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4< The real student of mankind treats no standpoint as abso 
lutely right or absolutely wrong." 


Printed by M. N. Kulkarni at the 
Karnatak Printing Press, Chira 
Ba?ar, Bombay and published by 
him at the Karnatak Publishing 
House, Chira Bazar, Bombay 2. 


Why I have attempted this re-examination of Maratha 
History I have explained in the Introduction. How is, no 
doubt, a matter for the Reader to judge. The subject is both 
vast and bristling with controversies. I claim no infallibility 
for either my conclusions or my authorities. I am open to 

I am indebted to Rev. Irineu Lobo, S.J., for the citations 
from Professor Pissurlencar's Portuguese e Maratas, as well as 
for his genial visits during the arduous moments of my writing; 
to Professor R. V. Oturkar, M.A., for his robust criticism which 
was helpful even when I was incorrigible ; and to my colleague 
Mr. K. G. Nitsure, M.A., who has materially shared my labours 
throughout and more particularly in the preparation of the 
Bibliography and the Index. 

To the venerable Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai, B.A., I 
owe much inspiration and help with books and discussions, 
especially on the pre-sivaji period. 

Great as my obligations are to all these and several other 
friends who patiently criticised portions of my MS., I own 
the fullest responsibility for all my views and especially my 
errors of commission and omission. 

Poona, October 1944. S. R. S. 












VIII. THE SEA FRONT . . . . f ' 206 






INDEX 345 


No apology is needed to introduce a re-examination of 
Maratha history which, it will be admitted, has been long 
overdue. I wish, however, that the task had been attempted 
by some one more competent or better qualified than myself 
to undertake it. " The Mahrattas were once a mighty nation ", 
wrote Edward Scott Waring in 1810 ; " how they rose and 
how they fell may surely challenge enquiry." Nearly twenty 
years before Waring's History of the Mahiattas appeared the 
subject had attracted the attention of a German professor of 
Halle University who published his now little known 
Geschichte der Maratten, as early as 1791, for the edification 
of his European contemporaries. The writer himself admitted 
that he could not vouch for the authenticity of the earlier 
parts of his fantastic wark, but that he had compiled it from 
such accounts as were available to him in the several Euro- 
pean languages. It comprised ^288 octavo pages and also con- 
tained a map prepared by Forster in 1786. The book closes 
with ' the peace with England of 17th *May, 1782.' The author 
never visited India and the work has little value to-day Ac- 
cept as a rare specimen of the first European account of the 
Marathas full of quaint errors. 

The next in point of interest is the better known work of 
Edward Scott Waring, published in London in 1810. The 
author was for seven years attached to the English embassy 
at Poona and had greater opportunities of gaining informa- 
tion upon many points than usually fall to the lot of other 
persons. " I states, this," he records in his Preface, " to excuse 
the presumption of my undertaking, aware that I expose my- 
self to the charge of having trifled with my time, and of hav- 
ing lost opportunities not to be recovered." Modestly conscious 
of his limitations, " yet, without arrogance," he adds, " I may 
assume the merit of having been the first to present the reader 


with a connected history of the Mahrattas, derived from origi- 
nal sources, and sources till lately not known to have existed. 
I am aware that some portions of Mahratta history are before 
the Public; none, however, derived from their own annals, 
and consequently neither so copious nor so authentic ". He 
particularly assumes merit 'of having considered his subject 
most fully, and of having spared no pains to procure every 
possible record that could add greater interest to his work, or 
justify the favourable opinion of his friends'. His appraisal 
of the comparative merits and demerits of the Persian and 
Marathi source materials is worthy of special attention. 

Regarding the former, he writes, " None, so far as I can 
judge, can be more fallacious, or can less requite the diligence 
of patient investigation. Ferishta, who composed a general 
history of India, as well as a particular history of the Deccan, 
is almost the only historian who merits the praise of impar- 
tiality and accuracy. He died before the era of Mahratta 
independence, and his man f le has not fallen upon any of his 
brethren. The Mooslims, of course, view with animosity and 
anguish, the progress the Mahrattas have made in the con- 
quest of their fairest provinces ; and which of late years must 
have been aggravated by the bondage of their king, the un- 
fortunate representative of the house of Timoor. From such 
persons little that was favourable to the Mahratta character 
could be expected. Thef facts they give are garbled and per- 
verted, while the slightest circumstance against them is seized 
upon, and extended to an immeasurable length. Their style is 
also a subject of just reprehension. Their forced and unnatu- 
ral images, their swelling cadences and modulated phraseo- 
logy, are as disgusting to a discriminating taste, as they must 
be inimical to historical truth. For in a history composed in 
verse, something will be sacrificed -to measure, and much to 
rhythm. Although the Persian histories be not written in 
verse, yet they partake of all its faults. They abound in quaint 
similes and forced antithesis, while the redundancy of their 
epithets distract and bewilder attention. If this judgment 
to the Persian scholar seem harsh, I refer him to the history 


of the late Nizam of the Deccan, or, if he object, to the un- 
disputed* master of this prurient style, the celebrated Abul 

One may not quite fall in with this criticism in toto, but 
it is certainly a welcome corrective to the exaggerated import- 
ance that is attached by some latter day scholars to the sanc- 
tity of the Persian authorities. Apart from the linguistic 
features, the Muslim accounts may not be considered more 
reliable or authentic simply because they contradict the native 
sources. There is much truth in Waring's warning that from 
such persons little that was favourable to the Maratha char- 
acter could be expected : * The facts they give are garbled 
and perverted, while the slightest circumstance against them 
is seized upon, and extended to an immeasurable length'. 

On the contrary, " Not so the Mahratta histories ", states 
Waring. " Their historians (some will deny them the name) 
write in a plain, simple and unaffected style, content to relate 
passing events in apposite terms, without seeking turgid imagery 
or inflated phraseology. * 'Excepting in the letter addressed to 
the Peshwa, by the great Mulhar Rao Holkar, no attempt is 
made to make the worse appear the better reason. Victory and 
defeat are briefly related ; if they pass over the latter too 
hastily, they do not dwell upon the former with unnecessary 
minuteness. They do not endeavour to bias or mislead ftie 
judgment, but are certainly deficient in chronology and in 
historical reflections. Whether I have done justice to their 
works I am at a loss to determine, aware of my own incompe- 
tency, and not ignorant of the deficiency of my materials." The 
frankness and modesty of Waring are worthy of emulation, 
though we may not accept all his conclusions. 

The premier historian of the Marathas in English, though 
not on that account unchallengeable, has been and still is, 
James Cunningham Grant Duff. He was captain of the Native 
Infantry of Bombay and Political Agent at Satara (1806-22). 
The first edition of his well-known History of the Mahrattas 
was published in London in 1826 (in 3 vols.). In its latest 
form (1921) it has been resurrected in two volumes edited by 


S. M. Edwardes with an interesting ' Memoir of the Author ' 
and a learned Introduction. * 

"The want of a complete history of the rise, progress, 
and decline of our immediate predecessors in conquest, the 
Mahrattas," writes Grant Duff, "has been long felt by all 
persons conversant with the affairs of India ; in so much, that 
it is very generally acknowledged, we cannot fully understand 
the means by which our own vast empire in that quarter was 
acquired, until this desideratum be supplied/' 

Aware of the difficulties and shortcomings of the inde- 
fatigable Orme and the pioneer Scott Waring, Grant Duff 
honestly strove ('working twelve and fourteen hours daily 

without intermission subject to very serious headaches, 

which at last became very agonising, returning every fifth day, 
and lasting from six to sixteen hours at a time, requiring me 
to work with wet cloths girt about my head') to maktf good 
their deficiencies, with what result modern scholars best know. 

"Circumstances placecj me'\ he says in his Preface to 
the first volume of the original edition, " in situations which 
at once removed many of the obstacles which those gentlemen 
(Orme and Waring) encounteised, and threw materials within 
my reach which had ben previously inaccessible." Neverthe- 
less, he confesses his initial lack of education and heavy pre- 
occupations with civil and military duties, "ill-calculated for 
preparing us for the task of historians". But it must be 
admitted that Grant Duff, by his indefatigable labours pro- 
vided for all his successors a solid bedrock and starting point 
in the writing of a history of the Maratha people. 

He has no doubt provoked much criticism not undeserv- 
edly ; but his very shortcomings and errors provided hot 
incentives to further efforts by the natives in re-writing their 
own history more correctly. To he fair to Grant Duff his 
critics would do well to remember his frank attitude expressed 
in these unmistakable words : " There being differences of 
opinion as to whether the writer of history should draw his 
own conclusions, or leave the reader reflect for himself, I may 
expect censure or approbation according to the taste of parties. 


I have never spared my sentiments when it became my duty 
to offer Aem; but I have certainly rather endeavoured to 
supply facts than to obtrude my own commentaries; and 
though I am well aware that, to gain confidence with the one 
half of the world, one has only to assume it, I trust that I 
shall not have the less credit with the other for frankly ack- 
nowledging a distrust in myself." 

Besides, he has also stated : " in such a work many errors 
must exist ; of these, I can only say, I shall feel obliged to any 
person who, after due consideration and inquiry, will have the 
goodness, publicly or privately, to point them out". No one 
can deny that this has been too well done by readers of Grant 
Duff for over a century since. ' Your difficulty, and yet what 
none but you could accomplish/ wrote Montstuart Elphinstone 
to him, 'was to get at facts and to combine them with judg- 
ment so as to make a consistent and rational history out of a 
mass of gossiping Bukkurs and gasconading Tawaretikhs.' He 
also suggested : * I think, however, you should have introduced 
more of the manners of -Jthe Mahrattas as they now stand, 
and it may be a question whether that does not come more 
naturally when you reach the present period ; but, on the whole 
I think that, as you are writing for Europe, you should make 
j)eople acquainted with your actors before you begin your 
play '. Grant Duff appears to have acted on this hint sonw- 
what in his * Preliminary observations respecting the Geo- 
graphy, Chief Features, Climate, People, Religion, Learning, 
Early History, and Institutions of the Mahratta Country ' ; 
and these have been supplemented and improved upon by his 
latest editor in his Introduction. Whether or not Grant Duff's 
History of the Mahrattas ' takes its place in the very first rank 
of historical compositions', it has been considered important 
enough to be translated ipto Marathi, quoted and criticised 
during a whole century. Though some of his details and con- 
clusions have been criticised and. corrected, the work as a 
whole is yet to be superseded effectively, despite the researches 
and writings of generations of scholars. 

Mahadev Govind Ranade's Rise of the Maratha Power,, 


published three quarters of a century later, in 1901, not only 
marked the next milestone in Maratha historiograph/, but also 
emphasised a new approach and outlook regarding the subject. 
It dearly indicated that no foreigner, however diligent or 
honest, could correctly gauge or interpret the true character 
or significance of historical movements. Grant Duff had no 
doubt sensed the importance! of 'a very extraordinary power, 
the history of which was only known in a very superficial man- 
ner 1 , but he could not adequately understand or assess its 
spirit as Ranade could. From this point of view, even Indian 
scholars of great reputation hailing from other parts of India 
and drawing their inspirations from tailed sources have sadly 
missed the real import and correct significance of the rise of 
the Maratha power. There cannot indeed be any true insight 
without sympathy. Ranade may not have been right in all his 
conclusions, but his main contribution consisted in emphasis- 
ing an approach and view-point. The rise of the Maratha 
power, he pointed out, '\yas not a mere accident due to any 
chance combination, but a genuine* effort on the part of a 
Hindu nationality to assert its independence ' ; and that ' the 
success it achieved was due c to a general upheaval, social, 
religious, and political Qf all classes of the population '. There 
are many, he writes, 'who think that there can be no parti- 
cular moral significance in the story of the rise and fall of a 
freebooting Power, which thrived by plunder and adventure, 
and succeeded only because it was the most cunning and ad- 
venturous among all those who helped to dismember the great 
Moghul Empire after the death of Aurangzeb. This is a very 
common feeling with the readers, who derive their knowledge 
of these events solely from the works of English historians. 
Even Mr. Grant Duff has given his support to the) view that 
" the turbulent predatory spirit of {he Hindus of Maharashtra, 
though smothered for a time, had its latent embers stirred by 
the contentions of their Mahomedan Conquerors, till, like the 
parched grass kindled amid the forests of the Sahyadri moun- 
tains, they burst forth in spreading flame, and men afar off 
wondered at the conflagration ". If this view of the historian 


be correct, it may fairly be urged that there is nothing in the 
narrative fthich can be described as having a moral signific- 
ance useful for all time. The sequel of this narrative will, 
however, it is hoped, furnish grounds which will lead, the 
historical student of Modern India to the conclusion that such 
a view is inconsistent with facts, and that the mistake is of a 
sort which renders the whole story unintelligible*. Without 
repeating all his arguments, I feel no hesitation in expressing 
my complete agreement with his main contention that "Free- 
booters and adventurers never succeed in building up empires 
which last for generations and permanently alter the political 
map of a great Continent." One cannot help regretting that 
Ranade's contemplated " second volume " of which manuscript 
notes were nearly ready should have for ever remained un- 
published. Nevertheless, his General Introduction to Shahu 
Chhatrapati and the Peshwas" Diaries is a very valuable 
sequel indicating^ the sound principles of his treatment. 

A History of the Maratha People by C. A. Kincaid and 
D. B. Parasnis, first publiehed in three volumes (1918, 1922, 
and 1925), has since been brought out in a single volume 
(1931). The work, despite th linking together of the two 
names, bears unmistakable testimony t? Mr. Kincaid's indivi- 
dual authorship, though Parasnis must have supplied him the 
materials. This is the meaning of the acknowledgment : " Fo? 
twelve years we had been closely associated in the creation of 
this work". Mr. Kincaid, it must be frankly stated, is a 
story-writer not a historian. His second chapter on 'The 
Pandharpur Movement, 1271-1640 ', is typical of his method ; 
he hardly misses an opportunity to intersperse his narrative 
with childish anecdotes which needlessly undermine the stand- 
ard of the book as a serious study of Maratha History. Den- 
nis Kincaid's The > Grand Rebel, which is admittedly 4 An 
Impression of Shivaji, Founder of the Maratha Empire' 
(1937) is, within its scope and purpose, a much better repre- 
sentation in a fascinating style of his important theme. His 
brilliant sketch of Siv&ji " the founder of the Maratha state 
whose memory inspired the rise of modem Hindu Nationalism, 


a man for whom a majority of Hindus entertain much the 
same sentiment as the Germans for Frederick the6econd and 
the Italians for Garibaldi, and whom the Marathas adore as 
more than human" is at once more artistic in its sense of 
proportion as well as sense of history. His picture of the 
Marathas presented in his 'Prologue', conveys a truer and 
more sympathetic impression of the people than is contained 
in more learned treatises lacking the poetic insight of Dennis 
Kincaid. As he has neatly put it in his ' Preface ' : ' Most 
English people have heard of the Moguls as almost the tradi- 
tional pre-British rulers of India. They then find it puzzling 
that the earlier heroes of Anglo-Indian biography apparently 
never oppose any Moguls but are constantly in difficulties with 
the Marathas. . . . Such of their chiefs who were so unfortu- 
nate as to oppose Anglo-Indian celebrities are generally repro- 
bated as rebels ; their names, which Victorian writers made 
earnest but incorrect attempts to spell, provide an easy target 
for such sprightly historians of to-day as Mr. Gueddla, who 
are entertained by the un-Englislu&mnd of them. But as at 
school one's curiosity was often piqued less by the inevitable 
Romans than by their unsuccessful opponents, many people 
must have vaguely wqndered about these Marathas ; the rise 
of whose power was exactly contemporaneous with the appear- 
ance of the English in India ; who destroyed the Mogul Em- 
pire and disputed with both English and French for the 
mastery of a sub-continent ; who once more opposed the Eng- 
lish in the Mutiny, providing in Nana Sahib the cleverest and 
in the Princess of Jhansi the best and bravest, of the revolu- 
tionary leaders ; and from whom have sprung rulers of such 
deserved repute as Princess Ahalyabai of Indore and the 
present (1937) Gaekwar of Baroda, and dynasties as devoted 
to the Empire as Gwalior and Kolhapur ', 

No other history of the Marathas, as a whole, has since 
been published in English. The Riyasat, in ManathJ, by Rao 
Bahadur G. IS. Sardesai, stands in a class by itself. It is a 
mine of information and a monument to the patient industry, 
painstaking scholarship, and patriotic zeal of the septuagena- 


rian historian of Mahana&ra who is still an unbeaten living 
encyclopaedia of historical information with a particular flail 
for dates, documents and details. This is not the place to 
assess his vast and varied work as an historian ; but his appre- 
ciation by his life-long collaborator and friend, Sir Jadunath 
Sarkar, may be quoted without being inapposite : " Eternal 
vigilanco in self-criticism has been the saving salt of his writ- 
ings. Tireless striving after accuracy, passion for going down 
to the root of things, CQO! balance of judgment and unfailing 
common-sense in interpretation have marked his historical 
works". It has been his long cherished desire to present his 
Riydsat in an English garb. Until that desire is fulfilled, Eng- 
lish readers should remain content with his Main Currents of 
Maratha History which is a reprint of his lectures delivered 
at the Patna University in 1926. The following extract from 
his introductory remarks is worthy of special attention : 

' A vast amount of fresh historical material has been pub- 
lished in Maharashtra during the last quarter of a century, of 
which the outside public *qf India who do not know the 
Marathi language, are more or less ignorant. It is impossible 
to make all this material available to readers in English, and 
unless it reaches non-Marathi readers, it; cannot excite corres- 
ponding research in other languages. With this object in view, 
I thought of taking a rapid glance over the whole course of 
Maratha history, touching those salient points which have been 
recently established in Maharashtra on this new evidence, and 
those others which are still to some extent debatable, indefinite, 
or vague. I shall therefore speak on the aims and objects of 
Maratha policy, explaining what it has achieved and what it 
has failed to achieve, what good or evil it did to India, and 
what place it can claim in the history of India as a whole, 
interpreting, in fact, .to the ,non-Maratha world, the meaning 
of this documentary evidence, and the results it leads one to, 
as regards the past achievements of the Marathas. At the 
same time, I have a great desire to bring about a co-ordina- 
tion of effort throughout the country between Maharashtra and 
the other parts of India in this important subject of national 


interest. ... I think without such an interchange and such a 
supplementing from all quarters, our individual*efforts in 
Maharashtra will for ever remain isolated and incomplete. 
Our past is a common property which we all have to share 

This puts in a nutshell the raison d'etre of the present 
effort also. It attempts to do more elaborately and systemati- 
cally what Ranade and Sardesai have already outlined from 
the point of view of the natives of Maharaja. Apart from 
a popular book in Hindi (G. D. Tamaskar's Mardfhonka 
Utthan aur Patan 1930) I have not come across any recent 
attempt to present Maratha history in a language that might 
appeal to a wider circle of readers outside Mahara$tra as welL 
Much research has been carried on ceaselessly, in and outside 
this province, bringing to light new facts as well as fresh stand- 
points. The work of synthesising and interpretation has not 
merely not kept pace with this march of research, but has 
altogether lagged behind. Very learned treatises, such as Sar- 
kar's Shivaji and His Timds and ^endranath Sen's Adminis- 
trative System o] the Marathas and Military System of the 
Marathas have been publisheci ; but no attempt has been made 
to re-examine Marathi^ history as a whole, in the light of all 
the new materials and literature. 

r The task no doubt appears to be too staggering for any 
single individual to attempt. The materials are so vast, varied 
and scattered, the languages in which they are found are so 
many and difficult, and the controversies over details and 
situations so frequent and baffling, that these have effectively 
scared away scholars far better equipped and qualified than I 
can ever claim to be. But time and tide! waits for no man, 
and with the ceaseless accumulation of materials the task is 
bound to grow more bewildering! jts the years roll cm. It is 
more than a century since Grant Duff wrote, and nearly a 
quarter century since Kincaid's book first appeared ; yet, none 
has come forward to fill the gap. 

If I have ventured to meet this need, it is out of no false 
sense of the lightness of the task that I have! done so. I am 


fully conscious of the greatness of my subject. However, hav- 
ing at leas** partially, succeeded in fulfilling such a want in the 
matter of Mughal History, for a fairly large body of readers, 
I felt tempted to try to meet this greater desideratum, as well. 
But readers will easily, I hope, note the difference in the 
treatment and style of presentation of my former and present 
themes. Considering the nature and scope of Maratha history, 
as well as my purpose here, I have tried to be artistic with- 
out being unscientific, sympathetic without being uncritical, 
and simple without being unhistorical. I have looked at the 
pattern as a whole without inspecting the details of the parts 
too closely, except where they seemed to be of vital import- 
ance. While emphasising the perspectives, I hope, I have not 
been blind to the prosaic details so as to pervert the picture. 
The bibliography at the end will indicate the extent of 
my indebtedness. Friends, too numerous to be mentioned 
without being invidious, have helped and encouraged me in 
this endeavour ; but the responsibility for all that I have put 
in final form here is entirely my own, though I have thank- 
fully considered their criticism and respected their differing 
points of view. This volume is part of my contemplated work, 
and closes with the death of Aurangzeb. I have relegated the 
notes and references to the end which I expect will be found 
convenient by most of my readers. The Appendices have been 
added to amplify the text and notes where I considered they 
were called for. For the rest the work must speak for itself. 


' The people of that country had never heard of the 
Mussulmans ; the Mahr&tta land had never been 
punished by their armies ; no Mussulman king or prince 
had penetrated so far. Deogiri was exceedingly rich 
in gold and silver, jewels and pearls, and other 
valuables/ SARANI. 

The central fact which provoked the Maratha movement 
-during the seventeenth century of the Christian era was the 
challenge of Muslim domination. That Menace had its por- 
tentous beginning in Sind and Multan nine centuries earlier, 
but its enduring consequences were not realised until long after- 
wards. Islam was a revolutionary force, and its advent in 
North India was opposed tooth and nail by the Rajputs for 
several centuries. Heroic ^ their resistance was it nevertheless 
ultimately proved ineffective.' The Muslim advance was delayed 
but not prevented. Was history to repeat itself in South 
India? Let us follow rather than anticipate the historical 

Saturday, 26 February, 1295 A.D. (19 Rabi '-u'l-akhar^ 
;695 H.) 1 was indeed a fateful day for the Deccan and South 
India. On that date 'Ala-u'd-iDin Khalji started from Kara 
on his historic expedition to Devgiri. The enormous treasure 
that he got on that occasion, and the ease with which he could 
gather it, were to him a revelation of the state of things in 
the South. Firishta reckons it at 600 maunds of pearls, 2 
maunds of diamonds, rubies, emeralds and sapphires, 1,000 
maunds of silver, 4,000 pieces of silk, besides other precious 
commodities 'to which reason forbids us to give credit/ 2 In 
addition to this) plunder the cession of Elichpur and its depen- 
dencies was also demanded, that the conqueror might leave a 
garrison there for the collection of revenues to be remitted to 

at Kam-Mapikpur. ' Ala-u'd-DIn determined by this dar- 


ing adventure the shape of things to come in the Deccan for 
several centuries. 

Khalii imperialism was sustained on the gold got from the 
Deccan and South India, from Devgiri, Warangal, Dvara- 
samudra, and Ma'bar. 'AM-u'd-DIn made his successful bid 
for the throne of Delhi being emboldened by the enormous loot 
he had secured from the Yadava capital. Having murdered his 
unde, Sultan Jalal-u'd-Din, and usurped his authority, he was 
devoured by a zeal for conquest. Ambitious of emulating the 
example of Alexander the Great, he found additional incentives 
in religious fanaticism and the greed for gold. In the South 
he had discovered an El Dorado too tempting to be ignored: 
even in the face of the Mughal raids nearer home. Like Maft- 
mud of Qhazna, he covered his lust for lucre with a fervour for 
his Faith. It was exceedingly worthwhile despoiling the infidels 
and desecrating their idol-temples in the name of Islam. If,, 
in addition td this, a Kamal Devi or a Deval Devi could also 
be secured for the royal farem, the Qhazi would consider that a 
heavenly reward. With all this,* 'Ala-u'd-Din was a shrewd 
and practical man. He did not seek to kill the goose that laid 
the golden egg. During the .Warangal expedition he instructed 
his slave-general, Nla'ib Malik Kafur, ' If the Rai consented to 
surrender his treasure and jewels, elephants and horses, and also 
to send treasure and elephants in the following year, the Na'ib 
was to accept these terms and not press the Rai too hard. He 
was to come to an arrangement and retire without pushing mat- 
ters too far, lest Rai Ladar Deo (Prataparudra Dev II of 
Warangal) should get the better of him. If he could not do 
this, he was, for the sake of his own name and fame, to bring 
the Rai to Delhi/ 3 

The Khaljis ruled over North India from 13 June 1290,, 
when Jalal-u'd-Din ascended the throne $t Delhi, to 8 Septem- 
ber 1320, whei>Gh5yas-u'd-Din Tughlaq Shah was proclaimed 
Sultan by the army. This was a short but revolutionary regime. 
The Khaljis inaugurated a military dictatorship of which 'Ala- 
u'd-Din was the best exponent. " The need for security, inter- 
nal as well as external, was the dominant note of his policy."' 


He found in South India a rich quarry to support his military 
rule. Fou/ expeditions were accordingly sent across the Vin- 
dhyas under his Na'ib or Deputy, the famous Malik Kafur who 
was a hazar dinari slave, a low-caste Hindu purchased in 

In 1306-7 he led an expedition to Devgiri (2nd since ' Ala- 
u'd-DJn's) on the ostensible ground that Ramdev Rao had' 
failed to pay the promised tribute for three years. The next 
raid was against Prataparudra of Warangal in 1309. His third 
was a campaign into Mysore (Dvarasamudra) and Ma'bar in 
131011. In 1312 Malik Kafur once again felt it necessary to 
invadfe Devgiri in order to punish RSmdev's son and successor 
gankardev. The last Khaljjl expedition to the Yadava capital 
was provoked by the rebellion of Harpaldev, the last ruler of 
that dynasty, in 1318. This was under Qutb-u'd-Din Mubarak 
Shah and Malik Khusrau, another Hindu slave of low-caste 
to act as a Muslim general. This favourite of the depraved 
Sultan, however, after a victorious expedition into Warangal 
and Madura, ' hatched the 3gg of ambition in his brain ' and 
usurped the throne of Delhi by murdering his master Mubarak 

To understand the ieasy triumphs of the Muslims during 
this quarter century (1295 1320) it is necessary for us to study 
more closely the conditions obtaining in the Deccan and South.* 
India at that time. The seven/expeditions of the Khaljls into 
the South were not unlike the seventeen raids of Mafcmud 
Qhazna in the North (100027): their aims, character, and 
results were almost identical. Both the Qhaznavid and the 
Khalii adventurers were actuated by predatory motives rein- 
forced with neligious fanaticism ; both were alike tempted by 
the opulence and political impotence of the infidels. The mili- 
tary advantage in both cases lay with the Muslim aggressors ; 
the revolutionary consequences too were not dissimilar in the 
two instances. Politically, a portion of the invaded territories 
nearest to their own kingdoms was annexed by both to serve 
as a stepping-stone for further encroachments. The Hindus of 
the South, however, seemed to have learnt nothing from the 


misfortunes of their co-religionists in the North. Equally rich, 
equally divided and short-sighted, their frantic an* fitful resis- 
tance was foredoomed to failure. The immediate result of the 
Khalii incursions was tragic. 

The principal kingdoms to bear the brunt of the Muslim 
attacks in the South were those of Devgiri of the Yadavas, 
Warangal of the Kakatiyas, Dvarasamudra of the Hoysalas, 
and Ma'bar (Madura) of the Parwjyas. Among these we are 
^concerned here mostly with the Yadavas ; the rest will be noticed 
only incidentally. 

The Yadava dominions constituted the Mahara^ra of those 
times. Of their extent and exact boundaries it is not possible 
to speak accurately. Epigraphic evidence on such matters is 
not always reliable. The Yadava rulers, like all their contem- 
poraries, claimed victories and conquests with scant regard for 
truth. 4 A recent writer, however, has computed that ' During 
the palmy days of Singhana, the greatest king of the dynasty, 
the Seuija (Yadava) Authority extended over the whole of 
Western Deccan, comprising Malfarastra, Northern Konkaii, 
including the districts of North Kanara, Belgaum, Bijapur, 
Dharwar, Bellary, and portions of the south-western Telugu 
country/ 6 But, for qjir purposes, the character of this kingdom 
is of greater importance than its extent or boundaries. Despite 
the pompous titles assumed by the Yadava monarchs, such as 
Pratapa-chakravartin, Samastabhuvanasraya, Samrat, and Sri 
Plthvl-vallabha, they proved themselves unworthy of the 
Suvarqagaru4a'dhvaja (golden eagle emblem) which they 
vainly flaunted. Whatever their earlier traditions or achieve- 
ments in a purely Hindu world, the last three of the glorious 
Yadavas failed ingloriously in the face of the Mlechhas. 'Ala- 
u'd-Din could reduce Ramdev Riao to submission in the course 
of twenty-five days. This amazjng and % ignoltninious surrender 
needs the closest scrutiny. It will reveal that there was nothing 
in it to support the traditional sentiment regarding the Yadava. 6 
From contemporary Muslim and other (local) sources we 
are able to reconstruct a fairly reliable picture of the situation. 
From Amir ibusrau we learn that ' Ala-u'd-Din started from 


Kara-Maajikpur on 19 Rabi-'u'l-dkhar 695 H., and returned to 
that place Rafter taking immense booty from Ramdeo' on 28 
Rajab the same year. 7 According to Wassaf, 'He appointed 
spies to ascertain when the Rai's army was engaged in warfare,, 
and then he advanced and took the country without the means 
which other kings think necessary for conquest. The prudent 
Rdi in order to save his life gave his daughter in marriage to 
the Sultan and made over to him his treasures and jewels" 9 
Barani, who followed soon after, states : ' When ' Ala-u'd-Din 
went to Bhailsan (Bhilsa) he heard much of the wealth and 
elephants of Deogir. He inquired about the approaches to that 
place, and resolved upon .marching thither from Kara with a 
large force (3 4,000 horse and 2,000 infantry) but without 

informing the Sultan 'Ala-u'd-Din marched to Elichpur, 

and thence to Ghati-lajaura .... When 'Ala-u'd-Din arrived 
at Ghatfi-lajaura, the army of Rdm-deo under the command of 
his son had gone to a distance. The people of that country had 
never heard of the Mussulmans ; the j^ahratta land had never 
been punished by their anfiies ; no Mussulman king or prince 
had penetrated so far. Deogffr was exceedingly rich in gold 
and silver, jewels and pearls, and other valuables. When Ram- 
deo heard of the approach of the Muliajnmadans, he collected 
what forces he could, and sent them under one of his rands to 
Ghati-lajaura. They were defeated and dispersed by 'Ala-u'd- 
Din who then entered Deogir. On the first day he took 30 
elephants and some thousand horstes. Ram-deo came in and 
made his submission. 'Ala-u'd-DJn carried off an unprecedented 
ainount of booty/ 9 * Iamy alleges that when Ramdev was 
warned by Kanha (governor of Lajaura) that the Turks were 
invading his dtfminions, the heedless monarch dismissed him 
with ridicule. But the valiant rdyd hastened to the frontier 
where, with the assistance of jtwo women^warriors, he attempted 
to stem the tide of invasion. ' The two bravfe Hindu wotnen 
who were like tigresses on the battle-field attacked the Turkish 
army fiercely, thereby exciting the admiration of their foes. 
Nevertheless the Turks defeated the Hindus and put most of 
them to death. During the battle, Kanha and the two women- 


jvere taken prisoner though they fought ever so well.' 10 Ibn-i- 
3atuta says that Ram-deo ' submitted and surrendered the city 
(Kataka or Deoglr) without fighting, making valuable presents 
to his conqueror/ 11 

Firishta, though writing very much later, is supposed to 
have made use of earlier works which have not survived since. 
Substantially agreeing with the accounts cited above, he gives 
further details. He states that 'Ala-u'd-Djm 'enlisted many 
:hiefs of distinction who had formerly been dependants of the 
Balban family/ 12 Secondly, he says that 'Ala-u'd-DIn's army was 
:omposedj of * 8,000 chosen horse.' The first place of any con- 
sequence reached by him was Elichpur where, having stopped 
for a while to refresh his troops, he moved by forced marches 
to Deoglr, ' the lower town of which was not entirely fortified, 
the outer wall being then incomplete' Ram-deo, with his son 
ankar-deo, was 'absent in a distant part of his dominions/ 
But, as soon as he heard of 'Ala-u'd-DJn's advance, he hastened 
home and tried to intercept the enemy with a numerous army. 
For this purpose he threw himself ^fl between 'Ala-u'd-DIn and 
the city and ' opposed him with great gallantry, but was even- 
tually defeated with severe loss/ 13 Firishta has supplemented 
and, in part, modified this statement by reference to the 
Mulbiqat and the Tobaqat-i-Na^irl thus : ' On reaching Devgiri 
'Ala-u'd-DIn found the Raja himself in the city, but his wife 
and eldest son were at worship at a temple at some distance. 
On thfe approach of 'Ala-u'd-jDJn, Ram-deo was in the greatest 
consternation. Having, however, collected 3 or 4,000 citizens and 
dofriestics, he opposed the Mahomedans at a distance of two 
kos (4 miles) from the city but, being defeated, retired into 
the fort which had at that time no ditch/ 14 In his great hurry, 
Ramdev had improvised an army of riff-raffs and domestics 
to defend his capital city ; so too tfid his jnen put into the fort 
salt bags which had been received from the Konkaij, mistaking 
them for grain. The garrison consequently was soon starved 
into submission. So helpless did the Yadava feel in the grip 
of 'AJa-u'd-D&i, that he tried to dissuade his more spirited son 
Sankardev (who had meanwhile rushed to the city with a large 


force) from attacking the aggressor, declaring that the Muslims 
were ' an enterprising and warlike race, with whom peace was 
better than war.' The young prince, however, would not be 
convinced of this until he had tried conclusions! with the Turk 
on the bloody field of battle. This made Ramdev Rao apologise 
to the conqueror in abject and pitiable terms : 4 It must be 
known to you/ he said to ' Ala-u'd-DIn, ' that I had no hand 
in the late quarrel. If my son, owing to the folly and petulence 
of youth, has broken the conditions between us, that event 
ought not to render me responsible for his rashness/ 

1 Ala-u'd-Din had so effectively surrounded the place that 
the inhabitants had no opportunity to escape, which enabled him 
to levy large sums on the merchants by way of contributions. 
He had also captured 40 elephants, and several thousand horses 
belonging to Ramdev in the town. Little wonder that Firishta 
triumphantly observes : ' We may here justly remark that in 
the long volumes of history there is scarcely anything to be 
compared with this exploit, whether we regard the resolution 
in forming the plan, the b&ljlness of its execution, or the great 
good fortune which attended its accomplishment.* 15 We learn 
from *Iamy that Garghasp (i.e. 'Ala-u'd-Din) was greatly 
pleased with Ramdev ; he summoned him to his camp, and treat- 
ed him with much consideration. He gave back to Ramdev 
his royal umbrella together with his kingdom, and presented 
him with two powerful elephants. They then vowed to each 
other that they would act as father and son ; whereupon, Gar- 
shasp who had attained his object returned to Kara/ 16 

If the Muslim accounts are to be trusted, the conduct of 
Ramdev Rao deserved condign punishment. His son Sankardev 
and his son-in-law Harpaldev, as we shall presently see, behaved 
more manfully as well as patriotically. But before proceeding 
to describe their martyrdom we should hold a closer inquest 
over the ignominious, capitulation of the most inglorious of the 
Yadavas. Dnanesvara's dedicatory lines eulogising Ramdev have 
misled some writers about the character of his reign. 17 

In the first place, there was little harmony within the royal 
family. Devgiri was a house divided against itself. On the 


death of Kjwa (1260 A.D.), father of Ramdev, his brother 
Mahadev appears to have usurped authority taking advantage 
of the minority of Ramdev. When the latter came of age, he 
had to secure his legitimate patrimony by means of a palace- 
revolution. 18 References in contemporary works, like Chakra- 
dhara's IMacharita and Bhdskara's Sisupalavadha, indicate that 
* Ramdev ascended the throne ; Amana (Mahadev's son) was 
overthrown; and Devgiri underwent a revolution.' 19 (1271). 
Likewise, Hemadri who was karanddhipa under Mahadev 
,(,whose son Amaaja, it is alleged, was cruelly executed by Ram- 
dev, along with several of his supporters) wasi too orthodox a 
protagonist of the conservative order Jx> be on good terms with 
his new master. Besides being the murderer of his late patron's 
son, Ramdev's religious inclinations were too friendly towards 
the heterodox (if not heretical) sect of the Mahanubhavas. 
Hemadri's critics allege that he invited the Muslims to Devgiri, 
while his defenders charge the Mahanubhavas with being in 
league with the Mlechhasl 2 * Whether the Muslims came of 
their own accord or in response to in invitation, the result was 
the same. It is clear that they must have found the internal 
situation very inviting indeed. Besides the antipathy between 
the king and his chief minister, sectarianism was rampant with- 
in the State : Sanatams vs. Mah&nubhavas, Lingayats vs. 
7ainas, etc. Some consider the Mahanubhavas more anti-Jaina- 
than anti-Sanatani. 22 This only adds one more edge to the 
anti-so-many dissensions. The militant sect of the Vira-ISaivas 
(Lingayats) was born at Kalyaaji (the Kalachuri capital) in- 
the Deccan only a century before. It was one of the most 
yiolent movements ever started against both Brahmanism and 
Jainism. 28 The Muslim invaders were too ready to exploit 
these differences. They seem to have exempted the Mahanu- 
bhava monks (who wore sable clothes lika the Muslim jaqirs) 
from paying the jiziya, thereby lending a dismal colour to 
orthodox suspicions about their complicity with the invaders. 24 
One trait, however, was common to all the sects of the 
Hindus, namely, their antipathy; towards all the rest. Besides 
this suicidal exclusivism, the moral or psychological effect of. 


their total teaching was devitalising. The fourfold way to 
Moksa (v&. Dnana, Karma, Bhakti and Vairagya) inculcated 
by them only stressed in different terms the means of escaping 
life. This was the very antithesis of the positive activism of 
the invading Muslims. To make matters worse, the leadership 
of Maharaja then was in the extremely incompetent hands 
of Ramdev Rao, who, despite his pedantic titles (Gurjara- 
kunjara-dana-kantlrava ; Telingatunga-tarunmulanamatta- 

dantdvala; Mdlavapradipa-samana-malaydnila, etc), as Raj wade 
has observed, was an unmilitary king. 2 * According to the Paithan 
copperplate inscription, Ramdev granted three villages to 57 
Brahmans on condition that (among other indications of good 
behaviour) they should use no weapons ! 26 This stipulation, 
indeed, was superfluous for a people for whom Hemadri had 
already prescribed an engrossing round of rituals in his Chatur- 
varga-Chintdmarii. Its Vrata-, Dana-, Tinha-, Mok$a- and 
Prdyaschitta-Khandas left little room for trifling duties like 
the defence of the State. Karma ipas not as yet the action 
of the Gita, but only one* class of ritual. 27 

Marco Polo who sojourned through the land between 1288- 
93, speaks of the people of Ma'bar as 'going to battle with 
lances and shields, but without clothing, and are a despicable 
unwarlike race'- 9 ' They do not kill cattle, he further observes, 
nor any kind of animals for food ; but when desirous of eating 
the flesh of sheep or other beasts, or birds, ' they procure the 
Saracens, who are not under the influence of the same laws and 
customs, to perform the office.' But under better leadership, 
even such a non-violent people were made to give a better ac- 
count of themselves by other rulers, as we shall notice later. 
But Ramdev Rao of Devgiri possessed little grit and found 
his own sons quarrelling among themselves. 29 A revolt of 
Malugi, one of his feudatories, is referred to by Rudra Kavi in 
his Ra$trau4ha-vamsa Mahakavya, wherein Ramdev was taken 
prisoner, but released by the intervention of Hemadri. 30 Marco 
Polo also refers to Thaina (?) as 'a great kingdom with a 
language of its own, and a king of its own, tributory to 
nobody.' 31 The sovereignty of the Yadavas over the Konkat? 


.appears to have been challenged about this time. According 
to the poet, above referred to, Malugi's grand-father obtained 
TaJ-Konkai} from the Yadava king as his marriage portion, 
-and this territory was extended by the next two rulers of the 
Mayuragiri Bagula family. 52 After 1322 the land definitely 
passed out of the hands of the Hindus into those of the ' Sara- 
cens ' who conquered it by force of arms, says Odoricus, and 
* are now subject to the emperor of Delhi.' 33 

All this came about because of the initial ineptitude of 
Ramdev Rao. Instead of strengthening the defences of his 
realm he appears to have indulged in futile puerilities. At the 
moment of the Muslim attack his capital was in a sad state of 
negligence : the fort was without a moat, the city wihout an 
army, and there were not even provisions for the besieged gar- 
rison. 34 Even after the shock of the first surprise was over, 
Ramdev Rao did no better. If 'Iamy is to be believed, 
4 Ramdev Rao, who remained loyal to 'Ala-ju'd-Din, sent a 
secret messenger to Delhi to inform him that a rebellion headed 
by Sangama (Sankara ?) had brokeq wit at Devgiri against the 
Sultan. He was himself held a prisoner in his palace by Bhil- 
lama (Sangama?) and his followers; and he requested the 
Sultan to send a competent pferson with an army to put down 
the rebels and restore the imperial authority.' 35 Malik Kafur 
appeared before Devgiri, may be in response to this call, on 
24 March 1307 (19 Ramazan 706 H.). 'Ramdev and his 
family who were spared by the special command of the Sultan 
were made prisoner' and sent to Delhi along with enormous 
lxx>ty. 36 According to Firishta, Malik Kafur ' having first sub- 
dued a great part of the country of the Mahrattas, which he 
-distributed among his officers, proceeded ta the siege of Deogiri, 
since known by the name Daulatabad. Ram-deo being in 
no condition to oppose the Maljomedan troops, left his son 
6anker-deo in the fort, and advanced with presents to meet the 
conqueror in order to obtain peace.' 

Going to Dfelhi as a prisoner of war, along with ' rich pre- 
sents and 17 elephants 1 to pay his respects ', Ramdev was * re- 
ceived with great marks of favour and distinction' He had 


* 4 royal dignities conferred upon him ; the title of Rdi-Rdydn was 
granted to him, and he was not only restored to his govern- 
ment, but other districts were added to his dominions, for all 
*of which he did homage and paid tribute to the King of Delhi.' 
The district of Nausari was given to him and a lakh of tonkas 
for expenses of his journey homie. Ramdev continued to pay 
his annual tribute regularly, Barani also tells us how Ramdev 
paid obsequious attentions to Malik Kafur, ' as dutiful as any 
raiyat of Delhi/ while he was on his way to Warangal in 1309. 

'On approaching Devgjr, Rai-Rayan Ramdeo came forth 
to meet the army with respectful offerings to the Sultan and 
presents to the generals. While the army was marching through 
the territories of Deogjr, Ramdeo attended every day at head- 
quarters. So long as it remained encamped in the suburbs of 
the city, he showed every mark of loyalty and to the best of his 
ability supplied Na'ib Kafur and his officers with fodder, and 
the army with materiel. Every day he and his officers went out 
to the camp rendering every assistance He made the bazdi 
people of Deogjr attend Ihe army and gave them strict orders 
to supply the wants of the soldiers at cheap rates. The army 
remained in the suburbs of Deogir for some days resting from 
its fatigues. When it marched, Ramdeo sent men forward to 
all the villages on the route, as far as the borders of Warangal, 
with orders for the collection of fodder and provisions for the 
army, and giving notice that if a bit of rope was lost they 
would have to answer for it. He was as dutiful as any raiyat 
of Delhi. He sent on all stragglers to rejoin the army, and he 
added to it a force of Mahrdtfds, both horse and foot. He him- 
self accompanied the march several stages and then took leave 
and returned. All wise and experienced men noticed and ap- 
plauded his devotion and attention.' 37 

Ramdev had fallen never to rise again. Deogiri was made 
the base of operations against all the southern Hindu kingdoms. 
Like a drowning person the Yadava! monarch was dragging all 
his possible saviours into the lethal element. For a third time 
the victorious Malik was at Devgiri on 3 February 1311 (13 
-Ramazdn 710 H.) ; this time to march against Ma'bar and 


Dvarasamudra. As before, the Rlai-Rayan placed all the re- 
sources of his State at the disposal of the Na'ib. During this 
dark period of Hindu history, Mahiarastra provided the sinews 
of war to the Muslim conquerors for the enslavement of the rest 
of India instead of fighting valiantly ' for the ashes of her 
fathers and the temples of her gods/ The days of redemption 
were far off. 

In the estimation of Khusrau, the materiel provided by 
Ramdeo ' was beyond all computation ' and included hard and. 
soft goods of wool and leather, brass and iron. 38 

We may not doubt that the King of Devgiri on this occa- 
sion was Ramdev, though Barani and I^irishta erroneously state 
that he was dead. 39 'Iamy and Khusrau correctly indicate 
the existence of Ramdev; Rao who died only a little after the 
return of Malik Kafur from his southern campaign. Ramdev's 
inveterate hostility towards the Hoysala Ballaja III is well 
known. It i therefore not surprising that he issued orders to 
Parsuram Dalavai (whose ^states lay on the border) to guide 
the Muslim army into Dvarasamudra. 10 iSankardev's hatred of 
the invaders was too deep-seated to permit him to stoop to such 
sycophancy. His opposition to 'Ala-u'd-JDin had been made 
clear on the very first occasion despite his father's cowardice. 
He had ever since continued to be rebellious. In fact, his in- 
tfansigeance had called for repeated punitive expeditions on 
the part of the KJialji Sultan. When Ramdev died, therefore, 
Sankardev once again rose in revolt. 

'News reached Delhi/ writes 'I$amy, 'sometime after 
Malik Kaffir's return from Ma'bar, that Ramdeo died and Bhil- 
lama (Sankardev) revolted. The Sultan sent Malik Na'ib to 
suppress the rebellion/ 41 According to Firishta : ' 'Ala-u'd-Dln. 
consented to Malik Kafur's proposal, who accordingly proceed- 
ed, the fourth time, to the Deccan in the j^ar 712 H. (1312). 
He seized the Raja of Deoglu and inhumanly put him to death: 
He then laid waste the countries of Kanara, from Dabhol to 
Chaul, and as far as Raichur and Mudgal. He afterwards took 
up his residence at Deogjr and, realising the tribute from the 
princes of Telingana and Karnatak, despatched the whole to* 


Delhi/ 42 'Iamy's description of the settlement of the country 
appears, ci the face of it, exaggerated : ' Malik Kafur/ he says, 
4 after taking possession of the kingdom treated the people with 
kindness and moderation. As soon as he entered Deogiri, he 
assured the people of safety ; nobody was slain, and none im- 
prisoned. He despatched letters to all parts of the kingdom 
declaring general amnesty. These measures restored tranquil- 
lity to the mind of the people, and they felt that they had 
nothing to fear from their new Muslim masters .... Malik 
Na'ib knew that the prosperity of the State depended on agri- 
culture. So he summoned the cultivators to his presence, spoke 
to them kindly, and granted them leases. The farmers being 
convinced that they had*a ruler who was interested in promoting 
their welfare, devoted themselves to their lands vigorously and 
-extracted greater yield from the soil tharj ever before/ 43 

This is, obviously, too idealised a picture even to appear 
plausible. The known policy of 'Ala-u'd-Din towards his in- 
fidel subjects should make us sceptical about such beneficence. 
*I$amy qualifies his statement by saying : ' Though he showed 
kindness to people who submitted to his authority, he put down 
rebels with a stern hand' If there were loyalists like Ramdev 
Rao at Devgiri, there were men too like Kanha and Sankardev, 
and even women ' who fought like tigresses on the field of battle.' 
It could not therefore have been * roses, roses all the way.' TJje 
peace and prosperity were not for those who opposed ; for, to- 
wards such, the conqueror was naturally stern. Besides, Malik 
Kafur was in the Deccan for too short a period to see the fruits 
of his benevolence. ' He pulled down temples and built mosques 
in their places/ the same *Iamy writes. ' He erected in obe- 
dience to the commands of the Sultan a great mosque at Deogiri 
and named it after him. He strove to establish Islam in the 
land of the Mahratftias and, under his rule, Deogiri became a 
great Muslim centre in the Deccan/ 44 The good that men do 
is oft interred with their bones, the evil lives long after them ! 

Neither Malik Kafur, nor his master 'Ala-u'd-Din, survived 
long enough to reap the harvest of their sowing in the Deccan. 
Both died a miserable death at Delhi with whose particulars we 


are little concerned here. Before the cycle of palace-revolutions 
was completed at the capital, am epidemic of revolt* broke out 
all over the Khaljl dominions. ' At this time/ writes Firishta, 
'the flames of universal insurrection, which had long been 
smothered, began to burst forth and were first apparent in 

Gujarat Meanwhile, the Rajputs of Chitor threw the 

Maftomedan officers over the walls and asserted their ^independ- 
ence, while Harpaldev, the son-in-law of Ramdev, stirred up the 
Deccan to arms, and expelled a number of the Maftomedan 
garrisons.'* 5 

These rebellions had started even before 'Ala-u'd-Dan's 
breath was stilled in his body. The*lying Sultan, it is said, 
bit his own flesh out of frenzy when he got news of these dis- 
orders. But his agony was cut short by his hazar-dindrl slave 
and Na'ib of the empire, it is alleged, by poison. Malik Kafur, 
having usurped the throne, was himself murdered soon after. 
It was, therefore, left to Mubarak Shah who succeeded, to quell 
the revolts. In the second year of his reign, the new Sultan 
marched into the Deccan to chastise Harpaldev, 'who by the 
assistance of the other 1 princes of the Deccan had recovered the 
country of the Marathas A detachment was sent in pur- 
suit which brought batfk Harpaldev prisoner. He was flayed 
alive, decapitated, and his head fixed above the gate of his own 
capital. The King then ordered a chain of posts to be esta- 
blished as far as Dvarasamudra, and built a mosque in Devgfr 
which still remains. He appointed Malik Beg Luky, one of his 
father's slaves, to command in the Deccan/ (Firishta) 40 . 

We learn from 'Iamy and Amir JQjusrau that, owing to the 
troubles at Delhi, 'Ain-u'l^Mulk and other officers were recalled 
post haste 'with all the Muslim inhabitants resident in Dev- 
giri.' 47 The opportunity thus creajed was % protnptly seized by 
Harpaldev and his coadjutors. But the result was catastrophic. 
Maratha independence, as it then appeared, was extinguished 
for ever. The historic family of the Yadavas, on whom lay 
the responsibility of stemming the tide of Muslim advance into 
South India, was tragically overwhelmed. A few more details 


of the denouement which are available might be noted for their 
pathetic interest. 

'I$amy simply says that Harpaldev was 'despatched to 
hell/ According to Amir Kfcusrau, Mubarak Shah 'received 
the submission of all the Rdis and Ra$as, of those parts, ex- 
cept Raghu, the deputy and minister of the late Rai Ramdeo. 
Raghu, on learning of the approach of the King, fled to the 
hills in open rebellion, Kfausrau Khan was detached with a 
powerful army to repel him, and a royal, tent accompanied in 
order to do honour to the expedition. One of his officers named 
Qutlugh, the chief huntsman, seized some of Raghu's adherents 
frtim whom it was ascertained that he had nearly 10,000 Hindu 
cavalry under him. KJiusrau Khan attacked him in a defile 
and completely routed him. The Hindus who had pretended 
to independence were either slain, captured or put to flight. 
Raghu himself was most severely wounded ; his body was 
covered with blood, his lips emitted no breath. He entered 
some cave in a ravine^ which evn a snake could scarcely 

' When Khusrau Khan was returning to the King, after the 
defeat of Raghu, he received intelligence on the road that 
Rana Harpal had rebelled and taken up a position in the hills 
at the head of a powerful army. The Khan went in pursuit ef 
him and was vigorously attacked two or three times by the rebel 
who in the end, being desperately wounded, was taken captive 
and his artny put to flight. He was brought, bound -hand and 
foot, before the King who gave orders that he should be put 
to death. When his way had been taken, towards hell by the 
sword, the King gave his body to the other hellites that this 
great infidel and little Satan might become one of the chief 
ornaments of theit kingdqm. The hellites who had accom- 
panied him out of regard, and had fought by his side, also af- 
forded food to the flames of the infernal regions. Those hellites 
did not desire that he should be burnt b$ himself alone, so they 
accompanied him into the flames, and hell was satisfied by that 
sacrifice/* 8 


Barani's account is somewhat different : ' In the year 718 H. 
(1318),' he writes, 'the Sultan marched with hisrfnofi&s and 
amirs at the head of an army against Deogir which, upon the 
death of Malik Na'ib Kaffir, had thrown off its subjection and 
had been taken possession of by Harpaldeo and Rdmdeo (?) 
... On arriving at Deogjr, Harpaldeo and other Hindus who 
had joined him were unable to withstand the army of Islam, 
and they and all the muqaddams dispersed, so that the Sultan 
recovered the fort without fighting and spilling of blood. The 
Sultan then sent some officers in pursuit of Harpaldeo who 
was the leader of the rebels, and had excited the revolt. He 
was captured and the Sultan ordered him to be flayed and his 
skin to be hung over the gate of Deogir. The rains came on 
and the Sultan remained with the artny for a time at Deogir. 
All the Mahraffas were once more brought into subjection. The 
Sultan selected as governor of Deogir Malik Yak Lakha, an 
old slave of 'Ala-u'd-DIn, who for many years was Na'ib of the 
bands (spies) ; and he appointed feudatories, rulers and revenue- 
collectors over the territories of the Mahratfas.' 49 

In all the above accounts, what is of greater significance for 
us is not the fate of Harpaldev as that of Mahara$tra. The 
consequences were far-reaching as well as disastrous, both to 
the people of Maharaja and the Southern peninsula generally. 
Jhe latter were able to rally their forces more quickly and build 
up a rampart sooner than the Hindus of the Deccan. But the 
fortunes of the two were closely knit together as the sequel 
will show. 

After the execution of Harpal, Mubarak's general Malik 
ISlusrau had marched into Telingana and Mia'bar to com- 
plete the work begun by Malik Kafur. But he too like his 
prototype was soon called to Delhi under very similar circum- 
stances, and partook of the same fate. When, ultimately, the 
Jhalj! rule was overthrown by the Tughlaqs at Delhi, the new 
Sultan, Qhiyas-u'd-Din, despatched his son Ulugh Khan (Md. 
Tughlaq) on the southern campaign. History again repeated 
itself. The aftibitious prince in his turn hastened, back to the 
capital to murder his old father, and occupied his throne. Only 


two things in the history of Muhammad Tughlaq are strictly 
relevant toour theme : (1) his change of capital to Devgiri, 
and (2) the various rebellions of his reign in so far as they 
had anything to do with the Deccan. 

Muhammad's conquest of Telingana, Ma'bar, Kampili and 
Dvarasamudra extended the dominions of the Sultan beyond 
the range of efficient control from Delhi. Hence, the idea of 
establishing a more central capital at Devgiri was a wise and 
expedient one. We are little concerned with its romantic de- 
tails here. 60 But, abortive as the plan proved, its net gain to 
the Muslims was that Devgiri permanently improved as a cen- 
tre of Muslim power. Daulatabad has ever since remained a 
proud Muslim possession* Its continued occupation by the 
Khaljls, Tughlaqs, Bahmanls, and the Nizamghahi, Qutbshahl, 
and the present rulers of Hyderabad, is an instructive com- 
mentary on the nature of the loss sustained by the Marathas 
as a result of the Yadava failure to withstand the first Muslim 
invasion. A stitch in time would have saved more than nine. 
That the Maratha failure was due to a fatal lack of leadership 
is amply demonstrated by the subsequent happenings. The 
Muslims of the Deccan, though they were an exotic minority, 
with better leadership and greater grit, could successfully chal- 
lenge the overlordship of Delhi and overthrow its domination 
for several centuries. Had the Yadavas acquitted themselves 
better, the history of South India might have been different. 

Shaikh Mubarak witnessed the fortifications of Daulatabad 
in progress between 1327 and 1329. 61 The tombs of Muslim 
celebrities like Amir Hasan (a comrade of Arnir Khusrau). 
Sfaaikh Burhan-u'd-Din Qharib (a disciple of Shaikh Nizam 
u'd-Dm Auliya), and Qazi Sharaf-u'd-DIn, added to the attrac- 
tion of the place as a centre of pilgrimage. The consequent 
increase of the Muslin^ population in the Deccan, Firishta notes, 
became a source of alarm to the Hindus. 52 Ibn-i-Batiita who 
visited Daulatabad during 1334-42 has many interesting obser- 
vations to make about the contemporary scene. 

From Ujjain, writes he, * we went to Daulatabad, a large 
and illustrious city which rivals the capital, Delhi, in impor- 


tance and in the vastness of its lay-out. It is divided into 
three parts : One is Daulatabad properly so called, reserved 
for the residence of the Sultan and his troops ; the second part 
is called Katakah (Skt. camp); and the third is the citadel, 
unequalled for its strength and called Davaiquir (DevgSr). At 
Daulatabad resides the great Khan. Qutlu Khan, preceptor to 
the Sultan. He is the commandant o the city and represents 
the Sultan there, as well as in the lands of Saghar, Tiling and 
other dependencies. The territory of these provinces extends 
over three months' march and is well populated. It is entirely 
under the authority of Qutlu Khan and his lieutenants. ... It 
was to the fortress of Devgir that Nasir-u'd-Din (son of Malik 
Mai) and Qazf Jalal-u'd-Din fled for refuge when they were 
defeated by the Sultan. 

4 The inhabitants of the territory of Daulatabad belong to 
the tribe of Mahrathias to whose women God has granted a 
peculiar beauty, especially in their noses and eye-brows. They 
possess talents not found in other women in the art of pleasing 
men The idolaters of Daulafiabad are devoted to com- 
merce and their principal trade consists in pearls ; their wealth 
is enormous, and they are called Saha (Skt. Sdrthavahq) ; the 
singular of the word is Sdh and they resemble the Akdrims of 

1 ' There are in Daulatabad, vines and pomegranates which 
yield two harvests in a year. By its population, and the extent 
of its territory, and the number of very large cities in it, this 
province is very important for the revenues derived from it. 
It was told that a certain Hindu took a lease of the contribu- 
tions from the province for seventeen crores . . . 

'In Daulatabad there is a bazar for singers and singing 
girls. This bazar, called Tarababad (abode of rejoicing), is 
among the largest and most beautiful in .existence. ... In it are 
mosques for prayer where the priests recite the tarawik during 
the month of Ramazan. One of the Hindu rulers, whenever he 
passed through this place, used to alight in the pavilion and the 
singing girls sang in his presence. One of the Muhammadan 
Sultans also did likewise/ 


Ibn-i-Batuta proceeded from here 'to the small town of 
Nazarbar Inhabited by Marathas well skilled in the mechanical 
arts/ Their physicians, astrologers, and nobles, he says, ' are 
called Brahmins and K$atriyas. Their food consists of rice, 
vegetables, and oil of sesami, for they dislike giving pain to 
animals or slaughtering them. They wash themselves before 
eating, as we do at home to get rid of a pollution. They do 
not marry among their relatives at least up to the seventh 
remove ; neither do they drink wine. For this in their eyes is 
the greatest of sins. It is so in all India, even among the 
Muslims ; any one among them that drinks wine is punished 
with 80 stripes and imprisoned for three months in a dungeon 
which is opened only during meal-time. 

'From Nazarbar we went to Saghar, a large city on a 
considerable river (Tapti Gibb.) of the same name. On the 
banks of this river, we see water-wheels, and orchards where 
grow mangoes, bananas, and sugar-cane. The inhabitants of 
this city are peaceable, religious and upright men, and all their 
acts are worthy of approbation. There are orchards with her- 
mitages meant for travellers. . . The population of Saghar is 
very large. Strangers go there for the company of the people, 
and because the town is exempt from ta*es and duties.'* 8 

Mahariatra was so much demoralised by the Khalji con- 
quest that it submitted as a matter of course to the yoke of 
the Tughlaqs. If there were frequent revolts in the Deccan, 
as elsewhere, during this period, they were not by the Marathas. 
The first of these was by Malik Yak Lakh! before the accession 
of Muliattimad Tughlaq. There were not less than twenty-one 
rebellions in the reign of this erratic monarch. Of these only 
five were connected with the Deccan. Their account is relevant 
and instructive if only because the Marathas never could make 
capital out of them,* but allowed the Muslims to perpetuate 
their hold over the Deccan ultimately by the establishment of 
a local kingdom of their own, viz. the Bahmanl. That this 
ineptitude or political impotency was not shared by all the 
Hindus of the South was demonstrated by the foundation of 
the virile Vijayanagar kingdom, south of the Tungabhadra river. 


The most disconcerting insurrection for Mulfratnmad Tugh- 
laq was that of Baha-u'd-Dan Gaishasp in 1327. ( f t did not 
originate in the Deccan, but, according to Firishta, the first 
battle of the war against him was fought near Devgiri. 6 * The 
Sultan came from Delhi to Daulatabad in pursuit of the rebel 
and directed his military operations from there. Garshasp es- 
caped, first to Sagar and thence to Kampili whose Hindu ija 
gave him shelter. Reinforcements sent from Devgiri brought 
about the defeat of the rebel as well as his supporters. Though 
Garshasp was the King's cpusin,* 5 he was according to Ibn-i- 
Bafuita flayed alive and his flesh cooked with rice was served 
to his family. 66 The iSja of Kampili died, chivalrously fight- 
ing for his protege. His stuffed head was carried to the Court 
as a trophy, while his sons and important officers of state were 
taken prisoner. 67 Firishta says that Muhammad thought of 
shifting his capital to Devgiri after this rebellion. Accordingly 
he called it Daulatabad, ' raised several fine buildings within it 
and excavated a deep ditch round the fort which he repaired 
and beautified. On the top of the hill whereon the citadel 
stood, he formed new reservoirs for water and made a beautiful 
garden/* 8 

Then the Sultan marched to Kondiana (Simhagad) where 
'Nag-jnak, a Koji chieftain, opposed him with great bravery, 
but was. forced to take refuge within his walls. As the place 
was built on the summit of a steep mountain, inaccessible but 
by one narrow pass cut through the rock, the King had no 
hopes of reducing it but by famine. He accordingly caused it 
to be closely blockaded, and at the same time made some attacks 
on the works in which he was repulsed with heavy loss. The 
garrison distressed for provisions, and having no hopes of the 
King's retreat, at length evacuated the fort at the expiration of 
eight months, after which the King returned to Daulatabad/ 59 

The next trouble arose in Ma'bar but its repercussions were 
felt in Mahiar&$tra. When Mufeammad Tughhlaq heard of the 
revolt of Sayyid Jalal-u'd-Dm, he proceeded to DaulatabSd 
(1335) and 4 laid a heavy contribution on that city and the 
neighbouring provinces which created an insurrection ; but his 


numerous army soon reduced the insurgents to thevr former 
state of slbvery." He did not, however, meet with the same 
success in the Ma'bar expedition. At Warangal, ' a pestilence 
broke out in his camp to which a great part of his army fell 
victim. He had on this occasion nearly lost his life, and was 
induced to leave erne of his officers, Malik Na'ib 'Imad-u'1-Mulk, 
to command the army, and to return himself to Daulatabad.' 
On his way thither, he suffered from a tooth-ache wherefore he 
got his aching tooth extracted and ceremoniously buried at Beer 
(BikJ) 'and caused a magnificent tomb to be reared over it, 
which still remains a monument of his vanity and folly/ At 
Mungi-Paithan he conferred the title of Narat Khan upon 
Shihab-u'd-DIn Multani and made him governor of Bidar and 
its dependencies which yielded an annual revenue of a crore 
of rupees. He, at the same time, appointed Qutlugh Khan, who 
was the Sultan's tutor in early life, to the government of Dau- 
latabad and the country of MahJaiiastra. 61 In 1338-39 (740 
H.) Narat Khan misappropriated the royal revenues and re- 
belled. Qutlugh suppressed the revolt and sent Narat as a 
prisoner to Delhi. 62 Soon after, followed the insurrection of 
'All Shah who killed the Hindu officer of Gulbarga and seized 
the government treasury. 63 He was an ' Amir Judida ' or Mughal 
recently converted to Islam and sent to the Deccan for reve- 
nue collection. ' Finding no legitimate authority in the country? 
he summoned together his Mughal brethren, raised an army, and 
occupied Gulbarga and Bidar on his own account.' 64 This re- 
bellion was also put down by Qutlugh Khan with the help of 
the Malwa army. 

The eighteenth revolt against Mubammad Tughlaq was that 
of * Ain-u'1-Mulk. It was occasioned by the transfer of that 
officer to Daulatabad (1340). Qutlugh KUan was recalled to 
Delhi on, a charge of misgavernment and abuse of authority. 
But, as a matter of fact, he appears to have been a popular 
and pious governor. According to 'I$amy, when the 'pious 
Khan ' left for Delhi, ' even the walls cried out (or echoed the 
people's wails) that all that was good was now departing from 
the Deccan/ 65 The remedy, however, proved worse than the 


disease. ' So extremely ill did this arrangement turn out that 
the people; disgusted at the removal of Qutlugh Khfln and the 
want of capacity displayed by the new administration, rebelled 
in all quarters and the country) was devastated and depopulated 
in consequence. To make up the deficiency of the revenue, as 
well as to gratify their own avarice, the Deccan officers plunder- 
ed and oppressed the inhabitants/ 66 

In the history of the fateful forty-five years (1295-1340) 
traced by us so far, the one distressfully disappointing feature 
has been the absence, in Maharastra, of the will to resist, bar- 
ring a few noble exceptions like Kanha and the two valiant 
women, Sankardeo and Harpaldeo, I*aghu and Nag-Nak the 
spirited Koji chief of Koncjiaoa. The people of Mahara$tra were 
conquered, oppressed and humiliated, but they meekly submitted 
like dumb-driven cattle. A sixteenth century Marathi work 
embodying earlier traditions dolorously records : ' There are 
too many Yavanas (Muslims) in the country ; the people 
are without patriotism ; c arms have been discarded ; they 
have taken to agriculture ; some have sought service ; seve- 
ral people have died ; many have lost their sense of duty/ 67 
Sporadic instances of courage are indeed available, but only 
in support of the Muslim rebels. Thus we learn that a raja of 
Thaiga (? Badahra or Burabrah) afforded shelter to Malik 
iloehang, but the latter subsequently recanted. * The rajas of 
the Deccan,' writes Firishta, ' suffering under the tyranny of 
Delhi, rejoiced at the revolt of the Muslims in which some 
joined, while others, more circumspect, only privately encouraged 
it and assisted the rebels with money and supplies.' 68 Only once 
do we come across a local chieftain called Kandhra (at Gul- 
barga) who, in mad desperation, put to death a number of 
Muslims, a month or two after the accession of Nair-u'drDln, 
the first independent Muslim Kmg of Daulatabad. He too 
being defeated, put himself in communication with the Delhi 
officers but was driven away by Zafar Khan. 69 

The sovereignty of the SultSns of Delhi over the Deccan 
was overthrown, not by the Hindus, but by the Muslim officers 
themselves. Muliammad Tughlaq had sent an army to suppress 


the wide-spread revolt of the ' Amir Judida ' of Raichur, Mudgal, 
Gulbarga, *idar, Bjjapur, Gunjoti, Raibag, Gilghuri, Hukeri, 
and Berar (Firishta). 'On arriving on the Deccan frontier, at 
Manukpoonj pass, fearing the King had a design on their 
lives, they entered into a confederacy and with one accord fell 
upon the guards/ The insurgents got the better of the Delhi 
army, besieged Daulatabad, killed many of the King's officers, 
and appropriated the treasury. Finally, they proclaimed one 
among themselves, 'Ismail, King of the Deccan with the title of 
Na$Ir-ud-Din. Muhammad Tughlaq did not live to suppress 
this revolt. He was hunted out by the rebels much like Aurang- 
zeb by the Marathas of 3 later generation. While he was pur- 
suing other rebels in Gujarat, the Sultan got news of the defeat 
and death of the royalist general 'Imad-u'1-Mulk. The imperial 
army was driven into Malwa. Thus began the independence 
movement in the Deccan ; but it was independence of the 
Muslims not of the Mardfhds. 

On Friday 24 RabVu'l-akhar 74& H. (12 August 1347) the 
crown was placed on the" head of Zafar Khan, and a black 
canopy (the colour assumed by the Abbasid khalifas) was 
raised above the throne. The khufba was read and coins were 
struck in the name of ' Ala-u'd-DIn Hasan Shah Bahmaru. He 
made Gulbarga his capital, and called it Hasanabad. ' Having 
assumed charge of his government, Hasan Shah neglected none" 
of his duties and his dominions daily increased ; so that in a 
short time (writes Firishta) the territory from the river Bhima 
to the vicinity of the fort of Adoni, and from the port of Chaul 
to the city of Bidar, was brought under his authority. 70 

This kingdom of Gulbarga (Bahmani) was not the only 
Muslim State to arise out of the ruins of the Khalii-Tughlaa 
dominions in the South. Sayyid Jalal-u'd-Kn Afosan Shah, 
governor of Ma'bar^ likewise ' rebelled, usurped power, killed 
the lieutenants and agents of the sovereign,, and struck coins of 
gold and silver in his own name,' writes Ibn-i-Batuta. 71 (1334- 
35). This Sultanate, however, proved ephemeral, as it was ex- 
tinguished by VIra Kampanja (c. 1378) which event has been 
celebrated by his queen Gangg Devi in her charming epic en- 


titled Madura Vijayam or Kamparaya-Charitam, an historical 
poem of rare merit. 72 Kampala was the son of *me of the 
founders of the great Vijayanagar power. Referring to this last 
event, namely, the establishment of the Vijayanagar kingdom. 
Firishta observes : ' The confederate Hindus seized the country 
occupied by the Muslims in the Dakhin and expelled them, so 
that within a few months, Mubammad Tughlaq had no pos- 
sessions in that quarter except Daulatabad.' 73 

The rise of this great Hindu power in South India is a 
very important and fascinating theme with whose foundation 
alone we are here concerned. Its influence upon Maratha his- 
tory will be appropriately dealt with i$ a later chapter. Arising 
out of very similar conditions as those which obtained in the 
Deccan, Vijayanagar grew into a mighty defender of Hindu 
civilisation for two centuries and a quarter (1336-1565). Its 
genesis provides an instructive contrast to the depressing story 
of the Hindus further north, during the same period. Waran- 
gal, Kampili and Dvarasataudra had been equally overrun by 
the Muslim invaders ; but their reactions were quite different 
from those witnessed by us in the Deccan. 

Two pieces of evidence should suffice to illustrate the re- 
sults of Muslim aggression in the Andhra and Karnatak coun- 
tries : An epigraph in the fortner region records : ' After the 
c death of Prataparudra, the earth was engulfed in the ocean of 
darkness of the Turuka rule. Adharma, which had been kept 
under control up to that time by that virtuous monarch, 
flourished under them unchecked, as the existing conditions 
were favourable for its growth. The cruel wretches subjected 
the rich people to torture for the sake of their wealth ; many 
of their victims died of terror at the sight of their vicious coun- 
tenances. The Brahmins were compelled to abandon their reli- 
gious practices ; the images of the gods were overthrown and 
smashed to pieces ; the learned were deprived of the agraharas 
which had been in the possession of their families from time 
immemorial ; and the agriculturists were despoiled of the fruits 
of their labour, and their families were impoverished and ruin- 
ed. None dared to lay claim to anything, whether it was a 


piece of property or one's own wife. To those despicable 
wretches wine was the ordinary drink, beef the staple food, and 
slaying the Brahmin the favourite pastime. The land of Te- 
linga, left without a protector, suffered destruction from the 
Mussulmans like a forest subjected to a devastating wild fire. 74 
In very similar language Ganga Devi writes : ' In the agraharas 
(of the temples) where the smoke issuing from the sacrificial 
fires was largely visible, and where the chant of the Vedas was 
always audible, we have now the offensive smelling smoke from 
roasted flesh, of the Muslims ; and the harsh voice of these 
ruffians is alone heard there/ 75 

Two inscriptions (oije of 1341 and another of 1376) speak 
of Sangama, father of the founders of Vijayanagar, as having 
beer} bom in fulfilment of a divine promise to deliver the coun- 
try from the hands of the Mlechhas. 76 A later epigraph (of 
1652) says that Vijayanagar was founded ' for the protection 
of gods, cows and Brahmans.' 77 Making due allowance for 
the idiom; of poetry in the above notices, we can yet perceive 
the historical facts imbedded in them. To follow their politi- 
cal reactions we have only to score the pages of Barani and 

* A revolt of the Hindus broke out in Arangal (Warangal),' 
writes Barani. ' Kanya Nayak had developed strength in the 
country. Malik Maqbul, the Na'ib Wazir, fled to Delhi and 
reached! there in safety. The Hindus captured Arangal which 
was entirely lost. At this time, one of the relations of Kanya' 
Nayak (Harihara ?) whom the Sultan had sent to govern Kam- 
pili, apostatised from Islam, and broke into rebellion. The 
land 1 of Kampili was lost and fell into the hands of the Hindus, 
and Deogir and Gujarat alone remained in the possession of the 
Sultan.' 78 Firishta adds a few more circumstantial details : 
* About this) time/ says he, *4Crishna Nayak, son of Ladar Deo 
(i.e. Prataparudra-deva), who lived in the vicinity of Wa- 
rangal, went to Belal Deo (Vira Ballaja III of Dvarasamudra), 
the powerful King of Carnatic, and told him that the Mutiam- 
madans had entered Telingtiya and Carnatic and had made up 
their minds to exterminate the Hindus. He suggested that 


something should be done to avert the crisis. Belal Deo called 
a meeting of his ministers, and, after a good deal* of delibe- 
rations, decided that, leaving his provinces in the rear, he should 
advance to the route of the armies of Islam, and deliver Ma'- 
bar, Dvarasamudra and Kampili from Muslim control, 
and place them in the charge of Krishna Nayak. In accordance 
with this plan, Belal Deo founded in the mountainous region 
near the frontier of his kingdom, in a well fortified place, a 
city which he named. . . .Bijanagar. Numerous horse and foot 
soldiers were sent under Krishna Nayak, and Warangal was 
captured. The governor ' Imad-u'1-Mulk fled to Daulatahad. 
Belal Deo and Krishna Nayak both combined their for- 
ces and delivered Ma' bar and Dvarasamudra, which had been 
for years in the past tributaries of the ruler of Carnatic, from 
Muslim control. On all sides the flames of war and rebellion 
were kindled, and of the distant provinces nothing remained in 
the possession of the Sultan except Gujarat and Deogir. 79 
(1336). Even this last stpmghold, as we have already noticed, 
was lost to Delhi in 1347. South India thus stood divided into 
two groups : the Bahmani kingdom in the Deccan, and the Vi- 
jayanagar kingdom to the south of the Tungabhadra river. 
The struggle between /he two and their respective successors 
constitutes the long prelude to the glorious war of independence 
which the Marathas of the 17th and 18th centuries carried on, 
and as a result of which they came very near to being the 
sovereign masters of the whole of India. But, for that consum- 
mation, the Marathas had to undergo a prolonged period of 
probation, which must engage us in the next three chapters. 


"Thus was the ground prepared partly by nature, 
partly by the ancient history of the country, partly by 
the religious revival, but chiefly by the long discipline 
in arms which the country had undergone under Mafco- 
medan rule for three hundred years." M. G. RANAplL 1 

The Bahmani kingdom, of whose foundation we have 
spoken in the preceding chapter, endured for nearly 180 years 
(1347-1526). But its effective existence came to an end with 
the murder of Mafcmud Gawan in 1481. With him, wrote 
Meadows Taylor, " departed all the cohesion and power of the 
Bahmani kingdom." 2 Out of its dominions were carved out 
(i) the 'Imadshahl of Berar in 1484 ; (ii) the 'Adilghahi of 
Bijapur in 1489 ; (iii) the NizamghShi of Ahmadnagar in 1490 ; 
(iv) the Qutbshahi of Golkonxja in 1518 ; and (v) the Band- 
s^ahi of Bidar in 1526. What place did the Mariathas fill in 
the history of these kingdoms? Ranatje has observed that 
their entire administration was permeated with Maratha per- 
sonnel. 3 Grant Duff has written : " It (the Bahmani, 
kingdom) was aided by the native princes of the Deccan, and 
from several circumstances in the conduct of war, particularly 
the desultory plan adopted by the insurgents (who founded 
the kingdom), which always requires the aid of the native in- 
habitants of any country, there is strong presumption of their 
.having contributed more to its success than the Mussulman 
.historian was aware of, or, perhaps was willing to allow''* 

Ranatfe has also> pointed! out that the foreign mercenaries 
(Turks, Persians, Abyssinians and Mughals) employed by the 
Deccan Sultans proved more troublesome than useful, and that 
gradually reliance came to be placed chiefly upon the country 
B&r&rs and Stttdar troops. "This training in arms brought 
education, power, and wealth with it, and in the sixteenth 


century we meet with Ghatjg^s and Ghorpa<Jes, Jadhavs and 
Nimbajkars, Mor& and Sind&, Daftes and Manfe,*as generals 
in charge of ten or twenty thousand horses, and in enjoyment 
of proportionate jahdglrs"* It is our purpose, in this chapter, 
to assess the nature of this tutelage of the Mamthias under their 
Muslim masters during the two and a half centuries which pre- 
ceded the rise of Shahjl Bhoste, father of the great Svajl. 
This is by no means an easy task, and we should particularly 
guard ourselves against hasty generalisations, both as regards 
the character of Muslim rule and policy in the Deccan, as well 
as the nature of the Hindu reactions and response. The fact 
that some of the Sultans were originally Hindus or married 
Hindu wives has led some writers to believe that " These influ- 
ences exerted a power which made it impossible for Mahomedan 
powers to retain their bigotry and fanatic cruelty in the Deccan, 
and (that) although there were irruptions of violence now and 
then, on the whole great toleration was shown towards their 
Hindu subjects by these Mabomedan kings, and gradually both 
civil and military power came into Hindu hands." 16 Closer 
examination will, however reveal that the causes of the consi- 
derable employment of Hindus in the civil and military services 
of the Sultans lay outside their policy of religious toleration 
which has been exaggerated by Ranaitje and some others beyond 
*what is warranted by the facts of the situation. Indeed, con- 
sanguinity had little to do with the so-called liberal policy of 
the Mafromedan kings of the Deccan. 

In the first place, the subjugation of the Hindus by the 
Muslims was never completed in western Mahara$tra and 
Konkajrj. The latter was not conquered till the middle of the 
fifteenth century ; and the GhatmatM of the Mavajs were 
never subdued in the sense in whi^h the IJes was. The reasons 
for this will become clear as we proceed. Secondly, the Mus- 
lim conquerors of the Deccan were considerably weakened by 
their isolation, being cut off from the stream of perennial 
replenishment like their coreligionists in North India. They 
further undermined their own strength by perpetual quarrels 


among the Deccani and Foreign parties. The murder of 
Gawan watf an indicator of this suicidal hatred and factious- 
ness. Opportunities were thus amply provided for the enter- 
prising and pushful Manathas, alike by the paucity of the 
Muslims in the Deccan and their disunity. But there was no 
uniformity of conditions all over the country, nor in the same 
tract of land under different rulers. We should therefore 
make a careful survey of the various parts of the Deccan and 
Mahiaifetra under its several dynasties during the three cen- 
turies that preceded the advent of Sivaj!, namely, 1347-1630. 

We have already noted that, under Hasan Shah, the 
founder, the Bahmani kingdom stretched from Daulatabad, in 
the north, to Adoni in the south, and from Chaul, in the west, 
to Bidar in the east, according to Firishta. The same writer 
tells us that * Ala-u'd-Din (Hasan Shah) divided his kingdom 
into four afraf or provinces viz. (i) Absanabad-Gulbarga 
(the Rrna-Tungabhadra Doab up to Dabol); (ii) Daulata- 
bad (including Junnar, Chaul and Paithan) ; (iii) Berar (includ- 
ing Mahur); and (iv) Bidar (including Qandhar, Indur, 
Kaulas, and parts of Telingana). 7 With minor variations this 
administrative arrangement continued ^down to the days of 
Mafrmud Gawan who made substantial alterations in it. By 
that time the kingdom had grown in extent and covered, not 
only the table-land of the Deccan up to the Ghlats, a portion 
of Telingaina and the Raichur Doab, but also the Konkaio down 
to Goa (in the west) and the whole of Andhra (in the east 
and south). Besides, Khandesh was a protectorate in the 
North. Gawan reduced this unwieldy Empire to order by 
dividing it into provinces of moderate size, each under a Sar- 
lashkar. Berar was cut into two parts : Giawil and Mahur ; 
Daulatabad and Junnar divisions extended up to Daman, 
Bassein, Goa, and Belgaum ; Bijapur, up to the Hor river 
including Raichur and Mudgal ; Ahsanabad-Gulbarga, from 
Sagar to Naldurg with Sholapur ; and Telinggria included 
Rajamundry and Warangal. 'Apart from nearly halving the 
old provincial areas, the Kfawaja removed certain tracts from 


the jurisdiction of each of the new governors, bringing them 
directly under the control of the king himself as the Khdsa-i- 
Sultml or Royal Domain, thus putting a strong royal check on 
the power of the Tawfdar in his own province/ 8 This was a 
wise precaution reminding us of the reforms of William the 
Conqueror in England and of Kleisthenes in ancient Athens. 

For greater efficiency, Gawan also reorganised the army 
and the revenue system. He made it a rule that there should 
be no more than one fortress under the direct command of each 
Tarajdar. QUe'ddrs of all other strongholds were to be appoint- 
ed and controlled directly by the central Government. The 
obligations of the jdgirdars and manyabddrs were more strictly 
defined in terms of definite contingents to be maintained by 
them, for which they were paid. A man$abdar was to receive 
one lakh of hons (later raised to 1J lakhs) annually for every 
500 men under arms. Where jaglrs were granted in lieu of 
cash payment, compensation was allowed to cover the collec- 
tion charges; but if the * stipulated .number of men was not 
maintained, a proportionate amount was deducted (or had to 
be reimbursed). A systematic land-survey was also carried 
out, fixing the boundaries of villages and towns and regulating 
the revenue assessments. 9 

The Muslim population being comparatively small, the 
working of these reforms, as well as the normal administration, 
necessitated increasing dependence on the Hindu personnel. 
Under the Khaljis and Tughlaqs, there were frequent with- 
drawals of the Muslim officers from the Deccan to meet the 
exigencies in the North. Twice at least we have noticed that 
the repatriation was on a large scale : i. When Malik Kafur 
recalled ' Ain-u'1-Mulk 'with all the Muslim inhabitants 
resident in the city (of Daulatfcbad) '; ii. When Mufcammad 
Tughlaq relinquished his second capital. Incidents of this 
nature encouraged insurrections on the part of even the Muslim 
officers. With the establishment of the Bahmani kingdom, 
contact with the North was almost completely cut off. Only 
such Muslims as elected to settle in the South permanently 


alone remained. Occasionly a fortune-hunter came from out- 
side. The*number of converts, though growing, was not very 
large. Despite the strength of their polygamous harems and 
fecundity, the rulers found it necessary to augment their num- 
bers by inviting foreign immigrants. But the remedy soon 
proved worse than the disease. The local Muslims hated the 
New-comers and gave rise to constant civil strife resulting not 
infrequently in murderous orgies. * While the Delhi aristo- 
cracy and its early representatives in the South', writes 
Professor Sherwani, ' were mostly of Central Asian Turki 
stock or of Afghan heritage, the New-comers of the South 
came mostly from the cgasts round the Persian Gulf or from 
further North, as far as the strip of territory on the south of 
the Caspian Sea, being mostly Syeds from Najaf, Karbala, 
and Medina, and Persians from Sistan, Khurasan or Gflan.' 10 
The conflict between the Northerners with their Habgiu 
(Abyssinian) subordinates (who had settled down earlier in 
the Deccan) and the New-comers fiom Iraq and Iran, led to 
precipitate the downfall of the Bahmams. 

The importance of the Hindus becomes quite obvious in the 
light of the above conditions. The attitude of the. Hindus 
towards the Mlecchas is illustrated by *Firishta's observations 
on the forced marriages effected by the conquerors (e.g. between^ 
the daughter of Dev Rai of Vijayanagar and Firuz Shah Bah- 
mam). 'Though the Rais of the Carnatic had never before 
given their daughters in marriage to any persons but those of 
their own caste ', he writes, ' and deemed it degrading to inter- 
marry with strangers, yet Dev Rai, out of necessity, complied/ 11 
We have no reason to expect the Hindus of the Deccan to have 
been less conservative or orthodox. 

From the beginning, Hijidus must have been largely em- 
ployed in the civil administration. With the lapse of time, 
they came to be recruited also in the armies in increasing num- 
bers. We have no statistical records to enable us to determine 
the proportion of Hindus in the Deccani forces employed in 
the so-called ' jihad ' against the ' infidels ' of Vijayanagar, but 


we cannot regard these medieval wars as wars of religion. 
Equal ferocity and destructive zeal were exhibited* by all the 
belligerents whether the fighting was among co-religionists or 
against the followers of another religion. The recorded in- 
stances of slaughter and demolition of sacred places are, 
therefore, to be looked upon more as ' acts of war ' than ' facts 
of fanaticism '. The Hindu rulers of Vijayanagar soon learnt 
to enlist Muslim mercenaries in their armies even as the Sultans 
of the Deccan had enrolled Hindus. 

The policy of the Bahmani rulers towards their infidel 
subjects may be best expressed in the words of Mahmud 
Gawan (used by him in another context). According to him 
'the principles of justice and the causes of domination and 
subjection* were that * those who of their own free will and 
without any compulsion acted according to the principles of 
the Qur'an and the ftadls, wore the turban of freedom, while 
those who put a cap of pride on their heads with the hand of 
denial fell from the steed of authority '. Again, ' Some rose 
from the stage of subjection to elevated pedestals of high office 
and others, through good fortune, sat on royal thrones '.^ In 
clearer terms we might state that 'submission to Islam was 
for the Hindus the highroad to promotion, while defection 
from it or opposition was the surest way to fall from the steed 
of authority*. This is amply borne out by the doings of the 

' AM-u'd-Din tfasan, the just Bahmani king, conquered 
territories belonging to the Muslims no less than the Hindus. 
But the Burhan-i-Mddthvr declares, that Hasan Kangu ordered 
his generals to devastate and plunder the country of the infidels 
soon after his assumption of royal authority. 13 The writer 
also adds that Hasan ' did much towards propagating the true 
Faith' Firishta describes his successor, as well, as ' a champion 
of the true religion '. The greatest of the Bahmani Sultans, 
namely Firuz Shah, who usurped the throne on 14 February 
1397, was, according to the Burhan-i-ma'athinr, ' a good, just, 
and generous king, who supported himself by copying the 


Quran, and the ladies of his harem used to support themselves 
by embroidering garments and selling them*. Among his 
eclectic tasfts were hard drinking, a passionate fondness for 
music, and addiction to a seraglio with an assortment of women 
drawn from several nationalities. 14 In his war against Vijaya- 
nagar, he left 'the roads littered with the bodies of the 
slaughtered Hindus/ though he agreed to release his Bnahman 
prisoners of war on payment of ten lakhs of hons. The 
Hindus when they won a victory over him, in 1419, mercilessly 
butchered their enemies, desecrated their mosques and ravaged 
their country. In the graphic words of Firishta, ' The Hindus 
made a general massacre of the Mussulmans, and erected a 
platform with their heads on the field of battle. They followed 
the Sultan into his own country, which they wasted with fire 
and sword, took many places, broke down many mosques and 
holy places, slaughtered the people without mercy ; by their 
actions seeming to discharge the treasured malice and resent- 
ment of ages '.^ 

Under the next Bahmam King,.Afcmad Shah, the capital 
was shifted from Gulbarga to BIdar. Dr. Ishwari Prasad has 
characterised this ruler as a ferocious bigot and a cruel tryant. 
But the Muslim chronicler says that 'his disposition was 
adorned with the ornament of clemency *and temperance, and 
with the jewel of abstinence and! devotion ' 16 Our particular 
interest in his reign is confined to his doings in the Konkag 

Western Mahari$tra was the real cradle of native indepen- 
dence. Even under the Yadavas, we have observed how, 
according to Marco Polo, the ruler of Thaaja owned no master 
above him. Another such instance is that of the chief of Bag- 
Ian who successfully defied Ramdev Rao. Ibn-i-Batuta has 
noticed that there was a Muslim principality at HonSvar and 
Goa. ' There are twa towns in the interior ', he writes, ' one an 
ancient construction of the infidels, and the other built by the 
Mussulmans when they first conquered the island (of Sandabur 
or Goa). In the latter there is a great cathedral mosque com- 
parable to the mosques of Baghdad : it was founded by Hasan, 


father of the Sultan JamSl-u'd-Dui Mtifeammad of Hanaur'.^ 
This place was later annexed by Vijayanagar, and the Muslim 
dominion was rendered precarious and unreal oVer the west 
coast. Marco Polo alludes to the rich trade of the Konkan in 
finely dressed leather, cotton goods, gold and silver, though 
the sea was infested with pirates. Bahmani boats occasionally 
put out to sea from Dabol and Chaul to bring commodities to 
the Kingdom from diverse maritime centres. 18 

In 1403, Kfaalaf Hasan Bari (Malik-u't-Tujjar) was 
ordered, by Sultan Ahmad Shah Bahmani I, to subdue the 
coast. But the territory round Mahim was disputed by the 
Sultan of Gujarat. Conflict was, however, averted by the 
intervention of some holy men on cither side. 19 In 143(5, the 
Hindu raja of Sonekhair was defeated, and he agreed to give 
his daughter in marriage to ' Ala-u'd-Dm II .*> Eleven years 
later, Malik-u't-Tujjar was again dispatched to the Konkao 
<1347). But the Muslims this time suffered a crushing defeat 
at the hands of the Hindus. There was division and suspicion 
of treason in the invader's camp* They retired to Chakafl 
where the Deccani faction 'entertained the foreign Muslims 
with the sherbat of destruction and the sword of tyranny ; so 
that about 1,200 Sayyids of pure lineage and nearly 1,000 other 
foreigners (from 7 'to 18 years of age) were put to the 
sword'. 21 Firishta's account of the Hindu resistance to Bah- 
mani is worthy of being noticed in full because of the light it 
throws upon the condition of the country and the spirit of the 
people. In it are to be found the seeds of the future Maratha 
revolt which was to spread out triumphantly in ever-widening 

'At this time', writes the historian, 'Meamun Oolta< 
Deccany formed a plan for reducing to subjection all the fort- 
resses along the sea-coast. To t effect tfiis, the King deputed 
Mullik-oot-Toojar with 7000 Deccany infantry and 3000 Ara- 
bian cavalry, besides his own division, to the west. Mullik-oot- 
Toojar, fixing upon Chakan as his seat of government, secured 
the fort near the city of Joonere, from whence he sent 


detachments at different times into Concan, and reduced 
several rajas to subjection. At length he moved to that 
country in person, and laid siege to a fort the raja of which 
was named Shirka, whom he speedily obliged to surrender and 
to deliver himself and family into his hands. 

' Mullik-oot-Toojar insisted that Shirka should embrace 
the faith of Islam or be put to death ; upon which the subtle 
infidel, with much assumed humility, represented that there 
existed between him and Shunkur Ray who owned the country 
round Khelna (Visalgatf) a family jealousy and that should 
he enter into the pale of Islam, and his rival remain secure in 
the full possession of power, he would, on the general's retreat, 
taunt him with ignominy an account of his change of relgion, 
and excite his own family and subjects to revolt ; so that he 
should lose the countries his ancestors had held for ages. Raja 
Shirka added, however, that if M. would reduce his rival 
Shunkur Ray of Khelna and give his country either to himself 
or one of his officers, which might be effected with little diffi- 
culty, he would then pronpunce the 'creed of the true faith, 
enroll among the servants of the King, and remit annually a 
tribute to the treasury, as well as assist in reducing those rajas 
who might fail hereafter in their duty and allegiance. 

4 M. replied that he heard the road to the Ray's country 
was woody, and full of difficult passes. To which Shirka 
answered that, while there was a guide with the army so faith- 
ful and capable as himself, not a single soul should receive 
injury. Accordingly, M. relying on the promises of the Raja 
in the year 858, began his expedition against Khelna, but 
was deserted in the outset by the Deccany and Abyssinian 
officers and troops who declined entering the woods. Raja 
Shirka, agreeably to his promise, during the first two days con- 
ducted the army along & broad.road, so that the general praised 
his zeal and fidelity ; but on the third day he led them by 
paths so intricate that the male tiger, from apprehension, might 
change his sex ; and through passes more fortuitous than the 
curly locks of the fair, more difficult to escape from than the 


mazes of love. Demons even might start at the precipices and 
caverns in those wilds, and ghosts might be panic-struck at the 
awful view of the mountains. Here the sun never enlivened 
with his splendour the valleys ; nor had providence designed 
that it should penetrate their depths. The very grass wa$ 
tough and sharp as the pangs of serpents, and the air fetid as 
the breath of dragons. Death dwelt in the waters and poison 
impregnated the breeze. After winding, weary and alarmed, 
through these dreadful labyrinths, the army entered a darker 
forest a passage through which was difficult even to the winds 
of heaven. It was bounded on three sides by mountains whose 
heads towered above the clouds, and on the other side was an 
inlet of the sea so that there was nrf path by which to advance, 
nor road for retreat but by which they had entered. 

' M. at this crisis! fell ill of a bloody flux so that he could 
not attend to the regularity of the line of march or give orders 
for the disposition of his troops who, being excessively fatigued, 
about nightfall flung themselves to rest wherever they could 
find room, for there was no spot which admitted of two tetits 
being pitched near each other. While the troops were thus 
scattered in disorder, Shirka, their treacherous guide, left them 
and communicated f to Shunkur Ray that he had lured the 
game into his toils. The Ray, with a great force conducted by 
Shirka, about midnight attacked the Mussulmans from all 
quarters, who unsuspicious of surprise were buried in the sleep 
produced by excessive exertions. In this helpless state, nearly 
7000 soldiers of the faithful were put to death like sheep, with 
knives and daggers ; the wind blowing violently, the rustling 
of the trees prevented the troops from hearing the cries of their 
fellow-sufferers. Among these was Mullik-oot-Toojar who fell 
with 500 noble Syuds of Medina, Kurbulla and Nujuf, as also 
some Deccany and Abyssinian, officers, together with about 
2000 of their adherents who had remained with their general. 
Before daylight, the Ray having completed his bloody work 
retired with his people from the forest '.** 

The struggle for MaiSthS independence begun by the 


Sirks, in the manner described above, was not taken up by 
other Maratbas immediately. For the time being it ended as 
a heroic episode. But in western Maharaja and Konkai? 
there were many hard nuts to crack, and ultimately the Muslim 
powers were baffled by the intrepid Mavales of these regions. 
It took a couple of centuries before the land could produce a 
Sivaji. Meanwhile the Muslims had their complete innings 
and the Manathas had to serve out their full tutelage. 

During the satanic rule of Humayun (1458-61) not only 
the Hindus, but even his Muslim subjects got disgusted. He 
was a sadist and constant shedder of human blood, fit to rank 
with the Hindu Han?a of Kashmir or Caligula and Nero of 
Rome. When he died, the poet Nagir composed this fitting 
chronogram : 

Humayun Shah has passed away from the world. 

God Almighty, what a blessing was the death of 
Humayun ! % 

On the date of his deSth the world was full of delight. 

So " Delight of the World " gives the date of his death. 
Two minors Afcmad III and Mubammad HI sat on the 
throne in three years (1461-63) under the regency of the 
Dowager-queen, Mal&dumah-i-Jahan. The enemies of the Bah- 
manis took full advantage of the situation and invaded their 
territories. The worst of them was Mafcmud Khali! of Malwa 
who advanced as far as Bidar and ravaged the country alt 
around the capital. The houses of the nobles as well as of .the 
common people were plundered and destroyed. But the queen- 
regent was a valiant lady. She drove away the invader with 
the help of the King of Gujarat, and also won great popularity 
for herself by releasing all the prisoners capriciously imprisoned 
by her son Nizam-u'd-DJn AJtfhad. Khwaja Jahan Mabmud 
Gawian was her coadjutor and successor to power in the Bah- 
man! Kingdom. 

Despite his undoubted greatness in other ways, Mahmud, 
like most of his contemporaries, was an uncompromising bigot. 


So far as the Hindu subjects were concerned, therefore, the 
efficiency of his administration only resulted in making Muslim 
tyranny more efficiently tyrannical He was also an imperialist. 
He 'increased the Bahmam dominions to an extent never 
reached before '. One of the tasks to which he addressed him- 
self was to rehabilitate the prestige of the Sultans shattered in 
western Maharatra by the disastrous Khejna expedition of 

The Maratha rajas of Khejna and Sangamesvar, embolden- 
ed by their recent triumph, had continued their rebellious 
activities. They particularly meddled with the sea-trade 
making common cause with the pirates of the west coast. The 
Raya of Sangamesvar alone, according to Gawan, sent 130 
ships to rob the Mecca pilgrims annually, and 'many thou- 
sands of Muslims were sacrificed at the altar of the greed of 
these people'. 38 He therefore organised a grand campahn in 
order to permanently subjugate the southern and western parts 
of the country. It was to be f| a three-pronged thrust : 
i. towards Bagalkot and Hubli under the Sultan in person ; 
ii. towards Belgaum under Yusuf ' Adil Shah ; and Hi. in the 
Konkaaj under Gawan himself. Though ultimately all of them 
were successful, the last one proved the most hazardous. 24 

It is to be remembered that in 1436 Sultan 'Ala-u'd-DIn 
had sent Dilawar Khan with an army ' to reduce the tract of 
country along the sea-shore called Concan inhabited by a hardy 
race of men' (Firishta) ; that Dilawar succeeded in reducing 
the rajas of ' Rairee and Sonkehr ' to submission ; and further 
that the Khan 'secured the beautiful daughter of the latter 
raja for the King/ Though the officer was suspected of having 
'received bribes from the rajas of Concan and had not done 
his utmost to reduce their fortresses', ' Ala-u'd-DjIn was 
'charmed with the raja's daughter, who was without equal in 
beauty, disposition and knowledge of music.' 85 However, no 
effective results followed, and the raj&s continued to harass 
travellers, both on land and sea, and ' constructed the strongest 
defences imaginable'. The merchants were afraid of taking 


their wares out, and there was a big drop in the commerce of 
the Kingdom.* 6 

Early in 1469 (874 H.) Malimud Gawan marched to 
Kolhapur and made that his H.Q. 27 during his campaign against 
the recalcitrant infidels of the west country. He summoned to 
his assistance troops from Junnar, Chakaaj, Kolhar, Dabhol, 
Chaul, Wai and Maaj. 28 ' Shunkur Ray of Khelna constantly 
maintained a fleet of 300 vessels,' writes Firishta, 'and inter- 
rupted the traffic of the Maftomedans. Upon the report of 
ifcwaja M. Gawan's approach, the infidels contracted defensive 
alliances with each other, and assembled in great numbers at 
the head of the passes ; but M. Gawan by degrees forced all 
their positions. Finding his cavalry useless in the mountainous 
country, he sent back the horse he had brought from the 
capital, and contented himself with the troops under Asud 
Khan Geelany, with the Joonere division, and his own depen- 
dents under Khoosh Kuddum, with the troops from Kolhar 
and Dabul. With this army he made his way by means of 
fire and the axe through* the woods. He lay five months 
before the fort of Khelna without reducing it ; and the rains 
setting in, compelled him to relinquish the siege. Committing 
the passes to the protection of 10,000 infantry inured to the 
climate, and on whom he could depend, he ascended the 
mountains and constructed thatched huts to pass the wet sea- ' 
son in the district of Kolhapur, where he captured the fort of 
Ramgur. After the rainy season, he again descended the 
passes, and by stratagems and gifts of money, obtained pos- 
session of the fortress of Khelna, which had never till then been 
in the hands of the Mussulmans/ 319 

Gawan returned to the capital only after an arduous 
campaign lasting three years. So great a strain had this put 
upon him that FirisRta say^: 'M. Gawan retiring to his 
chamber, disrobed himself of his splendid dress, threw himself 
on the ground, and wept plenteously ; after which he came out, 
put on the habit of a dervish, and calling together all the most 
deserving holy and learned men, and Syuds of Afemudiabad, 


Bidur, distributed among them most of his money, jewels, and 
other wealth, reserving only his elephants, horses, #id library ; 
saying, " Praise be to God, I have escaped temptation, and aim 
now free from dangers." ' 30 

After Gawan came the deluge. The Bahmani empire 
split up into the pentarchy of 'Imadgbah?, ' Adilglsahf, Nizam- 
ghahi, Qutbghahi, and Baiidshahl. There were in all fourteen 
rulers who reigned during 180 years. Avoiding the extremes 
of both eulogy and deprecation such as that of Meadows 
Taylor and Vincent Smith, and also bearing in mind the 
general standards of that age, 31 it is still difficult to feel enthusi- 
astic over the total performance <pf the Bahmani Kings. 
Confining our attention to their Hindu subjects whose condition 
alone is relevant to our theme, it is futile to deny that they 
were shabbily treated, though they might have shared a moiety 
of the good things of life during the fitful periods of prosperity 
as residuary legatees. 

Athanasius Nikitin, u Russian pierchant, sojourned in the 
Kingdom from 1470-74. His impartial observations are 
worthy of attention : ' The land is overstocked with people \ 
he writes ; ' but those in the country are very miserable, while 
the nobles are extrentely opulent and delight in luxury/ 32 It 
is not difficult to distinguish between the opulent classes and 
the indigent masses ; the former were mostly composed of the 
ruling Muslim nobles, and the latter largely comprised the con- 
quered Hindu subjects. The wealth of the rich was derived 
from the peaceful toils of the peasants, and the spoils of war, 
supplemented by the profits of such trade as then existed. But 
war was the most paying industry, especially when it was the 
enemies' countries that were more frequently devastated. Under 
the Bahmani Sultans most of the fighting was done on foreign 
soil. While, therefore, the ' overstocked * population supplied 
the man-power for the armies, those who survived the slaughter, 
or rather their masters, were enriched beyond the dreams of 
avarice. How this wealth was expended might be gathered from? 
the following description by Nikitin. 


He found the Khorassanian 'Boyar' Melik Tuchar, 
merchant jyince, keeping an army of 2,00,000 men ; Melik 
Khan, 1,00,000; Kharat Han, 20,000; and many other 
Khans keeping an army of 10,000 men. The Sultan went out 
with 3,00,000 men of his own. ' They are wont to be carried 
on their silver beds (palkis), preceded by some twenty chargers 
caparisoned in gold, and followed by 300 men on horse-back, 
and by 500 on foot, and by horn-men, 10 torchbearers and 
10 musicians. The Sultan goes out hunting, with his mother 
and his lady, and a train of 10,000 men on horseback,, 50,OOQ 
on foot ; 200 elephants adorned in gilded armour, and in front 
1QO horsemen, 100 dancers, and 300 common horses in golden 
clothing ; 100 monkeys, and 100 concubines, all foreign.' 3 -" 

It has ever been the lot of conquered peoples to support 
the burdens of such gilded prosperity. But what galled the 
' infidels ' most was not the shocking contrast between the 
wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor, but the religious 
intolerance of their fanatical rulers^ Consequently, the first 
spontaneous reactions of ftie oppressed masses were neither in 
the political nor in the economic field, but in the religious. We 
shall deal with these consequences in a later chapter. Here we 
must complete the story of Muslim rple under the minor 
dynasties which arose out of the ruins of the BahmanI 

Of the five kingdoms referred to before, the ' Imadgfcahl 
was absorbed by Afcmadnagar in 1574, and the Baridshahi by 
Bijapur in 1609. Thus the Nizaiqghjahf of Afcmadnagar, the 
'Adilghahl of Bijapur, and the Qutbshjahi of Golkontfa alone 
played r61es of any consequence in the seventeenth century. 
Of these three, the first was extinguished in 1636, the second 
in 1686, and the last in 1687. The Nizamsblahi existed for 
146 years, the 'Adil^jah! for* 197 years, and the Qutbs&ahi for 
169 years. Together they ruled over most of Maharastra, a 
part of Andhra and a portion of Kamatak. Besides these 
there was the Faruqa kingdom of Kfcandesh (1388-1601) in 
the Tapti valley with its key fortress of Asirgarh and its 


capital city of Burhanpur which became the Mughal base of 
operations in the Deccan during the seventeenth century. But, 
from the point of view of Maratha history, the Nizamghahl 
and the 'Adilshahl must engage most of our immediate 

The founder of the Nizamshaha was Malik Ahmad Bahri, 
son of Nizam-u'1-Mulk who led the Deccani Muslims against 
the foreigners in the quarrels which culminated in the assassi- 
nation of Mahmud Gawan (1481). Within a decade of this 
event three new kingdoms came into existence in quick succes- 
sion : the ' Imadghahl in 1484, the 'AdilsfaahJ in 1489, and the 
Nizamshai in 1490. 34 The Qutbshai followed in 1518, and 
the Baridstiahl in 1526. Malik Afcmad was governor of 
Junnar when he rebelled against his Bahmani sovereign. His 
position was considerably strengthened by his capture of Dau- 
latabad in 1499. His successor, Burhan Nizamshah, ruled for 
forty-five years (1508-53) playing an important part in the 
Deccan politics. In 1550 he allied himself with the Hindu 
kingdom of Vijayanagar against his co-religionist 'Adilsjtahi. 
Eight years later a reversal of alliances was brought about by 
the Bijapur ruler who invaded the Nizamshahi territory along 
with the Vijayanagar forces. This proved a fateful invasion. 
The Hindus under Rama Raya of Vijayanagar enacted such 
barbarities in the Ahmadnagar kingdom that they provoked 
savage repercussions. Indeed, to cut a long story short, these 
brutalities drove the Muslim powers to form a strong confedera- 
cy, under the leadership of Bijapur, for the destruction of 

In December 1564 the confederates met at Talikota (25 
miles n. of the Kjnioa river), now in Bijapur District. On 
Tuesday, 23 January 1565 (20 Jum. ii. 972 H.) 35 battle was 
joined with the Vijayanagar army in the village of Bayapur or 
Bhogapur (better known as Rakkastangatfi). The result is 
too well known to need dilation. That historic battle ranks 
with Tanain (1192), Kfcanua (i527), Hajd&ghat (1576), and 
Panipat (1761), in the annals of Hindu India. Each one of 


these engagements proved a sanguinary triumph for Muslim 
arms with far-reaching consequences. 

Husain Niaamsbah of Afomadnagar and ' Ali * Adilghah of 
Bijapur, commanded, respectively, the centre and the right 
wing of the Muslim army. The left wing was led by Ibrahim 
Qutbgfiah of Golkontf a. " The conquerors shared the dominions, 
though not the traditions, of the defeated Vijayanagar kingdom. 
The great Hindu empire of the South which had lasted for 
more than two centuries, as V. A. Smith has observed, was 
finally ended, and the supremacy of Islam in the Deccan was 
assured. 36 

Afrmadnagar continued to flourish for sixty years more 
(1565-1626), especially under the vigorous leadership of Chand 
Bibi and Malik 'Ambar. Husain Nizamshah was succeeded 
by Murtaza (1565-86). During the new regime Berar was 
annexed to the Nizamshahi territories (1574) ; but little else 
worthy of notice took place. On the other hand, the period 
following was marked by^ faction-fights, futile wars, and weak 
successors on the throne. Consequently, Abmadnagar fell a 
prey to ambitious aggressors from the North and the South. 
Chand Bib! and Malik 'Ambar, no doubt, heroically struggled 
against the external enemies and pulled up the State from 
within to the level of a precarious prosperity ; but they were 
soon overwhelmed by the external enemies. Partners in great 
victories have seldom continued to live in amity : Afomad- 
nagar and Bijapur were no exceptions. Their quarrels en- 
couraged the Mughal emperors to push forward their imperial 
designs in the Deccan, thereby endangering the liberty of all. 
Burhanpur and Aifrmadnagar were occupied by the imperialists 
in 1600 ; Asirgarh was taken by them in 1601. Malik 'Ambar 
continued to fight valiantly against them for another quarter 
of a century. But 'neither "his courage nor patriotism nor re- 
sourcefulness availed anything (as we shall witness in the 
next chapter), in the face of Bijapur and the Mughals. To 
anticipate that history a little, the fall of the Nizamshahi was 
precipitated by the unholy alliance between the 'Adilhah and 


the Mughal Emperor. The terms of the compact between 
them might be quoted here without comment ; for {hey speak: 
for themselves. 

i The ' Adilghah was to acknowledge the overlordship of 
the Mughal Emperor and promise to obey his orders in future/ 

ii The pretensions of Nizamsjjahlr were to be noted and 
all its territories to be divided between the Emperor and the 
King of ffijiapur. 

iii The latter was to retain all his ancestral dominions 
with the following additions : From the Abmadnagar kingdom 
in the west, the Sholapur and Wangi Mahals, between the 
Bhlma and the Sim rivers, including the forts of Sholapur 
and Parenda ; in the N.E., the parganas of Bhalki and Chid- 
gupa, and that portion of the Konkain which belonged to the 
Nizamsbah, including Poona and Chakan districts. 

These acquisitions comprised 59 parganas and yielded a 
revenue of 20 lakhs of hons or nearly 80 lakhs of rupees. The 
rest of the Nizamfaah! territory was to be annexed to the 
Mughal Empire " beyond question or doubt." 37 The parganas 
specified above and the hinterland between the Mughal and 
BIjapur dominions constituted the heart of Maharaja. This 
was the cradle of a historic movement that was presently to 
arise and shake the foundations of Muslim dominions alike 
itf the Deccan and the North. 

Bahmani history repeated itself in the 'Adilsjiahi no less 
than in the Nizamshahi. The 'Adilgljahi' kingdom of B5japur r 
founded in 1489, by Yusuf 'Adil Shjah, ran its uneven course 
until its extinction at the hands of Aurangzeb in 1686. Its 
greatest achievement in the cause of Islamic rule was the over- 
throw of Vijayanagar in 1565 followed by the annexation of 
its provinces in the South thereafter. Firishta has described 
Yusuf as 'a wise prince, intimately acquainted with human 
nature/ handsome, eloquent, well read, and a skilled musician. 
* Although he mingled pleasure with business, yet he never 
allowed the former to interfere with the latter. He always 
warned his ministers to act with justice and integrity, and ia 


liis own person showed them an example of attention to those 
virtues. He invited to his court many learned men and valiant 
officers from Persia, Turkistan, and Rum ; also several eminent 
artists who lived happily under the shadow of his bounty. In 
his reign the citadel of BJjapur was built of stone/ 88 

An illuminating incident is also narrated by Firishta : 
'When Yoosoof Adil Khan first established his independence, 
he heard that one Mookund Row Marhatta and his brother, 
who had both been officers under the Bahmuny government, 
had with a number of peasants fled and taken up a strong 
position among the hills with the determination of opposing 
his authority : he accordingly marched against them at the 
head of 2,000 cavalry arid 5,000 infantry : they were defeated 
.and their families fell into the hands of the King. Among 
these was the sister of Mookund Row, whom Yoosoof after- 
wards espoused, and gave her the title of Booboojee Khanum. 
By this lady he had three daughters and one son, Ismael, who 
succeeded to the throne. Of the three daughters, Muryum, 
the eldest, married Burhan Nizam* Shah Bheiry of Ahmud- 
nuggur : Khoodeija, the second, married Ala-ood-Deen Imad- 
ool-Moolk, King of Gavul and Berar : and Beeby Musseety, 
the third, married Ahmud Shah Bahmuny at Goolburga, as 
has been related/ 319 

This story is interesting as revealing Yusuf's intimacy 
with the Hindus. Vincent Smith says that he freely admitted 
Hindus to offices of trust ; the Marathi language was ordinarily 
used for purposes of accounts and business. 40 Marriage with 
a Hindu woman captured in war may not, however, be con- 
strued as anything more than attraction towards a member of 
the opposite sex rather than of the opposing sect. Yet, it is 
well to remember that the lady became the mother of one 
Muslim ruler and the mother-in-law of three others. It is also 
significant to observe that the unidentified Mukund Rlao, toge- 
ther with his unnamed brother, was carrying forward the tradi- 
tion of the iSirkfe, fighting valiantly with the help of a 
4 peasant' army and taking advantage of the mountainous 


character of their country. It is not, therefore, to be wondered 
at that the Muslim rulers found it expedient to tame these 
turbulent Mamthas under the yoke of civil and military ser- 
vice. " It must always be remembered," writes Gribble, " that 
the Mahomedan conquests, not only in the Deccan but also 
throughout India, were the conquests of a foreign army of the 
forts and strongholds. The country itself was left untouched, 
and the fort once taken, it was either razed like Vijayanagar, 
or a garrison being left there, the army marched on. The 
Hindoo ryots were left to till their fields as before, and the 
only difference to them was that they paid their land-tax to 
a Mahomedan instead of a Hindoo landlord. The artisans 
and merchants still plied their crafts 'as formerly ; it was only 
the members of the royal families who retreated before the 
conquerors. A large number of the landed proprietors were 
also allowed to remain, with authority to collect the revenue, 
on condition, however, that they paid a fixed rent to the 
Government. Over each small district was placed a Maho- 
medan governor who was "supported by a small body of troops 
with which he kept order. There was no occupation of the 
country by the Mahomedans and no settlement of the con- 
querors in the rural parts. The Hindoo population remained 
a nation as separate and as apart as it had been when they 
jvere ruled by their own countrymen. Their customs and 
their religious rites remained the same. When the wave of 
war swept over their villages, then temples and shrines were 
desecrated, in those places which had not been visited by the 
foreign army, the old structures still remained and, during 
times of peace, they were not molested. Some of these Hindoo 
Zamindars proved faithful servants and brought with them 
their own retainers to serve in the Mahomedan armies. In 
this way the constitution of the fc Mahonpedan armies of the 
Deccan underwent a gradual change. Whether it was owing 
to constant feud between the foreign and the Deccanee Maho- 
medans, or whether foreigners found greater attractions in the 
armies of the great Delhi Emperors, cannot now be said, but 


it seems certain that there was no longer the same quantity 
of volunteer adventurers from foreign parts from whom to 
recruit the^Deccan armies. It therefore became the custom 
to recruit the ranks largely from among the Hindoo warlike 
tribes the Beydars, Mahrattas and Rajputs. The chief com- 
mands were bestowed upon Mahomedans, and there were also 
special regiments composed exclusively of Mahomedans 
amongst whom were also Arabs and Abyssinians. The armies, 
however, were very largely made up of Hindoos, and not only 
did this cause a change in their system of warfare, but it led 
eventually to a weakening of the army itself/' 

The Marathas or Bargfs, he goes on to point out, espe- 
cially distinguished themselves as irregular cavalry and were 
largely employed in the hilly country ending in the Western 
Ghats. "Mahomedans at no period seem to have had any 
partiality for hills and jungles. When they received a jaghir 
(or estate) they preferred that it should be in the plains, if 
possible, not far from the capital. Even then, they seldom 
resided in their country seas, except* occasionally for hunting 
or purposes of sport. They preferred the vicinity of the Courts 
with all their intrigues and luxury. They therefore left the 
wilder portions of the Deccan in the hands of these Hindoo 
chieftains, stipulating only that each Zamindar should bring 
a certain number of retainers into the field. In this way there^ 
gradually grew up a hardy race of mountaineers, always the 
best stuff for soldiers, who, brought up in their own faith and 
traditions, were yet taught the art of war by their conquerors, 
and only awaited a time of danger and of weakness to raise 
the standard of revolt, and assert their own independence. 
This was, in fact, the origin of the Mahratta nation, and the 
Sultans of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar may be said to have 
educated and brought into ^xistence the nation which, before 
long, was to take, not only their places, but very nearly to 
'acquire the sovereignty of India." 41 

It is difficult to improve upon this description of the con- 
ditions in which the Marathas found their great opportunities. 


All over Mahara$tra tcxlay there are families in whose veins 
runs the blood of their ancestors who exploited this situation 
to their fullest advantage. Most of them have preserved 
traditions, partly oral and partly written, which when sifted 
and verified would provide rich material for their grand na- 
tional saga. These sources of Maifctha history ought not to 
be contemptuously dismissed as worthless fabrications or 
"gossiping Bakhars and gasconading Tawari&is." For our 
present period they constitute an invaluable source. Even 
where some of the details might appear to be of doubtful 
authenticity, the tradition as a whole is borne out by the test 
of cross-references and mutual corroborations. They are, be- 
sides, so interwoven with place-nantes, institutions and prac- 
tices which have continued in after ages, that little doubt 
might be cast upon their essential veracity. Minus a few 
mythical touches and interpolations calculated to foster family 
pride, they provide a wealth of valuable information which 
remains to be fully utilised. They certainly give us a full 
picture in tone and coloiir of the fq^mative period of Maratha 
history, which must not be ignored or neglected. 

Under the Deccan Sultans, the country was divided into 
Tarafs or Sorters, subdivided into parganas or prants, which 
in their turn were made up of units, the smallest of 
which was a village. The revenue was farmed out in small 
portions and collected mostly through Hindu agents. There 
were 'Amils or government officers to regulate the police work 
and decide civil suits. These last were generally referred to 
the Panchayats. Over the ' Amils was a Muqasdd&r or ' Amalddr 
(who was not always a Maiiomedan) ; and above the latter a 
Subd : " He did not reside constantly in the districts, and 
toe* no share in the revenue management, although deeds and 
formal writings of importance wpre made out in his name." 42 

The military organisation was feudal in character. The 
hill-forts were generally garrisoned by the Mamthas under the 
Desmukhs and Jagtrdars. A few places of great importance 
were reserved by the King, by whom the qile'dars and gover- 


riors were appointed. Rank depended upon the number of 
retainers and horses maintained for which a jd&r was gene- 
rally assigned. Grant Duff observes, 'the quota of troops so 
furnished was very small in proportion to the size of the 
jagheer. Phultun Desh, for which in the time of the Mahratta 
Peishwas 350 horse were required, only furnished 50 to the 
Beejapoor government, at a very late period of that dynasty ; 
but the Mahratta chiefs could procure horse at a short notice, 
and they were entertained or discharged at pleasure : a great 
convenience to a wasteful Court and an improvident govern- 
ment. The allegiance of the Hindoo sardars was secured by 
the conferment of titles lijce Naik, Raja, and Rao, which in- 
variably carried with it the means of supporting the new rank. 
Often the Mahrattas proved recalcitrant and even dangerous ; 
but they were seldom united. They fought with rancour 
wherever individual disputes or hereditary feuds existed ; and 
that spirit of rivalry, which was fomented by the Kings of 
the Bahmanne dynasty, was one means of keeping the Mah- 
rattas poised against each*other in the dynasties which suc- 
ceeded them.' 43 

Ranatfe has pointed out that Brahman Despdndes and 
Manatha Desmukhs or Desdis were in charge of district collec- 
tions, and the names of Dadopant, Narso Kale, and Yesu 
Pan<Jit were distinguished for the great reforms they introduced 
in the Bijapur revenue administration. Brahman ambassadors 
ivere employed by the Abmadnagar kings at the Courts of 
Gujarat and Malwa ; and Kamals&i, a Brahman Pesvd held 
great power under the first Burhanshah. Yesu Pancjit was 
Mustaphd in the Bijapur kingdom at the same time. 44 

One of the earliest Maratha families to carve out a place 
for themselves was that of te Nimbajkars of Phaltan. Its 
scions still rule over their historic principality. Their family 
traditions stretch back to the days of Muhammad Tughlaq, 
and recount the distinguished part played by the Nimbajkars 
tinder successive dynasties. 45 One Nimba Raj appears to have 
obtained the title of Naik from M. Tughlaq together with a 


jdglr worth three and a half lakhs. His son, Waijanga-bhupal, 
distinguished himself under the Bahmanis, and* he married 
Jaivantabai, daughter of Kamraj Ghatge, who was a great 
mansabdar. Under the 'Adilgjiahl, a Nimba]kar was made 
SardeSmukh of Phaftan, according to Grant-Duff, before the 
middle of the seventeenth century, "as appears by original 
sunuds of that date." He also adds, that Wungojee Naik, 
better known by the title of Jugpal, who lived in the early 
part of that century " was notorious for his restless and pre- 
datory habits." 46 A sister of this Jugpal was the grandmother 
of ivaji the Great (i.e. wife of Malojl Bhoste). 

Shahji, father of iSivaji, got a good footing because of his 
relations with the Nimbiajkars on the one side (in the 'Adil- 
ghahi) and with the Jadhavs on the other (in the Nizamghahl). 
The jagirs of these important Maratha families, stretching 
athwart the country, and occupying contiguous lands, formed 
an imperium in imperio on account of the de facto power they 
wielded. * e 

Another such family was that of the Mores who were 
' originally Naiks in the Carnatic.' One of them had risen to 
be a commander of 12,000 infantry. Yusuf ' Adil Shah em- 
ployed him in the reduction of the wild tract between the 
Nira and Waraaja rivers. In this enterprise More was suc- 
cessful, and he dispossessed the iSrkes and their allies, the 
Guzars, the Mohitfe, the Mahadiks, etc. For this great ser- 
vice the title of Chandra Rao was conferred upon More. His 
son YaSvant Rao, likewise, distinguished himself in a battle 
against Burhan Nizamshah, near Parenda, and captured his 
green flag. He was consequently allowed to use that trophy 
as his standard, and succeeded his father, as Raja of JavlL 
4 Their posterity used the saipe tract, of country for seven 
generations, and by their mild and useful administration that 
inhospitable region became extremely populous/ 47 

The Ghatg& of Khatav De were separated from the 
Nimbajkars by the Mahadev Hills. They were Detmukte 
of MSaj under Bahman! rule ; but the title of Sardesmukh was 


conferred upon Nagoji Rao Ghatge by Ibrahim 'Adilshah in 
1626, together with the honorific Jujar Rao. The MSnes were 
Desmukhs of MhasvaaJ in Mai) taluka (51 miles e. of Satara). 
They too were distinguished Siledars under Bijapur govern- 
ment, 'but nearly as notorious for their revengeful character 
as the iSirkes.' 4 * The Daftes of Jath (Bijapur District) were 
hereditary Patils of Dafliapur ; and the Savants of Wa<Ji (near 
Goa) were Desmukhs who got the title of Bahadur from the 
'Adilshah for service against the Portuguese. " It is remark- 
able of their territory," writes Grant-Duff, "that the ancient 
appellation of the family is preserved in our modern maps. 
They were distinguished as.commanders of infantry, a service 
best adopted to the country which they inhabited/' 49 

The Savants were Bhosles like the Desmukhs of MudhoJ 
and Kapsi, near the Waraija and Ghataprabha rivers respec- 
tively. All these Marathas traced their origin from North 
Indian Katriyas or Rajputs : the Nimbajkars were Pawars 
or Paramars, and the Dalles Chauhaiis*; the Jadhavs of Sind- 
khed were Yadavs, and the Bhosles Sisodiyas. The story of 
the migration of junior members of the Katriya ruling families 
of the North runs in the family traditions of several chieftaina 
of the Deccan and the South. According to Rudrakavi's 
Rd$frau4ha-Vamsa Mahdkdvya (1596 A.D.) the founder of the 
Bagul principality of Mayurgiri (Nasik District) belonged to 
the RathoxJ family, and originally came from Kanauj. Minus 
its poetic and mythological touches, several of the historical 
facts mentioned by the poet are corroborated by other evi- 
dence. A few incidents are worthy of notice here. 

Baglan (country of the Baguls) came under Muslim 
domination after the fall of the Yadavas of Devgiri. The 
Tarikh-i-FiruzsJiahi states that; (c. 1340) the mountains of 
SalhSr and Mulher were held by a chief named Mandev (a 
mistake for Nanadev of the Bagul family). The Mayurgiri 
kingdom appears to have been founded at the commencement 
of the fourteenth century. 50 But it was compelled into sub* 
mission successively by the Muslim rulers of BIdar, 


and Gujarat. In 1429, during the Bahmani-Gurjarat war, the 
Bagul territory was over-run and devastated by Ahmad Shah I 
(Bahmani). Seventy years later we find that the Baguls were 
tributaries to Afcmadnagar. Next, in 1539, Bahadur Shah of 
Gujarat subjugated them. Finally, when Akbar conquered 
Khandesh (1599), they had to submit to the Mughals. 

The A'in-i-Akbari refers to the RathotJ chief of the moun- 
tainous region between Surat and Nandurbar, who commanded 
8,000 horse and 5,000 infantry. He owned seven forts, two 
of which (Shatter and Mulhfr) were places of unusual 
strength. Owing to its abundance of grain, fodder and water, 
Baglan was able to resist Akbar during a prolonged siege of 
seven years. ' As the passes were most strongly fortified, and 
so narrow that not more than two men could march abreast, 
Akbar was in the end obliged to compound with the chief, 
giving him Nizampur, Daita, and Badur, with several other 
villages. In return Pratapshah agreed to take care of mer- 
chants passing through his territory, to send presents to the 
Emperor, and to leave one of his sons as a pledge at Burhan- 
pur.' 511 Jahangir in his Memoirs writes : ' He (i.e. Pratap- 
sh&h) had about 1,500 horse in his pay, and in time of need 
could bring into the field 3,000 horse . . . The aforesaid Raja 
does not drop the thread of caution and prudence in dealing 
with the rulers of Gujarat, the Deccan, and Khandesh. He 
has never gone himself to see any of them, and if any of them 
has wished to stretch out his hand to possess his kingdom, he 
has remained undisturbed through the support of the others. 
After the province of Gujarat, the Deccan and Khandesh came 
into possession of the late king (Akbar), Bharjiv (Pratapshah) 
came to Burhanpur and had the honour of kissing his feet ; 
and, after being enrolled among his servants, was raised- to the 
man$ab of 3,000.' 52 

The Bhostes were destined to play by far the most import- 
ant rdle in shaping the history of the future. Like the founder 
of the Mgul dynasty, the Sisodiya ancestor of 6ivjl appears to 
liave dome" into the Deccan about the time the Bahmani 


kingdom was established. According to the documents in the 
possession oftthe Bhoste (Ghorpa<j) rulers of MudhoJ, two 
brothers, Sajjan Sinh and Kem Sinh, sons of Ajay Sinh, 
son of Laksmaaj Sinh of Chitor (kinsman of Ratna Sinh, 
the husband of the famous Padmini of ' Ala-u'd-DIn Khalji's 
adventure of 1303) being disinherited by their father, came 
into the Deccan as soldiers of fortune. Sajjan and his son 
Dilip were granted a jdglr by 'Ala-u'd-Din IJasanshah BahmanI 
in recognition of their gallant services, at Mirat near Daulata- 
b&d. The farman relating to this (dated November 1352), 
still preserved at MudoJ, reads : ' Being pleased with the vali- 
ant deeds displayed on th battle-field by RS^a Dilip Sinh, 
Sardar-i-Khaskhel, the son of Sajjan Sinh and grandson of Ajay 
Sinh, ten villages in Mirat (Jaraf Devgarh) are granted to him 
for the maintenance of his family. So, in accordance with his 
wishes, they should be given over to him. Ramazan, 753 H.' 53 

Firishta says that 'Suddoo' (Sidoja, son of Dilip) was 
awarded the title of ' Meer Nobat ' for*his great exploits. His 
son Bhairoji or Bhimjl obtained MudhoJ, along with 84 ad- 
joining villages, in 800 H. (1398), from Firuz Shah Bahmam. 
In the farman Sidojl is referred to as Thanedar of Sagar who 
'sacrificed himself in the thick of the fight/ Bhairoji who 
' fought shoulder to shoulder with his father against our ene- 
mies, and showed great courage and ability, attracted our 
royal attention as deserving of favours. So in recognition 
of these qualities. .. .Mudhol and the adjoining 84 villages 
{Taraf Riaibag) have been granted as a mark of royal favour 
to Bhairavsinhji. So he should take possession of this jagir 
and enjoy it from generation to generation and render diligent 
and loyal service in the cause of our Empire. 25 Rabi-u'l- 
akhar, 800 H.' (15 January 1398). 54 

Another document speaks of the services of Ugrasen 'in 
the battle against the Raja of Vijayanagar '; and adds, ' In the 
same manner, from the beginning of this Kingdom, the ancestors 
of his family have faithfully sacrificed their lives in the service 
of our Sovereignty. Hence, the cherishing and sustaining of 


this family is incumbent on us'. This jar man (dated 8 
Shflwwal, 827 H. or 3 September 1424) links up the Mudhol 

and Mirat jaglrs (with PSthri) 'given from old days' to 

continue in the possession of Ugrasen, ' so that he may serve us 
with satisfaction.' 55 To these territories the pargana of Wai 
was added, in 1454, by 'Ala-u'd-Dan II for service during the 
campaign against the Sirkes of Khe]na. 

6ubhakr$na, a younger son of this Ugrasen, together with 
his paternal uncle, Pratap Sinh, left Mudhq] on account of a 
family dispute, and settled on the Mirat jaglr, about 1460. 
Thenceforward the two sections of the Bhostes developed along 
divergent lines. Muhammad Shah Bahmanfs jar man (of 7 
JumcuR-u'l-Awwal, 876 or 22 October 1471) explains the circum- 
stances in which the Mudho] family acquired its more popular 
name of Ghorpa^ ; in it the final capture of Khejna is attri- 
buted to Kr|na Sinh and Bhim Sinh of this family. 66 Suc- 
cessive farmans of the 'Adilshahs bear witness to the continued 
loyalty of the Ghorpatfes to their* Muslim masters. But the 
northern branch of the Bhostes, descended from Subhak^a, 
though serving under the Nizamshahi rulers, struck out for 
greater independence. Shahjl and 6ivaji belonged to the Mirat 
branch. In this line were born M^lojS and his brother Vithoji. 
They were originally Patils of VeruJ (Ellora near Daulatabad), 
under Lukhjl Jadhav Rao, who was Desmukh of SindkhetJ 
(Nizamhahl). MSlojI married Umabai, a sister of Vaajgoji 
Naik Nimbajkar of Phaltajn. Their son, Shahji was married 
to Jijiabai, daughter of Lukhji Jadhav Rao. She became the 
mother of the famous Sivaji. When Malojl died fighting at 
the battle of Indapur, in 1606, he left behind him as family 
jaglr, Ellora, Dheradi, Kannrad, several villages in the Jafrabad, 
Daulatabad and Ahmadabad (Nizamshahi) districts, besides the 
management of the Poona estate. 57 He had already acquired 
the status of a man$abdar of 5000 horse before the historic 
marriage of Shahjl and Jijabai. The exploits of Shahji will 
be dealt with in the next chapter. But the ground had been 
already prepared for him in the manner described by us above. 


' We Rajputs have served from old till now under 
several kings ; we have never before served nor shall we 
do so in future under dishon9ur and displeasure. We 
shall not further put up with unfair treatment. Shahj! 
to 'Ali 'Adil Shah.* 

During the seventeenth century, when the Mughal Empin 
was in the plenitude of ite power and prosperity, the Southerr 
States were in a crumbling condition. Already a century had 
elapsed since the dissolution of the Rahman! Kingdom, an<3 
Vijayanagar was more a memory than a political entity tc 
reckon with. While the Nizamsbahl was tottering to its fall, 
GolkonKJa and Bajapur were emitting a last fitful glow before 
their extinction. Both the Deccan and the peninsula furthei 
south, therefore, offered a tempting field to adventurous spirits 
whether they were of local or foreign origin. Our concern in 
this chapter is to trace the doings of some of these adventurers 
who ultimately proved themselves the creators of a new order. 

At the outset, it is helpful to bear in mind that the cen- 
tury opened with the death of Akbar (1605), in North India, 
and closed with the death of Aurangzeb (1707) in the Deccan. 
These two titans, each ruling for half-a-century, enclosed bet- 
ween their reigns an epoch of grandeur and power such as had 
rarely been witnessed in India since the days of the imperial 
Mauryas and Guptas. The best period of Muslim rule in the 
Deccan was certainly over ; and further south, the vanishing 
shadow of Vijayanagar brooded over a congeries of warring 
chieftains, rather than States,* who had up till recently been its 
subordinates or feudatories. Golkontfa and Bijapiir were like 
-two lizards trying to lick in these political ephemera, while the 
imperial cat was already at their back about to swallow them. 
The Manath&s stepped in at this juncture, and by a combina- 


tion of the ' mountain-irats ' performed the miracle of saving 
themselves from the feline danger. Shahji Bhoste, father of 
feivaji, occupies a position of great promise among the pioneers 
of the Manatha movement for the liberation of their country 
from the domination of Islamic powers. 

Personality has ever played a prominent part in politics ; 
and though our chief aim is historical rather than biographical, 
we have necessarily to note a few landmarks in the careers of 
the early makers of Maratha history. Shiahji was born on 15 
March 1594 and married Jijahai, daughter of Lukhji Jadhav 
Rao, in 1605. His second marriage took place about 1625, with 
Tukabai Mohit at Bljiapur. 2 These details are of importance 
on account of their 'political consequences. Siviaji was born of 
the former wife and Vyankojl of the latter. Both became 
founders of States whose history we are to trace in later chapters. 
Besides, the two marriages led to family feuds which were not 
without significance in shaping important events. One of the 
immediate results of the dispute which arose between the 
Bhostes and the J&dhavs was that Lukhji went over to the 
Mughal camp, 3 while Shiahji remained in the Nizamshahi to be 
one of its last defenders. 

It is not to be supposed, however, that Shahji's service was 
disinterested ; for he too was a fortune-hunter and changed sides 
as exigencies dictated. But his bona fides may not be ques- 
tioned, relatively speaking. While his father-in-law went away 
in a huff and petulant pique, Shahji proved a more loyal sup- 
porter of the kingdom though not of every prince who sat ort 
the Nizambah! throne. The circumstances were such that no 
absolute consistency of conduct could be expected from any- 
body. Shahji was one among several soldiers of fortune. We 
should judge his actions in terms of the situations as they 
arose rather than by any absolute standards ; more with a view 
to understand and elucidate than to praise or condemn. He 
could rise above many of his contemporaries, but not above 
his age. That transcendence was reserved for his gifted son 


The Nizamsfaahi kingdom, founded by Malik Ahmad Bahri 
in 1490, was practically extinguished in 1633 when Husain 
Nizam Shah HI was captured by the Mughals and sent a pri- 
soner to Gwalior fort, after the fall of Daulatabad. 4 But a 
puppet prince was put up by Shlahji, and lived as a fugitive, 
until the king-maker was compelled to surrender him at Mahuli 
three years later. 5 The commencement of the public career of 
ShahjJ covers the momentous period of the last four decades 
of the ill-fated 1 Nizamshahi State. His name first finds promi- 
nent mention among the Maratha officers who fought against 
the combined forces of the Mughals and the ' Adilshahi at 
Bhatvaxji in defence of the Nizatnshahi kingdom, under its 
great leader Malik 'AmtJar (Oct. 1624). 6 . His father-in-law, 
Lukhji Jadhav Ro, was in the opposite camp on this historic 
occasion. To appreciate its correct significance we must survey 
the situation in the Deccan from the commencement of the 

Akbar had begun hispolicy 01 a&&icssion into the Deccan 
in 1593. 7 The lack of harmony among the Muslim Sultans of 
the South, as well as their factious nobles, helped the Mughals 
in their imperial designs. Gfleat heroism and patriotism were 
displayed in resisting their advance by Chand Bibi and Malik 
'Ambar, but they proved of little avail in the end. 8 . Akbar 
occupied Burhanput on 31 March 1600. Prince Daniyal and 
Khan-i-khanan captured Afcmadnagar fort on 19 August the 
same year ; while Ashgarti came into Mughal possession on 17 
January 1601. 9 It is related that Akbar then proclaimed him- 
self Emperor of the Deccan. He also tried to establish a perma- 
nent link with the Muslim rulers! of the South by securing an 
'Adilghahf princess for his son Daniyal. But the Prince died 
within a few months after his reluctant bride had joined him in 
1604. Details of this incident are narrated by Firishta who 
personally escorted the unwilling princess to Paithaaj. The en- 
forced marriage and its fatal result may be considered pro- 
phetic of the future consciences of the imperial ' courting of 
the Deccan bride/ Aurangzeb was to be the last Mughal 


Emperor to suffer from the fatal consequences of the forced 
political * match-making.' For that imperial conqueror was also 
brought to his lethal bed in the Deccan, and the ' bride ' sur- 
vived to undo his Empire. 

Like the captive 'Adilghahi princess the States of the 
Deccan were long struggling to escape f rotn the imperial Mughal 
clutch. But Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkoixla were succes- 
sively over-powered. The pity of it, however, was that while 
the first was being attacked, the others co-operated with the 
aggressor instead of joining in common defence against the 
common danger. Consequently, the removal of the Nizamghahl 
(1636) brought the t Mughal menace 'to the very gates of Gol- 
kontfa and Bijapur. The imperial share-out of the Nizamshahi 
territories, which we envisaged in the preceding chapter, 10 proved 
but a deadly bait ; though for the time-being the jealous neigh- 
bours of the extinguished kingdom gloated over their temporary 
gains. The heroic Chand Bite died a martyr in this struggle, 
and the brave Abyssinian soldier-statesman, Malik 'Ambar, 
valiantly, though in vain, tried to defend his master's dominion 
during a full quarter-century. " It is my design," he declared 
to Ibrahim 'Adil Shah, "to fight the Mughal troops so long 
as life remains in my body. It may be that through Your 
, Majesty's ever increasing fortune, I shall expel the Mughals 
from the Deccan." 11 Ibrahim, however, proved unworthy of 
this noble trust and confidence. Ultimately he joined the 
Northern aggressor for the common ruination of all the Deccari 
States. The battle of Bhatvatfi (Oct. 1624) was a shining 
episode in the gallant defence of the Aftmadnagar kingdom by 
Malik 'Ambar. 12 It was a striking military triumph, won 
against the combined forces of Bijapur and the Mughals but 
barren of political results. The ' brave captain/ as Petro della 
Valle calls him, died (in 1626), like Chand BIW, extorting ad- 
miration even from his enemies. In the words of the Iqbal- 
nama-i-fahangiri : ' In warfare, in command, in sound judg- 
ment, and in administration, he .had no rival or equal. He 
well understood the predatory (kazzaki) warfare, which in the 


language of the Dakhni is called B&rgi-giri. He kept down the 
turbulent spirits of that country, and maintained his exalted 
position to the end of his life, and closed his career in honour. 
History records no other instance of an Abyssinian slave arriv- 
ing at such eminence/ 13 

From the point of view of Maratha history, the greatest 
i>ervice that Malik * Ambar rendered was the employment and 
training he afforded to the Marathas. He used them with such 
deadly effect that his enemies * passed their days without repose 
and nights without sleep.' Prominent among the Marathas 
who fought on his side at Bhatva<li, as we have stated before, 
were Shahjj Bhosle, Vitfialraj and his son Kheloji Bhosle, 
Mudhoji Nimhajkar of Phaltan, Hambir Rao Chuhao and 
Nagoji Rao Ghatge. On the opposite side were Lukhji Jadhav 
Rao, Uda Ram, and Visvanath (in the Mughal camp), and 
Dhurwjiraj Brahman, Ghate and several others (in the Bijapuri 
army). 14 The observations of Dr. Beni Prasad, in this con- 
nexion, are worthy of cifation : "*The Marathas entered the 
service and the courts of the Deccan monarchs. In the begin- 
ning of the seventeenth century they constituted a powerful 
factor at the Nizamshahl court of Ahmadnagar. The light 
Maratha horse formed valuable auxiliaries to the Deccan forces. 
Malik ' Ambar fully realised their value against the Mughals . . . 
From this point of view, the chief importance of the Deccan 
campaigns of the Mughals lies in the opportunities of military 
training and political power which they afforded to the 
Marathas. Malik 'Ambar as a great master of the art of guerilla 
warfare, as Shivaji himself, stands at the head of the builders 
of the Maratha nationality. His primary object was to serve 
the interest of his own master, but unconsciously he nourished 
into strength a power which more than revenged the injuries 
of the south on the ftorthern* power." 15 

Though Shahji was temporarily alienated, either by the 
hauteur of Malik 'Ambar 16 or his lack of adequate recogni- 
tion of the ambitious MaratM's services after Bhatv&tfi, and 
found welcome at BIjapur (between 1624-26), he was called 


back to the Nizamshahl when the able Abyssinian was no more, 
Shahjl was of sufficient importance at that time for his services 
to be coveted by Bajapur. Malik 'Ambar had killed Mulla 
Muhammad Lari, the B&japuri general, after Bhatvatfi, and 
followed up his victory by raiding the 'AdilshahS territories. 
The defection of Shahjl from 'Ambar, therefore, was a welcome 
relief to BIjapur. The Maltha captain was made Sar Lashkar 
by Ibrahim Shah and Karyat TaJbM, and P&nhaja were con- 
ferred upon his relations the Mohitfe. 17 The exploits of ShahjF 
during this period, such as his defeat of Mudhoji Phaltaijkar, 
are described in the Siva-Bharat. Though all its details may 
not be accepted as true, the serviceableness of Shahjl to his 
new master might not be gainsaid. But the jealousy of the 
older 'Adilshahl servants and the opportunity created by the 
death of Malik ' Ambar (14 May 1626) brought Shahjl back 
into) the Nizamshahl. It is also not unlikely that Murtaza II 
invited him, for the jaglrs of Poona and Sup& which Shahjl 
had secured on his leavirg BIjapur were reconfirmed by the 
Nizam Shah in May 1628. 19 The circumstances were certainly 
all very tempting and favourable for a person of Shahji's calibre 
and ambitions. 

The death of Ibrahim ' Adil Shah, on 12 September 1627, 
might have precipitated his action. Path Khan (Malik 
'Ambar's son) had, indeed, succeeded to his father's official 
position, but his character was not equal to his status as we 
shall presently see. The Emperor Jahiangir also died, on 29 
October 1627, leaving behind him a situation full of turmoil 
creating opportunities for the enemies of the Empire. Ever 
since the murder of prince Khiisrau (22 Feb. 1621 ) 20 by order 
of Khurram (Shah Jahan) at Burhanpur, troubles had been 
brewing thick within the Mughal dominions. Shah Khurram 
himself rebelled in 1623 and sought shelter in the Deccan. 21 
The imperial faftiily itself was torn with dissensions : Nur 
Jahan wanting her son-in-law Shahrfyar td succeed her husband 
to the throne ; her brother A$af Khan supporting the claims of 
his son-in-law, Kburram ; and prince PSrvez backed up by the 


powerful noble Mahabat Khan. The last named actually re- 
fodled and*took the royal couple captive a little before Jahangifs 
death in 1626. 22 Finally, Dawar Baksh (the hapless son of 
the tragic Khusrau) was ma de a scape-goat to pave the way 
for Shah Jahan who ascended the imperial throne through crime 
and bloodshed. 23 The new reign also opened ominously with 
the revolt of Khan Jahan Lodl, who following his master's 
precedent took refuge in the Deccan ( 1627-31 ). 21 

Such was the atmosphere within the Mughal Empire when 
Shahjl returned to the Nizamshahi kingdom. Things were not 
more settled at home. While Khan Jahan was seeking support 
from Murtaza Nizamghah (1629-30), Fatifc Khan was imprison- 
ed by the machinations of IJamid Khan, a vile and unscrupulous 
fellow who rose to power through vice and corruption. 25 In 
the face of the pursuing Mughal forces, a temporary alliance 
had been formed between Bijapur and Aftmadnagar in support 
of the rebel Khan Jahan who promistd restoration of the Deccan 
territories conquered by \he Mughals. 26 Being in league with 
the Lodl, even Lukhji Jadhav Rao had returned to the Nizam- 
shahl. Bijapur was so well fortified, and the allies acted in such 
unison, that the imperial army under A?af Khan had to return, 
not by imposing but accepting terms from the Deccanis. 27 But 
the wickedness of IJamid Khan soon changed the face of the 
situation. The ascendancy of Mustafa Khan and his pro- 
Mughal party in Bijiapur ( 1627-48 ) 28 was also not calculated 
to help in the continuation of the united front against the im- 
perialists. Shah Jahan, on the other hand, was wild with his 
father-in-law over his failure at Bijapur and was determined 
on more vigorous action. At such a moment the folly of 
IJamid Khan brought about a shocking crime in the Nteam- 
^jahJ in the shape of the murder of Lukhji Jadhav Rao and 
several members of his family (25 July 1629 ). 29 Suspicion of 
treason might have instigated this tragedy in that atmosphere 
of intrigue and disloyalty. But whatsoever the reason, it cer- 
tainly served to alienate from Murtaza even the recently restor- 
ed ShShjS Bboste. Alohg with some other frightened and dis- 


affected servants of the NizamgJjahJ, Shahjl felt it expedient to 
join the Mughals. The Mughal chronicler, AbdUl Hamld 
Lahauri, writes : 

' At this time, ShahujI Bhosle, son-in-Jaw of Jadu Rai, the 
Hindu commander of Nizam Shah's army, came in and joined 
Azam Khan (the Mughal commander). After the murder of 
Jadu Rai, . . . Shahuja broke off his connexion with Nizam 
Shah, and retiring to the districts of Puna and Chakan, he 
wrote to Azam Khan proposing to make his submission upon 
receiving a promise of protection. Azam Khan wrote to court 
and received orders to accept the proposal. ShahujI then came 
and joined him with 2000 horse. He received a kbil'at, a 
man$ab of 5000, and a gift of two lacs of rupees, and other 
presents. His brother Minajl (Mianaji?) received a robe and 
a man$ab of 3000 personal and 1500 horse. Samaji (Sambhaji), 
son of ShahujI, also received a robe ancl a man$ab of 2000 per- 
sonal and 1000 horse. Several of their relations and dependants 
also obtained gifts and marks of distinction/ (Nov. 1630). 30 

Wisdom dawned on Murtaza too late ; and when he tried 
to mend matters, the remedy proved fatal to himself. Disgusted 
with the domination of yamid Khan, he brought out Fatb Khan 
from the prison and put him in power. But the restored minis- 
ter, either* out of revenge or mistaking this for a confession of 
weakness, imprisoned Murtaza and wrote to the Mughal gover- 
nor Aaf Khan that he had done so because of the Nizamghaf 6 
evil character and enmity towards the Emperor, ' for which & 
he expected some mark of favour/ In answer he was asked to 
prove his loyalty and goodfaith by ridding the world of such 
a wicked being. Fatft Khan on receipt of this hint ' secretly 
made away with Nizam Shah but gave out that he had died 
a natural death.' 31 (Feb. 1632). Then he placed the deceased 
King's son Husain (III) on the throne, and having reported 
the news to the Imperial Court was called upon to submit to 
the Emperor. Fatfo Khan thereupon had the khufba read in 
the name of Shah Jahan, and Daulatabad was surrendered to 
the Mughals along with other rich tribute. Having thus secured 


the submission of Shahji in 1630 and of Path Khan in 1632, 
Shah Jahaft returned to Agra (which he had left on 3 Dec. 
1629) on 6 March 1632. 32 

The withdrawal of the Emperor from the South was dic- 
tated by two considerations : the death of the queen Mumtaz, 
at Burhanpur (7 June 1631), and the outbreak of a devastating 
famine in the Deccan at the same time. Concerning the latter 
calamity Abdul IJamid writes : ' During the past year no rain 
had fallen in the territories of the Balaghat, and the drought 
had been especially severe about Daulatabad. In the present 
year also there had been a deficiency in the bordering countries 
and a total want in the Deccan and Gujarat. The inhabitants 
of the two countries were reduced to the direst extremity : Life 
was offered for a loaf, but none would buy ; rank was to be 
sold for a cake, but none cared for it ; the ever bounteous hand 
was now stretched out to beg for food ; and the feet which had 
always trodden the way of contentment walked about only in 
search of sustenance. Fo* a long time dog's flesh was sold for 
goat's flesh, and the pounded bones of the dead were mixed 
with flour and sold. When this was discovered the sellers were 
brought to justice. Destitution at length reached such a pitch 
that men began to devour each other and the flesh of a son 
was preferred to his love. The numbers of the dying caused 
obstructions on the roads, and every man whose dire sufferings 
did not terminate in death, who retained the power to move, 
wandered off to the towns and villages of other countries. Those 
lands which had been famous for their fertility and plenty now 
retained no trace of productiveness/ 3 " 3 

Within a few months of Shlah Jahan's return to Agra, 
Shahji quitted the Mughal catnp (June 1632). The ostensible 
ground for his desertion was, his dissatisfaction at the redistri- 
bution of rewards once granted to him. On his joining the 
Mughals, he had been allowed to occupy the districts of Junnar,. 
Sangamngr and Byzapur as his estates. A little later, he was 
asked to stay at Nasik which was the jdgir of another Mughal 
officer, Khwaja Abul Hasan. Finally, when Path Kbn S ur- 


rendered Daulatabad to the Emperor, some of the places pre- 
viously assigned to Shahji were taken away from him and given 
to Fatb Khan (May 1632). Shahji therefore returned to the 
Nizamghahi within a month of this, and seized the districts of 
Nasik, Trimbak, SangameSvar, Junnar as well as parts of Nor- 
thern Konkaifl. 34 Then followed a tussle between the Mughal 
forces and the Deccan States which once more came together 
for the recovery of their lost possessions. The absence of Shah 
Jahan was an encouraging factor, and Khan-i-kh&nan Mahabat 
Kfoan had retired to Burhanpur leaving Daulatabad in the 
charge of Khan Dauran Nasir Khan. At BJjapur Mustafa 
Khan was undoubtedly favourable to the Mughals, as also Fatb 
Khan in the Nizamshahi. But there was a powerful anti- 
Mughal group in the * Adilshahf led by hawa Khan and Ran- 
daula Khan. They had also an intrepid Hindu general in their 
camp, namely, Murar Jagdev, who was friendly towards Shahji. 
It was this combination that the imperialists were called upon 
to face at this time. 36 The position was somewhat as follows : 

In the extreme east of the NizamshaM territories was 
Sholapur which was in the keeping of Sidi Raihan. In the 
west were Shahji at P^mgatJ and Srinivas Rao at Junnar. Sidi 
Saba Saif Khan in Tal-Konkag and Sidi Saba 'Ambar at 
Rajapuri (Janjira) were practically independent. BIjapur 
claimed suzerainty over the M&vajs and along the Nira river. 
But, owing to the unsettled conditions, and the see-sawing of 
authority, every petty chieftain and qiWdar was obliged to sub- 
rriit to the most powerful. Expediency rather than consistency 
and loyalty had become the rule of action for most people. 
The attitude of the waverers might be illustrated by the con- 
duct of Sidi Saif Khan. While Shlahjf was rallying the forces 
of the country in collaboration! with Bffjapiir, he called upon the 
Sidi to join him. But that recalcitrant captain marched away 
to Bajapur pretending to submit directly to the ' Adil Shah. 
Shahji then attacked him and dealt a severe blow from which 
Tie was rescued by the friendly intercession of Murar Jagdev. 
At Bijapur the Sidi was awarded a ja#r worth two lakhs," 


thereby showing that there was no perfect harmony between 
the allies, OB the party opposed to Khawas Khan was mobilising 
its strength to overthrow its rivals. 

Meanwhile, Shahjl, with the support of Murar Jagdev, 
got crowned at Pemga<J another petty princeling belonging to 
the Nizamshah's family ('September 1632 ) 37 in order to impart 
legality to his actions. By then he had made himself master 
of Junnar, Jivdhan, Sunda, BhorgaitJ, Parasga<J, Mahuli, 
Kohaj, etc. with a personal following of 12,000 troops. 38 The 
way he set about consolidating his authority may be indicated 
by his treatment of Srinivas Rao of Junnar. The unwary chief- 
tain was captured along with his castle under the ruse of pro- 
posing a marriage between ShahjI's eldest son Sambhaji and 
grlnivas Rao's daughter/ 59 Coercion and stratagem were con- 
sidered a part of the game while playing for higher stakes. 
Murar Jagdev was acting similarly on behalf of the ' Adil Shah. 
Aqa Riza was commandant of the important border fortress of 
Parenda, originally under tiie Nizam Shah. Owing to his dis- 
like of Path Khan, he had recently transferred his allegiance to 
the Mughals. Murar Jagdev now won him over by bribery 
(28 July 1632 ). 40 More instructive still are the instances of 
Jalna and Daulatabad. Mahmud Khan was keeper of the former 
stronghold under Path Khan. Both Shahjl and the Mughal 
general Khan Zaman made a bid for his surrender ; but the 
latter having offered the larger prize, Jalna submitted to the 
imperial officer. (7 October 1632 ). 41 Mahmud Khan was re- 
warded with a man$ab of 4000 zat and 4000 svdr. 

Fatfe Khan was himself in charge of Daulatabad wherein 
he had been reinstated. Though he was nominally subject to 
the Mughals, actually he was ready to side with the strongest 
party. While carrying on negotiations with Mahabat Khan at 
Burhanpur, he was won over by the ftiore immediate offers of 
help made by Shahji and Randaula Kh5n. The latter paid him 
3,00,000 pago$as cash, supplied him with provisions and fod- 
der, and promised to leave him in independent possession of 
Daulatabad. 'That ill-starred foolish fellow/ writes the dis- 



appointed Mughal chronicler, ' allured by these promises, Broke 
former engagements (with the Mughals), and entered into am 
alliance with them/ 

Mahabat Khan could not brook this. In January 1633 he 
sent his son, Khan Zaman, in advance to punish Path Khan, 
and himself followed in March next. When the Khan-i-fchanan 
joined his son in the attack on Daulatabad and stormed the 
fortress with shot and shell, writes Lahauri, Fatfo Khan ' woke 
up from his sleep of heedlessness and security. He saw that 
Daulatabad could not resist the Imperial arms and the vigour 
of the Imperial commander. To save the honour of his own 
and Nizam Shah's women, he sent his eldest son Abdu-r Rasul 
to Khan-i-khanan (laying the blame of his conduct on Shahuji 
and the ' Adil-Kfaanis) ... On the 19th Zi-l hijja, Path Khan 
came out of the fort and delivered it up/ (17 June 1633). He 
was rewarded with a khiVat and grant of two lakhs of rupees 
(annual), his property was restored to him, and he was ad- 
mitted into Mughal service. The pjippet prince Husain Nizam 
Shah III was sent a prisoner to Gwalior, and his property was 
confiscated. 42 (21 Sept. 1633). 

Shahji had oncp declared, that the loss of Daulatabad, 
which was but one out of the eighty-four fortresses in the 
Nizamshahl, was no cause for despair. In July 1633 he gather- 
ed round himself, at Bhimgaiol, an army of seven to eight 
thousand and seized the country frcrtn Poona and Chakan to 
Balaghat and the environs of Junnar, Afemadnagar, Sangamner, 
Trimbak and Nasik. The Mughals tried to tackle him by offer 
of terms through his cousin Maloji Bhoste, but he felt him- 
self strong enough to reject their offers. 43 The imperialists met 
with like failure against Murar Jagdev at P^renda. Prince 
Shuja was sent for the captur^ of that stronghold (24 Feb. 
1634); but it defied him. Azam Khan had attempted it three 
years earlier (March 1631), but with no better result. Onr 
both the occasions the valour of. Murar Jagdev baffled the 
Mughals. With the approach of rains, and lack of provisions, 
Shuja withdrew in May 1634. These failures broke the heart 


of Kban-i-fcjjanan who died on 26 October that same year, 
with the task* of subjugating the Deccan still unaccomplished. 44 
To retrieve the Imperial position, Khan Dauran was sent 
as viceroy in January 1635. He chased Shahji out of the en- 
virons of Daulatabad where he was collecting revenue at Ram- 
dud. Shahji escaped to Junnar via tSevgaon and Amarpur acros? 
the Mohri Ghatt, losing 8000 oxen laden with grain, arms, 
and rockets, along with 3000 followers who were taken prisoner. 
The Siva Bharat states that he was still master of the territories 
enclosed between the rivers Godavari, Pravara, Nira and Bhlma, 
besides the MavaJ and Konkai^. 45 What strengthened him fur- 
ther was his alliance with^BIjapur. To tackle this situation 
Shah Jahan himself moved into the Deccan, arriving at Daulata- 
bad on 21 February 1636. 

The time was certainly opportune for him. Mustafa Khan 
and Jhawa Khan were at logger-heads in Bijapur. The former 
had been sent to prison by the latter (in 1633) ; but fhe situa- 
tion soon recoiled on Ihaw^. The instrument of the reaction 
was Randaula Khlan who had fallen out with Murar Jagdev 
and Ktewa Khan. Finding himself in danger Khawa appeal- 
ed for Mughal help, but was murdered along with Murar 
Jagdev, before the Mughals could come to their rescue (1635). 4<i 
The ascendancy of Randaula Khan, however, did not affect the 
alliance with Shahji. Therefore Shah Jahan decided to act with 

The imperial army was divided into three parts, each being 
led respectively by Khan Dauran, Khan Zaman, and Sba'ista 
Khan. The first was sent towards Kandhar and Nand&J (in 
the border between Golkoixja and BSjapur territories), with in- 
structions to ravage the country and besiege the forts of Udgir 
and Avs6. The second division, under Khan Zaman, was direct- 
ed towards Afcmadnagar to capture or devastate Shahji's posses- 
sions from ChamargonKja and Ashti to the Konkaaj. The third 
was to conquer Junnar, Sangamn6r, Nasik and Trimbak. Find- 
ing that Bijapur was not shaken by these manoeuvres, Shah 
Jahan finally ordered the devastation of the 'Adilghahl terri- 


tories as well. These tactics, perhaps reinforced by intrigues 
through the pro-Mughal Mustafa Khan, succeeded in detaching 
Bijapur from Shahji. On 6 May 1|536 a treaty between the 
Emperor and 'Adil Shah was signed, followed by another, in 
June, with Golkontfa. 47 The purpose of these engagements was 
to isolate Shahji : after defining the share-out of the Niziam- 
sljahl territories (as indicated in the preceding chapter), it was 
particularly stipulated that the ' Adil Shah should give no quar- 
ter to the rebel Shahji until he submitted to the Emperor and 
surrendered Junnar and the other Nizan^hahff forts to the im- 
perialists, and agreed to take up service under Bijapur. Failing 
such surrender on the 'part of Shahji, ' Adilshahl forces were to 
co-operate with the imperial generals in the reduction of the 
'Maratha rebel. 48 

Thus deserted and betrayed by Bijapur, Shahji became a 
fugitive hunted from fort to fort, until at last he was forced 
to submit under the confined pressure of the confederate armies. 
The Siva Bharat names the following among Shahji's supporters 
in this grave extremity : his only friends in need : namely, 
Ghatge, Kate, Gaikwatf, Kank, Jhomre, Chauhaii, Mohitf, 
MafiaxJik, Kharate, Fanolhare, Wagh, Ghorpatfe, etc. all 
Marathas. 49 His own family! was at Junnar with his eldest son 
SambhajJ among its defenders. But they were all pursued and 
driven over the Ghats into the Konkanj. It was the rainy season, 
and the Mughal force under Khan Zaman was for a time held 
up by the floods in the MJuJa, Multha and IndrayairjJ rivers, bet- 
ween Poona and Lohgatf. Shahji wavered for a while between 
Mahuli and Muranjan forts before making a final stand. He 
<even sought assistance and shelter at the hands of the Portu- 
guese. But, in the face of the ' Adilshahl and Mughal pursuers, 
they dared not take any risks. 'The Council unanimously 
agreed,' frankly states the Portuguese record, ' that, concerning 
Shahji, who was pursued by two such powerful enemies as the 
Mughals and ' Adil Shah, with whom we are at peace and on 
friendly tertns, it was not convenient to favour and help openly, 
nor give him shelter in the fortress of Chaul, but, in case he 


were to go to DannJa (Rajapuri) or wherever he should think 
best, that wa$ he could be helped with all precaution/ 50 

Finally driven to bay, Shiahjj decided to take shelter within 
Mahull which had been lately surrendered to him by its Maratha 
commandant Mambajl Bhosle. There he was closely invested 
and forced to submit : ' He was told that if he wished to save 
his life he should come to terms with ' Adil Khan ; for such was 
the Emperor's command. He was also advised to be quick in 
doing so, if he wished to escape from the swords of the besie- 
gers. So he was compelled into submission to ' Adil Khan, and 
besought that a treaty might be made with him. After the arrival 
of the treaty, he made some absurd inadmissible demands/ 
writes the imperial historian, ' and withdrew from the agreement 
he had made. But the siege was pressed on and the final attack 
drew near, when Sahu came out of the fort and met Randaula 
half way down the hill, and surrendered himself with the young 
Nizam. He agreed to enter the servic^ of ' Adil Khan, and to 
surrender the forts of Junnar,Trimbak, Tringalwari, Haris, Jund, 
and Harsira, which were delivered over to Khan Zaman . . . 
Randaula, under the orders of 'Adil Khan, placed the young 
Nizam in the hands of Khan Zaman, and then went to Bijapur 
accompanied by Sahu/* 1 (November 1636). Here ended the 
first phase of ShShjfs restless career. It synchronised almost 
exactly with the Nizamshahfs struggle for existence (1594- 
1636) . With the extinction of that Kingdom and Shahjf s entry 
into the ' Adilshahl service, we turn from the Deccan proper to 
peninsular India ; from the fortunes of a growing Empire in 
the North to the! misfortunes of a languishing Empire in the 

The period which followed the treaty between the Mughal 
Emperor and the Deccan Sultans afforded the latter a respite 
on their northern frontiers which they fully utilised for extend- 
ing their dominions southwards. Golkontfa and Bijapur were, 
like the now extinguished Nizamshaha, inheritors of the Bahmani 
traditions. The renewal of the war with what remained of the 
once glorious Vijayanagar Empire, was therefore quite tradi- 


tional for them. Besides there were alluring prospects in the 
South from whose territories and treasures the 'Sultans could 
compensate themselves for losses sustained by them at the 
hands of the Mughals. To these temptations were added the 
inviting dissensions of the scions and vassals of Vijjayanagar 
(viz. the NSyaks of Ikkeri, Mysore, GinjS, Tanjore, Madura, 
etc.) who by their suicidal antagonisms undid all the good work 
of the great Rayas. As the Jesuit Antoine de Proenza signi- 
ficantly observed, in 1659 : " The old kings of this country 
appear, by their jealousies and imprudent actions, to invite the 
conquest of entire India by the Muslims." 52 The Muhammad- 
nama (official chronicle of the Kings of Bjijapur) plainly 
declares : ' As the Karnatak and Malnatf had not been con- 
quered before by any Muslim king of the Deccan, Muhammad 
4 Adil Shah thought of bringing them under his sway in order 
to strengthen and glorify the Islamic religion in the dominion 
of the Hindus :' 53f and * to win for himself the titles of Mujahid 
and Ghazi' adds the >asatin-u's-Salatin. ry4 

The objectives being thus settled, geography and their re- 
lative strength and status determined the respective shares in 
the spoils of victorv between Bljapur and Golkoiyja. Tenta- 
tively it was agreed upon that Golkon<la was to extend along 
the East coast below the Kreoa delta, and Bljapur to conquer 
Western Kamatak, MalnaxJ, and the Mysore plateau. The 
forces of the two inevitably met in the Eastern Carnatic near 
Ginja, and thereafter the division depended upon force majeure. 
Machiavellian real politik really decided the fate of small and 
great .principalities where grab as grab can was the only guid- 
ing principle, and neither 'border nor breed* was respected. 

The century which followed the disaster of Rakkastangajji 
(1565) was one of disintegration for the Vijayanagar domi- 
nions. From our point of view it closes with the death of 
Shahjl in 1664. Venkattapati II and Sri Ranga III were the 
last two rulers of the Aravitfu dynasty who struggled heroically 
to preserve their great inheritance ( 1630-64) . 56 But the Nayaka 
and polygars, their nominal vassals, saw to it that they did 


succeed. The petty chiefs of Ikkeri, Mysore, Ginji, Madura 
and Tanjord? who were originally officers of Vijayanagar, had 
gradually become its feudatories, and then independent rulers. 
Now they acted as enemies, rebels and traitors. A Dutch re- 
cord of the time speaks of 'the Tijmerage (Timma Raja), 
commander of the King of Carnatica, who had revolted against 
the King and arrested him, and except a few fortresses had con- 
quered the whole counfry.' 56 Though ultimately all of them 
went the way of traitors, for the time being, these short-sighted 
and selfish rebels played havoc with the remnants of the Vijaya- 
nagar empire. Our interest lies chiefly in the work of Shahjl 
and the Marathas who caipe into this disturbed atmosphere as 
agents and auxiliaries of the BSjapur King, but remained in the 
South to found a dominion of their own. 

Shahjl served under Muhammad ' Adil Shah (1636-56) and 
'Ali 'Adil Shah (1656-64). The Bijapur kingdom survived 
him only twenty-two years ; for it was absorbed in the Mughal 
Empire in 1686. The principal generals who led the southern 
campaigns were Raudaula Khan (1636-43), Mustafa Khan 
(1643-48), and Khan Mubammad (1648-57). Shahjl was 
associated with all of them practically throughout, and rose to 
be latterly one of the most important Bffjapur generals. He was 
appointed governor at Bangalore and entrusted with the work 
of consolidation and extension of the 'Adilshahl authority. 
Occasionally he was misunderstood or misrepresented by his 
Muslim colleagues, and suffered arrest or imprisonment more 
than once. But every time he vindicated himself successfully, 
and died in harness as a loyal servant of the 'Adil Shah in 
1664. The self-irespecting and independent tone of his letter 
to ' Ali ' Adil Shah (excerpt cited at the head of this t chapter) 
is indicative of his strength and importance in 1657. His 
southern activities certainly proved more fruitful for Maratha 
history than his earlier adventures in the Nizamshahi. 

Shahji's antecedents at the commencement of his enforced 
* Adilhahi service must be borne in mind in order to be able 
to assess his position correctly. Though defeated 1 in war, it is 


not to be forgotten that he had been lately ally of his present 
master. Secondly, though deprived of his other ^Nizamghahi 
possessions, his jagirs in Poona and Supa were left to him. 
These formed the nucleus round which his gifted son Sivajl 
developed his power and empire. We shall speak of these deve- 
lopments in later chapters, but here it must be remembered! 
that the activities of both father and son were to have impor- 
tant repercussions on each other. 

Between 1637 and 1640 three expeditions were sent into 
the Malnad area of Mysore. They were led by Randaula 
Khan and Shlahji who were old friends. The first was against 
Ikkeri and Basavapattai?a, which #ere ruled respectively by 
Virabhadra and Keng Hanuma. The Muhammad-ndma re- 
lates : ' Keng Nayak, the Raja of Basavapattaija, w ho had an 
ill-will against Vlrabhadra, through the deplorable propensity 
of taking revenge, informed Rustum-i-Zaman (Randaula KhanL 
" I will help you in conquering the whole country, but you 
should first invade Ikkeri. I will show you a path by which you 
can reach Ikkeri quickly, and Vffrabhadra will not catch scent 
of your coming. You will gain an easy victory over him if 
you will give me one lakh of hons as my reward and commend 
me to your king/' Efustum-i-Zaman agreed to this/ 57 The re- 
sult of this treachery was that Ikkeri was conquered (1637) 
and Virabhadra was compelled to cede half of his territory and 
pay a tribute of 18 lakhs of hons. Vlrabhadra then shifted his 
capital to Bidnur. 58 Two years later a punitive expedition was 
led against the Nayak for not having paid the stipulated tri- 
bute. "Ikkeri might have been annexed/ writes Dr. S. K. 
Aiyangar, "but was saved by the intervention of Shahji, and 
agreed to be a vassal kingdom under Bfjapur." 59 An inscription 
of 1641 speaks of Virabhadra as having ' given protection to 
the southern kings who were alarmed by the great army of the 
PStushah/ 60 

The next expedition was against Kasturi Ranga of Sim 
and Kempe Gaiwja of Bangalore (1638). The former division 
was led by Afzal Khan and the latter by Randaula Kfcpn and 


ShahjI. Following the morality of Pizarro at Maxico (against 
Atahualpa) ^ind anticipating his own fate at PratapgaKj, Afzal 
Khan murdered the chief of Sina during a feigned interview, 
and captured his stronghold. 61 The chief of Tatfpatri saved 
himself by cleverly diverting the Muslim army to Bangalore, 
The latter place was conquered by Randaula and Shahji and 
made the headquarters of the Bffjapur authority under Shahji. 
Srirangapaftaioa was next attacked (1639). But according to 
a contemporary Kanna^a work (Kanthlrava Narasarajendra 
Vijaya by Govinda Vaidya, composed in 1648) the Muslims, 
were defeated and driven out. 61 ' The Muhhammad-ndma, how- 
ever, claims that the Raja^ after a month's resistance, saved his 
kingdom by paying a tribute of five lakhs of hons. 63 The Siva 
Bharat attributes the victory to Shahjf s valour which it says 
was applauded by Rustum-i-Zaman (Randaula Khan). It also 
adds that the Nayaks of Kaveripattana and Madura also sub- 
mitted during this campaign. 04 

The third expedition was provoked by the revolt of Kenge 

Hanuma who appears to have engineered a general rising of the 
Hindu rajas in 1639. He had gathered together an army of 
70,000 men to defend his capital city of Basavapattaftja. But 
his bitter enemy Vfrrabhadra of Bidnur saw in this an opportu- 
nity for revenge and joined the Bijapur forces. The defenders 
made heroic resistance, but Basavapattaaja was conquered. 
Kengje Nayak was obliged to pay 40 lakhs of hons. Shahji, 
from all accounts, is said to have played a prominent part in 
this campaign. 65 Minor raids were directed towards Bdur, 
Tumkur, and Chiknaikana HaJJi, the last of which alone yielded 
20,000 hons ; another 80,000 were got from Ba]Japur. An abor- 
tive understanding with Sri Ranga Rayal was attempted, but 
it proved of little consequence. Rustum-i-Zaman carried away 
all the movable treasures from Kolihal (Kunigal, 40 m. w. of 
Bangalore) and left the empty fortress to Sri Ranga, ' as agreed 
to before/ 66 

The revolt of Sivappa Nayak, successor of Virabhadra of 
Bidnur, in 1643, opened the next stage of the conquest. Khan-i- 


&banan Muzafer-u'd-Din was dispatched to suppress the re- 
bellion. His success in this earned for him the title of Khan 
Muhammad Muhammadshahi. He effected the further con- 
quests of Nandiyal and eight other strongholds, during the year 
following, in the Karnool District. ( 1644-45) , 67 The major cam- 
paign, however, was entrusted to Nawab Khan Baba Mustafa 
in 1646. 

Marching via Gadag and Laxmesvar (June 1646) Mustafa 
Khan was joined by Asad jKhan and Shahji (3 Oct.) at 
HonhaJJi 12 m. w. of Basavapattaoa. Other chiefs came in 
at Sakkar^pattaaj (Ka<Jur District) among whom were Sivappa 
Nayak of Bidnur, DotWa Nayak of JfcupanhalJi, Keng6 Nayak's 
brother, the Desais of LaxmeSvar and Koppal, as well as Mara- 
thas like Abaji Rao Ghatg and Balaji Haibat Rao. At Siva- 
ganga even envoys from the Nayaks of GinjJ, Madura, and 
1 Tanjore came to meet the invaders : indeed a portentous symp- 
tom of the prevailing chaos. Sri Ranga Riayal, the nominal suze- 
rain of these rebellious Nayaks, attempted to coerce them with 
an army of 12,000 horse and 3,00,000 men, but found it an 
impossible task. An English Factory record notes : " This 
<xxmtry is at present full of wars and troubles for the King 
[Sri Ranga], and three of his Nagues [Nayaks] are at variance, 
and the King of Vizapore's army is come into this country 
on the one side, and the King of Golkoncja on the other, both 
against this King." 68 

Finding resistance impossible, Sri Ranga tried diplomacy. 
He sent his Brahman agent Venkayya Somaji to induce the 
Bijapur general to spare his country. But the Khan refused- 
to be diverted by *the deceitful words of the Rayal's envoy/ 
However, Shahji persuaded Mustafa Khan to send his represen- 
tative Mullah AJjmad to the Rayal at Vcllore to discuss terms 
with him personally. But the Rayal, unfortunately, appeared 
to have decided upon resistance. ShahjI's well meant interces- 
sion, therefore, created misgivings in the mind of MustaJa Khan. 
Nevertheless, the general acted tactfully under the circumstances. 
Marching on Vellore, he placed Sh&hjJ on the right wing of 


his army, at the same time keeping Asad Khan's division be- 
hind him as a safeguard against possible treachery. But Shahji 
acquitted himself well and did not betray the trust placed in 
him. Vellore was captured after heavy fighting ; 5,800 of Sri 
Ranga's troops lay dead on the field. The Rayal was thus 
forced to submit paying an indemnity of 50 lakhs of hons and 
150 elephants (April 1647 ). 69 Mutafa Khan returned in 
triumph to Bijapur, effecting some minor conquests on his way 
back. Muhammad ' Adil Shah showed his appreciation of the 
great victory by proceeding as far as the river Kjwa to receive 
the victorious general. The Mu^ammad-nama records the re- 
sult in characteristic! words : ' As the King thought of spreading 
and strengthening the true faith, he brought Ram Raj (Sri 
Ranga ?) and all other rajas of the south under subjection, and 
the strong temples which the kafirs had erected in every fort 
were completely demolished. The whole country was conquered 
in three years and the citadel of dualism and idol-worship was 
given such a rude shod; that the knots of the sacred-thread 
wearers (of Set-band Ramesvar) were; snapped.' 70 

Despite the religious fervour reflected in the Muslim chro- 
nicler's remarks, the campaign was not a mere fanatical raid. 
To garner its political fruits the Hindu Shahji was as much 
depended upon as the Muslim Asad Khan. A jar man issued 
on 11 January 1648 (a day after Mustafa, Khan was again dis- 
patched to the South) bespeaks of the confidence placed by 
Muhammad Shah in the Maiatha general. It enjoins on Ya- 
vant Rao Wadve equal obedience to the commands of the 
Nawab Kfc&n Baba (i.e. Mustafa han) and Shahji who is 
referred to in endearing terms such as ' Maharaj Farzand Shahji 
Bhoste.' He is asked, ' being in agreement with the Maharaj,' 
to practise loyalty tq Government 71 

This last campaign under Mustafa was due to an invitation 
from Tirumala Nayak of Madura who had quarrelled with the 
Nayaks of Ginji and Tanjore. 72 The combined forces of Tiru- 
tnala and Mustafa invested the fort of Ginji, but the siege was 
protracted on account of the severe famine which was raging 


all around. Suddenly, in the midst of these prolonged opera* 
tions, Shahji was arrested by Mustafa- According to**the Basd- 
ftn-u's Saldtin, 'Some incidents happened which became the 
cause of disunion and disaffection between Shahji and Mustafa 
Sian/ 73 Further details of the incident are thus stated in the 
Muhammad-ndma : ' When the siege of Ginji was protracted, 
and fighting continued long, the cunning Shahji, who changed 
sides like the dice of a gambler, sent an agent to Nawab Mutfa 
Khan begging leave to go to his own country and give repose 
to his troops. The Nawab replied that to retire then would 
be tantamount to desertion. Then Shahji remonstrated that 
grain was too dear in the camp, and his. soldiers could no longer 
bear the privation and strain of the siege. He added that he 
was retiring to his country without waiting for further orders. 
The Nawab being convinced that Shahji meant mischief, and 
might show fight, had him arrested (on 25 July 1648) with 
such extreme cleverness and circumspection that no part of his 
property was plundered, btit the whole was confiscated to Go- 
vernment/ 74 

The Basatm-tfs-Salatin also states that Rajl Ghorpatfe, 
Yasvant Rao Wadve, and Asad Khan were employed in appre- 
hending Shahja. He was surprised in his bed in the early hours 
of the morning, but his personal contingent of 3000 Maratha 
horse offered resistance and had to be dispersed. On hearing 
of this, Mufoammad ' Adil Shah dispatched Afzal Khan ' to 
bring Shahji away ; and an eunuch to attach his property.' 75 

Sir Jadunath Sarkar has attributed this arrest of Shahji 
definitely to his " disloyal intrigues/' 76 In support of this view 
he has cited a letter from Abdullah Qutb Shiah to Haji Nasira 
(his agent at Bfljapur) which alleges that on 23 December 1647 
Sh&hji Bhosl had petitioned him i begging, to be taken under 
his protection ', adding that ' then and repeatedly before this ' 
he had ' rejected Shahjfs prayers and told him to serve ' Adil 
Shlah loyally/ Continuing, Sir Jadunath has accused Shahji 
of "coquetting with both the Rayal and Qutb Shah," and states 
that " the latter sovereign divulged the fact to ' Adil Shah." 


The Venkayya Somajl incident is also alluded to by him as 
further supporting his allegation of treason on the part of 
Shahji. 77 A careful examination of the entire evidence, how- 
ever, points to a very different conclusion. 

We have already noticed how the misgivings about Shahji's 
loyalty, caused by his misplaced sympathy towards 6ri Ranga 
Rayal's agent, were proved basdess by his conduct at Vellore 
in November 1646. If he had started "coquetting" with the 
Qutb Shah between November 1646 and 23 December 1647 
(the date of the alleged appeal to Qutb Shah) and had "re- 
peatedly " done so during these thirteen months, the ' Adil Shah, 
after being informed abgut it by Qutb Shah, could not have 
issued the jarman, on 11 January 1648, to Yasvant Rao Wadve 
asking him to act in obedience to Mahdraj Farzand Shahji 
Bhosle. The allegation of disloyalty before 11 January 1648, 
therefore, stands disproved. 

During the short period of six months and two weeks (11 
January to 25 July 1648) preceding Shahjj's arrest, there was 
all round dissatisfaction owing to the lack of provisions and 
the strain of the prolonged operations. Khairiyat Khan and 
Sidi Raihan were as dissatisfied as Shahji. The hardships re- 
ferred to by Shahji were therefore real and not only a pretext. 
The Mufiammad-ndma itself complains that even the Qutb 
Shah (whose forces were defeated by Sri Ranga Rayal) formed 
a secret understanding with the infidel and sent Mir Jumla, his 
general, to assist in the defence of Ginji. 78 But Mar Jumla 
arrived too late and was defeated by the Bijiapur general Baji 
Ghorpatfe. Sir Jadunath himself states that Abdullah Qutb 
Shah wrote " whimpering to Shah Jahan that ' Adil Shah had 
broken his promise and was forcibly taking away Qutb Shah's 
portion." 79 In these circumstances wei are inclined to be scepti- 
cal about the allegation against ShiahjI. Qutb Shah who was 
himself intriguing against ' Adil Shah could not have " divulged " 
the repeated advances of Shahji if they had been true 

Mustafa Khan died under the strain on 9 
The siege of Ginji was concluded victoriouslv 


Khan Muhammad on 28 December, the same year. Shahja was 
all the time (25 July to 28 December 1648) detained at GinjI. 
Had he been guilty of treason, he would! have been post haste 
dispatched to Bajapur, especially as Afzal Khan had been sped* 
ally deputed for the purpose. The prisoner was, however, 
actually taken to the capital along with the treasures 'pro- 
perty beyond calculation and 89 elephants for the King ', which 
looks incredible had Shlahjl been really guilty of the offence for 
which he is supposed to have been arrested. The party led by 
Afzal Khan (which included Shahj!) was received by the ' Adil 
Shah ' in the Kalyian Maftal which had been decorated for the 

Nauroz festivities. 80 


The treatment of Shahjl at Bijapur and the terms of his 
release go to confirm! our belief that his arrest was not due to 
treason. He was kept in ordinary confinement under Ahmad 
Khan, sar sar-i-naubat, and told that 'he would be pardoned 
and restored to his former honours if he surrendered to the 
King the forts of Kon&ana, Bangalore, and Kandarpi.' 81 
Ahmad Khan, by the King's order, conveyed Shahjl to his own 
house and imparted to him 'the happy news of the royal 
favour and did his utmost to compose his mind. Shahjl decided 
to obey and wrote to 'his two sons ... to deliver the forts to 

the Sultan's officers immediately They obeyed promptly. 

Thus all the numerous misdeeds of Shahjl were washed away 
by the stream of royal mercy. The Sultn summoned Shahjl 
to his presence, gave him the* robe of a minister, and settled 
his former lands on him again' 82 Had ShBhjS been really guilty 
of treason, he would have been beheaded like &hawa$ Khan or 
torn to pieces like Murar Jagdev in 1635. That he should have 
been so honorably acquitted in the face of bitter enemies at the 
Court, who were thirsting for Shahjf's blood, speaks volumes 
for his integrity as well as importance. 

* The nobles and gentry of the city/ says the Muhammad- 
were astonished at the graciousness of the King and 

n to say : " Shiahja Raja deserves to be put to death, and 
hot to be kept under guard.'* . . . Some councillors did not at 


all like that Shahjl should be set free, because that faithless 
man . . . would play the fox again. Many others held the view 
that to liberate this traitor and ruined wretch would be like 
treading on the tail of a snake. ... No wise man would rest his 
head on a hornet's nest as on a pillow.' 83 Obviously Muham- 
mad Shah was no fool to invest such a man with ' the robe of 
a minister.' 

Between the arrest and release of Shahji only less than 
ten months had elapsed (25 July 1648 to 16 May 1649). Of 
these over five months had been spent at GinjI without trial. 
The journey from GinjI to Bijapur must have occupied at 
least a month. Finally, *!after about three months detention, 
perhaps as a state prisoner, he was sent back to the South with 
no stigma of a traitor attaching to him. Nevertheless, this ex- 
perience appears to have brought about a metamorphosis in the 
mind of this loyal servant of Bijapur. Though an earlier far- 
man of 'Adil SHah, dated 1 August 1644, speaks of Shahji as 
a ' reprobate ' in connexion with the activities of Dadaji Kon<J- 
dev, 84 nothing of an incriminating character had evidently been 
established against him personally. Kanhoji Jedhe had been 
sent against Dadiaji on that occasion ; but later he must have 
joined Shahji For, the following interesting entry, dated 16 
May 1649, is found in the Jedhe Sakdvali : 

' Shahji was released in return for Komjaria. At that time, 
Kanhoji Jedh and Dadaji Kr$na Lohkare were also released. 
They met the Maharaj who said to them : You have been put to 
the hardships of captivity on account of me. As to our future : 
The King of BSjapur ordered me to lead an expedition into 
Karnatak to which I replied, ' How can I do it with my income 
from only twelve villages ? ' Thereupon the King promised to 
confer on me the provinces of Bangalore yielding five lakhs of 
hons. I have undertaken this enterprise on these terms. 

' Your watan is in Mava\, and my son Sivba occupies 
KheKJbar and Poona. You should help him with your troops; 
and, since you are influential in those parts, you should see 
that all the Maval DeSmukhs submit to him and obey him. 


Thus you should all assert your strength, and should any 
Mughal or * Adilshahl army march against you, you- should fight 
them in full faithfulness to Sivba/ 85 

This record explicitly conveys to us Shahji's attitude to- 
wards Sivajji and his activities. We shall have occasion, at a 
later stage, to consider this more appropriately. But it in no 
way contradicts what we have already said about the conduct 
and character of Shahji. While being not less loyal than most 
other Bljapur officers, his private interests demanded the most 
jealous safeguarding. The tone of his letter to "Ali 'Adil Shah, 
dated 1657, referred to before, clearly indicates this very natural 
desire. Government officers of Shafijf s standing in medieval 
times were feudal vassals. Their jagirs and personal estates 
were not under the direct jurisdiction of the King who was 
merely their suzerain. It was the desire of every big officer 
to increase his jagirs, and! Shahji was no exception. While he 
personally tried to augment his southern estates through loyal 
service, he could not but wink at th' activities of his gifted and 
assertive son. His unjustifiable arrest must have brought home 
to him rather piquantly the precariousness of his position. It 
was a lucky circumstance that iSiviaji was carving out an in- 
dependent position for himself. While it was incumbent on him 
to continue in the service of Bljapur, as well as expedient, it 
was neither paternal nor human for him to take any other atti- 
tude towards his recalcitrant son. Shahji was, therefore, obliged 
under the circumstances to maintain as good a face with the 
* Adil Shah as he possibly could, without in any way jeopardis- 
ing or hampering the good work that iSivaj! was doing. If at 
all, he would help and encourage without compromising his 
position and interests in the South. This was the obvious degree 
of his ' reprobation *, in the eyes pf the ' dil Shah, which could 
not be established as * treason/ Besides, Shahji was too im- 
portant an officer in Karnatak, almost indispensable, to be 
executed or antagonised. Affairs in the 'Adilshahl were fast 
running to a crisis after the death of Mustafa Khan. Mubam- 
mad Shah's protracted illness (1646-56) culminating in his 


death, and the slur of illegitimacy cast over his successor 'Ali 
4 Adil Shah, ^constituted a period of great trepidation which was 
rendered worse by the chronic factiousness of the nobles. Tht 
murder of Khan Muftammad, the successor of Mustafa Kfaan 
and victor of Ginji, on 11 November 1657, was an event as 
symptomatic, if not portentous, as the assassination of Mafc- 
mud Gawan in the last days of the Bahmani kingdom. 86 

Aurangzeb's last viceroyalty of the Deccan (1652-57) was 
also another source of great danger to the Deccan States. His 
operations against Golkoiwja were no doubt frustrated by the 
over-riding policy of Shah Jahan (April 1656), but he had 
succeeded in winning over^the experienced and powerful general 
Mir Jumla. Sir William Foster writes : " In September 1654 
the English factors reported a fresh development in the unstable 
politics of the Coast. The king of Golkonxja, Abdullah Quflb 
Shah, had long been jealous of the power wielded by his servant 
Mir Jurtila, and an open breach had now occurred between 
them. The latter was suspected of an'intention of making him- 
self an independent sovereign of the territory he had conquered 
in the Carnatic ; but he was well aware of the difficulty of stand- 
ing alone, and after making overtures to the King of Bijapur, 
he finally succumbed to the intrigues o/ Aurangzeb, who as 
viceroy 6f the Deccan was eagerly watching for an opportunity 
to interfere .... Towards the end of 1655 an act provoked 
by the haughty behaviour of his son precipitated the crisis, 
and drove Mir Jumla into the artns of Aurangzeb, with dis- 
astrous results to the Golkonxja kingdom." 87 Much the same was 
to happen to the ' Adilshahi. 

Aurangzeb attacked Bijapur in 1657. Though Shah Jahan 
again interfered, the * Adil Shah had to surrender Bidar, Kalyarn 
and Pareiwja besides paying a .tribute of one crore of rupees. 88 
The Mughal war of succession, occasioned by Shah Jahan's 
illness, provided a short though welcome respite to BSjapur 
and Golkonqla (1657-65). When the campaign was resumed, 
it ended in the extinction of the only two Muslim Sultanates of 
the South (1686-87) still remaining. 


That Shahjff had remained loyal to the 'Adil Shah even 
after his arrest and release is indicated by a Portuguese letter 
dated 11 April 1654. It states that ' The persons acceptable to 
the King Idalxa and according to his belief loyal to him are 
Fatecan, Xagi (i.e. Shlahjl) and Malique Acute.' 89 But the 
game of independence was being played by all around him, 
great and stnall. He was no longer under the tutelage of a 
superior Muslim officer, and could more and more act on his 
own initiative ; perhaps also in his own interest as well as 
anybody else. As a matter of fact Muslim power in the South 
was palpably dwindling. Like the tail of a serpent whose head 
has been caught inextricably in a trap, the 'Adilshah! and 
Qutbshahi authority over Karnatak'was doomed to spasmodic 
withdrawal. But there was no one in the peninsula strong 
enough to take its place. Kanfhirava Narasaiiaja Wotjeyar of 
Mysore and Tirumala Nayak of Madura, who had made them- 
selves independent as well as powerful, died in 1658. 90 Sri 
Ranga Rayal was struggling tragically to recover his lost inheri- 
tance, but all his efforts proved in vain. " Here is nothing but 
taking and retaking of places with parties of both sides in all 
places," observes a contemporary European witness. The lack 
of unity among the native rulers is well indicated by the Jesuit 
records from Madura : "Tirumala Nayak (while he was still 
alive) instead of co-operating in the re-establishment of the 
affairs of Narasinga (i.e. Sii Ranga), who alone could save the 
country, recommended negotiations with the Muhammadans, 
opened to them again the passage through the Ghiats, and urged 
them to declare war against the King of Mysore whom he should 
have sought for help. (The King of) Bisnagar, betrayed a 
second time by his vassal, succumbed to the contest, and was 
obliged to seek refuge on the confines of his kingdom in the 
forests where he led a miserable life ... a prince made unhappy 
by the folly of his vassals, whom his personal qualities rendered 
worthy of a better fate." 91 

The same writer notes how the Muslims profited from 
such a state of things : "Kanakan (ln-i-fclnan) did not 


wish to leave the country without levying ransom on Tanjore 
and Madura. He raised large contributions and returned to 
Bajapur full of riches." Further, " The Muslims have already 
been for several months in possession of this beautiful and fertile 
country ; no one knows now what their ulterior designs are ; 
whether they will establish themselves there or will content them- 
selves with collecting the riches they can find there." 92 

One feels tempted to quote copiously from the contemporary 
Jesuit accounts which are one of our very important sources of 
information. Father Proenza writes in 1659 : " Muthu Virappa 
Nayak, Tirumala's successor, appeared to rectify the mistakes 
of his father and throw ^off the yoke of the Mufcammadans. 
Resolved to refuse the annual tribute which they had imposed, 
he began to make preparations for a vigorous resistance, and 
furnished with soldiers and munitions the fortress of Trichino- 
poly which was the key to his dominions on the northern side 
The King of Tanjore, instead of imitating his example and co 
operating with him, sent his ambassadors to Idal Khan, while 
he wasted time in negotiations, the enemy's army crossed the 
mountains and appeared before Trichinopoly with a preparation 
which revealed its scheme to conquer all the country. Observing 
the warlike preparation of the Nayak, it moved towards the 
east, pretending to devastate the surrounding country ; then, at 
a time when one least expected it, it fell on Tanjore on 19 March 
1659. This town, situated in the midst of a fertile plain, was 
not inferior to the strong citadels of Europe." 98 

This expedition was led by Shiahji. The final conquest of 
Tanjore was effected by his son Vyankojl in 1675. Vyanfcojl 
or Ekojl, as he is more familiarly called in the southern and 
foreign records, was born of Shahji's second wife Tukahai 
M6hit& Thus were {he foundations of the Maratha kingdom 
of Tanjore laid. But of this we shall see more later. SWahjfs 
eldest son by his first wife Jijabiai, Sambhaji (full brother of 
), appears to have died fighting at Kanakgin about 1655. 94 

The annals of South India during the last phase of Shahji's 
life are very chaotic. Apart from the quarrels between the local 


rulers, the Muslim invaders themselves had fallen out with each 
other. As early as 14 January 1652, the English factors observ- 
ed : " Wars being commenced between the Moors of Golkandah 
and Vizapore, who having shared this afflicted kingdom, are 
now bandying against each other, while the poor Gentue, hop- 
ing their destruction, watches opportunity to break of his present 
miserable yoke." 95 About ten years later (1660-62) we learn 
that " The Gentue is powerful about the Tanjore country, and 
if hee overcomes the Balle Gaun (Bahlol Khan) the Vizapore's 
servant, 'tis thought hee 'il meete with little or no opposition in 
all these parts." 96 

The above impressions relate to. .the activities of Chokka- 
natha, son of Muttu Virappa, who brought about a temporary 
coalition by force of arms between Madura, Tanjore and Ginji. 
In 1662, Linganna, the rebellious Madura general, joined Shahjl 
and besieged Trichinopoly. But Chokkanatha compelled them 
to seek refuge first in Tanjore and then in Ginji. Linganna, 
too, was before long reclaimed by tjje coalition and employed 
against Shahjl. The shrewd Proenza remarks, " It appears cer- 
tain that, if then the three Nayaks had joined 6ri Ranga with 
all the troops they could gather, they would easily have succeed- 
ed in chasing the comfnon enemy, and depriving him of the ad- 
vantage he had taken of their disunion and reciprocal betrayal. 
But Providence which wanted to punish them left them to this 
spirit of folly which precipitated the ruin of those princes and 
their dominions." 97 

The nature of the unspeakable ruin brought about by the 
chronic warfare is described in the Jesuit letters : Pestilence 
followed in the wake of war. " The Muslims were the first vic- 
tims of pestilence, having been themselves the cause of it. Their 
horses and men perished of famipe in suph large numbers that 
the corpses could not be buried or burnt, but were flung in the 
midst of the field, which imprudent act bred diseases and in- 
creased the mortality." 98 The inhumanity of man was worse. 
41 But nothing can equal the cruelties which the Muhainmadans 
employ," writes an eye-witness. "Expression fails me to re- 


count the atyocities which I have seen with my eyes ; and if I 
werq to describe them truth would be incredible. To the present 
horror are added the fears of what is to happen ; for it is 
announced that Idal Khan sends a strong army to raise contri- 
butions, which the Nayaks had promised, by force." 99 

As an instance of such devastating raids we might cite 
' Vana Mian's behaviour when he was baffled by the defence 
of Trichinopoly fort : " The besiegers broke out on the country, 
devastated the harvest, burnt the villages, and captured the 
inhabitants to be made slaves. It is impossible to describe the 
scenes of horror which th#n enveloped this unhappy country. 
The Indian nobility, thinking it infamy to fall into the hands 
of these despicable beings, did not fear to seek refuge in death, 
less frightful in their eyes than such a dishonour. A large 
number, after slaying their women and children, plunged the 
sword into their own bodies and fell on their corpses. Entire 
populations were seen resorting to thfe tragic death. In other 
villages the inhabitants gathered together in several houses to 
which they set fire and perished in their flames/' 100 

War is nothing if it is not barbarous. Consequently, it 
would be unfair to suggest that the Muslim advance was ever 
like this. Much depended upon the character of the coimman- 
ders. Another Jesuit letter from Trichinopoly (1662) states : 
" The Muslims under the command of Shahjii and Moula, gene- 
rals of 'Adil Shah, have occupied the realms of Ginj! and 
Tanjore for the last two years, and 1 seem to fix their domination 
there. The people have submitted to the yoke of a conqueror 
ftom whom they get less cruelty and more justice than from 
their own sovereigns" 101 This certainly shows that Shahji as 
a general must have acted more humanely and justly) than most 
of his contemporaries. A conqueror indeed reveals his truest 
character in the moment of his victory. Shahji by his conduct 
on this occasion earned the goodwill of the conquered who had 
suffered from the worst horrors of war at the hands of others. 
He thereby paved the way for his successors, the Mar&tha rulers 
of Tanjore, who created a condotninion in the South along- 


side of fiivajl's Svarajya in the Deccan, whose history, however, 
we shall not anticipate here. It will follow in due course. 

Before concluding this chapter it is necessary to note a fqp 
more incidents in ShahjFs career which provide a commentary 
upon his character as a pioneer in the great political adventure 
of the Marathas. His role was not that of a conscious builder ; 
but he did serve in carrying forward the cause of which his 
great son iSivaji was the best protagonist. ShShjI did not have 
6ivaji's vision or sense of mission ; his was the humbler but 
most necessary task of preparing the ground, not by precept 
but by example, by daring and doing. In this sense he was 
the most successful among the pioneers of Maratha freedom and 
prestige. While not being free himself, he made possible the 
freedom of his people who were fashioned into a nation by the 
'genius of his son. Kanha and the two brave women who 
4 fought like tigresses on u the battle-field ' when ' Ala-u'd-Din 
Khaljl first invaded the Deccan, sowd the seeds of heroic resis- 
tance. That seed was fostered by the blood of Sankar-dev and 
Haipal-dev who preferred to be broken rather than bend before 
the aggressors. The Jtoji Nag-nSk of Koixjajja and the irks 
of Khejna revealed the mettle of which the" true Maiiathas were 
made ; they also demonstrated the strength of the mountain 
fastnesses and their strategic importance. The innumerable 
Marathas who sought service under the Bahmanl Sultans were, 
through their very servitude, gathering very valuable experience 
in arms and in administration that was to constitute the richest 
asset of later generations. Lukhjl Jadhav Rao and others of 
his stamp sold their services as mercenaries. The GhorpagUs 
by their consistent loyalty continued through generations, re- 
deemed their unpatriotic character by ttyeir moral courage and 
personal dignity. It was left to Shahji Bhoste of all the men 
of his race and generation to play the more ambitious part of 
a king-maker and fight for the defence and maintenance of an 
independent kingdom (the Nizamshahl) in the face of the 
Mughals and the ' Adilghahl. If he failed in this, he failed 
honourably. If he was consequently obliged to accept service 


under his recent enemy, he served with a sense of realism, 
courage, dignity, and self-respect. This is nowhere better illus- 
trated than in his letter to ' Ali ' Adil Shah II (d. 6 July 1657). 

In that letter Shahji asked for a just reward for his recent 
services at Kanakgiri, Anegondi, Kundgol and TamgaucJ. 
' Knowing that the prestige and dignity of Your Majesty could 
not be assured without keeping the frontier tribes in awe, I 
have enrolled 1500 more men in my army. These cannot be 
maintained without an addition to my ja&rs. J He suggests an 
addition being made adjacent to Karydt Akluj or Tape Tem- 
bhumi, or Bhutagram and Penjne ; or else, in Patshahbad or 
the Vaderu District. He protests against his lands in Musajkal 
District and Katyat Karve being given away to Trimbakji 
(Shahji's cousin) without due compensation. He warns, ' If 
Your Majesty should thus tamper with my concerns, on the 
advice of worthless fellows, I must remind Your Majesty that 
we Rlajputs have served from old till t now under several kings ; 
we have never before served nor shall we do so in future under 
dishonour and displeasure. We shall not further put up with 
unfair treatment. I have patiently endured these indignities, 
during the past eighteen months, with the hope that I shall 
continue to receive from Your Majesty the treatment and 
favours I got from Your worthy father. To avoid embarrass- 
ing Your Majesty I have waited so long restraining my feelings. 
If Your Majesty will have my services in future, I claim that 
my status should be maintained as heretofore. Else, . /. . I 
shall retire to some sacred place there to serve the Almighty 
and pray for Your Majesty.' 102 

Eighteen months later, on 10th December 1659, we read 
in, a letter from Revington (written from Kolhapur) : One 
months tyme more will, wee believe, put an end to his (' Adil 
Shah's) trouble ; for Sevagyes father Shawjee, that lies to the 
southward, is expected within eight dayes with his army con- 
sisting of 17,000 men, and they intend for Vizapore, the King 
and Queenes residence, whose strength consists ondy in men 
and they are above 10,000 soldyers ; so that in all probability 


the kingdome will be lost." 103 We do not know the exact con* 
text of this threatened attack of Shahji on Bijapur. It might 
have been due to his failure to get satisfaction from the 'Adtt 
Shah even after his repeated protests. We learn from the 
Dutch Dagh Register (16 May, 1661) that "The Neyks of 
Madura and Tanjouwer and the commander Sahagie, Antosie 
Pantele, and Lingamaneyk have met to consider an offensive 
defensive contract which is a serious thing to us. And therefore 
the Governor has excused the intended visit of Masulepatnam 
settlement/' The alliance, however, appears to have soon melted 
away ; for the record continues : " But afterwards the Governor 
was informed that the contract mentioned above had been can- 
celled, and the Neyks have secretly conferred to attack 
Sahagie." 104 

This incident explains why Shahji again came to be arrested 
in 1663 by the ' Adil Shah. The circumstances leading to it 
are thus related by a Dutch record of 11 April 1663 : Bahlol 
Khan, the Bajapuri general, came to terms with the Nayak of 
Tanjore who promised to pay him 300,000 pardaux ; and the 
general proceeded against the fortresses of Ami and Bangalore 
to subdue " the rebel Sahagie." 105 But Shahji won over Bahlol 
Khan. Confirmation of this rebellion of Shahji is to be had 
in an English letter of 20 July 1663 (from Goa) wherein it is 
reported : " This Jassud (spy) sweares before he came out of 
Banckpore [where ' Adil Shah was] he saw irons put on Bussall 
Ckan and Shagee, but taken off the latter in two dayes : who 
is now with the king without any command/ 106 

It would be interesting to know in detail the history of this 
insurrection on the part of one who had been throughout loyal 
to the 'Adil Shah. It is significant that Shahji was soon re- 

f V 

stored to favour and sent back to the South, while Bahlol 
Khan was imprisoned and put to death. 107 Was Shahji in- 
fluenced by the Hindu confederates of the South, alliance with 
whom in May 1661 had proved abortive? Or was he being 
drawn into the vortex of fiivajf's powerful movement for the 
liberation of the country from the domination of the Muslim 


rulers? But his resumption of, or acquiescence in, the 'Adil- 
Sfcahl service culminating in his accidental death near Basava- 
patta|na, on 23 January 1664, while on a campaign to subdue 
the recalcitrant chieftains in that region, affords no clue to the 
inner workings of his mind. He died where he had first begun 
his earliest expedition under Randaula Khan in 1637 in the 
Shimogia District of Mysore. He must have been about seventy 
years of age then (1594-1664); but what a period, looked at 
from the point of view of happenings nearer Shahji's home- 
estates of Poona and Supa ! But he too served in his own way, 
with all his limitations, the cause of Maratha dominion in 
South India. At His dath his conquests included Anegondi, 
Basavapaiftaoa, Kanakgiri, Bangalore, Kolar, Ami, Ginji, 
Tegenapatam (Cuddalore) and Porto Novo, besides his personal 
estates scattered about in the Deccan and Karnatak. 108 They 
constituted the scaffolding on which his two sons Sivaji it\ 
the Deccan and Ekoji in the South were to erect their con- 
dominion for the greater glory of the Maratha people. To un- 
derstand the true inspirations of that national effort we should 
go deeper than the political and military history of the times. 


' The unclean Yavanas have become kings ; sins are 
being committed everywhere ; hence, there hath been 
Divine Manifestation to blot out the evils of Kali. 
Nama says, The people, having found the Yavanas un- 
endurable, are singing the praises of God : for, these are 
ever the means of redemptioo/NAMA-DEV. 1 


Hindu reactions to the Muslim domination, we have said 
earlier, were more cultural and religious than political. From 
the time of Jaipial and Anandap&l to the days of Pjthviraj, 
Sangr&masinh and Ram Pratap in North India, and the fall 
of the Yadavas of Devgiri, the Kakatiyas of Warangal, the 
Hoysajas of Dvarasamudra, and the I^rwjyas of Madura, king- 
dom after kingdom had been overthrown by the invading 
Muslims, and Dar-u'l-Barb sought to be converted into Dar-u'l- 
Isldm. 2 In all appearance, this revolution was political and 
brought about by military means. But the critical historian 
cannot miss two important characteristics : (a) that the con- 
querors were not content with mere loot or political subjugation ; 
(b) the vanquished Hindus sooner submitted to the political 
yoke of the Muslims than to their religious interference. The 
outer jihad, dramatically proclaimed and destructively carried 
out, was nothing compared with the insidious and constant war 
that was waged by the protagonists of Islam against the devotees 
of Hinduism. With noble exceptions like Zain-ul-Abideen's in 
Kashmir, Husain Shah's in Bengal, and Akbar*s at Agra, the 
Muslim toleration of Hindu institutions and culture had been 
casual, fitful and precarious. It did not depend, as has been sup- 
posed by some, on the Hindu parentage of a Muslim in power or 
his marriage with Hindu women. Malik Kaffir, Malik Khusrau. 
lihan-i-Jahan Maqbul (to mention only a few instances) were 
not less fanatical than the true-bom Muslims who came from 


outside In<Jia, like Mahmud Qiazna or MaJ^mud Gawan. Wed- 
lock with Hindu women, employment of Hindus in the army 
and administration, and even the adoption of the local language 
in official documents (in the lower reaches of red-tape) did not 
at all affect the fundamental attitude of the Muslim rulers 
towards their infidel subjects. Jiziya continued to be levied, 
temples desecrated, and 'infidels' persecuted in innumerable 
petty ways, after centuries of the conquerors' domicile in India. 
Yet, the Hindus could no more avoid seeking service under their 
hateful masters, than the Muslims could carry on without the 
infidels' co-operation. But though they were militarily con- 
quered and politically subjugated, the Hindus would not allow 
themselves to be religiously converted or culturally submerged. 
By a fundamental law of human nature, the greater the re- 
pression, the stronger and more rebellious became the reactions. 
Hindu civilisation has survived because of this inexorable law.* 
Defeated on the battle-fields and deqpsed from the seats of gov- 
ernment, it asserted itself* with irrepressible vigour in the hearts 
and homes of the Hindus. Rajasthan, Vijayanagar and Maha- 
raja have repeatedly demonstrated the truth of this thesis. 
The three centuries which elapsed between the first invasion 
of * Alia-u'd-Dffn Khalji (1295) and the birth of Shahji (1594), 
constituted a prolonged period of probation for the people of 
Mahara&ra, during which they suffered agonies of soul and 
body, but deliverance could not come until Sivajl began his 
great movement in the seventeenth century. Shahji died in 
1664, exactly one hundred years after the destruction of the 
great Hindu empire of Vijayanagar on the battle-field of Rak- 
kastangaxji (1565). The inner history of the heart of MahS- 
rastra during this epoch is more meaningful than the outer shell 
of tutelage which w^ have described so far. The secret of the 
amazing success which iSivaji met with in his single generation 
is unintelligible except in the light of the forces that were at 
work, far from the courts of kings and their sanguinary acti- 
vities. Those that have been blind to this vitalising factor have 
sadly missed the full significance of the pre-Siv&ji period of 
Manatha history. 


To the undiscerning and unimaginative rationalis^ of to-day, 
to whom all religion is superstition, the medieval mind must 
for ever reimain a sealed book. But Faith, transcending reason, 
formed the normal texture of the psychology of men and women 
then, in * India and elsewhere. Belief in the supernormal and 
spiritual forces was for them as obvious as the rising and the 
setting sun. To dismiss their beliefs as mere superstitions is, 
therefore, to throw away the only key which can disclose to us 
the motive springs of their actions. Whether the power that 
inspired the makers of Mai&tha history sprang from Tujaja 
Bhavani or from KhaiKjoba of Jejiiri is not a matter for scienti- 
fic inquest ; it is a 'fact ' to be adtnittdi as a potent instrument 
which shaped the life and conduct of the people living in those 
times. BhavanS and Kharwjoba were as great realities to the 
Mamthas of the seventeenth century as the goddess Athena and 
&ie Oracle of Delphi were to the Greeks of ancient times. The 
' fact ' for the historian is pot that, according to him, miracles 
did take place, but that the people sincerely believed that they 
did happen ; so much did they accept them as realities that 
their beliefs led them to heroic endeavours. In this sense, Sivaji 
was no more a pretender than Joan of Arc : some people did 
feel that inspiration ; others did accept it for a fact ; and 
all acted in that faith. The task of the historian is to guage and 
assess the extent and results of these potent forces. 

Intellectually and spiritually, there was a new age dawn- 
ing in Maharartra when outwardly she was being conquered and 
subjugated by the armies of Islam. This awakening had a social 
and political side to it, apart from the spiritual and intellectual. 
In a word, Mahcfra$traJDharma was at the root of Maratha 
Svarajya as it was conceived of and .politically translated by 
Sivajl. Its genesis is to be traced back to the protagonists of 
what is popularly called the Pan^harpur movement. It was 
mystical and devotional to begin with, but before long bore a 
rich harvest in fields other than the merely religious. It had 
an esoteric as well as a popular side, a philosophical no less 
than practical aspect. We are here concerned only with its 
pragmatic consequences. 


DnaneSvar who died soon after the first invasion of ' Ala- 
u'd-Din KJjaljI, and lived under the patronage of Ramdev Rao 
at Devgiri, might be considered the progenitor of this great 
movement. 3 "The beginning of the mystical line," according 
to the authors of Mysticism in Mahdrd$tra, "was effectively 
made in Mahanatra by Dnanadev .... And while a continuous 
tradition goes on from Dnanesvar to Namadev, and from 
Namadev to Ekanath, and from Ekanath to Tukaram, Ramdas 
like Heracleitus stands somewhat apart in his spiritual isolation." 
Further, they have observed : " If we reclassify these great 
Mystics of Maharaja according to the different types of mysti- 
cism, they fall into the following groups : DnaneSvar is the 
type of an intellectual Aiystic ; Namadev heralds the demo- 
cratic age ; Ekanath synthesises the claims of worldly and 
spiritual life ; Tukaram's mysticism is most personal ; while 
Ramdas is the type of an active saint." * Whatever be the 
school or category to which these saints belonged, the total effect* 
of their combined teachings was tjie propagation of Mahd- 
rdstra Dharma which had very far-reaching political results. 

It is significant that Dnanesvar chose to interpret the 
Bhagavad-^Gitdi and to do it in the language of the people, 
MarathS. Whatever else Dnanesvar may stand for, he ren- 
dered a great service to the cause of Marsha freedom by this 
double choice. In this respect, he stands with Gautama 
Buddha, John Wycliffe and Martin Luther. From a purely 
linguistic point of view, he did for MaiiathI what Chaucer did 
for English : a * well of the vernacular pure and undefiled.' 
He brought philosophy and religion from the heights of the 
HimaEyas, as it were, to the hearths and homes of Maha- 
raja. This democratic service was indeed both timely and 

The state of Mahara$tra when Dnianesvar appeared was 
a shade worse than Europe* when Luther preached and pro- 
tested. Theological and metaphysical obscurantism had been 
carried to excess without reference to the morals of the people. 
The situation has been well described by Rajw!a*J6 : " In the 
latter half of the thirteenth century/ under the Yadavas, the 


MaralthSs were too very engrossed with the good things of life, 
though they clothed them in the garb of religion. Their most 
honoured gospel was the Chaturvarga Chintamara of Heifladri, 
in which the Srutis, Smrtis and Purorias were pedantically 
paraded as authorities for feeding Brahmaijs with prescribed 
feasts in propitiation of particular deities for every day in the 
year. From Heirtadri's Vratakhanja it would appear that no 
less than 2000 ceremonies were to be performed in the course 
of 365 days ! For him, indeed, there was no distinction bet- 
ween feasting and religion. There is not to be found in any 
other language, in any other part of the globe, a work of that 
character making a fetish of such things/' 5 The consequence 
was that the people became ignorant; superstitious and effemi- 
nate ; and the foreigners took full advantage of their incapa- 
city to resist. Elsewhere we have noticed the sectarianism 
that was rampant : in the midst of great learning there was a 
tragic lack of wisdom. Besides, the language of religion had 
long been the sacred Sanskrit, of which the masses as well as 
classes were ignorant : a microscopic minority of erudite pandits 
enjoying the monopoly of exploiting the superstitious beliefs of 
the people. The obvious remedy for such evils was to break 
through this monopoly by spreading enlightenment of the 
purest sort through the medium of Maiiatha. Mukundaraj and 
the Mahanubhlavas had attempted this before DnSnesvar, but 
the Bastille had not fallen. The cult of the Mahanubhavas was 
too heretical to be popular on a wide scale ; and the metaphysics 
and mysticism of Mukundaraj were too esoteric to be understood 
or assimilated by the many. 6 Two of his tenets certainly mili- 
tated against the needs of the situation, namely, his conviction 
that "a mystic should never reveal his inner secret lest the 
people might deride it," and that contemplation on the Para- 
mamfia " turns back the devotee from the world and enables 
him to see the vision of his Self." 7 DnianeSvar, on the other 
hand, rightly adopted the popular exposition of a popular text 
as the instrument of his instruction. Not that the Dnanesvari 
(or Bhavartha-dipite) is less traditionally philosophical ; 8 but 
in it the genius of the commentator has translated the deepest 


truths in such an idiom and wealth of homely illustration, that 
his work Jias remained unrivalled as a classic of popular en- 
lightenment. So far-reaching was its influence that the barber 
Senia sang of the great service rendered by DnaneSvar in reveal- 
ing the surest path to salvation, and overflowing with a sense 
of obligation declared : ' Large-hearted is his benevolence, like 
that of father and mother ; how can I, poor soul, express the 
unrequitable. He has indeed shown the true path, and impart- 
ed life to the inert/ 9 To this day, the pilgrims to Pantfharpur 
and Dehu sing as they move along : ' Dndnadev^Tukdrdm I 
Dnanoba-Tukdrdm '! ' 

Dnanadev wrote his Amrtanubhava or ' Immortal Experi- 
ence ' for the few ; Bhcharthadipika, or ' Light on the Essen- 
tial Meaning (of the Gita)/ for the many ; and Abhangs, or 
devotional song$, for all. The second of these, popularly known 
as the Dnanesvarl, very properly conveyed the message of Sri 
Rrsna, a message of hope, of action, of courage and duty 1& 
the bewildered people of Mahara$ti# in the days of their un- 
doing at the hands of #ie invading Muslims. The Gita has 
been commented upon by men of genius in every age, stressing 
one or another aspect of its comprehensive philosophy to suit 
the needs of their time and generation. But any attempt to 
read into the Dnanesvan anything less than its universal mean- 
ing might appear too arbitrary and unwarrantable. Neverthe- 
less, it cannot be denied that the work breathes a contemporary 
and local) atmosphere, even while it envisages a wider and time- 
less truth. For illustration, we might cite DnaneSvar's descrip- 
tion of Daivl and Asufi Sampatti. It is not in the language of 
6ri Rr>a or Vyiasa, but in that of a Deccani writer of the 
medieval times. Without seeking in it the historical accuracy 
of a Domesday Swrvey, we might, without exaggeration still look 
for local colour in its^ terms and illustrations. The shortcomings 
of Ramdev Riao's contemporaries could not have been absent 
from the mind of DnaneSvar when he wrote his great commen- 

The intellectual atmosphere of his time is well reflected, 
for instance, in the thirteenth chapter, verses 653-842. He 


speaks of a villager worshipping god after god, going to a Guru 
and learning some mantra from him, placing an irqage of his 
choice in a corner of his house, but going on a pilgrimage to 
temple after temple, .... Forgetting the god at home, he wor- 
ships another : the spirits of the dead ancestors, with the same 
devotion as his God on Ekddasl and serpents on Nagapanchami, 
Durgd on the fourth of the dark fortnight ; then Navachanfi 
on another occasion and Bhairava on Sundays, the linga on 
Mondays, etc. He worships perpetually without being silent 
even for a moment, at various shrines ; ' like a courtesan at- 
tracting man after man at the entrance to the town,' the de- 
votee who thus runs after different gods, he says, is * ignorance 
incarnate.' He knows the theory of 1 karma, has learnt the 
Purdnas by rote, is a great astrologer and can predict future 
events, knows the science of architecture and the art of cooking ; 
has mastered the magic of the Atharva-veda, his knowledge of 
Sexual science is boundless, has studied the Bharata, attained 
proficiency in the Agamas ; in ethics, medicine, poetics and 
dramaturgy there is none equal to kirn ; he can discuss the 
Smrtis, is well versed in the Nighavfu, and very profound in 
logic. ' He knows all these sciences, but is stark blind in the 

Science of Self-knowledge The plumage of a peacock is 

covered all over with eyes ; but there is no vision. 1 

As a corrective, DnaneSvar's prescription is significant : 
Fearlessness, Purity, Steadfastness, Sacrifice, are the virtues he 
inculcates in the order of their importance. Sacrifice means 
dutifully offering to God whatsoever is best. Who can deny 
that, had the generation of Dnanesvar and Riamdev Rao possess- 
ed these qualities, the fate of Mahar1atra might have been dif- 
ferent. The context of the Gitd, the sermon of Sri Rreaja to 
Arjuna, and its fulfilment in action, all pointed to the same 
moral : Dharma. DnaneSvar swept away much nonsense, stimu- 
lated clear thinking, and, more than anything else, filled the 
people with a purer faith and hope in redemption : ' Where 
the Moon- is, there is moon-light; where fire exists, there is 
turning power ; where Kri>a is, there is victory/ 10 Confidence 
in Him is the beginning of Bhakti : ' He punishes the wicked 


and destroys all sin ; when Prahlad uttered His name, God ran 
to his rescue ; His name is indeed the best and holiest of all 
things : it came to the succour of Dhruva, of Ajamila, of Gajen- 
dra, of Valmlki. Mountains of sin are destroyed in an instant 
by the name of God. There is neither season nor prescribed 
time for its utterance. The devotees of God feed themselves 
with the nectar of His Name.' 11 

Such was the line of attack that DnanesVar adopted in 
order to purify, simplify, and popularise religion. That this 
renovated Faith proclaimed a revolt against the traditional 
ideas and practices will become more and more apparent as we 
proceed. ' We have discovered the secret : let us propagate the 
Bhdgavata-Dharma ; what use are pilgrimages while the mind 
still remains full of evil ?' 32 asks Namadev who ushered in the 
Democracy of Devotion. 

Namadev was a tailor, and Dnanadev the son of an out- 
caste Brahman. Others soon followed from all ranks and classes 
of people. As Ranade has pointed oift, there were about fifty 
saints and prophets during this age :' some of whom were women, 
.a few converts from Islam, nearly half of them Brahmans, 
while in the remaining half there were Manathas, Kujnbls, 
Mahars, goldsmiths, tailors, gardeners, potters, maid-servants 
and repentant prostitutes. According to him Dnanesvar's in- 
fluence was greater than that of any other saint except Tuka- 
ram. 13 Namadev was Dnanesvar's contemporary but outlived 
him by over fifty years (d. 1350). Others associated with them 
were Nivrtti, Sopan and Muktabai, the two brothers and a 
sister respectively of Dnanadev. To this cycle also belonged 
Goila the potter, Siavata the gardener, Narahari the goldsmith, 
Chok& the Mahar, Janabai the maidservant, Sena the barber, 
Kanhopatra the prostitute. Sena and Kanhopatra alone were 
separated from Namadev by about a century (c. 1448-68); all 
the rest were contemporaries. 14 Together they constituted 
fraternity of religious persons whose outlook and teac 
well reflected in the songs (abhangs) of Namdev. 
loped the sampradaya of Panxjhari as no other 
did." 15 


Dnanadev and Namadev represented, respectively, the in- 
tellectual and the emotional aspects of the revivak The spirit 
of the teachings of both alike was to penetrate to the essence 
through the externals : ' A stone god and his mock devotee 
cannot satisfy each other. Such gods have been broken to 
pieces by the Turks, or have been flung into water/ says Nama, 
' and yet they do not cry.' 16 Is it not amazing, he asks, that 
people should discard the animate and worship the inanimate ? 
* They pluck a living Tulasi plant to worship a dead stone ; . . . 
they kill a living ram to perform the Soma sacrifice ; they paint 
a stone with red-lead, and women and children fall prostrate 
before it ... People worship a serpent made of clay, but take 
up cudgels to kill a living one. All these are vain,' declares 
Nama : ' the only pursuit of value is to utter the Name of 
God/ 17 

In the propagation of moral ideals, illustrated with Paura- 
nic examples, and the homely imagery used by them for popu- 
lar enlightenment, we <find the simple technique and high 
character of the teachings of these Saints. ' Contact with other 
women,' says Nama, * is the sure cause of ruin : that way was 
Ravaaja destroyed and Bhasmasura reduced to ashes ; that way 
the Moon became consumptive and Indra's body became punc- 
tured with a thousand holes.' 18 

It is equally interesting to note that, according to Namadev, 
the following combinations are hard to meet with : * Gold and 
fragrance; diamond and softness; a Yogin with purity; a 
rich man with compassion ; a tiger with mercy ; a hearer who 
is attentive; a preacher who knows; and a K$atriya who is 
brave? What a bold commentary upon contemporary condi- 
tions ! 

Then we find him describing a saint as a * spiritual washer- 
man ' who uses the ' soap of iljutnination ' ; ' he washes on the 
slab of tranquillity, purifies the river of knowledge, and takes 
away the spots of sin/ 20 There is only one favour he would 
ask of God : ' that ,we should always feel Him in our heart, 
utter His name only with our tongue, see Him alone with our 
eyes. Our hands should worship Him only, our heads be placed 


at His feet alone, and our ears hear only His praise. He should 
show Hinisoif on our right, our left, before us and behind, as well 
as at the close of our lives. We should ask of God no other 
favour except this/ 21 The emotional effect of such ecstatic 
'madness' upon the devoted masses cannot be imagined but 
felt in the company of the God-intoxicated. 

" The value and significance of this movement," observes 
Mr. Macnicol, a foreigner nurtured in another creed and cul- 
ture " lie in its affirmation of the claims of the human heart 
and in the moral and religious consequences that follow from 
that affirmation. These are the elements in it that gave it 
its power and enabled it to make an appeal so far-reaching and 
so profound. It was, if we may say so, a splendid effort of 
the Hindu soul to break the bondage under which it had lain 
so long. It at last stirred in its long sleep, and turned its 
drowsy eyes towards the dawn." It is also to be noted that 
Mr. Macnicol opines : " They have no language but a cry," 
and their poems are " primarily religious and only secondarily 
and accidentally works of*art." 22 

The religious capital of Mahiaratra was, and still remains, 
Parwjharpur : 

' On Bhimffs banks all gladness is 
In Pandhari the Abode of Bliss' 

This is the refrain of many a song that is re-echoed by the choirs 
of singers that journey with eager expectation, year by year, 
to this Deccan village to look upon the face of the God, writes 
the Christian Missionary : " There is little outwardly to dis- 
tinguish the worship at this shrine from that of a hundred others 
throughout the land. The image is rudely fashioned and has 
no grace of form. The worship is that which is commonly per- 
formed in any Hindu tenple. , What gives it distinctive char- 
acter is the special song services, the ktrtans and bhajans, that 
are conducted for the instruction of pilgrims, and irt which their 
deep religious emotion finds its fullest utterance. Great numbers 
of pilgrims sit for hours at Paryjharpur and the other village 
centres of the cult (like Dehu and AJandi), listening to the 


exhortations of some famous preacher or Hand as (lit. slave 
of God) who bases his discourse upon verses from such poet- 
faints as Jfianadev or Ekniath or Tukaram. With the teaching 
is skilfully combined the singing of a choir. These klrtans have 
<L profound emotional effect upon the multitudes gathered in 
eager expectation at the holy place. The songs of the old saints 
awaken, and in some degree satisfy, the deep desires of their 
hearts. So also groups will gather for what are called bhajans, 
when there is no preaching, but they continue often for hours, 
singing those songs of longing and ecstasy/ 23 These foreign 
impressions, gathered from a modern setting, might serve to ac- 
quaint the reader with an echo (though necessarily faint) of 
the original thrills experienced by a' people more attuned and 
sensitive to that kind of appeal than our present generation 
which is far removed from such devotional experiences. 
t How the spirit of the Bhakti movement permeated the mass- 
es and coloured their psychology may be gathered from the lan- 
guage used by some of the saints. We have already cited some 
abhangs of Namadev. The gardener Savata says, * Garlic, 
Onion and Chilli are my God : the water-bag, the rope, and 
the well are all enveloped by Him . . . Well was it that I was 
born in a low caste ; and well is it also that I have not attained 
greatness. Had I been bom a Brahman, my life would have 
been a mere round of rituals. Raced as I am, I have no ablu- 
tions to make, nor Sandhya to perform. Born in a low caste, 
I can only beg for Thy compassion.' 24 Narahari, the goldsmith, 
makes his body the melting crucible of his soul, and pours the 
molten gold of God into the matrix of the three gui9ias. Ham- 
mer in hand he breaks to pieces anger and passion ; and with 
the scissors of discrimination, cuts out the gold-leaf of the Name 
of God. With the balance of illumination he weighs God's 
Name. Bearing a sack of gold he crosses to the other side of 
the stream (of Samsara). Likewise, Chokha the untouchable 
saint says : ' The worshippers at the temple beat me for no 
fault of mine : they abuse me and charge me with having pol- 
luted God. I am indeed a dog at Thy door ; send me not away 
to another/ Chokhia is convinced that the real Pantfhari is his 


own body ; Jhat his soul is the image of Vifthala therein ; and 
tranquillity plays the r61e of Rukmipi. ' Contemplating God in 
this wise I cling to the feet of God.' Chokha may be untouch- 
able, he argues, ' but my heart is not untouchable : just as the 
sugarcane might be crooked, but the juice is not crooked/ He 
earnestly prays that if God should give him a son, he should 
be a saint ; if a daughter, she shall be like Mirabai or Mukta- 
bai. ' If it should not please God to do any of these things, 
it is much better that He denies any offspring to Chokha/ 26 

Turning to the barber Senia, we find him holding the mir- 
ror of discrimination, and using the pincers of dispassion : ' We 
apply the water of tranquillity to the head, and pull out the 
hair of egotism ; we take away the nails of passion, and are a 
support to all the castes/ 27 Kanhopatra, the fallen woman, 
cries : ' I am verily an outcaste : I do not know the rules of 
conduct : I only know how to approach Thee, in submission. 
Thou callest thyself the saviour of the^ fallen : Why dost Thou 
not then uplift me ? I have once declared myself Thine : if 
others! should claim me now, whose then would be the fault ? If 
a jackal were to take away the food of a lion, who shall be 
blamed ? ' 28 These appeals rose from the heart of Maharastra 
trodden under the heels of the Mlecchas for several generations. 
The outcome was that, for five centuries, Maharagtra became 
the abode of " that noblest and truest of democracies, the Demo- 
cracy of the Bhaktas" 

From the middle of the fifteenth century, we come across 
another cluster of saints : Bhanudas, Janardhanswiami, and 
Ekanath. Their predecessors had carried ecstatic devotion to 
excess. It was time, therefore, to put a curb on extreme emo- 
tionalism. The balance between other-worldliness and the 
duties and obligations of this mundane life was held even by 
these three. We cannot say tfiat they consciously argued like 
this ; but their teachings as well as conduct indicate such har- 

Bhanudas was born at Paithan on the Godlavaif, about 
1448. He is supposed to have brought back the image of 
Vitthala from Hampi (Vijayanagar) whither it had been re- 


moved for safety from Muslim hands. His disciplj was Janar- 
dhanswami, the master of Ekaniath. Janardhan was qile'dar 
of Daulatabad till his death in 1575. He devoted himself to 
the service of God even while he was performing his worldly 
duties. He was a model for Ekanath in his combination of the 
worldly and spiritual life. He was respected alike by the Hindus 
and the Muslims. " Every Thursday which was sacred to the 
God of Janardhan Swami was proclaimed a holiday at Devagatf 
by the order of the Mahomedan king." His samddhi still exists 
inside a cave at Daulatabad. Ekaniath lived with him for nearly 
six years. On one occasion he is said to have impersonated 
Jartardhan and fought in defence of the fortress. Ekanath, all 
through his lifetime (1533-99), was noted for his industry and 
regularity. His patience and his equanimity were proverbial. 
His behaviour with a Muslim who spat on him every time 
he returned from his bath in the river, his redemption of a 
prostitute, his kindly treatment of an untouchable boy, and 
several other instances of his saintly behaviour revealed his 
practical spirituality. 

Ekanath wrote works like Bhavwrtha Ramdyan and edited 
the text of the Dnanesvan. But his reputation chiefly rests on 
his great commentary on the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavata, 
the bible of Bhagavata Dharma. From the point of view of 
style the work of Ekaniath is reckoned superior to that of 
DnianeSvar. His vindication of Marathi as an adequate vehicle 
of thought is familiar to most students of that language. If 
Sanskrit is to be regarded as the speech of the Gods, he declaims, 
is Prakrit to be considered the language of thieves ? Let alone 
these errors of vanity, he declares, both are equally sacred when 
used for praising God. God is no partisan of one speech or 
another : ' My Marathi ', he proudly proclaims, * is an excellent 
vehicle and is rich freighted with the fruits of divine thought.' 80 
His Bhagavata, indeed, amply illustrates the potentialities of 
that language. It covers every conceivable subject connected 
with Vedantic philosophy, with religion, with morality, etc. In 
the words of the late Rev. J. E. Abbott : " Did he believe 
in knowledge as a way of salvation? Yes, but it must be 


without hypocrisy. Did he believe in Bhakti as a way of salva- 
tion? Yes,* but it must mean true love of God, and sincere. 
Did he believe the Brahman held the first place in the social 
system? Yes, but a Brahman without true devotion to God 
would go to hell, and a Sudra with true devotion would be found 
in Heaven. Did he believe in Caste ? Yes, but his firm con- 
viction that God was in all men, Brahman or Sudra and even 
Mleccha, made him, if the traditional stories of him can be 
believed, disregard the rules of Caste when the needs of huma- 
nity demanded it." 31 

While the Ekanathi Bhagavata is replete with current 
social and religious philosophy, the same Christian critic ob- 
serves, it is not a book for teaching those doctrines. " It is 
rather the thought of sincerity, absence of hypocrisy, true love 
of God and man, moral ideas of truth and honesty, purity of 
life, sacredness of marriage, condemnation of immorality, sel- 
fishness, avarice, drunkenness, and other forms of vice, in all 
phases of life, that runs through the took and gives it its dis- 
tinction . . . The work is too large, the subjects too varied, for 
any detailed analysis here. But ft is in Marathi literature a 
unique book and worthy of study for its presentation of moral 
ideals, as they appealed to that great religious teacher to whom 
the trueness of the inner spirit was more than any outer 
fotrm."* 2 

After Ekanath we come to Tukanam and Ramdas, both of 
whom were contemporaries of Sivaji. The outlooks of these 
great makers of the Marathla mind and spirit were even more 
closely knit together, perhaps, than those of Mazzini, Cavour 
and Garibaldi in the creation of modern Italy. We might almost 
say that iSivaji carved out by his sword an independent State 
in the Deccan in order to safeguard the spiritual culture summed 
up in Tufcaram, with tfie sagadty of Ramdas. Tukaram is still 
the most popular saint of Mahariastra. He is the summit and 
culmination of a long line of Bhaktas. In him the stream of 
devotion has swollen into a flood. His emotion is overpowering, 
his philosophy is reassuring, and his vehicle is the daily speech 
of the masses. " Of all the Maifctha bhaktas" writes Mr. 


Macnicol, "the greatest in the popular estimation, certainly 

the widest in the extent of his influence is Tufcai&m The 

popularity of his verses has continued undiminished until today,, 
and they are so widely known among all classes of MarathSs 
that many of them have almost come to have the vogue and 
authority -of proverbs. They are more familiar throughout 
Mahanatra than are (or were) in Scotland 'the psalms of 
David or the songs of Burns.' Not only are they prized by the 
most illiterate worshipper of Vithoba as the ' Veda ' of their 
sect, but they furnish a large portion of the psalmody of the 
reforming Prarthana Samiaj, while some of the greatest of 
modern Indians, such as M. G. Rajia^e and Sir R. G. Bhan- 
(Jarkar, have found in them, perhaps more than in the ancient 
scriptures, nourishment for their own religious life.' Ha 

For all this, Tuka, as Mahlpati says, was not a learned 
( man. He never went to school. His father taught him the 
little that he knew. He did not know Sanskrit. " He must 
have found great difficult^ in understanding the works of Dnana- 
dev and Ekanath, in their antique MarathI forms, when he 
retired with his books to his mountain retreat, to read and study 
them," observes Abbott. <r His caste as Sudra (Vani) was com- 
paratively low, and no inspiration came to him from that source,, 
nor from the Brahmans of his acquaintance, to whom he was 
accustomed to bow as Hindu social laws demanded. Tuka's 
growth was like the growth of a tree, from seed to full stature, 
on some retired spot, unassisted except by the laws of his own 
being. Forced at first by hard necessity, he was a petty grocer 
in a little village, successful because of his natural ability and 
honesty ; but his heart was not in his business. He wanted 
God in his soul, and all earthly things, money and property, he 
counted as filth. Naturally, he failed in business, and then 
came a period of readjustment to his now complete indifference 
to earthly things, and the unsympathetic attitude of his sharp- 
tongued wife and scorning neighbours." 34 Despite these troubles,. 
Mahipatfif describes him as ' helping the sick, carrying the bur- 
dens of the weary, giving water to the thirsty, food to the 
hungry, going on errands for the lame. Even animals came in 


for his kind thought. He watched for such as needed water or 
food. Even* in this he met with no sympathy from his wife, 
and little from his neighbours. Tufca had to walk alone. His 
teacher was no other 'than the spirit within him/ 35 

Frequently as we have quoted the admiring Mr. Abbott 
already, the following appreciation by him of Tukaram's con- 
summation as a Bhakta is both correct and irresistible : In 
the latter half of his life, ' God is his all-in-all. God was his 
food and his drink. The world was nothing to him. God was 
his centre. His poetic inspiration came to him unexpectedly, 
but once in its grasp he thought and spoke only in abhangs. 
No one taught him the art, of poetry. His words flowed out of 
a heart full of love of God and goodwill to men. 36 

The saint himself proclaims : ' I know nothing, and what 
I am uttering are not my words, O ye saints. Be not angry 
with trie, for God Pannjuranga speaks through me. He has filled 
every nook and corner in me. How else can an ignorant person 
like me declare what transcends even the Vedas ? I only know 
how to sing the name of God ; by the power of my Guru, God 
is bearing all my burdens/ 87 ' Panxjuranga is my father and 
Rakhumai my mother. I am therefore of pure lineage from 
both tny parents. I need no longer be poor in spirit or a pigmy 
in power. I shall no longer be wicked or unfortunate. God 
will ever come to my succour/ 38 ' Who can deprive the son of 
the treasures of his father ? I sit on the lap of God and there 
remain fearless and contented/ ' By the power of my faith 
God has made me a free master, says Tuka/ 40 ' I distribute 
the harvest of God : all castes may come and partake of this 
bounty to their satisfaction/ 41 He declares his mission to be 
to promote religion and to destroy atheism. I take pointed 
words and fling themi like arrows. I have no consideration of 
great and small/ 42 ' Through 'various lives have I been doing 
this duty, to relieve the oppressed from the sorrows of existence 
I shall sing the praises of God and gather together His saints. 
/ shall evoke tears even from stones. I shall sing the holy name 
of God and shall dance and clap my hands with joy. I shall 
plant my feet on the brow of death. I shall imprison my pas- 


sions and make myself the lord of the senses/ 48 'Pebbles will 
shine only so long as the diamond is not brought out. Torches 
will shine only so long as the sun has not risen. People will 
talk of other saints so long as they have not met TuKa.' 44 ' I 
have come to illuminate the path and distinguish between the 

true and the false Before me no tinsel can stand/ 45 ' I 

have girded up my loins and have discovered for you the path 
across the ocean of life. Come hither, come hither ; come great 
and small ; men and women. Take no thought and have no 
anxiety : I shall carry you all to the other shore. I bear with 
me the certitude of God to carry you over in God's name.' 46 

Few could resist this call. For tke masses, indeed, the voice 
of Tuka was the voice of God. It reverberated throughout 
MahareLstra and its echoes rolled from soul to soul. The mes- 
sage was not a political one, but only religious. Yet the people, 
once filled with that fervour, could never remain apathetic. 
Tukaiam was undoubtedly a mystic, but the people were not 
mystical. Their mighty enthusiasm for religion could be easily 
directed into pragmatic channels. R&mdas was as much the 
instrument of this transformation as Sivaji. He converted the 
Vwrkari into the Dhdrkan sampraddya, as RajwKj6 puts it : the 
sahisnu psychology was revolutionised into the jayinu. The 
God of this) virile cult is not the static Vifhobd of Pandharpur, 
but the dynamic Maruti of Ramdas : Hanumian is our sup- 
porter ; Sri Raghun&th is the God we worship. While our Guru 
is the powerful Sri Ram, what room is there for penury ? When 
Kaghunandan is our best benefactor, why should we go to 
others ? Hence are we the slaves of Sif Ram ; our faith is firmly 
set on Him. Let the heavens fall, but we shall not think of any 
other/ 47 

It is to be remembered that Hanuman is the Hercules of 
Hindu mythology. His labours Cleared file Augean Stables for 
Sri Riamachandra the creator of Rama-fajya : the ideal Svardjya 
of the Hindus. In terms of Maratha history, we might describe 
Sivaji as a combination of Hanumian and Sri Riamachandra in 
the eyes of the masses. The emotional mysticism of Tukaram 
and the intellectual pragmatism of Ramdas must have been of 


considerable assistance to Siviaji in building up his great move- 
ment. He was certainly not writing on a blank page of History. 
The entire galaxy of saints had as much to do with the creation 
of a new Mailaltha society as Sivaji. The psychological and 
moral foundations had been well laid before SivajFs military and 
political genius laid thq coping stone. Manatha Svarajya of the 
seventeenth century was not the work of a single man howsoever 
gifted. It was a mansion built by several hands directed by 
several brains. It was the natural product and culmination of 
the historical process which we have described in its various 
aspects in the present and earlier chapters. 

It is futile to speculate on the exact share of each worker 
in this complex historical field. To attempt such an analysis 
is like trying to determine what proportion of soil and sunlight, 
wind and rain, have gone into the making of a huge banyan 
tree. The vital elements of historical evolution are incapable 
of accurate measurement and arithmetical apportionment. It 
is therefore vain to distribute the dividends among all the part- 
ners in the great business of nation-building. Both Sivaji and 
Ramdas were creators as well as participators in the new life 
that was surging through Maharatra during the seventeenth 
century. That they were contemporaries working for a com- 
mon cause is undeniable. The diary of their personal meetings 
and contacts is only of secondary importance. 

The controversy regarding the personal contacts between 
Sivaji and Riamdas is thus clinched by Ranaote and Belvalkar : 
The earliest date assigned to their first meeting is 1649 ; the 
last is 1672. " It is highly probable," they say, " that the 
earlier date is the more correct one ; but we shall await some 
new discoveries for the final decision in the matter." 48 The 
letter attributed to Sivajl and dated in the fifth year of Rtijya- 
bhiseka is an illuminating dodiment. In substance it reads as 
follows : 

'Obeisance to my noble Teacher (Ramdas), the father of 
all, the abode of bliss. iSivaji who is merely as dust on his 
Master's feet, places his head on the feet of his Master, and 
submits : I was greatly obliged to have been favoured by your 


supreime instruction, and to have been told that my religious, 
duty consists in conquest, in the establishment of Dharma, in 
the service of God and the Bifchmans, in the amelioration of my 
subjects, and in their protection and succour. I have been 
advised that herein is spiritual satisfaction for hie. You 
were also pleased to declare that whatever I should earnestly 
desire would be fulfilled. Consequently, through your grace, 
have I accomplished the destruction of the Turks and built at 
great expense fastnesses for the protection and perpetuation of 
my kingdom. Whatever kingdom I have acquired I have placed 
at your feet and dedicated myself to your service. I desired 
to enjoy your close company, for wjiich I built the temple at 
Chaphal and arranged for its upkeep and worship, etc. . . Then 
when I again desired to make over 121 villages to the temple 
at Chaphal, and also intended to grant eleven vitas of land to 
every place of worship, you said that all this could be done in 
due course. Consequently, I have assigned the following lands 
for the service of God . .*. I promis^ to make available, at the 
time of the annual festival, all the corn from these lands. 
Dated Rajyabhiseka saka 5 ; Asvin Suddha 10 ( = Saka 1600 
or 1678 A.D.). 49 

Competent critics have considered ' activism ' the most 
characteristic feature of the teachings of Ramdas. " Ramdas, 
more than any other saint of Mahanatra, called people's minds 
to the performance of Duty, while the heart was to be set on 

God No wonder that with this teaching he helped the 

formation of the Mariatha kingdom, as no other saint had done 
before." 50 His Ddsa Bodha is supposed to contain the political 
testament of Ramdlas. Particularly does he declare therein : 
4 The Mlecchas have long been rampant in the country and it 
is necessary to be very vigilant . . . The goddess Tujaja BhavSni 
is indeed benignly interested but it is necessary to be circumspect 
in action/ 51 Addressing the goddess at Pratapga<J, Riamdiis 
implores, ' I ask only one thing of Thee, my Mother : Promote 
the cause of the King in our very lifetime. I have heard of 
Thy exploits in the past ; but show Thy power today/ 52 His 
vision of the Kingdom of Bliss, wherein ' the wicked cease from 


troubling and the weary are at rest ', is described in his Ananda- 
vana Bhuvaxa : ' A great calamity has overtaken the Mlecchas ; 
God has become the Protector of the virtuous ; all evil-doers 
have come to an end. Hindusthan has grown strong ; haters 
of God have been slain ; tfie power of the Mlecchas has 
vanished. The Mother has blessed Sivaji and destroyed the 
sinners. I see the Goddess in the company of the king, intent 
on devouring the wicked. She protected Her devotees of old ; 
She is protecting them today in the Kingdom of Bliss.' 53 

To prepare for this consummation, Ramdas preached in the 
living present : ' Races of pilgrimage have been destroyed ; 
homes of the Brahmans have been desecrated ; the whole earth 
is agitated ; Dharma is gone. Therefore, Maiiathas should be 
mobilised ; Mahdrd$(ra Dharma should be propagated. The 
people should be rallied and filled with a singleness of purpose ; 
sparing no effort, we should crash upon the Mlecchas/ 54 Torn 
from their context these exhortations might sound fanatical. But 
from what we have recorded in the preceding pages the religious 
revival had reached a stage* where it was bound to become mili- 
tant. Even the patient and forbearing Ekanath wrote : ' Wicked 
kings began to rule, and they exploited their subjects like thieves. 
Themselves worse than Sudras, they converted people of all 
castes. Such being the condition (most sinful and sacrilegious) 
Brahmans gave up studying the scriptures ; they became drun- 
kards, served the ignominious, and fed themselves like dogs . . . 
on the leavings from the Turks' table/ 55 Ramdas, to be fair 
to him, also recommended moderation : * Extremes should be 
always avoided ; one should act according to situations. The 
wise should never be fanatical .... Times change ; rigid rules 
do not always help ; in politics theoretical consistency is mis- 
leading/ 56 

The saints taught by exatpple as well as by precept. On 
the whole, their total influence was in the direction of evoking 
great fervour for religion, yet restraining that zeal by a modera- 
tion which has always characterised Hindu social behaviour. 
The revivalism was creative and constructive, not violent and 
destructive. " The impulse was felt," as Riana<J& has observed, 


"in art, in religion, in the growth of vernacular literature, in 
communal freedom of life, in the increase of self-reliance and 
toleration." 57 In spirit, this renaissance was also fed from 
another source, namely, Vijayanagar. Particularly was that 
great kingdom (destroyed just a century before the death of 
Shiahji, as we have seen) the repository of the best traditions 
of Hindu rule and culture. Particularly, in the !matter of reli- 
gious toleration, no less than as a shining example of what 
Hindu organisation could achieve, the Marathas had an inspir- 
ing model in the " never-to-be forgotten Empire " of the South. 
The specific channels through which this inspiration worked 
must remain a controversial subject. On the religious side we 
have the significant tradition of the removal of the image of 
Vitthala (to save it from Muslim desecration) to Vijayanagar, 
and its restoration to Pantfharpur by Bhanudas (d. 1513). The 
Mailathi poet Mahipati has described this historic incident in 
his Bhakta-vijaya (composed, 1762) which evidently records a 
well-established tradition.* It is to be remembered that the ini- 
tial consecration of Vfthoba at Pan<Jfian is attributed to Puntja- 
lika a saint equally respected by the people of Maharatra 
and Karnatak. The service rendered by a Karnatak king 
through the protection and restoration of Vitthala, the most 
popular god of Mahailastra, was bound to make a deep and 
abiding impression upon a people who were now passionately 
devoted to the Parwjharpur cult. In the verses of Mahipati we 
witness the sentiments of the Mai&thas regarding their favourite 
god : While VithobS was away from Pantfhaif , ' the city was 
like a body without life, or a river without water. The city was 
oppressed with fears. It was like an army without a king, like 
constellations without the ttioon, or as a virtuous devoted wife 
deprived of her husband (unprotected among men). So with 
Hari gone to Vijayjanagar, the w,hole of JPantfhari seemed deso- 
late. Dejected, the saints and mahants sat down by the Eagle- 
platform. "Whose praises shall we now sing?" they asked 
among themselves. The Life of the World has deserted us. 
The promise given to PUixJalib (to stick to Pandhaii) has been 
broken/ 58 


The rejoicing at the return of Vithoba was commensurate 
with the sorrow at his absence . * And now the assembled crowd 
of men and women praised Bhanudas saying that it was through 
him that the Lord of Heaven had come back to Pndhari. 
Some distributed sweetmeats throughout the city. Others 
gave feasts of daintily cooked food to Brahmans. Thus all the 
dwellers of that sacred city rejoiced in their hearts. Just as 
when the son of Raghu came back to Ayodhya, after enduring 
fourteen years of exile, the people of the city rejoiced, so did 
the people of Paiwjhari also rejoice. As when a mountain be- 
comes dry in the time of drought, and then a cloud pours abun- 
dant rain upon it, so did the: people of Paixjhari feel relieved. 
It was like the joy of the 'clouds as they saw the ocean issuing 
from Agasti ; it was like the beauty of vegetation when Spring 
appears : so was the return of the Protector of the Helpless to 
Panxjhari. All the inhabitants became happy : It was as when 
life returns to the body and all the senses are quickened, and 
begin to perfortn their functions. 89 it happened to all the 
people of PanuJhari.' 59 

This event beautifully symbolises the return of life to the 
dead limbs of Hindu society. Out of the very ashes of Vijaya- 
nagar a spark was conveyed to Maharatra which added to the 
illumination created by the saints. The protection of Vitthala 
was the protection of Hindu Dharma and civilisation, as it was 
lived and understood by those generations. His restoration 
therefore was the restoration of Dharma which brought about 
a great and enthusiastic revival. Vijayanagar had stood like a 
rock against the waves of Islamic advance for over two cen- 
turies. While protecting all that Hindu civilisation meant, and 
fighting valiantly against the forces of Muslim aggression, 
Vijayanagar had throughout continued to be tolerant towards 
the Muslims individually. This tradition was not extinguished 
at T&likoKa or Rakkastangatfi, but transmitted to Mahara&ra 
through innumerable channels. 

Professor T. S. Shejwalkar has discussed some of these in 
his article on " What Sivlaji and the Marathi State owed to 
Vijayanagara " (in the Vijayanagafa Sexcentenary Commemo- 


ration Volume). 60 He has pointed out therein how the author 
of Mahara$tra Mahodaydchd Pifrvaranga (lit. Dawn of the 
Great Awakening of Maharia$tra) t dealing with the period 
13001600 A.D., unavoidably found himself writing a history 
of Vijayanagar. The family bakhars of the Brahman Sardesais 
of SangameSvar, he says, show how they were supported by the 
Vijayanagar kings, and thinks that their title of Ndyak must 
have been derived from Vijayanagar. " The cultural influence 
of Vijayanagara," according to him, " is found mentioned in a 
curious manner : When after the terrible Durgjadevi famine, 
at the end of the 14th century, the whole of Maharatra was 
-depopulated for thirty years, a certain Brahmin, D5do Nara- 
sinh by name, of Atharva Veda and Bhdlanjana Gotra, came 
from Vijayanagara to Karatf, and, with the permission of the 
Padshah of Bedar, helped in the reconstruction and repopula- 
tion of the land/' 61 Prof. Shejwalkar is also of the opinion 
that Sivaji, who was at Bangalore as a boy until 1642, must 
have imbibed at his father's court some of the surviving tradi- 
tions of Vijayanagar, as evidenced 'by the Siva Bharat and 
RMha-Madhava-Vilasa Champu.* 2 "We can take it almost 
for certain," he states, "that Sivaji's mind had become full 
of tales of Vijayanagara, of the exploits of its heroes, and the 
cultural work of its learned men like Vidyiarainya. The fame 
of ' Rama 1 Rija Kanaiolia ' and the historic battle of ' Rakshas- 
tagdi ' had spread far and wide in Maharatra as we can judge 
by the existence of Marathi Bakhars on the subject and the 
casual mention of his name elsewhere . . . Subjectively speaking, 
it seems clear to us that tSiviaji's ideal was formed in the shadow 
of Vijayanagara.' 63 Finally, he concludes, " Because Sivaji 
wished to stand forth as a successor of Vijayanagara, he selected 
as his imperial coin the gold hona in imitation of Vijayanagara, 
and did not copy the rupee of tbe Mughals though it was be- 
coming the current coin of India as a whole then. For the 
same reason he continued the practice of donating villages and 
cash from the treasury to learned Brahmins and to shrines of 
Hindu deities on the Madras coast. A number of the grant 
papers have been published in Marathi from the Peshwa State- 


Tecords by Parasnls and Mavji. His grant, indited on silver* 
plate, to Tirumalaraya and Ramaraya, the two sons of Sri 
Ranga Rayulu, the last nominal emperor of Vijayanagara, who 
died a fugitive in the west country (probably Bednur), though 
in its present form spurious, still appears to be, as remarked 
by Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, correct in substance from the senti- 
ments expressed therein/' 64 

Before we close this chapter, it is necessary to explain the 
work of -Shahji in Karnatak which has been characterised by 
one writer as " all along unfriendly though he was a Hindu." 
Mr. D. B. Diskalkar has observed, " He was no doubt the 
greatest Hindu general in those days whose help could have 
saved Vijayanagara for some more years .... If Shahji had 
left the cause of Bijapur and had taken up that of Vijayanagara 
the history of the "Karnataka could have taken a different turn. 
The foundation of the Maratha power in the south which he^ 
laid by his Bijapur seivice could as well have been laid by the 
Vijayanagara service." 65 * 

It indeed seems a pity that the historical process does not 
consult future wisdom. Our regrets that things might have 
been different from what they were actually reveal our senti- 
ments instead of elucidating History. 

' The old order changeth, yielding place to new, 
And God fulfils himself in many ways.' 

The collapse of the Vijayanagar empire clearly showed its mili- 
tary weakness. It had not enough political stamina to resus- 
citate itself. The unhealthy state of things during the last 
century of its shadowy existence (1565-1664) revealed the in- 
capacity of the South to sustain Hindu civilisation. It was an 
epoch of self-seeking adventurers. In that milieu * to scrap the 
sorry scheme of things' arid reshape it to a new pattern was 
not the work of individual men but of Destiny. Shiahji was as 
much an instrument in the hands of that 'Divinity which 
shapes our ends' as Sivajl. The emergence of a New Order 
necessarily involves the destruction of the old. Not all who 
participate in the processes of History act as conscious agents. 



Most men are like mere pebbles in the stream of life ; but some 
stand out as boulders and even shape the current^ of history. 
Shahjl was a builder unaware of the magnitude of his own con- 
tributions towards the rise of the Maratha power. He succeed* 
ed because Bijapur was behind him ; otherwise he might have 
died like Tirumala or Sri Ranga. Vijayanagar could not be 
resurrected. If Hindu civilisation was to survive, a new avatar 
was needed. He appeared in the person of Sivajl. 


" Report hath made him an airy body and adds wings, 
or else it were impossible hee could bee at soe many places 
as hee is said to bee at all at one time. Hee is very nimble 
and active imposing strange labour upon himself that hee 
may endure hardship, and alsoe exercises his chiefest men 
that hee flies to and fro with incredible dexterity. English 
Factory Record, 1664. 1 

The life and doings of Sivaji have been minutely and criti- 
cally studied by scholars in and outside Maharastra for more 
than a century since Grant Duff wrote his History of the 
Mahrattas. Still we are no nearer a correct understanding of, 
the various details of his crowded career today than were his 
earliest historians or biographers. '"It is impossible to come 
to any universal agreement/' writes Sir Jadunath Sarkar, " on 
questions like, Where did Shivaji spend the years 1637 and 
1638, at Puna or Bijapur ? Was it Dadaji KonS~dev or Shivaji 
who subjugated the Mavals? When did Dadaji die? What 
was the first Bijapuri fort taken by Shivaji and in what year ? 
In what year or years did he establish his own authority over 
those forts of his father which had not been at first placed 
under him ? What were the order and dates of his acquisition 
of the 40 forts of which he was admittedly in possession in 
1659 ? " 2 This questionnaire might be expanded almost without 
limit, according td the objectives held in view by the researcher. 
For the biographer of iSivajI such minutiae may be of insatiable 
interest. But, for our purpose, the character and outlook of 
SivajlL are of greater importance and significance than even the 
details of his horoscope or tfie ethnology of his lineage. 3 In the 
light of the place we have given to individuals in the preceding 
chapters, we should concentrate more on the historical than bio* 
graphical aspects of even this greatest of the makers of Maiatha 
nationhood. Except on matters which are of value in the under- 


standing of the historical process, therefore, we have relegated 
details to the notes and appendices at the end of this volume. 
It is to be admitted, however, that though tglvaji could be con- 
sidered in one sense as a product of his age, the dynamics of 
his great personality in their turn moulded and reshaped the 
destiny of the people and country. So powerful was this fac- 
tor that most writers have attributed, it seems to us, rather too 
much to his individual genius. Without seeking to under-rate 
this vital and almost decisive element, we should emphasise that 
&ivaji did not inherit a clean slate and he did not work in a 
vacuum. He had to rub out and rewrite much, but he had also 
to adjust his sails to the contemporary winds. Though he was 
a master-craftsman endowed with extraordinary talents, his 
tools were mostly old and his co-adjutors were not a negligible 
factor. The resultant of the total historical process provided 
him a congenial atmosphere which enabled his genius to bear 
abundant fruit. The soil indeed had been prepared and watered 
by the pioneers and sairfts. Sivaji did the final ploughing and 
seed-throwing. The farmer was a creature of the soil, the seed 
was indigenous ; and so were the bullocks and the plough. 
Finally, the harvest is never the product of any single person's 
labour : so also was the Maratha creation. 

That Sivaji's success was due to his qualities of leadership 
is quite obvious. The absence of those qualities in the Yadavas, 
as well as the apathy of the people of Maharatra in those days, 
had made for the collapse of Hindu power then. Now there 
was leadership of extraordinary vision combined with equal 
capacity for initiative and organisation ; now the people were 
awakened and ready to respond ; and all the opportunities that 
time, place, and circumstances could afford were available also. 
The result, however, did not depend upon these merely ; there 
-were, too, formidable odds to bereckonai with. When 'Ala-u'd- 
Din started his aggressions the whole peninsula, though politi- 
cally split up, was Hindu. Now there were the Muslim king- 
doms of Abmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkon<Ja. The first of 
these was indeed dissolved while Sivaji was still a boy of six 
years,* but its place had been taken by the more powerful and 


dangerous Mughal empire. To emerge successfully out of this 
situation required courage as well as dexterity. Sivaji had not 
the inherited resources of a long established kingdom like that 
of the Yadavas. Like Sher Shah Sur he had to build them 
up out of a "mere jagir. Bricks and mortar and even artisans 
alone, however, cannot build a magnificent and enduring struc- 
ture ; it requires the genius of an architect to achieve amazing 
results. Marble was available for long ages before the Taj 
Mahal was created ; and the huge rock out of which the temple 
of Kailas was hewn existed before this marvel was accomplish- 
ed. iSiviajI was a titanic creator in the realm of politics and 
nation-building. He had ,the vision of Mazzini, the dash of 
Garibaldi, the diplomacy of Cavour, and the patriotism, per- 
severance, and intrepidity of William of Orange. He did for 
Maharatra what Frederick the Great achieved for Germany 
or Alexander the Great for Macedonia. In India, later, Ranjit , 
Singh, the Lion of the Punjab, affords a striking parallel. Still, 
in several respects Sivaja stands alone 1 and unique. 

It has been observed that, in ancient Greece, the history of 
the rise and fall of Thebes was no more than the biography of 
Epaminondas. Some have regarded the rise of the Maratha 
State as almost a similar phenomenon ; but historical analogies 
are superficial, lame, and misleading. Sivaji's achievement was 
greater, richer, and more enduring. We propose to deal with it 
in this and the following three chapters. 

To begin with, the amazing success that Siviaji won in the 
course of his relatively short span of life, cannot be explained 
satisfactorily except in terms of his military talents. His poli- 
tical ideal could not have been accomplished without his mili- 
tary genius. He had to create and equip the armies with which 
he had to fight ; he had to fix for them a goal, fire them with a 
zeal, and lead them fr6m victory to victory so as to galvanize 
a whole people with a sense of national triumph. Progressively, 
as we shall witness, this was not purely a military achievement. 
Diplomatic skill, political manoeuvring, and creative statesman- 
ship had all to be brought into focus for the total result. Other- 
wise iSivaji Would have remained a mere war-lord, a futile and 


aimless adventurer. He has been spoken of as a ' Grand Rebel/ 
but this is too negative and incomplete an epithet to describe 
Win adequately. He was a strategist a Grand Strategist by 
which he accomplished his positive ends. These aims he sum- 
med up in the noble word ' Svarajya ' which was to be enjoyed 
under the protecting authority of the ' Chhatrapati' This was 
the legacy he wished to leave to posterity : his own progeny 
and his people. But this grand strategy was empirically evolved 
and rested on his patrimony, his early training, and opportuni- 
ties. It grew with his life and developed with his experience. 
What follows, therefore, must inevitably constitute a historical- 
biography or an account of how Siijaji made history for his 
country with the help of his people, during the seventeenth 

There is no unanimity among scholars about the exact date 
of his birth. Sir Jadunath Sarkar has accepted 10 April 1627 
on the authority of Chitnis whose account was written as late 
2? c. 1810 A.D/' 19 February 1630 i.s the date recorded in the 
Jedhe Sakavali, a work of undoubtedly earlier origin. We have 
.already stated that iSivaji was born of Shahji and Jijaba! both 
of whom traced their lineage from ancient royal families. 7 The 
place of his birth was Sivneri, a fortress which still contains 
monuments commemorating that event. 8 The circumstances at- 
tending his nativity, infancy and early life are worthy of re- 
capitulation for the light they throw upon his psychology. His 
father led an extremely unsettled and hunted life. His mother 
too was much exposed to the dangers and vicissitudes of her 
husband's fortunes. There were narrow escapes and thrilling 
-episodes in the fugitive family. When Sivajii was still in the 
embryo, his mother had been shocked by the cold blooded butch- 
ery of her father, two brothers) and a nephew in the NizSm- 
*hahl (25 July 1629). In 1633* Jijabaf had very nearly been 
captured by Mhaldar Khan the qile'dar of Trimbak. 9 In 1636 
ShlahjBf was besieged together with his family in the fortress of 
Mahuli, and might well have been either slaughtered or im- 
prisoned for life. Thereafter the little boy and his long-suf- 
fering tnother, except for short intervals perhaps, lived mostly 


'On the Poona jagir, while Shahjl was in the Kamatak along 
with his efdest son Sambhaji, and his second wife Tukabal 
Mohite. 10 The death of Sambhaji in action at Kanakgiri 
(c. 1655) 11 left Jijabai alone with Siviajl to engross her affec- 
tions. She thus lived for the most part with her gifted son to 
guide and inspire him in all the trying moments of his life. 
She died in 1674 a few days after Sivaji's coronation at Raiga<L 
She was his real and living Bhavani. 

It is more difficult to assess the direct influence of Shahjl 
upon Sivajl. But from what little we know, we cannot agree 
with those who have imagined that he neglected his first family 
at Pbona. The ground on which this opinion has been based 
is too fictitious to be convincing. 12 On the contrary, we have 
evidence to believe that there was no alienation in sentiment or 
purpose between Shahjl at Bangalore and Jijabai and Sivaji in 
Poona. According to Sabhasad, they were living together at 
Bangalore until Sivajl was twelve years of age. 13 Then, even* 
if we should skip over the highly draiftatised accounts of Sivaji's 
early visit to Bijapur, as given in the Siva Digvijaya and Chitnis 
Bakhars, there are more sober references in them which rnay 
not be doubted. For instance, the loyal father in Bijapur ser- 
vice is reported to have written to his adventurous son remostra- 
tihg against his disloyal conduct (towards the 'Adil Shah) in 
terms which sound quite plausible and natural : " I have to 
stay at the Court ; you are my son, and yet you are plundering 
treasures and capturing forts without pausing to think that it 
will compromise me. (Its only result will be) the Badshah's 
displeasure and the loss of all we have. What I have earned 
is for you. You should maintain and gradually increase it. It 
is youn duty to keep secure what my service has procured for 
me in my old age." 15 Despite the political divergence in out- 
look at that stage, revealed by this letter, the family affection 
of Shahjl towards Sivaji is too transparent to be questioned. 
Likewise, Jijabai is stated to have advised Sivajl : " What pro- 
perty your father has, he has earned for you. Do what may 
secure future good. That will please your father ; do not en- 
tertain any doubt about it." 16 We would only add to this that, 


when Shahjl .was imprisoned in 1648-49, Sivaji gave up Kontfana 
as that was one of the conditions of his liberation. He also 
appears to have carried on negotiations with prince Murad to 
secure the same purpose. 17 The Jedhe entry on Shahji's release, 
quoted earlier, also throws unmistakable light on the degree of 
ShiahjTs interest in his son's security and progress. 38 The alleged 
apathy between father and son, therefore, finds little support 
in the evidence at our disposal. If anything, as years passed, 
they understood each other better, and perhaps also appreciated 
each other's achievements in their respective spheres. Ulti- 
mately, the work of both, following seemingly divergent lines, 
proved equally fruitful in the creation of an independent 
Mar&tha dominion. 

In the purely political sphere, the most direct instrument 
of SivajS's instruction in the formative years of his life, was 
Padaja KorwJ-dev. He was Shahjfs Brahman steward on the 
Poona jagir, and became 'SivajI's tutor and mentor from 1642- 
47. Sabhasad speaks of him -as "tl# intelligent and shrewd 
Dadlaji Kon<J-dev," and according to Chitnis : " Sivaji Maharaj 
lived in the provihce of Puoa and was educated by Dadaji 
Pant. He was( taught the arts of wrestling and throwing mis- 
siles." 19 From all accounts, Dadaji appears to have been a 
very conscientious and capable administrator. On coming to 
Puna he took possession of the 12 Mavals, says Sabhasad. ' The 
MavaJ Desmukhs were seized and taken in hand ; the refrac- 
tory among them were put to death. Then, in course of 
time, Dadaji died/ 20 Sivaji thereafter managed his own affairs. 
The nature of the relations and activities of the Bhosles and 
their steward is revealed by a letter of Muhammad 'Adil Shah 
to Kinhojl Jedhe, dated 1 Aug. 1644. As Shahjl Bhosle, it 
states, has become a rebel and Dadaji, his supreme agent, is 
campaigning in the region of Kfcrwjaiga,* Kharajoji and Bajl 
Khopde have been deputed to suppress him, along with " our 
grand ministers." Kanhojl Jedhe too is asked to co-operate with 
the 'AdilshaWi officers in return for which he is promised eleva- 
tion. It closes with the remark, " know this to be urgent." 21 
We shall see later on how the Jedhes, far from acting as the 


agents of the 'Adil Shiah in suppressing the rebellious activities 
of the Bhosles, joined with them in the work of Maratha in- 
dependence. From this point of view it is significant to re- 
member that Ranhoji N&yak Jedhe and his karbhdn Dadaji 
Kpaja Lohokare were imprisoned in 1648 and released in 1649 
along with ShiahjI. 22 

Other coadjutors of Sivajl in these early years will come 
in for notice in due course. But the names of Yesaji Kank, 
Bajl Pasalkar, and Tanaja Malusare appear prominently among 
them. Could this band of young dare-devils have conceived of 
the noble ideals which Sivaji formulated explicitly in his maturer 
years ? Despite the precocious sentiments put into the mouth 
of the young hero by the Bakhar writers, we would rather not 
anticipate his idealism. At this stage, to begin with, they were 
a group of fiery young men, ambitious to achieve something, 
tugging at the leash, straining to go forward, bursting into ad- 
ventures for their own sake, and inebriated with success. But 
increasingly, gathering expeyence, under the! gifted leadership of 
SivajS they found their opportunities ever widening. The sober 
and consummate guidance of Dadaji Kon^-dev (until 1647) 
and the patriotic and powerful inspiration of Jijabal gave direc- 
tion and meaning to their juvenile escapades. 

History proceeds from the concrete to the abstract, from 
particulars to the general, and palpable human facts are the 
incentive which goad men to idealistic actions. The atmos- 
phere indeed must have been rife with stories of the misdoings 
of the Muslims : the declared policy of Muhammad 'Adil Shah 
(as stated in the Muhammad-Ndma) was " to strengthen and 
glorify the Islamic religion in the dominion of the Hindus." 23 
The technique of the execution of this policy was well-known : 
the desecration of Hindu places of worship and the conversion 
of the Hindus. ThougH Hindtte served under the Muslims, the 
price they had to pay was often too heavy. The massacre of 
the Jadhavas (Lukhjii and his sons and nephew), the murder of 
Khejoji Bhosle and the conversion of Bajajl Nimba]kar were 
instances 24 to provoke reprisals even as family vendetta. Nume- 
rous other such provocations must have been felt by Hindus all 


over the 'Adilshahl dominions. Ramdas preached his philosophy 
of ' direct action ' in such a society. No wonder* that inflam- 
mable material, such as the Sivajl group provided, caught im- 
mediate fire. Like the Carbonari and the young men of Italy 
under the fiery inspiration of Mazzini, the spirited youths of 
the Mavajs formed a revolutionary body ready for any sacri- 
fice. It is to be 'remembered that Sivaji was 18-19 years of 
age when his father Shahjl was imprisoned, then released. Think 
of its effect upon Jijabai, upon Sivaji and upon the Jedhs 
and Lohokares. Earlier, too, had suppressive measures been 
taken against Dadaji Kon<J-dev for insurrectionary activities 
in the region of Kontfaijia. Sivaji jnd his band of young fol- 
lowers whether they were Katriyas or Marathas were not 
tame cultivators but gallant fighters. They captured forts, looted 
government treasures, and may be even destroyed a mosque. 23 
They belonged to a people of whom Yuan Chwang had remark- 
ed : ' They are proud, spirited, and warlike, grateful for 
favours, and revengeful for wrongs, self-sacrificing towards 
suppliants in distress, and sanguinary to death with any who 
treated them insultingly/ 26 

Opportunities were provided by the very situation, geogra- 
phical constitution, and the administrative looseness of the 
regions which nursed these people in an atmosphere of freedom. 
Politically speaking, it is helpful to note (i) that the Nizam- 
shahi was dissolved 1 in 1636 ; (") that this was preceded and 
followed by unavoidable anarchy, particularly in the tracts now 
covered by the Poona, Thairja, Kolaba and Nasik districts ; (fit) 
that the 'Adil Shah's forces were pre-occupied with the Karria- 
tak campaigns thereafter ; and (it;) that ShahjS's Poona jdglr 
(comprising the land enclosed between the GhocJ river in the 
north, the Nfrra in the south, and the Bhimia in the east, stretch- 
ing over the Ghats and the Mavajs into the Konkaio in the west) , 
though nominally a fief under Bffjapur, was virtually indepen- 
dent. Apart from the general laxity of feudal administration, 
the last ten years of Muhammad 'Adil Shah's reign were mark- 
ed by his prolonged illness (1646-56) and court intrigues of a 
deadly nature. "The hill forts under all the Mahomedan 


governments," writes Grant Duff, "were generally much neg- 
lected/' 27 SJome of the more important strongholds were no 
doubt garrisoned by the State, but in times of need (like the 
Karaatak campaigns) the best troops were removed. Ordinarily, 
most of the forts were entrusted to the mokdsaddrs, the amildars, 
the jagfrdars or the desmukhs of the districts wherein they were 
situated. " There was no hill-fort in Shahjee's Jagheer com- 
mitted to the care of Dadajee Konedeo. The strong fort of 
Kondanah had a Mahomedan Killidar ; and Poorundhur was 
under charge of a Brahmin appointed by Morar Punt. Shahjee's 
family were on terms of intimacy with both the Killidars, parti- 
cularly Neelkunt Rao of P^onindhur, who was originally under 
the Nizam Shahee government and had adhered to Shahjee." 28 
What with constant war-activities and famine (such as the 
terrible one which devastated the Deccan in (1630-31) and the 
chaos which followed in their wake, the land had become a 
prey to robbers and wild beasts. The Tarikh-i-$ivafi cites the 
instance of a revenue officer under AJfrmadnagar, named Moro 
Tandev, who ' raised a tumult and seized the neighbourhood of 
Puna/ during this period. The whole region up to Wai and 
Sirwajnvas devastated and unsafe. 29 It was in the reduction of 
this state of things that Dadaji KonnJ-dev rendered the greatest 
service. His strong and efficient administration cleared the 
Augean Stables for Sivaji, as well as set a constructive model 
for him. The Mava] country, as Sarkar has well observed, was 
the cradle of SivajS's power and the Maval people formed the 
backbone of his army. The prevailing system of administra- 
tion left a free hand to the local chiefs and officers. The 
Desmukh was no more than the king's local agent for the col- 
lection of revenue througFT the village Pafils. They were grant- 
ed, in return for this service, some commission and rent-free 
lands. The king was* interested in nothing beyond receiving 
the stipulated revenue. The actual administrative work was 
done by Brahman stewards or karbhans, like Dadaji KorwJ-dev, 
assisted by a Kayastha Prabhu staff. The Maratha De&nukhs 
and Jagjrdars had enough leisure to play the rdle of petty 
rajas indulging in hunting and martial exercises. The mass of 


the people were Kuigbl farmers or Kola fishermen who provided, 
excellent material for the army or the feudal militia. It is said 
of Guru Govind Singh that he fashioned hawks out of sparrows 
and lions out of foxes. Sivajl likewise converted the Miaval 
yeomanry into ironsides for the achievement of Maratha free- 
dom and the creation of a Maratha State. 

The people but reflect the character of their land. No ela- 
borate natural or geographical description is called for here. 
But the most impressive features cannot be missed by any ob- 
server of these homelands of the Marathas : the main Sahyadri 
range forming the backbone of the country, with the Deccan 
plateau or Des in the east, and the Konkari coastal strip in the 
west. The arid plains above and the alluvial plains below the 
Ghats are nothing peculiar, except that they provided free access 
to raids from the hardy mountaineers who lived in the middle. 

The soil in the Konkain is productive and the rainfall even 
heavy at places. The coast is broken with inlets and creeks 
which afford havens for'country-cra/t to encourage some sea- 
borne trade. Ports like Bassein, Bombay, Chaul, Dabul, Ratna- 
giri, Rajapur, Vingurla, Goa, and Karwsar, attracted even foreign 
shipping. The tussle for their possession soon brought into exist- 
ence a chain of coastal fortresses like Janjira, Suvaniadurg, 
Vijayadurg, Sindhudurg, etc. The part played by these in 
Maratha history will appear in due course. The Konkain became 
the bone of contention between the Muslims, the Marathas and 
the European powers. 

The Mavaj country comprises the habitable portions of the 
tnountain region, with its terraced hills and hollows, where even 
today one. sees hamlets nestling in the beautiful valleys as he 
descends from the Ghats. The soil yields to hard labour a 
scanty subsistence which does not keep the MavaJ peasantry 
out of want. Higher up, the steep hillsides are covered with 
thick forests inhabited by wild beasts and mountain tribes. 
The climate and the surroundings both impart to the denisons 
of the valleys and Ghat-matha (summit) a sturdiness, vigour 
and simplicity of living which have constituted the greatest mili- 
tary assets of MaharSstra. This was the habitat of the ' moun- 


tain rats' that became the greatest source of danger to the 
Muslim poolers which had hitherto enjoyed such ' plain ' sail- 
ing over the vast stretches of the Deccan Trap. 

The strength of the Manathas lay in their forts and moun- 
tains. The Koli Nag Nak and the Sirkes of Khejna had de- 
monstrated it in the time of Muhammad Tughlaq and the 
Bahmams. So also had the valiant Mukund Rao taken advan- 
tage of the hills and defied Yusuf 'Adil Shah with the help of 
his peasant army. Sivaji was but following in their wake, and 
making large-scale application of their solitary experiments. As 
the author of the Adnapatra has strikingly put it : " Durga is 
the very essence of the State ; Ga4 and K6( constitute the king- 
dom ; they are its foundation ; its treasure. They are the 
strength of the army ; and the prosperity of the realm." 30 Not 
only the Kingdom, but the entire culture of Mahara$tra in those 
times, observes Prof. S. N. Banhatti, was fort-centred and hill- 
based. Hence, Sivaji and Ramdas, he says, laid the foundations 
of Maratfta Svarajya seeking support from the mountains. 31 

The twelve Mavajs 32 * which Dadaji KoracJ-dev is said to 
have taken possession of when he returned with the boy Sivaji 
from Bangalore (c. 1642), formed the nucleus round which the 
Manatha enterprise commenced. Sivajl was a strategist and, 
like Sher Shah, never scrupled about the means where the 
ends were considered of vital importance. We shall discuss this 
issue independently elsewhere. But we would caution the reader 
here against exaggerating its implications or applying it unfairly 
to all his actions and in all the stages of his career. Sivaji was 
not a saint like Ramdas or Tukaram. He was not acting in a 
purely spiritual or moral sphere. Political and military actions 
are to be judged in history, in the first instance, by canons other 
than purely ethical. Reserving ethical judgment, therefore, for 
ultimate evaluation at*the end, we shall examine each instance 
of his public conduct as history discloses it to our vision. Sus- 
pending the moral verdict we must concentrate, for the time 
being, on the historicity of the details. When the authenticity 
of each fact; is ascertained and established beyond doubt, or the 
evidence is verified, the verdict may not be shirked. To start 


with, therefore, Sivaji for us is neither saint nor sinner, but 
just human : impelled by human motives to adiieve human 
ends in a human world, we must also add, of the seventeenth i 

Since our purpose is not to give an exhaustive biography of 
Siv&ji, we can find space here only for the most typical and 
deciSve illustrations. The earliest instance of what we might 
describe as his pragmatic conduct, or stratagem, was his capture- 
of the treasures belonging to his uncle, Sambhaji Mohite, in Supa 
mahal (1649). 33 Sabhasad's account of this incident lacks 
details. 34 But Dr. Bialkrishna finds in it the young ruler's de- 
termination to set an example of firm rule to all his subordinates 
by thus sternly dealing with his own uncle. 35 The point, how- 
ever, is not the motive of the action but its method. The me- 
thod lay in concealing the real motive. Sambhaji was the bro- 
ther of Tufcabaff Mohite, the second wife of Shahji. He held 
charge of Supa directly from his brother-in-law and was not 
inclined to submit to young Sivajl. The latter therefore cir- 
cumvented him by a stratagem. Pretending to visit him on 
account of Simga he caught hold of his estate. 

Next, at Purandar (c. 1650), Sivajfs interference was invit- 
ed by a dispute between Nilkanth Nayak (the keeper of the 
fort) 1 and his two younger brothers. 36 iSivaji made use of the 
opportunity to imprison all the three and 1 occupied the fort in 
force with his Mavajes. The fort belonged to BIjapur ; now 
he made it his own. 

These two instances show that Sivaji was bent upon mak- 
ing himself master over all his surroundings. Sher Shah had 
used similar methods at Chunar and Rohtas, 37 and even the 
great Akbar had not scrupled to capture Asirgarh finally through 
bribery. 38 Chakaa?, Tonria, and Rajgatf came into Sivaji's 
possession through voluntary submission or persuasion or force. 
The last named place was further strengthened and used by 
Sivajl as his capital until it was superseded by the tnore famous 
RaigatJ. Kon^aaja was secured by bribing Siddi 'Ambar, its 
Bljapuri commandant. 39 It is difficult to Safe these acquisitions 
accurately; but their importance lies more in the total and' 


increasing power they brought to Sivaji than in the sequence of 
their annexation. Indapur and Baramati on the eastern side 
of his jaglr appear to have peacefully submitted to Sivaji. Ob- 
viously his power was becoming irresistible for the smaller fry 
by about 1649. He had begun to alarm the 'Adil Shah's govern- 
ment, which accounts for its insistence on the surrender of 
Kontjaija as the price of his father's freedom. That he did not 
yield without a struggle is indicated by circumstantial evidence. 
There appears to have been some fighting between Sivaji's men 
and the Bijapur* forces in the vicinity of Purandar. 40 

From these minor incidents, we must now turn to the 
major events of his life. The circumstances attending his cap- 
ture of Javji from the Mores (January 1656) and his killing 
of the great Bijapuri general Afzal Khan (November 1659) are 
among the most controversial topics connected with SivajI's 
earlier triumphs. Both are of critical importance in forming 
our judgment about him, and call for the most careful examina- 

The Mores of Javji Were vassals of the 'Adil Shahs for 
eight generations. Their first ancestor to occupy that place had 
rendered great service to Bijapur in establishing its hold upon 
that wild tract. In recognition of this his name, Chandra Rao, 
was proudly borne by every successor to the Javli fief. But the 
direct line of succession having failed in the eighth generation, 
tfie last chieftain Kr$a Riao, happened to be adopted. He was 
a boy of sixteen summers and had been in occupation of the 
gadl for three years when Siviaji conquered Javji. It is alleged 
that Sivaji got into possession of this valuable piece of terri- 
tory by means of a pre-meditated and cold-blooded murder 
which was the outcome of " organised treachery." 41 

There is little doubt that Sivaji was a pragmatic idealist. 
He was extremely ambitious aryl determined to secure his ends 
without making bones about the means. Javji was rich, strate- 
gically important, and lay athwart the path of his expansion. 
As we have already noted, Sivaji did have recourse to a strata- 
gem at Supa and bribery at Korwjaioa. But these facts alone 
cannot justify pre-judging his conduct at Javli. In our humble 


opinion, the available evidence is inadequate to establish that 
the acquisition of Javji was brought about fey "organised 

Sir Jadunath Sarkar has discussed this incident in his 
Shivaji and His Times. But his categorical indictment is based 
upon evidence which leaves us unconvinced. Brushing aside the 
.Siva-Bharat and the Jedhe Sakavafi, as unhelpful, he seems to 
have relied mainly on Sabhasad and Tartkh-i-Sivaji. 42 The com- 
plete authenticity in all details of this last named work, in its 
available form (in Persian), is yet to be convincingly established. 
The only contemporary authority, explicitly cited by Sarkar 
is Sabhasad. However, after having quoted from his (Sabh. 10) 
and certified that " There is no ftason to disbelieve such an 
authority in a matter like this," he summarises his conclusions, 
'drawn "from a consideration of all the materials," thus: 

" The then Chandra Rao, named Krishnaji and eighth in 
succession from the founder, was a boy of sixteen and all his 
business was conducted by his kinsman, Hanumant Rao More, 
who was his diwan. Raghunath Ballal Korde, under Shiva ji's 
orders, visited Hanumant with a pretended offer of marriage 
between his master and the late Chandra Rao's daughter, and 
treacherously slew him at a private meeting. [Sarkar, ibid, 
p. 65, speaks of " Shambhuji Kavji " as " the murderer of H. 
More."] He escaped unscathed and quickly brought Shivaji to 
the scene with a vast army. Javli was captured after six hours' 
fighting, and several members of the More family were taken 
prisoner. But Chandra Rao was either absent from the place 
or fled away before its fall. He took refuge in Raigarh. Shiva 
invested it and gained possession of it by negotiations. The 
two boys, Krishnaji Chandra Rao More and his younger bro- 
ther Baji Rao Mor y were carried away by Shivaji to Puna and 
there the elder one was beheaded," 48 ( 

None of these details " critically discussed " and finally con- 
catenated by Sarkar as " the most probable reconstruction " of 
the Javji affair, tallies with Sabhasad's account given by him 
earlier. There Raghunath Ballal Korjgte was commissioned " to 
kill " Chandfa Rao ; actually he finds that Hanumant Rao was 


slain, and Chandra Rao took refuge in Raigarh. According to 
Sabhasad, Kaghunath " stabbed Chandra Rao and his brother 
Surya Rao," and "the assassins promptly rushed out of the 
gate, cut their way through the alarmed and confused guards, 
beat back the small and hurriedly gathered band of pursuers 
and gained a chosen place of hiding in the forest." According 
to Sabhiasad, again, it was Hanumant Rao who held out in a 
neighbouring village, after Chandra Rao and Surya Rao were 
stabbed. Then there were pretended negotiations and Hanu- 
mant Rao was stabbed by Sambhaji Kdvji, 44 and not by Raghu- 
nSth KonJ. The discrepancies have not been explained by Sir 
Jadunath. If Sabhasad ws really ' such an authority there is 
no reason to disbelieve in a matter like this,' we find no reason 
either why his details should be tampered with or his authorita- 
tive account contradicted finally. 

For one thing, Sarkar has not strictly adhered to Sabha- 
sad 's text in his citations : (i) "learning that Chandra Rac 
usually lived in a careless unguarded * manner " is contrary tc 
Sabhasad's description of jfavji as a place well guarded by ten 
to twelve thousand troops ( ^ sre^T *TS ^te WTOT Fn* &*& 
SRTO SFfcT *T3T stfcT aTOrf. ) 4r ' The " small and hurriedly 
gathered band of pursuers," therefore, does not sound plausible. 
() There is nothing in Sabhasad's text which corresponds tc 
" and gained a chosen place of hiding in the forest/' Secondly, 
the name of the younger brother given by Sabhasad is SurySjj 
Rao and not Baji Rao. Both of them were stabbed and presum- 
ably killed ( ?nere TO&qratt ) 4G according to Sabhasad ; but 
Chandra Rao was absent and came to terms with Sivajl latei 
at Raigarh, according to Sarkar. Finally, the two brothers were 
taken to Poona where Chandra Rao alone (says Sarkar) was 
.beheaded : though according to his other authority Tarlkh-i- 
Sivdfi), "Shivaji sent Rfcghunath Ballal to Chandra Rao to ask 
for the hand of his fair daughter. On reaching the place, Raghu- 
nath first went to the diwan Hanumant Rao and stabbed him 
to death at the interview. He returned by a night-march tc 
Shivaji (at Purandar), who was highly delighted and by quick 
marches arrived before Javli with a vast army and took it aftei 


six! hours of fighting. The sardars Baji and Krishna Rao, aged 
14 and 16 years respectively, were brought prisorfers to Puna? 
and there beheaded. The women and children were set free." 41 

Here again, it is obvious that Chandra Rao who was only 
16 years of age could not have had a daughter whom Sivsajt 
might even pretend to ask in marriage. Besides, "the late 
Chandra Rao's daughter " spoken of by Sir Jadunath finds no 
place in any of the authorities cited by him. Though T. S. 
states that both the brothers were beheaded, Baji is found alive 
by Sarkar, by other evidence, 48 and therefore could not have 
been beheaded by iSivajS at Poona. His attempt at the repu- 
diation of the alleged correspondency of Chandra Rao with the 
'Adilshahi government for recovering his heritage ("which 
would be a quite natural and legitimate desire ") is too naive, 
inasmuch as he himself admits that BajJ escaped (on 28th 
August, according to the Shivapur Daftar Yadi), assumed the 
hereditary title of Chandra R5o, and in March 1665 joined 
Jai Singh for war against? iSivaj! ; Ambaji Govind Rao More was 
also with him. 49 

In the light of the above examination of Sir Jadunath Sar- 
kar's version of the Jav]i incident we should look for sotnething 
more plausible. That Sivaji captured Javji after six hours fight- 
ing, and that Chandra Rao submitted at Raigarh after negotia- 
tions, are two important facts admitted by Sarkar, after con- 
sidering all the evidence. The contemporary JedHS Sakavali re- 
cords : " Sivaj! goes and captures Javji, after taking with him- 
self and fighting with the help of, the contingents of Kanhojl 
Jedh Desmukh, and Bandal, and Silimkar, and the Desmukhs 
of MavaJ." 50 

Further details are supplied by the Jedh Kanna which 
states : " In course of time when an expedition against Jlavjr 
was planned, Kanhojl Nayak and thfc Desmukhs were sum- 
moned together with their contingents and sent against the 
Mors of J5v}i who had been already routed by Kanhojl and 
who had fled from Javji. Later, however, Hanumant Rao Mor 
renewed the insurrection in the Jor valley against whom SivajT 
sent Raghunath Ballal Sabnls with a body of troops from Poona, 


Raghunath Ballal killed Hanumant Rao and took possession of 
Jor. * 

"Soon after, Sivajl himself went against Javji with the 
troops of the De&nukhs and captured it on 31 December 1655. 
When Chandra Rao lost Javjji he took shelter at Rairi (i.e. 
Raigatf ) where Sivaji besieged him. The besieging party was 
composed of the contingents of Kanhoja and other Desmukhs 
among whom was one Haibat Rao Silimkar DeSmukh of Gun- 
jan MavaJ. He mediated for Chandra Rao with Sivaji and 
brought about a meeting between them. Negotiations took 
place and Rairi was captured in the Durmukhi year 1578 s. 
For these services, Haibat Rao Silimkar was given a fresh seal 
of De&mukhi in his jurisdiction of Gunjan Mava] and Sivaj! 
composed his domestic quarrel by effecting a partition/' 51 

An elaborate and interesting account of the Javji incident 
is also available in the More Bakhar which was first published 
by D. B. Parasnis in his Itihdsa Samgraha (June 1909). Ac- 
cording to it, Krsoaji Bajt ruled at Javji for three years when 
Sivaji demanded submission from him. The proud Mor, how- 
ever, was not to be easily cowed down. ' Then there came to 
be great enmity between Chandra Rao and Sivaji Mahanaj. 
givaji Maharaj sent Surya Rao Kafccte and 2000 infantry against 
Javji. Descending from the Nisni Ghat of Mahabalesvar, . . . 
they laid siege to Javji. The approaches of Javji were difficult ; 
there were dense clusters of bamboos. There the fighting went 
on for a month. At the end of the tnonth KrsijajS Baji More 
Raj left Jiavji and went with his men to RaigaxJ . . . Sivaji 
Mahanaj advanced against it. Chandra Rao held out at Rai- 
gad for three months. Then peace was made/ 52 Then follow 
illuminating details of the scene of meeting. Sivaji intended 
to restore Javji to Chandra Riao if he agreed to be submissive 
and loyal. 'Taking Kiwaja* with him, he came to ChakaK?, 
Kjwaji wrote secretly to Vyankajl Raj6 GhorpaiQte of MudhoJ, 
a man$abdar of Bijapur : You are a man$abdar of the Padshah. 
We too are esteemed rajas under the Padhahi . . . You and we 
are relatives. Siviaji Raje Bhoste is self-styled king. He has 
made such trouble for the Padshah. So, by hook or crook, in 


any way that you think suitable, secure our release from here 
and take us to MudhoJ. After we have joined yofi, we shall 
then exert ourselves to the utmost . . . These letters were dis- 
covered by the messengers of Sivajl Maharaj ... He read them, 
and saw there was treachery. Then he said to Krsajaji : You 
and I met at Raigatf. You gave me your word of honour that 
you would not be unfriendly to me. Still, you sent treasonable 
letters to Vyankaji Ghorpa<J6. It is clear from this that you 
Mors are faithless people. Thus accusing him, iSivaji Maha- 
raj had him beheaded at Chakaniu From that time the rule of 
the Mon6s disappeared from Javji.' 53 

The charge of treason has not therefore, issued from " some 
modern theorists " as Sarkar alleges, but is at least as old and 
authentic as the above record. The conduct ascribed to Baj5 
More by Sarkar is also in keeping with that. Sivaji's first inter- 
ference with the Mor6s appears to have been in connexion with 
the succession disputes after the death of Daulat Rao, the last 
of the Chandra Riaos in 'direct lineal descent. Kj^soaji Baji 
Raje was adopted from the Sivthar family. 54 Appeals from 
rival claimants invited interference from outside. Afzal Khan, 
the subadar of Wai, deputed K&nhoji JedhS to settle the affairs 
of Javji, but he proved to be in league with 6ivaji. Gr> Hanu- 
mant Riao, having taken possession of Jor (or Johar) Khor, 
must have invited punishment upon himself. Similarly, Sabha- 
sad speaks of another Babjl Rau as a jjs or rebel whom givaji, 
after the fall of Javji, imprisoned and blinded. 56 Many a bor- 
der dispute between the Mor6s and Sivaji which embittered their 
relations is also on record. 67 There is every reason to believe 
that Kjwajl owed his position to SivajS. The Tartkh-i-Sivaji 
refers to him as sardar, not raja. 68 Hence Siviaji's demand from 
him to renounce the title of Raje as recorded in the Mor6 
Bakhar. These antecedents explain giV&jI's conquest of Javji 
in 1656. 

The Mbrfe being loyal to and dependent on BIjapur, were 
obviously a thorn in the side of fiiviajf. He would not tolerate 
them unless they showed loyal submission to him. Failing this 
he fdt it necessary to remove them from his path of expansion. 


Hence Sabhasad's statement : 

"The kingdom cannot achieve (its objectives) unless Chandra 
Rao Mor is beaten (subdued). None can accomplish this bet- 
ter than you. You should go to him for negotiations." 60 He 
(Raghunath BalliaJ Sabws) was sent as he jib or envoy with 
an escort of 100-125 armed men. It would have been a suicidal 
venture for such a small party to proceed on a murderous errand 
to a stronghold well defended by 10-12 thousand troops. If, 
despite this, the emissary attacked any of the Mors single- 
handed in the course of the interview, his rashness cannot be 
construed as an act of premeditated murder treacherously plan- 
ned and instigated by Sivaji. Henry II, in our opinion, was 
more guilty of the murder of Becket than Sivaji in the alleged 
crime at Javji. Yet, it was Hanumant Rao that was killed, 
and not Chandra Rao. The verb mar has been used by SabhS- 
sad on the same page in ffie sense of, " raid " in the sentences : 

" Junnar city was raided ; Ahmadnagar was raided ; a great 
battle was fought with the Mughals." 61 qi^ does not therefore 
necessarily mean only "kill." Moreover, we do not find the 
naine of Raghunath Ballal Kord (who was merely an envoy) 
among those who were rewarded for distinguished action dur- 
ing the Javji campaign. Had he accomplished the important 
" murder " upon which he had been deliberately set by 6ivaji, 
as alleged, we should have expected him to be highly rewarded 
like Bir Singh Bundela by Jahangir for the assassination of 

According to Sabhasad, Moro Trimbak Pingle was reward- 
ed with the Pesvdship ; that office was formerly held by Samiao 
NSlkanth Rozekar. I^filo Sontiev was made Stfrms and Gangaji 
Mangaji became Vakriis. Btalambhat and Govindbhait (sons of 
the celebrated Prabhakarbhait) continued to be Upcdhyes. 
Netaji Palkar was created Sarnobat of 7000 horse and 3000 
siledars ; and Yesj5 Rank that of 10,000 MavaJ infantry. 
" Thus the kingdom was strengthened." 62 Evidently, Raghu- 


math Ballal Koncte must have continued to be Sabnis or pay- 
master *Balkp?na Dik$it Mujumdar or Accountant-general, and 
Sonajl Pant Dabvr or Secretary. They had been appointed by 
Shahji as men of tried ability, as early as 1639. To them Sivaji 
had added Tukojl Chor Marat^a, as Sarnobat, and Narayan 
Pant as divisional Paymaster. 63 

The acquisition of Javji, brought great accession of strength 
to Sivaji. Its hoarded treasures augmented his resources in 
money ; and its very position gave him immense strategic ad- 
vantages. He followed up this success by the subjugation of 
the Surv& and Iirfc6s of Srngarpur. Now perched on the 
Sahy&dri, at a point (4000 ft. aboyp sea-level) where no less 
than eight passes cross the range into the Konkaij, through 
countless gorges and narrow foot-tracks, he erected the historic 
stronghold of PratapgaxJ and installed therein his inspiring 
goddess Bhavani. He had also secured Raigad which was ulti- 
mately to be his capital, and where his coronation as Chhatra- 
pati was celebrated in 1674. Immediately his greatest gain was 
that the recruiting ground of his famous Mava] troops was en- 
larged. His Kingdom now comprised, besides Javji and its 
fortresses, Supa, Baramati and Indiapftr in the S. E. ; Purandar, 
Rajgatf, Kondaaja and Tonna in the S. ; and Tikofta, Lohgatf 
and Kajmachi in the N. W., overlooking the Konkan coast 
from the crest of the Sahyadri Range. 64 

It will be obvious from the above position that the Konkan? 
would be the most natural field of expansion for Sivajifs king- 
dom. There, however, iSivijf had to reckon with Bijapiir, the 
Mughals, the Siddis, and the Europeans (Portuguese, Dutch, 
French, and English). Though the Mughals were to prove, 
finally for Sivajl, the most formidable enemy (Aurangzeb was 
Viceroy of the Deccan from 1636-44 and 1652-57), his imme- 
diate concern was with Bijapur and the* Siddis as its subordi- 
nates. The Europeans were, by their situation and interests, 
always sitting on the fence. Aurangzeb was cleverly egging on 
Bijapur to tackle Siv&jff who was fast growing into a menace 
for the Muslim powers. The message he left for 'Adil SMh 
when he hurriedly left for the North to contest the throne speaks 


for itself : " Expel Siva who has sneaked into the possession of 
some of the forts of the land," it said : " If you wish to enter- 
tain his services, give him jdglrs in the Karnatak far from the 
imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them." 65 Sivajl 
had extended his activities as far as Junnar and Afrmadnagar 
(of which we shall speak later), and Aurangzeb had also in- 
structed his officers to carry on reprisals devastating and plunder- 
ing without pity. Poona and Chakaio were to be utterly ruin- 
ed, its people enslaved or killed, and those who had abetted 
Sivia's depredations in the imperial territories to be slain with- 
out mercy. 

The state of B&japur at this time was pitiable. Mufcammad 
"Adil Shah had died on 4 kov. 1656. Aurangzeb had compelled 
his successor to cede Kdar, Kalyani and Parenda together with 
the payment of an indemnity of one crore of rupees. Internally, 
the murder of Khan-i-Khanan Khan Mufcammad (11 Nov. 
1657) indicated that all was not well at Bij&pur. The very abltf 
officer Mulla Muhammad had been called away from Kalyaij, 
and Sivaj! found his opjJortunity there. Aurangzeb was play- 
ing a double game : while advising the 'Adil Shah to protect 
his country * as the son of a dog was waiting for his opportu- 
nity,' he kept 'the path of correspondence with Siva open/ 
Finally, on- 25 January 1658, he wrote to Sivaji : " Though 
your offences do not deserve pardon, I forgive you as you have 
repented. You propose that, if you are granted all the villages 
belonging to your home together with the forts and territory of 
Konkan, after the imperialists have seized the old Nizamghahl 
territory now in the hands of the ' Adil Shah, You will send 
Sona Pandit as your envoy to my Court, and a contingent of 
500 horse under one of your officers to serve under me, and 
you will protect the imperial frontiers. You are called upon to 
send Sonajf and youp prayeis will be granted." 6 * When Sivajl 
invaded the Konka$, therefore, he appeared to have done so 
with imperial connivance if not imperial authority ; though, as 
a matter of fact, he had seized Kalyan and Bhivarvji on 24 
Oct. 1657. 

'In the Hemalambi year saka 1579,' the JedhS Karina 


states, ' an expedition was undertaken against the Portuguese at 
Kalyaig and Bhivantji. Dadajl BapujI (a cousirt of Samraj 
Pant Pesve) was put in charge of it. DadiajS Kistoa and his 
brother Sakhoji (the Karbhdns of Kanhoji Nayak) were speci- 
ally called with their strong Mava] contingents. Dtadaji Rreioa 
was put in charge of Kalyap and Sakhoji in charge of Bhivantfi. 
They captured Kalyajiji and Bhivangli, plundered the Portuguese 
possessions, and established a post at Aseri. The Portuguese 
agreed to pay a khandi and a quarter of gold every year. Sivaji 
fortified the creek at Durgadi. This was a grand achievement, 
as it brought in plenty of money and provisions/ The account 
concludes with the observations that Sakhoji was killed in the 
operations, but the whole territory was captured ; that Ahajl 
Mahadev was placed in charge of the conquered territory ; that 
the vast collection of iron weapons, rockets, etc. captured were 
distributed over several forts ; and that Siv&ji founded siva- 
*paittao at the foot of Riajga<} as well as strengthened the de- 
fence of Prabhalgad (east'of Panvel). 07 He also made Kalyai? 
a naval base and built dockyards. 68 * 

On 8 January 1658 he seized Miahuli. ' His progress into 
the Kolaba district appears to have been assisted by local chiefs 
who were eager to throw off the Muslim yoke.' 69 A number 
of other fortresses were either acquired or built : Surgatf, 
Birwatfi, Tula, Ghosalga<J, Sudhagatf, etc. Both the Siddis of 
Janjira and the Portuguese were alarmed by these activities, 
and Bljapur determined to stop the aggressions. The result was 
the campaign of Afzal Khan who started in September 1659 
despite the rainy season, only to meet with his tragic end at 
Pratapgatf on 10 Nov. 1659. This brings us to a discussion 
of another great controversy on the conduct and motives of 
Sivaji. Historically, it is important because the overthrow of 
Afzal Khan was for Sivaji and the Marathas really a triumph 
over BJjapur or the 'AdilUahf. 

The account of this epic incident given in the Jedhe Karma 
appears to us to be the most .plausible. According to it Afzal 
Kh&n ordered all the MavaJ Desmukhs to join him at once with 
all their 'troops. Kedarj! and KhanKjoji Khop<l were among 


the first to obey his summons. But Klanhojl Jedhe informed 
Sivaji of whfet was happening. Since the narrative of the 
Karind is too long, we would recommend the reader to peruse 
it either in the Marathl text or in the Shivaji Souvenir trans- 
lation. We shall merely recount it here very briefly in part. 
The oaths exchanged between Kanhojl and Siviaji on this his- 
toric and critical occasion are very illuminating. 

4 Kanhojl Niayak informed Sivaji of these happenings in a 
personal letter, to which he received a reply that Kanhojl should 
get all the people to swear an oath of loyalty, or that he should 
please himself by going over to the Khian. In this situation, 
Kanhojl Nayak, with his fivp sons, went and saw Sivaji at Siva- 
pattafr and addressed him thus, in a private interview : " Your 
father had obtained an oath from me and sent me in your ser- 
vice. I am prepared to remain true to it. I am at your ser- 
vice, with my five sons and all my men, and will fight unto 
death for you. If we die, who is going to enjoy the watan ? 
I cannot prove false to my oath." Thereupon Sivaji said : " If 
so, you should solemnly swear the renunciation of your watan." 
Klanhoji took some water into his hands and poured it down in* 
confirmation. . . . Then Sivaji and Kanhojl ate milk and rice 
together, put their hands on bel-bhan4ar, and exchanged solemn 
oaths : Sivaji saying, " We and our descendants shall never fail 
to look after you and your descendants ; when I am victorious 
I shall reward you justly." Then Kanhojl conveyed the message 
to all the De&nukhs declaring : " The Khan is treacherous. 
When his object is accomplished, he will ruin us all. This 
Maratha kingdom is our own. We should stand by Sivaji and 
protect it with our contingents and courage." They repeated the 
oaths and Sivaji got together an army of the M&vajes/ 

Then the visit of the Khan was negotiated and arranged at 
Pratapgad, through Parrtaj! Gopinath. Kanhojl and the other 
Desmukhs were stationed at Javji ; Randal was posted at Dare, 
and Haibatrao B&lajS Silimkar at Boche-gholi Pass. At a pri- 
vate conference Sivaji told Kanhojl : " I have full confidence 
in you, but I am not equally sure about the others. You know 
how treacherous the Khan is. If I stibceed at the meeting, three 


guns will be fired from the fort, on which you should all attack 
the Khan's forces at Par. If I am captured by the Kfoan, you 
should block his path at Wardhani and prevent his forces join- 
ing him." Sivaji again gpt Kanhojl to swear loyalty. Kianhoji 
once more promised to execute his orders fully. 

* A grand structure was erected at the foot of Pratapgatf 
where Afzal Khan came to visit Sivajl, in the month of Kartika 
of the Vikari year saka 1581, seated in a palanquin, and ac- 
companied by his envoy and escort. Sivaji had already select- 
ed his men and assigned to them various duties. During the 
meeting, Afzal Khan caught hold of Siviaji's neck under his 
arm, when Sivaji (forearmed as hp was with wagnakhas) cut 
open his entrails. On getting his neck released Sivaji took out 
his sword. The Khan's men put him into the palanquin and 
began to run. His envoy and some attendants attacked and 
wounded Pantaj! Goplnath. Instantly, however, Jiva Mahala, 
Baji Sarj6 Rao, and a few others, counter-attacked them, pull- 
ed down the Khan froAi his palanquin and Siviaji severed his 
head. The guns were at once fired from the fort ; Kanhojl and 
the Desmukhs attacked the Baj&puri forces at Par and captured 
their elephants, horses and materials. The Khopo&s fled with 
fifty of their followers along the bank of the Koyna. Thus was 
the victory won by Sivaji/ 70 

The whole affair has been well discussed from various points 
of view and sources by Sir Jadunath Sarkar in his Shivaji and 
His Times. We find no reason to disagree with either his evi- 
dence or his conclusions. " The weight of recorded evidence, as 
well as the probabilities of the case," he writes, " support the 
view that Afzal Khan struck the first blow and Shivaji only 
committed what Burke calls, 'a preventive murder/ It was, 
as I wrote in the Modern Review in 1907, ' a case of diamond 
cut diamond/ " 71 

The situation should be humanly visualised. Sivaji was by 
now fighting, not for his own personal advancement, but for the 
liberation of his people and country from the yoke of the Mus- 
lims. He had succeeded hitherto in extending his power and 
influence without facing a 'big army or fighting a pitched battle. 


May be, as Aurangzeb put it, he had " sneaked into " possession 
of several fofts and lands. Now he was confronted with an 
experienced general, an army comprising at least 10,000 cavalry 
and artillery, etc. The BIjapur government had set its whole 
machinery of administration to mobilise even the MavaJ Des- 
mukhs against Sivaji. Afzal Khan had started with a bravado 
and fanfaronade that were calculated to demoralise and un- 
nerve the Marathas. He had boasted : " What is Sivajl ! I 
shall bring him alive a prisoner, without even once alighting 
from my horse." 72 If the traditional accounts are to be trusted, 
he had started with a devastating campaign laying his impious 
hands on Tulja Bhavani. EJven the English had come to know 
that the Dowager Queen of Bijapur, " because she knew with 
that strength (10,000 horse) he (Afzal Khan) was not able to 
resist Sivaji, counselled him to pretend friendship with his 
-enemy, which he did" Under these circumstances, 6lvaji act- 
ed with alacrity and judgment. 

Afzal Khan seemed equally anxioui in spite of his bluster, 
to capture Sivajl if he could without fighting a battle. He 
therefore proposed parleying through his envoy Kra?aji Bhas- 
kar. But Sivaji caught scent of the Khan's real intentions, 
"whether through intelligence or suspicion it's not known," 
write the English. He took counsel with his mother, Jijabai ; 
he had a vision, or the goddess Bhavani appeared to encourage 
and bless him, in a dream. He also " kept his powder dry ", 
made sagacious dispositions of his troops reinforced with the 
divisions of Netaji PSlkar and Moro Trimbak Pingte, 74 and 
-determined to face the consequences with coolness, caution and 
courage. The result was a triumph of superior strategy : the 
tragedy of Malik-u't-Tujjar and his ill-fated army, in the 
Bahmani adventure against the 6irks, repeated itself. It was 
a national crisis for tHfe Marathas ; and, as with the Spanish 
Armada in the English Channel, in 1588, God seemed to have 
breathed his squall and scattered the enemy's forces. The 
ambushed Maratha armies fell upon the BljapGr cavalry, and 
the carnage was terrible. Only those who begged for quarter 
"" holding grass between their teeth " were spared. 3,000 men 


were killed, according to reports received by the English at 
Rajiapur a few days later. 76 Even elephants anS camels were 
hacked to pieces ; 4,000 horses, 1,200 caiftds, 65 elephants, trea- 
sures worth more than 10 lakhs of rupees, besides artillery, 
waggons, ammunition, etc. were captured by the Marathas. 76 
Needless to add, it brought glory to Sivaji and humiliation to 

Smarting under this blow, the Bijapur government des- 
patched another army under Fazl Khan, son of Afzal Khan, 
who had escaped from the holocaust. Slvaji was besieged at 
Panhaia by 15,000 ' Adilshahl troops, while the Maratha gar- 
rison numbered no more than 5^-6,000. It was an unequal 
struggle ; yet Sivaji escaped through superior strategy. Divid- 
ing his forces, he left for Vialga4 (27 miles to the West) 
with half his army on 13 July 1660, leaving Pfcmhala in the 
charge of the gallant Pratiap Rao Gujar. He was hotly pursued, 
but the heroism of Baj^ Prabhu, Depand6 of Hirdas MavaJ 
Leonidas of Maratha history enabled Sivaji to escape by hold- 
ing up the pursuers at Pavankhind. 

* Death clamoured, and tall figures strew'd the ground Like 
trees in a cyclone/ 

Seven hundred brave Marathas laid down their lives in 
this ' Thermopylae ' for the safety of their King. Panhala was 
lost "(22 Sept. 1660), but the Saviour of the Marathas was 
saved. 77 Next came the struggle with the Mughal empire. 

It has been observed before that, towards the close of 
Aurangzeb's last viceroyalty in the Deccan, the Marathas had 
already begun their incursions into the imperial territory. 
Bijapur had narrowly escaped from the designs of Aurangzeb, 
at least for the time being, and was inclined to wink at Sivajfs 
raids beyond the 'Adilshahl dominions! Afomadnagar and Jun- 
nar were despoiled By the Marathas. From the latter place 
alone Sivaji obtained 3,00,000 hons, 200 horses, and much 
jewellery and clothing. 78 However, not until Aurangzeb was 
firmly seated on his ill-gotten throne, could he take effective 
steps for the security of the Deccan which he had hurriedly 


forsaken in 1657. In July 1659 he despatched his uncle Sha'ista 
Khan as its Viceroy. 

While Sivaji was besieged at Panhala, the new Mughal 
Viceroy opened a 'second front' against the Marathas by 
attacking Chakaio (18 miles to the North of Poona). This 
place was of strategic value on the route from Afcimadnagar into 
the Konkan. It was valiantly defended by the old Maratha 
veteran Firangji Narsala. He held out tenaciously for two 
rftonths, and extorted admiration even from SJia'ista Khan. 
When he was forced to capitulate he refused to be enticed 
away from his allegiance to Sivaji and was allowed to rejoin 
his master. 79 

On 3 February 1661 Sivaji surprised Kar Talb Khan, the 
Mughal officer who had been commissioned by ha'ista Khan 
to recapture Kalyain. While the Khan was descending from 
the Bhor Ghat with his heavy artillery and baggage, Sivaji 
pounced upon him and, cutting off alike his retreat and advance, 
forced him to buy his escape with a rahsom. He followed up 
this initiative by a cyclonic campaign in the Konkaii?. Posting 
Netaji Palkar to take care of his rear, Sivaji overran the 
'Adilshahi coastal districts from Danda-Rajapuri to Kharepatan. 
His movements were so rapid that no opposition was offered 
anywhere. Pilaji N!lkanth % and Tanaji Malusar distinguished 
themselves during this campaign. Sivaji secured his fresh gains 
in the Konkan by building new strongholds like Mancjangad 
and Palgarh, recalling the fugitives, and encouraging the agri- 
culturists and traders with generous subsidies. Though the 
Mughals reconquered Kalyan and dominated Northern Konkari 
(1661-63), Sivaji retained his hold over Ratnagiri and the 
S. E. corner of the Kolaba District. Then came the great 
coup at Poona in the night of 5 April 1663 : a blow, as Sarkar 
has described it, whose cleverness of design, neatness of execu- 
tion and completeness of success created in the Mughal Court 
and camp as much terror about Sivaji's prowess, as his coup 
against Afzal Khan had done among the Bijapuris. 80 

Sha'ista Khan had occupied Poona since 9 May 1660. But 
the celebrated adventure of Sivaji, whose romantic details are 


familiar to every schoolboy, appears to have taken place not 
in the Lai Mahal itself but in the camp. Both 'Sabhasad and 
Abb6 Carr speak of the " camp " rather than of a house or 
palace. Philip Gyfford's letter of 12 April 1663 (from Rja- 
pur to Surat) gives us the best contemporary report of the 
incident. 81 

' Rauji Pandit/ it states, ' is returned, and present upon 
his arrival he desired me to write to Your Worship . . . Yester- 
day arrived a letter from the Rajah, written by himself, to RaujT, 
giving him an account how that he himself, with 400 choice men, 
went to Sba'ista Khan's camp ; there, upon some pretence 
(which he did not insert in his letter) he got into his tent to 
saldm, and presently slew all the watch, killed Sha'ista Khan's 
eldest son, his son-in-law, twelve of his chief women, forty great 
persons attending their general ; wounded SJja'ista Kfran with 
his own hand (and thought to death, but since hears he lives), 
Wounded six more of his wives, two more of his sons ; and 
after all this, returns but losing six men and forty wounded ; 
10,000 horse under Rajah Jaswant Singh standing still and 
never offered to pursue him ; so that it is generally believed it 
was done with his consent, though iSivaji tells his men, his 
Paramesvara bid him do it.' 

The consequences of such master-strokes of strategy might 
very well be imagined. The catastrophe earned for Slja'ista 
Khan a penal transfer to Bengal which a chronicler has des- 
cribed as 'hell crammed with good things/ Sivaji was fast 
acquiring a reputation for working miracles : ' Report hath 
made "him an airy body, and added wings ; or else it were im- 
possible he could be at so many places, as he is said to be at, 
all at one time. . . . They ascribe to him to perform more than 
a Herculean labour that he is become the talk of all conditions 
of people. 82 . . . Sivaja reigns vietorioifely and uncontrolled, that 
he is a terror to all the kings and princes round about, daily 
increasing in strength. ... He is very nimble and active, im- 
posing strange labour upon himself that he may endure hard- 
ship, and also exercises his chiefest men that he flies to and fro 
with incredible dexterity.' 88 


One important element in Sivajf s strategy was that he 
allowed no Breathing time to his enemies and acted with in- 
credible swiftness. Soon after his Poona adventure he descend- 
ed into the Konkan? and struck a blow at those who were friendly 
towards Bijapur. The Savant of Kudal was the chief victim of 
this campaign. Though a Bhosla, like Sivaji, Lakham Savant 
had been acting contrary to the interests of the Marathas and, 
consequently, Sivaji thought it necessary to occupy hfs territory. 
The Dutch Register for 14 Nov. 1663 states : " At last, on the 
23rd May, the great rebel Siwasi, originator of all these inter- 
nal troubles, has come down to the province of Candael with 
his army comprising of 4,000 horsemen and 10,000 footmen, 
which created a great fear and panic among the inhabitants of 
Vingurla. The Dessy (Desai) Zokhamsant (Lakmaii Savant), 
well known from former letters, sent a Brahmin to the Com- 
pany's camp with the information of Siwasi's arrival, and with 
the request that our men, the governor and all the merchants 
of Vingurla, would come to the place "where he stayed at the 
moment called Wari, leaving the camp (or lodging) under the 
care of only 2 or 3 Dutchmen. The Resident, considering this 
a treacherous scheme to murder him, declined this offer ; and 
indeed, afterwards our men heard that the said Lokhamsant 
intended to attack our residence, against which attack they pre- 
pared." 84 Another entry in the Dagh Register reads : " Tidings 
came to Golkonda that our lodgings at Vingurla had been parti- 
ally destroyed by Siwasi and that the inhabitants have fled." 85 

This was a blow intended more against Bijapur than against 
the European settlements. It was portentous of the more 
dramatic blow on Surat that was soon to follow. Alarmed by 
these activities, the Dowager Queen of Bajiapur complained to 
Shahji of his son's depredations : " Although you are a ser- 
vant of this Governmeat, you. have committed treachery by 
sending your son iivaj! to Poona and upsetting the authority 
of the Badshah there. He has captured some forts belonging 
to the RadshSh, conquered and plundered several districts and 
provinces, overthrown one or two principalities, and killed some 
chiefs submissive to the Badshah. Now keep your son under 


proper control or your jagir will be confiscated." Shahjl replied : 
*' Although SivSji is my son, he has fled from nfe. He is no 
longer under my control. I am a faithful dependant of the 
Badshah. Though Sivaji is my son, His Majesty may attack 
him or deal with him in any way he likes ; I shall not inter- 
fere." 86 A similar attempt was also made to tackle Siviaji 
through the Portuguese at Goa and the Desais of Kudal. 87 
Meanwhile Sivaji suddenly turned north and ' blitzed ' Surat in 
the first week of January 1664. 

On 5 January he was at Gandevi 28 miles south of Surat. 
The next day (Wednesday 6 Jan. 1664) at 11 a.m. he was 
within bowshot of the Burhanpur Gate of the emporium. 
Escaliot writes : " Thuss farr, deare Browne, I had wrote on 
Tuesday the fifth January about ten in the morning, when on 
a sudden a strong alarme was brought to our house from the 
towne with news that Seva-Gee Raya . . . was coming downe 
with an army of an uncertain number upon Surat to pillage the 
city, which news strooke no small consternation into the minds 
of a weake and effeminate people,* in soe much that on all 
hands there was nothing to be scene but people flying for their 
lives and lamenting the loss of their estates ; the richer sort, 
whose stock of money was large enough to purchase that favour 
at the hands of the Governor of the Castle, made that their 
sanctuary and abandoned their dwellings to a merciless foe, 
wich they might well enough have defended with rest of the 
towne had they had the heartes of men." 88 But panic is para- 
lysing, and as Carr observed, the courage of the inhabitants 
of Surat ' did not serve as ramparts.' In fact, the biggest port 
on this side of India belonging to the Mughal was ' unfortified 
by art or nature/ 89 The Moors, through the unworthy covetous- 
ness of the governor of the town, ' had nobody to head them, nor 
none unto whome to joyne themselves, and so fled away for 
company ' whereas if there had been 500 men trayned and in 
readyness, as by order of the king there ever should, whose pay 
the governor puts into his own pocket, the number to defend 
the city would have amounted to some thousands. This was 
the condition of the citty at the tyme of its invasion/ 90 


" Wednesday the 6th January, about eleven in the morn- 
ing," says the 1 contemporary eye-witness, " Sevagee arrived neerc 
a great garden without the towne, about a quarter of a mile, 
and whilst he was busied in pitching his tents, sent his horse- 
men into the outward streets of the towne to fire the houses, soe 
that in less than halfe an houer wee might behold from the 
tops of our house two great pillars of smoke, the certaine signes 
of a great dissolation, and soe they continued burning that day 
and night, Thursday, Friday and Saturday : still new fires rais- 
ed, and every day neerer and neerer approaching our quarter of 
the towne. That the terror was great, I know you will eassly 
believe, and upon his first beginning pf his firing, the remainder 
of the people fled as thicke as possible, soe that on Thursday 
the streets were almost empty, wich at other tymes are exceeding 
thick with people, and we the English in our house, possessed 
of a Seraw or place of reception for strangers, were left by the 
governor and his people to make what shift we could to secure 
ourselves from the enemys : this might the English and Duch 
have done, leaving the towne and going over the river to Swalley 
to our shipps, which were then riding in Swalley hole, but it 
was thought more like Englishmen to make ourselves ready to 
defend our lives and goods to the uttermost than by a flight 
to leave money, goods, house, to merciless people, and were con- 
firmed in a resolution that the Duch alsoe did the same, though 
there was no possibility of relieving one another, the Duch house 
being on the either side of towne almost an English mile as- 
under .... 

"Things being thus reasonably well prepared, newes is 
brought to us that Mr. Anthony Smith, a servant of the com- 
panyes, one whoe hath been chiefe in several factoryes was taken 
prisoner by Sevagees souldiers as he came ashore neere the Duch 

house, and was coming to the English , hee obtaines leave 

some few houers after to send a note to the president, wherein 
hee acquaints him with his condition, that hee being brought 
before Sevagee hee was asked what hee was and such like ques- 
tions, and at last by Sevajee told that he was not come to doe 
any personal hurte to the English or other merchants, but only 


to revenge him selfe of Oram Zeb (the Great Mogol), because 
he had invaded his country, had killed some of his delations, and 
that hee would only have the English and Duch give him some 
treasure and hee would not medle with their houses, else hee 
would doe them all mischiefe possible/' 

Though Mr. Smith was kept in duress until Friday after- 
noon, he was later released and sent back to the English as a 
messenger with a demand for three lakhs of rupees. But Presi- 
dent Qxenden decided .to face all consequences and detained him. 
Luckily, Sivaji, having obtained sufficient booty otherwise, left 
Surat on Sunday morning : " about 10 o'clocke as they tell us 
hee went his way/' 91 

Among the houses ' fiered ' by sivajl were those of * Hogee 
Said Beg ' and ' Verge Voras ' the two merchant princes of the 
Empire. " On Friday after hee had ransaked and dug up Verge 
Voras house, he fiered it and a great vast number more towards 
the Duch house, a fier so great as turned the night into day : 
as before the smoke in -the day tyme had almost turned day 
into night ; rising soe thicke as it darkened the sun like a great 
cloud." The fires, however, were not all started by the Marathas. 
We learn frotn Carr that ' when the governor of the castle 
opened artillery fire upon the town, he shot at random ; and if 
it was to a certain extent fraught with dangers in regard to 
Sevagy's soldiers, it rendered the destruction of the people of 
Surat most certain/ 92 

The real character of 6ivaji as a conqueror is revealed by 
his conduct under extreme provocation. It is in great contrast 
to Nadir Shah's at Delhi under similar temptation. During the 
fiv& fatal hours (from 9 A.M. to 2 P.M.) on the terrible Sunday, 
11 March 1739, there was greater slaughter and destruction at 
the imperial Mughal capital than during the five days' occupa- 
tion of Surat by iSivaji. The randonv killing of a few of his 
followers by some ruffians in the streets of Delhi, according to 
Anandram Mukhlis, provoked the Persian into reprisals such as 
the capital had not witnessed during the 348 years since Hazrat 
Sahib-Kiran Amir Thnur ordered the inhabitants to be mass- 
acred. The loss in lives and treasure was indeed incalculable. 


Neither age nor sex was respected by the furies let loose upon 
the city ; the Miscreants in some cases appeared to have escaped 
leaving the innocent to be victimised. Several men and women 
were driven to insanity and suicide in their desperation. The 
streets and houses were glutted with corpses, and soon the stench 
of these threatened td choke the living. The debris could be 
cleared and cleansed only by means of fire. "By degrees the 
violence of the flames subsided, but the bloodshed, the devasta- 
tion, and the ruin of families were irreparable. For a long time 
the streets remained strewn with corpses, as the walks of a 
garden with dead leaves and flowers. The town was reduced to 
ashes, and had the appearapce of a plain consumed with fire. 
All the regal jewels and property and the contents of the treas- 
ury were seized by the Persian conqueror in the citadel. He thus 
became possessed of treasure to the extent of 60 lacs of rupees, 
and several thousand ashrafis ; plate of gold to the value of one 
crore of rupees, and the jewels many of which were unrivalled 
in beauty by any in the world, were valued at about 50 crores. 
The peacock throne alone, constructed at great pains in the 
reign of Shah Jahan, had cost one crore of rupees. Elephants, 
horses, and precious stuffs, whatever pleased the conqueror's 
eyes, more indeed than can be enumerated, became his spoil. 
In short, the accumulated wealth of 348 years changed masters 
in a moment/' 93 

Sivaji behaved with remarkable restraint while an attempt 
on his life was actually tnade in Surat at the instigation of the 
chicken-hearted governor. The assassin struck the blow and 
Sivaji rolled in a pool of blood, but when he recovered he did 
not give way to wild vengeance like the Irani invader. The 
English observer writes : " The fellow haveing made his thrust 
at Sevagee with all his might, did not stop but ran his bloody 
stump against Sevagees Breast, and with such force that both 
Sevagee and hee fell together, the blood being seen upon Sevagee, 
the noise ran through the camp that hee was killed, and the 
crye went, ' kill the prisoners/ whereupon some were miserably 
hacked ; but Sevagee haveing quitted himselfe, and hee that 
stood by haveing cloven the fellows skull, command was given 


to stay the execution, and to bring the prisoners before him, 
wich was immediately done ; and Sevagee, accordihg as it came 
in his minde, caused them to cutt of this mans head, that mans 
right hand, both the hands of a third." All together about 
four heads and 24 hands were cut off. Then it came to be 
Mr. Smith's turn (being caught as one of the suspected) : " and 
his right hand being commanded to be cutt of, hee cryed out 
in Indostani to Sevagee, rather to cutt of his head, unto which 
end his hatt was taken of, but Sevagee stopped execution, and 
soe praised be God, hee escaped ! " 94 

Thevenot, who passed through Surat two years afterwards 
(10 Jan. 1666 to Feb. 1667), further noted with satisfaction : 
" All the rest of the town was plundered except the monastery 
of the Capuchins. When the plunderers tvere in front of their 
Convent they pasted by, and they had orders from their chiej 
to do likewise, because on the eve of the very first day, Father 
Ambrose, who was their Superior, moved with pity for the Chris- 
tians inhabiting Sourat, went to see this Raja to speak to them 
in their favour, and to beg him a least to do no violence to 
their persons. Sivagy had respect for him. He took him under 
his protection and granted hint what he wanted for the Christ- 
ians" 9 * Cosme da Guarda categorically confirms : " Men, 
women and children ran naked without knowing where and to 
whom. But no one was in the peril of his life, for it was the strict 
order of Sevagy that, unless resistance was offered, no one should 
be killed ; and as none resisted none perished." 

iSivajI, according to Carre", then left Surat as easily as he 
had entered it, " having found in one single city all the wealth 
of the East and securing such war-funds as would not fail him 
for a long time." 97 Thevenot's estimate of the wealth secured 
by iSivaji was " in jewels, gold and silver, to the value of above 
thirty French millions/' 98 According'to the English President, 
they took away " in gold, pearle, pretious stones and other rich 
goods, to the value of money hundred thousand pounds/' 99 
Bernier reckoned that 6ivajl returned " laden with gold and 
silver to the Amount of several millions, with pearls, silken stuffs, 
fine clothes and a variety of other costly merchandise." 100 


Finally, Valentyn states : " Everything of beauty existing in 

Surat was thit day reduced to ashes Two or three Banian 

merchants lost several millions, and the total loss was estimated 
at 30 millions ... He (Siviaji) and his followers appropriated 
only the most valuable spoils and distributed the less valuable 
things, which could only hamper their retreat, among the poor, 
whereby many acquired much more than what they had lost 
through fire and pillage .... (Sivaji) departed at the first 
gleam of daylight, delighted to have plucked such a fine feather 
from Aurangzeb's tail" 10 ' 1 

Valentyn has hit the nail admirably on the head. No con- 
quest or annexation was intended by Sivajl. He only wanted to 
singe the Emperor's beard as the English " sea-dogs " Drake and 
Hawkins had done at Cadiz. He also wanted the " war-funds " 
as Carre noted. AH other things were only incidental to the raid. 
Few other conquerors in history have displayed the restraint and 
humanity shown by Sivajl during his attack on Surat. 

The defences of the greatest port of the Empire had been 
sadly neglected. According to Cosme da Guarda "some con- 
fused news of his (iSivaji's) intention reached Surrate but caused 
a great laughter, as hundred and eighty thousand cavalry were 
encamped in the very territories of which Sevagy had become 
master." But when sivaji actually appeared on the scene, 
Inayet Khan, the governor, shut himself up "like a woman" 
inside the fort, and when his men fired out of sheer desperation, 
" more damagie was done to the town than the enemy." 102 Prince 
Muazzam who had succeeded Sha'ista Khan as viceroy in the 
Deccan, was regaling himself at Aftmadnagar, ' caring only for 
pleasure and hunting/ Jaswant Singh tried to save himself 
from obloquy (on account of his alleged delinquency during 
the gfaia'ista Khan incident) by .besieging KorwJaBa. He was at 
it from November 1663 to 28 May 1664, but was obliged to 
retire for the monsoon to Aurang&bad, worse off 
had been at the start. But Sivaji was quite a 
general to wait upon the vagaries of weather. 
mencv of the season, he suddenly swooned dwi^uon Ahmadl 


nagar while the imperialists were still expecting him to be chew- 
ing the cud from Surat ! ' 

When Aurangzeb awakened to the realities of the situation, 
he did two things : (1) to set Surat on the road to recovery, 
and (2) to open a grand offensive against the ' grand rebel ' 
Sivaji. The two measures were not altogether unconnected. 
Surat was an important source of revenue to the Mughal Empire. 
'6ivaji's raid had dealt a blow at once to the treasury and the 
prestige of the Empire. The sinews of war came from the 
coffers of the ' Banians ', both Christian and heathen. " As 
the advantage the great Mogal derived from Surrate was enor- 
mous," writes Guarda, "and the governor had informed him 
(Aurangzeb) that all was lost and the merchants were ar- 
ranging for a change of place on account of the scant security 
of Surrate, he resolved to remedy everything by sending an 
army that would totally destroy Sevagy and detain the mer- 
chants. He ordered that they should be excused duties for three 
years, during which period nothing should be paid for import 
or export. This appeased and relieved all, for it was a very 
great favour in view of the large capital employed by those 
Gentios in trade. The wealth of those people is so great that 
when the Great Mogal sent for a loan of four millions to Ban- 
eane Doracandas Vorase, he answered that His Majesty should 
name the coin and the sum would immediately be paid in it 
.... What is still more surprising is that the major part of 
the Baneane's capital was invested at Surate and this offer 
was made jour years after the sack of Sevagy. So much had 
already been accumulated, and considerable had been the profit 
of those three years when no tax was paid." 103 

We find confirmation of the above in a letter dated 4 
August 1664, written by the Dutch Governor-General to the 
Directors of their East India Company : " King Orangech has 
ordered the town of Surat to be surrounded by a stone wall," 
it says, " and has granted a year's exemption of tolls and duties 
to the merchants, the Company and the English being also 
included. This exemption was to begin from March 16th 1663, 
and we calculate that the Company will then gain a sum of 


f 50,000 (4,200), so that this catastrophe has brought us 
profit \ " "* ' 

On 3 October 1670 Sivajl repeated his exploit at Surat. 
Property worth about 132 lakhs was looted and Surat remain- 
ed in continual dread of the Mamthas. As Sir J. Sarkar has 
observed, the real loss of Surat was not in, the booty carried 
away by the Marathas : " The trade of this, the richest port 
of India, was practically destroyed ---- Business was effectively 
scared away from Surat, and inland producers hesitated to send 
their goods to this the greatest emporium of Western India." 105 

To turn from Surat to the grand offensive against Sivajl : 
Despatches arrived from 9 Prince Muazzam, writes Khwafi 
K&an, ' to the effect that Shivaji was growing more and more 
audacious, and every day was attacking and plundering the 
imperial territories and caravans. He had seized the ports of 
Jiwal and Pabal and others near Surat, and attacked the pil- 
grims bound for Mecca. He had built several forts along the 
sea-shore and entirely disrupted maritime intercourse. He had 
also struck copper coins (sikka-i-'pul) and hons in the fort of 
Rajgad. Maharaja Jaswant Singh had endeavoured to suppress 
him, but without avail/ 106 Hence, Raja Jai Singh and Dilir 
Khan were sent to join the armies already fighting against 

Jai Singh's career, as Sarkar has said, 'had been one of 
undiminished brilliancy from the day when he, an orphan of 
twelve [now he was 60], received his first appointment, in the 
Mughal army (1617). Since then he had fought under the im- 
perial banner in every part of the empire, from Balkh in Cen- 
tral Asia to Bijapur in the Deccan, from Qandahar in the west 
to Mungir in the east .... In diplomacy he had attained to a 
success surpassing even his victories in the field. Wherever there 
was a difficult or delicate work to be done, the Emperor had 
only to turn to Jai Singh. A man of infinite tact and pati- 
ence, an adept in the ceremonious courtesy of the Muslims, a 
master of Turki and Persian, besides Urdu and the Rajput 
dialect, he was an ideal leader of the composite army of Afghans 
and Turks, Rajputs and Hindustanis that followed the ere- 


scent-banner of the sovereign of Delhi His foresight and 

political cunning, his smoothness of tongue and Cool calculat- 
ing policy, were in striking contrast with the impulsive gene- 
rosity, reckless daring, blunt straightforwardness and impolitic 
chivalry which we are apt to associate with the Rajput cha- 
racter/ 107 

Jai Singh's coadjutor, Dilir Khan, was also a veteran 
soldier. His real name was Jalal Khan Daud-zai. He had 
served under Prince Suleman Shikoh during the war of Succes- 
sion, and with Mir Jumla in the Assam campaign. He was 
the founder of Shahjahanabad in Rohilkhand. . He was to win 
further laurels in the present war against Sivaji. 

Faced with such generals and such forces as they led, 
Sivaji and the Marathas had their mettle put to the hardest test 
yet encountered by them. Jai Singh organised a whirlwind 
campaign in order to encompass the Marathas from all sides. 
Casting his net far and wide, the 'Adil Shah, the petty rajas 
and zamlndars, the Siddis, and evert the Europeans, were all 
enlisted as supporters. Corruption was set a-foot on its nefa- 
rious work in the very camp of the Marathas. Purandar, where 
Sivaji resided, was made the heart and centre of this colossal 
campaign. When Jai Singh arrived there, writes Cosme da 
Guarda, ' even Sevagy could not help being frightened. For, 
besides the 400,000 cavalry, the number of men and animals 
that followed these armies could neither be credited or ascer- 
tained. ' There went with it 500 elephants, 3 million camels, 
10 million oxen of burden, men of useless service and mer- 
chants without number. 

' The first thing that Sevagy did was to tempt this gene- 
ral in the same way as he had done the other. He sent him a 
very large and very valuable present Mlesiring his friendship. 
The Raya refused both and ordered to inform Sevagy that he 
had not come to receive presents but to subdue him ; and for 
his own good, he asked him to yield and avoid many deaths, 
or he would make him yield by force. This resolution perturb- 
ed Sevagy/ 


The siege of Purandar was proceeded with. ' The Raya 
had brought with him a large number of heavy artillery of 
such a calibre that each cannon was drawn by forty yokes of 
oxen ; but they were of no use for bombarding a fortress of 
this kind ; for it was not a handiwork of man, but of the au- 
thor of Nature, and it also had foundations so laid and forti- 
fied that they laughed at the balls, wind, and even the thunder- 
bolts. The plain at the top, where the -men communed with 
the stars, was more than half-a-league in breadth, provided 
with food for many years, and the most copious water that 
after regaling men was precipitated through the hill to fertilise 
the plants with which it was covered/ 108 The highest point 
of this fort is 4,564 ft. above sea-level, and more than 2,500 
ft. above the plain at its foot. It is reaHy a double fort 
Purandar and Vajraga<J or Rudramal. It was by the seizure 
of this latter citadel (in 1665), as later on the English were 
to do in 1817, that Jai Singh made it impossible for the Mara- 
thas to retain Purandar. 

It was during the defence of this strategic stronghold that 
Murar Baji, like Baji Despan-de and Tanajl Malusare, laid 
down his life heroically. Dilir Khan sat down before the fort- 
ress like Yama with a grim determination to capture it at any 
cost. Greatly admiring the gallant resistance of Baji he offered 
to spare his life if he should submit and accept high appoint- 
ment in the imperial service. But the valiant Maratha spurn- 
ed the temptation and continued the fight courageously. A 
shot from Dilir, however, soon brought down the dauntless and 
incorruptible Baji. Still the garrison, with the courage worthy 
of the mother of Brasidas, as Sarkar puts it, continued the 
struggle undismayed by the fall of their leader, saying : ' What 
though one man Murar Baji is killed ? We are as brave as he 
and we shall fight with*equal courage ! ' 109 That this was not 
a vain boast is borne out by Khwaf! Khan's testimony to 4 the 
surprises of the enemy, their gallant successes, attacks on dark 
nights, blocking of roada and difficult passes, and burning of 
jungles/ etc. which made the task of the Mughals very ardu- 
ous. 110 But, with all that the Marattoas could do, it was an 


unequal struggle. The resources of the Mughals were vastly 

Jai Singh's flying columns were everywhere. His army 
dispositions were those of a consummate general. He had open- 
ed his campaign from Poona on 14 March 1665. The van- 
guard of the imperialists, with heavy artillery under Dilir 
Khan, was in the vicinity of Purandar on the 30th. Vajragatf 
(RudramaJ) was forced to capitulate on 14 April. On the 25th 
following a choice division led by renowned captains was order- 
ed to devastate the surrounding regions. The area covered by 
RajgswJ, Simhaga<J and Rohida was to be utterly desolated 
without a vestige of cultivation or Jiabitation. Likewise, the 
villages enclosed between the forts LohgatJ, Visapur, Tikona 
and Tangai were also devastated ; much of Balaghat and Pain- 
ghat was harried. In the neighbourhood of Rohida alone, 50 
villages were destroyed towards the end of April. Another 
month passed and Purandar itself seemed irrevocably doomed. 
The casualties among the garrison wjre alarming. The realist 
in Sivaji anticipated the inevitable. To prolong resistance un- 
der such circumstances was to invite annihilation or worse dis- 
honour and captivity for the Maratha families sheltered with- 
in the fort. He therefore opened negotiations with Jai Singh, on 
20 May 1665, through his Pamjit Rao Raghuriath Ballal. But 
Jai Singh insisted on a personal interview with Siviaji. This 
was at last brought about at 9 A.M. on 11 June 1665. Khwafi 
Khan has recorded the proceedings as follows : 

' When Sivaji entered, the Raja (Jai Singh) rose and seat- 
ed him near himself. Sivaji then, with a thousand signs of 
shame, clasped his hands and said : " I have come as a guilty 
slave to seek forgiveness, and it is for you either 1 to pardon or 
to kill me at your pleasure. I will make over my great forts, 
with the country of Konkan, to -the Elhperor's officers, and I 
will send you my son to enter the imperial service. As for 
myself, I hope that after the interval of one year, when I have 
paid my respects to the Emperor, I may be allowed, like other 
servants of the State who exercise authority in their own pro- 
vinces, to live with my wife and family in a small fort or two. 


Whenever and wherever my services are required, I will on 
receiving orders, discharge my duty loyally/ 

The Raja cheered him up and sent him to Dilir Khan. 
* After direction had been given for the cessation of the siege, 
7,000 persons, men, women and children, came out of the fort. 
All that they could not carry away became the property of 
Government, and the fort was taken possession of by the forces. 
Dilir Khan presented Sivaji with a sword, etc. He then took 
him back to the Raja who presented him with a robe .... 
and renewed his assurances of safety and honourable treat- 
ment. Sivaji with ready tact bound on the sword in an instant 
and promised to render .faithful service. When the question 
about the time Sivaji was to remain under parole and of his 
return home came under consideration, Raja Jai Singh wrote 
to the Emperor asking forgiveness for Sivaji and the grant of 
a robe to him and awaited instructions .... 

' A mace-bearer arrived with the firman and a robe .... 
and Sivaji was overjoyecl at receiving forgiveness and honour. 
A decision then arose about the forts, and then it was finally 
settled that out of the 35 forts which he possessed, the keys of 
23 111 should be given up with their revenues amounting to 10 
lacs of hons or 40 lacs of \rupees. Twelve small forts with mo- 
derate revenues were to remain in the possession of Sivaji's 
people. Sambha, his son, a boy of eight years old, in whose 
name a mansab of 5,000 had been granted, at Raja Jai Singh's 
suggestion, was to proceed to Court with the Raja attended by 
a suitable retinue. Sivaji himself with his family was to re- 
main in the Hills and was to endeavour to restore the prospe- 
rity of his ravaged country. Whenever he was summoned on 
imperial service he was to attend.* 112 

On his being allowed to depart, he received a robe, horse, 
etc. In addition, Sivji further undertook, ' If lands yielding 
4 lakhs of hons a year in the lowlands of Konkan (Painghat) 
and 5 lakhs of hons a year in the uplands (Balaghat Bijapuri) 
are -granted to me by the Emperor, and I am assured by an 
imperial firman that the possession of these lands will be con- 
firmed in me after the expected Mughal conquest of BIjapur, 


then I agree to pay to the Emperor 40 lakhs of hons in thirteen 
yearly instalments/ 113 * 

Since these lands were to be wrested by Sivajl from Bija- 
pur, Jai Singh thought he had cleverly; thrown a bone of con- 
tention between the two enemies of the Mughals in the Dec- 
can, viz. the 'Adil Shah and the Marathas. Proud of this 
achievement, he wrote to the Emperor : * This policy will result 
in a threefold gain, 1st we get 40 lakhs of hons or 2 krors of 
rupees ; 2nd tSivaji will be alienated from Bijapur ; 3rd the 
imperial army will be relieved from the arduous task of cam- 
paigning in these two broken and jungly regions, as Sivaji will 
himself undertake the task of expelljpg the Bijapuri garrisons 
from them/ In return Siv&ji also agreed to join the Mughals in 
the invasion of Bijapur with 2,000 cavalry and 7,000 infantry 
under his own command. "Now that 'Adil Shah and Qutb 
Shah have united in mischief," Jai Singh wrote to Aurangzeb, 
*' it is necessary to win Sivaji's heart by all means and send 
him to North India to have audience with your Majesty." 114 

The reason for such a settlement may not be entirely attri- 
buted to Jai Singh's magnanimity. Khwaffi Kbjan's references to 
the embarrassment caused by the guerilla tactics of the MaiS- 
thas and Diiir iChan's apprehensions expressed to Jai Singh 
seem also to indicate that the Mughal generals considered dis- 
cretion the better part of valour. "I will not say anything 
more now," Dilir said, "this campaign will end by ruining 
both you and me." 3ir * 

Sivaji was prevailed upon by ' a thousand devices ' to un- 
dertake a visit to Agra, which he reluctantly accepted. He 
reached Agra on 11 May 1666 and was received by Kutn&r 
Ram Singh, son of Jai Singh Kachwah. Aurangzeb gave him 
audience the very next day ; but treated him with such calcu- 
lated insult that Sivajl was terribly upset Kumar Ram Singh 
was obliged to give an undertaking to the Emperor that ' if 
Sivaji escapes or does any mischief, the Kumar will take the 
responsibility/ Sivaji was consequently very anxious that Ram 
Singh did not come into trouble on account of himself if pos- 
sible. His enemies were persuading Aurangzeb 'either to kill 


Siva or to confine him in a fortress or to throw him into pri- 
son.' But Ram Singh having come to know of this, protested 
to Mufomad Amin Khan ; " It has been decided by His Ma- 
jesty to kill Sivajl ; but he has come here under a guarantee 
of personal safety. So it is proper that the Emperor should 
kill me first, and then only, after I am dead, do with fiivaji 
what he likes." Nevertheless, Sivaj! was ordered to be trans- 
ferred to the custody of Radandaz Khn. a reckless favourite 
of Aurangzeb, evidently to facilitate the nefarious design. 
Sivaji then tried to get out of Aurangzeb's clutches through 
diplomatic negotiations ; but he was firmly told that he must 
not visit anybody, * not eyen go to the Kumar's house/ Sub- 
sequently, isivaji was placid under the direct surveillance of the 
Kotwal, Fulad Khan. Thus freed from his moral responsibi- 
lity towards Ram Singh, Sivaji effected his dramatic escape from 
Agra, after having tried various other stunts, during the night 
of 17 August 1666. A letter of 18th August states, "This 

morning Sivajl was found to have fled away from Agra." 116 

All these details are now confirmed by the fresh evidence 
recently brought to light by Sir Jadunath Sarkar. " We must 
therefore now discard as pure fiction," he writes, "all the 
stories told by Khafi Khan and others about Shivaji's ro- 
mantic adventures during his flight through Allahabad, Bena- 
res and Gaya, and even Jagannath Pun, according to a Ma- 
ratha fabulist." 117 Sarkar now holds that Sivaji must have 
returned to Rajga$ on 12 Sept. 1666, by a more direct route 
than hitherto believed. His revised opinion rests upon a few 
statements in the Persian Akhbarats and the Dingal letters 
now published by him. An Akhbarat dated Delhi 15 Nov. 
1666 appears to state that the Emperor had learnt from a 
news-letter from Aurangabad that ' a son has been born in the 
house of the wretch Shra, and that he himself is ailing.' Fur- 
ther, a Dingal letter of Ballu Sah to diwan Kalyandds, dated 
Delhi 19 Nov. 1666, is said to refer to 'public rumours now 
confirmed by news-letters reaching the Emperor' that 6ivajT 
after having slipped out of Agra 'at midnight' reached his 
fort in 25 days ; and that ' his son who accompanied him had 


died on the way ' ! Again, the same purveyors of news re- 
ported the birth of another son to iSivaji at RajaiJ, adding 

that ' for many days Sivaji lay ill ' ' thus has the waqia- 

navis written/ From these references Sir Jadunath concludes 
that Siv&jl must have reached Rajgatf on 12 September, and 
that the imperial spies must have probably got the news in the 
middle of October following : " the rigid time limit of 25 
days," he states, " by a rather bow-shaped route, bars out all 
these (earlier described) anecdotes as impossible/' 118 

The date, hitherto accepted by Sarkar, of Sivaji's reaching 
home was 20 Nov. 1666. As a variant he has cited the Shiva- 
pm Yddi mentioning 10 December, 9 in his SKivaji and His 
Times (chronology at the end). The Jedh6 Sakdvali and 
Kanna, which correctly record Sravay Kr$na 12 Prabhava 1588 
Saka (17 Aug. 1666) as the date of Sivaji's escape from Agra 
" in a basket," also state that igivajS returned to Riajgaql with 
Sambhaji on Mdrgasirsa sukla 5 of the same year (20 Nov. 
1666). These local records indicating the later arrival of 
Sivtaji in Mahiana$tra appear to us more reliable than the more 
distant Persian and Dingal news-letters. The allusion to 
SambHaji's death on the way must serve to put us on our guard. 
Besides, the letter of Jai Singh dated 15 Nov. 1666, quoted by 
Sarkar in his Shivaji and His Times, whose authenticity we 
have no reason to doubt, militates against his latest view : 
" There is no trace or news of the fugitive Shiva" complains 
Jai Singh. "My days are passing in distraction and anxiety. 
I have sent trusty spies to get news of Shiva." 119 What a 
relief the Akhbarats and Dingal letters might have brought to 
Jai Singh had their writers taken him into their confidence ! 




The seven years that elapsed between Sivajf s return from 
Agra and his coronation as chhatrapati at RaigaxJ (5 June 
1674)' were the most momtntous years of his life. From a con- 
structive and creative point of view they constituted the most 
fruitful in the history of the Marathas. The arrangements that 
Sivaji made for the upkeep of his possessions (such as were 
left to him by the treaty of Purandar), during his absence at 
Agra, have rightly been characterised by Sarkar as " a master- 
piece of forethought and> organisation." 2 They revealed that 
Sivaji was as great a statesman as he was a strategist. For aU 
his thrilling adventures the future of Mahar&stra might have 
been as sterile as that of Macedonia after the death of Alex- 
ander, but for the solid foundations which igiviajl well and truly 
laid for the greater glory of his race, during the short interval 
separating his return home from Agra (20 Nov. 1666) and his 
second raid of Surat (17 Oct. 1670). The Rajyabhi$eka which 
took place on Friday 12 Jyetfha sukla of the Saka year Ananda 
(5 June 1674) was but the grand culmination of a career which 
evoked admiration and wonder even from his enemies. 

On his part Sivaji had scrupulously fulfilled all the terms 
of his treaty with Aurangzeb. Not only did he hand over to 
the Mughals all the fosts demanded by them in the agreement, 
but also actively joined them in the Bijapur campaign (20 
Nov. 1665) with 9,000 Mai&tha troops. In recognition of this 
assistance Aurangzeb sent him a letter of praise, a robe of 
honour and a jewelled dagger. 3 In the discharge of his obliga- 
tions 6ivaj5 had even to fight against his own half-brother Vyan- 


koji who was a loyal supporter of B&japur. 4 Though Netaji 
Palkar wavered for a while and went over to the enemy, he was 
soon persuaded to return and was rewarded with Rs. 38,000 
cash, a man$ab of 5,000 and a jagir in ' the settled and lucra- 
tive old territory of the empire/- 1 Finally, Sivaji yielded to Jai 
Singh's importunities and went to Agra, with what result we 
have already noticed. Not only Aurangzeb, who was his life- 
long and inveterate enemy, but even Jai Singh at one moment, 
under the chagrin of personal disappointment and discomfiture, 
yielded to the temptation of seeking to end Sivaji's life igno- 
miniously despite the plighted troth of a Rajput for the safety 
of his person. 6 Nevertheless Sivajl had borne himself with 
courage and dignity in the most trying circumstances and es- 
caped from ' the jaws of death ' by dint of his own resourceful- 
ness. The veteran Jai Singh was borne down by anxiety, humi- 
liation and misrepresentations at Court, and died at Burhampur 
(on 2 July 1667), cursing like Cardinal Wolsey the base ingrati- 
tude of kings. His place in the Deccan was taken by the easy- 
going Muazzam whose unseemly and suicidal quarrels with the 
capable but insubordinate Dilir Khan afforded golden opportu- 
nities to :ivaji to recover his lost dominion. Aurangzeb's pre- 
occupation with the suppression of the Yusufzai rebellion at 
Peshawar (March 1667) compelled him to acquiesce in a truce 
with the Marathas negotiated by the nerveless Muazzam and 
Jaswant Singh. A letter of Prince Muazzam, dated 6 March 
1668, informed Sivajl that the Emperor had conferred on him 
the title of Rajah and that his other demands were under con- 
sideration. 7 Sambhajl was restored to his man$abdarl of 5,000 
and was sent to Aurang&bad as Sivaji's representative along with 
the devoted Pratap Rao Gujar and Nirajl Raoji. According to 
the Jedh Sakavali, Sivajf himself went to Aurangabad where 
he interviewed Jaswant Singh op Kartik krsna 13 Monday of 
the iSaka year Plavanga 1589 : " Next day he left Aurangabad 
on horseback for Rajga<Jh." 8 This truce lasted till Pau$, Saumya 
1591 Saka (i.e. from 4 Nov. 1667 to Dec. 1669), when Pratap 
Rao and Anand Rao returned to RajganJ along with Sambhiajl 9 
Sivaji was not hibernating during the interval of peace, 


though the English factors at Karwar wrote to Surat (16 Sept. 
1668) : "The country all about} at present is in great tranquil- 
lity " ; and on 9 March 169, " Our feare of Sevagy this yeare 
is pretty well over, hee not using to stirr soe late in the yeare 
.... Sevagy is at Rajahgur, and very quiett, as alsoe is all 
the country round about us," etc. 10 The details of his construc- 
tive work of organisation of the State he was building we shall 
consider in our final chapter. At the time of his departure for 
Agra, Sabhasad tells us, Sivajl had entrusted Rajga<J and the 
other forts to the charge of his mother, Moro Pant Pesva, Nilo 
Pant Majumdar, and Netaji Palkar Sarnobat. When he return- 
ed from the North, ' Matusri and the karkuns and the soldiers 
in the army and the people in the forts and the militia were 
all pleased and held festivities. Preparations were then made 
for the recovery of the 27 forts ceded to the Mughals. Sivajj 
said to Moro Pant Pesva, Nilo Pant Majumdar and Aroiaji 
surnis : " You should capture these forts by diplomacy and exer- 
tion " ; and 1 the Raje said personally to the Mavales ; " Capture 
ye the forts." Thereupon there was a Hazari of the Mavajes - 
Tanajl Malusare by name who made the offer : " I shall take 
the fort of Kontfaija." 11 This incident may be taken as marking 
the end of the truce with the Mughals, and the beginning of 
Sivajf s fresh offensive. According to the Jedhe Sakdvali Kon- 
<Jana thereafter called Simhagatf was captured on Friday 
Mdgh kr$na 9 (4 Feb. 1670). Though Sabhasad assigns no date 
for this event, he mentions it as the first episode since Sivajfs 
return. Much as Simhaga4 stands out physically silhouetted 
against the southern sky of Poona to-day, Tanaji's heroic exploit 
has indelibly impressed itself on the racial memory of the 
Marathas as an achievement of the first magnitude ; and well 
it might, for it was here that the Koji Nag Nak had first opened 
the Mariatha resistance to the Muslim advance under MuJiam- 
mad Tughlaq. The powa4a or ballad of Tanaji by Tulsidas 
is familiar to every Maratha to this day. Our hearts throb as 
the Sahirs sing : 

' And ye MarathSs brave ! give ear, 

TanajlTs exploits crowd to hear. 


Where from your whole dominion wide 
Shall such another be supplied ? 
O'er seven and twenty castles high 
His sword did wave victoriously. 
The iron-years are backward roll'd, 
His fame restores the age of gold ; 
Whene'er this song ye sing and hear, 
Sinsi are forgiven, and heaven is near ! ' 12 

' In this manner/ simply writes Sabhasad, * was Kon<jat.ia cap- 
tured first. Then Moro Pant Pesva and Nilo Pant and Aajgajl 
Pant and the Mavajes, with similar distinction took twenty-six 
forts in four months. The Raje went on governing his kingdom, 
recapturing what forts had been ceded by the treaty.' 13 Accord- 
ing to the Sakavali, Purandar was recaptured by Nilo Pant 
Majumdar on Tuesday Phalgun Krma 12 (8 March 1670) ; 
Mughal territory was invaded and Junnar besieged by Sivaji 
in Bhadrapad, Sddkdran 1592 Saka (August 1670) ; Surat was 
looted for the second time on Kartik sukla 1 (4 Oct. 1670) ; 
and on 14 of the same month ( 17 Oct. ) on his way back from 
Surat, he fought with Daud Khan near Dintfori. In fye$tha f 
Virodhikrt 1593 Saka (June 1671) Sahler was besieged by 
Bahadur Khan and Dilir Khan, but they raised the siege in 
October the same year and retired to Aurangiabad. Prince 
Muazzam left for Delhi in Mdgh fFeb. 1682), evidently to 
report the gravity of the situation to the Emperor. 

The circumstances leading to these hostile activities on the 
part of iSivaji need to be looked into more closely. Aurangzeb, 
ever suspicious by nature, feared collusion between his son 
Muazzam and the Marathas. Consequently, he ordered the 
arrest of the MaiSthS agents of Sivaji at Aurangabad (Pratap 
Rao and NiiSjI Pant). But like the five members of Parlia- 
ment attempted to be apprehended by Charles I of England, 
these MaiSJthi sardars slipped out with their troops before 
action was taken against them. To make matters worse, 
Aurangzeb, in sore straits for money, also ordered the seizure 
of SivajTs estates in Beifir, ostensibly in lieu of the lakh of 


rupees advanced by Jai Singh for Sivaji's expenses en route to 
Agra. "The rupture, inevitable in any case," writes Sarkar, 
"was precipitated by financial causes. Retrenchment of ex- 
penditure had now become a pressing necessity to Aurangzib, 
and he ordered the Mughal army in the Deccan to be greatly 
reduced." 14 On 11 December 1669 the Emperor received inti- 
mation of four Maratha captains of Siv&ja's biradari having 
deserted from the imperial camp. On 26 January 1670 Aurang- 
zeb ordered Dilir Khan to hasten to Aurangabad and Daud 
Khan to run to the assistance of Prince Muazzam. 35 

Though Sivaji was never lacking in incentives to act 
briskly and vigorously against the Mughals, further zeal was 
imparted to his arms by Aurangzeb's fanatical actions at this 
time. " The archrebel Sevagee," observes an English contem- 
porary, " is againe engaged in armes against Orangshah, who 
out of blind zeale for reformation hath demolished many of 
the Gentiles temples, and forceth many to turn Musslemins." 16 
The Jedhe Sakdvali also records that in Bhddrapad or August 
1669 Aurangzeb started religious persecution at Kasi and broke 
temples. The breach with the Mughals, according to Sarkar, 
occurred early in January or a fortnight earlier, though he says 
" There is no evidence for holding that Shivaji broke the peace 
with Aurangzib as a protest against the latter's general order 
for temple destruction (9 April 1669), though the two events 
are placed immediately after one another in an English factory 
letter (Foster xiii. 256) and Jedhe" 17 It cannot, however, be 
asserted that Aurangzeb's religious persecutions had no reper- 
cussions in Mahaita&ra. 

In a firman issued to Abdul Hasan, dated 28 February 
1659, Aurangzeb wisely directed : " Our royal command is that 
you should direct that in future no person shall in unlawful 
ways interfere with or disturb the Brahmans and other Hindus 
resident in those places." 18 But later, on 20 November 1665, 
he reversed this policy and declared : " In Ahmadabad and 
other parganahs of Gujailat in the days before my accession 
temples were destroyed by my order. They have been repaired 
and idol^vorship has been resumed. Carry out the former 


order" The Maasir-i Alamgiri enthusiastically appreciative of 
this bigotry observes : * On the 17th Zi-l Kada i079 H. (18 
April 1669) it reached the ear of His Majesty, the Protector 
of the Faith, that in the provinces of Thatta, Multan and 
Benares, but especially in the latter, foolish Brahmans were in 
the habit of expounding frivolous books in their schools, and 
that students and learners, Musulmans as well as Hindus, 
went there, even from long distances, led by a desire to become 
acquainted with the wicked sciences they taught. The Director 
of the Faith, consequently, issued orders to all the governors 
of provinces to destroy with a willing hand the schools and 
temples of the infidels ; and they were strictly enjoined to put 
an entire stop to the teaching and practising of idolatrous 
forms of worship. On the 15th Rab?u-l akhar it was reported 

to his religious Majesty that, in obedience to orders, the 

government officers had destroyed the temple of Bishnath at 

Benares In the month of Ramazan 1080 H. (Dec. 1669), 

in the 13th year of the reign, this justice-loving 'monarch, the 
constant enemy of tyrants, commanded the destruction of the 
Hindu temples of Mathura known by the name of Dehra Kesu 
Rai, and soon that stronghold of falsehood was levelled with 
the ground. On the same spot was laid, at great expense, the 
foundation of a great mosque. The den of inequity was thus 

destroyed 33 lacs were expended on this work. Glory be 

to God who has given us the faith of Islam that, in the reign 
of the destroyer of false gods, an undertaking so difficult of 
accomplishment has been brought to a successful termination 

This vigorous support given to the true faith was a severe 

blow to the arrogance of the Rajas The richly jewelled 

idols taken from the pagan temples were transferred to Agra 
and there placed beneath the steps leading to the Nawab Begum 
Sahib's mosque, in order that t}iey might ever be pressed under 
foot by the true believers. Mathura changed its name into 
Islamabad/ 19 

Aurangzeb's frenzy continued for several years. Cart loads 
of idols were taken also from Jodhpur to the capital to be 
trodden upon by the faithful. The Jaziya was reimposed, 


Hindu fairs and festivals were prohibited. Hindus were for- 
bidden to wear arms and fine dresses, and to ride well-bred 
horses, elephants, and to go in palanquins. ' According to the 
law 2J p.c. should be taken from Musalmans and 5 p.c. from 
Hindus (customs duty)/ 20 In 1671 it was ordered that all 
rent-collectors in crown-lands ought to be Muslims. Provincial 
governors were also called upon to dismiss their Hindu head 
clerks and accountants and to replace them by the true believers. 
The dismissed employers sought service under Sivaji, in some 
cases at least. 21 In North India this policy antagonised the 
Rajputs and drove the Jats, Satnamis and Sikhs into open re- 
volt. In Maharatra one iconoclastic officer found his task 
too strenuous : ' The hatch-men of the government,' he com- 
plained, ' in the course of my marching do not get sufficient 
strength and power to destroy and raze the temples of the 
infidels that meet the eye on the way.' Hence Aurangzeb 
ordered : ' You should appoint an orthodox Inspector 
(darogha) who may afteiyrards destroy them at leisure and 
dig up their foundations.' 22 Ironically, however, this darogha 
happened to be the Maralthia, and he dug up the foundations 
of Aurangzeb's Empire ! 

Addressing the imperial officers, Sivaji wrote in effect : 
4 For the last three years ye have been under orders from 
Aurangzeb to seize my country and forts. Ye are reminded 
that even the steed of unimaginable exertion is too weak to 
gallop over this hard country, and that its conquest is difficult. 
My home is unlike the forts of Kaylani and Badar, and is not 
situated on a spacious plain. It has lofty mountain ranges, 
200 leagues in length and 4D leagues in depth : everywhere 
there are ndlas difficult to ford ; and sixty forts of rare strength 
have been built, some on the sea-coast. Afzal Khan came 

against me on behalf of tKe ' Adil Shah and perished Why 

do not you report to the Emperor what has happened, so that 
the same fate may not overtake you ? Amir-ul umara Sha'ista 
Khan was sent against these sky-kissing ranges and abysmal 
valleys. He laboured hard for three long years and bluffed 
to the Emperor that I was going to be subdued in the shortest 


time. But at last, as all false men deserve, he encountered a 
terrible disaster and went away in disgrace. It is 9 my duty to 
guard my land : 

The wise should beware of this river of blood, 
No man can ford, in safety, its terrible flood/ 23 

This was not a vain and empty boast. Its force was 
brought home to the Mughals during the campaigns of 1670 
and the succeeding years. On 4 February 1670 Korwjaiia 
(Simhagad) was captured by the heroic sacrifice of Taniajl. On 
8 March Purandar was retaken by Nilo Pant. A few days 
later, the qilffdar of Chandod was field up in his fort and the 
town was plundered yielding Rs. 40,000, an elephant and 
twelve horses. At Kalya^-Rhiwancli, Uzbeg Khan (thanediar) 
was killed and the place captured. Ludi Khan the fauzddr of 
Konkan was beaten and put to flight (March 1670). The 
jaujdar of NandetJ deserted his post in a panic. Though there 
were temporary setbacks at ParneY, Junnar and MBhuli, the 
position was soon retrieved. By the end of April 1670 the 
Manathas had plundered 51 villages in the vicinity of Ahmad- 
nagar, Junnar and Parenda/ LohganJ was captured in May, 
and Hindola, Karnalia and Rohida in June. On 16 June 
Mahuli was recaptured after slaying its new commandant, 
Alawardi Beg, and 200 of the garrison. 

All this time, Prince Muazzam and Dilir Khan were en- 
gaged in an unseemly quarrel, almost amounting to civil war. 
Aurangzeb deputed Iftikhar Khian in March 1670 to compose 
their differences ; but ' he played the Jack on both sides ' and 
added fuel to the fire. Muazzam complained of Dilir's defiant 
conduct, and the plunder of imperial villages by his Pathan 
troops. " The latter charge was borne out by the reports of 
the news-writers." The Khan was dftually chased across the 
Tapti by Muazzam and Jaswant Singh "with all the avail- 
able Mughal troops, calling upon Sivaja to come to their 
aid !" 2 * 

The weakness of the imperial position, betrayed by the 
above incidents, might have been apparent even to observers 


less acute than tgiviaji. To the astute Maratha leader it offered 
too tempting an opportunity for aggressive action. Surat once 
more attracted his attention. A letter of 10 July 1670 observ- 
es : " The notable progress of Sevagy in his conquest oi 
Mauly, etc., now in the blustering time of raines, makes his 
name yet more terrible to Surrat. Insomuch that the Governor 
is allarummed from Brampore, Orangabaud, Mooler and other 
places, to expect and prepare for an assault, so that this town 
is under no small feare/'- 5 

The English had put up a brave show in 1664, but their 
valiant President, Sir George Oxenden, had died on 14 July 
1669. Again they were catted upon to prepare themselves " for 
the preservation of the honour and repute of the English nation 
and security of the Hon'ble Companys house at Surratt. . . . 
Wherefore it was propounded Debated and Concluded to send 
order to the Deputy Governor &ca at Bombay that they spare 
us. .. .35 or 40 White Portugall souldiers who have been trayn- 
ed up & are actually in service so that the charge will be but 
little & that onely for Dyett (duty) the time they are in 

Sivaji actually appeared in Surat for the second time on 
3 October 1670 "whereupon the President and Councell re- 
solved to send the Hon'ble Companys treasures which is on 
shoare, some on board the Berkely Castle, the rest on board 
the Loyal Oxenden" On the third day (5 October), Sivaji 
suddenly left Surat, though no Mughal army was near. An 
official inquiry ascertained, says Sarkar, "that Shivaji had 
carried off 66 lakhs of Rupees* worth of booty from Surat, 
viz., cash, pearls, and other articles worth 53 lakhs from the 
city itself, and 13 lakhs worth from Nawal Sahu and Hari 
Sahu and a village near Surat."- 7 

According to Abbe>*Carre,. "Partly in different wars he 
(ivaji) had waged, and partly in the Court, he had exhausted 
Tiis treasures. This is what made him to resolve to plunder 
Surat for a second time/' 28 He also states : " As the purpose 
of Sevagy was only to make fun of the Great Mogol, he did 
not exert himself further ; and did no harm to the people/' 


The French, the Dutch and the English were given " a timely 
notice to display their standards on the top of their terraces 
that they may be saved thereby from the fury of the soldiers." 
The English lost one soldier, the French ' two black servants ', 
and the Dutch none : " We (tould only oppose to Sivasi'& 
hordes 35 men in all, but they did not molest us/' 29 

The English President, Gerald Aungier writes : " The 
King (Aurangzeb) being sensible of the great danger his chief e 
port was in, ordered downe Bahadur Cann, the viceroy of 
Ahmadabad, with 3/000 horse, to protect Surratt, whose arrival! 
eased us of the present feare, but cost us, the French and Dutch 
and all the Merchants, deare for oilr protection in presents to 
him (the viceroy) which is a civil kind of plunder demanded 
by these great Umbrawes as a tribute due to them ; wee at 
first intended him a small acknowledgment of 2 or 300 rupees 
worth in some European rarities, but the Merchants of the 
Towne having presented him high, and the Dutch Comman- 
dore, contrary to his private promise to Gerald Aungier, made 
him a Piscash of 4,000 rupees, we were forced for peace sake 
to please him with a present to the value of rupees 1,700 in 
imitation of the Indians that worship the Devill that he (the 
viceroy) doe them hurt, for indeed we expect little good from 
him, but the French gallantly exceeded all compare, for theii 
chief Directeur the Here Caron made him a present to the 
value of Rups. 10,000 in horses, rich tapestry, brass guns &c., 
which made no small noyse in Towne, and caused different 
censures, some commanding his generosity, others with reason 
taxing his ill husbandry. 

" The 3rd October Sevagy's army approached the walls 
and, after a slight assault, the Defendants fled under the shelter 
of the castle Gunns, and they possesUthemselves of the whole 
Towne, some few houses excepted (English, French, Dutch,. 
Persian and Turkish) which stood on their defence. . . . 

"The enemy having taken the Tartar Seray could from 
thence more safely ply their shot at our house, for which they 
prepared themselves, but finding our menn resolute on their 


defence, ttjey held up their hands desiring a Parley The 

Captain tould Mr. Master, the Rajah or Sevagy was much 
enraged that wfee had killed soe many of his menn and was 

resolved on revenge but Mr. Master stood in so resolute 

a posture that the Captain, not willing to hazard his men's 
lives, sent some person to him, demanding a present, though 
to noe great vallue. 

"Mr. Master thought it not imprudence to secure our 
goods, together with soe many mens lives at soe reasonable a 
rate, and therefore by advise of those with him, being a Mer- 
chant of Rajapore* fell into discourse with him touching our 
leaving that Factory, asking the reason why wee did not send 
our people to trade there as formerly. 

"Mr. Master answered that it was Sevagy's fault and 
not ours, for he had plundered the company's house, impri- 
soned their servants, and whereas since that time he had given' 
satisfaction to serverall persons whom he had robbed, yet he 
had not taken care to &tisfy the English the losse they had 
susteyned ; to which he answered that Sevagy did muck desire 
our return to Rajapore and would doe very much to give us 

" This gratefull discourse being over, the Present was sent 
by two of our servants who were conveighed to Sevagy's tent 
without the Towne ; he sent for them and received them with 
the Piscash in a very kind manner, telling them that the Eng- 
lish and he were good friends, and putting his hand into their 
hands, he told them that he would doe the English no wrong, 
and that this giving his hand was better than any cowl to 
oblige them thereunto. 

" Before your servants were returned to your house, Sevagy 
had called his Army oUt of the Towne, to the wonder of all 
men, in regard no enemy was neare, nor the noyse of any army 
to oppose him ; but he had gott plunder enough and thought 
it prudence to secure himself, and that when he marched away 
he sent a letter to the Officers and chiefe Merchants, the sub- 
stance whereof was that, if they did not pay him 12 lakhs of 


rupees yearly Tribute, he would return the next yeare and 
bume downe the remayning parte of the Towne." 

The account closes with a few observations which indicate 
how lightly the English came off out of this second sack of 
Surat. They made representations to the Emperor " soe that 
wee have a just right to demand the whole losse from the King 
and have taken such an effectual course by sending our re- 
monstrances to the Court and improving our interests with 
the Shawbunder, cozzy and Merchants whome wee have pro- 
tected in this danger, that wee trust in God you will be no 
losers by it in the end." 30 

The most important outcome of the raids on Surat was 
that the constant alarms they created for years " putt all trade 
into disorder". There was renewed panic in February and 
October 1672, in September 1673, October 1674, and December 
1679. tSivaji disorganised the imperial trade with the minimum 
effort and maximum gain to himself. When Muazzam heard 
of this disaster, he despatched Diaud Khan post haste from 
Burhlanpur, to intercept the Marathas returning from Surat. 
Sivaji had by then entered Baglana and plundered the environs 
of Mulher fort. The pursuing Mughals met the Marathas at 
Vani Din^ori ( 15 miles n. of Nasik ; 28 miles s. w. of Chan- 
docj) on the Ghats. The result was "a severe action" as 
Sabhasad has called it. 31 For two prahars the battle raged. 
The Marathas fought ne plus ultra, and killed 3,000 of the 
enemy, took 3 to 4,000 horses, and two wazlrs (officers). It 
was a resounding triumph for the Marathas. Pratap Rao 
(Samobat). Vyankoji Datto and Anand Riao distinguished 
themselves in this action (17 Oct. 1670). 

Encouraged by these successes and enriched with the 
booty secured, Sivajl launched a major campaign in Baglana, 
Xhandesh and Beriar. His forces numbered about 20,000. 
Capturing the forts of Ahivant, Markand, Ravla and Javla 
(in Baglana), he rapidly advanced to the vicinity of BurhSn- 
pur (Khandesh) and plundered Bahadurpur (2 miles from 
Burhanpur). But his most striking exploit was, however, the 
sack of Karanja (Beiar) where he secured booty worth one 


crore of rupees in gold, silver and finery. Many prominent 
and prosperous men were taken captive at Karanja and Nan- 
durbar, and held to ransom or chauth perhaps the first in- 
stance of its collection in Mughlai. 

The next exploit of Sivaji was the investment of Salhr 
(c. 5 January 1671). Like Humayun at Chanderi, Sivaji 
personally scaled the fortress with a rope-ladder while 20,000 
of his troops, horse and foot, surrounded the stronghold. 
Fatullah Khan, the commandant of the fort, fell fighting. But 
in other places the Mugai officers were regaling themselves with 
song and dance : there were daily entertainments in the houses 
of the grandees (including Mahabat Khan who was specially 
deputed by the Emperor to tackle Sivaji). There were no less 
than 400 dancing girls specially imported from the North for 
the delectation of the umara When reinforcements came, or 
more vigorous officers like Bahadur Khan and Diiir Khan were 
despatched in order to jinger up the resistance, they indulged 
in fitful and frenzied massacres, as at Poona where all above 
the age of nine were slaughtered in one raid in December 
1671. 33 

The imperialists tried to recapture Salher (January-Febru- 
ary 1672) with disastrous consequences. 'A great battle took 
place/ writes Sabhasad. ' For 4 prahars of the day the fight- 
ing lasted. Mughals, Pathans, Rajputs and Rohilas fought 
with artillery-swivels carried on elephants and camels. As the 
battle raged, such dust arose that for a distance of 3 koses 
square, friend could not be distinguished from foe. Elephants 
were killed ; 10,000 men on the two sides fell dead. Countless 
horses, camels and elephants as well. There was a deluge of 
blood.... The horses captured alive alone numbered 6,000. 
One hundred elephants were also taken, and 6,000 camels. 
Goods, treasures, gold "and jewels, clothes and carpets beyond 
calculation came into the Raje's hands. 22 waztrs of note were 
taken prisoner. Ikhlas Khan and Bahlol Khan themselves were 
captured. In this manner was the whole subah destroyed/ 

Sabhasad gives the names of a dozen Maratha sardars 
who distinguished themselves in this battle and adds, 'Simi- 


larly did Mavale soldiers and sarddrs toil hard. The com- 
manders, Moro Pant Pesvd and Pratap Rao Sarnobat, both 
distinguished themselves by personal acts of valour ; so also did 
Surya Rao Kjankacje (a panch-hazdfi) who was struck down by 

a canon-ball Other heroes of note also fell. Victory was 

won after such fighting/ 34 The news was flashed to the Raje 
and the canon boomed and sugar was distributed. Gold wrist- 
lets were put on the arms of the jdsuds who brought the news. 
Immense wealth was given to Pratap Rao Sarnobat, Moro 
Pant Pesvd, Anand Rao and Vyankoji Pant, in reward. The 
other officers and Mdvales were also similarly rewarded. ' Bah- 
lol Khan and the Nawab and wazlrs jvrho had been taken pri- 
soner were dismissed with horses and robes/ Dilir Khan, who 
was four marches away from Salher at that moment, fled. 
With pardonable pride, Sabhasad observes : * The Badshah at 
IJelhi felt much distressed at the bad news. For three days 
he did not come out into the Hall of Public Audience. So 
sad was he that he said : " It seems <?od has taken away the 
Badshahi from the Musulmans and conferred it on Sivajl/'" 5 

The English records also confirm the victory in which the 
Marathas " forced the two generals, who with their armies 
had entered into Sevagy's country, to retreat with shame and 
/oss." 36 But the Persian records are silent on this. 

On 5 June 1672 a large Maratha force under Moro 
Trimbak Pingle captured Jauhar (100 miles from Surat to- 
wards Nasik) from its Koji chieftain Vikramshah, and carried 
away treasure worth 17 lakhs of rupees. Ramnagar. (Dharam- 
pur) was likewise taken in July, and its raja, Somshah, forced 
to seek refuge under the Portuguese at Daman. The annexa- 
tion of these two important places brought the Marathas with- 
in 60 miles south of Surat which was perpetually placed on 
tenter hooks. ** 

An English record of 26 October 1672 states : " This day 
news being brought to Surat of a great army of Sevagee being 
come as near as Ramnagar and that 4 of the King's Umbraws 
with 4 Regiments of horse had deserted the King's service and 
revolted to Sevagee, the town took the allarme and the shroffs 


to whom we had sold the Company's treasure, who had weigh- 
ed a considerable part of it, and paid in about 30,000 rupees on 
the accounts, refused to carry it out of the house." 37 

The principal of the umard referred to in the above state- 
ment were Jadhav Rao Deccani (a great-grand-son of Lukh- 
jl) and Siddi Halal, both of whom, being defeated in the 
Nasik district, joined SivajJ between July and October 1672. 
Then Sivaji made a peremptory demand for chaut from Surat : 
" as your Emperor has forced me to keep an army for the de- 
fence of my people and country, that army must be paid by 
his subjects.' 1 The governor of Surat made this a pretext for 
taxing his Hindu subjects and pocketed their contribution ! :is 

While Surat was trembling under these tribulations, Sivaji 
suddenly turned towards Berar and Telingana. This raid was 
no part of his major campaign, but only intended to create 
diversions with a nuisance value. Perhaps it was also his 
intention to reconnoitre and test the enemy's forces. Certainly 
it served to keep the jfylughals guessing as to his plans and 
strategy. If Sivaji met with a reverse here and there, during 
such desultory action, he also came by some random booty. 

To meet the situation created by the Maratha raids dur- 
ing 1673, Bahadur 4 Khan, the new viceroy and c-in-c. of the 
Mughal forces in the Deccan, set up his H.Q. at Pexjgaum 
on the Bhima (8 miles south of Chamar gunda). Sivaji there- 
fore marched into Bijapur territory where the death of Ali 
'Adil Shah II (24 Nov. 1672) created tempting opportuni- 
ties. Ali's successor, Sikandar, was a boy of four summers. 
Khawas Khan, the Abyssinian, had assumed dictatorial autho- 
rity as Regent, and thereby evoked the jealousy of other offi- 
cers. The resulting tussle for power created confusion in the 
'Adilshahi kingdom and made it vulnerable to Maratha at- 
tacks. On 6 March ^1673 two of Sivaji's captains, Kon<Jaji 
Farzand and Aaiijaji Pant marched against PfcrMla. Under 
cover of night, like Tanaji at Simhagatf, Korxlaji scaled the 
steeper side of the fortress and surprised its garrison. The 
incident has befen vividly described by Jayaram PiniQte in his 
Parnala-parvata graha^dkhyanam. In view of SivajJ's earlier 


discomfiture at that place and its colourful antecedents, this* 
victory added a new feather to hig cap. It was followed up 
by the capture of Parli on 1 April and of Satara on 27 July. 
Pratap Rao drove away Bahlol Khan (BIjapuri general) after 
a desperate struggle at Umiiani (36 miles from Bijapur city), 
in the middle of April 1673. The doughty Pathan, however, 
returned to the fray and kept the Marafhas engaged, with better 
results, from June-August. But both Bijapur and Golkonda 
soon realised the expediency of making it up with iSivaji, in the 
face of the common enemy, viz., the Mughal. 

" It is confirmed to us from Choule and other parts," write 
the English factors in October 1673, " that overtures of peace 
are closely prosecuted betwixt the King of Vizapore and Seva- 
gee who hath a considerable army ready of horse and foote 
and thitherto maintaines his frontiers against the Mogull and 
Bullole Choune, and 'its generally concluded that the Kings 
of Bijapore and Golcondah do covertly furnish him with men 
and money, and that he also covertly fees the Generall 
and Commanders of the Mogulls Army which hath qualified 
their" heat against him, soe 'its thought that noe great action 
will be performed between them this yeare, yet the preparation 
Sewagee makes causeth us to believe that either he expects to 
be assaulted or designes to make some notable attempt in the 
King's country/' 39 Another letter (Gerald Aungier's) dated 
16 September, 1673 says : " Sevagee bears himself up man- 
fully against all his enemies and though it is probable 

that the Mogulls Army may fall into his country this yeare, 
and Ballol Chaune on the other side, yet neither of them can 
stay long for provisions, and his flying army will constantly 
keep them in allarme ; nor is it either their design to destroy 
Sevagee totally, for the Umaras maintain a politic war to their 
own profit at the King's charge, and nfcver intend to prosecute 
it violently so as to end it." 40 

One of the unfortunate happenings connected with this phase 
of SivajJ's war in Bijapur territory was the loss of Pratap Rao 
Gujar, in February 1674. tSivajJ had taunted him for having 
let go Bahlol Khan at Umrani in April last. " Go with your 


army," he t said, "and win a decisive victory. Otherwise never 
show your face to me again ! " The valiant but sensitive gene- 
ral literally carried out this mandate. On 24 February 1674 
at Nesari, * in the narrow gorge between two hills/ he charged 
like the Light Brigade at Balaklava and rushed ' into the jaws 
of death ' followed only by six faithful horsemen. The gallant 
seven drowned themselves in a river of blood : ' There was 
not to reason why ; there was not to make reply ; there was 
but to do and die, though some one had blundered ! ' But 
the disaster was retrieved by Anand Rao, his lieutenant, 
by a daring attack on Sampgaum in Kanara (20 miles from 
Bankapur), in March foUowing. He captured treasures worth 
150,000 hons, 500 horses, 2 elephants and much other booty. 
Bahlol Khan and Khizr Khan, with 2,000 horse and many 
foot-soldiers, tried in vain to intercept him. On 8 April Sivaji 
held a grand review of his troops at Chiplun and appointed 
Hamsajl Mohite as Sarnobat in place of the deceased hero 
Pratap Rao Gujar. "Finding him a very intelligent, brave, 
patient and cautious soldier," writes Sabhasad, "Sivaji con- 
ferred on him the title of Hambir Rao. Bounties were lavishly 
distributed among the soldiers/' 41 

Late in January 1674 Dilir Khan had tried to assail Sivaji 
in the Konkai), but as the English noted, " received a rout by 
Shivaji and lost 1,000 of his Pathans." Sivaji too lost 5 or 
600 men. 

By now it was evident that this son of a Bijapuri noble 
(Shahji Bhosle) though described by his enemies as a marauder 
and free-booter, had virtually become a King except in name. 
Even the title of Raja had been secured by him diplomatically 
from the Mughal Emperor than whom there was no greater 
sovereign in India. To set the imprimatur of legality over 
all he did, and also to**win the prestige of a crowned monarch, 
Sivaji had only to ceremonially translate his de facto power 
into de jure sovereignty ; and this coping stone he decided to 
lay over the edifice of his great achievements up to 1674. 
Raigatf was the capital he chose for the impressive ceremo- 
nial as well as to be the seat of his government thereafter. 


It was centrally situated in the heart of his territories. 
Nearly equidistant from Poona, Bombay and Siatara, it 
had a political and military, no less than commercial value, 
all its own. Detached from the Sahyadri, but elevated above 
the Konkari, Raigaql is removed from, yet served by the sea 
on account of its nearness to Maha<J which had considerable 
trade importance in those days. Strategically, it was protected 
from direct attacks by Bijapur as well as the Mughals ; but 
from its position in the MavaJ country and nearness to the 
sea, Sivaji could ideally direct all his military and maritime 
operations. From a religious point of view, the place was 
twice blessed by the shrine of Parasuram at Chiplun and that 
of Bhavani at Pratapga<J. Khwafi Khan has the following in- 
teresting observations to make about RaigatJ. 

4 When Sivaji had satisfied himself of the security of Raj- 
garh, his old retreat, and of the dependent territory, he turned 
his thoughts towards finding some other more inaccessible hill 
as a place for his abode. After diligent search he fixed upon 
the hill of Rahiri, a very high and strong place. The ascent 
of this place was three kos, and it was situated 24 kos from the 
sea ; but an inlet of the sea was about seven kos from the foot 
of the hill. TTie road to Surat passed near the place and that 
port was ten or twelve stages distant by land. Rajgarh was 
four or five stages off. The hills are very lofty and difficult 
of ascent. Rain falls there for about five months in the year. 
The place was a dependency of the Kokan belonging to Niza- 
mu-1-Mulk. Having fixed on the spot, he set about building 
his fort. When the gates and bastions and walls were complete 
and secure, he removed thither from Rajgarh and made it his 
regular residence. After the guns were mounted and the 
place made safe, he closed all the roads around, leaving one 
leading td his fortress. One day he railed an assembly and 
having placed a bag of gold and a gold bracelet worth a hun- 
dred pagodas before the people, he ordered proclamation to be 
made that this would be given to any one who would ascend 
to the fort and plant a flag, by any other than the appointed 
road, without thfc aid of ladder or rope. A Dher came for- 


ward and said that, with the permission of the Raja, he would 
mount to the 'top of the hill, plant the flag and return. He as- 
cended the hill, fixed the flag, quickly came down again, and 
made his obeisance. Sivaji ordered that the purse of money 
and the gold bracelet should be given to him, and that he 
should be set at liberty ; and he gave direction for closing 
the way by which the Dher had ascended/ 42 

Douglas calls it the Gibraltar of the East, and of all hill- 
forts of the Bombay Presidency the most interesting. Grose 
found it ' the most completely impregnable place in the uni- 
verse ! ' Sivaji ' like the Eagle of the hills/ says another, ' with 
his penetrating eyes could from this eyrie descry his prey in 
all directions, but no one could approach the Lion's Den.' 43 

On this hill-citadel Sivaji got himself crowned on Friday 
5 June 1674 (Jyestha suddha 12 of the Saka year 1596, An- 
anda). He thereby appeased the conscience of the formalists, 
soothed the sentiments of the superstitious, and made a strik- 
ing impression on the minds of the masses. It was an act of 
supreme sagacity and far-seeing statesmanship. It drew around 
6ivaji now Chhatrapati all the varied and scattered elements 
of the Maratha State and provided a focus for their loyalties. 
Sivaji had reached the apogee of his greatness and grandeur, 
and all the gold he had garnered was lavishly expended in the 
gorgeous ceremonial. " Fifty thousand Brahmans learned in 
the Vedas ", writes Sabhasad, " had assembled. Besides them 
had gathered many Taponidhis and holy men, Sanydsis, guests, 
Manbhavs, Jathddhdris, Jogis, and Jangams of various deno- 
minations. For four months they were given unhusked corn 
and sweets ; when dismissed, money, ornaments and dothes in 
abundance were presented to every one according to merit. 
To Gaga Bhat, the chief priest, was given immense wealth. 
The total expenditure amounted to one kror and forty-two lakhs 
of hons. To every one of the eight Pradhdns was given a re- 
ward of one lakh of hons and a gift of one elephant, one horse, 
and robes besides that. In this manner was the Raj6 installed 
on the throne. In this age of Mlechha Badshah's rule all over 
the world, only this Maratha Badshah became Chhatrapati. 



This affair that came to pass was one of no little importance/" 
Sabhasad also observes that Gaga Bhat opined that as Sivaji 
had subdued four Biadshahis and possessed 75,000 cavalry, in- 
fantry, forts and strongholds but no throne, the Maratha Raja 
should also be crowned Chhatrapati. 

Among the visitors to Raiga4 at the time of the Rajya- 
bhi$eka or coronation ceremonials were the representatives of 
the English East India Company, Henry Oxenden, Geo : Ro- 
binson and Tho : Michell. They reached 'Rairy ' when the 
Raja was away at Pratapgad to worship at 'the shrine of 
Bowany, a pagod of great esteeme with him,' and were receiv- 
ed by the ' Procurator Neragy Pundit .... whose reception was 
very kind.' They discussed many matters and were assured 
'that the Rajah would after his coronation act more like a 
prince by takeing care of his subjects and endeavouring the 
advancements of commerce and trade in his Dominions which 
he could not attend before being in perpetuall warrs tvith the 
King of Vizapore and the! Great Mogi*//.' 45 

On 22 May 1674, 'We received order to assend up the 
hill into the Castle ; the Rajah having enordered us a house 
there, which we did, leaving Puncharra about 3 of the clock 
in the afternoon, we arrived at the top of that strong mountain 
about sunset, which is fortified by nature more than art being 
of very different access and but one avenue to it, which is 
guarded by two narrow gates and fortified with a strong high 
wall and bastions thereto, all the other part of the mountaine 
is a direct precippice so that its impregnable except the Trea- 
chery of some in it betrayes it. On the Mountaine are many 
strong buildings of the Rajah court and houses for others, Mi- 
nisters of State, to the number of about 300, it is in lengths 
about 2 1| miles and in breadth about 1|2 a mile, but no 
pleasant trees nor any sort of graine-grows there on ; our house 
was about a mile from the Rajah's pallace into which we re- 
tired with no little content' 46 

The next day they were granted audience by Sivaji 
' though busily employed with many other weighty affaires as 
his coronation, marriage, etc.' ' The Rajah assured us that we 


might now trade securely in all his Dominions without the 
least apprehension of evill from him, for that the Peace was 
concluded/ On the 29th the Rajah was ' according to the Hin- 
doo Custome, weighed in Gold and poised about 1600 Pago- 
das, which money together with one hundred thousand more, 
is to be distributed after his coronation into the Bramings who 
in great* numbers are flockt hither from all the adjacent coun- 

After the coronation, the Englishmen saw Sivaji on the 
6th, about 7 or 8 of the clock, and the Rajah was seated on a 
magnificent throne, and all his nobles waiting on him in very 
rich attire. He presently enordered our coming nearer even 
to the Throne where being rested we were desired to retire 
which we did not so soon but that I tooke notice on each side 
of the throne there hung according to the (Mores manner) on 
heads of guilded Lances many emblimes of Government and 
Dominion, as on the right hand were two great fishes heads of 
Gould with every large teeth, on the left hand several horses 
tailes, a paire of Gould Scales on a very rich Lances head 
equally poysed an emblem of Justice, and as we returned at 
the Pallace gate there was standing two small ellephants on 
each side and two faire horses with Gould bridles and furni- 
ture, which made us admire which way they brought them up 
the hill, the passage being so difficult and hazardous/ 47 

Dr. Fryer, another Englishman who was then at Bom- 
bay, narrates an interesting anecdote illustrative of SivSji's 
hospitality towards his European guests. It is typical of his to- 
leration, especially as the occasion was that of a sacred ritual 
when a vast concourse of orthodox Brahmans had gathered to- 
gether at Riaigatf. "I will only add one Passage/ writes 
Fryer, * during the stay of our Ambassador at Rairee : The 
Diet of this sort of Peopte admits not of great Variety of Cost, 
their ddightfullest Food being only Cutchery, a sort of Pulse 
and Rice mixed together, and boiled in Butter, with which 
they grow fat. But such Victuals could not be long pleasing 
to our Merchants who had been used to feed on good Flesh : It 
was therefore signified to the Rajah. That Meat should be 


provided for them ; and to that end a Butcher that served 
those few Moors that were there, that were able to go to the 
charge of Meat, was ordered to supply them with what Goat 
they should expend (nothing else here being toi be gotten for 
them) which he did accordingly with the consumption of half 
a goat a Day, which he found very profitable for him, and 
thereupon was taken with a curiosity to visit his new custo- 
mers ; to whom, when he came, it was told them, The honest 
Butcher had made an Adventure up the Hill, though very 
old, to have the sight of his good Masters who had taken off 
of his hands more flesh in that time they had been there, than 
ne had sold in some years before ; so rare a thing it is to eat 
Flesh among them ; for the Gentiles eat none, and the Moors and 
Portugals eat it well stew'd, bak'd, or made into Pottage ; no 
Nation eating it roasted so commonly as we do ; And in this 
( point I doubt we err in these Hot countries, where our spirits 
being always upon the Flight, are not so intent on the busi- 
ness of concoction ; so that those things that are easiest digested 
and that create the least trouble to the Stomach, we find by 
Experience to agree best here/ 48 

The Dutch account of the coronation 49 refers to Shivajfs 
abandonment of ' his present caste of Bhonsla ' and taking ' the 
caste of Kettery' (Ksatriya). 'Taking into consideration that 
Suasy could not be crowned unless he first became a Rettery, 
and that he had promised not to act or rule tyrannically and 
badly as before, on 8th of June last, they granted Mm the 

caste of Kettery but he also demanded to be taught the 

Brahman rule. This, however, they refused, but one of the 
chief of them complied' 

This is rare testimony from an unexpected quarter, to the 
most heated controversy that must have raged among orthodox 
circles as to matters of rectitude and "propriety. Though the 
Bhostes claimed descent from the Sisodia Rajputs of MewSr, 
fiivfijfs eligibility to the ritual to which the twice-born (dvi* 
jas) alone were entitled, had to be established to the satisfac- 
tion of Benares Pundits. The hall-mark of that status was un- 
doubtedly the performance of the Upanayana ceremony which 


Sivaji had ^bviously not undergone. 50 Even the marriages in the 
Bhoste family had been performed in accordance with the Paw- 
rank and not the Vedic ritual. Sivajl aspired to be not merely 
the secular head of the State, but Raja and Chhatrapati in the 
Hindu tradition : to be supreme leader of the orthodox com- 
munities and sovereign protector of Dharma. For this, any 
status less than that of a K$atriya would be inadequate. Hence 
the Dutch allusion to his admission into the 'Kettery caste/ 
Whether by reference to authentic horoscopes or genealogies, 
it is significant to note that the Dutch also refer to com- 
pliance 51 by one of the chief of the Brahmans (evidently Gaga 
Bhat) . , 

It speaks volumes for SivajI's statesmanship to have con- 
ceived of all the implications of an Abhi$ikta Raja and the 
significance of the unique title of Chhatrapati. No Hindu or 
Indian Prince, or for that matter, any ruler whatsoever hadi 
borne the significant name of Chhatrapati symbolising the 
' protective umbrella ' instead of the truculent bird of prey, the 
Eagle of the Caesars (or Kaisers), or the Lion or 'king of 
beasts ', or the Dragon of the Celestial Emperors, or even the 
suvarna Ganufa-dhwaya of the ancient Yadava rulers of Ma- 
harastra. Once this noble ideal was conceived of, outward con- 
formity to orthodox prescriptions, investiture of the sacred- 
thread, ritualistic re-marriage with his own wedded wife, ac- 
cession to the throne, and even repetition of the Rajyabhi$eka 
according to Tantric rites, after the Vedic ceremonials had been 
once duly performed, were all of secondary value 52 . Sivaji, 
having secured the substance, went through the magic shadow- 
show of ceremonials according to this cult and the other creed 
with a rare sense of humour. 

A very good illustration of the manner in which the Chha- 
Irapati discharged his trust as leader and Protector of Hindu 
Dharma and civilisation is to be found in an interesting docu- 
ment which, if it is authentic, might be considered as the 
Magna Carta of Maratha Svarajya. It is dated 28 January 
1677, and recounts the circumstances of SlvajI's coronation in 
accordance with ascertained sacred laws for the protection of 


all Hindu religious and social traditions. It promises to ren- 
der the most speedy and impartial justice to all who should in- 
voke Sivaji's dispensation following established traditions, 
scriptures and public opinion ; and calls upon people of all 
communities to act with one accord and cooperate with the 
Government in defeating the yavanas coming from the North. 
This done, it concludes, the rulers and subjects will be alike 
blessed by God 53 . It reveals the spirit of tSivajfs administra- 
tion. It shows that he was not a mere empire-builder adding 
territory to territory. It proves that iSivaji was a man with a 
mission who drew his inspirations from history, from the clas- 
sics, from the society and culture ground him, from Ramdas 
and the saints of Maharaja, and more, and constantly, from 
his mother Jijabtai as an embodiment of all these. She had 
nursed his body and spirit, and lived just long enough to wit- 
ness his coronation. Then she said her nunc dimittis. 

44 Suasy's mother," declares a Dutch letter, " having come 
to be present at her son's coronation,** although about 80 years 
old, died 12 days after, leaving to her son about 25 lakhs of 
pagodas, some say 'more" 54 What " more," indeed, the poor, 
calculating, foreign traders could hardly assess : It was the 
spirit revealed in Sivaji's Dharma Rajya \ Jija Bai seemed to 
declare : 

Now lettest thou thy servant depart, O Lord, 

According to thy word, in peace ; 

For mine eyes have seen thy salvation, 

Which thou hast prepared before the face of 

all peoples ; 

A light for revelation to the Gentiles, 
And the glory of thy people ! 



* Dynamic like the new-born moon, adored by the universe, 
this Seal of Siva (son of Shahji) is the beacon of stable pros- 
perity.' The choice of this inscription for his Royal Seal by 
Sivaji is no less significant than his assumption of the title 
Chhatrapati. 4 Vikramaditya ' was quite in the Hindu tradi- 
tion ; but Chhatrapati was more characteristic of SivajFs ideal 
ism. He was not out for martial glory or imperial aggrandise 
ment, but only anxious to protect Hindu Dharma and Society. 
' Love of country is patriotism ; love of more country is impe- 
rialism/ Sivajfs patriotism was not geographical but ethical : 
his imperialism was protective, not acquisitive or destructive. 
He was not a Mardthd nationalist, if by this is implied anything 
parasitical . His cause was the cause of Hindu civilisation and 
not merely the freedom of Mahara$tra. Those who have con- 
centrated on his acts of war and temporary objectives have 
missed the meaning of his Mission. The true heart of Sivaji 
the man is revealed more by his submission to R&mdas and 
Tukaram, and the adoration of his mother, than by his slaying 
of Afzal Khan or the sack of Surat. 3Rft 5RT q$& re*ikft 
*lfaln 4 Mother and the Motherland are mofe adorable than 
Heaven.' Sivaj! Ioved4he culture of his land (Hvndu-ra$tra) 
as much as his mother. His mission was to fight for 'the 
ashes of his ancestors and the temples of his gods.' 

Though destiny had separated Sivaji from his father, 
their hearts were throbbing in unison. This was amply de- 
monstr^ted by their community of action. Sivajl exerted 


himself not merely for the release of his father from imprison- 
ment, but also for the permanent release of his patrimony from 
the harassing domination of Mlecchas. Shahji, as we have 
noticed, had grown under other circumstances, and his lot had 
been cast under masters whom his eldest surviving son heartily 
hated. Particularly had his mind undergone a metamorpho- 
sis since his malicious arrest and imprisonment. His release 
was more due to his own worth than to the capricious mag- 
nanimity of his masters. Shahji had made himself indis- 
pensable to thfe ' AdilshahJ ; he was the prop of the Karnatak 
dominion. His message to Kanhoji Jedhe, Ali J Adil Shah's 
mandate to the same captain, ShahjJ's reply to the Dowager 
Queen of Bijapur when she complained about iSivaji's activi- 
ties, Shahji's second arrest and immediate release thereafter, 
all bear testimony to our reading of the situation. Shahji as a 
Pioneer was working, though perhaps less consciously and deli- 
berately than Sivajl, yet as importantly, for the common cause 
of Hindu-rastra. To secure his patrimony in Karnatak, there- 
fore, was as necessary for Sivaji as his independence in the 
homelands. As soon as he had firmly established himself 
as sovereign over Mahara$tra, consequently, Sivajl turned his 
attention to Karnatak. Foil Karnatak was not a mere piece 
of territory but a heritage. It was more valuable to Sivajl, as 
the new champion of Hindu freedom and civilisation, than was 
the conriexion of the attenuated Holy Roman Empire of Aus- 
tria for Napoleon Bonaparte. Maratha Svarajya was the con- 
tinuation of Vijayanagar Samrajya. 

In dealing with Siviaji's campaign in the Karnatak during 
1677-78, which is the subject of the present chapter, it is neces- 
sary to be clear about its antecedents, as well as, its perspective. 
Its military details are only of secondary interest. In the first 
place, it is to be remembeited that (SivnjJ was following in the 
wake of his father Shahji and his half-brother VyankojI. Both 
Shahji and VyankojI were officers in 'Adilghahi service. The 
former, when hfe died in 1664, had left behind him a large 
number of scattered jdgirs and estates out of which Bangalore 
was initially the most important ; because that was for the 


most part ShahjTs head-quarters. Sivaji's elder brother, 
Sambhajl, ftad died at Kanakgiri about nine years before his 
father. iSivaji himself had left Bangalore while he was still a 
boy of twelve years. Choosing an independent career for 
himself hq had carved out a kingdom of which he was now 
sovereign master. Vyankojl, his younger half-brother, 1 had 
also built up for himself a principality at Tanjore (1675), but 
as a dependency of Bijapur-. Sivaji ndeded no augmenting 
of either his resources or prestige by wanting a share in his 
patrimony ; and Tanjore evidently had been no part of it. 
But he certainly did want in the South a foothold by which 
he could overthrow for ever the power of the Muslims. Had 
Vyankojl been like mindecl, his task might have been easier. 
But unfortunately it was otherwise. Already, as a loyal officer 
under Bijapur, he had fought against Sivaj! during the latter's 
abortive alliance with the Mughals. Obviously, for Sivajl the 
most natural thing to do, under the circumstances, was to ask' 
for a share in ShiahjI's property which Vyankojl had been en- 
joying undivided since 1664. He had no designs against his 
brother, but only wanted a political lever in the Karnatak. 
Since this could not be had for the asking, conflict was inevit- 
able. The logic of the situation demanded action. 

The first thing Sivajl attempted was negotiation. "For 
13 years you have enjoyed the undivided patrimony/* he wrote 
to Vyankojl. "I waited in patience. Then .... in many 
ways I demanded my share. But you would not even en- 
tertain the thought of yielding it. Then it became necessary 
to take harsh measures. It was not befitting my position and 

reputation to seize your person It is not good to promote 

internal discord ; by so doing, of old, the Paixlavas and Kaura- 
vas came to grief. I again told you, through Samjl Naik, 
Konheri Pant and Sivajfp Sankar : Let us make a division and 
take our respective shares and live with good-will towards each 
other. But you, like Duryodhana, intended evil and determin- 
ed not to come to any agreement, but to fight." 

This letter was actually written when the hostilities had 
started and Sivaji's forces had made considerable gains. But 


its recapitulation of the peaceful negotiations is authentic and 
reveals the mind of Sivaji no less than that of his brother. 
" Now, some places I have already taken," it continues ; 
"others which are still in your hands, viz. Ami, Bangalore, 
Kolar, Hoskote, and other minor places, and Tanjore should be 
handed over to our men ; and of the cash, jewellery, elephants 
and horses, half should be given to me as my share. You 
will be wise to make such accommodation with mfe. If you 
do so with a clear mind, I shall give you a jagir of 3 lakhs of 
hons in the district of Panhala, this side of the Tungabhadra, 
to be held under me. Or, if you do not like to hold a jagir 
under me, I shall procure for you a idglr of 3 lakhs from Qutb 
Shah. Both alternatives I have suggested to you. One of 
them you should consider and accept. Do not leave it to be 
decided by obstinacy. There is no reason why we should 
quarrel between ourselves and come to grief. " a 

The attitude of Vyankoji reflected in the above letter is 
also confirmed by foreign contempc r ary accounts. Martin, 
for example, observes : " Sivagy had some claim against Ecugy 
(Ekojl, i.e. Vyankoji), his brother by his father, with respect 
to his succession to the deceased. Ecugy had in his possession 
one third of the land of Gingy which their common parent 
Sagimagro (Shiahji Maharaj) held on his part. There were 
also his personal property and valuable effects. Sivagy de- 
manded his share of these goods. He had written several 
times to Ecugy to come and meet him, and that they would 
settle the matter between them ; the latter recoiled at last after 
having taken, according to his idea, all possible securities from 
his brother, by some oaths customary among them, but which 
were not inviolable to those who cared more for their interest 
than their religion. Ecugy crossed the river Coleroon and 
came to see Sivagy. The first conversations gave evidence of 
amity and tenderness only ; then it came to the negotiation, 
when Ecugy discovered that his brother would not let him go 
unless he had satisfied him about his claims. He also used his 
cunning, and while he offered friendly words he sought some 
means of withdrawing himself from such a bad^ strait. He 


succeeded tl^rein one night. He had a cattamaron kept ready 
for him on the banks of the Couleron under pretext of neces- 
sity, for he was watched. He approached the banks of the 
river, threw himself into the Cattamaron and crossed to the 
other side which was his country and where he had some 
troops. On receipt of the information given to Sivagy, he 
caused Ecugy's men who were in his camp to be arrested ; 
among them, was one Jagarnatpendit, a Bramen who com- 
manded the troops of his brother, a man of courage and abi- 
lity. The brothers did not meet again' since ; however, Sivagy 
took possession of a part of the lands of Gingy which belonged 
to Ecugy, but it would havf cost him more if he had remained 
in the camp." 4 

In the two accounts cited above, which substantially cor- 

t roborate each other, we have a clear picture of the; situation 

vis-a-vis the two brothers. To understand how the meeting 

of Sivaji and Vyankoji on the Coleroon (July 1677) came 

about, wte must follow the.earlier movements of iSivajI . 

Having convinced himself of the necessity of the Karnatak 
campaign, Sivaji set about it in a manner which will illustrate 
his strategy and statesmanship. He no longer moved like an 
adventurer as before. He carefully surveyed the situation 
both in the Deccan and in the Karnatak, matured his plans, 
chose his own time for action, and proceeded with it right 

The Muslim powers of the Deccan were disunited and 
weak. The Mughals had designs against both, which Aurang- 
zeb realised by the end of that decade (1677-87). The ' Adil- 
shahi and the Qutbshahi were extinguished respectively in 1686 
and 1687. They were on their last legs when Sivaji was plan- 
ning his Karnatak campaign. Once they had acted together in 
the business of subjugalShg the South. Then BIjapur was the 
senior partner ; but now she had fallen on evil days. The 
Afghan and Abyssinian parties paralysed the kingdom by 
their quarrels. The leader of the former group, Bahlol Khan, 
seized all authority in the nante of the boy-prince Sikandar 
(11 Nov. 1675) and murdered the old Regent, Khawa Khan 


(18 January 1676). Kfchizr Khan, the right hand man of 
Bahlol, met with a similar fate, soon after ; and the Mughals, 
taking advantage of this civil (Strife, opened a campaign against 
that helpless kingdom (31 May 1676). 

It was on such a broken reed that Vyankoji was foolishly 
relying when iSivaji demanded his share of their patrimony. 
Instead of directly dealing with the situation and settling the 
matter in his own judgment, the pusillanimous Vyankoji refer- 
red it to his suzerain master, the king of Bijapur. " I call my- 
self a Badshahj officer,* he plaintively wrote, " and enjoy this 
property in accordance with the RadghahJ orders. My elder 
brother demands a share of the patrimony, and I have answered 
that the property is in lieu of service. Why should I give him 
any share?" The reply of the Badshah is illuminating. 
" We havfe learnt the purport of your letter. Shahji Raj serv-. 
ed us faithfully, and the sanad was granted to him and his 
descendants, sivajl now demands his share. Although a 
traitor, he is a Government servant* and we are quite able to 
demand explanation of him. Why do you create family squb- 
bles and bring trouble to the Government ? ' If we write that 
you should not give him his share he will create disturbances 
in our territories, and that is not good. His father was our 
servant, and he will enjoy the ancestral property and serve us. 
Although an enemy, if he demands his rights as a servant in 
a friendly manner, you should certainly surrender them. He 
is the senior owner of your patrimony" 5 Despite these accents 
of justice one cannot miss the more than lurking sense of em- 
barrassment. Sivajl too was well aware of this. The astute 
Raghunath Narayajn Hanmante, who had acute differences 
with Vyankoji on matters of State and had but recently left 
Tanjore, had passed through Bijapur and joined tgivaji. The 
result wa^ a master-stroke of diplomacy. Sivaji bribed 
the Mughal viceroy, Bahadur Kfaan into inaction, through ' the 
highly intelligent* Niraji Raoji, and made alliance with Qutb 
Shah. Thfe reason is naively stated -by Sabhasad thus : 

' The Raj6 entertained in his heart the desire of conquer- 
ing the Kamatak from the Tungabhadrfc valley to the Kaveri. 


It would cause delay if only the army was sent for the con- 
quest. So the Raje decided to go in person ---- For accompany- 
ing him to Karnatak, the Raje selected from the Royal cavalry 
(pdgd) regiments 25,000 horsemen, and he took with him the 
Sarkarkun Raghunath Narayanj and Jariardhan Narayafl (Han- 
mante) who had local knowledge of Karniatak ---- The Raje 
thought that the cash accumulated in the treasury should not 
be spent for that campaign. The money should be procured 
from new sources and the conquest should be effected through 
such means. Seeing that there was abundance of wealth in the 
Badshahl of Bhaganagar, he decided to exploit it through 
friendly means' 7 

Through Pralhad Niraji he negotiated with Madaruia and 

a ' the virtual sovereigns and real masters of the whole 
The outcome was the happy concurrence of the 
Qutb Shlah in the projected campaign. But, as during the 
earlier Bajapur-GolkontJa campaign, so too on the present 
occasion, Qutb Shah was only a junior partner. 

Sivajl started from Rajgatf in January 1677 for Hydera- 
bad. His troops numbered about 50,000. 8 They were unusually 
well appointed for the occasion, and were under very strict 
orders to behave themselves exceedingly well in the Qutbshahi 
dominions. Sivaji himself acted with the best diplomatic finesse 
and condescension. . So the Marathas were received by the 
Qutb Shah with the utmost cordiality. The exemplary conduct 
of the guests during their entire sojourn indicated their rigor- 
ous discipline under Sivaji. The rough Mavaje soldiers, who 
were ferocious on the battlefields, gave a surprisingly good 
account of themselves under the civil restraints imposed upon 
them by their sovereign leader on this occasion. There was a 
unique display of grandeur on both sides ; but the personal 
equation between Sivajr&nd Abul Hasan seemed to be some- 
what like that between Nadir Shiah and Muliammad Shah at 
Delhi in 1739. The host in each case heaved a sigh of relief 
as the fearful guest quitted his dominions, after having dictated 
terms (which the host could ill-afford to refuse. It wis all 
through veni, vidi, vici for the Maratha Caesar. 


The terms of the * secret treaty ' have been thus summaris- 
ed by Sarkar : " The Sultan was to pay Shivaji 'a subsidy of 
3,000 hun a day, or four and a half lakhs of Rupees a month, 
and send 5,000 men (consisting of 1,000 horse and 4,000 foot) 
in charge of one of his generals (sar-i-lashkar) , Mirza Muham- 
mad Amin, to co-operate in the conquest of the Karntak. A 
train of artillery with material was also supplied by Qutb 
Shah, and probably a large sum of money as advance payment 
of the promised subsidy. In return for this aid, Shivaji pro- 
mised his ally such parts of his conquests in the Karnatak as 
had not belonged to his father Shahji. The defensive alliance 
against the Mughals was strengthened anew with solemn oaths 
taken by Shivaji in the presence of 'Qutb Shah, while the lattei 
promised to pay his annual tribute of one lakh of hun regu- 
larly and to keep a Maratha ambassador at his court/' 9 

Sivaji tried further to strengthen himself by calling upon 
important 'Adilshah! sardars like Maloji Ghorpad to join him, 
forgetting old family scores, in the name of Maratha, or rather 
Deccani, freedom from the domination of the foreign Pa/thans. 
In a letter of unique historical interest he points out that the 
'Adil Shah has fallen on bad days and the young Padshah 
has become a mere puppet in the hands of Bahlol Khan and 
his Pathan partisans. They will destroy the families of the 
Deccani nobles one after another, he warns ; they will not 
allow any one to live. 'Considering this, we from the begin- 
ning had maintained good relations with the Qutb Shah. The 
Qutb Shah has agreed to the terms proposed by me and 
Madaroa Pant. Whatever I proposed, he agreed to. Such 
duties and responsibilities were entrusted to us that our PSd- 
shahi should be madte to flourish in the highest degree. The 
Pathans should be destroyed and steps should be taken to keep 
the Padshahl of the Deccan in the hahds of the Deccanis. 

'After an agreement was reached on both sides, we also 
thought that all true Maralhas should be taken into the confe- 
deracy and introduced to the Qutb Shah. Considering the good 
of the Marathas, I have driven out of my mind all the enmity 
of our elders. You should be free from suspicion. Bearing in 


mind the good of the Marathas, who are people of importance, 
and speaking in several ways to the Qutb Shah, we have re- 
quested the King to send you a firman? Finally, Sivaji 
appeals^ to the sentiments of the Ghorpewjes, asks Malojl to 
disabuse himself of all false considerations of loyalty to the 
' Adilshahi of ' two generations/ and points to the usurpation 
of power by the Papuans at Bijapur at all costs/ ' You Ma- 
rathas/ he says ' arg our kith and kin ; and we should all join 
together and destroy the Pathans at all costs/ In return, 
jaglrs worth double their * Adilshahi estates are offered in the 
dominions of the Qutb Shah. 10 

Before we proceed further with the narrative of Sivaji's 
movements in the Karnatak, it will be helpful to survey the 
conditions obtaining there at the time of this campaign. The 
hold of the ' Adilshahi government in these regions was only 
nominal. Such of the officers and commandants of forts as still 
held their appointments from Bijapur, with the singular ex 
deption of Vyankoji Bhosle, were noted for neither their effi- 
ciency nor allegiance to superior authority. In fact, there was 
none at Bijapur at that time to command unified loyalty. 
Hence the administration in the South was completely dis- 
organised. Conditions since the death of Shahji (1664) had 
become worse instead of better. The land had been continu- 
ously ravaged by the armies of Bijapur, the Nayaks, and rob- 
bers, so much so that foreign observers (in 1676) remarked : 
" This long series of wars has been followed by a general 
famine which ravages especially in the environs of Madura and 
Marava. Everywhere only devastation and solitude and death 
are seen ; a part of the inhabitants have succumbed to starva- 
tion ; others have left their country to seek relief elsewhere. 
Day by day, Ekoji, on the one hand, and the King of Mysore, 
on the other, will absorb the. last ddbris of this kingdom, Mice 
so flourishing. The conquest of it will be very easy, for the 
people will regard the enemy, whoever he may be, as their true 
saviour." 11 

Another account, dated 16 November 1676, describing 
Negapatam states : " There was much consternation and the 


countries were continually being looted on account of differ- 
ences and intestine wars between the Madurese, Vansiouwer, 
Theuver and Visiapore rulers In the meantime, the pros- 
pects of trade and agriculture were absolutely ruined, by all 
these troubles, and for many years these countries would not 
be flourishing again, especially because now the Visiapore com- 
mander-in-chief Mamoedachan and Cherechan^Lody of Sinsier 
had also started a war against each other.",* 12 

It was into such a distracted and devastated land that 
Sivajl and his Maratha troops burst about May 1677. The. 
Golkoncja army, comprising no more than 5.000 horse and foot, 
could have counted for no more than camp-followers with the 
vastly superior forces of Sivajl. Hence, the alliance was merely 
nominal from the very beginning ; but with it Sivaji could 
appear to be acting not only in his own interest. Yet, as the 
campaign advanced, it was more than apparent that the 
Marathas would appropriate all. 

Leaving Golkontja in March, thfy were near Madras in 
the first week of May. The historic fortress of Ginji was taken 
by the middle of the month. Vellore was reached about the 
23rd. It was held by Abdullah Khan Habshi. Being well forti- 
fied and provisioned Vellore took over fourteen months to cap- 
ture (23 May 1677 to 21 August 1678). . But SiVajI marched 
on, leaving the siege operations to Narahari Rudra Sabnis, 
with 2,000 horse and 5,000 Mavate infantry. A great battle 
was fought at Tiruvadi on 26 June and the Bijapur army 
under Sher IQjan Lodi was put to flight. The Khan was pur- 
sued, discovered lurking in a forest, and finally forced to sur- 
render on 5 July. From 6 July to 2 August 1677 Sivji was 
encamped at Tirumalvadi on the Coleroon negotiating with his 
brother VyankojI. But his peaceful efforts had no better result 
than those of Humayun with Ramrai?/ Consequently Sivaji 
was obliged to fight. 

Martin's account of the meeting between the two brothers 
has already been cited. An entry in the Dutch Dagh-Register, 
dated 2 Oct. 1677, states : ' Siwagie is now with his army in 
the country of Mysoer, not far from the capitals of the princes 


of Madure and Tansjour, from which places he threatens the 
whole of Visiapour. People are of opinion that he will now 
.make himself Master (of the country), for the Golconda autho- 
rities on the whole will not do other than what he wants but 
try to satisfy him only with pretty words. He had already 
a quarrel with his brother Egosia Rajia (the present ruler of 
the Province of Tansjour) over the estates left by their father 
Sahasy, so that he took possession of those lands for himself/ 13 

The conduct of Vyankoji since he broke off the negotia- 
tions of Sivaji is reflected in several letters of the time. While 
Siviaji's forces were engaged in the sieges of Ami and Vellore, 
states an English report, 'Juxogee is leagueing with the Nai- 
gues of Madure and Maysore and other woodmen, and likely 
to find Sevagee work enough.' 31 Likewise, Andre Friere, the 
Jesuit missionary at Madura also writes : ' Ekoji profiting by 
this diversion to re-establish his affairs gathers his soldiers, 
crosses the river, and enters the territory of Gingi. Santoji 
comes to give him battle at head of an army superior in 
number and commanded by clever and intrepid captains.... 
But Ekoji's men with great fury fell on the enemy like lions, 
broke their ranks, and spread carnage everywhere and turned 
the victory to their side. But all on a sudden, art and strata- 
gem snatched away the victory from blind courage .... After 
a bloody combat of several hours, they are broken and they 
leave the battle-field and the honour of victory to Santogi, 
whose losses are, nevertheless, much more considerable than 
those of the conquered.' 15 

We have confirmation of this information in Martin's 
account : * A great battle was fought,' he writes, ' on the 26th 
of this month (November, 1677) between the armies of Sivagy 
and Ecugy. // was the latter who commenced it. The melee 
was severe for the peopl of these parts : many were killed 
and wounded ; among those were some men of importance. 
The two parties retreated and the loss was almost equal.' 16 
Further details of this Pyrrhic victory are contained in a 
Madras report dated 29 Nov. 1677. It states that ' Sevagees 
Lieutenant and brother Santogee left in Chengy and neigh- 



bouring conquest was few days since engaged by ^the forces of 
their brother Eccogee from Tangiour, being 4,000 horse and* 
10,000 ffoot, his being 6,000 horse and 6,0100 ffoot. The battle 
held from morning till night, in which Santogee was worsted 
and fled 3 quarters of ofle of those leagues, being pursued 5 of 
a league. When being returned to their severall camps, Santo- 
gee, consulting with his captains what the importance and 
shame would be, resolved to dress and saddle their horses 
again, and so immediately rode away by other wayes, and 
in the dead of the night surprised them fast at rest after soe 
hard labour ; their horses unsaddled, and made a great slaugh- 
ter of them, taking nigh 1000 hqrse in that manner, the 3 
chiefe commanders, the tents and all their baggage, and 100 
horse more taken by woodmen which fell to share the plunder ; 
and the rest fled over the river Coalladon (Coleroon) for 
Tangiour ; by which meanes Sevagee seemes to have gained 
a quiett possession for the present ; Maduray Naygue refusing 
to meddle on either part.' 17 That the conduct of the Madura 
Nayak was more pusillanimous than neutral is indicated by a 
Jesuit commentary : ' While the two armies were fighting, the 
Nayak of Madura came with his troops against Ekoji.... 
(but) he did not know how to take advantage of it. ... he 
wasted his time there (and finally) the cowardly and im- 
prudent Nayak lost his time and money and went to the citadel 
of Trichinopoly to hide himself in disgrace.' 1 s The Nayak 
was not a friend of Sivaj!, but he was certainly an enemy of 
Ekoji. This is clear from the Jesuit records. ' As I have told 
you in my last letter/ says one, 'the Nayak of Madura was 
preparing for a war with Ekoji, the old captain of Idal Khan, 
now an independent master of Tanjora and a part of Gingi. 
Meanwhile it was reported that Sabaji (iSivaji), the elder 
brother of Ekoji, in revolt against hfe* sovereign for some time, 
had seized several provinces of Bisnagar (Vijayanagar) and 
advanced at the head of a strong army. This news appeared 
incredible ; how to believe that Sabaji could traverse a dis- 
tance of several hundreds of leagues through (the country of) 
the warlike people of the Dekhan and Golconda to carry war 


into our country ? While the probability of this rumour was 
argued about, Sabaji solved the question by falling like a 
thunderbolt on the citadel of Ginge, which he took at the first 
assault. He owed this easy success to the division which pre- 
vailed, and to the numerous communications which he had 
carefully conducted with the Muhammadans.' 19 

In July 1677 an envoy from Madura had waited upon 
Sivaji : ' Here came an Higyb from the Nague of Madure ; 
to whom His Highness Sevagee Raja spoke that his master 
bore a signe of being worth 900 lacks, whereof he should give 
him for the present 100 lacks for his expenses, to which the 
said Higyb answered that part of his masters country the 
Nague of Misur had taken, and part Yekagee, wherefore he 
was not able to give anything at present, and that if he would 
restore him back the said country, he will give seaven lacks. 
These are the news at present here. The Nague of Madure 
has sent all his family away to Madure from Chertanapelle 
(Trichanapallee) where ttiey were before, and while the river 
of Colorun remaines full they feare nothing ; but afterwards 
God knows what will be done.'- 

Though no Maratha army of Sivaji invaded Madura, that 
unfortunate country could hardly escape the horrors of devas- 
tation by other agencies. From a Jesuit letter (1678) we 
learn : * To make matters worse, the whole country has been 
devastated by a kind of deluge : in the provinces of Satya- 
mangalam, Trichinopoly, Tanjore and Gingi, the inundations 
have carried away whole villages with their inhabitants. This 
scourge of divine anger was soon followed by famine, pesti- 
lence, and at last brigandage which infests all the kingdom. 
The capital, once so flourishing, is no longer recognizable ; its 
palaces, once so rich anjj majestic, are deserted and begin to 
fall into ruins ; Madura resembles a town much less than a 
den of robbers/ - 1 

To return to Ekoji, an English record, dated 9 April 1678.. 
notes : ' By intelligence from the parts of Chengee we under- 
stand that by Sevagees order to his Generall, his Brother San- 
togee, and to his Braminies and Chief Officers, they have con- 


eluded a firme peace with Eccogee, his Brother, apd delivered 
back to Eccogee a good part of the country worth 2 lacks of 
Pardoes per Annum ; which Sevagee had taken from him and 
Eccogee in lieu thereof had paid 3 lacks of Pardoes in ready 
money, and upon the confirmation of this agreement, Santogee 
had been feasted and nobly presented by Eccogee in his castle 
at Tanjoor, and after having received the third quarter of 6 
Lack of Pardoes, which the Madura Naigue promised to pay 
Sevagee, of which there now remains but 1J Lack behind to 
be paid. Santogee with his Army returned to Chengee Castle, 
great part of which is very strongly rebuilt since Sevagee took 
it, and there is great store of Graipe and all things necessary 
for a long siege allready laid in, and he has a good stock of 
many allsoe beforehand besides the Rent of the country he has 
taken, dayly coming/ 22 

It is interesting to find corroboration of this from the 
Dutch sources : ' The two last letters dated Nagapatam the 
1 1th and 15th May/ states the Dagh Register, * mention that 
the wandering robber Sewagie has at last made an alliance 
with his brother Egosie Ragia and the Madurese. The said 
Egosie Ragia would keep in his possession the rich country of 
Tansjour and Suwagie would have to abandon it for three lacs 
of pardaux and he would then go to Veloure, for which he had 
already left with the whole of his army/ Finally, 'The Ruler 
Egosie Ragia is now-a-days in peaceful possession of the coun- 
tries of Tansjour, more by the prestige of his brother Sewagie 
Ragia than by his own strength. . . . This was the reason why 
the Neyek of Madura did not draw sword against him/ 23 

Vyankoji was brave and, as his battle with Santoji show- 
ed, possessed great martial qualities. He had stepped into the 
shoes of Shahjl as the leading Bijapuri general in the Karnia- 
tak and made a mark by his* conquest of Tanjore in 1675. 
Not only could he act with vigour, as occasion demanded, but 
also rule the conquered lands wisely and efficiently. As ruler 
of Tanjore "he sought to make himself beloved by the in- 
habitants. The justice and wisdom of his government began 
to close the wounds of the preceding reign/' writes a Jesuit 


observer, " jnd to develop the natural resources of the country. 
By repairing the canals and tanks, he has given fertility to the 
vast fields which had been left unutilised for many years, and 
the last crop has surpassed all that was seen before." 24 This 
is valuable testimony coming as it does from a foreigner and 
contemporary. What he lacked was the vision of Sivajl. He 
could not even appreciate the mission of his great brother. 
But the magnanimity and statesmanship of the Chhatrapati 
showed themselves, as ever before, in the hour of triumph. 
This is revealed by his treatment of Vyankoji in all stages of 
their conflict, as well as by the terms of the treaty between 
them. According to Sa^hasad, Sivaji declared, "Vyankoji 
Raje is my younger brother. He has acted like a child. But 
still he is my brother ; protect him. Do not ruin his king- 
dom."- 5 So he commanded his generals. The terms of his 
treaty with Vyankoji are thus stated in the Siva Digvijaya 

1. The wicked, thfe thieves, drunkards, and haters of 
Hindus, etc., should not be allowed to stay within the king- 
dom. In case they are suffered to remain, they should be 
compelled to give security, and a strict watch must be kept 
over them, that they might do no harm. 

2. The Mahal of fort Arni, conferred on Yado Bhaskar 
by the late Maharaja (Shahji), should not be disturbed. He 
has eight sons who might render proper service. 

3. We have a sanad for jaglrs from Bijapur. Some of 
our estates were brought under their jurisdiction by treaty 
when we came from Daulatabad. Many paligars were also 
brought under our jurisdiction. There might be some excess 
or deficiency of revenues in our joint-holdings. We have to 
serve the Bijapur Government with a contingent of 5,000 horse. 
But in the treaty concluded between us it has been settled that 
we shall not be called upon to serve in person, but only 
render mlitary assistance whenever necessary. This was set- 
tled when our father was still alive. Hence, you shall not have 
to serve the Bijapur government personally. In case of your 


failure, I shall exact from you the money required for military 

4. The Pdtilki, Desmukhl and Nd4gau4a tvatans in the 
Deccan, viz., Hingao Beracji and Deujgaum, are our ancestral 
property. You will have nothing to do with them. I shall 
continue to manage them. 

5. If people from my provinces go to yours, and your 
people come into mine, they should be amicably induced to 
return to their original provinces. 

6. The pargana of Bengru] yields todaywith the neigh- 
bouring stations of Basket and Silekot a revenue of two lakhs 
Barai. If they are brought under r our administration, they 
might yield five lakhs. These I had conferred on Chi. Saub- 
hdgyavatl Dipa Bai, for Cho\i-bdng4i. These should be con- 
tinued in the female line. The mahals should be managed by 

,you, but their revenue should be enjoyed by her on whom it 
might be conferred by Sou. Dipa Bai. 

7. A Mahal yielding seven lakhs of hons out of my con- 
quests near Gingi, I have granted as hereditary indm to Chi. 
Rajesrl Vyankaji Raje for dudh^bhat. I shall send the sanads 
.according to the list of mahals sent by you. 

8. I have written to Chi. Bahirji Raje. He will deliver 
to you what mahals you want. He is a faithful ancestral ser- 
vant. A hereditary indm of villages yielding one lakh Barai in 
the province! of Tanjore is conferred on you. Sanads will be 
sent when you name the villages. 

9. If thieves from your province come into mine, I shall 
deliver them to you on demand ; and if traitors from my pro- 
vinces go to yours, you should do the same. 

10. You should continue the monthly allowance granted 
for the Maharaja's (ShahjI's) samddhi, including the band, 
horses, elephants, and kdrkuns that shtiuld be maintained there. 
Do not allow any slackness in this respect. 

11. The privileges, etc., of the relations of the Royal 
family and the titled nobility should be preserved, and their 
status and order of precedence should be respected. No heavy 
duties should be assigned to them. 


12. The officers and commanders should be consulted on 
important matters. Only loyal and competent officers should 
be appointed to positions of trust. Promotions should be given 
strictly according to merit. Conflicts among State officials 
must be discouraged by all possible means. 

13. The private suite of Raja Vyankoji should consist 
of good, loyal and upright servants who should give sureties 
for their good behaviour. All should be treated equally ; there 
should be no favourites. 

14. Agents and Envoys should be maintained in all the 
neighbouring Courts, whether friendly or hostile. Arrangements 
should be made for secret and prompt intelligence about 

15. Both paga and siledar cavalry divisions should be 
properly organised. Horses and men should be always in 
readiness. Siledar forces should be converted into paga as far 
as possible. Artillery and cavalry should both be ready in case 
of invasion. 9 

16. Disputes among high and Jow concerning boundary 
rights, contracts, treaties, etc. should be discouraged. The poor 
and needy should be succoured in difficulties, and saved from 
the oppression of. the rich and powerful. 

17. Religious grants from the State, benefactions to 
temples and holy places, should be continued. On no account 
should they be violated. 

18. Suits relating to debtors and creditors, partitions and 
successions, inheritances, etc. should be decided by specially 
constituted Panchdyats. The administration of Civil Justice 
should be conducted in the best interests of the people, without 
corruption or bribery. The State should consider itself the 
special guardian of the poor in matters of justice. 

19. Protection once* offered, mere might has never been 
resorted to in the history of our family. This tradition should 
be maintained in the future also. 

Obviously, this is not only a treaty as treaties go but 
also the Political Testament of 'Sivajl intended for the guid- 
ance of Vyankoji in his southern charge. 


The defeat of Vyankojl (16 Nov. 1677) had been at the 
hands of Santoji Bhosle and Hamblr Rao Mohite who were 
provoked into action by Vyankojl himself. Sivajl had been- 
obliged to leave the Karnatak earlier in November 1677 to 
defend his kingdom from the Mughals in the North. The siege 
of Vellore was at that time still dragging on ; it was success- 
fully terminated on 21 August 1673. Sivaji, nevertheless, took 
Bangalore, Kolar, Sera etc., in the Mysore plateau, during his- 
march northward. Bankapur, Koppal, Gadag and Laxmesvar,. 
in western Karnatak, were also likewise occupied more or less 
easily. Remarkable resistance was, however, offered by Malla 
Naikini at Bhilavdi and she could not be subdued until 28 
February 1678. Sivaji left part of his forces behind to com- 
plete his unfinished tasks, and himself reached Panhala on 4 
April. He was back in Raiga<J before June 1678, 18 months 
after he had left for Golkonda. 

An English report, dated 16 January 1678, said : ' With- 
a success as Caesar's in Spain, he came, saWf anc j overcame, 
and reported so vast a treasure in gold, diamonds, emeralds, 
rubies and wrought coral, that have strengthened his arms; 
with very able sinews to prosecute his further victorious de- 
signs/ 27 Sabhasad estimates the territory annexed by Sivajl in 
the Karnatak as yielding an annual revenue of 20 lakhs of horn, 
and including a hundred forts, taken or built by sivaji. 2S 
Another English record states that ' Sivajl by his deputies has 
a full and quiet possession of all these countries about those 
two castles of Jinji and Vellore, which are worth 22 lakhs of par- 
does (or 550 thousand pounds sterling) per annum, in which 
he has a considerable force of men and horse, 72 strong hills 
and 14 forts (in the plain), being 60 leagues long and 40 
broad/ 29 

In the light of the above, <Sir Jh'dunath jSarkar does not 
appear to be correct in his estimation of iSivajf s Karnatak 
campaign. In the 1st edition of his Shivaji and His Times, he 
hdd- the view that " It is incredible that a born strategist like 
Shivaji cobW have really intended to annex permanently a 
territory on the Madras coast, which was separated from his 


own dominions by two powerful and potentially hostile States 
like Bijapur and Golconda, and more than 700 miles distant 
from his capital. His aim was merely to squeeze* the country 
of its accumulated wealth and return home with the booty. 
The partition of his father's heritage was only a plea adopted 
to give a show of legality to this campaign of plunder." 30 
Though he has omitted this statement from the latest edition 
of his work, the latter part of the aim of iSivajI as understood 
by Sarkar, still finds elaborate argument. According to him, 
Sivajl wanted to replenish his treasury which was depleted by 
the extravagance of his coronation and military expenditure. 
All other avenues having been exhausted, he turned to Kar- 
natak, " this real land of gold." It seems to us, however, 
that Sarkar's description of this El Dorado is both unreal and 
anachronistic. Karnatak might have been both historically 
and potentially rich : in the time of " Samudra Gupta and the 
Western Chalukyas, Malik Kafur and Mir Jumla." It might* 
have had at the end of jthe 17th century " still enough wealth 
left in it to tempt the cupidity of Aurangzib." J1 But what 
is strictly relevant to our context is whether Karnatak was a 
land flowing with milk and honey at the moment when Sivajt 
contemplated and actually carried out his invasion. The con- 
temporary European descriptions tell a different story, as we 
have already witnessed. He himself states : " It is very doubt- 
ful whether Shivaji would, of himself, have cared to assert his 
right to his father's Karnatak territory. He certainly did not 
need it. As he rightly said on his death-bed, * I received 
[from my father] the Puna territory worth only 40,000 hun, 
but I have won a kingdom yielding one krore of hun' (Sa- 
bhasad 104 )."'- Further, he also observes : "Over the Kar- 
natak plains thus conquered, he at first placed Shantaji, a na- 
tural son of Shahji, as'viceroy with Jinji for his head-quarters,, 
assisted by Raghunath Narayan Hanumante as diplomatic ad- 
viser and auditor (majmuadar} and Hambir Rao as command- 
er of the artny of occupation. The table-land 
was placed under Rango Narayan as viceroy, 
the higher jurisdiction of Jinji." 88 


when the Maratha army under Hambir Rao was withdrawn, 
Raghunath Pant organised in Karnatak a " locaf force" of 
10,000 horse (both pdga and siledar) " for the defence of the 
new province." 34 In the face of these admissions we cannot 
accept Sarkar's categorical assertion : " But gold, and not 
land, was his (Sivaji's) chief object" 3R 

Sivaji improved the fortifications of the country he con- 
quered, appointed officers for its administration, left definite 
instructions as to the policies to be followed, and made every 
effort to conciliate the people and foster their trade and in- 
dustry. His dealings with the Dutch, the French and the Eng- 
lish during this campaign are illustrative of his attitude. On 
31st July 1677 the Chief of the Dutch factory at Tegenapa- 
tam (Cuddalore) waited upon sivaji, at Tundumgurti, with 
rich presents silks, spices, Maldiv cocoanuts, sword blades, etc. 
Sivaji was pleased with the gifts and sent the Dutchman away 
'with a robe of honour. On 2 October the same year the Dutch 
noted : ' in all these matters tht said Sitvasi conducted himself 
in a very polite and friendly manner toward the Company as 
also our residents in Golconda. Later he promised to our rep- 
resentative in Tegenapatam to promote the trade of our Com- 
pany in all possible ways which is also shown by the grant of 
same couls.' 3fl 

In June 1677, according to the French Governor of Pon- 
dicherry (Francois Martin), their Brahman envoy had no less 
than three interviews with Sivaji : * Sevagy assured our envoy 
that we might stay in complete security at Pandichery without 
taking the side of either party ; that if we offered the least 
insult to his petople there would be no quarter for us or for 
those of our people who were in the factory at Rajapour, that 
he would send an avaldar in a few days to govern Pondichery 
and that we might have to live with hxm in the same manner 
as we had done with the officers of Chircam ' 37 

From the English records we obtain several interesting 
* ..On 9 May 1677, for instance, they noted : ' Sevagee 
it bis "oun) being entertained in the King of Golcondas 
service, and noty upon his march to fall upon Chengy with an 


.army of 20 Mille horse and 40 Mille foot, the van whereof (be- 
ing about 5 Mille Horse) already past Tripatty and Calastry 
9 and 8- leagues Gentu from hence, and this night expected at 
Cangiawaram (anchivaram) about 4 leagues Gentu hence, a 
distance which it is very usuall for his Horse to march in a 
nights time.' :{S 6hivaji repeatedly asks for supplies of 'Mal- 
divo cokanutts, cordiale stones and some other precious roots," 
.... assuring us of his friendship and offering the price for 
them. 1 The English complied with his request and * for the 
service of the Honourable Company' sent 'unto him by our 
Camp Bramany Ramana with a civill letter as in the Golconda 
Register, not requiring the money but making a present of 
them, his power encreasing and he exercising so much autho- 
rity in the King of Golcondas country, that he sends all about 
to receive the Kings rents by his own people, and punishing 
the Avaldars and great men of the country at his pleasure.' 39 
Sir William Langhorne, writing in a very * civil ' tone to Sivaji, * 
declared : ' Wee entreat ^ou accept of the affectionate respects 
wherewith wee make present of them to your Highness ; and as 
the settlements which our Hon'ble Employers have already 
in your dominions obliges us to wish you all desirable prospe- 
rity, so the great honour your noble achievements acquires you 
from all men who shall attaine to a right, understanding of them, 
not only wins our reasons but our inclinations also, and wee 
do so highly prize the opportunitys of doing you such services 
as fall within the narrow compass of a strangers power that wee 
account it as an instance of your kindness that you are pleased 
to import your mind, which wee receive with all the resentments 
of a passion that must ever be pressing ourselves. 30 My Lord, 
your Highnesses most humble, most obedient servant, W. L.' 
How, despite these gushing civilities, the English really com- 
ported with Sivaji, will* be noticed in the next chapter. Mean- 
while, President Langhorne of Fort St. George, again wrote on 
17 February 1678 : * We are now to acquaint you that Sevagee, 
grown great and famous by his many conquests and pillageings 
of the Moghulls and Visapour countrys, is at length come hither 
-with an army of 16 in 20 M. (16 to 20 thousand) horse and 


severall thousand of foot, raised and raising among the woods,. 
being unfortunately called in by the King of Golconda or Ma- 
danna to help them to take Chengy, Vealour and Pamangoda 
(Pelgonda), the remainder of the sea part of the Cornatt coun- 
try as fair as Porto Novo, out of the Visiapours hands, with, 
title of Generalissimo, by which means he has gotten in a man- 
ner the possession of this country, the said King having no 
force to oppose him. We have twice presented him with some 
rarities of counter poysons, etc., by him desired, to the value 
of pagodas 112 Ind. in order the begetting a fair correspon- 
dence with him now at first, if possible, grounding it upon the 
introduction of those settlements you have already in his coun- 
try's at Rajapore and Carwar, the' former whereof was very 
well taken. Of the latter we have yet no news from our Bra- 
many who attends his motion, but more particularly upon the 
King of Golcondas Meirza Mahmud Omin and our loving 
friend, who has some 1000 horse and 4000 foot along with 
him.' 41 

The entire situation in the Karnatak changed with the 
entry of Shivajl therein. ShahjI's scattered jagirs and the 
principality of Tanjore were now linked up with Sivaji's do- 
minions. They attained a new significance in the history of 
the peninsula and became part of the new! order that was 
emerging out of the chaos of the dark age which had intervened 
between the fall of Vijayanagar and the rise of the Maratha 
power. Vyankojl had conserved his patrimony from Shahji, 
but Sivajl consolidated it and gave it a new orientation. The 
Ckhatrapati was no mere Jason in search of the golden fleece, 
but the conservator of the greater and larger Patrimony of 
Hindu civilisation. "The transactions of Sivaji in the Carna- 
tic," writes Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, "and his dealings with his 
half-brother Venkaji (or Ekoji).seem\:apable of an interpre- 
tation, once it is realized that Sivaji may have cherished the 
ambition to stand before his great enemy, the Moghul, as the 
acknowledged representative of the empire of Vijayanagar re- 
cently become extinct. The existence of the grant of Sivaji to the- 
two sons of Sriranga, though the document is not quite above 


-suspicion, aqd the issue of the coinage of which one specimen at 
.any rate, on the model of Vijayanagar, has been recently dis- 
covered, are indications in support of what some of the Mah- 
ratta documents do record in respect of this particular idea 
of Sivaji. Shahji had acquired as his jaghir in the Carnatic 
territbry, which could favourably compare with that of any 
other South Indian viceroy under Hindu rule. After the acqui- 
sition of Tanjore, Venkaji was actually in occupation of the 
territory of the Nayaks of Tanjore and of Gingi with a consi- 
derable portion of Mysore in addition. Madura was already 
decrepit and must have seemed to Sivaji capable of being 
brought under his imperial protection. Ikkeri was probably 
inclined to support him against Mysore. Mysore was perhaps 
the one State that was likely to prove troublesome. If Sivaji 
cherished such an idea, it cannot have been regarded impractic- 
able in 1677, and all his efforts to bring his brother to reason 
need not necessarily have been the result of greed. All the 
details of the transaction taken together seem to indicate a 
clearly higher motive, and that may well have been the ambi- 
tion to stand before Aurangzib as the acknowledged successor 
of the emperors of Vijayanagar' 12 

This opinion, though speculative in character, deserves 
special attention as coming from the Doyen of South Indian 
scholars who has devoted his life-time to the study of Vijaya- 
nagar history. Even though Sivaji's grant to the two sons of 
Sriranga, according to him, may not be * quite above suspicion/ 
his main thesis is not thereby affected. If the grant should 
prove spurious, in its available form, its fabrication itself will 
serve to indicate that the scions of the last imperial family of 
^Vijayanagar considered Sivaji great enough to receive such a 
compliment. The Marathia Chhatrapati must have appeared to 
them as the only prot&tor *>f their honour and patrimony. 
This in itself constitutes the best commentary on what Sivaji 
attempted to do for Hindu India through his Karnatak con- 


' All the way, as he goes along, he gives his qaul 
(assurance) promising them that neither he nor his 
soldiers shall in the least do any wrong to anybody 
that takes his qaul, which promise he hitherto hath 
kept/ Gyfford to Surat (24 May 1663 ).* 

Few Indian rulers have bestoweji as much attention on the 
sea as Sivaji did. Situated as his new and growing State 
was, its western fringe was of the utmost importance, and could 
not be neglected for long. Though there was no major enemy 
r as yet on the coast, its potentialities for good and evil were 
great as well as vital . With the keen vision and foresight that 
he possessed, the activities of the Siddis as well as the Euro- 
peans (Portuguese, Dutch, French and English) were shrewdly 
noted by him. Despite its importance and value, neither Bija- 
pur nor the Mughals had bestowed on the Konkan the attention 
it deserved. They marked the earth with ruin, but their con- 
trol stopped with the shore. As Muslim rulers, they were 
indeed anxious to protect the pilgrim traffic to Mecca ; but 
otherwise, their interest was confined to importing Arab horses 
and maintaining a few private ships for personal profit. Their 
governments as such maintained no fleets worth speaking, either 
for commerce or for defence, though Surat, Cambay, Broach, 
Bombay, Vingurla, Goa, Karwar, etc. attracted the maritime 
foreigners. 2 Sivajl appreciated the advantages better and 
decided to ' harness the sea/ 

His first task was to eradicate She Sfddis, who were not only 
like 'mice in the house,' a nuisance, but also a plague. They 
were nominally under Bijiapur, but actually their own masters. 
They pretended to pay homage to the ' Adil Shah or the Mu- 
ghal Emperor as it suited their convenience ; but the sovereign 
was more dependent than the vassal so far as de facto power 


on the coa^t was concerned. Janjira was their stronghold and 
the Gibraltar of the Muslims* . For Sivaj! it was a thorn in the 
side of his kingdom, a menace to his western defences, and a 
source of perpetual irritation. His determination to subjugate 
or oust the Siddis from their position of vantage is reflected 
in Oxenden's report of his negotiations at Raigagl. 

4 1 took (according to your Honours order),' he wrote to his 
superiors, ' occasion to discourse with him (i.e. Niraji Pandit ) 
concerning the concluding of a peace betwixt the Rajah 
(Sivajl) and the Siddy of Danda Rajapore urging those argu- 
ments enordered in my instructions and likewise those com- 
municated me in private by his Honour, but all were not 
prevalent enough to persuade him, it was not his Masters inte- 
rest to prosecute that siege (of Janjira) so near a conclution, 
lor the Rajah without doubt will have Danda either this rairies 
or next monsoon, intending to make an assault on it speedily 
after his coronation, to which effect he hath enordered his best, 
souldiers to get themselves in readyness, and hath already 
sent 15 pieces ordinance more to strengthen and renew the bat- 
tary. He hath offered the Siddy, upon delivery of the castle, 
what Monsup (Mansab or rank) he shall desire, upon refusall 
whereof he must expect the miserys that attend warr and sc- 
severe an enemy as Sevagee Rajah who, Naragee Punditt re- 
ports, vallues not the assistance the Mogulls fleete gives him 
nor the damage it will do his country in the future/ l 

The struggle for supremacy in the Konkan, however, must 
not be considered as a mere duel between Sivajl and the Siddis. 
It was part of SivajJ's programme to wrest his land from the 
domination of the foreigners. 5 It was equally necessary for 
him to subjugate the Hindu chiefs and rajas who had either 
remained vassals to Bijapur or asserted their feudal indepen- 
dence. In the larger i/iterest of his cause he could not leave 
their precarious position to be exploited by either BIjapur, the 
Siddis, or the Europeans. The Mughal Emperor was equally 
anxious to frustrate his ambitions as much in the Konkafl as 
on the main land. The Maratha struggle on the Sea Front 
therefore had many facets. 


We have witnessed Sivaji's relations with Lakham Savant 
of Kutfal, in an earlier chapter, as also his expeditions on the 
west coast. 6 Since his occupation of Kalyiaii Bhiwancji in 
October 1657, he had also taken Dancja in November 1659 
and Rajapur in March 1661. These activities were a source 
of embarrassment alike to the Bijapur authorities and the 
European traders. A Portuguese letter dated 16 August 1659 
observes : 'The son of Captain Xagi (Shahji) who has left Kin^ 
Idalxa ('Adil Shah), has taken over the lands near Bassein 
and Chaul, is getting very powerful and forces us to be careful 
as he has built a navy in Bhiwandi, Kalyan and Panvel, ports 
in the district of Bassein. We hav^ ordered our Captain not 
to allow him to put the vessels to sea, in order to embarass his 
going out/ 7 Another English record, five years later, states : 
' Deccan and all the south coasts are all embroiled in civil wars, 
,King against King and country against country, and Sivaji 
reigns victoriously and uncontrolled, that he is a terror to all 
the Kings and princes round abowt, daily increasing in 
strength.' s Ten more years elapsed and John Fryer observed 
that * Seva Gi is reckoned also as a diseased Limb of Duccan, 
impostumated and swoln too big for the Body ; in some respects 
benefiting, in others discommoding it ; beneficial by opposing 
the Mogul's entry into the Kingdom ; but prejudicial in being 
his own Paymaster, rewarding himself most unconscionably; all 
Conchon the Sea-Coasts, 250 Leagues, that is, from Balsore 
Hills to the River Gangole (Gangavaly); where neither is he 
limited in his extravagant Desires, expecting only opportunity 
to gain further. Inland he hath not much, the Goat (the 
western Ghat range) seeming to be a Natural Line of Circum- 
vallation to the Up Country, where it is Campaign, though be- 
low Hilly ; so that ascend to it by Mountains piled on one 
another, over which Seva Gi hath total Dominion, the Decca- 
nees not striving to retake anything, for all he heth blocked up 
their Ports, which may prejudice them for the future ; an ir- 
reparable Damage (Arab Steeds being the Life of their Caval- 
ry) ; they having only Porto Novo beyond Tutticaree left them 
free/ ** 


These Ijuropean notices of Sivaji's activities and growing 
importance on the Konkan and Kanara coasts cover the period 
of about twenty years from his conquest of Kalyafl (1557) to 
his great Karnatak campaign in 1677-78. During these two 
decades, it is to be recollected, Sivaji had achieved many mo- 
mentous things outside the Konkao : He had overthrown 
Afzal Khan and Sfca'ista Khan, he had raided Surat, fought 
with the Mughals under Jai Singh and Dilir Khan, accepted 
their terms at Purandar, gone to Agra and miraculously effected 
his escape therefrom, raided Surat again, defeated Mughal 
officers at Dindori, got himself crowned at RaigaxJ, and trium- 
phantly marched through folkonda and Bijapuri Karnatak. 
This was a record more impressive than that of Raghu as des- 
cribed by Kalidasa in his Raghuvamsa, more glorious than that 
of Samudragupta . He had baffled the Mughal Emperor and 
humbled Bijapur. Now it appeared that he had only to round 
off the conquests by the consolidation of the KonkaQ coast. 
This is the significance of.Sivaji's doings on the west coast. 

His two raids on Surat revealed to him the weakness of the 
Emperor in that region. His conquest of Kalyari and the Kar- 
natak equally well demonstrated the helplessness of the ' Adil- 
shiahi government. Bijapur authority had long been dwindling 
everywhere in its dominions. That the western region was no 
exception to this growing paralysis was soon evident to Sivaji. 
The Siddis on the one side and the Marathas on the other, 
while being inimical towards each other, proved equally fatal 
to Bijapur authority. The Desais of Kudal and the minor 
rajas of Sunda and Bidnur were lesser fry who by their own 
quarrels and ambitions made matters worse for their overlord 
the ' Adil Shah. ivaji was as ready to fish in these troubled 
waters as anybody else on the coast. Tempted by these oppor- 
tunities he raided the Kanara. coast as far south as Basriir 9 
and as much into the interior as Bidnur, 10 Sunda 11 and 
Hubli. 32 This inevitably brought him into clash with various 
rivals and enemies whose varying results we are to assess in 
this chapter. 

Many details relating to this phase of Maratha history 



are subjects of controversy, but we shall illustrate the situation 
with, a few salient examples. 

raided Basrur early in 1665. It was theft a port 
belonging to the raja of Bidnur who was a vassal of BIjapur . 
While returning north along the coast after this expedition, 
Jliawa Khan, the Bijapuri general, encountered him and at- 
tempted to block his path. Earlier Sivajl had occupied Dan- 
<Ja-Rajapur and Kharepatan ; he had destroyed Vingurla and 
built the stronghold of Sindhudurg. 13 At the approach of the 
Maratha " all the Muhammadan governors as far as Sanque- 
lim and Bicholin were fled," says an English record. 14 Alarm- 
ed by these happenings the BIjapur authorities tried to mobi- 
lise their forces. The governor of Phonda, the Desai of Kudal, 
and Khaw Khan were among those ordered to rally. Sivaji 
kept his gains none the less. Khawa? Kh&n was defeated and 
put to flight over the Ghats. Baji Ghorpa$e who was on his 
way to join the Khan, together with a division of 1,900 horse, 
was cut down in this connexion and^Mudhol was destroyed in 
a punitive raid 15 . 

'At Kudal in the Konkaij lived a rebel named Lakham 
Savant Desai with 12,000 hasam,' writes Sabhasad. 'Kudal 
was under the 'Adilhahl. He sent word to BIjapur that, as- 
sembling an army of horse, foot and militia, he was going to 
march against tSivSj! to recover Konkan. To this effect he 
sent a verbal message. Thereupon, from Bjjapur, Khawas 
Khan, c-in-c., a great warrior, came to Kudar with 10,000 
horsemen. Lakham Savant joined him with 12,000 hasam and 
went on reconquering Konkaai. In the meantime, the Raje got 
the information, and selecting the army and militia, marched 
straight on them. Baji Ghorpa^e, who was coming from BIja- 
pur with 1,500 horsemen to help Khawas Khan, descended from 
the Ghats and halted. Thereupon '"the Raje sent an army 
against him and by a surprise attack utterly destroyed Baji 
Ghorpatfe with his personal troops and 1,200 horses were cap- 
tured. A great battle was fought. Learning this news, Kba- 
wa Khan was struck with terror and fled over the Ghats and 
went straight to BIjapur/ 16 The Jedhe Sakavali gives Kar- 


ttka, krodhin, 1586 Saka (10 October--7 Nov. 1664) as the 
date of this event. Sarje Rao Jedhe is said to have fought va- * 
liantly in the action. 

The defeat of the Desai at the hands of Sivaji is attributed 
by the Dutch to the want of powder and the absence of Kha- 
wa Khan : 17 . 'After Chaveschan had courageously beaten 
Sivasi on a plain with a small army consisting of 200D horse- 
men and as many foot soldiers, Sivasi again rallied his army, 
divided it into three or four squadrons, and marched against 
that Lord in a very good order. A sharp fire of rockets 
was first opened on both sides [iSivaji met with stiff re- 
sistance at first] . Still, after a good deal of skirmishing and 
firing of muskets, he caused them (Lakham Savant's men) to 
waver. The main causes of this defeat were the want of pow- 
der and the absence of Lord Chaveschan.' 18 

The treaty of Purander (12 June 1665) allowed the Ma- 
rathas a free hand in Bijapuri Konkaio, while Sivaji was an 
active ally of the Mugljals in their campaign against the 'Adil 
Shah. The death of the Bijapuri general Bahlol Kkan, 19 in 
July 1665, was a great blow to that unfortunate kingdom. The 
English factory letter from Karwar to Surat dated 29 Aug. 
1665 verily notes, " The affairs of the royal drunkard at Bija- 
pur passed from bad to worse." 20 The absence of Sivaji from 
the Deccan during his visit to Agra and his policy of peace for 
some time thereafter provided a short respite. But troubles 
again gathered, especially after the death of Ali 'Adil Shah on 
24th Nov. 1672. We have vivid glimpses of these in the con- 
temporary English records. 

On 17 February 1673 Kiarwar wrote to Surat : ' We have 
been in double feare here, what with the Dutch on the one side 
and the Rajah of Cannarah and Sundas forces on the other ; 
but wee hope in God' mow , shall suddenly heare of a peace 
which may secure us from the one, and the arrivall of some 
forces from Vizapore here wee hope will secure us from the 
other. The Rajah of Connarahs forces hath taken Mirjee 
Castle and are retired back to theire owne country againe, and 
the Rajah of Sundas forces now lye in seize of Anchola Castle 


Muzaffer Ckaun, the Lord of this Country, c is likewise 

sent out of Vizapore against the Rajah of Caunarah 

to chastise both the Rajahs for invading his towns (At 

the same time internal trouble had arisen within Bednur owing 
to a quarrel between the Pepper Queen and her quandom fa- 
vourite Tlmmaijiii.) Tymmana and the Rauna of Cannara 
hath ben at warrs for this three monthes, he being the chiefe 
man in that country and of a very mean parentage did insult 
too much over all people, but more especially the Bramins, 
which they could not brooke, so that this warr was begunn by 
their instigation . ' 21 

6ivaji was too ready to exploit suclj a situation and we read 
in a letter of 31 October 1673 : ' Wee suppose Sevagees Army 
will not trouble your parts for some tyme, for wee have cer- 
taine intelligence that himselfe in person with his army of 15,000 
pen is gone to Sunda, a Castle near Goa, to take it from the 
Vizapore King, and alsoe to attempt the conquest of the Car- 
natick Country, where they are fallen into Civill warr amongst 
themselves, and the late Rajah's wife hath called in Sevagee 
to her assistance and promised him a great treasure/ 22 

We do not know what exactly transpired at Bidnur, 
but according to Chitnis, the Rani agreed to pay an annual 
tribute and to admit a Maratha Resident at her Court. 23 
Though Sarkar holds that Bidnur "did not really become a 
Maratha protectorate, " 24 we have clear testimony to the con- 
trary in an English letter dated 24 Aug. 1676 which unequivo- 
cally declares : ' Sevagee by his Power and Sovereignity in 
those parts may bring the Sunda Rajah to a good accomda- 
tion with us, obliging to lett our goods passe without moles- 
tation in the future >25 The Dutch were obliged to place their 
factories in Kanara (Chandavar, Vingurla, etc.) under the 
command of their General of Malabar *bn account of the dis- 
turbances caused by Sivaji's inroads." 2e Not only the coastal 
places but also the uplands had their trade upset. Hubli was 
raided in 16645 as well as in May 1673. After the latter loot 
by Pratap Rio, the English remonstrated : ' As for his last 
act Hubely you may tell him we have a better opinion of 


him than ty> think it was done by his order/ 27 He answered, 
" I never gave any orders to disturb the English in any way 
of their factories, but have ever had a good liking or opinion 
of them/' He also warned them as a friend : * that we trade 
so little as we can into Deccan, because he is determined to 
make a sharp war there as soon as the rains are over/ 28 We 
shall discuss Sivaji's relations with the English more fully la- 
ter. Meanwhile we should recount his activities in the Kon- 
kanjt leading to his conflict with the Siddis and the Pbrtuguese. 
BJjapur was too much paralysed by internal squabbles. The 
overthrow of I]aawa Khan and his supporters in November 
1675 was but a symptom^ 29 

On 8 April 1675 Sivaji commenced his siege of Phoiwja in 
Kudal territory. Though its governor, Muhammad Khan had 
provisions to last him for four months, and the garrison was 
secretly helped by the Portuguese from Goa, the fort capitulated 
in less than four weeks (6 May) . Mufcammad Khan saved 
himself and some of his men by promising to assist Sivaji in 
the acquisition of the neighbouring districts. 30 In a short time 
Ankola, Sivesvar, Karwar and Kadra, came into Sivajfs hands. 
By 25 May, the whole of Bijapuri Kanara, down to the Gan- 
gavati river, was conquered. A Karwar letter declares, ' Sevagee 
hath made a thorough conquest of the country hereabouts. . . . 
He is master of all as far as Anchola,' 31 Another from Raja- 
pur, dated 31 May, states : 'Sevagee Rajah hath now taken 
all belonging to the King of Veesapore in Cunkron' 32 (Kon- 
kan) . But the major operations of Sivaji were directed against 
the Siddi stronghold of Janjira. Epic in its interest, never- 
theless, this Trojan adventure of the Marathas miscarried. 
Despite his prolonged and pertinacious efforts Sivaji was des- 
tined to die without accomplishing this his greatest ambition 
on the sea front. J * 

"We cannot but admire," writes Dr. Bal Krishna, "the 
spirited and determined defiance exhibited by the Siddis in 
the long struggle which lasted for about a quarter of a century. 

It is indeed strange that the one who had swallowed a 

large part of the Bijapur Kingdom, who had made the Gol- 


konda King his tributary, and who had shaken the foundations 
of the Mogul Empire, should have been bafflied in capturing 
the castle of Janjira after so many heroic efforts. All his bril- 
liant victories seem to be eclipsed by this signal failure of his 
life. The causes of this life-long disappointment are to be 
traced to his inferior navy and artillery. His light vessels 
could never break through the cordon of big battleships placed 
all round the castle, nor stand the heavy fire of more than 300 
cannon with which the towers and bastions of Janjira bristl- 
ed." 33 It is well also to note that C. V. Vaidya, an enthu- 
siastic panegyrist of Sivaji, equally generously observes that 
the Siddi of Janjira " must be givenr the credit of obstinately 
maintaining his position and his small State against the con- 
tinuous effort of Shivaji to subdue or destroy him." 34 

We have already noted that Janjira was of great impor- 
tance to Sivaji as well as the Muslims. Opposite that island- 
fortress were Darwja and Rajapur both of which Sivaji had 
occupied between 1659-61. Janjira ftes only half-a-mile out 
across the sea. The Marathas, with their position of vantage 
on the coast, could cut off the Siddis' communications with 
Bijapur, but the latter would retaliate by ravaging the Konkan. 
Raghunath BallaJ Konje, says Sabhasad, 35 had wrested the 
coast from the Siddis, but after his death, the conduct of the 
Habshis underwent a change. Then the Raje sent the cele- 
brated Vyankojj Datto, who devastated and annexed the land of 
the Siddis. He came after inspiring such terror that the Sid- 
dis opened negotiations for peace. But the Raje did not accept 
the terms but remained in the Siddi's country and strengthened 
himself by the erection of new forts at various places. The 
Siddis had to obtain provisions from other lands in order to 
subsist. ' On that account the Raje fitted out ships in the sea.' 
He also fortified some submarine 1 rocks and built strongholds 
in the sea : ' Uniting ships with forts, the Raje saddled the 
sea.' 36 

Building ghuwbs, tarandes, tctfus, galvats, sibads and 
pagars, he appointed two Subaddrs (a Muslim Darya Sarang 
and a Bhantfafi Mai Nayak), constituting a sub a of 200 ships : 


In this marker was the navy equipped/ The Raje's ships then 
began to plunder the cities and forts belonging to the Mughals 
and the Firangis. They fought at various places and obtained 
grains and other provisions : * In this manner 700 ships were 
out in the sea . ' 37 Not all of these ships were intended to fight 
the Habshis, the Firangis, or the pirates. Some of them sailed 
as far as Mocha in western Arabia, loading them at Jaitapur 
(2 miles up the Rajapur river) "with goods of considerable 
value." On 12 March 1665, the English factors noted that from 
each of the 8 or 9 * most considerable ports in the Deccan ' 
seized by Sivaji, there ' set out 2 or 3 or more trading vessels 
yearly to Persia, Basra, Mocha, etc/ Later, in April 1669, 
they observed several of his rice-boats being destroyed by a 
storm, off Karwar, " one of the ships being very richly la- 
den." 38 

In the same year, Sivaji renewed his attack on Janjira 
with great vigour but failed. In 1671 the Siddis even recover- 
ed Danda fort by the bold coup of their captain Qasim. Sivaji 
tried to secure English assistance, but the Surat authorities ad- 
vised their factors " not to positively promise him the grena- 
does, mortar pieces, and ammunition he desires, nor to abso- 
lutely deny him, in regard we do not think it convenient to help 
him against Dunda, which place, if it were in his possession, 
wotdd prove a great annoyance to Bombay" 

Aurangzeb, on the contrary, sent a fleet of 36 vessels, great 
and small, (towards the close of 1672) from Surat to help 
the Siddi. These ships perpetrated great havoc in the Mara- 
tha ports of Dabol, Kelshi, etc., and destroyed above 500 of 
their vessels. The French supplied some ammunition to Siva- 
ji in August following, 40 while the Dutch proffered 22 ships if 
6ivaji would help them conquer Bombay from the English. 
Sivaji, however, declined the assistance on the terms demanded 
by the Dutch. 41 

The Mughal fleet returned in May 1673 and continued its 
work of destruction until October. But in March 1674 there 
was a swing in favour of Sivaji, though in the naval battle of 
Satavli the admirals of both sides (Siddi Sambal and Daulat 


Khan) were wounded. The Siddis lost 100 men Against 44 of 
the Manathas. The Siddis then retreated to Harisvar, 21 miles 
south of Janjira. iSivajl followed up this victory by reducing 
the whole of South KonkaiQ from Rajpur to Bardes. During 
the next two years (1675-77) he was engaged in delivering his 
final assault on Janjira itself. 

In August 1676, 10,000 reinforcements were sent under 
Moro Pant Pesva ; but the heroic effort was frustrated in De- 
cember. Desultory attacks on either side continued to the 
very end of Sivajfs life, but the conquest of Jangira remained 
an unfulfilled aspiration. All that the Marathas could do was 
to occupy Khanderi (Kennery) island, 30 miles N. of Janjira 
and 11 ms. S. of Bombay, as a consolation prize and hold it 
against the combined attacks of the Siddis and the English. 

The part played by the Europeans particularly the Por- 
tuguese and the English in this struggle for supre- 
macy in the Konkap needs closer examination. The 
French were as yet timid and the JDutch ineffective despite 
their hatred of both the English and the Portuguese. It is 
not to be forgotten that their very position and interests made 
the Europeans play a double game. Duplicity was the very 
breath of their nostrils, and diplomatic negotiations were in- 
tended to cut both ways if possible. Protestations of friend- 
ship for political or commercial reasons, therefore, under such 
circumstances, lacked even the passing emotional honesty of 
lovers' pledges. 

Antonio de Mello de Castro, the new Portuguese Viceroy, 
took office on 16 December 1662. iSivaji was then already at 
war with SJja'ista Khan. On 26 April 1663 de Castro wrote to 
iiVaji : " I send to the North a nobleman of such authority 
and experience that he can arrange with your Highness all that 
is practicable and convenient to Jx>th erf us. However, it will 
be with great stfcrecy, 'because in this consist the good results 
which I desire for Your Highness, not only on account of your 
brave acts but also for the good friendship which the Portu- 
guese will find in Your Highness And I hope that from 

the present struggle Your Highness will come out victorious and 


that from |he fame of your victories the terror in your anta- 
gonists will increase/ 42 Following this, on 5 May 1663, he 
ordered his Captain General of the North Dom Alvaro de Atai- 
de) " not to allow any foodstuffs or provender to go to the peo- 
ple of the Mughal Emperor." It would be expedient, he said, 
" to prevent with all dissimulation that any kind of provision 
should go to the camp of the Mughal in order that for want 
of it he would leave this neighbourhood, and thus Shivaji 
would have a chance of being able to accomplish his intentions 
of injuring the enemy who, as he is so powerful, would be bet- 
ter far away and not such a close neighbour.' 43 

This, however, did ngt prevent de Castro from writing to 
Raja Jai Singh, on 31 March 1665, " It pleases me very much 
to have so near such a good neighbour. Between our King, my 
Lord, and the King Sultan Aurangzib exists peace and friend- 
ship which has lasted for several years .... From these lands^ 
was never given help or favour to Shivaji . . . . / hereby send 
orders to the North that+they should not give Shivaji any kind 
of favour nor admit any of his people into our lands, and the 
same will be done from this side." 44 Only eighteen days later, 
the same de Castro again advised his Chief Captain of the 
North (Ignacio Sarmento de Carvalho), "The affairs of the 
Mughals which give so much anxiety .... are, however, worthy 
of great consideration, and thus it is meet we deal with them 
with great prudence, so that we neither give them occasion to 
break with us, nor should we show them that we doubt them ; 
and, because all their complaint is born of their imagination 
that we show favour to Shivaji, you should order that nothing 
should be done from which they could have this suspicion. 
However, if without this risk you could secretly give any aid 
with munitions and foodstuffs to Shivaji you should do it for 
money ; because it is A&t desirable that if he is driven from 
his lands, the Mughal should remain the lord of them. But 
this should be done with such great caution that never should 
he be able to guess, much less verify it" Further, " To Shivaji 
you will write how much better it is for him and for us that 
his retreat, in case it should be necessary to do so, should not 


be Chaul, but rather to Goa, where he would be mofe- safe, and 
we would not have to break with the Mughal ; and in this way 
we would be able to be intermediary in any conference when 
fortune changes the state of things. Also emphasise that he 
would obtain the greatest safety in this island of Goa, which he 
could not have in Chaul, and thus he should be persuaded that 
it is best for him, and we should save ourselves as far as pos- 
sible for us to do so." 45 

On the top of all this, de Castro felt obliged, in August 
1665, to direct his Vicar of Bassein (Fr. Daoi ma Vicira) to 
wait upon Raja Jai Singh and to congratulate him on his vic- 
tory over Sivaji saying : " / took jwm him all the transport* 
ships which the Mahratta Shivaji had carried off on the pre- 
tence he was coming to my land, thus preventing that he should 
provision the fortresses so that he could resist for a long time ; 
,as the success of this movement has shown, because for lack 
of provisions they gave themselves up to him." 4G 

In 1669, the Portuguese actively 'helped the Siddi against 
Sivaji. On 27 May 1669, learning that the position of Dancja 
was precarious, they considered : " This matter is of vital 
importance (and decided) that it is not convenient to the State 
to have such a powerful enemy in the neighbourhood. It ap- 
peared well to us to order you to assist the fortress of Danda 
with some soldiers, powder, and shot necessary for the defence. 
This can be done under the pretence that he (the Siddi) being 
our vassal we are bound to help him or under any other pre- 
text which you might think more fit." 47 On 21 August, again, 
the same Portuguese official (Acting Governor) gave strict or- 
ders that the Siddi should be succoured by all means against 
the attack of Siviaji. 48 

Finding that his efforts were thus being frustrated by the 
Firangis, Siviji sent his vakil, Vtthal Bandit, to Goa. Conse- 
quently a treaty was signed between the Marathas and the 
Portuguese, on 20 February, 1670, on the even basis of reci- 
procity. Clause 2 stated : " They should not give refuge nor 
provisions of any kind to the Habshi of Danda, and the Portu- 
guese should send orders to this effect to all their ports." This 


was agreed to. It was also accepted 'that there shall exist a 
strong friendship between both the parties, by sea and land, 
and should anything be done without reason, a report should 
be made by Raja Shivaji to the Governor of India, and in the 
same manner by the said Governor to the Raja Shivaji, and 
without obtaining satisfaction in this way this peace and friend- 
ship should not be broken." 49 Strangely, while these negotia- 
tions were going on in Goa, on 16 January 1670, a letter to 
Lisbon declared : " Shivaji Raje has made himself master of 
the Konkan and levies taxes by ways which the inhabitants 
take ill and therefore abandon their lands. He makes a very 
undesirable neighbour. He is not firm in his promise, and he is 
to be dreaded more when he pretends to be your friend : He 
lives on theft and cunning ; this is the fellow who entered Bar- 
dez in 1667 ; at present we have to defend our lands with great 
caution." 50 

Under the plea that the Marathas had seized a Portuguese 
vessel at Daman and taken it to Dabhol, in November 1670, 
despite the treaty engagements, the Portuguese retaliated by 
capturing 12 ships belonging to Sivajl and took them to Bas- 
sein. However, the Portuguese Captain of Chaul (Louis Al- 
vares Pereira de Lacesda) sheltered refugees from Sivajfs terri- 
tories while they were harried by Aurangzeb's men towards the 
close of 1672. "Shivaji and his secretary and subedar" says 
the Captain, " wrote to me thanking me for the favour done to 
those people, to whom I replied that I did nothing but keep the 
terms of the peace between Shivaji and the State and that no 
other motive moved me." Reporting all that then transpired 
between him and the Maratha envoy, the writer concludes : 
4< The said physician informed me that Shivaji wanted to make 
himself a vassal of His Highness, for he had leamt that others 
had done the same, and'*on finding the Portuguese disposed to 
protect him, he would send one to Goa to treat about this with 
your Excellency." 51 

Flattered by this, the Viceroy, Louis de Mendonca Furtado, 
sent a copy of this report to His Majesty the King of Portu- 
gal, on 19 January, 1673. But in reply he was told : " Having 


seen what you have written in your letter of IJth February 
1673, by which you informed us of the condition to which you 
have reduced Shivaji without waging war, about his being forc- 
ed to offer to the Captain of Chaul the Government of Chaul 
and to be the vassal of the State, I think it advisable to tell 
you to be careful regarding the designs of Shivaji. You should 
treat with him with all caution and diligence necessary for thf 
safety of this State without neglect, attending also to the in- 
solence with which he treats friends and enemies alike without 
keeping faith with any one/' 52 

The reversal of the Portuguese policy towards Sivaji be- 
came evident at the si^ge of Phonda on 8 April 1675. About 
the middle of the month, when they realised that the besieged 
needed help, they secretly sent ten boat-loads of provisions 
along with some men. But when these were intercepted by 
the Marathas the Portuguese disavowed them. 53 It is not 
quite correct therefore to assert, as Sarkar has done, that the 
Portuguese "remained strictly neutral during his (Sivaji's) 
wars with the Mughals and Bijapur." 54 The fact is that the 
Portuguese, at this time, were a decadent power in India 
" anxious only to hold their own, and timidly averting an armed 
encounter with every other State by employing friendly appeal, 
patient endurance, and diplomatic evasion." 6S 

Among the external causes of the Portuguese decline were 
the rivalry of the Dutch and the English. 50 These two latter 
powers were constantly at war among themselves and both in- 
voked Siviaji's assistance against each other. An English letter 
speaking of their Dutch rivals says, " Their envy is so great 
towards us that to take out one of our eyes, they will lose both 
their own." 57 The jealous and envious Portuguese, declares 
another, " have endeavoured all that lay in their power to obs- 
truct our settlement ; the (Mughal) "Governor of Surat hath 
not been wanting alsoe to use his policy to undermine us ; and 
Siddy Sambole with his Fleete hath been no small impediment. 
The Dutch with their powerful fleete designed to have swal- 
lowed us up, but blessed be God who hath hitherto preserved 
us and rendered all their evill designes advantageous (to us) ; 


Sevagee onely hath proved, and that for his own interest sake, 
our fairest friend and noblest enemy." 58 It is important to 
note that this is the dictum of Gerald Aungier, English Gov- 
ernor of Bombay. Yet, sadly, the English factorsparticu- 
larly in the Bombay settlement proved anything but friendly 
towards Siv&ji. Elsewhere also they were deeply suspicious 
of his designs despite outer civilities. For example, at Madras, 
41 Sevagee Rajia, having sent the Agent a letter of 22nd Septem- 
ber last (1677) by two of his spys, desiring us to supply him 
with Ingeniers, to which was returned him a civil excuse, it 
being wholly unfit for us to meddle in it, there being many dan- 
gers consequent thereon, as % well of encreasing his power, as of 
rendering both Golconda and the Mogull our enemys, all these 
parts being spread with his Spys and himself and army now 
come nearer this way, within two dayes march of this place." 
All available " Ingeniers " were employed " to prevent any de- 
sign of so evill a neighbour as Sevagee" 

On the West Coast tfvere was less of civility and more of 
hostility. The English had their factories at Bombay, Rajapur 
and Karwar ; and in the interior at Hubli, Athni, Dharangaon, 
etc. At Surat they had their Head-quarters. Their interests 
were primarily commercial, though exigencies of time and 
situation obliged them to handle fire-arms and ammunition. 
41 In general we must needs say" declared their Directors in 
London, " that peace and not wan is the Element in which 
T^ade thrives and flourishes and 'tis not the interest of a Com- 
pany of Merchants to launch into those great charges which un- 
avoidably attend it, especially where the opposition is consi- 
derable and the event very hazardous" Rajapur, however, 
proved this a mere pious intention. 

In January 1660 Sivaji's captain Donaji raided the port. 
Though the English had too business to take sides in the action, 
they openly assisted the Muslims. The Marathas infuriated 
by their interference, caught hold of their broker BalSji at 
Jaitapur. In order to secure his release they sent Mr. Philip 
Gyffard into the Manatha camp ; but he too was taken prisoner. 
Consequently, on 13 February, Mr. Revington wrote to Sivajl, 


offering to assist him in the conquest of Dantfa-Rajapur, should 
he be pleased to release the two prisoners. OrSers were ac- 
tually issued to set Balaji and Gyffard at liberty, but some sus- 
picious activity on the part of the latter led to Gyffard's re- 
moval to another place of security. On 23 February Reving- 
ton, taking the law into his own hands, way-laid the party, 
10 miles away from Rajapur, and romantically rescued the 
prisoner. Obviously he got the information from Gyffard him- 
self. It is evident, therefore, that the immediate release of 
Gyffard was not effected because of his unlawful conduct, and 
not being, as it was alleged, "kept by a rogue Brahman in 
Kharepatan castle out of the lucre and expectation of a 
bribe."" . 

The second Maratha attack on Rajapur took place in 
March 1661. This time too, as Sarkar has said, " the English 
were clearly in the wrong." 62 While Sivaji was besieged in 
Panhala bySiddhi Jauhar, from 2 March to 22 September 1660. 
the English supplied some ammunition to the besiegers for 
" tossing balls with a flag that was known to be the English's/* 
Siviaji's second raid on Rajapur factory was intended to punish 
the English for their egregious conduct. On this occasion he 
carried away, besides much valuable booty, Messrs. Henry 
Revington, Richard and Randolph Taylor, and Philip Gyffard 
as prisoners. Before they were removed from Rajiapur, 
Sivaji offered to release them if they would agree to help him 
in the capture of Rajapur- He also promised to give them 
a good salt-port besides. It be recalled that Revington had 
himself offered these terms an year earlier. But now the 
arrogant prisoners declined to discourse about it, until they 
should be actually set at liberty. When a ransom was de- 
manded, they declared that they had lost everything in the 
sack of their factory. Then thpy tried to negotiate once more 
proposing conditions leaving " a hole to creep out of their obli- 
gation." When this failed to deceive Sivajl, they threatened 
to invoke Imperial assistance through their Surat authorities. 
Finally, chafing under their loss of liberty, the 'disconsolate 
prisoners' petulantly complained of the apathy of their com- 


patriots- the President and Council at Surat. The result was 
the following well-merited rebuke : " How you came to be 
in prison you know very well. It was not for defending the 
Company's goods, 'twas for going to the siege of Panhala and 
tossing balls with a flag that was known to be the English's. 
None but what is rehearsed is the cause of your imprison- 
ment." c - 

Exasperated by this embarrassing situation the prisoners 
attempted to escape from gaol, but were apprehended and kept 
in closer confinement at Ralgad. Failing in all their strata- 
gems and designs, the English at last appealed to Sha'ista Khan 
the Mughal viceroy in the Deccan. Unfortunately, however, 
as we have already witnessed, the Khan himself came to grief 
(5 April 1663) at the hands of Sivaji. On 3 February, the 
same year, the Council had commissioned H. M. S. Covertite 
to seize Sivajj's richly freighted ships bound for Mocha. But 
only two days afterwards the prisoners were released, after* 
nearly two years, with an assurance that the English would 
receive protection in future. It is amusing to note the ful- 
minations of the Surat Council immediately after this unex- 
pected relief : They declared that they had * desisted from 
calling that perfidious rebel Sevagee to an account because they 
had neither conveniency of force or time/ They were still 
determined, none the less, upon avenging the wrong done to 
their ' loving brethren ' as well as the loss inflicted upon their 
Masters' property at Rajapur, though they sadly realised, " as 
yet we are altogether incapable for want of shipping and men 
necessary for such an enterprise : Wherefore patience ! " 8S 

Then followed Siviaji's two raids on Surat in 1664 and 
1670. We have already described them and discussed their 
consequences. In 1674 the English sought the opportunity of 
SivajTs coronation at make it up with him. Oxin- 
den's embassy was deemed a great success by all the English 
factors in India. On 10 July 1674 the Bombay Council noted 
with satisfaction, "Mr. Henry Oxenden returned from Sevagy 
with whom a firm peace is settled and articles signed between 
the Honble. Company and him." 64 The report was communi- 


cated to Surat as well as Madras. The latter expressed warm 
appreciation of ' that eminent service you have dond your 
Hvnble. employers in settling soe jaire a correspondence with 
Sevagee .... and soe reasonable overtures for advantages both 
in traffique and neighbourhood, now that the establishment of 
his conquests renders him no less concerned for the encourage- 
ment of trade than he was formerly for plunder.' 65 London 
too was likewise informed of this settlement in their letter, 
dated 20 August 1674, enclosing and commending Oxenden's 
fuller report. 

The preamble to the treaty read : " Articles of peace, union 
and friendship between the noble prince Sevagee Rajah and 
the Hon. English East India Company : 1. That from this 
day forward, there be a true, firm and inviolable peace and 
amity between the noble prince Sevajee Rajah and the Hon. 
E. E. I. Co., their successors and assignees, and between the 
'lands, countries, subjects and inhabitants of both parties of 
what degree and quality soever. 

" 2. That all acts of enmity, hostility and discord, shall 
cease and be abolished, and that both parties shall abstain and 
forbear from all plunderings, depredations and injuries what- 
soever, public and private, in all places both by sea and land. 

" 3. That the said Sevagee Rajah and his subjects and all 
other inhabitants in his Dominions, shall use and treat the Eng- 
lish kindly and with respect and honour due to them as friends 
and confederates, so that they may freely pass by land and 
water into the countrys, cities and towns belonging to Sevagee 
Rajah, and there continue so long as they please, and buy pro- 
visions and likewise trade and traffick in goods and commodi- 
ties of all sorts, paying the usual duties, and be obedient to the 
civil Government of the respective places, the same kindness 
to be reciprocally interchanged to the -subjects of Sevagee Ra- 
jah on the island of Bombay." 66 

Peace is never the outcome of compacts and agreement. 
Where there is no harmony of interests there cannot be lasting 
amity. Like the treaty between the Portuguese and SivajJ, 
this one also was not calculated to last long. The hollowness 


of the protestations of ' firm friendship ' was soon exposed 
when, in November 1674, Sivajl requested the Hon'ble. Com- 
pany's Bombay office to supply him fifty guns. The English 
had been importing guns for sale and Bombay advised Surat, 
" It will certainly be very good for the Company to ease their 
large dead-stock here by the sale of some of the guns and es- 
pecially the two great brass gunns which lye heavy upon us." 6 ' 
But the President and Council, having duly debated, judged it 
impolitic and inexpedient to part with them : " they are of such 
use and service by the command they have into the sea, besides 
the repute they give to the place, that although they are a 
charge, yet wee should blush to thinke that either Sevagee or 
any others should be master of them' Q<3> Surat therefore or- 
dered : " Though Sevagee should profer you ready money for 
your two brass gunns, yet we would not have you part with 
them without a positive order from us ; for it is a matter of ^ 
great 1 consequence and we know not\ how far he may be trust- 

C'<f." C!) 

The guns remained unsold in Bombay until 21 January 
1678, certainly, when Swally Marine reported to the Company : 
4 'The great brass gunns are remayning at the fort (Bombay), 
no person appearing to buy them. Indeed Sevagee would be 
our chapman for them and many more things, but for mony 
or expectation of payment his great debt to your Honours may 
witness what small punctuality may be expected from him. 
// any buyer presents, (ivc) shall dispose of them." 70 On the 
face of it, this was not a correct report . They were not willing 
to sell the guns to Sivaji in spite of his " extraordinary kinde 
letter .... together with a present of 5 loads of ordinary stuffs 
and a confirmation of the order for the President of the mony 
according to agreement at Rajapore and other priviledges 
which he hath granted tiythe English in his country. " T1 

On 1 January 1675, Maratha troops, while campaigning 
in Mughal territory, raided Dharangaon (near Burhanpur in 
KMndesh) . Considerable damage was done to the English 
factory there, and property worth Rs. 10,000 was looted. The 
English factors protested that they were at peace with ivajl, 



but the Maratha troops paid no heed. Representations were 
then made to SivajJ, but he too did not admit their claims to' 
compensation. Losses in enemy territory were obviously not 
contemplated in the Riaiga4 undertaking. Even Bombay ob- 
served : " Sevagee and iwee in these parts keep a faire under- 
standing and good correspondence and we question not but it 
will continue ; however we shall make a full demand of the 
Companys and factors loss there of him and procure for the 
future if possible we can, Coles (Kauls) for the English factors 
and Brokers in all places wh&re our investments are made that 
none of his forces at any time molest them." 72 

It is noteworthy to observe that SiVajI acceded to these 
requests and granted Kauls for future security, though at first 
he considered the English demands "very unreasonable.'* 
Absurd accounts were given by Samuel Austin in his letters to- 
Surat ; but the Surat authorities in their communication to 
London stated : " Satisfaction could not be procured, Sevagee 
declaring that he was not lyable to yiake good any losse wed 
sustained in his enemyes country against whome he prosecuted 
a fust war; he blamed the Generall of his Army much for 
violence done us : and to the end wee should not be subject to 
such injuries hereafter, he gave us his coles or passports for 
that place and also for many other factoryes." Austin, how- 
ever, was not appeased and persisted in asking for his personal 

Rajapur and Karwir, too, had suffered much on account 
of constant war in their vicinity. Messrs. Child and Oxenden: 
were specially deputed, as experienced men, to set matters right 
in those two places. They obtained from Shivajj "effectuall 
orders to his Ministers together with his Cole or passe for their 
future security." 74 Nevertheless the English factories con- 
tinued to suffer as there was BO peftte in the land and not 
all of Sivaji's officers iwere equally sympathetic. We find, in 
May 1676, Surat warning Kajapur " to be very circumspect and 1 
cautious in your dealings and contracts with Sevagee's minis- 
ters, for wee experience them to be more subtle and perfidious 
every day than other." 75 Not only Sivaji's men but other 


local chieftains proved equally a source of trouble. And to 
make matters worse, the weavers and other workmen entrusted 
with money ran away, as at Hubli. 

Hubli was ' a great inroad town and a mart of very con- 
siderable trade/ English records speak of the town as " that 
mark of our Carwarr factors where we sell and buy most of the 
goods that post affords us/' 70 The Maiathas first looted it in 
1664-5, but little damage was done to the English factory. 77 
However, in 1673, the English lost much and, failing to get 
satisfaction from Sivaji, threatened to take some "smart 
course to revenge the wrongs." 78 Sivajl, as we have noticed 
before, explained that the action was unauthorised, professed 
friendship towards the English and advised them ' that we trade 
so little we can into the Decan because he is determined to 
make a sharp war there so soon as the rains are over/' The 
demand for compensation was unsubstantiated : " However 
he desires to see the particulars of our loss, which we could' 
not show him having not received it from you." 79 All the same 
the English were getting impatient and planning some " smart 
course." 80 Not only Hubli and Rajapur, but also Athni and 
Karwar had suffered. " Though we conceive the Rajah him- 
self doth not desire to breake friendship with us, but would 
grant us what is reasonable, yett his officers have so little re- 
gard to his orders that they are not to be trusted." 81 

At first (14 June 1676) they thought of improving mat- 
ters by replacing their native agents Narain Shenvi at Raigatf 
by an Englishman : " And wee are of opinion, had you sent 
an Englishman at first and expostulated the matter a little 
roughly with him ; or had sent Girder, for whome they have a 
far greater respect than your Naran Sunay, they would sooner 
have complyed with you than now they are like to doe." 82 But 
on 29 September 167S they commissioned Captain Robert 
Fisher to threaten the 'coastal shipping unless the English were 
better treated : ' for as wee doe noe injury nor offer any injus- 
tice or affront to any nation whatsoever, soe wee are resolved 
to suffer none from any, but to vindicate the Company's right 
and honour in the manner wee cann.' 83 


" Wee had once great hopes that Sevajees country would 
have proved advantageous to the Hon'ble. Companys trade/' 
they mournfully declared, " and did believe he would have been 
soe wise and understand his own interest soe fair as to have 
kept a faire and just correspondence with us, but wee now find 
(17 Oct. 1676) that soe long as that pirate and universall rob- 
ber lives, that hath noe regard to friend nor foe, God nor man, 
there can be noe security in any trade in his country ; where- 
fore wee have determined to dissolve the factory of Rajpore 
soe soon as wee can call in our debts Wee have not con- 
signed them any goods this yeare nor shall wee, till wee can 
bring Sevagee to a better understanding with us. The same 
intention wee have for Carwarr if it continues long under his 
jurisdiction, and wee would have you alsoe withdraw all trade 
and correspondence out of his country .... Were it not for 
our factors and the Company's estate yet remaining at Rajpore 
wee would take a more smart course with him and doe our- 
selves justice on the first vessels wee r could meet with all be- 
longing to his ports ; but for this wee must take some more 
convenient opportunity . " 84 

Nevertheless, the Surat authorities climbed down only a 
week later (25 Oct. 1676) when business considerations cooled 
their temper. They wrote to Bombay : " Revoking all former 
orders touching Brawts (Varrants or Bhatty), wee doe require 
you to receive the Hon'ble. Companys debts due from Sevajee 
in plate, on as cheap terms as you can best agree." 8r> But no con- 
sistent policy was arrived at. The factors at Rajapur, Karwar 
and Hubli, however, were instructed to get in as much as their 
outstanding debts as possible "before the coming downe of 
our Europe shipps, and what goods you have made provision 
of to be in readiness with yourselves ; ' >8 also " we would have 
you deale plainely with Annagee JPunditt, and press him horre, 
either let him make us complete satisfaction or let him know 
the factory shall be withdrawne ; and that you may be ready, 
we would have you soe dispose affairs that upon order you 
may without faile embark with what belongs to be Hon'ble. 
Companys." 87 


That fche English could not get away so easily was revealed 
to them when Mr. Everage escaped from Rajapur : " The 

Soobedarr sent to us for the key of our warehouse the- 

which we refused to doe. [Then he took account of the stores 
and] sealed up the door with the Rajah scale," 88 Meanwhile 
hostilities had started between the English and the Marafhas 
over "the unhappy business of Hendry Kendry." 

We have before alluded to Sivaji's capture and occupation 
of the island of Khanderi (Kennery)i near Bombay. Undcri 
(Hendry) is only 12,00 yards from the mainland. Together 
these two islets constituted the " Hendry Kendry " of, perhaps, 
the most melodramatic enjsode in Anglo-Maratha history. 

Sivaji had attempted to fortify Khanderi in 1672, but 
failed. Owing to the combined opposition of the Mughals, the 
Siddis and the English, he was obliged to withdraw. The 
iva-Digvijaya Bakhar says : ' Doulat Khan and Mai Nailj 
Bhandari proceeded at the head of their squadrons to fortify 
the island of Khanderi.* They were going to build a fort, but 
the English ships came from Bombay, saw the extent of the 
projected fortifications and wrote to Yakut Khan at JanjinL 
The Habshis .... laid siege to Khanderi, with the cooperation 
of the English, and demanded that no building should be cons- 
tructed on their frontier. The forces were not strong enough 
to fight the enemies ; so the Bhandari concluded a treaty, came 
away amicably and informed the Maharaja of what had hap- 
pened . ' 89 

Sivaji took up this project more seriously in August 1679. 
The English once again protested saying that they had " allways 
supposed (Hendry Kendry) to belong to us/' But the real 
reason was that they perceived it "little policy to suffer so 
potent and voracious a Prince to possess himself of soe con 
siderable a post without disputing his title thereunto. His 
designes cannot be otherwise then to have check on the whole 
trade of this (Bombay) Island and adjacent parts, keeping 
there allwayes a fleett of small brigantines to cruse up and 
downe. ... If he is suffered to build, it will be hard disputing 
with him hereafter, but at present wee suppose standing on our 


tearmes and owning it as ours, with a seeming resolution to 
obstruct him, may make him desist/ 90 

This claim had never before been put forth in 1672 01 
1674. Clause 18 of the Raigatf treaty as drafted by the English 
themselves read : ' That th English, and other inhabitants 
upon the Island- Bombay, shall have free liberty to fetch fire- 
wood from the adjacent islands opposite to the main, without 
any obstruction from Sevagee's people, or any custom to be 
demanded or paid jor the same, to whom strict prohibition to 
be given to prevent misunderstandings/ 91 It is clear from 
this that the claim of Hendry Kendry as 'allwayes supposed 
to belong unto us* was only a pretext and after-thought. 
Besides, when the Siddi occupied Hendry, as a counterpoise 
to Sivaji's occupation of Kendry, on 9 January 1680, the Eng- 
lish far from objecting actually encouraged and assisted 
,him. They simply wrote to London : " The Syddy Admiral] 
of the King of India's fleete hath taken and fortifyed anothei 
little Island/' 92 Indeed, the Siddi pro/ed more obnoxious than 
the Maratha : His success " soe puft up the Syddy that he 
now presumes to give laws in all that Bay (solely your Honrs/ 
Royalty) requiring all vessells from your Island to take his 
passes, otherwise will seize on them ; besides his men coming 
in great numbers ashore are so insolent and abusive that your 
Deputie Governour and Councill write us (Surat) that they 
are not able to bear it, and that if it be not suddenly remedyed, 
some dangerous consequences will ensue." 03 

The reason why the English put up with the Siddi is thus 
frankly stated : " Our intention was to have complained to 
this Governor thereof ; but he is soe exasperated at making a 
peace with Sevagee that he not only encourages but abets the 
Syddy in these abuses, which your affaires here will not suffer 
us at present otherwise to remedy ; therefore it will highly con- 
cern your Honrs. speedily to take some effectual course for 
redress of these growing evills (with divers others in your 
affaires here, too many now to be repeated), otherwise you 
will suddenly lose your Island and all your Northern trade/' 94 

Despite the combined and most determined hostility of the 


English aijd the Siddis, however, the Marathas continued to 
occupy Khanderi and went on with the work of fortifying it 
Successive attempts of the English, from 3 September 1679 to 
28 January 1680, to frustrate their efforts were most valiantly 
withstood by them. Neither naval brow-beating nor diplo- 
matic blandishments deflected them from their firm resolve to 
hold the island at all costs. The foolhardy attempt of Lieut 
Thorpe, on 19 September, to effect a forced landing ended in 
a tragedy : Thorpe himself got killed and his shibar was cap- 
tured. A blockade was organised from 20 September to 9 Octo- 
ber, but proved equally futile. The naval engagements between 
the contemptible * mosquito craft ' of the Marathas and the better 
equipped ships of ' the Queen of the Ocean ' 95 during a whole 
month (18 Oct. 18 Nov.) brought no better result. On 31 
October Sivaji threatened a counter-blockade of Bombay. But 
on 5 November the English squadron (comprising the HUNTER, 
the FORTUNE, 2 machuas, and 5 shibars) drove the Maratha 
fleet into Nagothna crcjek where it was bottled up until 10 
November. Then the Siddis joined the English and carried on 
a relentless war against the Marathas, by land and sea. They 
occupied Underi (Hendry) island, as a counterpoise to Khan- 
deri, and soon made themselves an irksome nuisance to their 
English allies who made peace with sivaji. 96 

This sorry episode was communicated to London in the 
following terms : " After exceeding trouble and difficulty where- 
in Mr. Child, your new Deputy Governour, hath used great 
paines and industry, a peace is concluded with Sevagee : 
wherein 1. (we) have been forced to permitt his possession of 
the Island in the mouth of your port of Bombay, finding wee 
were not able with our present strength to force him from it ; 
2. what vessells taken from u$, he is to make satisfaction for, 
.and on which account* *wee kave allready received 100 Candy 
-of beetlenuts ; 3. likewise, what men he tooke in them to 
returne back, which is performed ; 4. liberty for your factors 
at Carwarr and Rajapore to come away at their owne conve- 
miencys ; and 5. to cleare his former account." 97 

No better commentary could be offered on the incident 


than the remarks of the Court of Directors of the East India 
Company (London) : "Now we come to treat of the busi- 
ness of Bombay, which by the hostilities lately entered into 
with Sevagee about Hendry Kendry, renews and aggravates 
our further charge and trouble when we hoped we had arrived 
to an undisturbed and prosperous posture of affaires, and that 
the Island Revenues would have quite eased us of further ex- 
penses and have yielded somewhat of retribution for those ex- 
cessive charges we have laid out upon it. But we are sorry to 
find it otherwise upon this unhappy quarrel we are fallen into, 
though upon what grounds began by Sevagee we know not ; 
but however it be, the conduct of our men by Lieutenant 
Thorpe was very unhappy, who either through drunkenness or 
great unadvisedness ran himself into the loss of his life and his 
party into that mischief which befell them, so that foolishly if 
not madly they fell into blood before you used the medium of 
accommodation for peace, and the endeavouring it afterwards 
when Sevagee had obtained and maintained his post and could 
not be removed from it, we doubt will either be to noe purpose 
or noe wayes to our honour or advantage/' 98 So it turned out in 
the end. As Dr. Fryer observed : " Amidst these Wars, and 
rumours of Wars, we quietly laid down our Arms and leave 
Seva Gi and Syddy alone to contend for our stony piece of 
Ground on Henry Kenry ; how much to our Honour or Re- 
proach may be gathered from the language we have daily cast 
in our Teeth : ' Why Vaunts your Nation ? What Victories have 
you achieved? What has your Sword done? Who ever felt 
your power ? What do you possess ? We see the Dutch outdo 
you ; the Portugalls have behaved themselves like Men ; every 
one runs you down ; you can scarce keep Bombain, which you 
got (as we know) not by your Valour, but compact ; And will 
you pretend to be Men of War or cope, with our Princes ? It's 
fitter for you to live on Merchandise and submit to us. ' " ou 


' This Kingdom was invaded by a powerful enemy 
in the person of Aurangzeb. He used all his valour and 
resources, in wealth and materials, for the destruc- 
tion and conquest of this 1 Kingdom. But all his efforts 
proved futile, by the grace of God.'Adnd-patra. 

The true test of a living organism is its capacity to- 
survive a crisis. The Maratha State created by Sivaji, in the 
course of less than three decades, proved its vitality during the 
thirty years that followed his death on 4 April 1680. Indeed, 
if the Darwinian test of survival is to be applied to the Mughal 
Empire and the Maratha Kingdom, both of which were strug 
gling for existence not by the tame principle of * live and let 
live ', but by the militant method of exterminating the rival 
the Manathias proved their fitness to survive by the eternal 
and immutable law of evolution. While the grandiose structure 
of the Mughal imperial system was visibly tottering to its 
fall, the young and vigorous Maratha power was advancing in 
a crescendo of staggering success. In the words of their most 
vigilant critic, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, " The Marathas were no 
longer a tribe of banditti or local febels, but the one dominat- 
ing factor of Deccan politics, and an enemy all-pervasive 
throughout the Indian peninsula, elusive as the wind, the ally 
and rallying point of all the enemies of the Delhi empire and 
all disturbers of public peace and regular administration 
throughout the Deccan and even in Malwa, Gondwana and 
Bundelkhand." 1 This is a Very correct estimate of the Maratha 
bady politic at the death of Sivaji, as will be amply borne 
out by any impartial examination, howsoever searching, of the 
happenings from 1680 to^l707 and after. 

Aurangzeb was the most inveterate enemy of not merely 
the 'execrable wretch Siva', but also of the Maratha power 


which survived him. With bitter chagrin Aurangzdb declared : 
4 My armies were employed against him (Siv&ji) for nineteen 
years, but nevertheless, his State has always been increasing*. 
The English factors verily observed : ' He is so inveterate 
against the Raja (Sambhaji) that he hath thrown off his 
pagri and sworn never to put it on again till he hath either 
killed, taken or routed him out of his country/ 2 But, by a 
strange irony of Fate, despite the destruction of Sambhaji, the 
rout of Riajaram, and the capture of Shahu, it was Aurang- 
zeb's empire and that of the Marathas that was undermined 
by his ceaseless war of over forty years. 

Mahariastra had met with her first crisis when she fell 
before the Khaljls and the Tughlaqs in the fourteenth century. 
Until the rise of Siviaji her emergence as an independent politi- 
cal entity could not have been even predicted. So long as 
Sivaji was alive, the only crisis she had to face was when he 
was virtually a captive at Agra with dire -possibilities. Of 
course earlier, anything might have happened at his fateful 
meeting, with Afzal Khan. But Sivaji appeared to have a 
charmed life. Indeed, ' Sevagy hath dyed so often/ wrote the 
English in May 1680, ' that some begin to thinke him immor- 
tall ' ! 3 The real crises, however, catne with perturbing per- 
sistence when Sivajl was dead. They were due partly to inter- 
nal and partly to external causes. The former arose out of the 
exigencies to which the medieval monarchy was everywhere 
exposed, viz., the dual curse of succession disputes and the 
incalculable element of the personal character of the successor 
to sovereign authority. To look no farther than the thirty 
years following Sivaji's death (1680-1710), Maharatra was 
confronted with crises arising out of these two factors at least 
four times : 1. During the succession dispute between the sup- 
porters of Sambhaji and Rajara'm (lfc80-81) ; 2. in 1689, when 
'Sambhaji fell and Rajaram had to seek refuge in Ginji ; 3. in 
1700, when Rajaram died leaving two sons (tSivajI and Sam- 
bhaji) by two different wives; and^4. in 1707, when Shahu 
was released by the astute imperialists in order to confound 
the Marathas who were already in the toils of a civil war. 


The external causes of what we might describe as the 
SUPER-CRISIS consisted of a combination of enemies, great and 
>small, who surrounded the Marathas on all sides : 1. The 
Mughals ; 2. BIjapur until its extinction in 1686 ; 3. The Sid- 
dis of Janjira ; and 4. the Portuguese to mention only those 
powers with whom the nascent Manatha State had actually to 
wage war. Among these the Mughals alone were the most 
formidable ; the rest being mere auxiliaries. We shall consider 
the latter before the former : the minor before the major. 

The Adilshahi had long been a-dying as we have witnessed 
in the preceding chapters. The succession of the boy Sikandar 
had indeed been the beginning of the end. The squabbles 
-among the Afghans and the Deccanis had become chronic in 
the absence of a strong and dominating Sultan. The State 
appeared to have been marked by an adverse Fate, and misfor- 
tunes entered every gate. Gone were the days when by a Mus- 
lim entente the great and glorious Vijayanagar Empire was 
overthrown under Adilshahi leadership. Gone too were the 
days when, in alliance with the weaker Qutbghahi of Golkoncja, 
Muslim dominion was spread over the Karnatak regions. 
Gone even were the days when, in cooperation with the Mu- 
ghals, BIjapur could obstruct though not prevent or frustrate 
the growth of the Maratha power. The 'Adil Shah could 
not even create an effective local diversion in the Deccan while 
ivajl was away in Karnatak (1677-78) with the larger por- 
tion of his army. Nay, 'Jamshid Khan, since the death of 
the Nawab (Bahlol Khan, on 23 Dec. 1677) found himself 
incapable of longer holding out (and) agrees with Shi- 
vaji to deliver up (the fort of Bijapur and the person of Si- 
kandar Adil Shah) to him for 6,00,000 pagodas 9 (Feb. 1678). 
The resourcefulness of Siddi Masud, however, saved Bijapur 
for the time being. 4 

The acquisition of Koppal, in March 1679, had put 'the 
gate of the South' (Sabhasad) into the hands of the Mafla- 
thas. Gadag had been conquered even earlier. Mara- 
tha dominion! now extended over the Tungabhadra river into 
the Bellary and Chitaldurg districts. The local chieftains of 


Kanakgiri, Harpanhalli, Raidurg, etc., having been subdued, 
that country was formed into a regular province under Ja- 
nardan Pant Hanumante. So weak was Bijapur all this time 
that, finally, even Masud had to acquiesce in Sivaji's Karna- 
tak conquests in return for help received from him when Bija- 
pur was besieged by Dilir Khan (Aug. to Nov. 1679) . But 
for ivajl's timely and effective assistance, Bijapur might have 
fallen then, instead of seven years afterwards. The 'rebel' 
Sivaji thus proved a truer saviour of the ' Adilshahi than its 
imperial ally from the North. r> 

Sivajl was certainly not in love with either Bijapur or 
Golkonola ; but he had clearly foreseen that the Mughals would 
prove more dangerous. As it transpired, the conquest of Bi- 
japur and Golkontja by Aurangzeb (1686-7) brought the Mu- 
ghals into closer proximity to the Marathas. The Muslim 
kingdoms could no longer be played off against one another. 
On the contrary Aurangzeb's prestige as their conqueror was 
considerably increased in the South., His resources as well as 
strategic advantages were also augmented. As successor to 
the 'Adil Shah and the Qutb Shah he could now legitimately 
claim hegemony over the Karnatak. 

Sivaji's failure in taming the Siddi had fateful repeicu?- 
sions on the West Coast. It hardened the masters of Janjira. 
on the one side, and emboldened the Portuguese, on the other. 
This was for Sambhaji a baffling inheritance. He could not 
be expected to succeed where his father had definitely failed. 
Yet the irrascible son of Sivaji was desperately determined to 
suppress the Siddi. So another heroic attempt was made to 
reduce Janjira (1680^82) before the Bhosle could feel convinced 
that his control must stop with the shore. 

Though the Siddis were much disturbed by the quantities 
of shot and shell incessantly fired into their island-fortress by 
the Marathias, they stuck to the rock like the iguana . * Sambha- 
ji is resolved,' wrote the English on 19 January 1682, 'not 
to raise the siege so long as he hath a rag to his back/ 6 He 
had drafted an army of 50,000 men, under Dadaji Despan<l, 
to build a causeway across the channel, 800 yards wide and 30 


yards deep, to reach the island. 20,000 troops with a vast 
train of artillery were also despatched to bombard Janjira. 
When sheer force failed, stratagem was tried, but with equally 
futile results. A desperate attempt to effect a landing by sta 
'had ill-success, for not above 500 escaped (out of 4,000), the 
rest being all killed by the Siddi and his men/ 7 

The attitude of the English and the Portuguese towards 
Sambhaji was more helpful to the Siddi than to the Mata- 
thas. When Sambhaji invoked their assistance, the President 
and Council at Surat instructed Bombay : " you must use all 
contrivances to keep fair with them ; as we would by no means 
quarrel with Sambhaji Rajgh, so upon no account can we with 
prudence fall out with the Siddi at present, it being a very 
unfit time." As a matter of fact they were " more afraid of 
the Mughal's displeasure than Sambhaji's (and) ordered the 
admittance of the Siddhi's fleet (in Bombay waters)." 8 

This kind of complicity enraged Sambhaji against both the 
English and the Siddis, Uut he had not the power to punish 
them. His fleet was twice beaten by the Siddis i. in August 
1681 at Underi, and ii. in October the same year at Bombay. 9 
In the latter action Siddi Misri, the Muslim Captain of the 
Maratha fleet, was mortally wounded and died in Bombay. 
An attempt to punish the English by setting the Arabs against 
them ended in a disaster to the latter. 10 Before this trouble 
was over, Sambhaji had to face the Portuguese, and the Siddis 
consolidated their position. 

After Sambhaji's death (1689), Siddi Khairiyat Khan cap- 
tured several of the Maratha strongholds in the Konkan, like 
Tale, Ghosale, Raigatf, etc. Between 1696 and 1706 Siddi 
Qasim ruled over Janjira as his brother IChairiyat's succes- 
sor, under the title of Yaqut Kftan. He fortified and garrison- 
ed all the places conquered by his predecessor, as well as looted 
and devastated the Maratha districts in the neighbourhood. 11 
All this was winked at or encouraged by Aurangzeb. Siddi 
Yaqut died in 1706. But the Marathas, being engrossed in 
their life and death struggle against the Mughals, could hardly 


attend to the Siddi. Not until a Sivaji of the Seas arose im 
Kanhoj! Angre could anything be done with their rivals. 

Turning to the Portuguese, we might characterise Mara- 
tha relations with them at the close of Sivaji's life as ' peaceful 
but not friendly/ Under SambhSjI the position deteriorated. 
Prof. Pissurlencar has deplored the imprudence of Sambhaji 
in this result and tried to show how friendly the Portuguese 
always were towards the Maiathas. 12 But we have seen enough 
of their dealings, in the last chapter, to accept this criticism.. 
With the Siddis still on his hands, Sambhaji could ill-afford 
to antagonise either the English or the Portuguese. Pissurlen- 
car has himself admitted that, to begin with, Sambhaji had 
begun well with the Portuguese. 13 Without overlooking the' 
faults of SambHaji, it is equally necessary to examine the con 
duct (1682-84) of the new Portuguese Viceroy, Francisco de- 
Tavora Conde de Alvor. 14 

Aurangzeb was very anxious to win over the Portuguese 
to his side in order to open a second front against the Mara- 
thas from the sea-side. Manucci was at that time in Goa. 
"When Aurangzeb's letter reached the Viceroy," he writes,, 
"he had me sent for to translate it into Portuguese. On 
hearing the proposals I gave him advice as to what he should 
do. For this war could not be of any benefit to the Portu- 
guese, seeing that the Mughal would never be content to leave 
the Portuguese to themselves after he had destroyed Sambhaji. 
In spite of this the Viceroy engaged in the war against that 
prince, and thereby all but lost Goa/' 15 

Conde de Alvor, rather than Sambhaji, it appears to us, 
was responsible for the breach of friendship between the Por- 
tuguese and the Marathas. Sambhaji wanted to fortify Anji- 
div, an island to the south of Karwiar, as a naval base (like 
Khanderi) to counterpoise Jaujhia ;-but the Portuguese fore* 
stalled him by planting their flag there in April 1682. Wheiv 
Sambhaji protested against this as an unfriendly act, the Vice- 
roy simply declared that he "was his own master in his own 
territories. 16 To make matters worse, he wrote to his Captain 
of the North (Don Manoel Lobo de Silveira) and the gover- 


nors of Chaul, Bassein and Daman, asking them to allow free 
passage to Che Mughal troops marching against Sambhajl. 17 
These were intolerable acts of unfriendliness in the eyes of 
SambhajJ. The make-believe of a congratulatory letter (28 
July 1682) over the birth of Shahu, written by de Alvor, 1 * 
could ill-conceal the real attitude of the Portuguese Viceroy. 
Sambhajl, in his sober moments, was too realistic a man to be 
deceived by such political gestures. He, therefore, made up 
his mind that it was necessary to foil Aurangzeb's designs by 
the conquest of Goa. War thus became inevitable. 

Shah Mahomed, Mughal envoy carrying Aurangzeb's let- 
ter to the Viceroy (dated June 1682), was in Goa on 20 Ja- 
nuary 1683. He left the place in April following. 19 But 
hostilities between the Portuguese and the Marathas had 
already begun. In December 1682 Mughal vessels carrying 
provisions to Ranmast Khan, who was ravaging Maratha ter- 
ritory near Kalyian?, had been allowed by the Portuguese to 
pass through Thana. Sambhaji started his reprisals on 5 
April 1683, surprising patience considering his irrascible tem- 
per ! He looted and destroyed Tarapur and other towns from 
Bassein to Daman. The Portuguese retaliated by capturing 
Maratha vessels and imprisoning (16 May) their ambassador 
(Essaji Gambhir Rao?) in Goa. 20 The major actions of this 
war were fought at Chaul, Phonqfea (Fondem) and Estevao 
near Goa. 

Sir Jadunath Sarkar has tripped at many points connected 
with this struggle, both as regards dates and places. His ac- 
count is both inaccurate and misleading. 21 The Portuguese 
case does not at all bear extenuation or defence as Sarkar has 
attempted to do. Conde de Alvor n&ver " planned to make a 
.diversion " for the Mar&thia : foe only fell a victim to Sambha- 
jl's ruse. Sambhajl, as Manucci has unequivocally stated, sent 
to the Viceroy tutored spies who told him that in the fortress 
of Phoncla there were great treasures. "His object was to 
get the Viceroy to leave Goa with a large force for the con- 
quest of that fortress. Then he meant to cut off the Portu- 


.guese retreat and prevent their return, in this way Baking him- 
self master of Goa." 22 

^lanucci learnt of this design through the French at Ra- 
japur. The warning was conveyed to the Portuguese Viceroy : 
" I told His Excellency, but he would not heed my words. 
He issued forth with eight hundred white soldiers and eight 
thousand Canarese. He crossed with them to the other side 
of the river and began his campaign. With him went five 
pieces of heavy artillery." 21 Far from being unopposed, as 
Sarkar has said, the Viceroy had a very hot reception at the 
hands of the Marathas : "They attacked with great fury the 
Viceroy's army, and gave him as much to do as he could man- 
age. His best troops were killed, and, if he had not used 
wooden obstructions with which to impede the onset of the 
cavalry he would never have been able to get back to Goa, 
nor could he have made any defence. The rainy weather 
impeded the discharge of his matchlocks ; thus, coming on 
still closer, a trooper among the Rajputs 24 dealt His Excellency 
a sword blow on the ribs. Retreating slowly, he reached the 
river-bank with great difficulty, and once more entered Goa. 
He recognised, although too late, that he had been misled." - 3 
This disastrous and disgraceful rout has been characterised 
by Sarkar as a retirement " bravely and skilfully conducted by 
the Viceroy in person " ! 26 All the field-pieces and ammuni- 
tion are declared to have been brought away, and " the Por- 
tuguese had only a small skirmish which cost about 100 men 
on each side." Yet Manucci, who was in Goa at the lime, 
noted that " great grief was caused in the city from the fruit- 
less loss of so many lives." 27 Well might this have been so 
mourned over, for the Portuguese as well as their native troops 
" threw down their muskets and fled .... but in vain, for the 
blacks rode over them, tramplipg meet of our men. All our. 
men fled in utter disorder, each one trying to save himself. . . . 
Nearly a whole company of seamen were killed, the dead and 
wounded amounting to two hundred." 28 

The Marathas next seized the island of Santo Estevao 
(Jua, 2 ms, N. E. of Goa). There was great consternation 


in Goa, anc^on the following day (15 Nov. 1683) the Vice- 
roy, " against the judgement of Dom Rodrigo da Costa, wished 

to reoccupy the place He selected some 150 soldiers, 

shouting in a Iqud voice that any one who meant should follow 
him. He went as far as the castle walls and marched round 
them, during which Sambhaji's troops slew a great many. 
Some reinforcements arrived, and by good luck the Viceroy 
and Dom Rodrigo were able to reach their boats and take to 
flight, otherwise they would certainly have been killed like the 
rest .... Sambhaji's soldiers retained the island 'and were very 
near to Goa. They gave so much trouble to the city that the 
Viceroy resolved to send an embassy to that prince to see if 
he could obtain a peace, and I was obliged to go a second time 
to Sambhaji .... But the fighting still went on with great 
energy. Well was it for the Portuguese that Sambhaji never 
knew exactly how jew men there were in the island. If he had 
known, he could have carried out his scheme (of occupying 
Goa) in its entirety."' 29 

The old tragedy was once more enacted : The Viceroy 
was himself wounded by a bullet in the arm ; more than 150 
men were killed ; the rest either fled or got stuck in the mud 
never to escape alive. The Marathas left the island on 16 
November 1683, 30 but continued to- ravage the country round 
about. Sambhaji quitted Goa in December. 

In the northern theatre of war, too, the fight was incon- 
clusive. The siege of Chaul (Aug. 1683) cost the Marathas 
dear. On 22 December they occupied the island of Karinja 
(10 ms. S. E. of Bombay) . It was however, retaken by the 
Portuguese in September. The two parties continued to ' snarl 
and snap at each other' for some time afterwards.- 1 

Early in 1684 a tnlce was patched up between the Por- 
tuguese Viceroy and Sambhaji by which, among other things, 
it was settled that * when Sambhaji on his part will have given 
over in the north all lands and fortresses, with all the artillery 
and arms which he had taken from us, and returned all the 
prisoners, then the same kind of restitution will be made to him 



of all his men who are now in our hands, and the $ao candil(?) 
of Bassein will be paid and the chouts of Daman, Sambhaji 
Raj6 being obliged to defend those territories as he has pro 
mised.' 32 However on 24 January 1686 we find the Portu- 
guese reporting to Lisbon that ' As Sambhaji did not keep the 
terms of peace it became necessary to continue the war with 
him.' 83 

Whatsoever the cause of continued or fresh hostilities, the 
Portuguese secretly incited the Desais of Concao (Konkaij) to 
rebel against 'Sambhaji. Consequently, Khem Savant, with 
Portuguese assistance, roamed over places belonging to the 
Marathas, burning and robbing, nprth of Goa. (Feb. 1685). 
The Dalvis of Phorwja did the same to the south of Goa, always 
finding safe refuge in Portuguese territory. The Portuguese 
treaty with these cffief tains (8 Feb. 1685) makes interesting 
reading. It was signed by ' Rama Dalvy Bounsullo and Deva 
Saunto Bounsullo, servants of Quema Saunto Sardesai of 
Curallo, and two others/ Its terms were : That they should 
capture the lands from Banda to Ancolla, and, dividing them 
into three parts, they should give two to the Portuguese ; tiiat 
the one who takes the lands from Cuddale to Chaul would be 
helped by a Portuguese fleet, to cow down opposition all along 
the coast, with their ownvcrew, arms and ammunition, in re- 
turn for which they were to receive a third of the lands, etc., 
taken. Besides the fleet, they would be supplied with gun- 
powder and bullets, 'as much as could be spared/ without 
paying in kind or money. The Viceroy also undertook to 
write to the King Mogor asking him to take the chiefs into his 
service, and to this end he would send his own men to accom- 
pany them to the Mogor. Finally, if they came out victorious, 
the Portuguese would grant them the same liberty as they en- 
joyed under the Moors and under SambhajS, to live in those 
territories according to their rites, having their own temples 
and other things ; but they should not make peace with Sam- 
bhaji, as the Portuguese too would not; nor do harm to the 
factories of the English, the French and the Dutch in SambhS- 
jfs territories. The Portuguese agreed to lend them money 


on these terms and on their giving hostages, but only to the 
extent they could, and after starting the war. 34 . 

The stipulation against harming the English and other 
Europeans, in the above treaty, throws an instructive side- 
light on the attitude of the foreigners. Despite their mutual 
rivalries and national antipathies (which often resulted in arm- 
ed antagonisms), per contra the heathen natives, they felt like 
safeguarding their European and Christian interests. The Ita- 
lian Manucci obtains secret information about SambhajTs 
military movements from the French at Rajapur, and warns the 
Portuguese, as we have before noticed. The Portuguese stipu- 
lation regarding the English is all the more interesting in 
the light of the English attitude about them. On 30 Nov. 
1683 Sir John Child wrote to Sir Josia Child : " Bombay 
labours under abundance of troubles from the Siddi and our 
very naughty neighbours the Portuguese. They have lately 
forbid all provisions going to our island and afford it all the 
injury they can. They ara at war now with Sambhaji Raja." 35 
Again, on 7 April 1684, we find the Company's Directors ask- 
ing Surat to vindicate the honour of their nation against the 
insolence of the Portuguese as well as the Moors : But " in 
the face of impending struggle peradventure it may be prudent 
to temporise with the Moghul and Sambhaji until we have 
righted ourselves with other two and until you have made 
Bombay so formidable that the appearance of it may fright the 
Moghul's government and Sambhaji Raja." 36 

Bombay was to be made ' as strong as money and art could 
make it' Sir John Child, President of Surat Council, was 
styled ' Captain General and Admiral of all forces by sea and 
land in the Northern parts of India, from Cape Comorin to 
the Gulf of Ptersia.' In October 1685 Surat was informed that 
the Directors had deddecf upoa firm action both against ' the 
Moors and the impudence of the interlopers ', for which it was 
necessary to ' enter into a close confederacy and friendship with 
Sambhaji Raja and maintain always a strict friendship with 
him. 9 " In 1687 Child moved to Bombay, together with his 
Council, from Surat and made it the seat of the Company's 



Government. Sambhaji was losing against the jVlughals, but 
the English felt that Bombay was safer than Surat. 38 

However, the negotiations with Sambhaji proved fruitless 
as he was not in a position to assist the English, nor were the 
English anxious to help Sambhaji. 39 After the final catas 
trophe of Sambhaji, iwe find Child writing to the Directors in 
England on 12 Dec. 1689 : " At present there is no certain 
news where Raja Ram is ; but on this part of India he does 
not appear, nor any force of his in the field to withstand the 
Moghul and his forces. Rairee and most of his strong- 
holds are fallen into the Moghul's hands All the country 

about us that was the Raja's is thf Moghul's now ; there only 
stands out for the Raja near us the little island Kenery, .... 
and another castle on the mainland called Padangarh to the 
southward of Chaul. . . . They have been with us for assistance 
and would feign borrow money, etc. We have given them all 
good words, may be, and keep them engaged what we can for 
the present, but in all appearance they will not hold out long, 
and should we trust them, they will certainly deceive us." 40 

The sad state of Maharatra alluded to in the above refer- 
ence constituted the Major crisis of her history since the death 
of Sivaji in 1680. The last days of that great monarch had 
indeed been clouded by anxieties such as Akbar had felt on his 
death-bed. SambhiajFs character and conduct were somewhat 
analogous to Sdim's in several respects : Both were inheritors 
of a glory and responsibilities which their characters could ill- 
sustain ; both were in revolt against their fathers who were 
forced to keep them under duress on account of grave mis- 
demeanour ; both alike were a prey to overpowering passions 
which neutralised virtues that might otherwise have enabled 
them to improve upon their heritage ; both were looked upon 
t>y their fathers with grave v apprehensions about the wis- 
dom of their succession ; both had junior rivals whose eligi- 
bility was considered more suitable ; both allowed authority to 
slip out of their own hands into those of their favourites, 
though of very different characters and consequently with very 
different results. There is no comparison between the noble 


Nur Jahan and the criminal Kavi KalaS or Kaluga ; the former 
proved the saviour of Jahangir, whije the latter was the miner 
of Sambhaji. Both, however, possessed' acomplfshments 
through which they could master their masters and hold them 
in a vice. The only redeeming feature of the two reigns was 
that there were very able State-officials who served their sove- 
reigns out of regard for their great predecessors and a deep 
sense of personal responsibilityr The tragedy of Sambhaji is 
without a parallel in history : a tragedy of high spirits self- 
poisoned, of courage without character and scholarship without 
sagacity, unfortunately fortunate to have been the son and 
successor of Sivajl, whosj incontinence and fitful cruelties 
eclipsed an otherwise loveable personality. 41 

What perturbed Siviajl more than any moral blemish cf 
Sambhaji was his defection to the Mughal camp on 13 Decem- 
ber 1678. That unfilial, unpatriotic, indiscreet delinquency 
seemed to jeopardise all the great and good work that Sivaji 
had done during nearly Jialf-a-century of his strenuous life. 
Was all that he had so arduously achieved to be undone by 
his own son? But the destinies of Mahailastra were not to 
miscarry even under such a misfortune. Still, it terribly upset 
the anxious father. Sambhaji had not merely deserted to the 
enemy but also attacked Bhupalga<J which was in the keeping 
of the veteran Firangji Narsala (the valiant hero of Chakaij). 
Overwhelmed by conflicting sentiments (human though un- 
soldierly) the old warri6r behaved like Tardi Beg Khan at 
Delhi on the eve of Akbar's entry into India, and met with the 
same fate. His error of judgment in yielding the fortress to 
the rebellious son of his master earned for him the extreme 
penalty of a delinquent soldier. 

Sambhaji, however, returned to his father in December 
next (1679) and was kSpt in -confinement in Panhala. Sivaji 
died at Raigatf on 4 April 1680. Plans to supersede Sambhaji 
only provoked him, when he regained freedom and authority, 
into acts of insensate cruelty. SoyarS Bai (Rajaram's mother) 
was inhumanly put to death, Anriaji Datto and several other 
important officers of State were barbarously executed, and the 


&irk& were equally ruthlessly externjdnated. 48 R^aram, Sam- 
bhajTs step-brother, hardly ten years of age, had been raised 
to the throne as a puppet only to be thrown into prison for no 
fault of his own. 

The accession of Sambhaji, on 20 July 1680, in the midst 
of the turmoil which followed the death of Sivaji, seemed to 
afford Aurangzeb the opportunity of his life. The flight of 
Prince Akbar (Aurangzeb's rebellious son) into Mahara^ra, 
on 1 June 1681, lured him into the Deccan which was destined 
to be his grave. Things had not been moving satisfactorily 
there for quite a long time. Shah 'Alam had been replaced by 
Khan-i-Tahan Bahadur Khan as viceroy in May 1680. The old 
general laid siege to Ahivant in July 1680, but the defenders 
made good resistance. As soon as the rains ceased, Sambhaji 
opened his campaign in Khandesh. Burhanpur and Dharam- 
pftr were sacked in January 1681. No resistance was offered, 
much harm was done, and the people threatened 'civil dis- 
obedience ' if better protection was pot afforded them by the 
imperial officers. 44 So the Emperor hastened South and arriv- 
ed at Aurangabad on 22 March 1682. 

'As soon as the peace negotiations with the Rana (of 
Mewar) were completed/ writes Manucci, 'Aurangzeb left 
Ajmer, early in September of the year 1681. His object was 
now a war with Sambhaji, all unmindful of his fate namely, 
that this departure was for ever, that there would be no return 
for him either to Agra or to Delhi ;/for it is now (in 1700) 
nineteen years that he has been in camp without effecting any- 
thing against that rebellious people, the MahrattaKs. God only 
knows what will come to pass in the end ! For the reports 
continually brought in to me are that he is in a very bad way, 
closely pressed by the aforesaid Mahrattahs. Thus until this 
day he has not been able to . accomplish the enterprise he 
intended (as he said) to finish in two years. He marched car- 
rying with him three sons, Shah 'Alam, A'zam Tara, and Kara 
Ba&hsh, also his grandsons. He had with him much treasure, 
which came to an end so thoroughly during this war that he 
was compelled to open the treasure-houses of Akbar, Nur 


Jahan, Jahapgir, and Shah Jahan. Besides this, finding him- 
self, with very little cash, owing to the immense expenditure 
forced upon him, and because the revenue-payers did not pay 
with the usual promptitude, he was obliged at Aurangabad to 
melt down all his household silver ware. In addition to all 
this, he wanted to empty the great store-houses filled with good? 
left by deceased persons or with property collected in Akbafs, 
Jahangir's and Shah Jahan's time from the men, great and 
small, who had been servants of the State. But afterwards he 
ordered these store-houses not to be opened, for he rightly 
feared that, he being absent, the officials would embezzle more 
than half.' 45 

While a Mughal fleet was cruising along the Konkai? 
coast in order to intercept Prince Akbar, to prey upon Maratha 
vessels, and to divert Sambhaji's attention generally, a Mughal 
army of 14,000 horse, under JJasan 'All Khan, descended upon 
Kalyaaj from Junnar, burning and destroying villages en route. 
Prince Azam and Dilir ^han were sent towards AJjunednagar, 
while another division was despatched to Nasik, under Shiljab- 
u'd-Din Khan and Dalpat Rai. But the siege of Ramsej (7 
ms. N. of Nlasik), despite reinforcements sent under Khan-i- 
Jahan himself, very soon revealed to Aurangzeb the might and 
resourcefulness of the Marathas. "If we may believe Khafi 
Khan who was present at the siege," writes Sir Jadunath Sar- 
kar, " the fort had no iron cannon, but the garrison hollowed 
vout trunks of trees apd fired leather missiles from them ' which 
did the work of ten pieces of artillery.' " 46 

Aurangzeb's spirit was roused by this incident and he de- 
tided upon extensive operations. Meanwhile the siege of Ram- 
sej dragged on and Khan-i-Tahan had to withdraw petulantly 
.burning down the wooden tower constructed by him at great 
cost. ' The exultant Maiatha^ crowded over the walls, beating 
their drums for joy and taunting the retreating Mughals in the 
foulest language.' 47 Likewise the imperialists felt obliged to 
decamp from Kalyai* destroying its fortifications. Sambhaji 
attacked them from the rear, killing many and capturing a large 
number of horses. " Thus we see," observes Sarkar, " that for 


more than 'a year after his arrival at Aurangabad, <pm Novem- 
ber 1681 to April 1683, the Emperor accomplished nothing 
notable in spite of his immense resources." 48 " The Surat fac- 
tors wrote on 3 April 1682 that Aurangzeb ' hath with him. 
a great army with which he sits still and attempts nothing,, 
being under great jealousy and fears, thinks himself hardly 
secure '. He was ' continually wavering ' being ' extraordinarily 
peevish and uneasy '. To avoid the Emperor's wrath, it was 
suspected, Dilir Khan poisoned himself. 49 

In the Konkan, Shiah 'Alam had crossed the Ramghat pass 
(26 ms. W. of Belgaum and 30 ms. N. E. of Goa) and entered 
SavantvaxJI. Hasan 'Ali Khan guarded his lines of communi- 
cation over the Ghlats with 5,000 men. It was on account of 
this move that Sambhajl had withdrawn suddenly from Goa 
after Estevao (Dec. 1683). Yet, Shah 'Alam demanded front 
the Portuguese a large fee for having rescued them from Sam- 
bhiaji ! When they demurred, he plotted to seize Goa by 
treachery and ravaged the surrounding country when he was 
baulked of his prey. This, says Sarkar, was " the worst mis- 
take the Prince could have committed, because ultimately it 
meant the annihilation of his army through famine/' 50 

The historic disaster of the worse than Zenophon retreat 
(more like Napoleon's from Moscow) of Shah 'Alam's army 
has been graphically described by Manucci who was an eye 
witness. They were retreating over the Ramghat pass " a league 
and a half of ascent. Here Sambhajl might have killed the 
whole of us, for it was a place difficult to climb, with narrow 
paths passing through jungle and thorny scrub. But he did 
not choose to attempt it, and they said he was acting in col- 
lusion with Shah 'Alam. But what Sambhiajl did not do by 
attacking us, God carried out by the pestilence which raged in 
the army with such violence that jui se\n days of its prevalence 
everyone died who was attacked that is about one-third of 
the army. Of this disease there died every day five hundred 1 
men ; nor was the mortality confined to men only it extended! 
to horses, elephants and camels. This made the air pestilential, 
and it being a confined route, supplies also failed, and this was 


like encountering another enemy. For although, as I said, 
wheat was abundant, from this time there were no animals to 
carry it. Thus the soldiers had more than enough to undergo. 
Many of those whose horses died had no money to buy others, 
nor was there anyone in the camp ready to sell. They were 
thus forced to march on foot, and many died of the great heat 
and thirst they underwent/ 51 The miserable remnants of Shah 
'Alam's army reached Alimednagar on 18 May 1684, having 
accomplished nothing beyond burning and plundering a por- 
tion of the Konkai?. " He hath taken no stronghold," observed 
the English, " but ruins the country, lays all waste, and burns 
all towns he comes near." 52 ^ 

Aurangzeb then concentrated on the conquest of Bijapur 
and Golkontja which he accomplished in 1686 and 1687 res- 
pectively. 53 Sambhajl sent some succour to the beleaguered 
cities but could do little more. Aurangzeb also accused the 
Qutb Shah of having sent a lakh of pagodas to 'the wicked 
Sambha.' When the two ^Sultanates were destroyed and their 
armies disbanded, Sambhiaji found employment for most of 
them. "God made use of this very expedient of Aurangzeb/ 1 
writes Manucci, " to counteract his projects. In disbanding the 
soldiers of those other kingdoms, he imagined he was making 
his future enterprises a certainty. But Sambhiaji was thereby 
only rendered the more powerful ; for although he had no suffi- 
cient resources to entertain so many men, he welcomed all who 
resorted to him, and in place of pay allowed them to plunder 
wherever they pleased." 54 All the same, flushed with his recent 
triumphs over Bijapur and Golkorxja, Aurangzeb vowed that 
he would not return to the North ' until he had seen SambhSji's 
bleeding head weltering at his feet/ 55 

One of the windfalls of the Mughal offensive at a very 
critical stage was the d&fth oS Hamblr Rao Mohite, SivajI's 
great generalissimo (Dec. 1687). .The Mughal general Sarja 
Khan indeed met with at Wai 'the fate that had befallen 
Afzal Khan/ 56 but it was a pyrrhic victory for the Maratfias. 
Hamblr Rao drew the enemy into, a death-trap in the Maha- 
baleSvar Hills as the Sirkfe had done with Malik-u't-Tujjar 


and slaughtered them. " The warworn cavalry l^der," writes 
Kincaid, "added to skilful generalship an intimate knowledge 
of the Deccan and Konkan hills. On the battle-field the sound 
of the veteran's voice was worth fifty squadrons. In the coun- 
cil chamber he alone ventured to beard the infamous Kalasha 
or recall to his master a fitting sense of his exalted duties. Had 
Hambirrao lived, it is possible that with his hold firmly esta- 
blished on Jinji and with the resources of much of southern 
India at his command, Sambhaji would have repelled the 
Mughal offensive. But on Hambirrao Mohite's death Kalasha 
became all powerful and Sambhaji became more and more a 
slave to profligacy and intemperance ; and the effects of the 
King's vice and sloth were soon visible in the disasters of his 
armies/* 57 

The sins of omission and commission were indeed begin- 
ning to bear fruit for Sambhaji. When Bial&ji Avj5, his son 
Avjl BalMl and brother 'Samji were trampled under the feet 
of elephants, Yesu Bai, Sambhajfs queen, is stated (by Chit- 
ois) to have declared to her erring husband : " You have not 
acted properly in killing Balajl Prabhu ; he was a venerable 
and trustworthy servant, feivaji used to confide his secrets to 
him and say 'Chitnis is the very life of the kihgdom and 
myself/ On oath he had pledged that office to Baliaji and his 
family. You have killed and alienated so many ; the few re- 
maining also you have treated so unfairly. What will become 
of our kingdom?" 58 Ramdas had likewise admonished the 
Prince advising him to avoid excesses and to act always in the 
memory of his noble father. 59 Raghunath Pant Hanumantd 
(whom Sambhji had displaced by his brother-in-law Hirji 
Mahadik, as viceroy of the Karnatak) equally candidly asked : 
" Why is the kingdom shrinking daily ? Why is the Siddi still 
unsubdued? Why are Brahmins being beheaded instead of 
being imprisoned? Why are the enemies sought to be won 
over instead of executed? Why is the administration in 
Kalusha's hands instead of the King's ? " 60 The one and only 
answer was that Sambhaji had gone too far down the primrose 
path to be redeemed. 


Writers have blamed Kavi KalaS for this. Khw&fi Khan, 
describes SambhajI's boon companion as a 'filthy dog/ He 
also observes that ' Unlike his father, (Sambhajl was addicted 
to wine, and fond of the society of handsome women, aijd 

gave himself up to the pleasure pleasures which bring so 

many men of might to their ruin.' 61 Both Sambhajl and 
Kabji were 'entirely unaware of the approach of the Falcon 
of Destiny/ as they were regaling themselves with the gifts of 
Bacchus and Venus, at Sangamesvar (22 ms. N. E. of Ratna- 
giri) on the Ghats. This was none other than Muqarrab 
Khan. 62 Aurangzeb's emissary, who with 3<,000 picked men 
came from Kolhapur 'with the speed of lightning* and 
pounced upon his prey on 1 February 1689. Two weeks later 
the unfortunate prisoners were presented to the Emperor in 
his camp at Bahadurgad. A verdict of death was pronounced 
by the doctors of law for having 'slain, captured, and dis- 
honoured Muslims, and plundered the cities of Islam/ The 
captives then became legitimate targets of humiliation, ridicule 
and torture (at which the Inquisitors of Europe might have 
blushed) at the hands of the true believers. Finally, on 
11 March 1689, the infidels were put through a ntost barbarous 
execution at Kor^gam on the Bhama (12 ms. N. E. of Pbona). 
The place was renamed Fatehabad. 63 

Martin alleges that ' some of the leading Brahmans ', dis- 
gusted with Sambhaji's misconduct, conceived 'the design of 
destroying him/ They informed some imperial officers and 
got troops placed in ambush ' at a place which was convenient 
for their purpose '. Then luring Sambhajl into ' the diversion of 
hunting, caused him to be led into the trap where the Mughals 
enveloped him. His head was by order of the Emperor carried 
to various provinces and publicly exposed in many cities/ 64 

" It has been said," iwrites ^fanucci, " that custom becomes 
nature ; and a man accustomed to any vice cannot, even when 
he would, free himself from the tendency that by repeated acts 
he has contracted. Thus was it with Sambhiji. Habituated 
to interfering with other men's wives, now when it had become 
necessary to act the hero, he could not rid himself of his per- 


verse inclinations. This was the cause of his losing liberty and 
life. Kab Kalish availed himself of this evil propensity to 
deliver him into the hands of Aurangzeb." The traitor was 
the first to be punished, " so that he might be unable to state 
that this great treason had been plotted at Aurangzeg's insti- 
gation." Then Sambhaj! was painfully paraded on a camel 
with the cap and bells of a clown, and when the humiliating 
and painful perambulation was completed, Aurangzeb 
" ordered his side to be cloven open with an axe and his heart 
to be extracted." The body was thrown to the dogs. 65 

Vain hatred ! Mahlarastra could not be crushed that way. 
The murder of Sambhaji sent a thrill of horror through every 
Maratha heart and made his hair stand on end. The reaction 
revealed that every such hair was also turned into a spike ; for 
Aurangzeb had unwittingly sown the dragon's teeth. " It 
seemed as if the death of Sambhaji/' Manucci observes, " was 
bound to secure Aurangzeb's lordship over all the lands of 
Hindustan down to the sea. But the commanders of valorous 
Shivaji, father of this unfortunate man, were by this time 
practised in fighting the Mughals, and expert in the way of 
dealing with those foreigners who deserted from his side. They 
determined to continue the campaign and uphold the cause of 
Ram Rlajia, younger brother of the deceased. Therefore they 

took him out of the prison and made him their prince 

Thus in 1689 the war recommenced with great fury. It was. 
not enough for Aurangzeb to have made himself master of 
Bijiapur and of Gulkandah ; he must needs oppress a little prince 
who yet was strong enough to compel so potent a king to re- 
main away from his kingdom (i.e. Hindustan) and dwell in 
camp merely to prevent the loss of his previous conquests/ " 66 

The period of eighteen years, from 1689 to 1707, was one- 
of utmost trial for the Mar&thas. T*heir race had produced 
not only a Sivaja, but also a Sambhaji. How could the future 
of such a people be confidently predicted ? Rlajaram was still 
in his teens and was not a man of genius ; certainly not a 
leader of the qualities of his father, nor had he the drive or 
flare of Sambhaji. Shahu, son of Sambhaji, was a lad of seven 


summers. Readership that the situation demanded was not 
to be found within the royal family. This was indeed the crest 
of the crisis, but the nation produced other men of drive and 
decision, of courage and character, of brawn as well as brain. 
That is why, despite the resources and determination of 
Aurangaeb, the country was saved. As men of faith, indeed, 
as the Amdtya put it, " all his efforts proved futile by the grace 
of God. 11 Yet is it equally true that Providence was acting 
through men like the Amdtya himself : ' This object, just as it 
was conceived in the mind of His Majesty', was carried out on 
account of God's extreme kindness and your efforts/ 67 

The saviours of the legacy of Sivaji and the heritage of 
Mahara$tra at this time to name only the most prominent 
were 1. Ramachandrapant Bavdekar Amatyc, 2. Sankraji 
Narayai), 3. Parasuifcm Trimbak, 4. Santaji Ghorpatfe, 5. 
Dhanaji Jadhav, 6. Khantfo BalllaJ Chifnis, and 7. Pralhad 
Nirajl. They were the seven sages (saptarji), the BRAIN 
TRUST of Mahiara$tra wfyose courage, wisdom, resourcefulness, 
perseverance, patriotism, presence of mind, loyalty, selflessness 
and devotion to duty saved Mahaia$tra. But it is not to be 
forgotten at the same time that these great qualities were ' in 
the widest commonalty spread', without which little could 
have been achieved by leadership alone. The innumerable 
heroes and heroines of Maharastra in those dark days of sore 
strain despite the blacksheep among them bore themselves up 
with courage and patience. It was their ' blood, sweat, tears 
and toil ' not less than the statesmanship of the Amdtya and 
the valiant generalship of Dhanaji and Santaji that made his- 
tory for Maharastra. While 'His Majesty' Rajaxfim sup 
plied the sentimental and traditional tie, the ^isdom and val- 
our of these Pillars of State overcame all obstacles * by the 
grace of God. 9 Faith, indeed, is life-giving. This Faith, which 
moves mountains, was the 'cumulative index* of the work 
done in Maharaistra by saints like Dn!ansvar, Eknath, Tuka- 
ram and Ramdas, as well as by all the Pioneers as political 
sappers and miners which preceded the great nation-builder 


Raj&ram does not appear to have undergone a formal 
coronation. In his letter to the Pant Sachiv SankrajS (25 Aug. 
1697) he says : ' God will bring back Shahlu surely in course 
of time ; he is the true master of the kingdom. All that I am 
doing is for his sake only. Ultimately all people have to look 
up to him : it is God's will/ 68 Yet the proclamation of Raja- 
ram as King proved a wise step. For on 19 October 1689, 
when Raigatf was captured by Zulfiqar Khan. Shahu and other 
members of the royal family were taken prisoners. Rajaram 
by his escape to Pratapgatf (5 April), thence to Panhala, and 
finally to Ginji, which he reached on 15th Nov. 1689, had saved 
the monarchy. The 'flight' was #s cleverly planned and as 
romantically executed as Sivajf s escape from Agra. 60 It was 
part of the strategy which the Maratha alone had the genius 
to carry out. 

Rajaram remained in Ginji for eight long years, until 
November 1697. The Mughals besieged that historic strong- 
hold from September 1690 to 8 January 1698, though they 
were not seriously at it all that time. Still the presence of 
Rajaram there, most of the period, served to tie up vast forces 
and supplies in the South, which the imperialists could ill spare 
from Maharastra proper. Had Aurangzeb been able to con- 
centrate all his attention and resources on his central target 
during this vital stage of his war, the result might have been 
fatal to the Maratha cause. Nor was Ginjf captured finally 
along with Rajaram : the bird had flown before! the nest was 

Fort St. George had noted on 14 Nov. 1689 : RSjaram's 
' designe of comeing hither being reported to divert the MugulTs 
army from theace and joine with several! Gentue Naigues and 
raise a considerable army to retake the Gulcondah and Viza- 
pore Kingdoms, wch. there is great probability of, both places 
being at present very weakly guarded/ 70 It is interesting to 
note that the Adnapatra also states : * After achieving so 
much success by favour of God, Rajaram divulged his inmost 
object of conquering the country occupied by the Yavanas, of 
destroying the Yavana conspiracy, and of beating down the 


Yavana predbminance which had taken root in the East, West 
and South, by sending large armies.' 71 

There is confirmation of these objectives as well in the 
correspondence of the Maratha generals and officers. A letter 
of 22 March 1690, written by Khaixjo BallaJ Chitms speaks 
of the rallying of the Poligars of the South in these terms : 
' The news here is : Since Rajaram readied Karnatak 40,000 
cavalry and 1,25,000 foot-soldiers have joined him ; more are 
coming. The hereditary Poligars of that province have all 
come over to him. It has become an impressive rally/ 72 

Aurangzeb, all this time, was hovering between Bajapur 
and Brahmapuri (Islampui^. Up to 1699 he tried out all his 
best generals in both the principal theatres of war, namely, 
Karnatak and Mahanastra. Thereafter (169947105), disgusted 
with their quarrels, corruptions, inefficiency, disloyalty, dis- 
honesty and defeats, particularly in Maharaja the Em- 
peror desperately decided to direct the operations in person. 
The result of this despairing adventure was that the imperial 
octagenarian suffered a physical break-down and felt constrain- 
ed to retire to Afomednagar, on 20 January 1706, where he 
died a year later. "One by one the old, able and inde- 
pendent officers and courtiers of his earlier years," writes Sar- 
kar, " had passed away, and he was now surrounded only by 
timid sychophants and upstart nobles of his own creation, who 
could never venture to contradict him in his errors nor give him 
honest counsel. The mutual jealousies of his generals Nusrat 
Jang against Firuz Jang, Shujaet Khan against Md. Murad, 
Tarbiyat Khart against Fathullah Khan, ruined his affairs 
completely as the French cause in the Peninsular War was 
ruined by the jealousies of Napoleon's marshals/' 73 

When Rajaram reached Ginji he set up a Court there with 
all the paraphernalia of'MarStha government As noticed 
above, he also rallied all the local forces around himself. In 
January 1690, even the Mughal feudatories and officers (newly 
brought under them) like Yachappa Naik, 'Isma'il and Md. 
Sadiq, rebelled against Aurangzeb and joined Rajaram. In 
April, the imperialists from Madras to Kunimedu were hope- 


lessly outnumbered and defeated, and forced to flee to the 
European settlements on the coast. The situation was slightly 
.improved when Zulfiqar Khan, the Mughal C.-in^C. arrived 
at Conjivaram in August and began the siege of Ginji the next 
month. For a time even Rajaram retired from Ginji ; but 
he soon returned in February following. Zulfiqar was baffled 
by the mocking fortress while the Marathas, recovering from 
their first shock, began to harass him incessantly. By April the 
deceptive superiority of the Mughals melted away and the 
Marathias played havoc with their camp and supplies. 74 Aurang- 
zeb sent heavy reinforcements on 16 December 1691 under Zul- 
fiqar's father Asad Khan (Imperial Wazlr) and Prince Kam 
Bakhsh. Yet nothing was achieved and the Mughal officers 
preyed upon the zamlnddrs of the surrounding country. ' The 
rains fell with excessive severity. Grain was dear. The soldiers, 
having to spend days and nights together in the trenches, 
suffered great hardship ; the entire tract looked like one lake/ 
To make matters worse, men of the garrison of Ginji sallied 
out and slaughtered the drenched Mughal soldiers. Bad as 
the Mughal position was during the rainy season, says Sarkar, 
it became absolutely untenable in the winter. 75 

Early in December 1692, 30,000 Maratha cavalry arrived, 
led by renowned generals like Santaji Ghorpatf^ and Dhanaji 
Jadhav. Their first success was the capture of the Mughal 
jaujdar of Conjivaram, All Mardan Khan, along with 1500 
horse and six elephants. All the property and equipment of 
the Mughals was plundered. The Khan was, however, released 
for a ransom of one lakh of hons. Several nobles and imperial 
officers fled for refuge to Madras where they were succoured 
by the English. 76 The victorious Marathas established their 
authority over Conjivaram and the Kadapa district. 

At Ginji the besiegers were thefriselves besieged. So com- 
pletely were they encircled that all communications with their 
base-camp were cut off. Aurangzeb's favourite son, Kam 
Bakhsh, himself opened secret negotiations with Rajaram. But 
he was arrested for his treason by the other generals and 
tumultuous scenes were enacted. ' The audacity of the infidels 


exceeded all Abounds and death stared the Muslims in the 
face/ 77 A desperate attempt was made by the imperialists to 
extricate themselves from the death-trap, but their ammuni- 
tion was soon finished. However, timely reinforcements com- 
ing under Sarfaraz Khan and the heroism of Dalpat Rai Bun* 
dda, saved the Mughals with the skin of their teeth. They 
were then allowed to withdraw (23 January 1693) to Wandi- 
wash, but not until the Wazir Asad Kfran himself had made 
overtures to Rajaram to secure a pitiable truce. 78 

The siege of Ginji was not renewed in earnest until 
November 1697. During the interlude between January 1693 
and November 1697 the Mifghals diverted themselves over the 
rest of Karnatak. They won over Yachappa Naik and 'Isma'il 
Maka, subdued fortresses in the S. Arcot district, invaded 
Tanjore and exacted tribute from Ekoji's son Shahji II. 
Towards the close of 1694 they turned to Ginji, but only to 
^deceive the Emperor. Bhimsen writes : ' If he (Zulfiqar) had 
wished it he could have captured the fort on the very day he 
reached Jinji. But it is the practice of generals to prolong 
operations (for their own profit and ease).' Manucci too 
^observes : * The project did not suit Zulfiqar Khan's views. 
Success in it would have ended the war, and with it his own 
power.' Consequently, the offer of Yachappa Naik to take the 
fort within a short time was not merely turned down, but he 
was barbarously executed as a traitor. 79 SarfarSz Khan left 
the camp in utter disgust in April 1695, without even asking 
for Zulfiqar's permission. Vellore was invested in October, but 
it held out for many years; and was not taken until 14 August 
1702. Meanwhile, the arrival of Santaji and Dhanaji created 
such panic that many took fright and prepared to decamp 
sending their families to Madras. 80 Zulfiqar himself took shelter 
in Arcot (1696). The soldiers 'were kept in arrears of pay. 
He even threatened to levy blackmail from the English at 
Madras, as no money came from the Emperor. 81 The siege of 
'Ginji iwas resumed only when Santaji had been murdered by 
the agents of itoanaji (June 1697) and Rajaram had left for 
Vtealgatf. "To preserve appearances," writes Wilkes, " it was 


necessary to report frequent attacks and repulses. >n the other 
side Daud Khan (Panni), second in command of the Mughal 
army, drank largely of the best European liquors, an<i when 
full of the god would perpetually volunteer the extirpation of 
the infidels. Zulfiqar necessarily assented to these enterprises, 
but always gave secret intelligence to the enemy of the time and 
place of attack ; and the troops of Daud Khan were often re- 
pulsed with slaughter." 82 

Zulfiqar and his coadjutors in the Karnatak may not be 
singled out for such comment. Elsewhere in the Mughal army 
things were no better. In May 1690, when Rustam Khan was 
captured 'by the joint-faction of Pfcafnchandra Pant, Sankraji,. 
Santaja and Dhanaji, near Satara, the tide appeared to be turn- 
ing against Aurangzeb for the first time. 83 It was a signal 
triumph for the Marathas. 1500 Mughals fell on the field 
and the Khan's family too was captured, together with 4,000 
horses, 8 elephants, and the entire baggage of Rustam's camp. 
After sixteen days the Mughal general purchased his freedom 
for one lakh of rupees. The Marathas then captured in quick 
succession the fortresses of Pratapgatf, Rohida, Rajgad and 
Tonjia in the course of the same year. Parasuranp Pant took 
Panhala in 1692, but the Mughals, under Prince* Muizuddin 
could not wrest it from him even after a close investment from 
1692-94. Then Prince Bidar Baj^it tried his skill at it until 
1696, followed by Firuz Jang ; but all in vain. From 1693-95 
the Marathas, particularly under Santajl Ghorpatfe and Amrt- 
uao Nimbajkar, were actively harassing the Mughals while 
their generals were quarrdling among themselves. The period 
closed with the defeat and death of two first-rate imperial 
generals, -Qasim Khan and Himmat Khan. 84 

The former general had been t sent against Santajl in 
November 1695. Finding that' locaf zammdars like Barmappa 
Naik had made common cause with the Marathas, 'a very 
choice corps 9 was despatched to assist Qaim Khan, under 
Khanazad Khan and Murad Khan. But Santajl proved him* 
self more than equal to this picked military* talent of the 
Mughals. He entrapped the enemy in the citadel of Dcxfoleri 


in the Chittldurg district of Mysore. There the rump of the 
beaten army had gathered for refuge, and such was their panic 
that the very officers (Khan azad Khan, Saf Shikand and Md. 
Murad) scrambled into safety before their men. The rank 
and file were left in the lurch to starve and die, for provisions 
were scarce. The transport animals are said to have eaten 
the thatch of neighbouring cottages : ' They even chewed one 
another's tails mistaking them for straw P The officers, once 
they sneaked into the safety of the stronghold, shamelessly 
declared " How gallantly have we brought ourselves here ! " 85 
Qasim Khan drugged himself to death out of despair. The rest 
purchased their freedom a great cost. The terms of the capi- 
tulation were strictly observed by the Marathas, but not by 
the Mughals. With a rare sense of chivalry Santajl supplied 
bread and water to the famished and woe-begone imperialists 
and nursed them back into life. " On the third day Khanazad 
Khan started' for the Court with a Maratha escort." 86 

Within two months af this triumph, on 20 January 1696,. 
Santajl scored another great victory over Himmat Khan, at 
Basavapattan. Here the general sent for the rescue of Qasim 
Khan was killed in action, and his troops were caught in the 
citadel as at Dcx^eri. Finally, Hamid-u'd-dln Khan followed 
with an army of 12,000 and retrieved the situation. " That is 
how a soldier fights ! " 89 declared Aurangzeb, praising Hamid. 
Bidar Ba&bt was sent to punish the rebellious zanundars of 
Mysore, while Santajl was away at GinjI (end of January 

Passing over the desultory fighting which continued in 
several places, and the murder of Santaja Ghorpa<J in June 
1697 (which we shall comment upon later), we must here refer 
to an abortive peace offer made in September 1698. It is not 
unlikely that Rajaram, who lacked the iron will of his father 
and brother in relation to the Mughals, and depressed over 
the tragic loss of the great general Santajl, might have desired 
a respite. But soon better counsels prevailed and a more 
vigorous policy was adopted. Early in 1699 Rajanam made a 
tour of inspection over Konkan visiting all the forts. In June 


he returned to Satara which he contemplated making his capi- 
tal. In September he planned an extensive campaign into 
Khandesh and Benin In October he was actually out on 
what unfortunately proved his last expedition. Broken in health 
he returned to Skhhagatf within a few months and died there 
on 2 March 1700. 88 He was but thirty years of age then. ' At 
that time,' writes Chitnis, ' he called together the Amatya and 
other ministers and declared : " Ever since the time of the 
Great King (Sivaji) you have been exerting yourselves in the 
cause of the Kingdom. My end is near. Hereafter you should 
all join together and continue the work as at present You 
should not slacken your efforts to secure the return of Shahu, 
when I am no more. You will win if you concentrate on that 
objective, you know it well. What more shall I add ? " So 
saying, he commended Ramchandra Pant and the rest to one 
another. Commanding all to act in obedience to the great 
Amatya, with a prayerful heart, he went to his eternal rest/ 89 

This illuminating record clearly reflects the soul of the 
dying Prince : conscious of his own limitations, he sincerely 
desired the return of Shahu ; while appreciative of the devo- 
tion of his ministers, he was apprehensive of the divi- 
sions among them. The blood-feud between Dhaniajl and 
Santa j!, with its tragic result, was a portentous warning. Per- 
sonally too fweak in mind and body to give a vigorous lead to 
his compatriots, he undoubtedly showed the greatest sagacity 
in entrusting tasks which were obviously beyond his own ca- 
pacity to hands that were more capable and brains that were 
more resourceful like those of the Amatya and his coadjutors. 
By his last act of commendation, leaving the kingdom in the 
safe hands of Ramchandra Pant Amatya Hukmatpanah, Ra- 
jaram redeemed at one stroke all his faults of omission and 
commission. Historians have* failecl to appreciate the cha- 
racter of this amiable Prince. He might have been weak, but 
he was shrewd, sincere, patriotic, wdl-meaning and inclined to 
be magnanimous. His death undoubtedly deepened the crisis 
of his country, though his survivors had both the courage and 
power to tide over it. 


To folfew the summary of the situation given by Chitnis : 
4 Here Parasuram Pant, Sankiajl Pant, and Hukmat-panah 
recovered the forts of Panhaja, Satara, etc. Konkanj had 
been assigned by Sambhajl to Sidojl Gujar, and Kanhoji Angre 
was under him. Considering Sidoja wise, brave, and virile, 
he was taken to GinjI ; and Angr was placed in charge of Su 1 - 
vanja-durg. With great vigilance he guarded that province 
and its strongholds .... When Rajaram returned, he was made 
Sarkhel on account of his meritorious services. Ramchandra 
Pfemt, by hie great valour, had protected the kingdom during 
Rajaram's absence ; therefore he was invested with all authority, 
and he continued to guide-the destinies of the State/ 90 Sank- 
raja Who was Sachiv until 1690 was given the title of Rajadna, 
and put in charge of the territory covered by RaigacJ. The 
Amdtya, personally looked after the region between KarhatJ 
and Gokarna. The army was commanded by Ramchandra 
Pant and Sankrajl with Santajl and Dhamji under them. Pa- 
rauram Pant, the captor* of Panhalia, also conquered the lands 
and forts between Miraj and Rangna. He earned the titles of 
Suba-lashkar and Samser-jang, and in course of time became 
Pratinidhi and Amatya. He combined in himself the civil 
qualities of Ramchandra Pant and the military qualities of 
Sanknaja, and earned the utmost confidence of Tarabai after the 
death of Rajaram. Pralhad Niraji and Khan^o Balla] were 
equally serviceable to Rajaram while he was at GinjI. 

Santajl Ghorpatfe belonged to the Kape! branch of the 
Bhosla family. He was pre-eminently a soldier, but too im- 
petuous, almost ungovernable and imperious. This character 
Brought him into conflict with Dhanajl Jadhav, which soon 
appeared to revive the ancient family feud of Bhosla vs. Ja- 
dhav. Had Rajaram th* tact, or force of personality, he might 
have composed their differences ; but he seemed to favour 
Dhanaji. Consequently the quarrel culminated in the cowardly 
crime of murdering Santajl while he was bathing in a seques- 
tered stream in a cornerof the country. 91 Dhanlaj! had already 
superseded Santajl as Senapati. He had served with distinc- 
tion under Pratap Rao Gujar and fought at Untfatji and Ne- 


sari. He came to be honoured as Jaising Rao forliis victories 
against the Mughals. Certainly he was a great general, though 
he lacked the lire and flash of his murdered rival . 

Wei need not follow Aurangzeb in his tale of woe in all 
detail- The denouement of his life was an unspeakable tragedy. 
During the last eight years (1699-1707), like a petty miser 
counting and recounting his coins, the senile Emperor was ob- 
sessed with taking and retaking forts. " The rest of his life 
is a repetition of the same sickening tale," says Sarkar : " a 
hill-fort captured by him after a vast expenditure of time, men 
and money, the fort recovered by the Marathas from the weak 
Mughal garrison after a few monthsr and its siege begun again 
by the Mughals a year or two later ! His soldiers and Amp- 
followers suffered unspeakable hardships in marching over 
flooded rivers, muddy roads, and broken hilly tracks ; porters 
disappeared ; transport beasts died of hunger and overwork. ; 
scarcity of grain was ever present in his camp. His officers 
wearied of this labour of Sisyphus ; ttit Aurangzib would burst 
into wrath at any suggestion of return to Northern India and 
taunted the unlucky counsellor with cowardice and love of ease 

Therefore, the Emperor must conduct every operation in 

person, or nothing (would be done." 92 

Leaving Brahmapuri (Islampur), which he had occupied 
continuously from 1695-99, Aurangzeb took VasantgatJ in No- 
vember 1699; Satara occupied him from Dec. 1699 April 
1700; Parli, April June 1700 ; Panhaja and PavangatJ, March 
May 1701 ; Vardhan, ^Jandgir, Chandan-Vandan, June- 
Get.; Vi&lga<J, Dec. June 1702; Simhagatf, Dec. April 
1703 ; Rajgatf, Dec. Feb. 1704 ; Tonga, Feb. March ; and 
Wiagingera, Feb. April 1795. Halting at Kfcawaspur (1700), 
Khataw (1701), Bahiadurgatf ^(170$), Poona (1703), Khe<J 
f (1704), and Devapur (1705), during the rains each year, des- 
tiny overtook the aged Emperor at last in October 1750. Break- 
ing up his camp at Devapur on the 23rd of that month he set 
out for the North in a palkl. He reached his ' journey's end ' 
at Ahm^toagar on the morning of Friday, 20 February 1707. 
Indeed, as he used to say, 


4 Ii? a twinkle^ in a minute, in a breath, 
The condition of the world changeth.' 98 

The Marathas pursued him like Yama to the very verge 
of earthly existence. Like the rats of Bishop Hatto, helter 
,-skelter they poured in, at all times and places. When Au- 
rangzeb commenced his fatal retreat, some fifty to sixty thousand 
Marathas pursued him, cutting off his supplies and stragglers, 
and even threatening to break into his very camp. The Em- 
peror left annihilation and anarchy behind him. 'Many maij- 
$abdars in the Deccan,' writes Bhimsen, 'starving and impo- 
verished, have gone over to the Marathas.' 94 In April or May 
1706 a vast Maratha forcfi appeared within four miles of the 
imperial entourage. KMn-i-Alam was despatched to drive 
them away, but he was hopelessly overwhelmed. Strong rein- 
forcements, however, kept the Marathas at arm's length, but 
not out of harm's way, after severe fighting. 

In Gujarat, Dhanaji Jadhav sacked Baroda in March 
1706. Nazrat 'Ali, the imperial faujdar was taken prisoner, 
and the other Mughal officers fled to Broach. Similar raids 
were carried into the outskirts of Ahmednagar in May. In 
the South, the Marathas captured Penukontfa, ' the key of both 
the Karn&taks,' and attacked Sira. A hit-and-run campaign 
was kept up incessantly by the Marathas, allowing no respite 
to the Mughals. 95 

To sum up, from the campaign of Rajaram, ' As before, 
the Maratha army was formed into three divisions. Dhanaji 
Jadhav, in addition to his supreme command, led one divi- 
sion. Parashuram Trimbak led the second and Shankar Nara- 
yan the third. Early in 1699 Rajaram took the field with the 
combined divisions, amounting at least to sixty thousand men; 
and as the artny advanced ndrthwards, it was joined by bri- 
gades under Parsoji Bhosle, the founder of the Bhosle house of 
Nagpur, Haibatrao Nimbalkar, Nemaji Sindia, and 
This mighty force moved towards the Godavari vallejj 
Moghul garrisons who tried to resist were overwh 
naji Jadhav defeated one large body of imperialjCfoSS/near 


Pandharpur. Shankar Narayan cleaced another contingent 
under Sarza Khan out of the Puna district. Entering the valley 
of the Godavari, Rajaram publicly proclaimed his right to levy 
from it the chauth and the sardeshmukhi From those vil- 
lages that could not pay, bonds were taken. From the Goda- 
veri valley Rajaram reached into Khandesh and Berar. This 
time he came not as a mere raider; and to convince the inha- 
bitants that he would give them protection, and exercise sove- 
reignty, he divided the country into military districts and left 
in them strong detachments under distinguished generals. 
Khanderao Dabhade took command in Baglan and northern 
Nasik. Parsoji Bhosle was made governor of Berar, Nemaji 
Sindia governor of Khandesh, and Haibatrao Nimbalkar gov- 
ernor of the valley of the Godavari. Rajaram himself led a 
large body of cavalry to plunder the rich city of Jalna, some 
miles south-east of Aurangabad. After the departure of the re- 
gent (i.e. Rajaram), Nemaji Sindia won an important success 
near Nandarbar, a large town same eighty miles east of 
Surat.' * It was while returning from Jalna that Rajaram had 
died at Simhaga'cl in March 1700. The domestic quarrels 
which ensued and the civil war with Shahu after his return 
from the imperial camp in 1707, will be dealt with in the next 
volume. This indeed created another major crisis in the history 
of the MaiSthas, but the manner in which they met it might 
be briefly characterised in the words of Khwafi Khan, the 
Mughal historian : 

'When Ram Raja (Rajaram) died, leaving only widows 
and infants, men thought that the power of the Marathas over 
the Dakhin was at an end. But Tara Bai, the elder wife (of 
Rajar&m), made her son of three years old successor to his 
father, and took the reigns of government into her own hands. 
She took vigorous measures for ravaging the Imperial territory, 
and sent armies to plunder the six subas of the Dakhin as far 
as Sironj, Mandisor. and the suba of Malwa. She won the 
hearts of her o Seers, and for all the struggles and schemes, 
the campaigns ;ffid sieges of Aurangzeb up to the end of his 
reign, the powe of the Marathas increased day by day. By- 


hard fighting? by the expenditure of the vast treasures accumu- 
lated by Shah Jahan, and by the sacrifice of many thousands 
of men, he had penetrated into theit wretched country, had 
subdued their lofty forts, and had driven them from house and 
home ; still the daring of the Marathas increased,, and they 
penetrated into the old territories of the Imperial throne, 
plundering and destroying wherever they went. In imitation 
of the Emperor, who with his armies and enterprising amirs. 
was staying in those distant mountains, the commanders of 
Tara Bai cast the anchor of permanence wherever they pene- 
trated, and having appointed kamaishdars (revenue collectors) 
they passed the years and^ months to their satisfaction with 
their wives and children, tents and elephants. Their daring 
went beyond all bounds. They divided all the paraganas 
(districts) among themselves, and following the practice of 
the Imperial rule they appointed their subadars (governors), 

kamaishdars (revenue officers) and rahdars (toll-collectors) 

They attacked and destroyed the country as far as the borders 
of Ahmedabad and the districts of Malwa, and spread their 
devastations through the provinces of the Dakhin to the envi- 
rons of Ujjain. They fell upon and plundered large caravans 
within ten or twelve kos of the Imperial camp, and even had 
the hardihood to attack the royal treasure .... It would be a 
troublesome and useless task/ concludes EJjwafi Khan, 'ta 
commit to writing all their misdeeds : but it must suffice to 
record some few of the events which occurred in those days of 
sieges which, after all, had no effect in suppressing the daring 
of the Marathas: 7 

Aurangzeb, at one moment, according to Bhlmsen, had at- 
tempted appeasement, but it .proved too late and futile : * As 
the Marathas had not been vanquished, and the entire Deccan 
had come into their possession' like a deliciously cookAd pudd- 
ing, why should they 'make peace ? .... The envoys of the 
Prince returned in disappointment and Raja Shahu was again 
placed under surveillance in the gulal bar.'** 



4 Whatsoever there is should be conserved ; more should 
be acquired ; the Maha-na&ra kingdom should be extended, in 
all directions.' The objectives of the Marathas could not have 
been put more clearly than in these words of Swaml Ramdas. 
We have in the preceding nine chapters examined the history 
of the Marathas from the advent of Islamic power in the 
Deccan to the death of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (1295- 
1707). During these four hundred* odd years we have wit- 
nessed the rise of a new force which was to shape the destiny 
of India for a , little over another hundred years. The 
eighteenth century was a great turning point in the history of 
modern India. It saw the catastrophe of the Mughal Empire, 
the climax of the Maratha power, the fall of the French and 
the rise of the British dominion in our country. The British 
really conquered India neither from the French nor from the 
Mughals, but from the Marathas. The ultimate failure of the 
last named in building up a free and prosperous Hindusthan 
has prejudiced critics to such a degree that their role in Indian 
history has been greatly misjudged. Indeed, nothing succeeds 
like success, and historians are almost invariably partial 
towards the successful. However, truth demands an unbiased 
assessment. While the Marathas cannot escape from the just 
verdict of historians that they sadly missed a golden opportun- 
ity to create in the whole of India a MaMrRa^ta or 'Great 
Dominion ', we should not be blind to their great achievements. 
There is, undoubtedly, a tide -in the affairs of men, and the 
Marathas were no exception. They were not merely unfortu- 


nate ; but thtV also blundered. They had their own faults and 
shortcomings. Yet, to judge a people in their total effort 
finally we should examine their entire history. We would 
therefore reserve this task for a later volume. At the present 
stage of our enquiry, we can do no better than tentatively focus 
the reader's attention on what the Marathas achieved during 
the four centuries which elapsed between the invasion of * Ala- 
u'd-Din Kbalja and the death of Aurangzeb. It will be ad- 
mitted that this was by all tests an honest record and a proud 

To begin with, we have witnessed how, for lack of leader- 
ship, during the earlier centuries of the Muslim advance into 
the Deccan, Mahara$tra was not merely over-run by the 
Yavana hordes but also all but totally overwhelmed. Without 
trying to recount in detail the nature of this calamity, we might 
roundly characterise the reaction in the words of Sewell, who 
wrote about Vijayanagar : ' Everything seemed to be leading 
up to one inevitable end the ruin and devastation of the 
Hindu provinces, the annihilation of their old royal houses, 
the destruction of their religion, their temples, their cities. All 
that the dwellers in the South held most dear seemed tottering 
to its fall. But suddenly, about the year 1344 A.D., there was 
a check to this foreign invasion a stop a halt then a solid 
wall of opposition ; and for 250 years South India was saved 
.... The success of the early kings was phenomenal.' 2 

Despite this success of the Vijayanagar kings history was 
to repeat itself. Rakkastangadi, in 1565, appeared to have 
undone all the good work of the Rayias. When the sun of the 
glories of Vijayanagar set with the red glow of destruction in 
that fateful year, the dark sky of the Hindus of the peninsula 
was studded only with innumerable orbs of a lesser magnitude. 
The Nayaks and Pbligars, indeed, shed a baleful halo which 
boded no good to anybody in the South. Sri Ranga verily 
struggled heroically to renovate the vanished empire, but he 
was doomed to fail in that anarchical age. His people had 
lost the inspiration, and he lacked the genius and personality 
-to ride the storm. Like the heroes of Rajasthan in North 


India, after an epoch of glorious resistance to thl foreign inva- 
ders, South India as well appeared to have succumbed to a 
spell of exhaustion. But thanks to the character of ^the 
Mafiathas, Hindu civilisation -was again saved. 

The rise of the Manathia power has hardly a parallel in the 
history of India. Neither the Rajputs nor the Sikhs, with 
all their ooble qualities, could ever rise to the great eminence 
reached by the Maiiathas. Even the achievements of Vijaya- 
nagar were confined to the south of the Tungabhadra, though 
its inspiration watered the roots of Mai&thia freedom. The 
uniqueness of the Maraithia movement lay in its national 
character. 3 It was not the creation of any single individual ; 
but it was born out of the sufferings of a great people, a 
people with a number of virtues which gave rise to and sus- 
tained the Maratha effort to build up an independent state. 
The hidden sources of its strength were not in the armories 
which fashioned the crude weapons of the rough Maratfia 
soldiers, but lay in the character *of the people and their 
country. How far the geography of Mahanastra fashioned the* 
history and fortunes of its people is too large a question to be 
discussed here. But we are inclined to emphasise the human 
more than the natural (i.e. geographical and physical) elements 
in the moulding of Manathia history. Race and environments, 
soil, climate, and the rivers, mountains and valleys did 
indeed play a very important r61e ; but we are more interested 
in knowing what the Marathias, so circumstanced, did in order 
to improve their lot. From this point of view, even the much 
discussed ethnology of the people of Maharaja, and the 
K$atriya lineage of the Bhostes and other ruling families are 
of secondary and purely scholastic interest. 4 The total achieve- 
ment was the resultant of all these factors, no doubt ; but it 
was the moral character and political genius of the people of 
MahSmstra that brought about the result which alone concerns 
us here. If race and physical environments alone decided the 
character of a people's history, we can hardly account for the 
rise and fall of nations and states. Even this philosophical* 
question need not divert us from our historical or factuaf 


survey. The^ferathas of our study were confronted with a 
very natural and human problem : namely, the problem of 
survival. They were threatened with cultural and political 
extinction; but they showed guts, moral fibre, and political 
tenacity. By virtue of these they survived, achieved their 
freedom, and, what is of greater historical importance, also 
made creative contributions to the heritage of the Hindus. To 
note these is our main business in this chapter. 

The collapse of the Hindus before the armies of the 
Khaljis and the Tughlaqs revealed the hollowness of the 
Yadava dominion. In the matter of defence of the realm 
the most fundamental duty of every government the rulers 
of Mahar&$tra had miserably failed. The people had to pay 
for this delinquency by over three centuries of political subjec- 
tion to the conquerors. But the inherent character of the 
Marathas their will and courage never to submit or yield, 
their pertinacity ultimately brought them victory and free- 
dom. This was a plant of slow growth, but its roots were 
deep down in the soil of MahaiSstra. The nation was alive 
though fallen for a long while. Its character is to be judged, 
not by its fall, but by its revival. Dead wood does not revive ; 
a corpse does not rise from its grave. The Maratha revival 
showed that the heart of Mahra$tra was quite sound even 
while its limbs were paralysed. More than anything else, its 
faith had not been shaken by the Muslim arms or its vision 
dimmed by defeat on the battle-fields. Through 'blood, 
sweat, tears and toil ' the soul of Maharaja worked its way 
to triumph. 

If the preceding chapters have shown anything, it is that 
the triumph of the Marathas was the triumph of a people, a 
nation, rather than that of a few men of genius. The role of 
the leaders is, no doubt,* of v^ry great importance; but no 
leader can succeed without a following worthy of his leader- 
ship. Maratha history has revealed that the people were not 
merely worthy of their leaders, but that they showed their 
mettle even in the absence of them. Leadership means orga- 
nisation : there was the absence of it under Ramdev Rao, and 


the triumph of it under Siviajl. But a people oijce awakened, 
and awakened properly, can never be put down. This is the 
meaning of the struggle which ensued after the death of Sivajl 
and its culmination in the dynamic freedom of Maharatra. 

It is significant that, when 'Ala-u'd-Din Khaljl invaded 
the country, it was Kanha, a provincial governor* and tWo 
women who fought against the aggressor while the king him- 
self was listless and apathetic. iSankardev and Harpaldev, 
again, indicated the difference between the elder and the 
younger generations. Janardan Swarm, Ekanath and Ramdas 
bore testimony to the essentially pragmatic outlook of the 
people of Mahanastra. As we have explained in an earlier 
chapter, even pure saints like t>nanadev, Namadev, and. 
Tutoaram may be non-politically poured life into the atro- 
phied limbs of Mahiaia$tra and filled them with a fresh outlook 
and energy. A people must have faith before they can fight 
for it. They must have something precious to preserve to 
make it worthwhile dying for it. The value of the work of 
the saints, therefore, lay in making the people conscious of the 
treasures of the great heritage of the Hindus. How successful 
and widespread this leaven was, was indicated by the message 
being propagated by not merely a potter like Gora, a tailor like 
Namadev, a gardener like Savta, and a goldsmith like Nara- 
hari, but also by a maid servant like Jana Bai, a prostitute 
like Kanhopatra, a mahar like Chokha, and a barber like Sena. 
To avoid being misunderstood, it is necessary to emphasise 
that their mission was spiritual, not political; but Ramdas 
showed the bearing of the one upon the other. If Tukaram 
was like St. Francis of Assissi, Rlamdas was like St. Dominic, 
Peter the Hermit and Ignatius Loyola. Sivaji was Mazzini, 
Cavour and Garibaldi rolled into one : the Maratha resorgi- 
mento was a compound of ipany elements and forces too- 
complex and numerous to be simply analysed in terms of 
' proteins and carbohydrates or vitamins a, b, c, etc/ of nation- 

Next to the role of the saints that of the active resisters- 
of aggression like Kanha, Sankardev and Harpaldev, Mukund 


Rao, Nag N|k (of Koo^aina), Sankar Rao (of Sangameswar) 
and the tSirkes (of Khejna) ought to find honourable mention. 
They were followed by a numerous body of adventurers and 
soldiers, barglrs and siledars, karkuns and kamavisdars, rahdars 
and jdsuds, sarddrs and man$abddrs, men of all conditions 
and ranks who, through the very channels of submission and 
service, gathered experience and merits that were to constitute 
the bedrock of self-government. The Desdis and Sardesdis 
the Desmukhs and Sardesmukhs, and even the Kulkarriis and 
Patils were to be the pillars of the new State. At first as rebels, 
then as mercenaries ; later as adventurers and careerists, 
these people of Maharatra Brahmans, Katriyas, Marathas, 
Kuiobis, Kojis and even R^mogSs were, like pebbles in a run- 
ning brook, being shaped into a mighty force by the stream of 
history. To begin with, most of them were unconscious agents, 
but progressively evolving into conscious pioneers of a new 
order in Maharatra. The historical process was transforming 
men of the type of Shahji into those of the character of SivajL 
Peasants were being moulded into TanajTs and BajJ's, and 
women were becoming inspirers like Jija Bai and Tara Bai. 
Baser metal was occasionally found mixed with the gold, but 
the balance was on the whole favourable to Maharatra. Meti- 
culous scholars have laboured to pick out the black-sheep from 
the white, and to show that " among the Marathas not much 
union was seen." The evidence cited, however, is too poor to 
be convincing. 5 Despite the defections pointed out (of some 
Jadhavs, Mores, Khopades and Pisals, etc.) it was the patri- 
otic Martathas that triumphed against the better equipped 
imperialists. As the Amatya proudly declared : ' This king- 
dom was invaded by a powerful enemy in the person of 
Aurangzeb. He used all his valour and all his resources in 
wealth and other things* for the destruction and conquest of 
this kingdom. But all his efforts proved futile by the grace of 

In the following pages, therefore, we shall be citing evi- 
dence, or samples, of the total Maratha achievement rather 
than illustrations of individual genius or accomplishments. It 


cannot be too often emphasised that, as we have ptated before* 
the creations of Siv&jl were also the achievements of the race ; 
because Siviajl himself was a creature of MaharSstra. He was 
undoubtedly a man of superb genius, but not less a Marsha 
on that account. He was the embodiment of the spirit of* his 
age and country and gave direction and shape to a power that 
had already come into existence. Sivajl was great because he 
understood his people their needs, aspirations and character 
thoroughly. He was great because he had the larger 
vision and capacity to exploit the situation fully for the ever 
lasting glory of Mahana&ra. Maratha Svmajya which was 
the combined product of all these forces individual and 
national bore distinct marks of tfie Maratha genius. 

The title of Chhatrapati itself, as pointed out before, 
was unique. So was also the form and character of the ad- 
ministration which 6iviaj! brought into existence. Far from 
being a mere imitation of what prevailed in the neighbouring 
Muslim States and the Mughal Empire, the Mariatha crea- 
tion was an improvement as much in matters of detail as of 
policy; as much in the civil government as in the military 
organisation. These have been very well described and dis- 
cussed at length by other writers, and it is not necessary, in 
our scope, to repeat all that has been said *by them. 6 But 
a few outstanding features might be usefully stressed here. 

In the first stage of their recovery the Marathas, as we 
have noted, gathered valuable experience as mere mercenaries 
and servants. Then came the stage of revolt. Sivajl in his 
earlier days was leader and organiser of this. But revolt is 
essentially negative, though to be successful and fruitful as 
the Maratha movement was it must be inspired by positive 
ideals. tSivtj! was a man of action and a statesman. His 
ideals were therefore embodied* in his actions. We need re- 
call only a few illustrations here to characterise them/ 

The first illustration of his manner and spirit was his 
interview with Kanhojl Jedte and the exchange of oaths which 
took place between them on the eve of the encounter with 
Afzal Khan. The whole account of the incident, reproduced 


earlier, 7 beans authentic testimony to the spirit of dedication 
to patriotic service and sacrifice that manifested itself in the 
awakened Maharastra of those days. The second example is 
that of Sivajfs letter to Malojl Ghorpatfe. 8 There was a bitter 
feud between the two branches of the Bhosle family. But 
Sivajl appealed to the need for unity and tried to bring about 
a combination of all the Deccani interests 'Hindu as well as 
Muftammadan against the foreigners. 'The Pathans should 
be destroyed and steps should be taken to keep the 
Padshahl of the Deccan in the hands of the Deccanis.' 
The third instance is that of 6ivaji's treatment of 
his brother Vyankoji. t His warning to him in the 
classic terms of the Mahabharata is at once an illustration of 
his intentions and outlook. The advice finally embodied- in 
the Treaty between the two brothers 9 is a political document 
of rare value. It clearly enunciates the principles on which 
6ivajS based his administration: they were principles calcu- 
lated to make the! civil and military organisations efficient as 
well as just. Lastly, we would refer here to the great charter 
of civil rights guaranteed by ivaji in his proclamation of 28 
January 1677 (quoted in extenso in the Appendix). That 
his State was broadbased upon the goodwill and welfare of 
all his people, including his Muslim subjects, has been amply 
testified to by impartial observers. 10 There was not another 
ruler like Sivaja in this respect, perhaps, with the singular 
-exception of Akbar. 

The beginnings pf his system have been outlined for us 
in the account given of it by Sabhasad. Though it appears 
to be somewhat scrappy and unsystematic, it is none the less 
authentic and happens to be the earliest connected account 
available of iSivaji's embryo State organisation. We make 
therefore no excuse in reproducing it in extenso. 

"The Raje," writes Sabhasad, 11 "appointed officers and 
framed the following regulations for the management of the 
forts that had been captured." In every fort there were to 
be a havaldar, a sabnls, and a sarnobat, all three of equal 
status. They were to conjointly carry on the administration. 


There was to be a store of grain and war mater&l in the fort 
to be looked after by a karkhams. The accounts of income 
and expenditure were also to be maintained by him. In larger 
and more important forts, there wtere to be five to seven T0( 
samobats who were to divide the ramparts among themselves 
and keep vigilance over their respective areas. Of every 10' 
men to be stationed in a garrison, one was to be a ndik; the 
other nine to be paiks. "Men of good families should irv 
this manner be recruited." Of the forces, the musketeers 
(bandukki), the spearmen (atekan), the archers (tirandaj), 
and the light-armed men (atf-hatyari) , were to be personally 
selected by the RSje himself to m^ke sure that each man was 
" brave and shrewd." The havaUar and sarnobat were to be 
Marathas of good family, whose integrity was to be assuredf 
by some kujrat or officer of the royal staff. A BrShman was 
similarly chosen to be sabriis, and a Prabhu to be Kar* 
khams. "In this manner each officer appointed should be 
different (in caste) from the others." The fort was not to 
be left in the charge of a havaldar alone: " No single indivi- 
dual could surrender the fort to any rebel or miscreant. Irr 
this manner was the administration of the fort carefully and 
newly organised." 

Similarly, pdgas were organised in the army. The siledars 
were placed under the jurisdiction of a pdgd. " To none was 
left independence to rebel." MaraJtha troopers with horses were 
called b&rgtrs ; 25 bargirs were under a havaldar ; a division of 
5 havaldars (with the bargirs under th^m) formed a jumla, 
which was to be under a jumladar'. The salary of a fumldddr 
was fixed at 500 hons, with a palanquin. His Majumdar was 
paid 100 to 125 hons. For every 25 horses there was to be 
a farrier (nalband) and a water-carrier (pakhalfi). Tea jum- 
laddrs were placed under a Kazan whose salary was 1,000 
hons, with a majumddr, a Maraitha karbhari, and a Kayastha 
Prabhu jantms attached. '500 hons were allotted for these 
latter. Salary and palanquin were given to each individual 
according to his rank. Accounts of income and expenditure 
were to be made out in the presence of all the four. Five 


hdzaris were to be under a Panch hazari, whose salary was to 
be 2,000 hons (with a Majumdar, a karbhari and a jamms 
attached). Over five such oflficers was the Sarnobat or com- 
mander-in-chief. The sileddrs also being similarly organised, 
were equally under the Sarnobat. The higher grade officers 
(hazarl, panch hazan and Sarnobat) were further served by 
vaknavises (news-writers), harkaris (couriers and spies), and 
jasiids (messengers) appointed by the Sarnobat. "Bahjrjf 
Jadhav, a very shrewd man, was appointed Nc&k of the 
jasuds under the Sarnobat. This man was selected after great 

The army regulations were conceived carefully and en- 
forced strictly. The armies were to come into cantonments in 
the home territories during the rainy season. Grains, fodder, 
medicines, thatched houses for men and stables for horses were 
to be provided-. They were to march out after Dasard. At 
the time of their departure an inventory was to be prepared of 
all things belonging to eve^y person (high and low). While 
out campaigning in the foreign territories (mulukhgiri) , the 
troops were expected to subsist on their spoils. There were 
to be no women, female slaved or dancing-girls, in the army. 
He who was found keeping them was to be beheaded. "In 
enemy territories, women and children should not be captured. 
Cows should not be taken. Bullocks should be requisitioned 
for transport purposes only. Brahmans should not be molest- 
ed. Where contributions are laid, no Brahman should be taken 
as a surety. None should commit adultery/' 

For eight months during each year the army was to be 
out campaigning in foreign territories. On its way bade, in 
the month of Vaisdkh, it was to undergo a thorough search 
at the frontier. Whatever a trooper carried in excess of his pay 
was to be calculated, deducted or recovered from his salary, 
by comparison with the initial inventory. Articles of very great 
value were to be sent to the royal treasury. If any one was 
found hiding anything, the sorddr (searching officer) was to 
punish him. After they returned to barracks the sardars were 
to account for everything to the Raje. "There all accounts 


should be explained and the things should be delivered to His 
Majesty." An account of the expenditure incurred by the 
army was also to be submitted. If any surplus was due to 
the contingents "it should be asked for in cash from His 
Majesty." Then they were to return to the barracks. 

Saranjdms were granted to those who had worked hard 
during the late campaign. If any one had been guilty of 
violating the rules or of cowardice, an enquiry was to be insti- 
tuted and "the truth to be ascertained by the consensus of 
many," and the offender dismissed. Investigations were not to 
be delayed. The army was then to rest for four months, until 
next Dasara, when it woulcjl mar^h out again according to the 
prders of the Raj& "Such were the rules of the army." 

Similarly, among the M5vaJs, there was to be a Ndik for 
every ten men; and a havalddr over every five Naiks (or 50 
men). Over two or three Naiks was a jundadar\ and a hazarl 
over ten jumlds. The jwntdddr was paid 100 hons per annum ; 
with a sabms who was paid 40 hons. The salary of a hazarl 
was 500 hons ; that of his sqbms, 100-125 hons. Over seven 
hazdns was a Sarnobat. Yesaj! Kank was the first to be ap- 
pointed to this command. "Everybody was to abide by his 

To the Sarnobats, the Majumdars, the Kdrkuns, and the 
men on the personal staff of the Raje, salary was paid by assign- 
ments on the land revenue. The lands cultivated by them 
were taxed like those of the ordinary rayats, and the dues 
credited as part. of their salaries. The balance was paid by 
varat or orders to pay on the Hutur (Central Govt) or on the 
District treasuries. " In this manner were their accounts punc- 
tually settled." Mokdsd mahds or villages with absolute rights 
were on no account to be granted to the men on military service. 
Every payment was to be mfcde 6y varat or in cash. None 
but the Kdrkuns had any jurisdiction over the lands. All 
payments to the army and the fort-establishments were made by 
them. " If mokdsds were granted, the rayats would grow un- 
ruly and wax strong ; and the collection regulations would no 
longer be obeyed. " If the rayats grew powerful, there would 


be disturbance^ in various places. Those who were granted 
mokdsds would join with the zammddrs and rebel. Therefore, 
mokdsds should not be assigned to anybody." 

Karkuns were also to be appointed for investigating into 
the conquered provinces. Intelligent and experienced men were 
to be appointed as daftarddrs in the Majumddr's office in each 
mahal and subd to keep accounts and draft papers. Then, as 
matters progressed, intelligent and careful havdlddrs were to be 
picked out and the subas conferred on them. The mamld of 
each mahal was to be given to a clever Majumdar of the subd, 
" skilled in writing and conversant with accounts." One who had 
not served as a kamdvisddr or one who could not write was not 
to be put in charge of a district or province. "Such a man 
should be sent back on being told either to serve under the 
Bddsdhl (!) or to enlist as a sileddr with his own horse." 

Of the kdrkuns employed in the provinces, the havdl-ddr, 
according to the size of his mahal, was to be paid from 4 or 5 
to 300 hons \ the Majumdar l from 3, 4, 5, 50 or 75 hons. Over 
two mahds yielding a lakh, 1J lakh, and f lakh of hons (ap- 
proximately) were to be a Subddar and a kdrkun. To them 
was to be assigned a salary of 400 hons per man. The Majum- 
dar appointed to the subd got a salary of 100 125 hons. The 
subdddr was expected to maintain a palanquin for which he 
received an allowance of 400 hons. The majumddr received a 
sunshade (dbddgiri) allowance. . .All officers with a salary of 
100 hons, while out on expedition, were required to maintain 
a sunshade. In the home dominions, a subd was placed in 
charge of a tract yielding one lakh of rupees. To the unsettled 
tracts on the frontiers, a force of infantry, cavalry, and militia, 
"as strong as each place might require," was sent with the 
kdrkun in charge of wuhtkhgiri. 

Likewise all lands in the provinces were surveyed, includ- 
ing forest areas. The measurements were fixed as follows : 
The length of a measuring rod was five cubits and five nutfhis. 
A cubit was fourteen tansus (3g) The length of the rod was 
ta be 80 tansus. 20 kathis (rods) square made one bfoga ; and 
120 btigas made one chdvar. The area of every village was 


ascertained according to these standards. An estimate was made 
of the produce (grain) of each bhiga, and after dividing it 
into five shares, three were given to the rayats\ two were taken 
'by government New rayats were given cattle and seeds. 
Money grants were also made, to be recovered in two to four 
years, according to the means of the rayat . The kdrkun collect- 
ed in kind, according to the assessment in each village, at the 
time of the harvest. In the provinces, the rayats were not to 
be under the jurisdiction of the zammdars, the Desmukhs and 
the DeSdis. "If they attempted to plunder the.ra.yrfs, by 
assuming authority, it does not lie in their power." Studying 
the defects and evils obtaining in the Bad&hi provinces, the 
iaj6 demolished the strongholds of the Mirasdars in the con- 
quered parts of the Des. .Where there were important forts, 
he garrisoned them with his own men, and nothing was left in 
the hands of the Mirasdars. "This done, he prohibited all 
that the Mirasdars used to levy at their sweet will, by Inam 
right or revenue farming, and fixed, the assessments in cash and 
grains ; for the zamndars, as well as the Desmukhs, the De- 
kulkaryis, the Patils, and the Karkuns, their rights and per- 
quisites were defined according to the yield of the village." The 
zemindars were forbidden to build castles with bastions. 

Finally, grants were made to all the temples in the country, 
for the proper maintenance of lights (f^nwrfr) offerings (jMfar ) 
;and other services (ajftifa ). Even the state-allowances to the 
shrines of the Muhammadan firs and mosques were continued, 
according to the importance of each place. Suitable allowances 
were also granted to pious and learned Brahmans to unable them 
to carry on their sacred duties. The kdrkuns were to convey 
to them annually the allowances and perquisites granted. " In 
this manner," writes Sabhasad, " the Raja ruled his kingdom, 
continuing his enquiries about the* forts and the strongholds, 
the army and the militia, the provinces and the personal staff." 

The system founded by Siviajl not merely worked well 
under the guidance and supervision of his personal genius but 
also survived the tests of time and circumstances.. The crises 
which followed the death of 6ivajl in succession, and the vicis- 


situdes of fortune which his nascent State and people experi- 
enced during the thirty years which preceded the rise of the 
Pevas, proved the wisdom of his arrangements. Though a 
very large part of the credit for this achievement belongs to the 
system which Sivaji brought into existence, we cannot, however, 
emphasise too often the role of the Maratha people at large. 
Without their grit and sagacity Maratha Svardjya might have 
crumbled into dust under the determined attacks of Aurangzdx 
There is no other instance in Indian history where the people 
withstood organised might on such a wide scale and over such 
a length of time successfully. The sustained Maratha resist- 
ance, practically over the whole of the southern peninsula, is a 
unique and admirable achievement. Except by an assessment 
of the totality of the forces involved, the rise of the Maratha 
nation into all-Indian importance cannot be adequately explain- 
ed. Sivaji was the brain of this mighty movement ; its heart 
was represented by the saints of Maharatra ; and its limbs, 
which translated ideas and emotions into facts of history, were 
spread out all over the co&ntry. 

Apart from the details of the Maratha civil and military 
organisation which it is not our intention to describe here, the 
quintessence of their political genius is contained in what is 
known as the Mnapatra ascribed to the great Amatya Rama- 
vchandrapant Bavxjekar. Nominally it was issued by Sambhajl 
of Kolhapur on 21 November 1716, but in reality composed by 
Ramachandrapant who served under Sivaja, Sambhajl, Rajaram, 
.and Sambhajl II. 1 * In effect it therefore embodies the collec- 
tive experience of four generations of Maratha rulers in the 
most momentous period of their history (1672-1716). 

Born in 1650, Ramachandrapant became Amatya in suc- 
cession to his father (Nilkanth) in 1672, and rose to the posi- 
tion of Hukumat Panhp under Rajaifcm (1689-1700). We 
have already estimated his 'character and services to the 
Maratha State, in the last chapter. In the words of Professor 
S. V. Puntambekar, " His Rajamti is one of the greatest literary 
legacies relating to the War of Maratha Independence and the 
principles of state policy which the great Sivaji laid down." 1 * 


Even in the literature of State-craft in India a% a whole, it 
holds a, place of unique interest and importance. It is not an 
* academic book like Sukramti or the Artha Sastra, but a con- 
densed record of the actual and tested political wisdom of the 
Maratha race. It breathes in every sentence the atmosphere 
in which it was conceived and reflects the empiricism of a most 
practical people. A summary of its main principles ought to 
form an important part of any survey of the early achievements 
of the Matfathlas. 

The first two sections of the Adnapatra deal with the 
troubles of the Kingdom during the War of Independence. The 
remaining seven are of importance because they deal respectively 
with the General Principles of Statfe Policy and Organisation, 
Administrative and Ministerial Policy and Organisation, Com- 
mercial Policy, Polky towards Watandars, Policy regarding 
Hereditary Vrttis and Inams, Policy about Forts, and Naval 
Policy. 14 

Summing up the great work of Sivajl, the 'Adnapatra says : 
' In this manner he subdued every enemy in the way in which 
he should be conquered, and created and acquired a Kingdom 
free from thorns (enemies) and extending from Salheri-Ahivant 
to Chanji and the* banks of the Kaveri ; and he also acquired 
hundreds of hill-forts as well as sea-forts, several great places, 
forty thousand state cavalry and sixty to seventy thousand 
siledars, two lakhs of foot soldiers, innumerable treasures, simi- 
larly the best jewellery and all kinds of articles. He regenerated 
the Marathas of the ninety-six noble families. Having ascended 
the throne he held the royal umbrella and called himself 
Chhatrapati. He rescued the Dharma, established Gods and 
Brahmans in their due places and maintained the six-fold duties 

of sacrifice according to the division of the (four) varyas. 

He destroyed the existence of thieves and other criminals in 
the kingdom. He created a new type of administration for his 
territories, forts and armies, and conducted the government 
without hindrance and brought it under one system of co-ordi- 
nation and control. He created wholly a new order of things.'** 
The preamble closes with the observation : ' In order that 


princes of Ipng life, ornaments to the kingdom, should be well- 
versed in political affairs and that other governors and officers 
in various parts of the country should protect the State by con- 
ducting themselves according to principles of good government, 
His. Majesty (Sambhaja II) has prepared this treatise in ac- 
cordance with the Sdstras. Remembering it well you should 
see that princes are educated according to its principles. Like- 
wise the kingdom should be protected by making all the people 
do their duties in consonance with it and according to the func- 
tions allotted to them/ 16 

The King being the highest functionary of the State, the 
Adndpatra looks upon him as divinely appointed. If the people 
have no protector, who could make for them one common law, 
they would quarrel and fight with one another and be destroyed ; 
this should not happen. All the people' should be free from 
trouble and should follow the path of Dharma. * Out of com- 
passion for the people God in his full favour has granted us J 
this kingdom/ 17 

The sections dealing with the duties of kings, no doubt, 
read like counsels of perfection. But it is well to remember that 
the Marathas, far from being bandits, worshipped high and 
noble ideals. ' Kings who lived in the past/ according to the 
Adndpatra, ' succeeded in this world and acquired the next with 
the help of Dharma.' It therefore enjoins on the King : 
'believing with a firm faith in the practice of Dharma, the 
worship of God, the acquisition of the favour of saintly persons, 
the attainment of the welfare of all, the prosperity of the dynasty 
and the kingdom should be uninterrupted and regulated. . . 
Holding universal compassion towards the Wind, the crippled, 
the diseased, the helpless and those without any means of sub- 
sistence, he should arrange for their means of livelihood so long 
as they live/ 18 * . , 

Appreciating the value and importance of servants, the 
treatise lays down : ' By taking work from those according 
to the functions allotted to them and by treating all with equal 
regard by virtue of his authority, he should keep them con- 
tented and look after them so that none of them would feel 


any want about their maintenance. Everything should be done 
which would keep them ready and pleased in his service. If 
any doubt is felt at some time or other about their conduct, an 
immediate inquiry should be made in accordance with justice. . . 
They should be paid well so that they should not find it neces- 
sary to look to others for their maintenance. . . From amongst 
them every one should be promoted and encouraged according 
to the measure or importance of his work. . .In tbis way, after 
appreciating the merit of every one according to the efforts 
made by him, he should be duly rewarded. Otherwise, if lie 
be given less, "the fault of want of appreciation would fall to 
his credit ; and, if he be given more, carelessness would be 
attributed to him ; but when he knovfe the real nature of work, 
both these faults would not occur/ 19 

The sense of proportion and seriousness of outlook about 
affairs of State is reflected in the instructions regarding enter- 
f tainments, and the patronage of poets, bards and jesters : ' The 
chief function of the King is the effective supervision of State 
affairs. There should be no break in this/ Poets and bards 
should be entertained at the Court. 'But hearing only self- 
praise is a very great fault. For this purpose one should not 
get wholly absorbed in their company by neglecting State 
affairs.' They should not be invited at the time of conducting 
State business. ' Kings should not at all indulge in the habit 
of making jokes. Friends are after all servants/ Too great 
familiarity would breed contempt, slacken discipline and under- 
mine dignity. 

The duty and wisdoiaof consultation is thus appropriately 
inculcated : The King should first think independently of any 
work to be done ; thefc he should consult experts in the busi- 
ness. ' Whatever leads to the success of the work undertaken 
should be done by accepting the Ipest possible advice given. If 
lie insists on his own plan, his servants would not at all speak 
out the merits and defects of the work proposed. Hence the 
intelligence and initiative of servants does not get full scope for 
development, but rather they get atrophied and the work gets 
spoilt Similarly, if he regards the glory achieved as satisfac- 


tory, ther^ he does not feel inclined for further exertion. As a 
result the enemy would find the occasion for an invasion and 
the kingdom would suffer. This should not be allowed to 
happen. While protecting what is already acquired, new 
achievements should always be attempted ; and this should con- 
tinuously remain the aim of the King.' 20 It is interesting to 
note the identity of Ramdas's words inscribed ovei this chapter 
with the last italicised sentence above. 

Intensely practical as the Marathas were they recognised 
that * Finance is the life of the State. In times of need if there 
is money all the perils are averted. Therefore with this aim 
in view the State treasury should be filled/ The advice re- 
garding payment for $ork is equally shrewd and salutary : 
4 Servants should be paid well and without any reluctance. If 
any special work is done by them or if they are burdened with 
a family they should be given something (in addition) by way 
of gifts. But any more salary than what is attached to Sit 
office should not be paid for any special work done in the same 
office. The reason is that if any one's salary is increased, other 
servants of the same rank ask for an additional salary, and if 
not paid they get discontented. If any one's salary is increased 
owing to his influence, the salaries of all others who are of the 
same rank will have to be increased, because they are similar 
to One another. Then the whole organisation will break down 
. . .For this reason salary should be paid according to rules, 
and rewards should be given according to special work done. 
But where the salary is fixed, no change should at all be 
made/ 21 

If so much care and thought were bestowed on the rewards 
and remunerations of servants greater care and caution were 
also necessary in their selection and appointment The prin- 
^ciples and tests recommended for employment in the royal 
troops might be taken as typical of the standards aimed at in 
the entire administration for all practical purposes. "Those 
persons should be employed in the body of royal troops,* states 
the Edict, 'who are very brave, powerful, select, thoroughly 
*6bedient, and the very mention of whose name will extort ad- 


miration in the army and the country, and wno orv occasion 
will inspire terror. Those who are capricious, arrogant, un- 
restrained, childish, vicious, defaming, vilifying and have acted 
treacherously towards their previous master should not at all 
be kept in the body of royal troops. For on the strength anrf 
assurance of the royal army one can remain free from anxiety 
about all matters. At times life has to be hazarded ; other 
soldiers have to be kept within bounds. If this method of 
organisation is kept up, all these things are attainable ; other- 
wise not/ 

But the writer is realistic enough to note that men of good 
character are not easily available at any time. 'Therefore 
while touring round in the country, in the army and in the 
small and big forts, the King should have an eye for proper men, 
and associating with him, in addition to his ministers, the best 
men wherever available, showing kindness to them and finding 
thfeir worth, he should employ them in his body of royal troops." 
If a man commits any wrong deserving of punishment, he 
should be immediately punished. * There should be no weak- 
ness shown out of any consideration. If discipline is at all 
absent in the King's own troops, then how can it be expected 
to prevail outside ? ' 

Further, the Edict adds : ' If any new servant is to be 
engaged, full enquiry should be made about his family, place of 
residence, relations and first seirvice ; and if he is not found 
fraudulent, profligate, or a spy on behalf of others, murderous, 
drunkard, dissolute) very old, incapable of any work, he should 
be kept if found very brave, But no servant should be engaged 
without taking a surety for him. If he runs away after com- 
mitting robbery, murder and other lawless acts, then the surety 
must be held responsible for the offender's conduct. This matter 
should not be neglected. Then the servant remains attentive 
(to his work) and does not go out of control, and the allotted 
work is done rightly/ 22 

Then follow detailed instructions as to <the behaviour of 
kings and the education of princes, with a special emphasis on 
tolerance. ' As the root of a tree makes the tree grow strong: 


in a well^atered place, so the King, who is the root of the 
kingdom and is endowed with virtues, causes the growth of the 
Jcingdom. The reason is that the ideal Hindu King is God 
himself who is the teacher of the whole world and is the distri- 
butor of weal and woe to all. If the King is endowed with 
virtues, then the welfare of the greatest number is possible ; if 
lie is possessed of vices, the misery of the most is the result 
Therefore it is said that the King is the maker of the Age/ 23 

The essential functions of the King are thus succinctly 
stated : * In the kingdom the organisation of royal troops, of 
small and large forts, of cavalry and infantry, the removal of 
the afflictions of the popple, the protection of the people, the 
Inquiry into the prevalence of Dharma and adharma, timely 
charity, regular distributions of fixed salaries, timely taxation 
of the people, and the storing of acquired things, a regular 
inquiry into the State income and expenditure, a resolve to cjp 
works great and small according to their importance after know- 
ing their past and with an eye to their future, the meting out 
of punishment after considering the justice and injustice of 
a thing, and then determining its penalty according to the 
.Sdstras, the organisation of means for removing the calamities 
of foreign invasion, receipt of news by appointing spies in all 
countries, the proper consideration of the duty of alliance, war 
.and neutrality towards another State upon any particular occa- 
sion, and the determination of action according to it, the pro- 
tection of the existing kingdom and the acquisition of new terri- 
tory, the proper observation of the rules relating to female 
.apartments and others, an increase of respect towards respect- 
able men and the control of low-minded persons, the gaining of 
the favour of gods and good Brahmans devoted to the gods, 
and the destruction of irreligious tendencies, the spreading of 
the duties of religion, the acquisition of merit for the eternal 
world, and doing such other duties, these are certainly the 
functions of a King/ 2 * 

These ideals do not indicate that the Maratha kingdom 
was a predatory State. No civilised State could have better 
ideals. But to carry them out it was realised that good and 


capable ministers were as necessary as the King himself 
Ministers are therefore described as the pillars of the kingdom. 
* A minister is one who spreads the King's power ; he is a 
restraint pn the sea of injustice born of the King's intoxication ; 
he is like the goad of an elephant. Nay, a minister is the re- 
pose of the King in this world, because of his administration oi 
State affairs, and the light for the next world on account of his 
protection of religion. Kings have no other relations or things 
higher than ministers ; of all the servants, ministers should have 
the highest respect. Kings should appoint ministers possessed 
of good qualities, realising fully that ministers alone are the 
King's true arms, that ministers alone are his relatives. The 
whole burden of the State should be placed on them.' Yet the 
King is advised not to leave too much in the hands of the 
ministers ; he should himself be active and vigilant. Two points 
a,re particularly noteworthy in these instructions : (a) that it 
is very improper to entrust the whole burden of the State and 
the authority to punish, in all territories; to one man ; (b) that 
the generals of the army should be made dependent on the 
minister. ' In this way, if at times a general quarrels with a 
minister, there will be no difficulty about punishment ; nay, in 
all kinds of work one will be a check on the other. On this 
account, one feeling afraid of the other, carries out regularly 
the laws laid down.' 25 

Nowhefe else was the practical wisdom of Maratha policy 
shown better than in the matter of the hereditary watanddrs, 
mamdars and the vrtti holders. They are described as small 
but independent chiefs of territories and sharers in the kingdom. 
4 They are not inclined to live on whatever watan they possess, 
or to always act loyally towards the King who is the lord of the 
whole country and to abstain from committing wrongs against 
any one. All the time they want to acquire new possessions bit 
by bit, and to became strong ; and after becoming strong their 
ambition is to seize forcibly from some, and' to create enmities 
and depredations against others. Knowing that royal punish- 
ment will fall on them, they first take refuge with others, fortify 
their places with their help, rob* the travellers, loot the terri- 


tones and fight desperately, not caring even for their lives. 
When a foreign invasion comes they make peace with the 
invader, with a desire to gain or keep a watan, meet personally 
the enemy, allow the enemy to enter the kingdom by divulging 
secrets of both sides, and then becoming harmful to the kingdom 
get to be difficult of control. For' this reason the control of 
these people has to be very carefully devised/ 

The directions given for the liquidation of this feudal 
anarchy are a masterpiece of political sagacity. ' Because these 
faults are found in them/ the Edict says, ' it would be a great 
injustice that they should be hated and that their watans should 
be discontinued ; and cm $pecial occasions it would be a cause 
of calamity. If, on the contrary, that is not done and these 
people are given freedom of movement, their natural (wild) 
spirit would immediately find play. Therefore both of these 
extreme attitudes cannot be useful in the interest of State policy 
They have to be kept positively between conciliation and punish- 
ment. Their existing w*t<*ns should be continued, but their 
power over the people should be done away with. They should 
not be allowed to have any privileges or watan rights without a 
State charter. Whatever has come down to them from the past 
should not be allowed to increase nor to become less even by a 
little, and they should be made to obey the orders of the autho- 
rities of the territory. A group of kinsmen or agents should 
not be allowed to remain jointly on the watan. After making 
inquiries, their kinsmen and agents should each be kept in dis- 
tant provinces along with their families by giving them work 
according to their abilities. They should not be allowed to 
get absorbed in their watans. Watendars should not be allowed 
to build even strong houses and castles. If by chance there is 
found anyone overbearing and unrestrained, he should be praised 
and sent to do that worK whieh is difficult of achievement. In 
it if he succeeds or is ruined, both the events would be in the 
King's interest. If he is saved he should be given even more 
difficult work. Watanddrs should not be allowed to quarrel 
among themselves. * They should be well flattered. But there 
are established usages for their behaviour and they should not 


be allowed to transgress even a little. If they ate infringed, 
immediate punishment should be inflicted. Looking to the 
position of watanddrs and establishing, every year or two, pro- 
per relations with them, the King should weaken them by taking 
a tribute and other things from them. When a watanddr who 
has not infringed the duties of his station is near him, the King 
should speak about him to other servants that he is virtuous, 
honest and attached to him, and similarly those words which 
would give encouragement to him. If among the watanddrs 
there are honest persons, it is difficult to get other servants of 
their type. Firstly, if a watandar be a reliable person, and if 
in addition be honest, he is a veritabje flower of gold which has 
smell. Therefore such watanddrs should be gathered together 
with great care ; favours should be bestowed on them, respect 
should be shown to them, royal service should be entrusted to 
, them ; nay, they should be reserved to do important work/ 20 

The same is said about the holders of vrttis and Inams : 
* If they are found fit, they should be told to do higher service, 
but should not bef given a new vtfti, for the reason that if a 
vrtti be given out of public revenue, then the revenue would 
get less hereditarily by so much. Decrease of revenue leads to 
the decay of the kingdom, and to the loss of the wealth of the 

kingdom Similarly, it is a great injustice to give lands as 

in3m$ to servants or vfWt-holders for the purpose of achieving 
a task. A King if he be an enemy of his kingdom should be 
generous in granting lands. The King is called the Protector 
of the 'land for the sake of preserving the land ; but if the 
land be given a<way, over what would he rule ? whose protector 
will he be? Even if a village or piece of land be given for 
every special service rendered, .... then it would so happen 
that, in course of time, the whole kingdom would be granted 
away. . . . Therefore a King who wishes to rule a kingdofci, 
to increase it and to acquire fame, as one who is skilled in 
politics, should not at all get infatuated and grant land to the 
extent of even a batley com. Tb say that servants who have 
rendered service which is useful from generation to generation 
should .be given something which would continue hereditarily 


is not proper. For, when he becomes a servant and accepts 
salary, then it is his duty to do his master's work by great 
exertion and daring, putting his heart and soul into it. 
However, if one has done very meritorious service, which 
could not have been done by others, then he should be given 
-a higher service with a watan or salary attached to it, so that 
there will be no infliction on the people nor any decrease in 
the public revenue/ 27 

During the seventeenth century forts were of the utmost 
value to the struggle for freedom in Maharaja. Hence a 
whole chapter of considerable length has been devoted to this 
subject in the Adnapatra.^ ' The essence of the whole king- 
dom,' it declares, ' is forts.' If there are no forts; during a 
foreign invasion, the open country becomes supportless and is 
easily desolated, and the people are routed and broken up. 
If the whole country is thus devastated, what else remains of 
the kingdom? Sivaj! built this kingdom on the strength of 
forts. He also built forts along the sea-shore. With great 
-exertion places suitable for forts should be captured in any 
new country which is to be conquered. The condition of a 
country without forts is like a land protected only by passing 
clouds. * Therefore those who want to create a kingdom 
-should maintain forts in an efficient condition, realising that 
forts and strongholds alone mean the kingdom, the treasury, 
the strength of the army, the prosperity of the kingdom, our 
places of residence and resting places, nay, our very security 
of life '. 

The last two sections of the chapter on forts are devoted 
to the building, equipment, garrisoning, and administration of 
these vital points. Considering their importance and value, 
it is pointed out, their upkeep, and organisation ought not to 
be neglected even in the slightest degree. 'On that account 
the life of the fort is the Havdlddr ; so is the chief sarnobat. 
They must be chosen by the King himself, and must not be 
engaged on the recommendation or flattery of some one '. They 
should be selected for their valour, self-respect, industry, 
honesty, wakefulness and appreciation of the fort as the dearest 


treasure entrusted to them by their master. 'Similarly, the 
Sabnts and the Kdrkhdnis, who are the promoters of the laws 
laid down by the King, and are the judges of all good and bad 
actions, and who are also high authorities like the Haval- 
ddrs and S&rnobats, should act like them by making all act 
in the same way.' Tat-sarnobats, Bdrgirs, Ndik-wddi, Raj- 
puts, etc. should also be chosen with similar care. 'Persons 
who are appointed for service in the forts should not be re- 
tained if they are addicted to intoxicating drugs or are un- 
steady, capricious, murderous and perfidious. Those who are 
to be appointed should be entertained only on assurance of 
their good character. Even then a r Havdlddr is to be trans- 
ferred after three years ; a Sarnobat after four years ; a Sabnis 
and Kdrkhdnis after five years '. 

It is recognised that it! is difficult to get reliable men to 
work in the forts. Yet, all kinds of precautions are recom- 
mended. If the workers are close relatives they should not 
be kept within the same fort. Desmukhs, Despandes, Pdtils, 
Kulkarnls, ChauguUs and other hereditary Watanddrs who- 
occupy the territory round about a fort should not be given 
service in the forts near it. They should be employed five or 
ten villages away from their watans '. If this precaution is not 
followed they might either prove idle or betray to the enemy. 
If they are found guilty of any offence, they should be imme- 
diately punished without waiting for the termination of their 
term of office. Even if there should be the slightest suspicion 
of betrayal, the officer concerned should be at once removed 
even before 1 the investigation starts. When he has come into 
the royal presence, he should be judged justly, and if the 
charge is proved against him he should be immediately be- 
headed-, without showing any ijiercyc The punishment should 
be proclaimed by beat of drums as a deterrent. If, after pro- 
per and just investigation his innocence is established, he 
should be conciliated and care taken to see that no stigma 
attaches to him. He should not, however, be sent back to the 
same post. 

The instructions in this behalf are clear, just, humane 


and cautious. The rule against employment of relatives in 
the same place is explained in a manner that appeals to com- 
mon sense : ' If they commit any offence one feels constrained 
in punishing them. If proper punishment is not given, others 
find excuse to petition on their own behalf ; and thus influence 
leads to the increase of influence, and the established laws 
are broken. This very thing is the cause of the ruin of a 
kingdom. For this purpose the breach of laws should not 
at all be allowed. The chief means for the protection of the 
kingdom are the forts/ 

Equally detailed- and interesting instructions are given 
about the choice of sites, materials, classes and modes of 
construction. Despite the length of the passage one feels tempt- 
ed to reproduce it as a whole because of its importance. 
Besides, it is reflective of the practical character of the 
Maratha people who have such a genius for details : Forts 
should be built on sites carefully chosen in every part of the 
country, it says. There Should not be any point, in the 
neighbouring hills, higher than the fort. If there is one, it 
should be brought under the control of the fort by reducing 
it with mines. If this were not possible such points should be 
occupied and strengthened. ' The building of the fort should 
not be undertaken only to meet a temporary need. Ramparts, 
towers, approaches by sap and mine, watches, outer walls, 
should be built wherever necessary. Those places which are 
vulnerable should be made difficult by every effort with the 
help of mines, and the weakness of the fort should be reduced 
by the erection of strong edifices. Gates should be constructed 
in such a way that they should escape bombardment from 
below, and they should have towers in front which would 

control egress and ingress. To have one gate to the fort is a 

* i 

great drawback. Therefore, according to the needs of the 
fort, one, two, or three gates and similarly small secret pas- 
sages should be provided. Out of these only those that are 
always required for normal use should be kept open, and other 
doors and inlets should be built up. ... 

'There are several classes of forts which can be built on 



every mountain. If there is a plain in front of the gate or 
below the walls of the fort, a deep moat should be dug and 
a second wall built mounted with guns to prevent the enemy 
approaching the moat. The approaches to the fort should not 
be easy of access. Besides this, secret paths should be main- 
tained for escape in times of emergency. There should always 
be outposts round forts. There should be patrolling by senti- 
nels of the environs of the fort. There should not at all be 
a strongly built house near below the fort, or a stone enclosure 
round any house. 

'Likewise the water-supply must be assured. If there is 
no water, and if it becomes necessary to fortify the place, then 
by breaking the rock, reservoirs and tanks should be construct- 
ed if there is a spring. One reservoir alone should not be de- 
pended upon. For during fighting it might get dried up. 
Therefore for storing water two or three reservoirs ought to be 
constructed. Water from them should not be ordinarily spent. 
The water in the fort should be sfiecially protected 

'Within the fort, excepting the royal residence, no well- 
built house should be constructed. The walls of the royal 
residence should be built of bricks thickly plastered with 
thunam. No cracks in the house should be allowed to remain 
where rats, scorpions,, insects and ants would find a place. The 
compound should be thinly planted with nirgudi and other 
trees. The officer in charge of the fort (Gajkari) should not 

keep the house unoccupied because it is the royal residence 

No rubbish should be allowed to fall on the roads, in the 
market place, or near the walls of the fort. By burning such 
rubbish, and by putting the burnt ashes in the backyard, 
vegetables should be made to grow in every house. In order 
that all granaries and storehouses of military provisions in 
the fort should be free from troubles of fire, rats, insects, ants, 
white-ants, the floor should be paved with stones and chunam. 
Tanks (cisterns) should be made on cliffs of forts in piaces 
where there is black rock having no cracks. If there is even 
a small crack, it should be seen that, by applying chunam, 
no leakage takes place. . . . 


' The powder magazine should not be near the house 

Rockets, grenades and other explosives should be kept in the 
middle portion of the house. They should not be allowed 
to get damp. After every eight or fifteen days the Havaldar 
should visit it, and taking out powder, rockets, grenades and 
other explosives and drying them, seal them again after stor- 
ing them. Guards should always be kept to protect the powder 
magazine. . . . 

'On all the vulnerable places in the fort, big and small 
guns, charkyas and other machines suitable for those places 
and also for higher places should be mounted on platforms on 
every bastion and- rampart wall at suitable intervals. The 
charaks and big guns should be kept on gun-carriages after 
testing the weight of the guns and by giving them strong iron- 
rings as supports. . . .tools for repairing the touch-holes of guns 
and other things necessary for gun-firing should always be 
kept ready near the guns. . . . Grenades and rockets should be 
kept ready at every watch % The officer in charge who says 
that there is no enemy in the country and that when he comes 
he would get ready by bringing things from the storehouses, 
is foolish and idle. Such an one should not be entrusted with 
the work. He should act according to orders blindly and be 
alert even if there is no occasion ; then when the real occasion 
comes there will be no danger. . . . 

' In the rainy season, guns and doors should be besmeared 
with oil and wax, and by filling the touch-holes of guns with 
wax and by putting front-covers on guns sufficient for cover- 
ing their mouths, they should be protected from being spoiled. 
All kinds of trees should be planted in the fort. In time of 
need all of them would serve as wood. In every fort Brah- 
mans, astrologers, vaidiks, the learned, and physicians who 
are versed in mineral and herbal medicines, surgeons, exor- 
cists, wound-dressers, blacksmiths, carpenters, stone-cutters, 
cobblers, etc. should be engaged in sufficient numbers. When 
there is no special work for them they should not be allowed 
to remain idle. They should be asked to do other work. In 
every fort salary, treasury, military provisions, and other kinds 


of articles necessary for forts should be oollectqfi and stored. 
While remembering that forts would not at all be useful in 
the absence of these arrangements, the administration of the 
forts should be carried on as detailed above/ 

The navy was considered an independent limb of the 
State. 29 'Just as the King's success on land depends on the 
strength of his cavalry, so the mastery of the sea belongs to 
him who possesses a navy. Therefore a navy ought to be built 
.... Whatever naval force is created should be fully and 
well equipped with brave and efficient fighters, guns, match- 
locks, ammunition, grenades and other materials of naval use/ 
Then follow instructions about organisation. 

' Every unit should contain 'five gurabs and fifteen gal- 
bats. Over all of them must be a sar-subha. All should obey 
him. For the expenses of the navy the revenue of a parti- 
cular territory should be apportioned. Commerce will be 
naned if the expenses are defrayed out of the income derived 
from ports, and merchants will be t troubled. Harbours should 
be well protected ; otherwise, in cases of need articles of neces- 
sity cannot be brought from abroad. There would also be a 
loss of customs duties and other income. . . . Trade should be 
increased. Kolis and merchants should not be troubled. If 
any one gives them trouble, it should be warded off. Foreign 
ships without permits should be subjected to inspection. By 
taking them under control, by using conciliation and intimi- 
dation, without touching any of their goods, and by giving 
them an assurance of safety, they should be brought to the 
port. In many ways naval and territorial authorities should 
conciliate and encourage them to freely sell and purchase what 
they desire, after taking from something by way of customs 
duties. If there is a great merchant he should be treated with 
special hospitality at government, expense. An effort should 
be made to see that the foreign merchant feels assured in 
every way and attracted to enter into commercial relations 
with the kingdom. Hostile ships should be brought into port 
without any damage and the King should be informed about 


Skipping over the instructions regarding naval fights and 
tactics, we might refer to the rules for sheltering the ships. 
* The navy should be sheltered every year in a different port 

which has a fort facing the sea Then also the whole fleet 

should not be kept in one place, but distributed in various 
places. In the night patrolling, both by land and sea, should 
be done round about the fleet With royal permission use- 
ful parts of teak and other trees which are in the forests of 
the kingdom should be cut and collected. Besides this, what- 
ever is necessary should be purchased and brought from foreign 
territories.. . Even when a tree is very old and not of much 
use, it should be cut only with the consent of its owner and 
after paying for it. Force? should not at all be used/ 

Lastly, we might consider the commercial policy as laid 
<!own in the Adnapatra Merchants are described therein as 
the ornaments and glory of the kingdom. They are the cause 
of its prosperity. They bring goods from other lands, and 
lend money in times of need. There is a great advantage in 
the protection of merchants. For this reason the respect due 
to merchants should be maintained. On no account should 
strong action be taken against them, nor should they be dis- 
respected. By making them establish shops and factories in 
market towns, trade should be fostered, in elephants, horses, 
rich silks, and cloths of wool etc., jewels, arms and all other 
kinds of goods. In the capital market great merchants should 
be induced to come and settle. They should be kept pleased 
with presents and gifts on special occasions. If they do not 
find the place favourable, they should be kept satisfied where 
they are, and by showing them kindness their agents should 
be brought and kept by giving them suitable places for their 
shops. Similarly, by sending an assurance of safety to sea- 
faring merchants at various ports, they should be given the 
freedom of intercourse in trade '. 

Very shrewd precautions about the Europeans are sound- 
ed. * These hat-wearers ( gfcffc% \ are ambitious of increasing 
their territories and establishing their religion. Moreover this 
race of people is obstinate. Where a place has fallen into thrir 


hands they will not give it up even at the cost of their Jives. 
Their intercourse should therefore be restricted to the extent 
only of their coming and going for purposes of trade. They 
should strictly be given no places to settle in. They should 
not at all be allowed to visit sea-forts. If some place has 
sometimes to be given for a factory, it should not be at the 
mouth of an inlet or on the sea-shore ; they would establish 
new forts at those ports with the help of their navy to protect 
them. Their strength lies in their navy, guns and ammuni- 
tion. As a consequence so much territory would be lost to the 
kingdom. Therefore, if any place is at all to be given to them, 
it should be in the midst of two or four great towns, eight to- 
sixteen miles distant from the sea just as the French were 
given lands at Rajapur. The place must be such as to be 
low-lying and within the range of control of the neighbouring 
town, so as to avoid troubling the town. Thus by fixing their 
place of habitation, factories might be permitted to be built. 
They should not be allowed to erect strong and permanent 
houses. If they live in this way by 'accepting the above condi- 
tions, it is well ; if not, there is no need of them. It is enough 
if they occasionally come and go, and do not trouble us ; nor 
need we trouble them '. 

The character of the Marafha achievement during the 
seventeenth century becomes clear from the above cited evid- 
ence. It was both a cultural and a political triumph. It;& 
roots were in the moral character of the people. A down- 
trodden and long-suffering race had reasserted itself with 
vigour and liberated the land and culture from the throttling 
grip of the foreigners. In doing this they had also shaken the 
Mughal Empire to its foundations ; they had made themselves 
the actual masters of their own homelands and- the potential' 
masters of the whole of India. Thqy had created a new State 
and a New Order superior to any that had hitherto existed 
in Hindu India. Their idealism was noble and their organi- 
sation sound : It was spontaneous, healthy, liberal, practical,, 
and was the natural expression of the genius of Maharaja,. 
in short, the concrete manifestation of Mahara$$ra-Dharma~ 


An ampler examination of all its phases and features 
must form the subject of an independent volume. It has 
evoked the admiration as well as criticism of scholars of re- 
pute in and outside Mahanasfcra. We might appropriately 
conclude this brief survey based on objective and contem- 
porary evidence with the following observations of Sir Jadu- 
nath Sarkar who might never be accused of any uncritical 
admiration of the Marathas : Though he speaks in terms of 
givaji the individual, we have no hesitation in extending the 
application of his remarks to SivajI's contemporaries whose 
contributions were not less important or less worthy of appre- 
ciation. Those who outlived him carried on his great work 
to its natural and grand^culmination. The blunders of his 
successors should not blind us in the appreciation of the net 
achievements that stand indubitably to the credit of his 
people, especially during the seventeenth century. 

Speaking of Sivajl, Sarkar writes: "But the indispens- 
able bases of a sovereign State he did lay down, and the fact 
would have been established beyond question if his life had 
not been cut short only six years after his coronation. He 
gave to his own dominions in Maharatra peace and order, 
at least for a time. Now, order is the beginning of all good 
things, as disorder is the enemy of civilisation, progress and 
popular happiness." Then he proceeds to i>oint out that order 
is only a means to an end : the next; duty of the State is to 
throw careers open to talents and to educate the people 'by 
creating and expanding through State effort the various fields 
for the exercise of their ability and energy economic, ad- 
ministrative, 'diplomatic, military, financial and even mechani- 
cal ' : all this was donei by Sivajl. The third feature was 
freedom in .the exercise of religion : ' though himself a pious 
Hindu he gave his State^ bounty to Muslim saints atid Hindu 
sadhus without distinction, and respected the Quran no less 
than his own Scriptures'. ffivaji's political ideals were such 
that we can almost accept them even today without any 
change. Hei aimed at giving his people peace, universal tole- 
ration, equal opportunities for all castes and creeds, a bene- 


ficent, active and pure system of administration, a navy for 
promoting trade, and a trained militia for guarding the home- 
land. Above all, he sought for national development through 

action, and not by lonely meditation Every worthy man, 

not only the natives of Maharashtra, but also recruits from 
other parts of India, who came to Shivaji, was sure of being 
iven some task which would call forth his inner capacity and 
pave the way for his own rise to distinction, while serving 
the interests of the State. The activities of Shivaji's govern- 
ment spread in many directions and this enabled his people 
to aspire to a happy and varied development, such as r11 
modern civilised States aim at." 31 

This, in brief, was the nature oi the Maratha achievement. 


If historical studies have any value and purpose it is to 
reveal the past with a view to instruct the present. This 
depends upon the discovery of the truth about the bygone 
times and its significance to the livihg generation. But it is 
obvious that * the whole truth and nothing but the truth ' is 
beyond recapturing and exact assessment. Nonetheless, we 
need not be cynical like jesting Pilate or consider that ' history 
is fiction agreed upon'. The best historical research, pursued 
with academic honesty, therefore, can recover only a partial 
view of the ' dead ' past. Inevitably this is bound to be not 
merely partial in the sense of being incomplete or fragmentary, 
but also ' partial ' as meaning biased. It is hardly to be ex- 
pected that any writer, however much he might protest to the 
contrary, will be altogether free from preferences or preju- 
dices. These inherent traits of the human mind are further 
coloured by the nature of the sources depended upon. In the 
case of the Marathas, without necessarily being credulous 
about the native versions as absolutely correct, one has got to 
be very guarded in accepting the foreign evidence as more reli- 
able or critical merely because it is contrary. Difficult as the 
task of the historian is, he has, in the last resort, to depend 
upon his own judgment and discretion. I claim to have done 


no better ^n the full consciousness of the above considerations. 
I have consequently been less categorical or dogmatic in the 
presentation of my conclusions. I am aware that, in the final 
analysis, they must stand the dual tests of logic and authenti- 
city of evidence. 

Facts are the bricks of which the edifice of History is 
built. But the architecture is the work of the historian. This 
.accounts for the difference in the presentation of the substance 
of history by different writers. In the reconstruction and 
interpretation of periods and movements in history the atti- 
tude and approach of the historian are not a negligible factor. 
To Grant Duff the rise of the Maratha power appeared to be 
as fortuitous as a forest* fire in the Saihyadri mountains. Sir 
Jadunath Sarkar has found in it no more than the manifesta- 
tion of the genius of supermen : " The cohesion of the peoples 
in the Maratha State," he says, "was not organic but arti- 
ficial, accidental, and therefore precarious. It was solety 
dependent on the ruler's extraordinary personality and dis- 
appeared when the country ceased to produce supermen" 
(Shivaji, pp. 485-86). But to Ranade belongs the credit of 
having pointed out the larger and deeper significance of 
Maratha history which he tracked to its very roots. This is 
not to deny that there were accidental as well as personal ele- 
ments in the shaping of the destiny of the Maratha people. 
While these exist in all histories, it cannot also be gainsaid 
that there have been movements like the Renaissance in 
Europe which may not be explained purely in terms of acci- 
dents and personalities. The Maratha resorgimento was one 
such complex historical phenomenon which, because of its 
uniqueness in Indian history, has not been correctly under- 
stood. There have been religious movements in India, as 
well as creations of political states, like Buddhism and the 
Maurya empire ; but the combination of the two in the rise 
of the Maraitha nationality was more integral and powerful 
than any that transpired before. Yet it was not a political 
movement intended for the propagation of Hindu religion ; 
rather was it an upsurge of a virile people in defence of their 


own way of living : the Maralthias called it Svqrajya and 
Mahdra$t Dharma. Its best and greatest exponents were 
Sivaja and Ramdas. Whatever the degree of their mutual 
acquaintance or intimacy, they were together the true prot- 
agonists of all that the Maratha movement stood for. 

It is absurd to characterise the Maraltha adventure as an 
attempt to establish a communal empire. Once the safety 
and integrity of Mahara$tra Dharma was secured, it ceased 
to be merely or even mainly religious. It tended to become 
more and more political, but the original impulse indubitably 
came from religion. The equality of opportunity afforded to 
men of merit drawn from all castes and grades of society, 
including the Muslims, demonstrated the broad basis on which 
the Maratha State in its prestine form was founded. Its later 
deterioration ought not to prejudice our judgment about its 
original character, which alone concerns us here. 
' A recent writer has attempted to make out a case for the 
economic interpretation of Maratha history.* He has tried* 
to show that Sivajl was the leader of the down-trodden peas- 
ants of Maharastra against the dominating landlord class. In 
this ' class-war ' it was a matter of historical accident that the 
majority of the exploited class happened to be Hindus. There 
were Hindu Desmukhs and watandars who were as much 
opposed to isivaji as the Muslim rulers themselves. It was a 
war of the exploited against the exploiters. However, even 
he does not deny that there were other factors also at work 
in the milieu : he only wants to emphasise that the economic 
incentive was an equally potent force which serverf to drive 
the masses into effective action. While there is room for spe- 
cial interpretations, the nearest approximation to historical 
truth must necessarily be the total view based upon such 
sociological data as might be available. This difficult task 
must be reserved for a special volume. 

Finally, whatsoever the forces at work and they wfere 
various ; and whosoever the personalities and they were 

? Lalji Pendse 


numerous participating in the historical process ; the total 
achievementthe building up of a rich, dynamic and creative 
new order out of an inert, spineless and chaotic mass of scat- 
tered ignorant supine peoples a metamorphosis, the like of 
which had never been witnessed in India before, certainly 
merits the closest, dispassionate and respectful study at the 
hands of historians. Nothing more and nothing less has been 
attempted here. 



1. Briggs, Firishta, Vol. I, p. 304 gives A.H. 693 (1294 A.D.). 
The date given in the text is according to Amir Khusrau Khaza 'in- 
td-Fi4tuh, J. I. H. VIII, p. 238 ; E. D. Ill, p. 69. The latter being 
contemporary is obviously more reliable. 

2. Firishta, I, p. 310. 

3. Ibid., p. 371 ; Ishwari Prasad, Hist, of Med. Ind. t pp. 228-29 
(1940 ed.). 

4. Cf. Fleet, Kanarese Dynasties, p. 74 ; Elliot MS. Collections, 
II, pp. 513-30 ; P. S. & O. C. Inscriptions, Nos. 125, 142 and 202- 
205 ; J. R. A. S. (O. S.), II, pp. 388 ff. and V, pp. 178 & 183 ; I. A., 
X, p. 1Q1. 

5. Venkataramanayya, The Early Muslim Expansion hi South 
India, p. 1. 

6. Sardesai, Main Currents of Maratha History, pp. 5-6. 

7. E. D. Ill, p. 69. 

8. Ibid., p. 40. 

9. Ibid., pp. 148-50. 

10. Futuh-us-Salatm, pp. 223-25 ; Venkataramanyya, op. cit., 
p. 16. 

11. E. D. III. p. 598. 

12. Ibid., pp. 304-10. 

13. Ibid. 

14. ' The ditch of Dowlatabad, the scarp of which is, in many 
places, 100 feet, excavated out of the solid rock, is now one of the 
most remarkable objects of curiosity in the Deccan ; but according 
to the author quoted, it must be a modern work, and executed 
subsequently to the first invasion of the Deccan by the Mahomedans.' 
Briggs, I, p. 306 n. 

15. Firishta, I, p. 311. 

,16. Venkataramanyya, *op. eft., pp. 17-19. 
17. Cf. Dndnesvara Darsan, I, p. 95. 


18-19. Bhandarkar, Collected Works, III, p. 161 ; I. A. XIV 
(Paitfian Grant), p. 317 ; Sisupala-vadha by Bhaskara KavISvara. 


and Llldcarita of Cakradhara. In the last named work occurs the 

reference : <W) flftt ^4t R5[ I 9TO<n3t ^r^t aatWi I 
Ml^^ I (725) ; K. A. Padhye, Lt/e o/ Hemddri, pp. 130-131. 

20. Thana copper-plate inscription of 5. 1194 cited by Padhy, 
Life of Hemadri, p. 248. 

21-22. V. B. Kolte, Bhdskara Bhatla Borikar, pp. 151-52, 203- 

23. S. R. Sharma, fainism and Karnatak Culture, pp. 34-38. 

24. S. D. Pendse, Mahdrdftrdcd Sdmskftika Itihdsa, pp. 100- 
101, 135-36; B. A. Saletore, * Delhi Sultansl as Patrons of Jainas' 
in K. H. R. IV, 1-2 (Jan. to July 1937) ; Med. Jainism, p. 37J. 

25. PSdhyS, op. cit., p. 143 ; Gaz. of Bombay Presidency, I, ii, 
pp. 246-48 ; Rajwide, Mahikdvati Bakjiar, pp. 42-43. 

26. Gaz. of Bombay Presidency, I, ii, p. 248. 

27. Cf. Rana<J, Mysticism in Mahdrdstra, p. 20. 

28. Marsden and Wright, The Travels of Marco Polo, ch. XX, 
p. 389. 

29. c SfoS 3TTq^T ^ Wft I % 5R5T55T ^ 5% ^Nt II 

ST^IS ^13 sra^t i C TT55T ^% n 5n*rH*[ ^ gg i 
^rr %55T f^ng ' states 

Bhaskara Kavisvar in his $isupdla~vadhaa contemporar> r work 
(c. 1308 A.D.). 

30. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. 5, p. xv. 

31. Yule, Marco Polo, II, pp. 230, 302 ; Da Cunha, Chaul and 
Bassein, pp. 14 and 131. 

32. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. 5, pp. xv-xvi. 

33,. Yule's Cathay, I cited in Gaz. oj Bom. Presidency, I, ii, 
p. 5. Early Muslim settlers in the Konkan are also referred to in 
ibid., p. 7. 

34. According to Firishta domestic servants and 'other riff-raff 
elements were hurriedly mobilised for the defence, at the eleventh 
hour. Bags of salt were mistaken for bags of grain ; the discovery 
was made very late while the garrison was without other provisions. 
Cf. W. H. Wathen, 'Ten Ancient Inscriptions/' in the /. R. A. S. 
(0. SJ, II, p. 389. 

35. Futub-us-Saldtin, p. 274 ; Venkataramanyya, op. cit., pp. 
26-29. Cf. Kfausrau, Khazd 'in-ul-Futuh, ]. I. H., VIII, p. 374. 

36. Khusrau, ##. cit., p. 374 ; Firishta, I, p. 369. 

37. E. D., Ill, pp. 201-02. 

3,8. Ebazd 'in-uLFutub, J. I. H. IX, pp. 53-4 ; E. D. Ill, p. 87. 
39. Barani, E. D. Ill, p. 203 ; Firishta, I, p. 373. 


40. E. b. Ill, pp. 87-88 ; Venkataramanyya, op. cit., pp. 50-51. 

41. Futuh-us-Salatin, pp. 325-26. 

42. Briggs, I, pp. 378-79. 

43-44. Futuh'us-Saldtin, pp. 326-27 ; Venkataramanyya, op. cit., 
p. 73. 

45. Tabaqdt-i-Akbari, Eng. tr. i, p. 194 ; Venkataramanyya, op. 
cit., p. 78, n. 5 ; Briggs, I, p. 381. 

46. Ibid., pp. 388-89. 

47. Futuh'US-Saldtm, pp. 340-41. 

48. Nuh Sipihr, E. D. III. Appendix, pp. 557-58, 564. 

49. E. D. Ill, pp. 214-15. 

50. jFor a fuller divscussion on the subject see Mahdi Husain, 
The Rise and Fall of Md. bin Tughluq, pp. 108-24. 

5,1. Ibid., p. 128. 

52. Ibid., p. 124 ; Briggs, I, p. 427. 

53. Nilkanta Sastri, Foreign Notices of S. India, pp. 226-28. 

54. Mahdi Husain, op. cit., pp. 142-45 ; Venkataramanyya, op. 
cit., pp. 130-33. 

55. Firishta calls him nephew ; Briggs I, p. 418. 

56. Nilkanta Sastri, op. cit., pp. 216-17. 

57. Briggs, 1, pp. 418-19 ; Venkataramanyya, op. cit., pp. 133-43. 

58. Briggs I, pp. 419-20 ; Mahdi Husain, op. cit., pp. 144-45 ; 
'Cf. Venkataramanyya, op. cit., p. 146, n. 29. 

59. Briggs I, p. 420 ; Futuh-us-Saldtin, p. 418. 

60. The date of this revolt (742 H.^1341 A.D.) is wrongly 
given by Firishta ; Briggs I, p. 423. Cf. Venkataramanyya, op. 
cit., pp. 192-96. 

6,1. Briggs I, pp. 423-24. 

62. Mahdi Husain, op. cit., pp. 165-66. 

63. Ibid., p. 166. 

64. Briggs I, p. 429 ; H. K. Sherwani, Mahmiid Gdivdn, pp. 

65. Mah'di Husain, op. cit.. pp. 166-67 ; Futuh-us-Saldtin, p. 
480 ; cf. Jour, of the Aligarh Hist. Res. Soy., p. 17. 

66. Briggs I, pp. 43(0-33. 

67. Mahikdvatici Bakhar by Bhagawan Nanda Dutta (c. 1578 
A.D.) which embodies easier traditions. 

68. Briggs II, pp. 286-87; E. D. Ill, p. 619; Venkata- 
ramanyya, op. cit., pp. 197-98 and n. 14 

69. Jour, of the Aligarh Hist. Res. Soy. I, pp. 24-26. 

70. Briggs II, pp. 290-91; ibid., I, pp. 437-41; II, pp. 284-92. 

71. E. D. Ill, p. 618; Nilkanta Sastri, op. cit., p. 219. 

72. Ed. by Harihara and Srinivasa Sastri, with an Introduc- 


tkm by T. A. Gopinath Rao (Trivandram. 1916), cf. R. S. Aiyan. 
Nayaks of Madura, pp. 3-4. 

73. Cf. Baram, p. 484 ; Ishwari Prasad, Qaraunah Turks, pp. 
200-202 ; Venkataramanyya, op. cit., pp. 169 ff. 

74. Bharati, XIX, p. 311, cited by Venkataramanyya, op. rit.,. 
pp. 164-67. 

75. Madura Vijayam ; see note 72 above; 

76. E. C. VIII, sb. 375, pp. 65-66. Ibid. IV, yd. 46, p. 58 ; 
Introd. p. 23j. 

77. Ibid. VI, sg. 11. 
78-79. See note 73 above. 


1. Ranade, Rise of The Mar at ha Power, p. 38. 

2. Quoted by V. A. Smith, The Oxford History of India, p. 28V 
(1923 ed.). 

3. Ranade, op. cit., pp. 27-58. 

, 4. Grant Duff, A Hist, of the Mahrattas, I, p. 45 (Rev. ed. 

5. Ranade, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 

6. Ibid., pp. 3A-32. 

7. H. K. Sherwani, Mahntitd Gawan, p. 48. 

8. Ibid., pp. 158-59. 

9. Ibid., pp. 159-61. 

10. Ibid. t pp. 62-63 and n. 50 ; cf. Denison Ross, Arabic Hist, 
of Gujarat, Introd. pp. xxxi-xxxii. 

11. Brigga II, p. 385. 

12. Sherwani, op. cit., p. 190. 

13. /. A. XXVIII, 1899, pp. 144-45. 

14. Ishwari Prasad, Med. India, pp. 375-76. 

15. Sewell, A Forgotten Empire, p. 65. 

16. Ishwari Prasad, Med. India, p. 3(82. 

17. Nilkanta Sastri, Foreign Notices, p. 232. 

18. Briggs II, p. 368 ; Sherwani, op. cit., p. 41. 

19. Iswari Prasad, op. cit., pp. 381-82 ; Sherwani, op. cit., . 
pp. 40-41. 

20. Ishwari Prasad, op. cit., p. 3&3. 

21. /. A. XXVIII, 1899, pp. 239-40; cf. Firishta, Briggs II, 
pp. 436-46 ; Sherwani, op. cit., pp. 69-71. 

22. Briggs II, pp. 43&40. 

23. Sherwani, op. cit. t p. 128. 

24. Ibid., pp. 129-33 ; Indian Hist. Congress Proceedings, 1935, . 
pp. 31-4X 


25. Brigfs II, p. 424. 

26. Riadhu'l-Insa, 79 and 83. 

27. Burhan-ul-Ma'$ir, 86 ; Briggs II, pp. 483-84. 

28. Riadhu'l-Inta, 61. 

29. Firishta II, pp. 483-84. 

30. Ibid., p. 486. 

3J. Meadows Taylor, Hist, of India, p. 186 (New ed.) ; V. A, 
Smith, 0. H. /., pp. 282-84. 
3. Ibid., p. 283. 

33. Ibid. 

34. Cf. 0. H. I., p. 286 ; Ishwari Prasad, op. cit., p. 405. 

35. 0. H. I., p. 294. 

36. Ibid., p. 295. 

37. Kincaid and Parasnis, A Hist, of the Mar at ha People, p. 443 
(1931 ed.). 

38. O. H. I., p. 292. 

39. Briggs III, p. 31. 

40. 0. //. /., p. 292. 

41. Cribble, A Hist, of the Deccan. I, pp. 205-7. 
42-43. Cf. Grant Duff, op. cit., I, pp. 64-68. 

44. Rise of the Marat ha Power, p. 33. 

45. D. B. Parasnis, Mara^he Sarddr, pp. 28-39. 

46. A Hist, of the Marathas I, p. 69. 

47. Ibid., pp. 68-69. 

48. Ibid., p. 70. 

49. Ibid., pp. 71-72. 

50. C. D. Dalai, Rashtrauclhavansakavya, Introd., p. xvii. 
51-52. Ibid., pp. xviii xix ; cf. Sarkar, Aurangzib, I, pp. 50-53. 

53. Ba&rishna, Shivaji the Great, I, i., p. 39. 

54. Ibid., pp. 41-42. 

55. Ibid., p. 43. 

56. Ibid., pp. 45-47. 

57. Patra*Sdra Samgraha, Nos. 26-29, 36, 92; Balkrishna, op. cit. r 
p. 59. 


Shahji to 'AH 'Adil Shah, 6 July 1657. 

2. Cf. D. V. Apte, Siva Caritra Nibandhavali, I, pp. 15-J6. 


3. L. Jadhav, along with Babaji Kayath, Uda ( Ram, Adam 
K)ian and Yakut Khan, appears to have gone over to the Mughals 
c. IGlGIqbal-nama, pp. 84-5 ; Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, R. B. I, pp. 312-13. 
The final desertion is referred to in Siva Bharat, ch. iv, si. 1-3 ; 
Iqbal-nama, p. 187 ; Tuzuk-i-J ahangm, R. B. II, p. 218. See Grant 
Duff, I, p. 78 ; Balkrishna, I, i., pp. 62-3. 

4. V. A. Smith, Akbar, pp. 276-77 and 282. 

5. E. D. VII, pp. 51-61 ; cf. Sarkar, House of Shivaji, p, 46. 

6. Chowdhuri, Malik Ambar, pp. 118-22 ; Siva Bharat, ch. iv. 
si. 10, 65. 

7. V. A. Smith, Akbar, pp. 248-9, 266. 

8. Gribble, A History of the Deccan, I, ch. xix, pp. 211-41 ; Ibid., 
ch. xxi, pp. 251-62 ; and J. N. Chowdhuri, Malik Ambar. 

9. Smith, Akbar, pp. 276-77, 282, 313-16. Sarkar, House of 
Shivaji, pp. 34-6. * c 

10. Ch. Two, pp. 43-44 above. 

11. Chowdhuri, op. cit., pp. 52-3. 

12. Ibid., pp. 1,15-18 for events leading up to the battle of 

13. E. D. VI, pp. 428-9. ' For a fuller appreciation of M. Ambar 
Chowdhuri, op. cit., pp. 132-71. 

14. Ibid., pp. 118-22 ; Siva Bharat, ch. iv," 10, 65. Cf. n. 10 a, 
Chowdhuri, p. 119 ; Sarkar, op. cit., p. 35 for the part played by 

15.. Jahangir, pp. 256-59. 

16. Chowdhuri, op. cit., pp. 40-47. 

17. Balkrishna, <*p. cit., I, i. pp. 68-9. 

18. Ch. v, ,18. 

19. Cf. Ibid., vi, 8 ; P. S. S., 262, 274, 275 ; Balkrishna, I i., 
p 76. 

20. Beni Prasad, Jahangir, pp. 330-33 ; Saksena, Shahjahan, 
pp. 34-5. 

21. Beni Prasad, op. cit., pp. 343-68, 383-86 ; Sateena, op. cit., 
pp. 47-8. Cf. Surat letter of 29 Nov. 1626 o.c. 1241 Surat to' the 

22. Beni Prasad, op. cit., ch. xx, pp. 387-411 ; E. D. VI, 
pp. 420-28. 

23. Ibid. 

24. Saksena, op. cit., pp. 66-79. 

25. Sarkar, House of Shivaji, pp. 37-38, 55. 

26. Ibid. t p. 36. 

27. Saksena, op. cit., pp. 152-159. 

28. Mustafa Khan was the son-in-law of Mulla M. Lari who had 
been cruelly done to death by Malik Ambar after the battle of 


Bhatvaoli. Hie was a deadly enemy of the Nizamshahi.Swfl Caritra 
Nibandhwan I, p. 23. 

29. Balkriahna, I, L, pp. 76-7 (n. 1); p. 80. Y. K. Deshpande 
in Hist. Rec. Com. Report, 1942 (Mysore), p. 233. Sarkar, Hmtse 
of Shivaji, pp. 38-9. 

30. Cf. Ibid., 39-40; Balkrishna, I, i., pp. 80-3; E. D. VII, 
pp. 7-22. 

31. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 41-42. The error in Sarkar's calculation 
of " two months " (July 1631- Feb. ,1632) is obvious. 

32. Sharma, Mughal Empire, pp. 460-66 ; Saksena, op. cit., 
pp. 66-79. 

33. E. D. VII, p. 24. 

34. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 40, 42-3, 45-6. 

35. Ibid., pp. 46-7. % 

36. Ibid., p. 47. 

37. Jedhe Sakavati gives Bhadrapad 1554 s. as the date of this 
coronation at ' Pemgiri.' Cf. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 46 ; E. D. VII, p. 51 . 

38. Balkrishna, I, i., p. 84. 

39. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 47-8. 

40. Cf. Ibid., p. 48. 

41. Ibid., p. 42. . 

42. Ibid., pp. 44-5 ; Smith, Akbar, pp. 276-77 and 282. 

43. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 45-6. 

44. Saksena, Shahjahan, pp. 159-63. 

45. Cf. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 49. 

46. Ibid., p. 54. 

47. For details of the campaign read Saksena, op. cit,, pp. 145- 
47 ; Sarkar, Aurangzib, I, pp. 35-48 (the terms of the treaty are given 
on pp. 38-40) . 

48. Ibid., pp. 44-48. 

49. Siva Bharat, ix, 5-7. 

50. Pissurlencar in Sardesai Com. Vol., pp. 45-6. 

51. E. ET. VII, pp. 51-61. 

52. R. S. Aiyar, Hist, of the Nayaks vf Madura, Appendix A ; 
La Mission du Madure, iii. 42 (Sarkar, House of Shivaji, p. 7.). 

53. Verma, Muhammad Ndma, p. 24. 

54. B. S., p. 317. 

55. R. S. Aiyar, op. cit., Ihtrod., pp. 18-28; S. K. Aiyanga*. 
Baroda Lectures, pp. 2-24. 

56. Dagh Register (1631-34) pp. 145, 241, 364 ; Cf. Balkrishna, 
op. cit., I, i., p. 109 n. 

57. Balkrishna, I, i., pp. 110-13. Verma, Muhammad Nama r 
p. 25. Cf. S. K. Aiyangar, Baroda Lectures, p. 44. 

58. Verma, op. cit., pp. 25-6. Keladi was the capital up to 1560. 


Ikkeri up to 1639 ; Bidnur thereafter. Read, Vij. Cow. Vo, pp. 255- 
69. Cf. Sewell, A Forgotten Empire, p. 220 n., Rice, Mysore and 
Coorg, p. 158 ; Balkrishna, I, i. pp. 105-8, ii. p. 95. 

60. E. C*. VII, Sh. 2. 

61. Balkrishna, I, i., p. 111. 

62. B. A. Saletore, ' Kannada Sources' in Sardesai Com. Vol. 

63. Verma, M. N., pp. 27-8. 

64. Siva Bharat, ix, 37-39. 

65. Cf. Verma, M. N., pp. 28-30. 

66. Ibid., pp. 30-31 ; S. K. Aiyangar, Baroda Lectures, pp. 47-8. 

67. Verma, A/. AT., pp. 33-40. 

68. E. F. (1646-50), pp 25-6; Cf. S. K. Aiyangar, Baroda 
Lectures, pp. 47-8. 

69. Sarkar, House of Shivaji, pp. 17-19. 

70. Verma, Muhammad Nama, pp. 36-7. 

7,1. Ibid., pp. 48-9. Siva Bharat, xii, 18-47. Cf. Dr. S. K. 
Aiyangar, op. cit., p. 50. The date (1646) given by the last as well 
as his reference to 'Yeshopant Bharve' are obviously erroneous. 

72% For a fuller account of the part played by Tirumala read 
R. S. Aiyar, Nayaks of Madura, pp. 1JO-49, and Jesuit records in 
ibid., pp. 264-69. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 21. 

73 and 74. Verma, M. N., p. 52 ; R. S. Aiyar, op. cit., pp. 265-66 ; 
Sarkar, op. cit. 

75. Verma, M. N., pp. 52-3. Cf. 5. B. xii for others associated 
with the arrest. 

76 Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 22-3 ; Shivaji, pp. 35-38 ; Modern Review 
XLVJ, p. 12. Cf. Diskalkar, Vijayanagar Com. Vol., pp. 120, 122-23. 

77. Sarkar, House of Shivaji, p. 23. 

78. Verma, M. N., p. 60. 

79. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 25. 

80. Basatin-e-Salatin, pp. 327-29. Verma, M. A 7 ., pp. 52-3. The 
fall of Ginji is thus described by the Jesuits : ' The fortress, protect- 
ed by its advantageous position, was besides defended by good forti- 
fications, furnished with a strong artillery and by a numerous army 
provisioned for a considerable time ; it could accordingly defy all the 
efforts of the besiegers. But soon disagreements and divisions sprang 
up among these men (the besieged) so diversified in nationality and 
manners. A revolt broke out ; in the midst of the general confusion, 
the gates of the citadel were thrown open to the enemy who rushed 
into it and delivered the town, the richest in all these countries, to 
pillage. The booty was immense, consisting of silver, gold, pearls, 
and precious stones of inestimable value/ R. S. Aiyar, op. cit., p. 266. 

81. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 24. 


-82. Ibid., p. 25. 

83. Ibid., p. 24 ; Verma, M. N., pp. 55-6. 

84. Sarkar, /. H. Q. VII, pp. 362-64. " The present firman is 
of great importance as throwing contemporary light on the activities 
of Dadaji Kon<J-dev and giving the exact dates' of the Maratha 
acquisition of Kontfana (Simhagarb) and Shahji's rupture with 
Bljapur." tew?., p. 363.. 

85. Shivaji Souvenir, pp. 6-7. The date of Shaji's release given 
therein is 15 fyesfha, 1571 Virodhi = 16 May 1649. For a full 
discussion of the causes of Shahji's arrest and release also read Bal- 
krishna, Shivaji I, i., pp. 127-35. 

86. Sarkar, House of Shivaji, p. 56. 

87. E. F. (1650-55) p. xxxiv. 

:88. Sharma, Mughal Empire, pp. 472-73. 

.89. Pissurlencar, Shivajji, p. 33. 
90-91. R. S. Aiyar, op. cit., pp. 266-67. 

92. Cited by S. K. Aiyangar, Baroda Lectures, p, 57* 

93. R. S. Aiyar, op. cit., pp. 269-70. 

94. Balkrishna, op. cit., p. 144. 

95. E. F. (1651-54), p. 111.- Jan. 27, 1652. 

96. Ibid. (1661-64), p. 174. 

97. R. S. Aiyar, op. cit., p. 267. Also read ibid: pp. 150-161 
and 269-77. 

98. Cf. Sarkar, House o\ Shivaji, p. 30. R. S. Aiyar, op. cit., 
p. 272. 

99. Ibid., p. 279. 

100. Ibid., p. 276. 

101. Ibid., p. 272 ; Sarkar, op. cit., p. 29. 

102. Shivaji Souvenir. 

103. E. F. (1655-59), pp. 249-51 -Revington to Co. d. 10 Dec. 
;1659 ; Balkrishna, op. cit., p. 155. 

,104. Dagh Register, 1661, p. 126 (16 May 1661). 

105. Balkrishna, op. cit., p. 156 ; also pp. 151-52. 

106. E. F. (.1661^64) p. 242 : Balkrishna, I, ii., p. 95. 

107. Siva Caritra Sahitya, IV, p. 21. 

108. Balkrishna, I, i., p. 157 ; S. K. Aiyangar, Baroda, Lectures, 
p. 57. 


TOT J^f 3" | 3R I 


2. ' Abode of Infidelity ' to be converted into ' Abode of Islam/ 

3. Belvalkar and Ranaql6, Mysticism in Maharashtra, p. 31. 

4. Ibid., pp. 19-20. 

5. Rajwatje, Itihasachi Sadhane, vol. VIII, p. 46. 

6. The Mahanubhavic conceits are like the conceits of the early 
Elizabethan writers, and we may say that Jnanadeva stands to the 
Mahanubhavas just in the same relation in which Shakespeare stood 
to the early Elizabethans." B. & R., op. cit.. p. 27. 

7. Paramamrta XIV, 18 and 25. 

8. B. & R., op. cit., pp. 52 ff. 

9. tit (f(KI*) %$T OT$TC I *H*7 


10. B. & R. 0/>. cit., p. 138. 

11. /ftirf., p. 168. 

12. STI^T 

^3. See Macnicol, Psalms of the Maratha Saints, pp. 12-13. 

14. B. & R., op. dt., pp. 183-191. 

15. Ibid. 

16. Abhanga 94. 

17. Abhanga 95. 

18. Abhanga, 102. 

19. Abhanga 106. 

20. Abhanga 115. 

21. Abhanga 140. 

22. Psalms of the Maratha Saints, Introd. 22, 26. 

23. /</., p. 12. 

24. Abhangas 1-2. 

25. Abhanga 5. 

26. Abhanga 5. 

27. Abhanga 11. 

28. Abhanga 3. 

29. W. B. Patwardhan quoted by B. & R., 0. dt., p. 209. 



i ror?ft ^ss^t in^ n 

3,1. Jbm/lr, pp. 255-58. Cf. B. & R., op. cit., pp. 256-57. 

32. Abbot, 6w/. 

33. P5/wi5 of the Maratha Saints, pp. 18-19. 

34. Tukaram, pp. x-xi. 

35. Ibid. 

36. /&n/. 

37. Abhanga 1188. 

38. Abhanga 1091. 

39. Abhanga 859. 

40. Abhanga 2386. 

41. Abhanga 3946. 

42. Abhanga 1445. 

43. Abhanga 1585. 

44. Abhanga 2012. 

45. Abhanga 176. 

46. Abhanga 221. 


48. B. &,R M op. cit., pp. 563-69. 

49. Ibid., pp. 368-69. 

50. /M, p. 422. 


irhrS w 1 3H ?Bft af^Nr i 

Dasabodh XVIII, 12. 


I ^^8t || Ibid., 9. 

52. Anandavana-bhuvana, 27-43. 


| tstf 5^51 II 



55. %^r *ffa % *r% ftcit i siirr ^n^eft ^c swr u vs^ n 

^ i ^rrdt ^fe^r flj 3^ ^R^R n 
( if. <r. ^>f, ^^^ ). 

Read S. D. Pandse, Maharatfraca Sariiskrtika Itihasa, p. 160. 
56. 9TJcf ^T ^flTt I SWT TTft'T ^f^lt I 

i f*T ^pn ^rten i 

I SlcR ^ II ^ II Dasabodh XVIII, 6. 

57. Rise of the Mardthd Power, pp. 1041. 

58. Bhakta Vijaya, 140. 

59. Ibid., 239-245. 
60-64. Pp. 125 ff. 

65. W;. Com. Vol., pp. 122-23. 


1. . F. jR. Surat Vol. 86, p. 102 of 26 June 1664. 

2. Shivaji and His Times, p. 20 n. Cf. D. V. Apte, Sivajici 

in Vividha Dnana Vistara, Sept. 1937. 
p. 118 and relevant notes below. For a brief state- 
ment read Har Bilas Sarda, Sivaji a Sisodia Rajput: a copy of 


Sivaji's horoscope is also given therein. Dr. Balkrishna discusstes the 
ancestry of Sivaj! in ch. ii of his Shivaji the Great, I, i., pp. 35-56. 

4. The date of SivajI's birth assumed by me as correct is .the 
new one, viz. 19 Feb.* 1630. 

5-6. For the controversy on the old and new dates of Sivaji's 
birth (6th April 1627 and 19 Feb. 1630) read D. V. Apte in Siva 
<Charitra Pradlpa ; V. S. Vakaskar in Sahavichara (Tercentinary spe- 
cial no. ed. by C. V. Vaidya and D. N. Apte), pp. 187-293 ; and G.D. 
Tamaskar's series of articles in the Educational Review of Madras 
June 1936 April 1938. Cf. Sarkar, Shivaji, p. 22. D. V. Apte and 
M. R. Paranjpe, Birth Date of Shivaji (Poona, 1927). Shivaji 
Souvenir, pp. 95-110 (Marathl section), 

7. See note 3 above. 

8. For an account of ^ivaneri read C. G. Gogate, *f$KI^ ^SIT" 
-flte fo, I, pp. 64-71 ; Bom. Gaz. (Poona), XVIII, Hi., pp. 153-63. 

9. Grant Duff, Hist, o* the Mahrattas I, p. 87. 

10. According to Chitnis the marriage of Shahji with Tukabai 
took place one year after the birth of Sivajl, i.e. in s. 1550 (Sanes ed.i 
1924, p. 27). Cf. Tanjore Inscription, p. 6; Grant Duff, op. cit., 
pp. 96-7. 

11. Balkrishna, Shivaji, I, i. p. 144. 

12-16. Sarkar writes " It is a fair inference from the known facts 
that by the year 1630 or thereabout Jija Bai lest her husband's love, 
probably with the loss of her youth, and Shahji forsook her and her 
little son Shivaji and took a younger and more beautiful wife, Tuka 
Bai Mohite, on whom and whose son Vyankoji he henceforth lavished 
his society and all his gains?. (Shivaji, p. 23- -Italics mine.) Shahji was 
round about 50 yrs. of age in ,1630 (See Balkrishna, op. cit., p. 58) . 
Presumably Jija Bai could not have been older than her husband. 
According to the 9,1 Kalmi Bakhar she was two years younger 
(Vakaskar's ed. Baroda 1930, pp. 6-7). Considering the hard life led 
by Jija Bai along with her husband and all the known details of her 
vigorous living, Sarkar's inference regarding her " loss of youth " ap- 
pears curious. Tuka Bai might indeed have been younger, but ergo 
" more beautiful " seems to be Sarkar's own embellishment. Sivaji 
and his mother were at Bangalore until the boy was 12 years of age 
according to Sabhasad. If he had been neglected by his father, as 
alleged, he need not have moved hisf little finger for the release of 
'his father. The entire relations sketched by me in the text consti- 
tute a refutation of Sarkar's misreading of Shahji's attitude towards 
Jija Bai and Sivaji. Cf. Sen, Siva Chhatrapati pp. 164, 174-75; 
Sardesai, Mardfkt Riyasat, I, p. 82 ; and Siva Bharat IX, 60. 


17. Sarkar, Shivaji, p. 37. Randulla Khan who died in 
could not have been the cause of Shahji's release in 1649 ! See 
P. S. S. 488 and Kincaid, I, p. 143. 
'18. Read pp. 79-80 ante. 

19. Sabhasad, pp. 3 and 164. Cf. Grant Duff, op. cit., 97 and 
102. The traditional view of Dadaji, recorded by Grant Duff, the 
editor (S. M. Edwards) notes, may have to be modified in the light 
of further research. 

20. Sabhasad, p. 4. The 12 Mavajs referred to by Sabhasad 
were i. Rohujkhor, ii. Velvan<J, iii. Muse, iv. Muthe, v. Jor, vi. 
Kanaicj, vii. Sivthar, viii. Murum, ix. Pautf, x. Gunjan, xi. 
Bhor, and xii. Pavan. Sen, Siva Chhatrapati pp. 3-4 ; cf. Sarkar,, 
Shivaji, pp. 24-30. 

21. Sarkar, House o] Shivaji, pp. 85-6. 

22. See note 18 above. c 

23. Verma, M. N., pp. 36-7 ; Cf. Basatm-e-Salatln, pp. 328-29. 
' The country which had nothing but idol-worship and infidelity for 
centuries was illumined with the light of Islam through the endeavours 
and good-wishes of the King . . . Mosques were erected in the cities 

1 which were full of temples and preachers and criers were appointed 
in order to propagate Islam/ 

24. See p. 61 and note 29 Ch. Ill a'bove for the murder of the 
Jadhavas. Kheloji Bhonsle is referred to by Sarkar as Sivaji's^ 
grand uncle, Shivaji, p. 31. For an account of Bajajl Nimbalkar, 
see Shivaji Souvenir, Marathi section, pp. 165-86. 

25. Siva Bharat, xviii, 52-54 ; V. S. Bendrey, Dandaniti, p. 63. 

26. 'Watters' Yuan Chwvng, ii, p. 239. 

27. Hist, of the Mar. I, p. 103. 

28. Ibid. 

29. Sarkar, Shivaji, pp. 25-6. 

30-31. For the importance of the part played by geography irr 
the rise of the Maratha power read Sivaji Nibandhdvali, pp. 330-33. 
The Adnd-patra states : 

See S. N. Banhatti's article in Rawdas hnd Rdmdasi, Vol. 50, pp.. 
3755; also read Shivaji Souvenir, pp. 48-94 (Marathi section). 

32. See note 20 above. 

33-35. Sambhajl Mohite was a brother of Tuka Bai the secondK 
wife of Shahji. Balkrishna, Shivaji, I, ii., pp. 25-6. 

36. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 39-40. 

37. Sharma, Mughal Empire, pp. 90-93 ; 138. 


38. Ibi, pp. 285-86. Cf. Smith, Akbar, p. 287. 

39. Balkrishna, op. cit., pp. 24-5. 

40. Siva Bharat, Chs. XII-XV ; Rawlinson, Source Bk. of Mar, 
Hist., pp. 13-19. Cf. Balkrishna. op. cit., pp. 27-8. 

41. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 44. 

42. Ibid., pp. 42-43, 

43. Ibid., p. 43. 

44-46. The relevant passage in Sabhasad is reproduced in full 
here for reference : 




47. Sarkar, op. cit. t p. 43. Cf. Rawlinson, Source Bk., pp. 54-5. 

48-49. Ibid., p. 44. Cf. 91 Kalmi Bakhar, para. 29. B. B. 
Misra "The Incident of Jayli" in the Jfiurn. of Ind. Hist. (April 
1936), pp. 54-70 ; S. N. Sen, Sardesai Com. Vol., pp. 197-201 ; C.V. 
Taidya, Shivaji, pp. 64-71 ; and Balkrishna, op. cit. pp. 31-39. 


50. Shivaji Souvenir, p. 7. This finds remarkable* confirmationi 
in contemporary letters: P. S. S. 553, 557 (June- July 1649). 

51. Shivaji Souvenir, p. 52. 

52-53. Rawlinson, Source Bk., pp. 55-57. 

54. Rawlinson, Source Bk., p. 56 ; Balkrishna, op. cit., p. 32: 
Siva Bhdrat, xviii, 8-9. 

55-57. P. S. S. 557, 615, 627. Balkrishna, op. cit., p. 33. Misra. 
/. /. H., April 193|6, pp. 64-7. The rebellion of Hanmant Rao is 
referred to by Subhasad and the Jedhe Karma, as well as, in P. S. 
S. 564 and 567. 

58-59. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 43. Cf. Misra, op. cit., pp. 64-65 ;. 
Rawlinson, op. cit., p. 56. 

60-62. Texts cited (Sen and Sane). 

63. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 33. 

64. Ibid., 45-47. c 

65-66. Ibid.. 51-54. Cf. Rawlinson, op. cit., p. 60; P. S. S.. 

67-68. Shivaji Souvenir, pp. 52-3 ; Sarkar, op. cit., p. 56 ; Pis- 
( surlencar, Shivaji, p. 4. 

69. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 56. Mahuli referred to here (my friend 
Prof. Oturkar points out to me) is in tfee Thana Dist., not that in 
Satara Dist. 

70. Shivaji Souvenir, pp. 53-6. 

71. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 73. 

72. Sabhasad ; Sen, Siva Chhatrapati, p. 9. 

73. E. F. R. V, i, p. 3 ; Sarkar, op. cit., p. 60. 

74. Ibid., p. 63. 

75-76. Cf. Ibid., p. 68. Balkrishna, op. cit., pp. 49-58. 

77. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 75-77, particularly n. on p. 77. Bal- 
krishna, op. cit., pp. 53-54, p. 58. 

78. P5rasnis MS. letter no. 5 ; Sarkar, 0/;. cit., p. 49. Sabhasad ; 
Sen, op. cit., p. 4. 

79. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 34, 81. 

80. Ibid., p. 88. 

81. F. 1?. Surat Vol. 103 ; E. F. vol. 1661-64, p. 236 Balkrishna, 
op. cit., pp. 80 ff. For career of ha 'ista Khan, ibid., p. 76. 

82-83. F. R. Surat, 86 : to Karwar ahd to Co. 

84. D. R. pp. 543-45 ; Balkrishna op. cit., p. 92. 

85. D. R., p. 455 (20 July 1663,). 

86. Sabhasad ; Sen, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 

87. For Bijapur diplomacy and the desperate efforts to tackle 
Sivaji through the Desais of Sawantwadi and the Portuguese read 
Balkrishna, op. cit., pp. 96-7. 


88. Thomas Browne, Vol. I, pp. 426-37 ; Balkrishna, op. cit., 
pp. 210-^1. 

89-90. Ibid., pp. 230-31 ; also pp. 210-11. 

91. Ibid., pp. 213-21. 

92. Ibid., p. 232. 

93. E. D. VII, pp. 88-89 ; Sharma, Mughal Empire, pp. 792-93. 

94. Br. Museum Sloane MSS. No. 1861, I. A., Dec. 1921. Bal- 
krishna, op. cit., p. 220. 

95. Ibid., pp. 226-27 ; Thevenot, III, ch. xvii. 

96. Sen, Foreign Bibliographies of Shivaji, pp. 73-6. 

97. Balkrishna, op. cit., p. 232. 

98-100. J. C. De, Indian Culture, VI-VII, articles on the Surat 

101. Sen, Foreign Biographies, pp. 360-62. 

102. Ibid., pp. 73 ff ; cf. other foreign accounts in Balkrishna, 
Shivaji, I, ii, pp. 190 ff. 

103. Ibid., pp. 79-80. 

104. The Dutch losses amounted to f. 20,000 (1,700). Ibid.. 
pp. 371-72. It is obvious that the compensation granted was not 
uniform in all cases. 

105. Shivaji, pp. 178-79, 

106. Ibid., p. 103. 

107. Ibid., pp. 106-07. 

108. Sen, op. cit., pp. 82-84 ; 40, 49. 
,109. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 125. 

110. Ibid., pp. 121-22. 

111. Ibid., p. 131. 

112-113. E. D. VII, pp. 272-75. 

1,14-115. Sarkar, House oj Shivaji, 143. 

116. Ibid., pp. 129-47. 

117-118. Ibid., pp. 130-31. 

119. Shivaji and His Times, p. 158. 


1. The crown quotation is from Nischalapuri who was a 
Tantric who brought about a second coronation ceremony of Sivaji 
in accordance with his cult; after the Vedic rites had already been 
performed. His work entitled Sri Siva-rajyabhiseka-kalpatant has 
been edited by D. V. Apte (B. I. S. M. Quarterly, Vol. X, ,1 March- 
June 1929). See V. S. Bendrey, Danfamti, p. 66 and p. 34, n. 57. 

2. Sarkar, Shivaji, p. 141. 

3. Ibid., pp. 130-31 ; House of Shivaji, pp. 124-27. 

4. Sarkar, Shivaji, p. 134. 


5. Ibid., p. 137. 

6. Ibid., p. 160. 

7. Parasms JMS. letter No. 11. 
8-9. Shivaji Souvenir, p. 16. 

10. E. F., Surat vol. 105 ; ,1668-69, p. 269. 

11. Sen, Siva Chhatrapati, pp. 72-73. 

12. Acworth, Ballads of the Marathas, p. 55. 

13. Sen, op. cit.* p. 75. 

14. Shivaji, p. 166. 

15. Ibid., p. 167. 

16. E. F. 1668-69, pp. 256-57.~23 Jan. 1670. Cf. Sharma, 
Mughal Empire, pp. 523-39 for Aurangzeb's religious policy. 

17. Sarkar, op. cit., ,166-67. 

18. Sarkar, Aurangzib, III, pp. 319-20. 

19. E. D. VII, pp. 183-85. * 

20. Ibid., p. 293 ; Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 318, 323. 

21. Ibid., p. 166. 

22. Sharma, Mughal Empire, p. 526. 

23. Sarkar, House of Shivaji, pp. 98-100. 

1 24. Sarkar, Shivaji, pp. 170-73. Cf. Manucci, II, pp. 162-67 ; 
F. /?., Surat, vol. 105 pt. ii (fl. 20-21), Bombay, 5 Sept. 1670. 

25. F. 1?., Bombay, vol. ,19, p. 27 (Surat to Bombay). 

26. Consultations, Surat, 16 Mar. 1670, and Swally Marine, 
2 Oct. 1670. 

27. Sarkar, Shivaji, p. 178. 

28. Balkrishna, op. cit., I, ii, p. 328. 

29. Ibid., pp. 328-31. 

30. O. C. 3515, 20 Nov. 1670. 

31. Sabhasad, 65. Cf. Sarkar, \op. cit., pp. 180-82. 
32-33. Ibid., p. 189. 

34-36. Sabhasad, 75-76. English records confirm this victory, 
though the Persian records are silent about it 0. C. 3633, Surat 
to Co., 6 April 1672. 

37. Surat, vol. 3, fl. 25 Surat Cons., 26 Oct. 1672. 

38. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 192-94. 

39. Bombay to Surat, Oct. 1673 ; Balkrishna, op. cit., pp. 343- 

40. F. /?., Surat, 106. 

41. Sabhasad, 79 ; Jedhe Sakavali gives the date. 

42. E. D. VII, p. 288. 

43. Balkrishna, op. cit., pp. J.-2. , 

44. Sabhasad ; Sen, Siva Chhatrapati, pp. 113-18. 

45. Sen, Foreign Biographies, pp. 456-61". 

46. Ibid., pp. 461-62 O. C. vol. 35, No. 3965. 


47. For&gn Biographies, pp. 467-68. 

48. Travels in India, pp. 263-64. 

49. Dutch Records, XXXIV, No. 841, 13 Oct. 1674. 

50-52. Ibid. The controversy regarding the ritualistic details 
of the coronation are of secondary interest. The political import- 
ance of the ceremony has been brought out in the text. [P. 181, 
1. 21 For dhwaya read dhwaja.] 



T ^ft 



(K. S. Thackerey, Gramanyacd Svdyanta Iti- 
hdsa, 154-55, Bombay, 1919.) 
54. See note 49 above. 


1. Vyankojl was the son of Tuka Bal Mohite the second wife 
of Shahji. Sivaji born of Jija Bal was elder in years as well as by 
the seniority of his mother as the first wife of Shahji. 

2. Until the subjugation of Kamatak by Sivaji in 1677 Vyan- 
koji, not only technically, but also by personal choice and inclination 
preferred his subordination to Bijapur. Read text p. 188 ante. 

3. Rawlinson, Source Bk. of Mar. Hist., pp. 129-31 ; Balkrishna, 
op. cit., pp. 284-86. 

4. Sen, ^Foreign Biographies, pp. 502-04. 

5. Sen, Siva Chhatrapati, pp. 231-32. 

6. Sarkar, Shivaji, pp. 285-86. 

7. Sen, op. cit., pp. 119-20. 

8. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 290. 

9. Ibid., pp. 294-95. 

10. Balkrishna, op. cit., pp. 281-84. 

11. See R. S. Aiyar, Nayaks of Madura, p. 280 ; La Mission dn 
Madure, iii, p. 273. 

12. Balkrishna, op. cit., pp. 227-28. 

13. Dagh Register, p. 3192 Oct. 1677. 

14. Ft. St. George, vol. 18, p. 42 (24 Aug. 1677). 

15. La Mission du Madure, iii, p. 27,1. 

16. Sen, Foreign Biographies, p. 317. 

17. F. R. Surat vol. ,107, pt. ii, fl. 24. 

18. La Mission du Madure iii, p. 271. 

19. Ibid, pp. 281-82. 

20. Ft. St. George Records, vol. 27, pp. 17-18 (16 July 1677). 

21. La Mission du Madure, iii, p. 273. 

22. 'Ft. St. George, Diary and Consultation Bk. (,1678-79) p. 67. 

23. Dagh Register, 28 Aug. ; 1678, p. 458 ; 10 Nov. 1678, p. 642. 

24. La Mission du Madure, iii, p. 249. 

25. Sen, Siva Chhatrapati, p. 129. 

26. Ibid., pp. 2S2-36 ; Cf. Balkrishna, op. cit., pp. 286-289. 

27. H. Gary's Report to the Co. dated Bombay 16 Jan. 1678 
o. c. 43,14. 

28. Sabhasad, 90. 

29. English Diary and Consultations (1678-79), pp. 105-06. Cf. 
Sarkar, Shivaji, pp. 308-9. 

30. Shivaji. pp. 366-67 n. (1919 ed.) 


31. Sarftar, Shivaji (1929 ed.), p. 280. 

32. Ibid., pp. 286-87. 

33. Ibid., p. 309. 

34. Ibid., pp. 311-12 and 312 n. 

35. Ibid., pp. 308-9. 

36. Dagh Register, 2 Oct. 1677, p. 319. 

37. Cited by Sen, Siva ft Nibandhavali, I (Eng. Section), 
pp. 58-9. 

38. Ft. St. George Records, 1672-78, pp. 112-13. 

39. Ibid., & June 1677, p. 115. 

40. [This ref. no. is erroneously printed in the text as '30.] lbid. f 
Vol. 27, p. 28. 19 June 1677. 

41. 0. C. 4266 ; Sen, Foreign Biographies, pp. 472-74. 

42. R. S. Aiyar, Nayaks^ o] Madura, pp. 176-77 ed. note by Dr. 
S. K. Aiyangar. Cf. B. I. S. A/. Quart., 1937, No. 68, pp. 136-44. 


1. Sabhasad (65-66) also states that Sivaji 'protected and pro- 
perly maintained those who accepted his Kaul.' 

2. E.g. read my Mughal Empire, pp. 410-418, 604-618 and 853- 
859 depicting the relations 'with the Europeans. 

3. Janjira island is 45 miles s. of Bombay, i mile to the e. on 
the mainland are Danda and Rajapuri on opposite sides of the Raja- 
puri creek. These three places were of very great commercial and 
strategic value, as will be clear from their history dealt with in the 
text. Read B. K. Bhonsle, Janjira Satnsthanca Itihds for a fuller 
account ; E. D. VII, p. 256. 

4. F. R., Surat vol. 88, Letters and Memorial, Rairy, 21 May 

5. The Siddis being Abyssinians were as much foreigners as the 
Portuguese, French, Dutch and the English. Their attitude towards 
Sivajl was mo/e persistently hostile. 

6. P. 143 ante. 

7. Pissurlencar, Shivaji, p. 4. 

8. Surat, vol. 86 Surat to Co., 26 Nov. 1664. 
8A. Fryer, Travels II, p. 66. 

9. Read Shejwalkar's' art. on the Basrur expedition in the Bul- 
letin of the Detcan College Post-graduate Research Institute voi 
IV, No. 2, pp. 135-144. 

10-11. See text pp. 21,1-12 ante. 

12. Hubli was sacked in 1664-5 and 1673. F. R. Surat vol. 86, 
p. 10226 June 1664, Surat to Carwar speaks of ' that mart of our 
Carwar factors where we sell and buy most of the goods that post 


affords us'; Hubli, a great inroad town and a mart tit very con- 
siderable trade.' Ibid. vol. 87, p. 54, 1 Nov. 1673; O.C. No. 3779 of 
31 May 1673. Also E. F. India 1665-67, pp. 75-76 ; Surat vol. 104, 
p: 212 of 6 Jan. A665 ; and F. R. Surat, vol. 106, pp. 145-6 of 2 Sept. 
1673 ; ibid., fl. 100-110 of 14 May 1673 ; 0. C. vol. 34 No. 3786 of 
17 May 1673. 

13. Cf. Dagh Register, Bl. 445, 7 Feb. 1676. 

14. F. R. Surat, 103 ; Gyffard to Surat, 24 May 1663 and 22 
June 1663. 

15. Sarkar, Shivaji, p. 235. We cannot! say how far Sivaji was 
provoked into this *' massacre of the Ghorpa<Jes " by the memory of 
Bag's role in the arrest of ShahjT in ,1648. Cf. Sabhasad p. 54 
(Sana's ed.). 

It is important to note that thig, passage mentions neither 
the Mudhol " massacre " nor the: " popular tradition " about the 
motive of revenge (for Baji's rdle in the arrest of ShShji in 1648). 
The only other authority cited for this enbellishment is the Jedhe 
Sakavali. The entry therein, however, simply reads : 

t. (Sivorcaritra-Pradlpa, p. 23). 
It means: ' Saka 1586 Krodha Samvatsara, in the month of Kartika, 
'Adilshahi and Raje Sri Swami having fallen out, and Khawas Khan 
having come to Kudal, Raje Sri Swiami, with his army, went and 
struck down Ghorpa<Je, fought with Khawas Khan, and he fled over 
the Ghats. Sarje* RBo Jedhe who was in that action, fought vali- 

The distinguished part played by Sarj Rao Jedhe in this engage- 
ment having attracted the special attention of the chronicler, this 
entry in the Sakdvali acquires a particular authenticity. The month 
Kdrdka of the Krvdha year (saka 1586) corresponds to 10th Oct. 
7th Nov. 1664 (Ephimeris). The destruction of the Ghorpades took 
place while Khawas Khan was in Kudal ; and his fight with $iv dji 
and flight over the Ghats followed after the Ghorpade incident. These 
happenings are recounted in this* seqifence in an undated letter 
(c. 1664) supposed to have been written by SivSji, and opening with 
the terms of address: qft'^R' ^fcft. These words mean : ' In the 
service of the Parent' (either father or mother), and it has been 
argued, that this letter must have been written by Sivaji to his 
mother, since Sftahji had died on 23rd January 1664. The letter re- 
counts incidents that took place at the end of that year, but quotes 


the purport'of a letter received to which it was presumably a reply. 
The translation of this letter given in the Shivaji Souvenir (pp. 145- 
46) is not idiomatic. It opens with ' At the service of Father '; ____ 
and the recounted wording is rendered as ' You are aware of 
the critical situation in which / found myself a few years ago in the 
Bijapur Darbar ---- ' (referring to Sahji's imprisonment in 1648). 
Stricter adherence to the conventions of the language and society 
would warrant its being put only in indirect speech : JctSHgtl 3 
iffi 33c ' the visit to Bijapur came about/ No one who is familiar 
with the charming indirectness in which a Hindu wife refers to her 
husband or his actions will miss the correct import of this expression. 
Hence it does not mean " what happened to me" as crudely implied 
by the English translation in the Souvenir. There is therefore 
nothing to preclude, if the letter is genuine, its having been addressed 
to Jijabai. Cf. Balkrishna, *I, ii. pp. 539-40 ; C. V. Vaidya, Shivaji, 
pp. 164-70. But C. V. Vaidya has strenuously argued for the greater 
plausibility of its being addressed to Shahji, and has consequently 
found it necessary to antedate the events referred to therein, re- 
jecting the date recorded by the Sakavali. No one has questioned the 
authenticity of the letter. Though it may not be possible to fix its 
address or date beyond dispute, its contents serve to confirm the two 
important facts recorded in the Sakavali. The destruction of Mudhol 
and its motive are also referred to therein. We are further informed 
that Mudhol jagir was annexed by Sivaji: 

Ali Adilshah, however, regranted Baji's jagirs to his son MSUoji, 
in perpetuity, in view of his father's " martyrdom " in the service of 
his Sarkar. It is important to note that, in the royal firman, there 
is not even an allusion to any barbarity committed by Sivaji : " And 
a dispute and fight also took place between the supreme (and) most 
holy Sarkar and Shivaji Rajah Bhonsle ; in the fight your father 
having displayed gallantry and heroism and self-sacrifice, and having 
(thus proved himself) useful in every respect to the most holy 
Sarkar, died like a martyr." Balkrishna, op. cit., I, i. firman dated 
20th Oct. 1670 (end of the vol.). 

The " massacre of the Ghorpades " finds no support anywhere. 
Sivaji's letter says "3T*ft *?fft% apfeck <sll3 5*fo qg%.' Baji was killed 
and many of his own men (troops) fell. A Dutch record as well 
speaks in very similar terms : " The victory gained by the rebel in 
taking Captain Corpora by surprise was far from what Chaveschan 
expected, as that person was certainly one of the most excellent com- 
manders. He got so severely wounded that he soon died and lost 
200 men besides all the cash .... Gorpara's men who escaped though 


no more than 300 horsemen, made it so hot for Sivasi^iear Carra- 
patam and Waim above the Ballagatta, that the same is said to have 
hastened the breaking up of his camp from here." Dagh-Register ; 
Balkrishna, op. cit., II, ii. p. 533^ In a very frank letter addressed to 
Maloji, in 1677, Sivaji writes : " From time to time enmity began 
to grow between your and our families. In several contests you kill- 
ed our persons and we yours. As a prominent instance, our people 
killed, in the contest, your father Baji Ghorpade. Mutual enmity 
continued in this way." He then invites Maloji's oof-operation in 
what he explains as their common interest, namely, to see that Deccan 
is in the hands of the Deccanees. Ibid. II, i. pp. 282-83. 

16. Sabhasad, 69. 

17-18. Balkrishna, op. cit., I, ii., p. 527. 

19-20. F. /?., Karwar to Surat, 29 Aug. 1665. 
We should point out here Sir Jadunath Sarkar's confusing refer- 
ence to Bahlol Khan in the context of the suppositious victory of 
Khawas Khan over Sivaji. He gives a common Index reference 
(p. 234) to both Khawa Khan and Bahlol Khan. The latter name, 
, however, does not appear on that page, though in the ft. n. that of 
Md. Ikhlas Khan does. But this was a brother of Khawas, and his 
second defeat and expulsion from S. Konkan (Nov. 1665) are refer- 
red to therein. Who then was Bahlol ? In the third edition of his 
Shivaji and His Times, this Bijapuri general is stated to have died in 
June or July 1665, (P. 240 and Index.) But, like a cat with nine lives 
he reappears, time and again later and wins victories over the 
Marathas in several encounters. On or about 15th April 1673 Bahlol 
Khan is supposed to have been allowed to withdraw at Umrani 
"probably for a bribe," (Shivaji, p. 201). In June, the same year, 
he " held Kolhapur and defeated the Marathas in several encounters, 
forcing all their roving bands to leave the Karwar country. He also 
talked of invading South Konkan and recovering Rajapur and other 
towns next autumn. In August he is still spoken of as ' pressing hard 
upon Shivaji, who supplicates for peace, being fearful of* his own con- 
dition." But soon afterwards Bahlol Khan, his irreconcilable enemy, 
fell ill at Miraj and Shivaji's help was solicited by the Bijapur and 
Golkonda Governments to defend them from a threatened Mughal 
invasion under Bahadur Khan .(September)." (Ibid., pp. 246-47). 
The difference in identity ( though obviouS) between the Bahlol fClian 
who died in JL665 and his latter namesake is nowhere explicitly indi- 
cated. Secondly, it passes our comprehension to see how Sivaji 
who ' supplicated for peace being fearful of his own condition ' in 
August could, in September have been 'solicited by Bijapur and 
Golkonda Governments to defend them from a threatened Mughal 
invasion: The illness of Bahlol Khan could not certainly have tilted 


the balanced miraculously. The same Bahlol Khan (we presume) 
was defeated by Anand Rao, at Bankapur, in the following March 
(1674), when, after a desperate battle, he and Khizr Khan were " put 
to flight with the loss of a brother of Khizr Khan." They had an 
army of ' 2000 cavalry and many foot-soldiers.' " Anand Rao robbed 
the entire Bijapuri army, captured 500 horses, 2 elephants, and much 
other prize." (Ibid., p. 204). We do not know why these cata- 
gorical statements), as to the places and personalities, in the text 
should be neutralised in the footnote by references which leave the 
reader utterly bewildered. Sabhasad's account, quoted verbatim, 
relates to Hambir Rao's defeat of Husain Khan Miana, which Sarkar 
has himself located at Yelburga and dated January 1679. (Ibid., 
p. 320.) A comparison of the two ft. notes (pp. 204 and 520) would 
show that Sarkar does not accept Sabhasad's concatination of the 
place of action and the generals named. The reference therefore, 
with all its wealth of details, is more confusing than helpful. Bahlol 
is as distinct from Husain Khan, as Anand Rao is different from 
Hambir Rao. The two actions were equally distinct from one 
.another, though both of them were decisive victories for the ( 
Marathas. They took place at two different times, though the places 
might have been very near each other. We do not see why, if other 
particulars given by Jedhe*are to be accepted as true, (Nagoji Rao 
Jedhe was killed in action on that occasion and his wife Godubai 
(of the Ghorpao!e family) died sati. Because of this close family 
interest the Jedhes could have made no mistake about the place. 
According to their Karma, Sivaji commiserated with Nagoji's mother 
Tuljabal and assigned to her one ser of gold yearly, there should be 
-any emendation of Yelgedla into Yelburga. 'Yelagi' (20 m. s. of 
Belgaum) sounds nearer to Yelgedla than ' Yelburga? (30 m. n.-e. of 
-Gadag). Sampgaon of Sabhasad is 19 m. s. e. of Belgaum, while 
Yelagi is 20 miles south of Belgaum. This accounts for the genesis 
-of Sabhasad's error in confusing the two incidents. But the modern 
reader need make no mistake about them. 

Sir Jadunath Sarkar has, in his recent work (House of Shivaji, 
Calcutta, 1940), independently elucidated the Bahlol Khan mystery 
-of his Shivaji and His Times ; though in this new work there is no 
indication whatsoever of the fresh information being an emendation 
of the earlier, perhaps unconscious, confusion. We now learn from 
him that Bahlol Khan I, who was a contemporary of Shahji, had two 
sJons both of whom inherited the title, as B.K. II and B.K. III. On 
the death of the latter (B.K. Ill) in July 1665, his son, Abdul Karim, 
TOS created Bahlol Kfaan IV. At this, Abdul Md., son of B.K. II, 
took umbrage and went over to the Mughals (Nov. 1665) who con- 
ferred upon him (c. 1669) the title of Ikhlas Khan. But Sarkar 


cautions us against confusing this title in the Mughal peerage with 
the same title borne by other Bijapuri nobles. This Ikhlas Khan was 
wounded by Sivaji in the battle of Dindori on 17th Oct. 1670, and 
again wounded and captured by Pratap Rao at Salher in Feb. 1672. 
It is not clear, even now, how the Ikhlas Khan, brother of Khawas 
Khan, defeated and put to flight by Sivaji in 1665 could be confused 
with the Bahlol Khan of Index reference (p. 234). However, it is 
well to bear in mind that Bahlol Khan III died in July 1665 ; and 
that the B.K. of all later incidents was the IV of that name, who 
was the Bijapuri Wazir from 1675-77. It was he who usurped all 
authority as the new Regent of the infant Sikandar ' Adilshah on 11 
Nov. 1675, and also before that, " being certain of heavy loss, and 
even utter repulse," at the hands of Sivaji, wisely withdrew after 
having proceeded to the succour of Phonda in May ,1675. Sarkar, 
Shivetji, p. 250. * 

To complete the Bahlol epic, we might also add that the cor- 
pulent Husain Khan Miana captured at Koppal by the Marathas 
(January 1677) was a "fellow-clansman* though 'no near relative' 
f of Bahlol Man III (died July 1665). He escaped to the Mughals 
in 1663, was made a 5-hazarl by Aurangzeb with the pompous title 
of Path fang Khan (House of Shivaji, pg. 62-3) but was again cap- 
tured by Marathas and honourably lodged, by Sambhaji, at Raigatf 
where he died. 

21. F. /?., Surat vol. 106 (2nd set), Carwar, (17 Feb. 1673), 
p. 100 ; ibid., vol. 88, pt. ii, vol. 37, Carwar, 14 April, 1675. Sivaji 
Nibandhavali, pp. 523-24. 

22. 0. C. 3881, 3,1 Oct. 1673. 

23. Chitnis, 70. 

24. Shivaji, pp. 252-53. 

25. S. F. Outward L. B. No. 2 Surat to Karwar, pp. 181-83,. 

26. Dagh Register, Bl. 445, 7 Feb. 1676. 

27-28. 0. C. vol. 34, No. 3786, 17 May 1673 ; Orme Mss. vol. 114, 
Section 2, p. 8721 June 1673. 

29. Sarkar, Aurangzib, IV. Ch. 42 ; House of Shivaji, p. 58. 

30. Sarkar, Shivaji, pp. 250-53. 

31. F. R. Surat vol. 88. 58 Karwar. 

32. Ibid., Vols. 62-3 Rajapore. 

33. Balkrishna, p. cit., II, L, p. f S73. " 

34. C. V. Vaidya, Shivaji, p. 330. 
35-37. Sen, Siva Chhatrapati, pp. 89-95. 

38. F. R. Surat, vol. 2, 86, ,105 ; Sarkar, Shivaji, p. 260. Sarkafs 
estimate of the total strength of Sivaji's fleet is erroneous. "The 
Maratha chronicles," he states (ib. p. 258), speak of Shiva ji's fleet 
as consisting at its best of four hundred vessels of various sizes and 


classes:' IP., p. 267 he hasi himself referred to the destruction of 
above 500 of Sivaji's vessels by Aurangzeb's fleet. Sabhasad speaks 
of 700 vesstels. 

39. ( F. R. Surat, 82. 

40. Sarkar, Shivaji, pp. 266-68. 

41. 0. C. 3760 cited by Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 267-68. 

42. Indian Hist. Rec. Com. Proceedings, vol. IX, p. 110. 

43. Ibid., pp. 110-11. 

44. Ibid., p. 112. 

45. Ibid. f pp. 112-13. 

46. Ibid., pp. 114-15. 

47-48. Shivaji Souvenir, pp. 124-26. 

49. Ibid., p. 128. 

50. Pissurlencar, Shivaii, p. 34. 
51-52. Shivaji Souvenir, pp. ,130-33. 

53. Pissurlencar, op. cit., pp. 38-9 ; Sarkar, Shivaji, p. 250. 

54. Ibid., pp. 363-65. 

55. Ibid., p. 362. 

56. Heras, The Decay of Portuguese Power in India, pp. 35-6. 

57. Letters Received by the E. I. Co., Ill, p. xxvi. 

58. 0. C. 4115, B. PUnav, vol. VI, p. 152. Bombay 28 Sept. 

59. F. R., Ft. St. George, vol. I, p. 17 3 Oct. 1677. 

60. B. P. Unav. VIII, p. 62 London to Surat, L. B. 6, 30215 
Mar. 1681. 

61. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 344. 

62. Ibid. [This no. has been erroneously repeated in the text 
(p. 223). The reference for this is F. R. Surat, vol. 8510 Mar. 

63! F. R. Surat, 103 (6 Feb. ,166$) and 2 (9 Oct. 1663). 
64-65. Ibid., vol. 88, p. 227. 

66. F. #. Bombay, vol. I, pp. 30-31 ; Orme, vol. 114, p. 185. 

67. -P. R. Surat, vol. 107 (Fol. 6), 9 Nov. 1674. 

68. Ibid., vol. 88 (Fol. 244), 13 Nov. 1674. 

69. Ibid., vol. 89 (Fol. 90), 5 Dec. 1676. 

70. Ibid., (Fol. 30). 

71. Ibid., vol. 107 (Fol. 6)? 9 Nov. 1674. 

72. Ibid., (Fol. 60), Bombay, 6 Feb. 1675. 

73.. 0. C. vol. 36, No. 41752 Feb. 1676 ; Forrest, H. S. I, 
Swally Marine to Co., p. 81. 

74. S. F. Letter Book No. 2., p. 3317 Jan. (out) 1676. 

75. Ibid., p. 120 Surat to Rajapore. 

76. F. R. f Surat, vol. 86, p. 102 ; Surat to Karwar, 26 June 1664. 


77. E. F. India, 1665-67, pp. 75-6 ; Surat, vol. 104? p. 212 6 
Jan. 1665. 

78. F. R., Surat, vol. 106, pp. 145-462 Sept. 1673. 

79. Orme Mss. vol. 114, sec. 2, p. 8721 June 1673'. 

80. F. R. Surat, vol. 106, Fols. J09-110 14 May 1673 ; vol. 3 
(3rd set), p. 2219 July 1673. 

81. S. F. Outward Letter Book No. 2., pp. 123-24, Surat to 
Rajapore, 13j May, 1676. 

82. Ibid., p. 140 ; Surat to Bombay 14 June 1676. 

83. 0. C. vol. 37, No. 4225 ; S. F. Outward L. B. No. 2, pp. 181- 
.83- Surat to Karwar, 24 Aug. 1676. 

84. F. /?., Surat, vol. 89 (Fols. 69-70)- Swally Marine, 17 Oct. 

85. S. F. Outward L. B. No. 2, p. 237 ; F. B. Surat, vol. 89, 
p. 72. 

86. F. /?., Surat vol. 89 (Fol. 112), Surat to Rajapore, 12 July 

87. Ibid., p. 67, Surat to Rajapore, 25 Feb. 1678. 

88. Ibid., Surat vol. 108, (Fol. 52). Rajapore, 28 Feb: 1679-80. 

89. Forrest, Home Series, p. 66 ; F. R.. Surat, vol. 106, pp. 94, 

90. F. R. Bombay vol. 8, p. 28. 

91. Ibid., vol. 6, pp. 124-28. 
92-94. 0. C., 4699. 

95-96. Cf. Sarkar, Shivaji, pp. 270-76. 

97. B. P. Unav. VIII, pp. 29-30; O. C. Vol. 40, No. 4699, 8 
April 1680. 

98. L. B. vol. 6, 302; London 15 Mar. 1681. 

99. John Fryer, East India, vol III, pp. 163-65. 


1. C. H. L, IV, p. 290. 

2. Ibid., pp. 281-82 Cf. Kincaid and Parasnis, A Hist of the 
Mar. Peo&e, p. 144 (,1931 ed.). 

3. F. R., Bombay vol. 19, p. 6 (2nd set), 7 May 1680. 

4. Ibid., vol. 107 ; Sarkar, Shivaji, pp. 317-18. 

5. Sarkar, A Short Hist, of Auv., pp.' 241-67. Cf. Kincaid and 
P., op. cit. t pp. 104-108. 

6. F. R., Surat, 108-Bombay to Surat, 19 Jan. 1682. 

7. B. K. Bonsle, Janjira, pp. 46-54 ; K. and P., op. cit., p. 21 ; 
F. R. Surat, 108 ; Carwar, 30 July 1682. 

8. Orme, J12 ; F. R. Surat, 90 ; to Sir John Child, 8 May 1682. 

9. Ibid., 107 ; K. & P., op. cit., p. 122. 


10. F. ., Surat, 91, Surat to Co., 10 April 1683. Siddi Misri 
was the son of S. Sambul who had joined Sivaji in 1677 Bhonsle, 
*p. cit., pp. 42-3, 51. 

11. For a list of the 22 forts owned by the Siddis at this time, 
see ibid., p. 58. 

12. Portuguese e Marathas II, Sambhaji, pp. 68-73. 

13. Ibid., pp. 2-4 ; e.g. letter of 5 May 1680. 

14. He 'arrived in Goa on 11 Sept. 168,1 and left India on 15 
Dec. 1686. Danvers, ii, 361, 370. 

15. Manucci, Storia do Mogor, ii, p. 261 ; Pissurlencar, op. cit., 
p. 12. 

16. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 

17. Ibid., pp. 13-14 ; reported to Portugal in a letter dated 24 
Jan. 1683. 

18. Ibid., p. 11. 

19. Ibid., pp. 14-20. 

20. Ibid., p. 26. 

21. Sarkar, A Short Hist, of Aur. p. 297. See note 31 below. 
22-23,. Storia, ii, pp. 262-63. See n. 3 on Ponda ; Orme dates* 

^he incident in Sept. 1683 (ib., n. 2.) Cf. Sarkar, A Short Hist, of 
Aur., p. 297 : " The Vicenoy planned to make a diversion by laying 

siege to Pkonda he arrived (on 22nd Oct.) in the vicinity of 

Phvnda and opened fire on that fort immediately." In his Aur., 
IV, pp. 273-74 he has stated : "On 27th Oct. he set out from the 
town .... and arrived in the vicinity of Ponda without opposition, 

on 1st Nov opened fire immediately.'' Note the discrepancies 

in dates as well as place names : "Ponda," he points out (Aur. IV, 
-p. 273 n.) is 10 miles s. s. e. of Goa town ; it must not be confused 
with "Phonda" in the extreme s. of Ratnagiri Dist. 

According to his Short Hist. (p. 297) "Next day they (Portu- 
guese began to retreat and on 1st Nov. reached Durbata where they 
were to embark for Goa/' In Aur. IV, pp. 274-75 the date given by 
him is " lltfi Nov." 

If the viceroy ' set out ' on the ' 27th Oct.' he could not have 
' arrived ' on the " 22nd Oct." 

24. Saxnbhaji's auxiliaries brought by Prince Akbar. 

25. Storia, ii, p. 263. . 

26. Hist, of Aur. IV, p. 275. 

27. Storia, ii, p. 263. 

28. Sarkar, A Short Hist, of Aur., pp. 297-298. 

29. Storia, ii., pp. 268-71. 

30. Cf. Kincaid & P.., op. cit., p. 124 ; the date of the capture 
of St. Estavao is given as 25 Nov. 1683. 


31. Pissurlencar, Sambhaji, pp. 65-67. The details *>f this inci- 
dent are very confusing. Sarkar in his Short Hist. p. 297 says, that 
Sambhaji's Peshwa laid siege to Chaul with an army of 6,000 infantry 
and 2,000 cavalry on 31st July. In his larger work (Aur., IV, p. 271) 
he has stated that Moro Trimbak Pingle laid siege to Chaul on 10th 
August. According to Kincaid and P. (p. 123) it was in June 1683. 
Grant Duff (p. 242) also gives the same date. Sardesai in his earlier 

(J915) ed. of the Riyasat had vaguely referred to the siege of Chaul 
as having taken place during the monsoon of 1683 (p. 570) ; now, on. 
the basis of the Jedhe Sakavali, he gives 10th June 1683, adding that 
8th Aug. (night) as the probable time of the final assault. (Ibid. 3 
3*T Sl?ict 3*TI3ft, pp. 46-471935 ed). For the opening of 
Sambhaji's campaign, Sarkar gives loth April 1683 in Aur., IV, 
p, 270 and 5th April 1683 in his Short Hist, of Am., p. 297. 

32. Pissurlencar, Sambhaji, pp. 56-7 ; letter of Conde de Alvoi 
to the General of the North, dated 4 Feb. 1684. 

33-34. Pissurlencar, A Liga dos Portuguese com o Bounsute' 
Contra Sambhaji. 

35. 0. C. 5005. 

36. Letter Bk. vol. 7 dated 7 April 1684 ; also F. R. Surat, 90 
d. 8 May 1682 reflecting the same attitudt. 

37. L. B. vol. 8 : London to Surat, 28 Oct. 1685. 

38. O. C. 5641 of 24 Dec. 1687. 

39. W. S. Desai in Ind. Hist. Cong., Proceedings, p. 605 (Alla- 
habad, 1938). 

40. O. C. 5691 of 12 Dec. 1689. 

41-43. Chitnis, (Sane's ed. 1930), pp. 3, 7, 15. Formal corona- 
tion of Sambhaji, 16 Jan. 1681. Cf. Character of Sambhaji 
in Sardesai, OT 3$fct ^Tf^ft; and of Jahangjr in my Mughal Empire. 
Ibid. p. 206 for. the Tardi Beg incident. Cf. Kincaid & P. pp. 1064)7.. 
[Ref. No. 42 has been omitted in the text through oversight.] 

44. Sarkar, Aur. IV, pp. 244-46. 

45. Storia, ii, p. 255. 

46. Sarkar, op. cit. t pp. 256-58. 

47. Ibid., p. 259 and n. 

48. Ibid., p. 261 ; earlier Sarkar (p. 256) has stated that Aur.. 
arrived at Aurangabad on 22 Mar., 1682*-- not Nov. 1681 as here. 
Surat to Co. 10 April 1683. 

49. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 263-64. 

50. Ibid., p. 291. For Portuguese negotiations through Manuoci: 
see Storia, ii, pp. 277-79. 

51-52. Ibid., p. 287 and n. 

53. Sharma, Mughal Empire, pp. 553-65. 


54. StoXa, ii, p. 309. 

55. Orme, p. 201 ; Kincaid & P., p. 144. 

56. Ibid., Sarja Khan was originally in Bijapfcr service. 

57. Ibid., pp. 144-45. 

58. Chitnis, Sambhaji, 7. 

59. Ibid., 3 ; * $1$ OT fWcft fltetff I 5>$ 4|WJdl 

60. Kincaid & P., p. 140. ' On 25 Dec. 1683 Sambhaji returned 
to Raigad ; there he gave full authority to Kavi Kalash '. Jedke 

61. E. D. VII, p. 338. 

62. Originally Shailvh Nizam, who deserted Golkonda during its 
siege (28 May 1687) andVas created 6 hazarl by Aurangzeb with 
his new title and a cash reward of one lakh of rupees, etc. 

63. Sarkar, Aur. IV, pp. 398-404. Cf. Chitnis, 20 and Jedhe 
Sakavali speak of Tulapur ; Sardesai identifies the place with Va*Ju. 
Sambhaji, 99 (new ed.). t 

64. Martin's Memoirs, ii, 454 ; Sarkar, House of Shivaji, p. 204. 
65-66. Storia, II, pp. 

67. Adndpatra. 

68. ft^i 5iif 


Sardesai, Rajaram, p. 41 (new. ed.) Rajwade, vol. XV, p. 296. 

Riajaram was only IH^IJ?*? but not ' crowned ' like Sambhaji. 
Cf. Sarkar, Aur. IV, p. 404. 

69. Rajarama-caritam by Keshav Pandit, ed. by V. S. Bendrey 
(Poona 1931). Cf. Sarkar gives the date as 1st Nov. Aur. V, p. 25. 
Sardesai, Rqjaram, gives 15 Nov. 

70-71. /. 7. #to., Vol. VII (1928) p. 92. 

72. Sardes&i, Rajarvm, p. 49 ; Rajwade, vol. 15, Nos. 347-348. 

73. Sarkar, Aur. V, p. J.4. For fuller details, ibid., pp. 1-254 ; 
Sardesai, Rajaram, pp. 164 ff. (1936 ed.). 

74. Chitnis, Rajdram* 34. . 

75. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 78. 

76. Ibid., p. 79. 

77-78. Ibid., p. 84 ; M. A., 357. 

79. Manucci, Storia, iii, pp. 271-72. 

80. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 103. 

81. Ibid., pp. 103-4. 


82. Mysore, i, p. 133 ; Sarkar, op. cit., V, p. 106. Ginji capitu- 
lated finally on 8 Jan. 1698. , 

83-86. Sarkar, Aur. V, p. 118 ; E, D. VII, pp. 356-57. Khwafi 
Khan estimates the Mughal losses at 50-60 lacs of rupees. 

87. [Marked '89' in the text (p. 259) by mistake.] Sarkar, 
op. cit., p. JL22. 

88. Kincaid (p. 176) gives 5th March (Falgun Vadya 9, Bake 
1621. Ac. to the Ephimeris, this should be 15th (Wednesday). 
Chitnis gives 3?giffcfi| H4fl 2nd March ; Sarkar makes it 
3rd March in Jedhe Sakdvali. |For details of Rajaram's last cam- 
paign read Sarkar, Aur. V, pp. 132-35 ; Kincaid, pp. 170-76. 

89-90. Chitnis, 54, 63. 

91. DhanajT was a Jadhav, being a grandson of Santa jl Jadhav 
(a brother of Jijabai). 

92. See Sarkar, Aur. V, pp. 14-15 lor Aurangzeb's campaigns,. 
Nov. 1699 Oct. 1705. 

93-94. Ibid., pp, 236-40. 

95. Ibid., pp. 234-55. 

96. Kincaid & P., op. cit., pp. 172-73. 

97. E. D. VII, pp. 373-75. 

98 Sarkar, Short Hist, of Aur., p. 358. 



1. Das Bodh. 

2. A Forgotten Empire, Introd. pp. 5 and 7. 

3. This is to be understood in a relative, not absolute, sense r 
No other people in India have displayed the peculiar traits of nation- 
hood, good as well as bad, as the Marathas during the period of 
their ascendancy. 

4. Read Grant Duff's Hist, of the Marathas, Introd. by S. M. 
Edwardes (1921 ed. O. U. P.) ; and C. V. Vaidya's ' Are the 
Bhonsles Kshatriyas?' in the Shiva ji Souvenir (Dhawale, Bombay, 

5. Sarkar, Aurangzib, V, pp. 207 -,13. 

6. S. N. Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas ; Mili- 
tary System of the Marathas. Balkrishna, Shivaji the Great, Pt. IV. 

7. Ante 136-37. 

8. Ante p. 190. 

9. Ante pp. 197-99. 

10. Read Balkrishna, Shivaji the Great, Pt. IV, ch. x. Sarkar, 
Shivaji and His Times, p. 381 and House of Shivaji, pp. 80-82. 

11. Sen, Shiva Chhatrapati, pp. 29-39. 

12. Journal of Indian History, Vol. VIII, pt. 1, pp. 81-82. 


13. /fcirf., p. 82. 

14. Ibid., p. 81. 

15. Ibid., p. 89. 

16. Ibid., p. 94. 

17. Ibid., p. 95. 
,18. Ibid., pp. 95-96. 

19. Ibid., pp. 96-97. 

20. Ibid., p. 99. 

21. Ibid., pp. 99-100. 

22. Ibid., pp. 100403. 

23. Ibid., pp. 104-5. 

24. /<*., p. 207. 

25. Ibid., pp. 208-211. 

26. Ibid., pp. 214-16. 

27. Ibid., pp. 217-18. 

28. Ibid., pp. 219-29. 

29. Jtaf., pp. 229-33. 

30. Ibid., pp. 212-14. 

31. Sarkar, House of Shivaji, pp. 79 and 82. 


An exhaustive Bibliography is a desideratum for the writing of 
scientific history in moderm times. It is obvious, therefore, that 
Maratha History cannot be properly studied except with the help of 
an adequate guide to the sources and literature on the subject. An 
attempt has been made in the Introduction to acquaint the reader 
with the general works hitherto available, particularly in English, to 
the students of MaiStha History. It is the purposte of this note to 
briefly indicate the wealth of materials that must be consulted by 
those who would like to form their own indfependent judgment cm 
the topics discusfeed in the body of this work. Attention is confined 
here to the period covered in the text' Ala-u'd-din's invasion of the 
Peccan to the death of Aurangzeb only. For obvious reasons no 
reference is made to unpolished materials. The more ambitious 
student will find additional aids in the references and bibliographies 
cited by writers like Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Dr. Surendranath Sen, 
Mr. S. M. Edwardes, Dr. Bal Krishna, Kincaid, and others. Apart 
from the mere lists of authors and works given by them, it is helpful 
to go through the critical comments made by some of them. 

To mention only a few specific instances we might refer the 
reader to Sir Jadunath Saikar's Shivaji and His Times, pp. 407-18 
(3rd ed. 1929) and his lectures on * Sources of Maratha History' 
delivered in Bombay in 1941 (Journal of the University of Bombay, 
Vol. X, Part I, pp. 1-22) , Dr. S. N. Sen's Introduction to his 
Administrative System of the Marathas (2nd ed., 1925), Foreign 
Biographies of Shivaji and his Siva Chhatrapati, pp. 251-59 (1920); 
and Dr. Bal Krishna's Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Rut I, Introduction, 
pp. 17-34 (1932). The Historical Miscellany, Serial No. 31 (B. I. 
S. M., Poona, 1928) also contains an article on ' A Brief Survey of 
Portuguese Sources of Maratha History', by Dr. S. N. Sen. Ex- 
tracts from the unpublished Dutch records in the Hague Colonial 
Archives are also to be found in the Sivajl Nibandhavali J, Eng. 
sec. pp. 61-88. (Siva Charitra Karyalaya, Poona, 1930). 

For the sake of brevity, and to avoid needless repetition, I have 
thought it superfluous to include here materials referred to in the 
above works, as well as in my NOTES. A very valuable bibliography 
of published works in Marathi, up to 1943, is now available to the 
readers' in Mr. S. G. Date's excellent compilation, Marathi Grantha 
Sucht Vol. I, pp. 958-96 (Foona, 1944). A thorough-going biblio- 
graphy in all languages must take more time to compile than I can 
command, and more paper than War controls permit. Out of the 
materials I have gathered I subjoin a few gleanings which might be 
of some use to the more painstaking readers. 



Bruce, John Annals of the East India Company, 1600-1708, London, 

Burnell, A. C. -Books and Mss. relating to the Portuguese in India, 

Mangalore, 1880. 
Grunt, Sir A. Catalogue of native publications in the Bombay Presi- 

dency wpto 1684, Bombay, ,1867. 
Jo&i, V. C. Records of the East India Company 1600-1677, Ind. 

Hist. Cong., 1941. 

Kale, D. V. -English records on Shivaji, Poona, 1931 ; 
Jlfa, ' Lokshikshana ', Poona, 1930 ; 

f ,' Sahyadri,' Poona, 1938. 

Kate, R. G. - ^H4l3 ^RglRl* SWfaf, ' Lokshikshana ', Poona, 

Notes on the extracts from the Government Records in the Wort St. 

George, Madras, 1670-81, India Office. 
Oaten, E. F. European travellers in India during 15th, 16th, & 

17th centuries, London, 1909. 
Pi&urlencar, P. Article in the Historical Records Commission Report, 

XVI, Calcutta, 1939. 
Potdar D. V. *!TOT W*R Sflfa W<l^ f-fefaw, 'Sahyadri', 

Poona, 1937 ; Historical Miscellany, Madras, 1928. 
Raghunathjl, K. A brief account of the Governors of Bombay 1662- 

1877, Bombay, 1878. 
Randive, R. K. - Maratha History Records, Hist. Records Com. VI, 

Sardesai, G. S. Present needs of Maratha History, Hist. Records 

Com. XII, Gwalior, 1929 ; Extant family records in Maha- 

rashtra, Hist. Records Com. XV, Poona, 1938. 
Sarkar, Sir J. True sources of Maratha History, 'Mod. Review 

XLVII, 1930. 


Abbott, J. E.Ramdas, 1932. 

Ahmed, S. S. Alauddin Khalji's 1 policy in the Deccan, Ind. Hist. 

Cong. 1941. 

Basu, K. K. the Bijapur Court Culture, Ind. Hist. Cong., 1941. 
Bendrey, V. S. Dantfamti (KeSava Pan#t), B. I. S. M. Poona, 

Betham, R. M. Marathas and the Deccani Musalmans, Simla, 1908. 


Birje, W. L.Who are the Marathas J Baroda, 1896. 
Broughton, T. D.The Marathas, London, 1813. 
Banctekar, S. V. The Bhagwat Movement in Maharashtra, Philoso- 
phical Quarterly, 1939. 
Deming, W. S.Eknath, Bombay, 1931. 
Hanumanta Rao Hindu religious movements' in Mediaeval Deccan, 

Jour. Ind. Hist. XV, ,1936 ; Some mediaeval mystics of the 

Deccan, Ind. Hist. Cong., 1941. 
Kale", D. V. The national character of the historical Marathas, Ind. 

Hist. Cons. 1938. 
Kanetkar, Y. G. Some political aphorisms and views) of the 

Marathas, Ind. Hist. Quar. XV, 1939. 
Kincaid, C. A. Saints oj Pandharpur, O. U. P. 
Macnicol, N. -Psalms of tfo Maratha Saints, O. U. P., 1915. 
Mahajani, V. M.Tukaram, Mod. Review, 190&. 
Mahdi Hussain The Hindu*' in Mediaeval India, Ind. Hist. Cong., 


Mir Mahmood AH Contributions of Bahmani Kings to Indian Civi- 
lization, Ind., Hist. Cong. 1941. 
Mookerji, R. K. Hindu conceptions of the Motherland, Ind. Culture, 

Puntambekar, S. V. The old feudal nobility of Maharashtra, Ind. 

Hist. Cong., 1941 ; Maratha Polity, Minerva, Lahore, 1942. 
Ranad, M. G. Introduction to the Satara Rajas and the Peshwa 

Diary, Satara, 1902. 

Sakstena, B. P. Early life of Malik Ambar, Ind. Hist. Cong. 194,1. 
Saletore, B. A. Note on Chauthai, New Ind. Ant., 1939. 
Saletore, R. N. Significance of Chauthai in Maratha history, Jour. 

Bom. Unl. Vol. VII, 1938. 
Sardesai, G. S. Achievements and failures 1 of the Marathas, Mod. 

Review, 1939. 
Sarkar, B. 'K. Hindu tradition in MaratM politics, Hitidusthan 

Review t 1936. 
Tone, W. H.- Illustrations of some institutions of Maratha people, 



Banerji, A, Siveneri, Mod. Review, 1937. 

Da Cunha, J. G.~0rigin of Bombay, Bombay, 1900. 

Hawthorne, R. -Picturesque Poona, Madras, 1903. 

Jervig, T. B. Geographical and statistical Memoir of the Kflnkan, 

Calcutta, 1840. 
Lethbridge, E.Topoeraphy of tfte Mo&d pmpire, Calcutta, 1871. 


Loch, W. W. Historical account of Poona, Satara a%d Sholapur 

districts, Bombay, 1877. 

Saletore, B. A. the antiquity of Pandharpur, Ind. Hist. Quar. 1935. 
Shakespeare, L. W. Local history of Poona and its battlefields, 

London, 1916. 

Sinha, H. N.- History of Surat, Ind. Hist., Records Com., 1940. 
Verma, B. D. V&algarh inscriptions, Bom. Uni. Jour. 1933. 
West, E. W; 1 . -Historical sketch of the Southern Marafha Country, 

Bombay-, 1878. 


Sarkar, Sir J. Rise of Shahji, Mod. Review, 1917 ; Shahji in Mysore, 
Mod. Review, 1929. 

Sriniva&diari, C. S. Shahji in Karnat^c, Oriental Conference pro- 
ceedings, Trivandrum. 

Verma, B. D. History in Muhammad Namah : achievements of 
Shahji, B. I. S. Mandal Jubilee Number : ShahjI's letter to a 
minister of Bijapur, Ind. Hist. C0wg., Hyd. 1941. 


Apte, D. V.Bivth-date of Shivaji Poona, 1927 ; when did Shivaji 
start his career of independence, Ind. Hist. Records Com. 1940. 

Altkar, A. S. Shivaji's visit to Benares, four. Bom. Hist. Society, 

Balkiisiina The nature of Sardeshmukhi during Shivaji's time, Ind. 
Hist. Cong. 1939. 

Banhatti, S. N. The social and political significance of the state- 
craft of Shivaji, Ind. Hist. Cong. 1939. 

De, J. C. Maratha attack on Surat, New Ind. Anti. 1940. 

Deming Ramdds and Ramddsis. 

God, P. K. Hari kavi and Shivaji's sword, Netv Ind. Anti. 1940. 

Kamdar, K. H. The year of Shivaji's birth, /our. 9 Bom. Hist. 
Society, 1929. 

Khan, T. D. SayeedThe Real Shivaji, Allahabad, 1935. 

Lachit Barphukan a great Assam contemporary of Shivaji, Ind. 
Hist. Cong 1935. 

Misra, B. B. The Incident of JawK, Jour. Ind. Hist. 1936. 

Mawjee, P. W. Shivaji's Swarajya, 7. B. B. R. A. S., 1903. 

Mujib-a-RahmanShivajI and Afzal Khan, Ind. Culture XII. 

Mukadam, V. S.Chhatrapati Shivaji Charitra, Godhra 1934 

Nilakanta Siastri, K. A. Shivaji's charter to the Dutch on the 
Coromandal Coast, Ind. Hist. Cong., 1939, 


Pissurlenca^ P.^-Attitude of the Portuguese towards Shivaji during 

the campaign of Shaista Khan and Jai Singh, Hist. Records Com. 

IX, 1926 : A Portuguese embassy to Raigad in 1684, Proceedings,. 

All India Hist. Cong., 1935. 
Potdar, D. V. Afzal Khan's invasion affects Vishalgad fort, Hist. 

Records Cow., XVI, 193p. 

Pudumjee, B. D. Notes on Shivdfi, Bombay, 1929. 
Sarkar, B. K. The political philosophy of Ramdas, Col. Review,. 

1935 ; the Pluralistic world of Shivaji, Hindustan Review, 1935. 
Sarkar, Sir J. Shiva ji in the Madras Karnatak, Hist., Recants Com*. 

VI, 1924. Tarikh-i-Shivaji, Mod. Review, 1907 and 1910 ; Life 

of Shiveji from the PersSan, Mod. Review, 1907. 
Sarma, R. A contemporary record of Shivaji's' birth, Jour. Bihar and 

Orissa Royal Socy., 1934. 
Sardesai, G. S.~ Kavindra Parmanand, Hist. Records Com. Calcutta,. 

Sen, S. N.The revenue policy of Shivaji, Calcutta, 1921 ; A note 

on the annexation of Jawil, Sardesai Com. Vol., J9S8. 
Tamaskar, B. G.Plunder of Surat, Ind. Hist. Cong., 1941 ; the 

policy of Shivaji and the English, New Ind., Anti. IV, 6-7, 194l! 


Desai, W. S. The relations of Bombay with the Marathas 1 during 
the Company's' war with Aurangzeb 1685-1690, Ind. Hist. Cong.. 

Code, P. K. -Parijala-dhvaja of the Maratha king Sambhaji Ind.. 
Hist. Quar. 1940 ; Fragments of poems pertaining to Sairibhaji, 
Annals of the Bhandarkar 0. R. Institute, Poona, 1937 ; the 
Samayanaya of Gagabhatta, composed by the Marata king 
Sambhaji in 1680-81, Ind. Hist. Cong., 1939. 

Pissurlencar P. Rajanam and the Portuguese, Ind. Hist. Records 
Com. 1940 ; A Portuguese embassy to Raigad in 1684, Ind. Hist. 
Cong. 1935. 

Potdar, D. V.~ Two! lines in Raja Sambhaji's own hand, Ind. Hist. 
Cong. 1935. 

Powar, A. G. A note on the date of Ramchandrapant Amatya's 
death, Ind. Hist. Cong., 1940. 

Puntambekar, S. V. RdmachaMrapant Amatytfs Rajniti, Madras, 

Srinivesachiri, C. S. The Maratha occupation of Jinji and its signi- 
ficance, Ind. Hist. Cong. 1940. 

Thakur, V. V.Life and achievements of Ramchandrapant Amatya 
Ind. Hist. Records Com. 1940. 


Aiyangar, S. K. Rise of the Maratha power in the South, Jour. Ind. 

Hist., 1930. 
Bhotnsle*, R. K. A note on the Tanjore palace Library, Hist. Records 

Com. Paina, 1980. 
Diskalkar, D. B. Shahaji's relations with Vijayanagar, Vijayanagar 

Sex-Centi. Com. Vol., 1986. 

A dissertation on Tanjore Marafhd History, Madras, 1902. 
Edwardes, S. M. A MsSs. history of the ruler of Jinji in the India 

Office Library, main facts set out in Ind. Anti., 1926. 
Code*, P. K.--A drama in Tamil, Bhandarkar Annals, XX. 
Hickey, W.The Tanjore Maratha Principality, Madra^, J873. 
Linganna Kefadi Nrpa Vijaya (Kannada), University of Mysore, 

Nilkant Sastri, K. A. Some Dutch documents on the siege of Jinji, 

etc., Ind. Hist. Records Com. J940. 
Ramanujaiyangar, M. A. Mahakavi Tirumalaraya's Chikadeva Raya 

Vamsdvali (Kannada), Mysore, 1919. 

Saletore, B. A. The value of Kannada sources for the history of the 
Marathas, Sardesai Com. Vol. 1938 ; Tutelage of Maharashtra 
under Karnatak, Hist. Records Com. Pbona 193|8 ; Some un- 
known events in Venkoji's career, Inf. Hist. Records Com. 1940. 
Saletore, R. N. The beginnings of Maratha revenue system in 
Karnatak, /. B. B. R. A. S., 1939 ; Sambhaji in Karnatak, /our. 
Oriental Research, 1939. 
Sambamurti Row The Mar at hi historical Inscription at Tanjore, 

Sastri, P. P. S. -Tanjore Mss. and their value, Jour. Bom, Hist. 

Socy., 1940, 
Sathianathier, R. A vindication of Venkoji BhonMe, Intl. Hist. Cong. 

Shejwalkar, T. S. What Shivajl and the Maratha state owed to 

Vijayanagar, Vijay. Sex-centi. Com. Vol. 1936. 
Srinivasachari, C. S. A great MarathS service in South' India in the 
pre-Shivaji epoch, Sardesai Com. Vol. 193 ; Histoire de Ginji, 
Pondicherry, 1940. 

Subramanyan, K. R. The Maratha Rajas of TanjorV, Madras, 1928. 
Vaidya Govind Kanthiravanarasarafendrfivijaya (Kannada), Uni- 
versity of Mysore, 1926. 

Vridhagirisan, V.The Nayaks of Tanjore, Annamalai University, 


Apte, B. K. The early beginnings of Maratha Navy, Bulletin of the 
Deccan College Research Insti. t 1941. 


Abstract of proceedings of the House of Commons in relation to the 

E. I. Co. and Trade, London, 1698. 
Desai, W. S. Relations of Bombay with the Marathas 1685-1690, 

Ind. Hist. Cong. 1938. 

Dighe, V. G. Kanhoji Ajigria, Sardesai Com. Vol. 1938. 
Gode\ P. K. Studies' in the history of the Angrias, four. Uni. Bom. 

Historical account of the settlement and possession of Bombay by 

the English E. I. Co. etc., London, 1781. 
Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, London, 1877. 
Moraes, G. M. Kanhoji Angria's relations with the Portuguese, Jour. 
Uni. Bom. X, July 1941 ; Causes! of the Maratha Portuguese 
war, ibid., 1943. 
Phipps, J. A collections of papers relative to shipbuilding in India, 

Calcutta, ,1840. l 

Sen, S. N. Half a century of the Maratha navy, Jour. Ind. Hist., 
1932 ; Early career of Kanhoji Angria, Calcutta Review, 1935 ; 
Khanderi expedition of Charles Boone, Aiyangar Com. Vol., 
1936 ; Early career of Kanhoji Angria and other papers, Univer 
sity of Calcutta, 1941. 

Betekar, N. L. -The importance of the Bhonsles in Indian history, 

Hist. Records Com., Nagpur, 1928. 

Betham. R. M. Marathas and Dekhani Musulmans, Calcutta, 1908. 
Burton and Wills- A sketch of the history of the Bhonsle family, 

Nagpur, 1920. 
Puntambekar, S. V. Old feudal nobility of Maharashtra, Ind., His I. 

Cong. 1941. 

Sardesai. G. S. Role of the Ghorpades in Maratha history, Mod. 
Review, 1940. 

Gupte, B. A. Notes on Grant Duffs history of the Marathas, 

Calcutta, 1912. 
Limaye\ H. G. ' Review of a history of the Maratha people ', Ind. 

Review. 1918. 

Kale, D. V. Balkrishna's Shivafi the Great, Sahyadri. Sept. 1944. 
'P '.Review of C. V. Vaidya's 'ShivSji the founder of Maratha 

Swanajya,' Modern Review, 1 1933. 
Puntamtekar S. V. -A review of ' Shiva Bharat,' four. Ind. Hist., 


Sardesai, G. S. The earliest Maratha Chronicle, Mod. Review, 
Review of BSlkrahna's ' Shivaji the Great, part I/ 



'Adilshahi 40-42 ; in battle ol 
Talikota < Rakkastangadi ) , 42- 
43 ; Treaty with Mughal Em- 
peror, 44-45 ; Farmans to Ghor- 
patfe's and Bhosle's, 54 ; 57. 

Afzal Khan 72, 73, 78; 136- 
139 ; 140-141 ; 209. 

Agra 156-157, 209, 246. 

Ahmadnagar 41, 43, 58-59, 61, 
66, 116, 140-41, 149, ,162, 166, 
246, 248, 2Q2-63. 

Akbar 52, 57, 126, 245-46. 

'Ala-u'd-Din Khalii Significance 
of his 1295 expedition* to Dev- 
giri, 1-3 ; details discussted, 4- 
7 ; repercussions of his death, 

Amir Khusrau 4, 12, 14-15. 

AnnSji Datto-245. 

Aiirangzeb 44, 81, 135, 139-40, 
,150, 156-57, 159, 163-64, 166, 
233-34, 236-39, 246-47, 251-5S. 
255, 262, 265. 

Avji BalKl 250. 

Baguls of Baglan 51-52. 

Bahmani Foundation of king- 
dom, 23 ; extent of dominions, 
29 ; Hindus in administration. 
30-32 ; policy towards infidels, 
32 ; break up of, 27, 40-41. 

Baj! Prabhu Deshpantfe 140, 

Balajl Avji 250. 

Bangalore 72-73,. 78, 89, 119. 

Basrur 210. , 

Belal Deo- Foundation of the 
kingdom of Vijayanagar, 25-26. 

Bhanudas Bhakta-vijaya, 101-2, 

Bhatvacji Battle of, 58. 

Bhavani (Tulaja B.) 92? 134, 
,139, 176, 178. 

Bhosle's 51-54 ; Maloji, 66, 
180; Parsoji, 263-64. 

Bidnur, 72-74, 209. 

BSjapur 29, 41-43 ; tottering, 
55 ; combines with Mughals, 
44, 58 ; Shahj! goes to, 59-60 ; 
joins Ahmadnagar against Mu- 

ghals, 61, 64, 68-9 ; and Gol- 
konda join in Karnatak cam- 
.paign, 70, 71, 113 : Mores and, 
127, 132 ; concentrates on de- 
feat of Sivaj!, 139 ; sends Fazl 
Khan against Sivaji, 140, 156, 
185, 188, 197, 206-7, 209, 220, 
235, 249. 

Bombay 176, 206, 215, 221, 
232, 237, 243-44. 

Burhanpur 60, 63-65. 

Chakan 39, 126, 132, 141. 
Chokha 100-101. 

Dadaji KorwJ-dev 79, 115, 120- 
123, 125. 

Daulatabad (See Devgiri) 17, 
18, 20-24, 29, 57, 62-67, 102. 

Devgiri Condition at invasion, 
6, 7-9 ; base of operations, 11- 
12 ; in revolt, 16 ; centre of 
Muslim power, 17. 

Dhanaji Jadhav 253, 261, 263. 

Dnanesvar his works and im- 
portance, . 93-97 ; condition of 
Maharastra, 93,-7 ; Dnanes- 
vari, 95. 

Dutch 143, 145-6, 150,182, 207, 
211-12, 216, 220, 242. 

Eknath 102-3. 

English 145, 148, 161, 167-70, 

174, 178-80, 207, 213, 221-32, 

236-37, 242-44. 

Firangji Narsala 142, 245. 
Firishta 1, 6, 7, 12, 14, 29, 34, 

S9, 45, 53. 
French 148, 206, 216, 240, 242. 

Ghatges 28, 50-5,1, 68. 
Ghorpac# 28, 53-54, 86; BSji 

G., 76-77, 210 ; Maloji G., 190- 

91 ; Santaji G., 193-94 ; Vyan- 

koji G., 131-2. 
Ginji 70-71, 75-79, 85, 186, 192, 

194-95, 198, 200, 205, 234, 250, 

254, 259, 261. 
Goa-29, 124, 213, 218-19, 238 



Hambir Rao MohitS 175, 201, 
244, 250. 

Harpaldev (last successor of 
Yadavas) Revolt of, 1446. 

Hemadri (Yadava Minister) 8; 
his chaturvarga-chmtama%i, 9, 

Hindu reactions to Muslim im- 
pact, 90-91 ; traditions', 182- 

Hindus of the South, 3-4 ; sec- 
tarianism, 8-9 ; virile, 19 ; re- 
volt of, 24-26 ; importance of, 
30-31 ; massacre Muslims, 33 ; 
suffer under Muslims, 24-25 ; 
of Konkan ac. to Ranaicte, 28 ; 
in Bijapur service, 45-50 ; cul- 
tural resistance to Islam, 90* 
91 ; taxed, 173. 

Ibn-i-Batuta impression of Ma- 
haraja, ig-19, 23, 33. 

'feamy 5. 10, 12-13, 15. 

Islam (Muslim) challenge of 
1 ; imperialism, 2 ; triumph of, 
3-4 ; invited by factions, 8 ; 
character of administration, 13; 
absence of Maratha resistance 
to, 19, 22 ; independence of 
Deccan Muslims. 23 : small- 
ness of population. 30 ; king- 
doms in Deccan, 41-42 : char- 
acter of rule ac, to Gribble, 
46-47 ; ac. to Gr. Duff, 48-49 ; 
ac. to Rana<fe 49-50. 

Jadhav&~28. 50, 54, 56-57, 61- 

62. 121. 173. 

Jai Singh 151-158, 160, 217. 
Janabai 97. 
Janiira (see SMrRO-- 124,, 207, 

213-14. 216, 235-38. 
Jaswant Singh 142, 149, 166. 
Javli (see Mores 1 ) 127-134, 13,7. 
/fc&/3l-32. 75. 91, 121. 
Jijabai- 56, 83, 118-119, 121-122, 


Jiziya (Jaziya) 164. 
Junnar- 63-69, 162, 166, 247. 

KSnhoii Jedhe 79, 120, 130-31, 

Kanhopatra 101. 

in Western K., 


70, 80 ; Carnatic, 81 ; 82, 89, 
110, 113; SivajT in, 122-23, 
184, 187, 189, 191, 200-202, 
204-205, 235-36 ; Rajaram, 
255 258 

Khelna" (VisalgatJ) Malik-u't- 
Tujjar's expedition, 34-36 ; 
Md. Gawan's expedition, 38-9. 

Khelojl Bhosle 121. 

Kondana (SimhagatJ) Mo. 
Tughiaq's siege at. 20, 78, 79 ; 
120, 122-23 ; SivajT take*;', 126- 
27 ; 134, 149, 161-62, 166. 

Konkan 38, 64,. 67, JL24, 141, 
143, 206, 209-11, 214, 216, 237, 
242, 249-50, 259. 

Lukham Savant 143, 21041. 
Lukhjl (Jadhav Rao) 54, 56-7, 
61-62, 86, 121, 173. 

Mahanubhavas 8, 94. 

Mahar-dstra [abode of demo- 
cracy of Bhaktas, 101 ; extent 
uader Yadavas, 4 ; helps Mus- 
lims, 12 ; described by Ibn-i- 
Batuta, 17-19 ; revolts in, 20- 
21 ; conquests of, 28 ; cradle of 
independence, 33 ; Muslim 
kingdoms of, 41-42 ; heart of, 
44, 91 ; mystics, 93.) 

Mahirastra-Dharma meaning 
of, 92, 109. 

Mahmud GawSn 27, 29, 32, 37- 

Mahmud Ghazna 3. 

Mahuli 65. 68-69, 118, 136, ,166. 

Malik Kafur expeditions in 
Deccan and South, 3, 10-13; 
condition of the country, 3-4 ; 
effects!, 12-.13. 

Malik-ut-Tujjar tragic expedi- 
tion against Sirkes, 34-36; 41. 

Maratha Ibn-i-Batuta des- 
cr^>es, 18-19 ; absence of re- 
' sistancc, 19, 22 ; tutelage 
under Muslims, 28 ; beginning 
of resistance, 36^-37 ; Marathas 
in Muslim service, 45-50 ; rul- 
ine families?, 50-54 : raids, 173, 

Marathi court language at Bija- 
pur, 4> ; 93-94 ; Eknath on, 
102, 104, 



Marco PoIo-^8, 33. 

Mir Jumla importance of, 81, 

Mors 28, 50; Javll incident, 

127-33; Bakhar, 131. 
Mudhol--53, 131-32. 
Muhammad Tughlaq 16-23 ; 

foundation of Daulatabad, 17; 

revolt against, 19-23 ; siege of 

Simhagad, 20 ; ineffectual Ma-. 

ratha resistance to, A9, 22; 

end of, 23. 
Mukundaraj his esoteric teach-. 

ings (Paramamrta) , 94. 
Mukund Rao-rresistancc to* AdU 

Shah, 45. 
Murar Bajl 153. 
Murar Jagdev 64-67. 

Nadir Shah 146. 

Namadev 97-98, 100. 

Netaji Falkar 133, 139, 141, 

Nikitin, Athanasius Russian 
traveller in Deccan (1470-74). 

NimbiUkars-49-50, 121, 258, 

Nizamshahi (Ahmednagar) 
Founded, 40-42 ; flourishes 
(1565-1626) under Malik 
'Ambar and Chand Bibi, 43, 
58-59 ; disruption of, 44, 55 ; 
vicissitudes, 57 ; Malik 'Am- 
bar's services to, 59 ; Shahji's 
relations with, 59-65. 

Pandharpur 92, 95, 99, 110-11. 
Panhala 140-41, 173, 186, 222- 

23, L'58, 261. 

Phonda 210/ 220, 239, 242. 
Poona 66, 79, 89, 115, 119-20, 

122, 141, 143, 154, 161, 171, 

176, 262. 
Portuguese ,172, 208, 213, 216- 

220, 232, 235, 237-243. 
Pratapgad 134, 137-38, 1T6. 
Prataprao Gujar160, 170, 172, 

174-75, 212 L 261. 
Purandar -125, 134, 152-54, 159, 

162, 166, 209. 

Qutbghahi 40-42 ; ally of Sivaji, 
189-91 ; 192-93. 

R%ad (Rairi) 126, 129, 131, 

134, 176, 178, 230. 
Rajapur (Danda) 207-8, 214, 

222-23, 225-27. 

Rajaram 234 ; accession of and 
. situation, 252-54 ; at Ginji, 
254-59 ; return and death, 

Rajgacl-126, 134, 136, 160, 176. 

Kamcnandra Pant Amatyfr 
Adnapatm of, 125; 253-54; 

Ramdas, 103-109. 

Ramdev Rao (Yadava)- col- 
lapse beiore 'Alla-u'd Dm, 
4-7 ; criticism of, 7-11. 

Rastraudha-vamfa Mahakavya 
Rudra kavi's history of bagu- 
las, 9. 

Sambhajl returns from Agra, 
158 ; accession, 234, 246 ; bat- 
tling mnentance or, 236 ; bng- 
lish attitude towards, 23V, 
244 ; and the Portuguese, 238- 
243 ; character of, '<s44-4i> ; re- 
lations v/ith Sivaji, 246 ; 
Aurangzebs war with, 246- 
252 ; aeath of, 250-52. 

SanKerdev ( Yauava ) 6-7 ; his 
revolt, 10, 12. 

Santaji Ghorpa<# 253, 258-59, 

Satara 176, 260, 262. 

Savta 100. 


Shah ji 28; relations with Nim- 
balkars^ 50; ancestors of, 52- 
54 ; birth and career, 56-57 ; 
at Bhatvadi, 59; relations 
with M. Ambar, 60; amoi- 
tions and opportunities, 60-69; 
crisis in the lite of 67-69, 118 ; 
enters Bijapur service, 69 ; 
service and attitude, 7JL-72 ; in 
Karnatak campaigns, 72-76 ; 
arrest of, 76-79; attitude to- 
wards Sivaji, 79-80, H9-12U ; 
loyalty to 'Adilshah, 82; 
'ianjore expedition, 83; char- 
acter as conqueror, 85 ; intri- 
gues with Nayaks, 84, 88 ; let- 
ter to ( AU 'Adibhah II, 87; 


revolt of, 87, 120 ; las/t arrest, 
88 ; assessment of services, 86- 
89; criticism of, 113J-14 ; in- 
dispensable to 'Adilshah, 183- 
85,, 197; samadhl of, 198; 
position in Karnatak, 205. 

SfcS'ista Khan 141-42, 149. 

Srfcs-35-36 ; 50. 

Siddis (Habshis) 136, 206-207. 
213-16, 229; and Sambhaji, 

Sivaji 28 52, 54, 56; referred 
to in SfaShji's letter to K. Je- 
dbe, 79-80 ; bearing of on 
Shahfc 80, 89, 183-84; his 
brother Sambhaji's deatli at 
Kanakagiri, 83; compared with 
Shahji, 86; secret of success, 
91-92, 116-117; his contem- 
porary saints, 103'; and Ram- 
das, 106-109; indebted lo 
Vijayanagar, 111-U4 ; doubt- 
ful details, 115 ; man and his 
age, 115-1,16; grand-strategist, 
118 ; influence of Jijabal, 118- 
119, 182 ; influence of Shahji, 
119-120 ; of Dadaji, 120-121 ; 
coadjutors, 121-122 j his op- 
portunities 122-123 ; geogra- 
phy, 124^25; Mavate. 125; 
early adventures, ,126-127 ; 
Javft incident, 127-134; im- 
portance of Konkan, 134 ; 
Aurangzeb and Bijapur, 134- 
135, 140-141; builds naval 
base at Kalyan, 136; Afzal 
Kban, 136-140 ; Sha'ista 
Khan. 141-142; Lakham Sa- 
vant 143 ; incredible dexterity 
of, 142-143 ; Surat raids, 144- 
150, 167-171 ; and Jai Singh, 
151-152; siege of Purandar, 
153; peace of P v 154-156; 
visit to Agra, J56-158 f^Rajya- 
bhfceka, 159, 175-182; Sinha- 
gad, 161-162 ; and Aurangzeb, 
162-166 ; raids Baglan, 
Khandesh, Berar, etc, 170- 
173 ; in the Deccan, 173-175 ; 
Konkan, 175 ; hid ideals, 181- 
ISA ; Karnatak campaign, 
184 ff ; goes to Golkonda, 189- 
191; conditions in Karnatak, 


191-192; Ginj!, VeUore etc., 
192 ; struggle with Ekoji, 193- 
197; treaty with Vyankoji, 
197-199; purposte of K. cam- 
paign, 200-205 ; importance of 
sea-coast, 206-209 ; campaign 
in Konkan, 210-216; Euro- 
peans, 216; Portuguese, 216- 
220; English, 221-232; the 
crisis, 233-234, 236 ; death of, 
244, 246. 

Sivaneri 118. 

Sri Ranga Rayal 70, 73-74, 77, 

Surat-sack of, 144-151; 162; 
167, 172-173; 207, 209, 221- 
223, 225, 244. 

Tanaji Malusare 121, 141, 153., 
161-162, 173. 

Tanjore Nayaks of, 75 ; con- 
quest of, 83 ; condition, 84 ; 
185, 193-194 ; estates in, 198 ; 
linked up with Sivaji, 204- 

TOra BaI264. 

Tukabai Mohit 56, 85, 126. 

TukaiSm 103-106. 

Ummni -174. 

Vijayanagar foundation of, 24- 
26; wars with Muslim King- 
doms, 31-33, 42-43; disinte- 
gration of, 70-71 ; betrayed by 
vassals, 82 ; 91 ; inspires 
Maharatre> 110-114 ; the 
legacy of, 184, 204-205, 111- 
113, (Bisnagar), 194; 195. 

Vyankoji (Ekoji) birth, 56 ; 
conquers Tanjore, 83, 185, 
,193; fights against Sivaji, 
159-160; loyal servant of 
Bijapur, 184, 188; Sivaji's 
letter to, 185, 186; foreigners 
on Ekoji's attitude, 186-187, 
192-194; treaty with SivSji, 
195-199; character of govern- 
ment in Tanjore, 196-197. 

Yadava dominions and titles, 
4 ; collapse before invaders,