Memories of a Turkish statesman--1913-1919

MEMORIES OF A TURKISH
STATESMAN-1913-1919

^Memories of a Turkish
Statesman- 19 13 1919 .. By

al *Pasha .': Formerly governor

of Constantinople, Imperial Ottoman Naval Minister, and
Commander of the Fourth Army in Sinai, Palestine and Syria

NEW fe*Utf! YORK

GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
1922

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION 9

CHAPTER

I. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 1913 ... n

II. THE OUTBREAK AND END OF THE SECOND BALKAN

WAR 43

III. AT THE ADMIRALTY 81

IV. IN COMMAND OF THE FOURTH ARMY 135

V. OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE EXPEDITION AGAINST

THE SUEZ CANAL 145

VI. THE DESERT FORCE 161

VII. THE BATTLES OF GAZA 173

VIII. THE ARAB REBELLION 195

IX, THE ARMENIAN QUESTION ... ... ... ... 239

500873

INTRODUCTION

MY personal participation in general politics in the Ottoman
Empire begins with the coup d'etat of January 23, 1913.

On the evening of that day I left the headquarters of the Lines
of Communication Inspectorate* and went to the Sublime Porte,
to which a great crowd was flocking at the time.

At that moment Mahmud Shefket Pasha, who had been
appointed Grand Vizier a few hours before, returned from the
Imperial Palace and met me at the entrance to the Grand Vizier's
palace.

He had hardly seen me before he called out : " Djemal Bey, I
want you to take over the Military Governorship of Constantinople
at once and you must not lose a minute in taking all measures you
think necessary for the preservation of order and confidence in the
capital/'

As I have said, my assumption of the highly important and
equally responsible office of Military Governor of Constantinople
meant my direct participation in general politics in my Fatherland.
I thus find myself compelled to start my memoirs at that point.

* At that time I was General Inspector of the Chataldja Lines of Communica-
tion.

MILITARY GOVERNOR OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 1913

CHAPTER I.
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 1913.

I ENTER UPON MY OFFICE.

WHEN I was commissioned by Mahmud Shefket Pasha to take over
the direction of the Military Government of Constantinople, the
corpse of Nazim Pasha was still lying in the room of the First
Aide-de-Camp of the Grand Vizier and the Ex-Grand Vizier, Kiamil
Pasha, as well as the Sheik-ul-Islam, Djemaleddin, the Minister
of the Interior, Reschid Bey, and the Finance Minister, Abdurrah-
man Bey, were lodged for safety in one of the rooms of the
Minister-President's quarters.

After a short conversation with Talaat Bey, who had been
entrusted provisionally with the administration of the Ministry of
the Interior, we decided that Nazim Pasha's corpse should be taken
to the hospital at Gulhane, Kiamil Pasha and Djemaleddin Effendi
should be sent home, and that we should keep Reschid Bey and
Abdurrahman Bey a few days in the Military Government building,
in order to protect them against the rage the revolutionaries were
displaying against them.

At that moment Lieutenant-Colonel Nadji Bey, Kiamil Pasha's
son-in-law, and a friend of mine since school days, was in the Grand
Vizierate building. I received him with the words : " You needn't
have any anxiety. Your father-in-law is safe. You can take him
home, but if he does not want to be molested by some excited
fellow it would be advisable for him to leave Constantinople for a
time and go to Europe."

Nadji Pasha thanked me very warmly, and Kiamil Pasha and
Djemaleddin Effendi reached their homes without mishap. Reschid
and Abdurrahman were brought to the Military Government
building, and Nazim Pasha's body was removed to the hospital at

13

14 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Gulhane. I myself went to the Military Government and spent
the night there engaged in taking such measures for the preserva-
tion of order as the situation required. Lest I burden my story
with immaterial details I will not describe them more fully.

I made the doctors at Gulhane give me a report on Nazim
Pasha, and also had a detailed report of the affair prepared.

THE BURIAL OF NAZIM PASHA.

On the next day the burial of Nazim Pasha was carried out in
accordance with my instructions.

I had attached importance to the obsequies being carried out
with every mark of distinction, and therefore insisted that the high
military dignitaries, ministers and civil officials, as well as the
military attaches of foreign Powers, should take part.

The weather was bad that day. I was a prey to profound melan-
choly. The Bulgarians stood before the Chataldja lines, the
Greek Fleet blockaded the Dardanelles, the warships of the Great
Powers were anchored off the Bechiktach, prepared to occupy
Constantinople at any moment. But we ourselves, who unfor-
tunately had not been in a position to wrest the reins of govern-
ment from wreak and nerveless hands by lawful means, had seen
ourselves compelled to resort to a coup d'etat, in which the former
War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of our army had unhappily
lost their lives. And in spite of all our efforts and such great sacri-
fices the future of our country was still in the greatest jeopardy.
Such was the gloomy vision that passed before the eyes of my
mind, as by the side of Major Maucorps, the French Military
Attache, I accompanied the earthly remains of Nazim Pasha to the
grave. As we were crossing St. Sophia Square I turned involun-
tarily to Maucorps and said: " Look here, my friend, the
Europeans alone are responsible for this victim, for by your per-
petual injustices you have enticed the Turkish nation into the arena
and compelled it to fight to be able to live in freedom and escape
thraldom and misery. Who knows how many more obsequies you
will attend ? It will be no surprise if you have to follow my coffin
to-morrow."

He made as if he did not understand me, and asked me to

Military Governor of Constantinople 15

make my meaning clearer. Passing over the French intrigues, out
of courtesy, I spoke of the machinations of the English and
Italians, and especially those of Russia, and referred to the spirit
of revolt they aroused in the country. I explained to him how the
Balkan peoples had been compelled to form an alliance by these
intrigues and added that now, when the slightest support from
England or France could still save us, they not only refused us
such support, but did not hesitate to speak evil of us through the
heads of their Governments, so that the poor Turks, after so many
blows of adversity, had ended up by tearing each other to pieces.
The English Military Attache, Tyrrel, followed our conversation
with interest, though he took no part in it. Maucorps, however,
replied : " You're right" ! He spoke in a tone which left me in no
doubt as to his genuineness. We ultimately lapsed into silence and
accompanied Nazim Pasha to his last resting-place.

THE GENERAL AMNESTY.

On the evening of the coup d'etat the President of Police took
the precautionary measure of arresting the most prominent
members of the Opposition and bringing them to headquarters.
A decision with regard to them had to be taken quickly, par-
ticularly as Reschid and Abdurrhaman were detained at the
Military Government building.

After discussing with a few friends, and particularly Talaat,
we decided not only to take no repressive measures against them,
but rather to strive to come to some understanding with them.
Mahmud Shefket Pasha entirely approved this decision.

Thereupon I sent for Abdurrhaman Bey, who wished to speak
to me. I gave him an assurance that he and his friends were in
no danger, that their detention was only temporary, and merely
for the purpose of protecting them against attempts at assassina-
tion, and that they could go home in a day or two. I added,
however, that in my opinion they would be wise to leave
Constantinople and live abroad for a time. I gave them per-
mission to have bedding and food fetched from their houses.
Two days later I had them taken back to their homes under safe
escort. A day or so later they left Constantinople, as did Kiamil
Pasha and Djemaleddin Effendi.

1 6 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

On the second day after my entry into office I went to the
garrison headquarters, and visited AH Kemal Bey as well as Riza
Nur and Ismael Bey of Gumuldjina, the deputies for Sinope, who
were interned there. I gave them the same assurance that they
were in no danger if they abandoned all idea of untimely
opposition. I remarked that in these unhappy times the country
needed the help of all reasonable and well-disposed men, and that
if they believed in my good intentions I could give them an
honourable field of labour.

Ali Kemal Bey wanted some post in Europe. Dr. Riza Nur
asked for the money necessary to prosecute his medical studies in
Paris. Ismael Pasha gave me his word of honour that if he were
allowed to remain in the country he would refrain from any
opposition to the Government until normal conditions were
restored.

I sent Dr. Riza Nur to Paris after I had obtained the necessary
approval of the grant of money he had requested. Kemal Bey I
sent to Vienna, compensating him in the same way for his removal.
1 had several letters from him there.

Four or five days after these negotiations with the leaders of
the Opposition, the political atmosphere cleared, and Mahmud
Shefket Pasha's Ministry could settle down to devote itself to its
great task.

As Military Governor of Constantinople I had also to hold
the post of General Officer Commanding the operations base of the
army at Chataldja, and in carrying out the double functions of
these offices I made it my principal business to preserve order in
the city and at any cost prevent the repetition of a coup d'etat
against Mahmud Shefket Pasha's Ministry.

I must not omit to refer here to two measures which I found
it necessary to take:

i. There were in Constantinople a number of smugglers who
were offering smuggled tobacco (in Government packets) in the
streets of the city, Sultan Hamam, Sirkedji, and on Mahmud Pasha
Hill and Bayadzid Square.

I detected an open proclamation of the bankruptcy of state
authority in the cry, " Two piastres' worth for one," to the accom-

Military Governor of Constantinople 17

paniment of which these people had the audacity to offer their
wares in packets under the tops of which the strands of light yellow
tobacco could be seen, even if indistinctly. To bring the strength
of the Government home to the civil population I therefore
resorted to the powers conferred on the Military Government by
martial law, and announced to all those concerned that anyone
who indulged in illicit trading, whether wholesale or retail, would
be arrested and banished from Constantinople.

In the next week I had four or five at most of these individuals
deported, and the court martial passed sentence on a few smugglers
who were caught in a kiosk not far from the Seraglio. The result
was that the common swindling which had become an everyday
occurrence was soon exceptional, and the people of Constantinople
and its suburbs could henceforth enjoy perfect security.

2. There were many people in Constantinople who indulged in
the vicious habit of making amorous remarks to Mohammedan
ladies as they passed them out walking, on the boats and bridges,
or in the streets and bazaars. Among them were even old women,
who made indecent suggestions and even laid hands on elegant and
well-dressed women.

I had always had a violent hatred of this abuse, and I had never
been able to understand the neglect to take strong measures
against it before. Indeed, the evil was always more or less notice-
able in proportion as the Government was strong or weak. When
I became Military Governor many fathers of families who had
reason to complain applied to me with a request to take steps to
change this condition of things. As our criminal code provided
but little with which to combat it, I found myself once more
compelled to resort to the powers which martial law conferred
upon the Military Governor.

I .issued a warning that men who used insulting language and
women who accosted ladies should be transported to the interior.
After four or five examples had been made our women were able
to walk in the streets without further molestation. For the first
time a definite step had been taken to place the personal freedom
of Turkish women on a secure basis.

During my period of office as Military Governor I have proved
that I am one of the most zealous advocates of the emancipation

B

1 8 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

of women, or, to put it more accurately, I believe firmly in the
important part which woman is called upon to play not only in
social life, but also in public affairs. It is true that for that reason
I was subsequently made the object of numerous calumnies on the
part of certain persons. Nevertheless the Women's Movement
which began with my term of office not only did not die out as time
went on, but extended and developed continuously and rendered
the greatest service during the war. I am absolutely convinced
that the civilising agencies of a country can best and soonest be
promoted with the help of woman, and that those nations which
keep their womankind in a state of slavery are on the high road
to inevitable decay.

AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT.

After my appointment as Military Governor of Constantinople
I invited the editors of the principal newspapers of the capital to
call upon me, and told them that their papers would be subjected
to a very mild censorship only if they would undertake to publish
no articles of a kind to imperil public order. I asked them to
write articles of a general and helpful nature, to enlighten public
opinion and rouse the new forces which the Fatherland needed for
its salvation. I desired to allow even the most violent organs of
the Opposition to continue publication, organs which dated from
the time of the previous Ministry. The latter certainly exceeded
on occasion the instructions given them, but I confined myself
to making representations to their editors or responsible directors.

The Government worked with the greatest energy to arouse
the martial spirit of the nation and create an army capable at any
rate of beating the Bulgarians facing the Chataldja lines during
the second war against the Allies. On the one hand they founded
the Committee of National Defence, and endeavoured to accumu-
late all possible material and military resources, and on the other
they tried to raise the moral of the army and did everything in
their power to create opinion favourable to Turkish interests
among the Great Powers.

At that moment the English, French and Russian diplomatists
who had been sent to Constantinople were doing their utmost to
induce us to make peace with the Balkan States on the terms that

Military Governor of Constantinople 19

we should accept the Enos-Midia line and abandon the islands of
the Archipelago.

When I called one day at the French Embassy the Ambassador,
Monsieur Bompard, with whom I had been on friendly terms since
the days when I was Governor in Adana, chose this topic as the
subject of conversation.

" My dear Djemal Bey/' he said, " why are you so obstinate
about keeping Adrianople and the islands ? You've effected a
coup d'etat. You're in power. We know that your party repre-
sents the strongest factor in the country and that, unlike the old
Ministry, you wouldn't hesitate to take and carry out decisions
such as even we ourself regard as in the best interests of Turkey.
You must make it your business now more than ever to secure
peace and order at home. Don't you think it wiser to devote the
moral and material resources you mean to squander on the reten-
tion of Adrianople to the reforms you intend to introduce ?
Broadly speaking, all you possess in the city is a few historically
notable mosques, and as for the islands, they've always been
inhabited solely by Greeks."

By way of answer I took the Ambassador up to a map of the
Ottoman Empire which was hanging on a wall. I pointed out
that for the defence of Constantinople a hinterland was required
which must at any rate stretch to Adrianople, and that if Anatolia
was to be protected against the attack of Greek robber bands the
possession of the islands off our coasts was absolutely essential.

" My dear Monsieur Bompard/' I ended up, " we regard this
question of Adrianople and the islands as a life and death matter
for our future. We should be eternally grateful to any European
Government which supported us in this affair, and it would always
find us at its side. It would be a great coup, and France could
thereby win a position of moral supremacy in the East/'

While the Government was thus endeavouring to save
Adrianople I was getting news every day which seemed to indicate
that the Opposition were planning a coup d'etat. The reports
were ultimately so numerous and became so urgent that I found
myself compelled to come to some decision in the matter.

One day fate delivered into our hands a certain Serdar Sidki
Effendi from Erzerum. This man was caught with another
individual in the act of having- proclamations printed at a printing

B2

20 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

» -j>

establishment in Pera. The ringleaders of this group were work-
ing under the moral protection of Prince Sabaheddin Bey and
taking direct orders from his Private Secretary, the Bosniac Satfet
Lutfi Bey. Their aim was a coup d'etat with the intention of
making Prince Sabaheddin Bey Grand Vizier.

We arrested them all. We did not get hold of Satfet Lutfi
for a time until we ultimately found him in the house of Herr
Lazare, interpreter to the Austro-Hungarian Consulate. I had
him arrested and imprisoned. As these measures were contrary
to the capitulations, I found myself compelled to get orders from
Mahmud Schefket Pasha and, as supreme responsible represen-
tative of the executive authority, call at the Austro-Hungarian
Embassy in full dress and present my apologies to Count
Pallavicini.

This attempt at a coup d'etat is described as an " attempt to
overthrow the Government " in the record relating to this affair.
These documents, which were most carefully drawn up, are pre-
served in the Military Government, the Prefecture of Police and
the War Court. The prisoners were condemned to various
penalties. Prince Sabaheddin I left alone for the time being, as
Talaat Bey, who was then performing the functions of Secretary-
General of the Committee and endeavouring to arrive at some
understanding with the Prince, had asked me to postpone his
arrest until we secured some obvious and irrefutable proof of
his guilt.

In spite of the arrest and punishment of Satfet Lutfi and his
accomplices Sabaheddin Bey continued his machinations. This
time he entrusted the conduct of the business to his close friend,
Dr. Nihad Reschad Bey. Nihad Reschad Bey now got into
touch with Talaat Bey with a view to finding a basis for compro-
mise between our party and Prince Sabaheddin's, and simul-
taneously started a plot, the object of which was the murder of
Talaat Bey, Mahomed Shefket Pasha, and other persons. But I
was daily kept informed of his intrigues, and, so to speak, followed
him step by side. The Doctor's double game was so well con-
cealed by his elegant exterior that Talaat Pasha, who was in
negotiation with him, would not believe in the machinations of
this gentleman, though I exposed them in all their details to him.
He accused my intelligence service of wishing to deceive me until

Military Governor of Constantinople 21

I ultimately convinced him entirely by a shattering piece of
evidence.

One day there was to be another conference between Talaat
and the Doctor. This conference was, however, preceded by
another meeting which the Doctor had arranged with his accom-
plices. Highly satisfied with the course of the discussion with his
friends, the Doctor took leave of them, remarking with a
Machiavellian smile : " Now we'll talk to Talaat about an under-
standing/' I had taken good care that someone in whom Talaat
Bey had perfect confidence should witness this scene. From that
moment on Talaat Bey doubted no longer. Doctor Nihad, who
had obviously got wind of the affair, succeeded in escaping when I
tried to have him arrested also. Several of his friends were put
under lock and key, and formed the second group which was
brought before a court martial.

Prince Sabaheddin disappeared from the scene. I learned
subsequently that under the protection of Mr. FitzMaurice, the
first interpreter at the English Embassy, and Major Tyrrel, the
Military Attache, he had fled to a house in English occupation, so
that our hands were, of course, tied.

I could not understand how the Prince, who had planned the
conspiracy with extreme boldness, could suddenly abandon his
scheme and take to flight. When Talaat Pasha was later on
returning from our journey from Constantinople to Berlin and
came to speak of this matter he remarked with a smile: " When
you gave me palpable proof of the intrigues of the doctor and
the Prince and I realised that you were determined to have them
arrested I had the Prince warned through one of his confidants to
disappear as quickly as possible. That is how he got away."

Curiously enough, it was I who had set the Prince free at the
time of the events of April I3th (March 3ist) after he had been
taken prisoner by the Army of Operations and brought to the
Ministry of War. I had hardly heard of his arrest before I went
to Mahmud Shefket Pasha and represented to him that these
measures against the Prince were not permissible. I told him that
inasmuch as we had come to Constantinople to remove the mischief
makers and fight the nefarious activities of the street politician, it
would not be right to behave in the same way towards the Prince
and certain individuals whose political opinions and convictions

22 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

differed from our own. The Pasha at once ordered his release.
I thereupon went to the great drawing-room in which the Prince
was waiting with his mother, the Sultana, and told him with polite
apologies that he was free. But while the enquiries into the
activities of Satfet Lutfi and his friends were in progress and
Doctor Nihad's accomplices were being searched for I was in-
formed that the Prince was one of the many authors of the events of
April I3th. This time he was enabled to escape through the pro-
tection of Talaat Pasha, although there could be no doubt about
his participation in the preparations for a coup d'etat.

One day at the time when I was taking proceedings against the
Prince and his fellow-conspirators (it was before his flight) his
brother, Prince Lutfullah Bey, came to the Military Government
to ask for my help in a personal matter. In the course of our
conversation I began to speak about Sabaheddin Bey, and said :
" I want you to do me a little favour, I mean take your brother
Sabaheddin Bey a message. In his appeals, both here and in
Europe, he asserts that the leaders of ' Unity and Progress ' are
assassins whose hands are red with blood. Although this allega-
tion is in direct contrast to the evidence, I will assume for the
moment that it is true. I myself maintain, on the other hand, that
all the members of the Opposition, Prince Sabaheddin included,
have blood on their hands as well as we ourselves.

" To begin with, it was they who organised the events of
April i3th ; theirs is the guilt for all the blood which was then shed
as well as for that which flowed when the Army of Operations
entered Constantinople. Further, the Prince took an active part
in the formation of the group of t Band of Delivers ' Officers, and
was not unconnected with the rising in Albania. His Highness
thus cannot evade partial responsibility for the blood that has
flowed. On the other hand, he is trying to brand us as murderers.
I must therefore ask the Prince to recognise these facts and be
good enough to admit that those whom he called murderers only
proceeded to take counter-measures in an absolute emergency.
He should also admit that the sharper measures were taken by his
party and should be prepared for a compromise which allowed both
parties to remain true to their different political convictions and
yet to work for the common welfare of the Fatherland, each in its
own way."

Military Governor of Constantinople 23

Lutfullah Bey naturally defended his brother most vigorously,
and vowed that he was incapable of dipping his hands in blood and
had nothing to do with all these affairs. Thereupon I said to
him: " I can't discuss these matters with you, as you know
nothing about them, but please tell me whether you will repeat my
words to your brother. That will satisfy me."

He promised, and added: " Perhaps I can do some good this
way."

Two or three days later Prince Lutfullah Bey called on me
again and told me that he had repeated my words to his brother,
and that the latter had replied that my accusations conflicted
wholly with the truth and that I either desired to slander him or
must unquestionably have been falsely informed. I recognised
but one political principle which he regarded as his ideal, and
fought for its realisation by the methods of peace. He shrank
with horror from all bloodshed, and he could not understand how
anyone could regard him as the advocate of a bloody revolution,
much less as its organiser. He was bound to assume, merely
from my remark as communicated to him, that there was a doud
of hatred and enmity about him, and he therefore considered he
must withdraw for some time to some safer place.

" I will make Sabaheddin a proposal," I replied. " We will
choose the three best-known English lawyers. I will show this
committee of judges the proofs and evidence against the Prince
which I can produce and they shall decide whether the Prince was
or was not one of the organisers of the various insurrections and
revolutionary movements. If their decision is against him the
Prince would have to face the Ottoman Courts."

A few days later Prince Lutfullah Bey returned and assured me
that he had no chance of seeing his brother and putting my proposal
before him. As a matter of fact Prince Sabaheddin had dis-
appeared the night before.

ABUK AHMED PASHA.

At the time of my enquiries into the coup d'etat planned by our
enemies my attention was urgently called by my intelligence
service to the fact that Abuk Ahmed Pasha, who was then com-
manding the Chataldja Army, was not unconcerned in the affair,
and had instructed his nephew, Prince Sabaheddin, and their

24 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

friends to promise his help. I have always considered Abuk Ahmed
Pasha a man of honour, and do not think any different of him now,
and I am convinced that the greatness and prosperity of his country
has always been his dearest wish, and that he has genuinely devoted
himself to it. For that reason I could put no faith in the numerous
reports which I received from my agents, and I remained of that
opinion even when he resigned after Enver Pasha was appointed
War Minister, and he was asked to reside in Damascus. Even
now I adhere firmly to that view although I see that Abuk Pasha
has become a Minister in the Cabinet, which includes individuals
like Marshal Shakir Pasha Hadra Sabri and others who, as the
most prominent and influential members of the Liberal-Union, were
the authors of the attack on Mahmud Shefket Pasha.

DAM AD SALIH PASHA.

My agents displayed the greatest zeal. They continuously
brought me news of a conspiracy which aimed at the overthrow
of the Ministry, and in particular contemplated the assassination of
Mahmud Shefket Pasha and the deaths of Talaat Bey and myself.
This time the conspirators had the protection and direction of the
first interpreter at the English Embassy, FitzMaurice, and Major
Tyrrel, the Military Attache. I was also informed that Muhib Bey,
the director of the Political Section of the Police in the time of
Kiamil Pasha's Ministry, Captain Cherkess Kiazim, Ex-Captain
Shefket Ismael of Gumuldjina, and several other individuals were
concerned in the conspiracy; I had these people very closely
shadowed by my secret agents. I received a report which gave me
the most positive indications that Damad Salih Pasha and Reshid
Bey, the former Minister of the Interior, were at the head of the
conspiracy. As I knew that Damad Salih Pasha was a member
of the committee of Liberal-Union I could not believe that he
would participate in such a crime. In any case I was very much
concerned to protect an individual closely related to the Imperial
Family, and prevent him from taking any part in a plot.

I therefore sent one of my aides-de-camp to him and asked him
to give me an appointment, and the Military Government. He
was there at the hour agreed. After I had given him a very
respectful reception I said to him : " Would Your Excellency allow

Military Governor of Constantinople 35

me to tell you quite straight what is on my mind ? Certain people
who wish to make use of the material and moral advantages of
your great name and person and your relationship with the
Imperial Family are secretly engaged in underhand intrigues and
misusing your name. A secret committee is said to have been
formed under your chairmanship and to be seeking adherence in
civil and military circles with the intention of removing the heads
of the present Government in the near future and starting a revo-
lutionary movement. I must assume that your Excellency knows
nothing of all this, but please be good enough to believe that the
individuals in question are actually doing as I have said, and
thereby saddling Your Excellency with the heaviest responsibility.
Please believe that I regard it as my sacred duty to protect you
against their activities, especially having regard to your relation-
ship to the Imperial Family, to which I am in the highest degree
devoted. I therefore beg you very respectfully to leave Constanti-
nople for a time and reside somewhere in Europe, so that if the
Government has to take strong measures against the leaders of the
conspiracy very shortly you will not be drawn into the affair. Be-
sides, such a step would also mean that these people were deprived
of the strongest support on which they could build. "

To these words, which were perfectly honestly meant, he
replied in a manner and tone which were utterly incompatible with
the rules of good breeding and courtesy.

" Look here, Bey Effendi," he said, " I'll speak to you quite
frankly. Thanks to Her Highness the Sultana, I'm leading an
extraordinarily pleasant life here, a life which suits me so well
that I shouldn't like to miss a moment of it. I must therefore
decline your suggestion of going to Europe. Besides, if I took
your advice and went to Europe people might regard it as an
admission and start accusing me. So here I am, and here I
remain; don't you hesitate to do whatever you think right. My
only regret is that you had me fetched to frighten me with
threats."

While asking the Pasha not entirely to forget the rules of
courtesy, I said to him: " I can see Pasha that you have great
confidence in the strength of your organisation, which is known
to me, and are convinced that your hopes will be realised very
shortly. You think that you can wait here for their realisation

26 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

without danger, but I can assure you that I have a magnificent
intelligence service at my disposal, and there is nothing doing with
conspiracies. It may be that a few attacks on individuals will
succeed, but the Government will never be overthrown. I must
therefore advise your Excellency to accept my proposal. Her
Imperial Highness the Sultana could also accompany you to Europe
if ishe thought at necessary. It would not be difficult to gat
His Highness the Grand Vizier to obtain the approval of His
Imperial Majesty the Sultan and to obtain the assurance of all
requirements. In case you wrere absolutely determined to reject
my well-meant advice, I should regard it as my duty to have you
strictly watched from this day on. But in that case please do
not complain and say that the ' Military Governor has us shadowed
by his spies! ' He sprang up angrily. " Don't hesitate for a
minute to do what you think good/' he replied. " I am not the sort
of man to be sent away easily. " Thereupon I rushed away.
From that day I had Salih Pasha continuously watched, so that
nothing he did was unknown to me.

Four or five days later the Director-General of the Regie, M.
Weyl, called upon me. He greeted me with the remark that he
had returned from Athens the previous evening and that his first
call had been on me. After a few polite nothings he said :
" Djemal Pasha, I am really very angry with you to-day. You
have insulted one of my friends who is as much to me as you
yourself and treated him in a way not in keeping with his posi-
tion. I mean Damad Salih Pasha. You have accused him of
being the leader of a conspiracy and advised him to go to Europe.
Why have you done that ? I know Salih Pasha as well as I know
myself, and I am convinced that he would never take part in so
horrible a business. "

After I had listened to him very quietly I replied: "My dear
M. Weyl, please don't get excited! I know I have said hard
things to Damad Salih Pasha, but I did so only after mature con-
sideration, and I am interesting myself in him not on his own
account, but solely out of regard for his relations with the Imperial
Family, whose honour I have to preserve. Unfortunately the
Pasha seems to have great confidence in the success of his friends,
as he would not listen to my honest advice. Henceforth I shall
find myself compelled to have Salih Pasha watched even more

Military Governor of Constantinople 27

closely. To show you how effectively he is shadowed I'll tell you
just one thing : Just ask him whether an anonymous letter has not
just reached him, and whether in that letter he was not requested
to go to Pera. Of course, the Pasha did not go. But why?
Because he realised he was under close observation and did not
wish to betray to me his accomplices' haunts. If the Pasha
will not leave Constantinople, I must grant myself licence
to take such measures as I think necessary to deal with him.
And you will have no ground of complaint against me on that

account/

M. Weyl, who had heard me out attentively, took leave of me
and departed. Next day he came back. He told me that the
Pasha had certainly received an anonymous letter containing the
proposal I had mentioned, but as he knew neither the place nor
who had sent the letter, and was afraid that it was a trap, he had
not accepted the invitation. Yet he was as determined as ever to
remain in Constantinople. " I don't wish to be mixed up in any
way in this ticklish business/' added M. Weyl. " It is only my
friendship for the Pasha which has moved me to put in a word
for him with another friend. Now that he refuses so obstinately
to take your advice, I shall intercede for him no longer. All I ask
is that you won't let him become the victim to calumny and intrigue.
Of course, I've boundless confidence in your probity and
conscientiousness. "

The house to which Salih Pasha was invited belonged to Captain
Cherkess Kiazim, who had arrived in Constantinople about a week
before the assassination, and been enabled to land by the protection
of FitzMaurice and Major Tyrrel. The Pasha, of course, knew
this, but as he saw that he was being watched he did not go to the
rendezvous that evening.

I was really anxious to save Salih Pasha, but he rejected my
advice with that obstinacy characteristic of those who are certain
of their success. His obduracy ultimately led to his death. I
regret this tragedy most fervently, particularly as I am entirely
devoted to the Ottoman Imperial Family, and must involuntarily
have contributed to cause a royal princess so terrible a sorrow.
But what could I do ? His crime was too great to be forgiven, and
if he had been pardoned after his conviction order and peace in
the country would have been shaken for ever.

28 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

ISMAIL HAKKI BEY OF GUMULDJINA.

At that time my agents were also watching one of the leaders
of the Opposition, Ismail Hakki Bey of Gumuldjina. I was firmly
convinced that this most audacious individual was a very doubtful
character, and positive that the country must expect great trouble
from him. But the scheme of my plan of action required that I
should make skilful use of him and have him arrested only when I
had incontrovertible evidence against him in my hands. I
assumed that my agents must have got him in a corner, for one
day he came to me at Military Headquarters in great excitement
(it was about a week before the assassination of Shefket Pasha),
and said :

"In view of the fact that I am under observation by your
agents, I must assume that the Government suspects me. Look
here, Djemal Bey ! I'm talking to you as a man of honour, and
can assure you that I shall keep the promise I made to you when
I was in prison at headquarters. Not a word passes my lips which
has any wrong intention. Neither publicly nor privately am I
concerned in any movement against the Government. As your
men are now spreading untrue reports about me, and may be
deceiving you, I think it better to speak to you personally. I give
you my word of honour that I am not engaged in any sort of
enterprise against the Government and have nothing to do with
those who are working against the Government. "

As I knew that this individual was one of the chief organisers
of the conspiracy which was being definitely hatched against
Mahmud Shefket Pasha, I was surprised and felt extremely dis-
gusted at his perjuring himself in this way. Even at the time
when he was released from prison by my intervention after the
coup d'etat of January he had sworn on his honour and conscience
that he would refrain from opposition until peace was concluded
and order restored. Hardly a month had passed before he was
working with all his might to arrange an abominable crime. When
I heard him thus repeat this false oath I could not refrain from
showing my disgust :

"Enough of oaths-, Ismail Bey ! "' I said. "You may be
certain that I condemn no one without incontrovertible proof.
Otherwise I should never have released you from prison as I
did. But I advise you really to have nothing to do with certain

Military Governor of Constantinople 29

people who are hatching plots, as otherwise my Intelligence Ser-
vice may not feel exactly well-disposed towards you. For this
time you may withdraw/'

He thanked me and went. But I had made a great mistake,
for if I had been more prudent and given an order for his arrest
at that moment it would not have been possible for him to make
good his escape after the murder of Mahmud Shefket Pasha. He
would also undoubtedly have been convicted on the facts disclosed
at the enquiry into the assassination, and the country would have
been freed for ever from a man who had been bribed by Greek
money to betray his country.

As I write these lines I read in the papers that Ismail Bey of
Gumuldjina has become Minister of the Interior in Damad Ferid
Pasha's Ministry, and even been appointed president of an extra-
ordinary court, which is sitting in judgment on the leaders of
" Unity and Progress." All I need say here is that we shall
probably see in a very short time what a fatal thing for his
country his appointment means.

In spite of the greatest efforts on my part, Ismail of Gumuldjina
succeeded in escaping after Mahmud Pasha's death.

KIAMIL PASHA.

Early one morning, a week or ten days before the murder of
Mahmud Shefket Pasha, the Prefect of Police, Azmi Bey, told me
that Kiamil Pasha was on board a ship of the Messageries Man-
times. It had arrived at the quay during the night, but he had
not yet gone ashore. He asked me to issue the necessary order
for his arrest. I ordered him to send the Director of the Political
Department to the Pasha at once and request His Highness not to
set foot on land, but return to Egypt by the same ship. Half an
hour later Azmi Bey informed me that Kiamil Pasha had landed
during the night and gone to his house in Stambul. I knew that
the conspirators had decided on the Pasha's return to Constanti-
nople, but I did not think Kiamil Pasha would have the courage
to respond to their invitation. The arrival of the Pasha in Con-
stantinople was the surest sign that the insurrection was immediate.
The situation demanded very speedy and strong measures. I sum-
moned Azmi Bey to me and asked him to proceed as follows : —

30 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

" I shall send an officer from Military Headquarters with some
military police to Kiamil Pasha's house. They will have a com-
missary and an adequate number of civil police under their orders.
The officer and the commissary with their party must go to Kiamil
Pasha's house. They must distribute their men and watch the
entrances so that not a soul, whether a native or a foreigner,
can communicate with the occupants. The officer and the com-
missary will ask the Pasha to see them and convey the following
decision of the Government : ' The presence of His Highness
Kiamil Pasha is a danger to the internal tranquillity of the country
at the moment. The Government requests the Pasha to be good
enough to return to Egypt by the ship in which he came. Even if
the ship lies at anchor here for three days His Highness is re-
quested to go on board within twelve hours at the latest. Other-
wise the Government would find itself compelled to take pre-
cautionary measures which His Highness might find very uncom-
fortable/ The officer and the commissary will then bring us back
the Pasha's answer. You yourself must remain in the house and
prevent anyone from entering."

These orders were immediately carried out. The Pasha replied
that he was very tired and could not stand the discomforts of a
second sea voyage within so short a time. He did not consider
it necessary to comply with the Government's illegal request. In
view of this reply I gave orders that his house should be guarded
so closely that no one could go out or in until the Pasha left
Constantinople.

While these orders were in force the First Dragoman of the
English Embassy, FitzMaurice, came to the Pasha's house to
welcome the Pasha in the name of the Embassy. The police,
however, refused to admit him. This gentleman immediately
decided to take counter-measures to prevent the deportation of
Kiamil Pasha from Constantinople, and at once went to Mahmud
Shefket Pasha in the name of the Ambassador. He said that he
did not understand how he could be prevented from calling on
Kiamil Pasha, an old friend of the Embassy, and it would have a
very bad effect on public opinion in England. In this and other
ways he revealed his animosity towards us. About mid-day
Mahmud Shefket Pasha rang me up and asked me to go to him
at once.

Military Governor of Constantinople 31

He was sitting in the Grand Vizier's room with the Naval
Minister, Churuk Sulu Mahmud Pasha. Halil Bey was also to be
received by the Grand Vizier. We entered together. The Grand
Vizier said, looking extremely gloomy :

" Here's a pretty state of things ! Apparently you're holding
Kiamil Pasha prisoner in his own house. You mean to compel
him to leave Constantinople ? "

" Certainly, Your Highness. I consider it necessary to take the
precautionary measure you mention."

" I order you to stop guarding his house at once and leave him
alone. The Pasha can please himself whether he lives here or
abroad. "

" In my opinion, Your Highness," I replied, " it would be
extremely dangerous to cancel the measures we have taken,
and . . ."

He bellowed at me: " You're a soldier, aren't you? I give
you orders ! Carry out my orders at once, or I shall deal
with you very severely. Do you want to make the English my
enemies ? If you'd heard what the First Dragoman told me you'd
see that you're wrong."

It was impossible for me to ask the Pasha what right the
representative of a foreign Power had to intervene in the action of
the Government against X. or Y., for the Pasha was in such a
state that he was not open to reason. I felt extremely bitter at
the severe and unjust condemnation of the measures I had taken
against Kiamil Pasha in view of his secret machinations. With
tears in my eyes I replied : "It shall be done, Your Highness ! "
and left the room.

Churuk Sulu Mahmud Pasha, who understood how hurt I was,
followed me out and took me into the Ambassador's drawing-
room. We stood by the window in silence for five minutes. At
last I said :

' Did you see how I was treated? Can anyone stand things
like that without loving his country ? "

" You're right," replied Mahmud Pasha, " but don't be
impatient."

After I had recovered my composure somewhat I thanked the
Pasha, took my leave, and returned to Headquarters. I
summoned Azmi Bey, and said :

32 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

" On the order of His Highness the Grand Vizier the police
guarding Kiamil Pasha's house are to be withdrawn and he is to
be allowed unhindered communication with anyone, but I consider
it necessary to take the following measure : One military police-
man and one civil detective must remain near the house and observe
everyone coming out or going in."

Then I wrote two letters to Mahmud Shefket Pasha. In the
first I informed him that his orders as regards Kiamil Pasha had
been carried out. In the second I asked to be relieved of my post
as Military Governor of Constantinople in view of the fact that my
health had given way under the strain of my work. I was per-
fectly conscious that this request was not in the interests of the
country, but I had no option but to decide as I did, as without free-
dom to take all necessary measures, it was impossible for me to
secure the safety of the capital.

The Pasha, who very soon regretted the violent way in which
he had spoken to me, called me up on the telephone and asked me
to see him even before he got my letters. As I did not wish to see
him again before he received my resignation I excused myself for
the moment on the ground of urgent business, and told him that I
could not be at his disposal until the evening at some hour con-
venient to him. He ordered me to go to the Grand Vizier's palace
at 9 p.m.

That day my resignation was laid before the Council of
Ministers, and the Pasha asked the Ministers what he was to do.
The latter frankly advised him to insist that I should remain at the
head of the Military Government. The Pasha said that this was
his opinion also, but that there was bound to be a difficult situation
if I insisted on the deportation of Kiamil Pasha, and, in any case,
he wished to speak to me first. That evening I met Ibrahim Bey,
who greeted me with the words : "I'm told you want to resign.
How on earth is that? We shall all resign." My other friends
also opposed my intention. But to me there wrere two alternatives
only : to be absolutely independent and assume all responsibility
for my orders, or to resign. For the delicate situation and my
responsibility for public safety demanded nothing less than entire
freedom of action.

At 9 p.m. I went to see the Pasha at the Grand Vizier's palace.
He gave me a very friendly reception.

Military Governor of Constantinople 33

" Why did you take my remarks this morning to heart so? "
he said. " Don't you know I love you like a son. When a father
is upset he can't treat his children quite as he would like. Please
regard the incident as a little altercation between father and son
and don't be angry with me any more."

" Pasha," I replied, " please don't doubt that I take your
behaviour to-day only as it was meant. I always regard myself as
your son and, as I know your worth only too well, I can stand even
the hardest treatment from you. Thus it is not your violence
towards me which has compelled me to ask for permission to
resign, but simply the impossibility of working under such circum-
stances. Your Highness is not aware of what is brewing and not
au courant of the secret revolutionary conspiracies. I did not
wish to trouble Your Excellency with police matters, and would
prefer not to do so even now. But I can assure Your Excellency
that Kiamil Pasha has been brought to Constantinople in order
to be made Grand Vizier over your corpse. The arrival of the
Pasha is the surest sign that a revolution is imminent. To compel
him to leave Constantinople is to clip the wings of the plot. Your
Highness knows well enough that those whose duty it is to take
measures against secret menaces and attempts at assassination do
not always have a free hand in the selection of their means.
When you appointed me to my post you promised me the freest
possible hand, and now, when faced with totally unjustifiable
interference by the English Embassy, you prevent me from taking
the most urgent steps. In these circumstances I am quite unable
to carry on my work."

After long consideration he replied: " All right, I give you
an entirely free hand, but don't take any stronger measures
against Kiamil than are absolutely necessary and allow him to
stay here three days."

On that I withdrew my request to resign. When I got back
to Headquarters I immediately asked Abdullah Bey, Kiamil
Pasha's son, and a member of the State Council, to call upon me
next day. He accepted the invitation, and I told him that in any
case the Pasha must leave Constantinople, that it was impossible
to withdraw the orders given, and that he need expect no support
from the English Embassy or any other foreign representatives.
I added that if he had not left the city by Friday at the latest I

34 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

should have to have him arrested and probably sent to somewhere
in Anatolia.

After considerable discussion Abdullah Bey entirely approved
my decisions, and went away after promising that he would try
and induce his father to abandon his futile opposition. He
returned in the evening to tell me that the Pasha would leave by
sea next day. And, true enough, the following day, a Friday,
Kiamil Pasha left his house, accompanied by Sir Gerald Lowther,
the English Ambassador, drove past the Sublime Porte, and went
on board ship at Galata. The same evening the vessel, gay with
lights, left Constantinople bearing Kiamil Pasha with her.

THE ASSASSINATION OF MAHMUD SHEFKET PASHA.

Many signs, not to mention the reports of my agents, seemed
to show that the conspirators had made their preparations and
that a general onslaught would be made in the next few days.

On the day of the murder, Wednesday, June 15, 1913, I went
to the War Office early in the morning to get the Pasha's orders
and to impress on his aides-de-camp the necessity of guarding
him with special care on his visits to the Sublime Porte. I talked
to the Pasha for about half an hour, and he was particularly
jovial that morning and felt quite safe as the result of the measures
which had been taken. As I did not want to make him unduly
anxious, I told him casually that attempts at assassination were
to be expected at that time, and for that reason it would perhaps
be necessary to make a few arrests the next day or the day
following. I added that, with all our precautions, it was impos-
sible to prevent individual attacks, and it was therefore advisable
for him to be very careful when he was in the streets. I had
therefore told his aides-de-camp to keep a particularly sharp
watch over him.

" I know," he said, " it's in God's hands! "

I left him and went up to the next floor to speak to Major
Saadullah and Major Keival Bey in the 3rd Section of the Head-
quarters Staff. We dfscussed a regulation. It was perhaps a
quarter of an hour later that a sound was heard coming from the
War Office Square — five regular taps as if someone was knocking
a large drum with a hammer. As I was expecting an attempt at

Military Governor of Constantinople 35

assassination any moment, I asked Kemal Bey whether they were
not revolver shots.

" I don't think so/' he said. " It's someone beating carpets
or knocking nails in somewhere."

But I was anything but satisfied with that answer, and expected
bad news at any moment. Five minutes later my faithful servant
Ramazan rushed into the room and screamed out : 4 ' The Pasha
has just been killed ! " I was in the vestibule at a bound. " Which
Pasha ? Who killed him ? Where ? " I shouted. " In the Bayazid
Square, on his way to the Sublime Porte. I don't know who
killed him."

As I was rushing up to the first floor Mahmud Shefket Pasha,
streaming with blood, was brought up to the steps to his room.
I can still hear his husky death-rattle. I stopped for a moment in
the corridor and looked into the Pasha's pallid face. Then I
reflected, where does duty call me ? I made up my mind at once.
My first task was to pursue and catch the assassins and hasten to
Military Headquarters to preserve order in the capital. My aide-
de-camp Hilmi came up to me. " Come along," I said, and sped
away to the Ministry of War. I called at the Garrison Head-
quarters to get the first reports. Just as I was turning the corner
I was met by a lieutenant in the Military Police. " Have the
assassins been caught ? " I cried. " I don't know, Effendi," he
answered, "I'm just looking for a patrol." " What do you want a
patrol for? " I shouted, " turn back at once and arrest the mur-
derers before they have time to get away or find a hiding place."
The officer, amazed at the violence of my order, was on his feet
in a moment, and ran to the scene of the crime.

When I reached the place a few minutes later in my car he told
me that he had just arrested a certain Topal Tewfik who was un-
questionably one of the assassins, but the others, according to
report, had made good their escape in a motor car. Of course I
had to remain satisfied with this first report. I then went to Head-
quarters and had military measures taken in Pera, Skutari, and
Stambul.

Hardly half an hour had passed since the crime when military
patrols, mounted and on foot, appeared in the streets of the capital,
and an hour later a proclamation was issued in which the public
was informed of the crime and the intensification of the state of

C 2

36 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

siege was announced. The patrols would take the strongest
measures against anyone who caused the slightest disturbance.

As I thought it possible that the conspirators might go to the
Imperial Palace and trouble His Majesty I rang up the First Sec-
retary of the Palace ; gave him certain instructions and asked him
to inform His Majesty at once that all necessary measures had
been taken.

At the same time I got into telephone communication with the
Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Izzet Pasha, in Hadem Koj, and gave
him a general summary of the situation. I told him of the steps
for the preservation of order which had already been taken and
asked him temporarily to place at my disposal two cavalry regi-
ments which were quartered in the Daud Pasha Barracks, and
also to send two infantry regiments from Hadem Koj to Kuchuk
Chekmedje to help in preserving public order. Simultaneously I
rang up Said Halim Pasha and the other Ministers to tell them
what had happened, and asked them to come to the Ministry of
War as soon as possible to take the necessary decisions.

SOME PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES.

Anticipating some such occurrence, I had previously made the
officials at the Police Prefecture draw up a list of all persons of
every class who might be expected to attempt to exploit the situa-
tion and start riots in the different quarters of the city. I had
given instructions to the Prefect of Police, Azmi Bey, to arrest
offhand every one on this list at the first serious attempt at a
rising. Azmi Bey reported to me that this order, given long
before, had just been carried out, and asked where the persons
arrested were to be taken to. Said Halim Pasha, the interim
Grand Vizier, Hadji Adil Bey, the Minister for the Interior, and
I decided that in order to keep the capital quiet it was necessary
to send the prisoners to Sinope and supply them with sufficient
money.

I asked the Shipping Administration to fit out a ship to take
them, and asked Azmi Bey to have all the arrests carried out in
the course of the night 'so that they could be put on board and sent
away by the next evening. I also had Damad Salih Pasha and
others whom I knew to be involved in the plot arrested and
examined by the police.

Military Governor of Constantinople 37

THE BURIAL OF MAHMUD SHEFKET PASHA.

I wanted Mahmud Shefket Pasha's obsequies to be as sump-
tuous an affair as possible in order to show that peace and order
were being maintained in the capital, notwithstanding the
assassination of the Grand Vizier. I asked the appropriate
authorities to send out the notices of his death and invitations to
the funeral to all leading people, high officials of state and staff
officers who were in the capital. A large escort of troops was to
follow the funeral cortege. The ambassadors of foreign Powers
and the captains and officers of the foreign warships in the harbour
were also invited to be present at the ceremony. Invitations were
issued to the military and naval attaches, and so forth. More than
five thousand people took part in the procession. The weather was
splendid, and the streets were thronged. Under the impression
of this great ceremony, many women were seen weeping bitterly,
and the general effect was thus all the greater. The large scale on
which the obsequies were planned had the desired effect. Person-
ally I should have preferred to pass through the streets of Stambul
at the head of a mounted patrol, but as I wanted to get a general
view of the cortege I entered my car on the Pera side, and going
by a roundabout way through Pankaldi, I joined the procession at
the School of Notre Dame de Sion. The general impression was
more or less exactly what I had hoped, but the moment I beheld
the coffin of the dead statesman, on whom I had placed so many
hopes, I was plunged into the deepest distress.

After the funeral the French Commandant of Gendarmerie,
Saron, came up to congratulate me on the perfect order which
reigned in the city. He told me of a conversation between the
Commander of the Italian Fleet and General Baumann (who had
been sent to reorganise the gendarmerie), which he had overheard
when standing on the Hill of Freedom waiting for the funeral
procession to pass. The Admiral had said to Baumann : " This
Djemal Bey is extraordinarily bold. It needs great courage and
equally great confidence in the efficiency of one's precautions to
arrange a funeral procession on this scale in a limited area on the
very day after the crime, and with the criminals still at large, and
then to assemble the ambassadors of foreign Powers, and even the
commanders of their men-of-war. If some revolutionary were
to throw a bomb and injured one or more of us the Turkish capital

38 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

would be immediately occupied by contingents from our warships.
As a matter of fact that, contingency has been under discussion,
and the necessary measures have been taken. But here we are
and nothing has happened ! If the criminals and their accomplices
are caught within a day or two Djemal Bey will have rendered his
country a great service and he won't fail to utilise that result to
demand the withdrawal of the fleets from the capital and the Bos-
phorus. In my opinion we are totally superfluous here/'

The murder had taken place on a Wednesday. The funeral
was on Thursday, and on the Friday I was able — at the price of my
aide-de-camp Hilmi's life — to hunt out and arrest the ringleaders
of the conspiracy, Kiazim, the Circassian, and some of his con-
federates, and bring them before the Committee of Enquiry of the
Court Martial.

The examination and enquiry revealed that the party as a whole
and individual members of it were working for the same end, to
deprive the country of its government, get the leaders of " Unity
and Progress " out of the way by assassination, and by putting
pressure on His Majesty the Sultan to get Marshal Shakir Pasha
temporarily appointed Grand Vizier. Under his presidency a
Provisional Cabinet was to be formed, and in three days and nights
all adherents of the Committee of " Unity and Progress " were to
be massacred. At a later stage a new Cabinet was to be formed,
with Kiamil Pasha or Prince Sabaheddin at its head.

I need not fear that anyone will dispute the accuracy of these
facts. My assertions will be confirmed if the report of the
examination and the results of the enquiry are published. If men
read the confession of Salih Bey, interpreter to the Tramway Com-
pany, who took part in the doings of very highly-placed individuals
who were involved in the plot, further proofs will be unnecessary.

Salih Bey is still alive. I consider him a man of honour. Even
after the punishment of Mahmud Shefket Pasha's assassins and
their confederates I was inspired by a desire to secure the cause
of peace and order in the country once and for all, and therefore
sent Salih Bey to Europe to make overtures to several individuals
who had been sentenced to death in contumaciam My proposals
were very simple. If these persons would write to me personally
in their own hand and tell me in what way they had participated in
the various revolutionary movements and assassinations since the

Military Governor of Constantinople 39

proclamation of the constitution, I would at once procure a general
amnesty in their favour. Of course my purpose was to enlighten
public opinion both at home and abroad and to prove that there
was nothing in the slanders on " Unity and Progress/' When
Salih Bey, who knew how far each of them was involved, laid these
proposals before the individuals concerned, they openly expressed
their astonishment, and, of course, rejected them, obviously
accusing Salih Bey of having received money from the Govern-
ment. I repeat once more that I have not given Salih Bey a penny.
His confession shows that Marshal Shakir Pasha had accepted the
interim Grand Viziership with full knowledge of the end in view,
and that among those who were to influence His Majesty the
Sultan in favour of his selection there were individuals who held
very high positions in the State. Legal actions against these
highly-placed persons would only have complicated the situation
still more and to no purpose.

SAID HALIM PASHA'S CABINET.

After the death of Mahmud Shefket Pasha it was decided to
propose Prince Said Halim Pasha as the party's candidate for the
office of Grand Vizier. For reasons which I cannot judge His '
Majesty had appointed Said Halim Pasha as Grand Vizier for the
interim, and ordered that the other Ministers should also carry on
their work for the time being. After a few days Said Halim
Pasha's Cabinet was reformed, the only change being that Talaat
Bey took over the Ministry of the Interior.

A DIGRESSION.

I must ask to be allowed a short digression at this point so that
I can lay a foundation for certain political remarks to which I shall
return later on in my memoirs.

There was great agitation over the fact that Damad Salih
Pasha was condemned to death. The trial was over, but the J
judgment had not yet received Imperial consent. One day I was
asked by the French Councillor of Embassy, Monsieur Boppe, who
was deputising for the Ambassador, then on leave, to call at the
Embassy on an important matter.

" My dear Djemal Bey," he said, " I've just had a telegram

40 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

from Monsieur Pichon, the Foreign Minister. You know what a
good friend to Turkey Pichon is. I am convinced of your
friendly feelings for France, and I wanted to have your opinion on
the attitude I am to adopt/*

The telegram which he handed to me read as follows :
" According to news just received, Salih Pasha, the son of
Haireddin Pasha of Tunis, has been arrested and condemned to
death. This news has caused great excitement in Tunis where
Salih Pasha is held in high esteem. The French Government is
certain that the conviction of one of its proteges may lead to great
unrest in Tunis, and feels compelled to intervene on behalf of
Salih Pasha. Speak to the Grand Vizier at once and insist that
Salih Pasha shall be released and allowed to return without
hindrance to Tunis/'

After I had read the telegram I said nothing for a time. I now
understood why Salih Pasha had not abandoned the organisation
of the plot in spite of my pleading. The nearer I arrived to the
truth, the more I pitied our unhappy country. At length I said to
Monsieur Boppe : " You know my great sympathy for France,
and notwithstanding the adverse comment of the French Govern-
ment in recent times, I have, as you know, not abandoned my
efforts to revive our French friendship. If you want to alienate
public opinion in Constantinople and throughout the East you will
certainly proceed with your intervention. I must tell you before-
hand, however, that that step will have no success. Salih Pasha
has been condemned on the strength of much incontrovertible
evidence. The execution of the sentence on him and his con-
federates awaits His Majesty's confirmation. We've had enough
of seeing the Government perpetually weakened by such crimes.
This time we have made up our minds to exact the extreme penalty,
however high their rank may be. We hope that by so doing we
shall check similar attempts in the future. The influence you pro-
pose to bring to bear on the Grand Vizier will not save Salih Pasha,
but public opinion will accuse the French Embassy of favouring
coups d'etat in Constantinople, and that may lead to permanent
estrangement. In my opinion, your better course is to ask
Monsieur Pichon to give up his idea."

Monsieur Boppe agreed with me, and, in fact, did not call on
the Grand Vizier at all.

Military Governor of Constantinople 41

Two days after the judgment had received the Imperial approval
it was decided that the sentence should be carried out next day.
At eleven o'clock at night I was rung up by the French Embassy,
and Monsieur Boppe asked me personally to go to him at once.
I was hardly in his presence when he handed me in great excite-
ment a second telegram from Monsieur Pichon. The latter had
been very angry at the reply of the Charge d'Affaires, who had
advised against intervention, and instructed him most definitely to
speak to the Grand Vizier without a moment's delay and save Salih
Pasha at any cost. As I didn't want to increase Monsieur Boppe's
agitation, I said: " It's too late, my friend. The sentence has
been confirmed by His Majesty and will be carried out at daybreak.
It's too late for you to speak to the Grand Vizier to-night. The
sentence will have been executed before it is possible to issue a
counter-order. But I cannot understand why Monsieur Pichon is
so obstinate and what are his motives in blaming you instead of
thanking you for your wise advice." Monsieur Boppe took the
whole responsibility on his own shoulders, again refused what he
knew would be a futile intervention, and next morning learned that
the sentence had been carried out. A few days before Salih
Pasha's execution I had had his brothers, Tahir and Mahmet
Haireddin Bey, put under arrest. I had not the slightest doubt that
Tahir Haireddin Bey was still a bolder and more dangerous person
than Salih Pasha. The French Embassy wanted to intervene in
favour of these two. We understood that this intervention was of
a semi-official character, and stipulated as the basis of our consent
that these two men should for the future take no part whatever in
the affairs of the Turkish Government, and that they would re-
nounce their Turkish nationality entirely, adopt French nationality,
and go to France. The necessary formalities were completed on
that basis.

These were the last services which the sons of Haireddin ren-
dered to the Turkish nation. I hoped that we should never hear
of them again.*

As these gentlemen hail from Tunis, they would be better
employed in trying to free their Fatherland from the French yoke.

* I heard subsequently that Tahir Haireddin had returned to Constantinople
and been appointed Minister of Agriculture with the title " Minniran " (What
a marvel !).

42 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

We should then see whether Monsieur Pichon would intervene
to save their heads from the guillotine.

Before I close this digression I should like to add one more
word. The malicious rumour that I and Talaat Bey went to the
Imperial Palace to put pressure on His Majesty, who did not wish
to confirm the sentence, is utterly false. The Grand Vizier's report
and appendices were sent to the Sublime Porte the same day,
together with the Imperial confirmation.

THE OUTBREAK AND END OF THE
SECOND BALKAN WAR

CHAPTER II.

THE OUTBREAK AND END OF THE SECOND BALKAN

WAR.

THE RECOVERY OF ADRIANOPLE.

IT was at the beginning of his term of office as Grand Vizier and
after the failure of the Sharkoj offensive, the fall of the fortress
of Adrianople, as well as Janina and Scutari in Albania, that Mah-
mud Shef ket Pasha had to sign the preliminary peace and accept the
Enos-Midia line. A short time after the Pasha's death the second
Balkan war broke out, and the Serbs, Greeks and Rumanians
marched against the Bulgarians.

The situation demanded that we should utilise this state of
affairs and attack the Bulgarians ourselves in order to recover
Adrianople. All the members of the party thought that the
Government had come to a decision in that sense, and hoped with
good reason that the army would be set in motion. The English
Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, aware of the state of public
feeling on this matter in Constantinople, worked with all his might
and the intervention of the English Embassy to persuade the
Sublime Porte to abandon this plan. He even used threatening
language in his speeches in the House of Commons. In the
Ministry opinions were divided.

I shall never forget the following occurrence. One Friday
evening I went to Said Halim Pasha's Palace in Jenikoj. All the
Ministers were present, as a Ministerial Council was in progress.
Before my arrival they had been discussing various questions, and
at the moment were enjoying an interlude on the marble balcony
ovei looking the sea. Osman Nizami Pasha remarked to his neigh-
bour, Mahmud Pasha, the Naval Minister: "HI now succeed
in persuading everyone here to abandon the idea of recovering

45

46 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Adrianople, I believe I shall have rendered the country the greatest

service/

The madness of his intentions, which were utterly opposed to
the interests of the country, made me gasp.

In one of the rooms I found Said Halim Pasha and Talaat Bey
feeling very depressed. Said Halim Pasha turned to me and said :
" We've quite failed to bring the majority round in favour of inter-
vention, and we simply don't know what to do."

Talaat Bey informed me that he would be able to settle the
money question next day in a conference Hvith M. Weyl, the
Director-General of the Regie. He actually discussed the matter
with M. Weyl next day, and I was present. M. Weyl promised
the Government a loan of a million and a half on condition that
the Regie's concession was extended for fifteen years. Acting
on the decision of the Council of Ministers, the Finance Minister,
Rifat Bey, and Talaat Bey, the Minister of the Interior accepted
these conditions. Such is the explanation of the Regie business,
which for the last two or three years has been denounced in the
Chamber of Deputies as a crime of Djavid Bey's.

I am convinced that a Government which has accepted these
conditions at such a moment cannot undo what has been done.

The same day Talaat Bey motored to Headquarters at Hadem
Koj to take the opinion of Izzet Pasha, the Deputy Commander-
in-Chief, at the War Ministry.

Izzet Pasha considered that two questions were particularly
important, but was prepared to give the army the order to advance
if he could be given satisfactory assurances on these two points :

1. Would not the political complications which might
arise out of the advance of the army bring the country into
very great danger?

2. Have we the necessary money to secure the supplies
for the army ?

Talaat Bey was commissioned to explain the standpoint of
the minority among the Ministers as regards the first point, and
to add that, as a result of the extension of the concession to the
Regie, the financial problem was solved. He returned the next
day and brought us Izzet Pasha's approval. Yet, in spite of all,
the majority of the Ministers was convinced that the advance would
have disastrous results for us.

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 47

Next morning I and Midhat Shukri Bey called on the Ministers
who were still wavering. We explained to them that we should
lose our moral right to guide the State and must send in our I
resignations if we allowed this opportunity of recovering
Adrianople to pass unutilised, for this has been the object which
had necessitated our coup d'etat and for which our Deputy
Commander-in-Chief and War Minister had had to give his life.

Some of them were convinced, but others announced their
intention of resigning. We told them that it was their duty to
show their devotion to the cause by not retiring. At long last
a majority was secured before the Council of Ministers assembled.
In this part of my memoirs I have no authority to give names.

I was concerned in this affair solely in my capacity as leading
member of our party, and because I was in the friendliest and
closest relations with the Ministers of that party. It was not, as
one journal asserted subsequently, because I wanted to bring
pressure or force to bear. As I have never allowed others to
intervene in matters, whether great or small, pertaining to my
Department, I have never myself interfered in matters which do
not concern me, and always confined myself to expressing my
wishes or giving friendly advice to my colleagues. Thus, I have
never failed to avoid hurting their feelings or any suspicion of
encroaching on their spheres. I am able to refute all statements
to the contrary at any time, and will give the following example.

The smiling faces with which the Ministers returned from the
sitting of the Supreme Porte they had so much dreaded filled us
with happy confidence. When the order to advance and re-occupy
Adrianople was given to the army the Foreign Minister informed
the Powers in a Note communicated through our Embassies that
the object of the army was to free Adrianople; that when that
object had been attained the advance would cease, and under no
circumstances would the right bank of the Maritza be crossed.
In my opinion this Note was a political mistake. In the first
place we could not rest satisfied with the recovery of Adrianople.
It was essential that the Maritza should remain a Turkish river,
and absolutely vital that Dedeagatch should be returned to us, as
it forms the natural boundary on the ^Egean side. Secondly, it
was necessary that Dimotska, Saffanti and all the adjoining terri-
tory should be left in our possession if the safety of Adrianople

48 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

was to be secured. And when it is remembered that 85 per cent,
of the population of Gumuldjina, Isketsche and their neighbour-
hood is Mussulman, it was a sacred duty to make an attempt to
get back those places. Of course, it was difficult to be certain
of the success of this enterprise, but the issue of this Note, which
bound the Government by a formal promise from the outset, was
certainly anything but evidence of political foresight.

Subsequently I shall show how, at the time of the Constanti-
nople Conference, the Ottoman delegates, in their efforts to bring
over their opponents, attempted to rest their case on the existing
situation, as they could not find any logical ground for refusal
in view of the very clear promise.

THE POLICY OF ENGLAND.

The moment the Ottoman Government decided to tree
Adrianople and issued the order to the army to advance, English
policy threw off the mask and showred its true face. Through the
English Embassy energetic representations were made to the

j Sublime Porte to prevent the Turkish army from crossing the
Enos-Midia line. Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary,
announced in a speech in the House of Commons that if the Turks
exploited the defeat of the Serbs by the Bulgarians to make an
attempt to recover Adrianople, in defiance of the Treaty of
London, they would be heavily punished for it afterwards, and
would lose not only all their possessions in Europe, but even
Constantinople itself.

It was clear from the note addressed to the Sublime Porte

. and the speeches of Sir Edward Grey that the policy pursued by
England was utterly hostile to the Turkish Government, and that

, she was taking every opportunity of making things difficult for
the Turks, and had made it her object to make full use of the
obstacles in the way of the internal consolidation of Turkey.

It must seem very curious that at the time of our reoccupation
of Adrianople the Russians were entirely favourable to us. 1
spent much time in considering what were the motives wrhich then
inspired the Russians to work against the interests of the Bulgarian
Government in this way. When I was commissioned to establish
a basis for negotiations for a Turco-Bulgarian understanding and

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 49

was talking one day with the Bulgarian envoy, Tocheff, I referred
to this matter and asked him for his opinion. "The Russians,"
he replied, " consider Constantinople their natural inheritance.
Their main concern is that when Constantinople falls into their
hands it shall have the largest possible hinterland. If Adrianople
is then in the possession of the Turks they will get it too, and in
case of an invasion of Bulgaria they will have plenty of room in
which to manoeuvre their armies. "

This explanation seemed to me thoroughly sound and
convincing.

Among the opponents of our reoccupation of Adrianople was
France, and French policy was in no way behind England's. The
French Ambassador issued a verbal note to the Sublime Porte to
the effect that the French Government was against the advance
of the army, and simultaneously the French Press indulged in a
heated denunciation of the enterprise. But, thank God, we occu-
pied Adrianople, notwithstanding all these obstacles, and
ultimately the Bulgarians had to recognise the fait accompli in
the Treaty of Constantinople.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN WESTERN THRACE.

When the army advanced on Adrianople the Government
had issued a note in which clear assurances were given that the
Maritza would not be crossed. But, notwithstanding this
fact, a few individuals who were the leading spirits in the army
succeeded in convincing the Government and the General Staff that \
this promise was untimely, and compelling them to shut their eyes •
to the activities of an unofficial " special organisation " (Techkilat-
i-Mahsussa) which had been formed. In this way this organisa-
tion has a free field on the far side of the river. This " special
organisation " was successful in occupying the whole of Western
Thrace as far as the valley of the Kara-Su in a rapid and very
skilfully conducted advance.

Western Thrace, consisting of the kazas of Orta Koj and
Kirdja Ali and the sandjaks of Dedeagatch and Gumuldjina and
comprising the vilayet of Adrianople, is a considerable region
with a population of which 85 per cent, is Mussulman. The leader
of the " special organisation " which occupied the district was

D

50 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Suleiman Askeri Bey, who has died since. Captain Cherkess
Reschid, Jzmirli Echref and his brother Sami, Fehmi Bey (now
dead), and a few others formed its general staff.

Suleiman Askeri Bey summoned the Mussulman notables to a
congress, and through this congress the formation of a
" Mussulman Provisional Government of Western Thrace/' with
headquarters at Gumuldjina, was proclaimed. The president of
the communal council of Gumuldjina was appointed President of
the Provisional Government. The armed forces were placed
under the command of Suleiman Askeri Bey. The divisions into
kazas which had prevailed in the days of Turkish domination was
retained, and each of them was given a president and commander
of the forces. The presidents of the kazas were under the orders
of the President of the " Provisional Government/' and the local
commanders took their orders from Suleiman Askeri Bey. The
latter was an energetic and extremely good administrator, though
somewhat headstrong and too optimistic. This West-Thrace
enterprise, for which we have to thank the extraordinary man
whose high intelligence, invincible courage and proved devotion
gave those about him confidence and a sense of security, brought
us substantial political advantages at the Constantinople Con-
ference later on, and subsequently when the basis in the Turco-
Bulgarian alliance was being discussed.

This Provisional Government, which existed from the middle of
July to the middle of September, came to an end in the latter month
as a result of the decisions of the Constantinople Conference.
But not without previous difficulties.

Notwithstanding the obligations undertaken by the Govern-
ment, some of Suleiman Askeri Bey's companions wanted the
" Provisional Government " to remain in existence, and contem-
plated armed resistance to occupation by the Bulgarians. The
Turkish Government, on the other hand, had undertaken to inter-
vene energetically to secure that the region of Western Thrace
should be occupied by the Bulgarian forces without resistance.
The Bulgarians in return had granted the Mussulman population
of Western Thrace' very considerable legal privileges and
guaranteed that they should not be subjected to barbarities or
reprisals. An immediate general amnesty was also promised.

Armed resistance to the Bulgarian occupation by the Mussulman

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 51

population would not only have brought them no advantage, but
would have meant the loss of the many political and economic
concessions which we had won for them.

Suleiman Bey, who had failed to overcome the resistance of
his comrades, sent a letter to Constantinople in which he wrote :
" If Djemal Bey, the Military Governor of Constantinople, in
whom my companions have great confidence and who can exercise
such great moral influence upon them, cannot come here at once to
explain the attitude and obligations of the Government, the
Bulgarian troops which cross the frontier and advance into
Western Thrace will meet with armed resistance, and it will be
impossible to avoid bloodshed."

Four or five hours after this letter arrived in Constantinople
Suleiman Askeri Bey turned up in Constantinople himself. After
a conference with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the War
Minister and the Minister of the Interior, it was decided that 1
should go to Gumuldjina and Isketche and attempt to bring the
officers there round to the views of the Government. At the same
time the Bulgarian Government was informed of the situation
through Tocheff, who had just been appointed envoy and was in
Constantinople at the moment. Tocheff was asked to have an
order sent to the commander of the division which was to occupy
Western Thrace not to start operations before all methods of
persuasion had been tried on the " Provisional Government," and
with that end in view to wait till he heard from me.

I left Constantinople and travelled through Adrianople,
Dimotika and Dedeagatch to Gumuldjina and Isketche. The
next day I met Sulieman Askeri Bey and had a conversation with
the commanders of the national forces. We settled all the condi-
tions on which the Bulgarian occupation was to proceed. I sent
all these conditions direct to the Bulgarian general. After they
had been accepted in toto the occupation began, and a week later
I returned to Constantinople.

THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE.

After the recovery of Adrianople by us, the Bulgarians, who
found themselves deserted all round, sent M. Nachivitch to Con-
stantinople to ascertain semi-officially the Peace conditions which

oa

52 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

we should be inclined to grant. This venerable old man, who was
an old Stambuloffist, was also one of the oldest and warmest advo-
cates of a Turco-Bulgarian rapprochement. After some semi-
official discussions it was ascertained that this gentleman Nachi-
vitch was not possessed of the necessary plenary powers to initiate
peace negotiations. Shortly afterwards a Bulgarian delegation
came to Constantinople to negotiate the terms of a Treaty of
Peace between Turkey and Bulgaria. This delegation was lead by
General Savoff, and Tocheff and Nachivitch were also members
of it. The Turkish delegation, under Talaat Bey, consisted of
Tchuruk Sulu, Mahmud Pasha, and Halil Bey. An advisory com-
mittee, consisting of military, financial and legal experts, was
attached to the Bulgarian delegation, and in the same way a com-
mittee with the same duties was associated with the Ottoman dele-
gates. I and Ismet Bey, Major of the General Staff, were
appointed military advisers. The delegations, whose task it was
to fix the frontier, deputed to us the business of settling details.
I may say that I made the greatest effort to keep Demotica with a
substantial slice of territory for Turkey, and to secure a number of
special rights for the Mussulman population of West Thrace, and
particularly the Turks settled in Bulgaria.

THE TURCO-BULGARIAN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE.

The members of the Bulgarian Government displayed a note-
worthy spirit of conciliation. We were at the beginning" of the
third conference and I was just discussing various matters with
Talaat Bey, who was presiding. " Let's finish our work quickly,
gentlemen, " said General Savoff, " so that we can get on to the
discussion of far more important affairs. I haven't come here to
haggle over a couple of yards of territory, or whether they are to
remain Turkish or Bulgarian. My mission is connected with a
project the realisation of which has been my dearest wish for many
years, I mean a Turco-Bulgarian alliance. I am here to see this
plan carried through/'

The two other Bulgarian delegates nodded approvingly. As
we knew that the general was fond of throwing a sop to Cerberus
we attached no other meaning to these words, and in drawing up
the terms of peace we endeavoured to insert as many advantages
as possible in the text. Ultimately we attained our end.

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 53

Towards the end of the conferences General Savoff returned in
a more concrete fashion to the alliance and the substantial mutual
advantages which it would bring with it. When the work of the
Peace Conference was concluded, Said Halim Pasha, Talaat and
Halil Bey agreed that I should go with General Savoff to Prinkipo
and that we should there decide upon the material provisions of a
Turco-Bulgarian offensive and defensive alliance.

Lest remark should be excited it was decided to announce pub-
licly that the General, who had worn himself out in the Balkan War,
had asked the Turkish Government for permission to recuperate for
a few days on the Prince Islands, and that he would subsequently
reside in one of the hotels in Prinkipo as the guest of the Govern-
ment. I was to go to the island one day and give a luncheon to
the General in the House of Nedjineddin Mollah. We were to
withdraw to one of the rooms after lunch and discuss the basis of
a treaty of alliance.

'. These matters were duly carried out and we began to draw up
with General Savoff the skeleton of a defensive and offensive alli-
ance between Turkey and Bulgaria.

A few days later we went to my house in Schischli one evening
to discuss the various articles of the draft treaty, make the necessary
changes, and affix its final form. Of the Bulgarians, General
Savoff and M. Tocheff were present, while Talaat Bey, Halil
Bey and I represented Turkey.

The defensive alliance decided in principle that " in case one of
the contracting parties were attacked by one or two Balkan States
the other contracting party engaged unconditionally to assist it
with all its resources. " In the offensive alliance it was agreed
that " if one of the contracting parties with the approval of the
other attacked one of the Balkan States, and in the course of the
hostilities were itself attacked by another State, the other con-
tracting party would render it every assistance. If either of the
two contracting parties found itself compelled to make war upon
one only of the Balkan States the other would observe a benevolent
neutrality towards it."

As regards territorial advantages to be obtained in a war waged
jointly, the following provisions were to have effect : " If Bulgaria
obtained possession of Cavalla and Drama the port of Dedeagatch
would be assigned to us. If the Bulgarians extended their frontier

54 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

to the Struma, Monastir and Ochrida on one side, and to Uskub
on the other, we should receive Western Thrace as far as the Kara
Su. Lastly, if Bulgaria obtained Salonika with Karaferia and
Vodena we should receive the line of the Struma, and our frontier,
which ran up stream and reached the defile of Kresna,
would run between Nevrokop and Razlik, and leaving the former
Kaza of Ropdjoz in our possession, reach the old Turco-Bulgarian
frontier at Dospat." This text was signed by both parties with
the reservation that it had no sort of binding force.

General Savoff returned to Sofia to discuss the different clauses
of the Treaty with the Minister-President Radoslavoff and the
Foreign Minister Genadieff, and to obtain the sanction of the King.
General Savoff assured us that he would return to Constantinople
within eight to ten days at the latest with the Bulgarian counter
proposals which he would get M. Tocheff (who had just been
appointed Envoy in Constantinople) to hand over, to avoid public
excitement. Weeks passed, however, and we received no news
from Sofia, and Tocheff did not say a word.

After the ratification of the peace treaty by both sides diplo-
matic relations with Bulgaria were resumed, and the Secretary-
General of the Committee, Fethi Bey, was appointed Minister at
Sofia. Fethi Bey knew about the project for a Turco-Bulgarian
alliance, and was a supporter of it. After his arrival at Sofia he
asked the Bulgarian Government what was the position as regards
the treaty of alliance which had been agreed upon with General
Savoff at Constantinople. In spite of repeated attempts Fethi Bey
could get no satisfactory answer. Indeed, no explanation what-
ever could be given for the delay caused by the Bulgarians in this
matter, seeing that in the peace conferences they had displayed
such zeal in getting this alliance concluded.

On the other hand, contrary to the text of the peace treaty
and the many verbal promises the Bulgarians had made, they
began to practise cruelties against the Mussulman population of
West Thrace; they had tried to proselytise the Pomaki by force.
Fethi Bey informed us that, disgusted at this two-faced behaviour
of the Bulgarians, it was impossible for him to retain his post at
Sofia any longer, and with a view to facilitating negotiations over
this matter and save the Mussulman population of West Thrace
from any more Bulgarian illegalities, and with the further idea of

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 55

discussing the alliance question and getting it settled, a meeting
between Talaat and Halil Bey on one side and Radoslavoff and
Genadieff on the other was arranged in a Bulgarian town. At
this conference the two Bulgarian Ministers promised to treat the
Mussulman population better and to send a special delegate
with the Bulgarian Government's proposal to Constantinople at
a very early date.

In due course Colonel Jekoff, Deputy Chief of the Bulgarian
General Staff, came to Constantinople during November, 1913.
The Colonel was an exceptionally intelligent man, thoroughly
conscientious, and endowed with a very intuitive mind and solid
education. And when Toscheff announced his arrival he added
that he enjoyed the conference of Radoslavoff and his party asso-
ciates. At that time I was Minister of Public Works, but, as before,
I participated with Talaat and Halil Bey in the conferences on the
Turco-Bulgarian alliance. At the hour appointed for the meeting
we went to the Bulgarian Legation, which was in the Taxim quarter
of the city. Here we were presented with an astonishing proposal
of the Bulgarians, so far as territorial concessions were concerned.

So long as that part of Macedonia which extends to the Struma,
Monastir and Ochrida was not incorporated in Bulgaria, the Bui- \
garians could not agree to cede to us the port of Dedeagatch, and \
only when they occupied Salonika would they agree that the port of '
Karaagatch should become Turkish. After four or five meetings
with Colonel Jekoff we drew up the preliminary outlines of an
alliance the form and sense of which we could accept.

The alliance with Bulgaria was important to us, for it was
certain that, sooner or later, we should have war with the Greeks.
It was impossible for us to leave to Greece the islands of the ^Egean
like Lemnos, Mytilene and Chios. It was therefore necessary
to take precautions that, in case of a war with Greece, we should
not find the Bulgarians once more on the side of our foes. On
the other hand, we knew that in the Macedonian matter the Bul-
garians would not accept the situation, and for the satisfaction
of their national claims would find themselves compelled to seek
our help. We wanted to draw every possible advantage from this
situation and not run the risk of finding ourselves faced with a
second Balkan alliance.

If we succeeded in associating Rumania in the Turco-Bulgarian

56 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

alliance by securing her against a Bulgarian attack in the Dobrudja,
the whole of which she had occupied, opposing allied groups
would be formed in the eastern and western halves of the Balkan
Peninsula, and we should at length have been able to look forward
to a time in which our peace would no longer have been at the
mercy of any little Balkan State at any moment. From this point
of view, the realisation of which was one of the objects of the
Young Turk party, we attached great importance to the Bulgarian
alliance, and for that reason we tried to arrive at a speedy under-
standing. As, however, it is a characteristic of Bulgarian policy,
or, to speak more accurately, one of the distinguishing features
of the Bulgarian temperament, to extract every possible benefit
and take advantage of even the most honest ally, it was quite
obvious to us that the Bulgarians would protract the affair as
long as possible in the hope that a time would come when we should
find ourselves in a dangerous situation and faced with the necessity
of signing a treaty within twenty-four hours, a treaty which would
have become incomprehensible as a result of the innumerable
alterations which had been made in it. The Bulgarians tried to
hold us up continuously right up to the outbreak of the World
War. After the essential outlines of the Treaty had been agreed
with Colonel Jekoff, I bothered about the matter no longer. I
learned subsequently that when the Bulgarians entered into nego-
tiations with us and the Central Powers in the course of the war,
with a view to joining us, not one of the originally excepted clauses
were taken into account, and they not only refused to sanction an
extension of territory in West Thrace for us, but even declined
to discuss the other articles until we had accepted the cession of
Dimotika, Karaagatch, Mustapha Pasha, and a strip more than a
kilometre in width along the left bank of the Maritza. As I shall
have occasion to return to our relations with Bulgaria in that part
of my memoirs which deals with the beginning of the World War,
I will conclude my discussion of this subject for the moment.

THE ALLIANCE WITH THE SYRIANS AND ALL ARABS.

I am convinced that in our country, even among the most
enlightened of our youth, there are few men who have really
considered the Arab question and the ideal which was before the

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 57

eyes of those who were called upon to deal with it. In that part
of my memoirs which relates to the time I was Commander of
the Fourth Army I will deal with this matter in detail, and for the
moment will confine myself to a short discussion of affairs cover-
ing the time when I was Military Governor of Constantinople.

As a result of many causes a number of Arabs, under the pretext
of obtaining reforms for their country and with the express per-
mission of the Vali, Edhem Bey, had succeeded in convoking a
national assembly at Beirut during the period when Kiamil Pasha
was Prime Minister. At this conference they indicated the reforms
which they desired should be introduced in Syria and throughout
all the Arabian vilayets. When Mahmud Shefket Pasha's Ministry
took office the Government dissolved this assembly, partly because t
of the changes which had meanwhile been made in the personnel k
of the governorships and partly because it considered the National I
Council illegal. The Government also announced that, as the
promulgation of regulations for the provincial administration was
exclusively the business of Parliament, the principles laid down
by the Congress of Beirut could not be considered.

The agitation for independence in Syria and Beirut had assumed
such proportions and the prestige of the Government had thereby
suffered such diminution that there were people who carried their
audacity to the point of hanging cards bearing the name of
the Governor-General (Ebu bekir Hazim) round their dogs' necks.
In Damascus Shukri el Asly and Mehemed Kurd Ali had gone to
the Vali, Mardini Arif Bey, and demanded that the Secretary-
General of the Province should be expelled from the vilayet on
the ground that he had not understood a petition in Arabic which
had been presented to him, and therefore demanded a Turkish
translation. They lost no opportunity of indulging in similar
impertinences. All the Syrian papers attacked the Government
with the utmost violence, and filled their space with horrible
insults against the Turkish race. The Sheik Reschid Riza of
Tripolis, in Syria, published in Egypt a journal which was written
in so provocative a tone against the heads of the Committee of
Unity and Progress that it seemed impossible for anyone who had
read it not to be anti-Turkish. When the Government was
absorbed in the Balkan War, officers of an Arabian Division in
the Gallipoli Peninsula supported the political blackmailing efforts

58 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

of the Arabian patriots at Constantinople instead of honourably
doing- their duty.

Subsequently they wanted to arrange a general congress of
the Arabs, though the Government had forbidden it, but, anticipat-
ing that the Government would certainly stop them this time and
that legal action would be taken against the organisers, they
decided, with the approval, or rather on the express initiative, of
the French Government, to assemble the Congress in Paris, and
issued a proclamation throughout the Arabian world with an
invitation to send delegates to the assembly. At the head of the
organisation were Abdul Hamid Zehravi, then deputy for Hama,
Abdul Ghani el Ureysi, owner of the Beirut paper El Mufid,
and Abdul Kerim el Haleli, President of the " El Muntedi el
Edebi." In this way the Congress, under the patronage of the
French Government, changed its form and constitution, and it
seemed certain that it would be followed by French intervention in
Syria.

At that time I paid very little attention to these Arabian
affairs. My wish was only to let it be known that foreign intrigues
were sowing discord between two great Islam races, the Turkish
and the Arabian. I also desired that we should use some highly
placed Arabian individuals, on whose patriotism and religious
fervour we could rely, to ascertain which of the Arab demands we
could accept without endangering the common interests and unity
of the Islam world and ultimately to take the steps necessary to
carry through these reforms. Fortunately this view was shared
by the Government, and Midhad Shukri Bey and some others were
sent to Paris to negotiate with the influential Arabs who had
assembled the Congress in the hope of finding a basis for an
understanding. The Congress did, in fact, assemble, but as the
meeting of Midhad Shukri Bey and his companions with the
Mussulman Arabs had given the affair another complexion, the
Congress dissolved after communicating to him a few of its dearest
desires.

One day Talaat Bey came into the Military Government building
and told me that we were invited to visit the Sheik Abdul Asis
Shavish on the following Friday with a view to finding some basis
for an understanding with the Arabs. We should there meet the
President of the secret political committee of the Arabs, and the

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 59

Government had decided that, as one of the warmest advocates of
that understanding, and in view of the experience I had gained of
all Arabian affairs when I was Governor-General of Baghdad, I
should take part in the conference.

On the day fixed we went to the place of meeting. There
appeared before us an individual of short stature, perhaps twenty-
eight or thirty years of age, dark, and with great black, sparkling
eyes which betrayed high intelligence and a general air which
seemed to indicate an enterprising and bold character. It was
Abdul Kerim el Halil, delegate of the Arab secret political
committee. The conference began after dinner. *~-

I at once observed that what he desired most of all was that
positions of influence in Constantinople should be assigned to
certain individuals, and I said to myself gloomily that, judging by
the views of these leaders, the Arabian reforms meant nothing
more than satisfying the ambitions of a few persons who were
hankering after offices and dignities. Yet we proceeded to draw
up an agreement which enshrined the following principles :
(i) The administrative work to be handed over to the native authori-
ties in accordance with the special law relating to the administration
of the vilayets ; (2) the secondary school teaching and quite general
national school teaching to be in Arabian ; (3) the Arabian tongue
to be used for certain legal formalities ; (4) the Arabian text to be
appended to summonses as well as criminal and civil judgments;
(5) petitions to the official authorities to be in Arabian ; (6) certain
Arabians to be appointed to the Senate, the State Council, the
Court of Appeal, the staff of the Sheik ul Islam, and the Fetvahane.J

We had other meetings with Abdul Kerim el Halil and Sheik
Abdul Hamid Zehravi in the Hotel Kroecker in Pera, and
thoroughly discussed the above subjects. These reforms were
subsequently carried out in toto after they had received the approval
and confirmation of the Government. Talaat alone was very
unwilling to approve the appointment to the Senate of Abdul
Hamid Zehravi Effendi, whom many Arabs regarded as unstable.
Abdul Kerim el Halil came to me on several occasions to ask me
to take the matter up with Talaat Bey and get it put right. Abdul
Hamid Zehravi's wish was ultimately fulfilled, but as his heart was
set on the office of Sheik ul Islam, he was not satisfied with his seat
in the Senate.

60 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

From this time on Abdul Kerim el Halil was a gentleman of
great importance, and he arrogated to himself the title of an
Inspector-General of the " Ella Mirkezie K (Decentralisation
Committee) of all Syria. Thanks to the particularly effective
measures taken by Talaat Bey, he had little success in the elections
for the Chamber of Deputies, in spite of the great activity of his
supporters. He was beaten by the Government candidate, or, to
speak more accurately, the candidate of the party for the Arabian
vilayets.

As I am on the Arabian question I cannot omit to mention a
matter which, in my opinion, is of very great importance. Enver
Pasha was War Minister and I held the portfolio of Public Works.
Asis Ali Bey, an Egyptian who was a major on the General Staff
and the most ambitious and vainglorious man the earth has ever
seen, could not endure that Abdul Kerim el Halil and Abdul Hamid
Zehravi should have exercised a greater influence than himself
when the Arabian affair was being settled. He was audacious
enough to proclaim openly that the Arabs could not rest satisfied
with the clauses of the agreement, that their only desire was for
internal independence, with their own army, and certainly could
not go further than form a dualistic state with the Turks on the
model of the dualistic Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, though, as a
matter of fact, the Arabs went further than the Hungarians and
demanded that the official language of their army should be
Arabian. He added that with such an ideal in view, those who
would not work for its realisation, but desired merely to secure a
brilliant position for themselves, and therefore remained satisfied
with a few insignificant reforms, would be considered traitors to
their nation, and must expect to pay heavily for it subsequently.

I knew Asis Ali Bey at the time when he left the Military School
witrj a captain's commission. I think it was somewhere about the
year 1320 (1904). He displayed great activity in chasing the Bul-
garian bands in the Kazas of Petric, Osmanie, and Macedonia.
Subsequently he had a good deal of fighting on the Greek frontier
with Greek, Bulgarian, and Albanian bands, and before the pro-
mulgation of the Constitution he joined the Committee of Union
and Progress, on which he did valuable work. When the Army
of Operations marched on Constantinople after the reactionary
movement of March 3ist (April I3th) he was commanding one of

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 61

its detachments, and after Galata Bridge had been seized he
attacked Tophaus Barracks and displayed great skill in clearing the
rebels out of them. Up to that time I did not know that this man
had Arabian connections. Whenever I met him he behaved most
courteously towards me, and was always a model of discretion in
his language.

While I was Governor in Adana I once went to Constantinople,
where I met Asis Ali Bey, and we had a few words about the
celebrated " letters from Beirut and Syria " which had been pub-
lished by Achmed Sherif Bey, the correspondent of the newspaper
Ik dam. When I told him that these letters provoked tendencies
dangerous to the maintenance of Ottoman unity and the authority
of the Mussulman Caliphate in the Arabian vilayets Asis Ali Bey
replied in a haughty tone : " The Arabs are perfectly right. What
have you Turks done for us Arabs — except try to exterminate us.
insult and despise us— that you should now expect friendly treat-
ment on our part ? Are you forgetting that in Constantinople
when you want to call a dog you shout ' Arab, Arab, Arab! '
When you want to say that anything is obscure and incomprehen-
sible you say it's * like the hair of an Arab.' One of your pet
phrases is ' a fig for the splendours of Damascus if only we needn't
see another Arabian face ! ' Are not the lines of your poet :
' On the evening I left Damascus I said, " Blessed be this holy
night/' ' one of your favourite expressions ? And as if that wasn't
enough, didn't you, on the very day after the issue of the Consti-
tution, purposely affront the Arabs by appointing as Marshal of the
Army in Syria a descendant of Hulagus, the man who despised
Baghdad and all Irak, a Tartar without any morals, an envoy from
Hell ? You know well enough how the Arabs hate the Tartars,
and therefore the only object of appointing Osman Pasha to
command the 5th Army can have been to humiliate the Arabs."

I was very astonished to hear such absurdities from the lips of
so intelligent a man. I ascribed his aspersions on Osman Pasha
to personal hatred, perhaps the result of a previous contretemps
in Macedonia between the two men. Asis Ali Bey was at that
time employed in a military department at Kotchana. During an
inspection Osman Pasha, who was then Commandant of the Uskiib
area, had addressed him in a somewhat offensive tone, and, thanks
to his bad habit of always speaking- ironically to everyone, he had

62 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

received a sharp reply from Asis Ali Bey. Osman Pasha was at
first quite taken aback at such an answer in public, and to cover
up his own mistake and assert the dignity of his position and
authority he took strong measures and ordered that Asis Ali Bey
should be put under arrest. Since then the latter had cherished a
feeling of hatred against him which nothing could assuage.

I answered Asis Ali Bey that the Turks, and particularly the
Anatolian Turks, had a high regard for the Arabs, that it was
very wrong to throw doubt upon that sentiment merely on the
ground of a few popular expressions, and that if educated people
like himself allowed themselves to be inspired by personal aversions
the result would be disorders, which would do irremediable harm
to the Turkish world.

After this incident Asis Ali Bey was sent at his own request
to join Izzet Pasha's staff in the Yemen. I learned subsequently
that he there made a great show with his Arab ideals and made all
sorts of trouble for poor Izzet Pasha. I also knew that at the
time of the Italian attack on Tripoli he went to Cyrenaica, and
with Enver and Mustapha Kemal Bey made a wonderful effort at
the defence of the town of Benghazi.

As I am convinced that Asis Ali Bey is one of the outstanding
personalities among the Arab revolutionaries, I think it advisable
to draw particular attention to some of his services and mistakes
which are closely related to his past. I was told that when he was
in Tripoli he simply could not bear having Enver Bey as his
superior officer, and had done everything he could to make him
unpopular with the Arab officers. But Enver Bey had more or less
disregarded all this, and when, after the peace treaty with Italy
had been signed, he returned to Turkey in order to serve in the
Balkan War, he handed over the command to Asis Ali Bey and
advised him to form an Arab government. But very soon Asis
Ali Bey had estranged first the Sheik Achmed Sherif Senussi and
then the Arab officers, and he therefore decided not to remain in
Cyrenaica, and returned to Turkey. At that time he had only one
object in life, to show himself a bitter enemy of Enver Pasha when
he was in the company of Turkish officers and his erstwhile
friends, and to agitate against the Turks when he was in the
company of Arab officers.

When Enver Pasha ultimately became Minister of War Asis

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 63

All Bey was literally beside himself. He could not bear the
thought that he, who had been Enver's contemporary at the
military school and had done such good work and displayed such
a high degree of patriotism, should have been left a simple major
on the General Staff while his rival became Minister of War, and
he came to the conclusion that co-operation with the Turks brought
him neither profit nor glory. " Long live the Arab Revolution ! "

The intrigues of Asis AH Bey assumed such proportions that
Enver Pasha's patience was at length exhausted. He had him
arrested and brought before a court martial on the charge of not
having accounted for the twenty or thirty thousand which
he had handed over to him as Government funds when he left
Cyrenaica, and also embezzling that sum.

On the news of Asis Ali Bey's arrest there was tremendous
excitement among all the Arab youth of Constantinople. I was
then Minister of Labour. The members of the " El Muntidi el
Arabi " never ceased making representations to Ministers and
influential people. Among others a deputation of five young men
from Beirut and Damascus, headed by Dr. Ezad Haikar of Baalbek,
came to me to beg me to procure a pardon for the Egyptian Asis.
They said it would make an excellent impression on the young
Arab intellectuals. The Ministry of War sent the sentence to the
Sublime Porte with a request that the Sultan would be pleased
to commute the death penalty into penal servitude for life. On the
same evening on which this revised sentence was accordingly to
be submitted for Imperial approval there was a great banquet at
the French Embassy to which almost all the Ministers, several
foreign ambassadors and many French notables were invited.
Enver Pasha and I myself were also among the guests. When we
adjourned to the drawing-room after dinner there were whispered
conversations about the conviction of Asis Ali Bey. Georges
Remond, the war correspondent of the Illustration, came up to
me. " Monsieur le General/' he said, " if Asis Ali Bey is con-
demned to death on the ground of the differences of opinions and
quarrels between him and Enver Pasha in Tripoli, the only con-
clusion I can draw is that in this country the law takes second
place to arbitrary and capricious action. As I am informed, the
charge against Asis Ali Bey is that he has embezzled money
entrusted to him for the defence of the country. Asis Ali Bey is

64 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

possibly an Arab revolutionary, his political opinions may differ
from those of Enver Pasha, but he is certainly no thief. I'm
positive you know as well as I do, and equally positive that you
can save Asis AH Bey from an unmerited punishment by your
intervention. "

After Georges Remond many of my Turkish and French
friends, both civilians and soldiers, came and implored me to inter-
vene in Asis AH Bey's favour, and in the looks cast at Enver
Pasha (he was present in the room) that evening it was easy to
read the thought: "There's the man who does not shrink from
satisfying his thirst for revenge by destroying a splendid officer
who defended Cyrenaica at his side ! >:

I realised at once that public opinion condemned Enver Pasha
more severely than Asis AH Bey. It was therefore necessary to
have it out with him. Besides, I considered Asis AH Bey one of
the bravest and most honest of the Arab revolutionaries. I
thought it would be illogical to proclaim a general amnesty in
favour of all other revolutionaries and except Asis AH Bey from
its operation. For this reason I was extremely and sincerely
anxious to save him. I therefore wrote a few lines to Enver Pasha
when I got back home that evening. My letter ran as follows :

My dear Enver,

Notwithstanding all the evidence which the court martial has accumulated
against Asis All Bey, and the fact that sentence has been passed upon him, it
is you whom public opinion condemns. Your condemnation in this way will
do you a thousand times more harm than anything Asis Ali Bey will suffer from
a few years in prison. Please try and get him the Imperial pardon and I will
take good care that he leaves Constantinople, and never returns to
Constantinople.

The next day Enver Pasha rang me up to say that His Majesty
had pardoned Asis AH Bey. His brother, who had already heard
the news, came with Georges Remond to call on me and thank me.
I told him that Asis AH Bey must leave for Egypt at once, and for
the future leave Turkish politics severely alone, but must never
tell anyone that he owed his pardon to my intervention.

I heard subsequently that although Asis Ali Bey had given me
his word of honour at the time, he placed himself at the service of
Sherif Hussein during the World War when the latter, a monster
of ingratitude, rose in arms against the Caliphate and deliberately
drove the world of Islam into the deplorable condition in which it
finds itself to-day. To-day it is I who cannot forgive him.

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 65

THE GERMAN MILITARY MISSION.

I doubt whether there is a single man in Europe or America
who really knows the circumstances under which the German Mili-
tary Mission came to Constantinople to reorganise the Turkish
Army.

The numerous accounts published by our enemies always aver
that this Mission arrived during Enver Pasha's term of office as
War Minister and impute it as a crime against him. My revelations
will show how the affair really came about.

When Mahmud Shefket Pasha had convinced himself that it
was impossible to beat the Bulgarians, and signed the Peace pre-
liminaries of London which gave us the Enos-Midia line as our
frontier with Bulgaria, and the Islands of Imbros and Kenedos, he
decided that the whole national energies must be husbanded for
domestic reforms if the country, which was already very exhausted,
was not to be weakened yet further. In accordance with this
resolve he authorised our delegates to affix their signatures to the
Preliminary Peace.

In his opinion what we needed most was money, and he was
contemplating raising a substantial loan from one of the
European Powers. First he applied to the Germans, but they
pointed out that the Berlin money market was in no position to
arrange a new Turkish loan, and they frankly advised us never
to count on Germany in financial matters, but always to apply to
France in that respect. Thereupon the Government decided to
follow that advice and sent Djavid Bey to Paris. Djavid was not
indeed a member of the Ministry, but he was regarded as the soul
of the efforts being made by the party of " Unity and Progress "
in the direction of organisation in the politico-financial sphere.
He was commissioned to lead the Turkish financial delegation
which was to negotiate the financial clauses of the peace
preliminaries.

But Mahmud Shefket Pasha also considered that the system of
loans was unlikely of itself to restore the financial position of the
state, and he was very anxious for the abolition of the financial
capitulations, the only measure which could re-establish our Budget
once more. Djavid Bey was instructed in that sense.

Mahmud Shefket Pasha next proceeded to settle certain ques-
tions which had already formed subjects for differences of opinion

E

66 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

between ourselves and certain foreign Governments, particularly
the Russian and English Governments. One of the most impor-
tant at that time was that of the Persian frontier, a question upon
which Russia and England sought to put a very peculiar interpre-
tation. The Pasha went into this problem personally. He had
asked both Governments to appoint missions to determine the
frontier and send them to the locality as the Turkish Government
had done.

Last but not least he took up the question of the re-organisation
of the army and navy. A British Naval Mission was already at
work. He got into personal touch with the head of that Mission
and asked him to accelerate the reorganisation of the Navy. As
regards the organisation of the Army I will now relate the facts,
the details of which were given to me by Mahmud Shefket Pasha
personally, so that their accuracy cannot be doubted.

During the Pasha's term of office as Grand Vizier he usually
spent the night and slept at the Sublime Porte, and as I slept at the
Military Governor's Headquarters he called me to the telephone
after dinner on several evenings when he felt very tired after heavy
work during the day and asked me to go round and see him. On
these occasions he often told me of his ideas and plans and asked
my opinion.

On one of these evenings he remarked :

" I believe that everything we have done hitherto with regard
to the reorganisation of our army has been only half measures, if
not bad measures. All the organisers whom we have had here,
both during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid and since the
promulgation of the constitution, have been selected quite casually,
and on no definite principle. We have never thought of inviting a
serious mission with an adequate and well-thought-out programme
and personnel, whose selection must be determined exclusively with
reference to that programme.

" Look at the Greeks, for example. They were much cleverer
than ourselves. They have entrusted the reorganisation of their
navy to the English, and that of their army to the French. Veni-
zelos has reserved the .offices of War Minister and Naval Minister
to himself. He has ruthlessly crushed all who dared to put the
slightest obstacle in the way of the missions. He has not paid the
slightest attention to the criticisms of his political opponents. He

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 67

is always in the closest touch with the Directors of the French and
English Missions, and done everything they asked of him. The
result was the creation of the Greek Army which we learned to
respect during the Balkan War, and of a fleet with which the old
fleet of the Turco-Greek War cannot be compared.

"In my view the greatest service Venizelos has rendered his
country was in organising the armed forces of the nation and thus
presenting the diplomatists with an effective argument — I might
say the only effective argument — for the realisation of the national
ideal. I want to perform the same service for my country. There
is already an English Mission for our fleet. I will get into touch
with the head of that mission and ask him what he requires to
make a complete success of it, and I intend to comply with all his
wishes.

" As regards our army, I don't think we must hesitate any
longer to adopt the methods of the Germans. For more than
thirty years we have had German instructors in our army, our
Corps of Officers is trained entirely on German lines, and our army
is absolutely familiar with the spirit of German training and military
education. It is quite impossible to change all that now. I there-
fore intend to send for a German military mission on the grand
scale and, if necessary, I shall even appoint a German general to
command a Turkish army corps, place German staff and regimental
officers in command of every unit comprising it, and in this way
form a model army corps. The staff and regimental officers of
the other corps would have to be posted to this corps for
a definite period in order to expand and complete their training.
I will also have this mission accompanied by many specialists
whose task it will be to reorganise the various departments of the
War Office, the General Staff and the military schools and factories.
I think that we shall have no occasion for a war for a long time,
and I will therefore reduce the cadres as much as possible and
restore the peace establishment, so that we can effect economies
which will enable me to meet the expenses of the reorganisation
mission. I will give the Turkish world an army which will certainly
be small but, on the other hand, well organised and trained. In
time of war it will not be difficult to bring this army up to maximum
strength by expanding the cadres. I am now inquiring of the
Germans on what terms they would be prepared to send us some

E2

68 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

such mission, and consider it advisable to leave the question of
their conditions entirely to them."

Such are the circumstances under which General Liman von
Sanders' mission for the reorganisation of our army was invited
to Constantinople. Enver Pasha had nothing to do with this
affair and played no part whatever in it.

After Mahmud Shefket Pasha's death his successor at the
War Office, Izzet Pasha, had the same idea, and took up the same
line as his predecessor. During his period of office the agreement
wkh reference to the mission was drawn up and concluded. On
the day of the arrival in Constantinople of Liman von Sanders and
his officers they were met at the station by Izzet Pasha and, in fact,
it was a month or six weeks after the arrival of the mission that
Enver Pasha became War Minister.

It was Enver Pasha who first pointed out the obstacles to be
overcome if the command of the First Army Corps was to be
entrusted to Liman von Sanders Pasha. He thought that it would
be better to employ the head of the mission in the capacity of an
Inspector-General rather than give him the command of an army
corps. It was wholly and solely as a result of his suggestion, not
under pressure from the Russians, French and English, that this
change was made.

On the day the military mission arrived in Constantinople I was
commanding the First Army Corps, and in that capacity Supreme
Military Authority during the state of siege. Two days later I had
to hand over my command to Liman von Sanders, but as a German
general could not, of course, be commandant during the state of
siege, we decided to proceed by a different method. Faik Pasha
was then Commandant. He was to be appointed Governor of the
fortress with the powers of a divisional commander, and the super-
vision of the state of siege was to be entrusted to him. For reasons
which I will discuss later I was temporarily to take over the office
of Minister of Public Works. The Imperial decree relating to my
appointment was issued the day after the arrival of the mission.
On the next day I went to the headquarters of the First
Army Corps and handed it over officially to General Liman von
Sanders.

In these circumstances it is clear that there is an end of
slanderous observations and opinions which Ambassador Mor-

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 69

genthau sets forth on pages 44 and 45 of his Memoirs on the
strength of totally false information.

The arrival of the mission in Constantinople was the signal for
the most violent attacks upon us by the Russians, French and
English. The fact which the Russians put in the forefront of
their grounds of protest was that, if the troops appointed to guard
the Straits were commanded by German officers, the defence would
be strengthened, and that this step, adopted out of suspicion and
specially directed against Russia, would seem to ascribe ambiguous
intentions to that Power.

The French arid English followed in the footsteps of the
Russians. The French and English Ambassadors adopted the
arguments of the Russian Ambassador. The Press of bothjthese
countries slavishly followed the Russian Press. In this connection
I must ask our political opponents one question : was this the way
to manifest the good intentions of the English and French of which
they boasted to us from morning to night ?

We wanted to reorganise our army, and for that reason we
had applied to Germany. We made our plans both for the introduc-
tion and realisation of the scheme. The German military mission
came to Constantinople, and the result was an addition to the
defensive resources of the Turkish armies, particularly in the
Straits. It was quite natural that the Russians should endeavour
to oppose the scheme, because they regarded themselves as the
natural heirs to Constantinople, and were convinced that one day
they would be engaged in a terrific struggle with the Turks on
land and sea in the vicinity of Constantinople. Was their action,
which meant intervention in the domestic affairs of a neighbouring
State, possible without the support and approval of England and
France ? Certainly not, I say ! Under these circumstances, and
remembering that in this affair the French and English shed even
more tears than the Russians themselves, must we not assume that
even then the Triple Entente had promised Constantinople to the
Russians? Great Heavens! When I think of those days I go
cold all over. I cannot describe the torments I had to go through
in the discussions with the French Military Attache, Maucorps, the
French Ambassador, Bompart, Councillor of Embassy Boppe, the
Inspector of Gendarmerie, General Baumann, and Major Sarrou.
One day I ended up with the words :

yo Memories of a Turkish Statesman

"Just look how unreasonable you are, gentlemen! Don't
suggest that you are putting forward these views without fully
realising the situation. You know as well as we ourselves that we
have the right to call in a German reorganisation mission. The
question whether the German officers are or are not competent to
organise an army is no doubt open to debate, but it is irrelevant at
the moment, as we are now definitely convinced of their efficiency,
and our choice has fallen upon them. Every country has armed
forces of three kinds — first, the army, then the navy, and, thirdly,
the police. We have entrusted the organisation of the first to the
Germans, that of the second to the English, that of the third to the
French. So where's the quarrel? Do you want us to commit
the reorganisation of our army to the Russians ? Just remember
what it is the Russians are saying: 4 If German officers take
command of the First Army Corps, the defensive resources of the
Straits will be strengthened/ That means that if we applied to the
French or English for a similar mission on the same terms the
Russians would be bound to make the same objection, for I cannot
assume that in taking over command of the First Corps the French
or English officers would deliberately intend to open the Straits to
the Russians when occasion arose. These protests of yours neces-
sarily arouse in us a feeling that you are anything but well-inclined
towards us."

As these gentlemen could not refute the logic of my words and
did not know what to answer they admitted that they were wrong-
by repeating : ' What do you expect ? In the first place, we are
Russia's allies and are thus compelled to support all their claims.
Secondly, the Germans are our enemies, and we're compelled to
remember the danger to ourselves inherent in everything they do.
And even if there were no danger we consider it a patriotic duty to
assert that as what is at stake is something to which the Germans
make a claim we are bound to oppose it."

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS, MIDDLE OF
DECEMBER, 1913, TO FEBRUARY, 1914.

I TAKE UP MY DUTIES.

Prince Said Halim Pasha's Ministry, which followed that of
Mahrmid Shefket Pasha, had taken over its political programme

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 71

in its entirety, i.e., to avoid external complications as much as
possible and devote the whole resources of the nation to internal
reforms. But that did not mean that he let slip the opportunity of
recovering Adrianople, and he also succeeded in concluding the
Treaty of Constantinople with the Bulgars, the Treaty of Athens
with the Greeks, and subsequently a second Treaty of Constanti-
nople with Serbia, which had become the most ambitious of the
Balkan States.

To secure the success of the domestic reforms it was necessary
to make an end of the questions which were always cropping up
owing to the difference^ between the nationalities and always
giving the small Balkan States an opportunity for loud and
vehement protest.

As regards the Bulgarians, after the final loss of Macedonia all
that was left to the Turkish Empire was a few scattered villages
along the northern boundary of the sandjak of Kirk Kilisse in the
vilayet of Adrianople. On the other hand, a few Turks remained
distributed in certain parts of Bulgarian territory in the vicinity of
the Turkish frontier. As an appendix to the Treaty of Constanti-
nople a secret agreement was signed by the Bulgars in which it
was provided that any Bulgarians residing on Turkish territory
should be removed to Bulgaria and any Turks still left in Bulgarian
territory should be removed to Turkey. This exchange was carried
out to the satisfaction of both sides.

To us the most important of the racial problems was that pre-
sented by the very numerous Greek elements which were scattered
about the coast side of the vilayet of Aidin. There was no doubt
that the Greeks who, after their easy victories in the Balkan War,
had occupied Macedonia as far as Drama on one side and seized the
islands off Asia Minor (Mytilene, Chios, and Lemnos) on the other,
would now concentrate all their efforts on the acquisition of the
vilayet of Aidin. With a view to having no internal difficulties if
we sooner or later came to blows with the Greeks (that was
inevitable owing to the question of the islands), it was suggested
to the Greek Government that there should be an exchange of these
Greek nationals for the Mussulman nationals who had been left
behind in Greek Macedonia and wished to emigrate to Turkey.
Venizelos, however, was not particularly enthusiastic about this
proposal, which looked like compromising the evil designs he had

72 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

in store for us. Yet at that time the nationalist sentiments of the
Turkish clans had begun to assert themselves very actively, and the
consequences began to make themselves felt, particularly in the
vilayet of Aidin, where hundreds of thousands of Mussulman
refugees who had not been able to bear the oppression of the
Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians any longer, and had taken refuge
within the Turkish Empire, often seriously molested the Greeks
settled in that region.

The Government was entirely out of sympathy with their action
because of the difficulties to which it would presumably give rise.
The European Powers, which are in the habit of manifesting their
humane sentiments when it is a question of intervention against
Turkey, had not a word to say against the abominations of the
Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians, who had slaughtered in the most
bestial manner more than five hundred thousand Turks, most of
them women, old people, and children. When Carnegie's Com-
mission of Enquiry had published its special report upon these
horrors there was not a single newspaper in the whole of Europe
or America — with the exception of a few socialist journals — which
had a word to say in favour of the poor Mohammedans who had
been killed off like flies.

The American Ambassador, Morgenthau, made the Armenian
massacres which took place during the World War an excuse for
heaping upon the Turks insults and affronts which are hardly fit to
be reproduced. Every line of his Memoirs reveals the deepest
hatred and enmity. Mr. Morgenthau should appoint a committee
to enquire into the Macedonian massacres and then read through
his book again and see if he can justify his charges.

When thousands of Mohammedans, after suffering all manner
of oppression and cruelties, fled to their motherland and found not
a cottage to shelter them or a yard of ground on which to settle, nay,
found themselves daily exposed to the insults of those who were
responsible for their misfortunes, they allowed themselves to be
carried away by a very natural and human craving for revenge and
to commit a few excesses. The Greeks made the fullest use of
these occurrences, and, true to their nature, raised a tremendous
outcry about them. They said they were being threatened by the
Turks, and a few of them accordingly began to take to the moun
tains. The boldest of these actually set fire to a few Mussulman

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 73

villages and murdered a large number of emigrants. This state of
affairs contributed to fan the flames of Mohammedan rage still
higher. Venizelos began to chant his unending song about the
Balkans, and it had its effect all over the world : " The Turks are
massacring the Greeks in the vilayet of Aidin with the approval,
and, indeed, with the assistance, of the Government ! '

Fortunately Talaat Bey, who acted quicker than Venizelos.
urged the Ambassadors of England, France, Germany, and
Austria to send their First Dragomans to conduct a joint enquiry
on the spot. This committee established the true facts, the
accuracy of which Mr. Morgenthau must admit, however
reluctantly. In other words, the enquiry showed clearly that there
had been no kind of oppression of the Greeks and that the sorely-
tried emigrants who here and there had been guilty of some crime
had been severely punished by the Ottoman Government.

Venizelos stipulated that the emigrants should take with them all
movable property, while immovables should be treated as subjects
for exchange, but finally adopted the view of Talaat Bey and agreed
to enter into negotiations on the footing that the Greek nationals
inhabiting the coastal region of the vilayet of Aidin should be sent
back to Greece, while the Mohammedans of Macedonia should be
allowed to settle in the vilayet in question if they so desired.

After a basis of agreement with the Arabs had been found, as
I have already related, we decided to tackle our thorniest domestic
problem, the Armenian question.

I think it better to devote a special chapter later on to this
extremely important and all-embracing matter.

ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH.

While Mahmud Shefket Pasha was Grand Vizier, Hakki Pasha,
the former Grand Vizier, went to London to settle various current
questions relating to the Gulf of Basra and the seven disputed
districts between the Yemen and Aden.

Djavid Bey was sent to Paris at the same time. The object of
his mission was:

1. To negotiate for a substantial loan.

2. The abolition of the financial capitulations.

As regards the loan, the French imposed conditions which were

74 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

utterly impossible for us. I give some of them so far as I can
remember :

1. No other lines to be constructed by the management of the
Hedjaz Railway in Syria and Palestine.

2. The management of the Hedjaz Railway were immediately
to stop the construction (which had already begun) of the branch
line from Afuleh via Djenin Naplus to Jerusalem, which belonged
to the Haifa-Deraa sector, and had already got as far as Seb' otia.

3. The French were to be granted the concession for a oroad-
gauge line from Afuleh to a point on the Jaffa-Jerusalem line as
yet undecided.

4. The French were also to be granted the concession of a
broad-gauge line, one terminus of which was to be the station of
Rayaak on the Damascus-Hamah line, and the other at Afuleh, the
line passing by the shores of Lakes Huleh and Tiberias.

5. The Ottoman Government shall have no right to approve any
railway rates on the Haifa-Deraa sector which could compete with
the railway rates on the Beirut-Damascus-Hauran line. The
Ottoman Government must also indemnify the Damascus-Hamah
Railway Company for the Damascus-Hauran sector.

6. The concession for any line to be constructed east of the
Damascus-Medina and Rayak-Aleppo must be reserved exclusively
for the French.

7. The extension of the Syrian harbours of Jaffa, Haifa and
Tripolis must be reserved exclusively for French capitalists.

8. The right of working the Yemen Railway must be bought
back by the Government and the Company must be indemnified.

9. The concession of the Samsun-Sivas Railway must be
granted to the French.

10. The buildings, real property and estates of all kinds belong-
ing to the very numerous French convent schools, hospitals and
other foundations must be exempt from all taxation.

11. The proceeds of the loan granted by France must be used
to procure the necessary military armament from France
exclusively.

It was only on these and other conditions I no longer remember
that Turkey was granted a 9 per cent, loan of a few million francs,
payable in two instalments.

As reigards the abolition of the financial capitulations, the!

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 75

French would not even hear of it. Only if we conceded various
other demands would they grant us an increase of the ad valorem
duty from n to 14 per cent., a monopoly of alcohol, matches and
cigarette paper, increase the royalties payable by foreign
merchants, and allow us to introduce a city tariff and enjoy a few
other minor advantages.

All these negotiations were carried on not without difficulty,
and Djavid Bey, who had been commissioned to conduct them,
was ultimately reduced to despair, as he had to cope with the
slackness of the Government in Constantinople, which was always
delaying its answer, and also with the obstacles placed in his
way by the French.

Among the members of the Cabinet at this time was Osman
Nizami Pasha, the Minister of Public Works. Although most of
these questions concerned his Ministry, he was in the habit of
resting content with sending every matter on to the department
concerned, and then forwarding to the Sublime Porte the opinions
of the departments on both the legal and utilitarian aspects. As
the general situation of the country required the Government to
make up its mind quickly, Osman Nizami Pasha's bureaucratic
methods made him unpopular with the Cabinet and the party. As
the party had also decided to accept the programme of the
Committee of Union and Progress as soon as possible, it wanted
the Government to get rid of this man, who had no following in
the party and had opposed the reoccupation of Adrianople, a line
of action which revealed a lack of sound judgment.

Since my appointment as Military Governor of Constantinople
I had lost no opportunity of bringing about a rapprochement
between the French and the Turks. In view of the friendly rela-
tions which I had established with the French Embassy, and with
Frenchmen generally, my friends were convinced that if the
examination and solution of the problems of public works were
entrusted to me the appointment would strongly recommend itself
to the French. They therefore warmly advocated my taking over
that Ministry.

As I knew then that I should have to hand over the ist Corps,
which I was commanding, to General Liman von Sanders, and
that by entering the Cabinet I could possibly render my country
greater service, I complied with the request.

76 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

As Osman Nizami Pasha had neglected to get the French affair
settled up quickly and the Government had not the time to wait
indefinitely, it was suggested to him that he should retire from his
office and send in his resignation. He at once adopted the
suggestion, and his Ministry was transferred to me for the interim.
A month after Osman Nizami Pasha resigned I definitely took over
the portfolio of Public Works.

The very first thing I did was to settle within a very short time
the various matters which had been put before the Ministry for
its examination and opinion and which the French had made a
sine qua non for the loan. A solution of the difficulty, which even
the French would accept, was immediately laid before the Grand
Vizier's Department by the Ministry. Thanks to this action, the
efforts of Djavid Bey were at length crowned with success, and the
loan was granted.

THE AD ALIA RAILWAYS.

During my term of office as Minister of Public Works I had a
little contretemps with the Italian Embassy over the Adalia Rail-
ways. It is well known that Italy had been in occupation since the
war in Tripoli of several of our islands, Rhodes, Stankoj, etc., and
had entered into an obligation to restore them to the Ottoman
Government. As the Balkan War intervened, however, the
Italians forgot to evacuate the islands, and defended their action
with the excuse that they wanted to prevent their occupation by
the Greeks. When the First Treaty of London ended the Balkan
War and we demanded the restoration of our islands by the
Italians they treated us to all sorts of pretexts. They alleged,
for instance, that Achmed el Sherif el Senussi wras still proving
refractory, and, as he still had Turkish officers in his service, we
had hot fulfilled our obligation. We proved to them by all kinds of
argument that their assertions were unfounded, that there was not
a single Turkish soldier in Tripolitana, and the Ottoman Govern-
ment was giving no assistance whatever to Sheik el Seid Achmed
el Sherif el Senussi. Therefore the Italians referred to public
opinion in Italy, and explained that if they restored these islands
to the Turks without getting something in the way of
compensation it would make a very bad impression.

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 77

This course of action made us very angry. The question
cropped up again when I became Minister of Public Works. One
day the Marquis Garroni, the Italian Ambassador, came to me and
told me that Halladjan Effendi, a Turkish subject, and several
other persons acting in the name of a group of Italian capitalists
intended to ask me for the concession of a railway northwards
from Adalia and from Makri to Mughla. For the moment he
asked me to permit preliminary surveys for the railway to be carried
out and to grant Government protection to the engineers and
workmen to be employed. I told him in sharp terms that for the
time being the Government was not contemplating the construc-
tion of railways northward from Adalia or between Makri and
Mughla.

This peremptory answer was a very great surprise to the skilled
diplomat. " Making a survey," he replied, " does not necessarily
mean building a railway. The first business is merely to find out
whether it is at all possible to construct such a railway. If the
result is satisfactory, the Ottoman Government can make up its
mind later on. Besides, we have a written undertaking of the
Government which empowers the Italians to make surveys. The
Ministry refusal is a matter for comment ! "

When I replied to the Ambassador that there was no such under-
taking in the archives of the Ministry, he showed me a paper bear-
ing the signature of the Foreign Minister, Prince Said Halim
Pasha. But this document had no official value at all. I therefore
told the Ambassador once and for all that we refused.

Thereupon he said to me: " My dear Djemal Pasha, I don't
think it right of you to give me an answer of that kind in this very
complicated matter just at the moment when I am making every
effort to secure the restoration to Turkey of the islands in Italian
occupation. You must know that public opinion in Italy attaches
very great importance to the question of the Adalia Railway. If
we could announce in our papers that the Italian engineers had
started on their surveys, public opinion would cease to make diffi-
culties for the Government in the question of the islands in view
of the fact that the Government had secured material advantages
as compensation for the sacrifice involved in the restoration of the
Dodecanese. In this way you would find yourselves in possession
of your islands once more ! "

78 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

I was now extremely angry, and replied: " You forget, Mr.
Ambassador, that a man who is returning the property of another
which he has only managed for him is not justified in demanding
compensation therefor. The Italian Government has to give us
back these islands in accordance with its obligations. I don't
understand how a nation can blame its Government and put diffi-
culties in its way because it fulfils an obligation it has expressly
entered into. What would Turkish public opinion think of our
Government if it saw that unhappy Turkey, after being the victim
of countless attacks for three or four years and losing 99 per cent,
of her European territory and the whole of her African colonies,
had now to give compensation for the recovery of her own islands
to which she had a claim by treaty? I am Minister of Public
Works, and it is my duty to secure to my country the execution of
works necessary to its prosperity in a manner dictated by require-
ments. As regards enterprises which are to be undertaken by way
of political compensation, these have nothing to do with my depart-
ment, and must be discussed with the Foreign Office or the
Grand Vizier. As I entirely disagree with you on this matter,
I regret that I cannot give Your Excellency the answer you
desire. "

Subsequently I reported this conversation to Prince Said Halim
Pasha, Enver Pasha, who was then War Minister, and Talaat
Pasha, the Minister of the Interior. They all agreed with me.
The next day a number of journalists, who had got wind of the
affair somehow or other, came to ask me for an interview. I sent
for Yonus Nadi, the editor of the Tasfir-Efkier, and granted him
an interview.

The very decided article which then appeared under the title
" Neither Compensation nor Concessions " was received every-
where with enormous pleasure and satisfaction, and my friends
congratulated me on my clear and categorical declarations. How-
ever, on the very day the article appeared the Marquis Garroni,
who was very excited about it, requested an audience of the Grand
Vizier. He complained bitterly about me, and said that this article
would make a very bad impression in Italy.

There was a Ministerial Council that day. When I entered the
Grand Vizier's Palace I saw that the Grand Vizier was very upset.
Talaat was present. Prince Said Pasha received me, and said in a

The Outbreak and End of the Second Balkan War 79

very imperious voice: " Pasha, so you have been talking to
journalists about the Adalia Railway ? "

" Yes," I answered. " And why not? Have I said anything
that is contrary to the truth? "

" No ! But I don't think you had any authority to do so."

" Will Your Highness allow me to say that that is a mistake?
A Minister has the right to make announcements to the Press when
he thinks it advisable about any question which concerns his depart-
ment, particularly when no State secrets are involved and the
general policy of the Government is not imperilled. The question
put to me by the editor was this : ' Does the Government intend
to give the Italians compensation in the shape of a concession to
construct the Adalia Railway in order to secure the restoration of
the ^Egean Islands ? ' I replied : ' No ! ' Is not my statement
true ? Is the Government of which Your Highness is the head of
a contrary opinion? Not so far as I know. That being so, the
Ambassador has no right to complain."

To this reply the Prince had not a word more to say. I don't
think he has ever forgiven me for making that declaration to the
journalists, whom he cannot endure.

A few days after this incident the English Ambassador, Sir
Lewis Mallet, came to me at the Ministry and told me he had
heard that the Ottoman Government was about to grant the
Italians a concession for the Adalia Railway, and that such action
would be an encroachment upon the rights of the English Aidin
Railway Company.

I had enquiries made and, as a matter of fact, the English com-
pany had received, with the right to extend its lines to Burdur and
Sparta and start a service of steamers on Lake Beyschir, a formal
assurance that no other line to the Mediterranean would be built
within a radius of I don't how many kilometres south of that
stretch. Its profit-earning power would thus be guaranteed.

When I informed his Highness Said Halim Pasha accordingly
he told me that he was very satisfied that I had made no agreement
with the Italians.

Ultimately I found another way of arriving at an understanding
with the Italian Ambassador. I told him I would send an official
technical commission of railway engineers, who should ascertain
definitely whether it was possible or impossible to construct rail-

8o Memories of a Turkish Statesman

ways from Adalia and Makri into the interior. The Ambassador
pretended he was satisfied with that, although, in fact, he was
anything but satisfied.

Another affair which I settled during my period of office in
the Ministry of Public Works was the composition of the numerous
differences which had arisen between the Road Construction Com-
pany and the Technical Commission of the Ministry. Instead of
getting to work like reasonable beings and thus settling the
problem, both parties endeavoured to refute the arguments of the
other with an obstinacy which aroused the greatest mistrust on
both sides. After getting Burhaneddin Bey, the Director of
Railways and Transport, to agree with Monsieur Chublier, the
Director of Roads, I went into all the questions myself and secured
their speedy settlement.

In February, 1914, I took over the Admiralty by way of
exchange with Tchuruk Sulon Mahmud Pasha.

AT THE ADMIRALTY

CHAPTER III.
AT THE ADMIRALTY.

MY APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER.

WHEN Enver Pasha was appointed Minister of War he occupied
himself with the reorganisation of the army, and his first act was
to make changes in all the higher posts. He transferred all
Generals to the Peace Establishment, and also all higher officers,
and such other officers as had no military merit beyond wearing
the epaulets. He made Colonels, Army Commanders; Lieu-
tenant-Colonels, Divisional Commanders; Majors, Regimental
Commanders; and Captains, Battalion Commanders. On the
advice of the reorganisation mission he undertook a thorough
reform of the different sections of the Ministry of War, and put
German officers in charge of most of them; he also began to pre-
pare the mobilisation plans of the army.

No effort was spared. Extraordinary care was taken with the
theoretical and practical training of the army, and after a month
or two we could already see that a new spirit inspired every part
of it.

While these extremely far-reaching changes were being made
in the army, no changes could be observed in the internal routine
of the navy. The Naval Minister, Tchuruk Sulon Mahmud Pasha,
although an extremely honest and able man, did not possess the
courage required to press through fundamental reforms, and paid
not the slightest attention to those members of the Cabinet who
advised him to follow Enver Pasha's example.

Thejre was not the slightest hurry to press on the construction
of the dreadnought Sultan Osman which had been bought in
Brazil; there was delay on delay in the building of the

83 F2

84 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Reschadieh. The necessary efforts were not made to repair
the damage which our ships had suffered in the Balkan War; the
proposals of the chief of the English Naval Mission with regard
to the organisation of the Ministerial department, as well as the
Corps of Officers, were not dealt with, under the excuse that they
must be examined by the Naval Council. The Government's view
was that, as a war with the Greeks was inevitable within a very
short time, it was urgently necessary to proceed with the reor-
ganisation and training of our fleet, in fact even more necessary
than in the case of the army. For that reason the Grand Vizier,
Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey proposed to Tchuruk Sulon Mahmud
Pasha that he should exchange with me. He adopted the sugges-
tion, and as a result of that decision I took over the post of Naval
Minister.

THE REORGANISATION OF THE ADMIRALTY DEPARTMENTS.

My first business on taking over the Admiralty was a long con-
ference with Admiral Limpus, the Chief of the English Naval Mis-
sion. I asked him to give me a copy of all the proposals he had
ever made and to point out the most important of them. I also
made the Director of the Archives collect all the reports on the
general reorganisation of our Navy which had been sent in by
Admirals Limpus, Williams and Gamble, and which were to be
found in the Naval Council and the various sections. I made it
my personal business to lgo through them. Admiral Limpus'
main proposal was that the departments of the Admiralty should
be reorganised, and I entirely agreed with him on that point. Both
Admiral Limpus and the two other English Admirals who had been
his predecessors complained about the Naval Council. They laid
stress on the fact that the heads of the departments, who were
reluctant to take any sort of responsibility in important depart-
mental affairs, were always shifting it on to the Naval Council,
which did not meet for months at a time, and even when it did
meet it was so alarmed at the accumulation of matters that it con-
tented itself with examining a few files and then adjourned again
and left the most important questions lying in the document box.
In that way the departmental heads shelved their responsibility.

I therefore made up my mind to abolish the Naval Council at
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At the Admiralty 85

The office of which Admiral Limpus complained the most
bitterly was that of the Naval Under-Secretary of State. The
English Admiral regarded Rustem Pasha, the Under-Secretary of
State, as one of the most obstinate opponents of the reorganisation
of the Ottoman Navy.

He told me that even when he had won over the various depart-
mental heads to hi$ views they always came to entirely opposite
conclusions after speaking to Rustem Pasha, and explained that
they could not act contrary to his orders. But the Admiral's
greatest grievance was against the Fourth Section, and the
directors of the Accounts and Audit Departments. Until
these departments, which clung slavishly to the most anti-
quated bureaucratic traditions, were reformed from top to
bottom, there was no chance of getting anything done at the
Admiralty.

After this verbal enquiry I made myself thoroughly familiar
with the carefully elaborated scheme for the reforms to be intro-
duced into the Ministry which had been drawn up by Admiral
Limpus and Admiral Gamble. Acting on the suggestions con-
tained in this scheme, and supplementing it with my own proposals,
I began the preparation of reorganisation regulations. The
Under-Secretariat, as well as the Naval Council, were to be
abolished. The Admiralty was to consist of four departments in
addition to a Medical Inspectorate and an Accounts Department.
The head of Department i was to have the title of a Chief of the
Naval General Staff. Each head of a section was to settle all
questions relating to his department, and on his own responsibility
lay his decisions before the Minister for his approval. In matters
which might affect other departments, though primarily concerning
one particular department, it was the duty of the departmental
head to arrive at a decision in concert with the other departments.
All departmental heads were also under a duty to keep the Chief of
the Naval General Staff fully informed as to all matters affecting
their sections.

The Chief of the Naval General Staff was responsible for the
reorganisation of the Fleet, its preparedness for war, the instruc-
tion and training of the Corps of Officers, and even the production
and management of war material, and he had the right to all neces-
sary information, either verbal or written, from the competent

86 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

authorities, and to acquaint them with the views of the Naval
General Staff.

When the reorganisation scheme was in draft and took practical
shape (having regard to the changes which experience dictated), I
considered it advisable to embody it in a temporary ordnance.
Lastly, I got rid of the Under-Secretary of State, Rustem Pasha,
two other admirals, Faik Pasha, the Medical Inspector, and a few
captains, commanders and lieutenant-commanders.

Admiral Limpus was ve^y pleased with these decisive steps and
told me he was sure that he would now undoubtedly be able to make
swift and satisfactory progress with his work at the Admiralty.

In accordance with the reorganisation ordnance, I divided the
harbours, which had hitherto been under the control of the Admiral
Commanding Constantinople Harbour, into six zones, and for the
first time established Naval Prefectures at Samsun, Stambul,
Smyrna and Beirut. I put the Red Sea ports under the command
of the Commodore of the Red Sea, and the ports of Basra and the
Euphrates and Tigris under the command of the Commodore of the
Gulf of Basra. My object in establishing these naval prefectures
was to try and put a stop to smuggling on the Ottoman coasts by
setting up a coastguard service and to keep the harbour captains
under close and continuous control. Hitherto they had had prac-
tically no sort of supervision. For that reason I assigned the gun-
boats we had just received from France, and the older gunboats
we already possessed, for service 'on the coasts of the Black Sea,
the Mediterranean, Syria and the Red Sea. I put them under the
orders of the Naval Prefects.

If the World War had not broken out five months after I went
to the Admiralty the authorities administering indirect taxes, State
monopolies and the national debt would have derived great profit
from these measures and smuggling would have been more or less
suppressed.

As my naval prefects I selected the most active of the senior
naval officers and impressed on them the necessity of thorough and
continuous inspection. Their reports enabled me to decide which
of the captains it was advisable to remove from their posts and also
revealed to me the deplorable condition of the ships in the
provinces.

To take the place of the harbour captains whom I put on the

At the Admiralty 87

general list I appointed officers who enjoyed a good name and a
reputation for efficiency, but who had not been as successful as was
desired in their service with the fleet.

I intended to divide all naval officers into three categories. The
first was to consist of officers who could serve in the fleet; the
second comprised officers who were to go to ships engaged in
coastal protection, and the third was to be composed of officers on
harbour duties. The officers were to interchange frequently within
their own categories, and those of the first category, for example,
who were not fitted to remain in it were transferred to the second,
officers of the second to the third. Officers in the third category
who proved inefficient were to be retired altogether.

Unfortunately the World War prevented me from carrying out
this plan in its entirety.

Let me give a few examples.

The first was during the first weeks of my period of office at
the Admiralty. I had ordered the departure of a gunboat and
myself fixed the exact date and hour. It was a ship which it had
been arranged in Mahmud Pasha's time should be placed at the
disposal of the Commodore of the Red Sea. On the evening
before the ship was to leave I went with Admiral Limpus on board
the gunboat, which was lyingf off Tophane roads. I asked the
Admiral to conduct the inspection himself and to tell me without
hesitation whether everything was really in order in view of the
long cruise ahead.

The Admiral told me that, apart from a few details, the ship
could be regarded as equipped for the journey.

I asked the commander whether he had sufficient stores on
board, whether the men were provided with summer uniforms, and
if they had money. My enquiries led me to the conclusion that the
clothing and stores needed supplementing to a certain extent. I
regarded it as essential that the ship's chest should have a supply of
money for three months so that the officers would not have money
difficulties on the way. I told the commander to send his second in
command and his paymaster to the Ministry so that the deficiencies
could be made good during the night and he could start at the
appointed time next morning. I returned to the Ministry myself,
had the depots opened in the night, made them disgorge food and
summer clothing, and, notwithstanding the objections of the

88 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

accounts officials, ordered them to pay out to the ship a sum on
account.

Next morning the moment I arrived at the Ministry I enquired
whether the gunboat had left. To my intense astonishment I
learned that she had not yet lifted anchor. I had the commander
fetched at once and asked him why he had not gone.

" Effendim," he replied, " my second in command and pay-
master have not yet returned on board, and I thought I dare not
leave without them ! '

Without a moment's hesitation I put that commander on the
half-pay list and appointed someone else in his place. 1 placed the
second in command on the general list and compelled the paymaster
to go with the ship, though he had promised himself that he would
not go to the Red Sea.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

It was a festival day before the outbreak of tlie World War. I
desired to review the officers and crews of the Fleet, and had given
orders that they were all to be present at a certain hour on the
square in front of the Admiralty building. The weather was wet
on the morning of the day in question. However, I appeared in
full dress on the review ground at the hour fixed. The men were
not there.

As I was leaving my car the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet,
Tahir Bey, and several of his officers came out of the office of the
Commodore of the Golden Horn. When I asked him why the fleet
was not assembled he answered :

" I thought, Effendim, that in view of the wet weather, you
would certainly not come, and so I have not brought the men to save
them from getting wet unnecessarily. "

I gave Tahir Bey three days' arrest for being afraid of getting
wet and a week later he was made to retire.

ANOTHER CASE.

During the year 1916 I had to visit Constantinople in connection
with various matters affecting the Fourth Army. It had been
proved beyond doubt that a naval officer had been guilty of more
than one fraud. Unfortunately, it was at this time that the moral

At^the Admiralty 89

of the army, no less than that of the navy, had begun to sink, and I
was determined to make an example. I handed the officer over to
the court martial with a request that judgment should be given as
soon as possible.

In spite of the accumulation of evidence, the court martial
acquitted him, although, in my judgment, and in that of all his
superiors, there could not be the slightest doubt about his fraudu-
lent dealings. Of course I had to respect the verdict of the court
martial, but I put the officer on the retired list all the same.

I put Ismail Bey (the president of the court martial) and some of
its members on the half-pay list on the ground that they had
revealed a lack of judgment and discrimination in questions ot
military honour.

ONE LAST EXAMPLE.

I had returned to Constantinople after sending home the com-
manders of the Fourth Army. The peace with Russia had been
signed and shipping had been resumed in the Black Sea. It was
considered necessary to prepare for sea the Res chid Pasha, which
had previously served as a depot for men undergoing a course of
instruction on the Yawus. After difficulties innumerable I
managed to get the ship from the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet
and have her brought into the inner harbour. Next morning the
Under-Secretary of State, Wassif Pasha, came to me with the
report that the Res chid Pasha, which had only just been thoroughly
repaired, was in a deplorable condition, and that if an end was not
put to the neglects and omissions of the captains and commanders,
the collapse of the navy would be inevitable before long. There-
upon I summoned the President of the Third Department, who
confirmed this news. I then ordered Ramzi Pasha, the Commo-
dore of the Golden Horn, to go on board the Reschid Pasha, pre-
pare a report on the condition of the ship, and give me the names of
those members of the ship's company who were responsible for
this state of affairs.

The next day he presented his report, which proved beyond
doubt the responsibility of the captain and his second in command.
I at once went on board myself, accompanied by Wassif Pasha and
Hamid Bey.

I ascertained from my own observation that the men had drawn

90 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

and scribbled obscene things upon the doors of the officers' cabins,
that the officers had permitted this, and that the ship's beautiful
wardroom was in an indescribable state.

I immediately ordered the dismissal from the service of the
captain and fourteen days' imprisonment for the second in com-
mand, and I circulated the information that if such a thing ever
occurred on any ship again the captain and commander would be
dismissed the service at once.

Although Captain Hakki, who was expecting the reversion to
the post of commander of the Yawus, was a very honest, clever,
and educated officer, he was lacking in practical experience at sea.
I think he did not fully realise that a commander is responsible for
everything and everyone on board his ship.

Among our naval officers the view prevailed, a wholly erroneous
view, that the commander alone was responsible for cleanliness,
discipline, and so forth on board ship. In a certain sense that view
was right. But in any case the commander is responsible only to
his captain, and the captain in turn is responsible to the Squadron
Commander or the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. Many of our
naval officers had not grasped that if ultimate responsibility is not
concentrated in the captain, there is no means of assuring unity of
command on board. Several short-sighted people have alleged
that the real reason for Captain Hakki's dismissal was that he was
on good terms with the German officers. A more ridiculous
hypothesis is hard to imagine. To ascribe such a motive to me is
absolutely absurd, as I was one of the warmest advocates of
discipline and a good understanding between the Turkish and
German personnel.

I often acted in a similar fashion when I wished to raise the
moral standard of our naval officers. I shall deal with this matter
fully when I get back home, and shall be able to resort to the
archives, so that I can complete my memoirs with special reference
to the period of my activities as Naval Minister.

ACCELERATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE " SULTAN OSMAN " AND THE
" RESCHADIEH." RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FACTORIES AND HARBOURS.
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARSENAL AT ISMID. ORDERS FOR WAR VESSELS.

Immediately after I took over my duties at the Admiralty I had
our ships like the Barbaras, Turghud, and Messadieh thoroughly

At the Admiralty 91

overhauled and repairs were put in hand at once so far as our poor
resources would allow. I inspected the work of restoration almost
daily, and I made it my special business to remove all obstacles
from the path. My main purpose was to get the Sultan Osman,
the construction of which in England was almost finished, into the
Sea of Marmora and to fix a definite time for the delivery of the
battleship Reschadieh, which had been ordered even before the
war with Italy and the building of which had suffered one delay
after another.

For six months and more the departments concerned had not
been able to give satisfactory answers to Wassif Bey and Reuf Bey,
who had demanded certain alterations in the Sultan Osman and
Reschadieh. As I wanted to know for myself the true state of
affairs I ordered Reuf Bey and Wassif Bey, who were in London,
to come to Constantinople. From the departments involved I
collected the documents they had sent in. I made all the experts
come to the Ministry, and after consultation with Admiral Limpus
I gave each of them the instructions they required. I wrote a letter
to the yards asking them to give me a final date for the delivery ot
the Sultan Osman and Reschadieh.

As Reuf Bey had reported to me that part of the crew of the
Sultan Osman ought to go on board at once in order to familiarise
themselves with the complicated technique of the instruments, I
immediately made a selection of certain petty officers and men
and sent them to England on the Res chid Pasha, under the com-
mand of Captain Ismail, the Commodore of the Golden Horn.

I asked Reuf Bey and Wassif Bey to refrain from demanding
further changes in these ships every day, so that the yards could
at last deliver them on the date appointed, and then sent both
officers back to London.

During Mahmud Pasha's term of office negotiations had been
opened with the firms of Armstrong and Vickers for the modern-
ising of the arsenal at the Golden Horn and the establishment of
an arsenal (on the most modern lines) and floating docks in the
Gulf of Ismid. The plans for these had already been prepared.

In view of the high importance of this matter I decided to
get the question definitely settled, and asked the two companies to
send their representatives to London. Thus Mr. Vincent Caillard,

92 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

member of the Administrative Board, and two directors of Arm-
strong and Vickers came to the capital. The Stambul lawyer,
Count Ostrorog, was appointed legal adviser to the companies,
and Deputy Halladjian Effendi legal adviser to the Naval Ministry.

After numerous meetings, at which our legal advisers were
also present, the terms of the contract were definitely drawn up.
Though I must admit that this contract had its drawbacks, I had
at any rate the great pleasure of knowing that within a short time
we should find ourselves in possession of an arsenal, building
yards, harbours and factories of the latest pattern.

From my earliest days I have had one principle — when the
Government had once come to a final decision in a matter I made
it my business to see that it was carried out without dilatoriness or
delay.

After the conclusion of the agreement with Armstrong and
Vickers the development of the Golden Horn Arsenal was to be
entrusted £0 a committee Consisting of representatives of the
Naval Ministry and the companies, and an English Director-
General was put in charge of it. People may say what they like,
but, personally, I am entirely convinced that it would have been
of the greatest advantage to the country if this scheme had been
thoroughly and carefully carried out. The probity of the
Director-General who was appointed, the ability and efficiency he
always displayed filled me with a great sense of satisfaction. We
were entirely in agreement as regards the provisional plans (for
the improvement of the factories and docks) which he drew up a
short time after his arrival in Constantinople. I will give one
example of his integrity.

According to the contract with the companies the Government
was bound to produce the capital wrhich was required for the con
struction of the new arsenal in the Gulf of Ismid.

After two months' investigation the Director-General said to
me:

" The position of the arsenal at the Golden Horn is so excep-
tionally good that I see no reason whatever to transfer the arsenals
of the Ottoman Navy to Ismid. If the existing buildings are con-
verted into modern works and certain improvements made in the
docks it will be possible to build even the largest dreadnoughts in
the Golden Horn arsenal within four years at the latest. I there-

At the Admiralty 93

fore think it would be advisable to abandon the establishment of
the Ismid arsenal and concentrate all our efforts on the transforma-
tion of the Golden Horn arsenal. We can do that with a relatively
small outlay. I promise you I'll bring the companies round to
this point of view."

Unfortunately, at the beginning of the World War our papers
published a lying report taken from the German Press. The
report was to the effect that at the time the repairs to our ships
were carried out the Director-General, acting on the orders of the
English Naval Mission, had removed the most important parts,
and thus rendered our ships unseaworthy. When this report
appeared I was at the 4th Army Headquarters. As it was abso-
lutely contrary to the truth (for the English Naval Mission and
the engineers of the company who had undertaken to organise and
modernise our arsenals had applied themselves to their work with
the greatest devotion up to the day they left our service), I asked
Enver Pasha to issue a dementi in the name of the Ministry, as he
was temporarily in charge of naval affairs at the time.

I do not yet know whether this dementi has been published or
not. Unhappily the lying report spread with amazing rapidity,
and from my perusal of many papers I saw that it had given rise to
a whole series of attacks on ourselves and the Germans.

I think I am under a moral obligation to affirm here once more
that the officers of the English Naval Mission, under Admiral
Limpus' command, and the English engineers and workmen to
whom was entrusted the reorganisation of the Golden Horn
arsenal, did their duty with absolute honesty. I had such confi-
dence in their honesty that I had commissioned them to fix the
torpedo lines in the Dardanelles and the Red Sea, and entrusted
them with the task of ascertaining the best minefields and the best
method of mine-laying. I had attached a torpedo-boat officer & la
suite of Admiral Limpus and a Turkish officer.

The first torpedo lines in the Dardanelles were actually laid in
accordance with that plan.

As I desire that this book shall contribute in every way to make
known the truth, I think I ought to relate the following incident.

At a time when it was becoming more and more probable that
the Straits would be closed, Admiral Limpus came to me one day
and said:

94 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

" If you think you'll have to close the Straits with mines, I've
a proposal to make to you. You can lay as many mines as you
like in the Dardanelles, but you should leave the Bosphorus open.
What you want to do is to distribute buoys to make it look as if
mines had been laid and inform all shipping that, owing to the
Bosphorus being closed by mines, it is forbidden to attempt to
pass through it without a pilot. Not knowing that in fact no
mines have been laid, the Russians will certainly not venture to
force the Straits. The Germans adopted that course in the year
1870. They announced that they had laid mines along the North
Sea coast, though in fact they hadn't laid a single one. The
announcement made the French fleet afraid and kept them away
from the coast. But if you strew mines in the narrows of the
Black Sea, one of them may break from its moorings in the very
strong current and come down into the Golden Horn, and if it is
unlucky enough to hit a trading or passenger vessel and there is a
catastrophe, you will have incurred an enormous responsibility in
the eyes of public opinion throughout Europe."

I thanked the Admiral for his warning, but told him that one
could not always rely on the success of such a stratagem, and the
Bosphorus was not to be compared with the North Sea coast, for,
if the enemy fleet ever got wind of the real situation and forced
the Straits, the result would be irremediable harm to us.

I will not discuss here whether the Admiral's proposal was
inspired by any consideration of the political situation at the
moment or whether he was giving his real professional opinion,
but in view of my confidence in the Admiral's probity and the fact
that he did not make the same suggestion with regard to the
Dardanelles (where the English fleet was in particularly great
strength), I am inclined to believe that the advice was dictated
solely by technical considerations.

The order for a dreadnought of the latest design and two light
cruisers, six destroyers and two submarines formed the second
part of our negotiations with the directors of Armstrong and
Vickers, who had come to Constantinople.

The agreements containing all the requirements of our tech-
nical experts and those of Admiral Limpus were drawn up by the

At the Admiralty 95

companies. They were now signed by both parties, and the con-
tracts distributed accordingly. The ammunition for our older
units, troop manoeuvres and exercises, and war itself was also
ordered. The dreadnought was given the name of Fatih, and
Commander Hamdy Bey was commissioned to supervise its con-
struction. The dates for the high-speed trials and gunnery tests
of the Sultan Osman had been finally fixed.

In view of all this activity, it will at once be admitted that our
one object in life was to make our fleet superior to the Greek fleet
at the first possible moment. I did everything conceivable to
remove all obstacles and prevent any delay in the realisation of
this project.

About this time the French manifested a desire to build ships
for us. After discussion with the representatives of the
Mediterranean Ironworks and Dock Company, whom I had
invited to Constantinople, six destroyers were ordered from their
yards. A contract for two submarines was also placed with
Creusot.

The battleship Fatih was to be ready in twenty-two months, and
the other units which had been ordered in England and France
were to be constructed in approximately the same period. The
dreadnought Snlta\n Osman was to be delivered by the end of
July, 1914, and the Reschadieh by the beginning of 1915. In 1916
we should thus have been in possession of a new fleet of three
dreadnoughts, two light cruisers, twelve destroyers and four
submarines, as well as a second fleet consisting of our old
units, and the combined fleets would have been superior to the
Greek fleet.

In close co-operation with Admiral Limpus we had drawn up a
very comprehensive programme of training and exercises for the
education of the crews who were to man the ships, but our main
concern was to proceed with the improvement of our old units in
order to prepare them for sea as soon as possible.

This was the first business of the English Director-General, who
had just taken up his duties. At last, on July 22nd, 1914, I saw
our fleet, comprising the Messudieh, Barbaras, Turghud, and
our old destroyers and torpedo-boats, leave the quays of the Golden
Horn. I sent them out to the islands where they were to begin
their fleet exercises under the command of Admiral Limpus.

96 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Our tireless activities gave the Greeks food for thought. They
set about strengthening their fleet, and ordered from France a
dreadnought, which was to be delivered within two years, six
torpedo-boats, and also six new torpedo-boats from German yards.
The construction of these ships meant no danger to us, for the
reason that the Sultan Osman arrived in Constantinople at the end
of August, so that we had already secured superiority over the
Greek fleet. Five or six months later the arrival of the Reschadieh
would increase that superiority, and we were all the more sure of
our advantage, because the Fatih would balance the Greek dread-
nought ordered in France. The Greeks themselves realised the
situation only too well, and did everything they possibly could to
prevent the arrival of the Sultan Osman in Stambul.

After the Goeben came in the middle of May, 1914, the English
sent the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean fleet, Admiral
de Robeck, to present his respects to His Majesty. He came on
the Invincible. Either during his official visit to the Admiralty or
in one of the various conferences we had together the Admiral
asked me what steps we had taken to secure the safe arrival of
the Sultan Osman in Constantinople.

" The Greeks are terribly frightened of the arrival of the Sultan
Osman in Turkish waters/' he told me, " and they are doing
everything they possibly can to protect themselves against this
danger. According to my information, if their agent failed to
destroy the ship before its last trials in England they are deter-
mined to send a submarine to sink it on its way through the Straits
of Gibraltar, and if this last method fails they will attack it with
their whole fleet immediately it reaches Greek waters. You can't
be careful enough if you want to get your ship/'

To-day I think I must assume that the object of the Admiral in
pressing this advice upon me was to frighten me into giving up
the idea of allowing the Sultan Osman to come to Constantinople
before the Reschadieh was ready, but at the time I thought that
the Admiral gave me this advice out of friendliness, and was point-
ing out the greatness of the peril so that I could take all necessary
measures to avert it.

According to the reports which I received from my agents in
England and Greece, apart from the Admiral's advice, it certainly
seemed necessary to take the most elaborate precautionary

At the Admiralty 97

measures to secure the safety of the Sultan Osman during her
voyage from England to Constantinople.

After I had discussed this matter with Admiral Limpus it was
decided that at the beginning of August our fleet should cruise
into the Mediterranean and meet the Sultan Osman on the latitude
of Crete.

During my visit to France for the French naval manoeuvres I
summoned Reuf Bey, who was in England, to Paris, and gave him
personally secret orders which the Admiral had drawn up in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. These orders
described the route to be taken by the Sultan Osman on its way
through the Straits of Gibraltar and the rendezvous where it was
to meet our fleet.

Unfortunately the English Government laid hands on our
dreadnought on July 21, and fate willed that our flag should never
fly on that magnificent vessel.

THE ATTEMPT AT A FRANCO-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT.

I have already briefly explained that as a result of the Balkan
War the Committee of Unity and Progress adopted the principle
that the old passive policy must be abandoned in favour of an
active foreign and domestic policy. Their reason was that it had
become clear that this was the only way of saving Turkey from the
complications which threatened on every side, building up her
strength and giving her her true place among the nations.

It seems to me necessary to enumerate once more the essential
features of that active policy which drove the Government into the
World War.

From the point of view of domestic politics, the most important
question was to determine the rights of the minority, to use a
current phrase, and to bring about an amicable understanding
between them and the majority. As I have already carefully
explained, a modus Vivendi with the Arabs had already been found,
and if it did not completely satisfy all the Arabian politicians, there
was no doubt that the great mass of Arab Mohammedans,
who were heart and soul in the cause of Islam, regarded it as
adequate.

The racial problem had been finally settled so far as the

98 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Bulgarians were concerned, and not a single Bulgarian was to be
found within the frontiers of the Turkish Empire.

On the other hand, the Greeks, who had childishly given their
King the name of Constantine XIIL, and hoped to revive the
Byzantine Empire, left us in no kind of doubt that a final reckoning
with them was a matter of the immediate future. It therefore seems
necessary to take precautionary measures at once, so that in that
eventuality we should not be at the mercy of Greek treachery within
our own borders.

We therefore began to proceed with the exchange of the Greek
population of the vilayet of Idin for the Mohammedans of Mace-
donia and other regions, and to take in hand the organisation and
increase of our army and navy. We also tried to make agreements
with foreign Powers.

But the most important domestic problem was the Armenian. I
wish I could convince my readers by all the proofs available to me
that it was the Armenian question, above all others, which the
Committee of Unity and Progress desired to solve in a way which
would satisfy and benefit the Armenians. I can produce those
proofs, and also recount the causes which prevented our success,
but it seems to me better to deal with this extremely important
matter in a special chapter.

Whenever an Armenian question cropped up in Turkey there was
always a Russian question behind it. At the meeting of the Jenikoi
Commission (which was composed of the First Dragomans of the
Great Powers), which had to decide on the form and nature of the
reform to be introduced in Armenia, the Russian First Dragoman
always put forward a maximum programme, while the German
First Dragoman advocated a minimum programme. The First
Dragomans of England and France, on the one side, and Austria
and Italy on the other, played the mediator. After several meetings
the commission failed to reach a final decision, and laid a minimum
and maximum programme before their Embassies. Subsequently
the discussion was continued at the Sublime Porte between the
German and Russian Ambassadors and the Grand Vizier, while the
other Ambassadors withdrew from active participation in the
affair, explaining that they would accept any decision ultimately
reached by the two Ambassadors representing the extreme points
of view.

At the Admiralty 99

This business proves quite clearly that if we were to be safe
against Russia we had no other resource but to win the sympathy
of France and England, and particularly of public opinion in those
two countries. We never dreamed of a general European war,
and still less that Germany would declare war on Russia on our
behalf. What we said to ourselves was this : " What has Germany
been doing to allow our closest ally to rob us of all our illusions
by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina a few days after the pro-
mulgation of our constitution ? Is not Italy, which has suddenly
attacked Tripoli, an ally of Germany, though apparently none too
loyal an ally ? Did not Italy declare that she was only acting as
Austria-Hungary had acted? The Germans want to exploit us
economically, and will stop at nothing to prevent their interests
being menaced. The only purpose of their intervention in the
matter of the Armenian reforms is to prevent Russian influence
extending beyond the Bagdad railway. Otherwise it would never
occur to the Germans to aid us if danger threatened. "

Such were the ideas in our minds. Besides, at the time when
we were devoting our attention to getting the money needed for
Turkey's development and progress, had not Germany roundly
declared that they could not help us in this matter, and that our
only chance was to remain on good terms with France and keep
open the door through which we could get money from the Paris
Bourse ?

In these circumstances we were determined to cultivate the
best relations, primarily with the French, but also with the English,
and to convince them beyond any possible doubt that our only
desire was to introduce serious reforms at home and assure our-
selves of their protection against a Russian attack.

We were extremely anxious that the negotiations of the
Foreign Ministry and Hakki Pasha should lead to a final solution
of the various questions at issue between the English and our-
selves. We had delimited the Turkish and English zones of
influence in the Gulf of Basra and in the southern part of the
Arabian peninsula, and we had also solved the problem of Aden
in a way which satisfied the English.

We had not opposed the English demands in the question of
the extension of the Bagdad Railway to Basra, nor in the matter
of shipping routes on the Euphrates and Tigris. We gave English

G2

ioo Memories of a Turkish Statesman

companies the concessions for petroleum in Mesopotamia, for the
extension of the Aidin Railway, the construction of several new
sections and the development of the harbours of Trebizond and
Samsun. As I have said before, we had called in an English
Inspector-General and several English inspectors to reform the
Ministry of the Interior and the organisation of the Civil Service.
Mr. Graves, who had been in Turkey for a long time, wras selected
for the post of Inspector-General. The reorganisation of our
customs system was entrusted to Sir Richard Crawford, and we
had decided to appoint a number of English inspectors for our
customs offices.

We had considerably enlarged the powers of the English naval
mission which we had called in for the reorganisation of our navy,
and we now began to enjoy the fruits of its labours. Sir Louis
Mallet, the English ambassador, with whom I was on the best
of terms, told me how grateful the Admiral was to me, and that
he was rapidly coming to the conclusion that the Turkish navy
had a future.

We had handed over the reorganisation of our arsenals to
English companies, the administrative committee of which was
under the chairmanship of gentlemen like Sir Adam Block, long
known as an advocate of Anglo-Turkish friendship. Sir Adam
Block often told me how grateful he was that the agreement
between the companies and the Turkish Admiralty had been
observed so meticulously, and that the matter was now on a really
sound footing.

Unfortunately, owing to Russian opposition, England declined
our proposal that we should call in English officials to administer
the vilayets inhabited by Armenians.

As we attributed the unpopularity of our political party in
England to the intrigues of the First Dragoman, FitzMaurice,
and the Military Attache, Tyrrel, in the days of Ambassador Sir
Gerald Lowther, Prince Said Pasha at once asked the new English
Ambassador, Sir Louis Mallet, to transfer these gentlemen from
Constantinople. The Ambassador promised that it should be done
immediately, and both of them left our country a month or so later.
Henceforth we had most active and amicable relations with Sir
Louis Mallet, who was a particularly fine man, thoroughly honest,
and very kind.

At the Admiralty 3 101

• » T ,j t * » , • 0 I * J . J j ' » •> j J

We strengthened all our private ties and endeavoured to remove
English prejudices with regard to the> Turks in the hope of finding
some means of bringing England back to her former views,
England, which had always shown herself disposed to support and
strengthen Turkey, but had revolutionised her traditional policy
as a result of her understanding with Russia. Apart from our
efforts in Constantinople to get on friendly terms with the
Ambassador, the staff of the Embassy and a number of other
Englishmen, we neglected no opportunity of trying to establish
good relations with gentlemen like Sir Thomas Barclay, one of
the strongest opponents of the Anglo-Russian understanding, and
an advocate of an Anglo-Turkish association, and other important
Englishmen.

The Government in general and its individual members worked
tirelessly, both officially and in private, to strengthen the bonds
of friendship with the English, and also let no opportunity slip
of bringing about a rapprochement with France.

The reorganisation of our gendarmerie had long been com-
mitted to the French General Baumann. His powers were
continually being extended, and with a view to pleasing the French
he was also asked to reorganise the gendarmerie of the Lebanon,
which had hitherto held a special position.

As the construction of the roads of the Ottoman Empire had
been entrusted to a French company, the Ministry of Public Works
engaged a number of French engineers. Their pay was to be
increased.

For the purpose of putting our financial house in order, we
conferred wide powers on the financial reform committee we had
accepted a short time before, and did everything in our power to
ensure that no finance bill should be laid before the Chamber of
Deputies until it had been approved by this commission.

With a view to keeping our finance officials under continuous
control and encouraging their sense of duty and responsibility
we appointed a Frenchman, Monsieur Joly, Inspector-General of
Finance, and gave him a number of French officials to assist
him.

At that time the desire to win the friendship of England and
France was so strong that we should not have hesitated even to
entrust the organisation of our army to a French mission if

102 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

that had been in any way possible. But it was, in fact, impossible.
In the first place a large number of our officers had completed
their training in Germany, and the rest of them had been trained
and educated according to German military methods. It is a fact
recognised by all experts that when the organisation and training
of an army have proceeded on certain principles it is impossible
to revolutionise that organisation offhand, and particularly to force
new methods upon it, without great confusion. In the second
place Germany had been asked by us, in Mahmud Shefket Pasha's
time, to send a military mission to reorganise our army, and the
request had been put into writing. It was not open to us to retrace
our steps after we had once taken that course.

Besides, it would have been very foolish to offend a State which
had no evil designs upon us in order to please other governments
which, very probably, contemplated doing us a bad turn. For
these reasons we had no intention of reversing our decision so
far as the army was concerned, and we paid no attention what-
ever to the noisy agitation which followed on the arrival of Liman
von Sanders' military mission.

While we were thus giving the French all the material
advantages they demanded of us in the negotiations for the loan,
we endeavoured to influence public opinion in France in our
favour.

From the technical point of view, serious objections could be
urged against having warships of different types, but notwith-
standing this drawback, we did not hesitate to order six destroyers
from the Havre yards and two submarines from Creusot in order
to please the French.

We also ordered from France a number of mountain guns as
soon as the superiority of the French mountain gun to that of
Krupp had been ascertained by our leading artillery expert, General
Hassan Riza Pasha. We entrusted the establishment of our naval
flying school to French experts, and a contract for twelve seaplanes
was given to a French company.

Lastly, I founded — with great success — a Franco-Turkish
friendship committee, which was to meet alternately in Constanti-
nople and Paris. In Constantinople I was to be president of this
committee, while in Paris the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Cruppi, was to be chairman.

At the Admiralty 103

The statutes for the organisation of this committee were drawn
up in Constantinople by a commission which I called the " Founda-
tion Committee." Many well-known Frenchmen and Turks were
members of it. After the principles had been worked out and the
committee had informed the Ministry of the Interior of its con-
vocation, the inauguration took place in the club rooms of the
Union Frangaise in Pera, and the election of the sub-committees
then took place. The programme contemplated by the committee
was so comprehensive that, if it had been followed up and carried
into execution, it would have proved the most effective agent for
improving Franco-Turkish relations in the next year or two.

One day, about the middle of June, 1914, when I was calling at
the French Embassy, Monsieur Bompard said to me :

" The French Government have observed the different efforts
you have been making to improve Franco-Turkish relations, and
want to invite you to France to make your personal acquaintance
and introduce you to the French nation. Would the Turkish
Government like an invitation to be present at the great French
naval manoeuvres which are to be held in the middle of July?
Before I ask the Grand Vizier, I should like to be certain of your
approval. "

I replied that if the Grand Vizier agreed and His Majesty the
Sultan gave me his permission, I should accept the invitation with
the greatest pleasure.

A few days later Monsieur Bompard communicated the French
Government's invitation officially to the Sublime Porte.

It was at this very moment that the Serajevo murder took place. «/
I asked His Highness, the Grand Vizier, for instructions as to
what line I was to take in Paris, particularly in my conferences
with the Foreign Minister.

" As you are quite familiar with our political views/' he replied,
" you will emphasise at every suitable opportunity how much
importance we attach to the friendship of France and the advan-
tages we hope to derive from French policy in connection with the
approaching settlement of the question of the islands, a question
of vital importance to us. You must do everything in your power
to draw the attention of the Foreign Minister to this ticklish
question/'

I left Constantinople, accompanied by two naval officers, in

104 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

the last days of June and went straight to Paris, where I arrived
early in July.

In Paris I found Wassif and Reuf Bey, whom I had asked to
meet me. When I gave Reuf Bey his instructions to arrange for
the gunnery and speed trials of the Sultan Osman at the earliest
possible moment he told me that he had observed that the English
were in a very peculiar frame of mind. They seemed to be always
searching for some new excuse for delaying the completion and
delivery of the warship. I replied that we, too, must keep all our
wits about us in this matter, for it was essential that we should get
possession of the ship as soon as possible.

The constructing company now informed us that they could not
fix two of the fourteen guns of which the ship's armament was to
consist by the time previously agreed upon. I gave Reuf Bey a
crowd of instructions, and also my answer to the company in which
I declared my readiness to allow the trials to proceed without
the two guns, which could then be fitted in Constantinople.
I sent the Bey back to England and kept Wassif Bey alone
with me.

After staying two days in Paris I went to Toulon, where I met
Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Frenjch Fleet. Together we went on board the dreadnought
Courbet, his flag-ship. I shall never forget those three days and
nights of fleet manoeuvres on the coast of the beautiful Riviera.
I could not speak too highly of the hospitality shown me by the
Admiral, a real old sailor.

There was a review of the Marines, and after three days I bade
farewell to the Admiral and returned by rail. After passing three
or four days visiting gun and rifle establishments and submarine
construction yards, I went back to Paris. Nor did I omit to visit
the yards at Le Havre before the I4th July.

During my visit to Paris, I several times called on the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Viviani. On my second call he suddenly said
with a look full of meaning :

' Your Excellency, though I am very anxious to discuss several
extremely important matters with you, the debates now taking
place in the Chamber are absorbing my attention to such a degree
that I cannot attend to anything else. It is very important that
I should go to Russia with the President of the Republic. The

At the Admiralty 105

Socialists will oppose the idea and refuse to vote the necessary
credits for the voyage. I've given Monsieur de Margerie, the
Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry, the necessary
instructions, and asked him to discuss everything with Your
Excellency. I'll be grateful if you will grant his request to see
you."

I thought my hopes and desires were drawing nearer to
realisation, and was very happy at the idea. The meeting took
place shortly afterwards at the Foreign Office.

The first thing M. de Margerie told me was how gratefully all
my efforts for a Turco-French rapprochement had been received
both by the Government and by public opinion, and that the
misunderstandings which had arisen between the two peoples might
now be considered as removed.

I interrupted him with the remark: "If you don't mind,
Monsieur le Directeur, let's get straight to business. You know
that the Turkish Empire has been greatly weakened by the
numerous attacks to which it has been subjected. It has not
only emerged quite helpless out of the Balkan War, but has had to
sacrifice almost the whole of its European territory and most of
the islands. We are now devoting all our efforts to heal its wounds
and breathe new life into our nation. But the present state of
affairs condemns all these efforts to failure. The result is that we
are under an imperious duty to recover from this precarious
position.

" I want to speak first of the question of the islands, which
is a subject of dissension between us and our Greek friends. You
consider it a wise policy always to back the Greeks and give them
your sympathy in the hope that they may prove of use to you in
the future. But if you will be good enough to look at a map
you will see that one day we shall be in a position to be more useful
to you than the Greeks. The Ottoman Government says to itself :
4 The object of the policy of France and England is to forge an iron
ring around the Central Powers/ That ring is closed except in
the south-west. If Turkey associated herself with the plans of
the Entente, Bulgaria, which would then be left entirely isolated
in the Balkans, would necessarily be compelled to come in too.

If you want to close your iron ring once and for all, you must
try to find some solution of this question of the islands between

io6 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

us and the Greeks. You must take us into your Entente and at
the same time protect us against the terrible perils threatening us
from Russia. If you support us in our upward strivings, you will
soon have a very faithful ally in the East ! It seems to me that
the Serajevo crime may lead to a world war. At such a moment it
is of the very highest importance that decisions of this kind should
be taken quickly."

The proposal was straight and unambiguous ; in the question of
the islands a solution must be found acceptable to Greeks and
Turks alike, then an Alliance with Turkey, and Germany is
completely cut off from the road to the East.

After a moment's reflection, M. de Margerie asked me what
was the solution of the islands question which we desired. I
replied that the archipelago, including the Dodecanese (which
must be restored to us by Italy), could be granted autonomy under
the suzerainty of Turkey, and its revenues could be applied solely
to its own needs. Exemption from military service and a number
of other privileges might also be conceded.

Ultimately M. de Margerie replied:

" I consider the proposal you have made with regard to the
question of the islands as worthy of the most serious consideration.
It seems to me quite possible that the problem should finally be
solved on that basis. You have a very accurate idea of the iron
ring we are thinking of forging round the Central Powers. But
before we can conclude an alliance with you we must have the
approval of our allies, and that approval seems to me very
doubtful. The Turkish Government's proposal is certainly frank
and clear. I will communicate your observations to our Allies
before I go with the President of the Republic and the Minister-
President on their voyage to Russia. We will give our
Ambassador the necessary instructions when we and our Allies
have made our joint decision. For the moment, unfortunately,
the French Government cannot take any initiative on its own."

It was obvious enough that this answer was only a veiled refusal.
I understood perfectly that France was convinced that it was quite
impossible for us to escape the iron claws of Russia, and that under
no circumstances would she vouchsafe us her help.

That evening my friend, Georges Remond, who went with me
everywhere during my visit in France, asked me whether I was

At the Admiralty 107

satisfied with the result of my conference. I simply replied: " I
could never have believed I was in for so gross a disappointment ! "

When I left Paris on my return journey on July i8th, Georges
Remond gave me a pamphlet on the station ; the French editor of
this document, whose name I cannot remember, wrote under a
pseudonym somewhat in the following strain :

" Djemal Pasha has been in Paris. He has attended the
manoeuvres of the Mediterranean Fleet. The official and semi-
official authorities have given him the warmest of welcomes, and
he has been decorated with the order of the Legion of Honour.
All this is very nice ! But what are the actual promises which
Djemal Pasha, who loves his country above anything else, can
take home with him from the French Government ? From all we
hear Djemal Pasha is one of the greatest Turkish patriots. All
the marks of favour showered upon him personally cannot make
him forget the advantages in hope of securing which he has come
to us. If Djemal Pasha now goes home without having done
anything for his country we shall have no right to be angry if he
finds himself compelled to take steps which may not be to the taste
of France."

What remarkably sound judgment that French editor had !

After my return I gave His Highness the Grand Vizier and my
friends a detailed report of my conversation with M. de Margerie
and the conclusions it had brought me to.

THE TURCO-GERMAN ALLIANCE.

The Turco-German alliance was not concluded during the
war, as people have believed hitherto. It was certainly signed on
August 2nd, 1914, but negotiations had been in progress long
before the war.

A few days after my return to Constantinople Talaat Bey said /
to me :

' What would you say, Pasha, if Germany proposed an alliance
with us on such and such terms ? Would you accept it ? You can
see for yourself that we have nothing to hope for from France.
As France has declined, would you decline Germany's suggestion
too?"

I immediately answered:

io8 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

" I should not hesitate to accept any alliance which rescued
Turkey from her present position of isolation. "

During the great military review on July 23rd, which took place
on the Levend Tchiflik on the occasion of the national festival,
the German Ambassador, Baron von Wangenheim, came up to me.

" Djemal Pasha," he said, " just look at the amazing results
achieved by German officers in quite a short time. You have
now a Turkish army which can be compared with the best organised
armies in the world! All German officers are at one in praising
the moral strength of the Turkish soldier, and indeed it has
proved itself beyond all expectation. We can claim we have won
a great victory if we could call ourselves the ally of a Government
which has such an army at its disposal ! '

In thanking the Ambassador for this compliment I had not
the slightest suspicion of the negotiations which had been in
progress for a Turco-German alliance.

A few days later, just as I was entering my car at the door of
my house in Schichli, I saw another car in which Enver Pasha,
Talaat Bey, and Halil Bey were seated, turning the corner of
Osman Bey's garden into the street leading to Enver Pasha's
house. The car was coming from the Maslok direction. I
wondered what on earth could bring them there at that time of
day, and almost certainly from the Grand Vizier's palace in
Yenikoi. I at once suspected that my friends might be engaged
in the discussion of affairs which they did not want me to
know.

Up to that time nothing had happened which could have started
such a suspicion. When I got home I rang up Enver Pasha on the
telephone. I asked where he had been going at so late an hour.
He replied that he had been whiling away the time by paying a
visit to the Grand Vizier, and as he had met Talaat Bey and Halil
Bey they had driven home together. The way in which he gave
me this answer only confirmed my suspicions.

Next afternoon I was summoned to a Council of Ministers
which was in progress at the Grand Vizier's palace. When I
reached Aya Pasha's kiosk it was raining and blowing so hard that
it was impossible for me to proceed in my car. Constantinople had
not known such a storm for a very long time. I returned to the
Ministry and went to Yenikoi in my motor launch.

At the Admiralty 109

"Where have you been, Djemal Pasha?" said the Grand
Vizier. " We waited for you a long time and the Ministers have
gone now. As we were told by the Ministry that you were on your
way we feared that you had met with some accident in the storm.
I'm going to tell you something new which will certainly be a
pleasant surprise to you. Can you think what it is ? "

" I suspect/' I replied after some consideration, " that it
relates to what you, Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, and Halil Bey have
just decided upon when I was absent, though I haven't the slightest
idea what it is."

" The German Government has offered us an alliance," he said,
" and as the proposal seems to us in the interests of the country
we have signed the compact with Ambassador von Wangenheim
to-day ! Now, are you satisfied ? "

The importance of the news, for which I was not prepared,
moved me to the depths.

" If the terms of the treaty are really in accordance with the
interests of the country it may be considered an outstanding
political success," I replied.

" It is an agreement which had due regard for the interests of
both parties, and secures their rights in a manner which no other
Government has yet done," he said.

He went into his cabinet and drew from a drawer in his writing-
table the treaty, which comprised several articles. I read it, and
saw that it was an excellent compact between two independent
Governments on the basis of equality of rights.

" What about Austria? " I asked.

" A few minutes after my colleagues went away, and about
half an hour before you came, I received a letter from Ambassador
Pallavicini in which he told me that his Government agreed with
every point of the compact we had made with Germany. Here's
the letter ! "

He showed it to me.

" And Italy? " I could not help enquiring.

" As Germany has not yet informed Italy of our entry into
the Triple Alliance I have no news for the moment on that point.
Germany will first prepare the ground, and we have no doubt that
Italy will accept our alliance in the same way that Austria has
done."

no Memories of a Turkish Statesman

I could not help asking for what reason it had been thought
necessary to keep me out of the negotiations, which must certainly
have been in progress for some considerable time to have led to
such a conclusion.

The Grand Vizier passed lightly over my question with the
remark that he had conducted the negotiations personally, had told
his colleagues nothing whatever about them until the affair took
definite shape, and that they had only learned of the matter that
very day. " Djavid Bey," he added, " still knows nothing about
it. I have asked him to come here. He is on his way, and when
he arrives I shall show him the treaty/'

I asked him whether all the Ministers now knew about the affair.

" As there are individual members of the Ministry who are
frightened of a scheme of such importance and might divulge this
state secret — a matter which is highly undesirable at the present
moment — I thought it my duty to inform only His Highness the
Sheik ul Islam, Halil, Talaat and Djavid Bey, Enver Pasha, and
yourself. The other Ministers have not yet been initiated. Ibrahim
Bey and Shukri Bey will be told by Talaat Bey, and the secret is
to be kept from the others. You will appreciate that in so delicate
a matter we shall have to proceed with the greatest caution. Now
you know everything, and you have not even given me your own
opinion ! " he said by way of conclusion.

" May God make this of real use to the country ! El Hair ft
ma vag'a,"* I replied. And that' was all I said.

I was not slow to congratulate the Grand Vizier on his success
in concluding such an alliance, which undoubtedly represented a
fact of the highest historical significance.

The importance of this occurrence gave me much to think
about. I may say that I did not sleep a wink that night. I kept
the general political situation before my eyes, and asked myself
what had been the real motives of the Government, for I saw
myself faced with a situation I had never even imagined hitherto.

Judging by all the signs, a terrible conflict at a very early date
between the countries of the Alliance and those of the Entente
seemed inevitable. If at such a time we were not bound to either
side, it would always be possible for us to throw in our lot with

* An Arab expression, meaning that a fait accompli is of good augury.

At the Admiralty in

the party which offered us the greater advantages. And now we
had taken our decision beforehand and chosen our partner. The
result was we had deprived ourselves of our freedom of choice.
Was the party in whose favour we had decided such as our national
aspirations dictated? If we had waited, would not its opponent
have made us better, more profitable proposals ? By accepting
those proposals should we not have rendered our country a greater
service ?

In spite of every possible outward expression of sympathy,
Germany had never actually come to our help, and was always re-
commending us to maintain the best possible relations with France.
Why was she now endeavouring to form an alliance with us ? And
why an alliance which assigned the same status to the Ottoman
Government as to Germany and Austria ? What had moved the
two Powers to such a sacrifice ? All these questions passed through
my mind and I found no answer to them.

At length I came to the following conclusion. There is one
fact that no one in the world can deny — that Russia is the hereditary ,
enemy of the Ottoman Empire, and that her greatest desire is the /
possession of Constantinople. It is absolutely impossible to make'
her abandon that ideal. After the Treaty of Berlin, and Czarism
had fully realised that it would be impossible for Russia to get
Constantinople, her ambitions had been turned towards India. As
the artful policy of England had then blocked her path in that
quarter, she turned her eyes to the Far East. But the hand which
she stretched out to Port Arthur received a hard knock from the
Japanese, and she had to withdraw the bleeding member. Thus
her only course was to return to the object of her century-old
ambition, and was making her preparations to begin her last
mighty onslaught on poor Turkey, the booty for which she had
been yearning for hundreds of years. Her allies, so far from
opposing her design, were now entirely in agreement with that
design. The circumstances prevailing at the time of the Crimean
War and the Treaty of Berlin had now wholly changed. England,
mistress of Egypt, looked with far more jealous eyes at Germany's
economic plans in the Gulf of Basra, than at Russia's ambitions
with regard to Constantinople and the whole of Anatolia. Russia
was to have Constantinople as compensation for Mesopotamia.
As for France, she was not of those who would oppose the.

ii2 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

partition of Turkey so long as she was given a free hand in
Syria.

The fundamental plan to be pursued by Russia, which saw the
realisation of her schemes at hand, was to isolate Turkey and
always do everything which would keep her weak.

That had been the only reason and motive for M. de Margerie's
refusal, or rather the refusal which Viviani had communicated
through him. If England and France desired to please Russia
they could not act otherwise. That was why I, who, indeed,
expected no advantages of any kind from Germany, had received
a categorical refusal from France, to which I had turned in order
to have some security against Russia. In declining to send the
officials for which we had asked for the eastern provinces of Asia
Minor, England had declared that she could not go against the
wishes of Russia. Besides, one of England's most fervent desires
was that the title " Khalif of Islam " held by the Ottoman
sovereign should be transferred to some insignificant individual in
one of the countries under her influence. The power of the Turkish
Sultan had thoroughly worried her in the last few years.

In view of all these considerations, I had turned to France in
order to secure her support and that of England in case we found
ourselves exposed to attack by Russia. While I was in the grip of
these phantoms my colleagues had found themselves presented
with extremely plain and important proposals — an association with
the Powers of the Triple Alliance, or, to speak more accurately,
an alliance with Germany.

A mighty Empire like Germany was offering us an alliance
based on equality of status, we who five or six months before had
tried to escape from our isolation and associate ourselves with a
group of Powers by making an attempt — a vain attempt — to form
an alliance with Bulgaria, from which we promised ourselves
great profit.

I myself had followed a policy favourable to the Entente group,
but had I found myself personally faced with such an offer would
I have discovered the moral force to refuse it ? Would such a
refusal have been reasonable ?

Let us consider the matter frankly and calmly.

What was the position of the two groups of Powers so far as
Turkey wa s concerned ?

At the Admiralty 113

Among the Entente Powers, England had got Egypt com-
pletely in her power, and would undoubtedly strive to possess
Mesopotamia, possibly Palestine also, and secure her exclusive
influence over the whole of the Arabian Peninsula.

Russia was so utterly anti-Turkish that it was quite unnecessary
to look round for proofs.

All this did not exactly suggest benevolent intentions towards
Turkey !

As regards the Triple Alliance group, Austria and Italy had
nothing more to ask from Turkey. They had already done that
country all the harm they possibly could. Thus they "coveted no
more. The most that could be said was that Italy might be
indulging in visions which were in conflict with those of the
Entente Governments. (With regard to the coasts of Adalia and
Phoenicia, for example.)

Germany, whatever else might be said, was the only power
which desired to see Turkey strong. Germany's interests could
be secured by the strengthening of Turkey, and that alone.
Germany could not lay hands on Turkey as if she were a colony,
for neither the geographical position nor her resources made that
possible. The result was that Germany regarded Turkey as a link
in the commercial and trading chain, and thus became her stoutest
champion against the Entente Governments which wanted to
dismember her, particularly as the elimination of Turkey would
mean the final " encirclement " of Germany. Her south-western
front remained open thanks to Turkey alone. The only way in
which she could escape the pressure of the iron ring was to prevent
the dismemberment of Turkey.

Thus we had two groups of Powers before us, the ideal of one
of which was to get us in its power, while the aim of the other
was to make friendly approaches to us in view of certain prospective
advantages, and to conclude an alliance with us based on equal
rights and obligations.

Could this offer be rejected?

In the first place, none of the small Balkan States would dare
to assert itself with a view to intervening in the domestic affairs of
a government which was a member of so powerful an alliance,
so that we should, at any rate, be left in peace.

In the second place, no member of the Entente group would

H

ii4 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

venture to lay hands on us for fear of starting a general European
war. Above all, Germany's savants, her art and commercial
experts would place their services at the disposal of Turkey in the
way she desired. Thus, within a short time we should be able to
obtain our release from the bonds of the capitulations.

Although this alliance made us the enemy of the Entente Powers
in case of a European war, as long as the conflict was postponed
for between five and ten years we should have brought up the
fortifications of the Straits and our different coasts to such a
standard, made our army so strong, and developed our country to
such a degree that we need not hesitate to take our part in such a
war.

But if the great war were to break out in a week or two, or a
month or two, in view of our weakened condition at the moment
should we not find ourselves in a terrible position if we were
involved in a war with France, England, and Russia ?

Had not Germany made up her mind so quickly to conclude an
alliance with us just because she suspected that war would break
out in the immediate future ?

There can be no doubt about that ! To compel Germany to
enter into an alliance with us, based upon equality of rights and
each and every term of the Triple Alliance compact, she must
have been alarmed at the preparations being made by her
opponents. She must have • been feeling the necessity of
strengthening her position in every possible way. Otherwise it
was inconceivable that a rationally-minded state should take upon
its shoulders such a burden as Turkey merely for the beaux
yeux of the Turks and from a desire to oblige the Turkish
sovereign.

The outbreak of a general European War in the very near
future must be regarded as a great misfortune for us.

Yet when the pros and cons were considered, it would
undoubtedly be more profitable for the country not to abandon
the scheme. If I had been in my friends' shoes I should have
taken that course and done exactly what they did — i.e., accept this
alliance without hesitation. At the same time I should have taken
good care to insert certain reservations in the treaty. For
example, I should have preferred that one stipulation for our
acceptance should be that if the European War broke out within

At the Admiralty 115

two years of the day of signature and the exchange of documents
Turkey should merely observe a benevolent neutrality towards the
Triple Alliance and enter into an obligation to give it moral
support by mobilising her army and closing the Straits to war and
trading vessels. If the war lasted more than two years Turkey
would intervene in the struggle with the Entente. If a general
war were declared more than two years after the signature of the
treaty, Turkey would be under an obligation to carry out the
terms of the alliance at once.

Of course, I cannot say whether Germany would have accepted
these terms or not.

After considering everything very carefully from every point
of view I repeated to myself the words I had used to the Grand
Vizier: " May God let this alliance turn out profitably for
us!" Ultimately I entirely approved the new situation thus
created.

As these memoirs of mine have clearly revealed when and how
the alliance between the Ottoman Government and Germany was
concluded, everyone can judge of the falsity of the versions given
to the world by the American Ambassador, Morgenthau, and by
Mandelstam, the First Dragoman of the Russian Embassy, and
how they are based on nothing but street-corner chatter.

AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR.
THE DECLARATION OF WAR AND THE MOBILISATION OF THE TURKISH

ARMIES.

AFTER the reception of the Serbian Note, which she regarded as
unsatisfactory, Austria mobilised a portion of her forces, and as
Russia replied generally with mobilisation, and thereupon
Germany and France proceeded to mobilise also, there was no
longer any doubt that we, too, would be involved in a general
European War.

After the German declaration of war on Russia, and the war
began on August ist, 1914, we saw ourselves bound by our treaty,
the ink of which was not yet dry, to intervene in the struggle at
once. The agreement made our intervention independent of the
causes of the war. We had to intervene with all our forces in a

n6 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

war in which Germany and Austria engaged with all theirs. Yet
I was extremely anxious to postpone our entry in the conflict for
as long as possible. I developed my views in the Council of
Ministers which at this time met practically every evening in
Prince Said Halim's palace in Yenikoi (Enver Pasha, Talaat,
Halil, Djavid Bey, and myself, with the Prince presiding). I
said that not only would it be of no benefit to Germany for us to
take an active part in the war before our mobilisation was complete,
but it would simply mean suicide on our part. If the English,
French, and Russians, who knew perfectly well that we had not
a single man at the Dardanelles, in Constantinople, or on the
Russian frontier, made a sudden attack on the Dardanelles and
the Bosphorus, simultaneously advanced on Erzerum, and after
occupying Constantinople and Erzerum approached the interior
of Anatolia through Sivas, our army would be unable to complete
its mobilisation during the war, and the downfall of the Ottoman
Empire would be decreed at the very outset.

My colleagues admitted the justice of my reasoning, and
brought the German Ambassador round to the same point of view.
So after discussion in the Council of Ministers, we decided to
proclaim the neutrality of Turkey, though the country would
commence a general mobilisation of the army in order to enforce
that neutrality against either side. We immediately translated
words into deeds. Even those of our colleagues in the Ministry
who did not know of our alliance with Germany and the obligations
it involved approved the general mobilisation of the army as a
wise precaution.

Two or three days after the mobilisation decree I took over the
command of the Ottoman 2nd Army, while retaining my office
at the Admiralty.

On the ist or 2nd of August, after Turkey had paid the last
instalment for the Sultan Osman, the English First Lord of the
Admiralty prevented the Turkish flag being hoisted on the ship,
and commandeered both the Sultan Osman and the Reschadieh.
Never, never shall I forget my mental anguish when I heard this
frightful news. That day I clearly realised that the apparently
friendly advice of Admiral Robeck, Commander of the English
Mediterranean Fleet, on his visit to Constantinople, and the
thousand and one difficulties raised by Armstrong to delay the

At the Admiralty 117

completion of the ship had been nothing but pretexts which, once
for all, revealed the design England had long cherished of making
these ships her own.

Even if the English Government had a right to commandeer
ships under construction in their arsenals in war, they were not at
war when they took our ships. Indeed, they had not even begun
to mobilise their army and fleet. This question was debated for
a very long time at this period, but as England's wrongdoing was
admitted even by her own diplomatists, I see no reason to open
this question again here.

This incident justified the mobilisation of our army, and thus
gave us a good reason for returning a tu quoque answer to the
Entente Ambassadors who found this general mobilisation un- ^
necessary. They justified the Ottoman Government once more x
when, as I shall now relate, they permitted the Goeben and
Breslau to enter the Sea of Marmora.

THE CRUISE OF THE " GOEBEN " AND " BRESLAU " THROUGH THE
DARDANELLES AND THEIR ARRIVAL IN CONSTANTINOPLE.

Several German officers (and in particular the aides-de-camp
of Marshal Liman von Sanders), who more or less knew about
the Turco-German alliance, but did not know the reason why
Turkey had for the time being declared her neutrality, came to me
with unreasonable and untimely suggestions, and regarded me
with deep dislike and even enmity, as they supposed I belonged to
the party which alone was restraining the Government from in-
tervening in the war at once. As, of course, they did not dare to
show any want of respect, I went on as if I had not noticed their
unfriendly behaviour.

One day we were on the quay by Prince Said Halim Pasha's
house. A steamer coming from Russia and full of mobilised men
was passing through the Bosphorus, setting a course for the Sea
of Marmora. A number of German officers and members of the
German Embassy Staff were also on the quay. They were discus-
sing the passage of this steamer. One of Liman von Sanders'
aides-de-camp remarked in a fairly audible voice so that I was
bound to hear :

" If His Excellency the Ottoman Naval Minister had refused

n8 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

to allow that ship to pass through the Dardanelles, our comrades
on the western front would have at least fourteen thousand fewer
French soldiers to cope with. This very profitable initiative lies
exclusively in his hands ! '

Of course I acted as if I had heard nothing, and the ship
continued its voyage. ^

On August 8th, 1914, Captain Ha'mann, Naval Attache to the
German Embassy, came to the Ministry. He informed me that
the German Mediterranean squadron, pursued by the English, was
withdrawing in the direction of the Dardanelles, and as, to judge
by his reports, the Goeben had practically no more coal, they were
compelled to send some from Constantinople. But as there was
no English coal available he asked me to lend him five or six
thousand tons from our naval depots. I immediately telephoned
to the Grand Vizier, Enver Pasha, and Talaat Bey to ascertain
their opinion.

They replied that I should agree. I ordered that the required
quantity of coal should be supplied from the Derindji depots, and
also sent a naval labour section to assist with the loading of the
vessel. It was loaded within a few hours, and then set out for the
^Egean Sea.

As usual, the evening of August nth found us assembled in
council at dinner at the Prince's house. Talaat, Djavid, and I had
been the first to arrive. Enver Pasha, who came in later, remarked
with that quiet smile which was peculiar to him : " Unto us a son
is born ! ' Of course we did not know what he meant. To put
an end to our feverish impatience he continued: " The Goeben
and the Breslau appeared off the Dardanelles this morning, and
as they were being followed by the English fleet, they asked that
they should be allowed to pass through the Narrows. I granted
the permission, as I did not wish to condemn the ships
of an allied State to certain destruction, and by now the
ships are in the Dardanelles under the protection of the forts
of the Narrows. The sequel is that we are faced with a political
problem. We shall have to come to a decision about it this
evening !"

It was certainly a very ticklish question. Two ships of one
of the combatants had fled into Turkish waters.

According to the rules of neutrality, we were bound either to

At the Admiralty 119

make them leave our waters within twenty-four hours or to
disarm and intern them in one of our harbours.

As Germany's ally we could not for a moment consider the first
alternative, as it would have been equivalent to handing the ships
over. Besides, such a course conflicted as much with our interests
as our duty.

Yet, as regards the second alternative, it was certain that the
Germans would never consent. Looked at from that point of view,
the Allies were entitled to consider our action a casus belli and
declare war upon us. Of course that was bound to happen sooner
or later, and we should be forced to intervene in the war. Yet the
state of our army compelled us to postpone that intervention for
as long as possible.

At this point the French and English Ambassadors called on
the Grand Vizier in a state of great excitement to protest against
the passage of the German warships through the Dardanelles and
against the audacity of their commanders in searching a post
steamer which had left Constantinople the previous evening with a
number of Frenchmen as passengers on board. They alleged that
this was an infringement of the neutrality which the Imperial
Government had declared.

After a very thorough discussion we decided to ask the German
Government to consent to the two ships being disarmed — tempo-
rarily and superficially only. Talaat Bey and Halil Bey went to
the German Embassy in Therapia to communicate our decision to
the Ambassador, von Wangenheim. An hour later they returned"
with the news that the Ambassador had declared that under no
circumstances could he consent. He had consented to the Ottoman
Government's refraining from taking part in the war under the
form of neutrality, but was convinced that the arrival !of the
German ships, compelled to withdraw into Turkish waters, had
completely changed the situation. If this piece of provocation
involved the breaking off of diplomatic relations, or even war
between the Entente and the Ottoman Government, we must
accept it as the logical consequence of events.

Enver Pasha identified himself with the views of the Ambas-
sador, but I insisted that, come what may, we must arrive at some
compromise, so that in view of our position at the moment we
could delay our entry into the war as much as possible.

Memories of a Turkish Statesman

The Grand Vizier and Djavid Bey were of my opinion. Ulti-
mately one of us proposed the following formula: " Could not
the Germans have previously sold us these units ? Could not their
arrival be regarded as delivery under the contract ? '

Everyone heaved a sigh of relief. The ground for a friendly
settlement of the affair had been discovered ! Shortly afterwards
we decided to ask Wangenheim to come to the Prince's house
to hear what we had agreed to do. One of Enver Pasha's
aides-de-camp was sent to the Embassy, and a quarter of
an hour later — after midnight — the Ambassador reached the
palace.

After an hour of lively discussion between the Grand Vizier,
Talaat Bey, and the Ambassador, the latter promised to get into
communication with Berlin the same night and get a favourable
answer before morning. We then decided to wait at the Grand
Vizier's house until the answer arrived. It came about four o'clock
in the morning. It empowered us, on condition that we accepted
Admiral Souchon in the Ottoman service, to say that the ships had
been sold to Turkey. It was not a real, but merely fictitious, sale.
We were informed that as the Emperor could not sell a single ship
in the navy without a decree of the Reichstag, the real sale could
not be carried out until the end of the war and the Reichstag
had conveyed its assent. As a solution which saved appearances
had now been found, the Ministers separated about live o'clock.
All matters of detail were to be left to the Naval Ministry in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.

Early next morning I sent to the papers an official communique
referring to the purchase of the Goeben and Bretlau by the
Government and the arrival of these two ships in the Dardanelles.
I asked the Press to speak enthusiastically of the circumstance that
we had obtained possession of the ships as compensation for the
Sultan Osman and the Reschadiek, of which the English had
robbed us.

The most delicate part of the business, however, was to get
the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, Admiral Limpus, and all
the English officers out -of the fleet without causing excitement
The very next day I had a report from the Admiral in question.
He congratulated the Ottoman Government on having secured
possession of two such vessels, and assured me that as the two

At the Admiralty 121

ships came under his direct command, he would have the selected
officers and men ready within a month to manoeuvre with these
most modern units. I asked the Admiral to call on me, and began
to discuss the matter with him. I asked him that, in view of the
fact that the German Admiral and ships' companies were very
exhausted, so that the date on which they would leave the ship was
still uncertain, he would occupy himself in making out the list of
officers and men who were to be employed on them.

By a stroke of luck it happened that four or five days later I
received a short letter from the Admiral in which he told me that
he was enclosing a copy of a report in English which he had
submitted direct to the Grand Vizier. I had the report translated.
In view of the condition of our fleet and army, he recommended
the Government to preserve the strictest neutrality, and expressed
his opinion that the Turkish officers and men needed at least four
or five years' training instruction before they would be efficient
enough to handle the recently-acquired units. I immediately
replied to the Admiral that he was there solely to reorganise the
fleet, that he was directly responsible to the Ministry, and must
therefore present his reports to that Ministry alone. As those
reports were to concern themselves with the reorganisation of the
fleet and nothing else, he had no authority to recommend any
political course to the Ottoman Government when dealing with the
situation in the navy !

The next day I received a very short reply from the Admiral.
" Your letter shows me the true position. For the future I will
be extremely careful not to exceed the limits you have imposed
for my activities. In any case, I am feeling very tired, and I should
be very grateful to you if you would allow me to spend some time
with my daughter, who is living in Therapia."

I told him that his wish was granted, but also pointed out that
during his absence there might be many misunderstandings in the
fleet between the English officers, mechanics, &c., and the Turkish
crews, and asked him to prevent such occurrences by sending the
officers to the Ministry, so that they could be distributed among the
different sections of the arsenal.

The day after this order was carried not a single English
officer remained on service with our fleet. Thereupon an Imperial
irade was issued, wherein Admiral Souchon was appointed to the

122 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

service of the Ottoman Government with the title of Commander-
in-Chief of the Imperial Fleet. The next day the Goeben and
Breslau, which were now called Jawus anS Midilli, hoisted the
Turkish ensign, entered Stambul harbour, and anchored in the
roads of Moda.

A few days later His Majesty the Sultan, who had gone on
board the yacht Erthogrul, reviewed the Turkish Fleet, which now
definitely included the Jawus and Midilli, during the regatta which
was in progress at the Princes Islands. It is utterly impossible to
describe the enthusiasm and pleasure which seized on the people of
Constantinople in those days. Everyone had confidence in the
military preparations of the Government, and not a Mussulman
was to be found who did not long for the victory of the Germans
and Austrians. This revelation of popular sentiment greatly
pleased the Germans and Austrians and correspondingly aroused
the fury of the English, French, and Russians.

VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH, FRENCH, AND RUSSIAN

AMBASSADORS.

After the arrival of the Goeben and Breslau in the Sea ot
Marmora we had, of course, closed the Straits. On the ground
that the German crews still remained on board the two German
warships, the English and French Ambassadors insisted that a
situation had been created inconsistent with neutrality, and on that
account made continuous protests, both official and personal. The
Entente represetatives, who knew nothing of the alliance, main-
tained that sooner or later the Germans would use the presence of
their ships and the large number of German officers to involve us
in the war, and that the only way to preserve our neutrality was to
get the German crews off these ships and send them back to
Germany along with the officers of the Military Mission. If we
had been really neutral, of course no other course would have been
open to us. But, as a matter of fact, we had declared our neutrality
solely with the object of gaining time, and, as far as our partici-
pation in the war was ccuicerned, we were simply waiting for the
completion of our military mobilisation.

Meanwhile at our regular meetings in the Grand Vizier's palace
the Ministers had decided that I should get into close touch with

At the Admiralty 123

the English Ambassador (Sir Louis Mallet) and Djavid Bey with
the French Ambassador, and that we should devote ourselves to
remove any suspicions they might have as to our alliances.

One evening, when I was talking with Sir Louis Mallet in his
house in Therapia, he said to me :

" Djemal Pasha, what concessions would the Ottoman Govern-
ment require to preserve a real and strict neutrality to the
end?"

I replied that there could be no doubt about the neutrality of
the Ottoman Government, but that I thought it my duty to bring
his question to the knowledge of the Grand Vizier.

Thereupon we consulted the Grand Vizier, and in agreement
with him drew up the principal conditions on which we might
possibly join the Entente. These conditions were :

The complete abolition of the capitulations.

The restoration of the islands taken from us by the Greeks.

A solution of 'the Egyptian question.

An assurance that for the future Russia would refrain from
interfering in our domestic affairs.

Effective English and French protection in case of a Russian
attack; and a few other points.

After we entered the war I saw from a number of telegrams
published in an English Blue Book that these conditions had been
communicated to London by Sir Louis Mallet.

Three or four days later Sir Louis Mallet replied to each of
these points in detail:

For the moment there could be no question of abolishing the
juridical capitulations. The utmost that England could concede,
with the approval of her allies, was the abolition of some of the
financial capitulations.

It would be advisable to postpone our dispute with the Greeks
over the question of the islands.

It would be better to let the Egyptian question rest until after
the war, as it could not be settled at the moment without conjuring
up various perils.

The Russians had no idea whatever of attacking Turkey, and
besides France and England were among the signatories to the
treaty guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey, so that we could feel
quite at our ease on that score, particularly as if we wished it

124 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

they were prepared to give us a fresh guarantee embodied in a
diplomatic record.

As compensation for all these concessions, we were required
not to close the Straits against Russian ships on any ground
whatever, and we must undertake to give the Russians the
necessary assurances on this most important point. They did not
desire to see us taking part in the war on the side of the Entente
for in their opinion that was contrary to their interests. What
they desired of us was strict neutrality, that the German crews and
the Military Mission should be sent back to Germany at once,
and that the Dardanelles should be opened to shipping and not
closed again in future. In return, France, England, and Russia
would give the Sublime Porte a diplomatic record guaranteeing
our territorial integrity and sanctioning certain modifications in
the matter of the financial capitulations.

In my opinion the answer was perfectly clear. The Entente
Powers did not desire our participation in the war on their side.
What could be the reason for that ?

If we came into the war on the side of the Entente, Russia
would see her last chance vanish of laying hands on Constantinople,
the goal of her future hopes. That she could never admit, and
therefore neither could France nor England.

Their object was patently as follows : " For the moment let us
prevent Turkey from doing anything to our disadvantage. During
the war we will preserve our association with Russia and thereby
bring it to a victorious conclusion. Then we can satisfy Russia's
ambition by giving her Constantinople, and on the pretext of
reforms grant the Arabian provinces autonomy so that they will
easily fall under our protection and control/7

It is thus quite easy to understand that my second pro-
posal, made to England, was rejected in the same way and for
the same reasons as that first offer of an alliance I had made
in Paris.

It may be said that it would have been better for us if we
had maintained our neutrality ! On condition, I think, that we
did not prevent shipping passing through the Straits ? But in
that case Russia would have emerged from the World War so
strong that she would certainly not have waited to seize
Constantinople and the eastern provinces of Asia Minor.

At the Admiralty 125

It may be said that we could have closed the Straits and still
preserved our neutrality. The agreement did not allow that, nor
would the English and Russians have allowed it either. There
would immediately have been pressure on all sides and suggestions
of this kind: " Let us occupy Constantinople and the Straits until
the end of the war and then we will give them back to you ! "

Nor would they have lost any time in translating words into
deeds !

In short, we had only two safe courses open to us. We could
either ally ourselves with the English and French, declare war on
the Central Powers, and in that way secure ourselves against
further attack by Russia, or we could join the Central Powers
and assist in the destruction of Russia. After declining our
alliance, France and England had required us to remain neutral
and keep the Straits open for the benefit of our worst enemy.
The Central Powers, on the other hand, allowed us to come in
with them, though they felt themselves strong enough to destroy
Russia, but they bound us to put every possible obstruction in
her way. Thanks to that attitude we could hope to see our foe
overthrown. There was, of course, a possibility that the Central
Powers might be beaten, and in that case a catastrophe for us was
a certainty. But it is also an undeniable fact that if we had
remained neutral and left the Straits open the inevitable victory of
our enemy would have sealed our fate with equal certainty.

Men may say what they like, looking back on events, but in
my view, rather than fall miserably under the yoke of the Russians,
English, and French, after the Russians had won, it was infinitely
better to defend ourselves to the last drop of blood in the hope
of freeing ourselves for ever — the only alternative worthy of a
brave and great nation — or at any rate to be able to say " Tout
est perdu hors I'honneurf " and thus bring to a splendid close a
national history which was established on honour and courage, and
rich in fame and glory.

Not I alone, but the great majority of the Turkish nation
cherish the opinion that our four years of war produced amazing
episodes worthy of the finest pages in the history of the greatest
nations — the defence of the Dardanelles, the Selman Pak, the
siege of Kut-el-Amara, the battles of Gaza, and the defence of
Medina.

Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Of course, my observations are addressed only to those who
are ready to give their lives to defend their honour. The miserable
creatures who are ready to endure anything if only they can
prolong their wretched lives for a few days will certainly not
appreciate my words. Making an excuse of the tragic situation
to which Fate has brought us to-day, they like to assume the
mantle of wisdom in saying: "We told you so. If we had
remained neutral we should not have lost so many men, nor should
we now be in such a horrible state/'

To such as these we can only reply : " It is quite impossible for
us to agree with men who cannot understand that to go down
fighting is one thing, and to go down submitting another. "

Our private relations with the Ambassadors of France and
England occasionally led to some highly amusing conversations.
I was chatting with Sir Louis Mallet one day when he told me he
was quite convinced that Enver Pasha had been won over by the
Germans, and that they probably wanted to use the German
officers, particularly the officers of the Goeben and Breslau, to
bring about some incident which would make a declaration of war
inevitable. I told him — more or less — that the neutrality idea
prevailed in the Cabinet, so that there was no danger.

" No, Djemal Pasha! " he interrupted, " you're wrong ! I'm
positive that the Germans wouldn't stop even at a coup d'etat to
gain their ends. They might shut you up in gaol, for instance,
and who knows what else ! '

By way of a less naive reply to these naive words, I answered
with a smile : "I've been thinking for a long time what I should do
if I had any suspicions of that kind. In virtue of my position as
Naval Minister I should open the Dardanelles to the English Fleet
and leave to you the suppression of the revolt in the fleet ! '

It is certainly astounding that this very perspicacious English
diplomat actually believed my words, so much so that he
communicated this crazy proposal to the Foreign Secretary, as I
read in a Blue Book.

In Document No. 40 of the Russian Red Book it is said that I
had given Baron von Giers my " word of honour that I should have
withdrawn the German crews of the Goeben and Breslau a
fortnight after our conversation." I assume that if Baron von
Giers did not actually desire to say what was untrue, he must have

At the Admiralty 127

used those words to please his superiors, for I was under no sort
of obligation to give him any personal assurance, and it is not my
custom to speak unless circumstances make it necessary.

WE INTERVENE IN THE WAR.

Meanwhile a number of very serious measures were in
progress. The Council of Ministers, which met every evening,
came to various decisions supplementary to the Turco-German
alliance, and asked the Germans to signify their consent.

What we most desired was to secure the intervention of the
Bulgarians in the war. We received the following communication
from our Ambassador in Berlin, His Excellency Mahmud Mukhtar
Pasha : " When the Turco-German alliance, bearing the signature
of His Majesty the Sultan, was laid before the German Emperor
he laid emphasis on the advantages it would bring to both nations,
and said, with a happy smile, ' Now let me give you another piece
of good news. Since this morning I've had in my pocket a letter
from the King of Bulgaria, in which he writes that he wants to
make an alliance with me/ '

This news gave us the very greatest pleasure, for the Bulgarians
had not said a word for five or six months about our negotiations
for an alliance with them, and we had not the slightest doubt
that if they came into the war on the side of the Entente it might
prove a perfect catastrophe for us. But as a month or two had
passed since the outbreak of war and no action had been taken by
the Bulgarians, we thought they must be tricking the Germans
just as they had tricked us.

The Bulgarian Envoy, Toscheff, with whom we had close and
constant relations, advocated the view that it would be unwise of
Bulgaria to intervene in the war before she could see how it was
going to end. He was adamant to any other argument.

As I have said, the Germans had agreed that we should remain
neutral until the mobilisation of our army was quite complete,
and that we should enter the war as late as possible. But when
their troops had to retreat somewhat after the Marne defeat, and
pass from the offensive to the defensive, while the Russian Armies
were engaged in their successful and destructive advance in East
Prussia and also overrunning Galicia, their situation was so utterly

ia8 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

changed that they began to urge us to intervene at once with a view
to tying down large Russian forces in the Caucasus and a
substantial English force in Egypt.

The representations of their Ambassador, who based them both
to the Grand Vizier and ourselves on the terms of the alliance,
became more and more imperious. In any case our mobilisation
was completed about this time, and all our army corps were
ready to take the field on the first order of the Commander-in-Chief .
The various units were drilled and exercised continuously, and
almost every day we had divisional and corps manoeuvres round
Constantinople and Skutari.

It was seen at once how right Enver Pasha had been in
insisting that the reorganisation of the army should begin with the
reconstruction of the cadres. The result was observable in the
mobility of the larger units, the command of which had been
entrusted to young officers well trained in strategy and tactics.
When the Germans realised these results they considered that as
we possessed so well organised an army we could not remain a
mere spectator of the calamities overtaking the Austrians and
Germans.

I must here ask indulgence for a slight digression. About this
time there was a rumour in Constantinople that Enver Pasha was
insisting on an alliance with the Germans and a declaration of war
on Russia, while I was determined to prevent any departure from
our neutrality in any case. It was said that the dispute had reached
such a pitch that before the assembled Ministers Enver had
threatened me with a revolver, but that I had anticipated him and
injured his foot. The really peculiar thing is that this legend has
found a place in Mr. Morgenthau's book. I should like to know
whether the honest Ambassador who bases his personal
observations on such idle chatter will blush if he takes the trouble
to re-read his book after reading what I have written.

I owe it to him to let him know that it would never have
occurred to Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, and all my colleagues even
to use a bitter word to each other — much less resort to weapons —
either at the time when we were working as revolutionaries for
the overthrow of the despotic rule of Sultan Hamid, or during the
period when we were together in the Ministry. We have not come

At the Admiralty 129

from low and obscure origins, as Mr. Morgenthau believes and
desires others to believe. Some among us finished their studies at
the Military Academy ; several have been to Turkish and European
Universities; and Talaat Bey (who was never a postman as the
Ambassador alleges) was at a law college in Salonica after leaving
school. It is thus ridiculous to suggest that we behaved like
Apaches.

We had no longer the excuse for postponing our participation
in the war that the mobilisation of our army was not yet complete.
The question of money was now raised. We had derived no direct
advantage from the fact that the capitulations had been abolished
by a provisional law, as the customs revenue had dropped to almost
a quarter of what it was in normal times.

The first instalment of the loan raised in France barely covered
the current expenses of the Government up to the end of the year.
We therefore asked the Germans to settle the financial problem.

On October nth I received from von Wangenheim an
invitation to an intimate lunch in the Embassy at Therapia. When
1 arrived I found the Grand Vizier present, with Talaat Bey, Halil
Bey, and Enver Pasha. Von Kuhlmann, recently appointed
Councillor of Embassy, was also there. After lunch we all went
to the Ambassador's private room. Wangenheim, with a very
doleful face, told us that Germany had accepted all our financial
conditions, and looked at us as much as to say : " Now don't start
thinking of any more objections ! "

The legend that we signed an alliance, and so forth, at the
Embassy that day is wholly untrue. As I have said above, the
compact had been signed at the very outbreak of war, so that there
was nothing to sign that day.

The general situation was examined" and discussed at a meeting
of the inner Cabinet (Endjumen Wiikela) which took place the
following day. At the outset there were two alternatives before
us :

1. Immediate intervention in the World War.

2. To send Halil Bey, accompanied by Hakki Bey and

the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to convince
the Germans of the necessity of maintaining neutrality
for another six months.

I

130 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

The second alternative was advocated by Djavid Bey, but the
other Ministers stood by the first. For the first time the Grand
Vizier showed himself undecided.

At that moment Enver Pasha told us that in consequence of the
numerous and very justified protests of the Admiral, on military
grounds he could no longer oppose the cruise of the Goeben and
Breslau into the Black Sea. Yet the excursion of these two
warships, accompanied by other Ottoman vessels, would inevitably
involve our participation in the war. In the first place, the Entente
Governments did not regard the Goeben and Breslau as Turkish
ships, and had made a formal declaration that if they passed
through the Straits, even without showing a flag and with Turkish
crews, they would be treated as hostile vessels. Thus it was
certain that the Russian Fleet would immediately attack the Goeben
and Breslau if they could be taken at a disadvantage. And even
if the Russian Fleet for any reason refrained from attacking these
two ships, Admiral Souchon, who was extremely anxious that we
should participate in hostilities, could bring us into the war
by attacking the Russian Fleet or Russian ports on his own
initiative.

After a short discussion we decided to send Halil Bey and Hafiz
Hakki Bey to Berlin to give full authority to the Deputy
Commander-in-Chief to deal with the fleet question, while avoiding
everything which might involve us in the war.

As the result of a report from Admiral Souchon, we were
compelled to recognise the fact that a well-planned attack of the
Russian Fleet had forced him into an action against it, whereupon
Russia — and consequently France — declared war on the Ottoman
Government.

When the news reached Constantinople that following on the
attack by the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea on the Ottoman Fleet
the latter had in <turn bombardedOdessa, Sebastopol,Theodosia and
certain other parts of the coast, we found the Grand Vizier, Said
Halim Pasha, in a vefy peculiar frame of mind. As he was utterly
opposed to our participation in the war, he was strongly averse
to sharing the responsibility for a war in which the attack of our
squadron on the Russian Fleet and the Russian ports was bound to

At the Admiralty 131

involve the Government. The Beiram festival was on at this time,
so we met every day at the Grand Vizier's Palace. Said Halim
Pasha declared that he would at once resign if this attack meant
war. We quickly pointed out that after he had himself signed the
alliance with Germany, and associated himself only a few days
before with the decisions which recognised all Turkish obligations
under it, he could not for a moment resign on a pretext of an event
which was nothing more than the natural consequence. Faced
with such incontrovertible logic, to which he could find no valid
answer, the Grand Vizier accepted the situation and abandoned
his idea of resigning.

The day Russia, France, and England announced to the
Ottoman Government the opening of hostilities, the Council of
Ministers met at the Sublime Porte for an extraordinary session.

Referring to the facts as set forth in Admiral Souchon's report
Said Halim Pasha related how, as a result of the attack by the
Russian Fleet on our warships in the Black Sea, our fleet had
taken up the challenge and used their weapons against the Russian
war and merchant vessels in Odessa, Sebastopol, and other ports.
Thereupon first Russia, and then France and England, had declared
war on the Ottoman Government. With a view to maintaining
peaceful relations and avoiding hostilities the Turkish Government
had proposed a joint enquiry to ascertain which fleet had attacked
first, so that the commander of that fleet could be made personally
responsible, but the Russian Government had rejected that
proposal. In view of their refusal the Turkish Government
found itself compelled to consider itself in a state of war with the
Russian, French, and English Governments, and accordingly to
bring the decree to the knowledge of His Imperial Majesty. The
Grand Vizier added that he wanted the Ministers to speak their
minds without fear or favour.

The first to speak was Oskan Effendi, the Minister of Posts
and Telegraphs, who said that as an invincible opponent of war
he could not sign a decree approving of the participation of the
Ottoman Government in the war, and must therefore resign. If,
however, the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs was reformed as a
department only, he would continue to carry on his duties as a
Director-General.

12

132 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Then Suleiman Effendi El Bustani, the Minister of Agriculture
and Commerce, said that as a member of the " Society for
International Peace " he need hardly say he opposed all wars and
was therefore compelled to resign.

Churuk Sulon Mahmoud Pasha, after dropping a few remarks
about the suspicion with which he was regarded in the Cabinet,
asked that his resignation also should be accepted.

Djavid Bey was not present at the Council on this day, but
Talaat Bey informed us that he had decided to resign.

The resigning ministers left the Council Chamber. The
others, Said Halim Pasha the Grand Vizier, Hairi Effendi the
Sheik ul Islam, ^Emir Pasha the War Minister, Talaat Bey the
Minister of the Interior, Ibrahim Bey the Minister of Justice,
Halil Bey the President of the Council of State, Shukri Bey, the
Minister for Education, and I drew up the decree setting out
the necessity for our intervention in the war and laid it before His
Majesty.

As the Chamber and the Senate approved the war by huge
majorities and expressed their confidence in the Cabinet, it was
obvious that the whole nation agreed with the foreign policy of the
Government.

The same day that we drew up the decree, and thereby
recognised a state of war with the Entente Powers, I held corps
manoeuvres near Skutari, between Idjadieh, Tchamlidja, and
Erenkoi. The units concerned were the 3rd Division, under the
command of the German Colonel Nicolai Bey, and the 5th Corps
under Colonel Mahmud Kiamil Bey. Never shall I forget the
display of patriotic feeling and warlike enthusiasm given by all the
officers of the four divisions when I gave them the news of the
outbreak of war. As G.O.C. the Corps I had sent for them to
come to the top of Ischamlidja Hill to criticise these manoeuvres,
which lasted a day and a night and ended at daybreak with the
attack on the hill, which was defended by the 3rd Division.

The officers and men of these four divisions were also members
of the Ottoman nation. Those who did not witness the rejoicing
and high spirit of the troops, and now have the audacity to
maintain that the Turkish people did not wish to join in the war,
are either inspired by base motives or else by pure cowardice or
shortsightedness.

At the Admiralty 133

The only change in the composition of the Cabinet was that
Prince Abbas Halim Pasha took over the Ministry of Public Works
and Achmed Nessiorri Bey that of Agriculture. Talaat Bay, who
was already a member of the Cabinet, took over the Finance
Ministry for the interim, and Shukri Bey the Ministry of Posts and
Telegraphs.

IN COMMAND OF THE FOURTH ARMY

CHAPTER IV.
IN COMMAND OF THE FOURTH ARMY.

ABOUT ten days after our entry into the war Enver Pasha invited
me to his house. He was suffering from an abscess on the foot
and had to keep his bed. After a few remarks about the general
situation he said to me :

" Djemal Pasha, I want to start an offensive against the Suez
Canal to keep the English tied up in Egypt, and thus not only
compel them to leave there a large number of Indian divisions
which they are now sending to the Western Front, but prevent
them from concentrating a force to land at the Dardanelles.

" With that end in view I've been making preparations in Syria
for a month of two. I've ear-marked the 8th Army Corps, under
the command of Mersinli Djimal Bey, for this business. As the
Germans attach the greatest importance to the execution of this
operation, I've appointed Lieutenant-Colonel von Kress Bey
Chief of Staff, and sent him to Damascus as attache of the German
Military Mission. I told him his principal task was to undertake
the preparations for the expedition against the Canal. I have
also sent my aide-de-camp, Major Merintas Bey, Senator Abdin
Rahman Bey, Sheik Essad Shukair, and various other Arab
notables to Syria with orders to form a Beduin Auxiliary Corps.
Zikki Pasha, of the 1st Division, and now commanding the 4th
Army, has orders to look after the defence of Syria and Palestine
only, while Djimal Bey, as Commander of the 8th Corps, is to
complete the mobilisation of his Army Corps and prepare the
operation against the Canal. Now His Excellency Zikki Pasha
is not only unwilling to undertake this expedition, but is actually

137

138 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

demanding larger forces in order to protect Syria against a hostile
landing. The news from Syria points to general disturbance in
the country and great activity on the part of the revolutionary
Arabs. In these circumstances I have wondered whether Your
Excellency would not give a further proof of your patriotism by
taking over the command of the 4th Army. In doing so you
would have to prepare (and carry through) the attack on the
Canal, and also maintain peace and internal order in Syria. I
don't know if I may venture to make this proposal to you ? '

I immediately replied :

" I consider it a sacred duty to go wherever you think my
capabilities may be of the most service to the country, so I gladly
accept the command of the 4th Army which you have offered
me, and will leave for my new sphere in a day or two."

Enver Pasha was very delighted at my answer. In the
subsequent conversation I obtained the full freedom of action
which the law confers upon an army commander. I retained my
former title of Naval Minister, but Enver Pasha took over my
portfolio on the terms that he should consult me and obtain my
consent to all reforms and improvements in that department.

I immediately went to the Military School, the headquarters
of the 4th Army, and as Deputy Commander-in-Chief appointed
the Chief of Staff, the heads of the ist, 2nd, and 3rd Sections, and
a few other officers. I told them of my appointment to command
the 4th Army, and gave Colonel von Frankenburg, the Chief
of Staff, orders to make preparations for our departure at the
earliest possible moment. When everything was ready, four or
five days later, I left Haidar Pasha Station for Syria on
November 2ist.

One of the gentlemen who came to the station to see me off
made a very impressive speech, in which he said that the nation
expected from me great exploits and speedy news of victory. Of
course there had to be a reply to this speech. I said that I was
fully conscious of the greatness as of the immense difficulties of
the task before me. If our enterprise failed, and my corpse and
those of the brave men. going with me were left at the Canal, the
friends of our country who would then have to take up our work
must sweep over us and rescue Egypt, the rightful property of
Islam, from the hands of the English usurpers.

In Command of the Fourth Army 139

Since then I have heard that quite a number of my enemies
have made use of my words on this occasion to perpetrate the
following sophism : " How could Djemal Pasha have the audacity
to come back from Egypt ? Wasn't it his business to drive out
the English or die ? Why did he not die ? "

What I have to say in my book will enable them easily to
realise that, so far as this expedition is concerned, it is no fault of
mine that I am still alive. But no one can kill a man whose death
God has not yet decreed. Who knows whether I have not been
called on to remain alive to suffer still more sorrow and slander in
the conflicts into which I am still prepared to enter, for the good
of my country !

But what do all these critics really want? Ought I to have
turned to the crowd and said : " My friends ! I am going to Syria
with a commission to drive the English out of Egypt, but the
resources at our disposal are inadequate to make the execution of
this project possible. I will therefore return to Constantinople,
grieved and humbled, without having effected anything at all.
Please shed tears now in anticipation of that sad day.. Why, it's
simply a decree of fate !

No, indeed ! If perhaps I did not succeed in really driving the
English out of Egypt, had it not been for the secret betrayal of
Sherif Hussein (who thereby committed an unforgivable sin
against the Mussulman world) I should, at any rate, as I shall show
hereafter, have prevented the usurpers from attempting anything
against Palestine and Syria, and in so doing have held the hundreds
of men composing the English Army inactive in Egypt.

It was the treachery of Sherif Hussein which made that desir-
able object unattainable for us. It divided the two (Mussulman)
brother nations, Arabs and Turks; he made the former the slaves
of the English and French and forced the latter to fight a hopeless
fight against the most pitiless foe.

Later on I will give full documentary proof of this statement.

Thirty-six hours after my departure from Constantinople I
reached Konia, where the Governor-General, Azmi Bey, and the
population gave me a warm reception. I seized the opportunity of
visiting the sacred tomb of Merlana Djelal-ed-dine Rumi and made
the acquaintance of His Excellency Weled Tchelebi Effendi. As
we were separating I asked him if he would not join the Egyptian

140 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Expedition with a volunteer corps. Sure enough, some time after
I left Weled Tchelebi came to Syria with an armed force he had
gathered together under the name of a " Battalion of Mevlevi
Volunteers." I cannot say enough in praise of his patriotism.
Although he himself was in very poor health, and had just suffered
the sad loss of his wife, with whom he had lived many years, he
never even thought of disappointing me, and the young men who
formed his battalion rendered the army a magnificent service.

Achmed Rassin Bey, whom I regard as one of the finest of
Turkish journalists, left Constantinople with me, and during the
Canal Expedition came to Beersheba with the second echelon of
Headquarters. Then he resided at Headquarters in Jerusalem and
wrote very important articles about my policy in Syria under the
heading " The Army's Policy. " I cannot omit to mention the
name of this gentleman, whose company was always fruitful and
valuable to me.

Two other gentlemen came to Headquarters as volunteers
One was Fuad Selim Bey Eff endi, who displayed a model patriotism
and zeal in taking on the post of Consul-General at Salonica after
the Balkan War, and the other was Dr. Fuad Bey, another
Egyptian, who was an official in the Ministry of the Interior.

Fuad Selim Bey did his duty in the Egyptian section with great
devotion and soldierly loyalty, and the army derived the utmost
advantage from his presence. It was a matter of the deepest regret
to me when important family affairs called him away and he had
to leave Headquarters.

I shall always think with feelings of gratitude of Fuad Selim
Bey, who was subsequently appointed to represent the Ottoman
Empire in Switzerland (and with great success), and of Dr. Fuad,
who rendered the army the greatest service.

After leaving Konia we came to Bozanti, and from there with-
out stopping continued our journey by car to Tarsus, from which
we travelled to Adana by rail. I was received with the greatest
enthusiasm by the people of this provincial capital, of which I had
been Governor-General four or five years before. We spent the
night there. The rainstorms, which had not stopped for a week,
had converted the Plain of Adana into a sea of mud.

In Command of the Fourth Army 141

At that time the Adana-Aleppo railway was only working- to
the station of Taprak Kaleh. Although the Taprak Kaleh-
Alexandretta sector had been finished, the line had been washed
away at various points in the neighbourhood of Dort Yol owing to
the rains, and communication with Alexandretta was interrupted.
I therefore decided to go by train to Taprak Kaleh or even
Mustafa Bey, and if possible to continue my journey from there by
car or horse to Alexandretta and Aleppo. Accordingly I left Adana
very early next morning. As I had ascertained that the Bozanti-
Tarsus sector, the only route which offered secure communication
with the army in Anatolia, was in very bad communication in
various places, I asked Ismail Hakki Bey, the Governor-General of
the province, to have the repair work put in hand as soon as
possible.

An hour or so after leaving Adana we reached Mustafa Bey,
where the horses and cars were detrained. We had barely got a
yard or two in our cars before they sank in the mud. As we
realised that we should get no further that way, we mounted our
horses and I started off, after instructing my aide-de-camp, Captain
Selaheddin Effendi, to have the cars towed to Alexandria, whence
he was to follow us.

Three or four hours later we came to Dort Yol. This is a large
and important village on the shores of the Gulf of Alexandretta,
and lies almost equi-distant from five or six other villages, which
are inhabited almost exclusively by Armenians, and celebrated for
their orange trees.

During the time I was Governor-General of Adana I had had a
plan drawn out by German engineers for another colony, to be
built on the extensive plot of gr.ound between Dort Yol and the
five other villages. But as I had to leave the vilayet this scheme,
like so many others, had not been carried out.

In the years 1910 and 1911 I had often visited Dort Yol, and the
villagers, whom I had often helped, now came down in crowds to
meet me.

As I had heard that I could get from Dort Yol station to Alexan-
dretta by an ordinary trolley in two hours, while it would take me
six hours to ride there, I preferred to use this method of locomotion
and started off with my Chief of Staff.

Never shall I forget this journey by trolley on the slippery

142 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

track. More than once we went in danger of our lives as in pouring
rain we passed along the coast, which was watched by enemy
ships. After a violent storm, the moon emerged from the clouds
and then disappeared again, after lighting up the sea in a wonderful
way, so that in the distance we could see the enemy's ships — a
sight which intensified the bitterness in my heart.

I did not conceal from myself that our foes were strong and stub-
born. But as there was no other way of preserving our existence,
we were compelled to resort to arms for weal or woe. I had sworn
to leave no stone unturned to break the power of our adversaries.

I remembered my oath, and seeing the difficulties which stood
in my path, I realised the terrible weight of the burden which rested
upon my shoulders. We reached Alexandretta after a journey
during which the trolley passed over rails which, in some places,
hung suspended over a void for fifteen to twenty metres, and in
others were under water. It was four or five hours before the
other General Staff officers turned up. We spent this night at
Alexandretta.

According to the information we received, the road between
Alexandretta and Aleppo was not passable for cars. The road
which had thus been allowed to become unusable for motor traffic
was the only road connecting Aleppo and the district around, or,
to speak more accurately, the whole of Northern Syria, including
the regions of Urfa, Diarbekir and Mosul, writh so important a
Mediterranean depot as Alexandretta. When I returned from
Bagdad some years before and passed this road in a car, I had
ascertained that repair work had been taken in hand at many
different points. It had been undertaken by the General Road
Construction Company, and since August, 1912— two years back —
it would have been perfectly possible to finish it. Thanks to the
difficulties innumerable which the Roads Department had met with
— a department totally incapable of doing anything on its own
initiative — the restoration of the road had been neglected. Until
we make up our minds to free our administration from the shackles
of bureaucracy, neither a Constitutional Government nor the help
of God will enable us to carry anything through to a successful
conclusion. The most extraordinary thing of all was that, on the
excuse of the repair work, those parts of the road which had
previously been in good condition had been allowed to get into

In Command of the Fourth Army 143

a wretched state. All the stones had been taken from the crown
of the highway, and they were piled up in two long heaps on each
side. The holes between these heaps had filled with rainwater,
and the result was a perfect canal. Such was the condition of the
Alexandretta-Aleppo road in November, 1914.

We were compelled to stop one night in Bilan whether we liked
it or not. On the following morning we continued our journey
on horseback, after arranging that three strong cars should be
sent from Aleppo to the nearest village. From here we reached
Katma Station by car. This station is the second from Aleppo on
the Bagdad line. As it is also the point of junction of the Aleppo-
Alexandretta road and the Bagdad railway a lines-of-communi-
cation depot had been established there.

The zeal and industry of those concerned may be well imagined
from the fact that, when we were about fifty metres from the
station, it was impossible to get the cars any further, and we had
to be carried in by soldiers in the inky darkness.

At that moment I remembered the Kirk Kilisse-Adrianople
road and the Kirk Kilisse-Bunarhissar- Wiza-Serai road during the
Balkan War. Here again the roads had a pile of stones on each
side, and as the rain had filled up the centre they looked exactly
like ditches.

What a dismal prospect it was for the march of the army I had
been appointed to command ! Once more I had before my eyes
the unforgettable picture of wretched misery presented by our
batteries, ammunition wagons and limbers failing to make any
further progress along the roads and being compelled to strike
across the fields until they stuck in the mud. " And here is the
only road which keeps my army in touch with the home country ! "
I thought.

Aleppo was the point of concentration of the I3th Army
Corps, which had completed its mobilisation in Mosul and neigh-
bourhood. Colonel Fahri Bey, of the General Staff, was in com-
mand. The bulk of this corps consisted of Kurds, and the balance
of trained Arabs. One division was at Aleppo, the other at Hama.
I stayed two or three days at Aleppo and inspected the troops. In
spite of Fahri Bey's extraordinarily hard work, the divisions and
the formations independent of the corps were not in a very satis-
factory condition. The material required for a mobilised army

144 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

corps had not been completed, and indeed, we could not hope
to complete it, for there was no chance of getting the necessary
equipment in and around Mosul, which was the mobilisation zone
of this corps.

I asked the Vali of Aleppo to take in hand the repair of the
Aleppo-Alexandretta road, and also to construct a new road from
Islahic to Katma Station via Radjo. Then I went to Hama to
inspect the division in garrison there. It was in exactly the same
condition as the division at Aleppo.

It was my intention, before going to Damascus, to visit
Northern Syria, to see for myself the condition of that region.

First I went through Horns to Tripolis, returning the same
day to Horns, where I spent the night. Next morning I continued
my journey and went to Damascus through Rayak. In all the
towns through which I passed, the people displayed the greatest
patriotism and devotion to the Turkish cause. It gave me enormous
pleasure to see and feel that the majority of the Arabs would not
hesitate to make any sacrifice in this great war for the liberation
of the Mussulman Khalifate. It was my duty to make the best use
of that frame of mind and to preserve this region, a region in-
flammable as powder, from the enticements of traitors who had
sold themselves to the enemy.

With a view to making it easier to follow the sucessive events
of the three years (December, 1914, to December, 1917) which I
spent in Syria, events concerning the army, the administration,
domestic policy in Syria and Arabia, the suppression of revolts, the
question of food supplies, and those other questions of material
progress, and so forth, with which I had to deal, I have thought
it wiser to devote a special chapter to each of these topics, instead
of discussing these matters in the form of a chronological diary.

OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE
EXPEDITION AGAINST THE SUEZ CANAL

CHAPTER V.

OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE EXPEDITION AGAINST
THE SUEZ CANAL.

As it is not my intention to write a history of the war, I shall avoid
entering into unnecessary details of the movements and operations
of the army and confine myself to describing the essential facts
in broad outline. Some day I shall ask Colonel Fuad Bey, my
invaluable Chief of Staff, to compile a special history of the
campaigns based on the " War Diary of the 4th Army," handed
over to the Great General Staff, and which was drawn up and
edited with the greatest care at Headquarters.

On the day of my arrival at Damascus, Mersinli Djemal Pasha,
the G.O.C. 8th Corps, came to meet me at Rayak and handed me
a bundle of documents. These contained the detailed plan for the
operations of his corps, which had been selected for the attack
on the Suez Canal, and a copy of all the orders, statistics and plans
concerning the work which was to be done, as well as that which
had been done already. His Chief of Staff, von Kress, gave
Colonel von Frankenberg, my Chief of Staff, a German copy of
the same document. My first act on reaching Damascus, where
I had made my headquarters in the " Damascus Palace Hotel/'
was to study these documents in the most thorough fashion.

In a few words, the plan of operations proposed by the 8th
Army Corps was as follows: "For the operation against the
Canal the 25th Division shall be used, in addition to a regiment
composed of officers and men selected from the two other divisions
forming the Army Corps.

' The rest of the 8th Corps is to be distributed on the lines of
communication for protective duties and to watch the Lebanon
and the coast region.

*47 K2

148 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

' The 8th and loth Divisions, which are to be expressly sent
from Constantinople for the Egyptian campaign, will be employed
as the Army Commander thinks fit, partly for the Suez Canal
expedition and partly for guard duties in the interior.

' In any case, no large force is to be engaged in this operation. "

In view of the physical conformation of the Sinai Desert, where
the operation was to be carried out, the basis of this plan was
entirely sound.

When I arrived in Syria the general situation was as follows :

The detachment of Beduin volunteers under the command of
Major Muntaz Bey had seized El-Arish and fortified itself there.

A detachment of volunteers under the command of Ismirli
Escref Bey and belonging to the " teasckilat Mahsussa" (Special
Organisation) had occupied the Kalaat-ul-Nahl in the centre of the
Sinai Desert.

An infantry detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Mussa
Kiasim Bey was in Akaba, while a regiment of the 27'ch Division
quartered at Beersheba served as support to all the forces in the
desert.

The whole of the 25th Division, under the command of Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Ali Fuad Bey, of the General Staff, was at
Damascus and training most diligently.

In view of the conformation of the Sinai Desert, the 8th Corps
had very properly realised that it was necessary to institute a
lines-of-communication organisation, proceeding from the rear to
the front, before marching orders were given to the army, or
rather the Expeditionary Force. Behdjet Bey, Lieutenant-Colonel
in the General Staff and Commander of the 23rd Division, was
placed in charge of the organisation, which took the name of the
" Desert L. of C. Inspectorate/'

I shall always think with affectionate respect of Behdjet Bey,
who displayed invaluable industry in the great desert both during
the first Suez Canal campaign and in the preparations for the
second.

It was the business of his inspector to decide on the L. of C.
depots (to be not more 'than twenty-five to thirty kilometres apart)
on a line connecting Beersheba with Ismaila, on the Canal. He
had to provide these points with water, to send forward in accord-
ance with orders the supplies which were previously to be stored

Expedition against the Suez Canal 149

at Beersheba, to fix up a hospital at every depot — in short, to
undertake everything in the way of preparation which the establish-
ment of a L. of C. organisation on that line required. Kalaat-ul-
Nahl and El-Arish were to serve as the two headquarters of the L.
of C. Inspectorate. From these two points food and all other
things required were to be supplied to the forces, which were to
concentrate there and proceed against the Canal.

The 8th Corps proposed to concentrate the bulk of the Expedi-
tionary Force at Beersheba and advance on Ismaila by the line J
Wadi el Arish-Ibin-Djefdjafe, i.e., as far from the coast as possible.
The flanks were to be covered by smaller bodies from El-Arish and/
Kalaat-ul-Nahl.

This scheme was very sound. Our main line of communication
must be so far from the sea that the English could not harass it
with their naval guns or destroy it altogether by small-scale
landings, of no importance in themselves, to which they might find
themselves occasionally compelled.

Accordingly von Kress personally selected as L. of C. depots
Beersheba, El Halassa, El-Hafir, Wadi -el-Arish, Ibin, Birindji-el-
Hubra, Djefdjafe, and Ikindji-el-Hubra. At each of these places
he had artesian wells sunk, dykes constructed, in view of the rain-
storms to be expected in December and January, and all other
arrangements made for the necessities of a line of communication

The 8th Corps reported that as the supply of food for officers
and men right through the desert to the Canal was impossible, we
must adopt a new system and call it the "desert ration/* It was
based on a list of comestibles, the weight of which was not to
exceed one kilogram per man, and comprised biscuits, dates, and
olives. As regards water, no man must carry more than contents
of a gourd.

As a result of careful calculation on the basis of these allow-
ances, we came to the conclusion that if we wanted to send the
loth Division and 25th Division and a few volunteer detachments
we should require 11,000 camels to carry the food and water, in
addition to the light and heavy transport of the troops. But even
with the help of this organisation, on crossing the Canal it would
be necessary for the Expeditionary Force within four days either
to drive the English troops from the far bank and securely dig itself
in, or else to retreat, as the fresh water collected at Ikindji-el-

150 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Hubra — fifty kilometres from the Canal — would last scarcely ten
days, and after it had been used up the force would be doomed to
distress worse than that of the children of Israel.

Nor was there any chance of concentrating the Expeditionary
Force at Beersheba and sending it to the Canal in one solid body,
for it was quite out of the question to convey water and food for
so many men by -means! of the camels forming the transport
columns.

Thus the battalions and batteries would have to march through
the desert at one-day intervals, and the corps had to concentrate
ultimately at a point twenty to thirty kilometres from the Canal,
and from there direct their attack on the point selected.

The 8th Corps proposed that the Expeditionary Force should be
composed of the following formations, distributed in two echelons :

FIRST ECHELON. — The 25th Infantry Division, a regiment con-
sisting of men from the 23rd and 27th Divisions, five field
gun batteries, two mountain gun batteries, a 15 cm. field
howitzer battery, one cavalry regiment, four squadrons of
the Camel Corps, a contingent of 1,500 mounted Arab
volunteers, enough pontoons to allow three battalions to
cross simultaneously, six engineer companies, a telegraph
section, field hospitals, medical units, &c., a total of 12,642
men, 968 horses, 12,000 camels, 328 oxen.

SECOND ECHELON. — The loth Infantry Division with its artillery,
cavalry squadron, and other auxiliary units.

When I arrived in Damascus I received from the Deputy Com-
mander-in-Chief a telegram, in which he placed the Hedjaz
Division at the disposal of the Commander of the Fourth Army, to
be assigned to the Canal Expedition or employed locally, as I
thought fit. I therefore wrote to Colonel Wehib Bey, Military
Governor and Vali of the Hedjaz, asking him to come to Maan
with detachments of regulars and volunteers. These troops, under
Wehib Bey, were then to be attached to the second echelon.

As the 11,000 camels mentioned above were assigned exclusively
to the 25th and loth Divisions and the various formations attached
to that force, the camels for the Hedjaz Division coming to join the
Expeditionary Force had to be brought from the Hedjaz by that
division itself.

Expedition against the Suez Canal 151

Although in their official reports the English have estimated the
strength of the force engaged in the first Canal expedition at
40,000 men, the fact is that this force, including the contingent
from the Hedjaz and the loth Division, never exceeded a strength
of 25,000.

The first echelon was to be under the command of Djemal
Pasha, the Commander of the 8th Corps, while the second echelon
was attached to Army Headquarters.

Such was the situation of the armies in the desert, Palestine,
and the interior of Syria at the time of my arrival in Damascus, and
so far had the preparations of the Commander of the 8th Corps for
the expedition against the Canal progressed. In view of the diffi-
culties which the L. of C. Inspectorate organised in Damascus had
met with in looking after so long a line of communications, the
8th Corps had also proposed, inter alia, that an independent L. of C.
Inspectorate should be established in Jerusalem, primarily to collect
supplies in Palestine and forward them to the army.

With certain quite slight modifications, I adopted all these
suggestions.

The Commander of the 8th Corps now came to me in great
distress to tell me that he had not yet succeeded in procuring the
camels required for the campaign, and did not see any chance of
doing so. He drew the special attention of the Army Commander
to this point.

True enough, this Corps had found itself beset with difficulties
innumerable on all sides, and in three months it had been able to
secure only two thousand of the eleven thousand camels required.
It must certainly come as a shock to very many people that in
regions such as Syria and the Hedjaz ten to fifteen thousand camels
could not be obtained, seeing that hundreds of thousands, or rather
millions, of these animals are to be found there. But not all camels
can carry burdens.

I do not wish to say anything more than is absolutely necessary
on a matter which will be discussed in detail when the history of the
4th Army comes to be written. I will merely remark that I alone
knew the greatness of the difficulties I had to overcome to procure
within a month fourteen thousand camels, including reserves. Yet
I ultimately succeeded, and the number of camels provided for in
the 8th Corps' plan of campaign was reached by the appointed date.

152 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

The troubles I had to face will be realised when I say that at
this time Ibn Sunud brought me camels from the far depths of
the Nedjed.

The great problem, on which everything hangs in these
difficult military operations in the Desert of Sinai, is the question
of water.

In any other than the rainy season it would be impossible to
attempt to cross this waste with an expeditionary force of approxi-
mately 25,000 men. Even a force of only 10,000 men could not be
brought through. As the rainy season in this desert comprises the
months of December and January only, it was necessary to
conclude the operation in these two months or postpone it to the
same season in the next year.

General Headquarters was very insistent that the expedition
should be carried through this year, and I therefore decided, after
hearing the verbal reports of the Commander of the 8th Corps and
the Chief of Staff, to press on the preparations and put the scheme
into execution. At the end of December I began to concentrate
the first echelon of the Expeditionary Force in the neighbourhood
of Beersheba.

Meanwhile, the loth Division had completed its concentration
in the town of Zahle in the Lebanon. I inspected it there, and
after issuing to its Commander, who was under the direct orders
of Army Headquarters, his instructions for its march to Jerusalem
and Beersheba, I transferred my headquarters to Jerusalem.

At this time I had begun to correspond with the Sherif of
Mecca, Emir Hussein Pasha, and I asked him to send the
Commander of the Hedjaz Division an auxiliary force under the
command of one of his sons, or to take command in person
and join the Army.

The Sherif replied very courteously to my first communication
and informed me that he would send his son AH Bey to accompany
the Vali of the Hedjaz, Wehib Bey. Ali Bey did, in fact, leave
Mecca with Wehib Bey's troops, but when he reached Medina he
declared that in accordance with his father's orders he could
accompany Wehib Bey no further. He remained in Medina and
began to interfere with the functions of the Commandant, Basri
Pasha.

In conformity with the plan of campaign, the first echelon of the

Expedition against the Suez Canal 153

Expeditionary Force began its march to the Canal on January
I4th. Army Headquarters left Beersheba on January I5th and
pressed on behind the main body.

About the close of the twentieth day after the advance guard
had left Beersheba the centre column of the first echelon had
reached in full strength a point about eleven kilometers from the
Canal. The right wing column, which had marched from El-Arish
in the direction of Katia, arrived before Kantara, and the left wing,
which had come from Akaba through Kalat-ul-Nahl, was before
Suez.

The leading units of the loth Division, which formed the second
echelon, reached the L. of C. depot at Ikindji-el-Hulbra, and the
Hedjaz force, under the command of Wehib Bey, had arrived at
Kalat-ul-Nahl after marching from Mecca to Medina and travelling
thence by rail to Maan.

The efforts and heroism of the Ottoman troops, both officers
and men, who took part in the first Canal Expedition were
wonderful and above all praise. I can have no greater duty than
to offer a respectful tribute to these heroes who accomplished their
march, though subject to privations innumerable, and dragged
their guns and, above all, their pontoons (all that was available
for crossing the canal) through a sea of sand. In this force,
composed of men of Arab and Turkish stock, a fine feeling of
brotherly affection prevailed, and not a man hesitated to sacrifice
himself for his comrades. This first campaign against the Canal
was a brilliant revelation of the fact that the majority of the
Arabs stood by the Khalifate with heart and soul.

The Arabs who composed the entire 25th Division and the whole
of the L. of C. organisation did their duty with the greatest zeal
and devotion. For that reason nothing can assuage my feelings
of bitterness and resentment against Sherif Hussein, who subse-
quently sowed the seeds of discord in that unity of thought and
sentiment. During this campaign, while we marched at night and
only by moonlight, my heart was filled with a deep melancholy,
mingled with a great hope of success, at the sound of the song,
11 The Red Flag Flies over Cairo/' to the accompaniment of which
the advancing battalions forged ahead over the endless waste of
desert, feebly illuminated by the pale gleam of the waxing moon.

It may well be believed that this army, in which no one from the

154 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Commander-in-Chief down to the humblest private was allowed
more than 650 grammes of biscuit and a few dates and olives, and
every man had to keep his consumption of water down to bare
necessity, was borne along by glowing hopes as it approached its
goal. Everyone was absolutely convinced that the Canal would
certainly be crossed, that we should dig ourselves in securely on
the further bank, and that the Egyptian patriots would then rise
and attack the English in the rear.

Although I, personally, was not so sure of the ultimate success
of this campaign, for I knew to what a pitch of perfection the
English had brought their Canal defences, I used to talk to the
troops every night about the victory in store, and what a glorious
victory it would be. I wanted to keep the sacred flame alive in
the whole force.

After the force had completed its concentration — both as regards
the main body and the two detachments forming the right and left
wings — in the region above-mentioned, I decided in the night of
January 20th/2ist (February 2nd/3rd) upon a surprise attack on
Ismaila with the centre column. The right column would
simultaneously make a demonstration against Kantara, while the
left column was to march on Suez.

It was hardly dark before the troops to be employed in the
attack began to approach the point from which they were to cross
the Canal, and shortly after sunrise the crossing itself commenced.
I had staked everything upon surprising the English and being
able to hold the stretch of the Canal south of Ismaila with five or
six thousand men at the first rush, so that I could bring up the
loth Division and have a force of twelve thousand rifles securely
dug in on the far bank. Then Ismaila was to be taken, if possible,
and held for four or five days from defensive positions facing west,
north, and south.

Meanwhile, the march of the 8th Division was to be accelerated,
and within ten days the number of men in Ismaila was to be
increased to 20,000.

During this time I hoped that the Egyptian patriots, encouraged
by the capture of Ismaila by the Turkish army, would rise
en masse, and Egypt would be freed in an unexpectedly short time
by the employment of quite a small force and insignificant technical
resources.

Expedition against the Suez Canal 155

According to the information in the possession of Army Head-
quarters the enemy had a force of about 35,000 men along the
Canal, and another 150,000 and more distributed in Egypt. But as
the English could not have these troops available at all the points
of the Canal — a line more than two hundred kilometres in length —
it was possible to gain a success, always providing that we could
cross the Canal by surprise at some point where the enemy was not
expecting it.

In any case, I contemplated this attack solely as a demonstra-
tion, partly in order to make the English realise that we had no
idea of sitting down quietly on the Canal, and partly in accordance
with our design of tying down considerable forces in Egypt.
Otherwise I should never have seriously pretended to myself that
with resources which did not permit of our remaining more than
four days on the Canal, i.e., fourteen thousand rifles, a few
mountain gun batteries, a single howitzer battery, and nothing but
ten pontoons with which to cross the obstacle — we could have
crossed a canal at least a hundred metres wide defended by an army
so mobile and brave as the English and provided with every
conceivable means of defence from the largest warships to
armoured trains. Yet notwithstanding my misgivings I managed
to inspire my staff and my troops with such confidence that no one
knew that this first attack on the Canal was nothing but a
demonstration, and not a man hesitated for a moment to make any
sacrifice in the cause.

If, by some unanticipated stroke of good fortune, this enter-
prise, which to me was nothing but a demonstration in force, had
brought us success, we should naturally have regarded it as a good
o.ien for the final liberation of Islam and the Ottoman Empire.

Unfortunately there was some slight delay in the approach of
the attacking force to the Canal. Morning broke, as the pontoons
were being put into the water and the crossing began, so that
the operation took place under the eyes of the English. The
defensive measures they immediately adopted at the crossing points
destroyed all our pontoons except three. As it was impossible to
send reinforcements to the six hundred heroes we had succeeded
in getting on to the opposite bank at the very outset, they were all
captured by the English. There now began a lively duel between
the English armoured vessels, auxiliary cruisers and armoured

156 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

trains, and the light artillery of the Expeditionary Force. By
mid-day we had destroyed an English auxiliary cruiser by the fire
of our howitzer battery. Meanwhile both regiments of the loth
Division had arrived on the battlefield, and I put them under the
orders of the G.O.C. 8th Corps.

At last I was quite clear about the situation. The Expeditionary
Force had carried out its purpose of effecting a demonstration, and
I was convinced that there was no chance of crossing the Canal
and seizing Ismaila. My headquarters was on a hill three and a
half kilometres east of the Canal, and the battle took place under
my eyes. The enemy, whose aircraft had enabled him to discover
the whereabouts of Headquarters, greeted it with a number of
9-2-inch shells from his warships.

About three o'clock I sent for Djemal Pasha, the Commander
of the 8th Corps, and his Chief of Staff, von Kress, who were
seven or eight hundred metres from the firing line — i.e., the eastern
bank of the Canal. My Chief of Staff and the Director of the
Operations Section at Headquarters, Major AH Fuad Bey, were
with me. A short time before I had received a report from the
G.O.C. 8th Corps informing me that if he could get the upper
hand with his artillery fire by the evening he would make an
attempt to force a crossing at dawn next morning.

Referring to this report, I asked von Kress, in his capacity as
Chief of Staff to the Army Corps, to give me his opinion on the
situation.

After explaining the general position to me, he repeated the
proposal put forward in the report received from the Corps
Commander. Djemal Pasha agreed with him. I said to
them :

' The attempt to cross the Canal a second time is dependent
upon the resources at our disposal, and according to the reports
you have sent in we have not more than three pontoons left. The
proposal to swim across the Canal is perfectly hopeless. How,
then, do you propose to carry out your scheme ? '

Both Djemal Pasha and von Kress admitted the justice
of my conclusion, but had not the courage to issue an order to
the force to retire. It was easy to see that von Kress, who had
been working ceaselessly on the preparations for the expedition
for two and a half months without taking a day's rest and regarded

Expedition against the Suez Canal 157

this campaign as his life's purpose, was in utter despair at the
apparent failure, and considered death the only remedy.

" Your Excellency! " he replied, " in my view it is now the
duty of the Expeditionary Force to die to a man on the Canal ! "

I answered him very quietly :

" I didn't call you here to hold a council of war and share the
responsibility for my decisions with you. I shall never allow
anyone but myself to shoulder the responsibility for the orders I
give in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief !

" My object in summoning you was to get information as to
the general condition of the troops in the front line and the state
of the technical resources at our disposal. I gather from what
you say that there is nothing more to be done. If we stay another
day by the Canal the Expeditionary Force will be entirely
destroyed. This force represents all that is available to the
Ottoman Empire in an emergency for the defence of Syria and
Palestine. I have no higher duty than to preserve this force from
danger, and put it to the best uses until the end of the war. So
I think it is preferable to hold our positions until evening, keeping
up the artillery duel with the enemy, and then utilise the darkness
to withdraw the troops to the lines they left yesterday evening.
From there we can march slowly back to Beersheba. I want
von Frankenberg Bey to draw up the daily Army Orders on that
footing! "

Djemal Pasha, von Kress, and von Frankenberg were
entirely convinced that my decision was the only logical one and
such as the general situation required. Just at this moment, as
if the enemy had suspected that we were engaged in an important
discussion, he began to rain shells right and left of our little
group, compelling us to change our position. But ultimately I
signed the Army Order AH Fuad Bey had drawn up. Djemal
Pasha and von Kress returned to the front line, and we remained
at Headquarters until the evening.

It was necessary to take appropriate steps to prevent this
failure from having a bad effect on the troops. I therefore
issued an Order of the Day, in which I announced that
all the troops had done their duty worthily and patriotically.
The object of our enterprise had been to carry out an 9ffensive
reconnaissance against the Canal with a view to finding out the

158 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

resources at the enemy's disposal, and also the resources we
ourselves should require to effect a crossing of the Canal. As
our purpose had been completely attained, it was now advisable
to retire in order to procure better material resources rather than
expose ourselves to unnecessary losses. Honour required that the
same spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion which had marked the
advance should be displayed in the retreat, so that we should not
suffer any loss whatever in materiel.

Army Headquarters, which had left Beersheba on January i5th,
I9I5) was back there again exactly a month later, February i5th.

As the telegraph could not be carried beyond the L. of C.
depot at Ibin (halfway between the Canal and Beersheba) General
Headquarters had had no news at all from me for a week, and
was in a state of great agitation. I learned subsequently that
the Director of Army Telegraphs (engaged in erecting the lines
in the desert), to whom some idiot had reported the mendacious
news of the capture of Ismaila, had hurried on his job and sent
the report on to Constantinople. The result was that when the
truth came through it produced the worst possible effect. Happily
the statements published broadcast by Headquarters to the effect
that the main purpose had been merely an offensive reconnaissance
succeeded more or less in effacing that impression.

To tell the truth, when we contemplated this first expedition,
not a man knew how the Canal was to be crossed. It was really
necessary to carry out some such reconnaissance. What material
resources would be required to effect the crossing of the Canal,
which was safe in every respect against attack ? Was it possible
to attempt the crossing under observation from the enemy's
warships ? Was it not possible to destroy the Canal ? And even
if the crossing itself failed, and it should prove impossible to
secure a hold on the Canal, could we not perhaps entrench
ourselves firmly on the eastern bank, and from there harass the
passage of warships and merchant vessels with long range
guns? Might not that be our best plan? These were real
problems, the answer to which necessitated a reconnaissance in
force.

Thanks to our reconnaissance, we obtained full knowledge of
the situation, and it was in expectation of the sequel to our attempt
that the English postponed their attack on the Dardanelles, and

Expedition against the Suez Canal 159

found themselves compelled to retain not less than two hundred
and fifty thousand men permanently in Egypt.

It is obvious from these remarks that the efforts which the
first expedition against the Canal had cost had not been in vain,
because we had attained the object we had in view.

During our retreat from the Canal I had given Major AH Fuad
Bey as a basis for his report the number of men and the nature
of the artillery and other materiel we should require to carry
through a successful expedition against the Canal. I told him to
draw up a detailed report on that foundation.

During the four or five days I spent at Ibin in witnessing the
march past of the troops Ali Fuad Bey finished his report and
gave it to me after revising it with the Chief of Staff and obtaining
his concurrence. I much regret that I do not now possess this
report, which I approved after making a few small changes. I
should like to make it known. Could I do so the English General
Staff would see what useful knowledge this offensive reconnaissance
brought us and it would be overcome by a feeling of shame
to think that our heroes in English captivity should have been
dragged through the streets of Cairo, and that the English
newspapers spoke of our army in anything but good taste.

But when I get back to Constantinople, if God wills, I will
make it my business to fill up these gaps in my work.

I give our casualty list in the first Canal Expedition :

Dead, Wounded. Missing.

Officers 14 15 15

Men 178 366 712

In their official reports the English gave our losses as follows :

1,000 Dead. 2,000 Wounded. 650 Prisoners.
Comparing our real losses with the inaccurate figures given by
the English, it is easy to realise the exaggeration in their reports.

THE DESERT FORCE

CHAPTER VI.
THE DESERT FORCE.

ON my return from the Canal I had carefully decided upon
everything that was to be done in the desert, and had also
considered how my plans were to be carried out. The work which
a decisive campaign involved was simply and solely the organisation
of the lines of communication. However well planned the lines of
communication organisation might be, if its depots were not linked
together by a safe road there would be no possibility of keeping
it in being for long or leading a considerable army to the Canal.
One of the first questions which I took up was the construction of
a road connecting Beersheba and all the L. of C. bases in the
direction of Ismaila, and thus permitting the transport of all kinds
of wagons and cars. I also considered the construction of
a railway to run parallel with this road.

It was also necessary to sink wells at each L. of C. base, and
erect all kinds of buildings, such as hospitals, depots, and so forth.
To be able to start on the construction of these buildings it was
essential to have forty to fifty thousand labour men at work in the
desert. But if we left these working posts unguarded they would
unquestionably be harassed the whole time by the bold and highly
mobile cavalry and camelry of the English. Thus it was necessary
effectively to fortify the desert.

I therefore decided to create a " Desert Force Headquarters "
which was to be directly responsible to Army Headquarters, and
have under its orders all troops which were garrisoning the various
desert bases. I proposed von Kress Bey for this post.

Von Kress, who regarded the Canal Expedition as the object of

163 L2

164 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

his life, and the tussle with the difficulties of the desert as
compensation, accepted my proposal without hesitation. In this
way two quite independent organisations came into being in the
desert. One, the " Desert L. of C. Inspectorate," had to arrange
for the establishment of bases and connecting roads; the other,
the " G.H.Q. Desert Force/' had to protect these works from
attack by the enemy, and keep au courant of his activities by making
reconnaissances to the Canal from time to time.

The headquarters of the Desert Force were, for the time being,
to be at Ibin, and its main detachments at Ibin, El-Arish and
Kalaat-ul-Nahl. Beersheba was decided upon as headquarters
for the Desert L. of C. Inspectorate. After issuing the necessary
instructions for the establishment of these institutions, I returned
to Beersheba and from there to Jerusalem.

Two or three days later, when the iSth and loth Divisions had
assembled at Beersheba, I invited a number of distinguished people
from Jerusalem, including the Consuls of neutral and allied Powers,
to come and see that my troops had been able to cross the desert
and reach the Canal without the slightest accident, fight a battle
there, and return in fine fettle to Beersheba, where I held a review.
The Italian Consul was among the guests, as at that time Italy
was not yet in the ranks of the combatants.

I can say with pride that the troops returning from this first
two months' expedition against the Canal had not left a single
straggler behind in the desert. Not a man was missing save those
who had fallen in battle at the Canal, or into the hands of the
English on the far bank. Not a man showed any signs of having
suffered from hunger or thirst. The supply columns did their
duty so conscientiously that not a column had reached its destina-
tion at other than scheduled time. But the most important point
of all was that among the Arabs from Syria and Palestine, of which
the supply columns were exclusively composed, not a single case
of desertion or treachery had been observed.

After I had organised the Desert Force and L. of C., I dis-
tributed the command within the extensive army zone as follows :

I called Palestine, comprising the Sanjak of Jerusalem and the
Sanjak of Akka, the " Jerusalem zone/' and entrusted the com-
mand to Djemal Pasha, G.O.C. 8th Corps.

The Desert Force 165

The Kazas (regions) of Beersheba and Gaza were not part of
that zone, and were to be in the sphere of command of the Desert
L. of C.

To Fahri Pasha, G.O.C. I3th Corps, I gave the command of
the zone composed of the central and northern part of the vilayet
of Beirut and the vilayets of Syria, Aleppo and Adana. He received
the title of " G.O.C. (interim) 4th Army." Then I transferred
my headquarters to Jerusalem and decided to occupy myself solely
with the preparations for the second campaign against the Canal.

The 8th and loth Divisions were incorporated direct in the army.
Such was the general situation of the 4th Army at the end of
February, 1915.

I gave Von Frankenberg, Chief of Staff of the Army, a careful
plan I had drawn up, dealing with the troops — striking force and
reserves, the materiel, the quantity and natures of the ammunitioa
required for the second Canal Expedition, and sent him to Con-
stantinople. The Turkish General Staff accepted my plan in its
entirety, but when I demanded for this important campaign a
number of artillery formations and German specialist troops, they
sent it on by Frankenberg to the German General Staff with a view
to obtaining the sanction of the latter. The then German General
Staff did not attach to this matter the importance that it deserved
and procrastinated unnecessarily.

After I transferred my headquarters to Jerusalem, I made it my
special business to compel the Arab leaders, such as Sherif Hussein
Pasha, the Emir of Mecca, Ibn-el-Reschid and Ibn-el-Sunud, to
render the armies of the Khalifate some real service. I got into
communication with each of them. When I publish the answers
I received from Sherif Hussein in the course of this correspond-
ence, the whole world of Islam will see well enough what a double-
faced role that gentleman played.

The Emir Ibn-el-Sunud could not give us any direct assistance
as he was too near the English, who could do him enormous harm.
But he made himself very useful to us by sending camels to the
army and permitting the export of merchandise from his country
to Syria. As for the Emir Ibn-el-Reschid, right to the end of the
war he proved that he was a true Mohammedan and intensely
devoted to the Khalifate. I shall deal with the plots of Sherif
Hussein later on.

1 66 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

It was about this time that I sent Nuri Bey, Enver Pasha'o
brother who had come from Constantinople, to Tripolis on a
smuggler's boat from Beirut.

I should add here that I had sent the force which I had fetched
from Mecca, under the command of Dehib Bey, to a point in the
immediate vicinity of Suez. When I decided on the retreat, I had
withdrawn these troops to Maan, and as Dehib Bey had just been
appointed Commander of the 2nd Army and had left for Con-
stantinople, I sent his force back to Mecca under the command
of Nedjib Bey.

If I give all these details, it is only because I want to reply
to the fools who would like to ascribe Sherif Hussein's re-
bellion to the fact that I had unnecessarily denuded Mecca of its
garrison.

It was about this time that the Allied fleets had been driven
off with loss in their attempt to force the Dardanelles. I sent
Enver Pasha a letter in which I set forth the reasons why I con-
sidered that it was impossible for the hostile fleet to pass through
the Straits. I think Talaat Bey also shared my view. My object
in sending my friends this communication was to confirm them in
their opinion and give them moral support. I am certain that at
that time everyone in Constantinople was expecting to see the
enemy's fleet off the Seraglio one fine morning. That frame of
mind might have had its effect on the confidence and convictions
of my colleagues, and as the mischief to be anticipated was simply
incalculable, I sent my friends my views as those of a colleague
who can see and judge the general situation from afar. Enver
Pasha told me afterwards that my communication, which was
entirely in agreement with his own views, had had a great moral
effect.

As it was possible that after the naval attack the enemy would
venture upon a great landing and send troops to the Dardanelles,
Enver Pasha realised the necessity of concentrating sufficient
infantry in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, and asked me
to send him the 8th and .loth Divisions.

I fell in with his views at once. When the enemy had landed
on the Gallipoli Peninsula, Enver Pasha asked me to send the
25th Division as well to Constantinople. I sent it. He also asked
me to send one of the divisions of the I3th Corps to Bagdad and

The Desert Force 167

the other to Bitlis. I carried out these instructions and also the
order to send all the quick-firing guns and machine-guns from
my army zone to the Dardanelles. Ultimately I found myself in
such a state that the troops in the army zone, the vilayets of Adana,
Aleppo, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, and including those in the
desert, were reduced to twelve battalions, and in the whole region
not a single quick-firing battery nor a single machine-gun company
was left.

These twelve battalions consisted exclusively of Arabs from
Syria and Palestine. There were no Turkish but the Dervish
volunteer battalions and an infantry company of volunteers from
the Dobrudja, which I had formed for Army Headquarters. There
can be no better proof of my conviction that the Arab would
not revolt and turn traitor.

The most important military event up to the end of the year
1915 was the attempted rising of the Armenians in fbeitun and
Urfa, which was put down by the regulars we sent there. In
general the year 1915 could be described as the year of preparation
and consolidation.

As I shall show later, numerous roads and railways were con-
structed both in the desert and in the interior, and L. of C. bases
were established and provided with everything they required.

In addition to all this fortification work was carried out at
Mersina, Taprakkale, Dort Yol, and on the Alexandretta coast,
and four or five lines of defence were provided against a hostile
landing at Beirut, Haifa, Jaffa, as well as in the Lebanon, Mount
Carmel, and everywhere in the interior of Palestine.

Of course the divisions sent to Constantinople had to be re-
placed by new divisions raised in the interior of Syria and Palestine,
Aleppo, and Adana. Their training was one of the army's chief
tasks.

In August, 1915, when the course of the military expedition in
Mesopotamia was taking an unfavourable turn for us, Enver
Pasha asked me if I would take over the civil and military
administration of that region.

I replied that at the very time when the secret intrigues of the
Arab revolutionaries in Syria and Palestine had shown that the
situation in those provinces had become extremely difficult my
absence would most probably have far worse consequences, but

1 68 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

that if he did not agree with me I was prepared to go to Bagdad.
Enver Pasha was of the same opinion, however, and proposed
Marshal von der Golz for the post of Commander-in-Chief in Irak.
The Marshal accepted and was duly sent there.

As I have said, the year 1915 passed in preparations for the
second campaign against the Canal. As I had an idea that the
German General Staff did not attribute to these preparations the
importance due to them, I travelled to Constantinople in November
to draw Enver Pasha's serious attention to the fact. I stayed
there a fortnight and then returned to Damascus without having
achieved very much.

As the English and French had retired after the evacuation of
the Dardanelles, I invited Enver Pasha to come to Syria to see for
himself the result of the preparations I had been making in the
desert. He came in February, 1916, and after making an extended
tour of inspection together in Syria, Palestine, and the Sinai
Desert, we went to visit Medina.

Sherif Faisal, who was then at Headquarters, accompanied us
on this visit.

Enver Pasha was highly satisfied with the organisation of the
desert L. of C. We both came to the conclusion that it was
certainly impossible to cross the Canal and drive the English out
of Egypt, but that it would be quite feasible to fortify ourselves
securely on the eastern bank and prevent the passage of merchant
ships with our heavy batteries.

At this time my greatest desire was to do anything and every-
thing to prevent the revolutionary tendencies displayed by Sherif
Hussein from developing and to persuade him to send an auxiliary
force to Palestine under the command of one of his sons. With
that end in view I conferred continuously with Sherif Faisal and
conducted a very intimate correspondence with Sherif Hussein.
As will be seen later in the chapter devoted to the Arab revolt, I
had no success in spite of all my efforts, and at length, on
January 2nd, 1916, I was faced with the fact of Sherif Hussein's
rebellion. This rising was a serious blow to the campaign against
the Canal.

I calculated that if the English wished to try an attack by land
on Palestine they would be compelled to establish a line of com-
munication between the Canal and Palestine (as we had had to do

The Desert Force 169

on our part) and to connect them by a railway. During the whole
of 1915 not a single English detachment had set foot on the
eastern bank of the Canal. From time to time a few Camel Corps
patrols had penetrated to points fifty or sixty kilometres from the
Canal and returned to their own side a few days later.

The first defence works of the English which we discovered
towards the end of January, 1916, were the fortifications of the
bridgeheads on the east bank of the Canal opposite Kantara and
Ismaila. The date of this work coincides with that of Sherif
Hussein's last letter to the English, in which he assured them of
his desertion of our cause. It seems obvious from this that
it was not until the English were perfectly clear on this point .that
they decided to cross to the eastern bank of the Canal or, to speak
more accurately, start an offensive against Palestine. They knew
perfectly well that Sherif Hussein's revolt would compel us to take
certain steps for the defence of the Hedjaz and that we should also
have to withdraw from that region a portion of the forces ear-
marked for Syria and Palestine. Apart from this they were
certain that the Beduins, to whom they had sent money through
Sherif Hussein, would rise against us, and that a Beduin revolt
would weaken us enormously.

On April ist, 1916, the German Air Force Company No. 300, the
first real help to reach us, arrived at Beersheba. On April I2th
and I5th two Austro-Hungarian 15011. field howitzer batteries \
arrived.

The Aeroplane section was of great use to us for re-
connoitring all the details of the bridgehead defences, railway
and other works on which the English were engaged east of
the Canal.

When Sherif Hussein's revolt broke out I appointed Fahri
Pasha commander at Medina and I had to organise a force there
consisting of fifteen or sixteen infantry battalions and as many
mountain batteries.

I had the greatest respect and unbounded admiration for Fahri
Pasha, who was assailed by hostile forces and influences on all
sides and yet managed to perform miracles with his force. From
January, 1916, to December, 1918— that is, for nearly three years-
he defended the Sacred Tomb against the troops of the renegade
Sherif Hussein and the rebellious Beduins, who were reinforced by

i yo Memories of a Turkish Statesman

English and French artillery and all kinds of auxiliary formations.
Even when this small garrison, which had been reduced to five or
six battalions by October or November, 1918, was completely cut
off from the interior as the result of the capture of Maan bv
Sherif Faisal in January, 1918, it persevered in its resistance
and succeeded in holding Medina until three months after the
Armistice.

Beyond all praise was the courage and persistence of the force,
consisting of four or five Turkish battalions, to which was com-
mitted the protection of the railway from Medina to Maan
and which maintained communication between Medina and the
army.

The men whom I consider the soul of the defence of this
thousand kilometre line of railway between Medina and Maan
were Fahri Pasha and brave officers such as the Governor of
Medina, Basri Pasha, General Djemal Pasha, who had distin-
guished himself in the defence of the Albanian fortress of Skutari
(and whom the Arabs called " Djemal Pasha Salis," i.e., Djemal
Pasha III.), Colonel Nedjih Bey, and later Lieutenant Kemal Bey
and some others.

The courage and fearlessness of this handful of soldiers frus-
trated all the efforts of Sherif Hussein's sons and drove them off
with bloody losses. The proof of their success is that though the
Beduin revolt spread from Medina to Maan and the coast was held
by the Sheriffs troops, which :were reinforced by English and
French troops, communication between Syria and Medina was
maintained from June, 1916, to December, 1917, and traffic was
more or less regular. But the sacrifices necessarily involved in
feeding the garrison in Medina and supplying the troops
echelonned between Medina and Maan with food and ammunition
compelled us to halve the supplies provided for Palestine and Sinai
and prevented us from reinforcing our Sinai front when and how
we liked.

On April 23rd, 1916, von Kress Bey, at the head of two infantry
battalions, a mountain. battery, and a volunteer camel regiment,
succeeded in a surprise attack which resulted in the capture of an
English cavalry regiment with its commander and all its officers.
This occurrence raised the confidence of our troops to a remark-
able degree. About this time the 3rd Infantry Division, some

The Desert Force 171

German machine-gun sections, and two Austro-Hungarian moun-
tain howitzer batteries had joined the Sinai front from Constanti-
nople.

Meanwhile the English had materially strengthened their
bridgehead defences opposite Kantara, and, resting their left wing
on the sea, had sent out a force of combined arms to Katia and
the wells of Romani.

Here they immediately began to construct defences.

Von Kress, who had resumed command of the Expeditionary
Force,^reported that the troops were tired of the long waiting, and
proposed an offensive against Romani.

I informed him in turn that I would give my consent to such
an operation on condition that the existence of the Expeditionary
Force — the only force on which we could depend for the defence
of Palestine — was not endangered.

I will now give the composition of the troops com-
prising the force engaged in the second expedition against the
Canal.

The 3rd Infantry Division (three regiments of three battalions,
a cavalry squadron, two mountain batteries, a battalion of
engineers).

One machine-gun battalion (eight companies).

Two Austro-Hungarian mountain howitzer batteries/

One German locm. battery.

One German I5cm. battery.

Two anti-aircraft gun sections.

A total of 10,000 men.

This enterprise, which opened in the beginning of July, 1916,
closed with the failure of the Expeditionary Force at Katia and
Romani. The English followed up this force step for step with
large bodies of cavalry and camelry, and compelled it to withdraw
to El Arish. Ultimately the force had to evacuate El Arish itself
on December i6th and retire to the Hans Yonus-El Hafir line on
the old Palestine-Sinai frontier.

The English constructed their railway with incredible speed,
and laid two kilometres of line almost every day. After conferring
with Enver Pasha, who had come to inspect the Palestine front,
and von Kress, we decided in the middle of February to make the
Gaza-Tel el Sheria-Beersheba line our defensive position, and

172 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

instructed von Kress to defend this position with the troops
available.

The difficulty of the general situation due to the revolt in th^
Hedjaz and the necessity of keeping a watchful eye on the Druses
and the various Beduin troops compelled me to leave Army
Headquarters at Damascus.

THE BATTLES OF GAZA

CHAPTER VII.
THE BATTLES OF GAZA.

THE Turkish troops which had withdrawn to the Gaza-Tel el
Sheria-Beersheba line after March I5'th, 1917, consisted of the
following units :

IN GAZA:

The 79th Infantry Regiment of the 27th Division and the

I25th Regiment of the i6th Division.
Two Austro-Hungarian mountain howitzer batteries.
Two Turkish field gun batteries.
One German locm. field gun battery.
One Turkish 15011. howitzer battery.
Two German machine-gun companies and five or six

Turkish machine-gun companies.
A total of 3500 rifles.

IN DJENMACH :

The 3rd Infantry Division (nine battalions; six field gun
batteries, four machine-gun companies, one I5cm. field
howitzer battery).
A total of 5000 rifles.
IN TEL EL SHERIA :

Corps Headquarters of 22nd Corps, with two infantry
regiments of the i6th Division and the divisional
artillery.

A total of 5000 rifles.
IN BEERS HEBA :

The 3rd Cavalry Division (three regiments),
A total of 1500 sabres.

176 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

In addition to these formations two regiments of the 53rd
Division had reached Ramleh.

In the official report published by General Murray in November,
1917, he gives the Turkish force employed in the first Battle of
Gaza as follows :

IN GAZA :

The 3rd Division and the 2nd Infantry Regiment.

Twenty-four machine-guns.

Two heavy German isomm. batteries.

Three Austro-Hungarian io5mm. field howitzer batteries.

Five field gun batteries.

A total of 10,000 rifles.

IN TEL EL SHERIA :

The i6th Infantry Division (6000 rifles, sixteen machine-
guns, four field batteries).

The 3rd Cavalry Division (four light guns, four
howitzers, four machine guns).

IN RAMLEH :

The 53rd Infantry Division.

IN JERUSALEM :

The 54th and 67th Infantry Divisions.

IN HAIFA:

The 27th Infantry Division.

I can give a most categorical assurance that the English saw
that force solely in their imagination. If all the figures for the
Turkish forces given by the English General were of that kind he
must have been badly served by his Intelligence. As I have said
before, the Turkish force which drove off the first English attack
on Gaza so victoriously consisted of 18,000 men at most.

According to General Murray's report the English Army was
composed of the following troops :

In first line (under the command of General Sir Philip
Chetwode) :

The Anzac Mounted Division

The Imperial Mounted Division, consisting mainly of
yeomanry.

The Battles of Gaza 177

The 53rd Infantry Division, several machine-gun
sections.

The troops of the second line comprised :

The Camel Corps Division, the 52nd and $4th Infantry
Divisions, heavy artillery, and machine-gun com-
panies, with automatic rifle sections.

According to these figures, in this first Battle of Gaza the
English had :

Three infantry divisions.
Three cavalry divisions.

A division of the Camel Corps and the naval units
participating in the action.

With these troops, commanded by General Sir Charles Dobell,
General Murray, the Commander-in-Chief of the English Mediter-
ranean Force, decided to attack the Beersheba-Gaza defences.

The 53rd Division, twelve thousand rifles strong, was to make
a direc! attack on Gaza, while the Anzac Mounted Division, the
yeomanry, and another cavalry division were to hem it in from
the east, and thrusting through between Gaza and Djemameh
finally isolate it altogether by closing the northern exits.

The troops which were to open the attack took up their
positions in the night of March 25-26. At 8 a.m. in the morning
of March 26th the cavalry completely surrounded Gaza, and
communication with the town was interrupted everywhere.

At 10 a.m. a brigade of the 54th Division and several regiments
of the 53rd Division were sent against Gaza. Thus one and a half
divisions, with more than two cavalry divisions, were opposed to
the small Turkish force of 3500 rifles garrisoning Gaza. Thanks
to the heroism of its Turkish and Arab defenders, Gaza held out
against the attacks of the enemy for twenty-four hours. These
heroes disputed every inch of the ground with the foe, and every
hill was lost and regained two or three times.

In the afternoon of the same day the 3rd Division from Djem-
mameh pressed forward against the English advance guard and,
next day, as soon as the English began to feel the effect of this
movement, they retired in great disorder. The i6th Division
which came from Tel el Sheria and the 3rd Cavalry Division from
Beersheba increased that disorder.

M

178 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

I have no desire to enter into superfluous detail here, but 1
cannot omit to state that, contrary to the statements of the English
General in his official dispatch (to the effect that reinforcements
arrived in the night of March 26-27), not a man reached the town
before the morning of the 27th, on which day the English began
to retire.

The first Battle of Gaza will have a high place in Turkish mili-
tary annals. Thanks to the resistance offered that day by a handful
of heroes, the English were compelled to remain in that line from
March 27th to October, 1917 — a period of eight months — and send
nine infantry divisions, a number of cavalry divisions, and two
divisions of the Camel Corps to this front.

The bravest of the defenders of Gaza was unquestionably
Major Hairi Effendi, the commander of the I25th Infantry Regi-
ment. This splendid officer, who preserved his unruffled calm and t
kept his head in the most difficult circumstances, placed himself at
the head of each battalion of his regiment in turn, twice recovered
the famous " Ali Mumtar " hill from the English, and kept it the
third time. In this attack the German Lieutenant Cordier, com-
mander of a machine-gun section, displayed the greatest courage,
and, like Captain Kitter von Trushkowsky, the Austro-Hungarian
battery commander, met a hero's death by his guns.

In his official report the English General estimated our losses
at 8000 killed and wounded. Including cooks, stretcher-bearers,
&c., who are not fighting troops, our whole force in Gaza
never exceeded that figure, and I cannot conceive how
General Murray arrived at it. As a matter of fact, our losses
were :

Officers, ten killed, twelve wounded, fourteen missing.

Men, 276 killed, 744 wounded, 571 missing.

As the losses of the English were admitted to be 4000, it is to
be concluded that each of the defenders of Gaza had killed an
English soldier.

I left Damascus in the evening of March 27th, and on the
morning of the 28th reached Tel el Sheria and then Gaza. After
decorating the officers and men I returned to Jerusalem. Two
hours later some portions of the i6th Division arrived at the front.
Von Kress, who attributed the disorderly retreat of the English to
demoralisation, proposed an attack on their flank with troops of

The Battles of Gaza 179

the 3rd and i6th Divisions. If this attack succeeded it would
certainly have been most advantageous to us, but if it failed we
should have been left with nothing whatever for the future defence
of Palestine and Syria, and the whole affair would have been
settled once and for all. As equally bold experiments on the other
fronts had resulted in very unhappy experiences, I was personally
strongly averse to having such experiences on my own front.
Hitherto it had been my object to keep the Expeditionary Force
in the desert out of harm's way, but after I had withdrawn to the
Gaza-Beersheba lines, which were the natural frontier between
the desert and the inhabited regions, I decided to hold that front
and prevent the English from breaking through at any cost by
concentrating all the Turkish forces there.

The greatest advantage of this position was that it could not
be turned, as the right flank rested on the sea and the left on the
desert.

Moreover, as long as we were holding these defences the
English were compelled to remain in the desert, while we were
in a region which could be described as cultivated. In short, so
long as we held the Gaza-Beersheba lines the English front could
not join up with the Arab front.

In consequence our best policy was to avoid any kind of action
which might imperil that front, and in view of these considera-
tions I rejected the proposal for an offensive put forward by von
Kress.

There was no doubt that the English would renew their attack
in a fortnight or three weeks, and so it was necessary for us to
reinforce our front from the interior in order to be able to beat off
this second attack. With the troops which had recently come up
we had a continuous fortified line (with the exception of a few
unimportant gaps) from Gaza to Beersheba.

The English proposed to begin the second attack on Gaza with
a ruse de guerre. On April I4th our wireless station at Tel el
Sheria picked up an English message, which was deciphered by
our telegraph officer, Lieutenant Stiller.

This message contained instructions from the commander of
the English Armies of the East to the commander of the Palestine
Army, informing him that Gaza was to be attacked on April I7th,
but while the main attack was to be made on land, an infantry

180 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

division landed at Askalon during the night of the I7th was
to fall upon Gaza from the rear, and thus support the frontal
attack.

We considered that this message, the genuineness of which we
at first had no doubt about, had possibly been sent out solely with
a view to compelling us to regroup our reserves. I therefore
refused to make any change in the general distribution of the front,
and contented myself with sending toward Askalon a small force
which I had left behind Jaffa.

During the twenty-four days which elapsed between the first
and second Battles of Gaza we had reinforced our troops with two
regiments of the 53rd Division — barely 2000 rifles.

The English also were reinforced on this front by the 74th
Division. They brought up to strength the divisions which had
taken part in the first Battle of Gaza, so that they had quite an
imposing force of four infantry and four cavalry divisions.

The violent English onslaught which began on the morning of
April I7th was again directed against Gaza and the 53rd Division
which formed the left wing.

The English employed eight tanks in the attacks, in which they
engaged a force six or seven times larger than that with which
we held this part of the line. Their fleet intervened in the action
and treated Gaza to a rain of steel and fire.

The battle raged with the utmost violence during April I7th,
i8th, and igth, and the English left no stone unturned to break
our front.

But once more it was seen that the courage of the Turkish
soldier prevailed against the determination of the English, and in
the night of April iQth the latter found themselves compelled to
return to their old lines, leaving their dead and wounded in
numbers (more than 7000) which almost equalled the total Turkish
force engaged in that sector.

Three of the eight English tanks which participated in the
attack were left before our lines, or, rather, in our trenches. It is
impossible to tell in a few lines the story of that glorious three
days' defence, which redounds to the highest credit of Ottoman
courage. I will postpone the details of this chapter to another
occasion and confine myself here to the results of this second
Battle of Gaza.

The Battles of Gaza 181

The great blow — the last thing on earth the English expected —
had, so to speak, utterly disconcerted them.

They always prided themselves on issuing communiques that
were absolutely accurate, but this time they found themselves
compelled to publish a short and vague report which was in no
way consistent with the truth.

But, as the English said, and said rightly, that a failure in
Palestine coming on the top of the Dardanelles failure would
mean the end of English prestige in the East, they decided to
employ the spring and summer in completing their preparations
for one last, victorious offensive in the autumn and winter of 1917,
General Murray had been twice beaten at Gaza and they replaced
him by General Allenby, who had gained a reputation on the
Western Front for alertness, discretion, and brains.

When General Allenby took up this new post he declared that
he would undertake no attack until he had under his command at
least four men to every Turk. I did not doubt for a moment that
English pride and obstinacy would make that proportion possible,
and I adopted every conceivable means of reinforcing and
strengthening the Palestine Front to the uttermost. I sent the
General Staff a very lengthy report dealing with the strength of
the force to be employed on the Palestine Front, the number of
divisions required to relieve the front line troops (and where these
were to be distributed in the interior), and also the troops which
must be concentrated in Aleppo or Syria to meet emergencies.

About the end of May I received a telegram from the Deputy
Chief of the General Staff, in which he said :

• " I have asked General von Falkenhayn to undertake a tour
of inspection via Aleppo to the Euphrates Valley and Mosul in
order to ascertain whether it is possible to send enough troops
there to recover Bagdad. I have advised him to go to Jerusalem
and pay you a visit with the idea of concealing the object of his
journey. Please give him a good reception and make things as
easy for him as possible."

The general situation on the Turkish fronts at the end of May,
1917, was as follows :

The Caucasus Front :

The Russian Revolution at the beginning of the year 1917 had
ruined the discipline of the Russian armies which had occupied

1 82 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Erzindjan and Trebizond and overrun our eastern vilayets as far
as Bitlis. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the commander of the 2nd
Army, had succeeded in recovering from them the province of
Bitlis and Mush. It would therefore have been possible to take a
few divisions from the 2nd and 3rd Armies and send them to more
important fronts.

The Irak Front (Mesopotamia) :

After our armies had been beaten on the Kut el Amara front
and Bagdad had been finally lost they were compelled to fall back
on Kerkuk and Hit respectively. There was no chance of these
armies recovering and driving the English out of Mesopotamia,
still less of their striking a really serious blow north or north-west
of Bagdad.

The Constantinople and Smyrna regions :

A landing of Entente troops at the Dardanelles or in the neigh-
bourhood of Smyrna, which would have created a new front, was
equally improbable seeing that the position in Europe was serious,
as the Rumanians had been utterly defeated, the English had
suffered two reverses at Gaza, and the Russian armies were in the
throes of a terrible revolution.

Thus there was a possibility of employing the troops at
Constantinople and Smyrna on the other important fronts.

Further, it was high time to withdraw our divisions from
Galicia, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

I drew attention to these matters and asked that all available
troops should be sent to Palestine and Northern and Central Syria,
so that this front might be reinforced so heavily as to be impreg-
nable. It was the weakest and yet the most important point in
the Ottoman Empire. As our resources in the East were inade-
quate to guarantee the supplies of so large a force, I asked that we
should be helped by the northern vilayets.

Enver Pasha visited the front in the month of June. He was
more than satisfied with the defensive measures we had taken, but
was still of opinion that the right flank of the English Army should
be attacked in the rear. At last he said to me :

" I have asked several army commanders to come to Aleppo
to discuss with me the following plan. I am contemplating an

The Battles of Gaza 183

offensive with a view to the recovery of Bagdad. I intend to form
a /th Army under the command of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the
G.O.C. 2nd Army, and by combining this army with Halil Pasha's
6th army to form an army group called the " Yildirim Group,"
which is to march against Bagdad under an army group com-
mander. I have already decided on the divisions which will have
to be taken for this enterprise from the various fronts. Germany
is giving us General Falkenhayn as the army group commander.
I believe he will carry through this plan to a successful
conclusion."

I offered no objection for the time being, but kept my thoughts
to myself.

When we returned to Aleppo together a few days later we
found Izzet Pasha, the commander of the Caucasus Army Group,
and Halil Pasha, G.O.C. 6th Army, already there. Mustafa
Kemal Pasha, the G.O.C. 2nd Army, who was already quartered
at Damascus, had visited the Palestine Front with us and we had
gone to Aleppo together.

The meeting of four army commanders with the Chief of the
General Staff to preside was not an everyday affair. Of course I
referred to the importance of the Palestine Front and the reasons
which should move the Commander-in-Chief to reinforce it first
and foremost. I proposed ihat instead of embarking on the
Bagdad campaign we should assemble at Aleppo a large force
which could be directed thence wherever its presence turned out
to be required. I added :

" If we concentrate such an army at Aleppo it will be able to
resist any Russian pressure on the front of the 2nd Army or oppose
any advance of the English up the Tigris or Euphrates. Above
all, we shall be able to force the Entente Governments to give up
the idea of a landing at Adana, an eventuality we greatly fear. If
the English knew we had such an army, ready to strike, at Aleppo,
perhaps they would be compelled to abandon their attack, although
I have not the slightest doubt that they are now preparing an
offensive against the Gaza front for next autumn. In short, the
Bagdad scheme strikes me as dangerous/'

The Commander-in-Chief replied in a serious tone :

' The General Staff has decided upon the campaign against
Bagdad and provided the best German General for it. We have

184 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

also secured the assistance of a German division consisting of six
picked battalions of light infantry with a large number of machine-
guns, other units and German batteries. It is not feasible to
abandon this operation. Please don't waste time in trying to make
me change my mind."

Izzet Pasha now intervened and proposed that at any rate a
division should be left at Aleppo to meet any emergency, but his
advice also was rejected. It was only after Izzet Pasha and I had
objected how disadvantageous it would be — and had been — in view
of the advance on Bagdad to send battalions piecemeal ifrom
Aleppo down the Euphrates to complete their concentration on a
line parallel with Ramadieh that our proposal was accepted to
concentrate the troops between Djerablus and Aleppo and then
send them forward.

The continuation of my memoirs of the military operations will
show how General von Falkenhayn entered the Turkish service
and describe the military events that followed. Although those
events were of the greatest personal importance to me, various
political considerations compel me to keep silent about them for
the moment. At present I deem it wise not to publish this portion
of my memoirs, though it has already been written.

Never shall I forget that Council of War at Aleppo, and never
shall I forgive myself for not putting my views with greater force
and persistency that day. If ever there was a time in my career
when events dictated my resignation, it was that conference in
Aleppo.

I will not say that the idea of resignation did not occur to me
at that moment. Izzet Pasha will be my witness on that point.
We exchanged our views on this matter in a long conversation I
had with him when he came to visit the Palestine Front after the
Commander-in-Chief's departure. In view of the extraordinarily
great importance of the 4th Army area, both in a military and
political sense, Izzet Pasha solemnly urged on me the danger in
which I should place the country if I laid down my command at a
most critical moment. He strongly advised me not to leave
Syria.

Yet I do not know that if I had persisted in my resignation I
should have been able to make General Headquarters change their
views, and whether they would not have insisted on the execution

The Battles of Gaza 185

of their plan and interpreted my desire to give up my command as
a wish to evade responsibility for events to come.

I think my request would undoubtedly have been looked upon
in that light.

From that time onwards preparations were pushed forward
along the Euphrates, and particularly in the region of Djerablus.
A large number of rafts were got ready and a line of communica-
tions was established down river from that place. All these
preparations, of course, had an injurious effect on the Palestine
Front, and reduced the forces indispensable to its maintenance.

The preparations of the English, the progress of which I was
following from day to day, had convinced me that the Palestine
Front was in imminent danger. When I saw that G.H.Q. did
not attach to my warnings the importance they deserved I hoped
I might attain my end by applying direct to the Grand Vizier in
one or two telegrams in which I gave my reasons in detail.
In one of these telegrams I said :

" At the very moment when we want to try and recover Bagdad
I am afraid in the very near future we shall find ourselves com-
pelled to fight for the safety of Jerusalem, perhaps even
Damascus."

The Grand Vizier's answer came in the following telegram :
" The decision to commence an important operation for the
recovery of Bagdad was taken at the Council of Ministers. On
my last visit to Germany I asked that General von Falkenhayn's
services should be placed at the disposal of the Ottoman Empire
to conduct the campaign. It is now impossible for me to take
steps to have this campaign postponed. As regards the troops
you feel called upon to demand for the Palestine Front, this seems
to me a fruitless dispute between an army commander and the
Commander-in-Chief. I do not think my intervention can do any
good at all."

At length, in the middle of August, I went to Constantinople
to make the position clearer and emphasise for the last time the
great danger with which the Palestine Front was faced. Once
more I insisted on the necessity of concentrating the Yildirim
Group between Damascus and Aleppo and even sending part of it
to Palestine. In a word, I wanted to have the main reserve of the

1 86 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Sinai Army ready to meet any eventuality, and by that precaution
prevent the breaking of the Palestine Front in case of an English
offensive in November and December. On the other hand, I was
willing to admit that it would be open to us to carry through a
campaign for the recovery of Bagdad in January or February and
that until then the line of communications along the Euphrates
must be fully prepared.

We then held a Council of War, at which Enver Pasha presided.
General von Falkenhayn and his Chief of Staff, my Chief of Staff,
and Bronsart Pasha, the Chief of Staff at G.H.Q., were also
present.

First of all Colonel AH Fuad Bey, my Chief of Staff, unfolded
in detail the preparations made by the English and the condition of
the troops with which we had to meet them. I then explained
what we should need in the way of personnel and materiel, and
came to the conclusion that it was in the interests of the Ottoman
Empire to abandon the campaign against Bagdad. Thereupon
Enver Pasha and von Falkenhayn began a discussion in German.
Of course I did not understand a word of what they said, but,
judging by their conversation, their reference to the map, and the
fact that they frequently pointed to the English front, as well as by
certain French military expressions they used, I assumed that they
had returned to the plan for an offensive which they had contem-
plated but which I thought had .been abandoned in view of my
decided opposition.

At this moment Enver Pasha seemed to be the strongest
opponent of that plan, whereas von Falkenhayn seemed to be
insisting on the highly advantageous results such a plan would
have.

But afterwards, when Enver Pa^ha translated the conversation
for me, I realised that it was von Falkenhayn who had advocated
the view that it was impossible to carry through the expedition
against Bagdad while the English were on the Palestine Front.
He maintained that it was the first task of the Yildirim Army to
make a surprise attack on the English and force them back to the
Canal. It could then tfe sent against Bagdad. As regards the
Palestine Front, it was merely a question of making a wheeling
movement and thrusting in between Hafir and the sea to catth the
English unawares. Enver Pasha opposed that view and expressed

The Battles of Gaza 187

his opinion that the troops then in Palestine were adequate for
defensive purposes. He saw no need to send further troops, and
declared that he could not abandon the Bagdad expedition.

I did not agree with either of them. I was utterly hostile to
the Bagdad scheme, and considered that it was extremely
prejudicial and dangerous to lose any time and not to send the
divisions concentrated at Aleppo to Palestine at the earliest
possible moment. In the second place, it seemed to me foolish to
start an offensive from the Palestine Front against the English
right through the desert, as even if we employed the whole
Yildirim Army for the purpose I was convinced that we were
scarcely in a position to effect anything in view of the scale on
which the English had made their preparations.

The English had constructed their defences so excellently that
for such an offensive we should have required all kinds of material
which we had not the faintest chance of securing — tanks, heavy
long-range guns, high explosives, the necessary supply of poison
gas, &c.

After the failure of this offensive — and it was twenty to one it
would be a failure — the English would have made their counter-
attack and could not have failed to capture most of our storm
troops. That would affect the moral of our force most preju-
dicially and make it easy for the enemy to assail our defences and
break through our Palestine Front completely. The English had
concentrated nine infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, and
a large force of special arms on the Palestine Front, and it was
absolutely certain that in the middle of August, or, at the latest,
during the winter, they would have carried out their last decisive
offensive against this front. Nor would they confine themselves
to a single onslaught. They would 'start an offensive which would
continue for months, an offensive like those of which we have seen
examples on the Western Front. The result of all this was that
it was our best course to await the end of the offensive, which
would cause the English immense losses, and if we completely suc-
ceeded in driving them off we ought to make a counter-attack at
short range on the defeated English divisions with fresh forces
held ready for the purpose.

This course would perhaps not bring us any great positive
benefits, but it was the best and most promising method of pro-

1 88 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

tecting the Palestine Front and averting a great danger from
Syria.

On the basis of my proposal the following plan could have
been adopted:

Abandon the expedition against Bagdad so far as August
or the coming winter was concerned.

Concentrate all the Yildirim divisions in Palestine, Damascus,
Hama, and Aleppo.

Send Yildirim divisions to Palestine as and when the English
reinforced their front.

Fix the number of divisions to be employed in second line
so that all the divisions in the front line could be relieved every
fortnight.

Strengthen our third line with a substantial main reserve.

Refrain from exposing to any danger the army awaiting the
English offensive in these positions — the only army at the
disposal of the Ottoman Government.

To execute these movements it was entirely unnecessary for
the Commander of the Yildirim Group and his Headquarters Staff
to come to Palestine. Von Kress Pasha, commanding the
Palestine Front, who had been on that front for more than three
years and conducted the two defences of Gaza, could have taken
command of all the divisions in first and second line, while the
divisions forming the main reserve would be under my direct
orders.

If, on the other hand, the Yildirim Group came to Palestine
the Headquarters Staff of the 7th Army relieved by that group
would have to follow it, and it would then become necessary to
separate the Palestine Front — essentially a single front — into two
independent sectors, each with an army.

Yet nothing would have been more ridiculous than to distribute
eight or nine and perhaps even ten army corps (and I do not know
how many divisions) in two armies, seeing that the whole force
from start to finish comprised scarcely fifty thousand bayonets.

It is certain that it would have been far better to employ all
the efficient young officers to be found in these armies and army
corps to fill up the gaps in the divisions.

The Battles of Gaza 189

But the object which Marshal von Falkenhayn Pasha had in
mind was of a different character. After he realised that the
expedition against Bagdad — which he had at first considered a very
simple matter — was impossible, he felt that his position was very
absurd, and desired to find some way out of it. To save his own
face he took up a plan which Enver Pasha had contemplated three
or four months before, the plan of an offensive against the English
in Palestine. Enver Pasha had dropped it in view of my oppo-
sition, but von Falkenhayn now said: " Djemal Pasha says this
operation is impossible, but I consider it not merely possible, but
profitable/'

Enver Pasha, however, wished neither to send troops to
Palestine nor to abandon the expedition against Bagdad, so he
brought the Council of War to an end by declaring that he
remained of his original opinion.

As a matter of fact, several units of the 7th Army had begun
to concentrate at Aleppo a month before, and Mustafa Kemal
Pasha, G.O.C. the 7th Army, had transferred his headquarters to
that city.

It was intolerable to me to see these troops idling in Aleppo
while, in my opinion, they should have been forming an indispen-
sable part of our force on the Palestine Front. So in spite of the
categorical declarations of Enver Pasha and the announcement of
his intentions at the Council of War, I continued to make repre-
sentations— but now in writing — that these troops should be sent
south without the slightest delay.

At this moment I received from the German Emperor an
invitation to visit the Western Front. I do not know the reasons.

Count Waldburg, the German Councillor of Embassy, who was
then performing the functions of Charge d'Affaires, sent the
official invitation to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and also
communicated it to me personally with the compliments of His
Majesty the Emperor. The same day the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador informed me that His Majesty the Emperor of
Austria and King of Hungary invited me to visit the Austro-
Hungarian front.

After obtaining the permission of His Majesty the Sultan I
went first to Germany.

I inspected the fleet at Wilhelmshaven and from there went to

i go Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Cuxhaven and Kiel on board the Bayern. At Kiel I was given a
very kind reception by Prince Henry and visited the Arsenal and
the Naval Training School at Hensburg. In Prince Henry's
company I was present at several naval manoeuvres. Travelling
via Hamburg and Essen, where I visited Krupp's works, I then
went to German G.H.Q. at Kreuznach. On the day of my arrival
the news of the capture of Riga by German troops had just come
in, and the rejoicing was great and general. His Majesty the
Emperor seemed really happy and light-hearted that day. I alone
felt depressed, although I forced myself to wear the mask of
cheerfulness.

The cause of my sorrow was a telegram I had received from
Enver Pasha on my arrival at Kreuznach.

In this telegram Enver Pasha wrote :

" After several discussions with von Falkenhayn I have decided
to take the offensive against the English with the whole of the
Yildirim Group and to send von Falkenhayn there to take the
necessary steps to carry this project into execution. In the cir-
cumstances it is inevitable that he should also be placed in command
on the Palestine Front. Will you please inform von Kress Pasha
that it will be necessary for him to carry out any orders issued to
him by von Falkenhayn ? '

This telegram was a terrible blow to me, The German General
had got his own way and ensured the adoption of a fatal scheme
which was bound to involve my country in an incalculable disaster

I sent Enver Pasha the following telegram :

" General von Falkenhayn was the author of the Verdun affair,
so disastrous for Germany, and his Palestine offensive will mean
an equal disaster for us."

What a grief it was to me to realise subsequently that I had so
accurately foretold the catastrophe that was to render us
defenceless !

The very same day I tried to convince Marshal Hindenburg and
General Ludendorff of all the disadvantages of the operation von
Falkenhayn desired. Marshal Hindenburg replied that from such
a distance it was difficult to calculate the disadvantages or advan-
tages of such a plan, but he thought I was right. General
Ludendorff said exactly the same, but thought that by attacking
the enemy in that way one might occasionally compel him to deliver

The Battles of Gaza 191

his own attacks, not at the point he himself intended, but where
his opponent desired. He said he assumed that this was what
General von Falkenhayn had in mind when he decided on his
offensive. He added further that any intervention by him could
only do harm, and that the only way out of the difficulty was for me
to come to some understanding- with Enver Pasha after my return
to Constantinople.

After leaving Kreuznach I visited Bruges, Zeebriigge, Ostend,
and then the front of the German 4th Army, which had its
headquarters at Cambrai. I returned to Constantinople.

On my arrival I had several further discussions with Enver
Pasha, but was compelled to recognise that I should not succeed in
making him abandon his plan. I thereupon made up my mind to
resign. In view of the fact that the Arab revolt had already
reached the neighbourhood of Maan and if I now left Syria would
soon extend to Damascus and thereby involve the country in
certain disaster, Enver Pasha begged me fervently to abandon the
notion. The objections he raised were certainly valid ones. The
Druses and Beduins were north of Maan. The refractory Arabs,
whose influence had begun to make itself felt in Damascus, but
who had not dared to kick over the traces (thanks to my strong
rule), might rise at any moment, cut all the communications of the
Palestine Army, loot all its supply depots, and bring about its
utter defeat.

I had no alternative but to sacrifice myself once more. I was
compelled to put up with a compromise which severely restricted
my powers and materially affected my position vis & vis General
von Falkenhayn. In accordance with this arrangement the
General, who had the title of Commander of the Yildirim Army
Group, was assigned the task of carrying through an offensive
against the English Palestine Front with the 7th Army attached
to this Army Group. While this operation was being prepared
and carried out the troops on this front under the command of
von Kress Pasha (which had hitherto, of course, been under my
command) were put under the command of the G.O.C. Yildirim
Army Group.

I was instructed to see to the supplies of the armies of the
Yildirim Group and the troops of the Palestine Front. General
von Falkenhayn was to have nothing to do with the civil authorities

192 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

of Syria and Palestine. I alone was to deal with the civil
administration.

The detachments which were to operate east of the Jordan were
to be under my command, and I was entrusted with the defence of
the entire coast north of Jaffa and the military protection of the
country.

On these terms I assumed the title of " Commander of the
Armies in Syria and Western Arabia/' with the privileges of an
Army Group Commander.

If General von Falkenhayn had also displayed a certain spirit
of conciliation this arrangement would have led to no diffi-
culties in the matter of spheres of command or the administration
of Syria and Palestine, and everything would have remained as it
was. Even if nothing could excuse the appalling mistake of
allowing divisions to idle away two or three months at Aleppo on
the excuse of an expedition against Bagdad so that they arrived
on the Palestine Front very late, at any rate there need have been
no transformation of the internal administration of Syria, which
had lasted three years.

When I returned from the German front to Constantinople I
had heard that differences of opinion had arisen between Mustafa
Kernel Pasha, the Commander of the 7th Army, and von Falken-
hayn. I went into the cause of the dispute, and came to the con-
clusion that Kemal Pasha was entirely in the right.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha respected all the rights of the Army
Commander, while von Falkenhayn claimed the right to interfere
in the affairs of the 7th Army in a way which was inadmissible
even in dealing with a Corps Commander.

For example, when von Falkenhayn wished to intervene
directly in Arab affairs which appertained to Mustafa Kemal
Pasha's sphere, the latter gave him to understand that these affairs
concerned his army alone and von Falkenhayn had no authority
whatever in such matters.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who knew only too well how much
damage might be done by certain orders of von Falkenhayn's
which were incompatible with the Beduin constitution, opposed
these encroachments of the German general in the most categorical
fashion, appealing to the authority given him by his position as
Army Commander.

The Battles of Gaza 193

Such was more or less the position in Syria when I returned to
Aleppo from Constantinople towards the middle of November.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha saw that it was impossible for him to be
under the orders of General von Falkenhayn, and I also was con-
vinced that as long as the German general was in Syria the influence
I had been able to exercise for three years would be undermined
and irreparable harm would result for the country.

Ultimately, after a long and bitter correspondence, Mustafa
Kemal Pasha gave up his army command and returned to
Constantinople.

I had told him that I was thinking of following his example,
but that, as Enver Pasha had told me he was coming to Syria in the
immediate future, I would await his arrival.

I considered my decision irrevocable.

But when Enver Pasha came to Damascus he was so fervent
in his entreaties and the Governors-General of Beirut, Syria and
Aleppo pressed me so strongly that for the time being I considered
myself compelled to abandon my intention of leaving Syria.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha disapproved of my attitude, but subse-
quently I convinced him that the situation at the moment made
this last sacrifice inevitable.

For myself, I maintain that if (i) the idea of recovering Bagdad
had never been mooted and all available troops had been concen-
trated on the Palestine front, (2) von Falkenhayn had not been
put in command of the army in Palestine, we could have held the
Gaza-Beersheba line for years, and on the day of the armistice
Syria and Palestine would still have formed part of the Ottoman
Empire.

N

THE ARAB REBELLION

N2

CHAPTER VIII.
THE ARAB REBELLION.

ON the day of my arrival in Damascus Hulussi Bey, the Governor-
General of Syria, told me he wanted to confer with me on extremely
important matters. We met the same night at Government
House. He handed me some very important documents which
had been seized at the French Consulate, and told me that most of
the documents implicated the most highly-placed and influential
Mussulmans of Damascus, Beirut and other cities. He said he
had not cared to decide whether immediate legal action against
these people was indicated or not, and had therefore awaited my
arrival.

Judging by these documents, there was not the slightest doubt
that the Arab revolutionaries were working under French protec-
tion and, indeed, under the guidance and for the benefit of the
French Government.

Yet to take immediate legal action against these traitors might
well endanger the success of the Islam unity movement, which
was the goal of our endeavour. If we had taken such action at
once, Mohammedan countries such as Egypt, India, Algiers and j
Morocco, which had lost contact with us, would have thought that
the Turks were yielding to feelings of vengeance or endeavouring
to secure the supremacy of the Turanian nation by taking the lives
of the most influential Arabs. In the mighty struggle upon which
we had entered to free the Mohammedan world from a foreign
yoke it was our principal task to preserve unity of aim and effort
in the lands of Islam. For that reason we decided not to breathe
a word about this matter for the time being.

197

198 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Shortly before my arrival in Syria several important documents,
implicating Nahle Mutran Pasha of Baalbek, were handed over
to a court martial. As the inquiry was already in progress, it was
necessary to let justice take its course. The court martial con-
demned Nahle Mutran Pasha to penal servitude for life.

After my visit to Jerusalem Hulussi Bey told me that the
presence of Nahle Pasha in Damascus was open to objection, and
he had obtained permission from Constantinople to send him under
guard to Diarbekir. During the journey the Pasha had attempted
to escape one night when they were near Djerablus, and had been
found dead by his guards.

The documents discovered in the French Consulate at Damascus
contained sufficiently strong evidence to implicate beyond hope
Envir AH Pasha, the son of Envir Abd-el-Kader, Vice-President
of the Chamber of Deputies, his brother Envir Olmer, ex-Deputy
for Damascus, Sheffik el Mueyyed Bey, Senator Abdul Hamid
Lehravi Effendi, Yahya el Atrash, Sheik of the Druses, Civil
Inspector Wehab el Inglisi, Shukri el Asli, Rushdi Bey el Shema,
formerly Deputy for Damascus — i.e., many of the most influential
and well-known Arabs.

Yet I felt sure that they would ultimately realise that the general
war was a life and death matter for the Mohammedan world and
would one day repent of their criminal activities. On that assump-
tion I had come to the honest conclusion to take no action against
them. Being not averse in principle to the use of the Arab tongue
and the grant of certain privileges in administrative affairs, I sent
for the leader of the Arab revolutionary movement, Abdul Kerim
el Halil, of whom I spoke in the opening chapter of my memoirs.
I overwhelmed him with courtesies and benevolence.

Through his agency I had a meeting with some of the most
influential revolutionary leaders, including one of their greatest
zealots, Dr. Abdul Rahman Shehbendir, the proprietor of the
paper El Mufid, Abdul Gani el Arisi, one of the principal organisers
of the Arab Congress in Paris, and the proprietor of the well-
known paper El Muktebes, Mehoned Kivid AH. I explained to
them the views of the Government, and insisted that it would be
possible to liberate the Mohammedan world from a foreign yoke
if the great war ended with a victory for us. All of them — with-
out exception — agreed with what I said, and swore by their faith

The Arab Rebellion 199

and honour that during the war the Arabs of Syria and Palestine
would remain loyal to the Government, place no difficulties in its
way, and translate these words into deeds. In the same breath
these so-called revolutionaries, starting with Abdul Kerim el Halil,
began a doleful tale about their poor financial position and great
need of money. I distributed pretty substantial sums between
Abdul Kerim el Halil, Melumed Kurd Ali and Abdul Gani el Arisi.
From that time onwards these gentlemen were my most humble
servants, and assured me that they would lose no time in doing
everything in their power to assist me.

•

Immediately on my arrival in Damascus I started on the prepara-
tions for the expedition against the Canal, and also endeavoured | \/
to create an atmosphere of religious and patriotic fervour in all /
the Arab countries.

I had a literary festival arranged through the agency of leaders
of the Arab revolutionaries, such as Abdul Kerim el Halil, Dr.
Abdul Rahman Shehbender and several others (who were known
as " Reformers "). During this festival the best speakers among
the Reformers gave several lectures and read poems which sang
the praises of the Arabs and glorified the passion for knowledge
and progress which animated the Arab race. Songs were sung
in which the hopes of Arab unity were proclaimed. The " Nahnu
Djundullahu Shubban el Bilad," an Arab patriotic song, nearly
brought down the roof of the building in which we were.

After showing by my conduct that I was quite sympathetic to
all this and desired to help as much as I could, I mounted the
rostrum and made a long speech. I emphasised the fact that we
were all devoted to the Arab tongue, the language of our religion,
and loved and respected the race, with which we were associated
by a common faith. I said they could be assured that the steps
we had taken in the previous year to help the Arabs in their
ambitions would be repeated, and I added :

" Gentlemen, the programme for the welfare of the Arabs
which our party means to carry out in its entirety is more compre-
hensive than anything you can imagine. I myself am not one of
those who think it a harmful or dangerous thing that the two races,
Arab and Turkish, should secure their unity while remaining
separate nations, subject to the same Khalif.

200 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

" But if we want to achieve our object, much, very much,
remains to be done. The impostors in our midst who betray their
country and faith must be driven away, and we must make certain
that those who are at work with the enemy's gold find no place
among us. Above all, I want you to realise that the pro-Turkish
movement which you have noticed in Constantinople and other
Mussulman regions inhabited by Turks in no way conflicts with
Arab ambitions. You know well that there have been Bulgarian,
Greek and Armenian movements in the Ottoman Empire. There
is now an Arab movement. The Turks had forgotten their own
existence so completely that they hardly dared to mention their
own race. The national spirit had gone to sleep and ultimately
the race might have completely disappeared.

' Under the impression of the menace ahead the Young Turks
rose with a zeal beyond praise. They took to arms to teach the
Turks national spirit and the virtues associated with it. That has
been the object of all their endeavours for the last two or three
years, and those efforts have brought about the revival of the
Ottoman Khalifate. It was they who raised the army you see
to-day, and they have not hesitated to enter into an alliance with
those whom fate has sent to us and to declare a holy war upon the
fetreditary enemy of our faith.

" To-day I am in a position to assure you that the Turkish and
Arab ideals do not conflict. They are brothers in their national
strivings, and perhaps their efforts are complementary. The aims
of the Young Turks are to awaken national feeling in the Turkish
nation, train their countrymen to work, free them from the Slav
yoke, give them health and national expansion, increase the wel-
fare and prosperity of Turkish countries. In a word, they want
to make the Turkish race respected in the eyes of the world and
secure its right to exist side by side with the other nations in the
twentieth century.

" The Young Turks have resolved to work tirelessly to achieve
these objects. As one of them, I appeal to you in your own
tongue that, as the representatives of Young Arabia, you, too,
should work for the success of this cause. Do not believe the
lies of the hirelings in foreign pay, to whom fraud and cunning
are permissible methods of securing control of the Arab countries.

" I turn to the youth of Turkey and Arabia and say these two

The Arab Rebellion 201

nations will be doomed to destruction the moment they separate.
Discord between these two great pillars of the Islam religion will
bring with it the downfall of the Mussulman power, and ultimately
it will be impossible to avert slavery under the Slavs.

" Most regrettable would it be, gentlemen, if the devilish con-
trivings of the foes of our faith and country resulted in dissension
among us. Turks and Arabs must love and respect each other,
and thus harvest the fruits of their joint labours. I warn you that
otherwise you are doomed to slavery and destruction ! "

This speech made a considerable impression upon my audience.
The next day many distinguished people came to Headquarters to
thank me. The reformers were very satisfied. During the days
following the inhabitants of the city assembled in various groups
with their banners, pledged their loyalty to the Government on
the Koran, and vowed that they intended to do everything in their
power to help in the defence of the rights of Islam against the
English and French.

When I contrast the results obtained to-day with the religious
demonstrations which took place at that time at Damascus, Aleppo,
Kama, Horns, Beirut and even in the Lebanon, I can only call down
the curse of Heaven on Sherif Hussein and his sons, who are wholly
and solely responsible.

As I have already said, the policy I desired to see pursued in
Syria was a policy of clemency and tolerance. I left no stone
unturned to create unity of views and sentiments in all the Arab
countries.

I wrote, for example, to the men of standing in Bagdad,
Kerbela and the Nedjef, to several of the Sheiks of Irak, with
whom I had been on friendly terms in my Bagdad days, and to
Ibu Saoud and Ibu Reschid to ask them to help Suleiman Askeri
Bey, who had been sent with one or two divisions and the " Tech-
kilat Mahsusse " Osmandjik battalion against the English, who
were in occupation of Basra and district. I sent a special letter
to the Imam Seid Yahya Hamid-ed-dine pointing out the necessity
of his making common cause with our detachments in the Yemen.

From all these Arab leaders I received answers in which they
assured me of their devotion and loyalty to the Khalifate and the
religious enthusiasm which inspired them in common with all the

202 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Arab countries intent on participating- in the Holy War against
the foes of our faith.

I had letters to the same effect, though expressd somewhat
vaguely, from Sherif Hussein, with whom I had been in
correspondence.

As I knew that one of the most effective ways of pleasing the
Arabs was to avoid requisitioning anything from them and pay
for what we wanted cash down, the first order I issued on my
arrival was that nothing should be taken by way of requisition
from the civil population of Syria and Palestine in the 4th Army
area. Prompt cash was to be paid for everything of any descrip-
tion whatever — food, equipment or clothing. In view of the
injustice and inequality in insisting that everything must be paid
for in Syria and Palestine, while food and other articles were simply
requisitioned in other parts of the Empire, I recommended the
Government at home to adopt the same course.

I displayed great confidence in the " Reform " party. I did
not hesitate to go and see a patriotic demonstration in the neigh-
bourhood of Reis Baalbek, an outlying and lonely station, although
I was accompanied only by my aide-de-camp and Hulussi Bey, the
Vali of Syria. I had considered it necessary to take part in this
ceremony and thus evince the highest confidence in Abdul Kerimel
Halil (who had organis'ed this affair), in order to strengthen his
position in the eyes of the Mitvalis (Shiites). In fact, whatever I
did and wherever I went in the vilayets of Beirut and Syria, I was
always accompanied by Reformers, until I went to the Sinai
Peninsula to conduct the operations against the Canal.

About this time there was a general idea throughout Syria and
Beirut that the Christians of the Lebanon would rise in the near
future. I was advised on all sides to suspend the special rights of
the Lebanon and issue a proclamation calling upon the civil popula-
tion to deliver up their arms to the Government. It was said that
there were fifty thousand modern rifles in the Lebanon.

I did not credit these rumours in the least, and such action on
my part would have aroused suspicion among the Christian inhabi-
tants of Syria and Palestine and provoked them to rebellion, even
if they had no such intention hitherto. I was certain that, whoever
took in hand the business of disarming them, several illegal acts
were bound to occur and many innocent persons would be unneces-

The Arab Rebellion 203

sarily disturbed. Under the pretext of house searching the pro-
pertied classes among the inhabitants of the Lebanon were bound
to suffer immense material damage.

For these reasons I issued a proclamation to the civil popula-
tion of the Lebanon assuring them that their old privileges would
be respected and no one would do them any harm. Three bishops
sent by the Maronite Patriarch, Monsignor Peter Hoyek, visited
me and told me that my proclamation had reassured the Maronites ;
they would never forget this kindness of mine, and I need never
expect anything but the most loyal devotion from them in future.
The same sentiments were expressed in a letter from the Patriarch
himself.

But a few of the Maronites and Druses of the Lebanon were
well known to be friendly to the French and English and under
strong suspicion of secretly fomenting disorder, and as a matter
of precaution I invited them to reside in Jerusalem for the duration
of the expedition against Egypt. The expenses of residence there
were defrayed from army funds, and they were free to reside
exactly where they liked.

The list of the names of these people was given to me by Govern-
ment officials, but it was drawn up by the reformers of Syria and
Beirut with the assistance of some of the leading men of the
Lebanon.

The result of the secret inquiries I made showed that these
gentlemen were not altogether without reproach, and I can see
that I made no mistake in my selection when I read their names
in the papers to-day and realise that they are the very men who
are now doing their utmost to restore the French protectorate —
thus dealing a fatal blow at Arab unity.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Morgenthau, in his well-known
book in which he speaks of me in anything but complimentary
terms, has not hesitated to allege that I was guilty of many illegal
and oppressive acts towards the Christian population of Syria. I
could answer this gentleman with a simple " It is not true, sir ! '
but it seems to me more appropriate to give a few facts in chrono-
logical order.

On my arrival in Jerusalem on the 3rd or 4th of January, 1915,
the Consuls of Allied and neutral States drew my attention to a
certain book, and informed me that its contents had caused the

204 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

greatest excitement among the Mussulman inhabitants, and that
everyone was expecting a massacre of the Christians by the
Mohammedans at any moment. I read the pamphlet and saw that
it was a commentary on the Jehad, and set forth that it was the
sacred duty of the Mohammedans to declare a holy war on the
Christians. As I wanted to undo^the evil effect of this pamphlet,
I issued a long proclamation to the civil population of Syria. Un-
doubtedly the pamphlet used language which might easily mislead
the ignorant. My proclamation, which was distributed even in the
tiniest hamlets and made public everywhere by posters, ran briefly
as follows :

" The Holy War has been declared by the Khalif of Islam only
against the English, French and Russians, who are the enemies of
our faith. It relates to those, and those only, who take up arms
against us. For that reason all who cherish any evil design what-
ever against our non-Mohammedan countrymen, associated with
us by the bond of a common fatherland and common interests, will
be punished by me with the greatest severity/'

The Russian diplomatist, Mandelstamm, refers in great detail to
the pamphlet in question on page 370 of his book, " The Fate of
the Ottoman Empire/' May I ask this gentleman why he did not
take the trouble to translate my proclamation also ? I can assure
Messrs. Morgenthau and Mandelstamm that had I at any time
during the war cherished the idea. of provoking a massacre of the
Syrian Christians by the Mohammedans, nothing could have been
easier. The fact that throughout the war the Christians and Jews
were never in the slightest degree troubled by the Mohammedans
and Druses is to be ascribed solely to my efforts and precautions.
Mandelstamm may say in his notorious book that the Christians
of Syria were not massacred merely owing to the absence of the
Kurds, who had been sent against the Armenians, but I am quite
sure that, in his heart of hearts, he does not believe it himself. If
I had once let the Beduins and Syrians know that there was a
chance of their robbing the Christians of the Lebanon, who are
very rich, I need have taken no further trouble.

No, gentlemen ! Once more I say that when you maintain
in your books that I intentionally allowed the Christians of Syria
to die you are stating what is pure fiction. The day will come
when honourable men in America, France, and England will tell

The Arab Rebellion 205

the truth and authenticate it with their signatures. Will your
cheeks then flame with shame ? I doubt it !

After my return from the first expedition against the Canal
nothing happened to shake my confidence in the reformers. My
policy towards them was so straightforward that I urged Abdul
Kerim el Halil and Dr. Abdul Rahman el Shehbender to visit the
Turko-Arab troops who were returning from the Canal Expedition
and satisfy themselves of their excellent moral. I invited them to
come to Jerusalem and after giving them a considerable sum to
defray the expenses of their journey, I sent them to the troops.
Without any sort of supervision they spent three weeks with the
army. On their return they spoke in high terms of the discipline
and supply arrangements of the troops.

During May, 1915, I read in the Egyptian papers such violent
attacks on the Ottoman Government by the Ella Merkezye Com-
mittee that I was at a loss to account for this degree of bitter
vulgarity.

One day I asked Abdul Kerim el Halil if he could explain the
contrast between the loyalty of the teformers of Syria and Beirut
and the base allegations made by men like Refik el Azmet and
others who were regarded as leaders. In some confusion he tried
to give me an answer, but it was perfectly obvious that my question
had greatly frightened him.

A few days later he called on me and told me that if I wished
he would go to Egypt to explain the policy I was pursuing in Syria
to the leaders of the Ella Merkezye. He assured me that he would
use every endeavour to make them adopt a different attitude.

At this time the state of Syria was as critical and deplorable as
could be. The English and French had landed at the Dardanelles
and were renewing their violent attacks every day. At the wish of
G.H.Q. I had sent to Constantinople the 8th, loth, and 25th
Divisions, which had been in Syria. They were subsequently
followed by all the machine-gun companies and, in short, every-
thing in the way of men and material required for the defence of
the Dardanelles. In an area stretching from the Taurus to the
Medina I had to maintain internal order and prevent any hostile
landing, but there was nothing at my disposal but one or two Arab
divisions and the Dervish Mevlevi volunteer battalion. If a revolt

206 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

had broken out as the result of foreign intrigues there would have
been no way of suppressing it, and the Government would have
lost all its Arab territories. If the English and French had secured
the assistance of the natives and landed two divisions at any point
of the Syrian coast — Beirut or Haifa, for example — we should
have found ourselves in a perfectly desperate situation. But as I
felt perfectly sure of the civil population, I had no hesitation what-
ever in committing the safety of the country to the Arab
formations and leaving the coastal districts practically without
surveillance.

I am certain that if the English had had the slightest doubt
about the loyalty of the civil population of Syria and Palestine
they would certainly have attempted a landing. But at this time
the treasonable activities of Sherif Hussein had scarcely begun,
and I knew nothing about them. But notwithstanding all the
superficial confidence I displayed in Abdul Kerim el Halil I was
sure that he could be easily won over by money, and his proposal
to go to Egypt aroused my suspicions. Italy also had declared
war on us at this time, and thus all communications between the
Syrian coast and the outside world had been broken. I did not
understand how Abdul Kerim Halil thought he could get to Egypt.
In reply to my question he answered, " I'll find some way." This
answer confirmed my suspicions, but I did not betray anything.

About the end of June Sheik Essad Shukair, the " Army
Mufti "* came to me to tell me of the beginnings of revolt which
were perceptible in Syria. He said that Kiamil el Essad, the
deputy for Beirut, who lived in his native village in the Kaza of
Sidon, could give me more detailed information. I immediately
telegraphed to Kiamil Essad Bey, and he came to Jerusalem two
days later with another gentleman. What he said was this :

" Effendim ! Your Excellency shows great confidence in the
reformers and allows them absolute freedom in the country, but
I'm afraid that they are abusing your confidence. At the moment
Riza Beyel Sulk, the former deputy for Beirut, and Abdul Kerim
el Halil are engaged in organising a rebellion in the region of
Tyre and Sidon. If Your Excellency will make enquiries you will
obtain confirmation of all I tell you."

* Corresponds to Chaplain General [Tr.].

The Arab Rebellion 207

The Arabs have one great weakness. The moment one of
them gets more attention or kindness than the others, all the rest
are smitten with jealousy and begin to agitate against him. But
I could not assign any such motive to the revelations of Kiamil el
Essad. I had never treated him as of lower rank than Abdul
Kerim el Halil, and so he could have had no personal interest in
intriguing against him. Riza Bey el Sulk, on the other hand, I
had always regarded as a low intriguer and refused to receive
him.

After taking Kiamil el Essad's opinion as to the best method
of conducting the enquiry I issued the necessary instructions.
The enquiry lasted a fortnight, and showed that Abdul Kerim el
Halil and Riza Bey el Sulk were in fact fomenting a revolt in the
region of Tyre and Sidon. I immediately ordered their arrest and
that of their accomplices, for any loss of time might be dangerous.
The conspirators had chosen their locality well, for the district of
Tyre and Sidon was guarded less than any other part of the coast
region. There was only one company there, and the surveillance
force consisted of a few gendarmes.

As the stretch of coast between Beirut and Syria lies on no
great highway, neither officers nor administrative officials were in
the habit of visiting it. I myself had never thought of making a
journey to that region. Thus the revolutionaries could work there
quite undisturbed, and after thoroughly preparing and poisoning
public opinion, they could have been assisted by a hostile force,
landed at night, and have occupied the mountainous district in the
interior and put in a state of defence against attack from north
east, and west.

As a matter of fact, while Abdul Kerim el Halil and Riza Bey
el Sulk were fomenting disorder several not unimportant attempts
on Tyre and Sidon were made by the enemy's vessels employed in
watching the coast. From time to time and for no apparent
reason men were landed from these ships to destroy the telegraph
lines, but each time they were driven back to their ships by our
gendarmes. The discovery of these traitorous activities showed
the aim and purpose of the enemy's operations, and henceforth I,
of course, considered it would be simply fatuous on my part to
place any further trust in the reformers. I decided to take ruthless
action against the traitors.

208 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Just about this time the Intelligence Staff at my Headquarters
came into possession of an extremely important document, which
I reproduce here :

Circular No. 403. Cairo,

27 Ramazan, 1322

To the wise and venerable Seyd Effendi Shukri.
Honour and Greeting !

At this moment, when the World War rages in all

its fury, the Fatherland expects greater sacrifices from its children than ever
before. The world conflagration may shoot sparks into the East, set our country
on fire, an4, consume the innocent with the guilty, the Arabs with the Turks.
It is certain that if, contrary to all expectation, the Government were to plunge
into the struggle, they would not emerge unscathed, and it would mean their
end. If the war ended with the victory of the Entente that end would be all
the more certain, and would facilitate the solution of the Eastern question
by Russia. The Arab territories would be exposed to the same peril as the
Turkish. As the Turks would, in any case, use all the defensive resources
available to protect their own Empire and possessions, the danger threatening
the Arabs would be all the greater. That is what will certainly happen.

All the more urgent is it for us Arabs to take steps to defend our threatened
independence. Our society, which possesses a special organisation, and whose
members are known for their patriotism and self-sacrifice, considers it a duty
to take immediate measures to secure the welfare of our Fatherland and the
lives of its children. For that reason we ask an immediate answer to the
following questions :

1. What are the forces at your disposal with which to start a general rising

if the necessity arises ?

2. Would it be possible to give us pecuniary help or raise money, which you

yourselves could use if necesjsary ? What amount could be raised ?

3. Is it possible to find a safe place of refuge for the confidential agents

who are to lead the rising, and will be supported by us ?

4. Is it possible to send us, as representative of your community, a reliable

man who can go to some fixed place and receive our instructions?

5. If you can find no reliable man to send, do you think it will be necessary

for us to send someone to you to convey our instructions?
Please give us a detailed reply on these points. Every minute lost may
cost an Arab his life. The time of self-sacrifice for duty and the Fatherland

has arrived.

Greeting,

A.

p.S.— We shall sign as above in future also, but in your answers to me
please be careful to give my name on the address. The envelope must he
placed in another, addressed as follows :

Cairo,

Shari-ud-Devavine,

Sheik Hakky Halef,

Superintendent of the Mosque of Shamli Hanim
(Opposite the Palace of the late Sherif Pasha).

The Arab Rebellion 209

You must be careful to give the letter to a reliable man, who must give it
personally to a foreign post-office on the coast. If that is impossible it will
do no great harm if you send the letter through the local post.

As soon as I read this letter I realised the situation at once.
It was obvious that the Arab revolutionaries had in no way aban-
doned the plan of a rising in Syria and Palestine. The only thing
I could not understand was why Abdul Kerim el Halil and others
had shown so much loyalty to the Government since the war
began, seeing that the Ella Merkezye Committee in Egypt, whose
representatives they were, had taken over the leadership of the
revolt. Neither at that time, nor after Sherif Hussein's rising, or
the total loss of Syria and Palestine, after the defeat of our glorious
army, did I succeed in penetrating this secret.

A few months after I began to write my memoirs certain
political articles in the Temps opened my eyes to their secret aims
and objects.

It was in June, 1915, that Abdul Kerim el Halil had begun his
work on the organisation of the revolt, and the correspondence
between the English and Sherif Hussein with reference to a rising
also falls into this time. I give the article which appeared in the
Temps on September i8th, 1919 :

THE ARABS AND THE ENTENTE.

To-day we are in a position to say something fresh about the
negotiations during the war between the British authorities and the
King of the Hedjaz, father of the Emir Faisal, who is using his
influence in Syria at the present moment. The exchange of views
between the British Government and Sherif Hussein of Mecca,
now King of the Hedjaz, on the subject of the territorial peace
terms in the Levant, are contained in eight letters between July,
1915, and January, 1916.

i. In July, 1915, the Sherif offered the British Government
military assistance in return for the promise of independence for
Arabia in an area including Mersina and Adana in the north and
stretching from the 37th degree of latitude to the Persian frontier.
The eastern limit is to be the Persian frontier down to the Gulf of
Basra, the southern the Indian Ocean, but Aden is excluded. In
the west the kingdom is to be bounded by the Red Sea and the
Mediterranean as far as Mersina.

o

210 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

2. On August 30th, 1915, Sir Henry MacMahon, British Resi-
dent in Cairo, replied evasively with the remark that the moment
for deciding on the future frontiers had not yet arrived.

3. In a letter of September Qth, forwarded on October i8th, Sir
Henry MacMahon tells the Foreign Office that the Sherif insists
on a prompt discussion of the frontier question. At the same
time Sir Henry MacMahon sends on the declaration handed him by
the Egyptian representative of the Sherif. It runs as follows :

A French occupation of the purely Arab districts of Aleppo, Harna, Horos,
and Damascus would meet with armed resistance from the Arabs. But with
the exception of these regions, and a few rectifications of the frontier in the
north-west, the Arabs accept the frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.

4. On October 24th, 1915, on the instructions of his Govern-
ment, Sir Henry MacMahon sends the following letter to the
Sherif :

The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the parts of Syria lying west
of Damascus, Hones, Harna, and Aleppo cannot be regarded as purely Arab,
and must therefore be excluded from the frontier settlement now in contempla-
tion. With this exception, and without insisting on the agreements we have
made with the Arab leaders, we accept the frontiers. As regards those areas
in which Great Britain has freedom of action without encroaching upon French
interests, I am authorised by the British Government to give you the following
assurances :

" With the above exceptions, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and
support Arab claims to independence in the territories within the frontiers
proposed by the Sherif of Mecca."

5. On November 5th the Sherif replied that he was willing to
agree to the exclusion of Mersina and Adana, but must insist upon
the inclusion of the other regions, especially Beirut.

6. On December I3th Sir Henry MacMahon took notice of the
abandonment of Mersina and Adana by the Sherif.

7.. On January ist, 1916, the Sherif explained that, with a view
to avoiding any prejudice to the Anglo-French alliance, he will not
insist on his claims to the Lebanon for the duration of the war, but
would put forward these claims afresh when the war was over.

8. On January 30th Sir Henry MacMahon took notice of the
Sheriffs intimation that he would avoid anything which might
complicate Anglo-French relations, and informed him that the
friendship between England and France would continue after the
war.

Thereupon the correspondence, discussion, and negotiations

The Arab Rebellion an

• wf ' ~ '' '

between the Sherif and Great Britain on the territorial conditions
of peace came to an end.

These documents reveal the facts that :

1. In the letter of October 24th, 1915, which constitutes the sole
binding agreement between Great Britain and the Shenf, the
English Government entered into no obligation which conflicted
with the Franco-British agreement of May, 1916.

2. After the opening of the negotiations for the agreement of
May, 1916, which Monsieur Georges Picot was commissioned to
conduct in London, Great Britain entered into no fresh commit-
ment with the Sherif. The first meeting of the negotiators took
place on November 23rd, 1915, and the two last letters of January,
1916, added nothing to the obligations undertaken tpwards King
Hussein on October 24th.

This article shows clearly enough that as early as the first
months of 1915 Sherif Hussein had decided upon a revolt, and laid
before the British Government a proposal for the establishment of
an independent Arab State, bounded on the north by a line drawn
from Mersina-Adana to Mosul. If England accepted this proposal
the Sherif pledged himself to rise against his illustrious sovereign,
the Khalif of Islam.

When these facts (which I have ascertained subsequently) are
viewed in conjunction with the attempts at revolt which I dis-
covered at the end of June, 1915, it is perfectly clear that Abdul
Kerim el Halil and his confederates had then received appropriate
instructions from the Sherif of Mecca, and already taken the first
steps towards the organisation of the revolt.

Although I had never believed in the honesty of the Sherif
of Mecca, I could never have conceived that in a war, upon
which the fate of the Khalifate depended, he would ally himself
with the States which desired to thrust the Slav yoke upon the
whole Mohammedan world, and, indeed, would go so far as to
sow the seeds of discord in the whole country to gratify his
personal ambitions.

The correspondence, couched in a highly respectful tone, which
I had had with him since December, 1914, continued, and he pro-
mised to assist the second Canal Expedition, which was due for
the winter of 1915, with a corps he proposed to send from the

02

212 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Hedjaz. Although I was perfectly certain that men like Refik el
Azem, Sheik Reshid Riza, and Abdul Kerim el Halil were base
enough to sell themselves to the English and French, it never
struck me as possible that a man of Sherif Hussein's experience,
a greybeard, with one foot in the grave, could be so egoistical and
ambitious as to embark upon an enterprise the development of
which inevitably involved thraldom for the Arabs and the whole
Mohammedan world.

About this 'time the crew of the Emden were attacked by
Beduins in the neighbourhood of Yeddah, just after their landing
on the coast of the Hedjaz, near Assyr. (After overcoming diffi-
culties innumerable, they were ultimately to make good their
return to Germany.) It was obvious to me that this attack by the
Beduins had been suggested and ordered by Sherif Hussein; but
I thought that his action had been prompted by a desire to make
himself popular with the English and to make it appear to the
Arabs that all he was doing was preventing infidels from entering
the Holy Places.

At this time the English were blockading all the coasts of the
Empire, but the coast of the Hedjaz was excepted and they per-
mitted the Arabian Zambuks to get as much food and corn as
they liked from Egyptian ports. I took no exception to this,
because the Beduins of the Hedjaz, the local fixed population,
and the inhabitants of the Holy Places were almost starving. In
this way Syria, which could hardly feed itself, was relieved of the
necessity of sending food supplies to that region.

I believed that the English took that course in order to win the
sympathies of the Mohammedans of India and Africa, and that
Sherif Hussein was doing everything to avoid estranging the
English. I considered that the main object of the attacks on the
crew of the Emden was solely to avert English ill-will. I can see
now that all these ideas were phantoms. Sherif Hussein had
betrayed me, the Government and the illustrious Khalifate, and,
indeed, in a manner worthy of the commonest of hypocrites. He
had not shrunk from allying himself with the foes of the Ottoman
Empire, and sowing discord and weaving plots among the
Mohammedans.

The trials of Abdul Kerim el Halil and his accomplices took
place in the months of June and July. As they proceeded,

The Arab Rebellion 213

the criminal aims of the revolutionaries became abundantly
clear.

The wide range of their plottings simply astounded me. At this
time the only troops in Syria were Arab regiments, and if these
had mutinied I should have had nothing with which to quell the
revolt. The battle at the Dardanelles was raging in all its fury,
and it was out of the question to take a battalion, let alone a
division, away from that front.

As I wished to give a warning to all and sundry who were
fomenting any kind of disorder, I considered it necessary, in view
of the situation and the powers conferred upon the Army Com-
mander in exceptional circumstances, to confirm the sentence of
the court martial and allow it to be carried out at once. Imperial
sanction to be obtained subsequently. I had already obtained the
sanction of the War Minister and the Minister of the Interior.

After reading the proceedings of the court martial and obtain-
ing the views of the Judge Advocate General, I confirmed the
sentence of death, and it was carried out the following day at
Beirut. This was the end of August, 1915. These speedy
executions produced no small panic among the rebels.

Meanwhile Sherif Hussein was not merely content to enter into
negotiations with the English, but had actually had the effrontery
to send his son, Sherif Faisal, to me to keep him informed of every-
thing which was happening in Syria.

In September, 1915, Sherif Faisal came to Syria and then went
on to Constantinople. When he was received in audience by the
Sultan in Stambul, he protested his loyalty and that of his father
and family in words of such humble devotion that His Majesty
could not have the slightest doubt about his honesty. Sherif Faisal
returned to Syria, after giving all the Ministers the same assur-
ances, and was received by me with great honour. During his
short visit we arranged that his father should send to Palestine
a volunteer corps of fifteen hundred camelry to take part under
Faisal's command. Before he left Jerusalem the Emir Faisal made
a long speech to my Headquarters Staff, in which he swore by
the glorious soul of the Prophet to return at an early date at the
head of his warriors and help them to fight the foes of the Faith
to the death. It is worth noticing that at the very moment when
Sherif Faisal was taking this perjured oath, his father had already

214

Memories of a Turkish Statesman

written the letters of September 9th and November 5th to the
English and prepared his treacherous blow at the Khalifate. At
that time I knew nothing whatever about his infamies.

The trial of Abdul Gani el Vreissi disclosed a large number
of important facts, and I thought the moment had come to make
appropriate use of the documents seized at the French Consulate
at Damascus at the beginning of the war. I had asked the War
Minister and the Minister of the Interior for the necessary
authority. After a somewhat lengthy correspondence I was given
permission. The hesitation they displayed I ascribed to the fact
that the persons implicated by the Documents held very high
positions. In my opinion the punishment of a man who betrays
his faith and his country should be in proportion to the social
position he enjoys, for the criminal activities of such a man are
not to be ascribed to ignorance and folly, and their effects may be
infinitely more disastrous. His treachery is the result of malice
aforethought.

After the two responsible Ministers had communicated their
agreement with me on this matter, I gave the court martial the
evidence with which to convict persons who, for years, had been
planning all sorts of revolutionary enterprises on the pretext of
claiming reforms, self-determination, and independence for the
Arabs.

While the second group of Arabs were on their trial for high
treason I continued the very amicable correspondence with Sherif
Hussein. In January Sherif Faisal at length appeared at Damas-
cus with fifty horsemen from Mecca. He resided at my head-
quarters to help me in equipping the promised 1500 volunteers
and despatching the necessary material to Mecca.

The court martial prepared the case very carefully. In
February Enver Pasha came to Syria to visit the 4th Army and
inspect the L. of C. organisation in Sinai. I suggested that he
should go to Medina also, and we went there accompanied by
Sherif Faisal. During this visit we received various presents from
Sherif Hussein, and among them a sword of honour, a distinction
which the Arabs regard as the greatest proof of friendship. But
all the time he was thus demonstrating his loyalty in this way, he
was making definitive proposals for the organisation of a rebellion

The Arab Rebellion 215

against the Khalifate in the letter of January ist, 1916, to which
I have referred.

If I give all these details, it is to expose Sherif Hussein's base-
ness and furnish an adequate reply to certain short-sighted
people who have attributed the Sheriffs rebellion to my bad
administration.

The trial continued even after Enver Pasha's return to
Constantinople. It was then that Sherif Hussein showed his
true colours. Just after Enver Pasha got back he sent me a tele-
gram in cipher which he had received from Sherif Hussein.
Omitting certain introductory sophisms, it ran more or less as
follows :

" If you want me to remain quiet, you must recognise my in-
dependence in the whole of the Hedjaz — from Tebbuk to Mecca —
and create me hereditary prince there. You must also drop the
prosecution of the guilty Arabs and proclaim a general amnesty
for Syria and Irak."

The meaning of this telegram was so obscure that Enver Pasha
told me he could not make head or tail of it and considered it a
puzzle.

Simultaneously Sherif Faisal, probably on instructions from
his father, begged me to show forbearance and generosity to the
prisoners.

On receipt of Enver Pasha's telegram I sent for the Sherif. I
asked my Chief of Staff, Ali Fuad Bey, to come as witness to
our interview. After a few introductory words, I addressed Sherif
Faisal as follows :

" When I heard on my return from Medina that your brother
Ali Bey was interfering with the authority of the Governor of
Medina and assuming powers on the pretext that they were part
of his authority as Imam, I attributed his action to his youth and
inexperience. I told the Governor to ask him to discontinue such
action for the future. I asked your father also to make similar
representations to him.

" In our many previous conversations I have always impressed
upon you that I myself would leave nothing undone to safeguard
the rights of the Imam, and if any of your rights were illegally
encroached upon, I would give you every help in my power, even
if, in doing so, I came into conflict with other people, however

216 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

highly placed. I have told your father so by letter on several
occasions, and received letters of thanks from him in return.

" At the same time I think you yourself will admit that
your father has many enemies in his own family. Some of those
enemies are in Constantinople and trying every day to rouse the
Government's suspicions against your father. That being so,
the best course for you is to avoid doing or saying anything which
could give your enemies any ground for calumniating you. If
you read this telegram you must admit that your father is on
the wrong track and giving his political enemies a weapon to use
against him."

Sherif Faisal feverishly read the telegram and turned pale. At
length he said:

" Effendim ! You've no idea what a grief this is to me. This
telegram is certainly the result of some great misunderstanding.
I can positively assure you that my father means nothing wrong.
You know he does not understand Turkish very well. This tele-
gram must have been written out by some Turkish scribe who did
not understand the Arab text and has reproduced it in this in-
accurate translation. God forbid that my father should ever
contemplate such a notion ! '

Sherif Faisal's discomfort waxed patently. He immediately
offered to write to his father to ask him to abandon his intention,
and took refuge in every possible excuse.

As a result of this conversation I sent Sherif Hussein the
following telegram :

" I have been informed of your telegram to Enver Pasha.
You ask that the Imaret should be made hereditary in your family
and the Imperial pardon granted to several persons who have
proved themselves traitors to the nation and the faith. Your
second request cannot be complied with, for it would involve highly
injurious action in a matter touching the common weal. A Govern-
ment which pardoned traitors would be accused of weakness by
public opinion. It would be itself encouraging a large number
of persons to play the part of traitor and dealing a severe blow at
the welfare of the Empire and the Faith. If you were acquainted
with the contents of the documents in these trials you would see
to what depths of treason the accused descended. But as regards
the question of making the Imaret hereditary in your family, my

The Arab Rebellion 217

view is — and you will forgive me for the suggestion — that the
moment for putting this demand forward does not seem to me
well chosen.

" At a time when, owing to the war, everyone's mental and
physical forces are exposed to the most extreme strain, you must
admit that the expression of such a wish by one occupying the
position of Imam at the most important point in the Ottoman
Empire — and a point more exposed to danger than any other — is
bound to make the worst possible impression on the public.

" In my opinion you ought not to put forward such a claim,
even if you had the right to do so. The entire resources of the
nation should be concentrated for one purpose and one purpose
alone to-day — to win the final victory.

" I should also draw your attention to the following aspect of
the matter. Let us assume that the Government complied with
your demand solely because they wanted to keep you from being
troublesome in the difficult times through which we are passing.
If the war came to a victorious conclusion, who could prevent the
Government from dealing with you with the greatest severity
when it is over ? The men who form the present Government and
dared to rise against Sultan Hamid, whose despotism alarmed you
also, would never forgive anyone who had the audacity to hamper
them in the war upon which they have entered for the good of the
Mohammedan world. On the other hand they would not fail to
secure His Majesty the Khalif 's gracious favour for all those who
have contributed for love of God towards the attainment of our
sacred purpose."

While these communications were passing, the court martial
at Aalye passed sentence. Sherif Faisal moved heaven and earth
to secure a pardon for the condemned men. He came to see me
every day, and always brought the conversation round to the
question of pardon. As I heard from time to time, he blamed the
notables who visited him, reproached them with having done
nothing to save their countrymen, and insisted that the least they
could do was to approach me on their behalf.

One Friday he asked me to lunch with him at the farm of Kabun,
an hour's distance from Damascus. I went there accompanied
by several officers. After the meal we got round to the same
old subject. I asked him whether he knew how great the guilt of

2i 8 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

the prisoners was. He said he had no idea. I replied that when
he heard the details he would be extremely sorry that he had ever
asked for them to be pardoned.

On the day before the executions, at Sherif Faisal's request,
Sheik Bedreddin, for whom I had a profound respect, came to my
headquarters to put in a word for the condemned men. Sheik
Abdul Kader el Halil, preacher of the Mosque of Ormajade,
accompanied him. It would be difficult to find a more dishonest
and treacherous individual, not merely in Damascus, but in the
whole world. The treachery of the Medina people, who have earned
the Prophet's curse, is nothing compared with his low cunning.
I thought it wiser to defer his punishment to some later time.

I asked Sheik Essad Shukair, the Mufti of the Army, to act
as interpreter.

Sheik Bedreddin put his request in the well-chosen words
peculiar to him. Without mentioning the court martial and the
prisoners, he made general and pointed observations on criminal
intrigues which endangered the welfare of Islam. After referring
to various books, he ended up as follows :

" God has three punishments for those responsible for discord
and disorder among the believers : death, the loss of both arms,
and banishment for life. The punishment must be according to
the evils which flow from the crime. We are living at a time when
the world of Islam has entered upon a most perilous war. Men
who, at such time, are capable of weakening Islam by their
intrigues are nothing but a dangerous pest. The Prophet says :
' He who intervenes with a judge on behalf of a traitor is himself
a traitor, for consciously or unconsciously he is promoting
dissension.'

When Sheik Kiamil Bedreddin had finished I looked hard at
Sheik Essad and Abdul Kader el Halil, and said with a smile :

" You brought the venerable Sheik to me to put a word in for
the traitors condemned by the court martial. What he has done is
simply to approve the sentence of the court martial and show me
by reference to Holy Writ that I have no right to pardon traitors.
That is so, isn't it, Bedreddin Effendi ? "

He glanced at us all and nodded. " Great Heavens, Sheik ! '
cried Sheik Essad Shukair. " You've done for us ! After what
you've said, how is it possible for us to make further representa-

The Arab Rebellion 219

tions to the Pasha. Thanks to your fetva he'll treat us as traitors
and hang us, too, without hesitation/' he said in a joking tone and
with that the interview came to an end.

The next day the executions took place at Beirut and Damascus.

Some say I should not have allowed the sentence to be carried
out before confirmation by the Sultan.

The reply is (i) that I had legal authority to do so; (2) that the
speedy execution of the sentence was the only way in which I could
keep traitors in check. In Arabia highly-placed individuals have
such influence that quite frequently the presence of a single
individual can have a greater effect than that of a whole army corps.
If an Army Commander with such small resources at his disposal
as I had is to preserve the authority and influence of the Govern-
ment in a country which has been poisoned by English and French
propaganda for years, it is absolutely essential that the civil popu-
lation should be convinced of his power to reprimand and punish
anyone without having to refer to Constantinople for permission
first.

I am certain that to the executions in April, 1916, alone do we
owe the fact that there was no rising in Syria during the
two-and-a-half years following Sherif Hussein's declaration of
independence.

But, apart from that, Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha, the War
Minister and Minister of the Interior, had agreed that the sentences
should be carried out without previous references. Subsequently
I sent the report of the proceedings to Constantinople, where they
were revised by the appeal court of the Ministry of War and sent
to the Sultan for confirmation on a decree of the Council of
Ministers. In this way the sentences pronounced and carried out
by the army received Imperial sanction, and the proceedings were
definitely closed.

There are some also who say that the crimes of those who were
condemned and executed in Syria were covered by the general
amnesty of 1913, so that their subsequent conviction for the same
offences was illegal.

As I have shown in the Red Book, " The Truth About the
Syrian Question/' these people used the general amnesty to start
their criminal activities afresh, and their conviction related solely
to their crimes after that time. As the documents relating to their

220 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

guilt before the amnesty are very strong evidence, the court martial
examined and published them to show up how shameless their
treason was. If there are some who, even after the publication
of the Red Book, still persist in these allegations, it is easy to see
that their motive is to prove the Government wrong in any case.

On the day the sentences were carried out the army published
a proclamation, embodying some of the documentary evidence, to
expose the guilt of the prisoners.

Two or three hours later Sherif Faisal called upon me. " I
swear by the memory of my ancestors/' he said, " that, had I
known how heinous was the offence of those criminals, I should
not merely have refused to intervene for them. I should have
asked for them to be torn limb from limb to prolong their
sufferings. God's curse be upon them ! "

The same day Azem Lade Mehmed Pasha, the Deputy for
Damascus, came to see me. " I feel absolutely ashamed/' he
said, " that such people should be members of my family. You
have vindicated God's justice. May God and his Prophet take
you in His holy care ! "

A month after these events I received from Sherif Hussein a
reply to my telegram. I gathered from his answer that my com-
munication had made a most unpleasant impression upon him.
He first recommended a general amnesty in the interests of the
Government, and then complained bitterly of the Governor of
Medina. He wrote that he could not suffer rights to be illegally
filched from him which had been conferred upon him by the
Ottoman Khalif.

At this time the behaviour of Sherif Ali Bey towards Basri
Pasha at Medina was simply intolerable. I immediately asked
Sherif Faisal to come and see me, showed him his father's reply,
and told him severely that if his brother continued to interfere as
he had been doing, I should use military force against him. I
added :

" I may as well tell you, Faisal Bey Effendi, that I understand
neither the language used by your father of late nor the behaviour
of your brother at Medina. Our relations with you here have
been friendly. How is Ali Bey's conduct in Medina to be
explained? On the one hand they are equipping a force of 1,500
volunteers for the Canal Expedition. The Government is helping

The Arab Rebellion 221

them with money and arms. On the other hand, your father is
beginning to show separatist inclinations, while your brother, Ali
Bey, is pursuing a line of conduct which is in harmony with your
father's claims. I want to make you realise that if you want to
remain good friends with us you yourself must observe the laws
of friendship.

" But if you have other intentions you'd better take up arms
and start your rebellion at once. We should at any rate end the
present comedy and be open enemies. The sequel will be in God's
hands ! But if rebellion is not your object, write to your brother,
Ali Bey, to tell him to come to me here at once and stop encroach-
ing upon the authority of the Governor for the future ! '

Sherif Hussein's last letter made it quite clear to me that this
man was only seeking some pretext for a revolt. That was why
I used such unambiguous and peremptory language to Sherif
Faisal.

Under the effect of my words Sherif Faisal turned deadly pale
and every drop of blood left his cheeks. He rose and, putting his
hand on his heart, said :

" Forgive me, Your Excellency ! How could you accuse us
of such things ? How could we be traitors, members of a family
descended from the Prophet, a family whose greatest honour it is
to be most devoted and loyal followers of the Khalif ? My father,
my brother and I are not traitors to the nation and the Govern-
ment. We are the faithful servants of the illustrious sovereign
who has always heaped favours upon us. You may be certain that
I will settle the differences between my brother and Governor
Basri Pasha, I'll see that he comes here to kiss your hand ! " 4XA1

AH Fuad Bey, Chief of Staff of the Army, was present at this
interview. Sheik Essad Shukai told me subsequently that Sherif
Faisal had gone to the office of my Chief of Staff in extreme agita-
tion, burst into tears, and told him that as I had been in such a
rage he feared that I would have his brother arrested and executed
at Damascus.

All this happened at the beginning of April, 1916. From the
article published in the Temps to which I have referred it is clear
that since January ist, 1916, Sherif Hussein had had an understand-
ing with" the English and was only waiting for a favourable
opportunity of raising the standard of rebellion.

222 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Had I known this at the time, I should have immediately
arrested Sherif Faisal in Damascus and his brother in Medina. I
should have sent a Turkish division in hot haste to Mecca, seized
Sherif Hussein and his sons, and nipped this fateful rebellion in
the bud. But in the circumstances what could I do ? At that time
I had no documentary evidence of the criminal designs of these
people.

Sherif Hussein had already had fifty to sixty thousand pounds in
gold for the equipment of his auxiliary force of 1500 volunteers
for the Canal Expedition. The necessary rifles were sent to
Medina at the end of April, and were to be sent on from there to
Mecca. Sherif Hussein's changed tone, however, made caution
necessary; I pleaded difficulties of transport and wrote that I
thought it better to send his volunteers on foot and without arms
to Medina, where rifles would be supplied.

One day about the middle of May Sherif Faisal appeared, and
told me that his brother had been ordered by his father to join the
Sinai Army at the front, and with my permission he himself would
like to go to Medina to accompany his brother to Jerusalem. He
added that this would make an excellent impression on the
Mujahids.

I at once realised that he hoped to outwit me by this device,
but as I was quite accustomed to being deceived by Sherif Hussein
and his sons I preferred to be top dog. After a moment's
consideration I replied :

" All right ! I'll give you permission. Receive the volunteers
at Medina in my name and bring them on here. I'll give the
railway authorities concerned the necessary movement orders
for the troops and give you a few ulemas from Damascus
as your escort. You can form a special delegation to greet the
Mujahids/'

At these words Sherif Faisal's eyes simply sparkled with
defight, and at that moment I knew the truth and the whole truth.
Indeed I said to Ali Fuad Bey, my Chief of Staff : " I'm absolutely
certain we shall have a rising in the Hedjaz in the immediate future.
Sherif Faisal was so delighted at the prospect of taking me in that
he could hardly conceal his delight."

Ali Fuad Bey was of the same opinion, and approved the course
I had taken, seeing the impossibility of any other.

The Arab Rebellion 223

At that time a force of two or three thousand men which had
been sent to supplement the cadres of the corps in the Yemen had
arrived at Medina from Constantinople. The Governor had been
trying for the last fortnight to raise the camels required for its
transport. Basri Pasha informed me that there was a rumour that
this force, which was not very well trained and had hardly one
reservist officer and fifty armed men per company, was to be enticed
into a trap by the Beduins between Mecca and Medina as a result
of inflammatory speeches made by Sherif Hussein.

I answered the Governor, giving him strict instructions to keep
this detachment back in Medina until further orders, have the men
well trained by all officers available, and arm them with the rifles
originally destined for the Mecca volunteers. In view of Sherif
Ali's suspicious behaviour he must also be prepared for an attack
on Medina. I added that Sherif Faisal was on his way to Medina.

After Sherif Faisal had left with the small escort I had given
him I decided as a matter of precaution to send Fahri Pasha to
Medina. He was of the Divisional Commanders of the Army
Corps under my command, and well known for his reliability and
patriotism. I explained to him the situation and my views upon it,
and told him my suspicions that Sherif Hussein would shortly
revolt. I asked him to go to Medina on the pretext of visiting the
Prophet's grave, and if occasion required to arrange with Basri
Pasha all necessary measures of defence. Basri Pashi, the
Governor of Medina, was unquestionably a courageous, honest,
and patriotic man who was very familiar with the peculiar psycho-
logy of the Arab, but he had no great war experience, and I was
afraid he would not act with the necessary strength and resolution
in a difficult situation.

Basri Pasha and Fahri Pasha were given the same secret
instructions, which provided that on the first sign of a revolt Fahri
Pasha was to take over the commands of the Sheriffs sons, while
Basri Pasha was to undertake the civil administration. I was quite
sure that at such a time there would be no differences between
those two fine Turks, who placed love of country before anything
else. TBteSiJ^xj^ 7K^* \^

In order to be armed against any emergency I had two or three
battalions and one or two mountain batteries at Damascus ready
to march on Medina immediately. These troops did not know

224 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

their destination, but were always ready so that they could be
entrained within half an hour of receiving the first signal.

After Sherif Faisal's arrival in Medina he wrote to me to say
how glad he was his brother AH was to meet me before long. As
Sherif Hussein had asked me to send him I forget how many
thousand pounds for the expenses of his Mujahids, who were ready
to march, I asked the Governor of Medina to give Sherif AH the
sum required. Sherif Hussein, who had been allied with the
English since January ist, 1916, did not shrink from obtaining
money by false pretences from the Government a day or so before
his defection towards the end of May, 1916.

On June 2nd, when I was on a visit to Beirut, I was called up
on the telephone from Medina by Fahri Pasha. I had an unmis-
takable foreboding that I was to get bad news. Fahri Pasha
reported as follows :

Since I came here I've been on the best of terms with Sherif Ali and Faisal
Bey. Only two days ago they invited me to Hezret Hamza, where the camp of
the Mujahids is. We lunched together. The volunteers were indulging in all
the sports beloved of the Beduins and singing songs about the blows they were
going to inflict on the English. Last evening I was asked to Ali and Faisal
Bey's house. The first contingents of the Mujahids was to be sent to Deraa in
two days' time.

This morning I find myself faced with a situation which has changed in
the most remarkable way. One of Sherif Ali Bey's men brought me some letters.
One was for me, the second — from Sherif Hussein — for you, and the third — also
from Sherif Hussein— was addressed to the Grand Vizier. As the two last were
in cipher I had them sent on at once.

In the letter to me Ali Bey writes : "In accordance with my father's
orders the transport of the volunteers to Palestine will be suspended. I have
therefore decided to return with the Mujahids to Mecca instead of wasting my
time here. I regret that I must go without taking leave of you. Please excuse
me! "

Of course I could not read the letters in cipher from Sherif Hussein,
immediately sent a detachment to the place occupied by the volunteers yesterday.
It was deserted. Ali Bey had written that he was returning to Mecca, but
according to the information given me by loyal Beduin Sheiks, he had divided
his force into three detachments and sent them in different directions. It seems
to me certain that the railway will be attacked to-night or to-morrow morning at
the latest, and that Ali Bey will interrupt our communications between Medina
and Syria and attempt a surprise attack on Medina with his whole force. In
accordance with your instructions I have assumed command of all the troops in
Medina and taken all measures of defence necessary to meet emergencies.
Please don't leave us without reinforcements !

I told Fahri Pasha that I would immediately give orders that the
troops destined for Medina should proceed there at once, and
asked him whether he required any further reinforcements.

The Arab Rebellion 225

I had Sherif Hussein's letters to the Grand Vizier and myself
deciphered. In the telegram to me Sherif Hussein wrote that
unfortunately he could take no part in the expedition against the
Canal until the conditions he had laid down in his telegram to the
Grand Vizier were complied with and our attitude towards him
ceased to be equivocal.

In his letter to the Grand Vizier he said that he did not know
whom he was to believe, as one of the two diplomatists with whom
he was dealing had always shown him the most distinguished
courtesy, while the other had used the most insulting language.
He considered himself compelled to break off relations with the
Government until the request was acceded to which he had made to
Enver Pasha two months before.

I was the courteous diplomat, while Enver Pasha was the man
who had been so rude to him. About three weeks before Enver
Pasha had sent Sherif Hussein a telegram pointing out the neces-
sity of his son Ali's acting very differently towards the Governor
of Medina.

It must be supposed that Sherif Hussein had discovered no
other excuse for rebelling and wished to exploit this matter. The
letters I had sent him were couched in terms which offered no
pretext whatever for disagreement. As a matter of fact, there
were no insulting expressions in Enver Pasha's letter, though it
was not overburdened with polite formulae. Thus, the form of
this letter was the reason why Sherif Hussein rebelled.

When Sherif Faisal went to Medina I provided him with a
cipher key, in case anything unusual occurred of which he might
like to inform me.

I duly received a communication from him in cipher. It ran
as follows :

My father has given orders to stop the transport of the volunteers to Syria,
for reasons I hope to explain personally when I have the pleasure of seeing
you before long. The situation which has now arisen has upset me very much
and, as it would be painful for me to see you again before matters have been
put right, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I am going to
Medina for a time.

Two or three days later the outbreak of the revolt, which
began with an attack on the railway north of Medina, confirmed the
criminal designs of Sherif Hussein.

As subsequent events relate solely to the fighting between the

p

226 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

rebels and the troops, I do not think it necessary to discuss them
in my memoirs. On my return to my country — in God's good
time ! — I hope to be able to publish the whole of the correspondence
(which I have kept) between Sherif Hussein and myself. But as
I have read in Mandelstamm's book the French translation of the
proclamations Sherif Hussein felt impelled to issue to justify his
revolt, it seems to me that the object of my book makes it advisable
to examine them more closely.

The causes of the revolution, which are enumerated in the first
proclamation of Sherif Hussein on the 25 Chaban, 1334 (June 27th,
1916), may be summarised as follows. In its original text the
proclamation furnishes an eloquent example of the literary
hypocrisy of the Arabs. It is translated at p. 260 of Mandel-
stamm's work :

1. Since the day on which the " Committee of Unity and Progress " obtained
power (he probably means since July 23, 1908, when the country received a con-
stitution) the country has been governed so badly that the Empire has lost a
large part of its territory, with its population, and also its prestige.

2. During the many foreign wars resulting from this bad government the
people, particularly the inhabitants of the Hedjaz, have been reduced to such a
state of misery that they have had to sell even the roof over their heads.

3. As if that were not enough, the laws of the Mohammedan religion have
been disregarded. In Constantinople, for instance, and under the eyes of the
Government and the Sheif ul Islam, a newspaper, El-Ijitihadj has had the
audacity to use language about the Prophet which is incompatible with the
traditional reverence due to him.

4. This journal even went so far as to suggest a change in the laws of the
Mussulman sherifats relating to inheritance in favour of equal rights between
men and women.

5. Using the state of war as a pretext, the Government has issued a decree
releasing troops stationed in cities like Damascus, Medina and Mecca from the
necessity of observing the fasts.

6. The prerogative granted to the Khalif by the laws of our religion (Sheriat*
and the authority of the Khalif have been restricted by depriving His Majesty
of the right to choose his own Chief of the Cabinet or the Ministers of his Civil
List.

7. Lastly, the veil has fallen, and it is obvious that the Empire is in the
hands of Enver Pasha, Djemal Pasha and Talaat Bey, who govern it just as
they like.

8. The most striking proof of this is the order recently Issued to the Kadi
of the Tribunal of Mecca instructing him to base his judgments solely on the
evidence taken down by the court in his presence and to ignore the evidence
solely recorded by Mohammedans elsewhere. This is a breach of the sura (verse
of the Koran) " Suret el Baquara."

9 Another proof is that at the same time the following people of rank have
been hung : Emir Omar of Algiers, Emir Arif. El Shihabi, Shefil Bey el Maayyad,
Shukri Bey el Assali, Abdul Wahab (I cannot see why Sherif Hussein does not
give the latter the nickname of "El Inglisi " by which he was known), Tefhk

The Arab Rebellion 227

Bey el Easet, Abdul Hamid el Zehravi, Abdul Gani el Ureissi and their
followers.

10. Even that was not enough, but all their friends and relations have been
banished and their property has been confiscated.

11. They have destroyed the tomb of the illustrious brother of the Emir
Abd-el-Kadr, el Djezari el Hassani.

These were all the excuses for the rebellion which Sherif
Hussein for all his pains could produce in the period of twenty-five
days between the 2nd of June, the first day of the rebellion, and
the 27th of June, the date of his proclamation.

I appeal to the natural justice of the whole Mohammedan world.
Is there in the first eight clauses anything- whatever, however small,
to justify a genuine Mohammedan, much less a man claiming the
honour of being a descendant of the Prophet, in 'rising in revolt
against the Mohammedan Khalif ? The events to which Sherif
Hussein refers in paragraphs 9, 10 and n took place after July,
1915, when he had already entered into negotiations with the
English, and it was in consequence of the suspected defection of
Sherif Hussein that the Government found itself compelled to
take those precautionary measures in the general interests of the
world of Islam. Thus the Sherif has no right whatever to bring
them forward as reasons for his revolt.

In one of the 1918 numbers of El Kible, a paper appearing in
the sacred city of Mecca, I have read a letter of Sherif Hussein's.
Unfortunately, I cannot give the whole of this letter, as it is not
in my possession at the moment. In it the Sherif wrote as follows
to some Arab gentleman, whose name he does not give :

Since we first became Emir pur aim has always been the exalted one of
freeing the Arabs. We have left nothing undone to achieve that aim and, with
that end in view, we have established friendly relations with the highly-placed
Arabs. How great have been our efforts appears from the fact of our participa-
tion in the Assyr Expedition, when we sent an armed force, under the command
of our son Abdullah, to frustrate the attack which Emir Ibn el Restrid, on
Turkish inspiration, had made on Emir Ibn-el-Snud, etc.

That is what may be called an involuntary confession !

The fact is that, as the Sherif himself admits he had contem-
plated rebelling against his sovereign from the day on which he
was appointed Imam, all the valis of the Hedjaz had known of his
intentions and communicated them to Constantinople. Wehib
Pasha proved himself particularly sound and reliable on this
matter. He considered it necessary to send at least two divisions

P2

228 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

to Mecca to depose the Sherif and set up a successor, but the
Government refused to take so strong a step which might result
in fresh and futile scandal and provoke disorder. They considered
that, in view of their domestic policy, it would be better to come
to some friendly arrangement with the Arabs when the Balkan
War ended.

When I have an opportunity of publishing the correspondence,
which covers a period of more than a year, the public will be able
to realise the efforts I made, particularly after our entry into the
World War, to give the Sherif no cause and deprive him of any
excuse for quarrelling with us.

Sherif Hussein would like to call it a crime in us to have pro-
nounced sentence of death upon a few Arabian notables in Syria.
Although I have previously published the documents in a Red
Book, entitled The Truth About the Syrian Question, documents
which prove the guilt of the accused, it seems to be not without
value to reproduce some of them here.

I.

THE FRENCH CONSULATE IN DAMASCUS.

January 15, 1913.
Reference the Case of Nahle Mutran Pasha of Baalbek.

The Consul-General to His Excellency Monsieur Bompard.

I have the honour to inform You* Excellency that in recent weeks I have
had two visits from Nahle Mutran Pasha, a very influential man in Baalbek.
Two years ago this gentleman was Secretary of the Turkish Embassy in Paris,
and he knows most of our diplomatists. He is a member of the Greek Catholic
Church and also of the Unionist Party, though, in his conversation with me, he
disavowed the latter by talking about the " collapse of the Committee's policy
and the insolence of the Young Turks/'

Nahle Mutran Pasha took advantage of a journey he had to make to
Damascus to secure the revision of the trial of one of his friends to call upon
me and discuss a matter which was bound, so he said, to interest the natural
protector of the Lebanon and Syria. He said that the leading statesman of
France had expressed himself to the same effect.

The present situation is intolerable (he continued). We have decided to
secure the incorporation of Baalbek and the Plain of Bukaa in the Lebanon, with
which they are united geographically. We need the help and protection of the
French Government. Mohammedans and Christians alike, we are all deter-
mined to succeed. We know how we can achieve our object if the Ottoman
Government opposes an armed resistance. One section of the people of Baalbek
belongs to our party and the town enjoys a special position. It is the key to
the heart of Syria and the roads into the interior. The Chief of the Mutevalis
(Essad Bey Haydar), the most influential man in the district, Abdul Gani el
Rufai, the leader of the Mohammedans, and I are determined that our region
shall form part of the Lebanon, and we have decided to go to Beirut to inform

The Arab Rebellion 229

Monsieur Couget of our plans. He has always taken the greatest interest in
everything connected with the Lebanon. But as Baalbek is in the area of your
consulate, it is my duty to inform you of these matters on behalf of Essad Bey,
Abdul Gani, and myself.

I could only accept Nahle Mutran Pasha's assurances with the greatest
reserve, though I received him with every courtesy. But the former Embassy
secretary paid me a second visit, in which he renewed the assurances of his
devotion to France and promised to render me any service in his power in his
own country.

II.

BEIRUT,

March 12, 1913.
To Monsieur F. Couget,

Consul-General of France in Syria.

M. Consul-General, — Remembering that France is the protector of the
Ottoman Christians and the adopted fatherland of the Christians of Syria, we,
the undersigned Christian members of the Executive Committee of the General
Assembly, elected by all the communal councils of the province of Beirut to
draw up a scheme of reform for this vilayet, wish to lay before the French
Consul-General in Syria the following observations on :

(1) The position of the Ottoman Christians;

(2) The reforms proposed by the Executive Committee;

(3) The hopes and desires of the Syrian Christians ;

and beg Monsieur the Consul-General to submit these observations to the Govern-
ment of the French Republic and support them with his authority.

III.

BEIRUT,

March 18, 1913.

M. Birre, the editor of the Arab journal El Salad, has just given me on
behalf of the signatories a manifesto which I am sending Your Excellency here-
with in view of its political interest.

This manifesto has been drawn up with the approval of the leading members
of the Committee which is secretly engaged in carrying through reforms in
Syria, as I have frequently reported to the Department. It is signed by the
most influential of these gentlemen. The lawyer, M. Pierre Tarrad, and
M. Tueni, interpreter at the Consulate, are Greek Catholics, while M. J. Hani
is a Maronite, and Dr. Sabit is a Protestant.

In the letter which they send me in the name of their co-religionists they
are mostly concerned with putting forward the wishes of the Christians in
Syria, and emphasising their friendship for France. This document is a fresh
proof of the deep attachment to us felt by the Christian population of this
region. It also shows what a great impression French promises have made
and what great hopes they have awakened.

i. The Position of the Ottoman Christians.

The situation of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire has always been
wretched— nay, tragic. As the result of the Balkan War and the Turkish
defeats it may well become far worse, for the direct consequences of those
defeats are (i) increase of taxation, (2) a revival of Mohammedan fanaticism,
(3) a new impulse towards emigration on the part of the Syrian Christians.

As to (i) increase of taxation. As a result of the loss of their European
provinces, the Turkish Government will try — and are now trying — to shift the

230 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

burden which rested on the lost provinces on to the shoulders of the Asiatic
provinces. Those who are familiar with the trickery and injustice displayed by
the Turkish administration in assessing and raising taxes cannot doubt for a
moment that the new burdens will fall exclusively on the Christian population.

As to (2) the revival of Mohammedan fanaticism. In the hands of Turkish
politicians Mohammedan fanaticism has ever been a valuable and infallible
weapon. They did not hesitate to use it during recent events in the Balkans.
The Balkan War was regarded by the Mohammedans as a religious war, a
crusade of the Cross against the Crescent, united Christendom against Islam.
Hence it is a simple step further for the Mohammedans to think that the
presence of Christians in the Ottoman Empire has been the main cause of their
defeats and decay. In Mohammedan eyes the Ottoman Christians are the true
authors of all the evils which have overtaken the Empire. They are its natural
enemies. They will be made the object of all kinds of insults and oppression —
not, of course, such brazen and palpable oppression as might give a foreign
Power an excuse for intervening (the Turk is too cunning and cautious for
that), but that secret and " slow-torture " oppression in which the Turkish
authorities are such masters and have the elasticity of their laws to help them.

As to (3), a new impulse towards immigration on the part of the Syrian
Christians. Since the Balkan War began a considerable number of Moham-
medans have emigrated from Macedonia and Thrace into Syria. This
movement is on the increase, and is openly favoured by the authorities. It
means, unfortunately, that the numerical balance between the Christians and
Mohammedans in Syria is upset, to the disadvantage of the Christians. The
Mohammedans are already despotic enough through their religion, and they
will become even more so through the oppressive weight of their numbers.

The Christians of Syria are greatly agitated at this prospect, and in conse-
quence many of them have emigrated to America. Thus the present situation
provides an extremely strong impulse to double emigration — of the Mohamme-
dans to Syria and of the Syrian Christians to America. Even if it continues for
quite a short time it will mean the destruction of the Christian element in Syria.

Reform Proposals.

Immediately after the speech of Minister-President Poincare, in which that
influential statesman called upon Turkey to bring in reforms in her Asiatic
provinces, the Turkish Government announced on their own that they were
prepared to concede reforms in their vilayets, and required the valis to draw
up schemes of reform for their provinces. Taught by experience, the Ottoman
Christians knew what they had to expect in the way of honest intentions from
the Government. The sole object of these reform schemes was to prevent Europe
from intervening to demand the introduction of definite reforms by Turkey.
Turkey was proposing to use these reform schemes — which would look as if
they were the work of the inhabitants, whereas in truth they would be drawn
up by the Government — as a pretext for refusing the reforms demanded by
Europe. They would allege that these were not in accordance with the draft
schemes produced by the parties interested themselves.

Yet in spite of all this the Christians of Beirut declared their willingness to
work together with the Mohammedans in the carrying out of the reforms, and
for the two reasons following : (i) To checkmate the design of the Turkish
Government and prevent tfye draft being drawn up as it desired; (2) to intro-
duce into this draft the principle of European control in every branch of the
administration. If this principle were once accepted by all the members of the
Committee, both Christian and Mohammedan, it would prove beyond dispute
that the whole population considers that without help from Europe reform in
Turkey is quite impossible.

The Arab Rebellion 231

The Wishes of the Syrian Christians.

Assuming that reforms could be obtained with the assistance of Europe, this
would not satisfy the desires of the Christians in Syria. They are indissolubly
allied with France, and can never forget how much admiration they owe her for
her high civilisation and how much gratitude for her help in time of trouble.

The heart's desire of the Christians in Syria is the occupation of Syria by
France.

For these reasons the undersigned members of the Executive Committee, in
the name of the Christians of Beirut, and in order of rank, have put forward
the following suggestions, the only suggestions they deem adequate to meet the
political situation in Syria :

1. The occupation of Syria by France.

2. The complete independence of the vilayet of Beirut under the protection
and supervision of France.

3. The incorporation of the vilayet of Beirut in the Lebanon, which is to be
under the actual suzerainty of France.

(Signed) MICHEL TUENI, JOSEF HANI, PIERRE TARRAD, DOCTOR

EYUB SABIT, RIZCULLAH ARCASCH, KHALIL ZEINE.

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

CAIRO,

March 28, 1913.
Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

Political and Trade Department.
Europe, Africa, and the East.
No. 131.

Syria. The Ottoman Decentralisation Committee.

COPY.

M. Defrance, Plenipotentiary of the French Republic
in Cairo, to M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

At the moment the Syrians in Cairo are very active, or at any rate spurring
each other on to great activity. On the 22nd of this month I informed you in
my telegram No. 17 of the sitting of the Decentralisation Committee, at which
M. Michel Tueni, auxiliary interpreter at our consulate in Beirut, was present.
From the supplementary information I have been able to gather, it appears that
the decisions of the committee were neither so definite nor so unanimous as
M. Tueni thought. The latter, who was acting solely as a private person, a
leading man in Syria, and in no official capacity whatever, is displaying an
almost exaggerated zeal in the Syrian business in favour of an immediate and
radical decision.

It is interesting to note also that the tendencies revealed by the Decentralisa-
tion Committee confirm at any rate in one point the information I was given a
short time back as to the views on the probable future of their country held by
the Syrian Mohammedans. I sent on that information to the Department in my
letter of March 23, No. 123.

It appears that the Syrians — both Mohammedans and Christians — or at any
rate those living in Egypt — have adapted their demands to the second of the
proposals referred to in my letter of the 23rd — i.e., the plan of making Syria
an autonomous State under a Mohammedan prince. I heard that Kiamil Pasha
— now in Cairo — roused the hopes of the members of the Decentralisation
Committee, said that he agreed entirely with the draft reforms, and promised
them to satisfy all their desires when he obtained power. But just as all those
who received these assurances do not doubt for a moment that the aged

232 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

statesman would not hesitate to renew these promises if he were reappointed
Grand Vizier, they are equally certain that the promises will not be kept, and
that the Syrians will once more be put off with fine words. That is the reason
why the first plan of a regime with decentralised administration (the so-called
administrative decentralisation) appears to be unacceptable.

As regards one point — the protection of a foreign Power under which the
Syrians are willing to place their future principality if need be — the views
referred to in my letter No. 123 are, judging by Tueni's report, in conflict with
the tendencies displayed in the Committee. According to the reports I have
received this week, the Syrians desired English protection, to the exclusion of
all other. According to M. Tueni, the Mohammedans and Christians on the
Committee are at one in aiming at a French protectorate alone. I may say that
my own informant is an official of the Anglo-Egyptian Government, while
M. Tueni is passionately devoted to France. The truth seems to me to lie
between these two extremes. If Syria is to be under foreign protection, some day
the Syrian Christians would unanimously — or almost unanimously — desire the
protection to be French. Of the Mohammedans, a considerable number of whom
prefer England, some would accept the protection of France because they are
her real friends, while others would accept an English or French protectorate
quite indifferently, whichever was decided for them by outside agencies.

As the Committee has pronounced in favour of the provincial autonomy of
Syria, it must naturally set about finding suitable persons to govern the future
principality. So far as I know, this question has not been dealt with at any of
the sittings of the Committee, but several of its members have already taken it
up. In my previous letter, No. 123, I pointed out that the President of the
Committee, Refik El-Asm, thinks that the future ruler of Syria could be none
other but the head of his family, Shefik-Bey el Mueyed el Asm. Other members
of the Committee are of opinion that the Syrians would never recognise one
of themselves as their soveriegn, as they all think themselves equal to, if not
above, each other. They want to elect a prince from the family of the Khedive.
This last view is that of M. Tueni, who came to give me his views, which he
said are shared by many Syrians. At the moment the scheme is to advocate the
candidature of Prince Yussuf Kemal Pasha, the Khedive's cousin.

This prince is a man of immense wealth, entirely independent, and when
he was asked his opinion he let it be understood that he would accept election,
but on the formal condition that if Syria was to be under the protection of a
foreign Power, that Power should be France. Any other protectorate, particu-
larly an English protectorate, was to be absolutely excluded.

The above explains the excitement and agitation undoubtedly prevailing
among the Mohammedan and Christian leaders. But from suggestion to action
is a great step, and the Syrians in Cairo seem to me — at any rate at the present
time — incapable of taking the step unless they are urged on powerfully from
outside.

Anyone who reads through these documents attentively will
easily realise that the French Government was doing its utmost
to pave the way for the annexation of Syria on the pretext of
protecting the Arabs. I should like to know, too, if anyone had
any doubts about England's intentions with regard to Irak and
Palestine. Those who pretend they knew nothing of these designs
must either be weak-minded or have sold their conscience. Let
us assume that at the time — July, 1915 — when Sherif Hussein was

The Arab Rebellion 233

negotiating with the English he knew nothing of the intentions
of France, that he was convinced that the end of the Ottoman
Empire was at hand, and had risen to render the Mohammedan
world a glorious service, and thereby restore the Arab State, and
that he was establishing a great Arab Empire in the Arabian Penin-
sula in the place of sinking Turkey — an empire which, in accord-
ance with the promises he had received from England, was to
comprise all territory south of a line from Mersina to Adana and
Mosul. But if the answer given him through Sir Henry Mac-
Mahon on October 24, 1916, did not rouse his suspicions, did not
the documents I published in Syria after the executions of the
conspirators — documents each of which was unanswerable proof
of France's designs — open his eyes more effectively than every-
thing I have said here ? Were they not sufficiently cogent argu-
ments to show him the measure of the crime he was contem-
plating ? It is easy to see what Sir Henry MacMahon had in
mind when — even at that time, in his letter of October 24, 1916—
he explained that certain parts of the coasts of Syria and the
Lebanon could not be called purely Arab. England had no
option but to respect French claims to those parts of Syria.

A man must be smitten with pure political blindness to believe
that England has taken Irak from the Turks solely for the purpose
of presenting it to the Arabs.

When Sherif Faisal was at the headquarters of the army in
Syria I told him all this, and brought it home to him that on the
day when the Arabs severed their connection with the Turks they
would fall under the yoke of the English and French, and thus
be wholly deprived of the protection of the Khalif of Islam.

Now the World War is over, and the English, thanks to Sherif
Hussein's revolt, have destroyed the Turkish army in Palestine
and completed their occupation of Syria and Palestine, what is
the condition of affairs in the Mohammedan territories? The
region of Palestine with Jerusalem — the precious gift of the great
Khalif Omar to the Mohammedan world — is entirely in the hands
of the English, who intend to establish a Jewish State there.
They have assigned to the French a region they call " Greater
Lebanon/' which comprises the former Lebanon, Tripolis, Beirut,
the cities of Tyre and Sidon, and the region of Baalbek and the
Plain of Bukaa. The English have taken the whole of Irak under

234 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

their protection. As they have avoided the annexation of the
Hedjaz, which is recognised as an independent State, they wanted
to set up under the French protectorate an Arab State, to include
the towns of Damascus, Kama, Horns, and Aleppo. But
apparently the French object to this scheme.

To show how well the English know what amazing advantages
they derived from the revolt of Sherif Hussein, I give in full the
article which Shukri Ganem, the President of the Syrian Central
Committee, who was honoured with titles such as " Grand Emir,"
" Defender of the Arabs/' and so on, published in the Figaro on
October 12, 1919:

SYRIA AND THE RIGHTS OF THE HEDJAZ.

Apparently they are still " hesitating," and refusing the Emir Faisal the
rights of the King in his Kingdom of Syria.

If the Emir's statements are to be accepted, these rights are not disputed by
the majority of the parties concerned.

Let us examine them !

They are based on the English promises in 1915. It does, indeed, appear
from a perusal of the letters between Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, and Sir
Henry MacMahon, that England promised the Hedjaz, if not the whole of
Syria, at any rate its most famous part, Damascus, Horns, Kama, and Aleppo.
On this basis, therefore, rest the rights of the Sherif, now King, and his son
Faisal ! These are the promises (no one uses the word " obligations ") on which
the Emir takes his stand, and which, he thinks, justify him in having his say in
all other agreements or decisions, and even at the Peace Conference itself.

What really are these letters, promises, or obligations ? In the twentieth
century is it permissible for two private individuals, whoever they may be —
and especially if they are foreigners — to dispose of the fate and fortunes of a
whole country and nation ?

Can a secret correspondence, with supplementary conferences, furnish a
ground for any legal or valid claims whatsoever ? Did the issue of a bill drawn
in this way for so large a sum, and in the name of third parties who knew
nothing about it and owed nothing at all, mean that we could become their
creditors ?

Then why is this claim better founded than other claims of the same kind ?
The agreements of 1916 between England, France, and Russia, however little
may be said in their defence, had at any rate considerable force, owing to the
importance of the contracting parties. Moreover, the Powers who were dividing
these countries among themselves could excuse themselves on the ground that
they intended to bring them peace and prosperity. But what could the weak
Hedjaz, with its chronic lack of culture, bring young Syria ?

But if Faisal loves our country so much, and wishes to preserve its
inviolability, why does he not reject all voluntary agreements without distinc-
tion ? Why does he make an exception where they are in his favour ? On the
contrary, he says to Reuter's Agency : " We do not recognise the agreement of
1916." He adds : " I do not care what this or that Government thinks."

Is he quite sure ? Is he quite indifferent to the views of the Government from
which he received those letters he now puts forward as the basis of his claims ?
Yet this cautious diplomat of the Turkish school — who forty days before the
occupation of Syria by the Allies tried to make his peace with Turkey because

The Arab Rebellion

235

he felt the insecurity of his position — says that this first agreement (of 1915) was
in accordance with the desires of the people of Syria. Even then ! What did he
know about it, or the archaeologist Lawrence, and Sir Henry MacMahon ? They
must have known that the reverse was the truth, as the main concern of the
Emir and his confidants after their arrival in Syria was to prevent the falsity
of their assertions from being shown up. A shower of gold and promises, a
display of lavish wealth and military power, propagandist intrigue, which it is
well known was directed even against the French ally, threats, murders —
nothing was left untried. Examples were made : the murder of the grandson of
Abd-el-Kader, the banishment of his brother Said of Damascus and his subse-
quent arrest, which preceded the arrest of Manjib Bey, Governor of Aleppo,
whose crime was that he and the eight hundred thousand members of his party
had given their votes to France. (If the space at my disposal were not so limited
I should give a detailed account of this occurrence!) The arrest, conviction,
and death of the notables of Baalbek, also for voting for France. Even in
Damascus, which became the seat of the autocratic and theocratic sovereignty
of the Hedjaz after the armistice, this system imposed silence upon some while
heaping gold on others in order to loosen their tongues. The son of the Sherif,
the bearer of the Holy Standard, who is the sure herald of a religious revival in
the eyes of the blind and ignorant section of the populace, cannot afford to
neglect any means of symbolising the sovereignty which Faisal is promising to
the believers. If Syria really wants him, why has he to resort to illegalities of
all kinds, compromises, corruption, terror, and crime ?

What remains, then, of the alleged rights of the son of that Mohammedan
Pope, whose son was apparently rewarded for his revolt against his Turkish
suzerain with the title of King and the grant of temporal power in accordance
with the materialist spirit of the age ?

What is plain is something that the Emir has not said, and which can only
be put in diplomatic phraseology — that the truth, as befits the peculiarities of
this country, is treated as a Mohammedan lady who must not be seen unveiled
by the uninitiated. Perhaps in France, too, there is a desire to spare the
feelings of neighbours and allies, who are terribly shocked when they hear the
commonest things called by their true names. And so we decorate and evade
with a knowing wink. But all this does not affect the fact that the legal claims
of that Emir rest solely upon the wishes of those to whom I have referred. He
owes everything to those wishes which have received formal expression since
1915, inspired the agreements of 1916, revealed themselves in the undertaking
of September 30, 1918 (on the very next day the Abd-el-Kader's grandson was
killed and his brother banished), and are now responsible for the provisional
agreement of September 19. The Emir is the tool of a policy which has made
him what he is and brought him to Syria; this policy is determined to keep him
here, perhaps in order to have him at its disposal when the time arrives

Of course eveiything has been done in a perfectly correct manner, and it
would be wrong to reproach England or her agents with the slightest breach of
etiquette. Superficially nothing has been outraged by this series of enterprises
by which the Syrians have been turned into Arabs and geography and history
turned upside down. This absolute rectitude in the selection and employment of
means is the speciality of skilled diplomacy.

Thus Emir Faisal, who was once simply the commander of a detachment of
2000 men, is now the unchallenged ruler of Syria. We should hardly have the
courage to complain of this undeserved misfortune if France — still bleeding
from her wounds — had obtained some advantage from the new regime. But is
it possible to speak of " advantage " when she is robbed of a land which has
increased her prestige in the East and the whole world of Islam, quite apart
from her considerable material interests ?

236 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

No, if the Hedjaz bluff succeeds — for Faisal is only a figurehead — if he is
left in Syria, or merely with Damascus, Horns, Kama, and Aleppo, while
England rules over Haifa, Akka, Palestine, Cyprus, Egypt, Mesopotamia
Arabia, and Persia, and all the. holy places of Islam, would not French interests
in this country, the French tongue, and French ambitions be seriously menaced ?
Would not Syria, a land she had begun to form after her own pattern, be for
ever changed and unrecognisable ? Who could have thought that this would be
the fruit of the victory of civilisation over barbarism ? It is inconceivable. We
must defend ourselves against such a result. It is a torturing dream, a hallu-
cination. The truth is otherwise. It must be so.

England is an ally who is not only correct in conduct, but judicially minded,
and has a liberal constitution. She is wise in counsel, prudent in policy, humane
to the highest degree. She cannot allow herself to be led away by selfish desires
and to be open to such a reproach, as she would be if Syria was dismembered
through her fault and delivered into the hands of the Hed]az or a man of the
Hedjaz. Syria will remain Syria unsullied, a Syria within unchanged frontiers
like a pretty picture in its frame.

In the words of the Minister-President to the Central Committee in Syria,
upon France alone will fall the duty of securing her future and rendering her
brotherly assistance in realising her high national ideals.

SHUKRI GANEM,
President of the Syrian Central Committee.

From this article it is perfectly clear that none of the claims
of the King of the Hedjaz, Sherif Hussein, to the cities of
Damascus, Hama, Horns, and Aleppo are regarded with any
favour. He and his son Faisal have been treated as catspaws.
The grandson of Emir Abd-el-Kader, el Djezairi el Hassan (whom
he called "my honoured brother "), accuses him of having
treacherously slain the Emir. In an article I have read in an
English newspaper it is said that Sherif Hussein is working in
Mecca with English money. Those who know the nature of the
soil and the climate in the Hedjaz can have no doubt that this will
always be so. The result is that, thanks to Sherif Hussein's revolt,
the " Hadem el Haremein el Sherif ein " (Protector of the two
Holy Cities) is, in my opinion, none other than His Majesty King
George V. of England.

It is obvious that England is making Sherif Faisal Emir of an
Arab state to be formed from the cities of Damascus, Hama,
Horns, and Aleppo, and in this way attempting to lay hands on
this region, comprising all the important towns of the Islam world.

This is a true picture of the disaster which has overtaken the
Mohammedan world as the result of Sherif Hussein's rebellion.
Compared with the injury done to the Khalifate by Sherif Hussein,
the blows dealt at Mohammedan power by the Moorish leaders

The Arab Rebellion 237

when they allied themselves with Christian states are simply
insignificant.

And if—which God forbid — Constantinople, described by the
sacred Hadiss as " Lefe tachtahane Kostantinieti," the natural
centre of the Mohammedan Khalifate, is governed by the League
of Nations (as the Europeans intend), Sherif Hussein's treacherous
work will have been completed. To those who say to us: "If
you had not entered the World War things would not have come
to such a pass," our reply is that if we had not entered the World
War the result would have been just the same, as the French,
English, and Russian lust of conquest is not a thing of yesterday,
but has existed for centuries. After emerging victorious from the
war these three nations would inevitably have carved up our
country. The property of the weak and helpless usually is divided
up. We should then have had to bear the shame and humiliation
of seeing ourselves deprived without a struggle of what God had
entrusted to our care.

If God pleases, the Turks will succeed in saving proud Stamboul
and beautiful Smyrna for their country, thanks to the recent
national rising under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and
if they take proper measures they will assure the welfare of their
nation and the prosperity of their country within its natural
frontiers.

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

CHAPTER IX.
THE ARMENIAN QUESTION.

AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

WE Young Turks unquestionably prefer the Armenians, and par-
ticularly the Armenian revolutionaries, to the Greeks and Bul-
garians. They are a finer and braver race than the two other
nations, open and candid, constant in their friendships, constant in
their hatreds. We are absolutely convinced that the policy of
Russia was alone responsible for the enmity between Turkish and
Armenian elements. Sixty years ago, or, to speak more
accurately, until ten years before the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8,
there was no question whatever of any religious conflict between
the two races, i.e., religious differences between Mohammedans
and Christians. In Anatolia, Rumelia, Constantinople, indeed
throughout the Turkish Empire, the Armenians and Turks lived
together in such harmony that Ottoman histories of that period do
not even mention such a thing as an Armenian question. In family
affairs there was no limit to Turco-Armenian friendship. When a
Turk left his village in Asia Minor for some business journey he
left his Armenian neighbours in full charge of his family, honours
and rights, and the Armenians on their side showed equal
confidence in their Turkish neighbours.

In the whole of Anatolia and Rumelia, and even in Constanti-
J nople there was not an Armenian who could speak Armenian.
Turkish— in Armenian characters— was taught in all the schools,
and in the churches Mass was said in Turkish. The highest offices
of State were open to the Armenians, and they were regarded as
the most loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

241

242 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

When the Beys of Kurdistan were overthrown by the Turks the
Armenians who lived under their sway did not form an independent
State. Under Kurdish domination they had suffered terrible
oppression. Mr. Ambassador Morgenthau may say what he likes
and take endless pains, as he does, to suppress the historical
evidence. The fact is that just as justice and tolerance alone can
explain the formation of the Turkish Empire and the rapid exten-
sion of Turkish dominion, so the magnanimity and friend-
ship shown the Armenians won their gratitude. The result
was that for five hundred years there was no sort of conflict
between the two peoples and there was not a single Armenian
who had not made the Turkish tongue and national customs
his own.

When Sultan Fatih Mehmed Han allowed the Orthodox
patriarchate to remain in existence after the capture of Constanti-
nople and granted the Greeks (not as a result of any external
pressure, but purely out of generosity and nobility of mind) a
number of rights known as " religious privileges,'* he also founded
an Armenian Patriarchate in the capital of his Empire, so that the
rights of the Armenian nation, who were a national minority
among the Mohammedans of Anatolia, should be the more
worthily upheld. He also gave the Armenians the same rights
and privileges he had granted to the Greeks.

On page 190 of his work Mandelstamm relies on the observa-
tions of a historian who, notwithstanding incontrovertible
historical facts, is shameless enough to ascribe the tolerant
generosity of the Turks solely to their contempt for all things
Christian, which, in their eyes, wrere from the religious point of
view impure !

In the year 1462 of the Christian era, at a time when throughout
Europe ithe notion of the " rights of minorities " was utterly
undeveloped, a Mohammedan Sultan at the height of his power
allowed the Greek Patriarchate to continue in Constantinople. He
granted the Greeks as " religious privileges " a whole series of
special rights as to marriage, inheritance, and education. In his
own capital he founded another Patriarchate for another nation
which had lived under the yoke of Kurdish tyranny, and granted it
the same rights and privileges. Yet shameless individuals of
Mandelstamm's kidney do not shrink from ascribing this

The Armenian Question 243

generosity to a feeling of contempt for everything Christian !
What an injustice !

Were not these rights granted by a great Turkish Sultan in the
fifteenth century the highest application of those principles of
the " Rights of Minorities " which President Wilson has
endeavoured to get recognised by the civilised world ?

Has this principle received the same recognition and extension
in the recent peace treaty with Austria at Saint Germain (which
the Jugo-Slav and Rumanian Governments refused to accept) as
it did in those rights granted by the Conqueror to the Christian
nationalities ?

The Armenians know well enough that to these privileges alone
they owe the fact that they have preserved their religion and
nationality. Instead of the oppression they endured under the
thraldom of the Kurds they have been able to live on the best of
terms with the Turks, and especially with the Turkish Government.
Why does Herr Mandelstamm, who gets his information from the
works of men like Zarzeski and others, turn for proof to the
sufferings and wrongs to which the Armenians were exposed before
the nineteenth century under the feudal tyranny of the Kurdish
Beys ? Why does he not think of the feudal tyranny in which the
French nation lived before the Great Revolution ? It is not even
necessary to go as far afield as that. Was the existence of the
Russian mujiks more tolerable than that of the Armenians in
Turkey ?

Herr Mandelstamm does not shrink from confessing himself
an enthusiastic partisan of the Russian Revolution. Does he not
know that we, too, know something about the Russian revolu-
tionary writings and something about the oppression of the
Russian peasants by their landlords, and not so long ago ? If
Herr Mandelstamm has the audacity to maintain that those
writings exaggerated we can assure him without hesitation that
he is not speaking the truth.

I repeat once again that until after the Crimean War of 1856
the Turks and Armenians lived together on the best of terms and
the former were never guilty of any wrongs against their
Armenian neighbours.

When the Russians turned greedy eyes on the Ottoman Empire
they began to think it would be politically effective if they

Q2

244 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

could make the Christian elements in Rumelia tools in then-
designs.

It produces a remarkable impression to find Herr Mandel-
stamm, after saying on page 300 of his book that the Russian
Revolutionary Government thoroughly approved of the steps
taken by Czarist Russia to support the Christian nations against
Turkish oppression, and adding that " the mujik, who himself is
a victim of the greatest oppression, has always gone to war to
save the Greeks, Bulgars, and Serbs/'

All this was the result of that famous policy which aroused
fear and aversion throughout the world. For the sake of man-
kind we cannot but hope it will be doomed to eternal extinction
along with Czarism.

It must, of course, be admitted that the nationalist tendencies
which began to develop and spread about the middle of the nine-
teenth century was the direct explanation of the fact that the young
Armenians who had gone to Europe and America to gain know-
ledge or a living absorbed that mental atmosphere which drove
them to strive for an easier private life for their people and more
independent political activities. This development wras regarded
by the Russian diplomats as a gift from God, and from that moment
they left no stone unturned to excite the Armenians against their
Government.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Sultan Mahmud IT.
had taken extreme steps to restore order in his Empire and
suppress the administrative and military anarchy which had been
the result of two hundred years of misgovernment. He abolished
the janissaries, restricted the powers of the Beys of Anatolia and
Rumelia until they had hardly any authority left, and also curbed
the power of the Beys of Kurdistan.

But while this unfortunate sovereign was endeavouring to
, restore order in his country he found himself faced with difficulties
Y innumerable. The Greeks were egged on through the intrigues
of the " Ethniki Heteria," an organisation founded by Russian
capital, and he had all the trouble in the world to pacify them. He
saw himself attacked by the French, English and Russians, lost
his entire fleet at Navarino, and was at length compelled to recog-
nise the independence of Greece. Mehmed AH Pasha, the
Governor-General of Egypt, rose against him as the result of

itu- \

nti-

r\r\t* *'

The Armenian Question 245

French inspiration. He wanted to secure the Turkish crown for
himself, and succeeded in taking the whole country as far as
Kutahia.

Who can reproach a Government faced with such enormous
internal and external difficulties with not having taken all the steps
possible to promote the welfare not merely of its Armenian
subjects, but of all its subjects ?

The Government of Sultan Abdul Medjid granted the
Armenians such extensive privileges that even Mandelstamm men-
tions the fact with admiration. On page 90 of his book he writes :

In the year 1863 the Armenians received a real constitution. That constitu-
tion gave them the right to elect a Supreme Council, with its seat at Constant!
nople. The Supreme Council consisted of four hundred members, of which one
hundred and twenty were elected by the people themselves.

Could President Wilson think of any better method of safe-
guarding the rights of national minorities ?

The Ottoman Government granted the Armenians this consti-
tution without any pressure from outside. The loyalty they had
displayed hitherto had gained the sympathies of the Government
to such an extent that the latter did not hesitate for a moment to
give the " faithful Armenian nation " a constitution. It was to
be the beginning of a new and happy era. The Russians, however,
used this constitution to interfere in Armenian affairs.

Even as early as the Russo-Turkish War of 1856 a few Armenian ,
rebels had given assistance to the Russians. Thereafter the ,
Russians maintained relations with Armenia, and lost no oppor- j
tunity of encouraging the Armenian revolutionaries. The effect
made itself felt so quickly that within four years of the grant of
the constitution (1867) the first Armenian revolt broke out at
Zeitun.

This first armed revolt on the part of the Armenians naturally
made a considerable impression on the Government. The Russian
and Anatolian Armenians made things extremely difficult for the
Turkish armies during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8.

Nercess Effendi, the Armenian Patriarch, who at that time went
to San Stefano to secure the Czar's support for the cause of
Armenian independence, was thereby largely responsible for the
fact that the Armenians had entirely lost their old name of the
" loyal nation " (millet-i-Sadika).

246 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

The Russian politicians realised well enough that after the
declaration of Bulgarian independence any chance of interfering
in the internal affairs of the Empire had gone. But the Imperial
Russian Government desired to preserve that right, and therefore
secured the insertion in the Treaty of San Stefano of a special
article for the benefit of the Armenians. This article was repro-
duced in another form in the Treaty of Berlin.

In this way relations between the Armenians, Kurds and Turks
had become very strained. Throughout the Ottoman Empire, in
large towns as in the smaller villages, the Armenian Revolutionary
Committee had established secret associations, very well organised.
These secret associations worked tirelessly to rouse the Armenians
against the Kurds and Turks, and demanded nothing less than the
establishment of a privileged Armenian province consisting of six
vilayets in eastern Anatolia. The Government and the Turk
and Kurdish population were, of course, well aware of these
intrigues.

As the Armenians were bent on founding an independent State
in which they could impose their will on the Kurds and Turks, who
greatly outnumbered them, the latter naturally tried to frustrate
this plan. To speak more plainly, the Kurds and Turks realised
only too well that the whole scheme was only a pretext on the part
of Russia for snatching a very large part of Anatolia, which was
inhabited exclusively by Turks and Kurds. They naturally
regarded Armenia, so to speak, as a snake let loose by Russia
against them.

In January, 1880, as a result of continuous pressure by Russia,
and in view of the various Armenian revolts, the States of Europe
issued a Note on the subject of Armenian Reforms to the Sublime
Porte. It was just then that the Bulgarians were trying to annex
Eastern Rumelia. Every time the Government had to settle some
very important domestic or foreign problem the Russians brought
up the Armenian question again. Abdul Hamid II. settled the
matter by giving way on certain points.

The Armenian troubles reached their height in the years 1894-
1896, and there were risings, more or less, everywhere. The
Armenian disorders now resulted in such intense hatreds between
the three nations, which had lived peacefully side by side for five
to six hundred years, that they were ready to fall upon one another

The Armenian Question 247

and stain the soil of Anatolia, and even Constantinople itself, with
their blood.

Even men like Mandelstamm who thoroughly detest the Turks
cannot deny that during the events of those years the Turks felt
no sort of hatred towards the Armenians. Many Turks vied with
one another in protecting the Armenians, and in Constantinople
a number of Turkish families showed the greatest friendliness to
their Armenian neighbours by hiding them in their houses to save
them from death. Many dignitaries of the Empire were horror-
struck, and condemned the Armenian massacres in Constantinople,
which were started by the porters at the Custom House. They
did everything in their power to stop them.

The whole world knows what strong steps Marshal Fuad Pasha
took to protect the Armenians at Kadikoi. Mandelstamm says
that it was just because of Fuad Pasha's friendship for the
Armenians that he afterwards fell into disfavour, but there is not
a human being in Constantinople who does not know that the
statement is untrue.

During the two or three years in which these massacres were in
progress a very large number of Kurds and Turks were killed
by the Armenians, and the two sides vied with each other in
thinking out every possible form of torture. But as the Armenians
were, of course, in a minority, the Turks and Kurds had the
upper hand. If the Armenians had had a numerical majority the
number of murdered Turks and Kurds would have exceeded that
of the Armenians. The best proof is the number of Turks
massacred by the Greeks in the Morea. But as those poor unfor-
tunates were only Turks and Mohammedans there was no poet
like Lord Byron or Chateaubriand to sing their hard lot, and those
bloody events left no memories behind them but a record in the
annals of Ottoman history.

Consistently with my views on political administration I have
an absolute horror of such methods. I condemn the practice of
using the masses to suppress revolutionary movements and
organise massacres. Such practices do a nation the utmost harm
and cast a stain on their history.

This view is shared by all the patriots who banded together as
the " Young Turk " revolutionaries. They condemned the hap-
penings of 1894-1896 in Armenia as a grave political blunder of

248 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Sultan Abdul Hamid II., who hoped to maintain his own despotic
authority in that cruel way. It was thus that Ahmed Riza Bey and
his companions who were in Europe at the time gave the revolting
Armenians effective assistance. The other revolutionaries who,
like myself, were at home and shared the same views, did not hesi-
tate to condemn Abdul Hamid because of the injury done to the
Turkish, and more especially the Ottoman, cause by the
Armenian massacres.

Some of the most high-minded of the Armenian revolutionaries
then began to see the situation in a true light. They saw that
while on the one hand the Russians were stopping at nothing to
secure independence for the Armenians of Turkey, the Armenians
of the Caucasus were suffering under the greatest despotism. In
return for the promise that no railways would be constructed in
Eastern Anatolia the Czar actually promised the Sultan Abdul
Hamid II. to forbid the return to Turkey of the Armenians who
had fled into the Caucasus after the revolution of 1896.

There could not be clearer proof of Russia's intentions towards
Turkey and the Armenians. It is incontestable that culture and
material well-being are the most essential elements in the pro-
sperity of a nation. But well-being begins with the establishment
of suitable communications such as railways and roads. The
Russians were demanding reforms for the welfare and security of
the vilayets inhabited by Armenians and simultaneously insisting
that we should refrain from the construction of railways, which
would have promoted those objects.

What is Herr Mandelstamm's explanation of these facts ? He
confines himself simply to reviling a European writer who drew
attention to this matter. But insults are not proof.

The double game played by Russian politicians made the
honourable Armenians reflect. They could not help putting to
themselves the following question : If Armenia gained autonomy
would she not fall under the Russian yoke, which was a thousand
times worse than the Turkish ? The Turkish revolutionary com-
mittees therefore made great efforts to get the " Dachnakzutiun
Committee," the most- reasonable and best conducted of the
Armenian committees, to recognise the reforms for the benefit of
all the nationalities of the Ottoman Empire for which they were
working.

The Armenian Question 249

Herr Mandelstamm cannot say that my statements are invented
because the " Dachnakzutiun," which participated in the general
congress of the Committee of Unity and Progress in Paris in 1907
and their published programme, closely approached the reforms
at which we aimed. They also promised to work in co-operation
with the Committee of Unity and Progress. Malumian Effendi
(Agnoni), one of the leaders of the " Dachnakzutiun Committee/'
whom I met in Constantinople in 1908, frequently spoke to me of
the Russian danger which was hanging over the Armenians' heads.

But among the Armenian revolutionary committees were some
like the " Hinjakists " and " Reformed Hinjakists," most of whose
leaders had been bought by the Russians, who sought no
rapprochement with the Turkish committees and were aiming at
an Armenian State under Russian protection.

Thanks to the representatives of these Russian committees and
the Russian money distributed by all the Russian Consulates which
took an active part in the revolutionary organisations, even the
ecclesiastical party began to say that the protection of the Russian
Czar was preferable to that of the Mohammedan Khalif .

Such was the position of the Armenian and Turkish revolu-
tionaries when the revolution of 1908 began. The secret " Com-
mittee of Unity and Progress " which was formed at Salonica had
accepted as its 'domestic programme the establishment pf the
" Midhat Pasha " constitution. The basis of this constitution was
the recognition of Ottomanism and simultaneous decentralisation
of administration. On the other hand, the system of " political
decentralisation " without recognition of Ottomanism was the
goal aimed at by the Macedonian Bulgarian Committees, the
Macedonian Greek Committees under the leadership of the
Ethniki Heteria, the Macedonian National War Committee, and
the revolutionary Albanian, Armenian, and Arab Committees.

:t Decentralisation of the Administration " meant administra-
tive local autonomy in a single " Ottoman Empire " for the
various parts inhabited by the different national elements. If the
Committee of Unity and Progress had held the same views as our
external enemies, who desired nothing so much as the dismember-
ment of the Empire and left nothing undone in the way of plots
and intrigues, it would not have hesitated for a moment to accept
that principle of " political or legal autonomy/* the greatest cham-

250 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

pion of which was Prince Sabaheddin. But France coveted Syria,
the English hoped to make themselves masters of Mesopotamia and
the whole Arabian Peninsula, the Russians were only waiting for
a favourable opportunity to seize the eastern provinces of Anatolia,
the Bulgarians and Serbs wanted to carve up Macedonia, the
Italians and Austrians wished to lay hands on Albania, and the
Greeks hoped to incorporate the islands of the Archipelago in their
kingdom. If all these regions had been created provinces on the
principle of " political decentralisation/' would those nations have
had the slightest difficulty in swallowing them up one after the
other ? Would our decentralisation principle have stood the test
of time any better than the decentralisation principle of Austria ?
Did it make the Czecho-Slovaks, Croats, and Slovenes lose hope
of breaking away altogether from Austria ? Would the authority
and power of our central Government have proved more effective
than those of the Austrian Government to protect the independent
provinces against the intrigues of our even more numerous and
covetous enemies ? No region enjoyed a larger measure of
administrative autonomy than the island of Crete. But did we
succeed in compelling the Cretans to abandon their hope of uniting
with Greece ? The Island of Cyprus had a privileged position
before the English occupation, but did we not hear the same story
every year — the age-old desire for incorporation with Greece ?

Were we able to prevent the Bulgarians from taking Eastern
Rumelia, though Rumelia enjoyed a generous administrative
autonomy ? Did England have any difficulty in occupying Egypt,
which was among the most highly privileged of our provinces ?
Have the English hesitated to lay hands on Kuiveit, a dependency
of the Ottoman Khalifate for centuries, after announcing that the
Sheik Mubarek el Sabah had accepted English protection ? Did
the English find any difficulty in treating Mesopotamia as their
sphere of influence on the pretext that the local population were
longing for English protection ? Could not the same be said of
the French with regard to Syria ? And can we regard Macedonia
or Albania in a different light to Eastern Rumelia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina ?

I do not think the advocates of " political decentralisation "
can give a logical and satisfactory answer to all these problems.
To those who reproach us with having pursued a " purely Turkish

The Armenian Question 251

policy/' I reply emphatically that our policy was not a " Turkish "
policy, but the policy of Ottoman unity. If we had accepted the
decentralisation principle, the Committee would, indeed, have had
to pursue a " Turkish " policy, for we should have had to demand
the same local autonomy for vilayets inhabited solely by Turks
as for the other provinces. So those who confess themselves
" Turks " only are really advocates of " decentralisation," for in
effect they are simply following a purely Turkish policy. We, on
the other hand, whose policy was Ottoman unity, had accepted
as a fundamental principle that the influence of the Central Govern-
ment on the vilayets should not be diminished, though the local
administration should be granted the most extensive powers,
always provided that the unity of army organisation should not be
prejudiced.

Young Turkey realised that among the various Ottoman
elements which were struggling for the advancement of their
respective nationalities the Turks alone were isolated and without
leaders, and so they, too, began to work for a great national
revival in knowledge, education and virtue. The Committee of
Unity and Progress had no right to put any obstacles in their way,
and I cannot imagine that the advocates of decentralisation would
have wished to oppose their endeavours.

Can it be said that the " Turkification " of the nations was
involved in the demand that the Turkish language should be the
official tongue in the Ottoman Empire ? Were we engaged in the
" Turkification " of the other nations when we said that public
education in the Ottoman Empire must be under the supervision
of the Government and well conducted ?

Just after the inauguration of the constitution a number of
national committees were established in Constantinople, com-
mittees such as the " Arab Union/' the " Cherkess Mutual Help
Society/' the " Kurdish Club/' the " Albanian Club," and many
others. Then why is it said that the foundation of the " Ottoman
Home " proves that the Unionist Government had " Turkifica-
tion " designs?

Speaking for myself, I am primarily an Ottoman, but I do not
forget that I am a Turk, and nothing can shake my belief that the
Turkish race is the foundation-stone of the Ottoman Empire. The
educational and civilising influence of the Turks cements Ottoman

252 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

unity and strengthens the Empire, for in its origins the Ottoman
Empire is a Turkish creation.

If any evidence is required, look at the tragic situation in which
we find ourselves to-day. Look at the Arabs, who rose against
us in the hope of gaining their independence. Where are they
to-day? I have referred to this point before.

Immediately after Egypt deserted the Ottoman Union it fell
under English domination. The moment Young Egypt protested
against that domination England's heavy fist descended upon them.
The coast region of Syria and Lebanon are not enough for France.
She wants to occupy the interior as well.

Does anyone in those countries ever speak of Ottomanism ?
On the contrary, the cry, " By the grace of God we are freed from
Ottomanism/' is ever on the lips of a crowd of traitors who have
lived on the favour of the Government. But the voice raised in
Anatolia — that sacred land to the Turks — proclaims that the
" Ottoman Empire " still exists, and her noble sons who dwell in
Western Thrace — that little Turkish corner — have never ceased to
strive for their union with the Empire. In short, all Turks —
wherever they are — endeavour to assert themselves and seek refuge
in the glorious Ottoman name. We appeal to all who wish to
preserve the cause of Ottoman unity to realise their holy duty of
encouraging the Turks, increasing their number, and giving them
their place in the sun.

I hope my little diversion, for the purpose of making my
personal views widely known, may not be regarded as superfluous.

In accordance with the Act of the Constitution, the Central
Committee of " Unity and Progress " expressed a desire to form
the various revolutionary political committees in the country into
one " Political Committee of Ottoman Unity/' With that end in
view it first of all got into touch with the various Bulgarian revolu-
tionary committees. We opened negotiations with the celebrated
Sandansky, Chernopexiff, and their friends. But, whereas we
regarded the principle of Ottomanism as the basis of the negotia-
tions, they refused to make the slightest concession, and demanded
the autonomy of Macedonia. God alone knows what we had to
put up with at those conferences in which Talaat Bey and I partici-
pated as delegates. I shall never forget the painful day I spent

The Armenian Question 253

with Sandansky in the Bulgarian villages of Menlik, Petric, and
Osmanje Djuma-i-Bala at the time of the first elections. Yet we
got on better with them than with any of the other revolutionary
committees, for the Macedonian Bulgarian Committee absolutely
refused to abandon its own programme.

A Greek, who had come to Salonika to negotiate in the name
of the Ethniki Heteria, proposed that Crete and Samos should be
annexed by Greece, that the other islands should be granted
administrative autonomy, and so-called Greek Macedonia the most
far-reaching privileges. As compensation there was to be an
alliance between Greece and Turkey. We rejected these proposals
as, of course, what we wanted was not a Turco-Greek alliance, but
that the Greeks of Turkey should join our Committee of Unity
and Progress so that Ottoman unity could become a reality.

In August, 1908, the Central Committee was provisionally
transferred to Constantinople, where we opened negotiations on
the same principles with Prince Sabaheddin and the Armenian
Committee. Our party was represented by Talaat Bey, Behaeddin
Shakir Bey and myself. Dr. Reschad Nihad represented Prince
Sabaheddin, while Malumian and Shahirikian Effendi acted on
behalf of the Armenians. We demonstrated to them in turn all
the drawbacks the principle of decentralisation involved for the
Ottoman Empire. Prince Sabaheddin's views were more or less
those of the Dachnakzutiun Committee. They both replied to us
in the same sense.

It was curious that Dr. Reschad Nihad asked us to grant privi-
leges even more extensive than those claimed by the Armenian
Revolutionary Committee and refused to consider the disadvan-
tages those privileges involved. At length Malumian Effendi,
speaking in the name of the Dachnakzutiun Committee, made the
following proposal :

The Dachnakzutiun Committee will work hand in hand with the Committee \
of Unity and Progress to safeguard the constitution in the Ottoman Empire, but \<
otherwise each Committee retains full freedom of action both as to the realisa-
tion of its main programme and the choice of means. This means that the /
Dachnakzutiun Committee will maintain its revolutionary organisation in the
country with the single difference that the organisation, which has hitherto been,,
secret, will now come forward openly as a political committee and its member/
will work in public.

Of course we had no alternative but to accept this proposal.
To put it shortly, after all our sacrifices and three or four months

254 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

of unceasing labour, we had not succeeded in incorporating the
revolutionary committees of the other nationalities in our " Unity
and Progress " Association because our aims and theirs diverged
too greatly. They wanted to carry on in public their propaganda
in favour of autonomy and independence, propaganda which had
hitherto been secret and exposed to great perils. They hoped in
that way to reach their goal all the sooner. We, on the other
hand, wanted to give the Committee of Unity and Progress the
prestige of a joint association of all revolutionary committees of
the Ottoman nationalities, just as the Empire itself had come into
being by the joint association of all those nationalities. We
wanted the necessity of Ottoman unity to be realised and recog-
nised by all the elements so that the constitution should be safe
from any danger.

Just as all Republicans in France at once unite against the
aggressor the moment they consider the Republic in danger, the
" Unity and Progress " Association, composed of all the old revo-
lutionary committees, was to call upon its members to rise as one
against the slightest attack on the constitution. Just as the Repub-
licans in France comprise men of the most varying political views
and adherents of different parties, our " Unity and Progress n
Association was to comprise men of different political views and
parties, without prejudice to their national and religious
convictions.

None of the political parties whose aims were exclusively
nationalist were willing to accept this super-national programme,
for in reality they were receiving their directions from abroad, and
as far as we were concerned they were simply puppets.

Thus the Dachnakzutiun Committee, which was the most
favourably inclined to us and had a very real fear of seeing
Armenia fall under the Russian yoke, maintained its own organisa-
tion, and publicly announced its intention of continuing its work
for the realisation of its political aims. The Armenian Hinjakists
and Reformed Hinjakists absolutely refused to enter into negotia-
tions with us and their leaders in Constantinople or entered into
open relations with tfce Russian Embassy.

In 1909, at the instigation of the Committee of Unity and Pro-
gress, Hussein Hilmi Pasha's Cabinet decided to send a commission
of enquiry to the eastern vilayets to settle the agrarian disputes

The Armenian Question 255

which had broken out in those vilayets between the Armenians,
Turks, and Kurds. Ghalib Bey, Member of the Senate and
Supreme Administrative Court, was appointed chairman of the
commission, which, in addition to him, was composed of two
Turkish and two Armenian members. One of the Turkish mem-
bers was Major Zeki Bey, of the General Staff, who had been on the
best of terms with the Dachnakzutiun Committee when he was in
Europe. I was the other member. Once more it was the leaders
of the Dachnakzutiun who asked that I should be a member of this
committee. In the previous negotiations they had realised that
my views were just and impartial, and they assumed that as I was
a member of the Central Committee, my decisions would be less
exposed to attack by the committee.

Glad to fall in with the suggestion, I left Salonica for Con-
stantinople. Yet this proposal of the Government was most
violently attacked in the Chamber by the deputies for the eastern
vilayets, who maintained that to send a commission of enquiry was
to encroach upon the constitutional authority of the Governor-
General.

As Ferid Pasha, then Minister of the Interior, proved incom-
petent to defend the Government's views to the Chamber, I had
to wait idly in Constantinople until the events of March 3ist
(April i3th), 1909.

After those events the scheme was entirely dropped, and at the
end of May, 1909, I was appointed Governor of Skutari .

THE ADANA AFFAIR AND AFTER.

Just at the time when the revolt of March 3ist began with the
avowed object of finishing with the leaders of the Committee of
Unity and Progress and their followers there was a Turco-
Armenian massacre in Adana.

As I was appointed Governor of Adana about the middle of
August, 1909, four months after this occurrence, I may maintain
that no one was better qualified than I to enquire into the psycho-
logical causes of this massacre, one of the most painful events
in the history of our constitution.

After the constitution was proclaimed the civil population in
every part of the Ottoman Empire had become so unruly that no

256 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

one, from the lowest gendarme to the mighty Governor-General,
had any influence with them. The word " freedom " was inter-
preted both by Press and public in a very erroneous sense, and
every man thought he could do exactly what he liked without
penalty. Several valis and many civil police and legal officials
who had oppressed the people during the Absolutist regime were
now subjected to very ugly and illegal attacks. Men who had
never even heard the name of " Unity and Progress " before the
promulgation of the constitution often paraded as " heroes of
liberation/' and went so far as to interfere with Government
officials in the execution of their duty. My memories of the early
days of the constitution, when I was a member of the Central
Committee, are full of occurences of that kind.

The Central Committee did everything in its power to check
such excesses and to protect everyone, whether guilty or innocent,
against illegal attacks. With a view to imbuing the public with
the essential principles of the committee's programme special
deputies were sent out with the task of founding sections in all
places where the committee had not yet established local organisa-
tions. Unfortunately, generally speaking, these deputies were not
well chosen. Some of them allowed themselves to be carried away
by the spirit of indiscipline prevailing among the people, and forgot
that the main purpose of our regulations was to maintain the
prestige of the Government in the country.

Later on several politicians who came forward as opponents of
' Unity and Progress " used the harmful and peculiar interpreta-
tion put upon the word " freedom " in the Press to make attacks
upon the committee and plunge the country into a perfectly hope-
less anarchy. As the. Government was deprived of all prestige and
power in the capital of the Empire, it is easy to imagine the state
of affairs in the provinces. Many men who failed to secure impor-
tant positions in the local Unity and Progress Committees which
we established founded branches of the various political commit-
tees which were gradually formed in Constantinople and took
their revenge that way.

The Mohammedan and Turkish population was thus at
sixes and sevens, while the Christian population through their
own committees worked hard for the realisation of their pro-
gramme.

The Armenian Question 257

In the vilayet of Adana the Turkish population is in a majority.
After it come the Armenians, then the Arabs (known by the name
of " Arab Uschagi "), and finally the Greeks. The vilayet has a
population of five hundred and fifty thousand. There are about
sixty thousand Armenians, between twenty and twenty-five
thousand Arab Uschagi, and ten to fifteen thousand Greeks. All
the rest are Turks. For centuries these people, who are mostly
engaged in agriculture, have lived together in the greatest peace
and harmony.

It is an incontestable fact that long before the Ottomans came
the vilayet of Adana was Turkish, for the Ottomans seized it
from a Turkish ruling family known under the name of " Ramazun
Oghullari." Although history tells us that at the time of the
Crusades there was an Armenian kingdom called Cicilia in this
region, it is equally true that a large number had settled in the
country at that time, and the Turkish feudal Beys did not like that
kingdom.

The majority of the Armenians now dwelling in the vilayet of
Adana had their original home in Diabekir, Sivas and Mamuret-
ul-Asis. They migrated during the nineteenth century in the
hope of seeking their fortune. The real Adana-born Armenians
are to be found in the town of Hadjin, on the northern border of
the vilayet, in a few villages in the neighbourhood of Sis, chief
town of the Sandjak of Kozan, and in Dort Yol, on the shores of
the Gulf of Alexandretta, and some villages in its vicinity.

The Arab-Uschagi are part of the population which was trans-
planted from the Sandjak of Lazkie, under the government of
Sultan Abdul Aziz, in order to cultivate the plain of Adana, which
was very fertile, but at that time sparsely populated.

As I have already said, the Turks and Armenians, as, indeed, the
rest of the population, had previously lived together on the very
best of terms, and there was no reason to anticipate any sort of
strife between them. At the time of the disorders and massacres
of 1894-1896 nothing at all had happened in the vilayet of Adana,
and Turks and Armenians had worked together to prevent the
spread of disorder into their district. Their efforts had not been
without success.

After the promulgation of the constitution the Armenians of

Adana founded local branches of the Dachnakzutiun, Hinjakists

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258 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

and Reformed Hinjakists in opposition to the Turkish political
committees which were being- formed, or rather — to speak more
accurately — they continued openly those activities of their
organisation which they had hitherto carried on in secret.

At this time the Armenian vicar in Adana was a young- and
ambitious priest named Muscheg Effendi, who was also leader
of the Reformed Hinjakists. The Armenians could not say
enough about the licentiousness of this man. If all the stories
told about him by the Armenians are true, it may be stated
without exaggeration that he was the incarnation of all the evil
instincts.

After the promulgation of the constitution Monsignor Muscheg
regarded himself as the religious and political head of Adana. I
was told that this priest, shamelessly taking advantage of the weak-
ness of the Government, adopted a most insulting attitude towards
the Governor-General at a meeting of the Administrative Council,
and left the assembly in a furious rage after threatening to box the
ears of the Colonel of Gendarmerie for the vilayet. I was also
told by Armenians that at this time a considerable number of young
Armenians — acolytes of Monsignor Muscheg — carried their
effrontery so far as to proclaim publicly at various meetings that
it would not be long before the Armenians were liberated from the
Turkish yoke.

To be fair, I should add that the delegate of the Dachnak-
zutiun had no part in Monsignor Muscheg's excesses, and did not
fail to draw the attention of the Dachnakzutiun deputies in Con-
stantinople to the very evil results of his conduct.

But Monsignor Muscheg was not content with all this. He sent
to Europe for rifles and revolvers with which to arm the Armenians.
At this time the Government was permitting everything, even
traffic in arms and their importation. Monsignor Muscheg let it
be known publicly in all quarters that, " as the Armenians are
armed at last, they no longer fear a repetition of the massacres of
1894, and that if anything happened to any Armenians ten Turks
would pay for it with their lives. " These declarations and
Monsignor Muscheg's acts compelled the Turks of Adana to take
similar steps.

It is at this point that the heavy responsibility of the then
Government of Adana begins, for an admission of weakness can

The Armenian Question 259

never be a permissible excuse for the authorities. When
Monsignor Muscheg's unruly agitation began to have its evil
influence on the local population the safest course would have been
at once to arrest him and his adherents, and also any Turks who
seemed likely to promote disorder, hold a legal investigation with-
out delay, and, if necessary, threaten the vilayet with martial law.
But at that time the Grand Vizier himself, Hussein Hilmi Pasha,
did not dare to adopt energetic measures in Constantinople. It
was he who had been insulted by members of the Mohammedie
Committee in the avenue leading to the Sublime Porte on the occa-
sion of the funeral of the journalist, Hassan Felimi Bey. The first
duty of a Government is to make it clear to the nation that freedom
and anarchy are not the same thing. Unhappily, we had no such
Government in the Turkish Empire at the end of 1908 and the
beginning of 1909.

At this period the Governor-General of Adana was Djevad Bey.
He may certainly be regarded as a model of uprightness,
but, unfortunately, he was also a model of administrative
incapacity. He was in no way equal to the demands made upon
a vali of Adana. An old soldier, General Mustafa Renizi Pasha,
commanded the division. In his youth he had come to the front
through his great energy, and he always maintained the traditions
of honourable patriotism. But it cannot be said that this
officer, who was both old and without any police powers, pos-
sessed the qualifications required by the military commander of
Adana.

In the Sandjak of Bjebel Bereket the mutessarif was Assaf
Bey, who was so timid that he was afraid of his own shadow. I
have never been- able to understand how such an individual came
to be appointed Vice-Governor.

At the beginning of the year 1909 a rumour was going round
that the Armenians would rise and destroy the Turks in the imrrre-
diate future. They would use the opportunity to let the vilayet
be occupied by contingents from the fleets of European Powers,
and then proceed to form an Armenian State. The Turks were
so convinced of the truth of these rumours that many reputable
people took their families to a place of safety.

I was told that certain members of the Mohammedie Committee
had been sent from Constantinople to Adana to warn the people

R2

260 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

of the Armenian rising, but I have never succeeded in ascertaining

the truth of that rumour.

At the beginning of April, 1909, the situation on both sides was

so strained that every day it was expected that the two parties

among the local population would fall upon each other.

At length, on April I4th, the " Adana affair " began, on Mon-

signor Muscheg's orders, with attacks started by the Armenians.
At Adana, Tarsus, Hamidie, Mismis, Erzine, Dort Yol and Azirli,

in fact, in all places inhabited by Armenians, a massacre began,

the details of which are too loathsome to describe. The Govern-
ment showed itself utterly powerless even in the chief town of the

vilayet, and in its utter bewilderment went so far as to order a

rising en 'masse in these districts to prevent the Armenian attacks

on the Turks.

On hearing the news that the Armenians of Dort Yol were
approaching Erzine, the chief town of the Sandjak of Djebel
Bereket, in arms, the mutessarif Assaf Bey did not dare even to
leave his room. He scattered all over the villages of the Liwa
telegrams in which he wrote :

The Mohammedans here are in danger of being wiped out, and it is the duty
of every man who loves his country and nation to fly to arms and hurry to the
Sandjak of Djebel Bereket.

It was certainly true that the Armenians of Dort Yol were
approaching Erzine with the intention of massacring the Turks in
the Sandjak of Djebel Bereket. But it is an utterly unpardonable
error for a mutessarif to shut himself up in his room and tell the
inhabitants to do what they liked, for people who find themselves in
danger will not only attack aggressors, but even the unarmed and
helpless, such as women, old men, and children, and end by looting
and burning towns, villages, and country houses. And all this is
exactly what happened.

Such were the causes of the first events in Adana. The subse-
quent occurrences, which were confined to the town of Adana,
followed ten days later in consequence of shots fired by young
Armenians into the camp of the troops. The Adana massacre
became even worse after that.

My personal opinion is that Monsignor Muscheg is the real
culprit, the real author of the Sicilian Vespers, but his responsi-
bility is almost shared by the Governor, who must have realised

The Armenian Question 261

what a danger this man represented and yet did not take the
necessary steps to avert it. It was quite unpardonable of him to
let the reins of authority slip from his grasp at such a time and to
be guilty of such deplorably feeble conduct when dealing with a
looting and murderous rabble.

What is absolutely certain is that two or three months before
these events the Turks and Mohammedans of all public and official
circles in the vilayet of Adana were firmly convinced that the
Armenians were procuring fresh arms every day for the purposes
of a general massacre, and that they were really in great danger.
The unbridled and provocative language of Monsignor Muscheg
only confirmed that opinion.

The psychological causes I have discussed are not merely my
own opinion. The English Major Doughty Wyllie, who was then
English Consul at Adana, also shared my view. I much regret
that this honourable gentleman, who showed high courage in
the Dardanelles actions and gave his life for his country, is no
longer alive to confirm what I say.

The American missionary, Mr. Chambers, and the Director of
the American College at Tarsus, Mr. Christine, told me of the
horrible cruelties perpetrated by the Turks and Arab Uschaks
during the massacres, but also assured me that Monsignor
Muscheg was the prime instigator of the massacre.

Seventeen thousand Armenians and one thousand eight hun-
dred and fifty Turks were killed in Adana in this massacre. The
figures show that if the Armenians had been in a majority the
reverse would have been the case and the Turks would have been
massacred by the Armenians. There was nothing to choose
between the two sides as regards cruelties. The Armenians never
stopped attacking Turkish women and children, the Turks did the
same, and the two infuriated races proved that there was no
difference between them.

When I was appointed Governor-General of Adana the Govern-
ment placed a credit of £200,000 (Turkish) at my disposal. One ^ f
hundred thousand were for rebuilding the Armenian and Turkish
houses in the towns and villages which had been burnt ; the other
half was to be lent to the Armenian traders, artisans, and farmers
to enable them to resume business. The loans were not to be paid f!
back for ten years.

262 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

I established a building committee in Adana and took the
chairmanship myself. The committee consisted of several
foreigners, such as the American missionary, Mr. Chambers, and
a large number of natives, the majority being Armenians.

Thanks to the steps I took, four months after my arrival all
the Armenian houses in the vilayet had been rebuilt and in the
provisional capital there was not a single small family house which
had not been finished. In brief, within five or six months the
Armenians had freely resumed their trade, agriculture, and
industry, and between Turks and Armenians there was no trace,
at any rate superficially, of the previous hatreds.

When Herr Mandelstamm, on the authority of the work of a
Greek named Adossides, says on page 205 of his book that of the
guilty Mohammedans only nine of the most insignificant were
killed, he does not speak the truth. Nor does Adossides, who is
well known for his spiteful writings against the Turks.

Four months after my arrival at Adana I had not less than
thirty Mohammedans executed who had been convicted by court
martial. Two days later 1 had seventeen executed at Erzine.
Among them were members of the oldest and highest families in
Adana, such as the Mufti of the Kaza of Bagjce, who was
extremely popular with the Turks of his district.

Monsignor Muscheg succeeded in escaping to Alexandretta on
board a foreign steamer two days after these events, and I greatly
regret that he did not fall into* my hands. He was very properly
condemned to death in contumaciam. If I had caught him I should
have had him hanged opposite the Mufti of Bagjce.

The Armenians themselves have fully recognised all the efforts
I made in their behalf, and the restoration of their property while
I was Governor-General of Adana. Many foreigners — French,
English, Americans, and Russians — who came to Adana were wit-
nesses of my work, and congratulated me upon it. The great
orphanage I had built for the reception and bringing up of the
children orphaned in the Adana affair is still in existence.

THE REFORMS.

In August, 1912, when I left the administration of Bagdad
(where I was sent on from Adana) and returned to Constantinople,

The Armenian Question 263

the Ottoman Empire was passing through one of the most danger-
ous crises of its existence, (i) We were in the throes of war with
Italy. (2) Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece had formed
an alliance and were searching for some excuse for making war on
us. (3) The Albanians were in revolt. (4) The whole Syrian
Press was vomiting flames against the Government and demanding
reforms for the Arabian provinces. (5) The Armenian Patriarch
was addressing note after note to the Sublime Porte and insisting
upon reforms in Armenia. (6) Perhaps the greatest danger of all
— a number of officers had banded together under the name of the
" Officer Liberators Group " (Halaskiaran) and were promoting
deadly anarchy in the army. It could be said with perfect truth
that the troops at the Dardanelles and in Smyrna and Albania were
completely out of hand.

At the head of the Government was Ghazi Muhtar Pasha's
Cabinet.

During all these troubles the Balkan War began. The
politicians of Russia and France took advantage of our various
military failures to get to work. The French egged on the Arabs
to demand reforms in SyriaK and the Russian Ambassador at Con-
stantinople, Baron von Giers, raised the Armenian question once
more and handed the Minister of the Interior the following note
on November 26th, 1912:

Since the memorable events of 1894-1896, when Asia Minor and Constanti-
nople were bleeding from the barbarous Armenian massacres, the position has
in no way improved. Effect has not been given to the reforms decreed by
Sultan Abdul Hamid on October 2oth, 1895, as a result of Russian, French, and
English pressure. The agrarian question is becoming more and more acute
from day to day. Most of the landed estates have been or are being seized by
the Kurds, and instead of forbidding this illegal confiscation, the authorities
are protecting and assisting the usurpers. The reports of all our consulates
agree as to the acts of brigandage perpetrated by the Kurds, the unprecedented
exactions, the murder of Armenians, and forced conversion of Armenian women.
The miscreants are hardly ever dealt with according to law. The memoir pre-
sented by the Armenian Patriarch in Constantinople to the Sublime Porte and
the Minister of the Interior gives a true picture of the miseries and persecution
to which the Armenian subjects of the Sultan are exposed.

This state of things {continued Baron von Giers) sufficiently accounts for the
fact that the Armenian nation is looking more and more to Russia. The Russian
consulates in Armenia all bear witness to the state of public feeling there. The
Armenians are demanding the introduction of reforms under Russian super-
vision or even a Russian occupation. The Armenians professing the Catholic
faith are imploring Russia, the " ancient protectress of the Christians of the
East," in the name of the Almighty to take the wretched Armenian population

264 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

in Turkish Armenia under her protection. The Ambassador is of opinion that
the Armenian question is of the highest importance to Russia, and desires the
Government will do what is necessary to remedy matters. He regards an
occupation as premature and advocates reforms. But in doing so he does not
forget the tragic fate of the decree of 1895, and insists upon the necessity of the
reforms being effectively supervised by Russian or European officials. In view
of the state of anarchy in which Turkey is plunged at the moment, the possibility
must be reckoned with that the reforms will not have the calming effect desired
and that it may be necessary for our troops to enter this region.

As early as the beginning of 1912 the Catholicos of Etschmiazin
in Russia had sent the Boghos Nubar Pasha, to the Cabinets of
Europe with a commission to demand administrative autonomy
for Turkish Armenia. This proceeding was nothing but a step in
Russian policy.

What a strong resemblance there was between the course taken
by the Russians (which was designed to conceal their real inten-
tions with regard to Armenia) and the policy pursued by France in
Syria !

A Mohammedan of Beirut, member of the Arab Congress which
met in Paris at the beginning of 1913, said to Monsieur Pichon, the
French Foreign Minister :

Although we have called our congress in Paris, our only object is to obtain
reforms for the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Government. We want
neither a French occupation of Syria nor a French protectorate.

To prove that France had no arriere pensee with regard to Syria
Herr Pichon reported this conversation to Herr Bompard, the
French Ambassador in Constantinople. Almost at the same
moment, on March I5th, 1913, the Russians said the same thing,
possibly in the same words, to the Boghos Nubar Pasha.

What I say is confirmed by the following letter of February
28th (March I3th) from M. Isvolsky, the Russian Minister in Paris,
to H. Sasonov, the Russian Foreign Minister.

Boghos Nubar Pasha (the Ambassador writes) repeatedly asserts that the
Armenians of Turkey in no way desire to bring up the question of independence
or constitutional changes. Their sole aim is to secure the reforms drawn up
by Russia, France and England and provided for in the Treaty of Berlin,
reforms which have remained a dead letter hitherto.

I think this remarkable coincidence in the views of the Arab
and Armenian reformers is sufficient proof of the policy pursued
by Russia and France with the object of dismembering Turkey.

On March 22nd, 1913, the Russian Foreign Minister at length

The Armenian Question 265

took the first step in the matter of the Armenian reforms. In a
telegram of that date to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin M.
Sassonoff called on Germany to associate herself with an inter-
national appeal to the Sublime Porte. The date coincides with
the time when the Ottoman Government, utterly helpless,
saw itself compelled to sign the preliminary peace in London
and recognise the Enos-Midia line as the Turco-Bulgarian
frontier.

At this time, too, the national demonstrations of the Armenians
in Constantinople began to take unusual forms. They organised
great celebrations in memory of the anniversary (I do not know
which anniversary) of the discovery of the Armenian alphabet.
They carried their audacity to the point of throwing confetti in the
Armenian national colours about the streets. We bore all this with
unshakable patience, and took the necessary steps to prevent ugly
incidents. I was then Military Governor of Constantinople, and
on an invitation from the Armenians went to the Tascion Garden
and made a speech, speaking in the highest terms of the Armenian
nation.

The course taken by the Russian Foreign Minister was to hand
the representatives of the Great Powers in Constantinople a new
scheme of reforms based upon the draft issued by the Ottoman
Government in 1895. England and France at once fell in with
their proposal. Germany alone suggested that plenipotentiaries
of the Sublime Porte should be invited to join the committee to be
formed by representatives of the Ambassadors. This suggestion
was rejected out of hand by Russia, and Germany's consent was
ultimately obtained to the establishment of a committee consisting
of the Dragomans of the Embassies, which was to study the
Armenian question. The only Government really concerned in
the matter was calmly excluded.

Before the committee started on its work Russia had already
had a scheme of reform prepared by Mandelstamm, the First
Dragoman of the Embassy in Constantinople. I leave it to the
conscience of the author to decide whether, under the pretext of
preserving the rights of a national minority in a great empire, he
can reconcile his sense of shame and the presentation of such a
scheme of reforms to an independent State. In view of its great
importance, I give the exact text of the Russian scheme :

266 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

THE RUSSIAN PROJECT (Oiange Book No. 50).

Constantinople, June 8th, 1913.

Scheme for the reforms for Armenia, drawn up by M. A. Mandelstamm,
First Dragoman of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople.
Based on the following :

(1) The Memoir in Armenian reforms of the French, Russian and English
Ambassadors in Constantinople (March and April, 1895) ;

(2) The scheme for administrative reforms for the province of Armenia drawn
up by the French, Russian and English Ambassadors (March and April, 1895);

(3) The Armenian reform decree issued by His Majesty the Sultan on October
2oth, 1895;

(4) The draft for a vilayet law for European Turkey of August nth to 23rd,
1880, drawn up by the European Commission;

(5) The vilayet law of 1913;

(6) Orders and negotiations with regard to Syria.

I.

§i. One province to be formed from the following six vilayets : Erzerum,
Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharput and Sivas, excepting certain frontier districts,
i.e., Hekkiari, the southern part of Surts, Bicheriks, Malatias and the districts
north-east of Sivas.

§2. The administrative division of the province is to be as follows : i, Sand-
jak (district); 2, Kaza (department); 3, Nahie (commune).

§3. The parishes are to be arranged in such a way that, from the ethno-
graphical point of view, homogenous national groups are to be formed.

Compare Point I. of the Three Ambassadors7 Memorandum of 1895 and Art. 7
of the Ambassadors' scheme of 1895.

II.

The Governor-General (Vali Umumi) of the Armenian province is to be a
Christian Ottoman subject, or, better still, a European appointed by His Imperial
Majesty the Sultan for five years and approved by the Powers.

(Cf. Art. 17 of the Treaty of Berlin; Art. I. of the Cretan Regulations of
1896; Orders and negotiations with regard to the Lebanon; Arts. II. and VI. of
the Three Ambassadors' Memorandum of 1895; Introduction to the Reform
Decree in Armenia of October 2oth, 1895, Point I.)

III.

The Governor-General is the head of the executive in the province. He has
full authority to appoint and replace all the provincial administrative authorities.
He also appoints all the judges of the province.

2. The police and gendarmerie are to be under the orders of the Governor-
General.

3. If the Governor-General so desires, the military forces are to be at his
disposal to maintain order in the province.

(Cf. Art. I. of the Lebanon Orders, 1864; Arts. 27, 32 and 44 of the Scheme
of the European Commission, 1884; Arts. 20, 25 and 26 of the Vilayet Administra-
tion Decree of 1913.)

IV.

The Governor-General of the province is to be assisted by an Administrative
Council with full advisory powers, and consisting of :

The Armenian Question 267

(a) The heads of the different administrative parishes of the province;

(b) The spiritual heads of the religious associations ;

(c) The European technical advisers in the service of the Imperial Govern-
ment appointed to assist the heads of the administrative parishes;

(d) Six legal advisers (three Mohammedans and three Christians) chosen from
the members of the Provincial Assembly.

(Cf. Art. 49 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Art. 62 of
the Vilayet Administration Decree of 1913; Art. 6 of the Decree of October,
1895.)

V.

1. The Provincial Assembly is to consist of Mohammedans and Christians
in equal numbers.

2. The members of the Provincial Assembly are to be elected by secret ballot
in the department by the electoral colleges to be formed tEere.

3. The number of seats to be assigned to the Mohammedan and Christian
nationalities of the province is to be specially fixed for each department. So far
as is compatible with the principle laid down in the first paragraph of this
article, this number is to be in proportion to the population of the department.

(Cf. Art. II. of the Negotiations and Orders with reference to the Reorganisa-
tion of the Lebanon, 1861 ; Art. 3, §5, of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895;
Art. 69 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Art. 103 of the
Decree of 1913.)

VI.

1. The Provincial Assembly will be elected for five years, and meet once
a year for a regular sitting of two months. The sitting may be extended by
the Governor-General.

2. The Provincial Assembly may be summoned for an extraordinary sitting
either by the Governor-General on his own initiative or on the demand of two-
thirds of the members of the Assembly.

3. The Governor-General may dissolve the Assembly. In this case the
elections must be held in two months, and the new Assembly meet within four
months of the dissolution decree.

4. The decrees summoning or dissolving the Assembly must be issued in the
name of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

(Cf. Arts. 73-75 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Arts.
111-115 and Art. 125 of the Provincial Decree of 1913.)

VII.

1 The Provincial Assembly is the legislative authority for provincial
interests.

2 The powers of the Provincial Assembly in respect of legislation and finance
are to be at least co-extensive with those provided for in Arts. 82-93 of the
scheme drawn up in 1880 by the European Commission.

3. The laws passed by the Provincial Assembly are to be sent up for the
consent of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. That consent must be given or
refused within two months and after the expiry of that period the silence of (the
Government is to be taken as consent.

(Cf. Arts. 82-93 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Arts.
123, 124, 128-135 of the Vilayet Administration Decree of 1913.)

268 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

VIII.

1. The Mutessarif is to be president of the Administrative Council of the
Sandjak; the Administrative Council is to consist of the administrative heads of
the Sandjak, the spiritual heads of the religious societies, and six members (three
Mohammedans and three Christians) to be chosen from the administrative
councils of the Kazas.

2. The Kaimakam is to be the president of the Administrative Council of
the Kaza; the Administrative Council is to consist of the administrative heads
of the Kazcij the spiritual heads of the religious societies, and four members

(two Mohammedans and two Christians) to be elected by the council of the
commune.

3. The powers of these councils will be fixed in accordance with Arts. 115 and
116, 139, and 140 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880.

(Cf. Arts. 114, 115, 116, 138, 139, 140 of the Scheme of the European Com-
mission of 1880; Art. 6 of the Decree of October 2Oth, 1895; Arts. 62, 63, 64, and
65 of the Decree of 1913.)

IX.

1. The boundaries of each commune (Nahie] are to be fixed in such a way
that as far as possible villages inhabited by one nationality are to form one
commune.

2. Each commune is to be administered by a Mudir, assisted by a council of
not less than four and not more than eight members elected by the people. The
council is to elect the Mudir and his assistant as members. The Mudir is to be a
member of the national group which ethnologically forms a majority, his
assistant to belong to the other group.

3. In communes where the population is mixed the minority is to be repre-
sented according to its numbers, provided that it comprises not less than twenty-
five houses.

4. The powers of the communes are to be fixed in accordance with Arts. 163-
168 of the Scheme drawn up by the European Commission of 1880.

(Cf. Arts. 167, 168 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Arts.
7, 8, and 9 of the Three Ambassadors' Reform Scheme of 1895; Arts. 7, 8, and 9
of the Decree of October 2oth, 1895.)

X.

1. In every commune there will be a juge de $aix> appointed by the Governor-
General and of the same religion as the majority of the commune.

2. The juge de $aix will decide :

(a) in criminal cases (without appeal) in offences punishable by simple
police penalties, with a right of appeal in offences punishable by fine
not exceeding 500 piastres or by not more than three months'
imprisonment.

(b) in civil actions (without appeal) in all civil and commercial cases
where the claim does not exceed 1000 piastres, with a right of appeal
in similar actions where the claim does not exceed 5000 piastres.

3. The Court of the juge de -paix is to be also a court of arbitration. On
demand by the parties it may appoint arbitrators who shall decide even in
disputes over 5000 piastres. In case of the award of an arbitrator there
shall be no right of appeal.

4. The Sandjak Courts are to have only one civil court, consisting of a
president and two paid judges (one Mohammedan and one Christian), to be

The Armenian Question 269

appointed by the Governor-General. The Sandjak Courts are to function as
(a) a court of first instance in civil and commercial matters where the amount
involved exceeds 5000 piastres, and (b) a court of appeal from the decisions of
the juges de -paix in civil and commercial actions.

5. The criminal section of the Sandjak Courts is to be replaced by mobile
courts of assize. These are to consist of a president (to be selected from the
members of the next higher appeal court to which the Sandjak Court is attached)
and two members (one a Mohammedan and one a Christian) selected by the same
Court of Appeal from among the juges de $aix of the Sandjak.

6. The assizes will be held in succession in all Kazas where the presence of
these courts is considered necessary.

7. There will be a juge d~ 'instruction in every Kasa. On the arrival of tihe
president of the Assize Court in a Kaza the juge d} instruction will put before him
the documents relating to cases prepared by the juge d' 'instruction and already
ripe for action, and also the documents relating to pending cases and cases not
yet complete. If the latter reveal irregularities or unjustifiable delay he must
immediately report the matter to the President of the Court of Appeal.

8. The Assize Court is to decide, subject to appeal, upon the sentences passed
by the juges de -paix in criminal causes. As a court of first and last instance it
is to decide in cases of crime or misdemeanour punishable by fine of more than
500 piastres or imprisonment for more than three months.

9. There are to be at least six Courts of Appeal. Each Court of Appeal is to
be composed of a president, a trained lawyer appointed by the Governor-General,
and a sufficient number of members to deal with the civil business brought before
it and provide the Courts of Assize with presidents. The Court of Appeal is
competent to decide when a quorum of a president and two members is present.

10. Commercial Courts will be established wherever required. Where these
are functioning the civil courts shall have no jurisdiction in commercial actions.

11. The powers of the sheriat courts shall be strictly defined, and it shall be
the business of the Governor-General to see that the functions of the other
judicial authorities of the province are not encroached upon. The judges of
the sheriat courts may not simultaneously be presidents of the other provincial
courts.

(Cf. Arts. 2Q-3Q of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Arts. 125-263 of
the scheme of the European Commission of 1880.)

XI.

1. A corps of police and a corps of gendarmerie will be formed in the
province. Half of these corps will be recruited from the Mohammedan and
Christian population of the province.

2. The organisation and command of these forces will be in the hands of the
European officers in the Turkish service.

3. A constabulary is to be formed in the communes. The constables are to
be appointed by the Governor-General and be under the orders of the Mudir.

(Cf. Arts. 18-21 of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Art. 24 of the
Decree of October 2oth, 1895.)

XII.

Recruits who are natives of the province shall perform their military service
in peace-time in the province. The regiments of Kurdish light cavalry (Ex-
Hamidie) will be disbanded.

(Cf. Art. 25 of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895 ; Art. 28 of the Decree
of October 2oth, 1895.)

270 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

XIII.

T. The administrative officials and provincial judges are to be selected in
equal numbers from the Mohammedan and Christian population.

2. In appointing the governors of the Sandjaks (Mutessarif) and the Kasas
(Kaimakam) regard is to be had to the national populations and their economic
interests.

(Cf. Art. 5 of of the Decree of October 2otK, 1895.)

XIV.

i. Only domiciled inhabitants are to have the electoral franchise and to be
eligible for election.

(Cf. Art. 24 of §8 of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Art. 27 of the
Decree of October 2oth, 1895.)

XV.

1. All laws, orders, regulations, official circulars and announcements are
to be published in the three languages of the province (Turkish, Armenian, and
Kurdish).

2. All petitions and requests, and all documents addressed to the judicial
or administrative authorities, are to be in one of the three provincial languages,
according to the unfettered choice of the parties.

3. Parties may defend themselves in the courts in their own language.

4. Judgment is to be given in Turkish, and will be drawn up with a translation
in the language of the party concerned.

(Cf. Art. 40 of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Art. 22 of the
Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Circular from the Ministry of
the Interior to the vilayets, re Arabic, of April 6th, 1913.)

XVI.

1. Each nation in the province has the right to establish and maintain
private schools of all kinds.

2. They may raise taxes for the benefit of these schools among their own
nationals.

3. Teaching in these schools will be given in the national language.

4. The supervision of these schools will be in the hands of the Governor-
General, in accordance with the regulations laid down in the provincial laws.

5. Turkish is to be compulsory in all private schools.

(Cf. Clause XIV. of the Scheme of the Commission of 1880.)

XVII.

A Special Commission, presided over by the Governor-General, will prescribe
the conditions upon which Armenians illegally deprived of their lands will
have them restored, or receive compensation in the shape of other lands or
money.

(Cf. Art. 26 of the Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Art. 29 of the Decree of
October 2oth. 1895.)

XVIII.

The rights and privileges of the Armenian nation derived from the
Sahmanatrutiun (Fundamental Decree) of 1868 and the berats issued by the
Sultan are expressly recognised as inviolable.

(Cf. Point XI. of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895.)

The Armenian Question 271

XIX.

No Mohadjvis (Mohammedan immigrants) may settle within the boundaries
of the province.

XX.

Special regulations in the spirit of the above principles shall be issued for
the benefit of Armenians residing outside the province, particularly in Cilicia.

(Cf. Art. 12 of the Ambassadors' Memorandum of 1895; Art. 4 of the
Introduction to the Decree of October, 1895.)

XXI.

A Special Commission, consisting of representatives of the Ottoman Govern-
ment and the Great Powers will draw up the Organisation Decree of the
province and the special regulations referred to in Article XX. hereof.

XXII.

The Great Powers will see that all the regulations are carried out.
(Cf. Art. VIII. of the Memorandum of 1895; Art. 32 of the Decree of
October 20th, 1895; Art. 14 of the Cretan Decrees of 1896.)

I do not think anyone can have the slightest doubt that within
a year of the acceptance of these proposals the vilayets of Erzerum,
Vovas, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, and Mamuretel-Aziz would have
become a Russian protectorate or, at any rate, have been occupied
by the Russians.

During the negotiations the German delegate had always
endeavoured to preserve and advance the rights of the Ottoman
Government, while the Russian representative did his utmost to
undermine them.

The delegates of England and France supported Russia, while
the Austrian and Italian representatives appeared to take the same
view as their German colleague.

The Commission, which first met on July 3rd, 1913, broke up
on July 23rd. In spite of several sittings it had done nothing, as
Russia's object was to carry out this scheme without any modifi-
cations, while Germany wanted to protect the Ottoman Govern-
ment as much as possible. At length, in September, 1913, Baron
von Giers succeeded in persuading Baron von Wangenheim, the
German Ambassador at Constantinople, to accept a basic pro-
gramme of six points. Then began negotiations between Said
Halim Pasha, Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and
the two diplomatists.

After we knew of the six fundamental points, we saw that it

272 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

would be possible for the Ottoman Government to give effect to
them itself and without any external pressure. We thereupon
worked out a very comprehensive programme for the whole
Empire and communicated it to the great Powers through our
Ambassadors.

In accordance with this programme the whole Empire was to
be divided into six General-Inspectorates, two of which were to
be formed of the vilayets o( eastern Anatolia.

With a view to foiling Russian intrigues, we wanted to let the
English supervise these two districts. Tewfik Pasha, our Ambas-
sador in London, was asked to enquire of Sir Edward Grey whether
two English officials would be sent, and he replied that the English
seemed inclined to favour this plan. The Grand Vizier immediately
put forward the request officially. The moment England accepted
this proposal the doom of Russia's designs would be sealed. A
fortnight later, when the news came through that England could
not undertake the appointment of the officials for eastern Anatolia
without Russian consent, we had to abandon all our hopes and
realise that England had once and for all sacrificed us to Russian
ambition.

We were compelled to continue the negotiations between the
German and Russian Ambassadors, and on February 8th, 1914, the
resulting agreement was signed by M. Gulkievitch, the Charge
d'Affaires of the Russian Embassy, and Said Halim Pasha.

THE TURCO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 26in (FEBRUARY STH), 1914.
(Orange Book, No. 147.)

His Excellency M. Constantine Gulkievitch, Russian Charge <T Affaires, and
his Highness Prince Said Halim Pasha, Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, are agreed that, simultaneously with the appointment of the two
Inspectors for the provinces of Eastern Anatolia, the Sublime Porte will issue
the following Note to the Great Powers :

Two foreign Inspectors will be put in charge of the provinces to be
formed in Eastern Anatolia : Monsieur A. will have the vilayets of Erzerum,
Trebizond, and Sivas, and Monsieur B. the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Kharput,
and Diarbekir.

The Inspectors will supervise the civil administration and the administration
of justice, the police, and the gendarmerie of the two districts. If the police
force is insufficient to maintain order, military forces will be at the disposal
of the Inspector, if required by him, to enable him to carry out the duties of
his office.

If necessary the Inspectors may dismiss officials who prove unsuitable
through inefficiency or bad behaviour, and hand over to justice officials who
have been guilty of crimes. They have the right to propose the higher officials

The Armenian Question 273

for appointment by his Majesty. In such cases of dismissal they are to send
an immediate telegraphic report, with a summary of their reasons, to the
Ministers concerned, and a more detailed report, with the documents, must
be forwarded within a week. In important cases which require immediate
action the Inspectors have the right to suspend judicial officers, who cannot
be dismissed, on condition that they immediately refer the matter to the
Department of Justice.

Should any actions for which the Vali has made himself responsible call
for energetic measures, the Inspectors will inform the Minister of the Interior
by telegram. The latter will immediately bring the case to the notice of the
Cabinet, which will come to a decision within four days at most after the
receipt of the telegram.

Agricultural disputes will be decided under the personal supervision of the
Inspector.

After the appointment of the Inspectors, detailed memoranda will be drawn
up, with their co-operation, on the subject of their duties and rights.

Should the post of Inspector remain vacant during a period of ten years, the
Sublime Porte will avail itself of the benevolent assistance of the Great Powers
in making the new appointment. Laws, edicts, and public proclamations are to
be in the language of each district respectively. In so far as the Inspector
may deem it possible, each party has the right to use its own language before
a court of justice or an administrative authority. Judgment is to be given in
the Turkish language, accompanied, when possible, by a translation in the
language of the party concerned.

The contribution to the schools budget of the vilayet payable by the
different native elements will be fixed in accordance with the rate of the school
tax originally in force. The Imperial Government will place no difficulties
in the way of the religious orders sharing in the maintenance of their schools.

Every Ottoman must, in peace time, perform his military service within
the military Inspectorate in which his home is situated. The Sublime Porte
will, however, until further notice, detail contingents of the military forces
from all parts of the Empire for service in the outlying regions of the Yemen,
Assir, and Nedjd in proportion to the population of these regions; it will,
moreover, relegate to the Navy recruits from all parts of the Empire.

The Hamidie regiments will be converted into Cavalry Reserves. Their
arms are to remain in the military dep6ts, and will only be issued in case of
mobilisation and manoeuvres. They will be under the command of the Corps
Commander in whose district they are. In peace time, regimental, squadron,
and platoon commanders will be selected from officers .on the active list of
the Imperial Ottoman Army. The men of these regiments will perform one
year's military service. They must bring to the regiment their own horses
and complete saddlery equipment. Every man, without distinction of race
or faith, who comes within this recruiting area and fulfils the required condi-
tions, may be drafted into the aforesaid regiments. In case of war and during
manoeuvres they will be subject to the same disciplinary regulations as the
regular troops.

The authority of the Inspectors of the vilayets will be in accordance with
the provisions of the Act of March isth, 1320, (1913).

A census will be taken under the direction of the Inspectors at the earliest
opportunity — if at all possible, not later than a year hence — in order to ascertain
the exact conditions as to religion, nationality, and language in the two districts.
Until then the elected members of the " General Council " (Medjlissi Umumi)
and the " Vilayet Committees " (Endjumen) of Van and Bitlis will consist of
equal numbers of Mohammedans and non-Mohammedans. In the vilayet of
Erzerum the members of the? General Council ? in the event of the final census

274 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

not being completed within the year, will be elected on the same basis as those
of the other two vilayets. In the vilayets of Sivas, Kharput, and Diarbekir
members will be elected immediately in proportion to the population. To
facilitate the carrying through of these measures, the number of Mohammedan
electors will, until the new census is made, be fixed according to the old lists,
and the number of non-Mohammedans according to the parish lists. Meanwhile,
should material difficulties prevent the adoption of this provisional system
of election, the Inspectors have authority to propose for the vilayets of Sivas,
Kharput, and Diarbekir a division of the electorate for the General Councils
which may be more suitable to the present needs and conditions of the vilayets
in question. In all vilayets in which the General Councils are elected by
proportional suffrage, the minority of the population will be accorded
representation on the Committees (Endjumen).

The members of the Administrative Council will, as heretofore, consist of
Mohammedans and non-Mohammedans in equal numbers. It is left to the
discretion of the Inspector to undertake recruiting for the police and gendarmerie
in the districts in a similar ratio. The principle of proportion will also be
observed as far as possible in filling the other official posts.

In witness of which we, the undersigned, hereto append our signatures and
affix our seals.

(Signed) GuLKiEViTCH. (Signed) SAID HALIM.

Dated, Constantinople, January 26th (February 8th), 1914.

The Russians had acclaimed this agreement as a substantial
political success. To appreciate its significance, it is sufficient to
read the following passages from Gulkievitch's telegram to
Sassonoff, the Foreign Minister:

Thus the Act of January 22nd, 1914, signifies without doubt the opening
of a new and happier era in the history of the Armenian people. In political
significance it is comparable with the Firman of 1870, in which the Bulgarian
Exarchate was founded and the Bulgars were freed from Greek guardianship.
The Armenians must feel that the' first step has been taken towards releasing
them from the Turkish yoke.

The agreement of January 26th, 1914, has, at the same time, great signi-
ficance for the international status of Russia. It has been signed personally
by the Grand Vizier and Russia's representative, and pledges the Turks to
hand to the Powers a note, the contents of which have been precisely set forth.
The outstanding role of Russia in the Armenian question is thus officially
emphasised, and Art. 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano to some extent ratified.
This circumstance will certainly not fail to exert a most favourable influence
on the international status of Russia, and to place a halo on the head of her
sovereign in the eyes of the Christians of the Near East. In reaching an
agreement with the Porte on the Armenian question the Imperial Ambassador
has had to overcome extraordinary difficulties. It was necessary to reckon, on
the one hand, with the natural desire of the Armenians to introduce the
most far-reaching reforms possible; on the other, with the stubborn resistance
of the Porte, which did its utmost to defeat the proposed reforms, and opposed
all the important points, of the scheme. As far as Germany is concerned, the
understanding with us serves a double purpose; first, by convincing the Porte
that in consenting to these moderate reforms, fraught with little danger to her,
Germany had shielded the Turkish Government from more drastic reforms;
secondly, by winning over the sympathy of the Armenians, which is of great

The Armenian Question 275

importance because of Cilicia, which they regard as coming within their sphere
of influence. Germany's conduct, therefore, was lacking in candour; her
support was merely bluff as far as the Armenians were concerned. In reality
the German diplomatists were the loyal advisers of the Turk.

(Signed) GULKIEVITCH.

The Russian Charge d'Affaires regards the Armenian plan for
reform merely as the first step towards the Russian occupation
of Armenia, and in this is completely justified. I cannot avoid
expressing my astonishment that these lines, which so openly
reveal Russia's political aim with regard to Armenia, could be
published in the Orange Book; I can justly say: "God has
brought the guilty to an acknowledgment of their guilt."

Of late the Russians have considerably altered their policy with
regard to the Armenians of the Caucasus. Seeing that the
oppression which the Armenians there have had to suffer at their
hands had awakened the mistrust of the genuine Armenian
revolutionaries against Russia, they at once abandoned their
malevolent policy, they returned the confiscated property to the
Monastery of Etchmiazin, issued a general pardon for all Armenian
political criminals, and proclaimed the greatest friendliness towards
the Armenians. This new policy won over even those revolu-
tionary Armenians who hitherto had detested Russia.

After the activity which Boghos Nubar Pasha had displayed
in Europe, particularly towards the middle of 1913, we repeatedly
suggested to the leaders of the Dachnakzutiun that they should
support us in resisting the Russian efforts for reform in Armenia ;
as the Balkan War was over, it would now have been easier for us
to subject the Kurds to more stringent discipline and secure peace
for the Armenians. The answer we received was somewhat after
this fashion : "As the Great Powers are intervening in this matter,
we can no longer stand aside."

Painful for us and satisfactory for Russia as was the agreement
of the 8th February, 1914, the Ottoman Government nevertheless
intended meticulously to enforce all the conditions. But is
Russian policy ever at a loss to find new impediments ? Was not
her real aim never to permit peace in East Anatolia? For this
she had first to establish a protectorate over Armenia, further to
awaken the sympathy of Europe for the Armenians, and also to
stir up the Kurdish Beys and, more important still, the influential
sheiks to resistance against the Government and the Armenians.

82

276 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

In accordance with this carefully planned scheme the Russian
Government at home supported the famous Abdul Rezak Bey
Bederhani, furnished him with lavish supplies of money on the
pretext of restoring Kurdish rule in Sinai, and on the other hand,
through the agency of the Consul at Bitlis, provoked Sheik N. N.
to rise against the Government.

However hard M. Mandelstamm may try he cannot conceal the
truth.

While the question of the Armenian reforms was developing in
this way the Great War broke out. The Ottoman Government
saw that sooner or later they would be drawn into the War by the
German alliance. As they foresaw the impossibility of occupying
themselves with internal reforms during the long trying years of
war they considered it unnecessary to prolong the mandate of the
two foreign Inspectors whom they had appointed to the East
Anatolian Provinces.

Of course it was our one hope to free ourselves through the
World War from all conventions, which meant so many attacks on
our independence, and to be able to live in future as an independent
and free nation, which in its own territory, of its own initiative
introduces the reforms which local necessities have made impera-
tive. Just as it was our chief aim to annul the Capitulations and
the Lebanon statute, so in the matter of Armenian reform we
desired to release ourselves from the Agreement which Russian
pressure had imposed upon us.

As has already been discussed in detail in a special chapter, we
entered the World War in the hope of being able in future to lead a
free and independent existence as a self-respecting Nation.

This was our intention, and so the treaty dealing with the
reforms for the vilayets inhabited by Armenians, wrung out of
us by our hereditary enemies (the Russians), had no further
significance. That is not to say, however, that we had not the
earnest intention of introducing reform in our country. On the
contrary, we had determined on radical reform, as we were inspired
by the conviction that otherwise we could not continue to exist.

But we approached the question of reform from the standpoint
that Czardom, which for two centuries had hovered over our heads
like a scourge, must be destroyed, so that the eternal intrigue
smouldering within our country might be finally quenched. And

The Armenian Question 277

this aim was only to be realised by throwing into the World War the
fullest strength of our military resources. And so we decided to
defer tackling the internal reforms until the end of the War, first
devoting all the forces of our nation to the War itself. We have
not failed to communicate this point of view to the leaders of the
Dachnakzutiun.

Finally we became actively involved in the World War. A few
days after the declaration of War I was appointed to the Command
of the 4th Army and left Constantinople to proceed to Syria.
From that time I have learnt nothing further of the conditions
in the vilayets of East Anatolia, nor on what grounds the Govern-
ment saw itself called upon to deport all Armenians. I neither
took part in the negotiations at Constantinople nor was I consulted.
It was through the Government Proclamation to the vilayets that
I first learned that all Armenians were provisionally to be deported
to Mesopotamia, where they were to remain until the end of the
War.

The Commander-in-Chief at home also informed me that I was
to take the necessary measures to protect the Armenians against
any attack while passing through my command; their deportation
was in the hands of the civil authorities. That was all I learned.
At that time I was busy with the organisation of the line of
communications between Bozanti and Aleppo; it was the only route
by which the military forces which were to be sent to Syria towards
the end of the autumn of 1915 to take part in the second Canal
Expedition could pass; I was to provide for the necessary supplies.

I was furious when I learned that the exiled Armenians
were to come to Bozanti on their way over the Taurus and
Adana to Aleppo; for any interference with the line of com-
munications might have the gravest consequences for the Canal
Expedition.

My correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief is preserved
in the Army records; later, when these records are published, it
will be possible to show that I considered it more expedient to
settle the Armenians in the interior of the provinces of Konia,
Angora, and Kastamuni than to send them to Mesopotamia.

But as I could not oppose a Government measure based on an
Act of Parliament, and had, moreover, received a specific order not
to hinder the progress of the Armenian emigrant columns which

278 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

were passing Adana and Aleppo on their way to Mesopotamia, I
saw myself compelled to yield.

I heard from time to time of deeds of violence against the
emigrating Armenians in the vilayets of Mamuret-ul-Asis and
Diarbekir. The organisation of the emigrants was exclusively
the concern of the civil authorities, the Army had nothing to do
with it. As, however, I could not allow attacks on the
emigrants to take place in my Army zone, as had occurred
in the other Army zones, I thought it my duty to issue
stringent orders to this effect. As I was continually hearing
complaints that the civil authorities in the sector between
Bozanti and Aleppo were unable to provide the emigrant columns
with adequate supplies, and that the people in consequence were
being found in a condition of the greatest distress along the
route. I made a journey from Aleppo to Bozanti to view the
situation personally, issued an order that bread was to be pro-
vided for the emigrants from the Army depots, and ordered
the doctors on the lines of communication to look after the sick
Armenians.

I thus did everything possible during the whole period of their
deportation to give help to the Armenians, as has been confirmed
by the Armenians themselves and by all impartial foreigners. For
the moment I will refer only to some orders and negotiations
recorded in the book of Lepsius, which contains official reports of
the German Foreign Office in connection with the Armenian
question. All my telegrams which I sent to Constantinople, to the
District Commandants, and to the vilayets are collected in the
Army War Records; on the day when this is published the public
will know more of the humane intentions upon which my measures
were based.

When, after the deportations of the Armenians of Anatolia,
the civil authorities received the command to deport all
Armenians from Adana and Aleppo, I repeatedly opposed this
measure. I wrote a detailed report on this subject to Constanti-
nople, explaining that I could see no necessity for such a measure,
and that, in my opinion, such action was bound to have the worst
possible influence on the economic, and especially on the
agricultural situation in the territory of the 4th Army. But as I
was told that it was not my business to meddle with the concerns

The Armenian Question 279

of the civil authorities, but merely to give them assistance, I was
unable to prevent these orders being carried out.

However, as I was convinced that the deportation of all
Armenian emigrants to Mesopotamia was bound to cause them
great distress, I thought it better to bring a large number of them
into the Syrian vilayets of Beirut and Aleppo; I succeeded in
obtaining the desired permission after I had made vigorous
representations to Constantinople. In this way I was actually able
to bring nearly 150,000 Armenians to these vilayets.

I have a fundamental aversion to telling of the help I rendered
to these widows and orphans. It seems to me as though in
doing so I am reflecting on the moral value of these actions which
were prompted only by feelings of humanity. As, however, in spite
of all the help given, our foreign enemies point to me as morally
responsible for these occurrences, and that caricature of a Govern-
ment which has been set up at Constantinople since the Armistice
even went so far as to condemn me to death on an accusation of
moral guilt for these banishments and butcheries, I regard it as a
just means of self-defence to give some explanation in accord-
ance with the truth. Public opinion will recognise that I had
nothing to do with the deportations and Armenian massacres.
Just as I had nothing to do with the aforementioned negotiations
about the deportation of the Armenians, I am equally innocent of
ordering any massacres; I have even prevented them and caused
all possible help to be given lo all emigrants at the time of the
deportations.

If I had been in Constantinople at the time and taken part in
the discussions, knowing what was happening in the rear of the
Army in East Anatolia, should I not have supported the
deportations ? This question I cannot now answer. But I assume
that my friends, in reaching such a drastic decision as this wholesale
deportation which roused the indignation of the whole civilised
world, must have been actuated by weighty reasons. I have no
doubt that in the publications which are shortly to appear they
will satisfy our doubts and curiosity.

I am certainly firmly convinced that the Armenians planned
insurrections which endangered the rear of our Army in the
Caucasus and which might under certain circumstances have
completely destroyed it. Consequently my friends held it more

280 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

expedient to transfer the whole Armenian nation to another region
where they could do no harm, than to expose the whole Ottoman
Empire to a catastrophe which would have involved Russian
occupation of the whole of Asia Minor.

As to the occurrences which took place during the deportations
these must be ascribed to seventy years of accumulated hatred
between Turks, Kurds, and Armenians. The responsibility must
lie with Muscovite policy which made mortal enemies of three
nations who for centuries had lived together in peace. The
crimes perpetrated during the deportations of 1915 justly roused
the deepest horror, but those committed by the Armenians during
their rising against the Turks and Kurds do not in any way fall short
of them in cruelty and treachery. But whatever may have been
the causes that gave rise to these crimes, they ought to have been
prevented by every possible means. The Government regarded
deportation as the most effective and speedy means of ensuring
the safety of the Kurdish and Turkish population, the Army and
the whole political existence of the Ottoman States. Yet, on the
other hand, by these measures they opened the way for the crimes
perpetrated by the Kurds and Turks. Could not the question
have been solved in another way ? Or, would it not have been
possible to protect the exiles from attacks en route f We can only
deal with these questions after seeing the explanation of those who
organised the deportations and those who carried them out. In
any event, I am able to prove that in the territory occupied by
my Army no outrages on the emigrants wrere permitted, and, apart
from a few exceptional cases, none occurred.

As to the bad impression created, a no less lamentable
impression was given by the spectacle of the Turks fleeing from
Diarbekir, via Aleppo and Adana, to Konia, and from Erzerum
and Erzindjan to Sivas, before the Russians, and the horrors and
outrages committed by Armenians. But these unfortunate
wretches were only Mohammedans; so there was no German or
American missionary available to send reports or to feel called
upon to devote his eloquence to describing their woes.

Let us assume that the Ottoman Government deported a million
and a half Armenians from the East Anatolian Provinces, and
that 600,000 of them died, some murdered, some collapsing on the
way from hunger and distress. But does anyone know how many

The Armenian Question 281

Kurdish and Turkish inhabitants of the vilayets of Trebizond,
Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis were done to death in circumstances of
the greatest cruelty by the Armenians when the Russians marched
into these provinces ? Then let it be stated that the number of
Turks and Kurds killed on this occasion far exceeded one and a
half millions. If the Turks are to be made responsible for the
Armenian massacres, why not the Armenians for the massacres
of the Turks ? Or are the Turks and Kurds of no more value in
the eyes of humanity, or of such politicians as Mandelstamm and
Morgenthau and their like, than flies ?

I ask my readers to examine the two following Russian reports
with care, for they give an idea of the hatred fostered by the
Armenians against the Turks, and the excesses in which they have
indulged :

RUSSIAN OFFICIAL MEMORANDUM.
The Retreat of the Russian Army.

Memorandum of Lt.-Col. Twerdokhleboff concerning the Armenian attacks
on the Turkish population of Erzerum and its neighbourhood, from the beginning
of the Russian Revolution to the reoccupation of the town by the Turkish troops
on February 27th, 1918.

INTRODUCTION.

The enmity known throughout Europe to have existed for a long time
between Turks and Armenians has revealed itself during the War in a manner
that passes all description. It is a commonly recognised fact that the
Armenians cannot stand the Turks; in spite of this they have always managed
to pose as martyrs, and to convince the world that on account of their high
state of civilisation and their faith they have been the object of the most
ghastly cruelties.

The Russians, who of all Europeans have necessarily been in closest touch
with the Armenians, have a different conception of the manner in which this
nation understands civilisation and morality. They have learnt to know them
as miserly, avaricious, parasitical, only able to exist by preying on others. The
Russian peasant has seen into this nation's soul. I have often heard from
Russian soldiers such expressions as : " The Turks have used the Armenians
badly, but they should have done it in quite a different way and left not one
of them alive."

From a military point of view the Armenians are worthless. The Armenian
soldiers of the Russian Army play a very insignificant role; they always prefer
service in the rear of the Army, however menial, to the firing line. The
persistent desertions and cases of self-wounding confirm the opinion which has
been given of the bravery of the Armenians.

But the course of events, from the beginning of the Russian Revolution
to the reoccupation of Erzerum by the Turkish troops, surpasses anything that
could have been expected from this nation. I have witnessed some of these
occurrences partly with my own eyes ; others I have heard of from eye-witnesses.

When, in 1916, Erzerum was taken by the Russians, not a single Armenian

282 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

was allowed to enter the town or its neighbourhood. So long as General Kalikin
was at the head of the ist Army Corps, which occupied the town and surround-
ings of Erzerum, not a single unit which contained Armenian elements was
sent there. After the Russian Revolution these measures were discontinued,
and the Armenians took advantage of this to attack Erzerum and its neighbour-
hood, and then the plundering of houses and villages and the massacres
began.

During the Russian occupation the Armenians did not dare to indulge openly
in deeds of violence; the looting and murder was committed in secret. In
1917 the Armenian Revolutionary Committee, which consisted chiefly of
soldiers, instigated general house-searchings on the pretext of disarming the
population. But, as they were conducted without any control, they soon
developed into systematic lootings which were carried on by the soldiers on
an even more extensive scale. The worst looters among the Armenian soldiers
were usually those who had shown themselves the most cowardly in face of
the enemy.

One day, as I was riding through the streets of the town, I saw a group
of Russian soldiers who, egged on by an Armenian soldier, were dragging
along two old Turks of seventy. The Armenian solclier seemed to be in a state
of frenzy and lashed the poor devils with a wire whip. I tried, without
success, to induce the soldiers to treat the old men a little more humanely.
The Armenian stepped up to me, threatened me with his riding-whip, and
shouted : " You dare, to protect our murderers? " Other Armenians who came
up took his part, of course, and my position with regard to the Russian soldiers,
who would seize any opportunity to beat and, if possible, kill their officers,
began to look critical. The appearance of an officers' patrol, however, changed
the situation : the Armenians vanished into thin air and the soldiers led off the
two old men without further violence.

With the return home of the Russian front-line troops, the danger arose
that the Armenians remaining at the front, or nocking to Erzerum, would take
the opportunity, before the arrival of units of other nationalities, to commit
outrages on the Turkish population. The influential Armenians, of course,
gave assurances that nothing of the kind would happen; they asserted their
anxiety to bring about a reconciliation of the two peoples, and their conviction
that the adoption of suitable measures would ensure success.

At first events seemed, indeed, to justify these assertions. The mosques,
which had been converted into barracks, were cleared and cleaned out and no
longer used as military quarters. Militia units were formed, comprising Turks
and Armenians, and the Armenians even clamoured loudly for the setting up
of a court martial to deal with the crimes that had been committed against
the Turks.

Not until later did it become known that all these manoeuvres were nothing
but bluff and cunningly concealed treachery. The Turks who joined the militia
soon had enough of it when they observed that the majority of those who were
told off for night patrol did not return, and no news of their fate could be
obtained. The Turks who were taken to work in the fields disappeared in like
manner without a trace. Also, the members of the court martial, when they
finally met, dared not enforce any penalties for fear of their own lives.
Murder and looting multiplied; between January and February Bekir Hadji
Effendi, one of the most respected notables of Erzerum, was murdered in his
own house. General Odichelidze thereupon issued an order to the officers in
command of the troops that the murderer must be found within three days. This
order produced no result.

The Commander-in-Chief sent severe reprimands to the headquarters of the
Armenian detachments on the intolerable lack of discipline among their men.

The Armenian Question 283

He also appealed to the Armenian notables, pointing out the atrocities that
had been committed by the troops— e.g., that of the Turkish land workers who
had been ordered to the fields less than half had returned — and explained to
them that if the Armenians desired to obtain control of the occupied territory
they would have to prove themselves worthy of it. He added that these crimes
were a blot on the fame of the Armenian nation. The war is not yet over,
he said, and the Peace Congress has not yet assigned this territory to the
Armenians; it behoved them, therefore, to conduct themselves thenceforward
as a nation worthy of freedom.

The answer of the Armenian leaders was to the effect that the honour of
a whole people could not be prejudiced by the crimes of an insignificant
minority; they gave assurance that the reasonably-minded Armenians were
doing their utmost to put a stop to these acts of vengeance for the Turkish
tyranny of the past; they observed, further, that they were engaged in framing
the sternest measures, which they would enforce without delay, justly and
equitably. Shortly after the receipt of these oft-repeated assurances we learned
of the massacre of Turks at Erzindjan. The following details I heard from
the mouth of the Commander-in-Chief, Odichelidze. The massacre was not
instigated by bands, but by the doctor of the town and the army contractor.
As I do not know the exact names of these Armenians I cannot give them.
The report runs :

" More than 800 unarmed, defenceless Turks were murdered. The
Armenians had dug gigantic trenches into which the poor Turks were thrown
after being slaughtered like a herd of cattle. An Armenian who directed the
execution counted the unhappy victims. ' That's seventy,' he roared, * there's
still room for ten more ; hack away ! ' And another ten wretches were slaughtered
to fill up the gap, which was then filled in with a little earth. The army
contractor wanted to provide a little diversion for his own benefit. He locked
into a house eighty wretched victims, and then had them let out one after
another while he smashed in their skulls with his own hand."

After the massacre at Erzindjan the Armenians, well armed, made their way
to Erzerum. A Russian officer who, with the aid of a few guns, was protecting
the line of communication of the retreating force from the attacks of the Kurds,
one day attempted to lead an Armenian detachment into the firing line. The
men, however, had no stomach for real fighting; instead, they set fire
to the house in which the Russian officers were and tried to get rid of them in
this way. The officers narrowly escaped death and lost all their possessions.

The Armenian bands, swarming from Erzindjan to Erzerum, destroyed on
their way all Mohammedan villages and annihilated the inhabitants.

During the retreat of the Russian troops to Erzerum Kurds and other peace-
able inhabitants of the district were recruited as drivers of ammunition trans-
port. Not a man of these possessed a weapon. As they approached Erzerum the
Armenians seized the moment when the Russian officers had turned in to rest
to kill the drivers. The Russian officers, brought up by the shrieks of the
unhappy wretches, were received by the Armenians, arms in their hands, and
threatened with a similar fate if they dared to interfere. These murders were
carried out with the direst cruelty.

In the Officers' Club at Erzerum a Russian artillery officer, Lieutenant
Medivani, publicly stated that he had witnessed the following scene :

" One of the Armenians had mortally wounded a Kurdish driver; he had
fallen on his back in a dying condition. The Armenian then tried to drive
the stick he held in his hand into his victim's mouth, but the poor fellow's teeth
were so tightly clenched in his death agony that the murderer could not carry
out his horrible design, and in his fury he despatched the dying man with kicks
in the stomach."

284 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Odichelidze has himself told me that in the village of Ilidja all Turks who
wera unable to escape were massacred; he saw numbers of corpses of children
whose heads had been hacked off with blunt axes.

Lieutenant-Colonel Griaznoff, who returned from Ilidja on the 28th February,
three weeks after the slaughter, related to me what he had seen.

" In the courtyard of the mosque the corpses lay heaped to a depth of two
lance-lengths. There were bodies of men, women, children, old people, people
of every age. Lieutenant-Colonel Griaznoff told a couple of young Armenian
girls, who were employed with the Armenian troops to serve the telephones, to
accompany him to the courtyard. He showed them the atrocities committed
by their countrymen, and said bitterly they had something to be proud of.
Griaznoff was both astonished and enraged at being forced to realise that the
spectacle, far from rousing the disgust of the young women, merely moved them
to loud laughter. Overcome by his anger, he began to abuse them, telling them
that the Armenians, the women included, were the most cowardly and barbarous
of all the nations, and the fact that educated, well brought-up young girls could
laugh at a spectacle that even made the hair of an officer stand on end was proof
of the barbarity of the race. At these words the girls thought it advisable to
appear impressed, and said that their laughter was hysterical; but the witness
was not deceived."

An Armenian contractor to the line-of -communication forces at Aladja told
me the following :

" On the 27th February the Armenians crucified a Turkish woman — still alive
— on a wall after tearing out her heart; she was hung head downwards."

On the 7th February the great massacre at Erzerum began. Armenian
artillery soldiers had captured 270 people in the street and, after stripping them
of all their clothing, shut them into a bath to sate their perverse lusts upon
them. After superhuman efforts I succeeded in saving a hundred of these
unhappy wretches who were still alive; they are alleged to have been released
by the soldiers. The ringleader of these horrors was an Armenian non-
commissioned infantry officer named Karabedoff, serving with the artillery. On
the same evening several Turks were done to death in the streets of the town.
On the i2th February the Armenians shot ten peaceful, unarmed peasants at
Erzerum station; the officers, who tried to interfere, were threatened with
death.

At this time I had under arrest an Armenian who had killed a Turk without
any plausible pretext; the Commander-in-Chief had ordered him to be brought
before the court martial. According to an old-established law murderers are
executed. An Armenian officer informed the murderer that he would be hanged
for his crime. "What!" exclaimed the man, amazed. "Hanging an
Armenian for a Turk ! Who ever heard of such a thing ! "

In Erzerum the Armenians had set fire to the Turkish bazaar. On the i7th
February I heard that the inhabitants of the village of Tepe Koj, in the district
of the artillery regiment, had been completely exterminated — men, women, and
children. The same day I met Andranik, who had been sent to Erzerum by the
Caucasus Government to restore order. I informed him of the butchery, and
urged him to find out who was responsible. I have never heard the result of
my request. In the casino of the artillery officers Andranik publicly promised
the restoration of order, but in spite of the two envoys of the Caucasus Govern-
ment, Andranik and Dr. Zawrieff, this promise has never been fulfilled.

In the town the disturbances have, comparatively speaking, died down; in
the villages where all the inhabitants had been slain complete quiet reigned of
course. The imprisonment of Turkish inhabitants in Erzerum began afresh
when the military movements of the Turks proclaimed their approach from
Ilidja; these arrests were particularly numerous on the 26th and 27th February.

The Armenian Question 285

In the night of the 26th-27th the Armenians eluded the vigilance of the Russian
officers and perpetrated another massacre, but at once took to their heels at
the first approach of the Turks. This massacre was no impromptu affair — it
had been planned beforehand; all captured Turks were collected and put to
death one by one. The Armenians reported with pride that the night's toll
reached a total of 3,000.

The Armenians who had to defend the town were numerically so weak that
they fled before a Turkish army of 1,500 men with two guns. Nevertheless, the
number of murders committed by them on the night of the massacre was very
great.

As the educated classes of the Armenian population could very well have
prevented the massacre, it is to be concluded that these classes played a greater
part in the crime than the bands, and that, in any case, the chief responsibility
rests with them. The humble people are very sensitive to the influence of the
higher classes. My regiment, which is officered exclusively by Russians, con-
sisted entirely of Armenian soldiers; although we had no means at hand of
using force against them, we were able to make them obey all our orders; they
have never ventured to indulge in open looting. On the night of the massacre
not one of the Kurdish grooms was murdered in the barracks, where several
detachments of the regiment were quartered, although only one Russian officer
was on duty and forty Kurdish grooms were amongst hundreds of Armenians.

I do not, of course, wish to maintain that the Mite of the Armenian nation
without exception had a hand in the crimes. I have met Armenians who deeply
deplore these crimes; others who have protested not only in words, but by
action. Yet I must confess that these are a very small minority and are in
ill-odour with their compatriots; they are accused of treason against the national
ideal. Others, again, posed as enemies of these bestialities, but condoned them
in secret. Some Armenians maintained an attitude of silence in face of all
reproach, but the majority had the same answer ready on their lips : " You are
Russians. You cannot understand the ideal of the Armenian nation." Some-
times they tried to defend themselves in such speeches as : " Have the Turks
behaved otherwise towards the Armenians? What we are doing is merely
revenge." These incidents prove how bloodthirsty this ideal of the Armenian
people and upper classes is.

It lay in no man's power to prevent these lamentable happenings. The
Armenians have sown the wind without taking thought that they would reap
a storm,

ERZERUM, i6th April, 1918.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TWERDOKHLEROFF, Commandant ad interim of the
garrison of Erzerum and Neveboyun, O.C. 2nd Engineer and Artillery Regiment.

OFFICIAL DIARY OF THE SECOND RUSSIAN GARRISON
ARTILLERY REGIMENT IN ERZERUM.

The Russian Army of the Caucasus evacuated the stations they had previously
occupied towards the middle of December, 1917, and, without having received
orders from G.H.Q. or any of the Army Commanders, began their withdrawal.
The Garrison Artillery Regiment brought up the rear of the Army. Of the
detachments from the Deve-Boinu fortresses and the Artillery Regiment from
Erzerum only 40 officers remained behind. Deserted by their men, they remained
by the guns from a feeling of duty. In the fortresses were more than 400 guns,
left behind for lack of means of transport. The officers, inspired by feelings
of honour and duty, waited permission from G.H.Q. to leave the guns or for

286 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

reinforcements to carry on the defence. With the officers of the first Regiment
the cadre of the second Artillery Regiment was formed.

After the withdrawal of the Russian Army an Armenian Revolutionary Com-
mittee was set up in Erzerum, calling itself " The Armenian Military Union. "
At the same time the Army Commander sent to the Second Garrison Artillery
Regiment 400 untrained Armenians, of whom the majority deserted and the
remainder could only be used to guard the batteries of the fortresses.

Shortly before the withdrawal of the Army, when touch had been lost between
Russia and the Trans-Caucasus, a provisional Government had been formed in
Tiflis, which was called " The Trans-Caucasian Commission." This Commis-
sion announced that there was no intention of instituting an independent Trans-
Caucasian Government, as before Trans-Caucasia belonged absolutely to Russia,
but until the restoration of order the Commission would undertake to represent
the central administration.

On the i8th December, 1917, the Commission issued a proclamation that in
place of the scattered Russian Army, a new Army would be raised on a national
basis, consisting of three Army Corps — one Russian, one Georgian, one Mohamme-
dan— and some detachments of smaller nationalities, such as Cherkesses, Ossets,
etc. Only the artillery in the fortresses of Erzerum and Deve-Boinu retained
their old character (i.e., comprised troops of various nationalities) until a
decision should be arrived at as to the nationality of this unit, consisting of
Russian officers and Armenian men. It was clear that this unit, whose cadres
and leading were in Russian hands, could not be claimed as Armenian. More-
over, we had received no orders with regard to the Armenian character of the
formation, which was still regarded as Russian, being led by Russian officers
who had actually served in the Russian Army and drew their pay from the
Russian Treasury. The fact that the Army possessed no Armenian, but only a
Russian church, conducted by Russian priests, was a further proof of the complete
Muscovite character of the unit.

Since the withdrawal of the Army, begun some two months before, order
could not be re-established among the soldiers, who deserted, looted, and
threatened their officers, and were in a state of complete mutiny. Colonel
Torkum, alleged to be an Armenian Bulgar, was appointed Commandant of
Erzerum.

Towards the middle of January, 1918, some Armenians of the infantry
detachment murdered a Turkish notable of Erzerum in his dwelling and looted
the house. Commander-in-Chief Odichelidze mustered all detachment com-
manders and summoned them to discover the perpetrator of this horrible crime
within three days at most. He then turned to the Armenian officers and told
them that the honour of the Armenian nation was at stake in this matter; it
was therefore their duty to leave no stone unturned to discover the guilty
person if they were to clear their reputation in the eyes of the world.

" If these outrages of which the Armenians are guilty do not cease, I shall
find myself compelled to distribute arms to the Mohammedan population so
that they can defend their lives and property," he added. To these accusations
Colonel Torkum retorted in an injured tone that it was unjust to lay the crimes
of a few individuals at the door of a whole nation. The detachment com-
manders proposed the setting up of a court martial, which by military law
could punish murder with death. Odichelidze replied that he had already taken
the necessary measures.

Colonel Torkum, if I am not mistaken, organised on 25th January a
review of the troops and had twenty-one guns fired to impress the population
with his military power. On this occasion he made a speech in Armenian. In
this speech, which is directed against General Odichelidze, he asserted Armenian
independence, and mentioned that he was taking over the reins of authority as

The Armenian Question 287

head of the new State. After hearing this grotesque statement the General
had the new head of the State, Colonel Torkum, removed from Erzerum.

This measure was sufficient to show that the Russian Government intended
to prevent at all costs the founding of an independent Armenian State. I have
learnt that the Russian General Staff has reminded the Armenians repeatedly
that all arms, ammunition, and other war stores, partly from the depdts at
Erzerum, partly from other depots, had only been handed over to them provision-
ally because no other troops were available. These arms, therefore, were
only loaned to the Armenians^ and had to be handed back at any time on
request.

In these days the Armenians were perpetrating indescribably cruel murders
among the poor Turkish inhabitants of the neighbourhood of Erzindjan; the
Turks were unarmed and without any means of self-defence. On hearing that
the Turkish troops were approaching, the Armenians, committing fresh crimes,
fled in the direction of Erzerum.

According to the reports of the Commander-in-Chief, confirmed by officers
who were actually present at the scene of the crime, the Armenians slew more
than 800 Turks in Erzindjan, and so avenged one of their miserable
accomplices who had been killed by a Turk in justified self-defence. Further-
more, the Armenians massacred the unhappy Mohammedan population of Ilidja,
in the neighbourhood of Erzerum, without sparing the women and children.

On February yth the following incident came to my notice : I ascertained
that the Militia and the Armenian soldiers of the town were carrying off some
hundreds of Mohammedans to an unknown destination. When I inquired into
the reasons for this, I received the answer that these men were being recruited
to clear the railway of snow. I expressed myself satisfied with this explanation.
The following story will prove how unsatisfactory it was :

About three o'clock 2nd Lieut. Lipsky, an officer of my regiment, reported
to me over the telephone that some Armenian soldiers had attacked five Turks
in the streets; they had driven them into a corner of the barrack yard, beaten
them mercilessly, and would certainly kill them. The intervention of the
Russian officer in favour of the unfortunate men was met with threats, where-
upon an Armenian officer, who was also present at the scene, took the part of
the bandits and joined in preventing Lipsky from intervening. On hearing
this I hurried, accompanied by three officers, to the scene of the outrage. On
the way I met the officer who had telephoned to me and the Mayor of Erzerum,
Stawrosky, looking for one of their Turkish friends who had been captured
by the Armenians. Lipsky told me that the soldiers were holding the entrance
to the barracks by force of arms. I went on my way. As I came near the
barracks I saw twelve Turks leaving ; they were running away, obviously panic-
stricken. I stopped one of them, but, as I did not understand his speech, it
was impossible to know what he said. Finally, with great difficulty, I entered
the barracks. I immediately inquired about the Turks who had been captured
in the street. The soldiers affirmed that there was no civilian of the town in
the barracks. I began a personal search of every nook and corner of the
barracks, and finally discovered in the bathroom seventy Mohammedans, victims
of the most ghastly horrors. I immediately instituted an inquiry and had six
Armenians who were responsible for this crime arrested. I also learned in the
course of the inquiry that an Armenian, whose identity I could not establish,
had shot an unfortunate Mohammedan who had shown himself on the roof of
a house near the barracks.

Naturally I at once set at liberty the unfortunate victim of this horrible
outrage. The minutes of this inquiry, together with my own records, including
the list of the Mohammedans whom I had succeeded in rescuing, were lost
during the reoccupation of Erzerum by the Ottoman troops on February 27th.

288 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

But the incident can be confirmed by questioning the Turks, who, whenever we
meet, are profuse in their gratitude. In addition, Ali Bey Pepeoff, the Secretary
of Mayor Stawrosky, who drew up the list and the protocol, would certainly
recognise the parties concerned.

The inquiry revealed that Karaguedoff, an Armenian cadet of the artillery
regiment, was the instigator of the outrage. In the course of ruthless house-
searchings in Turkish homes, which he had conducted in the company of
Armenian soldiers accustomed to such methods, he had appropriated furniture
and other domestic property. Karaguedoff was arrested, together with other
Armenian soldiers. The incidents were reported the same evening to the
Commander-in-Chief in the presence of Government Commissioner Zetaloff and
his assistant. On the same day the Armenians murdered other Turks and set
fire to the Turkish bazaar. It was generally known that during these days
several murders were committed in Erzerum and its neighbourhood. I person-
ally arrested an Armenian who had killed Turks in the neighbourhood of Tafta
and handed him over to the Commandant. It was said in the town that the
Turks who had been told off to work in the fields never returned from their
work, and that nothing could be learnt as to their whereabouts. The magistrates
reported the disappearance of these men to the Commander-in-Chief.

In a report which we handed to the Commander-in-Chief on the occasion of
an officers' conference we requested his permission to leave the fortress of
Erzerum in view of our complete uselessness and the impossibility of preventing
the Armenian crimes. We were afraid of besmirching our reputation.
Odischelidze told us of the arrival of a wireless message which he had received
from General Wehib Pasha, in command of the Ottoman troops. The General
informed him that his troops had received orders to garrison Erzindjan and
to advance until they had established touch with the Russian troops. Wehib
Pasha further remarked that this was the only means of paving the way for
the suppression of the barbarous cruelties practised by the Armenians upon the
Turkish population.

After this the Trans-Caucasian Commission made offers of peace to the
Ottoman Government. In the telegram of reply the Commandant of the
Ottoman troops expressed his readiness to accept the proposal, and added that
he had communicated the proposal of the Trans-Caucasian Commission to his
Government, recommending its acceptance. In accordance with a petition from
us, General Odichelidze got into communication with Gueguetschkoni, the
President of the Trans-Caucasian Commission, and General Lebedinsky, the
Commander-in-Chief.

The reply contained the announcement that an ultimatum had been
despatched to the Armenian National Assembly, demanding the immediate cessa-
tion of all Armenian atrocities in order to put an end finally to these lamentable
occurrences, and that Dr. Zavrieff and Andranik had been sent as delegates to
Erzerum. As to the request of the officers, the advice of the Commissaries was
that they should remain at their posts until the expected answer to the peace
overtures had been received from the Ottoman Government. The Council
expressed their thanks to the officers for the service they had rendered, and
declared that if Russia were faced with any fresh danger they were sure that the
officers would be found at their posts to the last minute.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Army also issued an order of the day in
which he recommended officers not to leave their posts, adding that to shield
their honour and protect their lives he would enforce the most stringent
measures against the Armenian criminals. On these conditions we remained
at Erzerum with the sole object of safeguarding the interests of Russia, and
under the sole command of the Commander-in-Chief. We learned that the
Ottoman Government had received the proposal of the Trans-Caucasian Commis-

The Armenian Question 289

sion with favour and replied to this effect, and that peace negotiations would
be opened on February i;th in Trebizond.

Our Army Commander informed all officers that there was no intention of
stirring up enmity against the Ottoman troops in Erzerum and the neighbour-
hood and that accordingly they were to remain in Erzerum until the conclusion
of peace, when arms and other war material, according to the peace conditions,
would cither be transported to Russia or handed over finally to the Ottoman
Government. In case of any attempt on the part of the Ottoman troops to occupy
Erzerum before the signing of peace, all guns were to be put out of action
and the troops and officers withdrawn to Russia, definite orders for which would
be promulgated at least seven days in advance.

The necessity for defending ourselves against the attacks of the Kurds until
the final decision as to our remaining grew more and more obvious, for during
the Armistice the Ottoman Government had declared that the Kurds were
subject to no orders and would act on their own initiative. The Army Com-
mander had, therefore, decided as early as the end of January to strengthen
the Erzerum-Erzindjan line-of-communication by an appropriate number of
guns to keep off the attacks of the Kurds, who were trying to loot our line-of-
communication depots. An officer and two guns were ordered to each strategic
point. On the withdrawal of the Armenians from Erzindjan and Erzerum the
guns were withdrawn with them. On February loth two guns were placed
in all the positions from Buyuk-Kiremidli along the road from Trebizond as
far as Erep-Michan, as at all other important strategic points of the town, with
the same object in view. In view of the probability of a Kurdish attack from
the direction of Palan-Dongno, guns were to be placed also between the Kars
and Charput gates. These guns, which were only to be used against a possible
attack by the Kurds, and were scarcely adequate for this object, would have
been useless against a regular army with artillery : a few shots would suffice
to put them out of action. Towards the middle of February the sights of the
guns in the outlying positions were collected and delivered to the central dep6t ;
the same measure was now to be carried out also in the case of the guns in the
nearer positions. This order was also given for the guns in Palan-Dongno, but
was never carried out. Only the guns which remained in the positions to be
used against the Kurds retained their sights. However, no immediate offensive
on the part of the Ottoman troops was expected, as the Turks were regarded
as demoralised and not in a position to undertake any movements before the
summer. On February i2th some Armenian bandits, armed to the teeth, had
openly shot ten or twelve Turks in the neighbourhood of the station. Two
Russian officers, infuriated by these impudent outrages, had tried to interfere,
but had been compelled to give way before armed threats and to leave the
victims to their fate.

On February i3th the Commander-in-Chief proclaimed a state of siege and
convened a court martial, which was to enforce the death penalty according
to the old regulations. Colonel Morel was appointed Commandant of the
fortress of Erzerum, and an Armenian as president of the court martial. On
the same day the Commander-in-Chief and General Gerassimoff left the town :
they wished to fix a rendezvous in case the artillery had to withdraw. I
remained in Erzerum in command of the Garrison Artillery. Colonel Morel's
staff consisted exclusively of Russian officers, and the Adjutant of the regiment
was Staff-Captain Schnauer.

After the departure of the Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Morel at once
changed his attitude. He declared that Erzerum was to be defended to the
last moment, and forbade all officers and inhabitants capable of bearing arms
to leave the town. When I submitted to the court martial the wishes of some
of the officers to avail themselves of this permission, one member, an Armenian

T

290 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

named Sokhonnyan, replied brutally that he would himself cut down all who
showed any intention of quitting the town, and would have any man who should
dare to attempt flight seized by the Armenian forces in Kopri-Koj and Hassan-
Kale, and taken before the court martial unless they were provided with permits.
These permits, however, were issued solely by him. I realised that we were
in a trap, escape from which would be extremely difficult, and that the court
martial and the state of siege were directed less against the bandits than against
the Russian officers.

The outrages continued in the town, and the unhappy Turkish population,
unarmed and defenceless, were continually attacked by the Armenians. Their
only refuge was the Russian officers, who, however, could only offer them verv
limited protection. A few officers under my command had been obliged to use
force to save the lives of a couple of Turks who were being robbed in the
street. A military engineer, Karaieff, shot down with his rifle an Armenian
who was taking to his heels after robbing a Turk in the street in the middle
of the day. The promise to punish the bandits who murdered peaceful,
unarmed Mohammedans remained, as usual, a dead letter.

From fear of Armenian revenge, the court martial did not dare to sentence
one single Armenian, in spite of the fact that it had been set up chiefly at
Armenian request. The Turks, moreover, had prophesied that a court martial
of Armenians would not condemn a single one of their compatriots. We
could now see the truth of the proverb that the wolves do not prey on one
another. All fit Armenians immediately escaped with their wives on the pretext
of being obliged to protect them.

I learned that a non-commissioned officer, Karaguedoff, had been freed from
prison without my permission. I made inquiries of Colonel Morel as to the
reason for this, and was told in reply that Karaguedoff' s innocence had been
established at a new inquiry. In spite of the fact that two of my officers
and I had been the principal witnesses on this occasion, neither of us had been
summoned to this very extraordinary inquiry. I expressed my dissatisfaction
with the reply received from Colonel Morel, reported the matter again, and
handed over the minutes to Colonel Alexandroff. The murderer I had captured
in Tafta likewise went unpunished.

Colonel Morel feared a mutiny of the Turkish troops in Erzerum. On
February iyth Andranik arrived in Erzerum, accompanied by Dr. Zavrieff,
Assistant Commissioner for the occupied area. As we had not been instructed
on Armenian questions, we did not know that Andranik was one of the criminals
condemned to death by the Ottoman Government. I first learned these details
on March 7th, in a conversation with the Turkish Army Commander. Andranik
appeared in the uniform of a Russian brigadier-general. He was wearing the
Order of Vladimir, Fourth Class, and the Cross of St. George, Second Class,
as well as the Military Cross of St. George, Second Class. He was accompanied
by his Chief-of- Staff, the Russian colonel, Zinkewitsch. In the evening before
his arrival Colonel Morel informed us that, according to a telegram received
from Andranik at Kopri-Koj, machine-guns were to be employed to shoot down
all cowards who attempted to escape from Erzerum. Immediately after his
arrival Andranik took over the command of the fortress; Colonel Morel was
subordinate to him, and we to Morel.

On the day of Andranik's arrival the whole of the inhabitants of Tepe-Koi,
which belonged to my command, were massacred — men, women, and children.
The officer on duty in this section communicated the tragic news to me, and I
immediately reported it to Andranik in our first conversation. In my presence
he gave orders for twenty horsemen to be despatched to Tepe-Koj to bring
back at least one of the criminals. Up to the present day I have never heard
the result of this step.

The Armenian Question 291

•Colonel Torkum turned up again in the town, and at the same time the
Armenian artillery colonel, Dolukhanoff, made his reappearance in Erzerum.
His first announcement was that he, an Inspector of Artillery, would hence-
forward rank as my superior officer. I replied that I held the rank of a
Divisional Commander and did not require a superior officer; otherwise, I
added, I should leave the service. It was thereupon announced that Colonel
Dolukhanoff would carry on the administrative work of the Garrison Artillery,
and that consequently his instructions to me would not be issued under his own
name, but, as before, under that of Andranik. One day the Armenian lieu-
tenant, Djanbuladion, who commanded the artillery battalion under my orders,
also made an attempt to interfere with my affairs. When I directed that all
guns, searchlights, and dynamos were to be transported towards the rear, he
replied that he would not allow any withdrawal of material, as the Armenians
intended to take all the administrative posts in the command into their
own hands, and might only use the Russian officers as executives; they also
wished to use them, without their realising it, in establishing Armenian
independence. Had the Russian officers grasped the purpose they were intended
to serve the majority of them would have resigned, and the Armenians would
have been left with an inadequate number of officers. The following statements
of Captain Peliat, temporary O.C. of the 7th Battalion of Caucasian Mountain
Artillery, show how gravely the Armenians feared the resignation of the
artillery officers. When the Armenians learned that the 7th Battalion Mountain
Artillery were holding themselves in readiness to withdraw to San Kamisch on
February 7th, they seized the commanding officer on the 5th of that month;
and although at the orders of the Army H.Q. they were obliged to set him
at liberty, they repeated the attempt three times.

The Armenians of Erzerum threatened H.Q. to drown the town in
blood if the guns were withdrawn. The Army Commander was consequently
forced to cancel the order for the withdrawal of the artillery. An attempt
had to be made to come to an understanding with the officer commanding the
7th Artillery Battalion. We agreed secretly that, in case the Armenians should
attempt to force the hands of the Russian artillery officers and officially propose
that they should ally themselves with the Armenian cause, we would help one
another mutually. We possessed considerable war material, guns, machine-
guns, and officers. The officers of the Mountain Artillery tried to find billets as
near as possible to one another in the town, and we of the Garrison Artillery
collected as far as possible in the Turkish quarter, where our headquarters
had been situated since the occupation of the town.

Since Andranik's arrival at Colonel Morel's side the fears of a rising of
the inhabitants of Erzerum had greatly increased. The Colonel ordered that
an efficient Russian officer should be put in command of Fort Medjedie to
direct the bombardment in the event of a rising, which might follow the arrest
of the instigator of the unrest. We all received the order to leave the Turkisn
quarter and transfer ourselves to the Armenian quarter. As we had lived in
this quarter for two years, and were always in sympathy with the Mohammedan
population, we thought this suggestion, to say the least of it, remarkable.

The Russian artillery officers unanimously declared that they had remained
in the service to fight a worthy foe, and would never agree to fire on women
and children, for it was quite clear that the Armenians would use a threatened
Turkish rising as a pretext to open a bombardment of the Turkish quarter.
As to the transfer to the Armenian quarter, it was impracticable for three
reasons : Firstly, it was impossible to effect the removal in the time given ;
secondly, the withdrawal of the Russian officers from the Mohammedan quarter
would, of course, be followed by a fresh massacre; and thirdly, in view of the
strained relations that had existed for some time between them and the

T2

292 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Armenians, it would have been risky for the Russian officers to venture into
their midst.

The officers of the Mountain Artillery Battalion who did not belong to the
cadre of the Garrison Artillery also rejected the proposal. Finally the
Armenians, who were left with no choice but to do their own dirty work, began
to arrest some alleged agitators.

As Colonel Morel's proposal to bombard the town was very significant, I
considered it necessary £p call together all the officers under my command. We
met twice in the course of three days. The first meeting was attended by all
artillery officers in Erzerum, as well as by two English officers who had arrived
a few days before; also by Colonels Morel, Zinkewitsch, Dolukhanoff and
Torkum, Andranik and Dr. Zavrieff. Our object in inviting the English
officers was to let them see the relations existing between the Russian officers
and the Armenian Command. It would also give them an opportunity of finding
out what resources the Russians had at their disposal to prevent Armenian
atrocities, so that on their return they might support their observations by
tangible proofs. As I had no telephonic or telegraphic connections under my
personal control, I was convinced that telegrams sent by me would never
reach their destination. I therefore seized the opportunity of this meeting
to describe in the greatest detail all that I had myself observed and heard from
reliable sources as to the atrocities and horrors perpetrated by the Armenians.
I described to my hearers the degree of insubordination that prevailed among
the Armenian troops, and cited examples I had heard from the lips of General
Odischlidze himself. I concluded with the words : " We Russian officers who
have remained in Erzerum have not done so with the object of placing our
uniforms at the service of the Armenians as a cloak to conceal their ghastly
crimes, but simply and solely in obedience to our superiors and to protect
Russia. Unless the Armenian atrocities are suspended during our stay in
Erzerum," I added, " every Russian officer will insist on leaving the town and
resigning his post." Some other officers, speaking after me, emphatically
confirmed what I had said.

In his reply Andranik intimated that the Armenians would be eternally
grateful to Russia, that the Armenians formed an integral part of the popula-
tion of Greater Russia, and that they had no other end in view than that of
serving Russian interests. As to the so-called massacres committed by the
Armenians, they were the result of the enmity existing between Armenians and
Turks. He added that the principal object of his mission in Erzerum was to put
down such crimes, and, should he fail to bring the Armenians to reason, he would
be the first to leave the town. The business of the meeting was carried on through
the medium <?f an interpreter. Questioned as to his views on allowing officers
who wished to do so to leave the town, Andranik replied that he considered it
desirable that all those who were not too confident of their own courage should
leave the town, and he would himself assist their departure as far as possible.
Colonel Zinkewitsch declared before the whole meeting that, once convinced
that the contimied presence of the Russian officers in Erzerum would serve
the interests of Russia, he would remain solely for that reason. In the end
all officers decided to remain ten days longer and to regulate their conduct
by the future course of events, according as these might confirm or refute
Andranik's pledges.

The meeting had been held on February 2oth or 2ist. Shortly afterwards
Colonel Dolukhanoff expressed to me and other Russian officers his astonish-
ment at the contempt and even horror with which the Russian officers regarded
the Armenians. On the next day Andranik proclaimed, on large wall-posters
written in Turkish, that any man who killed either Armenians or Mohammedans
would be arrested and punished by death ; further, that the Turks might resume

The Armenian Question 293

their occupations without fear, and that, in the event of any one of the
Mohammedans engaged in labour in the fields failing to return from his work,
he would hold the entire detachment in charge of the supervision of the work
responsible. As I was riding through the streets the following day, accompanied
by the Armenian captain, Djanbuladian, we noticed many people reading the
posters. Djanbuladian assured them in Turkish that, provided the Mohammedan
population refrained from revolt, they would have nothing to fear from the
Armenians. The reply was that for two years the Mohammedans had committed
no crimes, and that there was no intention of doing so in the future ; all they
asked was that the Mohammedans, who were unarmed and without any means
of defence, should not be killed without reason. I asked the captain to tell
the people that I was the Russian artillery commander, and to state that I and
my Russian comrades were sympathetic towards the Mohammedan population,
and would continue, as before, to look after these poor people. Some of the
Turks present, two or three especially, confirmed my words, saying that I had
with my own hand saved their lives during the massacre of February 7th.
Djanbuladian, who acted as interpreter, was himself a member of the
Armenian Committee.

At the second meeting Russian officers were present, the only foreigner
admitted being Dr. Zavrieff. The following points were discussed : That
an attempt should be made to define clearly the status of the 2nd Garrison
Artillery Regiment of Erzerum, in the sense that this regiment was not, as the
Armenians imagined, an Armenian artillery regiment, but a Russian regiment;
not one of its officers had voluntarily enlisted in Armenian service, not one
of us bad made any agreement to do so. If the regiment was Russian we
insisted on preserving Russian status; if Armenian, we desired the right to
leave the town at will in order to serve with the Russian Army. The state
of siege had only served to prevent the departure of those officers who wished
to leave in order to serve on another than the Caucasus front. If, on the other
hand, the current rumour materialised and the Trans-Caucasus had split off
from Russia, it would certainly be necessary to grant leave of absence to
the Russian officers if we were not to find ourselves strangers in a foreign
land.

After prolonged discussion we reached the conviction that, according to the
circular we had received, every officer had the right to apply for transfer to a
Russian Army Corps or to be placed at the disposal of the War Ministry. 1
therefore consented to forward all such applications to the proper authorities.

During the meeting the experience of Lieutenant Yermoloff, of the yth
Battalion Caucasus Mountain Artillery, was brought up as a striking example.
He had asked to be transferred from the new Armenian battalion to which he
had been assigned. Colonel Morel had first tried to dissuade him, then, in face
of this officer's fixed determination, he had added to the written form of
application that the officer in question had shown himself incompetent for his
duties, that he would therefore be placed at the disposal of the General Staff
of the Front, and would receive orders to leave Erzerum within twenty-four
hours. Thus was the honour of an efficient officer attacked, for the sole reason
that he refused to serve Armenian interests and had been indiscreet enough to
declare that Colonel Morel had allied himself to the Armenian cause.

Dr. Zavrieff repeated word for word Andranik's statement given above. He
said that by remaining in Erzerum until the conclusion of peace we should be
serving Russian interests. Officers belonging to a civilised nation had no
right to adopt such a line of reasoning as, for example : " Let the Armenians
and Turks settle their own quarrel ! Let them cut each others' throats ! Why
should we Russians interfere with their affairs? Let them go to the devil! "

At the conclusion of his speech, which had not made the desired impression,

294 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

Dr. Zavrieff said that if we wished to serve humanity it was our duty to
remain in Erzerum to prevent butchery of the Turks.

Andranik's promises were not fulfilled, nor had the Mohammedan population
ever placed any faith in them. Shops remained closed and terror continued
to reign. Not a living soul showed himself in the Mohammedan quarters.
Only a few shops in the neighbourhood of the Town Hall opened their shutters,
and there a few Mohammedans collected during the day.

Not a single Armenian was punished. To keep up the pretence of Armenian
innocence the question was asked whether the innocent were to be punished for
the sake of Andranik's promise. But when the Russian officers replied that they
had themselves handed over various Armenian offenders and accused them
before the authorities, this irrefutable argument was received in silence.
Murder still went on and was merely concealed. It was practised in the more
remote villages, no longer before the eyes of the Russian officers. The Turkish
inhabitants of the villages round Erzerum disappeared, and nothing was heard
as to their fate.

Arrests in the town increased in number on the excuse of a possible rising.
To my ironical question, what happened to the prisoners, and whether they
all ran the risk of being slaughtered, Colonel Morel replied that some would
be taken to Tiflis under adequate escort, others would be kept in Erzerum as
hostages. In the streets Armenian bands, formed of Armenian deserters,
murdered the passers-by — partly from fear, partly to rob them of their
possessions; in any case, robbery was the chief motive. Before Andranik's
arrival the companies refused to go into the front line. Afterwards they obeyed
the order, but only to desert in the most craven fashion. Andranik, on horse-
back, tried to drive them back with his sword and fists. To have him at their
head was the dearest wish of all Armenians of the Russian artillery. They
were apparently incapable of grasping that the Garrison Artillery required the
services of trained artillerymen and an adequate number of infantry. But it
ivas easy to guess their secret thought : when the moment came for withdrawal,
to escape under cover of the guns. Subsequent events have proved the truth
of this.

The opening of peace negotiations at Trebizond was delayed. We learned
through the General Staff at Erzerum that the negotiations fixed for
February i7th had been postponed until the 2oth or 25th. As my Staff was
separated in opposite ends of the town, and the telephonic communication
was in an inefficient state, I was compelled to make the journey twice a day.

According to information I received from Colonel Morel and his Staff in
the course of an official visit, there were no regular Ottoman troops in the
neighbourhood of Erzerum; we were fighting Kurdish bands and villagers,
togethet with a few regulars, relics of the Turkish Army of 1916. It was
understood that these bands had been raised by some Ottoman officers who had
come to the neighbourhood to protect the population. These troops had only
two mountain guns, which had been left in Erzindjan by the Armenians. They
could advance by the Erzindjan-Olti-Jeni road, or from the other side from
Kars and Palan-Dogno. Colonel Morel, on what grounds I do not know,
assumed that the attack would be made from Qlti. The intelligence service
was conducted by the Armenians most inefficiently. They were chiefly occupied
in murder in the villages and driving off any herds of cattle they came across.
Their reports were lies from beginning to end. If they reported that the patrol
had been attacked by an enemy force of 2,000 men, one could be sure that there
had actually been 200 at most. They were not ashamed to admit having fled
before an attack by 300-400 men, in which their sole loss was one killed and
one wounded. One day an Armenian officer reported over the telephone that
his detachment had been attacked by 400 of the enemy; it transpired that two

The Armenian Question 295

unarmed men had emerged from a neighbouring village and immediately with-
drawn into their houses. From the evacuation of Erzerum until the Turkish
occupation the Armenian scout patrols only once succeeded in making a capture
— a single Turkish horseman. He was probably suffering from frozen feet, or
was prevented by some other reason from escaping.

After our second officers' meeting some officers had applied for transfer to
other posts. When these applications were submitted to Colonel Morel he
was very angry, and said that he would refuse to permit their departure on
the grounds of a court martial decision. When I pointed out that the guns
were still in the hands of the Russian officers, who could reply to such
unjustified severity with artillery fire, and, moreover, that as the applications
were absolutely legal and could not be stigmatised as an attempt at desertion,
it was necessary to comply, he retorted that, if the officers insisted, he would
give them, as he had done in the case of Captain Yermaloff, papers which
would compromise their records. I replied to Colonel Morel that, as Colonel
Dolukhanoff had justly declared in Tiflis and Batum, officers who were forced
to remain at their posts against their will could not be expected to give good
service. He replied that for this reason he had asked for sixty English officers
to be sent to Erzerum, and had already received formal consent. On this
occasion I also heard of another incident : a Russian or Polish soldier who was
acting as station-master in Erzerum bad refused to continue his duties. He
had been at once arrested and forced to carry on. Under the pretext of
facilitating a more rapid circulation of orders I ordered my officers to billet
themselves as near to one another as possible; in reality my object was that we
might be in a better position to help one another in case of need.

Captain Yermoloff had departed on February 25th. I had asked him to
break hi? journey at Sari-Kamieko to inform Generals Wischinsky and
Gerassimoff, artillery commanders, of the serious position in which we were
placed in relation to the Armenians, and to urge him to free us as quickly as
possible from this cul-de-sac.

On February 24th I sighted a Turkish aeroplane reconnoitring, and concluded
that the enemy was at Erzindjan or even Mama-Khatum. The same day Colonel
Morel informed me that he had received the Turkish proposal regarding the
evacuation of Erzerum. After the Turkish occupation I learned from Corps
Commander Krazim Bey that this proposal had not been a worthless scrap of
paper, but an official document bearing his own signature, whereas Colonel
Morel had deliberately led me to believe that this official ultimatum, signed by
the Officer Commanding the Army Corps, was mere bluff. The General Staff of
the fortress announced on February 24th and 25th that no danger was imminent.
Only a band of Kurds had been seen in the neighbourhood of Teke-Deressi,
and their advance had been checked by a detachment sent out against them.
It was also stated that a detachment sent out from Erzerum had thrown back
the enemy a few kilometres beyond Ilidja. Meanwhile we heard that on
February 26th the Armenian detachment at Teke-Deressi had been attacked, and
that those who had been able to escape had fled like the wind to Erzerum; the
Ilidja detachment, completely broken up, was also running away in the same
direction.

I had received from Colonel Morel verbal orders to open artillery fire on
the attacking enemy, but I could see no target. On the Charput road only
fleeing Armenian soldiers were visible, and on the Trebizond road Armenian
detachments retreating on Erzerum in close formation, as if on the parade
ground. In the course of the afternoon it became known, also, that an enemy
detachment was halted close to Guoz-Koj. I estimated it at 1,500 men; it did
not look like Kurdish bands, but a properly-led regiment.

Andranik attempted to muster the fugitives and send them against the

296 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

enemy, but these cowards took to their heels as soon as they came into touch
with the foe. The artillery fire, however, was maintained until midnight.
Immediately the Kurd offensive was opened and we had got to work, no more
was heard of departure from the Russian officers, who carried out their assigned
duties honourably.

I could not induce the Armenian infantry attached to my batteries at Buyuk-
Kiremidli to attack ; instead they deserted the batteries and withdrew persistently
towards the Charput gate. The Armenians who had fled at Teke-Deressi
even carried off in their flight the herds of cattle and slew the defenceless
isolated peasants they encountered on their way. The Turkish advance on
Erzerum came as a complete surprise to the Russian General Staff; no battle
orders had been issued, or, if they had, I, at any rate, had heard nothing of
them. My task was very simple : it consisted of keeping the enemy under fire
to prevent him from piercing the belt of forts which surrounded the town. In
the advanced positions were also infantry and mountain artillery, which were
not under my command.

On the same day the Armenian militia busied themselves in the town until
evening in seizing all male Mohammedans, including old men and sick. When
questioned as to the object of these measures, the reply was that men were
being collected to clear the railway of snow. In the evening I learned that
an Armenian student, with his band, had forced an entry into my house, in
spite of my name on the door, on the excuse of searching it. As my wife
resisted this deliberate intrusion he did not succeed in his attempt, and was
also prevented from carrying off the owner of the house, an old Turk, together
with some Kurdish servants; he cursed roundly at this thwarting of his plan.
The student declared that the searchings were being carried out at the order
of Andranik. I at once had a communication door cut so that the old man could
take refuge with us in case they came a second time to fetch him.

I had recently been in the habit, each time I visited Andranik and his Staff,
of taking with me Captain Yulkewitsch, the chief of the Mobilisation Depart-
ment, as a witness of my relations with these men. One evening he accompanied
me to an officers' meeting. When we entered the meeting had already begun.
Those present were Andranik, Dr. Zavrieff, Colonels Zinkewitsch and
Dolukhanoff, and a few others. On my arrival Zinkewitsch began to read
aloud the following telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, General Odiche-
lidze : " I have received a wireless message from Wehib Pasha, commanding
the Ottoman forces, in which he states that his troops have orders to occupy
Erzerum. Destroy the guns of the fortress and withdraw with the troops.
(Sgd.) Odichelidze."

This belated order left us no time to destroy the guns. After Andranik had
given vent to his fury, he announced his decision to hold Erzerum two days
longer, to enable the destruction to be carried out, and then to evacuate the
fortress. When Dr. Zavrieff pointed out that nothing was being done to suppress
the firebrands who infested the town, and that the Mohammedan aged and sick
had been seized and despatched to an unknown destination, he replied that orders
had already been given to put down this disorder. But, as with all the others,
these fine promises were never carried out.

After discussing the best way of carrying out Andranik's decision we with-
drew. As to the question of holding Erzerum for two more days, considering
the strength of the troops and of the advanced position, the town could have held
out for another forty-two c\ays, not only against the Kurds, but even against a
regular army4.

As Ottoman H.Q. had officially stated in the course of the armistice negotia-
tions that they could not be responsible for keeping the Kurds in order, it was
our duty to take all necessary measures against a possible attack from them.

The Armenian Question 297

When I returned to my Headquarters I gave the necessary orders for the
destruction of the guns, which in any case could have been rendered useless
within two days. I learned from the reports of my officers that the infantry,
under cover of darkness, had deserted the trenches and taken to flight. I
communicated this news to Colonel Morel, who assured me that it would give
rise to no danger at all, as reinforcements had been sent up. I returned home
and went to bed about one o'clock.

Between one and three I heard isolated shots in the town, and soon after
I could hear the voices of Armenians, the sound of doors being smashed in with
axes, and the despairing cries of the poor unhappy Mohammedans, who had
been attacked. Two thoughts gave me anxiety : In the first place, our honour
was threatened, for anyone who had not witnessed personally the cowardly
cruelty of the Armenians (fighting for freedom !) might assume that these
inhuman brutalities were being perpetrated with the connivance of the Russian
officers, and we should have to share the blame with these wild beasts; in the
second place, as it was not in accordance with the views of G.H.Q. to engage
the regular Turkish forces, the result might be that the orders of the Commander-
in-Chief would not be obeyed if a misunderstanding should arise among the
attackers. With regard to these two points I came to the following decision :
To call on Colonel Morel first thing in the morning and suggest to him — first,
that the Armenians must be prevented from perpetrating fresh outrages, even
if the only method of doing so were to turn part of our guns upon them and
so control them to heed our orders; secondly, envoys should be at once sent
with a flag of truce to the Turkish troops to inform them that in two days the
town would be ceded without bloodshed. Moreover, it would be necessary to
raise detachments, excluding Armenians, in order to suppress the disturbances
by force of arms and prevent the butchery of the Turks by the Armenians.

When, in the early morning, I went to see Colonel Morel, accompanied by
Captain Yulkewitsch, I met, near the artillery munition dump, the Armenian
second lieutenant, Bagratonian, who was on duty at this depfit. He told me
that when the order came to withdraw he would like to blow up the dump, but
would wait for orders from me. This statement astounded me, for the ammuni-
tion dep6t was under the command of Colonel Dolukhanoff, and no orders
had been received to blow it up. I gave him to understand that such an
explosion might cause injury to the Russian officers as well as to the civilian
population, advised him to abandon his project, and finally succeeded in
convincing him. In this way I saved the ammunition.

As I approached Colonel Morel's quarters I saw that everyone was taking
flight. The house of the American Consul, which stands opposite his quarters,
was in flames. Colonel Morel and Colonel Torkum were mounted and ready
for flight ; their baggage had been loaded on to a motor-car and several carriages.
It was seven o'clock in the morning. I inquired as to the situation. I was
told that the order for withdrawal had been issued at 5 a.m., and astonishment
was expressed that I had not received it. This is what I had feared : the
Armenians succeeded in escaping under the protection of the Russian officers
and the artillery. But while the Russian officers were working the guns single-
handed and beating back the onslaught of the attackers, the Armenians were
at full liberty to slaughter the Mohammedans and take to their heels. If I had
not appeared no Russian officer would have known of the order for withdrawal.
I thought for a moment of running to Fort Medjedie to send a farewell of
shrapnel into the brave Armenians who, clad in bullet-proof tunics, were fleeing
unhindered along the Kars road. But it occurred to me that there might be
one or two innocent men among them, so I abandoned the idea.

It was also a result of the cunning and cowardice of the noble Armenian
looters that the guns could not be put out of action. When I reurned to my

2y8 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

quarters I heard in an obscure street cries of pain and the crackle of a terrific
rifle volley. As I was at a street corner I could not see what was happening,
but the bloodstains in the snow showed that a fight had taken place. I got
down from my carriage to continue my journey on foot; but when I saw the
Armenian Commanding Officer of the Militia on horseback, coming out of a
side street, I could imagine the scene of horror that had been enacted.

When I was back in my quarters I gave orders to the batteries to sound
the retreat at the same time as the infantry and to get the carriages ready for
the artillery officers. I was told that the outriders had already escaped in the
night. Armenian deserters, armed to the teeth, had taken the horses belonging
to the carriages, and galloped off two on each horse. As my groom had put
up a resistance they had not been able to take my horses, but they wounded
one of them with a shot. Of the fifty carriages we were left with only three,
which some of the officers used. Soon afterwards we learnt the Turkish army
had entered the town, and were at last able to ascertain that they did not consist
of bands of Kurds collected together haphazard, but regular troops. The brave
Armenian infantry took advantage of the night to dash off with all speed along
the Erzerum-Kars road. A hurricane could hardly have swept Erzerum so
thoroughly of the Armenian dirt in so short a time.

Neither in the firing trenches nor in the town were there any wounded
Armenians to be found. This proves afresh with what courage and audacity
they had defended Erzerum. The only prisoners were Russian officers, so the
Armenians can boast of having taken a negative part in the defence of the town.

After receiving news of the occupation of the town by the Turks I went
with my adjutant to headquarters to report.

As I passed along the streets, the Turks I met expressed in most moving
fasjiion their gratitude }o me for saving their lives. This gratitude included all
the Russian officers, for if the Russian officers had not been there, the Turkish
troops reoccupying Erzerum would not have found a single Turk alive.

The Russian author Petronius says of the Armenians : " The Armenians arc
certainly human, but at home they go on all fours." The Russian poet
Lermontoff sings their praises in the following words : " You are a slave, you
are a coward, for you are an Armenian."

ERZERUM, April 2Qth, 1918.

(Signed) LT.-COL. TVERDOKHLEBOFF, Provisional Commandant of the
Fortresses of Erzerum and Deveboynu, Commanding the 2nd Garrison
Artillery Regiment, Erzerum.

Now, honoured readers, what do you think of the humanity of
the Armenians ?

No ! no ! don't judge the two peoples unjustly !

It was not their fault, but that of Muscovite policy which
had hounded them on one against the other. The Muscovite,
who had no other wish than to slay the Turk and, after destroy-
ing the thousand-year-old national glory, to usurp the inheritance
of the Turk; the Muscovite, who delighted only in swimming
in blood, and egged on the Armenian against the Turk. The
result of this was to put into the mind of the Turk the definite
conviction that " it is necessary to slay the Armenian if we Would

The Armenian Question 299

have our own lives safe/' while the Armenian said that in order to
rise again and recover his majority he must strangle the Turk.
This is what paved the way for the tragic events we have
witnessed. 600,000 Armenians on the one side, 1,500,000 Turks
and Kurds on the other are said to have met their death. And
now it is Russian policy, which, like its imbecile confederates of the
Morgenthau stamp, is impervious to all feelings of shame, to throw
all the blame on to the Turks, whom they would like to annihilate,
filling the Press of the whole world with their ravings.

Mandelstamm says that, except in Van, the Armenian nowhere
made the slightest attempt at revolution. I have already said that
I had no knowledge of the events which took place in the vilayets
of East Anatolia and in the rear of our army in the Caucasus ; on
the other hand, I am perfectly acquainted with the condition of
affairs within the sphere of my own army. The incidents which
took place in Zeitun and Urfa, in the middle of 1915, were nothing
more nor less than an armed rising of the Armenians. The rising
at Mussa Baba is also a part of this organised revolution. A fact,
in my opinion absolutely irrefutable, is that at the moment when
the Dardanelles campaign was at its crisis, the Armenians were
ordered by the French and English Commanders-in-Chief of the
Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean to rise. They had certainly
judged that an Armenian rising, beginning in Rein-ul-Hinzir, in
the Gulf of Alexandretta and spreading over Dort Yol, Mussa
Baba, Aleppo, Aintab, Ursa, and Zeitun, might well signify an
operation ending in the severing of Syria from Asia Minor. More-
over, the Armenians, who had made their preparations in these
places a long time beforehand, were only waiting the signal to
begin.

Can the responsible authorities of the Governments in question
maintain that my statements are untrue ? Now that the war is
over, I should regard it as a chivalrous act if the true facts with
regard to this were placed before the public.

If Mandelstamm still insists on maintaining that these incidents,
far from being a rising, were nothing more than an attempt at
resistance, a resort to arms in justified self-defence, then I must
point out to him that his Allies, the French and English officers
who organised this rising, will think this ridiculous. This is my
conviction and my opinion about the Armenian massacres. Now

300 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

that the war is over, and Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian
Peninsula, the brightest jewels in the Ottoman crown, are severed
from the Mother country, Turkey is beginning afresh the struggle
to prevent the loss of the sacred ground of Anatolia, which alone
remains to the Turks. If there is anything left to console poor
Turkey for having sacrificed over 3,000,000 men in the course of
a world war, it is the fact that our hereditary enemy, Czardom,
has been vanquished and destroyed.

Among the States which have been newly formed as a result of
what has happened in the Caucasus we see to-day an Armenian
Republic. But we can also be sure that the Turkish-Armenians,
with Zaven Effendi, the Patriarch of Constantinople at their head,
will stop at no intrigue to exasperate the Turks. The Turks are in
no way opposed to the foundation of an Armenian republic, with
Edjmiadzim and Erivan as centres; but they do most definitely
desire that that republic should remain on the best of terms with
the republics of Azerbaidjan and Georgia, which were formed from
various national elements from the Southern Caucasus, as well
as with the Ottoman Empire, the incontestable owner of Asia
Minor, and not throw covetous glances at what is its property by
undeniable rights.

Above all things, I advise the Ottoman Armenians, in the
interest both of their own peace and happiness, and especially
in the interests of the Turks, to give up their hare-brained dreams
that Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Diarbekir, Mamuret-ul-Asis shall ever
become part of Armenia.

On the day when the Turkish Armenians definitely show that
they have given up this impossible hope they will begin to live in
honourable friendship with their Turkish and Kurdish compatriots.
It is always open to those among them who wish to be Armenians
and Armenians alone to settle in the republic of the Armenian
Caucasus. But for those who wish to remain in Turkey, it is an
absolute condition that they should show themselves true Otto-
mans and refrain from any activities which might throw suspicion
on their loyalty. Henceforward, there will no longer be a place
among the Armenians of Turkey for the Dachnakzutium, the
Hintschak, and other parties, and I am convinced that such
organisations can only do harm to the Armenians of the Caucasus.

At the present moment the task before the three Caucasian

The Armenian Question 301

Republics and the Ottoman Empire is to help one another
mutually and to devote their powers to the restoration of their
devastated countries, the organisation and establishment of their
administration. There is yet another task before these four
States : that of using every necessary measure to prevent the
Russian torrent from breaking over the Caucasus mountains. To
ensure this it is of the utmost importance for these four States to
form a defensive alliance against the Muscovite invasion. Zaven
Effendi, the present patriarch of the Armenians, knows better than
anyone else the friendliness towards the Armenians with which
I am inspired.

When I came to Constantinople in December, 1915, Zaven
Effendi visited me in the Pera Palace Hotel and handed me a
memorandum from the Patriarchate thanking me in the name of
the whole Armenian nation.

As I hear that he is now being employed as a tool in the in-
trigues of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, I beg him, as a
friend of the Armenians, to examine the advice I have given above.
Consideration of the advantages which my view would offer to the
Armenians might perhaps prevent him from becoming the
plaything of the Greek Patriarch.

If, as I have said already, we four nations of the Near East
do not conclude a formal alliance of defence against Russia, if we
do not co-operate in the foundation of a republic of the North
Caucasus and include it in our alliance, we cannot doubt that
we shall fall victims to the power of Russia, who, for years, has
yearned to bring us under her yoke.

Who knows, perhaps the day will come when the poor Arabs
and Persians who have fallen under the influence of the French
and English may slip out of the hands of their present masters
and join our alliance ?

The nations of the Near East can only live in freedom if they
make themselves absolute masters of their fate.

I believe that this political ideal which I have sketched out
for the Ottoman, Armenian, Georgian, and Azerbaidjan politicians
is calculated, in less than twenty years, to transform the Near
East, hitherto regarded as a hot-bed of intrigue and unrest, into
a paradise, and to give it a status which will make it independent
of the foreigner.

302 Memories of a Turkish Statesman

For the Turks, who form an overwhelming majority of the
Ottoman Empire, this ideal is of fundamental importance. If
the Armenian minority desires to remain Ottoman, it has only
to prove that, like the Armenians of seventy years ago, it is
inspired with feelings of loyalty and true Ottoman ideals.

This, in my opinion, is the only method I can suggest for
finally burying the blood-stained past and preparing the way for
a rich and happy future. I and my compatriots are always ready
for discussion with anyone who can produce a better solution.

THE END.

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