t
119971
"Dr. Turck in his excellent work 'Tftft,
LTOWIG BircHOTR, in Internationale, Ltofrtourt&'v&te? *
"The whole character of the general lectures inDr. IJujyfc^ book must be
described as that of a polemic for idealism and against JfcSfcigr Kind of egoism,.
Hence the inner warmth in the work, for Tiirck is deTOlaTto* the matter in
hand with all his mind and soul, and it is as if he had himself in his own men-
tal life passed through all that he presents. Tiirck himself sees in his book
only sketches that require further amplification, he desired to give only
outlines, but he proves himself familiar with what is essential. We may
point, for instance, to the manner in which he utilises the conception of
play, of freedom, both in general and in particular. It is exactly this
undivided connection of the whole that constitutes the charm and the
suggestive value of the book" Professor Dt. KICHABDMABIAWEENEB, in
Jdhresberickte fur neuere devtsche Literaturgeschichte.
"One of the most interesting thinkers of the younger generation has
hitherto made the problem of genius the chief subject of his scientific
studies. His exceedingly clever and captivating book owes its origin to
a number of lectures. The essays on TSamleV on Goethe's TausV on
Byron's 'Manfred,' and especially also on Buddha and Christ stir not only
our intellectual interest, but also our minds by the subtle, warm and
ideal mode of presentation of their subjects. The reader will find his mind
ever more elevated by them." Dr. HELMUTS MEBLKB, in Barmer Zeitung.
"The convincing interpretations given by Dr. Tiirck of poems hitherto
insufficiently understood, the now apparently self-evident solutions of diffi-
cult character problems seem to be the less essential portions of his book.
The more essential are found rather in the simple yet imposing conception
of life that does equal justice to the ethical sensation and the realistic mode
of thinking of the modern mind." Dr. med. GAEL WEBNEB, in Magazin
fur Lti&ratur.
"In a comparatively short time the book has gone into a fifth edition
and it has well earned this conspicuous success. Like few others of recent
times it has emphatically promoted the extension of the doctrine of the
essence of genius. It has done so by a mode of exposition carefully rounded,
satisfactorily clear, lucid, and agreeable, so that the work is made accessible
to the understanding of every educated reader and affords him not only real
instruction, but also enjoyment." Dr. M. KBOIOOSTBEBG, mEtJiischeKuUur
"Dr. Turck's book deserves attention and careful appreciation; it may
be called one of the most 'interesting productions of modern sociological
literature." B. M., in Sozialistische Monatsfafte.
"Among the best portions of the book I count the study of Hamlet.
It is a very interesting fact that the author, as he declares, was inspired
with this very attractive and convincing solution of the problem by
Matthew 12, 46 sq." Pfarrer J.HANS, in Theologische Ltieraturzetiung, edited
by Professor Dr. E. SOHUEEB and Professor Dr- A. HABNACK.
"An honest fervour and a noble zeal pervade all the disquisitions in the
book. Df . Turck's total conception of the exalted subject is refreshingly sound
and unsophisticated, and his mode of exposition very subtle." Die Post.
"Dr. Turck's book belongs to those which, written with a genuine
love, afford instruct 4 ^i and permanent enjoyment to every reader."
Processor Dr. G. GAJ&JSTD, in Die Kunstlialk.
"Dr. Turok has the indisputable merit of having established his own
opinion on two important literary questions, namely, his conception of the
character of Hamlet and his explanation of Faust's blindness caused by
'Care.' The simple language that avoids all unnecessary technicalities, makes
.toa bopk, although if jbtetfts/of \$ie highest and weightiest human prob-
lems? intelligibly /a^'eiJc^bVidso to every non-professional reader.'*
DJ. K'DoNAEfes* in Berliner Tageblatt.
"In every* *4ii>8ct an important book. The more thoroughly I occu-
pied myself wi$^Efch of these interesting questions, the clearer and the
more comprehensible* the high mind and ideal striving of the author became
to me. Everywhere the high morality, the beauty, and the indescribable
idealism of the book affect the reader agreeably." Landtagsabgeordneter
A. BATOERT, in Erfurter Tribune.
"Dr. Tiirck's book has its roots in Goethe's view of the world, it ex-
hibits most brilliantly the problem of humanity as reflected in 'Faust,*
'Hamlet,' and 'Manfred,' and refutes energetically the antipodes of the
spirit of Goethe (Stirner, Nietzsche, Ibsen, and Lombroso). It is to be hoped
that the ' work may find its way into every rank of society." Professor
Dr. ALFRED BIESE, in SMeswger Nacfaricnten.
"The polemic against Lombroso belongs to the most valuable por-
tions of Dr. Tiirck's book." KARL v. THALER, in New Freie Presse.
"An extraordinary fluency of style and a noble simplicity of lan-
guage that avoids all unnecessary technical expressions, enable the reader
to follow without trouble the author's elucidations which combine the
perspicuous mode of thought of Schopenhauer with Hegel's dialectic
keenness." Dr. PR. JUNGKLATJS, in Neue Stettiner Zetiung.
"The twelve essays contain so much that is interesting, clever, and
profound, that the reading of this book is a real enjoyment, nay more, a
source of mental invigoration and absorption." NeueBadischeLandeszeitung.
"This work may be warmly recommended to every educated man, most
specially to every theologian. The book is pervaded by a noble spirit and
sentiment that affect me agreeably." Pastor PAUL GRATTE, in Protestantische
MonatsJiefte.
"Dr. Tiirck's book belongs to the few works of these later years, that
one must have read if one wishes to attain an independent judgment of
the intellectual currents of the present time." Professor Dr. ETOEK
WOLBT, in Hamburger Korrespondent.
"The reading affords a high intellectual enjoyment and is a stimulant
to serious thought on questions that are nowadays of far-reaching theoret-
ical and practical interest." Dr. med. P. K6HLER, in Die christliche WeU.
"In this book speaks the spirit of true humanity and a philosophy of
life that exhibits and elucidates, by the light of practical application, the deep
thoughts of our greatest philosophers." Kolnische Zetiung.
"The author knows how to present the result of his studies in a manner al-
ways interesting, and usually original, and always embodies them in a pleasing
and readable form. Dr. Tiirck belongs to the best armed champions against
Nietzsche and also against the erroneous doctrines of Lombroso." ALFR.
EMBKSI v. EJLAEBACH, in BeilagezwrAllgemeinen Zetiung inMunchen*
"Everything written by Dr. Tiirck is written from the mind of the
idealist, every paragraph brings a revelation producing a joyful surprise."
Hofrat Dr. ERIEDR. DUKMEYER, idem.
"The high and free standpoint chosen by the author enables him to open-
many a surprising outlook on the career of all these prominent figures,
and to give many a deep insight into their mental Me. Nay, even a new
light is cast on the activity of Christ, for instance on His relation towards
John the Baptist. Dr. Tiirck's book becomes instructive and valuable by
the fact that he succeeds in combining in a clever manner historical specu-
lation with aesthetic criticism. There are few occasions on which one
disagrees with him." Vossische Zeitung.
THE MAN OF GENIUS
AGENTS
AUSTRALASIA , THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
205 FLINDERS LAKE, MELBOURNE
CANADA THE MACKELLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, LTD.
27 RICHMOND STREET WEST, TORONTO
INDIA MACMILLAN & COMPANY, LTD,
MACMILLAN BUILDING, BOMBAY
809 Bow BAZAAR STREET, CALCUTTA
THE
MAN OF GENIUS
BY
HERMAN TtfRCK, PH.D.
A. & C. BLACK, LTD.
4, 5 & 6 SOHO SQUARE, LONDON, W. i
1923
First German Edition, published 1896.
Second German Edition, published iSgtf.
Third German Edition, revised and enlarged, 1898.
Fourth German Edition, revised and enlarged, J#p
Fifth German Edition, revised and enlarged, zyoi.
Sixth German Edition, revised, 1903.
Seventh German Edition, revised and enlarged f
First English Edition, published 1914.
Copyright, 1914, by
STILLERSCHE HOFBUCHHANDLUNG (J. A. STRHNGE)
Schwerin i. M.
CONTENTS
Page
1. ARTISTIC ENJOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY i
2. PHILOSOPHICAL ASPIRATION ...... 27
3. CONDUCT IN PRACTICAL LIFE 51
APPENDIX-. GOD AND THE WORLD 71
4. SHAKESPEARE'S CONCEPTION OF THE NATURE OF
GENIUS IN HAMLET 87
5. GOETHES SELF-EEPRESENTATION IN FAUST . . 135
-6. BYRON'S DELINEATION OF THE SUPERMAN IN MAN-
FRED . 179
7. GENIUS AND FREEDOM OF MIND IN SCHOPENHAUER'S
AND SPINOZA'S TEACHINGS 199
8. THE AWAKENING OF MENTAL FREEDOM THROUGH
CHRIST AND BUDDHA 215
9. TEMPORAL SUPERHUMAOTTY IN ALEXANDER, CESAR,
AND NAPOLEON . . . 273
10. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGHER MAN ACCORD-
ING TO DARWIN, AND LOMBROSO J S HYPOTHESIS . 305
.11. THE NARROW-MINDED MAN AND THE ANTISOPHY
OF EGOISM: STIRNER, NIETZSCHE, AND IBSEN . . 325
12. THE MYTHS OF PANDORA AND OF THE FALL OF MAN 431
13. CONCLUSION ............ 455
INDEX . 465
NOTE
This book was translated from the sixth edition of the
German original by the late Professor George J. Tamson,
lecturer in English at the University of Gottingen. The
additions to the book in the seventh German edition, the
explanation of Ibsen's "Ghosts" in Chapter XI and the
whole of Chapter XII, were translated by Mrs. Elizabeth
C. Deibel. The entire English version was then thoroughly
revised by Mr. George F. Payn,' reader to the Tauchnitz
Edition in Leipzig, and editor of James's German-
English dictionary, Professor F. Sefton Delmer, lecturer
in English at the University of Berlin, and Mr. John
A. Falconer of the English Seminary at the Hamburg
Colonial Institute.
In the following lectures it is the author's design to
develop definite trains of thought as clearly as possible.
This endeavour may be responsible for a certain amount
of repetition by which means alone, however, it was
possible to arrange the book so that each chapter
should form a complete whole which may be read
independently.
L
ARTISTIC ENJOYMENT AND
PRODUCTIVITY OF THE MAN
OF GENIUS
SCHOPENHAUEE makes the statement that "genius is
simply the completest objectivity, i. e., the objective tend-
ency of the mind, as opposed to the subjective, which is
directed to one's own self in other words, to the" selfish
"will." l Goethe observes: "The first and last thing that
is demanded of genius is love of truth." 2 No one will deny
that both Schopenhauer and Goethe are entitled to speak
with some authority in this matter, for each of them was
a genius of no mean order. How then do the statements
of these two great men stand to each other? Is it ob-
jectivity or is it love of truth that forms the essential
factor of genius? The question is not very difficult to
answer; for objectivity and love of truth are merely two
different expressions for one and the same attitude of
mind. In order to be able to judge objectively, we must,
to a certain extent, be above the thing to be judged. The
longing to ascertain the actual facts, to sift what is true
from what is untrue, must far outweigh any temptation
to present the resultant facts in some particular form cor-
i The World as Witt and Idea. Translated by R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp.
6th ed., 1907-9, vol. I, p. 240.
8 Criticisms, Reflections, and Maxims. Translated by W. B Ronnfeldt,
p. 224.
Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity
responding to a personal desire of our own. From the
moment that we cease to be above the thing to be judged,
we cease to judge objectively, and truth is to us no longer
of any importance. From the moment we entertain the
personal desire of seeing the matter in question reveal
itself in some particular aspect, we cease to be unbiassed
in the investigation, and, consciously or unconsciously,
we are dishonest.
Honesty, love of truth, and objectivity are therefore
identical. Everyone who has a personal interest in a matter
is, from the very outset, exposed to the suspicion of
stating the case to his own advantage, and the stronger
this personal interest is, the stronger will also be the
tendency to look at the matter in a biassed, subjective
way. The moment personal interest, subjectivity, and
self-seeking enter the field, truth is put to flight.
, And just as self-seeking, subjectivity, and falsehood are
kith and kin, so love, which is the antithesis of self-
seeking, and objectivity, which is the pure, single-eyed
interest in the thing itself, are akin to truth. If self-
seeking makes one blind, and incapable of recognising
truth, if the self-seeking man is at the same time the
narrow-minded man, then on the other hand love makes
a man clairvoyant, intuitive, a diviner of hidden
things. The man who has an interest merely in the thing
itself, who is impersonal, disinterested, loving, is the man
whom truth rushes to meet of its own accord; the man who
is impartial and just, who observes objectively, will thus
at the same time be the man of genius; for we must agree
with Schopenhauer, that "genius is simply the completest
objectivity," and with Goethe, that "the first and last
thing that is demanded of genius is love of truth."
Now, as objectivity and love of truth are based on
that tendency of the will which we call love, as opposed
Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity
to self-seeking, we may say that the degree of love in a
man is the measure of the genius he possesses, and that
the degree of his self-seeking is the measure of his narrow-
mindedness.
Other observations made by Goethe in his "Maxims
and Reflections" still further confirm these views: "In
art and knowledge, as also in deed and action, all
depends upon the object's being clearly apprehended and
treated in accordance with its nature." x Again: "By
ill-will and hatred a man's observation is limited to the
surface of things, even though those qualities be accom-
panied by a keen perception. But if the latter goes hand
in hand with good-will and love, it is able to penetrate
into the heart of man and the world, and may even attain
to the supreme goal." 2 Later on: "The whole art of living
consists in giving up our existence" an existence self-
seeking and confined to ourselves "in order to exist,"?
that is, all the more truly and on a higher standard/
Further, in "After Falconet and about Falconet": "What
the artist has not loved, does not love, he should not
depict, he cannot depict."
Let us now attempt to gain a clear conception of the
truth that love pervades and illumines all, and begin
with the domain of aesthetics. The first requisite for
the productivity of the artist is his enjoyment. The artist
cannot produce, unless his mind has previously received
the most manifold impressions. Goethe, who may in this
respect also be taken as an authority, states: "It is
sometimes said in praise of an artist that he has evolved
everything out of himself. Would that I might never
hear this again! Properly speaking, the productions of an
original genius of that kind are composed for the most
- 1 Criticisms, Reflections, and Maxims, p. 163. 2 Id. pp. 175-6.
s Id. p. 178.
Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity
part of reminiscences; any one who has experience will
be able to recall numbers of specific instances." *
The manner of creative production is therefore directly
determined by the nature of the impressions received
by the artist. To be able to paint with genius, one must
be able to see with genius; to compose with genius, one
must be able to hear with genius. Technical aids, talent in
execution, dexterity, and self -discipline, are naturally most
important factors in carrying out a piece of work, the part
they play is, however, but a secondary one. Lessing's
statement is frequently quoted, that Eaphael, even if he
had by some mischance been born without hands, would
nevertheless have been a painter of supreme genius. Why ?
Because even without hands, he would still have seen the
world through the divine eyes of genius, eyes through
which the world shone in bathed in the beauty of the
ideal. His hands only enabled him to represent what
he saw; for what he saw filled him with the rapture that
urges a man to create, to fix his impressions, first for
himself, and then for others.
The difference, therefore, between the genius and the
every-day man lies in their totally different manner of
receiving sense-impressions. When a bull and a Eaphael
contemplate the same landscape, the landscape of course
remains the same; what is not the same, however,
is the impression received by each. The bull prob-
ably sees in the landscape only a mixture of colour-
blotches such as many of our impressionist painters
nowadays represent. A Eaphael, on the other hand, sees
even the most delicate shades of colour, the finest gra-
dations of light and shadow; he traces the contours of
the objects, and follows the lines of the hills with his eye;
and all these colours, lights, and lines awaken peculiar,
1 Criticisms, Reflections, and Maxims, pp. 245-6.
Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity
harmonious feelings in his mind; for a Raphael the whole
landscape speaks a language that the bull does not under-
stand, because the bull sees only the green spot that to
him means fodder.
To form a conception of artistic genius, we must first
of all take into consideration how the aesthetically gifted,
as opposed to the aesthetically limited man, allows sense-
impressions to affect him; for this purpose a critique of the
senses, as G-oethe calls it, is necessary. Concerning this he
says: "Kant has made us acquainted with the critique of
reason, and taught us that this, the highest of human powers,
has need to keep a careful watch over itself. Of the great
benefit which we have derived therefrom, it is to be hoped
that every man has convinced himself. But I should like to
suggest that we require a critique of the senses, if Art in gen-
eral, and especially German art, is ever to regain its vigour
and to advance in a satisfactory and hopeful manner." l
How then is the mode of sensation or sense-reception
of the man of genius connected with the ob j ectivity, which
Schopenhauer claims as the special mark of genius; how,
further, is it connected with the love of truth, which
Goethe demands of genius; and finally how is it con-
nected with that love or intensified objective interest
as opposed to self-seeking which is such an essential
symptom of the presence of genius ?
In order to answer these questions, we must look a little
more closely into the psychic process of sensation or
reception of sense-impressions, bearing in mind the dis-
tinction drawn by psychologists between sensation and
feeling; by sensation being meant the mere admittance of
sense-impressions, and by feeling, on the other hand, that
psychic state of pleasure and pain, of comfort and discom-
fort, connected with every reception of sense-impressions
i Criticisms, Reflections, and Maxims, p. 247.
Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity
as well as with, every other psychic activity. Thus, for
example, when we meet a lady in the street who wears a
scarlet dress, a grass-green cloak, and a bright yellow
hat, the psychologist calls the mere seeing of the colours
red, green, and yellow a sensation, while he calls the
satisfaction or dissatisfaction connected with the sight
of this colour-combination a feeling.
Let us now consider a simple psychic process, such,
for instance, as takes place in a wild animal on sighting
its prey, and thus try to make clear to ourselves the
interplay of the various psychic activities, sensation,
comprehension, and resolution or desire. Suppose a hungry
lion prowling around suddenly sees a slender gazelle in a
thicket. What feeling would be combined with this visual
sensation in the lion? Would the lion become absorbed in
the contemplation of the slender limbs and graceful move-
ments of the pretty creature ? Would an aesthetic feeling
of pleasure arise at the same time with the visual sen-
sation? Clearly not, and why? Because the beast of prey,
driven by hunger, could feel no interest in the mere out-
ward looks of the gazelle. On the contrary, urged by
the wildest desire to appease hunger, the lion cannot
possibly be satisfied with merely gazing at the gazelle.
The visual sensation is for the beast of prey nothing
but a signal that sets in motion, first its primitive power
of thought, and next its desire. Simultaneously with the
visual impression, the vague idea of an object that prom-
ises satiety arises like a flash in the beast's brain. It
is unconscious of the gazelle's individuality and its ex-
quisite grace, and sees in it only a specimen of those animals
that serve it as food. As soon as the beast of prey has
combined this simple general conception with the visual
sensation, it has done with the sensation as such, and
hence no longer dwells upon it.
Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity
If the visual sensation, or the auxiliary sensations of
smelling and hearing, had not been sharp and distinct
enough, the lion would at first have started, stopped
in his tracks, and scrutinized the object more keenly,
to see what kind of thing was moving in the thicket,
whether a possible victim or another beast of prey. If
thus in doubt, the lion would actually have dwelt on
the visual sensation, or on the impression made upon
him by any of the other senses, but obviously only
until, with his primitive powers of thinking, he had
decided whether he is to class the animal in question
with those that serve him as prey, or with those that
might oppose him and become dangerous to him. If
the general conception of something to kill and eat be-
comes combined, either at once or after some hesitation
and examination, with the visual impression, then this
conception will direct the animal's instinct to satisfy his
hunger. The general idea of an object of prey, combined
with the visual sensation, forms a guide for the animal's
instinct. The general idea, thought, or conception, is like
a switchman sending the rushing train, that is, the in-
stinct demanding satisfaction, along the right track. As
soon as the lion has decided that he has before him a
beast fit for prey, the resolution to fall on it and rend
it to pieces is at once formed,
Thus sensation, thought, and resolution* pass into
one another. Sensation instantly becomes thought,
thought becomes resolution, and resolution leads to action.
The main point of this whole inner process remains, for
the beast of prey, the instinct to satisfy its hunger, and
this instinct presses into its service the processes of
sensation, thought and action. The visual sensation,
its collocation into the general idea of an object suit-
able for the satisfaction of hunger, and the movement
Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity
in the direction of this object, are here only subordinate
factors, the mere means to an end, and not the end and
purpose itself. Neither in the mere contemplation of the
gazelle, nor in the mere mental operation of recognising
the gazelle as his "kill," nor in the mere action of leaping
forward and seizing the gazelle, does the beast of prey
take any interest whatever, its whole will being intent
solely and exclusively on satisfying its appetite. Thus
sensation, thought, and action are here entirely sub-
ordinate to the selfish will.
Now, does the lion behave subjectively or objectively
on perceiving the gazelle? Subjectively, it is clear.
According to Schopenhauer, by subjectivity is meant "the
tendency of the mind directed to one's own self in
other words, to the" selfish "will. 55 Subjectivity and
self-seeking are therefore identical.
It is the same with man. Every time he is subjective
and pursues self-seeking interests, he behaves like the
beast of prey. He occupies himself neither with mere
seeing, with mere thinking and comprehending, nor with
that pure species of action the purpose of which lies in
itself; but sensation, comprehension, and action are for
the subjectively biassed man also only means to an end,
means to accomplish his own selfish will, to satisfy his
own self-interest.
To become absorbed in the contemplation of any object,
to be able to dwell on any sensation at all with undivided
attention necessitates detachment of the mind from every
personal, subjective, self-seeking interest. In so far as self-
interest comes into play, a man as well as an animal first
seeks only to grasp the significance of the sensation for his
personal well-being, in order to regulate his conduct by it,
and when this significance has been discovered, he finds
no further use in lingering over the sensation.
Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity
Let us imagine a timber-merchant whose whole interest
happens to consist in making as much money as possible.
He wishes to buy a forest for the purpose of clearing it,
and goes to inspect it. He will carefully examine the
condition of the forest; he will note the different kinds
of timber, will compute his probable gains, will notice
everything which has reference to his business, and when
he has done all this he will go away again. Has he seen
the forest? No, provided that he has only had a selfish
business -interest in it; he has only seen that there is
"money in it." In looking at the forest, he dwelt upon
it only as long as was necessary for him to calculate its
possible advantage to himself. The shifting lights, the
gentle dreamy rustling of the tree-tops, the trickling
rills, the song of the birds, the graceful lizard gliding
through the leaves upon the ground, all this perhaps will
strike his eye and ear, but it will recoil without effect,
and strike no chord of sympathy in his soul. The man's
interest is directed to an entirely different point, his eye
sees and his ear hears only things that have some
bearing on this point; all else knocks in vain at the por-
tals of his soul for admittance.
For in all our sense-perceptions we consciously or
unconsciously select, sift, and arrange. Every moment
of our waking state a host of impressions makes appeal to
our senses. Our clothes, shoes, and hat produce friction and
pressure on the skin; the ground on which we walk, the
chair on which we sit, the table on which we lean, call
forth sensations of pressure; the draught of air that passes
over us brings with it sensations|both of touch and tem-
perature; before our eyes the most various objects are
in motion; our ears 'are struck by the most miscellaneous
sounds; and yet of many, indeed it may be said of the
* greater number of these sense-excitations we know nothing
10 Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity
at all, because our attention is directed to quite definite
sensations connected with the interest that occupies us
at the moment.
Therefore among the numerous sense-stimulations that
reack us simultaneously at any given instant, we always
make a selection, particular stimulations being preferred
and admitted into the bright light of consciousness, while
others are pushed into the background and obstructed,
so that we hardly become aware of them or not at all.
But this selection among the many simultaneous stimu-
lations is directly influenced by man's conscious or un-
conscious will, by his impulses, inclinations, interests,
by his whole character. Thus, for instance, the egotistical
man, who regards everything in its relation to himself,
will only be able to think of himself when anything af-
fects his senses, he will see and hear only that which is
connected with his selfish interest, he becomes narrowed
and confined, therefore, in the use of his senses by his
natural selfishness. Whatever does not minister to his
self-seeking, he neither sees nor hears; it has no exist-
ence for him. He is blind and deaf to whatever lies
beyond his interest in himself.
Hence Goethe's remark: "As in Kome there was, in
addition to the Romans, also a population of statues, so
too there is, in addition to this real world, a world of
illusion which is far more potent than the other, and in
which the majority of persons live," 1 namely the narrow-
minded, self-seeking everyday-folk.
For the better understanding of these psychic processes,
a brief psychological explanation of the word "feeling"
may here be given. Sensation we call the mere reception
of sense -impressions; feeling, on the other hand, the
resultant and concomitant satisfaction or dissatisfaction,
i Criticiems, Reflections, and Maxims, pp. 176-7.
Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity 11
pleasure or pain. Of course, agreeable and disagreeable
feelings, pleasure and pain, occur not only in com-
bination with sensation, but also in close combination
with thoughts and impulses of the will, in other words,
with any psychic operation whatever. An absurd, foolish
thought awakens dissatisfaction, a sensible, wise idea
causes pleasure. A passion by which we are ruled may
under certain circumstances fill us with the deepest grief
and a good, honest resolution with the greatest joy. The
feelings of pleasure or pain, of satisfaction or dissatis-
faction in all their many gradations, are therefore con-
stant accompaniments of all psychic operations, hence
of all sensations, thoughts, and aspirations. But every
activity is directed to some end, and at the base of every
activity lies the wish to attain this end; while every
approach to this end is accompanied by the feeling of
pleasure, and every departure from it by that of annoy-
ance. If then the mind is occupied with any operation,
such, for example, as the operation of perceiving or
receiving sensations, of understanding or arranging sensa-
tions under some general idea, of willing or determining
to do something, then pleasure will accompany an
approach towards the object of such an operation, an-
noyance a departure from it.
Usually it is said that a man desires that which causes
him pleasure. But in reality a man finds pleasure only
in the attainment of his desire, of that towards which,
consciously or unconsciously, his natural impulse is direct-
ed. The lion- is not pleased with the mere sight of the
graceful gazelle, because it is not the sight of the gazelle
he wishes for, but its flesh and blood. If he saw the gazelle
without being able to approach it, the sight, far from
filling the lion with satisfaction, would convulse him wit!
rage. Similarly the sight of a beautiful forest which
12 Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity
rival has forestalled him in buying would not produce in
the timber-merchant a mood of sBSthetic pleasure, but one
of resentment.
Therefore when we see a man take pleasure in the mere
sight of an object, we may assume that, as long as this
pleasure lasts, he desires the sight of the object only and
nothing else; that consequently he takes no material, no
subjective, no selfish, personal interest in the object, but
only an ideal, objective one; that he is in fact a man of
genius, at least during those moments of objective con-
templation* \
The genius is distinguished from the ordinary, average
man only by being permanently and intensively in
this state of disinterested absorption in mere sensation,
whereas the average man is able only transiently, and
usually for some special reason, so far to forget himself
and his earthly needs, as to be carried away by con-
templation, by hearing, or by imaginative impressions
and thus to enter intp the blessedness of a god, a genius,
a pure spirit, who does not need to seek anxiously for
himself within himself, because he finds himself in
all else.
T-.With reference to this Schopenhauer says: "Genius
consists in the capacity of being the pure subject of
knowledge," that is, of being quite disinterestedly carried
away by contemplation. "Yet this faculty must exist in all
men in a smaller and different degree; for if not, such men
would be just as incapable of enjoying works of art as of
producing them; they would have no susceptibility for the
beautiful or the sublime; indeed, these words could have
no meaning for them. We must therefore assume that
there exists in all men this power of knowing the Ideas
in things, and consequently of transcending their person-
ality for the moment, unless indeed there are some men
r,?/.u Artistic Enjoyment and Productivity 13
who are capable of no aesthetic pleasure at all. The man
of genius excels ordinary men only by possessing this
kind of knowledge in a far higher degree and more contin-
uously. Thus, while under its influence, he retains the
presence of mind which is necessary to enable him to
repeat in
