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BARON DE MARBOTVS MDIOIRS

VOL. II.

PRINTT-:!) BY

sporris WOODS ani> co., new-stueet square

IX>NrM)X

BARON DE MARBOT'S MELMOIRS

VOL. II.

Ijeul. General
BARON de MARBOT.

THE MEMOIRS

BARON DE MAEBOT

LATE

Lieutenant-general in the french army

TKAN>LATIiD FKf»M THK FIlKNCH

AKTHUK JOHN BUTLEK

IN TWO VdLl'MKS

VOL II.

WITH portrait and MAPS

LONDON

L o N (; M A X s, an k k n, a n i> vo

AND NEW YORK : 1;". EAST UV^ STREET

181)2

AH '•ifhit mrrrrj

ritrx'i-Ki» BY

SrO'rTl8WO(H)K and CO., ^•KW-^1■KEK•1• aQUAUE

IX)NnON

PORTRAIT AND MAPS IN VOLUME IL

Lieut.-Gknebal Raron de Maubot, 1840 . . . . Front iêjticcc

Waobam jmfje 23

Russian Campaign, 1812 To/acejf. 197

Leipzig (Ortobcr 18) jMf/e 390

Leipzig (October 16) ,,405

Li eu I. General
BARON de MARBOT.

i^n{»u Gwr< *<? UEdm A NnrY.rk

THE MEMOIRS ,.__

I UIQLJ
OF

-KA.^ /i'-ki'''<- (5^?'<- «.';•<»-• "^•.•'

baeon; de maebot

LATE
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL IN THE FRENCH ARMY

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

AETHUR JOHN BUTLER

Luff Fellow of T/inity College^ Cambridge

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL II.

WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS

LONDON

LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND CO.

AND NEW YORK ; 15 EAST IG»»» STREET

1892

PORTRAIT AND MAPS m VOLUME II.

Lieut.-General Babon db Maubot, IS-IO . . . Froutitpiece

WaOBAH page 23

RraaiAH Caupaion, 1812 Tofœeji. 197

Leipzig {Oetuber 18) juige ;i!W

Leipzig {October 16) ,.405

KKIMII' IIY
«l>tl tUiW(ii»t>B AMI (•>. NKM -lUCki MJCAKB

lOMMtN

PORTRAIT AND MAPS IN VOLUME IL

Liei't.-Gknkral Bakon DU Maubot, 1840 . FfOHtlipiccv

Wagbam .... patje 23

RCiiHIAN ('AMPAKiN, I8l2 To face p. 197

LkIPZïG (Ortobrr IH) jM^f im)

LairziG (Ckiobrr \^) 405

THE MEMOIRS

OP TUB

BAJION DE MARBOT

•o*

Jl CHAPTER I

By the end of Jane I was well enough to join Masséna's
headquarters on tht» isle of Ijobau, and was greeted in friendly
fashion by my new comrades. The staff was numerous, and
contained several officers of distinction. Before resuming
my tale of the campaign of 1809 I should like to make you
acc|uainted with one of them who played an important part
in the events prt»ceding the Imttle of Wagram — Colonel de
Sainte-Croix.

Charles d'Escorches de Sainte-Croix, son of the marquis of
that name, once Ix)ui8 XVI. 's ambassador to the Porte, was
in all respects a most remarkable man. His military career
w;is short enough, but of wonderful brilliancy. His family
and mine were connected, and we were most intimate friends ;
inde»Ml, the desire of ser\'ing with him had bt»en a stn^ng
inducement to me to accept Masséna's proposal. K<vii as
was Sainte-('r«»ix's natural love of war, it was late Ix^fore he
r*'uld gratify it, .since he was de.stined for diplomacy, and all
through the Peace of Amiens was employed under Talleyrand
in the Foreign Office. When the campaign of 1S(^") opi'ued he
wa» twentv-three, and tluTefore too old to enttT the l\cn!t

\lilititiir, so that but fora lucky circumstance In» might nev*»r
have entered the arm v.

After Austerlitz Na|wle<»n formed fmm the prip(»ners there

VC#L. II. B

The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

taken two foreign i*egiments for the French service. These
not being governed by the same regulations as the national
forces, he was able to officer them as he pleased, appointing
even to field rank men who had had no military experience,
but belonging to good families, and showing a zeal for the
service. By this abnormal system of promotion Napoleon
got the benefit of attaching to himself some hundred and fiftj'
young men of education and fortune who otherwise would
have be«n corrupted by a slothful life at Paris. The first
foreign regiment was commanded by the nephew of the
famous La Tour d'Auvergne ; the second, by a great German
noble, the Prince of Eisenburg ; and they were known by the
names of their chiefs. They were organised on the model of
the foreign regiments in the French service before the Revo-
lution, and as the Foreign Minister had always been respon-
sible for the levying of these troops, Napoleon ordered
Talleyrand to search the archives for precedents. Knowing
young Saint^-Croix's military tastes, the Minister assigned
the work to him, and, in addition to tracing the history of the
old regiments, he proposed modifications to suit the altered
conditions. Struck with the good sense displayed in this
scheme, and knowing the author's desire to serve in the new
corps, the Emperor appointed him first major, and, soon afler,
lieutenant-colonel in the La Tour d'Auvergne Regiment. It
was a great favour, as the Emperor had never seen Sainte-
Croix ; but it went near to spoil his prospects at tlie outset.

A M. de M , cousin to the Emperor, had hoped for

the rank of lieutenant-colonel, but only got that of major.
Hurt in his vanity, he sought a quarrel with Sainte-Croix on
a frivolous pretext. As he was a first-rate performer with
every kind of weapon, his friends were sure of his victory,
and escorted him in a cavalcade to the Bois de Boulogne ; but
only one accompanied him to the spot where his adversarj^,
with one second, awaited him. They fought with pistols, and

M. de M received a bullet in the breast which laid him

dead ; upon which, his second, instead of going to fetch help,
and thinking only of the consequences which this tragic end
of a relation of the Emperor might entail on himself, fled

Sainte-Croix

through the wood and far away from Paris, without return-
ing for his horse or infonning the dead man's friends-
Sainte-Croix and his friends also returned to the city, and
the body was left alone on the ground. Meanwhile, those

who were awaiting M. de M *s return, hearing the shots

but seeing no more of him, went into the wood, and found
the poor young man's body. It happened that in falling he
had fractured his skull on a hard stump, and when his friends,
after examining the wound in the breast, saw another in the
head, they thought that Sainte-Croix, after wounding his
opponent with a bullet fix)m his pistol, had finished him by
smashing his skull with the butt. This seemed to explain
the disappearance of the dead man's second, on the supposi-
tion that he lacked either strength or courage to prevent the
assassination. With this notion in their minds, they hastened
to Saint-Cloud, and imparted it to the Empress, who went to
the Emperor demanding justice. An order was given to
arrest Sainte-Croix, and, as he had in no way concealed him-
self, he was locked up. Doubtless he would have lain in
prison while a long inquiry was held had not Fouché, a family
friend, being sure that he would not have committed such a
crime, made an active search for the missing second. Being
found and brought to Paris, he honestly reported what had
happened, and further, the officials charged with the inquiry
discovered near the corpse a stump of a root stained with blood,
and having hair adhering to it. Sainte-Croix's innocence
was admitted ; he was set free, and went to join his regiment
in Italy.

M. de La Tour d'Auvergne was an estimable man, but
with no great turn for military matters. Sainte-Croix, there-
fore, had the organising of the new regiment, and did it with
such zeal that he made it one of the finest corps in the army.
He distinguished himself in Calabria, and earned the great
regard of Masséna, who, after the battle of Eylau, sent for him
to Poland, though it was quite against the regulations to take
an officer, especially a major, from his regiment. When he
reached Warsaw he was presented by Masséna to the
Emperor, who, recalling the death of M. de M , received

B 2

The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

him coldly, expressing to the marshal his dissatisfaction at
his having been brought away from his regiment. The
p]mperor had another reason for his unfriendly welcome.
Although of short stature himself, Napoleon had a great
preference for tall, strong, masculine men ; but Sainte-Croix
was small, slight, and with the face of a pretty fair-com-
plexioned woman. In this feeble-seeming body, however,
there was a soul of steel, an heroic courage, and a restless
activity. The Emperor soon recognised these qualities, but,
thinking that it was enough for Sainte-Croix to have started
with the rank of major ^ he did nothing for him during that
campaign. When, however, in 1809, Masséna was put in
command of an army corps, he remembered how the Emperor
had reproved him for attaching Sainte-Croix to his staflF
without leave, and asked and obtained him for his aide-de-
camp.

In one of the actions preceding our entry into Vienna
Sainte-Croix took a flag from the enemy, and the Emperor made
him colonel ; at Essling he showed wonderful courage and in-
telligence, and the Emperor's prejudice against him was com-
pletely destroyed by the important services which he rendered
to Masséna's corps when acting as advanced guard on the isle
of Lobau. The Emperor went every day to inspect the fortifica-
tions on the island, remaining on foot for seven or eight hours.
These long walks fatigued Masséna, who was already a little
infirm, and General Becker, chief of the staff*, often could not
answer the Emperor s questions, while Sainte-Croix, with his
wonderful activity and intelligence, knew everything, foresaw
everything, and could give the most exact information.
Thus Napoleon fell into the way of applying to him, and
gradually Sainte-Croix became, if not de jure, certainly defacio
chief of the staff* to the army corps which was defending the
island of Lobau.

It would have been so easy for the Austrians to bombard
us out of this island, that the Emperor went away each
evening with regret, and passed each night in cruel anxiety.
As soon as he awoke he wished to have news of Masséna's
corps, and Sainte-Croix had orders to report to him in his

On Lob au Island 5

room every morning at daybreak. Thus, every night the
colonel went on foot round the vast island, visiting our out-
posts and examining those of the enemy ; then, mounting his
horse, he hurried over the two leagues to Schonbrunn. The
aides-de-camp had orders to bring him at once to the
Emperor's bedroom, and the Emperor, dressing in his
presence, would discuss the position of the two armies.
Then they would gallop off to the island ; the Emperor would
inspect the works all day, often mounting a high double
ladder, which the ingenious Sainte-Croix had had set up as
an observatory, and whence the movements of the enemy's
troops on the left bank could be seen, and in the evening
Sainte-Croix would escort the Emperor back to Schonbrunn.
for forty-four days in extreme heat he worked in this way,
without being weary or slackening his activity for a moment.
Often Napoleon would call him to council, when discussing
with Marshals Masséna and Berthier the best way of getting
the army across to the left bank. The passage would have
to be made at a different point to the former one, since it was
known that that place had been strongly entrenched by the
Archduke. Sainte-Croix proposed to turn the enemy's
defences by crossing opposite Enzersdorf, which course was
adopted.

In short, Napoleon's opinion of his merit was so high
that he said one day to the Russian envoy, M. de Czernicheff,
* I have never since I have been in command of armies met
a more capable officer, nor one who understood my thought
quicker and executed it better. He reminds me of Marshal
Lannes and General Desaix, and if he is not struck down by
a thunderbolt France and Europe will be astonished at the
distance which I shall take him.' These words were very
soon known everywhere, and it was expected that Sainte-
Croix would quickly be a marshal. But, unhappily, the
thunderbolt did strike him ; he was killed the next year by
a cannon-ball at the gates of Lisbon.

Napoleon, though he usually kept at a distance the
commanders whom he most esteemed, now and again was
familiar with one of them, and even amused himself by

6 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

inciting him to frank repartees. Thus Lasalle, Junot, and
Bapp used to say to the Emperor whatever came into their
heads. The two first, who used to ruin themselves every
other year, would thus relate their pranks to Napoleon, who
always paid their debts. Sainte-Croix was too clever and too
decorous to abuse the favour which he enjoyed ; still, when
the Emperor drove him to it, he was capable of prompt and
decisive repartee. Thus, when Napoleon, who would often
take his arm, as they walked through the sands of the isle of
Lobau, said to him, on one of their numerous expeditions,
* I remember that after your duel with my wife's cousin I
wanted to shoot you ; I admit that it would have been
a mistake and a very great loss.' * That is quite true, sir,'
answered Sainte-Croix, * and I am certain that now, when
your Majesty knows me better, you wouldn't exchange me
for one of the Empress's cousins.' * For one, indeed ! ' said the
Emperor ; ' you may say for the lot of them.' Another day,
when Sainte-Croix was present, as Napoleon got up the
latter said, as he drank a glass of cold water, * I believe that
Schonbrunn in German means " beautiful spring " ; it was
rightly named, for the spring in the park produces delicious
water, which I drink every morning. Do you like cold
water ? ' * No, indeed, sir ; I prefer a good glass of bordeaux
or champagne.' Then the Emperor, turning to his valet,
said, ' Send the colonel a hundred bottles of bordeaux and
the same number of champagne,' and that very evening, as
Masséna's aides-de-camp were dining in their bivouac under
the trees, we saw several mules, from the imperial stables,
arriving with two hundred bottles of excellent wine for
Sainte-Croix, and we drank the Emperor's health therein.

CHAPTER II

As the moment approached for crossing the Danube again,
the Anstrians watched more assiduously the bank of the
small arm of the river which lay between us and them.
They fortified Enzersdorf, and if a group of French soldiers
came too near the part of the island opposite that village
their outposts would fire upon them; but they took no
notice of parties of two or three. The Emperor wished
to have a near view of the enemy's preparations, and it has
been said that in order to do so without danger he disguised
himself as a private, and did sentry's duty. This report is
incorrect; the real fact was as follows. The Emperor
and Marshal Masséna, wearing sergeants' great-coats, and
followed by Sainte-Croix in a private's uniform, went close up
to the bank. The colonel stripped himself, and went into
the water, while Napoleon and Masséna, to still any
suspicion on the part of the enemy, took off their coats
as though they too proposed to bathe, and then examined at
their ease the point where they wished to throw the
bridges across. The Austrians were so accustomed to see
our soldiers come in little parties to bathe at that place that
they remained quietly lying on the grass. This fact shows
that in war commanders ought strictly to forbid this kind of
truce, and marking off of neutral points, which the troops
on either side often establish for their respective convenience.
Having settled to cross the river at this spot, the
Emperor decided that several bridges should be constructed
there ; but as it was more than probable that on the alarm
being given by the outposts the Austrian troops posted at
Enzersdorf would hasten up to oppose the construction of
the bridges, it was arranged that 2,500 grenadiers should

8 The Memoirs of the Bamos de Marbot

first be transported to the other bank, and shoold at once
attack Enzersdorf to occnpv the garrison, and prerent their
interfering with oar works and hindering onr passage.
This being settled, the Emperor said to Masséna, ' As this
leading oolunm will be specially exposed, we mnst compose
it of our best troops, and select a brave and capable colcnel
to command them.' ' But, sir, that is my job/ said Sainte-
Croix. ' How so ? ' replied the Emperor, who probibly
asked the question only to draw the answer which he got.
' Why,' said the colonel, ' because of all the officers on the
island I am the one who has had the most tiring work for
six weeks past. I have been on my legs carrying out your
orders day and night ; and I beg that your Majesty will be
kind enough to give me in return the command of the 2,500
grenadiers who are to make the first landing on the enemy's
bank/ * Well, you shall have it,' replied XajX)leon, much
pleased with this noble daring ; and the final arrangements
for the crossing having been made, the attack was fixed for
the night of July 4.

Before that time came two important events happened
in our army corps. Lieutenant-General Becker was a good
officer, though indolent, but it was his fault to criticise
everything, and he allowed himself openly to disapprove
Napoleon's plan of attack. On hearing of it the Emperor
eent him back to France. We shall see how he avenged
himself in 181 5. • General Fririon became chief of the
staff; a capable man, but without the firmness required in
one acting under Massena. The other event nearly de-
prived the Emperor of the aid of Massena himself in the
comiug battle. One day, as he and Napoleon were riding
round the island, the mai*shars horse put its foot in a hole
and fell, injuring its riderV leg so that he could not keep his
saddle. This was the more annoying that the battle was to
take place on the same ground as that of Essling, which

[• Unfortunately, (ù»nonU Marinât 's Memoirs stop short of 1815. Greneral
Becker was directed by tht) ]*rovisional Government to escort Napoleon to
Rochefort after his second abdit^ation, and discharged the duty so con-
siderately, that they {tarted in the most atVectionate manner.]

A Spy Detected

Masséna of course knew well. He showed, however, his de-
termination by asserting that in spite of his pain he would
be taken on to the field in a litter, like Marshal Saxe at Fon-
tenoy. A litter was got ready ; but it struck the marshal,
upon a remark which I ventured to make, that this mode of
transport was rather pretentious and not so safe as a light
carriage, which, with four good horses, could get him about
the ground more quickly than men. It was therefore ar-
ranged that he should go thus, accompanied by his surgeon,
Dr. Brisset, who changed the compresses every hour with
perfect coolness under fire during the two days which the
battle of Wagram lasted, and in the subsequent fights.

Knowing that the enemy was expecting him to cross as
before between Aspern and Essling, and that it was impor-
tant to conceal his plan of turning their position by crossing
opposite Enzersdorf, Napoleon had a careful watch kept over
all who entered the island by the great bridges connecting it
with Ebersdorf. Everyone on the island must have learnt
the secret towards the end of the time ; but as it seemed
certain that none were on it but French soldiers or officers'
servants, who were all guarded, no danger was apprehended
from inquisitiveness on the enemy's part. This, as it turned
out, was a mistake ; for the Archduke had contrived to in-
troduce a spy among us. Just when he was about to give
information of the point which we were going to attack, an
anonymous letter, written in Hungarian, was brought by a
little girl to the Emperor's Mameluke, Roustan, with the
warning that it was important and urgent. It was at
first supposed to be a begging letter; but the interpreters
soon translated it, and informed the Emperor. He came at
once to the island, and on arriving, ordered all works to be
suspended, and every soul — troops, staffs, commissaries,
butchers, bakers, canteen men, even officers' servants — to
be drawn up on parade. As soon as everyone was in
the ranks, the Emperor announced that a spy had found his
way into the island, hoping to escape notice among 30,000
men ; and now that they were all in their places he ordered
every man to look at his neighbour to right and left.

lo The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

The success of this plan was instantaneous. In the midst of
the dead silence, two soldiers were heard to cry, ' Here is a
man we dont know.' He was arrested and examined, and
admitted that he had disguised himself in a French uniform
taken from men killed at Essling. This wretch had been
bom at Paris, and appeared very well educated. Having
ruined himself at play, he had fled to Austria to escape his
creditors, and there had offered himself as spy to the Aus-
trian staff. A small boat used to take him across the
Danube at night, landing him a league below Ebersdorf, and
fetch him back the next night on a given signal. He had
already been frequently on the island, and had accompanied
detachments of our troops going to fetch provisions or
materials from Ebersdorf. In order to avoid notice, he
always went to places were there was a crowd, and worked
with the soldiers at the entrenchments. He got his meals at
the canteen, passed the night near the camps, and in the
morning, armed with a spade as though on his way to join a
working party, he would go all over the island and examine
the works, lying down among the osiers to make hurried
sketches of them. The next night he would go and make
his report to the Austrians, and come back to continue his
observations. He was brought before a court-martial and
condemned to death ; but the bitter regret which he ex-
pressed for having served the enemies of France disposed
the Emperor to commute the penalty. When, however, the
spy proposed to deceive the Archduke by going to make a
false report on what he had seen, and coming back to tell the
French what the Austrians were doing, the Emperor, dis-
gusted at this new piece of infamy, abandoned him to his
fate, and let him be shot.

Meanwhile the day of the great battle was drawing on.
Napoleon had assembled round Ebersdorf the Army of Italy,
the corps of Davout and Bemadotte with the guard, and
transformed the island of Lobau into a vast fortress. Three
strong bridges secured the passage of the large arm of the
Danube, and everything was ready for throwing several across
the small arm. To confirm the Archduke in the belief that

Ready for Battle ii

he intended to cross again between Essling and Aspem,
Napoleon had the small bridge by which we had retreated
after the battle of Essling reconstructed after the night of
July 1, and sent across two divisions whose skirmishers might
attract the attention of the enemy while all was making
ready for our attack on Enzersdorf. It is hard to understand
how the Archduke could have supposed that Napoleon would
make a front attack upon the huge fortifications with which
he had surrounded Essling and Aspern ; this would indeed
have been taking the bull by the horns.

The second and third were passed by both sides in pre-
paration. The French army, to the number of 150,000 men,
was massed on the isle of Lobau ; the Archduke assembled
an equal force on the left bank, where his troops, posted in
two lines, formed an immense arc, overlapping those parts of
the island which were opposite to them. The right-hand end
of this arc rested on the Danube at Floridsdorf ; their centre
occupied the villages of Essling and Aspem, which were
strongly entrenched, and connected by works armed with
many guns. Finally, the left of the arc was at Gross-Enzers-
dorf, with a strong detachment at Miihlleiten. The Arch-
duke, therefore, was watching all the points of the island by
which we could emerge ; but as, for some unexplained reason,
he had made up his mind that Napoleon would attack his
centre, crossing the little arm of the Dauube where he had
done iu May, the Austrian commander had concentrated his
whole force in the wide plains which extend from those
villages as far as Deutsch-Wagram and Markgrafen-Neusiedel,
a large village on the Russbach stream, the steep banks of
which, commanded by high ground, offer an excellent defensive
position. His right was weak, and his left still weaker,
because, though he had ordered his brother the Archduke
John, commanding the Aniiy of Hungary, with his 35,000
men, to be by the morning of July 5 at Unter-Siebenbrunn
iind in touch on the left with the second line of the main
army, this order was not carried out.

In pursuance of the Emperor's instructions, the French
army began its attack at 9 p.m. on July 5. Just then a

12 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

tremendous storm burst ; the night was of the darkest, the
rain fell in torrents and the noise of the thunder mingled
with that of our artillery, which, sheltered from the enemy's
shot by an epaulement, aimed all its fire at Essling and
Aspem. Thus confirmed in the belief that we were going to
land at that point, the Archduke turned all his attention
thither, without troubling himself about Enzersdorf, upon
which the bulk of our force was marching. As soon as the
first shots were heard Marshal Masséna, though still in much
pain, was placed in a small open carriage and, surrounded by
his aides-de-camp, was driven towards the point where the first
attack was to be made. The Emperor soon joined us. He
was in good spirits and said to the marshal : ' I am delighted at
this storm. What a fine night for us ! The Austrians cannot
see our preparations to cross opposite Enzersdorf, and they \vill
know nothing of them till we have carried that important posi-
tion ; by which time our bridges will be placed and part of my
army formed on the bank which they think we are defending.*
In fact Colonel Sainte-Croix, after having landed his
2,500 grenadiers in silence, took up his ground on the
enemy's flank in front of Enzersdorf. A regiment of Croats
was bivouacking at this point. Attacked unawares, they
defended themselves obstinately with the bayonet ; but our
grenadiers, inspirited by the voice of Sainte-Croix, who had
thrown himself into the hottest of the scuffle, drove back the
enemy, who retreated in disorder upon Enzersdorf. That
large village, surrounded by a loopholed wall, having in front
of it a dyke cut in the form of a parapet, was full of infantry,
while all the entrances were covered by small earthworks.
To carry the village was all the more difiicult, because the
houses had been burnt down and the garrison might any
moment be supported by General Nordmann's brigade posted
a little in rear between this village and that of Miihlleiten.
But no obstacle checked Sainte-Croix, who at the head of his
grenadiers carried the outer works, pursued the enemy at the
sword's point, and entered pell-mell with them into the
redan which covered the south gate. The gate was closed,
Sainte-Croix drove it in under a, hail of bullets from the

The First Stroke 13

loopholed walls. Once masters of this passage, the colonel
and his soldiers dashed into the village, while the garrison,
weakened by its enormous losses, took refuge in the castle.
But at sight of the scaling ladders which Sainte-Croix
ordered up, the Austrian commander capitulated. Thus
Sainte-Croix, to whom this fine feat of arms did the greatest
honour, remained master of Enzersdorf, to the great satisfac-
tion of the Emperor, whose plans were admirably served by
its capture. He ordered eight bridges to be at once thrown
over the small arm between the island and Enzersdorf. The
first of these bridges was an invention of the Emperor's own.
It was made in four sections, connected by hinges so as to
allow it to turn and follow the windings of the bank ; one
end was fixed to the trees on the island, while the other was
guided towards the opposite bank by the help of a cable
carried by a boat. Swinging to the current, this new style of
bridge turned on itself, made a complete wheel to the right,
and was ready for use in a moment. In a quarter of an hour
the other seven were fixed, enabling Napoleon rapidly to
bring over to the left bank the corps of Masséna, Oudinot,
Bernadette, Davout, and Marmont, Prince Eugene's army,
the artillery reserve, all the cavalry, and finally the guard.

While the Emperor was thus profiting by the capture of
Enzersdorf, the Archduke, still convinced that his enemy in-
tended to debouch between Essling and Aspem, was wasting
his time and his ammunition in hurling shot and shell on to
the part of the island which faced those villages, under the
impression that he was causing great loss to the French
troops. As, however, we had at that point only a few scouts
well protected by earthworks, the projectiles did no damage,
and meanwhile the bulk of our troops were traversing the
small arm of the river, and forming on the left bank. The
Austrian general was astounded when, marching towards
the old battle-field on the morning of July 5, with the inten-
tion of taking us at a disadvantage the moment we landed,
he perceived that his left wing had been tuiTied by the left
army, which was marching upon Sachsengang, and shortly
occupied that place. Thus surprised, and his rear threatened,

14 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

the Archduke was obliged, in order to face us, to execute a
retrograde movement on a vast scale towards the Russbach,
always retreating before Napoleon, while our various corps
were taking up their order of battle in the great plain which
spread before them.

The Emperor sent three strong divisions of cavalry, with
several battalions, supported by light artillery, to watch for
the Archduke John at Siebenbrunn, these troops being re-
garded as outside the fighting line, and intended merely to
prevent a surprise. Of the main army, Davout's corps, rest-
ing on the Russbach, formed the right ; the centre was com-
posed of Bavarians, Wurtembergers, the corps of Oudinot
and Bernadette, and the Army of Italy. The left, under
Masséna, moved along the small arm of the Danube, in the
direction of Essling and Aspern. Each of these corps, as it
advanced, was to carry the villages on its road. The reserve
consisted of Marmont's corps, three divisions of cuirassiers,
numerous artillery, and all the imperial guard. Finally,
General Reynier, with one division and guns, remained to
guard the island of Lobau, the old bridge which we had used
at the time of the former battle having been replaced. A
splendid day had succeeded the most horrible night. The
French army in review order advanced majestically, preceded
by an immense force of artiller}^ which crushed all opposition
on the part of the enemy. The regiments composing the
Austrian left, with General Nordmann in advance, were the
first with whom he came in contact. Driven from Enzersdorf
and Mtihlleiten, they attempted to defend Raschdorf, but
were pushed back, and General Nordmann was killed in the
fight. This officer was from Alsace, formerly colonel of the
Bercheny Hussars. He deserted to the enemy in 1793 with
part of his regiment, at the same time as Dumouriez, and
entered the Austrian service. Our march at first meeting no
serious resistance, we occupied successively Essling, Aspern,
Breitenlee, Raschdorf, and Siissenbrunn. So far Napoleon's
plan had succeeded, the troops having crossed the Danube,
and occupied the plain on the left bank. But nothing could
be considered as decided until we had beaten and thoroughly

Wagraaî: The First Day 15

broken up the enemy. He now made the serious mistake,
instead of uniting his whole force on the Russbach, of
dividing it, by retreating on two very divergent lines ; one
upon Markgraf and Neusiedel, behind the Russbach ; the
other upon the heights of Stamersdorf, where his right wing
was obviously too far from the field of battle. The position
on the bank of the Russbach is strong, commanding the plain,
and covered by the brook, which, though not large, forms a
very good obstacle, its banks being too steep for infantry to
cross, except with difficulty, while the only way for cavalry
and artillery is over the bridges in the villages which the
Austrians held. As, however, the Russbach was the key of
the position. Napoleon resolved to seize it. He therefore
ordered Davout to attack Neusiedel ; Oudinot and Bernadette,
Baumersdorf and Wagram respectively ; while Prince Eugène,
supported by Macdonald and Lamarque, crossed the stream
between the two latter villages. The light artillery of the
guard crushed the Austrian masses with its fire, but Marshal
Bemadotte, commanding the Saxons, attacked Wagram so
feebly that he did not succeed. Macdonald and Lamarque,
crossing the Russbach, placed the enemy's centre for a moment
in danger; but the Archduke, flinging himself upon that point
with his reserves, forced our troops back again across the
brook. This movement was at first executed in perfect
order, but as night had approached, our infantry, who had just
resisted a front attack of the Austrian light horse, seeing in
their rear a brigade of French cavalry which General Salme
was bringing up to their support, thought they were cut off,
and some disorder ensued, aggravated by the blunder of some
Saxon battalions firing on Lamarque's division. This con-
fusion, however, was quickly repaired. Oudinot's attack on
Baumersdorf, being made with a lack of cohesion, was also
repulsed ; Davout alone had any success ; having forced the
Russbach and turned Neusiedel, he was on the point of
capturing that village, in spite of an obstinate defence, when
night compelled him to suspend the attack, and shortly after
the Emperor ordered him to retire, so as not to leave him
exposed by being isolated on the further side of the stream.

CHAPfER III

Ji'LY •*), the clut»f events of which I have recorded, served
only as preparation for the decisive battU» of the morrow.
The niirht i^issimI (|ui»'tly ; our army, with its three cavalry
divisions dftaclie<l towanls Leo|)uldsdorf, had its true right
near (in)sshofen ; our centn* was at Aderklaa ; onr left some-
what withheld at Hrt'itenlee. irivinj^ our line the form of
an angle, of which Wa^ain was the apex. The tents of
tin* Knip<*n»r antl hisguanl w«*re a litth» in lulvance of Hasch-
(lorf. A irlance at the plan of the battle of Wagram will
vhow that the enemy's right, starting from the environs of
Kanij)fndort* and passing along tin» left bank of the Rassbach
to llrhnhof. whenc»» it reached bv Saurin^ to Stamersdorf,
fornird thus a re-entering anglf. of which the apex was
«ijually at Wagram. This, then^fore. was the essential point
t»f which »'arh side wishetl to get posses.sion. To succeed in
thi>. the ««bject of either was to turn his enemy's left flank;
Init til'- Arrhdnke, having extended his army too much, was
oblii»>Ml to M*nd hi> onlers in writing, and these were either
misund»r-t<MKl or ill-t»xecute<l ; while the Km |K*ror, having his
reM»rve> under his hand.c<»uld s**e and superintend the carr\*-
out of hi^ instructions.

At davbr«*ak on the *ith the battle was renewtxl with

more vigour than «ui the previou> day. Much to Xa|)oleonV
surpris»*, the Ai-chduke, who had till then confined himself to
the defensive. lM*gan to attack, and took Aderklaa from us.
S«Min the artill«*ry tire extended over the whole lin»»; never
in the memory of man had the lik«» l>*H»n SiN»n, f»»r the number
of pi«»Cfs bn night into action by the two armies amounted to
1.-*»». The Austrian left wing, under th*» An*hduke in
p«T>o!i, cn».»w»'d the Russbach, and debouchtnl by those

Wagram I y

columns towards Leopoldsdorf, Glinzendorf, and Grosshofen,
but was stoutly resisted, and even checked, by Davout and
Grouchy's cavalry by the time that Napoleon came up at the
head of an enormous reserve. Seeing the extreme right of
his line engaged, he had supposed for a moment that the
Archduke John had joined the enemy's main army. So far
was this, however, from being the case, that, as we afterwards
learnt, he was at that moment at Pressburg, eight leagues from
the field of battle. Deprived of the support from him which
they had hoped for, the Austrian left soon repented having
attacked us. Overwhelmed by superior forces, more espe-
cially of artillery, it was driven back across the Russbach, with
heavy loss, by Davout, who then sent a portion of his troops
across, and marched by both banks on Neusiedel.

His right thus secured, the Emperor returned with his
guard to the centre, and while Bernadette attacked Wagram,
and Oudinot marched on Baumersdorf, he ordered Masséna
to retake Aderklaa. Taken and re-taken, this village finally
remained in the hands of the Austrian grenadiers, whom the
Archduke led to a renewed attack, while at the same time he
launched a strong column of cavalry against the Saxons,
under Bernadette, routing them completely, and flinging
them on Masséna's troops, who were thrown into momentary
disorder. The marshal was in his carriage, and the enemy,
noticing it with its four white horses in the middle of the
line, guessed that its occupant must be a person of importance,
and poured a storm of shot upon it. The marshal and those
about him were in great danger ; we were surrounded with
dead and dying. Captain Barain, an aide-de-camp, lost an
arm, and Colonel Sainte-Croix was wounded.

The Emperor, galloping up, became aware that the Arch-
duke, in order to turn or even surround his left, was bring-
ing forward his own right wing, which already occupied
Sûssenbrunn, Leopoldau, and Stadlau, and was marching on
Afipem, thus threatening the column of Lobau. In order to
be better seen by the troops, he got for a moment into the
carriage, beside Masséna, and at sight of him order was
restored. He bade Masséna change front to the rear, in order

VOL. n. c

1 8 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

to bring his left to Aspem and front towards Hirschstetten,
causing Macdonald, with three divisions, to take up the
ground which Masséna left. These movements were carried
out in good order, under an artillery fire from the enemy.
Thus Napoleon, profiting by the concentration of his princi-
pal forces, brought up to support Macdonald, not only strong
reserves of all arms, but finally the imperial guard, which
took up its position in three lines in rear of the other
troops.

At this moment the positions of the two armies were very
curious, the opposed lines having almost the shape of two
letters Z placed side by side. The Austrian left, posted at
Neusiedel, was giving way before our right, while the two
centres were holding their respective places, and our left wing
was retreating along the Danube before the enemy's right.
The chances of either side thus seemed to be about equal.
Really, however, they were all in favour of Napoleon — in the
first place, because it was unlikely that the village of Neusiedel,
where the only means of resistance was afforded by an old
fortified tower, would hold out long against the attack which
Davout was delivering with his usual vigour; and it was
easy to see that when this was taken, the Austrian left, being
outflanked and without support, would retreat indefinitely and
get separated from the centre, while our left wing, though
beaten at the moment, was in its retreat coming nearer to
the island of Lobau, the powerful artillery on which w^ould
check the Austrians, and prevent them from following up
their success. Secondly, Napoleon, acting on inner lines,
could hold a great part of his troops in reserve, and yet show
a front in different directions; while the Archduke, being
obliged to extend his army, in order to execute his great
movement on an outer line with the view of surrounding us,
was not in force at any point. The Emperor, observing this
mistake, was perfectly calm, though he could read in the
faces of his staff* the anxiety caused by the conquering march
of the enemy's right, which, always driving Masséna's corps
before it, had already reached the battle-field of May 22,
and after crushing Boudet's division by a formidable charge

The Decisive Blow 19

of cavalry, was threatening our rear. But the success of the
Austrians was short-lived. The hundred heavy guns with
which Napoleon's foresight had armed the island of Lobau
opened a scathing fire upon the enemy's right, and it was
compelled, under pain of annihilation, to halt in its triumphant
course, and retire in its turn. Masséna was then able to
reform his divisions, which had lost heavily. We thought
that Napoleon would profit by the disorder into which the
cannonade had thrown the enemy's right wing to attack with
his reserves; Marshal Masséna, indeed, sent me to ask for
instructions on this point. But the Emperor remained
impassible, his eyes ever fixed on the extreme right, towards
Neusiedel (which lies high and is surmounted by a tall tower,
visible from all parts of the field), waiting to hurl himself
upon the enemy's centre and right until Davout had beaten
the left and flung it back beyond that village. A valiant
defence was being maintained by the Prince of Hesse-
Homburg, who was there wounded ; but at last we suddenly
saw the smoke of Davout's guns beyond the tower. Beyond
a doubt the enemy's left was beaten. Then, turning to me,
the Emperor said : ' Quick ! tell Masséna to fall upon what-
ever is in front of him, and the battle is won.' At the same
time the aides-de-camp from all the other corps were sent off
to their chiefs with an order for a simultaneous attack. At
this supreme moment Napoleon said to General Lauriston,
* Take a hundred guns, sixty from my guard, and crush the
enemy's column.' As soon as their fire had shaken the
Austrians, Marshal Bessières charged them with six regiments
of heavy cavalry, supported by part of the cavalry of the
guard. In vain did the Archduke form squares ; they were
broken, with the loss of their guns and a great number of
men. Our centre advanced in its turn, under Macdonald,
and Siissenbrunn, Breitenlee, and Aderklaa were carried after
a smart resistance. Meanwhile Masséna had recovered the
ground lost on our left, and was pressing the enemy hard,
forcing him back beyond Stadlau and Kagran ; and Davout,
calling Oudinot to his support, occupied the heights beyond
the Russbach, and captured Wagram. This decided the

c 2

20 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

defeat of the Austrians : they retreated all along the line,
retiring in very good order along the road to Moravia.

The Emperor has been blamed for not pursuing the
defeated army with his usual vigour; but the criticism is
baseless. Napoleon was hindered by many weighty reasons
from launching his troops too promptly on the enemy's track.
In the first place, the high road to Moravia would bring them
into a rough country, divided by wooded hills, ravines, and
gorges, commanded by the mountains and forests of Bisamberg,
which would offer excellent defensive positions, all the more
difficult to carry that the Archduke could occupy them with
a large force, much of which had not been engaged, while
his rear-guard was protected by powerful artillery. We
might therefore expect a stubborn resistance, which, if pro-
longed, would lead to a night battle. Of these the chances
are always uncertain, and the Emperor's victory might well
be compromised.

In the second place, to ensure the assembling of the
French army in the isle of Lobau by the 4th, it had been
necessary to put some of the corps in movement as early as
the 1st. These, in order to reach the meeting-place, had
had to make forced marches, succeeded without any rest
between by a battle extending over two days of veiy hot
weather. Our troops were therefore worn out; while the
Austrians, who had been for more than a month in camp, had
had only the fatigues of the battle to endure. Thus, if we
had attacked the Ardhduke in the strong position which he
had taken up, every advantage would have been on his
side.

But a third and still more powerful argument checked
Napoleon's ardour and decided him to allow his troops time
to rest on the field of battle. He had just been warned by
the generals of his light cavalry placed by him to look out
beyond his extreme right that an enemy's force of 35,000 to
40,000, under the command of the Archduke John, had been
seen debouching at Unter Siebenbrunn, that is to say, upon
what, since our change of front, had become our actual rear.
The reserve provided by the Emperor would doubtless have

End of the Battle 21

been enough to repulse the Archduke ; but one must admit
that prudence would lead Napoleon not to engage his troops
in the attack of the strong positions which the Archduke
Charles appeared determined to defend obstinately, so long
as he himself was open to an attack in rear from the Arch-
duke John at the head of a strong and perfectly fresh force.
The Emperor therefore ordered the pursuit to cease, and made
his army bivouac in such a way that one part fronted to the
side where the Archduke John was, and was "ready to receive
him if he ventured into the plain. Fearing, however, to come
into contact with our victorious troops, he retreated hastily
towards Hungary. If Napoleon had pursued with his usual
vigour, the trophies from Wagram would probably have been
more numerous, but on considering the motives which decided
him to halt one cannot but praise his caution. If he had
always acted with as much prudence he would have spared
both France and himself great calamities.

In order to rest for a few hours after its victory, our army
took up its position with its left at Floridsdorf, its centre in
front of Gerpardsdorf, and its right beyond the Russbach. The
Emperor's tents were pitched between Aderklaa and Rasch-
dorf, and Masséna's headquarters were at Leopoldau. The
replacement of the old Spitz bridge put the army in direct
communication with Vienna, which favoured the transport of
the wounded to the hospitals, and of food and ammunition to
the army.

The Austrians have, not without reason, blamed the Arch-
duke John for the delays in his march and his carelessness in
carrying out the Archduke's Charles' orders. Indeed, on the
evening of the 4th Charles wi^ote to his brother to leave
Pressburg at once, and form a junction with the Austrian
left at Siebenbrunn ; but although John received the order
by 4 A.M. on the 5th he did not march till eleven in the even-
ing, and moved so slowly that, although he had only eight
leagues to do, he took twenty hours to reach Siebenbrunn,
not coming up till seven o'clock on the 6th, by which time
the battle was lost and the Austrians were in full retreat.
The Archduke Charles never forgave his brother for not

22 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

carrying out his orders; John lost his command and was
banished to Styria.^

In the absence of pursuit, the Austrian losses were much
less considerable than they might have been. Still, they
admitted 24,000 killed and wounded, among the former
three of their generals. One of them, Wukassowitz, had
distinguished himself against Bonaparte in Italy ; the other
two, Nordmann and D'Aspre, were Frenchmen in arms
against their country. According to the bulletins we made
20,000 prisoners and captured 30 guns ; but I believe this
estimate was much exaggerated. We only took a few
colours. Our loss was nearly equal to that of the enemy ;
Generals Lacour, Gauthier, and Lasalle, and seven colonels
were killed. The enemy had ten generals, including the
Archduke, wounded ; the number of ours was twenty-one,
among them. Marshal Bessières. Among the twelve colonels
wounded three were special favourites with the Emperor —
Dumesnil, Corbineau, and Sainte-Croix : the two first, who
belonged to the mounted chasseurs of the guard, lost a leg
apiece ; the Emperor rewarded them richly. As for Sainte-
Croix, who had his skin grazed by a cannon-ball, his wound
was not dangerous, at which his friends rejoiced. However,
if he had lost a leg he might perhaps have been living now,
as well as his brother Robert, one of whose legs remains on
the battle-field of Moskwa. Although Sainte-Croix had been
only two months colonel, and was not yet twenty-seven, the
Emperor made him major-general, Count with 25,000 francs
pension, Grand Cross of the Order of Hesse, and Commander
of that of Baden. On the evening of the battle the Emperor
rewarded the services of Macdonald, Oudinot, and Marmont
by giving each of them his marshal's bâton. It was not,
however, in his power to give them the talents required to
command an army ; brave and good divisional generals as
they were when in the Emperor's hands, they showed them-

[• Forty years later he reappeared on the scene. In 1848 the German
revolutionists named him Vicar-General of the Germanic Empire. In the
meantime he took an active part in the early exploration of the Austrian
Alps.]

Small Change fou Lannes

selves clnmay when they were away from Mm, either in
devising a plan of campaign, or in executing it, or modify-
ing it according to circumstances. It was held in the army
that the Emperor, not being able to replace Lannes, wanted
to get the email change for him ; a severe judgment, but we
must remember that these three marshals played an unlucky
part in the campaigns which ended in the fall of Kapoleoo and
the rain of the country.

CHAPTER IV

General Lasalle, who fell at Wagram, was keenly regretted
both by the Emperor and the army. He was the best light
cavalry oflBcer for outpost duty, and had the surest eye. He
could take in a whole district in a moment, and seldom made
a mistake, so that his reports on the enemy's position were
clear and precise. He was a handsome man, and of a bright
wit, but, although well educated, he had adopted the fashion
of posing as a swashbuckler. He might always be seen
drinking, swearing, singing, smashing everything, and
possessed by a passion for play. He was an excellent
horseman, and brave to the point of rashness. Although he
had fought in the first revolutionary wars, he was little
known before the famous campaign of 1796, when, as a
captain in the 2nd Hussars, he attracted the notice of
General Bonaparte at the battle of Rivoli. This took place,
as is well known, on a lofty plateau bounded on one side
by steep rocks, at the foot of which flows the Adige, along
the road to Rivoli. The Austrians, having been beaten by
the French infantry, were leaving the battle-field by every
available way. One of their columns hoped to escape by
reaching the valley over the rocks; but Lasalle followed
them down this diflScult passage with two squadrons. In
vain it was represented to him that cavalry cannot be
employed on such dangerous ground. He galloped down
the descent, followed by his hussars ; the astonished enemy
retreated headlong. Lasalle overtook them, and made some
thousand prisoners under the eyes of General Bonapsirte and
the army. Prom this day onwards Lasalle was in high
favour with Bonaparte, who promoted him rapidly and took
him to Egypt, where he made him colonel. In one of the

General Lasalle 25

numerous engagements with the Mamelukes the thong
which held Lasalle's sabre to his wrist broke ; he dismounted
in the thickest of the mêlée, and, undisturbed by danger,
picked up his weapon, nimbly remounted, and dashed at the
enemy afresh. One must have seen a cavalry combat to
appreciate the courage, coolness, and dexterity which such
a deed requires, especially in presence of horsemen like the
Mamelukes.

Lasalle had intimate relations with a French lady in high
society, and while he was in Egypt their correspondence was
seized by the English and insultingly published by order of the
Government — an act which even in England was blamed. A
divorce followed, and on his return to Europe Lasalle married
the lady. As general, Lasalle was placed by the Emperor in
command of the advanced guard of the Grand Army. He
distinguished himself at Austerlitz and in Prussia ; having
the audacity to appear before Stettin and summon the place
with two regiments of hussars. The governor lost his head
and brought out the keys, instead of using them to lock
the gates, in which case all the cavalry in Europe could not
have taken it. This feat brought Lasalle much credit, and
raised the Emperor's liking for him to a high point. Indeed,
he petted him to an incredible degree, laughing at all his
freaks, and never letting him pay his own debts. Just as he
was on the point of marrying the lady to whom I have
referred. Napoleon had given him 200,000 francs out of his
privy purse. A week later, meeting him at the Tuileries, the
Emperor asked, * When is the wedding ? ' 'As soon as
I have got some money to furnish with, sir.' * Why, I gave
you 200,000 francs last week ! What have you done with
them ? ' ' Paid my debts with half, and lost the other half
at cards.' Such an admission would have ruined any other
general. The Emperor laughed, and, merely giving a sharp
tug to Lasalle's moustache, ordered Duroc to give him
another 200,000.

At the close of the battle of Wagram, Lasalle's division
had not been engaged. He came and begged Masséna to let
him pursue, and the marshal assented, on condition that he

20 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

I ■

would act with prudence. Hardly had Lasalle started, when
he saw a brigade of enemy's infantry, which was hasten-
ing, closely pressed, to reach the village of Leopoldau, in
order to obtain a regular capitulation and escape the fury
of the victors in the open. Lasalle guessed what the
Austrian general was after, and, pointing to the setting sun,
addressed his men, ' The battle is ending, and we alone have
not contributed to the victory. Come on ! ' He dashed
forward, sword in hand, followed by his squadrons, and, in
order to prevent the enemy from entering the village, made
for the narrow space now left between the head of the
column and Leopoldau. The others, seeing themselves cut
off from the hoped-for shelter, halted and opened a brisk
file-fire. A bullet struck Lasalle in the head, killing him
on the spot. His division lost a hundred troopers, besides
many wounded. The Austrians opened their way to the
village, and when our infantry divisions came up, capitulated,
the officers declaring that that had been their intention in
making for Leopoldau. Thus, Lasalle's charge was useless,
and he paid dear for a mention in a bulletin.

His death left a great gap in our light cavalry, which
he had trained to a high degree of perfection. In other
respects, however, he had done it much harm. The
eccentricities of a popular and successful leader are always
imitated, and his example was long mischievous to the
light cavalry. A man did not think himself a chasseur,
still less a hussar, if he did not model himself on Lasalle,
and become, like him, a reckless, drinking, swearing rowdy.
Many officers copied the fault of this famous outpost leader,
but none of them attained to the merits which in him atoned
for the faults.

When a battle is fought in summer, it often happens that
the ripe com is set on fire by shells and gun-wadding ; but
in no battle of the Empire did this occur on such a scale as
at Wagram. The season was early, and the weather hot ;
the battle-field was completely covered with crops ready for
harvest, which caught quickly and carried the fire .with
terrific rapidity. The movements of both armies were

Premature Rejoicing 27

hampered by the necessity of avoiding it ; for if once troops
were overtaken by it, pouches and wagons exploded, carrying
destruction through the ranks. Whole regiments might be
seen hastening out of the way of the fire, and taking up their
position where the com had been burnt already ; but this
means of escape was only open to the able-bodied. Of the
soldiers who were severely wounded great numbers perished
in the flames ; and of those whom the fire did not reach, many
lay for days hidden by the tall com, living during that time
on the ears. The Emperor had the plain searched by bands
of cavalry, and vehicles were brought from Vienna to remove
the wounded, friends and foes alike. But few of those even
whom the fire had passed recovered, and the soldiers had a
saying that straw-fire had killed nearly as many as gun-
fire.

The two days of the battle were an anxious time for the
Viennese, who, from their roofs and towers, could enjoy a
full view of all that took place, and who swayed from hope
to fear with the progress of the fight. The famous and
witty field-marshal Prince de Ligne, now well advanced in
years,* had assembled the best society in Vienna in his
country house, in the highest of the neighbouring hills,
whence the eye could take in the whole field of battle.
With his experience of war and his keen intelligence, he
quickly seized Napoleon's design and the Archduke's
blunders, and foretold the defeat of the latter. When
the Viennese saw the right of their army, on the 6th, rolling
back our left, they broke into a frenzy of joy, and through
our glasses we could see thousands of men and women
waving hats and handkerchiefs to kindle still ftirther the
courage of their troops, who were winning at that point,
but there only. The Prince de Ligne did not share the joy
of the Viennese, and I have it from one who was close by the
old soldier that he said to his guests, * Do not rejoice just
yet ; in less than a quarter of an hour the Archduke will be
beaten. He has no reserves, and you see the plain is

[' Bom 1735. He survived five years longer, dying during the Congress
of Vienna.]

28 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

crowded with the masses of Napoleon's ! ' His prediction
was justified. As, however, one must do justice even to an
enemy, I may say, after criticising the Archduke's tactics,
that his blunders are vastly excused by the hope, which he
was justified in having, of the arrival of his brother with
35,000 or 40,000 men to fall on our right or rear. More-
over, it must be allowed that, having formed his plan,
he carried it out with much vigour, showing great personal
courage, with a remarkable gift of keeping up the spirit of
his troops. Of this I will cite a striking instance.

As is well known, every regiment has, besides its colonel
commanding, a proprietary colonel, whose name it bears ;
usually some prince or general. At his death the regiment
passes to another, so that a corps may often have to abandon
a name illustrated on a score of fields, and take some new
and unknown designation. In this way Latour's dragoons,
so famous throughout Europe in the days of the early
Eevolution wars, when General Latour died took the name of
General Vincent, whereby a fine tradition was destroyed, the
self-esteem of the regiment injured, and their zeal materially
weakened. Now it happened on the first day of Wagram
that the Archduke, seeing that his centre was on the point of
being broken by Oudinot's corps, decided to attack this with
cavalry, and ordered Vincent's dragoons, who were at hand,
to charge. They did so, but without vigour ; they were
beaten off, and the French advance continued. Again the
Archduke sent the regiment at them, and again it recoiled
before our battalions. The Austrian line was pierced. In
this emergency the Archduke, hastening to meet the regi-
ment, stopped it in its flight, and, to shame it for its lack of
vigour, said in a loud voice, ' Vincent's Dragoons, it is easy
to see that you are no longer Latour's Dragoons ! ' Humi-
liated by this cutting but deserved reproach, they replied,
' Yes, yes, we are ! ' ' Well, then,' cried the Archduke,
drawing his sword, ' show yourselves worthy of your old
fame, and follow me ! ' A bullet struck him, but he flew
upon the French. Vincent's regiment followed him with
ardour ; their charge was terrible, and Oudinot's grenadiers

Bernadotte in Trouble 29

fell back with heavy loss. This is how an able and energetic
general contrives to turn everything to account which can
restore the shaken courage of his men. The Archduke's
address kindled the dragoons to such a degree that after
stopping Oudinot's grenadiers, they charged Lamarque's
division, and recaptured 2,000 prisoners and five stand of
colours which it had just taken. In complimenting the
dragoons the Archduke said, ' Now you can be proud to
bear the name of Vincent, which you have just made no less
illustrious than that of Latour.' This regiment was one of
those which on the following day contributed most to the
rout of Boudet's division of infantry.

Among the multitude of episodes to which the battle of
Wagram gave rise, the most important, and one which
produced very strong feeling in the army, has not been
related by any author. I mean the disgrace of General
Bernadotte, who was ordered off the field by the Emperor.
Between these two eminent persons no love was ever lost ;
and since the conspiracy of Rennes, got up by Bernadotte
against the Consular Government,* they had been on very bad
terms. This notwithstanding. Napoleon had included Ber-
nadotte in the first creation of marshals, and made him
Prince of Ponte Corvo at the request of Joseph Bonaparte,
whose sister-in-law Bernadotte had married. Nothing, how-
ever, could appease Bemadotte's hatred and envy of Napoleon.
He flattered him to his face, and afterwards, as the Emperor
well knew, criticised and found' fault. The ability and
courage which he had shown at Austerlitz would have in-
duced the Emperor to overlook his misdeeds had he not
aggravated them by his conduct at Jena. In spite of the
urgent requests of his generals, he let his three divisions
remain wholly inactive, refusing to support Davout, who a
league away, at Auerstadt, was withstanding half the Prussian
army under the King in person, and ultimately beat them.
The army and all France were indignant with Bernadotte ;
but the Emperor did no more than reprimand him severely.
Stimulated by this, the marshal did well at Hall and

• See vol. i. chap. xv.

30 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Lubeck, but soon fell back into his customary laziness, ill-
will possibly, and, in spite of orders, was two days late for the
battle of Eylau. This lukewarm conduct roused afresh the
Emperor's dissatisfaction, which grew more and more during
the campaign in Austria. Bernadette, in command of a
corps of Saxons, always came up late, acted without energy,
and criticised not only the Emperor's tactics, but the way in
which the other marshals handled their troops. The Em-
peror, however, restrained his irritation until on the first day
of the battle of Wagram Bernadotte's lack of vigour and
false tactics allowed the Austrians to re-take the important
position of Deutsch- Wagram. It seems that after this re-
pulse Bernadette said to some officers that the crossing of
the Danube and subsequent action had been mismanaged,
and that if he had been in command he could by a scientific
manoeuvre have compelled the Archduke to surrender almost
without a blow. This remark was reported the same even-
ing to the Emperor, who was naturally angry. Such were
the terms on which Napoleon and Bernadette stood when the
undecided action was resumed on the 6th.

We have seen that when the battle was at its height, the
Saxons, badly handled by Bernadette, were repulsed and
charged by the enemy's cavalry, being flung in disorder upon
Masséna's corps, which they nearly carried with them. The
Saxons are brave, but the best of troops are sometimes
routed ; and in such cases it is of no use for the officers to
try to rally the men who are within reach of the enemy's
sabres and bayonets. Generals and colonels should get as
quickly as possible to the head of the flying mass, then face
about, and by their presence and their words arrest the
movement of retreat, and re-form the battalions. In con-
formity with this rule, Bernadette, whose personal bravery
was unquestioned, galloped ofi* into the plain at the head of
his staff*, to get in front of the fugitives and stop them.
Hardly was he clear of the throng, when he found himself
face to face with the Emperor, who observed, ironically, * Is
that the scientific manoeuvre by which you are going to
make the Archduke lay down his arms ? ' Bernadotte's

The Disgraced Marshal 31

vexation at the rout of his army was heightened by learning
that the Emperor knew of his inconsiderate remark of the
previous day, and he remained speechless. Presently re-
covering himself, he tried to mutter some words of explana-
tion ; but the Emperor in a severe and haughty tone, said :
* I remove you, sir, from the command of the army corps,
which you handle so badly. Withdraw at once, and leave the
Grand Army within twenty-four hours ; a bungler like you is no
good to me/ Therewith he turned his back on the marshal,
and, taking command for the moment of the Saxons, restored
order in their ranks, and led them again to meet the enemy.
Under any circumstances, Bemadotte would have been in
despair at such an outburst ; but as he had been ordered to
leave the field at the moment when he was galloping ahead
of the fugitives, which might give an opening for slanderous
tongues to reflect on his courage, though the object of his
retreat was to check that of his soldiers, he understood how
much worse it made his position, and it is asserted that in
his despair he wished to throw himself on the enemy's bavo-
nets. His aides-de-camp, however, held him back, and
took him away from the Saxon troops. All day long he
strayed about the battle-field, and stayed towards evening
behind our left wing at the village of Leopoldau, where his
officers persuaded him to pass the night in the pretty little
château belonging to that place. Hardly, however, was he
established, when Masséna, who had ordered his headquarters
to be fixed at Leopoldau, came to take possession of the
same house. As it is customary for generals to be quartered
in the midst of their troops, and not to lodge in villages
where their colleagues* regiments are, Bemadotte wishtnl to
give way to Mass^na ; the latter, however, not yet knowing
of his colleague's mishap, begged him to stay and share the
quarters with him, to which Bemadotte agreed. While
arrangements were being made for their lodging, an officer
who had witnessed the scene between the Emperor and
Bemadotte came and told Masséna of it, whereupon he
rliaoged his mind, and discovered that the house was not
roomy enough for two marshals and their staffs. Wishing,

32 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

however, to keep up an appearance of generosity, he said to
his aides-de-camp, ' This lodging was mine by rights, but as
poor Bemadotte is in trouble I must give it up to him; find
me another place — a barn, or anywhere.' Then he got into
his carriage and went off without a word to Bemadotte, who
felt this desertion deeply. In his exasperation he committed
another and very serious mistake ; for though no longer in
command of the Saxon troops, he addressed them in a
general order, in which he made the most of their exploits,
and consequently of his own, without waiting for the usual
assignment of credit on the part of the commander-in-chief.
This infringement of regulations increased the Emptor's
anger, and Bemadotte was obliged to withdraw from the
army and return to France.

Among the remarkable incidents of the battle of Wagram,
I may mention the combat between two cavalry regiments,
which, though serving in hostile armies, belonged to the
same proprietary colonel, Prince Albert of Sachs-Teschen.
He had married the celebrated Archduchess Christina of
Austria, governor of the Low Countries, and, having the title
of prince in both states, he possessed a regiment of hussars
in Saxony and of cuirassiers in Austria. Both one and the
other bore his name, and, as was the custom of both states, he
appointed all the oflRcers in each. Austria and Saxony
having been at peace for many years, whenever he had an
officer to place he would put him indifferently in whichever
regiment had a vacancy, so that out of one family there
could be found some members in the the Saxon hussars, and
others in the Austrian cuirassiers. Now, by an accident at
once deplorable and extraordinary, these two regiments met
on the battle-field of Wagram, and, impelled by duty and by
the point of honour, they charged each other. Strange to say,
the cuirassiers were broken by the hussars, who, in their
desire to retrieve under the eyes of Napoleon the repulse of the
Saxon infantry, fought with the greatest vigour. Indeed, the
Saxon infantry, though it has often shown its courage, is far
from being either as solidly organised or as well trained as the
cavalry, which is rightly held to be one of the best in Europe.

CHAPTER V

You will piobably now like to hear my own adventures in
this terrible battle. Though frequently much exposed, espe-
<;ially on the second day, when the enemy's artillery con-
verged its fire on Marshal Masséna's carriage, and we were
literally under a hail of cannon-balls, which struck down
a good many around me, I was lucky enough not to be
wounded. I was also in considerable danger when the
Austrian cavalry had broken and routed Boudet's division, and
the marshal sent me to that general in the middle of 1 0,000
flying soldiers, who were being hewn down by the cavalry.
Again I was more than once in danger when, in carrying
orders, I had to pass near some of the many spots where
the com was blazing. By frequent détours I managed to
escape the flames, but it was impossible to avoid crossing the
fields where the ashes of the burnt straw were still hot
enough to scorch the horses' feet. Two of mine were rendered
useless for some time by the injuries they thus received, and
a third was in such pain that he was within an ace of rolling
me over in the half-extinguished straw. However, I got
through without any serious accident ; but though I escaped
personal damage, a disagreeable thing befell me, which had
very injurious results. On the second day of the battle I got
into almost hopeless trouble with Masséna. The way of it
was this. The marshal sent me with a message to the Em-
peror; I had the very greatest diflSculty in reaching him, and
was coming back after having galloped more than three leagues
over the yet burning ashes of the com. My horse, dead beat,
and with his legs half burnt, could go no ftirther when I
got back to Masséna, and found him in a great difficulty.
His corps was retreating before the enemy's right along
VOL. n. D

34 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

the Danube, and the infantry of Boudet's division, broken
by the Austrian cavalry, which was sabring them merci-
lessly, were flying pell-mell across the plain. It was the
most critical moment of the battle. From his carriage the
marshal could see the imminent danger, and was calmly
making his dispositions to maintain order in the three in-
fantry divisions which as yet were unbroken. For this pur-
pose he had been obliged to send so many aides-de-camp
to his generals that he had none with him except his son,
Prosper Masséna, a young lieutenant. At that moment he
saw that the fugitives from Boudet's division were making^
for the three divisions which were still fighting, and were on
the point of flinging themselves upon their ranks, and drawing
them along in a general rout. To stop this catastrophe the
marshal wished to tell the generals and officers to direct the
torrent of fliers towards the island of Lobau, where the
disordered troops would find a secure shelter behind the
powerful artillery. It was a dangerous mission, as there was
every probability that the aide-de-camp who went into that
disorderly rabble would be attacked by some of the enemy's
troopers. The marshal could not make up his mind to
expose his son to this danger, but he had no other officer
near him, and it was clear that the order must be carried.

I came up just at the right moment to extricate Masséna
from this cruel dilemma, so, without giving me time to take
breath, he ordered me to throw myself into the danger which
he dreaded for his son ; but observing that my horse could
hardly stand, he lent me one of his, which an orderly was
leading. I was too well acquainted with military duty not
to be aware that a general cannot bind himself to follow the
arrangement which his aides-de-camp have made amongst
themselves for taking their turn of duty, however great Âe
peril may be ; the chief must be free in a given case to em-
ploy whichever officer he thinks best suited to get his orders
executed. Thus, although Prosper had not carried a single
order all day, and it was his turn to go, I made no remark. I
will even say that my self-esteem hindered me from divining
the marshal's real motive in sending, me on a duty both

Parental Affection 35

difficult and dangerous when it ought to have &llen to
another, and I was proud of his confidence in me. But
Masséna soon destroyed my illusion by saying, in a wheedling
tone, ' You understand, my friend, why I do not send my
son, although it's his turn ; I am afraid of getting him killed.
You understand ? you understand ? ' I should have held my
tongue, but, disgusted with such ill-disguised selfishness, I
could not refrain from answering, and that in the presence of
several generals : ' Marshal, I was going under the impres-
sion that I was about to fulfil a duty ; I am sorry that you have
corrected my mistake, for now I understand perfectly that,
being obliged to send one of your aides-de-camp to almost
certain death, you would rather it should be I than your son,
but I think you might have spared me this cruel plain speak-
ing.' And without awaiting a reply I went ofi* at full gallop
towards Boudet's division, which the enemy's troopers were
pitilessly slaughtering. As I lefb the carriage I heard a dis-
cussion begin between the marshal and his son, but the
uproar of the battle and the speed at which I was going
prevented me from catching their words. Their sense, how-
ever, was shortly explained, for hardly had I reached Boudet's
division and begun doing m^ utmost to direct the terrified
crowd towards the island of Lobau, when I beheld Prosper
Masséna at my side. The brave lad, indignant at the way in
which his father had sent me into danger and wished to
reduce him to inactivity, had escaped unawares to follow me.
' I wish,' said he, ' at least to share the danger from which
I ought to have saved you if my father's blind afiection had
not made him unjust to you when it was my turn to go.'
The young man's noble straightforwardness pleased me ; in
his place I should have wished to do the same. Still, I had
rather he had been further ofi* at this critical moment, for no
one who has not seen it can form an idea of a mass of infantry
which has been broken and is being actively pursued by
cavalry. Sabres and lances were working terrible execution
among this rabble of terrified men, who were flying in dis-
order instead of taking the equally easy and much safer
course of forming themselves into groups and defending

D 2

\
\

36 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

themselves with the bayonet. Prosper Masséna was very
brave, and in no way dazed by the danger, although we
found ourselves every moment in this chaos face to face with
the enemy's troopers. My position then became very critical,
since I had a threefold task to fulfil. First, to parry the
blows aimed at young Masséna, who had never leamt the
sword exercise and used his weapon clumsily ; secondly, to
defend myself, and lastly, to speak to our demoralised soldiers
to make them understand that they were to go towards the
island of Lobau and not towards the divisions which were
still in line. Neither of us received any wound, for when
the Austrian troopers perceived that we were determined to
defend ourselves vigorously, they left us, and turned their
attention to the unresisting foot-soldiers.

When troops are in disorder, the soldiers fling them-
selves like sheep in the direction where they see their com-
rades running, and thus, as soon as I had imparted the
marshal's orders to a certain number of officers, and they
had shouted to their people to run towards the island, the
stream of fugitives made in that direction. I found General
Boudet at last, and he succeeded under the fire of our guns
in rallying his troops. My task was thus at an end, and I
returned with Prosper towards the marshal. But in my
desire to take the shortest road, I imprudently passed near a
clump of trees, behind which some hundred Austrian uhlans
were posted. They charged upon us unawares, we mean-
while making at full speed for a line of French cavalry
which was coming our way. We were none too soon, for the
enemy's squadron was on the point of reaching us, and was
pressing us so close that I thought for a moment that we
were going to be killed or taken prisoners. But at the
approach of our men the uhlans wheeled about, all but one
officer, who, being admirably mounted, would not leave us
without having a shot at us. One bullet pierced the neck of
Prosper's horse, and the animal, throwing up his head vio-
lently, covered young Masséna's face with blood. I thought
he was wounded, and was getting ready to defend him
against the uhlan officer, when we were met by the

Filial Pride 37

advanced files of the French regiment. These, firing their
carbines at the Austrian officer, laid him dead on the spot,
just as he was turning to gallop ofil

Prosper and I then returned to the marshal, who uttered
a cry of grief on seeing his son covered with blood. But on
finding that he was not wounded he gave free vent to his
anger, and in the presence of several generals, his own
aides-de-camp, and two orderly officers of the Emperor's, he
scolded his son roundly, and ended his lecture with the
words, 'Who ordered you to go and stick your head into
that row, you young idiot ? ' Prosper's answer was really
sublime. * Who ordered me ? My honour ! This is ray
first campaign. I am already lieutenant and member of the
Legion of Honour ; I have received several foreign decora-
tions, and so far I have done nothing for them. I wished
to show my comrades, the army, and France that if I am
not destined to have the military talent of my illustrious
father, I am at least worthy by my courage to bear the name
of Masséna.' Seeing that his son's noble sentiments met
with the approbation of all the bystanders, the marshal
made no answer ; but his anger fell chiefly on me, whom he
accused of having carried his son away, when, on the con-
trary, his presence was a great hindrance to me. The two
orderly officers having reported at headquarters the scene
between the marshal and his son. Napoleon heard of it, and
happening to come that evening to Leopoldau, sent for
Prosper, and said to him, taking him in a friendly way by
the ear : * Good, very good, my dear boy ; that is how young
people like you ought to start on their career.' Then, turn-
ing to the marshal, he said in a low tone, but loud enough to
be heard by General Bertrand, from whom I have the story,
'I love my brother Louis- no less than you your son ; but
when he was my aide-de-camp in Italy he did his turn of
duty like the others, and I should have been afraid of bring-
ing him into discredit if I had sent one of his comrades into
clanger instead of him.' This reproof from the Emperor, in
addition to the answer which I had been foolish enough to
make to Masséna, naturally set him still more against me.

38 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

From that day forward he never addressed me with iu^ and
although outwardly he treated me well, I knew that the
grudge would remain, and as you will see I was not mis-
taken.

Never again did the Austrians fight with so much vigour
as at Wagram ; their retreat was admirable for its coolness
and good order. They had, no doubt, the advantage, for the
reasons I have stated, of leaving the field without being pur-
sued ; but I am not able to explain the reasons for Napoleon's
delay in following them up on the ensuing morning. It
has been said that as the roads both to Bohemia and to
Moravia were in front of him, the Emperor was awaiting the
result of reconnoissances in order to know what force the
the Archduke had on each of these roads. Beconnoissances,
however, can only give very incomplete information, since
the enemy's rear-guard very soon brings them to a halt, and
they can see nothing beyond. Precious time was therefore
lost uselessly ; we had seen the enemy's columns marching
off on both the roads, and should have pursued them at day-
break on the 7th by one or the other. However that may
be, the Emperor did not commence the pursuit till 2 p.m.,
and went himself no more than three leagues, staying the
night at the château of Volkersdorf, fix^m which the Emperor
of Austria had on the two previous days watched the
battle. General Vandamme was left in command at Vienna,
General Beynier in the island of Lobau, Oudinot at Wagram,
and Macdonald at Floridsdorf. His rear thus secured. Napo-
leon sent Marmont and Davout in pursuit on the road to
Moravia, and Masséna on that to Bohemia. The Army of
Italy and the guard marched between the two high roads,
ready to give support where it was wanted.

The stronger portion of the Austrian army was on the
road to Bohemia. The Archduke had made good use of the
night of the 6th, and so much of the 7th as Napoleon had
allowed him, and his baggage wagons and artillery were
well out of our reach. On leaving the field of battle we fell
in with the scouts of the enemy's rear-guard in the defile of
Langen-Enzersdorf, a long and narrow passage which

Dangers of Over-Confidence 39

would have been &tal to the Archduke if, on the previous
day, we had been able to push him back to it. Passing this
we entered a wide plain, in the middle of which stands
Kom-Neuburg, a small walled town. Here the rear-guard,
composed of nine battalions of Croats and Tyrolese Jagers,
with a strong body of cavalry and plenty of guns, awaited us
in impressive tranquillity. No doubt it is right in war to
be enterprising, especially in presence of an already beaten
foe ; but this rule must not be followed beyond the limits of
prudence. French cavalry generals are often too venture-
some. Here they repeated the fault which Montbrun had
committed before Baab in the previous June, when he
would not wait for the in&ntry, and, leading his squadrons
too near the fortress, suffered heavily from its artillery.
In spite of that severe lesson. General Bruyère, who had
succeeded Lasalle in the command of the light cavalry of
Masséna's corps, having the lead when we emerged from the
defile, would not wait for the infantry to pass him and form
in the plain. Deploying his squadrons, he advanced towards
the enemy, who, remaining quite still, let him come within
cannon-range, then opened a heavy fire, under which he lost
heavily. At sight of this Masséna got very angry, and sent
me to Bruyère to express his dissatisfaction. I found the
general at the head of his division, under a storm of balls,
brave enough, but much vexed at having run into this risk,
and much perplexed as to his best course. If he charged
the Austrian cavalry, of twice his own numbers, he would
have his division cut up. On the other hand, if he retreated
to get out of range, and await the infantry, it was certain
that the enemy's cavalry would be on him as soon as he had
&ced about, and would drive him back on our battalions, as
they issued from the defile. The only other thing was to
stay where he was, and wait for the infantry ; and this
seemed the least of evils, as I permitted myself to tell
General Bruyère, when he did me the honour to ask my
advice. When I repeated it to the marshal, he approved,
but was still in a high rage with the general, exclaiming
every moment : * Can you conceive anyone getting his people

40 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

killed like that for no good ? ' Meanwhlie, he hurried up
Legrand's division, and, as soon as it was formed, sent the
26th to attack Kom-Neuburg. The place was taken, and
the enemy's cavalry driven back by Bruyère's squadrons, who
much preferred the danger of a charge to being pounded, as
they had been for half-an-hour, by the artillery. The general
behaved like a hero in the hand-to-hand fighting, which did
not save him from being sharply reprimanded by the marshal.

On the 8th Masséna continued the pursuit, but we only
had a slight engagement. We occupied the town of
Stockerau, taking large stores of provisions, especially wine,
which delighted the soldiers. Continuing on the 9th, the
army was stopped by a strong force, before Hollabrunn. A
brisk fight ensued, in which General Bruyère, remembering
his mistake, handled his division more prudently, but exposed
himself freely, and got severely wounded. The unlucky
town of Hollabrunn, hardly rebuilt after the fire in 1805,* wa&
again reduced to ashes, and again many wounded men were
buried in the ruins. The enemy withdrew with loss.

During the night of the 9th the marshal sent me to the
Emperor with a report of the action. After a long march,
and frequently losing my way in country roads, I reached
Napoleon, still at the chateau of Volkersdorf. His Majesty
had just learned that a great part of the Austrian army,
leaving the road to Moravia, was marching towards Laa, to
cross the Taya, and rejoin the Archduke at Znaym, and
had sent Marmont in haste to follow them. He took the
same direction himself on the 10th, while Davout pushed on
to Nikolsburg, and took it. I was sent back to Masséna
with orders to march quickly on Znaym, where the enemy
appeared to be concentrating, with the view of again giving
battle. All through the 10th the enemy's rear-guard re-
treated steadily before Masséna's corps. After its losses at
Hollabrunn, some disorder began to show itself, and we made
a great many prisoners. The same day. Prince Liechtenstein
appeared at our outposts with a flag of truce, to ask for an
armistice on the part of the Austrian commander-in-chief.

* See vol. i., p. 186.

The Jew Spies 41

Masséna sent him on to Napoleon with one of his officers,
but by the time they reached Volkersdorf the Emperor had
set out for Laa, and the flag of truce only reached him the
next evening at Znaym, a delay which cost a good many
lives. The Austrian rear-guard, after retreating all day
without fighting, in the evening disputed our entrance inta
the village of Guntersdorf. There was a brisk artillery
engagement, in the course of which a ball struck Masséna's
carriage, and another killed one of the horses. Luckily, the
marshal had got out five minutes before. We repulsed the
enemy at length, and passed the night at Guntersdorf.

In war, spies are indispensable. Masséna used to employ
in this capacity two Jews, brothers, very intelligent men,
who, in Older to get accurate information, and earn higher
pay, used to slip in among the Austrian columns, under
guise of selling fruit and wine; then, falling to the rear,
they would wait till the French came up, and report to the
marshal. While he was at Hollabrunn, he had promised a
large sum to one of these Jews if he would get him, by the
next evening, an approximate ' state ' of the forces in front
of us. Tempted by this bait, the Israelite travelled all
night by country roads, reached the head of the Austrian
army, and climbed a leafy tree in a wood, where he was able
to command a view of the road without being seen. As
the columns filed past, the Jew entered in a note-book the
strength of each arm. While he was thus occupied, a
sergeant of Jâgers entered the wood for a few moments' rest,
and lay down just at the foot of the tree in which the Jew
was perched. In his alarm the spy probably made some
movement in order to hide himself; the note-book fell from
his hand, and dropped by the sergeant's side. Looking np«
he saw a man amongst the topmost branches, and took aim
at him, ordering him to come down. The miserable Jew
was forced to obey, and was taken before an Austrian
general, who, on seeing the accusing note-book, had him
bayonetted. He lay on the road till the FVench army
came up, some hours later. As soon as the second Jew,
who was with us at that moment, beheld his brother's corpse,

42 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

he broke out into fearful shrieks ; then, collecting himself, he
rummaged the dead man's pockets. Finding nothing there,
however, he cursed the enemy for, as he said, stealing fix}m
him the money which his brother had with him ; and,
finally, so that he might at least inherit something from
him, he took all his clothes, in order to sell them later
on. There you have a good picture of the Jewish character !

CHAPTER VI

On July 11, an ill-omened day for me, Masséna's corps
appeared before Znaym about 10 a.m., and half a league to
our right we could see Marmont's divisions on the plateau of
Teswitz, which they had reached by the road from Laa to
Brunn. By mid-day the Emperor and his guard were at
Zuckerhandel, and the Army of Italy not far away. The
town of Znaym is surrounded by a solid wall, and stands on
a vine-clad hill, at the foot of which runs the river Taya and
a large brook named Lischen, which joins the Taya below
Teswitz. Thus the hill of Znaym forms a position en-
trenched by nature, for the banks at most points bristle with
steep rocks difficult of access. The ground falls towards the
village of Oblass, through which runs the Vienna road, by
which we arrived.

Having had no answer to his proposal of an armistice,
the Archduke resolved to profit by the good position which
he occupied, and risk the chance of another battle. Ac-
cordingly he formed his army in two lines, the first having
its right on the Taya near Klosterbruck, its centre opposite
Teswitz, and its left reaching to Kukrowitz. The second
line occupied Znaym, the Galgenberg, and Brenditz, with
the reserves in rear ; while a swarm of skirmishers defended
the vineyards between Znaym and the two streams.

On arriving before Oblass Masséna occupied that village
and the double bridge which crosses the river at the so-
called * Pheasants' Island.' Legrand's division, after cap-
turing it, went on towards Alt-Schallersdorf and Kloster-
bruck, a large convent turned into a tobacco factory. Here
our troops met with a brisk resistance, and as our artillery
were unable to pass through the vines, and had consequently

44 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

to fire uphill from the bank of the river, it was unable to
afford them any support. The marshal regretted that his
inability to mount his horse prevented him from going to
see for himself what could be done to remedy this state of
things ; whereupon I ventured to say that having explored
the ground before the attack, I thought that a battery going
from Oblass along the right bank of the river, and taking up
its position above the village of Edelspitz, might do good
service. Masséna, thanking me for the suggestion, ordered
me to guide six guns to the spot named ; and these, taking
in rear the troops defending Klosterbruck and Alt-Schallers-
dorf, did so much execution among them that they quickly
abandoned those two positions to our troops. As the
marshal was congratulating himself on the effect produced
by this battery, I went up and suggested taking another ta
the Kuhberg, the highest ground on the left bank, which
could be reached by strengthening the teams. He agreed;
and after some trouble I got eight guns on to the Kuhberg,
whence they could play full on the Austrians massed in
front of Znaym ; so that I have no doubt but that, if the
battle had continued, our battery on the Kuhberg would
have been of great use by forcing the enemy to retire within
the^ place. It is the best point from which to reduce the
fortress of Znaym with artillery.

While this brisk cannonade was going on, a fearful storm
burst over the district. In a moment everything was under
water ; the Taya overflowed ; not a gun or musket could be
fired. General Legrand's troops took shelter in Klosterbruck
and Schallersdorf, and most of all in the cellars hollowed out
among the vineyards. But while our soldiers, unheeding the
enemy, whom they supposed to be under shelter in Znaym,
were emptying the casks, the Archduke, informed doubtless
of this carelessness, and wishing to cut off the retreat of
Legrand's division, sent a column of a thousand men fi*om
the town. Marching at the double down the high road,^
they went through Alt-Schallersdorf, and reached the first
bridge at Oblass just as I was coming down from the Kuh-
berg. I had gone up by way of Neu-Schallersdorf, having-

The Surprisers Surprised 45

brought my guns from Oblass ; but when I went back alone
it seemed useless to go so far round, as I knew that all the
ground between Znaym and the Taya was occupied by our
infantry. So, as soon as I reached the little bridge between
Edelspitz and Pheasants' Island, I crossed the Taya to reach
the large bridges on the high road opposite Oblass, where I
had left the marshal. Just as I had got on to the causeway
connecting these two bridges, I heard behind me, in spite of
the storm, the sound of many feet marching in time. Turn-
ing my head I beheld a column of Austrian grenadiers not
twenty-five paces away. My first impulse was to go off at
full speed to warn the marshal and his troops ; but to my
great surprise I found the bridge nearest to Oblass occupied
by a brigade of French cuirassiers. General Guiton, who
commanded it, knowing that Legrand was on the other side
of the river, and having received an indistinct order, was
quietly advancing at a walk. I had hardly time to say,
* There is the enemy,' when the general saw them, drew his
sword, and shouting ' Gallop ! ' flew at the Austrian grena-
diers. Having come to attack us unawares, they were so
astounded at being thus unexpectedly attacked themselves
that the foremost ranks had hardly titne to bring their bayo-
nets down. In a moment the three battalions were literally
roUed over under the hoofs of the cuirassiers' horses, not one
remaining on his legs. One only was killed ; we took all
the rest prisoners, with three guns which they had brought
to fortify the Pheasants' Island.

Their return to the offensive would have had awkward
results for us, if the Archduke had carried it out with more
troops, and at the same time attacked Legrand's division in the
vineyards. Unable to retreat by the bridges, our men would
have undergone a severe reverse. But the Austrian general
miscalculated when he flattered himself that a thousand of
his men on the Pheasants' Island could have held it against
three of our divisions, while Legrand's division, when at-
tacked itself, would certainly have tried to force a passage.
Thus, caught between two fires, the thousand grenadiers
would equally have had to surrender, though General

46 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Guiton's unexpected attack doubtless saved much loss of
life. Emboldened by their success, though not knowing
the ground, the cuirassiers charged right up to the gates of
Znaym, General Legrand's infantry hurrying up to their
support, and the town was nearly carried. But superior
forces, backed by powerful artillery, forced the French back
to Alt-Schallersdorf, and Klosterbruck, when Masséna sent
Carra-Saint Cyr's infantry division to their support.

At this moment, the Emperor, posted on the heights of
Zuckerhandel, ordered Marshal Marmont to debouch from
Teswitz and get in touch with Masséna's right. The battle
was spreading gradually, and in order to get nearer to it,
Napoleon came to Teswitz. Masséna sent me to his
Majesty to report, and I came back with orders to carry the
town at any cost. Our battery on the Kuhberg was
hammering it, and Marmont was about to assault by the
valley of the Leska. As they beat the charge on all sides,
the sound of the drums, muffled by the rain, mingled with
the thunder. Our troops, in good spirits, advanced bravely
against the battalions which were stoutly awaiting them in their
position before Znaym ; only an occasional shot came from
the houses. Everything foretold a bloody bayonet fight, when
an officer from the Emperor galloped up with an order
fit)m Masséna to cease fighting, as an armistice had just
been concluded. The marshal at once sent officers with
the news to the different points of the line, and appointed
me by name to go towards that one of our brigades which
was nearest to the town and had the smallest distance to
cross in order to reach the enemy. Coming up in the rear
of these regiments, I vainly tried to speak ; my voice was
drowned by cries of ' Vive T Empereur ! ' which always
preceded a fight, and the bayonets were already crossing.
A moment longer, one of those terrible infantry tussles
would take place, which, once started, cannot be checked.
I hesitated no longer, and passing through the files, I got
between the two lines, which were on the point of meeting.
As I was shouting, * Peace ! peace ! ' and with my left hand
giving the sign for a halt, suddenly a bullet from the

The Reward of Peacemakers 47

outskirts of the town struck me on the wrist. Some of our
officers, understanding at length that I brought the order to
suspend hostilities, halted their companies ; others, seeing
the Austrian battalions within a hundred paces, were doubtful.
At the same moment, an aide-de-camp from the Archduke
also came between the two lines, with a view of preventing
the attack, and got a bullet through his shoulder, from the
same quarter. I hastened towards him, and to make both
sides see for what purpose we had been sent, we testified it
by embracing each other. At sight of this, the officers on
both sides had no more hesitation about ordering a halt.
Flocking round us, they learnt that an armistice had been
agreed on. There were mutual congratulations ; the
Austrians returned to Znaym, and our troops to their
former position.

The blow which I received had been so sharp that I
thought my wrist was broken ; luckily, it was nothing of the
kind, but the bullet had injured the tendon. None of my
many wounds have caused me so much pain ; I had to carry
my arm in a sling for six months. My wound, however,
was far less severe than that of the Austrian aide-de-camp.
He was quite a young man, full of pluck, and in spite of
what had happened would come with me to Masséna, quite
as much to see the famous old warrior as to carry a message
which the Archduke had sent by him. As we were going
together to Klosterbruck, the Austrian officer, who was
losing blood freely, nearly fainted, and I proposed to take
him back to Znaym. But he persisted in coming with me to
be treated by the French surgeons, who, he said, were much
better than those of his own army. His name was Count
d'Aspre, and he was the nephew of the general of that name
who was killed at'Wagram. Masséna received him kindly,
and took every sort of care of him. As for me, the marshal,
seeing me wounded again, felt bound to agree with all
the officers, and even the soldiers of the brigade, who praised
my devotion in going between the two armies to prevent
bloodshed. Napoleon came round the bivouacs in the
evening, and expressed his satisfaction with me in lively

48 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

terms, adding, * You get wounded very often, but I will
reward your zeal/ He had formed a plan of creating
a military order of the Three Fleeces, the knights of which
were bound to have had at least six wounds, and I learnt
afterwards that his Majesty had entered me on the list
of officers to receive this decoration, of which I shall have
to speak hereafter. He asked to see M. d'Aspre, who had
devoted himself as I had, and gave him many complimentary
messages for the Archduke.

While deeming it fortunate that the cuirassiers had
reached the bridges just at the moment when the Austrian
grenadiers were going to take possession of them, Napoleon
was surprised that heavy cavalry should have been sent
across the river on to a hill-side, where the only passage was
a high road with steep sides among vineyards. No one,
therefore, admitted having given the order ; it came neither
from the marshal nor from his chief of staff, and as the
general of cuirassiers could not point out the officer who had
brought it, the author of this lucky blunder remained
unknown.

In the few minutes during which the grenadiers occupied
Pheasants* Island, they captured three of our generals,
Fririon, Masséna's chief of staff, Lasouski, and Stabenrath,
and relieved them in a trice of their purses and silver spurs.
The generals, who had been set free the next moment by our
cuirassiers, treated their short captivity as a good joke.

I have mentioned that before I received my wound, and
immediately after the brilliant charge of the cuirassiers, the
marshal had ordered me to report it to the Emperor at
Zuckerhandel. As the storm had made it impossible to ford
the Taya, I had to cross it in front of Oblass, by the Pheasants'
Island bridges, just as Marshal Marmont's troops were
debouching from Teswitz. The enemy's artillery had opened a
terrible fire upon them, so that the ground near the river was
ploughed up by the balls. But as there was no means of
taking another road without going a long way round, I took
that line. I had left Oblass with Major de Tallejrrand
Périgord, who was on the imperial staff, and was returning

A Fix

after bringing an order to Masséna. He had already been
that way, and offered to guide me. As he was going in front
of me along the narrow path beside the right bank of the
Taya, the enemy's fire increased and we qaickened our pace.
All of a sudden a confounded soldier of the transport corps,
his horse laden with plundered chickens and ducks, came out
from the willows on the river bank, a few paces from M. de
Talleyrand, and went off along the path at full gallop. But
his horse being knocked over by a cannon-ball, that of M. de
Talleyrand, who was just behind him, tumbled over its body,
and came down with a crash. Seeing my companion fall, I
dismounted to help him up, a diflScult job, for one of his feet
was entangled in the stirrup under the horse's body. The
transport man, instead of helping us, ran and hid among the
trees, and I was left alone to perform a task which was made
all the more troublesome by the cannon-balls pitching all
round us, and by the fact that the enemy's skirmishers were
pushing ours back, and might come upon us. I could not,
however, leave a comrade in this awkward position, so I set
to work, and aflber incredible efforts I was lucky enough to
get the horse up, and put M. de Talleyrand back in his
saddle, and we resumed our course. I felt all the more
deserving because I had never met my companion before ; he
expressed his gratitude in the warmest terms, and when we
had got to Zuckerhandel, and I had delivered my message to
the Emperor, I was congratulated by all the officers of the
headquarters staff. M. de Talleyrand had told them what I
had done, and kept repeating, * That's what you may call a
first-rate comrade.' Some years afterwards, on my return from
the exile to which I was condemned at the Restoration, M.
de Talleyrand, then General of the Royal Guard, received
me pretty coldly. However, when I met him twenty years
later at Milan, whither I accompanied the Duke of Orleans,
I bore him no grudge, and we shook hands. It was on the
same journey that I met M. d'Aspre at Cremona; he was
then a general in the Austrian service, having been till 1836
in that of Spain. Later on, he was second in command of
the Army of Italy, under the famous Marshal Radetzky.

VOL. II. E

50 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

But to return to Znaym. The Austrians evacuated the
town, and Masséna fixed his headquarters there, his army
corps encamping in the neighbourhood. By the armistice
a third of the Austrian monarchy ydth eight million in-
habitants had been provisionally given up to Napoleon —
a powerful guarantee of peace.

M. d'Aspre, being too badly hurt to rejoin his own army,
stayed at Znaym. I saw much of him; he was a quick-
witted man, but rather excitable. I too had a good deal of
pain from my wound, and could not ride ; therefore, Masséna
sent me with despatches for the Emperor, bidding me post to
Vienna, where he and the staff soon came. Our people and
horses remained at Znaym. Peace took a long time to con-
clude. Napoleon wishing to crush Austria, while the Austrians
were encouraged to hold out for better terms by the news
that the English had landed in Holland and taken Flushing.
Cambacérès, who governed France during the Emperor's
absence, sent all available troops to the Scheldt, putting
(much to Napoleon's displeasure) Bernadette in command.
The English withdrew before long.* The conferences were
resumed, and went on no faster. We continued to occupy
the country, and Masséna's headquarters remained at Vienna
till November 10. My wound prevented me from taking any
part in the amusements of the place, but I was kindly treated
by the Countess Stibar, on whom I was quartered. At
Vienna I found my friend. General Sainte-Croix, who was
kept some months in bed by his wound. He was quartered
in the Lobkowitz palace, where Masséna was. I passed
much time with him every day, and told him about the dis-
like which the marshal seemed to have conceived for me
since the incident at Wagram. As he had great influence
with Masséna, he used it in my favour, and this, with
my conduct at Znaym, restored me to a fairly good place in
the marshal's esteem; but then by overplain speaking I
destroyed the good result, and revived the marshal's ill-will
towards me.

As I have told you, the injury to his leg caused by the
\} The unlucky « Walcheren Expedition.']

Tw^o Brave Men 51

fisdl (rom his horse at Lobau had compelled Masséna to use
a carriage at the battle of Wagram and the subsequent
actions. In the first instance, artillery horses were to be
harnessed to the carriage, but it was found that they were
too long for the pole and not easy enough in their action, so
four horses firom the marshal's stable were substituted. Two
soldiers from the transport train were to drive, and they
were just getting into the saddle on the evening of July 4,
when the marshal's own coachman and postilion declared
that as he was using his own horses it was their business to
drive. No representation of the danger into which they
were running could deter them from their purpose; the
coachman got on the box and the postilion mounted just as
if they were going for a drive in the Bois de Boulogne. The
two brave servants were in constant danger for eight days,
especially at Wagram, where many hundred men were killed
close to the carriage, and at Guntersdorf, where the ball
which struck the carriage went through the coachman's
overcoat, and another ball killed the horse under the pos-
tilion. Nothing seemed to frighten these two faithful
attendants, whose devotion was admired by the whole army.
Even the Emperor complimented them, and observed once
to Masséna : * There are 300,000 combatants on the field ;
now do you know who are the two bravest ? Your coach-
man and your postilion. For all the rest of us are here in
pursuance of our duty, while these two men might have
excused themselves from being exposed to death. Their
merit is therefore greater than that of anyone else.' To the
men themselves he called out : ^ You are two brave fellows ! '
Napoleon would certainly have rewarded them, but he could
only have given them money, and he probably thought that
this might ofiend Masséna, in whose service the danger had
lje«n incurred, and, indeed, it was the marshars business,
and all the more so that he had an enormous fortune ;
2<K>,000 francs as army leader, another 200,000 as Duke of
Rivoli, and 500,000 as Prince of Essling. But for all that he
allowed two months to pass without telling the men what be
meant to do for them. One day when I and several of the

52 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

aides-de-camp happened to be by Sainte-Croix's bedside,
Masséna came into the room, and as we chatted over the
events of the campaign, he said how fortunate it was that he
had followed my advice and gone on to the field in a
carriage, instead of being carried by grenadiers, and thence
he naturally went on to speak of the plucky conduct of his
coachman and postilion. He ended by saying that he
wished to reward them well, and was going to give each of
them 400 francs. Then, turning to me, he had the face to
ask if the two men would not be pleased ? I had better
have held my tongue, or merely suggested a. rather higher
sum ; but I made the mistake of speaking too plainly and
mischievously into the bargain. I knew perfectly well that
Masséna only intended to give them 400 francs down ; but I
answered that with a pension of 400 francs added to their
savings, the coachman and postilion would be secured fix)m
want in their old age. The eyes of a tigress who sees her
young attacked by the hunter are not more terrible than
were Masséna's on hearing me speak thus. He leapt from
his chair, exclaiming : ' Wretch ! do you want to ruin me ?
What ! an annuity of 400 francs ? No, no, no : 400 francs
once for all ! ' Most of my comrades prudently held their
peace ; but General Sainte-Croix and Major Ligniville de-
clared plainly that the proposed reward was unworthy of the
marshal, and that he ought to make it an annuity. At this
Masséna could restrain himself no longer; he rushed about
the room in a rage, upsetting everything in his way, even
large furniture, and cried, * You want to ruin me ! * His
last words as he left the room were, ' I would sooner see you
all shot, and get a bullet through my arm, than bind myself
to give an annuity of 400 francs to anyone. Go to the devil
the lot of you ! ' Next day he came among us again, very
calm outwardly, for no one could play a part better; but
from that day forward General Sainte-Croix lost much of his
esteem, and he bore a grudge against Ligniville which he let
him see the next year in Portugal. As for me he was most
angry with me of all, because I was the first to mention the
annuity. The story travelled from mouth to mouth till it

The Fate of Stabs 53

reached the Emperor, and one day when Masséna was dining
with him, Napoleon kept bantering him about his avarice,
and said that he understood he had at any rate given a good
pension to the two brave servants who drove his carriage at
Wagram. Then the marshal answered that he was going to
give them each an annuity of 400 francs ; so he did it with-
out having to be shot through the arm. He was all the
more angry with us, and often said to us with a sardonic
laugh, ' Ah ! my fine fellows, if I followed your good advice
you would soon have me ruined.'

Seeing that the Austrian plenipotentiaries kept putting
off the conclusion of the treaty of peace, the Emperor kept
ready for war, bringing up numerous reinforcements, which
he inspected daily at the parade held in the court of the
palace at Schônbrunn. The recruits attracted many sight-
seers, who were allowed to approach too freely; thus one
day a student named Frederick Stabs, son of a bookseller at
Naumburg, and member of the secret society called the
Tugendbund, or League of Virtue, took advantage of this
lack of supervision to slip into the group which surrounded
the Emperor. General Rapp had twice told him not to
come so near, and on pushing him away for the third time
he felt that the young man had arms concealed under his
clothes. Being arrested, he confessed that he wished to
deliver Germany from the Emperor's yoke by killing him.
Napoleon would have spared his life and treated him as
insane ; but as the doctors declared that he was not mad, and
the man himself persisted in saying that if he escaped he
should try to accomplish what had been a longstanding
purpose, he was tried by court-martial and shot.

The treaty of peace was signed on October 4; the
Emperor left Austria on the 22nd, and it was ten days later
before the troops had left the place. Then Masséna
permitted his officers to return to France. I left Vienna
November 10, driving as far as Strasburg with my comrade
Ligniville. I had left my servant behind to bring one of my
horses on to Paris. From Strasburg I was afraid to continue
my journey alone, for my arm was much swelled, and I was

54 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

in great pain. Fortunately, I found in my hotel the surgeon-
major of the 10th Chasseurs, who was kind enough to dress
my wound and to share my carriage as far as Paris, taking
care of me on the way. The doctor left the army, and
settled at Chantilly, where I met him, twenty years later, at
the table of the Duke of Orleans, as commandant of the
national guard. I was still very poorly when I reached
Paris, but rest and my mother's care soon made me well.

Thus ended the year 1809. Now, if you recollect that
I began at Astorga, in Spain, during the campaign against
the English, and then took part in the siege of Saragossa,
where I got a bullet through my body ; if you consider that
1 had next to cross part of Spain, and the whole of France
and Germany ; that I was present at the battle of Eckmuhl ;
mounted the walls of Ratisbon ; performed the risky passage
of the Danube at Molk ; fought for two days at Essling,
where I was wounded in the leg; then was engaged for
sixty hours at the battle of Wagram; and, lastly, was
wounded in the arm at the action at Znaym, you will agree
that this year had been very eventful for me, and had seen
me pretty frequently in danger.

CHAPTER Vn

The year 1810 opened happily for me. I was at Paris
with my mother, and my wounds being quite healed, I was
able to go into society. I became very intimate with M.
and Mme Desbrières, whose daughter I married in the
following year. Before that happy moment came, however,
I had a laborious campaign and plenty of danger to go
through.

The Emperor had appointed Marshal Masséna to the
command of a formidable army, which was to march in the
spring upon Lisbon, then occupied by the English. We
made our arrangements, therefore, to set out; but as the
French way is to make amusement a prelude to fighting,
Paris was unwontedly brilliant that winter. Everywhere,
both at court and in private houses, were balls and parties,
to which, as aide-de-camp of the Prince of Essling, I had
constant invitations. The Emperor required that the great
officials, to whom he gave enormous salaries, should en-
courage trade by luxurious entertainments, and they rivalled
each other in earning their master's favour by doing their
duty in this respect. Of them all the most conspicuous was
(3onnt Marescalchi, ambassador from Napoleon, King of
Italy, to Napoleon, Emperor of the French. This diploma-
tist, who had a fine house in the Champs Elysées, at the
comer of the present Avenue Montaigne, had devised a fonn
of amusement which, if not new, was brought to perfection
b}' him ; I mean the fancy-dress or masked ball. As
etiquette prevented fancy-dress from being worn at Court
or at high officials' houses, M. Marescalchi had a monopoly
of this kind of entertainment. All the best society went
to them, and the Emperor (who had just been divorced from

56 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Joséphine, but had not yet married Marie-Louise) never
missed one ; it was even said that he arranged them.
Wearing a plain black domino and common mask, and with
Duroc, similarly disguised, on his arm. Napoleon used to
mix with the crowd and puzzle the ladies, who were rarely
masked. The crowd, it is true, consisted of none but
trustworthy persons, because M. Marescalchi always sub-
mitted his list to the minister of police; and also because
the assistant-adjutant-general, Laborde, so well known for
his talents in scenting a conspirator, was at the entrance of
the rooms, and allowed no one to enter without showing his
^ace and ticket, and giving his name. Agents in disguise
went about, and a battalion of the guard furnished sentries
to every exit. These precautions, however, were so well
managed by Duroc, that once in the room, the guests were
unconscious of any supervision.

I never missed one of these gatherings, and had much
amusement at them. One night, however, my pleasure
was disturbed by an awkward incident which is worth
recording. My mother was some kind of relation to General
Sahuguet d'Espagnac, whose father had been governor of
the Invalides under Louis XV. General Sahuguet was
appointed, under the Consulate, Governor of Tobago, and
died there, leaving a widow, who came to live at Paris»
She was a good woman, but of a sharpish temper; sa
my mother and I did not often visit her. Now, it happened
that once in the course of this winter I met at her house
a friend of hers, of whom I had often heard, but whom I did

not know. Mme X was a lady of great stature, over

fifty years of age. She was said to have been very handsome,
but nothing remained of it save her splendid hair. Her
voice and demeanour were those of a man; with her lofty
air and vigorous language, she was a very dragoon. Her
late husband had held high oflSce, but he had abused the
confidence of the Government, and her pension had been
commuted, on what she thought inadequate terms. Having
come to Paris to protest against what she called a crying
injustice, and finding her claims rejected by the ministry,

An Importunate Shepherdess 57

she applied in vain to all the members of the Imperial
family, and, finally, in despair, resolved to speak to the
Emperor himself. Unable to obtain an audience, she
pursued Napoleon everywhere, trying to get at him wherever
he went. She had found out that he was going to M.
Marescalchi's ball, and thinking that the diplomatist would
not decline to receive the widow of a man once in a high
position, she boldly wrote, asking for an invitation. The
ambassador put her name on his list, where it escaped the

notice of the police, and Mme X had just received

a ticket for a ball on the evening of the day when I met her
at Mme Sahuguet's. In the course of conversation she found
out that I was going, and said that she should be glad to
meet me there, as she had few friends in Paris, and none of
them went to Marescalchi's balls. I replied by some polite
commonplace, little thinking that the result would be one
of the most awkward situations I ever was in.

Night came, and I went to the Embassy. The ball was
on the ground floor, card-tables being on that above. When
I entered quadrilles were going on, and a crowd was gazing
at the magnificent costumes. Suddenly, in the midst of silk,
velvet, feathers, and embroideries appeared a colossal female
figure, clad in plain white calico, with red corset, and
bedizened with coloured ribbons in the worst taste. This
was Mme X , who had found no better way of display-
ing her magnificent hair than dressing as a shepherdess, with
a little straw hat over one ear, and two large tresses down to
her heels. Her curious get-up, and the strange simplicity of
the dress in which she appeared in the brilliant assembly,
drew all eyes towards her. I had the curiosity to look that

way, having unluckily taken off my mask. Mme X ,

feeling awkward in the crowd of strangers, came to me, and
took my arm without more ado, saying aloud, ' Now I shall
have a partner.' I should have willingly seen this strange
shepherdess at the devil, all the more so that from her in-
discreet confidences I feared a scene with the Emperor, which
would have seriously compromised me. I was looking for an
opportunity of getting rid of her, when a pretext spon-

58 The Memoirs ob the Baron de Marbot

taneously presented itself. As I have said, most of the
ladies unmasked on coming in, which made the gathering
more pleasant. Some men did the same for coolness, and
so long as they were few in number it was allowed. If,
however, all had uncovered their faces, the only two masked
men would have been the Emperor and Duroc, and the
occasion would have lost all its attraction for Napoleon, who
liked to go about incognito and hear what people said.
Now, just when I was wishing most ardently to get away

from Mme X , many men beside myself had their

masks off, and M. Marescalchi's secretaries were beginning
to go round the rooms, requesting us to resume them. Mine
was in my pocket, but I pretended to have left it in the next
room, and, promising to return quickly, 1 left the shepherdess
under the plea of going to fetch it.

Rid at length of this dreadful incubus, I hastened up to
the first floor, where, going through the quiet card-rooms, I
went and established myself in a room at the further end,
dimly lighted by a shaded lamp. No one being there, I took
off my mask, and was resting and consuming an excellent
ice, rejoicing in my escape, when two masked men, short and
stout, in black dominoes, entered the little room. ' Here we
shall be out of the crowd,' said one ; then, calling me by my
name without prefix, he beckoned me to him. I could not
see his face, but as I knew all the great dignitaries of the
Empire were in the house, I felt sure that a man who could so
imperatively summon an officer of my rank must be an
important personage. I came forward, and the unknown said
in a whisper, * I am Duroc ; the Emperor is with me. He
is overcome by the heat and wishes to rest in this out-of-the-
way room ; stay with us, to obviate any suspicion on the part
of chance enterers.' The Emperor sat down in an arm-chair,
looking towards a corner of the room. The general and I
placed ours back to back with his, so as to cover him, facing
the door, and began to chat, by the general's wish, as if he
were one of my comrades. The Emperor, taking off his
mask, asked the general for two handkerchiefs, with which
he wiped his face and neck ; then, tapping me lightly on the

The Use of Cold Water 59

«houlder, he begged me (that was his term) to get hkn a
large glass of cold water, and bring it myself. I went at
once to the nearest buffet, and filled a glass with iced water ;
but as I was about to carry it to the room where Napoleon
was, I was accosted by two tall men in Scotch costume, one
of whom said in my ear, * Can Major Marbot answer for the
wholesomeness of that water ? ' I thought I could, for I had
taken it at random from one of the many decanters standing
there for the use of all comers. Doubtless, these two persons
were some of the police agents who were distributed about
the house under various disguises to look after the Emperor
without worrying him by too ostentatious attention, and
moved about at a respectful distance, ready to fly to his help
if they were wanted. Napoleon received the water which I
brought him with so much satisfaction that I thought he
must be parched with thirst; to my surprise, however, he
swallowed only a small mouthful, then, dipping the two
handkerchiefs in the iced water, he told me to put one on the
nape of his neck while he held the other to his face, repeating,
* Ah ! that's good, that's good ! ' Duroc then resumed his
chat with me, chiefly about the recent campaign in Austria.
The Emperor said, ' You behaved very well, especially at the
assault on Ratisbon and your crossing of the Danube ; I shall
never forget it, and before long I will give you a notable
proof of my satisfaction.' I could not imagine what this new
reward was to consist of, but my heart leapt for joy. Then,
oh, woe ! the terrible shepherdess appeared at the end of the
little room. * Oh ! there you are, sir ! I shall complain to
your cousin of your rudeness,' she exclaimed. ' Since you
deserted me I have been all but smothered ten times over.
I had to leave the ball-room, the heat is stifling. It seems
comfortable here ; I will rest here.' So saying, she sat down
beside me.

General Duroc said nothing, and the Emperor, keeping
his back turned and his face in the wet handkerchief, remained
motionless ; more and more so as the shepherdess, giving free
play to her reckless tongue, and taking no notice of our
neighbours, told me how she thought she had more than once

6o The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

recognised the personage whom she sought in the crowd, but
had not been able to get at him. ' But I must speak to him,'
she said, 'he absolutely must double my pension. I know
that people have tried to injure me by saying that I was free
in my youth. Good heavens ! go and listen for a moment to
the talk down there, between the windows. Besides, what
about his sisters ? What about himself ? What does ha
come here for, if not to be able to talk as he likes to pretty
women ? They say my husband stole ; poor devil ! he took
to it late, and was pretty clumsy at it ! Besides, have not
his accusers stolen, too? Did they inherit their town
houses and their fine estates? Didn't he steal in Italy,
Egypt, everywhere ? ' ' But, madam,' said I, ' allow me to
remark that what you say is very unseemly, and I am all the
more surprised you should say it to me, that I never saw you
till this morning.' * Oh ! I speak the truth before anyone.
And if he does not give me a good pension, I will tell him,
or write to him, what I think of him pretty plainly. Oh ! I
am not afraid of anything.' I was on tenterhooks, and would
willingly have exchanged my situation for a cavalry charge
or a storm ing-party. However, my agony was alleviated by

feeling that Mme X 's chatter would clear my character

with my two neighbours when they heard that I had never
seen her till that morning, had not brought her to the ball,
and had got away from her as soon as I could.

Nevertheless I was rather anxious about the way in which
this scene would end, when Duroc, leaning towards me, said :
* Don't let this woman follow us.' He rose ; the Emperor

had replaced his mask while Mme X was raving at

him, and as he passed in front of her he said to me, ' Marbot,
people who take an interest in you are pleased to know that
you never met this charming shepherdess till to-day, and you
would do well to send her off to feed her sheep.' So saying.

Napoleon took Du roc's arm and went out. Mme X ,

astounded and thinking she recognised them, wanted to dart
after them. I knew that, strong as I was, I could not hold
this giantess by the arm, but I seized her by the skirt, which
tore at the waist with a loud crack. At the sound the

The End of an Adventure 6i

shepherdess, fearing that if she palled she would presently
find herself in her shift, stopped short, saying, ^ It's he ! it's
he!' and reproaching me bitterly for having hindered her
from following. This I endured patiently until I saw in the
distance the Emperor and Duroc with the two Scotchmen
following a little way off come to the end of the long suite
of rooms and reach the staircase. Judging, then, that

Mme X would not be able to find them in the crowd, I

made her a low bow without a word, and went off as quick as
I could. She was ready to choke with rage, but feeling that
the lower part of her garment was about to desert her, she
said to me, * At least, try to get me some pins, for my dress
is falling off.' But I was so angry at her freaks that I left
her in the lurch, and I will even admit that I was mischievous
enough to rejoice at her awkward position. I quickly left the
house and returned home. I passed a disturbed night, seeing
myself in my dreams pursued by the shepherdess, who, in
spite of my remonstrances, kept insulting the Emperor
horribly. Next day I went to cousin Sahuguet to tell her
the extraordinary conduct of her dangerous friend : she was

disgusted, and forbad her house to Mme X , who a few

days after received orders to leave Paris, nor do I know what
became of her.

The Emperor, as is well known, attended a state Mass
every Sunday, after which there was a grand reception at the
Tuileries, open to everyone who had reached a certain rank
in the civil or judicial service, and to oflScers in the army.
As such I had the entrée, of which I only availed myself once
a month. The Sunday following the day on which the scene I
have related took place I was in a perplexity. Ought I to show
myself to the Emperor so quickly, or would it be better to let
some weeks pass ? I consulted my mother, and her opinion
was that as I was in no way to blame in the affair, I had
better go to the Tuileries, showing no signs of embarrassment,
which advice I followed. The people who came to court
formed a rank on each side of the way to the chapel. The
Emperor passed in silence between them, returning their
salutes. He replied to mine by a good-natured smile, which

62 The Memoirs op the Baron de Mar bot

seemed to me of good omen and completely reassured me.
After the Mass, as Napoleon went through the rooms again,
and, according to his custom, addressed a few words to the
people who were there, he stopped in front of me, and being
unable to express himself freely in presence of so many hearers
he said to me, sure that I should take his meaning : ' I am
told that you were at Marescalchi's last ball ; did you enjoy
yourself very much ? ' ' Not the least bit, sir.' * Ah ! ^
replied the Emperor, ' if masked balls sometimes offer agree-
able adventures, they are apt also to cause very awkward ones.
The great thing is to get well out of them, and no doubt that
is what you did.' As soon as the Emperor had passed on,
General Duroc, who was behind me, said in my e€«*, ' Confess
that there was a moment when you were in a considerable
fix. I was so no less, for I am responsible for all the
invitations ; but it won't happen again. Our impudent shep-
herdess is far away from Paris, and will never come back.'
The cloud which had a moment disturbed my tranquillity
was dissolved, and I recovered my habitual gaiety. Very
soon I had cause to be well satisfied, for at the following
reception the Emperor was good enough to tell me in public
that he had included me in the number of oflScers who were
to receive the order of the Three Fleeces.

You will doubtless like to know something about this
new order, the creation of which, though announced in the
'Moniteur,' was never candied into effect. As you know,
Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, founded in the fifteenth
century the famous order of the Golden Fleece. By the
marriage of the daughter of Charles the Bold to the heir of
the house of Austria, the Duchy of Burgundy, and with it
the right of conferring the Golden Fleece, passed to that
house, and the Emperor Charles V., after uniting the crown
of Austria to that of Spain, continued to enjoy the privilege.
When Spain and Germany were separated after his death,
the princes of the house of Austria, though no longer
possessing the Duchy of Burgundy, preserved the grand
mastery of the Golden Fleece uncontested. But when, on
the extinction of the Austrian branch in Spain, a French

The Three Fleeces 63

prince mounted that throne, the Kings of Spain, as well as
the house of Austria, claimed the right of conferring the
order. Some people considered that neither the one nor the
other had the right ; but that since Burgundy now formed
part of France it was proper that a Burgundian order should
be given by our kings. They never did give it, however, but
the sovereigns of Au8tria"and Spain- each continued to do so,
so that there was both a Spanish and an Austrian Golden
Fleece. Finding things in this state at his accession, the
Emperor Napoleon resolved, as being actually in possession
of the old Burgundy, to throw the two rival orders into
the shade by creating that of the Three Fleeces, restrict-
ing the members to a small number in order to make it
more illustrious, and admitting them only on condition of
distinguished service, the first requirement being that the
receiver should have been wounded at least four times.
Great privileges and a considerable pension were to be
attached to the decoration.

By a sentiment which one can easily understand, Napo-
leon chose to date the decree founding the new order from
Schonbrunn, the palace of the Emperor of Austria, at a
moment when the French armies, having just conquered half
of his dominions, were occupying Spain. The King of
Spain, probably, did not feel this fresh outrage, which was a
small matter after the loss of his crown, but it was otherwise
with the Emperor of Austria. He, it is said, was much hurt
on learning that Napoleon intended to tarnish the splendour
of an order founded by one of his ancestors, and highly
valued by the princes of his house.

In spite of the numerous congratulations which I
received, and the joy which I felt, I could not help inwardly
blaming the creation of the order. I thought that the
splendour which the Emperor wished to give it must lower
that of the Legion of Honour, the institution of which had
already produced such great results. Still, I congratulated
myself on having been thought worthy to receive the new
order. But whether Napoleon feared to lower the value of
the Legion of Honour, or wished to please his future father-

64 The Memoirs op the Baron db Mar bot

in-law, he renounced his purpose, and, after his marriage
with the Archduchess Marie-Louise, no more was heard of
the order of the Three Fleeces.

The civil marriage was celebrated at Saint-Cloud, April 1,
and the religious ceremony took place the next day in the
chapel of the Louvre. I was present both at this and at the
many festivities and rejoicings in honour of this event, which,
as they said, was going to secure the crown on Napoleon's
head, and which, on the contrary, actually contributed so
much to his fall.

CHAPTER Vni

The time was drawing near when Marshal Masséna was to
go to Portugal, and the troops which were to compose his
army were already assembled in great numbers in the south-
west of Spain. As I was the only one of his aides-de-camp
who had ever been in the Peninsula, he decided that I
should go on in fix)nt to establish his headquarters at Yalla-
dolid. I left Paris on April 15 with a sad presentiment that
I was going to make a disagreeable campaign in all ways.
This seemed to be justified at the outset, for one of the
wheels of the post-chaise in which I was travelling with my
servant Woirland broke when we were a few leagues from
Paris, and we had to walk on to the post at Longjumeau.
It was a holiday, and we lost more than twelve hours.
Wishing to make them up by travelling night and day, I
was rather tired when I got to Bayonne. Beyond that town
one could not travel in a carriage ; we had therefore to ride
post ; and, to complete our troubles, the weather, which was
magnificent when I left France, suddenly turned to rain, and
the Pyrenees were covered with snow. I was very soon wet
through and worn out, but there was nothing to do but to
go on.

I am not superstitious ; but at the moment when I left
French soil, and was crossing the Bidassoa to enter Spain,
an incident happened which struck me as an evil omen. A
huge hideous black jackass, with rough and shaggy coat, was
standing in the middle of the bridge, apparently disputing
our passage. The outrider, who was a little in front of us^
administered a sharp cut with his whip to make it get out
of the way, when the animal in a fury threw itself upon the
man's horse and bit it savagely, lashing out all the time at

VOL II. F

66 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Woirland and myself, who had come up to the rescue. The
blows which we all three dealt to the infernal beast, so far
from making him let go, seemed to excite him still further ;
and I really do not know how the ridiculous fight would
have ended but for the help of the custom-house officers, who
pricked the donkey's rump with their spiked sticks. My
melancholy anticipations were certainly justified by the
event, for my two campaigns in the Peninsula were ex-
ceedingly laborious. I was twice wounded without obtaining
any reward, and scarcely any mark of kindness from
Masséna.

After crossing the Bidassoa and reaching Irun there was
no more security. OSicers bearing despatches had to be
escoiiied by a picket of the so-called Burgos gendarmerie,
which had been formed of picked men in the town of that
name, and had the special duty of protecting the communica-
tions. To this end there was at every posting-station a detach-
ment in an entrenched block-house. The gendarmes, men in
the prime of life, had veiy severe service for five years, and
lost heavily, since it it was war to the death between them
and the Spanish insurgents. It was raining hard as I left
Irun. After some hours' march through the mountains, as
I was reaching the little town of Montdragon, I heard a
brisk musketry fire about half a league ahead. I stopped to
consider. If I went forward it might be to fall into the hands
of the bandits, with whom the country was swarming. On
the other hand, if an oflScer bearing despatches turned back
every time he heard a musket-shot it would take him several
months to go the shortest journey. So I went on, and soon •
came upon the corpse of a French officer. The poor man, on
his way from Madrid to Paris with letters from King Joseph
to the Emperor, had just changed horses at Montdragon.
He was not two cannon-shots from the station when he and
his escort received an almost point-blank discharge firom a
group of bandits hidden behind a rock. The officer had
several bullets through his body, and two of the gendarmes in
his escort were wounded. If he had started a quarter of an
hour later from Montdragon, I should undoubtedly have been

The Way to Reconcile an Opponent 67

the one to fall into the ambush. This looked promising, and
I had still more than one hundred leagues to traverse through
provinces all up in arms against us. The attack at the very
gates of Montdragon had put the little garrison of the town on
the alert, and they had started in pursuit of the brigands.
These, delayed in their march by their wish to carry off three
of their men, who had been wounded by the gendarmes, were
quickly overtaken and forced to escape into the mountains,
leaving their wounded behind. These last were shot.

My experience in the former Spanish campaign had
taught me that the most favourable moment for an oflScer
who has a diflScult country to traverse is just after one of
these attacks, when the brigands, in their fear of being
pursued, are in a hurry to get out of the way. I was there-
fore getting ready to proceed, but the officer in command of
the place objected — first, because he had just learnt that
the famous guerrilla leader. Mina, had appeared in the neigh-
bourhood ; and, secondly, because the night was drawing on,
-and by the Emperor's order escorts were directed to start
only in daylight. This commandant was a Piedmontese who
had long served in the French army, and was distinguished
for unwonted intelligence and courage. The insurgents were
extremely afraid of him, and, except for a few ambuscades,
which it was impossible to foresee, he had, by employing
address and vigour in turn, got the whole district in hand.
I will instance çach quality, which will give you some idea
of the kind of war which we had to wage in Spain, though
plenty of the educated class were on our side.

The parson of Montdragon was one of the fiercest oppo-
nents of the French. When, however, Napoleon passed
through the town on his way back to Paris, in January 1809,
the reverend gentleman, like all the rest of the inhabitants,
went in front of the post-house to have a look at the Emperor.
The commandant caught sight of him, went straight up to
him, took him by the hand, and, leading him to the Emperor,
said, loud enough for everyone to hear, ' I have the honour
to present to your Majesty the curate of this town, one of
the most devoted servants of your brother King Joseph.'

F 2

68 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Napoleon, taking what the wily Piedmontese said as sound
currency, received the clergyman most kindly, and thus he
found himself against his will compromised in presence of his
whole flock. That very evening, as he was going home, he
was shot in the arm ! He knew his compatriots too well not
to understand that if the French were not victorious in the
struggle his fate was sealed. Prom that moment he declared
openly for them, and, at the head of the partisans on King
Joseph's side, known as Joséphins, he rendered us useful
service.

Not long before I passed through Montdragon the same
commandant had shown great courage. He had had to send
the greater part of his garrison away to guard an expected
convoy of provisions, and when he had a few hours later to
furnish escorts to some officers bearing despatches he had
but a score of soldiers left. It was market-day, and the
market-place was full of country folks. The postmaster, one
of our bitterest foes, harangued them, bidding them profit by
the weakness of the French garrison to cut their throats. At
last the crowd made for the house, whither the commandant
had retired with his small reserve. An impetuous attack
was met by a vigorous defence, but our men would have
given way in the end. Then the commandant ordered the
door to be opened, sallied out with his little force, went
straight up to the postmaster and ran him through the
heart, then had the body dragged into the house and placed
on the balcony. This vigorous action was followed by a well-
delivered volley, whereupon the crowd fled in terror. That
evening the garrison returned, and the commandant had the
postmaster's body hung on the public gibbet as an example ;
nor, though he had many friends and relations in the town,
did anyone lift a finger.

Next morning I started at daybreak. To my disgust, the^
Spanish postilion who was leading stopped under the gallows
and lashed with his whip the corpse which was hanging
there. I reproved the scoundrel sharply, but he answered,
laughing : ' It is my postmaster ; when he was alive he gave
me many a cut with a whip, and I don't mind giving him

The Guerrilleros 6q

back a few ' — a very characteristic instance of the vindictive
disposition of the lower class of Spaniards.

I got to Vittoria drenched through, and so feverish that I
had to stop with General Seras, for whom I brought despatches.
You will remember that he was the general who had made
me sergeant ten years before, after the affair between the
Bercheny detachment and the Barco Hussars.^ He welcomed
me warmly, and wished me to rest there for a time ; but
my errand would not bear delay, and I rode on next day in
spite of my fever, which was not improved by the frightful
weather. That day I crossed the Ebro at Miranda, where
the spurs of the Pyrenees end, and where ended then the
power of the famous partisan leaders named Mina.

The first of these guerriUeros was the son of a rich farmer
near Montdragon, and was studying for holy orders when
the War of Independence broke out in 1808. It is a fact, not
generally known, that at that time many Spaniards, with some
of the secular clergy at their head, wishing to shake off the
yoke of the Inquisition and the monks, not only longed for
the continuance of Joseph on the throne, but even joined our
troops in trying to beat off the insurgents. Young Mina was
of this number ; he levied a company of ' friends of order,'
and made war on the bandits. By a curious reaction,
however, Mina, captivated by the adventurous life, became
an insurgent himself, and fought us desperately in Biscay
and Navarre, at the head of a band which at this time
amounted to near 10,000 men. The commandant of Mont-
dragon managed at last to seize him at a wedding festivity in
the house of a relation ; and Napoleon put him into prison at
Vincennes. Mina was an able and straightforward guerrilla
chief. When he returned in 1814 he opposed Ferdinand VII.,
for whom he had fought so well; and when about to be
arrested he escaped to America, where he got mixed up in
Mexican revolutions, and was shot. During his confinement
at Vincennes the insurgents took for their chief an uncle of
liis. This man, a rough blacksmith, of bloodthirsty disposi-
ez Vol. i. p. 68.]

70 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

tion, and no ability/ gained great influence solely through
his name. The Seville Junta sent some educated officers to
direct this new chief, who did us a great deal of damage.

I entered now upon the vast and dreary plains of Old
Castile. At first sight an ambush seems quite impossible in
this treeless and mountainless country ; but it is so undu-
lating that this apparent security was deceptive. The hollows
between the frequent hillocks allowed bands of insurgents
to hide, and pour forth unawares upon French detachments^
marching with confidence through a country where they
could apparently see four or five leagues all round them and
discover no enemy. A few disasters had made our men more
cautious, and they no longer crossed the plains without
searching the hollows with skirmishers. This precaution,
however, was not available in the case of such escorts — five or
six gendarmes — as were allowed to officers bearing despatches ;
so that many of them lost their lives on the plains of Castile.
Still, I liked better to travel in this open country than in the
mountains of Biscay and Navarre, where rocks command the
roads ; and the inhabitants are likewise far more enterprising
than the Castilians.

I went on my way without accident as far as the little
town of Briviesca; but between that place and Burgos we
saw twenty mounted Spaniards appear suddenly round a low
hill. They fired several shots at us without effect ; then my
escort, my servant, and I drew our swords, and went forward
without deigning to reply to the enemy, who, judging from
our resolute attitude that we were the kind of people to
defend ourselves vigorously, went off* in another direction.

At Burgos I put up with General Dorsenne, commanding
a brigade of the guard, for in the actual state of the country
nearly every town and village was occupied by our troops.
The roads only were insecure, and therefore those who, like
me, had to travel with small escorts ran the most danger. Of
this I had a fresh proof next day, when between Palencia

[ * Headers of Napier will think this judgment somewhat too deprecia-
tory. * Mina y Espoz,' though not equal to * the student ' Mina, did some good
service.]

Defending a Convoy 71

and Dnenas I fell in with an oflScer and twenty-five, men of
the Young Guard escorting a chest of money for the 'garrison
at Valladolid. The escort was evidently inadequate, for the
gverrilleros of the neighbourhood had assembled to the
number of 150, and were just attacking the detachment.
On seeing my escort galloping up they took us for the
advanced guard of a cavalry corps, and stopped short in their
onset. But one of them, ascending a hillock, whence he
got a distant view, called out that no French troops were in
sight, whereupon the brigands advanced boldly towards the
tempting treasure-waggon. I naturally took command of
the small united forces, and bade the officer of the guard not
to fire till I gave the word. Most of the enemy had dis-
mounted, the better to get hold of the money-bags, and were
poor fighters with muskets ; many had only pistols. I had
placed my infantry behind the wagon, and as soon as the
Spaniards were within twenty paces I made them come out,
and gave the order to fire. This was obeyed with terrible
precision ; the leader of the Spaniards and- a dozen of his
men dropped. The rest bolted at full speed towards their
horses, which some of their friends were holding two hundred
yards off; but as they were mounting I ordered the infantry
and the six gendarmes to charge them, my servant Woirland
joining. This little band of brave fellows, catching the bandits
in disorder, killed thirty of them, and captured fifty horses,
which they sold that evening at Duenas. I had only two
wounded, and those slightly. The officer and men of the
Young Guard had shown much courage ; if I had had only
recruits we might well have suffered a disaster, especially as
I was myself too weak to take part in the charge. The
excitement had increased my fever, and I was forced to spend
the night at Duenas. Next day, the commandant of that
place, in consequence of what had happened, sent a whole
company to escort the treasure to Valladolid, and I went with
them, being hardly able to sit my horse, and quite unable to
gallop. The details I have given may serve further to show
you the danger to which officers were exposed who were com-
pelled by their duties to post through the insurgent provinces.

72 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

My mission being discharged, I hoped to get some rest at
Valladolid ; but tribulation of a new kind awaited me. Junot,
the Duke of Abrantes, commanding one of the corps which
was to form part of Masséna's army, had been for some
months at Valladolid, quartered in the huge palace built by
Charles V., an ancient house, but in perfect preservation and
comfortably furnished. I made no doubt that on hearing of
the immediate arrival of the marshal to take supreme com-
mand, the Duke of Abrantes would at once leave this old
palace of the kings, and take up his quarters in one of the
handsome houses which the town contained. To my surprise,
however, Junot (whose wife, the duchess, had come to
Valladolid, and held a most elegant little court there)
informed me that he meant only to surrender half his
palace to Masséna. He was sure, he said, that the marshal
would be too polite to turn the duchess out, especially as the
palace was large enough to lodge both staffs comfortably.

To understand the dilemma in which this statement
placed me, you must know that Masséna was accustomed
to take everywhere, and even to the wars, with him a lady

named N . So attached was he to her that he only

accepted the command of the Army of Portugal on condition
that the Emperor would let him take her. Being of a gloomy
and misanthropic turn, and preferring to live alone, secluded
in his own rooms and away from his staff, Masséna needed
sometimes the distraction afforded by a lively and witty

companion. In this way Mme N suited him perfectly,

for she was a clever, kindly, and amiable woman, who, besides,
quite understood the awkwardness of her position. It was
impossible that she could lodge under the same roof with the
Duchess of Abrantes, a descendant of the Comneni, and full
of family pride. ^ On the other hand, it was not fitting that
the marshal should be quartered in a private house, while his
subordinate was in the palace. So I was obliged to explain
the state of things to Junot, who, however, would only laugh,

[ * Mme Junot's descent on the mother's side seems to have been some-
what legendary. Her father, M. Permon, was a clerk in the victualling
department, and made his fortune with Rochambeau's army in America.]

A Domestic Difficulty 73

and say that he and Masséna had often lodged in one cottage
in Italy, and that the ladies might settle it among them-
selves.

In despair I spoke to the duchess herself. She was a
woman of quick wit, and decided to go and establish herself
in the town. Junot opposed this obstinately, much to my
annoyance; but what could I do against a commander-in-
chief? Things were still in this position when, after being
several days in bed with fever, I got a message by express to
say that the marshal was coming in a few hours. I had at a
venture taken a house for him in the town, and, weak as I
was, would have mounted my horse to meet him and let him
know what had happened, but his mules had gone so quickly
that on going downstairs I found the marshal himself, leading

in Mme N . I was beginning to explain my difficulties,

when in rushed Junot, bringing the duchess with him. He
fell into Masséna's arms ; then before all the staff he kissed

Mme N 's hand, and introduced his wife. Imagine the

ladies' confusion ! They stood like stones, without a word.
The marshal had the wit to restrain himself; but he was
deeply hurt when the Duchess of Abrantes, pleading indis-
position, left the dining-room just as Junot was leading in
Mme N .

These details, which at first sight may seem superfluous,
are here related because the scene had serious results. The
marshal never quite forgave Junot for refusing to give up the
whole palace to him, and for putting him in a false position
before a number of general officers. Junot, on his side, made
common cause with Marshal Ney and General Reynier, the
commanders of the two other corps forming with his the Grand
Army of Portugal. This gave rise to mischievous differences,
which had a great deal to do with the unlucky result of the
campaign of 1810 and 1811, and the unhappy effects which
flowed from that, and weighed so heavy on the destiny of the
French Empire. So true is it that causes apparently trivial
or ridiculous often lead to great calamities. General
Kellermann, commanding in Valladolid, reported to Masséna
all the trouble which I had taken to spare him a part of

74 THE Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

this, unpleasantness ; but he bore me a grudge for it all the
same.

In due course the marshal's stafiF arrived at Valladolid.
It was pretty numerous, since, peace appearing to be settled
for some time in Germany, officers desirous of promotion had
asked as a favour to be allowed to fight in Portugal ; and
those who had the most int-erest got on to the staff of the
general-in-chief. With his extensive command at a great
distance from France, he required many officers, and his staff
accordingly consisted of fourteen aides-de-camp and four
orderly officers.

The promotion of Sainte-Croix to the rank of general
had been a misfortune for Masséna. In him he lost a wise
counsellor at a moment when, growing old, and left to his own
resources, he had to oppose a foe like the Duke of Wellington,
and get obeyed by lieutenants, one of whom was a marshal
as well as himself, while the other two, with the title of
commander-in-chief, had long been used to take their orders
directly from the Emperor. Although Sainte-Croix was with
the Army of Portugal in command of a brigade of dragoons,
his new duties did not allow him to be constantly by
Masséna's side. The marshal's character, once so firm, had
become in a high degree irresolute, and one soon missed the
able man who during the Wagram campaign had been the
life and soul of his staff. The marshal having no longer a
colonel as senior aide-de-camp, the office was filled by the
senior major. This was Pelet, a good comrade, a brave man,
a learned mathematician, but one who had never commanded
troops, for on leaving the Polytechnic School he had been
placed in the corps of mapping engineers. This corps while
accompanying the armies was non-combatant, and acted, to
tell the truth, merely as an understudy to the engineers. It
is human nature to admire what one can least do one's self,
and thus Masséna, whose education was very incomplete, had
an immense respect for mapping engineers who could lay
nice plans before him, and had had several on his staff.
Pellet had been with him in this capacity at Naples in 1806,
and in Poland in 1807. He behaved with courage in the

M ASSÉNA AND PeLET 75

campaign of 1809, and was wounded on the bridge at
Ebersberg, earning thereby his promotion to major. He was
present at the battles, and often risked himself in mapping
the island of Lobau and the Danube. Good service as this
doubtless was, it could not give Pelet practice in the art of
war, especially when it was a question of commanding
70,000 men against Wellington in a difficult country. Yet
he became Masséna's chief adviser even when neither Ney,
nor Reynier, nor Junot, nor any of the other generals were
consulted. Sainte-Croix, no doubt, was an extraordinary
genius who understood the art of war on a great scale by
intuition without having ever held an important command.
Miracles of this kind are rare ; and Masséna, after he had got
into the way of yielding to the inspiration of his senior aide-
de-camp, put his lieutenants out of heart and paved the way
to disobedience which led us into disaster. These disasters
would have been still greater if the name and fame of
Masséna had not survived to act as a caution to the English
leader. So afraid was Wellington of making any mistake
in presence of the conqueror of Zurich, that he always
acted with the utmost circumspection. The prestige of his
name had influenced even the Emperor. Napoleon never con-
sidered enough that he himself had been the prime author
of the success gained at Wagram, and when he set Masséna
the difficult task of going five hundred leagues away from
France to conquer Portugal it was through a too firm belief
that he had preserved all his vigour of mind and body.
This judgment may appear to you too severe, but it will be
confirmed when I relate the events of the two campaigns.

Pelet, though at that time not up to Masséna's require-
ments, gained much in practical soldiership, especially
during the Russian campaign, where he commanded a regi-
ment of infantry. He was then serving under Marshal Ney ;
and though Ney had conceived a great antipathy to him,
Pelet was able to recover his esteem. When Ney, cut off
from the Russians by the rest of the army during the retreat
from Moscow, found himself in a most dangerous position, it
was Pelet who proposed to cross the half-frozen Dnieper — a

76 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

perilous enterprise, but one which, being resolutely executed,
saved Ney's corps. This good advice made Pelet's fortune
in a military sense; he was appointed by the Emperor general
to the grenadiers of the old guard, and fought valiantly at
their head in Saxony in 1813, and the next year in France ;
also at Waterloo. Afterwards he became director of the
Ordnance Office, but in his excessive attachment to scientific
officers he too often took on his staff map-draughtsmen who
knew nothing of manoeuvring. He has written several works
of good repute, especially an account of the Austrian cam-
paign of 1809, the clearness of which has unluckily been
injured by theoretic discussions.

I was Masséna's second aide-de-camp; the third was
Major Casabianca, a Corsican by birth, and related to the
Emperor on the mother's side. Educated, able, and very
brave, this officer had been attached to Masséna by Napoleon
himself; so Masséna, while paying him much attention, often
kept him away from the army under the pretext of honouring
him. He sent him to the Emperor with the news of the
capitulation of Ciudad Eodrigo, and when he came back, a
month later, sent him back to Paris to announce the capture
of Almeida, and, on his rejoining us as we entered Portugal,
gave him the duty of reporting the position of the armies to
the minister. He did not finally come back to us till the
end of the campaign. In the Russian campaign he was
colonel of the 1 1th Infantry in the same army corps with my
own regiment. He was killed in a fight which he had under-
taken fruitlessly and to no purpose.

The fourth aide-de-camp was Major the Count of Ligni-
ville. He belonged to one of four distinguished families,
known as the great team of Lorraine, which spring from the
same house as the present sovereigns of Austria. After the
battle of Wagram the Emperor Francis II. sent a flag of
truce to inquire if any harm had happened to his cousin the
Count of Ligniville. He had such a passion for soldiering
that at fifteen he ran away and enlisted in the 13th Dragoons.
He was severely wounded at Marengo, was promoted officer
on the battle-field, and served brilliantly in the campaigns of

Masséna's Staff 77

Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland. In 1809 he passed fh)m
the staflF of General Becker to that of Masséna. I have told
how he got. into trouble with the marshal by helping me in
supporting the interests of the brave servants who had
driven him on the battle-fields of Wagram and Znaym. The
marshal's dislike increased during the campaign in Portugal,
and Ligniville went back to the 13th Dragoons, of which he
soon became colonel. After the Restoration he became
general, married well, and was living happily, when he ruined
himself by unsound speculations. He was much depressed
by this, and died soon after, much to my regret.

The fifth aide-de-camp was Major Barin, who had lost an
arm at Wagram, but persisted in serving as aide-de-camp,
though he could do hardly any active service ; a good fellow
but taciturn. My brother was the sixth. The following were
captains : M. Porcher de Richebourg, a capable officer, but with
no great taste for military life. He left the army when his
father died, and succeeded him in the Chamber of Peers.
Captain Barrai, nephew of the Archbishop of Tours, had
many of the qualities which make a good soldier, but they
were neutralised by his extreme shyness; he retired as
captain. Captain Cavalier belonged to the same corps as
Pelet and acted as his secretary. Captain Despenoux came of
a legal family, and had inherited from, them an extremely
calm temperament, only becoming animated when going into
action. The fatigues of the Portuguese campaign were
almost too much for him, and he succumbed to the climate of
Russia. He was found in a bivouac frozen stiff. Captain
Renique was in particular favour with Masséna, but, being a
good conirade,^he did not presume upon it. I took him into
my regiment when I became colonel of the 23rd Chasseurs,
and he left the army after the retreat from Moscow, Captain
d'Aguesseau, a descendant of the celebrated chancellor, was
one of the wealthy young men who, at the Emperor's in-
stance, took to military life without considering their physical
strength. He was a brave man but very delicate, and the
incessant rain of the winter 1810-11 injured his health so
far that he died on the banks of the Tagus.

78 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Captain Prosper Masséna, whose noble conduct at
Wagram I have already related, was a brave and excellent
young man, and displayed the greatest friendship towards
me. The marshal often associated him with me on difficult
missions. After long hesitation, his father, having no
command in the Russian campaign, ended by keeping him
at home. When the marshal died in 1817, Prosper was so
deeply affected that he was seized with violent fits. I
was then in exile, and when I returned, and went to pay
my respects to the marshal's widow, she sent for her son.
His emotion at seeing me again was such that he again fell
seriously ill ; his health was hopelessly broken, and he soon
departed this life, leaving his title and part of his fortune to
his younger brother, Victor.

The youngest and the junior in rank of all the aides-de-
camp was Victor Oudinot, son of the marshal. He had been
the Emperor's page, and had accompanied him in this
capacity at the battle of Wagram. Now he had just entered
Masséna's staff as lieutenant, being but twenty years old.
To-day he is lieutenant-general. We shall hear of him
again in the course of my story ; I will now merely say that
he gained the reputation of being one of the best horsemen of
his time.

Besides the fourteen aides-de-camp, the marshal had four
orderly officers : Captain Beaufort d'Hautpoul, of the En-
gineers; Lieutenant Perron, a Piedmontese, ugly, but witty
and jovial — he kept us all merry during the winter of 1810,
by a theatre of marionettes which he got up, and which the
marshal and generals sometimes attended for their amuse-
ment. He died at the battle of Montmirail, just as he was
leaping astride on to a Russian gun. The next was Lieu-
tenant de Briqueville, a man distinguished by bravery,
carried to the point of imprudence, as he showed when
fighting in 1815, at the head of his regiment, between
Versailles and Rocquencourt, when he got entangled
between two park walls, losing many men, and receiving
three sabre-cuts on the head. He entered the Chamber as
deputy for Caen, and went into violent opposition, ultimately

The Rest of the Staff 79

dying in a condition of mental excitement. Masséna's fourth
orderly officer was Octave de Ségur, son of the count. Edu-
cated, exquisitely polite, of an affable disposition and calm
valour, he was beloved by the whole staff. In rank, he was the
junior officer, though nearly thirty years old. He left the
Polytechnic School in the days of the Directory, and held the
post of Sub-Prefect of Soissons under the Consulate, but
resigned in disgust at the judicial murder of the Duke of
Enghien, and enlisted in the 6th Hussars. He was wounded
and taken prisoner in 1809 at Eaab, in Hungary, and when
exchanged asked leave to serve as sub-lieutenant in the
Portuguese campaign, where he did brilliant service. When
captain in the 8th Hussars, he was taken prisoner in Russia,
and, as son of our former ambassador, was treated with much
consideration by Catherine II. After two years' residence
at Saratoff, in the Volga, he returned to France in 1814,
and was on the staff of the guard under Louis XVIII. He
died, still young, in 1816.

CHAPTER IX

Although the Minister of War had assured the marshal
that everything was ready for the campaign, it was nothing
of the kind, and the commander-in-chief had to stay a
fortnight at Valladolid, looking after the departure of the
troops and the transport of stores and ammunition. At
last the headquarters were removed to Salamanca, where my
brother and I were quartered with the Count of Montezuma,
a lineal descendant of the last Emperor of Mexico. The
marshal wasted three more weeks at Salamanca waiting for
General Reynier's corps. These delays, while hurtful to us,
were all in favour of the English.

The last Spanish town towards the Portuguese frontier
is Ciudad Rodrigo, a fortress, if the strength of its works
alone be considered, of the third class, but having great im-
portance owing to its position between Spain and Portugal,
in a district with few roads, and those very difficult
for large guns and the apparatus of a siege train. It
was, however, absolutely necessary that the French should
get possession of the place. With this resolve, Masséna left
Salamanca about the middle of June, and caused Rodrigo
to be invested by Ney's corps, while Junot covered the
operations from the attacks of an Anglo-Portuguese army,
which was encamped a few leagues from us, near the
Portuguese fortress of Almeida, under Lord Wellington.
Ciudad Rodrigo was defended by a brave old Spanish
general of Irish origin, Andrew Herrasti.

The French, unable to believe that the English would
have come so near the place just to see it captured under their
eyes, expected a battle. None took place ; and on July 10,
the Spanish guns having been silenced, a part of the town

Capture of C/udad Rodrigo 8r

being on fire, and the counterscarp overthrown by the ex-
plosion of a powder magazine for a space of thirty-six feet,
while the ditch was filled with the ruins and the breach
widely opened, Masséna resolved to give the signal for the
assault. To this end Marshal Ney formed a column of 1,500
volunteers, who were to mount the breach first. Assembled
at the foot of the rampart, these brave men were awaiting the
signal to attack, when an officer expressed his fear that the
breach was not yet practicable. Thereupon three of our
soldiers mounted to the top of it, looked into the town, made
such examination as was useful, and fired their muskets,
rejoining their comrades without being wounded, although
this bold feat was performed in broad daylight. Kindled by
this example, the assaulting column advanced at a run and
was on the point of dashing into the town when General
Herrasti capitulated. The defence of the garrison had been
very fine, but the Spanish troops composing it had good
reason to complain of their desertion by the English, who
had merely sent • reconnoitring parties towards our camp,
without attempting any serious diversion. The skirmishes
resulting from these nearly always turned out to our advan-
tage. One of them was so creditable to our infantry, that
the English historian Napier has been unable to refrain from
doing homage to the valour of the men who took part in it.
On July 11 the English General Craufurd, who was operating
in the country between Ciudad Rodrigo and Villa de Puerco,
at the head of six squadrons, having perceived at day-break
a company of French grenadiers, about 120 strong, marching
in the open, ordered two squadrons to attack them. But the
French had time to form square, and were so cool that the
enemy's officers could hear Captain Gouache and his sergeant
exhorting their people to take good aim. The cavalry
charged with ardour, but received such a terrible volley that
they left the ground piled with dead, and had to retire.
Seeing two English squadrons repulsed by a handful of
French, Colonel Talbot advanced furiously wijbh four squadrons
of the 14th Dragoons and attacked Captain Gouache. Firmly
awaiting the charge, he ordered a volley at point-blank range,
VOL. n. G

82 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

which killed Colonel Talbot and some thirty of his men ;
after which the brave Gouache retired in good order towards
the French camp without the English general venturing
to attack again. This brilliant affair was much talked of in
the two armies.* When the Emperor heard of it he raised
Captain Gouache to major, promoted the other officers, and
gave eight decorations in the company.

After having mentioned a fact so glorious for the French
arms, I ought to report one no less creditable to the Spaniards.
The giœrrillero Don Julian Sanchez, having voluntarily shut
himself in Ciudad Rodrigo with his two hundred horsemen,
did good service by making frequent attacks on our trenches.
At length, when the want of forage caused the presence of
200 horses to l)e a trouble to the garrison, Sanchez left the
town with his men one dark night, and, crossing the bridge
over the Agreda, the approaches to which Ney had omitted to
block, fell on our outposts, killed several men, pierced our
lines, and went off to join the English army.

The siege of Rodrigo nearly cost me my life ; not by the
enemy's fire, but by reason of an illness which I contracted
in the following manner. The neighbourhood of the town,
being infertile, is thickly inhabited, and there had been
much difficulty in finding quarters for the marshal near the
trenches. Finally he was put into an isolated building
situated in a spot commanding the town and suburbs. As
the siege promised to last long, and there was no lodging for
the staff close by, we hired, at our own cost, some planks and
beams, and erected a large room, where we were sheltered
from sun and rain, and slept on boards, which, though rough,
kept us clear of the damp rising from the soil. But the
marshal was inconvenienced from the outset in his stone
building by an intolerable stench, and on inquiry it was
found that the building had been used to keep sheep in.
Masséna proceeded to set his affections on our extempore
house ; but, not liking to use his authority to eject us, came

[ * See Napier, xi. ch. 4. He relates the incident in much the same
terms, only making the strength of the French rather greater and the
English loss a good deal less.]

Illness 83

to see us on some pretext or other, and exclaimed as he
entered : ' Well, my lads, you have a nice place here ! May I
beg for a comer to put my bed and desk in ? ' This, as we
saw, was sharing with the lion, and we left our excellent
abode in haste, to take up our quarters in the old sheep-stall.
It was paved with small stones, their interstices clogged with
filth, and highly uncomfortable to lie on, from the want of
long straw in Spain.^ Forced thus to lie on the bare ground
and inhale the fetid exhalations rising from it, we all became
more or less unwell before long. I was much the worst ; for
in these warm countries fever always tries most those who
have already suffered from it, and my Valladolid attack
returned in an aggravated form. Still I resolved to take my
share in the siege, and remained on duty. Duty was often
pretty laborious, especially when we had to carry orders in
the night to our division on the left bank of the Agreda,
which was carrying out the necessary works for the reduction
of the Franciscan convent, used by the enemy as a bastion.
In order to reach this point from the headquarters without
coming under the fire of the place, it was necessary to make
a long wind to a bridge which our troops had constructed, or
else cross by a ford. One night, when all was ready for the
assault, and Ney only awaited Masséna's order to give the
signal, it happened to be my turn for duty, and I had to take
the order. It was a dark, hot night ; I was in a high fever,
and streaming with perspiration when I reached the ford. I
had only once crossed it in daylight, but the dragoon orderly
who was with me had crossed it several times, and offered to
guide me. This he did very well till he got to the middle,
where it was not more than two or three feet deep ; but then
he went wrong in the darkness, and our horses, stepping on
big slippery stones, fell and we were in the water. There
was no fear of drowning ; we scrambled on to the bank with
ease ; but we were wet through. In any other circumstances
I should only have laughed at this involuntary bath ; but,
though not cold, the water checked the perspiration, and I
was seized with a shivering fit. I reached the convent and

[ ' Cf, vol. i. p. 101.]

o 2

84 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

passed the night in the open air beside Marshal Ney. The
attacking column was commanded by a major named
Lefrançois, whom I knew well. The day before he had
shown me a letter from his sweetheart announcing that her
father agreed to their marriage as soon as Lefrançois was
lieutenant-colonel. It was with this object that he had asked
permission to lead the storming party. The attack was brisk,
the defence stubborn. After three hours' fighting our troops
remained in possession of the convent, but poor Lefrançois
was slain. His loss was much felt in the army, and grieved
me deeply.

In hot countries sunrise is usually preceded by piercing
cold. I was the more sensitive to it that day for having
passed the night in wet clothes, so that when I returned to
headquarters I was much out of sorts. Still I had to report
the result of the attack to Masséna before getting into dry
things. He was at that moment taking his morning walk
with General Fririon, his chief of stafiF. In their interest in
my story, or wishing to get a closer view, they gradually drew
near the town, and we were not more than a cannon-shot
away when the marshal let me go and rest. Hardly had I
gone fifty paces from them when a gigantic shell, launched
from the ramparts, fell close to them. At the fearful noise of its
explosion I turned round, and, seeing nothing of the marshal
and the general, who were concealed by a cloud of dust and
smoke, I thought they were killed, and ran to the place. To
my astonishment I found them alive and none the worse,
save for some contusions from the stones which the bursting
shell had thrown up. They were, however, both covered with
earth, especially Masséna. He had lost an eye shooting *
some years before, and his remaining eye was so full of sand
that he could not see his way, while the bruises he had
received from the stones prevented his walking. It was
necessary to get him out of range, however, and, as he was
small and thin, I managed, ill as I was, to take him on my
shoulders and carry him out of reach of the enemy's shot. I
went on and told my comrades, and they brought the marshal

[ » See p. 193.]

A Disabled Soldier 85

in without the men finding ont the danger which their
commander-in-chief had run.

The fetigue and excitement of the last twenty-fonr hours
increased my fever a good deal ; still I braced myself up, and
contrived to hold out till the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, on
July 9.^ But as fix)m this day forward the excitement which
had kept me up so far had nothing more to feed on, I must
needs give in to the fever. This became so alarming that I had
to be carried to the one house in the town which the French
shells had left intact. It was the only time that I have been
seriously ill without being wounded, but this time my life
was despaired of, and I was left at Ciudad Rodrigo while the
army crossed the Coa and marched on Almeida. This place not
being more than four leagues as the crow flies from Ciudad
Rodrigo, I could hear from my sick-bed the uproar of the
cannon, and every report made me writhe with rage. Often
did I try to rise, and the fruitlessness of the attempts, by
showing me how utterly weak I was, increased my wretchedness.
My brother and my comrades, kept by their duty at Almeida,
were fer away, and my solitude was only broken by the short
visits of Dr. Blancheton, who, clever as he was, could only
treat me very ineflSciently for want of medicaments. The
air of the town was tainted by the stench of many thousands
of corpses which lay unburied among the rubbish of the ruined
houses. A temperature of more than eighty-five degrees,
aggravating these causes of unhealthiness, soon brought
typhus. Both the garrison and such of the inhabitants as
had remained in the place to look after what was left of their
property suflered terribly. I was left to the care of my ser-
vant, and, with all his zeal, he could not get me what I
required. My illness increased and I became delirious. I
remember that there were in my room some large pictures
representing the four quarters of the earth. Africa, which
was right in front of my bed, had at her feet a huge lion, the
eyes of which seemed to be fixed on me, while I could not
take mine from them. At last one day I thought I saw
him move, and, wishing to anticipate his attack, I tottered up,

[' July 11, according to Napier.]

86 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

took my sword, and, striking with edge and point, I hewed
the lion to pieces. After this truly Quixotic feat I fell half-
fainting on the floor, where the doctor found me. He had all
the pictures removed from the room, after which I grew
quieter. My lucid moments were not less terrible ; it was
painful to think of my melancholy situation and utter loneli-
ness. Death on the battlefield seemed sweet to me compared
to that which I expected, and I regretted not to have fallen
like a soldier. To die in a bed of fever while there was
fighting near me seemed to me a horrible, almost a shameful
thing.

I had been in this dreadful position for a month, when
on August 26, towards nightfall, a fearful explosion was
heard. The earth trembled till I thought the house was
coming down. It was the fortress of Almeida which had
just blown up through the explosion of a huge powder
magazine, and the disturbance was distinctly felt at Rodrigo,
from which one may judge the efiects which it had produced
in Almeida itself. The unlucky place was destroyed from
top to bottom ; not six houses remained standing. Six
hundred of the garrison were killed, and many wounded ;
some fifty French employed on the siege works were struck
by splinters of stone. In pursuance of instructions from his
Government, Lord Wellington, with the view of sparing Eng-
lish blood at the cost of that of his allies, after having entrusted
the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo to the Spanish troops, who
had just surrendered, had left that of Almeida to the Portu-
guese, Colonel Cox, the governor, being the only English-
man in the place. That brave officer, not sufiering himself
to be intimidated by the horrible disaster which had just de-
stroyed almost all his means of resistance, proposed to the
garrison to continue their defence behind the ruins of the
city. But the Portuguese troops, terrified, and led away by
their officers, especially by Bernardo Costa, the lieutenant-
governor, and José Bareiros, commanding the artillery, re-
fused, and Colonel Cox, being unsupported, was compelled to
capitulate.

It has been said that the French commander had tarn-

Capture of Almeida 87

pered with the Portuguese oflScers, and that the explosion
was brought about by their treason ; but this is a mistake.
The only cause of the fire was neglect on the part of the
garrison, who, instead of fetching the powder barrels one by
one from the cellars and shutting the door behind each, had
been imprudent enough to roll a score of them at a time into
the courtyard of the castle. It seems that a French shell
falling on one of the barrels exploded it, and that the others
forming a train right up to the middle of the magazine,
<^used the explosion which wrecked the town and injured
the fortifications. However that may be, the English
brought the two Portuguese oflScers to trial, Costa being
condemned and shot, while Bareiros succeeded in escaping.
These two officers were certainly not guilty of treason ; at
most they could be reproached with not having continued a
hopeless defence, the only result of which could have been
to preserve the ruins of Almeida for a few days longer, while
the English army was tranquilly encamped two leagues from
the place without making any movement to aid them.

After having thus got possession of Almeida, Marshal
Masséna, not being able to establish himself among the ruins
of the town, moved his headquarters to Fort Concepcion, on
the Spanish frontier. The French * had destroyed part of
the fortifications, but the buildings were sufficiently intact to
aflford lodging. There Masséna made preparations for his
expedition to Lisbon. My brother and my comrades took
advantage of this interval to come and see me. Their pre-
sence increased the soothing eflfect which the capture of
Almeida had produced on my spirits. The fever disappeared,
and in a few days I was convalescent. I was eager for
change of air, and, with the aid of my brother and some
of my friends, I contrived to ride the short distance to Fort
Concepcion. My comrades, who had feared that they would
never see me again, received me most aflfectionately ; but the
marshal, whom I had not seen since the day when I had
carried him out of range of the guns of Eodrigo, never said

[ ^ Napier would seem to imply that Craufnrd had blown up Fort Con-
cepcion before retiring to Coa.]

88 The ME.\fo/h'S of the Baron de Marbot

a wonl to me about my illness. After a fortnight in the fort
in gooil air and able to rest, I recovered my full health, and
was ready for the campaign in Portugal. Before relating
the events of this famous and disastrous campaign I must
briefly make you acquainted with what had taken place in
the Peninsula since the Emperor left it in 1800.

CHAPTER X

While Ney was holding the Asturias and Leon, Marshal
Soult, who to the conquest of Corunna had added that of the
port of Ferrol, concentrated his troops at Santiago, in Galicia,
and made ready to invade Portugal. Under an illusion which
turned out disastrous, Napoleon never understood the enor-
mous difference which the fact of Spain and Portugal being
in insurrection pi*oduced between the nominal state of the
French troops in the Peninsula and the actual number of com-
batants which could be arrayed against the enemy. Thus
the strength of the second corps under Soult amounted on
paper to 47,000; but, after deducting the garrisons at
Santander, Corunna, and Ferrol, the 8,000 men employed to
maintain the communications and 12,000 sick, the number
of those at present under arms did not exceed 25,000, and
these were tired out with fighting all through the winter in a
mountain country ; wen» short of shoes, often of provisions ;
and had only broken-down horses to drag the artillery over
the bad roads. It was with means so feeble as these that the
Emperor ordered Marshal Soult to enter Portugal. It is true
he reckoned on the valour of the second corps, almost wholly
composed of veterans from Austerlitz and Friedland, and
proposed an attack on Portugal from another side by Marshal
Victor's corps, which was to advance from Andalusia and join
Soult at Lisbon ; but fortune did not endorse his calculation.*
On February 1, 1809, Soult, after informing Ney that he
was leaving him to look aft«r (tnlicia, marched towards
the Minho. He tried to cross it near the fortified town

[ ' The remainder of this and mach of the next cliapter, which do not
prufrMi Ut give General Marbot's pentonal reniiniftoencen. nocrn to bo taken»
often ▼erhatim. from Napier (vi., chap». 5 and 7 ; vii., chap^. 1 and 2).]

90 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

of Tuy, but the strength of the current and the fire of the
Portuguese militia from the opposite bank rendered the
attempt abortive. Then the marshal, with wonderful activity
and vigour, chose a new line of operations, and, marching up
the river, crossed it at Ribada-Via ; occupied Orense ; then,
descending again, attacked and captured Tuy, making it his
place of arms. He left there part of his artillery, his heavy
baggage, his sick and wounded, guarded by a strong garrison ^
which reduced his force to 20,000 coftibatants, and with these
he boldly advanced to Oporto.

This great town, the second in the kingdom, was in a state
of complete anarchy. The bishop, having seized the sole
command, had himself traced fortifications, and had brought
in the countiy folk in great numbers to work at them. The
people were living in a state of licence ; the troops were
insubordinate, the generals quarrelling among themselves;
everything, in short, was in the utmost disorder. The Com-
mission of Regency and the bishop were sworn foes ; while the
adherents of either side were assassinating the conspicuous
men on the other. Such were their arrangements for oppos-
ing our army. But, though harassed by continual marching
through swarms of insurgents, our army attacked the
Spanish force, commanded by La Romana, and the Portuguese,
under Sylveira, at Verin, defeating the former completely ; while
the second retreated beyond the Portuguese fortress of Chaves,
which Soult captured. One of the chief inconveniences
which we experienced in the Peninsula was that of guarding
prisoners. A large number were taken at Chaves, and Soult,
not knowing how to dispose of them, accepted their proposal
to enter the French service, even though most of them had
àone the same thing in the time of Junot's expedition and
ended by deserting.

The army next moved on to Braga, where there was a
second and considerable Portuguese force, under General
Freira. This unfortunate officer, seeing his advance-guard
beaten by the French, was preparing to retreat, when his
troops, consisting almost entirely of peasant levies, killed him
with cries of treason. At the same moment the French

SouLT AT Oporto 91

aâvance-gnard having appeared at the gates of Braga, the
population betook themselves to the prisons, where the persons
suspected of favouring the French were shut up, and
slaughtered them all. Meanwhile Marshal Soult had
attacked the enemy's army, which, after a short but brisk
resistance, was utterly routed. In passing through Braga the
fugitives killed the corregidovj and began to set the town on
fire ; but, being pursued by the French troops, they set off in
the direction of Oporto. The advantage gained by the
capture of Braga was a good deal reduced by a loss which
Soult incurred at the same time. The Portuguese general,
Sylveira, having flung himself on the left flank of the French
army while it was marching on Braga, had carried the town
of Chaves, and captured 1,200 of our sick and 800 comba-
tants. Ignorant of this annoying circumstance, Soult left
Heudelet's division in Braga, and continued his march to
Oporto. The enemy ofiered gallant resistance at the river
Ave, but the passage was forced, the French general Jardon
being killed, while the Portuguese, in a rage at their defeat,
murdered their general, Vallongo. The divisions of Mermet,
Merle, and Franceschi, being thus united on the left bank of
the Ave, with the road to Oporto open, concentrated in front
of the entrenchments which covered the town and the camp.
These contained at least 40,000 men, half being regular troops,
under Generals Lima and Pereiras, but the real authority was
in the hands of the bishop, a hot-tempered man who swayed
the multitudes as he liked. English and Portuguese histo-
rians have held him responsible for the murder of fifteen
persons of high position, whom he was unwilling or unable
to save from the fury of the people, exasperated by the sight
of the French army.

Oporto is built on the right bank of the Douro, and com-
manded by lofty rocks, which at that time were garnished
with 200 guns. A bridge of boats, 500 yards long, joined
the town with the suburb of Villa Nova. Before attacking
Marshal Soult wrote to the bishop entreating him to spare
the great town the horrors of the siege. The Portuguese
prisoner who was sent with the message was very near being

92 The Memoirs op the Baron de Mar bot

hanged. The bishop, however, entered into correspondence,
but without ordering the fire from the ramparts to cease.
Finally, fearing, as would appear, to fall a victim to the fury
of the people, which he had himself fomented by giving false
hopes of success, he refused to surrender. On March 28 the
marshal, in order to withdraw the enemy's attention from
the centre of the entrenchments, attacked their wings.
Merle's division carried several fortified enclosures on the
left, while Delaborde and Franceschi threatened the works to
the right. While this was going on, some battalions having
cried out that they wished to surrender. General Foy advanced
incautiously, followed by his aide-de-camp. The aide-de-camp
was killed ; the general was made prisoner, stripped naked,
and dragged into the town. The Portuguese detested General
Loison, who had beaten them.* This general had some time
back lost an arm, whence they had nicknamed him Mafieta.
On seeing General Foy a prisoner, the populace of Oporto,
thinking that it was Loison, began to shout : ' Kill him !
kill Maneta ! ' But Foy had the presence of mind to lift his
two hands, and the mob, seeing its mistake, let him be taken
to prison. The bishop, who had brought things to this crisis,
lacked courage to face the danger, and, leaving to the generals
the task of defending the town as best they could, fled across
the river to the convent of La Serra, on the top of the steep
hill which commands the suburb of Villa Nova, whence he
was able in perfect safety to witness the horrors of the
morrow's fight.

It was a fearful night for the inhabitants of Oporto. A
violent storm broke out, and the soldiers and peasants fancied
that in the roaring wind they,heard the sound of the enemy's
cannon-balls. In spite of all that the officers could do, a fire
of cannon and small arms was opened all along the line, and
their noise mingled with that of the thunder and the inces-
sant bells. Throughout this frightful uproar the French,
sheltered in the ditches against balls and bullets, were calmly
awaiting the daylight to attack the place. By the morning
of the 29th the weather had cleared, and our troops marched

[ * At Almeida and elsewhere in 1807.]

Capture oi^ Oporto 93

eagerly to the fight. The marshal, as he planned on the
previous day, engaged first on the wings. The stratagem
succeeded perfectly ; the Portuguese generals weakened their
centre out of all proportion in order to strengthen their
flanks ; and Marshal Soult, giving the order to beat the
charge, hurled the French troops on that point. The im-
petuous attack of our soldiers carried the entrenchments,
and, pushing on, they entered the two principal forts through
the embrasures, killing or dispersing all who resisted. After
this success several battalions took the wings in rear, while
Marshal Soult ordered another column to advance upon the
town and make for the port. Driven from its entrenchments,
and cut at several points, the Portuguese army fled through
the town in despair. Some reached Fort Sao Joao, on the
bank of the Douro, seeking to cross the river by swimming
or in boats. General Loison, pointing out the danger of
this course, was murdered, and as the French continued to
advance, the fugitives made another attempt to cross, most
of them being drowned. Meanwhile fighting went on in
the town; the column sent forward by the marshal had
cleared the barricades which blocked the streets and reached
the bridge, where more than 4,000 persons of every age and
sex were struggling to cross. The Portuguese batteries on
the further shore, catching sight of the French, opened a
heavy fire, which did not reach our troops, but told heavily
on this heaving mass, while a cavalry detachment in flight
cut its way through the terrified crowd. The boats composing
the bridge soon became loaded, and several of them sank.
Thus the bridge was broken ; those who were nearest to the
openings were pushed in by the pressure of the crowd from
behind, and the river was covered with floating corpses — to
such an extent that boats were capsized by them, and many
trying to cross in that way were drowned. A good number
of the poor creatures were rescued by the French soldiers
who first came up, while the Portuguese gunners had fired
on their own countrymen. By the help of planks our men
crossed the gaps in the bridge, and, reaching the right bank,
carried the batteries and captured the suburb of Villa Nova,

94 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

securing thus the passage of the Douro. As the woes of the
town seemed drawing to an end, news came that the bishop's
guard, 200 in number, were holding his palace and firing
through the windows. A summons to surrender being fruit-
less, the French broke in and put these myrmidons to the
sword. So far our troops had acted according to the laws of
war : the town and its inhabitants had been respected. As
they returned, however, excited by the capture of the bishop's
palace, our soldiers saw in the public place some tliirty of
their comrades, captured the day before, who had been horribly
mutilated by the Portuguese, and of whom most were still
alive. Exasperated at this horrible sight, the soldiers thought
no more of anything save vengeance, and began to take fear-
ful reprisals, which were only stopped, with much difficulty,
by the efforts of the marshal, the officers, and many of the
cooler heads among the men themselves. Ten thousand
Portuguese are said to have been slain that day, including
those killed in the entrenchments. Our own loss was not
more than five hundred. To the universal satisfaction. General
Foy was set free. As for the bishop, having seen the ruin
of his ambitious projects — it was said that he wished, for his
own benefit, to sever the northern provinces from the rest of
the kingdom — he fled to Lisbon, where he not only became
reconciled to the Commission of Regency and was received
into that body, but was soon appointed Patriarch of Portugal.
The fall of Oporto gave Soult a solid base of operations,
and replenished his supplies. As at Braga, he adopted a
policy of conciliation, endeavoured to heal the misfortunes of
war, and recalled the inhabitants who had fled. A curious
result, which historians have not explained, and of which
naturally the newspapers said little, followed from this course
of action. The Portuguese could not forgive the House of
Braganza for its fliight to America ; nor did they wish to
become a dependency of Brazil or an English colony, which
seemed the most likely alternatives. Accordingly they pro-
posed to choose a king; and Soult's orderly rule after the
previous anarchy had made him so popular that the leading
men went to him suggesting that an independent government

King Soult 95

should be formed, with himself at its head. Soult, regarding
their plan with favour, began to appoint civil officials, raised
a Portuguese legion, and managed so well that in a fortnight
addresses came in from the captured towns, signed by thirty
thousand persons of all classes, and expressing consent to
the new order of things. The Duke of Rovigo states in his
memoirs that Soult refused these proposals; but several of the
generals who were then at Oporto have assured me that they
were present at receptions where the Portuguese addressed
him as ' your Majesty,' and that he accepted the title with
much dignity. Finally, when I put a question on the subject
to my old colonel and excellent friend General Peter Soult,
the marshal's brother, he answered me frankly that the
Emperor on sending his brother to Portugal had authorised
him to employ every means to detach the country from the
English alliance, and that when the crown was offered to him
he considered this not merely the best but the only means of
making the interests of Portugal identical with those of
France, and therefore that, subject to the Emperor's approval,
he made use of it. A fiirther proof is, that instead of
expressing any discontent with the marshal's action Napoleon
extended his powers considerably, herein yielding only to the
exigencies of the situation which made Marshal Soult in-
dispensable. Is it true that Napoleon wrote to him, ' I
remember nothing but your conduct at Austerlitz ' ? This
point has never been cleared up. Marshal Bertrand told me
that while talking with Napoleon at St. Helena he often
tried to turn the conversation towards Soult's short-lived
royalty, but that the Emperor would say nothing, from which
Bertrand inferred that he had neither incited nor restrained
him.

Originally, no doubt, the Emperor's idea was to unite the
whole Peninsula into a single state under his brother Joseph ;
but when he realised that the mutual hatred of the Spanish
and Portuguese made this impossible, he would, in his desire
to detach Portugal from English influence at any cost, have
consented to allow one of his lieutenants to wear the crown,
and, Soult being the choice of the majority of the nation^

go The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

— ■ — ■ ■

Bertrand thought that Napoleon would have made up his
mind to endorse that choice. However that may be, as soon
as the offer of the Portuguese to Soult was known in the
army there was great excitement, the junior oflScers and
the men who were very fond of the marshal having no fault
to find with the plan except its supposed antagonism to the
Emperor's wishes. As soon as it was known that tjie
marshal would do nothing without the Emperor's consent,
the great majority took his side and was ready to suppoi-t
his projects. Still a large number of senior officers were
afraid that Soult's accession to the Portuguese throne would
bind the emperor to maintain him there, and that the second
corps would be left in the country to settle there after the
Koman fashion, whereby they would be engaged in an endless
war. Their scheme, therefore, was to make a truce with the
English, and, after choosing a leader and appealing to the
French troops in Spain, to return altogether to France and
force the Emperor to conclude a peace.

This plan, which was inspired by the English Government,^
was easier to form tlian to execute. It may be doubted
whether all the armies and the mass of the French nation
would have agi'eed to it. Steps were, however, taken to carry
it out. The English General Beresford, marshal in the
Portuguese army, was the soul of the plot, and carried on
through an Oporto merchant named Viana a correspondence
with the French malcontents, who were mean enough to
suggest the arrest of Marshal Soult. As may be supposed,
the discovery of this conspiracy put Marshal Soult into
much perplexity ; all the more so that he did not know the
partners to it. His accustomed firmness, however, did not
desert him.

[ * There appears to be no authority whatever for this statement. Cer-
tainly Napier, from whom, as has been said, ail this is borrowed, suggests
nothing of the kind, but speaks in terms no less severe than General
Marbot*s own of the conduct of the malcontents, which, however, he
ascribes to the republican views held by some officers of high rank, and their
•consequent desire to reduce Napoleon's power.]

CHAPTER XI

While Soult was attending to the administration of the
conquered country, the English and Portuguese troops which
Sir Arthur Wellesley and Marshal Beresford were bringing
up from Lisbon and Coimbra were every day drawing nearer
the Douro. Greneral Sylveira, after retaking Chaves from the
French, descended the Tamega to Amarante, and, capturing
that village with its bridge, brought his army in rear of Soult.
Generals Heudelet and Loison were despatched to this point,
and drove Sylveira from Amarante ; but Wellesley, with the
intention of turning the French left, sent a strong Anglo-
Portuguese force across the Douro in front of Lamego.
These marched upon Amarante, and General Loison in spite
of his orders to defend that town to the uttermost abandoned
the only passage by which the French army could escape
from its perilous situation. Seeing that part of the enemy's
force was making its way to his rear, while the remainder
were marching on Oporto and threatening an attack in frx)nt,
Marshal Soult resolved to abandon the town and retreat upon
the Spanish frontier. His march had been fixed for April 12,
bat was delayed twenty-four hours by the necessity of
collecting the artillery and starting the baggage trains.
This delay was fatal to him ; the conspirators were busy, the
marshaFs orders were disobeyed or misunderstood, and their
execution falsely reported to him. Things were therefore as
bad as they could be when the English columns reached
Villa Nova on the morning of the 12th. Soult had with-
drawn his troops from the suburbs on the previous day,
deetroying the bridge which connected with the town, and
carrjnng off every boat from the left bauk. Thus secured
against any attempt at crossing the Douro in front of Oporto,

VOL. II. B

98 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

the marshars only fear was that the English fleet might lan<î
troops on the right bank at the river's month, and he had a
careful watch kept on the banks below the town. But Sir
Arthur Wellesley, hovering like an eagle over Oporto and
the surrounding country from the heights of the Serra,
became aware that above the town the French pickets were
few and far between, and so coûfident in the protection
afforded by the broad river that they neglected to patrol.

It may well happen in war that a battalion, a regiment,
even a brigade, should be surprised ; but history affords very
few examples of an army being attacked unawares in broad
daylight without being warned by its outposts. This, how-
ever, befell the French at Oporto in the following manner.
Above the town the Douro flows in a sharp bend round the
foot of the Serra. This part of the river the French might
conceivably neglect when it was covered by the troops at
Villa Nova and on the hill ; but as soon as they abandoned
these positions and concentrated on the right bank, they
ought to have placed outposts above the town. However,
whether through negligence or treason not only was this
precaution omitted but a large number of boats were left
unguarded outside the town close to an unfinished building
called the New Seminary, the enclosure of which going dowii
on each side to the bank might hold four battalions. Seeing
so important a position deserted, Sir Arthur Wellesley con-
ceived the bold plan of making this point the base of his
attack, and, if he could procure a boat, of crossing the river
under the eyes of a seasoned army and one of its most
renewed generals.

A barber, eluding the French patrols, had come over fix)m
the city during the previous night in a small boat. This an
English colonel seized,* and with a few men crossed the river
and brought back three large barges, by means of which a
battalion was conveyed to the Seminary. Taking possession
of this, they sent over a great many boats, and in less than
a hour and a half 6,000 English were in a strong position in

[' Waters.]

Another Capture op Oporto 99

the heart of the French army, and protected by guns placed
on the Serra hill. The French outposts had seen nothing,
and the army was at its ease in Oporto, when suddenly the
town resounded with the noise of the drums and the call to
arms. Then one might judge of the stuff of which French
soldiers are made, and of their valour. Undiscouraged by
the surprise, they rushed furiously to the Seminary, and had
torn down the main gate and slain many of the English
before overpowered by the cannonade from the left banky
and threatened in rear by an English force which had landed
in the town. They were ordered by the marshal to quit the
place and retire on Yallonga, a small town two leagues away
in the direction of Amarante. The English did not venture
to pursue that day, having lost heavily in the encounter.
Lord Edward Paget, one of their best generals, was severely
wounded ; and on our side. General Foy. Otherwise our loss
was not great.* Our veterans were so experienced, so har-
dened to war, that they recovered from a surprise more readily
than any other troops. The English writers admit that order
was restored in the French ranks before they reached
Vallonga. The marshal might well blame himself for letting
himself be surprised in this fashion ; but it is only justice to
say that when the disaster, came he showed that his personal
courage and steadiness did not fail him in the most difiScult
circumstances.

The marshal's one chance of safety on leaving Oporto
was by the bridge of Amarante, which he believed to be held
by Loison; but on the morning of the 13th he heard at
Peâafiel that that general had abandoned it and withdrawn
to Guimaraens. With unabated energy, seeing that his re-
treat by road was cut off, he resolved, silencing all timid
and treacherous counsels, to retire by cross-country paths,
difficult as the country was. He at once destroyed his
artilleiy and baggage, placed his sick and his infantry ammu-
nition in the teams, and under a pelting rain crossed the
Sierra de Catalina by a narrow rocky path, and thus reached

\} English loss: twenty killed, ninety-five wounded. French: five
hundred killed and wounded. — Napier.]

H 2

100 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbôt

Goimaraens. There he found the divisions of Loifion and
Lorge, who had come by road from Amarante.

Thus the French forces were concentrated at Goimaraens
withont having been attacked ; from which Soult sagacionsly
inferred that the English had marched straight to cut off the
retreat of the French at Braga, there being no longer any
road practicable for their artillery. The malcontents, Loison
among them, said that the only conrse left was to capitulate
as at Cintra ; but, with admirable decision, Soult ordered all
the guns of Loison's and Lorge's divisions to be destroyed,
and, having the Braga road on the left, took again to the moun-
tain paths, thus gaining a day on the enemy, and reaching
Salamonde in two marches. There, still resolved to avoid the
beaten tracks, he crossed at right angles the road from Chaves
to Braga, and pushed on through the mountains towards
Montalegre. After marching some way the scouts brought
word that the bridge over the Cavado at Ponte Novo was
broken, and that 1,200 armed peasants with artillery were
posted there to prevent its reconstruction.^ If this obstacle
could not be removed, retreat was impossible, and the troops
worn out, short of food and boots, and with cartridges mostly
spoilt by the wet, must surrender as soon as the English
army came up with their rear.

Even in this extremity Soult's courage did not fail.
Summoning Lieutenant-Colonel Dulong, who was justly
reputed one of the bravest officers in his army, he bade him
take a hundred picked grenadiers and try to surprise the
enemy in the night. The only part of the bridge not de-
stroyed was a course of masonry about six inches wide, and
along this Dulong and twelve men crawled on their stomachs
towards the enemy's outposts. One grenadier lost his balance
and fell into the swollen river ; his cries were drowned by the
storm and the roar of the torrrent. Dulong with the re-
maining eleven reached the further bank, found the outposts
asleep, and killed or dispersed them. The Portuguese

[* There seeniB to be a confusion here between two bridges. This ac-
count applies to that of Roivaens. Fonte Novo, as will be seen, was only
partly broken.]

Out of Portugal ioi

soldiers, encamped not far off, thinking that the French army-
had crossed the Cavado, fled likewise. The bridge was at
once repaired, and the army saved. The brave Dulong was
severely wounded the next day in an attack on an entrench-
ment thrown up by the Portuguese in a diflScult defile. This
was the last bit of fighting which the French had in their
painful retreat. On the 17th they reached Montalegre,
where they crossed the frontier into Spain, and concentrated
at Orense, being again in communication with Ney's troops.
Dulong was promoted to colonel. He died a lieutenant-
general in 1828.

Thus ended the second invasion of Portugal. Marshal
Soult had lost from all causes 6,000 men ; and of the fifty-
eight guns with which he started he brought back one only.
Yet his reputation as a valiant soldier and capable general
was unshaken, for people took into consideration both the
steadiness which he had displayed and the great difficulties
which he had to sustain, no less from the intrigues of
conspirators than from the Emperor's omission to have him
properly supported by Marshal Victor. Napoleon, having
been used to receive punctual obedience from his lieuten-
ants in former campaigns, expected to find the same in the
Peninsula ; but distance and the title of marshal rendered
them more independent. Thus Victor, who should have
marched on Lisbon by the Tagus valley, waited so long at
Talavera, that the Spanish general Cuesta had time to collect
a large army in the mountains of Guadalupe. Then Victor,
rousing himself from his apathy, beat him in several battles,
notably at Medellin on the Guadiana, and reached Merida on
March 19, a month after the date fixed by the Emperor.
But when reminded by King Joseph of Napoleon's order to
enter Portugal and join Soult, Victor, being the junior, and
not wishing to take a subordinate position, not only refused,
but stayed the advance of Lapisse's division, which was
already in possession of the bridge of Alcantara over the
Tagus, and might have caused a diversion in favour of Soult
before the English could reach Oporto. Finally, after a
month's delay, learning that Soult had left Portugal, Victor

•

I02 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mardot

retired, first blowing up the bridge of Alcantara, the finest
monument of Trajan's genius.*

Soult, after providing himself with artillery from Corunna,
held an interview with Ney, and proposed to unite their
available forces and re-invade Portugal. But, as they could
not agree, he brought his troops to recruit themselves at
Zamora. Of the officers compromised in the plot at Oporto,
Captain Argenton, adjutant of the 18th Dragoons, who was
the soul of the conspiracy, was tried by court-martial and
sentenced to death, but succeeded in escaping.^ His colonel,
M. Lafitte, was retired. General Loison and Colonel
Donnadieu, who were accused, but without evidence, were
not punished ; but Loison's being allowed to remain with the
Army of Portugal could not fail to be mischievous.

At this time Soult sent General Franceschi to Madrid to
explain his views to Joseph. This excellent officer fell into
an ambush laid by the guerrilla chief, called the Capuchin,
and, being taken to Seville and Granada, was treated by the
central junta as a criminal and thrown into prison. After-
wards he was removed to Cartagena, where he died of yellow
fever. This was a great loss to the army, for ÎVanceschi
possessed all the qualities of a consummate general.

[ * The destraction of the bridge, though purposely brought about by
Victor, seems actually to have been performed by Colonel Mayne, in
command of a Portuguese force.]

[ * He escaped to England for a time only; returning to France, he was
tried by court-martial and shot, December, 1809.]

CHAPTER XII

Towards the end of 1809 the Emperor had placed all the
.army corps in Spain under the orders of his brother Joseph ;
but as he was no soldier, Napoleon only allowed him a
nominal authority, and, by making Soult chief of the staff,
gave him the real command of all the French troops in the
south of Spain. While these were successful in capturing
Seville and Cordova, and even investing Cadiz, the seat of the
governing junta. General Suchet was administering Âi*agon
and Valentia, most of the fortified towns in which he
had taken by siege. Saint-Cyr and Augereau were active
in Catalonia, where the warlike population was defending
itself with vigour. The troops of the Young Guard were
steadily keeping up an irregular warfare against the guerrillas
of Navarre and the northern provinces. Generals Bonnet
and Drouet occupied Biscay in the Asturias ; Ney held the
province of Salamanca, and Junot that of Valladolid. The
French had evacuated Galicia, the country being too poor to
maintain our troops. Such was, in brief, the position of our
armies in Spain when Masséna entered Portugal after taking
Oiudad Rodrigo and Almeida. His troops were composed
as follows. The second corps of veterans from Austerlitz,
who had been under Soult the previous year at Oporto, and
whom General Reynier now commanded with Merle and
Heudelet as generals of division; the sixth corps, also
veterans, commanded by Ney, the divisions being under
Marchand, Loison, and Mermet ; the eighth corps, composed
of moderately good troops, commanded in chief by Junot, with
Solignac and Clausel, the future marshal, as generals of
division; two divisions of cavalry under Montbrun, and a

I04 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

powerful field artillery directed by General Eblé. General
Lasouski commanded the engineers.

Deducting the garrisons left at Rodrigo, Almeida, and
Salamanca, with the sick, the total number][of combatants
amounted to 50,000, with sixty guns and a great quantity of
ammunition chests. This was far too large a train for a rough
country like Portugal, where there were scarcely any high
roads. Almost the only communications are narrow, rocky
paths, often very steep, and everything is transported on
mule-back. There are even districts where roads are abso-
lutely unknown. Lastly, except in certain valleys, the soil is
mostly arid, and offers insufficient resources for maintaining an
army. Masséna had therefore every reason to go through
the least difficult and most productive country. He did,
however, just the contrary.

Having left the neighbourhood of Almeida on September
14, 1810, the army assembled next day at Celorico, where it
saw the rich valley of the Mondego opening before it and
might march on Coimbra by Sampayo and Ponte de Murcelha,
over roads which, if not good, were at least tolerable. But under
the influence of Major Pelet, his adviser, the marshal left the
practicable country where the troops might have lived in com-
fort, and went off to the right into the mountains of Viseu,
where the roads are the worst in Portugal. One need only look
at the map to see how uni'easonable it was to go by Viseu on
the way from Celorico to Coimbra ; a mistake all the greater
from the fact that Viseu is separated from the Sierra
d'Alcoba by high hills, which the army might have avoided
by marching down the valley of the Mondego. The neigh-
bourhood of Viseu produces no com or vegetables, and the
troops found nothing there but lemons and grapes — not very
sustaining food.

Masséna's expedition very nearly came to an end at Viseu
through lack of foresight on the marshal's part. He made
his artillery park march on the extreme right of the column
outside the masses of infantry, its only escort being an Irish
battalion in the French service and a company of French
grenadiers. Marching in single file more than a league in

Saving a Convoy 105

length, the park was proceeding slowly and laboriously by
difficult roads, when suddenly on its right flank appeared the
English colonel Trant, with 4,000 or 5,000 Portuguese militia.
If the enemy, profiting by his superior strength, had sur-
rounded the convoy and made a resolute attack, all the
artillery, ammunition, and provisions of the army would have
been captured or destroyed. But Colonel Trant, as he him-
self said afterwards, could not suppose that a general of
Masséna's experience could have left unsupported a convoy so
essential to the safety of his army, and, supposing that a
powerful escort must be close at hand, he dared to advance
only with extreme caution. He confined himself, therefore,
to attacking only the leading company of grenadiers, who
answered by a heavy fire, killing some fifty men. The militia
men recoiled in alarm, and Trant, doing what he should have
done at first, overlapped a portion of the convoy. As he went
forward he discovered the weakness of the escort, and sent a
flag of truce to the commander, summoning him to surrender
or he would attack him all along the line. The French
officer adroitly consented to negotiate, in order to give the
Irish time to come up from the rear of the convoy. They
appeared at length, coming up at the double. As soon as the
French officer saw them he broke off the conference, saying :
' I cannot treat any further ; here is my general coming to
my support with 8,000 men.' Each resumed his position,
but Trant shortly left his and made off, thinking he had to
do with the advanced guard of a strong column. Thus the
artillery was saved, but the army soon learnt the danger in
which it had been and the excitement was great. Ney,
Junot, Reynier, and Montbrun went straight off to Viseu
and addressed strong remonstrances to General Fririon, chief
of the staff. He, however, asserted that, in spite of his
demands, no information of the march of the columns had
been given him, everything being settled by Masséna and
Pelet. Horrified and indignant at this state of things, the
commanders of the four corps called on Masséna with a view
of making well-deserved remarks on it. Ney was the
speaker, and from the aide-de-camp's room we could hear him

io6 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

protesting; but Massena, foreseeing that the conversation
would become animated, took the generals into a more dis-
tant apartment. I do not know what was decided, but it
appears that the commander-in-chief promised to change his
mode of action, for in a quarter of an hour we saw Massena
walking quietly in the garden, taking the arm of each of his
lieutenants in turn. Unanimity seemed to be restored, but
it was not for long.

As I have already said, childish reasons sometimes pro-
duce great and mischievous results. We had a striking
example of it, which influenced the result of a campaign
which was to have driven the English out of Portugal, but
which by its failure increased their confidence in Wellington,
while it seasoned the troops who did most to bring about our
defeat in the following years. All the army knew that

Massena had brought Mme N to Portugal with him.

This lady, having crossed the whole of Spain in a carriage,
and having remained at Salamanca during the sieges of
Rodrigo and Almeida, thought fit to follow Massena on horse-
back as soon as he set out to march through a country
impracticable for carriages, which produced a very bad efiect.
The marshal, who generally took his meals alone with her,
had had his table laid that day under a clump of lemon-trees,
the aide-de-camp's table being a hundred yards away in the
same garden. Dinner was about to be served, when the
commander-in-chief, wishing probably to cement the good
relations which had just been established between himself and
his lieutenants, remarked that as each of them had several
leagues to go in order to reach his headquarters it would be
best for them to dine with him before starting. All four ac-
cepted, and Massena, in order to prevent any ftirther remarks
on the incident of the convoy, ordered that for once the aide-
de-camp's table should be set by his.

So far all went well ; but just before sitting down

Massena sent for Mme N . On seeing the generals she

drew back, but he said to Ney, *My dear marshal, kindly
take Madame.' Ney turned pale, and nearly burst out;
but, restraining himself, he led the lady by the finger-tips,

Quarrels 107

to the table, and placed her, by Masséna's direction, on his
right. During the whole meal, however, Ney said not
a word to her, but talked to Montbmn, his neighbonr

on the left. Mme N , who was too quick-witted not

to see how false a position she was in, was seized with
^ nervous attack, and fell in a faint. Then Ney, Reynier,
Montbrun, and Junot left the garden, not without a vigorous
and audible expression , of his views on the part of Ney.
Reynier and Montbrun also said plainly what they thought;
Junot spoke so bitterly, that I took the liberty of reminding

him of the way in which he had met Mme N at

Valladolid. He answered, laughing, ' Because an old hussar
like me has his games sometimes, that is no reason for
Masséna to imitate them. Besides, I must stand by my
colleagues.' From that day forward the four generals were
on the worst of terms with Masséna, who, on his side, bore
them no goodwill.*

This quarrel among the chiefs could not fail to aggravate
the causes making for the ill-success of the campaign.
These arose mainly from our utter want of topographical
knowledge of the districts in which we were fighting ; arising
from the omission of the Portuguese Government — either
as a defensive measure, or through indolence — to have good
maps made of the kingdom. The only one in existence was
as bad as could be ; so that we had, as it were, to feel our way
along. There were ofiicers in plenty who had campaigned in
Portugal with Soult and Junot, but they had not been in
the provinces where we were, and could be of no use as
guides. On the staff we had some thirty Portuguese
officers, among them two generals — the Marquis of Aloma
and Count Pamplona, who had come to France in 1808 with
the contingent furnished to Napoleon by the court of Lisbon.
Though they had only obeyed the orders of the former
Government, they were proscribed by the Commission of
Regency, and thus had returned to seek possession of their

* CJonfirmation of these details wiU be found in M. Thiers's review
-of the causes \\4iich led to the French defeats in Portugal. [Consulat et
Empire, book xl.]

io8 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

confiscated goods in the train of oar army. Masséna had
hoped to get some useful information from these exiles ; but
except in the neighbourhood of Lisbon they knew nothing
of their own country; while the English, who had been
going all about it for two years knew its configuration
perfectly, gaining thereby a great advantage over us.

Another cause told no less powerfully against as. Lord
Wellington, being allowed a perfectly free hand by the
Government, used it to compel all the people to leave their
houses, destroy all provisions and mills, and retire with
their cattle to Lisbon on the approach of the French, who
thus were unable to obtain any information, and had to
beat the country to a great distance in order to get pro-
visions. The Spaniards had constantly refused to adopt
this terrible means of resistance at the instance of the
English ; but the Portuguese were more docile. We thus
crossed vast districts without seeing a single inhabitant;
such an exodus had not been seen within human memory.
The city of Viseu was totally deserted when we entered it,
yet Masséna halted the army there for six days. This was
à second mistake added to that which he had committed in
leaving the valley of the Mondego. If on the morrow of
his arrival at Viseu the French general had made a rapid
march and attacked the Alcoba, on which Lord Wellington
had then very few troops, the fault might have been
repaired. But our delay of six days allowed the English
to ford the Mondego above Ponte de Murcelha, and to unite
their army on the ridges of the Alcoba at Busaco. No
military writer of any country has been able to account for
Masséna's inactivity of nearly a week at Viseu, but the

marshal's staff can testify that Mme N 's fatigue had

much to do with delaying Masséna and keeping him at that
place. The country was in arms, and it would have been
impossible to leave her behind without exposing her to the
danger of her being captured. Moreover, when he had
made up his mind to start, Masséna made only very short
marches, halting first at Tondella. The next day, Sept-
ember 26, after establishing his headquarters at Mortagoa,

Position of Busaco 109

on the right bank of the Criz, he lost precious time in
securing the lady's quarters ; and it was not till two in the
afternoon that he set out with his staff for the outposts —
five good leagues off, at the foot of the Alcoba.

This mountain ridge, about three leagues in length,
abuts upon the Mondego to the east, and to the west is
connected with detached hills of great steepness, impassable
for an army. At the highest point is a convent, named
Saco. The central part of the summit forms a sort of
plateau, on which the English artillery was posted. It
had freedom of action along the whole front of the position,
and its range extended to beyond the Criz. A road passing
round the ridge of Busaco afforded easy communication
between the various portions of the enemy's army, while the
slope facing towards the direction from which the French
approached was, from its sharpness, well adapted for defence.
The enemy's left rested on the hills above Barria ; his
centre and reserves on the convent ; his right on the heights,
a little in rear of San Antonio de Cantara. So formidable
was the position that the English had some fear that the
French commander-in-chief might not venture to attack.

When Masséna came up on the evening of the 26th he
found that the army had in his absence been posted by Ney
as follows: the 6th corps on the right, at the village of
Moira; the centre facing the convent; Reynier's corps on
the left, at San Antonio ; and the 8th corps, under Junot,
with the artillery, marching to take up a position in reserve
in rear of the centre. The cavalry, under Montbrun, was at
Bienfaita.

When an army has undergone a check it is but too
common to find the generals throwing the blame on each
other. This happened aft^r Busaco, and thus it is necessary
to mention here the opinion expressed before the battle
by Masséna's lieutenants, who, having first urged him on to
the commission of his greatest blunder, after the unfortunate
event criticised his conduct. I have said that on the day
but one before the battle the corps under Ney and Reynier
were at the foot of the Alcoba, and in presence of the enemy.

I lo The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

While impatiently waiting for the commander-in-chief, these
two generals exchanged in writing their respective views on
the position of the Anglo-Portuguese army. There exists a
letter,* dated on the morning of September 26, in which
Marshal Ney says to General Reynier, * If I were in command
I would attack without a moment's hesitation.' Both
expressed the same feeling in their correspondence with
Masséna : — ' The position is far less formidable than it looks,
and if I had not been in so subordinate a position I would
have carried it without awaiting your orders.' Relying on
the assurance of Generals Reynier and Junot that nothing
could be easier, Masséna made (although the contrary has
since been aflirmed) not the smallest attempt to reconnoitre,
and, merely replying, * Very well, I will be back at daybreak,
and we will attack,' he turned and rode back to Mortagoa.
Great was the astonishment at this abrupt departure, for,
seeing Masséna join his troops, who were encamped within
cannon-shot of the enemy, everyone supposed that he would
use the remaining daylight to study the position which he
had to carry, and would stay with the army. In going off
thus, without seeing anything for himself, he no doubt made
a great mistake ; but I do not think that, after lulling to sleep
his usual vigilance and urging him to attack, his lieutenants
had any right to blame him as they afterwards did. On the
contrary, they might well have found fault with themselves ;
for, after spending two days at the foot of the Alcoba, they
advised a front attack, in spite of the steepness, and made no
inquiries as to the possibility of turning it — a course, as you
will presently see, offering no difficulty.

It was a misfortune for the army that General Sainte-
Croix was not then with Masséna. His instinct for war
would certainly have led him, taking advantage of the
marshal's confidence in him, to induce him to abandon the
idea of attacking directly so formidable a position before
making sure that it could not be turned. But he was with
his brigade some leagues to the rear, escorting a convoy.

Hardly had the commander-in-chief with his staff left

[ » It wiU be found in the Appendix to Napier, vol. iii.]

How TO Admonish a Marshal hi

the army than night came on — and Masséna had only one eye
and was not a good horseman. Oar road was strewn with
large stones and pieces of rock, so we had, in the darkness,
to go for more than two honrs at a walk to accomplish the
five leagaes to Mortagoa. As we went along I meditated
sadly on the probable results of the battle which we were
going to fight on the morrow at such a disadvantage, and
imparted my reflections in a low voice to my firiend Ligni-
ville and to General Fririon. We were all most anxious
that Masséna should alter his dispositions ; but no officer save
Felet was allowed to submit any suggestions to him directly.
Yet the matter appeared urgent, and we decided to employ
an artifice, which we had sometimes used with success, for
bringing the truth indirectly to his notice. Agreeing upon
our parts, we got near the marshal, feigning not to see him
in the darkness ; then we began to talk about the coming
battle, and I said that I was sorry the commander-in-chief
intended to assault the position in fix>nt without being
certain that it could not be turned. Then General Fririon,
playing his part as arranged, answered that Ney and
Beynier had stated positively that there was no other way to
get past, to which Ligniville and I replied that we could not
believe that, for it was impossible that the people of Mortagoa
should have lived for centuries devoid of direct communica-
tion with Boialva, and with no other way to the Oporto road
than by Busaoo, over the steepest part of the mountains. I
added that when I had made the same remark to the aides-
de-camp of Ney and Beynier, and asked which of them had
reconnoitred the extreme left of the enemy's position, not
one answered, ttom which I concluded that no one had
visited that part. If Masséna saw badly his hearing was
extremely keen, and, as we hoped, he had not missed one
word of our talk. So much struck was he, that he came up
to our group, and, joining in the conversation, admitted —
cautious as he was — that he had assented too easily to the
plan of assaulting in firent. He said that he would counter-
order this, and that if a way could be found of turning the
position he would let the army rest next day, and on the

1 1 2 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

following night woold conœntrate it opposite the vnlnerable
point and attack anawares. No doabt there would be a day's
delav. bat the chances of sncoess would be better and the
probable loss lighter.

So determined did the marahal appear, that when we
reached Mortagoa he bade Ligniville and me try to find
some inhabitant who coold show ns a road to Boialva without
passing Bosaco. It was a difficult job, for the inhabitants
had all fled at the approach of the French, and the extreme
darkness was against oar search. At length, however, we
foand in a monastery an old gardener who had stayed to take
care of a sick monk. He broaght as to this monk, who
answered oar questions fineely ; he had often been from
Mortagoa and Boialva by a good road which branched off a
short league fix)m the place where we were. He was all the
more surprised at our not knowing this, that part of our
amy in going firom Viseu to Mortagoa had passed the
turning. Guided by the old gardener, we went to verify the
monk s statement, and found that an excellent road actually
went in the direction of the mountains and appeared to pass
round the enemy's left. Yet Marshal Xey had stayed two days
at Mortagoa without eiqiloring this road, a knowledge of
which would have saved us manv disasters.

Lâgniville and I, delighted at oar discovery, hastened to
report it to the marshal ; but we had been away more than
an hour, and we found him with Major Pelet, surrounded by
maps and plans. Pelet said that he had examined the
mountains with a telescope by daylight and had seen in their
configuration no sign of a pass to our right ; moreover, he
could not believe that Marshal Xey had not explored the
neighbourhood while he was at Mortagoa, and as he had not
found a pass it was clear that none existed, nor could we
convince him of the contrary. In vain did we offer to go
round and ascend the hiU which the monk assured us was
less steep than that of Busaoo, or even to go as fieur as Boialva
if they would give us three battalions oH the headquarters
guard. In vain did General Fririon beg the marshal to
accept this offer : all was useless. Masséna ¥ras very tired,

Forebodings i i 3

he said that it was near midnight and that we must be off
at four o'clock to reach the camp by daybreak, and with that
he went to bed. Never did I pass a more melancholy night ;
and my comrades were as sad as I. At last the hour came
for onr start, and we reached the outposts with the first
morning light of September 27, an ill-omened day which was
to behold one of the most terrible reverses which the French
army ever suffered.

VOL. U.

CHAPTER XIII

Ox finding himself in front of the position which he had
Hcarcely examined on the previous day Ma8S^*na appeared to
hesitate, and. coming up to the place where I was chatting
with (ieneral Fririon, he said sadly, * Your suggestion of
yesterday was worth considering.' Our hopes rekindled by
these few words, we doubled our efforts to induce the com-
mander-in-chief to turn the mountain by Boialva, and he
was already coming over to our way of thinking, when Ney,
Key nier, and Pelet came up and interrupted our talk with
the remark that all was ready for the attack. Maaséna
made a few more remarks, but at length, overborne by his
lieutenants, and fearing, no doubt, that he might be blamed
for letting slip a victory which they declared to be certain,
he gave onlers towards seven o clock to open fire.

The 2nd corps, under lieynier, attacked the enemy's right ;
Ney their left and centre. Tlie French troops were drawn
up on stony gn>und. sloping st^H^pIy down to a great ravine
which se|>arated us from the Alcoba, which was lofly, steep,
and occupied by the enemy. From their commanding position
they could see all our movements, while we saw only their
outposts half-way up the hill between the convent of Bnsaoi)
and the ravine, which at this point was so deep that the
naked eye could hanily make out the movements of troops
who were marching through it, and so nam>w that the
Knglish bullets carried right across it. It might be re>
garded as an immense natural ditch, serving as the first line
of defence to the natural fortifications formed by great rocks
cut almost into a vertical wall. Besides this, our artillery,
engaged in very bad roads and obliged to fire upwards, ooold
render very little service ; while the infantry had to oontend

English Methods 115

not only against a mass of obstacles and the roughest pos-
sible ascent, but also against the best marksmen in Europe.
Up to this time the English were the only troops who were
perfectly practised in the use of small arms, whence their
firing was far more accurate than that of any other infantry.
Although you might expect that the rules of war would
be alike among civilized nations, they do, as a fact, vary
immensely even in identical circumstances. Thus, when the
French have to defend a position they first garnish the front
and flanks with skirmishers, and then crown the heights
conspicuously with their main body and reserves, which has the
serious inconvenience of letting the enemy know the vulner-
able point of the line. The method employed in similar
cases by the English seems to me far preferable, as was
often demonstrated in the Peninsular War. After havings
as we do, garnished their front with skirmishers, they post
their principal forces in such a way as to keep them out of
sight, holding them all the time sufficiently near to the key
of the position to be able to attack the enemy at once if they
come near to reaching it ; and this attack, made unexpectedly
upon assailants who have lost heavily and think the victory
already theirs, succeeds almost invariably. We had a melan-
choly experience of this at Busaco. In spite of the numerous
obstacles which favoured the defence, the brave men of the
2nd corps had just succeeded, after an hour of desperate
work, performed with really heroic courage, in scaling the
mountain, when, as they arrived panting at the summit of
the ridge, they found themselves in front of a hitherto un-
perceived line of English infantry. After receiving them at
fifteen paces with an admirably aimed and sustained fire
which stretched more than five hundred men on the ground^
this line dashed at the survivors with the bayonet. The un-
expected attack, accompanied by a storm of grape on their
flank, shook some of our battalions ; but they quickly rallied,
and, in spite of their heavy losses, our troops, astonished but
not disconcerted, charged the English line, broke it at several
points, and cari'ied six guns. But Wellington had brought
up strong reserves, while ours were at the foot of the mountain^

I 2

ii6 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

and the French, pressed on all sides, and compelled to give
up the narrow ground which they occupied on the plateau,
found themselves, after a long and brisk resistance, driven in
a heap down the steep descent up which they had climbed.
The English lines followed them halfway down, firing volleys
to which our men could not reply — and murderous they were.
All resistance being useless in so unfavourable a position, the
oflBcers ordered the men to take skirmishing order about the
broken ground, and under a hail of bullets they reached
the foot of the mountain. At this point we lost General
Graindorge, two colonels, eighty officers, and seven or eight
hundred men.

After such a check prudence would have forbidden to
send any troops weakened by heavy losses a second time
against a triumphant enemy with his position unaltered;
yet General Reynier ordered Foy's and Sarrut's brigades to
return to the charge; and Masséna, who witnessed this
madness, allowed the second attack. It met with the same
fate as the first. While this was taking place on our left,
fortune was not more favourable to the 6th corps on our
right. Although it had been arranged to attack simul-
taneously at all points, and Masséna had repeated the order
about seven o'clock at the moment of engaging, it was half-
past eight before Ney set his troops in motion. He asserted
afterwards that he had been delayed by the difficulty of the
position on that side, and it certainly was greater than on
the left. Our people had just made one great mistake in
sending the 2nd corps into action before the 6th was ready ;
Ney made one similar when he engaged Loison's, Marchandas,
and Mermet's divisions without any cohesion. The troops
attacked vigorously, and although entire files were swept
away by cannon and musketry, the brigades of Ferey and
Simon, with the 26th of the line, clambering up the steep
rocks, flung themselves on the enemy's guns and captured
three of them. The English, being reinforced, returned to
the attack ; General Simon, with his jaw smashed, fell, and
was taken prisoner on one of the guns which he had just
captured. Almost every field officer was killed or wounded,

Defeat 117

and three volleys at close quarters completed the rout of the
French masses, ivho returned in disorder to their starting-
point. Thus ended the principal fight. The losses of the
2nd and 6th corps were immense. They amounted to more
than 5,000 men, including 250 officers killed, wounded, or
prisoners. General Graindorge, Colonels Monier, Amy, and
Berliet killed ; two others wounded ; General Simon wounded
and taken prisoner; Generals Merle, Mancune, and Foy
severely wounded, besides two colonels and thirteen majors.
The enemy in their sheltered position lost far less heavily,
but they admitted 2,300 men disabled. We learnt after-
wards that if we had attacked the day before the English
would have withdrawn without fighting, because 2,500 of
their best troops were then on the other side of the Mondego,
and only arrived at Busaco the night before the battle. Such
was the result of the six days lost by Masséna at Viseu, and
his hurry to return on the 26th to Mortagoa instead of
reconnoitring the position.

Our efforts having thus utterly failed in face of a hillside so
steep that an unburdened man would have cUmbed it with
difficulty, it surely behoved our leaders to put a stop to firing
which had now become useless. Yet a brisk fiJe-firing went
on all along the lines at the foot of the position, which our
soldiers, in their excitement, were to assault anew. These
small encounters with an enemy hidden by lofty rocks were
very costly to us, and there was a general feeling that they
should cease, though no one gave the formal order. Just then
the two armies witnessed a touching incident, forming a
contrast to the scenes of slaughter all round. General Simon's
valet, hearing that his master had been left badly wounded
on the summit of the Alcoba, tried to make his way to him ;
but the enemy, not understanding his motive for approaching
their lines, tired on him repeatedly, and the faithful servant
was compelled to return to the French outposts. As he was
lamenting his inability to aid his master, the cantim'ère of the
2(jth, belonging to the brigade, took the things from the valet's
hands, loaded them on her donkey, and went forward, say-
ing, * We will see if the English will kill a woman ' ; listen-

ii8 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbôt

ing to no objections, she went up the hill, and, passed coolly
between the lines of skirmishers, who, savage as they were,
ceased firing till she was out of range. Presently she saw the
English colonel, and explained what she had brought. He
received her kindly, and had her taken to General Simon,
with whom she stayed several days, tending him to the best
of her power, and only leaving him when the valet arrived.
Then, getting on her donkey, she went through the enemy's
army, by that time in retreat on Lisbon, and rejoined her
regiment, without having received an insult of any kind,
though she was young and very pretty. On the contrary,
the English made a point of treating her with great respect.^
The two armies maintained their respective positions ; it
was a sad night for us ; the future appeared gloomy enough.
At daybreak on the 28th, the Alcoba echoed with mighty
cheering and the strains of the English military bands.
Wellington was reviewing his troops, who were saluting him
with their hurrahs; while the French at the foot of the
mountain were in gloomy silence. Masséna should have
mounted his horse then, reviewed his army, harangued his
soldiers, until they replied by their cheers to the defiant
enthusiasm of the enemy. The Emperor and Marshal Lannes
would certainly have acted thus. But Masséna held aloof,
walking about all alone, and making no arrangements ; while
his lieutenants, especially Ney and Reynier, the very men
who the day before had urged him to engage, saying that
they would answer for victory, were loudly accusing him of
imprudence in attacking a strong position like Busaco.
When, finally, they joined the commander-in-chief, it was to
propose that he should advertise our failure to the army, and
all the world by abandoning Portugal and take the army back
into Spain. Then old Masséna, recovering a little of the
energy of Rivoli, Zurich, and Genoa, and many another
memorable occasion, rejected their proposal as unworthy of
the army and of himself.

[ * Napier also tells a story of a girl who passed unmolested through the
armies ; but in this case it was a Portuguese girl who actually crossed the
battlefield, in the opposite direction, down, and not up, the mountain.]

A Flank March 119

The English have called the affair of Basaco a political
battle, because the British Parliament, alarmed at the enormous
cost of the war, appeared resolved to withdraw the troops from
the Peninsula and content itself in fiiture with supplying arms
and ammunition to the guerrillas. As this plan tended to
destroy Wellington's influence, he had resolved to prevent it
from being carried out by replying with a victory to the fears
of the English Parliament, and this determined hîm to await
the French at Busaco. His plan succeeded, and Parliament
voted further supplies for the war which was to be so disastrous
to us.

While the marshal was discussing with his lieutenants,
General Sainte-Croix came up. On seeing him everyone
expressed regret that he had not been present the day before
to act as the marshal's good genius. Masséna now under-
stood the mistake he had made in not turning the enemy's
left as we had advised him, and, on hearing the state of
things from Masséna himself, Sainte-Croix advised him to
revert to that plan. With the general's assent, he galloped
off, accompanied by Ligniville and me, to Mortagoa, whither
he sent for his brigade of dragoons. As we passed through
the village we picked up the convent gardener, who, at sight
of a piece of gold, consented to act as our guide, laughing
when he was asked if there really existed a road to Boialva.

While Sainte-Croix's brigade, and a regiment of infantry,
led the way in this new direction, the 8th corps and Mont-
brun's cavalry followed close behind, and the rest of the army
prepared to do the same. Urged by Sainte-Croix, Masséna
had at last spoken with authority, and imposed silence on his
lieutenants when they persisted in denying the existence of a
pass on the right.

In order to conceal from the English the movement of
such of our troops as were at the foot of the Alcoba, they did
not march until night, and then in dead silence. But in-
formation was soon given by the despairing cries of the
French wounded, whom we were under the sad necessity of
abandoning. A great number of horses, and all the beasts
of burden, were employed to carry the men whom there was

120 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

hope of curing ; but those who had lost their legs, or were
otherwise severely wounded, were left lying on the dry heath,
and as the poor fellows expected to have their throats cut by
the peasants as soon as the armies were out of the way, theii*
despair was terrible.

The French army had reason to fear that Wellington,
seeing them execute a flank march so near him, would attack
them vigorously. This might have led to the capture of
Reynier's entire corps, which would be the last to leave its
position, and would remain for some hours unsupported in
presence of the enemy. But the English general had no time
to think of turning the French rear-guard, for he had just
learnt that he was being himself turned by the pass of which
the French commander-in-chief had so long denied the
existence. What actually happened was this. After we had
marched all the night of the 28th, the gardener, going with
the head of Sainte-Croix's column, brought us by a road
practicable for artillery as far as Boialva, that is to say, to
the extreme left flank of the English army, so that all the
positions on the Alcoba had been outflanked without a blow,
and Wellington, under pain of exposing his army to be taken
in rear, had to abandon Busaco in haste, to regain Coimbra,
and cross the Mondego there, with a view of retreating upon
Lisbon, which he did with all speed. Our advanced guard
only met with a small detachment of Hanoverian hussars
posted at Boialva, a pretty village situated at the southern
issue from the mountains. The fertility of the country gave
hopes that the army might find abundant subsistence there.
A shout of joy went up from our ranks, and the soldiers very
soon forgot the fatigues and dangers of the previous days,
perhaps also the unhappy comrades whom they had left dying
before Busaco.

To complete the success of our movement, a good road
joined Boialva with the village of Avelans on the road from
Oporto to Coimbra. Sainte-Croix occupied this, and by a
further piece of luck we discovered a second road from Boialva
to Sardao, another village on the high road. At last, then,
we had the proof of the existence of this pass, so obstinately

Faults on Both Sides 121

denied by Ney, Beynier, and Pelet. Masséna must have
reproached himself for having omitted to reconnoitre the
strong position before which he had lost several thousand
men, and which his army had now turned without meeting
the least resistance. But Wellington was still more to blame
for not having guarded that point, and surveyed the ix)ad
leading to it from Mortagoa. It was of no use for him to
say afterwards that he did not believe the road had been
practicable for artillery, and that he had besides ordered
Trant to cover Boialva with 2,000 militia. Such an excuse
is not permissible for experienced fighting men. It might
perfectly well be answered that as to the state of the road
the English commander should have reconnoitred it before
the battle, and that, in the second place, it is not enough for
the chief of an army to give orders, but that he should make
sure that they have been executed. Boialva is only a few
leagues from Busaco, and yet Wellington never ascertained
that this pass, so important to the safety of his army, had
been guarded according to his orders ; so that if Masséna had
been better inspired, and had, during the night of the 26th,
sent an army corps to Boialva to attack the left flank of the
enemy, while threatening him in front with the rest of his
force, the English would certainly have suffered a sanguinary
defeat. From all this we conclude that in the circumstances
neither Wellington nor Masséna showed himself equal to his
high reputation ; and that they deserved the blame which
their contemporaries addressed to them, and which history
will confirm.

CHAPTER XIV

As scx)n as the army was clear of the defile of Boialva, Masséna
marched on Coimbra by way' of Milheada and Tomos. At
the latter point there was a cavalry engagement, in which
Sainte-Croix overthrew the English rear-guard, forcing them

back on Coimbra. On October 1 the French entered that

place. Deceived by the result of the battle of Busaco, and the
assertion of English officers that the French army was
retiring into Spain, the unhappy inhabitants of that city
had abandoned themselves to a display of rejoicing. The
festivities were not at an end, when suddenly came the news
that the French had turned the mountains and were marching
straight on Coimbra — that indeed they were not a day's
journey distant. Indescribable panic prevailed ; the popula-
tion of 120,000 souls simultaneously with the news of the
enemy's approach received orders to leave their home forth-
with. Their departure was, by the admission of English
officers, a most terrible sight; I refrain from relating the
heart-breaking incidents.

Wellington's army, hampered by the mass of fugitives of
every age, sex, and class, men and beasts of burden in
inextricable confusion, retired in the greatest disorder
toward Coimbra and Pombal, many perishing in the passage
of the Mondego. This was good for Massêna. He should
have sent Junot's corps, which, not having fought at Busaco,
was fiilly available, in pursuit, and by a sudden attack he
might have caused heavy loss to the English army, which, by
the testimony of some of our men who had been captured at .
Busaco and had escaped, was in disorder beyond words. But,
to our great surprise, and as if he wished to allow the enemy
time to restore order to get away, the commander-in-chief

On the March to Lisbon 123

bUleted his army in Coimbra and the adjacent villages, and
waited three clear days. His excuse for this delay was the
necessity of reorganising the 2nd and 6th corps which had
saffered at Basaco, and of establishing hospitals at Coimbra ;
all which he might have done while the 8th corps was in
pursuit of the enemy. But the real notion for the stay at
Coimbra was, in the first place, the increasing want of confi-
dence between Masséna and his lieutenants ; and, further, liis
difficulty in deciding whether to leave a division in the place
to cover his rear and protect the sick and wounded, or to
take all his available forces fi'om the battle which was ex-
pected to be fought outside Lisbon. Either course had its
advantages and disadvantages ; but he need not have taken
three days to make up his mind. Finally he decided to leave
a half-company to guard the convent of Santa Clara and
protect the wounded who were assembled there from the first
fury of an attacking force, with orders to capitulate as soon
as an officer appeared.

But no definite instructions were given ; and, under the
impression that a division would remain, the colonels put all
their infirm men, most of whom could perfectly well have
marched, and desired nothing better, in the vast convent.
More than three thousand were thus left behind, with two
lieutenants and eighty men of the naval brigade as their sole
guard.

I was surprised that Masséna, who was sure to require
sailors when he reached the Tagus, should have sacrificed a
number of these valuable men, who could not easily be replaced,
when he might have left some infantry of inferior value. It
was clear that in less than twenty-four hours the enemy's
irregular troops would occupy the town ; and indeed in the
evening of the very day, October 3, ' on which the French had
left it, the Portuguese militia entered.

Our poor wounded had barricaded themselves in the

convent, having no longer any doubt that Masséna had

abandoned them, and were preparing to sell their lives dearly.

The naval lieutenants behaved admirably. With the help of

[ ' So in the original, but the dates here and a few lines below seem wrong.]

124 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

some infantry officers who were among the wounded, they
collected all the men who still had muskets and could use
them, and succeeded in holding the Portuguese in check all
the night. On the morning of the 6th Brigadier Trant, the
commander of the militia, arrived ; and the naval officers
capitulated to him in writing. Hardly, however, had the
wounded French surrendered the few arms which they had
than the militia fell on the poor wretches, many of whom
could not stand, and butchered over a thousand. The rest,
sent without mercy to Oporto, perished on the road ; as soon
as anyone fell out from fatigue the Portuguese killed him.
Yet this militia was organized and led by English officers,
commanded by an English general ; and in not checking
these atrocities Trant dishonoured his country and his
uniform. In vain does Napier allege in his excuse that only
ten French prisoners were sacrificed ; the fact is, that nearly
all were murdered either in the hospital at Goimbra or on
the road. Even in England the name of Trant has become
infamous.*

From Coimbra Masséna had written to the Emperor ; but
the difficulty was to transmit the despatch through the insur-
gent population. A Frenchman must have failed, and it was
necessary to find someone who knew the country and could
speak the language. A Portuguese officer named Mascare-
guas, who had entered the French service with General
d'Aloma, offered to be the bearer. I saw him start disguised
as a mountain-shepherd, with a little dog in his basket, in
which costume he hoped to reach Almeida, where the French
commandant would put him in the way of proceeding to
Paris. But it was of no use for Mascareguas, who belonged
to the first nobility of Portugal, to attempt to conceal his
distinguished bearing and manner and his refined speech.
The peasants were not taken in ; he was arrested, brought to
Lisbon, and condemned to death ; and in spite of his appeal

[ * General Marbot*s study of Napier does not appear to have extended
to the Appendix, or he would have found a letter written to Trant by three
French officers, a doctor, a colonel, and a naval commander, thanking him,
in the name of the prisoners, for < the trouble which he had taken to alle-
viate their condition/ ]

Brought to a Halt 125

for the noble's privilege of decapitation, he was hanged as a
spy in the public square.

The three further days wasted by the French at Coimbra
allowed the English to get away, and it took us three days
more to come up with their rear-guard at Pombal. Before
our coming the body of the celebrated marquis of that name
had lain in a magnificent tomb, erected in an immense mauso-
leum of wonderful architecture. This had been wrecked by the
stragglers from the English army. They had broken the tomb
and thrown the bones under the feet of their horses, which
they had stabled in the vast building. A strange instance
of the vanity of human things ! There, lying in the filth,
when Masséna and his staff visited the place, were the scanty
remains of the great minister who put down the Jesuits !

From Pombal we went on to Leyria, and at 9 a.m. our ad-
vance-guard was on the banks of the Tagus, at Santarem.
There we found immense stores of provisions ; but this ad-
vantage was almost neutralised by autumnal rains such as
are not seen out of the tropics except in the southern shores
of the Peninsula, and which assailed us after unbroken fine
weather. Both armies sufiered much from this cause ; but
ours reached Alemquer, a market town at the foot of the
hills of Cintra, which gird Lisbon at a few leagues' distance.
We quite expected to have to fight a battle before entering
Lisbon, but, as we knew that the town was open on the land-
side, we had no doubt of success. Meantime, however, all the
neighbourhood of Lisbon had been covered with fortifica-
tions. For a year and a half the English had been working
at them; but neither Ney, who had just spent a year at
Salamanca, nor Masséna, who for six months had been making
ready to invade Portugal, had the least inkling of these
gigantic works. Reynier and Junot were equally ignorant ;
most surprising of all — incredible, indeed, if the fact were not
absolutely certain — the French Government itself did not
know that the hills of Cintra had been fortified. It is incon-
ceivable how the Emperor, who had agents in every country,
could have omitted to send some to Lisbon. At that time
thousands of American, German, Swedish, and English ships

126 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

were daily bringing into the Tagus stores for Wellington's
army ; and it would have been perfectly easy to have introduced
some spies among the numerous sailors and clerks employed
on these vessels. Knowledge of all kinds can be obtained by
money ; it was by this means that the Emperor kept himself
informed of all that went on in England and among the great
Powers of Europe. Nevertheless, he never gave Masséna any
information as to the defences of Lisbon ; and it was only on
reaching Alemquer that the French general discovered that the
hills were fortified and connected by lines of which the right
touched the sea in rear of Torres Vedras, the centre was at
Sobral, and the right rested on the Tagus, near Alhandra.

The day before our troops appeared at this point the
English army had entered the lines, driving before it the
population of the surrounding districts, to the number of
300,000 souls. Utter disorder prevailed ; and those among
the French oflScers who guessed what was taking place
among the enemy regretted afresh and very keenly that
Masséna had resolved a fortnight before to attack the position
of Busaco in front. If that position had been turned, the
enemy would have been taken in flank and have retired upon
Lisbon, and our army, in full strength and ardour, would have
attacked the lines on its arrival, and certainly have carried
them. With the capture of the capital the English must
have retreated precipitately, and the reverse would have been
irreparable. But our heavy losses at Busaco had chilled the
ardour of Masséna's lieutenants, and bred ill-will between
them and him ; so that now all were trying to paralyse his
operations, and representing every little hillock to be a new
height of Busaco the capture of which would cost copious
bloodshed. In spite, however, of this want of loyalty,
Masséna despatched the 8th corps towards the enemy's
centre, and Clausel's division carried the village of Sobral — a
very important point for us. Just when a simultaneous
attack along the whole line was expected. General Sainte-
Oroix, who had urged this course, was killed by a cannon-
shot in front of Villa-Franca. That excellent oflScer was with
General Montbrun making a reconnoissance toward Alhandra,

Torres Vedras 127

and as they passed along the Tagns, on which several Portu-
guese sloops were cruising, and firing out our outposts, poor
Sainte-Croix was cut in two by a chain-shot. It was a
grievous loss for the army, for Masséna, and above all for me,
who loved him like a brother.

After the death of the only man capable of giving him
good advice the commander-in-chief fell back into his state of
perpetual indecision, wavering under the clamour of his lieu-
tenants, who, in their present faint-heartedness, represented
all the hills of Cintra as bristling with cannon ready to make
mince-meat of us. In order to know what he was really to
think about it, Masséna, who since the advice which Ligniville
and I had offered at the battle of Busaco, had evinced some
kindness towards us, directed us to examine the front of the
enemy's lines. They were undoubtedly of imposing strength,
but very far from what people were pleased to say. The
English entrenchments formed an immense arc round Lisbon,
at least twenty French leagues in length. Every ofiicer of
the least experience knows well that a position of this extent
cannot present the same difficulties everywhere and must
have its weak spots. We became aware of several such by
seeing officers, and even cavalry pickets, ride up quite easily ;
and we also became convinced that our engineer officers who
had mapped the hills had figured an armed redoubt wherever
they saw a little earth recently disturbed. The English, to
lead us into a mistake, had on every small elevation traced
works of which most had not yet got beyond the stage of
planning. But even if they had been completed it seemed
to us that the ground was sufficiently irregular to conceal the
movements of a portion of our army, and that by employing
one corps to make a feint on the front while the other two
pushed real attacks on the weakest points of this long line,
they would find the English troops too widely scattered, or at
any rate with their reserves at a considerable distance from
the points attacked.

The age of Louis XIV. was a period when great use was
made of lines, and history shows that the greater part of
those which were attacked were carried for want of the power

128 The Memoirs of the Baron db Mar bot

of mutual support among the defenders. We thought that at
some point of their vast extent it would be easy to pierce the
English lines, and an opening once made, the enemy's troops,
who would be in some cases a day's journey from the opening,
would recognise that they had not time to come up, except in
very inferior strength, and would retire, not to Lisbon, whence
vessels cannot get out in all winds, but to Cascaes, where their
military fleet and transports were assembled. ^Pheir retreat
would have been very difficult, and might perhaps have
become a rout. In any case their embarkation in presence
of our army would have been a second edition of Sir John
Moore's at Corunna. We have since seen English officers,
among others General Hill, admit that if the French had
attacked within the first ten days after their arrival they
would have easily penetrated together with the confused
multitude of peasants in the midst of whom the English
armies could never have disentangled themselves nor made
any regular dispositions for defence.

When my comrade and I reported in this sense to
Masséna, the old soldier's eyes sparkled with martial ardour,
and he at once issued marching orders to prepare for the
attack which he reckoned on making the next day. However,
on receiving the orders, his four lieutenants hastened to his
quarters and a stormy discussion took place. Junot, who
had commanded in Lisbon, and knew it well, declared that
it seemed impossible to him to maintain so large a town, and
expressed himself strongly for the attack. General Montbrun
shared his opinion ; but Ney and Reynier hotly opposed it,
adding that the loss at Busaco, together with that of the
wounded who had been abandoned at Coimbra, and the
numerous sick who had been for the moment disabled by the
rains, had so largely diminished the number of combatants,
that it was not possible to attack a strong position, and
further, that their men were demoralised — an inaccurate
statement, for the troops were showing great ardour in
demanding to march upon Lisbon. Losing his patience,
Masséna repeated viva voce the orders he had already given
in writing, and Ney declared in so many words that he would

Insubordination 129

not carry them out. The commander-in-chief was minded
then to remove Ney from the command of the 6th corps, as
some months later he was obliged to do. But he considered
that Ney was beloved by his men, whom he had commanded
for seven years ; that his removal would involve that of Reynier,
which would complete the discord in the army at a moment
when unanimity was so eminently needed. The energetic
advice of Sainte-Croix was no longer at hand to sustain him,
and Masséna quailed before the disobedience of his two chief
lieutenants. They could not indeed decide him to leave
Portugal, but they extorted from him a promise to move away
from the enemy's lines, and to retire ten leagues back behind
Santarem and Rio Mayor and there await fresh orders from
the Emperor. I saw with regret this little retreat, which
seemed to me to augur one more general and definitive, nor,
as you will soon see, did my presentiment deceive me. I
turned my back therefore with sorrow on the hills of Cintra,
ftilly persuaded that if we had profited by the confusion into
which the fugitives had thrown the English camp we might
have forced the unfinished lines. But what was then easy
was no longer so a fortnight later. Compelled to feed the
vast population, which at his bidding had streamed in upon
Lisbon, Wellington used the arms of 40,000 stout peasants
by making them work at the completion of the fortifications
with which he proposed to cover Lisbon, and thus the place
became of immense strength.

VOL. II

CHAPTER XV

During our stay at Sobral I saw another artifice employed
by the English, and one of sufficient importance to be worth
noting. It is often said that thoroughbred horses are of no
use in war, because their price is so high and they require
80 much care that it would be almost impossible to provide a
squadron, much more a regiment, with them. Nor indeed
do the English use them o^ campaign; but they have a habit
of sending single officers, mounted on fast thoroughbreds, to
watch the movements of a hostile army. These officers get
within the enemy's cantonments, cross his line of march, keep
for days on the flanks of his columns, always just out of
range, till they can form a clear idea of his number and the
direction of his march. After our entry into Portugal, we
frequently saw observers of this kind flitting round us. It
was vain to give chase to them, even with the best-mounted
horsemen. The moment the English officer saw any such
approach he would set spurs to his steed, and nimbly clearing
ditches, hedges, even brooks, he would make oS* at such
speed that our men soon lost sight of him, and perhaps saw
him soon after a league ftirther on, note-book in hand, at the
top of some hillock, continuing his observations. This prac-
tice, which I never saw anyone employ like the English, and
which I tried to imitate during the Russian campaign, might
perhaps have saved Napoleon at Waterloo by affording him a
warning of the arrival of the Prussians. Anyhow, these
English ' runners,' who were the despair of the French
general from the moment we left Spain, increased in boldness
and cunning as soon as we were in front of Sobral. One
could see them come out of the lines and race with the speed '

Englishmen Captured 131

of stags through the vines and over the ix)ck8 to inspect the
positions occupied by our troops.

One day, however, when there had been a little skirmish
of outposts, in which we had remained in possession of the
ground, a light-infantryman, who had for some time had his
eye on the best mounted and boldest of the enemy's ' runners,'
and knew his ways, shammed dead, quite sure that as soon
as his company was out of the way the Englishman would
come back to look at the little battlefield. He did come,
and was unpleasantly surprised to see the supposed dead man
jump up, kill his horse with a musket-shot, and then charge
him with the bayonet, summoning him to surrender, which
he had no choice but to do. The prisoner, on being presented
ix) Masséna by his captor, turned out to be a member of the
highest English nobility, a Percy, descended from one of the
most illustrious Norman chiefs, to whom William the Con-
queror gave the Duchy of Northumberland, which his ofispring
still hold. Mr. Percy was honourably received by the French
commander and taken to Sobral. Being curious to mount
the clock tower, in order to observe how our army was posted,
he was allowed to do so ; and from this lofty point, telescope
in hand, he witnessed an amusing sight, at which, in spite of
Ids own bad luck, he could not help laughing : the capture
of another English officer. This gentleman, having returned
from India after twenty years' absence, and hearing in London
that his brother was serving in Portugal, had sailed for
Lisbon, and hurried up on foot to the front to greet his
brother, whose regiment was on duty. It was a lovely day,
and the new comer diverted himself by admiring the beautiful
country and studying the fortifications and the troops which
occupied them. So intent was he on this, that he walked
past the outposts without knowing it, and was between the
two armies. Just then he caught sight of some fine figs,
and not having tasted European fruit for a long time, took a
fancy to climb the tree. While he was quietly regaling him-
self, the soldiers of a neighbouring French picket, surprised
to see a red coat among the branches, came up, and seeing
what it was, captured the English officer, amid the laughter

X 2

132 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

of all those who witnessed the incident from afar. This
Englishman, however, better advised than Mr. Percy, begged
his captors to keep him on the outskirts of the French army,
hoping, that if he saw nothing of its internal arrangements,
he might be exchanged. His foresight proved successful;
for Masséna, having no fear of his being able to give any
information as to the disposition of our troops, sent him back
on parole, begging Lord Wellington to exchange against him
Captain Letermillier, who had been taken at Coimbra, and
afterwards became one of our best colonels. Mr. Percy, who
had laughed much at his comrade, on learning that he had
been exchanged, requested the same favour; but this was
refused, as he had seen too much, and might report it. The
unlucky young man followed the French army as a prisoner, and
shared its sufferings for six months. On our return to Spain
he was transferred to France, where he passed several years.

Unable to obtain any backing from his lieutenants in his
proposed attack on the lines, and being short of provisions,
Masséna was compelled, on November 14, to retire ten leagues
back from the hills and establish his army in a corn-growing
district, where positions could be found suitable for defence.
He selected the country between the Rio Mayor, the Tagus,
and the Zezere, establishing the 2nd corps at Santarem, the
8th at Torres Novas (where also he fixed his headquarters),
the 6th at Thomar, the artillery park at Tancos, while the
cavalry were at Ourem with their outposts pushed as far as
Leiria. Inferring from this movement that the French were
in full retreat for Spain, the English followed, but cautiously
and at a distance, fearing a trick to draw them out of their
lines. When they found that we were halted behind the
Rio Mayor they gave us some trouble, but were vigorously
met ; and judging that want of provisions would soon drive
us to leave this district, well adapted for the defensive, they
contented themselves with watching us. Lord Wellington's
headquarters were fixed at Cartaxo, opposite Santarem, and
from November 1810 till March 1811 the armies faced each
other, separated only by the Rio Mayor. The English, having
their food supplies brought by the Tagus from Lisbon, lived

Marshal Stock pot 133

in comfort; but the provisioning of our army, having no
stores, and being in a contracted space, was a serious problem.
Our troops, however, worked with admirable patience and
industry, each contributing, like bees in a hive, his share to
the common welfare. Workshops were started in every
battalion ; and each regiment, organising a system of raids
on a large scale, sent out detachments, armed and well led,
who returned driving thousands of donkeys laden with pro-
visions of all kinds, and immense herds of sheep, pigs, and
goats, the booty being proportionately divided on its arrival.
As the nearer districts became exhausted, the raids had to be
pushed further afield, even to the gates of Abrantes and
Goimbra ; and the attacks of the infuriated peasantry, though
always beaten ofi*, caused some loss. Besides these, the
foraging parties had a new form of enemy to contend with,
resembling in its organisation the robber bands of the middle
ages.

A French sergeant, wearied of the misery in which the
army was living, resolved to decamp and live in comfort. To
this end he persuaded about a hundred of the worst characters
in the army, and going with them to the rear, took up his
quarters in a vast convent, deserted by the monks, but still
foil of furniture and provisions. He increased his store largely
by carrying off everything in the neighbourhood that suited
him ; well-fomished spits and stewpans were always at the
fire, and each man helped himself as he would; and the
leader received the expressive if contemptuous name of
'Marshal Stockpot.' The scoundrel had also carried off
numbers of women ; and being joined before long by the
scum of the three armies, attracted by the prospect of unre-
strained debauchery, he formed a band of some three hundred
English, French, and Portuguese deserters, who lived as a
happy family in one unbroken orgy. This brigandage had been
going on for some months, when one day, a foraging detach-
ment having gone off in pursuit of a flock as far as the convent
which sheltered the so-called ' Marshal Stockpot,' our soldiers
were much surprised to see him coming to meet them at the
head of his bandits, with orders to respect his grounds and

134 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

restore the flock which they had just taken there. On the-
refusal of our officers to comply with this demand, he ordered
his men to fire on the detachment. The greater part of the
French deserters did not venture to fire on their compatriots
and former comrades, but the English and Portuguese obeyed,
and our people had several men killed or wounded. Not
being in sufficient numbers to resist, they were compelled
to retreat, accompanied by all the French deserters, who
came back with them to ofier their submission. Masséna
pardoned them on condition that they should march at the head
of the three battalions who were told off to attack the convent.
That den having been carried after a brief resistance, Masséna
had ' Marshal Stockpot ' shot, as well as the few French who
had remained with him. A good many English and
Portuguese shared their fate, the rest were sent off to
Wellington, who did prompt justice on them.

Early in November, Masséna had sent General Foy to report
his position to the Emperor : three battalions being required
to escort him in safety to the Spanish frontier. Meanwhile,
not knowing when the expected reinforcements might arrive,
he feared that the English army might cross the Rio Mayor,
and make an unexpected attack on our divisions at a time
when every regiment had detached at least a third of its men
to search for provisions. If the enemy had arrived in the
middle of our cantonments while so many soldiers were
away, a catastrophe would certainly have followed ; and the
dispersed troops would have been liable to be beaten in detail
before they could reassemble. Luckily for us, however. Lord
Wellington based all his plans on lapse of time, and did not
venture upon any enterprise.

Meanwhile the Emperor, whose only news of Masséna's
army had so far been obtained from the London newspapers,
having at length received the despatches brought by General
Foy, ordered the Count of Erlon, commanding the 9th corps,
cantoned near Salamanca, to march upon Portugal, and to
send Gardanne's brigade forward at once with instructions to
find the French army, and take it the ammunition and the
draught horses of which it presumably stood in need. With

Baffled 135

all the Emperor's perspicacity it was impossible for him at
Paris to judge of the numerous difficulties which would
hamper Gardanne in carrying out his orders. Napoleon
could never believe that the flight of Portuguese occupants
at the approach of a French corps had been so universal
that it was impossible to come across an inhabitant from
whom one could receive the slightest information. This,
however, was what befel Gardanne. A former page of
Louis XVI., whom the Emperor had made governor to his
pages, he was lacking in initiative, and only did well under
the direction of an able general. Now he completely lost
his bearings. Not knowing where to find Masséna's army, he
wandered in all directions, and when he at length reached
Cardigos, a day's march, as his maps showed, from the Zezere,
he did not realise that in war a flying column in search of a
friendly force should always steer itself by rivers, forests,
large towns, and mountain chains, for if the troops whom he
has to reach are anywhere near, they will certainly have
pickets at these important points. It is hard to underatand
why Gardanne forgot this rule of the craft, but he actually
lost a good many men by a precipitate retreat without having
seen the enemy. If he had but pushed on three leagues to
the Zezere he would have seen our outposts, as it was he
returned to Spain taking back reinforcements, ammunition,
and horses.

Jlasséna began to fear lest provisions might run short on
the right bank of the Tagus, and resolved to tap a new
country by throwing a portion of his army across the river^
into the fertile province of the Alemtejo. To this end he
ordered a division to cross the Zezere and occupy Punhete,
a small town at the point where that river flows into the
Tagus. This seemed a good point to establish a bridge, but
materials were lacking. Everything was, however, supplied
by the zeal and activity of General Eblé, well supported by
his surbordinate artillery officers. Forges and saw- mills
were built ; tools, planks, beams, anchors and ropes manu-
factured, numerous boats were constructed, and the work
progressing as it were by magic, we conceived the hope of

136 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

being able to cast a solid bridge over the Tagus. Lord
Wellington prepared to oppose the crossing of the river,
bringing troops up from Lisbon to form a camp on the left
bank opposite Punhete : whence we augured that before we
could establish ourselves on the further side of the great river
we should have to sustain a hot engagement. All this while
the French army was occupying the positions which it had
taken up in November. Several English divisions were en-
camped on the right bank of the Rio Mayor, Lord Welling-
ton's headquarters being at Cartaxo. There died the celebrated
General La Romana.

The weather was fearful ; the roads had become torrents,
and the diflSculty of seeking provisions, and especially forage,
was much increased. Yet our French gaiety did not desert
us. In every camp societies were got up for theatricals, and
the houses deserted by the inhabitants supplied us with
plenty of costumes in the wardrobes which the Portuguese
ladies had left behind. We found also plenty of French
books ; our quarters were comfortable, and we continued to
pass the winter pretty well. Our reflections were, however,
often sad, both as to the situation of the army, and our own
position. For three months we had had no news from our
families, from France, even from Spain. Would the Emperor
send us reinforcements sufficient to take Lisbon, or should
we be compelled to retreat before the English ? Our minds
were full of these thoughts, when on December 27 it was
suddenly reported that General Drouet, Count of Erlon, had
just joined the army with the 9th corps, 25,000 to 30,000 strong.
But our satisfaction was much reduced on finding that the Count
of Erlon's army had never contained more than 12,000 men :
half of whom he had left on the Spanish frontier under
General Claparède, bringing with him only Comoux's division,
6,000 strong, a reinforcement quite inadequate to meet the
English and take Lisbon. Instead of going at once to the
commander-in-chief at Torres Novas, the Count of Erlon
stopped ten leagues short of it at Thomar, Ney's headquarters.
This was a great blow to Masséna, and he sent me to the
commander of the 9th corps to ask for an explanation of a

A Delicate Duty 137

course as much opposed to politeness as to military regula-
tions. When he gave me this commission he had no doubt
that the Count of Erlon had been placed by the Emperor
under his orders, but there he was wrong. The instructions
given by the chief of the staff to the commander of the 9th
corps were only to enter Portugal, find Masséna's army, hand
over to him some hundreds of draught horses with ammuni-
tion, and then to return to Spain with his troops. It is hard
to understand how, after the reports which the Emperor had
received from Foy and Casabianca as to the bad plight of the
army, he could have limited himself to sending such weak
support.

I found that the Count of Erlon had been lodging with
Ney twenty-four hours. The marshal, who was anxious to
get away from Portugal, had detained his guest in order that
the influence of the commander-in-chief might not induce him
to put their 6,000 men at his disposal, and thus enable him
to resist the proposal to retreat. The Count was therefore
making ready to depart next day, without visiting Masséna ;
to whom he begged me to make his excuses on the plea that
important business called him back to the frontier.

An aide-de-camp's duties are pretty difficult, since in
performing them he often has to convey instructions to his
superiors which may wound their self-esteem. Sometimes
in the interests of the service he has on his own responsi-
bility to act as interpreter of his general's wishes by giving
in his name orders which he has not dictated. This is a
serious — even a dangerous matter ; but the tact of the aide-
de-camp must enable him to judge of the circumstances. My
position was as delicate as it well could be, for Masséna, not
having foreseen that the commander of the 9th corps might
wish to leave Portugal, had put nothing in writing on the
subject. Still, if he did take away his troops the operations
of the army would be paralysed, and the commander-in-chief
would blame the caution which had made me shrink from
speaking in his name. I took, therefore, a bold resolve ; and
although I had never met the Count of Erlon (Ney being
present the while, and strongly opposing my arguments), I took

138 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

the liberty of saying that at least he ought to give Marshal
Masséna time to consider the orders which he had brought
from the chief of the staff, as well as time to reply to them.
Finally, when the count had repeated that he could not wait,
I struck my great stroke by saying : * Since your Excel-
lency forces me to fulfil my errand to the last word, I have to
inform you that Marshal Masséna, Commander-in-Chief of the-
French forces in Portugal, has directed me to convey to you
both in his own name and that of the Emperor, a formal
order not to move your troops, but to report yourself to him
to-day at Torres Novas/ The count made no reply but
ordered his horses. While they were being got ready, I
wrote to Masséna telling him what I had been obliged to do
in his name ; and I learnt later on that he approved. (A
passage relating to my mission to the Count of Erlon may be
found at p. 286 of the eighth volume of General Koch's
* Memoirs of Masséna ; ' but the scene I have mentioned is
not fully reported.) The Count of Erlon was a gentle and
reasonable man. As soon as he had left Ney's camp he
admitted that it would not have been proper for him to leave
the Army of Portugal without calling on the commander-in-
chief; and all the way from Thomar to Torres Novas he treated
me with much kindness, in spite of the vigour with which I
had thought myself bound to appeal to him. No doubt his
interview with Masséna finally convinced him, for he agreed
to remain in Portugal and his troops were sent into quarters
at Leyria. Massena's gratitude for the firmness and readiness
which I had shown was increased a few days later when he
learnt that Lord Wellington had formed a plan of attacking
our camp, and had been checked by the amval of the Count
of Erlon ; while, if the reinforcement had been withdrawn,
the English would have marched on us, and profited by our
extended line to crush us with superior numbers.

CHAPTER XVI

We began the year 1811 at Torres Novas, and its early days
were marked by an event which saddened all the staff, the
death of our comrade d'Aguesseau. This excellent young
man, the heir of an illustrious name and possessor of a large
fortune, had been drawn by the desire of acquiring fame into
the career of arms which might have been supposed to be
closed to him by his delicate health. He had borne the
fatigues of the Austrian campaign pretty well, but those
which we had to undergo in Portugal were beyond his
powers, and he died in the prime of life. We erected a
monument to him in the principal church of Torres Novas.

Colonel Casabianca, whom Masséna had sent with des-
patches to the Emperor, had returned with the Count of
Erlon, bringing information that Marshal Soult, who was in
command of a powerful army in Andalusia, had received
orders to enter Portugal and join the commander-in-chief.

Disquieted by our preparations, and wishing to know in
what condition our works were, Wellington employed a
strong measure which he had often found successful. One
very dark night an Englishman, dressed in officer's uniform,
got into a small boat on the left bank a little above Punhete,
landed in silence, passed through the French outposts, and at
daybreak walked boldly towards our workshops examining
everything at his ease as if he had belonged to the staflF of
our army. Our artillerymen and engineers coming to their
work in the morning perceived the stranger, arrested him, and
brought him to General Eblé, to whom this scoundrel impu-
dently declared that he was an English officer, and that, in
disgust at a piece of favouritism which had been committed
to his injury, he had deserted in order to take service in our

I40 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Irish legion. On being taken before the commander-in-
€hief he not only repeated his story, but oflTered to give
detailed information as to the positions of the English troops,
and point out the places where we might with most advaDtage
cross the Tagus. You will hardly believe that Masséna and
Pelet, much as they despised the fellow, put faith in his tale,
and wishing to profit by his advice, spent whole days over
the maps with him, taking notes of what he said. We of the
staff were not so much taken in, for nothing could persuade
us that an English officer would have deserted, and we
declared plainly that in our opinion the pretended captain
was nothing but a clever spy sent by Wellington ; but
nothing that we could say shook Masséna's and Pelet's belief.
Yet oar conjectures were well founded, as it was soon
proved, when General Junot came to headquarters, and his
aide-de-camp recognised the so-called English officer as having
acted the deserter once before in 1808, when the French armv
was occupying Lisbon. Junot also remembered him perfectly,
although he was now wearing an infantry uniform instead of
the husgar uniform which he wore at Lisbon, and advised
Masséna to shoot him. But the stranger protested that he
had never served in the cavalry, and to prove his identity
showed a captain's commission with which Wellington had
probably supplied him in order to enable him to pass for
what he professed to be. Masséna therefore did not like to
order his arrest, but his suspicions were aroused, and he
ordered the commanding gendarme to have him closely
watched. The spy got an inkling of this, and the following
night got down very cleverly from a third-floor window and
reached the neighbourhood of Tancos, whence he probably
swam across the Tagus, for some of his clothes were found on
the bank. Thus it was clearly shown that he was an agent
of the English general, and that Masséna had been tricked.
His wrath fell upon Pelet, and rose to fury when he discovered
that the sham deserter, who had been so imprudently ad-
mitted into his study, had walked off with a small note-book
in which the effective strength of each regiment was entered.
Later on we learnt that this clever scamp was no officer in

Retreat 141

the English army, but a captain of Dover smugglers, who,
to abundant resource and audacity, added the power of
speaking several languages and of wearing every kind of
disguise.

Meanwhile time passed and brought no change in our
position, for although the Emperor had thrice bidden him to
reinforce Masséna, Soult, imitating the attitude of Marshal
Victor towards himself in 1809, had stopped on the way
about the end of January to besiege Badajos. We could
hear the firing distinctly, and Masséna regretted much that
his colleague should be wasting precious time on a siege
instead of marching towards him just when we were about
to be compelled by scarcity of provisions to abandon Portugal.
Even after the capture of Badajos, the Emperor blamed
Marshal Soult's disobedience and said, 'He captured me a
town, and lost me a kingdom.'

On February 5 Foy rejoined the army, bringing up a rein-
forcement of 2,000 men. He came from Paris, where he had
held long conferences with the Emperor, and announced
afresh that Soult was soon coming to join us. But as the
whole of February went by and he did not appear, the
Count of Erlon, whom by an inexplicable blunder the
Emperor had not placed under Masséna's orders, declared
that his troops could not live any longer at Leyria, and that
he was going to march back to Spain. Marshal Ney and
General Reynier seized this opportunity to set forth again the
misery of their cause in a country which was completely
ruined, and the conmiander-in-chief was obliged at last, after
several months of obstinate resistance, to consent to a retreat
towards the frontier, hoping to find there the means of sup-
porting his army without entirely abandoning Portugal, and to
invade again as soon as the reinforcements arrived. Our re-
treat began on March 6th. General Eblé had with much regret
employed the previous days in destroying the barges which
he had taken so much trouble to build, but in the hope that
part of his preparations might one day be of use to a French
army he had all the iron- work secretly buried in the presence
of twelve artillery oflScers, and drew up a report which must

142 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

be in the Ministry of War, showing the place where this
precious depository is to be found. Its position will probably
remain unknown for many centuries. The preparations were
kept so secret and executed during the night of March 5
in such good order, that the English, whose outposts were
only separated from ours by the little stream of the Rio
Mayor, did not discover our movement till the morning of the
next day, by which time General Reynier's troops were five
leagues away. Lord Wellington, in his uncertainty whether
the object of our movement was to cross the Tagus at
Punhete or really to retire towards Spain, lost twelve hours
in hesitation ; and by the time he resolved to follow, which
he did without energy and at some distance, the French
army had gained a march upon him. Meanwhile, General
Junot, having gone prancing imprudently in front of the
English hussars, was struck on the nose by a bullet ; but the
•wound did not hinder him from retaining the command of the
8th corps during the rest of the campaign.* The army
moved in several columns on Pombal, Marshal Ney with the
6th corps forming the reiur-guard, and valiantly defending his
ground foot by foot. As for Masséna, roused at length from
his torpor, he gained between the 5th and 9th of March three
days on the enemy, and completely organised his retreat —
one of the most diflOicult operations of war. Contrary to his
usual custom, also, he was so cheerfril as to surprise us all.

The French army, continuing its retreat with regularity
and in compact order, was leaving Pombal when the rear-
guard was briskly attacked by the advanced guard of the
^nemy. Marshal Ney drove them back ; and in order to bar
their passage completely and save our baggage wagons, he
set fire to the town. The English historians * have cried ont
:against this as a cruel action — as if a general's first con-

\} According to Napier, the date of Jimot*s wound was some weeks
•earlier, and it did disable him, though, of coarse, he may have retained the
nominal command.]

[' Not inclnding Napier, apparently. In fact, in his account of the
fighting at Pombal he does not mention that the place was burnt, while he
•excuses the burning of Redinha and other places on the ground that it
.served to cover Masséna's movements.]

Fighting on the Way 143

fiideration should not be the safety of his army. Pombal
and its neighbourhood forming a long and narrow defile
through whic h the enemy must pass, the best way to stop them
^as to burn the town. It was an extreme measure, but one
which in similar cases the most civilised nations have been
compelled to take, aud the English themselves have often
acted in the same manner.

On March 12 there was a smart engagement before
Redinha. Marshal Ney having found a defensible position,
decided to halt there, and Lord Wellington, taking this as a
challenge, sent forward a strong body. After a hot action
Ney repulsed the enemy, and continued his I'etreat briskly,
but with the loss of two or three hundred men. The enemy
lost more than a thousand,* our artillery having played on his
masses for some time, while he had only two light guns in
position. This engagement was of as little use to the English
as to us. Why should Wellington, knowing that Ney had
orders to retire, and that the French were in declared retreat,
be in such a hurry to attack merely in order to make Ney
resume his march a little sooner than he would otherwise
have done ? 1 was present at this affair, and deplored the
false pride of the two generals which cost so many brave
men their lives with no result.

The main French army took up a position between
-Condeixa and Cardaxo. The critical moment of our retreat
had arrived. Masséna, not wishing to leave Portugal, had
resolved to cross the Mondego at Coimbra, and await orders
And reinforcements from the Emperor in the fertile district
between that town and Oporto ; but Trant had cut the bridge
of Coimbra, and the Mondego was so much swollen as to be
unfordable. The only course open was, therefore, to reach
Puente de Murcelha, and there cross the rapid torrent of the
Alva. Accordingly, on the 13th the headquarters started in
that direction. We ought to have reached Miranda de Corvo
the same day ; but for some unknown reason the marshal
established himself at Fuente-Cuberta, where, believing him-
self covered by the divisions which he had ordered Ney to
[' Twelve officers and two hundred men (Napier).]

144 ^^-^ Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

post at Cardaxo and Condeixa, lie had with him only a guard
of thirty grenadiers and twenty-five dragoons. But Ney^
under plea of an attack by superior forces, had abandoned
these points ; giving notice to Masséna so late that he did
not get the letter till some hours after the execution of the
movement, and might have been captured with all his stafi.
In fact, believing that he was under the safeguard of several
French divisions, and finding the place agreeable and the
weather fine, he had ordered his dinner to be served in the
open air. We were sitting quietly at table under the trees
near the entrance of the village, when suddenly there
appeared a detachment of fifty English hussars, less than a
hundred yards away. The grenadiers surrounded Masséna,
while the aides-de-camp and the dragoons mounted and rode
towards the enemy. As they fled at once, we supposed they
were some stragglers, seeking to rejoin their army ; but we
soon saw an entire regiment, and perceived that the
neighbouring hillsides were covered with English troops
who had almost completely surrounded Fuente-Cuberta.
The imminent danger in which the headquarters were
placed was due to a mistake on the part of Ney. Thinking
that the commander-in-chief had had his letter, he ordered
all his divisions to evacuate Cardaxo and Condeixa, thus
uncovering Fuente-Cuberta. The enemy had come up in
silence, and you may judge of our astonishment; but luckily
night was at hand, and a thick fog rising. The English,
never d^reaming that the French commander would be thus
separated from his army, took our group for a rear-guard,
which they did not venture to attack ; but it is certain that
if the hussars had made a resolute charge, they would have
carried oflF Masséna and all who were with him. Naturally
when the English heard of Masséna's narrow escape they
made the most of it ; and Napier avers that he only escaped
their hussars by taking the feathers out of his hat.
Unfortunately for this story, marshals did not wear plumes.

That evening the headquarters left Fuente-Cuberta very
quietly, though several regiments of the enemy were close
by; one posted on some rising ground which our road

No Place for a Lady 145

crossed. To get it out of the way, the marshal employed an
artifice of which the enemy, to whom French was familiar,
often made use against us. Knowing that my brother spoke
English well, he gave him instructions ; and Adolphe,
advancing towards the foot of the hill and keejûng in shadow,
called out to the commanding officer that Lord Wellington
ordered him to bear to the right, and take up a position
which he indicated, in another direction than that which we
were following. The colonel, unable to see my brother's
uniform, took him for an English aide-de-camp, and obeyed.
When he was out of the way, we passed on quickly, glad to
escape a new danger, and joined the 6tli corps before day-
light.

During this long and toilsome march, llassena's attention

was much occupied with the danger to which Mme N

was exposed. Several times her horse fell over fragments of
rock in\'isible in the darkness, but although cruelly bruised,
the brave woman picked herself up. After several of these
falls, however, she could neither remount her horse nor walk
on foot and had to be cjirried by grenadiers. What would have
happened to her if we had been attacked, I do not know.
The marshal, imploring us all the time not to abandon her,
said repeatedly : * What a mistake I made in bringing a
woman to the war ! ' However, we got out of the critical
situation into which Ney had brought us.

On the following day, ^larch 11, after beating back a
smart attack upon his rear-guard, Mass6na ])osted the mass
of his troops in a strong position in front of JVIiranda de
Corvo, in order to give the artillery and baggage wagons
time to pass the deiilo beyond the town. Seeing the French
army halted, Lord Wellington brought up a strong force, and
everything promised a serious engagement when Massena
summoned his lieutenants to receive his instructions. All
but Ney came at once, and as he did not arrive the com-
mander-in-chief ordered Major Pelet and me to go and ask him
to come quickly. This errand, which seemed an easy one to
discharge, nearly cost nin my life.

The French army ^^îls drawai up on ground descending

VOL. II. L

146 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

gently in the form of an amphitheatre towards a large brook,
lying between two broad hills, over the summits of which
passed country roads, leading to Miranda. At the moment
when Pelet and I galloped oflF to execute the marshal's
order, the English skirmishers appeared in the distance,
coming up to attack the two hills. In order to be more
certain of finding Marshal Ney, my companion and I
separated. Pelet took the road on the left, I that on
the right, passing through a wide clearing, in which were
our outposts. Hearing that Marshal Ney had passed by,
less than a quarter of an hour befoi*e, I felt bound to hasten
to meet him, and just as I hoped to come up with him, I
heard several shots, and bullets whistled past my ears. I
was no great distance from the enemy's skirmishers, posted
in the woods surrounding the clearing. Although I knew
that Marshal Ney had a strong escort, I was uneasy on his
account, fearing that the English might have cut him off,
until I saw him on the other side of the brook. Pelet was
with him, and both were going in the direction of Masséna.
So, being sure that the orders had been conveyed, I was
about to return, when a young English light infantry officer
trotted up on his pony, crying, ' Stop, Mr. Frenchman ;
I should like to have a little fight with you ! ' I saw no
need to reply to this bluster, and was making my way
towards our outposts, 500 yards in arrear, while the English-
man followed me, heaping insults on me. At first I took no
notice, but presently he called out, 'I can see by your
uniform that you are on the staflF of a marshal, and I will
put in the London papers that the sight of me was enough
to frighten away one of Masséna's or Ney's cowardly aides-de-
camp ! ' I admit that it was a serious error on my part, but
I could no longer endure this impudent challenge coolly ;
so, drawing my sword, I dashed furiously at my adversary.
But just as I was about to meet him, I heard a rustling in
the wood, and out came two English hussars, galloping to
cut oflT my retreat. I was caught in a trap, and understood
that only a most energetic defence could save me from the dis-
grace of being taken prisoner, through my own fault, in sight of

One Frenchman a Match for Three English 147

the whole French army, which was witness to this unequal
combat. So I flew upon the English oflScer ; we met ; he
gave me a slash across the face, I ran my sword into his
throat. His blood spurted over me, and the wretch fell
from his horse to the ground, which he bit in his rage.
Meanwhile, the two hussars were hitting me all over, chiefly
on the head. In a few seconds my shako, my wallet, and
my pelisse were in strips, though I was not myself wounded
by any of their blows. At length, however, the elder of the
two hussars, a grizzled old soldier, let me have more than an
inch of his point in my right side. I replied with a vigorous
backhander ; my blade struck his teeth and passed between
his jaws, as he was in the act of shouting, slitting his mouth
to the ears. He made off promptly, to my lively satisfaction,
for he was by far the braver and more energetic of the two.
When the younger man found himself left alone with me, he
hesitated for a moment, because as our horses' heads were
touching, he saw that to turn his back to me was to expose
himself to be hit. However, on seeing several soldiers
coming to my aid, he made up his mind, but he did not
escape the dreaded wound, for in my anger I pursued him
for some paces and gave him a thrust in the shoulder, which
quickened his speed. During this fight, which lasted less
time than it has taken to tell it, our scouts had come up
quickly to set me free, and on the other side the English
soldiers had marched towards the place where their officer
had fallen. The two groups were firing at each other, and
I was very near getting in the way of the bullets from both
sides. But my brother and Ligniville, who had seen me
engaged with the English officer and his two men, had
hastened up to me, and I was badly in want of their help, for
I was losing so much blood from the wound in my side that
I was growing faint, and I could not have stayed on my
horse if they had not held me up. As soon as I rejoined
the staff, Massena said, taking my hand, * Well done ; rather
too well done ! A field officer has no business to expose
himself in fighting at the outposts.' He was quite right,
but when I told him the motives which had led me on,

L 2

148 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

he blamed me less, and the more fiery Ney, rememberings
his own hussar days, cried, * Upon my word, in Marbot's
place I should have done the same ! ' All the generals and
my comrades came to express their concern, while Dr.
Brisset was attending to me. The wound in my cheek was
not important ; in a month's time it had healed over, and
you can scarcely see the mark of it along my left whisker.
But the thrust in my right side was dangerous, especially
in the middle of a long retreat, in which I was compelled
to travel on horseback, without being able to get the rest
which a wounded man needs. Such, my children, was the
result of my fight, or, if you like, my prank at Miranda
de Corvo. You have still got the shako which I wore, and
the numerous notches with which the English sabres have
adorned it prove that the two hussars did not let me ofi*.
I brou^t away my wallet also, the sling of which was cut in
three places, but it has been mislaid.

As I said, at the moment when I was sent in search of Ney,
the French army was drawn up in its position, commanding
Miranda de Corvo, expecting an attack. However, Welling-
ton, deterred no doubt by his losses on the previous days,
checked the march of his troops, and Masséna, seeing this, deter-
mined under cover of the approaching night to pass through the
town and long defile of Miranda. I was in a painful position,
having been on the march for two days and a night, and now
severely wounded and weakened by loss of blood, being
obliged to pass another night on horseback. The roads were
fearfully crowded with baggage and artillery wagons and
numerous columns of troops, against which I was always
running in the pitchy darkness. To crown our disasters, we
came in for a heavy storm. I was soon wet through, and sat
shivering on my horse, for I knew that if I got off to warm
myself, I should not have strength to mount again. Mean-
while my wound caused ûie acute pain ; so you may judge how
I suffered during this cruel night.

On the morning of the 15th the army reached the banka
of the Ceira, opposite Foz de Arunce, a small town on a hill
commanding the river and the level ground on the left bank.

Foz DE Arunce 149

Crossing the bridge, I settled myself for a moment in a
touse, hoping to get a little rest ; but the terrible scene
which was passing before my eyes prevented this. Reynier's
and Junot's corps were already in Foz de Arunce, Ney's still
on the other side of the river ; but the commander-in-chief,
knowing that the enemy was close upon us, and not wishing
his rear-guard to fight with the Ceira in its rear, ordered Ney
to bring all his troops across, cut the bridge, and strongly
guard the neighbouring ford, so that the men might rest
undisturbed. Ney, however, supposing that the enemy, tired
by the labours of the two last days, were still at a distance,,
and deeming it pusillanimous to abandon the left bank
wholly, left on that side two divisions of infantry, Lamotte's
brigade of cavalry, and several guns, and did not cut the
bridge ; a fresh piece of disobedience which went near to cost
us dear. As it happened, while Masséna was gone off to
Ponte Murcelha to superintend the restoration of another
bridge which was to secure the passage of the river Alva on
the next day, and Ney, full of confidence, had just given
General Lamotte leave to cross the Ceira by the ford, in order
to forage on the right bank, Lord Wellington suddenly
appeared, and instantly attacked the divisions left so impru-
dently on the hither bank. Ney himself, at the head of the
39th, bravely repulsed with the bayonet a charge of English
dragoons, but their colonel, Lamour, having been killed by a
bullet, the 39th, losing their heads, flung themselves back on
the 59th and carried them away. At the same moment, one
of our batteries inadvertently sent a shot in their direction,
and our men, thinking they were surrounded, fled in a panic
to the bridge. Lamotte, who could see all this from the
other bank, tried to bring his cavalry across in support ; but
instead of coming by the difficult ford where he had gone
over, he took the shortest way, and so blocked the bridge
with his brigade just as the fugitives came up from the
opposite direction. No one could pass, and a good many men,
seeing the bridge thus blocked, made for the ford and threw
themselves in. Most got over, but several missed their
footing and were drowned. Meanwhile Ney, exhausting every

ISO The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

effort to repair his mistake, succeeded at length in collecting
a battalion of the 27th, and making his way to the divisions
of Mermet and Ferey, who were holding their ground man-
fully, put himself at their head, and attacking on his side
drove the English back to their camp. Astounded at this
vigorous attack, and hearing the shouts of our men who were
struggling to cross the Ceira, they imagined that the whole
French army was upon them. Panic-stricken in their turn
they flung down their arms, left their guns, and took to head-
long flight. We on the right bank then witnessed a sight
unusual in war : two sides flying each from the other in com-
plete disorder ! Finally the panic on both sides was checked,
and English and French returned to the abandoned ground
to pick up their muskets ; but both sides were so much
ashamed of themselves that though they were quite close to
each other not a shot was fired nor any challenges exchanged,
and they retired to their positions in silence. Wellington
did not even venture to oppose Ney's retreat ; and he re-
crossed the river and cut the bridge. In this queer engage-
ment the English had some 200 men disabled, and killed 50
of ours ; but we lost 100 by drowning, and unhappily the
39th lost its eagle. The best divers failed to recover it at
the time, but it was found by Portuguese peasants in the
following summer, when part of the river bed was dry.

Ney visited on General Lamotte his wrath for the check
he had received, and withdrew from him the command of his
brigade. Lamotte was, however, a good and brave officer,
and in after times the Emperor did him justice. Next, eager
to have his revenge, he waited on the banks of the Ceira
throughout part of the 16th in the hope of attacking Welling-
ton when his turn came to cross, and Masséna had to send four
or five aides-de-camp before he could induce him to follow
the retreat. On the 17th, we crossed the Alva at Ponte
ilurcelha, and marched for five days, reaching Celorico
unmolested.

The valley between the Mondego and the Estrella is ex-
ceedingly fertile, and we lived in comfort. Thus, on finding
ourselves again at Celorico, whence Masséna had had the un-

Ne y Dismissed i 5 1

lucky idea of turning aside from this fertile region on our
outward march, and taking to the mountain district of Busaco,
the army blamed him afresh, feeling that his mistake had
cost many thousands of lives, and brought the campaign to
failure. The marshal now — unable to make up his mind to
re-enter Spain — resolved to hold his ground at any cost in
Portugal. His plan was to regain the Tagus by way of
Guarda and Alfayates, and having rebuilt the bridge of
Alcantara, to join the French troops under Soult before
Badajos, with them to enter the Alemtejo, and at once march
upon Lisbon. He hoped thus to force Wellington to march
back at once for the defence of the capital, which, being un-
fortified on the left bank of the Tagus, would have very little
means of resistance. To relieve the march, the marshal sent
all sick and wounded into Spain, but I declined to go with
them, preferring to remain with my brother and my comrades.
Masséna having communicated his plan to his lieutenants at
Celorico, Marshal Ney, who was burning with desire to re-
cover his independence, opposed the idea of a new campaign,
declaring that he was going to take his troops back to Spain
because they could no longer get any bread in Portugal.
This was true, but the army had been accustomed to live
without bread for the last six months, each soldier receiving
several pounds of meat and plenty of wine. This fresh dis-
obedience on Ney's part roused Masséna's wrath, and he
replied by a general order, removing Marshal Ney from the
command of the 6th corps. This act of vigour, just and
necessary as it was, had been too long delayed; he should
have done it at the first sign of insubordination. Ney at first
refused to go away, saying that as the Emperor had given
him the command of the 6th corps he should not resign it
but by his direction ; but on the order being repeated, he
returned to Spain, and thence went to Paris. The command
of the 6th corps fell by right of seniority to General Loison.
Ney's dismissal produced an impression upon the army which
was all the stronger that the principal cause of it was known,
and that, insisting on a return to Spain, he had expressed the
general wish of the troops.

152 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

On the 24th, the army began to move back upon the
Tagus, and occupied Guarda. Of all towns in the Peninsula,
this is in the highest situation. Several men died from the
cold, and my wound in the side became very painful. Here
Masséna received several despatches from Berthier, nearly all
two months old ; which shows what a mistake Napoleon had
made in thinking that from Paris he could direct the move-
ments of an army in Portugal. These despatches reached
the commander-in-chief in a manner which up to then had
been unknown in the French army. Prince Berthier had
entrusted them to his aide-de-camp, M. de Canouville, but
that young oflScer, who was one of the beaux of the army,
seeing the difficulty of reaching Masséna's army, was satisfied
with depositing them at Ciudad Rodrigo, and returned to
Paris. Now Paris was the very place from which, on account
of a notorious freak on his part, he was desired to keep away.
The story is as follows : it carries us back to the time when
General Bonaparte was commanding the Army of Italy,
and several ladies of his family joined him at Milan. One of
them married one of his most attached generals, and, as in
the fashion of the time, she used, when riding, to wear a
hussar pelisse over her habit, Bonaparte gave her one,
handsomely furred and with diamond buttons. Some years
afterwards, this lady, having lost her first husband, married
a foreign prince. In the spring of 1811, the Emperor, when
reviewing the guard in the Place du Carrousel, noticed
among Berthier's staff Canouville, wearing the pelisse which
he had formerly given to his kinswoman, the identity of which
was established by the fur and the diamonds. Napoleon re-
cognised them, and displayed much annoyance. The lady,
it was said, was severely reprimanded, and one hour later the
imprudent captain received an order to cariy despatches to
Masséna, who was enjoined in them to keep that officer with
him for an unstated time. Canouville had his suspicions,
and, as I have just related, took advantage of the chance
which prevented him from entering Portugal. But hardly
had he got back to Paris, when he was packed off again to
the Peninsula, where he arrived very much ashamed at his

A Modern Lauzun 153

'discomfiture. The conversation of this modem Lauzun
amused us, as he gave us the latest news of what had been
taking place in the Paris drawing-rooms during our absence,
and we laughed much at the contrast between his elegant
costume and the dilapidations of our uniforms after a year's
•campaigning. Canouville, who at first was much astonished by
his rapid transition âx)m Parisian boudoirs to a bivouac
among the rocks of Portugal, soon resigned himself to the
change. He was a man of good wit, and of courage, and in
the following year fell bravely in the battle of the Moskowa.

CHAPTER XVII

The despatches which Canouville had left at Ciudad Rodrigo
reached Masséna, as I have said, at Guarda, just when he w;vs
making arrangements to hold the upper Tagus ; and instead
of going on at once with his movement, he wasted some days in
replying to these letters of two months ago. This delay was
injurious to us, for the enemy took advantage of it to bring
up his troops, and attack us at Guarda. We repulsed * him
here, and so in the other partial combats which Masséna
sustained while awaiting the officers whom he had sent to
Alcantara. On learning from their report that it would be
impossible to feed the army in a country devoid of resources,
Masséna's will had at last to yield before accumulated obstacles,
aggravated by the opposition of the generals and the
destitution of the troops ; and it was decided to return to
Spain. Still, however, the commander-in-chief delayed, and
Wellington profited by a false move on the part of Reynier
to attack him at Sabugal. The fight was undecisive; but
we lost two or three hundred more men in a glorious but
useless engagement.

Next day, April 1, the army crossed the frontier and
encamped on Spanish territory. It still included more than
45,000 efiectives, and had sent more than 10,000 sick and
wounded to Rodrigo and Salamanca. We had entered
Portugal with 60,000 combatants, besides the division of the
9th corps which had joined us. During this long campaign,
therefore, we had lost about 10,000 men killed, dead of illness,
and prisoners.

[* So one has to render repoutëer ; but, seeing that as a matter of
fact, the French were forced to evacuate Guarda, the words evidently do
not correspond accurately in meaning.]

At Almeida 155

The army took post round Almeida, Ciudad Eodrigo, and
Zamora. Masséna was thus in a most awkward position, for
the two fortresses and the surrounding country were under
the authority of Bessières, to whom the Emperor had entrusted
the command of a new army, called the ' Northern/ entirely
composed of troops belonging to the Young Guard.
Hence arose a conflict of authority between the two marshals,
Bessières wishing to keep all the supplies for his troops, while
Masséna reasonably maintained that his army, which had
endured so many hardships in Portugal, had a right to at
least an equal share in the distribution of provisions. The
Emperor, usually so farsighted, had not given any orders to
meet the case of Masséna's army being forced to evacuate
Spain. Great perplexity, therefore, prevailed on the frontier,
especially as to the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo and
Almeida. These two fortresses, though in different countries,
are so near that it was unnecessary to hold both, and the
Emperor had ordered the withdrawal of the garrison of
Almeida and the destruction of the ramparts, already much
shattered by the explosion of the previous year. But just
when the governor. General Brénier, was taking steps for the
destruction of the place, he had received a counter-order
from the War Minister, so that Masséna, who meantime
arrived from Portugal, could not decide anything. However,
as the troops could not subsist in the sterile neighbourhood
of Almeida, he was obliged to take them away, and abandon
the place to its own resources. These consisted of a weak
garrison victualled for twenty-five days. If positive orders
had been received, a week during which the army was
present would have sufficed to destroy the fortifications ;
but as soon as it was gone, the English hastened to invest
the place, and next month an expedition had to be under-
taken for its relief which cost many lives, and did not attain
its object.

The order placing the Count of Erlon and his force under
Massena's command came at length, three months too late.
After cantoning his army between Rodrigo, Zamora, and
Salamanca, the marshal, on April 9, fixed his headquarters

iS6 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

in the last-named town. While we were there an event
occurred not very creditable to the English army. Colonel
Waters, a member of Wellington's staff, had been taken
prisoner by our troops ; and | as he gave his parole, Masséna
allowed him to retain his sword and his horse, and to lodge
each night in a private house. He thus travelled at liberty,
in company with our columns, till one day when they were
halted in the wood of Matilla, he seized the moment
when all were reposing, and putting his excellent horse into
a gallop, disappeared. Three days later he rejoined
Wellington, who seemed to find the trick highly amusing.^
When Masséna complained that the Portuguese militia had
been massacring French prisoners, and recently a colonel,
the same Wellington replied, * That he had to employ all his
resources to repel a war of invasion, and could not answer
for the excesses into which the peasants were led.'

Eest and good care at Salamanca soon cured me ; but my
satisfaction at this was alloyed by a vexatious incident which
caused me much trouble. My good friend Ligniville left us
in consequence of a serious difference with Masséna. The
marshal had entrusted him the laborious duties of chief
equerry, which he performed, I may say, quite voluntarily,
and out of good-nature. Fond as he was of horses, he had
much difficulty in feeding them in Spain and Portugal, but
he made the best of it. It had been ascertained that in order
to convey all the utensils and baggage of the headquarters,
tiirty mules were required, and Ligniville, before entering on
the campaign, had proposed to obtain them; but Masséna,
not wishing to bear the cost himself, had ordered the commis-
sary-general to get them for him. He had these pack
animals with him throughout. Now the Spaniards have a
good habit of shaving their mules' backs, so that the hair
may not work into lumps under the pack, and make them
sore. The operation can only be done by experts, and is
pretty costly. Masséna, therefore, proposed to Ligniville
to make the Mayor of Salamanca pay the cost out of the

{} Napier (book xii. ch. 5) expressly states that Waters had refused his
parole.]

Marshal and Aide-de-camp 157

local funds ; but Ligniville refused to be a party to what he
thought an exaction, and a scene ensued. Finally my friend
told the marshal that as he showed so little gratitude for his
condescension in acting as equerry he would not only
vacate the post, but oflfer his resignation, and rejoin the 18th
Dragoons, to which he belonged. In vain did. Masséna try
every means to make him stay ; Ligniville, a calm but very
deteimined man, was inflexible, and fixed the day for his
departure. Major Pelet being away on service, I was doing the
duty of senior aide-de-camp, and in that capacity I assembled
all the staff officers, and proposed to them that we should
show our esteem for our good comrade by riding with him a
league from the town. My suggestion was accepted, and in
order that Prosper Masséna should not seem to be finding
fault with his father, we were careful to tell him ofi* to remain'
in the ante-room while we escorted Ligniville. Our farewell
was cordial, for we all liked him. Though our action was
perfectly honourable, Masséna was angry at it, and accused
me of instigating it ; and from that time his grudge against
me revived, though my behaviour during the campaign had
restored his confidence and interest in me.

Meanwhile the garrison of Almeida, invested by the
English, and almost out of provisions, was on the point of
surrendering, and the Emperor, in order to deprive the
p]nglish of this triumph, had ordered Masséna to march his
whole forces to the place and blow up the ramparts. But
this operation had, as I have said, now become a very delicate
one, since a considerable force was blockading Almeida and
we should have to fight a battle. There was another not less
serious difiiculty. Masséna's army, distributed through the
province of Salamanca, was not exactly living in the arms of
plenty. Still every cantonment could supply the small
body quartered in it, while if we were to march on the
English, we must concentrate our troops and provide supplies
which we had no sufficient means of storing or transporting.

As governor of the province, Marshal Bessières could
dispose of all its resources, but he reserved them for the
regiments of the guard. He had plenty of cavalry and a

158 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

formidable artillery, while Masséna, though his infantry was
still respectable, was short of horses. He therefore asked
Bessières to lend him some, and all the letters which he
received from him abounded in the most encouraging pro-
testations. As, however, they remained without result, and
Almeida was known to be at the last gasp, Masséna no longer
contented himself with writing to his colleague, whose head-
quarters were at Valladolid, but resolved to send an aide-de-
camp, who could explain the gravity of the position, and
press him to send support. The commander-in-chief selected
me to discharge this duty. Having been severely wounded
on March 14, I was, five weeks later, not exactly in condition
to ride post-haste over roads covered with guerrillas. In any
other circumstances I should have remarked as much to the
marshal, but as he was cross with me, and as I had, through
excessive zeal, asked leave to resume my duties (not expecting
to have such a severe job in the course of the next few days)
I did not care to throw myself on Masséna's pity, so I started
in spite of the remonstrances of my comrades and my
bi^other, who ofiered to take my place. In order to perform
the duty I had to gallop the whole way on post horses ; the
wound in my side reopened and caused me much pain, still I
reached Valladolid. Marshal Bessières, to prove outright
that he cherished no grudge against me in regard to the
quarrel between Marshal Lannes and himself on the battle-
field of Essling, in which I was so innocently involved, re-
ceived me very kindly. Complying with Masséna's reiterated
request, he promised to send several regiments and three
batteries of field artillery as well as abundant provisions. In
such haste was I to report this good news to Masséna that I
started back after a few hours' rest. At one moment I
thought I was going to be attacked, but at the sight of the
pennons on the lances of our escort, the giierrilleros, who had
a particular dread of that arm, took to their heels, and I got
back to the marshal without any trouble. Satisfied as he
was with the result of my mission, he did not say a single
good-natured word about the zeal which I had shown.
It must be admitted that the many annoyances which

Squabbles i 59

he had all around him did a good deal to embitter his
naturally vindictive temper. He had to undergo another
and crowning one. Our war in the Peninsula being directed
from Paris, many strange anomalies resulted. For instance,
just as the chief of the staff was directing Masséna to bring
all his troops together and hasten to the relief of Almeida, he
was ordering the Count of Erlon, whose corps formed part of
Masséna's army, to repair at once to Andalusia and join Soult.
Ordered thus in two contrary directions, and knowing that his
troops would be better off in fertile Andalusia than in sterile
Portugal, Erlon was making ready to start for Seville. But
as his departure would have deprived Masséna of two fine
infantry divisions, and made it impossible for him to relieve
Almeida, according to the Emperor's instructions, he declined
to allow it. The other insisted, and the wretched squabbles
which we had already witnessed in the past winter with re-
gard to the corps were revived. At length, under pressure
from Masséna, the Count of Erlon agreed to remain till the
blockade of Almeida was raised. That a commander-in-chief
should have thus to entreat his subordinate was quite un-
reasonable, and could only injure military discipline.

Meanwhile Bessières' promised reinforcements, not having
arrived by the 21st, Masséna, reckoning only on his own
resources to make his way to Almeida, concentrated his army
on the 26th at Ciudad Bodrigo. But in order to feed the
assembled forces, it was necessary to draw upon the supplies
of Rodrigo, and thus compromise the Aiture fate of that
important place. We were only three leagues from the
English who were surrounding Almeida. We could not
communicate with the place, and we did not know their
strength. But we knew that Wellington had gone beyond
Badajos with a strong detachment, and Masséna, trusting
that he would be unable to be back for eight or ten days,
wished to take advantage of his absence and accomplish the
re-victualling of Almeida. Wellington, however, hearing of
the movement of the French, returned promptly on his
tracks, and was in front of us on May 1st. This was a great
misfortune, for it was probable that General Spencer, who

i6o The. Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

was in temporary command of the English army, would not
have ventured to take the responsibility of engaging such an
adversary as Masséna, and Almeida might have been re-
victualled without trouble.

Great was the joy of our soldiers, who, though they had
lived some days on half rations of bread and less of meat, were
yet eager to fight, when, on the morning of the 2nd, they saw
a weak column of Marshal Bessières' troops approaching, and
took it for an advance-guard. But the reinforcement so pom-
pously announced, and so long awaited, was confined to 1,500
cavalry, 6 guns, and 30 good teams. Bessières was bringing
neither ammunition nor provisions. It was a regular hoax.
Masséna was horrified, but very soon grew angry at seeing
that Bessières was himself in command of this feeble succour.
Indeed, the presence of that marshal was calculated to annoy
him. The Army of Portugal was, it is true, in a province
subject to the jurisdiction of Bessières, but it was inde-
pendent of him, and solely under Massena's orders, nor was
there any reason, because Bessières was lending a few soldiers,
that he should come in person to control in some measure his
colleague's actions. Masséna understood this, and said to us,
' He would have done much better to have sent me a few
more thousand men with ammunition and provisions, and
to have remained at the centre of his province than to
come examining and criticising what I am going to do.^
Bessières was therefore very coldly received, but this did not
liinder him from following Masséna during the short cam-
paign and giving him his advice. The army started on the
afternoon of May 2, and hostilities began the next day. A
new series of mistakes commenced, arising from the ill-will
of certain generals towards Masséna, and the want of under-
standing which prevailed among the rest.

We fell in with the Anglo-Portuguese army on the frontier,
posted in front of Almeida, and blockading the place. The
troops were occupying a broad plateau between the stream of
the Turones and the one which flows in the deep gorge called
Dos Casas. Lord Wellington's left was near the ruined Fort
Concepcion, his centre towards the village of Alameda, and

An Unlucky Blunder i6i

his right posted at Fuentes d'Onoro was prolonged towards
the marsh of Nave de Avel, whence flows the stream which
some call Dos Casas and others d'Onoro ; this brook covered
his front. The French came up in three columns by the
Ciudad Bodrigo road ; the Gth and 9th corps, under Loison,
formed the right wing, facing Fuentes ; the 8th corps, under
Junot, and Montbrun's cavalry, were in the centre ; General
Reynier, with the 2nd corps, watched Alameda and Fort
Concepcion on the right. Several picked battalions, the
lancers of the guard, and some batteries formed the reserve ;
it was commanded by General Lepic, famous for his brilliant
conduct at Eylau.

Our troops were hardly in their respective positions when
General Loison, without awaiting Massôna's orders for a
concerted movement, charged the village of Onoro, occupied
by the Highlanders and some picked battalions. Their
attack was so brisk that the enemy, although entrenched in
solid stone houses, were compelled to abandon the position.
But they retired into an old chapel on the top of the huge
rocks which command Ofioro, and it was impossible to dis-
lodge them. Mass6na, therefore, gave orders for the moment
only to occupy the village and to garnish all the houses
with troops. But the order was badly executed, for Ferey's
division, to whom the duty fell, carried away by the ardour
of a first success, formed in a mass outside Onoro, thus
exposing itself to an artillery and musketry fire from the
English at the chapel. Finally, to complete oui' disasters,
our troops were thrown into disorder by a deplorable occur-
rence, which should have been foreseen. In Ferey's division
there was a battalion of the Hanoverian legion in the French
service. Their uniform was red, like the English, but they
had the usual grey overcoat of the French soldier, and
accordingly their commander, who had had several men
killed by our jpeople at Busaco, asked leave for his men to
wear their greatcoats instead of rolling them up, as the order
was. But General Loison replied that he must follow the
order given to the whole corps. The result was a cruel
blunder. The 66th regiment, having been sent to support

VOL. II. M

1 62 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

the Hanoverians, who were in the fighting line, mistook
them in the smoke for an English battalion, and fired into
them, while our artillery, equally misled by the red coats,
played on them with grape. I must do the brave Hanoverians
tihe justice to say that, placed as they were between two fires,
they endured them for a long time without recoiling a step,
but after losing 100 men killed and many wounded, the
battalion was compelled to retire, passing along one side of
the village. Another regiment, which was entering the
village at that moment, seeing the red coats on their flank,
supposed that the position had been turned by an English
column, and the enemy cleverly took advantage of the result-
ing confusion to recapture Fuentes d'Onoro, which would not
have happened if the generals had followed Masséna's order
to line the windows with infantry. Night put an end to this
first engagement, in which we had 600 men disabled ; the
enemy's loss was about the same, and fell chiefly upon their
best troops, the Highlanders. Colonel Williams was killed.

I could never understand how Wellington consented to
await the French in so unfavourable a position as that in
which General Spencer's incapacity had placed the troops.
The allies had in fact in their rear not only the fortress of
Alameda barring their only good line of retreat, but also the
Coa, a stream with steep banks and difficult approaches,
which might have caused the entire loss of the army if it had
been compelled to retreat. It is true that the steep and deep
ravine of the Dos Casas protected the English front fi-om
Fort Concepcion to Nave de Avel, but beyond that point the
sides of the ravine fall away and sink to a marsh which is
easy to cross. Even so, Wellington might have used it ta
cover his extreme right if he had defended it with a good
regiment supported by artillery, but forgetting the harm
which had resulted at Busaco from assigning to Trant's
irregulars the task of preventing the French from making a
flank march by Boialva, he fell into the same error again
when he entrusted the defence of the marsh to the irregular
bands of Don Julian, who were quite unfit to resist troops of
the line. On hearing of this negligence through a cavalry

Manœuvring 1 63

patrol, Masséna ordered everything to be got ready for
crossing the marsh at daybreak the next morning, in order
to take the enemy's right wing in rear. Plenty of fascines
were constructed during the night, and the 8th corps, with
part of the 9th, marched in silence towards Nave de Avel,
Ferey's division remaining before Onoro, which was still
occupied by the enemy.

At daybreak on May 5 a company of light infantry,
slipping through the willows and the reeds, crossed the marsh
noiselessly, and, passing the fascines along, filled up the bad
places, which turned out to be much fewer in number than
we had supposed. Don Julian and his guerrillas, deeming
themselves secure behind the marsh, kept such a bad watch
that our people found them asleep and killed some thirty of
them. All the rest of the band, instead of keeping up a
smart fire, if only to warn the English, took to its heels and
fled beyond the Turones, and Don Julian, brave as he was,
could not keep his undisciplined soldiers in hand. Profiting
by Wellington's negligence, our troops hastened to cross the
marsh, and we had on the other side four divisions of infantry,
all Montbrun's cavalry with several batteries, and were in
possession of Nave de Avel before the English found it out.
This was one of the finest movements which Masséna ever
devised, the last flicker of an expiring lamp.

By our passage of the marsh the enemy's right was
completely out-flanked, and Wellington's situation became
extremely difficult. Not only had he to execute a huge
change of front to meet those of our divisions which were
occupying Nave de Avel and Pozo Velho, but he was
compelled to leave part of his troops before Fuentes d'Onoro
and Alameda to check Erlon's and Reynier's corps, which
were making ready to cross the Dos Casas and attack the
enemy during their evolutions. Lord Wellington had sa
fully believed his extreme right wing to be sheltered by the
marsh, that he had only left a few cavalry scouts at that
point, but seeing that wing turned he made haste to send
forward towards Pozo Velho the first infantry brigade that
came to hand. This advanced guard was overthrown and

M 2

164 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

cut to pieces by our cavalry under Montbrun. General
Mancune, following up this advance, flung himself into the
wood of Pozo Velho, driving from it the Highlanders with a
loss of 250 prisoners and 100 killed. Thus everything was
promising a brilliant victory for the French when a discussion
arose between Generals Loison and Montbrun, and the latter
stayed the march of the cavalry reserve under the plea that
the batteries of the Guard which had been promised him had
not yet come up. In point of fact, Marshal Bessîères had
detained them without letting Masséna know, and he, learning
of the difficulty too late, sent several guns to Montbrun.
The delay, however, was doubly fatal to us, first because
iioison's infantry, seeing that it was no longer supported by
Montbrun's cavalry, hesitated to engage in the plain, while
in the second place this disastrous halt gave Wellington time
to bring up all his cavalry to support Houstoun's and Craufurd's
divisions, which alone were as yet in position before us.
Meantime, by Masséna's orders. General Montbrun, covering
his artillery with some squadrons of hussars, advanced afresh,
and, suddenly unmasking his guns, tore up Houstoun's
<îi vision, and when it began to waver charged it with
Wathiez' and Fournier's brigades. These cut the 51st
regiment almost entirely to pieces, and completely routed the
rest of Houstoun's division. The fugitives reached Villa
Formosa on the left bank of the Turones, and owed their
safety solely to the regiment of chasseurs Britanniques^
who, ranged behind a long and stout stone wall, stayed the
dash of our troopers by a fire no less well sustained than
aimed.

In this part of the field Wellington had now only Crau-
furd's division and the cavalry, the rest of his army, which
had been taken in rear, not having as yet completed the
immense change of front necessary to bring them into line
against the French. As the ground on which they were now
fighting had been, until we crossed the marsh, the least
exposed part, the English commissariat and the wounded,
the servants, baggage and led horses, the soldiers who had
got separated from their regiments, were crowded together

F U ENTES D'OnORO IÔ?

there, and the vast plain as far as the Turones was covered
with a disorderly multitude, in the midst of which the three
squares formed by Craufurd*s infantry looked like mere
specks ; and there we had, within cannon-shot, and all ready
to charge the enemy, the corps of Loison and Junot, 5,000
cavalry, and 4 field-batteries into the bargain. The 8th
corps was already clear of the wood of Pozo Velho, the 9th
was vigorously attacking the village of Fuentes d'Onoro by
the right bank of the Dos Casas, and General Reynier had
orders to debouch by Alameda, and take the English in the
rear. We had only to march forward. Indeed, Napier, who
was present at this battle, admits that, during the whole war,
there was no moment of such danger for the British army.
But blind Fortune decided otherwise. General Loison,
instead of marching by the left bank to take Fuentes d'Onoro
in rear, while Drouet d'Erlon attacked in front, lost much
time and made false movements which allowed Wellington
to reinforce that important point — the key, indeed, of the
position. General Reynier, on his side, did not carry out
Masséna's orders ; for, under the plea that he had too strong
a force in front of him, he never went beyond Alameda, and
took scarcely any part in the action. In spite of all these
mishaps, so great were our advantages that it was yet
possible to win the battle. Montbrun's cavalry, having
beaten that of the enemy, soon found itself in presence of
Craufurd's infantry. It charged and broke two squares,
cutting one literally to pieces. The men of the 2nd threw
down their arms and fled to the plain ; Colonel Hill surren-
dered his sword to StaflT-Adjutant Dulimberg of the 13th
Chasseurs, and we took 1,500 prisoners. The third English
square held firm. Montbrun caused Fournier's and Wathiez'
brigades to attack it, and they had pierced one of the faces
when both generals had their horses killed under them and
all the colonels were wounded, so that there was nobody to
take «îharge of the victorious regiments. Montbrun hastened
up, but the enemy's square had been refonned, and, in order
to attack it, he would have to reform his own squadrons.
While he was thus engaged, Masséna sent an aide-de-camp

1 66 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

to General Lepic, in command of the reserve cavalry of the
Guard, with orders to charge. But Lepic, biting his sword-
blade in desperation, replied, with much regret, that his
immediate chief, Marshal Bessières, had forbidden him to
take the Guard into action without his order. Ten aides-de-
camp went off in every direction to look for Bessières ; but
he, after being for some days always at Masséna's side, had
now disappeared. This was not owing to any want of courage,
but of set design, or from a jealousy which made him un-
mindful of the interest of France and unwilling to send a
single man under his command in order to secure a victory
the credit of which would fall to his comrade. At last, after
a quarter of an hour, Bessières was discovered at a distance
from the field of battle, wandering on the further side of the
marsh, and examining the construction of the fascines which
had been used in the morning. He hastened up with a show
of earnestness, but the decisive moment had been missed,
through his fault, and did not recur. The English had
recovered from the disorder caused by Montbrun's charge,
and had brought up a powerful artillery which was playing
our squadrons with grape, while their men were recapturing
the prisoners whom we had taken. In short. Lord Welling-
ton's change of front was completed, and his army in its new
position on the plateau, with its right resting on the Turones,
its left on Fuentes d'Ofioro.^

At the sight of this new and solidly-constituted line,
Masséna halted his troops and opened a heavy cannonade,
causing much destruction in the enemy's ranks. A general
charge of our cavalry might have crushed them, and Masséna
hoped that Bessières would at last allow the regiment of the
Guard to take part in this ' pull all together,' which would
infallibly have given us the victory. But Bessières refused,
saying that he was responsible to the Emperor for any losses
which his Guard might incur, as if all the army were not in

\} It will be seen that, while General Marbot's account of this battle
agrees in substance with Napier's — from which, indeed, several passages are
very literally copied — the order of events has been somewhat dislocated
and their relative importance confused.]

When Marshals Fall Out — 167

the Emperor's service, and the essential point with him were
not to hear that the English had been driven out of the
Peninsula ! All the soldiers, those of the Guard most of all,
were indignant at Bessières' decision, wanting to know what
that marshal had come before Almeida for, if he did not wish
his troops to take part in the fighting which was to save the
place. This unexpected mishap changed the complexion of
affairs at once; every moment the English were receiving
reinforcements, and one of their divisions, coming from the
force blockading Almeida, had just crossed the Turones, and
was forming in the plain. The position of the two armies
being thus altered, Masséna's dispositions had to be altered
likewise. He resolved, therefore, to move the bulk of his
troops towards Almeida, and, joining Reynier, to fall upon
the right and rear of the enemy. This was the counterpart
of the previous night's movement on Nave de Avel ; but a
new obstacle hindered its execution. General Eblé, com-
manding the artillery, hurried up with the news that he had,
at the artillery park, not more than four cartridges per man,
which, with those left in their pouches, gave not more than a
score to each soldier. This was an insuflScient supply with
which to renew the struggle against a foe who was sure to
resist desperately, and Masséna ordered every wagon to be
sent instantly to Rodrigo for ammunition. But the commis-
sary-general reported that he had made use of them to fetch
from the same place the bread required for the morrow's
supply. Having no other means of transport, Masséna asked
Bessières to lend him the Guard's ammunition-wagons for a
few hours ; but he replied that his teams were already tired,
and that a night march over bad roads would finish them —
he could not lend them till the next day. Masséna flew
into a rage, exclaiming that victory was being snatched
from him a second time ; but Bessières maintained his
refusal, and a violent scene took place between the two
marshals.

At daybreak on the 6th, Bessières' wagons started for
Rodrigo ; but they moved so slowly that the cartridges did
not come till the afternoon, and Wellington had employed

1 68 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

the twenty-four hours in entrenching his new position, espe-
cially the upper part of the village of Fuentes d'Onoro. It
could not now be taken save at the expense of torrents of
French blood, and the opportunity of victory was hopelessly
lost to us.

CHAPTER XVIII

When it became clear that there could be no question of
another battle, or of re-victualling Almeida, it became Masséna's
duty to try at least to save the garrison of the place after
destroying the fortifications. To this end some means must
be found of communicating with the governor — a task which,
as the town was strongly invested, was diflScult, if not impos-
sible. Three brave men, whose names deserve to be recorded
in our annals, volunteered for the perilous duty of passing
through the enemy's camp, and carrying to General Brénier
instructions with regard to the evacuation. These three
intrepid soldiers were Pierre Zaniboni, corporal of the 76th,
Jean Noel Lami, a canteen-man in Ferey's division, and
André Tillet, of the 6th Light Infantry. They had all taken
part in the siege of Almeida the year before, and knew the
surrounding district thoroughly. They were to take different
roads, and each bore a letter in cipher to the governor. They
started at night&U on the 6th; Zaniboni disguised as a
Spanish pedlar, for he spoke the language well, slipped into
the English bivouacs on the plea of selling tobacco and
buying dead men's clothes ; Lami, as a Portuguese peasant,
played much the same part at another part of the English
lines. This kind of petty trade is common in all armies, and
the two Frenchmen went from line to line without awaking
any suspicion. Just as they were drawing near the gates of
Almeida, however, the trick was discovered — in what manner
has never been explained — the poor fellows were searched,
and being convicted by the letters found on them, were shot
as spies, according to the law of war which punishes with
death every soldier who lays . -de his uniform when on duty.
Tillet, with better judgment '-•han his unhappy comrades,

17 o The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

started in uniform, with his sword. Following at first the
deep gorge of the Dos Casas stream, up to his waist in
the water, he crept slowly from rock to rock, hiding himself
behind them at the least sound, until he was near the ruined
Fort Concepcion. There, leaving the stream, he crawled -on
all fours through the full corn, and at length reached the
outworks of Almeida, being received there at dawn on the
17th by the French outposts. The letter which he bore to
General Brénier contained the order to blow up the ramparts,
and retire forthwith on Barba del Puerco, whither Reynier's
troops were to precede him. The arrival of his emissary was
to be announced to Masséna by salvos of the heaviest guns,
and on hearing these the marshal made the necessary pre-
parations for retreating on Ciudad Rodrigo, being assured of
the imminent demolition of the ramparts. These operations
take some time, as the ramparts must be mined, the chambers
of the mines charged, ammnnition, artillery and gun-carriages
destroyed, and so on. We had therefore to wait till the noise
of the cannon let us know that Brénier was evacuating the
place, and the two armies remained facing each other for four
days without any further action. The English asked for a
suspension of hostilities to bury the dead — a homage to
brave warriors which all civilised nations ought to practise.
In the plain the EngUsh corpses were by far the more in
number ; but it was quite otherwise in the village, where the
enemy had fought sheltered by houses and garden- walls.
Many wounded were picked up on both sides ; among ours
was Captain Septeuil, an aide-de-camp to Berthier, who had,
like Canouville, been sent from Paris to Masséna. He was
still more unlucky, for his leg was smashed by a round-shot,
and had to be amputated on the field. He bore the operation
bravely and is still living.

Seeing the French army remain stationary in front of
him for several days, and doubtless hearing the salvos from
Almeida, Wellington perceived that Masséna intended to
facilitate the escape of the garrison. He therefore reinforced
the blockading division, an» gave General Campbell, who
was in command of it, oraers so well devised that if they

The Last of Portugal 171

had been duly carried out Brénier and his troops would have
had small chance of escape. At midnight on the 10th a long,
dull, explosion announced to the French army that Almeida
existed no longer — at least, as a fortress. In order to puzzle
the allies, General Brénier had kept them occupied for several
•days past on the side opposite to that by which he intended
to make his escape. This was earried out without disaster,
and it was the same at first with his retreat, which he led,
guiding himself by the moon and the direction of the
streams. He had come within a short distance of General
Heudelet's division, which Masséna had sent to meet him,
when he fell in with a Portuguese brigade. He attacked and
dispersed it, continuing his retreat swiftly; but General
Pack, warned by the sound of musketry, hastened up from
Malpartida and pursued our columns, firing. Quickly, too.
General Cotton's cavalry made a vigorous attack on the rear-
guard, causing it some loss. Our people at length caught
sight of the bridge of Barba del Puerco, and Heudelet's
division advancing to meet them. Believing themselves
saved, they gave vent to their joy ; but it was written that
the soil of Portugal was yet to be watered with French
blood.

The last of our columns had to pass through a defile
opening into a quarry among steep and pointed rocks. The
enemy was pressing on from all sides, and several sections of
our rear-guard were cut ofi* by the English cavalry. Seeing
this, the French soldiers climbed nimbly up the steep sides
of the ravine, and escaped the English cavalry, only to fall
into another danger. The Portuguese infantry pursued
them on the heights, pouring a murderous fire into them.
When at length our men, on the point of being succoured
by Heudelet's division, thought that they were in sight of
safety, the earth suddenly failed under their feet, engulfing
part of them in a yawning chasm, at the foot of a huge rock.
The head of the pursuing Portuguese column incurred the
same fate, rolling pell-mell into the gulf with our people.
Heudelet's division succeeded in forcing the allied troops
back beyond the sight of this disaster, and when the foot of

172 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

the precipice was explored, a fearful sight appeared. Three
hundred French and Portuguese soldiers lay there, dead or
horribly mutilated. Some sixty French and thirty Portu-
guese alone survived this terrible fall. Such was the last
incident in the laborious and unlucky campaign of the
French in Portugal. They never entered the country again.
Masséna's army, leaving the battlefield of Fuentes d'Onoro,
retreated towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and went into canton-
ments, the English not following. We learnt, later on, that
Wellington, angry with General Campbell for having, as he^
said, by neglect of his orders allowed the garrison of
Ahneida to escape, had brought that general to court-
martial, and that Campbell, in despair, had blown his brains
out.^

Scarcely was the French army in quarters where it could
rest and recruit, than Masséna began to think of reorganis-
ing it, with a view to a fresh campaign. The work was,
however, barely set on foot, when Marshal Marmont arrived
from Paris. Though he held his appointment to the
commander-in-chief, he presented himself at first as Ney's
successor in the command of the 6th corps ; then, a few days
later, when he was suflSciently acquainted with the state of
affairs, he produced his commission, and handed to Mass6na
the Emperor's order, recalling him to Paris. This unforeseen
disgrace, announced in such a way indicating that the
Emperor did not approve his conduct of the operations, was
a crushing blow to Masséna, but he was compelled to
surrender the command to Marmont, and, taking leave of the
army, he retired, in the first place, to Salamanca, after a
very lively altercation with General Foy, whom he accused
of having made common cause with Ney to do him a dis-
service with the Emperor.

On learning how vigorously General Brénier had led
the retreat of the garrison of Almeida, the Emperor ap-
pointed him lieutenant-general. He rewarded also Tillet's-

[* Campbell died, Governor of Madras, in 1826. I'he person who blew
his brains out was the lieutenant-colonel of the 4th King's Own.]

M ASSÉNA* s Mistakes 173

devotion and courage with the Cross of the Legion of
Honour and a pension of six hundred francs. This second
favour was, in later days, the subject of a discussion in the
Chamber. Tillet had become a sergeant, and had obtained
a retiring pension under the Restoration. It was proposed
to dock him of this by applying the law as to ' pluralities,'
but General Foy eloquently pleaded the cause of the brave
soldier, and he kept both his pensions.

Masséna stayed a short time at Salamanca, and proceeded
to Paris. On his arrival, he called upon the Emperor, who,
under the plea of urgent affairs, refused for a whole month to
see him. His disgrace was complete. No doubt, Masséna
had committed very grave mistakes, especially in his march
upon Lisbon ; but it must be admitted also that the Govern-
ment had done very wrong to abandon his army in a country
so bare of resources as Portugal, and not to secure his
communications by means of troops echelonned between his
army and the Spanish frontier. At any rate Masséna rose
in the opinion of his troops during the expedition under-
taken to relieve Almeida. Not only was his strategy often
very fine, but he showed much activity, having no more

anxiety about Mme N , whom he had left at the rear,

and being able to give all his attention to the war. Still, I
shall take leave to point out several faults which he com-
mitted during that expedition. In the first place, it was
undertaken with insuflScient means of transport, both for
])rovisions and ammunition. It has been said that draught-
horses were wanting ; this is true, but there were plenty of
mules in the district, which might have been requisitioned
for a few days. Next was the fatal mistake occasioned by
the red coats of the Hanoverians. As the same had already
ha[)pened at Busaco, Masséna should have made them wear
their grey overcoats before sending them into Onoro to fight
the English. By this amount of foresight, he would have
retained the whole village ; as it was, we lost the upper part,
and could not retake it. Thirdly, when Masséna was
master of a great part of the plain, and of the whole course
of the Dos Casas, except the point where it passes through

174 ^^^ Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Fuentes d'Onoro, he was, as I think, quite wrong to lose
precious time and many men in seeking to drive the
English entirely out of that strongly-intrenched village. I
think that it would have been better worth while, following
the example of Marlborough at Malplaquet, to have left
a brigade to observe Onoro, out of range of its fire, and to
hold the garrison, and to have advanced. They would have
thought themselves on the point of being surrounded, and
would have been compelled to abandon the position, and
rejoin Wellington, or run the risk of having to capitulate
after the defeat of the English army. The important thing
for us was to beat the main body of the enemy's troops
in the open country. Unluckily, however, it is a principle
with the French never to leave an intrenched position
behind them in battle. This habit has often been fatal to us
here, and, above all, at Waterloo, where we persisted in
attacking the farms of La Haye-Sainte and Hougoumont,
instead of masking them with a division, and marching
upon the already severely-shaken English lines. We should
have had time to destroy them before the Prussians came
up, and to secure the victory, after which the defenders
of the farms would have had to lay down their arms, as our
troops had to do at Malplaquet. The fourth mistake with
which Masséna may be blamed, at the battle of Fuentes
d'Onoro, was not making sure that there were a sufficient
number of cartridges in his wagons. Failing this, he
should have fetched them from Ciudad Eodrigo, which was
not more than three leagues from the point where we were
going to tight. This lack of foresight was one of the
principal causes of our failure. Fifthly, if Masséna had
still possessed the firmness of which he so often gave proof
at Rivoli, Genoa, and Zurich, he would have put General
Reynier under arrest for disobedience to orders, and the
command of the second corps would have passed to General
Heudelet, who would have pushed the English hard and
promptly. But Masséna did not venture to take such
vigorous action; the conqueror of Souvaroff had lost his
energy, and let himself be defied with impunity, and the

Causes of Our Failure 175

blood of his soldiers was shed to no advantage and with no
glory.

It forms no part of my purpose in writing these memoirs
to relate the various phases of the War of Independence in
the Peninsula ; but before quitting that country, I ought to
point out the chief causes of the reverses sustained there by
the French, in spite of the fact that our troops nowhere
showed more zeal, more patience — above all, more valour.

It is needless again to go over the events of 1808 and
the following year, but it may be observed that if after the
expulsion of the English, under Sir John Moore, from Spain,
the Emperor had himself been able to go on directing the
operations, the Peninsula must have quickly succumbed.
The Cabinet of London had, however, cleverly raised a new
and potent enemy, and when Austria declared war. Napoleon
was compelled to leave the tafik of repressing the insurrection
in the hands of his lieutenants. King Joseph's lack of
military capacity prevented any concentration of command,
and complete anarchy reigned among the marshals and the
various corps commanders, each confining himself to the defence
of the provinces occupied by his troops, and refusing any aid to
his colleagues who governed the neighbouring districts. The
most peremptory orders from the Emperor were unable to
produce any co-operation, there was no obedience, and each
asserted that he himself needed all the resources at his dis-
posal. Thus Saint-Cyr was nearly crushed in Catalonia
without the support of a single battalion from Suchet, who
was governing Aragon and Valencia; Soult, as you have seen,
was left alone in Oporto, while Victor refused to obey the
order to join him. Soult, in his turn, allowed Masséna to wait
for him for six months in vain at the gates of Lisbon ; finally,
Masséna could not obtain help from Bessiôres to beat the
English before Almeida. I could quote many more
examples of selfish disobedience, but it must be admitted that
the main fault lay with the Government. It was natural
that, in 1809, the Emperor should have left Spain in order

176 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

to meet the most pressing danger, but why, when peace was
concluded in the north, did he not see the importance of
returning to drive the English from the Peninsula? The
most surprising thing is, that with all his genius he should
have thought it possible to direct from Paris the movement
of armies 500 leagues away, in a country where bearers of
despatches were liable to be stopped by swarms of insurgents,
and commanders-in-chief thus compelled to remain for
months without news or orders. If the Emperor could not
come himself, he should have entrusted the chief command
of all the armies in the Peninsula to one of his best marshals,
with power severely to punish disobedience. Napoleon had
no doubt made Joseph his titular lieutenant, but he, a man of
gentle disposition, clever and well-educated, but having no
knowledge of the art of war, had become the plaything of the
marshals. They did not execute his orders, and considei-ed
his very presence with the army as a hindrance. The worst
mistake into which the King's good-nature led him was that
of opposing the Emperor's wish with regard to Spanish
soldiers captured in battle. Napoleon ordered them to be
sent into France as prisoners of war, in order to diminish the
numbers of our enemies in the Peninsula, while Joseph,
hating to fight against men whom he called his subjects,
would defend the Spaniards against us. When they were
captured they were ready enough to cheer for their good
King Joseph and ask to serve among his troops. He actually
created a numerous army, composed exclusively of prisoners
whom he had taken, well paid, well fed, and well equipped.
They were loyal to Joseph as long as things went weU, but at
the first reverse they deserted in thousands and went off Xxy
join their insurgent compatriots until they were taken
prisoners again. Then they again begged to enlist in
Joseph's regiments. More than 150,000 men changed sides
in this way, and as Joseph had them promptly re-clothed
when they came back in rags, the Spaniards nick-named him
'the head of the army clothing department.' The French
troops objected strongly to this system, and the Emperor
often expressed his discontent with it, but he could never

English Shooting 177

succeed in stopping it. He, on his side, contributed much
to the perpetual recruiting of the enemy, for not wishing to
reduce too much the French army in Germany, he called on
his allies to furnish part of the contingents stipulated for in
the treaties, and sent these troops to the Peninsula in order
to spare trench blood. His motive was doubtless laudable,
but circumstances made the application of this system
injurious to our cause. It is all very well to employ foreign
troops in a short campaign, but it is a different thing when
it is a question of fighting for several years against an enemy
like the Spaniards and Portuguese who were always harass-
ing you and could never be got at. Nothing but an ardour
such as is never found in auxiliary troops can enable men to
endure the fatigues of this kind of warfare. Thus not only
did the troops which the Emperor obtained from his allies
serve badly enough in our ranks, but they deserted daily in
heaps. Italians, Swiss, Saxons, Bavarians, and other Germans
were soon formed into regiments by our enemies, and the Poles
passed in such numbers into the well-paid and well-fed
English army, that Wellington was able to form a strong
Polish legion, which fought the French without scruple.

But, in my opinion, the principal cause of our reverses,
though one which has never been pointed out by any soldier
who has written on the Peninsular War, was the immense
superiority of the English infantry in accurate shooting, a
superiority which arises from their frequent exercise at the
targets, and in a great measure also from the formation in
two ranks. I know that a great many French oflScers deny
that this latter cause is a true one, but experience has shown
that soldiers confined between the first and third rank nearly
always fire in the air, and that the third rank cannot take
aim at an enemy who is hidden from them by the two
ranks in front. It is asserted that two ranks do not offer
sufficient strength to resist cavalry, but the English infantry
can in a moment form four deep to receive a charge, and our
squadrons were never able to catch it in two ranks, though
as soon as it has to fire it quickly resumes this formation.

However this may be, I am convinced that Napoleon

VOL. II. N

178 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

would in the end have established his brother triumphantly
on the throne of Spain if he had been content to finish this
War before going to Russia. The Peninsula received no
support, save from England, and England, in spite of the
recent successes of her armies, was so exhausted by the
incessant demands of men and money for the Peninsula, that
the House of Commons was on the point of refusing the
necessary subsidies for a new campaign. But at the moment
of our return from Portugal rumours had got about of the
design formed by Napoleon of attacking Russia at home, and
the English Parliament authorised the continuance of the
war. It was not fortunate for us, for the misunderstandings
which I have noticed still prevailed among our commanders.
Marshal Marmont got beaten by Wellington at the Arapiles,
King Joseph lost the battle of Vittoria, and these reverses
compelled our armies towards the end of 1813 to re-cross the
Pyrenees and abandon entirely the country which had cost
them so much blood. I judge that in the six years from the
beginning of 1808, the French lost in the Peninsula 200,000
men killed or dead in hospital, to which one must add 60,000
lost by our various allies.

The English and the Portuguese lost also considerably,
but the Spaniards most of all, by reason of the obstinacy
with which they withstood the siege of many of their towns.
The vigour of these famous defences, particularly that of
Saragossa, has thrown such lustre over the Spaniards that
the delivery of the Peninsula has generally been attributed to
their courage, but this is a mistake, for without the support
of English troops the Spaniards would never have resisted
the French. One immense merit they have, which is that
they are never discouraged. Their confidence, often deceived,
cannot be destroyed. Our soldiers used to compare them
to flocks of pigeons, which fly away at the least sound, to
return a moment later. As for the Portuguese, justice has
never been done to the share which they took in the war.
Less cruel, far better disciplined, and more calmly courageous
than the Spaniards, they formed in Wellington's army several
brigades which, when led by English officers, were in no way>

Home Again 179

inferior to the British troops ; but being less boastful than the
Spaniards, they have said less about their exploits, and have
acquired less renown.

But less us return for a moment to June 1811, when
Masséna resigned his command. The war in the Peninsula
was so disagreeable and so toilsome that every man longed
to get back to France. The Emperor, knowing this, and
wishing to keep his army up to its full strength, had decided
that no officer was to leave Spain without special leave, and
the order recalling Masséna authorised him to bring away
only two aides-de-camp, and to leave the others at Marshal
Marmont's disposal. He, having his staff complete, and
knowing none of us, was no more anxious to keep us than
we to stay with him. He assigned us no duties, and we
passed some three weeks at Salamanca drearily enough. The
time seemed, however, less long to me than to my companions,
because I employed it in committing my recollections of the
recent campaign to paper. I have found these notes very
useful in writing these memoirs.

In consideration of my wound the minister at last sent
me leave to return to France. Some others of Masséna's
staff having also been permitted to leave the Peninsula, we
joined a detachment of 500 grenadiers, who were on their
way to reinforce the imperial guard. General Junot and his
wife the duchess also took advantage of this escort. We
travelled easily on horseback, with fine weather. On the
journey some eccentric conduct on the part of Junot made
me anxious as to his future.^ We reached the frontier, and I
could not but smile when I thought of the evil omen which
I had drawn from my encounter with the black jackass on the
Bidassoa bridge when last I entered Spain. The campaign
had nearly been my last, but I was in France and should see
my mother and another who had become very dear to me. So,
forgetting past troubles, I hastened on to Paris, arriving in
July, after an absence of fifteen toilsome months. Contrary
to my expectation the marshal received me well, and I
learnt that he had spoken very kindly of me to the Emperor.

\} See vol. i. p. 295.]

i8o The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

So on my first appearance at the Tuileries, the Emperor ex-
pressed his satisfaction with me, spoke with interest of
Miranda de Corvo, and asked how many wounds I had now
had. ' Eight, sir,' I answered. ' Well, they are eight good
quarterings of nobility for you,' rejoined the Emperor.

CHAPTER XIX

I SPENT all the summer and autumn at Paris, passing some
days of every month at the château of Bonneuil with M.
and Mme Desbrières. While I was away, this excellent
family had shown great friendship for my mother, and before
long I was permitted to pay my addresses to their daughter.
Our marriage was arranged, and for a moment I hoped to
obtain my promotion to colonel before the event took place.

According to etiquette the Emperor signed the marriage
contracts of all his colonels, but he rarely paid this honour
to officers of a lower rank ; if they wished for it they had to
acquaint the Minister for War with their reasons. I based
my application on the fact of the Emperor having said to me
just before Marengo, and soon after my father's death, * If you
behave well, and follow in his footsteps, it will be I who will
act as your father.' Since that day I had been eight times
wounded, and was conscious of having always done my duty.
Clarke, the minister, a rough man, who nearly always re-
jected such applications,' admitted that mine deserved con-
sideration, and promised to present it. In a few days I was
ordered to present myself at Compiègne and bring the
notary with the marriage contract. When we arrived, the
Emperor was out coursing — not that he cared much for this
exercise, but he rightly thought that he ought to imitate the
old French kings. The matter had therefore to be put off
till the next day, at which the notary, who had business in
Paris, was much distressed; but there was no help for it.
Next day we were presented to the Emperor, and my
marriage contract was signed in the room where, twenty
years later, I was often on duty with the Orleans princes.
In these short interviews Napoleon was most affable.

i82 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

He asked several questions of the notary : inquired if the
young lady was pretty, what was her dowry, and so on ; and
when I took leave he said that he would like me to have a
good post, and that he would, before long, reward me for my
good service. Then I did think that I was as good as
colonel ; and my hopes rose higher yet when, as I left the
room. General Mouton, Count of Lobau, assured me that my
name was on the list of field-oflScers who were to receive
regiments, an assurance all the more welcome that the Count
of Lobau was in charge of that department of the War
OflSce which dealt with promotions. I returned to Paris, there-
fore, with a joyful heart, and was married on November 11.

Happy in the bosom of my family, I was daily awaiting
my commission as colonel, when I was informed by the
minister that I had been appointed as major to the 1st
Mounted Chasseurs, then in garrison at the other end of
Germany. This was a severe blow. As a major I had
already been thrice wounded and served two campaigns, and
it was hard to have to serve again with that rank, nor, after
what the Emperor and the Count of Lobau had said, could
I understand why I was thus treated. However, the latter
soon explained it.

After the promotion of Pelet and Casabianca, I was the
senior major on Masséna's staff. But M. Barain, the
artillery captain, whom I have mentioned as having lost an
arm at Wagram, and who, though he had been promoted to
major with a view to his service in the arsenals, had insisted
on accompanying Masséna to Portugal, possessed relations
whose influence with the marshal was considerable. Through
his intervention Masséna was persuaded to recommend
Barain for promotion, and the Emperor, yielding with some
hesitation to the same influence, made him colonel.

If I have seemed to make too much of my disappoint-
ment over this afiair it must be remembered that at that time
the commanders of regiments were important persons. I
have known several colonels decline the rank of general, and
ask as a special favour to be left at the head of their regi-
ments.

Farewell to M asséna 183

From Masséna I received the following letter, as my sole

reward for three campaigns served under him and three

wounds received :

Paris, November 24, 1811.

My Dear Marbot, — I forward your commission, which
has been sent to me. As you know, I asked for your pro-
motion ; and it is a matter of twofold regret to me that
I failed to obtain it, and that I am losing your services. 1
appreciate them highly, and, so far as you are concerned, they
are independent of the rewards which they entitle you to
claim, and will always earn you the esteem of those under
whom you may happen to serve. You may be sure of mine,
and equally sure of my regret and my sincere attachment,

Masséna.

I did not expect to see him again ; but the maréchale
wishing, as she wrote, to make my wife's acquaintance,
invited us to dinner. Of her I have nothing but good to say,
ever since I met her at Antibes, her native place, on my way
back from Genoa ; so I accepted. Masséna came up to me
with fresh expressions of regret, and proposed that he should
apply for my nomination as officer of the Legion of Honour.
I replied that, as he could do nothing for me when I was on
his staff, I would not trouble him further, and would try to
secure my promotion for myself; and so slipped off into the
crowd of guests. I never met the marshal again, though I
continued to visit his wife and son, who were both my very
good friends.

I may as well give here some details of Masséna's life.
As is usually the case with famous men, his biography has
been very incorrectly written. André Masséna was born
May 6, 1758, at Turbia, near Monaco. His grandfather, a
respectable tanner, had three sons, Jules, Augustin, and
Marcel. The two elder went to Nice and set up a soap-
factory ; Marcel entered the French service ; Jules died poor,
and of his five children, three, including André, were taken up
by the uncle, Augustin, who, after having them taught to
read and write, employed them in his soap-works. André,

1 84 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

however, was of too adventurous a disposition to settle to
business, and at the age of thirteen ran away from his uncle's
house, and went to sea as a cabin-boy in a merchantman,
accompanied by a cousin named Bavastro, who became in the
wars of the Empire the most famous privateer in the Medi-
terranean. As for André, two years of hardship disgusted
him with a sailor's life, and in 1775 he enlisted as a private
in the Royal Italian regiment, where his uncle Marcel was
sergeant-major. I knew this Marcel Masséna in 1800,
when he was commandant of the fortress of Antibes. He was
a serious and able man, much esteemed by his colonel,
M. Chauvet d'Arlon. The colonel kindly extended his
patronage to André, put him in the way of acquiring a fair
knowledge of French, and in a few years promoted him to
regimental staff-sergeant. He even held out to him the hope
of becoming sub-lieutenant in the mounted police; but
André was tired of waiting, and left the army when his time
expired. On returning to civil life he rejoined his cousin
Bavastro ; and the two together carried on a smuggling busi-
ness on a large scale, both by sea and across the land fix)ntier.
In this way Masséna acquired a thorough knowledge of the
mountain paths, which was of great service to him later on,
when he commanded troops in those districts. The hard life
of a smuggler, with its constant need for keeping an eye on
the movements of the preventive men and concealing his
own, insensibly produced in Masséna the intelligence, watch-
fulness, and activity so essential to a good oflScer. Having
amassed a little capital he married a Frenchwoman, Mile
Lamarre, daughter of a surgeon at Antibes, and was settled
in that town, doing a small trade in olive oil and dried fruits,
when the Revolution supervened. Then, under the impulse
of his military tastes, he left his wife and his shop and en-
listed in the volunteers of the Var. His knowledge of
military theory and practice soon earned him the post of
adjutant, and when war broke out his courage and activity
quickly raised him to the rank of colonel and then of major-
general. He commanded the camp called des milles fourches,
which comprised the artillery company commanded by Captain

Early Days of M asséna 185

Napoleon Buonaparte, under whom he was in after days to
serve in Italy. At the siege of Toulon he distinguished
himself by taking Forts Lartigues and St. Catherine, earning
his promotion to lieutenant-general, and after the capture of
the town returned to the Army of Italy, and was conspicuous
in all the engagements between the Mediterranean coast and
Piedmont.

Intelligent, restlessly active, and of undaunted courage,
Masséna had become a famous man, but a serious mistake
committed early in the campaign of 1796 went near to ruin
his whole career. General Bonaparte had just taken the
chief command of the army, which brought his former superior,
Masséna, under his orders. Masséna was commanding the
advanced guard, and had beaten an Austrian corps near
Cairo. Learning that the enemy's oflBcers had left a good
supper all ready prepared in a neighbouring village inn, he
and some of his officers thought they would take advantage
of this windfall. They left the division encamped on the
top of a high hill ; but meantime, the Austrians having
recovered from their alarm returned to the attack at daybreak,
and charged the French corps. Our men, though taken by
surprise, defended themselves bravely, but as their general
was not there to lead them, they were pushed back to the
edge of the plateau, and would certainly have been heavily de-
feated by the superior number of the enemy. Just then, Mas-
séna, having made his way through the Austrian skirmishers,
hurried up by a path which he knew of old, and appeared in
front of his troops. In their indignation they received him
with well-deserved hootings, but the general, little perturbed,
resumed the command, and marched forward with his division
to rejoin the army. It was then seen that one battalion, which
had been posted the day before on an isolated spur, had no
practicable road by which they could descend without going
a long way round, and exposing themselves to the enemy's
fire. Masséna made his way alone, climbing the steep slope
on hands and knees, towards this battalion, and on reach-
ing it addressed the men, assuring them that if they would
do as he did, he would get them out of their fix. Then,

1 86 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

ordering them to sheath bayonets, he sat down on the snow
at the edge of the slope, and, pushing himself with his
hands, slid down to the bottom. The soldiers, shouting with
laughter, did the same thing, and in the twinkling of an eye
the whole battalion was out of range of the astonished
Austrians. This way of descending, much like that which
the Swiss peasants call glissading/ had certainly never before
been employed by regular troops. Extraordinary as it may
seem, the story is none the less true ; I have not only been
assured of it by various generals and other officers who were
then in Massena's division, but nine years afterwards, when
Marshal Augereau received the Emperor and all the marshals
at La Houssage, I heard them chaffing Masséna about the
new mode of retreat which he used on that occasion. It is
stated that on the day when Masséna employed this comical
expedient, to which he had been well accustomed in his
smuggling days. General Bonaparte, thinking that as a very
young commander-in-chief it was his duty to show especial
severity towards officers who failed in their duty, gave orders
that Masséna should be tried by court-martial on a charge of
having abandoned his post, which would involve the penalty
of death, or at least, dismissal. But just as he was about to
be put under arrest, the battle of Montenotte began, and after
the complete rout of the Austrian army, to which Masséna
so largely contributed, there could not well be any talk of
trying him. So his fault was forgotten, and he was able to
continue his glorious career.

He distinguished himself at Lodi, Milan, Verona, Areola,
but above all, at Eivoli, and his success gained him from
General Bonaparte the famous nickname, ' The spoilt child of
victory.' After the preliminaries of peace had been signed at
Lisbon, he was commissioned to take the draft to the Govern-
ment, and was received in Paris with the strongest marks of
admiration. But his triumph was tarnished by his always
prevailing fault of extreme avarice. General Duphot, French
ambassador at Rome, had been assassinated; the task of

[* In the original * la ramoMe^ a word which does not seem to be now in
use.]

M ASSÉNA IN Switzerland 187

taking vengeance was entrusted to part of the Army of Italy,
under the command, at first, of Berthier, and when he was
palled away to Egypt, of Masséna. Very soon after the
arrival of that general, the army began to complain that it
was in a state of destitution, without clothing or food, while
those who had the management were drawing millions from
the Papal States and living in luxury. At length, a deputa-
tion of one hundred officers was sent to demand from Masséna
an account of his expenditure ; but whether he had no defence
to offer, or refused to recognise an act of insubordination, he
declined to clear himself, and as the troops persisted, found
himself obliged to leave Rome, and surrender the command
of the army. On his return to France he published a justifi-
catory statement, addressed to his comrades, but neither they
nor the public accepted it ; and his annoyance was increased
when Bonaparte started for Egypt without replying to a
letter which he wrote him on the subject.

However, when war again broke out with the coalition
formed by England, Bussia, and Austria, Masséna's military
talents could not well be spared, and the Directory lost no time
in putting him in command of the force to which the defence
of Switzerland was to be entrusted. After some considerable
successes, he was beaten with loss by the Austrians, in conse-
quence of an over-hasty attack on the defile of Feldkirch. At
the same time the Army of the Rhine, under Jourdan, was
defeated by the Archduke Charles at Stockach, and that of
Italy, at Novi, by Souvaroff, General Joubert being killed.
The Austrians were threatening Alsace and Lorraine ;
Souvaroff was crossing the St. Gothard into Switzerland;
and France, on the point of being invaded in two quarters,
felt that her only hope was in Masséna, nor was her hope
disappointed.

Bernaclotte and the Directory impatiently sent messenger
after messenger with orders to Masséna to give battle ; ^ but
he, knowing that the defeat of his army would mean
irretrievable ruin to the country, allowed no threats of dis-

[» See vol. i. p. 22.]

1 88 The Memoirs ofi the Baron de Marbot

missal to move him. Like Fabius or Catinat, he would not
strike till he could strike decisively, taking advantage of some
opportunity when he might for a moment have the superiority.
TÏie moment came when the incapable General Korsakoff had
imprmdently advanced on Zurich with 50,000 Russians and
Bavarians, there to await Souvaroff, who was bringing 55,000
men fix)m Italy. Flinging himself like a lion on Korsakoff
before Souvaroff could come up, Masséna surprised him in
his camp at Zurich, beat him, and broke up his troops,
driving them with immense loss to the Rhine. The moving
upon Souvaroff he defeated him as he had done his lieutenant.
In these engagements 30,000 of the enemy were killed or
taken, fifteen stand of colours and sixty guns captured, the
independence of Switzerland confirmed, and France saved
fh)m invasion. Masséna's fame was never so high nor so
honourable, and he and his army were thrice thanked by
the Legislature.

Meanwhile the Government and the country, torn by
fiwîtions, were throwing on each other the responsibility
alike for internal disorder and reverses abroad. The
Directory was tottering under the contempt of the public,
and it was clear that things could not go on in the present
fashion. Then came the 18th Brumaire, and Bonaparte as
First Consul headed the new Government. Masséna, a
nullity in politics, took no hand in this revolution, and had
no great love for the new state of things, but accepted the
command of the Army of Italy, which my father, as senior
general of division, had held momentarily on the death of
General Championnet. So careless had the Directory been
that Masséna found his army in utter misery. I have already
mentioned the efforts which he made to put the troops on a
good footing in face of the destitution which then prevailed
along the Genoese coast ; and I need not tell that part of my
story over again. I will merely say that by his courage,
physical and moral, and his knowledge of the art of war,
Masséna covered himself with glory. He again saved France
from invasion, when by the obstinacy of his defence of
Genoa, he allowed the First Consul time to concentrate at

In North Italy 189

Dijon the reserve army with which he crossed the Alps, and
beat the Austrians at Marengo. After that victory, the
command of the army was left in Masséna's hands, but the
old complaints soon broke out again. Remonstrances were
heard from all sides, requisitions were levied on various
pretexts, and yet the troops were not paid. On hearing of
the state of affairs, the First Consul suddenly, and without
explanation, removed Masséna from the command. Return-
ing then into private life, he showed his dissatisfaction by
refusing to vote for Bonaparte's appointment as Consul for
life, nor would he show himself at the new court. None the
less the First Consul gave him a sword of honour, inscribed
with all the victories in which he had borne a share. Also
when he seized the imperial crown, he included Masséna in
his first list of marshals, and named him Grand Cordon of the
Legion of Honour. On this Masséna's opposition ceased ;
he voted for the Empire, and attended the ceremonies of
consecration and coronation at the Tuileries.

When France was in 1805 threatened for the third time
by a coalition, the duty fell to Masséna of defending North
Italy against the Archduke Charles. He not only saved
Lombardy, but he attacked the enemy, and drove him beyond
the Tagliamento ; penetrating even to Camiola, where, by
forcing the Archduke to halt, and face him everyday, he delayed
him till he was too late to save Vienna, or join the Russian
army which was beaten at Austerlitz. The Emperor, how-
ever, did not seem to appreciate Masséna's services in this
campaign very highly. He accused him of not acting with
his wonted vigour — but this did not prevent him from being
shortly sent to conquer the kingdom of Naples.

In a month the French had occupied the whole country,
except the fortress of Gaeta, and this Masséna took after a
vigorously sustained siege. During his attack on that
town, he experienced a very keen annoyance, which he never
got over. An immense sum which, he asserted, belonged
to him, was confiscated by the Emperor. The story is curious
enough to be worth telling.

Under the conviction that the best way to compel the

iQO The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

English to sue for peace was to destroy their commerce by
forbidding the importation of their goods into the Continent,
Napoleon used to have these goods seized and burnt in every
country subject to his authority ; that is, in more than half of
Europe. But the love of gold is powerful, and trade is
cunning ; and thus a system of smuggling without risk had
been devised. The method was that arrangements were made
with English merchants under which they sent out vessels
to be captured by our privateers, who brought them into
some of the numerous ports between Pomerania and the Bay
of Naples which were occupied by our troops. The next act
was to unlade the packages and land them so as to escape
confiscation ; but this had already been provided for. The
extent of coast line being too great to be watched throughout
by regular preventive officers, the duty was done by soldiers
under the orders of the general in command of the kingdom
or province. An authorisation from one of these was suffi-
cient to pass in the bales of goods, and after this the
merchants dealt with the ' protector.' This was called a
'licence.' * This new style of trade began as early as 1806,
when Bernadette was occupying Hamburg and part of
Denmark. That marshal acquired by this means considerable
sums, and whenever he wished to testify his satisfaction with
any person, he would grant him a licence, and the receiver
would sell it to some merchant. This practice gradually
extended, and even reached the Emperor's court, where
chamberlains and ladies-in-waiting got the ministers to give
them licences. It was kept from Napoleon's knowledge, but
he found it out, or suspected it. In order, however, not to
interfere too abruptly with the habits of the conquered
countries, he tolerated the abuse outside France, provided
that it was carried on with secrecy ; but strange to say of so
great a man, as soon as he learnt that anyone had carried his
illicit games too far, he made him disgorge. Thus, on hearing
that the commissary Michaux, head of the administrative
department in Bemadotte's army, had lost 300,000 francs at

[* Not quite the same, apparently, as the so-called • system of licences *
by which Napoleon modified his ' Continental system.']

Ill-gotten Gains 191

one sitting in a gambling house at Paris, he ordered an
aide-de-camp to write to him saying that the ' Invalides ' was
in want of cash, and bidding him pay up 300,000 francs.
Michaux did so without loss of time, out of his profits on
licences.

You may suppose that Masséna had not been behindhand
in this business. In partnership with General Solignac, his
chief of staff, he flooded every port in the kingdom of Naples
with licences. The Emperor, hearing that he had deposited
three millions with a banker at Leghorn, and General
Solignac 600,000 at the same time, wrote to the marshal,
asking for the loan of a million, and requesting 200,000
from the chief of the staff; just a third of the profits which
each had made, so that as you see he did not shear them too
close. But at sight of this new kind of draft, Masséna,
shrieking as though his bowels were being torn out, replied
to Napoleon that he was the poorest of the marshals, had
a numerous family to maintain, and was over head and ears
in debt ; he regretted, therefore, that he could not send him
anything. General Solignac made a similar answer, and both
were congratulating themselves on having thus taken in the
Emperor, when the son of the Leghorn banker arrived post-
haste, announcing that the inspector of the French treasury
had called on his father, escorted by the commissary of police
and several gendarmes, ordered the cash book to be handed over
to him, and given a receipt for the 3,600,000 francs paid in
by the marshal and General Solignac, adding that this sum
belonged to the army and had been entrusted on deposit to
those two personages. The Emperor, he said, ordered it to
be remitted at once, either in specie or negotiable bills, and
the receipts given to Masséna and Solignac might be cancelled.
The seizure had been made in due legal form, and the banker,
who, indeed, lost nothing by it, was powerless to oppose it.
It is difficult to conceive the fury of Masséna on hearing that
his fortune had just been snatched away from him. He fell
ill, but did not venture to address any remonstrance to the
p]mperor, who was at that time in Poland and summoned him
thither. After the Peace of Tilsit the title of Duke of Eivoli

192 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

and a pension of 300,000 francs were the reward of his
services, but they never consoled him for what he had lost at
Leghorn. In spite of his cautious habits he was heard
sometimes to cry : ' I was fighting in his service, and he was
cruel enough to take away my little savings which I had
invested at Leghorn.' *

I have already related the glorious part which the
marshal took in the campaign of 1809. To reward his con-
duct at the battles of Essling and Wagram, the Emperor made
him Prince of Essling with a further pension of 500,000
francs, in addition to the 300,000 which he had as Duke of
Rivoli, and 200,000 as marshal Tand commander-in-chief.
The new-made prince did not increase his expenditure by a
halfpenny.

The campaigns in Spain and Portugal were Masséna's
last, and as I have related, they were not fortunate. His
mind was not what it was, so that these two campaigns added
nothing to his glory, but rather diminished his reputation as
a general, and the ' spoilt child of victory ' experienced reverses
when he might and ought to have been victorious.

Masséna was lean and spare, below the middle height ; he
had a highly expressive Italian face. The bad points in his
character were want of candour, a tendency to bear malice^
harshness, and avarice. He had much natural ability, but
his adventurous youth and low origin never gave him a
chance of studying, and he was totally lacking in what is
called cultivation. He was a bom general ; his courage and
tenacity did the rest. In the best days of his military career
he saw accurately, decided promptly, and never let himself
be cast down by reverses. As he grew old he pushed
caution to the point of timidity, in fear of compromising the
reputation he had earned. He hated reading, and thus had
no knowledge of what had been written about war ; it was
an inspiration with him, and Napoleon judged him rightly
when he said in his memoirs that when Masséna arrived on

* General Lamarque, in his memoirs, relates how he had the unpleasant
task of announcing to Masséna that his millions were confiscated. The
scene took place at night in the Palazzo Acton.

A Discreet Courtier 193

the field of battle he did not know what he should do, and
circumstances decided him.

It is a mistake to represent Masséna, as some have done,
as a stranger to flattery, speaking the truth to the Emperor,
frankly, and even, indeed, a little brusquely. Under his
rough hide Masséna was a cunning courtier. The following
was a curious instance of this. One day the Emperor,
accompanied by several marshals, among them Masséna, was
shooting in the forest of Fontainebleau, and fired at a pheasant.
The shot, badly aimed, went in Masséna's direction, and one
pellet destroyed his left eye. No one but the Emperor had
fired at the moment, and he was certainly the involuntary
author of the accident ; but Masséna, realising that his eye
was gone and it would do him no good to call attention to
the clumsiness which had been the cause of his wound, while
the Emperor would be grateful to him for diverting attention
from himself, attacked Prince Berthier, who had not yet fired,
for his reckless shooting. Napoleon and all those present
quite understood this courtier-like discretion, and every atten-
tion was paid to Masséna by his master.

With all his avarice, the conqueror of Zurich would
have given half his fortune to have been born in France, and
not on the left bank of the Var. He disliked nothing
so much as the Italian termination of his name. He always
wrote e for a in his signature, and when he spoke to his
eldest son called him Massène. But the public never
accepted the change, and in spite of him who had made it
famous the name of Masséna prevailed.

The campaign in Portugal afiected Masséna's health so
much that he was obliged to rest and recruit at Nice. He
passed the whole of 1812 there, but when Napoleon, on his
return from Russia, found it necessary to use all his resources,
considering that Masséna s name might yet be of service, he
employed him as governor of the 8th military division. When
the allies invaded France in 1814, Masséna, who had, indeed,
few troops at his disposal, did nothing to check their advance.
On April 15 he made his submission to the Duke of Angou-
lôme, who created him commander of the order of St. Louis,

VOL. ir. o

194 TV/:^ Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

but did not make him a peer of France, on the plea that he
was bom a foreigner and had not been naturalised, as if the
victories of Rivoli and Zurich, the defence of Genoa, and a
whole list of glorious battles in the cause of France were not
as valid as any papers of naturalisation. The afiront thus
done to Masséna produced a very bad effect on public opinion
and that of the army, and had as much to do as anything
with the natural irritation against Louis XVIII.'s Govern-
ment and the consequent return of the Emperor. When he
landed on March 1, 1815, and marched towards Paris at the
head of a thousand grenadiers, Masséna was taken by sur-
prise and much perplexed by the unforeseen event. He tried
to stem the torrent by collecting some regiments of the
line, and calling out the National Guard of Marseilles ; but
on learning that the Duke of Angouleme had been forced to
capitulate at La Palud, Masséna sent his son to Louis XVIII.
to let him know that he must not count on him any longer.
Rallying to the Imperial Government, he hoisted the tri-
color flag on April 10 throughout his division, and locked
up the Prefect of the Var, who was still for holding out.
By this conduct Masséna satisfied neither side ; the Emperor
summoned him to Paris, and gave him a pretty cold recep-
tion.

When Napoleon committed the immense blunder of
abdicating a second time in consequence of the battle of
Waterloo, the chamber of representatives, which he had
made the mistake of summoning before joining the army,
seized the power and named a provisional government. Its
first act was to assign to Masséna the command of the
National Guard of Paris. He was too infirm to be able to
perform the duties in person, but they wished to have a name
which might stimulate the civil inhabitants and induce them
to aid the army in the defence of the capital. Fouché's
intrigues sowed discord among the members of the provisional
government, and the plans of defence having been submitted
to a military committee Masséna gave the opinion that Paris
<x)uld not resist. Consequently an armistice was concluded,
and the French army retired behind the Loire and was then

The End of a Famous Career 195

disbanded. To punish Masséna for having deserted his
cause, Louis XVIII. included him among Marshal Ney's
judges, in the hope that, under the influence of personal dis-
like, he would condemn his unhappy colleague and thus stain
his own illustrious name. He attempted, however, to decline,
giving as a reason the disagreement which had existed
between himself and Ney in Portugal. When this plea was
rejected he joined that portion of the court which voted for
sending Ney before the chamber of peers. They hoped thus
to save him ; but they would have done better il* they had
had the courage to try him themselves and acquit him.
When Ney had been condemned by the peers and shot, so far
from appeasing the rage of the royalist faction, his blood
made them implacable, and they soon began to persecute
Masséna himself. The people of Marseilles, whose benefactor
he had been, denounced him before the Chamber of Deputies
for peculation. There was no ground for the accusation, for
he had been guilty of no exactions in Provence, and so the
majority of the * ideal ' chamber, celebrated as it was for its
hatred towards the famous men of the Empire, rejected the
petition of the Marseilles people with contempt. It was at
this sitting that Manuel, since become famous, first came into
notice by his warm defence of Masséna. From that time
onwards the marshal lived in retirement at his château
of Rueil, and ended his glorious career in misfortune
and solitude on April 4, 1817. He was fifty-nine years
old.

When he died he had not yet received from the Govern-
ment his new marshals baton, and, as it is the custom to
place this on a marshal's coffin, his son-in-law, General Reille,
requested Clarke, Duke of Feltre, the Minister of War, to
forward it. But Clarke had become a furious legitimist, and
made no reply to this fair request. Then General Reille let
the court know that if the marshars baton was not sent for
his father-in-law's funeral, he would place conspicuously on
the coffin the one which the Emperor had given him in
former days, whereupon the Government agreed to send the
emblem.

o 2

196 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

I have noted many blemishes in the life of this famous
warrior, but they are covered by his renown and his signal
services to France, and Masséna's memory will go down ta
posterity as that of one of the greatest captains of an age so
fertile in illustrious soldiers.

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198 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

for my new destination when my leave was prolonged till the
end of March, a favour that was none the less agreeable
because I had not asked for it.

The 23rd Chasseurs was then in Swedish Pomerania, and,
wishing to join before the end of my leave, I left Paris on
March 15. I gave a place in my carriage to M. Durbach,
nephew of Marshal Mortier, a lieutenant in the same regi-
ment. My old servant, Woirland, had asked leave to stay
in Spain, hoping to make his fortune in a canteen, and I had
replaced him when I left Salamanca by a Pole named Lorenz
Schilkowski. He had been an Austrian uhlan and was not
lacking in wits, but was a drunkard like all the Poles, and,
unlike the soldiers 6f that nation, as cowardly as a hare.
But, besides his native tongue, Lorenz spoke French a little,
German and Russian perfectly, and in these respects was
exceedingly valuable to me for a war in the north.

As we were starting at night from the post-house of
Kaiserslantem, the postiKon upset my carriage into a quag-
mire and it was broken. Nobody was hurt, but M. Durbach
and I both said : ' A bad omen for soldiers who will soon be
in presence of the enemy.' However, after a day spent in
repairing damages, we were able to proceed, but the springs
and wheels were so much injured that they broke six times
during the journey, causing us much delay, and making us
do several leagues on foot in the snow. At length we reached
the shores of the Baltic, and found the 23rd Chasseurs in
garrison at Stralsund and Greifswald.

I found Colonel de la Nougarède an excellent man, culti-
vated and capable, but so prematurely aged by gout that he
had to travel constantly in a carriage — a melancholy way for
the commander of a light cavalry regiment to move. He
received me most kindly, and after explaining to me his
reasons for remaining with the regiment, he showed me a
letter in which the Count of Lobau informed him of the
reasons which led the Emperor to place me with him. So
far from being hurt by this, he regarded it as an additional
kindness on the Emperor's part, and as holding out hopes
that he would soon be appointed general, or commander of

My New Regiment 199

gendarmerie. He expected, with my help, to be able at
least to take some part in the campaign, and obtain what he
desired at the first review held by the Emperor. Therefore,
to associate me in the command more than my position as
senior major would naturally imply, he assembled the officers,
and in their presence delegated his powers provisionally to
me, bidding each obey me without reference to him, since his
weak health often made it impossible for him to keep suffi-
ciently near the regiment for him to command it in person,
A general order to this efiect was drawn up, and from that
day I became in everything but rank a regimental com-
mander, and the regiment soon became accustomed to regard
me as its actual commander. Since that time I have com-
manded army cavalry regiments, either as colonel or as a
general officer, and I have been for a long time inspector of
that arm ; but I can safely say that, if I ever saw a regin^ent
in as good condition as the 23rd Chasseurs, I never saw a
better. It was not that it contained men of surpassing merit,
such as I have occasionally known in other regiments, but if
there was no man in the 23rd of extraordinary ability, there
was not one who was not thoroughly up to his duty. All
were on the same level of courage and zeal : there was no
weak spot. The officers, highly intelligent and sufficiently
well trained, were all of excellent character, and lived
together as true brethren in arms. It was the same with the
non-commissioned officers, and the troopers followed their
good example. Nearly all were veterans of Austerlitz, Jena,
Friedland, and Wagram, and most had three, or at least two,
good-conduct stripes ; those who had only one were a small
minority. They were a splendid lot of men, from Normandy,
Alsace, Lorraine, and Franche-Comté, provinces well known
for military spirit and love of horses. General Bourcier,
when charged with the general remounting, had been so
struck with the stature of the men that he had given them
larger and stouter horses than the chasseurs usually have, so
that this regiment was called the carbiniers of the light
cavalry. Their long stay in Germany had brought men and
horses into perfect condition ; and when I took the command

200 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

of the regiment it had an effective strength of over 1,000
fighting men, well-disciplined, calm, and able to hold their
tongues, especially in presence of the enemy.

I got my horses firom the island of Rtigen, where there is
a good breed, and from Rosbock, seven in all. This was
none too many, for war with Russia was clearly imminent.
I had foreseen it since the summer of 1811, when I noticed
how the Emperor was withdrawing men from the Peninsula
to reinforce his Guard, and while staying in Paris my con-
victions of it had been strengthened. Rumours of strained
relations — vanishing during the diversions of the winter, but
always reviving in a more definite form — finally grew stronger,
till they reached almost the point of certainty in consequence
of a serious occurrence, which, as it was discussed throughout
Europe, I ought to relate here.

The Emperor Alexander had been brought up with a
young Russian noble called Czemicheff, whom, when he came
to the throne, he had appointed his aide-de-camp. In 1809,
when Alexander, as Napoleon's ally, was preliending to be at
war with Austria, we saw Colonel Czemicheff arrive at
Vienna, ostensibly charged with maintaining good relations
between Napoleon and Alexander ; but with the secret duty
of keeping his sovereign informed of our successes and
reverses, so that he might maintain or dissolve his alliance
with France, as circumstances indicated. Alexander's
favourite was kindly received by Napoleon, and was always
by his side during the period preceding the battle of Essling,
but when the result of that sanguinary action appeared
doubtful, and cannon-balls began to drop among the imperial
staff, M. de Czemicheff rode off out of the way of danger,
and two days after the battle started for St. Petersburg,
no doubt to relate the failure of our attempt. Napoleon
regarded his conduct as very unseemly, and let fall sharp gibes
upon the courage of the Russian colonel. After the peace,
however, Czemicheff came often to Paris, and, being handsome,
amiable, and exquisitely polite, was well received, not only at
<îourt but also in the drawing-rooms of the best society. He
never talked politics, and had the reputation of being much

CZERNICHEFF 20 1

in favour with ladies. Towards the end of 1811, however,
when the rumours of war revived, the police had information
that the Russian colonel, while feigning to be devoted to
pleasure, was concerned in suspicious dealings connected with
politics. He was carefully watched, and it soon became known

that he had frequent interviews with M. X , an

official in the War Office, whose special duty it was to draw
up the ' stotes ' presented every ten days to the Emperor,
showing the strength and condition of every arm in the service.
Not only was CzemichefF recognised when walking after
midnight in the darkest parts of the Champs Elysées with

the French official, but he was often seen to enter X 's

lodgings dressed in shabby clothes, and stay there several
hours. This intimacy on the part of a person of high rank
with a poor War Office clerk was clear proof that the latter
was in the pay of the former for the betrayal of state secrets,
and the Emperor gave orders to arrest M. de Czemicheff.
He was, however, warned, it is said by a woman, and leaving
Paris at once travelled by the least-frequented roads, and
reached the Rhine frontier, avoiding Mainz and Cologne,
whither orders for his seizure had been telegraphed. As for
the poor clerk, he was arrested at the very moment when he
was counting a sum of 300,000 francs in bank notes, the
price of his treason. Compelled by the evidence to admit
his crime, he stated that another War Office clerk had sold
documents to the Russian colonel. He, too, was arrested, and
both were tried, condemned, and shot. They died cursing
Czemicheff, who, they said, had sought them out in their
garrets and seduced them by the sight of a heap of gold which
he kept increasing as long as they had any hesitation. The
Emperor caused a virulent article against M. de Czemicheff
to be published in all the French papers, adding remarks
which, indirect as they were, must have deeply wounded the
Russian Emperor, for they recalled the fact that Alexander
had never punished the murderers of his father Paul.

After this there could be no further question about war,
and although it was not yet declared, open preparations for it
were made on both sides. Czemicheff's conduct, although

202 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

blamed in words by everybody, yet found specially among^
diplomatists some who approved it in secret, on the strength
of the famous adage : Solus patriae prima lex. On this point
too, they recalled a little-known anecdote which I had from
Marshal Lannes, proving that while Napoleon punished, and
rightly, Frenchmen who sold their country's secrets to the
enemy, he was accustomed to corrupt foreign officials who could
furnish him with information likely to be useful in war. The
story, as Lannes told it me at Vienna in 1809, was as follows.
When hostilities between France and Austria were on the
point of breaking out, the Archduke Charles was anonymously
informed that a certain general, whom he valued highly and
had just appointed deputy-chief of his staff, had sold himself
to General Andréossi, the French ambassador, and had fre-
quent interviews with him at night in an empty house in the
Leopoldstadt, the number of which was given. So high was
the Archduke's esteem for the general, that he treated the
accusation, brought by a person who dared not name himself,
as a foul calumny, and took no steps to verify it. Just when
the French ambassador, having asked for his passports, was
about to leave Vienna within forty-eight hours, a second
anonymous letter came, informing the Archduke that his
deputy-chief of the staff, after working alone in his room,
where the ' states ' of the army were kept, was to have that
night a final meeting with General Andréossi. Wishing ta
put out of his mind any suspicion which he feared might linger
against an officer whom he liked, the Archduke resolved to
establish his innocence for himself. Dressing, therefore, in
ordinary civil clothes, and accompanied only by his senior
aide-de-camp, he took his stand after midnight in the darkest
part of the side-street where the house in question stood.
After a few moments' waiting, they saw a man, in whom,
though disguised, they were grieved to recognise the deputy-
chief of the staff. At a signal from him, the door was
opened ; and a few seconds later. General Andréossi entered
in the same manner. The interview lasted some hours, during
which the disgusted Archduke, who could no longer doubt as
to the treason of his subordinate, waited patiently before the

Plot and Counterplot 203.

house. At length the door opened, and General Andréossi
came out with the Austrian general, meeting the Archduke
full in face. He said aloud, ' Good evening, Mr. French
Ambassador,' then disdaining to address any words of reproach
to his deputy-chief of the staff, he merel;^ turned a dark
lantern on to him. But the aide-de-camp, less cautious,
tapped the wretch on the shoulder, observing : ' Look at that
infamous traitor, General So-and-so, who will be degraded
to-morrow ! ' The ambassador slunk away without a word-
As for the Austrian general, caught in flagranti delicto, and
knowing what he had to expect, he went home and blew his
brains out. The tragedy was studiously hushed up by the
Austrian Government, and made little noise ; it was given
out that the deputy-chief of the staff had died from a sudden
apoplectic seizure. He appears to have received two millions
from the French ambassador.

One curious feature about Colonel Czemicheff's business-
was, that at the moment when Napoleon was complaining of
the means employed by him to obtain the ^ states ' of our
armies, General Lauriston, our ambassador at St. Petersburg,
was buying, not only the most accurate information about the*
position and strength of the Russian army, but also the
engraved copperplates from which the great map of the
Russian Empire had been printed. In spite of the vast
difficulties in the transport of this heavy mass of metal, the
treason was so well arranged, and so handsomely paid for,
that these plates were abstracted from the archives of the
Russian Government and carried into France without their
disappearance being discovered, either by the police or by the
customs officials. As soon as the plates reached Paris, the War-
Office, after substituting French for Russian characters in the
names of places and rivers, had this fine map printed, and the
Emperor ordered a copy to be sent to all the generals and com-
manders of light cavalry regiments. Thus I received one, which
I succeeded, with some difficulty, in saving during the retreat,
as it forms a large roll. The map contained all Russia ; even
Siberia and Kamschatka, which considerably amused those who-
received it. Very few brought theirs back, but I have got mine.

CHAPTER XXI

The Emperor's most powerful motive for war \vith Russia
was his wish to compel her to cany out the treaty signed at
Tilsit in 1807. By this the Emperor Alexander had under-
taken to close all his ports to England ; but this had never
been carried out otherwise than very imperfectly. Napoleon
rightly thought that he could ruin the English, an essentially
manufacturing and trading people, if he could succeed in
destroying their commerce with the continent ; but the
execution of this gigantic scheme involved such difficulties
that only France proper was really subject to the commercial
restrictions, and even there, the licences of which I have
already spoken broke into them considerably. As for Italy,
Germany, and the Illyrian provinces, the application of the
continental system, though established by imperial decree,
was quite illusory, both from the extent of the coast line and
by the connivance and defective vigilance of those who
iidministered the districts. Thus the Emperor of Russia,
when summoned by France to forbid all commercial relations
with England, replied by pointing to the exceptions which
had become almost the rule throughout Europe. But the
real reason for Alexander's refusal to comply with Napoleon's
claims was his fear of being assassinated like the Emperor
Paul, his father, the cause of complaint against whom was
that he had wounded the national self-esteem by his alliance
with France, and destroyed Russian commerce by going to
war with England. Now Alexander began to see that by
showing deference and friendship to Napoleon at Erfurt and
Tilsit he had already alienated people's minds, and he had now
to fear that by suspending all trade with England, the only
outlet which the Russian nobility had for the produce of their

Wai^ Impending 205

vast estates, he would supply them with a fresh ground of
complaint. The death of Paul I. had shown the danger to
which an Emperor of Russia exposed himself by taking such
a step, and Alexander had all the more reason to fear, that
he saw about him the same officers who had been about his
father, among them Benningsen, his chief of staff.

Napoleon, when threatening Alexander with war if he
did not accede to his wishes, hardly took into account the
difficulties of his position. However, when he learnt the
reverses which he had undergone in Spain and Portugal, he
seemed to hesitate about engaging in a war of which the
result seemed very uncertain. General Bertrand told me
how Napoleon often repeated at St. Helena that at first his
only idea was to frighten the Emperor Alexander into carry-
ing out the treaty. ' We were,' he would say, ' like two
equally good fencers, who seem ready to try conclusions, but
neither one nor the other quite liking it. They advance by
small steps, threatening with eye and with blade, each
hoping that fear of crossing swords will make his enemy
give way.'

But the Emperor's comparison was not exact ; for one of
the fencers had behind him a bottomless abyss ready to en-
gulf him if he took a step backwards; and thus placed
between an ignominious death and the necessity of fighting
with some chance of success, he was bound to take the latter
course. Such was the situation of Alexander, made still
worse by the intrigues of the Englishman, Wilson, with
General Benningsen and the officers of his staff.

Still Napoleon hesitated, and seemed willing to listen to
the prudent counsels of Caulaincourt, formerly ambassador
at St. Petersburg. He questioned French officers who had
lived in Russia, and knew the country and its resources.
Among them was Lieutenant-Colonel de Ponthon, one of the
engineer officers whom Napoleon had, at Alexander's re-
quest, authorized, and even asked, to enter the Russian
service after the Peace of Tilsit. He was an able and very
modest man, and did not give his opinion until the Emperor
questioned him ; then, like an honourable man devoted to

2o6 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

his country, he felt bound to speak the whole truth, and,
without fear of displeasing the head of the state, he pointed
out all the obstacles in the way of his enterprise. The
chief of these were, the apathy of the Lithuanian provinces,
and the unlikelihood of their offering any support; the
fanatical resistance of the Russians proper ; the scarcity of
provisions and forage, the need of crossing almost desert
regions, the impracticability of the roads for artillery after
some hours' rain ; but, above all, he insisted on the rigour of
the winter, and the physical impossibility of fighting after the
snow fell, which it usually did in the early days of October.
Finally, with real courage, because he was running the risk
of giving displeasure and compromising his own career, M.
de Ponthon went so far as to fall at the Emperor's knees and
entreat him in the name of the fortunes of France and his
•own glory, not to undertake this dangerous expedition, all
the disasters of which he predicted. The Emperor heard him
.calmly, and took leave of him without remark. For several
days he was pensive, and the rumour got about that the
expedition was postponed. But very soon the Duke of
Bassano brought the Emperor back to his original plan, and
it was said that Marshal Davout was no stranger to Napo-
leon's resolution of moving the army of Germany to the
banks of the Niémen. From that moment, although M. de
Ponthon remained in the Emperor's immediate service and
went everywhere with him, Napoleon never spoke to him
.again during the whole march to Moscow, and when on the
retreat he was forced to admit that that excellent officer's
prevision had been only too completely verified, he avoided
meeting him. Nevertheless, he promoted him to full colonel.
Let us, however, not anticipate events, and let us return
to the preparations which Napoleon was making to persuade or
■coerce Russia into accepting his conditions. In April the
French troops in Germany and those of the allied princes of the
Germanic confederation were set in motion, and their march
towards Poland was delayed only by the difficulty of procuring
forage. Meanwhile the Emperor left Paris on May 9, and,
cwith the Empress, betook himself to Dresden. He was

The Start for Moscow 207

awaited there by his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria,
and nearly all the German princes, some drawn by the hope
of seeing their States extended, others by fear of displeasing
the arbiter of their destiny. The only king absent was the
King of Prussia. Not belonging to the Confederation of the
Rhine, he had not been summoned to the meeting, and dared
not present himself without Napoleon's leave. For this he
humbly begged, and when he had obtained it, hastened to
make another among the crowd of sovereigns who had
repaired to Dresden to pay their court to the all-powerful
conqueror of Europe.

The protestations of fidelity and devotion which were
there lavished on Napoleon dazzled him till they made him
commit a most serious mistake in the organisation of the
contingents which were to compose the Grand Army. Instead
of weakening the Governments of Austria and Prussia, his
former foes, by requiring them to contribute the larger part
of their available troops, whom prudence would have enjoined
him to place in the advanced guard, as much to spare French
blood as to enable him to keep an eye on his new and
wavering allies. Napoleon not only contented himself with
taking 30,000 men from each of these Powers, but employed
them on the wings of his army. The Austrians, under Prince
Schwarzenberg, were on the right, in Volhynia ; the Prussians,
whom he placed under a French marshal, Macdonald, formed
the left ; the centre was composed of French troops and the
contingents from the Confederation of the Rhine. The faults
of this organisation struck many intelligent men, who were
sorry to see the wings of the Grand Army composed of
foreigners, who, placed on the frontiers of their own countries,
were in a position to form, in case of a reverse, two armies in
our rear, while our centre, consisting of trustworthy troops,
would be deep within the Russian Empire. Austria was
retaining 120,000 soldiers ready to act against us in case of
our failure, Prussia had 60,000 men over and above her con-
tingent. It is astonishing that the Emperor took so little
heed of what he was leaving behind him, but so confident
was he that, when the King of Prussia begged him to allow

2o8 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

his eldest son (the present King *) to go with him as aide-de-
camp, Napoleon, although the young prince would have been
a valuable hostage for the loyalty of his father, would not
consent. It was a remarkable fact that, while the Austrian
generals expressed their satisfaction at the union of their
flag with ours, the inferior oflScers and the men regretted
having to march against Russia. In the Prussian contingent
it was just the contrary. The generals and colonels felt
humiliated at being obliged to serve their conqueror, while
the junior oflScers and the soldiers rejoiced at the opportunity
of fighting beside the French, to show that, if they had been
beaten in the Vienna campaign, it was not for want of xîourage
but because they had been badly led.

Besides enclosing the Grand Army between Austrian and
Prussian contingents. Napoleon had lowered the tone of the
French troops by mingling foreign regiments with them.
Thus the first corps commanded by Marshal Davout reckoned on
June 1st 67,000 men, of whom 58,000 were French, the balance
consisting of Germans, Spaniards, and Poles. In the second
corps under Oudinot, with 34,000 French, there were 1,600
Portuguese, 1,800 Croats, and 7,000 Swiss. In Ney's corps,
the third, the proportion of French was even smaller, while
in the fourth and sixth corps, united under Eugène Beau-
hamais, the French composed less than one-half, the re-
mainder being Croats, Bavarians, Spaniards, Dalmatians, and
Italians, and of the 44,000 cavalry under Murat 27,000 only
were French. It is not my intention here to name all the
forces at Napoleon's disposal when he entered Russia, but I
wished to show to what extent the French element was
mingled with foreigners, who were themselves in the most
heterogeneous confusion with regard to language, manners,
customs, and interest ; all served very badly, aud often para-
lysed the eflTorts of the French troops. This was one of the
principal causes of the reverses which we underwent.

Leaving Dresden on July 29,^ the Emperor went
towards Poland, by way of Dantzig and Prussia Proper-

» Frederick WiUiam IV., King of Prussia, 1840-60.

[' So in the original, bat July is obviously an error for May.]

A CoLONEiJs Ordeal 209

His troops were crossing this country at the same time, and
he reviewed them as he came up with them. The 23rd
Mounted Chasseurs was brigaded with the 24th. This
brigade, commanded by General Castex, formed part of the
2nd army corps, under Marshal Oudinot. I had known
General Castex for some time; he was an excellent man,
and I got on perfectly with him throughout the campaign.
Marshal Oudinot had seen me at the siege of Genoa, as well
as in Austria, in 1809, and he treated me with much
kindness. On June 20 the 2nd corps was ordered to halt
at Insterburg, to be reviewed by the Emperor. These
military solemnities were always awaited with impatience
by those persons who hoped to share in the favours which
Napoleon distributed on such occasions. I was of the
number, believing myself all the more certain to be appointed
colonel of the regiment that, besides the promises which the
Emperor had made to me, General Castex and Marshal
Oudinot had told mQ that they were going to recommend
me officially, and that they believed that M. de la Nougarôde
was going to be placed, with the rank of general, at the
head of one of the grand re-mount depots which would
be established in rear of the army. But the same fatality
which had so frequently postponed the delivery of my
commission as major" pursued me afresh in obtaining that of
colonel. The reviews involved severe examinations by the
Emperor of the regimental commanders, especially on the
eve of a campaign. Besides the usual questions as to the
numerical strength in men and horses, he used to address a
heap of unexpected queries which people were not always
prepared to answer. For instance, * How many men have
you had from such a department in the last two years?
How many carbines from Tulle or frt)m Charleville ? How
many Norman horses have you ? How many Breton ?
How many German? How many men of that troop have
got three stripes ? How many two, or one ? What is the
average age of your soldiers ? Of your officers ? Of your
horses?' and so on. These questions, always put in a
short, imperative tone, accompanied with a piercing glance,

VOL. II. p

210 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

put many colonels out of countenance ; and yet woe to him
who hesitated to answer : he got a bad mark in Napoleon's
mind. I had prepared myself so well that I had an answer
for everything, and the Emperor, after complimenting me
on the fine condition of the regiment, would probably have
named me colonel, and promoted M. de la Nougarède
general. But just then the latter, with his legs wrapped
in flannel, had got hoisted on his horse, to follow the move-
ments of his regiment at a distance, while I commanded in
his place, and, hearing his name, came up to Napoleon and
irritated him by an untimely request on behalf of an officer,
a relation of his, who was unworthy of any interest. This
request raised a storm of which I experienced the recoil.
Napoleon flew into a violent rage, ordered the gendarmes to
expel the officer in question from the army, and galloped
away, leaving La Nougarède confounded ; so he was not
made general. Marshal Oudinot having followed the
Emperor to inquire his orders with regard to the 23rd
Chasseurs, his Majesty replied, * Let Major Marbot continue
to command it.' Before I obtained coloners rank I was to
be wounded again, and that severely.

To do M. de la Nougarède justice, I must say that he
expressed in the frankest manner his regret at having been
the involuntary cause of the delay in my promotion. I was
much concerned by the worthy man's awkward position;
he feared that he had lost the Emperor's confidence, and
at the same time his infirmity prevented him from recovering
it by good conduct in battle.

I had been fortunate enough on the review day to obtain
all the promotions and decorations which I had asked for on
behalf of my officers and men ; and, as the gratitude for these
favours always falls upon the commander who has secured
them, my influence in the regiment increased considerably,
and mitigated my regi'et at not having been promoted to the
rank of which I was discharging the functions. At this
time I received letters from Marshal Masséna and the
Maréchale, the former commending to me M. Renique, the
latter her son Prosper. I was touched by this attention,

Historians of the Campaign 211

and accepted both as captains in my regiment ; but Prosper
Masséna never came to Russia ; nor could he, indeed, have
borne the climate.

We were now close upon the Russian frontier, and once
more about to see the Niémen, which had been our limit in
1807. The army was arranged in the following order. The
Austrians, under Schwarzenburg, on the extreme right ; to
his left between Bielostock and Grodno, two army corps
under King Jerome, and next to them Eugène Beauhamais ;
the centre faced Kowno, consisting of 220,000 combatants,
under Murat, Ney, Oudinot, Lefebvre, and Bessières; the
Emperor being with it in person. Macdonald, with 35,000
Prussians, formedj as I have said, the left wing at Tilsit.
Behind the Niémen was the Russian army, 400,000 strong,
commanded by the Emperor Alexander, or rather by
Benningsen. It was divided into three principal corps under
Bagration, Barclay de Tolly, and Wittgenstein.

Four historians have written on the campaign of 1812.
The first was Labaume, a mapping engineer — a member, that
is, of a corps which, although part of the military establish-
ment, never went into action, and only accompanied the army
for surveying purposes. He never commanded troops, and
had no practical knowledge of the art of war. His judg-
ments are, therefore, usually incorrect, even when not unjust to
the French army. As, however, Labaume's work appeared
soon after the restoration of Louis XVIII., party spirit, as
well as the desire for information about the terrible events of
the Russian campaign, gave it some celebrity, increased by
the fact that no one took the trouble to refute it, and thus
the public got into the way of regarding its accuracy as
unquestioned.

The second narrative is that of Colonel Boutourlin, aide-
de-camp to the Emperor Alexander. This work, although
written by an enemy, contains much sensible criticism, and
if the author is not always strictly accurate it is for want of
documents, for he has impartially done all that was in his
power to discover the truth, and is in general esteem as
having written like an honourable man.

p 2

212 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Labaume's libellous work was already forgotten when
General the Count de Ségur published, in 1825, a third
history of the campaign of 1812. More than one survivor
of that campaign was distressed by the spirit of the work,
and even our enemies called it a military romance. It had
nevertheless a great success, both from the purity and elegance
of its style, and on account of the reception which it had
from the court and the ultra-royalist party. The old oflScers
of the Empire, feeling that they were attacked, charged
General Gourgaud to reply. He did it successfully, but in
too bitter a fashion, and a duel resulted between him and
M. de Ségur, who was wounded. It must be owned that if the
latter shows little favour to Napoleon and his army , General
Gourgaud is too flattering, for he will see none of the
Emperor's mistakes. I certainly have no intention of writing
the history afresh, but I think I ought to record the principal
facts, since they form an essential part of the period in which
I have lived, and in many cases are connected with my
fortunes. I wish, however, in this brief summary to avoid
the contrary extremes into which Ségur and Gourgaud fell.
I will neither detract nor flatter: I will tell the truth.

At the moment when the two mighty empires were
about to clash together, England, Russia's natural ally, was
bound to make every effort to assist her to repel invasion.
By lavishing gold * on the Turkish Ministers the English
Cabinet succeeded in establishing peace between Eussia and
the Porte, thus enabling the former to call home her army, then
on the frontier of Turkey, which army played an important
part in the war. England had also arranged a peace between
the Emperor Alexander and Prance's natural ally, Sweden,
on whom Napoleon had all the more right to count, since
Bernadette had just been appointed Crown Prince, and was
governing the country in the name of the old King, his
adoptive father. I have already told you^ the curious

[ » This, of course, is * commoa form.' English gold had less to do with
the Treaty of Bucharest than the energy and ability of young Mr. Stratford
Canning, and the Bnglish Cabinet took very little hand in it.]

[ « Vol. i. p. 238.]

Swedes and Poles 213

concourse of circumstances by which Bernadette had been
raised to the position of heir-presumptive to the Swedish
crown. Afker all his assurances that he would remain a
Frenchman at heart, the new prince let himself be inveigled
or intimidated by the English, who could, indeed, easily have
overthrown him. He sacrificed the true interests of his new
country when he let himself be swayed by England and
allied himself with Kussia, as he did in a meeting with the
Emperor Alexander at the Finnish town of Abo. The
Russians had just conquered that province, and promised to
indemnify Sweden by the cession of Norway, which was
to be torn from Denmark, the too faithfiil ally of France.
Thus Bernadotte, instead of relying on our army to get back his
provinces, sanctioned these encroachments by placing himself
among the allies of Russia. If he would have acted with us
the geographical position of Sweden would have served our
common interests admLrably.

So far, however, the new Crown Prince did not definitely
take sides against us ; he waited till he could judge the
chances of victory, and did not declare himself till the next
year. Deprived of support from Turkey and Sweden,
Napoleon's only available allies towards the north were the
Poles : a turbulent race, whose forefathers, when they formed
an independent state, could not agree, and from whom no
moral or physical support could be hoped for. Indeed,
Lithuania and the other provinces of the former Poland had
in their forty years' subjection to Russia almost wholly lost
the remembrance of their ancient constitution, and regarded
themselves as Russians of old standing. The sons of the
nobles, accustomed to enter the Czar's armies, were not likely
to attach themselves to the French. With regard to those
Poles who were subject to Austria and Prussia, they marched
against Russia, but only under the flag of their present
sovereigns, with no enthusiasm for Napoleon. The grand
duchy of Warsaw, added to Saxony by the Treaty of Tilsit,
alone retained a trace of national feeling and attached itself
to France ; but what could so small a state do ? Still
Napoleon, confident alike in his might and in his genius,

214 ^^^ Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

resolved to cross the Niémen. On June 23, wearing the cap
and cloak of a Pole in his gurad, he examined the banks ;
and that evening at 10 p.m. ordered the passage to begin.
Three bridges of boats had been thrown across opposite Kowno,
and our troops occupied that town without resistance.

\ t.

CHAPTER XXn

When the sun rose on June 24 we witnessed a most im-
posing spectacle. On the highest point near the left bank
were seen the Emperor's tents. Around them, the slopes
of every hill and the valleys between were gay with men and
horses flashing with arms. Tîiis mass of 250,000 combatants
was rolling on in three huge columns with the most perfect
regularity towards the three bridges which crossed the river,
and over which the various corps were proceeding to the
right bank, each to advance in the direction prescribed to it.
On the same day our troops crossed the Niémen at other
points, near Grodno, Pilony, and Tilsit.

From a ' state ' furnished to me by General Gx)urgaud,
and scored all over with notes in Napoleon's hand, it appears
that the army which crossed the Niémen amounted to 325,000
men actually present, of whom 155,000 were French; and
984 guns. The 2nd corps, of which my regiment formed
part, crossed by the first bridge on June 23, and marched
direct for Janowo. It was intensely hot, and towards night
a heavy storm came on, with floods of rain. The army did
not, however, as has been stated, regard this as a bad omen ;
soldiers are well used to hail and thunder in summer time.
Moreover, the Russians had also their bad omen, for on the
same night the Emperor Alexander nearly lost his life during
a ball at Wilna, by the floor of a room giving way under his
chair, just at the time when the first French detachment was
landing on Russian soil. However, the storm made the
weather very cold, and our horses, who had to eat wet grass
and sleep on muddy ground, suffered a good deal. We also
lost some thousands of men from acute colic.

Beyond Kowno flows a small stream called the Wilia, the

2i6 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

bridge over which had been cut by the enemy; and the
storm having swollen it, Oudinot's leading scouts were
stopped. The Emperor came up just as I reached the spot
with my regiment. He ordered the Polish lancers to sound
the ford, and one man was drowned. I took down his name,
which was Tzinski. If I emphasise this detail it is because
the accident to the Polish lancer at the passage of the
Wilia has been vastly exaggerated. ^

Meanwhile the Russians were retiring, and the French
army soon occupied Wilna, the capital of Lithuania. Near
this town a cavalry action took place, in which Octave de
Ségur, elder brother of the general and historian, was
captured when leading a squadron of the 8th Hussars. On the
day when the Emperor entered Wilna, Marshal Ouidnot's
troops encountered the Russian corps under Wittgenstein at
Wilkomir, and the first serious engagement of the campaign
took place. I had never served imder Oudinot, and this
beginning confirmed my high opinion of his courage, but
still farther reduced that which I held of his military
talents.

One of the chief faults of the French in time of war is to-
pass without reason from the most minute caution to un-
bounded confidence. Thus the Russians having let us cross
the Niémen and occupy Wilna unopposed, it became the-
thing among some officers to say that the enemy would
always run away, and nowhere make a stand. Oudinot's
st^, and the marshal himself, often vented this opinion, and
treated the reports of the peasants as to a great Russian force
posted before the little town of Wilkomir as fables. This
incredulity was very near being the ruin of us, in this wise»
Light cavalry, being the eyes of an army, usually marches in
front and on the flank. My regiment then was a short
league in advance of the infantry divisions, when, on getting
near Wilkomir, without having seen a single enemy's picket
I found myself in front of a forest of mighty pines, among
which cavalry could easily move in sections, while the
branches ma^ed all distant view. Fearing an ambush, I

[ ' E.g. Scott (who follows Ségur), Life of Napoleon^ chap. Ivii.]

Across the Frontier 217

halted the regiment, and sent a single squadron forward to
reconnoitre. In a quarter of an hour the captain in com-
mand, a very intelligent man, returned with the news that
the enemy was present in force. Hastening to the extreme
edge of the forest, I saw, a cannon-shot away, the town of
Wilkomir, covered by a stream and a hill upon which were
drawn up in line 25,000 to 30,000 infantry, with cavalry and
ai'tillery. It may seem strange that these troops had thrown
out neither grand guards, nor pickets, nor scouts ; but when
the Russians mean to defend a strong position their way is
to let the enemy approach as near as possible without any
warning from the fire of skirmishers of the resistance with
which he is to meet ; and not till his masses are within easy
range do they open with artillery and musketry, so as to
bewilder and throw into confusion the enemy's soldiers. This
plan, which perhaps offers advantages, has often resulted
well for the Russians ; so Wittgenstein was preparing a
reception of this sort for us.

Matters seemed to me so serious that, without showing my
regiment, I withdrew it into the forest, and hastened off myself
to warn Marshal Oudinot of the state of affairs. I found him
outside the wood, having dismounted and halted his troops,
quietly breakfasting in the middle of his staff. I expected
that my report would draw him from this false security ; but
he received me with an incredulous air, and said, patting my
shoulder : * Oh, come ! here has Marbot just found 30,000
men for us to drub ! ' General Laurencez, his son-in-law
and chief of staff, was the only one who believed; he had
formerly been aide-de-camp to Augereau, and knew me of
old. So he took my part, remarking that when the commander

of a regiment says, ' I have seen ,' he ought to be believed ;

and that to neglect the warnings of light cavalry officers was
to run a great risk. This made the marshal reflect, and he
was beginning to ask me further questions about the enemy,
of whose presence he still seemed to have doubts, when a
captain on his staff, M. Duplessis, came up all out of breath,
to say that he had been all over the place, and even into the
forest, and had not seen a single Russian. Hearing this, the

2iS The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

marshal and his staff fell to laughing at my fears, much to my
vexation. I contained myself, however, knowing that the
tnith would soon appear.

Breakfast ended, the march was resumed, and I returned
to my regiment at the head of the column. As before, I took
it through the wood, for I foresaw what would happen as soon
as we emerged in front of the enemy's position. In spite of
all I could say Oudinot insisted on following a very broad
road cut straight through the forest ; but no sooner had he
got near the edge of it than the enemy, perceiving the
numerous group formed by the staff, opened a rolling fire
from their guns, which were placed facing the road so as to
enfilade it. The gilded squadron, lately so cheerful, was
thrown into disorder. Happily, no man was touched by the
balls, but the marshal's horse was killed, as well as those of
M. Duplessis and several others. I was well revenged, and .to
my shame I admit that I found it hard to conceal the satis-
faction which I felt at seeing all those who had laughed at>
my report and treated what I had said about the enemy's
presence as mere fancy running in all directions under a
storm of shot and jumping the ditches with all their might to
take shelter behind the great pines. Good General Lau-
rencez, whom I had advised to remain in the forest, laughed
heartily at the scene. I must do Marshal Oudinot the justice
of saying that he was hardly on horseback again when he
came to express his regret to me for what had happened at
breakfast, and begged me to give him information as to the
position of the Russians, and point out the ways by which he
could bring his infantry columns through the forest without
exposing them too much to artillery fire. Several officers
of the 23rd, who had explored the wood with me in the
morning, were bidden to guide the divisions. These were
received on emerging with a terrible cannonade, which might
have been avoided if, warned as we were of the presence of
the Russians, we had manoeuvred to turn their fiank instead
of marching straight on their front. Once out of the wood,
I was thus compelled to attack the position by the best
defended point, and to take the bull by the horns.

The First Engagement 219

At all events, our brave troops attacked the enemy with
resolution, and drove him back on all sides, until after two
hours' fighting he effected a retreat. This he did not do
without danger, for to accomplish it he had to pass through
the town and cross a bridge over a stream with steep banks.
The operation, always a difficult one when it has to be done
fighting, was begun in good order; but our field artillery
having come into position on a height commanding the town,
its fire soon carried disorder into the enemy's masses, and
they fled headlong towards the bridge. After crossing, instead
of re-forming their ranks we could see them flying in a crowd
over the plains on the opposite bank, their retreat soon
turning to a rout. The Toula regiment alone still held its
ground at the end of the bridge towards the town. Marshal
Oudinot was most anxious to force this passage and complete
his victory over the flying troops ; but as our infantry columns
had barely reached the suburbs, it would take them at least
a quarter of an hour to come up before the bridge, and every
moment was precious. My regiment, having made a suc-
cessful charge at the entrance of the town, was now assembled
on the promenade not far from the stream. The marshal
sent word to me to bring it up at a gallop, and as soon as we
reached him he ordered me to charge the battalions which
were covering the bridge, cross it, and at once pursue the
fugitives on the plain. Experienced soldiers know how hard
it is for cavalry to break a brave infantry which defends itself
with resolution in the streets of a town. I understood in
their full extent the dangers of my task ; but it was necessary
to obey at once, and, besides, I knew that a regimental
commander makes a favourable impression or otherwise on
his troops by his conduct in the first fights. My regiment
was composed of brave soldiers. I brought them along at a
gallop and charged the Russian grenadiers at their head.
These received us bravely with the bayonet; but so im-
petuous was our rush that they were nevertheless broken at
the first shock. Having once pierced the enemy's ranks, my
chasseurs, dexterously using their points, did fearful execution.
The enemy retired across the bridge, we following so closely

220 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

that they tried in vain to re-form ; they could not succeed in
doing so, our troopers being mixed up with them and killing
all whom they could reach. The Russian colonel fell dead, and
his regiment, losing heart at the loss of their commander, and
seeing the French light infantry already at the bridge, laid
down their arms. I lost six men killed and about a score
wounded, while we captured a colour and 2,000 prisoners.

After the fight I hastened on with my people into the
plain, where we took a great number of fugitives, many
horses, and several guns. Marshal Oudinot, who had seen
the whole affair from the town, came to compliment the
regiment. From this day he had a special predilection for it,
which it deserved in all respects. I was proud to command
such soldiers, and when the marshal informed me that he
intended to ask for a colonelcy for me I was quite afraid lest
the Emperor might renounce his first intention and give mo
the first vacant regiment. Things fall out strangely. The
action at Wilkomir, where the 23rd covered itself with glory,
very nearly became the cause of its destruction later on,
because the courage which it had shown on that occasion
caused it to be selected for an impracticable operation, of
which I shall presently speak.

But let us return to Wilna, where the Emperor was
beginning to meet with some of the difiiculties which were
to wreck his mighty enterprise. The first of these was the
organisation of Lithuania. This had to be done in such a
way as to attach to us not only the provinces still in Russian
operation, but also the duchy of Posen and Galicia, incor-
porated by treaty in Prussia and Austria, allies whom it wa&
at this moment of such importance to Napoleon to conciliate.
The most ardent among the Polish nobility proposed to Napoleon
to raise all the provinces and place more than 300,000 men
at his disposal as soon as he would ofiicially declare that all
the partitions of their country were annulled and the king-
dom of Poland reconstituted. But while he saw the advan-
tages which he might derive from this universal levy, the
Emperor could not disguise from himself that its first result
would be to set him at war with Prussia and Austria, who,

Polish Enthusiasm Cooling 221

rather than see those fair provinces torn from them, would
join forces with the Russians. Above all, however, he feared
the unstableness of the Polish nation, who, when they had
embroiled him with the three greatest Powers of the North,
would perhaps not keep their promises. He answered, there-
fore, that he would not recognise the kingdom of Poland
until the population showed itself worthy of independence by
rising against its oppressors. Thus they were revolving in
a vicious circle, Napoleon unwilling to recognise Poland
until it rose, and the Poles unwilling to act until their
nationality was reconstituted. Moreover, what proved that the
Emperor's only aim in invading Russia was to re-establish
the continental blockade was, that he had made no provision
for arming and equipping the troops which the Poles were to
raise.

■

However that may be, some influential noblemen, wishing
to force Napoleon's hand, formed themselves at Warsaw into a
national Diet, which was joined by a few deputies from different
' circles.' The first act of this assembly was to proclaim the
reconstitution and independence of the ancient kingdom of
Poland, which patriotic declaration made an immense stir
throughout all the provinces, whether Russian, Prussian, or
Austrian. For some days people believed in a general rising
wliich would probably have supported Napoleon; but this
unreflecting exaltation lasted but a short time, and barely a
few hundred Poles came to join us. So quickly did it cool
down, that the town and circle of Wilna could not fiirnish
more than twenty men for Napoleon's guard of honour. If
the Poles had displayed at that time a fraction of the energy
and enthusiasm which they showed in the insurrection of
1830-31, they would perhaps have recovered their indepen-
dence ; but, so far from coming to help the French troops,
they refused them the most necessary things, and in the
course of this campaign our soldiers had often to take by
force the provisions which the inhabitants, and especially the
nobles, concealed from us, and yet gave up on their first
demand to their persecutors the Russians. This partiality
in favour of our enemies disgusted the French soldiers, and

222 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

gave rise to some unpleasant scenes, which M. de Ségur calls
horrible pillage. But you cannot stop unlucky soldiers, worn
out by fatigue, and receiving no rations, from laying hands
upon the bread and the animals which they require to feed
them.

The necessity of maintaining order compelled the Emperor
to appoint prefects and sub-prefects chosen from among the
most enlightened Poles ; but their administration was illusory,
and did no service to the French army. The apathy of the
Lithuanian Poles arose mainly from the attachment of the
nobles to the Russian Government, which secured their rights
over the peasants, whose enfranchisement by the French they
dreaded. For all these Polish nobles, who were for ever
talking of liberty, held their peasants in the most brutal
serfdom.

Although the massing of French troops on their frontiers
must have given the Russians notice of the approaching com-
mencement of hostilities, the passage of the Niémen no less took
them by surprise ; nor did they oppose it at any point. Their
army retreated on the Dwina, on the left bank of which river,
at Drissa, they had constructed an immense entrenched camp.
The various French corps followed the enemy in all directions.
Murat commanded the cavalry of the advanced guard, and
came in contact every evening with the Russian rear-guard,
but after a slight engagement they would retire by forced
marches in the night ; nor was it ever possible to bring them
to a serious action.

CHAPTER XXIII

At our very first entry into Russia the enemy had committed
the huge blunder of allowing Napoleon to break their line,
with the result that the main body of their troops, led by the
Emperor Alexander and Barclay, had been thrown back to the
Dwina, while the remainder, under Bagration, was eighty
leagues distant, near Mir, on the Upper Niémen. Bagration's
plan was to rejoin the Emperor by way of Minsk; but
Davout, who was guarding that important point, drove him
back upon Bobrinsk, where he knew that Jerome Bonaparte
with 60,000 men ought to be on the look-out. Nothing but
the bungling of Jerome, who had not only misunderstood the
instructions of Davout, but also, refusing to recognise the
right to command which long and successful experience had
given to the marshal, wished to act on his own judgment,
saved Bagration from having to surrender. Even so,
Davout, following him up with his wonted temerity, over-
took him on the road to Mohileff, and, although he had at
the moment only 12,000 men, attacked and beat his force of
30,000. It is true that Bagration was taken by surprise on
ground too much enclosed to allow him to bring his whole
force into action. Thus pushed back, he crossed the Dnieper
low down at Novoï-Bychoff, and, being thenceforth safe from
Davout's attack, succeeded in rejoining the main Russian
army at Smolensk. In the course of his marches and
counter-marches to avoid Davout he surprised BordesouUe's
brigade of cavalry, and captured the entire 3rd Regiment of
Chasseurs, of which my friend Saint-Mars was colonel.

The capture of Bagration's corps would have had immense
results for Napoleon, and his anger against King Jerome for
having let him escape was terrible. He ordered him to leave

224 ^^^ Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

the army on the spot and return to Westphalia. This
severe if unavoidable measure produced in the army an
effect unfavourable to King Jerome ; but was he really most
to blame? His chief fault was having thought that his
dignity as sovereign was inconsistent with taking in-
structions from a marshal ; but the Emperor, who knew quite
well that the young prince had never in his life set a battalion
in the field, nor taken part in the very smallest action, was
surely to blame for allowing him to make his start with an
army of 60,000 men, and that in such serious circumstances.
General Junot replaced Jerome, and it was not long before
he too committed an irreparable blunder.

About this time the Emperor of Eussia sent to Napoleon,
who was still at Wilna, one of his Ministers, Count Bala-
khoff*. The object of this interview has never been known.
Some persons supposed that there was talk of an armistice ;
but they were quickly undeceived by Count Balakhofi''s de-
parture, and it was soon known that the English party, which
was very influential in the Russian court and army, had
taken offence at his mission. Dreading lest any personal
intercourse should take place between Alexander and Napo-
leon, they required that the Emperor of Russia should leave
the army and return to St. Petersburg. Alexander agreed
to this, but insisted on taking his brother Constantino with
him. The Russian generals, when left to themselves and in-
fluenced by Wilson,^ only thought of giving the war such a
ferocious character as might terrify the French. With this
view they ordered their troops to make a desert behind
them by burning houses and everything which they could
not carry away.

On July 15 the columns under Murat, Ney, Montbrun,
Nansouty, and Oudinot had reached the Dwina. The last-
named, probably misunderstanding the Emperor's orders,
made an erratic march, and, descending the Dwina by the
left bank, while Wittgenstein's corps was going up it on the
opposite side, he appeared before the town of Dunaborg.
The fortifications were old and bad, and he hoped to carry

[ » Sir R. Wilson did not join the Russian army till August 14.]

DÛNABORG 22 S

the bridge, cross the river, and attack Wittgenstein in rear.
But Wittgenstein on leaving Dilnaborg had left there a
strong garrison, with plenty of artillery. My regiment was,
as usual, with the advanced guard, which Oudinot was that
day leading in person. Ddnaborg stands on the right bank,
and as we came up on the left bank we found it defended by
A considerable work which acts as a f&U de pont to the bridge,
which connects the place itself with its outworks beyond the
river, here very broad. A quarter of a league from the for-
tifications, on which Oudinot averred that there were no guns,
I espied a Russian battalion, with its left resting on the river
and its front covered by the huts of an abandoned camp —
a position in which it was very difficult to get at the enemy.
The marshal, however, told me to attack them ; and, leaving
the task of avoiding the huts and passing through the intervals
between them to the intelligence of my officers, I gave the
word to charge. But hardly had the regiment advanced a
few paces, amid a hail of bullets from the Russian infimtry,
when the artillery, whose existence the marshal had denied,
began to thunder from the fortifications. So close were we
that the shrapnel passed over our heads before it had time
to burst. One of the few roundnshot which came with it
passed through a fisherman's house, and broke the leg of one
of my best trumpeters, who was sounding, the charge beside
me. I lost several men at this point.

Marsbel Oudinot, who had made the serious mistake of
attacking a camp of huts protected by cannon and musketry,
hoped to dislodge the enemy's infiuitry by sending a Portuguese
battalion against them ; but these foreigners, old prisoners of
war who had been enlisted in France rather unwillingly, did
not face the fire with any energy, and we were still exposed.
Seeing that Oudinot was maintaining his position under the
enemy's bullets bravely enough, but without giving any orders,
I saw that if this state of things lasted a few minutes longer
my regiment would be destroyed. So I ordered my chasseurs
to open out and charge the Russian in&ntry in loose order,
which had the advantage both of making them give way and
of stopping the artillery fire, the gunners being afraid of

VOL. II. Q

226 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

hitting their own men. Under the sabres of my troopers the
defenders of the camp fled in disorder towards the Uie dje
2)ont; but the garrison entrusted with the defence of tliat
work consisted of newly enlisted soldiers, who, fearing to see
us enter with their comrades, closed the gates in a hurry,
compelling the fugitives to make for the bridge of boats in
order to reach the other bank and take shelter in the town.
This bridge had no rail, the boats were unsteady, the river
wide and deep, and on the other side I saw the garrison
making ready to close the gates. To advance further seemed
to me madness, so, thinking that the regiment had done
enough, I halted it. Just then the marshal came up, crying
* Brave 23rd ! do as you did at Wilkomir : cross the bridge,
force the gates, and capture the town.' In vain did General
Laurencez try to make him see that the difiiculty here was
much greater, and that a cavalry regiment could not attack a
fortress, however badly guarded, if to get there it had to cross
a bad bridge of boats two abreast. The marshal was obstinate.
He said they would profit by the enemy's disorder and fright,
and ordered me afresh to march on the town. I obeyed ; but
I had scarcely reached the first compartment of the bridge
with my leading section, at the head of which I had felt
bound in honour to place myself, when the garrison, having
succeeded in closing the gate towards the river, appeared on
the top of the ramparts and opened fire upon us. The narrow
front which we presented ofiering but a small mark to un-
practised soldiers, the fire caused us much less loss than I
should have expected. But when the defenders of the fête (le
pont heard the fortress firing on us they i*ecovered from their
scare and began themselves to take a hand in the game.
Seeing the 23rd thus placed between two fires, and unable to
advance beyond the near end of the shaky bridge. Marshal
Ondinot sent me the order to retire. The wide spaces which
I had left between my sections allowed them to wheel round
without too much disorder, yet two men and their horses fell into
the river and were drowned. To regain the left bank we had to
pass again under the ramparts of the tête dspont, and were again
received with a rolling fire, which, very fortunately, proceeded

A Useless Attempt 227

from unskilful militiamen. If we had had to do with soldiers
well accustomed to musketry practice the regiment must have
been exterminated. As it was, this unlucky engagement, so
imprudently brought about, cost us some thirty men killed
and many wounded. One might at least have hoped that the
marshal would rest content with this fruitless attempt, espe-
cially when, as I said before, he had no instructions from the
Emperor to take Dunaborg ; but when his infantry came up
he ordered a fresh attack upon the Uie de pont. The enemy
had had time to strengthen the garrison of this, troops having
hastened up from their cantonments at the sound of the
cannon, and our men were repulsed with far heavier loss than
the 23rd Chasseurs had suffered. Marshal Oudinot waa
blamed by the Emperor for this useless attempt.

My regiment was brigaded, as you know, with the 24th.
General Castex had from the first day of the brigade's forma-
tion made an admirable arrangement of duty. Each of the
two regiments, in turns of twenty-four hours, acted as.
advanced guard when we were going towards the enemy, and
as rear-guard in retreating, supplied pickets, reconnoitring
parties, and so forth ; while the other, following easily, rested
from the fatigues of the previous day and made ready for
those of the morrow, being at the same time always ready to
support its fellow if that had to do with a superior force.
By this system the soldiers were never separated from their
comrades and their own oflScers, nor mixed up with those of
the other regiment. In the night one half of the brigade
slept while the other mounted guard. Of course everything
has its inconveniences, and it might happen that one regiment
should chance to be more often for duty on days when serious
engagements took place, as was the case with the 23rd at
Wilkomir and Dunaborg. Indeed, this was its luck through-
out most of the campaign; but it did not complain. It
always came off with honour, and frequently was envied by
the 24th, which got fewer opportunities of distinguishing
itself.

Meanwhile Ney's coi-ps, as well as Murat's immense
cavalry reserve, were going up by the left bank of the Dwina

a 2

228 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

towards Polotsk, Wittgenstein's army taking the same direc-
tion by the right bank. Having thus the river between them
and the enemy, our troopers kept a bad look-out, and, as the
French habit is, bivouacked every night much too near the river
bank. Wittgenstein, observing this, let Ney's infantry and
most of Montbrun's cavalry pass on. Sebastiani's division
brought up the rear of the column, its rear-guard being formed
by the brigade under Saint-Geniès, formerly an officer in the
Army of Egypt, a brave man but not very capable. Having
reached a point opposite the little town of Druia, Saint-Geniès,
by Sebastiani's orders, fixed his bivouac two hundred yards
from the river, believing it impassable except by boat. But
Wittgenstein knew of a practicable ford, and under cover of
night passed a cavalry division across the stream. Falling
on the French army, this carried off nearly the whole of
Saint-Geniès' brigade, took the general prisoner, and forced
Sebastiani to withdraw on Montbrun's corps promptly with
the rest of his division. After this smart stroke Wittgen-
stein recalled his troops to the right bank and marched on up
the Dwina. The affair did much discredit to Sebastiani, and
brought him a reprimand from the Emperor.

Not long after this untoward event Oudinot received
orders to go up the Dwina and rejoin Ney and Montbrun.
His corps, taking the same route which the others had taken,
came past the town of Druia. The marshal's plan was to
encamp three leagues further on ; but, fearing that the enemy
might take advantage of the ford to attack his large baggage
train, he decided that while he with the army moved on a
regiment of Castex's brigade should pass the night, with
orders to watch the ford, on the ground where Saint-Geniès
had been surprised. My regiment was for duty that day, and
the dangerous task of remaining opposite Dwina alone fell to
it. I knew that most of Wittgenstein's army had gone on
up the river ; but I could see that he had left near the ford
two strong cavalry regiments — more than would be needed
to beat me.

Even if I had wished to carry out literally the order to fix
my bivouac on the same spot as Saint-Geniès had occupied

Defending a River 229

two days before, it would have been impossible for me to do
so, the ground being strewn with more than 200 decomposing
bodies. But, in addition to this, I had another reason hardly
less powerful. All my military experience had convinced
me that the best means of defending a river against the
attack of an enemy who does not wish to establish himself
on your side of it is to keep the bulk of your force at some
distance from the stream ; first, in order to have timely
warning of the enemy's passage ; and secondly, because, his
purpose being only to strike suddenly and then retire quickly,
he will not dare to go far from the bank by which his retreat
is secured. So I established my regiment half a league from
the Dwina, in a field where the ground was slightly undula-
ting. I had left only a few double vedettes on the river-bank,
for I am convinced that, when it is only a question of watch-
ing, two men see just as well as a strong picket. Several
lines of horsemen were posted between the vedettes and our
bivouac, serving like the threads of a spider's web to bring
me rapid intelligence of whatever passed on the ground
which I had to watch. Furthermore, I had forbidden all
fire, even pipe-lights, and enjoined perfect silence. In Russia
July nights are very short ; however, this appeared to me
very long, apprehensive as I was of being attacked in the
darkness by a force stronger than my own. Half the men
were in the saddle, the rest feeding their horses and ready to
mount at the first signal. Everything appeared quiet on the
opposite bank when Lorenz, my Polish servant, who spoke
Russian perfectly, came and told me that he had heard an
old Jewess in a neighbouring house say to another woman :
' The lantern is lighted on the tower of Morki : they are going
to attack.' I sent for the women and questioned them
through Lorenz, when they replied that, as they feared to
see their hamlet become a battlefield, they had been alarmed
at seeing the same light shining from the church of the village
of Morki, on the opposite bank, which two nights before had
been the signal for the Russian troops to cross the ford and
charge u]:)on the French camp. Although I was prepared
for anything, this information was very useful to me. In

230 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

an instant the regiment was mounted, swords were drawn,
and the word was passed, in a low voice, for the vedettes on
the river-bank and the troopers who were posted across the
plain to fall in. Two of the bravest non-commissioned
officers, Prud'homme and Graft, went with Lieutenant Bertin
to watch the movements of the enemy. In a few moments
he came back, announcing that a column of Russian cavalry
was crossing the ford, that several squadrons were already
on the bank, but that, surprised not to find our camp in the
old place, they had halted, doubtless fearing to go too far
from the ford. However, they had made up their minds,
and were coming on at a walk, being by this time at no great
distance from us. Instantly I ordered an immense hayrick
and several barns to be set on fire ; the flames lighted up the
whole country, and I could plainly see the enemy's column,
consisting of the Grodno Hussars. I had with me 1,000
brave troopers. With cries of ' Vive l'Empereur ! ' we
galloped upon the Russians, who, surprised at so brisk and
unexpected an attack, turned round and fled in disorder, sabred
by the chasseurs, towards the ford over which they had come.
There they found themselves face to face with a dragoon
regiment, which, being brigaded with them, had followed
them, and was only just coming out of the river. From the
shock and confusion of the two regiments there resulted a
fearful disorder, of which my men took advantage to kill a
^eat number of the enemy and capture many horses. The
Russians threw themselves in headlong tumult into the ford,
and as, in order to escape the shots which my chasseurs were
firing from the bank into the distracted crowd, they wanted
all to cross at once, a good many were drowned. Our sudden
attack in the plain had so astounded the enemy, who ex-
pected to catch us asleep, that not one stood on the defensive,
but all fled without fighting ; so that I had the pleasure of
returning to my bivouac without having to lament the loss
of one of my men. The dawning day lighted up our battle-
field, where lay several hundred of the enemy, killed or
wounded. I left them to the care of the inhabitants of the
ha mlet near which I had passed the night, and went on my

Polotsk 23 1

way, rejoining Oudinot's corps that same evening. The
marshal gave me a good reception, and complimented the
regiment on its fine performance.

In three days the 2nd corps came opposite Polotsk.
There we learnt that the Emperor had at last left Wilna after
twenty days' stay, and was going towards Witebsk. On
moving from Wilna the Emperor lefb the Duke of Bassano
there in the capacity of governor of Lithuania, and General
Hogendorf as military commander. Neither of these two
officials was fitted to organise the communications of an army ;
for the Duke of Bassano, an old diplomat and careful secre-
tary, knew nothing of administration; while Hogendorf, a
Dutchman, who could hardly speak our language, and had no
idea of our military customs and regulations, could not get
on with the French who passed through Wilna, or with the
local nobility. Thus the wealth of Lithuania was of no
assistance to our troops.

Polotsk, on the right bank of the Dwina, consists of
wooden houses, and is commanded by a magnificent college,
kept at that time by Jesuits, who were nearly all Frenchmen.
It is surrounded with earthworks, and sustained a siege
in the wars of Charles XII. The corps of Ney, Murat, and
Montbrun, on their way from Drissa to Witebsk, had thrown
a bridge of boats across the Dwina, opposite Polotsk, which
they left for Oudinot's corps. Our destination was the St.
Petersburg road, for at this point the 2nd corps took a
direction different from that of the Grand Army ; nor did we
meet it again until the following winter at the passage
of the Beresina.

It would take volumes to recount the manoeuvres and
combats of that part of the army which followed the
Emperor to Moscow, so I shall confine myself to mentioning
the most important events as I come to them. On July 25
there was an action near Ostrowno, very favourable to our
infantry; but several cavalry regiments were brought into
action by Murat too precipitately, among them the 16th
Chasseurs. My brother, who was a major in that regiment,
was captured and taken far beyond Moscow, to Sataroff, on the

232 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Volga, where he found Colonel Saint-Mars and Octave de
Ségnr. They helped each other mutually to support their
wearisome captivity. My brother was already used to it,
for he had passed several years in Spanish prisons and hulks.
Our fortunes in war were very different ; Adolphe, thrice
taken prisoner, was never wounded ; whereas I was wounded
very often, but never captured.

While the Emperor, in possession of Wilna, was unsuc-
cessfully manoeuvring to force the Russian army to a
decisive battle, Oudinot's corps, after crossing the Dwina at
Polotsk, sat down before that town, having in front of
it General Wittgenstein's troops, forming the enemy's right
wing. . Before recounting the incidents which took place on
the banks of the Dwina I ought to say something of the
composition of the 2nd corps. Marshal Oudinot had at first
under his orders only 44,000 men, distributed among three
infantry divisions, whose commanders were Generals Legrand,
Verdier, and Merle, all three excellent officers, especially the
first. Among the generals of brigade, Albert and Maison
were conspicuous. The cavalry consisted of a superb
division of cuirassiers and lancers, commanded by General
Dumerc, a somewhat commonplace officer, having under him
the brave Major-General Berckheim. There were also two
brigades of light cavalry ; the first, composed of the 23rd
and 24th Chasseurs, was commanded by General Castex,
an excellent soldier in all respects; the second, formed by
the 7th and 20th Chasseurs and the 8th Polish Lancers,
were under General Corbineau, a brave but indolent man.
These two brigades were not formed into a division ; the
marshal attached them as they were wanted, now to the
infantry divisions, now to the advanced or to the rear guard
— a system which had great advantages.

The 24th Chasseurs, with which my regiment was
brigaded, was excellently constituted, and might have done
great service if there had been a bond of sympathy between
the soldiers and their commander. Unluckily, Colonel

A was very harsh towards his subordinates, who, on

their side, were not well disposed towards him. This state

A Light Cavalry Officer 233

of things decided General Castex to march and camp with
the 23rd, and to mess with me, although he had served

in the 24th. Colonel A , tall, active, always perfectly

mounted, generally showed well in hand-to-hand combats,
but was reputed to be less fond of musketry and artillery.
With all his faults, the Emperor appreciated in him one
quality, which he possessed in the highest degree : he was
undoubtedly the best light cavalry officer in any European
army. A finer tact or equal judgment in exploring a
country with a glance was never seen. Before traversing
a district he divined the obstacles which maps did not show,
foresaw the points where streams, roads, or the smallest
paths must come out, and could draw from the enemy's
movements inferences which nearly always came true.
Both in the details and in the general conception of war, he
was a most remarkable officer. The Emperor, who in
former campaigns had frequently employed him on recon-
noissances, had brought him under the notice of Marshal
Oudinot, by whom he was often called to counsel ; the result
of this being that many tasks and dangerous duties perforce
fell to the share of my regiment.

CHAPTER XXIV

As soon as the corps which had preceded us to Polotsk had
gone on to join the Emperor at Witebsk, Oudinot massed all
his troops in one huge column on the St. Petersburg road,
and on July 29 marched against Wittgenstein, whom he
knew to be in position ten leagues from us between two
towns named Sebesh and Newel. That night we slept on
the banks of the Drissa, an affluent of the Dwina. At
Sivoshina, where the high road to St. Petersburg crosses it,
it is no more than a large brook. There was no bridge ; but
the Russian Government had had the lofty banks sloped
away on both sides, and the bottom of the stream paved to a
width equal to the road. There was thus a practicable ford,
but the bank was so steep on either hand that troops and
wagons could not cross to right or left of it. This detail is
necessary, because a few days later an active engagement
took place there.

On the next day, my regiment being for duty, I took my
place at the head of the advanced guard, and, followed by the
whole army corps, crossed the ford of the Drissa. The heat
was most oppressive ; in the dusty wheat on each side of the
road could be seen two broad bands where the crushed and
flattened straw, looking as if a roller had gone over it,
marked the passage of large columns of infantry. Suddenly,
close to the post station of Kliastitsi, these tracks disappeared
from the edge of the high road, and appeared again to the
left on a broad cross-road ending at Jakobowo. It was
evident that the enemy had at this point turned away from
the direction of Sebesh to throw himself on our left flank.
Matters seemed to me serious. I halted the troops and sent
a message to my brigadier. But the marshal, who usually

A Prisoner in his own House 235

marched within sight of the advanced guard, noticing the
halt, galloped up, and, in spite of all that Generals Castex and
Laurencez could say, ordered me to keep on along the high
road. I had hardly gone a league when I saw a kibitka, or
Russian carriage, coming towards us, drawn by two post-
horses. I stopped it, and found a Russian oflBcer who had
fallen asleep in the heat, and was lying at full length at the
bottom of the carriage. He was a young man, son of the
landowner to whom the station of Kliastitsi belonged, and
aide-de-camp to General Wittgenstein, and was returning
from St. Petersburg with an answer to despatches sent by his
general to the Government. His astonishment when he
awoke with a start to find himself in the presence of our
chasseurs with their forbidding countenances, and saw close
by a French army, cannot be described. He could not
understand how he had failed to meet the army of Wittgen-
stein, or at any rate some of his scouts, between Sebesh and
the point where we were, which only confirmed General
Castex and me in our belief that Wittgenstein had been
setting a trap for Oudinot by quitting abruptly the road to
St. Petersburg in order to throw himself on the rear and left
flank of our army, and in fact we soon heard the sound of
cannon, and shortly after that of musketry. Marshal Oudinot,
although surprised at so unforeseen an attack, got out of the
fix pretty well. Ordering the various portions of his column
to left-face, he got them into line, and so vigorously repulsed
Wittgenstein's first attack, that the Russian thought it
best not to try again that day, and retired behind Jako-
bowo. His cavalry, however, had a fair measure of success,
for it captured in our rear a thousand men and part of the
baggage, including our field forges. This was a serious loss,
of which the cavalry of the 2nd corps was painfully con-
scious throughout the campaign. After this engagement
Oudinot's troops took up their position, while Castex's brigade
was ordered to march back as far as Kliastitsi and guard the
point where the roads divided. General Maison's infantry
presently joining us. The Russian officer, a prisoner in his
own father's house, did the honours of it very graceftilly.

236 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Meanwhile, preparations were being made by the com-
manders on both sides for a serious engagement on the
morrow, and at daybreak the Russians marched on the post-
house of Kliastitsi, on which the French right rested.
Although in such circumstances the whole brigade was
employed, the regiment for duty formed the first line, and to-
day it was the turn of the 24th. To avoid all delay. General
Castex put himself at the head of the regiment, and led
them at the Russian battalions, breaking them and taking
400 prisoners with very small loss. He was the first to enter
the enemy's ranks. His horse was killed by a bayonet, and
the general in his fall sprained his foot. It was several days

before he could lead the brigade again, and Colonel A

took the command. The Russian battalions which the 24th
had cut up were at once replaced by others which debouched
from Jakobowo, and advanced rapidly upon us. The marshal

sent orders to M. A to attack them, and he gave the

word for the second line to pass to the front, which I duly
executed. As soon as the 23rd were re-formed in line we
marched upon the Russian infantry, which halted and steadily
awaited us ; it was the Tambofi* regiment. When we were
within striking distance I gave the word to charge. Thia
was carried out all the more efficiently for the stimulus which
the fact that their comrades of the 24th were watching them
gave to my troopers. The enemy committed the serious
blunder, as I think it, of spending all his fire at once, by
giving us a volley, which badly aimed as it was emptied but
few saddles. A file fire would have been far more destruc-
tive. Before the Russians could reload we were upon them
at the full speed of our excellent horses, and the shock was
so violent that they were overthrown in heaps. Many rose
again and tried to defend themselves with the bayonet
against the troopers' points; but after losing heavily they
fell back, and at last broke, many being killed or captured as
they fled towards a cavalry regiment which was coming up
to their aid. It was the Grodno Hussars. Now I have
observed that when one regiment has beaten another it
always retains the superiority, and here I had a fresh proof

Ku AST IT SI 237

of it, for the 23rd dashed at the Grodno Hussars, whom they
had beaten so soundly in the night engagement at Druia, as
at an easy prey ; while the hussars, recognising their con-
querors, fled in all haste. Throughout the rest of the cam-
paign this regiment was always meeting the 23rd, which
steadily preserved the upper hand.

While these events were taking place on our right, the
infantr}^ of the centre and left had attacked the Russians,
who, beaten all along the line, left the field of battle, and took
up their position at nightfall a league away. Our army re-
tained its ground between Jakobowo and the division of the
roads at Kliastitsi. Great was the joy at our victory in the
bivouacs of the brigade that evening.

My regiment had taken the colour of the Tamboff regi-
ment, and the 24th that of the Russian regiment which it had
broken ; but its satisfaction was dashed by the fact that both
its majors were wounded. The senior, M. Monginot, was in
all respects an officer of the highest merit ; the other was the
colonel's brother, and, though he had not his abilities, was a
most valiant officer. They both soon got well, and served
throughout the campaign.

AVhen a force tries to turn its enemy's flank it is liable
itself to be turned. That was what happened to Wittgenstein,
for, having, on the 29th, left the St. Petersburg road to fling
himself on the left and rear of the French army, he had en-
dangered his own line of communications ; and if Oudinot had
followed up his victory of the 30th with vigour, it might have
been completely cut. The Russian general's position seemed
still more hazardous when he learnt that Marshal Macdonald,
having crossed the Dwina and taken Diinaborg, was advancing
on his rear. To get out of this fix, Wittgenstein had cleverly
employed the whole night after the battle in making a détour
across-country, bringing his army by Jakobowo back to the
St. Petersburg road, beyond the post station of Kliastitsi.
Fearing, however, lest the French right, near which he must
pass, should charge his troops during their flank march, he re-
solved to stop it by himself attacking our right wing with a
superior force, while the rest of his army was executing the

238 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

movement which was to reopen his communications with
Sebesh. Next morning, as my regiment was going on duty
at daybreak, a portion of the enemy's army, which we had
beaten on the previous day, was seen to have turned our
extreme right, in full retreat to Sebesh, while the remainder
was coming to attack us at Kliastitsi. In an instant all
Marshal Oudinot's troops stood to their arms ; but while the
generals were making their arrangements a column of Russian
grenadiers attacked and routed the Portuguese legion, and
was marching on the large and solid post-house. It was on
the point of capturing this important position, when the
marshal, always foremost under fire, hurried up to my regi-
ment, which by this time was at the outposts, and ordered
me to try to stop the enemy, or at least delay him till our
infantry could come up. I took my regiment along at a
gallop and ordered them to charge, taking the enemy's line
obliquely from its right, which always hampers infantry fire
considerably. That of the grenadiers was, therefore, ineffective,
and they would soon have felt our sabres. They were wavering
already, when, whether instinctively or by order from their
commander, they faced about and ran for a deep ditch which lay
behind them, jumping into it, and, covered up to the chin,
they opened a well-sustained file fire. In a moment I had
six or seven men killed and a score wounded, and received
myself a bullet in the left shoulder. My troopers were wild ;
but our rage was powerless against men whom we were
physically unable to reach. At this critical moment General
Maison came up with his brigade of infantry, and ordered me
to retire behind his battalions ; then he attacked the ditch
from both flanks, killing or capturing all its defenders. As
for me, I was taken severely wounded to the post-house, and
helped to dismount with difficulty. Dr. Parot, our regimental
surgeon-major, came to dress me; but the operation had
hardly begun when it had to be interrupted. The Russian
infantry was renewing its attack, and bullets were dropping
like hail about us ; so that we had to move out of range.
The doctor found my wound serious: it would have been
mortal had not the thick twisted fringe of my epaulette turned

Wounded Again 239"

the bullet and greatly deadened the force of the blow. This,
however, was hard enough to throw me violently back till my
body touched the croup of my horse ; the officers and men
who were behind me thought I was killed, and I should have
fallen if my orderlies had not held me up. The dressing was
very painfdl, as the bullet had stuck in the bones just where
the humerus is joined to the clavicle. To extract it the wound
had to be enlarged, and the great scar is still to be seen. I
confess that if I had been colonel I should have accompanied
the troops of wounded who were being sent to Polotsk, crossed
the Dwina, and gone to some town in Lithuania where I
could get attended to. But I was only major ; the Emperor
might come posting in a day from Witebsk to review the
regiments, and he never did anything except for soldiers
present under arms. This rule, which at first sight seems
cruel, was really in the interest of the service. It kept up
the zeal of those who had been wounded, and made them
eager to rejoin their regiments as soon as they could, instead
of dawdling in hospital, and the army gained much in efficient
strength. Besides, I had every inducement to stay : success
against the enemy, attachment to the regiment, the fact that
I had been wounded when fighting with it. So I stayed,
though suffering intolerable pain, and, putting my arm as
well as I could into a sling, and getting hoisted on to my
horse, went back to the regiment.

Since I had received my wound the aspect of affairs was
much changed ; our men had beaten Wittgenstein and taken
many prisoners. However, the Russians had succeeded in
reaching the St. Petersburg road and effecting their retreat
towards Sebesh. In order to reach this town from Kliastitsi
it is necessary to cross the vast swamp of Khodanui- through
which the great road is carried on an embankment formed of
huge fir-stems laid side by side. A ditch, or rather a broad
and deep canal, runs along each side of the embankment,
and there is no other means of passing without going a long
way in the direction of Sebesh. This passage is more than
a league in length, but the wooden road is of considerable
width. As, therefore, it was impossible to place skirmishers

240 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

in the marsh, the Russians retired in dense columns along
this artificial road, beyond which our maps marked a plain.
Marshal Oudinot, wishing to complete his victory, decided to
pursue them, and to this end he had already sent Verdier's
infantry division by the road through the marsh, to be
followed first by Castex's cavalry brigade and then by the
whole army corps. My regiment had not yet taken its place
in the column when I rejoined it. On seeing me resume my
place at their head in spite of my wound, officers and men
received me with a general cheer, which, as showing the
esteem and regard which the good fellows had conceived for
me, touched me deeply. I felt especially grateful for the
satisfaction which my colleague Major Fontaine expressed on
seeing me again. This officer, though a brave and highly
capable man, had so little ambition that he remained captain
for eighteen years, thrice declined a majority, and only accepted
it at the Emperor's express order.

I resumed then the command of the 23rd, and we made
our way through the marsh after Verdier's division ; the
near sections of the enemy's column contenting themselves
with firing a few long shots while we were on the causeway.
As soon, however, as our infantry debouched into the plain
they saw the Russian army deployed, and were received by a
heavy fire of artillery. In spite of their losses the French
battalions marched forward, and soon were all in the open
ground. Then it was the turn of my regiment to show itself

on the plain at the head of the brigade. Colonel A , who

was provisionally in command, not being there to give us orders,
I thought to get my regiment as soon as possible away from
the dangerous place, and gave the word to gallop as
soon as the infantry made room for me. Even so I had
seven or eight men killed and many more wounded, while
the 24th also suffered heavily. It was the same with General
Legrand's infantry division; but as soon as this had formed in
the plain Marshal Oudinot attacked the enemy, and their
artillery had to distribute its fire upon several points, so
that the issue from the causeway would have become less
•dangerous for the other troops, had not Wittgenstein at that

The Tables Turned 241

moment attacked the troops which we had in the open
ground with hia entire force. Being outnumbered, we had
to give way till the rest of our army came up, and were com-
pelled to retreat towards the causeway. Fortunately the
way was very broad, whict made it easy for us to march
in sections. Directly we left the plain the cavalry became
more a hindrance than a help, so the marshal withdrew that
first. It was followed by Verdier's infantry division, the gene-
ral himself having been very severely wounded. Legrand's
division formed the rear-guard, and his rear brigade, under
General Albert, had to maintain a brisk fight just as its last
battalions were on the point of entering the marsh. Once
they were in column, however, General Albert placed eight
guns to bring up the rear, and these as they retired fired
upon the enemy's advanced guard, causing it considerable
loss. His own guns, indeed, were only able to fire at rare
intervals, because after every round they had to face about
once to continue the pursuit, and once again to fire, and
these movements take time and cause a good deal of trouble
in a narrow space. Thus the Russian artillery did us very
little damage in passing the marsh. Night was drawing on
when the French troops issued from the causeway, passed
Kliastitsi, and found themselves on the banks of the Drissa,
at the ford of Sivoshina, which they had crossed in the
morning in pursuit of the Russians, after beating them at
Kliastitsi.* They had now taken their revenge, for, after
having killed and wounded 700 or 800 of our men on the
other side of the marsh, they were in their turn driving us at
the sword's point. In order to put an end to the fighting
and give our army a little repose. Marshal Oudinot made it
cross the ford and encamp at Bieloe.

It was early in the night when our outposts on the
Drissa sent word that the enemy was crossing the stream.
Marshal Oudinot betook himself promptly to the spot, and
observed that eight Russian battalions, with fourteen guns on

[ * The topography here seems somewhat confused. Sivoshina is some
miles to the south of Kliastitsi, and, as wiU be seen by reference to p. 234^
the French had crossed the ford before the action at the latter place.]

VOL. 11. R

242 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

their front, had just taken up their quarters on the left bank.
The bulk of their army was on the other side, no doubt
making ready to cross and attack us on the next day. The
advanced guard was commanded by General Kulnieff, a man
of much enterprise, but having, like most of the Russian
officers of that time, the bad habit of drinking too much
brandy. He must have taken an extra quantity that evening,
for otherwise it would be impossible to explain the huge
blunder which he made in coming, with only eight battalions,
to encamp close to an army of 40,000 men, and that under
conditions most unfavourable to himself. He had, in fact,
200 paces in rear of his line the Drissa, which except at the
ford could not be forced — not, indeed, on account of its depth,
but because its vertical banks were fifteen to twenty feet
high. Kulnieff therefore had no way of retreat but by the
ford ; and could he expect in case he were defeated that his
«ight battalions and fourteen guns could get away with
sufficient rapidity by this one passage in face of the whole
French army, which at any moment could come down upon
them from its position close by ? But General Kulnieff mnst
have been in no condition to make these reflections when he
fixed his camp on the left bank of the stream. It was
oertainly surprising that Wittgenstein should have relied on
Kulnieff, whose intemperate habits he must have known, to
settle the position of his advanced guard.

While the head of the Russian column was being arro-
gantly brought to so short a distance from us, great confusion
prevailed, not among the French troops but among their
leaders. Marshal Oudinot, one of the bravest of men, was
wanting in decision, and passed in a moment from planning
an attack to making arrangements for retreat. The loss
which he had suffered on the further side of the great marsh
had thrown him into much perplexity, and he did not know
how he was to carry out the Emperor's orders, according to
which he was to drive Wittgenstein back on the St. Peters-
burg road at least as far as Sebesh and Newel. It was
therefore with much joy that he received during the night a
despatch announcing the immediate arrival of a Bavarian

A Plan of Attack 243

corps commanded by General Saint-Cyr, whom the Emperor
placed under his orders. But instead of awaiting this rein-
forcement in a good position, Oudinot wanted, following the
advice of General Dulauloy of the artillery, to go and meet
the Bavarians by withdrawing his whole army as far as
Polotsk. This extraordinary idea met with a lively opposition
from the council of generals whom the marshal had called
together. General Legrand explained that though our
success of the morning had been counterbalanced by the
losses of the evening the army was perfectly well disposed
to march against the enemy ; that to make it beat a retreat
on Polotsk would have the effect of lowering its tone and
displaying it to the Bavarians as a vanquished force coming
to seek shelter with them; in short, that the mere idea
would be degrading to every French heart. Legrand's warm
address carried the votes of all the generals, and the marshal
declared that he renounced his plan of retreat. One impor-
tant question remained to be settled : what should be done
when daylight appeared? General Legrand, with the
authority of long and distinguished service and great
experience in war, proposed that we should take advantage
of Kulnieff's mistake, attack the Russian advance guard
which had been placed so imprudently without support on
our bank, and drive it into the Drissa. The marshal and all
the council accepted this plan, and its execution was entrusted
to General Legrand.

Oudinot's army was encamped in a forest of large fir-
trees standing well apart. Beyond it was a large clearing.
The edge of the wood formed an arc, of which the river
was the chord. The Russian battalions were bivouacking
very close to the river opposite the ford, with fourteen guns
in battery along its front. Wishing to surprise the enemy.
General Legrand ordered General Albert to place a regiment
of infantry in the wood at each extremity of the arc, and,
as soon as he heard the sound of cavalry in march, to advance
upon both flanks of the enemy's camp, while the cavalry
issuing from the wood at the middle of the arc was to charge
at full speed upon the Russian battalions and drive them

B 2

244 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

into the ravine. The duty assigned to the cavalry was
clearly one of great peril ; for not only had it to deliver a
front attack upon the enemy's line, but before reaching it to
receive the fire of fourteen guns. It is true that by surprising^
the Russians we had a good hope of catching them asleep
and meeting with little resistance.

My regiment, having, as you have seen, been on duty the
whole of July 31, was as usual to be relieved by the 24th at
1 A.M. on August 1. That regiment was therefore ordered
to attack, and mine to act in reserve, for the vacant space
between the wood and the stream would only hold one

regiment of cavalry. Colonel A went to Oudinot and

remarked that there was reason to fear that while we were
making ready to fight the troops in firent of us Wittgenstein
would have sent a small column ofi* to our right to cross the
Drissa at a ford which probably existed three leagues higher
than the point where we were, work round to our rear, and
carry oflF our wounded and our baggage, and that it would
therefore be as well to send a cavalry regiment to watch the
ford in question. The marshal fell in with this idea, and

Colonel A , whose regiment had just gone on duty,

ordered it to mount at once, and, taking it ofi* on the proposed
expedition, left the risk of the anticipated combat to the
23rd. My brave regiment, however, received the announce-
ment of the dangerous task which it had to perform very
calmly, and was delighted to see the marshal and Greneral
Legrand pass along the front of the line to superintend our
preparations for the attack.

At that period all the French regiments except the
cuirassiers had a picked or grenadier company or troop,
which was always placed on the right of the line. That of
the 23rd was in its place accordingly, when General Legrand
remarked to the marshal that as the enemy's artillery was
in front of his centre, and this would consequently be the
point of greatest danger, it would be best, in order to avoid
all possible hesitation, that the attack at that point should be
made by the picked troops, consisting of the most seasoned
men and the best horses. It was of no use to assure the

A Night Attack 245

marshal that the regiment, being ahnost entirely compoeed of
veteran soldiers, was in all respects, moral and physioal, jnst
as strong in one part as another ; he ordered me to place the
picked troop in the centre. I obeyed, and, calling togetlier
my officers, I explained to them in a low voice what we had
to do, and gave them notice that, in order to snrprise the
enemy better, I should confine myself to giving the wofd
^ Charge,' withont any preliminary command, as soon as onr
line was in short striking distance of the enemy's gpns.
Everything being settled, the regiment came ont of its
bivoaac in dead silence with the first streak of dawn, and
passed through the wood easily enough. Then we entered
the level clearing, at the further end of which was the
Russian encampment. Alone of the whole regiment, I had
no sword in my hand, fi)r my right, the only one which I
could use, was occupied in holding the reins — a painful posi-
tion, as you can understand, for a cavaby officer who was just
about to lead a chaige. But I was determined to march
with my regiment, and so took my place in firent of the
picked troop, having close to me its brave captain, M.
Courteau, one of the best officers in the regiment, and the
one to whom I was most attached.

All was perfectly quiet in the Russian camp as we
advanced noiselessly at a walk, and my hope of surprising
it rose when I saw that General Kulnieff had brought no
cavalry across the ford, and we could distinguish by the
faint Ught of the fires only a few in&ntry sentries, and those
so near the camp that between the time they gave notice and
our sudden appearance it was probable tiiat the Russians
would not be able to prepare for the defence. But suddenly,
two ugly Cossacks, prowling and suspicious beings, appeared
on horseback thirty paces firom my line, looked at it for a
moment, and sped away towards the camp, where, it was
clear, they would announce our coming. This was a most
disagreeable mishap, since but for it we should certainly have
fallen upon the Russians without losing a single man. How-
ever, as we were discovered, and were, besides, approaching
the point at which I had settled to quicken the pace, I put

246 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

my horse into a gallop. The whole regiment did the same^
and very soon I let them have the word to charge. There-
upon all my valiant troops dashed with me towards the
camp, and we fell upon it like a thunderbolt. But the Cossacks
had given the alarm ; the gunners, who were lying close ta
their pieces, snatched up their linstocks, and the guns at
once belched grape at my regiment. Thirty-seven men, of
whom nineteen belonged to the picked troop, fell dead on the^
spot, including Captain Courteau and Lieutenant Lauouette.
Before the Russian gunners could reload they were cut down
by our men. We had few wounded, nearly every hit having
been mortal ; some forty of our horses had been killed ; mine
was lamed by a grapenahot, but was able to carry me into
the camp, where the Russian infantry, suddenly aroused,^
were already hurrying to their arms. The chasseurs by my
orders had placed themselves between them and the piled
arms, so that very few were able to get at their muskets and
open fire on us. At the sound of the cannon General
Albert's two regiments of infantry had issued from the wood
and hastened at the double to the two ends of the camp,
where they were bayoneting all who tried to defend them-
selves. The Russians, in their confusion, could not resist this
triple attack, and great part of them, who, having come
across at night, had not been able to see the height of the
banks, tried to escape in that direction, and fell fifteen or
twenty feet on to the rocks. In this way many perished.

General KulnieflT, scarcely awake, made his way towarda
a group of 2,000 men, of whom a third at most had muskets,
and, following mechanically this disordered crowd, appeared
at the ford. But on entering the camp I had caused this
important point to be held by 500 or 600 cavalry, including
the picked troop. These men, enraged at the loss of their
captain, dashed furiously at the Russians, and a great
slaughter ensued. General KulnieflF, already swaying on
his horse with intoxication, attacked Sergeant Legendre^
who ran him through the throat, stretching him dead at his
feet. In his account of the campaign of 1812, M. de Ségur
makes Kulniefi*, when dying, deliver an oration, like a hera

Death of Kulnieff 247

in Homer. I was a few paces from. Sergeant Legendre when
he plunged his sabre into Kulnieff's throat, and I can certify
that the Russian general fell dead without uttering a word.*
The victory of General Albert's infantry and the 23rd was
complete. The enemy lost at least 2,000 killed and wounded,
and we took nearly 4,000 prisoners ; the rest perished in the
fall on to the sharp rocks. A few of the more nimble suc-
ceeded in rejoining Wittgenstein, who, on learning the
sanguinary defeat of his advanced guard, retreated on
Sebesh.

Emboldened by this brilliant success, Marshal Oudinot
resolved to pursue the Russians, and again passed the army
to the right bank of the Drissa; but in order to allow
Albert's brigade and the 23rd time to recover from the
fatigues of the action, he left them posted in observation on
the field of battle. I took advantage of this rest to per-
form a ceremony seldom enough attended to in time of war,
namely, to pay the last duties to those of our brave comrades
who had fallen. A good-sized trench received them all, laid
according to their ranks, with Captain Courteau and his lieu-
tenant at the head of the line. Then the fourteen Russian
guns, which the 23rd had so valiantly captured, were placed
in front of the soldiers' grave.

This pious duty completed, I thought I would have my
wound dressed, as it was causing me intense pain, and sat
down for that purpose a little way off, under a huge pine.
There I saw a young major, who, with his back against the
trunk of the tree, and supported by two grenadiers, was
painfully fastening a small packet the address of which was
traced with blood ; the blood was his own. He belonged to
Albert's brigade, and had received in the attack on the
Russian camp a fearful bayonet wound which had laid his

' We read in M. de Ségur's book : * The death of Euhiieff was, it is said,
heroic. A cannon-ball broke both his legs and threw him down on one of
his own guns. Then, seeing the French approaching, he tore off his
decorations, and, in wmth with himself for his rashness, condemned
himself to die on the scene of his blander, ordering his men to leave him
to his fate.'

248 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

body open. The wound had been dressed, but the blood
continued to flow, and the stroke had been a deadly one. The
poor man, who was aware of this, had wished before he
succumbed to send his adieux to a lady to whom he was
attached, but after he had written it he did not know to
whom to entrust the precious missive. Just then chance
brought me in his way. We knew each other only by sight ;
still, feeling that death was close at hand, he begged me in a
scarcely audible voice to do him two services, and after having
sent the grenadiers a little way oflF, he gave me the packet,
saying, with tears in his eyes, ' There is a portrait in it.' He
made me promise to place it with secrecy in the proper hands
if I was ever fortunate enough to return to Paris ; ' besides,'
he added, 'there is no hurry, for it will be better that it
should not be received till long after I am no more.' I
promised to discharge this sad commission, but it was two
years before I was able to do so. As for the second entreaty
that the young major addressed to me, it was complied with
two hours afterwards. It was painful to him to think of his
body being torn to pieces by the wolves, with which the
country swarms, and he begged that I would place him
beside the captain and troopers of the 23rd, whose burial he
had seen. I undertook to do so, and the poor oflBcer having
died soon after our interview, 1 carried out his last wishes.

CHAPTER XXV

Profoundly touched by this melancholy episode, I was
plnnged in sad reflections, when I was roused from my reverie
by the distant sound of a lively cannonade. The two armies
were again engaged. It turned out that Marshal Oudinot,
having passed the station of Kliastitsi, had come up with the
Russian rear-guard at the entry of the marsh, the issue from
which had been so deadly to us twenty-four hours before,
and had set himself to drive the enemy back into it. But
the enemy, not being disposed to pass this dangerous strait,
had made a counter-attack in force upon the French troops,
who after considerable loss were retreating, pursued by the
Russians. One would have said that Oudinot and
Wittgenstein were playing prisoners' base: when one
advanced the other retired, to pursue in his turn as soon as
the adversary had beat a retreat. This new recoil on
Oudinot's part was announced to us on the battlefield of
Sivoshina by an aide-de-camp, who at the same time brought
an order to General Albert to take his brigade and the
23rd Chasseurs two leagues to the rear in the direction of
Polotsk. At the moment of starting, as I did not wish to
af)andon the fourteen guns which my regiment had captured
in the morning, the horses which had drawn them from the
enemy having also fallen into our hands, we harnessed them
and drove them to our next bivouac, whence this glorious
trophy of the courage of the 23rd was forwarded the next
night to Polotsk, and our fourteen guns very shortly rendered
efficacious help in the defence of that town. Oudinot's
army retreated that day as far as the ford of Sivoshina, while
Wittgenstein, rendered more cautions by the disaster which
his advance guard had incurred at the same spot that

250 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

morning, did not dare to venture any detached corps on the
bank occupied by our troops, and, with the Drissa between
them, both armies took up their positions for the night.
But on August 2, Oudinot having brought his troops near
Polotsk, both sides were in such need of rest, that hostilities
ceased for some days. The good General Castex rejoined us,
and also the 24th, who were by no means grateful to their
colonel for having carried them off just when it was their turn
to attack the Russian camp, while on their way up to Drissa
they had neither seen a single enemy nor found the supposed
ford.

After a few days' rest Wittgenstein took part of his troops
lower down the Dwina, where Macdonald was threatening
his right. Marshal Oudinot having followed the Eussian
army in that direction, they faced round towards us, and for
eight or ten days there were continual marches and counter-
marches, and many small engagements, of which it would be
too long and too troublesome to give particulars, seeing that
all this led to no other result than a useless slaughter of
men, and a proof that the commanders of the two armies were
lacking in decision. The most serious of the combats which
were fought during this short period took place on August 13,
near the splendid convent of Valensoui, on the banks of the
Svolna. This little stream, the banks of which are very
muddy, lay between the French and the Russians, and it was
evident that whichever of the two generals tried to force
a passage over such unfavourable ground would incur a
sanguinary repulse. Accordingly, neither Wittgenstein nor
Oudinot had any plan of crossing the Svolna at this point \
but, instead of going elsewhere to look for a battlefield on
which they might try conclusions, both took up their position
on the stream, as though in mutual defiance. Very soon a
brisk cannonade was set up between the two banks ; utterly
useless, because on neither side could the troops reach their
adversary ; so that this deplorable fighting could not be of the
least advantage to anybody. Wittgenstein, however, to
spare his soldiers, had merely posted a few battalions of
infantry among the willows and reeds on the river's edge.

Rewards 251

keeping his other troops out of range of the French guns,
whose well-sustained fire only reached a few of his skirmishers.
Oadinot, however, insisted, in spite of the prudent remarks
of several generals, on bringing his first line near the river^
and thus incurred losses which he could and should have
avoided. The Russian artillery is fSsu* from being as good as
ours, but on campaign it employs pieces called unicorns^ the
range of which was longer than that of any French guns of
that period, and it was these that did the greatest execution
among our troops.

Marshal Ondinot, pursuaded that the enemy was going to
cross the stream, not only kept a dividon of in&ntry near
enough to repulse them, but also made General Castex's
cavalry support it ; a superfluous precaution, since the crossing
of even a small river requires more time than the defenders
need to come up to meet the attack. In spite of this, my
regiment and the 24th were exposed for twenty-four hours
to the Russian cannon-balls, which killed and maimed a good
many of our men.

While this action was going on, the aide-de-camp whom
Oudinot had sent to the Emperor at Witebsk with the
report of the fighting at Kliastitsi and Sivoshina returned.
Napoleon lavishly rewarded the 2nd corps, both with promo-
tions and with decorations, to show that he did not hold the
troops responsible for the ill-success of our operations. Four
Crosses of the Legion of Honour were awarded to each cavalry
regiment; but with regard to the 28rd Chasseurs Berthier
added that, in order to express his satisfaction at the
admirable conduct of tiie regiment in the various engage-
ments, the Emperor sent it, over and above the four rewards
given to the other regiments, fourteen decorations, one for
each gun captured by it from KulniefiTs advanced guard. I
had therefore eighteen crosses to distribute to my brave
regiment. The aide-de-camp had not brought the patents,
but the chief of the staff supplemented hie message by asking
the commanders of regiments to indicate the soldiers who
should receive them, and send him the list. I assembled all
the captains, and, guiding myself by their advice, I drew up

252 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

my list and went to present it to Marshal Oudinot, begging
him to let me announce it on the spot to the regiment.
* What ? here among the cannon-balls ? ' * Yes, marshal,
among the cannon-balls ; it would be more chivalrous.'

General Laurencez, who, as senior staff officer, had drawn
up the report of the various actions, and warmly eulogised
the 23rd Chasseurs, being of my opinion, the marshal acceded
to my request. The decorations would not come till later,
but I sent for a piece of ribbon which I happened to have in my
baggage, and, cutting it into eighteen pieces, I made known
to the regiment the rewards which had been granted them by
the Emperor. Then, calling the recipients out of the ranks
in their turn, I gave each a bit of the red ribbon, which then
was so coveted, and so honourably borne, and of which the
distinction has been since so sadly lowered by the way in
which it has been lavished — I may say prostituted. This
distribution in presence of the enemy, under fire, produced an
immense effect on the regiment, and their enthusiasm rose to
the highest point when I called old Sergeant Prud'homme,
justly reputed the bravest and the most modest soldier in the
whole regiment. Calm as ever, this hero, famous in many
brilliant actions, came up with a shy demeanour and received
the ribbon amid the hearty cheers of all the squadrons. It
was a real triumph for him. I shall never forget this
touching scene, which, as I have said, took place under the
guns of the enemy. But no happiness is complete. Two
men whom I had got on my list as most nearly rivalling
Prud'homme in desert had just been cruelly wounded :
Sergeant Legendre, the slayer of General Kulnieff, had had
an arm carried away, and Corporal Griffon a leg smashed.
They were undergoing amputation when I proceeded to the
ambulance to give them their decorations. At the sight of
the ribbon of the Legion of Honour they seemed to for-
get their pain, and broke forth into the liveliest joy.
Legendre, however, did not survive his wound long, but
Griffon got well and was sent back to France ; some years
afterwards I came across him again at the Invalides.

The 24th Chasseurs, which only got four decorations,

Not Colonel Yet 253

while the 23rd got eighteen, admitted that it was fair, but
none the less displayed its regret at having lost the honour
of capturing the fourteen Eussian guns, even at the cost of
incurring the losses which we had undergone. *We are
soldiers/ they said, ' and we must take our luck as it comes/
But they were very sore with their colonel for what they
called superseding them. What an army was that of which
the soldiers claimed as a privilege to march against the
enemy !

You are doubtless asking what I got for myself in this
distribution of rewards. Nothing whatever; because the
Emperor, before deciding to withdraw the command of the
regiment from Colonel de la Nougarède by promoting him,
wished to be sure that his health would allow him to serve
as general, or head of a legion of gendarmerie. Marshal
Oudinot was therefore directed to have him examined by a
medical board. Their opinion was that he would never be
able to ride again, and the marshal accordingly gave him
leave to return to France, where he was put in command of
a second-class fortress. Before leaving Polotsk, whither he
had been compelled by infirmity to retire, the poor colonel
wrote me a very touching letter in which he took leave of
the 23rd ; and although he had never led the regiment into
action, which attaches troops more than anything to their
commander, he was nevertheless regretted, as he well deserved.
The regiment being thus left without a colonel, the marshal
expected to receive notice of my promotion to that rank,
and I frankly admit that I also quite hoped for it ; but the
Emperor having left Witebsk to march on Smolensk, depart-
mental business slackened under the stress of business caused
by military operations. It wasstill three months before I got
my step.

But let us return to the banks of the Svolna. The
French retired hurriedly, leaving a portion of their wounded
in the convent of Valensoui. Among those whom we suc-
ceeded in removing was Colonel Casablanca, of the 11th
Light Infantiy, who had been my comrade in the days when
we were botli serving as aides-de-camp to Masséna. He

254 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

was an officer of the highest merit, and promotion had come
to him very quickly ; but he was struck in the head when
visiting the skirmishers of his regiment on the banks of the
Svolna, and his career was cut short. He was dying when
I saw him on a stretcher carried by the pioneers. He knew
me, and, pressing my hand, said how sorry he was to see our
corps led in such poor style. That very evening the unfor-
tunate colonel breathed his last. His dying words were only
too well-founded ; for our chief seemed to act with neither
method nor plan. After a success he would pursue Witfc-
genstein without heeding any obstacle, and spoke of nothing
but driving him to St. Petersburg. But at the least check
he would quickly retreat, and see an enemy everywhere. It
was under this latter impression that he brought his troops
back under the walls of Polotsk, much annoyed as they were
at being thus made to retreat before the Russians, whom
they had beaten in almost every encounter.

On August 15, the Emperor's fete day, the 2nd army
corps arrived, in very low spirits, at Polotsk, where we found
the 6th corps, formed by two fine Bavarian divisions, under
General Wrede, and commanded in chief by a French general,
Gourion Saint-Cyr. The Emperor had sent this reinforce-
ment of 8,000 to 10,000 men to Marshal Oudinot, who
would have received it with more satisfiwîtion if he had not
dreaded the influence of its leader. Saint-Cyr was, indeed,
one of the most able soldiers in Europe ; a contemporary and
rival of Moreau, Hoche, Kleber, and Deeaix, he had com-
manded successfully a wing of the Army of the Bhine at a
time when Oudinot was colonel, or at most major-general.
I never knew anyone handle troops in battle better than
Saint-Cyr. He was the son of a small landowner at Toul,
and had studied for a civil engineer ; but, disliking this pro-
fession, he became an actor in Paris, and it was he who
created the famous part of Robert, the brigand chief, at the
TUâire de la Cité. The revolution of 1789 found him in this
position ; he entered a volunteer battalion, showed talent
and much courage, and very quickly rose to the rank of
lieutenant-general, and distinguished himself by many

SainT'Cyr 255

isnccesses. He was of tall stature, but looked more like a
professor than a soldier, which may perhaps be ascribed to
the habit which, like the other generals of the Army
of the Rhine, he had acquired of wearing neither uni-
form nor epaulettes, but a plain blue overcoat. It was im-
possible to find a calmer man; the greatest danger, dis-
appointments, successes, defeats, were alike unable to move
him. In presence of every sort of contingency he was like
ice. It may be easily understood of what advantage such a
character, backed by a taste for study and meditation, was to
a general officer. But Saint-Cyr had serious fSsiults as well :
he was jealous of his colleagues, and was often seen to keep
his troops inactive when other divisions were being shattered
€lose to him. Then he would advance, and, profiting by
the enemy's weariness, would beat them, seeming thus to
have the sole credit of the victory. Further, if he was
among the commanders who were best able to handle their
troops on the field, he was undoubtedly the oue who took
least thought for their welfare. He never inquired if his
soldiers had food, clothing, or boots, or if their arms were in
good condition. He never held a review, never visited the
hospitals, did not even ask if there were any. His view was
that the colonels ought to see to all that. In a word, he ex-
pected that his regiment should be brought into the field
all ready to fight, without troubling himself about the means
to keep them in good condition. This method of procedure
had done Saint-Cyr much harm, and wherever he had served,
his troops, while doing justice to his military talents, had
disliked him. His colleagues all dreaded having to act with
him, and the different successive Grovemments of France had
only employed him from necessity. It was the same with
the Emperor ; and such was his antipathy for Saint-Cyr that
he did not include him in his first creation of marshals,
although he had a better record and much greater talent
than the majority of those to whom Napoleon gave the baton.
Such was the man who had just been placed under Oudinot's
command, much to his regret, for he knew that he would be
put in the shade by Saint-Cyr's superior ability.

256 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

On August 16, the day on which my eldest son Alfred*
was bom, the Russian army, more than 60,000 strongs
attacked Oudinot, who, with Saint-Cyr's Bavarians, had
52,000 men at his disposal. In any ordinary war an engage-
ment in which 112,000 men took part would have been
called a battle, and its decision would have had important
results ; but in 1812, amid belligerent forces amounting to
600,000 or 700,000 men, the meeting of 100,000 only
reckoned as a combat. At any rate this is the name given
to the affair between Oudinot and the Russians under the
walls of Polotsk. This town, which stands on the left bank
of the Dwina, is surrounded with ancient earthworks. Before
the principal front of the place, the fields, in which vegetables
are grown, are cut up by an infinite number of little water-
courses ; obstacles which, though not exactly impassable for
guns and cavalry, hamper their march a good deal. These
market-gardens extend to some half a league before the town ;
but to their left, along the bank of the Dwina, is a vast
stretch of meadow, level as a carpet. That was the side by
which the Russian general should have attacked Polotsk.
He would thus have become master of the single weak bridge
of boats affording us our only communication with the left
bank, whence we drew our supplies of ammunition and pro-
visions. But Wittgenstein preferred to take the bull by the
horns, and directed his main body towards the gardens, hoping
to be able from thence to carry the place by escalade ; the
ramparts being, in fact, nothing but slopes easy to ascend,
though commanding a distant view. The attack was smartly
delivered; but our infantry defended the gardens bravely,
while from the top of the ramparts our artillery, including
the fourteen guns captured at Sivoshina, did terrible execu-
tion in the enemy's ranks. The Russians retired in disorder
to re-form in the plain ; and Oudinot, instead of maintaining
his good position, pursued them, and was in his turn repulsed.
Thus a great part of the day passed ; the Russians returning
incessantly to the attack, and the French always driving them

* Baron Alfred de Marbot was Maître des Jiaqiiêtes to the Coancil of
State. He died 1865.

An Unprofitable Lieutenant 257

back beyond the gardens. While the slaughter thus swayed
to and fro Saint-Cyr followed Oudinot in silence; and
whenever his opinion was asked he merely bowed and said :
' My lord marshal ! ' as though he would say : * As they have
made you a marshal, you must know more about the matter
than a mere general like me ; get out of it as best you can.'

Meanwhile Wittgenstein was losing enormously; and,
despairing of success by continuing to attack on the side of
the gardens, he ended where he should have begun, and
marched the bulk of his troops towards the meadows on the
bank of the Dwina. So far, Oudinot had kept his twelve-,
pounders and all his cavalry at this point, and they had
taken no part in the fighting ; but now General Dulauloy of
the artillery, fearing for his guns, came and proposed to the
marshal to retire across the river not only the heavier pieces,
but also the cavalry, under the plea that they would be in
the way of the infantry movements. Oudinot asked Saint-Cyr
what he thought; but instead of giving the good advice
to employ the artillery and cavalry on ground where they
could easily manoeuvre in support of the infantry, he replied
with his eternal ' My lord marshal ! ' Finally, in defiance ot
the remarks of General Laurencez, his chief of stafi*, Oudinot
ordered both arms to withdraw across the river.

This deplorable movement, which seemed to herald the
total abandonment of Polotsk and the right bank, was
infinitely displeasing to the troops who were removed, and
affected the tone of the infantry, who would have to defend
the side of the town towards the meadows ; while, on the
other hand, the sight of ten cavalry regiments and several
batteries leaving the field was a great stimulus to the
Russians. Then, to carry disorder into this huge retreating
mass, they promptly brought up their * unicorns,' the
projectiles of which, being hollow, acted like round-shot, and
then burst like shells. The regiments near mine had several
men killed and wounded. I was fortunate enough to have
none of my troopers touched, and only lost a few horses. The
one which I was riding had his head smashed, and in the fall
my wounded shoulder came heavily on the ground, causing

VOL. n. s

258 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

me frightful pain. A trifle less slew in laying the Russian
gun, the shot would have struck me full in the body, and
my son would have been orphaned a few hours before his
birth.

The enemy had now renewed the combat, and when we
had crossed the bridge and turned our heads to see what was
taking place on the bank we had left we witnessed a most
affecting sight. The French infantry, with the Bavarians
and the Croats, were fighting bravely, and having the best of
it ; but the Portuguese legion and the Swiss were flying before
the Russians, and did not halt till they were knee-deep in
the river. There, compelled to face the enemy or be drowned,
they fought at last, and by a well-sustained file fire, forced
the Russians to give ground somewhat. The French artil-
lery commander, who had just crossed the Dwina, cleverly
seized the moment to be of service. Bringing his guns to
the bank, and firing over the river, he smote the enemy's
battalions on the other side. This powerful diversion stopped
Wittgenstein in this quarter, and as the French, Bavarians,
and Croats were elsewhere repulsing him, the fighting
slackened, and for the last hour of the day degenerated into
sharpshooting. But Marshal Oudinot could not hide from
himself that he would have to begin again next day. Full
of thought over a state of things of which he could not see the
issue, and brought up at every turn by Saint-Cyr's obstinate
refusal to speak, he was riding along at a walk, followed by a
single aide-de-camp, among his infantry skirmishers, when
the enemy's marksmen, noticing the horseman with white
plumes, made him their target, and sent a bullet into his
•arm.

The marshal at once sent word to Saint-Cyr that he was
wounded, and handed the command over to him. Leaving to
him the task of getting things straight, he left the field,
crossed the bridge, and, leaving the army, retired to Lithuania
to get his hurt tended. It was two months before we saw
liim again.

CHAPTER XXVI

S.\int-Cyr seized the reins of command with a firm and
capable hand, and in a few hours the aspect of things changed
entirely — so great is the influence of an able man who knows
how to inspire confidence. Marshal Oudinot had left; the
army in a most alarming situation — ^part of the troops with
the river at their backs, others scattered about beyond the
gardens, and keeping up a disorderly fire ; the ramparts badly
furnished with guns ; the streets of the town blocked with
caissons, baggage wagons, and wounded, heaped together
pell-mell ; lastly, the troops had in case of defeat no other
way of retreat than by the bridge of boats, which was very
narrow, and six inches deep in water. Night was coming on,
and the regiments of the different nations were so out of
hand that it was quite possible for the sharpshooting to bring
on a general action, which might be fatal to us.

General Saint-Cyr's first act was to call in the skirmishers.
He was certain that the tired enemy would follow his example
as soon as they were no longer attacked ; and in fact the fire
soon ceased on both sides. The troops could concentrate and
take some rest, and business seemed to be put off until the
next day. So that he might be in a position to engage with
best chances of success, Saint-Cyr took advantage of the
night to make his arrangements for repulsing the enemy, or
securing his retreat in the event of a reverse. To this end
he assembled the regimental commanders, and after having
explained the dangers of the situation, the most serious of
which was the crowded state of the town and of the ap-
proaches to the bridge, he gave orders that the colonels, with
other officers and patrols, should go through the streets
directing all the uninjured soldiers of their regiments to

s 2

26o The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

the bivouacs, and sending the sick and wounded and all led
horses and wagons across the bridge. He added that at
break of day he would go round the town and suspend any
colonel who had not carried out his orders. No excuse would
be accepted. The orders were quickly carried out, and all
that was not required for the fight — all the impedimenta of
the army, in short — was collected on the left bank. Soon the
ramparts and streets, as well as the bridge, were completely
clear. The bridge was strengthened, the cavalry and artillery
brought back to the right bank and established in the suburb
furthest from the enemy. Finally, to facilitate his means of
retreat, the prudent commander-in-chief had a second bridge,
to be used only by infantry, constructed out of empty barrels
and planks. All these preparations were finished before day-
light, and the army awaited the enemy with confidence. But
he remained inert in his bivouacs on the plain along the
edge of the vast forest which surrounds Polotsk on the side
away from the river. General Saint-Cyr, who had expected
to be attacked in the early morning, ascribed the tranquillity
in the Russian camp to their enormous loss on the previous
day. This might have had something to do with it, but the
principal cause of Wittgenstein's inaction arose fi^m the fiact
that he was expecting a strong division of infantry and
several squadrons from St. Petersburg by the next night, and
had put off his attack till this reinforcement arrived, so that
he might vanquish us with more ease on the morrow.

Although the great Polish landowners in the neighbour-
hood of Polotsk did not venture, for fear of compromising
themselves with the Russians, to take sides openly with the
French, they helped us in secret, and made no diflBculty about
finding us spies. General Saint-Cyr, in his anxiety as to
the enemy's preparations, had asked one of these nobles to
send him one of his most intelligent serfs. He sent several
wagons of forage to the Russian bivouac, and among the
wagoners placed his bailiff, dressed as a peasant. This
person, a man of intelligence, chatted with Wittgenstein's
soldiers, and learnt that a large body of troops was ex-
pected. He even witnessed the arrival of the Cossacks of

An Evening Attack 261

the Guard, and of a squadron of ' gentlemen-guards/ and was
told that several battalions would reach the camp towards
midnight. Having got this information, the bailiff reported
it to his master, who lost no time in imparting it to the
French commander-in-chief. On receiving this news Saint-
Cyr resolved to beat Wittgenstein before the reinforcements
came up ; but as he did not wish to enter upon too long an
engagement, he yarned the generals and colonels that he
should not attack till six in the evening, so that night should
set a term to the fighting, and that in case the Russians
were successful they should not have time to follow it up.
It is true that in the event of our getting the best of the
fight we should be unable to pursue the enemy in the darkness,
but this was not Saint-Cyr's purpose. He desired for the
moment merely to give them a good lesson, and make them
move further away from Polotsk. Wishing to act by way of
surprise, he gave orders that the most perfect quiet should
be maintained in the town, and along the whole line of
outposts.

We found the day very long : everyone, even the com-
mander-in-chief, for all his coolness, had his watch constantly
ill his hand. Having noticed the day before that the retire-
ment of the French cavalry had allowed the Russians to push
our left wing back into the Dwina, General Saint-Cyr brought
all his squadrons quietly, a moment before the attack, behind
some large stone houses, beyond which the meadows began.
On this level ground the cavalry were to act, charging the
enemy's right and covering the left of our infantry, the two
first divisions of which were to attack the Russian camp,
while the third supported the cavaby, and the two last formed
the reserve and guarded the town. All was ready when, at
six in the evening, the general signal for the attack was
given by cannon-shot. This was followed by the thunder of
all the French artillery, the projectiles of which fell upon the
outposts, even upon the camp of the enemy. Instantly our
two leading divisions, the 26th Light Infantry in front, dashed
upon the Russian regiments posted in the gardens, killed and
captured all whom they could reach, and, putting the others

262 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

to flight, pursued them to the camp, where they made many
prisoners and captured several guns. The surprise, although
in broad daylight, was so complete that General Wittgenstein
was quietly dining in a small country house contiguous to
his camp when he was warned that the French voltigeurs
were in the courtyard. Jumping out of window, he found a
Cossack pony at hand, got on its back, and fled with all
speed to his main body. Our men took possession of the
Russian general's horses, his papers, his wagons, and his
wine, as well as his plate and the dinner on the table.
Immense booty was also taken in the camp by other companies.
At the uproar of this unexpected attack panic seized the
enemy. They fled in most cases without thinking of taking
their arms. The disorder was complete, and meanwhile the
approach of our infantry divisions was announced by a brisk
fire, and the sound of drums beating the charge. Everything
pointed to an immense success for the French troops, at
whose head was marching Saint-Cyr, calm as usual. But
in war an unforeseen and ofben unimportant incident changes
the aspect of affairs. A great number of the enemy's soldiers
had reached the rear of the camp in their flight. There was
bivouacking the squadron of the ' gentlemen-guards,' which
had arrived only a few hours back. This force, composed
of young men selected from the noblest families, was
commanded by a major of tried courage, whose ardour, it
was said, had recently been increased by copious libations.
As soon as he learnt what was going on this officer mounted
his horse, and, followed by 120 cavaliers, dashed upon the
French. The first of our battalions whom he attacked
belonged to the 26th. It offered a vigorous resistance, and
the guards, repulsed with loss, were trying to rally to charge
a second time in line, when their major, impatient at the
time which it takes for horsemen in disorder to recover their
ranks, left the French battalion, which he could not break,
and, ordering his men to follow him, launched them at full
speed in loose order through the camp. He found it full of
our allies, Portuguese, Swiss, and Bavarian infantry, some of
whom, scattered by the very effect of their victory, were

The General Overturned 263

seeking to reassemble, while others were collecting the
plunder which the Russians had abandoned. Of these, the
guards killed and wounded a good many, until they began to
retreat, at first in disorder, soon even in panic-stricken flight.
In such cases soldiers take all of their own side who are
running up to join them for the enemy ; and in a cloud of
dust the number of the pursuers, often only a handful of men,
appears immense. This was what happened here. The
' gentlemen-guards ' scattered over a wide space, and always
coming on without looking behind them, looked to the fugitives
like a huge body of cavalry ; so that the disorder spread until
it reached a Swiss battalion in the midst of which General
Saint-Cyr had taken refuge, and by the pressure of the crowd
he and his horse were overturned into a ditch. In his plain
blue overcoat, with no mark of his rank, the general lay
prostrate on the ground, and made no movement when the
guards drew near, and they, thinking him dead, or taking*
him for some non-combatant official, passed on over the plain
in pursuit. There is no knowing where the disorder would
have stayed had not General Berckheim, with equal boldness
and good sense, hurried up at the head of the 4th Cuirassiers
and charged the Russian horsemen. They defended them-
selves bravely, but were nearly all killed or taken, their
valiant major being among the slain. If the charge executed
by this handful of men had been properly supported it would
have been very effective ; and this fine feat of arms performed
by the ' gentlemen-guards ' proved afresh that an attack by
cavalry has the best chance of success when it is unexpected.
General Saint-Cyr, having been picked up by our cuiras-
siers, at once ordered all his infantry divisions forward, and
attacked the Russians before they had recovered from their
disorder. Success was not for a moment doubtful — the
enemy were beaten with the loss of many men and guns.
While this infantry action was taking place before Polotsk,
the fortunes of the left wing of our army in the meadows
along the Dwina were as follows. As soon as the first
cannon-shot gave the signal for action, our cavalry regiments,
headed by Castex's brigade, moved rapidly to meet the

264 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

enemy's squadrons which were advancing on us. A serious
engi^ment appeared imminent, and Gfeneral Castex kindly
remarked to me that though I had been able, in spite of my
wound, to command my regiment at Sivoshina and the
Svolna, when I only had to face infantry and artillery fire,
it did not follow that I could do so now, when we should be
engaged with cavalry. I might find myself involved in a
charge without the means of defending myself, since, as I
could only use one arm, I could not hold both sabre and
bridle ; and he advised me, therefore, to stay for the moment
with the infantry division posted in reserve. I felt that I
could not accept this good-natured ofier, and expressed so
strongly my objection to being away from the regiment that
the general yielded ; but he had six of the bravest troopers
placed close in rear of me, commanded by the intrepid
Sergeant Prud'homme. Further, I had beside me the two
adjutants, the regimental stafi-sergeants, a trumpeter, and
Fousse, my orderly, one of the best men in the regiment.
Thus surrounded, and riding in front of the centre of a
squadron, I was pretty well protected, and in the case of
urgent necessity I could drop my reins and take up my
sword, which hung to my wrist by its knot.

The meadow being large enough to hold two regiments
in line, the 23rd and 24th formed the first line. General
Corbineau's brigade, consisting of three regiments, forming
the second, and the cuirassiers following as reserve. The
24th, which was on the left, had in front of it a regiment of
Russian dragoons ; my regiment was facing Cossacks of the
guard, known by their red coats and the beauty of their
horses. These, though they had arrived only a few hours
before, seemed in no way fatigued. We advanced at a
gallop, and as soon as we were within striking distance
General Castex gave the word to charge. His brigade fell
upon the Russians, and at the first shock the 24th broke the
dragoons opposed to them. My regiment met with more
resistance from the Cossacks, picked men of large stature,
and armed with lances fourteen feet long, which they held
very straight. I had some men killed, a good many wounded ;

Sword v. Lance 265

but when, at length, my troopers had pierced the bristling
line of steel, all the advantage was on our side. In a cavalry
fight the length of lances is a drawback when their bearers
have lost their order and are pressed closely by adversaries
armed with swords which they can handle easily, while the
lancers find it difficult to present the point of their poles.
So the Cossacks were constrained to show their backs, and
then my troopers did great execution and took many excel-
lent horses.

As we were about to follow up our success our attention
was drawn by a great uproar to our right, and we saw the
plain covered with fugitives ; it was just then that the
* gentlemen-guards ' were making their vigorous charge.
General Castex, deeming it unwise to advance further while
our centre seemed to be retreating in confusion, ordered the
recall to be sounded, and the brigade halted. But it had
hardly re-formed, when the Cossacks, emboldened by what was
taking place on the centre, and anxious to avenge their first
defeat, returned to the charge and dashed madly on my
squadrons, while the Grodno Hussars attacked the 24th.
llepulsed at all points by Castex's brigade, the Russians
brought up in succession their second and third lines, while
General Corbineau supported us with the 7th and 20th Chas-
seurs and the 8th Lancers. A grand cavalry engagement
ensued, in which each side experienced varying fortunes.
Our cuirassiers were just coming up to take part in it, and
the Russian cuirassiers were advancing also, when Wittgen-
stein, seeing that his infantry was beaten and hard pressed
by ours, ordered his cavalry to retire; but it was too closely
engaged to be able to efiect a retreat easily. Indeed, Generals
Castex and Corbineau, sure of support from the cuirassiers,
weie launching their brigades alternately at the Russian
cavalry, who were being thrown into great disorder and
losing heavily. General Saint-Cyr, having got beyond the
forest, where our victorious divisions of infantry and cavalry
were collected, and seeing that night was coming on, stopped
the pursuit, and the troops returned to Polotsk and regained
the bivouacs which they had left a few hours before.

266 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

During this bustling cavalry action my wound had caused
me severe pain, especially when I had to put my horse into
a gallop. My inability to defend myself often put me into a
very awkward position, from which I should not have escaped
had I not been surrounded by a group of brave men who-
never let me out of their sight. One time, when I was
pushed by the combatants on to a section of Cossacks, I was
obliged, in self-defence, to let go my reins and take my
sword. However, I had no need to use it, for the men of
every rank who escorted me, seeing their commander in
danger, furiously attacked the Cossacks by whom I was sur-
rounded, made many of them bite the dust, and put the rest
to flight. My orderly, Fousse, killed three ; Adjutant Joly,
two. I returned, therefore, from this great fight safe and
sound. I had wished to be present at it in person in order
to put still more dash into my regiment, and to show that,
so long as I could sit on my horse, I felt bound in honour to
command it in the hour of danger. Officers and men were
much pleased with my devotion, and, as you will see later
when I come to speak of the disasters of the great retreat^
the liking they had for me increased.

When cavalry meets cavalry the slaughter is much less
than when it is opposed to infantry. Moreover, the Russian
troopers are generally awkward in handling their weapons,
and their leaders not very competent in handling their men.*
Thus, although at Polotsk my regiment had to do with the
Cossacks of the Guard, reputed among the best troops in
the Russian service, its losses were not heavy. I had eight
or nine killed and some thirty wounded, but among the
latter was Major Fontaine. This excellent and valiant officer
was in the thick of the scuffle when his horse was killed. He
was trying with the help of some of the men to get his feet dis-
entangled from the stiri-ups, when a confounded Cossack officer,
galloping into the middle of the group, leant dexterously over,
and aimed a terrible blow at Fontaine, destroying his left
eye, injuring the other, and splitting his nose. As, however,
the Russian officer was going off, proud of his exploit, one of

[ ' English readers will remember the heavy cavalry aotion at Balaclava.]

Sa/nT'Cyr's Ways 267

our men broke his back with a pistol-shot at six paces*
distance, and thus avenged his major. I had M. Fontaine-
attended to as soon as possible, and he was placed in the
Jesuit convent at Polotsk. Visiting him that evening, I was
much struck with the brave soldier's resignation. With an
eye quite destroyed, he was patiently enduring all the pain
and inconveniences resulting from the almost total loss of
sight. He was never again fit for active service, which was
a great loss to the 23rd Chasseurs. He had belonged to the
regiment since its formation, universally loved and esteemed,
and I could sympathise with its loss. Left as I was, the
only field-oflScer in the regiment, I had to see to the duties
of all, which was a heavy task.

You will think that I have described too much in detail
the various actions in which the 2nd corps was concerned ; but
I repeat what I have said before, that I enjoy the reminiscences
of the great wars in which I took part, and I speak of them
with pleasure. I seem to be in the field, in the midst of my
gallant companions, most of whom, alas ! have now left this
world.

But to return to the Etissian campaign. Anyone but
Saint-Cyr, after such heavy fighting, would have reviewed
his troops, complimented them on their courage, and in-
quired into their wants; but that was not his way. The
last shot had hardly been fired when Saint-Cyr went and shut
himself in the Jesuit convent, where he spent all his days
and part of his nights in — what do you suppose ? Playing
the fiddle ! This was his master passion, and nothing but the
uecessity of marching against the enemy could draw him
from it. He left the task of placing the troops to Generals
Laurencez and Wrede, who posted two divisions of infantry
and the cuirassiers on the left bank of the Dwina. The third
French and the two Bavarian divisions remained at Polotsk,
where they were set to throw up a vast entrenched camp to
serve as a base for the troops, who from this important point
covered the left and rear of the Grand Army in its march to-
wards Smolensk and Moscow. Corbineau's and Castex's brigades
of light cavalry were placed two leagues in advance of the

268 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

great camp, on the left bank of the Polota, a small stream
which joins the Dwina at Polotsk. My regiment was to
bivouac near a village called Luchonski, the colonel of the
24th fixing himself a quarter of a league in rear of us.
We stayed there two months, during the first of which we
never went far away.

On hearing of Saint-Cyr's victory the Emperor sent him
his marshars baton. But instead of visiting his troops, the
new marshal lived, if possible, more apart than ever. No
one could approach the commander-in-chief, whence the
soldiers nicknamed him * the owl.' The numerous rooms of
the convent would have been of great service for the wounded,
but he would live there alone, and thought he had conceded
a great deal when he allowed wounded field-officers to be put
in the out-buildings. Even they were only allowed to remain
forty-eight hours, after which they had to be moved into the
town. The cellars were overflowing with provisions, but the
marshal kept the keys, and not even the hospitals could get
anything. I had much trouble in getting two bottles of
wine for Major Fontaine. Strange to say, Saint-Cyr was
most abstemious, and used scarcely any of the stores for
himself. Two months later, when the French had to leave
the place, after setting town and convent on fire, all these
provisions, which the marshal would not distribute, became
the prey of the Russians or of the flames.

CHAPTER XXVII

While the events which I have just been recording had
been taking place before Polotsk, the Emperor had stayed at
Witebsk and thence was directing the operations of his
numerous army corps. Some military writers have blamed
Napoleon for losing his time first at Wilna, where he stayed
nineteen days, and then at Witebsk, where he passed seven-
teen ; asserting that these thirty-six days might have been
better employed, especially in a country where the summer
is very short, and the rigours of winter begin to be felt by
the end of September. The blame seems to be well founded
up to a certain point ; but some extenuation may be found,
first, in the hope which the Emperor had of seeing the
Russians seek an understanding ; secondly, by the necessity
of concentrating the various corps which had been detached
in pursuit of Bagration ; and, lastly, because some rest had
to be granted to the troops. In addition to their day's
march they had every evening to go and seek provisions far
from their bivouacs, since the Russians as they retired had
burnt all stores, and it was impossible to distribute rations
regularly to the French troops. Davout's corps was, however,
for a long time a fortunate exception to this rule, since that
marshal, who was no less great as an administrator than as a
leader, had organised before the passage of the Niémen huge
trains of small carts to follow his army. These carts, filled
with biscuits, salted meat, and vegetables, were drawn by
oxen, a certain number of which were slaughtered every
evening. This, while assuring a supply of provisions, had a
great efiect in keeping the soldiers in their ranks.

The Emperor left Witebsk August 13, and, placing the
2nd and 6th corps under the command of Saint-Cyr at

2/0 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

Polotsk, he moved to Krasnoe, where part of the Grand Army-
was assembled in presence of the enemy. A battle was
expected, but only a slight engagement took place with the
Russian rear-guard, who were beaten and retreated nimbly.
On the 15th, his fete day, the Emperor held a march past of
the troops, who greeted him with enthusiasm. Next day the
army came in sight of Smolensk, called by the Russians ' the
holy,' since they regard it as the key of Moscow and the
palladium of their Empire. Ancient prophecies predicted
great misfortunes to Russia whensoever she let Smolensk be
taken. This superstition, studiously fostered by the Govern-
ment, dates from the time when the town marked the
•extreme frontier of the Muscovites.

King Murat and Marshal Ney were the first to arrive
before Smolensk, and thought, for some reason which did not
appear, that the enemy had abandoned the place. Their
reports to the Emperor having made him adopt the same
•opinion, he gave orders for the advance-guard to be marched
into the town. Ney, in his impatience, awaited no further
orders. He advanced towards the gate with a feeble escort
of hussars, when suddenly a regiment of Cossacks, masked by
a fold in the ground and a thicket, dashed upon our troopers,
drove them back, and surrounded Marshal Ney, who was so
close pressed that a pistol-bullet fired almost point-blank
tore his coat collar. Luckily, Domanget's brigade came up
and relieved the marshal, and the arrival of General Razout's
infantry permitted Ney to approach near enough to the town
to convince himself that the Russians purposed to defend it.

Seeing that the ramparts were armed with a great number
of guns, General Eblé of the artillery, a most able man,
advised the Emperor to turn the place, by sending Prince
Poniatowski's Polish corps to cross the Dnieper two leagues
further up. But Napoleon, following the opinion of Ney,
who assured him that Smolensk would be easily carried,
gave the order to attack. Thereupon the corps of Davout,
Ney, and Poniatowski made for the place from diflFerent sides.
A murderous fire was opened from the ramparts, and this
was not equal to that which came from the batteries on the

Smolensk 271

high ground of the further bank. A sanguinary combat
took place. Our troops were decimated by round-shot,
grape, and shells, while • our artillery could make no impres-
sion on the walls. At length, as night came on, the enemy,
after disputing the ground valiantly foot by foot, was pushed
back into Smolensk, and made ready to abandon it. But as
they withdrew they set it on fire in various quarters, and
thus the Emperor saw his hopes of taking a town which he
had every reason to suppose was full of provisions vanish.
Not till daybreak on the next morning did the French enter
the place, the streets of which were heaped with corpses and
smoking ruins. The capture of Smolensk had cost us 12,000
men, killed and wounded ; and this huge loss we might have
avoided by crossing the Dnieper, as General Eblé proposed,
further up, for in that case General Barclay de Tolly would
have had to evacuate the place and retreat towards Moscow
on pain of being cut ofi". After burning the bridge the
Russians took up their position for the moment upon the
high ground of the right bank, but soon retreated along the
road to Moscow. Marshal Ney pursued them with his own
corps, strengthened by Gudin's division and Davout's. A
short distance from Smolensk he came up with the Russian
army at Valutina, engaged in a defile, with all its baggage.
The action developed into a real battle, which would have
been fatal to the enemy if General Junot, who had accom-
plished the passage of the Dnieper too slowly at Prondichewo,
two leagues above Smolensk, and halted there for forty-eight
hours, had marched upon the sound of Ney's guns, only a
league away from him. But, though warned by Ney, Junot
did not stir. In vain did the Emperor's aide-de-camp,
Chabot, bring him an order to join Ney ; in vain did Gourgaud
repeat the order. Junot remained immovable.

Meanwhile Ney, engaged with infinitely superior forces,
had brought all his troops successively into action, and
ordered Gudin's division to capture the formidable positions
occupied by the Russians. The order was carried out in the
most intrepid fashion, but in the very first attack the brave
general fell mortally wounded. Yet always maintaining his

272 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

wonderful coolness, he wished before he died to assure the^
success of the troops whom he had so often led to victory^
and appointed General Gérard, though he was the junior
major-general of the division, to succeed him in the com«
mand. Gérard at once placed himself at the head of the
division, and by ten o'clock in the evening, after losing 1,800
men and slaying 6,000 of the enemy, he remained in
possession of the field of battle, the Russians retiring in
haste.

Next day the Emperor came to inspect the troops who-
had fought so valiantly. He distributed rewards freely, and
confirmed Gérard in command of the division. General
Gudin died a few hours later.

If Junot had chosen to take part in the fight he could
have shut the Russian army into a narrow defile, where it
would have been caught between two fires and compelled ta
lay down its arms, and this would have put an end to the
war. Then people regretted King Jerome, who, though a
poor general, would probably have come to the assistance of
Ney, and everyone expected to see Junot severely punished.
But he was the first officer in whom Napoleon had inspired a
personal attachment, and he had followed him in every cam-
paign from Toulon to Russia; the Emperor liked him and
forgave him — a misfortune, for it was becoming necessary to
make an example.

As soon as the capture of Smolensk was known in Russia
a universal outcry arose against General Barclay de Tolly.
He was a German ; the nation accused him of not conducting
the war with sufficient vigour, and demanded a Muscovite
general to defend the ancient Muscovy. The Emperor Alex-
ander was forced to give way, and conferred the command in
chief of all his armies on General Kutusoff ; he was past his
prime and a man of little ability, best known for having been
defeated at Austerlitz. But he had the merit, in the circum-
stances a great one, of being a Russian of the old stock ;
which gave him much influence, both over the troops and
over the mass of the people.

The French advance-guard, always pushing the enemy

Borodino 273

before it, had passed Dorogobush before the Emperor made up
his mind to leave Smolensk. It was oppressively hot ; they
had to march on shifting sands ; and the supply of food was
insufficient for such a mighty assemblage of men and horses,
for the Russians had left nothing behind them but burnt
villages and farms. When the army entered Wiazma that
pretty town was in flames, and so with Ghiat. The nearer
they drew to Moscow the scantier grew the resources of the
country. Men, and especially horses, began to die. In a
few days cold rain succeeded the intolerable heat, and con-
tinued till September 4 ; autumn was coming on. The army
was not more than six leagues from Mojaisk, the last town
left to take before reaching Moscow, when a considerable in-
crease was perceived in the strength of the enemy's rear-guard,
and there was every sign that a great battle wafls at last
going to be fought. On the 5th our advance was checked for
a moment by a powerful Russian column strongly intrenched
on a rising ground garnished with twelve guns. The 57th
of the line, which in the Italian days the Emperor had sur-
named ^ The Terrible,' bravely maintained its reputation by
capturing the enemy's redoubt and artillery. They were
now on the ground where forty-eight hours later took place
the battle which the Russians call BorodinOj the French
la MosJcova.

On September 6 the Emperor issued a general order
announcing a battle for the morrow. The army joyfully
awaited the great day which was to end its misery, for the
troops had received no rations for a month, each man living
how he could. The final arrangements were made on both
sides. For the Russians, Bagration commanded the left wing,
62,000 men; in the centre was the hetman PlatoflF, with
his Cossacks, and 30,000 infantry in reserve; the right,
consisting of 70,000 men, was under Barclay de Tolly,
who, having been deposed from the chief command, had
taken a secondary place. Kutuaoff was commander-in-chief.
To oppose his 162,000 men the Emperor Napoleon had
barely 140,000 at his disposal. They were thus distributed :

VOL. n. T

274 ^^^ Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Eugène commanded the left, Davout the right, Ney the
centre, Murat the cavahy, the guard was in reserve.

The battle was fought on September 7. The weather
was overcast, and a cold wind raised clouds of dust. The
Emperor, suffering terribly from headache, descended towards
i\ kind of ravine, where he passed the greater part of the day
in pacing about. Fix)m this spot he could see only a portion
of the field, and to command the whole of it he had to ascend
a neighbouring hillock. This he did only twice during the
battle, and he has been reproached with inaction ; but it
must be remarked that at the point where he was with the
reserve he was in a position to receive frequent reports as to
what was taking place all along the line ; while if he had been
always going from one wing to another over ground so' broken,
the aides-de-camp bringing important intelligence would not
have known where to find him. It must be remembered, too,
that he was unwell, and the icy wind, blowing with great
force, prevented him from staying on horseback.

As I was not present at the battle of the Moskwa I
refrain from entering into details of the manœuvres, and
merely say that, after unparalleled efforts, the French
obtained a victory over the Eussians, whose resistance was
most obstinate. Naturally, the battle reckons as one of the
most bloody of this age. The losses of the two armies were
calculated at 50,000. The French lost forty-nine generals,
killed and wounded, and had 20,000 men disabled. The
Eussian loss was greater by a third. General Bagration,
their best officer, was killed, and, by a strange chance, the
ground on which the battle was fought was his property.
The French took very few prisoners — a proof of the valour
with which the vanquished fought.

Several interesting episodes occurred during the action.
Thus, when the Eussian left, twice broken by the efforts of
Murat, Davout, and Ney, and rallying as often, was coming
a third time to the charge, Murat sent General Belliard to
the Emperor with a request that he would send part of his
guard to complete the victory, as otherwise it would take
â second battle to beat the Eussians. Napoleon was

Deeds of Daring 275

inclined to comply with this request ; but Marshal Bessières,
who commanded the guard, said, * Allow me to point out
that your Majesty is at this moment seven hundred leagues
from France.' Whether this remark decided the Emperor,
or he did not think the battle sufficiently developed to
employ his reserve, he refused to do so. Two similar
requests met with the same answer.

One of the most remarkable feats performed in this
battle, so fertile of brave actions, was the following. The
front of the enemy's line was covered by high ground,
provided with redoubts, redans, and, above all, a loopholed
fort armed with eighty guns. The French, after heavy loss,
had carried all these works, but had been unable to hold their
ground in the fort. General Montbrun, commanding the 2nd
cavalry corps, observed by the aid of his telescope that the
fort was not closed at the gorge, and that the Russian troops
were entering by sections ; while it was possible, by turning
the high ground, to avoid the ramparts and the rocks, and
bring the squadrons up to the gate by gently sloping ground
practicable for horses. Accordingly, he proposed to enter
the fort in rear with his cavalry, while the infantry attacked
it in front. This daring suggestion was approved by Murat
and the Emperor, and its execution entrusted to Montbrun.
But while that fearless general was preparing for action he
was killed by a cannon-ball — a great loss for the army — and
the Emperor sent General Caulaincourt, brother to the
grand equerry, to take his place. Then was seen some-
thing unprecedented in the annals of war : a fort defended
by many guns and several battalions, attacked and captured
by a cavalry column. Caulaincourt, hastening on vdth a
division of cuirassiers, the 5th regiment, under Colonel
Christophe, leading, reached the entrance, made his way
inside, and fell with a bullet through his head. Colonel
Christophe and his cuirassiers avenged their general by
putting part of the garrison to the sword. The fort
remained in their hands, and the victory of the French was
assured. In these days, with their insatiable thirst for pro-
motion, people would be astonished if, after so fine a feat of

2/6 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

arms, a colonel were not promoted. But under the Empire-
ambition was held in check ; Christophe did not become a
general for several years, and never expressed any dissatis-
faction at the delay.

Although the Russians had been beaten, and forced
to evacuate the field of battle, their commander-in-chief,
Kutusofi", had the audacity to write to the Emperor
Alexander that he had just won a great victory over the
French. This misleading news reached St. Petersburg on
the day of Alexander's feie^ and caused the liveliest joy.
Te Beuirv was sung, whUe Kutusofi" was proclaimed the
saviour of his country, and created field-marshal. But the
truth was soon known, and joy turned to mourning.
Still, Kutusofi" was a field-marshal, and he desired no more.
Any other than the timid Alexander would have severely
punished the falsehood; but he could not do without
Kutusofi*, who therefore remained in command of the army.

The Russians, in their retreat towards Moscow, were
overtaken on the morning of the 8th at Mojaisk, and in
the cavalry action which ensued General Belliard was
wounded. [Napoleon stayed three days at Mojaisk to await
despatches. One which had come the day before the battle
had done much to cause his indisposition, for it announced
the defeat of Marshal Marmont at Salamanca. Marmont was
one of Napoleon's mistakes. They had been together at the
college of Brienne, where Marmont's schoolboy successes had
led the Emperor to credit him with more, military talent
than his performances justified. When he replaced Masséna
in 1811 he gave out that he was going to beat Wellington.
He was now vanquished and wounded, and but for General
Clausel his army would have lost still more heavily. This
catastrophe might have made the Emperor reflect that while
he was invading Russia he was losing Spain. Major
Pabvier, who brought the despatch, was wounded in the
action on the great redoubt — a long way to come in search
of a bullet!]

CHAPTER XXVin

Napoleon left Mojaisk on September 12 and entered Moscow
on the 15th. The great town was deserted, the governor,
General Rostopchin, having made all the inhabitants go out.
This Rostopchin, whom some would make a hero, was a
barbarian who shrank from no means to make himself
notorious. He had allowed a number of foreign traders to be
killed by the populace ; above all, some French domiciled in
Moscow, whose only crime was that they were suspected of
wishing for the arrival of Napoleon's troops. Some days
before the battle of the Moskwa, the Cossacks having captured
a hundred of the French sick, General Kutusoff sent them to
the governor of Moscow. Without any pity for their suffer-
ings, he left them without food for forty-eight hours, and
then marched them through the streets, where several of the
poor wretches died of hunger. Meanwhile the police-agents
read a proclamation in which Rostopchin, to encourage the
people, said that all the French were equally feeble, and would
be as easily knocked over. At the end of this terrible pro-
cession the greater part of our soldiers who survived it were
butchered by the populace, without any attempt on Rostopchin's
part to stop i*"

The beaten Russian troops only passed through Moscow,
and went on to re-form thirty leagues further, towards
Kalouga. King Murat followed them with infantry and
cavalry, while the guard remained in the city, and Napoleon
established himself in the Kremlin, the ancient palace of the
Czars. All was apparently quiet, when, on the night of
September 15, the French and German traders who had
escaped the governor's search came and warned Napoleon's
staff that the town was about to be set on fire. This was

2/8 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

soon confirmed by a Russian police-agent, who could not
make up bis mind to execute the orders of his chief. He said
that before leaving Moscow Rostopcbin had set firee the
prisoners, and distributed to them torches made by English
workmen. The incendiaries were in the palace awaiting the
signal. The Emperor at once prescribed the most severe
measures. The streets were patrolled, and many brigands
caught in the act of arson were killed. But it was too late ;.
the fire burst out at different points, and spread all the more
rapidly that Rostopchin had had all the pumps removed ; so
that in a short time Moscow was one fiery furnace. The
Emperor left the Kremlin, and took reftige in the château of
Peterskoe ; only returned three days later, when the fire was
beginning to burn itself out. I shall not enter into any
details of the burning of Moscow, as the story has been told
by several eye-witnesses, but will discuss later on the effects
of this enormous catastrophe.

Napoleon, misconceiving Alexander's situation, was always
*in hope of his coming to terms. At length, tired of waitings
he decided to write to him. Meanwhile the Russian army
was being reorganised in the direction of Kalouga, whence its
commander sent officers towards Moscow to bring back to
their regiments the stragglers, who were estimated at 15,000.
These men had retired to the suburbs, and went about freely
among our bivouacs, sitting at our soldiers' fires, and eating
with them, without its occurring to 'anyone to make them
prisoners. This was a mistake, for they gradually rejoined
their army, while ours was growing weaker every day from
sickness and the efiects of the first cold weather. Our loss in
horses, owing to the immense labour which Murat had through-

> M. de Ségur writes : * There was no longer any ooncealment of the
fate to which Moscow was doomed. At night emissaries knocked at all
the doors announcing the fire. The pomps had been removed, and none
knew what to do. That day a terrible scene ended the sad drama. The
prisons opened, and a filthy crowd issued tumultuously. From that day^
Moscow belonged neither to French nor Russians, but to this foul mob,
whose rage was guided by police officers and men. They were organised,
and his post assigned to each, and they dispersed, to let fire and pillage
burst forth on all sides at once.'

A T Mosco w 279

out the campaign imposed on the cavalry, was enormous.
Mindful of his brilliant successes against the Prussians in 1806
and 1807, he thought that cavalry could do anything, and
march twelve or fifteen leagues a day, the only thing neces-
sary being to bring the heads of his columns in contact with
the enemy. But the conditions were much changed by the
climate, the difficulty of getting forage, the length of the
campaign, and, above all, Bussian tenacity. Thus when we
arrived at Moscow half the cavalry had no horses, and Murat
destroyed the rest in the province of Kalouga. Proud of his
stature and his courage, and always bedizened in strange but
brilliant costumes, the prince had attracted the notice of the
enemy, and liked to parley with them, exchanging presents
with the Cossack leaders. Kutusoff took advantage of these
meetings to keep up false hopes of peace, which were passed
on from Murat to the Emperor. But one day the same
enemy who said he was growing weak roused himself, slipped
through our cantonments, and walked off with several
baggage-trains, a squadron of dragoons of the guard, and a
battalion of the line. From that time Napoleon forbade all
communication with the Russians except by his authority.

He did not, however, lose all hope of peace. On October 4
he sent General Lauriston to Kutusoff's headquarters. The
cunning Russian showed Lauriston a letter from himself to
the Emperor Alexander urging him to accept the French
proposals, seeing, as he said, that the Russian army was in no
state to continue the war. But hardly had the officer bearing
this despatch started for St. Petersburg, furnished by
Lauriston with a passport to guard him against attack from
any of our people who were prowling between the two armies^
when Kutusoff sent a second aide-de-camp to his Emperor.
Having no French passport he was caught by our patrols,
arrested as lawful prize, and his despatches sent to Napoleon.
They contained the very opposite of what Kutusoff had shown
to Lauriston. In fact, the Russian marshal, after begging
his sovereign not to treat with the French, announced that
Admiral Tchichagoff's army, having left Wallachia after
peace made with the Turks, was advancing on Minsk to cut

28o The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

off Napoleon's retreat. He further informed Alexander of the
conversation which he had been so diligently keeping up with
Murat, in order to maintain the French in their mischievous
security at Moscow at so advanced a season of the year.
At sight of this letter Napoleon, perceiving that he had been
tricked, burst into a violent rage, and, it is said, formed a plan
of marching on St. Petersburg. But the weakness of his
army and the rigours of winter were in the way of that
expedition; and, moreover, he had important reasons for
wishing to be near Germany, and in a better position for
keeping an eye on it and on affairs in France. A conspiracy
had broken out in Paris, and for one day its leaders had been
in possession of the capital. General Malet, an excitable
person, had thrown the spark which might have kindled a
blaze ; and if he had not been met by a man no less clear-headed
than energetic, in the person of Laborde, it might have been
all up with the Imperial Government. Even so the incident
made a great impression, and Napoleon's grief at learning the
danger in which his family and his ministers had been may
be imagined.

Meanwhile his position at Moscow was growing daily more
serious. The cold was already intense, and only those
soldiers who were French by birth retained their spirit. But
they were not the half of those whom Napoleon had led into
Russia. The rest were Germans, Swiss, Croats, Italians,
Spaniards, Portuguese. All these foreigners, who remained
loyal so long as the army prospered, were beginning to
grumble ; Russian agents inundated our camps with procla-
mations in divers languages ; and the men began to desert in
great numbers under promise that they should be sent home.
Besides this, the two wings of the Grand Army, composed
solely of Austrians and Prussians, were no longer in line
with the centre as when the campaign began, but were in
our rear, ready to bar our road at a word from their sovereigns,
the ancient and irreconcilable enemies of France. The
position was most critical ; and, bitter as it was to Napoleon's
pride, by withdrawing before he had imposed peace on
Alexander, to admit to the whole world that he had missed

The Army Melting Away 281

the aim of his expedition, the word * retreat ' was at last
spoken. Not yet, however, had the Emperor or the marshals
or anyone any idea of leaving Bussia and recrossing the
Niémen ; it was only a question of taking up winter quarters
in some of the least uncomfortable provinces of Poland.

The evacuation of Moscow was thus practically settled ;
but, before making up his mind to carry it out, Napoleon, with
some last hope of an understanding, sent Caulaincourt, the
Duke of Vicenza, to Marshal Kutusoflf, but got no reply.
During this delay our army was melting away daily, while in
blind confidence our outposts were left exposed in the pro-
vince of Kalouga. Suddenly an unexpected event occurred,
to open the eyes of the most incredulous, and destroy any
hopes which the Emperor might retain on the subject of
peace.

General Sébastiani, whom we saw allowing himself to be
surprised at Druia, had replaced Montbrun in the command
of the 2nd cavalry corps. Close to the enemy as he was, he
passed his days in slippers reading Italian poetry and never
reconnoitring. Kutusoff took advantage of this, and on
October 18 marched on Sébastiani's corps, surrounded it,
overwhelmed it by superior numbers, and compelled it to
abandon part of its artillery. The three cavalry divisions
only succeeded in rejoining Murat's troops by cutting down
several battalions of the enemy who tried in vain to oppose
their passage. Sébastiani, who was brave enough, displayed
much courage in the fight; but as a general he may be
noted for mediocrity. When we come to the campaign of
1813 you will have further proof of it.

Simultaneously with this surprise of Sébastiani, Kutusofl
attacked Murat all along his line ; and the prince himself was
slightly wounded. The Emperor heard of the afiair the same
day; also that 10,000 cavalry from the army of Wallachia
had been permitted by our allies the Austrians to reach the
enemy's camp. Thereupon he ordered that the retreat should
begin next day.

On the morning of October 19 the Emperor left Moscow.
He had entered it on September 15. He himself, with the Old

282 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Guard and the main body of the army, took the road \x>
Kalouga. Marshal Mortier and two divisions of the Young
Guard stayed for twenty-four hours in the city to complete its
ruin by blowing up the Kremlin, with orders to bring up the*
rear. The army was followed by more than 40,000 vehicles,
which blocked the defiles. When this was remarked to the-
Emperor he said that each of them would save two wounded,.
and would feed several men, while they would gradually be-
got rid of. This philanthropic system seems to me open to
objection ; for the need of lightening the march of an army
in retreat appears to take precedence of all other considera-
tions.

While the French were at Moscow, King Murat and his-
cavalry had been occupying part of the province of Kalouga^
but had not taken the town of that name, the neighbourhood
of which is very fertile. The Emperor, wishing to avoid
passing the battlefield of the Moskwa, and taking the^
Mojaisk road, the resources of which the army had already
exhausted, took the line of Kalouga. From this he hoped to-
reach Smolensk through a fertile and unexhausted district.
But, after several days' march, our troops, which since Murat
had rejoined them, amounted still to over 100,000 men, found
themselves in presence of the Russian army, occupying the
little town of Malo-Jaroslavitz. The enemy's position was
exceedingly strong, but the Emperor none the less ordered
Eugène to attack it with the Italian corps and the divisions
of Morand and Gérard. Nothing could stay the dash of our
troops, and they took the town after a long and murderous
engagement, which cost us 4,000 men killed and wounded.
General Delzons, a most deserving oflScer, was among the
killed. Next day, October 24, the Emperor, astounded by
the brisk resistance by which he had been met, and knowing
that the whole Bussian army blocked his road, halted his
troops, and spent three days in considering what steps he
should take.

During a reconnoissance Napoleon was on the verge of
being captured by the enemy. It was a thick fog. Suddenly
the shouts of ' Hourra ! hourra ! ' were heard, and a number of"

The Retreat 283,

Cossacks issued from a wood near the road. They crossed
the road twenty paces from the Emperor, overturning and
spearing all whom they met as they passed. But General Rapp,.
dashing forward at the head of two squadrons of chasseurs and
mounted grenadiers of the guard, put the enemy to flight.
In this fight M. Le Couteulx, my old comrade on Lannes'
staff, now Prince Berthier's aide-de-camp, having armed him-
self with the lance of a Cossack whom he had slain, was
imprudent enough to return brandishing the weapon. It
was the more imprudent that he had on a furred pelisse and
cap, under which the French uniform could not be seen.
Accordingly, a grenadier, taking him for a Cossack oiBBcer,
and seeing him make for the Emperor, pursued him, and ran
him through with his gigantic sabre. In spite of this fright-
ful wound Le Couteulx survived both the cold and the fatigues
of the retreat, and got back to France, travelling in one of
the Emperor's carriages.

Napoleon, having assured himself by reconnoissances that
it was impossible to continue his march towards Kalouga^
except by fighting a sanguinary battle against KutusoflTs
numbers, decided to regain Smolensk by way of Mojaisk.
So the army left a fertile region to follow a route which they
had devastated and had traversed in September amid blazing
villages and heaps of corpses. The nature of the Emperor's
movement, which resulted in bringing him, after ten days'
hard work, to a point only twelve leagues from Moscow, made
the troops very anxious as to the future. The weather be-
came fearful ; and afber blowing up the Kremlin, Marshal
Mortier rejoined the Emperor. Again the army beheld
Mojaisk and the battlefield of the Moskwa. The ground
was furrowed by cannon-balls and covered with débris of
every kind, and 30,000 corpses half-devoured by wolves.
The soldiers and the Emperor passed quickly, casting a sad
look on this vast charnel-house.

In the first edition of his work on the campaign M. de
Ségur says that as they passed the battlefield they saw an
unhappy Frenchman, who, having had both his legs smashed
in the fight, had packed himself into the body of a dead

284 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

horse and had lived there for fifty days, using the flesh of the
animal both to feed himself and to dress his wounds. It was
pointed out to him that the man would have been stifled by
the gases of decomposition, and that he would probably have
preferred to cover his wounds with fresh earth, or even with
grass, than to make them worse by bringing them into con-
tact with putrid flesh. I only make this remark to put the
reader on his guard against the exaggerations of a book the
success of which was largely owing to its brilliant style.

Beyond Wiazma the march of the army was delayed by
snowstorms and an icy wind. Many of the carriages were
left behind, and thousands of men and horses perished from
<;old ; the flesh of the horses supplied food to the soldiers, and
«ven to the officers. The rear-guard passed from the com-
mand of Davout to that of Eugène, and finally came under
Ney, who discharged this laborious duty for the rest of the
campaign. Smolensk was reached on November 1. Napoleon
had ordered a great quantity of provisions and clothing to be
collected in that town ; but the commissaries in charge,
knowing nothing of the state of disorganisation into which
the army had fallen, would not distribute them without
regular orders and the formalities usual under ordinary
circumstances. These delays irritated the soldiers, dying as
they were of hunger and cold. They broke into the store-
houses and possessed themselves of the contents, so that
many men got too much, some not enough, others nothing.

So long as the march of the troops was orderly the
mixture of difierent nations had given rise only to slight
inconvenience ; but when misery and fatigue had broken up
the ranks, discipline was at an end. How could it exist in
an immense body of isolated individuals lacking everything,
going along on their own account, and not understanding
each other? A veritable confusion of tongues reigned in
that disorderly mass. Some regiments, notably that of the
guard, still held out. The troopers of the line regiments
had lost nearly all their horses, and were formed into bat-
talions. The officers who still were mounted composed the
sacred squadrons, the command of which was entrusted to

Bar A GUE Y d' H I LU ERS 285

Generals Latour-Maubourg, Grouchy, and Sébastiani. They
did the duties of mere captains, while major-generals and
colonels acted as sergeants and corporals. An organisation
like this would, of itself, be suflScient to show to what ex-
tremities the army was reduced.

The Emperor had reckoned upon a strong division of
troops of all arms, which General Baraguey d'Hilliers was ta
bring to Smolensk ; but when they got near the town they
learnt that that general had surrendered to a Russian column
on the understanding that he alone should not be made prisoner,
but be allowed to go and join the French army to explain his
conduct. The Emperor, however, would not see him, but
ordered him to return to France and consider himself under
arrest until he could be tried by court-martial. Baraguey
d'Hilliers anticipated their judgment by dying of grief at
Berlin. He had been one of Napoleon's mistakes. He had
taken his fancy in the days of the Boulogne camp by pro-
mising to train the dragoons to serve as infantry or cavalry
alike ; but this system was tried 'in Austria during the cam-
paign of 1805, and the veteran dragoons, dismounted and
commanded by Baraguey d'Hilliers in person, were beaten at
Werthingen under the Emperor's eyes. Their horses were
given back to them, but they were beaten again, and for
several years this arm felt the disorder into which Baraguey
had thrown it. Having fallen into disgrace, he hoped to
retrieve himself by asking leave to come to Russia, and there
ruined himself finally ia the Emperor's favour by capitu--
lating without fighting, and violating the decrees which
ordered the commander of a surrendered corps to share the
fate of his troops and forbade him to ask for conditions
favourable to himself alone.

After several days' halt at Smolensk to allow the
stragglers to come up, the Emperor went on the 15th to
Krasnoe, and thence sent an officer to the 2nd army corps
on the Dwina, in which now his only hope of safety resided,
llie regiments composing this corps had undergone less
fatigue and privation than those which had taken part in
the march to Moscow ; but, on the other hand, they had

.286 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

encountered the enemy much more frequently. Napoleon
wished to reward them by appointing them to all the vacant
posts, and had all the recommendations for promotion
brought to him. There were several in my favour, one of
which asked only for the rank of ma^or (lieutenant-colonel)
for me. The secretary happened to present this one, and I
have it from General Grundier, who, having been ordered to
bring these despatches, was at the moment in the Emperor's
room, that Napoleon when signing struck out the word
ipMiJQr and substituted colonel, remarking, * I am discharging
an old debt.' So at last I became colonel of the 23rd
Chasseurs. It was November 15, but I did not hear of it
till some time afterwards.

The retreat continued painfully, and the enemy, with ever
increasing numbers, separated Prince Eugene's corps from the
army, and also those of Davout and Ney. The first two
succeeded with much difficulty in cutting their way through
-and getting back to the Emperor, who was in a state of
painful anxiety about Ney's corps, several days having
passed without any news of it. On November 19 Napoleon
reached Orcha. A month had passed since he had left
Moscow, and he was still 1 20 leagues from the Niémen ; the
cold was intense.

While the Emperor was agitated by gloomy uncertainty
as to the fate of the rear-guard and its intrepid leader, Ney was
performing one of the most brilliant feats of arms recorded in
military annals. Leaving Smolensk on the 17th after blowing
up the ramparts, the marshal had hardly started when he
was assailed by myriads of the enemy, who attacked him on
Tx)th flanks, in front, and in rear. Continually beating them
off, Ney marched through their midst for three days ; but he
found himself checked at length by the dangerous passage
of the Krasnoe ravine, beyond which could be seen a strong
body of Eussian troops, with a formidable artillery, which
opened a brisk and well-maintained fire. Undismayed by
this unforeseen obstacle, the marshal took the bold resolve of
forcing the passage, and ordered the 48th of the line, com-
manded by Masséna's old aide-de-camp. Colonel Pelet, to

The Rear-guard of the Grand Army 287

charge with the bayonet. At the sound of Ney'ô voice the
French soldiers, worn out as they were with fatigue and
want, and numbed with the cold, dashed forward and carried
the Eussian batteries. The enemy recovered them, and our
troops drove them out again, but they had at last to yield
to numbers. The 48th was cut to pieces by grape-shot, and
in great part destroyed. Out of 650 men who entered the
ravine, 100 only came back. Colonel Pelet, severely wounded,
being of the number. Night came on, and all hope of the
rear-guard rejoining the army appeared to be lost. But
Ney had confidence in his troops, and above all in himself.
By his orders numerous lines of fires were kindled so as to
hold the enemy in their camp, in fear of a fresh attack on
the morrow. The marshal had resolved to place the Dnieper
between him and the Russians, and to entrust his destiny
and that of his troops to the frail ice of the river. His only
doubt was as to the road which he ought to take in order to
reach the Dnieper as soon as possible. Just then a Russian
colonel, coming from Krasnoe, presented himself as a flag
of truce, and summoned Ney to lay down his arms. At the
thought of such humiliation the marshal's anger burst forth,
and, as the officer bore no written orders, Ney declared that
he did not consider him as a flag of truce, but as a spy, and
that he would have him bayoneted if he did not guide them
to the nearest point of the Dnieper. The Russian colonel
was compelled to obey, and Ney instantly gave orders to
leave the camp in silence. Artillery, caissons, baggage, and
wounded were abandoned, and, favoured by the darkness, he
reached the banks of the Dnieper after four hours' march.

The river was frozen, but not hard enough to be practicable
at all points, for there were many cracks and places where
the ice was so thin that it gave way when several crossed at
once. The marshal therefore made the soldiers cross in
single file, and the passage of the river thus accomplished.
Marshal Ney's troops deemed themselves in safety. But by
the dawning light they perceived a large bivouac of Cossacks.
The hetman, Platoff, was in command then, and as, according
to his habit, he had been drinking all night, he was at that

288 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

moment asleep. Now discipline is so strict in the Bussian
army, that no one dared to awake the chief, nor stand to arm»
without his order. The fragments of Ney's corps therefore
edged along a league from the hetman's camp without being^
attacked ; nor did they see any more of PlatofTs Cossacks till
the next day. For three days Marshal Ney marched, fighting
incessantly, along the winding banks of the Dnieper, to
Orcha, and on the 20th came in sight of the town. He
hoped to find the Emperor and the army there ; but between
him and it there still lay a wide plain, occupied by a strong
body of the enemy's infantry, which was advancing on him,
the Cossacks, meanwhile, preparing to attack his rear.
Taking up a defensible position, he sent several oflScers, one
after another, to make sure that the French were still in
Orcha ; since otherwise further resistance would be of no
avail. One of them reached the place, and found the head-
quarters still there. On learning that Ney had returned
the Emperor evinced the greatest joy, and in order to deliver
him from his dangerous situation he sent Eugène and
Mortier to meet him. They repulsed the enemy, and brought
Marshal Ney, with what remained of the brave men under
his command, back to Orcha. This retreat did Ney the
greatest credit.

That day the Emperor continued his retreat by Kokanoft
and Toloczin, to Bobra, where he found Marshal Victor'»
troops lately arrived from Germany, and came into touch
with the 2nd corps, the command of which Saint-Cyr had
just handed back to Oudinot.

CHAPTER XXIX

As it is important to explain the reasons which had brought
the 2nd corps back to the main body of the army, from
which it had been separated since the beginning of thé cam-
paign, I must resume the summary of its history from the
month of August. At that time, after having beaten the
Russians before Polotsk, Marshal Saint-Cjnr had formed a vast
entrenched camp near that place, garrisoning it with some of
his troops, and distributing the rest about both banks of the
Dwina. The light cavalry covered the cantonments, and, as
I have said, Castex's brigade, including my regiment, was
placed at Luchonski on the Polota, whence we were able to
watch the main roads coming from Sebesh and Nevel. Wittgen-
stein's army after its defeat had retired behind those towns,
so that between the Russians and the French there was a
space of more than twenty-five leagues. This was not regu-
larly occupied, but both sides sent cavalry to reconnoitre it,
which gave rise to sundry skirmishes. As in the neigbour-
hood of Polotsk, there was abundant forage, the crops still
standing ; the soldiers, knowing that we should stay there for
some time, set to work to reap and thresh the com, grinding
it afterwards in the little hand-mills, such as are found in
every peasant's house. This appeared to me to be slow work,
and I caused two water-mills on the Polota to be repaired,
from which time my regiment was sure of its bread. As for
meat, the woods were full of beasts abandoned by their
owners ; but since providing ourselves from these meant a
daily hunt, I resolved to imitate a practice which I had seen
with the Army of Portugal, and to form a regimental herd.
I succeeded in a short time in getting together 700 or 800
beasts, putting them under the care of some dismounted

VOL. II. u

290 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

chasseurs, whom I supplied with some of the horaes of the
country, which were too small to be drafted into the ranks.
I increased my herd by frequent raids, and it existed for
several months, so that I was able to give the re^ment as
much meat as they wanted, and keep my troops, who were
grateful for my care, in good health. I also looked after the
horses, for which large sheds were constructed thatched with
straw and placed in rear of the soldiers' huts, so that our
bivouac was almost as comfortable as a camp in time of peace.
The other colonels made similar arrangements, but none of
them collected a herd, their soldiers living from hand to month.
While the French, Croat, Swiss, and Portuguese regiments
worked unceasingly at improving their position, the Bavarians
alone took no steps to escape from sickness and want. In
vain did General Wrede try to stimulate their energy by
pointing out the activity with which the French soldiers were
constructing huts, harvesting, threshing, grinding, and
baking ; the poor Bavarians, wholly demoralised since they
had ceased to receive rations, admired the intelligent work of
our troops without trying to imitate them. Thus they died
like flies, and not one would have survived if Marshal Saint-
Oyr, giving up his habitual indolence for a moment, had not
bidden the colonels of the other divisions to supply the
Bavarians every day with bread, while the light cavalry
fetched cattle for them. Yet these Germans, so slack when
it was necessary to work, were brave enough before the
enemy, but as soon as the danger was over they relapsed into
utter apathy. Home-sickness took possession of them ; they
crawled to Polotsk, and making for the hospitals, which the
care of their chiefs had established, they asked for ' the room
where people die,' lay down on the straw, and never got up
again. In this way a great number perished, and things
came to such a point that General Wrede was obliged to
place in his baggage wagon the colours of several battalions
which had no longer men enough to guard them. Yet we
were in September, and so far the weather was very mild ;
the other troops were in good condition and lived merrily
while awaiting future events. The troopers of my regiment

Taking Care of my Men 291

were especially noticed for their good health, which I attri-
buted in the first place to the quantity of bread and meat
which I gave them, and still more to the plentiful supply of
spirits which I was able to obtain by an arrangement with
the Jesuits of Polotsk. Those kind fathers, all French, had
a large farm at Luchonski with a distillery of corn brandy,
but on the approach of war the workmen had all fled to the
monastery, taking their stills and apparatus, so that the
manufacture had stopped, and the brethren had lost part of
their income. Meanwhile the assemblage of the army about
the town had made alcohol so scarce and so dear that the
canteen-men made several days' journey to Wilna to fetch it.
It occurred to me then to make a treaty with the Jesuits, under
which I was to protect their distillers, and make my soldiers
provide the necessary com, on condition that my regiment
should have every day à share of the resulting brandy. My
proposal was accepted ; the monks derived great profit from
the sale of their spirit in the camp, and I was able to serve
it out three times a day to my men, who since they crossed
the Niémen had drunk nothing but water.

I know that these details seem at first sight superfluous,
but I recall them with pleasure, because the care which I
took of my men saved the lives of many of them, and kept
the effective strength of the 23rd Chasseurs far above that of
any other cavalry regiment in the army corps. This gained
me a testimony of the Emperor's satisfaction, of which I will
speak later on. I took two other precautions which saved the
life of many of my troopers : the first was compelling them
all to provide themselves with sheepskin-overcoats, such as
were to be found in plenty in the deserted villages. Soldiers
are big children, and one has to take care of them in spite of
themselves. My men declared at first that these greatcoats
were useless and overweighted their horses ; but by the time
that October began they were very glad to put them under
their cloaks, and when the great cold came on they thanked
me for compelling them to keep them. My second precaution
was to send to the rear of the army all troopers who had lost
their horses by the enemy's fire, or by breaking down. There

u 2

292 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

was a general order that all such men were to be sent to
Lepel, in Lithuania, where they were to receive horses that
were expected from Warsaw. I was preparing to obey this
order, when I heard that the depot at Lepel was choked with
dismounted troopers in great want, and having nothing to do,
since no remounts had arrived. I therefore took it upon
myself to send all my dismounted men direct to Warsaw under
the command of Captain Poitevin, who had been wounded. I
knew quite well that I was contravening the regulations, but
in an immense army transported to such a distance, and placed
in such unusual circumstances, it was physically impossible
that the administrative staff could attend to the requirements
of the troops. It was therefore necessary for a regimental
commander often to act on his own responsibility ; so General
Castex, who could not give me an official authorisation,
promised to wink at what was going on, and I continued as
far as possible to act on this principle, until the troopers
whom I sent to Warsaw gradually amounted to 250. After
the campaign I picked them up on the Vistula, all newly
clothed, well equipped, and with excellent horses, and they
formed a capital reinforcement for the regiment. The dis-
mounted men from other regiments who were collected at
Lepel to the number of more than 9,000, overtaken by the
retreat of the troops on the way from Moscow, were nearly all
taken prisoners or died of cold on the road ; yet it would have
been easy to have sent them during the summer and autumn
to Warsaw, where there were in the depot plenty of horses
only wanting riders.

I had a good month's rest at Luchonski, which helped
forward the cure of the wound that I had received in July at
Jakobowo. In that camp we were well off from a material
point of view, but very uneasy about what was going on in
the direction of Moscow, and we very seldom got news from
France. At length I received a letter from my dear
Angélique, in which she announced that she had given birth
to a boy. Great as was my joy it was mingled with sad-
ness, for I was far from my family, and though I did not
foresee all the dangers to which I was shortly to be e3q)osed,

A Mission 293

I could not hide from myself that there were great obstacles
in the way of our meeting again.

Towards the middle of September Marshal Saint-Cyr sent
me on a very delicate errand. Its end was twofold : first to
find out what the enemy was doing in the neighbourhood of
Nevel, and then to return by the shores of Lake Ozerichtchi
and speak with Count Lubenski, the greatest noble of the
country, and one of the few Poles who were ready to do any-
thing to shake off the Russian yoke.

The Emperor, who, while hesitating to proclaim the resto-
ration of the old Poland, had wished to organise the parts
already occupied into departments, had met with much
opposition from the nobles to whom he had proposed to en-
trust the administration of them. However, after the
assurances which he had received as to the patriotism of
Count Lubenski, he had appointed him prefect of Witebsk.
As he lived on an estate lying outside of the districts occu-
pied by the French, it was diflScult to get the announcement
of his nomination to him, and Napoleon had therefore gfiven
orders that a body of light cavalry should be sent his way.
The duty of carrying out this task having fallen to me, I
picked 300 of the bravest and best-mounted men of my
regiment, and, after duly victualling them, departed on
September 14 from the camp at Luchonski, leaving there
Castex's brigade and the rest of our squadrons. I took
Lorenz with me to act as interpreter.

Partisan warfare is dangerous and very laborious. Avoid-
ing high roads ; hiding by day in the forest without daring to
light a fire ; getting food and forage in some hamlet, and
going some leagues away to consume it, so as to get the
better of the enemy's spies ; marching all night, and sometimes
towards a point other than that which we were really making
for ; being for ever on the alert — such was the life which I
led from the moment when I was launched with only 300 men
into a vast and unknown region, ever getting further from
the French and nearer to the Russians, with a chance of
meeting strong bodies of them. My position was diflScult ;
but I trusted to my luck and the courage of my troopers, and

294 ^^^ Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

advanced steadily, keeping always two or three leagues to one
side of the road from Polotsk to Nevel by Tomchino.

I need not relate in detail the incidents of no great
interest which befel us ; it will suffice to say that, thanks to
the good counsel given us by the peasants, who were opposed
to the Russians, we went all round the town of Nevel, avoid-
ing the enemy's outposts, and after marching eight days, or
rather eight nights, reached Lake Ozerichtchi, on the shores of
which stood the handsome château belonging to Count
Lubenski. I shall never forget our arrival at that ancient
and immense mansion. A lovely autumn evening was lighted
up by the moon. The count's family were assembled to cele-
brate his birthday and rejoice over Napoleon's success at the
Moskwa, when the servants ran in announcing that the house
was surrounded by soldiers, who had set outposts and sentinels,
and were already entering the courtyards. They thought it
was the Russian police come to arrest their master. He, being
a man of courage, was calmly awaiting his removal to the
prisons of St. Petersburg, when one of his sons, having opened
a window through curiosity, remarked : * Those troopers are
talking French.' At these words Count Lubenski with his
family and servants rushed out of the house. He assembled
them under a large portico, and as I mounted the steps
came towards me with open arms, exclaiming in tragic tones :
* Welcome, generous Gaul, bringing liberty to my country,
so long oppressed ! Come, warrior of the great Napoleon,
Poland's liberator, let me press thee to my heart ! ' Not only
did the count embrace me ; he insisted on the countess, his
sons, and daughters doing the same. Then the chaplain, the
tutors, the governesses kissed my hand, and the servants
touched my knee with their lips. Astonished as I was at
the various grades of honour which were rendered me, I
received them with all the gravity at my command, and I
imagined the scene at an end, when, at a word from the
count, all fell prostrate in prayer.

We entered the château, and handing Count Lubenski
his appointment as prefect of Witebsk bearing the seal of the
I]mperor of the French I asked if he accepted it.

Count Lubenski 295

' Yes,' he cried vigorously, * and 1 am all ready to follow
you.' The countess was no less enthusiastic, and it was
settled that the count should start with me. I allowed an hour
to prepare for the journey, which I need not say that my
detachment employed in making a good supper, though in
our fear of being suprised they were obliged to eat on horse-
back. Having taken our leave, we went four leagues further
and slept in a forest, where we lay hidden all the next day.
On the following night we continued our march ; but in order
to put the enemy, who might have been surprised at the
presence of a French detachment in these regions, off the
scent I carefully avoided taking the same road as I had
followed when coming, and reached Polotsk in five days by
way of Lombrowka, sometimes following paths, sometime»
going across country. I was all the more thankful that I
liad returned by a different road when I learnt from some
traders belonging to Nevel that the Eussians had sent a
regiment of dragoons and 600 Cossacks to look out for me,
about the head waters of the Drissa, towards Krasnopoli.

After reporting to Marshal Saint-Cyr, and presenting
Count Lubenski to him, I returned to our bivouac at
Luclionski, where I found General Castex and the rest of my
regiment. My expedition had lasted thirteen days, during
which we had incurred much fatigue and some privation, but
I brought my people back in good condition. We had not
had to fight, for such small bodies of the enemy as we had
seen had all taken flight at the sight of us.

During our journey I had been in a position to form an
opinion with regard to Count Lubenski. He was a well-
educated and able man, patriotic above all things, but his.
judgment was sometimes led astray by his enthusiasm when
it was a question of choosing the means to the reconstitution
of Poland. If, however, all his compatriots had shared his
ardour, and taken up arms on the coming of the French,
I^oland might, perhaps, have recovered her independence
in 1812; but they remained, with very few exceptions, utterly
apathetic.

After leaving Polotsk the count went to take possession

296 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

of his prefecture. He did not hold it long, for a month had
hardly lasped, when the French army was passing through
the province of Witebsk in its retreat. Thus compelled to
resign his prefecture and withdraw from the vengeance
of the Russians, Count Lubenski took refuge in Galicia,
where he had large possessions. He lived there peaceably
till 1830, at which time he returned to Russian Poland when
it was in arms against the Czar. What befel Count
Lubenski during and after this rising I do not know.
Several of his compatriots assured me that he retired again to
Galicia. He was a great patriot and an excellent man.

A few days after our return to Luchonski I was much
surprised at seeing a detachment of thirty troopers of my
regiment arrive from France. They came from Mons and
had thus crossed Belgium, the Rhine provinces, all Germany,
part of Prussia and Poland, and travelled more than 400
leagues under the command of a sergeant ; yet not a
man had stayed behind, and not a horse was injured. This
will serve to show the zealous spirit which animated the
23rd Chasseurs.

About October 12 the 2nd corps, which had been for two
months living in abundance and tranquillity at Polotsk and
the neighbourhood, had to get ready to take its chance of
more fighting. We learnt that Admiral Tchichagoff,
•commanding the army of Wallachia, having through English
mediation, made peace with the Turks, was making for
Mohileff with the view of falling on the Emperor's rear, while
he was still at Moscow, and still lulling himself with the
hope of making a treaty with Alexander. People were
astonished that Prince Schwarzenberg, whose duty it was
with 30,000 Austrians to watch the army of Wallachia,
should have let Tchichagoff pass, but it was no less the fact.
Not only had the Austrians omitted to close the way, as they
might have done, to the Russians, but they had, instead of
following them up, remained quiet in their cantonments in
Volhynia. Napoleon had counted too much on the good
faith of his father-in-law's ministers and generals, when he
entrusted to them the duty of covering the right wing of the

Misplaced Confidence 297

'Grand Army. In vain does Count de Ségur seek to palliate
the offence of the Austrian Government and Prince
Schwarzenberg — their treachery was flagrant and history
will brand their conduct.

While the Austrians on our right were opening the way
to the Kussian army coming from Turkey, the Prussians, who
had so imprudently been allowed to form our left wing, were
also preparing to make terms with the enemy ; and that
almost openly, without any concealment from Marshal
Macdonald, whom the Emperor had put at their head to keep
them to their allegiance. As soon as they learnt that the
occupation of Moscow had not led to peace, they foresaw the
disasters of the French army, and all their hatred towards us
awoke. They did not yet rebel openly, but Marshal
Macdonald could not get his orders well obeyed, and the
Prussians, who were cantoned near Biga, might at any
moment join Wittgenstein's troops and overwhelm the French
army encamped near Polotsk. It is clear how difficult
Marshal Saint-C}T's situation became, but this did not
disturb him, and with his usual coolness he gave, calmly and
clearly, his orders for an obstinate defence. The infantry
was concentrated in the town and the entrenched camp,
while several more bridges were thrown across the Dwina.
The sick and the non-combatants were placed in old Polotsk
and Ekimania, fortified positions on the left bank. The
marshal, not thinking that he had troops enough to dispute
the plain with Wittgenstein, who had just been strongly
reinforced from St. Petersburg, deemed it best to keep only
five squadrons, and took one from each regiment of light
cavalry, while the remainder crossed the river. On October 16
the enemy's scouts appeared before Polotsk. They must
have found its appearance much changed on account both of
the huge entrenched camp and of the numerous works with
which the plain was covered. The largest and strongest of
these was a redoubt called La Bavaroise. All those of
Wrede*s unfortunate soldiers who had not died of home
sickness asked leave to defend this redoubt, and did it very
valiantly.

• • «% • • <

1 • • • ?•

• • • • •
- • • •

298 The Meawirs of the Baron de Marbot

The battle began on the 17th and lasted all da}v
Marshal Saint-Cyr's position could not be forced, and General
Wittgenstein, in his anger attributing this check to the fact-
that his oflScers had not sufficiently reconnoitred the strength
of our defensive works, thought fit to inspect them himself,
and approached them with great boldness. But this devoted
action went near to cost him his life, for Major Curély, one of
the best officers in the French army, having caught sight of
the Russian general, dashed upon him at the head of the
squadron of the 20th Chasseurs, sabred part of his escort, and,,
making up to Wittgenstein, forced him at the sword's point
to surrender his own. After this important capture of the
enemy's commander-in-chief, Major Curély should have
promptly retired and brought his prisoner into the entrenched
camp, but he was too impetuous, and seeing that the
Russian general's escort was returning to the charge in order
to set him free, he though that French honour was involved
in his keeping his prisoner in spite of every eflTort on the^
enemy's part. Thus Wittgenstein found himself for some
minutes in the middle of a group contending for the posses-
sion of his person, but Curély's horse was killed and several
of our chasseurs leapt down to pick up their commander.
Then Wittgenstein, taking advantage of the confusion, made
off at full gallop, ordering his men to follow.

This episode, which was soon known throughout the army,
gave rise to a lively controversy. Some declared that Curély's
moderation in not striking Wittgenstein should have come to
an end at the moment when the Russians, returning to the
fight, were on the point of setting their general free, and
they maintain that Curély ought then to have run him
through. But others held that, having accepted the Russian
general's surrender, Curély had no longer the right to kill
him. There may be some truth in this last argument, but
for it to be perfectly sound General Wittgenstein should,
after the example of the knights of old, have constituted
himself a prisoner, rescue or no rescue. It seems, however,
that he had not entered into any such engagement, or else
that he broke it, seeing that he escaped as soon as he saw a

A Case of Conscience 299-

chance. Had he the right to do so ? That is a question
very difficult to settle. So is also that respecting Curély's
alleged right to kill Wittgenstein while they were trying to
recapture him. Anyhow, when Curély was afterwards pre-
sented to the Emperor, during the passage of the Beresina,
where Wittgenstein inflicted such heavy loss on us, Napoleon
said to him : ' This disaster would probably not have happened
if you had used your right to kill Wittgenstein on the battle-
field of Polotsk, when the Russians were trying to tear him
from your hands.' In spite of this reproach, whether deserved
or not, Curély became a colonel soon afterwards, and general
in 1814.

But to return to Polotsk. Repulsed on October 17, the
enemy returned to the attack on the 18th, in such strength
that, after suffering immense loss, Wittgenstein captured the
entrenched camp. But Saint-Cyr, at the head of Legrand's
and Maison's divisions, drove him out with the bayonet.
Seven times did the Russians return with fury to the charge,
and seven times did the French and Croats repulse them,
remaining in the end masters of all the positions. Marshal
Saint-Cyr was wounded, but continued no less to direct the
troops. His efforts were entirely successful, for the Russians
left the field and retired into the forest, 50,000 men having
been beaten by 15,000. Joy was general in the French
camp; but on the 19th we heard that General Steingel, at
the head of 14,000 Russians, had crossed the Dwina by
I3isna, and was marching up the left bank to turn Polotsk
and enclose Saint-Cyr's army between his force and that of
Wittgenstein. And before long his advanced guard appeared
before Natcha, making for Ekimania, where were our
cuirassier division and the light cavalry regiments, from
which the marshal had kept only a squadron of each at
Polotsk.

In a moment we had mounted, and driven back the
enemy, who would, however, have had the best of it in
the end, as strong reinforcements were arriving, and we had
no infantiy, had not Marshal Saint-Cyr sent three regiments
from those guarding Polotsk. Then Steingel, whom an effort

300 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

. > .

would have brought to the bridges, stopped short, while
Wittgenstein, on the other bank, also remained motionless.
It seemed as if the two Russian generals, after having formed
a well-conceived plan for a combined attack, did not dare to
cany it out, but were relying on each other to beat the
French. Our position was nevertheless terribly critical ;
for those on the right bank were being forced back by Witt-
genstein's army, threefold theirs in number, upon a town,
built wholly of wood, and a large stream, and had no way
of retreat open, save by the bridges which Steingel, on the left
bank, was threatening. Then all the generals urged Saint-
Cyr to evacuate Polotsk; but knowing that the Russians only
awaited the first sign of a retrograde movement to fall on his
weakened army and throw it into disorder, he preferred to
wait till night. Taking advantage, therefore, of the unex-
pected inertness of the enemy, he waited immovably for
sunset. The arrival of this was luckily hastened by a thick
fog, which hid each of the three armies from the others ; and
the marshal seized this favourable moment for retreat.

The numerous artillery and some squadrons which had
remained on the right bank had silently crossed the bridges,
.and the infantry was about to slip away, when, at the
moment of their departure, Legrand's men, unwilling to
leave their huts to the Russians, set them on fire. The other
two divisions, thinking that it was an arranged signal, did
the like, and in an instant the whole line was in a blaze.
The conflagration proclaimed our retreat to the Russians,
their batteries opened, and their shells set fire to the suburbs
as well as to the town. Their columns advanced upon it
headlong, but the French defended the ground foot by foot,
being able to see, by the light of the fire, as in broad day.
Polotsk was burnt to the ground, both sides lost heavily, but
our troops retreated in good order. All the wounded who
could be removed were brought away ; the rest, and many of
the Russians, perished in the flames.

There appeared to be an utter want of agreement between
the enemy's commanders, for during all this fighting Steingel
remained quiet in his camp, and gave Wittgenstein no more

Bavarians Fall Away 301

help than Wittgenstein had given him on the previous day.^
Only when Saint-Cyr, after evacuating the place, had burnt
the bridges over the Dwina and put himself out of Wittgen-
stein's reach, did Steingel begin to make arrangments to
attack us. But by that time the French troops were con-
centrated on the left bank, ^nd Saint-Cyr led them against
Steingel, beating him off with a loss of more than 2,000 men.
In this hard fighting, during four days and one night, the
Russians had six generals and 10,000 men killed and
wounded. The loss of the French and their allies did not
amount to more than 5,000, the difference being no doubt
due to the superiority of our fire, especially in the case of the
artillery. But our advantage in the matter of loss was in
some measure balanced by the fact that Marshal Saint-Cyr
was wounded, and the army thus deprived of a chief in whom
it had entire confidence. It became necessary to replace him,
and Count von Wrede, on the strength of his rank as general-
in-chief of the Bavarians, claimed to take command over
the French generals of division. But as they refused to
obey a foreigner, Saint-Cyr, though in much pain, agreed to
keep the leadership of the two corps a little longer. He
ordered a retreat towards Dula, so as to bring himself near
to Smoliany, thus protecting the flank of the road from Orcha
to Borisoff, by which the Emperor was returning from Moscow,
So well was this retreat conducted that Wittgenstein and
Steingel, who had repaired the bridges, and were following
us up with 50,000 men, did not dare to attack us, though
we had not more than 12,000. As for Wrede, his pride was
wounded, and he could not bring himself to obey. He
marched, therefore, as he pleased with the 1,000 Bavarians
whom he had left, and a brigade of French cavalry, which he
had brought away by telling General Corbineau, what was not
the fact, that he had been ordered to do so. His presumption
was soon punished ; being attacked and beaten by a Russian

I If we may believe TchicbagofE's memoirs, tbe fatal disunion wbicb
too often prevailed among Napoleon's lieutenants existed no less among
those of Alexander. It was to tbis, in great measure, tbat the fragments
of the Grand Army owed their escape at tbe passage of tbe Beresina.

302 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

division, he retired, without orders, to Wilna, whence he
reached the Niémen. Corbineau's brigade refused to follow
him, and rejoined the French army, to which you will see,
when I come to speak of the passage of the Beresina, its
return was of great service.

Meanwhile, by the Emperor'^ orders. Marshal Victor, at
the head of the 9th army corps, 25,000 strong, half of
which belonged to the Confederation of the Ehine, was
hurrying up from Smolensk to join Saint-Cyr, and throw
Wittgenstein back across the Dwina. This plan would
have taken effect promptly if Saint-Cyr had had the chief
<;ommand, but Victor was the senior, and Saint-Cyr, not
wishing to serve under him, declared, the day after their
meeting, which took place on October 31 before Smoliany,
that he could campaign no longer, and, handing over the
<X)mmand of the 2nd corps to General Legrand, departed for
Prance. The troops regretted him, for, though they did not
like him personally, they did justice to his courage and his
wonderful military talent. All that Saint-Cyr needed to be
A consummate commander was a smaller share of egotism and
the knowledge how to attach men and officers to him by
attending to their wants. But no man is faultless.

Hardly had Marshal Victor taken command of the united
2nd and 9th corps when fortune offered him the chance of
winning a brilliant victory. Wittgenstein, ignorant of the
junction which had taken place, and trusting to his own
superior strength, attacked our outposts imprudently, leaving
difficult defiles in his rear. It only wanted a simultaneous
■effort of the two corps to destroy him, for our troops were
now as numerous as his ; their spirit was excellent, and they
were keen to fight. But Victor, no doubt distrusting him-
self on ground which he had not seen before, took advantage
of the night to retire, reached Sienno, and cantonned the
two corps in the neighbourhood. The Russians also went
away, leaving only a few Cossacks to watch us. This state
of things, which lasted for the first fortnight of November,
was very favourable to our troops, for the district offered
plenty of resources, and they lived in comfort.

An Absurd Alarm 303

The 23rd Chasseurs, posted at Zapole, was covering one
flank of the united corps, when Marshal Victor, hearing that
a large force of the enemy was at Vonisokoi-Ghorodie,
ordered General Castex to reconnoitre this point with
one of his regiments. It was the turn for mine to march.
We started at nightfall, and reached Ghorodie without
hindrance. The village stood in a bottom, on a large
drained marsh. Everything was quiet, and the peasants
whom I questioned through Lorenz had not seen a Russian
soldier for a month. I therefore prepared to go back to
Zapole ; but our return was not as calm as our outward
march had been. There was no fog, but the night was very
dark, and I was afraid of the regiment going astray among
the numerous dykes in the marsh. I therefore took for
guide one of the inhabitants of Ghorodie, who appeared less
stupid than the others. My column had proceeded in good
order for half an hour, when I suddenly perceived bivouac
fires upon the hills surrounding the marsh. I halted my
men, and sent out two intelligent sergeants to reconnoitre,
bidding them try to avoid being seen. They soon came
back, saying that a strong body was blocking our way,
while another was in position in our rear. I turned round,
and when I saw thousands of fires between me and Ghorodie
it seemed clear that I had inadvertently got into the middle
of an army corps, which was preparing to bivouac on the
spot. The fires kept increasing in number ; the plain and
the hills were soon covered with them, and presented the
appearance of a camp of 50,000 men, in the midst of which
was I with less than 700 troopers. The odds were great,
but how were we to avoid the danger which threatened ?
The only way was to gallop forward in silence along the
main dyke upon which we were, to surprise the enemy
by a sudden charge, and cut our way through, sword in
hand. Once out of the light of the camp-fires, the darkness
would save us from pursuit. Having decided on this course,
I sent officers all along the column to let the troops know,
being certain that all would approve my plan and follow me
resolutely. I must admit that I was not without anxiety.

304 The Memoirs op the Baron de Mar bot

for the enemy's infantry might stand to their arms at
the first challenge of a sentry, and kill many of my people
while my regiment was passing in front of it. In the middle
of my anxiety, the peasant who was guiding us burst into-
shouts of laughter, and Lorenz did the same. In vain did
I question the latter, he could not stop laughing ; and not
knowing enough French to explain the unusual circumstances,
he showed me his cloak, on which had just settled one of the
will-o'-the-wisps which we had taken for bivouac fires»
The phenomenon was produced by the marsh emanations,
which a slight finest following on a day of hot autumn sun-
shine had condensed. In a little time the whole regiment
was covered with these fires, as large as eggs, at which the
soldiers were much diverted. Thus relieved from one of
the greatest frights that I had ever had I returned ta
Zapole.

CHAPTER XXX

A FEW days later a freali duty fell to me, ia the coutbô of
which we had to face not will-o'-the-wisps, but the carbines
of Roasiaa dragoons. One day when General Castex had
gone to Sienno to meet Marshal Victor, and my regiment was
at Zapole, I Sfiw two peasants arrive, and recognised in one of
them Captain Boargoing, an aide-de-camp of Oudinot's. That
marshal, who, after being wounded at Polotsk on August 18,
had gone to Wilua, having learnt that Saint-Cyr had
been wounded in hia turn on October 18 and left the army,
had decided to resume the command of the 2nd corps.
Knowing that Ms troops were in the neighbourhood of
Sienno, he was making for that town, when, on reaching
Kasna, he was warned by a Polish priest that a party of
Kussian dragoons and Cossacks was prowling about. He
heard, however, at the same time that there were French
cavalry at Zapole, and resolved to write to the commander
asking for a strong escort. The letter was sent by the hand
of M. de Bourgoing, who, for greater secnritj, disguised
himself aa a peasant. It was just as well he did, for he had
hardly gone a leagne when he fell in with a strong force of
Russian cavalry, who, thinking he waa an inhabitant of the
country, took no notice of him. A few moments later M. de
Bourgoing heard firing, and hastened on to Zapole. On
hearing from him of the marshal's critical position, I trotted
off with my whole regiment to bring him speedy succour. It
was high time for us to do so, for, although the marshal had
barricaded himself in a stone house and waa defending him-
self valiantly with the help of hia aide-de-camp and a dozen
French soldiers on their way back to the army, hia position
was about to be forced by the Ruasian dragoons, when we
VOL. U. X

3o6 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

appeared. Ât sight of us they remounteâ and took to flight.
My troopers pursued them, killed a score of them, and took
some prisoners, with a loss of two wounded. Marshal
Oudinot expressed his gratitude, and my regiment escorted
him till he reached the French cantonments and was out of
danger.

At the time of which I speak all the marshals of the
Empire seemed determined to recognise no rights of seniority
among themselves, for none would serve under one of his
colleagues, however serious the occasion might be. When,
therefore, Oudinot had resumed the command of the second
corps, Victor, rather than fight Wittgenstein under his orders,
marched off with his 25,000 men towards Kokanoff. Thus
left alone, Marshal Oudinot marched his troops about for
several days in different parts of the province, and finally
established his headquarters at Tchereia with his advanced
guard at Lukulen.

It was during a little fight which Castex's brigade had in
front of that town that my promotion to colonel at last
reached me. If you consider that as major I had received a
wound at Znaym in Moravia, two at Miranda de Corvo in
Portugal, one at Jakobowo, had served four campaigns with
that rank, and that I had been in command of a regiment
ever since the French entered Russia, you will perhaps think
that I had pi-etty well earned my new epaulettes. I was
none the less grateful to the Emperor, especially when I
learnt that I was still to have the 23rd Chasseurs, of whom I
was very fond, and by whom I knew that I was both beloved
and valued. In fact, there was great joy throughout the
regiment, and the brave men whom I had so often led to
battle came, men and oflii^ers alike, to ex}>re8S their satis&c-
tiou at keeping me as their c^^mmander. The kind General
Castex, who had always treateil me as a brother, himself
announced my promotion at the head of the regiment.
Lastly, the colonel of the 2ith, although we were not very
intimate, came at the head of all his officers to congratu-
late me.

Î^Ioanwhîle the situation of the FriMioh anuy was getting

Mismanagement 307

worse every day. Field-Marshal Schwarzenberg, commander-
in-chief of the Austrian corps which formed the right wing
of the army, had by the basest treachery allowed Tchicha-
goflPs troops to pass him ; they had taken Minsk and were
threatening our rear. The Emperor must have deeply
regretted that he had entrusted the command of Lithuania
to the Dutch general, Hogendorf, who, having seen nothing
of war, did not know how to set about saving Minsk. The
capture of that place was a serious matter ; but the Emperor
attached little importance to it, because he reckoned on
passing the Beresina at Borisoff, where there was a bridge
covered by a fortress in good condition and guarded by a
Polish regiment. So great was Napoleon's confidence on this
point that, in order to lighten the march of his army, he
had had all his pontoons burnt at Orcha. This was a great
disaster, for they would have assured us a ready passage over
the Beresina, a passage which we had to buy at the cost of
so much bloodshed. Secure as Napoleon felt with regard
to this, on learning that Minsk was occupied by the
Eussians, he ordered Marshal Oudinot to come by forced
marches to Borisoff; but we arrived too late, because General
Bronikoffski, who was charged with the defence of the fort
on the right bank, finding himself surrounded by large
numbers of the enemy, thought to do a praiseworthy action
by saving the garrison. Instead, therefore, of offering a
stubborn resistance, which would have given Oudinot time to
come to his relief, the Polish general abandoned the place,
crossing with his whole garrison to the left bank and taking
the road to Orcha, so as to rejoin Oudinot, which he did in
front of Natcha. The marshal received him with displeasure,
and ordered him to return with us towards Borisoff. Not
only were the town, the bridge over the Beresina, and the
fortress commanding it already in Tchichagoff's hands, but
that general, who, after his success, was eager to fight the
French troops, had started on November 23 to meet them
with the greater part of his army, the advance-guard being
commanded by General Lambert, the best of his lieutenants.
The ground being level. Marshal Oudinot made the cuirassier

z 2

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« '

308 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

divicdon march at the head of his infantry, preceded by
Castex*s light cavalry brigade.

Three leagues finom Borisoff the Rnssian adyance-gaard
came in contact with onr cuirassiers, who, having had very
little fighting in the course of this campaign, had b^^ed
for the honour of being placed in the first line. At the
sight of these five regiments, which were stiU strong and
well mounted, the Russian cavalry stopped short. Recovering
their courage, however, they advanced again. Then our
cuirassiers with a inrious charge overthrew them, killing or
capturing a thousand men. Tchichagoff, who had been
assured that Napoleon's army was by this time only a
disorderly and unarmed crowd, was not prepared for such
vigour, so he retreated in haste towards Borisoff. It usually
happens that after executing a chai^ the big horses of the
heavy cavalry, especially the cuirassiers, cannot go on gaUop-
ing. It was, therefore, the 23rd and 24th Chasseurs wha
were ordered to pursue the enemy while the cuirassiers came
on at a slackened pace in the second line.

Tchichagoff had not only committed the mistake of
coming to meet Oudinot's corps, but he had also caused all
the baggage wagons of his army, to the number of more
than 1,500, to follow him. So great, therefore, was the
disorder in the headlong retreat of the Russians towards
Borisoff that Castex's two regiments often found their march
hampered by the vehicles which the enemy had abandoned.
This hindrance became still greater when we entered the
town, the streets of which were crowded with baggage and
draught horses, among which were streaming the Russian
soldiers, who had thrown away their arms, and were trying to
get back to the Russian regiments. Still, we reached the
middle of the town, but only after losing precious time, by
which the enemy profited to pet across the river.' The
marshal's orders were to reach the bridge and try to cross it,
together with the Russian fugitives : but in order to do this,
it was necessary to know where the bridge was, and none of
us was acquainted with the town. At length my troopers
I Tchichagoff's memoirs fully conârm aU the»o details.

The Last Chance 309

found a Jew, whom I questioned in German ; but whether it
was that the scamp did not understand that language, or
pretended that he did not, we could get no information from
him. I would have given a good deal to have had my Polish
servant Lorenz with me, but the coward had remained
behind when the fighting began. Still, we had to get out of
the fix somehow ; so we made several detachments explore the
streets until at last they found the Beresina. That river was
not yet sufficiently frozen for us to be able to cross it on the
ice, so that it was necessary to pass over the bridge. But to
take the bridge we required infantry, and ours was still three
leagues off. Marshal Oudinot, who came up at this moment,
ordered Greneral Gastex to supply its place by making three-
quarters of his troopers dismount and attack the bridge
formed into a little battalion armed with carbines. We
hastened to obey, and, leaving our horses in the neighbouring
streets guarded by a few men, made for the river, under the
lead of General Castex, who chose to march to this perilous
undertaking at the head of his brigade.

The recent discomfiture of the Russian advance-g^ard
had carried alarm into Tchichagoff's army. Disorder prevailed
on the bank which it occupied, where we could see masses of
fugitives making off across the country. Thus, although it
had at first seemed to me very hard work for dismounted
troopers without bayonets to force a bridge and maintain
themselves there, I began to hope for success when I saw
that we were opposed by only a few skirmishers. I therefore
ordered the section who should first reach the right bank to
capture houses near the bridge, so that holding both ends
of it we could defend it till our infiuitry came up, and thus
secure the passage of the Beresina for the French army. But
the guns of the fort began to thunder, and the bridge was
swept by a storm of grape which threw our feeble battalion
into disorder, and forced it for a moment to recoil. A band
of Russian pioneers armed with torches took advantage of
this moment to set the bridge on fire ; but, as their presence
caused the enemy's artiUery to cease firing, we hurled
ourselves on them, killing or throwing into the river the

3IO The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

greater number of them. The chasseurs had put out the fire,
which had hardly caught, when a battalion of grenadiers
came up at the double, and forced us at the bayonet's point
to abandon the bridge, which was presently covered with
lighted torches, and became a huge furnace, until its blazing
heat compelled both sides to draw off. Thenceforth the
French had to renounce all hope of crossing the Beresina by
that bridge, and their retreat was cut off. This terrible
calamity decided our fate and aided vastly to shake down
Napoleon's throne and change the face of Europe.

Oudinot saw that it was impossible to force the passage of
the river in front of Borisoff, and decided that it would be
dangerous to crowd that town with his own troops. He
therefore gave orders to encamp between Lochnitza and

I Nemonitza. Castex's brigade alone remained at BorisoS^

\ under strict orders not to communicate with the other corps,

so that the fatal news of the burning of the bridge might be

I kept from them as long as possible. They did not learn it

; till forty-eight hours later.

By the custom of war, enemy's baggage belongs to the
captors. General Castex therefore authorised the men of the
23rd and 24th to take possession of the plunder contained in
the 1,500 vehicles of all kinds which the Russians had left
behind when they fled across the bridge. The booty was
immense — a hundred times more, indeed, than the brigade
could carry. So I assembled my regiment, and pointed out
that as they had a long retreat before them, during which it
would probably be impossible for us to continue distributing
rations of meat, as I had done throughout the campaign, they
had better take steps chiefly to supply themselves with pro-
visions. I added that they should also think of protecting
themselves against the cold ; and that as overladen horses do
not last long, they must not break theirs down with all sorts
of things of no use in war. To sum up, I said that I should
hold an inspection, and that all that was not food, shoes, or
clothing would be rejected without mercy. To avoid all
discussion, General Castex had had stakes planted, to divide
the captured carriages into two divisions, and each regiment

On the Beresina 311

had its own. As the town was surrounded on three sides by
Oudinot's army, while the fourth side was covered by
the Beresina and watched by pickets, our men could safely
investigate the contents of the Russian carts and carriages.
So when the word was given the search began. It seemed
that TchichagoflF's officers took good care of themselves, for
never in the equipage of an army was seen such a profusion
of hams, pies, smoked fish and meat, and wines of all kinds,
not to mention ship's biscuit, rice, cheese, &c. Our soldiers
also benefited by the furs and strong boots which they found
in the wagons, the capture of which thus saved many a
man's life. The drivers had not even had time to take away
their horses, and as these were nearly all good, we selected
the best to replace any with which our troopers found fault.
The officers also took some to carry the provisions with which
each had so amply furnished himself.

The brigade passed the whole of November 24 in Borisoff,
and, as in spite of all precautions the news of the destruction
of the bridge had spread in the bivouacs of the 2nd corps,
[Marshal Oudinot, wishing that all his troops might profit by
the goods contained in the enemy's wagons, agreed to let
detachments from all the regiments enter the town, making
room for others as soon as they had loaded themselves. Not-
withstanding that Oudinot's troops carried off great quantities
of provisions and all kinds of plunder, there was plenty left to
be taken on the following day by the swarms of disbanded
troops on their way back from Moscow.

Meanwhile the chiefs and all officers capable of estimating
the awkward position of the army were feeling keen anxiety.
Before us we had the Beresina with Tchichagoff's troops
lining the opposite banks, Wittgenstein had outflanked us,
and Kutusoff was in our rear. Except for the remains of
the guard and the corps of Oudinot and Victor, now reduced
to a few thousands, the rest of that Grand Army which had
lately been so splendid was composed of sick and of disarmed
soldiers, from whom misery had taken all their old energy.
Everything seemed to conspire against us, for even though
Ney had been able, thanks to the lowered temperature, to

312 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

escape the enemy a few days back by crossing the Dnieper
on the ice, we had found the Beresina unfrozen in spite of
the extreme cold, and we had no pontoons by which to
cross it.

On the 25th the Emperor entered Borisoff, where he found
Marshal Oudinot waiting with the 6,000 men who remained
to him. Napoleon and the marshals and officers who accom-
panied him were surprised to see the good order maintained
in the 2nd corps, the bearing of which formed a remark<-
able contrast to that of the miserable bands whom they were
bringing back from Moscow. Our troops did not look so
nice, indeed, as they would in a garrison town, but each man
had kept his weapons and was ready to make a brave use of
them. The Emperor, struck by their martial air, called
together all the colonels and bade them express to their regi-
ments his satifaction at their excellent conduct in all the
sanguinary engagements fought in the province of Polotsk.

You will remember that when the Bavarian general. Von
Wrede, left the 2nd corps he carried off with him Corbineau's
brigade of cavalry, after deceiving the general by assuring
him that he had orders to that effect. To this bit of deceit
was due the salvation of the Emperor and the fragments of
the Grand Army. As it turned out, Corbineau, dragged off
against his will in the opposite direction to the corps to
which he belonged, had followed General Wrede as far as
Glubokoi. There, however, he declared that he would go
no further unless the Bavarian general would show him his
alleged orders to keep the brigade with him. As Wrede
could not satisfy this demand, Corbineau left him and made
for the head waters of the Beresina, then passing down the
right bank he hoped to reach Borisoff, cross the river there,
and taking the Orcha road go to meet Oudinot's corps, which
he assumed to be in the neighbourhood of Bobra.

The Emperor has been blamed for that having several
millions of Poles in his service he did not at the beginning of
the campaign place some of them as interpreters with every
general and every colonel ; a prudent measure which would
have avoided many errors. A proof of this was seen during

An Old Artifice 313

the dangerous journey of several days which Corbineau's
brigade was obliged to make through an unknown country,
of which no Frenchman could speak the langnage. Very
fortunately one of his three regiments was the 8th Polish
Lancers, the officers of which got all the necessary information
irom the inhabitants ; a service which was of immense advan-
tage to Gorbineau. For instance, when he had come within
half a day's journey of Borisoff some peasants informed his
Polish lancers that the town was occupied by Tchichagoff's
army. Corbineau was giving up all hope of crossing the
Beresina, when the same peasants advised him to retreat, and
guided his column to a point opposite Studzianka, a little
village about four leagues above Borisoff, in front of which
there was a ford. The three cavalry regiments crossed it
without loss, and the general, making across country, cleverly
avoiding any approach to Borisoff or to Wittgenstein's troops,
who were posted at Bogatka, slipped between them and
finally rejoined Marshal Oudinot on the evening of the 23rd,
close to Natcha. This bold march of Corbineau's was credit-
able to him and most fortunate for the army, for the Emperor,
seeing that it was physically impossible to restore the bridge
at Borisoff, decided after consultation with him to cross the
Beresina at Studzianka. Seeing, however, that Tchichagoff,
having heard of Corbineau's passage at that point, had posted
a strong division with plenty of artillery opposite Studzianka,
Napoleon deceived the enemy by an artifice which, though it
is pretty old, seldom fails. He pretended to have no design
on Studzianka, but to be intending to make use of two other
fords situated below Borisoff, the less unfavourable of which
is by the village of Ukoloda. To this end one of the bat-
talions which still had its arms was marched towards that
spot, followed by many thousands of stragglers, whom the
enemy were to take for a strong infantry division. The rear
of the column was brought up by many wagons, some gnus,
and the cuirassier division. On reaching Ukoloda these
troops began to do whatever was necessary to give the im-
pression that they were constructing a bridge. Tchichagoff
got warning of these preparations, and, nothing doubting but

314 ^-^^ Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

that Napoleon's plan was to cross the river at this point and
reach the neighbouring road to Minsk, not only hastened to
send all the garrison of Borisoff by the right bank to the
point opposite Ukoloda, but by an extraordinary piece of
blundering, not having sufficient forces to guard the river
both up and down at the same time, he also made all the
troops which he had posted the day before above Borisoff,
between Zembin and the Beresina, descend towards Ukoloda.
Now, it is exactly opposite Zembin that the village of Vese-
lovo, to which the hamlet of Studzianka belongs, is situated.
Thus the enemy abandoned the point at which the Emperor
wished to throw his bridge across, and hurried off uselessly to
defend a ford six leagues below that of which we were going
to make use.

Besides this blunder of massing his whole army below
the town of Borisoff, Tchichagoff committed another which
any sergeant would have avoided, and for which his Govern-
ment never forgave him. Zembin is built on a broad marsh
crossed by the road to Wilna. In the causeway which
carries this road there are twenty-two wooden bridges, which
the Russian general might have reduced to ashes in a moment,
seeing that they are surrounded by a great many stacks of
dry rushes. Had Tchichagoff taken this wise precaution, the
French army must have been irrevocably lost. To cross the
river would have done it no good, since it would have been
stopped by the deep marsh which surrounds Zembin. But^
as I have said, the Russian general left these bridges intact
and went down the Beresina with all his people, leaving only
some fifty Cossacks in front of Veselovo.

While the Russians were deceived by Napoleon's demon-
stration into abandoning the real point of attack. Napoleon
was giving his orders. Marshal Oudinot was to take hi»
corps in the night to Studzianka to allow of the construction
of two bridges there, and then to cross to the right bank and
form between Zembin and the river. Victor was to start
from Natcha, and, forming the rear-guard, to drive all strag-
glers in front of him, try to defend Borisoff for a few hours,
and then make for Studzianka and cross the bridges. Such

Studzianka 315

were the Emperor's orders, but events prevented them from
being accurately carried out.

On the evening of the 25th Corbineau's division marched
towards Studzianka, passing up the left bank of the Beresina.
Castex's brigade and a few light battalions followed, and then
the bulk of the 2nd corps. We were sorry to leave Borisoff,
where we had passed two pleasant days. It might seem that
we had a presentiment of the troubles in store for us.

At daybreak on the 26th we were at Studzianka. No
preparations for defence were to be seen on the further bank,
so that if the Emperor had kept the pontoons which he had
burnt a few days before, the army might have crossed the
Beresina on the spot. That river, which has been imagina-
tively described as of enormous width, is at most as wide as
the Rue Royale at Paris, opposite the Ministry of Marine.
As for its depth, it will be enough to say that the three
cavalry regiments of Corbineau's brigade had forded it with-
out any mishap three days before, and did so again. Their
horses either never lost the bottom or had at most to swim
two or three fathoms. At that moment the passage could be
made by cavalry wagons or artillery, with slight inconveni-
ence, the chief being that troopers and drivers had the water
up to their knees, which was quite bearable, as the cold was,
unfortunately, not enough to freeze the river, and there was
little ice even floating down ; a few degrees lower would
have been all the better for us. The second inconvenience
was also a result of the absence of severe cold; for the
swampy meadow on the fiirther bank was so muddy that
saddle-horses could only cross it with difficulty, while wagons
went in up to the axletrees.

Esprit de corps is no doubt highly praiseworthy, but one
should be able to hold it in check or forget it in difficult cir-
cumstances. This was more than the artillery and engineer
commanders could do at the Beresina. Each of these corps
claimed the sole right to build the bridges, with the result
that they got in each other's way, and no progress had been
made when the Emperor arrived about noon on the 26th.
He settled the difficulty by ordering that each should build

3i6 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

one bridge. Beams and laths were at once torn &om the
hovels in the village, and sappers and gunners fell to work.
Then those brave men gave a proof of devotion, for which
credit enough has not been given them. They leapt into the
cold water of the Beresina and worked there for six or seven
hours, though there was not a drop of spirits to give them,
and they had no bed to look forward to for the following
night, but a field covered with snow. They nearly all died
when the great frost came.

While the construction of the bridges was going on, and
my regiment with all the 2nd corps was on the left bank,
awaiting the order to cross the river, the Emperor was
striding about, accompanied by Murat, going from one regi-
ment to another, and talking to men as well as officers.
Murat, the brave and dashing soldier, who had performed
such fine feats of arms when the French were marching
victoriously on Moscow, had been, as it were, under an eclipse
ever since they had left that town, and during this time had
taken no part in any fighting. Men saw him following the
Emperor about in silence, as though a stranger to all that
was going on. When, however, he came in sight of the
Beresina, and the only hope which had maintained their dis-
cipline, and now formed the last hope of safety, he seemed to
awake from his torpor. Being very fond of the cavalry,
and seeing that, of all the squadrons which had crossed the
Niémen, those of Oudinot's corps alone remained, he diverted
the Emperor's steps towards them. Napoleon was in ecstasies
at the fine condition of the troops in general, and of my regi-
ment in particular, for it was indeed stronger than many
brigades. In fact, I still had more than 500 men mounted,
while the other colonels of the army corps had, none of them,
more than 200. I received, therefore, most flattering con-
gratulations from the Emperor, in which my officers and men
shared largely. It was just then that I had the joy of seeing
John Dupont, my brother's servant, whose devotion, courage,
and fidelity were above all proof. Left alone, after his master
had been taken prisoner early in the campaign, John followed
the 16th Chasseurs to Moscow, and accompanied the retreat.

Crossing the Beresina 317

always tending and feeding my brother's three horses. Nor
would he sell one of them, in spite of the most tempting
offers. The good lad came to rejoin me after five months of
fatigue and misery, bringing all my brother's property ; but,
as he showed it to me, he said, with tears in his eyes, that,
having worn out his boots and finding himself reduced to
walking barefoot on the ice, he had made free to take a pair
of his master's boots. Z kept this good man in my service,
and found him very useful a little later, when I was again
wounded in the worst days of the retreat.

But to return to the passage of the Beresina. Not only
did all our horses cross the river easily, but the canteen-men
got over with their light carts, w^ch made me think that it
might be possible to unharness some of the numerous wagons
which followed the army, and fixing them in the river one
behind another to form in this way footways for the in&ntry.
This would greatly facilitate the flow of the masses of isolated
men who would next day be passing about the entrance of
the bridges. This idea seemed to me so happy that, wet to
the waist as Z was, Z recrossed the ford to conmiunicate it to
the generals of the Emperor's staff. They thought my plan
a good one, but no one stirred to speak of it to the Emperor.
Finally, General Lauriston said to me : ^ Z entrust to you the
task of making this footbridge, the utility of which you have
so well explained.' To this Z replied that, as Z had at my
disposal neither sappers, nor infantrymen, nor tools, nor
stakes, nor ropes, and as further Z was unable to leave my
regiment, which was on the right bank, and might be attacked
at any moment, Z confined myself to offering what Z thought
a good piece of advice, and would return to my post. With
that Z went into the water again and rejoined the 23rd.
Meanwhile the engineers and artillery had at length finished
the two trestle bridges, and Oudinot's infantry and artillery
were sent across. On reaching the right bank they went
and bivouacked in a great wood half a league off, beyond
Zavniski, where the cavalry were ordered to join them. Thus
we could watch Stakovo and Dominki, where the main road
from Minsk comes in. By this Tchichagoff had taken all

3i8 Thb Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

his troops towards the lower Beresina, and by this he mnst
perforce come back when he heard that we had crossed the
river near Zembin.

On the evening of the 27th the Emperor with his gaard
crossed the river and established himself at Zavniski. The
enemy had not yet shown. Mach has been said of the
disasters which took place at the Beresina ; bnt what has never
yet been said is, that the greater part of them might have
been saved if the headquarters staff had understood its
duties better, and taken advantage of the night of the 27th
to get all the baggage and, still more, the thousands of
stragglers who next day blocked the way across the bridges.
After settling my regiment in its bivouac at Zavniski, I
noticed the absence of a packhorse which carried our regi-
mental cash-box and account-books, and therefore could not
be allowed to run the risks of the ford. I thought, therefore,
that his driver and the troopers who escorted him had
waited till the bridges were finished. This they had been
for some hours, and yet the men did not appear. Then, being
anxious about them as well as about the important property
which was entrusted to them, I thought I would go myself
and assist them to cross, for I supposed that there was a
block on the bridges. I galloped off, therefore, and what
was my surprise to find them completely deserted. At that
moment no one was crossing, while a hundred paces away I
could see by the bright moonlight more than 50,000
stragglers and soldiers separated from their regiments —
rôtisseurs as they were called. These men, sitting calmly in
front of enormous fires, were grilling horseflesh without a
notion that they had in front of them a river, the passage of
which would cost many of them their lives on the next day,
while they could at the present time cross it without hin-
drance in a few minutes, and finish preparing their supper
on the other bank. Not one officer of the imperial house-
hold, not one aide-de-camp, not a single marshal, was there
to warn those poor wretches, and, if necessary, to drive them
to the bridges. It was in this disorderly camp that I saw
for the first time soldiers returning from Moscow ; it was a

Disorganisa tion 319

heartbreaking sight. All ranks were confoanded ; there
were no arms, no military bearings ; soldiers, officers, even
generals were clad in rags, and for boots had nothing but
strips of leather or cloth hardly fastened together with
string — a huge rabble, in which thousands of men of
different nations were jumbled, shouting in every language
of the continent of Europe, and unable to understand each
other. Yet if in Oudinot's corps or in the guard some
of the battalions had been selected which still kept their
discipline, they might easily have driven the mass across the
bridges. I myself, when returning to Zavniski, having only
a few orderlies with me, succeeded, partly by persuasion,
partly by force, in making 2,000 or 3,000 of the poor
wretches cross to the right bank ; but other duties called me,
and I had to rejoin my regiment. As I passed by the head-
quarters staff and Oudinot's staff I called attention to the
empty state of the bridges, and the ease with which the
unarmed men could be brought across at a moment when the
enemy was not trying to do anything. But it was in vain ;
I only received evasive answers, and each man left the task
of directing the operation to his colleagues.*

On returning to the bivouac of my regiment I was
agreeably surprised to find the corporal and eight troopers
who had had charge of our herd during the campaign.
These good fellows were in despair because the mob of
rôtisseurs had thrown themselves on our cattle, cut them up,
and eaten them under their very eyes, without their being
able to hinder it. The regiment consoled itself for the loss,
for each trooper had taken twenty-five days' provisions at
Borisoff. The zeal of my adjutant having urged him to
return to the other side of the bridges to try and discover
the guardians of our account-books, that brave soldier went
astray in the crowd, could not recross the river, and was
made prisoner in the tumult of the following day. It was
two years before I saw him again.

> In his account of the campaign of Rassia, pablished at Stuttgart in
1 843, Faber du Faur notices this empty state of the bridges on the night
of November 27, and even on that of the 28th ^

CHAPTER XXXI

We have now reached the most terrible moment in the fatal
Russian campaign, the passage of the Beresina, which took
place chiefly on November 28. When this ill-omened day-
dawned the position of the two armies was as follows. On
the left bank Marshal Victor's corps, having evacuated
Borisoff during the night, had reached Studzianka with the
9th corps, driving a crowd of stragglers before it. The
marshal had left to act as rear-guard General Partouneaux's
infantry division, which, having been ordered not to evacuate
the town till two hours later, ought to have sent out several
small detachments to follow the army corps, and so being
connected with the main body by a line of scouts, as it were, to
stake out the direction. Besides this the general ought to
have sent an aide-de-camp to Studzianka to reconnoitre the
roads and come back to meet the division. But Partouneaux
neglected all these precautions, and contented himself with
marching at the appointed hour. He came to where two
roads forked, and he knew neither of them ; but as he could
not have been ignorant, coming from Borisoff, that the
Beresina was on his left, he might have concluded that in
order to reach Studzianka, which was on the river, it was the
left-hand road that he ought to take. He did just the con-
trary, and, mechanically following some light infantry who
were in advance, he got on to the right-hand road and
walked straight into the middle of Wittgenstein's army.
The division was quickly surrounded and compelled to lay
down its arms.^ Meanwhile, a major who was in command

> General Partouneaux made an heroic resistance, and before his division
surrendered it was reduced to a few hundred combatants (see Thiers'
History of the Ckmsulate a/nd Empiré),

A Last Volley 321

of the rear-guard, having had the good sense to take the
road to the left, simply because it would bring him to the
river, rejoined Marshal Victor at Studzianka. Great was the
marshal's surprise when he saw this one battalion come up
instead of Partouneaux's division. But his surprise changed
to bewilderment when he was attacked by Wittgenstein's
Russians, whom he supposed Partouneaux to be holding in
check. Then Victor could no longer doubt that that general
and all his regiments were taken.

But fresh disasters awaited him, for Marshal Kutusoff,
who had been following Partouneaux all the way from
Borisoff with a strong force, on hearing of his surrender
quickened his march and came on to join Wittgenstein and
crush Victor. The latter, with his corps reduced to 10,000
men, offered a vigorous resistance. His troops, even the
Germans, fought with an heroic courage all the more striking
because, while attacked by two armies at once and having
the Beresina in their rear, their movements were further
hampered by a number of wagons driven without any order
by a crowd of individuals striving in wild tumult to reach
the river. Even so, Victor held Wittgenstein and Kutusoff
the whole day.

During this confusion and this fighting at Studzianka,
the enemy, who aimed at getting possession of both ends
of the bridges, were on the right bank, attacking Oudinot's
corps, posted in front of Zavniski. Tchichagoff's 30,000 men,
issuing from Stakovo, advanced with loud shouts against the
2nd corps, which could not number more than 8,000. But
as our soldiers had not come into contact with those who
were returning from Moscow, and had no idea of the disorder
prevailing among those poor wretches, the tone of Oudinot's
corps had remained excellent, and Tchichagoff was vigorously
repulsed under the Emperor's eyes. He himself arrived at
the moment with 3,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry of the
tj^uard, old and young. The Russians renewed their attack
and broke the Polish Legion of the Vistula. Oudinot was
sev(?rely wounded, and Napoleon sent Ney to take his place.
General Coudras, a good infantry officer, was killed, and the

VOL. II. Y

322 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

valiant General Legrand dangerously wounded. This action
took place in a wood of huge firs. The enemy's artillery was
thus prevented from getting a good sight of our troops, so
that its volleys did not touch us ; but as the shot flew over
our heads they broke off branches thicker than a man's body,
which killed and wounded many of our people and many
horses in their fall. As the trees stood wide apart the cavalry
could move among them, though with difficulty ; in spite of
which Ney, on seeing a strong Russian column advancing,
launched what was left of our cuirassiers against them.
Though executed under these unwonted conditions, that
charge was one of the most brilliant I ever saw. Colonel
Dubois, at the» head of the 7th Cuirassiers, cut the enemy's
column in two, taking 2,000 prisoners. Thus thrown into
confusion, the Russians were pursued by the light cavalry,
and driven back with immense loss even to Stakovo.^

As I was re-forming my regiment after this engagement,
I saw my friend M. Alfred de Noailles coming towards me.
He was coming back from carrying an order for Prince
Berthier, to whom he was aide-de-camp ; but, instead of re-
turning to his chief, he said as he left me that he would go
as far as the first houses of Stakovo to see what the enemy-
were doing. His curiosity was fatal to him, for, as he drew
near the village, he was surrounded by a group of Cossacks,
who threw him from his horse and dragged him along by
the collar, striking him as they went. I sent at once a
squadron to his assistance, but my effort was fruitless, for a
brisk fire from the houses prevented the troopers from enter-
ing the village, and from that day nothing was ever heard of
M. de Noailles. No doubt his richly-furred uniform with its
gold lace had excited the cupidity of the barbarians, and they
had butchered him. His family, hearing that I was the last
Frenchman to whom he had spoken, asked me for information

' Tcbichagoff, in his Memoirs, has done justice to the vigour of our
<;avalry in tliis affair. Both he and Count Rochechouart confirm every poiDt
of the details given as to these events — the capture and loss of Borisoff by
the Russia HH, their ill-timed movement down the Beresina, the fighting at
Zavniski, the fatal destruction of the bridges, and the retreat of cor troops
Across the frozen marshes of Zembin.

The Lowest Depth 323

about his disappearance, but Z could give them no more than
I have told here. He was an excellent officer and a good
comrade.

But this digression has made me forget Tchichagoff, who,
having been beaten by Ney, did not venture to attack us
again all that day.

Having thus explained briefly the position of the armies
on the two banks of the Beresina, I must say a few words as
to what was taking place upon the river while the fighting
was going on. The masses of unattached men — who had had
two nights and days to cross the bridges, and who, in their
apathy, had not taken advantage of them because no one
compelled them to do so — wanted to cross all at once as soon
as Wittgenstein's cannon-balls began to drop among them.
The v£bst multitude of men, horses, and wagons got com-
pletely clubbed at the entrance of the bridges, blocking them
without being able to reach them. Many were pushed by
the crowd into the Beresina, and of these neai*ly all were
drowned. As a crowning disaster, one of the bridges broke
under the weight of the guns and ammunition wagons. All
then made for the other bridge, where the confusion was
already so great that the strongest could not withstand the
crush, and a great number were suffocated. Seeing the im-
possibility of crossing the encumbered bridges, many of the
wagon drivers urged their horses into the stream. But this
method of crossing, which would have been very useful if it
had been carried out in an orderly way two days before, was
fatal to almost all who attempted it, because, pushing wildly
forward, they hustled and overturned each other. Still, some
reached the opposite bank, but as nothing had been done to
prepare a landing by sloping away the banks — as the staff
ought to have done — few vehicles succeeded in getting up,
and many people perished there also.

During the night of the 28th, these horrors were increased
by the Russian guns playing upon the wretches who were
struggling to cross the river. At nine in the evening the
cup of misery was overflowing, when Marshal Victor began his
retreat, and his divisions came up to the bridge in good order,

T 2

324 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

but could only reach it by forcibly pushing aside all who
obstructed their passage. But let us draw a veil over these
horrible scenes. At daybreak on the 29th all the vehicles
remaining on the left bank were burnt ; and when General
Eblé saw the Russians approaching the bridge, he had that
also set on fire. Some thousauds of poor fellows who re-
mained near Studzianka fell into Wittgenstein's hands.
ÏTius ended the most terrible episode of the Russian campaign,
an event which would have been far less disastrous if anyone
had known how to make use of the time which the Russians
allowed us after reaching the Beresina, and had chosen to do
so. In that passage the anny lost from 20,000 to 25,000 men.
This great obstacle passed, there still remained an
immense body of unattachixl men who had escaped the
frightful disaster. These were cleared away towards Zembin.
The Emperor and his guard followed, next came the frag-
ments of some regiments, and lastly the 2nd corps, of
which Cast^x's brigade brought up the extreme rear. I have
already said that the road to Zembin crosses a wide marsh
over a great number of bridges, which TcliichagofT, when he
occupied that position some days before, had omitted to burn.
We did not commit a like eiTor ; for, after the army had
passed, my regiment and the 2 kh set fire to them easily by
means of the dry reeds which were stacked in the neigh-
bourhood. When he gave orders to burn these bridges the
Emperor had hoped to be freed for some time from pursuit
by the Russians, but it was written that all the luck was to
be against us. Thus the frost, which at this season of the
year should have turned the waters of the Beresina into an
easy road, when we had to cross them left them almost as
iiuid as usual ; but hardly were we over when the cold
became severe, and froze them till they were solid enough to
bear the weight of guns. The same took place with regard to
the marshes of Zembin, so that burning the bridges was no
use to us.^ The tliree Russian annies which we had left
behind us could betake themselves to the pursuit \vithout any
obstacle; luckily, however, they did so with little vigour.
* Tcliichagort" excuses his own negligence by this fcict.

At Pleshtchenitsi 325

Moreover, Marshal Ney, who commauded the French rear-
guard, had got together all who were fit to fight, and made
frequent counter-attacks on the enemy when they ventured
to approach too near.

Since Marshal Oudinot and General Legrand had been
wounded, General Maison had been in command of the 2nd
corps, which in spite of its heavy losses was the most
numerous in the whole army, so that the task of beating oft
the Russians usually fell to it. We kept them at a distance
during November 30th and December 1st; but on the 2nd
they pressed us so close with powerful forces that some serious
fighting took place, in which I received a wound that was all
the more dangerous from the fact that there were that day
twenty-five degrees of frost. ^ I ought, perhaps, to say no
more than that I received a lance wound, without entering
into any details, for they are so shocking that I still shudder
when I think of them ; but I have promised to tell you the
whole story of my life, so you shall hear what happened at
the action of Pleshtchenitsi. In order to put you in a position
to understand my story, I must tell you, to begin with, that
a Dutch banker named Van Berghem, of whom I had been
an intimate friend at the college of Sorèze, had at the
beginning of the campaign sent me his only son, who, having
become a Frenchman by the inclusion of his country in the
Empire, had, though hardly sixteen years old,^ enlisted
in the 23rd. This young man had many good qualities and
much intelligence. I took him for my secretary, and he
always marched fifteen paces behind me with my orderlies.
(>n the day of which I speak he was in his place, when, as
we were crossing a wide plain, the 2nd corps saw hastening
towards it a large body of Bussian cavalry, which in a
moment overlapped it and attacked it on all sides. General
Maison arranged so well that our infantry squares beat off all
the charges of the Emperor's regular cavalry. As, however,

[ * Presumably Centigrade ; that is, 13° below zero Fahrenheit.]

[ '^ General Marbot's memory most surely have played him false here.

He was himself but just over thirty, and it seems hardly credible that one

of his school-friends can have had a son of sixteen.]

326 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

they brought into action a host of Cossacks, who came-
insolently up, spearing the French officers in front of their
troops, Marshal Ney ordered General Maison to drive them
away by sending at them all that was left of the cuirassier-
division, as well as Corbineau's and Castex's brigades. My
regiment, which was still strong, found itself in front of a
* pulk ' of Cossacks from the Black Sea, wearing tall astrakhan
caps, and much better dressed and mounted than the Cossacks
usually are. We charged them, but as Cossacks never fight
in line they wheeled about and galloped away. Being, how-
ever, strangers to the locality, they went in the direction of
an obstacle which is very uncommon in these wide plains,
and were brought to a dead stop by a deep and broad ravine,
which the perfect evenness of the ground made it impossible
to see from a distance. Finding it out of the question to cross
with their horses, and forced to face my regiment, which was-
on the point of catching them, the Cossacks turned, and closing
up, met us bravely with their lances. The ground was covered
with ice and very slippery, so that our tired horses could not
gallop without tumbling. There was, therefore, no shock,
and my line reached the motionless mass of the enemy at a
trot only. Our swords touched the lances, but, as these were
thirteen feet or fourteen feet long, it was impossible for us to
touch our adversaries, who on their side dared not back for
fear of falling over the precipice, nor advance to meet our
swords. We therefore watched each other, until the following
scene took place in less time than it takes to tell it. In
haste to get done with the enemy, I called out to my men
that they must catch hold of the lances with their left hand,
turn them aside, and push into the middle of the crowd, where
our short weapons would give us a great advantage over their
long poles. In order to be better obeyed, I thought I would
set the example, and, putting some lances aside, I actually
succeeded in getting within the front ranks of the enemy. My
adjutants and orderlies followed me, and all the regiment
presently doing the same, a general scuffle ensued. But at
that moment an old white-bearded Cossack, who, being in
the hinder ranks, was separated from me by other combatants^

An Incident of War 327

bent forward, and, pointing his lance adroitly between his
comrades' horses, struck me with his sharp steel, which passed
clean through below the knee-pan of my right leg. Feeling
myself wounded, I was pressing forward to revenge myself on
the man for the sharp pain which I experienced when I saw
before me two youths of eighteen or twenty years, in a rich cos-
tume ; they were the sons of the chief of the * pulk.' An elderly
man accompanied them as mentor, having no sword in his hand^
nor did the younger of the two lads use his ; but the elder
charged bravely, and attacked me furiously. He seemed so
undeveloped and so weak that I merely disarmed him, and
taking him by the arm, passed him behind me, and told Van
Berghem to look after him. The next moment, however, I felt
a hard object laid against my left cheek, a double report rang
in my ears, and a bullet went through the collar of my cloak.
Turning sharply, I saw the young Cossack officer with a brace
of double-barrelled pistols in his hands. He had just fired
treacherously on me from behind, and he now blew poor Van
Berghem's brains out. Beside myself with rage, I dashed on
the madman, who was taking aim at me with his second
pistol. But as he met my eye he seemed fascinated, and
cried out in good French, ' Oh God ! I see death in your
eyes ! I see death in your eyes ! ' ' Ay, scoundrel, and you
see right ! ' And he dropped.

Blood calls for blood. The sight of young Van Berghem
stretched at my feet, and my own action, the excitement of
battle, and perhaps also the frightful pain of my wound, all
combined to throw me into a state of feverish agitation. I
made towards the younger of the Cossack officers, caught him
by the throat, and was in the act of raising my sword, when
the old governor, seeking to protect his ward, bent forward
over my horse's neck in such a way as to prevent me from
using my arm, and cried in a tone of entreaty, * For your
mother's sake pardon this one, who has done nothing ! ' On
hearing him invoke that revered name, my mind, overwrought
by the surroundings, was struck with hallucination: I
thought I saw a well-known white hand laid upon the young
man's breast, which I was on the point of piercing, and I

328 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

seemed to hear my mother's voice saying * Pardon ! pardon ! '
My sword point dropped, and I had the youth and his governor
taken to the rear.

So great was my emotion after this incident that I could
not have given any word of command if the fight had lasted
much longer; but it was soon at an end. A great many
Cossacks had been killed, and the rest, leaving their horses,
had slid down into the ravine, where most of them perished
in the snow-drifts which the wind had heaped up there. On
other sides, too, the enemy were beaten off.

During the evening I questioned my prisoner and his
attendant, and learnt that the two youths were the sons of a
powerful chief who had lost his leg at Austerlitz, and in con-
sequence vowed so fierce enmity to the French that, as he
could fight them no longer himself, he had sent his two sons
to the war. I could see that the cold and his grief would
soon make an end of the junior, so I took pity on him and
his old mentor, and set them at liberty. As the old man
took leave of me, he said : * When she thinks of her elder son,
these lads' mother will curse you ; but when she sees the
younger, she will bless you and your mother, for whose sake
you spared her only remaining child.'

The vigorous repulse with which the Russian troops had
met in the recent action damped their ardour, so that we
saw nothing more of them for two days, and our retreat to
Malodeczno was secured. But if the enemy left us a
moment's peace, the frost waged bitter war with us, for the
thermometer fell to 27 degrees of cold. Men and horses were
dropping at every step — many never to rise again. Still I
remained with the fragments of my regiment, bivouacking in
their midst every night in the snow. Where, indeed, should I
have been any better off? My officers and men, who looked
upon their colonel as a living flag, made it a point of honour to
save me, and took all the care of me that our terrible situation
allowed. The wound in my knee prevented me from riding
astride, so that I had to put my leg on the horse's withers and
sit quite still, wliich made me very cold, my pain being
intolerable ; but what could I do ?

The Twenty-ninth Bulletin 329

The way was strewn with dead and dying ; our march
was slow and silent. The remains of the infantry of the
guard formed a small square, within which went the Emperor's
carriage. He had Marat beside him. On December 5th, after
issuing his twenty-ninth bulletin, which threw France into a
state of dismay, Napoleon left the army at Smorgony, and
set out for Paris. At Ochmiany he was nearly carried off by
Cossacks. His departure produced a great effect on the
troops : some blamed him for deserting them ; others approved
the course as the sole means of saving France from civil war
and an invasion by our so-called allies, most of whom were
only awaiting a favourable moment to declare against us.
They would not dare to stir when they heard that Napoleon
had re-entered his realm, and was organising a new army.
This was the view which I shared, and events showed the
justice of it.

CHAPTEE XXXn

The Emperor, at his departure, entrusted the command oF
his shattered army to Murat, who showed himself unequal
to the task — one as difficult, it may be admitted, as can
be imagined. Everyone's faculties of mind and body were
paralysed by the cold, and disorganisation prevailed through-
out. Victor refused to relieve the 2nd corps, which had beea
acting as rear-guard irom the Beresina, and Ney had much
trouble in making him do so. Every morning we left
thousands of dead in our bivouacs. Then I congratulated
myself on having in September made my troopers set them-
selves up with sheepskin coats, a precaution to which many
of them owed their lives. So with the victuals with which
we had supplied ourselves at Borisoff, for without these we
should have had to fight for dead horses with the famished
multitude. On this point I may say that M. de Ségur
exaggerates when he says that the poor wretches were driven
by the pangs of hunger to eat human flesh.^ The road was
so lined with dead horses that no one needed to think of
cannibalism. Further, it would be a great mistake to
suppose that provisions were altogether lacking in the district.
They only ran short in the places actually on the road, since
the neighbourhood of these had been drained when the army
was on its way to Moscow ; but it had swept by like a torrent
without spreading laterally, and the harvest had since been

* * Some wretches flung themselves into the blazing heaps ; their
famished comrades looked on unterrified ; there were even some who
dragged ont the disfigured and roasted bodies, and it is too true that they
dared to fill their mouths with this revolting food* (De Ségur). [Sir
Robert Wilson (Private Journal) states that he saw * a group of wounded
men lying over the body of a comrade which they had roasted, and the
flesh of which they had begun to eat.' This was before the Beresina.]

The Elements 33

gathered, so that the country had in some measure recovered,
and, by going a league or two to one side, a fair amount could,
be found. It is true that only detachments still in good
order could make these expeditions without being picked
up by the troops of Cossacks who prowled around us. I
made arrangements, therefore, with several colonels to organise
armed forages. These returned always not only with bread
and some head of cattle, but bringing sledges laden with
salt meat, flour, and oats, obtained in the villages which tlie
peasants had not deserted; showing that if the Duke of
Bassano and General Hogendorf, who had been entrusted
with the management of Lithuania, had done their duty
while they were at Wilna, they might with ease have
established large stores. But they attended only to pro-
visioning the town, and took no thought for the troops.

On December 26, the cold got far more intense, and that
day was even more fatal than the preceding, especially for
the troops who had not become gradually acclimatised.
Among these was Gratien's division, consisting of conscripts
to the number of 12,000, which had left Wilna on the 4th
and come to meet us. The abrupt change from hot barracks
to a bivouac with 29^ degrees of frost caused the death of
nearly all these poor fellows within forty-eight hours. Still
more terrible was the effect produced on 200 Neapolitan
troopers of Murat's guard. They also had stayed a long time
at Wilna when they came to meet us, but the first night
which they passed on the snow killed them all. Those wha
were left of the Germans, Italians, Spaniards, and other
foreigners whom we had brought into Russia saved their
lives by a means repugnant to the French : they deserted,
took refuge in the villages near the road, and waited till the
enemy came up. This often did not occur for several days,
for, strange as it may seem, the Russian soldiers, accustomed
as they are to pass the winter in houses where draughts are
always excluded and stoves are always lighted, are far more
sensitive to cold than those of any other country, and the
heavy losses which the enemy incurred from this cause
explained the slackness of the pursuit. We did not under-

332 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

stand why Kutusoff and his generals merely followed us with
a weak advance-guard, instead of hurling themselves on our
flanks, overlapping us, and thus cutting oflF our retreat. But
this manoeuvre, which would have completed our rum, was
impossible for them, seeing that the greater number of their
soldiers, no less than of ours, died on the roads and in the
bivouacs. So intense was the cold that we could see a kind
of vapour rising from men's ears and eyes. Condensing on
contact with the air, this vapour fell back on our persons
with a rattle such as grains of millet might have made.
We had often to halt, and clear away from the horses' bits
the icicles formed by their frozen breath.

Thousands of Cossacks, meanwhile, attracted by the hope
of plunder, endured the inclemency of the weather, and kept
alongside of our columns, having even the audacity to
attack them at the points where they saw the baggage.
A few shots, however, were enough to drive them away.
Finally, in order to give us trouble without any danger to
themselves — since we had been obliged for want of teams to
leave all our artillery behind — the Cossacks placed light guns
on sledges, and with these fired at our men until they saw a
detachment coming in their direction, when 'they made off
with all speed. These partial attacks, which did us, indeed,
little harm, became very disagreeable by continued repetition.
Many of our sick and wounded were taken and plundered
by these marauders, some of whom acquired immense booty.
Even from the ranks of our allies, the desire of acquiring
wealth raised up new enemies for us — I refer to the Poles.
Marshal Saxe, the son of one of their own kings, said rightly
that the Poles are the greatest plunderers in the world, and
would not respect even their fathers' goods. You may judge
whether those who were in our service respected their alUes'
goods. On the march and in the bivouac they stole all
that they could see, but as people began to distrust them,
and petty larceny became difficult, they decided to go to
work on a large scale. To this end they organised them-
selves into bands, threw away their helmets, and put on
peasants' caps ; and, slipping out of the bivouacs after dark.

Playing at Cossacks 333

they assembled at an appointed place, and came back to the
camp shouting the Cossacks' war-cry of * Hourra ! ' thus terri-
fying the weaker men, many of whom fled, leaving their
effects behind. Then the pretended Cossacks, after pillaging
all round, went off, and returned before daylight to theii'
]Dlaces in the French column, where they resumed the title of
Tholes, with liberty to become Cossacks again the next night.
Attention having been called to this atrocious brigandage,
several generals and colonels resolved to punish it. General
liaison had such a good look-out kept in the bivouacs of the
2nd corps, that one fine night our outposts surprised some
fifty Poles just as they were making up to play their part of
sham Cossacks, and were on the point of giving their
' Hourra ! ' as pillagers. Seeing themselves surrounded
on all sides, the brigands had the impudence to say
that they had meant to play a practical joke, but, as it
was neither the place nor the time for joking, General Maison
had them all shot then and there. It was some time before
we saw any more robbers of that sort, but they re-appeared
later on.

On December 9, we reached Wilna, where there were still
some stores, but the Duke of Bassano and General Hogendorf
had retired to the Niémen, and there was no one to give
orders. There, as at Smolensk, the commissaries required,
before giving out provisions and clothing, that regular receipts
should be handed to them, a thing which, in the disorganised
state of all the regiments, was impossible to do, and thus
precious time was lost. General Maison had several store-
houses broken open, and his troops got some food and cloth-
ing, but the rest was taken the next day by the Russians.
Soldiers from the other corps went about the town in the hope
of being taken in by the inhabitants, but the people who, six
months before, had been longing for the French closed their
houses as soon as they saw them in trouble. The Jews
alone received those who could pay for this fleeting hospitality.
Thus repulsed alike from the stores and from private houses,
the great majority of the famished men made their way to
the hospitals, which soon were crammed to overflowing,

334 1^^^ Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

although there was not food enough there for all the poor
people ; but at least they were sheltered from the cold. Yet
this precarious advantage decided more than 20,000 sick
and wounded, among them 200 officers and eight generals,
to go no further ; they were utterly exhausted in mind and
body. Lieutenant Hemoux, one of the stoutest and bravest
officers of my regiment, was so distracted by what he had
seen in the last few days that he laid himself down on the
snow, and, no persuasions being able to make him rise, died
there. Many soldiers of all ranks blew out their brains to
put an eud to their misery.

In the night of December 9, with 30 degrees of frost, some
Cossacks came and fired shots at the gates of Wilna. Many
people thought that it was KutusoflTs whole army, and in
their terror left the town precipitately. I regret to have to
say that King Murat was among the number. He departed
without leaving any orders, but Marshal Ney remained* and
organised the retreat as best he could. We evacuated Wilna
on the morning of the 10th, leaving there a great number of
men, a park of artillery, and a portion of the treasure.
Scarcely were we out of Wilna when the infamous Jews
threw themselves on the French, whom they had taken into
their houses to get out of them what little money they had,
stripped them of their clothing, and pitched them naked out
of window. Some officers of the Russian advance-guard,
who were entering at the moment, were so angry at this
atrocity that they had many of the Jews killed. In the
midst of this tumult Marshal Ney had taken all whom he
could set in motion along the road to Kovno, but he had
hardly gone a league when he came to the heights of Ponari ,
This hill, which in ordinary circumstances the column would
have crossed without noticing it, became- a serious obstacle,
since the ice had made the road so slippery that the horses
were unable to drag the wagons up it. What " remained of
the treasure was therefore on the point of falling into the
hands of the Cossacks, when Marshal Ney gave orders to
have the chests opened and to let the men help themselves,
'This prudent step, the motive of which M. de Ségur probably

A Brigade on Sledges 335

did not know, led him to say that the troops plundered the
imperial treasure. In the Spectateur Militaire of the period
I have also noted the following expression used by M. de
Ségur : * After the Emperor's departure, most of the colonels
of the army, who had up till then gone on marching admirably
with four or five officers or soldiers around their eagle, no
longer took any orders save from themselves. There were
men who went 200 leagues without turning their heads.* I
may add that Marshal Ney, having seen the colonel and
the major of a regiment which contained only sixty men fall in
one fight, perceived that losses of this kind would stand in the
way of reorganising the army, and gave orders that no more
Held officers should be retained in presence of the enemy than
were in proportion to the number of the troops.

Some days before our arrival at Wilna, many horses of
my regiment having died from the intense cold, while it was
impossible to mount those that remained, all my troopers
marched on foot. I should have been very glad to be able
to do the like, but as my wound did not allow of this I got
a sledge and harnessed one of my horses to it. This gave
me the idea that I might by the same means save my sick,
wlio now were numerous, and as in Russia a sledge can be
found in the poorest house, I soon had a hundred, each of
wliicli, drawn by a troop horse, brought away two men.
General Castex thought this manner of travelling so conve-
nient that he authorised me to put all the other troopers
in sledges. Major Monginot, who had become colonel of the

24th Chasseurs since M. A had been promoted to

general, received the same permission, and all that remained
of our brigade harnessed its horses and formed a caravan
which marched in peifect order. You may think that by
tr«ivelling thus we destroyed our power for defence, but you
must know that on the ice we were much stronger with the
sledges — wliich could go anywhere, and in which the horses
had the support of shafts — than if we had remained mounted
on animals which tumbled down at every step.

The road was covered with muskets which had been
tlirown away, and our troopers took two apiece and a plenti-

336 Thr Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

ful stock of cartridges, so that when the Cossacks ventured
too near they were met by a brisk fire which quickly drove
them off. When necessary, our men fought on foot ; and in
the evening we formed the sledges into a square, and lit
our fires inside it. Marshal Ney and General Maison often
came to pass the night there, finding it a safe place so long
as we were pursued only by Cossacks. Doubtless it was tlie
first time that a rear-guard had gone in sledges ; but owing
to the frost it was the only practicable method, and it
answered.

Thus we continued covering the retreat till December 13,
when we at length saw once more the Niémen and Kovno,
the last Russian town. Five months before we had entered
the Empire of the Czar at the same spot. Wliat a change
had since then taken place in our fortunes, and what had
been the loss of the French army ! \Vhen the rear-guard
entered Kovno, Marshal Ney found a weak battalion of 400
Germans doing duty as the only garrison. With these he
joined such troops as were lefb to him, in order to defend the
place as long as possible, and enable the sick and wounded to
get away into Prussia. On hearing that Ney was coming,
Murat went away to Gumbinnen.

On the 14tli, Platoff's Cossacks, followed by two battalions
of infantry and some guns, all drawn on sledges, attacked
Kovno at several points; but Ney, helped by General
Gérard, beat them off and held the town till night. Then
he made us cross the Niémen on the ice, and was himself the
last to leave Russian soil.

We were now in Prussia, among allies. But Ney, worn
out with fatigue, unwell, and, moreover, considering that the
campaign was over, left us at once, and joined the other
marshals at Gumbinnen. Thenceforth the army had no longer
a commander, and the remains of each regiment marched
independently through Prussia. Tlie Russians, being at war
witli that country, had the right to follow us on to its terri-
tory ; but content with having reconquered their own, and
not knowing whether they should appear in Prussia as allies
or as enemies, they tliouglit it best to await orders from their

In Prussia Again 337

Government, and' halted at the Niémen. Their hesitation
gave us time to reach the towns of Prussia Proper.

Germans are for the most part humane, and many of
them had friends or relations in the regiments which had
gone with the French to Moscow. They received us well,
and I must admit that, after sleeping for five months under
the stars, it was delightful to find myself in a warm room
and a good bed. But this rapid transition from any icy
bivouac to comforts so long forgotten made me seriously ill.
Nearly all the army suffered from the same cause ; and we
lost many, including Generals Eblé and LariboisièrG of the
artillery.

For all the decent reception which they gave us, the
Prussians had not forgotten Jena, and the manner in which
Napoleon had treated them in 1807 when he dismembered
their kingdom. They hated us in secret, and at a signal
from their king would have disarmed us and made us prisoners.
General York, commanding the Prussian corps which the
Emperor had so imprudently employed as the left wing of
the Grand Army, being in cantonments between Riga and
Tilsit, was already making terms with the Russians, and had
sent Marshal Macdonald away, though he had enough shame
left to refrain from arresting him. All classes in Prussia
applauded General York's treachery ; and as the provinces
through which the French soldiers were just now passing,
sick and disarmed, were ftJl of Prussian troops, it is probable
that the inhabitants would have tried to get hold of us had
they not been restrained by fear for their king, who was at
Berlin, surrounded by a French army under Marshal Augereau.
This fear and a disavowal on the part of the King — the most
honourable man in his kingdom — of General York's conduct,
to the point of having him tried and condemned to death for
liigh treason,* prevented a general rising against the French.
We took advantage of its absence to get away and reach the
banks of the Vistula.

[ ^ The sentence does not seem to have taken effect, for in the following
year we find General York von Wartenburg in command of Prussian
forces. In 1814 he was created count, and he lived till 1830.]

VOL. II. Z

338 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marboi

My regiment crossed that river near the fortress of
Grandenz, which we had passed on our way to Bussia. This
time the crossing was very dangerous, for, as a thaw had taken
place some leagues higher up, the ice was a good foot deep
in water, and ominous crackings were heard foretelling a
general break-up. The order to cross instantly reached me^
moreover, in the middle of a dark night ; for the general had
just learnt that the King of Prussia had left Berlin and fled
into Silesia, that the people were getting uneasy, and there
was reason to fear that they would rise against us as soon as
the break-up of the ice prevented us from crossing the Vistula.
It was, therefore, absolutely necessary to face the danger.
This was very great, for the river is very wide opposite
Grandenz, and the ice was full of wide cracks which could
only be seen with difficulty by the light of fires kindled on
both banks. As it was useless to think of taking our sledges
across, we left them behind ; and, leading the horses, and pre-
ceded by men with poles to notify the cracks, we began our
perilous crossing. We were up to mid-leg in half-frozen
water, which made things worse for the sick and wounded ;
but bodily pain was nothing to the fear caused by the cracking
of the ice, which threatened every moment to give way under
ij our feet. A servant of one of my officers fell into a hole and

never re-appeared. At last we reached the other bank, where
we passed the night warming ourselves in fishermen's huts.
Next day we saw the Vistula thaw completely, so that if we
had delayed a few hours we should all have been made
prisoners.

CHAPTEE XXXni

Fkom the spot where we crossed the Vistula my regiment
proceeded to the little town of Sweld, where it was cantoned
before the war, and there I began the year 1813. That
which was just over had surely been the most painful of my
life.

We may now cast a glance at the causes which led to the
failure of the Russian campaign. Of these the chief was un-
doubtedly the mistake into which Napoleon fell when he thought
he could go to war in the north of Europe before making an
end of that which he had long been waging in Spain, in which
country his armies had just undergone heavy reverses when
he made arrangements to attack the Russians at home. As
the genuine French troops, when thus divided between the
north and the south, were in both parts insufficient, Napoleon
thought to make up by uniting battalions of his allies with
them. It was like diluting generous wine with dirty water.
The French divisions deteriorated ; the allied troops remained
as moderate as ever, and they it was who during the retreat
threw the Grand Army into disorder.

A cause, not less fatal, of our reverses was the bad organ-
isation, or rather total want of organisation, in the conquered
countries. Instead of doing as we had done in the campaigns
of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, namely, establishing in
the country left behind by the way small corps which could
form from post to post regular communications, and so secure
that our rear should be undisturbed, and that ammunition,
solitary men, and trains of wounded should move in safety,
all our available forces were imprudently pushed on to Moscow,
until between that place and the Niémen there was, with the
exception of Wilna and Smolensk, not a garrison, not a store,

34^ The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

not a hospital. Two hundred leagues of country were thus
given over to wandering bands of Cossacks ; and the result
was, that the sick when cured could not rejoin, and that, for
want of convoys to evacuate them, all those wounded at the
Moskwa had to be left for two months in the convent of
Polotsk. They were still there when the retreat began;
nearly all were captured, and those who reckoned that they
had strength to follow the army died of fatigue and cold on
the high road. Lastly, the retreating troops had no assured
supply of food in districts which produce com in abundance.

To the lack of small garrisons in our rear was also due
the fact that out of more than 100,000 prisoners taken by
the French in the course of the campaign, literally not one
ever left Russia ; the reason being that no organisation existed
for passing them to the rear. Accordingly they all escaped
with ease and returned to the Russian army ; thus repairing
in some degree its losses, while ours increased daily.

The lack of interpreters also did us more mischief than
might be supposed. How were we to obtain information,
when we could not exchange a single word with the inhabi-
tants ? For instance, when General Partouneaux mistook his
road on the banks of the Beresina and marched into Wittgen-
stein's camp, he had with him a peasant from BorisofiF, who,
knowing no French, tried to make him understand by expres-
sive signs whose camp it was ; but for lack of an interpreter
he was not understood, and we lost 7,000 or 8,000 men. So
again, in October, under very similar circumstances, the 3rd
Lancers was taken by surprise through inability to under-
stand its guide's advice, and lost 200 men. All this time
the Emperor had in his army several corps of Polish cavalry,
most of whose officers and sergeants could speak very well ;
but instead of placing some of these, as should have been
done, beside every general and colonel, they were left with
their regiments. I insist upon this point because, though
the French army is that in which there is the least knowledge
of foreign languages, and great inconvenience has often
resulted therefrom, this has never corrected us of the care-
lessness with which we treat a matter so essential in war.

Prussia and Austria 341

I have already remarked how great a mistake it was to
form the two wings of the Grand Army from the Prussian
and Austrian contingents. The Emperor must have regretted
it keenly — first, when he learnt that the Austrians had let
Tchichagofif's army pass to cut off our retreat at the Beresina ;
and secondly, when he was informed of General York's
treachery. But still more bitter must Napoleon's regrets
have been during and after the retreat ; for if at the beginning
of the campaign he had composed the wings of the Grand
Army of French troops and taken the Prussians and Austrians
to Moscow, these latter would have borne their share of
miseries and losses, and would have returned not less
weakened than the other corps, while the French troops
composing the two wings would have come back to Napoleon
intact. I will even go further, for I think that in order
to weaken Prussia and Austria, the Emperor should have
demanded of them contingents three and four times as great
as those which they sent. People said after the event that
those two states would not have complied with such a demand.
I think differently ; for the King of Prussia, who came to
Dresden entreating Napoleon to be so good as to take his son
for aide-de-camp, would have refused him nothing; while
Austria, in the hope of recovering some of the rich provinces
which he had torn from her, would have done anything to
oblige him. Napoleon was ruined by over-reliance on
Prussia and Austria in 1812.

It has been asserted, and will long be repeated, that the
burning of Moscow, which has been held to do honour to the
bold resolution of the Russian Government and General
Rostopchin, was the principal cause of the failure of our
campaign . This assertion seems to me very doubtful. In the
first place, the destruction of Moscow was not so complete
but that there remained sufficient houses, churches, and
barracks to lodge the whole army ; as is proved by a report
which I have seen in the possession of my friend General
Gourgaud, at that time the Emperor's first orderly officer. It
was not, then, lack of accommodation which compelled the
French to leave Moscow ; many people think that it was the

342 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

fear of provisions failing ; but that is another mistake, for the
reports drawn up by the Emperor for Count DarUjCommiissaiy-
general to the army, prove that even after the fire there were
in that immense town more than sufficient provisions to main-
tain the army for six months. It was not, therefore, the fear
of dearth which decided the Emperor to retreat ; and, so fiur
as that went, the Bussian Grovemment would not have attained
its end if that had been its end. It was, however, quite other
than this ; for, in fact, the court wished, by destroying the
town, to strike a mortal blow at the old aristocracy of the
Boyards, whose constant opposition had been centred there.
Despotic as the Eussian Government is, it has to reckon with
a high nobility, whose displeasure has cost many emperors
their lives. The most powerful members of that nobility
having made Moscow the perpetual focus of their intrigaes,
the Government, ever viewing the increase of that city with
fresh anxiety, found in the French invasion an excuse for
destroying it. General Rostopchin, being one of the authors
of this scheme, and charged with the execution of it, wished
later on to throw the odium of his action on the French ; '
but the aristocracy was not deceived. It accused the Govern-
ment so openly, and showed such displeasure at the useless
burning of its palaces, that, in order to avoid personal disaster
to himself, the Emperor Alexander was compelled, not only
to allow the rebuilding of Moscow, but to banish Rostopchin,
who, for all his protestations of patriotism, ended his days in
Paris, detested by the Russian nobility.

Whatever the motives for the burning of Moscow may
have been, I think that its preservation would have done the
French more harm than good, since, in order to hold in check
a city of more than 300,000 inhabitants always ready to
revolt, it would have been necessary to weaken the army by
keeping in Moscow a garrison of 50,000 men, who, when the
moment for retreat came, would have been attacked by the
populace ; while, when nearly all the inhabitants had departed
on account of the fire, a few patrols were sufficient to keep
order. The only influence which Moscow may have had on

^ In a pamphlet published in 1823 Rostopchin particularly insiats that
the fire was caused bv accident.

The Losses of the Grand Army 343

the course of events arose from the fact that Napoleon, unable
to comprehend that Alexander could not, nnder pain of being
put to death by his subjects, sue for peace, thought that
to evacuate the capital before concluding a treaty with the
Bussians would be to admit his inability to maintain himself
there. He theiefore persisted in remaining as long as possible
at Moscow, and lost more than a month in waiting uselessly for
proposals for peace. This delay settled our fate, because it
gave time for the winter to declare itself before the French
army could go and take up its quarters in Poland. But even
if Moscow had remained intact the event would not have
been altered. The catastrophe rose from the fact that the
retreat had not been prepared for beforehand, and was not
carried out in seasonable time ; and yet it was easy to foresee
that it would be very cold in Russia during the winter. But,
I repeat, it was the hope of concluding peace which misled
Napoleon, and this was the sole cause of his long stay at
Moscow.

The losses of the Grand Army during the campaign were
immense, but yet they have been much exaggerated. I have
already said that I saw in General Goorgaud's possession a
' state ' written all over with notes in Napoleon's hand, from
which it appears that the number of men who crossed the
Niémen was 1 55,400 French and 1 70,500 allies. On the return
the Prussian and Austrian contingents went bodily over to the
enemy, and nearly all the other allies had deserted individu-
ally during the retreat. An approximate calculation of the
French loss cannot therefore be obtained by striking a balance
between the effective force with which they entered on the
campaign and that which remained when they crossed the
Niémen for the second time. Now, from the ^ states ' presented
in February 1813 it appears that 60,000 French recrossed the
Niémen ; so that 95,000 were missing. Of these 30,000 had
been taken prisoners, and returned homeafterthe peace in 1814.
The total loss, therefore, by death of actual French was 65,000.'

I M. Thiers works out the figures of our losses as follows : 420,000 men
crossed the Niémen, raised by subsequent reinforoements to 633,000 ; so
that, of French and allies together, 300,000 must, according to him, have

perished.

344 ^^^ Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

The proportion of loss in my regiment was far smaller.
When the campaign opened the 23rd Chasseurs were 1,018
all told. Thirty more joined at Polotsk, bringing the total
up to 1,048. Out of these I had 109 killed, 77 captured,
65 maimed, and 104 missing — 355 in all ; so that on tihe
return of the troopers whom I had sent to Warsaw after the
campaign, the regiment, when sent on beyond the Elbe in
February 1813, could muster 693 mounted men, who had all
shared in the Eussian campaign. When the Emperor, who
was at Paris looking after the reorganisation of the army,
saw these figures he thought that there must be some mistake,
and sent back my report, with orders to have a correct one
made out. The second agreed with the first ; whereupon the
Emperor ordered General Sébastiani to inspect my regiment
and draw up a * state ' of all the men present &y name. All
doubts being set at rest by this operation, and my statement
confirmed, I received a few days later from the adjutant-general
a letter in terms most flattering to the officers, and above all
to myself. It was to the effect that Prince Berthier was
instructed by the Emperor to express his Majesty's satisfac-
tion for the care which we had taken of our men. Th&
Emperor knew that the 23rd had not been to Moscow, and
accordingly did not compare its loss with that of the regi-
ments who had reached that point, but founded his estimate
on that of the 2nd army corps, which, having been placed in
similar conditions, should have lost only in the same propor-
tion. He found, however, that the 23rd, though it had been
more exposed than the other regiments to the enemy's fire,
was the one which had brought back the greatest number of
men ; a result which his Majesty ascribed to the zeal of its
colonel, its officers, and non-commissioned officers, no less
than to the excellent tone of its men.

After reading out this letter in the presence of all the
squadrons, I intended to keep it as a glorious heirloom for
my family ; but it was withheld by a scruple which you will
doubtless approve. It appeared scarcely seemly to deprive
the regiment of a document, which, as it contained the proof of
the Emperor's satisfaction with all, belonged to all. I therefore

A Lost Testimonial 345

placed Berthier's letter among the regimental archives. I have
repented this delicate attention ; for almost before a year was
out, the Government of Louis XV ill., on coming into power
in 1814, amalgamated the 23rd Chasseurs with the 3rd of the
same arm. The archives of the two corps were at first put to-
gether and badly looked after, until, at the general reduction
of the army in 1815, they were lost in the vast gulf of the
War OflBce. After the revolution of 1830 I got the adjutant-
general to look for the letter ; but it was in vain : I never
succeeded in recovering it.

CHAPTER XXXIV

The year 1813 opened inauspiciously enongh for France.
The fragments of our army had hardly croBsed the Vistula
and begun to reorganise, when the treachery of General
York and his troops compelled us to withdraw behind the
Oder, and before long to evacuate Berlin and the whole of
Prussia, which was now, with the help of the forces which
Napoleon had imprudently left there, in arms against us. The
Russians made all haste to rejoin the Prussians, and the
King of Prussia declared war against the Emperor of the
French.

In the north of Germany Napoleon had only two divisions.
It is true that they were commanded by Augereau, but they
consisted almost wholly of reci^iits. The French who had
been to Russia recovered their strength as soon as they got
proper food and had no longer to sleep on the snow, and
they might have been opposed to the enemy. But the
troopers were nearly all dismounted ; very few infantrymen
had kept their muskets. We had no artillery. Most of the
men were shoeless, and their clothes were in rags. The
Government had, indeed, occupied part of 1812 in having
equipment of all kinds got ready ; but owing to the neglect
of the administration, which was then directed by the Count
of Cessac, no regiment got the clothes intended for it. The
conduct of our administrators in this matter deserves to be
noticed. This was what happened. As soon as the costly
and extensive equipment required by a regiment had been
got ready at its depot, the office made arrangements with a
firm of carriers to transport them to Mainz, then included in
the Empire. The packets were in no danger so long as they
were passing through France ; still, by M. de Cessac's orders,

Our Able Administration 347

a detachment had to escort them as far as Mainz. There the
French carriers and their escort were dismissed, and the cases
handed over to foreign contractors, who were to take them to
Magdeburg, Berlin, or the Vistula, without any oversight by
a French agent. The duty was therefore performed so dis-
honestly and so slowly, that packages of clothing and shoes
took from six to eight months to accomplish the journey
from Mainz to the Vistula, for which six weeks would have
sufficed.

But what was only a serious inconvenience so long as
the French armies were in peaceable occupation of Germany
and Poland after the Russian campaign became a calamity.
More than 200 boats laden with property intended for our
regiments were icebound on the Bromberg canal near Nackel
when we passed that point in January 1813. But as there
was not a single French agent with the convoy to let us
know, while the boatmen, being all Prussians, considered
themselves already our enemies and said not a word, we
passed on thinking that they were merely barges with mer-
chandise. Next day the Prussians took more than twelve
millions' worth of clothing, linen, and boots, which had been
meant for our unlucky soldiers, and served to clothe several
of the regiments which Prussia levied against us. The
frost came on with renewed aeverity, and caused the death of
several thousands more French ; but xione the less people
bragged about our able administration.

The lack of regularity with which the march of the Frencii
across Prussia was conducted arose in the first instance from
the carelessness of Murat, who had taken the command after
the Emperor's departure, and later on from the weakness of
Eugène Beauharnais. It was indeed high time torecrossthe
Elbe into the territory of the Confederation of the Rhine.
But before making up his mind to remove his troops from
Poland and Prussia, the Emperor, wishing to leave at his
disposal means of returning to the attack, gave orders to leave
strong garrisons in such places as to secure the passage of the
Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe. This important decision
may be regarded from two different points of view ; so that

348 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

some well-informed soldiers have praised it, while others,
equally competent to judge, have blamed it severely. The
former say that the necessity for giving rest and shelter to
the numerous sick and wounded whom the army brought back
from Bussia compelled the Emperor to retain fortresses the
occupation of which would assure to the French the safety of
a vast material of war and large supplies of food. They add
that these fortresses would impede the movements of the
enemy, who would be compelled to mask them, thus reducing
the number of troops which they could employ against us ;
and lastly, that if the reinforcements brought up from France
and Germany should enable him to win a battle, the fortresses
which he kept would make it easy for the French to conquer
Prussia, which would soon bring us back beyond the Vistula,
and force the Eussians to return to their country.

To this it is replied that by scattering his army over so
many distant points, too far apart for the garrisons to
support each other. Napoleon was reducing his strength, and
that it was not right to endanger the safety of France in
order to save a few thousand sick and wounded, very few of
whom would be able to serve again. As a matter of fact
nearly all of them died in the hospitals. Further, it was said
that the Italian, German, and Polish regiments which the
Emperor had attached to the garrisons to economise his own
troops would do no good service : and indeed nearly all the
foreign soldiers fought slackly, and ended by going over to
the enemy. The last point was, that the occupation of the
fortresses would cause very little hindrance to the Russian
and Prussian armies, who would merely leave a corps to mask
them and continue their march towards France ; which was
what actually took place. Each of these views has some-
thing to be said for and against it. Nevertheless, con-
sidering the circumstances in which the French army was
placed, I feel bound to take the side of those who wished to
abandon the fortresses ; even their opponents admit that they
could be of no use to us unless we could thoroughly beat the
Russian and Prussian armies, which was another reason for
endeavouring to increase our available forces instead of

On Retaining Fortresses 349

distributing them indefinitely. Nor let anyone say that in that
case the enemy, having no blockading to do, would also have
increased the number of their battalions, and thus restored
the proportion. To say this would be to fall into a great
mistake, for he would have been always obliged to keep strong
garrisons in the places which we had left. I may add that
the useless defence of these numerous fortresses deprived our
active army of many experienced generals, among others
Marshal Davout, who was alone worth many divisions. I can
understand that on campaign one may dispense with the
services of several brigades when it is a question of entrusting
to them the duty of guarding places on which the safety of
the country depends, such as the towns of Metz, Lille, and
Strasburg in the case of France, for one is then, so to speak,
defending the body of the fatherland. On the other hand,
the importance of fortresses 200 or 300 leagues from France
was not absolute, but only conditional ; that is to say, con-
tingent on the success of our active armies. As this success
did not come to pass, the eighty odd thousand men whom the
Emperor left in 1812 in garrison in these places were com-
pelled to lay down their arms.

The situation of France in the early months of 1813
was most critical. In the south, our armies in Spain had
suffered great reverses through the reduction of our force in
the Peninsula, whence regiments were continually being
drawn ; while the English never stopped sending troops to
Wellington. Thus in the course of 1812 this general had
made a brilliant campaign. He had recaptured Ciudad
Rodrigo, Badajoz, and Salamanca; had won the battle of
the Arapiles,^ and occupied Madrid ; and now was threatening
the Pyrenees. In the north, the seasoned soldiers whom
Napoleon had led into Russia had nearly all fallen in battle
or succumbed to their hardships. The Prussian army, still
intact, had just joined with the Russians, and the Austrians
were on the point of following their example. Lastly, the
sovereigns, and still more the people of the Germanic Con-
federation, incited by England, were wavering in their
[ ' Which we call the battle of Salamanca.]

3 so The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

alliance with France. The Prassian Baron von Stein, a man
of resource and enterprise, seized this occasion to publish
sundry pamphlets, in which he summoned all the Germans to
shake off the yoke of Napoleon and reconquer their freedom.
His appeal received all the more attention, since the main-
tenance of the French troops, which had been occupying
Germany since 1806, had caused them great losses, to which
had.been added the confiscation of English goods, by reason
of Napoleon's continental blockade. The Confederation of
the Rhine would therefore have slipped from him if the
sovereigns of the various states composing it had then made
up their minds to yield to the wishes of their subjects. But
so great was their habit of obedience to the French Emperor,
and their fear of seeing him arrive at the head of the forces
which he was rapidly organising and directing towards Spain,
that none of them dared stir.

The majority of the French nation still confided in
Napoleon. No doubt well-informed persons blamed him for
having forced his army on to Moscow, and especially
for having waited there till winter; but the mass of the
people, accustomed to regard the Emperor as infallible, and
having, moreover, no idea of what had really happened, or of
the losses of our army in Russia, saw only the renown which
the capture of Moscow had shed on our arms ; so they were
keen to give the Emperor the means of bringing victory
back to his eagles. Each department and town was patrioti-
cally ready to find horses ; but the levies of conscripts and
money soon chilled their enthusiasm. Still, on the whole,
the nation sacrificed itself with a good grace, squadrons and
battalions rising as by magic from the ground. It was
astonishing that, after all the draughts of men which
France had undergone in the last twenty years, never had
soldiers of such good quality been enlisted. This was due
to several causes: first, there had been for some years in
each of the 120 existing departments a so-called 'depart-
mental ' company of infantry — a kind of praetorian guard to
the prefects, and formed by their picked men, who, being
well looked after, and not overworked, had time to grow to

France at Bay 351

their full strength, and, being regularly drilled and exercised,
needed only their * baptism of fire ' to make them perfect
troops. The companies varied in strength from 100 to 250
men ; the Emperor sent them all to the army, where they
were merged in line regiments. Secondly, a great number
of conscripts from previous years, who, for one reason or
another, had obtained leave to be placed at the ' tail ' of their
depots, to wait until they were required, were called up.
They too, as they grew older, had nearly all become strong
and vigorous.

These were legal measures; but not so was the re-
calling of persons who had drawn a lucky number at the
conscriptions and thus escaped service. All of these below
the age of thirty were required to serve. This levy, therefore,
furnished a number of men fit to undergo the fatigues of war.
There was some grumbling, especially in the south and west ;
but so great was the habit of obedience, that nearly all the
contingent went on duty. This submission on the part of
the people led the Government to take a still more illegal
step, which, as it touched the upper class, was still more
dangerous. After having made men serve whom the ballot
had exempted, they compelled those who had quite lawftdly
obtained substitutes to shoulder their muskets all the same.
Many families had embarrassed, and even ruined themselves
to keep their sons at home, for a substitute coat from 12,000
to 20,000 francs at that time, and this had to be paid down.
There were some young men who had obtained substitutes
three times over, and were none the less compelled to go ;
cases even occurred in which they had to serve in the same
company with the man whom they had paid to take their
place. This piece of iniquity was owing to the advice of
Clarke the War Minister, and Savary the Police Minister,
who persuaded the Emperor that, to prevent any movement
of opposition to the Government during the war, sons of
influential families must be got out of the country and sent
to the array, to act in some sort as hostages. In order, how-
ever, to reduce the odium of this measure somewhat, the
Emperor created, under the name of Guards of Honour, four

352 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

cavalry regiments formed of young men of good education.
They wore a brilliant hussar uniform, and had generals for
their colonels.

To these more or less legal levies the Emperor added the
produce of a forestalled conscription, and many excellent
battalions formed of sailors, and artificers or gunners ot
marine artillery, all well-set men trained in handling arms,
who had long been weary of their monotonous life in ports,
and were eager to go and win glory along with their comrades
of the land forces. They soon became formidable infantry,
and amounted to 30,000. Lastly, the Emperor further
weakened the army in Spain by taking from it not only some
thousands of men to replenish his guard, but whole brigades
and divisions of seasoned veterans.

On their side the Eussians, and still more the Prussians,
were making ready for war. The indefatigable Stein was
visiting the provinces preaching a crusade against Prance,
and organising his Tugendbund, or League of Virtue, the
initiated in which swore to take up arms for German freedom.
This society was acting openly in Prussia, which was already
at war with Napoleon, and was working its way among the
states and armies of the Confederation of the Rhine, in spite
of some of the sovereigns ; so that nearly all Grermany was in
secret our enemy ; and even the contingents which it con-
tributed to our forces were ready, as events soon showed, to
betray us on the first opportunity. These events were, indeed,
only delayed by the natural slowness of Germans, for the
fragments of the French army, after recrossing the Elbe at
the end of 1812, remained undisturbed on the left bank of
that river during the first four months of the next year with-
out the Russians and Prussians, on the opposite side, venturing
to attack them. They did not deem themselves strong enough,
although Prussia had called out the Landwehr ; while Berna-
dette, forgetting that he was a Frenchman by birth, had
declared war against us and united the Swedish troops with
those of the enemies of his native land.

During our stay on the left bank of the Elbe the French
army continued short of cavalry, except for a few regimen]»

In Winter Quarters 353

of which mine was one. We were quartered in several
villages not far from Magdeburg. While there I experienced
a great disappointment. The Emperor, wishing to quicken
the organisation of the new levies, and thinking that the
presence of the regimental commanders at the depots of their
regiments would be useful for this purpose, decided that all
colonels who had less than a certain number of men — for
cavalry 400 — under arms should return to Prance. As I
had more than 600, I was obliged to stay, but I should have
been glad to embrace my wife and the child which had been
bom while I was away. To the pain which this caused me
was added another great annoyance : the good General
Castex, to whom I had occasion to be so grateful during the
Russian campaign, left us for the mounted grenadiers of the
guard. General Corbineau had been appointed aide-de-camp
to the Emperor, and the two brigades were combined under
General Exelmans ; General Wathiez replaced General Castex,
and General Maurin, Corbineau. But as these three generals
had gone to France after the campaign, and I was the only
colonel at hand, General Sébastiani, to whose corps the new
division was to belong, put me in command of it. This gave
me much extra duty, since I had in terrible weather often to
visit the cantonments of the three other regiments. My
wound in the knee, though it had closed, still gave me pain,
and I do not know how I should have carried on my duties
to the end of the winter had not General Wathiez rejoined
at the end of a month and taken command.

A few days after this, without any request on my part, I
received orders to repair to France and organise the recruits
and remounts which were in great numbers at the depot of
my regiment. This was at Mons, in Belgium, which then
formed part of the Empire. I started at once, and travelled
quickly, and as I knew that, having been authorised to come
to France on duty, I could not properly ask for any leave to
go to Paris, I accepted the offer of my mother-in-law, Mme
Desbrières, to bring my wife and child to Mons. After a
year of separation and all that danger, it was a great pleasure
to see my wife again, and for the first time to kiss our little

VOL. II. A A

354 ^^^ Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Alfred, now eight months old. It was one of the happiest days
of my life. You may imagine with what joy I recalled how
nearly my child had become an orphan on the day of his
birth.

I remained at the depot, very busy, till the end of June.

I ; ' The recruits were very numerous, fine men, and of a warlike

race, coming nearly all from the neighbourhood of Mons, in
the old province of Hainault, whence Austria, in the days

j when the Low Countries belonged to her, used to draw her

[\ best troopers. The inhabitants of this district are fond of

horses, and take good care of them ; but as those of the
country were rather too powerful for chasseurs, I got leave to
buy them in the Ardennes, and we were well remounted.
At the depot I found several good officers. Many of those

',; \ who had served in the Russian campaign had gone there to

recover from wounds or sickness, and the minister had sent
me some young sub-lieutenants from the Cavalry School and
from Saint-Cyr. Out of these elements I soon formed some
squadrons, which doubtless were not perfect, but which could
take their places, without too great contrast, among the veteran
troopers whom I had left on the Elbe ; and as soon as a squa-
dron was ready it went off to the army.

■■

CHAPTER XXXV

While I was actively engaged in reconstituting my regiment,
most of the colonels, especially those of the cavalry, being
detained in France on the same duty, the allies crossed the
Elbe and hostilities recommenced. The Emperor had left
Paris, and on April 25 was at Nanmberg in Saxony, at the
head of 170,000 men. Only a third of these were French,
since some of the troops who had recently been sent forward
to ^Germany had not yet reached the seat of war. The
remaining two*thirds were formed by the contingents from
the Confederation of the Rhine, the greater part of whom
were little inclined to fight for Napoleon. General Wittgen-
stein, who since our disaster at the Beresina had acquired
some reputation, although the elements had done us much
more harm than his combinations, was commander-in-chief
of the united Russian and Prussian troops. These to the
number of 300,000 appeared on April 28 before Napoleon's
army in the neighbourhood of Leipzig.

On May 1 a brisk engagement took place at Posema»
in the plain rendered famous by the death of Gustavus
Adolphus, and Marshal Bessières was killed by a cannon-ball.
The Emperor regretted him more than did the army, which
had never forgotten that it was through his advice that
Napoleon had been hindered on the evening of the battle of the
Moskwa from bringing his guard into action and thus com-
pleting his victory, whereby the aspect of events would have
been changed and the complete destruction of the Russian
troops brought about. On the day after Marshal Bessières^
death, while Napoleon was continuing his march on Leipzig,
he was unexpectedly attacked in flank by the allies, who had

A A 2

3S6 The Memoirs of the Baron db Marbot

crossed the river Elster before daybreak. This battle, which
was known as Lutzen, was keenly contested. The troops
recently arrived from France fought with the utmost valonr,
the marine regiments being especially distinguished. The
enemy were beaten at all points, and withdrew towards the
Elbe ; but the French, having scarcely any cavalry, could
take but few prisoners, so that their victory was incomplete.
Nevertheless, it produced a great moral effect all over Europe
and especially in France, as showing that our troops had pre-
served all their superiority, and that nothing but the frostB
of Russia had vanquished them in 1812.

The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, who,
after having witnessed tlie defeat of their armies at Lutzen,
had gone to Dresden, were obliged to leave it on Napoleon's
approach. On the 8th he took possession of that town, where
he was soon joined by his ally the King of Saxony. After
a short stay at Dresden the French crossed the Elbe and pur-
sued the allies, coming up with their rear-guard and beating
it at Bischofswerda.

The Emperor Alexander, being dissatisfied with Wittgen-
stein, had himself taken command of the allied forces ; but,
being in his turn defeated by Napoleon in the action at
Burtkau, he probably perceived that he was unequal to
direct the troops, for he soon ceased to lead them. The allies
halted and intrenched themselves at Bautzen, but the
Emperor caused Ney to turn their position, and on May 21
gained a victory which was again rendered incomplete for
want of cavaliy. Still the enemy had 18,000 men disabled,
and fled in great disorder.

On the 22nd the French came up with the Russian
rear-guard in front of the defile of Reichenbach. Napoleon's
small force of cavalry was commanded by General Latour-
Maubourg, who led it with such energy that the enemy were
driven in and abandoned the field after heavy loss. That of
the French, though not very numerous, was of a kind to be
much felt. General Bruyères, an excellent cavalry officer,
had both liis legs shot off, and died of the wound. But the
most disastrous event of that day was caused by a ball which,

Victory Once More • 357

after killing General Kirgener, Marshal Lannes' brother-in-
law, mortally wounded Dnroc, the grand marshal of the
palace — a man beloved by everybody, and Napoleon's oldest
and best friend. He survived his wound a few hours, and the
Emperor went to him and evinced the deepest feeling. His
despair was most touching ; the witnesses of that heart-
breaking scene observed that, when obliged to leave his friend
to resume the command of the army, Napoleon, on parting
from him, bathed in tears, appointed a meeting in a ' better
world.'

Meanwhile the French army, following up its success, had
reached Silesia, and occupied Breslau, the capital, on June 1.
Then the allies, the Prussians most of all, struck with alarm
at their critical position, and recognising that, for all their
big words, they were unable by themselves to stop the
French, wished to gain time, in the hope that Austria might
make an end of her hesitation and join forces with them.
They sent, therefore, to sue for an armistice, which might, it
was said, through the mediation of Austria, lead to a definite
treaty of peace. Napoleon thought it right to grant this
armistice, and it was signed on June 4, to last till August 10.

While Napoleon was marching from victory to victory.
Marshal Oudinot got beaten at Luckau, losing 1,100 men.
The Emperor s hope was that during the armistice his rein-
forcements would come up, and be at hand if a fresh
campaign should be necessary. In spite of this, however,
several of the generals regretted that the Emperor had not
followed up his advantages. They said that if the armistice
tjrave us the time to bring up our reserves it would do the
same for the Russians and Prussians. The Swedes were
already on the march to assist them, and they had hopes of
the Austrians, who, though not ready at that moment, would
have more than two months to mobilise their large army.

When I heard at Mons of the victories of Lutzen and
Bautzen, I was vexed at not having shared in them ; but my
regret was diminished when I learnt that my regiment had
not been there. It was, in fact, still in front of Magdeburg.
j\r. Lacoiir, an old aide-de-camp of General Castex, was in

358 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

command of it as senior major. He was a brave officer ; but
had half-educated himself with the help of books, which gave
him a self-conceit out of keeping with soldierly ways. I shall
have to speak later on of the loss which his want of skill in
command brought on the regiment. At the depot I admitted
as second major M. Pozac, a brilliant officer in all respectSi
who had won a sword of honour at Marengo.

Towards the end of June the task of organising the new
levies was completed, and the colonels were ordered to return
to their duty with the army. I had therefore to part from
my family, with whom I had been spending happy days ; but
honour and duty had to be obeyed, and I took the road back
to Germany. I went, in the first place, to Dresden, whither
the Emperor had summoned all the colonels to question them
as to the composition of the new detachments. In regard to
this I learnt a thing which nearly broke my heart. I had
organised four splendid squadrons of 150 men apiece. The
two first, and luckily the finest, had joined the regiment ;
but the third had by the Phnperor s orders been taken off to
Hamburg, and drafted into the 26th Chasseurs, one of the
weakest regiments in the army. This was quite regular, and
I submitted without a nmnnur. But it was otherwise when
I was informed that the fourth squadron, having come under
the notice of Jerome, King of Westphalia, at Cassel, had taken
his fancy so much, that he had on his own authority embodied
it in his guard. I knew that the Emperor, angry at the
liberty taken by his brother in thus carrying off his soldiers,
had ordered them to resume their journey at once, and I
hoped to get them back ; but Jerome got at some of the
Emj^eror's aides-de-cam}), and they represented that as the
King of Westphalia's guard was composed of untrustworthy
Germans, it would be well to let him have a French squadron
on whom he could count ; that, further, the King had just
given them handsome unifonns at his own cost ; and, lastly,
that ev(în without this squadron the 23rd Chasseurs would
be one of the strongest regiments in the French cavalry.
Anyhow, my squadron was incoi-porated in the Westphalian
bodyguard, ol)ject as I might. I could not reconcile myself

Cheating the Firing-party 359

to this loss, and thought it very unjust that I should thus be
deprived of the fruit of all my trouble.

I rejoined my regiment not far from the Oder. It was
cantoned with the rest of Exelmans' division near the little
town of Freistadt. M. Wathiez, my new brigadier, had been
my captain in the 2ôth Chasseurs, and was always very kind to
me. We were quartered in a comfortable château, named
Herzogwaldau, in the centre of the village which my troopers
occupied. While we were staying there a curious incident
took place. A man named Tautz, the only bad character in
my regiment, got very drunk, and threatened an officer, who
put him under arrest. He was tried and condenmed to
death ; and the sentence was approved. When the guard,
under the regimental staff-sergeant, Boivin, went to fetch
Tautz out to be shot, they found him in his cell perfectly
naked, pleading the extreme heat. The stafiF-sergeant, a
brave soldier, but of intellect not equal to his courage, instead
of making the culprit dress, merely made him put on a cloak.
When they reached the drawbridge across the broad moat of
the citadel, Tautz flung the cloak in the faces of his guard,
jumped into the water, swam across, and, reaching the shore,
went off to join the enemy on the other side of the Oder. He
was never heard of again. I reduced the staff-sergeant for
his lack of vigilance ; but he soon regained his epaulettes by
an act of courage which I shall presently have to recount.

The new squadrons brought up the strength of the regi-
ment to 993, nearly 700 of whom had been in the Russian
campaign. The newly joined men were strongly built, and
nearly all had served in the legion of the department of
Jemmapes, which had made their training easy. I blended
them with the old squadrons. Both sides were preparing for
the struggle ; but the enemy had used their time to raise up
a powerful adversary for us, when they persuaded Austria to
march.

The Emperor Napoleon, accustomed by many victories
not to count up his foes, thought himself as invincible as
ever when he found himself in Germany at the head of
300,000 men ; nor did he sufficiently take into account the

360 The MRË40IRS of the Baron db Marbot

elements composing the forces with which he was about to
meet a hostile coalition of all Europe. As I have said, the
material of the French army had never been finer ; but since
only a few of the new regiments contained men who had
ever fought before, and the effects of the disastrous Russian
campaign were still felt, our magnificent troops formed an
army which was better adapted to use for the purpose of
demonstrations for securing peace than in actual warfare;
and most of the superior officers who had a near view of the
regiments were of opinion that they needed several years of
peace.

If from examining the French army one passed to those
of their allies, one could find nothing but slackness, unwilling-
ness, and a wish for an opportunity of betraying France. It
was therefore, on all accounts, to Napoleon's interest to make
terms ; and to this end he ought, in the first place, to have
brought back his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, to
his side, by restoring to him Dalmatia, Tyrol, and a part of
the other provinces which he had taken from him in 1805
"!;. and 1809. A few similar concessions to Prussia would have

; quieted the allies ; who, it appears, offered Napoleon to restore

; the colonies taken from France, and to guarantee to him all

the territory bounded by the Rhine and the Alps, as well as
Upper Italy ; but he would have to give up Spain, Poland^
Naples, and Westphalia.

These proposals were reasonable enough ; nevertheless,
afler conferring with the foreign diplomatists commissioned
to treat with him. Napoleon treated Mettemich with rudeness,
and dismissed him with no concessions. It is even asserted that
on seeing them leave the palace at Dresden he added, ' What a
beating we are going to give them ! ' He seemed to forget
that their armies were nearly three times as numerous as the
forces which he had to oppose to them ; for against the
320,000 men whom he had in Germany the allies could set
nearly 800,000.

The Emperor's /efe fell on August 15, but as the armistice
I ended on the 10th, he ordered it to be kept earlier, and the

I festivities of ' St. Napoleon's Day ' were held in the canton-

Distribution of Troops 361

ments. This was the last time that the French armv
celebrated its Emperor's birthday. There was little enthu-
siasm ; for even the least foreseeing of the officers realised
that we were on the eve of great changes, and their fore-
bodings were reflected in the minds of the subalterns. Yet
each was ready to do his duty, though with small hope of
success, for we were vastly inferior to the enemy in numbers.
Our allies of the Confederation of the Rhine were wavering,
and the Saxon General Thielmann with his brigade had already
gone over to the Prussians. So there was much uneasiness
and little confidence among our troops.

Just then we heard that General Moreau had returned to
Europe. After his condemnation in 1804, in consequence of
Pichegru's conspiracy, he had gone to America. Now his
hatred of Napoleon made him forget his duty to his country,
and he tarnished his laurels by joining the ranks of the
enemies of France. But the new Coriolanus soon suflTered
the penalty which his conduct deserved.

Meanwhile a vast circle was forming round the French
army. A Russian corps was in Mecklenburg ; Bemadotte, with
a force of Swedes, Russians, and Prussians, occupied Berlin ;
the two main armies of Russia and Prussia were in Silesia ;
40,000 Austrians at Linz, and their main force at Prague.
Behind this front line, numbering altogether 560,000, were
immense reserves.

On our side, 70,000 men, concentrated near Dahmen, were
to act against Bemadotte; Marshal Ney guarded part of
Silesia. Another corps was near Zittau. Saint-Gyr occupied
Pima, and covered Dresden ; round which capital was posted
the imperial guard, ready to give help where it was wanted.
Even adding the garrisons left in fortresses, Napoleon's forces
were infinitely less numerous than those of the enemy.

Our army was divided into fourteen infantry corps, so
called, though each contained at least one brigade of cavalry.
The generals commanding them were Vandamme, Victor,
Ney, Bertrand, Lauriston, Marmont, Reynier, Prince Ponia-
towski, Augereau, Rapp (who was invested in Danzig),
Macdonald, Oudinot, Davont, Saint-Cyr. Lastly, the guard

362 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

J".
I.

was under the immediate orders of the Emperor. The
cavalry proper formed five corps: their commanders being
Latonr-Maubourg, Sebastiani, Arrighi, Kellermann, Milhau.
The cavalry of the guard was under General Nansouty.
While the army approved some of these selections, such as
those of Davout, Ney, Augereau, Reynier, Saint-Cyr, it was
sorry to see important commands given to such men as
Oudinot, who had committed several blunders in the Russian
campaign ; Marmont, who had recently lost the battle of
the Arapiles through over-haste; Sebastiani, who seemed
unequal to the task ; and it lamented that the Emperor
should be testing the strategic powers of Lauriston and
Bertrand in a critical campaign. The first was a good artil-
leryman, the second an excellent engineer ; but neither had as
yet handled ti*oops in the field, so it was clear that they
would not be able to lead an army corps. Probably Napoleon
recollected that when he was appointed commander-in-chief
of the Army of Italy, the fact that he had never had more
than a few battalions under him did not prevent him from
managing an army, and so thought that Lauriston and
Bertrand would do the same. But a universal genius like
Napoleon is very rare, and he could not expect to meet with
such in these new commanders. In this way his personal
affection towards those generals led him into the same error
which he had already committed when he entrusted an army
to the iirtilleryman Mannont. It is vain to argue on this
point. The history of war shows that theory will not make
a conimaiider-in-cliief ; and that, with very rare exceptions, a
man must have commanded a regiment of infantry or cavalry
us colonel if he is to be in a position to handle masses of
troops well. Very few men are capable of semng this
apprenticeship as general office i*s, still fewer as commanders-
in-chief Louis XI \\ never entrusted the command of a
IxkIv of ti'oops in the Held to Mai-shal Vauban, and if he had
oflered it to him it is to be presumed that Vauban would
have refused it and confined himself to what he undei*stood,
the attack and defence of fortresses. Slannont, Bertrand,
and Lauriston had not the like modesty, and Napoleon's

JOMINI 363

affection for them prevented his heeding any of the remarks
made on this point.

Murat, who had gone to Naples after the Russian cam-
paign, rejoined the Emperor at Dresden. The Coalition — that
is to say, the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians — opened the
campaign by a piece of bad faith unworthy of civilised
nations. Although, according to the latest convention, hosti-
lities were not to recommence before August 16, they attacked
our outposts on the 14th, and set the greater part of their
troops in movement in consequence of Jomini's treachery.
Up to that day only two Saxon generals, Thielmann and
Longuereau, had debased themselves by going over to the
enemy ; the uniform of a French general had so far been
clear of such a stain. This was inflicted upon it by a Swiss,
General Jomini. That wretch had been a mere clerk in the
office of the ministry of the Helvetic Republic, on a salary of
1,200 francs, when General Ney was sent to Beme in 1800
by the First Consul to arrange with the Swiss Government
about the defences of that state, which was then our ally.
The duties of the clerk Jomini, which had to do with keeping
the register of the forces of the Republic, brought him in
contact with Ney, who was thus able to judge of his talents,
which were great. Yielding to his entreaties, Ney got him
admitted as lieutenant, and soon after as captain in a Swiss
regiment formed for the French service. His liking for him
increasing, he got him made a French officer, took him as
aide-de-camp, and gave him the means of publishing his
works on the art of war — works which, though they have
been ovei-praised, are certainly not without merit. Thanks to
this powerful protection, Jomini rose rapidly, and when hos-
tilities recommenced, in 1813, was a major-general, and chief
of the staff to Ney. Then, however, seduced by the brilliant
offers of the Russians, and forgetting his duty to the marshal,
the Emperor, and his adopted country, he desei^ted ; taking
with him statements of the strength of the army and notes
relating to the plan of campaign. Fearing, moreover, lest
Napoleon, on hearing of his flight, should change his plans,
he urged the allies to resume hostilities two days before the

I-

364 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

date fixed. To the geneml surpiise of Europe, Alexander
rewarded his treason by making him his own aide-de-camp ;
an act which so shocked the Emperor of Austria, that one
day, when dining with Alexander, seeing Jomini amoug the
guests, he said audibly : ^ I know that sovereigns sometimes
have to em[)loy deserters, but I do not see how they can admit
them to their staff and their table ! ' *

Jomini's treason was a most disastrous blow to Napoleon,
since many of his army cor])s were attacked while concentrating
and obliged to surrender impoiiiant positions for want of time
to arrange foi' the defence of them. Meantime, the Emperor,
finding the enemy forewarned and on their guard to prevent his
intended march on Bohemia, resolved to attack the Prussians
in Silesia, and to make the French forces who had been com-
pelled to retire before Blucher resume the offensive in that
quartei*. On August 20 he reached Lowenberg and attacked
a considemble force of the Coalition ; and after varions
I : actions lasting over thi'ee days the enemy retired, with a loss

of 7,000 men, behind the Katzbach.

During one of the numerous engagements of those days,
Wathiez's brigade, while pursuing the enemy, was stopped
by a broad and muddy bi-ook flowing into the Bober. The
only way of crossing was l^y two wooden bridges a quarter
of a league apait, and swept by the Russian artillery. The
24tli Chasseurs, now commanded by Colonel Schneit, attacked
the left-hand bridge with its wonted intrepidity ; but the 1 1th
Dutch Hussars, which was sent to carry that on the right,
behaved less well. In vain did its colonel, M. Liégeard, the
only Frenchman in the regiment, call on his troopers ; all
wei'e too much alarmed to stii*. My regiment was in the
second line, awaiting its turn ; and as it got nearly as many
balls as the 11th, I hastened forward to help the colonel of
that regiment in persuading his men to charge, as the only
means of silencing the fire. My effoits, however, being vain,
and as it was clear that the cowardice of the Dutchmen would

' It should bo snid that the accusation against Jomini of having taken
documents with him when lie went over to the enemy has been contra-
dicted. See Thiers, xvi. pp. 275, 276.

Retrieving his Credit 365

entail heavy loss on my regiment, I took my men to the
front and was just about to send them forward, when I saw
the left-hand bridge break under the first section of the 24th,
drowning many men and horses. The Russians had prepared
this catastrophe by ingeniously sawing through the beams
which held up the flooring of the bridge. At the sight of this
unfortunate accident I became afraid that the enemy would
have set a similar trap at the bridge towards which my column
was moving, so I halted there a moment to examine. It was
a difficult business, for not only were the enemy's guns trained
on that bridge, but it was open to the fire of one of his bat-
talions Just as I was about to call for a volunteer to under-
take the duty, with the certainty of finding one, Staff-sergeant
Boivin (whom I had reduced for letting the condemned man
escape) dismounted and came up to me, saying that it was
not fair that one of his comrades should be killed in recon-
noitring the bridge, and begging me to let him do it in order,
to letrieve his fault. This noble determination pleased me,
and I said : ^ Go, sir, and you will find your epaulette at the
other end of the bridge.'

Boivin advanced calmly in the thick of the fire, examined
the flooring, went under the bridge, and came back to assure
me that all was sound. I reinstated him ; and, remounted, he
placed himself at the head of the leading squadron. The
Russians retired without awaiting our attack. Next month,
when the Emperor reviewed the regiment and made several
promotions, I got M. Boivin appointed sub- lieutenant.

Our new general, M. Wathiez, gained the esteem and
affection of the troops in these fights. General Exelmans,
commanding the division, was only known to us by public
report, which affirmed him to be a man of brilliant valour,
but often lacking in the judgment which a commander should
have. We had a proof of this in the following incident. Just
as the division was executing a retreat, which my regiment
had to cover, General Exelmans, under the plea of setting a
trap for the Prussian advance-guard, ordered me to place at
his disposal my picked troops, and my twenty-five best sharp-
shooters. He put Major Lacour in command of them, and

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366 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

then posted these 150 men in the middle of a plain sur
/ 1 rounded by woods, and, after forbidding them to stir without

his orders, went off and forgot all about them. The enenij
came up, and, seeing the solitary detachment, halted, saspect
ing an ambush. To make sure, they sent a few men one b]
one into the woods to right and left, and, hearing no shots
increased the number till our troopers were completely sur
rounded. Some of the officers observed to Lacour that hi
retreat was being cut off. Lacour, a brave soldier, but noi
original, stuck to the letter of his orders. It did not occar t<
1^ \ \ him that General Exelmans might have forgotten him, and

that it would be as well to send and let him know, or at least

reconnoitre the ground by which he might retreat. He had

been told to stay there, and stay he would, whether his men

were killed or taken.

I i* While Major Lacour was carrying out his orders in the

] style rather of a sergeant than of a field officer, the division

■ was retiring. General Wathiez and I, not seeing the detach-

« ment return, and not knowing where to find Exelmans, whc

* i was galloping across country, began to feel very uneasy. I

obtained permission from the general to go back for Major
Lacour, and, starting with a squadron at full gallop, I got up
in time to witness a terrible sight for a colonel who loved hia
men. After overlapping both flanks and even the rear of oui
detachment, the enemy attacked it in front with infinitely
superior forces, so that 700 or 800 Prussian lancers surround^
our 150 men, who, to complete their misfortunes, had no way
of retreat save a wooden foot-bridge over a deep mill-stream.
Our troopers could only march in single file, so that there
was a block, and my picked company lost several men. Some
of them then perceived a large courtyard, and, thinking that
it opened upon the stream, and that they would find a bridge
there, entered it, followed by the whole detachment. The
stream did indeed run along the yard, but at that point it
formed the milldam, the banks of which were sustained by
large slippery slabs, rendering the approach exceedingly diffi-
cult for horses, and giving a great advantage to the enemy^
who had closed the gates of the courtyard in order to make

Chasseurs f. Lancers 367

sure of captnring the French. At this critical moment I
appeared on the other side of the stream with my squadron.
I made the men dismount, four of them leaving their horses
in the charge of one ; the remainder, armed with their carbines,
hastened towards the foot-bridge. This was guarded by a
squadron of Prussians, but having remained on horseback, and
with no firearms but pistols, they could not resist the fire
from our carbines, and were forced to retire some hundred
paces, leaving about forty killed and wounded on the ground.
Those of my troopers who were shut up in the courtyard
thought to take advantage of this respite to force the great
gate ; but I called out to them to do nothing of the kind. It
would have done them no good, for in order to join me they
would have been obliged to cross the foot-bridge on horseback,
which they could only have done in single file, ofiering their
flank and rear to the Prussians, who would promptly have
charged and exterminated them. The bank was planted with
riverside trees, among which infantry could defy a large
number of cavalry in perfect safety. I therefore placed my
dismounted men as skirmishers along the stream, and, as soon
as they were in touch with the courtyard of the mill, I
ordered those who were within it to dismount also and take
their carbines ; then, while a hundred of them kept the enemy
ofi* with their fire, the remainder could pass the horses along
over the bridge.

While this movement^was being executed in perfect order^
the Prussian lancers, furious at seeing their pregr on the point
of escaping, tried by a vigorous attack to throw our retreat
into disorder. But their horses were hampered by the willow
branches, by pools of water, and numerous holes, and, being
scarcely able to walk over the muddy ground, never succeeded
in reaching our skirmishers, whose fire, well aimed at a short
distance, caused them considerable loss. However, the
Prussian officer who commanded the charge pushed boldly
on to the middle of our line and shot one of my best officers.
Lieutenant Bachelet, through the head. I regretted him
keenly, but he was promptly avenged by his men, for several
bullets laid the Prussian officer dead beside him.

368 The Memoirs of the Baron db Marbot

Tiie fall of their leader, their heavy lot», and their in-
ubility to touch us determined the enemy to retire. I took
up my wounded and i*etreated unpursoed. In this deplor-
* able affair my regiment lost an oiBcer and nine troopers
killed and thirteen prisoners^ among the latter Lâeutenaat
Miirt\*hal. The loss of these twenty-three men grieved me
tlie mon^ that it was needless, nnd fell entirely on the bravest
men of the re^iiiieut, most of whom weiv marked for deocH
I'Mtioii or promotion. I was never able to console myself for
t h 1:1 check, and it put the finishing stroke to our dislike of
Kxehnans. He got off with a reprimand from General
Sr* biistiani and the Kmperor, to whom he had been reoom-
n)i*nil(Ml Ity his friendship with Mnrat. Old General Saint-
(ii'nnain. a former (^olonel of the 2-3rd Chassears, and
indt'ed the man who had made the regiment, for which Le
had pn*st>rvinl a great regard, siiid openly that Exelmans
tle<iTVt*d an e^t^niplary punishni^^nt. A quarrel ensued, and
they would have eoine to blows had not the Kmperor person-
ally intr*i*\vned. Maji>r Lacoiir. whose l)ad management had
so largt^ly contribut«Ml to the disaster, lost my confidence from
that dav forth.

CHAPTER XXXVl

Akfrk beating the Prussian corps under Field-Marshal
DIucher, who had retired behind the Katzbach river, the
Kmperar gave orders to pursue on the following day, but on
learning that the Grand Army of the Coalition, 200,000 strong,
under IVince Schwarzenberg, had debouched on August 22
from the mountains of Bohemia and was marching on Saxony,
Napoleon took his whole guard, Latonr-Maubourg's cavalry,
and Keveral divisions of infantry, and made his way by forced
marcheH back to Dresden, into which Marshal Saint-Cyr had
thrown himself with his troops, hastily withdrawn from the
camp of IMma. On leaving Silesia the Emperor had ordered
Marslial Ney to follow him and left Macdonald in command
of tlie army on the Bober. consisting of the 3rd, 5th, and
1 1 th corps of infantry, and the 2nd of cavalry, which, with
the artillery, formed an effective force of 75,000 men. As
events showed, the command of such a mass of combatants
was a task too heavy for Macdonald.

As you will have observed, the larger the number of
tnx)ps engaged the less I describe their movements in
detail. The work would be so great that I fear I should not.
h" capable of performing it satisfactorily, and it would render
th(^ rending of these Memoirs too wearisome. I shall, there»
fort*, relate the events of the war of 1813 more concisely than
I havi> done in the case of my previous campaigns.

On Aui^nist 28, 200,IM>0 of the allies invested the town of
DreMltMi. the fortifications of which were hardly able to resist
a rnui*-^1e'vvnn, and Marshal Saint-Cyr's situation with only
17.onn French became extremely critical. The enemy was
hadly ^rrved by his spies, so that he did not know that

VOL. II. B B

370 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Napoleon was close at hand, and, confiding in his numbers,
])at off the attack till next day. His confidence was increased
by seeing two Westphalian regiments arrive, who having
deserted Jerome joined the Austrians. Marshal Saint-Cyr
was anxiously awaiting an attack on the morning of the 25th,
but he was reassured by the arrival of the Emperor, who
entered Dresden early that day. A few moments later, the
enemy, expecting to have to deal with Saint-Cyr's corps only,
marched on the town so impetuously that they carried several
redoubts. The Russians and I^ussians having occupied the
suburb of Pima, tried to drive in the Freiberg gate, when, by
an order from the Emperor, the gate suddenly opened and
out marched a column of infantry from the imperial guard,
its leading brigade commanded by General Cambronne. It was
like the appearance of the head of Medusa; the enemy
recoiled in terror, their guns were captured, and the gunners
killed on their carriages. Similar sorties were made from all
the gates of Dresden with a like result ; the enemy evacuated
the captured redoubts and fled into the surrounding country,
charged by Napoleon's cavalry. They lost 5,000 men dis-
abled and 3.000 prisoners. The French had 2,500 killed or
wounded, among the latter five generals.

Next day the French army attacked first, though its
strength was less than that of its opponents by 87,000 men.
There was at first a brisk and bloody engagement ; but the
rain falling in torrents on a heavy soil soon turned the battle-
field into pools of muddy water, in which our troops moved
with great difficulty. Nevertheless, they continued to
advance, and the Young Guard was making the enemy's left
give ground, when the Emperor, perceiving that Prince
Schwarzenberg had made the mistake of insufficiently sup-
porting his left wing, crushed it \vith Victor's infantry and
Latour-Maubourg's cavalry. Murat, who commanded this
part of the French line, showed himself more brilliant than
ever ; for after forcing the defile of Cotta, he turned and cut
off from the Austrian army Klenau's corps, hurling himself
upon it at the head of the carabim^ers and cuirassiers. His
movement was decisive ; Klenaii could not resist that terrible

Battle of Dresden 371

charge. Nearly all his battalions were compelled to lay-
down their arms, and two other divisions of infantry shared
their fate.

While Murat was thus beating the enemy on their left,
their right was being routed by the Young Guard, so that by
three o'clock the victory was secured and the Coalition forces in
retreat towards Bohemia, They left that day on the field
eighteen stands of colours, twenty-six guns, and 40,000 men,
half of whom were prisoners. The heaviest loss fell on the
Austrian infantry. Percussion muskets were, of course,
hardly known at that time, and the infantry used flint-locks,
which became almost useless when the priming had got wet.
Now as the rain had never stopped all day this had much to
do with the defeat of the infantry by our cavalry. In regard
to this a curious thing happened. A cuirassier division under
General Bordesoulle, finding itself in front of a strong
division of Austrian infantry formed in square, summoned
it to surrender. The Austrian general refused ; and Borde-
soulle, going forward, pointed out to him that not one of his
muskets could be fired. The Austrian general replied that
his men could defend themselves with the bayonet, and
would be all the better able to do so that the French horses
were up to their hocks in mud, and could not meet them with
the breast-to-breast shock in which the strength of cavalry
lies. * I will break up your square with artillery.' ' But you
have none ; it has stuck in the mud.' * Well, if I show you
the guns behind my leading regiment, will you surrender ? '
' I shall have no choice, for I shall have no means left of
defence.' Thereupon the French general brought up a
battery of six guns to within thirty paces, and the gunners
stood with lighted matches ready to fire. Tlien the Austrian
division laid down its arms. It was indeed the artillery
that played the principal part in this battle. Napoleon doubled
the teams by taking horses from his commissariat wagons,
to enable the guns to move, and our field pieces did great
execution. It was a ball from one of them which struck
Moroau.

r^iblic rumour had some time back announced the return

u B 2

372 The ME.\foiRs of the Baron de Marbot

to Europe of their once famous French general, and added
that he had taken service among his country's foes ; but few-
people believed the report. It was, however, confirmed in a
curious way on the evening of the battle of Dresden. Our
advance-guard was pursuing the routed enemy, when one of
our hussars observed at the entrance of the village of Notnitz
a magnificent Danish hound. The dog seeming to be looking
uneasily for its master, the soldier called it and took hold of
it. On its collar were the words ' I am General Moreau's
dog.' Then they heard from the village priest that General
Moreau had just had both his legs amputated in his house.
A French cannon-ball had dropped among the Emperor of
Russia's staff and broken both the famous deserter's legs, going
through his horse's body. This happened just as the allied
armies were defeated ; and the Emperor Alexander, fearing
lest Moreau should fall into the hands of the French, made
some grenadiers carry him in their arms until the pursuit
slackened, and it was possible to dress his wound and take
both legs ofi* at the thigh. The Saxon clergyman witnessed
this terrible operation, and said that Moreau, knowing his
danger, cursed himself, and incessantly repeated : ' What ? I,
Moreau, I to die among the enemies of France, struck down
by a French ball ! * No man in the French army regretted
him when it was known that he had borne arms against his
country. A Russian flag of truce came to claim the dog on
behalf of his aide-de-camp, Colonel Rapatel, and the animal
was sent back, but without his collar. This was sent to the
King of Saxony, and now is among the curiosities in the
Dresden Gallery.

Meanwhile Prince Schwarzenberg had given orders to his
beaten troops to rendezvous at Teplitz. The Austrians
effected their retreat by the Dippoldiswalde valley, the Russians
and Prussians by the Telnitz road, and the remains of
Klenau's corps by that to Freiberg. Napoleon accompanied
the pursuing corps as far as Pima ; but just before reaching
that town he was attacked by sudden illness, with slight
vomiting, the result of the fatigue caused by five days in the

[ * Another version of Moreau's end is given. See vol. i. p. 149.]

The Turn op the Tide 373

saddle under incessant rain. One of the inconveniences to
which sovereigns are exposed is that there are always persons
about them who, to show their attachment, profess to be
alarmed at their smallest ailments, and must take exaggerated
precautions. This was what happened in the present case.
The grand equerry, Caulaincourt, advised Napoleon to return
to Dresden, and the other high oflBcials did not venture to
give him the far better advice to go on to Pima, only a
league further. The Young Guard was there already, and
the Emperor would have not only found there the rest which
he needed, but have been in a position to direct the move-
ments of the pursuing forces, for which at Dresden he was
too far off. He left to Marshals Mortier and Saint-Cyr the
task of supporting Vandamme, who, with the 1st corps, had
been detached three days ago from the Grand Army. He
had beaten a Russian corps and now was threatening the
enemy's rear, blocking the road from Dresden to Prague, and
occupying Peterswald ; whence he could command the basin
of Kulm and the town of Teplitz. But Napoleon's return to
Dresden cancelled his recent success and led to a great
disaster, which contributed powerfully to the fall of the
Empire. I will give a brief account of that famous over-
throw.

General Vandamme was a brave and good oflBcer. He
had acquired fame in the first Revolutionary wars, and under
the Empire had constantly been in chief command of army
corps, so that people were surprised that he had not got his
marshal's baton; bat this was due to his rough and overbearing
manner. After his defeat his detractors said that it was the
hope of earning that honour which had led him to throw
himself so madly at the head of 20,000 men across the road
of 200,000, and try to stop their passage. The truth, how-
ever, is that the chief of the staff had told him that he would
be supported by Mortier and Saint-Cyr, and had given him a
distinct order to capture Teplitz and cut off the enemy's
retreat ; so that he was bound to obey. Believing himself
sure of support, he descended boldly towards Kulm on
August 29, and thence, pushing the enemy before him, tried

374 '^^^ Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

to reach Teplitz. It is certain that if Mortier and Saint-
Cyr had carried out their instructions, the Coalition forces,
engaged in horrible roads and cut oif from Bohemia, would
have been attacked in front and rear and forced to surrender.
Then the very persons who afterwards found fault with
Vandamme would have been loud in his praise.

However this may be, when Vandamme arrived before
Teplitz on the morning of the 30th, and found himself in front
of Ostermann^s Russian division, he attacked it vigorously ; all
the more so that he saw an army corps descending from
Peterswald by the route which he had taken the day before,
and had reason to believe that the promised aid from Mortier
and Saint-Cyr was coming. But the newcomers were no
friends, but two strong Prussian divisions under General
Kleist. Marching on Kulm, by Jomini's advice, they had
passed un perceived between Mortiers and Saint-Cyr's armies ;
owing largely to Saint-Cyr's indisposition to back up one of
his colleagues, and its influence in the present case on
Mortier. Neither stirred, though by co-operating with the
brave effort of Vandamme they would infallibly have brought
about the total defeat of the enemy. As it was, their
columns, infantry, cavalry, artillery, baggage wagons, were
huddled pell-mell in the narrow gorges of the mountains
separating Silesia and Bohemia. Thus, instead of the
expected aid, General A'^andamme saw General Kleist's two
divisions, which straightway attacked him. Continuing to
make head against Ostermann's Russians, he faced about
with his rear-guard and attacked Kleist furiously. The enemy
was giving way at all points when immense reinforcements
brought their total numbers above 60,000 ; and Vandamme's
1 5,000 were so hopelessly out-numbered that he was com-
})elled to take steps for retiring on the corps of Saint-Cyr and
Mortier which, according to the information he had received
from Berthier, he still believed to be at hand. But on
reaching the Telnitz defile, the French found it occupied by
Kleist's army, and their passage entirely barred. Our bat-
talion, however, led by General Corbineau's cavalry, whicli
even in this rough country had claimed their right to act as

KuLM 375

advance-giiard, dashed on the Prussians so impetuously that
they overthrew them and made their way through the defile,
lirst capturing the whole of the enemy's artillery. They
were, however, owing to the bad state of the roads, only able
to take away the horses.

Soldiers who have seen service will understand that such
a success can only be obtained at the cost of much bloodshed,
and that after so terrible a fight the 1st corps was greatly
reduced. Yet Vandamme, surrounded by forces ten times
his own, refused to surrender; and placing himself at the
head of his only two available battalions, charged into the
midst of the enemy, in the hope of finding his death there.
But his horse was killed, a strong body of Russians flung
themselves on him, and he was taken prisoner. On the other
side, generals, officers, and privates admired Vandamme's
courage, and felt the greatest esteem for him \ but, incredible
as it may seem, the kind treatment ceased and was replaced
by insults when the prisoner was taken to Prague. The
Emperor of Russia and his brother, the Grand Duke Con-
stantine, addressed him in insulting terms ; and the Grand
J)uke actually snatched away his sword. Vandamme indig-
nantly exclaimed, * My sword is easy to take here ; it would
have been nobler to come and fetch it on the battle-field.
But you seem to like your trophies to be cheap.' Thereupon
the Emperor Alexander, in a rage, ordered the arrest of
Vandamme, calling him 'plunderer' and 'brigand.' Van-
damme replied, looking Alexander proudly in the face : ' I
am no plunderer or brigand ; * and, anyhow, history will not
reproach me with having murdered my own father ! ' Alex-
ander turned pale at this allusion to the assassination of his
father, Paul I., to which he had been accused by rumour of
having assented from fear of sharing the same fate, and
quickly left the room. The French general, strictly watched,
was taken to Wintka, on the Siberian frontier, and did not
return home till after the peace of 1814.

[ ' According to a story told by Scott, Napoleon said that *if he had
liad two Varulammes in his service, he must have made one hang the

other.]

Syô The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

The battle of Knlm cost the French army 2,000 killed
and 8,000 prisoners, including their general. The remainder
of Vandamme's troops, to the number of 10,000, cut their way
through and rejoined Saint-Cyr and Mortier. Those two
marshals had been grievously wanting in their duty when
they failed to pursue the enemy, and halted, the first at Rein-
hardsgrimme, and the other at Pirna, whence they could
hear the sound of the battle which the brave and unfortunate
Vandamme was maintaining. It may seem surprising that
Napoleon had not sent an aide-de-camp from Dresden to make
sure that Saint-Cyr and Mortier had started, according to Lis
instructions, to succour Vandamme. As those two marshals
did not carry out their orders, they deserved to be tried by
court-martial.* But the French army was by this time so
exhausted that if the Emperor had wished to punish all those
who showed lack of energy he must have dispensed with
the services of nearly all his marshals. For this reason,
and because it was more than ever necessary to conceal his
disasters, he confined himself to reprimanding Saint-Cyr and
Mortier. Indeed, it was not only at Kulm that his troops
had sufiered defeat, but at every point of the long line which
they held.

' M. Thiers (xvi. 351), when discussing the shares which the marshal
and the Kmperor himself had in the responsibility for the disaster, says: * It
was natural that Marshal Mortier should await Napoleon's commands with-
out moving, and the definite order to support Vandamme only reached
him during the iJOth, by which time the catastrophe had already taken
place. It is, therefore, impossible to find any fault with him.* This
despatch, signed by Berthier, is in the possession of the Dnke of
Treviso.

CHAPTER XXXVII

It has been truly said that in the later campaigns of the
Empire the fighting was seldom well managed when Napoleon
did not direct it in person. It is to be regretted that the
great captain did not realise this, and put so much tnist in
his lieutenants, many of whom — though, as we had plenty of
evidence, they had no lack of self-confidence — were not up to
their work. Instead of ordering the commanders of the
detached corps to keep as much as possible on the defensive
until he could come up with strong reserves to crush the
opposing forces, the Emperor allowed them too much latitude ;
and as each of them wanted to have his own Austerlitz, they
often attacked when it was unwise, and got beaten through
their own fault. This was what happened to Marshal
Oudinot, to whom Napoleon had given a large army composed
of Bertrand's and Reynier's corps, with orders to watch the
combined Prussian and Swedish troops, who were near
Berlin under the command of Bernadette. Marshal Oudinot,
being weaker than his opponent, should have tried to gain
time, but the habit of going straight ahead, the sight of the
towers of Berlin, and the fear of not justifying Napoleon's
confidence urged him on. He sent Bertrand's corps straight
forward and was beaten, which did not stop Oudinot from
persisting in his aim of capturing Berlin, but he lost a great
battle at Gross-Beeren, and was compelled to retire with heavy
loss towards Wittenberg.

A few days later. Marshal Macdonald, whom Napoleon
had left on the Katzbach at the head of several corps,
thought that he would take advantage of the freedom which
the Emperor's absence gave him to try to win a battle, and
wipe out the memory of his defeat on the Trebbia in the

378 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Italian campaign of 1799 ; but he got beaten again. Per-
sonally brave though he was, he was always unlucky in war ;
not that he lacked ability, but because he was, like an
Austrian general, too limited and too exclusive in his strategy.
Before a battle he could chalk out a plan which was nearly
always good, but he should have modified it according to
circumstances, and this he was too slow-witted to do. He
acted like some chess players, who can play very well as long
as they are directing both sides, but are at a loss in a real
game when the adversary moves his pieces otherwise than
they had expected. Thus on August 26, the very day when
the Emperor was winning a brilliant victory before Dresden,
Macdonald lost the battle which the French call the Katz-
bach, and the Germans Jauer or Janowitz.

The French army, consisting of 75,000 men, including my
regiment, was posted betwen Liegnitz and Goldberg on the
left bank of the little stream of the Katzbach, separated by it
from several Prussian corps commanded by Field-Marshal
Blucher. The ground which we occupied was cut up with
wooded hillocks which, though practical for cavalry, rendered
its movements difficult and for that reason offered great
advantages to infantr}". Now as Macdonald's force consisted
chiefly of that arm, and he had only the 6,000 force of
Sébastiani's corps, while the enemy had 15,000 to 20,000 at
his disposal posted on the vast level plateau of Jauer, it
was obviously his duty to await the Prussians in his position.
It may be added that the left bank of the Katzbach is low,
while on the opposite side, in order to reach the plateau of
Jauer, a lofty and rocky hill has to be climbed by means of a
steep and stony road. The only bridges over the Katzbach
are in front of the villages, which are few, and the fords are
very narrow and become impracticable if the water rises in
the least. The stream covered the front of the French army,
than which nothing could have been more favourable to us,
but Marshal Macdonald, wishing to attack the Prussians,
abandoned the great advantages of his position and put the
Katzbach behind him, ordering his troops to cross at several
points. The cavalry corps, including Exelmans' division.

The Katzbach 379

of which my regiment formed part, had to cross the river at
the ford of Chemochowitz. The weather had been threaten-
ing in the morning, and this should have led the marshal to
put off his attack till another day, or at least induced him to
act promptly. Instead of this he lost precious moments in
giving detailed orders, so that his columns were not in
motion till two in the afternoon. Scarcely had the army
started when a fearful storm came on, swelling the Katzbach
and rendering the ford bo difficult that General Saint-
Germain's cuirassiers could not cross.

On reaching the opposite bank we had to climb a steep
hill through a narrow defile, where the rain had made the
ground so slippery that our horses were falling at every step.
We were therefore obliged to get down, only re-mounting
when we reached the plateau. There we found several
divisions of infantry which the generals had prudently posted
near the clumps of wood with which the plain is covered, for,
as I have already said, we knew that the enemy was far
superior to us in cavalry ; and this was all the greater disad-
vantage to us because, as has been explained, the rain
prevented the soldiers from firing. We were much
surprised to see no sign of the enemy. The complete silence
made me suspect some trap, since we knew for certain that
on the previous night Blucher had occupied the position with
more than 100,000 men. We ought, therefore, in my opinion,
to have reconnoitred the country well before committing
ourselves to it. General Sébastiani thought otherwise. As
soon as Roussel d'Urbal's division was formed he sent it
forward into the plain, not only with its own artillery, but
with that of Exelmans' division which we had had so much
trouble in getting on to the plateau. As soon as Exelmans
perceived that Sebastiani had carried off his guns he hastened
after that general to reclaim them, leaving his division with-
out any orders. The two brigades composing it were about
five hundred paces apart on the same front and drawn up in
columns of regiments. Mine formed the head of Wathiez'
brigade, having the 24th behind it and the 11th Hussars in
the rear.

380 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

The plateau of Jauer is so extensive that we could barely
see Eoussel d'UrbaFs division of seven regiments. A
thousand paces from the right flank of my column was one of
the numerous coppices with which the plain is studded. If
my regiment had been alone at that point, I should certainly
have searched the wood ; but as Exelmans, who was very
jealous of his own authority, had made it a rule that no man
of his division was to leave the ranks without orders, I had
not ventured to take that usual precaution, and for the same
reason the brigadier had also abstained from doing so. This
passive obedience went near to be fatal to us.

I was in front of my regiment — which, as I said, was
leading the columns — when suddenly I heard loud shouts
behind me. A large body of Prussian lancers had issued
unexpectedly from the wood, and hurled themselves on the
2ith Chasseurs and the lancers, taking them in flank, and
throwing them into great disorder. Being directed obliquely,
their charge reached the rear of our column first, then the
centre, and now was threatening the head. My regiment
was therefore about to be attacked on the right flank. The
enemy was advancing quickly, and the position was critical ;
but fully confident in the courage and intelligence of all my
men, I gave the order to charge first to the right at full
gallop. The manœuvre was a risky one in presence of the
enemy, but it was executed so quickly and in such good
order that in an instant the regiment was fronting towards
the Prussians. These from their oblique movement now
presented their flank to us, and our squadron took advantage
of this to penetrate the enemy's ranks, doing great exe-
cution.

On seeing the success of my regiment, the 24th, re-
covering from its surprise, rallied and repulsed the part of
the enemy's line opposed to it. As for the 11th, however —
the Dutchmen whom the Emperor had thought to make
Frenchmen by a stroke of the pen — their colonel could not
bring them to charge. However, we could do without them,
for the 23rd and 2'lth were enough to rout three Prussian
regiments.

A Hopeful Beginning 381

While our chasseurs were in hot pursuit, an old colonel
on the other side, who had been unhorsed, came near to me
for safety, siuce, even in the heat of the fight, no one dared
to strike him while he was under my protection. On foot,
and over a soil washed to mud, he followed the rapid move-
ments of my horse for a quarter of an hour, with one hand
on my knee, saying : * You are my guardian angel.' I was
really sorry for the old man, for he was dropping from fatigue
and yet would not leave me, till presently, seeing one of my men
leading a captured horse, I made him lend it to the Prussian
colonel, whom I sent to the rear with a sergeant. You will
see that he lost no time in showing his gratitude.

Meanwhile, the plateau of Jauer and the banks of the
Katzbach had suddenly become the scene of a bloody battle,
for Prussian troops were emerging from every coppice and
the plain was soon covered with them. I could not check
my regiment, and we presently found ourselves in front of a
brigade of the enemy's infantry, who, owing to the effects of
the rain on their muskets, were unable to fire a shot at us.
I tried to break the square, but our horses could only advance
at a walk, and every one knows that without a dash it is
impossible for cavalry to break a well-commanded and well-
closed-up battalion which boldly presents a hedge of bayonete.
In vain did we approach so close to the enemy that we could
talk to them and strike their muskets with our sword-blades ;
we could not break their lines, as we could easily have done
if General Sébastiani had not sent the artillery to another
point. The position on both sides was truly ridiculous ; we
looked each other in the eyes, unable to do any damage, our
swords being too short to reach the enemy, and their muskets
refusing to go off. Things went on like this for some time till
General Maurin sent the 6th Lancers to our aid. Their long
weapons, outreaching the enemy's bayonets, soon slew many
of the Prussians, enabling the chasseurs to penetrate into the
square, where they did terrible execution. In this fight the
sonorous voice of Colonel Perquit could be heard, shouting,
in a rich Alsatian accent, ' Bointez, landers j hointez.*

In this part of the field, then, the fight was going in our

382 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

favour ; but things were altered by the arrival of 20,000
Prussian cavalry, who, having crushed Roussel d'tlrbal's
division, sent unsupported more than a league ahead, attacked
us with overpowering forces. Their approach was notified to
us by the return of General Exelmaiis, who, as I said, had
left his division and gone off almost alone to get back from
Sebastiani his guns, which that general had unwisely attached
to Roussel d'TIrbal's division. He had not found Sebastiani,
but had reached the first division in time to see his guns
captured, together with d'UrbaVs own, and to find himself
caught in tlie rout of his colleague's squadrons. We felt a
presentiment of disaster on seeing our general hurry up with
changed countenance, and having lost his hat and even his
belt. In haste we halted our soldiers, who were engaged
in sabring the enemy's infantry ; but before we could re-form
th(^m we were enveloped by the Prussian squadron, who
pursued the remains of d'Urbal's division right into our
ranks.

In an instant the 5,000 or 6,000 combatants of Sébas-
tiani's corps were overwhelmed by 20,000 troopers, nearly all
uhlans, and therefore armed with the lance, a weapon which
only a few squadrons of ours carried. Tlie groups which we
formed were thus, in spite of all our efforts, constantly
broken up, and tlie enemy pushed us steadily back to the end
of th(î plain, where the steep descent to the Katzbach
begins.

At this point we were received by two divisions of French
infantry, in rear of which we hoped to rally ; but our men's
muskets were also too wet to be fired. Their only means of
defence was a battery of six pieces, with which and their
bayonets they checked the enemy for a moment ; but the
Prussian generals brought up twenty pieces, the French guns
were dismounted in an instant, and their battalions broken.
Then, with one general Itiirrah^ the enemy's troopers Imrled
us down in disorder to the Katzbach. The stream, which we
had crossed in the morning with diflSculty, had been trans-
formed by the deluge of rain wliicli had fallen all day long
into a raging torrent. The water had overflowed, covering

The Rout 383

almost entirely the parapet of the Chemochowitz bridge, and
preventing us from ascertaining if the ford were still passable.
People made, however, for the points where they had crossed
in the morning ; the ford was impracticable for men on foot,
and many were drowned, but the greater number escaped by
the bridge.

I got my regiment as much as possible together, Tnft]n>g
them march in close column of half-sections, so as to gire
mutual support. They entered the water, and reached the
other side with the loss of two men only. All the other
cavalry regiments took the same line, comprehending, even in
the confusion of the retreat, that the bridges must be left for
the infantry. I must admit that the descent of the hill was
one of the most critical moments of my life. The steep
ground slipped under our horses' feet, and at every step they
stumbled over fragments of rock. The enemy's artillery,
belching grape upon us, completed the horror of our situation.
Still I got off with no accident, thanks to the pluck and
cleverness of my Turkish horse. He went along the preci-
pice like a cat on a roof, and saved my life, not for the
only time. I shall have more to say about this excellent
beast.

After crossing the Katzbach our troops expected to be
safe from the enemy ; but the Prussians had sent a strong
column across the river by a bridge above that of Chemo-
chowitz, so that when we reached the bank which wç had left
in the morning we were astonished to find ourselves attacked
by numerous squadrons of uhlans. Yet several regiments —
mine was mentioned by Marshal Macdonald in his despatch —
went at the enemy without hesitation. I do not know, how-
ever, what would have happened if General Saint-Germain's
division, which had been left behind in the morning and
consequently was quite fi'esh, had not been on the spot to
come to our succour. This division, consisting of two regi-
ments of carabiniers, a brigade of cuirassiers, and six guns,
attacked the enemy furiously, and drove the troops who had
come to cut off our retreat into the river. Then, as nothing
is so terrible as beaten troops who resume the offensive, the

384 The Memoirs op the Baron de Mar bot

troopers of Exelmans' and Roussel d'Urbal's divisions annihi-
lated all whom they could get at.

This counter-attack was of great service to ns, for it
checked the enemy, who, on that day, did not venture to
pursue us beyond the Katzbach. But the disaster to the
French army was immense, for, having crossed the sf i-eam by
all the fords and bridges between Liegnitz and Goldberg —
that is to say, over a distance of more than five leagues — now
that those passages were all rendered useless by the flood the
French army found itself extended on a long front, with the
Prussians in its rear and an almost impassable stream in its
front. ITie scenes which I had witnessed on the plateau of
Jauer and at the bridge of Chemochowitz were reproduced at
all points of the battle-field. Everywhere the rain paralysed our
infantry fire and favoured the Prussian cavalry, outnumbering
us fourfold. Everywhere was our retreat rendered verv
dangerous by the difficulty of crossing the swollen Katzbach.
Most of those who tried to swim the river were drowned
General Sibuet among the number, and we saved only a few
guns.

After this disastrous afiair. Marshal Macdonald tried to
rally his troops on the towns of Bunzlau, Lauban, and Gôrlitz.
A pitch-dark night, roads cut up, rain always falling in
torrents, rendered our march slow and toilsome ; many men
fell out or went astray.

At the battle of the Katzbach, Napoleon's army lost
13,000 men killed or drowned, 20,000 prisoners, and 50
guns. Marshal Macdonald, whose miscalculation fix)m a
strategic point of view had brought about this irreparable
disaster, though he had lost the confidence of the army, was
able to preserve its esteem by the honest and straightforward
way in which he admitted his mistake. On the following»
day he called a meeting of all the generals and colonels, and
after inviting us all to help to maintain order, said that eveiy
man and officer had done his duty, that the loss of the battle
was due to one man only, and that was himself, because when
it came on to rain he ought not to have left broken ground
to go and attack in an open plain an enemy out-numbering^

An ENRXfv's Gratitude 385

him immensely in cavalry, nor should he have placed a river
behind him in stormy weather. This noble confession dis-
armed criticism, and each man did his utmost to contribute
to the safety of the army during its retreat to the Elbe.

Fate seemed determined to overwhelm us, for a few days
after Oudinot had lost the battle of Gross-Beeren, Macdonald
that of Katzbach, and Vandanune that of Kulm ; the French
experienced a serious reverse. Marshal Ney, who had suc-
ceeded Oudinot in command of the army which was to march
on Berlin, was beaten at Jutterbach by the deserter Berna-
dette, and compelled to abandon the right bank of the Elbe.
The Emperor returned to Dresden, and the various corps
under Macdonald took up a position not far from that town,
while Marshal Ney, after driving back the Swedes to the
right bank, assembled his troops on the left, at Dessau and
Wittenberg. The French army remained almost motionless
for about a fortnight in September and the beginning of
October. My regiment bivouacked near Weissig on the
heights of Pilnitz, these being occupied by one of our divisions
of infantry. There was no oflScial armistice, but both sides
were tired and hostilities were Ae fdcto suspended, each
side benefiting by this to prepare for new and more terrible
combats.

At Pilnitz I received a letter from the colonel of Prussian
cavalry to whom I had lent a horse when taken prisoner by
my troopers at the beginning of the battle of Katzbach. He
had been set free by his own side when the tide of fortune
turned, but was none the less grateftil for what I had done
for him. In order to prove it he sent me ten troopers and a
lieutenant of my regiment, who had been wounded and taken
prisoners. Herr von Blankensee, for that was his name, had
had their wounds dressed, and, after taking every care of
them for a fortnight, had obtained leave to have them
escorted to the French outposts, and forwarded them to me
with many thanks, assuring me that he owed me his life. I
])elieve he was right, but I felt none the less this expression
of gratitude from one of the enemy's commanding officers.

While we were encamped at Pilnitz, a curious thing took

VOL. II. C C

386 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

place in the sight of the whole division. A corporal of the
4th Chasseurs had in a dmnken moment insulted his lieu-
tenant, and a lancer of the 6th, being savagely bitten by his
horse and unable to make it let go, had struck it in the
belly with a pair of shears, thereby killing it. Both men
certainly deserved punishment, but only as a disciplinary
measure. General Exelmans by his own authority condemned
them to death, and having made the division mount to be
present at the execution, he drew them up on three sides of
a large hollow square, two pits being dug on the fourth side,
and the criminals placed in front of them. I had been riding
about all night, and returned to camp at that moment. On
seeing the melancholy preparations I had made sure that the
oflTenders had been duly tried. I soon found out that it was
not so : and on going up to a group formed by General
Exelmans, the two brigadiers, and all the colonels, I heard
M. Devance, of the 4th Chasseurs, and M. Perquit, of the
6th Lancers, entreating the general to pardon the two
offenders. Exelmans reftised ; walking up and down in front
of the troops while they were begging for clemency. I have
never been able to refrain from expressing my indignation at
the sight of an act which seems to me unjust. I may have
been wrong, but addressing Colonels Devance and Perquit, I
told them that they were lowering their dignity by permitting
men of their regiments to be marched through the camp as
criminals without having been tried. I added, * The Emperor
has granted power of life and death to no one, and has
reserved that of pardoning to himself.' On seeing the effect
produced by my outbreak, General Exelmans was moved,
and called out that he forgave the chasseur, but that the
lancer would be shot. That is to say, he pardoned the
soldier who had insulted his lieutenant and meant to execute
the man who had killed a horse.

To put the poor fellow to death, two sergeants were
called for from each regiment ; but as sergeants have no
carbines, they had to take those belonging to some of the
men. When the order reached me I made no answer to my
adjutant, so no man of the 23rd presented himself to take

A Piece of Buffoonery 387

part in the execution. General ExfilmanR perceived it and
said nothing. A report rang out, and all the spectators
groaned with indignation. Exelmans ordered that, according
to custom, the troops should file past the corpse ; the march
began. My regiment was second in the column, and I was
just debating whether I ought to make it pass the body of
the unhappy victim of Exelmans' severity when shouts of
laughter were heard proceeding firom the 24th Chasseurs,
who had already reached the place of execution. I sent a
staif-sergeant to find out the cause of this indecent mirth in
presence of a corpse, and I soon learnt that the dead man
was doing very well. In fact all that had taken place was
merely a farce invented to firighten any soldiers who might
be tempted to fail in their disciplinera fiurce which consisted
in shooting a man with blank cartridges. In order that the
secret of this sham execution should be better kept, our chief
had entrusted the duty to sei^;eants and had had cartridges
containing only powder served out to them ; but as in order to
complete the illusion it was necessary that the troops should
see the corpse, Exelmans had told the lancer to fall fiice
forwards as soon as they fired, to sham dead, and to leave the
army the next night in peasant's clothes, and with a little
money given to him on purpose. But the soldier, a crafly
Gascon, knew quite well that Exelmans was exceeding his
powers, and had no more right to shoot him without trial than
to send him away without leave. 80 he remained standing
after the discharge, and refused to go away unless he was
given a passport, and guaranteed against arrest by the gen-
darmes. On learning that it was this discussion between the
general and the supposed dead man which had excited tl^e
merriment of the 24th, I did not choose that my regiment
should take part in this comedy, which in my view was far
more contrary to discipline than were the faults which it was
intended to check. So I made my squadrons wheel, and
trotting off, I brought them away firom this unpleasant scene
back to their camp, where I made them dismount. All the
generals and colonels having followed this example, Exelmans
remained alone with the dead man, who calmly took his way

c c 2

388 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

back to his bivouac, where he at once set to work to eat his
soup with his comrades amid renewed peals of laughter.

Daring our stay at Pilnitz, the enemy was receiving strong
reinforcements, notably 60,000 Russians under Benningsen.
These came firom beyond Moscow, and included many Tartars
and Bashkirs, armed only with bows and arrows. I have
never understood with what object the Russian Government
brought up from so great a distance these masses of irregular
cavalry, who could be of no use against troops armed in the
modem fashion, and only made food more scarce for the
regular troops. Our soldiers were in no way impressed by
the sight of these half-savage Asiatics, whom, from their
bows and arrows, they nicknamed ' the Cupids.' The new-
comers, however, who had never seen Frenchmen, encouraged
by officers nearly as ignorant as themselves, expected to see
us fly at their approach. The very day after their arrival
they assailed our troops in countless bands, but were received
with musketry-fire, and left many of their number dead on
the ground. Their losses seemed only to excite them further ;
and as any ground suited them they began wheeling round
us like swarms of wasps, and it was hard to catch them.
When our troopers did get at them, the execution was con-
siderable. Still, as the Russians took advantage of the
disorder into which they threw our line to support them by
detachments of hussars, the Emperor ordered the generals
to keep a redoubled watch and to visit the outposts fre-
quently.

Meanwhile, both sides were preparing to resume the
hostilities which, as I have said, had been unofficially sus-
pended. One morning, when our camp was perfectly quiet,
just as I was in my shirtsleeves, preparing to shave myself
before a little mirror hung to a tree, I felt a tap on the
shoulder. Looking round sharply to see who in my regiment
had taken this liberty with his colonel, I beheld the Emperor.
He had wished to examine the neighbouring position without
alarming the enemy, and had gone the rounds with a single
aide-de-camp, followed by some squadrons selected from all
the regiments in the division. By his order, I took command

The Bashkirs 389

of this escort, and went about all day with him ; nor had I
any fault to find with him in the matter of kindness to me.
As we were about to return to Pilnitz, we perceived some
thousand Bashkirs galloping towards us at jthe ftill speed of
their little Tartar horses. The Emperor had not seen them
till now, and reined up on a rising ground, asking me to try
and capture some. To this end, I placed two of my squadrons
in ambush behind a clump of trees, bidding the rest march
on. This trick would not have taken in Cossacks, but with
the less experienced Bashkirs it answered perfectly. They
passed close to the wood, and were pursuing the column when
our squadrons dashed out, killing a good many, and capturing
some thirty of them. I had them brought to the Emperor,
who exhibited much surprise at seeing these wretched horse-
men sent with only bows and arrows to fight European
troops. These Tartars had Chinese faces, and wore strange
dresses. When we got back to camp my men amused them-
selves by giving the Bashkirs wine. Charmed with this un-
wonted reception, they all got drunk, and expressed their satis-
faction by such wonderful giimaces and capers that Homeric
laughter, in which Napoleon shared, overcame all beholders.

On September 28 the Emperor reviewed our corps, and
gave me proofs of exceptional favour; for, contrary to his
usual practice of giving only one reward at a time, he made
me officer of the Legion of Honour and Baron, and granted
me a gratuity. Further, he heaped honours on my regiment,
saying that it was the only one in Sébastiani's corps which
had maintained good order at the Katzbach, had captured
guns, and beaten the Prussians wherever it met them. The
regiment owed this distinction to Marshal Macdonald's eulogy
of it ; at the time of the rout at the Katzbach he had taken
refuge in its ranks, and shared in the firm charge by which
it had driven the enemy back across [the river. After the
review, as the troops were on their way back to camp. General
l^]xelmans passed along the front of my regiment, loudly com-
plimenting it on the justice which the Emperor had done to its
valour, and eulogising the merits of its colonel in a way which
I can ouly call exaggerated.

390 Tuf Memoiks of the Bakou de ATakiiot

ïteonwhile. tlie Fiviich army waa concentrating in th»
Dfif^libiiiirlioHl of l^ip/jg. The enemy was also marching
'III that tuwn in .1 vast circle which contracted «lay by day;
with the evident object of shiittin;; up the Freoeh troo|«,
!i»d wholly cutting off tlieir i-etreat.

CHAITER XXXVIII

On October lia brisk cavalry engagement took place
l)t»t\veeu our advance-guard and that of the KuBsianB and
Aiistrians, without decisive result; ending in that most
ai)surd of warlike operations, a cannonade going on till
îii gilt fall, with no effect beyond the destruction of a good
liuuiy men. Karly next morning the Emperor reached
L»*ipzig, leaving 25,000 men at Dresden under Saint-Oyr.

The exact facts about the battle of Leipzig will never be
known. The fighting, which lasted several days, took place
t»ii a vast and complicated field, and the immense number of
Î roops which took part in it l>elonged to different nations. It
i-i on the French 4jide that documenta are chiefly lacking; so
many commanders of army corps and divisions, as well as
sUiff'-oflicers, fell in the l>attle or were taken prisoners that
t heir reports were never completed, and those which came to
hand showed the hurry and disorder amid which they had
1 .tH-n dniwn up. In my own case, ))eing colonel of a regiment,
:tii(i com(>elle<l to follow all the movements of my division, I
could not kn<»w what others were doing, as in the days when
1 wîis an aide-iliMjamp, and by carrying orders to different
parts of tlu» field was enabled to know something of the
Lr»'n«*nil plan of o|)enitions. 1 must therefore more than ever
aliridu'f my >tory, and confine myself to what is absolutely
lu-cr^Hary in order to give a notion of the most im|)ortant
v»*nts in a battle wliich so |)owerfully influenced the destinies
-.t' Napoleon, France, and all Kui*ope.

'I'll»* ring of steel in which the enemy was preparing to
t Tiil<>^« the Fn*nch army was not yet completed round
Lt'ip/Jir. wh<*n th<* King of Wurtemberg thought it his duty
to warn Na(K>le<»n that all Germany was, at the instigation of

392 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

the English, about to rise against him ; and that as the
troops of the Confederation would shortly desert him he
would not have more than time to retire behind the Main.
He added that he himself would be unable to avoid following
their example, for he must at length yield to the pressure of
his subjects and follow the torrent of public feeling in
Germany.

Strongly affected by the advice of the ablest and most
loyal of his allies, the Emperor had, it is said, the idea of
retreating towards the hilly district of Thttringen and Hesse,
and, covered by the Saale, allowing the Coalition to attack
him in a diflBcult country. Had this plan been carried out,
it might have saved Napoleon ; but for that prompt action
was needed before the enemy's armies were whoUy joined
and near enough to attack us on the retreat. The Emperor,
however, could not make up his mind to abandon any part
of his conquests, nor yet to let it be believed that he con-
sidered himself beaten. The great captain's excess of courage
was our ruin: he overlooked the fact that his army,
weakened by its heavy losses, numbered among its ranks
many strangers who were only waiting the opportunity to
betray him, and that in the broad plains of Leipzig he ran
every chance of being overwhelmed by numbers. If, on the
other hand, he had assumed a defensive position in the
mountains, the approach of winter and the need of feeding
their numerous forces would soon have compelled the enemy
to break up, while the French army, protected in front and
on the flanks by the natural difficulties of the country, would
have had the fertile valleys of the Ehine and Neckar in its
rear. At the very least, we should have gained time, and
perhaps wearied out the allies till they desired peace. But
Napoleon's confidence in himself and in his troops prevailed,
and he decided to accept battle in the plains of Leipzig.

Hardly had this fatal decision been taken when a second
letter came from the King of Wurtemberg, with the news
that the King of Bavaria had come to terms with the
Coalition, and that the united Austrian and Bavarian armies,
under General von Wrede, were marching on the Rhine.

The Field of Leipzig 393

With much regret Wurtemberg had been compelled by the
strength of this army to unite here with it ; and the Emperor
might therefore expect that before long 100,000 men would
be investing Mainz and threatening the French frontier.

This unforeseen news led Napoleon to think that he had
better return to his plan of retiring behind the Saale ; but
it was too late. The main force of the allies was by this
time in presence of the French army, and too near for retreat
to be possible without being attacked during the operation.
He therefore determined to fight, though his whole force,
French and allied, amounted only to 157,000 men, including
29,000 cavalry, while Schwarzenberg could dispose of
350,000 Russians, Austrians, Prussians, and Swedes, his
cavalry being 54,000.

The town of Leipzig, one of the busiest and wealthiest in
Germany, stands near the middle of the vast plain whicb
extends from the Elbe to the Harz Mountains. The situa-
tion of this district has made it the principal theatre of war
in Germany. The small stream of the Elster, almost insig-
nificant enough to be called a brook, flows from south to
north through a shallow valley amid marshy meadows.
Being divided into many branches, it offers a serious obstacle
to the operations of war, and requires a great many bridges
for communication among the villages. The Pleisse, a still
smaller stream than the Elster, flows about a league and a
half from it, and joins it under the walls of Leipzig, while
north of the town the Partha flows into it. Being thus at the
confluence of these three streams, and almost surrounded on the
north and west by their many arms, Leipzig is the key of the
position. The town, which at that time was not very extensive,
was surrounded by an old wall having four large and three
small gates. The road to Lutzen, by Lindenau, formed the
only communication open to the rear of the French army.
It was on that part of the ground between the Pleisse and
the Partha that the hardest fighting took place. A noticeable
point is the Kolmberg, known as the Swedish redoubt,
because in the ITiirty Years' War Gustavus Adolphus had
raised fortifications at that point.

394 2r«^ Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

The battle of Leipzig began on October 16, 1813, and
lasted three days. Without going into the details of this
memorable action, I think I ought to specify the principal
positions occupied by the French army, which will also give
a general idea of those of the enemy. Murat commanded
our right wing, the extremity of which rested on the Pleisse,
near the villages of Connewitz, D5litz, and Mark-Kleeberg,
which were occupied by Prince Poniatowsky and his Poles.
Next to these, behind the village of Wachau, was Marshal
Victor ; Augereau's troops occupied Dosen. These corps of
infantry were supported by cavalry under Kellermann and
Michaud. The centre, under the immediate command of the
Emperor, was at Liebertvolkwitz. It consisted of Lauriston's
and Macdonald 8 corps of infantry with the cavalry of Latour-
Maubourg and Sébastiani ; my regiment, forming part of the
latter general's corps, was posted facing the Kolmberg. The
left wing, under Marshal Ney, was formed of Marmont's,
Reynier's, and Souham's corps, supported by the Duke of
Padua's cavalry. It occupied Taucha, Plaussig, and the
banks of the Partha. A corps of observation, 15,000 strong,
under General Bertrand, was sent to the further side of
Leipzig to hold Lindenau and the road to Lutzen. At
Probstheida, in rear of the centre, was the reserve, under
Oudinot, consisting of the Old and Young Guard, and Naii-
souty's cavalry. The King of Saxony remained in the town
of Leipzig with his own guard and a few French regiments.

During the night of the 15th, Marshal Macdonald had
made a movement to concentrate on Liebertvolkwitz, but
as it was not wished to let the Kolmberg fall into the enemy's
hands before morning I was ordered to watch it till day-
break. It was a ticklish duty, since it involved advancing
with my regiment to the foot of the hill while the army
retired half a league in the opposite direction. I ran the
risk of being surrounded and carried oflF with my whole
regiment by the enemy's advance-guard. Their scouts
could not fail to ascend the hill as soon as the first light of
dawn should permit them to see what was going on in the
plain. It was splendid weather, and one could see very well

Incident op the Kolmberg 395

by the starlight ; bat, as in such a case one can much more
easily perceive from below men coming on to high ground
than those above can see those below, I brought my
s({uadrons as near as possible to the hill, and, after ordering
perfect silence and stillness, awaited events. Chance very
nearly produced one which would have been very fortunate
for France and for the Emperor, and would have made me for
ever famous. It happened thus.

Half an hour before the first light of dawn, three horse-
men, coming from the enemy's side, slowly ascended the
Kolmberg. They could not see us, while we plainly made
out their outlines and heard their conversation. They were
talking French ; one was a Russian, the otJier two Prussians.
The first, who appeared to be in authority, told one of the
others to let their majesties know that tJiere were no French
at that point, and that they could come up, for in a few
minutes all the plain would be visible, but that they must
make the most of the time lest the French should send
skirmishers in that direction. The officer to whom these
words were addressed remarked that the escorts were still
some way oS. * What matter ? ' was the answer, ' since there
is no one but us here.' At this my troops and I redoubled
our attention, and soon perceived on the top of the hill a
score of officers, one of whom dismounted.

Although I certainly had had no expectation of capturing
a great prize, I had warned my officers that if we saw any of
the enemy on the Swedish redoubt, two squadrons should, at
a signal which I would give with my handkerchief, work
round the hill to right and left, so as to cut off anyone who
should have ventured so near to our army. I was, therefore,
very hopeful, but just then the over-eagerness of one of my
troopers wrecked my plan. The man, having accidentally let
his sword drop, instantly took his carbine, and, fearing to be
left behind when I gave the signal for attack, fired into the
group and killed a Prussian major. As you may suppose,
in the twinkling of an eye all the enemy's officers, having
no escort but a few orderlies, and seeing themselves on
the point of being surrounded by us, galloped away. Our

396 The Memoirs of the Baron db Marbot

people could not follow them far for fear of themselves falling
into the hands of the escort, whom we could hear coming up.
My men, however, captured two officers, from whom we
could get no information, but afterwards I learnt from
my friend. Baron von Stoch, that the Emperor Alex-
ander of Russia and the King of Prussia were among the
officers who had so nearly fidlen into the hands of the French
near the Swedish redoubt. If this had happened the
destinies of Europe would have been changed. As, however,
luck had decided otherwise, there was nothing left for me
but to withdraw quickly towards the French army.

On October 16, at eight in the morning, the allied
batteries gave the signal for attack. A brisk cannonade
opened along all the line, and the allied army marched on us
at all points. The action began on our right, where the
Poles were driven back by the Prussians and abandoned the
village of Mark-Kleeberg. On our centre, the Russians and
Austrians six times attacked Wachau and Liebertvolkwitz,
and each time were beaten with heavy loss. The Emperor,
doubtless regretting the abandonment of the Swedish redoubt,
whence the enemy was pouring a hail of grape upon us, gave
orders to recapture the hill, which was promptly eflFected by
the 22nd light infantry supported by my regiment.

After this success, the Emperor, being unable to produce
any impression on the enemy's wing owing to the great
extent of their front, resolved merely to keep them employed
while he endeavoured to pierce their centre. To this end he
sent Mortier with two divisions of infantry, and Oudinot
with the Young Guard, towards Wachau, Drouot supporting
the attack, which to some extent succeeded, with sixty guns.

On his side, Marshal Victor routed the Russian corps
under Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg ; but the latter rallied
his troops at Jossa. At the same moment Lauriston and
Macdonald debouched from Liebertvolkwitz, the enemy was
put to flight, and the French took possession of the wood of
Gross Possna.^ In vain did the Austrian cavalry under
Klenau, supported by a * pulk ' of Cossacks, endeavour to

» CaUed the » University Wood.*

First Day's Battle 397

restore the fight; it was charged and thrown into disorder
by Sebastiani's corps, after desperate fighting, in which my
regiment took part. I lost some men, and my senior major,
M. Pozac, was wounded by a lance in the breast, in conse-
quence of having omitted to adopt the customary protection
of his rolled-up cloak.

Meanwhile, Prince Schwarzenberg, seeing his line badly
shaken, brought up his reserves, upon which the Emperor
determined to order a grand cavalry charge. Kellermann,
Latour-Maubourg, and the dragoons of the guard took part
in this, and the first overthrew a division of Russian cuirassiers,
but, being taken in flank by another division, he had to retire
to the high ground near Wachau, after capturing several
stand of colours. Then Murat brought up the French infantry,
and fresh fighting took place. The Prince of Wurtemberg's
corps was broken again, and lost 26 guns. After this rough
handling, the enemy's centre began to bend, and was on the
point of being pierced, but the Emperor of Russia quickly
brought up the cavalry of his guard, and they, catching
Latour-Maubourg's squadrons in the disorder which always
results from a charge pushed home, drove them back in theii*
turn, and recaptured twenty-four of the guns. In this
charge. General Latour-Maubourg had his leg shot off.

As neither side had so far gained any marked advantages.
Napoleon, by way of a decisive stroke, launched on the
enemy's centre his reserve, composed of all the Old Guard and
a coi-ps of fresh troops from Leipzig. But at that moment a
regiment of the enemy's cavalry, which had made its way by
design or accident to the rear of the French, caused some
uneasiness among our troops. They halted and formed square
to avoid a surprise, and before the cause of the alarm could
be discovered night came on, and suspended operations at that
point.

On our extreme right. General Merfeldt had during the
whole day been vainly trying to get possession of the passage
over the Pleisse, which Poniatowski's Poles defended.
'J'owards evening, however, he succeeded in making himself
master of the village of Dolitz, thus putting our right wing

398 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

in danger. But the chasseurs of the Old Guard, under General
Curial, came up at the double, hurled the Austrians back
over the river, taking several hundred prisoners. General
Merfeldt himself falling, for the third time in his life, into
the hands of the French. Although the Poles had allowed
Dôlitz to be taken from them, the Emperor thought it well,
in order to inspirit them, to give a marshal's baton to their
chief, Prince Poniatowski : he did not long enjoy the honour
of bearing it.

On the other side of the Elster the Austrian general,
Gyulai, had carried the village of Lindenau after seven hours'
hard fighting. On hearing of this serious event, which en-
dangered the retreat of the greater part of his troops, the
Emperor ordered Gteneral Bertrand to attack Lindenau, and
the position was recaptured with the bayonet.

On our left Ney's impatience nearly brought about a great
disaster. That marshal, who was conmianding the left wing
posted according to the Emperor's orders, finding that by
ten o'clock no troops were to be seen in front of him, of his
own accord sent one of his army corps under General Souham
to Wachau, where the fighting appeared to be hot. But
during this ill-judged movement Marshal Blncher, who had
been delayed, came up with the Anny of Silesia, and captured
the village of Môckem. Thereupon Ney was obliged, owing
to the reduction of his force, to retire towards evening
within the walls of Leipzig, and to confine himself to
defending the suburb of Halle. In this engagement the
French lost heavily, and a bad effect was produced on those
of our men who in other parts of the field could hear the
firing in their rear. Towards eight in the evening all firing
ceased on both sides and the night was quiet.

This first day left victory undecided, but still it was in
favour of the French, since, with forces far inferior, they had
not only made headway against the Coalition, but had driven
them from some of the positions which they had occupied the
day before. On both sides preparations were made to renew
the combat next morning, but, contrary to expectation, the
1 7th passed without any hostile movement taking place. The

Brea thing- time 399

allies were awaiting the arrival of the Bnssian army &om
Poland, and also tiie troops which Bemadotte, the Crown
Prince of Sweden, was bringing up. Napoleon, on his side,
regretted that he had rejected the proposals for peace made
two months ago, but hoped for some result from a pacific
message which he had sent the night before to the allied
sovereigns by his prisoner, the Austrian general, Count
Merfeldt. The sequence of events is sometimes very
strange ; this Count Merfeldt was the same man who, six-
teen years before, had come to General Bonaparte, then
commanding the Army of Italy, to sue for the famous armis-
tice of Leoben. It was he who had brought back to Vienna
the treaty of peace concluded between the Austrian Govern-
ment and the Directory, represented by General Bonaparte.
It was he who, during the night after the battle of Austerlitz,
had carried from the Emperor of Austria to the Emperor of
the French proposals for an armistice ; and now that General
Merfeldt's destiny brought him once more to Napoleon at the
moment when Napoleon needed an armistice and a peace,
there seemed an encouraging hope that the same emissary
would again bring about the desired result. But things had
advanced too far for the allied sovereigns to treat with
Napoleon ; the mere fact of his proposing it showed that he
was in difficulties. Thus, although they had not been able
to beat us on the 16th, they had still a hope of overwhelming
us by a renewed effort with greater forces. They reckoned
also on the defection of the German troops which were still
among us, whose chiefii^ all members of the Tugendbund,
took advantage of the quasi-armistice of the 17th to agree
upon the manner in which they should carry out their notable
treachery. No reply was ever given to the message brought
by Count Merfeldt.

Early on the 18th the army of the Coalition opened
the attack. The 2nd cavalry corps, to which my regiment
])elonged, was posted as before between Liebertvolkwitz and
the Kolmberg. The fighting was hottest towards our centre,
where the village of Probstheida was attacked simultaneously
by a Russian and a Prussian force. Both were repulsed wiA

400 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

heavy loss. But the combat went on at all points, and the
Russians attacked Holzhansen, which Macdonald saooess*
fally defended. Towards eleven o'clock firing was heard
beyond Leipzig, in the direction of Lindenan ; and we heard
that oar troops had at that point broken the circle in which
the enemy flattered himself that he had shat np the French
army, and that General Bertrand was making his way in tiie
direction of the Rhine. The Emperor then gave orders that
the baggage should be withdrawn towards Lutzen.

Meantime the plain was the scene of a fierce engage*
ment about Connewitz and Lossnig ; and the earth shook with
the thunder of a thousand guns. The enemy tried to force
the passage of the Pleisse, but were repulsed, though the
Poles spoilt some of our finest cavalry charges. Then the 1st
cavalry coi*ps, seeing the Austrian and Prussian squadrons
coming up to the aid of their allies, issued from behind
Probstheida, broke the enemy and drove them back on their
reserves, which were commanded by the Grand Duke Con-
stantine. The allies at once brought up immense forces and
tried to carry Probstheida, but the formidable masses were
80 well received by our infantry that they promptly recoiled.
Ât this point we lost Generals Vial and Rochambeau ; the
latter had just been created marshal by the Emperor.

Up to this time Bernadotte had not fought against the
French, and was said to be wavering. But at length, under
the exhortations and even threats of Marshal Blucher, he
decided to cross the Partha above the village of Mockau with
his Swedes and one Russian corps.* A brigade of Saxon
hussars and lancers was posted at this point, and, on seeing
Bernadotte's leading Cossacks approach, made as though to
charge them ; but they suddenly wheeled round, and for-
getting the risk to which they were exposing their King, who
was still in the midst of Napoleon's army, these scoundrelly
Saxons turned their muskets and cannons against the French.

' The Count of Rochechouart gives a most picturesque description of
his mission to Bernadotte, who, in the month of September, was still hesi-
tating tcj [lass the Elbe ; and similarly describes his meeting on the battle-
field of Leipzig with the Crown Prince of Sweden, ' superb in the thickest
of the fire, with dead and wounded all round him.'

Desertion op the Saxons 401

The head of Bemadotte's army marched along the left
1)ank of the Partha towards Sellershansen, which Beynier was
defending. That general, whose troops were almost entirely
drawn from the German contingents, after witnessing the
desertion of the Saxon cavalry had lost confidence in the
infantry of the same nation and placed Dnrutte's cavalry
near them to keep them in hand. But Ney, with over-confi-
dence, bade him deploy the Saxons, and send them in support
of a French regiment which was holding the village of
Pannsdorf. Hardly, however, had the Saxons got away from
the French troops, when, seeing the Prassian standards near
Paunsdorf, they made off at fnll speed in that direction, led
by General Rnssel, their nnworthy chief. Some French
officers, nnable to imagine such treachery, thought that the
Saxons were going to attack the Prussians, so that General
Gressot, Reynier's chief-of-staff, actually liunied off to check
what he took for over-eagerness ; but he found that he had
none but enemies before him. This desertion of an entire
army corps not only produced an alarming gap in the French
line, but rekindled the ardour of the allied forces, and the
Wurtemberg cavalry instantly followed the example of the
Saxons. Bernadette welcomed the traitors into his rankfs,
calling upon their artillery to assist his ; and even b^;ged
the English commissioner to lend him the battery of Congreve
rockets which he had brought. These the former marshal of
France directed upon the French.

No sooner was the Saxon corps in the ranks of the enemy
than it notified its treachery by a volley from all its guns —
the commander exclaiming that he had burnt half his ammu-
nition for the French, and would now fire the rest at them !
Therewith he launched a hail of projectiles at us, of which
my regiment received a large share. I lost some thirty men,
including Captain Bertin, a most deserving officer, whose
head was taken off by a round-shot. And it was Bemadotte,
a Frenchman, for whom the blood of Frenchmen had earned
a crown, that gave us this finishing stroke !

Among this general disloyalty the Eong of Wurtemberg
formed an honourable exQ<eption« As I have said^ he warned

VOL. n. D D

402 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

Napoleon that circumstances would force him to leave his
cause ; but even after taking this supreme decision, he carried
it out with perfect loyalty, ordering his troops to take no
action against the French without giving them ten days'
notice. Even when he had become our enemy, he expelled
from his army the general and several of the officers who had
taken their troops over into the Russian ranks during the
battle of Leipzig, and deprived the deserting regiments of
all their decorations.

Meanwhile Probstheida continued to be the scene of a
murderous struggle. The Old Guard was deployed in rear of
the village, ready to aid its defenders. Bulow's corps, trying
to advance, was crushed, but we lost General Delmas, a dis-
tinguished soldier and honourable man, who had fallen out
with Napoleon at the creation of the Empire and lived ten
years in retirement, but demanded to serve when his country
was in danger. The French were maintaining their position
all along the line. On the left, where Macdonald and Sébas*
tiani had held their ground between Probstheida and
Stotteritz in the teeth of frequent attacks from Klenau's
Austrians and Doctoroff's Russians, we were suddenly
assailed by a charge of more than 20,000 Cossacks and
Bashkirs. Their efforts were chiefly directed against Sébas-
tiani's cavalry, and in a moment the barbarians surrounded
our squadrons with loud shouts, letting off thousands of
arrows. The loss these caused was slight, for the Bashkirs
are totally undrilled and have no more notion of any forma-
tion than a flock of sheep. Thus they cannot shoot horizon-
tally in front of them without hitting their own comrades,
and are obliged to fire their arrows parabolically into the air,,
with more or less elevation according to the distance at which
they judge the enemy to be. As this method does not allow
of accurate aiming, nine-tenths of the arrows are lost, while
the few that hit are pretty well spent, and only fall with the
force of their own weight, which is inconsiderable ; so that
the wounds they cause are usuaUy trifling. As they have no
other weapons, they are certainly the least dangerous troops
in the world. However, as they were coming up in myriads^

An Arrow-wound 403

and the more of these wasps one killed the more came on —
the vast number of arrows with which they filled the air
were bound sooner or later to inflict some severe wounds.
Thus one of my non-commissioned officers^ named Meslin,
was pierced from breast to back by an arrow. Seizing it in
both hands he broke it and drew the two portions &om his
body, but died a few minutes later. I &ncy this was the
only case of death caused by the Bashkirs' arrows : but I had
several men and horses hit, and was myself wounded by the
ridiculous weapon. I had my sword in my hand, and was
giving orders to an officer. As I raised my arm to indicate
the direction in which he was to go, I felt my sword unex-
pectedly checked, and perceived a slight pain in the right
thigh. Looking down I saw that an arrow four feet long
was sticking an inch deep in my right thigh, though in the
excitement of the fight I had not perceived the wound. I
got Dr. Parot to take it out and place it in the regimental
ambulance, for I wished to preserve it as a curious relic ; but
I am sorry to say it has been mislaid. As you may suppose, I
did not leave my regiment for so slight a wound : and, indeed,
the moment was very critical. The reinforcements brought
up by Bernadette and Blucher were attacking the suburb dT
Schonfeld, not far fix)m the point where the Partha enters the
town of Leipzig. Generals Lagrange and Friederichs re-
pulsed seven assults on this important point, driving the
allies from the houses which they carried. General Friederichs
was killed in the combat ; he was an excellent and brave
ofiicer, and had the further advantage of being the handsomest
man in the French army. The enemy would, however, have
probably captured Schonfeld, had not Marshal Ney flown to
the support of that village. He himself received a contu-
sion in the shoulder, which compelled him to leave the field.

When night fell, the two armies were over most part of
their lines in the same position as when the battle began.
That evening my troopers, and indeed all Sébastiani's corps,
tethered their horses to the same pickets which they had used
for the three previous days, and most of the battalions occu-
pied the same bivouacs. Thus this battle, so vaunted as a

D D 2

404 The MEMOiRS of the Baron de Marbot

victory by our enemies, was indecisive. We were inferior in
numbers, with nearly all the nations of Europe against us
and a crowd of traitors in our ranks, and yet did not lose an
inch of gi'onnd. The English general, Sir Robert Wilson,
who was present at Leipzig as British commissioner and
whose evidence cannot be suspected of partiality, says : ^ In
spite of the defection of the Saxon army in the middle of the
battle, in spite of the ardent and persevering courage of the
allied troops, they could not carry a single one of the villages
which the French proposed to hold as vital to their position.
The action was closed by night, leaving to the French, and
especially to the defenders of Probstheida, the glory of
having inspired a generous envy in their enemies.'

When darkness came on, I received orders to bid the
useless sharpshooting, which usually follows engagements,
cease along the front of my regiment. It is not easy in these
cases to separate the men who have just been fighting each
other, all the more so that in order to prevent the enemy
knowing what is done one cannot use drums or trumpets to
sound the ' cease firing ' and the ' recall,' but one has to give
the word in a low voice to \hQ section leaders, and they send
sergeants to take the order quietly to the outposts. On his
side, the enemy does the same, and the fire gradually slackens,
And soon ceases entirely.

In order to be sure that no vedette was forgotten on the
ground, and that the little retreat towards the bivouac was
carried out in good order, my practice was to have it seen to
by an adjutant. The one on duty that evening was named
Captain Joly, a capable soldier and very courageous. He had
given proof of this some months before, when, being entrusted
with the distribution of the re-mounts which the Emperor
presented to such of the officers as had served in the Russian
campaign, M. Joly, in spite of all that I and his friends conld
say, had selected for himself a splendid white horse which
the rest of us had declined on account of his too conspicuous
vesture, and which I had at first assigned to the trumpeters.
Now on the evening of the battle of Leipzig, as M. Joly was
passing at a walk behind the skirmishing line, his white

Saving a Sivosd of Honour

405

horse was so plainly seen by the enemy, in spite of the dark-
ness, that horse and man were both severely wounded. The
captain was shot through the body, and died in the course of
the night in a house in the suburb of Halle, where I had had
Major Poaac taken the day before. His wound was not
dangerous, but he was melancholy at the thought that the
French army would probably retire and leave him in the
hands of the enemy, who then would get possession of th©
sword of honour which he had received when a sergeant from
the hands of the First Consul afler the battle of Marengo.
But I calmed his natural regrets by making myself reaponeibla
for the glorious sword. One of the sui^eons of the regiment
took charge of it, and it was handed back to Pozac when h©
I'eturned to France,

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-'° ' C.Juitrm'L,,u™ic-ftal<S'.

CHAPTER XXXIX

In the calm of the night which fell on the fields of Leipzig after
the terrible battle which they had witnessed, the chiefs on both
sides could consider their position. Napoleon's was most un-
favourable, and indeed if that great man has been blamed for
not having retired behind the Saale a week before the battle,
when he might still have avoided endangering the safety of
his army, around which infinitely superior forces were about
to form a ring of steel, it is with much greater reason that
many soldiers have disapproved his dispositions when he
allowed himself to be completely surrounded on the battle-
field of Leipzig. I say completely, because, when Lichen-
stein's Austrians captured the village of Zschochem on the
left bank of the Elster at 11 a.m. on the 18th, there was a
moment when the road from Leipzig to Weissenfels, the only
way of retreat open to the French, was intercepted, and
Napoleon's army completely hemmed in. It is true this state
of things only lasted half an hour, but was it prudent to
expose himself to all the evils which might have resulted
from it, and would it not have been better worth while, before
the French army was surrounded by the united forces of the
enemy, for its chief to have sheltered it behind the mountains
of Thuringia?

We are now approaching a critical moment. The French
had maintained their positions during the three days which
the battle had lasted, but this success had only been obtained
at the cost of much bloodshed, for they had had nearly 40,000
men disabled. The enemy had, it is true, lost 60,000, a
difference which must be attributed to their persistency in
attacking villages which we had entrenched, but as the
number of their troops was infinitely greater than ours, our

Where Are the Bridges? 407

army was proportionately far more weakened by its losses
than theirs. It must be added that as the French artillery
had in the three days fired 220,000 rounds onr reserves were
exhausted, and we had only 16,000 rounds left — enough, that
is, for two hours' fighting. This lack of ammunition, which
ought to have been foreseen before engaging superior forces
at a distance from our frontier, rendered Napoleon incapable
of giving battle again, and he was compelled to make up his
mind to order a retreat.

It was no easy matter to carry this out. The ground
which we occupied, being damp meadows with brooks
between them and intersected by three streams, offered a
number of small valleys, and these we had to pass close under
tlie eyes of the enemy, who would find it easy to throw our
march into disorder. There was only one way to secure our
retreat : namely, the provision of a number of plank roads
across the meadows, ditches, and watercourses, and of larger
bridges across the three streams, especially the Elster, into
which the others flow at the very gates of Leipzig. Nothing
was easier to effect, since any amount of planks, beams,
nails, &c., were close at hand in the town and suburbs.

The whole army was under the impression that all this
had been done on its first arrival, and the work added to on
the 17th when there was no fighting. But by a series of
unfortunate circumstances, and by inconceivable neglect, no
steps had been taken. Among the documents which are
extant about the battle, there is absolutely no official state-
ment to show that any measures had been taken, if a retreat
was necessary, to facilitate the outflow of the columns from
either the river valleys or the streets of Leipzig. No officer
among the survivors, no author who has written on the battle,
has been able to show that the chiefs of the army did any-
thing to increase the number or the efficiency of the existing
ways of communication. Only General Pelet, who pushed
his admiration for Napoleon sometimes to the point of extra-
vagance, wrote, fifteen years after the battle, that he had
heard more than once from M. Odier, sub-intendant of the
imperial guard, that he was present in the morning (he does

4o8 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marboj

not say of what day) when the Emperor gave a general on
the staff orders to attend to the construction of the bridges,
specially charging him with that duty. General Pelet does not
mention the name of the general o£Scer to whom the Emperor
gave that order — rather an important detail. Napoleon's
secretary, M. Fain, says in his ' Memoirs ' that the Emperor
ordered several new passages across the marshes to be con-
structed in order to facilitate the crossing. How far
posterity will admit the truth of these assertions, made long
after date, I know not; but even supposing them accu-
rate, many writers think that the head of the French army
should not have been satisfied with 'giving orders' to a
general, who, perhaps, had neither sappers nor materials at
his disposal ; but that several officers, at least one per regi-
ment in every corps, should have been charged with tii&
duty. One thing is certain — no one carried it out. Th&
real reason, which at the time very few people knew, was as
follows.

The Emperor's chief of the headquarters staff was Prince
Berthier, who had been with him since the Italian campaign
of 1796. He was a man of capacity, accuracy, and devotion
to duty, but he had often felt the effects of the imperial wrath^
and had acquired such a dread of Napoleon's outbreaks that he
had vowed in no circumstance to take the initiative or ask
any question, but to confine himself to executing orders
which he received in writing. This system, while keeping
the chief-of-the-staff on good terms with his master, wa&
injurious to the interests of the army ; for great as were the
Emperor's activity and talents, it was physically impossible
for him to see to everything, and thus, if he overlooked any
important matter, it did not get attended to.

So it seems to have been at Leipzig. Nearly all the
marshals and generals commanding army corps pointed out
to Berthier, over and over again, the necessity of providing
many passages to secure the retreat in the event of a reverse^
but he always answered : * The Emperor has given no orders.'
Nothing could be got out of him, so that when, on the night
of the 18th, the Emperor gave the order to retreat on

Preparing for Retreat 4pg

Weissenfels and the Saale, there was not a beam or a plank
across a single brook.

The losses of the allies had been so great that they did
not venture to attack afresh, and they were themselves on the
point of withdrawing when they saw our heavy baggage
being taken towards Weissenfels by way of Lindenau. Then
they understood that Napoleon was preparing to retreat^ and
made their dispositions to profit by any chance in their
favour which might result from his movement.

The most terrible moment of a retreat, especially for a
commanding officer, is when he has to leave his wounded to
the mercy of the enemy, who often have none, but plunder or
put an end to the unhappy men who are unable to follow
their comrades. However, as the worst thing of all is to be
left lying on the ground, I had all my wounded taken up
under cover of night and coUected in two neighbouring
houses, both to remove them from the first ftuy of the enemy,
who would be flushed with wine, and to enable them to aid
each other, and keep up each other's courage. M. Bordenave,
assistant-surgeon, offered to remain with them. At the
peace I got the Legion of Honour for that estimable doctor,
by whose care many men's lives were saved.

Meanwhile, the troops were marching firom that field
which had witnessed their prowess and been watered by ao
much of their blood. The Emperor left his bivouac at 8 FJt.>
and took up his position in the town at the ^ Prussian Arms '
in the horsemarket. After giving his orders, he visited the
King of Saxony, whom he found making arrangements to
follow him. The King, a model friend, expected that, to
punish him for his fidelity to the Emperor of the French, the
allied sovereigns would deprive him of his crown, but he was
most afflicted by the thought that his army had disgraced
itself. Napoleon could not console the good old man, and
only with difficulty persuaded him to stay at Leipsdg and
send one of his ministers to make terms with the Coalition.
The Emperor then took leave of the King, the Queen, and
their daughter. The parting was the more touching by thé
fact of news having come that the allies declined to enter

4IO The Meawirs of the Baron de Marbot

into any engagement as to the coui'se they meant to take
with regard to the Saxon monarch. He would, therefore, be
at their mercy, and in his rich provinces they had strong
motives for severity.

About eight o'clock in the evening the corps of Victor
and Augereau, the ambulances, part of the artillery, the
cavalry, and the imperial guard began to reti'eat. While
they were passing through Lindenau, Ney, Marmont, and
Reynier guarded the suburbs of Halle and Bosenthal.
Lauriston, Macdonald, and Poniatowski entered the town and
established themselves behind the gates, the walls of which
had battlements. Thus all was ready for an obstinate resist-
ance by the rear-guard, and the army was free to retreat in
good order. Still, Napoleon, wishing to spare the town the
horrors of street fighting, had allowed the magistrates to
petition the allied sovereigns for an armistice of a few hours
that the evacuation might be conducted with order. This
humane proposal was rejected, and the allies, in hope of
profiting by any disorder which might arise in the French
rear-guard, scrupled not to expose one of the largest towns in
(Jermany to total destruction. Then, in their indignation,
several generals proposed to the Emperor to secure the
retreat of his army by concentrating it within the town, and
setting fire to all the suburbs except that of Lindenau. I
think that the refusal to allow us to retreat unmolested justi-
fied us in employing all possible means of defence, and that
as fire was the most efiective we should have made use of it ;
but Napoleon could not make up his mind to it. This
excessive magnanimity lost him his crown, for the fight
which I am going to relate cost us nearly as many men as
the tliree days' battle. Indeed, it was more disastrous, for it
demoralised the army, which would otherwise have reached
France in considerable strength ; and the fine way in which
our weak remnant opposed the allies for three months shows
pretty well what we could have done if the survivors of the
great bittle had recrossed the Rhine without losing their
arms and their organisation. France would probably have
n^pelled the invadera.

The Last Kick 411

But it was not to be so ; for while Napoleon, with a too
chivalrous generosity — ^mistaken, as I think — was refusing to
burn an enemy's town and thus secure without a blow the
safe retreat of his army, Bemadotte, the unworthy Crown
Prince of Sweden, blaming the lack of zeal which his aÙies
showed in the destruction of his fellow-countrymen, launched
all his troops against the suburb of Taucha, captured it, and
entered the town. Following his example, Blucher with his
Prussians, the Russians, and the Austrians attacked the rear
of the French columns in their retreat towards the Idndenau
bridge over the Elster ; and finally, to fill our cup full, a
smart musketry-fire opened near that bridge, the only way of
retreat open to our troops. This fire came from the battalions
of the Saxon guard, who had been left in the town with their
King. Regretting that they had not been able to desert with
the rest of their army, and wishing to testify their Grerman
patriotism, they attacked the French in rear, before the
palace of their sovereign. In vain did the unfortunate prince,
appearing on the balcony, where the bullets were flying, exclaim
to his officers and men, * Cowards ! kill me, your sovereign,
and spare me the sight of your dishonour.' The scoundrels
continued to assassinate the French, and the King, returning
to his apartments, seized the colours of his guard and flung
them into the fire.

The last kick was given to our troops by a Baden batta-
lion which, being notorious for cowardice, had been left in the
to\vn during the battle to chop wood for the bakehouses.
These miscreants, from the shelter of the windows of the great
bakery, also fired on our soldiers, killing a great number.
The French, meanwhile, made a brave resistance, defending
themselves in the houses, and, in spite of their losses, dis-
puting the ground foot by foot with the allied armies, while
they retired in good order towards the bridge of Lindenau.

The Emperor had with difficulty got out of the town, and
reached the suburb. At the last bridge, called the Mill-
bridge, he dismounted, and not till then gave orders to
charge the mine under the main bridge. Further, he sent
orders to Ney, Macdonald, and Poniatowski to hold the town

412 The Memoirs of the Baron de Mar bot

twenty-foar houi's longer, so as to allow the aitilleiy and
baggage time to get thi-ongh the suburb and across the-
bridges. Then he remoanted ; but he had hardly ridden a
thousand paces along the road to Lutzen when a fearful ex-
plosion was heard. The great bridge over the Elster had
blown up. And the troops under Macdonald, Lauriston^
Eeynier, and Poniatowski, with more than 200 guns, were
still in Leipzig, and their retreat was wholly cut off. It was a
climax to our disasters.

To explain this catastrophe, people said afterwards that
Prussian and Swedish skirmishers had slipped along to the
neighbourhood of the bridge, and, joining the Saxon guards,
had taken possession of some houses, and begun to fire on the
French columns ; and that the sapper .who had to fire the
mine was misled into thinking that the enemy was comiug-
up, and that the moment had come to blow up the brid^,
and had therefore set fire to the powder. Others attributed
the deplorable mistake to Colonel Montfort of the engineers,
alleging that he had given the order in consequence of seeing
the enemy's skirmishers. This version was adopted by the
Emperor, who made a scapegoat of M. de Montfort, and
ordered him to be brought to trial ; but it was proved later
on that he had nothing to do with it. Whatever the truth
may have been, the army accused the chief- of-the-staff of
neglect ; and it was said with reason that he ought to have
entrusted the guardiansliip of the bridge to an entire brigade,
making the general personally responsible for giving the
order to fire the mine at the proper moment. But Berthier
defended himself with his usual answer : * The Emperor had
given no orders.'

After the destruction of the bridge, some of the French
threw themselves into the Elster, in the hope of swimming
across. Some succeeded, including Mai'shal Macdonald ;
but the gi'eater number. Prince Poniatowski among them,
were drowned, because when they had crossed the river they
could not get up the muddy banks, which were lined, more*
over, with the enemy's skirmishers. Those of our men who
remained in the town, thinking only how to sell their lives

: .»

Wf, Leave the Field 413

«dearly, barricaded themselves behind the houses, and fought
Taliantly all the day and part of the night ; but their ammu-
nition failed, their hastily-raised entrenchments were forced,
and nearly all were slain. The slaughter did not cease till
two in the morning.

All this time the allied sovereigns, Bemadotte among
them, assembled in the chief square, were relishing their
victory, and deliberating how best to make sure of its results.
The number of French massacred in the houses is reckoned
at 13,000, and 25,000 were made prisoners. The enemy
took also 250 guns.

Aft^r this general account of the events which followed
the battle of Leipzig, I ought to tell you what specially befell
my regiment, and Sébastiani's corps, to which it belonged.
As we had for three days beaten off the enemy and held our
part of the field, the troops were much astonished and
gi'ieved to hear on the evening of the 18th that for want of
ammunition we were going to retreat. We hoped (and it
seems to have been the Emperor's design) that he would at
least go no further than beyond the Saale ; where we might,
in the neighbourhood of the fortress of Erfurt, replenish our
powder wagons and recommence hostilities. We mounted
then at 8 P.M. on October 18, and quitted the field where we
had fought for three days, and where so many of our comrades
had fallen with honour. Hardly were we out of our bivouac,
when we felt the inconvenience arising from the neglect of
the imperial staff to prepare for the retreat of so large an
army. Every minute the columns were stopped by broad
ditches, by marshes and brooks, which might so easily have
been bridged. Horses and wheels stuck in the mud ; and as
the night was dark there were blocks everywhere. Our march
was, therefore, very slow, and my regiment, being at the
liead of Exelmans', the leading division, did not reach the
Ijindenau bridge till 4 a.m. on the 19th. As we crossed it
we were far from foreseeing the frightful catastrophe which
it was in a few hours to witness.

Dny broke; the broad road was covered with troops of all
arms in great number, which showed that the army would

414 Tuf. Memo!rs of the Baron de Marbot

be still strong when it reached the Saale. The
came by ; but as he galloped along the flank of the oolnnm
he heard none of the acclamations which were wont to
proclaim his presence. The army was ill-content with the
little care which had been taken to secure its retreat ; but
what would the troops have said if they liad known with how
little foresight the passage of the Klster had been arranged?
Thfv had crossed it ; but nianv of their comrades were about
to find their dt*aths there. We were halting at Markranatadt,
a little t«)wn three leagues from I^ipzig, when we heard the
explosion of the mine; but instead of being grieved, aD
njoiced, for wc doubted not that it had been fired to prevent
the passagt» of the enemy after all our columns
acro.vs.

During the few hours' rest which we took at
stadt 1 was able to l(X)k at our squadrons in detail, and V
the losses of the regiment in the three days' fightin^f. I
horrititH.1 to lind that they amounted to 119, of which
including two captains, three lieutenants, and eleven
commissioned officers, were killed ; a terrible proportion out of
7<H), which had been the strength of the regiment on the
morning of the UUh. Nearly all the wounds were canaed bv
gni{)e or n>und shot, which unhappily allowed small hope of
rt*CMVi'r}'. Hut my losses would, {lerliaps, have been twch4bld
if 1 had not taken the precaution of keeping my reigiment ^
much ÎLS prissible out of artillerj'-fire. To explain this, I
l>iint out that then* art* positions in which the most hi
genenJ linds hims4»lf under the painful necessity of e:
his men to the fire of cannon ; but it also often happens that
they are e.vpostnl ({uite unneces.sarily, especially in the case
of cavalr}', who are able to move quickly from place to place.
It is just in the case of large Ixxlies of cavalry and on
battle-fields that precautions are most needed, bat least
Now on October IG, at IxMp/ig. (leneral àSébastiani haviar
pla^-eil his thn^ divisions betwefn the villages of Wachan
and Liebertvolkwitz, and indicated to each
commander approximately the ground which hia
should take up, it fell to that of Kxelmans to be

How TO Save Cavajlry 415

\
I

on andalating ground, broken into small mounds and
hollows. The enemy's cavalry was a long way off,^d therefore
could not surprise us ; and I took advantage of the hollows
in the ground to cover my regiment. Thus sheltered firom
artillery-fire, and at the same time all ready to act, we had the
satisfaction of seeing a great part of the day go by without
our having a single man hit, while the regiments in our
neighbourhood were losing pretty heavily.

I was congratulating myself on having placed my men so
well when General Exelmans, on the plea that everyone
should take his share of danger, ordered me, in spite of the
remonstrances of my brigadier, to advance my regiment a
hundred paces. I obeyed, and in a short time lost Captain
Bertin killed and a score of men disabled. Then I tried a
new plan, namely, to send troopers, well apart, to fire at the
enemy's gunners with their carbines. This made the enemy
also send out skirmishers, and when skirmishing was thus
going on between the lines the enemy's guns could not fire
on us for fear of hitting their own people. Ours were of
course similarly hampered ; but to get the artillery silenced
on even a small part of the line was all in our favour, as the
enemy was far superior in that arm. Moreover, our in&ntry
was just then at close quarters with that of the enemy in the
villages, and the cavalry on both sides had nothing ta do but
await the issue; so it was of no use for either side to be
smashing up the other with cannon-balls. A skirmishing
engagement, in which for the most part more powder is
burnt than damage done, was a much better way of spending
the time. Accordingly, all the colonels followed my example,
and much bloodshed was saved. Still more would have been,
if General Exelmans had not given the order to recall the
skirmishers : which was the signal to the enemy to pour a
hail of shot on our squadrons. Luckily it was near the end
of the day.

This was the evening of the 16th. All the cavalry
colonels of the 2nd corps approved so highly this plan of
economising human life that we all agreed to employ it on
the 18th. When the enemy^s guns opened we sent out

4i6 Thr Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

skirmishers ; and as these would have captured the ^ns had
they been left andefended, oar opponents had also to send out
skirmishers, thus paralysing their artillery. The commander
of the enemy's cavalry, probably divining our motive, did
the same, with the result that on that day the artillery
attached to the cavalry on both sides was much less em-
ployed. None the less we met in vigorous charges, bot
these had always a definite object, and in that case one mnst
not spare oneself. But an artillery duel between two cavalry
corps only leads to the useless slaughter of brave men. That
was what Exehiians would not see, but as he was always rush-
ing from one wing to another, as soon as he was a little way
from a regiment the colonel would send out his skirmiahers
and the artillery would cease to speak. So persuaded were
Sobastiani and all the cavalry generals of the merit of this
plan, that Exelmans at last got orders to leave off teasing the
enemy's gunners by firing at them when our squadrons were
merely in observation. Two years later I employed the same
system with the English artillery at Waterloo, and lost much
less heavily than I otherwise should have done.

CHAPTER XL

While the Emperor and the diviaions from Leipzig were baited
at Markranstadt came the disastrous news of the destruction of
the Lindenau bridge. The army bad lost by this nearly all its
artillery ; half the troops were left as prisoners, and thou-
sands of our wounded comrades handed over to the outrage of
the hostile soldiery, bounded on by its infamous officers to
the slaughter.' Grief was universal, for each man had a
relation or a friend to mourn. The Emperor appeared over-
whelmed; but he ordered Sébastiani*s cavalry to return as
far as the bridge for the protection of individuals who might
succeed in crossing the river at one point or another. My
refrimeut and the 24th, being the best mounted, were
ordered to lead the column and to go at full trot. General
Wathiez being unwell, it fell to me, as senior colonel, to
command the brigade. Hardly had we traversed half the
distance when we heard frequent shots, and as we drew near
the suburb we could distinguish the despairing cries of the
unhappy French, who, unable to retreat, and without car-
trid^^s, were being hunted from street to street, and butchered
in a cowardly manner by Prussians, Badeners, and Saxons.

The fury of my two regiments was indescribable. Every
man breathed vengeance, and regretted that vengeance was
almost impossible, nince the Elster, with its broken bridge,
lav l)etw(*en us and the assassins. Our rage increased when
wt* met alx)ut 2,000 French, mostly without clothing, and
nearly all wounded, who had only escaped death by leaping into

[ ' It ifl only fair to the ▼icton to mj that ay^-wUiMMMa glv» a VMj
ritfTerent account of their oondact iowardi tha woôadad tban Umm azpTM-
.lionn woukl êttm t4) implj. Bat pfobahly thay only Judicata tha teapir of
th<* French army at the motnant.]

VOL. II. B B

41 8 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

the river and swimming across under the fire from the other
bank. Among them was Marshal Macdonald, who owed his
life to his bodily strength and his practice in swimming. He
was completely naked, and his horse had been drowned. I
hastily got him some clothes and lent him my led horse,
which allowed him to rejoin the Emperor at once and report
the disaster he had witnessed, one of the chief episodes in it
being the death by drowning of Prince Poniatowski.

The remainder of the French who had crossed the river,
having had to get rid of their arms in order to be able to
swim, were without means of defence ; they were running
across the fields to escape from some 400 or 500 Prussians
and others, who, not content with the bath of French
blood which they had had in the town and suburbs, had laid
planks across the pieces of the exploded bridge and had
come over to kill such of our unhappy soldiers as they could
overtake on the road to Markranstadt. When I caught sight
of this band of murderers I ordered M. Schneit, colonel of the
24th, to make a combined movement with my regiment, by
means of which we enclosed these brigands in a vast semi-
circle. Then I gave the order to sound the charge. The
effect was teiTible. The bandits, taken by surprise, offered
only a feeble resistance, and there was a very great slaughter,
for no quarter was given. So enraged was I, that before the
charge I had vowed to run my sword through all who came
within my reach. Yet when I was in the thick of them and
saw that they were drunk, in disorder, and with no com-
manders but two Saxon officei's, who trembled before the
approaching vengeance, I saw that it was no case of fighting,
but an execution, in which it did not become me to take a
part. I dreaded lest I might actually find pleasure in IrillÎTig
some of the scoundrels with my own hand. So I sheathed
my sword, and lefb the task of exterminating the assassins to
my troopers. Two-thirds of them fell on the spot ; the rest,
among them two ofiicers and several men of the Saxon guards,
fled towards the bridge in hope of recrossing the river by the
planks. But as they could only go in single file, and our
men were pressing them hard, they made for a large inn

Turning the Tables 419

close by, whence they set to work to fire on my people, some
Badish and Prussian pickets on the further bank aiding.

As it was probable that the noise of the fight might
attract large forces towards the bridge, who, without crossing
the river, could destroy my two regiments by musketry and
artillery fire, I resolved to lose no time. I ordered most of
my men to dismount, and taking a good supply of cartridges,
to attack the inn in rear, and set fire to the stables and hay-
lorts. On this, the assassins, finding themselves about to be
caught by the flames, made an efibrt to escape ; but as fast as
they appeared at the gates the chasseurs shot them down.
In vain did they send one of the Saxon officers to me: I
refused to treat the monsters who had butchered our comrades
as soldiers who surrendered honourably. The Prussian,
Saxon, and Badish assassins who had crossed the foot-bridge
were therefore all exterminated. I announced the fact to
General Sebastiani, and he halted the other brigades half-way.

The fire which we had kindled soon reached the neigh-
bouring houses. A great part of the village of Lindenau
was burnt, and the reconstruction of the bridge and passage
of the enemy's troops in pursuit of the French army thereby
delayed.

Our expedition ended, I brought back the brigade to
Markranstadt, as well as the 2,000 French who had escaped
the disaster at the bridge. Among them were officers of all
ranks. The Emperor questioned them as to what they knew
regarding the explosion of the mine and the massacre of the
French prisoners by the allies. It is probable that the sad
tale made Napoleon regret that he had not followed the
advice which had been given him that morning to secure the
retreat of the army and prevent any attack from the enemy
by setting fire to the suburbs, and, even, if necessary, to the
town of Leipzig. I may say that nearly all the inhabitants
had left the place during the three days' battle.

In our counter-attack at the bridge of Lindenau, only
three men in my brigade had been wounded, and only one of
my regiment, but he was one of my bravest and best non-
commissioned officers, named Foucher. In the attack on the

B B 2

420 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

inn a bullet had made four holes in him, passing through
both his thighs. In spite of this severe wound, the brave
Poucher went through the retreat on horseback, refused to go
into hospital at Erfurt, and accompanied the regiment into
Prance. His comrades and all the troopers of his section
took, indeed, particular care of him, and in all respects he
deserved it.

When I left Leipzig I was in fear for the wounded men
of my regiment whom I had left there, among them Major
Pozac. But, fortunately, the distant suburb in which I had
left them was not visited by the Prussians.

You will remember that during the last day of the battle
an Austrian corps had wished to cut off our retreat by occu-
pying Lindenau, and the Emperor had caused General
Bertrand's troops to drive it back. Aftyer thus reopening
communications Bertrand had reached Weissenfels, and we
fell in with him there. Aft^er the losses caused by the de-
struction of the Lindenau bridge, there could be no more
thought of halting on the Saale, so Napoleon passed that river.
A fortnight before the battle, that stream had offered him an
impregnable position, which he had then despised, in order to
risk a general engagement in an open country with three
rivers in his rear, besides a large town with its narrow streets.
The great captain had reckoned too much on his star, and on
the incapacity of the enemy's generals. These did, indeed,
commit such gross blunders that, in spite of their immense
superiority in numbers, not only were they unable in three
days to take a single one of the villages which we held, but
I have heard the King of the Belgians, who then was serving
in the Russian army, admit to the Duke of Orleans that the
allies were on two occasions in such confusion that the order
for retreat was given. However, the state of affairs changed,
and it was our army which had to yield to misfortune.

After crossing the Saale Napoleon thanked and bade
farewell to the officers and some troops of the Confederation
of the Rhine who, whether from honourable feeling or for
want of an opportunity to desert, were still in our ranks. He
carried his magnanimity so far as to allow these soldiers to

The Last Retreat 421

retain their arms, although, as their sovereigns had joined
his enemies, he had the right to detain them as prisoners.
The French army continued its retreat to Erfurt, with no
event except the combat of Kosen, where a single French
division beat an Austrian army corps, and took its com-
mander Count Gyulai prisoner.

Always beguiled by the hope of returning to the attack
of Germany, in which case the fortresses which he was com-
pelled to leave would be of great service to him. Napoleon
established a strong garrison at Erfurt. He had left 25,000
men under Saint-Cyr at Dresden, 30,000 at Hamburg under
Davout, while the various fortresses on the Oder and the Elbe
were garrisoned in proportion to their importance. These
were additional losses to those which Dantzig and the other
places on the Vistula had already cost us. I need not repeat
here what I have said about the inconvenience of distributing
forces to hold places from which one is about to retire, but
will merely say that Napoleon left in the fortresses of Germany
80,000 soldiers, not one of whom saw France again before
the fall of the Empire; which they might, perhaps, have
prevented if they had been united on our frontiers.

Our artillery repaired its losses in the arsenal of Erftirt.
The Emperor, who up till then had borne his reverses with
stoic fortitude, was affected by the desertion of his brother»
in-law. Under the pretext of going to defend his kingdom
of Naples, Murat left Napoleon, to whom he owed everything.
Formerly so brilliant in war, he had done nothing remarkable
during this campaign. It is certain that while he was still
among us he had been keeping up a correspondence with
Mettemich, and the Austrian minister, placing before his
eyes the example of Bemadotte, had, in the name of the
allied sovereigns, guaranteed him the preservation of his
kingdom if he would take his place among Napoleon's
enemies. Murat left the French army at Erfurt, and no
sooner had he reached Naples than he prepared to make war
upon us.

At Erfurt also the Emperor heard of the audacious
manœuvre of the Bavarians, his former allies, who, after

422 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

betraying his cause, had joined an Austrian corps, and
marched, under command of General Wrede, with the inten-
tion not only of opposing the passage of the French army,
but of taking it and the Emperor prisoners. Wrede marched
for two days parallel with our army, and was already at
WUrzburg with 60,000 men. He detached 10,000 towards
Frankfort, and with the remainder proceeded towards the
small fortress of Hanau, with a view of blocking the road to
the French. He had been with us on the Russian campaign,
and thought to find the French army still in the wretched
state to which cold and hunger had reduced it when it
reached the Beresina ; but we soon showed him that, in spite
of our misfortunes, we still had some troops in good condition,
and quite enough to beat the Austrians and Bavarians.

Not knowing that beyond Erfurt the allied troops whom
we had fought at Leipzig had been following us only at a
considerable distance, Wrede had become very enterprising,
and thought to catch us between two fires. This he could
not do ; still, as several of the enemy's corps were seeking to
outflank our right by way of the Franconian Mountains,
while the Bavarians met us in front, our situation might
become critical. Then Napoleon, rising to the height of the
danger, marched briskly on Hanau, the approaches to' which
are covered by thick forests, and especially by the famous
defile of Geluhausen, through which the Kinzig flows. This
stream, the banks of which are very steep, runs between two
mountains where there is only a narrow passage for the
river, beside which a very fine road has been hewn out of the
rock, going from Fulda to Frankfort-on-Main, by way of
Hanau. Sébastiani's cavalry, which had acted as advance-
guard from Weissenfels to Fulda, ought at that point where
the road enters the mountains to have been replaced by
infantry. I have never known for what reason that grand
principle of war was not followed on this occasion ; but, to our
surprise, Exelmans' light cavalry division continued to march
in front of the army. My regiment and the 24th were at
the head, and I commanded the brigade. We learned from
the peasants that the Austro-Bavarian army was already at

Showjng our Teeth 423

Hanau, and that a strong division was coming to meet us to
dispute our passage through the defile.

My position as commander of the advance-guard now
became very ticklish. How was I, without a single foot-
soldier, and with my cavalry shut in between lofty hills and
an impassable torrent, to attack infantry whose scouts could
climb the rocks and shoot us down at point-blank range ? I
at once sent to the rear of the column to let the general
know, but Exelmans was not to be found. So, as my orders
were to advance, and I could not stop the divisions behind
me, I marched on, until at an elbow in the valley my scouts
reported that there was a detachment of the enemy's hussars
in front. The Austrians and Bavarians had made the same
mistake as our leaders. We had to attack with cavalry a
long and narrow defile in which not more than ten or twelve
horses could walk abreast, and they were sending cavalry to
defend a place which a hundred light infantry could have
held against any number of horse. I was rejoiced to see that
the enemy had no infantry, and as I knew by experience
that when two columns meet in a narrow place the advantage
is always to the side that makes the charge, I sent my picked
company ahead at full speed. Only the first section could
touch the enemy, but it did it so thoroughly that the
Austrian column was thrown into disorder, and my troopers
had only to hold their swords straight.

We pursued for more than an hour. The enemy were Ott's
regiment, and I never saw finer hussars. They were just from
Vienna ; and their uniforms, handsome, if a little theatrical,
were as new and smart as you could wish. You might have
thought they came from a ball-room or a theatre. Their
brilliant costume contrasted strangely with the more than
modest get-up of our chasseurs, many of whom were still
wearing the clothes, stained with smoke and dust, in which
tliey had bivouacked for a year and a half past ; but brave
hearts and sturdy limbs were inside them. The white jackets
of Ott's hussars were soon terribly blood-stained, and the
trim regiment lost more than 200 killed and wounded. Not
one of ours was touched, as the enemy never had a chance of

424 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

turning round. Our men took a number of excellent horses
and gold-laced jackets. So far all had gone well ; but as I
galloped after the stream of pursuers I was not without
anxiety as to the end of this curious fight. The hills on
each side of the stream were falling away, and it was clear
that we were approaching the end of the valley. There we
should probably find a plain full of infantry, and might have
to pay dear for our success. Happily it was not so. On
issuing from the defile we saw nothing but the cavalry,
including the main portion of Ott's hussars, whom we had
just handled so roughly, and who now drew along some
fifteen squadrons with them in their headlong retreat on
Hanau.

Then General Sébastiani made his three divisions of
cavalry debouch. These were soon supported by the infantry
under Victor and Macdonald, with several batteries; the
Emperor and part of the guard presently appeared, and the
remainder of the army followed. It was the evening of
October 21. We bivouacked in a neighbouring wood, at not
more than a league from Hanau and the Austro-Bavarian
army.

CHAPTER XLI

What had kept Exelmans at the rear dnring our passage of
the defile was the following incident. Before entering the
valley the scouts had brought in two Austrian soldiers who
had straggled from their army^ and were takeA drinking in a
lonely village. Exelmans had them questioned in German
by one of his aides-de-camp, when, to his surprise, they
answered in very good French. On his asking where they
had learnt it so well, one of the wretches, who was half-
drunk, thinking to make himself important, exclaimed that
they were Parisians. Hardly had he uttered the words when
the general, enraged at seeing Frenchmen in arms against
their countrymen, ordered them to be shot on the spot.
They were seized ; but no sooner had the poor lad, who in
order to show off had claimed to be French, been put to death,
than his comrade, sobered by the sight, protested that neither
of them had ever set foot in France. They had been bom at
Vienna of naturalized Parisian parents, and compelled, as
domiciled in the Empire, to serve in the army, and to enter
the regiment assigned to them. To prove the truth of what
he said, he showed his papers and those of his unlucky
comrade. Finally, yielding to the entreaty of his aides-de-
camp, Exelmans consented to spare the innocent man.

Then, hearing the sound of the fight, the general wished
to reach the head of my column ; but so rapid was the pace
at which the two regiments were pursuing the enemy, that
lie found it impossible to get within the ranks. After several
attempts to do so, he and his horse were hustled into the
Kinzig, where he was nearly drowned.

During the night the Emperor relieved the army very
materially by sending all the baggage off to Coblentz,

426 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

escorted by some battalions of infantry and the cavalry of
Lefebvre-Desnouettes and Milhau. On the morning of the
30th he had with him only Macdonald's and Victor's
infantry, 5,000 bayonets in all, and Sébastiani's cavalry.

On the side by which we approached Hanau is covered
by a great forest, through which the road passes ; the trees of
which are large enough to allow scarcely impeded movement.
The town of Hanau is on the further bank of the Blinzig.
(General Wrede, who as a rule was not devoid of military
talent, had committed the huge blunder of posting his army
with the river in its rear ; thereby depriving it of the support
offered by the fortifications of Hanau. His only means of
communication and retreat was by the bridge of .Lamboy.
No doubt the position which he occupied barred the road to
Frankfort and to France, and he thought himself well able
to stop us.

At daybreak on October 30 the battle began. It was
like a great hunting expedition. A few rounds of grape, the
fire of the infantry skirmishers, and a charge in loose order
by Sébastiani's cavalry dispersed the enemy's first line,
awkwardly posted on the edge of the wood. But when we
had advanced a little further, our squadrons could only act
in the few clearings, and the light infantry pursued the
Bavarians singly, driving them from tree to tree till they got
out of the wood. Then they were brought up by the enemy's
line, 40,000 strong, with eighty guns in its front. If the
Emperor had then had all the troops whom he brought away
from Leipzig, a vigorous attack would have mastered the
bridge, and Wrede would have paid dear for his rashness ; but
the corps of Mortier, Mannont, and Bertrand, and the great
park of artillery had been delayed by the. defiles, and
Napoleon had only 10,000 combatants at his disposal. The
enemy should have seized the opportunity for a brisk charge ;
but they did not venture it, and their hesitation allowed time
for the artillery of the guard to come up. As soon as
General Drouot, who commanded it, had fifteen pieces on
the field he opened fire ; and his line increased gradually,
till it showed fifty guns. These he caused to advance

Battle of Hanau 427

firing, though he had few troops to support him ; but this,
owing to the smoke of so great a battery, the enemy did not
find out. At last, just as a puff of wind drove the smoke
away, the chasseurs of the guard appeared.

At the sight of the bearskins the Bavarian infantry
recoiled in consternation. Wishing to check the disorder at
any cost, General Wrede made all the cavalry at his disposal
charge our guns, and in a moment the battery was sur-
rounded by a cloud of horsemen. But at the voice of their
intrepid chief, who, sword in hand, was setting the example
of a valiant resistance, the French gunners seized their
muskets and remained immovable behind the carriages,
whence they fired on the enemy at close quarters. Numbers
would, however, have triumphed, but that at the Emperor's
order tlie whole of Sébastiani's cavalry and that of the guard,
grenadiers, dragoons, chasseurs, Mamelukes, lancers, dashed
furiously on the enemy, killing a great number and dispersing
the rest. Then, flying upon the squares of Bavarian infantry,
they broke them with heavy loss, and the routed Bavarian
army fled towards the bridge and the town of Hanau.

General Wrede, being a brave man, determined, before
owning himself beaten by a force of half his own strength, to
make a fresh effort. Assembling all his available troops, he
attacked us unexpectedly. The musketry-fire suddenly drew
near to us ; again the forest re-echoed with the roar of the
cannon, the balls whistled through the trees, bringing great
branches down with a crash. The wood was too deep for the
eye to penetrate ; through the shade cast by the thick foliage
of the huge beeches one could barely see the occasional
flashes of the guns. On hearing the noise of this attack the
Kmperor sent off in that direction the grenadiers of his Old
Guard, under General Friant. These soon repulsed this last
effort of tlie enemy, who quickly left the field of battle and
rallied under shelter of the fortress of Hanau. During the
night they abandoned this also, leaving a great number of
wounded, and the French occupied the place.

We were only two short leagues from Frankfort, where
there is a stone bridge over the Main. Now, as the French

428 The Me\wirs of the Baron de Marbot

army had to march along this river to reach the French
frontier at Mainz, Napoleon sent forward General Sébastiani's
corps with a division of infentry to occupy Frankfort and
destroy the bridge, he himself with the main army bivouacking
in the forest. The high road from Hanau to Frankfort passes
close along the right bank of the Main. My friend General
Albert, who commanded the infantry which accompanied us,
had been married some years before at Offenbach, a pretty
little town on the left bank, exactly opposite the spot where,
having emerged from the forest of Hanau, we rested our horses
in the wide plain of Frankfort. Finding himself so near his
wife and children, General Albert could not resist the desire
to get news of them, and still more to reassure them of his
safety after the battles of Leipzig and Hanau. To this end
he exposed himself perhaps to more danger than in those
sanguinary engagements. Advancing in uniform and on
horseback to the edge of the stream, in spite of all we could
say, he hailed a boatman who knew him. While he was
talking to this man, a Bavarian officer, coming up at the head
of an infantry picket, ordered them to make ready, and was
about to fire on the French general. However, a number of
inhabitants and of boatmen placed themselves in front of the
muskets and stopped the soldiers from firing, for Albert was
much beloved at Offenbach. As I looked at that town where
I had just been fighting in my country's service I little
thought that I should one day take refuge there from the
proscription of the French Government, and should pass
three years there in exile.

The Emperor, on leaving the forest of Hanau, had scarcely
gone two leagues on the road to Frankfort when he learned
that the battle had begun again behind him. The Bavarian
general, who had feared after his defeat that the Emperor
would stick to his heels till he had made an end of him, when
he saw that the French army cared more about reaching the
Rhine than about pursuing him, plucked up courage and
made a smart attack on our rear-guard. But the corps of
Macdonald, Marmont, and Bertrand, who had occupied Hanau
during the night, received his army with the bayonet and

A Narrow Escape 429

overthrew it with great slaughter. General Wrede was
severely wounded, and his son-in-law, the Prince of Oettingen,
was killed. The command of the enemy's army devolved on
the Austrian general Fresnel, who gave orders for a retreat,
while we .continued our march to the Rhine unmolested,
crossing it on November 2 and 3, after a campaign in which
brilliant victories had been mingled with depressing reverses.
The cause of these last was Napoleon's mistake in quarrelling
with Austria instead of making peace after his victories in
the month of June. All Germany followed, and Napoleon
soon had the whole of Europe against him.

After our return to France the Emperor stayed only six
days at Mainz, and then went to Paris — a prompt departure
with which the army found fSftult. It was admitted that
there were strong political reasons calling him to Paris ; but it
was thought that the duty of reorganising the army also had
claims on him, and that he should have gone to and fro
between it and the capital, for experience might have taught
him that when he was absent little or nothing was done.

The last cannon-shots which I heard in 1813 were fired
at the battle of Hanau, and that day went very near to be
the last of my life. My regiment charged five times — ^twice .
upon infantry squares, once upon guns, and twice on Bavarian
cavalry ; but the greatest danger which I ran arose from the
explosion of a wagon full of shells, which took place dose to
me. As I have said, the Emperor ordered the cavahy to
make a general charge at a very difficult moment. Now, in
such a case, it is not enough for a commanding officer^ and
especially when he is engaged in a forest, to send his regi-
ment straight forward, as I have seen many do ; he must
cast a rapid glance over the ground to which his squadrons
are coming, so that he may not lead them into swampy places.
I marched, therefore, some paces in front, followed by my
regimental staff, and having beside me a trumpeter who sig-
nalled, as I bade, the obstacles which the various squadrons
would find in front of them. Although the trees stood wide
apart, the passage through the forest was difficult fi)r cavalry,
because the ground was piled with men and horses killed or

430 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

wounded, and with weapons, guns, and wagons which the
Bavarians had left. It is easy to see that it is difficult in
such a case for a colonel, as he gallops amid bullets and
cannon-balls, to examine the ground which his squadrons
have to cross, and at the same time take any thought for his
personal safety. I had to leave this to the intelligence and
nimbleness of my excellent horse Azolan; but the small
group which followed me close had been greatly thinned by a
discharge of graj^e, which had wounded many of my orderlies,
and I had only my trumpeter near me, when suddenly from
the whole line I heard shouts of ' Colonel ! colonel ! look
out ! ' and ten paces from me I saw a Bavarian artillery
wagon which one of our shells had just set on fire. A huge
tree which had been cut down by the cannon-balls barred the
road in front of Tiie. To go round would have taken me too
long. I called to the trumpeter to stoop, and, lying flat over
my saddle-bow, I took my horse at the jump. Azolan made
a long leap, but not long enough to clear all the branches,
and his legs got caught among them. Meantime the wagon
was blazing and the powder would take fire in a moment. I
gave myself up for lost, when my horse, as though he had
understood our common danger, began bounding four or five
feet high, always getting further from the wagon, and as soon
as he was clear of the branches he went off at such a stretching
gallop that he was almost literally ventre à terre, I shivered
when the explosion took place, but I must have been out of
the reach of the bursting shells, for neither my horse nor I
was touched. It was otherwise with my young trumpeter,
for when the regiment resumed its march after the explosion
they saw the poor fellow dead and horribly mutilated by the
splinters. His horse also was blown to pieces. My brave
.\zolan had saved me already at the Katzbach, and now I
owed him my life a second time. I caressed him, and, as
though to show his joy, the poor animal whinnied aloud.
There are moments when one is led to believe that some
creatures have far more intelligence than is generally
thought.

I keenly regretted my trumpeter, who was beloved by the

Virgil under Fire 431

whole regiment no less for his courage than for his general
behaviour. He was the son of a professor at the college of
Toulouse; had been through his course there, and took great
delight in spouting Latin. An hour before his death the
poor lad, having observed that nearly all the trees in the
forest of Hanau were beeches, and that their spreading
branches formed a kind of roof, found it a suitable occasion
to repeat the Eclogue of Virgil which begins with the verse

Tityre, tu patula' recubans sub tegmine fagi.

Marshal Macdonald, who happened to pass at the moment,
laughed heartily, exclaiming, ' There's a little chap whose
memory isn't disturbed by his surroundings ! It is certainly
the first time that anyone has recited Virgil under the fire of
the enemy's guns.'

' He who takes the sword shall perish with the sword,'
says tlie Scripture. If this saying does not apply to all
soldiers, it did to many of them under the Empire. M.
(luindet, who in October 1806 had killed Prince Lewis of
Prussia at Saalfeldt, was himself killed at the battle of
Hanau. No doubt it was the fear of a like fate which led
the Russian general Czernicheif to ily from the danger.
You will remember that early in 1812 that oflScer, then a
favourite aide-de-camp of the Emperor Alexander, happening
to be at Paris, had abused his position to corrupt two poor
officials in the War Office.* They were executed for selling
infonnation about the French army, while the Russian colonel
only avoided the punishment which he deserved by secretly
escaping from France. On returning to his own country,
]M. de (^zernicheff, though more of a courtier than of a soldier,
l)ecame a general, and in that capacity commanded a Cossack
division, the only Russian troops at Hanau. The part its
leader played there made him the byword of the Austrians and
Bavarians who were present at that fight. So long as Czemi-
cheff expected to meet none but sick and demoralised troops,
lie crowed loudly ; but he changed his tone when he found him-
self face to face with the veterans from Leipzig. General

[» Seep. 201.]

432 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

Wrede had at first much trouble to make him take his place
in the line, and no sooner did he hear the roar of our artillery
than with his 3,000 horsemen he trotted away ^m the
battle-field, amid the hootings of the Austrians and Bavarians.
General Wrede hurried up in person to reproach him.
Czemicheff replied that his horses wanted food, and that he
was going to bait them in the neighbouring villages. This
excuse was thought so ridiculous that before long the walls
of nearly every town in Germany were covered with carica-
tures representing Czemicheff feeding his horses on bundles
of laurel gathered in the forest of Hanau. The Germans can
be caustic sometimes.

The remnants of the French army expected when they
crossed the Rhine that their hardships would be at an end
as soon as they were on their native soil ; but they were
greatly mistaken. The Government and the Emperor him-
self had so reckoned on our success that no arrangements
had been made to receive the troops at the frontier and
reorganise them. On the very day of our entry into Mainz
the men and horses would have had no food if they had not
been billeted about in the neighbouring towns and villages.
The inhabitants, however, had had no experience of feeding
soldiers since the old Revolutionary wars. They complained
loudly, and in fact the charge fell too heavily on the
' communes.

The sick and wounded were established as well as circum-
stances permitted in the hospitals of Mainz, and in order to
watch the line of the Rhine from Basle to Holland all able-
bodied men joined the nuclei of their regiments, and the
divisions and army corps, sadly weakened, were distributed
along the river. My regiment, with what was left of
Sébastiani's corps, went down the Rhine by easy marches.
The weather was splendid, and the country lovely ; but we
were all heart-broken, foreseeing, as we did, that France was
going to lose these fair countries, and that her misfortunes
would not stop there.

After passing some time at Cleves and Urdingen, we
went on to Nimeguen. On the further bank we could see the

A Phantom Army 433

Dutch and German population tearing the French flag firom
their towers and replacing those of their old sovereign.
Amid our melancholy thoughts the colonels did their best to
reorganise their few remaining troops ; but we could do little
for want of supplies. Moreover, the necessity of feeding
the army forced the Emperor to keep it scattered ; while in
order to organise it, it should have been concentrated. Mean-
while the enemy required time to recover from the rough
handling we had given them, and were in no condition to
cross the Rhine and interfere with our reorganisation. They
left us alone, therefore, throughout November and December,
and I passed those months chiefly on the banks of the Rhine
with the phantom of an army corps commanded by Mao-
donald.

At length all the colonels received orders to take all
their men who were unmounted to the depots of their regi-
ments, and that of the 23rd Chasseurs being still at Mons, I
went there. There I saw the eventful year 1813 out — a year
in which I had borne many toils and incurred many dangers.
But before concluding my account of it I must briefly de-
scribe the closing events of the campaign.

VOL. II. FF

CHAITKU XLn

Thk (lerinau fortresses in whidi we had left garrisons w
soon invest eil, and s<.)nie of tlieni besieged. By the end of
\^\o only four wen» still standinc^. These were Hambnrv,
where the intn^jiiJ Davont succeeded in holding the place
till the Kmperor alxlicated and the ^irrison was recalled to
France ; Ma^'debuiy, wliich (îeneral Ije Marois also held till
the einlof the war: WittenhrTj,', which was bravely defended
hy«»hl <Jrnerul Li]>oyj)t\ and takt»n by assault on Janoair 12;
and, lastly, Krfurt. which had to capitulate for want of pro»
visions. All the otlu»r fortresses lind already fallen into the
hands of tiie enemy. In the case of Di-esden and Dantziff,
their «Hcupation was discréditai )le to the allied armiea.
When, after the battle of Leipzijr, Naix>leon was retreating
tn iVaii»-»* with the reninants of his aiTny, leaving 25,000
men at Hn-sden under Saint-Pyr. the marshal endeavonred
tt» cut his way throtio-li the bh»i-kading force. Several times
Iir droVf them back, 1>ut at len^Mli, overwhelmed by superior
f"rce.s, antl ^iiort of provisions, hr was constrained to
an hMuoural)le eaj)itulat ion. Th«» t erms were that the _
should retain thfir arms, that thi*y should not be prisonera of
war, and sln>uld P'turn to France by rej^ular marches. The
nutrshal would have pn- fer red that liis tnK)ps should march aa
a united army corjtf, and bivouai- to^'ethiT every night, which
would have allowed tiiein to defend themselves in the evenl
of tnvicheiy; but the enemy's panerais pointed oat that the
country* wa.^t4N) much (exhausted to furnish rations for 25«000
men in the s;ime plac** ; and. yieldinjr to necessity, the
marshal agreed to divide his tbrce into oolunns of 2,000
:{.(MM» men, who marched one or even two days' jonmejaui
During the first days all went <*n as it shonld; but

Capitula tions 43 5

soon as the last column was out of Dresden, having handed
over the forts and the munitions of war, the allied generals
declared that they had no power to sign the capitulation
without the consent of the generalissimo, Prince Schwarzen-
berg, and that as he would not ratify it it was null and
void. They offered, indeed, to let our troops return to
Dresden, putting them in exactly the position in which they
were on the day of the capitulation, that is, with provisions
for a few days only. But so long as the French occupied
the place they had concealed their destitution ; now that the
enemy knew it, their offer was, of course, illusory. Our troops
were indignant at this breach of faith ; but what could they
do ? The enemy had taken care to surround our isolated
detachments with battalions, posted previously at the places
where the news of the breach of the capitulation would re^ichthe
various columns. Resistance was out of the question, and our
people were under the sad necessity of laying down their arms.

After the treachery committed on the field of Leipzig came
the breach of capitulations, which up to then all civilised
nations held sacred. None the less have the Germans
chanted * Victory ' ; for everything, even dishonour, seemed
to them allowable in order to crush Napoleon. All the allied
sovereigns having adopted this new and iniquitous law of
nations, they put it in force with regard to the garrison of
Dantzig. After a vigorous defence of that place, General
Rapp was forced, by want of provisions, to surrender, on
condition that the garrison should return to France. Yet, in
spite of the treaty signed by the Prince of Wurtemberg, who
commanded the besieging army, this condition was basely
violated, and the brave defenders of Dantzig, to the number
of 10,000, were sent as prisoners into Russia, where most of
them perished from their hardships.

A conspicuous feature of that siege was the conduct of an
infantry captain in the garrison, M. de Chambure. This
brave and intelligent officer obtained leave to form a * free
company,' composed of picked volunteers. This band under»
took tlie most venturesome enterprises. It used to go at
night and surprise the besiegers' outposts, penetrate within

F F 2

436 The Memoirs op the Baron de Marbot

their trenches, destroy their works, spike their gnns, and go
out into the country to plunder their convoys. One night,
Chambure took boat with his men, surprised a Bussian
cantonment, set fire to an ammunition train, destroyed several
magazines, killed or wounded more than 150 men, and returned
in triumph with a loss of only three. Not long after, he
attacked a breaching battery, captured it, and spiked the
guns. Then, uniting banter to courage, he left in the
muzzle of a mortar a letter to the Prince of Wurtemberg, to
this effect : * Prince : as your shells spoil my sleep, I have
had to come and spike your mortars. Do not wake me any
more, or I shall be obliged to come and see you again.' He
did, indeed, come i^in more than once, and spread a panic
among the enemy's sappers and gunners. Horace Vemet
has made his name popular by a picture of him in the act
of depositing his letter in the mortar.

The frequent desertions which took place at this time
remind me of the following anecdote.* Among the generals
who served under Washington in the War of American
Independence, the bravest, most able, and most esteemed by
the army was General Arnold. He had lost a leg in battle,
and yet such was his patriotism that he continued to fight
against the enemies of his country. Ultimately, however,
having quarrelled with Washington, on account of some
supposed favouritism, he deserted and took service in the
British army, becoming one of the most dangerous enemies
of his countrymen. Some time afterwards an armistice
was signed. Several American oflScers advanced between
the two camps, and were met by some English oflScers,
among whom was General Arnold. A friendly conver-
sation ensued, until Arnold, perceiving that his former
friends were displeased at his presence, remarked that he was
surprised at this, for though he was fighting against them

* Many regrettable desertions took place, even among officers, from the
garrisons of the fortresses, notably from that of Dresden, which was com-
posed of troops belonging to different nations. The deserters were warmly
welcomed in the Russian camp, and fonght against us during the subse-
quent campaign in France.

Defeats in Spain 437

now, they should not forget that he had lost a leg in the
American service. Upon this an American replied, ^We
remember it quite well, and if ever yon &11 into our hands
your wooden leg shall be deposited in the Capitol to remind
our descendants of the heroic coarage yon displayed when
fighting for the independence of your country, after which
we shall hang the remainder of you on a gallows as a warning
to traitors.'

But let us return to the situation of the French armies in
December 1813. Spain, the original cause of the catastrophe
which marked the end of Napoleon's reign, had been stripped
of a great many of the best troops, who were required to
reinforce the army in Germany. There were, however, still
more than 100,000 men in the Peninsula— enough to keep
the enemy in check if Napoleon had left Marshal Soult in
command. But as he was determined to turn his brother
Joseph into a general capable of defending the kingdom
which he had given him, the Emperor entrusted the command
of the army in Spain to that highly estimable but very un-
military prince. It is true he gave him Marshal Jourdan as
chief of the staff; but Jourdan was prematurely old, and had
seen no service since the early days of the Revolution. He
was worn out, morally and physically, and inspired no confi-
dence in the troops. Thus, in spite of the ability shown by
Suchet, Beille, Foy, Clausel, and other generals who served
under King Joseph, the Anglo-Portuguese armies commanded
by Lord Wellington, and assisted by the Spanish guerrillas,
inflicted on us irreparable losses. The French had been
compelled to leave Madrid, recross the Ebro, and concentrate
their main forces round the town of Vittoria. Attacked in
that position by an army three times greater than their own,^
they lost a battle all the more disastrous in its results that
King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan had taken no precautions
to secure the retreat. The king's carriages, those of a number

[ ' The Anglo-Portaguese army numbered somewhat over 88,000, with
90 guns. The French muster-roU waA lost in the battle, but Sonlt had
probably about 60,000 combatants, and 148 of his gims were captured

(Napier).]

438 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

of Spaniards who had taken his side, and were flying from
the vengeance of their countrymen, parks of artillery, treasure
wagons, eveiything was in confusion, and the regiments
liad much difficulty in making their way thron^h. They did
not, however, break up, and, in spite of the vigorons attacks
of the enemy, the bulk of the anuy succeeded in retreating to
Pampeluna. The battle of A^ittoria did credit to the ability
and courage of General Clausel, who rallied and directed
the army. In that unhappy day the French lost 6,000 killed.
wounded, and jjrisoners, and left most of their artillery, and
nearly all their baggage, in the enemy's hands.

In spite of this check our troops might have maintained
their footing in Navarre, but King Joseph ordered them to
retreat beyond the Bidassoa, directing Greneral Foy, who
coininanded the rear-guard, to destroy the bridge. Thus, by
the end of June we had abandoned Spain in that direction.
]Marshal Suchet still held out in Aragon, Catalonia, and the
kingdom of Valencia, but after the battle of Vittoria Welling-
ton was able to send reinforcements to the south of Spain,
and Suchet had to evacuate Valencia, both kingdom and city.

At this moment the Emperor was still triumphant io
Gei*many. As soon as he learned the state of affairs beyond
the Pyrenees he hastened to revoke the powera he had given
to Joseph and Jourdan, and ai)pointed Marshal Soult his
lieutenant-general over all the Spanish armies. After re-
organising the divisions Soult made a great effort to succoui
the French garrison left in l^impeluna; but the place ww
obliged to capitulate, and he had to take his troops back
across the Bidassoa. The fortress of St. Sebastian, undei
its brave governor, General liey, held out for a long time;
but it was finally taken by assault, and the English and
Poituguese, oblivious of all lunnanity, pillaged, violated, and
massacred the unhappy inhabitants, allies though they "vvere
The English oflicers took no ste])s to put a stop to these
atrocities, which, to the disgrace of Wellington, his generals
and the English nation, went on for three whole days.*

[ ' Roadors of Naj)ier will remember the indignant tone in which hi
speaks of the atrocities committed by some of the English and Portug^eai

France Invaded 439

Foot by foot Soult defended the Pyrenees, and beat
Wellington several times ; but the superior forces at the
disposal of the latter allowed him to return incessantly to
the attack, until he succeeded in establishing himself within
our frontiers, and fixing his headquarters at St, Jean de
Luz, the firet French town, which had never been lost to
France, either by the defeats of Francis I. or the disastrous
wars at the end of the reign of Louis XIV,

It is hard to believe that after the desertion of the German
troops at Leipzig Marshal Soult should have thought that
he could keep German soldiers in the Army of the Pyrenees.
In one night they all went over to the enemy and increased
Wellington's forces. However, Soult collected several divisions
under the ramparts of Bayonne, and attacked the English
again. On December 9 a battle began which lasted five
days, and was one of the most bloody of the war. It cost
the enemy 16,000 men, and the French 10,000 ; but they,
nevertheless, took up their position again round Bayonne,

Before this, Marshal Suchet, having heard in October of
Napoleon's reverses in Germany, understood that he could no
longer hold out in the south of Spain, and prepared to draw
nearer to France. Retreating on Tarragona, he blew up the
ramparts, and added the garrison to his army. His retreat,
though molested by the Spaniards, was effected in good order,
and by the end of December 1813 he and his troops were
established at Gerona.

To complete our view of the situation of the French
armies at the end of 1813, we must remember that in the
spring of that year the Emperor had assembled in Tyrol, and
in his kingdom of Italy, a numerous army under his stepson,
i']iigène Beauharnais. That prince was a man of a kind and
gentle disposition, and very devoted to the Emperor; but,
though a far better soldier than Joseph, he fell very far short
of being lit to command an army. On this point the
Emperor was misled by the affection he felt for him. On

sol<licrs at the capture of St. Sebastian, and also the manner in which
English and Portuguese officers, at the risk, and in some cases at the cost,
of their own lives, exerted themselves to get the men in hand again.J

440 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

August 28, the day on which the armistice between Napoleon
and the allies was to end in Germany, the Austrians, who
had hitherto been neutral, declared themselves our enemies
beyond the Alps. Hostilities were never very active, for the
chiefs on both sides understood that the success of the cam-
paign would depend upon the result of events in Germany.
Still there were frequent combats with varying fortunes ; but
the superior forces of the Austrians, who were soon joined by
an English corps, ultimately compelled the viceroy to with-
draw the Franco-Italian army across the Adige.

In November came the news of the defection of Murat,
King of Naples. The Emperor, to whom he owed every-
thing, could not at first believe it ; but it was only too real.
Murat had joined his flag to that of Austria, and his troops
were already in occupation of Bologna. Such is the fickleness
of Italians that they everywhere greeted the Austrians and
Neapolitans, whom they had hated before, and soon after-
wards hated still more bitterly. In December the viceroy's
army, 43,000 strong only, occupied Verona and the neigh-
bourhood.

On seeing all Europe in coalition against him Napoleon
could not hide from himself that the first condition of peace
imposed on him would be the re-establishment of the Bourbons
on the throne of Spain. He resolved, therefore, to do of
his own proper motion what he foresaw he would presently be
compelled to do. He restored King Ferdinand VII. to liberty,
and ordered Suchet*s army to retire on the Pyrenees.

Thus at the end of 1813 we had lost all Germany, all
Spain, and most of Italy ; while Wellington's army had
crossed the Bidassoa, and was encamped on French territory,
threatening Bayonne, Navarre, and the district of Bordeaux.

CHAPTER XLIII

I BEGAN the year 1814 at Mons. Physically, I ran no
dangers that year equal to those of its predecessors ; but I
underwent far greater moral suffering.

All my troopers who were still mounted having remained
at Nimeguen, I found at the depot only men in want of
horses. These I was trying to supply from the Ardennes,
when the course of events interfered. On January 1, after
nearly three months' hesitation, the enemy crossed the Rhine
at several points. The two most important were Caub, be-
tween Bingen and Coblentz, close to the Lurlei ; and Basle,
where the Swiss violated their neutrality by throwing open
the bridge. They have a way of insisting on or renouncing
their neutrality according to their interests of the moment.

The number of the invading troops was reckoned at
500,000 to 600,000. France was exhausted by twenty-five
years of war ; more than half her soldiers were prisoners in
foreign lands, and many of her provinces were ready to break
away on the first opportunity ; among them, that to which
Mons, the capital of the department of Jemmapes, belonged.
This broad and rich country, annexed at first to France de
fficto by the war of 1792, and then de jure by the Treaty of
Amiens, had grown so accustomed to the union that it had
distinguished itself after the Russian disaster by the zeal
which it displayed in helping the Emperor to restore his
army to its former footing, and the willingness with which it
complied with all kinds of requisitions. But our losses in
Germany had taken heart out of the Belgians, and I found the
spirit of the population changed. There was regret for the
old paternal government of Austria, and a keen desire for
separation from France, and the perpetual wars which were

442 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

ruining commerce and industry. In short, Belgium was only
awaiting the opportunity to revolt ; and owing to her position
in rear of the weak army corps which we had on the Rhine,
nothing could have been more dangerous for us. The
Emperor accordingly sent troops to Brussels under General
Maison, a man of ability and solid character.

After visiting various departments he found that that of
Jemmapes, and especially the town of Mons, was deeply
disaffected. People talked openly of taking men against the

weak garrisons ; nor could the commandant, General ,

gouty, old, and indolent, as a native of Belgium, besides,
afraid of compromising himself in the eyes of his countrymen,
have done anything to hinder it. General Maison relieved
him of his functions, and appointed me commandant of the
department of Jemmapes. It was a diflScult duty ; for next
to the men of Liège, those of Mons and its district are the
boldest and most turbulent in all Belgium ; while to keep
them in check I had only, a battalion of 400 recruits, some
gendannes, and 200 dismounted troopers of my own regi-
ment, fifty of whom were natives of those parts. All I
could really count on, therefore, were the remaining 150
chasseurs, who, being French by birth, and having all fought
under me, would have followed me anywhere. The officers
were good ; and those of the infantry, especially the major,
were perfectly willing to back me up. Yet I could not but
see that if we came to blows the odds would be great. From
my hotel I could see every day 3,000 or 4,000 peasants and
artisans, armed with big sticks, assembling in the square and
listening to the talk of certain retired Austrian officers.
These men, all wealthy and of good family, had left the
service when Belgium was joined to France, and now preached
against the Empire, which had loaded them with taxes,
can-ied their children off to the wars, and so forth. This
talk found all the readier listeners for being addressed by
great landowners to their tenants and persons whom they
employed, and over whom they had great influence.

Every day, too, brought news of the enemy's advance
from Brussels, driving before them the remnants of Mao-

Maintaining Order 443

donald's corps. All French oflScials left the department to
take refuge at Valenciennes and Cambrai. Finally, the mayor
of Mens, M. Duval de Beaulieu, felt bound in honour to
warn me that I and my small garrison were no longer safe
amid the excited populace, and that I had better evacuate
the town. No hindrance would be offered, as the regiment
had lived on perfectly good terms with the inhabitants. This
proposal came, I was aware, from a committee of ex- Austrian
officers, and they had sent it through the mayor in the hope
of intimidating me. Therefore I determined to show my
teeth, and begged M. Duval to summon a meeting of the
town council and notables, when I would reply to the proposal
he had made. Half an hour later my garrison was under
anns ; and as soon as the town councU, accompanied by the
wealthier inhabitants, appeared in the square, I mounted my
horse so that all could hear, and, having told the mayor that
before talking to him and the council I had an important
order to give my troops, I imparted to them the proposal
whicli had been made that we should leave without a fight
the town which had been given into our keeping. They
were indignant, and said so plainly. I added that no doubt
the ramparts were broken down in many places and had no
guns, so that it would be difficult to defend them against
regular troops ; but that if, contrary to the law of nations,
the civil population of the town and district rose against us,
we need not confine ourselves to the defensive, but should
treat them as rebels, and have the right to attack them by
every means in our power. I therefore ordered my men to
take possession of the belfry, and thence, after half-an-hour's
delay and three summons by beat of drum, to fire on the
crowd in the square ; while patrols were to clear the streets,
shooting down especially the country people, who had left
their work to make trouble for us. Lastly, I ordered that,
fighting once begun, the town was to be set on fire to occupy
the inhabitants, and that in order to prevent the flames from
being extinguished the men were to keep firing on the burning
quarters.

This speech will seem to you pretty brutal ; but think of

444 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

ray critical position. With only 700 men, few of whom had
seen any fighting, I was snrronnded by a multitude which
increased every moment, and the oflScer in command on the
tower told me that all the roads leading to the town were
covered with dense masses of colliers from the mines of
Jemmapes, making their way to Mons. If I did not act
with energy my little band was in danger of being crashed.
The nobles who had promoted the rising, and the inhabitants
of the town, felt the force of my discourse, and began to
withdraw ; but the peasants did not stir ; so I ordered up
two wagons of ammunition and distributed a hundred
cartridges to each soldier. Then I gave the order to load,
and bade the drums beat the three rolls which were to pre-
cede a volley. At the dreaded signal the crowd fled in
disorder into the nearest streets, and in a few moments the
leaders of the Austrian party, with the mayor at their head^
came to shake me by the hand and implore me to spare the
town. I agreed on condition that they would instantly order
the colliers and workmen to return home. They accepted
eagerly ; and the young men of fashion who had the best
horses galloped out at every gate, met the crowds, and sent
them back without any demur to their villages. This ready
obedience confirmed my belief that the movement had power-
ful leaders, and that I and my garrison would soon have been
prisoners had I not frightened the promoters by threatening to
use all means, even arson, rather than give in to insurgents.

The Belgians are great musicians. That evening there
was to be an amateur concert, to which my oflScers and I, as
well as the prefect of the department, were invited. We
settled to go as if nothing had happened, and we did rightly ;
for, so far as appearances went, we were perfectly well
received. As we chatted with the leaders of the movement
we pointed out to them that the fate of Belgium was to be
decided not by the population in rebellion, but by the belli-
gerent armies, and that it would be madness in them to excite
labourers and peasants to fight and shed blood in order ta
hasten by a few days a decision for which they should wait.

An old retired Austrian general, a native of Mons, then

P /RUSSIAN Cossacks 445

told his fellow-townsmen that they had done very wrong in
plotting the capture of the garrison. It would have brought
calamity on the town, since soldiers may never surrender
without a fight. All admitted the justice of this, and from
that day garrison and inhabitants lived on the same good
terms as before. A few days later the people of Mons gave
us a striking proof of their loyalty, under the following cir-
cumstances. As the allied army advanced a crowd of
vagabonds, chiefly Prussians, got themselves up like Cossacks,
and, urged by the lust of plunder, fell upon everything
which had been official property during the French occupa-
tion, seizing even without scruple the property of individuals
not belonging to the army. A strong band of these pre-
tended Cossacks made their way even to the gates of Brussels
and looted the château of Tervueren, carrying off all the
horses of the stud which the Emperor had formed there.
Then, breaking up into detachments, they went marauding all
over Belgium. Coming into the department of Jemmapes,
they tried to bring about a rising, and when this did not
succeed they thought it was owing to the fact that Mons was
deterred from pronouncing for them by the fear which the
colonel commanding there had inspired among the people.
They determined, therefore, to carry me off or kill me ; but
in order not to arouse my suspicions by employing too many
men on that service, they sent only three hundred. The
leader of these partisans must have had good information, for,
knowing that I had too few people to guard properly the old
gates and half-demolished ramparts, he brought his horsemen
close to the town on a dark night, and the greater part of
them, dismounting, made their way in silence through the
streets in the direction of the Hôtel de la Poste, where I had
at first lodged. But since hearing that the enemy had crossed
the lihine I had taken to going every evening to the barracks
and passing the night with my troops. It was lucky I did,
for the German Cossacks surrounded the hotel, rummaged all
the rooms, and in their rage at finding no French officers fell
out with the landlord. They ill-treated him, plundered him,
and got drunk, men and officers alike, on his best wine.

446 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

A Belgian named Courtois, formerly corporal in my
regiment, for whom, as one of my best soldiers, I had ob-
tained the Legion of Honour, entered the hotel at that
moment. He had lost a leg in Russia in the previous year,
and I had been fortunate enough to save his life by procuring
for him the means of returning to France. For this he was
so grateful that while I was at Mons in the winter of 1814
he oft^n came to see me, on those occasions putting on the
UTiifomi of the 23rd Chasseurs, which he had so honourably
worn. Now it happened that on the night in question.
Courtois, being on his way back to the house of a relation with
whom he was staying, saw the enemy's detachment making
for the Hôtel de la Poste. Although the brave corporal
knew that I no longer stopped there, he wished to make sure
that his colonel was not in any danger, and boldly walked
into the hotel, taking his relation with him. At the sight of
the French uniform and the decoration the Prussians were
infamous enough to assault the poor maimed man, and try
to tear the cross from his breast. The old soldier tried to
defend his decoration; the Prussian Cossacks killed him,
dragged his body into the street, and continued their orgies.

In proportion to my weak garrison, Mons was so large
that I had fortified myself in the barrack and concentrated
my right defence on that point, forbidding my soldiers to go
in the direction of the great square. I had been informed
that the enemy were there, but I did not know their strength,
and feared that the inhabitants might unite with them. But
as soon as these latter heard of the murder of their compatriot
Courtois, a man esteemed by all the neighbourhood, they
resolved to avenge him, and, forgetting for the moment their
grudge against the French, they deputed the brother of Courtois
and some of the most prominent and bravest among them-
selves to ask me to put myself at their head and drive out
the Cossacks. No doubt the excesses which these people
had committed in the hotel made every citizen fear for his
own family and house, and had quite as much as the death
of Courtois to do with their desire to turn the Cossacks out.
rhey would, no doubt, have acted very differently if regular

The End of a Raid 447

troops had entered the town instead of marauders and
assassins. Nevertheless, I thought it my duty to profit by
the goodwill of the inhabitants, and, taking part of my force,
I went towards the square. Meanwhile the infantry major,
who knew the town well, went, by my orders, with the
remainder, and formed an ambuscade near the breach by
which the Prussian Cossacks had got into the place.

At the first shots which our people fired on the scamps
the hotel and the square were in a tumult. Those of the
enemy who were not killed on the spot made off as fast as
their legs would carry them, but a good many lost their way
in the streets, and were polished off in detail. As for those
who got as far as the spot where they had left their horses
fastened to the trees on the promenade, they found the major
there, and were received by a volley at close quarters. When
day came, we counted, in the town or on the breach, more
than 200 of the enemy dead, while we had not lost a single
man, for our adversaries were too stupefied by wine and
strong drink to be able to defend themselves. Such of them
as survived the surprise slipped along the ruins of the old
ramparts and made off into the country. There they were all
captured or killed by the peasants, who were furious at hear-
ing of the death of poor Courtois. He was regarded as the
glory of the neighbourhood ; the people called him wooden-leg^
and he was as dear to them as another wooden-leg, General
Daumesnil, was to the people of the Paris suburbs.

I do not quote the combat at Mons as anything to be
vain about, for with the National Guards I had 1,200 or 1,400
men, while the Prussian Cossacks were not much more than
300 ; but T thought T would relate this curious engagement to
show how fickle is the spirit of the masses. All the peasants
and colliers, who a month before had come in a crowd to
exterminate, or at least disarm, the handful of French left in
iMons, had now taken sides with them against the Prussians
because the Prussians had killed one of their countrymen.
I was very sorry, too, for the brave Courtois, who had fallen a
victim to his attachment for me. The most important trophy
of our victory was the three hundred and odd horses which

44^ The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

the enemy had left in our hands. They came nearly all from
the district of Berg, and were very good, so I embodied them
in my regiment, for which this unexpected re-mount came
very conveniently.

I passed another month at Mons in perfect friendship
with the inhabitants, but the advance of the enemy's armies
became so serious that the French had to leave not only
Brussels, but all Belgium, and re-enter the frontiers of France
proper. I was ordered to bring the depot of my regiment to
Cambrai, where, with the horses which we had taken from the
Prussian Cossacks, I was able to replace in the ranks three
hundred good troopers returned from Leipzig, and thus to
form two fine squadrons, which, under Major Sigaldi, were
shortly sent to the army which the Emperor had assembled
in Champagne. They attracted notice there, and sustained
the credit of the 23rd Chasseurs, particularly at the battle of
Champaubert, where Captain Duplessis was killed.

I have always had a great predilection for the lance, a
terrible weapon in the hands of a good horseman. I therefore
obtained permission to distribute to my squadrons the lances
which the artillery officers could not bring away when they
evacuated the Rhine fortresses. So well were they appre-
ciated that several other cavalry regiments also asked for them,
and were glad to have got them.

The regimental depots being obliged to move to the left
bank of the Seine to avoid falling into hands of the enemy,
mine went txi Nogent-le-Roi. We had a good number of
troopers, but scarcely any horses. The Government was
making great efforts to collect some at Versailles, where a
central cavalry depot had been created under the command
of General Preval. Like his predecessor, Geneml Bourcier,
he understood the details of organisation much better than
war, of which he had seen very little. He discharged his
difficult duty very well ; but as he could not improvise horses
or equipments, and was particular about not sending out any
but well-organised detachments, they went off very slowly.
I groaned over thi.s, but no colonel could join the army with-
out an order from the Emperor, and, to economise his resources

A Sad Time 449

he had forbidden any more oflBcers to be sent to the war than
were proportionate to the number of men that they had to
command. In vain, therefore, did I beg General Préval to
let me go to Champagne ; he fixed my departure for the end
of March, at which date I was to join the army with a so-
called ' marching ' regiment, composed of mounted men from
my depot and some others. Till then I was allowed to reside
at Paris with my family ; for my lieutenant-colonel, M. Case-
neuve, could command and organise the 200 men who were
still at Nogent-le-Roi, and I could always inspect them in a
few hours. In Paris therefore I passed most of the month of
March, one of the saddest times of my life, although I was
with those who were dearest to me. But the Imperial
Government to which I was attached, and which I had so long
defended at the cost of my blood, was crumbling on all sides.
From Lyons the enemy's armies occupied a great part of
France, and it was easy to see that they would soon reach
the capital.

VOL. II. G G

CHAPTER XLIV

The strongest opponents of the Emperor are compelled to
admit that in the winter campaign of the first three months
of 1814 he surpassed himself. Never did general display
such talents or do so much with such feeble resources. With
a few thousand men, a great part of whom were untried
recruits, he made head against all the armies of Europe ;
showing a front in every direction with the same troops,
whom he carried about with a marvellous rapidity. Making
clever use of the defensive resources of the country, he flew
from Austrians to Russians, from Russians to Prussians ; from
Blucher back to Schwarzenberg and Sachen, sometimes
repulsed, but more often victorious. There was even at one
moment a hope of chasing the strangers out of French terri-
tory. One more effort on the part of the nation would have
done it ; but there was a wide-spread weariness of war, and
conspiracies against the Empire everywhere, especially at
Paris. Several military writers have expressed surprise that
France did not rise as in 1792 to repel the invaders, or at
least form, like the Spaniards, a focus of national defence in
every province. To this the answer is, that twenty-five
years of war, and the conscription too frequently anticipated,
had worn out the enthusiasm which in 1 792 had improvised
armies. In most departments only old men and boys
remained. The example of Spain does not apply to France.
Paris has been allowed to gain too much influence, and unless
she puts herself at the head of the movement, France is
helpless. In Spain, on the other hand, each province, being
a little government, could act and raise an army, even when
the French held Madrid. France was ruined by centralisa-
tion.

»i

The Last Defence 451

It forms no part of my plan to relate the feats of the
French army in the campaign of 1814. One would have to
write volumes and notice all that has been published on the
subject ; nor have I the heart to dwell on the misfortunes of my
country. I will only say, therefore, that after disputing every
foot of the ground between the Marne, the Aube, the Saône,
and the Seine, the Emperor devised a great scheme which must
have saved France if it had succeeded. This was to march
upon Lorraine and Alsace, by Saint-Dizier and Vitry, thereby
threatening the enemy's rear, and alarming him for his com-
munications, and thus forcing him to retire to the frontier
while he could. But two conditions were needed to bring this
superb strategic movement to a good issue, and these were not
satisfied. They were loyalty on the part of the great state
officials, and some means of preventing the enemy from
marching on Paris in case he took no notice of the Emperor's
march on his rear. Unhappily the loyalty of the Chambers
had been so weakened that it was their principal members,
Talleyrand, the Duke of Dalberg, and others who secretly
kept the allied sovereigns informed of the disaffection of the
upper classes, and invited them to attack the capital. As
regards defences, I must confess that sufficient provision had
not been made. The gates on the right bank had been
palisaded, but no works thrown up to contain cannon. The
garrison, consisting of a few line troops, pensioners, and
Polytechnique students, was insufficient even to attempt
resistance ; so that on leaving the capital in January the
Emperor had entrusted the defence of Paris to the National
Ouard. The officers of that citizen militia had met at the
Tuileries, and replied after their wont by many oaths and
warlike declarations to the Emperor's ardent discourse. He
named the Empress regent, and appointed as lieutenant-
general in chief command his brother Joseph, the ex-King of
Spain, the best of men, and the most unmilitary.

Deluding himself with the belief that the safety of the
capital was thus provided for, Napoleon thought that he
might safely leave it to its own resources for a few days,
while he carried out his plan of attacking the enemy's rear

o o 2

452 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

and started for Lorraine towai*ds the end of March. But he
had marched only a few days when he learnt that, instead oi'
pursuing him, the allies were making for Paris, driving before
them the weak remains of Marmont's and Mortier's corps ;
and that these, with but small aid from the National Guard,
were trying to defend the heights of Montmartre. His eyea
opened by this news, Napoleon led his columns back at once
towards Paris.

By March 30, travelling rapidly and unescorted, he had
passed Moret when he heard the sound of guns, and hoped
then to enter the capital before the allies. Ilis presence
would have produced a great effect on the people, who were
asking for anns ; but though there were plenty in store,
Clarke would not allow them to be served out. On reaching
Fromenteau, five leagues only from Paris, Napoleon heard
tlie guns no longer, and knew that the city was in the power
of the enemy. At Villejuif this was confirmed ; and, in fact,
Marmont had just signed the capitulation. The Empress
and her son, the King of Rome, had, on the approach of
danger, been removed to Blois, and Joseph soon followed them.
The troops evacuated Paris by the Fontainebleau gate, on the
road by which the Emperor was expected.

It is impossible to give any idea of the agitation which
prevailed. Few of the inhabitants had foreseen an invasion ;
and as for me, who had expected it, and had seen the horrors
of war so near, 1 was in great trouble to know where I could
place my wife and little child in safety. The kind old
Marshal Serurier offered them shelter at tlie Invalides, of
which he was governor, and I was calmed by the thought
that as the French had always respected the places where old
soldiers lived, the enemy would do the same. So I took my
family there, and left Paris before the allies entered. I
reporttMl myself to General Preval at Versailles, and he put
me in command of a small column formed of troopers from
my own regiment and from the 9th and 1 2th Chasseurs, with
orders to rende/AOUs the same day at Rambouillet. There I
found my horses and outfit, and took the command of my
squadrojis.

Capitulation of Paris 453

The road was covered with the carriages of persons
leaving the capital. This did not surprise me ; but I could
not understand whence came the great number of troops of
different arms who arrived from all sides in detachments large
enough, if combined, to have formed a body capable of stopping
the enemy before Montmartre, and gaining time for our army
to come up from Champagne. But the Emperor, misled by
his War Minister, had given no orders on this point, and pro-
bably did not know that he still had such means of defence
remaining. The following statement of what these were is
from official documents. At Vincennes, the École militaire^
and the central artillery depot were 400 guns and over 50,000
new muskets. Joseph and Clarke had at their disposal
the tr(K>ps brought by Marshals Mortier and Marmont, to the
number of 19,000 ; 7,000 or 8,000 soldiers in the barracks of
Paris ; 3,000 at the depots of the imperial guard ; 15,000 to
1 8,000 dismounted troopers in Versailles and the neighbour-
hood ; 1 8,000 to 20,000 recruits intended for the line regi-
ments, and National Guards in the barracks of the villages
round Paris ; more than 2,000 oflBcers on leave or retired who
came to offer their services; and lastly, 20,000 workmen,
nearly all old soldiers, who begged to be allowed to aid in the
defence of Paris : in all, an effective strength of 80,000
men, who could have been got together in a few hours and.
made use of to defend the capital till Napoleon and his army
could come up.

Joseph and Clarke got warning of the approach of the
enemy on the morning of March 28, and thus had forty-eight
liours in which to make use of these resources, but took no
steps to do so. Finally, to crown their bungling, they sent
4,000 of the best men in the imperial guard out of Paris
to reinforce the already needlessly numerous escort of the
I'^mpress, at the moment when the enemy was attacking
Romain vil le.

As soon as Napoleon learnt that Paris had capitulated,
and that the two small corps of Marmont and Mortier were
withdrawing to join him, he ordered them to take up a
position at Essonnes, half-way between Paris and Fontaine-

454 J^^^ Memoirs of the B^iron de Marbot

bleau, aad went himself to the latter town as the heads of
the columns returned from Saint-Dizier were reaching it,
which shows that his intention was to march on Paris, The
enemy's generals have since admitted that if the Emperor
had attacked them, they would not have dared to accept
battle. Behind them was the Seine, and Paris with its
million inhabitants, who might rise during the battle, barri-
cade the streets and bridges, and cut off their retreat. They
had, therefore, determined to retire, and encamp on the
heights of Belleville, Montmartre, and Chaumont, which-
command the right bank of the Seine and the road to
Germany.

But fresh events detained them in I^aris. M. de Talley-
rand, once a bishop, now married, had been to all appearance
most devotedly attached to the Emperor, who had made him
Prince of Benevento, Grand Chamberlain, and so on. But
his pride was hurt at being no longer Napoleon's first confidant
and director of his policy, and he had, since the disasti*ouâ
Russian campaign, put himself at the head of the smothered
opposition set up by the malcontents of all parties, and
especially the aristocracy of the Faubourg Saint-Germain.
In the days of his prosperity they had submitted to and even
served Napoleon ; now they were his enemies, and without
openly compromising themselves, attacked him by all avail-
able means. Tlie chiefs were such men as the Abbé de
Pradt, Archbishop of Malines, M. de Chateaubriand, M.
Laisné, and others, all able men, who, directed by Talleyrand,
the ablest intriguer of them all, had for some time been
looking out for a chance of upsetting Napoleon. They saw
that they would never have one more favourable than the
present. But though Napoleon was at the moment greatly
weakened, he was not quite beaten. Besides the army which
had just done such wonders under him, there were Suchet's
between the Pyrenees and the Garonne, numerous troops
under Soult, and two fine divisions at Lyons. The Army of
Italy was still formidable; and thus, though the English
were in occupation of Bordeaux, Napoleon could still collect
a large force and prolong the war indefinitely if he raised

White Cockades Again 455

the population, whom the enemy's requisitions had exas-
perated.

M. de Talleyrand and his party saw that if they allowed
the Emperor time to bring up all these troops to Paris, he
might beat the allies in the streets, or retire to the loyal
provinces and continue the war till he tired the enemy into
making peace. The government must be changed. But
there was the diflBculty. They wanted to restore the Bour-
bons, while part of the nation wished to leave Napoleon on
the throne, or call his son to it. There was the same differ-
ence of opinion among the allies ; the Kings of England and
Prussia being on the side of the Bourbons, while the Emperor
of Russia, who never liked them, was disposed to support
the interests of Napoleon's son.

In order to settle the question by taking the first step,
and as it were to force the hand of the allied sovereigns,
Talleyrand caused a score of young aristocrats to appear on
horseback on the Place Louis XV. wearing white cockades.
Led by Viscount Talon, an old comrade of mine, from whom
I have the details, they made their way towards the Emperor
Alexander's hotel, loudly shouting, ' Long^ live Louis XVIII. !
Down with the tyrant ! ' At first the bystanders were merely
stupefied ; presently the crowd began to threaten, and the most
resolute members of the cavalcade wavered. The first outburst
of royalism had missed fire, but they repeated the scene at
various points. Sometimes they were hooted, sometimes
applauded. The Parisians required a cry to arouse them, and
that which Talon and his friends had started resounded all day
in the ears of the Emperor Alexander. In the evening Talley-
rand was able to say to him, ' Your Majesty can judge for
yourself with what unanimity the country desires the restora-
tion of the Bourbons.' From that moment, though Napoleon's
partisans, as the events of the next year showed, were many
more than those of Louis XVIII. , his cause was lost.

EPILOGUE

General MxVHbot's * Meraoîrs ' end with the first abdication
of Xapoleon, so that we lose what we would gladly have had
— his reminiscences of the Elba and Waterloo period ; though
a few letters exist giving some scanty details with regard to
the Waterloo campaign. From an article by M. Cuvillier-
Fleuiy, published in the ' Journal des Débats ' shortly after
the general's death, we learn that at the first Bestoration he
was maintained in the army, and placed in command of the
7th Hussars. As might be expected when Napoleon returned,
Marbot and his regiment.went back to their former allegiance,
and at Waterloo they formed part of the corps under the
Count of Erlon ; being posted on the extreme right of the
French line. On April 10 he had written:

I have to guard the line from Mouchin to Chéreng. It is not
much trouble to do, for the English do not stir, and are as quiet
at Toumay as if they were in London. I think that everytliing
will pass off peaceably.

Writing from Saint- Amand in the following month, he
still reports all quiet ; the enemy's troops deserting in heaps ;
men flocking ' thick as flies ' to the French regiments.
* People think there will be no fighting. Here we think that
almost certain.'

By June lo the complexion of affairs is changed, and he
writes from Pont-sur-Sambre : ' I do not think there will be
a battle for another five days ' — a very accurate forecast*
After the affair of June 17 at Genappe, Marbot was promoted
major-general ; but this appointment did not take effect.
The following letter, written on June 26 from Laon, gives
Marbot's fresh impressions of Waterloo :

W A TE /e LOO 457

I cannot get over our defeat. We were manœuvred like
so many pumpkins. I was with my regiment on the right flank
of the army almost throughout the battle. They assured me that
Marshal Grouchy would come up at that point ; and it was
guarded only by my regiment with three guns and a battalion of
infantry — not nearly enough. Instead of Grouchy, what arrived
was Blucher's corps. You can imagine how we were served.
We were driven in, and in an instant the enemy was on our rear.
The mischief might have been repaired, but no one gave any orders.
The big generals were making bad speeches at Paris ; the small
ones lose their heads, and all goes wrong. I got a lance- wound
in the side ; it is pretty severe, but I thought I would stay to
set a good example. If everyone had done the same we might
yet get along ; but the men are deserting, and no one stops them.
Whatever people may say, there are 50,000 men in this neigh-
iDourhood who might be got together ; but to do it we should
liave to make it a capital offence to quit your post, or to give
leave of absence. Every lx)dy gives leave, and the coaches are
full of officers departing. You may judge if the soldiers stay.
There will not be one left in a week, unless they are checked by
the death penalty. The Chambers can save us if they like ; but
we must have severe measures and prompt action. No food is
sent to us, and so the soldiers pillage our poor France as if they
were in Russia. I am at the outposts, before Laon ; we have
]:>een made to promise not to fire, and all is quiet.

In a letter written fifteen years later to General E. de
Grouchy, Marbot enters more into detail. From this we
learn that his regiment formed part of the force which was
thrown back en potence on the extreme right, fronting the
stream of the Dyle, as may be seen in any plan of the battle.
The Emperor's instructions, conveyed to him by his old
comrade Labedoycre, who was then acting as aide-de-camp to
Napoleon, were, while keeping the bulk of his force in view
of the iield of battle, to push forward his outposts towards
Saint- Lambert and Ottignies ; leaving a line of cavalry
pickets a quarter of a league apart one from the other, so
that when Grouchy arrived the news might be passed
along without delay. One of these detachments reached
Moustier about 1 p.m., and the officer in command at once

458 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

sent back word that the French troops posted on the right bank
of the Dyle were crossing the river — i.e. falling back. This
intelligence was forwarded to the Emperor, and an orderly
officer soon came with orders to Marbot to push as far a»
possible in the direction of Wavre. Near Saint-Lambert one
of his sections fell in with some Prussian cavalry, capturing
an oflBcer and a few men. These were promptly sent to the
Emperor, and Marbot hastened with a squadron towards
Saint-Lambert. There he saw a strong column advancing^
and again sent intelligence to headquarters. But the reply
was that it could be nothing but Grouchy ; that the prisoners
were doubtless some Prussian stragglers flying before his
advance, and that Marbot might go forward boldly. Of
course he had to obey orders ; but soon had proof positive as
to the nature of the advancing column. After hard fighting
he had to retire, again reporting the circumstances to the
Emperor. So possessed, however, was Napoleon with his own
view of the case, that he merely sent back the adjutant with
orders to Marbot * to let Grouchy know.' By this time his-
outposts were all falling back, and soon he was closely en-
gaged with the English left, near Frischermont, and received
the wound which he mentions in the letter already quoted.
A report which he drew up later in the year at the instance-
of Davout, then Minister of War, has unfortunately dis-
appeared.

AAer Waterloo, Marbot had to leave France ; and during
the period of his exile, which he spent in Germany, he com-
posed the work by which until the appearance of the present
Memoirs he was best known — a criticism on General Bogniart's
' Considérations sur l'Art de la Guerre.' It was this which
earned the flattering reference to him, accompanying a legacy
of 100,000 francs, in Napoleon's will. * I bid Colonel Marbot,'
he says, ' continue to ^vrite in defence of the glory of the
French armies, and to the confusion of calumniators and
apostates.' (Bogniart had criticised the conduct of the
Essling campaign, as Marbot mentions on pp. 438, 439, or
the first volume.)

In 1818 Marbot was recalled to France and placed ott

The Last Wound 459

half- pay. He occupied his leisure by writing another book,
' On the Necessity of Increasing the Military Forces of France/
which was well thought of. Presently his services were
again in request, and in 1829 he was placed in command of
the 8th Chasseurs. In the following year he became aide-de-
camp to the Duke of Orleans, and a second time attained the
rank of major-general. From that time till the fall of the
monarchy 'of July' he was constantly employed. He re-
ceived one more wound, when he was nearly sixty years old.
During the Medeah expedition in Algiers he was hit by a
a bullet in the left knee. As he was being carried to the
rear, he remarked with a smile to the Duke : 'This is your
fault, sir.' ' How so ? ' naturally said the Duke. ' Did I not
hear you say, before the fighting began, that if any of your
staff got wounded, you could bet it would be Marbot ? You
see you have won ! ' On the death of the Duke in 1842, he
was attached to the staff of the Count of Paris, then a child
of four years old ; a post which at all events may have kept
the veteran out of danger. In 1848 he was placed for the
last time on the retired list; and in November 1854 his
honourable life came to an end. Few men of that age seem,
to have left a more creditable record.

INDEX

ABE

Abknsbebo (battle), i. 371
Abrantès, Dake of. See Jonot
Abrantès, Duchess of (Mme Junot),

ii. 12 9q,
A(lam, Mme, i. 156
Agreda, i. 340

Aguesseao, Captain d', il. 77, 139
Aister, Herr von, i. 260
Albert, General, i. 134, 246 9qq.^ 252 ;

u. 232, 24 J , 243, 428
Albert of Saxony, Prince, i. 231
Albuquerque, Marquis Serafino d', i.

330, 368, 367, 387, 418 «j'., 421
Alexander I. (Emperor of Russia), i.

184, 187, 193, 196, 206, 215, 2%^8qq. ;

ii. 200, 204, 211, 213, 215, 223 «^.,

272, 276, 279, 342, 356, 364, 372,

455
Algiers, ii. 469
Almeida, ii. 86, 165 êqq.
Aloma, Marquis of (General), iL 107,

124
Amiens, i. 113 ; ii. 441
Amy, Colonel, ii. 117
Andalusia, i, 323
Andréossi, General, ii. 202
Angoulême, Duke of, ii. 193
Anthony, Prince (Spain), i. 810, 312,

316
Antilles, i. 157

Arapiles (Salamanca), ii. 349, 362
Argenton, Captain, ii. 102
Arnold, General, ii. 436
Arrighi, Duke of Padua (General),

ii. 362
Artois, Count of, i. 149
Aspem (battle), i. 419 «9^., 438
Aspre, Count (General), ii. 22
Aspre, Count (nephew of the General),

ii. 47, 49
Assalagny, Dr., L Z^2sqq,
Astorga, i. 354 êqq.

BAS

Asturias, Prince Ferdinand of the.
See Ferdinand VII.

Auersperg, Prince (General), i. \%l8qq.

Auerstadt (battle), i. 229

Auerstadt, Duke of. See Davout,.
Marshal

Augereau, General, i. 134

Augereau, Marshal (Duke of Casti-
gUone), i. 12, 24 »., 29, 133, (bio-
graphy) 134 êqq.^ 148 sqq., 150, 153
sqq., 156, 159, 161, 164, 166, 168
sqq., 174, 177, 186, 207 sqq., 211
iqq.y 219 iqq,, 226 sqq.^ 233 $q., 239
A/., 244, 246, 248, 252, 255, 258, 262
«$., 269 sqq., 300, 322, 328 »q., 446 ;
ii. 103, 186, 361, 394

Augereau, Mme (the Marshal's first
wife), i. 139, 143, 155, 216

Augustus (of Prussia), Prince, i. 234

Austerlitz (battle), i. 186 «^^. ; ii. 33^

Avignon, i. 35

* Azolan * (Marbot's charger), ii. 430

Bachelet, Lieutenant, ii. 367

Badajos, ii. 141, 349

Baden, L 176

Bagration, Prince (General), i. 184;

ii. 211, 223, 273 #y.
Balakhoff, Count, ii. 224
Baragney d'Hilliers, ii. 285
Barain, Colonel, ii. 17, 76, 182
Barairon, M., 1. 26
Barcelona, i. 302
Barclay de Tolly, General, ii. 211, 223,

271 sqq.
Bareiros, José, ii. 86 9q,
Barrai, Captain, ii. 77
Barras (Director), i. 24 /t., 25
Bassano, Duke of, ii. 206, 231, 331, 333
Bastide (Marbot's servant), i. 73, 75

êqq., 89

462 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

BAU

Baatzen (battle), ii. 356

Bavaria,' King of, i. 177, 208, 390,
411 ; iL 392

Bavastro (a privateer), ii. 184

Baylen, L 324 Bqq,

Bayonne, i. 143, 294, 301, 309 ; ii. 439

Beaufort d'Hautpoul, ii. 78

Beaaharnais, Connt, i. 304, 308

Beanharnais, Prince Eugène de, i.
208, 330, 437. 450; ii. 15, 208, 211,
274, 286, 439

Beaumont, General, i. 62

Becker, General, ii. 4, 8, 77

Belair, Sergeant, i. 135

Ik'llavère, General, i. 158

Belliard, General, i. 313, 322 ; ii. 274,
276

Bencvento, Prince of. See Talleyrand

Bennett, Lieutenant Charles, i. 167 n.

Bennigsen, Marshal, i. 254, 2ïil tq.^
276 ; ii. 21 1

Berckheim, General, ii. 232, 263

l^eresford, General, ii. 96

Beresina, the, ii. 307 ^qq.^ 315 «^^.

Berghem, Van (Marbot*8 secretary),
ii. 325 %qq.

Beriiet, Colonel, ii. 117

Berlin, i. 234

Bemadotte (afterwards King of Swe-
den), i. ^%qq.y 25, 90, 92 %q., 96«<7.,
109, 113, 142, 150, 161, 192, 198,
229 %qq., 238 %q., 253, 437 ; ii. 14 iqq.,
17, 29, 31, 50, 187, 190, 212 «^.,361,
.385, 399 «^(/., 403, 411, 421

Bemadotte, Mme, i. 94, 142

Bert hier. Prince (Marshal), i. 29, 32,
269,328,332, 349, 441, 444; ii. 5,
152, 193, 344, 408

Bertin, Captîiin, ii. 230, 401

Bertrand, General, i. 203, 398, 441;
ii. 37, 95, 205, 361, 394, 400, 420

Bessières, Marshal, i. 150, 198,285, 309,
327, 419 «y^., 432, 450; ii. 22, 155,
157, IGO, 164, 166*^., 211, 276, 365

Blancheton, Dr., ii. 85

Blancheville, Major, i. 108, 111

Bliinkensee, Colonel von, ii. 381, 385

Blucher, Field-Marshal, i. 238; ii.
364, 368, 378 «gr., 398. 403, 411, 457

Bohemica, i. 177

Boivin, Lieutenant, ii. 359, 365

Bonaparte, Caroline, i. 442, 447
Bonaparte, Jerome (afterwards King
of Westphalia), i. 287, 414 ; ii. 211,
223, 272, 358

CAN

Bonaparte, Joseph (afterwards King
of Spain), i. 20, 198, 231, 287, 321,
323, 327, 331, 359 ; ii. 29, 101, 103,
175 %q., 178, 437, 451 9q.

Bonaparte, Louis (afterwards King of
Holland), i. 29, 215, 287

Bonaparte, Lucien, i. 20, 97, 103, 304

Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Ns^x>leon

Bonaparte, Pauline, i. 96 n.» 113

Bonnet, General, ii. 103

Bordeaux, ii. 454

Bordenave, M., i. 107, 143

BordesouUe, General, ii. 223, 371

Borisoff, ii. 301, 807

Borodino, ii. 273 9qq,

Boudet, General, i. 418 «;., 421, 429,
431 ; u. 36

Boulogne, i. 152

Bourcier, General, i. 110, 112 ; ii. 199,
448

Bourgoing, Captain, ii. 305

Boutourlin, Colonel, ii. 211

Brame, Major, i. 134

Bregenz, i. 170

Brénier, General, ii. 165, 169 9qq.

Brest, i. 144 %qq.

Briqueville, lieutenant d*, ii. 78

Brisset, Dr., ii. 9, 148

Bro, Captain, i. 260, 262

Bronikoffski, General, ii. 807

Brune, Marshal, i. 160

Brunswick, Duke of, i. 229 9q,

Brunswick, Prince of, i. 193

Brunswick-Gels, Prince of, i. 414

Brussels, ii. 442

Bruyère, General, ii. 39 ^., 366

Buget, General, i. 48

Buitrago, i. 348

Bulow, (General, ii. 402

Buonaparte. See Bonaparte anA
Napoleon

Burg-Eberach (battle), i. 141

Burgos, i. 331

Busaco (battle), i. 124 ; ii. 108 9qq.

Cadiz, i. 157, 166
Cadoudal, Georges, i. 145, 147 9qq,
Cambacérès, i. 20 ; ii. 60
Cambronne, General, ii. 870
Campbell, General, ii. 170, 172
Campo Formio (Treaty), i. 21 n.
Canisy, Count de, i. 411
Canning, Mr. Stratford, ii. 212 m.
Canon, Sergeant, i. 51 9qq,^ 67
Canouville, Captain de, il. 162

Index

463

CAN

<'anrobert, Antoine de, i. 129
<^anrobert, Certain de, i. 2, 90, 121,

129
Canrobert, Marcellin de (Marshal),

i. 129
Camot (Director), i. 24 n.
Carrière, i. 90
Casabianca, Colonel, ii. 76, 139, 182,

197, 253
Caseneuve, Colonel, ii. 449
Cîissel, i. 235
Castanos, General, i. 323 %qq.^ 332,

369
Castelnaudary, i. 13
(astex, General, ii. 209, 227, 232,

235 iiqq., 250, 264, 292, 295, 303,

306, 324
Castiglione (battle), i. 140, 155
Castiglione, Duke of. See Augereau,

Marshal
€atalonia, i. 302, ii. 438
Catinat, ii. 187
Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, ii.

205, 276, 281
Caulaincourt (equerry), ii. 373
Cavaillon, i. 3(î sq.
Cavalier, Captain, ii. 77
Certain, De, i. 2
Cervoni, General, i. 375
Cessac, Count of, ii. 346
Chabot, Deputy (ex-Capuchin), i. 18
Chabot (Napoleon's aide-de-camp),

ii. 271
Chalopin, Major, i. 93
Chambure, Captain de, ii. 435
Charaot, M., i. 211
Champaubert (battle), ii. 448
Championnet, General, i. 59, 62, 66 %q. ;

ii. 188
Charles IV. (Spain), i. 297 zqq., 302

»qq., 305, 308 sqq., 312, 318 tqq.
Charles XII., ii. 231
Charles, Archduke (Austria), i. 146,

169, 177, 371, 378, 381, 395, 404.

409, 417, 420, 427, 432, 436; ii.

9«y^/., Vèiqq., 16, 20 sqq., 27y 38,

43. 187, 189, 202
Charles, Prince (Spain), i. 308, 318,

320
Chasteler, Marquis of, i. 310
Chateaubriand, ii. 454
(■hateauville. Comtesses de, i. 128
Chauvet d'Arlon, Colonel, ii. 184
Chérin, General, i. 22 sq.
Chévetel, Captain, i. 134
* Chouans,' the, i. 147,149

DAV

Christina, Archduchess (Austria), 11. 32^
Christka, i. 251 sq.
Christophe, Colonel, ii. 275
Ciudad Rodrigo, i. 296; ii. 80 sqq.r

165, 349
Claparède, General, i. 428 ; ii. 136
Clarke, Duke of Feltre, i. 330; ii. 181,

195, 351, 453
Clary, Mile, i. 231

Clausel, Marshal, ii. 103, 126,276, 437
Coburg, Prince of (Field- Marshal), i.

220
Coeli, Don Miguel Rafael, i. 97 sqq.,

306 sq.
Colbert, General, i. 367
Condé, Prince of, i. 146
Condorcet, Mme. de, i, 20
Constantine, Gnand Duke (Russia), i.

198 sq., 201 ; ii. 224, 375, 400
Corbineau, General, i. 267; ii. 22, 232,

264, 302, 312
Coriolanus, ii. 361
Corunna, i. 367
Costa, Bernardo, ii. 86 sq.
Cotton, General, ii. 171
Coudras, General, ii. 321
Coupé, M., i. 127
Courteau, Captain, ii. 246 sq.
Courtois, Corporal, ii. 446
Coutard, Colonel, i. 381
Cox, Colonel, ii. 86
Craufurd, General, ii. 81, 164
Cressensac, i. 9
Cuesta, (General, ii. 101
Curély, General, ii. 298 sq,
Curial, General, ii. 398
Czartoryski, Prince, 1. 215
Czemicheff, Count, ii. 6, 200 sqq.,

431

Dagusan, Captain, i. 330, 358
Dahlmann, General, i. 206, 268
Dalberg, Duke of, ii 461
Dannel, Pierre, i. 268 sq.
Dantzig, i. 259, 275 ; ii. 435
Dantzig, Duke of. See Lefebvre,

Marshal
Danube, the, i. 164
Darmstadt, i. 208

Daumesmil, General, i. 314 ; ii. 447
David, M., i. 263
Davout, Marshal (Duke of Auerstâdt),

i. 113. 160, 161, 196, 200, 229 #^..

231, 233, 245 sq,, 248, 263 sqq., 374,

381, 428, 432, 437; ii. Usqq., 17 sqq..

464 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

»6, 2OG, 208, 223. 2T0, 2T4, 28G, 34»,

Dcbiy, Jean, i. 410
Decaen, General, i. 126, 237
Dofennon, Coant, i. lO», 122 *q., 320
Delatwrde, Ueneral, ii. it2
Delzoiu, General, ii. 232
Demont, Ueneral. i. 104, 428
Denniée, U., \. 273 ui.
Demeberp Colont-l. i. 414
Desaii, GeDuml, i. 88 ; ii. S. 264
De^briËruH, U., i. 373 ; ii. ii-t
Dei<bricrcK, Mile (aftcrwiirrls Marbot's

wife), ii. 181
DoKJonlins, GtoiL-ml, i. 245 «jj., 257
DeBpanlx, Dom, i. I.f
IDespenonz, Captain, ii. 77
Devance, Colonel, ii. :i86
UcHTtoroff, «Plural, il. 402
Domanget, General, ii. 270
IX)nmi(licu, Geni-ral, ii. 102
Donnailiuu, Strguant, i. I.lli
UoTizelot, Oenuml, i. 134
Dorignau, M., i. 20, 10ft
Donienne, Oencral, i. 3UM ; ii. 70
■ "S, 3r.!l, 4;"

467
Droaot, Oeoeml, ii. 4Sli
Daboia-Crancé, i. 2fi: ii. 322
Diuxw, Ueneral, i. US
Uiinaborft, ii. 22B
DQirenstein. L 179
Dngonunier, General, i. 13
DuheHiue, QeneTul, i. 302
Dnlanloy, General, ii. 213, 2S7
Ihllimberg, Arljiitaut, ii. 1 6S
DulODg, General, ii. lOo
Dumerc, Gent-nil, ii. 232
rmnesnii. CoU.iiiel. ii. 22
Duphot, Gentrnl, ii. IftH
Duplessig, Captain, ii. 217jiï., 448
Duponi, General, i, 178 tq., 323 «27.
Durbach, Lieutenant, ii. I9K
nnroo, Murshal, L 16fi, 169, 188, 194,

212, 24Ui(r/iy., 289, 318, 352; U. 66,

68, 63, 337
Durosacl, (ieniml, i. 231,

Duru

i, 401

DhvhI de lleitiilieu, M., ii. 443

Ebrrsbbrg (baltle), i. HS4
Kblë, Genemi, ii. 103, 136, 139,141,
167, 270, 324, 337

Eckniiihl, i. ilZtqq.

BRjpt, i. 31

Eiseabnrg. Prinue of, ii. 2

Elcliingcn (bnltle). i. 176

Enghien, Duke of, i. 141 «;., i09

Erfurt, ii. 421

Erlon, Count uf. Stui Dronet

Et-coiquiï, Canon, i. 304

Eala, the, i. 352>;y.

Eipngne, General, i. 418. 424

KsgUni^ (biitUe), i. 183, 419 «79., 488

Esiiling Prince of. See MaasHuir

llar-lial
E-itresse, Marquis d" (Colonel), I. 2,

Exclmani:. General, ii. 353, 369, 365,

380. 386,309, 41.'i, 425
Eytau (Untie), i. 263 «fj.

Fai

, M., :

.408

Faur, Fiiberdn,ii.3I9n.
Feldkircli, i. I(i6, 168
KerdinuTidVn.(Spain).i.298«j.,303

«/.,;t07<ijj„ 313,31H»ïî.j lit 440
Ferdinand, Archduke, L. 164, 177
Ferdinand (of PruasiAX Prince, i. 234
Kerey, Gencnil, ii. 116, 150, 161
FerluB, Dom, i. 15«}.
Fingucrlin, U. (banker), i. 260
Fontiiine, Major ii. 240, 266
Ponché (Qnke ot Otranto), ii. 3, 194
ToQcher (a Frencb soldier), ii. 418
Fonrcart, Major, i. 115 (94., 12S
Founiier, Captain, i. 188 tq., 201
Foumier, Q^ieral, ii. 1641;.
rouara (French soldier), IL 266
Yoj Général, ii. 93, 94, 99, 117, 134,

HI, 172.JÎ., 437 ij.
FranccseUJ, General, L 86, 89 ; U. 91

»q., 102
Francis II. (Emperor of Austria), i.

187, 196, 201, 206*;. 1 iL 6S, 76.

360, 364
Kranciaco d'Assis, PrLnoe (Spain), 1.

312 «,
Francisco de Paula, Frince (Sp^n),

i, 312, 31C
Franck, Dr., 1. 442
Frankfort, i. 210,428
Frederick the Great, i. 138, 233

Index

465

FRE

Frederick II. (King of Wurtemberg),

i. 374 ; ii. 391, 401
Frederick Augustus (King of Saxonv),

ii. 394, 409
Frederick William III. (King of

Prussia), i. 192, 213 iqq., 216, 220,

225, 229 *(/., 233, 240 «(7., 243, 285

sqq. ; ii. 207, 337, 341, 356
Frederick William IV. (Prussia), ii.

208
' Free-and-Eîisy,' Miss, i. 155
Freira, General, ii. 90
Frère, General, i. 348
Friant, General, i. 189, 230 ; ii. 427
Frioderichs, General, ii. 403
Friedland, i. 276 »qq. ; ii. 338
Fririon, General, ii. 8, 48, 84, 105,

111 »qq.
Froissard, Captain, i. 262
Fuentes d'Onoro, ii. 165
Fuentes-Pignatelli, Prince, i. 359, 365

Garda N NE, General, ii. 134

Gault, Captain, i. 9, 22, 28 «y., 37, 41,

48, 66, 90
Gautliier, General, ii. 22
Gautrin, Colonel, i. 404
Gavoille, Lieutenant, i. 108 sq.
Gazan, (Joneral, i. 178 »q.
Genoa, siege of, i. 69 sqq.
Gérard, Marshal, i. 93, 124 ; ii. 272,

282, 33()
Gérard (the painter), i. 199
Germany, invasion of (1805), i. 161

9qq.
Ghorodie, ii. 303
Godanl, Colonel, i. 118
Godov, Manuel. See Peace, Prince

of tlie
Gohier (Director), i. 23, 25
Golyniin, i. 246 sqq.
Gortschakof?, General, i. 280, 284
Gouache, Maior, ii. 81
Gour^^^iud, General, ii. 212,215,271,

313
Graft (French soldier), ii. 23

Grainduruc, ii. IH)
Grange, M. de la, i. 410, 413
Gratieri, General, i. 413; ii. 331
Graudenz. i. 240
Gravina, Admiral, i. 95
Graziaui, Major, i. 88
Gressot, General, ii. 401
(irilfon, Corpor.al, ii. 252
(hf>s>-i>cereii, ii. 376

HOL

Grouchy, Marshal, i. 93 ; ii. 17, 284

sq.y 457
Grouchy, General E. de, ii. 467
Grundier, General, ii. 286
Guadarrama (mountains), i. 317,

351
Gudin, General, i. 110, 189, 230, 373

sq. ; ii. 271 sq.
Guéhéneuc, General, i. 330, 346, 350,

358, 380, 39.S, 410
Guéhéneuc, Mlle (afterwards Marshal

Lannes' second wife), i. 447
Guéhéneuc, Senator, i. 142
Guindet, Sergeant, i. 222; ii. 431
Guiton, General, ii. 45 sq,
Gunzburg (battle), i. 176
Gustavus Adolphus, ii. 355, 393
Gustavus IV. (Sweden), i. 238 sq.
Gyulai, Count (General), i. 181 ; ii.

398, 421

Hamburg, ii. 434
Hanau, ii. 426 sqq.
Hanover, i. 208, 214
Harpin (a Dragoon), i. 242 «^.
Hatzfeid, Princess of, i. 237
Haugwitz, Count von, i. 192 «^^.
Hautpoul, General d', i. 254, 258
Heilsberg, i. 275 sq.
Henry, Prince (Prussia), i. 138, 222
Hernandez, Don Antonio, i. 313
Hernandez, Senor, i. 350
Hernoux, Lieutenant, ii. 334
Herrasti, General Andrew, ii. 80*3-.
Hersant (the painter), 372
Hesse-Cassel, Elector of, i. 235
Hesse-Darmstadt, Landgrave of

(afterwards Grand Duke),'i.208 sqq.y

232
Hesse-Darmstadt, Landgravine of, i.

209
Hcsse-Homburg, Prince of, ii. 19
Heudelet, General, i. 2i5 sqq.^ 257;

ii. 91,97, 103, 171
Hijar, Duke of, i. 314 sq.
Hill,General, ii. 128, 165
Hiller, General, i. 395, 404
Hoche, General, i. 141 ; ii. 254
Hofer (leader of Tyrolese moun-
taineers), i. 413
Hogendorf, General, ii. 231, 307, 331,.

333
Hohenlohe, Prince of, i. 227, 229 sq.^

238
Hollabrunn, i. 185

VOL. II.

H H

466 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

HOL

Holbmd, King of. See Bonaptirte,

Louis.
Holstein-Augustenburg, Duke of, i.

239
Hortense, Queen, i. 418
Houdetot, General d', i. 107
HouKtoun, General, ii. 164
Hulot d'Hozery, i. 444

Jacqueminot, General, i. 158
Janowitz (battle), ii. 378 *yy.
Janlin, M., i. 127
Jardon, General, ii. 91
Jauer (battle), ii. 378 f^q.
Jellachich, Field- Marshal, i. 104*/.,

168 A?</., 174, 177
Jemmapes, ii. 442
Jena (battle), i. 223 fiqq. ; ii. 338
John, Archduke (Austria, i. 177, 437 ;

ii. 11, 14, 17, 2()*(/.
Joly, Captain, ii. 260, 405
Jomini, Genenil, ii. 363, 374
Josephine, Empress, i. 20, 140, 155,

289 ; ii. 3, 56
Joubert, General, i. 20, 24 ; ii. 187
Jourdan, Marshal, ii. 150, 187, 437
Junot, Marshal (Duke of Abrantôs),

i. 2.^hsqq„ 327, 358, 366; ii. 6, 72

iqq., 80. 103, 105, 107, 109, 128,

140, 142, 161. 179,271»^.
Jutterbach, ii. 385

Kalkreuth, Marshal, i. 229
Katt (Prussian officer), i. 414
Katzbach, the, ii. 377*yr/.
Keith, Lord (Admiral), i. 81*/., 80

Kellermann, • Marshal, i. 150,291; ii.

73. 362, 394, 397
Kicnmîiyer, General, i. 1 77
Kirgener, General, ii. 356
Kleber, General, ii. 254 j

Kleist, General, ii. 374
Klenau, General, ii. 370, 402
Klingin, General, i. 145
Koch, General, ii. 138 i

Korsakoff, ii. 188
Kosciusko, General, i. 240
Kosen, ii. 421
Kr:isnoe (ravine), ii. 287
Kremlin, the, ii. 277, 282
Kulm, ii. 373

Kulnieif, General, ii. 242, 245 sgq.
KutusofF, Field-Marshal, i. 177 sq,,

LAS

184 ; ii. 272, 276, 279*^^., 311, 321,
332

Labaume, M. (an engineer), ii. 211
Labédoyère, Captain, i. 330, 333, 358,

366, 386, 388, 393, 431, 451 ; ii.

457
Tiaborde, Adjutant, ii. 56, 281
Ija Board onnaye, Lieutenant, i. 393

Ay., 421,450
Ijachèze, M., i. 28 «^., 74
La Coste, Certain de, i. 2 sq., 129 êçq.
Lacoste, General, i. 360
l>acour, General, ii. 22
Ijacour, Major, ii. 357, 366
Ijafltte, Colonel, ii. 102
Laforest, M., i. 213
Lagarde, i. 17
Lagrange, General, ii. 403
Laisné, M., ii. 454
Lajolais, M., i. 146
Lallouette, Lieutenant, ii. 240
Lamarque, General, ii. 15, 29, 192
Ijamarre, Mlle (afterwards wife of

Marshal Masséna), ii. 188 sq.
Lambert, General, i. 281 ; ii. 307
Lambesc, Prince de, i. 127
Lami, Jean Noel, ii. 169
Lamothe, Major, i. 322
La motte, General, ii. 149
Lamour, Colonel, ii. 149 aq.
Landanimann of the Helvetic Re*

public, the, i. 330
Ijandgrafenberg, i. 225
Lannes, Marshal, i. 14, 29,32,141, 150,

161, 180, 198, 221, 226, 238, 246,

250, 273, 276, 282, 285, 288, 329,

348, 357, 366, 368, 373, 381, 385,

392, 390, 405. 408, 412. 415, 430,

440, (biography) 446 «^^., 447; ii.

5,202
Lannes, Napoléon Auguste (son of

the Marshal), i. 447
La Nougarède, Colonel, ii. 197 iq.,

209 «<7., 253
Lapisse, General, ii. 101
Lapoype, General, ii. 434
Lariboisière, General, ii. 837
Larivière, Château, i. 1
Ija Romana, Marquis of (General), i.

327 ; ii. 90, 136
Larrey, Dr., i. 206, 369, 882, 484
l>asalle, General, i. 102, 418 ; ii. 6, 2S.

24
Lasalle, M. de, i. 326

Index

467

LAS

Lasouski, General, ii. 48, 104
Latour, General, ii. 28
La Tour d'Auvergne, ii. 2 %qq.
Latour-Maubourg, General, i. 357 ; ii.

285, 356, 362, 394, 397
Launay, M. de, i. 271, 288
Ijaurencez, General, ii. 217, 235, 262,

257, 267
Lauriston, General, ii. 19, 203, 279,

317, 361, 394, 412
Jjauriston, Mme de, i. 260
Laval de Cere, Château, i. 2
Leclerc, General, i. 95, 97, 101, 113
Le Couteulz de Canteleu, Lieutenant,

i. 330, 368, 431, 434 ; ii. 283
Lefebvre, Marshal (Duke of Dantzig),

i. 25, 92, 123, 150, 237, 413; ii. 211
Lefebvre -Desnouettes, General, i.

352 «17. ; ii. 416
Lefrançois, Major, ii. 84
Legendre, Sergeant, ii. 246, 252
Legrand, General, i. 418 ; ii. 40, 43,

232, 240, 243, 299, 302, 322
Leipzig, ii. 391 ^qq.
Le Marois, General, ii. 434
Leopold I. (King of the Belgians), ii.

420
Lepel, General, ii. 292
Lepic, General, ii. 161, 165
Lesteinschneider, Lieutenant, i. 42,

51
Letermillier, Colonel, ii. 132
Lichtenstein, Prince John of, i. 201 ;

ii. 40, 406
Liégeard, Colonel, ii. 364
Ligne, Prince de (Field-Marshal), ii.

27
Ligniville, Count of (Major), ii. 52,

76, 111, 147, 156
Liguria, i. 45
Lille, ii. 349
Lima, General, ii. 91
Lindau, i. 170
Ijindenau (bridge), ii. 412
Lisbon, i. 296 ; ii. 125 sqq.
* Lisette ' (a vicious mare), i. 260 sq»,

263, 266, 269 sq., 275, 282, 288
I/Isle, Certain de, i. 2, 129 sqq.
Lobau (island), i. él7 sqq. ; ii. ésqq.
Lobau, Count of. See Mouton, Mar-
shal
Loison, General, ii. d2sq., 97, 100,

102 sq., 151, 161, 164
Longiiereau, General, ii. 363
Lorgo, General, ii. 100
Louis XIV., ii. 362, 439

lEAB

Louis XVI., i. 19, 136, 139

Ix)ai8 XVIIL, L 146 ; ii. 194, 211, 345,

466
Louis Philippe, i. 326
Louis, Prince (of Pmssia), i, 193, 214,

221 $q, ; ii. 431
Louisa Amelia (Queen of Prussia), 1.

192, sq., 218 sqq., 220, 233, 240 sq.,

286
Lubenski, Ck)ant, ii. 293 sqq.
Luchonski, ii. 289 sqq.
Luckau (battle), ii. 867
Lutzen (battle), ii. 356

Maoabd, General, i. 60 sq.
Macdonald, Marshal, it 16, 18, 22,38,

207, 211, 237, 260, 297, 337, 361,

369, 376, 884, 394, 412, 418
Maok, Field-Marshal, i. 163, 176 sq.,

183
Madrid, i. 802 sqq.
Magdeburg, i. 286 ; ii. 484
Magon, Admiral, i. 166 sq.
Mainvielle, Lieutenant, i. 134, 144,

260, 262
Maison, Marshal, i. 93 ; ii. 232, 286,

238, 299, 326, 333, 336, 442
Malet, General, ii. 280, 321
Malo-Jaroslavitz, ii. 282
Malseigne, Count de (General), i^

138 «;.
Mancune, Gen., ii. 117, 164
Manuel (advocate), ii. 196
Marac, Château, i. 133
Marbot, Antoine (General: Marbot's

father), i. 1 sqq^ 9 sqq., 20 sqq.,

28 sqq., 89, 48, 47, 60, 65 sqq.,

69 sq., 72 sq^ 74
Marbot, Mme (née Certain du Pay:

Marbot*s mother), i. 2 sqq., 6 sq., 26,

89 sqq., 122, 126, 128, 133, 169, 212,

272, 298, 800, 822, 829, 864, 870 ;

ii. 61, 827
Marbot, Mme (Marbot*8 wife), ii, 298,

363
Marbot, Alfred (Marbot's son), ii. 256,

854
Marbot, Adolphe de, i. 3, 9, 27, 77,

86, 90, 92 sq., 116, 120, 126, 287,

269, 828, 832, 867, 870; u. 146, 147,

231
Marbot, Felix de, 1. 8, 90, 121, 126»

168
Marbot, Theodore de, 1. 8, 90, 121
Marchand, Gteneral, ii. 108

468

The Memoirs of the Baron de Marbot

MAR

Maréchal, Lieutenant, ii. 3()8
Marengo (battle), i. 87, 278 ; ii. 405
Mareâcalchi, Count, ii. 55
Mari;i Louisa, Archducliess (after-

wiirds Napoleon's wife), i. 411 ; ii.

64, 206, 451
Marlborough, Duke of, ii. 174
Marmont, Marshal, i. 152, KJl, 177;

ii. 14, 22, 38, 172, 178,276, 361, 394,

452
* Marshal Stockpot,' ii. 133
Martinique, i. 157
Marulaz, General, i. 418
Mascareguns, Senhor. ii. 124
Masséna, Marshal, i. 21, ()6, 72, 74, 77,

«0, 'i^^, î)2, 124, 150, 162, 169, 177,

392, 394, 415. 426, 431, 437, 450; ii.

3, 8, 12, 17, 31, 33, 38, 43, 50, 72, 80,

102, 10(5, 109, 118, 122, 127, 132,

140, 143, 149, 154, 161, 172, 182.

(bioj:rrai>hy) 183 $c[q.
Masséna, Augustin (the Marshal's

uncle), ii. 1S3
MîLsséna, Jules (the Marshal's uncle),

ii. 183
Massuna, Marcel (the Marshal's uncle),

ii. 183 9qq.
Masséna, Captain Prosper (the Mar-
shal's son), ii. 34, 78. 84, 157
Masséna, Victor (the Marshal's son),

ii. 7S
Massv, Colonel, i. 134, 174, 180, 185,

191. 205, 207, 252. 259
Mat his. Captain, i. 39
Maurice, Colonel, i. 127
Maurin, General, i. 93, 353, 381
Maximilian, Archduke (Austria), i.

409 sqq.
Mîiyne, C'oloncîl, ii. 102 n.
Meiîus, Field- Marshal, i. 85
Menard. Colonel, i. 21. 29, 33, 48, 66
Méneval, M. de, i. 289, 318
Merfeldt, General, ii. 397
Mergey, (icneral, i. 93
Méric, ^Ilî»^ (afterwards Marshal

Lannes' first wife), i. 446 ^q.
Merle, General, ii. 91, 103, 117, 232
Merlhes, Dr., i. 108
Merniot, (îencral, ii. 91, 103, 150
Moslor (Vienne.se mechanician), i.

440
Miîslin (a French soldier), ii. 403
Metz, ii. 340

Mettcrnich. Prince, ii. 360, 421
Michau»!, General, ii. 394
Michaux, Commissiiry, ii. 190

MUK

Milan, i. 84 nqq.

Milhau, General, ii. 362, 426

Mina (8|)iinish guerrilla leader), ii

67, 61>
Mina y Kspoz (uncle of the above), ii.

69 '
Môlk (Abbey), i. 174.396
Moerner, Count, i. 239
Mojaisk, ii. 273
Molitor, Geni?ral, i 417 %q.
Mollendorf, Marshal, i. 229 $q.
Moncey, Marshal, i. 160, 306, 323,

332, 348, 358
Mongalvi, Mile, i. 7 «^., 13
Monginot, Major, ii. 237, 335
Monier, Colonel, ii. 117
Monk, General, i. 145
Mons, ii. 354, 441
Montbrun, General, i. 348 Bqq, ; ii. 39,

103, 105, 107, 109, 128, 161, 163,

224, 228. 231, 275, 281
Montezuma, Count of, ii. 80
Montfort, Colonel, ii. 412
Montier, Generjd, i. 123
Montmorency, Constable, i. 13
Moore, Sir John, i. 361, .353, 367
Morand, General, i. 230, 282, 382,

389
Moravia, i. 174, 176
Moreau, Colonel, i. 101, 104, 110
Moreau, General, i. 24, 113, 146, 264,

361, 371
Morland, Genend, i. 188 «/., 201,

258
Mortier, Marshal, i. 150, 178, 276,

279,358; ii. 282, ,373, 462
Moscow, ii. 277 fiqq.^ 341
Moskova, La (battle: Borodino), ii.

273 sqq.
Moulins (Director), i. 23, 26
Mounier, M., i. 1 17 j»^^., 460 iq.
Moustache (Napoleon's courier), i.

242 %q.
Mouton, Marshal (Count of Lobaa), i.

84,371,432; ii. 182,197
Muller. Major, i. 39 «y., 222
Munich, i. 208
Musta])ha (a Mameluke at Austerlits),

i. 199, 314
Murat (afterwards King of Naples),

i. 29, ,32, 123, 150. 180, 199, 212,

227, 238, 24H, 258, 300, 304, 310,

312, 316, 321, 412, 421 ; il. 208,

211, 222, 224, 227, 231, 270, 274,

27S, 281, 316, 330, 347, 363, 370,

394, 421, 440

Index

469

NAN

Nansouty, General, i. 378 ; ii. 224,
362

Napier, Sir William, ii. 81, 9G 7i.,
118 «., 124, 142 «., 144, IG5, 438 n.

Naples, King of (1788), i. 139

Napoleon (aftervvanls Emperor) :
Artillery officer, i. 13«.; General,
24, 20 ; First Consul, i. 43, 72, 78,
S;-), 87, 94. 103, 113, 120, 132, 140,
145, 148 ; Emperor, i. 149, 155, 159,
1()2, 1G8, 176, 183, 187, 192, 200,
206, 208, 212, 214, 219, 225, 234,
238. 243, 250, 257, 259, 262, 273,
277, 285, 288, 293, 300, 308, 318,
:'.2G, 331, 335, 347, 353, 356, 366,
370, 377, 380, 391, 405, 410, 415,
427, 431. 437, 440, 442, 451 ; ii. 2,
7. 9, 16, 20, 22. 24, 27, 29, 33, 37,
4:^, 46, 50, 53, 56, 63, 67, 75, 95,
101, 103, 12G, 134, 137, 141, 152,
172, 175, 178, 181, 189, 193, 197,
200, 204, 214. 220, 224, 231, 233,
251, 2G9, 273, 277, 281, 286, 293,
299, 306, 315, 318, 321, 324, 329,
339, 343, 346, 350, 355, 359, 368,
372, 376, 385, 388, 391, 394, 399,
406, 411, 422, 429, 438, 450

Narboniie, M. de, i. 151

Nelson, Lord (Admiral), i. 96, 166

Ney, Marshal, i. 150, 161, 169, 177,
227, 229, 253, 255, 257, 279, 282,
335; ii. 73, 80, 102, 105, 109, 114,
128, 137, 141, 143, 145, 151, 195.
20s, 211, 224, 227, 231, 270, 274,
286, 321, 323, 334, 336, 356, 361,
363, 385, 403

Nice, i. 40

Nicoel, M.,i. 129

Nioiiien, the, i. 285 ; ii. 336, 343

Noailles, M. Alfred de, ii. 322

Nonhnann, General, i. 416; ii. 12, 14,
22

Novi (battle), i. 21

Odjkr, M., ii. 407

()ettinfj:en, Prince of, ii. 429

O'Meara, Colonel, i. 330

()[iorto, ii. 91 iqq.

Ordcner, General, i. 148

O'Keillv, General, i. 412

Orhans, Duke of, i. 115, 124, 134; ii.

49, 54, 420. 459
Orléans, Gaston d', i. 13
Ostermann, General, ii. 374
Ott, General, i. 80, 85; ii. 423

POM

Oudinet de Beauliea, Mile, 1. 2
Oudinot, Marshal, i. 181, 276; ii. 12,
17, 19, 22, 38, 208 sqq., 216 %qq.,
224 9qq., 232, 238, 240, 247, 249,
256, 306 iqq., 314, 321, 367, 361,
376, 394
Oudinot, Victor (General : son of the
Marshal), ii. 78

Pack, General, ii. 171

Padua, Duke of. Sc4i Arrighi, General

Paget, Lord Edward (General), ii. 99

Palafox, Count, i. 359, 366

Palfy, Count (General), i. 440

Pampeluna, i. 302 ; ii. 438

Pamplona, Count (General), ii. 107

Papon, M., i. 138

Paris, i. 21 ; ii. 450«^^.

Paris, Count of, ii. 459

Parot, Dr., ii. 238, 403

Parqué, Duke of, i. 304

Partouneaux, General, ii. 320, 340

Pasqual, i. 367

Pasquier, M., i. 144

Paul I. (Russia), ii. 201, 205, 375

Peace, Prince of the (Mjinuel Godoy),

i. 102 «^., 297, 302 «<?</., 306 «^., 310,

320
Pelet, General, i. 392 «</., 411, 436 n. ;

ii. 74, 104, 112, 114, 140, 182, 197,

287, 407
Peninsular campaigns, 70 sqq. y 437
Percy, Mr., ii. I'dl sq.
Pereiras, General, ii. 91
Pérignon, Marshal, 1. 150
Permon, M. (Mme Junot's father), ii.

72 n.
Perquit, Colonel, ii. 382, 386
Perron, Lieutenant, ii, 78
l*ertelay. Sergeant, i. iOgqq., 52, 55.

60, 62«<7., 64^</., 238,365
Picart-, M., i. 38
Pichegru, General, i. 24 w., li^sqq,;

ii. 361
Piedmont, i. QOsqq.
Pilnitz, ii. 385 sqq.

Pinotcau, Colonel, i. 115, 117 «7., 124
Platoff, Hetman, ii. 273, 287, 336
Pleshtchenitsi, ii. 325
Ponzet, General, i 348, 433
Poitevin, Captain, ii. 292
Poland, i. 240 ; ii. 221
Polignac, the Princes de, i. 147 sqq.
Polotsk, ii. 231, 296*^*7.
Pombal, Marquis of, ii 125

470 The Memoirs of the Baron de Marrot

PON

I'onari-, ii. 3:W

Poniatowski, Prince, ii. 270, 361, 31M,

398,412,418
Ponthon, Colonel de, ii. 205 «7.
Porcher rie RichelKiurg, ii. 77
PortuRîil (1800), i. 94 aqq, ; (1S07), "

294 »qq.
l*ortuf<al. Queen of, i. 297
Portugîil, Kejçent of, i. 297
Pot.s(lain (Treiity), i. 193
Pr>zac, Major, ii. 358, 405 1

Pnult, Abbé (le, ii. 454 I

]*réval, G(;iienil, ii. 44S, 452 1

Prolwtheida, ii. 399, 402 i

Prmrhonime, Serjireant, ii. 230, 252,

204
Pru.ssia (war of 1806), i. 217 J»y//.
Pyrenees, ii. 437 /r^.
Pii}', Mile du. Stfe Marbot, Mme

PiADETZKY, ii. 49

Uîimbuteau, Countess of, i. 151

lùistadt, i. 21

Kill Mitel, Colonel, ii. 372

Bjipp, General, i. 198*7., 202; ii. 0,

53, 283, 3(îl, 435
Riwout, General, i. 3(52 *//. ; ii. 270
Rîiti>bon, i. 381 »qq.
Rîiyniond, Dr., i. 134, 209
Ue^linjEf, fîenenil, i. 325
lleille, General, ii. 195, 437
Kenique, Captain, ii. 77
Itepnin, Prinec;, i. 199
Ke>s6^uier, Mme. de, i. 11
Hévellière-Iiepeaux, La (Dire(^tor), i.

24 7t.
Kewbeu (Director), i. 21 n.
Key, Genenil, ii. 438

Reynier, General, ii. 14, 3«, 73, 75, 80,
103, 106, 107, 109, 111, 12s, 141,
154, 101, 105,301,394, 412

Khine, tlie, i. 102 «^7., 216

Klione, the, i. 34 ^7.

Rivière, M. de la, i. \M iqq.

Rivoli (battle), ii. 24

Rivoli, Duke of. Heo Mas.séna, Mar-
shal

Roch, St., i. 2

Rochîimbeau, Marshal, ii. 400

Rochechouart, Count, ii. 322 n., 400 n.

Ro^er-Ducos (Din^ctor), i. 25

Roj^niart, General, i. 438 «5^. ; ii. 458

Rohan, Prince of (General), i. \^\%iqq,

Romestan, i. 17

Ronsin, General, i. 140

SAX

Rosily, Admiral, i. 160
Rostopchln, General, ii. 277, 341
Rothschild (Frankfort banker), i. 236
Roumestain, Lieutenant, i. 204 nq.
Romtsel d' Urbal, General, ii. 379»

382
Roustan (Napoleon *s Mameluke), i.

31, 205 ; ii. 9
Ruchel, General, i. 227, 229 <^.
Russel, General, ii. 401
Russian campaign, ii. 204 %qq.

Saale, the, ii. 420
Sîialfeld (battle), i. 221
Sachen, General, i. 450
Sachs-Teschen, Prince Albert of, i.

412; ii. 32
Sacleux, Colonel, i. 67, 69, 75, 77 êq.
Sahuguet d'Kspagnac, General, ii. 5(î
Sainte-Croix, Charles d'Escorches de

(General), ii. 1 êqq., 8, 12, 17, 22,

50, 74, 110, 119, 127
Sainte-Croix, Robert d^Escorches de,

ii. 22
Saint-Cvr. Carra (General), i. 418 ; ii.

46
Saint-Cvr, Gouvion (Marshal), i. 169?

ii. 175, 243, 251, 257, 259, 263, 267,

288, 299, 3()1, 3(>9, 434
Sainte-Eglise, Colonel de, i. 326
Saint-Geniès, General, ii. 228
Saint-George, Chevalier de, i. 12, 135
Saint -Germain, Genend, ii. 368, 379
St. Helena (island), i. 206
Saint-Hilaire, General, L 414, 428,430
St. Jean de Luz, ii. 439
Saint- Marc, Genend, i. 367
Saint-Mars, General, i. 330, 336, 346»

358, .308, 410, 413, 461; ii. 223.

232
St. Sebastian (fortress), ii. 438
Saint-Sulpice, General, i. 374
Salamanca, i. 101 ; ii. 276, 349
Salicetti ( Corsica n Deputy), i. 25
Salme, General, ii. 16
Samson, General, i. 166
Sanchez, Don Julian, ii. 82, 162
Sanguinet, Mlle de, i. 129
Sanigossa, i. 348, 357 Bqq.
Sarrut, General, ii. 116
Sa vary, General (Duke of Rovigo), L

148, 308, 322, 361
Savary, Colonel, i. 245, 264
Savona, i. ()8
Saxe, Marshal, ii. 8, 332

Index

471

SAX

Saxony, Elector of (Frederick Au-
gustus : made King by Napoleon),

i. 225, 232, 287 %qq.
Soberer, General, i. 20
Scherer, M. (banker), i. 260
Scliilkowski, Lorenz, ii. 198, 229, 304,

309
Schill, Major, i. 413
Schmettau, General, i. 230
Schmidt, Corporal, i. 247
Schneit, Colonel, ii. 364, 418
Schonberg, Count de (General), i. 2
Schwarzenberg, Prince (Field-Mar-
shal), ii. 207, 211, 296, 307, 369,

372, 397, 435
Scott, Sir Walter, i. 440 n., ii. 216 n,
Sebastiani, General, ii. 228, 281, 285,

344, 353, 361, 368, 379, 394, 414,

419, 426
Ségur, Count de (General), ii. 212,

222, 247 71., 278 n., 283, 297, 330,

334
Ségur, Octave de (brother of the

Count), ii. 216, 232
S6gur, Octave de (Captain : son of the

Count), ii. 79
Sénarmont, General, i. 280
Septeuil, Captain, ii. 170
Seras, General, i. 51, 53, 57,69
Serurier, Marshal,!. 150; ii. 452
Sibillo, Captain, i. 26
Sibuet, General, ii. 384
Sicard, Colonel, i. 134, 275
Sieyt^'s, Abbé, i. 23,'»^^.
Sigaldi, Major, ii. 448
Simon. General, i. 115 %qq.y 122, 124 ;

ii. 116 $qq.
Smolensk, ii. 270 »qq.
Solignac, General, ii. 103, 191
Soroze, College of, i. 9, 15
Sonham, General, ii. 394, 398
Soult, General Peter (brother of the

Marshal), ii. 95
Soult, Marshal,!. 67, 79, 150, 161,198,

226, 238, 255, 357; ii. 89. 94, 97,

100, 139, 141, 175, 437
Souvaroff, General, i. 21, 138 ; ii. 187
Spain, i. ^(Ssqq.^ "1^1 sqq.
Spain, Queen of, i. 102, l'èl %qq., 302,

305, '^msqq., 311, 318 «^(7.
Spencer, General, ii. 159, 162
Spire (a servant in the Marbot family),

i. 10, 29, 48, 67, 89
Stabenrath, General, ii. 48
Stabs, Frederick, ii. 53
Staël, Mme de, i. 20

VAL

Stein, Baron von, ii. 350, 352

Steingel, General, ii. 299

Stettin, ii. 25

Stibar, Countess, ii. 50

Stoch, Baron von, i. 232, 260 ; ii. 396

Stoch, General von, i. 210

Stralsond, i. 413

Strasburg, i. 176, 349

Studzianka, ii. 314 sq.

Suchet, Marshal, i. 47, 65, 86, 103,

110; ii. 437,439,454
Sudermania, Duke of, i. 239
Sweden, i. 238
Switzerland, i. 162
Sylveira, General, ii. 90 ^q.^ 97

Talrot, Colonel, ii. 81
Talon, Viscount, ii. 455
Talleyrand, Prince de, i. 195, 212*^. ;

ii. 2, 451, 454«^.
Talleyrand-Périgord, General, ii. ^^iq.
Tandy, Napper, i. 21
Tarragona, ii. 439
Tassin, Lieutenant, i. 339, 346
Tautz (a French soldier), ii. 359
Tchichagoff, Admirai, ii. 279, 296,

30] n., 307 «s-^., 313, 317, 322 n,
Teplitz, ii. 373

Tharreau, General, i. 410, 428
Thiébault, General, i. 71
Thielmann, General, ii. 361, 363
TUlet, André, ii. 169, 172 #^.
TUsit, i. 193, 285
Toulon, i. 13
Toulouse, i. 11
Torres Vedras, ii. 126 %qq,
Toussaint Louverture, i. 113
Trafalgar, i. 96, 166
Trant, Colonel, ii. 106, 121, 124, 143
Trebbia, the, ii. 378
Trépane, Colindo, i. 67, 69, 72, l^^M[q^

88 «^.
Truguet, Admirai, i. 145
Tudela, i. 333
Tarenne, i. 7 iqq.
Tyrol, i. 168
Tzinski (a Polish lancer), ii, 216

Ulm, i. 164

Valencia, i. 323 ; ii. 438
Vallongo, General, ii. 91
Valois, M., i. 127

472 The Mpaîoirs op the Baron de Marbot

VAN

Vandainme, General, ii. 3S, 3G1,

373
Vauban, Marslial, ii. 362
Vedel, General, i. 323 sqq.
Venice, i. 168
Venial, De, i. 2, 97
Verdier, General, i. 359 ; ii. 232, 241
Vemet, Horace (pînnter), ii. 43<)
Versailles, i. 126
Vial, Genenil, ii. 400^
Vij»n;i, Senhor, ii. 06'
Victor, :Mnrshnl, ii. 89, 101, 288, 302,

306,314, 321, 323.361, 394
Vienna (1805), i. 177 *qq.\ captured

by the Frcncli, 409
Villeneuve, Adminil, i. 157 «</</.; 166

Vinieira, i. 327
Vincent, General, ii. 28
Virion, General, i. 117 *////.
Vistula, the, i. 239; ii. 337
Vittoria, ii. 437
Vorarlberjjf, the, i. 164 «/y.
Virv, M. de, i. 330, 333, 358, 364, 36S,
385, 423, 430. 442

Wagqam (battle), i. 183; ii. 11 x//-y.

Warsaw, i. 245

WasliiiijTton, General, ii. 436

Waterl(jo, ii. 457

Waters, Colonel, ii. 98, 156

Wathiez, General, ii. 164, 353, 3r)9,
364

Wîittevillo, Captain, i. 330, 358, 431

Weber, General, i. 428

Weimar, i. 228

Weiiriar, Prince of, i. 228

Wellesley, Sir Arthur. Sec Welling-
ton.

ZUB

Wellington, Duke of, i. 124,327, 357 ;
ii. 75, 80, 86. 97, 108, 118 êqq., 122,
129, 132, 134, 136, 138 «y., 142, 143,
145, 148 9qq., 154, 156, 169 «^., 162
zqq., 167, 170, 172, 177 »y., 27l5,
349, 437 %qq., 440

Werthingen (battle), i. 176

Wilkomir, ii. 217 tiqq,

Wilhitte, General, i. 93

WilliauLs, Colonel, ii. 162

Wilna, ii. 216, 220, 334

Wilson, Sir R., ii. 224, 330 «., 404

Witebsk. ii. 269

Wittenberg, ii. 434

Wittgenstein, General, ii. 211, 216,
224, 228, 236, 247. 249, 256, 258
Jiqq.y 297 sqq., 311, 324, 355

Wkrsj, i. 246 #7.

Woirland, ii. 65, 71, 219, 261, 301,
370, 373, 378 ; ii. 198

Wredo, Count von (General), ii. 254,
267, 290, 301, 312. .392, 422, 426,
429, 432

Wukassowitz, Genenil, ii. 22

Wurtemberg, i. 164, 176

Wiirtemberg, King of. See Frederick
II.

Wiirtemberg, Prince of, ii. 435

York von Wahtenbubo, General,

ii. 337. 341
Yvan, Dr., i. 434, 440

Zaou, General, i. 88
Zaniboni, Pierre, ii. 169
Zavniski. ii. 318 %q.
Znaym, i. 186 ; ii. 43, 46, etc.
Zurich, i. 22 «//., ii. 188

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