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Full text of "Memoirs of the Chevalier de Johnstone. Translated from the original French MS. of the chevalier"

MEMOIRS 



OF THE 



CHEVALIER DE JOHNSTONE. 

IN THEEE VOLUMES. 

TRANSLATED. FROM THE ORIGINAL FRENCH 
MS. OF THE CHEVALIER. 



BY 

CHAELES WINCHESTER, 

ADVOCATE, ABERDEEN. 



YOLUME THIRD. 

^ / a 

f)> 7 u 



ABERDEEN: D. WYLLIE & SON, 
to fyt 




AND H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES. 

1871 



14- 
5" 



G. CORNWALL AND SONS, PRINTERS AND LITHOGRAPHERS, ABERDEEN. 



MEMOIRS 

OF 

THE CHEVALIER DE JOHNSTONE. 



THE WAR IN CANADA 

(Campaign of 1759 ); 

DIALOGUE OF THE DEAD BETWEEN M. THE MARQUIS OP 
MONTCALM, WHO COMMANDED THE ARMY IN CANADA, 
UNDER THE ORDERS OF M. THE MARQUIS OF VAUDREUIL, 
AND M. WOLFE, GENERAL OF THE ENGLISH ARMY, BOTH 
KILLED THE 13TH 'SEPTEMBER, 1759, IN THE BATTLE 
BEFORE QUEBEC ; OR AN IMPARTIAL AND MILITARY 
EXAMINATION OF THAT CAMPAIGN, TO SERVE AS A. JUS- 
TIFICATION OF M. THE MARQUIS OF MONTCALM. 



jONTCALM. "It is singular, Sir, that my 
shade has not again met yours since the time 
that I descended into this region, where I 
have followed you so closely. It is no fault 
to have searched for you from a desire on my 
part to enter with you upon discussion of the 
operations of a campaign which has proved so fatal to both 
of us." 

Wolfe. "I have no less desire than you, Sir. One of my 
compatriots, who died two days after the affair of the 13th, 
apprized me that there had not been more than some hours 
of interval between your destiny and mine. He added some 




details regarding this event; but as he was but very imperfectly 
informed, and as I myself was very ignorant of things rela- 
tive to the operations preceding that day, I desired much to 
have a conversation with you upon these subjects ; so much 
the more, that the details that different persons have commu- 
nicated to me of both nations, which have come, whether from 
Europe or America, have always been very imperfect : and 
I am enchanted that, after having made so many useless 
efforts to meet you, chance at last produces this happy 
result." 

Montcalm. " Will you permit me, Sir, before our conver- 
sation becomes more serious, to make one reflection upon the 
difference of lot which we have experienced, comparing the 
one with the other. They have rendered to you the greatest 
honours. Your body has been transported to London with 
magnificence, and deposited in "Westminster Abbey, among 
those of kings. The English nation has erected to you a 
superb mausoleum ; and your name, dear to Englishmen, and 
continually in their mouths, is pronounced with the greatest 
praises. But as for me, what sensation has my death made ! 
The Canadians and savages, who knew the uprightness of my 
soul, and my devotedness for my king and country, are the 
only ones who have done me justice, if you except a small 
number of friends who, not daring to oppose the torrent, were 
forced in secret to shed some tears upon my tomb." 

Wolfe. "In this region, where there exists no longer 
prejudice, I confess with frankness, that I have found your 
lot preferable to mine, notwithstanding the injustice you have 
experienced, for the most part, from your countrymen ; you 
have been regretted, and your memory has been exculpated 
by all those who are capable of appreciating your talents and 
your eminent qualifications, and who have sufficient probity 
and disinterestedness to render their homage. Why not take 
the testimony of my army to your account ? Your virtues, 
jand, above all, your humanity for prisoners, have gained you 



the hearts of all my soldiers. They have not seen, but with 
gratitude and veneration, the care you took to stay the hands 
of the savages, when these barbarians prepared to slaughter 
them, in order to make of them a horrible banquet ; and I 
have known, that whereas they have refrained tears at my 
death, they have shed bitter ones on being informed of yours. 
I do not see in this mausoleum but a proof of a foolish weak- 
ness in men ; what avails this block of marble to my actual 
state? The monument remains, the conqueror has disap- 
peared. This testimony in your favour, joined to that of 
true judges in the art of war, and that of gentlemen in your 
own country, is far above the empty honours which are 
bestowed by the populace, who judge of things by the events, 
and, besides, are incapable of annalyzing operations. The 
greater part did not know me before the attack on this 
colony ; and if fortune, to which I owe almost all my success, 
had favoured me less, perhaps I should have been the victim 
of this blind and impassioned people. The multitude have 
not, and cannot have, but success to regulate their opinions." 

Montcalm. "I am very much flattered, Sir, by your 
manner of thinking with regard to me. Let us leave human 
weakness to produce errors upon errors, and to praise to the 
skies to-day what they will condemn to-morrow. It is now 
that we can contemplate at leisure the errors and the passions 
of men, which rush like the waves of the sea to dash and 
often break themselves in pieces upon the rocks ; and since 
the mist, which hitherto had concealed from our eyes part of 
the truth, is cleared away, and as you have very justly 
remarked, we are located in a region where they are divested 
of all prejudice, would you be quite willing that we should 
examine without partiality the operations of that campaign of 
1759, equally fatal to the conqueror and the vanquished, and 
what was the epoch of the loss of Canada to France." 

Wolfe. " I agree to it, Sir, and to testify to you all my 
willingness, I confess to you frankly, that I have been greatly 



surprised at having been able to arrive with the English fleet 
quite opposite to the town of Quebec, without having had to 
encounter the slightest opposition in the river St. Lawrence." 
Montcalm. "You have reason, Sir; it is not my fault 
that you did not meet with obstacles in your way; I proposed 
to make a redoubt and battery on Cape Tourmento, opposite 
the passage at the end of the Isle of Orleans. The ships are 
obliged to approach the Cape at the distance of a hundred 
toises, to enter into the bay. It is a rock of about fifty feet 
in height, by consequence a shelter to the guns of our vessels ; 
and, besides, it is a position so advantageous that your troops 
should have never been able to approach from any side to 
form the siege, this rock being steep all around, and almost 
perpendicular ; thus it is very likely that the first four ships 
which should have presented themselves to enter the passage 
would have been sunk to the bottom by the fire plunging from 
this redoubt. I had also the idea of making a battery upon 
the highest point of the peak which is opposite to the Isle at 
Condre, which would have raked your vessels in their advance 
from the rear, while they approached the anchorage, being 
obliged to cast anchor to wait the return of the ebb tide, or 
to be carried along and dashed upon the shallow coast by the 
excessive violence of the currents at low water. I had even 
sent the engineers to examine these positions. I proposed 
this project for the part of the river below Quebec, but I did 
not command a chief who was capable of executing it." 

Wolfe. " It is true, Sir, that this would have occasioned 
us a great embarrassment, and in a small degree retarded our 
operations for some time." 

Montcalm. " It was fully my intention, because I was 
always sensible how fortunate it is to gain time in certain 
positions ; above all in a climate such as Canada, where the 
fine season is so short, that one cannot there maintain the 
campaign, owing to the excessive cold which prevails at 
Quebec from the month- of May even to the commencement 



I of October; and your fleet did not arrive at the Isle at 
Condre till the end of June." 

Wolfe. " Certainly, Sir, we arrived in the river St. 
Lawrence by far too late by six weeks. This is the ordinary 
fate of all grave naval armaments and expeditions. The fleets 
are almost never in a state to depart on the day named ; and 
this is the cause which makes enterprises by sea so often 
miscarry, the least delay being dangerous and of the last 
consequence, by giving the enemy time to reconnoitre and 
make the necessary preparations for defence." 

Montcalm. " I will not conceal from you, Sir, that I 
have always regarded the disposition which you made of your 
army, after your landing before Quebec, as diametrically op- 
posed to the first principle of the military art ! It appears to 
me that this is an axiom recognized that an army ought to 
be disposed in such a manner as to be able promptly to re- 
unite, and to sustain itself reciprocally in all its parts. You 
had divided your army into three camps one of which on 
Point Levis, another upon the Isle of Orleans, and the third 
at the Fall of Montmorency in such a manner that the 
communications of one camp with the other were cut off by 
two arms of the river St. Lawrence, formed by the Isle of 
Orleans, and every one of which was six hundred toises in 
breadth. Your position was like that of the French at the 
siege of Turin when the Duke of Orleans proposed to leave 
the lines to fight the enemy ; and it would not have been 
difficult to attack your separated camps to triumph without 
difficulty, as Prince Eugene did at Turin ; your two most 
considerable camps that at Point Levis, and that at the 
Fall of Montmorency being at the distance of two leagues 
from each other, and separated by two arms of the river. 
Your position was such that if we had fallen with our army 
upon any one of your three camps, at our option, you would 
have been destroyed and overwhelmed before it would have 
been possible for your other camps to arrive to your succour. 



How could you be able to rest tranquilly and without trouble 
in a position so perilous during more than two months ? " * 

Wolfe. " And you, Sir, what hindered you to execute 
that which appeared to you so easy ? " 

Montealm. "We attempted it, but with bad success. 
Some days after our landing at Point Levis, we sent JM. 
Dumas, major of the troops of the colony, with a detachment 
of five hundred men, who in the night crossed the river oppo- 
site Quebec, without having been discovered by your ad- 
vanced posts, in order to fall upon your camp at Point Levis ; 
but scarcely were they disembarked and in march to attack 
you, than a panic terror so overcame them, that disorder then 
ensued, they fired the one upon the other, and betook them- 
selves immediately to flight in the greatest possible confusion, 
to rejoin their boats. Discouraged by this bad beginning, 
they never spoke again of attacking your camps, and it was 
decided that they should stand solely upon the defensive." 

Wolfe. " It appeared to me, however, that you were not 
encamped in a manner to remain on the defensive, since your 
army did not amount but to ten thousand men, and that your 
camp occupied a space of from two to three leagues." 

Montealm. " I am convinced of it, and I feel with you 
that a line too much extended is too weak in all its parts ; I 
am very much convinced by proof of this principle, and even 
that it is a recognized maxim when they are not able to pre- 

* To know how to choose advantageous positions for encamping is one 
of the talents the most essential for a general of an army. " He who has 
the conduct of an army," says a Chinese general, " ought not to trust to 
others a choice of that importance. He ought to do something more still. 
If he is truly able, he ought to be able to dispose of even the encampment 
and all the marches of his enemy. A great general does not wait till he 
make him go : he knows how to make him come. If you find in sallying that 
the enemy seeks to render himself precisely to the places where you just 
wish him to be, make in sallying also smooth for him all the difficulties, and 
deliver him from all the obstacles which he could encounter. The great 
science is to make him do all you wish him to do, and to supply to him, 
without his perceiving it, all the means of aiding you." 



vent a line from being forced, and I believe it equally impos- 
sible to prevent the defeat of an enemy when they have many 
leagues of coast to guard : he who attacks with all his force 
united and concentrated on a single point ; on the contrary, 
he who relies upon his force separated through the whole 
length of his lines ; and one cannot know where the enemy 
may make his real attack, since he is master of choosing the 
place which he inclines. Thus it is evident that when one 
makes feint attacks to threaten at once the whole extent of 
the line, it is necessary that a column, forty or fifty men deep, 
should penetrate an intrenchment, where it would scarcely be 
possible to have two ranks of soldiers. It is the same as to 
landings, notwithstanding the common opinion that it is pos- 
sible to prevent them, and I do not know a better course to 
adopt than to have a flying body of troops to fall upon the 
enemy with the bayonet at the end of the musket before there 
are a great many on the land, and before they could have 
formed after the confusion which necessarily occurs in getting 
out of their boats. My plan of defence was to occupy the 
heights of Abraham, to encamp there, and to make the city of 
Quebec serve as a pivot to all my movements, seeing the fate 
of Canada depended on the capture of that city ; in this view, 
I would have made intrenchments along the banks of the 
river St. Charles, I would have remained encamped on these 
heights fully two days before your arrival. The person in 
my army in whom I always placed the greatest confidence, 
on account of his merit and knowledge, proposed to change 
our position by supporting our left by the fall of Montmor- 
ency, and our right by the river St. Charles, making, as you 
have remarked regarding it, a camp of an extent of two 
leagues. He pretended, that on showing a large front, this 
apparent boldness would impose upon the enemy. As there 
is not a point of moral certainty in any operation of war, the 
least unforeseen incident being capable of overturning the 
best concerted plan, I sacrificed my own opinion to his, with- 



10 

out being satisfied. In that new position, M. Levis com- 
manded the left and fall of Montmorency, I had the centre at 
Beauport, and M. the Marquis of Vaudreuil the right, oppo- 
site Canardiere, which was the head-quarters." 

Wolfe. " If you had remained upon the heights of Abra- 
ham, it is most likely that you would have prevented the 
capture of Quebec, but you would have left me at liberty to 
ruin and devastate the country." 

Montcalm. " That may be so, but the Colony would not 
have been taken, and you would not have dared to penetrate 
into the interior of the country, leaving Quebec behind you. 
If you had attempted to attack me, I had for my advantage 
the heights, which I would have fortified by intrenchments, 
and by a chain of redoubts, even to Cape Rouge, which is 
about two leagues in a straight line from Quebec, and which 
would have been an advanced post for me, difficult to force 
by its advantageous position ; and I would have had for my 
doorway the succour of the town, by which my army would 
have been supported. I never could have imagined that it 
could have been your idea to reduce Quebec to ashes, the 
greater part of that city having been destroyed entirely by 
the fireworks and bombs which you had thrown from your 
batteries on the other side of the river. It appears to me that 
when you intend to take a city with the intention of keeping 
it, you ought to turn it to its proper use, in order to have in 
place of a mass of ruins, houses to lodge your army in. 
Besides, the destruction of that city would not have accele- 
rated the capture in any manner. In the first place, you 
could not have dismounted our batteries, which were much 
more elevated than yours ; and, in short, the river which was 
between you and the city, and which was six hundred toises 
broad, would not have permitted you to approach it. What 
advantage could you then expect from that manoeuvre ? " 

Wolfe. "My inaction during the whole course of the 
summer ought to have made you sufficiently acquainted with 



my embarrassment, and the little hope I had of success in nay 
enterprise ; and the destruction of Quebec in a mass to the 
foundation, as it would have been in effect, would have 
appeared, in the eyes of the English people, a considerable 
advantage gained over your army, whom it behoved necessarily 
to blind, to allay their passions." 

Montcalm. "The day, Sir, that you landed at the fall of 
Montmorency, and when you encamped there with a corps of 
four thousand men, you were apparently ignorant that the 
river Montmorency was fordable in the wood, at half a league 
from your camp, where fifty men could have passed in front. 
In passing, all at once, this ford, you would have been able to 
fall unperceived upon the left of our camp, and to have cut us 
in pieces before it could have been possible for us to assemble 
a sufficient force to be able to present you a front capable of 
arresting you, for we were in full security, ignorant ourselves 
that there was a ford of this river, and we were not informed 
of it till some hours after your landing." 

Wolfe. "It is, then, not extraordinary that I should have 
been ignorant of it. Besides, it is only the inhabitants of the 
vicinity of rivers, morasses, and ponds who can give informa- 
tion as to that, and all those of that quarter had fled and 
retired into your camp. On my arrival I did not find a single 
person ; and when I had found one, your Canadians were too 
much attached and too much devoted to their King and their 
country to have given me the least light on the subject. 
Those whom we sent to reconnoitre could not do it but very 
superficially, if they confined themselves to their own proper 
observations, without interrogating the people of the sur- 
rounding country." 

Montcalm. " During the time your soldiers were occupied 
in laying out your camp, and putting up their tents, M. Levis 
found himself before the fall, with M. Johnstone, his aide-de- 
camp, who investigated your manoeuvre. The aide-de-camp 
having asked at M. Levis if he was certain that there was not 



12 

a ford in the river Montmorency, upon the positive reply of 
M. Levis ' that he was assured that there was not one, since 
he had himself reconnoitered this river up to a lake and 
morass at two or three leagues in front of the woods, out of 
which it arose, without ever finding one,' an inhabitant, who 
heard them, immediately whispered into the ear of the aide- 
de-camp, ' That the General deceived himself, that there was 
a ford, and that the inhabitants daily passed this river on foot 
to carry corn to the mill.' M. Johnstone imparted it imme- 
diately to M. Levis, but the inhabitant having been interro- 
gated somewhat roughly by M. Levis, expressed himself in a 
voice so timid and trembling that M. Levis could not persuade 
himself that he was deceived in his observations. On leaving 
the fall to return to the lodging of M. Levis, M. Johnstone 
gave orders to the countryman to find immediately some one 
who had passed the ford within twenty-four hours, and to 
bring him with diligence with him to the house of M. Levis. 
The Canadian returned in a moment to find M. Johnstone, 
followed by a man who had passed the night before with a 
sack of corn on his back, and who declared that^he had found 
the water not above his mid-leg. We sent, immediately, a 
detachment to occupy this post, with tools to make intrench- 
ments on the spot." 

Wolfe. "If I had been as fortunate as you, Sir, to dis- 
cover the ford, I would have fallen upon your army at the 
instant ; for certainly I should not have let escape so fine an 
occasion to distinguish myself. There is nothing so perilous 
as the proximity of rivers or morasses, when they are not 
sounded and examined with the greatest attention. A mishap 
which occurred to one of my brother officers, Lieutenant- 
General Cope, proves sufficiently the necessity of sounding, 
with all the care and all the circumspection possible, the 
rivers and the morasses which are found in the neighbourhood 
of a camp. M. Cope, who passed for one of the best officers 
of England, was sent to Scotland in 1745 to command an 



13 

army against Prince Edward. He chose a position the most 
advantageous to wait for the rebels. He had on his right two 
enclosures, with" stone walls seven or eight feet in height, 
between which there was a road from fifteen to eighteen feet 
broad, which led to the village of Prestonpans. Before his 
front was another enclosure, surrounded by a ditch full of 
water, twelve feet broad and very deep. At his left there 
was a pond and a morass which he believed to be imprac- 
ticable ; and behind him the'sea, which shut him up in the 
best fortified camp. The proprietor j of the morass informed 
Prince Edward that there was a place which he had often 
crossed whenever he chose, but that there could not pass 
more than a single man abreast. Prince Edward, sending at 
once to reconnoitre this morass, found that it was unguarded, 
crossed it during the night with his army, making them defile, 
the one after the other ; and at the break of day M. Cope 
saw the Highlanders a hundred feet before him, sword in 
hand, who fell unexpectedly upon his army, without leaving 
them time to put themselves in battle-array. All his troops 
were in an instant shamefully cut in pieces or made prisoners, 
and it was the strength of his camp that proved his ruin. 
With difficulty could he save himself, with a score of horse- 
men to carry into England the news of his own disgrace, 
covered with dishonour, shame, and confusion. His misad- 
venture has always made such a great impression upon me 
that I have been continually upon my guard against a like 
surprise ; and at the same time I have always sought to profit 
by the negligence of the enemy in that respect. Thus, it is 
greatly to be presumed that I should have discovered the 
ford during the march, and then I should not have been 
found wanting to take advantage of it." 

Montcalm. " But, Sir, how do you justify yourself for 
the imprudence with which you ensconced yourself in the 
wood, with two thousand men quite opposite to our intrench- 
ments at the ford; not a single man of your detachment would 



14 

have been able to escape ; nine hundred savages in ambus- 
cade, within pistol shot of you, without your having perceived 
it, would have invested and cut off your retreat. The savages 
had sent at the instant their officer, M. Langlade, to inform M. 
Levis of their position, and to beg him with clasped hands to 
give orders to M. Repentigny, who commanded a corps of 
eleven hundred men in the intrenchments at the ford, to cross 
the river with his detachment ; and that they would answer 
with their heads for the success of the attack ; adding that 
you appeared to be about two thousand men, and that they 
were not strong enough to attack you without reinforcements, 
which they asked from the Canadians. There were a great 
many officers in the house of M. Levis when Langlade arrived, 
among others, commanders of battalions. M. Levis consulted 
them, but no one officer gave it as his opinion for the detach- 
ment of Repentigny to pass the river ; they pretended that it 
was dangerous to attack an enemy in woods, of which it was 
impossible to know the number, that perhaps this was the 
whole English army ; and that it would be impossible to 
engage in a general action without being prepared ; that if we 
had the misfortune to be repulsed, M. Levis would be blamed 
for taking this affair upon himself without waiting for orders ; 
they alleged, besides, many other reasons equally less solid. 
Never did any one see such a blindness ! M. Johnstone was 
the only one who gave an opposite advice, and maintained 
with spiritedness that there was not the least appearance 
that this was the whole English army, since the savages, 
who never failed to exaggerate the number of the enemy, 
supposed them only two thousand men ; that although this 
should be the whole English army, and that we should en- 
gage in a general action in the woods, that was all that we 
could desire as most fortunate, since one Canadian in the 
wood was worth much more than three soldiers of regular 
troops, and that one soldier on the plain was worth more than 
three Canadians, of whom the greater part of our army was 



15 

composed ; and that it was necessary to suit and make the 
different kinds of troops, of which our army was composed, 
available ; that, without losing time, it was necessary to send 
to Beauport to inform M. Montcalm to cause the army to 
advance at once in echelons, replacing the post of M. 
Repentigny at the ford by the Royal Eegiment Roissillon, 
which was encamped close to that, and thus to stop the army, 
always advancing in proportion as they passed the ford ; that 
even supposing that the worst should happen, that we should 
be repulsed, the English could not reap any advantage from 
it, since we should have a secure retreat in the thickness 
of the woods, where the enemy never durst pursue us, at the 
risk of being cut to pieces by the savages and the Canadians ; 
and he added that in war when fortune presented to us pro- 
pitious moments, it was necessary to profit by them on the 
instant. These reasonings made no impression, and Langlade 
was sent back without having obtained anything. The am- 
buscade of the savages was a little more than half a league 
from the house of M. Levis ; in the meantime, Langlade 
returned once more to give us instant news on the part of the 
savages. M. Levis did not wish ever to give a positive 
order to M. Repentigny to pass the river with his detach- 
ment, but he charged Langlade with a letter on his part to 
Repentigny, in which he notified to him the confidence he had 
in his prudence, and that he could pass the ford with his 
detachment, to join himself to the savages, if he saw a like- 
lihood to succeed. M. Johnstone foreseeing the answer M. 
Repentigny would make, he said to M. Levis, in sealing his 
letter, that Repentigny had too much good sense and judge- 
ment to take upon himself so delicate an affair. Accordingly, 
he sent at once to demand from M. Levis an order more 
positive and more clear. M. Levis in the end determined on 
it, and mounted his horse to proceed to the ford, in order to 
give his orders viva voce ; but scarcely was he on half the 
road than he heard a fire of musketry. The time having 



16 

slipped away in indecision ; the savages impatient at having 
remained more than an hour in a position so perilous, let go 
their shot, killing five hundred men, and retiring immediately 
without having lost a single man. It is evident that had M. 
Repentigny passed the ford with his detachment, you would 
have been cut in pieces, and accordingly, to all appearance, 
this action would have determined for ever the war in Canada, 
your army not having anything further to expect after such a 
loss. Never did fortune seem to decide so favourably for 
you, and it seems that the ruin of Canada was also decided 
in the decrees of Providence. As to the rest we cannot 
blame M. Levis. Every subordinate officer, is in rule when 
he executes the orders he receives, much more when he sees 
daily officers who are victims in having even followed orders 
badly expressed and convertible into a double sense. One is 
not wrong in being mistrustful in similar cases, where the 
honour and reputation of an officer is engaged. The human 
mind is too limited to foresee the result of an affair, and 
when the success does not respond to an enterprise, even well 
conceived and with all appearances of succeeding, one finds 
but too many people who cover themselves under the shelter 
of censure, which they have merited by their ignorance and 
want of capacity, profiting thereby to destroy and sacrifice 
innocent victims, while they themselves, who are really in- 
capable, escape the punishment they deserve." 

Wolfe. "My intention, of advancing so closely to your 
intrenchments at the ford, was to see if there was any means 
of forcing them, and in effect they appeared to me to be of 
little consequence ; but the sole view of the stirring ground 
imposed respect. Besides, accustomed to war in Europe, 
could I imagine the bravery of your savages ambuscaded so 
.close to me, unless I had discovered them ? " 

Montcalm. "Your attack, Sir, on the 31st July, at a 
place the most inaccessible of our camp, has always to me 
appeared inconceivable. From Quebec to Beauport is a flat 



17 

and uniform country, and close to the source of the river, 
From Beauport to the Fall of Montmorency, the country in- 
sensibly rises ; and at the redoubt and battery which M. 
Johnstone had erected, which was your landing and point of 
attack, it formed, as you know, a mountain very steep and 
sharp, which your soldiers would have had great difficulty in 
scaling, even without the encumbrance of their accoutre- 
ments. But supposing that they had been able to mount, 
which they would not have been able to do, but at the 
loss of three-fourths of your force, before arriving at the 
summit, the height serving us as a very steep glacis, you 
would have still found, upon the crest of the height, a very 
solid intrenchment and well flanked, which M. Johnstone had 
traced and conducted, the fire of which from the front and 
the flanks would have made a butchery of your soldiers, as 
soon as ever you had been engaged in the ascent. Besides 
these difficulties, the ground between the redoubt of Johnstone 
and the foot of the acclivity, was marshy, where one sunk 
considerably. Your Scotch Highlanders would have broke 
through this barrier, and would have advanced even to the 
foot of the ascent, but they could not have escaped out of it. 
I was a long time before I was able to persuade myself that 
this was your real attack. I always feared for the loop-hole, 
and if you had found it there, opposite the house of M. Vau- 
dreuil, and a feint attack where you had made your real one, 
you would have easily penetrated into the country by entering 
it on plain ground ; and you would have cut our army in two 
through the centre, unless the different corps could have been 
easily able to join themselves : you would have compassed 
the ruin of Beauport, which you would have taken all at 
once, under shelter of being attacked by the left of our camp ; 
and by your prolonging your line on the side of Quebec, and 
forcing our horn work, which upon that side it would have 
been possible to scale by a coup de main, you would have 
been in an instant masters of the Heights of Abraham, even 

B 



18 

to have turned against us the intrenchments which I had 
made on the banks of the river St. Charles, which would not 
have been available by changing our position ; and our com- 
munication being cut off from the city by that manreuvre, you 
would have been able to form the siege without fear of being 
annoyed. Behold, Sir, what I continually apprehended ; and 
if you had taken this course, I do not know indeed, how we 
would have been able to extricate ourselves. M. Levis seeing 
your attack determined against M. Johnstone's redoubt, caused 
his troops prudently to retire, which were there inside, which 
would not have been able to resist a shock of your army. It 
was then, Sir, that miracles came to our aid, and greatly 
apropos. As soon as you were at the redoubt, at the point of 
seeing the difficulty of the ascent, but engaged in a bad mode 
of proceeding, so as not to be able to extricate yourselves 
but by the loss of half your army ; at this critical moment a 
tempest arose, so great as to screen you all at once from our 
view, we not being able to see more than two paces from our 
intrenchments. When the tempest ceased, it was then that 
we saw again your army which deployed in column towards 
your camp at the Fall of Montmorency, for the purpose of 
passing the ford of that river, close to the bank of the river, 
which they did at low water. You profited, Sir, like an 
able man, by this event to secure your retreat ; and certainly 
you must have been content to escape, though with the loss of 
five or six hundred men." 

Wolfe. " I confess I was deceived with regard to that 
height. In the distance it appeared inconsiderable ; and it was 
only at the redoubt that the escarpment developed itself, and 
appeared truly such as it is. I commenced at seven o'clock 
in the morning, to open my battery of forty pieces of cannon, 
of twenty-four pounders, at the Fall of Montmorency, as well 
as my mortars and howitzers. The " Centurion" ship of war, 
of sixty guns, and two small frigates, brought their broad- 
sides to bear, at the same tune, against your intrenchments, 



19 

which kept up a continual fire like platoons of musketry ; 
which I continued so from my batteries up to six o'clock in 
the evening, when I commenced my landing at low water. 
I daresay no one ever saw artillery better served. I imagine 
that this terrible cannonade, which continued without inter- 
mission throughout the whole day, intimidated the Canadian 
militia, of which your army was principally composed, and 
caused them abandon their intrenchments. My batteries, at 
the Fall, being from twenty-five to thirty feet more ele- 
vated than your camp, we saw your force in the intrench- 
ments, even to the buckles of their shoes ; so it is not 
possible but that you must have lost an infinite number of 
men." 

Montcalm. " This is what ought to form the eulogy of 
that brave militia. Not a single man gave way ; all con- 
ducted themselves with as much courage and ardour as my 
regular troops. In reality, I had not but fifty men killed or 
wounded by your furious cannonade. That is a proof that 
these cannons do much less execution, in comparison to the 
fear and respect which they ordinarily inspire. This occasion 
made me remark, Sir, that your English countrymen, not- 
withstanding their reputation for phlegmatic bravery, which 
has been attributed to them, are more foolhardy and less fore- 
seeing than the French, who have always passed for being 
lively, fiery and impetuous, that scarcely have they patience 
to examine a position of the enemy before attacking him. 
Such is the idea you have in England of our nation ; but if 
you judge of the two nations impartially, by the different 
actions which have occured in Canada, I am persuaded that 
you will render us justice ; and that you will confess that we 
have shown more sang froid, circumspection, and presence 
of mind than you. Your attack on the 31st of July, made 
without ever having taken an exact reconnoissance of that 
height, of which you had been deceived in the distance, is 
not the first attack of that kind which your countrymen have 



20 

made in Canada. In the meantime, nevertheless, it appears 
to me that, viewing the proximity of your camp to the Fall, 
you would have been able to make a perfect reconnoissance of 
that acclivity, whether with telescopes, or by landing a force 
across the ford of the river of Montmorency in the night at 
low water, to visit that height ; or by landing a force be- 
tween our two hindmost redoubts, to climb up there during 
the obscurity of the night. General Abercrombie, your pre- 
decessor in the command of the English army, made the 
same mistake in the year 1758, at Carillon, and his loss was 
still more considerable than yours. I left Montreal in the 
month of May, 1758, to proceed to Fort Carillon, which the 
English called Tinonderoga, with all my regular troops, the 
regiments of the Queen, the Sarre, the Royal Rousillon, 
Languedoc, Beaux, G-uyenne, and Berry which was of two 
battalions, and the unattached French companies of the 
marine of Canada ; the whole composing a corps of about 
four thousand men, the regiments not being complete, with- 
out having had any certain advice that the English army 
would come by the Lake of St. Sacrement to attack Carillon 
and penetrate thereby into Canada. I foresaw it, neverthe- 
less, on account of the proximity of that fort to your estab- 
lishments upon the Lake of St. Sacrement ; and I never 
ceased to press M. Vaudreuil to send to me, with all possible 
despatch the Canadian Militia, which formed the principal 
strength of my army ; but M. Vaudreuil not imagining that 
my conjectures were well founded, in place of sending them, 
gave them leave to remain at Montreal to work in fields 
and at other country labour. On the 7th of July, my con- 
jectures were realized, being informed that the English army, 
of six thousand three hundred regular troops and thirteen 
thousand militia of the colonies, had landed at the fall, an 
advanced post a league from Carillon, where the Lake of St. 
Sacrement terminates, and where there were about twenty 
thousand men commanded by M. Abercrombie, a general of 



-iy^ . 

flgjfp* 

fv*m 




21 

reputation in your country, who had succeeded General 
Braddock, killed the year before at the Beautiful River : the 
arrival of the debris of a detachment of four hundred men 
which I had placed at the fall, of which there had been five 
hundred killed there, did but confirm me too surely of the 
truth of that news. One can hardly imagine a situation 
more embarrassing and more annoying than that in which I 
then found myself, above all, not having the Canadians, 
which formed the most essential part of my army, by their 
manner of fighting in the woods. The Fort of Carillon (a) 
is a square of about seventy toises of length on every side, 
regularly fortified with walls of masonry and terraces, ditches, 
with a court-way and glacis. M. Bourlamarque, a very skil- 
ful officer, and of great merit, added to it in 1759 a half 
moon. For me to retire with my four thousand men was to 
give up the colony to M. Abercrombie, the Fort Carillon not 
being able to sustain for a long time a siege against an army 
so considerable. Besides, this fort was the key of Canada on 
that side of it, and M. Abercrombie having rendered himself 
master of it, would have found nothing that would have been 
able to prevent him from going straight to Montreal, which 
was not susceptible of defence. On the other hand, to oppose 
four thousand men against twenty thousand, the game was by 
no means equal; nevertheless there was nothing to decide 
the chance, and I determined either to save the country, or to 
die gloriously with arms in hands. During the night I made 
the whole force work to cut down trees to make an intrench- 
ment (&, &, &, &,) which was very small ; the engineers having 
stripped the trees of their branches, piled at length the one 
above the other, forming a kind of parapet, but not sufficiently 
high to place my soldiers under cover ; and which the enemy 
could without difficulty have been able to overleap. A heap 
of tree-tops outside, with points of their branches well shar- 
pened, would have made an intrenchment, which would have 
required less time to construct, and would have been more 



22 

impenetrable. At two paces outside the intrenchment, I 
caused place all around the height a line of branches (h, h, 7i,) 
points outside. Not having time to make an intrenchment 
in the bottom at the left of the height, which could have been 
done, about forty or fifty paces broad, between the foot of the 
height and the river at the Fall, I placed there two companies 
of grenadiers (d), and I caused the hollow at the right of the 
height to be occupied by the unattached marine troops, where 
the intrenchment (c, c,) was still worse than upon the height, 
supporting their right in front of the wood. The next day, 
the 8th of July, your army appeared at the border of the 
wood, about three hundred toises in front of our intrench- 
ments upon the height, and bore down in an instant (e) upon 
three columns, without waiting to reconnoitre our position. 
Two columns attacked at once the height, with all the fury 
and impetuosity possible, but immediately they found them- 
selves embarrassed by the branches, and being engaged inside, 
without being able to advance, they lost there an immense 
number of men. Some even having cleared them, were killed 
by our soldiers at the point of the bayonet, when jumping into 
our intrenchments. The chasseurs and militia of M. Aber- 
crombie, who were under two engineers (g, <?,) which com- 
manded our intrenchments, pierced through part of them, and 
took another of them behind (&), where was the regiment of 
Berry, which was harrassed by their fire, one of these 
columns not being more than about forty toises from our in- 
trenchments. The third column came forward, to attack the 
intrenchments in the hollow, which the French unattached 
companies of marines occupied, but the very brisk fire which 
poured on the head of these troops of the colony, and at the 
same time in flank of those who were on the height, turned 
the tables there presenting its head at the height (&) which 
it attacked vigorously. The troops of the colony, commanded 
by M. Raimond, then proceeded out of their intrenchments to 
approach nearer the column, and having poured a very brisk fire 



23 

upon the left flank of the column, at the side of the border of 
the wood, it appeared to us as if it wavered, but it continued 
always with obstinacy its attack against the height, and threw 
into disorder the regiment of Berry, which began to fall back 
and abandon the intrenchments. I was there quickly, and 
having encouraged the soldiers, order was re-established in a 
moment. I had placed my Grenadiers in rear of my in- 
trenchments, in order as soon as we perceived that any por- 
tion of them should be forced, they might be able to run to 
their assistance on the spot, and throw themselves with head 
low upon the enemy, the bayonet at the musket's end. Hav- 
ing done all that the shortness of the time permitted me to 
do for a good defence, and preserved during the whole length 
of this attack the utmost coolness and presence of mind, to 
remedy the disorder which must naturally arise in an action 
so long and so determined, M Abercrombie, after struggling 
desperately with the intention of forcing our intrenchments, 
was obliged in the end to make his retreat with the loss of 
from four to five thousand men, and to abandon his enterprise. 
In the space of a night it was impossible to throw up works 
so considerable, as to oppose an army so superior as mine. 
I did everything that it was possible to do to acquit myself 
with honour, and if I had been beaten, I would have had no- 
thing to reproach myself with. To have done one's duty is a 
sweet satisfaction in all events, and most flattering and con- 
soling, in fortune the most adverse. M. Abercrombie had 
made his attack with an inconceivable blindness and audacity, 
without having previously reconnoitred the place. This is 
what he would have had time to do from his landing, during 
two hours that he remained at the Fall, which is not a league 
from our intrenchments. Having neglected to examine our 
position at night, at least it would have been possible to do it, 
by remaining some time on the borders of the wood before 
debouching, but immediately on arriving, he proceeded forth- 
with in advance to make the attack. If he had advanced on 



24 

the 7th, at the moment of his landing, in place of passing 
the night at the Fall, I would have never dared to make head 
against him, on equal ground with so small a force ; and he 
would have allowed me to take the course of retiring on the 
spot, leaving at Carillon as many troops as the fort could con- 
tain, in order to protract the siege of it longer. If the co- 
lumns of the left ( 3 ) had followed the border of the wood to 
fall upon the right flank of the intrenchments of the colony 
to hold the middle of the space between the wood and the 
height, which might be three hundred toises in length, it 
would have found itself beyond the reach of the fire of the 
height, and would have overthrown in an instant the troops 
of the colony, who not being able to resist the shock of the 
columns, would have been all at once put to flight. Carrying 
themselves up, in fine, with rapidity to the side of the height, 
in a place where it diminished much and is of easy access, 
they would have taken our intrenchments behind. At the 
single view of this manoeuvre, I would have been under the 
necessity of abandoning my intrenchments with precipitation, 
not to have allowed my retreat to have been cut off from the 
fort, that which would have destroyed me without resource. 
The enemy would have been able to penetrate equally at the 
place where were my two companies of grenadiers (d\ and 
which I had not time to cut off and mount upon the height, 
where the ascent (Z) is gentle, to take equally the reverse of 
the intrenchments on the height. But he always persisted 
with determination and obstinacy in his attack upon the most 
difficult places, without ever regarding his right or his left, to 
see if he had the means of penetrating otherwise than by the 
height. It must have been that he had a bandage about his 
eyes, not to perceive that, during many hours that his attack 
lasted." 

Wolfe. " It was there, Sir, a day most glorious for you, 
and worthy the ambition of the greatest of men. Our 
columns not being distant but about ten paces from your in- 



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25 

trenchments, all our army recognized you, and distinguished 
you perfectly well, engaged incessantly cheering up, encourag- 
ing, and exciting the ardour of your soldiers ; running con- 
tinually along your lines with the fierceness of a lion, at a few 
paces in rear of your intrenchments, and exposing yourself 
too much for a general of an army. It appeared very clearly 
the disorder of your right, and M. Abercrombie redoubled his 
eif orts to take advantage of it ; but you were always through- 
out never disconcerted, and remedying immediately the least 
derangement that one could perceive in your troops, before 
it was possible to communicate itself to the other corps, 
which happens commonly with the quickness of lightning. 
This affair made you acquire so great a reputation in England, 
for talents, capacity, and great genius, that I confess to you. 
Sir, that the idea of having to fight against a general of your 
merit, made me act with trembling during the campaign of 
1759, and my movements were always undecided. I would 
not be inclined to condemn the conduct of my countrymen 
who were before me in the command of the armies in Canada. 
The war of woods, which the savages and Canadians carry 
on, is so different from that of Europe, that the most able 
General, with the best disciplined troops, will never fail to be 
cut in pieces by the scalping knife of savages in these vast 
woods, by conducting themselves according to the rules of the 
military art, the principles of which throughout Europe are 
sure, fixed, and clear. They cried out in England against M. 
Braddock, who was cut in pieces at Belle Riviere in 1755, with 
four thousand men, by six hundred and fifty savages and 
Canadians, more than against M. Abercrombie. The reason 
is clear. M. Abercrombie returned to England ; and the 
living find out a thousand ways of justifying themselves. 
But M. Braddock was dead. The dead are always in the 
wrong, and find few advocates sufficiently disinterested to 
plead their cause. The order of march and disposition of M. 
Braddock appears at the first sight altogether singular. In 



26 

analyzing it, it is no other thing than the rule of march prac- 
tised throughout all Europe in crossing woods. An army of 
three columns ; artillery carriages and baggage forming the 
column in the centre ; the half of the grenadiers at the head 
to sustain the pioneers, having been obliged to form a road, 
in proportion as it should advance in the wood, to be able to 
pass its artillery and carriages ; and the rest of the grenadiers 
closed up its march. It was invested all at once on all sides 
by savages dispersed in the woods, and every savage behind a 
tree, who looked out for a man, in a manner that all their 
aims took effect ; and at every discharge they vaulted from 
tree to tree. What could regular troops do in such a case ? 
To press close their ranks and files in proportion as they were 
exposed, as did General Braddock. They fired continually 
without seeing a man ; and they were all cut to pieces with- 
out seeing an enemy. I do not know any other way of 
defending one's self against savages than that which I did at 
the Ford of Montmorency, by causing my soldiers cut with 
the bayonet at the but end of their muskets, slashing on all 
sides, wherever they saw a fire proceeding, without preserving 
any order, and dispersing themselves as they did. I had not 
two thousand men with me, and there were against me nine 
hundred savages, who were repulsed all at once, and were 
immediately dispersed." 

Montcalm. " I believe, Sir, that your idea is just. The 
savages, by repassing the Ford, said that there was no other 
means of fighting against the English, since they had learned 
to fight like them. It is singular that you had remained two 
months in inaction with your army divided, when, being 
master of the river St. Lawrence, by your ships of war, which 
had passed in front of Quebec, you would have been able to 
send a detachment below the city to effect a landing all around 
where you could have pleased, without finding the least opposi- 
tion. You limited yourself to make one single landing at the 
village of Chambeux, about thirteen leagues from Quebec, 



27 

with a detachment of two thousand men ; but you were no 
sooner on the land, than the sight of our cavalry, which con- 
sisted of only two hundred Canadians, to whom I had given 
horses, and which the Chevalier Rochebeaucourt had a little 
drilled to form ranks and march together, you re-embarked 
all at once with precipitation, and with all the disorder 
possible, not having remained scarcely two hours on the land. 
All this brilliant exploit terminated in burning a house at 
Chambeaux, wherein were the equipments of some regiments. 
If this detachment, on being landed, had occupied James 
Cartier a place which retained the name of him by whom 
the river St. Lawrence had been discovered, and who passed 
the winter there amongst the savages, having lost his vessel 
about ten leagues from Quebec, and had occupied it, you 
would have cut off our communication with Montreal, where 
we kept our provisions, and we would have been lost without 
resource. James Cartier is so fortified by nature, that an 
army of a hundred thousand men could not have forced 
that post against three hundred men, who chose to defend 
it. It is situated in the bottom of a ravine of immense 
depth, and lost to view. The sides of the mountain are steep, 
but glistening in such a manner that you can see even to the 
bottom of the ravine. It is not possible to take it on the side 
of the wood, on account of the impracticable lakes and quag- 
mires which are there found ; and it is equally beyond 
assault on the side of the river by its sharp elevation. The 
only way of attacking it would be to make a landing at the 
Chambeaux, as you had done, which is not distant more 
than three leagues, and to take it in rear ; and we never 
could have dislodged you therefrom, seeing you were absolute 
masters of the river by your marine. It is a most unique 
position." 

Wolfe. " That is well said, but we did not know the 
locale of these places then ; and we cannot send to reconnoitre 
as in Europe." 



28 

Montcalm. " Your landing on the 13th of September, 
the day of our fatal epoch, to come to an anchorage at the 
foot of a mountain immensely high and steep, appeared to me 
a rashness beyond imagination. A handful of men upon the 
crest of this mountain would have been sufficient to repulse 
you with sticks in hand, or by throwing down stones upon you. 
I was very much surprised that this idea had never occurred 
to your mind, when we had three posts, the one close to 
the other, to defend that part, each of a hundred men ; the 
one commanded by M. Douglas, captain of the Regiment of 
Languedoc ; another by M. Rimini, captain of the Regiment 
of Sarre ; and the third by M. Vergor, captain of the troops 
of the Colony. These three hundred men would have been 
more than sufficient to have placed us under shelter from 
every assault from that side, viewing the difficulty of the 
ground, which you could have never surmounted, if you had 
there met with the slightest resistance." 

Wolfe. " I do not justify my project of landing by the 
success of it, but by my combinations, which turned out to be 
good, and which succeeded according to what I had foreseen. 
It is by analyzing a plan that one is able to demonstrate, if it 
is well or ill concerted. In giving you the detail, I am per- 
suaded, Sir, you would not blame me for having undertaken 
an attack so ridiculous in appearances, but reasonable on 
examination, if you do it impartially. In all expeditions 
composed of naval and land forces, there never fails to be 
between the two corps altercations, jealousies, and quarrels. 
The admiral and the general not being subordinate the one 
to the other, each commanding in chief his corps independent 
of the other, it is almost a miracle if you see them united in 
the same plan of operations, and that they yield reciprocally 
for the good of the service. The service of the marine and 
that of the land service are two studies, the principles of 
which are altogether different there being no resemblance 
between the manoeuvre of a ship and that of a battalion of 



29 

infantry ; nevertheless the admiral wishes to mix himself up 
with questions of land forces, of which he knows nothing ; 
and the general wishes to give his advice about the manoeuvre 
of ships, of which he is equally ignorant. It is that which 
occasions these discords which reign perpetually between the 
two forces when they are detached together with a separate 
authority. If every one wished to confine himself within the 
knowledge of the part he has made his study, and had no- 
thing solely at heart but the good of the service of his king 
and country, three-fourths of the expeditions of land troops 
mixed with the marine, would succeed better than they 
ordinarily do. They annoyed me much, especially towards 
the end of the campaign. On the 10th of September they 
held a council of war on board the " Admiral," when it was 
decided on to depart for Europe, viewing the danger to which 
ships of war were exposed in the end of the season in these 
outrageous seas, and that they could not remain longer. In 
consequence, orders were given to some vessels to sail, which 
immediately weighed anchor to descend the river St. Law- 
rence, and they commenced at once their preparations for the 
approaching departure of the whole fleet. On the 12th, two 
deserters came to me from one of your three posts, who were 
of your French regiments, and sufficiently drilled. On exa- 
mining them, I discovered that your three posts, of which 
you have been speaking, were negligently guarded ; and, 
moreover, that M. Bougainville, who was with a detachment 
at Cape Rouge, about three leagues from Quebec, behoved to 
bring down, during the following night, some ships laden 
with provisions. It occurred to me at once to avail myself 
of this discovery, and I proceeded immediately to the admiral 
to communicate to him the particulars, praying him, at the 
same time, with clasped hands, to be pleased to concur in 
allowing me again to make another attempt ; and I promised 
him, if they fired on us twenty musket shots from your posts, I 
should desist at the moment, and that I should not think of 



30 

anything farther than to embark to return for England. The 
council agreed, and I commenced my landing at eleven 
o'clock at night. When my boats approached your two posts 
commanded by M. Douglas and M. Rimini, to the " "Who 
goes there ? " of your sentinels, my soldiers replied in French 
" Ships with provisions," as I had ordered them, and they let 
them pass without stopping them, as it would have been right 
to do, in order to recognize them and receive the password. 
Not finding any sentinel at your third post, where M. Vergor 
commanded, I made my disembarkation upon the spot, and 
all my army was on the ground before you perceived it. I 
commenced my landing by making a sergeant put his foot on 
ground, with ten grenadiers, ordering him to move himself 
always right in front, so that he might not be discovered, and 
I caused him to be followed by a lieutenant with a detach- 
ment of grenadiers, who had also orders to advance always 
at quick tune, but to stop in an instant when he found the 
enemy. Not intending to fire, I made all my corps of grena- 
diers who followed the sergeant and lieutenant to debouch at 
once, and also, successively, the rest of my army, conceiving 
then good hopes of my enterprise by the silence of your posts. 
As soon as the head of my column arrived at the foot of 
the mountain, the soldiers climbed it, not without difficulty ; 
and they served as guides to the others who were behind 
them. In short, they all passed to a marvel, and there was 
only one shot of a gun fired, which wounded M. Vergor in 
the heel, and they made him prisoner immediately ; but we 
did not see a single soldier of his detachment. If your posts 
had been alert and upon ' their guard, all that I would have 
risked by their discharge would have been the loss of the 
sergeant and the lieutenant, with some forty grenadiers, and 
I would have stopped my career in the moment ; for to at- 
tempt an attack on a strong force at a place so impracticable 
would have been a folly and extravagance unpardonable ; 
but finding no opposition I continued to disembark my troops 



31 

with diligence, and as soon as I had some hundreds of men 
landed I feared nothing more, having known by your deser- 
ters that you had no troops upon the Heights of Abraham. 
You see then, Sir, that I risked nothing. It is my principle 
to seek out difficult places, which are generally ill guarded 
and neglected ; and looking out where it might be possible to 
pass not more than one man abreast, it is there that a landing 
is sure to be made ; for where one man is able to pass, a 
hundred thousand may do it, if they meet with no resistance. 
In forming them in proportion as they cleared the defile, the 
enemy being late in perceiving them, they would have imme- 
diately a sufficient force landed to make head, which at every 
moment increased ; and the soldiers in those kinds of enter- 
prises do not amuse themselves by the road, and they pass on 
with speed. Besides, in every surprise, the enemy is struck 
with terror, dismayed and disconcerted ; and it requires more 
or less time for reflection to come to his aid : stupified by a 
circumstance which he had not foreseen, he is about half 
beaten in advance, before coming to the fight. It is true that 
if the enemy is beforehand aware of your design, you run the 
risk of his allowing part of your force to pass to entrap them 
in the end. But in these kind of enterprises, you proceed by 
groping your way in proportion as you advance. The land- 
ing at Louisbourg was executed in the same manner, and was 
very successful. We did not despise a small creek, of diffi- 
cult approach, in which we disembarked, because it was not 
possible but for one boat to enter in front, all their forces 
being distributed in the great anchorages ; and when they 
perceived our manoeuvre, we had already landed from three 
to four hundred men, in battle array, who covered the land- 
ing. Scarcely ever do surprises, well planned and well exe- 
cuted, fail to be successful. The enemy do not meet you in 
a place difficult of access. Ordinarily, they do not even seem 
to give them the least attention ; and it is when the enemy 



32 

does not wait for me that I always wish to make my principal 
attack."* 

Montcalm. " Confess at least, Sir, that men are unjust. 
They reproach me for having been the cause of your success. 
They accuse me of having sacrificed the interests of my king 
and country, for which I would have shed all my blood, 
drop after drop, with pleasure, and that through pique and 
jealousy ; and those who treated me a little more humanely, 
made me pass for a giddy goose and ignoramus. All these 
injurioxis stories, all these atrocious calumnies which were 
spread abroad, had their source from a class of men, who for 
their interest, and by their immoderate desire of riches, would 
have betrayed their God, as they have betrayed their king 
and country. These vile mercenary souls knew quite well 
that I detested them, as I nourished continually those in 
whom I found probity, integrity, and greatness of soul. My 
death has been their prosperity. If I had survived that fatal 
day to return to Europe, I would not have had any difficulty 
in justifying myself, and one only look would have made 
them tremble and shrink into nothingness. Truth, supported 
by innocence, overcomes and dissipates, sooner or later, the 
obscurity of the mist which covers it. They were not 
ignorant that I was acquainted with all their infamies and 
jobberies, and my death was not able even to glut their ven- 
geance. Coming into Canada to enrich themselves, they left 
in Europe their honour and probity on embarking, and easily 
forgot to be patriotic and to be just. I will give you, Sir, a 
relation of our manoeuvres on the action of the 13th of Sep- 
tember, adhering scrupulously to the pure and simple truth, 
which has always been the rule of my conduct ; and I will 

* Ferdinand, king of Arragon, made two armies take the field against 
the Moors, under the conduct of Count Aguilar, and gave them orders to 
enter at the same time the mountains of Grenada by the most difficult 
passes, and consequently the least guarded, and he gained a victory the 
most complete over the Moors. Life of Ximines. 



33 

demonstrate to you at the same time how_you ..w_ere. indebted, 
to fortune for your success, and that there happened a con- 
centration of a thousand circumstances, which were all 
against you, to ensure your success, upon a false rumour at 
the beginning of August, that a body of English troops in- 
tended to penetrate into Canada by the highland districts. 
M. Levis was sent by M. Vaudrueil to command at Montreal. 
I felt all the regret possible at the departure of M. Levis, 
having always had a very great opinion of his intelligence and 
capacity, to which he had acquired a just title. Having pro- 
ceeded to his house two hours before his departure, I be- 
seeched him to leave with me his aide-de-camp, M. Johnstone, 
as an officer who would be useful to me by the knowledge \j, h [^ 
which he had of our posts at the Fall of Montmorency, and 
the plans of defence of M. Levis in that quarter. He con- 
sented to it, and M. Johnstone remained with me, performing 
the functions of my aide-de-camp. In the night of the 10th 
or llth of September, your boats had got the start of us, by 
appearing opposite the ravine of Beauport. I remained in 
the house of M. Vaudrueil till one o'clock in the morning 
that I left his house with M. Montrueil, major-general of the 
army, and with M. Johnstone. On again seeing M. Mon- 
trueil, after having given him my orders, I recounted to M. 
Johnstone all the arrangements I had taken with M. Vaudrueil 
in case you should have effected your landing at break of day. 
He answered me that the enemy having actually concentrated 
their forces to that at the point Levis, and their army having 
ascended below Quebec, coasting along the other bank of the 
river on the side towards the south, they were not able to 
know at the moment, the place where you would attempt your 
landing, whether it would be above the city, or below on the 
side of Canardiere, being menaced equally by both. He 
added that he believed a body of troops would be advantage- 
ously placed on the Heights of Abraham, as in a central 
point, to be able to throw itself with celerity, wherever the 

C 



34 

enemy should attempt his landing. I approved greatly of 
these ideas. I recalled M. Montrueil, who was not as yet far 
from us, and I ordered him immediately to cause mount at 
once the regiment of Guyenne, on the Heights of Abraham, 
there to pass the night. This regiment being encamped 
before the horn-work, found itself the readier for the height. 
The next day, the llth of September, I wrote to M. Montrueil, 
ordering him to cause the regiment of Guyenne to encamp 
upon the Heights of Abraham, to remain there in a fixed post 
till a new order, and I always believed, that that regiment 
was there, in consequence of my orders to M. Montrueil ; for 
what reason he had landed and occupied his old camp in 
front of the horn-work, I am ignorant ; but it is certain that 
if that regiment had remained there conformably to my 
orders, you would have been cut up in an instant, the height 
where you had made your landing being ten times more steep 
and elevated than that where you made your attack on the 
31st of July. Moreover, you would have never attempted 
your landing, and you would have embarked your army to 
return to Europe. Thus Canada would have been saved and 
delivered for ever from your enterprises, in the view of the 
incredible expense your expedition cost England, Avhich they 
suppose a million a day, French money ; and then the cam- 
paign would have been ended. 

"As soon as you had united your whole army in one single 
camp at the point Levis, after having remained nearly two 
months separated in a position, in which it was not possible 
to establish communication, between the one end and the 
other, your army ascended the river to within seven or eight 
leagues below Quebec. I then sent M. Bougainville with a 
detachment of five hundred, the elite of my army, composed 
of all the grenadiers, the companies of volunteers drafted 
from different regiments, my best Canadians and savages ; 
and I gave him, at the same time, some pieces of cannon. I 
had ordered M. Bongainville to follow with precision all your 






35 

movements, and never to lose sight of you ; to ascend the 
river when you ascended it, and descend it in the same 
manner. In short, to be a corps of observation, always 
ready to be at hand to oppose your landing, in case you 
attempted to cross the river, to fall upon you with the swift- 
ness of an eagle, the moment that you should attempt to set 
your foot on ground. On the 12th of September, M. Bou- 
gainville sent to inform me that your army was landed quite 
opposite to Quebec. Why he had not followed his instruc- 
tions, instead of remaining with his detachment at Cape 
Rouge, which is about three miles from Quebec ? Why were 
you not followed to the Heights of Abraham ? Why did he 
not send back my grenadiers and volunteers, who were the 
soul of my corps, as I have well proved by their absence from 
the battle the next day ? Why, after having informed me 
also that the posts of Douglas and Rimini, where he ought 
to have landed his boats that night laden with provisions, 
did he not send, at the instant, a counter order to let them 
know his change of plan, and that his boats would not sail 
till the following night ? I knew nothing of all this. I 
learnt between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, by 
deserters from these posts, that you were on ground upon the 
Heights of Abraham, and he put himself in march, but un- 
fortunately by taking the road along the coast which con- 
ducted straight to your army, in place of the other road 
which led to my camp. He would have even been able to 
quit the Heights of Abraham, after having come in sight of 
your army, convinced clearly that it shut up the road, and to 
have joined me again, some time before the battle, which did 
not take place till about one o'clock in the morning, in pro- 
ceeding by the side of the general hospital, and from thence 
to the bridge at the horn-work, traversing the river St. 
Charles. It was still more in effecting my misfortune that he 
found on this road a house full of from three to four hundred 
men of your troops. He attempted to take there M. Noir, 



36 

captain of the regiment of Sarre, in that house with his com- 
pany of volunteers, having much more intrepidity and bravery 
than prudence and knowledge of the strength of a fort secured 
by barricades and well fortified. He was immediately re- 
pulsed with the loss of more than the half of his com- 
pany ; and he received at the same time two wounds, one 
ball through the body, and the other in the hand. M. 
Bougainville had stood firm and stopped before that fort to 
wait the arrival of his cannon in order to force it. The can- 
nons arrived, but they found they had forgot the balls ; thus 
they lost the most precious moments ; and in the end he re- 
traced his steps to Cape Rouge with his detachment. The night 
of the 12th and 13th of September, M. Poularies, comman- 
dant of a battalion of the royal regiment of Roussillon, who 
was encamped behind my house at Beauport, entered my 
house, at midnight to inform me that he saw boats opposite 
my camp. I ordered the whole force immediately to proceed 
to the border of the intrenchments, and I sent without delay 
M. Marcel to the house of M. Vaudreuil, an officer in the 
train of the regiment of the queen, who served me as aide- 
de-camp, ordering him to pass the night there ; and if he 
learned there anything new, to despatch one of my ordnance 
troopers, which I gave him to remain with him, in order to 
acquaint me with it forthwith. I promenaded in front of my 
house with M. Poularies and M. Johnstone. At one o'clock 
in the morning I sent back M. Poularies to his regiment, and 
I passed the rest of that night promenading with Johnstone 
between my house and the ravine. I was throughout the 
whole night in a state of extreme dejection and inconceivable 
agitation of mind. I believed, that my anxieties arose from 
the boats of provisions which M. Bougainville ought to have 
sent ' an ^ ^ re P eate d often to Johnstone that I trembled lest 
they should be captured, the loss of which would ruin us 
without resource, not having two day's provisions of subsis- 
tence for the army. It appears to me that my extraordinary 



37 

sufferings that night were a presage of the fatal lot that be- 
fell me some hours after. At break of day they fired some 
cannon shots from our battery of Samos opposite Sillery, and 
I never more doubted but that our boats had not been taken. 
Alas ! I never could have imagined that our provisions were 
in safety at Cape Rouge with M. Bougainville, and that you 
were landed on the Heights of Abraham since midnight, 
without my having had advice of a circumstance so important, 
and which was known throughout all the right of our army. 
Broad daylight beginning to appear without receiving any 
news, and M. Marcel not having sent back my ordnance 
trooper, I had my mind more tranquil by the reflection that if 
anything had happened they would, without doubt, have given 
me advice ; and I sent M. Johnstone to cause the whole force 
re-enter their tents, the whole having passed the night bivou- 
acking in the intrenchments. Having retired myself to my 
house, and after having drunk some cups of tea with M. 
Johnstone, I said to him ' to saddle the horses, and that we 
would make a tour to the house of M. Vaudreuil in order to 
learn why the battery at Samos had fired.' No person having 
come from the right since midnight that I had sent M. Mar- 
cel, we departed between six and seven o'clock in the morning. 
Having arrived in front of M. Vaudreuil's house, great God, 
what a surprise ! For the first news of what had occurred 
during the night was that we saw your army on the Heights 
of Abraham, who were keeping up a discharge of musketry 
with the Canadians scattered among the brushwood. At the 
same time I met M. Vaudreuil on horseback, who was just 
coming from his house. I spoke to him on the instant, and 
turning towards M. Johnstone, I said to him, ' the affair is 
serious : run to Beauport at the gallop, ordering M. Poularies 
on my part to remain at the ravine of Beauport with two 
hundred men, and that he should cause the whole left ad- 
vance in order to take possession of the height in front of 
Quebec with all possible despatch.' M. Johnstone having 






. 

"7 

communicated my orders to M. Poularies, left him an instant 
to give some instructions to the people of my house, which 
was close by ; and being returned from the ravine in the road 
to rejoin me on the height, he there found M. Poularies with 
M. Senezergue, lieutenant-colonel of the regiment of "Saste, 
and M. Lotbiniere, aide-de-camp to M. Vaudreuil, who 
stopped him to reiterate my orders to him. M. Johnstone 
having done this, added that he strongly advised M. Poularies 
not to confine himself to this order, but to repair himself 
before Quebec with the whole left, not leaving one behind ; 
since the English having landed on the Heights of Abraham, 
it was evident that they would never seek to make a second 
landing at Beauport to divide their forces ; and that there 
would be certainly a general and decisive action on the 
Heights immediately. M. Poularies then showed to M. 
Johnstone a signed order by M. Montreuil, which M. Lotbi- 
niere had come to bring him, which said ' that no person of 
H the left should budge from the camp.' M. Johnstone de- 
clared to them upon his honour, and taking God to witness 
that what he had said to them was word for word my orders 
and my intentions, and he advised strongly M. Poularies not 
to have the least regard to the order signed by M. Montreuil, 
the affair being very serious and of the last consequence, 
since it would occasion the absence of about two thousand 
men from the battle, which might take place in an instant, 
and was inevitable from the position which they had taken 
up on the Heights. M. Senezergue, a very worthy man, who 
was killed an hour afterwards, said to Johnstone that he 
should take upon him to cause them march ; but he replied, 
that not being but the simple bearer of my orders, he could 
take nothing upon him : that if he was a brigadier of the 
army, as he was, and second after me in commanding the 
army by the absence of M. Levis, he would not hesitate an 
instant in causing the march : that all that he could do was 
to run with the utmost speed to give me an account of this 



r 



39 

counter-order. Johnstone then took his leave at once, leaving 
them together in a state of indecision. / / * 

"I do not know, among a thousand other things of which 
I am ignorant, what it was that made us take up a position 
between your army and Quebec, which was of all those which 
it was possible for us to choose the very worst, because there 
were no provisions in the city, and the best j)f our ^r6dps L^lW^ 
were absent with M. Bougainville at Cape Rouge. It was not fy/ff* 
I that did this, for all the picquets of the right had already 
marched to the heights before my arrival at the house of M. 
Vaudreuil, and even before I knew that you had landed, and K* 
I found the different corps without arms ready to follow them 
when I arrived at their encampments. Our true manoeuvre 
ought to have been to have proceeded by the village of Lor- 
rette, to have straightway gained the heights of the village of 
St. Foix, about three leagues from Quebec and a league from 
Cape Rouge, in order to facilitate our junction with the de- 
tachment of Bougainville, and to have come upon you at St. 
Foix the next day before you would have been able to en- 
trench yourselves, hemming you in against the city, where 
you would have been engaged between two fires, by a sally 
from the garrison at the same time with an attack. I was 
not sooner upon these heights than I perceived well our un- 
fortunate position, cooped up as we were against the city, and 
having no provisions there inside to subsist our army twenty- 
four hours. But the evil was without remedy, and being in 
battle array at a gun-shot from your line, it was morally im- ! 
possible that you would have been able to dislodge us from 
thence. To descend the heights to return to the bridge of 
St. Charles at the horn-work, we would have laid open our 
left flank to the enemy, and been exposed in an instant to be 
entirely cut in pieces with disgrace, not having the power of 
defending ourselves ; to have entered into the city you would 
have been able in a moment to shut us up without provisions 
by lengthening your left by the suburbs at the side of the 



40 

palace, even to the bank of the river St. Charles. I did not 
think more than to overwhelm you with a cannonade, and 
the ground upon which my army found itself in battle array 
was favourable for that, having several small eminences in the 
the extent of our line which commanded you. I imagined that 
on your finding yourself greatly incommoded by my artillery, 
perhaps you would take the course of retiring in the night. 
Then I sent at once to the town to demand of M. Ramsay, 
the king's lieutenant at Quebec, to bring me with all the 
diligence possible the twenty-four field pieces which were 
upon the palace battery. Precisely at the instant that M. 
Johnstone rejoined me upon the Heights of Abraham, and 
that he had communicated to me the counter order that had 
been sent from M. Poularies, the sergeant whom I had sent to 
M. Ramsay for the fourth time, that I had ordered him to 
send me the field pieces, came to tell me on his part ' that he 
had sent me three pieces of cannon, and that he could not 
give me more, having the town to defend.' What could have 
been the idea of M. Ramsay ? I know nothing of it. In the 
I/ first place, the town was defended by our army, which 
covered it, being in battle array at the distance of a gun-shot 
from the gates, and its safety depended upon the issue of a 
combat. 

" Secondly, There were in the town more than two hun- 
dred pieces of cannon for its defence, of which the greater 
part were twenty-four and thirty-six pounders. 

" Thirdly, Of the field pieces of two pounders, of which 
the battery of the palace was composed, they could never be 
regarded as of any utility in defence of a place. 

" I assembled at once a council of war, composed of all 
the chiefs of corps. Some_pretended that you were occupied 
in entrenching yourselves ; others that you would attempt to 
descend from the height to proceed to the bridge over the 
river St. Charles, in order to cut off our retreat, and even 
communication with the left of our army, which remained at 



v 



41 

the ravine of Beauport, in consequence of the counter order 
from M. Poularies ; in fact, a movement which your army 
then made in carrying you to the side of the house of Borgios, 
that which you had occupied at first from which the Cana- 
dians chased you, in there keeping up a fire, seemed to 
favour this opinion, that movement having been made at the 
moment of holding the council. Others said that the more 
they delayed the more they would have of the enemy to com- 
bat, in the belief that your whole army was not yet landed, 
and brought on the heights ; in short, there was not a single 
officer of the council of war who was not of opinion that we 
should attack you the moment. What to do in this dis- 
tressing and desolate situation, from which I could see no 
resource ! I believe that a Marshal Turenne would have 
found himself very much embarrassed to be able to extricate 
himself from a situation so unfortunate as that in which they 
had placed me. Having heard all their advices, I replied, ' It 
appears to me, gentlemen, that you are all unanimously of 
opinion to give battle and charge the enemy forthwith, and 
that it does not signify at present, but to know in what man- 
ner we ought to attack.' M. Montreuil said, ' that we should 
charge in columns.' I answered him, ' that that was not 
possible, and that it was necessary to charge in front of ban- 
ner.' Thus some columns would be able to form themselves 
with undisciplined men, and at a distance of a gun-shot from 
the enemy. We would have been cut off before being formed 
into columns. Besides, we had not our grenadiers, who were 
at Cape Rouge with M. Bougainville, to guard the head of 
our columns. I yielded to their advice. I sent back at once 
every one to his post, and I caused make the charge. Our 
attack was not forcible. We were repulsed in an instant. 
And this could not have been otherwise, from the absence of 
our volunteers with M. Bougainville, and our best Canadians, 
the Montreal regiment, with M. Poularies, at the ravine of 
Beauport. This brave militia, the Canadians, to the num- 



J-A 



42 

ber of from twelve to fifteen hundred, saw us, with grief, cut 
to pieces on the heights, suffering violently at being spectators 
of our misfortunes, without their being permitted to cross the 
river of St. Charles to come to our assistance, having been 
all stopped at the horn-work. We did not lose many men. 
About two hundred resolute and determined Canadians 
rallied themselves at the foot of the height, in front of 
Boulangerie, and remounted the ascent with inconceivable 
bravery and intrepidity. They threw themselves upon your 
left with incredible fury, like desperate men, and kept your 
army in check during some minutes, which gave time to 
our army in rear to save themselves with less loss, by stopping 
the pursuit of your victorious army to turn against them. 
These brave Canadians disputed foot to foot of ground, and 
in retreating they continued always firm, mid-way up the 
ascent, firing above upon your troops. When they were en- 
tirely repulsed, obliged in the end to yield to numbers, and 
your troops pursuing them were descending after them into 
the plain before Boulangerie, if you had advanced three or 
four hundred paces farther to the banks of the river St. 
Charles, you would have shut up the debris of our army in 
the town of Quebec, without provisions, and there must have 
then been next day a general capitulation of the colony ; but 
as to that, it was wise and prudent for you in your position 
to make a bridge of boats to your enemy in rout, and not to 
run the risk of letting the victory escape out of your hands. 
You see, Sir, by the true and sincere detail which I have 
given you, how all the events combined in your favour to en- 
able you to succeed in your enterprise, of the great number 
of which one alone would have sufficed to make your expedi- 
tion in Canada successful. It seemed that Heaven had or- 
dained the loss of this colony to France. Let us conclude 
presently that I have little merited the blame and injustice 
which they have heaped upon me in public, than you the ex- 
cessive honours which they have lavished on you in your 



43 

country, and that the ablest general in my situation would 
not have been able to conduct himself otherwise than I have 
done. Besides, being subordinate to M. Vaudreuil, I could 
not act and follow my ideas so freely as if I had commanded 
in chief. It is only the ignorant who judge by events." 

Wolfe. "I confess, Sir, that I have been guilty of errors. 
I was then young and rash, but age and experience would 
have corrected me. Marshal Turenne had in view Mariend- 
hal, which he never forgot. The human mind is limited. I 
shall finish our discussion by what was said by the Duke of 
Buckingham, one of the greatest geniuses of England, whose 
ashes repose beside mine, in an epitaph which he composed 
himself for his tomb ' Humanum est errore et nescire ' (' To 
err is human and not to know.') " 



The death, of Wolfe was like that of Epaminondas when mortally 
wounded he asked if the British were victorious, and being told they were, 
he said " I die content," and expired without a groan. ED. 



END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1759. 




MONTCALM, in endeavouring to rally our 
troops in their rout, received the shot of a 
gun, which pierced through his abdomen. 
He was- carried to Quebec, and lodged in the 
house of M. Arnoux, surgeon to the king. 
The wound having been examined by M. 
Arnoux, the younger, the elder brother being absent with M. 
Bourlaraarque at Carillon, was pronounced mortal. This 
worthy and great man learned his melancholy news with a 
tranquillity and serenity of soul and with a heroism worthy 
of the ancient Romans. He begged M. Arnoux, with sang 
froid, and an air of indifference to the choice of living or 
dying, to tell him frankly till what hour he would be able to 
preserve his existence. The surgeon answered him that he 
could not be able to pass three o'clock in the morning ; and 
he ended his days a little before the hour that M. Arnoux 
had foretold him, pronouncing for his last words, " I die con- 
tent, since I leave the affairs of the king, my dear master, in 
good hands : I have always highly valued the talents and 
capacity of M. Levis." I shall not undertake to pronounce 
the eulogy of this great, truly patriotic man, whose reputation, 
if he had chanced to be born in England, would have been 
transmitted to posterity : celebrated and illustrious by his 
virtues, by his great genius, by every sort of eminent quali- 
ties which deserved the best chapjet ; but an unfortunate 



. ...-'i, <ju^4+v tU-i. 



45 

victim to the insatiable avarice of some, and a prey to the 
ambition of others.* 

As soon as I learned his misfortune, I charged Joseph, 
his valet-de-chambre, who went the instant to rejoin his 
master at Quebec, to say to him that if I could be useful to 
him, that I would come immediately to be with him ; but 
Joseph returned without delay, to find me at the horn-work, 
with a reply on his part " that it would be useless to come 
thither, not having but a few hours to live, advising me to 
remain with M. Poularies to wait the arrival of M. Levis." 

Our army in rout, totally dispersed, threw itself on the 
side of Quebec, the great part of which, without entering into 
that town, descended the Heights of Abraham opposite the 
palace in the suburbs, and followed the banks of the river St. 
Charles to proceed to the horn-work, where there was a 
bridge of boats across that river. From the time I saw our 
overthrow without remedy, I formed the resolution of de- 
scending from the heights to the side of the windmill to 
throw myself into the horn-work, fearing the risk of being 
shut up in the town by the enemy going there, which he would 
have been able to do by easy movements from the position of 
the English army, by cutting off the communication of the city 
with the horn-work. Carried along at first towards Quebec 
in the middle of the fugitives, in descending into a marshy 
puddle, I there found one of our cannons embedded, with 
some gunners who were making ineffectual exertions to drag 
it out. I stopped for a little with them to encourage them ; 

* The ashes of this man, mixed with those of savages, repose coldly on 
the other side of the seas. They do not require a mausoleum or altars. 
Wolfe had statues in England for the blunders which he had continually 
committed during the course of this campaign. How do deaths veil the 
remains of the greatest men to titles still more vain ! 0, injustice of men ! 
Mausoleums decorate our temples and repeat incessantly false eulogiums ; 
and history, which ought to be the asylum of truth, and to prove that sta- 
tues and panegyrics are almost always monuments of prejudice or adulation, 
denies this unjust reputation. 



46 

but the gunners having in the end abandoned it, on re-as- 
cending the eminence to go to the windmill, I found myself 
presently in the midst of a crescent which the English army 
had formed in advancing. I persisted in going to the mill, 
and in spite of the thousand musket shots from all parts that 
were aimed at me, I was sufficiently fortunate to escape that 
terrible fusillade, without any other hurt than to have my 
clothes shattered and pierced through by four different balls, 
another ball lodged in the front stuffing of my saddle, and 
four balls in my horse's body, which carried me, nevertheless, 
to the horn-work, in spite of his wounds. On arriving there 
I found an incredible confusion and disorder ; a general panic 
and consternation ; M. Yaudreuil listening to every one, and 
always to the advice of him who spoke to him last ; not an 
order given with reflection or coolness ; in short, not knowing 
in fact, neither what they said nor what they wished to do. 
When the enemy had defeated the Canadians, who had re- 
ascended the heights, that necessarily happened, as two hun- 
dred men could not long keep in check an army of ten 
thousand men ; the English descending in the plain close to 
the baking establishment in pursuit of these Canadians, it 
was then that the disorder in the horn-work became to an 
inconceivable degree, and that every one's head was turned. 
M. Montgay and M. Motte, two captains in the Berne regi- 
ment, cried out with vehemence to M. Vaudreuil, " that the 
horn-work would be carried in an instant, sword in hand ; 
that we would all be passed at the point of the sword ; and 
that there was only a general capitulation for the colony at 
once that would be able to save us." M. Vaudreuil an- 
swered them, "that as to a capitulation there must be articles, 
and time and consideration for making them." M. Montreuil 
said to them, " that they could not sweep away these works as 
briskly as the former." It must be observed that we had 
the river St. Charles between us and the enemy, of about 
forty toises broad, which served as a ditch to the horn-work ; 



47 

and the part of that work which skirted the river was made 
very solidly with thick piles of wood, but very high and 

very difficult to be taken by assault. Others cried with a 

COT"*^ 

loud voice, that it was necessary to ]pai3s down the bridge, 
while as yet a fourth part of our army had not passed, as one 
might be able to see from the banks of St. Charles ; the whole 
force, which came in flocks, covered the ground from the 
town to the bridge, and the royal regiment of Roussillon, 
which we could discover on the other side of the river ready 
to cross it. Having formerly met in with defeats, my head 
was not turned ; and although I had already learned the dis- 
mal fate of the unfortunate M. Montcalm, which penetrated 
me with grief to the bottom of my soul, 1 presumed as yet 
upon a kind of authority and respect, which I had acquired 
in the army, and which were lent me from the goodness and 
confidence which he and M. Levis had always testified to me 
publicly. I called on M. Hugen, an officer of the colony, who 
had commanded at the horn-work for some time with a de- 
tachment, and begged him to accompany me. We ran to the 
Abridge, and without demanding who it was that had given 
orders to break it down, we drove away from it the soldiers, 
who had already hatchets lifted up to accomplish this fine 
manosuvre. M. Vaudreuil having entered into a house which 
he had within the walls of the horn-work, immediately after 
his reply on the subject of the general capitulation, he there 
held a council with M. Bigot, the commissary, and with some 
inconsiderable officers. Doubting greatly of what they 
treated, the bridge being safe, I entered also ; but I had only 
time to see M. Bigot seated, with a table before him, and a 
pen in his hand, when M. Vaudreuil said to me at once to 
leave the house, adding that I had no business there. The 
Governor-general had reason along with him, for the infamy 
of wishing to surrender to the English, so lightly, a colony 
which had cost France such immense sums of money, as well 
as blood, to preserve it, and which could be so advantageous 



48 

to that nation ought naturally to revolt and check a man 
who had a soul and who thought with honour and sensibility. 
On leaving the house I found M. Dalquier, commandant of 
the battalion of Berne, and having laid open to him what had 
been transacting, I caused him to enter there to take his place 
at the council. He was one of those true military men, cap- 
able of shedding all his blood, drop and drop, for his king, 
brave as a hero, a well-bred man, and full of honour. I then 
left the horn-work to join M. Poularies at the ravine of 
Beauport ; but I met him not far from that work, and having 
informed him of all that had taken place there, he replied to 
me that he would rather be hacked in a thousand pieces than 
submit to a general capitulation set spurs to his horse, and 
parted like a flash of lightning, flying at full speed. As this 
Avas a determined officer, of a phlegmatic bravery, I was re-as- 
sured that he and M. Dalquier would overturn every project 
which they could have for a general capitulation of the 
colony. M. Poularies, on quitting me, offered me his horse, 
which I accepted ; and I continued my road to proceed to 
Beauport, with a very broken heart, greatly fatigued, low- 
spirited, and overwhelmed with chagrin with the horrid ad- 
venture of the morning, a few hours having produced a 
terrible revolution in my situation by the death of M. Mont- 
calm, which even time would not be able to repair, losing in 
him a true and sincere friend, who loved me tenderly, and 
with whom in appearance I should have passed the rest of 
my days, as he often said to me, if cruel and perfidious For- 
tune had not snatched him from me. 

It was decided at the council of war, in the horn work, 
that we should retreat to James Cartier, an advantageous 
position, about ten leagues from Quebec, and there wait the 
arrival of M. Levis, to whom^we despatched a courier to in- 
form him of our disaster. Our departure, in the meantime, 
was fixed to be at night-fall ; and all the corps were ordered 
to betake themselves to their different camps till a new order. 



49 

-A resolution taken for the purpose of retreat, ought, to be 
a secret, without being communicated to any person, not even 
to the officers. I passed the whole day with M. Poularies, in 
continual expectation till he should receive his orders on the 
subject of the arrangements, and necessary disposition to con- 
duct a retreat without disorder and confusion ; but at eight 
o'clock at night, the night closing in, and not having had any 
news, M. Poularies, not knowing further to what hand to turn 
him, sent his sub-aide, Major M. Castaigne, to the house of M. 
Vaudreuil to receive his orders in that respect. M. Castaigne 
returned with speed to apprize M. Poularies that M. Vaud- 
reuil and the whole right of our army Avere already gone ; 
that there had not been any o'rder given on the subject, 
but that the army had left the horn-work. One may judge 
of our surprise ! M. Poularies sent at once to the post which 
was nearest to his regiment at Beauport, with orders to 
give notice thereof from post to post, till the Fall of Mont- 
morency ; and I departed instantly with him and his regi- 
ment, every one having for guide the regiment which had left 
before him, but Avithout knowing othenvise the route which 
they ought to take, a march exactly a la sauvage, (like 
savages.) This Avas not a retreat, but a flight the most 
abominable ; a rout even a thousand times Avorse than that of 
the morning on the Heights of Abraham, and with so much 
confusion and disorder that, if the English had known it, it 
would not have required more of them than three hundred 
men to have cut in pieces our whole army. Except the Royal 
Regiment of Roussillon, which M. Poularies kept in and pre- 
served in order, I did not see thirty men of any one regiment 
together. All the corps mixed and dispersed, and every one 
running as fast as his legs could carry him, as if the enemy 
Avere pursuing them close at their heels. 

As I had a perfect knowledge of the local position of the 
left of our camp, during several Aveeks that I had remained 
there Avith M. Levis and M. Montcalm, I believed it possible 

D 



50 

to point out to M. Poularies the arrangement which they ought 
to make for our retreat, and the road which every regiment 
should take to arrive at Lorrette. But I deceived myself 
grievously ; and I could have never imagined such a disposi- 
tion of march for regular troops, equally foolishly concerted as 
ill executed, and which lengthened considerably the road 
which the troops of the centre had to make, and of the left of 
our camp to reach Lorrette. There is a great road which 
goes in a direct line direct from the Fall of Montmorency to 
the village of Lorrette, and which makes the side of a tri- 
angle formed by another great road from the Fall to Quebec, 
and by a road which ascends from the horn-work straight to 
Lorrette. In the extent of the road to Quebec from the horn- 
work to the Montmorency Fall, there are about seven or eight 
different cross-roads to get into the great road from the Fall 
to Lorrette ; thus it was natural to believe that every regi- 
ment would have been ordered to take the cross road which 
would be the nearest to the place where they were encamped. 
This would have shortened the road a league to the troops 
who were encamped at the Fall, who might arrive at the 
horn-work to seek the road from thence to Lorrette. Above 
all, the whole corps would have been able in a short time to 
reunite in the road to Lorrette ; and that would have pre- 
vented them from coming near the enemy, as they did ; but 
they fled with such precipitation that they were under the 
necessity of abandoning everything which was in our camp, 
tents, cannons, munitions of war, the royal magazines, the 
baggage, in a word, any thing that they were not able to 
carry along with them, which they would have been able 
easily to avoid, having had time from mid-day, when the 
retreat was decided on, till night, to clear everything away ; 
but they never thought of putting the horses and carriages 
into requisition. The enemy was ignorant of our retreat 
for forty-eight hours ; and always seeing our tents standing, 
believed us still in our camp, without ever daring to send to 



51 

clear up the matter. M. Bellecour, a cavalry officer of Roche- 
beaucourt's, returned to our camp two days after our retreat, 
where he found everything in the same state in which we had 
left them ; having entered the horn-work with his detachment, 
he pointed some of our cannon at the enemy's camp upon the 
Heights, and fired off some shots which alarmed them greatly. 
"We marched all the night, and at the break of day, M. Bou- 
gainville rejoined us with his detachment. We arrived at 
night at the point of Trembles, where we passed the night ; 
and next day at James Carrier. 

In short, M. Levis having made great speed, arrived at 
James C artier to take the command of the army, very oppor- 
tunely to revive the exhausted spirits, and re-animate the 
courage of the soldiers, who are brave or dastardly, according 
to the manner in which they are commanded, and the disposi- 
tion of their commanders. This general, brave, intrepid, and 
of distinguished merit, determined to give battle for the pur- 
pose of trying to save Quebec, the capture of which would 
naturally involve the loss of Canada ; and for that purpose, 
oui' army returned to Cape Rouge the next day, after his 
arrival, every one appearing very much disposed and ardent to 
repair the misfortune of the 13th. 

M. Vaudreuil, upon our retreat, had written without re- 
flection to M. Ramsay, king's lieutenant and commandant of 
the city of Quebec, that he should make a capitulation of 
that city within forty-eight hours after our departure from 
Beauport, upon the best conditions that he could obtain from 
the enemy. As soon as we arrived at Cape Rouge, M. 
Levis and M. Vaudreuil wrote to M. Ramsay, not to have 
any regard to the letter that M. Vaudreuil had written to him 
the day of our retreat ; that the French army would be the next 
day in the morning upon the Heights of Abraham, in sight of 
the city, and that it was the issue of a battle that ought to 
decide the surrender of Quebec. M. Rochebeaucourt was 
charged to transmit these letters to M. Ramsay, and this 



52 

officer acquitted himself of that commission with all the 
promptitude and prudence possible. He crossed the river of 
St. Charles, and entered the city without having met with 
any one post of the enemy in his way. It was not even in- 
vested by the enemy on the side of the suburbs of the palace. 
Having delivered his despatches, M. Ramsay answered him 
that he had already entered into a capitulation with the 
English, and that it was at present too far advanced for him 
to be able to retract, as there were no provisions in the 
city, and above all, that he knew for what he hehj it. M. 
Rochebeaucourt said to him that there were certainly provi- 
sions in the private cellars, and that if he would force open 
the doors, he would find them there. But M. Ramsay always 
repeated to him, that he had entered into a capitulation, 
and that he knew how to hold it. This officer having re- 
turned to Cape Rouge with the answer of M. Ramsay, was 
sent back at once with a peremptory order in writing to M. 
Ramsay, to suspend every capitulation with the enemy till 
a new order, and he was escorted by fifty of his horsemen, 
each horseman carrying behind him a sack of biscuits. The 
Chevalier Rochebeaucourt entered the city with his horsemen 
as before, but the reply of M. Ramsay was always the same, 
that the capitulation was too far advanced for him to be able 
to suspend it, and that he knew for what to hold it. It was 
thus that M. Ramsay, who did not wish to send to M. Mont- 
calm the twenty-five pieces of cannon from the palace battery, 
having his place to defend, surrendered his place without 
trenches being opened, without batteries being established by 
/" the enemy, and without there being a cannon-shot fired either 
| upon the one side or the other : an inconsistency and extra- 
( ordinary folly, of which one can comprehend nothing. 

Seeing the determination of M. Ramsay to surrender the 
city of Quebec, our army returned to James Cartier, M. 
Levis not wishing then to expose them to the hazard of a 
battle, where there was little to gain and much to lose, the 



53 

enemy being in possession of the city. Otherwise by making 
a sortie from the city by our garrison during the attack of 
our army, the enemy would have found themselves between 
two fires, and would have felt themselves much embarassed in 
returning it ; and I do not doubt but the colony would have 
yet been able to have been saved, if it had not been for this 
irregular conduct of M. Ramsay. "We remained at James 
Cartier till towards the end of October, that M. Levis sent 
the whole force into their winter quarters, with the excep- 
tion of two thousand men, which he left there under the 
orders of M. Dumas, major of the colonial troops, to pass the 
winter ; this detachment under M. Dumas being intended to 
continually harass the enemy, and attack the detachments 
which might sally out of Quebec, to seek for forage in the 
woods, and other things of which they might stand in need 
from the country. In the meantime the winter passed on 
without hostilities ; on the contrary, there was established an 
intercourse between the English at Quebec and the French at 
James Cartier, as if it had been a time of peace, which to 
appearance the two commanders turned to account. 

The English having intercepted by their fleet all our mer- 
chant vessels, coming out of France, the merchandizes of 
Europe were at an incredible price at Montreal, where they 
were in want of everything, while at Quebec everything was 
in abundance and at a low price, owing to the prizes which 
the English had made of the French shipping. The house 
merchant sold at Montreal four barrels of wine at a thousand 
livres the barrel, which was sold in retail at forty- eight per 
pint ; the bushel of salt sold for eight hundred livres ; a pound 
of sugar at ten crowns ; a pair of woollen socks at sixty 
livres ; a yard of coarse cloth at eight livres, such as they sell 
in France at forty sous per ell ; a pound of shaggy tobacco, 
sixty-two livres; a pair of shoes, ten crowns; an ell of 
drab at twenty-four livres; an ell of velvet at a hundred 
crowns ; and all other things in proportion. This necessarily 



54 

enhanced the price of food, which the country people brought 
in on the march : they sold a sheep at forty and fifty crowns ; 
a calf at a hundred crowns ; a hen at twelve livres ; a turkey 
at twenty-four livres ; the pound of meat was sold at the 
butcher's shop at forty and fifty sous, which was established 
in name of the king, with an exclusive permission to slaughter 
cattle, and thus to charge the meat, and with power to seize 
and carry off on the part of the king, all the cattle which 
they might find with the inhabitants, paying twenty-four 
livres per ox, the price at which they had taxed them, in 
name of the king, while these brave and unfortunate 
Canadians, who shed daily their blood in the king's service in 
defending that colony, were able to sell their oxen to private 
individuals at a hundred pistoles, and at twelve hundred livres 
a head. These brave people devoured by rapacious vultures, 
suffered without a murmur these oppressions, always saying 
at every rise, " that the king took all care that the colony 
should be saved." What subjects has the king lost in Canada 
and in Acadia ! We shall not find their equal in any part of 
Europe. 

The scandalous traffic which was practised throughout the 
whole winter between the English and the French, whom one 
would have taken for merchants rather than for military (in 
place of an exchange which they ought to have made con- 
tinually of musket shots), greatly enriched private individuals, 
and procured to the rich delicacies and refreshments, while 
these honest people of the colony, who with difficulty could 
obtain from the royal butcher's stand a pound of bad meat, for 
which they paid so dear, groaned under an accumulation of 
misery the most dreadful : badly nourished, and dragging out 
their lives by an exhaustion of their strength, and in a 
languor inexpressible; but this was not the least of our 
sufferings ! Having lost all our artillery and munitions of 
war in the town of Quebec, we were no longer in a condition 
to hope for any favourable change in our state of affairs, and 






55 

we had not then any other prospect in view for the termina- 
tion of our misery but by the capture of the colony in the 
approaching campaign, a situation frightful for those who 
entertained sentiments of honour, probity, and attachment to 
their country, and the good of the king's service. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1760. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1760, TO THE GENERAL CAPITULATION OF CANADA, 
WHICH TOOK PLACE AT MONTREAL, THE 7TH SEPTEMBER, 
1760. 




. OPE is a blessing of heaven, and a favour of Provi- 
dence mingled with its afflictions, to soften the 
bitterness of its chastisements, and to prevent the 
unfortunate from falling under the weight of their 
misfortunes.* It is natural for man, overwhelmed 
with adversity, to hope for a favourable change in 
his lot, however small may be the appearances on which his 
hopes may be founded, or of the mitigation of his pains 
and sufferings ; and the mode of thinking of all individuals 
united and forming society ought to be analagous to that of 
every one in particular. The Canadians, without any foun- 
dation and without knowing why, still flattered themselves to 
be able to save their country, and never lost hope of it, 

* She does not abandon even the dying. He agonises he still 
feels life he is not detached from it by thought. Death has knocked, 
before his heart has believed it possible to cease living. She penetrates 
into dungeons, where cheering hope dwells, near to the unfortunate who 
next day goes to receive his sentence ; every time that the bolts begin to 
creak he believes his deliverance will enter with the gaoler. Entire years 
of slavery cannot eradicate this feeling of consolation. The contradictions, 
the diversities of views, these stormy returns, the flux, and the reflux, are as 
many effects of that hope which rejoices us and are never obliterated. "We 
never believe dangers," says Machiavelli, " till they fall on our head, but 
entertain hope however far removed it may be." 



57 

although in their then position without cannon, without muni- 
tions of war, and the enemy in possession of Quebec, it would 
require a miracle for that purpose. They occupied them- 
selves during the winter only to form projects for retaking 
that city, altogether chimerical, and nowise susceptible of exe- 
cution. Never did country give birth to more of them, nor 
more ridiculous and extravagant. Every body intermeddled 
therein, even from my lord the bishop and his priests, who 
gave theirs, but which were like the others, without common 
sense. Among the thousands of imaginary phantasies, that of 
taking the enemy by surprise, during the winter, by a forced 
march, and scaling the walls of Quebec, was the only one 
which had the least possibility of being successful. The plan 
of escalade was treated so seriously, during some time, that 
they had employed the work people to make ladders of wood ; 
but having always regarded it as an extravagant reverie, and 
jvvorthy_ofjbeing the production of priests, I never ceased to 
combat it at all times, when they spoke of it, and it was 
always in the mouth of every one. 

The lofty city of Quebec is situated upon the summit of a 
rock, which is more than two hundred feet in height, almost 
perpendicular, very steep and inaccessible throughout, except 
on the side of the Heights of Abraham, which are a continua- 
tion of the same mountain, almost to the level of the same high 
city, and terminating at Quebec by this steep rock. I was 
even charged, during some weeks, in conducting miners and 
other labourers in finishing the escarpment, and rendering the 
footpaths impracticable, by which one man could mount 
thereby to the low town ; and I had only finished this work 
some days before the arrival of the English fleet. The 
low^town of Quebec occupies a narrow space at the foot 
of the rock on the border of the river, and it has a communi- 
cation with the upper town by a large street, but without 
any continuation to the houses on the slope of the hill. 

A city of a great circumference, which has few troops, 



58 

and where you can approach the walls, in different places, 
by giving a general alarm, in all quarters at the same time, in 
order to divide the force of the garrison, escalade could be 
attempted to be made in a situation as greatly dispersed as 
was ours, by risking all for all. A surprise in the obscurity 
of the night, would necessarily carry with it terror and dis- 
order among those, whom it was intended to surprise. A 
terror communicates itself like lightning, the soldiers losing 
their presence of mind, not knowing the places of the 
town where they were making the escalade, nor where they 
were the most in danger. The thing is very different in a 
besieged town, where you are assured that the assault cannot 
be made but by breaches ; and the place there is pointed out 
where the besiegers have established their batteries without 
its being possible to be thereby deceived. But Quebec is 
not accessible, but on the side of the Heights of Abraham, 
and having nothing otherwise to fear, because from the steep- 
ness of the rock upon which it is built, the enemy upon the 
first alarm would naturally throw all his forces upon that 
part of the city, as the only place capable of being escaladed. 
Thus the enemy having then had about seven thousand troops 
in the city, almost as many of the force of our army as esca- 
laded, it is strongly to be presumed that we would have lost 
more than one half, and that after having sustained a hor- 
rible carnage of our force, we would have been obliged in the 
end to let go our prize, and retrace ingloriously our steps. 
Supposing even that we could have mounted to the lower 
town by escalade, we would not have been thereby any fur- 
ther advanced, not being able to rest there for a quarter of an 
hour, without being there interred under the ruin of houses, 
by the fire plying from the higher town. The enemy would 
be able equally to dislodge us from thence, by their throwing 
down fire by fire pots, and other combustible materials from 
the height upon the tops of the houses. This extravagant 
project of escalade, after having been treated seriously, was 






59 

in the end sent by M. Levis to the list of others, the pro- 
ductions of women, priests, and ignoramuses ; substituting in 
its place a project truly reasonable, combined with justice, 
and which did honour to his talents and capacity. 

M. Levis, in reporting to the Court the loss which we had 
sustained by the capture of Quebec, of all our artillery and 
munitions of war, gave at the same time his assurances that 
he would re-take that city in the spring, provided they would 
send from Europe, in the month of February, a vessel laden 
with cannon and munitions, in order to be in the river St. 
Lawrence before the English, and before Quebec in the course 
of the month of April. 

M. Levis re-assembled our army as soon as the season 
permitted ; collected together a dozen pieces of miserable can- 
non, which had remained a long time out of use ; and departed 
from Montreal with his army about the commencement of 
April, to sit down before Quebec, snow being still upon the 
ground. He conducted so well his march that our army 
arrived at Cape Rouge without the English having been in 
any way apprized of it. It was impossible to capture Quebec 
with such a wretched artillery. His design was to invest the 
city, to open trenches, to advance his approaches with vigour 
and speed, in order not to have anything to do when the ship 
which he had asked of the Court should arrive, but to dis- 
embark the cannon, and mount them at once upon the bat- 
teries, which would be found immediately in a condition to 
batter in a breach. Every one seconded these views ; and if 
the ship which he expected had arrived, the city would not 
have been able to resist for twenty-four hours, and the colony 
would have still been saved. 

The English learned that we were at Cape Rouge by the 
most whimsical and singular accident that it was possible to 
imagine : a manifest proof that the ablest general that has 
ever been in the world will not be able to guard himself 
against events which the mind of man could not foresee, and 



60 

which often frustrate the best combined plans.* A boat with 
artillery having been sunk to the bottom, opposite Cape 
Rouge, by the ice, of which the river still swept down a 
great deal, a gunner saved himself upon a piece of ice, and 
the current carried down the piece of ice, with the gunner, 
without its being possible for him to extricate himself from it. 
The piece of ice having been carried down opposite to Quebec 
by the current, the English perceiving from the town the 
unfortunate gunner in the midst of the river, had compassion 
on him, and sent immediately boats to his succour, which they 
got there with great difficulty. He was then without con- 
sciousness or sign of life; but having revived with cordials 
which they gave him, he came, by little and little, to himself. 
As soon as he was in a condition to speak, they asked of him 
from whence he came. The gunner answered, with naivete 
and innocence, that he had come from the French army at 
Cape Rouge ! At first, they believed him to be in a delirium; 
but having examined him more fully, they came to the con- 
clusion that he spoke without guile ; and one may be able to 
judge their astonishment. Had it not been for this extra- 
ordinary adventure, M. Levis would have been able to make 
himself master of the city of Quebec ; at least he would have 
been able to force the advanced posts, which they had at the 
village of St. Foix, which is about two leagues from the town 
of Quebec, and about a league from Cape Rouge, which M. 
Murray, the English general, took possession of at once ; and 
they set fire to a magazine of powder which they had in the 
church of St. Foix, not having time to carry it off. It is very 
certain that fortune takes, more or less, a part in all the 
events of life, which is seen and evident in all the operations 
of war. These chances ought to be in favour of an enter- 
prising general, as much as against him ; and the Cardinal 

* We would, to all appearance, have taken Quebec by surprise, but for 
one of these caprices of fortune which often has as much part in influencing 
events in war as the genius of the greatest generals. 






61 

Mazariii seemed to be well founded, when he asked, if he, 
whom some one recommended to him, was fortunate. The 
English themselves have acknowledged a great superiority of 
genius and talents in Prince Eugene over their famous gene- 
ral, the Duke of Marlborough ; but Marlborough was fortu- 
nate in all his enterprises by unforeseen events always in his 
favour, as much as Prince Eugene was unfortunate, and 
frustrated continually in the execution of his projects the 
best concerted and where he did not appear to want any- 
thing in his plans, by cross accidents. The Greeks have 
painted Timotheus sleeping, while Fortune, in another part of 
the picture, takes for him towns with threads.* The strength 
of an army does not depend upon the personal luck of the 
general. Does Fortune conduct herself at the head of armies 
as she does at a gaming table in the midst of gamblers ? It 
is a grand science of a general to know to correct bad fortune 
by prudence and circumspection, and to profit by run of suc- 
cess with rapidity.f The very smallest event which we 
might neglect at first as despicable, might produce an incon- 
ceivable chain of great effects. The boat, sunk at the battery 
at Cape Rouge, was the cause that the gunner found himself 
upon a piece of ice, in the middle of the river St. Lawrence, 
which inspired compassion in the English to save his life. 
The personal good fortune of the gunner, on the point of 
perishing, saved Quebec to the English, which but for him, 
M. Levis would have taken by surprisej/which would have 
prevented the English from again attempting the conquest of 

* Timotheus, the Athenian general, was the most fortunate of men 
even to taking cities while sleeping. Whether he wished to attribute his 
good fortune to his own merit, he became, at last, an unfortunate person. 
Erasmus's Eulogy on FoUy. 

"t It is also by small attentions that we arrive at accomplishing the 
greatest things. The general and his officers who neglect them, often fail 
in their enterprises, although very well concerted otherwise, and although 
they have had in appearance every thing which was necessary to see them 
crowned with the most fortunate success. 



62 

Canada, and, in appearance, would have been taken immedi- 
ately. This town in the possession of the English will insure 
them the speedy possession of the whole colony of Canada. 
The conquest of Canada, after so much bloodshed, and money 
expended by the English in their different expeditions, in- 
flamed their cupidity too greatly for them to consent to a 
peace, on reasonable terms, and engaged them to put far 
from them their enterprises upon colonies. 

The possession of so many colonies conquered by the 
English, brought along with it the most unfortunate peace 
which France has been constrained to see made. Thus the 
boat sunk to the bottom by the ice at Cape Rouge, has been 
the proximate cause of the unfortunate situation to which 
this kingdom is at this day reduced ; and has an influence by 
a counter stroke on all the affairs of Europe. Our army 
occupied the village of St. Foix, as soon as the English 
retired from it, and there passed the night of the 27th and 
28th of April. The next day in the morning, M. Levis 
learned that the English army had left Quebec, and that it 
occupied the same ground as that of the battle of the 13th of 
September of the preceding year. M. Levis on this news, 
caused beat the "general" immediately, put his army in battle 
array, and marched forward at once to encounter M. Murray, 
the English general, in the meantime, without being con- 
vinced that he would have had the imprudence and rashness 
to wait him with determined resolution outside Quebec ; a 
fault which the English general had made, of which the 
chastisement followed closely. The English had the advan- 
tage of ground, being in battle array upon a small eminence, 
with their front provided with twenty-two field pieces. The 
battle began by an attack upon a fort, which lay upon their 
right flank and our left, which was maintained for a long time 
with fierceness and obstinacy, by five companies of grenadiers, 
against as many Scotch Highlanders, both armies vying with 
each other to seize upon it. The grenadiers and Highlanders, 



63 

alternately in possession of this fort, were, notwithstanding, 
forced to evacuate it several times, each in their turn, before 
they had time to barricade it. ^These two antagonists, wor- 
thy the one of the other, were no sooner out by the windows, 
than they returned to the charge, and broke open the doors. 
In this murderous conflict, they were not provided with other 
arms, than the Highlanders with their dirks, and the grena- 
diers with their bayonets, using them with might and main. 
The grenadiers were reduced to forty men per company, 
and there would not have remained either Highlander or 
grenadier of the two armies if they had not, as by tacit and 
reciprocal agreement, abandoned the desire of occupying 
the fort. Our left, which was in a hollow, and distant from 
the English about thirty paces, was swept by their artillery, 
which they fired with grape shot. M. Levis perceiving their 
bad position, and wishing to remedy it, by making our army 
fall back to occupy an eminence parallel to that where the 
English were, sent M. Pause, an officer of the regiment of 
Guyenne, who acted as his aide-de-camp, to inform all the 
commanders of corps to make this movement in rear with 
their regiments ; but whether it was that Pause had miscon- 
ceived the intentions of M. Levis, or whether it was that he 
had badly delivered his orders, he ran along our line, order- 
ing, on the part of M. Levis, every regiment to face about to 
retreat, without further explaining himself. It is hardly pos- 
sible that the best troops that ever were in the world could be 
able to retreat at twenty paces from the enemy, without being 
thrown into disorder. Our army appeared to the English 
general to be in rout, and he quitted his position on the rising 
ground, to pounce upon us completely, and to pursue us. M. 
Dalquier, commandant of the battalion of the Berne regi- 
ment, who was at the left of our army, beside the troops of 
the colony a brave, old officer, fierce and intrepid as soon 
as Pause gave him the order to retreat, at the instant he 
turned to his soldiers and said to them, " At twenty paces 



64 

from the enemy, my boys, there is no time to retreat ; 
bayonets to the mouth of your muskets ; strike upon the 
enemy : that is best." He charged the enemy with impetu- 
osity, seized their artillery immediately, and received, at the 
same time, a volley of musketry across the body, already 
quite covered with scars, but which did not hinder him from 
continuing to give his orders. M. Poularies, who was at the 
right of our army, with his Roussillon Royal Regiment and 
Canadians, the whole interval between the two wings of our 
army being already thrown back in disorder, seeing M. Dal- 
quier advancing against the enemy, in place of retreating like 
the other regiments, he made, on the instant the wheel of a 
quarter circle, to the left, to fall upon the left flank of the 
English, which he outflanked with his regiment and the 
Canadians. The enemy, as soon as he perceived this 
movement on the part of M. Poularies, was struck with a 
frightful panic, broke loose ; and the English soldiers all fled 
Avith such precipitation, that their officers were not able to 
restrain a single man. Our army pursued them hotly ; and 
if the cry had not been raised among our force to stop, it 
would have possibly happened that we should have entered 
the city of Quebec pell-mell with them, not being at any 
distance from the gates. M. Poularies and M. Dalquier 
arrived in France in 1760, and were both made commandants 
of battalions ; M. Bellecomb, brevet-major of the Royal 
Roussillon Regiment, and M. Montgay, captain in the regi- 
ment of Berne, both very fine men, whose figures attracted 
the attention of the Court, were made colonels. Bad fortune! 
the power of which shews itself cruelly in military life. Jus- 
tice and deserved punishments appositely applied form the 
basis of the military art. Men do not conduct themselves save 
by honour or by interest ; and there is no longer true emula- 
tion in a place where mediocrity, intrigue, favour, and influ- 
ence annihilate the rights of merit, which produces elevation, 
boldness, and greatness of soul. Great talents are ignorant 



65 

of the art of sycophancy. They displease, in consequence, 
the clerks of the cabinet, who would wish them to fall down 
before them. They are humbugs, those vain, useless, medi- 
ocre men, who alone are the dispensers of favours. It is in 
the nature of things that men of that stamp detest officers of 
merit and sentiment, and prefer to them, cheats, flatterers, 
sycophants, and intriguers, disposed to everything.* 

"We had about two thousand men killed, as well as 
wounded, in this battle, which was fought on the 28th of 
April, of which ten officers of the regular troops were of the 
number, besides many officers of the militia. M. Levis, at 
the beginning of the night, caused open trenches before the 
town, and they were pushed on, with such diligence and acti- 
vity, that in a short time our batteries were ready to batter 

* "If such is the military condition of the state," says an author, "of 
which the sovereign (King of Prussia) is the greatest of his age, -who 
instructs and commands his armies himself, forming, so to speak, the pomp 
of the Court, what ought to be that of those States where the sovereign is 
not a military man ; where he does not see his troops ; where he seems to 
disdain or ignore all that belongs to them ; where the court, which always 
follows the impressions of the sovereign, is of consequence not military, 
where almost all the great rewards are obtained by intrigue ; where the 
greater part of them become hereditary monopolies ; where merit languishes 
without support ; where credit can advance itself without talents, or make 
fortune, not regarding further to acquire reputation, but to amass riches ; 
where they are able in one hour to be lavished with dignities and infamy, 
with decorations and ignorance, to serve badly the State, and to possess 
themselves of the best situations ; to be defiled with public blame, and to 
enjoy the favour of the sovereign : If, while all other sciences are brought 
to perfection, that of war remains in infancy, 'that is the fault of govern- 
ments which do not attach sufficient importance to it, who do not make it 
an object of public education, who do not direct towards this profession 
men of genius ; who leave them to reap mere glory and advantages in frivol- 
ous or less useful sciences ; who render the career of arms an ungracious 
career, in which talents are outwitted by intrigue, and prizes distributed by 
fortune." Discourse upon the actual state of Politics and Military Science in 
Europe (printed at Geneva) pages 121 and 130. It is morally impossible for 
merit to conduct to fortune in a country corrupt, tyrannical, and venial. 
Merit there becomes a cause of exclusion. Virtue elevates the soul : it does 
not know to cringe, under mere patronage, nor to flatter vice and incapacity. 



66 

in a breach, if we had had cannon fit for the purpose ; but 
the greatest number of rubbish of cannons which M. Levis 
had been able to collect, were not more than a dozen not- 
withstanding, this general mounted them upon our batteries 
for want of better, and fired them off from time to time, to 
keep up a good countenance ; but always husbanding our 
ammunition, of which we had but a small stock, with great 
economy. It only wanted the arrival of the vessel from 
Europe, charged with cannons and munitions of war, to have 
covered M. Levis with glory in saving the colony. M. Mur- 
ray, the English general, often used to say that the first flag 
that should appear in the river St. Lawrence would decide 
the dispute, whether Quebec should remain with the English, 
or return to France, and that he only waited for that to 
deliver it up. 

In short, the fate of this colony was verily decided by the 
arrival of three English frigates on the 7th of June. They 
ascended at once the river St. Lawrence, below Quebec, with- 
out stopping there, and destroyed from head to foot our 
frigates, which had wintered in Canada, with all the rest of 
our shipping, of which they burned some, and captured others. 
Their unexpected arrival, having always been hoped for from 
hour to hour, the arrival of the vessel which M. Levis had 
demanded from the Court, made us raise the siege, with much 
precipitation, without knowing for what, as we had left once 
before, to the enemy, after the affair of the 13th of Septem- 
ber, all our tents and all our baggage, our army having been 
struck, as it were like a clap of thunder. 

M. Yauclin, who commanded one of our frigates at Cape 
Rouge, the greatest force of which was not more than sixteen 
guns, fought like a lion against two English frigates of forty 
guns. He made such a beautiful defence that he commanded 
respect even from the English, having maintained the conflict 
as long as he had ammunition ; and when he had not another 
shot to fire, he landed such of his crew as were fit to serve, 



67 

remaining himself on board the frigate, with his wounded, 
and the French flag always flying 011 high at the top-mast. 
The English having cannonaded him for some time, and 
seeing that he no longer answered, they went alongside in the 
end in their boats, and cried to him to lower his flag. But 
Yauclin replied fiercely, that if they had a mind to take his 
ship, they could pull it down themselves. In fact, the English 
going on board, themselves cut the halyards of his flag, and 
treated M. Vauclin with all the regard which his intrepidity 
and heroic bravery deserved. This was not his first acquaint- 
ance with the English. He had formerly commanded a 
frigate of twenty-four guns at Louisbourg, during the siege, 
where he performed prodigies of valour. The English pressed 
upon him to make him offers of service ; but he replied that 
he had no other favour to ask of them than to be sent at once 
to France ; and the English made so great a point of his merit 
that they immediately dispatched a ship, express for him, 
ordering the English captain to be under the directions of 
M. Vauclin, and to land him in whatever part of France he 
might judge proper, granting him moreover the liberty of 
naming the passengers, whom he would allow to embark with 
him in the ship. I have always regarded this proceeding as 
truly great and noble on the one part as on the other. The 
generosity of the English is a fine eulogium on the bravery of 
Vauclin. 

Our misfortune w^s then without remedy and without 
resource ; and one can only compare Canada in this violent 
crisis to a sick man in the agonies of death, for whom the ordi- 
nary medicine of cordials is administered to ameliorate and 
soften the violence of his sufferings, without producing any 
effect for the cure of his malady. All our hopes ^\ere to 
obtain an honourable capitulation, at the general surrender of 
the colony, which could not be very far distant. M. Levis 
made our army take the road to Montreal, in order to wait 
there that dismal moment, and to make, if he had the means, 



68 

a last effort under the walls of that city ; and he left at 
James Cartier two thousand men, under the command of M. 
* * * , with orders to retreat slowly, in proportion as 
the English advanced, but never to lose sight of them. On 
the arrival of our army at Montreal, not being able to have 
a store of provisions there on account of an extreme dearth, 
which would overwhelm us, M. Levis, to keep our army col- 
lected together, was obliged to send back all the regiments 
into their different quarters, where they had passed the winter, 
every inhabitant being obliged to maintain a soldier, iu con- 
sideration of a fixed price, which was paid him by the com- 
missary-general of the king. 

M. Vaudreuil gave me an order to go to serve under the 
command of M. Bougainville, at the Isle of Nuts, where he com- 
manded with a hundred men, of the regiments of Guyenne 
and Berry, which formed part of its garrison. It is situated 
on the river Chambly, about eight leagues south of Montreal, 
and at three-quarters of a league from the commencement of 
Lake Champlain. M. Bourlamarque, an officer of very great 
merit, who was master in general of all the different parts of 
the military art, had chosen this isle for our retiring there, at 
the time of the evacuation of Carillon the preceding year, 
when we were obliged to abandon the whole of Lake Champ- 
lain. He had it fortified as well as its situation was suscep- 
tible of, to serve as a frontier on that side ; and this isle was 
very essential for preventing the English from descending the 
river of Champlain, a route which would have shortened 
greatly their road in getting to Montreal ; besides that, by 
the Lake Ontario the road is much longer, and there are 
several dangerous rapids* in the river St. Lawrence which it 

* That which they call in Canada "rapids," is when a river meets in 
its course a mountain, which, in place of falling as a cascade, descends the 
peak of the height with the swiftness of the flight of a bird the cane 
there descending, what they call leaping a rapid, by holding themseh 
always in the stream of the water ; for fear lest they should dash the 
selves, are in an instant broke in pieces, without its being possible 



69 

is necessary to avoid. The Isle of Nuts is about two hundred 
toises long, and about one hundred and fifty to two hundred 
toises broad. M. Bourlamarque had intrenched it, and he 
formed regular works on the ground. He had barricaded at 
the same time the two arms of the river, formed by the island, 
by two stockades (d,dj made by thick trees, attached end to end 
with hoops and crampets of iron. These stockades prevented 
the enemy from descending the river Chambly with vessels, 
which they had on Lake Champlain, and stopped there their 
shipping, which would have otherwise been able to pass that 
island in the darkness of the night ; and Montreal would have 
then been immediately taken. Thus, as long as we were 
able to keep the Isle of Nuts, the English would not have 
been able to penetrate by Lake Champlain. 

We learned at Montreal by some savages of the Five 
Nations that the bulk of the English army had come by the 
Rapids of the river St. Lawrence below Montreal, under the 
orders of General Amherst ; and that M. Murray, with the 
English troops who had wintered at Quebec, behoved to 
ascend the river St. Lawrence, to form a junction with 
General Amherst in the island of Montreal ; but we had no 
news of a third corps of troops of about four thousand men, 
who had gone in the month of July by Lake Champlaiu to 
besiege us in the Isle of Nuts, and which had preceded the 
other corps of English troops, by about five weeks. 

The enemy having a good number of cannon, mortars, and 
howitzers, they established at once different batteries on the 
other side of the river, which took us in flank, rear, and on 

any person to be able to save himself from being dashed against the 
rocks. Able as the savages and Canadians may be in leaping these rapids, 
the art of which is to keep in the stream of the water, the canoe, guided 
by two small oars, one at the front and the other behind, they often 
perform leaps the most wonderful. Having no other way in Canada for 
crossing these vast woods than some footpaths on the banks of the rivers, to 
communicate from one habitation to another, these journeys and transports 
are always made by water. 



70 

every side, in so much, that no part of the island afforded a 
shelter from their artillery ; they had, besides that, many mor- 
tars. Having sustained six days' siege, enduring a continual 
brisk cannonade, without a moment's relaxation, one of their 
batteries being so near us on the side of the stockade, on 
the south, that they killed a great many of our soldiers at 
musket shot, and without having any casements to repose our 
force, M. Noquaire, an officer of the Royal Regiment of 
Roussillon, came up to us ; he had come from Montreal 
across the woods, under the conduct of some savages, charged 
with two letters for M. Bougainville, one of which was from 
M. Vaudreuil, and the other from M. Levis. This was at a 
most critical moment, M. Bougainville being then greatly 
embarrassed in the choice of the courses he ought to take, 
not having more than two days' provisions in his garrison, 
the seven or eight oxen, which he had, having been killed at 
the commencement of the siege by cannon shots ; and he had 
no reserve of fish, which almost furnished subsistence to the 
whole garrison, previous to the arrival of the English, this 
river being very full of fish, and abundant in all sorts of fish. 
The letter of, M. Vaudreuil to M. Bougainville contained 
permission to make a capitulation, or to retreat from the Isle 
of Nuts, if that was practicable that of M. Levis contained 
an order to hold the Isle of Nuts even to the last extremity. 
It seemed to me that it was already at the last extremity, not 
having provisions but for forty hours, and without any hope 
of succours. How is it possible to reconcile this contradic- 
tion between the two letters ? M. Bougainville showed them 
to me, and asked my advice. I did not see any other course 
to take than to attempt a retreat, since it would necessarily 
follow that we must surrender at discretion in two days, in 
which our provisions would be consumed ; and the reinforce- 
ment of a thousand men, which our garrison would afford at 
Montreal, appeared to me an essential object, if we still had 
the means of making head against the enemy, and of making 



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71 

a last effort under the walls of Montreal. Above all, M. 
Bougainville could risk nothing by conforming to the orders 
of M. Vaudreuil, who commanded in chief. The retreat was 
then decided on, concerted with accuracy and executed with 
all the good conduct possible, the success answering entirely 
to the arrangements which M. Bougainville had adopted. 

The banks on the other side of the branch, on the north 
side of the river Chambly, being wet and marshy, there were 
no posts of the enemy nearer therefrom than that of the mea- 
dow of Boileau, (h) so the choice for our passage of the river 
naturally presented itself close ( d) to the stockade on the 
north. Above all, it is thereby our route to get straight for- 
ward to Montreal in crossing the woods. M. Bougainville 
took all the prudent precautions possible. He ordered all the 
boats to be prepared and to be put in a state to be available 
in the passage. He caused all the boats of bark of trees, 
and boats of savages, to be assembled in order to prevent the 
possibility of any soldier having it in his power to desert and 
give notice to the enemy of the project of retreat. He gave 
out in orders that all the garrison should be under arms at 
ten o'clock at night, ready to march, observing a profound 
silence, without the least noise, by the clanking of their arms 
or otherwise. And he ordered M. Bergue, an officer of the 
colonial troops, to remain in the Isle of Nuts with a detach- 
ment of forty men, and to keep up the briskest fire from our 
batteries, which consisted of seven or eight pieces of cannon, 
during the whole time that would be occupied in passing 
the river, in order to prevent the enemy from learning our 
manoeuvre, and to continue firing as long as he had ammuni- 
tion, to conceal our retreat, for as long a time as it was pos- 
sible. 

We commenced our embarkation towards ten o'clock at 
night in two coasting vessels, with some long boats, which 
went and came continually, without the enemy ever appearing 
or suspecting our manoeuvre, although they were as near to us 



72 

as to be able to hear them speak. At midnight the entire 
force had passed ; and the whole was executed without the 
least noise, disorder, or confusion, a thing very rare on such 
occasions. M. Bergue acquitted himself perfectly of his 
orders, and managed so well his ammunition that he had 
wherewith to fire at intervals, even an hour after mid-day 
the next day, that he hoisted a white flag to capitulate ; 
we believing then that we were nearly arriving at Montreal ; 
and the English still ignorant of our retreat, accorded him a 
capitulation the most honorable. As soon as the whole force 
had passed, we put ourselves in march, in crossing the wood 
to proceed straight forward, going at double pace, and in file 
one after the other. We did not lose, in the course of the 
siege, but about twenty-four men, a very inconsiderable loss 
for so terrible a cannonade, to which we had been exposed 
during sixteen days, without an instant's relaxation, besides 
the bombs and shells which they threw upon us continually. 
Happily for us the ground of the island was sandy, for if 
there had been stones or pebbles we would have lost an infinite 
number of men. 

After having marched from midnight to mid-day, always 
in quick time, running through the frightful swamps, where 
we often sunk even to the navel, and without resting an 
instant to repose ourselves, in place of being close to the mea- 
dow opposite Montreal, as we believed, we were only about 
half a league from the Isle of Nuts, near to the meadow of 
Boileau, not having done anything but turned about continu- 
ally nearly in the same place, without perceiving it, owing to 
the fault of our guides, who did not know the roads, and we 
had none of the savages along with us. Of all the thirty 
persons, who presented themselves as guides to us, there was 
not a single one of them capable of conducting us to Mon- 
treal across the wood. We were so close to the meadow of 
Boileau, where the enemy were encamped, that a grenadier 
of the regiment of Berry approached so near as to carry 



73 

over a horse to the English, to give to his commandant, M. 
Cormier, reduced by fatigue, and not able to march further, 
but who saved himself by means of this gift of his grenadier. 
Having lost all hopes of being able to reach Montreal by 
crossing the wood, we then took the route to Fort St. John, 
which is situated upon the river Chambly, about four leagues 
further below the Isle of Nuts, and about five leagues by 
land from Montreal. I was so overcome with fatigue, and so 
totally exhausted, not being able but with the greatest pain 
to trail my legs, that I thought a thousand times of lying 
down to finish my days, but the fear of falling into the hands 
of savages connected with the English, and the idea of the 
cruelties and torments which they exercised over their pri- 
soners, making them die under the cruellest sufferings, at a 
small fire, after having exhausted their invention of horrors 
which disgrace human nature the terror of that gave me 
from time to time new strength, when ready to succumb, and 
spurred me on. At length, arriving towards four o'clock in 
the afternoon, at a cultivated place about a league and a half 
from Fort St. John, where M. Bougainville caused his detach- 
ment to halt, to rest themselves, and to wait for the laggers 
behind, I observed a boat which was going to depart for Fort 
St. John, and there remained for me only strength sufficient 
to throw myself inside of it. We lost in this march about 
twenty-four men. Those who had remained behind, not 
being vigorous enough to support this rough march, were left 
as victims of it to the savages of the enemy. I have very 
often found myself in these painful and fatiguing positions, 
but never in any, where I experienced so much suffering as in 
this cruel journey. 

On arriving at Fort St. John, I saw M. Poularies on the 
bank of the river, who told me that they had learnt the news 
of our retreat from the Isle of Nuts, and that he had been 
sent there with his regiment to support us in case of our being 
attacked. I was so much done up that I was with difficulty 



74 

able to speak. It had been fine weather, and very hot. I 
left the boat, and threw myself immediately into the water, 
in full dress, not having sufficient strength to take off my 
clothes, which were soaked with mud, where I remained, 
lying with my head only out of the water, during more than 
an hour, M. Poularies having had the complacency to seat 
himself on the bank of the river to keep me company. On 
coming out of the water, I felt myself very much refreshed, 
and M. Poularies having regaled me with a very good supper, 
with a bed there to pass the night, the next day in the morn- 
ing, not feeling almost anything more of my fatigues, and 
finding myself in a state to march, I started to proceed on my 
way to Montreal, performing on foot five miles of wretched 
road, by a track, which there is from Fort St. John to Mon- 
treal. 

"We began to be hemmed in on the island of Montreal on 
all sides. The enemy having made himself master of the river 
of Chambly, by the capture of the Isle of Nuts, M. Amherst 
approached it with his army on the other side by the rapids 
in the river St. Lawrence ; and M. Murray ascended the river 
with troops who had wintered at Quebec, accompanied by 
ships of which there was one of fifty guns, which incited the 
admiration of the city of Montreal ; for till then they had 
never seen a ship of more than twenty-four tons, which had 
ventured to come from Quebec to Montreal, having always 
singularly neglected to sound the river. M. Murray con- 
ducted himself as an able man and an officer of capacity. 
He had taken five weeks to the sixty leagues which there are 
from Quebec to Montreal ; and he put us more at fault by 
his political conduct than by his arms. He stopped in the 
villages, caressed the Canadians whom he found in their 
houses ; hunted our army with hunger and misery, and he 
gave provisions to these poor unfortunate people ready to 
perish for want of subsistence ; he burned some houses of 
those who Avere at Montreal in our army, publishing through- 



75 

out all an amnesty, and offering good treatment to the 
Canadians who should return to their habitations there to 
live peaceably : in short, flattering the one, and inspiring 
the other with terror, he succeeded so well that it was with 
much difficiilty that in the end that we were able to keep 
the inhabitants at Montreal, and prevent them from returning 
to their houses. Verily, we had need of nothing but to put on 
a good countenance, for the three united armies of the enemy 
made up a corps of twenty thousand men, thus there was no 
possibility of being able to make head against them. 

The enemy had so well combined their operations this 
year, that on the 7th of September, towards two o'clock in 
the afternoon, the advanced posts of the army of General 
Amherst came in sight of Montreal on the side of the China 
gate ; and two hours after, M. Murray appeared with his 
ai-my on the side of the gate of Quebec. 

The town of Montreal was not any wise susceptible of the 
least defence. It is surrounded with walls without being 
fortified, and which sufficed only to afford the inhabitants a 
shelter from the incursions of savages in the early period of 
that settlement ; not foreseeing, that in the end, there would 
be in that country, armies of regular troops, who would make 
war in Canada methodically the same as in Europe. We 
were in the meantime completely shut up in this dismal place, 
which was a thousand times worse than a simple intrench- 
ment in a bare country, and which could not resist a can- 
nonade two hours. It required merely the time to get under 
these walls from the cannon shots, which were not a whit 
better than the garden walls, to enter there in full speed and 
take us at discretion ; and this with the greater certainty that 
there were not provisions in the city sufficient for nourishing 
the three thousand men of our army which remained to us, 
for three days, the greater part of the inhabitants having 
been obliged to return to their houses, in default of having 
provisions to give them to subsist on, and not improper un- 



76 

willingness to fight ; for these Canadians are brave as well 
as docile, submissive and easy to manage ; besides, they are 
patient under their sufferings, active as savages, of a strong 
temperament, and indefatigable in campaigns. They are 
better militia than any in the world. 

The night of the 7th and 8th September was passed in 
preliminaries, and in the discussion of the articles of general 
capitulation for the colony ; but in the morning M. Amherst 
granted it to us a thousand times more favourable than we 
had any right to expect in a position so very unfortunate. 

\T 

r 



CAPITULATION. 






Articles of Capitulation, concluded between His Excellency 
General Amherst, Commander -in- Chief of the forces of 
His Britannic Majesty in North America, and His 
Excellency the Marquis of Vaudreuil, Grand Cross of 
the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis, Governor 
and Lieutenant-General of His Most Christian Majesty 
in Canada. 

ARTICLE 1. Twenty-four hours after the signature of the 
present capitulation the English general, Amherst, shall take 
possession of the gates of the city of Montreal by the troops 
of His Britannic Majesty, and the English garrison shall not 
enter the place till the French troops shall have evacuated it. 
Answer. All the garrison of Montreal shall lay down 
their arms, and shall not serve during the present 
war. Immediately after the signature of the present 
capitulation, the king's troops shall take possession of 
the gates, and place the necessary guards for preser- 
ving good order in the city. 

ARTICLE 2. The troops and militia which are in garrison 
in the city of Montreal shall depart by the gate of * * *, 
with all the honours of war, six pieces of cannon, and a 
mortar, which shall be put on board the vessel in which the 
Marquis of Vaudreuil shall embark, and ten charges for every 
piece. The same honours shall be granted to the garrison of 
Three Rivers. 



78 

ARTICLE 3. The troops and the militia in garrison in the 
fort of James Cartier, in the island of St. Helen, and in the 
other forts, shall be treated in the same manner, and shall 
have the same honours. The troops stationed at Montreal, 
or at Three Rivers, or at Quebec, to be there embarked 
and conducted forthwith to the first port in France by the 
shortest route. Those which are in our posts upon our 
frontiers, on the side of Acadia at Detroit, at Michelima- 
kinak, and at other places, shall enjoy the same honours, and 
be treated in the same manner. 

Answer, All the troops not to serve during the present 
war, and shall equally lay down their arms, till the 
rest is granted them. 

ARTICLE 4. The militia, after leaving the towns, forts, 
and posts above-mentioned, shall return home without being 
molested upon any pretext whatever, on account of having 
borne arms. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 5. The troops which occupy the country shall 
raise their camps, and march drums beating with their 
arms, baggage, and artillery, to join the garrison of Montreal ; 
and shall be treated as it, in all respects. 

Answer. These troops must, the same as the others, 
lay down their arms. 

ARTICLE 6. On the one side and the other, pardon shall 
be granted to the subjects of His Britannic, and His Most 
Christian, Majesty the soldiers, militiamen, and seamen, 
who have deserted or quitted the service of their sovereigns, 
and carried arms in North America. They shall return to 
their respective countries, except such of them as shall remain 
where they are, without being sought after or molested. 

Refused. 

ARTICLE 7. The magazines, the artillery, arquebuses, 
swords, munitions of war, and generally, all that pertains to 
His Most Christian Majesty, as well in the towns of Montreal 



79 

and Three Rivers, as in the forts and posts mentioned in 
Article 3, shall be delivered up, upon exact inventories, to 
commissaries, who shall be named to receive them in name of 
His Britannic Majesty. Copies of said inventories shall be 
delivered to the Marquis of Vaudreuil. 

Ansicer. This is all that can be demanded under this 
article. 

ARTICLE 8. Officers, soldiers, militiamen, seamen, and 
even Indians, detained on account of their wounds or mala- 
dies, Avhether in hospitals or in private houses, shall enjoy the 
privileges of cartel, and shall be treated accordingly. 

Ansicer. The sick and wounded shall be treated as our 
own people. 

ARTICLE 9. The English general engages himself to send 
back to their homes the Indians and Americans who are 
belonging to his army, immediately after the signature of the 
present capitulation. And in the meantime, in order to pre- 
vent all disorder on the part of those who may wish not to 
depart, the said general shall grant safe guards to all persons 
who may wish to leave it, whether in town or in the open 
country. 

Ansicer. The first part of this article is refused. The 
Indians of our army have never committed cruelties. 
Besides, we will take care to maintain good order. 

ARTICLE 10. The general of His Britannic Majesty shall 
be responsible for all disorders on the part of his troops, and 
obliges himself to pay the damages which they may do in the 
towns and open country. 

Answered by the preceding Article. 

ARTICLE 11. The English general shall not oblige the 
Marquis of Vaudreuil to leave the city of Montreal before the 
* * * and no person shall be lodged in his house till he 
has left it. The Chevalier de Levis, commandant of the land 
forces, the principal officers and majors of the land forces, 
and those of the Colony, engineers, officers of artillery and 



80 

commissaries of war, shall remain also at Montreal, till the 
said day, and shall keep possession of their lodgings. The 
same thing shall be observed with regard to M. Bigot, the 
resident, the commissaries of marine, and the secretaries of 
which the said M. Bigot may stand in need ; and no person 
shall be lodged at the residency till he shall have left it. 

Answer. The Marquis of Vaudreuil, and all his gentle- 
men, shall be masters of their houses ; and shall 
embark when the ships of His Majesty shall be ready 
to sail for Europe. "We will provide for them, be- 
sides, all the accommodation possible. 

ARTICLE 12. The most commodious vessel shall be found 
to avail for conducting M. Vaudreuil to the nearest port 
of France, by the most direct route. They shall furnish the 
necessary commodities for the said M. Vaudreuil ; for M. 
Rigaud, the governor of Montreal ; and for the suite of the 
general. The vessel ought to be equipped in a convenient 
manner, at the expense of His Britannic Majesty ; and 
the Marquis of Vaudreuil shall carry with him his papers 
without their being examined, his equipages, his plate, uten- 
sils, his baggages, and those of his suite. 

Granted, under reserve of the Archives, which shall be 
necessary for the government of the country. 

ARTICLE. 13. If before or after the embarkation of the 
Marquis of Vaudreuil, news of peace shall arrive, and that by 
the treaty Canada remains with His Most Christian Majesty, 
the Marquis of Vaudreuil in that case shall restore to Quebec 
or to Montreal all things in their original state, under the 
dominion of His Most Christian Majesty ; and the present 
capitulation shall be null and of no effect. 

Answer. Everything which the King may be able to 
perform in regard to this matter shall be observed. 

ARTICLE 14. Two vessels shall be furnished to convey to 
France the Chevalier de Levis, the principal officers, and the 
staff major of the land forces, the engineers, officers of artil- 



81 

lery and their suites. These vessels shall be equipped and 
provided with all necessary commodities. The said officers 
shall take with them their papers without being examined, as 
well as their equipages and baggages. Those among them 
who are married shall have liberty to take with them their 
wives and children, to whom also provisions shall be fur- 
nished. 

Granted, on condition that the Marquis of Vaudreuil and 
all the officers, of whatever rank they may be, shall 
deliver to us all the charts and plans of the country. 

ARTICLE 15. There shall also be furnished for the pas- 
sage of M. Bigot, Resident, and his suite, a vessel in which 
there shall be all convenient commodities for him and the 
persons he shall take with him. He shall equally carry along 
with him his papers without their being examined, his equi- 
pages, his plate, his baggage, and those of his suite. This 
vessel shall also be equipped as is mentioned above. 

Granted, under the same reserves as in the preceding 
Article. 

ARTICLE 16. The English General shall also order to be 
furnished the vessels necessary and most commodious for con- 
veying to France M. Longveuil, Governor of Three Rivers ; 
the Staff Major of the Colony, and the Commissaries of the 
Marine. They shall therein embark, their families, domestics, 
baggage, and equipages ; and there shall be provided at the 
expense of His Britannic Majesty, all things necessary for 
their transit. 

Granted. 

ARTICLE 17. Officersjxnd soldiers, as well troops of the 
line as of the Colony, and officers of Marine, which shall 
happen to be in the Colony, shall in like manner embark for 
France ; and there shall be given to them vessels sufficient 
and commodious. The officers of the land and marine who 
are married, shall take with them their families, and they 
shall all be at liberty to embark their servants and baggage. 

F 



82 

Their vessels shall be victualled in a manner convenient and 
sufficient, at the expense of His Britannic Majesty. 

Granted. 

ARTICLE 18. Officers, soldiers, and all those who follow 
the troops, shall be allowed to send to enquire, before their 
departure, for the baggages which they may have in the 
country without any impediment. 

Granted. 

ARTICLE 19. The English General shall furnish an 
hospital ship for the sick and wounded officers, soldiers, and 
seamen, who shall be found to be in a state to be conveyed 
to France ; and the vessel shall in like manner be victualled at 
the expense of His Britannic Majesty. The same thing shall 
be done in regard to the other sick and wounded officers, 
soldiers, or seamen, until their health shall be re-established. 
They shall be at liberty to take with them their wives, 
children, domestics, and baggage. And the land soldiers and 
seamen shall not be enticed or forced to enter the service of 
His Britannic Majesty. 

Granted. 

ARTICLE 20. There shall be left a Commissary and 
King's Secretary to take care of the hospitals, and all that 
belongs to the service of His Most Christian Majesty. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 21. The English General shall also provide a 
ship for conveying to France with their families, domestics, 
and equipages, the officers of the Supreme Court of Justice, 
Police, and Admiralty, the same as those who hold commis- 
sions or brevets of His Most Christian Majesty ; and all other 
officers. They shall be in like manner furnished with all 
necessary provisions at the expense of His Britannic Majesty. 
They shall, notwithstanding, be at liberty to remain in the 
Colony, if they shall judge proper to regulate their affairs, or 
to retire into France when they please. 

Agreed to ; but if they have any papers relating to the 






83 

government of the country, they shall deliver them 
up to us. 

ARTICLE 22. If there are any military officers whose 
affairs demand their presence in the Colony till the ensuing 
year, they shall be at liberty to remain there after having 
obtained permission from the Marquis of Vaudreuil, and with- 
out being accounted prisoners of war. 

Answer. All those whose affairs particularly require 
that they should be in the country, and who shall 
have for that purpose permission from the Marquis 
of Vaudreuil, shall be allowed to remain till their 
affairs shall be regulated. 

ARTICLE 23. The Commissary of provisions shall have 
liberty to remain in Canada till the ensuing year, in order to 
be able to discharge the debts which he has contracted in 
the Colony on account of what has been furnished to him ; but 
if he prefers going into France this year, he shall be obliged 
to leave, till the next year a person to do his work ; and this 
person shall be at liberty to carry with him his papers with- 
out being inspected. His clerks also shall be allowed to 
remain in the Colony, or to go to France, and in this latter 
case they shall be provided with a passage and subsistence on 
board of vessels of His Britannic Majesty, for them, their 
families, and their baggage. 
Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 24. The provisions and ammunition which 
shall be found in the stores of the Commissary, as well in 
the towns of Montreal and Three Rivers, and in the country, 
shall be preserved to him ; the said provisions belonging to 
him and not to the King, and he shall be at liberty to sell 
them to the French or to the English, 

Answer. Everything which is actually in the stores 
intended for the use of the troops, ought to be 
delivered to the English commissaries for the King's 
troops. 



84 

ARTICLE 25. A passage to France shall also be granted 
on board ships of His Britannic Majesty, and likewise neces- 
sary provisions, to the officers of the East India Company 
who wish to go thither ; and they shall take with them their 
families, domestics, and baggage. The principal agent of the 
Company, in case he shall wish to go to France, shall have it 
in his power to leave, till the ensuing year, such person as he 
shall judge proper to regulate the affairs of the said Company, 
and to recover the sums which are due to it. The principal 
agent shall take possession of all papers belonging to the said 
Company, and they shall not be subject to examination. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 26. The said Company 'shall retain in property 
the silks and beavers which they may have in the city of Mon- 
treal. They shall not be touched there upon any pretext 
whatever ; and all necessary facilities shall be provided to the 
principal agent for conveying to France, this year, these 
beavers, on board vessels of His Britannic Majesty, on pay- 
ment of freight at the same rate as the English would have 
to pay. 

Agreed for what shall pertain to the Company or indi- 
viduals ; but if His Most Christian Majesty has any 
part there, it shall be delivered to the king. 

ARTICLE 27. The free exercise of the Catholic- Apostolic 
Roman religion shall subsist in its entirety, in such manner 
that all the states, and people of towns and countries, places 
and distant posts, shall continue to assemble in the churches, 
and frequent sacraments, as heretofore, without being molested 
in any manner, directly or indirectly. The English govern- 
ment shall oblige these peoples to pay to the priests the tithes 
and all the taxes which they were accustomed to pay under 
the government of His Most Christian Majesty. 

Granted as to the free exercise of their religion ; the obli- 
gation to pay the tithes to the priests shall depend 
upon the king's pleasure. 



85 

ARTICLE 28. The Chapters, Priests, Curates, and Mis- 
sionaries, shall continue with the utmost liberty their exercises 
and their functions in the parishes, in the towns, and open 
countries. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 29. The Grand Vicars nominated by the Chap- 
ter to administer the Diocese during the vacancy of an Epis- 
copal See, shall have liberty to make their residence in the 
parishes of the towns or open country as they shall judge it 
proper. They shall have liberty on all occasions to visit the 
different parishes of the Diocese with the ordinary ceremonies, 
and to exercise all jurisdiction which they exercised under the 
dominion of the French. They shall enjoy the same rights in 
case of death or future Bishop, which will be made mention 
of in the following Article. 

Agreed to, unless in so far as regards the following 
Article. 

ARTICLE 30. If by the Treaty of Peace Canada shall 
remain in the power of His Britannic Majesty, His Most 
Christian Majesty shall continue to nominate the Bishop of 
the colony, which shall always be of the Roman Communion, 
and under the authority of which the peoples shall exercise 
the Romish religion. 

Refused. 

ARTICLE 31. The Bishop, in case of need, shall establish 
new parishes to provide for the construction of a Cathedral 
and his Episcopal Palace, and shall be entitled in the mean- 
time to make his residence in the towns or parishes, as he 
shall judge proper. He shall be at liberty to visit his Diocese 
with his ordinary ceremonies, and to exercise all the jurisdic- 
tion which his predecessor exercised under the French do- 
minion, except that they shall exact from him an oath of 
allegiance or a promise that he shall do nothing contrary to 
the service of His Britannic Majesty. 

Answer. This Article is comprehended in the preceding. 



86 

ARTICLE 32. The religious corporations shall maintain 
their constitutions and privileges. They shall continue to 
observe their rules. They shall be exempt from lodging 
military men, and they shall be defended from trouble in their 
religious exercises, or their monasteries being entered into. 
Safe passports shall be given to those demanding them. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 33. The preceding Article shall in like manner 
be executed in regard to Corporations of Jesuits, and Recol- 
lets, and Priests of the House of St. Sulplice, at Montreal. 
These last and the Jesuits shall preserve their right to nomi- 
nate certain Curates and Missionaries as heretofore. 

Refused until the pleasure of the king is known. 

ARTICLE 34. All the Corporations and all the Priests 
shall preserve their moveable effects, the properties and re- 
venues of their lordships, and other endowments which they 
possess in the colony, of whatsoever kind they may be ; and 
these same endowments shall preserve their privileges, rights, 
honours, and exemptions. 

Granted. 

ARTICLE 35. If the Canons, Priests, Missionaries, and 
Priests of Seminaries, Stranger Missions of St. Sulplice, 
Jesuits, and Recollets, should wish to go to France, they shall 
be afforded a passage on board ships of His Britannic Ma- 
jesty ; and they shall have liberty to sell, in whole or in part, 
the goods, moveable and immoveable, which they possess in 
the colony, either to the French or to the English, without 
the least obstacle or hindrance on the part of His Britannic 
Majesty. They shall have it in their power to take with 
them or to send into France the profits, of whatever kind they 
may be, of said effects sold, on paying freight as is set forth 
in Article 26 ; and such of the said Priests as may wish to 
depart this year shall have their provisions during the passage 
at the expense of His Britannic Majesty, and may carry with 
them their baggage. 



87 

Answer. They shall be entitled to dispose of their effects, 
and to send into France the product of them, also to 
proceed thither in the same manner with all that be- 
longed to them. 

ARTICLE 36. If by the Treaty of Peace, Canada shall 
remain with His Britannic Majesty, all the French Canadians, 
Acadians, merchants, and other persons who wish to retire 
into France, shall have permission to do so from the English 
general, who shall procure them a passage. Nevertheless, if 
at present, till this decision be given, any French or Canadian 
merchants, or other persons, should desire to proceed to 
France, they shall equally have the permission of the English 
general. And both the one and the other may take with 
them their families, servants, and baggage. 

Granted. 

ARTICLE 37. The Lordships, Land Owners, Officers, 
Civil and Military, the Canadians, both of the towns and 
open countries, the French established in trading throughout 
the whole extent of the colony of Canada, and all other per- 
sons whomsoever, shall preserve peaceably the entire property 
and possessions of their effects, coins, and means, moveable 
and immoveable, their merchandises, furniture, and other 
effects, as well as their ships. They shall not be touched, 
nor the least damage done to them, under any pretext that it 
is possible to conceive They shall be permitted to keep, rent, 
or to sell them, either to the French or to the English, and to 
carry the proceeds in bills of exchange, furs, species, blank line, 
or other produce, when they shall judge it proper to proceed 
to France, on payment of freight as it is provided in Article 
26. They shall also have the furs which pertain to them in 
the high up posts, and which may be on the road to Montreal. 
In consequence, it shall be permitted to them to send this 
year, or the ensuing year, proper barges to go to collect these 
said furs, which shall remain in these posts. 

Agreed to, as in Article 26. 



. 88 

ARTICLE 38. All the people who have left Acadia, and 
who shall be found in Canada, comprising therein the frontiers 
of Canada on the side of Acadia, shall be treated the same as 
the Canadians, and enjoy the same privileges. 

Answer. It belongs to the king to dispose of these ancient 
subjects ; in the meantime they shall enjoy the same 
privileges as the Canadians. 

ARTICLE 39. Any of the Canadians, Acadians, or French, 
who are actually in Canada, and on the frontiers of the 
colony, on the side of Acadia at the Strait, at Michelimakinak, 
and other places and posts of the higher territories, any 
soldiers, married or unmarried, remaining in Canada, shall 
not be conducted or transported to English colonies, or to Old 
England, nor shall they be molested on account of having 
carried arms. 

Agreed to, except in regard to Canadians. 

ARTICLE 40. The Savages or Indians, allies of His Most 
Christian Majesty, shall be maintained in their habitations ; if 
they choose to remain there, they shall not be molested on any 
pretext whatever for having carried arms, or for having served 
His Most Christian Majesty. They shall also have the same as 
the French, toleration of religion and keep their Missionaries. 
The actual Vicars' general, and the Bishop, when the Epis- 
copal See shall be full, shall have liberty to send them new 
Missionaries, when they shall judge it necessary. 

Accorded, except the last Article, which has been already 
refused. 

ARTICLE 41. The French, Canadians, and Acadians, of 
whatever rank they may be, who shall remain in the colony, 
shall not be forced to take up arms against His Most Christian 
Majesty or his allies, directly or indirectly, on any occasion 
that this might be. The British government exact only from 
them a strict neutrality. 

Answer. They shall become subjects of the king. 

ARTICLE 42. The French Canadians and Acadians shall 



89 

continue to be governed according to the custom of Paris, and 
following the usages established for this country. They shall 
not be subject to any other imposts than those which were 
established under the French dominion. 

Answered by the preceding Articles, and particularly by 
the last. 

ARTICLE 43. The papers of the government shall remain, 
without exception, in the power of the Marquis of Vaudreuil, 
and go to France with him. These papers shall not be 
examined under any pretext whatever. 

Agreed to, under the reservation already made. 

ARTICLE 44. The papers of the residency, of the cabinets, 
of the comptroller of the marine, of the old and new trea- 
suries, the king's magazines, of the cabinet of revenues, and 
ordnances of St. Maurice, shall remain under the power of 
M. Bigot, the intendent, and shall be embarked along with 
him in the same vessel which is appointed to convey him to 
France. These papers shall not be examined. 

The same thing for this Article. 

ARTICLE 45. The registers and other papers of the su- 
preme council of Quebec, of the provost and admiralty of the 
said city, those of the supreme jurisdiction of the Colony, the 
minutes and notarial acts of the cities and the open country, 
and generally the acts and other documents which serve to 
prove the goods and fortunes of citizens remaining in the 
Colony, with the presses of the jurisdictions to which these 
papers belong. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 46. The inhabitants and merchants shall enjoy 
all the privileges of commerce, with the same favours and 
with the same conditions granted to the subjects of His Bri- 
tannic Majesty, as well in the higher territories, as in the 
interior of the colony. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 47. The negroes and peasants of both sexes 



90 

shall remain in their condition of slavery, in the power of the 
French and Canadians to whom they belong. Their masters 
shall have liberty to keep them in their service in the colony, 
or to sell them ; and shall also have it in their power to 
instruct them in the Romish religion. 

Agreed to, under reserve of those who have been made 
prisoners. 

ARTICLE -48. The Marquis of Yaudreuil, the general and 
the staff officers of the land forces, the governors and the 
staff officers of the different places of the colony, the civil 
and military officers, and all other persons who shall quit the 
colony, or who are already absent, shall have liberty to 
nominate and appoint attornies, who shall act for them and 
in their name in the administration of their effects, moveable 
and immoveable, until the peace ; and if by the treaty be- 
tween the two Crowns, Canada shall not return under the 
French dominion, these officers and other persons, or their 
attornies, shall have permission to sell their feifs, houses, or 
other estates, and their moveables, goods, and to carry or send 
to France the proceeds, in bills of exchange, specie, furs, or 
other produce, as it is provided for in Article 37. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 49. The inhabitants and other persons who 
have suffered any damage in their effects, moveable or im- 
moveable, who remained at Quebec under the faith of the 
capitulation of that city, shall have it in their power to make 
representation to the British Government, who shall render 
just judgment against those whom it may concern. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 50. The present capitulation shall be inviolably 
executed in all these respects, and in good faith, on the one 
part and the other, notwithstanding any infraction and other 
pretexts in regard to preceding capitulations, and without 
using reprisals. 

Agreed to. 






91 

ARTICLE 51. The English general obliges himself, that 
in case there shall remain any Indians, after the surrender of 
this city, to prevent their entry into the towns, and prevent 
them from insulting in any manner the subjects of His Most 
Christian Majesty. 

Answer. Care shall be taken that the Indians shall not 
be guilty of any insult to the subjects of His Most 
Christian Majesty. 

ARTICLE 52. The troops and other subjects of His Most 
Christian Majesty, who ought to proceed to France, shall be 
embarked, at the latest, in five days after the signature of the 
present capitulation. 

Answered as in Article 11. 

ARTICLE 53. The troops and other subjects of His Most 
Christian Majesty who are destined to proceed to France, 
shall remain lodged and encamped in the city of Montreal, 
and other posts which they actually occupy, until they shall 
embark to depart. In the meantime, passports shall be 
granted to those who require them, for the different places of 
the colony, in order to take care of their effects. 

Granted. 

ARTICLE 54. All officers and soldiers of the troops in the 
service of France who are prisoners in New England, and 
those who have been taken in Canada, shall be sent back as 
soon as possible to France, either to treat there for their ran- 
som or their exchange, conformable to cartel ; and if any of 
these officers have business in Canada, they shall have liberty 
to go there. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 55. In regard to the officers of militia, or 
militiamen and Acadians who are prisoners in New Eng- 
land, they shall be sent back to their own countries respec- 
tively. 

Done at Montreal, the 8th of September, 1760. 

(Signed) VAUDREUIL. 



Agreed to, except in regard to the Acadians. 

Done at the camp before Montreal, the 8th of Sep- 
tember, 1760. 

(Signed) JEFF. AMHERST. 



These articles are a fine specimen of terms of capitulation, and equally 
honourable to both parties. ED. 



CAPITULATION OF QUEBEC BY M. EAMSAT, 

The 18 th of September, 1760. 



ARTICLE 1. M. Ramsay demands that the honors of war 
shall be granted to his garrison, and that they shall be con- 
ducted in safety to the army of the king by the shortest road, 
with arms, baggage, six field pieces of cannon, two mortars, 
or a twelve-pounder shot shell. 

Answer. The garrison composed of land troops, marine, 
and seamen shall leave the place with arms and 
baggage ; drums beating, colours flying, and two 
pieces to fire. They shall be embarked the most 
conveniently possible for being transported to the 
first port of the realm of France. 

ARTICLE 2. The inhabitants shall be maintained in pos- 
session of their houses, estates, effects, and privileges. 

Agreed to : provided they lay down their arms. 

ARTICLE 3. They shall not be exposed to any bad treat- 
ment on account of having carried arms in defence of the 
place, having been forced to serve as militia, following the 
usual custom of the respective colonies of the two Crowns. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 4. None of the effects shall be touched which 
appertain either to the officers or inhabitants absent from the 
place. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 5. No persons settled in the city shall be 
obliged to quit their dwellings before there shall be arranged 
a definite treaty between their Most Christian and British 
Majesties. 

Very well. 



94 

ARTICLE 6. The public exercise of the Catholic Apos- 
tolic and Romish religion shall be maintained. They shall 
grant the same safeguards to the houses of the clergy and to 
the monasteries : above all, to the palace of the Bishop of the 
Diocese, which is animated with zeal for religion, and full of 
charity for his flocks, desirous of residing constantly in the 
city of Quebec, in order there to exercise freely and with 
decency, and where he may judge proper, his Episcopal ati- 
thority in whatever regards the duties attached to his charac- 
ter, and the functions requisite to the sacred mysteries of 
the Catholic Apostolic and Romish religion, till the possession 
of Canada shall be decided by a treaty between the Most 
Christian King and the King of Great Britain. 

The Romish religion shall be exercised freely. All reli- 
gious persons and the Bishop shall have passports, 
with liberty to pass and repass where their functions 
call them, and that till the arrangement spoken of is 
made. 

ARTICLE 7. The garrison shall deliver up, in good faith, 
the artillery and munitions of war, of which they shall pre- 
pare a list. 

Undecided. 

ARTICLE 8. The sick and wounded, commissaries, chap- 
lains, physicians, surgeons, apothecaries, and other employes 
in the hospitals, shall be treated conformably to the cartel 
established between the Courts of Versailles and London, the 
6th day of February of the present year. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 9. Before the gates shall be given up to the 
English troops to enter the city, their general shall send there 
some soldiers, who shall be placed as safeguards to the 
churches, convents, and hotels. 

Granted. 

ARTICLE 10. The Commandant of the city of Quebec 
shall have permission to despatch an express to the Marquis 



95 

of Vaudreuil, governor-general, to inform him of the sur- 
render of the place. He shall be equally permitted to give 
advice thereof by letters to the minister at Versailles. 

Agreed to. 

ARTICLE 11. The present capitulation shall be observed 
in all its force and tenor, without any pretext or motive of 
reprisals, or reason of non-execution of every prior capitula- 
tion, being able to serve as the foundation for support of its 
infringement. 

Copies of this Convention, stipulated between us, have 
been signed in the camp before Quebec to-day, the 18th Sep- 
tember, 1759. 

(Signed) CHAELES SAUNDERS. 

GEORGE TOWNSHEND of Ramsay. 



APPENDIX, 



Conjectures b>j M. the Chevalier on the Manoeuvres of the 
Disposition of March of M. Braddock. 



THE disposition of M. Braddock was found at the Belle 
River among the papers of that English general, and sent to 
Louisbourg, where I saw it, without any explanation of the 
manner of manoeuvreing in that order of march, so as to get 
into battle array. Finding it at the first glance of the eye 
very singular, I sent a copy of it to M. the Marshal of 
Thomond, with whom I had always kept up a correspondence 
by letters ; but my Lord Thomond confined himself to thank- 
ing me, without communicating to me what he thought of it ; 
and I sent another copy of it to M. Surlaville, our old troop 
major at Louisbourg, who answered me that that order of 
march was very defective, and that with that disposition the 
English general would not have been able to avoid letting him- 
self be beaten. On examining it, it appeared to me to be the 
practice followed throughout all Europe for crossing a wood, 
an army under three columns, the provisions, the munitions 
of war, artillery and baggage forming that of the centre ; and 
I hazarded my ideas upon the manreuvre of these columns. 
Every company appears, according to the plan, into three 
platoons, of which I suppose the greatest part of the three is 
commanded by the captain, the second by the lieutenant, 
and the third, the one most distant from the carriages, by a 
sergeant, not having an appearance but of two files of four 
or six men deep ; the platoon of the sergeant should be able 



kj 






Og 



1 



:L: ::::i: 









I 



97 

to be destined to fight on the high road, and hold in check the 
light troops, who might vault through the skirt of the wood. 
If the enemy should appear in sufficiently great numbers to 
fear being attacked, we should form (fig. 2J into platoons of 
column from the right one to the right ; and to the platoons 
of the column of the left one to the left, making them march 
immediately in advance, in a straight line of the platoon of the 
sergeant. That which should be done in an instant, a long 
square, fronting every way and firing from the head to the 
foot by the companies of grenadiers. If the attack of the 
enemy is decided on the side of the column of the right, the 
column of the left should then be a half circle to the right, it 
becoming the second line, and the carriages re-entering at the 
same time to the centre through the intervals ; this would 
immediately restore the army again into three columns. If we 
wished to make a retreat in place of one at the left, it should 
be made at the right. According to the column which will 
form the first line we should place the cannon in the the inter- 
vals, and cause form the grenadiers into four squares to guard 
the flanks. Supposing (Jig. Z) that the enemy should be 
arranged in battle order on a plain, having many natural 
meadows on the side of Illinois of an immense greatness and 
that it was his design to attack you at the moment that the 
army debouched from the wood, in forming a square at the left 
to the platoons of the column to the right, and a quarter of a 
square at the right to the platoons of the column of the left, 
the two columns are at once formed in divisions by two com- 
panies in each division ; and in debouching they will be able 
to form themselves in battle array by division. 



* NOTES ON THE OEDER OF MARCH. 

This disposition of M. Braddock was found among his 
papers at Belle river, but without any explanation of the 



98 

manoeuvres which it behoved him to make of the columns, 
and containing only the names of the companies which were 
attached to every brigade of baggage ; the column of the 
centre being composed of carriages of provisions, of his artil- 
lery and his munitions and other baggage, was divided into 
two brigades, which were distributed throughout his whole 
army, as they had need of them. Thus I will hazard my 
conjectures in regard to the different manoeuvres which M. 
Braddock would have had it in his power to form the idea of 
making by his order of march. Every company, by the plan, 
appears to be divided into three platoons, of which I imagine 
the greatest of the three was commanded by the captain, the 
second by the lieutenant, the third, the most distant of car- 
riages, by a sergeant, the third not being in appearance but 
like two files of four or six deep. This sergeant's platoon 
might be designed to skirt the wood, break down the stockade 
and hold in check the light troops who leap upon the skirts 
of the wood. If the enemy appear in any great numbers, for 
fear of being attacked, they ought to form (fig. \) platoons 
of column from the right one to the right ; and from those of 
the column of the left one at the left ; causing them to march 
immediately in advance from the line of the sergeant's pla- 
toon, which should make a long square, facing every way, 
and form at the head and rear by companies of grenadiers. 
If the attack of the enemy is decided from the side of the 
column of the right, the column of the left ought then to 
make a half circle to the right, which would then become the 
second line ; and the carriages would pass at once through 
the intervals between the companies to place themselves in 
the rear of the column to the left, in order to leave free space 
between the two lines ; thus, vice versa, if it is at the column 
of the left where the enemy makes his attack, if they wish 
to continue their march in advance, they ought to make to 
the whole force, one at the left, the carriages at the same time 
returning back through the intervals, which would imme- 



99 

diately replace the army into three columns. If they should 
wish to effect a retreat, in place of effecting it at the left, it 
ought to be made at the right. Immediately when it is ascer- 
tained that it is from the column of the right that the enemy 
would present himself to do battle, you ought then to intro- 
duce the artillery into the openings of that column, and you 
will make a quarter circle from the right to the grenadiers to 
protect the flanks of the first line. If it is the column of the 
left that is attacked, you will place the artillery there in the 
intervals, and the grenadiers will form a quarter circle to the 
left ; the carriages passing at once becoming the column of 
the right, which will then be the second line. Supposing 
(fig. 2} that the enemy should be ranged in battle array in a 
plain, as there is often natural meadows on the side of Illi- 
nois, of an immense magnitude, and that it is his design to 
attack you at the moment when the army debouches from the 
wood, in making a quarter circle from the left to the platoons 
of the column of the right, and a quarter circle from the 
right to the platoons of the column of the left, the two 
columns are at once formed in divisions by companies ; and 
in debouching from the wood you would be able to form at 
once in battle array through the centre, the companies of the 
column of the right placing it from the right to their first 
company, successively, in proportion as they debouched ; and 
from the same companies of the column of the left, to their 
first company ; a manoeuvre which is in use at the passage of 
a bridge the two companies at the head of the columns 
forming the centre of the line. 



* These conjectures, although in part repetitious, being in the original, 
we did not feel ourselves justified in abridging or omitting either of them. 
ED. 



O. CORNWALL AND SONS, PRINTERS AND LITHOGRAPHEBS, ABERDEEK. 

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