhe  following  February,  the 
committee  informed  the  President 
that  "there  is  a  chance,  and  a  fair 
one,  if  a  process  involving  the  use  of 
a  minimum  amount  of  material 
proves  feasible,  that  the  first  bomb 
can  be  produced  in  the  late  fall  of 
1944."  6 

Once  project  leaders  had  approved 
undertaking  a  major  developmental 
program  for  the  implosion  bomb. 
General  Groves  began  a  full  and  ob- 
jective analysis  of  the  laboratory's  or- 
ganization, personnel,  and  facilities 
for  carrying  it  out.  Consulting  with 
von  Neumann  and  Parsons  in  Wash- 
ington, D.C.,  he  arranged  to  have 
Tolman  visit  Los  Alamos  for  an  ex- 
tended period  to  investigate  the  pro- 
gram. Giving  special  attention  to  the 
laboratory's  ordnance  division, 
Tolman  prepared  a  detailed  analysis 
of  its  organization  and  activities,  in- 
cluding estimates  of  the  additional 
personnel  that  he  believed  the  divi- 
sion would  require  to  complete  the 
implosion  program.  Tolman  found 
that  the  laboratory  had  indeed  made 
considerable  progress  toward  shifting 
priority  to  implosion,  although  Op- 
penheimcr  was  not  yet  prepared  to 
abandon  some  further  efforts  on  the 


almost  certain-to-work  plutonium  gun.' 
By  the  time  of  Tolman's  visit,  the 
inevitable  shift  in  emphasis  from  re- 
search and  experimentation  to  engi- 
neering, fabrication,  and  testing  was 
already  well  under  way.  Construction 
crews,  under  direction  of  Maj.  Wilber 
A.  Stevens  and  partially  comprised  of 
men  from  the  Provisional  Engineer 
Detachment,  had  completed  or  were 
at  work  on  a  number  of  essential  test 
areas  (eventually  there  would  be  more 
than  thirty  of  these).  They  had  built  a 
facility  for  casting  containers  for  ex- 
plosive charges  at  the  Anchor  Ranch 
Proving  Ground  and,  less  than  a  mile 
to  the  south,  were  well  advanced  on  a 
much  larger  and  more  elaborately 
equipped  area — designated  S  (for 
Sawmill)  Site — with  a  laboratory, 
shops,  powder  magazines,  and  even  a 
dining  hall.  In  addition.  Major  Ste- 
vens's crews  had  begun  work  on  sev- 
eral outlying  sites  required  especially 
for  testing  various  implosion  devices. 
Special  Engineer  Detatchment  (SED) 
troops  provided  a  considerable  part 
of  the  manpower  operating  these  test 
sites. 

Ordnance  teams  from  Los  Alamos 
also  assembled  and  tested  bomb  com- 
ponents at  test  sites  at  Wendover 
Field  (Utah),  Inyokern  (California), 
and  Alamogordo  Army  Air  Field 
(New  Mexico).  {See  Map  2.)  For  these 
tests,  the  laboratory  procured  normal 
weapon  components  and  high  explo- 
sives from  a  variety  of  government 
and  private  suppliers — the  Naval  Gun 


«  Quotation  from  MFC  Rpt,  4  Feb  44,  MDR.  See 
also  Groves  Diarv.  20  and  29-Sl  Oct  43.  LRG,  and 
MFC  Min,  9  Nov  4.^.  OCC,  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP 
Files,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A,  MDR. 


■'  Memo,  lolman  to  (iroves,  sub:  Rpt  on  Status  of 
Ord  Work  at  Y,  i  Mar  44,  and  attached  report, 
OC(;  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MF  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  G, 
MDR;  (iroves  Diarv.  21  jaii,  22  Feb,  and  2-3  Mar 
44,  FRG. 


508 


MANHAITAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Factory  in  Washington,  D.C.;  the 
Naval  Ordnance  Plant  in  Centerline, 
Michigan;  the  Naval  Depot  in  York- 
town,  Y^irginia;  the  Expert  Tool  and 
Die  Company  in  Detroit;  the  Hercules 
Powder  Company  in  Wilmington, 
Delaware;  the  Monsanto  Chemical 
Company  in  Dayton,  Ohio,  to  name 
only  a  few.  But  for  special  parts  and 
materials  that  were  unobtainable,  the 
laboratory  itself  had  to  function  as  an 
ordnance  manufacturing  plant.  Best 
illustrating  this  concentration  of  effort 
was  the  major  task  of  converting 
U-235  and  Pu-239  into  metal  bomb 
components.^ 

In  early  1944,  the  laboratory  inten- 
sified procurement  efforts  for  special- 
ized equipment  for  implosion  testing. 
In  April,  the  IBM  machines  needed  to 
speed  up  analysis  of  useful  data  from 
implosion  tests  arrived.  And  in  July, 
the  Military  Policy  Committee  ap- 
proved procurement  of  a  huge  solid 
steel  receptacle  for  testing  the  first 
implosion  device,  thus  ensuring  re- 
covery of  the  active  material  in  the 
event  of  a  fizzle.  By  then,  implosion 
development  had  made  giant  strides, 
but  still  unknown  were  the  relative  ef- 
ficiency of  such  a  design  and  how 
long  it  would  take  to  build  a  moder- 
ately effective  implosion  device.^ 

Despite  frequent  changes  in  the 
general  specifications  for  an  atomic 
weapon,  the  laboratory's  ordnance  di- 


8MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  1.  "General,"  pp.  5.12-5.13. 
6.12,  Apps.  A8  (Site  Map)  and  D16  (Site  Constr 
Data),  and  Vol.  2.  pp.  V1I.30-VII.31,  XVI.  12, 
XVI.14-XVI.15,  XIX.1-XIX.5,  DASA;  Hewlett  and 
Anderson,  X'ew  World,  pp.  312-17. 

9  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  288-89;  MPC 
Min,  23  Jul  44,  MDR.  The  bottle-shaped  steel  re- 
ceptacle for  the  implosion  device  was  designated 
"Jumbo"  because  of  its  massive  size  (25  by  12  feet) 
and  weight  (214  tons). 


vision  had  worked  out  the  design  of 
two  basic  bomb  models  by  the 
summer  of  1944.  The  gun-type 
model,  the  "Thin  Man,"  was  about  10 
feet  in  length,  with  a  varying  diameter 
of  1.5  to  2.5  feet,  and  had  an  estimat- 
ed weight  (when  loaded)  of  5  tons. 
The  implosion-type  model,  the  "Fat 
Man,"  was  almost  as  long  (9  feet)  but 
thicker,  tapering  down  from  a  hemi- 
spherical nose  measuring  5  feet  in  di- 
ameter to  a  tailend  of  about  3  feet, 
and  had  an  estimated  weight  (when 
loaded)  of  6  tons.  Captain  Parsons 
had  the  models  constructed  at  the 
Applied  Physics  Laboratory  in  Silver 
Spring,  Maryland,  and  tested  at  the 
Naval  Proving  Ground  on  the  Poto- 
mac River  at  Dahlgren,  Y^irginia.  The 
laboratory's  delivery  group  then  con- 
ducted in-flight  tests  in  a  modi- 
fied B-29,  dropping  dummy  models 
of  both  types  of  bombs,  at  the  Muroc 
Army  Air  Field  near  San  Francisco. 
The  ballistical  characteristics  of  Thin 
Man  were  satisfactory,  but  Fat  Man 
displayed  serious  instability,  fortunate- 
ly soon  overcome  by  a  relatively  simple 
modification  in  the  tail  assembly.  ^° 
But  the  sense  of  having  achieved 
substantial  progress  in  weapon  design 
and  fabrication  was  marred  by  a 
number  of  uncertainties.  The  feasibil- 
ity of  implosion  had  yet  to  be  demon- 
strated and  the  rate  at  which  U-235 
and  Pu-239  could  be  produced  by  the 
Clinton  and  Hanford  plants  remained 
very  much   in   question.   And  in  July, 


»o  MPC  Rpt,  7  Aug  44,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  K,  MDR.  Ltr,  Parsons  to 
Groves,  24  Dec  43;  Rpt,  Parsons,  sub:  Prgm  for 
Flight  Test  of  Dummy  Bombs  from  B-29  Plane,  24 
Dec  43.  Both  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.913, 
MDR.  Ltr.  Parsons  to  Norman  F.  Ramsey  (Delivery 
Gp,  Los  Alamos  Lab),  17  Jul  43,  Admm  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  600.12  (Research),  MDR. 


WEAPON  DE\  ELOPMENT  AND  TESTING 


509 


Los  Alamos  scientists  furnished  dis- 
quieting new  data  on  the  plutonium 
that  would  be  produced  in  the  Han- 
ford  piles,  indicating  the  composition 
of  its  neutron  background  would 
cause  predetonation  in  the  plutonium 
gun. 

Project  scientists  had  known  for 
some  time  that  in  the  process  of  irra- 
diating uranium  in  the  pile  some  of 
the  Pu-239  was  likely  to  pick  up  an 
extra  neutron,  forming  Pu-240.  When 
plutonium  from  the  Clinton  pilot  pile 
became  available  in  the  spring  of 
1944,  the  radioactivity  group  at  Los 
Alamos  ran  a  series  of  tests  that  con- 
firmed the  presence  of  Pu-240  and 
indicated  it  would  be  present  in  far 
larger  amounts  in  plutonium  from  the 
Hanford  piles.  Hence,  the  neutron 
background  of  the  active  material  for 
the  bombs  would  be  several  hundred 
times  greater  than  was  permissible. 
While  the  Pu-240  could  be  separated 
from  the  Pu-239  by  the  electromag- 
netic process,  construction  of  a  plant 
to  do  so  would  delay  production  of  a 
plutonium  weapon  for  many  months. 

Oppenheimer  informed  Conant  of 
the  240  problem  in  early  July.  To 
decide  how  best  to  deal  with  it, 
Conant  took  immediate  steps  to  as- 
semble project  leaders  for  a  confer- 
ence at  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
on  the  seventeenth.  Besides  Conant, 
the  following  were  in  attendance:  Op- 
penheimer, Compton,  Charles  A. 
Thomas,  in  his  capacity  as  coordina- 
tor of  active  material  purification  re- 
search, Fermi,  Croves,  and  Nichols. 
After  some  deliberation,  the  group 
decided  that  the  predetonation  threat 
posed  by  240  made  the  use  of  pluto- 
nium in  the  gun-tvpe  bomb  impracti- 
cable and  work  on  this  system  should 
be  suspended  inimediatclv.  With  this 


decision,  even  greater  urgency  was 
placed  on  the  development  of  a  work- 
able implosion  weapon,  in  which  the 
240,  because  of  the  higher  velocities 
involved,  would  be  unlikely  to  cause 
predetonation.^  ^ 

Abandonment  of  the  plutonium 
gun  compelled  General  Groves  to 
revise  his  predictions  on  when  an 
atomic  weapon  would  be  ready  for 
employment  against  the  enemy.  In  a 
progress  report  to  General  Marshall 
in  early  August,  he  presented  a  re- 
vised timetable  of  weapon  produc- 
tion: five  to  eleven  implosion  bombs 
in  the  period  from  March  through 
June  1945,  with  an  additional  twenty 
to  forty  implosion  bombs  of  the  same 
size  by  the  end  of  the  year.  He  cau- 
tioned, however,  that  this  schedule 
would  not  apply  "if  experiments  yet 
to  be  conducted  with  an  implosion 
type  bomb  do  not  fulfill  expectations 
and  we  are  required  to  rely  on  the 
gun  type  alone"  and  suggested  that,  if 
this  delay  should  occur,  the  first 
bomb  would  not  be  ready  until  1 
August  1945,  with  one  or  two  more 
by  the  year's  end.  In  Groves's  opin- 
ion, any  delay  virtually  guaranteed 
that  the  bomb  would  not  be  used 
against  Germany,  which  by  the  late 
summer  of  1944  appeared  likely  to  be 
defeated  within  a  few  months.  And  to 
many,  even  the  bomb's  use  against 
Japan  seemed  doubtful. ^^ 


'»  Groves  Diarv,  17-18  Jul  44.  1,RG;  I.trs,  Oppen- 
heimer to  Gonani.  11  Jul  44,  and  Tolman  to 
Groves,  21  Jul  44,  OSRD;  Ltr,  Oppenheimer  to 
Groves,  18  Jul  44,  Admin  Files.  Gen  C:orresp. 
400.17  (Mfg-i'rod-Fah),  MDR. 

'^QiK.tation  from  MFC.  Rpt,  7  Aug  44.  MDR. 
Groves  continued  to  hold  to  the  idea  that  the  Ger- 
mans might  soon  be  readv  to  use  an  atomic  weapon 
against  the  Allies  and,  therefore,  that  the  Americans 
must  continue  to  be  prepared  to  counter  this  threat 


510 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Through  the  remaining  months  of 
1944  and  the  first  half  of  1945,  pro- 
grams to  perfect  the  uranium  gun  and 
implosion  principle  absorbed  the 
major  energies  and  resources  of  the 
reorganized  laboratory.  As  predicted 
by  the  Los  Alamos  scientists,  develop- 
ment of  the  gun  moved  ahead 
smoothly  with  few  serious  problems. 
Experiments  by  the  laboratory's 
physicists  proved  the  correctness  of 
earlier  estimates  of  the  critical  mass 
of  the  U-235  metal  required  for  the 
gun  and  the  gun  group  conducted 
successful  firing  tests,  using  a  full- 
sized  tube  and  substituting  U-238  for 
U-235. 

Implosion,  by  way  of  contrast,  con- 
tinued to  be  afflicted  with  doubts  and 
uncertainties.  Progress  toward  achiev- 
ing sufficient  symmetry  in  implosion 
was  discouragingly  slow.  Of  the  vari- 
ous implosion  bomb  designs,  that 
proposing  the  use  of  explosive 
"lenses"  appeared  most  feasible.  ^^  A 
more  accurate  assessment  was 
achieved  with  the  first  tests:  Results 
were  so  unpromising  that  in  Decem- 
ber 1944  Groves  and  Conant  con- 
cluded that  U-235  should  not  be  used 

with  their  own  atomic  weapon.  But  Hewlett  and  An- 
derson (Xew  World,  p.  253)  note  that  eariier  devel- 
opments all  pointed  to  Japan,  not  Germany,  as  the 
ultimate  target  for  the  bomb.  As  early  as  May  1943, 
the  Military  Policy  Committee  (see  MPC  Min,  5  May 
43,  OGC.  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A, 
MDR)  concluded  that  the  optimum  target  would 
be  the  Japanese  fleet  anchored  at  Truk.  Then  in 
September  of  that  year  choice  of  the  new  B-29, 
scheduled  for  employment  in  the  Pacific  Theater, 
over  the  British  Lancaster  seemed  to  imply  that  the 
bomb  was  to  be  used  against  Japan.  See  Ch.  XXVI. 
"Tubes,  shaped  like  optical  lenses  and  filled  with 
high  explosives,  were  placed  in  a  symmetrical  pat- 
tern around  the  active  material  (Pu-239).  When  the 
explosives  detonated,  thcv  created  an  inward  blast 
that  compressed  the  active  material  until  it  reached 
a  critical  mass. 


in    an   implosion    bomb   but    be   con- 
served for  the  certain-to-work  gun.^"* 

As  the  new  year  opened,  surprising 
developments  dispelled  the  lingering 
air  of  discouragement.  In  February, 
when  Groves,  Tolman,  and  Conant 
visited  Los  Alamos,  they  found  far 
more  reasons  for  optimism.  A  few 
days  before  their  arrival  on  the 
twenty-seventh,  the  gun  group  finally 
had  frozen  design  on  the  U-235 
weapon,  indicating  a  usable  model 
would  be  ready  by  July.  Implosion 
also  had  made  notable  progress,  and 
laboratory  leaders  decided,  in  a  con- 
ference that  Groves  attended,  to  man- 
ufacture the  implosion  model  favored 
by  Oppenheimer.  And  to  ensure  at 
least  one  implosion  bomb  test  with 
active  material  by  4  July,  Oppen- 
heimer also  decided  to  use  the  Cali- 
fornia Institute  of  Technology's 
Project  Camel  facilities  for  construc- 
tion of  a  second  model  with  alternate 
design  features.  At  this  juncture,  with 
data  from  Hanford  indicating  that 
shipments  of  plutonium  in  quantity 
would  begin  to  arrive  at  Los  Alamos 
in  May,  with  experiments  on  accurate 
establishment  of  the  critical  measure- 
ments on  Pu-239  in  progress  at  the 
Metallurgical  Laboratory,  and  with 
construction  of  a  much  larger  plant 
for  final  purification  of  plutonium  at 


'■•Rpt,  Cmdr  A.  Francis  Birch  (Gun  Gp  Ldr,  Los 
Alamos  Lab),  sub:  Gun-assembled  Nuclear  Bomb,  6 
Oct  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  16, 
Tab  E;  Ltr,  Oppenheimer  to  Groves,  30Jun  45,  and 
Rpt,  prepared  bv  Bristish  scientists  at  Los  Alamos,  7 
Mav  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  17; 
Ltrs,  Oppenheimer  to  Groves,  6  Oct  and  14  Nov  44, 
.\dmin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Research);  Ltr, 
Oppenheimer  to  Groves,  8  Dec  44,  OCG  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  19,  lab  D.  All  in  MDR.  Rpt, 
Conant,  sub:  Summary  of  Trip  to  \,  Dec  44,  OSRD. 
Groves  Diary.  19  Dec  44,  LRG.  Hewlett  and  Ander- 
son. Xew  World,  pp.  317-21. 


WEAPON  DEVELOPMEN  r   AND  TESTING 


511 


Los  Alamos  well  under  way,  the  Trin- 
ity test  date  now  appeared  feasible.  ^^ 

Project   Truiity:   The  Test  of  the  Bomb 

Project  Trinity  was  the  final  step  of 
the  Los  Alamos  weapon  program,  the 
culmination  of  the  laboratory's  reori- 
entation from  research  and  experi- 
mentation to  engineering,  fabrication, 
and  testing  of  an  atomic  device.  With- 
out Trinity,  without  the  test  of  the 
bomb,  the  feasibility  of  employing  the 
new  weapon  appeared  to  be  much 
more  questionable.  "If  we  do  not 
have  accurate  test  data  from  Trinity," 
Oppenheimer  and  Kistiakowsky  had 
warned,  "the  planning  of  the  use  of 
the  gadget  over  the  enemy  territory 
will  have  to  be  done  substantially 
blindly."  As  1945  unfolded,  the  Trini- 
ty mission  became  the  central  focus 
for  the  scientists  at  Los  Alamos.  With 
the  bomb  test  now  first  priority,  the 
tempo  and  intensity  of  Trinity  prep- 
arations increased  dramaticallv.^^ 


'^Rpt.  Birch,  sub:  Gun-assembled  Nuclear  Bomb, 
6  Oct  45,  MDR;  Memo,  Ciroves  to  Secy  War,  sub: 
Atomic  Fission  Bombs,  2?>  Apr  45,  OCG  Files,  MP 
Files.  Fldr  25.  Tab  M,  MDR;  Groves  Diary,  27  Feb- 
2  Mar  45, 1.RG.  On  the  continuing  program  to  establish 
more  exact  measurements  concerning  plutonium  see 
Memos.  Groves  to  Nichols,  sub:  Measurements 
Prgm,  3  Apr  45,  and  Nichols  to  Groves,  10  Apr  45, 
same  sub.  Admin  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  400.12  (Ex- 
periments), MDR.  On  the  expansion  of  plutonium 
fabrication  facilities  at  Los  .Alamos  see  MDH,  Bk.  8, 
\'ol.  2,  XVII.20-XVII.22,  DASA,  and  Ltr.  Roger 
Williams  ( INX  Div  chief,  Du  Pont)  to  Groves,  16 
Mav  45,  Admm  Files,  Gen  Gorresp.  337.  MDR.  For 
the  views  of  the  British  scientists  at  Los  Alamos  on 
the  progress  of  bomb  development  in  early  1945 
see  .\dmin  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  201  (Ghadwick), 
MDR 

'^Quotation  from  Rpt,  Oppenheimer  and  Kistia- 
kowskv,  sub:  Activities  at  Trinity,  13  Oct  44,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  600.12  (Los  Alamos),  MDR. 
Except  as  otherwise  indicated,  the  section  that  lol- 
lows  on  the  Irinitv  test  is  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  8, 
\'ol.  2,  pp.  X\1II.1-X\III.22,  DASA,  and  Hewlett 
and  Anderson.  .\>«'   World,   pp.  37(i-8().  For  a  popu- 


In  the  critical  months  of  early  1945, 
making  the  gadget  work  consumed 
the  energies  of  both  the  bomb  build- 
ers and  Army  leaders.  While  the  sci- 
entists worked  at  perfecting  implosion 
assembly  and  field  teams  prepared 
the  remote  Trinity  test  site  at  Alamo- 
gordo,  General  Groves  and  his  new 
deputy  commander.  Brig.  Gen. 
Thomas  F.  Farrell,  devoted  much 
time  to  overseeing  Trinity  prepara- 
tions. Because  of  pressures  of  other 
responsibilities,  including  planning 
for  use  of  the  bomb  against  Japan  and 
for  the  postwar  control  of  atomic 
energy,  Groves  managed  only  three 
hurried  visits  to  Los  Alamos  during 
the  months  of  full-scale  preparations 
(April  to  July),  but  he  was  able  to 
maintain  day-to-day  contact  with 
bomb  test  developments  through 
timely  observation  reports  from  Far- 
rell, who  made  several  extended  tours 
to  the  Trinity  site. 

As  Trinity  preparations  began, 
Groves  had  advised  Colonel  Tyler, 
the  Los  Alamos  post  commander,  that 
he  must  carefully  coordinate  plans  for 
development  of  the  bomb  test  with 
the  laboratory  staff  and  with  Farrell 
"so  that  every  part  of  it  fits  into  a 
time  schedule."  As  procurement 
crises  built  up  in  April  and  May, 
Groves  personally  intervened  in  expe- 
diting requisition  of  lenses  for  the 
implosion  bomb  and  globe-shaped 
container  shells  ("pumpkins")  for  im- 
plosing  test  devices.  In  May,  with  a 
special  report  by  Farrell  on  means  to 
improve  the  procurement  situation  at 
the  New  Mexico  installation  to  guide 
him,  the  Manhattan  commander  con- 


lar  account  see  Lamonl,  Da\  oj  Tnnity.  pp.  2-13  and 
72-236. 


512 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  A.  Farrell  (right) 
with  General  Groves 

tributed  to  the  agreement  with  the 
University  of  CaHfornia  to  hire  more 
procurement  personnel.  Finally,  in 
the  weeks  immediately  preceding  the 
test,  Groves  and  Farrell  devoted  spe- 
cial attention  to  shipment  and  receipt 
of  active  materials  from  Hanford  and 
Clinton.!"^ 

General  Farrell  represented  the 
Army  at  Trinity's  first  major  event  on 
7  May — a  rehearsal  shot  of  100  tons 
of  high  explosives  combined  with  a 
very  small  amount  of  radioactive  fis- 
sion   materials    atop    a    20-foot    plat- 


^^  In  January  1945,  after  the  Secretary  of  War  had 
advised  the  Manhattan  commander  that  he  should 
select  an  officer  who  could  replace  him  in  the  event 
of  his  illness  or  death.  Groves  chose  Farrell,  a  Corps 
of  Engineers  officer  who,  in  1941,  had  served  as  his 
deputy  in  the  military  construction  program  before 
going  overseas  to  the  China-Burma-India  Theater. 
See  Groves,  Xoiv  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  30-32;  Groves 
Diary,  9  Jan,  1  Feb,  23  Mar,  29  Mar  (source  of  quo- 
tation), Apr-Jun  45,  passim,  LRG;  Memo  for  File, 
Groves,  sub:  Note  Taken  at  Mtg  at  Y,  27  Jun  45, 
OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  20,  Tab  F, 
MDR. 


form.  Observers,  including  Tolman 
and  Oppenheimer,  judged  it  a  suc- 
cessful trial  run  for  the  final  implo- 
sion test.  It  gave  the  various  Project 
Trinity  teams  practical  experience  in 
performing  their  assignments  under 
difficult  field  conditions,  demonstrat- 
ed a  need  for  improvements  in  the 
transportation  and  communications 
facilities,  helped  calibrate  instru- 
ments, and  provided  a  likely  indica- 
tion of  the  amount  of  radioactive  ma- 
terials needed  for  the  final  test.^® 

In  early  June,  "Jumbo,"  the  huge 
steel  container  to  be  used  in  explod- 
ing the  first  atomic  device,  arrived  at 
Trinity.  General  Groves  had  main- 
tained a  special  interest  in  the  design, 
procurement,  and  shipment  of  the 
vessel,  which  was  moved  in  early 
April  on  a  special  railroad  car  from 
Barberton,  Ohio,  via  a  carefully 
planned  route  to  a  railroad  siding  at 
Pope,  New  Mexico.  There,  Trinity 
workers  loaded  it  on  a  massive  trailer 
pulled  by  two  tractors  for  the  25-mile 
trip  to  the  test  site.  When  the  vessel 
finally  came  to  rest  some  800  yards 
from  the  final  test  tower,  there  it  re- 
mained never  to  be  used.  For  by  the 
time  of  Jumbo's  arrival,  Los  Alamos 
scientists  had  decided  to  dispense 
with  the  container,  concluding  that  its 
use  would  interfere  with  obtaining 
adequate  data  on  the  nature  of  the 
atomic  explosion — the  primary  reason 
for  conducting  the  Trinity  test.^^ 

'*  Rpt,  sub:  Trinity,  14  May  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  319.1  (Trinitv  Test  Rpts-Misc),  MDR; 
Memo,  Col  Stafford  L.  Warren  (MD  Med  Sec  chieO 
to  Groves,  sub:  Analysis  of  Problems  Presented  by 
Test  II  at  Muriel  (Trinity),  16  May  45,  OCG  Files. 
Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  4,  Tab  H,  MDR; 
Groves  Diary,  7  May  45,  LRG. 

'^Trinity  scientists,  too,  were  much  more  confi- 
dent of  the  success  of  implosion  and  certain  that, 

Continued 


WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT  AND  TESTING 


513 


Although  4  July  had  been  set  as  the 
target  date  for  the  test,  few  scientists 
at  Los  Alamos  were  convinced  it 
could  be  met.  Precise  scheduling  de- 
pended upon  bringing  a  tremendous 
number  of  factors  into  proper  juxta- 
position, including  weather,  procure- 
ment of  key  components  and  equip- 
ment, production  and  shipment  of 
active  material,  preparation  of  many 
experiments,  and  arrangement  of  se- 
curity and  safety  measures.  In  mid- 
June,  Oppenheimer  announced  to  the 
laboratory's  group  leaders  that  13 
July  was  the  earliest  possible  date, 
with  up  to  ten  days  later  not  unrea- 
sonable. He  based  his  estimate  upon 
information  provided  by  the  labora- 
tory's cowpuncher  committee,  which 
had  primary  responsibility  for  coordi- 
nation and  scheduling  of  Trinity. 

Following  another  review  of  devel- 
opments on  30  June,  this  committee 
advanced  the  test  date  to  16  July  to 
permit  inclusion  of  certain  additional 
vital  experiments.  Two  days  later, 
Oppenheimer  indicated  to  Groves 
that  the  laboratory  leaders  finally  had 
agreed  on  the  seventeenth.  Groves, 
however,  objected  to  the  later  date, 
pointing  out  that  the  situation  in 
Washington  required  an  earlier  date. 
With  the  end  of  the  war  in  Europe, 
Secretary  Stimson  was  scheduled  to 
depart  in  early  July  for  the  Potsdam 
Conference,  with  sessions  starting  on 

with  the  rapidly  increasing  production  at  the  Han- 
ford  and  Clinton  Works,  more  active  material  would 
be  available.  For  further  details  on  Jumbo  see  MDH, 
Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  p.  XVIII.6.  DASA;  C.roves  Diary,  :^0 
Mar  45,  LRCi;  Memos,  (iroves  to  .Alburquerque  Disi 
Engr,  sub:  Irans  Contract,  Trinity  Proj,  7  Feb  45, 
C-apt  Philip  Firmin  (Wash  Liaison  OHicc)  to  (iroves, 
sub:  Status  of  Jumbo  and  Special  Trailer,  30  Mar 
45,  and  Farrell  to  Groves,  sub:  Jumbo,  4  Jun  45, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  400  (Equipment- Trini- 
ty), MDR;  Groves,  Xoif  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  288-89. 


the  sixteenth.  The  Manhattan  com- 
mander undoubtedly  had  conferred 
with  Conant,  Tolman,  and  Stimson's 
assistants,  George  L.  Harrison  and 
Harvey  Bundy,  all  of  whom  favored 
carrying  out  the  test  on  the  four- 
teenth. Again  Oppenheimer  consulted 
with  the  bomb  test  team,  which  re- 
ported continued  difficulties  with  the 
implosion  device,  wiring  at  Trinity, 
and  uncertainty  concerning  receipt  of 
active  material.  On  that  basis  he  in- 
formed Groves  on  3  July  that  the  test 
date  of  the  seventeenth  must  stand. 
But  final  preparations  advanced  more 
rapidly  than  expected,  and  Oppen- 
heimer called  Groves  on  the  seventh 
to  announce  that  the  test  might  take 
place  after  all  on  the  sixteenth.  ^° 

In  the  final  days  before  the  test,  the 
Army  had  the  major  responsibility  for 
completing  security  and  safety  ar- 
rangements. To  meet  the  eventuality 
that  the  people  living  in  towns  and  on 
ranches  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
might  have  to  be  evacuated  to  avoid 
radioactive  fallout,  the  Army  sta- 
tioned a  detachment  of  160  enlisted 
men  with  vehicles  at  Socorro  (New 
Mexico)  and  other  strategic  points 
along  main  highways  a  few  miles 
north  of  the  site.  {See  Map  6.)  To  sup- 
plement this  detachment  and  also  to 
increase  security,  the  Army  detailed 
about  25  CIC  (Counterintelligence 
Corps)  members  to  towns  and  cities 
up  to  100  miles  from  the  Trinity  site, 
with  instructions  to  summon  evacua- 


2"  Memo,  Oppenheimer  to  All  Gp  Ldrs  (Los 
Alamos),  sub:  Trinity  Test,  14  Jun  45.  File  No. 
314.7  (Trinity),  LASL;  Ltr.  Tolman  to  Groves,  sub: 
Prgm  for  Trinity  Test,  17  Apr  45,  .Admin  Piles,  Gen 
Corresp,  400  (tlquipment-Trinity),  MDR;  Ltr.  Op- 
penheimer to  Groves,  27  Jun  45,  OSRD;  Groves 
Diarv,  2-4  and  7  Jul  45.  LRG;  Stimson  Diarv,  6  Jul 
45,  HLS. 


514 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


tion  troops  if  they  were  needed  and 
to  help  circulate  the  Manhattan 
Project's  cover  story  about  an  ammu- 
nition dump  explosion.  An  officer 
from  Groves's  headquarters  had  al- 
ready taken  this  story  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  Alamogordo  base,  to 
be  issued  as  soon  as  the  test  took 
place.  Another  project  officer  took  up 
a  station  in  the  Associated  Press 
office  in  Albuquerque  to  suppress  any 
stories  that  might  alarm  the  public 
unduly.  Earlier,  Groves  had  arranged 
with  the  Office  of  Censorship  in 
Washington,  D.C.,  to  keep  news  of 
the  explosion  from  getting  into  news- 
papers in  other  parts  of  the  country. 
Finally,  the  Alamogordo  commander 
had  reluctantly  acceded  to  the  Army's 
request  to  suspend  all  flights  during 
the  test. 2^ 

Meanwhile,  scientists  and  techni- 
cians at  the  Trinity  site  were  complet- 
ing preparations.  On  12  July,  two  sci- 
entists from  Los  Alamos  arrived  in  an 
Army  sedan  with  the  Pu-239  core  for 
the  implosion  device.  The  next  day  a 
convoy  came  from  the  Hill  with  the 
nonnuclear  components,  including 
the  high  explosives.  Before  the  test 
device  assembly  team  moved  the  plu- 
tonium  core  to  the  tent  at  the  base  of 
the  100-foot  steel  shot  tower.  General 
Farrell  signed  a  receipt  for  the  active 
material,  thus  formally  completing 
transfer  of  the  Pu-239  from  the  scien- 
tists to  the  Army  for  use  in  the  test. 
With  all  components  in  place  except 
the    detonating    system,    workers    re- 


moved the  tent  and  a  hoist  lifted  the 
device  to  a  metal  shed  on  a  platform 
at  the  top  of  the  tower.  The  detona- 
tor group  then  completed  the  firing 
circuit  and  other  technicians  added 
apparatus  for  experiments.  By  five  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  fourteenth,  the 
device  was  ready  for  the  test.^^ 

The  next  day,  a  Sunday,  Trinity 
crews  carried  out  last-minute  inspec- 
tions and  observers  checked  into  the 
base  camp,  about  10  miles  south  of 
the  test  tower.  OSRD  Director  Vanne- 
var  Bush  and  Conant  arrived  from 
Pasadena  with  General  Groves;  Army 
sedans  brought  Charles  Thomas  from 
Santa  Fe  and  Ernest  Lawrence,  Sir 
James  Chad  wick,  and  Xezv  York  Times 
science  reporter  William  L.  Laurence, 
as  well  as  others,  from  Albuquerque. 
Compton  had  decided  not  to  come. 
Tolman  and  General  Farrell  were  al- 
ready on  hand.  The  large  contingent 
from  Los  Alamos,  aboard  three  buses, 
did  not  reach  Trinity  until  shortly 
before  three  in  the  morning  of  16 
July,  barely  in  time  for  the  originally 
scheduled  zero  hour,  4:00  a.m.  They 
stepped  out  into  blustery  and  rainy 
weather  with  occasional  flashes  of 
lightning — not  the  clear  skies  and 
moderate  winds  the  Trinity  meteorol- 
ogists had  predicted. ^^ 


''Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  299-301; 
Memo.  14  May  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP 
Files,  Fldr  4,  Fab  A;  Notes  on  Interim  Committee 
Mtg,  18  Mav  45,  OCG  Files.  Gen  Corresp,  Groves 
Files,  Pldr  ,S,  Tab  O.  See  also  materials  and  reports 
in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1  ( Trinitv  Test 
Rpts-Misc).  All  m  MDR. 


^'MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  XVIII.  12-XVIII.  14, 
DASA;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew  World,  p.  378; 
Product  Receipt  No.  5502,  signed  by  Farrell  and  ap- 
proved bv  Groves,  13  Jul  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp. MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  I,  MDR.  This  is  the  re- 
ceipt registering  the  transfer  of  Pu-239  from  the 
Los  Alamos  Laboratory  to  the  Army.  In  a  note  ap- 
pended by  Farrell  on  16  July,  he  states  that  he  "wit- 
nessed the  expenditure  of  the  above  materials  in  the 
first  nuclear  explosion  thus  marking  the  birth  of  the 
age  of  atomics." 

"Groves  Diarv,  11-14  Jul  45,  LRG;  Groves,  Xow 
It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  290-91. 


WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT  AND  TESTING 


515 


Trinity  Control  Dugout  and  Observation  Post,  located  six  miles  from  the 
detonation  point 


Oppcnheimer  and  Groves  had  re- 
viewed the  weather  situation  at  mid- 
night and  then  had  gone  forward 
from  the  base  camp  some  7,000  yards 
to  the  control  dugout  (10,000  yards 
from  the  test  tower)  to  wait  with  Far- 
rell,  physicist  Kenneth  Bainbridge, 
who  was  the  leader  of  the  bomb  test 
team,  and  chief  meteorologist  Jack  M. 
Hubbard,  who  with  Oppenheimer  had 
responsibility  for  making  the  final  de- 
cision on  whether  to  carry  out  the  test 
as  scheduled.  As  four  o'clock  ap- 
proached and  the  rain  continued. 
Groves  and  Oppcnheimer  weighed 
the  risks  of  going  ahead — the  likeli- 
hood of  heavier  radioactive  fallout  at 
some  points,  electrical  failures  from 
dampened  circuits,  and  poor  visibility 
for  the  observation  airplanes.  They 
decided  to  delay  the  shot  an  hour  and 


a  half.  The  rain  stopped  at  four  and 
shortly  before  five,  with  wind  still 
blowing  in  the  right  direction,  they 
gave  the  go-ahead  signal  for  the 
test. 24 

As  the  final  countdown  began, 
Groves  left  Oppenheimer  and  Farrell 
in  the  control  dugout  and  returned  to 
the  base  camp,  a  better  point  of  ob- 
servation and  in  compliance  with  the 
Manhattan  chiefs  rule  that  he  and 
Farrell  must  not  be  together  in  situa- 
tions where  there  was  an  element  of 
danger.  At  approximately  the  same 
time,  the  five  Trinity  scientists  who 
had  been  guarding  the  test  device 
drove   away   in    their  jeeps   as   bright 


^^  Memo.  Groves  to  Secy  War,  sub:  The  Test,  18 
|ul  45,  HB  Files,  Fldr  49,  MDR;  Groves,  Sow  It  Can 
Bf  Told.  pp.  291-95  and  433-40  (App.  8,  which  is  a 


516 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


lights  illuminated  the  tower  to  foil 
any  would-be  saboteurs.  Precisely  at 
5:30  A.M.,  an  automatic  firing  mecha- 
nism actuated  the  implosion  device. 

Data  from  hundreds  of  instruments 
recorded  what  occurred  in  that  deso- 
late stretch  of  the  Jornada  del 
Muerto  valley:  the  dawn  of  the  atomic 
age.  It  began  with  a  brilliant  yellow  light 
that  suffused  the  remotest  recesses  of 
the  Trinity  site  and  was  seen  as  far 
away  as  Albuquerque  and  Los  Alamos 
to  the  north,  Silver  City  (New 
Mexico)  to  the  west,  and  El  Paso 
(Texas)  to  the  south.  With  the  light 
came  a  sensation  of  heat  that  persist- 
ed even  as  a  huge  ball  of  fire — like  a 
rising  sun — took  shape,  then  trans- 
formed quickly  into  a  moving  orange 
and  red  column.  Out  of  this  broad 
spectrum  of  colors  rose  a  narrower 
column  that  rapidly  spilled  over  to 
form  a  giant  white  mushroom  cloud 
surrounded  by  a  blue  glow.  Only  as 
the  glow  began  to  fade  did  observers 
at  the  base  camp  feel  the  pressure  of 
the  shock  wave,  but  its  rumble  rever- 
berated for  more  than  five  minutes  in 
the  surrounding  hills. ^^ 

The  effects  of  this  explosion  on 
eyewitnesses  were  as  varied  as  the  ob- 
servers themselves.  What  General 
Farrell,  for  example,  saw  and  heard 
from  the  control  dugout  was  "unprec- 
edented, magnificent,  beautiful,  stu- 
pendous and  terrifying.  .  .  .  The 
whole  country  was  lighted  by  a  sear- 
reprint  of  ihc  18  Jul  45  memorandum  with  some 
editorial  changes  and  without  inclosures);  MDH,  Bk. 
8,  Vol.  2.  pp.  XVIII.  14-XVIII.  15,  DASA;  Memo. 
Warren  to  Groves,  sub:  Safeguards  for  Test  II  at 
Muriel  (Trinity),  27  Jun  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  4,  Tab  H,  MDR. 

2^  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New  World,  p.  379.  See 
also  the  eyewitness  and  other  reports  on  the  Trinity 
test  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Trinity 
Test  Rpts-Misc),  MDR. 


The  Atomic  Explosion  at  Trinity, 
16 July  1945 

ing  light  with  the  intensity  many  times 
that  of  the  midday  sun.  It  was  golden, 
purple,  violet,  gray  and  blue.  It  light- 
ed every  peak,  crevasse  and  ridge  of 
the  nearby  mountain  range  with  a 
beauty  .  .  .  the  great  poets  dream 
about.  .  .  .  Thirty  seconds  after,  the 
explosion  came  .  .  .  followed  almost 
immediately  by  the  strong,  sustained, 
awesome  roar  which  warned  of 
doomsday.  .  .  ."  What  General 
Groves  recalled  was  that  "Drs. 
Conant  and  Bush  and  myself  were 
struck  by  an  even  stronger  feeling 
that  the  faith  of  those  who  had  been 
responsible  for  the  initiation  and  the 
carrying-on  of  the  Herculean  project 
had  been  justified.  I  personally 
thought  of  Blondin  crossing  Niagara 
Falls  on  his  tightrope,  only  to  me  this 
tightrope  had  lasted  almost  three 
years,  and  of  my  repeated,  confident- 
appearing     assurances     that     such     a 


WEAPON  DEVELOPMENT  AND  TESTING 


517 


thing  was  possible  and  that  we  would 
do  it."  26 

But  the  Manhattan  commander  per- 
mitted himself  only  a  fleeting  moment 
of  relaxation.  Less  than  half  an  hour 
after  the  test  shot  he  called  his  secre- 
tary in  Washington,  D.C.,  to  inform 
George  Harrison  so  that  he  could 
pass  on  word  of  the  test  to  Stimson  in 
Potsdam.  Groves's  two  main  concerns 
were  the  explosive  strength  of  the  im- 
plosion device  and  the  impact  of  the 
test  on  project  security.  There  were 
strong  indications,  Groves  reported, 
that  the  strength  of  the  explosion  was 
at  least  "satisfactory  plus"  and  per- 
haps far  greater  than  estimated.  As  to 
the  effects  of  the  test  on  project  secu- 
rity, he  would  take  the  necessary 
measures  as  soon  as  its  impact  on  the 
public  had  become  apparent.  By  late 
morning  there  was  evidence  that  the 
explosion  had  aroused  considerable 
excitement  throughout  New  Mexico 
and  in  west  Texas,  near  El  Paso. 
Groves  gave  permission  to  the  Associ- 
ated Press  at  Albuquerque  to  release 
the  previously  prepared  cover  story 
with  such  changes  as  were  necessary 
to  fit  the  exact  circumstances  of  the 
test: 

Alamogordo,  N.M.,July  16 

The  commanding  officer  of  the  Alamo- 
gordo Army  Air  Base  made  the  following 
statement  today: 


2^  In  his  18  Jul  45  memorandum  (source  of  quo- 
tations) for  the  Secretary  of  War  in  Potsdam  de- 
scribing the  Trinity  test  in  detail.  Groves  incorporat- 
ed Farrell's  description  of  the  explosion.  He  also  at- 
tached as  an  inclosure  Ernest  Lawrence's 
"thoughts"  on  the  Alamogordo  test.  See  HB  Files, 
Fldr  49,  MDR.  Ihe  memorandum  and  inclosure  are 
also  reproduced  in  U.S.  Department  of  State,  The 
Conference  of  Berlin  (The  Potsdam  Conference),  1945, 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  Diplomatic 
Papers,  1945,  2  vols.  (Washington,  D.C.:  Govern- 
ment Pnnting  Office,  1960),  2:1361-70. 


Several  inquiries  have  been  received 
concerning  a  heavy  explosion  which 
occurred  on  the  Alamogordo  Air  Base 
reservation  this  morning. 

A  remotely  located  ammunition  maga- 
zine containing  a  considerable  amount 
of  high  explosives  and  pyrotechnics 
exploded. 

There  was  no  loss  of  life  or  injury  to 
anyone,  and  the  property  damage  outside 
of  the  explosive  magazine  itself  was 
negligible. 

Weather  conditions  affecting  the  con- 
tent of  gas  shells  exploded  by  the  blast 
may  make  it  desirable  for  the  Army  to 
evacuate  temporarily  a  few  civilians  from 
their  homes. ^^ 

That  same  afternoon,  news  of  the 
momentous  event  reached  Secretary 
Stimson  in  Potsdam: 

Operated  on  this  morning.  Diagnosis 
not  yet  complete  but  results  seem  satis- 
factory and  already  exceed  expectations. 
Local  press  release  necessary  as  interest 
extends  great  distance.  Dr.  Groves 
pleased.  He  returns  tomorrow.  I  will  keep 
you  posted. ^^ 

A  follow-up  cable  from  Harrison  con- 
firmed the  success,  tentatively  implied 
in  the  first  message: 

Doctor  has  Just  returned  most  enthusi- 
astic and  confident  that  the  little  boy  is  as 
husky  as  his  big  brother.  The  light  in  his 
eyes  discernible  from  here  to  High  Hold 
and  I  could  have  heard  his  screams  from 
here  to  my  farm.^^ 


^'^  The  cover  story  released  was  one  of  several 
possible  versions  prepared  in  May  by  personnel  in 
Groves's  office.  See  Memo,  14  May  45,  MDR.  The 
story  is  also  reprinted  in  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told, 
p.  301.  A  transcription  of  Groves's  telephone  call  to 
his  secretarv  (Mrs.  Jean  O'Leary)  on  16  Jul  45  is  in 
Admin  Files.  Gen  Gorresp,  319.1  (Trinity  Test  Rpt), 
MDR. 

28  Msg,  Harrison  to  Stimson,  16  Jul  45,  CM- 
OUT-32887,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  MP  Files, 
Fldr  5E,  Tab  A.  Copy  also  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  64. 
Both  in  MDR. 

2^  Msg,  Harrison  to  Stimson,  17  Jul  45,  CM- 
OUT-33556,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  MP  Files, 
Fldr  5E,  Tab  A.  Copv  also  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  64. 
Both  in  MDR. 


51J 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Stimson  passed  on  this  second  cable 
to  Truman  at  once,  explaining  to  the 
President  that  Groves  ("Doctor")  was 
convinced  that  the  implosion  bomb 
("little  boy")  was  as  powerful  as  the 
gun-type  bomb  ("big  brother").  Proof 
of  its  power  was  the  fact  that  the  light 
of  the  explosion  was  visible  for  250 
miles  (the  distance  from  Washington 
to  Stimson's  summer  home  at  High 
Hold  on  Long  Island)  and  its  sound 
was  audible  for  50  miles  (the  distance 
from  Washington  to  Harrison's  farm 
near  Upperville,  Virginia).  Stimson, 
Truman,  Churchill,  and  other  Allied 
leaders  at  Potsdam  were  quick  to  real- 
ize that  this  preliminary  evidence  of 


the  enormous  power  of  the  Trinity 
explosion,  followed  soon  by  more  de- 
tailed substantiating  data  from  Gener- 
al Groves,  had  introduced  a  new 
factor  that  would  profoundly  affect 
not  only  their  own  deliberations  on 
how  to  end  the  war  with  Japan  but 
also  the  whole  course  of  international 
relations  in  the  postwar  world. ^° 


3°  On  the  limited  effect  of  the  Trinity  test  on 
project  security  see  Notes,  1st  I.t  Thomas  R.  Moun- 
tain to  Mrs.  O'Leary,  17  Jul  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  371.2  (Scty),  MDR;  Stimson  Diary,  16-18 
Jul  45,  HLS.  Subsequent  detailed  conclusions  on 
the  effectiveness  of  the  implosion  device  are  given 
m  Memo,  Groves  to  Chief  of  Staff,  30  Jul  45,  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  4,  Tab  C,  MDR. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 


The  Atomic  Bombing  of  Japan 


The  explosion  of  an  implosion  de- 
vice on  16  July  1945  at  Trinity  provid- 
ed final  confirmation  to  America's 
wartime  leaders  that  employment  of  an 
atomic  weapon  in  the  war  with  Japan 
was  indeed  a  strategic  reality.  Until 
1945,  the  Army's  supersecret  atomic 
weapon  program  had  not  been  a  factor 
in  strategic  planning  for  carrying  on 
the  war,  either  in  Europe  or  in  the 
Pacific.^  The  successful  Allied  oper- 
ations against  Germany  in  the  summer 
of  1944  portended  that  country's  im- 
minent collapse  and  obviated  the  need 
for  an  atomic  weapon  to  end  the  con- 
flict in  Europe.  Because  of  these  devel- 
opments, Manhattan  Project  leaders 
thus  considered  using  the  bomb  in  the 
war  in  the  Pacific  and  accelerated  pre- 
liminary planning  with  the  Army  Air 
Eorces  (AAF)  for  a  possible  atomic 
bombing  mission  against  Japan. 


'  Strategic  planning  lot  t-mplovnu-nt  of  the  atomic 
bomb  always  was  limited  to  the  relatively  few  mili- 
tar\  and  civilian  leaders  who  knew  of  its  existence. 
Most  Arm\  planners  remained  totalK  unaware  of 
the  atomic  weapon  program.  In  the  Operations  Di- 
vision onlv  three  senior  oflicers — (ieneral  Malin 
Craig.  I.t.  (".en.  John  K  Hull,  and  Brig,  (ien.  (ieorge 
A.  Lincoln — learned  about  the  bomb  before  it  was 
dropped  on  Japan.  .See  Ra\  S.  ('.line.  \V<i\hiniiliiii 
C.otnmnud  Past:  The  Opcnitioiis  Difisniii.  I'.S.  .\rm\  in 
World  War  II  (Washmgion.  DC:  C.oNernment 
Printing  Oflice,  !<»,') li,  p    :i47. 


Preparations  for  an  Atomic 
Bombing  Mission 

Preparations  for  the  tactical  em- 
ployment of  an  atomic  weapon 
against  Japan  began  in  late  March 
1944,  when  General  Groves  first  met 
with  General  Henry  H.  Arnold,  the 
AAF  commanding  general.^  The 
Manhattan  commander  briefed 
Arnold,  who  already  had  some  knowl- 
edge of  the  atomic  program,  on  the 
current  status  of  bomb  development, 
estimating  the  probable  time  when 
bombs  would  be  ready  for  use  in 
combat.  He  then  reviewed  the  latest 
technical    data   from   Los   Alamos    on 


^  Except  as  otherwise  indicated,  this  account  of 
the  long-range  preparations  for  emplovmeni  of  the 
atomic  bomb  in  combat  is  based  on  Ms.  "Historv  of 
the  5()9th  Composite  (iroiip,  17  December  1944  to 
15  August  1945."  31  Aug  45,  SHRC;  Cert  of  Audit 
MDK  228-46,  VV-47  Spec  Ord  Del.  27  Sep  45, 
Fiscal  and  Audit  Files,  Certs  of  Audit  (Sup),  MDR: 
Historical  Notes  on  Svc  of  Col  Klmer  F.  Kirkpatrick, 
Jr.,  With  Manhattan  Fro|,  1944-47,  Ind  lo  I.lr,  Kirk- 
patrick to  OCFHD.  30  Sep  6S.  OCFHD;  .MDH,  Bk. 
8.  \ol.  2,  "Technical,"  pp.  XIX.  1-XI\.  13.  DASA; 
Weslev  Frank  Craven  and  Janes  I.ea  ('.ate,  eds.,  '/'he 
hill  fir  Mnttnhorn  lo  Snuauiki.  Jiuif  1^H4  to  August 
1945.  I  he  Army  Air  Forces  in  World  War  II,  Vol.  5 
(Chicago:  I'niversitN  of  Chicago  Press,  1953),  pp. 
704-09,  ('.roves.  Now  It  Can  Hi-  Told.  pp.  253-62  and 
277-H7:  Hewlett  and  .Anderson,  .Weir  World,  pp.  252- 
54,  313,  317-18.  321,  334;  William  I..  Laurence. 
Dau'N  Oxer  Zero:  The  Slon  of  the  .ilomir  Bomb.  2d  ed. 
enl.  (Wesipoit,  Conn.:  (;reenw()od  Press,  1977),  pp. 
19t')-2()t'). 


520 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


the  likely  size,  weight,  and  configura- 
tion of  an  atomic  bomb,  indicating 
that  the  dimensions  of  the  gun  type 
were  reasonably  well  established  but 
those  for  the  implosion  type  were  still 
very  much  in  question. 

The  two  leaders  next  took  up  the 
question  of  what  type  of  airplane 
would  be  required  to  transport 
atomic  bombs.  The  Manhattan  com- 
mander noted  that  Oppenheimer,  on 
the  basis  of  investigations  carried  out 
at  Los  Alamos  and  Muroc  Army  Air 
Field,  had  concluded  that  a  modified 
B-29  probably  had  the  requisite 
weight-carrying  capacity  and  range. 
Should  the  B-29,  which  had  gone 
into  production  in  September  1943, 
prove  not  feasible,  Groves  suggested 
the  British  Lancaster  would  have  to 
be  considered.  This  displeased 
Arnold,  who  stated  emphatically  that 
an  American-made  airplane  should 
carry  the  bombs,  and  he  promised  to 
make  a  special  effort  to  have  a  B-29 
available  for  that  purpose.^ 

With  this  assurance  that  the  AAF 
would  provide  the  necessary  air- 
planes, the  two  leaders  reached  tenta- 
tive agreement  on  a  broad  division  of 
responsibilities  in  making  the  prep- 
arations for  that  atomic  bombing  mis- 
sion. The  AAF  would  organize  and 
train  the  requisite  tactical  bomb  unit, 
which,  for  reasons  of  security,  must 
be  as  self-sustaining  as  possible  and 
exercise  full  control  over  delivery  of 
bombs  on  the  targets  selected.  Man- 
hattan would  receive  from  the  AAF 
whatever  assistance  it  needed  in  bal- 
listic testing  of  bombs  and  air  trans- 
portation of  materials  and  equipment. 


To  facilitate  close  coordination  be- 
tween the  two  organizations.  Groves 
would  continue  to  have  as  frequent 
access  to  Arnold  as  he  deemed  neces- 
sary, and  Maj.  John  A.  Derry  of 
Groves's  staff  and  Maj.  Gen.  Oliver  P. 
Echols,  an  AAF  officer  already  serving 
as  a  consultant  with  Manhattan, 
would  provide  day-to-day  liaison. 
Echols  subsequently  designated  an  al- 
ternate. Col.  Roscoe  C.  Wilson,  who 
since  the  latter  part  of  1943  had  been 
providing  AAF  liaison  with  the  Los 
Alamos  delivery  group  in  its  work  on 
B-29  modification  and  testing.'* 

In  the  ensuing  months,  General 
Groves  personally  assisted  the  AAF  in 
developing  an  overall  and  concrete 
tactical  plan.  As  soon  as  the  anticipat- 
ed schedule  of  fission  bomb  produc- 
tion was  available.  Groves  supplied 
Colonel  Wilson  with  the  crucial  data. 
Drawing  upon  estimates  he  had  re- 
cently prepared  for  the  Military  Policy 
Committee's  August  progress  report 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  Chief  of 
Staff,  and  Vice  President,  the  Manhat- 
tan commander  indicated  to  Wilson 
that  an  implosion-type  bomb  might 
be  ready  as  early  as  January  1945  and 
a  gun-type  bomb  by  June  of  that  year. 
Although  these  dates  were  slightly  in 
advance  of  those  in  the  progress 
report,  they  illustrate  a  precautionary 
maneuver  on  Groves's  part  "to  avoid 
any  possible  unnecessary  delay  in  the 
use    of    the    bomb.  .  .  ."  ^    Pending 


Mirovts  Diarv.  21  Mar  44,  LRC.;  H.  H.  Arnold, 
Global  Mission  (New  ^'ork:  Harper  and  Brothers, 
1949).  p.  491 


*  On  the  earlier  liaison  arrangements  with  the 
AAF  see  MPC  Min,  9  Nov  43,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A.  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  8, 
\'ol.  2,  pp.  VII.35-VII.39,  DASA.  The  frequent  con- 
sultations between  Manhattan  and  AAF  personnel 
during  the  fall  and  winter  of  1944  are  recorded  in 
Groves  Diary,  Sep-Dec  44,  passim,  LRG. 

^  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  256,  n.  2. 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


521 


completion  of  the  fission  bombs, 
Groves  assured  Wilson  that,  for  test- 
ing purposes,  Manhattan  would 
supply  the  AAF  with  several  hundred 
high-explosive  bombs  having  ballistic 
characteristics  similar  to  the  implo- 
sion-type model. ^ 

On  the  basis  of  this  data,  Wilson 
drafted  a  general  plan  outlining  the 
support  the  AAF  would  provide  in 
preparation  for  the  atomic  bombing 
mission.  The  AAF  committed  itself  to 
supply  the  personnel  and  equipment 
for  a  heavy  bomb  squadron,  with  at- 
tached special  units  as  required,  and 
to  make  available  an  air  base  in  the 
southwestern  United  States  for  its 
training.  In  addition,  it  agreed  to 
modify  and  complete  delivery  of  four- 
teen B-29's  to  the  squadron  by  1  Jan- 
uary 1945;  to  continue  flight  testing 
of  implosion-type  bombs,  with  related 
training  under  direction  of  Manhattan 
and  AAF  specialists;  and  to  assist 
Manhattan  personnel  in  testing  equip- 
ment and  assembling  ballistic  data.  Fi- 
nally, the  AAF  would  participate  in  a 
field  inspection  of  a  suitable  site  for 
an  overseas  operating  base  on  the 
Mariana  Islands  in  the  Central  Pacific. 

To  command  the  bomb  combat 
unit,  subsequently  designated  the 
509th  Composite  Group  and  formally 
activated  on  17  December  1944,  Gen- 
eral Arnold  selected  Col.  Paul  W. 
Tibbets,  Jr.  Tibbets  had  an  outstand- 
ing record  in  flying  heavy  bombers  in 
Europe  and  North  Africa  and  had 
gained  a  special  knowledge  of 
the  B-29  as  a  test  pilot.  Because  of 
the  great  importance  and  secrecy  of 
the  509th's  mission,  Arnold  gave  the 


509th  commander  virtual  carte  blanche 
to  select  the  best-qualified  personnel 
available. 

In  September  1944,  Colonel  Tib- 
bets began  to  assemble  the  elements 
of  the  509th  at  Wendover  Field  {see 
Map  2),  an  isolated  air  base  in  west- 
ern Utah  with  adequate  security  and 
facilities  and  well  located  for  air  travel 
to  Los  Alamos  and  the  Salton  Sea 
Naval  Air  Station."^  The  509th  com- 
mander devoted  the  next  several 
months  to  organizing  his  new  com- 
mand, consulting  frequently  with 
Groves,  Captain  Parsons  of  the  Los 
Alamos  ordnance  group,  and  other 
Manhattan  representatives.  Following 
the  security  guidelines  set  forth  in 
Colonel  Wilson's  plan,  Tibbets 
formed  the  various  elements  of  the 
509th  with  the  objective  of  making  it 
as  self-sufficient  as  possible.  Thus,  he 
included  in  the  group  not  only  a 
normal  B-29  unit,  the  393d  Bombard- 
ment Squadron  (VH),  but  also  a 
number  of  supporting  elements,  in- 
cluding the  390th  Air  Service  Group 
(consisting  of  the  603d  Air  Engineer- 
ing and  1027th  Materiel  Squadrons), 
the  320th  Troop  Carrier  Squadron, 
and  the  1395th  Military  Police  Com- 
pany (Aviation).  Subsequently,  for 
special  technical  requirements,  the 
509th  acquired  the  1st  Ordnance 
Squadron,  Special  (Aviation),  and  the 
1st  Technical  Detachment,  War  De- 
partment Miscellaneous  Group,  a 
catchall  unit  comprised  of  both  civilian 
and    militarv    scientists    and     techni- 


^  See  MFC.  Rpt,  7  Aug  44,  Incl  to  Memo,  Groves 
(for  MFC)  to  Chief  of  Staff,  same  date,  OCG  Files, 
MF  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  K,  MDR;  Groves  Diary,  31 
Jul  and  17,  21,  29  Aug  44,  LRG. 


^  I.OS  Alamos  personnel,  given  the  task  of  con- 
structing bombing  tables,  acquired  the  necessary 
data  from  field  measurements  taken  at  the  Salton  Sea 
Naval  Air  Station,  where  an  approach  over  water 
simulated  the  near  sea-level  conditions  that  would 
be  encountered  over  Japan. 


522 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 

I 


Little  Boy,  the  uranium  bomb  dropped  on  Hiroshima 


cians — many  from  the  Manhattan 
Project  but  including  Army,  Navy, 
and  AAF  personnel.^ 

At  the  beginning  of  September, 
with  the  external  shape  and  aircraft 
requirements  of  the  three  basic  bomb 
models — one  of  the  U-235  gun  type 
(now  designated  Little  Boy  instead  of 
Thin  Man)  and  two  of  the  Pu-239  im- 
plosion type  (Fat  Man) — now  frozen, 
the  AAF  started  training  the  bomb 
drop  squadron  and,  with  assistance 
from  Los  Alamos  technicians,  com- 
pleted necessary  modifications  on  the 
B-29.  While  awaiting  delivery  of  the 
first  planes,  scheduled  under  Colonel 
Wilson's  plan  to  be  on  the  thirtieth  of 


^  For  further  details  on  organization  and  composi- 
tion of  the  509th  see  Ms,  "Hist  509th  Comp  Gp," 
pp.  1-2  and  8-11,  SHRC,  and  the  unit's  own  post- 
war publication,  50911)  Pictorial  Album:  Wntteii  and 
Published  by  and  for  the  Members  of  the  509th  Composite 
Group,  Tiuiau,  1945,  ed.  Capt  Jerome  J.  Ossip  (Chi- 
cago; Rogers  Printing  Co.,  1946).  By  the  summer  of 
1945,  the  509th  had  substantially  exceeded  the  au- 
thorized personnel  of  225  officers  and    1,542  men. 


the  month,  the  squadron  underwent 
training  that  emphasized  ground  and 
air  techniques  for  handling  atomic 
bombs. 

In  October,  only  days  past  the 
scheduled  delivery  date,  the  393d  re- 
ceived the  first  modified  B-29's  out 
of  a  production  lot  of  fifteen  (one 
more  than  originally  requested). 
W'ithout  delay,  a  continuing  series  of 
essential  test  drops  commenced  at 
Wendover.  Over  the  next  few 
months,  these  tests  furnished  critical 
information  on  ballistics,  electrical 
fusing,  flight  performance  of  electrical 
detonators,  operation  of  aircraft  re- 
lease mechanisms,  vibration,  and  tem- 
peratures, as  well  as  provided  bomb 
assembly  experience.  But,  perhaps 
more  importantly,  they  revealed  cer- 
tain weaknesses  in  the  original  modi- 
fications and  defective  performance  in 
the  flying  capabilities  of  the  big 
bombers. 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


523 


Fat  Man,  the  implosion  bomb  dropped  on  Xagasaki 


Because  B-29's  were  in  very  short 
supply,  the  AAF's  lower  echelons  dis- 
played some  reluctance  to  satisfy  the 
Manhattan  request  for  replacement  of 
the  inadequate  planes.  In  December, 
shortly  after  the  393d  Squadron  was 
detailed  to  Batista  Field,  Cuba,  for 
two  months  of  special  navigational 
training,  Groves  decided  to  appeal 
directly  to  General  Arnold  about 
the  B-29  problem.  Without  hesita- 
tion, the  AAF  chief  responded  em- 
phatically that  the  509th  Composite 
Group  would  get  as  many  new  planes 
as  it  required.  "In  view  of  the  vast  na- 
tional effort  that  had  gone  into  the 
Manhattan  Project,"  as  Groves  later 
recalled  Arnold's  words,  "no  slip-up 
on  the  part  of  the  Air  Force  was 
going  to  be  responsible  for  a  fail- 
ure." ^  After  the  393d  returned  to 
Wendover,  the  fliers  continued  to 
gain     experience     during     tests     with 


(;i<)\es.  Sow  II  Can  He  Told.  p.  25'; 


dummy  bombs  of  various  types.  Final- 
ly, in  the  spring  of  1945,  the  second 
lot  of  fifteen  greatly  improved  ver- 
sions of  the  B-29  reached  the  air 
base,  and  training  and  ballistic  tests 
proceeded  at  a  more  intensive  pace. 

The  Overseas  Operating  Base 

With  training  of  the  509th  Compos- 
ite Group  and  the  Los  Alamos  pro- 
gram for  testing  bomb  models  well 
under  way,  project  leaders  turned 
their  attention  to  establishing  a  base 
of  operations  for  the  509th  in  the  Pa- 
cific Theater.  At  the  end  of  December 
1944,  Manhattan  and  AAF  officials, 
including  Groves  and  Arnold,  met  to 
discuss  plans  for  moving  the  509th 
overseas.  The  AAF  recommended 
that  leaders  of  the  Twentieth  Air 
Force  in  the  Marianas — at  the  time 
the  only  feasible  location  for  the 
509th  base — be  informed  of  the 
atomic   bomb   mission.    With   permis- 


524 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


sion  from  General  Marshall,  Groves 
accepted  the  AAF's  offer  to  have  Brig. 
Gen.  Lauris  Norstad,  its  assistant 
chief  of  staff  for  plans  who  would  be 
visiting  Pacific  bases  in  January  1945, 
brief  Lt.  Gen.  Millard  F.  Harmon, 
deputy  commander  of  the  Twentieth 
Air  Force,  and  two  of  his  staff  offi- 
cers. (Groves  had  to  repeat  the  brief- 
ing again  for  Lt.  Gen.  Barney  McK. 
Giles,  who  in  May  became  Twentieth 
Air  Force  deputy  commander  after 
Harmon  and  the  two  staff  officers  dis- 
appeared in  a  flight  from  Guam  to 
Washington,  T>.C.)^^ 

The  meeting  reemphasized  the 
need  for  also  informing  the  Navy 
commanders  in  the  Pacific  of  the 
atomic  bomb  mission,  as  Navy  sup- 
port in  the  immediate  area  of  oper- 
ations would  be  indispensable.  Fur- 
thermore, Admiral  Chester  W. 
Nimitz,  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific 
Ocean  Areas  (CINCPOA),  had  learn- 
ed of  the  imminent  arrival  of  the 
509th  in  his  theater  and  was  asking 
questions  concerning  its  mission.  In 
February,  Groves  arranged  with  Rear 
Adm.  William  R.  Purnell  of  the  Mili- 
tary Policy  Committee  to  have 
Comdr.  Frederick  L.  Ashworth,  Par- 
sons' operations  officer  and  military 
alternate  in  charge  of  field  operations 
at  Wendover,  visit  Nimitz's  headquar- 
ters on  Guam.  Ashworth  briefed 
Nimitz,  who  in  turn  informed  two 
staff  members  of  the  509th  mission.  ^^ 
Groves  also  had  instructed  Com- 
mander Ashworth  to  inspect  carefully 


both  Guam  and  Tinian  as  possible 
sites  for  the  509th  base  operations. 
General  Norstad  had  recommended 
Guam,  citing  its  excellent  deepwater 
harbor  and  maintenance  facilities.  But 
Guam  was  125  miles  farther  from 
Japan  than  Tinian — a  critical  factor 
considering  the  heavy  load  the  B-29 
would  be  carrying.  Ashworth  also 
found  that  Guam  had  overtaxed  port 
facilities  and  a  shortage  of  construc- 
tion personnel  to  build  an  additional 
airfield.  In  contrast,  airfield  and  port 
facilities  under  construction  on  Tinian 
would  be  more  than  adequate  for  the 
atomic  bomb  mission  and  would  be 
ready  for  use  by  the  time  the  509th 
arrived  in  June.  Furthermore,  al- 
though the  Army  had  jurisdiction 
over  Tinian,  the  Navy's  6th  Naval 
Construction  Brigade  was  available 
there  to  build  the  special  installations 
that  would  be  needed  by  the 
mission. ^^ 

With  the  information  he  had  col- 
lected on  Guam  and  Tinian,  Com- 
mander Ashworth  reported  to  Groves 
on  22  February.  The  following  day 
Groves  wrote  to  Norstad,  indicating 
his  choice  of  Tinian  as  the  more  suit- 
able site  (Map  7).  Norstad  concurred, 
and  on  24  February  Groves  briefed 
the  Military  Policy  Committee.  By  end 
of  the  month.  Navy  Seabees  were  at 
work  on  the  base  facilities. ^^ 


»°  MPC  Min,  29  Dec  44,  Exhibit  H  (prepared  by 
Groves),  MDR;  Groves,  \ow  II  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  278- 
79;  Craven  and  Gate,  The  Pacific,  pp.  530-31. 

>»  Llr.  Groves  to  Chief  of  Staff,  30  Dec  44,  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files.  Fldr  23,  Tab  A,  MDR: 
Groves,  S'ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  277. 


'2  Memo,  Ashworth  to  Groves,  sub:  Base  of  Opns 
of  509th  Comp  Gp,  24  Feb  45,  OCG  Files.  Gen 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  23,  Fab  A,  MDR:  Craven 
and  Gate,  The  Pacific,  pp.  516-17  and  518-19. 

'3  Groves  Diarv,  22-24  Feb  45,  LRG:  MPC  Min, 
24  Feb  45,  with  Ashworth's  24  February  memoran- 
dum attached  as  Exhibit  A,  MDR:  Memo,  Groves  to 
Norstad,  sub:  Decisions  Concerning  Movement  of 
509th  Comp  Gp,  23  Feb  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp, MP  Files,  Fldr  5,  Tab  C,  MDR;  Craven  and 
Gate,  The  Pacific,  p.  706;  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be  Told, 
p.  278. 


MAP  7 


526 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


At  the  end  of  March,  General 
Groves  sent  the  District's  deputy  en- 
gineer. Col.  Elmer  E.  Kirkpatrick,  Jr., 
a  long-time  associate  of  the  Manhat- 
tan commander  on  Army  construction 
projects,  to  the  Marianas  as  his  per- 
sonal representative  with  the  mission 
of  expediting  delivery  of  the  bomb 
components  to  Tinian  and  making 
sure  that  all  essential  construction 
work  there  was  completed  on  sched- 
ule. Groves  had  brought  Kirkpatrick 
to  the  project  the  previous  September 
for  the  specific  purpose  of  preparing 
him  to  monitor  development  of  the 
overseas  operational  base.  Thus,  in 
the  guise  of  a  special  assistant  to 
Groves,  he  had  spent  considerable 
time  at  Los  Alamos,  Wendover  Field, 
and  Kirtland  Field  (near  Albuquer- 
que), assisting  in  inspection  of  bomb 
prototypes,  observing  the  training  of 
the  509th  Composite  Group,  and 
helping  to  plan  shipment  of  essential 
equipment  and  bomb  components  to 
Tinian.^* 

As  soon  as  Kirkpatrick  arrived  on 
Guam,  he  went  to  Admiral  Nimitz 
with  a  letter  of  introduction  from 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations  Admiral 
Ernest  J.  King  that  explained  his  mis- 
sion. Nimitz  then  assigned  a  member 
of  his  own  staff,  Capt.  Thomas  B. 
Hill,  as  Kirkpatrick's  contact  at 
CINCPOA    headquarters.    Kirkpatrick 


'■*  Historical  Notes  ....  Incl  to  Ltr,  Kirkpatrick 
to  OCEHD,  30  Sep  68,  OCEHD;  List  of  Duties  .  .  . 
of  Liaison  Off  to  509th  Comp  Gp.  Incl  to  Memo, 
Maj  John  A.  Derry  (Groves's  Asst  for  Proj  Opns)  to 
Groves,  sub:  Discussion  of  5  Mar  With  Norstad,  10 
Mar  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Gorresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  5, 
Tab  C,  MDR:  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  279. 
Colonel  Kirkpatrick  first  worked  with  Groves  in  the 
Construction  Division  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps. 
He  came  to  the  Corps  of  Engineers  when  the  Con- 
struction Division  was  transferred  to  the  Engineers 
in  December  1944. 


also  delivered  a  similar  letter  from 
General  Arnold  to  Maj.  Gen.  Curtis 
LeMay,  commanding  general  of  the 
XXI  Bomber  Command.  To  maintain 
the  secrecy  of  his  mission,  Kirkpatrick 
was  identified  simply  as  a  special  rep- 
resentative from  the  War  Department 
General  Staff  to  the  Twentieth  Air 
Force  and  its  XXI  Bomber  Command, 
reporting  to  General  LeMay.  He  was 
carried  as  an  assistant  operations  offi- 
cer of  the  bomber  command  and 
quartered  with  the  313th  Bombard- 
ment Wing,  located  at  the  same  field 
on  Tinian  that  would  be  used  by  the 
509th  Composite  Group.  ^^ 

Kirkpatrick  devoted  April  and  May 
to  expediting  facilities  construction.  A 
typical  problem  was  a  delay  in  un- 
loading ships  at  Tinian  harbor.  Kirk- 
patrick notified  Groves,  who  went  to 
Admiral  Purnell.  The  Navy  represent- 
ative on  the  Military  Policy  Commit- 
tee obtained  an  order  from  Admiral 
King  to  Nimitz  that  all  material  for 
the  509th  must  be  unloaded  as  soon 
as  it  reached  Tinian.  Another  prob- 
lem arose  in  constructing  facilities  on 
Iwo  Jima  for  transferring  an  atomic 
bomb  from  one  B-29  to  another,  in 


15  Historical  Notes  ....  Incl  to  Ltr,  Kirkpatrick 
to  OCEHD,  30  Sep  68,  OCEHD;  Memo,  Groves  (to 
Nimitz),  8  Mar  45,  sub:  Preparation  and  Movement 
of  Personnel  and  Equipment  to  Tinian,  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Gorresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  5,  Tab  C,  MDR. 
Groves  states  in  a  note  at  the  bottom  of  page  1  of 
this  memorandum  that  he  had  intended  to  show  it 
in  person  to  Nimitz,  who  was  in  Washington  attend- 
ing strategy  meetings  on  the  war  in  the  Pacific,  but 
he  was  unsuccessful  in  securing  an  appointment. 
Consequently,  at  Groves's  direction.  Colonel  Kirk- 
patrick memorized  the  contents  of  the  memoran- 
dum before  leaving  on  his  trip  to  the  Marianas  and 
subsequentlv  passed  on  the  information  to  Nimitz  at 
a  meeting  on  Guam  in  early  April.  See  also  Craven 
and  Gate,  The  Pacific,  pp.  706-07.  The  Air  Force  his- 
torians mistakenlv  identify  Kirkpatrick  as  a  "Twenti- 
eth Air  Force  engineer." 


IHE  Al  OMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


527 


the  event  a  bomber  en  route  to  Japan 
should  have  to  make  an  emergency 
landing  there.  Kirkpatrick  had  ar- 
ranged to  have  these  faciHties  com- 
pleted by  1  July,  but  an  inspection  by 
a  project  officer  there  as  of  that  date 
revealed  that  virtually  nothing  had 
been  done.  Kirkpatrick  informed  Cap- 
tain Hill,  and  prompt  action  was 
taken.  16 

In  early  May,  Kirkpatrick  came  back 
to  the  United  States  for  conferences 
with  Groves  and  with  personnel  work- 
ing on  design  and  delivery  of  the 
bomb.  He  visited  Captain  Parsons  at 
Los  Alamos  and  other  project  officials 
there  and  at  Wendover  Field  and  the 
Inyokern  test  site.  When  Kirkpatrick 
returned  to  Tinian  toward  the  end  of 
the  month,  he  found  the  first  ele- 
ments of  the  509th  arriving  there. 
The  group  brought  with  it  a  number 
of  C-54  transport  planes,  which  were 
soon  operating  as  a  continuous  shut- 
tle service  to  the  United  States  main- 
land, greatly  facilitating  movement  of 
personnel  and  urgently  needed  equip- 
ment. By  mid-July,  all  elements  of  the 
group  had  reached  Tinian,  including 
the  1st  Technical  Detachment  com- 
prised chiefly  of  civilian  specialists 
from  Los  Alamos,  some  of  whom  had 
been  brought  temporarily  into  mili- 
tary service.  Commanded  by  Parsons, 
the  detachment  furnished  and  tested 
weapon  components  for  the  509th, 
supervised  assembly  of  bombs,  and 
checked  out  completed  units,  careful- 
ly inspecting  them  in  bomb  bays 
before  planes  took  off.  Frequent  com- 
munication with  Los  Alamos  threat- 
ened project  security,  so  Groves  dis- 


CoL.  Elmer  E.  Kirkp.atrick,  Jr. 

patched  Lt.  Col.  Peter  de  Silva,  chief 
security  officer  at  Los  Alamos,  to 
Tinian  to  establish  effective  security 
measures  for  the  detachment,  and 
John  H.  Manley,  a  Los  Alamos  physi- 
cist, to  Washington,  D.C.,  to  serve  as 
point  of  transmission  for  all  project 
messages  to  Tinian.  ^^ 

Meanwhile,  the  509th's  combat 
crews  were  undergoing  intensive 
flight  training.  This  involved  practic- 
ing navigation  missions  to  Iwo  Jima 
and  making  bomb  runs  to  nearby  is- 
lands still  in  enemy  hands,  using 
high-explosive  projectiles  with  Fat 
Man's  pumpkin  shape.  At  the  end  of 


1^  Historical  Notes  ....  Iiul  t( 
to  OCKHi:).  30  Sep  68,  OC.KHD,  C, 

Told.  pp.  280-81. 


I.ti, 


Kirkpatiick 

Xoir  II  Can 


I''  Historical  Notes  ....  Irui  to  Ltr,  Kirkpatrick 
to  OCEHD,  30  Sep  68,  OCFIHD;  Memo,  Kirkpatrick 
to  Groves,  26  Mav  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp. 
201  (Gen),  MDR;  Memo,  de  Silva  to  Ll  Col  John 
Lansdale.  Jr.  (Groves's  Spec  Asst  for  Sctv),  28  Jiin 
45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  371.2  (Sctv),  MDR: 
Groves  Diarv,  10  Mav  and  31  Jul  45,  l.RG;  MDH, 
Bk.  8,  \ol.  2.  pp.  XIX.5-XIX.8,  DASA;  Groves,  Xow 
n  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  282-83. 


528 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


training,  which  lasted  three  weeks,  the 
crews  in  late  July  began  a  series  of 
combat  strikes  over  Japan  to  gain  fa- 
miliarity with  target  areas  and  mission 
tactics  and  also  to  accustom  the  Japa- 
nese to  the  appearance  of  small  for- 
mations of  B-29's  flying  at  a  great 
height.  Using  the  pumpkin-shaped 
bombs,  the  509th  achieved  excellent 
results  against  enemy  towns,  most  of 
which  had  been  hit  by  previous  B-29 
strikes.  These  towns — Koriyama,  Na- 
gaoka,  Toyama,  Kobe,  Yokkaichi, 
Ube,  Wakayama,  Maizuru,  Fukushima, 
and  Niihama — were  in  the  general 
vicinity  of  those  communities  select- 
ed earlier  as  targets  for  atomic 
bombing.  ^^ 

The  Bombing  Targets 

In  the  late  spring  and  early  summer 
of  1945,  Manhattan  and  AAF  repre- 
sentatives met  in  Washington  and  Los 
Alamos  for  the  purpose  of  choosing 
targets  for  the  509th's  atomic  bomb- 
ing mission.  Normally  the  selection  of 
specific  bombing  targets  was  a  re- 
sponsibility of  the  highest  echelons  in 
a  theater  of  war.  But  in  April,  after 
briefing  President  Truman  on  the 
atomic  program,  General  Marshall  de- 
cided that  the  nature  of  Manhattan's 
security  requirements  and  its  inher- 
ently unique  technical  problems  made 
it  imperative  for  project  leaders  to 
have  a  major  voice  in  the  choice  of 
targets,  subject  to  final  approval  by 
himself  and  the  Secretary  of  War. 
Hence,  instead  of  assigning  the  task 


to  the  War  Department  General 
Staffs  Operations  Division,  the  Army 
Chief  of  Staff  turned  over  this  respon- 
sibility to  General  Groves.  ^^ 

Although  the  Manhattan  command- 
er had  not  anticipated  Marshall's  deci- 
sion, he  moved  immediately  to  carry 
out  his  new  responsibility.  After  con- 
ferring with  General  Arnold,  he  and 
General  Norstad  selected  a  target 
committee.  The  committee  included 
two  members  of  Groves's  staff  (Gen- 
eral Farrell,  who  served  as  de  facto 
chairman  when  Groves  was  not 
present,  and  Major  Derry),  an  AAF 
officer  (Col.  William  P.  Fisher),  and 
five  technical  experts  (John  von  Neu- 
mann, Robert  R.  Wilson,  and  William 
G.  Penney,  a  member  of  the  British 
team  at  Los  Alamos,  all  from  the 
Manhattan  Project,  and  Joyce  C. 
Stearns  and  David  M.  Dennison  from 
the  AAF.  20 

At  the  opening  meeting  of  the 
target  committee  on  27  April,  Groves 
briefed  its  members,  first  emphasizing 
the  need  for  the  highest  degree  of  se- 
crecy in  its  deliberations  and  then 
laying  down  some  general  guidelines 
for  selection  of  targets.  He  suggested 
that  they  choose  four  targets  and  in- 
dicated that  General  Marshall  had 
pointed  out  that  ports  on  the  west 
coast  of  Japan,  vital  to  that  country's 
communications  with  the  Asiatic 
mainland,  should  not  be  overlooked. 
General  Norstad  then  told  the  com- 
mittee that  the  Twentieth  Air  Force 
would  provide  it  with  whatever  sup- 
port    it     needed,     including     related 


'* Craven  and  Gate,  The  Pacific,  pp.  708-09;  Ms, 
"Hist  509th  Comp  Gp,"  pp.  50-55  and  58-61, 
SHRG;  Memo,  de  Silva  to  Lansdale,  28  Jun  45, 
Admin  Files.  Gen  Gorresp,  371.2  (Sctv),  MDR. 


>9 Groves  Diary,  23  Apr  45,  LRG;  Groves,  Now  It 
Can  Be  Told,  pp.  266-67. 

20  Groves  Diary,  23  Apr  45,  LRG;  Groves,  Now  It 
Can   Be   Told,    pp.    266-68;    Hewlett   and   Anderson, 

New  World,  p.  365. 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


529 


information,  operational  analyses, 
maps,  and  targets  data.^^ 

The  second  committee  meeting 
took  place  on  10  May  in  Los  Alamos, 
where  committee  members  had  an 
opportunity  to  hear  from  the  scien- 
tists and  technicians  who  had  worked 
on  the  bomb.  At  the  third  meeting  in 
Washington  on  28  May,  Colonel  Tib- 
bets  and  Commander  Ashworth,  who 
had  returned  from  Tinian  for  consul- 
tation, and  scientific  adviser  Richard 
C.  Tolman  provided  further  data.  The 
committee  carefully  considered  vari- 
ous criteria:  the  maximum  range  for 
the  loaded  B-29  aircraft;  the  need  for 
visual  bombing;  likely  weather  condi- 
tions; and  expected  damage.  The  last 
criterion  weighed  heavily  on  the  com- 
mittee, for  it  pointed  up  the  necessity 
to  select  targets  where  the  bomb 
would  produce  the  maximum  damage 
and  hence  have  the  profoundest 
impact  upon  enemy  morale.  Project 
scientists  had  indicated  that  the  bomb 
would  most  likely  achieve  the  desired 
results  if  it  were  dropped  on  densely 
built-up  areas  of  significant  value  to 
the  Japanese  war  effort.  They  also 
had  emphasized  that  the  targets 
should  not  have  been  bombed  previ- 
ously, so  the  effects  might  be  assessed 
more  accurately. ^^ 

Before  concluding  its  28  May  meet- 
ing, the  committee  recommended 
four  targets  to  General  Groves,  who 
promptly  approved  all  of  them.  The 
choices  were  Kokura  Arsenal,  one  of 
Japan's  largest  munitions  plants,  cov- 


^'  (iroves  Diarv,  27  Apt  45,  I.RG;  Notes  on 
Target  Committee  Mtg,  27  Apr  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen 
(.orresp,  MP  Files.  Fldr  5.   1  ah  1).  Mi:)R. 

"Notes  on  Target  (.oiniiiiitee  Mtg,  27  Apr  and 
28  Mav  45.  MDR,  Ms,  Manhaiian  Fngineer  District, 
"The  Atomic  Bombings  of  Hiroshima  and  Naga- 
saki," June  1946,  pp.  5-8,  TG;  Groves,  Xow  It  Can 
Be  Told,  p.  270." 


ering  an  area  of  8  million  square  feet; 
Hiroshima,  a  major  military  embarka- 
tion port  and  convoy  assembly  point 
with  a  local  army  headquarters,  rail- 
way yards,  storage  depots,  and  some 
heavy  industrial  plants;  Niigata,  an 
important  seaport  with  significant  in- 
dustrial and  commercial  facilities,  in- 
cluding an  aluminum  reduction  plant, 
a  large  ironworks,  an  oil  refinery,  and 
a  tanker  terminal;  and  Kyoto,  with  a 
concentrated  3-square-mile  industrial 
area  and  a  population  of  about  one 
million  people.  As  soon  as  he  re- 
ceived the  committee's  list.  Groves 
prepared  a  plan  of  operations  for 
General  Marshall  based  upon  the 
identified  target  choices. ^^ 

On  30  May,  before  delivering  the 
plan  of  operations  to  General  Mar- 
shall, Groves  visited  the  Secretary  of 
War  on  other  business.  The  Secretary 
used  the  opportunity  to  query  the 
Manhattan  commander  on  the  target 
choices.  As  soon  as  Groves  men- 
tioned Kyoto,  Stimson  expressed 
strong  objection,  noting  that  the  city 
had  been  the  ancient  capital  of  Japan 
and  was  a  place  of  great  religious  and 
cultural  significance  to  the  Japanese. 
Groves  pointed  out  that  Kyoto's  large 
population  and  military  and  industrial 
importance  made  it  an  exceptionally 
suitable  target,  but  the  Secretary  of 
War  held  fast  to  his  views. 

The  target  committee,  nevertheless, 
did  not  find  an  immediate  substitute 
for  Kvoto.  General  Arnold  included  it 


23  Groves,  Sow  II  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  272-73;  Ltr, 
Norstad  through  Dep  Gdr,  Twentieth  Air  F'orce,  to 
CG  XXI  Bomber  Cmd,  sub:  509th  Gomp  Gp  Spec 
Functions,  29  Mav  45,  OGG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP 
Files,  Fldr  5,  Tab  G.  MDR.  This  letter  appears  to 
contain  the  substance  of  (iroves's  plan  of  oper- 
ations, including  reference  to  three  of  the  four  com- 
mit lee  target  choices  (Kokura  Arsenal  is  missing). 


530 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


in  his  instructions  in  early  June  to  the 
Twentieth  Air  Force  to  withhold  con- 
ventional bombing  of  the  four  select- 
ed targets.  So  did  Groves  in  late  June, 
when  he  requested  General  Marshall 
to  inform  General  Douglas  MacArthur 
and  Admiral  Nimitz  to  refrain  from 
attacking  the  target  cities,  but  prob- 
ably with  the  intention  of  making  cer- 
tain that  Kyoto  was  not  subjected  to 
ordinary  bombing.  The  Manhattan 
commander  endeavored  to  change 
Stimson's  mind  on  a  number  of  occa- 
sions, but  the  Secretary  remained  ad- 
amant. Finally,  on  21  July,  Stimson, 
who  was  in  Germany  attending  the 
Potsdam  Conference,  received  a  cable 
signed  by  special  assistant  George  L. 
Harrison  but  certainly  inspired  by 
Groves:  "All  your  local  military  advi- 
sors engaged  in  preparation  definitely 
favor  your  pet  city  and  would  like  to 
feel  free  to  use  it  as  first  choice  if 
those  on  the  ride  select  it  out  of  4 
possible  spots  in  the  light  of  local 
conditions  at  the  time."  ^*  After  con- 
ferring with  President  Truman,  Stim- 
son replied:  "Give  name  of  place  or 
alternate  places,  always  excluding  the 
particular  place  against  which  I  have 
decided.  My  decision  has  been  con- 
firmed by  highest  authority."  ^^ 
When  the  atomic  bomb  directive  was 
issued  to  the  United  States  Army 
Strategic  Air  Forces  (USASTAF)  on  25 
July,  Nagasaki  had  replaced  Kyoto  on 
the  target  list.^^ 


2"*  Msg,  Harrison  to  Stimson,  21  Jul  45,  CM- 
OUT-35987,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files, 
Fldr  5E,  Tab  A,  MDR. 

25  Msg,  Stimson  to  Harrison,  23  Jul  45,  CM-IN- 
23195,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  5E, 
Tab  C,  MDR. 

2^  Ltr  Directive,  Gen  Thomas  T.  Handv  (Act 
Chief  of  Staff)  to  Gen  Carl  A.  Spaatz  (CG  USA- 
STAF), 25  Jul  45;  Memo,  Groves  to  Norstad,  30 
May  45;  Memo,  Groves  to  Chief  of  Staff,  30  Jun  45. 


The  Decision   To  Use  the  Bomb 

Meanwhile,  the  question  of  military 
employment  of  the  bomb  against 
Japan  came  up  for  consideration  by 
the  Interim  Committee,  a  temporary 
body  appointed  by  Stimson  in  May 
1945  at  the  urging  of  project  leaders 
and  with  the  approval  of  the  Presi- 
dent. The  committee's  function  was  to 
advise  and  report  on  atomic  energy 
matters.  Membership  was  comprised 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  as  chairman; 
George  Harrison,  as  alternate  chair- 
man; former  War  Mobilization  Direc- 
tor James  F.  Byrnes,  representing  the 
President;  Vannevar  Bush;  James  B. 
Conant;  MIT  President  Karl  T. 
Compton;  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  Economic  Affairs  William  L.  Clay- 
ton; and  Under  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
Ralph  A.  Bard.  At  its  first  meeting  on 
the  ninth,  Stimson  outlined  the  pa- 
rameters of  the  committee's  broad  au- 
thority— from  advising  on  wartime 
controls  and  publicity  releases  to 
making  recommendations  on  postwar 
policies  concerning  research,  develop- 
ment, and  control  of  atomic  energy 
(including  legislation).  He  did  not 
mention  that  the  committee  would 
also  advise  on  the  military  use  of  the 
bomb,  but  the  interrelationship  be- 
tween this  aspect  of  atomic  energy 
and  war  and  postwar  controls  made 


All  in  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  5, 
Tab  B,  MDR.  Stimson  Dairy,  30  May,  6  Jun,  22  and 
24  Jul  45,  HLS.  In  the  entry  of  30  May,  Stimson 
mentions  the  conference  on  S-1  but  says  nothing 
about  targets.  Groves  Diary,  30  May  45,  LRG.  Stim- 
son and  Bundy,  On  Active  Sennce,  p.  625.  Groves, 
AW  //  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  273-76.  Nagasaki,  the  city 
substituted  for  Kyoto  on  the  bomb  target  list,  was  a 
major  military  port — one  of  Japan's  largest  ship- 
building and  repair  centers — and  a  producer  of 
naval  ordnance. 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


531 


^ 

'"^ 

m 

^', 

•^•^''                ^ 

^^■1 

7 

.  \ 

,  ,  s  .    ■  .      •■      -                            -         1 

f 

^ 

General  Groves  Checking  Location  of  Bombing  Targets 


its      involvement     in     that     decision 
almost  inevitable. ^^ 

At  its  next  meeting  on  the  four- 
teenth, the  Interim  Committee  estab- 
lished a  scientific  panel,  comprised  of 
Oppenheimer,  Fermi,  Arthur  Comp- 
ton,  and  Lawrence.  This   group  pre- 


^^  See  Ch.  XXVII  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  the 
Interim  Committee's  activities  in  the  preparation  of 
press  releases  and  public  statements,  and  in  plan- 
ning for  postwar  controls  and  legislation.  On  the 
committee's  organization  and  first  meeting  see  Stim- 
son  Diary,  25  Apr  and  2-3  and  8-9  May  45,  HLS; 
Memo,  Bundy  to  Secy  War,  3  Mar  45,  OCG  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  9,  Tab  A,  MDR; 
Groves  Diary,  9  May  45,  LRG.  See  also  in  MDR,  HB 
Files,  the  following:  Notes  on  Interim  Committee 
Mtgs,  9  and  17  May  45,  Fldr  100;  Interim  Commit- 
tee Log,  9  May  45,  Fldr  98;  Ltrs,  Secy  War  to 
Conant,  4  May  45,  and  Conant  to  Secy  War,  5  May 
45,  Fldr  69;  Memo,  Harrison  to  Secy  War,  sub:  In- 
terim Committee  on  S-1,  1  Mav  45,  Fldr  69. 


sented  its  views  on  the  technical  and 
political  aspects  of  atomic  energy  at 
the  fourth  meeting  of  the  committee 
on  the  thirty-first,  which  Generals 
Groves  and  Marshall  attended.  While 
recognizing  that  use  of  the  bomb  was 
essentially  a  military  matter,  the  panel 
members  nevertheless  offered  their 
opinions  concerning  the  way  it  should 
be  employed  and  the  likely  effects  it 
would  have  on  the  targets  selected. 
Oppenheimer  closed  the  panel's 
briefing  by  emphasizing  that  the 
atomic  bomb  would  have  a  different 
impact  from  any  previous  weapon  be- 
cause "the  visual  effect  .  .  .  would  be 
tremendous,  it  would  be  accompanied 
by  a  brilliant  luminescence  which 
would  rise  to  a  height  of  10,000  to 


532 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


20,000  feet,  [and]  the  neutron  effect 
.  .  .  would  be  dangerous  to  life  for  a 
radius  of  at  least  two-thirds  of  a 
mile." 

Taking  a  moment  to  reflect  on  the 
discussion  of  targets  and  effects.  Sec- 
retary Stimson  proffered  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  atomic  bomb  should  be 
used  against  Japan  with  no  advance 
warning  and,  while  not  restricting  the 
target  to  a  civilian  area,  should  be 
employed  in  such  a  way  as  "to  make  a 
profound  psychological  impression  on 
as  many  of  the  inhabitants  as  possi- 
ble." Both  committee  and  panel 
members  generally  agreed,  and  the 
discussion  continued.  Conant  sug- 
gested that  the  "most  desirable  target 
would  be  a  vital  war  plant  employing 
a  large  number  of  workers  and  closely 
surrounded  by  workers'  houses,"  and 
Stimson  indicated  that  was  the  type  of 
target  he  also  visualized.  When  Op- 
penheimer  proposed  that  several  si- 
multaneous strikes  would  be  feasible. 
Groves  strongly  objected.  Such  tac- 
tics, he  stated,  would  eliminate  the 
possibility  of  "gaining  additional 
knowledge  of  the  new  weapon  at  each 
successive  bombing  .  .  .  ,  would  re- 
quire a  rush  job  on  the  part  of  those 
assembling  the  bombs  and  might, 
therefore,  be  ineffective,  [and]  the 
effect  would  not  be  sufficiently  dis- 
tinct .from  .  .  .  regular  Air  Force 
bombing.  .   .   ."  ^® 

Panel  members  left  the  31  May 
meeting  with  the  Secretary's  instruc- 
tions that  they  should  prepare  sug- 
gestions on  postwar  organization,  re- 


search, and  development  for  the  In- 
terim Committee.  Arthur  Compton 
was  very  much  aware  that  there  was 
great  concern  and  substantial  differ- 
ence of  opinion  among  Metallurgical 
Laboratory  scientists  on  how  to  deal 
with  postwar  problems  and  programs. 
And  in  the  interest  of  maintaining  the 
morale  of  his  scientific  staff,  he  re- 
quested suggestions  from  them  on 
the  future  of  atomic  energy,  which  he 
might  then  pass  on  to  the  scientific 
panel. 

Among  the  various  reports  Comp- 
ton received  in  the  following  two 
weeks  was  one  prepared  by  a  group 
of  scientists  under  the  leadership 
of  James  Franck,  an  outstanding 
German-refugee  physicist  who  had 
come  to  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
from  the  staff  of  the  University  of 
Chicago.  Centering  on  the  political 
and  social  ramifications  of  an  atomic 
bombing,  the  Franck  report  favored 
eventual  international  control  of 
atomic  energy  as  the  only  safe  solu- 
tion. Using  the  bomb  against  Japan 
without  adequate  warning,  the  report 
cautioned,  would  arouse  great  ani- 
mosity against  the  United  States  and 
isolate  her  morally  among  the  nations 
of  the  world,  making  establishment  of 
international  controls  much  more  dif- 
ficult. As  an  alternative,  the  report 
advocated  a  demonstration  of  the 
bomb  in  an  uninhabited  area,  point- 
ing out  that  this  action  would  not  pre- 
vent later  military  use  of  the  bomb 
against  Japan,  if  this  were  necessary.  ^^ 


^*  Quotations  in  this  and  the  preceding  paragraph 
from  Notes  on  Interim  Committee  Mtg,  31  May  45, 
MDR.  See  also  Memo,  1st  Lt  R.  Gordon  Arneson 
(Interim  Committee  Secv)  to  Harrison,  6  Jun  45, 
HB  Files,  Fldr  100,  MDR;  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 
Xeu'  World,  pp.  356-59. 


^*The  Franck  report,  signed  by  Franck  and  six  of 
his  fellow  scientists  at  the  Metallurgical  Laboratory 
(David  J.  Hughes,  James  J.  Nickson,  Eugene  Ra- 
binowitch,  Glenn  Seaborg,  Joyce  Stearns,  and  Leo 
Szilard),  was  published  under  the  title  "Before  Hiro- 
shima" in  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists.  1  May  46. 
See  also  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  pp.  233-36;  Hewlett 
and  Anderson,  Xew  World,  p.  366. 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


533 


Some  members  of  the  Franck  group 
did  not  feel  that  they  could  depend 
upon  the  scientific  panel  to  bring 
their  views  to  the  attention  of  govern- 
ment leaders,  so  Franck  himself  car- 
ried the  report  to  the  capital.  There, 
Arthur  Compton  saw  to  its  delivery 
on  12  June  to  George  Harrison's 
office  at  the  War  Department.  Harri- 
son, acting  in  his  capacity  as  alternate 
chairman  of  the  Interim  Committee, 
decided  that  the  Franck  report  should 
be  turned  over  to  the  scientific  panel 
for  possible  inclusion  in  the  latter's 
own  report  on  the  use  of  the  bomb. 

Both  the  Franck  report  and  the  sci- 
entific panel's  report  were  discussed 
at  the  meeting  of  the  Interim  Com- 
mittee on  the  twenty-first.  In  contrast 
to  the  Franck  report's  recommenda- 
tion that  the  bomb  be  used  first  in  a 
technical  demonstration  made  public 
to  other  countries,  the  panel's 
report — which  acknowledged  the  dif- 
fering views  of  project  scientists  on 
how  the  bomb  should  be  employed — 
concluded  that  it  could  "propose  no 
technical  demonstration  likely  to 
bring  an  end  to  the  war  .  .  .  [and]  see 
no  acceptable  alternative  to  direct 
military  use."  ^°  After  considering  the 
panel's  views,  the  Interim  Committee 
reaffirmed  its  earlier  position  "that 
the  weapon  be  used  against  Japan  at 
the  earliest  opportunity  .  .  .  without 
warning,  and  ...  on  a  dual  target, 
namely  a  military  installation  or  war 
plant    surrounded   by   or   adjacent   to 


homes   or  other  buildings   most   sus- 
ceptible to  damage."  ^^ 

On  21  July,  Stimson  received  not 
only  Groves's  detailed  report  on  the 
successful  test  at  Trinity,  delivered  by 
special  courier,  but  also  cables  from 
Harrison  indicating  that  atomic 
bombs  would  be  ready  sooner  than 
expected.  He  promptly  passed  the 
word  to  American  and  British  leaders 
at  Potsdam,  including  President 
Truman,  Prime  Minister  Churchill, 
Secretary  of  State  Byrnes  (as  of  3 
July),  General  Marshall,  and  Lord 
Cherwell,  all  of  whom  were  elated  by 
the  news.  On  the  twenty-fourth,  Stim- 
son showed  the  President  the  tenta- 
tive plan  of  operations,  which  Groves 
had  prepared  and  which  he  (Stimson) 
had  received  the  day  before  from 
Harrison.  This  plan  called  for  the  first 
atomic  bombing  mission  any  time 
after  1  August,  subject  to  completion 
of  preparations  and  suitable  weather. 
Truman  accepted  the  plan  without 
reservation,  for,  Stimson  recalled, 
"that  was         just  what  he 

wanted.  .  .   ."  ^^ 


^"Rpi.  Scientific  Panel,  sub:  Recommendations  on 
the  Immediate  Use  of  Nuclear  Wpns,  16  Jun  45. 
This  report,  one  of  three  prepared  bv  the  panel  on 
various  aspects  of  the  control  and  empl<)\nient  of 
atomic  energy,  is  attached  to  Ltr,  Oppenheimer  (for 
Scientific  Panel)  to  Secy  War,  Attn:  Harrison,  16  Jun 
45,  OCG  Piles,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Pldr  3, 
Tab  T,  MDR. 


'^  Notes  on  Interim  Committee  Mtg,  21  Jun  45, 
MDR;  Ltr,  Compton  to  Stimson,  12  Jun  45,  and  Incl 
(unsigned  copv  of  Franck  report),  OCG  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Fldr  3,  Tab  T,  MDR;  Interim 
Committee  Log,  12  and  15-16  Jun  45,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  98,  MDR;  Compton,  Atomic  Qitest.  pp.  233-36 
and  239-41;  Hewlett  and  Anderson.  Sew  World,  pp. 
365-69. 

32  Stimson  Diary,  16-19  and  21-24  Jul  45  (quota- 
tion from  24  Julv),  HLS.  Memo.  Groves  to  Secv 
War,  sub:  The  Test,  18  Jul  45.  HB  Files,  Fldr  49, 
MDR.  Msgs,  Harrison  to  Secv  War,  21  Jul  45,  CM- 
()t'T-35988,  Tab  B;  Secy  War  to  Harrison,  23  Jul 
45,  CM-IN-23487.  Tab  C;  Harrison  to  Secv  War, 
23  Jul  45,  CM-Ol'T-36792  and  CM-OlT-37350, 
lab  A,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  5E, 
MDR  (copies  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  64,  MDR).  Groves, 
\'ou<  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  309-10.  Iruman  later  re- 
called that  he  had  reached  a  decision  in  favor  of 
using  the  atomic  bomb  on  the  basis  of  recommen- 

ConliiuK-d 


534 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


On  25  July,  General  Marshall  sub- 
mitted to  Stimson  the  draft  of  the 
USASTAF  directive  to  proceed  with 
the  atomic  bombing  of  Japan,  and  the 
Secretary — with  assurance  that  all  the 
Allied  leaders  favored  going  ahead 
with  employment  of  the  bomb — ap- 
proved it.  The  directive  carefully 
spelled  out  the  procedures  that  were 
to  govern  the  atomic  bombing 
mission: 

1.  The  509  Composite  Group,  20th  Air 
Force  will  deliver  its  first  special  bomb  as 
soon  as  weather  will  permit  visual  bomb- 
ing after  about  3  August  1945  on  one  of 
the  targets:  Hiroshima,  Kokura,  Niigata 
and  Nagasaki.  To  carry  military  and  civil- 
ian scientific  personnel  from  the  War  De- 
partment to  observe  and  record  the  ef- 
fects of  the  explosion  of  the  bomb,  addi- 
tional aircaft  will  accompany  the  airplane 
carrying  the  bomb.  The  observing  planes 
will  stay  several  miles  distant  from  the 
point  of  impact  of  the  bomb. 

2.  Additional  bombs  will  be  delivered 
on  the  above  targets  as  soon  as  made 
ready  by  the  project  staff.  Further  instruc- 
tions will  be  issued  concerning  targets 
other  than  those  listed  above. 

3.  Dissemination  of  any  or  all  informa- 
tion concerning  the  use  of  the  weapon 
against  Japan  is  reserved  to  the  Secretary 
of  War  and  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  No  communicjues  on  the  subject 
or  release  of  information  will  be  issued  by 

dations  of  his  military  advisers  and  after  Churchill 
had  told  him  at  Potsdam  that  he  was  convinced  it 
should  be  employed  "if  it  might  aid  to  end  the  war" 
(see  Harry  S.  Truman,  Memoirs,  2  vols.  (Garden 
City,  N.Y.:  Doubleday  and  Co.,  1955-56],  1:419). 
Truman  subsequently  informed  Air  Force  histori- 
ans that  he  actually  gave  the  order  for  dropping  the 
bombs  on  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki  in  the  mid-At- 
lantic while  returning  to  the  United  States  from 
Potsdam  on  board  the  cruiser  USS  Augusta  (2-7  .Aug 
45).  See  Ltr,  Truman  to  Cate,  12  Jan  53,  repro- 
duced in  Craven  and  Cate,  The  Paaftc.  between  pp. 
712-13.  For  a  further  discussion  on  the  decision  to 
use  the  bomb  see  Louis  Morton,  "The  Decision  To 
Use  the  Atomic  Bomb,"  in  Command  Decisions,  ed. 
Kent  Roberts  Greenfield  (Washington,  D.C.:  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office,  1960),  pp.  493-518. 


Commanders  in  the  field  without  specific 
prior  authority.  Any  news  stories  will  be 
sent  to  the  War  Department  for  special 
clearance. 

4.  The  foregoing  directive  is  issued  to 
you  by  direction  and  with  the  approval  of 
the  Secretary  of  War  and  of  the  Chief  of 
Staff,  USA.  h  is  desired  that  you  person- 
ally deliver  one  copy  of  this  directive  to 
General  MacArthur  and  one  copy  to  Ad- 
miral Nimitz  for  their  information.^^ 


Dropping  the  Bomb 

Manhattan  played  an  important 
supporting  role  in  the  AAF's  execu- 
tion of  the  25  July  directive.  At  the 
top  level,  General  Groves  continued 
to  retain  a  voice  in  the  general  direc- 
tion of  the  mission,  through  his 
access  to  General  Arnold's  staff  in 
Washington,  through  his  two  repre- 
sentatives on  Tinian  (Colonel  Kirk- 
patrick  and,  as  of  31  July,  General 
Farrell)  and  through  Admiral  Purnell, 
whom  Admiral  King  had  assigned  to 
coordinate  the  bombing  with  Navy 
commanders  in  the  Pacific  Theater.^'* 

General  Farrell  arrived  in  the  Cen- 
tral Pacific  area  with  specific  instruc- 
tions from  Groves:  to  coordinate  on- 
going preparations  for  dropping  the 
first  atomic  bomb  on  Japan.  Farrell 
first  stopped  on  Guam,  where  he  con- 
ferred with  General  LeMay,  who 
would      shortly     become     USASTAF 


^^  Ltr  Directive,  Handy  to  Spaatz,  25  Jul  45, 
MDR.  A  copy  of  the  original  directive  is  reproduced 
in  Craven  and  Cate,  The  Pacific,  following  page  696. 
See  also  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  308-09. 

="*  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  311;  Memo, 
Groves  to  Chief  of  Staff,  sub:  Plan  of  Opns-Atomic 
Fission  Bomb,  24  Jul  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
MP  Files,  Fldr  25,  Tab  P,  MDR;  Groves  Diary,  24- 
26  and  31  Jul  45,  LRG;  Rpt,  Farrell,  sub:  Overseas 
Opns-Atomic  Bomb,  ca.  15  Sep  45,  Admin  Files, 
Rpts  Pertaining  to  the  Effects  of  the  Atomic  Bomb, 
Farrell,  ML^R;  Testimony  of  Farrell  in  Atomic  Energy 
Hearings  on  S.  Res.  179,  p.  502. 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


535 


N 


f%^  J 


^r§-^^1lt 


m^JiJMAM 


Col.  Paul  W.  Tibbets,  Jr.  (center),  with  Ground  Crew  at  Tinian 


chief  of  staff,  and  with  Admiral 
Nimitz.  Moving  on  to  Tinian,  Farrell 
visited  Admiral  Purnell  and  Captain 
Parsons. ^^ 

Farrell  spent  considerable  time  with 
Parsons,  who  talked  at  length  about 
the  intensive  activities  of  the  1st 
Technical  Detachment  on  Tinian 
during  the  month  of  July.  The  detach- 
ment, with  assistance  from  other  ele- 
ments of  the  509th  and  the  Navy,  had 
installed  the  technical  facilities  re- 
quired for  assembly  and  testing  of 
bomb     components,     especially     with 


^^  Rpt,  Farrell,  sub:  Overseas  Opns-Atomic 
Bomb,  ca.  15  Sep  45,  MDR;  Historical  Notes  .... 
Incl  to  Ltr,  Kirkpatrick  to  OCEHD,  30  Sep  68, 
OCEHD. 


Little  Boy,  and  had  carefully  checked 
out  the  emergency  reloading  facilities 
at  Iwo  Jima.  Parsons  also  informed 
Farrell  about  the  function  of  his 
newly  formed  project  technical  com- 
mittee, namely,  to  assist  him  in  plan- 
ning and  coordinating  with  AAF 
elements  the  complex  final  tests  and 
assembly  of  both  the  gun-type  and 
implosion  weapons.^® 


36  Memo,  E.  J.  Doll  (Delivery  Gp,  Tinian)  to  Par- 
sons, sub:  Summary  of  Spec  Mtg  (24  Jul  45)  of 
Wpns  Committee,  27  Jul  45;  Memo,  Norman  F. 
Ramsey  (Delivery  Gp,  Tinian)  to  Parsons,  sub:  Sum- 
marv  of  Spec  Mtg  (27  Jul  45)  of  Proj  Tech  Commit- 
tee, 28  Jul  45,  and  Ind  (Table  1,  Schedule  of 
Events);  ibid.,  sub:  Summary  of  Mtg  (30  Jul  45)  of 
Proj  Tech  Committee,  6  Aug  45.  All  in  OCG  Files, 

Continued 


536 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Component  parts  and  active  materi- 
al for  both  types  of  atomic  bombs 
reached  the  detachment  on  Tinian 
only  shortly  before  they  were  actually 
used  in  bombing  missions.  Those  for 
Little  Boy  arrived  first.  Most  of  its 
components  and  the  U-235  had  left 
Los  Alamos  in  mid-July  in  custody  of 
Maj.  Robert  R.  Furman,  a  special 
projects  officer  from  Groves's  Wash- 
ington headquarters,  and  Capt.  James 
F.  Nolan,  chief  medical  officer  at  the 
New  Mexico  installation.  They  trav- 
eled by  automobile  from  Santa  Fe  to 
Albuquerque,  by  airplane  to  Hamilton 
Field  near  San  Francisco,  thence  to 
Hunters  Point  to  board  the  cruiser 
Indianapolis.  Crossing  the  Pacific  in 
record  time,  they  reached  Tinian  on  26 
July.^"^  Two  Los  Alamos  security  offi- 
cers brought  the  remaining  compo- 
nents and  the  rest  of  the  active  mate- 
rial for  Litde  Boy  aboard  two  C-54 
cargo  aircraft,  the  first  arriving  at 
Tinian  on  the  twenty-eighth  and  the 
second  on  the  following  day.^® 

The  509th  technical  teams  quickly 
assembled  the  Little  Boy  unit,  and 
Parsons  requested  permission  from 
Groves  to  drop  it  as  early  as 
1  August.  But  weather  conditions  for 
the  first  four  days  of  the  month  were 
unsuitable.  During  this  period,  the 
technical  teams  and  bombing  crews 
worked  on  an  around-the-clock  basis. 


Tinian  Files,  Env  B,  200  (Kirkpatrick),  MDR.  See 
also  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  XIX.7-XIX.8,  DASA. 

^''  A  Japanese  submarine  sank  the  ill-fated  Indian- 
apolis four  days  later  en  route  to  the  Philippines.  See 
Richard  F.  Newcomb,  Abandon  Ship!  Death  of  the  L'SS 
Indianapolu  (New  York:  Holt,  Rinehart  and  Winston, 
1958). 

38  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  XIX.8-XIX.9,  DASA; 
Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  305-08;  Craven  and 
Gate,  The  Pacific,  pp.  714-15;  Testimonies  of  Groves 
and  physicist  Philip  Morrison  (Los  Alamos  Lab)  in 
Atomic  Energy  Hearings  on  S.  Res.  179,  pp.  39-40  and 
234-35. 


perfecting  plans  for  delivering  Little 
Boy  and  carrying  out  tests  on  Fat 
Man  rehearsal  units.  At  the  same 
time,  components  for  the  Fat  Man  ar- 
rived at  Tinian  aboard  two  B-29's 
that  Groves  had  held  at  Albuquerque 
for  that  purpose  and  plutonium  active 
material  came  in  aboard  a  C-54.^^ 

Finally,  on  the  morning  of  the  fifth, 
AAF  meteorologists  indicated  that 
visual  bombing  should  be  possible 
over  the  target  cities  on  the  following 
day,  and  General  LeMay  directed  that 
the  Littly  Boy  mission  would  take 
place  on  the  sixth.  Technical  teams 
loaded  the  bomb  in  the  Enola 
Gay  B-29  aircraft  and  completed  the 
final  testing  of  the  unit.  A  few  days 
earlier  bomb  technicians  had  worked 
out  a  method  for  reducing  the  danger 
of  a  premature  explosion  by  delaying 
final  arming  until  the  aircraft  was  air- 
borne. Captain  Parsons,  who  was  to 
go  on  the  flight  as  the  bomb  com- 
mander, had  responsibility  for  per- 
forming this  function. 

The  final  briefing  took  place  at 
midnight,  and  the  weather  planes  de- 
parted for  the  target  area.  Hiroshima 
was  the  primary  target,  Kokura  sec- 
ond, and  then  Nagasaki  (see  Map  7). 
In  the  meantime,  a  C-54  had  car- 
ried Colonel  Kirkpatrick  and  a  crew 
from  the  technical  group  to  Iwo  Jima 
to  stand  by  to  transfer  the  bomb  to  a 
spare  B-29  if  the  strike  aircraft  had  to 
land  there. *° 


39  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  XIX. 8  and  XIX.  10, 
DASA;  Rpt,  Farrell,  sub:  Overseas  Opns-Atomic 
Bomb,  ca.  15  Sep  45,  MDR;  Historical  Notes  .  .  .  , 
Incl  to  Ltr,  Kirkpatrick  to  OCEHD,  30  Sep  68, 
OGEHD;  Groves  Diary,  4  Aug  45,  LRG;  Memo, 
Groves  to  Chief  of  Staff,  6  Aug  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  5,  Tab  B,  MDR. 

40  MDH,  Bk,  8,  Vol.  2,  XIX.8-XIX.9,  DASA; 
Memo,  Groves  to  Chief  of  Staff,  6  Aug  45,  MDR; 

Continued 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


537 


Enola  Gay  at  Tinian 


At  0245  (Tinian  time)  on  6  August, 
with  Little  Boy  in  her  bomb  bay  and 
Colonel  Tibbets  at  the  controls,  the 
Enola  Gay  lifted  off  the  Tinian  runway, 
followed  at  two-minute  intervals  by 
two  observation  planes  carrying  re- 
cording instruments  and  scientific  ob- 
servers, most  of  them  from  the  Man- 
hattan Project.  Tibbets'  instructions 
were  to  choose  the  target  on  the  basis 
of  reports  from  the  weather  planes — 
Hiroshima  was  preferred  because  it 
was  the  one  target  that  had  no  Ameri- 
can prisoner-of-war  camp — and,  if  all 
were  closed  in,  to  return  with  the 
bomb."*^ 


Historical  Notes  .  .  .  ,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Kirkpatrick  to 
OCEHD,  30  Sep  68,  OCEHD;  Craven  and  Gate,  The 
Panfic.  p.  176 

*^  At  the  end  of  July,  General  Spaatz  had  cabled 
General  Groves,  calling  attention  to  the  reported  lo- 
cation of  prisoner-of-war  camps  near  some  of  the 
target  areas  selected  for  atomic  bombing  and  re- 
questing advice  on  how  this  should  affect  his  orders 
to  the  509th  Composite  Group.  Groves  consulted 
with  General  Handy,  the  Acting  Chief  of  Staff,  and 


Captain  Parsons  kept  the  log  of  the 
flight  that  described  in  terse  phrases 
the  progress  of  the  historic  mission: 


0300 
0315 
0605 
0730 


0741 


0838 
0847 

0904 


Started  final  loading  of  gun. 
Finished  loading. 

Headed  for  the  Empire  from  Two. 
Red  plugs  in  [these  plugs  armed 
the  bomb  so  it  would  detonate  if 
released]. 

Started  climb.  Weather  report  re- 
ceived  that  weather  over  primary 
and  tertiary  targets  was  good  but 
not  secondary  target. 
Leveled  off  at  32,700  feet. 
All      Archies      [electronic      fuses] 
tested  to  be  OK. 
Course  west. 


they  agreed  that  Spaatz  should  be  told  to  disregard 
the  purported  presence  of  prisoner-of-war  camps  in 
issuing  his  orders.  Handy,  however,  believed  that 
Stimson  should  be  informed  of  this  policy.  .Accord- 
ingly, Groves  showed  the  Secretary  of  War  both  the 
cable  from  Spaatz  and  his  reply  to  the  USASTAF 
commander.  Stimson,  by  taking  no  action,  in  effect 
approved  the  polic\.  See  Groves,  S'ow  It  Can  Be  Told, 
pp.  312-13. 


538 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


0909     Target  [Hiroshima]  in  sight. 

0915V2  Dropped  bomb  [Originally  sched- 
uled time  was  0915].  Flash  fol- 
lowed by  two  slaps  on  plane. 
Huge  cloud. 

1000  Still  in  sight  of  cloud  which  must 
be  over  40,000  feet  high. 

1003     Fighter  reported. 

1041  Lost  si^ht  of  cloud  363  miles  from 
Hiroshmia  with  the  aircraft  being 
26,000  feet  high.^s 

About  fifteen  minutes  after  the 
bomb  was  dropped,  Parsons  radioed 
back  to  Farrell  on  Tinian  in  a  special 
code:  "Results  clear  cut,  successful  in 
all  respects.  Visible  results  greater 
than  Trinity.  Conditions  normal  in 
airplane  following  delivery.  Proceed- 
ing to  Tinian."  Farrell  promptly  re- 
layed this  first  report  to  Groves, 
waiting  anxiously  in  Washington,  but 
because  of  unexplained  communica- 
tions delays,  it  did  not  reach  him  until 
11:30  P.M.  (Washington  time),  5 
August,  more  than  four  hours  after 
the  dropping  of  the  bomb.  At  4:30 
the  next  morning  Groves  received  a 
detailed  cable  from  Farrell,  dis- 
patched after  return  of  the  Enola  Gay 
to  Tinian.  This  cable  became  the 
basis  of  Groves's  report  to  General 
Marshall  at  the  Pentagon  and,  by  tele- 
phone, to  Stimson  at  home.  Farrell's, 
cable  also  provided  most  of  the  con- 
firmation Groves  needed  to  clear  for 
release  to  the  press  the  President's 
statement,  prepared  earlier  by  the  In- 
terim Committee.  The  one  point  on 
which  the  cable  lacked  sufficient  in- 
formation was  the  amount  of  damage 
inflicted  on  Hiroshima.  To  avoid  any 
chance  of  overstatement  that  might 
reduce  the  announcement's  effect  on 
the  Japanese,   Groves   obtained   from 


General  LeMay  on  Guam  assurance 
that  the  bomb  appeared  to  have 
caused  enormous  destruction.  Then 
at  11:00  A.M.  the  President's  press 
secretary  (Truman  was  still  en  route 
home  from  Potsdam)  released  the 
statement  to  the  waiting  newsmen  at 
the  W^hite  House,  giving  the  Ameri- 
can people  their  first  news  of  the 
atomic  bombing  of  Japan  and  of  the 
wartime  project  that  made  it 
possible.*^ 

Meanwhile  on  Tinian,  the  509th's 
weapon  assembly  teams  prepared  for 
the  first  Fat  Man  mission,  scheduled 
for  1 1  August.  Rapid  progress  with 
assembly  of  the  implosion  unit  led 
Parsons  to  propose  to  Tibbets  on  the 
seventh  that  the  mission  be  moved  up 
to  the  tenth.  But  forecasts  indicated 
that  a  period  of  bad  weather  was  due 
to  begin  on  the  tenth  and  last  for  five 
days.  Would  it  be  possible,  Tibbets 
asked  Parsons,  to  have  the  bomb 
ready  by  the  ninth?  Parsons  ex- 
pressed uncertainty  as  to  whether  the 
bomb  could  be  safely  readied  in  so 
short  a  time,  but  agreed  to  try.  Work- 
ing without  letup,  the  technical  teams 
succeeded  in  assembling,  loading,  and 
checking  the  unit  by  the  evening  of 
the  eighth.  Kokura  was  the  primary 
target    and    Nagasaki,    the    secondary 


''^  The  log  is  reproduced  in  MDH,  Bk.  8,  \'ol.  2, 
XIX.9-XIX.10,  DA.SA. 


*^  Qiiote  from  Rpt,  Farrell,  sub:  Overseas  Opns- 
Atomic  Bomb,  ca.  15  Sep  45,  MDR.  Groves,  AW  // 
Can  Be  Told.  pp.  320-31.  Farrell's  message  to  Groves 
is  reprinted  on  page  323.  Groves's  report  to  Mar- 
shall on  the  bombing  of  Hiroshima  is  the  memoran- 
dum of  6  Aug  45,  filed  in  MDR,  OCG  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  5,  Tab  B.  The  presidential 
statement  is  in  Hmi-y  S.  Truman,  1945.  Public  Papers 
of  the  Presidents  of  the  I'nited  States  (Washington, 
D.C.;  Government  Printing  Office,  1961),  pp.  197- 
200. 


Mi'SHRooM  Cloi'd  Ovkr  Hiroshima 


540 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


objective.  Niigata  was  excluded  as 
being  too  far  away  from  Tinian.** 

Shortly  before  dawn  on  9  August, 
the  B-29  strike  plane  Bock  5  Car,  with 
Maj.  Charles  W.  Sweeney  as  pilot  and 
Commander  Ashworth  as  the  bomb 
commander,  prepared  to  take  off  with 
two  observer  aircraft.  Sweeney's  origi- 
nal flight  plan  designated  the  same 
route  to  Japan  via  the  Volcano  Islands 
followed  by  the  Hiroshima  mission, 
again  to  provide  for  an  emergency 
stop  if  needed  on  Iwo  Jima.  Again 
Colonel  Kirkpatrick  awaited  with  a 
bomb-loading  team  and  a  spare  B-29. 
Just  before  lift-off,  the  Bock^s  Car  crew 
discovered  that  the  fuel  pump  for  the 
plane's  reserve  gasoline  tank  in  the 
bomb  bay  was  not  working  properly. 
Normally  such  a  mechanical  problem 
would  have  aborted  the  mission.  But 
faced  with  a  prediction  of  worsening 
weather  and  knowing  the  importance 
to  the  Allied  surrender  negotiations 
with  Japan  of  having  a  second  atomic 
bomb  attack  closely  follow  the  first, 
Farrell  decided  to  risk  going  ahead 
with  the  mission. ^^ 

The  defective  fuel  pump  was  only 
one  of  a  number  of  difficulties  that 
were  to  make  the  second  atomic 
bombing  mission  as  eventful  as  the 
first  was  routine.  Taking  off  at  about 
0347,*^  the  strike  plane  and  accompa- 


"MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  XIX.lO-XIX.l  1,  DASA; 
Rpt,  Farrell,  sub:  Overseas  Opns-Atomic  Bomb,  ca. 
15  Sep  45,  MDR;  Craven  and  Gate,  The  Pacific,  pp. 
718-19. 

*^  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  344. 

*^  The  0347  takeoff  time  is  recorded  by  Ashworth 
in  the  log  of  the  mission.  Other  sources  vary  as  to 
the  precise  moment  of  lift-off.  Farrell  states  in  his 
15  September  report  that  the  time  was  0348; 
Craven  and  Gate,  the  Air  Force  historians,  fix  it  at 
0349  (The  Pacific,  p.  719);  and  New  York  Times  sci- 
ence reporter  William  Laurence,  who  was  riding  as 
an  observer  in  one  of  the  instrument  planes,  record- 
ed it  as  0350  (Dawn  Over  Zero,  p.  231).  Ashworth's 


nying  aircraft  did  not  attempt  to  fly  in 
formation  because  of  the  bad  weather 
between  Tinian  and  Iwo  Jima.  To  get 
around  this  weather  and  to  save  fuel, 
they  headed  separately  for  a  rendez- 
vous point  at  Yaku-shima  off  the  coast 
of  Japan.  Commander  Ashworth  suc- 
cinctly recorded  in  the  log  of  the 
flight  the  succeeding  series  of  events 
that  threatened  the  mission  with  fail- 
ure and  very  nearly  with  disaster: 

0900  Arrived  rendezvous  point  at  Yaka- 
shima  [sic]  and  circled  awaiting  ac- 
companying aircraft. 

0920  One  B-29  sighted  and  joined  in 
formation. 

0950  Departed  from  Yakashima  [sic] 
proceeding  to  primary  target 
Kokura  having  failed  to  rendez- 
vous with  second  B-29.  The 
weather  reports  received  by  radio 
indicated  good  weather  at  Kokura 
(3/10  low  clouds,  no  intermediate 
or  high  clouds,  and  forecast  of  im- 
proving conditions).  The  weather 
reports  for  Nagasaki  were  good 
but  increasing  cloudiness  was 
forecast.  For  this  reason  the  pri- 
mary target  was  selected. 

1044  Arrived  initial  point  and  started 
bombing  runs  on  target.  Target 
was  obscured  by  heavy  ground 
haze  and  smoke.  Two  additional 
runs  were  made  hoping  that  the 
target  might  be  picked  up  after 
closer  observations.  However,  at 
no  time  was  the  aiming  point 
seen.  It  was  then  decided  to  pro- 
ceed to  Nagasaki  after  approxi- 
mately 45  minutes  spent  in  target 
area. 

At  this  point,  Ashworth  and  Swee- 
ney determined  they  had  only  enough 
gasoline  to  make  a  single  bombing 
run  over  Nagasaki,  if  they  were  to 
reach    the    closest    alternate    landing 


log  is  reprinted  in  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  pp.  XIX.ll- 
XIX.  12,  DASA 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


541 


field  on  Okinawa.  More  than  one  run 
would  require  ditching  Bock 's  Car. 

1150  Arrived  in  Nagasaki  target  area. 
Approach  to  target  was  entirely  by 
radar.  At  1150  the  bomb  was 
dropped  after  a  20  second  visual 
bombing  run.  The  bomb  func- 
tioned normally  in  all  respects. 

1205  Departed  for  Okinawa  after  having 
circled  smoke  column.   .   .  . 

1351     Landed  at  Yontan  Field,  Okinawa. 

1706     Departed  Okinawa  for  Tinian. 

2245     Landed  at  Tinian. 

Ashworth  radioed  first  word  of  the 
bombing  of  Nagasaki  to  Farrell  on 
Tinian  while  Bock's  Car  was  en  route 
to  Okinawa,  indicating  some  uncer- 
tainty as  to  the  results,  although  the 
visible  effects  appeared  to  him  about 
equivalent  to  those  at  Hiroshima.  On 
Okinawa,  Ashworth  consulted  with  all 
the  crews  and  observers  and  conclud- 
ed that  the  implosion  bomb  had  been 
satisfactorily  placed  over  the  target. 
They  reported  that  the  flash  was 
brighter,  the  shock  waves  greater,  and 
the  cloud  was  larger  and  moved  up 
faster  than  at  Hiroshima.  But  photo- 
graphs taken  four  hours  after  the 
strike  showed  little  because  of  the 
cloud,  smoke,  and  dust  cover.  Only 
days  later  would  additional  photo- 
graphs reveal  that  the  entire  industri- 
al part  of  Nagasaki  and  a  considerable 
part  of  the  residential  area  had  been 
destroyed.*"^ 

The  Surrender  of  Japan 

As  soon  as  he  received  word  of  the 
successful  bombing  of  Nagasaki,  Gen- 
eral Groves  felt  certain  Japan's  capitu- 

*■'  For  other  accounts  of  the  bombing  of  Nagasaki 
see  Craven  and  Gate,  The  Panfic.  p.  719-21;  Lau- 
rence, Dauni  Over  Zero.  pp.  228-43;  (iroves,  Xow  It 
Can  Be  Told.  pp.  344-46. 


lation  would  follow.  He  went  at  once 
to  see  General  Marshall  to  discuss 
future  operations  against  Japan.  They 
agreed  that,  in  view  of  Stimson's 
policy  of  using  the  bomb  only  to  end 
the  war,  shipment  of  materials  for  a 
third  bomb  should  be  delayed  until 
13  August.  When  by  that  date  the 
Japanese  still  had  not  surrendered, 
neither  the  Secretary  of  War  nor  the 
Chief  of  Staff  was  available  to  Groves 
for  consultation  because  of  the  con- 
tinuing negotiations  for  an  armistice. 
Groves  then  went  to  General  Thomas 
T.  Handy,  Acting  Chief  of  Staff,  and 
informed  him  that  he  would  order  the 
continued  holding  of  all  fissionable 
materials  in  the  United  States,  re- 
questing Handy  to  pass  this  informa- 
tion on  to  Stimson  and  Marshall  at 
the  earliest  opportunity.  Meanwhile, 
project  personnel  at  Los  Alamos  and 
on  Tinian  also  continued  in  full  readi- 
ness to  prepare  and  deliver  additional 
atomic  bombs. ^® 

The  march  of  events  vindicated 
Groves  in  his  decision.  On  14  August, 
President  Truman  received  a  message 
from  the  Japanese  government  that 
constituted  full  and  satisfactory  ac- 
ceptance of  the  Allied  terms  of  sur- 
render, as  set  forth  in  the  Potsdam 
Declaration.  The  judicious  employ- 
ment of  atomic  bombs  in  tandem  with 
a  series  of  warnings  to  the  Japanese 
government  of  more  to  come  if  it  did 
not  yield  had  comprised  the  strategy 
in  the  final  successful  maneuverings 
for  the  surrender.  To  the  average  ob- 
server in  the  West  in  mid- 1945,  the 
Japanese  decision  to  comply  with 
Allied  terms  appeared  to  be  the  direct 
result  of  the  atomic  bombing  of  Hiro- 


•»8  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  352-53. 


542 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


shima  and  Nagasaki,  the  Soviet 
Union's  declaration  of  war  against 
Japan  on  9  August,  and  the  AlHed 
promise  not  to  alter  the  legal  position 
of  Emperor  Hirohito.  Yet,  with  the 
advantage  of  hindsight  and  a  detailed 
knowledge  of  developments  within 
Japan  in  the  weeks  preceding  the  sur- 
render, a  leading  historian  on  the 
subject  makes  clear  that  the  "deci- 
sion— in  embryo — had  long  been 
taking  shape."  *^ 

By  the  spring  of  1945,  the  Japanese 
armed  forces  had  brought  the  Empire 
to  the  brink  of  disaster.  Broad  public 
support  for  the  military  had  begun  to 
disintegrate  as  the  people  of  Japan 
came  to  realize  that  the  very  survival 
of  their  country  was  threatened. 
When  Premier  Kantaro  Suzuki  re- 
placed General  Hideki  Tojo  in  April, 
the  government  initiated  a  definite 
campaign  to  seek  an  end  of  the  war 
on  terms  acceptable  to  the  ruling 
elite.  But  this  campaign,  begun  in 
June  with  efforts  to  open  peace  nego- 
tiations through  the  Soviet  Union, 
was  of  little  avail  as  long  as  the  Japa- 
nese militarists  dominated  the  gov- 
ernment and  the  Allies  were  unwilling 
to  guarantee  the  future  status  of  the 
Emperor.  Only  the  shock  impact  of 
the  atomic  bombings  of  Hiroshima 
and  Nagasaki,  combined  with  the 
Soviet  entry  into  the  war,  created 
"that  unusual  atmosphere  in  which 
the  theretofore  static  factors  of  the 
Emperor  could  be  made  active  in 
such  an  extraordinary  way  as  to  work 
what  was  virtually  a  political  mira- 
cle. ...  It  was  the  nation's  good  for- 
time  that,  in  spite  of  the  existence  of 


a  hard-headed  and  strongwilled  corps 
of  fanatics,  the  men  responsible  for 
the  movement  to  terminate  the  war 
were  finally  able,  under  the  circum- 
stances of  1945,  to  give  the  fullest 
possible  effect  to  the  depth  of  appeal 
in  the  voice  of  the  man  who  is  the  su- 
preme symbol  in  Japanese  life  and 
thought."  ^0 

The  surrender  of  Japan  on  14 
August  completed  the  mission  of 
Manhattan's  Project  Alberta  group, 
assigned  to  the  1st  Technical  Detach- 
ment, on  Tinian.  Most  technical  per- 
sonnel of  the  Alberta  group  originally 
planned  to  return  to  the  United 
States  on  the  twentieth,  leaving  only  a 
small  team  under  General  Farrell  that 
was  to  go  to  Japan  to  investigate  the 
results  of  the  bombing.  But  when 
delays  developed  in  arranging  surren- 
der procedures.  General  Groves  re- 
quested that  essential  project  person- 
nel remain  on  Tinian  pending  suc- 
cessful completion  of  the  occupation 
of  Japan.  Project  Alberta  scientists 
and  technicians  finally  left  Tinian  on 
7  September.  Colonel  Kirkpatrick  and 
Commander  Ashworth  stayed  behind 
to  make  final  disposition  of  project 
property,  taking  special  care  to  return 
to  Los  Alamos  under  guard  or  to 
dump  in  the  sea  any  items  likely  to 
reveal  information  about  the  bomb. 
Some  project  property  went  with  the 
investigating  teams  assembled  under 
General  Farrell,  to  be  used  in  survey- 
ing the  effects  of  atomic  bombing  on 
Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki.^ ^ 


*^  Robert  J.  C.  hinow ,  Japan 's  Decision  To  Sunender 
(Stanford,  Calif.:  Stanford  I'niversitv  Press,  1954), 
p.  231. 


50  Ibid.,  pp.  231  and  233. 

5'  For  the  official  account  of  the  closing  out  of 
Pioject  Alberta  see  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  p.  XIX.  13, 
DASA. 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


543 


Sunify  of  the  Bombing  Effects 

The  swift  surrender  of  Japan 
opened  the  way  for  American  scientif- 
ic teams  to  survey,  on  the  ground,  the 
specific  effects  of  the  atomic  bombing 
of  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki.  Not  only 
were  scientists,  medical  personnel, 
and  professional  military  men  greatly 
interested  in  learning  the  results  of 
the  first  employment  of  atomic  weap- 
ons in  warfare,  but  also  the  com- 
manders of  the  occupation  troops 
that  were  scheduled  shortly  to  move 
into  the  two  bombed  cities  desired  a 
check  of  the  possible  hazards  with 
which  they  might  have  to  cope.  Al- 
though Manhattan  scientists  were  vir- 
tually sure  that  detonation  of  the 
atomic  bombs  a  considerable  distance 
above  the  ground  had  eliminated  the 
likelihood  of  any  lingering  large-scale 
radioactivity  in  the  two  cities,  lacking 
previous  experience  they  could  not  be 
certain  without  actual  inspection  of 
the  affected  areas. ^^ 


^^  This  account  of  the  effects  of  atomic  bombs  on 
Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki  is  based  primarily  upon  the 
following  sources:  MDH,  Bk.  I,  Vol.  4,  "Auxiliary 
Activities,"  Ch.  6  (Investigation  of  the  After  Effects 
of  the  Bombing  in  Japan),  DASA;  Ms,  MED,  "The 
Atomic  Bombings  of  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki,"  June 
1946,  LC;  MED,  "Photographs  of  the  Atomic  Bomb- 
ings of  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki,"  June  1946,  LC; 
Austin  M.  Brues  et  al.,  comps..  General  Report  of 
Atomic  Bomb  Casualty  Commission,  January  1947  (Wash- 
ington, DC.:  National  Research  Council,  1947);  The 
Committee  for  the  Compilation  of  Materials  on 
Damage  Claused  by  the  Atomic  Bombs  in  Hiroshima 
and  Nagasaki,  ed.,  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki:  The  Physi- 
cal. Medical,  and  Social  Effects  of  the  Atomic  Bombings, 
trans.  Eisei  Ishikawa  and  David  L.  Swain  (New 
York:  Basic  Books,  1981);  United  States  Strategic 
Bombing  Sur\  e\ ,  7'he  Effects  of  Atomic  Bombs  on  Hiroshima 
and  Xagasaki  (Washington,  D.C.:  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  1946);  Atomic  Energy  Hearings  S.  Res.  179. 
Nov  45-Feb  46;  Statements  iDy  Voshio  Nishina  (In- 
stitute of  Physical  and  Chemical  Research,  Tokyo, 
Japan),  12  Aug  48  and  4  Mav  50.  in  Ms.  Historical 
Division,  Militarv  Intelligence  Section,  General 
Headquarters,    Far   East    Command,    "Statement    of 


Thus,  when  General  Groves  heard 
from  General  Marshall  on  10  August 
that  the  Japanese  had  started  surren- 
der negotiations,  he  took  steps  to  or- 
ganize Manhattan  Project  teams  to 
carry  out  atomic  investigations  in  Hiro- 
shima and  Nagasaki,  as  well  as  else- 
where in  the  home  islands.  On  the 
eleventh,  the  Manhattan  commander 
directed  District  Engineer  Nichols  to 
select  qualified  project  personnel  and 
procure  the  special  equipment  the 
teams  would  need  to  perform  their 
mission.  He  also  sent  instructions  to 
General  Farrell  that  he  was  to  be  in 
command  of  the  Manhattan  survey 
teams  going  into  Japan.  Farrell  began 
to  assemble  medical,  scientific,  and 
intelligence  personnel  already  on 
Tinian  to  participate  in  the  investiga- 
tions. On  the  twelfth,  three  days 
before  General  MacArthur's  appoint- 
ment as  Supreme  Commander  for  the 
Allied  Powers  (SCAP),  Japan,  General 
Marshall  informed  him  of  the  purpose 
of  the  survey  groups,  clearing  the  way 
for  their  early  entry  into  Japan. 

Meanwhile,  Colonel  Nichols,  with 
assistance  primarily  from  the  medical 
staff  of  the  District,  hurriedly  brought 
together    fifteen    officers    and    twelve 


Japanese  Officials  on  World  War  II,"  copy  in  CMH. 
On  medical  aspects  see  Memo,  sub:  Toxic  Effects  of 
the  Atomic  Bomb,  12  Aug  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  5,  Tab  G,  MDR;  Radiology  m 
World  War  11.  pp.  831-919;  Michihiko  Hachiva,  Hiro- 
shima Diaiy:  The  Journal  of  a  Japanese  Physician,  August 
6-September  30.  1945.  ed.  and  trans.  Warner  Wells 
(Chapel  Hill,  N.C.:  Universitv  of  North  Carolina 
Press,  1955);  Office  of  Civil  Defense,  Office  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  (Japan),  and  1  echnical  Manage- 
ment Office,  U.S.  Naval  Radio,  Analysis  of  Japanese 
Xuclear  Casualty  Data,  comps.  L.  Wayne  Davis  et  al. 
(Albuquerque,  N.Mex.:  Dikewood  Corp.,  April 
1966);  I'nited  States  Strategic  Bombing  Surve\, 
Medical  Division,  The  Effects  of  Atomic  Bombs  on  Health 
and  Medical  Sennces  in  Hiroshima  and  Xagasaki  (Wash- 
ington, D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office,  1947). 


544 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


enlisted  men  from  the  Clinton  Lab- 
oratories, Metallurgical  Laboratory, 
Los  Alamos,  the  Monsanto  Chemical 
Company,  and  the  University  of 
Rochester.  Comprised  chiefly  of  med- 
ical scientists  and  individuals  trained 
in  taking  radiation  measurements,  this 
group  rendezvoused  on  the  twelfth  at 
Hamilton  Field  in  California  and  de- 
parted for  Tinian  on  the  following 
day. 

When  the  project's  survey  group 
reached  Tinian  on  the  sixteenth,  they 
joined  the  group  General  Farrell  had 
organized,  which  included  not  only 
Manhattan  personnel  but  also  several 
AAF  representatives  and  two  inter- 
preters. Groves  had  designated  Major 
Furman,  who  had  participated  in 
Manhattan's  scientific  intelligence  ac- 
tivities in  Europe,  to  lead  a  unit  with 
a  similar  mission  of  investigating  the 
progress  of  atomic  research  in  Japan. 

While  the  assembled  survey  person- 
nel marked  time  in  late  August,  Gen- 
eral Farrell  formed  them  into  three 
teams.  The  first  team  going  to  Japan 
included  Farrell  himself.  Brig.  Gen. 
James  B.  Newman,  Jr.,  of  the  AAF, 
who  served  as  his  deputy;  medical 
and  intelligence  officers;  and  officers 
trained  in  metallurgy.  In  the  other 
two  teams,  he  included  chiefly  medi- 
cal officers.  Col.  Stafford  L.  Warren, 
chief  of  the  Manhattan  District's  Med- 
ical Section,  commanded  the  Nagasaki 
group,  while  his  deputy  in  the  Medi- 
cal Section,  Lt.  Col.  Hymer  L.  Frie- 
dell,  led  the  Hiroshima  team. 

Negotiations  with  the  Japanese  to 
arrange  for  an  early  entry  into  Hiro- 
shima and  Nagasaki  culminated  in 
formation  of  a  special  party,  com- 
prised mostly  of  medical  personnel 
from  the  International  Red  Cross,  the 
Army     Medical     Corps,     MacArthur's 


staff,  and  the  Manhattan  Project.  The 
Manhattan  contingent  consisted  of 
Farrell,  Newman,  Warren  (whom  Far- 
rell had  relieved  temporarily  of  his  as- 
signment as  chief  of  the  Nagasaki 
team  so  that  he  could  serve  as  his 
medical  consultant),  and  a  medical 
and  an  intelligence  officer.  The  spe- 
cial party,  accompanied  by  two 
representatives  of  the  Japanese 
government,  flew  into  Hiroshima  on 
8  September.  Using  Geiger  counters 
and  other  instruments,  members  of 
the  party  checked  through  the  de- 
stroyed area  of  the  city,  determining 
that  no  significant  amounts  of  radio- 
activity persisted.  A  Signal  Corps 
photographer  with  the  party  took 
some  of  the  first  official  pictures  of 
the  damage  wrought  by  the  bomb. 
Completing  the  preliminary  survey  in 
a  few  days,  the  special  party  (except 
for  Farrell  and  Newman  who  had  left 
earlier  for  a  hurried  visit  to  Nagasaki) 
returned  to  Tokyo. 

Meanwhile,  Colonel  Warren's  team 
reached  Nagasaki  on  17  September 
and  began  three  weeks  of  intensive 
investigation  of  damage  and  injuries 
wrought  by  the  bomb  in  that  city.  The 
group  concentrated  on  gathering  data 
concerning  the  nature  of  casualties.  It 
examined  survivors  in  the  nearby 
Omura  Naval  Hospital  and  obtained 
autopsy  records  of  those  who  were 
killed  or  died  of  injuries.  A  new  detail 
of  officers  from  the  Army  Medical 
Corps  relieved  Warren's  team  in  early 
October,  and  it  departed  from  Naga- 
saki on  the  sixth,  arriving  back  in  the 
United  States  on  the  fifteenth. 

A  series  of  typhoons  prevented 
Colonel  Friedell's  team  from  reaching 
Hiroshima  until  26  September.  It  had 
only  about  a  week  to  carry  out  investi- 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


545 


gations  designed  to  supplement  the 
preliminary  data  collected  by  Farrell's 
party.  Departing  Hiroshima  on  3  Oc- 
tober, Friedell's  team  joined  the  Na- 
gasaki group  for  the  return  trip  to  the 
United  States. 

Other  investigative  groups,  some  of 
them  sponsored  by  the  Army,  also 
conducted  surveys  of  the  effects  of 
the  atomic  bombing  of  Japan  in  late 
1945  and  1946.  SCAP  headquarters 
had  established  a  Joint  Commission 
for  the  Investigation  of  the  Atomic 
Bombing  of  Japan  during  the  period 
when  the  Manhattan  Project  survey 
was  in  progress.  Commission  teams 
comprised  chiefly  of  Army  medical 
personnel  and  Japanese  scientists 
worked  closely  with  the  Manhattan 
teams,  which  were  viewed  as  part  of 
the  commission's  survey  organization. 
The  commission's  personnel  contin- 
ued to  work  in  Hiroshima  and  Naga- 
saki after  the  departure  of  the  Man- 
hattan teams,  extending  studies 
begun  by  the  bomb  project  groups. 

The  Manhattan  teams  also  cooper- 
ated with  the  group  sent  to  Japan  by 
the  United  States  Strategic  Bombing 
Survey  (USSBS),  an  organization  es- 
tablished by  the  War  Department  in 
1944.  The  USSBS  had  received  a  re- 
quest from  the  President  in  August 
1945  to  conduct  a  study  of  the  effects 
of  all  types  of  air  attack  in  the  war 
against  Japan,  including  the  employ- 
ment of  atomic  bombs.  In  addition, 
the  Secretary  of  War  retained  Maj.  Al- 
exander de  Seversky,  a  well-known 
aviator  and  aeronautics  engineer,  to 
serve  as  his  special  consultant  on  the 
results  of  employing  air  power  in  the 
Pacific  Theater,  including  the  atomic 
bombing  of  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki. 
The  Navy  had  its  own  special  investi- 
gative unit,  the  Naval  Technical  Mis- 


sion to  Japan,  which  collaborated  with 
Manhattan  teams.  The  British  Mission 
arrived  too  late  to  work  with  the  Man- 
hattan groups,  but  cooperated  with 
the  USSBS  in  surveys  of  Hiroshima 
and  Nagasaki  in  November  1945. 

All  of  the  survey  groups  eventually 
published  reports  of  their  observa- 
tions and  conclusions  concerning  the 
effects  of  the  atomic  bombing  of  Hir- 
oshima and  Nagasaki.  The  Manhattan 
District  released  its  report  on  30  June 
1946,  summarizing  the  physical 
damage,  medical  findings,  and  other 
pertinent  observations  made  by  its 
survey  teams. 

Both  cities  had  suffered  extensive 
physical  damage  to  structures  and 
other  inanimate  objects  as  a  result  of 
the  tremendous  blast  and  conflagra- 
tion, the  latter  caused  by  heat  from 
the  atomic  explosion,  collapse  of 
buildings,  overturned  stoves,  shorting 
out  of  electrical  systems,  and  spread 
of  fire.  Within  a  radius  of  1  mile  of 
the  epicenter  of  the  explosion,  de- 
struction in  both  cities  was  virtually 
complete,  except  for  the  frames  of  a 
few  reinforced  concrete  buildings.  Be- 
cause of  differences  in  topography 
and  layout  of  the  cities,  more  than  5 
square  miles  of  Hiroshima  were  total- 
ly devastated,  while  only  3  square 
miles  of  Nagasaki  were  similarly  de- 
stroyed. In  the  relatively  flat  terrain 
of  Hiroshima  there  was  heavy  damage 
to  almost  everything  up  to  2  miles 
from  the  blast  center,  destruction  of 
50  percent  or  more  up  to  3  miles, 
and  comparatively  light  damage  for 
several  miles  beyond,  with  broken 
glass  as  far  away  as  12  miles.  In  the 
rougher  terrain  of  Nagasaki,  severe 
damage  extended  for  about  3  miles 
north  and  south  in  the  valley  where 


546 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


.^-tv. 


Physical  Damage  at  Hiroshima 


the  bomb  had  been  dropped  and  gen- 
erally shorter  distances  up  the  hill- 
sides to  the  east  and  west,  but  with 
partial  damage  or  fire  as  far  as  4 
miles  out  from  the  blast  center  at  cer- 
tain points. 

The  various  survey  groups  were 
able  to  obtain  a  reasonably  accurate 
assessment  of  the  actual  physical 
damage,  but  they  all  experienced 
greater  difficulty  in  securing  a  clear 
picture  of  the  effect  on  the  inhabit- 
ants of  the  two  cities.  The  Manhattan 
teams,  for  example,  were  handi- 
capped by  the  length  of  time  that  had 
elapsed  before  they  were  able  to 
enter  the  cities.  They  also  found  that 
Japanese  public  officials  lacked  pre- 
cise statistical  data  on  the  actual  pop- 
ulation of  the  two  stricken  communi- 


ties at  the  time  of  the  bombings  and 
on  the  subsequent  movement  of 
people  in  and  out  of  the  cities.  The 
extensive  destruction  of  such  record- 
keeping civil  organizations  as  hospi- 
tals, fire  and  police  departments,  and 
other  government  agencies  further 
complicated  the  collection  of  accurate 
statistics. 

Thus,  the  Manhattan  teams  had  to 
derive  most  of  their  medical  data 
from  examining  the  injured;  analysis 
of  death  records,  including  autopsy 
reports;  and  tabulation  of  such  data 
as  the  Japanese  had  compiled.  The 
District  released  its  survey  results  in 
June  1946,  including  the  estimate  of 
casualties  that  differed  somewhat 
from  those  released  by  other  groups 
{Table  3). 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN  547 

Table  3 — Comparative  Estimates  of  Atomic  Bombing  Casualties  in  World  War  II 


Popu- 
lation 
1945 

MED  June  1946 

USSBS  March  1947 

OSW  (Japan) 

City 

Dead 

Injured 

Dead 

Injured 

and  L'SNR 
April  1966 

Dead 

Injured 

255,000 
195,000 

66,000 
39,000 

69,000 
25,000 

80,000 
45,000 

80,000-100,000 
50,000-60,000 

70,000 
36,000 

70,000 
40  000 

Nagasaki 

Total 

450,000 

105,000 

94,000 

125,000 

130,000-160,000 

106,000 

1 10  000 

Sources:  Ms,  MED,  "The  Atomic  Bombings  of  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki,"  June  1946,  LC;  USSBS,  The 

Effects  of  Atomic  Bombs  on  Health  and  Medical  Seivices  in  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki;  OSW   (Japan)   and  USNR, 
Analysu  of  Japanese  Nuclear  Casualty  Data.  See  also  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  pp  6.12-6.15,  DASA. 


Manhattan's  survey  data  did  not 
mention  that  American  prisoners  of 
war  held  in  a  camp  in  Hiroshima  were 
among  the  atomic  bombing  casuakies. 
The  Commander  in  Chief,  U.S.  Army 
Forces,  Pacific,  had  received  informa- 
tion that  about  twenty  American 
airmen  from  the  crews  of  airplanes 
shot  down  over  Japan  were  killed  in 
the  bombing  of  Hiroshima.  Subse- 
quent information  provided  by  Japa- 
nese officials  appeared  to  confirm  the 
presence  of  the  airmen  in  Hiroshima 
on  6  August  1945.^^ 

A  primary  objective  of  the  Manhat- 
tan survey  teams  was  to  ascertain  the 
particular  kinds  of  injuries  suffered, 
with  special  attention  to  the  effects  of 
radioactivity.  By  far  the  largest 
number  of  casualties  resulted  from 
burns  traceable  to  the  heat  of  the  ex- 
plosion and  the  fires  generated  by  it 
and  secondary  causes.  Other  major 
sources  of  injury  were  falling  debris, 
pressure  of  the  blast,   and  radiation. 


5=*  See  CINCAFPAC  Msgs,  23  Sep  and  18  Oct  45, 
HRC  Files,  471.6  (Bombs,  Atomic),  CMH;  Telecons, 
Ruth  Markwood  (Gen  Ref  Br,  CMH)  to  Maj  G. 
Chase  (OCINFO,  DA),  sub:  Names  of  Americans 
Killed  by  Hiroshima  Atomic  Bombing,  17  and  26 
Apr  72,  HRC  Files,  384.5  (Aerial  Attacks  and  Raids- 
Atomic  Bomb),  CMH;  Washington  Post,   11-12  Jul  70. 


Most  radiation  injuries  occurred  from 
exposure  of  the  victims  to  gamma 
rays  at  the  time  of  the  explosion. 
There  was  little  evidence  of  casualties 
from  alpha  and  beta  rays  and  from  re- 
sidual radioactivity  in  the  bombed-out 
areas. 

While  giving  less  attention  to  the 
psychological  impact,  the  teams  nev- 
ertheless ranked  terror  with  physical 
damage  and  human  death  and  injury 
as  the  three  most  important  effects  of 
the  new  weapon.  They  particularly 
noted  the  immediate  panic  caused  by 
the  explosions,  followed  by  a  tempo- 
rary mass  exodus  from  the  cities. 
Residents  who  had  generally  ignored 
the  appearance  of  only  one  or  two 
enemy  aircraft  moved  promptly  into 
air  raid  shelters  at  the  slightest  indica- 
tion of  enemy  air  activity  overhead. 

The  USSBS,  unlike  the  Manhattan 
survey,  devoted  considerable  effort  to 
trying  to  determine  the  effects  of  the 
bombs  on  the  attitude  of  the  Japanese 
people  toward  the  war  and  the  deci- 
sion of  the  Japanese  government  to 
surrender.  It  reaffirmed  the  substan- 
tial adverse  impact  the  bombs  had  on 
the  morale  of  the  local  inhabitants  of 


548 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Atomic  Bombing  Casualties  at 
Nagasaki 

Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki.  But  the 
USSBS  found  that,  in  the  relatively 
brief  period  between  the  dropping  of 
the  bombs  and  the  start  of  surrender 
negotiations,  people  elsewhere  in 
Japan  had  "neither  time  nor  under- 
standing of  the  revolutionary  threat 
of  the  atomic  bomb  ...  to  see  in 
[them]  a  final  blow  to  Japan's  pros- 
pects for  victory  or  negotiated 
peace."  ^4  The  USSBS  concluded  also 
that,  while  the  bombs  had  some 
impact  on  the  leaders  of  the  Japanese 
government,  their  knowledge  of  the 
awesome  character  of  the  new 
weapon  seems  not  to  have  played  a 
significant  part  in  convincing  them  of 
the  need  to  surrender. 

The    USSBS    and    virtually    all    the 
other    survey    groups    that    inspected 


the  results  of  the  attacks  on  Hiroshi- 
ma and  Nagasaki  agreed  with  the 
Manhattan  teams'  assessment  that  the 
atomic  bomb  was  indeed  a  revolution- 
ary new  device  capable  of  inflicting 
damage  and  casualties  on  a  scale  far 
beyond  any  existing  weapon  available 
for  use  in  modern  warfare.  The  one 
dissent  to  this  view  among  the  survey 
groups  came  from  Major  de  Seversky, 
who  had  made  a  hurried  one-man  in- 
spection of  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki 
in  the  fall  of  1945.  He  contended  that 
the  other  survey  groups  had  greatly 
exaggerated  the  effects  of  the  bombs 
and  misinterpreted  the  character  of 
the  destruction  they  had  wrought.  He 
asserted  that  about  200  B-29's  loaded 
with  incendiaries  could  have  accom- 
plished an  equivalent  amount  of 
damage.  Furthermore,  he  argued, 
atomic  bombs  dropped  on  modern 
cities,  such  as  New  York  or  Chicago, 
would  do  no  more  damage  than  a  10- 
ton  blockbuster.  The  wide  circulation 
of  de  Seversky's  conclusions  in  news- 
papers and  the  publication  of  his  arti- 
cle, "Atomic  Bomb  Hysteria,"  in  the 
February  1946  issue  of  Reader's  Digest 
created  a  public  controversy.  As  a 
result,  the  Senate  Special  Committee 
on  Atomic  Energy,  at  work  on  prepar- 
ing legislation  for  the  peacetime  con- 
trol of  the  new  energy  source,  invited 
de  Seversky  and  representatives  of 
the  Manhattan  Project,  the  USSBS, 
and  other  appropriate  organizations 
to  present  their  views  at  its  15  Febru- 
ary session. ^^ 


^*  USSBS,  The  Effects  of  Atomic  Bombs  on  Hiroshima 
and  Xagasak),  p.  22. 


^^  Atomic  Energy  Hearings  on  S.  Res.  179.  pp.  453- 
551.  The  Senate  in  late  October  1945  had  estab- 
lished a  Special  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  to 
deal  with  "problems  relating  to  the  development, 
use,  and  control  of  atomic  energy"  (ibid.,  p.  1).  De 
Seversky  reported  to  the  Secretary  of  War  on  the 

Continued 


THE  ATOMIC  BOMBING  OF  JAPAN 


549 


Survivors  of  the  Nagasaki  Bombing  returning  to  the  devastated  city 


Representing  the  Manhattan  Project 
at  the  hearing  were  General  Farrell 
and  Colonel  Warren.  Farrell  concen- 
trated on  refuting  de  Seversky's 
downgrading  of  the  psychological  and 
physical  effects  of  the  bombing  of 
Japan.  De  Seversky,  he  said,  underes- 
timated the  psvchological  damage  cre- 
ated by  the  instantaneousness  of  an 
atomic  explosion  and  the  lack  of  any 
effective  defense  against  it.  He  chal- 
lenged the  accuracy  of  de  Seversky's 
data  on  the  comparative  damage  pos- 
sible with  conventional  air  weapons 
and  stated  that  the  evidence  collected 
by  the  Manhattan  survey  teams  indi- 
cated that  at  least  703  B-29's  would 


nsiilis  ol  his  stiiflv  ot  ail  power  in  the  Pacific  rhca- 
ter  111  a  letter  daUfI  1  1  February  1946.  Fhat  part  of 
the  letter  which  relates  to  the  atomic  bombing  of 
Japan  is  reprodiu  eel  m  ibid.,  pp.  49;i-,'i()l. 


be  required  to  do  the  physical 
damage  caused  by  the  atomic  bomb  at 
Hiroshima.  While  expressing  concern 
with  the  popular  tendency  to  overesti- 
mate the  power  of  the  bombs,  Farrell 
asserted  that  "if  two  bombs  will  do 
what  was  done  to  Hiroshima  and  Na- 
gasaki, put  two  cities  out  of  commis- 
sion and  stop  a  war,  I  think  it  is  [sic]  a 
fairly  effective  weapon."  ^^ 

Colonel  Warren  generally  supple- 
mented General  Farrell's  testimony 
on  the  extensive  physical  damage, 
caused  by  fire  and  the  blast  effect,  in 
Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki.  He  empha- 
sized especially  the  difficulty  of  arriv- 
ing at  any  accurate  conclusions  on 
what    had   actually   happened    on    the 


^^   1  estimonv  ol  Farrell  in  ibid.,  p.  505. 


550 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


basis  of  observations  made  and  infor- 
mation gathered  in  the  period  of  a 
few  days  of  hurried  inspection,  such 
as  that  carried  out  by  Major  de  Se- 
versky.  He  cited,  for  example,  the  im- 
possibiHty  of  arriving  at  an  accurate 
estimate  of  casualties  without  a  great 
deal  more  investigation  and  analysis, 
as  the  Japanese  themselves  were  not 
able  to  furnish  reliable  statistics.  Be- 
cause of  confusion,  shock,  and  panic, 
Japanese  medical  officials  had  not 
kept  adequate  records  of  mortalities 
and  injuries  caused  by  the  bombs. 
Colonel  Warren  reinforced  General 
Farrell's  conclusion  "that  a  tremen- 
dous amount  of  destruction  oc- 
curred" and  the  atomic  bomb  had  ac- 
complished "the  job  it  was  intended 
to  do."  ^"^ 

For  the  most  part  representatives  of 
the  USSBS  and  other  experts  sup- 
ported the  views  expressed  by  Farrell 
and  Warren.  In  the  face  of  almost 
unanimous  disagreement,  de  Seversky 
persisted  in  his  contention  that  a  Hiro- 
shima-type atomic  bomb  was  not  any 
more  effective  against  the  stone,  con- 
crete, and  brick  structures  in  Western 
cities  than  a  well-placed  1 0-ton  block- 
buster. He  did  concede,  however,  that 
a  final  understanding  of  the  potential- 


^■^  Testimony  of  Warren  in  ibid.,  p.  513. 


ities  of  atomic  bombs  as  weapons  of 
war  would  be  possible  only  after  a 
much  more  thorough  and  careful  in- 
vestigation and  analysis  of  their  ef- 
fects on  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki. 

Personnel  of  the  Manhattan  Project 
had  participated  in  almost  every 
aspect  of  the  planning  and  prepara- 
tions for  employment  of  atomic 
bombs  against  Japan:  in  the  decision 
to  use  the  bombs  against  Japanese 
cities;  in  the  choice  of  targets;  in  the 
development  of  an  overseas  base; 
and,  finally,  in  the  assessment  of  the 
damage  wrought.  The  destruction  of 
Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki  marked  their 
efforts  with  complete  technical  suc- 
cess and  contributed  significantly  to 
ending  World  War  II.  Yet  the  respite 
that  the  project's  success  had  afford- 
ed was  momentary,  for  looming  on 
the  horizon  was  another  threat  to  the 
security  of  the  nations  of  the  world — 
how  to  control  this  revolutionary  new 
force  in  a  peacetime  environment.  In 
face  of  this  profound  problem,  the 
Manhattan  Project  would  continue  to 
operate  in  the  emerging  postwar 
period  and  its  personnel  would 
assume  a  role  in  guiding  the  domestic 
and  international  efforts  to  ensure 
that  atomic  energy  would  best  serve 
the  needs  of  mankind. 


PART  FIVE 
COMPLETING  THE  ATOMIC  MISSION 


CHAPTER  XXVII 


The  Atomic  Age  and  Its  Problems 


Employment  of  an  atomic  bomb 
against  Japan  demonstrated  to  the 
world  that  atomic  energy  was  no 
longer  an  experimental  hypothesis, 
but  a  material  reality.  A  creation  of 
the  new  atomic  age,  this  awesome 
weapon  of  mass  destruction  heralded 
the  onset  of  a  multitude  of  fundamen- 
tal political,  social,  and  economic 
problems  for  national  leaders  in  the 
emerging  postwar  era.  As  Secretary 
Stimson  cautioned  in  his  memoran- 
dum to  the  press  shortly  after  the 
bombings  of  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki, 
"great  events  have  happened.  The 
world  is  changed  and  it  is  time  for 
sober  thought."  ^ 

Anticipating  the  likely  ramifications 
of  the  atomic  bombing  mission,  the 
leaders  of  the  Manhattan  Project  in 
the  summer  of  1945  concentrated 
their  efforts  on  two  problem  areas 
deemed  as  priority  matters:  releasing 
just  enough  information  on  the 
atomic  project  to  inform  the  general 
public  without  violating  essential  mili- 
tary security,  and  participating  more 
actively  in  developing  the  means  of 
peacetime  control  of  the  new  source 
of  energy  both  at  home  and  abroad. 
"The  result   of  the   bomb   is   so   ter- 


rific," the  Secretary  warned  in  his  pro- 
nouncement, "that  the  responsibility 
of  its  possession  and  its  use  must 
weigh  heavily  on  our  minds  and  on 
our  hearts."  ^  Even  those  at  Trinity 
who  had  witnessed  the  birth  of  the 
new  age  had  felt  within  moments  of 
the  first  atomic  explosion  "their  pro- 
found responsibility  to  help  in  guid- 
ing into  right  channels  the  tremen- 
dous forces  which  had  been  unlocked 
for  the  first  time  in  history".^ 

The  Atomic  Story:  Informing  the  Public 

The  bombing  of  Japan,  in  an  in- 
stant, catapulted  the  Manhattan 
Project's  closely  guarded  secret — de- 
velopment of  an  atomic  weapon  for 
military  use — into  the  public  lime- 
light. This  event  precipitated  a  seem- 
ingly endless  barrage  of  requests  for 
information,  but  project  leaders  were 
prepared  with  official  statements  on 
selected  aspects  of  the  atomic  story. 
"In  accord  with  its  policy  of  keeping 
the  people  of  the  nation  as  complete- 
ly informed  as  is  consistent  with  na- 
tional security,  the  War  Department 
wishes  to  make  known  at  this  time,  at 


1  MDH.  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  "Auxiliary  Activities,"  Ch. 
8,  Press  Release  No.  29,  Comment  by  Secy  War  on 
Llse  of  Atomic  Bomb,  9  Aug  45,  DASA. 


2  Ibid. 

^  Ibid.,  Press  Release  No.  4,  First  Test  Conducted 
in  New  Mexico,  6  Aug  45,  DASA. 


554 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


least  in  broad  dimension,  the  story 
behind  this  tremendous  weapon.  .  .  . 
Other  statements  will  be  released 
which  will  give  further  details  con- 
cerning the  scientific  and  production 
aspects  of  the  project  and  will  give 
proper  recognition  to  the  scientists, 
technicians,  and  the  men  of  industry 
and  labor  who  have  made  this 
weapon  possible."  '^ 

The  official  statements  released  to 
the  public  following  the  bombings  of 
Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki  were  the 
result  of  a  carefully  designed  public 
relations  program,  begun  in  early 
1944.  At  this  time,  Manhattan's  mili- 
tary and  scientific  leaders  had  per- 
ceived that,  from  the  standpoint  of  se- 
curity, the  release  of  some  selected 
information  would  make  it  easier  to 
maintain  the  secrecy  of  the  highly 
classified,  patented  aspects  of  the 
project.  With  the  objective  of  preserv- 
ing essential  military  security  while 
also  adequately  informing  the  Ameri- 
can people,  the  public  relations  pro- 
gram was  planned  along  two  broad 
lines:  preparation  of  a  series  of  public 
releases,  and  preparation  of  an  ad- 
ministrative and  scientific  history  of 
the  project. 

Press  Releases 

Responsibility  for  preparation  of 
the  press  releases — to  include  public 
statements  for  the  President,  the  Sec- 
retary of  War,  and  other  government 
leaders — in  large  measure,  fell  initial- 
ly upon  General  Groves  and  his 
Washington  staff.  The  need  for  pro- 
fessional guidance  was  apparent. 
Groves  contemplated  borrowing  Jack 


Lockhart,  liaison  official  for  atomic 
energy  matters  in  the  Office  of  Cen- 
sorship, but  pressing  job  commit- 
ments made  him  unavailable  for  the 
assignment.  Lockhart,  however,  sug- 
gested that  Groves  approach  William 
Laurence,  the  well-known  science  re- 
porter of  the  New  York  Times.  Re- 
sponding to  the  Manhattan  command- 
er's request,  the  managing  editor  of 
the  Times  readily  agreed  to  release 
Laurence  for  as  long  as  he  was 
needed  by  the  atomic  project.^ 

During  the  early  months  of  1945, 
Groves  cleared  the  way  for  Laurence 
to  visit  the  principal  atomic  installa- 
tions and  to  interview  the  major  par- 
ticipants. He  also  arranged  for  Lau- 
rence to  observe  the  final  significant 
events  in  the  development  of  atomic 
weapons,  including  the  Trinity  test 
and  the  bombing  of  Japan.  With  as- 
sistance from  public  relations  person- 
nel at  each  site,  Laurence  wrote  most 
of  the  press  releases  on  various 
project  activities  and  events  and  then 
circulated  them  to  the  appropriate 
project  officials  for  review.^ 

Because  official  releases  from  high- 
ranking  members  of  government 
would  constitute  important  pro- 
nouncements on  future  atomic  energy 
policy,  final  responsibility  for  these 
statements  was  assigned  to  the  Inter- 
im Committee.  The  committee  agreed 
that  Laurence  should  draft  the  state- 
ments and  submit  them  to  Arthur 
Page,  a  long-time  friend  and  aide  of 
the  Secretary  of  War,  for  review. 
Page,  in  turn,  would  submit  the  drafts 


*  Ibid.,   Press   Release   No.   2,   Statement   by  Secy 
War,  6  Aug  45,  DASA. 


5  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  325-26;  MPC 
Min,  24  Feb  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files, 
Fldr  23,  Tab  A,  MDR. 

®  For  examples  of  the  press  releases  prepared  by 
Laurence  see  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  Ch.  8,  DASA. 


THE  A roMic  ac;k  and  us  problems 


555 


to  the  committee.  As  work  pro- 
gressed, the  committee  asked  1st  Lt. 
R.  Gordon  Arneson,  an  officer  on 
Stimson's  staff  serving  as  the  commit- 
tee's secretary,  to  assist  Laurence  and 
Page.  The  three  worked  first  on  the 
Trinity  test  press  releases  and  then 
on  those  to  be  issued  by  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  War  following 
the  bombing  of  Japan.  At  its  meeting 
on  21  June,  the  committee  suggested 
a  number  of  changes  to  the  prelimi- 
nary drafts  and  formed  a  subcommit- 
tee, consisting  of  Page  and  a  repre- 
sentative from  General  Groves 's 
office,  to  redraft  the  statements.^ 

After  the  June  meeting,  the  burden 
of  shaping  the  press  releases  into 
final  form  fell  largely  to  the  personal 
staffs  of  Stimson  and  Groves.  The 
Secretary's  staff  took  responsibility 
for  coordination  with  the  British  and 
for  securing  approval  of  the  state- 
ments by  Stimson  and  the  President. 
The  Potsdam  Conference  and  the 
defeat  of  Churchill  in  the  British  par- 
liamentary elections  at  the  end  of  July 
complicated  the  coordinating  process, 
but  did  not  result  in  any  radical 
changes  in  the  statements  as  earlier 
approved  by  the  committee.  Groves's 
staff  prepared  such  additional  releases 
as  would  be  needed  following  that  of 
the  Secretary  of  War.  ^ 


^  See  Ch.  26  on  the  establishment  and  member- 
ship of  the  Interim  Committee.  Interim  Committee 
Log,  9.  14,  19  May  and  15.  18,  20-21  Jun  45,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  98,  MDR;  Notes  on  Interim  C>ommittee 
Mtgs,  14  Mav  and  1  and  21  Jun  45,  HB  Files,  Fldr 
100,  MDR.  See  also  Notes  on  Interim  Committee 
Mtg.  18  Mav  45,  ()(^G  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves 
Files,  Fldr  3,  Tab  (),  MDR. 

^Interim  Ck)mmittee  Log,  21,  26  Jun  and  1,  5-7, 
10-11,  19,  28  Jul  45,  MDR:  Notes  on  Interim  Com- 
mittee Mig,  6  Jul  45,  MDR;  Memo,  Conanl  and 
Bush  to  Harrison,  25  Jun  45,  HB  Files,  Fldr  79, 
MDR;  Memo,  .Arneson  to  Harrison,  25  Jun  45,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  100.  MDR;  Memo,  (Rogers  Makins  (Brit- 


As  the  time  neared  for  releasing  in- 
formation to  the  public.  Groves  reor- 
ganized the  Manhattan  Project's 
public  relations  program  to  ensure 
close  coordination  between  the  public 
relations  officers  at  each  installation 
and  the  District's  Intelligence  and  Se- 
curity Division  and  to  retain  within 
his  office  strong  control  over  all  re- 
leases. He  assigned  Lt.  Col.  William 
A.  Consodine,  a  lawyer  and  experi- 
enced newspaper  writer  who  was  serv- 
ing as  a  security  officer  on  his  staff,  to 
take  charge  of  public  relations  in  his 
Washington  headquarters  and  also 
designated  those  officers  who  were  to 
oversee  public  relations  activities  at 
each  of  the  major  installations. 
Groves  emphasized  the  necessity  for 
direct  liaison  at  all  times  and  speci- 
fied, in  some  detail,  the  precise  limi- 
tations on  publication  of  information, 
particularly  on  that  relating  to  scien- 
tific matters.  As  a  guide  for  the  public 
relations  officers,  the  Manhattan  com- 
mander provided  the  district  engineer 
with  a  specific  list  of  those  subjects 
that  were  to  be  omitted  from  all 
releases  and  outlined  the  mechanics 
for  clearing  material  for  publication, 
photographs,  motion  pictures,  and 
radio. ^ 

When  authorized,  the  release  of 
prepared  statements  was  carefully 
controlled  and  adroitly  managed. 
Within    sixteen    hours    of    the    Hiro- 


ish  embassv  staff  member  in  Wash.,  D.C^.)  to  Harri- 
son], 16  Jul  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files, 
Fldr  12,  Fab  S,  MDR.  I  he  exchange  of  messages 
(30  Jul-6  Aug  45)  between  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  of  War  concerning  last-minute  changes  in 
the  President's  statement  arc  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  64, 
MDR. 

^  Ltr,  Groves  to  Dist  Engr,  sub:  MED  Pub  Rels 
Prgm,  26  Jul  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  000.71 
(Releasing  Info),  MDR. 


556 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


shima  bombing,  the  President  an- 
nounced to  the  American  pubHc:  "It 
is  an  atomic  bomb.  It  is  a  harnessing 
of  the  basic  power  of  the  universe. 
The  force  from  which  the  sun  draws 
it[s]  power  has  been  loosed  against 
those  who  brought  war  to  the  Far 
East."  After  giving  the  people  a  brief 
glimmer  into  the  atomic  story,  he 
continued  that  "science  and  industry 
worked  under  the  direction  of  the 
United  States  Army  ...  [to  effect] 
the  greatest  achievement  of  organized 
science  in  history  [and  that]  the  Sec- 
retary of  War,  who  has  kept  in  per- 
sonal touch  with  all  phases  of  the 
project,  will  immediately  make  a 
public  statement  giving  further  de- 
tails." ^°  The  release  of  Stimson's 
statement  came  shortly  after  the 
President's.  In  it  he  provided  selected 
fact:  on  Manhattan's  atomic  activities 
and  promised  that  "every  effort  is 
being  bent  toward  assuring  that  this 
weapon  and  the  new  field  of  science 
that  Stands  behind  it  will  be  employed 
wisely  in  the  interests  of  the  security 
of  peace-loving  nations  and  the  well- 
being  of  the  world."  ^^ 

In  the  press  releases  that  followed 
in  the  days  before  and  after  the 
bombing  of  Nagasaki,  the  American 
people  learned  the  truth  about  the 
"explosion"  at  Trinity  and  significant 
aspects  about  harnessing  atomic 
energy  and  its  future  applications. 
They  also  received  selected  back- 
ground information  on  Manhattan's 
atomic  processes,  production  plants, 
communities,  and  significant  person- 
alities, both  military  and  civilian. 
From    a    public    relations    standpoint. 


>OMDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  Ch.  8,  Press  Release  No 
1,  Statement  bv  President  of  the  United  States 
DASA. 

•>  Ibid.,  Press  Release  No.  2,  DASA. 


War  Department  and  Manhattan 
Project  officials  could  view  their  well- 
planned  and  well-orchestrated  pro- 
gram of  public  releases  as  a  substan- 
tial success.  While  unfolding  the 
drama  of  the  atomic  story  in  surpris- 
ingly detailed  episodes,  the  program 
managed  to  adhere  to  its  central  ob- 
jective, the  preservation  of  essential 
military  security. 

The  Smyth  Report 

In  the  course  of  the  development  of 
the  atomic  bomb,  a  number  of  the 
scientific  leaders  of  the  project — nota- 
bly James  B.  Conant,  Vannevar  Bush, 
Arthur  Compton,  and  Henry  D. 
Smyth — foresaw  the  need  to  release 
to  the  public,  as  soon  as  an  atomic 
weapon  was  used,  a  report  of  some 
type  that  recounted  the  technical 
accomplishments  of  the  wartime 
project.  General  Groves  went  along 
with  this  proposal,  perceiving  that  the 
release  of  carefully  selected  informa- 
tion would  make  maintaining  the  se- 
crecy of  the  rest  easier.  Consequently, 
in  early  April  1944,  Groves  conferred 
with  Conant  and  Smyth  concerning 
the  preparation  of  a  report  for  ulti- 
mate public  release. 

A  short  time  later,  after  further 
consideration  of  the  proposed  idea. 
Groves  requested  Smyth  to  undertake 
the  task  of  preparing  the  report.  Both 
Groves  and  Conant  viewed  the 
Princeton  University  physicist  as  an 
excellent  choice.  He  had  been  associ- 
ated with  the  project  in  various  capac- 
ities since  1941,  starting  as  a  member 
of  the  Uranium  Section  of  the  Nation- 
al Defense  Research  Committee 
(NDRC)  and  its  successor  organiza- 
tions, then  serving  as  a  division  head 


THE  ATOMIC  AGE  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS 


557 


General  Groves  {center  left)  Holding  a  Press  Conference  at  District  headquarters 


and  associate  director  of  the  Metallur- 
gical Laboratory,  and  was  currently 
acting  as  a  consultant  to  the  Universi- 
ty of  Chicago  program.  On  21  April, 
Smyth  informed  Groves  that  he  would 
be  happy  to  accept  the  responsibility 
for  the  assignment,  and  in  May  the 
Military  Policy  Committee  approved 
both  preparation  of  the  report  and 
the  selection  of  Smyth  as  its  author.  ^^ 
From  the  outset.  General  Groves 
made  a  special  effort  to  facilitate 
Smyth's  work.  Manhattan  provided 
him  secretarial  service  and  guards  for 


^^  Ltrs,  Bush  to  Conant,  9  May  44,  and  Conant  to 
Bush,  15  May  44,  OSRD;  Groves  Diary,  10  Apr  44, 
LRG;  Ltrs,  Groves  to  Smyth,  17  Apr  44,  and  Smyth 
to  Groves,  21  Apr  44,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
319.1  (Smyth),  MDR;  MFC  Min,  10  May  44,  MDR; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  \'eu<  World,  p.  368;  Groves, 
Sow  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  348.  Except  as  otherwise  indi- 
cated, section  that  follows  on  Smvth  Report  based  on 
MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  Ch.  13,  DASA. 


his  Princeton  office,  and  Groves 
cleared  security  barriers  so  Smyth 
could  visit  the  various  project  sites, 
confer  with  key  personnel,  and  exam- 
ine pertinent  documents.  In  a  letter 
to  all  heads  of  the  major  Manhattan 
installations.  Groves  wrote:  "The  pur- 
pose is  to  give  clearly  and  promptly 
recognition  to  those  who  have  worked 
so  long  and  necessarily  so  anony- 
mously. .  .  .  To  accomplish  his  pur- 
pose. Dr.  Smyth  must  have  rather 
complete  information  concerning 
your  phase  of  the  project  including 
access  to  necessary  documents  .  .  . 
[and]  information  and  advice  from 
you  and  your  principal  assistants."  ^^ 


"Ltr,  Jean  O'Leary  (for  Groves)  to  Dist  Kngr, 
sub:  Info  for  H.  D.  Smyth,  13  May  44,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Smyth),  MDR.  Similar  letters 
to  Oppenheimer,  Lawrence,  Urey  and  Matthias  may 
be  found  in  the  same  file. 


558 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


As  Professor  Smyth  progressed 
with  his  work,  Groves,  in  effect, 
became  the  coordinator  of  the 
project.  Whenever  Smyth  needed  as- 
sistance, he  apphed  for  it  directly  to 
the  Manhattan  commander.  For  ex- 
ample. Groves  in  the  fall  of  1944  ap- 
proved his  request  to  employ  a  fellow 
Princeton  physicist,  Lincoln  G.  Smith, 
as  a  research  assistant.  And,  in  De- 
cember, he  again  aided  Smyth  in  ob- 
taining information  about  the  thermal 
diffusion  program,  emphasizing  that 
"it  is  particularly  important  .  .  .  that 
proper  credits  be  given  to  the  Navy 
and  to  Abelson  and  Gunn."  ^'* 

Starting  as  early  as  August  1944, 
Smyth  began  submitting  draft  sec- 
tions to  Groves  and  completed  eleven 
of  thirteen  projected  chapters  by  Jan- 
uary 1945.  In  late  February,  he  deliv- 
ered the  manuscript  to  Groves,  lack- 
ing only  a  concluding  chapter  that 
would  "not  be  a  very  serious  under- 
taking." In  March,  Conant  and 
Groves  undertook  a  preliminary 
review  of  the  manuscript.  After  a 
close  scrutiny,  they  determined  that 
Smyth's  treatment  was  too  technical, 
did  not  mention  enough  names  of 
participants,  included  too  many  of  the 
author's  own  critical  comments  on 
events,  and  provided  too  much  infor- 
mation about  the  work  at  Los 
Alamos.  ^^ 


"On  the  assignment  of  Smith,  who  finally  joined 
the  project  in  the  spring  of  1945,  see  Ltrs,  Smyth  to 
Groves,  31  Aug  44,  and  Groves  to  Smyth,  9  Apr  45. 
On  the  Navy  and  thermal  diffusion  see  Ltrs,  Smyth 
to  Groves,  31  Nov  44,  and  Groves  to  Smyth,  1 1  Dec 
44  (source  of  quotation).  All  letters  in  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Smvth),  MDR.  Groves  Diarv,  6 
Apr  45.  LRG. 

'*Ltrs,  Stnyth  to  Groves,  5  Aug  44  and  13  Jan 
(source  of  quotation),  23  Feb,  23  Mar  45,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1  (Smvth),  MDR;  Groves 
Diaiv,  31  Mar  45,  LRG. 


As  the  time  grew  near  when  the 
report  had  to  be  ready  for  release. 
Groves  arranged  for  an  elaborate  and 
thorough  review.  He  gave  the  heads 
of  the  major  project  installations  and 
the  leading  contractor  firms  an  op- 
portunity to  comment  on  the  parts  of 
the  report  that  pertained  to  their  ac- 
tivities. After  Smyth  incorporated 
whatever  revisions  these  comments 
made  necessary.  Groves  turned  over 
the  entire  manuscript  to  his  trusted 
scientific  adviser,  Richard  Tolman,  for 
a  final  review  and  editing.  Two  scien- 
tists in  Tolman's  NDRC  office — Paul 
C.  Fine,  a  physicist  from  the  Universi- 
ty of  Texas,  and  William  S.  Shurcliff, 
Tolman's  technical  assistant — aided  in 
the  final  editing.  ^^ 

To  guide  the  reviewers  on  the  key 
issue  of  security.  Groves  had  Smyth 
and  Tolman  draw  up  a  set  of  "rules. 
There  was  a  general  exclusion  of  ev- 
erything concerning  actual  construc- 
tion of  an  atomic  bomb.  Other  infor- 
mation could  be  included  if  it  satis- 
fied at  least  one  of  the  requirements 
in  each  of  the  three  categories  set 
forth  by  Smyth  and  Tolman: 

I.  (A)  That  it  is  important  to  a  reasona- 
ble understanding  of  what  had  been  done 
on  the  project  as  a  whole  or  (B)  That  it  is 
of  true  scientific  interest  and  likely  to  be 
truly  helpful  to  scientific  workers  in  this 
country  and 


'^Oppenheimer's  letter  to  Smyth,  14  Apr  45,  pro- 
vides a  good  example  of  the  review  comments  by 
project  leaders.  The  letters  exchanged  between 
Groves  and  Roger  Williams  of  Du  Pont  on  12  Apr 
and  3  May  45  are  representative  of  those  received 
from  industrial  firms  involved  in  the  atomic  project. 
On  the  provisions  for  the  final  review  and  editing  of 
the  manuscript  see  Ltr,  Smyth  to  Groves  22  May  45. 
These  letters  are  filed  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
319.1  (Smvth),  MDR.  See  also  Groves  Diarv,  18  Jun 
45,  LRG. 


THE  ATOMIC  AGE  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS 


559 


Henry  D.  Sm\th  (right)  conferring ivith  Richard  Tolman 


II.  (A)  That  it  is  already  known  gener- 
ally by  competent  scientists  or  (B)  That  it 
can  be  deduced  or  guessed  by  competent 
scientists  from  what  is  already  known, 
combined  with  the  knowledge  that  the 
project  was  in  the  overall  successful  or 

III.  (A)  That  it  has  no  real  bearing  on 
the  production  of  atomic  bombs  or  (B) 
That  it  could  be  discovered  by  a  small 
group  (15  of  whom  not  over  5  would  be 
senior  men)  of  competent  scientists  work- 
ing in  a  well-equipped  college  lab  in  a 
year's  time  or  less. 

The  Smyth-Tolman  security  rules 
resulted  in  many  more  changes  in  the 
draft  manuscript.  Nevertheless, 
Tolman  and  his  editorial  staff  had 
completed  their  work  by  early  July. 
Finallv,    to    make    certain    that    Smvth 


'^  The  quoted  material  is  from  Ltr,  Groves  to 
Smyth,  21  May  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP 
Files,  Flder  12.  Tab  N,  MDR.  See  also  Groves,  \ou' 
II  Can  Be  Told,  p.  349. 


had  given  recognition  in  the  report  to 
all  project  personnel  deserving  it 
(Groves  was  convinced  that  this  was 
the  best  means  for  avoiding  future  se- 
curity violations),  the  Manhattan  com- 
mander arranged  for  couriers  to  de- 
liver selected  chapters  to  appropriate 
project  scientific  personnel  for  a  hur- 
ried final  review.  Given  only  a  few 
hours,  in  most  instances,  to  complete 
this  review,  the  majority  of  the  scien- 
tists simply  signed  a  statement  indi- 
cating that  they  approved  the  portion 
of  the  report  they  had  received  with- 
out making  detailed  suggestions.  One 
exception  was  Colonel  Nichols,  who 
predicted  the  report  would  arouse 
"controversy  concerning  the  fairness 
of  credit  given  to  different  individ- 
uals. .  .  ."  He  also  found  that  it  gave 
too  much  attention  to  the  work  of  the 


560 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Metallurgical  Laboratory  and  to  those 
activities  in  which  Professor  Smyth 
was  a  participant,  and  not  enough  to 
the  commercial  firms  and  to  Los 
Alamos.  For  these  reasons,  the  dis- 
trict engineer  recommended  that  "if 
the  report  is  issued  in  its  present 
form,  full  credit  be  given  to  H.  D. 
Smyth  for  preparing  it  and  that  the 
statement  be  made  that  the  Army  has 
no  responsibility  for  the  report  except 
for  asking  him  to  do  it."  In  the  report 
as  ultimately  published  Nichols's  first 
recommendation  was  accepted;  the 
second  was  not.^^ 

Once  again  Tolman  and  Smyth  re- 
viewed the  report  to  make  certain  that 
every  section  conformed  to  the  estab- 
lished security  rules,  while  Groves  as- 
sembled a  corps  of  stenographers, 
some  of  whom  had  to  be  flown  from 
Oak  Ridge,  to  do  the  final  typing.  By 
the  end  of  July,  the  manuscript  was 
ready  to  go  to  the  printers.  But  a  final 
hurdle  remained:  obtaining  the  ap- 
proval of  the  Secretary  of  War — and 
probably  the  President — and,  because 
of  interchange,  at  least  tacit  approval 
from  the  British.  ^^ 

Stimson  had  come  back  from  the 
Potsdam  meeting  on  28  July.  In  the 
days  following  his  return,  the  Secreta- 
ry gave  immediate  attention  to  a 
number  of  urgent  issues  on  his  accu- 
mulated agenda.  Initially,  he  devoted 
considerable     time     to     consultations 


*^  Ltr  (source  of  quotations),  Nichols  to  Groves, 
sub:  H.  D.  Smyth  Ms,  25  Jul  45;  Memo,  Fine  to 
Consodine,  sub:  Msg  tor  H.  D,  Smyth,  1 1  Jul  45; 
Memo,  C-onsodine  (for  Groves)  to  (".ompton,  Urev 
et  al.,  sub:  Insirs  on  Review  of  Smyth  Ms,  13  Jul  45; 
Ltr,  I'rev  to  Groves,  14  Jul  45;  Msg,  Oppenheimer 
to  Groves,  31  Jul  45  All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Gor- 
resp,  319.1  (Smvth),  MDR.  For  Grovess  views  see 
Now  It  Can  Be  Told.  p.  349.  Groves  Diarv,  Jul  45, 
I.RG,  contains  entries  that  serve  as  a  guide  to  the 
final  review  process  of  Smvth's  manuscript. 

'9  Groves,  Noir  ll  Cnu  H,   I  old.  pp.  349-50. 


with  his  two  assistants,  Harvey  Bundy 
and  George  Harrison,  as  well  as  other 
staff  members,  and  General  Groves 
on  the  subject  of  ongoing  prepara- 
tions of  the  public  statements  to  be 
made  by  the  President  and  himself 
after  the  first  bomb  drop.  Then  on 
the  morning  of  2  August,  he  turned 
to  the  question  of  publication  of 
Smyth's  manuscript.  Present  at  the 
meeting  in  his  office  were  Harrison 
and  Bundy;  his  military  aide.  Col. 
William  H.  Kyle;  Groves,  Conant,  and 
Tolman  as  project  representatives;  Sir 
James  Chadwick,  leader  of  the  contin- 
gent of  British  scientists  assigned  to 
the  project;  and  Roger  Makins,  the 
member  of  the  British  embassy  staff 
in  Washington  assigned  responsibility 
for  atomic  energy  matters. 

For  almost  two  hours,  the  conferees 
discussed  the  advantages  and  disad- 
vantages of  releasing  what  Stimson 
called  "the  proposed  statement  to  be 
made  by  the  scientists.  .  .  ."  Conant 
and  Groves  argued  strongly  for  publi- 
cation and  release  as  the  best  means 
for  protecting  the  future  security  of 
the  American  program.  Groves,  in 
particular,  saw  an  analogy  between 
the  information  in  Smyth's  manu- 
script and  "similar  instruction  given 
people  going  west  years  ago  when 
they  were  told  that  they  should  go  to 
a  water  hole  about  30  miles  away  and 
that  if  it  was  dry  they  should  go  to 
one  about  10  miles  beyond  that."  ^° 
His  point  was  that  it  provided  facts 
about  the  atomic  project  without  re- 
vealing any  vital  secrets. 

Stimson,  having  just  returned  from 


^°  First  quotation  from  Stimson  Diarv,  2  .Aug  45, 
HLS.  Second  quotation  from  notes  on  Smvth  Ms 
Mig  in  Secv  War  Office,  2  Aug  45,  OGG  Files,  Gen 
Goiresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  12,   lab  (),  MDR. 


THE  ATOMIC  AGE  AND  US  PROBLEMS 


561 


disquieting  face-to-face  encounters 
with  Soviet  representatives  at  Pots- 
dam, expressed  serious  doubts  about 
releasing  any  information  that  would 
be  helpful  to  the  Russians.  Chadwick, 
who  had  not  yet  read  the  manuscript, 
also  had  reservations.  He  found  diffi- 
culty in  understanding  why  the  atomic 
leaders  in  America  saw  the  need  to 
publish  such  an  extensive  statement, 
something  he  said  that  the  British 
would  not  do.  Makins  stated  that  Sir 
John  Anderson,  the  British  Cabinet 
officer  in  charge  of  atomic  energy, 
was  convinced  of  the  need  for  issuing 
a  report,  but  he  feared  its  cumulative 
impact.  The  meeting  closed  with 
Stimson  indicating  "that  he  was  prac- 
tically prepared  to  accept"  publica- 
tion, relying  upon  the  counsel  of  his 
advisers,  "because  of  my  confidence 
in  the  conservatism  of  General 
Groves."  Nevertheless,  he  concluded 
that  publication  should  not  take  place 
until  both  the  President  and  the  Brit- 
ish had  approved  of  it.^^ 

The  following  day  Stimson  dis- 
patched a  cable  to  the  President,  stat- 
ing that  on  the  unanimous  advice  of 
his  advisers  he  had  decided  to  recom- 
mend the  release  of  the  report  for 
reasons  of  future  security.  While 
awaiting  an  opportunity  to  see  the 
President,  Chadwick,  who  in  the 
meantime  had  read  the  report,  sent 
an  acknowledgment  that  he  could  see 
the  necessity  for  its  release.  When  the 
Secretary  finally  saw  Truman  on  8 
August,   two  days  after  the  bombing 


of  Hiroshima,  he  advised  him  that  he 
should  make  the  decision,  as  "he 
would  have  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the 
disapproval  of  Congress  for  giving 
away  such  a  valuable  secret."  After 
hearing  the  views  of  Bush,  Conant, 
Groves,  Stimson,  Harrison,  and  Ad- 
miral William  D.  Leahy,  his  personal 
chief  of  staff,  at  a  White  House  meet- 
ing on  the  ninth,  Truman  decided  in 
favor  of  immediate  publication.^^ 

On  12  August,  the  War  Department 
released  the  first  of  a  thousand  copies 
of  the  report  entitled  A  General  Account 
of  the  Development  of  Methods  of  Using 
Atomic  Energy  for  Military  Purposes  Under 
the  Auspices  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment, 1940-1945,  which  Groves  had 
printed  earlier  by  the  Pentagon's  clas- 
sified reproduction  facilities  in  antici- 
pation of  the  President's  approval. 
Issued  with  each  copy  of  the  report 
was  an  accompanying  statement  that 
sought  to  place  its  publication  in  the 
proper  perspective: 

Nothing  in  this  report  discloses  neces- 
sary military  secrets  as  to  the  manufacture 
or  production  of  the  weapon,  h 
does  provide  a  summary  of  generally 
known  scientific  facts  and  gives  an  ac- 
count of  the  history  of  the  work  and  of 
the  role  played  in  the  development  by 
different  scientific  and  industrial  organi- 
zations. 

The  best  interests  of  the  United  States 
require  the  utmost  cooperation  by  all 
concerned  in  keeping  secret  now  and  for 
all   time   in   the   future,   all   scientific   and 


^'  Stimson  I)iar\  (source  of  quotation).  2  Aug  45, 
HLS;  Notes  on  Snivth  Ms  Mtg  in  Secv  War  Office.  2 
Aug  45.  MDR;  Groves  Diarv,  27  Jul  and  2  Aug  45. 
I.R(i:  I-trs,  lolman  to  Groves,  subs:  Status  of  Sinvth 
Hist,  2(>  Jul  45,  and  Conversation  This  Morning 
With  Chadwick  Re  Svmth  Hist,  27  |ul  45.  Adniiii 
Files,  Gen  Coiresp,  319.1  (Smvthl,  MDR 


'^Stimson  Diarv  (source  of  quotation),  9  Aug  45, 
HLS;  Msg,  Secv  War  to  President,  3  Aug  45,  HB 
Files,  Fldr  64,  MDR;  Groves  Diarv,  9  Aug  45,  LRG; 
Bush,  Pieces  of  l/ie  Action,  pp.  294-95.  On  Chadwick's 
views  see  I-tr,  Chadwick  to  Field  Marshal  Henry 
Maitland  Wilson  (head  of  British  joint  Staff  Mission, 
Wash.,  D.C.).  4  Aug  45.  (KXi  Files,  Gen  Coiresp, 
MP  Files,  Fldr  12.  Fab  H,  MDR. 


562 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


technical  information  not  given  in  this 
report  or  other  official  releases  of  infor- 
mation by  the  War  Department.  ^^ 

While  the  Smyth  Report — as  it  came 
to  be  popularly  known — achieved  its 
basic  purposes  of  informing  the 
American  public  without  compromis- 
ing vital  project  secrets,  there  were 
inevitably  objections  and  criticisms  on 
some  points.  Where  appropriate,  Pro- 
fessor Smyth  made  corrections  and 
additions  for  incorporation  in  later 
printings.  But  none  of  these  correc- 
tions and  additions  greatly  altered  the 
original  report,  which,  as  Groves 
noted  in  retrospect,  was  "on  the 
whole,  .  .  .  considering  the  rather 
difficult  conditions  under  which  it  was 
prepared,  .  .  .  extraordinarily  suc- 
cessful in  its  efforts  to  distribute 
credit  fairly  and  accurately."  ^^ 


Professor  Smyth  himself  felt  the 
report  achieved  considerably  more 
than  this  limited  objective.  In  his  view 
the  development  of  the  atomic  bomb 
had  raised  many  questions  on  postwar 
atomic  energy  policy  "that  must  be 
answered  in  the  near  future  ...  by 
the  people  through  their  representa- 
tives." In  accomplishing  this,  Smyth 
looked  to  the  men  of  science,  "who 
can  understand  .  .  .  and  explain  the 
potentialities  of  atomic  bombs  to 
their  fellow  citizens,"  to  use  his 
report  as  the  vehicle  for  helping  the 
public  gain  some  insight  into  the  new 
atomic  world.  "The  ultimate  responsi- 
bility for  our  nation's  policy  rests  on 
its  citizens,"  Smyth  wrote,  "and  they 
can  discharge  such  responsibilities 
wisely  only  if  they  are  informed."  ^^ 


"WD,  Bur  of  Pub  Rels,  Press  Branch,  Press  Re- 
lease, 12  Aug  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.1 
(Smyth),  MDR.  The  release  also  made  an  addition 
to  the  text  of  the  Smyth  Report  at  paragraph  12.18, 
which  was  intended  to  allay  public  anxiety  concern- 
ing the  dispersal  of  radioactivity  by  the  bomb:  "The 
War  Department  now  authorizes  the  further  state- 
ment that  the  bomb  is  detonated  in  combat,  at  such 
a  height  above  the  ground,  as  to  give  the  maximum 
blast  effect  against  structures,  and  to  disseminate 
the  radioactive  products  as  a  cloud.  On  account  of 
the  height  of  the  explosion  practically  all  the  radio- 
active products  are  carried  upward  in  the  ascending 
column  of  hot  air  and  dispersed  harmlessly  over  a 
wide  area.  Even  in  the  New  Mexico  test,  where  the 
height  of  explosion  was  necessarily  low,  only  a  very 
small  fraction  of  the  radioactivity  was  deposited  im- 
mediately below  the  bomb."  A  copy  of  the  release  is 
reproduced  in  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  351- 
52. 

^^  Groves,  Sow  It  Can  be  Told.  p.  352.  Typical  ex- 
amples of  the  reaction  to  the  publication  of  the 
Smyth  Report  may  be  found  in  Admin  Files,  Gen 
Corresp,  MDR.  See  319.1  (Smyth)  for  Ltrs,  August 
C.  Klein  (Y-12  Proj  Engr,  Stone  and  Webster)  to 
Smyth,  30  Aug  45,  and  Smyth  to  Boris  Pregel  (Ca- 
nadian Radium  and  Uranium  Corp.),  14  Sep  45;  and 
095  (Metal  Hydrides)  for  Ltrs,  P.  P.  Alexander 
(Metal  Hydrides  president)  to  Groves,  19  Sep  45, 
Groves  to  T.  Lindsley  (Metal  Hydrides),  5  Dec  45, 
and  Alexander  to  Irvin  Stewart  (OSRD  Ex  Secy),  12 


Atomic  Energy:  Planning  for 
Postwar  Control 

Release  of  selected  information  was 
only  one  aspect  of  the  much  larger 
problem  of  planning  for  peacetime 
legislation  and  international  agree- 
ments to  control  the  use  of  atomic 
energy  in  the  postwar  era.  When 
President  Truman,  in  a  message  to 
Congress  on  3  October  1945,  empha- 
sized the  importance  of  dealing  with 
this  problem  on  "two  fronts — the  do- 
mestic and  international,"  he  focused 
attention  upon  a  matter  that  had  long 
been  a  cause  of  considerable  concern 


Jan  46.  In  the  privately  published  Princeton  Univer- 
sity edition  (1945)  of  the  report,  Smyth  added  ap- 
pendices giving  the  texts  of  the  War  Department's 
release  on  the  Trinity  test  of  16  Jul  45  and  the 
statements  issued  by  the  British  Information  Service 
on  12  August  and  the  Canadian  Information  Service 
on  13  August. 

^^  Smyth  Report,  pp.  v  and  165. 


THE  atomic:  age  and  its  problems 


563 


for  atomic  project   leaders   and   their 
scientific  stalls. ^^ 

Wartime  Background 

As  many  of  the  scientists  completed 
the  basic  research  work  required  to 
achieve  the  wartime  objectives  of  the 
atomic  program,  they  began  to  con- 
sider the  future  possibilities  in  the  ex- 
citing new  field  of  atomic  energy.  The 
situation  in  the  Metallurgical  Project 
was  typical.  In  the  latter  part  of  1943, 
rumors  spread  of  an  impending  re- 
lease of  numerous  personnel.  To 
counter  the  disquieting  effects  of 
these  rumors  on  his  scientific  staff, 
Arthur  Compton  included  in  his  new 
program  for  the  coming  fiscal  year 
basic  research  projects  as  well  as  con- 
tinuing support  for  the  Hanford  and 
Los  Alamos  operations. 

For  the  most  part.  Groves  and  his 
scientific  advisers  opposed  having 
Metallurgical  Project  scientists  under- 
take any  new  large-scale  or  long- 
range  research  activities  until  the  war 
was  over,  but  they  could  see  the  ne- 
cessity for  limited  research  projects 
for  those  scientists  serving  in  a 
standby  capacity  for  the  plutonium 
production  facilities  and  the  bomb 
development  program.  This  concept 
of  limited  research  generally  did  not 
satisfy  most  Metallurgical  Project  sci- 
entists. Accordingly,  Compton  en- 
deavored to  reduce  their  unrest  by 
giving  them  an  opportunity  to  partici- 
pate in  postwar  planning.  In  July 
1944,  he  appointed  a  committee  to 
formulate  "sound  national  postwar 
policies  .  .  .  from  the  military,  scien- 
tific and  industrial  standpoint."  This 
committee     issued     in     November     a 


"Prospectus  on  Nucleonics."  It  dis- 
cussed in  detail  future  research  and 
industrial  applications  of  atomic 
energy  in  the  United  States  and  the 
need  for  a  world  organization  to  pre- 
vent nuclear  warfare. ^'^ 

By  August,  the  Military  Policy  Com- 
mittee had  also  approved  appoint- 
ment of  a  special  committee,  suggest- 
ed by  Bush  and  Conant,  "to  recom- 
mend from  a  technical  standpoint  the 
postwar  policy  for  governmental  re- 
search and  development  in  the  atomic 
energy  field."  Groves,  who  later 
stated  that  a  prime  purpose  of  this 
committee  was  to  convince  project 
scientists  that  the  Army  was  not  for- 
getting postwar  problems,  appointed 
Tolman  as  chairman,  with  Warren  K. 
Lewis,  Henry  D.  Smyth,  and  Rear 
Adm.  Earle  W.  Mills,  assistant  chief  of 
the  Navy's  Bureau  of  Ships,  as  mem- 
bers. Capt.  Thorvald  A.  Solberg  of 
the  Navy  also  sat  in  on  all  meetings. 

This  Postwar  Policy  Committee,  as 
it  came  to  be  called,  interviewed  sci- 
entists from  all  of  the  major  Manhat- 
tan Project  research  centers  and  re- 
ceived a  large  number  of  written 
memorandums.        The        committee, 


-"   Iiunian,  Mn 


:530. 


^'^  "Prospectus  on  Nucleonics,"  prepared  by  Zay 
Jeffries  (committee  chairman),  Enrico  Fermi,  James 
Franck.  Thorfin  R.  Hogness,  Robert  S.  Mulliken 
(secretary),  Robert  S.  Stone,  and  Charles  A. 
Thomas.  The  covering  communication  from  which 
the  quotation  in  the  above  paragraph  was  taken  is 
I.tr,  Jeffries,  Fermi  et  al.,  to  Compton,  18  Nov  44, 
HB  Files,  Fldr  59,  MDR.  A  copy  is  also  on  file  in 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  334  (Postwar  Policy 
Committee-CEW).  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew 
World,  pp.  324-25.  Fermi's  wife  states  that  Metallur- 
gical Faboratorv  phvsicist  Eugene  Rabinowitch  also 
had  an  important  hand  in  drafting  the  report  on  nu- 
cleonics, although  he  was  not  a  member  of  the  com- 
mittee; see  Eaura  Fermi,  Illustrious  Imnugrnnis:  The  In- 
tellectudl  Migration  From  Europe.  1930-1941  (Chicago: 
I'niversity  of  Chicago  Press,  1968).  p.  201.  Ra- 
binowitch later  became  the  editor  of  the  Bulletin  of 
the  Atomic  Scientists. 


564 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


seeing  the  need  for  maintaining 
United  States  military  superiority,  rec- 
ommended continued  production  of 
active  materials  and  weapon  develop- 
ment and  government  support  of  fun- 
damental research  and  industrial  ap- 
plications. To  administer  the  pro- 
gram, the  committee  proposed  a  na- 
tional authority  that,  in  the  manner  of 
the  Office  of  Scientific  Research  and 
Development  (OSRD),  would  make 
funds  available  to  government-operat- 
ed military  and  civilian  laboratories, 
colleges  and  universities,  and  com- 
mercial firms.  ^® 

Another  individual  gravely  con- 
cerned with  postwar  planning  was 
Niels  Bohr,  the  eminent  Danish  physi- 
cist who  had  escaped  from  his  occu- 
pied homeland  in  1943.  In  conversa- 
tion with  Soviet  officials  at  the  Soviet 
embassy  in  London  in  April  1944, 
Bohr  had  learned  that  the  Soviets  had 
heard  rumors  of  the  Manhattan 
Project  and  were  very  much  interest- 
ed in  the  program.  He  concluded  that 
Russia  would  continue  to  push  devel- 
opment of  atomic  energy  and,  consid- 
ering the  quality  of  the  prewar  work 
of  Soviet  physicists  added  to  the 
knowledge  they  might  gain  from  a  de- 
feated Germany,  he  thought  they 
would  succeed.  Bohr  advocated  that 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
should  adopt  an  open  atomic  policy 
after  the  war,  using  the  revolutionary 


^^  MPC  Min  (source  of  quotation),  5  Aug  44, 
OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  23,  Tab  A, 
MDR;  Ltr,  Groves  to  Tolman,  29  Aug  44,  and 
Memo,  Tolman  to  Lawrence,  sub:  Committee  on 
Postwar  Recommendations,  16  Sep  44,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  334  (Postwar  Policy  Committee,  Cor- 
resp), MDR;  Rpt,  Postwar  Policy  Committee,  28  Dec 

44,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Fldr  3, 
Tab  A,  MDR;  Memo,  Groves  to  Harrison,    19  Jun 

45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Fldr  3, 
Tab  H,  MDR;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xew  World. 
pp.  324-25. 


new  development  to  achieve  effective 
international  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  Meeting  with  Churchill  in 
April  and  Roosevelt  in  August,  the 
Danish  scientist  zealously  conveyed 
his  convictions  to  both  of  the  wartime 
leaders.  Bohr  experienced  little  suc- 
cess in  communicating  his  ideas  to 
Churchill,  but  he  received  a  much 
more  sympathetic  hearing  from 
Roosevelt,  who  promised  to  take  up 
the  matter  with  Churchill  at  their  next 
meeting. ^^ 

Roosevelt  next  met  with  Churchill 
in  early  September  at  the  Octagon 
Conference  in  Quebec, ^°  called  to 
plan  for  the  final  campaigns  against 
Germany  and  joint  operations  against 
Japan,  but  it  apparently  was  not  until 
Churchill's  two-day  visit  to  Hyde  Park 
following  the  conference  that  the  two 
leaders  discussed  Bohr's  proposals. 
With  Admiral  Leahy  present,  they 
considered  the  Danish  scientist's  sug- 
gestions for  ending  the  secrecy  of  the 
bomb  and  negotiating  an  agreement 
with  Russia  to  avoid  a  postwar  arms 
race,  but  decided  that  his  ideas  were 
premature.  They  then  turned  to  post- 
war Anglo-American  atomic  relations, 
including  the  possibilities  of  industrial 


2^  Bohr  visited  the  Soviet  embassy  in  London  in 
April  1944  to  pick  up  a  letter  from  Peter  Kapitza, 
the  Russian  physicist  who  had  been  a  member  of 
Ernest  Rutherford's  research  team  at  Cambridge 
University's  Cavendish  Laboratory  in  the  1920's. 
Kapitza,  upon  hearing  of  Bohr's  escape  from  Den- 
mark, wrote  to  invite  him  to  come  with  his  family  to 
the  Soviet  Union  to  continue  his  scientific  work.  For 
a  detailed  description  of  this  and  other  aspects  of 
Bohr's  activities  in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1944 
see  Gowing,  Britain  and  Atomic  Energy,  pp.  346-48. 
See  also  Memo,  [Bohr],  3  Jul  44,  and  Ltr,  Bush  to 
Bundv,  25  Apr  45,  with  inclosure  bv  Felix 
Frankfurter.  HB  Files,  Fldr  19,  MDR. 

^°  For  a  detailed  account  of  the  Octagon  Confer- 
ence see  MatlofT,  Strategic  Planning  for  Coalition  War- 
fare. Ch.  XXIIL 


THE  ATOMIC  AGE  AND  IIS  PROBLEMS 


565 


application,  which  Churchill  perceived 
could  contribute  to  British  economic 
recovery,  a  subject  he  had  discussed 
with  Roosevelt  at  Quebec. 

Agreeing  that  the  wartime  atomic 
partnership  should  continue  after  the 
war,  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Presi- 
dent recorded  their  views  in  a  brief 
aide-memoire,  typed  on  Churchill's  offi- 
cial stationery  and  initialed  in  red  ink 
by  both  leaders.  In  it  they  rejected 
any  immediate  announcement  of  the 
existence  of  the  Manhattan  Project 
and  called  for  continuing  "the  utmost 
secrecy";  they  recommended  that  the 
bomb  "might  perhaps,  after  mature 
consideration,  be  used  against  the 
Japanese,  who  should  be  warned  that 
this  bombardment  will  be  repeated 
until  they  surrender";  and  they 
agreed  that  "full  collaboration  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Brit- 
ish Government  in  developing  Tube 
Alloys  for  military  and  commercial 
purposes  should  continue  after  the 
defeat  of  Japan  unless  and  until  ter- 
minated by  joint  agreement."  For  the 
two  leaders,  the  aide-memoire  constitut- 
ed a  preliminarv  statement  of  their 
hopes  and  fears  concerning  future 
use  and  control  of  the  newly  evolving 
revolutionary  source  of  energy,  espe- 
cially in  its  application  to  develop- 
ment and  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.^  ^ 


^^Aide-memoire,  Roosevelt  and  Churchill,  sub: 
Tube  Alloys,  18  Sep  44,  FDR.  Admiral  Ixahv,  in  his 
account  of  the  Hyde  Park  meeting,  states  that  the 
aide-memoire  was  signed  on  19  September,  but  this 
appears  to  be  incorrect.  See  William  D.  Leahv,  / 
Was  There  (New  York:  W'hittlesev  House,  McGraw- 
Hill  Book  Co..  1950),  pp.  265-66.  I'his  account  of 
the  atomic  discussions  at  Hvde  Park  is  based  on  Ms, 
"Diplomatic  Hist  of  Manhattan  Proj,"  pp.  33-34, 
HB  Files,  Fldr  111,  MDR;  Winston  S.  Churchill,  The 
Second  World  War:  Tnitmph  and  Tragedy  (Boston: 
Houghton  MifHin  Co..  1953),  160-62;  Groves,  Xow 
It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  401-02;  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 


Meanwhile,  Bush  and  Conant,  un- 
doubtedly influenced  by  the  growing 
unrest  among  project  scientists  as 
well  as  by  the  progress  of  the  war  in 
Europe,  also  sought  to  instigate  plan- 
ning for  postwar  control  and  use  of 
atomic  energy.  The  day  after  the 
Hyde  Park  meeting  (about  which  they 
knew  nothing),  the  two  scientific  lead- 
ers wrote  to  Secretary  Stimson,  point- 
ing out  that  the  time  was  approaching 
when  the  public  would  have  to  be  in- 
formed about  atomic  developments 
during  the  war  and  when  national  leg- 
islation would  have  to  be  enacted  and 
diplomatic  measures  taken.  Release  of 
information,  preferably  in  the  form  of 
a  detailed  history,  would  become  es- 
sential, they  believed,  either  when  the 
bomb  was  used  against  the  enemy  or, 
if  Japan  surrendered  before  that  hap- 
pened, when  the  war  ended.  Basic 
atomic  knowledge,  they  warned  Stim- 
son, could  not  be  kept  secret  and  for 
a  government  to  assume  that  by 
doing  so  it  would  become  secure 
"would  be  extremely  dangerous." 
The  Secretary,  Bush  and  Conant  sug- 
gested, should  talk  to  the  President 
about  drafting  legislation  to  establish 
a  "national  commission"  and  a  treaty 
with  Great  Britain  and  Canada  that 
would  continue  and  extend  the  war- 
time arrangements  for  interchange  of 
technical  information.^^ 

Three  days  later,  Bush  received  an 
unexpected  summons  to  the  White 
House  to  bring  the  President  up-to- 
date  on  atomic  developments.  When 


Xew  World,  pp.  326-28;  Gowing,  Bntam  and  Atomic 
Energy,  pp.  358-60  and  447  (App.  8  gives  text  of  the 
aide-memoire) . 

32  Memo,  Bush  and  Conani  to  Secv  War,  sub:  Re- 
lease of  Info  to  the  Public.  19  Sep  44,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  108,  MDR. 


566 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Roosevelt  introduced  Bush  to  Lord 
Cherwell,  Churchill's  scientific  advis- 
er, and  Admiral  Leahy  and  then 
began  talking  generally  about  the 
bomb  and  interchange  with  the  Brit- 
ish without  regard  to  Cherwell's  con- 
tinued presence,  the  OSRD  director 
became  aware  that  the  President  had 
been  carrying  on  freewheeling  dis- 
cussions with  Churchill,  Bohr,  and 
others  without  benefit  of  consultation 
with  his  regular  advisers  on  atomic 
matters.  Without  mentioning  the  aide- 
memoire,  Roosevelt  stated  that  he  had 
talked  to  Churchill  about  complete 
interchange  as  a  way  of  keeping  Brit- 
ain strong  after  the  war.  Greatly  con- 
cerned by  Roosevelt's  indication  that 
he  was  plunging  ahead  with  postwar 
planning  for  atomic  energy  without 
sufficient  guidance  from  those  with  an 
expert  knowledge  of  atomic  matters. 
Bush  suggested  that  the  President 
should  have  a  talk  with  Stimson. 
Roosevelt  agreed,  but  when  Bush 
proposed  to  Stimson  three  days  later 
(25  September)  that  he  point  out  to 
the  President  the  dangers  of  an  inter- 
national armaments  race  if  Russia 
were  not  permitted  to  share  in  the  in- 
terchange of  scientific  data,  the  Secre- 
tary demurred.  He  did  not  think,  he 
told  Bush,  that  he  could  hold  the 
President's  attention  long  enough  to 
impress  upon  him  the  seriousness  of 
the  prospect.  Bush  then  suggested 
that  he  and  Conant  prepare  a  state- 
ment on  international  control  that 
Stimson  could  then  pass  on  to  the 
President.  The  Secretary  consented  to 
this  arrangement.^^ 


Bush  and  Conant  submitted  a  state- 
ment on  the  "salient  points  concern- 
ing future  international  handling  of 
[the]  subject  of  atomic  bombs"  on  30 
September.  They  elaborated  in  some 
detail  "on  the  international  post-war 
aspects  ...  of  great  importance  to 
the  future  peace  of  the  world"  and 
predicted  a  successful  demonstration 
of  an  atomic  bomb  capable  of  a  blast 
damage  equivalent  to  1,000  to  10,000 
tons  of  ordinary  explosives  before  1 
August  1945.  But,  they  continued, 
this  enormously  powerful  weapon  was 
only  the  first  step  in  "an  expanding 
art."  The  future  was  likely  to  bring 
development  of  a  "super-super 
bomb"  using  heavy  hydrogen  that 
would  produce  blast  damage  equal  to 
that  of  "1,000  raids  of  1,000  B-29 
Fortresses  delivering  their  load  of 
high  explosives  on  one  target."  Be- 
cause any  nation  having  the  necessary 
technical  and  scientific  resources 
could  produce  in  three  or  four  years 
atomic  bombs  equivalent  to  those  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  would 
soon  have,  the  advantage  held  by 
these  two  countries  was  only  tempo- 
rary.^'* Given  the  ever-present  possi- 


^''The  President  apparently  had  turned  over  his 
copy  of  the  aide-memoire  to  his  file  room  without  ever 
mentioning  its  existence  to  anyone  associated  with 
the  Manhattan  Project.  Not  until  after  Roosevelt's 
death  in  April  1945  did  Manhattan  leaders  learn  of 


the  aide-memoire  from  British  sources,  and  not  until  a 
decade  later  was  the  original  American  copy  discov- 
ered, misfiled,  in  the  Roosevelt  papers,  FDR.  See 
also  Conference  Memo,  Bush,  22  Sep  44;  Memos, 
Bush  to  Conant,  23  and  25  Sep  44.  All  in  OSRD. 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  \ew  World,  pp.  326-29. 
Stimson  Diary,  25  Sep  44,  HLS. 

^■*  The  prediction  of  Bush  and  Conant  as  to  how 
Icjng  other  nations  having  the  requisite  resources 
would  require  to  produce  an  atomic  bomb  equiva- 
lent to  that  developed  by  the  United  States  in  1945 
proved  to  be  amazingly  accurate.  President  Truman 
announced  in  September  1949  that  the  Soviet 
I'nion  had  achieved  an  atomic  explosion,  only 
slightlv  more  than  four  years  after  the  Americans 
had  set  off  the  first  such  explosion  at  Alamogordo 
in  Julv  1945.  See  A>«'  York  Times,  24  Sep  49. 


THE  ATOMIC  ACiE  AND  US  PROBLEMS 


567 


bility  of  "the  accidents  ot  research," 
another  country  might  attain  as  great 
a  temporary  advantage  as  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  then  held. 
Nor  was  a  continuing  policy  of  com- 
plete secrecy  after  the  war  likely  to 
prevent  other  countries  from  produc- 
ing nuclear  weapons,  for  all  the  basic 
scientific  facts  necessary  to  do  so 
already  were  known  to  physicists. 

Hence,  the  soundest  policy  was  to 
disclose  completely,  as  soon  as  the 
first  bomb  had  been  demonstrated, 
the  history  of  its  development  in  the 
United  States,  keeping  secret  only 
"manufacturing  and  military  details." 
Complete  secrecy  was  certain  to 
result  in  an  international  armament 
race,  with  secret  development  in  the 
Soviet  Union  and  other  countries. 
Not  even  control  of  most  of  the 
world's  supply  of  uranium  and  thori- 
um would  prevent  development  of 
the  super-super  bomb,  using  heavy 
hydrogen,  the  supply  of  which  is  vir- 
tually unlimited.  The  wisest  solution 
for  the  postwar  period  was  "free  in- 
terchange of  all  scientific  information 
on  this  subject  .  .  .  under  the  auspic- 
es of  an  international  office  that  de- 
rived its  power  from  whatever  asso- 
ciation of  nations  is  developed  at  the 
close  of  the  present  war.  .  .  .  Under 
these  conditions,"  Bush  and  Conant 
concluded,  "there  is  reason  to  hope 
that  the  weapons  would  never  be  em- 
ployed and  indeed  that  the  existence 
of  these  weapons  might  decrease  the 
chance  of  another  war.^^ 


^^Qiiotations  in  paragraphs  on  Bush-Conant 
statement  from  Memo,  Bush  and  Conant  to  Secv 
War,  sub:  Sahent  Points  Re  Future  International 
HandHng  of  Atomic  Bombs,  30  Sep  44,  Incl  to  Ltr, 
same  addiessees,  same  date,  HB  Files,  Fldr  09, 
MDR.  Copies  of  the  letter  are  also  in  ()C-C  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files.  Fldr  10,  lab  A.  and  Fldr 
26,  Tab  L,  MDR. 


The  Bush-Conant  statement 

brought  no  immediate  reaction  from 
Stimson.  Toward  the  end  of  October, 
the  Secretary  talked  to  Bush  about 
some  of  the  points  made  in  it,  but  he 
did  not  indicate  what  action  he  in- 
tended to  take.  Bush's  own  view  at 
the  time  was  that  Stimson  should 
comment  on  the  points  and  then  send 
them  on  to  the  President.  Foreshad- 
owing the  ultimate  establishment  of 
the  Interim  Committee,  the  OSRD 
chief  also  suggested  that  Roosevelt 
was  going  to  need  an  advisory  group 
to  guide  him  in  reaching  decisions  on 
atomic  matters,  but  he  felt  the  time 
was  not  quite  propitious  yet  for  sug- 
gesting it  to  the  President.  Harvey 
Bundy  also  proposed  such  a  group. 
He  visualized  a  six-man  commission 
comprised  of  a  representative  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  the  Secretary  of 
State,  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
and  three  scientists  familiar  with  the 
atomic  project.  After  atomic  weapons 
had  been  used,  this  commission 
would  assist  the  President  in  prepar- 
ing a  brief  public  statement  about  the 
importance  and  characteristics  of 
atomic  energy  and  in  outlining  a  pro- 
gram for  its  temporary  and  its  perma- 
nent control  in  the  United  States. ^^ 

Not  until  early  December  did  Bush 
have  another  opportunity  to  broach 
the  subject  of  future  atomic  energy 
problems  at  the  War  Department.  On 
the  eighth,  at  a  meeting  with  Bundy 
and  John  J.  McCloy,  the  Assistant 
Secretary  of  War,  Bush  suggested  that 
the  President  should  immediately 
nominate  an   advisory   group   to  pre- 


^^ Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xeiv  World,  p.  330; 
Memo,  Bush  to  Conant,  24  Oct  44.  OSRD:  Memo, 
Bundv  to  Secv  War,  16  Nov  44,  HB  Files,  Fldr  108. 
MDR. 


568 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


pare  press  releases,  draft  legislation, 
and  advise  on  the  development  of  a 
postwar  experimental  program,  em- 
phasizing the  need  for  bringing  the 
Department  of  State  into  the  planning 
for  the  international  aspects  of  atomic 
energy.  Subsequently,  both  Bundy 
and  Bush  briefed  Stimson  on  the  sub- 
stance of  the  discussion.  While  agree- 
ing that  the  State  Department  had  to 
be  informed  soon,  Stimson  was  still 
not  ready  to  make  decisions  on  an  ad- 
visory committee  or  international  ex- 
change. Months  would  pass  before  he 
reached  a  decision  on  either  matter.^' 
After  Roosevelt's  death,  Stimson 
went  to  Truman  with  a  suggestion  to 
appoint  an  advisory  group  on  atomic 
energy.  The  resulting  Interim  Com- 
mittee, which  began  meeting  in  May, 
did  not  take  up  the  discussion  of 
postwar  legislation  for  domestic  con- 
trol of  atomic  energy  until  July.  On 
the  nineteenth,  the  committee  consid- 
ered the  first  draft  of  an  atomic 
energy  bill,  prepared  by  two  War  De- 
partment lawyers — Brig.  Gen.  Ken- 
neth C.  Royall  and  William  L.  Mar- 
bury.  Under  guidance  from  George 
Harrison  and  with  technical  assistance 
from  the  Manhattan  District,  Royall 
and  Marbury  in  drawing  up  the  draft 
bill  had  included  the  Bush-Conant 
proposals  and  incorporated  the  basic 
premise  that,  in  the  postwar  period, 
atomic  energy  would  have  to  continue 
to  receive  substantial  federal  support 
and  remain  under  strong  federal 
control. ^^ 


^'Conference  Memo,  Bush,  8  Dec  44;  Memo, 
Bush  to  Conant,  13  Dec  44.  Both  in  OSRD.  Hewlett 
and  Anderson,  \eu'  World,  pp.  330-31. 

^«Rovall-Marburv  draft  bill,  18  Jul  45,  HB  Files, 
Fldr  77,  MDR  (copv  also  in  OSRD);  Notes  on  Inter- 
im Committee  Mtg,  19  Jul  45.  MDR;  Hewlett  and 
.Anderson.  Xrw  World,  pp.  412-14. 


Many  provisions  seemed  closely 
patterned  after  the  wartime  program, 
including  continuation  of  essentially 
military  control  with  no  significant  re- 
laxation of  security  restrictions  on  re- 
search and  development  activities. 
The  nine-man  commission  proposed 
by  the  bill — five  civilians,  two  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Army  and  two  of  the 
Navy — resembled  the  Military  Policy 
Committee.  The  commission  was  to 
be  a  part-time  advisory  group,  whose 
members  could  hold  other  govern- 
ment positions  and  would  receive  no 
compensation.  Assisting  the  commis- 
sion would  be  four  advisory  boards 
on  military  applications,  industrial 
uses,  research,  and  medicine,  each 
comprised  of  technical  experts  ap- 
pointed by  the  commission.  Serv- 
ing the  commission  would  be  a  full- 
time  staff  headed  by  an  administrator 
and  deputy  administrator,  an  ar- 
rangement not  unlike  that  of  Groves 
and  Nichols  in  the  Manhattan  Project, 
particularly  because  the  commission 
could  delegate  all  of  its  powers  to 
these  officials. 

The  extensive  powers  granted  to 
the  commission — in  this  Royall  and 
Marbury  followed  the  earlier  sugges- 
tions of  Bush  and  Conant — were  simi- 
lar to  those  held  by  the  Army  in  the 
wartime  program.  They  included  cus- 
tody of  raw  materials,  facilities  and 
equipment,  technical  information  and 
patents,  and  all  contracts  and  agree- 
ments related  to  production  of  fis- 
sionable materials.  As  in  the  Manhat- 
tan Project,  the  administrator  would 
have  authority  to  carry  on  atomic  re- 
search in  commission-owned  facilities 
or  to  have  it  done  by  other  institu- 
tions under  contract.  For  this  or  any 
other  commission  activities,  he  would 


THE  ATOMIC  AGE  AND  IIS  PROBLEMS 


569 


have  broad  powers  to  acquire  proper- 
ty, facilities,  or  services.  The  commis- 
sion would  administer  its  own  securi- 
ty, personnel,  and  audit  regulations. 
Finally,  the  bill  provided  that  the 
commission  would  direct,  supervise, 
and  regulate  all  atomic  activities, 
even  those  pursued  by  outside 
organizations.^^ 

Bush  and  Conant  felt  that  the  two 
War  Department  lawyers  had  granted 
the  commission  more  sweeping 
powers  than  were  needed  for  a  peace- 
time organization.  They  also  pro- 
posed, and  Groves  and  Harrison 
agreed  with  them,  that  only  civilians 
should  be  members  of  the  commis- 
sion. Harrison  noted  that  the  armed 
services  would  be  adequately  repre- 
sented on  the  advisory  board  on  mili- 
tary applications.  "^^ 

The  War  Department  asked  Gener- 
al Royall  to  revise  the  bill  on  the 
basis  of  the  comments  made  by  Man- 
hattan leaders  and  Interim  Committee 
members.  With  the  objective  of 
making  only  minor  changes  so  as  to 
provide  the  basis  for  compromise,  he 
reduced  the  number  of  officers  on  the 
commission  to  four  and,  to  a  limited 
extent,  the  commission's  powers  over 
nuclear  research,  stating  that  its  mis- 
sion would  be  to  minimize  interfer- 
ence in  private  research  and  to  make 
more  use  of  it. 

But  these  modest  changes  did  not 
satisfy  Bush,  who  requested  that  the 
War  Department  bill  be  completely 
reviewed  with  the  aim  of  subjecting 
the  commission  to  the  usual  govern- 
ment controls  except  where  exemp- 
tions were  clearly  necessarv.  The  bill 


underwent  several  revisions  in  late 
July  and  early  August,  yet  it  did  not 
fundamentally  change  in  its  original 
approach  and  continued  to  prescribe 
a  considerable  amount  of  military 
control  and  governmental  dominance 
in  nuclear  research  activities.  Conse- 
quently, when  the  War  Department 
submitted  its  proposals  for  domestic 
control  of  atomic  energy  to  Congress, 
they  largely  took  the  form  and  direc- 
tion laid  down  in  the  Royall-Marbury 
bill.^i 

Postwar  International  Aspects 

After  the  atomic  bombing  of  Japan, 
the  problem  of  international  control 
of  atomic  energy  loomed  large  for  the 
leaders  of  the  American  and  British 
governments,  and  each  gave  the 
matter  their  immediate  attention. ^^  In 
his  9  August  radio  message  to  the 
American  people  on  the  Potsdam 
Conference,  President  Truman  de- 
clared that  the  United  States  intended 
to  make  the  new  force  of  atomic 
energy  into  a  weapon  for  peace  and 
that    information    on    weapon    design 


»9R()vall-Marbiiiv  draft  bill.  18  Jul  45,  MDR; 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  .\>zr  World,  pp.  412-13. 

""Notes  on  Interim  Committee  Mtg,  19  Jul  45. 
MDR;  Ltr,  Bush  to  Harrison,  19  Jul  45,  OSRD. 


"'  Ltr,  Bush  to  Harrison,  7  Aug  45,  OSRD;  Inter- 
im Committee  Log,  20  and  25  Jul  45,  MDR:  Draft 
bills,  Jun-Sep  45,  prepared  by  MD  legal  stafl  for  In- 
terim Committee,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  032.1 
(Atomic  Legislation),  MDR. 

"^Except  as  otherwise  indicated,  section  based  on 
MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  pp.  7.1-7.17,  DASA;  Groves, 
\ou<  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  409-12;  Hewlett  and  Ander- 
son, Xew  World,  pp.  465-81  and  531-619;  Truman, 
Memoirs,  1:523-51  and  2:5-16.  Most  of  the  diplo- 
matic documents  pertinent  to  the  efforts  at  interna- 
tional control  mav  be  found  in  the  U.S.  Department 
of  State,  General:  Political  and  Economic  Matters.  For- 
eign Relations  of  the  United  States,  Diplomatic 
Papers,  1945,  Vol.  2  (Washington,  D.C.:  Govern- 
ment Printing  OHke,  1967),  pp.  1-99;  ibid..  General: 
The  i'nited  Xations.  Foreign  Relations  of  the  I'nitcd 
States,  Diplomatic  Papers,  1946,  Vol.  1  (Washing- 
ton, D.C;.:  Ciovernment  Printing  Office,  1972),  pp. 
1197-259. 


570 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


and  production  would  not  be  released 
to  the  rest  of  the  world  until  adequate 
means  of  control  had  been  estab- 
lished. After  reading  the  President's 
statement,  Prime  Minister  Clement 
Attlee  promptly  endorsed  it,  and  on 
13  August  he  publicly  stated  his  sup- 
port of  the  "preparation  of  plans  for 
the  future  control  of  the  bomb  ...  to 
the  end  that  its  production  and  use 
may  be  controlled  and  that  its  power 
may  be  made  an  overwhelming  influ- 
ence towards  world  peace."  ^^ 

In  a  memorandum  to  Truman  on 
II  September,'*'*  Secretary  Stimson 
advised  the  President  that  the  best 
policy  for  international  control  would 
be  for  the  United  States,  with  British 
support,  to  make  a  direct  approach  to 
the  Soviet  Union,  proposing  joint  ar- 
rangements for  limiting  use  of  the 
bomb  and  encouraging  development 
of  atomic  power  for  peaceful  and  hu- 
manitarian purposes.  A  few  days  later, 
at  a  meeting  of  the  President's  Cabi- 
net, Vannevar  Bush  and  Under  Secre- 
tary of  War  Patterson  joined  with 
Stimson  in  support  of  direct  negotia- 
tions with  the  Soviets.  Other  mem- 
bers of  the  Cabinet,  however,  op- 
posed sharing  the  secrets  of  atomic 
energy  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
rest  of  the  world. 

The  American  government,  howev- 
er, was  under  continuing  pressure 
from  the  British  to  institute  interna- 
tional control  measures  as  quickly  as 
possible.  From  the  standpoint  of  the 
British,  who  wanted  to  implement  the 


■•^  Telg,  Attlee  to  Iruman,  1  I  Aug  45,  with  text  of 
the  Prime  Minister's  statement  released  on  13 
August,  reproduced  in  IS.  Department  of  Stale, 
General:  Political  and  Ecoiidiiiu  Matters.  1945.  \'ol.  2, 
p.   40. 

"''  1  he  full  text  ol  this  memorandum  is  repro- 
duced in  Stimson  and  Bund\,  On  Actwe  Sen'ire.  pp. 
541-46, 


Hyde  Park  aide-memoire  provision  as- 
suring them  full  collaboration  "in  de- 
veloping Tube  Alloys  for  military  and 
commercial  purposes  .  .  .  after  the 
defeat  of  Japan  .  .  ."  and  to  secure  a 
revision  of  the  1943  Quebec  Agree- 
ment provision  that  restricted  their 
access  to  information  pertinent  to  the 
industrial  and  commercial  applica- 
tions of  atomic  energy,  these  interna- 
tional measures  were  essential  not 
only  to  ensure  that  the  atomic  bomb 
would  be  used  in  the  interest  of  world 
peace  but  also  to  facilitate  new 
agreements  on  a  postwar  atomic 
partnership.'*^ 

Taking  cognizance  of  the  British 
desire  for  prompt  action,  President 
Truman  in  his  3  October  message  to 
Congress  stated  emphatically  that  a 
discussion  on  an  international  control 
policy  could  not  wait  until  the  United 
Nations  Organization  began  function- 
ing. Negotiations  must  begin  at  once 
with  the  United  Kingdom  and 
Canada,  and  then  subsequently  with 
other  nations,  for  the  purpose  of 
working  out  "arrangements  covering 
the  terms  under  which  international 
collaboration  and  exchange  of  infor- 
mation might  safely  proceed."  '*^ 
Consistent  with  this  objective, 
Truman  at  the  end  of  the  month  ac- 
cepted Prime  Minister  Attlee's  re- 
quest for  a  meeting  with  him  and  Ca- 
nadian Prime  Minister  William  Lyon 
Mackenzie  King. 

In  preparation  for  this  conference, 
scheduled  to  open  in  Washington  on 
1 1  November,  both  Secretary  of  State 
Byrnes  and  Secretary  of  War  Patter- 
son   (who   had    replaced    Stimson    on 


Aide-memoire.   18  Sep  44,  KDR. 
Truman,  .Memoirs.   \:b'M). 


THE  ATOMIC  AGE  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS 


571 


27  September)  consulted  extensively 
with  Bush  and  Ciroves.  When  Bush, 
on  his  own  initiative,  visited  Byrnes 
on  3  November  to  urge  adoption  of  a 
definite  policy  on  international  con- 
trol, the  Secretary  asked  him  to  pre- 
pare a  written  statement  of  his  views 
of  w  hat  needed  to  be  discussed  by  the 
three  heads  of  state.  Sensing  a  lack  of 
preparation  by  the  State  Department 
for  the  upcoming  conference.  Secreta- 
ry Patterson  had  members  of  his  War 
Department  staff  draw  up  proposals 
to  be  discussed.  Both  Groves  and 
Bush  were  called  in  for  consultation 
by  Byrnes  on  the  eighth  and  by  Pat- 
terson on  the  tenth  to  revise  the  War 
Department  proposals.  When  the 
actual  conversations  on  atomic  energy 
began,  Truman  and  Byrnes  advanced 
the  proposals  set  forth  in  the  state- 
ment Bush  had  prepared  for  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  and  the  British  agreed 
to  them  as  an  agenda  without  pre- 
senting any  counterproposals.  Byrnes 
then  called  in  Bush  on  the  twelfth  to 
assist  in  preparation  of  the  confer- 
ence communique. 

On  15  November,  the  three  politi- 
cal leaders  announced  their  conclu- 
sions on  atomic  energy  in  the 
Truman-Attlee-King  Declaration. 

They  agreed  that  an  open  exchange 
of  the  fundamental  scientific  aspects 
of  atomic  energy  with  other  nations 
of  the  world  was  desirable  to  facilitate 
its  development  for  peaceful  pur- 
poses; however,  to  ensure  against  its 
use  for  destructive  purposes,  they  ac- 
knowledged that  a  limited  exchange 
of  the  specialized  aspects  necessary 
for  industrial  application  must  be  en- 
forced until  such  time  as  the  United 
Nations  could  establish  international 
controls.  I'o  achieve  these  controls, 
thev    recommended    that    the    United 


Nations  set  up  an  international 
organization  to  function  under  its 
auspices. 

1  he  three  leaders  also  directed  that 
steps  be  taken  to  work  out  a  new 
basis  for  Anglo-American  collabora- 
tion in  atomic  energy  matters  in  the 
postwar  period.  They  delegated  the 
task  of  preparing  a  suitable  directive 
to  Patterson  and  Sir  John  Anderson. 
Patterson  called  in  Groves  and  Harri- 
son to  advise  him,  and  the  two,  work- 
ing with  members  of  Sir  John's  staff, 
prepared  two  memorandums  issued 
on  16  November.  The  first  memoran- 
dum stated  that  there  should  continue 
to  be  full  and  effective  cooperation 
between  the  three  states  in  atomic 
energy  matters,  that  the  Combined 
Policy  Committee  and  Combined  De- 
velopment Trust  should  be  perpetuat- 
ed,^^ and  that  the  committee  should 
work  out  an  appropriate  basis  for 
future  collaboration.  The  second  doc- 
ument, "Memorandum  of  Intention," 
set  forth  detailed  guidelines  for  the 
committee  to  follow  in  developing  a 
new  agreement  to  replace  the  Quebec 
Agreement. 

For  the  period  of  several  months, 
the  Combined  Policy  Committee  en- 
deavored to  work  out  suitable  terms 
of  a  new  Anglo-American  agreement. 
It  turned  over  to  a  subcommittee — 
composed  of  British  embassy  staff 
member  Roger  Makins,  Canadian 
Ambassador  Lester  B.  Pearson,  and 
General  Groves — the  task  of  drafting 
a  report  with  scientific  recommenda- 
tions for  inclusion  in  a  new  agree- 
ment. When  completed,  the  subcom- 
mittee's report  called  for  the  rescind- 


^'^  The  cslahlisluiu'iil  and  work  ol  ihcst-  intern; 
tional  adxisorv  groups  are  discussed  in  detail  i 
C;hs.  X  and  XIII. 


572 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


ing  of  the  provisions  in  the  Quebec 
Agreement  that  had  restricted  British 
development  of  atomic  energy  for  in- 
dustrial and  commercial  purposes  and 
proposed  that  each  signatory  state  de- 
velop the  means  for  full  and  effective 
interchange  of  information  required 
for  its  atomic  activities;  agree  not  to 
disclose  information  or  enter  into 
negotiations  with  outside  states 
concerning  atomic  energy  without 
prior  discussion  and  policy  determi- 
nation; undertake  measures  not  only 
to  control  uranium  and  thorium  de- 
posits within  its  own  borders  but  also, 
through  established  international  ore 
control  agencies,  to  acquire  foreign 
ore  deposits;  and  coordinate  and  con- 
sult with  each  other  before  using  nu- 
clear weapons  against  other  states. 
Subcommittee  members  did  not  nec- 
essarily agree  on  all  points  outlined  in 
the  submitted  report.  General  Groves, 
for  example,  noted  that  inclusion  of 
many  of  the  suggested  provisions, 
especially  those  on  full  and  effective 
interchange,  would  give  the  agree- 
ment the  effect  of  a  secret  military 
treaty  in  violation  of  Article  102  of 
the  United  Nations  Charter. 

On  15  February  1946,  the  Com- 
bined Policy  Committee  considered 
the  subcommittee's  proposals  for  a 
new  agreement.  Committee  members 
were  inclined  to  agree  with  Groves 
that  many  of  the  recommended  provi- 
sions would  violate  Article  102.  One 
member  suggested  that  this  conflict 
with  the  United  Nations  Charter  be 
avoided  by  continuing  Anglo-Ameri- 
can cooperation  on  atomic  matters 
under  terms  of  the  Quebec  Agree- 
ment. But  Lord  Halifax,  the  British 
ambassador  who  had  replaced  Sir 
Ronald  Campbell  on  the  commit- 
tee, objected  that  the  wartime  agree- 


ment did  not  meet  postwar  require- 
ments, especially  on  exchange  of 
information. 

At  the  next  committee  meeting  on 
15  April,  Halifax  shifted  his  position. 
The  United  Kingdom  would  be  will- 
ing, he  said,  to  accept  the  proposal 
for  continued  collaboration  under  the 
Quebec  Agreement  and  the  Declara- 
tion of  Trust  in  the  area  of  raw  mate- 
rials, provided  that  these  two  docu- 
ments were  amended  to  meet  postwar 
requirements  as  outlined  in  the  sub- 
committee's proposals.  This  compro- 
mise was  unacceptable,  however,  to 
the  American  members  (Byrnes,  Pat- 
terson, and  Bush)  because  they  did 
not  think  it  would  eliminate  the  con- 
flict with  Article  102.  Finding  itself  in 
a  deadlock,  the  committee  turned  the 
problem  back  to  the  heads  of  state. 

Truman  and  Attlee  were  unable  to 
make  further  progress  toward  the  full 
and  effective  cooperation  they  had  set 
as  a  goal.  In  fact,  Attlee's  strongly 
worded  plea  to  President  Truman  in 
June  1946  went  unanswered,  because 
Congress  was  about  to  enact  domestic 
legislation  placing  additional  restric- 
tions on  release  of  atomic  information 
that  cast  further  doubt  on  the  feasibil- 
ity of  any  kind  of  interchange. 

From  May  until  the  end  of  1946, 
Anglo-American  cooperation  on 
atomic  energy  continued  to  function 
under  the  Quebec  Agreement  and  the 
Declaration  of  Trust.  Practically 
speaking,  collaboration  was  limited 
essentially  to  the  area  of  raw  materi- 
als. In  late  July,  for  example,  the 
Combined  Policy  Committee  ap- 
proved the  Groves-Makins-Chadwick 
formula  for  allocating  in  1946  the 
larger  share  of  the  available  supply  of 
uranium  ore  to  the  United  States  so 


THE  ATOMIC  AGE  AND  IIS  PROBLEMS 


573 


that  the  Manhattan  Project  had  a  suf- 
ficient amount  to  meet  the  needs  of 
its  bomb  production  program.  It  also 
adopted  a  Combined  Development 
Trust  proposal  designed  to  ensure  a 
fair  allocation  of  the  costs  of  raw  ma- 
terial received  by  each  country 
through  the  Trust  since  V-J  Day. 

As  the  date  neared  for  a  civilian 
agency  to  take  over  control  of  the 
program  in  the  United  States,  Attlee 
wrote  to  Truman  that  he  felt  the  time 
was  opportune  to  resume  discussion 
of  cooperation.  The  President  prom- 
ised to  take  up  the  question  in  the 
near  future,  but  reminded  the  Prime 
Minister  that  Combined  Policy  Com- 
mittee discussions  had  revealed  con- 
siderable differences  in  interpreting 
the  16  November  memorandum  by 
the  two  countries  and  that  new  legis- 
lation for  domestic  control  in  the 
United  States  contained  provisions 
that  would  further  complicate 
collaboration. 

Many  factors  had  contributed  to  the 
breakdown  of  efforts  to  establish  ef- 
fective Anglo-American  cooperation. 
Among  them  were  the  lingering 
American  distrust  of  the  British 
dating  back  to  wartime  incidents,  the 
continuing  problem  of  security  (rev- 
elations in  early  1946,  for  example,  of 
espionage  in  the  Canadian  program 
that  pointed  up  once  again  the  inher- 
ent threat  in  information  inter- 
change), and  the  determination  of  the 
United  States  not  to  jeopardize 
achievement  of  international  control 
through  the  United  Nations  with  too 
close  a  relationship  to  the  British. 

In  the  efforts  of  the  United  States 
in  late  1945  and  in  1946  to  establish 
in  the  United  Nations  an  effective 
system  for  the  international  control  of 
atomic  energy,   members   and   former 


members  of  the  Manhattan  Project 
played  a  considerable  role  in  assisting 
the  State  Department,  the  agency  re- 
sponsible for  developing  America's 
proposals.  Foreign  ministers  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  the  United  States  met  in  Moscow 
from  16  to  20  December  1945  and 
agreed,  as  enunciated  in  the  Truman- 
Attlee-King  Declaration  of  15  No- 
vember, to  form  a  United  Na- 
tions Commission  on  Atomic  Energy, 
with  representatives  from  each  state 
on  the  organization's  Security  Coun- 
cil, and  from  Canada  when  it  was  not 
a  member  of  the  Council.  On  24  Jan- 
uary 1946,  the  United  Nations  Gener- 
al Assembly  approved  the  British  res- 
olution authorizing  establishment  of 
the  Commission  on  Atomic  Energy 
and  scheduled  its  first  meeting 
in  New  York  City  for  June.  In 
March,  President  Truman  nominated 
Bernard  M.  Baruch,  the  well-known 
financier  and  long-time  adviser  to 
American  presidents,  to  be  the  rep- 
resentative for  the  United  States 
on  the  commission. 

Meanwhile,  the  Secretary  of  State 
had  established  a  special  committee 
to  advise  him  on  the  interchange  of 
atomic  information  with  other  coun- 
tries. He  named  Dean  Acheson,  the 
Under  Secretary  of  State,  chairman  of 
the  committee,  and  appointed  John  J. 
McCloy  (who  had  resigned  as  Assist- 
ant Secretary  of  War  in  November 
1945  to  return  to  the  practice  of  law). 
Bush,  Conant,  and  Groves  as  mem- 
bers. At  its  first  meeting  on  14  Janu- 
ary, Acheson  suggested  that,  because 
the  members  of  the  committee  were 
busy  officials  who  could  devote  only  a 
limited  amount  of  time  to  preparation 
of  such  a  plan,  the  committee  should 


574 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


appoint  a  panel  of  consultants  to  as- 
semble the  pertinent  data  and  draw 
up  proposals.  General  Groves  object- 
ed, pointing  out  that  he,  Bush,  and 
Conant  were  familiar  with  the  prob- 
lems involved. 

But  the  special  committee  decided 
in  favor  of  a  panel.  The  six  mem- 
bers— David  E.  Lilienthal  of  the  Ten- 
nessee Valley  Authority,  who  served 
as  chairman,  Chester  I.  Barnard  of 
New  Jersey  Telephone,  Harry  A. 
Winne  of  General  Electric,  Charles  A. 
Thomas  of  Monsanto  Chemical,  and 
J.  Robert  Oppenheimer,  who  had  left 
Los  Alamos  and  returned  to  the  Uni- 
versity of  California,  Berkeley — sub- 
mitted a  draft  report  to  the  commit- 
tee in  early  March.  This  draft,  after 
considerable  revision,  became  the 
basis  for  the  Acheson-Lilienthal 
report,  a  plan  for  step-by-step  coop- 
eration of  the  United  States  with  the 
other  nations  of  the  world  in  estab- 
lishing international  controls  over 
atomic  energy.  The  report,  released 
on  the  twenty-eighth,  served  as  a 
working  paper  and  a  basis  for  public 
discussion.  The  United  States  delega- 
tion to  the  United  Nations  Commis- 
sion on  Atomic  Energy  presented  the 
essential  points  of  the  plan  in  June, 
and  these  became  substantially  the 
principles  finally  accepted  by  the 
commission  on  30  December.  During 
the  extended  deliberations,  Bernard 
Baruch  relied  heavily  upon  many 
members  and  former  members  of  the 
Manhattan  Project,  including  Groves, 
who  served  as  his  consultant;  Tolman, 
who  acted  as  his  scientific  adviser; 
and  a  scientific  panel  made  up  of 
Robert  F.  Bacher,  an  experimental 
physicist  who  had  served  in  various 
capacities     at     Los     Alamos,     Arthur 


Compton,  Oppenheimer,  Thomas  and 
Urey. 

Postwar  Domestic  Aspects 

"No  matter  what  international 
policy  may  be  eventually  worked  out 
for  the  United  States  and  the  world," 
General  Groves  told  a  congressional 
committee,  peacetime  control  of 
atomic  energy  "is  necessary  to  protect 
America's  tremendous  investment  in 
atomic  research  and  development  and 
to  insure  that  this  development  will 
go  steadily  forward."  *®  To  achieve 
this  end,  members  of  the  Manhattan 
Project  in  late  1945  and  early  1946 
actively  participated  in  the  planning 
and  ongoing  discussions  of  the  vari- 
ous legislative  proposals  under 
consideration. 

Shortly  after  V-J  Day,  the  Interim 
Committee  sent  the  President  its  re- 
vised Royall-Marbury  bill  on  atomic 
energy,  and  the  President  immediate- 
ly circulated  the  draft  measure  to  the 
various  government  agencies  likely  to 
be  affected  by  its  provisions  so  that 
they  could  review  it.  Assured  by  the 
commitee's  provision  that  any  legisla- 
tion enacted  should  be  subject  to  re- 


■'^  Quotation  from  Groves's  28  Nov  45  opening 
statement  in  Atomic  Energy  Hearings  on  S.  Res.  179.  p. 
32,  with  pertinent  paragraphs  reproduced  in  App.  X 
of  Groves,  \'ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  441-42.  Except  as 
otherwise  indicated,  section  based  on  Groves,  \ou'  II 
Can  Be  Told,  pp.  389-98;  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 
.\ew  IVorld.  pp.  482-530;  U.S.  Congress,  Senate, 
Special  C'ommittee  on  Atomic  Energv,  Atomic  Energy 
Act  of  1946:  Heanngs  on  S.  1717.  79th  Cong.,  2d 
Sess.,  22  Jan-8  Apr  46  (Washington,  D.C^.:  Govern- 
ment Piinting  Office,  1946);  and  on  HB  Files,  espe- 
ciallv  FIdrs  6  (S-1  MPC),  15  (Hist  of  Atomic  Bomb, 
Apr  45),  63  (Working  Committee,  1945-46),  65-69 
and  72-74  (Interim  Committee),  82  (Atomic  Energv 
Bill-1945),  88  (Analvses  of  Bills),  89  (Amendments, 
Analvses,  etc.,  of  Mav-Johnson  Bill,  1945),  and  100 
(A-1  Interim  Committee-Min  of  Mtgs),  MDR. 


THE  ATOMIC  AGE  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS 


575 


vision  at  the  end  of  a  two-year  period, 
most  of  the  agencies  gave  their  ap- 
proval to  the  draft  bill  very  quickly. 
Only  the  State  Department,  which 
was  deeply  involved  in  the  question 
of  international  control,  threatened  to 
hold  up  its  approval  for  an  indefinite 
period.  But  because  most  of  the  lead- 
ers associated  with  the  wartime 
atomic  energy  project  strongly  felt 
there  should  be  no  delay  in  establish- 
ing a  clear  national  policy.  Secretary 
Patterson  secured  the  President's  per- 
mission to  proceed  without  that  agen- 
cy's approval  and  to  introduce  into 
Congress  what  came  to  be  known  as 
the  May-Johnson  bill.'*^ 

On  3  October,  the  President  in  his 
message  to  Congress  emphasized  the 
need  for  prompt  action  on  the  meas- 
ure to  ensure  preservation  of  the 
enormous  investment  in  atomic 
energy,  to  provide  direction  for  con- 
tinuing research,  and  to  establish  ade- 
quate controls  over  raw  materials. 
That  same  day.  Congressman  Andrew 
J.  May  introduced  the  War  Depart- 
ment's bill.  When  the  hearings  on  the 
bill  opened  in  the  House  Military  Af- 
fairs Committee  on  the  ninth.  Secre- 
tary Patterson  in  a  prepared  state- 
ment explained  to  the  committee  why 
the  Army  was  anxious  to  turn  over  re- 
sponsibihty  for  atomic  energy  to  a 
peacetime  organization:  "The  War 
Department  has  taken  the  initiative  in 
proposing  that  it  be  divested  of  the 


*^  rhe  Interim  Committee  bill,  in  view  of  the 
military  potentialities  of  atomic  energy  and  prepara- 
tion of  the  measure  under  the  guidance  of  the  War 
Department  and  Manhattan  Project,  was  remanded 
to  the  military  affairs  committees  of  both  Houses. 
Congressman  Andrew  J.  Mav,  representing  a  Ken- 
tucky district,  headed  the  House  Military  Affairs 
Committee  and  Senator  Edwin  C.  Johnson  of  (Colo- 
rado was  the  ranking  member  of  the  Senate  Military 
Affairs  Committee. 


great  authority  that  goes  with  the 
control  of  atomic  energy,  because  it 
recognizes  that  the  problems  we  face 
go  far  beyond  the  purely  military 
sphere.  The  atomic  bomb  is  the  most 
devastating  weapon  we  know,  but  the 
means  of  releasing  atomic  energy 
which  it  employs  may  prove  to  be  the 
greatest  boon  to  mankind  in  the 
world's  history.  The  wisest  minds  in 
our  Nation  will  be  required  to  admin- 
ister this  discovery  for  the  benefit  of 
all  of  us."  ^° 

Also  appearing  before  the  commit- 
tee were  Groves,  Bush,  and  Conant. 
Committee  members  questioned  each 
of  them  concerning  the  unusually 
broad  powers  to  be  given  to  the 
atomic  energy  commission  proposed 
in  the  bill.  Groves,  who  first  restated 
the  Army's  desire  to  be  relieved  of 
the  burden  of  administering  the 
atomic  energy  program,  posited  that 
the  powers  were  necessary  for  the 
commission  to  cope  with  its  vast  re- 
sponsibilities. Bush  granted  that  Con- 
gress would  be  giving  up  control  of 
atomic  energy,  except  for  appropria- 
tions and  its  right  to  revise  the  basic 
act,  but  considering  the  enormous 
hazards,  he  believed  rigid  federal  con- 
trol was  an  absolute  necessity. 
Conant,  too,  expressed  the  view  that 
the  commission  must  be  able  to  exer- 
cise extraordinary  controls  for  rea- 
sons stated  clearly  in  the  bill  itself: 
"The  misuse  of  such  energy,  by 
design  or  through  ignorance,  may  in- 
flict incalculable  disaster  upon  the 
Nation,    destroy   the   general   welfare, 


^°  Quotation  from  Patterson's  9  Oct  45  opening 
statement  in  I'.S.  Congress,  House.  Military  Affairs 
Commitee,  Atomic  Energy  Hearings  on  H  Res.  -1280, 
79th  Cong.,  1st  Sess..  9  and  18  Oct  45  (Washing- 
ton, D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office,  1945),  p.  7. 


576 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


imperil  the  national  safety,  and  en- 
danger world  peace."  ^^  At  the  con- 
clusion of  the  testimony,  the  commit- 
tee prepared  to  end  the  hearings  and 
report  the  atomic  energy  bill  back  to 
the  floor  of  the  House. 

But  adverse  reaction  in  the  Senate 
Military  Affairs  Committee,  and  from 
the  press  and  public,  indicated  the 
measure  would  arouse  considerable 
opposition.  When  Senator  Edwin  C. 
Johnson  introduced  the  bill  in  the 
Senate  committee,  Senator  Arthur  H. 
Vandenberg  of  Michigan,  the  commit- 
tee's minority  leader,  challenged  it  as 
dealing  with  a  subject  beyond  the 
competence  of  a  standing  committee 
and  therefore  requiring  consideration 
by  a  special  joint  committee  of  Con- 
gress. He  had  already  introduced  a 
joint  resolution  proposing  formation 
of  such  a  committee.  By  a  parliamen- 
tary maneuver,  he  was  able  to  hold  up 
further  consideration  of  the  bill  until 
the  House  of  Representatives  voted 
on  his  resolution. 

Meantime,  newly  formed  associa- 
tions of  atomic  scientists  at  the  Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory  and  at  the  Clinton 
Engineer  Works  had  mobilized  a 
press  campaign  against  the  bill  on  the 
grounds  that  it  was  an  attempt  by  the 
Army  to  railroad  legislation  through 
Congress  without  the  extensive  hear- 
ings before  an  impartial  committee 
such  an  important  subject  deserved. 
They  also  gave  voice  to  the  suspicion 
that  the  bill  represented  an  attempt 
by  the  War  Department  and  the  Navy 
to  secure  control  of  the  postwar 
atomic  energy  organization,  pointing 
especially  to  the  provision  that  would 


^^  Quotation  from  Conant's  opening  statement  in 
ibid.,  p.  51.  Conant  was  quoting  from  the  May-John- 
son bill,  Declaration  of  Policy,  Section  1  (a). 


permit  military  officers  to  serve  in  the 
chief  administrative  posts  without 
adequate  supervision  by  the  part-time 
commissioners.  Many  scientists,  too, 
called  attention  to  the  severity  of  the 
penalties  provided  in  the  bill's  securi- 
ty provisions  (ten  years  in  prison  and 
a  $10,000  fine),  seeing  in  them  evi- 
dence of  an  attempt  to  place  undue 
restrictions  on  scientific  employees  in 
the  postwar  atomic  program.  Mem- 
bers of  the  Interim  Committee's  sci- 
entific panel,  who  had  earlier  en- 
dorsed the  May-Johnson  bill,  ex- 
pressed alarm  at  the  heavy  penalties 
for  unauthorized  release  of  classified 
information. 

These  developments  marked  the 
beginning  of  a  prolonged  legislative 
battle.  During  the  remainder  of  1945, 
a  coalition  of  scientists,  legislators, 
and  government  officials  exerted  a 
growing  opposition  to  the  May-John- 
son bill,  which  had  at  first  the  effect 
of  preventing  the  backers  of  that 
measure  from  securing  its  rapid  en- 
actment and  led  ultimately  to  its  dis- 
placement by  a  bill  more  acceptable 
to  the  groups  in  the  coalition.  Becom- 
ing increasingly  aware  of  the  growing 
criticisms  of  the  May-Johnson  bill, 
President  Truman  privately  withdrew 
his  endorsement,  leaving  the  way 
open  for  substantial  changes  in  the 
measure.  And  in  the  Senate,  support 
grew  for  Vandenberg's  proposal  that 
a  special  committee  be  established  to 
deal  with  atomic  energy  matters. 
When  his  resolution  for  setting  up  a 
joint  committee  of  both  Houses  failed 
to  secure  the  required  votes,  Brien 
McMahon,  a  young  senator  from 
Connecticut,  led  a  movement  for  cre- 
ation of  a  special  committee  in  the 
Senate.  Passage  of  a  resolution  subse- 


THE  atomic:  age  and  rrs  problems 


577 


quently  established  the  Special  Com- 
mittee on  Atomic  Energy,  with  McMa- 
hon  as  chairman. 

Serving  with  McMahon  were  Sena- 
tors Vandenberg,  Johnson,  Richard  B. 
Russell,  Tom  Connally,  Harry  F. 
Byrd,  Millard  E.  Tydings,  Warren  R. 
Austin,  Eugene  D.  Millikin,  Bourke  B. 
Hickenlooper,  and  Thomas  C.  Hart. 
Edward  U.  Condon,  the  physicist  who 
had  worked  at  Los  Alamos  briefly 
during  the  war  but  departed  because 
of  his  objection  to  security  measures, 
joined  the  committee  as  its  scientific 
adviser  and  James  R.  Newman,  a 
lawyer  with  an  extensive  knowledge 
of  science,  as  its  special  counsel.  In 
late  November,  while  Newman 
worked  with  Manhattan  and  other 
government  officials  to  draft  a  substi- 
tute measure  to  replace  the  May- 
Johnson  bill,  the  committee  com- 
menced a  series  of  almost  daily  public 
hearings  with  the  objective  of  inform- 
ing its  members  and  the  American 
people  on  the  scientific  aspects  of 
atomic  energy.  It  closed  the  hearings 
on  20  December,  when  Senator 
McMahon  introduced  his  new  bill, 
and  reconvened  them  in  late  Januarv 
1946. 

As  the  attention  of  the  country  fo- 
cused on  atomic  energy,  opposition 
grew  toward  any  legislation  likely  to 
give  an  undue  amount  of  influence  to 
the  military  in  atomic  activities  and 
place  too  restrictive  controls  on  nu- 
clear research  and  scientists.  The 
movement,  an  aspect  of  widespread 
postwar  weariness  with  things  mili- 
tary, received  extensive  support 
among  scientists  employed  on  the 
Manhattan  Project,  who  were  by  then 
effectively  organized  as  the  Federa- 
tion of  Atomic  Scientists. 


In  February,  Secretary  Patterson 
and  General  Groves  testified  before 
the  Senate  Special  Committee,  urging 
passage  of  legislation  generally  along 
the  lines  of  the  May-Johnson  bill. 
Both  objected  strongly  to  the  provi- 
sions in  the  McMahon  bill  that  virtu- 
ally excluded  the  armed  services  from 
participation  in  the  military  applica- 
tion of  atomic  energy.  Groves,  for  ex- 
ample, contended  that  no  shift  in  em- 
phasis on  atomic  energy  as  a  military 
weapon  was  possible  until  there  were 
no  longer  wars  between  nations.  Both 
also  felt  that  the  security  provisions  of 
the  McMahon  bill,  based  upon  the 
Episonage  Act,  were  inadequate  for 
an  area  as  sensitive  as  atomic  energy. 

Secretary  Patterson  thought  the 
McMahon  bill  placed  too  many  re- 
strictions on  research  in  nuclear  sci- 
ence. Groves  continued  to  express 
preference  for  the  May-Johnson  bill's 
provision  that  the  members  of  the 
commission  be  part-time,  rather  than 
full-time  as  provided  by  the  McMahon 
measure,  because  he  believed  more 
capable  men  could  be  secured  for 
part-time  service.  He  also  objected  to 
the  McMahon  bill's  exclusion  of  active 
military  members  from  the  commis- 
sion and  he  favored  the  May-Johnson 
bill's  provision  of  a  single  executive 
rather  than  a  commission  performing 
the  executive  function. ^^ 


^2  Patterson's  14  Feb  46  opening  statement 
before  the  Senate  Special  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy  mav  be  found  in  Alomir  Energy  Act  Hearings  on 
S.  1717.  pp.  389-90;  the  original  version  of  the 
statement,  as  prepared  by  the  Secretary's  office,  is 
in  HB  Files,  Fldr  92  (Drafts  of  Secv  War  Testimo- 
n\).  MDR.  (iroves's  27  Feb  46  opening  statement 
mav  be  found  in  Atomic  Energy  Act  fleanngs  on  S. 
1717.  pp.  467-68:  the  original  version  of  the  state- 
ment, as  prepared  bv  Groves's  office,  is  in  OCXi 
Files,  Cen  C.orresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  13  (Legislation), 
MDR. 


578 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Although  the  Special  Committee 
had  reported  the  McMahon  bill  to  the 
Senate  on  19  April,  it  did  not  come  to 
the  floor  of  the  Senate  until  1  June. 
After  only  three  hours  of  debate  and 
a  few  minor  amendments,  the  meas- 
ure passed  with  no  dissenting  votes. 
The  bill  went  to  the  House  Military 
Affairs  Committee  on  the  fifth  and, 
after  brief  hearings  (11-13  June),  to 
the  House  of  Representatives.  The 
House  passed  the  bill  with  major 
changes  on  20  July,  but  most  of  the 
amendments  were  removed  in  a  sub- 
sequent conference  session.  President 
Truman  signed  the  measure  on  1 
August  as  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of 
1946.  Under  terms  of  the  act,  the 
Army's  responsibility  for  direction 
and  control  of  atomic  energy  in  the 
United  States  was  to  pass  to  a  civilian 
agency,  the  United  States  Atomic 
Energy  Commission.  This  legislation 
also  created  the  Military  Liaison  Com- 
mittee and  the  General  Advisory 
Committee,  which  were  to  provide, 
respectively,  coordination  and  sup- 
port on  matters  relating  to  future 
military  and  scientific  and  technical 
applications.^^ 


^^  As  spelled  out  in  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of 
1946  (Public  Law  585,  79th  Congress),  the  Atomic 
Energy  Commission  was  to  consist  of  five  civilian 
presidential  appointees  who  would  serve  full  time 
administering  the  program;  the  General  Advisory 
Committee,  nine  civilian  presidential  appointees 
who  would  meet  at  least  four  times  a  year;  and  the 
Military  Liaison  Committee,   representatives  of  the 


For  the  wartime  leaders  of  the 
Manhattan  Project,  the  long-delayed 
enactment  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Act 
marked  another  significant  step  in 
their  efforts  to  solve  the  problems 
they  faced  in  peacetime  control  of 
atomic  energy.  Already  they  had 
achieved  success  in  the  program  for 
release  of  public  information,  accom- 
plished without  endangering  the  na- 
tion's security.  But  many  were  con- 
vinced that  provisions  in  the  new  leg- 
islation were  likely  to  be  inadequate 
from  the  standpoint  of  security  and 
ineffectual  for  the  future  military  ap- 
plication of  atomic  energy.  Many  also 
were  disappointed  in  the  limited  suc- 
cess attained  in  reaching  workable 
agreements  for  international  control 
of  atomic  energy.  They  had  willingly 
made  available  their  special  knowl- 
edge to  the  American,  British,  and 
Canadian  political  leaders  endeavor- 
ing to  achieve  such  agreements 
through  diplomatic  negotiations  and 
the  new  United  Nations  Organization. 
These  efforts,  however,  clearly  re- 
vealed that  substantive  progress  in  in- 
ternational exchange  of  information 
and  control  of  atomic  energy  would 
become  possible  only  when  ways  were 
found  to  remove  the  numerous  and 
persistent  causes  of  fundamental  dis- 
trust among  the  nations  of  the  world. 


War  and   Navy  Departments  whom   the  Secretaries 
would  detail  in  such  numbers  as  deemed  necessary. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 


The  Army  and  the  Atomic  Energy 
Program,  1945-1947 


In  the  months  leading  up  to  the 
end  of  the  war,  the  Army's  involve- 
ment in  the  Manhattan  Project  had 
expanded  rapidly  as  all  of  its  efforts 
converged  on  completing  its  atomic 
mission  and  saving  the  lives  of  thou- 
sands of  fighting  men.  With  the  at- 
tainment of  the  wartime  objective,  the 
project's  military  leaders  expected 
that  the  Army's  administration  of  the 
atomic  energy  program  would  be 
promptly  terminated  and  strongly  rec- 
ommended that  the  government 
adopt  this  course  of  action.  In  Octo- 
ber, while  appearing  before  the 
House  Military  Affairs  Committee, 
General  Groves  once  again  advanced 
this  point  of  view,  stressing  that  the 
Army's  "responsibility  for  directing 
all  activities  relating  to  the  release 
and  use  of  atomic  energy  .  .  .  should 
not  be  continued  today."  Yet  his  solu- 
tion of  vesting  control  "in  the  most 
representative  and  able  body  our 
democratic  society  is  capable  of  orga- 
nizing" was  not  immediately  possible, 
and  the  Army  was  left  with  no  alter- 
native but  to  continue  in  a  prolonged 
and  often  frustrating  caretaker  role.^ 


A  Postwar  Trusteeship 

In  carrying  out  what  Groves  later 
termed  its  "trusteeship,"  the  Army 
not  only  would  contribute  significant- 
ly to  preserving  much  of  the  wartime 
program  but  also,  in  spite  of  wide- 
spread opposition  to  its  influence, 
would  have  an  opportunity  to  leave 
its  imprint  on  the  character  of  the 
peacetime  program.  "The  War  De- 
partment will  always  have  a  vital  in- 
terest ...  in  atomic  energy,"  Groves 
told  the  Senate's  Special  Committee 
on  Atomic  Energy,  and  "in  the  field 
of  practical  administration  and  oper- 
ation the  Army  can  furnish  invaluable 
assistance."  ^ 

While  Congress  and  the  country 
debated  the  issue  of  a  successor  orga- 
nization during  late  1945  and  early 
1946,  the  Army  experienced  a  diffi- 
cult period  of  transition  because  of  a 
number  of  critical  operational  and  ad- 
ministrative problems  at  Manhattan's 
production  and  research  facilities.  Es- 


*  Quotations  from  Groves's  9  Oct  45  opening 
statement  in  Atomic  Energy  Heanngs  on  H.  Res.  4280. 
p.  9,  with  pertinent  paragraphs  reproduced  in  App. 


IX  of  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  440-41.  A 
copy  also  may  be  found  in  HB  Files,  Fldr  66,  MDR. 
2  Qiiotations  from  Groves's  28  Nov  45  opening 
statement  in  Atomic  Energy  Hearings  on  S.  Res.  1/9.  p. 
31,  with  pertinent  paragraphs  reproduced  in  .App.  X 
of  (Proves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  441-42. 


580 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


pecially  challenging  was  the  serious 
manpower  problem  that  resulted 
from  the  process  of  postwar  demobili- 
zation. "Because  of  the  current  uncer- 
tainty," Groves  had  warned  the 
Senate  committee  in  November  1945, 
"we  are  losing  key  people  whose  ser- 
vices should  be  retained.  Until  that  un- 
certainty is  resolved  by  the  establish- 
ment of  a  national  policy,  .  .  .  [the 
project  will  experience  an]  apprecia- 
ble loss  of  the  present  efficiency  of 
the  vast  combination  of  plants,  scien- 
tific talent,  and  engineering  skill."  ^ 

Project  Operations  and  Problems 

In  the  weeks  immediately  after  the 
surrender  of  Japan,  while  Manhattan 
District  teams  were  collecting  data  on 
the  effects  of  the  Hiroshima  and  Na- 
gasaki bombings  and  tracing  the 
progress  of  Japanese  scientists  in  the 
field  of  atomic  energy.  General 
Groves  and  his  staff  were  preparing 
to  convert  the  atomic  program  to  a 
peacetime  status.  As  perceived  by 
Groves,  the  Army's  responsibility 
during  the  transitional  period  would 
be  keeping  the  wartime  program 
functioning  efficiently,  closing  down 
those  elements  that  were  no  longer 
needed,  completing  construction 
projects  already  in  progress,  and 
maintaining  as  far  as  feasible  an 
effective  working  organization  in 
face  of  the  eroding  pressures  of 
demobilization. 

To  facilitate  the  Army's  interim 
stewardship  of  the  atomic  program, 
Groves  and  his  staff  drafted  a  plan  for 


postwar  project  operations.*  Under 
this  plan,  fissionable  materials  pro- 
duction at  the  Clinton  and  Hanford 
Engineer  Works  would  be  reduced  by 
about  15  percent,  thus  cutting  operat- 
ing costs  more  than  30  percent  and 
achieving  an  appreciable  savings  in 
uranium;  weapons  production  at  the 
Los  Alamos  Laboratory  would  contin- 
ue, but  at  a  somewhat  lower  rate,  with 
the  objective  of  building  a  stockpile 
of  twenty  bombs.  Project  operations, 
Groves  emphasized,  would  proceed  at 
this  curtailed  rate  only  until  Congress 
reached  a  decision  on  America's 
future  atomic  energy  policy.  In  late 
August,  following  the  Military  Policy 
Committee's  approval  of  his  plan,  the 
Manhattan  commander  submitted  it 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Chief 
of  Staff  for  their  endorsement.  After  a 
close  review,  Stimson  and  Marshall 
concurred  with  the  provisions  of  the 
plan. 

An  obvious  first  step  to  implement- 
ing Grovcs's  plan  was  to  close  down 
less  efficient  production  units,  to 
achieve  the  most  economical  use  of 
money,  manpower,  and  materials.  In 
early  September,  the  District  shut 
down  the  thermal  diffusion  plant  at 
Clinton  and  placed  the  Alpha  race- 
tracks of  the  electromagnetic  plant  on 
standby.  Additional  Beta  facilities 
under  construction  would  be  ready  in 
November  to  provide  much  more  effi- 
cient enrichment  facilities  than  the 
unreliable  Alpha  calutrons.  Further- 
more,   upper    stages    of  the    gaseous 


^  Quotation  from  Ainmu  Energy  Hearings  on  S.  Res. 
179,  p.  32.  See  also  Statement  by  General  Groves 
on  Dissolution  of  Manhattan  Engr  Dist,  14  Aug  47, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  319.2  (Misc),  MDR. 


■•  For  details  of  Groves's  plan  see  Memo,  Groves 
to  Chief  of  Staff,  23  Aug  45,  OCG  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp, MP  Files,  Fldr  2,  1  ab  A,  MDR.  Groves  appears 
to  have  based  his  plan  on  Draft  Memo,  Groves  (pre- 
pared by  Nichols)  to  Secv  War,  13  Aug  45,  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Fldr  17,  Tab  K, 
MDR. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1945-1947 


581 


diffusion  plant,  which  had  proved  to 
be  the  most  efficient  producer  of 
partly  processed  uranium  feed,  had 
become  operational  in  mid-August, 
making  available  higher  assay  feed  for 
the  Beta  enrichment  process.  The 
District  also  decided  to  complete  con- 
struction of  the  plant's  K-27  side-feed 
extension  unit,  scheduled  to  be  ready 
for  full  operation  by  early  1946. 

At  Hanford,  the  District  directed 
Du  Pont  to  continue  operation  of  all 
three  production  piles  but  to  shut 
down  one  of  the  two  chemical  separa- 
tion plants.  It  also  closed  the  last  of 
the  three  heavy  water  plants  that  the 
project  had  built  in  the  United  States; 
two  had  ceased  operation  before  V-J 
Day.  The  plant  at  Trail  (British  Co- 
lumbia) continued  in  operation,  but 
the  District  recommended  that  by  Jan- 
uary 1946  partial  control  be  turned 
over  to  the  Canadian  firm  (Consoli- 
dated Mining  and  Smelting  Company) 
operating  it. 

In  contrast  to  Clinton  and  Hanford, 
the  future  of  postwar  operations  at 
Los  Alamos  was  more  problematic  be- 
cause of  the  combination  of  produc- 
tion activities  with  an  extensive  re- 
search and  development  program. 
Under  Groves's  plan,  bomb  produc- 
tion at  Los  Alamos  was  to  continue  at 
least  until  completion  of  an  adequate 
stockpile  of  weapons.  But  the  labora- 
tory was  no  longer  the  base  of  oper- 
ations for  bomb  production.  Soon 
after  the  end  of  the  war,  the  engi- 
neering group  of  the  laboratory's  ord- 
nance division  had  decided  to  consoli- 
date much  of  its  weapon  assembly  ac- 
tivities at  Sandia  Base,  located  directly 
east  of  Kirtland  Field  on  the  site  of 
Albuquerque's  original  airport  at  the 
southern  edge  of  the  city.  Beginning 
in  September  1945,  to  support  bomb 


production  activities  at  Sandia,  essen- 
tial technical  and  military  personnel 
from  Los  Alamos  and  all  project  per- 
sonnel and  facilities  from  Wendover 
Field  transferred  to  the  Albuquerque 
site.  Finally,  in  early  1946,  most  of 
the  remaining  members  of  the  engi- 
neering group  relocated  there. ^ 

Another  problem  in  Los  Alamos 
operations  was  the  progressive  ero- 
sion of  its  scientific  and  technical  per- 
sonnel. Because  of  the  uncertainty  of 
the  laboratory's  future,  many  wartime 
scientists  and  technicians  prepared  to 
resign  and  return  to  civilian  pursuits. 
Some,  of  course,  would  have  depart- 
ed under  any  circumstances;  the  war 
was  over  and  they  had  jobs  waiting  in 
universities,  scientific  laboratories,  or 
industry.  Others  were  tired  of  the 
security  restrictions  or  disliked  the 
isolation  and  unfavorable  living 
conditions. 

To  deal  with  this  personnel  prob- 
lem. General  Groves  and  Oppen- 
heimer,  who  was  himself  returning  to 
the  University  of  California  at  Berke- 
ley, met  with  the  scientists  and  techni- 
cians in  the  weeks  following  the  end 
of  the  war.  During  these  meetings  the 


^  The  immediate  postwar  history  of  the  bomb 
production  groups  at  Los  Alamos  and  Sandia  Base 
is  covered  in  some  detail  in  Frederic  C.  Alexander, 
Jr.,  Hutory  of  Sandia  Corporation  Through  Fiscal  Year 
1963  (Albuquerque,  N.Mex.:  [Sandia  Corp.],  1963, 
pp.  1-14.  See  also  MDH,  Bk.  8.  Vol.  2,  "Technical," 
Supp.,  pp.  VIII.1-VIII.7,  DASA.  In  the  transition 
period  from  July  1945  to  July  1947,  the  total 
number  of  nuclear  components  for  bombs  produced 
was  about  eighteen  (seventeen  implosion,  one  gun), 
which  included  those  for  the  test  device  exploded  at 
Trinity,  the  two  bombs  used  on  Hiroshima  and  Na- 
gasaki, and  the  two  exploded  in  Operation  Cross- 
roads. An  estimated  twenty-nine  mechanical  assem- 
blies for  implosion  bombs  were  available  in  June 
1947.  See  David  Rosenberg.  "U.S.  Nuclear  Stock- 
pile, 1945  to  1950,"  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists  38 
(May  82):  25-30.  The  above  figures  are  derived 
from  Table,  p.  26. 


582 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


two  leaders  assured  the  staff  members 
that  the  laboratory  would  continue  to 
be  a  center  of  weapons  research,  that 
security  would  be  less  strict,  and  that 
the  work  schedule  would  be  more  re- 
laxed. Even  the  newly  appointed  in- 
terim laboratory  director,  Comdr. 
Norris  Bradbury,  joined  in  the  efforts 
to  arrest  the  outflow  of  personnel.  At 
a  briefing  in  October,  he  outlined  a 
program  of  the  activities  he  hoped 
would  be  sufficiently  attractive  to 
hold  some  of  the  scientific  staff — 
reengineering  implosion  weapons,  re- 
search on  the  feasibility  of  the  hydro- 
gen bomb,  further  Trinity-type  tests, 
and  study  of  constructive  uses  of 
atomic  energy.  But  despite  these  ef- 
forts, the  laboratory  by  early  1946 
was  seriously  short  of  both  scientific 
and  technical  personnel.^ 

Manhattan's  other  research  and  de- 
velopment centers  experienced  diffi- 
culties similar  to  those  at  Los  Alamos. 
Sensing  that  a  time  of  uncertainty 
would  follow  employment  of  the 
bomb,  project  scientists  had  long 
been    proposing    possible    areas    for 


®  This  account  of  developments  at  L.os  Alamos 
from  August  to  December  1945  is  based  on  Hewlett 
and  Anderson,  New  World,  pp.  625-27;  Groves,  Xow 
It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  377-79;  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2, 
Supp.,  passim,  DASA.  Commander  Bradbury,  a 
physicist,  served  for  four  years  at  the  Naval  Proving 
Ground  (Dahlgren,  Virginia)  before  coming  to  Los 
Alamos  in  1944  to  head  the  field  test  program  for 
the  implosion  bomb.  He  subsequently  worked  on  a 
variety  of  other  programs  at  the  laboratory.  On  the 
interim  director's  efforts  see  Ltr,  Bradbury  to 
Groves,  3  Nov  45,  322  (Los  Alamos);  Ltr,  Bradbury 
to  Lt  Col  Stanley  L.  Stewart  (Los  Angeles),  14  Nov 
45,  600.12  (Los  Alamos);  Ltr,  Bradbury  to  Groves, 
23  Nov  45,  600.12  (Projs  and  Prgms).  All  in  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MDR.  For  Groves's  views  on  re- 
placing Oppenheimer  see  Draft  Memo  for  Record, 
Groves,  13  Sep  45,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  001, 
MDR.  On  the  departure  of  the  British  scientists 
from  Los  Alamos  see  Ltr,  Chadwick  to  Groves,  9 
Jan  46,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  201  (Chadwick, 
J),  MDR. 


Oppenheimer  Congratulating  the 
Troops.  In  one  of  his  last  official  acts, 
the  laboratory  director  participated  with 
Col.  Gerald  R.  Tyler,  post  commander, 
in  an  aivards  ceremony  at  Los  Alamos. 

continued  research  and  development 
in  the  field  of  atomic  energy.  They 
suggested,  for  example,  exploring 
atomic  energy  as  a  source  of  power 
for  both  military  and  civilian  applica- 
tions, producing  radioactive  isotopes 
for  scientific  research  and  industrial 
uses,  and  improving  devices  to 
employ  the  tremendous  explosive 
energy  of  fission.  But  the  Army  hesi- 
tated to  start  any  research  program 
that  would  constitute  long-range  com- 
mitments for  the  still  to  be  estab- 
lished successor  agency  to  the  Man- 
hattan Project."^ 


^  On  proposed  postwar  programs  in  atomic 
energy  see  committee  reports  of  meetings  at  the 
Metallurgical  Laboratory  in  the  fall  of  1944,  which 
may  be  found  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  334 
(Postwar  Policy-CEW),  MDR.  See  also  Rpt,  Scientif- 

C'.ontinued 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1945-1947 


583 


Although  most  of  the  project's  re- 
search and  development  facilities  had 
to  devote  their  time  to  the  generally 
less  attractive  and  challenging  busi- 
ness of  winding  up  wartime  research, 
some  managed  to  launch  their  own 
investigations  into  aspects  of  atomic 
energy  that  held  broader  promise  for 
the  future.  At  the  Clinton  Laborato- 
ries, scientists  continued  wartime  in- 
vestigations into  the  effects  of  radi- 
ation on  animals  and  undertook  re- 
covery of  uranium  from  wastes  held 
in  storage  solutions,  but  also  began 
two  new  programs:  the  production  of 
radioactive  isotopes,  and  the  design 
and  development  of  a  heterogeneous 
pile  using  enriched  uranium.  At  the 
Metallurgical  Laboratory,  while  oper- 
ating under  an  interim  organization, 
scientists  kept  busy  supporting  the 
Hanford  project,  but  also  were  able 
to  give  some  time  to  such  programs 
as  the  development  of  a  breeder  reac- 
tor for  producing  nuclear  fuel.^ 

ic  Panel,  sub:  Proposals  for  R  &  D  in  the  Field  ol 
Atomic  Energy,  2  vols.,  28  Sep  45,  HB  Files,  Fldr 
113,  MDR;  Ltr,  Compton  to  Secy  Comm  Henry  A. 
Wallace,  sub:  Policy  Re  A-Energy,  27  Sep  45, 
Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  312.1  (A-Energy),  and 
Ltr,  Bradbury  to  Groves,  23  Nov  45,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Projs  and  Prgms),  MDR.  On 
the  production  and  release  of  radioactive  isotopes 
for  scientific  research  see  the  materials  in  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  441.2  (Isotopes),  MDR. 

'The  term  breeder  reactor  was  broadly  applied  to 
any  nuclear  chain  reactor  in  which  fertile  material 
(U-238,  for  example)  could  be  converted  into  more 
fissionable  material  than  it  consumed.  Looking  to 
the  future  use  of  atomic  energy  as  a  source  of 
power  for  producing  electricity  and  propelling  naval 
vessels,  nuclear  scientists  could  perceive  the  value  of 
developing  a  means  for  steadily  increasing  the 
stockpile  of  fissionable  material.  Fhe  breeder  would 
maximize  utilization  of  fertile,  nonfissionable  mate- 
rial by  converting  it  into  nuclear  fuel  that  could  be 
used  for  the  production  of  power.  For  a  detailed  ex- 
planation of  the  breeder  reactor  see  Glasstone, 
Sourcebook  on  Atomic  Energy,  pp.  572-74,  pars.,  15.44- 
15.52. 


Of  all  the  project's  research  and  de- 
velopment centers,  the  Radiation  Lab- 
oratory succeeded  best  in  switching 
from  wartime  activities  to  fundamen- 
tal scientific  research.  It  had  been  a 
well-established  research  center 
before  the  war  (since  1935)  and  could 
again  take  up  suspended  tasks  (such 
as  completing  the  184-inch  cyclotron, 
stopped  in  1941)  and  new  projects 
(such  as  building  a  synchroton,  an  ap- 
paratus for  imparting  charged  parti- 
cles with,  higher  speeds  than  were 
possible  in  the  cyclotron).  Ernest 
Lawrence,  continuing  as  director  of 
the  laboratory,  even  managed  to  per- 
suade a  reluctant  General  Groves  to 
approve  use  of  some  government 
funds  to  carry  on  these  scientific  con- 
struction projects.® 

As  the  Army  was  curtailing  project 
operations  and  winding  up  its  re- 
search and  development  programs, 
the  process  of  postwar  demobilization 
became  a  serious  threat  to  its  effec- 
tive administration  of  the  program 
during  the  interim  period.  In  an 
effort  to  maintain  present  efficiency, 
the  district  engineer  in  October  1945 
requested  all  organizations  in  the 
project  to  make  a  study  of  their  an- 
ticipated personnel  problems  and  to 
submit  plans  for  making  the  necessary 
adjustments.  In  the  next  eight  or  nine 
months,  he  noted,  many  military  per- 
sonnel would  become  eligible  for  re- 
lease. Some  in  this  category  could 
continue  in  a  civilian  capacity  in  their 
present     assignments,     while     others 


'This  paragraph  and  the  preceding  one  based  on 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  \eu>  World,  pp.  627-28.  The 
Metallurgical  Laboratory  operated  under  an  interim 
organization  because  Arthur  Compton  had  left  to 
become  chancellor  of  Washington  University  in  St. 
Louis,  Missouri. 


584 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


would  become  available  for  reassign- 
ment to  other  installations.  Planning 
well  in  advance  of  these  inevitably 
disrupting  shifts  of  personnel,  the  dis- 
trict engineer  advised,  was  the  only 
way  to  prevent  a  serious  decline  in 
the  efficiency  of  project  operations.  ^° 

Personnel  attrition  was  especially 
heavy  among  Manhattan's  commis- 
sioned officers.  During  the  war,  the 
military  officer  complement  was  com- 
prised almost  exclusively  of  noncareer 
reservists;  at  the  war's  end,  most  were 
eligible  for  immediate  discharge.  For 
replacements.  Groves  decided  he 
would  need  about  fifty  regular  offi- 
cers. Under  ordinary  circumstances,  a 
request  for  this  number  could  readily 
be  filled,  but  the  Manhattan  com- 
mander advanced  special  require- 
ments that  complicated  the  requisi- 
tion. He  specifically  stipulated  that 
only  the  most  highly  qualified  officers 
meeting  very  strict  selection  standards 
be  assigned  to  Manhattan  as  replace- 
ments, for  officers  of  lesser  capabili- 
ties could  not  work  successfully  with 
scientists  and  would  not  be  able  to 
acquire  the  technical  knowledge 
needed  to  perform  effectively  on  the 
project. 

The  replacements  were  needed 
quickly,  and  because  there  was  Httle 
time  for  extensive  investigation  into 
their  qualifications,  Groves  turned  to 
graduates  of  the  United  States  Mili- 
tary Academy  as  the  most  likely 
source  of  candidates.  This  poHcy  soon 
brought  protests  from  the  War  De- 
partment General  Staff,  which  could 
see  no  reason  why  the  Manhattan 
Project  should  have  first  choice  of  the 
best-qualified    officers    in    the    Army. 


General  Groves  sought  the  support 
of  the  new  Chief  of  Staff,  General 
Eisenhower,  for  this  selection  pohcy, 
but  the  latter  sided  with  the  General 
Staff.  Groves  then  turned  to  Secretary 
of  War  Patterson,  who  finally  resolved 
the  matter  in  his  favor.  The  Manhat- 
tan commander,  Patterson  directed, 
was  "to  have  as  many  officers  as  he 
decided  he  needs  and  of  the  quality 
he  thinks  he  needs,  and  I  want  him  to 
have  complete  freedom  of  choice."  " 
During  the  Army's  postwar  steward- 
ship, the  number  of  commissioned  of- 
ficers fell  from  a  September  1945 
peak  of  more  than  700  to  a  December 
1946  low  of  250.  But  the  decline  was 
generally  proportionate  to  the  overall 
reduction  in  employment  on  the 
project  during  the  transition  period 
(thus,  contractor  employment  fell 
from  eighty  thousand  to  a  little  over 
forty  thousand  in  the  same  months). 
Similarly,  enlisted  personnel  declined 
from  over  five  thousand  to  somewhat 
more  than  two  thousand.  While  there 
was  the  anticipated  turnover  in  officer 
personnel  characteristic  of  any  period 
of  demobilization  after  a  war,  a  sur- 
prisingly large  percentage  of  the  war- 
time officers  in  key  positions  stayed 
on  until  at  least  the  latter  part  of 
1946,    and    many    of  those   who    did 


•"MD  Cir  Ltr,  sub:  Org  Adjustments,  27  Oct  45, 
Admin  Files,  MD  Directives,  Ser.  46,  Control,  MDR. 


"As  quoted  in  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p. 
376.  A  good  example  of  the  quality  of  regular  offi- 
cers Groves  was  able  to  secure  was  Col.  Frederick  J. 
Clarke,  an  engineer  officer,  who,  in  early  1946,  re- 
placed Colonel  Matthias  as  area  engineer  at  Han- 
ford.  Clarke,  a  graduate  of  the  United  States  Mili- 
tary Academy,  held  important  assignments  in  the 
Army  Service  Forces  during  the  war,  and  before 
completing  his  career  in  the  Army,  he  served  as  the 
engineer  commissioner  for  the  District  of  Columbia 
(1960-63)  and  as  the  Engineers  chief  (1969-73). 
See  Corps  of  Engineers,  Engineer  Memoirs:  Interviews 
With  Lieutenant  General  Frederick  J.  Clarke  (Washing- 
ton, D.C.:  OCE  Historical  Division,  1979),  pp.  v  and 
93-106. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1945-1947 


585 


i|H| 

■■■■■■■■■jjjHHI 

^^^^BIH^H 

^^^^H 

^I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^V  ^                I^^^^^^^^B 

^^^Hki^  ^^^^1 

'^•TA-Cjl^^^ 

Pli^jl^^l 

jj^^HHHuHJBB^B^P 

Secretary  of  War  Robert  P.  Patterson  {left)  meeting  with  General  Groves  on 
postwar  problems 


resign     continued     with     the     atomic 
project  in  a  civilian  capacity.  ^^ 

Serious  losses  of  personnel  also  oc- 
curred among  operational  and  re- 
search employees,  including  most  of 
the  nonmilitary  scientists  and  techni- 
cians. From  a  total  often  thousand  in 
September  1945,  this  group  declined 
to  under  three  thousand  by  December 
1946.  Other  contract  employees — 
chiefly  those  operating  the  produc- 
tion facilities  and  maintaining  services 
at  Clinton  and  Hanford — also  fell  in 
numbers,   but   at   a   somewhat   slower 


'^MDH,  Bk.  1.  Vol.  8,  "Personnel."  Apps.  Al 
(Chan,  Manhattan  Proj  Contractor  Emplovment, 
Aug  42-Dec  46)  and  A13  (Chart,  MD  Mil  Personnel, 
Aug  42-Dec  46),  DASA;  Org  Charts,  L.S.  Engrs 
Office,  MD,  10  Nov  44  and  6  Nov  46,  Admin  Files, 
Gen  Corresp,  020  (MED-Org),  MDR. 


rate.  In  the  same  period,  the  decline 
at  Clinton  was  from  about  forty-five 
thousand  to  twenty-five  thousand  and 
at  Hanford  from  ten  thousand  to  less 
than  five  thousand.  At  the  New 
Mexico  site,  the  always  small  operat- 
ing work  force  remained  at  a  constant 
level  of  fifteen  hundred  to  two  thou- 
sand during  late  1945  and  most  of 
1946,  then  rose  rapidly  in  November 
and  December  to  over  five  thousand 
as  the  Sandia  Base  built  up  its 
personnel.  ^^ 

Destruction  of  Japanese  Cyclotrons 

Illustrative    of    the    serious    break- 
down   in    the   operating   efficiency   of 


'^MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  8,  App.  Al,  DASA. 


586 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


the  Army  in  the  first  hectic  months  of 
its  postwar  trusteeship  was  the  unfor- 
tunate decision  to  destroy  the  Japa- 
nese cyclotrons.^"*  With  the  war  over, 
the  process  of  demobilization  began 
to  diminish  the  ranks  of  the  project's 
key  personnel.  Despite  concerted  ef- 
forts to  procure  only  highly  compe- 
tent men,  the  experienced  were  re- 
placed in  some  instances  by  the  inex- 
perienced. This  was  the  case  at 
Groves's  personal  headquarters  in 
Washington,  where  the  staff  officer 
who  prepared  the  directive  to  destroy 
the  cyclotrons  was,  in  Groves's  opin- 
ion, not  sufficiently  familiar  with  the 
project's  operating  procedures. 

Manhattan's  discovery  of  the  Japa- 
nese cyclotrons  in  the  weeks  immedi- 
ately following  the  Hiroshima  and  Na- 
gasaki bombings  was  significant,  for  it 
confirmed  the  wartime  judgment  of 
project  scientists  that,  in  the  area  of 
atomic  energy,  Japan  had  not  pro- 
gressed beyond  the  stage  of  laborato- 
ry research.  The  country  had  too  few 


'*This  account  of  the  destruction  of  the  Japanese 
cyclotrons  is  based  on  the  following  sources:  Corre- 
spondence and  related  items  in  HB  Files,  Fldrs  7 
and  70,  MDR;  Correspondence,  including  MacAr- 
thur's  denial  of  responsibility  for  destruction  of  the 
cyclotrons  and  Secretary  of  War  Patterson's  accept- 
ance of  that  responsibility,  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  413.6  (Destruction  of  Japanese  Cyclotrons), 
MDR;  Ltrs,  Dean  Acheson  (for  Secy  State)  to  Sir 
Frederic  W.  Eggleston  (Australian  Minister  to  U.S.), 
10  Dec  45,  and  Col  R.  L.  Vittrup  (for  Secy  War)  to 
State  Dept,  Attn:  Japan-Korea  Economic  Division, 
sub:  Request  for  Info  on  Cyclotrons  in  Japan,  29 
Dec  45,  in  U.S.  Department  of  State,  The  Bnlish  Com- 
monwealth [and]  The  Far  East,  Foreign  Relations  of 
the  United  States,  Diplomatic  Papers,  1945,  Vol.  6 
(Washington,  D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office, 
1969),  pp.  1011  and  1014-15;  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  14, 
"Intelligence  &  Security,"  pp.  5.1-5.4;  Groves,  S'ow 
It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  187  and  367-72;  Douglas  MacAr- 
thur.  Reminiscences  (New  York:  McGraw-Hill  Book 
Co.,  1964),  pp.  286-87;  Compton,  Atomic  Quest,  p. 
24;  Yoshio  Nishina,  "A  Japanese  Scientist  Describes 
the  Destruction  of  His  Cyclotrons,"  Bulletin  of  the 
Atomic  Scieritists  3  (Jun  47):  145  and  167. 


scientists  trained  in  nuclear  physics 
and  lacked  both  the  sources  of  ura- 
nium and  the  necessary  industrial 
capacity  to  produce  fissionable 
materials  for  development  of  atomic 
weapons. 

A  project  survey  team  had  found 
cyclotrons  at  three  of  the  major  scien- 
tific research  institutions  in  Japan: 
two  at  the  Institute  for  Physical  and 
Chemical  Research  in  Tokyo,  two  at 
the  Osaka  Imperial  University,  and 
one  at  the  Kyoto  Imperial  University. 
After  Japan's  surrender,  scientists  at 
these  institutions  requested  permis- 
sion from  the  headquarters  of  Gener- 
al MacArthur,  recently  appointed  Su- 
preme Commander  for  the  Allied 
Powers  (SCAP),  Japan,  to  resume  op- 
erations of  these  cyclotrons  for  vari- 
ous research  projects.  SCAP  authori- 
ties promptly  granted  a  permit  for 
operation  of  those  at  the  Institute  for 
Physical  and  Chemical  Research,  al- 
though they  subsequently  limited 
their  employment  to  investigations  in 
biology  and  medicine. 

Meantime,  in  early  September,  the 
War  Department  General  Staff  had 
issued  instructions  directing  destruc- 
tion of  all  enemy  war  equipment, 
except  that  which  was  to  be  saved  for 
examination  because  of  its  new  or 
unique  character.  The  instructions 
clearly  stated  that  "equipment  not  es- 
sentially or  exclusively  for  war  which 
is  suitable  for  peacetime  civilian  uses 
should  be  retained."  ^^  On  30  Octo- 
ber, the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  expand- 
ed these  instructions,  directing  com- 
manders in  the  Pacific  area  and  China 
to  seize  any  facilities  for  research  in 


^*As   quoted   in   Groves,   Noiv  It  Can   Be   Told,   p. 
368. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1945-1947 


587 


atomic  energy  and  related  fields  and 
to  take  into  custody  any  individuals 
engaged  in  nuclear  research. 

When  a  copy  of  the  30  October  di- 
rective reached  General  Groves,  he 
called  in  an  officer  from  his  head- 
quarters staff  and  went  over  its  con- 
tents with  him,  with  the  objective  of 
making  certain  that  the  five  Japanese 
cyclotrons  were  brought  under  con- 
trol. The  Manhattan  commander  did 
not  specify  precisely  how  they  were  to 
be  secured.  The  staff  officer,  inter- 
preting his  instructions  from  Groves 
to  be  that  he  was  to  take  steps  to 
have  the  cyclotrons  destroyed,  on 
7  November  prepared  a  message  to 
General  MacArthur  ordering  that  this 
be  done  as  soon  as  they  were  no 
longer  needed  by  Allied  scientific 
teams  to  obtain  technical  and  experi- 
mental data.  Because  the  message  was 
to  go  out  under  the  Secretary  of 
War's  name,  Groves's  office  cleared  it 
through  John  W.  Martyn,  Patterson's 
administrative  assistant,  who,  viewing 
it  as  concerned  only  with  a  routine 
matter,  did  not  specifically  call  it  to 
the  Secretary's  attention.  ^^ 

On  24  November,  SCAP  headquar- 
ters reported  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff  that  it  had  started  destruction  of 
the  cyclotrons,  which  it  had  seized  on 
the  twentieth,  citing  as  authority  only 
the    30    October    directive.    Although 


^^General  Groves  notes  in  his  memoirs  (see  ibid., 
p.  369)  that  the  stafT  officer  who  oversaw  prepara- 
tion of  the  message  had  only  recently  been  assigned 
to  the  atomic  project.  He  thinks  that  if  the  officer 
had  been  more  familiar  with  the  project's  operating 
procedures,  he  would  have  questioned  Groves's  ap- 
parent desire  to  have  the  cyclotrons  destroyed.  The 
destruction  order  thus  would  have  been  brought  to 
Groves's  personal  attention,  and  he  would  have  had 
it  remanded.  The  draft  cable  message  is  attached  to 
Memo,  Maj  Amos  E.  Britt  (for  Groves)  to  Martyn, 
sub:  Destruction  of  Cyclotrons  in  Japan,  7  Nov  45, 
HB  Files,  Fldr  7,  MDR. 


copies  of  the  report  went  to  the  of- 
fices of  nine  different  officials,  includ- 
ing that  of  General  Groves,  apparent- 
ly no  one  in  authority  actually  saw  it. 
In  retrospect,  Groves  attributed  the 
failure  of  policymaking  officers  in 
Washington  to  question  the  destruc- 
tion on  the  widespread  inexperience 
prevalent  in  subordinate  staffs  as  a 
result  of  the  postwar  readjustment.^' 

SCAP  headquarters  first  got  an  in- 
kling that  there  was  some  confusion 
in  policy  within  the  War  Department 
on  the  matter  of  the  Japanese  cyclo- 
trons when  it  received  a  request  on 
28  November  to  send  one  of  the  cy- 
clotrons to  the  United  States  for 
study.  General  MacArthur  personally 
informed  General  Eisenhower  of  the 
conflicting  instructions,  but  received 
no  reply  to  his  cable. 

Meanwhile,  the  story  of  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  cyclotrons  had  come  out 
in  the  American  press.  A  dispatch 
from  Tokyo  carrying  a  date  line  of 
24  November  attributed  the  action  to 
orders  from  General  MacArthur. 
However,  another  story  on  29  No- 
vember, quoting  sources  in  MacAr- 
thur's  headquarters,  stated  that  the 
decision  was  not  made  by  SCAP,  but 
by  a  "higher  authority"  in  Washing- 
ton. The  occupation  government  had 
reluctantly  carried  out  these 
instructions.^^ 

Faced  with  inquiries  from  the  press, 
the  War  Department  cabled  MacAr- 
thur's  headquarters  that  it  had  never 
sent  the  instructions  to  destroy  the 
cyclotrons.  The  department  conced- 
ed, however,  that  its  failure  to  com- 
ment    on     MacArthur's     message     of 


'^  Groves.  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  369. 
'KWew  York  Times.  24  and  29  Nov  43. 


588 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


24  November  had  contributed  to  the 
misunderstanding.  MacArthur  repHed 
that  the  special  instructions  had  come 
from  the  Secretary  of  War,  pointing 
out  that  he  had  personally  informed 
Eisenhower  of  their  apparently  con- 
flicting nature  but  had  never  received 
a  reply.  MacArthur  felt  he  had  to 
answer  the  untrue  charges,  which 
continued  to  appear  in  the  press,  that 
the  occupation  government  had  made 
the  decision  to  destroy  the  cyclotrons. 
The  War  Department  immediately 
sent  him  assurances  that  he  had  acted 
correctly  and  the  misunderstanding 
had  occurred  entirely  because  officials 
in  Washington  had  not  coordinated 
outgoing  messages. 

Having  thus  accepted  full  responsi- 
bility for  mismangement  of  the 
matter,  the  War  Department  had  next 
to  seek  some  way  to  allay  the  continu- 
ing widespread  criticism  in  the  press. 
Patterson  and  Groves  finally  agreed 
upon  release  of  a  frankly  worded 
statement  to  the  press,  signed  by  the 
Secretary,  accepting  full  responsibility 
for  the  unfortunate  incident: 

General  MacArthur  was  directed  to  de- 
stroy the  Japanese  cyclotrons  in  a  radio 
message  sent  to  him  in  my  name.  The 
message  was  dispatched  without  my 
having  seen  it  and  without  its  having 
been  given  the  thorough  consideration 
which  the  subject  deserved.  Among  other 
things,  the  opinion  of  our  scientific  advis- 
ers should  have  been  obtained  before  a 
decision  was  arrived  at. 

While  the  officer  who  originated  it  felt 
that  the  action  was  in  accord  with  our  es- 
tablished policy  of  destroying  Japan's  war 
potential,  the  dispatch  of  such  a  message 
without  first  investigating  the  matter  fully 
was  a  mistake.  I  regret  this  hasty  action 
on  the  part  of  the  War  Department.  ^^ 


The  press,  apparently  not  expecting 
such  an  open  admission  of  error  on 
the  part  of  the  War  Department,  soon 
lost  interest  in  the  matter  of  the  Japa- 
nese cyclotrons.  Unfortunately,  how- 
ever, the  incident  would  provide  addi- 
tional fuel  for  the  more  vociferous 
critics  of  the  department's  atomic 
policies  in  the  immediate  postwar 
period. 

Reorganization  and  New  Commitments 

Faced  with  a  continuing  attrition  in 
personnel,  the  need  to  prepare  pro- 
grams for  fiscal  year  (FY)  1947,  and 
other  urgent  administrative  problems, 
the  Army  decided  in  early  1946  to 
abandon  the  "hold-the  line"  policy  and 
make  long-range  commitments  neces- 
sary to  keep  the  project  a  viable  and 
efficient  operation.  For  example. 
Groves  advised  Bradbury  at  Los 
Alamos  that  "it  has  .  .  .  become  nec- 
essary for  me  to  make  definite  plans, 
despite  the  fact  that  this  will  commit 
to  some  extent  at  least  any  future 
control  body."  Similarly,  in  a  pre- 
pared brief  for  Groves,  General  Nich- 
ols warned  that  the  Manhattan  Project 
must  begin  making  some  firm  com- 
mitments to  avoid  dissolution  of  its 
many  research  programs.  Hence,  a 
first  order  of  business  under  the  new 
policy  was  to  make  certain  changes  in 
the  administrative  organization  of  the 
project,  to  facilitate  planning  and  to 
oversee  the  day-to-day  operations. ^° 


i«WD  Press  Release,  15  Dec  45,  HB  Files,  Fldr  7, 
MDR. 


^'' Quolaiions  from  Ltr,  Groves  to  Bradbury,  4  Jan 
46,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  600.12  (Atomic), 
MDR.  Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves,  2  Feb  46,  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  20,  Tab  U,  MDR. 
Nichols's  promotion  to  the  temporary  rank  of  briga- 
dier general  became  effective  on  22  Jan  46  but  was 
terminated  on  30  Jun  46. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1945-1947 


589 


The  hold-the-line  policy  had  occa- 
sioned very  few  changes  in  the  inter- 
nal administrative  organization  of  the 
postwar  Manhattan  Project  up  until 
1946.  The  relationship,  too,  with  the 
War  Department  had  continued  more 
or  less  on  the  same  basis  as  during 
the  war,  with  Groves  having  a  good 
deal  of  autonomy  in  his  administra- 
tion and  having  access  to  the  depart- 
ment through  the  Chief  of  Staff  and, 
when  necessary,  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  himself.  The  War  Department,  in 
consultation  with  Groves  and  Bush, 
had  replaced  the  Military  Policy  Com- 
mittee with  a  Military  Advisory  Board, 
comprised  of  three  Army  and  three 
Navy  officers  responsible  for  coordi- 
nating activities  of  the  War  and  Navy 
Departments  with  those  of  the  Man- 
hattan District.  At  the  same  time,  the 
War  Department  had  established  an 
ad  hoc  reviewing  committee  to  indoc- 
trinate selected  officers  in  the  organi- 
zation and  work  of  the  Manhattan 
Project  and  to  submit  recommenda- 
tions for  development  of  appropriate 
relationships  between  the  project  and 
the  War  Department.  Groves  served 
as  a  member  of  this  last-named  com- 
mittee, which  had  met  a  number  of 
times  in  late  1945.^^ 

The  wartime  ad  hoc  reviewing  com- 
mittees and  the  Military  Policy  Com- 
mittee had  provided  invaluable  plan- 
ning assistance  to  Manhattan,  but 
project  leaders  soon  realized  that  the 


^'  Memo,  Brig  Gen  William  A.  Borden  (New  De- 
velopments Div  Dir,  W'DSS)  to  Gen  Thomas  T. 
Handy  (Dep  Chief  of  Staff),  sub:  Integration  of  WD 
Requirements  With  Manhattan  Proj  Opns,  4  Oct  45; 
Memo,  Borden  to  Chief  of  Staff,  same  subject,  12 
Oct  45,  Memo,  Brig  Gen  H.  J.  Hodes  (Asst  Dep 
Chief  of  Staff,  GSC)  to  Lt  Gen  J.  E.  Hull  (Asst  Chief 
of  Staff,  OPD.  WDGS)  et  al.,  sub:  Ad  Hoc  Commit- 
tee, 20  Oct  45.  All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp, 
334  (Committees  and  Mil  Advisory  Board),  MDR. 


new  Military  Advisory  Board,  with 
only  military  members,  was  hardly 
suitable  for  the  task  of  preparing  a 
viable  atomic  program  for  FY  1947. 

To  correct  this  deficiency,  General 
Nichols  in  late  January  secured 
Groves's  approval  for  establishment 
of  an  Advisory  Committee  on  Re- 
search and  Development.  He  enlisted 
the  aid  of  Richard  Tolman  and  Ernest 
Lawrence,  who  soon  formed  a  group 
consisting  of  Robert  F.  Bacher, 
Arthur  H.  Compton,  Warren  K. 
Lewis,  John  R.  Ruhoff,  Charles  A. 
Thomas,  John  A.  Wheeler,  and 
Tolman  himself.  ^^ 

The  new  committee  met  for  the 
first  time  in  early  March  at  the  Man- 
hattan Project  office  in  Washington, 
joined  by  General  Nichols  and  repre- 
sentatives of  organizations  wanting  to 
secure  sponsorship  of  programs.  The 
committee  proffered  various  research 
and  development  proposals,  noting 
especially  the  need  for  expanding  the 
number  of  agencies  performing  re- 
search in  atomic  energy.  It  recom- 
mended continued  subsidization  of 
the  University  of  California  program 
and  emphasized  that  university  lab- 
oratories should  devote  their  efforts 
primarily  to  unclassified  research  but, 
where  necessary,  should  also  carry 
out  classified  research,  with  the  basic 
objective  of  adding  to  scientific 
knowledge.  For  fundamental  research 
requiring  equipment  too  costly  to  be 
purchased  by  most  university  or  pri- 
vate laboratories,  the  committee  fa- 
vored the  establishment  of  national 
laboratories.  Finally,  it  supported  the 


"Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves,  22  Jan  46,  Admin 
Files.  Gen  Corresp,  334  (Advisory  Committee  on  R 
&  D),  MDR:  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  S'eu<  World,  p. 
633. 


590 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


development  of  high-temperature  and 
fast-fission  piles,  as  well  as  other  reac- 
tor projects  related  to  commercial  as- 
pects of  atomic  energy,  at  govern- 
ment-operated facilities,  such  as  the 
Clinton  Engineer  Works  and  Argonne 
and  Metallurgical  laboratories.^^ 

The  Manhattan  District's  strong  en- 
dorsement of  the  committee's  recom- 
mendations is  evident  from  the  con- 
siderable amount  of  funding  allotted 
for  research  and  development  in  the 
FY  1947  budget.  The  committee  had 
proposed  expenditures  from  $20  to 
$40  million,  but  the  District's  budget 
provided  more  than  $72  million,  di- 
vided between  construction  (68  per- 
cent) and  operating  expenses  (32  per- 
cent). While  the  largest  amounts  went 
to  the  project's  laboratories  at  Ar- 
gonne and  Clinton,  substantial  funds 
were  earmarked  for  programs  at  a 
number  of  universities.  In  July  1946, 
Congress  voted  the  necessary  funds 
to  finance  the  research  and  develop- 
ment budget. ^"^ 

Of  the  various  proposals.  Groves 
devoted  his  greatest  effort  to  estab- 
lishment of  the  national  laboratories. 
The  committee  had  suggested  one 
laboratory  in  each  major  region  of  the 
country.  Universities  and  other  re- 
search organizations  in  the  region 
would  provide  a  board  of  directors  to 
recommend  research  projects  and 
prepare  the  annual  budget.  The  com- 
mittee proposed  that  the  first  of  these 
laboratories  should  be  the  Argonne 
Laboratory  at  C>hicago  and  another 
located  somewhere  in  the  northeast. 


The  University  of  Chicago  in  mid- 
April  1946  agreed  to  operate  the 
soon  to  be  established  Argonne  Na- 
tional Laboratory  (1  July),  which 
would  be  formed  from  the  existing 
Metallurgical  and  Argonne  laborato- 
ries, and  representatives  of  twenty- 
four  participating  institutions  in  June 
submitted  data  pertinent  to  the  policy 
to  be  followed  in  its  organization  and 
operation.  The  Manhattan  District 
then  announced  that  it  would  negoti- 
ate a  formal  contract  with  the  Univer- 
sity of  Chicago.  While  the  participat- 
ing institutions  secured  security  clear- 
ances for  their  scientists,  what  was  left 
of  the  Metallurgical  Project  staff  at 
Argonne  initiated  the  research  pro- 
gram for  the  new  laboratory.  Much  of 
this  program,  of  necessity,  consisted 
of  continuing  projects  already  in 
progress  at  the  old  Argonne  Labora- 
tory, including  design  of  a  breeder  re- 
actor and  investigation  of  graphite  ex- 
pansion in  the  piles  at  Hanford.^^ 

In  July  1946,  nine  universities  in 
the  northeastern  part  of  the  L^nited 
States — Columbia,  Cornell,  Harvard, 
Johns  Hopkins,  Massachusetts  Insti- 
tute of  Technology,  Pennsylvania, 
Princeton,  Rochester,  and  Yale — 
banded  together  as  the  Associated 
LIniversities,  Inc.,  to  support  a  nation- 
al laboratory  in  that  region.  Groves 
announced  that  this  laboratory  would 
be  located  at  the  site  of  the  Army's 
Camp  Upton  on  Long  Island,  but  dis- 
agreement among  the  universities  as 
to    the    extent    that    the    government 


^^  (k-ncral  Nichols  rcporlcd  to  General  Groves  on 
whal  the  Advisorv  (.oniinittee  had  proposed  in 
Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves.  14  Mar  46,  Admin  Files, 
(ien  Gorresp,  3.S4  (AcKisorx  Committee  on  R  &  I)). 
MDR 

^^  Hewkti  and  Anderson.  Xrw  Umld.  p.  6:55. 


^^  For  a  detailed  account  of  the  establishment  of 
the  Argonne  National  Laboratory  see  MI^H,  Bk.  1, 
\ol.  4,  "Auxiliaiy  Activities."  pp.  2.5-2.20,  DASA. 
For  correspondence  and  other  documents  pertinent 
to  its  organization  see  .Admin  Files,  (ien  Gorresp, 
080  (Argonne-Univ  of  Chicago)  and  600.913 
(Rpts-Fire  and  Accidents),  MDR. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1945-1947 


591 


should  control  research  activities  at 
the  new  institution,  designated  the 
Brookhaven  National  Laboratory,  de- 
layed a  start  in  its  program  until  early 
1947.26 

The  committee  also  had  recom- 
mended national  laboratories  else- 
where in  the  country,  especially  on 
the  West  Coast.  But  the  heads  of  a 
group  of  universities  in  southern  Cali- 
fornia did  not  take  affirmative  action 
on  information  forwarded  to  them  by 
the  District  in  November  until  the 
end  of  the  year.  Their  proposal  there- 
fore became  a  matter  for  later  deci- 
sion by  the  new  Atomic  Energy 
Commission. 2'^ 

A  national  laboratory  in  the  south- 
eastern region  was  unnecessary,  be- 
cause an  organization  had  evolved  at 
Clinton  that,  by  early  1946,  was  serv- 
ing a  purpose  similar  to  that  of  the 
other  national  laboratories.  The  Mon- 
santo Chemical  Company,  the  prime 
contractor  for  the  Clinton  Laborato- 
ries, had  invited  the  University  of 
Tennessee  at  Knoxville  to  conduct 
graduate  courses  for  its  employees  as 
a  means  of  securing  and  holding  the 
technically  trained  personnel  it 
needed  for  its  operations.  Expanding 
upon  this  plan,  the  University  of  Ten- 
nessee convened  a  meeting  of  repre- 
sentatives of  other  southeastern  uni- 
versities. Out  of  this  conference  came 
an  agreement  that  personnel  from 
these  institutions  could  participate  in 
the  graduate  training  at  Clinton  and, 
in  addition,  make  use  of  the  research 
facilities  there.  During  1946,  District 
officials  and  representatives  of  the 
various     universities     involved     took 


steps  to  formalize  the  relationship.  In 
October,  the  associated  institutions 
received  a  charter  from  the  state  of 
Tennessee  as  the  Oak  Ridge  Institute 
of  Nuclear  Studies,  and  in  the  last 
months  of  the  year,  they  were  pro- 
ceeding with  negotiations  for  a  con- 
tract with  the  Manhattan  District. ^^ 

In  addition  to  providing  for  the 
continuation  and  expansion  of  the 
project's  research  and  development 
programs.  Groves  and  his  staff  had  to 
keep  production  operations  function- 
ing smoothly  and  efficiently.  From  an 
administrative  standpoint,  one  of  the 
first  postwar  problems  they  had  to 
deal  with  was  extending  major  operat- 
ing contracts.  Most  of  these  contracts 
had  been  scheduled  to  terminate  six 
months  after  the  cessation  of  actual 
hostilities,  but  shortly  thereafter  Man- 
hattan had  secured  supplemental 
agreements  to  fix  the  expiration  date 
as  30  June  1946,  with  options  for 
government  renewal  for  one  year.  In 
March,  Groves  obtained  approval 
from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  exercise 
these  options  and  to  negotiate  the 
necessary  contract  extensions  to  30 
June  1947.  He  informed  the  Secretary 
that  funds  for  this  purpose  were  al- 
ready available,  but  that  additional 
appropriations  would  be  necessary  to 
prevent  a  cessation  of  production  and 
research  operations  at  some  time 
before  mid- 1947.  He  also  notified  the 
Secretary  that  one  major  contractor, 
the  Du  Pont  Company,  had  indicated 
an  unwillingness  to  continue  and 
would  have  to  be  replaced. ^^ 


26  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  pp.  2.20-2.38,  DASA. 
2^  Memo,   Nichols   to  Groves,    14   Mar  46,   MDR; 
MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  pp.  2.38-2.39,  DASA. 


28  MDH,  Bk.  1,  Vol.  4,  pp.  10.1-10.12,  DASA. 

29  Memo,  Groves  to  Secy  War,  1 1  Mar  46,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  008  (WD),  MDR. 


592 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Subsequent  efforts  by  Patterson 
and  Groves  to  persuade  Du  Pont  to 
continue  at  the  Hanford  Engineer 
Works  failed.  Groves  then  negotiated 
a  contract  with  the  General  Electric 
Company,  similar  in  most  respects  to 
Du  Pout's.  The  major  exception  was 
General  Electric's  insistence  that  a 
provision  be  placed  in  the  contract 
that  would  permit  the  company  to  be 
relieved  of  its  obligation  in  the  event 
that  the  atomic  energy  legislation  en- 
acted by  Congress  imposed  condi- 
tions not  acceptable  to  the  firm.  The 
new  contract  provided  for  the  oper- 
ation of  Hanford,  construction  of 
certain  new  facilities  there,  and  for 
construction  and  operation  of  a  gov- 
ernment-owned laboratory  at  the 
Knolls,  some  five  miles  distant  from 
the  company's  home  plant  at  Sche- 
nectady, New  York.  This  laboratory, 
which  was  separate  from  the  new 
Brookhaven  National  Laboratory, 
would  provide  the  company  with  fa- 
cilities for  pursuing  its  interest  in  the 
development  of  atomic  power.  ^° 

The  Hanford  production  facilities 
turned  over  to  General  Electric  had 
major  operational  problems.  The 
most  serious  was  the  expansion  of  the 
graphite  moderators  in  the  three  pro- 
duction piles,  the  result  of  heavy  neu- 
tron bombardment  (the  so-called 
Wigner  Effect).  Du  Font's  plant  man- 
ager had  called  this  phenomenon  to 
the  attention  of  the  district  engineer 
in  February  1946,  pointing  out  that 
there  was  visible  bowing  of  the  tubes 
containing  the  uranium  slugs  and  pre- 


^°  Ltr,  C.  E.  Wilson  (Gen  Electric  president)  to 
(iroves,  28  May  46;  Memo,  Groves  to  Secy  War, 
sub:  Change  of  Opn  and  Management  Contractor  at 
HEW.  31  May  46;  Ltr,  Nichols  to  Lilienthal.  4  Nov 
46.  All  in  Admm  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  161  (Electric), 
MDR. 


dieting  that,  because  no  effective  way 
had  been  discovered  to  combat  this 
development,  the  operating  life  of  the 
piles  certainly  was  limited.  Groves 
and  Nichols  had  followed  Du  Pout's 
suggestion  to  shut  down  one  pile  to 
ensure  that,  should  the  other  two 
become  inoperative,  one  would  be 
available  to  maintain  the  essential 
production  of  polonium  (used  as  a 
neutron  source  in  atomic  bombs), 
which  could  not  be  stored  because  of 
its  short  half-life.  When  General  Elec- 
tric took  over,  two  piles  were  in  oper- 
ation and  the  oldest  unit,  the  B  Pile, 
was  on  standby.^ ^ 

Deficiencies  in  the  Hanford  separa- 
tion process  were  not  as  serious  as 
those  in  the  pile  operation,  and  Du 
Pont,  with  assistance  from  the  Metal- 
lurgical Project  scientists,  had  made 
more  progress  in  finding  a  solution 
for  them.  The  drawback  of  the  bis- 
muth phosphate  method  was  that, 
after  extraction  of  the  plutonium,  it 
left  the  residue  of  uranium  in  a  state 
from  which  it  could  not  be  readily  re- 
covered. Consequently,  much  valua- 
ble uranium  suspended  in  the  process 
solution  was  drained  off  to  be  stored 
unused  in  huge  underground  tanks. 
Chemists  at  the  Metallurgical  Labora- 
tory had  developed  another  separa- 
tion process  that  promised  not  only 
to  be  a  more  efficient  method  of  re- 
moving the  plutonium  from  the  pro- 
cess solution  but  also  to  leave  the  fis- 
sion products  and  uranium  in  more 
easily  recoverable  states.  In  August 
1946,  after  engineering  and  cost  stud- 
ies had  demonstrated  the  feasibility  of 


3  1  Ltr,  R.  M.  Evans  (HEW  Opns  Mgr,  Du  Pont)  to 
Nichols,  20  Feb  46,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Coresp.  410.2 
(Metals),  MDR;  MDH,  Bk.  4,  Vol.  6,  "Operations," 
pp.  4.19-4.20,  DASA. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1945-1947 


593 


this  process,  Du  Pont  had  begun  de- 
velopment of  a  demonstration  unit 
and  pilot  plant,  with  the  goal  of  even- 
tually testing  the  process  in  a 
semiworks.^^ 

The  K-25  and  K-27  production 
units  at  Clinton  were  operating  more 
successfully  than  anyone  had  antici- 
pated. Plant  engineers  therefore  con- 
cluded that  the  two  diffusion  units  by 
themselves  might  achieve  as  high  a 
concentration  of  U-235  as  the  Beta 
tracks  of  the  electromagnetic  plant.  In 
May  1946,  the  Carbide  and  Carbon 
Chemicals  Corporation  made  careful 
studies  to  ensure  that  there  was  no 
danger  of  the  concentration  level 
reaching  a  critical  mass  in  the  diffu- 
sion plant  and  that  the  corrosive  ef- 
fects of  the  feed  material,  uranium 
hexaflouride,  were  not  soon  going  to 
destroy  the  operating  surfaces  of  the 
process  equipment.  The  Manhattan 
District  then  authorized  Carbide  and 
Carbon  to  raise  product  concentra- 
tion on  an  experimental  basis,  with 
the  objective  of  obtaining  perform- 
ance data  that  could  be  used  to  justify 
ultimately  shutting  down  the  relative- 
ly inefficient  and  hard-to-maintain 
Beta  tracks  of  the  electromagnetic 
process. ^^ 

By  way  of  contrast  to  Clinton  and 
Hanford,  where  none  of  the  operating 
problems  seriously  interfered  with 
continued    production    of   fissionable 


^^  The  so-called  redox  solvent  extraction  process 
was  based  on  the  principle  of  alternating  between 
the  plutonium  oxidation  state  and  higher  states  to 
separate  plutonium  from  uranium  and  then  remov- 
ing the  fission  products  with  other  organic  solvents, 
such  as  hexone.  See  MDH.  Bk.  4,  \'ol.  6.  pp.  4.24- 
4.26,  DASA;  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  Xezi'  World,  p. 
630. 

33  MDH,  Bk.  2,  Vol.  5,  "Operations,"  pp.  4.1- 
4.12  and  8.1-8.4.  DASA;  Hewlett  and  Anderson, 
Xeiv  World,  pp.  629-30. 


materials,  deteriorating  conditions  at 
Los  Alamos  during  1946  threatened 
to  halt  the  continued  stockpiling  of 
atomic  weapons.^*  Poor  morale  was  a 
major  factor,  caused  by  an  uncertain 
future  for  the  laboratory,  a  lack  of 
even  the  basic  amenities  of  a  peace- 
time community,  and  an  intolerance 
of  the  military  and  security  aspects  of 
community  life. 

Groves,  determined  to  improve 
morale,  directed  that  such  measures 
as  were  necessary  to  keep  Los  Alamos 
active  to  meet  the  defense  require- 
ments of  the  country  were  to  be  taken 
as  quickly  as  possible.  "The  transition 
from  war  to  peacetime  community 
conditions  will  start  immediately,"  he 
told  Bradbury.  He  outlined  a  pro- 
gram for  community  development 
that  became  the  blueprint  for  major 
improvements  in  the  utilities,  includ- 
ing a  million-gallon  steel  storage  tank 
to  ensure  an  adequate  supply  of  water 
at  all  times;  for  constructing  three 
hundred  permanent  housing  units; 
and  for  increasing  recreational  facili- 
ties to  make  life  at  the  isolated  site 
less  irksome. ^^ 

While  the  community  development 
program  was  being  implemented. 
General  Nichols  worked  on  another 
program  to  improve  and  expedite 
stockpiling  operations  at  Los  Alamos. 
Concerned  about  the  slow  rate  of 
weapons  development,  Nichols  pro- 
posed to  turn  over  to  outside  contrac- 
tors full  responsibility  for  fabrication 
of  most    bomb    components,    making 


3*  Except  as  otherwise  indicated,  section  on  Los 
Alamos  in  1946  based  on  MDH,  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2, 
Supp.,  passim,  DASA;  Gro\es,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told. 
pp.,  381-85. 

35  Ltr,  Groves  to  Bradbury,  4  Jan  46.  MDR;  Hew- 
lett and  Anderson,  Xew  World,  pp.  630-31. 


594 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Los  Alamos  responsible  for  only  the 
development  of  new  types  of  bombs. 
The  district  engineer  also  recom- 
mended creation  of  a  special  technical 
military  unit  in  the  Manhattan  District 
to  do  the  final  assembly  work  on 
bombs. ^^ 

One  activity  diverting  many  senior 
staff  members  at  Los  Alamos  from 
weapons  development  was  Operation 
Crossroads,  the  test  of  atomic 
bombs  against  naval  vessels  scheduled 
to  take  place  in  the  early  summer  of 
1946  at  Bikini  Atoll.  After  devoting 
many  months  to  assembling  and  test- 
ing the  weapons  components,  prepar- 
ing a  technical  handbook,  and  fur- 
nishing much  additional  technical 
data,  laboratory  staff  members  were 
detailed  to  the  Bikini  site  to  help  pre- 
pare for  and  to  observe  the  two  tests 
undertaken — Test  Able,  30  June,  the 
explosion  of  a  bomb  over  a  group  of 
ships  at  a  considerable  altitude;  and 
Test  Baker,  25  July,  detonation  of  a 
bomb  under  water.  During  the  tests 
Col.  Stafford  L.  Warren  of  the  Dis- 
trict's Medical  Section  supervised  spe- 
cial radiation  teams  who — under  the 
guidance  of  officers  and  men  trained 
at  the  Clinton  Laboratories,  the  Uni- 
versities of  Chicago  and  Rochester, 
the  Philadelphia  Navy  Yard,  and  Los 
Alamos — carried  out  a  variety  of  radi- 
ological safety  procedures  with  radi- 
ation-detecting instruments.^^ 


^^  Memo,  Nichols  to  Groves,  22  Mar  46,  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  410.2  (Melals),  MDR. 

"  Groves,  \ow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp.  384-85;  MDH, 
Bk.  8,  Vol.  2,  Supp..  pp.  1. 13-1. 17,  and  Vol.  3, 
"Auxiliary  Activities,"  Ch.  8,  DASA;  Radiology  in 
World  War  II.  pp.  901-15.  The  Bikini  tests  were  car- 
ried out  under  the  overall  direction  ot  the  Navy,  al- 
though the  District  had  technical  responsibility  for 
them. 


In  the  meantime,  John  H.  Manley,  a 
long-time  and  influential  scientist  on 
the  laboratory  staff,  indicated  to 
Groves  and  Nichols  his  support  of  the 
plan  to  relieve  Los  Alamos  of  most  of 
the  activities  relating  to  actual  weap- 
ons production.  Manley  objected  to 
what  he  felt  was  a  growing  interfer- 
ence of  the  military  with  the  program 
at  Los  Alamos.  This,  he  thought, 
could  be  eliminated  by  turning  over 
to  a  special  military  unit  the  produc- 
tion, stockpiling,  and  protection  of 
atomic  bombs,  leaving  to  the  civilian 
staff  only  bomb  development.  Groves 
had  already  organized  a  special  Army 
battalion  at  Sandia  Base  to  assume 
responsibility  for  surveillance,  field 
tests,  and  weapons  assembly.  He  also 
had  worked  out  an  agreement  with 
Monsanto  for  development  and  fabri- 
cation of  weapons  components  in  a 
plant  at  Dayton,  Ohio.  Furthermore, 
he  had  started  preliminary  planning 
for  the  shift  of  uranium  purification 
and  its  reduction  to  metal  to  Clinton 
and  of  similar  operations  on  plutoni- 
um  to  Hanford.  Thus,  the  way  was 
almost  clear  for  the  scientists  at  Los 
Alamos  to  devote  their  full  efforts  to 
the  design  and  development  of  new 
weapons.^® 

While  attending  to  problems  asso- 
ciated with  postwar  project  oper- 
ations, the  Army  inevitably  became 
involved  in  a  good  many  other  admin- 
istrative problems,  some  routine  in 
nature.  Illustrative  of  this  type  of  ac- 
tivity was  the  settlement  of  various 
contractors'  war  claims  against  the 
project.  Typical  was  a  suit  brought  in 
earlv  1946  bv  Clifton  Products,  Inc.,  a 


38  MDH,  Bk.  4,  \()1.  6,  p.  4.25,  and  Bk.  8,  Vol.  2, 
Supp.,  pp.  VI1,6-VII.7  and  App.  9,  DASA;  Hewlett 
and  Anderson,  Xew  World,  pp.  632-33. 


THE  ARMY  AND    IHE  AIOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1945-1947 


595 


metal  processing  firm,  for  losses  of 
about  $18,000  it  tlaimcd  to  have  in- 
curred in  construction  and  operation 
of  a  beryllium  plant.  The  company,  in 
filing  its  claim  with  the  Appeal  Board 
of  the  Office  of  Contract  Settlement, 
stated  that  the  Manhattan  District  was 
one  of  several  wartime  agencies  that 
had  encouraged  it  to  undertake  pro- 
duction of  beryllium.  The  Manhattan 
District  informed  the  Judge  Advocate 
General  attorneys  preparing  the  gov- 
ernment's defense  that  the  War  Pro- 
duction Board,  not  Manhattan,  had 
taken  the  initiative  in  persuading  Clif- 
ton to  build  beryllium  production  fa- 
cilities that  were  primarily  for  the 
benefit  of  other  branches  of  the 
Army.  The  Appeal  Board,  neverthe- 
less, decided  in  favor  of  Clifton.  Con- 
sequently, in  August  1946,  the  Dis- 
trict's Madison  Square  Area  Engi- 
neers Ofiice  had  to  negotiate  a  final 
financial  settlement  with  the  firm, 
agreeing  upon  payment  of  some 
$5,000  "for  losses  sustained."  ^^ 

Disposition  of  surplus  property  was 
another  routine  activity  that  absorbed 
a  good  deal  of  time.  Property  disposal 
was  a  matter  of  considerable  interest 
to  the  general  public  and  therefore 
also  to  members  of  Congress.  Typical 
of  the  problems  that  arose  were  those 
relating  to  the  priority  rights  of  veter- 
ans in  the  purchase  of  surplus  gov- 
ernment property.  For  example,  Col. 
Elmer  E.  Kirkpatrick,  Jr.,  now  serving 
as  deputy  district  engineer,  had  to 
assure  Senator  Edwin  C.  Johnson  of 


^^  On  the  claim  filed  by  Clifton  Products  see 
Memos,  Capt  John  1..  Davies,  Jr.  (Mad  Sq  Area 
Engrs  Office)  to  Nichols,  9  Jan  46,  and  Lt  Col 
Cooper  B.  Rhodes  (Mad  Sq  Area  Engrs  Office)  to 
Cjroves  and  Nichols,  28  Aug  46,  and  also  Ltr 
(source  of  quotation).  Groves  to  Appeal  Board,  30 
Aug  46,  Aclmin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  156  (Clifton 
Products),  MDR. 


Colorado  that  in  the  sale  of  Manhat- 
tan District  materials  and  equipment 
at  Grand  Junction,  where  the  project 
had  secured  uranium  from  vanadium 
tailings,  "veterans  are  being  given  all 
possible  consideration  under  the  laws 
and  regulations  governing  the  sale  of 
war  contractor  inventories.  .  .  ."  In 
another  instance,  Groves  himself  had 
to  assure  the  two  senators  from  Ten- 
nessee, Kenneth  D.  McKellar  and 
Tom  Stewart,  that  Roane-Anderson's 
sale  of  surplus  property  at  Clinton 
would  take  into  account  the  special 
rights  of  veterans.  Complaints  from 
constituents  claimed  that  the  firm  had 
been  disposing  of  property  to  the 
highest  bidder  without  reference  to 
veterans'  rights.  Groves  pointed  out 
that  this  disposition  procedure  was 
legal  and  had  been  done  in  the  inter- 
est of  expediting  reduction  of  inven- 
tories as  quickly  as  possible,  but  as- 
sured them  that,  in  the  future,  every 
effort  would  be  made  to  observe  vet- 
erans' rights. *° 

A  crucially  important  function  that 
devolved  upon  the  Army  was  the 
technical  information  program  for  in- 
dividuals and  groups  with  a  need-to- 
know  about  the  new  source  of  energy 
and  its  military  and  industrial  applica- 
tions. The  secret  circumstances  under 


*°  Quotation  from  Ltr,  Kirkpatrick  to  Johnson,  1 
Mar  46,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  400.7  (Disposi- 
tion of  Equip),  MDR.  See  also  Telgs,  Knoxville  Post 
No.  2,  American  Legion,  Dcpt.  of  Tenn.,  to  McKel- 
lar and  Stewart,  5  Aug  46,  Incls  in  Ltrs,  McKellar 
and  Stewart  to  Groves,  9  Aug  46;  Ltr,  Groves  to 
McKellar  and  Stewart,  14  Aug  46.  All  in  Admin 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  400.703,  MDR.  See  memo  rout- 
ing slip  attached  to  the  14  August  letter  for  addi- 
tional comments  by  Groves,  who  wrote  that  the  Dis- 
trict's procedure  on  the  sale  of  surplus  property  had 
provided  some  justification  for  the  complaints  and 
that  corrective  action  would  now  be  taken  to  ensure 
full  observation  of  veteians'  rights. 


596 


MANHATTAN.  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


which  atomic  energy  had  developed, 
combined  with  its  relative  newness  as 
a  major  field  of  scientific  knowledge, 
placed  upon  a  comparatively  small 
group  of  military  and  technical  ex- 
perts the  formidable  task  of  educating 
and  indoctrinating  a  vast  number  of 
military  men,  government  officials,  in- 
dustrial engineers,  business  execu- 
tives, scientists  and  technicians,  medi- 
cal personnel,  and  a  great  many  other 
people.  Groves  was  often  called  upon 
to  brief  the  Secretary  of  War,  Chief  of 
Staff,  and  other  officials  in  the  mili- 
tary services,  and  to  speak  before 
conferences  of  military  officers.  Fre- 
quently, too,  he  and  many  project 
members  were  called  to  testify  before 
the  committees  of  Congress  consider- 
ing domestic  legislative  proposals  and 
to  assist  those  government  officials 
charged  with  shaping  postwar  policies 
for  the  international  control  of  atomic 
energy.  "^^ 

The  Final  Act:  Transfer  to 
Civilian  Control 

With  the  President's  signing  of  the 
Atomic  Energy  Act  on  1  August  1946, 
the  United  States  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  was  created  as  the  civil- 
ian successor  agency  for  the  Army. 
This  commission,  to  consist  of  five 
full-time       presidential       appointees. 


*'  On  the  military  application  of  atomic  energy 
see  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp.  MP  Files,  Fldr  1,  Tabs 
A-D,  MDR,  especially  Tab  D  for  Memo,  Groves  to 
Chief  of  Staff,  sub:  New  Wpns  Development,  12  Feb 
46,  and  OCG  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  Groves  Files,  Fldr 
8,  MDR,  for  Talk,  Groves  to  Mil  Conf  (Fort  Belvoir, 
Va.)  Attendees,  sub:  Hist  of  Manhattan  Proj,  23  Sep 
46.  On  the  indoctrination  of  engineers  see  Groves, 
Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  pp.  387-88.  One  of  those  who 
took  the  training  offered  at  Oak  Ridge  was  Capt. 
Hyman  G.  Rickover,  who  subsequently  was  assigned 
to  direct  the  Navy's  program  for  development  of  the 
atomic  submarine. 


would  oversee  the  domestic  atomic 
energy  program  by  assuming  respon- 
sibility for  most  of  the  activities  of  the 
Manhattan  District,  including  the  pro- 
duction, ownership,  and  use  of  all  fis- 
sionable materials  in  the  United 
States;  for  sponsorship  of  the  exten- 
sive research  and  development  pro- 
gram in  government  laboratories,  uni- 
versities, and  elsewhere;  for  control 
and  release  of  restricted  scientific  in- 
formation; for  enforcement  of  securi- 
ty and  safety;  and  for  mihtary  applica- 
tion of  atomic  power. 

Yet  enactment  of  this  long-awaited 
legislation  did  not  immediately  relieve 
the  Army  of  its  stewardship  of  the  do- 
mestic program.  The  contributing  fac- 
tors were  many.  The  President  expe- 
rienced extended  delays  in  securing 
the  individuals  he  wanted  to  serve  as 
commissioners,  whose  names  he  did 
not  announce  until  the  end  of  Octo- 
ber. Once  appointed,  the  new  com- 
mission requested  General  Groves  to 
delay  the  official  act  of  transfer  until 
1  January  1947.  In  retrospect,  the 
Manhattan  commander  remembers 
the  period  from  August  through  De- 
cember 1946  as  one  of  the  most  diffi- 
cult of  his  entire  time  as  head  of  the 
project,  because  "everyone  knew  that 
I  was  in  a  caretaker's  position,  and 
they  had  no  assurance  that  my  views 
would  be  those  of  the  Commission. 
After  the  commissioners  were  finally 
appointed,  it  was  quite  evident  that 
my  views  would  not  be  accepted  with- 
out a  long-drawn-out  delay."  *^ 


42  Groves,  Now  It  Can  Be  Told,  p.  395.  Except  as 
otherwise  indicated,  section  on  the  transfer  of  the 
atomic  energy  program  from  the  Manhattan  Project 
to  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  based  on  Memo, 
Aurand  to  Secy  War,  sub:  Mtg  With  Groves,  5  Jul 
46,  471.6  (Atomic  Bomb);  Memo,  Groves  to  Secy 

Continued 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1945-1947 


597 


During  this  difFicuit  period,  there 
was  little  the  War  Department  and 
the  Manhattan  District  could  ac- 
complish beyond  making  plans  for 
transferring  project  control  until  the 
President  appointed  the  new  commis- 
sioners. Secretary  Patterson,  in  par- 
ticular, was  anxious  to  have  the  trans- 
fer go  smoothly  and  took  steps  to 
provide  for  continued  Army  liaison 
with  the  commission.  At  his  request, 
General  Groves  and  Maj.  Gen.  Henry 
S.  Aurand,  the  General  Staffs  direc- 
tor of  research  and  development,  dis- 
cussed tentative  measures  for  dealing 
with  the  problems  that  would  arise 
when  the  military  personnel  assigned 
to  the  Manhattan  District  would  have 
to  be  absorbed  by  the  Army.  From 
their  discussions  evolved  the  proposal 
to  set  up  within  the  War  Department 
an  atomic  energy  committee,  com- 
prised at  least  in  part  of  those  Army 
officers  who  would  also  be  assigned 
to  the  commission's  Military  Liaison 
Committee. 

The  President  announced  the  five 
members  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
mission on  28  October.  To  the  post 
of  chairman,  he  named  David  E.  Lil- 
ienthal  who,  as  head  of  the  Tennessee 
Valley  Authority,  had  gained  consid- 
erable knowledge  of  project  activities 

War,  sub:  Mil  Liaison  Committee,  AEC,  17  Jul  45, 
352.13;  Ltr.  Secy  War  to  Groves,  15  Sep  46,  319.2 
(Misc);  DF,  Maj  Gen  Lauris  Norstad  (Plans  and 
Opns  Dir,  WDGS),  sub:  WD  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
mittee, 19  Sep  46,  334  (Mil  Liaison  Committee); 
Memo,  Groves  to  Secy  War,  sub:  WD  Atomic 
Energy  Committee,  18  Sep  46,  334  (Atomic  Com- 
mittee on  AE);  Memo,  Groves  to  Chief  of  Staff,  sub: 
Turnover  to  AEC,  31  Dec  46,  352.13;  Ltr,  Groves  to 
Lilienthal,  20  Dec  46,  201  (Lilienthal,  D.  E.);  Memo, 
Brereton  to  Groves,  sub:  Comments  on  Proposed 
Memo  to  Secv  War,  26  Dec  46  (Org-AFSWP);  Draft 
Ltr,  Groves  to  Lilienthal.  28  Dec  46,  319.2  (Misc). 
All  in  Admin  Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MDR.  Hewlett  and 
Anderson,  Xew  World,  pp.  620-24  and  634-55. 


at  Clinton  and  had  served  as  a 
member  of  the  State  Department 
panel  on  international  control  of 
atomic  energy.  For  the  other  four  po- 
sitions, the  President  selected  Robert 
F.  Bacher,  a  Cornell  physicist  who 
had  played  a  leading  role  at  Los 
Alamos;  Sumner  T.  Pike,  editor  of  the 
Des  Moines  Register  and  Tribune  and  a 
Pulitzer  Prize  winner;  William  W. 
Waymack,  a  former  member  of  the 
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission; 
and  Lewis  L.  Strauss,  a  Navy  reservist 
who  had  served  during  the  war  in  the 
Bureau  of  Ordnance  and  as  an  assist- 
ant to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

While  awaiting  official  announce- 
ment of  his  appointment,  Lilienthal 
had  formed  a  temporary  administra- 
tive staff  comprised  of  individuals  that 
had  worked  together  with  him  on 
atomic  energy  matters.  He  selected 
Herbert  S.  Marks,  director  (acting)  of 
the  War  Production  Board's  Power 
Division  before  becoming  Dean  Ach- 
eson's  assistant  at  the  State  Depart- 
ment; Joseph  Volpe,  Jr.,  a  former 
military  officer  on  the  legal  staff  in 
General  Groves's  Washington  head- 
quarters; and  Carroll  L.  Wilson,  a 
wartime  assistant  to  Vannevar  Bush  at 
the  Office  of  Scientific  Research  and 
Development.  Myriad  housekeeping 
arrangements  for  the  new  commission 
required  the  immediate  attention  of 
Marks,  Volpe,  and  Wilson,  who 
worked  out  most  of  the  details  with 
Lt.  Col.  Charles  Vanden  Bulck,  chief 
of  the  District's  Administrative  Divi- 
sion. Pressed  by  the  commissioners' 
impending  arrival  in  early  November, 
Vanden  Bulck  expedited  all  requests 
from  the  stafi'  for  funds,  for  office 
space  in  the  New  War  Department 
Building,     which     was     adjacent     to 


598 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Groves's  headquarters,  and  for  cleri- 
cal support. 

In  early  November,  after  winding 
up  personal  affairs  and  relocating  to 
Washington,  the  commissioners  col- 
lectively channeled  their  energies  and 
talents  to  prepare  for  the  transfer  of 
the  atomic  program  from  military  to 
civilian  control.  As  a  first  measure, 
they  directed  their  staff  to  arrange 
briefings  and  inspection  tours  of  the 
District's  various  installations.  Lilien- 
thal,  joined  by  Bacher  and  Pike,  vis- 
ited District  headquarters  at  Oak 
Ridge  on  the  fourth.  Nine  days  later, 
accompanied  by  Marks,  Volpe,  and 
Wilson,  all  five  commissioners  under- 
took a  tour  of  the  major  atomic  reser- 
vations and  research  facilities.  By  the 
time  they  returned  to  Washington  on 
the  twentieth,  they  were  considerably 
more  familiar  with  the  character  and 
problems  of  the  Manhattan  Project 
and  were  ready  to  proceed  with  carry- 
ing out  the  formal  transfer. 

Meanwhile,  the  Army  had  moved 
ahead  with  steps  to  facilitate  the 
transfer.  From  a  list  of  candidates 
prepared  largely  by  the  Manhattan 
commander,  the  Secretaries  of  War 
and  the  Navy  had  selected  three 
members  for  the  commission's  Mili- 
tary Liaison  Committee — Air  Force 
Lt.  Gen.  Lewis  H.  Brereton,  as  chair- 
man; Rear  Adm.  Thorvald  A.  Sol- 
berg,  who  had  participated  in  the  Op- 
eration Crossroads  tests;  and  Rear 
Adm.  William  S.  Parsons,  who  had 
seen  long  service  on  the  atomic 
project's  Los  Alamos  technical  staff — 
that  would  administer  any  military 
functions  transferred  from  the  Man- 
hattan   District.*^    Groves,    who    had 


designated  Nichols  to  function  as  his 
point  of  liaison  with  the  commission, 
also  attempted  to  secure  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  district  engineer  to  fill 
the  commission  post  of  director  of 
the  Division  of  Military  Application. 

But  the  commissioners  expressed  a 
desire  for  a  clean  break  with  the  past 
military  administration  of  the  project. 
Moreover,  because  they  disagreed 
with  Nichols's  view  that  the  division 
should  function  as  a  "line"  rather 
than  a  "staff'  organization,  as  well  as 
with  his  strong  advocacy  of  military 
custody  of  atomic  weapons,  they  re- 
quested the  Secretary  of  War  to 
submit  other  nominees  for  the  posi- 
tion. Their  rejection  of  Nichols  was 
evidence  of  an  enduring  suspicion 
that  the  Army  was  still  trying  to  retain 
a  dominant  influence  in  the  field. 
This  mistrust,  a  legacy  of  the  pro- 
longed legislative  fight  over  the  issue 
of  military  versus  civilian  control,  ex- 
acerbated what  might  otherwise  have 
been  essentially  a  formality.*^ 

Consistent  with  provisions  of  the 
Atomic  Energy  Act,  the  commission 
in  early  December  informed  General 
Groves  that  it  planned  to  take  over 
full  responsibility  for  the  atomic 
project  as  of  I  January  1947.  As  of 
that  date,  the  Manhattan  District  was, 
without     exception,     to     transfer     all 


*^  Subsequently,  both  Generals  Groves  and  Nich- 
ols served  as  Army  members  of  the  Military  Liaison 


Committee— Groves  from  2  Feb  47  to  29  Feb  48 
and  Nichols  from  29  Feb  48  to  1  Feb  51. 

■**  On  Nichols's  rejection  as  nominee  for  the  posi- 
tion of  director  of  the  Division  of  Military  Applica- 
tion see  Nichols,  Comments  on  Draft  Hist  "Manhat- 
tan," Incl  to  Ltr,  Nichols  to  Chief  of  Mil  Hist,  25 
Mar  74,  CMH,  and  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  New 
World,  p.  653.  On  the  issue  of  custody  of  weapons 
see  Hewlett  and  Duncan,  Atomic  Shield,  p.  585.  This 
issue  remained  in  dispute  until  September  1952, 
when  an  agreement  was  reached  that  the  military 
would  control  the  greater  share  of  the  stockpile  of 
atomic  weapons. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1945-1947 


599 


property  and  functions  of  the  project 
to  the  commission,  which  subsequent- 
ly would  retransfer  such  property  and 
functions  deemed  more  appropriate 
for  armed  services  control.  Groves 
and  Nichols  promptly  and  firmly  ob- 
jected to  this  proposed  procedure. 
Their  reasons  were  straightforward: 
Certain  properties — for  example,  all 
ordnance  works  (except  the  heavy 
water  facilities),  Sandia  Base  at  Albu- 
querque, and  weapons  storage  sites — 
should  not  be  transferred  even  tem- 
porarily; the  raw  materials  function 
should  remain  under  Army  control 
until  the  commission  became  a 
member  of  the  Combined  Develop- 
ment Trust;  and  intelligence  oper- 
ations and  records  should  be 
transferred  directly  to  the  new  Cen- 
tral Intelligence  Group,  not  via  the 
commission. 

In  spite  of  Groves  and  Nichols's 
objections,  the  commission  indicated 
that  it  intended  to  adhere  strictly  to 
the  concept  of  transfer  and  retransfer. 
Regardless  of  this  resolute  stance, 
Nichols  met  with  the  commission  on 
several  occasions  in  mid-December 
and  sought — but  without  success — to 
secure  a  modification  of  its  posi- 
tion, fighting  particularly  hard  for 
military  custody  of  atomic  weapons. 
On  the  last-named  issue,  Nichols 
seems  to  have  achieved  some  measure 
of  success,  for  at  the  end  of  the 
month  the  commission  informed  the 
Secretary  of  War  that,  while  it  was  not 
willing  to  give  up  its  basic  insistence 
on  a  simple,  all-inclusive  transfer,  it 
would  consider  some  concessions.  As 
its  concessions,  the  commission 
agreed  to  accept  only  nominal  trans- 
fer of  properties  relating  to  weapons, 
ordnance  parts,  and  fissionable  mate- 
rials; to  consider  arrangements  for  re- 


transfer of  these  properties  to  Army 
control  not  later  than  1  March  1947; 
and  to  resolve  the  question  of  mem- 
bership in  the  Combined  Develop- 
ment Trust.  On  the  issue  of  intelli- 
gence, it  refused  to  take  action  until  it 
had  more  information. 

The  last  days  of  December  were 
unbelievably  hectic  for  the  commis- 
sion, which  participated  in  a  series  of 
hurried  conferences  at  the  State  and 
War  Departments  in  an  attempt  to 
clear  the  way  for  agreement  on  the 
unresolved  aspects  of  the  raw  materi- 
als and  intelligence  issues.  At  the 
State  Department,  it  worked  out  an 
arrangement  that  involved  eventual 
disbandment  of  the  Combined  Policy 
Committee  (its  continued  existence 
appeared  to  be  in  serious  conflict 
with  provisions  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Act)  and  membership  in  the  Com- 
bined Development  Trust,  provided 
that  Congress  was  informed  of  this 
hitherto  secret  wartime  agency.  At  the 
War  Department  on  the  thirtieth,  Lil- 
ienthal  briefed  the  Secretary  of  War 
on  the  commission's  arrangement 
with  the  State  Department.  Patterson 
was  satisfied  and  thereupon  agreed  to 
transfer  the  Army's  raw  materials 
function.  After  discussing  the  remain- 
ing points  in  dispute  on  intelligence, 
Lilienthal  determined  the  Secretary's 
position  was  immutable.  Pressed  by 
the  1  January  deadline,  the  commis- 
sion chairman  resorted  to  a  compro- 
mise. He  agreed  that  the  function 
temporarily  should  remain  with  the 
Army,  provided  that  the  commisson's 
staff  was  given  an  opportunity  to  ex- 
amine all  the  records. 

The  last  formal  procedure  in  the 
transfer  occurred  at  the  White  House 
on    the    afternoon    of   31    December. 


600 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Transfer  of  Control  to  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Seated,  left  to  nght: 
Carroll  L.  Wilson,  President  Harry  S.  Truman,  David  E.  Lilienthal.  Standing,  left  to  right. ■ 
Sumner  T.  Pike,  Colonel  Nichols,  Secretary  of  War  Patterson,  General  Groves,  Lewis  L. 
Strauss,  William  W.  Way  mack. 


Four  of  the  five  commissioners 
(Bacher  was  inventorying  weapons  at 
Los  Alamos)  and  Carroll  Wilson,  re- 
cently appointed  general  manager  of 
the  commission,  joined  with  Patter- 
son, Groves,  and  Nichols  in  President 
Truman's  office  to  witness  the  final 
act:  the  signing  of  the  executive  order 
that  legally  ended  the  Army's  stew- 
ardship of  the  atomic  energy  program 
and  turned  over  peacetime  control 
and  development  of  the  atom  to  a 
commission  of  five  men.*^ 


''^  Ihc    Manhattan    1' 
end    with    the    signing 
translcr    ol     the    atoini 
Kncigy   C-onimission,   .» 
irict  was  not  ahohshcd 


o)c-(l    officially 
>l    the   exccutix 


ame  to  an 
order  and 
program  to  the  Atomic 
loiigh  the  Manhattan  Dis- 
niil   15  Aug  47  (see  MDH, 


For  a  period  of  sixteen  months  fol- 
lowing the  end  of  the  war,  the  Army 
had  carried  out  the  often  perplexing 
and    thankless   task   of  administering. 


Bk.  1,  Vol.  1,  "General,"  p.  F2,  DASA).  Karly  m 
1947,  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  the  Navy  estab- 
lished the  Armed  Forces  Special  Weapons  Project 
(AFSWP),  effective  31  Dec  46,  to  assume  all  of  the 
functions  of  the  Manhattan  Project  that  had  not 
been  transferred  to  the  commission.  Organized  as  a 
joint  agency  in  anticipation  of  the  unification  of  the 
military  services,  the  AFSWP  was  responsible  for 
their  participation  in  the  development  of  atomic 
energv  for  military  purposes.  On  the  establishment 
of  the  AFSWP  see  Groves,  Xow  It  Can  Be  Told.  pp. 
398-400;  Hewlett  and  Duncan,  Atomic  Stiield.  pp. 
131-32;  and  Draft  WD  Cir,  sub:  AFSWP,  7  Feb  47, 
and  Ltr.  Col  J.  W.  Brown  (Secv,  Gen  Slafl)  to 
(iroves,  sub:  Appointment  of  Groves  as  AFSWP 
Chief,  28  Feb  47,  both  in  Admin  Files,  (Jen  Cor- 
resp,  322  (Org-AFSWP),  MDR. 


THE  ARMY  AND  THE  AIOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM,   1945-1947 


601 


on  an  interim  basis,  an  atomic  organi- 
zation undergoing  the  severe  stresses 
and  strains  of  transition  from  a  war  to 
a  peacetime  status.  Compounding  the 
problems  of  what  was  inherently  a 
difficult  assignment  was  the  wide- 
spread disagreement  among  the 
American  people  as  to  precisely  what 
kind  of  organization  was  best  suited 
to  develop  and  control  in  peacetime 
so  significant  a  new  source  of  energy. 
By  mid- 1946,  many  Americans  were 
disappointed  and  disillusioned  be- 
cause the  "golden  atomic  age," 
widely  predicted  when  news  of  the 
wartime  atomic  energy  program  was 
first  made  public,  had  failed  to  mate- 
rialize, and  the  tendency  was  to  blame 


the  Army  for  this.  Yet,  as  General 
Groves  pointed  out  in  retrospect,  the 
Army  had  accomplished  during  its 
trusteeship  what  was  perhaps  most  es- 
sential to  the  long-range  future  of 
atomic  energy  in  the  United  States.  It 
had  preserved  and  turned  over  to  its 
new  civilian  administrators  "a  good 
organization — one  ranked  among  the 
top  industrial  organizations  of  the 
country — and  [achieved]  the  orderly 
demobilization  of  its  forces  to  fit  into 
the  organization  of  the  Atomic 
Energy  Commission."  *^ 


*^  Quotation  from  Statement  by  General  Groves 
on  dissolution  of  Manhattan  Engr  Dist,  14  Aug  47, 
MDR. 


EPILOGUE 


An  Atomic  Legacy 


The  advent  of  the  atomic  age — and 
its  concomitant  legacy  of  not  only 
great  benefits  but  also  great  risks — 
emanated  from  the  Manhattan 
Project.  In  the  history  of  technologi- 
cal development  in  the  Western 
world,  America's  atomic  energy  pro- 
gram constituted  a  unique  episode: 
Through  an  integrated  synergy  of  sci- 
ence, industry,  and  the  military,  the 
men  of  Manhattan  created  a  revolu- 
tionary new  device,  the  atomic  bomb, 
unleashing  for  the  first  time  the 
power  within  the  atom. 

Ever  intrigued  by  the  phenomenon 
of  the  atom,  particularly  its  vast  stores 
of  energy,  men  in  past  centuries  had 
frequently  endeavored  to  discover 
means  to  release  this  power.  These 
efforts  consistently  failed,  however, 
and  the  potential  of  the  atom  re- 
mained a  matter  of  theory,  a  hypothe- 
sis graphically  realized  only  in  the 
imaginative  world  of  science  fiction. 
Ongoing  research  by  a  small  group  of 
European  physicists  in  the  early  years 
of  the  twentieth  century  finally  culmi- 
nated in  the  late  1930's  with  Hahn 
and  Strassmann's  demonstration  of 
the  feasibility  of  fissioning  the  atom, 
the  key  to  tapping  its  enormous 
energy.  But  repressive  political  and 
ideological  conditions  abroad  occa- 
sioned   many    of   these    physicists    to 


forego  their  scientific  investigations 
and  to  seek  refuge  in  America.  There, 
World  War  II  provided  them  the  op- 
portunity to  apply  their  research — to 
transform  atomic  theory  into  a  mate- 
rial reality — as  they  collaborated  with 
American  scientists,  engineers,  and 
industrialists  imder  the  direction  of 
the  United  States  Army  on  the  project 
to  produce  the  world's  first  atomic 
weapon. 

During  the  course  of  this  unprece- 
dented undertaking,  the  Army  had  a 
significant  role  in  orchestrating 
almost  every  aspect  of  atomic  devel- 
opment— from  the  design,  construc- 
tion, and  operation  of  large-scale  pro- 
duction plants  to  strategic  planning 
for  the  employment  of  the  atomic 
bomb.  Until  1942,  its  participation  in 
the  atomic  energy  research  carried  on 
largely  by  the  refugee  and  American 
scientists  at  various  government  and 
university  laboratories  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  Office  of  Scientific  Re- 
search and  Development  and  its  pred- 
ecessors was  sporadic  and  peripheral. 
Yet  the  scientific  leaders  of  the  OSRD 
program,  having  full  cognizance  of 
the  military  potentialities  of  atomic 
energy,  had  anticipated  that  the 
Army,  or  an  equivalent  agency,  even- 
tually would  have  to  assume  a  leading 


AN  ATOMIC  LEGACY 


603 


part  in  its  development.  The  juxtapo- 
sition of  a  number  of  factors  in  the 
winter  of  1941-42,  including  the 
sudden  entrance  of  the  United  States 
into  World  War  II,  the  prevailing 
belief  that  the  Germans  were  moving 
ahead  with  their  own  atomic  investi- 
gations, and  the  rapid  approach  of 
the  American  program  to  the  pilot 
plant  stage,  convinced  them  that  this 
time  had  come.  Hence,  in  early  1942, 
they  advised  the  President  to  take  the 
measures  necessary  to  bring  the  Army 
into  the  program  on  a  major  scale. 

As  a  first  step.  Army  Chief  of  Staff 
General  George  C.  Marshall  selected 
Brig.  Gen.  Wilhelm  D.  Styer  of  the 
Services  of  Supply  to  establish  liaison 
between  the  Army  and  the  atomic 
program.  General  Styer,  working  with 
the  OSRD  leaders,  particularly  Van- 
nevar  Bush  and  James  B.  Conant, 
drew  up  plans  for  bringing  the  Army 
more  fully  into  the  program.  Approv- 
al of  these  plans  in  June  1942  by  the 
Top  Policy  Group — the  President, 
Vice  President,  the  Secretary  of  War, 
Marshall,  Bush,  and  Conant — marked 
the  start  of  the  Army's  managerial 
role  in  the  most  revolutionary  enter- 
prise of  its  time.^ 

The  program  approved  in  June 
turned  over  to  the  Army  three  impor- 
tant tasks:  design,  construction  and 
operation  of  plants  to  produce  fis- 
sionable materials;  organization  of  a 
special  laboratory  to  design,  manufac- 
ture, and  test  atomic  weapons;  and 
responsibility  for  security  for  the 
entire  project.  Under  the  provisions 
of  the  program  the  Army  was  to  work 
in  close  coordination  with  the  OSRD, 
which    would    continue    to   administer 


'  Ltr,  Bush  to  President,   17  Jim  42, 
Files,  Fldr  6,  MDR. 


iid  Iiicl,  HB 


the  research  and  development  as- 
pects, and  to  use  the  funds  and  the 
facilities  of  its  Corps  of  Engineers  in 
carrying  out  its  new  assignment. 

To  discharge  these  tasks,  the  Army 
selected  Col.  James  C.  Marshall,  an 
engineer  officer  with  broad  construc- 
tion experience  and  a  reputation  for 
high  professional  competence,  as 
manager  of  the  atomic  energy  pro- 
gram. During  the  summer  of  1942, 
Marshall,  drawing  chiefly  upon  Corps 
personnel,  facilities,  and  practices  for 
administering  large-scale  construction 
projects,  laid  the  groundwork  for  the 
Army's .  atomic  infrastructure.  He 
formed  a  new  engineer  district,  with 
headquarters  temporarily  in  New 
York  City,  and  appropriately  named  it 
the  Manhattan  District.  But  by  Sep- 
tember, the  project's  mihtary  and  ci- 
vilian leaders  had  come  to  realize  that 
development  of  an  atomic  weapon 
was  going  to  require  an  enterprise  of 
far  greater  scope  and  complexity  than 
they  earlier  had  anticipated.  Conse- 
quently, they  agreed  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  an  Army  officer  who  would 
be  assigned  overall  responsibility  for 
not  only  the  District  but  also  all  other 
aspects  of  the  wartime  atomic  pro- 
gram. To  fill  this  key  position,  the 
Army  designated  Col.  Leslie  R. 
Groves,  a  career  engineer  officer  who, 
while  serving  in  the  Corps'  Construc- 
tion Branch,  had  consistently  demon- 
strated an  exceptional  ability  to  com- 
plete difficult  large-scale  construction 
projects.  At  the  same  time,  the 
project  leaders  also  created  a  Military 
Policy  Committee,  comprised  of 
Bush,  Conant,  Styer,  and  Rear  Adm. 
William  R.  Purnell,  representing  the 
Navy,  to  broadly  control  and  oversee 


604 


MANHATTAN.  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


the      Army's      management      of     the 
program. 

The  assignment  of  Groves  had  an 
immediate  and  significant  influence 
on  the  subsequent  development  of 
the  atomic  energy  program.  As  a  pro- 
fessional manager,  Groves,  newly  pro- 
moted to  brigadier  general,  was  ener- 
getic, hard-working,  and  aggressive  to 
a  fault,  single-minded  yet  adaptable 
when  flexibility  was  necessary,  and 
well  equipped  both  by  education  and 
experience  to  oversee  and  direct  a 
highly  technical  and  complex  con- 
struction project  under  the  often  diffi- 
cult conditions  existing  in  wartime. 
Skillfully  using  his  dual  position  as,  in 
effect,  the  executive  secretary  of  the 
Military  Policy  Committee  and  chief 
administrative  officer  of  what  came  to 
be  known  as  the  Manhattan  Project, 
Groves  quickly  established  dominant 
control  over  the  rapidly  expanding 
program.  In  late  1942  and  early  1943, 
making  maximum  use  of  the  authority 
granted  from  the  War  Department  to 
use  existing  facilities  of  the  Corps  of 
Engineers  (such  as  the  Real  Estate 
Branch),  of  other  branches  of  the 
Army  (such  as  the  Medical  Corps  and 
Military  Intelligence  Division),  of 
other  government  agencies  (such  as 
the  United  States  Employment  Serv- 
ice and  Tennessee  Valley  Authority), 
Groves  succeeded — despite  severe 
shortages  and  competition  from  other 
wartime  programs — in  securing  the 
priorities,  land,  materials,  tools,  man- 
power, and  other  requirements  essen- 
tial to  the  Manhattan  Project's  contin- 
ued development.  The  Manhattan 
commander's  adoption  and  imple- 
mentation of  this  management  prac- 
tice of  securing,  whenever  feasible, 
assistance  from  other  military  and  ci- 
vilian   agencies    made    it    possible    for 


him  to  organize  and  direct  effectively 
the  multifarious  activities  of  the 
project,  aided  only  by  a  headquarters 
staff  that  was  extremely  small  by  war- 
time standards. 

Contributing  also  to  Groves's  suc- 
cess as  the  top  manager  of  the 
Manhattan  Project  was  the  skill  and 
dedication  of  his  team  of  middle  man- 
agers— including  District  Engineer 
Marshall  and,  following  the  relocation 
of  the  Manhattan  District  headquar- 
ters to  Oak  Ridge,  his  replacement, 
Col.  Kenneth  D.  Nichols;  Lt.  Col. 
Franklin  T.  Matthias,  in  charge  of 
the  Hanford  Area  Engineers  Office; 
and  the  four  key  scientific  directors: 
J.  Robert  Oppenheimer  of  the  Los 
Alamos  Laboratory,  Arthur  Compton 
of  the  Metallurgical  Project,  Ernest 
Lawrence  of  the  Radiation  Laborato- 
ry, and  Harold  Urey  of  the  SAM  Lab- 
oratories. Faced  with  the  vast  scope 
and  complexity  of  the  atomic  pro- 
gram, the  task  of  each  project  manag- 
er was  to  keep  the  diverse  activities  of 
his  installation  focused  on  Manhat- 
tan's primary  goal:  production  of  an 
atomic  weapon.  Working  in  close  co- 
ordination with  Groves  in  Washing- 
ton, each  manager  established  specific 
project  objectives,  organized  oper- 
ational functions,  measured  perform- 
ance and  compliance  with  schedules, 
and  motivated  and  developed  person- 
nel resources  to  administer  the  far- 
flung  research,  construction,  and  pro- 
duction aspects  of  an  enterprise 
which,  at  its  height  of  activity,  em- 
ployed a  work  force  of  nearly 
129,000. 

A  relatively  small  proportion  of  this 
work  force,  some  thirty-six  hundred 
military  and  civilian  personnel  as- 
signed   directly    to    Manhattan    or   its 


AN  AIOMIC  LEGACY 


605 


university  contractors,  comprised  the 
project's  administrative  core  element. 
Members  of  this  group  found  them- 
selves with  responsibilities  for  carry- 
ing out  a  great  variety  of  activities. 
Many  assignments  were  quite  similar 
to  those  they  had  experienced  as  em- 
ployees of  the  Corps  of  Engineers  or 
other  government  agencies.  These  in- 
cluded monitoring  the  negotiations 
and  implementation  of  contracts  and 
subcontracts;  expediting  procurement 
of  materials  and  manpower;  assisting 
in  site  selection  and  acquisition;  en- 
forcing security,  health,  and  safety 
regulations;  and  overseeing  the  con- 
struction and  administration  of  the 
atomic  communities  in  Tennessee, 
New  Mexico,  and  Washington  State. 
Other  assignments,  however,  were 
new  and  unlike  anything  hitherto  un- 
dertaken by  uniformed  or  civilian  em- 
ployees of  the  Army.  These  included 
overseeing  the  worldwide  search  and 
exploration  for  deposits  of  uranium, 
thorium,  nickel,  and  other  vital  raw 
materials  required  by  the  project; 
working  as  scientists  and  technicians 
in  research  laboratories;  serving  as 
diplomatic  agents  in  treaty  negotia- 
tions with  foreign  governments;  and 
making  significant  contributions  to 
planning  for  the  peacetime  control 
and  use  of  atomic  energy  at  home 
and  abroad. 

Participation  in  the  atomic  energy 
program  was  by  no  means  limited  to 
personnel  assigned  only  to  the  Man- 
hattan District  or  the  Corps  of 
Engineers.  Many  of  the  Army's  key 
officials,  staff  components,  and  subor- 
dinate elements  became  involved  in 
the  program  and  contributed  to  its  ul- 
timate success.  For  example,  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  himself  assisted  in 
maintaining  essential  liaison  between 


the  Manhattan  Project  and  the  Presi- 
dent and  Congress  and  played  an  im- 
portant role  in  planning  for  the  tacti- 
cal employment  of  the  bomb  and  the 
postwar  control  of  atomic  energy. 
The  staff  of  the  Under  Secretary  of 
War  proved  indispensable  to  Manhat- 
tan in  solving  numerous  manpower 
procurement  and  labor  problems. 
The  Ordnance  Department  made 
available  existing  munitions  plants 
that  facilitated  development  of  heavy 
water  production  works.  The  Signal 
Corps  installed  vital  communications 
systems  that  ensured  adequate  co- 
ordination of  complex  activities  at  the 
widely  separated  and  isolated  in- 
stallations. Military  Police  and  Mili- 
tary Intelligence  units  performed  key 
security  functions.  The  Medical  Corps 
furnished  the  personnel  for  the  health 
and  medical  facilities.  And  when  the 
atomic  bombs  were  ready  for  combat 
employment,  the  Army  Air  Forces 
provided  the  B-29  aircraft  and  crews 
for  delivering  them  on  enemy  targets. 
There  are  few  who  would  question 
that  the  development  of  atomic 
energy  and  atomic  bombs  under  the 
Army's  direction  was  one  of  man- 
kind's greatest  technical  and  military 
achievements — one  that  the  Army 
shares,  of  course,  with  American  sci- 
ence and  American  industry.  The  na- 
tion's political  leaders  in  the  early 
months  of  America's  participation  in 
World  War  II  had  concluded  that  the 
Army  was  the  organization  best 
suited,  and  perhaps  the  only  one  able, 
to  undertake  the  responsibility  for  ad- 
ministering a  program  of  the  magni- 
tude and  difficulty  of  the  Manhattan 
Project.  The  events  of  the  summer  of 
1945  proved  the  soundness  of  their 
choice,   for  the  Army  carried  out  its 


606 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


unenviable  mission  with  success  that 
certainly  matched  its  achievements  on 
the  battlefields  of  World  War  II.  Gen- 
eral Groves  succinctly  summarized 
the  breadth  and  significance  of  this 
accomplishment  in  his  farewell  mes- 
sage to  the  men  of  Manhattan: 

Five  years  ago,  the  idea  of  Atomic 
Power  was  only  a  dream.  You  have  made 
that  dream  a  reality.  You  have  seized 
upon  the  most  nebulous  of  ideas  and 
translated  them  into  actualities.  You  have 
built  cities  where  none  were  known 
before.  You  have  constructed  industrial 
plants  of  a  magnitude  and  to  a  precision 
heretofore  deemed  impossible.  You  built 
the  weapon  which  ended  the  War  and 
thereby  saved  countless  American  lives. 
With  regard  to  peacetime  applications, 
you  have  raised  the  curtain  on  vistas  of  a 
new  world.  ^ 

Undeniably,  in  the  history  of  tech- 
nology, the  Manhattan  Project  stands 
as  a  spectacularly  successful  venture, 
having  demonstrated  to  the  world  the 
kind  of  technical  miracles  possible 
when,  through  skillfully  applied  man- 
agement techniques,  the  resources  of 
science  and  industry  are  brought  to 
bear  single-mindedly  on  the  resolution 
of  extremely  complex  technological 
problems.  But  there  are  those  who 
have  suggested  that  the  Army's  partici- 
pation in  the  project  was  not  necessary 
at  all — that  science  alone,  with  civilian 
industry's  help,  would  have  been  able 
to  build  the  fissionable  materials  pro- 
duction plants  and  to  perfect  the 
bomb.  Some  have  even  indicated  that 
the  Army's  entry  into  the  atomic  pro- 
gram brought  a  bureaucratization, 
perhaps  most  dramatically  exempli- 
fied in  the  policy  of  compartmentali- 


^  Quotation  from  Groves's  farewell  message  to 
Manhattan  Proj,  23  Dec  46,  Admin  Files,  Gen  Cor- 
resp,  316,  MDR. 


zation,  that  unnecessarily  restricted 
and  slowed  the  development  of  the 
bomb.  These  Army  policies  left  an 
aftermath  of  resentment  and  suspi- 
cion, which  found  expression  after 
the  war  in  a  long  and  bitter  contro- 
versy over  enactment  of  legislation 
for  peacetime  control  of  atomic 
energy.  And  the  American  public's  ul- 
timate solution  was  to  give  a  civilian 
agency,  the  United  States  Atomic 
Energy  Commission,  the  dominant 
control  over  the  new  source  of 
energy. 

In  compliance  with  the  people's 
mandate — a  decision  that  represented 
probably  not  so  much  a  criticism  of 
the  Army's  role  in  the  Manhattan 
Project,  as  it  did  a  continuing  adher- 
ence to  the  traditional  American 
belief  in  subordinating  the  role  of  the 
military  in  peacetime — the  Army  on 
31  December  1946  passed  on  to  the 
Atomic  Energy  Commission  primary 
responsibility  for  the  future  develop- 
ment and  control  of  atomic  energy. 
And  even  as  the  Army  completed  its 
final  act,  some  of  the  correlative  ben- 
efits and  risks  of  the  atomic  legacy 
that  it  had  done  so  much  to  create 
were  already  discernible.  Hiroshima 
and  Nagasaki  had  revealed  the  power, 
and  the  horror,  of  an  atomic  bomb- 
ing, forecasting  the  urgent  need  for 
an  international  alliance  to  control 
nuclear  weapons  that,  if  left  uncon- 
trolled, threatened  the  existence  of 
civilized  society.  But  the  fissioning 
process  that  had  made  possible  the 
release  of  the  enormous  energy 
within  the  atom  also  gave  promise  of 
providing  vast  amounts  of  heat  for 
generating  electricity  and  useful  ra- 
dioactive isotopes  for  industrial  and 
medical     application.     In     the     years 


AN  ATOMIC  LEGACY  607 

ahead,   while  having  a  lesser  role  in  Forces  Special  Weapons  Project,   the 

atomic   matters   as   a   member  of  the  Army — as    an    integral    institution    of 

commission's    Military    Liaison    Com-  American  society — would  continue  to 

mittee  and,  subsequently,  the  Armed  share  in  the  atomic  legacy. 


Appendix — Einstein's  Letter 


Albert  Einstein 
Old  Grove  Rd. 
Nassau  Point 
Peconic,  Long  Island 
August  2d,   1939 

F.  D.  Roosevelt 

President  of  the  United  States 

White  House 

Washington,  D.C. 

Sir: 

Some  recent  work  by  E.  Fermi  and  L.  Szilard,  which  has  been  communicat- 
ed to  me  in  manuscript,  leads  me  to  expect  that  the  element  uranium  may  be 
turned  into  a  new  and  important  source  of  energy  in  the  immediate  future. 
Certain  aspects  of  the  situation  which  has  arisen  seem  to  call  for  watchfulness 
and,  if  necessary,  quick  action  on  the  part  of  the  Administration.  I  believe 
therefore  that  it  is  my  duty  to  bring  to  your  attention  the  following  facts  and 
recommendations. 

In  the  course  of  the  last  four  months  it  has  been  made  probable — through 
the  work  of  Joliot  in  France  as  well  as  Fermi  and  Szilard  in  America — that  it 
may  become  possible  to  set  up  a  nuclear  chain  reaction  in  a  large  mass  of  ura- 
nium, by  which  vast  amounts  of  power  and  large  quantities  of  new  radium-like 
elements  would  be  generated.  Now  it  appears  almost  certain  that  this  could  be 
achieved  in  the  immediate  future. 

This  new  phenomenon  would  also  lead  to  the  construction  of  bombs,  and 
it  is  conceivable — though  much  less  certain — that  extremely  powerful  bombs 
of  a  new  type  may  thus  be  constructed.  A  single  bomb  of  this  type,  carried  by 
boat  and  exploded  in  a  port,  might  very  well  destroy  the  whole  port  together 
with  some  of  the  surrounding  territory.  However,  such  bombs  might  very  well 
prove  to  be  too  heavy  for  transportation  by  air. 

The  United  States  has  only  very  poor  ores  of  uranium  in  moderate  quanti- 
ties. There  is  some  good  ore  in  Canada  and  the  former  Czechoslovakia,  while 
the  most  important  source  of  uranium  is  the  Belgian  Congo. 

In  view  of  this  situation  you  may  think  it  desirable  to  have  some  perma- 
nent contact  maintained  between  the  Administration  and  the  group  of  physi- 
cists working  on  chain  reactions  in  America.  One  possible  way  of  achieving 


610  MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 

this  might  be  for  you  to  entrust  with  this  task  a  person  who  has  your  confi- 
dence who  could  perhaps  serve  in  an  unofficial  capacity.  His  task  might  com- 
prise the  following: 

a)  to  approach  Government  Departments,  keep  them  informed  of  the  fur- 
ther development,  and  put  forward  recommendations  for  Government  action, 
giving  particular  attention  to  the  problems  of  securing  a  supply  of  uranium 
ore  for  the  United  States. 

b)  to  speed  up  the  experimental  work,  which  is  at  present  being  carried  on 
within  the  limits  of  the  budgets  of  University  laboratories,  by  providing  funds, 
if  such  fimds  be  required,  through  his  contacts  with  private  persons  who  are 
willing  to  make  contributions  for  this  cause,  and  perhaps  also  by  obtaining  the 
co-operation  of  industrial  laboratories  which  have  the  necessary  equipment. 

I  understand  that  Germany  has  actually  stopped  the  sale  of  uranium  from 
the  Czechoslovakian  mines  which  she  has  taken  over.  That  she  should  have 
taken  such  early  action  might  perhaps  be  understood  on  the  ground  that  the 
son  of  the  German  Under-Secretary  of  State,  von  Weizaecker,  is  attached  to 
the  Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut  in  Berlin  where  some  of  the  American  work  on 
uranium  is  now  being  repeated. 

Yours  very  truly,  ^ 
(signed)  A.   Einstein 


*  Original  of  letter  and  inclosures  filed  in  FDR. 


Bibliographical  Note 

Unpublished  Sources 


Archival  Collections 

Manhattan:  The  Army  and  the  Atomic 
Bomb  is  based  primarily,  although  not 
exclusively,  upon  the  archival  records 
created  by  the  Manhattan  Project 
from  1942  to  1948.  Physical  control 
of  the  bulk  of  these  records  is  divided 
between  two  federal  agencies — the 
National  Archives  and  Records  Serv- 
ice (NARS)  and  the  Department  of 
Energy  (DOE).  A  useful  guide  to 
records  in  the  custody  of  NARS  is  its 
Inventory  of  the  Records  of  the  Manhattan 
Engineer  District,  1942-1948  (Washing- 
ton, D.C.,  November  1956).  As  yet, 
DOE  has  not  published  a  similar 
guide  for  its  records,  but  each  of  its 
records  centers  maintains  a  catalog  of 
its  holdings.  All  footnote  citations  in- 
clude sufficient  data  for  locating  Man- 
hattan Project  archival  records  in 
their  respective  depositories,  indicat- 
ed by  a  final  two-,  three-,  or  four- 
letter  abbreviation  that  is  fully  identi- 
fied in  the  Guide  to  Archival  Collec- 
tions. For  reasons  of  brevity,  in  each 
chapter  only  the  initial  citation  of  a 
document  gives  the  full  reference 
data  (MPC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42,  OCG 
Files,  Gen  Corresp,  MP  Files,  Fldr  25, 
Tab  B,  MDR);  subsequent  citations 
arc  shortened  references  that  contain 
the  essential  identifying  elements,  fol- 


lowed by  the  appropriate  depository 
code  (MPC  Rpt,  15  Dec  42,  MDR). 

The  Manhattan  District  records  at 
NARS  fall  into  several  major  catego- 
ries, of  which  three  are  of  particular 
interest.  Relating  primarily  to  high- 
level  policymaking  matters  are  the 
records  of  General  Groves's  Manhat- 
tan Project  headquarters  in  Washing- 
ton, D.C.,  designated  the  Office  of 
the  Commanding  General  Files;  and 
those  of  Secretary  Stimson's  office, 
designated  the  Harrison-Bundy  Files 
(for  George  Harrison  and  Harvey 
Bundy,  Stimson's  principal  assistants). 
Relating  primarily  to  the  Army's  prac- 
tices and  problems  as  administrator 
of  the  Manhattan  Project  are  the  Gen- 
eral Administrative  Files. 

The  Office  of  the  Commanding 
General  Files  are  comprised  of  letters, 
memorandums,  directives,  diaries,  re- 
ports, and  similar  materials  that  con- 
cern a  variety  of  topics — including  or- 
ganization, research,  production, 
stockpiling,  weapon  testing,  domestic 
and  international  control,  security, 
and  foreign  personnel.  Of  special 
value  is  the  diary  of  Col.  (later  Brig. 
Gen.)  James  C.  Marshall,  the  first  dis- 
trict engineer,  which  records  in  detail 
the  early  months  (June-October 
1942)  of  the  Army's  administration  of 
the    atomic    bomb    project,    and    the 


612 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


aide-memoire  notebook  of  Groves, 
which  covers  the  activities  of  the  com- 
manding general  from  May  1943  to 
May  1945.  This  file  group,  however, 
does  not  include  the  similarly  useful 
office  diary  (1942-46)  of  Groves, 
which  is  retired  in  NARS  Record 
Group  200. 

The  Harrison-Bundy  Files  contain 
the  letters,  memorandums,  and  cables 
on  atomic  energy  that  were  ex- 
changed between  the  Secretary  of 
War,  his  assistants,  the  Under  Secre- 
tary of  War,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  vari- 
ous scientists,  and  appropriate  repre- 
sentatives of  the  British  and  Canadian 
governments.  In  addition  to  corre- 
spondence, the  files  include  minutes 
of  the  meetings  of  the  Military  Policy 
Committee,  the  Combined  Policy 
Committee,  and  the  Interim  Commit- 
tee; a  documentary  diplomatic  history 
of  the  Manhattan  Project  prepared  at 
the  direction  of  General  Groves;  and 
various  drafts  of  bills  for  domestic 
control  of  atomic  energy  drawn  up  by 
War  Department  personnel,  copies  of 
speeches,  press  releases,  and  reports 
to  Congress. 

The  General  Administrative  Files 
consist  primarily  of  correspondence 
between  the  District's  military  and  ci- 
vilian personnel  and  the  project's  sci- 
entists and  engineers,  as  well  as  be- 
tween individuals  in  the  War  Depart- 
ment and  the  various  field  offices  of 
the  District.  In  addition,  these  files 
contain  copies  of  the  District's  circu- 
lar letters,  memorandums,  and  bulle- 
tins, touching  upon  such  matters  as 
audits,  civilian  and  military  personnel, 
contracts  and  claims,  costs,  finance, 
insurance,  labor  relations,  organiza- 
tion, equipment,  safety,  transporta- 
tion, priorities,  and  property. 


Other  categories  of  Manhattan  Dis- 
trict records  at  NARS  pertain  to  a 
number  of  disparate  project  activities. 
The  Investigation  Files  include  corre- 
spondence, memorandums,  and  pro- 
ceedings related  to  personnel  security 
and  criminal  investigations.  The 
Fiscal  and  Audit  Files  contain  useful 
information  concerning  operating 
costs  at  specific  installations  and  data 
compiled  for  budget  planning.  The 
Foreign  Intelligence  Files  are  com- 
prised of  letters,  messages,  and  re- 
ports of  the  District  intelligence  of- 
fices established  in  early  1944  in 
London,  Paris,  and  Frankfurt. 

Besides  the  formal  collection  of 
Manhattan  District  records,  NARS 
also  has  other  extensive  materials  per- 
tinent to  the  wartime  atomic  bomb 
project,  including  Ofiice  of  Scientific 
Research  and  Development  (OSRD), 
congressional,  and  Department  of 
State  records.  Those  from  OSRD  are 
essential  for  the  history  of  the  project 
before  the  Army's  entrance  into  it  in 
1942  and  for  the  views  of  scientists, 
especially  Vannevar  Bush  and  James 
B.  Conant,  on  such  subjects  as  post- 
war planning  for  control  of  atomic 
energy.  The  hearings  on  enactment  of 
postwar  legislation  by  the  Senate  Spe- 
cial Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  in 
1945-46,  as  well  as  other  congres- 
sional records,  include  considerable 
historical  information  concerning  de- 
velopment of  the  wartime  project. 
State  Department  records  contain  im- 
portant data  on  American  policy  relat- 
ing to  postwar  international  control 
measures. 

At  the  time  of  the  writing  of  this 
volume,  most  of  the  day-to-day  ad- 
ministrative, construction,  and  oper- 
ational    records     of    the     Manhattan 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 


613 


Project  (such  as  contracts,  construc- 
tion completion  reports,  security  and 
personnel  records,  and  periodic  re- 
ports on  research  and  development 
programs,  plant  operations,  and  com- 
munity fimctions)  were  located  in  the 
DOE^  facility  at  Germantown,  Mary- 
land, and  in  the  several  DOP^  or  con- 
tractor-operated records  centers  at 
DOE  field  installations.  Most  of  these 
records,  however,  will  eventually  be 
retired  to  the  appropriate  regional 
depositories  in  the  NARS  system. 

By  far  the  largest  and  most  impor- 
tant collection  of  DOBL  records  was  in 
the  Oak  Ridge  Operations  Office.  It 
contained  not  only  the  central  mail 
and  records  files  of  the  Manhattan 
District  headquarters  but  also  those 
of  a  number  of  other  important  sub- 
ordinate elements  of  the  project  (for 
example,  the  Washington  Liaison 
Office  and  the  District's  area  offices 
in  New  York  City).  Here  also  were  the 
records  on  the  design,  construction, 
and  operation  of  the  electromagnetic, 
gaseous  diffusion,  and  thermal  diffu- 
sion plants,  as  well  as  the  plutonium 
semiworks,  and  on  the  planning, 
building,  and  administration  of  the 
Oak  Ridge  community.  Of  special 
value  were  the  construction  comple- 
tion reports  of  Stone  and  Webster, 
M.  W.  Kellogg  and  Kellex,  Du  Pont, 
and  other  major  contractors,  and  the 
diary  (1943-46)  of  Col.  E.  H.  Marsden, 
executive  officer  in  the  district  engi- 
neer's office. 

Records  in  the  Hanford  Operations 
Office  documented  the  story  of  the 
plutonium  production  plant.  Du  Pont, 
the  major  contractor,  produced  volu- 
minous historical  reports  on  site  de- 
velopment and  plant  and  community 
construction  and  operations.  The  area 
engineer,   Col.    Franklin    I.    Matthias, 


recorded  the  Army's  role  at  Hanford 
in  a  detailed  diary  (1943-46). 

The  bulk  of  the  source  materials  on 
scientific  and  technological  develop- 
ments in  the  atomic  bomb  program 
were  in  DOE's  major  contractor-oper- 
ated research  centers.  These  include 
the  Argonne  National  Laboratory  at 
Lemont,  Illinois,  which  has  the  files  of 
the  Metallurgical  Project;  the  Law- 
rence Radiation  Laboratory  at  Berke- 
ley, California;  and  the  Los  Alamos 
Scientific  Laboratory  at  Los  Alamos, 
New  Mexico.  The  records  of  the  SAM 
Laboratories  at  Columbia  University 
were  in  the  Oak  Ridge  Operations 
Office. 

Persona!  Papers 

In  the  years  since  the  end  of  World 
War  II,  the  personal  papers  of  many 
of  the  statesmen,  military  leaders,  and 
scientists  who  played  important  roles 
in  development  of  the  atomic  bomb 
have  become  available  for  historical 
research.  Papers  of  Franklin  D. 
Roosevelt  and  Harry  L.  Hopkins  are 
in  the  Roosevelt  Library  at  Hyde 
Park,  New  York,  as  well  as  some  of 
those  of  Vannevar  Bush  pertaining  to 
the  atomic  project.  Harry  S.  Truman's 
papers  are  in  the  Truman  Library  at 
Independence,  Missouri.  Those  of 
Henry  L.  Stimson,  including  the  in- 
dispensable personal  diary  (1939-45), 
are  in  Yale  University's  Sterling  Me- 
morial Library  in  New  Haven,  Con- 
necticut. Most  of  General  Groves's 
personal  papers  are  in  the  National 
Archives,  as  are  those  also  of  Lyman 
J.  Briggs,  director  of  the  National 
Bureau  of  Standards  (1932-46).  The 
Manuscript  Division  of  the  Library  of 
Congress   has   the  J.    Robert   Oppen- 


614 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


heimer  papers  and  a  substantial  por- 
tion of  those  of  Bush.  Papers  of 
Enrico  Fermi  and  some  of  those  of 
James  Franck,  the  British  scientist,  are 
in  the  University  of  Chicago  Library 
and  those  of  Ernest  O.  Lawrence  are 
in  the  Bancroft  Library,  University  of 
Cahfornia  at  Berkeley.  The  volumi- 
nous diaries  of  William  Lyon  Macken- 
zie King,  the  Canadian  political 
leader,  are  in  NARS  and  contain 
many  entries  concerning  wartime 
atomic  energy  development. 

Manuscript  Histories 

There  are  several  manuscript  his- 
tories that  cover  all  or  important  as- 
pects of  the  atomic  bomb  project. 
The  most  extensive  and  comprehen- 
sive is  the  Armed  Forces  Special 
Weapons  Project's  "Manhattan  Dis- 
trict History,"  prepared  at  the  direc- 
tion of  General  Groves  and  under  the 
general  editorship  of  Gavin  Hadden, 
a  longtime  civil  employee  of  the 
Corps  of  Engineers.  Conceived  as  the 
official  history  of  the  Army's  role  in 
the  project,  it  consists  of  historical 
narratives  prepared  by  each  of  the 
programs  and  activities  of  the  Man- 
hattan Project  in  accordance  with  a 
general  plan  of  organization  and  list 
of  topics  to  be  treated.  Many  of  the 
narratives  are  amply  supplemented 
with  appropriate  supporting  docu- 
ments, bibliographies,  charts,  statisti- 
cal tables,  engineering  drawings, 
maps,  and  photographs.  The  "Histo- 
ry" is  arranged  in  some  thirty-six  vol- 
umes grouped  in  eight  books,  with 
detailed  general  indices  to  names  of 
persons,  agencies,  and  subjects. 
Copies  of  the  "History"  are  located  in 
NARS  and  in  DOE's  Germantown  fa- 


cility. In  1962,  the  Los  Alamos  Scien- 
tific Laboratory  published  an  unclassi- 
fied version  of  a  major  portion  of  that 
part  of  the  "History"  that  covered  its 
activities  from  1943  to  1947  {Manhat- 
tan District  History:  Project  Y,  The  Los 
Alamos  Project,  LAMS-2532,  2  vols.). 
Extensive  extracts  from  the  "History" 
also  are  published  in  Anthony  Cave 
Brown  and  Charles  B.  MacDonald, 
eds..  The  Secret  History  of  the  Atomic 
Bomb  (New  York:  Dial  Press/James 
Wade,  1977). 

Other  manuscript  historical  ac- 
counts cover  specific  aspects  of  the 
project.  On  the  international  activities 
of  the  atomic  program,  there  is  the 
"Diplomatic  History  of  the  Manhattan 
Project,"  compiled  by  members  of 
General  Groves's  staff.  Brief  narrative 
sections,  intended  to  justify  involve- 
ment of  Manhattan  personnel  in  the 
international  field,  are  supported  by  a 
useful  selection  of  pertinent  docu- 
ments. Copies  are  held  by  DOE,  the 
State  Department,  and  NARS  (in  the 
Harrison-Bundy  Files). 

Several  manuscript  histories  pro- 
vide information  on  the  extensive 
support  that  the  Manhattan  Project 
received  from  other  elements  of  the 
Army's  wartime  staff.  In  this  category 
are  Richard  M.  Leighton's  "History  of 
the  Control  Division,  ASF,  1942- 
1945"  (in  two  volumes);  several 
manuscript  histories  pertinent  to  mili- 
tary intelligence  activities,  including 
Bruce  W.  Bidwell's  "History  of  the 
Military  Intelligence  Division,  Depart- 
ment of  the  Army  General  Staff' 
(Part  5),  Capt.  C.  J.  Bernardo's 
"Counterintelligence  Corps  History 
and  Mission  in  World  War  II,"  the 
Army  Service  Forces'  "History  of  the 


bibli()(;raphic:al  noie 


615 


Intelligence  Division"  (in  four  vol- 
umes), and  the  Office  of  the  Provost 
Marshal  General's  "The  Loyalty  In- 
vestigations Program";  and  the  Army 
Service  Forces'  documentary  "History 
of  the  Research  and  Development  Di- 
vision, 1  July  1940-1  July  1945,  with 
Supplement  to  31  December  1945" 
(in  three  volumes).  Also,  a  section  in 
\'ernon  E.  Davis's  "Organizational 
Development:  Development  of  the 
j(^S  (committee  Structure"  (Volume 
2)  describes  how  the  atomic  program 
was  coordinated  with  the  other  armed 
services.  Copies  of  all  these  manu- 
script histories  are  in  NARS. 

Some  of  the  many  hundreds  of 
firms  that  were  under  contract  to  the 
Manhattan  Project  prepared  accounts 
of  their  activities  that  are  more  com- 
prehensive and  detailed  than  tfie 
usual  contractor's  completion  report. 
Of  considerable  importance  are  those 
of  the  Du  Pont  Company  on  the 
design  and  construction  of  the  Clin- 
ton semiworks  and  on  the  building 
and  operation  of  the  Hanford  Engi- 
neer Works.  Useful,  too,  are  the  his- 
tories produced  by  Roane-Anderson 
concerning  its  management  of  the 
town  of  Oak  Ridge  and  of  passenger 
transportation  at  the  Clinton  Engi- 
neer Works.  Copies  of  contractor  his- 
tories are  in  the  appropriate  DOE 
field  records  centers. 


Intennews  and  Correspondence 

Recollections  of  participants  re- 
corded in  interviews  and  correspond- 
ence gave  the  author  information  that 
often  supplemented  the  official  archi- 
val  records.    ELxcept   where   otherwise 


indicated,  copies  of  interview  notes 
and  correspondence  with  the  follow- 
ing persons  are  on  file  in  the  U.S. 
Army  Center  of  Military  History:  Col. 
Keith  F".  Adamson;  Col.  Whitney  Ash- 
bridge;  Col.  Maurice  E.  Barker;  James 
Phinney  Baxter  3d;  Maj.  Samuel  S. 
Baxter;  Lt.  Col.  Benjamin  R.  Bierer; 
Lt.  Col.  Robert  C.  Blair;  Harvey  H. 
Bundy  (in  Columbia  University  Oral 
History  Collection);  Elkin  Burckhardt; 
Charles  W.  Campbell;  Lt.  Gen.  Fred- 
erick J.  Clarke  (in  Corps  of  Engineers, 
Engineer  Memoirs:  Intemiews  With  Lieu- 
tenant General  Frederick  J.  Clarke);  Karl 
P.  Cohen;  W^inston  Dabney;  Col.  Peer 
de  Silva;  Brig.  Gen.  John  H.  Dudley; 
Maj.  Harold  A.  Fidler;  Col.  Mark  C. 
Fox;  F.  A.  Gibson;  Lt.  Gen.  Leshe  R. 
Groves;  Lt.  Gen.  Richard  H.  Groves; 
Edith  E.  Hagg;  Norman  Hilberry;  F. 
E.  Jochen;  Col.  Elmer  E.  Kirkpatrick, 
Jr.;  Col.  Harry  A.  Kuhn;  Brig.  Gen. 
James  C.  Marshall;  Col.  Franklin  T. 
Matthias;  Pat  McAndrew;  Maj.  Wil- 
liam R.  McCauley,  Jr.;  Francis 
McHale;  Maj.  John  H.  McKinley; 
Edwin  M.  McMillan;  Duncan  McRae; 
Capt.  William  J.  Morrell;  Lt.  Col. 
Edgar  J.  Murphy;  John  Musser;  S.  H. 
Nelson;  Charles  E.  Normand;  Jean 
O'Leary;  Harry  Parker;  David  Piccoli; 
Maj.  Gen.  William  N.  Porter;  Robert 
Y.  Porton;  W.  B.  Reynolds;  Frederick 
J.  Roach;  Brig.  Gen.  Jacquard  H.  Roth- 
schild; Alexander  Sachs;  Brig.  Gen. 
Haig  Shekerjian;  S.  Sobol;  Henry 
L.  Stimson  (in  Columbia  University 
Oral  History  Collection);  N.  D. 
Sturgis;  Lt.  Gen.  Wilhelm  D.  Styer; 
Edna  Summerfield;  Ceroid  H.  Tenney; 
Hanford  Thayer;  Brig.  Gen.  Paul  W. 
I  ibbets,  Jr.  (in  Columbia  University 
Oral     Historv     Collection);     Lt.     Col. 


616 


MANHATl  AN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


James    E.    Travis;    Harry    S.    Truman;      Vanden         Bulck;         Raymond         K. 
Col.  Gerald  R.  Tyler;  Lt.  Col.  Charles      Wakerling;  and  T.  Cortland  Williams. 


Published  Sources 


U.S.  Government  Publications: 
Prunary  Materials 


In  the  years  since  the  end  of  World 
War  II,  a  substantial  amount  of  pri- 
mary source  material  relating  to  de- 
velopment and  employment  of  atomic 
energy  has  become  available  in  publi- 
cations of  federal  agencies.  The  public 
pronouncements  of  President  Harry  S. 
Truman  on  atomic  energy  are  conven- 
iently assembled  in  Harry  S.  Truman: 
Containing  the  Public  Messages,  Speeches, 
and  Statements  of  the  President,  1945  and 
1946,  Public  Papers  of  the  Presidents  of 
the  United  States  (Washington,  D.C.: 
Government  Printing  Office,  1 96 1  -62) . 
Comprehensive  coverage  of  interna- 
tional aspects  up  to  the  beginning  of 
1947  is  provided  in  the  Department  of 
State's  carefully  edited  Foreign  Rela- 
tions of  the  United  States,  Diplomatic 
Papers,  series.  Pertinent  are  The  Confer- 
ence of  Berlin  (The  Potsdam  Conference), 
1945,  2  vols.  (Washington,  D.C:  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office,  1960)  and  Gen- 
eral: The  United  Nations,  1946,  Vol.  1 
(Washington,  D.C:  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  1972).  On  the  preparation  of 
domestic  legislation  and  the  question 
of  military  versus  civilian  control,  the 
United  States  Senate  has  published  its 
hearings  held  in  late  1945  and  early 
1946:  U.S.  Congress,  Senate,  Special 
Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Atomic 
Energy:  Hearings  on  S.  Res.  179,  79th 
Cong.,  1st  and  2d  Sess.,  27  November 


1945-15  February  1946  (Washington, 
D.C:  Government  Printing  Office, 
1945-46),  and  Atomic  Energy:  Hearings 
on  S.  1717,  79th  Cong.,"  2d  Sess., 
22January-8  April  1946  (Washington 
D.C:  Government  Printing  Office, 
1946). 

In  1954,  the  United  States  Atomic 
PLnergy  Commission  published  the 
transcript  of  the  hearing  that  its  per- 
sonnel security  board  conducted  into 
the  matter  of  continuing  J.  Robert 
Oppenheimer's  security  clearance. 
Besides  data  on  security,  the  testimo- 
ny recorded  in  this  transcript,  much 
of  it  given  by  participants  in  the  Man- 
hattan Project,  provides  extensive  his- 
torical information  on  many  other  as- 
pects of  the  World  War  II  atomic 
energy  program.  A  detailed  record  of 
research  in  nuclear  technology 
achieved  under  government  contracts 
during  World  War  II  is  provided  in 
the  multivolumed  National  Nuclear 
Energy  Series,  prepared  under  the 
sponsorship  of  the  Manhattan  District 
and  its  successor  civilian  agencies,  the 
Atomic  Energy  Commission,  the 
Energy  Research  and  Development 
Agency,  and  the  Department  of 
Energy.  There  are  some  one  hundred 
volumes  in  the  series,  arranged  in  ten 
divisions. 

I  he  effects  of  the  atomic  bombing 
of  Japan  are  covered  in  detail  in  sev- 
eral of  the  hundreds  of  reports  pre- 
pared by  the  United  States  Strategic 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 


617 


Bombing  Survey  on  the  effects  of 
aerial  attacks  in  Europe  and  the  Pacif- 
ic in  World  War  II.  These  reports  are 
organized  into  two  broad  categories, 
Europe  and  the  Pacific,  and  num- 
bered consecutively  within  each  cate- 
gory. Four  reports  within  the  Pacific 
category  are  concerned  with  the 
atomic  bombing  of  Japan.  Report  3, 
The  Effects  of  Atomic  Bombs  on  Hiroshima 
and  Nagasaki,  issued  as  an  unclassified 
publication  in  mid- 1946,  briefly  sum- 
marizes all  aspects  in  layman's  terms. 
Report  13,  The  Effects  of  Atomic  Bombs 
on  Health  and  Medical  Services  in  Hiroshi- 
ma and  Nagasaki,  also  unclassified  and 
published  in  March  1947,  provides 
detailed  data  on  the  medical  conse- 
quences. Report  92,  The  Effects  of  the 
Atomic  Bomb  on  Hiroshima,  issued  in 
Mav  1947,  and  Report  93,  The  Effects 
of  the  Atomic  Bomb  on  Nagasaki,  issued 
in  June  1947,  each  in  three  volumes, 
were  originally  classified  secret  (sub- 
sequently downgraded)  and  furnish, 
in  great  detail,  data  on  the  physical 
effects  of  the  atomic  bombings.  All  of 
these  reports  were  published  by  the 
Government  Printing  Office  in  Wash- 
ington, D.C. 

The  Manhattan  District  also  issued 
the  results  of  its  own  survey,  "The 
Atomic  Bombings  of  Hiroshima  and 
Nagasaki,"  June  1946,  and  "Photo- 
graphs of  the  Atomic  Bombings  of 
Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki,"  June  1946. 

The  official  account  of  Operation 
Crossroads,  the  atomic  bomb  tests 
conducted  by  U.S.  Joint  Task  Force 
One  at  Bikini  Atoll  in  the  Pacific  in 
July  1946,  is  contained  in  its  historical 
report  Atomic  Bomb  Tests  Able  and  Baker 
(Operation  Crossroads),  3  vols.  (Wash- 
ington, D.C:  U.S.  Joint  Task  Force 
One,  1947). 


U.S.  Government  Publications: 
Secondary  Accounts 

Among  the  most  useful  of  second- 
ary accounts  on  the  development  of 
atomic  energy  and  related  activities  in 
World  War  II  are  those  in  historical 
series  officially  sponsored  by  the  U.S. 
armed  forces  and  by  various  govern- 
ment agencies.  The  author  found  the 
following  especially  valuable. 

War  Department 

An  indispensable  source  on  the 
wartime  project,  and  a  classic  in  the 
literature  dealing  with  the  develop- 
ment of  atomic  energy,  is  the  War 
Department's  official  report  that  was 
published  shortly  after  the  bombings 
of  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki  in  August 
1945. 

Smyth,  H.  D.  A  General  Account  of  the 
Development  of  Methods  of  Using 
Atomic  Energy  for  Military  Purposes 
Under  the  Auspices  of  the  United' 
States  Government,  1940-1945. 
Washington,  D.C:  Government 
Printing  Office,  1945. 

In  September  1945,  Professor 
Smyth's  institution,  Princeton  Univer- 
sity, issued  a  slightly  modified  version 
of  this  account,  with  the  addition  of 
an  index  and  photographs. 

Smyth,  H.  D.  Atomic  Energy  for  Military 
Purposes:  The  Official  Report  on  the 
Development  of  the  Atomic  Bomb 
Under  the  Auspices  of  the  United 
States  Government,  1940-1945. 
Princeton:  Princeton  University 
Press,  1945. 


618 


MANHATTAN:  THP:  ARMY  AND  IHE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


Department  of  the  Army 

Each  of  the  following  volumes  in 
the  U.S.  Army  in  World  War  II  series 
provides  important  information  on 
some  historical  aspect  of  the  wartime 
Army  that  related  to  the  Manhattan 
Project. 

Brophy,  Leo  P.,  and  Fisher,  George  J. 
B.  The  Chemical  Warfare  Serince:  Or- 
ganizing for  War.  Washington, 
D.C.:  Government  Printing 
Office,  1959. 

Cline,  Ray  S.  Washington  Command 
Post:  The  Operations  Division.  Wash- 
ington, D.C.:  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  1 95 1. 

Coll,  Blanche  D.;  Keith,  Jean  E.;  and 
Rosenthal,  Herbert  H.  The  Corps 
of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment. 
Washington,  D.C.:  Government 
Printing  Office,  1958. 

Dziuban,  Stanley  W.  Military  Relations 
Between  the  United  States  and 
Canada,  1939-1945.  Washington, 
D.C.:  Government  Printing 
Office,  1959. 

Fairchild,  Byron,  and  Grossman,  Jon- 
athan. The  Army  and  Industrial 
Manpower.  Washington,  D.C.: 
Government  Printing  Office, 
1959. 

Fine,  Lenore,  and  Remington,  Jesse 
A.  The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Construc- 
tion in  the  United  States.  Washing- 
ton, D.C.:  Government  Printing 
Office,  1972. 

Green,  Constance  McLaughlin; 
Thomson,  Harry  C;  and  Roots, 
Peter  C.  The  Ordnance  Department: 
Planning  Munitions  for  ]Var.  Wash- 
ington, D.C.:  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  1955. 

Matloff,  Maurice.  Strategic  Planning  for 
Coalition        Warfare,        1943-1944. 


Washington,  D.C.:  Government 
Printing  Office,  1959. 

Millett,  John  D.  The  Organization  and 
Role  of  the  Army  Service  Forces. 
Washington,  D.C.:  Government 
Printing  Office,  1954. 

Palmer,  Robert  R.;  Wiley,  Bell  I.;  and 
Keast,  William  R.  The  Procurement 
and  Training  of  Ground  Combat 
Troops.  Washington,  D.C.:  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office,  1948. 

Smith,  R.  Elberton.  The  Army  and  Eco- 
nomic Mobilization.  Washington, 
D.C.:  Government  Printing 
Office,  1959. 

Thompson,  George  Raynor;  Harris, 
Dixie  R.;  Oakes,  Pauline  M.;  and 
Terrett,  Dulany.  The  Signal  Corps: 
The  Test.  Washington,  D.C.:  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office,  1957. 

Treadwell,  Mattie  E.  The  Women's  Army 
Corps.  Washington,  D.C.:  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  1954. 

Watson,  Mark  S.  Chief  of  Staff:  Prewar 
Plans  and  Preparations.  Washing- 
ton, D.C.:  Government  Printing 
Office,  1950. 

In  the  World  War  II  series  Medical 
Department,  United  States  Army,  the 
following  volumes  provide  data  relat- 
ing to  the  organization  and  activities 
of  the  medical  element  in  the  Manhat- 
tan Project. 

Armfield,  Blanche  B.  Organization  and 
Administration  in  World  War  II. 
Washington,  D.C.:  Government 
Printing  Office,  1963. 

McMinn,  John  H.,  and  Levin,  Max. 
Personnel  in  World  War  II.  Wash- 
ington, D.C.:  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  1963. 

Warren,  Stafford  L.  "The  Role  of  Ra- 
diology in  the  Development  of 
the   Atomic    Bomb."    Radiology   in 


BIBLKK.RAPHICAL  NO  IE 


619 


]\'or/(/  War  II.  Edited  by  Kenneth 

D.    A.    Allen.  Washington,    D.C.: 

Government  Printing       Office, 
1966. 

Depart  men  t  of  the  Xavy 

In  the  Navv's  semiofficial  series 
History  of  Ihiited  States  Naval  Oper- 
ations in  World  War  II,  the  story  of 
the  ill-fated  Indianapolis,  which  carried 
atomic  bomb  parts  to  Finian,  and  the 
achievement  of  victorv  and  peace  in 
the  Pacific  are  dealt  with  in  the  fol- 
lowing volume. 

Morison,  Samuel  Eliot,  rictory  m  the 
Pacific  1945.  Vol.  14.  Boston: 
Little,  Brown  and  Co.,  1960. 

Arm\  Air  Forces 

1  wo  \olumes  in  The  Army  Air 
Forces  in  World  War  II  series,  edited 
by  Wesley  Frank  Craven  and  James 
Lea  Cate,  include  materials  pertinent 
to  that  arm's  participation  in  the 
atomic  bombing  of  Japan. 

Europe:  Argument  to  ]'-E  Day.  January 
194-1  to  May  1945.  Vol.' 3.  Chica- 
go: Universitv  of  Chicago  Press, 
1951. 

The  Pacific:  Matterhorn  to  Xagasaki,  June 
1944  to  August  1945.  Vol.  5.  Chi- 
cago: University  of  Chicago 
Press,  1953. 

The  special  military  unit  that  car- 
ried out  the  atomic  bombing  of  Japan 
is  depicted  in  the  following  volume. 

56*9///  Pictorial  AU)um:  Written  and  Pub- 
lished h\  and  f)r  the  Members  of  the 
509th  Composite  Group,  Tinian, 
1945.  Edited  by  Capt.  Jerome  J. 
Ossip.  Chicago:  Rogers  Printing 
Co.,  1946. 


Office  of  Scientific  Research 
and  Development 

Several  volumes  in  the  historical 
series  Science  in  World  War  II  con- 
tain substantial  sections  on  atomic 
energy,  with  emphasis  on  the  OSRD's 
role. 

Baxter  3d,  James  Phinney.  Scientists 
Against  Time.  Boston:  Little, 
Brown  and  Co.,  1946. 

Stewart,  Irvin.  Organizing  Scientific  Re- 
search for  War:  The  Administrative 
History  of  the  Office  of  Scientific  Re- 
search and  Development.  Boston: 
Little,  Brown  and  Co.,  1948. 

Thiesmeyer,  Lincoln  R.,  and  Bur- 
chard,  John  E.  Combat  Scientists. 
Boston:  Little,  Brown  and  Co., 
1947. 

Department  of  Energy 

Hewlett,  Richard  G.,  and  Anderson, 
Oscar  E.,  Jr.  The  New  World, 
1939-1946.  Vol.  1.  University 
Park,  Pa.:  Pennsylvania  State  Uni- 
versity Press,  1962.  This  volume, 
the  first  in  the  Department  of  En- 
ergy's history  of  the  former 
Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
comprises  a  detailed  narrative  of 
atomic  developments  from  1939 
through  1946,  with  emphasis  on 
the  scientific  aspects. 

,    and   Duncan,    Francis.   Atomic 

Shield,  1947-1952.  Vol.  2.  Univer- 
sity Park,  Pa.:  Pennsylvania  State 
University  Press.  1969. 

National  Bureau  of  Standards 

Cochrane.  Rexmond  C.  Measures  for 
Progress:  A  History  of  the  Bureau  of 
Standards.   Washington,  D.C.:  Na- 


620 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


tional  Bureau  of  Standards,  U.S. 
Department  of  Commerce,   1966. 

Bureau  of  the  Budget 

Bureau  of  the  Budget.  The  United 
States  at  War:  Development  and  Ad- 
ministration of  the  War  Program  by 
the  Federal  Government.  Washing- 
ton, D.C.:  Committee  of  Records 
of  War  Administration  No.  1, 
War  Records  Section,  Bureau  of 
the  Budget,  1946.  This  is  the 
first  of  the  bureau's  historical  re- 
ports on  administration  in  World 
War  II. 

Civilian  Production  Administration 

Civilian  Production  Administration, 
Bureau  of  Demobilization.  Indus- 
trial Mobilization  for  War:  History  of 
the  War  Production  Board  and  Prede- 
cessor Agencies,  1940-1945,  Program 
and  Administration.  Washington, 
D.C.:  Government  Printing 
Office,  1947.  This  is  the  first 
volume  in  a  projected  history  of 
the  War  Production  Board. 

Foreign  Government  Publications 

Foreign  governments  have  spon- 
sored a  number  of  official  publica- 
tions about  atomic  energy  develop- 
ments in  World  War  II.  The  author 
found  the  following  useful  in  prepar- 
ing his  account  of  the  Manhattan 
Project. 

United  Kingdom 

Crowther,  J.  G.,  and  Whiddington,  R. 
Science  at  War.  London:  His  Maj- 
esty's Stationery  Office,  1947. 


Gowing,  Margaret.  Britain  and  Atomic 
Energy,  1939-1945.  London:  Mac- 
millan  and  Co.,  St.  Martin's 
Press,  1964.  This  volume  is  the 
official  history  of  the  British  war- 
time atomic  energy  program. 

,  Independence  and  Deterrence:  Brit- 
ain and  Atomic  Energy,  1945-1952. 
2  vols.  New  York:  St.  Martin's 
Press,  1974.  This  work,  written 
with  the  assistance  of  Lora 
Arnold,  is  the  continuation  of  the 
official  history  of  the  British 
atomic  energy  program. 

Hall,  H.  Duncan,  and  Wrigley,  C.  C. 
Studies  of  Overseas  Supply.  History 
of  the  Second  World  War. 
London:  Her  Majesty's  Stationery 
Office,  1956.  J.  D.  Scott  wrote 
one  of  the  chapters  in  this 
volume. 


Japan 

The  Committee  for  the  Compilation  of 
Materials  on  Damage  Caused  by 
the  Atomic  Bombs  in  Hiroshima 
and  Nagasaki,  ed.  Hiroshima  and 
Nagasaki:  The  Physical,  Medical,  and 
Social  Effects  of  the  Atomic  Bombings. 
Translated  by  Eisei  Ishikawa  and 
David  L.  Swain.  New  York:  Basic 
Books,  1981.  This  report,  com- 
missioned by  the  cities  of  Hiro- 
shima and  Nagasaki,  was  compiled 
by  a  committee  of  thirty-four  Japa- 
nese specialists,  with  the  aim  of 
achieving  as  definitive  an  account 
as  possible  of  the  nature  and 
extent  of  the  damage  wrought  by 
the  atomic  bombings  of  6  and  9 
August  1945. 

Office  of  Civil  Defense,  Office  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  (Japan),  and 
Technical     Management     Office, 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 


621 


U.S.  Naval  Radio.  Analysis  of  Japa- 
nese Nuclear  Casualty  Data.  Com- 
piled by  L.  Wayne  Davis  et  aL  Al- 
buquerque, N.Mex:  Dikewood 
Corp.,  April  1966. 

Personal  Accounts,  Memoirs,  and 
Collected  Papers 

Of  the  many  personal  accounts, 
memoirs,  and  collected  papers  of  par- 
ticipants in  the  Manhattan  Project  or 
in  events  related  to  the  development 
and  employment  of  the  atomic  bomb, 
the  author  has  found  the  following 
volumes  to  be  most  useful. 

Arnold,  H.  H.  Global  Mission.  New 
York:  Harper  and  Brothers,  1949. 

Bush,  Vannevar.  Pieces  of  the  Action. 
New  York:  William  Morrow, 
1970. 

Compton,  Arthur  Holly,  Atomic  Quest: 
A  Personal  Narrative.  New  York: 
Oxford  University  Press,  1956. 

Conant,  James  Bryant.  My  Several 
Lives:  Memoirs  of  a  Social  Inventor. 
New  York:  Harper  and  Row, 
1970. 

Fermi,  Enrico.  United  States,  1939- 
1954.  The  Collected  Papers  of 
Enrico  Fermi.  Edited  by  Emilio 
Segre  et  al.  Vol.  2.  Chicago:  Uni- 
versity of  Chicago  Press,  1965. 

Fermi,  Laura.  Atoms  in  the  Family:  My 
Life  With  Enrico  Fermi.  Chicago: 
University  of  Chicago  Press, 
1954. 

Goldschmidt,  Bertrand.  The  Atomic  Ad- 
venture: Its  Political  and  Technical 
Aspects.  Translated  from  the 
French  by  Peter  Beer.  Oxford, 
England,  and  New  York:  Perga- 
mon  Press  and  Macmillan  Co., 
1964. 


Goudsmit,  Samuel  A.  ALSOS.  New 
York:  Henry  Schuman,  1947. 

Groves,  Leslie  R.  Now  It  Can  Be  Told: 
The  Story  of  the  Manhattan  Project. 
New  York:  Harper  and  Brothers, 
1962. 

Leahy,  William  D.  /  Was  There.  New 
York:  Whittlesey  House, 

McGraw-Hill  Book  Co.,  1950. 

Ley,  Willy,  ed.  and  trans.  Otto  Hahn:  A 
Scientific  Autobiography.  New  York: 
Scribner's  Sons,  1966. 

Lilienthal,  David  E.  The  Journals  of 
David  E.  Lilienthal.  5  vols.  New 
York:  Harper  and  Row,  1964. 
Volumes  1  and  2,  covering  the 
years  from  1939  to  1950,  include 
references  pertinent  to  the  Man- 
hattan Project. 

Mac  Arthur,  Douglas.  Reminiscences. 
New  York:  McGraw-Hill  Book 
Co.,  1964. 

Oppenheimer,  J.  Robert.  Robert  Oppen- 
heimer:  Letters  and  Recollections. 
Edited  by  Alice  Kimball  Smith 
and  Charles  Weiner.  Cambridge, 
Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press, 
1980. 

Pash,  Boris  T.  The  ALSOS  Mission. 
New  York:  Award  House,  1969. 

Pickersgill,  J.  W.  The  Mackenzie  King 
Record,  1939-1944.  Vol.  1.  To- 
ronto: University  of  Toronto 
Press,  1960. 

,  and  Forster,  D.  F.,  The  Macken- 
zie King  Record,  1944-1948.  Vols. 
2-4.  Toronto:  University  of  To- 
ronto Press,  1968-70.  The  above 
four  volumes  comprise  the  sub- 
stantially edited  diary  of  William 
Lyon  Mackenzie  King. 

Speer,  Albert.  Inside  the  Third  Reich- 
Memoirs.  Translated  from  the 
German    bv    Richard    and    Clara 


622 


MANHATTAN:  IHE  ARMY  AND  THE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


Winston.    New    York:    Macmillan 

Co.,  1969. 
Stimson,      Henry      L.,      and      Bundy, 

McGeorge.     On    Active    Service    in 

Peace  and  War.  New  York:  Harper 

and  Brothers,  1947. 
Strauss,    Lewis    L.    Men    and   Decisions. 

Garden     City,     N.Y.:     Doubleday 

and  Co.,  1962. 
Szilard,  Leo.  "Reminiscences."  In  The 

Intellectual    Migration:    Europe    and 

America,    1930-1960.    Perspectives 

in     American     History.     Vol.     2. 

Cambridge,         Mass.:         Charles 

Warren    Center    for    Studies    in 

American   History,    Harvard    Llni- 

versity  Press,  1968. 
Teller,    Edward,    and    Brown,    Allen. 

The   Legacy    of  Hiroshima.    Garden 

City,    N.Y.:    Doubleday   and    Co., 

1962. 
Tibbets,  Paul  W.,  Jr.  The  Tibbets  Story. 

New  York:  Stein  and  Day,  1978.' 
Truman,    Harry    S.    Memoirs.    2    vols. 

Garden     City,     N.Y.:     Doubledav 

and  Co.,  1955-56. 

Biographical  Studies 

Most  of  the  biographical  studies  of 
participants  in  the  World  War  II 
atomic  energy  program  are  of  scien- 
tists or  political  figures.  The  author 
found  that  the  following  volumes  pro- 
vide some  insight  into  the  Army's  role 
in  the  program. 

Allison,  Samuel  K.  "Arthur  Holly 
Compton."  In  Xational  Academy  of 
Sciences:  Biographical  Memoirs.  Vol. 
38  (pp.  81-110).  New  York:  Co- 
lumbia University  Press,  1965. 

Baker,  Liva.  Felix  Frankfurter.  New 
York:  Coward-McCann,  1969. 


Bernstein,  Jeremy.  Hans  Bethe:  Prophet 
of  Energy.  Cambridge,  Mass.: 
Basic  Books,  1980. 

Biquard,  Pierre.  Frederic  Joliot-Curie: 
The  Man  and  His  Theories.  New 
York:  Paul  S.  Eriksson,  1965. 

Blumberg,  Stanley  A.,  and  Owens, 
Gwinn.  Energy  and  Conflict:  The 
Life  and  Times  of  Edward  Teller. 
New  York:  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons, 
1976. 

Childs,  Herbert.  An  American  Genius: 
The  Life  and  Times  of  Ernest  Orlando 
Lawrence.  New  York:  E.  P.  Dutton 
and  Co.,  1968. 

Clark,  Ronald  W.  Einstein:  The  Life  and 
Times.  New  York:  World  Publish- 
ing Co.,  1971. 

Tizard.      Cambridge,     Mass.: 

Massachusetts  Institute  of  Tech- 
nology Press,  1965. 

Davis,  Nuel  P.  Lawrence  and  Oppen- 
heimer.  New  Y'ork:  Simon  and 
Schuster,  1968. 

Fermi.  Laura.  Illustrious  Immigrants:  The 
Intellectual  Migration  From  Europe, 
1930-1941.  Chicago:  University 
of  Chicago  Press,  1968. 

Goodchild,  Peter  J.  /  Robert  Oppen- 
heimer.  Shatterer  of  Worlds.  Boston: 
Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1981. 

Harrod,  R.  F.  The  Prof  A  Personal 
Memoir  of  Lord  Chenvell.  London: 
Macmillan  and  Co.,  1959. 

Huie,  William  Bradford.  The  Hiroshima 
Pilot:  The  Case  of  Major  Claude 
Fatherly.  New  York:  G.  P.  Put- 
nam's Sons,  1964. 

Kunetka,  James  W.  Oppenheimer:  The 
Years  of  Risk.  Englewood  Cliffs, 
NJ.:  Prentice-Hall,  1982. 

Latil,  Pierre  de.  Enrico  Fermi:  The  Man 
and  His  Theories.  New  York:  Paul 
S.  Eriksson,  1966. 


BIBLIOCiRAPHICAL  NO  IE 


623 


Libby,  Lcona  Marshall.  The  Uranium 
People.  New  York:  Oanc,  Russak, 
1979. 

Michelmorc,  Peter.  The  Swift  Years:  The 
Robert  Oppeuheimer  Story.  New- 
York:  Dodd,  Mead  and  Co.,  1969. 

Moore,  Ruth.  Xiels  Bohr:  The  Man,  His 
Science,  and  the  World  They  Changed. 
New  York:  Alfred  A.  Knopf, 
1966. 

Moorehead,  Alan.  The  Traitors:  The 
Double  Life  of  Fuchs,  Pontecorvo,  and 
Xiinn  Slay.  London:  Hamish 
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Morison,  Elting  E.  Turmoil  and  Tradi- 
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Henry  L.  Stimson.  Boston:  Hough- 
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Rozental,  S.,  ed.  Niels  Bohr:  His  Life 
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Rouze,  Michel.  Robert  Oppenheimer:  The 
Man  and  His  Theories.  New  York: 
Paul  S.  Eriksson,  1965. 

Segre,  Emilio.  Enrico  Fermi,  Physicist. 
Chicago:  University  of  Chicago 
Press,  1970. 

Ulam,  Stanislav;  Kuhn,  H.  W.; 
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Claude  E.  "John  von  Neumann, 
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1930-1960.  Perspectives  in 
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Center  for  Studies  in  American 
History,  Harvard  Universitv 
Press,  1968. 

Books  on  Other  Aspects 

Alexander,  Frederic  C.,  jr.  History  of 
Sandia  Corporation  Through  Fiscal 
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Bar-Zohar,  Michel.  The  Hunt  for 
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Batchelder,  Robert  C.  The  Irreversible 
Decision,  1939-1950.  Boston: 
Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1962. 

Bentwich,  Norman.  The  Rescue  and 
Achievement  of  Displaced  Scholars  and 
Scientists,  1933-1952.  The  Hague: 
Martinus  Nijhoff,  1953. 

Bernstein,  Barton  J.,  ed.  The  Atomic 
Bomb:  The  Critical  Issues.  Critical 
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Boston:  Little,  Brown  and  Co., 
1976. 

Beyerchen,  Alan  D.  Scientists  Under 
Hitler:  Politics  and  the  Physics  Com- 
munity in  the  Third  Reich.  New 
Haven:  Yale  University  Press, 
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Brodie,  Bernard  and  Fawn.  From 
Crossboiv  to  H-Bomb.  Rev.  and  enl. 
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LIniversity  Press,  1973. 

Butow,  Robert  J.  C.Japan's  Decision  To 
Surrender.  Palo  Alto,  Calif.:  Stan- 
ford LIniversity  Press,  1954. 

Church,  Peggy  Pond.  The  House  at 
Otowi  Bridge.  Albuquerque:  Uni- 
versity of  New  Mexico  Press, 
1959. 

Churchill,  Winston  S.  The  Second  World 
War:  The  Grand  Alliance.  Boston: 
Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1950. 

The    Second    World    War:    The 

Hinge  of  Fate.    Boston:   Houghton 
Mifflin  Co.,  1950. 

The  Second  World  War:  Triumph 


and    Tragedy.     Boston:    Houghton 
Mifflin  Co.;  1953. 
Clark,    Ronald    W.     The    Birth    of   the 
Bomb.    New  York:   Horizon  Press, 
1961. 


624 


MANHA 1  IAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  A  EOMIC  BOMB 


The  Greatest  Power  on  Earth:  The 

International  Race  for  Nuclear  Su- 
premacy. New  York:  Harper  and 
Row  Publishers,  1980.  The  origi- 
nal British  edition  was  published 
under  the  title  The  Greatest  Power 
on  Earth:  The  Story  of  Nuclear  Fis- 
sion (London:  Sidgwick  and  Jack- 
son, 1980). 

DeWeerd,  H.  A.  British-American  Col- 
laboration on  the  A-Bomb  in  World 
War  II.  Santa  Monica,  Calif.: 
Rand  Corp.,  1963. 

Dietz,  David.  Atomic  Science,  Bomb  and 
Power.  New  York:  Dodd,  Mead 
and  Co.,  1954. 

Du  Pont  de  Nemours  and  Company, 
E.  I.  Du  Pontes  Part  in  the  National 
Security  Program,  1 94 0-194 5.  Wil- 
mington, Del.:  Du  Pont,  1946. 

Eggleston,  Wilfrid.  Canada's  Nuclear 
Story.  London:  Harrap  Research 
Publications,  1966. 

Feis,  Herbert.  The  Atomic  Bomb  and  the 
End  of  World  War  II.  Princeton: 
Princeton  University  Press,  1966. 
This  is  a  revised  edition  of  a 
work  originally  published  under 
the  lk\e  Japan  Subdued:  The  Atomic 
Bomb  and  the  End  of  the  War  m  the 
Pacific  (1961). 

Giovanitti,  Len,  and  Freed,  Fred.  The 
Decision  To  Drop  the  Bomb.  New 
York:  Coward-McCann,  1956. 

Glasstone,  Samuel.  Sourcebook  on 
Atomic  Energy.  3d  ed.  Princeton, 
N.J.:  D.  Van  Nostrand  Co.,  1967. 

Goldschmidt,  Bertrand.  The  Atomic 
Complex:  A  Worldwide  Political  Histo- 
ry of  Nuclear  Energy.  Translated 
from  the  French  by  Bruce  M. 
Adkins.  La  Grange,  111.:  American 
Nuclear  Society,  1982. 

Les    Rivalites   atomiques,    1939- 

1966.  Paris:  Fayard,  1967. 


Groueff,  Stephane.  Manhattan  Project: 
The  Untold  Story  of  the  Making  of  the 
Atomic  Bomb.  Boston:  Little, 
Brown  and  Co.,  1967. 

Hecht,  Selig.  Explaining  the  Atom.  2d 
ed.  New  York:  Viking  Press, 
1954. 

Hempstone,  Smith.  Rebels,  Mercenaries 
and  Dividends:  The  Katanga  Story. 
New  York:  Frederick  A.  Praeger, 
1962. 

Herken,  Gregg  F.  The  Winning  Weapon: 
The  Atomic  Bomb  in  the  Cold  War, 
1945-1950.  New  York:  Alfred  A. 
Knopf,  1981. 

Irving,  David.  The  I'lrus  House. 
London:  William  Kimber,  1967. 
The  American  edition  was  pub- 
lished under  the  title  The  German 
Atomic  Bomb:  The  History  of  Nuclear 
Research  in  Nazi  Germany  (New 
York:  Simon  and  Schuster,  1968). 

Johnson,  Charles  W.,  and  Jackson, 
Charles  O.  City  Behind  a  Fence: 
Oak  Ridge,  Tennessee,  1942-1946. 
Knoxville:  LIniversity  of  Tennes- 
see Press,  1980. 

Jungk,  Robert.  Brighter  Than  a  Thou- 
sand Suns:  A  Personal  History  of  the 
Atomic  Scientists.  Translated  by 
James  Cleugh.  New  York:  Har- 
court.  Brace  and  Co.,  1958. 

Kopp,  Theodore  F.  Weapon  of  Silence. 
Chicago:  University  of  Chicago 
Press,  1946. 

Kramish,  Arnold.  Atomic  Energy  in  the 
Soviet  Union.  Stanford:  Stanford 
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Kunetka,  James  W.  City  of  Fire:  Los 
Alamos  and  the  Atomic  Age,  1943- 
1945.  Rev.  ed.  Albuquerque:  Uni- 
versity of  New  Mexico  Press, 
1979.  The  original  edition  was 
published  under  the  title  City  of 
Fire:  Los  Alamos  and  the  Birth  of  the 


I 


bibli()(;raphk.al  noik 


625 


Alomic  Age,  194  3-1945  (Englc- 
wood  Cliffs,  NJ.:  Prentice-Hall. 
1978). 

Lamont,  Lansing.  Das  of  Trinity.  New 
York:  Atheneum,  1965. 

Lang,  Daniel.  Early  Tales  of  the  Atomic 
Age.  New  York:  Doubledav  and 
Co.,  1948. 

Lapp,  Ralph  E.  Atoms  and  People.  New 
York:  Harper  and  Brothers,  1956. 

Laurence,  William  L.  Men  and  Atoms: 
The  Discovery,  the  i'ses  and  the 
Future  of  Atomic  Energy.  New  York: 
Simon  and  Schuster,  1959. 

Dawn  Over  Zero:  The  Story  of  the 

Atomic  Bomb.  2d  ed.  enl.  West- 
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Martin,  Roscoe  C,  ed.  TVA:  The  First 
Twenty  Years.  Knoxville:  LIniversity 
of  Tennessee  Press,  1956. 

McKee,  Robert  E.  The  Zia  Company  in 
Los  Alamos:  A  History.  El  Paso, 
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Meigs,  Montgomery  C.  "Managing 
Uncertainty:  Vannevar  Bush, 
James  B.  C'onant  and  the  Devel- 
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from  University  Microfilms  in 
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Nathan,  Otto,  and  Norden,  Lleinz, 
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Nelson,  Donald  M.  Arsenal  of  Democra- 
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Purcell,  John.  The  Best-Kept  Secret:  'The 
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Robinson,  George  O.,  Jr.  The  Oak 
Ridge  Story.  Kingsport,  Tenn.: 
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Schoenberger,  Walter  Smith.  Decision 
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Seaborg,  Glenn  T.  The  Transuranium 
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Sherwin,  Martin  J.  A  World  Destroyed: 
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1975. 

Sherwood,  Robert  E.  Roosevelt  and 
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626  MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 

Wheeler,    Keith,    and    the   Editors    of    Wyden,  Peter.  Day  One:  Before  Hiroshima 
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Alexandria,  Va.:  Time-Life,  1983.  Schuster,  1984. 


Guide  to  Archival  Collections 

To  reduce  the  length  of  the  footnotes,  the  following  abbreviations 
were  used  to  indicate  the  specific  archival  collection  for  each  document 
cited. 

ANL  Records  of  the  Argonne  National  Laboratory 

U.S.  Department  of  Energy 
Lemont,  Illinois 

ASF  Record  Group  160 

Records  of  Headquarters  Army  Service  Forces 

Records  of  the  Office  of  the  Commanding  General,   1941-46 

National  Archives  and  Records  Service 

Washington,  D.C. 

CMH  Records  of  the  Center  of  Military  History 

Department  of  the  Army 
Washington,  D.C. 

DASA  Record  Group  374 

Records  of  the  Defense  Atomic  Support  Agency 
National  Archives  and  Records  Service 
Washington,  D.C. 

DS  Records  of  the  U.S.  Department  of  State 

Washington,  D.C. 

FDR  Papers  of  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt 

Franklin  D.  Roosevelt  Library 
Hyde  Park,  New  York 

HLH  Papers  of  Harry  L.  Hopkins 

Franklin  D.  Roosevelt  Library 
Hyde  Park,  New  York 

HLS  Henry  L.  Stimson  Collection 

Sterling  Memorial  Library 
Yale  University 
New  Haven,  Connecticut 

HOO  Records  of  the  Hanford  Operations  Office 

U.S.  Department  of  F.nergy 
Richland,  Washington 


628 


MANHA  r  IAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


JCS  Record  Group  218 

Records  of  the  United  States  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
National  Archives  and  Records  Service 
Washington,  D.C. 

LASL  Records  of  the  Los  Alamos  Scientific  Laboratory 

U.S.  Department  of  Energy 
Los  Alamos,  New  Mexico 

LC  Library  of  Congress 

Washington,  D.C. 

LRG  Record  Group  200 

National  Archives  Gift  Collection 
Papers  of  Leslie  R.  Groves 
National  Archives  and  Records  Service 
Washington,  D.C. 

LRL  Records  of  the  Lawrence  Radiation  Laboratory 

U.S.  Department  of  Energy 
Berkeley,  California 

MDR  Record  Group  77 

Records  of  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers 
Records  of  the  Manhattan  Engineer  District,  1942-48 
National  Archives  and  Records  Service 
Washington,  D.C. 

OCEHD  Records  of  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers, 

Historical  Division 
U.S.  Army  Corps  of  Engineers 
Washington,  D.C. 

OCO  Record  Group  156 

Records  of  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance 
National  Archives  and  Records  Service 
Washington,  D.C. 

OROO  Records  of  the  Oak  Ridge  Operations  Office 

U.S.  Department  of  Energy 
Oak  Ridge,  Tennessee 

OSRD  Record  Group  227 

Records  of  the  Office  of  Scientific  Research  and  Development 
National  Archives  and  Records  Service 
Washington,  D.C. 

SEOO  Records  of  the  San  Erancisco  Operations  Office 

U.S.  Department  of  Energy 
San  Francisco,  California 


GUIDE  K)  ARC:HI\  AI.  COLLKC/IIONS  529 

SHRC  Records  of  the  Albert  F.  Simpson  Historical  Research  Center 

Maxwell  Air  Force  Base,  Alabama 

USS  Record  Group  46 

Records  of  the  United  States  Senate 
National  Archives  and  Records  Service 
Washington,  D.C. 


List  of  Abbreviations 


AAF 

Army  Air  Forces 

ACS 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff 

Act 

Acting 

Admin 

Administrative;  Administrator 

AEC 

Atomic  Energy  Commission 

AEM 

Architect-Engineer-Manager 

AFL 

American  Federation  of  Labor 

AFSWP 

Armed  Forces  Special  Weapons  Project 

Agri 

Agricuhure 

ANMB 

Army  and  Navy  Munitions  Board 

Ann(s) 

Annex(es) 

AR 

Army  Regulation 

ASF 

Army  Service  Forces 

Asst(s) 

Assistant(s) 

ASTP 

Army  SpeciaUzed  Training  Program 

Att 

Attachment 

Attn 

Attention 

Atty 

Attorney 

Bldg 

Building 

BPA 

Bonneville  Power  Administration 

Br 

Branch 

Budg 

Budget 

Bull(s) 

Bulletm(s) 

Bur 

Bureau 

Cdr 

Commander 

CDT 

Combined  Development  Trust 

CE 

Corps  of  Engineers 

Cert(s) 

Certiricate(s) 

CEW 

Clinton  Engineer  Works 

CG 

Commanding  General 

CIC 

Counterintelligence  Corps 

CINCAFPAC 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.S.  Army  Forces,  Pacific 

CINCPOA 

Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Ocean  Areas 

CIO 

Congress  of  Industrial  Organizations 

Cir 

Circular 

Cmd 

Command 

632 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  IHE  A  lOMIC  BOMB 


CO 

Commanding  Officer 

Co 

Company 

Comm 

Commerce 

Conf 

Conference 

Cong 

Congress 

Constr 

Construction 

Corp 

Corporation 

Corresp 

Correspondence 

CPC 

Combined  Policy  Committee 

CPFF 

Cost  Plus  Fixed  Fee 

CWS 

Chemical  Warfare  Service 

DASA 

Defense  Atomic  Support  Agency 

Def 

Defense 

Deliv 

Delivery 

Dep 

Deputy 

Dept 

Department 

Det 

Detachment 

DF 

Disposition  Form 

Diff 

Diffusion 

Dir 

Director 

Dist 

District 

Div 

Division 

DSM 

Development  of  Substitute  Materials 

Engr(s) 

Engineer(s) 

Env 

Envelope 

Equip 

Equipment 

ETO 

European  Theater  of  Operations 

ETOUSA 

European  Theater  of  Operations,  U.S.  Arrr 

Ex 

Executive 

Fab 

Fabrication 

FBI 

Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation 

Fwd 

Forward 

FY 

Fiscal  Year 

G-1 

Personnel 

G-2 

Intelligence 

Gen 

General 

GO 

General  Orders 

GOCO 

Government  Owned,  Contractor  Operated 

Govt 

Government 

Gp 

Group 

GSC 

General  Staff  Corps 

LIS  1  OF  ABBREVIA  riONS 


633 


H 

House 

HB 

Harrison-Bundy 

HEW 

Hanford  Engineer  Works 

Hist 

History 

HQ. 

Headquarters 

Hwy 

Highway 

IBM 

International  Business  Machines 

ICC 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

Intel 

Intelligence 

Incl 

Inclosure 

Ind 

Indorsement 

Insp 

Inspector;  Inspection 

Instl(s) 

Installation(s) 

Instr(s) 

Instruction(s) 

Interv 

Interview 

Intro 

Introduction 

JCS 

Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 

JNW 

Joint  Committee  on  New  Weapons  anc 

Just 

Justice 

K-25 

Gaseous  diffusion  project 

K-27 

Gaseous  difhision  extension  unit 

Lab 

Laboratory 

LASL 

Los  Alamos  Scientific  Laboratory 

Ldr 

Leader 

Ltr 

Letter 

Mad 

Madison 

Maim 

Maintenance 

Man 

Managing 

Mat 

Materials 

MD 

Manhattan  District 

Med 

Medical 

MED 

Manhattan  Engineer  District 

Memo 

Memorandum 

Met 

Metallurgical 

Mfg 

Manufacturing 

Mgr 

Manager 

MID 

Military  Intelligence  Division 

Mil 

Military 

Min 

Minutes 

MIS 

Military  Intelligence  Service 

Misc 

Miscellaneous 

MIT 

Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology 

and  Equipment 


634 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


MP 

Manhattan  Project;  Military  Policy;  Military  Police 

MPC 

Military  Policy  Committee 

Ms 

Manuscript 

MSA 

Madison  Square  Area 

Mtg 

Meeting 

Mtn(s) 

Mountain(s) 

Natl(s) 

National(s) 

NDRC 

National  Defense  Research  Committee 

NLRB 

National  Labor  Relations  Board 

No 

Number 

NWLB 

National  War  Labor  Board 

OCE 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers 

OCG 

Office  of  the  Commanding  General 

OCO 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance 

OCS 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff 

ODT 

Office  of  Defense  Transportation 

OEM 

Office  of  Emergency  Management 

Off(s) 

Officer(s) 

OIC 

Officer  in  Charge 

OIG 

Office  of  the  Inspector  General 

OPD 

Operations  Division 

OPMG 

Office  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General 

Opn(s) 

Operations 

OQMG 

Office  of  the  Quartermaster  General 

Ord 

Ordnance 

ORD 

Ohio  River  Division 

Org(s) 

Organization(s) 

OSG 

Office  of  the  Surgeon  General 

OSRD 

Office  of  Scientific  Research  and  Development 

OWU 

Office  of  War  Utilities 

P-9 

Heavy  Water 

PED 

Provisional  Engineer  Detachment 

PD 

Pacific  Division 

PR 

Press  Release 

Prelim 

Preliminary 

Prgm(s) 

Program(s) 

Prod 

Production 

Proj(s) 

Project  (s) 

Promo(s) 

Promotion(s) 

Prov(s) 

Provision(s);  Provisional 

Pub 

Public 

Rad 

Radiation 

R&D 

Research  &:  Development 

LIST  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


635 


Re 

Regarding 

Rec(s) 

Rec()rd(s);  Recording 

Reg(s) 

Regulali()n(s) 

Rels 

Relations 

Res 

Resolution 

Rev 

Revision;  Revised 

Rpt(s) 

Report(s) 

S 

Senate 

S-1 

OSRD's  uranium  program 

S-50 

Liquid  thermal  difTusion  project 

SCAP 

Supreme  Commander  for  the  Allied  Powers 

Scty 

Security 

Sec 

Section 

Secy 

Secretary 

SED 

Special  Engineer  Detachment 

Sen 

Senator 

Ser 

Series 

Sess 

Session 

SHAEF 

Supreme  Headquarters,  Allied  Expeditionary  Force 

SMI 

Safeguarding  Military  Information 

SOS 

Services  of  Supply 

Spec 

Special 

Sq 

Square 

Sup 

Superseding 

Supp 

Supplement 

Supt 

Superintendent 

Surg 

Surgeon 

Svc 

Service 

SW 

Southwest 

SWD 

Southwestern  Division 

TA 

Tube  Alloys 

TAG 

The  Adjutant  General 

TEC 

Tennessee  Eastman  Corporation 

Tech 

Technical 

Telecon 

Telephone  conversation 

Telg 

Telegram 

rherm 

rhermal 

Trans 

Transportation 

Treas 

Freasury 

TVA 

I  ennessee  Valley  Authoritv 

Und 

Under 

Univ 

University 

USASIAF 

United  States  Army  Strategic  Air  Forces 

USN 

United  Slates  Navv 

636 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


USSBS 


United  States  Strategic  Bombing  Survey 


WAAC 

Women's  Army  Auxiliary  Corps 

WAG 

Women's  Army  Corps 

WD 

War  Department 

WDGS 

War  Department  General  Staff 

WDSS 

War  Department  Special  Staff 

West 

Western 

WMC 

War  Manpower  Commission 

WPB 

War  Production  Board 

Wpn(s) 

Weapon(s) 

WW  I 

World  War  I 

WWII 

World  War  II 

X-10 

Plutonium  project 

Y-12 

Electromagnetic  project 

ZI 

Zone  of  Interior 

UNITED  STATES  ARMY  IN  WORLD  WAR  II 

rhe  following  volumes  have  been  published  or  are  in  press: 

The  War  Department 

Chief  of  Staff:  Prewar  Plans  and  Preparations 
Washington  Command  Post:  The  Operations  Division 
Strategic  Planning  for  Coalition  Warfare.  1941-1942 
Strategic  Planning  for  Coalition  Warfare,  1943-1944 
(;iobal  Logistics  and  Strategy,  1940-1943 
Global  Logistics  and  Strategy,  1943-1945 
The  Army  and  Economic  Mobilization 
The  Army  and  Industrial  Manpower 

The  Army  Ground  Forces 

The  Organization  of  Ground  Combat  Lroops 

The  Procurement  and  Training  of  Ground  Combat  Troops 

The  Army  Service  Forces 

The  Organization  and  Role  of  the  Army  Service  Forces 

The  Western  Hemisphere 

The  Framework  of  Hemisphere  Defense 
Guarding  the  L'nited  States  and  Its  Outposts 

The  War  in  the  Pacific 

The  Fall  of  the  Philippines 

Guadalcanal:  The  First  Offensive 

Victory  in  Papua 

Cartwheel:  The  Reduction  of  Rabaul 

Seizure  of  the  Gilberts  and  Marshalls 

Campaign  in  the  Marianas 

The  Approach  to  the  Philippines 

Leyte:  T  he  Return  to  the  Philippines 

T  riumph  in  the  Philippmes 

Okinawa:   Ihe  Last  Battle 

Strategy  and  Command:  I  he  First  1  wo  Years 

Ihe  Mediterranean  T  heater  of  Operations 

Northwest  Africa:  Seizing  the  Initiative  in  the  West 
Sicih  and  the  Surrender  of  Italy 
Salerno  to  Cassino 
Cassino  to  the  Alps 


638  MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 

The  European  Theater  of  Operations 
Cross-Channel  Attack 
Breakout  and  Pursuit 
The  Lorraine  Campaign 
The  Siegfried  Line  Campaign 
The  Ardennes:  Battle  of  the  Bulge 
The  Last  Offensive 
The  Supreme  Command 

Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  May  1941 -September  1944 
Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  September  1944-May  1945 

The  Middle  East  Theater 

The  Persian  Corridor  and  Aid  to  Russia 

The  Chma-BurmaTndia  Theater 
Stilwell's  Mission  to  China 
Slilwell's  Command  Problems 
Time  Runs  Out  m  CBI 

The  Technical  Services 

The  Chemical  Warfare  Service:  Organizing  for  War 
The  Chemical  Warfare  Service:  From  Laboratory  to  Field 
The  Chemical  Warfare  Service:  Chemicals  in  Combat 
The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment 
The  Corps  of  Engmeers:  The  War  Against  Japan 
The  Corps  of  Engineers:  The  War  Against  Germany 
The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Construction  in  the  United  States 
The  Medical  Department:  Hospitalization  and  Evacuation, 

Zone  of  Interior 
The  Medical  Department:  Medical  Service  in  the  Mediterranean 

and  Minor  Theaters 
The  Ordnance  Department:  Planning  Munitions  for  War 
The  Ordnance  Department:  Procurement  and  Supply 
The  Ordnance  Department:  On  Beachhead  and  Battlefront 
The  Quartermaster  Corps:  Organization,  Supply,  and  Services,  Volume  I 
The  Quartermaster  Corps:  Organization,  Supply,  and  Services,  Volume  II 
The  Quartermaster  Corps:  Operations  in  the  War  Against  Japan 
The  Quartermaster  Corps:  Operations  in  the  War  Against  Germany 
The  Signal  Corps:  The  Emergency 
The  Signal  Corps:  The  Test 
The  Signal  Corps:  The  Outcome 

The  Transportation  Corps:  Responsibilities,  Organization,  and  Operations 
The  Transportation  Corps:  Movements,  Training,  and  Supply 
The  Transportation  Corps:  Operations  Overseas 


unhed  states  army  in  world  war  ii 

Special  Studies 

Chronology,  1941-1945 

Military  Relations  Between  the  United  States  and  Canada,  1939-1945 

Rearming  the  French 

Three  Battles:  Arnaville,  Altuzzo,  and  Schmidt 

The  Women's  Army  Ck)rps 

(^ivil  Affairs:  Soldiers  Become  Governors 

Buying  Aircraft:  Materiel  Procurement  for  the  Army  Air  Forces 

The  Employment  of  Negro  Troops 

Manhattan:  The  Army  and  the  Atomic  Bomb 

Pictorial  Record 

The  War  Against  Germany  and  Italy:  Mediterranean  and  Adjacent  Areas 
The  War  Against  Germany:  Europe  and  Adjacent  Areas 
The  War  Agamst  Japan 


639 


U.S.  Army  Center  of  Military  History 

The  Center  of  Military  History  prepares  and  publishes  histories  as  re- 
quired by  the  U.S.  Army.  It  coordinates  Army  historical  matters,  including  his- 
torical properties,  and  supervises  the  Army  museum  system.  It  also  maintains 
liaison  with  public  and  private  agencies  and  individuals  to  stimulate  interest 
and  study  in  the  field  of  military  history.  The  center  is  located  at  20  Massachu- 
setts Avenue,  NW,  Washington,  D.C.  20314. 


Department  of  the  Army  Historical  Advisory  Committee 

Roger  A.  Beaumont,  Texas  A&M  University 

Maj.  Cien.  Qiiinn  H.  Becker,  Deputy  Surgeon  General,  U.S.  Army 

Maj.  Gen.  John  B.  Blount,  U.S.  Army  Training  and  Doctrine  Command 

Brig.  Gen.  Dallas  C  Brown,  Jr.,  U.S.  Army  War  College 

Richard  D.  C^hallener,  Princeton  Ihiiversity 

(k)l.  Roy  K.  Mint,  U.S.  Military  Academy 

John  H.  Hatcher,  OfTice  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Information 

Management 
Archer  Jones,  North  Dakota  State  University 
Jamie  W.  Moore,  The  Citadel 
James  C.  Olson,  University  of  Missouri 
James  O'Neil,  National  Archives  and  Records  Service 
Charles  P.  Roland,  University  of  Kentucky 
John  Shy,  University  of  Michigan 
Col.  William  A.  Stoflt,  U.S.  Army  Command  and  General  Staff  College 


Index 


Aachen,  Germany,  288 

Abelson,  Philip  H.,  36,  172-76,  180 

Acheson,  Dean,  573 

Acheson-Lilienthal  report,  574 

Ackari.  L.  G.,  199 

Adams  County,  Wash.,  110,  332 

Adamson,  Lt.  Col.  Keith  F.,  19-22,  24 

Adelman,  Arthur,  20 

Adler,  Edward,  154-57 

Advisory  Committee  on  Nuclear  Research,  26-27 

.Advisory  Committee  on  Research  and  Development, 

589-91 
Advisory  Committee  on  Uranium,  21-23,  26.  See  also 
OfTice  of  Scientific  Research  and  Development. 
S-1  Executive  Committee  and  S-1  Section; 
Uranium,  Committee  on;  Uranium,  Section  on. 
African  Metals  Corporation,  65,  79,  300-301,  304, 
308,  310,  See  also  Union  Miniere  du  Haut 
Katanga. 
Agreement  and  Declaration  of  Trust,  297-98,  30 1«, 

304,  572 
Air  Engineering  Squadron,  603d,  521 
Air  Force 
Eighth,  288 

Twentieth,  523,  528,  530 
Air  Service  Group,  390th,  521 
Air  Transport  Command,  217,  408-09 
Akers,  Wallace  A.,  99,  229-33.  237,  245 
Alabama  Ordnance  Works,  108,  191,  343 
Alamogordo  Army  Air  Field,  N.Mex.,  478,  507,  511, 

517.  .SV^'  also  Project  Trinity,  bomb  test. 
Albuquerque  District,  84-85,  466,  468-69,  486 
Allis-Chalmers  Manufacturing  Compan\ 
electromagnetic  project,  130,  133,  136-37 
gaseous  diffusion  plant,  158,  160 
unionized,  371 
Allison,  Samuel  K.,  488 
Alma  1  railers,  437 
Alpha  racetracks.  120,  128-29,  132,  134-39,  142, 

144,  580 
Alsos  mission 
in  Italy,  281-82 
in  London, 282-84 
organization  of,  280-81 
in  Western  Europe,  285-91 
Amberg,  Julius  M.,  337,  .340 
American  atomic  energy  program.  See  Manhattan 

Project. 
American  Cynamid,  314 
American  Federation  of  Labor,  351,  370-71 


American  Industrial  1  ransit.  Inc..  446 

American  Red  Cross,  428.  443 

Anacostia  Station.  D.C..  173 

Anchor  Ranch  Proving  Ground,  N.Mex.,  506-07 

Anderson,  Herbert  L.,  8// 

Anderson,  Sir  John 

agreements  with  French  scientists,  249-52 

Anglo-American  collaboration,  228-29,  235,  237, 
239.  244,  248.  561.  571 

control  of  Congo  ore  deposits,  297-98,  300 

thorium  supplies,  305 
Anderson  County,  Tenn.,  70,  78.  320.  326,  403 
Anglo-American  collaboration 

acliievement  of  in  1940-41,  29,  31 

breakdown  of  in  1942.  227-32 

Combined  Policy  Committee,  239.  241-43.  245- 
47.  252 

French  repatriated  scientists,  248-52 

new  negotiations  in  1943.  232-40 

postwar  planning.  564-67.  570-73 

Quebec  Agreement,  241-42,  245,  247,  249 

and  security,  230 
Applied  Physics  Laboratory,  508 
Argonne  Forest,  111..  47,  67-68,  71-72,  96,  1 11-14, 

185,  194,  221.  247 
Argonne  Laboratory,  113,  200.  342,  350,  385,  590. 

See  also  Metallurgical  Project. 
Argonne  National  Laboratory,  590 
Aristotle,  3 

Armed  Forces  Special  Weapons  Project,  600« 
Army  Air  Forces.  490,  495,  519-23 
Army  Command  Administrative  Network,  395 
Army  Groups 

6th,  287-88.  290 

12th,  288 

20th.  288 
Army  and  Navy  Munitions  Board,  57-61.  67,  81 
Army  Service  Forces,  116,  208«,  358,  365.  See  also 

Services  of  Supply. 
Army  Specialized  Training  Program.  358.  497 
Arneson.  Isl  Lt.  R.  Gordon,  555 
Arnold,  General  Henry  H.,  519-21,  523,  528-29 
Arnold.  Samuel  T..  350.  492 
Ashbridge.  Lt.  Col.  Whitney 

Los  Alamos  construction.  469.  475.  477 

Los  Alamos  post  commander,  425,  487,  497-98, 
500-501 
Ashworth,  Comdr.  Frederick  L.,  524,  529,  540-42 
Associated  Press  (Albuquerque),  514,  517 


644 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Associated  I'niversilies,  Inc.,  590-91 

Atchison,  Fopcka  and  Santa  Fe  Railroad,  397,  478 

Atkinson,  Guy  F.,  Company,  406 

Atlee,  Clement,  570,  572-73 

Atomic  bombing  of  Japan 

AAFiolein,  519-23 

American  casualties  in,  547 

overseas  bases  for,  523-28 

preparations  for,  519-23,  534-36 

Senate  hearings  on,  548-50 

target  choices  for,  528-30 

USASTAF  directive  for,  534 
Atomic  communities.  See  Clinton  Engineer  Works; 
Hanford  Engineer  Works;  Eos  Alamos 
Laboratory. 
Atomic  energy 

international  control  of,  569-74 

postwar  legislation,  574-78 

postwar  planning,  562-68 
Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946,  578,  596,  598-99 
Atomic  F^nergy  Commission.  See  United  States 

Atomic  Energy  Commission. 
Atomic  fission 

concept,  historical  evolution  of,  3-8 

military  application  of,  11-12 

and  uranium,  8-1 1 
Auger,  Pierre,  249-50,  252 
Aurand,  Maj.  Gen.  Henry  S.,  597 
Austin,  Warren  R.,  577 


B-29s,  510«,  520-23,  528 

Bacher,  Robert  F.,  574,  589,  597-98 

Bacon,  Francis,  3 

Badger,  E.  B.,  and  Sons,  49,  58 

Badoglio,  Marshal  Pietro,  281 

Bambridge,  Kenneth,  478,  515 

Bakelite  Corporation,  151,  155,  160.  See  also  Union 

Carbide  and  Carbon  Corporation. 
Ballistic  Research  Laboratory,  487 
Bandelier  National  Monument,  N.Mex.,  469 
Bankers  Trust  Company,  302 
Bard,  Ralph  A.,  530 
Barker,  Maj.  Maurice  E.,  20 
Barkley,  Alben  W.,  272 
Barnard,  Chester  I.,  574 
Barnes,  Sir  Thomas,  297 
Barnes,  W.  L.  Gorell,  298 
Barrier  R&D,  154-57- 
Baruch,  Bernard  M.,  573-74 
Bateman,  George  C,  299 
Batista  Field,  Cuba,  523 
Baxter,  John  P..  145 
Baxter,  Capi.  Samuel  S.,  435-37,  443 
Bayway,  N.J.,  133 
Beams,  Jesse  W.,  10,  36 
Bear  Creek  Valley,  Tenn.,  130 
Becquerel,  Henri,  4 
Belgian  .Agreement.  See  Tripartite  Agreement. 


Belgian  Congo  and  uranium  ore,  8,  14,  24-25,  79- 

80,  292,  295-96,  310,  312 
Bell,  Daniel  W.,  67 

Bell  Telephone  Laboratorie.'i,  151,  155 
Benbow,  Maj.  Horace  S.,  247 
Benton  Countv,  Wash.,  1 10,  332,  451 
Beta  racetracks,  128-29,  132,  135,  139,  142,  580 
Bethel  Valley,  Tenn.,  204,  206 
Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation,  160 
Betts,  Brig.  Gen.  Edward  C,  297-98 
Beverly  Junction,  Wash.,  405,  408« 
Biddle,  Francis,  338,  340-41 
Bikini  Atoll  tests.  See  Operation  Crossroads. 
Bissell,  Maj.  Gen.  Clayton  L.,  285 
Bissingen,  Germany,  287,  290 

Black  Oak  Ridge,  Tenn.,  78-79,  320«,  433-34,  443 
Black  oxide,  processing  of,  310-12,  314-16 
Blair,  A.  Farnell,  437 
Blair,  Lt.  Col.  Robert  C,  443 
Blair  Road,  CEW,  403-04 
Bloch,  Capt.  Edward  J.,  438 
Blok,  Arthur,  248 
Bock's  Cflr  (B-29),  540-41 
Bohemian  Grove.  Muir  Woods,  Calif.,  70-72,  74, 

79,96 
Bohr,  Niels,  4,  7,  13,  564 

Bomb  components  stockpile,  postwar,  58  b(,  593-94 
Bomb  models,  508 

Bombardment  Squadron  (VH),  393d,  521-23 
Bombardment  Wing,  313th,  526 
Bomber  Command,  XXI,  526 
Bonnet,  Maj.  William  A.,  137 
Bonneville  Dam,  Wash.,  1 10,  392 
Bonneville  Power  Administration,  69,  110,  378-81, 

387-88,  391-94 
Bowen,  Rear  Adm.  Harold  G.,  24,  26 
Boyd,  George  E.,  318 
Boyle,  Robert,  3 
Bradbury,  Comdr.  Norris,  582 
Brazier,  B.  E.,  476 
Breeder  reactor,  583 
Breieton.  Lt.  Gen.  Lewis  H.,  598 
Brewster,  Owen,  335« 
Bridges,  Styles,  273 
Briggs,  Lyman  J. 

development  of  atomic  energv  program,  21-24, 
26-27,  34,  38, 44 

liquid  thermal  diffusion  process,  173-75 
Brindisi,  Italy,  281 

British  atomic  project.  See  Lube  Alloys. 
British  Mission  to  Japan,  545 
British  scientists 

electromagnetic  research,  124-25,  147 

gaseous  diffusion  process,  10,  29-30,  35,  153, 
155-56,  230-31 

interchange  policy,  271,  304 
Brookhaven  National  Laboratory,  591-92 
Brown,  Edward  J.,  354 
Brown  oxide,  processing  of,  315-16 
Brown  LJnivcrsity,  1 19// 


INDEX 


645 


Bruce,  E.  L.,  437 

Brims  General  Hospital  (Santa  Fe),  425 

Brush  Beryllium  Company,  313 

Building  and  Construction  Trades  Department, 

AFL,  351,  370-71 
Bundy,  Harvey,  46,  60,  77,  242,  298,  337,  349,  513 

Anglo-American  collaboration,  228,  237,  240, 
248,  251-52 

postwar  planning,  560,  567-68 
Bureau  of  Mines,  313,  427 
Bureau  of  Ordnance  (Naw),  495,  501,  505 
Bush.  Lt.  Harold  C,  480-81 
Bush,  \'annevar,  47,  53-54,  56,  174,  285,  335 

Anglo-American  collaboration,  227-31,  234-40, 
248,  250,  296 

Army  control  of  atomic  program,  73-74,  76-77 

bombing  of  Japan,  514,  516,  530 

Combined  Policy  Committee,  241-43,  246 

development  of  atomic  program,  30-35,  37-39 

establishment  of  Manhattan  District,  40,  44,  46 

Los  Alamos  program,  87,  494 

Military  Policy  Committee,  77,  227,  335,  494,  589 

NDRC  and  OSRD,  26-28.  30-31 

postwar  planning,  556,  563,  565-71,  573-75 

priority  ratings,  59-61 

scientific  personnel  procurement,  345,  349 

security  system  for  Manhattan  District,  261,  273, 
277 

Top  Policy  Group,  31,  34,  73 
Byrd,  Harry  F.,  336,  577 
Byrnes,  James  F.,  374,  530,  533,  570-71,  573 


C-54's,  527.  536 

California  Institute  of  Technology,  499,  501,  510 

Calutrons,  119-20,  122,  132-33,  136 

Cahert,  Maj.  Horace  K.,  256,  258,  282,  286 

Campbell,  Sir  Ronald  I.,  305 

Canada 

joint  control  of  Congo  ore,  296,  298 

ore  resources,  25,  299,  310-12,  314 
Canadian  atomic  project.  See  Eyergreen. 
Canadian  Radium  and  Uranium  Corporation,  62, 

79,  312 
Cannon,  Clarence,  274 
Cantril.  Simeon  T.,  41 1«,  415 
Carbide  and  Carbon  Chemicals  Corporation 

barrier  fabrication,  151,  156 

labor  activities  at,  372.  374,  376 

operation  of  gaseous  diffusion  plant,  106,  165-67, 
170,  398,418,  593 

See  also  Union  Carbide  and  Carbon  Corporation. 
Carnegie  Institution,  8,  24,  36,  173,  487 
Carnotite  ores,  311,  314 
Carpenter,  Walter  S.,  Jr.,  98-99,  337 
Carteret,  NJ..  133 
Casablanca  meeting,  233-34 
Cascade  design,  single.  152-53.  155-59.  169 
Celle,  Germany,  289 
Censorship,  277-79 


Centrifuge  process,  10.  23,  47,  50-51,  71,  149;; 
Chadwick,  Sir  James,  5-6,  8n,  100,  514 

Combined  Policy  Committee,  242«,  243-47 

postwar  planning,  560-61,  572 
Chain  reaction,  7-10 

pile  process.  51-52,  102-04,  190-91 

uranium-graphite  system,  11,  21,  23,  28 
Chalk  Riyer,  Ontario,  246-47 

Chambers  Chemical  and  Dye  Works,  202,  315.  See 
also  Du  Pont,  E.  I.,  de  Nemours  and  Company. 
Chemical  Warfare  Service.  20,  132 
Cherwell,  Lord  (Frederick  Lindemann),  235-37, 

533,  566 
Chevalier,  Haakon,  264 
Chicago,  Milwaukee,  St.  Paul  and  Pacific  Railroad, 

332,405-08,451 
Chrysler  Corporation,  160,  166,  371 
Churchill,  Wmston  S.,  31-32,  298,  518,  533 

Anglo-American  collaboration,  228,  233-39 

postwar  planning,  564-66 

Quebec  Agreement,  240-42 
Clark,  Joseph  P.,  374 
Clarke,  Col.  Frederick  J.,  584« 
Clay,  Brig.  Gen.  Lucius  D.,  57-60.  433-34 
Clayton,  William  L.,  530 
Clifton  Products,  Inc.,  594-95 
Clmch  River,  Tenn.,  47,  71.  78,  160-61.  320«,  390, 

433, 442 
Clinton,  Tenn.,  78,  179,  204,  326,  433 
Chnton  Engineer  Works,  78-79,  91,  128,  576,  590 

Army-Du  Pont  cooperation  at,  206 

atomic  communities,  432-48 

communications  and  transportation  at,  394-99, 
401-05,  408 

electrical  power  for,  380-82,  386,  388-91 

health  program  at,  415-16.  418-19.  421-24 

labor  shortage  at,  351-54 

labor  relations  at,  372-74 

labor  turnover  and  absenteeism  at,  363-66 

land  acquisition  for,  322-28 

plant  construction  at,  130,  134-40,  159-65, 
179-80,  205-08,  580-81,  585,  593 

plant  operation  at,  140-48,  165-71, 
180-83,  208-10 

safety  program  at,  427-30 

site  selection  for,  78-79,  435-40 

work  stoppages  at,  370-71,  375-76 
Clinton  Home  Building.  437 
Clinton  Laboratories.  200,  350,  544 

construction  of,  204-08 

medical  research  at.  415 

operation  of.  208-10.  .583,  591,  .594 

See  also  Metallurgical  Project. 
Cockcroft,  Sir  John  D..  5-6,  246-47 
"Codes  of  Wartime  Practices  for  the  .American  Press 

and  .American  Broadcasters."  277 
Cohen.  Karl  P..  150.  152.  177 
Collins,  Li.  Col.  John  K..  352-53.  365 
Colorado  Plateau.  8.  80.  31 1-12.  314 


646 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Columbia  River,  Wash.,  110-11,  210.  212,  215.  332, 

405,  450,  455-56,  460.  478 
Columbia  University,  27-28,  415 

barrier  fabrication,  154-57 

gaseous  diffusion  research,  105,  149-50,  153-54, 
159 
Combined  Development  Trust,  90ri,  571,  599 

foreign  ore  acquisition,  286.  302-06,  573 

joint  control  of  Congo  ore,  298-301 

legality  of,  297-98 
Combined  Policv  Committee,  90n,  239,  241-43, 
245-47,  252 

Anglo-American  cooperation,  571-73 

foreign  ore  acquisition.  296.  299-300.  303.  572- 
73 

patent  problems,  247-48 

technical  subcommittee  on  interchange,  242-47 
Communications,  394-97 
Community  management 

at  Hanford  and  Richland.  460-64 

at  Los  Alamos,  474-77 

at  Oak  Ridge,  443-48 
Compartmentalization  policy,  410 

and  Congress,  272-74 

at  Los  Alamos  Laboratory,  491,  495 

for  safeguarding  military  information,  268-72 
Composite  Group,  509th,  521-24,  526-28,  534. 

536.  538 
Compton.  Arthur  H..  44.  62,  271,  275,  350,  509, 
583« 

chain  reaction,  102-03 

development  of  atomic  energy  program,  30,  34, 
36,  38 

establishment  of  Los  Alamos.  83-84,  86-87 

interchange  arrangements  with  British,  243,  246 

pile  process,  185,  190,  194-97,  221 

Plutonium  project,  47,  51-52,  95-101,  199-200 

plutonium  semiworks,  1 1 1-14,  208 

postwar  planning,  556,  563,  574,  589 
Compton.  Karl  T..  530-33 
Conant.  James  B.,  28,  118,  261,  284.  350 

Anglo-American  collaboration,  227,  230-35,  239- 
40 

Army  control  of  atomic  program.  73.  77 

bomb  development.  503,  506-07,  509-10,  513- 
14,  516 

Combined  Policy  Committee,  241-42,  244,  246 

establishment  of  Los  Alamos,  83,  86-87.  467 

establishment  of  Manhattan  District.  44-45 

Interim  Committee,  530,  532 

isotope  separation  processes,  36-39 

liquid  thermal  diffusion  process,  174,  177 

Los  Alamos  weapon  program,  486,  490,  494,  496. 
501 

plutonium  project.  97-101,  1 14 

postwar  planning,  563,  565-67,  569,  573-76 

prioritv  ratings,  58-59,  61 

Smyih  Report,  556,  558.  560-61 

Top  Policv  Group.  3 1 .  33-34 
Condon,  Edward  U.,  271,  492,  577 
Conklin,  PYederick  R.,  146 


Connally.  Tom.  577 

Consodine.  Lt.  Col.  William  A.,  298,  555 

Consolidated  Mining  and  Smelting  Companv,  47. 

49.  581 
Contractor  poHcies,  275-76,  370-71,  417-18,  428. 

461 
Contractor  war  claims.  594-95 
Cook.  Walter  W..  476 
Cook  County  Forest  Preserve.  111.,  47,  68 
Coolants,  190-93,  212,  215 
Copper,  61,  66 

Cornelius,  Maj.  William  P.,  161 
Cornell  University,  27,  590 
Corps  of  Engineers.  See  Engineers.  Corps  of. 
Counterintelligence  Corps  Detachment.  256.  260- 

68,  272 
Counterintelligence  operations.  255-57.  259-63 
Craig,  General  Malin,  519/( 
Creedon.  Frank  R..  137 
Crenshaw.  Lt.  Col.  Thomas  T..  53,  64,  71,  1 18, 

307-08,  317-18,437 
Cyclotrons,  35,  52,  86,  119,  122,  583 
Cyclotrons,  destruction  of  Japanese.  585-88 


Dahlgren,  Va.,  508 

Dale  Hollow  Dam  and  Reservoir.  Tenn..  320 

Dalton,  John,  3 

Davalos.  Capt.  Samuel  P.,  478.  500 

Davis.  Clifford  C,  325 

Davis.  Laurence  W.,  354 

Dav,  H.J..  201 

Decatur,  111.,  370-71,  376 

Declaration  of  Trust.  See  Agreement  and  Declaration 

of  Trust. 
Deep  Water,  NJ.,  202,  315 
Defense  Plant  Corporation,  133 
Delimitations  Agreement,  255 
Dennison,  David  M.,  528 
Department  of  Agriculture,  27,  324,  329 
Department  of  Interior,  380 
Department  of  Justice,  322.  325.  333,  336-38,  341- 

42 
Department  of  Labor,  427 
Department  of  State,  568,  571,  573,  575.  599 
Department  of  the  Treasury.  67.  301 
Derry.  Maj.  John  A..  520,  528 
Descartes,  Rene,  3 

Desert  training  area  (Army),  near  Rue,  Calif.,  478n 
de  Severskv,  Maj.  Alexander,  .545.  548-50 
de  Silva.  Lt.  Col.  Peer.  527 
Diebner.  Kurt.  290 
Dill.  Field  Marshal  Sir  John.  241-43 
Division  of  Military  Application.  AEC,  598 
Doan,  Richard  L.,  318 
Donner  Laboratory.  118,  122.  See  also  University  of 

California  (Berkeley). 
DSM  (Development  of  Substitute  Materials) 

project,  43-44,  67,  71 


INDEX 


647 


Dudlev,  Maj.John  H..  84,  328 
Dunning,  John  R.,  8«,  10,  30,  51,  150 
Du  Pont,  E.  I.,  de  Nemours  and  Company,  64,  104, 
154,371 
Chambers  C.hemical  and  Dye  Works,  202,  315 
Clinton  Engineer  Works 

semiworks  construction  at,  204-08 
Oak  Ridge  housing  at,  441-42 
Engineering  Department,  199,  206 
feed  materials  production,  314-17 
Hanford  Engineer  Works 

Army  collaboration  at,  202-04 
community  construction  at,  452-59 
community  management  at,  460-63 
plant  construction  at,  211-18,  352,  354 
plant  operation  at,  219-22,  391-92,  591-93 
safety  and  health  programs  at,  413,  420,  424, 

428 
site  selection  for,  109-10,  450-51 
transportation  and  communications  at,  395- 
96,  398-99,  40  1h.  403,  406-07 
Metallurgical  Laboratory  collaboration,  194-97, 

452,  454 
Metallurgical  Project  collaboration,  203-04 
Plutonium  project,  96-99,  101,  105-06,  108-12, 

114,  190-94,  198-99,  210 
TNX  Division,  113,  198-99,  202-03,  210,  217 
Durand  and  Sons,  A.  A.,  454-455 


East  Fork  Valley,  Tenn.,  434 

Eastman,  Joseph  T.,  408 

Eastman  Kodak  Laboratories,  119« 

East  Town,  CEW,  435-36,  439,  443 

East  Village,  CEW,  436,  439,  458 

Echols,  Maj.  Gen.  Oliver  P.,  520 

Eden,  Anthony,  235 

Einstein,  Albert,  6,  13-14,  21,  23 

Eisenhower,  General  Dwight  D.,  284,  297,  584 

Eldorado  Gold  Mines,  Ltd.,  8,  25,  62,  64,  79-80, 

296/(,  311 
Eldorado  Mining  and  Refining  Company,  308,  310- 

311,313-14 
Electric  power,  377,  393 

contracts  and  agreements  for,  386-88 

distribution  of 

at  Clinton  Engineer  Works,  388-91 
at  Hanford  Engineer  Works,  391-93 

requirements  and  sources  of,  377-82,  385,  388 
Electromagnetic  (V-12)  process,  10,  34-35,  37,  71, 
104-05,  117-18,  176-77 

Army  administration,  118-26 

construction  procurement,  130-33 

failure  of  great  magnets,  266-67 

hazards  control  program,  418-19 

plant  construction,  130,  134-40 

plant  design  and  engineering,  126-29 

plant  operation,  140-48,  580 

research  and  development,  50-53,  1 19-20 


Electromagnetic  (¥-12)  process — Continued 

War  Department  contracts,  120-23,  126,  134, 
140, 145 
Elcctio  Metallurgical  Company,  64,  310,  316-17 
Elliott  Company,  154 
Engel,  Albert  J.,  273-74 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  1269th  (less  Company 

B),  290 
Engineers,  Corps  of,  40-41,  89 
Engineers  offices 

Beverly  Area,  308,  310 

Boston  Area,  127,  130,  434 

California  Area,  53,  64,  118 

Chicago  Area,  68,  185-87,  201-02 

CUnton  Area,  200-201,  346,  368,  395-96 

Colorado  Area,  308 

Hanford  Area,  200-201,  457,  463 

Iowa  Area,  308,  310 

Los  Angeles  Area,  499 

Madison  Square  Area,  91,  143,  308,  312-14,  316- 
18,416,  595 

Murray  Hill  Area,  294-95,  308 

New  York  Area,  91,  133,  151,  160,  166 

Santa  Fe  Area,  466 

St.  Louis  Area,  308,  310 

Tonawanda  Area,  308,  310 

Wilmington  Area,  201-02,  308,  310 
Enlisted  Reserve  Corps,  354,  359 
Enola  Gay  (B-29),  536-37 
Espionage.  See  Security. 
Espionage  Act,  261,  577 
Ether  process,  62 

European  Theater  of  Operations,  280 
Evans,  R.  Monte,  199 
Evans,  Maj.  Thomas  J.,  Jr.,  178 
Evergreen  (code  name  for  Canadian  atomic 

project),  246-47 
Expert  Tool  and  Die  Company,  508 


Farm  Security  Administration,  323 
Farrell,  Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  F. 

bombing  of  Japan,  528,  534-35,  538,  540,  542- 
44, 549 

problems  at  CEW,  147-48 

Project  Trinity  preparations,  511-12,  514-16 
"Fat  Man,"  508,'  522.  527,  536,  538,  540-41 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  255 
Federal  Prison  Industries,  334 
Federation  of  Architects,  Engineers,  Chemists,  and 

Technicians  (CIO),  264 
Federation  of  Atomic  Scientists,  577 
Feed  materials  program 

organization  of,  307-10 

procurement  for,  310-14 

production  of,  314-17 

quality  control,  317-18 
Feis,  Herbert,  65 
Pelbeck,  George  T.,  165 


648 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Fercleve  Corporation,  180-83,  374,  418 
Ferguson,  H.  K.,  Company,  178-80 
Fermi,  Enrico,  1 13,  531 

atomic  energy  research,  6-7,  8«,  9-12,  21-24,  30 

bomb  development,  488,  503«,  509 

chain  reaction,  21,  23,  102-04 

pile  process,  184h,  190-92,  194,  221 
Perry,  Capt.  John  L.,  416 
Fidler,  Capt.  Harold  A.,  118,  122-23,  125-26 
Field  Artillery  Armory,  124th,  186 
Fifth  Army,  28 1 
Fine,  PaulC,  558 
Finletter,  Thomas  K.,  65 
First  War  Powers  Act  of  1941,  430 
Fisher,  Col.  William  P.,  528 
Flaherty,  Lt.  (jg.)  JohnJ.,  374 
Fontana  Dam,  N.C.,  381 
Ford,  Bacon,  and  Davis,  161,  163,  166,  442 
Foreign  intelligence  operations.  See  Alsos  mission. 
Fort  Loudoun  Dam,  Tenn.,  390-91 
Foster  and  Creighton,  437 
Fox,  Lt.  Col.  Mark  C,  137,  178,  180 
Franck,  James,  272,  532-33 
Franck  report,  532-33 
Franklin  County,  Wash.,  1 10,  332 
Franklin  Institute,  415 
Frazier,  Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  A.,  279 
French  repatriated  scientists,  248-52 
Friedell,  Lt.  Col.  Hymer  L.,  411-12,  415,  544 
Frijoles  Canyon,  N.Mex.,  469 
Frijoles  Lodge  (near  Los  Alamos),  469 
Frisch,  Otto  R.,  7,  290 
Fuchs,  Klaus,  266 
Fukushmia,  Japan,  528 
Fuller  Lodge  (Los  Alamos),  471 
Funding 

for  Combined  Development  Trust,  301-02 

for  electromagnetic  process,  121-23 

for  Manhattan  Project,  49-50,  56-57,  115-16, 
272-74,  590 

for  NDRC-OSRD  program,  22,  24-25,  38-39 
Furman,  Maj.  Robert  R.,  282,  286,  536,  544 
Fusion  bomb  development,  503?! 


Gable  Mountain,  Wash.,  Ill,  331 « 

Galileo,  3 

Gallaher  Bridge  Road,  Tenn.,  403-04 

Gamble  Valley,  CEW,  441 

Gary,  Tom  C,  101 

Gaseous  diffusion  (K-25)  process,  149-51,  171 

Army  administration,  149-50 

extension  plant  (K-27),  390-91,  581,  593 

plant  construction,  159-65 

plant  design,  152-59 

plant  operation,  165-71,  580-81,  593 

research  and  development 
barrier.  154-57 

by  British  scientists,  10,  29-30,  35,  153,  155- 
56,  230-31 


Gaseous  diffusion  (K-25)  process — Continued 

research  and  development — Continued 

at  Columbia  and  Kellex,  10,  34,  36,  38,  101, 
104,  149-50,  153-55,  157,  159 
General  Advisory  Committee,  AEC,  578 
General  American  Transportation  Company,  313 
General  Chemical,  314 
General  Electric  Company,  129-30,  592 
George,  Lt.  Col.  Warren,  132,  135 
Gerlach,  Walther,  290 
Germany 

Alsos  missions  against,  280-82,  285-91 

Groves's  concern  about,  509« 

intelligence  information  on,  253 

interest  in  heavy  water,  23,  66 

interest  in  nuclear  research,  12-14,  23-24,  27, 
253,  280 

special  intelligence  activities  against,  282-85 

U.S.  race  with,  35-39 
Giles,  Lt.  Gen.  Barney  McK.,  524 
Giroux,  Carl  H.,  1 10,  380,  382 
GOCO  plants,  370,  373-74 
Goettingen,  Germany,  289 
Goldschmidt,  Bertrand,  249-50 
Goudsmit,  Samuel  A.,  285-86,  290 
Grafton,  Capt.  James  F.,  68,  186,  201 
Graham's  Law,  152 

Grand  Coulee  Dam,  Wash.,  1 10,  379«,  381,  392 
Grand  Junction,  Colo.,  308,  595 
Grant  County,  Wash.,  1 10,  332 
Graves,  George,  199 
Great  Bear  Lake,  Canada,  8,  31 1-12 
Great  Britain 

proposed  international  control  measures,  564-67, 
570-73 

raw  materials  acquisition,  295-96,  303-06 

See  also  British  scientists;  Anglo-American 
collaboration. 
Great  Northern  Railroad,  407 

Great  Sand  Dunes  National  Monument,  Colo.,  478« 
Green,  William,  373 
Green  salt,  processing  of,  315-16 
Greenewalt,  Crawford  H. 

pile  process,  195,  199,  203-05,  221-22 

plutonmm  project,  100-101,  104,  112 
Greenglass,  David,  266 
Gross,  Maj.  Gen.  Charles  P.,  80 
Groves,  Maj.  Gen.  Leslie  R.,  41,  55,  74«,  79,  103,427 

Alsos  mission,  280-89,  291 

Anglo-American  collaboration,  227,  229-31,  233, 
240 

bombing  of  Japan,  519-21,  523-24.  526-27,  533- 
34,  537«,  538,  541-43 

bombing  targets,  528-30,  532 

CEW  community  development,  433-34,  443-44 

communications  and  transportation  systems,  396, 
403-04,  407-08 

contract  negotiations,  105-07,  166,  443-44,  591- 
92 

destruction  of  Japanese  cyclotrons,  587-88 


INDEX 


649 


Groves,  Maj.  Gen.  Leslie  R. — (^onlinued 

development  of  the  bomb,  503-04,  50(5-07,  509- 

10 
electric  power  procurement,  377,  380-83,  385, 

387 
electromagnetic  process,  118,  125-26,  128-29, 

134-36,  138,  145-46 
establishment  of  Los  Alamos,  83-87 
French  repatriated  scientists,  249-52 
gaseous  diflusion  plant,  155-57,  159,  165,  171 
health  programs,  411,  420-21 
HEW  communitv  development,  453,  455,  457, 

461-62 
interchange  with  British,  243-47 
liquid  thermal  diffusion  process,  174-78,  180-81 
Los  Alamos  Laboratory  administration,  485-86, 

489-92,  494-96,  499-501 
Los  Alamos  community,  467,  469,  475 
Manhattan  Project,  organization  and  funding  of, 

73-77,  89-90,  115,  588-90 
manpower  conservation,  364,  370,  372-74,  376 
manpower  procurement,  347-54,  356,  358,  361- 

62 
Oppenheimer  security  clearance,  261-62 
ore  exploration  and  joint  control  of,  293,  296, 

298-306 
pile  process,  188-91,  194,  196-97 
plutonium  project  organization,  96-101 
Plutonium  production,  198,  202-03,  206,  208, 

210,  220-23 
postwar  policy  planning,  563,  569,  571-75,  577 
press  releases,  554-55 
priority  ratings,  61,  81-82 
production  operations,  postwar,  579-82,  584, 

591-95 
Project  Trinitv,  511-17 
securitv  systems,  256-58,  260,  263-64,  266-68, 

270-72,  274,  277-78 
site  selection,  47,  69-70,  78-79,  83-88,  108-11, 

434 
Smyth  Report,  556-61 

transfer  of  Manhattan  Project  to  AEC,  597-601 
Guam,  524,  534,  538 
Guarin,  Maj.  Paul  L.,  294,  304-05 
Gueron,  Jules,  249-50 
Gun-assemblv  method,  489 
Gun-tvpe  bomb,  504-06,  508-10,  520 
Gunn,  Ross,  12,  27-28,  172-73 
Gunnison  Housing,  437 


Hadden,  Gavin,  341 

Hahn,  Otto,  7,  8/;.  13,  290 

Haigerloch,  Gcrmanv,  290 

Halifax,  Lord,  572 

Ham,  Maj.  R.  G.,  282 

Hambro,  Sir  Gharles  J.,  299-300 

Hamilton,].  D.,  \2\n 

Hamilton  Field,  Galif.,  536,  544 

Handv,  General  Thomas  T.,  537/(.  541 


Hanford,  Wash.,  110,  114-15,  211,  332,  339-41, 

391-92,  450-51,  453,  460-62 
Hanford  Engineer  Works,  91,  267,  274,  278 

Armv-Du  Pont  administration  of,  202-04,  210-12, 
214,  216-17 

atomic  communities,  450-64 

communications  and  transportation  at,  394,  396- 
99,401-02,404-09 

electrical  power  for,  381-82,  387-88,  391-93 

health  program  at,  420,  424 

labor  shortage  at,  214,  216,  218,  351-54 

labor  turnover  and  absenteeism  at,  363-66,  370 

land  acquisition  for,  331-41 

plant  construction  at,  210-18 

plant  operation  at,  219-23,  580-81,  .585,  592-93 

safety  program  at,  428-29 

work  stoppages  and  union  activities  at,  370,  375 
Happy  Valley,  GEW,  442 

Harman,  Gol.  John  M.,  86-87,  328-29,  486-87,  497 
Harmon,  Lt.  Gen.  Millard  F.,  524 
Harriman,  Tenn.,  320 
Harrington,  Willis,  98 
Harrison,  Brig.  Gen.  Eugene  L.,  290 
Harrison,  George  L.,  251,  299,  302 

bombing  of  Japan,  513,  517,  530,  533 

postwar  planning,  560-61,  568-69,  571 
Harshaw  Chemical  Company,  168,  310,  314,  316 
Hart,  Thomas  C.,  577 
Harvard  University,  27,  590 
Hawkins,  David,  494« 
Health  program,  410-12 

clinical  medicine  services,  420-26 

industrial  medicine  research,  416-20 

medical  research,  414-16 

organization  of,  412-14 
Heavv  water  (P-9),  11,  23,  29,  34-35,  51 

British  interchange  on,  229,  231,  235 

and  Canadian  project,  246-47 

as  a  coolant,  190-91 

production  of,  58-59,  61,  66-67,  72 

research,  196-97 
Hechingen,  Germany,  287,  290 
Heisenberg,  Werner,  8/;,  290-91 
Helium,  312-13 
Hempelman,  Louis  H.,  416-17 
Hercules  Powder  Company,  508 
Hernandez,  Clinton  N.,  446 
Hickenlooper,  Bourke  B.,  577 
Hilberrv,  Norman,  98,  103,  113-14,  200,  222 
Hill,  Capt.  Thomas  B.,  526 
Hirohito,  Emperor,  542 
Hiroshima,  Japan,  537-38 

bombing  of,  537-38 
survey  teams  at,  544-45,  548 
Hitler,  Adolf,  280 
Hobcrg,  Maj.  Henrv  (i.,  446 
Hodgson,  Lt.  Col.  John  S.,  137,  139,  447 
Holmes,  Hal.  336 

Hooker  Electrochemical  Company.  166.  310,  314. 
371 


650 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Hooper,  Rear  Adm.  Stanford  C,  12 

Hoover  Dam,  Ariz.,  1 10 

Hoover,  Comdr.  Gilbert  C,  20-22,  24 

Hopkins,  Harry,  233-37 

Horb,  Germany,  290 

Houdaille-Hershey  Corporation,  156-57,  160,371 

Hough.  Maj.  Benjamin  K.,Jr.,  127,  150 

House  committees.  See  U.S.  Congress,  House  of 

Representatives. 
Housing 

at  Clinton  Engineer  Works,  435-42 

at  Hanford  Engineer  Works,  455,  457-60,  462 

at  Los  Alamos,  468-71.  475,  477 
Howard,  Nathaniel  R..  278 
Howe,  Clarence  D.,  241-42 
Hubbard,  Jack  M.,  515 
Huffman,  J.  R.,  247 
Hughes,  Arthur  L.,  492 
Hull,  Cordell,  297 
Hull,  Lt.  Gen.  John  E.,  519« 
Hutchins,  Robert  Maynard,  115 
Hyde  Park 

aide-memoire,  565-66,  570 

summit  meetings,  227-28,  241,  564-65 


Implosion  bomb.  489.  504.  506-10.  512,  516-17, 

519-21 
Imrie,  Capt.  Mathew,  476 
Indianapolis,  536 
Industrial  hazards.  416-19 
Industrial  Personnel  Division.  ASF.  348,  351 
Institute  for  Physical  and  Chemical  Research, 

Tokyo,  586 
Insurance  program,  430-31 
Interchange,  Anglo-American.  See  Anglo-American 

collaboration. 
Interchemical  Corporation,  151 
Interim  Committee 

composition  and  function  of.  530-33 

postwar  legislation  on  atomic  energv,  90?i,  568, 

574,  576 
press  releases,  538.  554-56 
scientific  panel,  531-33,  576 
International  Association  of  Chiefs  of  Police,  428 
International  Association  of  Machinists.  374 
International  Association  of  Plumbers  and  Pipe 

Fitters,  354 
International  Brotherhood  of  Electrical  Workers, 

372,  374 
International  Brotherhood  of  Firemen  and  Oilers, 

372,  374 
International  Brotherhood  of  Teamsters,  459 
International  Nickel  Company.  154«,  156 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  407,  459 
Interstate  Roofing  Company,  160 
Inyokern.  Calif,  507 
Iowa  State  College.  27,  64,  193.  316-18,  343,  487, 

505 
Ismay.  Lt.  Gen.  Sir  Hastings  L.,  284 


Isotopes.  5,  8-11.  23.  28-29,  32-33 
Iwojima.  526.  535-36 


Japan 

bombing  of  Hiroshima,  537-38 

bombing  of  Nagasaki,  538 

surrender  of,  541-42 

See  also  Atomic  bombing  of  Japan. 
Jeffers,  William.  407 
Jemez  Mountains.  N.Mex..  328,  465 
Jemez  Springs,  N.Mex.,  84 
Jennings,  John,  Jr.,  324-26 
Joachimsthal  (Jachymov),  Czechoslovakia,  283 
Johns  Hopkins  University,  8,  27,  119/1,  126,  145, 

314,  590 
Johnson,  Capt.  Allan  C,  61,  380-81.  385,  434 
Johnson,  Edwin  C,  575n,  576.  595 
Johnson,  Herschel  V.,  305 
Johnson.  John  A.,  437 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.  82.  586-87 
Joint  Commission  for  the  Investigation  of  the 

Atomic  Bombing  of  Japan.  SCAP.  545 
Joint  Committee  on  New  Weapons  and  Equipment, 

JCS,  39.  44,  73,  77 
Joliot-Curie,  Frederic,  8n,  12.  66.  249-50,  252,  286 
Jones,  J.  A.,  Construction  Company 

gaseous  diffusion  plant.  106-07,  160-61.  163-65, 
167.  383.  398.  404 

Oak  Ridge  community,  442-43 
Jones,  Couillan,  Thery,  and  Sylliassen,  454 
Jornada  del  Muerto  valley,  N.Mex.,  465,  478,  516 
"Jumbo,"  508«,  512 


k  factor,  190-92 

Kadlec,  Lt.  Col.  H.  R.,  203 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  Institute.  Berlin,  Germany,  12,  287- 

88 
Kapitza,  Peter,  564n 
Keith.  Percival  C. 

Anglo-American  collaboration,  233,  243 
gaseous  diffusion  plant,  151,  156,  165.  170-71 
Kellex  Corporation 
barrier  R&D,  154-57 
gaseous  diffusion  plant 

design  of  106,  150-51,  153,  158-59,  170, 

383 
construction  of  160-63,  165-66 
Kellev,  Maj.  Wilbur  E.,  132.  141.  146-47 
Kellogg.  M.  W.,  Company.  49.  51.  102,  106.  150-51 
Kelly.  Joseph  A.,  312-13 
Kennewick,  Wash.,  456,  460 
Kinetic  Chemicals,  314 
King,  Admiral  Ernest  J.,  526,  534 
King,  William  Lvon  Mackenzie,  235,  570 
Kingston,  Tenn.,  78,  326 

Kingston  Demolition  Range  (Clinton  Engineer 
Works),  78,  319 


INDEX 


651 


Kirkpatiick,  Col.  Elmer  E..  jr..  526-27,  534,  536 

540,  542,  595 
Kiiiland  Eield,  N.Mex.,  408,  581 
Kisiiakowskv,  George  B.,  350,  506,  511 
Klein,  August  C,  53,  127,  136 
Knolls  Atomic  Power  Laboratory,  592 
Knoxville  Airport,  lenn.,  408 
Kobe,  Japan,  528 

Kokura  Arsenal,  Japan,  529,  536,  538 
Kolm,  305 

Kowarski.  Lew,  8«,  66,  249 
Krug,J.  A..  385,  387 

Kruger.  Willard  C,  and  Associates,  466-68 
Kvle,  Col.  William  H.,  274,  560 
Kyoto,  Japan,  529-30 
Kyoto  Imperial  University,  Japan,  586 


Lancaster  (British  aircraft),  510«,  520 
Land  acquisition 

Clinton  Engineer  Works,  319-22 

Congressional  investigation  of,  325-27 
cost  of,  327-28 
local  opposition  to,  322-24 
Hanford  Engineer  Works,  331-33 
condemnation  trials  for,  336-42 
cost  of,  342 

local  opposition  to,  334-36 
Los  Alamos,  328-31 
other  sites,  342-43 
Landrum,  C.  U.,  339 
Lansdale,  Col.  John,  Jr.,  298,  306 

counterintelligence  system,  255,  257,  263 
Operation  Harborage,  289.  341 
Lanthanum  fluoride,  193-94 
L'Arcouest,  France,  286 
Latimer,  W.  M.,  I2\n 
Lattice  pile,  28,  30 
Laurence,  William  L.,  514,  554-55 
Lavender,  Capt.,  Robert  A.,  248 
Lawrence,  Ernest  O.,  28,  30,  38,  44,  66,  514,  531, 
583,  589 
electromagnetic  process,  34-35,  47,  52-53,  70, 

118-21,  123,  125,  128-29,  138 
Los  Alamos  site  selection,  84-85,  87 
pile  process,  99-101 
Leahv,  Admiral  William  D.,  561,  564,  565«,  566 
Lee,  Frank  G.,  299 
Lee.  Rear  Adm.  Willis  A.,  Jr.,  44,  77 
Leith,  Charles  K.,  299 
LeMay.  Maj.  Gen.  Curtis,  526.  534,  536 
Lewis,  Warren  K.,  563,  589 

liquid  thermal  diffusion  process.  174-77 
plutonium  project,  101,  197,  490 
Lewis  reviewing  committee,  101-02,  104-05,  117, 

149,  174 
Lilienthal,  David  E..  381,  386,  574,  597-99 
Lincoln,  Brig.  Gen.  George  A.,  519« 
Lindau,  Germanv,  289 


Linde  Air  Products  Company,  151,  160,  310,  314- 
16.  See  also  Lhiion  Carbide  and  (Carbon 
Corporation. 
Liquid  thermal  diffusion  {S-50)  process,  31/(,  36 

full-scale  development  of,  174-78 

Navy  R  &  D  on,  149«,  172-75,  177-78 

plant  construction,  179-80 

plant  design,  178-79 

plant  operation.  180-83,  580 
Littell,  Norman  M.,  336-41 
"Little  Bov."  522.  535-38.  See  also  "Thin  Man." 
Llewellin.  Col.JohnJ..  241-43.  305 
Lockhart,  Jack,  554 
Los  Alamos  Laboratory 

accidents  at,  420« 

administrative  organization,  491-93 

atomic  communities,  465-81 

censorship  at,  278-79 

communications  and  transportation  at,  395-98, 
400-401,  404,  408 

electrical  power  for,  385,  388 

espionage  at,  265-66 

Groves's  efforts  at,  485-86,  500-501 

health  and  safety  programs  at,  416-17,  419-20, 
424-26,  428-29 

interchange  with  British  scientists,  231,  245 

land  acquisition  for,  328-31 

manpower  recruitment  for,  347-48,  353, 
358,487,  501-02 

post  administration.  496-502 

postwar  operations,  580-82,  585,  593-94 

site  selection  for,  82-88,478 

special  reviewing  committee,  490-91 

technical  organization.  493-96 

weapon  construction  at,  507-10 

weapon  design  at,  503-07 

weapon  planning  at,  488-91 

weapon  testing  at,  511-18 
Los  Alamos  Ranch  School  for  Boys,  84,  329, 

465-66.  472 
Lotz.John  R.,  55-56,69 

Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad,  397,  404-05,  433 
Ludwigshafen,  Germany,  288 


MacArthur,  General  Douglas,  530,  534,  543-44, 

587-88 
Mackenzie,  C.  J..  232.  235,  243,  246-47 
Maddv.  James  R.,  426-27,  429 
Mahon,  George  H.,  274 
Maizuru,  Japan,  528 
Makins,  Roger,  560-61.  571-72 
Mallinckrodt,  Edward,  62 

Mallinckrodt  Chemical  Works,  62,  64.  310.  315-17 
Manhattan  (code  name  for  American  atomic 

project),  43-44 
Manhattan  District,  40-41,  80.  595 

administrative  organization,  88-91,  256-59, 

308,  346-47.  412-13.  420,  437-38 


652 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Manhattan  District — Continued 

and  the  AEC,  596-97.  600« 

area  offices.  See  Engineers  offices. 

deferment  policies,  367-69 

establishment  of,  41-46 

labor  relations  activities,  363-66,  370-75 

and  plant  operations,  142-43,  150-51,  160,  166 

Oak  Ridge  community  development,  434-40, 
443, 445-46 

Production  Control  Committee,  169 

relations  with  Los  Alamos,  468-69,  477 

report  on  bombing  efTects,  545-46 

security  systems,  254-59,  274-77,  279 
Manhattan  Project 

and  atomic  energy  legislation,  574-78 

and  the  bombing  of  Japan,  521-23,  543-47,  550 

end  of,  599-600 

funding  for,  115-16,  272-74,  590 

major  installations.  See  Clinton  Engineer  Works; 
Hanford  Engineer  Works;  Los  Alamos 
Laboratory. 

organization  of,  88-92,  588-90 

origins  of,  19-39 

policymaking  bodies.  See  Interim  Committee; 
Military  Policy  Committee;  Top  Policy  Group. 

postwar  operations,  580-85,  588-96 

priority  ratings  for,  80-82 

public  relations  program,  553-62 

Soviet  interest  in,  265-66,  564 
Manley.John  H.,  527,  594 
Manpower  conservation,  375-76 

labor  turnover,  363-66 

procedures  for  grievance  hearings,  374-75 

security,  366-67,  369,  371-72 

Selective  Service  System,  366-69 

union  activities  and  work  stoppages,  369-76 
Manpower  procurement,  344-45,  361-62 

of  civilian  employees,  355-57 

of  industrial  labor,  350-55 

of  military  personnel,  357-61 

organization  for,  345-48 

of  scientific  and  technical  personnel,  348-50 
Marburv,  William  L.,  568 
Mariana  Islands,  521,  523 
Marks,  Herbert  S.,  380-81,  597-98 
Marsden,  Lt.  Col.  E.  H.,  112,  308« 
Marshall,  General  George  C,  42,  98,  273,  580 

Alsos  mission,  280-81,  289 

Anglo-American  collaboration,  234,  239-41 

atomic  energv  program,  26,  31,  34,  37,  39,  73-74. 
76 

bombing  of  Japan,  524,  528,  534,  541,  543 
Marshall,  Col.  James  C,  19,  31«,  39,  55-56,  88«, 
115,  255,  307,  356,426 

electromagnetic  program,  118,  128,  133 

establishment  of  Manhattan  District,  40-42,  45-46 

financing  of  atomic  project,  49-50,  56-57 

Oak  Ridge  community  development,  434-35 

plutonium  program,  96,  113,  185,  194,  205 

priority  ratings,  57,  59,  61 

research  and  development,  50,  52-53 


Marshall,  Col.  James  C. — Continued 

site  selection,  47,  68-70,  78,  434 
Martin,  Joseph  W.,Jr.,  273 
Martyn,  John  W.,  587 
Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology,  64,  308, 

314,317-18,487,590 
Materiel  Squadron,  1027th,  521 
Matthias,  Lt.  Col.  Franklin  T.,  276,  375 

Hanford  Engineer  Works 

community  development,  452-55,  457-60 
electrical  distribution  system,  391-93 
land  acquisition,  110,  333-34,  336-38,  342 
transportation,  405-06,  409 

plutonium  project.  201-02,  210-21 
May,  Andrew  J.,  325,  575 
Mav-Johnson  bill,  575-77 
McCloy,  JohnJ..  378,  567,  573 
McCormack,  John  W.,  273 
McGrady,  Edward,  374 
McKee,  Robert  E.,  371,  469,  471,  498 
McKellar,  Kenneth  D.,  595 
McLeod,  Capt.  Robert  J.,  256,  258 
McMahon,  Brien,  576-77 

McMahon  bill  (Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946),  577-78 
McManama  and  Company,  455 
McMillan,  Edwin  M.,  8«,  84,  100 
McNarney,  Lt.  Gen.  Joseph  T.,  285 
McNeil  Island  Penitentiary,  Wash.,  334 
Mead,  James  M.,  335n 

Mead  Committee.  See  U.S.  Congress,  Senate. 
Medical  Corps,  413,  416,  422,  425,  544 
Meitner,  Lise,  7,  290 
Menke,  Capt.  Bernard  W.,  258 
Merritt,  Capt.  PhiUip  L..  80,  307 
Metal  Hydrides,  Inc.,  62,  64,  310,  316-17 
Metallurgical  Laboratory,  47,  342,  347,  350,  385, 
487.  576 

chain  reaction.  102-03 

Du  Pont  collaboration.  194-97,  452,  454 

espionage  at,  265 

feed  materials  processing,  313,  317-18 

health  programs,  4l0n,  415,  419« 

pile  design  and  engineering,  185-93 

plutonium  program,  35-36,  52,  65-66,  72,  86, 
95-101.  113.  510.  583.  590.  592 

See  also  Metallurgical  Project;  University  of 
Chicago. 
Metallurgical  Project.  371.  563.  590 

Council,  204 

Du  Pont  collaboration,  203-04 

plutonium  program,  199-200 

transfer  of  physicists,  501 

See  also  Argonne  Laboratory;  Clinton 
Laboratories;  Metallurgical  Laboratory. 
Metals  Reserve  Corporation,  31 1 
Middlesex,  N.J.,  80 
Miles,  J.  B.,  204 
Military  Advisory  Board.  589 
Military  Appropriations  Act  of  1944.  1 16 
Military  Intelligence  Service.  WD.  255 


INDEX 


653 


Military  Liaison  Committee,  AEC,  578,  597-98 
Military  Police  Company  (Aviation),  1395th,  521 
Military  Folicv  Committee,  77,  80,  266,  293,  557, 
580 

administration  of  Manhattan  Project,  89,  115,  589 

Anglo-American  collaboration,  227,  231-32,  234- 
35,  242-43,  245 

bombing  mission,  524-526 

Hanfoid  land  acquisition,  335-37 

implosion  program,  507-08,  510« 

Los  Alamos,  87,  494 

Plutonium  project,  99,  105-07,  109,  184-85,  191, 
194,  198,  203 

postwar  policy  on  atomic  energy,  563 

production  methods,  117,  139 

raw  materials,  293,  295-96 
Millikin,  Eugene  D.,  577 
Mills,  Rear  Adm.  Earle  W.,  563 
Mitchell,  Dana  P.,  492 
Mohler,  Fred  L.,  21 

Monsanto  Chemical  Company,  210,  508,  544,  591 
Moore,  Lacey,  406 
Moore,  Thomas  V.,  185 
Moran,  Maj.  JohnJ.,  166 
Morgan,  J.  E.,  and  Sons,  469,  471 
Morgantown  Ordnance  Works,  W\Va.,  107-08,  191, 

343 
Morgenthau,  Henry,  67,  302 
Morrison-Knudsen  Company,  37 1 
Moses,  Brig.  Gen.  Raymond  G.,  44 
Mountain  States  Telephone  and  Telegraph 

Company,  395-96 
Munnecke,  Wilbur  C,  200 
Muroc  Army  Air  Field,  Calif.,  508,  520 
Murphree,  Eger  V.,  34,  36,  38,  44,  51,  101 

heayy  water  program,  197 

liquid  thermal  diffusion  process,  174-77 
Murray,  Philip,  373 


Nagaoka,  Japan,  528 
Nagasaki,  Japan,  530,  536 
bombing  of,  538,  540-4 1 
survey  teams  at,  544-46,  548 
Nash  Building,  150-51,  155 
National  Academy  of  Sciences,  30,  32-33 
National  Bureau  of  Standards,  21.  23-24,  27,  62, 

64-65,  173,  308,  316-18.  419«,  487 
National  Carbon  Company,  65-66,  313 
National  Defense  Research  Committee,  26-31,  33- 

34,  254,  490,  505 
National  Electrical  Contractors  Association,  354 
National  Homes,  437 

National  Labor  Relations  Board,  345,  372-73 
National  laboratories,  590-91 
National  Research  Council,  253,  345 
National  Roster  of  Scientific  and  Specialized 

Personnel,  358,  492 
National  Safety  Council,  428-30 
National  War  Labor  Board,  355,  364,  372 


Naval  Construction  Brigade,  6th,  524 

Naval  Depot,  Yorktown,  \'a.,  508 

Naval  Gun  Factory,  Wash.,  D.C.,  505-08 

Naval  Ordnance  Plant,  Ccnterline,  Mich.,  508 

Naval  F'roving  Ground,  Dahlgren,  Va.,  508 

Naval  Research  Laboratory,  12-13,  22,  24,  3 In, 

173-74 
Naval  Technical  Mission  to  Japan,  545 
Neddermeyer,  Seth  H.,  506 
Nelson,  Lt.  Col.  Curtis  A.,  501 
Nelson,  Donald,  59,  81,  381 
Neptunium,  28 
Netherlands  East  Indies.  306 
Newman,  Brig.  Gen.  James  B.,Jr.,  544 
Newman,  James  R.,  577 
New  Mexico  Power  Company,  33 1«.  388 
Newton.  Isaac.  3 

New  War  Department  Building.  42.  89,  597 
Nichols,  Col.  Kenneth  D.,  42.  46-47.  53.  55,  88, 
380.  509,  543 
Anglo-American  collaboration,  233,  241 
electromagnetic  construction,  133-36,  139,  146 
feed  materials  program,  307-08 
gaseous  diffusion  plant.  160.  169 
Hanford  production  plant.  109,  218.  220,  592 
liquid  thermal  diffusion  process,  174,  177-78,  182 
manpower  conservation,  369,  374 
Oak  Ridge  community  development,  437,  443-44 
Plutonium  project,  98,  112-14,  185,  194,  202,  209 
postwar  commitments,  588-89 
priority  ratings.  57-60 
reorganization  of  atomic  project.  75-76 
security  system.  258 
silver  procurement,  66-67 
site  selection.  68.  71 
Smyth  Report.  559-60 

transfer  of  Manhattan  Project  to  AEC,  598-600 
uranium  procurement,  62,  65,  79,  292,  295 
weapon  stockpiling,  postwar,  593-94 
Nickel  barrier,  154-57 
Nickel  chromium,  312 
Nier,  Afred  O.,  10 
Niigata,  Japan,  529,  540 
Niihama,  Japan,  528 

Nimitz,  Admiral  Chester  W.,  524,  526.  535 
Nitrogen,  4,  133 

Nolan,  Capt.  James  F.,  420,  425-26,  536 
Norris,  Edward,  154-57 
Norris  Dam,  Tenn.,  390-91 

Norsk  Hydro  plant,  Rjukan,  Norway.  23.  66.  280 
Norstad.  Brig.  Gen.  Lauris.  524.  528 
Northern  Pacific  Railroad,  405,  407.  460 
Norton,  William  J.,  126 


Oak  Ridge,  Tenn..  79.  88.  201.  361.  382.  389-91, 

421-23,  427-30,  435-40,  443-44,  448 
Oak  Ridge  Institute  of  Nuclear  Studies.  591 
O'Brien.  Col.  John  J.,  78,  110,  324 


654 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Octagon  Conference,  564 

O'Driscoll  and  Grove,  437 

Office  of  Censorship,  278-79,  514,  554 

Office  of  Defense  Transportation,  404-05,  407-08, 

459 
Offiice  of  Naval  Intelligence,  255,  280 
Offiice  of  Scientific  Research  and  Development,  28, 
36-37,  39,  254 
Army  collaboration,  46-50,  66-67,  69,  71-72 
Committee  on  Scientific  Personnel,  345,  349 
electromagnetic  program,  118,  119«,  120-21 
health  and  safety  measures,  410-1 1 
and  the  Manhattan  District,  40,  44-47,  49 
materials  procurement,  292,  307,  315-16 
S-I  Executive  Committee,  77-81 

Anglo-American  relations,  228-30 
electromagnetic  process,  117,  126 
gaseous  diffiision  process,  51 
liquid  thermal  diffusion  process,  174-75 
Manhattan  Project  administration,  71-72,  89- 

90 
organization  of,  44-46 
Plutonium  project,  52-53,  96-97,  101,  107 
procurement,  58-59,  65-66 
S-1  Section,  33-35,  44,  62,  292 
Office  of  Strategic  Services,  280 
Office  of  the  Surgeon  General,  412,  422 
Offiice  of  War  Utilities.  See  Power  Division,  WPB. 
Ohio  State  University,  151 
Ohly,John  H.,  373 
Okinawa,  541 
0'Leary,Jean,  89 

Oliphant,  Marcus  L.  E.,  124,  147,  242«,  243,  245 
Olympic  Commissary  Company,  461 
O'Meara,  Capt.  Paul  E.,  435,  437 
Omura  Naval  Hospital,  Japan,  544 
Oolen,  Belgium,  25 
Operation  Crossroads,  594 
Operation  Harborage,  289-90 
Operation  Peppermint,  284-85 
Oppenheimer,J.  Robert,  52,  71,  271,  574 
decision  to  use  the  bomb,  531-32 
electromagnetic  process,  128 
implosion  bomb  design,  503,  506-07,  509-15 
liquid  thermal  diffusion  process,  175-76 
Los  Alamos  Laboratory 

establishment  of,  82-84,  86-88 
organization  of,  491-96,  499-500 
postwar  personnel  attrition,  581-82 
recruiting  of  scientists,  347,  350 
weapon  planning,  488-91 
Los  Alamos  operating  communitv,  466-67,  475, 

481 
Radiation  Laboratory  espionage  reports,  264 
security  clearance  for,  261-62 
Orange  oxide,  processing  of,  315 
Oranienburg,  Germany,  287-88 
Ordnance  Department,  23-24,  108,  495 


Osaka  Imperial  University,  Japan,  586 

Pacific  and  National  Hut,  470 

Pacific  Power  and  Light  Company,  381-82,  391-93, 
451 

Pacific  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company,  394, 
396 

Page,  Arthur,  554-55 

Pajarito  Plateau,  N.Mex.,  465,  478 

Parsons,  Lt.  Col.  William  B.,  258 

Parsons,  Rear  Adm.  William  S.,  499,  501,  598 
bomb  development,  504,  506,  508 
liquid  thermal  diffusion  process,  175 
preparations  for  atomic  bombing,  521,  527,  535- 
38 

Pasco,  Wash.,  1 10,  405-06,  456,  460 

Pash,  Lt.  Col.  Boris  T.,  261-62,  281-82,  286,  288- 
90 

Patent  rights,  247-48 

Patterson,  Robert  P.,  74,  78,  111,  302,  354-55,  374, 
584,  597,  600 
electric  power  requirements,  381,  386-87 
land  acquisition,  319,  325,  331,  338,  340 
Manhattan  Project  appropriations,  273-74 
postwar  atomic  policy,  570-71,  575,  577 

Patterson-Brown  Plan,  354 

Peabody,  A.  O.,  398 

Pearson,  Lester  B.,  571 

Pegram,  George  B.,  8«,  12,  24-25,  34-35,  44 

Pehrson,  G.  A.,  457-58 

Peierls,  Sir  Rudolph  E.,  8«,  242n,  243,  245 

Penn  Salt,  314 

Penney,  William  G.,  528 

Personnel 

for  Alsos  mission,  281,  285-86 
attrition,  postwar,  581-85 
for  Clinton  Laboratories,  208 
for  electromagnetic  plant,  141-42 
for  gaseous  diffusion  plant,  151,  166-67 
for  Hanford  production  plant,  214,  218-19 
for  Los  Alamos,  487,  492-93,  497-98,  501-02 
for  Manhattan  District  security  force,  258 
medical,  412-14,  422,  425 
See  also  Manpower  conservation;  Manpower 
procurement. 

Persons,  Brig.  Gen.  William  B.,  337 

Peterson,  Maj.  Arthur  V.,  114,  188,  194,  196-97, 
201-02,  208-09,  283-84 

Philadelphia  Navy  Yard,  175-76,  594 

Physical  Review,  14 

Pierce  Foundation,  John  B.,  435 

Pike,  Sumner  T.,  597-98 

Pile  (X-10)  process,  184-85,  419 

Army-Du  Pont  administration,  202-04 
chemical  separation  process  design,  193-94 
Chnton  Laboratories 

plant  construction,  205-08 
plant  operation,  208-10,  583,  591,  594 
design  and  engineering  for,  184,  187-94 
Du  Pont-Metallurgical  Laboratory  collaboration, 
194-98 


INDEX 


655 


Pile  (X-10)  process — Continued 

Hanford  Engineer  Works 

plant  construction,  212-18 

plant  operation,  219-23,  581,  585.  592-93 

research  and  development,  51-52,  99, 
102-05,  184-85 
Plutonium  (Pu-238,  -240),  28-30,  32-34,  36,  38, 

99,  283,  488-90,  504-05,  508-09,  514 
Pond,  Ashley,  465 

Port  Hope,  Ontario,  62,  64,  79-80,  313-14 
Port  Richmond,  N.V.,  65 
Postwar  Policy  Committee,  563-64 
Potsdam  Conference,  555 
Potsdam  Declaration,  54 1 

Power  Division,  WPB,  380,  382,  384,  387-88,  597 
Prefabricated  Engineering  Company,  458-59 
Press  releases.  See  Manhattan  Project,  public 

relations  program. 
Price,  Byron,  278 
Priest  Rapids  Branch.  See  Chicago,  Milwaukee, 

St.  Paul  and  Pacific  Railroad. 
Priestly,  Kenneth,  123 
Princeton  University,  8,  27-28,  47,  52,  590 

barrier  corrosion  research,  151,  154 

feed  materials  research,  308,  317-18 
Priority  ratings 

for  labor,  352-53 

for  tools  and  materials,  80-82 

for  weapon  development,  50,  57-61 
Prisoner-of-war  camps,  537,  547 
Procurement,  130-33,  206,  217,  455,  486,  491,  499- 
500 

of  copper,  61,  66 

of  electric  power  and  equipment,  377-80,  393 

of  feed  materials,  310-14 

of  graphite,  22-23,  61,  65-66,  312-13 

of  heavy  water,  61,  66 

of  raw  materials.  See  Raw  materials  program. 

of  silver,  66-67,  133 

of  thorium  ore,  292-95,  300,  303,  305-07 

of  uranium  ore,  62,  64-65,  79-80,  286-87,  292- 
95,  300,  303,  310-11 
Procurement  and  Assignment  Service,  413 
Project  Alberta,  496,  542 
Project  Camel,  499,  501,  510 
Project  Trinity,  496,  503,  58  h/ 

bomb  test,  514-19 

establishment  of  base  camp,  478-81 

origin  of  code  name,  465« 

preparations  for,  511-14 
"Prospectus  on  Nucleonics,"  563 
Provisional  Engineer  Detachment,  469,  473-74, 

497-98.  502,  507 
Public  Roads  Administration,  403-04 
Pumps,  design  of,  157-58 
"Pumpkins,"  51 1 

Purdue  University,  86,  1 19w,  126.  145,  314,  487 
Purnell,  Rear  Adm.  William  R.,  77.  174.  3.50,  524, 
526.  534 


QjLiADRANT  Conference,  240-4 1 

Quebec  Agreement,  241-42,  245,  247,  249 
British  proposed  revision  of  570-72 
uranium  resources,  296h,  299n 


Rabi,  Isidor  I.,  488 

Racetracks.  See  Alpha  racetracks;  Beta  racetracks. 

Radiation,  3-4,  415-16 

Radiation  Laboratory,  35,  125,  343,  411n 

espionage  at,  261,  263-65 

research  and  development,  120-26,  128-29,  138, 
141-42,  583 

See  also  University  of  California  (Berkeley). 
Radioactive  lead,  312-13 
Radioactive  warfare,  283-84 
Radioactivity,  543-44,  547,  562« 
Radium,  8,  25,  312-13 
Radium  Chemical  Company,  312 
Railroads,  404-08 
Ramsey,  Norman  F.,  349 
Raw  materials  program 

acquisition  in  foreign  areas,  299-306 

international  ore  exploration,  292-95 

joint  control  of  Congo  ore,  295-97 
Ravburn,  Sam,  273-74 
Rea,  Lt.  Col.  Charles  E.,  420 
Read,  Granville  M.,  199,  203 
Reader's  Digest,  548 
Real  estate  branches 

Corps  of  Engineers,  70,  78,  324,  331,  340,  342 

Ohio  River  Division,  70,  320-21,  404 

Pacific  Division,  331-34 

Southwestern  Division,  328,  331 
Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation,  31 1« 
Redox  solvent  extraction  process,  593« 
Revbold,  Maj.  Gen.  Eugene,  19,  40,  42-43,  55,  75, 

115,  319,  326 
Rice.  Calif,  478n 

Richards,  Maj.  Gen.  George  J.,  273 
Richland,  Wash.,  1 10.  212.  332-33.  392,  401,  406, 

428.  430.  450-51.  456-60,  462-64 
Rickover,  Capt.  (USN)  Hyman  G.,  596/; 
Rjukan  (Norway)  plant,  280.  See  also  Norsk  Hydro 

plant. 
Road  systems,  400-404 
Roane-Anderson  Company,  371,  427 

Oak  Ridge  community  administration,  444-47 

operation  of  CEW  communications  and 
transportation,  397-98,  401,  404 
Roane  County,  Tenn.,  70,  78,  320,  326,  403 
Roberts,  Richard  B..  21 
Robins.  Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  M..  41-42.  55.  70.  77. 

110 
Roentgen.  Wilhelm.  4 
Roosevelt.  Franklin  D.,  73,  80,  98,  115,  197 

Anglo- American  collaboration,  31-32,  46,  228-29, 
232-33,  236-38,  240,  251 

approved  briefing  congressional  leaders,  272-73 


656 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Roosevelt,  Franklin  D. — Continued 

control  of  Congo  ore  deposits,  297-300 

government  support  of  atomic  energy  program, 
13-15,  19,  26,  28,  31-32,  39 

Hanford  land  acquisition,  335-36 

Los  Alamos  security,  494 

Navy  exclusion  from  atomic  program,  31,  174 

postwar  planning,  564-66 

Qiiebec  Agreement,  241-42 
Rose,  Edwin  L.,  490 
Rosenberg,  Ethel  and  Julius,  265 
Rosseli,  Maj.  Paul  F.,  438 
Rowe,  Hartley,  496 

Royall,  Brig.  Gen.  Kenneth  C,  568-69 
Royall-Marburv  draft  bill,  568-69,  574-75 
Ruhofl,  Lt.  Coi.  John  R.,  146,  589 

feed  materials  program,  307-08,  31 1 

uranium  procurement,  64-65,  79 
Russell,  Richard  B.,  577 
Rutherford,  Ernest,  4-6 


S  (Sawmill)  site,  507 

S-1  Executive  Committee.  See  Office  of  Scientific 

Research  and  Development. 
S-1  Section.  5^^  Office  of  Scientific  Research  and 

Development. 
Sabotage,  measures  against,  266-67 
Sachs,  Alexander 

Congo  ore  acquisition,  24-25 

government  support  of  atomic  program,  13-15, 
19-24,  26,  28 
Safety  program 

insurance  plans,  430-31 

occupational  and  community  aspects,  428-30 

organization  of  426-28 
Salton  Sea  Naval  Air  Station,  Calif,  521 
SAM  (Special  Alloved  Materials)  Laboratories,  150, 

153-54,  156,  i67, 343 
Sandia  Base.  N.Mex.,  581,  585,  594,  599 
San  Luis  Valley,  Colo.,  478« 
San  Nicolas  Island,  Calif,  478« 
Sapper,  Maj.  William  L.,  112,  201-03 
Schulman  Electrical  Company,  A.  S.,  389 
Schult  Trailers,  437 
Schwellenbach,  Judge  Lewis  B.,  331,  337,  339-40, 

342 
Seaborg,  Glenn,  99,  173,  185 
Secrecy,  26,  44-45,  56 
Security 

bodyguards,  267-68 

censorship,  277-79 

Clinton  Engineer  Works,  447 

communications,  395-97 

compartmentalization  policy,  268-72 

counterintelligence  program,  255-57,  259-63 

espionage  activities,  263-66 

French  repatriated  scientists,  249,  252 

Hanford  Engineer  Works,  461,  463 

informing  Congress,  272-74 


Security — Continued 

Los  Alamos,  474,  480,  491-92,  494-95.  513-14, 
517 

measures  against  sabotage,  266-67 

organization  and  administration  of  254-59,  274- 
76 
Selective  Service  System,  344,  346,  366-69,  376 
Senate  committees.  See  U.S.  Congress,  Senate. 
Seneca  Ordnance  Depot,  N.Y.,  80 
Sengier,  Edgar,  25,  64-65,  79-80,  292,  295,  300 
Separation  methods,  9-1 1,  21,  23.  28-30,  34-37, 

193-94.  See  also  by  process  names. 
Service  Commands 

4th,  395-96 

6th,  358 

8th,  358,  361,474,497,  502 

9th,  396,  408 
Service  Command  Unit.  4817th.  361.  474 
Services  of  Supply,  19,  40,  57,  116«.  358,  486.  See 

also  Army  Service  Forces. 
Shane,  Charles  D.,  492-93 
Shasta  Dam,  Calif,  70,  1 10 
Shekerjian,  Lt.  Col.  Haig,  20 
Shinkolobwe  mine,  Belgian  Congo,  8,  25,  64,  295- 

96,  300 
Short,  Dewey,  325 
Shurcliff,  William  S.,  558 
Signal  Corps,  377,  395-96,  544 
Silver  Spring,  Md.,  508 
Simon,  Sir  Francis  E.,  242«,  243 
Site  selection 

Chalk  River  pilot  plant,  246-47 

Clinton  Engineer  Works,  78-79,  435-40,  450-51 

Hanford  Engineer  Works,  108-1 1 

Los  Alamos  Laboratory,  82-88,  478 

other  installations,  46-49,  65-71 
Skidmore,  Owings  and  Merrill,  435-36,  438-39.  441 
Slotin.  Louis.  420« 
Smith,  Harold  D.,  34 
Smith,  Hoffman,  and  Wright,  458 
Smith,  Lincoln  G.,  558 
Smith,  Capt.  Ralph  C,  500 
Smith,  Lt.  Gen.  Walter  Bedell,  284 
Smyth,  Henry  D.,  196,  556-63 
Smyth  Report,  556-61 
Snyder,  J.  Buell,  274 
Sobell,  Morton,  265 
Soda  salt,  processing  of,  314-15 
Solberg,  Rear  Adm.  Thorvald  A.,  563,  598 
Somervell,  Lt.  Gen.  Brehon  B.,  116,  338,  348 

establishment  of  Manhattan  District,  42-43 

organization  of  atomic  energy  program,  74-75,  77 
Southern  Bell  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company, 

396-97 
Southern  Railway,  320«,  397,  404,  433 
Soviet  Union 

espionage  activities,  265-66 

postwar  atomic  explosion,  566« 

proposed  atomic  relations  with,  564,  570 
Spaak,  Paul  H.,  300 


INDEX 


657 


Spaatz.  (General  Carl  A.,  288,  5:}7/( 
Sparkman,  John,  325 

Special  Enginet'i  Detachment,  141,  1.51,  166,  180- 
81,  208,  349,  358-59,  367,  469,  497-98,  502, 
507 
Special  Engineer  Detachment  (Provisional),  13th, 

258 
Spedding,  Frank  H.,  145,  185 
Speer,  Albert,  291 

Speer  Carbon  Company,  65-66,  313 
Spokane  Army  Air  Field,  Wash.,  409 
Spokane,  Portland,  and  Seattle  Railroad,  405,  407 
Spokesman- Review  (Spokane,  Wash.),  279 
Sproul,  Robert  C,  126 
Stadtilm,  Germany,  288-89 
Standard  Oil  Development  Company,  27,  36,  51, 

65,  79.  96 
Stanford  University,  487 
Stark,  Admiral  Harold  R.,  26 
Staten  Island  cache,  64-65,  79-80,  292 
Stearns,  Joyce  C",  528 
Steel,  procurement  of,  61,  218 
Steel-bomb  process,  64 
Stettinius,  Edward  R.,Jr.,  306 
Stevens,  Maj.  Wilber  A.,  500,  507 
Stewart,  Irvin,  44 

Stewart,  Lt.  Col.  Stanley  L.,  499,  501 
Stewart,  Tom,  595 

Stagg  Field,  University  of  Chicago,  103,  194 
Stassfurt,  Germany,  287 
State,  Countv,  and  Municipal  Workers  of  America, 

371 
Stimson,  Henry  L.,  67,  98,  126,  580 

Alsos  mission,  280,  289 

Anglo-American  collaboration,  229,  232,  234, 
237-40,  251 

atomic  energy  program,  39,  73,  77 

bombing  of  Japan,  529-30,  532,  537n,  541,  545 

briefing  congressional  leaders,  573-74 

Combined  Policy  Committee,  241-42 

deferments,  367-68 

establishment  of  Manhattan  District,  45-46 

Hanford  land  acquisition,  335-37 

joint  control  of  Congo  uranium,  296-98,  300,  302 

manpower  recruitment,  349,  353-54,  357 

postwar  planning,  565-68,  570 

press  release  on  bombing,  553,  556 

priority  ratings,  61 

Project  Trinity,  517-18 

Smyth  Report, ^m-6\ 

Top  Policv  Group,  31,  33-34 
Stine,  Charles,  98,  100 
Stone,  Robert  S.,  200,  410«,  411,  415 
Stone  and  Webster  Engineering  Corporation,  42, 
49.  52,  68-71,  79,  185,  428// 

acquisition  of  feed  materials,  307,  31  1 

as  an  AEM,  55-56,  .59,  61,  95-97,  99,  106-07 

CEW  communications  and  transportation,  396, 
398,  404 

CEW  housing  construction,  43.3-37,  439,  441, 
443 


Stone  and  Webster  Engineering  Corporation — 
Continued 
electromagnetic  plant 

construction  of,  130,  132-37,  139,  389-90 
design  and  engineering  of,  124,  126-29 

Stowers,  Lt.  Col.  James  C,  151,  156,  160,  166 

Strasbourg,  France,  287,  290 

Strassmann,  Fritz,  7,  8«,  290 

Strauss,  Lewis  L.,  597 

Strong.  Maj.  Gen.  George  V.,  26,  25.5-56.  277,  280- 
81 

Styer.  Maj.  Gen.  Wilhelm  D.,  19,  37-38,  46,  59. 
206,  381 
Combined  Policy  Committee,  242-43 
establishment  of  Manhattan  District,  40,  42-43,45 
foreign  ore  acquisition,  300 
manpower  procurement,  350,  354,  356 
reorganization  of  atomic  energy  program,  74-77, 
81-82 

Sundt  Company,  M.  M..  398,  466,  468-69,  474 

Supreme  Headquarters,  Allied  Expeditionary  Force, 
289-90 

Surplus  property,  595 

Suzuki,  Kantaro,  542 

Swanson,  Maj.  Melvin  O.,  438 

Sweeney,  Maj.  Charles  W.,  540 

Syracuse  District,  19,  42,  356 

Szilard,  Leo,  Sn,  10-11,  190 

compartmentalization  policy,  270-71 
development  of  atomic  energy  program,  24,  26 
efforts  to  secure  U.S.  government  support,  12-14 
uranium-graphite  system,  11,  21-22 


Taber,  Rep.  John,  274 

Tailfingen.  Germany.  290 

Taranto.  Italy,  281 

Taylor,  Hugh  S.,  47,  49 

Taylor,  Capt.  Thomas  W.,  438 

Technical  Detachment,  1st,  521,  527,  535,  542 

Technical  Service  Unit,  9812th.  361.  497-98 

Teller.  Edward,  8«,  11,  13,  271,  503n 

development  of  atomic  energy  program,  21-22 

Los  Alamos  weapon  program,  487 
Tennessee  Eastman  Corporation,  119«,  126 

hazards  control  program,  418-19 

labor  relations,  371,  374 

operation  of  electromagnetic  plant,  107,  124,  134 
140-48,  ,398 
Tennessee  Valley,  55,  71,  78-79 
Tennessee  Valley  Authority,  108 

electrical  power  from,  378-83,  386.  389-91 

site  selection,  46-47,  68-69,  432 
"Thin  Man,"  508.  See  also  "Little  Boy." 
Thomas,  Charles  A.,  210,  .509,  514,  574.  589 
Thomas.  Elmer.  273 
Thomas,  W.  I.,  177 
Thomson,  George  P.,  8« 
Thomson,  J.  J.,  4 


658 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


Thorium  ore.  See  Procurement,  of  thorium  ore. 

Tibbets,  Col.  Paul  W.,Jr.,  521,  529,  537-38 

Tilley,John  N.,  199 

Tinian,  524,  526-27,  536,  538,  540-44 

TNX  Division.  See  Du  Pont,  E.  I.,  de  Nemours  and 

Company. 
Tojo,  General  Hideki,  542 
Tolman,  Richard  C,  197,  271,  350,  529,  589 

Combined  Policy  Committee,  242-44 

liquid  thermal  diffusion  process,  176-77 

I.OS  Alamos  weapon  program,  490,  503«,  507, 
510,  512-14 

postwar  planning,  558-60,  563,  574 
Top  Policy  Group,  31.  34-35,  45-46,  80,  89,  232, 

267,  296 
Toyama,  Japan,  528 
Trail  plant,  British  Columbia,  47,  53,  58-59,  61,  66- 

67,  72,  107,  343,  388,  581 
Transportation 

air,  408-09 

Corps,  377,  398-401,  405 

motor  vehicles,  400-402 

organization  for,  399-400 

problems  of,  397-98 

railroads,  404-08 

road  networks,  402-04 
Travancore,  India,  305-06 
Travis,  Maj.  James  E.,  203 
Traynor,  Maj.  Harry  S.,  45«,  297-98 
Trident  Conference,  235 
Trinity.  See  Project  Trinity. 
Tripartite  Agreement,  300-301 
Troop  Carrier  Squadron,  320th,  521 
Truman,  Harry  S.,  337,  518 

appointments  to  AEC,  596-97 

bombing  of  Japan,  533,  541,  556 

domestic  control  of  atomic  energy,  575-76,  578 

future  control  of  the  bomb.  569-74 

postwar  planning,  561-62 
Truman-Attlee-King  Declaration,  571,  573 
Truman  Committee.  See  U.S.  Congress,  Senate. 
Trytten,  M.  H.,  492 
Tube  Alloys  (code  name  for  British 

atomic  project),  99,  228-29,  223,  236,  304,  565. 
570 
Tularosa  valley,  N.Mex..  478« 
Turner  Construction  Company,  444 
Twaits,  Morrison,  and  Knudsen.  458 
Tydings,  Millard  E.,  577 
Tyler,  Col.  Gerald  R.,  498,  501 


Ube.  Japan,  528 

Underbill,  Robert  M.,  121-23 

Uniform  Vehicle  Code,  429 

Union  activities,  369-75 

Union  Carbide  and  Carbon  Corporation,  96,  106, 
165,  293.  See  also  Bakelite  Corporation;  Linde 
Air  Products  Company;  Union  Mines 


Union  Carbide  and  Carbon  Corporation — Continued 
Development  Corporation;  United  States 
Vanadium  Corporation. 
Union  Mines  Development  Corporation,  293-95, 
299«,  303.  See  also  Union  Carbide  and  Carbon 
Corporation. 
Union  Miniere  du  Haut  Katanga,  8,  25,  286,  300- 
301,  310.  See  also  African  Metals  Corporation. 
Union  Pacific  Railroad,  405,  407,  460 
United  Nations 

Article  102  of  charter,  571-72 
Commission  on  Atomic  Energy,  573-74 
United  States  Army  Strategic  Air  Forces,  288,  530 
United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  67^;, 

342,  376,  578,  591,  596-600 
United  States  Bullion  Depository,  West  Point, 

N.Y.,  133 
United  States  Employment  Service.  141, 

351-53.  366 
United  States  Strategic  Bombing  Survev.  545.  547- 

48.  550 
United  States  Vanadium  Corporation,  311.  See  also 

Union  Carbide  and  Carbon  Corporation. 
University  of  California  (Berkeley),  348,  371,  428n, 
487,589 
Board  of  Regents,  120 
electromagnetic  program,  119-23 
Los  Alamos  prime  contractor,  86-87,  467-68, 

475,486-87,  491,499,  512 
nuclear  research,  8,  27-28,  52,  83,  185,  193 
See  also  Donner  Laboratory;  Radiation  Laboratory. 
University  of  California  (Davis),  1 19,  123 
University  of  Chicago,  68.  86,  121,  590,  594 
nuclear  research,  27-28.  52.  83 
Plutonium  program,  185-87,  193-94,  210 
plutonium  semiworks,  114-15,  398 
See  also  Metallurgical  Laboratory. 
University  of  Illinois,  86.  487 
University  of  Minnesota.  27,  86,  487 
LIniversity  of  Pennsylvania,  590 
University  of  Rennes,  France,  286 
University  of  Rochester,  41 1-12,  415-16,  421,  487, 

544,  590,  594 
University  of  Rome,  282 
University  of  Strasbourg,  287 
University  of  Tennessee,  142,  591 
University  of  Virginia,  23-24,  27,  51 
University  of  Washington.  415 
LIniversity  of  Wisconsin,  86,  487 
Uranium  (U-233,  -234.  -235.  -238),  8-11.  23-25, 
28-29,  32-33 
and  bomb  development,  504-06,  508.  510 
British  research  on.  231.  235 
electromagnetic  process.  128.  142-44 
explosive  potential  of.  488-89 
gaseous  diffusion  process.  149.  152.  169.  171 
Lewis  reviewing  committee  report  on.  104-05 
liquid  thermal  diffusion  process.  173.  175-77.  182 
Uranium,  Committee  on,  26-28,  253.  See  also 
Uranium,  Section  on. 


INDEX 


659 


Uranium,  Section  on,  28,  556.  Str  also  Onict-  of 
Scientific  Research  and  Development,  S-1 
Section. 
I'ranium  ('ommittce.  Sir  Advisory  (>ommitlcc  on 

L'raniuni. 
I'raniuni-graphite  system,  1  1,  21,  23,  28 
Ihanium  hexanuoride,  152,  154,  173,  175 
L'ranium  ore.  See  Procurement,  of  uranium  ore. 
I'ranium  tetrachloride,  143 
Uravan,  Colo.,  376 

Urey,  Harold  C,  24,  26,  30,  34-35,  44,  87,  243,  574 
gaseous  diffusion  process,  34,  36,  38,  51,  101, 

150,  155 
liquid  thermal  diffusion  process,  174-75 
U.S.  Congress,  327,  576,  579-80,  590,  595 
atomic  project  briefings,  272-74 
hearings  on  atomic  bombings,  548-50 
House  of  Representatives,  273-74,  324,  576,  578 
Appropriations  Committee,  273-74 
Militarv  Affairs  Committee,  75,  325,  575, 
578-79 
postwar  atomic  legislation,  572,  574-78 
Senate,  273,  336,  578 

Appropriations  Committee,  273 

Mead  Committee,  341 

Military  Affairs  Committee,  575-76 

Special  Committee  on  Atomic  Energv,  548, 

577-80 
Truman  Committee,  279,  335,  337 
U.S.  Navy,  12-13,  22,  24,  31«,  172-75,  177-78,  255, 
524,  535,  545,  576,  594« 


X'anadium,  31 1 

\'anadium  Corporation  of  America,  311 

\'ance,  Mai.  John  E.,  306 

Vanden  Bulck,  Lt.  Col.  Charles,  43«,  357.  597-98 

\'andenberg,  Arthur  H.,  576-77 

Van  Fleet,  J.  R..  293 

\'an  Vleck,John  H.,  490 

\'argas,  Cetulio,  306 

\'entures,  Ltd.,  299« 

\'itro  Manufacturing  Company,  308,  314 

\'olcano  Islands,  540 

\'olpe,  1st  Lt.,  Joseph,  Jr.,  278,  306,  597-98 

von  Halban,  Hans,  8«,  66,  235,  243,  246-47,  249- 

50 
von  Neumann,  John,  506,  528 


Wabash  River  Ordnance  Works.  Ind,,  108,  191.  343 
Wakavama,  Japan,  528 
Wallace,  Henry  A.,  31,  34,  39,  46,  234 
Wallgren,  Mon  C,  336-37 
Walton,  E.  T.  S.,  5-6 

War  Department  Miscellaneous  Group,  521 
War  Manpower  Commission,  351-54,  364-65,  370, 
461 


War  Production  Board 

electric  power  requirements,  380-83,  387-88,  393 

priorities,  57,  353 

procurement,  67,  80 
Warren,  Col.  Stafford  L.,  91/;,  594 

bombing  survey  team,  544,  549-50 

health  program,  411-15,  421,  425-26 
Washington  Liaison  Office,  81-82,  89,  91,  130,  178, 

180/(,  310,  349,  377,  380 
Washington  Post.  279 

Watson,  Maj.  Gen.  Edwin  M.,  19-20,  22-23 
Watson,  William  W.,  247 
Watts  Bar  Dam,  Tenn.,  390 
Waymack,  William  W.,  597 
Weapon  development  and  testing.  See  Los  Alamos 

Laboratory. 
Weaver,  Brig.  Gen.  Theron  D.,  60,  81-82 
Webster,  W.  L.,  248 
Wegener,  A.  L.,  374 
Weil,  George,  103-04 
Weisskopf  Victor,  12 
Welsh,  Col.  Arthur  B.,  412 

Wendover  Field,  Utah,  507,  521-22,  526-27,  581 
Wensel,  H.  T.,  44 
Wesson,  Maj.  Gen.  Charles  M.,  23 
Western  Defense  Command,  261,  263-64 
Western  Union  Company,  397 
Westinghouse  Electric  and  Manufacturing  Company, 

62,  64,  124,  129-30,  153 
Westinghouse  Research  Laboratories,  51,  487 
West  Stands.  See  Stagg  Field,  University  of 

California. 
Wheeler,  John  A.,  8n,  203,  589 
Whitaker,  Martin  D.,  1 12,  1 14,  208,  210 
White,  Wallace  H.,  273 
White  Bluffs,  Wash.,  1 10,  211-12,  332,  392,  405, 

450-51,456 
Wickard,  Claude,  329 
Wigner,  Eugene 

nuclear  research,  8«,  11,  13,  21-22,  24 
pile  process,  190,  192,  195-97 
Wigner  Effect,  592 

Williams,  Roger,  101,  113-14,  199,  203,  221 
Williams,  Maj.  Walter  J.,  137 
Wilson,  Carroll  L.,  597-98,  600 
Wilson,  E.  Bright,  Jr.,  197.490 
Wilson,  Robert  R.,  528 
Wilson,  Col.  Roscoe  C,  520-21 
Winant,  John  G..  249-51,  297-98,  300 
Winkleman,  D.  W.,  Company,  160 
Winne,  Harry  A.,  574 
Women's  Armv  Auxiliary  Corps,  358 
Women's  Army  Corps,  277,  357-58,  397,  473 
Woolworth  Building,  151 
Work  stoppages  and  absenteeism,  206,  370-71, 

375-76 
Wright,  Brig.  Gen.  Boykin  C,  298 
Wuerttemberg,  Germany,  287,  289 


660 


MANHATTAN:  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  ATOMIC  BOMB 


XAX  development  plant,  134-35,  142 
Xenon, 221-22 


Yancey,  E.  B.,  199 
Yokkaichi,  Japan,  528 
Yontan  Field,  Okinawa,  541 


Yakima,  Wash.,  110,  337-39,  402 
Yakima  County,  Wash.,  1 10 
Yaku-shima,  Japan,  540 
Yale  University,  308,  315 


Zinn,  Walter,  8n 
Zirconium  oxide,  133 


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