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THE  MERCHANT  NAVY 


HISTORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

BASED  ON  OFFICIAL  DOCUMENTS 

BY    DIRECTION    OF    THE    HISTORICAL   SECTION   OF   THE 
COMMITTEE    OF    IMPERIAL    DEFENCE 

THE 

MERCHANT  NAVY 

Vol.  I 


BY 

ARCHIBALD  KURD 


LONDON 

JOHN  MURRAY,  ALBEMARLE  STREET,  W 

1921 


t) 

Stl 


i/./ 


ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 


PREFACE 


WHEN  the  peace  was  broken  on  August  4th,  1914, 
nothing  suggested  that  British  merchant  seamen  would 
fare  worse  than  their  predecessors  of  the  Napoleonic  era, 
and  the  statement  that  the'y  would  be  compelled  to  face 
perils  in  intensity  and  variety  unparalleled  in  human 
experience  would  have  been  rejected  as  unbelievable  in 
face  of  all  the  efforts  made  at  The  Hague  to  humanise 
warfare.  Events  falsified  all  anticipations. 

After  the  comparative  failure  of  the  attack  on  commerce 
by  surface  craft — cruisers  and  auxiliary  cruisers — the 
enemy  became  convinced  that  in  the  submarine  he  had 
found  the  means  of  cutting  the  communications  of  the 
British  Empire,  and  of  shutting  off  from  the  European 
battle-fields  the  essential  supplies  without  which  the  troops 
could  not  continue  to  fight.  The  use  of  the  submarine 
for  commerce  destruction  involved  the  infraction  of  inter- 
national law  as  well  as  the  ignoring  of  the  code  of 
humanity,  since  these  small  craft,  packed  with  machinery 
and  equipped  for  war,  were  unable  to  accommodate  the 
crews  of  ships  sunk,  whether  by  torpedo,  gunfire,  or 
botiibs.  The  German  flag  had  already  been  banished  from 
the  highways  of  the  world.  So,  in  desperation,  it  was 
decided,  whatever  the  loss  of  human  life  might  be,  and 
without  respect  for  considerations  of  law,  however  widely 
recognised,  to  embark  on  a  policy  which,  rightly  or 
wrongly,  became  generally  known  as  piracy. 

This  decision  changed  the  whole  aspect  of  the  War  so 
far  as  merchant  seamen  were  concerned.  As  the  cam- 
paign made  progress  it  became  apparent  that  the  British 
merchant  seamen  were  being  forced  by  circumstances, 
over  which  neither  they  nor  the  British  naval  authorities 
had  any  control,  into  the  forefront  of  the  struggle  by 
sea.  They  had  entered  the  Mercantile  Marine  with  no 
thought  that  they  would  be  exposed  even  to  such  trials 


ri  PREFACE 

and  sufferings  as  their  predecessors  sustained  during  the 
previous  Great  War,  for  there  had  been  much  talk  at 
various  international  Conferences  of  ameliorating  the  con- 
ditions of  warfare  ;  they  found  themselves  involved  in  a 
conflict  waged  by  a  merciless  enemy  with  large  and  newly- 
developed  resources.  The  seamen  were  defenceless,  for  this 
emergency  had  not  been  foreseen  either  by  the  Admiralty, 
by  the  shipowners,  or  by  the  seamen  themselves.  As  the 
campaign  continued,  the  Germans  fornid  that  their  best 
hope  of  sucdess  lay  in  discharging  their  torpedoes  without 
warning,  leaving  the  crews,  and  in  some  cases  passengers, 
at  the  mercy  of  the  elements. 

In  these  cdnditions  it  was  thought  appropriate  that  an 
official  history  should  be  prepared,  placing  on  record  for 
all  time  the  manner  in  which  British  seamen,  refusing  to 
be  colwed  by  the  enemy's  threats,  confronted  a  ruthless 
foe,  regarding  their  own  lives  as  cheap  if,  in  spite  of  the 
perils  they  willingly  faced,  the  stream  of  ocean  traffic, 
necessary  alike  for  naval,  military,  and  economic  reasons, 
were  maintained.  This  history  was  consequently  undet- 
taken,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  under  the 
authority  of  the  Historical  Section  of  the  Committee  of 
Imperial  Defence  towards  the  close  of  1917,  the  proposal 
receiving  the  cordial  support  of  the  Admiralty  and  the 
Ministry  of  Shipping. 

The  ordeal  to  which  the  men  of  the  British  Mercantile 
Marine  submitted  with  generous  patriotism  can  be  ap- 
preciated only  if  it  is  described  in  an  appropriate  setting, 
ignoring  neither  the  plans  of  the  naval  authorities  for  the 
protection  of  merchant  shipphig,  elaborated  in  the  years 
before  the  outbreak  of  war,  nor  the  measures  afterwards 
adopted  to  enable  merchant  shipping  to  resist  with  better 
hope  of  success  the  enemy's  policy.  On  the  other  hand, 
no  attempt  has  been  made  to  deal  with  the  naval  operations 
undertaken  by  the  Admiralty  for  the  protection  of  this 
country's  sea  communications,  except  in  so  far  as  they 
immediately  concerned  the  Mercantile  Marine,  nor  with 
the  economic  effects  of  the  naval  war  on  ocean-borne  trade. 
The  former  subject  has  been  treated  in  the  companion  work 
by  Sir  Julian  Corbett,  and  Mr.  C.  Ernest  Fayle  has 
become  responsible  for  the  latter. 

While  British  seamen,  uncovenanted  to  the  State,  had 
never  had  to  confront  such  an  ordeal  as  that  of  1915-18, 


PREFACE  vii 

it  would  be  to  misunderstand  the  history  of  the  British 
Mercantile  Marine,  of  which  little  has  been  written,  to 
conclude  that  never  before  had  sailors  of  the  Merchant 
Service  taken  part  in  our  wars,  creating  traditions  handed 
down  from  generation  to  generation  with  increasing  pride. 
On  the  contrary,  the  Merchant  Navy  was  the  defence  of 
the  nation's  sea  interests  and  its  bulwark  against 
invasion  before  the  Royal  Navy  had  any  existence,  and 
after  the  foundation  of  the  Royal  Navy  it  continued  to 
bear  no  small  share  in  the  sea  defences  of  the  country. 
It  has  been  thought  not  inappropriate  to  the  story  which 
these  volumes  tell  to  give  in  very  brief  summary,  as 
a  preliminary  chapter,  some  account  of  the  contribution  of 
British  merchant  seamen  in  the  past  to  this  country's 
maritime  history ;  this  summary  furnishes  a  fitting  back- 
ground to  the  unexampled  record  of  high  courage,  un- 
complaining suffering,  and  in  thousands  of  instances 
martyrdom,  which  the  late  struggle  has  provided  as  an 
example  and  inspiration  to  future  generations.  The 
theme  is  a  great  one,  and  there  is  a  tendency  to  forget 
that  the  Merchant  Navy  was  the  creator  of  the  Royal  Navy. 

As  soon  as  the  task  of  preparing  this  History  was 
Undertaken,  it  became  apparent  that,  if  the  record  were 
strictly  confined  to  the  experiences  of  merchant  seamen 
in  passenger  and  cargo-carrying  ships,  it  would  con- 
vey an  inadequate  impression  of  the  dauntless  courage, 
fine  resource,  and  dogged  endurance  of  the  men  serving 
by  sea,  who  were  exposed  to  the  full  fury  of  the 
enemy's  campaign,  and  of  the  wide  range  of  the  services 
they  rendered.  The  Germans  determined  to  hold  up,  or 
destroy,  merchant  shipping,  and  their  failure  is  traceable 
alike  to  the  spirit  exhibited  by  the  crews  of  merchant 
vessels  and  to  the  manner  in  which  merchant  seamen, 
fishermen,  yachtsmen,  and  others  responded  to  the 
Admiralty's  invitation  when  it  was  decided  to  build 
up  a  new  Navy  to  deal  with  the  new  problems  created 
by  the  submarine  and  mine.  And  thus  it  happens  that 
this  History  embraces  an  account  of  the  operations  of  the 
Auxiliary  Patrol,  constituting  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
aspects  of  the  war  by  sea. 

Acknowledgment  is  made  of  the  assistance  rendered 
by  Lieutenant-Commander  E.  Keble  Chatterton,  R.N.V.R., 
in  the  preparation  of  this  portion  of  the  History.  He  was 


viii  PREFACE 

associated  with  that  phase  of  the  war  by  sea  for  three 
winters  and  three  summers,  and  obtained  first-hand 
knowledge  of  the  sterling  work  done  by  the  merchant 
seamen  as  belligerents  in  circumstances  of  much  danger 
and  difficulty.  With  his  aid,  an  attempt  has  been  made 
to  convey  an  impression  of  the  elaborate  organisation 
which  was  gradually  created  by  the  Admiralty,  ultimately 
comprising  nearly  4,000  vessels,  and  of  the  high  standard 
of  seamanship  of  officers  and  men. 

Little  has  hithertb  been  revealed  of  the  activities  of 
the  Auxiliary  Patrol.  Now,  with  the  advantage  of  official 
records,  the  veil  can  be  lifted  arid  particulars  given  of 
some  of  the  most  stirring  incidents  of  the  war  by  sea.  It 
must  be  apparent  that  the  story — a  typical  British  story 
of  a  fight  against  heavy  odds — has  been  little  more  than 
half  told  in  the  limited  space  available  in  this  book. 

The  writing  of  this  record  of  the  ordeal  of  British  mer- 
chant seamen  would  have  been  impossible  had  it  not  been 
for  the  cordial  help  received  from  officers  of  the  Royal 
Navy  who,  while  serving  at  the  Admiralty  or  elsewhere, 
were  brought  into  intimate  association  with  the  Merchant 
Service,  from  the  officials  of  the  Marine  Department  of 
the  Board  of  TVade,  of  the  Ministry  of  Shipping,  and  of 
the  Admiralty,  from  the  Registrar-General  of  Shipping 
and  Seamen,  and  from  many  others,  to  whom  acknow- 
ledgment is  made. 

Full  use  has  also  been  made  of  the  records  of  the  various 
departments. 


CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 

Mistaken  conception  of  the  Merchant  Navy — Traditions  and  romance 

Significance  of  sea  power — Growth  of  the  world's  war  fleets — Influence 
of  the  steam-engine — Responsibilities  of  merchant  shipping  on  the  outbreak 
of  war  .  ......  pp.  l — 7 

CHAPTER  I 

THE   MERCHANT   NAVY   OF  THE   PAST 

I.    THE  FIGHTING  MERCHANTMEN 

The  Cinque  Ports  and  Home  Defence — The  Laws  of  Oleron — Merchant- 
men at  the  Battle  of  Sluys — War  and  piracy — Issue  of  letters  of  marque — 
Appointment  of  Admirals — The  Merchant  Adventurers — Sebastian  Cabot — 
English  seamen  in  the  Narrow  Seas — The  Hanseatic  League — The  founda- 
tion of  the  Royal  Navy — Elizabethan  voyagers — Drake  and  the  Spanish 
Main — The  defeat  of  the  Spanish  Armada — The  "  Adventurers  for  the 
Discovery  of  the  Trade  of  the  East  Indies  " — The  rivalry  of  the  Dutch 

pp.  8-44 

II.    THE  MERCHANT  FLEET  IN  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  AND  NAPOLEONIC 

WARS 

Enemy's  war  on  sea-borne  commerce — Heavy  losses  of  merchant 
shipping — Successes  of  French  corsairs — Unreadiness  of  the  Channel 
Fleet — Spirited  defence  by  British  merchant  seamen — The  risks  of  com- 
merce in  war  time — Unwieldy  British  convoys — Man-power  of  the  Merchant 
Navy — The  effect  of  impressment — The  guerre  de  course  after  Trafalgar — 
The  fight  of  the  Windsor  Castle — The  escape  of  the  Shaw — The  Antelope 
and  the  Atlante — Consideration  for  prisoners — The  value  of  Dunkirk, 
Calais,  Boulogne,  and  Dieppe — Raids  on  shipping  in  the  English  Channel — 
British  merchantmen  captured,  1793-1812  .  pp.  44—69 

III.  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MERCHANT  NAVY,  1815-1914 
The  aftermath  of  the  War — Prosperity  and  sea  power — The  influence 
of  the  Navigation  Laws  and  the  movement  for  repeal — The  competency 
of  masters  and  officers — Mr.  Joseph  Hume's  agitation — Legislation  to 
promote  safety  at  sea — The  Foreign  Office  inquiry  of  1843 — Mr.  Samuel 
Plimsoll  and  "  coffin-ships  " — The  work  of  reform — Growth  of  the  Merchant 
Navy,  1818-74 — The  rivalry  of  the  United  States — Effect  of  the  Civil 
War — Progress  of  ameliorative  legislation — Responsibilities  of  the  Board 
of  Trade — Strength  of  the  British  Mercantile  Marine  on  the  outbreak  of 
the  War,  1914 — Liners  and  tramps— Expansion  of  the  world's 'sea-borne 
commerce — Distribution  of  the  Merchant  Fleet  .  .  .  pp.  70—97 


x  CONTENTS 

IV.    THE  MEN  OF  THE  MERCHANT  NAVY 

Changed  relations  of  the  Royal  Navy  and  the  Mercantile  Marine — 
Unpopularity  of  impressment — The  Registry  of  seamen — Deterioration 
of  the  personnel — Reports  from  British  Consuls — Discreditable  conditions 
— Increase  in  the  number  of  apprentices — A  new  scheme  of  registration 
and  its  failure — Repeal  of  the  Manning  clauses  of  the  Navigation  Laws — 
Establishment  of  a  Voluntary  Naval  Reserve — A  chequered  history — 
New  scheme  of  training  of  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve  introduced  in  1906 — 
The  country's  resources  in  seamen  .  .  pp.  97 — 116 

CHAPTER   II 

ON   THE   EVE   OF   THE   WAR 

The  position  of  the  merchant  seamen — Discussions  at  The  Hague — 
Germany's  deceptive  declarations — Professions  of  respect  for  the  code  of 
humanity — Right  of  conversion  on  the  high  seas — The  Admiralty's  sus- 
picions— A  policy  of  defensive  armament — Germany's  varied  resources 
for  a  war  on  commerce — British  merchant  ships  detained  in  German  ports 
before  the  outbreak  of  war — British  protests — The  enemy's  Naval  Prize 
Code — The  status  of  merchant  seamen — The  German  declaration  of  July 
22nd,  1914 — Merchant  seamen  as  prisoners  of  war — The  opening  of 
hostilities — Loss  of  the  s.s.  San  Wilfrido  .  .  .pp.  117 — 136 

CHAPTER   III 

CRUISER  ATTACKS   ON   SHIPPING 

The  KONIGSBERG'S  attack  on  merchantmen — A  British  master's  early 
experiences — The  DRESDEN  as  a  commerce  destroyer — Chase  of  the  Pacific 
Steam  Navigation  Company's  s.s.  Ortega — A  fine  exhibition  of  sea- 
manship— Escape  of  the  armed  merchant  cruiser  KAISER  WILHELM  DER 
GROSSE  from  the  North  Sea — Experiences  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
s.s.  Galicia — Consideration  for  women  and  children — Operations  of  the 
KARLSRUHE  off  Parnambuco — An  enforced  cruise — A  British  captain's 
diary — A  lucky  escape — Misfortunes  of  a  defensively  armed  merchantman 
— The  fate  of  the  sailing-ship  Wilfred  M. — Capture  of  the  armed  merchant 
cruiser  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM — Operations  of  the  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH — 
The  sinking  of  the  American  s.s.  William  P.  Frye — Capture  of  the  s.s. 
Elsinore  by  the  LEIPZIG— Marooned  on  an  island  .  .  pp.  137—185 

CHAPTER    IV 

THE   EXPLOITS    OF   THE    "  EMDEN  " 

Captain  von  Miiller's  resource  and  courtesy  exaggerated — Record  of 
the  EMDEN' s  captures — Raid  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal — A  passenger's  ex- 
periences— A  rich  harvest — A  British  master's  diary — The  attack  on  the 


CONTENTS  xi 

oil-tanks  at  Madras — Captain  von  Miiller's  change  of  scene — Treatment 
of   British   seamen — Escape   of   the   s.s.    Glenturret — Destruction   of   the 

EMDEN — The  gunboat  GEIER'S  only  capture — Rescue  of  the  s.s.  Southport 

A  notable  exploit — Total  captures  by  enemy  cruisers — No  lives  sacrificed 

pp.  186—209 

CHAPTER   V 

THE   PROTECTION   OF   MERCHANT  SHIPPING 

I.    STRATEGIC  POLICY 

The  responsibilities  of  the  Navy — The  Royal  Commission  on  the  Supply 
of  Food  and  Raw  Material  in  Time  of  War — Changes  in  naval  conditions 

owing  to  the  introduction  of  steam — Command  of  the  sea  essential 

Concentration    of   force   the    key   to   security — Losses   of   merchantmen 

anticipated — Shipowners  and  the  risks  of  war — An  enemy's  difficulties 

Linking  up  the  Admiralty  and  the  Merchant  Service — No  fear  of  starva- 
tion    .  .     pp.  210—216 

II.    PRE-WAR  ARRANGEMENTS 

Action  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence — The  basic  principle  of 
British  defensive  policy — Oversea  ports  and  their  protection — The  danger 
of  panics — Limitation  of  local  defence — An  enemy's  probable  policy — 
Harbours  of  refuge — -The  compilation  of  the  War  Book — Admiral  of  the 
Fleet  Sir  Arthur  Wilson's  declaration — Influence  of  a  policy  of  concentra- 
tion of  naval  force  .......  pp.  216 — 223 

III.    THE  CREATION  OF  THE  TRADE  DIVISION  OF  THE  WAR  STAFF 

A  Royal  Commission's  recommendation  ignored — A  reversal  of  policy — 
Captain  Henry  Campbell's  Memorandum  on  an  intelligence  service  for  the 
main  trade  routes — The  creation  of  a  Trade  Division — Its  growth  and 
organisation — Relations  between  the  Admiralty  and  the  Merchant  Navy 

pp.  224—228 
IV.    THE  WAR  INSURANCE  SCHEME 

Mr.  Austen  Chamberlain's  Committee  of  1907 — A  fresh  inquiry  under- 
taken in  1913 — Formation  of  Mutual  Insurance  Associations,  or  Clubs, 
changes  the  situation — Government  action  and  the  avoidance  of  publicity — 
Co-operation  between  the  State  and  the  Clubs  suggested — Estimate  of 
probable  losses — Basis  of  the  value  of  shipping  to  be  accepted — Proposals 
for  the  insurance  of  cargoes — "  An  administratively  practicable  scheme  " — 
Prompt  action  on  the  outbreak  of  war  ....  pp.  228 — 239 

V.    ADMIRALTY  DIRECTIONS  TO  SHIPPING 

Communications  opened  with  ships  and  shipowners — Co-operation  of 
other  State  departments — Counsels  of  weakness  rejected — Merchant 
shipping  urged  to  continue  its  operations — A  policy  of  dispersion  of  ship- 
ping adopted — Why  the  convoy  system  was  impracticable — Early  in- 
structions to  merchant  shipping — The  "  sea  is  free  to  all  " — Re-establishing 


xii  CONTENTS 

confidence  amongst  shipowners — An  official  review  of  the  first  two  months 
of  the  War — The  opening  of  the  New  Year — Activities  of  the  Operations 
Division  of  the  War  Staff — Daily  voyage  notices  to  the  Mercantile 
Marine  ...  ...  pp.  239—252 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE   ORGANISATION   OF  THE   AUXILIARY   PATROL 

Scarcity  of  small  craft  for  purposes  of  patrol — Influence  of  the  sub- 
marine and  mine — Organisation  of  the  New  Navy — Lord  Beresford's 
foresight — Trawlers  organised  for  war  purposes — An  Admiralty  Com- 
mittee appointed — The  purchase  of  trawlers  in  1910 — Manning  policy — 
Progress  of  recruiting — The  mobilisation  scheme — The  trawler  section  on 
the  outbreak  of  war — A  notable  achievement  .  .  .  pp.  253 — 267 

CHAPTER   VII 

THE  APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE 

Development  of  a  new  policy  for  attacking  sea-borne  commerce — The 
sinking  of  the  s.s.  Glitra,  the  first  merchant  ship  to  be  destroyed  by  a 
submarine — The  achievement  of  U2 1  in  the  English  Channel — Germany's 
decision  to  ignore  international  law  and  the  code  of  humanity — Interview 
with  Grand  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  in  December  1914 — Germany's  declaration 
of  the  War  Zone  on  February  4th,  1915 — The  reply  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment— The  attack  on  the  s.s.  Laertes — The  British  seamen's  ordeal — 
Enemy  threats  treated  with  contempt — The  rising  toll  of  lives  lost — 
Merchant  ships  attacked  by  aeroplanes — Vessels  torpedoed  without 
warning — The  escape  of  the  s.s.  Vosges — The  s.s.  Faldba  torpedoed  and  sunk 
— A  court  of  inquiry — The  tragedy  of  the  s.s.  Fulgent  .  pp.  268—317 

CHAPTER   VIII 

THE   AUXILIARY   PATROL   AT   WORK 

Mine-laying  by  the  Germans — Operations  of  British  mine-sweepers — 
Maintaining  a  swept  channel — The  needs  of  the  Grand  Fleet — Trawlers 
in  a  new  role — Steam-yachts  requisitioned — The  Motor-Boat  Reserve — 
Clearing  three  German  minefields — The  menace  of  the  submarine — An 
anti-submarine  trawler  flotilla — Protecting  merchant  shipping — A  new 
naval  command  at  Dover — Hunting  for  submarines — Expansion  of  the 
mine-sweeping  service — Escape  of  the  Norddeutscher  Lloyd  liner  Berlin — 
A  minefield  laid  off  Tory  Island — Foundering  of  H.M.S.  AUDACIOUS — 
Impressment  of  Liverpool  tugs  as  patrols — Exploration  of  a  new  mine- 
field— The  Gorleston  raid — Activity  in  the  English  Channel — U18  sunk 
by  a  trawler — Incursions  into  Scapa  Flow — The  raid  on  Scarborough 

pp.  318—366 


CONTENTS  xiii 


CHAPTER    IX 

THE  GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE 

The  enemy's  dependence  on  the  mine  and  submarine — An  attack  upon 
the  Grand  Fleet — Additional  armed  trawlers  fitted  out — The  development 
of  the  "  indicator  net " — An  extended  scheme  of  patrol  introduced — The 
nucleus  of  the  drifter  fleet — Submarine  attack  off  the  Mersey — Reor- 
ganisation of  the  patrol  area — The  war  zone  declaration  and  its  influence 
on  the  patrol — Netting  the  Straits  of  Dover — Destruction  of  a  submarine 
by  the  steam  trawler  Alex  Hastie — Encounters  with  submarines — The 
value  of  the  modified  sweep — The  fighting  spirit  of  the  British  crews — 
The  enemy's  reply  to  the  indicator  net — Loss  of  fishing- vessels  and  crews — 
Protective  measures  devised  by  the  Admiralty — Further  changes  in  the 
Auxiliary  Patrol — The  discovery  of  an  enemy  minefield  .  pp.  367 — 409 

CHAPTER   X 

THE   SINKING   OF   THE   "  LUSITANIA  " 

The  "  Blue  Ribbon  of  the  Atlantic  " — Enemy  warning  of  an  attack  on 
the  Lusitania  ignored  by  passengers— An  unarmed  ship,  with  1,959  people 
on  board — Lord  Mersey's  judgment  supported  by  an  American  judge — 
The  cross- Atlantic  voyage — Warnings  from  the  Admiralty  as  to  the 
presence  of  submarines  off  the  Irish  coast — Captain  Turner's  decision— 
The  enemy's  attack  without  warning — A  passenger's  experience— Scene 
on  board  the  doomed  ship — Heroic  conduct  of  an  able  seaman — The  first 
officer's  exertions  to  save  life — Captain  Turner's  explanation — The  official 
inquiry  and  judgment — Reception  of  the  news  in  Germany  pp.  410—428 

CHAPTER   XI 

THE   ADVENT   OF   THE   OCEAN-GOING   SUBMARINE 

The  concentration  of  enemy  craft  off  the  Irish  coast  to  attack  the 
Lusitania— The  disposition  of  patrol  vessels— The  S.O.S.  signal  and  the 
response — Rescue  of  the  survivors— Fine  service  of  unarmed  fishing- 
vessels — Increasing  constriction  on  the  enemy's  movement  owing  to  the 
activity  of  the  patrol— A  well-devised  scheme— The  introduction  of  the 
hydrophone— The  fighting  spirit  of  the  new  Navy— Entrapping  the 
submarine— The  harvest  of  the  sea— Trawler  sea-fights— A  submarine's 
cowardly  action— Destruction  of  the  U-boat— Rescue  of  a  merchant  ship 
and  a  valuable  cargo  .  •  •  •  PP-  429- 

INDEX  •     PP.  451-473 


LIST    OF    ILLUSTRATIONS 

PACING  PAGE 

AFTER  A  MINE  EXPLOSION           .....  134 
THE  SINKING  or  A  MERCHANT  SHIP    .         .         .         .146 

THE  WHITE  STAR  LINER  "  OLYMPIC  "  (FROM  THE  AIR)  202 

SURVIVORS  FROM  A  TORPEDOED  SHIP  ....  270 

A  DRIFTER  FLEET  AT  SEA           .....  320 

FLAGSHIP  OF  A  DRIFTER  FLEET            ....  330 

A  DRIFTER  ON  PATROL 358 

NET  MINES  BEING  THROWN  OVERBOARD       .          .          .  374 

THROWING  A  LANCE-BOMB    ......  392 

THE  CUNARD  LINER  "  LUSITANIA  "  OFF  BROW  HEAD   .  416 

GRAVE  OF  VICTIMS  OF  THE  "  LUSITANIA  "  AT  QUEENSTOWN  426 

LAYING  NETS  FROM  DRIFTERS  TO  CATCH  SUBMARINES       .  438 

MAPS 

THE  WORLD.  SHOWING  THE  VOLUME  AND  DISTRIBU- 
TION OF  BRITISH  TRADE  AND  THE  SCHEME  OF 
CRUISER  PROTECTION  FOR  THE  TRADE  ROUTES  At  end  of  took. 

EUROPEAN  WATERS.  SHOWING  THE  VOLUME  AND 

DISTRIBUTION  OF  BRITISH  TRADE  .  .  .  „ 

BRITISH  ISLANDS,  NORTH  SEA  AND  BALTIC  EN- 
TRANCE , 


XIV 


THE 

MERCHANT   NAVY 

INTRODUCTION 

A  HISTORY  of  the  part  which  merchant  seamen  took  in 
the  war  by  sea,  from  its  dramatic  opening  on  August  4th, 
1914,  to  its  close  over  four  and  a  half  years  later,  would 
be  incomplete  were  no  attempt  made  to  fill  in  the  back- 
ground against  which  the  stirring  events  of  those  years 
must  stand  out  in  due  perspective.  Without  such  an 
historic  setting  it  would  be  difficult  to  appreciate  the 
character  and  extent  of  the  services  which  British  seamen, 
non-combatants  and  unpledged  to  the  State,  rendered 
with  fine  patriotism,  never-failing  resource,  and  a  hardi- 
hood unparalleled  even  in  British  annals. 

During  the  long  period  of  peace  after  the  conclusion 
of  the  Napoleonic  War,  the  British  Merchant  Navy  was 
regarded  as  a  trading  organisation — that  and  nothing 
more.  The  authority  which  the  State  had  exercised  in 
the  past  had  been  in  general  of  two  kinds — protective  and 
economic.  Throughout  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth 
and  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century,  it  tended 
to  interest  itself  increasingly  in  shipping,  and  especially 
to  regulate  it  more  closely  in  the  interest  of  the  persons 
(passengers  and  crews)  carried  in  the  ships,  with  a  view 
to  safeguarding  life.  The  restricted  powers  formerly 
vested  in  the  Admiralty  were  transferred  to  the  Board 
of  Trade  and  exercised  by  that  department,  overburdened 
with  many  and  varied  responsibilities,  with  sagacity  and 
restraint,  the  aim  being  to  discourage  as  little  as  possible 
the  individualistic  enterprise  of  the  shipping  industry. 

It  was  forgotten  by  the  British  people  that  the  British 
Merchant  Navy  had  a  war  history  dating  back  to  a  period 
anterior  to  the  founding  of  the  Royal  Navy.  No  one 

l 


2  INTRODUCTION  [INTRO. 

recalled  the  part  which  merchant  seamen  had  borne  in 
former  wars,  or  remembered  that  in  earlier  periods  of 
British  history  the  merchant  sailor  had  stood  between 
this  country  and  the  invader  when  little  or  no  progress 
had  been  made  in  the  organisation  of  a  fighting  Navy  as 
a  State  institution.  The  Merchant  Navy  was  thought  to 
be  an  organisation  without  traditions  and  with  little 
remaining  romance,  owing  to  the  advent  of  steam,  which 
had  replaced  sail  power.  That  was  a  narrow  and  mistaken 
view,  as  events  were  to  show.  Just  as  in  the  great  period 
of  the  nation's  expanding  self-consciousness  the  Merchant 
Navy  was  the  finest  embodiment  of  the  national  spirit, 
so  when  the  war  clouds  burst  in  the  summer  of  1914,  the 
real  character  of  the  British  merchant  seamen  was  re- 
vealed as  the  flash  of  artillery  lit  up  the  battle-fields  on 
the  Continent  of  Europe.  These  sailors  were  recognised  as 
no  ordinary  men  engaged  merely  in  facilitating  the  barter 
and  exchange  of  a  commercial  community,  but  as  belong- 
ing to  a  great  brotherhood,  instinct  with  patriotism  and 
proud  of  the  traditions  dating  back,  in  unbroken  and 
glorious  sequence,  to  the  early  years  of  British  history. 

When  the  present  struggle  began,  two  great  national 
forces,  the  Navy  and  the  Army — the  latter  supported  by 
Territorials — were  recognised,  and  supported  out  of  public 
funds.  Within  a  few  months  of  the  opening  of  hostilities, 
the  King,  in  a  message  of  appreciation  of  the  services 
of  the  merchant  seamen,  referred  to  "  his  Merchant  Navy," 
subsequently  appointing  Captain  H.  J.  Haddock,  C.B., 
one  of  the  most  distinguished  senior  officers  of  the 
Mercantile  Marine,  as  an  aide-de-camp,  and  the  Prime 
Minister,  in  a  self- revealing  phrase,  described  the  Merchant 
Navy  as  "  the  jugular  vein  of  the  nation."  Its 
officers  and  men  in  a  short  time  set  up  a  record  of 
daring,  resource,  and  fine  seamanship,  so  conspicuous, 
even  when  studied  against  the  background  of  past  cen- 
turies, that  it  was  necessary  to  amend  the  statutes  and 
introduce  new  regulations  in  order  to  enable  suitable 
recognition  to  be  given  to  them.  The  merchant  sailor, 
unassuming  and  modest,  took  his  stand,  with  the  full 
recognition  of  an  aroused  and  grateful  public  opinion, 
beside  the  men  of  the  ancient  fighting  services. 

During  the  years  of  fierce  naval  competition  which 
preceded  the  War,  when  the  talk  was  of  Dreadnoughts,  sea 


INTRO.]  MODERN   SEA  POWER  3 

power  was  thought  to  be  a  matter  of  men-of-war — battle- 
ships, cruisers,  destroyers,  and  submarines — organised  in 
fleets,  squadrons,  or  flotillas,  and  manned  by  highly 
trained  officers  and  men.  So  long  as  the  country  possessed 
a  supreme  Navy,  any  other  deficiency  was  of  minor  im- 
portance. The  relationship  between  the  Royal  Navy 
and  the  Mercantile  Marine  had  undergone  a  radical  change 
since  the  close  of  the  last  Great  War,  to  be  reflected  in  the 
public  attitude  towards  the  Merchant  Fleet.  The  former 
had  become  independent  of  the  latter  as  a  source  of  man- 
power, owing  to  the  introduction  of  a  system  of  continuous 
naval  service  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.  It 
was  concluded  that,  since  the  necessity  of  compulsory 
service  had  disappeared,  the  value  of  the  Merchant  Fleet 
as  an  auxiliary  force  in  time  of  war  had  been  reduced, 
though  its  place  as  a  food-carrier  from  distant  markets  was 
realised  by  open-eyed  statesmen.  Mahan,  fresh  from  the 
study  of  naval  history,  had  made,  it  is  true,  a  significant 
declaration.  "  Sea  power,"  he  remarked,  "  primarily 
depends  upon  commerce  which  follows  the  most  advan- 
tageous road  ;  military  control  follows  upon  trade  for  its 
furtherance  and  protection.  Except  as  a  system  of 
highways  joining  country  to  country,  the  sea  is  an  un- 
fruitful possession.  The  sea,  or  water,  is  the  great  medium 
of  circulation  established  by  Nature,  just  as  money  has 
been  evolved  by  man  for  the  exchange  of  commerce. 
Change  the  flow  of  either  in  direction  or  amount,  and  you 
modify  the  political  and  industrial  relations  of  mankind."  l 
This  writer  was  groping  after  a  truth,  but  even  he  was 
blind  to  the  essential  character  of  the  functions  of  a 
merchant  navy,  or,  rather,  did  not  associate  cause  with 
effect.  He  and  other  writers,  in  common  with  Govern- 
ments throughout  the  world,  failed  to  trace  the  wide 
influence  exerted,  on  the  one  hand,  by  conscription  for 
military  purposes,  and,  on  the  other,  by  the  introduction 
of  steam  as  the  motive  power  for  men-of-war. 

When  Napoleon  decided  to  make  a  levy  on  the  population 
of  France  in  order  to  raise  a  vast  army  which  was  to  domin- 
ate Europe,  he  laid  the  foundations  of  a  system  which 
rendered  a  long  war  in  future  years  impossible  except 
with  the  aid  of  sea  carriage.  Before  that  development, 
armies  and  navies  made  relatively  small  demands  upon 
1  Naval  Strategy  (Mahan). 


4  INTRODUCTION  [INTRO. 

the  man-power  of  the  nations  engaged,  and  those  nations 
were  in  large  measure  self-supporting.  Europe  had  had  its 
Hundred  Years'  War.  Maritime  commerce  was  still  in 
its  infancy  during  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic 
Wars.  The  Continent  of  Europe  was  engaged  in  hostilities 
almost  without  interruption  for  a  period  of  nearly  a 
quarter  of  a  century  without  being  brought  to  a  condition 
of  famine,  so  great  were  its  resources.  Between  1815  and 
1914,  however,  the  standard  of  living  in  Western  Europe 
had  been  raised  ;  industrialism  had  grown  at  the  expense 
of  agriculture  ;  and  increasing  reliance  had  been  placed 
upon  the  ship  of  commerce,  acting  as  the  link  between 
the  highly  developed  nations  of  the  West  and  the  States 
overseas,  which  still  continue  to  produce  a  surplus  of 
food-stuffs  and  raw  materials. 

In  war-time  conscription,  as  the  late  struggle  was  to 
reveal,  withdraws  from  essential  industries  all  the  able- 
bodied  men  of  a  State  ;  it  blights  agriculture  and  depresses 
trade ;  it  converts  producers  into  consumers.  Moltke, 
after  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  admitted  that  long-drawn- 
out  contests  would  in  future  be  checked  by  the  economic 
exhaustion  which  wars  on  the  scale  of  national  man-power 
would  involve,  since,  from  the  moment  such  a  struggle 
opened,  a  State,  in  developing  fighting  energy  on  a  broad 
national  basis,  would  begin  subtracting  from  its  economic 
strength.  But  in  this  respect,  as  German  writers  were 
among  the  first  to  recognise,  a  maritime  Power  necessarily 
enjoys  advantages  over  a  land  Power,  so  long  as  it  is  able 
to  use  the  pathways  of  the  sea  to  replenish  its  supplies  of 
food  and  raw  material  from  neutral  markets.  Conscription 
casts  fresh  burdens  on  sea  power,  and,  in  particular, 
on  that  form  of  sea  power  represented  by  the  ship  of 
commerce. 

But  that  is  not  the  only  change  which  occurred  during 
the  nineteenth  century.  The  great  development  of 
military  power  on  shore  was  accompanied  by  a  vast 
growth  of  military  strength  by  sea.  Owing  to  the  advent 
of  steam,  the  typical  man-of-war  of  the  Nelsonian  era 
disappeared,  and  was  replaced  by  the  coal  or  oil  consuming 
vessel.  Mahan l  remarked,  long  before  the  Great  War 
opened,  that,  "  The  days  when  fleets  lay  becalmed  are 
gone,  it  is  true  ;  but  gone  are  the  days  when,  with  four  or 
1  Naval  Strategy  (Mahan). 


INTRO.]  NEW  WAR  CONDITIONS  5 

five  months  of  food  and  water  below,  they  were  ready  to 
follow  the  enemy  to  the  other  side  of  the  world  without 
stopping.  Nelson,  in  1803-5,  had  always  on  board 
three  months'  provisions  and  water,  and  aimed  to  have 
five  months' — that  is,  to  be  independent  of  communications 
for  nearly  five  months.  If  it  is  sought  to  lessen  the  strategic 
difficulty  by  carrying  more  coal,  there  is  introduced  the 
technical  drawback  of  greater  draught,  with  consequent 
lower  speed  and  more  sluggish  handling,  a  still  more 
important  consideration.  The  experience  of  Admiral 
Rodjestvensky  in  this  matter  is  recent  and  instructive. 
His  difficulties  of  supply,  and  chiefly  of  coal,  are  known  : 
the  most  striking  consequence  is  the  inconsiderate  manner 
in  which,  without  necessity,  he  stuffed  his  vessels  with 
coal  for  the  last  run  of  barely  a  thousand  miles.  That  he 
did  this  can  be  attributed  reasonably  only  to  the  impression 
produced  upon  his  mind  by  his  coaling  difficulties,  for  the 
evident  consequence  of  this  injudicious  action  was  to  put 
his  ships  in  bad  condition  for  a  battle  which  he  knew  was 
almost  inevitable."  Those  words  indicate  that  the  Ameri- 
can historian  was  approaching  a  realisation  of  the  changes 
which  had  occurred  in  the  character  of  naval  power, 
rendering  it  dependent  on  auxiliaries  for  food,  ammunition, 
and  stores  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  he  under-estimated 
the  extent  to  which  the  ship  of  commerce  loaded  with  coal 
and  operating  with  the  ship  of  war  engaged  in  attacking 
commerce,  as  in  the  case  of  the  EMDEN  and  other  enemy 
cruisers,  could  provide  a  measure  of  compensation  for  the 
restrictions  on  naval  warfare  traceable  to  the  development 
of  the  swift-running  steam-engine  with  its  enormous  con- 
sumption of  fuel. 

All  those  considerations  were  inadequately  recognised 
before  the  War  opened  in  1914,  which  was  at  last  to  involve 
in  its  horrors,  directly  or  indirectly,  practically  all  the 
nations  of  the  Continent  of  Europe,  was  later  on  to  draw 
in  Japan  and  China,  and  at  last  to  bring  the  United  States 
and  other  American  Republics  into  the  arena.  Even 
Mahan  did  not  go  farther  than  to  suggest  that  "  a  broad 
basis  of  mercantile  maritime  interests  will  doubtless  con- 
duce to  naval  efficiency  by  supplying  a  reserve  of  material 
and  personnel."  Events  were  to  show  that  his  anticipation 
of  reliance  being  placed  upon  the  Mercantile  Marine  for 
men  to  anything  like  the  same  extent  as  during  the  wars 


6  INTRODUCTION  [INTRO. 

of  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  was  based  upon 
an  under-appreciation  of  the  varied  responsibilities  de- 
volving upon  a  merchant  navy  as  soon  as  the  maritime 
State  whose  flag  it  carries  becomes  engaged  in  warfare. 
The  books  of  British  writers  upon  war  policy  may  be 
studied  in  vain  for  a  just  appreciation  of  the  essential  part 
which  the  British  Mercantile  Marine  necessarily  assumed 
as  soon  as  this  country  become  involved  in  varied  war 
activities  overseas. 

Soon  after  the  declaration  of  war,  the  British  Mercantile 
Navy  was  confronted  with  responsibilities  which  in  character 
and  extent  were  without  parallel  in  maritime  history. 

1.  Owing  to  circumstances  which  need  not  be  examined 
in  this  connection,  the  Royal  Navy  was  without  defended 
bases  of  supply  on  the  east  coast  vis-d-vis  to  Germany. 
Consequently,  as  soon  as  the  Grand  Fleet  was  mobilised, 
heavy  demands  were  made  upon  the  Mercantile  Marine 
for  ships  to  carry  fuel  (coal  and  oil),  ammunition,  stores, 
food,  and  everything  required  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  in  home  waters.     At  the  same  time,  other  ships  were 
requisitioned  for  the  support  of  naval  power  in  the  outer 
seas. 

2.  The  resources    of   the  Royal  Navy — large   as   they 
were — proved  inadequate   to  maintain  the  patrol  which 
it   became   necessary  to   organise  in  order  to  make  the 
blockade  of  the  enemy  effective.      Some  of  the  swiftest 
liners  were,  therefore,  taken  up  and  commissioned  under 
the  White  Ensign,  and  from  the  varied  resources  of  the 
Merchant  Navy  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  was  organised. 

3.  As   the  military   commitments   of  the   country  in- 
creased, a  large  volume  of  mercantile  tonnage  was  required 
for  transport  purposes.     Transport  facilities  had  to'  be  pro- 
vided for  the  Gallipoli  Expedition,  the  army  at  Salonika, 
the  forces  based  on  Egypt,  the  operations  in  Mesopotamia 
and  Palestine,  and  the  campaign  in  East  Africa.     Shipping 
was  also  requisitioned  for  the  troops  engaged  in  routing 
the  Germans  out  of  their  Pacific  possessions,  and  other 
ships  were  employed  in  maintaining  the  military  lines  of 
communication  between  the  mother-country  and  India, 
New    Zealand,    Australia,    South    Africa,    Canada,    and 
Newfoundland.     Hospital  carriers  had  to  be  fitted  out. 

4.  Storeships  had  to  be  found  for  the  growing  armies 


INTRO.]          AN  HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND  7 

engaged  in  all  the  widely  separated  theatres  of  war  to 
carry  the  vast  assortment  of  material  ranging  from  heavy 
guns  and  horses  to  bomb-throwers  and  medical  comforts. 

5.  As  the  British  Army  grew  in  size,  a  vast  expansion 
occurred  in  the  munition  movement  in  the  British  Isles, 
in  India,  and  in  Canada,  as  well  as  in  the  United  States, 
and  a  large  number  of  ships  were  soon  engaged  exclusively 
in  conveying  ores  and  other  raw  materials  over  the  seas. 

6.  At  the  same  time,  the  sea-dependent  people  of  the 
British  Isles,  numbering  over  forty  million  persons,  had  to 
be  fed,  and,  owing  to  the  isolation  of  Russia  with  its  surplus 
grain  production,   the   cutting  off   of    beet    sugar    from 
Germany,  and  the  dangers  which  threatened  navigation 
between  the  British  Isles  and  Scandinavia,  new  sources 
of  supply  had  to  be  opened  up,  involving  longer  voyages, 
and   therefore   the   employment   of  a  larger  amount  of 
tonnage. 

It  was  a  fortunate  circumstance  that  this  country 
possessed  about  half  the  merchant  shipping  of  the  world ; 
otherwise  it  would  have  been  seriously  hampered  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  War.  It  is  also  a  fortunate  circumstance 
that  its  merchant  ships  possessed  officers  and  crews  who 
were  not  to  be  frightened  by  the  enemy  threats  or  acts. 

The  British  Navy  has  never  wanted  historians  ;  its 
history  has  been  written  from  every  standpoint ;  but  the 
historian  to  give  full  credit  to  the  British  Merchant  Navy, 
with  its  fine  achievements  in  peace  and  in  war,  has  not  yet 
arisen.  In  approaching  the  study  of  the  part  taken  by 
the  Merchant  Navy  in  the  Great  War,  it  has  been  thought 
pardonable  to  supply  a  background,  consisting  of  a  short 
survey  of  the  place  which  British  merchant  seamen  have 
filled  in  the  evolution  of  the  British  people,  a  brief  record 
of  the  heroic  services  they  have  rendered  in  successive 
wars,  and  particularly  in  the  Revolutionary  and  Na- 
poleonic Wars,  and  some  details  of  the  gradual  develop- 
ment of  the  Mercantile  Marine  during  the  nineteenth 
century.  A  contrast  may  thus  be  provided  between  the 
conditions  existing  in  former  wars  and  those  with  which 
the  British  seaman,  unarmed  and  undefended,  was  con- 
fronted when,  in  performance  of  his  peaceful  duty,  he  was 
suddenly  called  upon  to  meet  the  menace  of  the  raider,  the 
mine,  and,  above  all,  the  submarine. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE   MERCHANT   NAVY   OF  THE   PAST 

I.  THE  FIGHTING  MERCHANTMEN 

OF  all  the  lessons  taught  to  the  inhabitants  of  these 
islands  by  the  Great  War,  none  can  have  been  more  com- 
pletely mastered  than  this — that  they  owe  their  very 
existence  to  the  two  branches  of  the  great  Sea  service — the 
Mercantile  Marine  bringing  them  the  bulk  of  their  supplies, 
and  the  Royal  Navy,  the  "  sure  shield  "  of  that  vital 
traffic  as  well  as  of  the  homeland  itself.  Viewed  in  the 
light  of  this  immense  debt  of  gratitude,  the  two  branches 
are  seen  to  be  essentially  one,  the  fighting  arm  but  an 
extension  of  the  Mercantile  Marine  ;  and  the  modern 
separation  of  functions  takes  its  proper  place  as  a  natural 
evolution  from  the  days  when  our  sea  battles  were  fought 
by  vessels  temporarily  converted  from  merchantmen  to 
men-of-war.  That  condition  did  not  mark  in  any  degree 
the  centuries  which  immediately  followed  the  Roman 
occupation.  Sunk  in  internecine  strife,  and  the  prey  to 
successive  piratical  invasions,  England  had  then  no 
effective  share  in  the  sea-borne  commerce  of  which  the 
Mediterranean  was  the  secular  home ;  and  in  constructing 
and  maintaining  the  Fleet  which  has  given  him  such  a 
high  place  in  our  naval  history,  King  Alfred  was  dealing 
with  a  simple  though  formidable  problem  of  invasion, 
and,  taking  an  accurate  strategical  view  of  the  situation,  he 
placed  his  first  line  of  defence  off  his  coasts.  His  policy 
was  vigorously  carried  on  by  Athelstan,  and  though  from 
time  to  time  merchant  shipping  was  drawn  upon  by  the 
Saxon  kings  for  their  war  fleets,  it  may  be  said  generally 
that  the  basis  of  the  navies  of  these  troublous  centuries 
was  essentially  a  military  one.  The  change  came  with 
the  return  to  greater  national  security,  and  the  consequent 
growth  of  maritime  enterprise,  and  the  incorporation  of 

8 


CH.  i]          SEAMEN   OF  THE   CINQUE  PORTS  9 

the  famous  Cinque  Ports  by  the  Conqueror — a  step  directly 
due  to  the  fear  of  a  Danish  invasion — may  conveniently 
be  taken  as  inaugurating  the  unity  of  the  two  branches 
of  the  sea  service. 

Upon  the  seamen  of  the  Cinque  Ports — Dover,  Sandwich, 
Romney,    Winchelsea   and   Rye   (the   list   was   extended 
later) — were    conferred    certain    unique    commercial    and 
maritime  privileges  on  condition  of  their  raising  a  powerful 
force  of  fifty-seven  ships  properly  manned  and  equipped 
for  use  in  any  sudden  emergency.     The  period  of  service 
(fifteen  days)  could  be  extended  at  the  King's  pleasure, 
but  in  such  event  the  cost  was  to  be  borne  by  the  Royal 
Treasury.     The  fleet  thus  created  was  actively  maintained 
by  William  Rufus,  and  it  contributed  its  full  share  to  the 
great  expedition  undertaken  by  Richard  I  to  recover  the 
Holy  Land  from  the  Saracens.     In  this  enterprise  over 
200  merchant  vessels  were  enrolled  for  the  task  of  trans- 
porting the  Crusaders ;  and,  disastrous  as  it  proved  in  some 
respects,  the  expedition  had  notable  consequences  for  the 
country's  maritime  progress.     In  the  critical  days  which 
followed  the  death  of  King  John,  the  Cinque  Ports  Fleet 
covered  itself  with  immortal  glory  by  the  prominent  part 
it  took  in  the  defeat  of  the  French  Armada  dispatched 
from  Calais  under  Eustace  the  Monk.     Responding  to  the 
patriotic  appeal  of  Hubert  de  Burgh,  the  stout  sailors  and 
fishermen   of  Dover  manned   all  the  vessels,   large  and 
small,  lying  in  the  harbour,  and,  having  taken  the  knights 
and  men-at-arms  on  board,  sailed  out  to  meet  the  enemy. 
The  battle,  as  recorded  by  Matthew  Paris,  took  place  off 
Sandwich.     The  English  sailors  proved  their  better  sea- 
manship by  getting  the  weather  gauge,   and  when  the 
cross-bowmen  and  archers  had  discharged  their    arrows 
under   these   favourable   conditions   and   quick-lime   had 
been  thrown  at  close  quarters,  the  Frenchmen  were  rammed 
and  boarded.     Such  a  picture  presents  the  mariners  of 
the  southern  ports  in  the  most  favourable  colours.     Their 
brilliant  share  in  the  exploit  won  them  a  generous  ex- 
tension of  their  already  existing  rights,  but  it  has  to  be 
admitted  that  the  position  of  the  seamen  of  the  Cinque 
Ports  as  a  privileged  class  was  productive  of  many  evils 
which  must  be  set  off  against  their  great  services  to  the 
nation.     The  privilege  now  conferred  upon  them — in  itself 
a  foreshadowing  of  the  custom  of  issuing  Letters  of  Marque 


10  THE   MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST    [CH.  i 

— of  annoying  "  the  subjects  of  France  and  all  they  met 
of  whatever  nation,"  simply  meant  the  right  to  plunder 
any  and  every  foreign  merchant  ship.  The  example  found 
so  many  imitators  that  before  long  the  Channel  was  swarm- 
ing with  pirates,  the  strong  preying  on  the  weak,  "  until 
the  evil  had  grown  to  such  an  enormous  extent  that  the 
most  stringent  measures  were  found  necessary  to  sweep  the 
seas  of  the  marauders." 1  Moreover,  the  Cinque  Ports  were 
not  free  from  the  jealousy  characteristic  of  a  privileged  class, 
and  feuds  with  other  ports,  and  notably  with  Yarmouth, 
broke  out  again  and  again,  often  marked  by  savage  energy. 

We  get  a  picturesque  hint  of  the  beginnings  of  maritime 
enterprise  under  the  Saxon  kings  in  Athelstan's  grant  of 
the  rank  and  privileges  of  Thane  to  any  merchant  or 
mariner  who  should  successfully  accomplish  three  voyages 
on  the  high  seas ;  but  for  long  after  the  Conquest  the  limits 
of  British  overseas  trade  appear  to  have  been  the  entrance 
to  the  Baltic  in  the  north  and  the  ports  of  the  Bay  of 
Biscay  to  the  south,  nor  did  our  wool  trade  with  Flanders 
reach  its  high  prosperity  till  a  later  date.  Richard's  last 
crusade,  therefore,  has  a  special  significance  as  the  first 
extended  voyage  of  English  ships,  and  it  furnished  results 
far  removed  from  its  idealistic  purposes.  For  the  first 
time  since  the  Roman  occupation  the  English  now  entered 
into  trade  relations  with  the  Levant  (though  English  ships 
did  not  penetrate  there  till  much  later) ;  and  not  only  was 
a  new  stimulus  applied  to  the  growth  of  English  shipping, 
but  the  attempt  was  made  to  codify  by  regular  enactment 
the  rules  of  the  sea. 

The  famous  Laws  of  Oleron,  generally  attributed  to 
Richard  himself,8  but  almost  certainly  derived  from  a 
French  source,  are  of  great  interest  for  the  light  they 
throw  on  life  on  board  the  sea-going  merchant  ship  of  the 
period.  The  articles  covered  all  matters  relating  to 
mercantile  shipping — questions  of  total  loss,  damage, 
demurrage,  harbour  regulation,  fishing,  and  the  like — and 
in  particular  defined  for  the  first  time  the  duties  and 
qualifications  of  the  Master  of  the  ship.  The  Master  was 
put  in  charge  of,  and  held  answerable  for,  everything  on 
board,  and  he  was  required  to  understand  thoroughly  the 

1  The  British  Merchant  Service  (Cornewall  Jones). 

2  For   a  full   discussion  of   this   question,  see    The  Black   Book   of   the 
Admiralty,  in  the  edition  of  Sir  Travers  Twiss. 


CH.  i]  MEDIAEVAL  REGULATIONS  11 

art  of  navigating  his  vessel,  for  the  specific  reason  that  he 
might  thereby  control  the  pilot,  who  was  the  Second  Officer 
on  board  a  merchantman.  Nor  could  any  sailor  leave  the 
ship  without  his  consent.  Navigation  in  the  days  before 
the  compass  was  largely  a  matter  of  practical  experience, 
and  of  this  fact  the  second  article  of  the  Code  affords  a 
striking  illustration  ;  for  it  was  there  laid  down  that  if  a 
vessel  was  delayed  in  port  by  unfavourable  weather,  or 
by  the  failure  of  the  wind,  the  Master  had  to  call  the  ship's 
company  together,  and  take  their  opinion  on  the  situation, 
and  in  the  event  of  a  division  of  opinion  he  was  to  abide 
by  the  voice  of  the  majority.  This  rule,  in  fact,  applied 
to  every  emergency  by  which  the  Master  might  be  con- 
fronted. It  is  interesting  to  note  that  such  a  regulation 
in  a  modified  form  remained  in  active  force  for  centuries  ; 
indeed,  one  of  the  charges  brought  by  his  detractors  against 
Sir  Francis  Drake  in  the  period  of  his  great  voyages  was 
that,  by  his  attitude  towards  his  officers,  he  had  on  occasion 
treated  this  obligation  with  contempt.  But  Drake,  a  giant 
among  sea  captains  and  self-reliant  to  his  finger-tips,  was 
a  law  unto  himself  in  such  matters.  Here,  surely,  in  this 
thirteenth- century  code  we  perceive  the  beginnings  of  that 
spirit  of  freedom  under  discipline  which  has  become 
traditional  in  the  Mercantile  Marine,  a  spirit  which  found 
such  rich  expression  in  Elizabethan  times,  and  helped  to 
make  the  British  the  first  seamen  of  the  world. 

The  same  principle,  born  as  it  were  of  the  breath  of  the 
sea,  is  traceable  in  the  article  defining  with  amusing 
particularity  the  relations  of  the  Master  with  the  crew. 
It  was  the  Master's  duty  to  keep  peace  among  his  men. 
If  one  called  another  a  liar  at  table,  he  was  to  be  fined 
fourpence,  but  if  the  Master  himself  so  offended  he  was 
mulcted  in  twice  the  amount.  For  impudently  contradict- 
ing the  Master,  a  seaman  was  fined  eightpence.  A  single 
blow  from  the  Master  was  to  be  accepted  by  a  sailor 
without  retaliation,  but  a  second  blow  gave  him  the  right 
to  defend  himself.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  sailor  struck 
the  first  blow,  he  was  either  to  pay  a  heavy  fine  or  lose  his 
hand.  Finally,  if  a  sailor  received  abuse  from  the  Master, 
he  was  advised  to  hide  himself  in  the  forecastle ;  but  if  the 
Master  followed  him  into  that  retreat— the  Englishman's 
house  at  sea  in  the  proverbial  sense  of  his  castle — then  the 
victim  was  entitled  to  stand  on  his  defence. 


12          THE    MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

This  significant  recognition  of  the  rights  of  the  common 
sailor  went  hand-in-hand  with  strict  discipline,  and  order 
and  good  conduct  were  maintained  with  mediaeval  severity. 
Damage  to  the  ship  due  to  a  sailor's  absence  without  leave 
was  punishable  with  a  year's  imprisonment ;  a  fatal 
accident  due  to  the  same  cause  involved  a  flogging — a 
flogging  of  the  period — and  actual  desertion  meant  branding 
in  the  face  with  a  red-hot  iron.  Other  offences,  including 
such  human  weaknesses  as  swearing  and  gambling,  often 
incurred  brutal  penalties  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  the  punish- 
ment of  keel-hauling,  which  seems  to  have  been  first  practised 
by  the  English  in  the  twelfth  century,  survived  into  modern 
times,  as  we  know  from  the  pages  of  Captain  Marry att. 

By  the  Oleron  Code,  a  defaulting  pilot — the  navigating 
officer  of  the  time — was  allotted  treatment  in  full  pro- 
portion to  the  responsibility  of  his  task.  If  through  his 
ignorance  his  vessel  miscarried  in  entering  a  port,  and  if 
he  were  unable  to  render  full  satisfaction  for  the  damage 
or  loss,  then  he  paid  for  the  mishap  with  his  head ;  and  if 
the  Master  or  the  merchants  on  board  chose  to  exact  the 
penalty  there  and  then,  they  were  not  to  be  called  on  to 
answer  it  in  law.  Furthermore,  any  pilot  who,  in  con- 
nivance with  the  "  lords  of  the  coast,"  ran  his  ship  on 
shore,  was  to  be  hanged  on  a  high  gibbet  at  the  place  of 
destruction,  as  a  caution  to  other  vessels  that  might  pass 
thereby.  Against  any  "  lord  of  the  coast  "  involved  in 
such  a  crime  drastic  measures  were  laid  down.  His  goods 
were  to  be  confiscated  by  way  of  restitution,  while  he 
himself  was  to  be  fastened  to  a  stake  in  the  midst  of  his 
mansion  and  the  whole  building  committed  to  the  flames. 
In  the  Middle  Ages  wreckers  infested  the  shores,  and  the 
sense  of  this  ever-present  menace  to  shipping  is  fully 
expressed  in  the  severe  treatment  reserved  for  those  who 
plundered  a  ship  or  murdered  castaway  mariners.  They 
were  to  be  "  plunged  into  the  sea  till  they  were  half  dead, 
and  then  drawn  out  from  the  sea  and  stoned  to  death." 
A  notable  example  of  the  common  practice  of  the  impress- 
ment of  sailors  occurred  in  the  following  reign  at  a  time 
when  King  John  was  preparing  an  expedition  to  Ireland. 
For  the  transport  of  the  soldiers,  the  seamen  of  Wales  were 
ordered  to  repair  to  Ilfracombe  on  pain  of  hanging  and 
forfeiture  of  goods.  This  power  of  the  Crown  was  con- 
tinuously exercised  up  to  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 


CH.  i]  BATTLE  OF   SLUYS  13 

century.  Though  never  a  statutory  right,  and  occasionally 
challenged  as  an  illegality,  it  is  implied  in  numerous 
statutes,  and  was  judicially  regarded  as  a  part  of  the 
Common  Law  of  the  Realm. 

Like  the  fight  off  Sandwich  of  1217,  the  Battle  of  Sluys, 
early  in  the  reign  of  Edward  III,  was  a  triumph  for  the 
merchantmen  of  England.  The  French  King's  fleet,  largely 
composed  of  Norman  ships,  reinforced  by  a  Genoese 
squadron,  were  massed  in  the  harbour  at  the  entrance  to 
the  canal  leading  to  the  great  mart  of  Bruges — so  vast  in 
numbers,  says  Froissart,  that  "  their  masts  seemed  to  be 
like  a  great  wood."  King  Edward  attacked  with  a  fleet 
drawn  from  the  various  ports  of  the  kingdom,  and  carrying 
a  large  force  of  archers  and  men-at-arms.  A  fierce  struggle, 
lasting  all  day  and  renewed  the  following  morning,  ended 
in  a  complete  victory,  with  capture  or  destruction  of  nearly 
all  the  French  vessels,  though  the  Genoese  mercenaries 
escaped  in  the  night.  The  Harleian  MSS.  have  preserved 
for  us  the  list  of  the  Armada  with  which,  six  years  later, 
the  King  blockaded  Calais.  Exclusive  of  those  of 
"  forrayne  Countreyes  in  this  Ayde,"  the  roll  shows  a  total 
of  707  vessels,  and  of  that  number  only  twenty-five  were 
King's  ships.  The  detailed  list  is  of  great  interest,  also,  as  an 
indication  of  the  relative  prominence  of  the  different  mari- 
time towns.  The  famous  Cinque  Ports,  their  harbours 
already  i  beginning  to  silt  up,  were  far  out-distanced  by  the 
West  Country.  Sandwich,  Winchelsea,  Dover,  Rye,  and 
Hythe,  together  muster  an  average  of  fifteen  ships  each, 
but  Fowey — a  place  of  little  importance  to-day,  but  then  a 
centre  of  the  tin  industry — sent  47  ;  Dartmouth — whence 
Chaucer's  shipman  haled — 32 ;  Plymouth,  26 ;  Bristol,  22  ; 
and  Looe,  20.  On  the  other  hand,  the  modern  Welsh 
ports  of  Cardiff  and  Swansea  were  represented  by  only  one 
ship  each,  and  Liverpool  did  not  even  appear  in  the  tally. 

The  Battle  of  Sluys  marked  the  beginning  of  that 
exhausting  attempt  at  Continental  conquest  known  as  the 
Hundred  Years'  War,  itself  followed  by  the  devastating 
civil  strife  of  the  Wars  of  the  Roses.  The  long  struggle 
with  France  interrupted  trade  and  checked  maritime 
enterprise,  though  it  helped  powerfully  to  evoke  a  new 
spirit  of  national  consciousness  at  a  time  when  municipal 
institutions  were  beginning  to  decay  and  our  mercantile 
policy  was  undergoing  a  drastic  change.  Apart  from  the 


14        THE   MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE   PAST      [CH.  i 

ravaging  of  seaports  by  the  enemy — those  on  the  south 
coast  being  special  sufferers l — the  country's  shipping  was 
continually  being  diverted  from  its  normal  purposes  by 
the  military  requirements  of  the  Sovereign.  In  his 
great  invasion  of  France  in  1415,  Henry  V  sailed  from 
Southampton  with  a  vast  fleet  of  1,400  vessels,  having 
previously  impressed  all  the  craft  in  the  country  of  20  tons 
and  upwards,  and  obtained  his  crews  largely  by  similar 
methods.  Brilliant  as  the  adventure  was  in  its  temporary 
achievements,  one  is  apt  to  overlook  the  enormous  strain 
it  placed  on  the  economic  resources  of  the  kingdom,  and 
to  forget  such  contemporary  protests  as  the  humble 
petition  of  Parliament  representing  that  the  conquest  of 
France  would  be  the  ruin  of  England. 

Furthermore,  the  almost  continuous  state  of  war,  foreign 
and  civil,  intensified  the  lawlessness  which  had  so  long 
prevailed  at  sea.  The  complex  problem  presented  by 
mediaeval  piracy  baffled  the  efforts  of  even  the  most 
statesmanlike  rulers.  Sea-trading  in  those  days  was 
anything  but  a  peaceful  occupation.  Professional  pirates, 
whether  individual  ships  or  organised  gangs  like  the  Rovers 
of  the  Sea,  whose  activities  at  Scarborough  anticipated 
the  modern  revival  of  unrestrained  piracy,  infested  the 
Channel  and  the  North  Sea,  adding  their  depredations  to 
those  of  enemy  craft ;  and  these  marauders  carried  their 
daring  to  the  extent  of  harrying  the  coast  and  burning 
seaside  towns.  At  one  time,  the  Isle  of  Wight  was  virtually 
in  the  possession  of  a  certain  John  of  Newport,  whose 
misdeeds  and  "  riot  kept  uppon  the  see  "  were  the  theme 
of  a  plaintive  petition  to  Parliament. 

But  apart  from  sheer  plundering,  though  not  always 
distinguishable  from  it,  was  the  system  of  legalised  priva- 
teering arising  out  of  the  issue  of  Letters  of  Marque.  By 
the  licence  thus  obtained  from  the  Crown,  a  trader  who 
had  been  the  victim  of  foreign  aggression,  or  who  sought 
the  means  of  collecting  a  difficult  debt,  was  given  the  right 
of  reprisals  on  the  goods  of  the  community  or  country  to 
which  the  offender  belonged.  The  first  recorded  instance 
of  such  a  grant  occurs  in  the  reign  of  Edward  I,  though  it 
cannot  safely  be  assumed  that  none  was  issued  earlier.  It 

1  The  activity  of  the  Norman  corsairs  in  the  early  years  of  Edward  Ill's 
reign  was  so  effective  that  an  order  was  issued  directing  dwellers  on  the 
south  coast  to  take  refuge  in  fortresses  and  withdraw  their  goods  a  distance 
of  four  leagues  from  the  sea.  (Pol.  Hist,  of  England,  vol.  iii,  p.  334.) 


CH.  i]  LETTERS   OF  MARQUE  15 

was  made  in  favour  of  the  English  owner  of  a  ship  which, 
while  bringing  fruit  from  Malaga,  was  piratically  seized 
off  the  coast  of  Portugal  and  carried  as  a  prize  into  Lisbon. 
In  this  case,  the  licence  to  seize  the  goods  of  the  Portuguese 
to  the  extent  of  the  loss  sustained  was  limited  to  five  years. 
The  disadvantages  of  such  a  rough-and-ready  method  of 
adjusting  differences  need  no  great  emphasis.  In  the  first 
place,  experience  showed  that  licence  for  reprisals  tended 
to  degenerate  into  licence  of  a  more  general  -kind  ;  and, 
secondly,  this  method  of  making  innocent  Peter  pay  for 
guilty  Paul  often  acted  as  a  serious  deterrent  upon  trading. 
In  the  British  Museum  may  be  seen  a  gold  noble  coined 
by  Edward  III  after  the  taking  of  Calais  had  given  him 
the  command  of  the  Channel.  On  the  reverse  it  depicts 
a  ship  and  a  sword,  and  it  possesses  a  peculiar  interest  as 
the  symbol  of  the  first  claim  by  an  English  King  to  the 
sovereignty  of  the  sea.  In  formally  adopting  the  title  of 
Dominus  Maris  Anglicani  Circumquaque,  this  clear-sighted 
ruler  was  laying  claim  to  no  empty  formula,  but  to  a  real 
sovereignty  involving  a  number  of  substantial  rights — 
such  as  those  of  fishing,  the  levying  of  tolls  for  the  use  of 
the  sea,  free  passage  for  ships-of-war,  and,  lastly,  juris- 
diction for  crimes  committed  at  sea.  It  was  therefore  by 
the  active  assertion  of  this  claim  that  Edward  sought  to 
deal  with  the  growing  practice  of  piracy  and  give  protection 
at  sea.  His  practical  measures  included  the  granting  to 
merchant  vessels  of  letters  of  safe-conduct  and  the  or- 
ganising of  fleets  in  convoy.  Vessels  bound  for  Gascony, 
for  instance,  were  directed  to  assemble  on  the  day  of  the 
Nativity  of  the  Virgin  outside  Southampton  Water,1 
sailing  thence  under  the  charge  of  Royal  officials.  The 
main  effect,  however,  of  the  first-mentioned  remedy  seems, 
in  later  times,  to  have  aggravated  the  evil,  for  under  the 
Lancastrian  Kings  we  get  many  complaints  of  the  forging 
of  such  documents  ;  and,  moreover,  it  was  found  by  the 
men  on  the  English  coasts  that  the  issue  of  letters  of 
safe- conduct  prevented  them  from  getting  redress  for 
pillage  by  taking  the  matter  into  their  own  hands.  In 
short,  the  efforts  of  Edward  III  had  little  or  no  effect  in 
giving  protection  on  the  seas.  So  it  was  with  his  successors. 
In  the  next  reign,  letters  of  marque  were  granted  more 

1  "  Chalcheford  "  in  the  original,  which,  according  to  Dr.  Cunningham, 
was  probably  Calshot  Castle. 


16         THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

freely  than  ever,  and  it  is  recorded  of  one  of  the  merchants 
of  Dartmouth,  a  port  which  held  a  general  privateering 
commission  from  the  Crown,  that  with  a  fleet  of  his  own 
he  captured  no  fewer  than  thirty-three  vessels  with  1,500 
tuns  of  Rochelle  wine. 

Apart  from  its  more  direct  results,  the  long  period  of 
wars,  by  its  consumption  of  the  national  energies,  offered 
an  opportunity  to  foreign  rivals  which  they  were  quick 
to  seize.  The  Hanseatic  League  had  become  the  most 
important  commercial  association  of  the  world  at  the 
beginning  of  the  fourteenth  century ;  Bruges  and  Antwerp 
had  established  themselves  as  the  great  entrepots  of 
Northern  Europe,  and  the  merchant  vessels  of  the  Italian 
Republics  were  frequenting  the  markets  of  the  Nether- 
lands. To  these  several  rivals  fell,  during  the  war,  the 
bulk  of  the  English  carrying  trade.  Another  cause 
operating  against  the  interests  of  the  English  shipper  was 
the  commercial  policy  carried  out  by  Edward  III.  His 
broad  aims  may  be  summed  up  as  a  combination  of  cheap 
imports  for  the  benefit  of  the  consumer,  with  high  prices 
for  exports  as  a  means  of  providing  revenue  through  the 
Customs  ;  and  those  aims  were  apparent  in  the  regulations 
affecting  wool  and  wine,  and  the  liberal  provisions  for 
encouraging  the  foreign  trader.  A  few  years  after  Ed- 
ward's death  saw  the  start  of  a  reversal  of  this  policy. 
The  increased  resentment  of  English  merchants  against 
the  foreign  trader,  and  the  depressed  condition  of  English 
shipping,  found  expression  in  the  first  of  many  Navigation 
Acts  (1381),  which  provided  that  "  to  increase  the  Navy 
of  England,1  which  is  now  greatly  diminished,  it  is  assented 
and  accorded  that  none  of  the  King's  liege  people  do  from 
henceforth  ship  any  merchandise  in  going  or  coming 
within  the  realm  of  England  in  any  port,  but  only  in  ships 
of  the  King's  liegance."  So  diminished,  indeed,  was  "  the 
Navy  "  that  in  the  following  year  the  new  ordinance  had 
to  be  modified,  owing  to  an  insufficiency  of  shipping. 
Taken  in  conjunction  with  the  new  regulations  for  keeping 
bullion  in  the  country,  and  the  protective  encouragement 
of  tillage,  not  merely  as  a  means  of  safeguarding  the  food- 
supply,  but  for  the  fostering  of  the  country's  military 
strength,  the  Navigation  Act  marks  the  beginning  of  a 
drastic  change  of  mercantile  policy — a  change,  in  a  happy 
1  That  is  to  say,  the  general  shipping  of  the  kingdom. 


CH.  i]       COAST  PROTECTION  BY  CONTRACT  17 

phrase  Bacon  applies  to  the  policy  of  the  first  Tudor  King, 
"  from  consideration  of  plenty  to  consideration  of  power." 
In  spite,  however,  of  the  growth  of  national  conscious- 
ness, an  effective  means  of  providing  for  the  due  protection 
of  the  country's  coasts  and  shipping  seemed  for  a  time  no 
nearer.  It  was  the  plundering  of  English  vessels  by  a  daring 
Scottish  pirate  early  in  the  reign  of  Richard  II,  and  the 
ravaging  of  Rye  and  other  south  coast  towns  by  a  French 
fleet,  which  induced  Parliament,  alarmed  for  the  safety  of 
the  realm,  to  pass  the  first  law  levying  dues  on  all  merchant 
vessels  (with  a  few  exceptions)  frequenting  English  ports, 
for  the  specific  purpose  of  maintaining  an  efficient  Royal 
Navy.  But  the  fleet,  no  sooner  created,  was  led  by  John 
of  Gaunt  on  the  wild  enterprise  of  the  Siege  of  St.  Malo, 
instead  of  being  employed  in  its  proper  service.  And  it 
was  a  squadron  of  sturdy  merchant  ships  which,  in  the 
absence  of  the  Royal  fleet,  and  of  its  own  initiative, 
repelled  a  French  marauding  expedition.  The  usurper  of 
the  following  reign  narrowly  escaped  capture  by  pirates 
when  coming  up  the  Thames  to  London,  and  he  was  so 
little  able  to  achieve  his  aim  of  establishing  a  Royal  Navy 
that  for  a  period  of  over  a  year  the  entire  guardianship  of 
the  coasts  was  entrusted  to  the  country's  merchantmen. 
By  this  plan,  which  illustrates  the  general  system  of  pro- 
tection by  contract,  the  shipowners  were  required  to  main- 
tain certain  ships  on  the  sea,  and  to  two  "  fit  persons  " 
chosen  from  their  body  the  King  granted  commissions  to 
act  as  his  Admirals,  one  for  the  north  and  one  for  the  south. 
In  recompense  for  these  services  they  were  empowered  to 
take  three  shillings  on  every  cask  of  imported  wine,  as 
well  as  certain  dues  on  exports.  It  was  the  Crown's 
complaint,  subsequently,  that  the  merchantmen  had 
failed  to  fulfil  their  part  of  the  contract,  and  the  scheme 
came  to  nothing.  A  similar  plan  was  tried,  with  no  better 
result,  under  Henry  VI ;  in  that  case  the  Commissioners 
were  the  Earls  of  Salisbury,  Shrewsbury,  Worcester,  and 
Wiltshire,  and  Lord  Sturton,  who  were  assigned  the  grant 
of  tonnage  and  poundage  on  condition  of  "  keeping  the 
seas  "  for  three  years.  The  significance  of  the  maritime 
efforts  of  Henry  V's  reign  lies  mainly  in  the  improvements 
in  shipbuilding.  Three  ships  turned  out  at  Southampton 
by  the  victor  of  Agincourt,  on  the  models  of  three  big 
Genoese  merchantmen  which  traded  with  that  port,  excited 


18        THE  MERCHANT   NAVY   OF  THE  PAST       [CH.  i 

the  country's  admiration;  and  examples  of  private  enterprise 
are  found  in  the  great  carack  built  by  John  Taverner,  of  Hull, 
and  the  fleet  maintained  by  Bristol's  merchant  prince, 
William  Canynges,  among  which  was  a  vessel  of  900  tons 
burden.  It  was  owing  to  this  advance  in  shipbuilding  that, 
later  in  the  century,  Englishmen  found  themselves  with 
vessels  fit  to  take  part  in  distant  voyages  of  discovery. 

It  was  in  such  conditions  of  turmoil  as  have  been 
described  that  our  merchantmen  in  the  Middle  Ages  not 
only  maintained  and  even  extended  their  trade,  but  also, 
as  we  have  seen,  provided  the  only  means  for  the  defence 
and  security  of  their  country.  In  the  light  of  their  varied 
record  we  clearly  perceive  that  the  mariners  who  won 
wide  renown  in  the  days  of  Queen  Elizabeth  were  but 
carrying  a  step  forward  in  the  dawn  of  a  new  age  the 
traditions  of  their  predecessors — "  good  felawes  "  of  the 
type  so  vividly  presented  by  Chaucer's  shipman.  The 
mariner  of  mediaeval  England  was  an  example  of  the 
hardihood  of  his  day.  "  Of  nyce  conscience  took  he  no 
keep,"  the  Prologue  tells  us.  "If  that  he  fought  and 
hadde  the  hyer  hond  By  water  he  sente  hem  hoom  to 
every  lond."  But  he  was  "  hardy  "  and  "  wys  to  under- 
take," and  again  and  again  in  the  records  of  these  centuries 
we  get  proofs  of  that  endurance  and  tenacity,  that  native 
sea  sense,  that  ready  resource,  which  we  have  come  to 
regard  as  the  birthright  of  the  English  seaman.  When  in 
1378,  as  already  mentioned,  the  King's  ships  were  busy 
besieging  St.  Malo,  a  squadron  of  French  and  Spanish 
galleys  seized  the  opportunity  of  sailing  up  the  Kentish 
coast  and  entering  the  mouth  of  the  Thames,  burning  the 
towns  and  villages  on  its  banks  as  far  as  Graves  end.  On 
returning  by  the  Channel,  however,  intent  on  further 
destruction,  the  marauders  were  met  by  a  fleet  of  West 
Country  merchantmen  and  valiantly  repulsed.  The 
English  ships  were  of  less  tonnage  than  those  of  the  enemy, 
but  boldness  of  attack  and  better  seamanship  prevailed, 
as  they  have  on  so  many  historic  occasions  since.  And 
in  the  fifteenth  century,  in  spite  of  conditions  which  often 
approached  to  social  anarchy,  we  get  evidence  of  the  slow 
but  real  progress  of  maritime  commerce  fostered  by  the 
new  mercantile  policy,  which  was  still  further  developed 
under  the  Tudor  kings.  The  reign  of  Henry  IV  saw  the 
establishment  of  the  Merchant  Adventurers  and  similar 


CH.  i]  THE   AGE   OF  DISCOVERY  19 

organisations  of  English  merchants,  trading  to  the  Baltic 
and  to  Prussia  ;  commercial  treaties  were  common  from 
the  reign  of  Edward  IV  onwards  ;  in  1480,  the  year  of 
the  birth  of  the  great  Magellan,  Bristol — then  the  most 
enterprising  seaport  of  England,  its  fishermen  making 
regular  voyages  to  Iceland — dispatched  an  exploring 
expedition  in  search  of  the  "  Island  of  Brazil " ;  a  score 
of  years  later  John  Cabot,  sailing  from  the  same  port,  had 
made  two  memorable  voyages  to  the  coast  of  Labrador, 
and  though  he  found  no  precious  metals,  reported,  what 
was  far  more  significant,  an  abundance  of  cod-fish  ;  in 
1485  there  appeared  at  Pisa  the  first  English  Consul  to  be 
appointed  in  the  Mediterranean  ;  and  the  decline  in  power 
of  the  Hanseatic  League  in  this  country,  destined  to  be 
extinguished  finally  under  Queen  Elizabeth,  was  rapidly 
hastened.  By  the  new  consistency  in  her  mercantile 
policy,  based  on  national  consciousness,  England  was 
steadily  preparing  to  gather,  by  means  of  her  merchantmen 
of  a  later  day,  the  fruits  of  the  Age  of  Discovery. 

When  men  were  bidden  by  law  to  eat  fish  twice  a  week, 
and  throughout  the  whole  of  Lent,  they  were  obeying  an 
obligation  which  it  was  believed  the  political  needs  of  the 
country  imposed.  Fish  was,  of  course,  an  article  of  diet 
of  national  importance,  apart  from  the  religious  considera- 
tions which  entered  into  the  matter.  But  the  real  sig- 
nificance of  the  act  was  political.  The  buying  of  fish 
stimulated  the  fishing  industry,  the  fishing  industry  was 
the  best  school  for  seamen,  and  seamen  and  shipping 
were  necessary  for  strengthening  the  country's  power 
against  its  rivals.  Another  essential  of  the  national 
ambition  was  wealth,  and  one  avenue  to  wealth  was  already 
being  indicated  by  the  great  explorations  of  the  last 
decades  of  the  century.  The  effects  of  the  discovery  of 
America,  of  the  rounding  of  the  Cape  by  Vasco  da  Gama, 
and  later  the  accident  of  storm  which  gave  Brazil  to 
Portugal,  were  as  swift  as  revolutionary.  The  Levantine 
trade  with  the  East  was  ruined.  For  a  time  the  Portuguese 
became  the  first  maritime  Power.  Lisbon  established 
itself  as  the  great  commercial  depot  for  Western  Europe. 
In  their  desire  for  wealth,  as  a  means  of  national  power, 
Tudor  Englishmen  turned  their  eyes  to  the  New  World 
and  to  the  looked-for  promise  of  a  north-west  route  to  Far 
Cathay.  This  sentiment  found  expression  in  1511,  in  the 


20          THE  MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST      [CH.  i 

protest  made  by  certain  members  of  King  Henry  VIII's 
Council  against  Continental  conquest.1  If  we  would 
enlarge  ourselves,  these  statesmen  argued,2  "  let  it  be  that 
way  we  can,  and  to  which  it  seems  the  eternal  Providence 
hath  destined  us,  which  is  the  sea.  The  Indies  are  dis- 
covered, and  vast  treasure  brought  from  thence  every  day. 
Let  us,  therefore,  bend  our  Endeavours  thitherward,  and 
if  the  Spaniards  or  Portuguese  suffer  us  not  to  join  with 
them,  there  will  be  yet  region  enough  for  all  to  enjoy." 

Henry  VIII  himself  gave  effect  to  the  prevalent  ideas 
of  the  time  by  endowing  the  country  with  its  first  Royal 
Navy  on  an  organised  basis.  But 'his  establishment  of  the 
Royal  Navy  as  a  regular  department  of  the  State  was  also 
in  accordance  with  the  Tudor  dynasty's  principle  of 
personal  power,  and  in  idea  it  may  be  compared  with  the 
tendency  towards  standing  armies  on  the  Continent.  The 
importance  of  Henry  VIII's  policy  must  be  emphasised,  for 
here  we  have  the  beginnings  of  the  differentiation  between 
the  naval  and  mercantile  services.  A  skilled  amateur  in 
many  arts  and  crafts,  the  King  concerned  himself  personally 
with  improvement  in  construction,  and  his  famous  ship,  the 
GREAT  HARRY,  of  at  least  1,000  tons,  was  the  largest  vessel 
then  known.  The  first  fleet  which  he  secretly  fitted  out 
at  Portsmouth,  small  but  admirably  equipped,  was  specially 
designed  to  deal  with  the  French  buccaneers  who  infested 
the  Channel,  and  it  successfully  disposed  of  a  squadron 
of  marauders  which  had  been  plundering  merchant  craft 
in  Mounts  Bay.  The  great  fleet,  assembled  at  Spithead 
in  his  last  war  with  France,  was  formed,  as  in  the  old  days, 
on  a  nucleus  of  the  ships  flying  the  Royal  Standard,  but 
that  nucleus  organised,  as  indicated  above,  on  definite 
lines.  Privateers  joined  the  Admiral  chiefly  from  the  West 
Country  ports.  At  his  death  Henry  left  a  fleet  of  over 
seventy  vessels  ;  but  more  important  than  that,  he  had 
applied  a  new  principle  to  national  defence.  Nor  did  his 
scheme  of  organisation  end  with  the  provision  of  a  Royal 
fleet  and  its  crews.  As  a  means  of  protecting  London 
from  pirates,  he  established  two  ports  on  the  river  at,  and 
opposite  to,  Gravesend,  so  that  Londoners  enjoyed  an 

1  This,  it  may  be  noted,  was  eight  years  after  the  Portuguese  had  tapped 
the  sources  of  the  Venetians'  Eastern  trade  and  had  brought  their 
first  cargo  of  pepper  to  England. 

3  Recorded  in  Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury's  History. 


CH.  i]  WILLOUGHBY'S   ARCTIC  VOYAGE  21 

hitherto  unknown  security  ;  he  founded  a  Naval  Arsenal 
at  Deptford  ;  and  there  also  he  established  the  Fraternity 
of  the  Holy  Trinity,  that  since-famous  body  whose  Tudor 
Charter  empowered  it  to  frame  "  all  and  singular  articles 
in  any  wise  concerning  the  science  or  art  of  mariners," 
and  to  make  ordinances  "  for  the  relief,  increase,  and 
augmentation  of  this  our  Realm  of  England."  Nor  could 
we  find  clearer  evidence  of  Parliament's  recognition  of  the 
national  importance  of  the  Mercantile  Marine  than  in  the 
preamble  of  the  Act  passed  in  1540  for  the  "  maintenance 
of  the  Navy."  The  dual  purpose  of  the  "  Navy  or  multi- 
tude of  ships  of  this  Realm  "  (the  sense  in  which  we  now 
use  the  word  Navy  has,  of  course,  become  more  specialised) 
is  explicitly  set  forth — that  is  to  say,  first :  "  for  the 
intercourse  and  concourse  of  merchants,  transporting  and 
conveying  their  wares  and  merchandise  "  ;  and,  secondly, 
for  "  a  great  defence  and  surety  of  this  Realm  in  time  of  war, 
and  also  the  maintenance  of  many  master  mariners  and  sea- 
men." It  went  on  to  complain  of  the  infringement  of  the  ex- 
isting laws  against  importing  in  foreign  ships,  re-enacted  the 
old  Navigation  Laws,  and,  among  other  provisions,  arranged 
for  the  publication  in  Lombard  Street  of  notice  of  the  sailings 
of  ships.  Eight  years  later,  Parliament  passed  the  statute 
imposing  the  sumptuary  regulations  as  to  the  eating  of 
fish,  to  which  allusion  has  already  been  made. 

A  significant  event  which  followed  the  death  of 
Henry  VIII  was  the  return  to  Bristol  of  Sebastian  Cabot, 
who — whether  or  not  he  became,  as  Hakluyt  says,  "  Grand 
Pilot  "  of  England — received,  at  any  rate,  the  recognition 
of  a  pension  of  250  marks  from  Henry's  youthful  son  and 
successor,  who  was  himself  a  keen  student  of  geography. 
It  was  Cabot  who  revived  interest  in  the  idea  of  a  north- 
east passage  to  China,  and,  having  formed  the  Company  of 
Merchant  Venturers  to  promote  the  scheme,  he  fitted  out 
an  expedition  under  the  command  of  Sir  Hugh  Willoughby, 
with  Richard  Chancellor  as  Pilot-Major,  which  left  the 
Thames  on  the  first  organised  voyage  of  Polar  discovery 
in  1553.  All  the  famous  explorer's  skill  and  experience 
lent  themselves  to  the  preparations  for  this  great  voyage. 
Hakluyt  tells  us  that  "  strong  and  well-seasoned  planks 
for  the  building  of  the  requisite  ships  were  provided,"  and 
as  a  protection  against  the  depredations  of  the  worms 
which  "  pearceth  and  eateth  through  the  strongest  oak," 


22          THE  MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

parts  of  the  keels  of  the  ship  were  covered  "  with  thin 
sheets  of  lead,"  which  seems  to  be  the  first-recorded  instance 
of  such  sheathing  in  this  country.  The  little  flotilla  bore 
Royal  Letters  of  Safe-Conduct,  and  the  elaborate  instruc- 
tions drawn  up  for  its  government — an  admirable  document 
characteristic  of  the  period — suggest  the  sagacity  and  ripe 
experience  of  Sebastian  Cabot.  The  contemporary  fame  of 
the  voyage  may  be  judged  from  the  large  concourse  which, 
amid  the  shooting-off  of  the  ship's  ordnance,  bade  the 
expedition  farewell  on  the  river-shores  of  Greenwich. 

The  auspicious  start — "  a  very  triumph,"  says  the 
chronicler — was  belied  by  speedy  disaster.  Violent 
storms  separated  the  ships,  and  Willoughby,  with  two 
vessels,  beaten  out  of  his  course  and  unable  to  make  the 
appointed  rendezvous,  remained  to  winter  in  Lapland  ; 
there,  from  cold,  famine,  and  disease,  he  and  all  his  men 
miserably  perished.  Chancellor  was  more  successful. 
After  waiting  a  few  days  at  the  rendezvous,  he  at  length 
passed  through  the  uncharted  seas  to  the  Bay  of  St. 
Nicholas,  and  landed  at  the  spot  near  where  the  town  of 
Archangel  now  stands.  He  entered  into  friendly  relations 
with  the  natives,  who  were  indeed  "  amazed  at  the  strange 
greatnesse  of  the  shippe,"  and  then,  after  gaining  a  smatter- 
ing of  the  language,  this  astonishing  seaman  started  on  a 
tour  of  the  interior,  which  brought  him  finally  to  Moscow, 
where  Ivan  the  Terrible  gave  him  a  kindly  reception.  A 
couple  of  years  later,  after  vainly  attempting  to  rescue 
his  missing  companions,  Chancellor  returned  to  Moscow, 
and  succeeded  so  well  in  his  negotiations  that  a  Russian 
Ambassador  accompanied  him  on  the  return  voyage,  to 
negotiate  a  treaty  on  liberal  terms  with  the  Association 
of  Merchant  Venturers.  His  ship  was  wrecked  in  a  gale 
off  the  north  of  Scotland,  and  Chancellor  lost  his  life  in 
an  effort  to  save  the  Russian  Ambassador.  That  func- 
tionary, at  any  rate,  escaped,  and  received  an  enthusiastic 
welcome  in  London.  Though  a  north-east  passage  to  Far 
Cathay 1  remained  as  much  a  dream  as  ever,  Chancellor's 
enterprise  laid  the  foundations  of  British  commerce  in 
Russia  and  the  East.  The  new  opening  for  overseas  trade 
was  speedily  followed  up.  Another  merchant  (Captain 

1  The  north-eastern  passage  from  Europe  to  the  Indies  was  not 
achieved  till  the  nineteenth  century.  In  1878-80  the  VEGA  doubled  the 
most  northern  promontory  of  Asia,  and  made  her  celebrated  circumnavi- 
gation of  the  two  continents  of  the  Old  World. 


CH.  i]  THE   NEW   WORLD  23 

Anthony  Jenkinson)  pushed  into  Asia  by  way  of  the  Volga 
and  the  Caspian  Sea  in  1558,  and  two  years  later  was 
dispatched  on  a  commercial  mission  to  the  Sophi  of  Persia. 
These  beginnings  led  to  considerable  developments  of 
England's  Baltic  trade  during  the  next  decade. 

But  it  was  westward,  not  eastward,  that  English  sea- 
men's eyes  were  chiefly  turned  ;  the  treasure  of  the  Spanish 
Main,  not  the  merchandise  of  Tiflis  and  Samarcand,  called 
aloud  to  the  adventurous  spirit  of  the  nation  of  islanders. 
With  the  accession  of  Elizabeth  we  enter  upon  a  new  phase 
of  national  development.  The  bonfires  which  blazed  up 
on  the  death  of  Mary  symbolised  the  new  expansive  spirit 
of  a  nation  which,  though  by  no  means  completely  united, 
was  moved  to  the  pursuit  of  aggressive  aims  ;  and  the 
challenge  to  the  domination  by  Spain  and  Portugal  of  the 
New  Hemisphere  rang  out  clearer  and  clearer  with  Eng- 
land's growing  consciousness  of  power  upon  the  seas. 
The  Pope's  decree,  by  which  the  New  World  had  been 
divided  between  the  two  Catholic  Sovereigns,  was  not  at 
once  actively  defied  either  by  England  or  France.  Neither 
country,  in  fact,  was  in  a  state  to  do  so  at  the  end  of  the 
fifteenth  century,  nor  had  the  new  religion  sprung  into 
vigorous  birth.  But  half  a  dozen  decades  had  brought 
sweeping  changes.  Catholic  England  had  become  a 
Protestant  State,  and  a  long  period  of  peace  had  fostered 
the  growth  of  national  self-consciousness.  The  almost 
submissive  tone  of  Henry  VIII's  Council — "  if  the  Spani- 
ards or  Portuguese  suffer  us  not  to  join  them  "  i — is  replaced 
with  a  very  different  note.  In  the  third  year  of  Elizabeth's 
reign  even  the  cautious  Cecil  bluntly  tells  the  Spanish 
Ambassador  that  the  Pope  had  no  right  to  partition  the 
world.  It  was,  however,  England's  seamen — rough  mer- 
chant sailors — rather  than  her  statesmen,  who  were 
challenging  the  pretensions  and  the  colonial  regulations 
of  the  Catholic  Powers.  The  English,  freed  from  the  last 
trace  of  Continental  entanglements — even  Calais  had  just 
been  lost  to  them — were  embracing  more  and  more 
effectually  their  birthright  on  the  sea.  In  other  ways 
they  were  favourably  placed  for  extracting  full  advantage 
from  the  new  conditions.  Geographically,  the  kingdom 
lay  between  the  King  of  Spain's  southern  dominions  and 
his  rich  and  prosperous  province  of  Flanders — a  strategic 

i  Vide  ante,  p.  20. 


24          THE  MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE  PAST      [CH.  i 

position  the  value  of  which  was  illustrated  by  the  frequent 
success  of  the  reprisals  at  sea  that  marked  Elizabeth's 
foreign  policy.  The  staunch  mercantile  class,  with  which 
so  much  real  power  rested,  were  developing  overseas  trade 
at  a  rapid  rate ;  and  the  experiences  gained  from  many 
a  stormy  voyage  in  the  northern  latitudes  were  applied 
to  good  purpose  in  the  shipbuilding  yards,  which  were 
beginning  to  turn  out  swifter  and  more  weatherly  ships 
than  those  of  any  other  nation.  The  day  of  the  oared 
galley  was  already  passing  ;  its  last  great  sea-fight  was 
to  come  in  1571  in  the  Bay  of  Lepanto,  a  short-lived 
triumph  for  the  decaying  Spanish  sea  power.  Hitherto, 
sea  power  had  been,  in  a  modern  historian's  happy  phrase,1 
"  pelagic  not  oceanic  "  ;  now  oars,  the  means  of  propulsion 
by  which  the  mastery  of  the  Mediterranean  had  been 
maintained  for  centuries,  had  yielded  precedence  to  sails, 
the  instrument  of  supremacy  on  the  ocean.  It  was  English 
merchant  vessels  and  English  seamen  who  were  to  prove 
the  full  significance  of  that  revolution  in  the  type  of 
ocean-going  ships  which  the  age  of  discovery  had 
inaugurated. 

After  his  marriage  with  Mary  Tudor,  Philip  of  Spain 
sought  for  his  own  purposes  to  encourage  the  increase  of 
the  English  Navy.  But  the  unpopularity  of  the  marriage 
was  deepened  by  the  persecuting  zeal  of  the  fanatical 
Queen,  and  before  the  end  of  the  short  reign  the  new 
religion  had  given  many  recruits — particularly  from  among 
the  West  Country  families  of  good  blood  and  with  sea 
associations — to  the  ranks  of  the  privateers.  Without 
entering  into  the  religious  aspect  of  the  matter,  it  may 
be  noted  how  truly  the  rising  Protestant  States  drew 
their  strength  from  the  sea.  Persecution  in  France  turned 
many  Huguenots  into  sea  adventurers,  preying  on  the 
traffic  of  the  Catholic  nations,  and  even  attempting  settle- 
ments in  Spanish  America  ;  the  dreaded  "  Sea  Beggars  " 
were  a  later  creation  of  the  burnings  and  slaughterings 
of  Alva  in  the  Netherlands. 

England's  national  spirit,  then,  found  its  fullest  and 
fittest  expression  in  the  deeds  of  the  sea  adventurers,  and 
Elizabeth,  of  whom  the  Spanish  Ambassador  Feria  told 
his  master  that  "  she  is  very  much  wedded  to  her  people 
and  thinks  as  they  do,"  adapted  this  formidable  weapon 

1  A.  F.  Pollard  (Pol.  Hist,  of  England,  vol.  vi,  p.  309). 


CH.  i]  ELIZABETH'S   NAVY  25 

to  the  main  purpose  of  her  policy — namely,  the  unity  of 
the  nation  and  the  preservation  of  the  realm  from  foreign 
intervention.  It  was  a  policy  that  combined  bold  strategy 
with  circumspect  tactics.  The  privateers,  with  their 
often  dubious  letters  of  marque,  found  in  their  Sovereign 
a  tacit  ally.  The  Queen  might,  and  as  the  reign  advanced 
often  did,  take  a  private  share  in  the  expeditions  to  the 
West,  or  even  lend  a  Royal  ship  to  stiffen  a  squadron 
of  merchantmen  bound  for  the  Indies.  But  it  was  clearly 
understood  that  officially  she  had  no  responsibility  for 
any  deeds  that  might  be  called  in  question,  or  for  any 
unlucky  miscarriages  ;  and  if  any  freebooters  were  caught 
red-handed,  they  knew  they  must  abide  their  fate  without 
appeal  to  their  Queen.  In  fine,  "  it  was  Elizabeth's  privi- 
lege to  reap  the  fruits  of  public  peace,  while  her  subjects 
gleaned  the  spoils  of  private  war." 

This  line  of  policy  was,  indeed,  almost  dictated  by  the 
conditions  with  which  the  reign  opened.  The  Exchequer 
was  impoverished,  and  the  letters  of  Sir  Thomas  Gresham, 
the  City  magnate  and  Elizabeth's  first  Ambassador  at 
Antwerp,  plainly  indicate  two  facts — the  difficulty  of 
maintaining  the  English  Queen's  credit,  and  the  country's 
dependence  for  gunpowder  on  supplies  from  abroad.  As 
to  the  Royal  Navy  proper,  the  imposing  fleet  which 
Henry  VIII  had  assembled  was  represented  at  the 
accession  of  his  daughter  by  a  total  of  only  twenty-two 
"  great  ships."  These  and  other  signs  of  weakness  due 
to  religious  and  political  causes  deceived  some  Spanish 
observers.  Feria,  bred  up  in  the  tradition  of  Spain's 
military  strength  on  land,  went  so  far  as  to  describe 
England  in  a  phrase  which  has  become  familiar  in  our  own 
day  as  "  the  sick  man  of  Europe,"  and  recommended 
Philip  to  land  an  army  promptly  and  turn  the  island  into 
a  Spanish  province.  Philip,  probably,  had  a  better  idea 
of  the  latent  strength  beneath  the  apparent  weakness. 
Elizabeth's  difficulties  and  problems  were,  in  truth,  real 
enough  ;  but  a  dozen  years  of  her  statesmanlike  handling 
of  affairs  and  of  English  enterprise  on  the  seas  were  enough 
to  give  to  Feria's  words  an  echo  of  mocking  irony.  As  to 
certain  elements  of  our  naval  strength,  some  Spaniards 
remained  deceived  even  after  the  defeat  of  the  Armada, 
but  there  was  little  self-illusion  in  the  letter  written  by 
Feria's  successor,  Guerau,  in  1570.  "  The  whole  channel," 


26         THE    MERCHANT   NAVY   OF   THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

he  said,  "  from  Falmouth  to  the  Downs  is  infested.  .  .  . 
They  assail  every  ship  that  passes,  of  whatever  nation, 
and  after  capturing  them,  equip  them  for  their  own  pur- 
poses, by  this  means  continually  increasing  their  fleet, 
with  the  intention  on  the  part  of  the  queen  thus  to  make 
war  on  his  Majesty  through  these  pirates  without  its  costing 
her  anything,  and  under  the  specious  pretence  that  she  is 
not  responsible,  since  the  pirates  carry  authority  from 
Chatillon,  Vendome,  and  Orange." 

That  is  a  vivid  glimpse  of  the  unofficial  war  carried  on 
in  the  Narrow  Seas  by  the  English  seamen.  Nor  can  it 
be  regarded  as  too  highly  coloured  a  picture  of  a  time 
when  the  Mayor  and  principal  inhabitants  of  a  port  like 
Dover  were  among  the  most  active  of  the  Rovers,  and 
when  even  English  vessels  engaged  in  the  Antwerp  trade 
and  the  very  fishermen  on  the  coast  often  fell  victims  to 
the  more  reckless  type  of  pirate.  But  already  greater 
deeds  were  being  accomplished  in  the  waters  of  the  New 
World — deeds  in  which  it  is  sometimes  hard  to  distinguish 
the  different  elements  of  trading — legitimate  enough 
according  to  the  ideas  of  the  time — exploring,  and  sheer 
piracy  ;  yet  which,  by  their  daring,  skill,  and  hardihood, 
have  justly  won  a  classic  place  in  maritime  history.  The 
early  slave-trading  voyages  of  John  Hawkins  are  of  special 
interest  as  a  definite  attempt  to  break  down  the  Spanish 
commercial  monopoly  in  the  New  World.  Modern  ideas 
of  slavery  have  cast  an  unjust  opprobrium  on  the  name  of 
one  of  the  greatest  Elizabethan  seamen.  Hawkins  was 
no  better  or  worse  than  his  time,  and  no  "  guilt  "  attached 
to  slave-owning  or  slave-dealing  in  the  sixteenth  century. 
It  was  not  in  any  case  the  nature  of  the  cargo  that  gave 
special  significance  to  this  expedition  of  a  seafaring  mer- 
chant ;  its  importance  lay  in  its  overt  challenge  to  Spain. 
Hawkins,  doubtless,  spoke  for  a  section  of  English  mercantile 
opinion  when  he  claimed  the  right,  under  treaties  dating 
back  to  the  first  Tudor  reign,  to  trade  with  the  Spanish 
Colonies.  Yet  the  challenge  was  a  bold  and  new  departure. 
French  pirates,  mostly  Huguenots,  had  for  thirty  years 
been  harrying  Spain's  trade  routes  in  the  West,  and  only 
ten  years  before  a  bold  French  corsair,  with  a  single  ship, 
had,  with  the  help  of  escaped  slaves,  laid  waste  some  of 
the  chief  settlements  of  the  Spanish  Main,  and  even  sacked 
Havana  itself.  But  no  English  squadron  had  yet  navigated 


CH.  i]  HAWKINS'S   FIRST  VOYAGE  27 

the  waters  of  the  Spanish  Indies.  And  though  Hawkins  and 
other  traders  had  flouted  Portuguese  pretensions,  based  on 
the  papal  decree  already  referred  to,  and  had  freely 
traded  with  the  Guinea  coasts,  and  even  with  Brazil, 
no  similar  invasion  of  Spanish  claims  had  hitherto  been 
attempted. 

It  was  while  trading  to  the  Canary  Islands  that  Hawkins 
learnt l  that  "  negroes  were  very  good  merchandise  to 
Hispaniola,  and  that  store  of  them  might  easily  be  had 
upon  the  coast  of  Guinea" ;  and  in  1562,  with  three  small 
vessels,  whose  tonnage  would  make  a  Solent  yachtsman 
smile,  he  sailed  from  Plymouth  for  Sierra  Leone.  There 
he  collected  two  hundred  negroes,  "  partly  by  the  sword  " — 
it  is  a  rough  story  of  rough  times,  which  are  not  to  be  judged 
by  the  ordinary  standards  of  the  twentieth  century — 
crossed  the  Atlantic,  disposed  of  his  human  goods  with 
much  profit  and  little  difficulty  to  the  planters  of  Hispani- 
ola, where  the  shortage  of  labour  was  severely  felt,  and 
returned  home  "  with  prosperous  success  and  much  gain 
to  himself  and  the  aforesaid  Adventurers."  In  what  seems 
to  have  been  an  honest  belief  in  the  legitimacy  of  his 
proceedings,  Hawkins,  on  the  return  voyage,  had  dis- 
patched two  vessels  chartered  in  the  West  Indies  with  a 
portion  of  his  goods  to  a  Spanish  port.  Philip  left  no 
doubt  as  to  his  view  of  the  voyage.  He  seized  the  cargoes 
on  their  arrival,  and  dispatched  peremptory  orders  to  the 
Colonies  forbidding  all  trading  intercourse  with  English 
vessels.  The  Adventurers  who  had  planned  and  financed 
the  voyage,  the  Lord  Mayor  of  London  being  of  their 
number,  sought  in  vain  to  obtain  redress  for  what  they 
regarded  as  an  illegal  seizure.  While  in  American  waters 
Hawkins  had  acted  with  the  circumspection  of  an  astute 
and  experienced  trader.  He  obtained  the  requisite  licence 
to  trade  from  the  Governor  at  the  ports  of  Hispaniola  at 
which  he  had  called  ;  he  paid  the  local  customs  dues,  or 
left  security  for  any  sums  in  dispute  ;  he  even  obtained 
from  the  authorities  written  evidence  of  his  good  conduct 
during  his  sojourn.  These  points  were  urged  without 
avail ;  nor,  indeed,  did  they  touch  the  main  issue.  Philip's 
insistence  on  his  exclusive  policy  showed  clearly  enough 
his  recognition  of  a  threat  to  his  sea  dominion  more  for- 

1  Hakluyt  is  our  authority  for  this,  as  for  the  other  great  Elizabethan 
voyages. 


28        THE   MERCHANT   NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

midable  than  that  of  the  French  pirates,  and  his  deter- 
mination to  resist  it  to  the  uttermost.  If  one  were  to 
compile  a  list  of  single  voyages  which  have  marked  the 
opening  of  great  commercial  or  political  epochs,  the  little 
squadron  with  which  John  Hawkins  made  his  first 
expedition  might  well  claim  its  place  therein. 

Hawkins's  second  voyage,  1565,  was  a  repetition  of  the 
first  on  a  rather  larger  scale,  and  not  only  brought  him 
and  his  fellow-adventurers  a  handsome  profit  of  60  per  cent., 
but  established  his  renown  among  his  countrymen,  par- 
ticularly as  a  seaman.  In  this  instance  he  had  carried 
his  negroes  to  the  Spanish  Main  itself,  and,  confronted 
by  the  Viceroy's  order  forbidding  any  dealings  with  him, 
had  to  back  his  negotiations  with  a  show  of  force  before 
the  necessary  licence  to  trade  was  forthcoming  from  the 
authorities.  He  was  careful  to  follow  his  usual  custom 
of  obtaining  certificates  for  good  conduct.  The  success 
of  the  voyage,  while  it  excited  feverish  anticipations  and 
hopes,  and  strengthened  the  growing  consciousness  of  the 
superiority  of  English  sea  power,  awoke  the  liveliest  alarm 
in  Spain,  and  fears  for  the  two  great  treasure  fleets  which 
annually  made  the  voyage  between  the  West  Indies  and 
Spain  now  found  expression  in  the  Spanish  Ambassador's 
correspondence  with  Philip. 

Hawkins  lost  no  time  preparing  for  another  expedition, 
and  at  the  same  time  Thomas  Fenner,  one  of  the  Chichester 
Fenners,  was  busy  fitting  out  a  trading  expedition  to  the 
Guinea  coast.  Political  reasons  were,  at  the  moment, 
giving  a  conciliatory  turn  to  the  Queen's  foreign  policy, 
and  De  Silva's  remonstrances  resulted  in  both  seamen 
being  required  to  find  heavy  security  that  they  would  not 
go  to  the  Indies.  Hawkins,  therefore,  temporarily  aban- 
doned his  scheme,  but  Fenner,  having  no  intention, 
apparently,  of  going  farther  than  the  Guinea  coast,  sailed 
in  the  Castle  of  Comfort,  with  one  other  small  vessel. 
The  voyage  was  to  prove  a  memorable  one,  and  to  open 
many  eyes  to  the  fighting  quality  of  the  English  merchant- 
man of  the  day.  At  the  Cape  Verde  Islands  Fenner  found 
all  his  attempts  at  peaceable  trade  prevented  by  the  open 
hostility  of  the  Portuguese  authorities,  and  at  the  Azores, 
when  separated  from  his  consort,  he  was  caught  by  a 
Portuguese  squadron,  consisting  of  a  400-ton  galleon  and 
two  caravels.  Three  times  that  day  the  Castle  of  Com- 


CH.  i]  HAWKINS'S  THIRD   VOYAGE  29 

fort  beat  off  her  assailants.  The  next  day,  the  Portuguese 
commander,  reinforced  by  four  more  caravels,  again 
attacked,  but  so  gallantly  did  Fenner  fight  his  ship  that 
at  nightfall  the  powerful  squadron  drew  off  and  he  escaped. 
English  seamen  already  enjoyed  a  wide  reputation  for  skill 
and  hard  fighting  on  the  high  seas.  But  Fenner's  splendid 
combat  against  heavy  odds  went  far  to  establish  also  the 
technical  superiority  of  English  gunnery.  The  incident  is 
the  more  noteworthy  since,  only  a  decade  earlier,  the 
Portuguese  had  again  and  again  proved  themselves  more 
than  a  match  for  English  and  French  gold-dust  traders 
in  conflicts  off  the  Guinea  coast. 

The  third  and  most  important  expedition  of  Hawkins 
left  Plymouth  in  October  1567,  its  unacknowledged 
destination,  privily  approved  by  the  Queen,1  being  the 
Spanish  Indies.  The  squadron  of  six  vessels  included  two 
"  great  ships  "  of  the  Royal  Navy,  a  fact  in  accordance 
with  the  universal  custom  of  the  day,  by  which  ships-of-war 
were  employed  in  commerce  in  times  of  peace.  These 
ships  were  the  JESUS  OF  LUBECK,  of  700  tons,  a  sturdy 
survivor  of  Henry  VIII's  fleet,  and  the  MINION,  300-350 
tons.  Of  the  remaining  four  vessels,  the  Judith,  a  little 
barque  of  50  tons,  was  commanded  by  Hawkins's  young 
kinsman,  Francis  Drake,  now  twenty-two  years  of  age, 
and  already  burning  with  a  grievance  against  treacherous 
treatment  at  Rio  de  la  Hacha,  and  destined,  as  a  result 
of  his  voyage,  to  become  the  terror  of  the  Spanish  Main. 
The  presence  of  Her  Majesty's  ships  had  a  political  signi- 
ficance beyond  the  Royal  desire  to  take  a  share  in  what 
promised  to  be  a  highly  profitable  enterprise.  The 
squadron  was  armed  and  organised  on  the  lines  of  the 
Royal  Navy ;  its  complement  of  500  men  included  several 
gentlemen  of  good  houses,  whose  swords  were  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Captain  of  Soldiers  ;  and  Hawkins,  who  at 
this  period  might  fairly  be  ranked  among  the  merchant 
princes  of  his  time,  and  who  described  himself  in  his 
letter  to  Cecil  as  an  "  orderly  person  "  who  had  "  always 
hated  folly,"  who,  moreover,  as  Hakluyt's  pages  proved, 
wielded  an  able  pen — Hawkins  himself  kept  the  state  of 
one  of  Her  Majesty's  Admirals  at  the  Seas.  A  man,  in 

1  Sir  Julian  Corbett  thinks  it  "  hardly  doubtful  "  that  the  agent  who 
brought  Hawkins  a  letter  from  Cecil,  warning  him  to  avoid  damages  to 
Spaniards,  also  conveyed  the  secret  consent  of  Elizabeth  to  the  purpose 
of  the  voyage.  (Drake  and  the  Tudor  Navy,  vol.  i,  p.  99.) 


30        THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST      [CH.  I 

short,  worthy  of  the  role  with  which  he  regarded  himself 
as  entrusted — that  of  vindicating,  by  force  if  need  were, 
the  legitimate  aspirations  of  English  commerce  !  Acts  of 
illegality — judged  by  modern  standards — were  undoubtedly 
committed  on  this  memorable  voyage,  but  none  of  the 
great  figures  in  the  new  school  of  adventure  which  was 
now  arising,  and  Hawkins  least  of  all,  is  to  be  classed 
with  those  cosmopolitan  buccaneers  of  a  later  century, 
whose  criminal  deeds  and  reckless  careers  have  surrounded 
the  very  name  of  the  Spanish  Main  with  an  irresistible  if 
sinister  glamour  of  romance.  Romance  was  far  from 
wanting  to  the  deeds  of  these  Elizabethan  mariners,  but 
what  gives  those  deeds  their  epic  quality,  as  enshrined  in 
the  immortal  pages  of  Hakluyt,  is  the  national  spirit  and 
national  purpose  which  inspired  them. 

The  course  of  the  voyage  of  the  JESUS  OF  LUBECK  and 
her  consorts  may  be  followed  in  the  Admiral's  own  narra- 
tive as  recorded  by  that  chronicler.  Reprisals  on  the 
Portuguese,  as  well  as  the  usual  hunting  for  negroes, 
marked  the  weeks  spent  on  the  African  coast ;  and  when 
the  Atlantic  had  been  crossed,  the  ship  sailed  from  place 
to  place,  "  making  traffic  "  with  the  Spaniards —  "  some- 
what hardly,  because  the  King  had  steadily  commanded 
all  his  Governors  in  those  parts  by  no  means  to  suffer  any 
trade  to  be  made  with  us."  Nevertheless,  they  met  on 
the  whole  with  "  courteous  entertainment,"  save  at  Rio 
de  la  Hacha,  the  depot  for  the  pearl  trade,  and  a  place  of 
disagreeable  memories  for  Francis  Drake.  Carthagena, 
which  was  to  have  been  the  last  port  of  call,  also  proved 
officially  obdurate,  and  then,  some  days  later,  arose  the 
"  extreme  storm  "  which  drove  the  ships  out  of  their  course, 
and  ultimately  involved  them  in  the  disastrous  incident 
of  San  Juan  de  Ulua.  Into  this  roadstead,  the  haven  of 
the  town  of  Vera  Cruz,  the  battered  squadron  came  to  refit 
and  revictual,  and  no  doubt  to  force  a  market  for  the 
negroes  that  remained  unsold.  The  consternation  of  the 
Spaniards  was  great  when  they  recognised  their  formidable 
visitors,  for  lying  at  moorings  were  the  treasure-ships  with 
over  a  million  on  board,  awaiting  the  annual  fleet  of  New 
Spain  and  its  escorts  for  the  combined  homeward  voyage. 
A  huge  prize,  in  fact,  lay  at  the  Englishman's  mercy.  If 
Hawkins  had  been  a  mere  pirate  he  would  have  seized  it 
out  of  hand,  and  he  proved  himself  the  "  orderly  "  trader 


CH.  i]  THE   FIGHT   IN  THE   HARBOUR  31 

he  had  always  claimed  to  be  by  ignoring  the  treasure. 
He  took  certain  measures  of  defence  against  treachery, 
and  sent  a  formal  message  to  the  city  authorities  for 
permission  to  refit  and  obtain  requisite  supplies,  with  the 
further  request  that  action  should  be  taken  to  prevent  any 
conflict  between  him  and  the  expected  Mexico  fleet.  The 
very  next  morning  the  "  flota  "  appeared  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Haven,  headed  by  a  Royal  galleon. 

Of  the  dramatic  events  which  followed,  Sir  Julian  Corbett 
has  given  a  singularly  clear  and  unbiassed  account,  based 
on  both  English  and  Spanish  authorities.1  Passing  over 
the  details,  one  may  state  the  facts  broadly  thus :  Hawkins, 
with  a  couple  of  batteries  mounted  ashore  for  his  protection, 
was  strong  enough  to  have  prevented  the  entry  of  a  newly- 
arrived  fleet,  and  to  have  accomplished  its  destruction. 
But  he  was  fully  aware  that  an  overt  act  of  war  would  have 
been  displeasing  to  the  Queen,  and  he  gave  fresh  evidence 
of  his  discretion  and  sense  of  responsibility  by  entering 
into  negotiations  with  the  Viceroy  and  the  Admiral  of  the 
Fleet.  Under  the  terms  arranged  after  a  good  deal  of 
disputation,  the  two  fleets  moored  side  by  side  within  the 
protection  of  the  breakwater,  the  English  were  permitted 
to  continue  their  refitting,  and  hostages  were  exchanged. 
The  sequel  to  this  formal  military  convention  was  a  care- 
fully matured  plot  on  the  part  of  the  Spaniards.  Secret 
reinforcements  were  smuggled  on  board  the  ships,  and  the 
signal  for  a  cowardly  attack  was  given  with  the  sudden 
stabbing  of  several  English  sailors  who  had  been  drinking 
and  fraternising  with  the  Spaniards  ashore.  Taken 
unawares  and  at  a  complete  disadvantage,  Hawkins  fought 
a  fierce  action,  in  which  his  superior  gunnery  silenced  the 
enemy's  fire  and  sank  at  least  two  galleons ;  but  discharges 
from  the  shore  batteries,  treacherously  captured  at  the 
first  signal,  had  sunk  one  of  his  own  vessels  and  disabled 
another,  and  when  the  Spaniards  loosed  a  couple  of  fire-ships 
at  night,  the  badly  crippled  JESUS  had  to  be  abandoned  to 
her  fate,  and  Hawkins  himself  barely  escaped  by  boarding 
the  MINION  just  as  her  sails  were  filling.  The  only  other 
vessel  to  get  away  was  the  Judith,  Drake  having  worked 
out  of  the  harbour.  In  the  northerly  gale  which  immedi- 
ately afterwards  sprang  up  the  two  ships  were  separated, 
and  the  little  barque  was  the  first  to  arrive  home;  but 

1  Drake  and  the  Tudor  Navy  (Corbett),  vol.  i,  p.  Ill  et  seq. 


32         THE  MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST       [CH.  I 

there  seems  no  evidence  for  Hawkins's  complaint  of  de- 
sertion against  his  kinsman.1 

It  was  a  tragic  and  disastrous  story,  that  lost  nothing 
in  its  effect  when  told  to  English  ears.  It  came  at  a  time 
when  the  hostility  of  Spain  and  the  activity  of  the  counter- 
reformation  were  becoming  more  and  more  menacing,  and 
when  Catholic  plots  were  on  foot  at  home  against  Eliza- 
beth's life  and  throne.  "  The  military  and  seafaring  men 
all  over  England,"  says  Camden,  of  the  San  Juan  de  Ulua 
affair,  "  fretted  and  demanded  war  against  the  Spaniards." 
Cautious  as  ever,  Elizabeth  remained  true  to  her  principle 
"No  war,  my  lords,"  but  her  help  to  the  Huguenots  and  to 
the  rebellious  subjects  of  Philip  in  the  Netherlands  became 
more  active.  Finally,  in  1572,  came  the  exposure  of  the 
foreign  plot  to  assassinate  Elizabeth,  whichled  to  thedismissal 
of  the  Spanish  Ambassador  and  brought  the  two  countries 
to  the  verge  of  open  war.  It  was  in  that  same  year  that 
Francis  Drake  fitted  out  the  expedition  which  was  to  achieve 
one  of  the  greatest  adventures  in  our  maritime  annals. 

The  incident  of  San  Juan  de  Ulua  had  created  in  the 
minds  of  Hawkins  and  Drake  a  feeling  of  bitter  resentment 
and  irreconcilable  hostility  towards  Spain.  Hawkins, 
whose  energies  were  soon  to  become  absorbed  in  the  official 
work  of  the  Royal  Navy,  had  secured  the  release  of  his 
abandoned  crews,  as  well  as  heavy  compensation,  by  the 
characteristic  method  of  a  sham  intrigue  in  which  he 
completely  outwitted  the  Spanish  Ambassador.  Drake 
sought  another  way  by  taking  out  letters  of  reprisal,  armed 
with  which  commission  he  joined  in  two  voyages  to  the 
Spanish  Indies.  On  the  second  occasion  he  captured  at 
least  one  valuable  prize.  More  important  still,  he  effected 
a  valuable  reconnaissance  in  the  Gulf  of  Darien,  estab- 
lished friendly  relations  with  the  Maroons  (the  escaped 
negroes  of  the  Panama  Isthmus),  and  even  set  up  a  regular 
base  for  future  operations.  For  Drake  was  taking  up  the 
work  of  Hawkins,  and,  by  infusing  into  it  a  new  spirit  of 
daring  and  a  contempt  ^for  tradition,  bettering  the  in- 
struction of  his  master.  So  now  he  sailed  out  of  Plymouth 
Sound  on  the  famous  voyage  of  Nombre  de  Dios,  bent  on 
reprisals  in  the  form  of  a  piratical  adventure,  but,  we  cannot 
doubt,  with  a  perfectly  clear  conscience,  convinced,  as 

1  "  So,"  runs  Hawkins's  narrative  in  Hakluyt,  "  with  the  MINION  only 
and  the  Judith,  the  small  barque  of  ten  ton,  we  escaped  ;  which  barque 
the  same  night  forsook  us  in  our  great  misery." 


CH.I]          DRAKE   IN   THE   SPANISH  MAIN  83 

all  his  Protestant  countrymen  were  convinced,  of  the  ab- 
solute justice  of  the  proceedings.  The  voyage  may  be  said 
to  mark  a  new  departure  in  sea-going  expeditions — a 
change  in  effect  from  armed  trading  to  privateering. 

The  little  squadron  consisted  of  two  vessels  only — 
the  Pascha,  of  70  tons,  and  the  Swan,  of  which  his  brother, 
John  Drake,  was  captain,  of  only  25  tons.  But  small  as 
it  was,  its  equipment  was  as  perfect  as  the  military  science 
of  the  day  could  make  it.  Crossing  the  Atlantic  in  twenty- 
five  days,  Drake  anchored  to  water  his  ships  off  the 
American  coast,  and  then  made  the  secret  harbour  where 
on  his  previous  voyage  he  had  improvised  a  base.  To  his 
chagrin,  he  found  that  the  Spaniards  had  discovered  and 
plundered  his  stores.  While  at  this  spot  he  fell  in  with 
another  English  adventurer,  Captain  Ranse,  carrying  two 
Spanish  prizes  along  with  him.  To  the  new-comer  Drake 
revealed  his  plans  ;  he  meant  to  seize  Nombre  de  Dios,  the 
renowned  depot  of  the  Spanish  traffic  from  Peru — to  seize  it 
while  the  treasure-houses  were  still  full.  Articles  of  partner- 
ship were  agreed  on ;  and  after  setting  up  the  pinnaces  which 
Drake  had  brought  with  him,  the  combined  squadron  sailed 
north-west  along  the  coast  to  the  Pine  Islands,  where 
Ranse  remained  with  the  three  ships  and  the  prize  caravel, 
while  Drake  continued  the  voyage  with  the  pinnaces  and 
the  remaining  prizes  and  a  force  of  seventy-three  men. 

In  a  few  days  the  little  expedition  reached  the  entrance 
to  Nombre  de  Dios  Bay,  and  an  hour  before  dawn  dashed 
in  to  the  attack  by  the  light  of  the  moon.  While  the 
Englishmen  were  forming  up  on  the  sand  after  surprising 
the  shore  battery,  the  church  bell  was  frantically  pealing 
its  alarm  in  the  ears  of  the  terrified  inhabitants.  For  his 
assault  on  the  town  Drake  divided  his  men  into  two  forces, 
and  after  a  brief  resistance  the  Spaniards,  caught  between 
the  double  fusilade  and  over-estimating  the  strength  of 
their  assailants,  broke  and  fled,  casting  away  their  arms 
as  the  sailors,  with  broad  West  Country  cheers,  chased  them 
through  the  Panama  gate.  With  the  plaza  held,  the  hunt 
for  treasure  began.  In  the  Governor's  house  were  found 
bars  of  silver  piled  high,  350  tons  in  all,  awaiting  the  arrival 
of  the  flota  of  Tierra  Firme — the  treasure  fleet  of  the 
Spanish  Main.  But  it  was  gold  and  jewels,  not  merely 
silver,  that  Drake  was  in  search  of,  and  these  were  stored 
within  the  solid  masonry  of  the  King's  Treasure-House, 


34   THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST   [CH.  i 

down  by  the  water.  It  was  then  that  the  first  check 
occurred  to  damp  the  ardour  of  these  amazing  men  of  the 
sea.  A  tropical  downpour  of  rain  necessitated  their  seeking 
shelter  for  the  sake  of  bow-strings  and  powder,  and  the 
consequent  abandonment  of  their  post  in  the  plaza,  and 
the  stout  walls  of  the  treasure-house  resisted  all  efforts 
to  break  in.  Rumours  of  Spanish  reinforcements  produced 
something  like  a  panic,  and  how  natural  was  the  feeling 
can  easily  be  imagined.  For  never  before  had  these  simple 
though  daring  merchant  seamen  engaged  in  such  an  extreme 
adventure  as  this  of  Drake's — the  deliberately-planned 
attack  by  a  diminutive,  if  well-found,  land  force,  upon  a 
town  of  such  size  that  the  men  of  Devon  could  only 
compare  it  with  their  well-loved  port  of  Plymouth. 

The  rain,  however,  ceased,  and  Drake  controlled  the 
panic  with  characteristic  resource  and  courage.  A  de- 
tachment was  sent  round  to  break  in  the  doors  of  the 
treasure-house,  and  the  wildest  , dreams  of  the  seamen 
might  well  have  been  realised  but  for  another  unlucky 
stroke  of  fate.  Their  indomitable  leader  had  concealed  a 
wound  received  in  the  first  Spanish  volley,  and  now  at  the 
critical  moment  he  suddenly  fell  in  a  swoon.  That  ended 
the  matter.  The  men,  vowing  their  captain's  life  more 
valuable  than  all  the  treasure  of  the  Indies,  bore  him  to 
the  boats,  and  picking  up  on  the  way  out,  with  a  coolness 
that  provokes  a  smile,  a  solitary  wine-ship  newly  arrived 
at  its  moorings  in  the  harbour,  they  installed  themselves 
and  their  wounded  on  the  town's  victualling  island  just 
outside  the  bay.  Hither  in  due  time  came,  on  a  spying 
errand  and  under  a  flag  of  truce,  an  officer  bearing  a  message 
from  the  Governor  couched  in  terms  of  true  Spanish 
politeness,  and  paying  tribute  to  the  humanity  shown  by 
Drake  on  his  previous  expeditions.  The  visitor  was  finally 
dismissed  with  a  flow  of  equally  impressive  compliments,  but 
with  the  plain  assurance  that  Captain  Drake,  ere  he  departed, 
meant  to  reap  some  of  the  harvest  of  that  commodity  which 
alone  would  satisfy  his  company.  The  story  of  this  interview, 
the  substantial  truth  of  which  seems  indubitable,  reads 
like  a  page  from  some  stirring  romance.  It  is  of  special 
interest,  also,  as  illustrating  those  qualities  in  the  young 
commander  which  consistently  marked  his  future  career — a 
strong  regard  for  humane  dealing,  and  a  love  of  ceremonial 
and  display  befitting  the  dignity  of  a  great  sea-captain. 


CH.  i]  THE  TREASURE-TRAIN  35 

For  the  present,  however,  the  stroke  so  daringly  con- 
ceived and  so  energetically  executed  had  failed.  Yet  the 
fact  remained  that  Nombre  de  Dios,  the  very  gate  of  the 
Peruvian  Treasure-House,  had  been  actually  taken  and 
for  awhile  held,  and  Drake  returned  to  the  waiting  ships 
evolving  new  schemes  in  his  restless  brain.  These  plans, 
based  on  the  information  of  a  runaway  slave  called  Diego, 
did  not  commend  themselves  to  Ranse,  who  parted 
company  with  the  bolder  man,  arguing,  with  reason  enough, 
that  the  affair  of  Nombre  de  Dios  would  have  given  the 
alarm  to  all  the  coast  settlements.  So,  indeed,  the  event 
proved  when  Drake  turned  to  his  next  incredible  adventure 
— an  attempt  on  the  capital  of  the  Spanish  Main  itself. 
Carthagena,  like  the  rest  of  the  ports,  was  on  the  alert, 
and  though  he  took  three  prizes  in  the  bay,  including  a 
well-laden  Seville  ship,  he  quickly  saw  that  some  new  plan 
must  be  evolved.  What  he  finally  decided  on  was  a  novel 
and  characteristic  departure  from  the  general  method  of 
harrying  the  coast — nothing  less  than  a  raid  into  the 
interior.  And  his  purpose  was  to  seize,  in  co-operation 
with  the  Maroons,  the  mule-train  which  would  bring  the 
treasure  of  Peru  from  Panama  across  the  Isthmus  to 
Nombre  de  Dios  for  shipment  to  Spain.  In  order  to  man 
the  pinnaces,  which  would  be  essential  to  the  enterprise, 
it  was  necessary  to  sacrifice  one  of  his  ships,  and  the  secret 
scuttling  of  the  Swan,  his  own  vessel  and  a  particularly 
good  sailer,  is  one  of  those  incidents  which  cast  a  flood  of 
light  on  the  masterful  and  fearless  character  of  this  born 
leader  of  men.  Back  in  the  Gulf  of  Darien  a  new  head- 
quarters was  established,  and  then  passed  months  of 
waiting  for  the  great  attempt — months  full  of  the  most 
diversified  incidents  which  are  none  the  less  astonishing 
for  the  simplicity  and  directness  with  which  the  Narrative 
sets  them  forth.  It  is  a  wonderful  tale  of  privation, 
extremity  of  tempest,  daring  defiance  of  Spanish  authority, 
threatened  desertion,  desperate  fighting,  decimating  sick- 
ness— a  succession  of  vicissitudes  such  as  might  have 
broken  the  stanchness  of  the  bravest,  and  seemed  only 
to  stimulate  the  great  sea-captain  to  fresh  feats  of  resource 
and  daring. 

At  length  the  march  inland  began,  with  the  negro  allies 
as  guides,  and  on  the  fourth  day  this  devoted  band  of 
English  seamen  reached  the  highest  ridge  of  the  Cordilleras, 


36        THE    MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST       [CH.  i 

at  a  point  where  the  faithful  Diego  had  promised  his  white 
master  that  he  should  set  eyes  on  the  South  Sea.  Pizarro 
and  Cortez  and  Balboa  had  been  there  before  him,  but 
can  our  maritime  history  conjure  a  more  dramatic  scene 
than  was  enacted  on  this  spot  in  the  vast  mountain  forest  ? 
The  Maroons  led  Drake  to  a  "  goodly  and  great  tree," 
notched  with  steps  for  climbing,  and  promised  him  that 
from  its  top  he  might  see  the  two  oceans  at  once.  So  the 
mightiest  of  our  mariners  ascended,  and  having  beheld — 
with  what  pure  passion  of  the  explorer  surging  in  his 
heart ! — "  that  sea  of  which  he  had  heard  such  golden 
reports,"  made  his  memorable  vow,  beseeching  "  Almighty 
God  of  His  goodness  to  give  him  life  and  leave  to  sail  once 
in  an  English  ship  in  that  sea."  And  another  contem- 
porary chronicler  (Camden)  adds,  "  From  that  time  forward 
his  mind  was  pricked  on  continually  night  and  day  to 
perform  his  vow."  Not  long  after  his  first  sight  of  the 
Southern  Sea,  Drake  had  accomplished  the  crowning  feat 
of  his  daring  raid,  by  the  capture  of  the  mule  treasure- 
train  on  its  way  across  the  Panama  Isthmus. 

It  was  not  till  November  1577  that  Drake  sailed  from 
Plymouth  on  the  immortal  voyage  of  circumnavigation 
which  was  to  accomplish  his  vow.  The  fame  of  his  past 
exploits  brought  a  throng  of  volunteers  to  his  service,  and 
the  expedition  was  a  considerable  one  for  the  time,  con- 
sisting of  the  Pelican  (Admiral),  of  100  tons,  and  four 
smaller  vessels,  all  well  armed  and  equipped.  To  follow 
the  course  of  one  of  the  most  famous  voyages  in  history 
is  beyond  our  scope,  and  excellent  contemporary  narratives 
have  made  its  details  familiar.  Drake's  purpose  was  to 
reach  the  Pacific,  by  way  of  the  passage  discovered  by 
Magellan  in  his  last  fatal  voyage ;  and  so,  having  crossed 
the  Atlantic,  he  took  a  south-westerly  course  along  the 
South  American  coast.  Every  sort  of  misfortune  seemed 
to  dog  his  way  ;  the  fleet  was  scattered  by  storm,  and  one 
of  the  smaller  vessels  foundered  ;  dissensions  occurred 
between  the  sea  officers  and  the  gentlemen  volunteers  ; 
and  the  extraordinary  episode  in  which  Thomas  Doughty 
played  the  leading  role  ended  with  the  execution  of  that 
officer  in  the  little  port  of  St.  Julian.  In  the  buffetings 
which  befell  the  ships  on  rounding  the  American  continent 
Drake  discovered  the  open  sea-passage  south  of  Magellan's 
Straits,  and  it  was  during  these  terrible  months  of  almost 


CH.  i]  DRAKE   IN   THE    PACIFIC  37 

ceaseless  tempests,  contrary  winds,  and  incipient  mutiny, 
that  the  Elizabeth,  Wynter's  ship  (Vice- Admiral),  was 
separated  from  her  consort  in  a  fearful  storm,  and,  giving 
up  the  struggle,  made  the  best  of  her  way  home. 

Thus  it  was  left  to  Drake  in  the  Golden  Hind  (as  the 
Pelican  had  been  rechristened  on  entering  the  Southern 
Seas)  to  accomplish  the  voyage  alone.  And  everyone 
knows  how  magnificently  he  accomplished  it,  once  he  had 
burst  into  that  sea  which  the  Spaniards  imagined  to  be 
their  sole  and  secure  domain.  All  along  the  Spanish 
settlements  of  Chili  and  Peru  he  spread  amazed  terror. 
Prize  after  prize  was  taken,  generally  with  little  resistance  ; 
the  port  of  the  world-renowned  Potosi  Mine  was  coolly 
ransacked,  though  without  much  result ;  and  finally, 
despite  her  fortnight's  start,  a  huge  treasure- ship,  "  the 
great  glory  of  the  South  Sea,"  was  overhauled  and  cap- 
tured before  she  could  reach  the  shelter  of  Panama 
Harbour.  So  with  £600,000  worth  of  treasure  in  his  hold, 
literally  ballasted  with  silver  and  gold  and  precious  stones, 
Drake  sailed  north  in  a  fruitless  effort  to  make  in  reverse 
the  north-west  passage  which  Frobisher  was  supposed  to 
have  discovered  in  his  famous  voyage  a  few  years  earlier. 
Baffled  by  contrary  gales  and  by  conditions  of  Arctic 
severity,  the  Golden  Hind,  with  the  aid  of  a  captured 
China  pilot's  chart,  crossed  the  Pacific,  reached  the 
Moluccas  (being  nearly  cast  away  in  those  perilous  waters), 
and,  having  added  a  cargo  of  costly  spices  to  her  gold  and 
silver,  made  her  way  home  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 

So  much  for  a  bare  outline  of  the  voyage — the  first  cir- 
cumnavigation of  the  world  ever  achieved  by  a  sea-captain, 
and  that  captain  a  merchant  seaman.  Its  political  con- 
sequences were  far-reaching.  Drake  became  the  hero  of 
his  fellow-countrymen,  and  the  example  of  his  great 
adventure,  with  its  direct  challenge  to  the  pelagic  empire 
of  Spain,  was  a  powerful  incentive  to  national  enterprise. 
The  Golden  Hind's  reappearance  in  Plymouth  Sound 
came  at  a  critical  moment  to  widen  the  breach  already 
growing  between  England  and  Spain,  and  when  the  now- 
famous  craft  had  been  brought  round  in  triumph  to  the 
Thames,  and  the  Queen  went  down  to  knight  its  captain 
and  to  dine  in  state  on  board,  the  official  recognition  of  the 
great  raid  was  complete.  After  Philip's  absorption  of  the 
kingdom  of  Portugal,  with  its  immense  maritime  re- 


38       THE    MERCHANT    NAVY    OF  THE  PAST      [CH.  I 

sources,  open  war  became  only  a  question  of  time,  and  no 
doubt  existed  as  to  the  objects  with  which  Philip  was 
already  beginning  to  prepare  a  great  offensive  fleet.  So 
now  we  part  company  with  Drake,  the  indomitable  navi- 
gator and  brilliant  sea  adventurer.  Henceforth,  it  was 
largely  to  the  work  of  national  defence  that  Sir  Francis 
Drake,  as  Admiral  of  Her  Majesty's  Navy,  devoted  himself 
in  the  interval  that  precedes  the  sailing  of  the  Armada. 
It  must  suffice  here  to  record  that,  after  the  discovery  of 
Spanish  complicity  with  Throgmorton's  plot,  Drake,  with 
Frobisher  as  second-in-command,  conducted  a  raid  of 
reprisals  on  the  Spanish  Indies  with  a  fleet  of  thirty  sail, 
plundering,  sacking,  and  ransoming,  on  a  scale  hitherto 
unattempted ;  and  that,  by  his  blockading  operations  off 
the  Spanish  coast  two  years  later,  he  threw  Santa  Cruz's 
plans  into  utter  confusion  and  delayed  the  sailing  of  the 
Armada  by  a  twelvemonth. 

The  familiar  story  of  that  determined  attempt  at  invasion 
need  not  be  told  here,  beyond  noting  that  this  great  fight 
in  the  Narrow  Seas  sheds  lustre  on  the  daring  of  the  Eliza- 
bethan merchantmen,  whether  trading  vessels  or  privateers, 
and  on  their  crews.  Her  Majesty's  ships  formed  only  the 
nucleus  of  the  fleet  which  gathered  in  the  Channel  under 
the  flag  of  Lord  Howard  of  Effingham,  with  Drake  and 
Hawkins  and  Frobisher,  as  well  as  others  scarcely  less 
famous,  as  his  vice-admirals  and  captains.  The  defeat 
of  Medina  Sidonia's  vast  and  heterogeneous  concourse  of 
craft  was  conclusive  evidence  of  the  complete  superiority 
of  English  ships,  English  gunnery,  and  English  seamen 
of  the  Royal  Navy,  which  was  once  more  to  assume  import- 
ance. For  not  only  were  the  English  ships  faster  and 
more  weatherly  than  the  enemy's,  but  their  crews  were 
seamen  and  gunners  too,  capable  equally  of  sailing  their 
ships  and  fighting  them,  nor  did  they  need  to  crowd  their 
decks  with  soldiers  as  the  Spanish  did.  Expressed  briefly 
and  broadly,  the  English  sea  tactic  was  naval  in  its  origin, 
the  Spanish  military.  In  justice  also  to  those  fighting 
seamen  of  three  centuries  ago,  one  other  point  should  be 
noticed.  With  some  commentators  it  has  been  a  habit 
to  ascribe  the  defeat  of  the  Armada  to  the  storms  which 
followed  the  battle  off  Gravelines.  It  is  well,  then,  to 
record  here  the  simple  fact  that  the  Armada  was  a 
Beaten  and  utterly  demoralised  fleet  before  it  turned 


CH.  i]          TRADE   WITH  THE   EAST   INDIES  39 

northwards  on  its  wild,  storm-driven  course  round  Scotland 
—beaten  by  the  superior  dash,  gunnery,  and  seamanship 
of  English  sailors.  The  weather  and  the  perils  of  those 
northern  waters  completed  the  work  of  the  English  guns. 
The  bearing  of  this  great  fleet  action  on  the  further  differ- 
entiation between  the  naval  and  mercantile  services  may 
conveniently  be  referred  to  later. 

Drake's  burst  into  the  Southern  Seas  stimulated,  as  we 
have  said,  the  national  spirit  of  adventure,  and,  in  particular, 
the  minds  of  British  merchant  seamen  were  more  than  ever 
bent  on  the  ambition  of  reaching  the  land  of  spices  and  pre- 
cious stones,  so  long  the  close  preserve  of  the  Portuguese. 
Frobisher's  great  voyages  to  the  north-west  early  in  the  reign 
were  originally  inspired  by  the  desire  to  find  a  north-west 
passage  to  India,  and  they  degenerated  into  a  fruitless 
quest  for  gold-yielding  ore.  In  the  years  between  Drake's 
voyage  of  circumnavigation  and  the  coming  of  the  Armada, 
John  Davis,  one  of  the  most  scientific  of  Elizabethan 
navigators,  followed  in  Frobisher's  track  in  three  successive 
years  in  the  hope  of  reaching  India ;  and  in  the  same  decade 
Thomas  Candish,  taking  Drake's  old  route  by  way  of  the 
Magellan  Straits,  so  far  realised  his  ambitions  as  to  reach 
China  and  the  East  Indies,  and  ended  by  sailing  round  the 
world.  Sir  Humphrey  Gilbert's  disastrous  expedition  to 
Newfoundland  of  1583  is  to  be  noted  as  one  of  those  early 
attempts  at  British  colonisation  which  seemed  so  fruitless 
in  their  immediate  results  ;  and  in  the  following  year 
Sir  Walter  Raleigh  obtained  his  letters  patent  "  for  the 
planting  of  new  lands  on  the  coast  of  America,"  the  first 
step  to  the  successful  foundation  of  Virginia,  the  original 
seat  of  the  Anglo-American  race. 

It  is,  however,  with  the  rise  and  prosperity  of  the  East 
India  Company  that  the  history  of  the  Merchant  Marine 
in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  is  chiefly 
associated.  The  defeat  of  the  Armada  provided  a  new 
incentive  to  Englishmen  to  share  in  the  coveted  trade  with 
India.  Candish,  who  returned  from  his  great  voyage  just 
in  time  to  hear  of  his  countrymen's  triumph,  brought  home 
detailed  observations  of  the  greatest  value  to  British 
seamen  and  British  merchants.  So  in  the  following  year 
we  find  a  significant  decision  taken  by  the  syndicate 
concerned  in  dispatching  John  Davis  on  his  north-west 
voyages.  Abandoning  this  long-cherished  hope,  they 


40        THE   MERCHANT   NAVY   OF  THE   PAST      [CH.  i 

sent  out  yet  another  expedition  under  the  great  navigator, 

but  this  time  by  way  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.     It  proved 

the  first  of  a  series  of  voyages  which  only  ceased  with  the 

death  of  this  fine  seaman,  who  was  killed  by  pirates  off  the 

coast  of  Malacca.     More  significant,  however,  than  Davis's 

voyage  of  1589  was  the  action  taken  in  that  year  by  certain 

English  merchants  in  petitioning  the  Queen  for  licence 

and  encouragement  to  open  a  trade  with  the  East  Indies. 

In  support  of  their  memorial,  they  urged  that  such  trade 

would,  as  the  example  of  Portugal  had  shown,  tend  to  the 

increase  of  the  strength  of  the  Royal  Navy.     Elizabeth 

characteristically  toyed  with  the  proposal,  but  in  the  end 

granted  the  necessary  authority,  and  in  April  1591  "  three 

tall     ships  " — the     Penelope,      Marchant      Royall,      and 

Edward    Bonaventure — sailed    out    of    Plymouth    Sound 

under    James    Lancaster.     Hakluyt's    narrative    of    the 

voyage  l  shows  that  from  Table  Bay  the  Marchant  Royall 

was  sent  back  owing  to  the  ravages  of  scurvy,  and  that 

the    Penelope    foundered    in   a   "  mighty    storme "   soon 

after  rounding  the  Cape.     With  a  stricken  crew  and  a 

partially  disabled  ship,  Lancaster  kept  steadfastly  on  his 

way  through  hurricanes  and  "  electric  storms,"  and  with 

the  further  loss  of  his  master  and  sixteen  men  treacherously 

slain  at  Comoro  Islands,  to  Zanzibar.     Here  the  mariners 

had  their  first  taste  of  the  acute  jealousy  with  which  the 

Portuguese  regarded  all  rivals  in  the  rich  trade  of  the  East. 

After  some  months  on  the  African  coast,  Lancaster  got  a 

favourable  wind  to  take  him  across  the  Indian  Ocean, 

doubled    Cape    Comorin,    missed    the     Nicobar    Islands 

"  through  our  master's  default  for  want  of  due  observation 

of  the  South  Starre,"  and  reached  one  of  the  small  islands 

to  the  north  of  Sumatra.     In  spite  of  the  weakness  of  a 

crew  now  reduced  to  thirty-three  men  and  a  boy,  the 

Edward  picked  up  two  small  prizes,  and  then,  while  lying 

in  wait  in  the  Malacca  Straits,  this  resolute  little  fighter 

attacked  and  captured  a  Portuguese  trader  of  250  tons, 

and  later  on  a  ship  of  750  tons  with  a  cargo  of  great  variety 

and  value.     In  fact,  profit  was  looked  for  from  what  was 

considered  a  legitimate  form  of  piracy  rather  than  from 

trade,  and  but  for  a  run  of  ill-luck  of  all  kinds,  Lancaster 

would   have   remained   lurking   in   the   Nicobar   Islands, 

whither   he  returned   on  the   homeward   voyage,   in   the 

1  He  obtained  his  story  from  Lancaster's  lieutenant,  Edmund  Barker, 


CH.  i]         THE   FIRST   EAST   INDIA   COMPANY  41 

knowledge  that  many  a  rich  merchantman  from  Bengal 
and  Siam  would  be  sure  to  pass  that  way  on  the  first  stage 
of  the  voyage  to  Lisbon.  A  mutinous  spirit  among  his 
men,  damage  by  storm,  contrary  gales,  shortness  of 
provisions  so  that  off  Porto  Rico  they  were  reduced  to 
eating  hides,  culminated  in  the  loss  of  the  ship  herself  while 
the  majority  of  the  company  were  ashore.  Finally, 
Lancaster  and  his  companions  obtained  a  passage  home  on 
board  a  Dieppe  ship,  and  crossed  to  Rye  in  May  1594.  In 
a  sense,  the  voyage  had  been  disastrous.  But  Lancaster's 
misfortunes  had  purchased  a  fruitful  experience  and  a 
fund  of  valuable  information,  and  offered  English  mer- 
chants and  seamen  a  great  and  convincing  proof  that  the 
treasure-house  of  the  East  lay  open  before  them. 

Meanwhile,  the  Dutch  were  beginning  to  establish  that 
trade  with  the  Orient  which  was  soon  to  enable  them  to 
supplant  the  Portuguese  as  our  chief  rivals,  and  their 
enterprise  spurred  London  merchants  to  new  action.  In 
1599,  a  number  of  them,  chiefly  associated  with  the  Levant 
Company,  which  held  a  charter  for  overland  trading  to 
India,  petitioned  for  a  monopoly  of  trade  with  the  East 
Indies.  The  Queen  gave  her  assent  to  the  petition  at  the 
end  of  the  following  year,  the  trading  privilege  being 
granted  for  a  period  of  fifteen  years,  and  thus  came  into 
existence  the  first  East  India  Company — the  progenitor 
of  that  "  John  Company  "  which  was  to  be  the  means  of 
adding  India  to  the  British  Empire.  No  time  was  lost 
in  dispatching  the  first  expedition  of  these  "  Adventurers 
for  the  Discoverie  of  the  Trade  for  the  East  Indies."  The 
fleet  of  four  vessels — of  tonnage  ranging  from  300  to  130, 
with  crews  to  the  number  of  480  men — left  Woolwich  in 
February  1601.  A  fitting  "  generall  of  the  Fleet  "  was 
found  in  James  Lancaster,  who  in  his  recent  voyage  had 
given  such  plain  proof  of  indomitable  courage  and  re- 
sourceful leadership,  and  with  him  as  Vice- Admiral  went 
John  Middleton,  and  as  Pilot-Major,  the  famous  John 
Davis.  The  voyage  was  a  complete  success.  Lancaster 
put  his  merchants  ashore  to  trade,  and  established  factories 
in  Java  and  elsewhere,  and  while  this  more  legitimate 
business  was  going  on,  himself  got  across  the  trade  route 
and  presently  captured  a  rich  carack  of  900  tons.  On  the 
voyage  home,  this  gallant  seaman  proved  his  rare  qualities 
afresh  by  saving  his  ship  in  well-nigh  desperate  circum- 


42       THE    MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE  PAST       [CH.  i 

stances,  such  as  would  have  tested  the  nerve  and  endurance 
of  the  bravest.  The  little  fleet  returned  in  the  early 
months  of  James  I's  reign,  laden  with  cargoes  that  included 
over  a  million  pounds  of  pepper,  and  those  who  had  in- 
vested their  money  received  95  per  cent,  on  their  capital. 
The  same  four  vessels  made  the  company's  second  voyage 
in  the  following  year,  with  a  resulting  profit  of  nearly 
100  per  cent.,  to  which,  as  before,  extensive  privateering 
had  largely  contributed;  and  in  1607  a  third  expedition 
set  out,  remarkable  for  the  fact  that  now,  for  the  first  time, 
the  company's  ships  entered  a  port  of  the  Indian  sub- 
continent itself.  This  port  was  Surat,  just  above  Bombay, 
and  an  agent  was  landed  to  convey  to  the  Great  Mogul  at 
Agra  a  letter  of  recommendation  from  King  James  I.  A 
little  later  that  Sovereign  extended  the  Company's  Charter, 
and  in  the  same  year  (1609)  was  present  at  the  launching 
of  the  largest  contemporary  East  Indiaman,  the  Trade's 
Increase,  one  of  the  first  two  vessels  built  in  the  company's 
own  yard  at  Deptford.  A  ship  of  1,100  tons,  she  was  one 
of  the  sensations  of  the  early  seventeenth  century,  but  she 
proved  clumsy  and  unhandy,  and  came  to  a  tragic  end 
after  a  brief  and  adventurous  career.  She  may  be  taken 
as  a  fitting  illustration  of  the  rule  of  thumb  methods  of 
ship  construction  then  prevailing,  and  it  may  be  noted  here 
that  it  was  not  until  after  the  Stuart  period  that  English 
shipbuilding  began  to  establish  itself  on  a  scientific  basis, 
largely  as  the  result  of  the  example  of  French  naval  models. 
At  this  early  period  in  its  history,  the  East  India  Com- 
pany is  seen  firmly  established  as  well  as  earning  handsome 
dividends  for  its  shareholders,  its  ships  built  in  its  own 
yard  (although  this  practice  was  changed  at  a  later  date) 
and  victualled  from  its  own  stores,  and  enjoying  the 
enormous  advantage  of  a  hydrographical  department  of 
its  own,  based  on  the  journals  and  observations  compul- 
sorily  contributed  at  the  end  of  each  voyage  by  the  masters 
of  its  fleet.  Developments  in  India  came  swiftly.  Sailing 
with  two  vessels  from  Gravesend  in  1612,  Captain  Best 
encountered  the  Portuguese  traders  in  Surat  Roadstead, 
and  beat  them  in  a  skilfully-conducted  action.  It  was  a 
small  if  decisive  affair  ;  but  its  effects  were  immediate 
and  far-reaching.  For  the  prestige  of  the  Portuguese  in 
the  East  was  sharply  lowered,  and  the  Grand  Mogul 
hastened  to  confer  trading  privileges,  hitherto  denied  it, 


CH.  i]  DUTCH  RIVALRY  48 

upon  the  new  Power  in  the  East.  Factories  were  set  going 
at  Surat  and  elsewhere,  Sir  Thomas  Row  came  out  three 
years  later  as  an  Ambassador  to  the  Grand  Mogul  in  order 
to  ratify  the  new  treaty,  and  by  the  same  date  the  Indian 
Marine,  initiated  by  the  Corporation  as  a  means  of  pro- 
tection from  pirates  and  Portuguese  alike  and  manned  by 
British  seamen,  had  reached  the  total  of  ten  local  vessels. 
Forty  years  later  Cromwell,  in  pursuance  of  that  policy 
which  is  so  well  expressed  in  his  Navigation  Act,  dealt  the 
last  blow  to  Portugal's  pride  and  sea  dominance  by  ex- 
torting a  treaty  giving  to  English  ships  the  right  to  trade 
in  all  the  Portuguese  possessions  in  the  East. 

The  Navigation  Acts  of  the  seventeenth  century,  how- 
ever, were  mainly  directed  against  the  Dutch,  for  Holland 
succeeded  Portugal  as  our  supreme  rival  on  the  seas.  The 
struggle  with  that  stubborn  sea-going  race  continued 
almost  ceaselessly  for  twenty-five  years,  and,  while  it  nearly 
exhausted  the  Dutch,  left  England  buoyantly  ready  to 
meet  the  more  powerful  rivalry  of  the  French.  In  the  great 
expansion  of  England's  sea  power  which  followed,  the 
East  India  Company  played  a  conspicuous  part,  and  before 
the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  it  stood  virtually  alone 
as  the  one  surviving  trading  Power  in  the  Orient,  its 
operations  embracing  China  as  well  as  India.  Moreover, 
these  strongly  built,  well-armed  East  Indiamen,  with  their 
fine  crews  of  seasoned  sailors,  did  yeoman  service  for  the 
country  in  the  long  series  of  wars  which  culminated  in  the 
Napoleonic  struggle.  For  they  constituted  the  chief 
element  in  that  large  commercial  marine  which  our  mer- 
cantile policy  created  as  a  reserve  from  which  the  Royal 
Navy  could  be  almost  indefinitely  increased. 

It  is  convenient  here  to  note  one  aspect  of  the  significance 
of  the  Armada  campaign  for  its  effect  on  the  movement 
towards  that  differentiation  between  the  naval  and  mer- 
cantile services  which,  as  we  have  seen,  was  initiated  by 
the  second  Tudor  king.  Gallantly  as  the  merchantmen 
fought  in  single-ship  combats,  the  naval  battle  in  the 
Channel  showed  how  inadequate  they  were  to  the  needs 
of  a  great  fleet  action,  and  from  the  clear  perception  of 
that  fact  sprang  a  strong  impulse  to  specialisation  and  a 
widening  of  the  breach  between  professional  and  amateur 
warfare  at  sea.  The  institution  of  Ship  Money  in  the  next 
century  marked  a  further  step  in  the  same  direction. 


44      THE    MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST       [CH.  i 

The  policy  of  Charles  I  expressed  in  that  levy  was  to 
substitute  a  system  of  money  contributions  as  a  means  of 
forming  a  regular  fleet  for  the  mediaeval  plan  of  contributions 
of  ships.  A  few  years  later,  Cromwell's  policy  secured, 
under  the  professional  soldier-admiral  of  the  Blake  type, 
an  increased  specialisation,  which  by  the  end  of  the  century 
led  to  the  practical  disappearance  of  the  merchantman  as 
a  fleet  ship. 


II 

THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  IN  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  AND 
NAPOLEONIC  WARS 

IN  that  period  of  almost  continuous  war  which  began  with 
the  struggle  with  Revolutionary  France  in  1793,  and  ended 
with  the  downfall  and  exile  of  Napoleon  in  1815,  the 
strength  of  France  on  the  seas  was  devoted  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  British  commerce,  and  never  with  more  determined 
persistency  than  in  the  ten  years  which  succeeded  the 
victory  at  Trafalgar.  The  conflict  was  maintained  with 
all  the  resources  which  France,  ruled  by  despotism,  was 
able  to  throw  into  the  scales,  with  the  support  of  the 
resources  of  allies  whom  she  made  her  vassals.  Yet  this 
result  is  clearly  shown:  that  from  the  outbreak  of  hos- 
tilities the  strength  of  the  British  mercantile  fleet  ever 
grew  larger  and  larger,  despite  the  unceasing  onslaught 
which  was  maintained  against  it,  and  despite  the  heavy 
losses  which  such  protracted  warfare  necessarily  in- 
volved. 

Eleven  thousand  British  merchant  ships  passed  out  of 
the  Service  by  capture  as  prizes  during  the  French  wars.1 
Some  compensation  was  found  in  the  numbers  of  enemy 
ships  taken  and  transferred  to  our  flag  ;  but  the  activity 
in  British  shipyards  was  so  well  sustained  that  in  1815  this 
country  possessed  more  ships  and  a  greater  volume  of 
tonnage  than  at  the  opening  of  the  Anglo-French  struggle. 
On  the  other  hand,  French  trade  in  a  few  years  was  almost 
swept  from  the  seas  by  the  British  naval  superiority, 
and  opportunities  of  prize-taking  by  our  cruisers  were 

1  "Roll  of  English  merchant  vessels  captured  by  the  French  during  the 
war,  1793-1815" — Norman's  Corsairs  of  France. 


CH.  i]  A  WAR  OF  PRIVATEERS  45 

necessarily  smaller.     France  maintained  a  coastal  trade 
in  the  Mediterranean,  but  little  more. 

Fortunately  for  the  world,  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
in  February  1793  England  found  herself  complete  mistress 
of  the  seas.  So  early  as  1795  the  enemy  had  abandoned 
all  pretence  of  opposing  fleet  to  fleet,  and  entered  upon  an 
unrestricted  guerre  de  course.  France,  the  spirit  of  her 
navy  having  Buffered  during  the  Revolution,  turned  to 
her  mercantile  fleet  to  supply  its  place.  The  object  of 
Revolutionary  France  was  frankly  stated  by  Citizen 
Boyer  Fonfrede  in  the  Convention  :  "  We  have  now " 
(he  said)  "  to  wage  a  war  of  iron  against  gold.  We 
must  ruin  the  commerce  of  our  enemies,  and  in  order 
to  remove  all  opportunity  of  reprisals  we  must  suspend 
our  own  commerce.  Our  shipbuilding  yards  must  build 
nothing  but  corsairs,  and  our  manufactories  turn  out 
nothing  but  munitions  of  war."  British  seamen,  on 
their  part,  responded  with  the  audacity  expected  of 
them.  Not  only  were  our  frigates  and  sloops  engaged  in 
constantly  harrying  the  enemy  and  capturing  his  ships 
wherever  they  showed  the  flag,  but  our  forces  afloat  were 
reinforced  by  hundreds  of  vessels,  manned  by  British 
merchant  seamen,  which  sailed  from  British  ports  under 
letters  of  marque.  Liverpool  alone  had  sixty-seven 
privateers  armed  and  manned,  at  sea  or  ready  for  sea,  four 
months  after  the  outbreak  of  war.1  Numbers  were  fitted 
out  afterwards  in  the  Thames  and  at  east  and  south 
coast  ports,  and  operated  in  the  North  Sea  and  on  more 
distant  cruising  grounds.  The  significant  admission  was 
made  by  the  enemy,  after  six  years  of  war,  that  "  not  a 
single  merchant  vessel  sailed  under  the  French  flag."  2 

The  challenge  made  to  our  predominance  at  sea  by  the 
French  Navy,  revived  under  Napoleon,  does  not  call  for 
consideration  here,  but  the  circumstances  of  the  two  rival 
Powers  at  the  outset  coloured  the  whole  conditions  of  the 
war.  If  unable  to  fight  a  fleet  action,  France,  by  reason 
of  her  geographical  position,  her  long  coasts,  with  so 
many  favourably-placed  sally  ports,  and  her  large  maritime 
population,  was  more  favourably  situated  than  any  other 
Power  in  the  world  to  conduct  a  campaign  against  British 
maritime  commerce.  Those  of  her  peaceful  trading  ships 

1  Gomer  Williams,  The  Liverpool  Privateers. 

2  Message  to  the  Directory,  January  1799. 


46  MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE  PAST  [CH.JL 

which  escaped  capture  by  British  cruisers,  or  in  close 
pursuit  were  driven  into  her  ports,  effected  a  quick  trans- 
formation. France  had  in  the  sturdy  Norman  and  Breton 
populations  of  her  coasts,  inured  to  the  hardships  of  life 
at  sea  and  already  made  familiar  with  war,  a  striking  force 
ready  to  be  used,  and  they  were  not  content  to  remain 
idle  while  rich  rewards  were  within  their  grasp.  In 
hundreds  French  merchant  ships  were  armed  and  trans- 
formed into  privateers,  new  craft  specially  designed  for 
speed  were  laid  down  in  the  yards,  and,  sailing  with  letters 
of  marque,  they  harried  the  long  lines  of  British  ships 
beating  up  the  English  channel  or  traversing  the  North 
Sea  routes.  Into  the  single  port  of  Dunkirk  thirty-six 
English  prizes  were  brought  within  three  months  of  the 
outbreak  of  war.  No  fewer  than  407  English  prizes  were 
sold  in  that  port  alone  before  the  Peace  of  Amiens  brought 
the  first  pause  in  the  war.  The  enterprise  or  greed  of 
profit  by  owners  was  seconded  by  public  subscriptions. 
A  club  at  Strasburg  fitted  out  a  corsair,  the  Jacobin,  which 
effectively  raided  British  trade.  The  municipality  of 
Bordeaux  equipped  three  corsairs,  one  of  which,  the  General 
Dumourier,  in  her  first  cruise,  returned  with  prizes  valued 
at  £240,000.  Blank  letters  of  marque  were  issued  to  the 
Commissionaires  of  Marine  in  every  port  of  France,  and 
from  Dunkirk  to  St.  Jean  de  Luz  the  coast  was  studded 
with  companies  whose  sole  aim  and  object  was  the  de- 
struction of  English  commerce.1 

The  more  venturesome  French  corsairs,  better  equipped 
and  fitted,  and  commanded  by  men  whose  daring  won  for 
them  a  warm  place  in  the  hearts  of  their  countrymen,  lay 
in  wait  for  the  valuable  cargoes  passing  to  and  from  India 
and  the  East,  and  the  highly  important  trade  carried  on 
between  England  and  the  West  Indies.  France  brought 
into  this  service  swift  sailing  ships,  powerfully  armed. 
One  of  these  privateers,  the  Bordelais,  captured  in  1799, 
had  operated  at  no  greater  distance  than  Tory  Island, 
about  which  she  had  done  great  damage  in  the  previous 
summer.  Her  keel  was  as  long  as  that  of  our  38-gun 
frigates,  she  was  pierced  for  twenty- two  guns  on  deck,  had 
twenty-four  brass  12-pounders  mounted,  and  carried  a  crew 
numbering  222  men.  The  Bordelais  was  conducted  into 
Cork  by  His  Majesty's  ship  REVOLUTIONNAIRE,  after  having 

1  Norman,  The  Corsairs  of  France,  p.  292. 


CH.  i]  CONDITIONS   IN  THE  CHANNEL  47 

been  chased  129  miles  in  nine  and  a  half  hours,  being  finally 
overhauled  in  a  gale  of  wind.1 

As  often  before  in  her  history,  England  at  the  outbreak 
of  war  was  unready.  Nearly  six  months  passed  before 
the  Channel  Fleet,  under  Lord  Howe,  got  to  sea.  Near 
home,  in  the  early  days  of  the  struggle,  it  was  believed 
that  British  merchant  shipping  was  best  protected  by  the 
concentration  of  a  main  fleet  in  the  vicinity  of  Torbay, 
with  a  reserve  fleet  off  the  Isle  of  Wight.  Frigates 
watched  Brest  and  other  French  ports,  and  a  constant 
patrol  was  maintained.  This  disposition  was  afterwards 
varied,  the  blockade  of  Brest  being  made  still  closer,  and 
two  separate  squadrons  were  formed,  with  bases  at  Spithead 
and  the  North  Sea.  The  sealing  of  French  outlets  could 
rarely,  however,  as  experience  showed,  be  made  effective 
against  raiding  craft. 

The  configuration  of  the  opposing  coasts  of  France  and 
England  and  the  small  distances  to  be  traversed  by 
fast-sailing  raiders  added  greatly  to  the  perplexity  of  the 
problem  confronting  the  British  Admiralty.  The  English 
Channel  has  nowhere  a  greater  width  than  one  hundred 
miles,  and  at  the  neck  narrows  to  twenty  miles  ;  and 
though  the  North  Sea  offered  a  broader  expanse,  the  English 
coast  was  quickly  reached  from  the  northern  ports  of 
France  and  the  Netherlands.  The  English  south  coast  is 
poorly  provided  with  natural  havens,  and  in  certain  winds 
no  shelter  was  to  be  obtained  between  Portsmouth  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  Downs  on  the  other.  Newhaven  had 
not  been  developed  into  a  port,  nor  had  even  a  light  been 
placed  there.  Opposite  were  the  French  ports  of  Cher- 
bourg and  Havre,  with  St.  Malo,  Boulogne,  Calais,  and 
Dunkirk,  all  within  easy  access  of  the  trade  routes  ;  all 
offered  admirable  shelter  to  the  French  privateer  able  to 
wait  a  favourable  wind  and  opportunity.  The  concavity 
of  the  English  land-line,  especially  the  long  stretch  from 
Selsey  Bill  to  Beachy  Head,  the  dangerous  shore,  the 
impossibility  of  weathering  a  southerly  gale  upon  it  at 
anchor,  and  the  great  want  of  lights  and  of  convenient 
harbourage,  all  added  to  the  perils  to  which  British  ships 
congregating  there  were  exposed.  If  making  a  large  offing 
to  escape  the  bay,  they  ran  imminent  risks  from  privateers 
which  sallied  out  from  the  ports  of  Normandy.  LeVille,  of 

1  Naval  Chronicle,  ii,  535. 


48          THE    MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST    [CH.  i 

Dunkirk,  one  of  the  most  daring  of  these  commanders, 
cruising  in  the  Channel  in  the  privateer  Vengeance,  and 
eluding  British  warships  on  watch,  in  five  weeks  of  the 
autumn  of  1795  made  no  fewer  than  twenty  English  prizes. 

The  most  urgent  call  for  naval  ships  being  about  the 
British  coasts  and  in  the  West  Indies,  the  Indian  seas  were 
left  unprotected.  When  Admiral  Cornwallis  sailed  for 
Europe  with  his  small  squadron  in  September  1793,  a 
single  sloop-of-war  remained  to  protect  the  vast  expanse 
of  ocean  covered  by  the  commerce  of  the  East  India 
Company  l ;  his  successor  did  not  reach  the  station  till  a 
year  later.  In  such  circumstances  severe  losses  were 
inevitable.  They  were,  however,  less  severe  than  might 
have  been  expected.  The  Indiamen  of  a  century  ago  were 
the  monarchs  of  the  seas,  stout  ships  of  800  to  1,200  tons, 
some  reaching  1,500  tons,  fast  sailers,  better  armed  and 
manned  than  any  others  flying  the  mercantile  flag,  and 
capable  of  giving  a  good  account  of  themselves  in  an 
encounter  with  any  interfering  craft  short  of  an  enemy 
frigate.  The  East  India  Company,  too,  fitted  out  several 
heavily- armed  ships  to  cruise  for  the  protection  of  trade. 
The  fleets  engaged  in  the  commerce  carried  on  with  the 
West  Indies  in  sugar,  coffee,  rum,  and  other  colonial 
produce — and  in  this  connection  slaves  must  not  be 
omitted — offered  an  easier  prey  for  the  larger  class  of 
French  privateer  fitted  for  long  voyages  and  ocean  service, 
and  facilitated  raids  upon  the  traffic  to  and  from  the  West 
Indies,  varied  with  irruptions  upon  the  routes  to  India. 
To  such  attacks  on  commerce,  the  more  daring  of  the 
French  corsairs — men  like  the  famous  Robert  Surcouf, 
of  St.  Malo — devoted  their  restless  energies. 

The  fine  spirit  in  which  these  attacks  were  met  by  British 
merchant  seamen  is  manifested  in  the  records  of  a  hundred 
actions  fought  about  the  islands  out  in  the  Atlantic.  This 
one  is  typical.  The  British  ship  Planter,  in  the  year 
1799,  was  overhauled  by  a  fast  sailer.  Captain  John 
Watts,  her  "commander,  backed  his  mainsail  and  laid  by 
for  the  enemy,  all  hands  giving  three  cheers.  "  We  found 
her,"  he  says,  "  to  be  a  privateer  of  twenty-two  guns, 
twelves,  nines,  and  sixes,  with  small  arms  in  the  tops,  and 
full  of  men.  We  poured  in  our  lagrische,  and  used  grape- 
shot  with  great  success."  The  privateer  sheered  off  to 

1  Brenton's  Naval  History,  i,  340. 


CH.  i]  ACTIONS   WITH   PRIVATEERS  49 

repair  damage.  The  action  recommenced,  and  was  fought 
with  great  gallantry  throughout  the  afternoon  till  the 
light  waned.  Captain  Watts  adds  in  a  letter  to  his 
owners  : 

"  At  last  he  found  we  would  not  give  out,  and  night 
coming  on,  sheered  off  and  stood  to  the  south-west.  Our 
fire  must  have  done  great  execution.  My  ship's  company 
acted  with  a  degree  of  courage  which  does  credit  to  the 
flag.  I  cannot  help  mentioning  the  good  conduct  of  my 
passengers  during  the  action  :  Mr.  McKennon  and  Mr. 
Hodgson,  with  small  arms,  stood  to  their  quarters  with 
a  degree  of  noble  spirit ;  my  two  lady  passengers,  Mrs. 
McDowell  and  Miss  Mary  Hartley,  kept  conveying  the 
cartridges  from  the  magazine  to  the  deck,  and  were  very 
attentive  to  the  wounded,  both  during  and  after  the  action, 
in  dressing  their  wounds  and  administering  every  comfort 
the  ship  could  afford,  in  which  we  were  not  deficient  for  a 
merchant  ship.  When  he  sheered  off  we  saw  him  heaving 
dead  bodies  overboard  in  abundance.  We  had  four  killed, 
eight  wounded.  The  force  of  the  Planter  was  twelve 
9-pounders  and  six  6-pounders — forty- three  men."  l 

It  was  the  common  object  of  a  privateer-captain  wherever 
possible  to  effect  a  boarding.  The  advantage  lay  with  him 
in  his  superior  numbers  of  men,  trained  in  the  use  of  arms 
and  excited  by  the  prospect  of  a  prize,  while  the  merchant- 
man's crew  was  generally  weaker,  and  many  a  bloody  fight 
was  waged  on  the  narrow  decks.  A  letter  from  Barbadoes 
of  December  1st,  1798,  describes  such  an  action,  fought 
most  gallantly,  and  in  this  instance  successfully,  by  the 
Liverpool  ship  Barton  (Captain  Cutler),  after  being  over- 
hauled twenty  leagues  to  windward  by  a  French  privateer 
mounting  eighteen  guns,  9-pounders  and  6-pounders.  The 
chase  lasted  two  and  a  half  hours,  the  privateer  repeatedly 
altering  her  course  to  board,  but  the  heavy  and  well-directed 
fire  from  the  British  ship  prevented  her  from  getting  near 
enough  to  effect  her  purpose.  Dismantled  in  her  rigging, 
the  enemy  sheered  off. 

"  But  having  refitted,  commenced  a  second  attack  at  noon, 
with  a  most  sanguinary  design  of  boarding,  and  notwith- 

1  Naval  Chronicle,  ii,  250. 


50         THE   MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST      [CH.  i 

standing  the  incessant  cannonading  from  the  ship,  ran 
plump  on  board,  and  endeavoured  to  throw  her  men  into 
her,  but  found  her  well  prepared  to  receive  the  enemy, 
the  whole  of  Barton's  crew  being  assembled  on  the  quarter- 
deck, and  headed  by  their  gallant  commander,  who  was 
spiritedly  seconded  by  his  passengers.  An  attack,  sword 
in  hand,  commenced,  and  the  enemy  were  driven  back  with 
considerable  loss,  many  of  them  being  spiked  from  the 
netting  and  shrouds  of  the  ship,  while  by  a  well-directed 
fire  from  the  cabin  guns,  numbers  were  swept  from  their 
own  deck  ;  and  a  great  part  of  her  rigging  being  cut  away 
she  dropped  astern  and  gave  over  the  contest,  amidst  the 
victorious  huzzahs  of  the  British  tars,  whose  bold  com- 
mander, calling  from  his  quarter-deck,  defied  the  van- 
quished Republicans  to  return  to  the  attack.  His 
passengers  bear  a  proportionate  share  of  the  honour  with 
the  captain."  1 

After  such  adventures  in  the  open  sea  many  a  stout 
merchantman  returned  to  port,  badly  mauled,  for  repairs, 
but  ship  and  cargo  saved  by  the  dauntless  conduct  of 
officers  and  crew. 

The  geographical  position  of  the  French  West  India 
Islands  favoured  the  operations  of  the  raiders,  affording 
bases  into  which  prizes  could  be  taken,  and  from  which 
cruisers  and  privateers  could  sally  out  quickly  upon  the 
trade  routes,  besides  offering  shelter  and  opportunity  for 
refitting.  Around  these  islands  the  war  on  commerce  was 
carried  on  with  ever-increasing  British  losses,  and  the 
necessity  of  protecting  this  trade  involved  the  detachment 
of  large  numbers  of  frigates  and  sloops  which  were  badly 
needed  for  service  elsewhere.  The  seizure  one  after 
another  of  all  the  French  islands  eventually  checked  the 
depredations,  though  it  was  found  impossible  to  stop  them 
altogether.  Driven  from  their  own  lairs,  French  privateers 
fitted  out  in  American  ports,  whence  they  sailed  under  a 
thin  disguise  to  resume  their  predatory  warfare  upon 
British  merchantmen. 

The  guarding  of  the  long  ocean  routes  to  India  and  China 
offered  far  greater  perplexities  to  the  British  Admiralty. 
As  the  years  went  on,  the  French  made  ever  more  deter- 
mined efforts  to  cut  our  trading  connections,  strengthening 

1  Naval  Chronicle,  i,  437. 


CH.  i]  A  PICTURE   OF   SEA  TRAFFIC  51 

their  already  powerful  patrols  of  cruising  frigates  and 
sloops  with  ships  of  the  line.  The  concentration  of  a 
considerable  fleet  under  Rear- Admiral  Sir  Edward  Pellew, 
afterwards  Lord  Exmouth,  resulted  in  the  losses  being  kept 
within  bounds,  but  throughout  the  long  war  the  Eastern 
trade  routes  were  the  scenes  of  some  of  the  most  desperately 
contested  actions  between  British  and  French  frigates  and 
our  armed  merchantmen  and  raiding  privateers.  The  need 
for  protection  of  the  large  British  trade  with  the  Baltic 
and  that  with  America  were  other  causes  which  made 
necessary  the  dissipation  of  British  naval  strength  over 
many  distant  seas. 

When  all  has  been  said,  however,  the  area  of  the 
gravest  peril  was  the  waters  about  our  own  coasts,  for  there 
the  greatest  part  of  our  commerce  borne  by  the  merchant 
fleets  necessarily  congregated.  Mahan  has  drawn  in  lively 
fashion  a  picture  of  the  seas  in  Napoleonic  times  : 

"  Fast  frigates  and  sloops-of-war,  with  a  host  of  smaller 
vessels,  were  disseminated  over  the  ocean,  upon  the  tracks 
which  commerce  follows  and  to  which  the  hostile  cruisers 
were  therefore  constrained.  To  each  was  assigned  his 
cruising-ground,  the  distribution  being  regulated  by  the 
comparative  dangers,  and  by  the  necessary  accumulation 
of  merchant  shipping  in  particular  localities,  as  in  the 
North  Sea,  the  approach  to  the  English  Channel,  and, 
generally,  the  centres  to  which  the  routes  of  commerce 
converge.  The  forces  thus  especially  assigned  to  patrol 
duty,  the  ships  '  on  a  cruise,'  to  use  the  technical  expression, 
were  casually  increased  by  the  large  number  of  vessels 
going  backward  and  forward  between  England  and  their 
respective  stations,  dispatch  boats,  ships  going  in  for 
repairs  or  returning  from  them,  so  that  the  seas  about 
Europe  were  alive  with  British  cruisers  ;  each  one  of  which 
was  wide  awake  for  prizes.  To  these,  again,  were  added 
the  many  privateers,  whose  cruising-ground  was  not, 
indeed,  assigned  by  the  Government,  but  which  were 
constrained  in  their  choice  by  the  same  conditions  that 
dictated  at  once  the  course  of  the  trader  and  the  lair  of  the 
commerce-destroyer.  Through  this  cloud  of  friends  and 
foes  the  unprotected  merchantman  had  to  run  the  gauntlet, 
trusting  to  his  heels.  If  he  were  taken,  all,  indeed,  was 
not  lost,  for  there  remained  the  chance  of  recapture  by  a 


52          THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

friendly  cruiser  ;  but  in  that  case  the  salvage  made  a  large 
deduction  from  the  profits  of  the  voyage."  1 

The  unprotected  merchantman  making  his  way  over 
seas  covered  with  friends  and  foes  was  a  reality  ;  but  this 
was  not  the  typical  British  commerce-bearer.  Always  there 
was  the  individual  owner  willing  to  take  the  greater  risks 
in  order  to  earn  enhanced  profits,  trusting  to  speed  and 
good  luck  to  avoid  capture  by  the  enemy,  and  crews  were 
ready  for  high  wage  to  tempt  Fortune  on  an  adventure. 
Such  vessels  were  the  constant  cause  of  attention  by  and 
anxiety  to  the  patrols  which  the  Admiralty  found  itself 
forced  to  maintain.  But  the  bulk  of  British  ocean-borne 
commerce  was  not  left  to  the  hazard  of  chance.  Convoy 
was  offered  and  accepted  ;  and  the  merchantmen  outward 
sailing  or  congregating  near  our  coasts  were  mostly  gathered 
in  large  fleets.  Every  such  convoy  involved  delay  in  the 
assembling  of  the  ships  ;  the  speed  of  the  fastest  craft 
sailing  in  the  company  was  brought  down  to  that  of  the 
slowest ;  and  the  simultaneous  arrival  of  many  ships  in 
port  threw  large  cargoes  upon  a  choked  market,  thus 
tending  to  lower  prices  and  reduce  profits.  It  was  the 
elimination  of  these  effects  in  the  balance-sheet  that  made 
the  daring  individual  voyage  so  attractive.  The  evasions 
of  convoy,  and  the  many  losses  of  ships  and  seamen 
consequent  upon  them,  led  to  the  passing  of  the  Convoy 
Acts  in  1798  and  1803,  which  compelled  ship-masters  to 
take  convoy  and  to  pay  a  certain  sum  for  the  protection 
afforded.  The  beneficial  results  were  at  once  apparent  in 
the  fall  of  insurance  rates,  and  in,  what  was  more  important 
to  the  nation,  fewer  captures  of  ships  and  men. 

British  convoys  during  the  Napoleonic  Wars  reached 
the  most  unwieldy  dimensions,  and  the  fine  spectacle  such 
as  a  cluster  of  sail  made  at  sea  was  well  calculated  to  rouse 
enthusiasm  in  every  British  heart.  Admiral  Sir  William 
Parker,  when  a  young  midshipman  in  the  ORION  in  1794, 
in  a  letter  to  his  mother  says  : 

"  We  left  Torbay  on  the  13th,  Saturday,  and  the  next 
day  were  off  Plymouth,  where  the  convoy  came  out  to  us. 
It  was  the  grandest  sight  ever  was,  a  convoy  of  six  hundred 
sail,  besides  thirty-six  line- of -battle  ships.  The  wind  was 

Influence  of  Sea  Power  on  the  French  Revolution,  ii,  204-5. 


CH.  i]          CONVOY  OF  A  THOUSAND   SHIPS  53 

quite  fair  and  a  fine  evening  :  as  soon  as  the  convoy  was 
all  out,  it  came  on  so  fine  a  breeze  that  we  went  eight  miles 
an  hour,  without  a  stitch  of  sail  set ;  in  fact,  in  three  days, 
they  were  all  so  far  to  southward  that  they  were  out  of  all 
danger ;  and  so  we  hauled  off.  .  .  .  Captain  Duckworth 
says  if  I  live  to  be  one  of  the  oldest  Admirals,  it  is  ten 
thousand  to  one  if  I  ever  see  so  large  a  convoy  carried  so 
far  to  the  westward,  and  without  the  least  accident,  and 
the  wind  fair  enough  to  bring  us  back  again  in  so  short 
a  time."  i 

A  stupendous  convoy  of  no  fewer  than  a  thousand  ships 
was  gathered  in  October  of  the  same  year  in  The  Belt, 
when  Admiral  Sir  James  (afterwards  Lord)  de  Saumarez, 
on  board  the  VICTORY,  sailed  with  it,  homeward  bound  from 
Swedish  waters.  An  eyewitness  has  described  the  vast 
assemblage  in  the  following  passage : 

"  A  scene  scTnovel  conveyed  some  idea  of  the  wealth 
and  power  oy  the  British  nation — a  most  beautiful  and 
wonderful  sight.  The  day  was  very  fine ;  the  fleet  was 
anchored  in  a  close  compact  body,  with  the  VICTORY  in  the 
centre,  bearing  the  Admiral's  red  flag  at  the  fore,  sur- 
rounded by  six  ships  of  the  line  and  six  frigates,  and  sloops 
disposed  for  the  complete  protection  of  the  convoy.  The 
yacht,  with  a  Swedish  flag,  containing  the  Crown  Prince 
passed  through  ;  the  convoy  soon  after  weighed  anchor, 
when  the  Royal  stranger  had  the  pleasure  of  seeing  them 
all  under  sail  and  proceeding  to  their  destination,  regardless 
of  the  enemies  who  occupied  the  adjacent  shores."  8 

The  congregation  of  so  many  ships  in  a  single  convoy 
and  a  scene  like  that  above  described  convey  a  better 
idea  of  the  importance  of  the  British  merchant  fleets  a 
century  ago  than  any  elaboration  of  figures.  Small  though 
the  wooden  sailing-ships  were,  their  management  required 
the  signing  on  of  large  crews,  and  the  population  afloat 
was  nearly  three  times  as  numerous  as  would  be  required 
to  carry  the  same  trade  in  days  of  steam-power  and 
improved  mechanical  appliances. 

1  Phillimore,  Life  of  Admiral  Sir  William  Parker,  i,  39-40.    . 

2  Ross,   Memoirs  and   Correspondence  of  Admiral  Lord  de  Saumarez, 
ii.  214-5. 


54          THE  MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

The  attack  by  the  enemy  was  not  only  against  ships 
and  cargoes,  but  also  against  the  seamen.  Happily,  the 
barbarities  which  attended  submarine  warfare,  as  prac- 
tised by  the  Germans  in  the  European  War,  were  then 
unknown.  Ships  were  not  sunk  at  sight,  and  merchant 
sailors — often,  as  well,  passengers,  delicate  women  and 
helpless  children — left  adrift  in  open  boats  at  the  mercy 
of  the  ocean,  the  gale,  and  the  biting  frost,  sometimes  when 
hundreds  of  miles  from  land.  Spurlos  versenken  as  a  policy 
of  warfare  had  not  been  invented.  But  the  merchant 
seaman  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars  was  liable  to  capture  and 
confinement  till  the  end  of  the  war  or  exchange,  and  this 
peril  was  ever  present  with  him  when  he  went  to  sea.  He 
knew  the  risk,  and  accepted  it,  as  seamen  of  the  Great  War 
of  the  twentieth  century  faced  without  flinching  the  far 
more  serious  risks  of  loss  of  life  by  torpedo  and  shell-fire  or 
drowning,  or  maiming  by  exposure  to  frost-bite.  The  prac- 
tice of  confining  captured  merchant  seamen  was  adopted 
by  both  belligerents,  for  in  days  of  simple  armaments  the 
trained  merchant  seaman  was  already  more  than  half  a 
fighting  man,  and  his  transformation  into  an  efficient  naval 
rating  was  quickly  accomplished.  The  Royal  Navy  was 
largely  manned  by  men  recruited  from  the  merchant 
ships,  so  the  capture  and  detention  of  peaceful  seamen 
by  the  enemy  served  him  in  a  double  purpose — by  injuring 
British  carrying  trade  and  by  withholding  a  potential 
source  of  strength  from  the  Navy. 

Mention  has  been  made  of  the  large  size  of  the  East 
India  Company's  ships,  rising  to  1,300  registered  tonnage, 
and  in  a  few  exceptional  instances  to  as  much  as  1,500 
tons.  Such  vessels  exceeded  the  dimensions  of  a  first-class 
frigate,  and  were  almost  equivalent  to  a  small  ship  of  the 
line.  Early  in  the  war  their  armament  was  increased  by 
the  addition  of  1 8-pound ers,  and  they  were  able  to  put 
up  a  good  fight  with  any  raiding  corsair.  These  were, 
however,  exceptions  in  our  carrying  trade — a  class  by 
themselves.  The  traffic  between  America  and  Europe 
was  mostly  done  in  vessels  not  exceeding  300  tons.  From 
Macpherson's  tables,  quoted  by  Admiral  Mahan,  it  appears 
that  the  ships  trading  to  the  West  Indies  and  the  Baltic, 
between  1792  and  1800,  averaged  about  250  tons  ;  to 
Germany,  to  Italy,  and  the  Western  Mediterranean,  about 
150  tons ;  to  the  Levant,  250  to  300  tons,  with  a  few 


CH.  i]         TONNAGE   OF  BRITISH  SHIPPING  55 

of  500  tons.  Even  by  throwing  into  the  scale  the  East 
India  Company's  ships  (averaging  about  800  tons),  the 
general  average  of  British  shipping  is  reduced  to  as  low 
as  125  tons,  owing  partly  to  the  small  capacity  of  the  large 
number  of  vessels  engaged  in  the  Irish  trade.  In  1796 
there  were  13,558  entries  and  clearances  from  English  and 
Scottish  ports  for  Ireland,  and  the  average  size  of  these 
ships  was  only  80  tons.  A  similar  average  is  found  from 
the  returns  of  the  Irish  trade  in  1806.  Other  indications 
in  the  naval  literature  of  the  time  confirm  the  small  size 
of  both  our  own  and  enemy  shipping.  Thus  Sir  William 
Parker,  when  an  active  frigate  captain  commanding  a 
single  ship  from  the  year  1801  to  1811,  was  in  that  period 
interested  in  fifty-two  prizes,  the  average  tonnage  of  which, 
excluding  a  ship  of  the  line  and  a  frigate,  was  126  tons.1 
Vessels  engaged  in  the  British  coastal  traffic  were  still 
smaller ;  of  6,844  coasters  which  entered  or  left  the  port 
of  London  in  the  year  1798,  excluding  the  colliers — which, 
as  a  class,  were  of  larger  build — the  average  size  was  only 
73  tons.2 

Such  was  the  type  of  vessel  dotted  about  the  oceans  of 
the  world.  The  merchant  seaman  of  the  day  was  a  much 
harried  individual,  living  the  life  of  a  fugitive,  dreading 
not  only  capture  by  the  enemy,  but  almost  as  much  capture 
by  the  ships  of  war  of  his  own  country.  Ashore  or  afloat 
the  trained  seaman,  so  much  sought  after,  was  never  free 
from  the  attentions  of  the  press-gang,  which  was  the 
ultimate  method  of  enforcing  compulsory  service  in  the 
Fleet  on  those  who  tried  to  avoid  it.  In  the  street,  in 
the  tavern,  in  his  own  home,  the  merchant  seaman  was 
marked  down  for  seizure.  He  had  no  redress ;  the  appeal 
which  was  supposed  to  shield  him  against  injustice  existed 
only  in  the  letter.  At  night  he  was  dragged  out  of  his  bed, 
to  be  herded  with  a  crowd  of  others,  awaiting  distribution 
among  the  King's  ships.  Close  as  was  the  man-hunt 
ashore,  it  was  not  less  keen  afloat.  The  sailors  in  the 
Merchant  Service  had  to  run  the  gauntlet  for  their  liberty 
from  one  end  of  the  world  to  the  other.  A  British  ship- 
of-war,  falling  in  with  a  merchant  vessel  in  any  part  of  the 
globe,  would  unceremoniously  take  from  her  the  best 
seamen,  leaving  her  just  enough  hands  to  bring  her  home. 

1  Life  of  Admiral  Sir  William  Parker,  i,  412. 

2  Colquhoun's  Commerce  of  the  Thames,  p.  13. 


56          THE   MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

As  the  vessel  approached  the  English  shore  our  cruisers, 
hovering  in  all  directions,  would  take  the  pick  of  the 
remainder.  An  old  Liverpool  sea-captain,  in  reminiscences 
of  the  closeness  of  the  press  in  that  port,  has  declared  that 
such  was  the  dread  of  the  ever-active  press-gangs  ashore 
that  homecoming  seamen  would  often  take  to  their  boats 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Black  Rock,  that  they  might 
conceal  themselves  in  Cheshire,  and  many  a  vessel  had  to 
be  brought  into  Liverpool  by  a  lot  of  riggers  and  carpenters, 
sent  round  by  the  owner  for  that  purpose.1 

Many  a  merchant  seaman  figuring  as  "volunteer"  was 
a  pressed  man,  so  described  to  get  him  the  bounty,  and 
others,  when  the  emergency  arose,  volunteered  to  assure 
themselves  of  the  bounty,  knowing  that  they  were  liable 
to  be  impressed,  and  that  the  chances  of  escape  were 
remote.  Many  men  hid  from  the  press-gangs  while 
waiting  for  the  offer  of  a  bounty,  which  followed  after 
compulsion  had  done  its  best.  The  importance  of  im- 
pressment in  the  scheme  for  manning  the  Royal  Navy 
can  best  be  judged  from  the  establishment  which  was 
kept  up  for  this  service  alone.  In  1793-4,  the  first  year 
of  the  long  French  Wars,  when  impressment  was  by  no 
means  at  its  height,  nor  was  the  Royal  Navy  maintained 
at  anything  comparable  to  its  subsequent  strength,  there 
were  three  flag  officers,  twenty-nine  captains,  fifty-four 
lieutenants,  employed  in  the  impress  service,  with  over 
4,000  men — and  on  occasions  many  more.2 

The  rigour  which  marked  the  impressment  on  some 
occasions  when  men  were  badly  wanted  for  the  Royal 
Navy — and  the  want  was  never  satisfied — is  sufficiently 
illustrated  by  two  quotations  from  the  newspapers  of 
the  day : 

"  The  impress  service,  particularly  in  the  metropolis, 
has  proved  uncommonly  productive  in  the  number  of 
excellent  seamen.  The  returns  at  the  Admiralty  of  the 
seamen  impressed  on  Tuesday  night  amounted  to  1,080, 
of  whom  no  less  than  two-thirds  are  considered  prime 
hands.  At  Portsmouth,  Portsea,  Gosport,  and  Cowes,  a 
general  press  took  place  the  same  night.  Every  merchant 
ship  in  the  harbour  and  at  Spithead  was  stripped  of  its 

1  Gomer  Williams,  The  Liverpool  Privateers,  p.  320. 

2  Steel's  Navy  List,  1 794. 


CH.  i]  THE   WAR  AFTER  TRAFALGAR  57 

hands,  and  all  the  watermen  deemed  fit  for  His  Majesty's 
service  were  carried  off.  Upwards  of  600  seamen  were 
collected  in  consequence  of  the  promptitude  of  the  mea- 
sures adopted.  .  .  .  Government,  we  understand,  relied 
upon  increasing  our  naval  force  with  10,000  seamen,  either 
volunteers  or  impressed  men,  in  less  than  a  fortnight,  in 
consequence  of  the  exertions  which  they  are  making  in  all 
the  principal  ports.  .  .  .  Several  frigates  and  gun-brigs 
have  sailed  for  the  Islands  of  Jersey  and  Guernsey,  with 
impress  warrants."  l 

14  The  impress  on  the  Thames  on  Saturday,  both  above 
and  below  the  bridge,  was  the  hottest  that  has  been  for 
some  time ;  the  boats  belonging  to  the  ships  at  Deptford 
were  particularly  active,  and  it  is  supposed  they  obtained 
upwards  of  200  men.  .  .  .  The  impressed  men,  for  whom 
there  was  no  room  on  board  the  ENTERPRIZE  on  Saturday, 
were  put  into  the  Tower,  and  the  gates  shut  to  prevent 
any  of  them  effecting  their  escape."  z 

The  epoch  of  fleet  actions  between  the  British  and  French 
navies  closed  with  the  victory  of  Trafalgar.  England  had, 
thanks  to  her  isolation  by  sea  and  her  naval  supremacy, 
maintained  her  independence  and  enlarged  her  Empire, 
while  on  the  Continent  State  after  State  was  tumbling  to 
ruin  and  vassalage.  Yet  the  cost  had  been  a  heavy  one. 
Her  merchant  shipping  had  undergone  devastation,  though, 
thanks  to  the  activity  of  her  shipyards  and  her  own 
wealth,  the  losses  were  more  than  made  good.  In  the 
struggle  lasting  over  twelve  and  a  half  years,  broken 
by  one  brief  interval  of  peace,  England  had  lost  some 
6,500  ships  by  capture.  In  the  single  year  1797  the 
statistics  show  947  vessels  captured — a  number,  happily, 
far  higher  than  in  any  other  year,  and  only  approached  in 
1799,  when  the  captures  are  returned  at  730.  In  the 
single  month  of  June  1797  no  fewer  than  106  ships  were 
placed  upon  the  lists  of  prizes  taken  from  us. 

Trafalgar  signalised  the  beginning  of  a  yet  more 
intense  attack  upon  Britain's  ocean-borne  commerce. 
Napoleon,  defeated  in  his  efforts  to  oppose  British  naval 
strength  at  sea,  despoiled  of  all  hopes  of  effecting  such  a 
naval  concentration  as  should  make  the  invasion  of 
England  a  practicable  task,  sought  other  means  to  accom- 

1  The  Times,  March  llth,  1803.  3  Ibid.,  May  9th,  1803. 


58          THE  MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

plish  the  downfall  of  his  chief  adversary.  The  Berlin  and 
Milan  Decrees  of  1806  and  1807  aimed  to  shut  out  from 
the  Continent  all  British  commerce,  and,  by  causing  wide- 
spread ruin  at  home,  to  undermine  the  strength  of  the 
great  Power  against  which,  on  sea  and  land,  he  had  fought 
in  vain.  The  Emperor,  unable  to  keep  a  ship  at  sea  except 
for  such  a  time  as  it  could  elude  the  stronger  forces  of  his 
opponent,  declared  a  blockade  of  Great  Britain.  The 
British  Ministers  retorted  by  the  famous  Orders  in  Council 
which  forbade  all  neutral  vessels  to  trade  between  the 
ports  belonging  to  the  enemy  and  his  allies,  and  sought 
to  divert  the  world's  trade  through  England.  From 
Trafalgar  onwards  the  French  fleets,  though  continually 
enlarged,  never  deliberately  attacked,  and  at  sea,  as  in 
the  earlier  Revolutionary  period,  the  struggle  again  became 
that  of  a  guerre  de  course. 

It  was  conducted  with  the  extraordinary  thoroughness 
and  vigour  which  Napoleon,  enjoying  complete  mastery 
over  France,  was  able  to  employ  in  all  his  schemes. 
Nothing  was  permitted  to  stand  in  his  way.  Under  his 
impulse  the  French  fleet  soon  became  stronger  in  material 
than  it  had  been  since  the  opening  of  the  war ;  and  the 
new  fleet  was  created  with  a  single  object.1 

Nelson's  one  call  throughout  his  commands  had  been 
for  more  frigates — always  more  frigates.  The  larger 
number  of  them  were  employed  on  the  protection  of  trade, 
and  the  shortage  of  cruising- vessels  with  the  battle  fleets — 
whose  eyes  they  were — due  to  this  cause,  had  a  marked 
influence  on  many  of  the  most  important  engagements. 
With  the  disappearance  of  fleet  actions,  the  smaller  ships 
were  able  to  give  less  divided  attention  to  trade  protection, 
but  there  still  remained  work  for  the  larger  vessels.  The 
French,  for  instance,  detached  several  ships  of  the  line 
to  support  the  determined  attacks  they  made  on  the  Indian 
trade  routes,  and  our  own  squadrons  had  similarly  to  be 
reinforced.  England,  after  Trafalgar,  devoted  her  chief 
energies  in  shipbuilding  to  launching  increasing  numbers 
of  frigates  and  sloops.  This  growth  in  the  number  of 
cruising-ships  actually  employed  on  sea  service,  whilst 
the  number  of  ships  of  the  line  remained  practically 
stationary,  is  shown  in  the  following  table  :  * 

1  Brenton's  Naval  History. 

2  Journal  of  Royal  United  Service  Institution,  April  1913. 


CH.  i]       BRITISH   PACKET'S   GALLANT  FIGHT 


59 


1804. 

1805. 

1806. 

1807. 

1808. 

1809. 

1810. 

1811. 

1812. 

1813. 

1814. 

Ships  of  the 

Line 

75 

83 

104 

103 

113 

113 

108 

107 

102 

102 

99 

Cruisers 

356 

473 

551 

606 

618 

684 

666 

620 

584 

570 

594 

The  disposition  of  naval  ships  for  the  protection  of  trade 
necessarily  underwent  considerable  modification.  Squad- 
rons of  large  frigates  were  kept  constantly  at  sea,  ranging 
from  Cherbourg  to  Finisterre ;  the  coastal  trade  and  the 
St.  George's  Channel  were  guarded  by  the  smaller  craft; 
and  a  string  of  cruisers  kept  up  communication  between 
Falmouth  and  Gibraltar.  The  work  put  the  greatest 
strain  upon  our  seamen,  who  for  yet  another  ten  years 
were  called  upon  to  maintain  their  untiring  vigilance. 
Collingwood,  having  embarked  at  Plymouth  on  the  last 
day  of  April  1805,  and  after  Trafalgar  assumed  the 
command  in  the  Mediterranean,  never  found  opportunity 
again  to  set  foot  in  his  native  country,  to  which  he  was 
brought  home  a  corpse  in  1810. 

The  story  of  fights  by  British  merchant  crews  in  defence 
of  their  ships  during  the  fierce  attack  upon  our  trade  after 
Trafalgar  is  told  in  hundreds  of  letters  from  captains  to 
their  owners.  Many  of  them  are  addressed  from  ports 
which  the  ships  had  safely  made,  with  riddled  hull  and 
shot-torn  sails,  and  rigging  telling  of  the  perils  safely 
passed.  Not  less  frequently,  it  must  be  admitted,  the  letters 
bearing  the  ill  news  of  capture  came  from  some  prisoners' 
camp.  Enemy  cruisers  were  constantly  on  the  look-out 
for  vessels  detached  from  the  large  sailing  convoys,  and 
against  a  well-armed  man-of-war  the  merchantman,  with 
a  lesser  weight  of  metal  and  ill-trained  crew,  had  small 
chance.  An  Homeric  contest,  waged  successfully  against 
overwhelming  odds,  was  that  between  the  British  packet 
Windsor  Castle  and  the  French  privateer  schooner  Le. 
Jeune  Richard.  A  passenger,  writing  from  Barbadoes  on' 
October  3rd,  1807,  gives  the  following  account : 

"  We  are  just  landed  here  after  an  unpleasant  passage 
of  thirty-seven  days,  and  experiencing  one  of  the  most 
desperate  actions  which  has  been  fought  in  this  war, 
though,  thank  God,  we  have  been  victorious,  and  have 
cleared  those  seas  of  one  of  the  fastest-sailing  privateers 


60         THE   MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

out  of  Guadaloupe,  which  had  in  the  last  six  weeks  taken 
no  less  than  six  fine-running  ships — viz.,  the  America  and 
Clio  in  company,  the  Margaret,  the  Pope,  the  Portsea,  and 
another.  When  we  met  her  she  was  six  days  on  a  fresh 
cruise,  with  eighty-six  men,  and  six  long  sixes  and  one 
long  32-pounder  gun.  Our  force  consisted  of  six  guns, 
short  sixes,  and  thirty  men,  including  three  passengers. 
We  lost  three  men  killed  and  seven  wounded,  the  first 
broadside  ;  but  I  am  happy  to  say  that  with  the  remainder, 
in  an  hour  and  forty  minutes,  such  was  their  gallantry, 
that  they  carried  the  privateer,  after  killing  twenty-six, 
wounding  thirty,  and  making  prisoners  thirty  not  wounded, 
in  all  sixty  prisoners,  almost  treble  the  number  we  had  left 
for  duty.  I  cannot  enter  into  more  detail  by  this  oppor- 
tunity, and  can  only  say  that  if  any  man  has  deserved  a 
token  of  merit  from  your  Underwriters,  Captain  Rogers 
deserves  it  in  the  highest  degree.  He  is  a  young  man,  his 
first  voyage  as  Acting  Captain  (the  Captain  being  left  at 
home),  and  has  therefore  nothing  but  his  merit  to  depend 
upon.  He  was  left  with  only  ten  men  about  him  for  the 
last  half-hour,  rallying  them  to  their  duty,  with  a  deter- 
mination to  carry  the  prize,  which  repeatedly  endeavoured 
to  clear  from  the  packet,  but  was  too  fast  lashed  by  her 
bowsprit  to  escape,  and  he  boarded  her  at  the  head  of  four 
men,  and  charged  her  deck,  with  a  gallantry  never  excelled 
and  seldom  equalled.  The  officers  of  the  man-of-war  here 
are  astonished  when  they  look  at  the  two  vessels  and  their 
crews,  and  instantly  in  the  handsomest  manner  relinquished 
all  claim  to  the  prize."  1 

Instances  of  such  actions  fought  by  British  merchantmen, 
when  practically  every  ship  was  armed  for  its  defence, 
might  be  recorded  indefinitely.  It  must  suffice  to  mention 
the  gallantry,  both  in  defence  and  attack,  of  the  little 
Falmouth  packet  Antelope,  when  chased  off  the  Cuban 
coast  by  the  French  privateer  Atlante.  The  packet  carried 
a  crew  of  twenty-three  men,  and  had  no  better  armament 
than  six  3-pounders,  but  she  had  several  passengers  on 
board,  who  assisted  in  loading  the  guns  with  grapeshot, 
buckled  on  cutlasses,  and  primed  their  muskets.  The 
privateer's  first  broadside  at  close  range  killed  the  Ante- 
lope's captain  and  the  first  mate.  Her  second  mate  having 

1  Gomer  Williams,  The  Liverpool  Privateers,  p.  410. 


CH.  i]          A  CORNISH  BOATSWAIN'S   PRIZE  61 

died  of  fever  a  few  days  before,  she  was  left  without  a 
senior  officer.  John  Pascoe,  the  boatswain,  took  com- 
mand of  the  ship,  and  the  French,  having  boarded,  were 
attacked  with  such  vigour  that  they  were  hurled  back  to 
their  own  ship,  leaving  their  captain  run  through  the  body 
dead,  and  several  of  their  crew  killed  or  wounded.  Again 
and  again  the  privateersmen  attempted  to  board,  but  at 
each  trial  they  were  driven  back  by  the  desperate  defence. 
Realising  that  they  had  "  caught  a  Tartar  "  and  that  the 
ship  was  too  hot  for  them,  the  French  endeavoured  to  cut 
the  grapplings  and  make  off,  but  the  Antelope  lashed  her 
foreyard  to  the  enemy's  shrouds,  and  poured  in  grape  and 
musket-ball  at  point-blank  range.  Pascoe,  daring  every- 
thing, then  determined  to  carry  his  enemy,  and  had 
collected  a  boarding  party,  who  raised  lusty  cheers  pre- 
liminary to  the  assault,  when  to  their  surprise  the  Atlante's 
red  flag  at  the  mainmast  and  the  ensign  at  her  peak  were 
hauled  down.  The  British  merchantmen  made  their 
prize,  and  safely  brought  both  ships  into  port  at  Jamaica. 
The  privateer  had  twenty-eight  killed  and  nineteen 
wounded,  more  than  the  entire  number  of  the  Antelope }s 
crew  and  passengers  when  she  went  into  action.1 

It  fortunately  was  customary,  both  on  the  French  and 
British  side,  that  after  a  fight  at  sea  the  prisoners  taken 
should  be  well  treated.  A  privateer,  unable  to  bring  his 
prize  into  port,  would  at  times  hold  a  ship  to  ransom, 
accepting  the  captain's  acknowledgment  on  the  part  of 
the  owners,  and  such  arrangements  were  honourably 
fulfilled.  In  one  letter  of  complaint  of  ill-treatment  a 
British  captain  declared  that  it  was  "  disgraceful  to  a 
polite  nation  like  the  French."  This  compliment  of  being 
"  a  polite  nation  "  was  frequently  paid  to  our  determined 
enemy.  The  chivalry  of  the  sea  is  illustrated  by  many 
instances  in  the  long  wars.  The  British  ship  Sally,  having 
fought  the  French  privateer  VAmelie  off  the  entrance  to 
the  Bristol  Channel,  and  having  been  carried  by  boarding, 
the  crew  were  allowed  to  preserve  the  whole  of  their  private 
property,  and  given  such  comforts  as  the  privateer  afforded. 
Captain  Lacroix  promised  the  English  commander  his 
liberty  and  the  first  ship  of  little  value  that  he  should  take, 
and  he  was,  in  fact,  sent  home  in  a  captured  Dundee  brig 
with  all  his  men  and  the  brig's  crew  and  passengers,  a 

1  James  Howe,  History  of  Flushing,  Cornwall,  pp.  26-9. 


62          THE   MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

bargain  having  been  struck  that  he  should  obtain  the 
exchange  of  an  equal  number  of  French  prisoners-of-war, 
to  be  sent  from  England  to  France.  The  French  captain 
further  declared  that  if  the  exchange  were  honourably 
made  he  would  set  free  on  the  first  opportunity  every 
Englishman  whom  the  fortune  of  war  should  throw  into 
his  power. 

No  royal  road  to  preventing  losses  among  our  shipping 
was  ever  found,  and  year  after  year,  until  peace  in  1815 
crowned  the  titanic  efforts  of  a  nation  almost  exhausted 
in  the  struggle,  the  tables  of  statistics  tell  their  own  certain 
tale.  By  immense  effort,  continuously  sustained  by  a 
Royal  Navy  which  increased  each  year  in  strength  of 
fighting  ships,  in  guns  and  in  personnel,  the  losses  of 
merchant  ships,  in  the  ten  years  after  Trafalgar,  were  so 
checked  that  they  were  not  greater  than  in  the  corre- 
sponding earlier  period.  And  it  must  be  recollected  that 
for  a  year  and  a  half  during  that  period  hostilities  with  the 
United  States  added  a  heavy  quota  to  the  depredations 
of  French  privateers.  The  British  merchant  ships  were 
pygmies  compared  with  the  leviathans  that  cross  the  seas 
to-day.  Individually  their  loss  counted  for  much  less, 
but  the  large  numbers  taken  each  year,  in  a  war  waged 
continuously  for  twenty  years,  placed  a  strain  upon  the 
trade  and  resources  of  the  nation  which  only  the  gigantic 
edifice  of  Britain's  world- wide  commerce,  built  up  upon 
solid  foundations  of  individual  enterprise  and  served  by  a 
stalwart,  seafaring  race,  could  have  borne. 

Our  ocean-borne  trade,  attacked  with  untiring  persist- 
ence throughout  two  decades  of  war,  was  the  chief  object 
sought  out  by  the  French  naval  ships  and  the  larger 
privateers,  but  it  by  no  means  represented  the  whole  body 
of  British  commerce  exposed  to  sea  peril.  England  was 
at  the  same  time  served  by  great  numbers  of  small  sailing- 
ships,  which  conducted  the  coastal  trade  round  the  British 
Isles  and  that  between  our  island  colonies ;  and  these  lines 
of  shipping  were  peculiarly  open  to  raids  by  the  enemy. 
Many  such  vessels  undoubtedly  swell  the  lists  of  captures, 
and  they  have  complicated  the  tables  of  contemporary 
statistics,  vitiating  the  conclusions  drawn  from  them,  both 
by  their  presence  there  and  by  their  absence  ;  for  a  large 
proportion  of  the  coastal  ships  figure  on  no  return,  and 
the  vast  bulk  of  commerce  which  they  carried,  and  of 


CH.  i]          LOSSES   OF   COASTAL  SHIPPING  63 

which  the  enemy  took  toll,   escaped  observation,  as  the 
clearances  made  are  but  imperfectly  recorded. 

Any  estimate  of  losses  among  the  ships  trading  from 
port  to  port  around  the  coasts  can  only  be  made  by 
inference,  but  there  are  abundant  indications  that  these 
losses  were  severe.  In  a  southerly  gale  blowing  along  the 
English  south  coast,  ships-of-war  guarding  the  Channel 
found  themselves  compelled  to  run  for  Portsmouth  or  the 
Downs,  leaving  the  slower-sailing  merchantmen,  heavily 
laden,  without  protection  or  without  harbourage  about 
the  long  stretch  of  dangerous  shore,  and  open  to  attack 
by  French  privateers  putting  out  from  Cherbourg,  Havre, 
and  Dieppe.  The  Frenchmen,  well  aware  of  the  system 
pursued  by  our  cruisers,  and  enabled  constantly  to  keep 
to  windward  of  them,  found  the  merchantmen  an  easy  prey 
in  these  conditions.  They  came  out  in  the  wildest  weather, 
in  which,  far  too  often  for  our  welfare,  they  achieved  their 
greatest  successes. 

Mixed  with  the  ocean  traders  beating  up- Channel  was  a 
not  inconsiderable  coastal  trade,  and  at  the  Thames  mouth 
this  was  joined  by  a  still  larger  stream  of  small  vessels 
making  the  journey  along  the  east  coasts  of  Scotland  and 
England  to  London.  There  being  no  inland  waterways, 
and  the  main  roads  being  wholly  insufficient  to  carry  the 
burden  of  traffic,  London  received,  not  only  the  great 
exchange  of  commerce  which  made  it  the  trading  centre 
of  the  world,  but  also  the  bulk  of  its  own  supplies  from  the 
sea.  At  every  hour  of  the  day  and  night  long  lines  of 
ships,  numbered  by  thousands  in  all,  stretched  from 
Orfordness  to  the  far  north  of  Scotland,  and  from  Selsey 
to  Ramsgate.  In  the  Thames  estuary  hundreds  con- 
gregated at  every  tide,  passing  on  their  way  or  waiting  to 
go  up  or  down  the  river,  or  taking  advantage  of  the  shelter. 
Given  a  dark  night,  a  fair  wind,  often  a  fog,  and  a  daring 
enemy  was  rarely  without  an  opportunity  for  attack,  the 
quick  seizure  of  a  prize,  and  safe  escape.  Of  such  oppor- 
tunities he  made  full  use.  "  With  a  fleet  surpassing  the 
navy  of  the  whole  world,"  complained  a  writer  in  the  year 
1810,  "  and  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  set  so  large  a 
proportion  of  it  at  defiance,  we  cannot  guard  our  coasts 
against  insult." 

In  addition  to  the  cruising  frigates  and  warships  watching 
the  French  shore,  our  own  coasts  swarmed  with  brigs, 


64         THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

sloops,  and  cutters,  kept  ready  for  instant  action  in  every 
harbour  and  inlet,  whose  duty  it  was  to  patrol  and  to 
protect  the  coastal  traffic.  So  numerous  were  these  that 
at  one  period  there  were  149  stationed  between  Southend 
and  Orfordness  ;  181  between  the  Thames  mouth  and 
Hastings  ;  138  from  Newhaven  to  Poole  ;  21  at  Liverpool, 
Glasgow,  and  Greenock  ;  114  on  the  coast  of  Ireland  ; 
and  the  long  stretch  from  Yarmouth  to  Leith  was  protected 
by  135  craft.1  Yet  in  spite  of  the  utmost  vigilance  the 
losses  continued.  The  public  indignation  at  raids  effected 
within  sight  of  our  coasts  was  expressed  in  the  letter  of 
another  writer,  who  declared  that  the  audacity  of  French 
privateers  occasioned  universal  indignation  and  regret. 
"  Our  merchantmen  captured  before  our  eyes — the  national 
colours  of  our  enemy  floating,  with  gasconading  insolence, 
along  our  shores,  and  effecting  their  escape  with  impunity, 
is,  indeed,  too  much  for  an  Englishman's  reflection, 
accustomed  as  he  is  to  behold  the  vanquished  streamers  of 
the  foe  waving  in  submission  beneath  his  country's  flag." 

The  French  privateers  engaged  in  these  depredations 
upon  the  coastal  traffic  were  mostly  the  smaller  vessels 
which  swarmed  in  the  harbours  of  Dunkirk,  Calais,  Bou- 
logne, and  Dieppe.  Any  craft  could  be  made  to  serve, 
provided  it  had  speed.  The  provision  of  a  gun  or  two,  a 
few  hands  collected  from  the  desperate  riff-raff  of  the  ports, 
the  very  minimum  of  provisioning,  and  all  was  ready. 
Little  was  risked  by  the  owners,  whose  craft  was  worth  no 
more  than  the  proceeds  of  one  or  two  fortunate  voyages. 
The  crews,  it  was  true,  ran  the  chance  of  capture  and  of 
pining  in  an  English  prison,  but  the  reward,  quickly  earned, 
was  an  ample  incentive.  Luggers,  sloops,  fishing- smacks, 
with  a  single  gun  placed  on  board,  even  open  row-boats, 
played  their  part  in  the  service ;  and  though  individual 
prizes  might  be  of  small  value  compared  with  those  made 
by  the  ocean-going  corsairs,  together  they  amassed  a  very 
considerable  sum.  A  privateer,  stealing  out  at  dusk 
before  a  long  winter's  night,  might  with  fortune  return 
with  its  prize  before  the  next  day's  sun  was  high. 

Naturally  the  headlands,  such  as  Portland,  Beachy 
Head,  Dungeness,  and  others,  were  favourite  places  for 
attack,  and  not  infrequently  those  watching  from  the  shore 

1  Hannay's  Short  History  of  the  Royal  Navy,  ii,  440. 

2  Naval  Chronicle,  xxiv,  460. 


CH.  i]  FRENCH   PRIVATEERS'   DARING  65 

were  witnesses  of  some  smart  bit  of  "  cutting  out  "  which 
the  British  naval  forces  were  powerless  to  prevent.  Util- 
ising the  British  flag — a  frequent  ruse — and  moving  on  the 
skirts  of  the  assembled  shipping,  a  daring  raider  in  full 
daylight  would  make  prizes  and  get  clear  away  under  the 
very  eyes  of  watching  seamen.  But  night  was,  of  course, 
the  most  favourable  time,  and  the  very  severe  losses  of 
trade  in  the  winters  immediately  before  and  after  Trafalgar 
led  to  the  introduction  of  a  system  of  watching,  by  appointed 
cruisers,  each  harbour  and  outlet  on  the  French  coast, 
thus  blockading  the  privateers  seeking  to  dash  out  from 
the  ports  between  Cherbourg  and  Dunkirk  ;  but,  notwith- 
standing this  vigilance,  many  continued  to  slip  through 
the  cordon,  as  the  heavy  losses  among  the  British  merchant 
ships  from  1805  to  1810  testify.  A  complete  chain  of 
watching  cruisers  to  be  maintained  all  along  the  French 
coast  was  one  of  the  means  recommended  by  the  ship- 
owners to  reduce  the  tale  of  losses.1 

The  French  spirit  made  their  men  quick  to  adopt  every 
ruse.  A  common  peril  besetting  our  coastal  trade  was 
found  in  innocent-looking  fishing-boats,  showing  their 
half-dozen  men  busy  at  their  work,  which  lay  at  anchor 
upon,  or  within,  the  lines  joining  headland  to  headland. 
Desperadoes  out  from  Dunkirk  or  Calais,  armed  with 
nothing  more  effective  than  the  short-range  muskets 
of  the  day,  watched  the  character  and  appearance 
of  passing  vessels.  When  night  or  other  favourable 
opportunity  came  they  pulled  quickly  alongside  the 
unsuspecting  merchant  ship  which,  undermanned  and 
unwatchful,  from  the  scarcity  of  seamen,  was  first  awakened 
to  the  danger  by  a  volley  of  musketry,  followed  by  the 
clambering  of  the  enemy  on  the  decks.  The  crews,  few 
in  number,  poor  in  quality,  and  not  paid  for  fighting, 
frequently  could  offer  but  slight  resistance  to  an  over- 
powering assault.2  Typical  of  French  daring  was  the 
capture  of  a  West  Indiaman,  the  Benjamin  and  Elizabeth, 
in  1799,  four  leagues  off  Dungeness,  in  a  fog.  She  was 
hailed  by  a  lugger,  who,  running  under  her  quarter,  asked 
her  if  she  wanted  a  pilot.  On  being  answered  "  No,"  a  man 
on  board  the  little  craft  who  spoke  good  English  called  on 

1  Memorandum  on  the  Protection  of  the  Coasting  Trade,  presented  by 
Mr.  Greville,  1809. 

2  Mahan,  .Influence  of  Sea  Power  on  the  French  Revolution,  n,  208. 


66         THE   MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE  PAST      [CH.  i 

the  Indiaman  to  back  her  mainyard  and  surrender,  follow- 
ing this  demand  with  a  volley  of  musketry,  after  which 
men,  swarming  on  the  lugger,  boarded  her  on  the  quarter. 
A  sharp  fight  resulted  in  the  crew  being  overpowered,  and 
the  prize  was  headed  for  France.  H.M.S.  RACOON  came  up 
on  the  crossing,  recovered  the  ship,  and  sank  the  lugger 
with  a  broadside,  all  on  board  going  down.1  Tales  of  the 
sort  were  the  common  talk  in  every  sailors'  tavern. 

The  total  losses  to  which  the  British  mercantile  fleets 
and  British  commerce  were  subjected  during  the  Revolu- 
tionary and  Napoleonic  Wars  have  been  discussed  by 
Commander  (now  Captain)  K.  G.  B.  Dewar,  R.N.2  It 
must  be  admitted  that  the  material  available  is  far  from 
satisfactory,  owing  to  various  .causes :  the  incomplete 
manner  in  which  statistics  were  kept ;  their  not  infre- 
quently conflicting  nature  ;  the  complications  introduced 
by  the  recapture  of  vessels  taken  by  the  French,  and  the 
additions  of  enemy  prizes  which  were  diverted  to  the  British 
merchant  fleets  ;  and  the  uncertain  evidence  concerning 
clearances  and  times  of  voyages,  which  require  an  average 
to  be  assumed.  Admiral  Mahan  estimated  the  total  losses 
of  British  ships  in  round  numbers  at  11,000,  an  annual 
average  of  about  2j  per  cent.,3  and  held  that  the  direct 
total  loss  to  the  nation  by  the  operation  of  hostile  cruisers 
did  not  exceed  2  J  per  cent,  of  the  commerce  of  the  Empire.4 
The  studies  of  the  Naval  War  College  have  placed  the 
losses  at  double  that  proportion — 5  per  cent.6  Low  as 
his  estimate  is,  Mahan  qualified  and  reduced  it,  adding : 

"  This  loss  was  partially  made  good  by  the  prize  ships 
and  merchandise  taken  by  its  (Great  Britain's)  own  naval 
vessels  and  privateers.  A  partial,  if  not  complete,  com- 
pensation for  her  remaining  loss  is  also  to  be  found  in  the 
great  expansion  of  her  mercantile  operations  carried  on 
under  neutral  flags  :  for,  although  this  too  was  un- 
doubtedly harassed  by  the  enemy,  yet  to  it  almost  entirely 
was  due  the  volume  of  trade  that  poured  through  Great 

1  Naval  Chronicle,  ii,  162. 

2  "  What  is  the  Influence  of  Overseas  Commerce  in  the  Operations  of 
War,  etc."     Printed  in  Journal  of  the  Royal   United  Service  Institution, 
April  1913. 

3  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  the  French  Revolution,  ii,  223. 
*  Ibid.,  ii,  226. 

5  Official  Memorandum,  by  Sir  Julian  Corbett. 


CH.  i]  ESTIMATE   OF  BRITISH  LOSSES  67 

Britain  to  and  from  the  Continent  of  Europe,  every  ton 
of  which  left  a  part  of  its  value  to  swell  the  bulk  of  British 
wealth.  The  writings  of  the  period  show  that  the  injuries 
due  to  captured  shipping  passed  unremarked  amid  the 
common  incidents  and  misfortunes  of  life  ;  neither  their 
size  nor  their  effects  were  great  enough  to  attract  public 
notice,  amid  the  steady  increase  of  national  wealth  and  the 
activities  concerned  in  amassing  it."  l 

The  duties  levied  upon  cargoes  of  neutrals  who  were 
forced  to  enter  our  ports,  by  the  Orders  in  Council  framed 
as  an  answer  to  the  Berlin  and  Milan  Decrees,  certainly 
assisted  Great  Britain  in  bearing  the  cost  of  the  war  ;  but 
it  is  straining  the  meaning  of  words  to  comprise  such  traffic 
within  the  ambit  of  British  wealth.  Mahan  claimed,  in 
particular,  that  the  British  returns  of  British  losses  at  sea 
were  larger  than  those  made  by  the  French,  but  that  result 
is  probably  due  to  the  very  inefficient  manner  in  which 
the  French  returns  were  compiled,  and  the  omission  of 
colonial  captures. 

Without  entering  into  detailed  examination  of  statistics 
on  which  there  is  ground  for  disagreement,  we  may  cite 
the  table  (p.  68)  compiled  by  Commander  Dewar  as 
affording  an  approximate  indication  of  the  intensity  of 
the  attack  on  trade  during  the  war. 

Neglecting  the  year  1793,  the  average  column  (IV)  works 
out  at  5*6  per  cent.  As,  however,  ships  must  on  the 
average  have  cleared  more  than  once  a  year,  the  number 
of  ships  must  be  considerably  overestimated,  and  the 
percentage  of  captures  in  Column  IV  correspondingly 
underestimated.  On  the  other  hand,  a  large  number  of 
captures  included  ships  engaged  in  the  coastal  trade,  and 
if  the  tonnage  of  the  coastal  shipping  were  added  to 
Column  III,  the  percentage  of  captures  would  be 
decreased. 

Returns  of  the  coasting  trade  were  not  made  until  1824. 
It  was  a  vital  part  of  our  commerce  in  an  epoch  when  the 
bulk  of  the  distribution  of  merchandise  throughout  the 
British  Isles  was  done  by  water,  and  the  many  hundreds 
of  small  sailing-ships  continuously  engaged  in  this  traffic 
traded  with  a  comparatively  small  number  of  ports.  To 

1  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  the  French  Revolution,  ii,  227. 


68          THE   MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

BRITISH  MERCHANTMEN  CAPTURED  1793-1812 

By  Commander  K.  G.  B.  Dewar,  R.N.,  Journal  of  the  Royal 
United  Service  Institution,  vol.  Ivii,  No.  422. 


I 

II 

III 

IV 

Year. 

British 
Merchant- 
men cap- 
tured. 

Clearance  of  British 
Shipping  engaged  in 
the  Foreign  Trade. 

Percentage  of  Captures  to 
British  Ships  engaged  in 
Foreign  Trade  (assuming 
One  Clearance  a  Year). 

Tons. 

Per  Cent. 

1793 

352 

1,240,000 

3-8 

1794 

644 

1,382,000 

6'2 

1795 

640 

1,145,000 

7*5 

1796 

489 

1,254,000 

5'2 

1797 

949 

1,103,000 

11-5 

1798 

688 

1,139,000 

6'9 

1799 

730 

1,302,000 

7'5 

1800 

666 

1,445,000 

6-1 

1804 

387 

1,463,000 

3'5 

1805 

507 

1,495,000 

4'6 

1806 

519 

1,486,000 

4'7 

1807 

559 

1,424,000 

5'2 

1808 

469 

1,372,000 

4-6 

1809 

571 

1,531,000 

5-0 

1810 

619 

1,624,000 

5'1 

1811 

470 

1,507,000 

4'3 

1812 

475 

1,665,000 

3'8 

AUTHOR'S  NOTE. — The  accuracy  of  this  table  cannot  be 
guaranteed,  but  it  affords  an  accurate  comparison  between 
the  various  years.  Columns  II  and  III  are  taken  from  the 
Cambridge  Modern  History,  vol.  viii,  pp.  485  and  486, 
vol.  ix,  pp.  241  and  242.  The  average  tonnage  of  ships 
employed  in  the  foreign  trade  in  1802  is  taken  as  134  tons 
(Essays  on  Naval  Defence,  by  Vice-Admiral  P.  H.  Colomb, 
p.  241).  Assuming  that  each  ship  cleared  once  a  year, 
the  number  of  ships  employed  in  the  foreign  trade  is 
obtained  by  dividing  Column  III  by  134. 


CH.  l] 


BRITISH-OWNED   SHIPS 


69 


ignore  it,  as  too  often  has  been  the  tendency,  is  to  throw 
out  all  the  calculations. 

Insurance  rates  may  be  taken  as  affording  some  guid- 
ance. They  fluctuated  violently,  and  seem  to  have  been 
highest  in  1805,  when  two  strong  French  fleets  were  at 
large  in  the  Atlantic  ;  but  it  is  not  without  significance 
that  the  average  rate  of  insurance  during  the  long  wars 
was  more  than  5  per  cent.1 

Although,  with  the  materials  available,  anything  beyond 
an  approximate  estimate  is  impossible,  there  appear  to 
be  sound  reasons  for  the  conclusion  that  the  losses  incurred 
by  British  commerce  in  the  great  struggle  in  which  it  was 
engaged  a  century  ago  were  much  nearer  to  5  per  cent, 
than  2  J  per  cent.,  as  suggested  by  Admiral  Mahan.  The 
wonder  is,  not  that  the  proportion  was  so  large,  but  that 
it  was  not  larger,  in  view  of  the  advantages  which  lay 
with  the  enemy,  possessing  many  convenient  ports  and  a 
large  number  of  small  craft. 

A  table  showing  the  number  of  British-owned  ships  during 
the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Wars  is  appended. 
It  reflects  the  steady  growth  of  the  British  Mercantile 
Marine  in  spite  of  the  losses  sustained  during  the  years  of 
war.  It  will  be  seen  that,  mainly  owing  to  activity  of 
shipbuilding,  the  numbers  increased  from  16,329  to  24,860 
between  1793  and  1815,  the  year  when  peace  was  con- 
cluded. 


REGISTERED   SHIPS  BELONGING  TO  THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE  DURING  THE 
PERIOD  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS 

From  the  Appendix  to  Minutes  taken  before  the  Manning  Committee, 

1859. 


Tear. 

No. 

Year. 

No. 

Year. 

No. 

1793    . 
1794   . 

.  16,329 

.  16,806 

1801   . 
1802   . 

.  19,711 
.  20,568 

1809   . 
1810   . 

.  23,070 
.  23,703 

1795 
1796 

.  16,728 
.  16,903 

1803   . 
1804 

.  20,893 
.  21,774 

1811   . 
1812   . 

.  24,106 
.  24,107 

1797 

.  16,903 

1805   . 

.  22,051 

1813   . 

.  23,640 

1798   . 
1799   . 

.  17,295 

.  17,879 

1806   . 
1807 

.  22,182 
.  22,297 

1814   . 
1815   . 

.  24,418 
.  24,860 

1800   . 

.  17,895 

1808 

.  22,646 

1  Cambridge  Modern  History,  i,  241. 


70          THE   MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

III 

THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MERCHANT  NAVY,  1815-1914 

THE  British  people  emerged  from  the  Continental  struggle 
victorious  but  exhausted.  Famine  is  the  offspring  of 
war,  and  it  seemed  to  contemporaries  that,  although  the 
supremacy  of  the  seas  had  been  won,  economic  ruin  con- 
fronted them.  While  wages  had  risen  by  about  60  per 
cent.,  the  price  of  wheat  had  gone  up  by  130  per  cent. 
Throughout  the  country  the  lower  classes  of  the  population 
had  been  reduced  to  a  state  of  privation.  In  the  rural 
districts,  particularly  in  the  south,  the  advent  of  the  steam- 
engine,  and  the  industrial  movement  northward,  towards 
the  coal-fields,  in  association  with  the  economic  effects  of 
the  war,  had  robbed  prosperous  little  towns  and  hamlets 
of  the  means  of  livelihood.  The  conditions  had  become  so 
grave  that,  in  the  absence  of  Parliamentary  intervention, 
local  justices  felt  compelled  before  the  end  of  the  century 
to  grant  allowances  from  the  rates  to  supplement  the  low 
wages  then  ruling,  the  allowances  being  varied  according 
to  the  price  of  corn.  Rural  England,  largely  owing  to  the 
extinction  of  village  industries,  was  brought  to  a  condition 
of  misery  which  had  not  been  known  hitherto.  The  suffer- 
ings of  the  towns  were  even  worse,  and  distress  was  wide- 
spread. The  privations  of  the  mass  of  people  had  seemed 
to  reach  a  climax  in  1811-12,  when  the  harvest  failed  all 
over  Europe.  The  evil  was  deep-rooted,  and  did  not  soon 
pass  away.  Riots,  due  in  the  main  to  the  introduction 
of  machinery  at  this  period  of  economic  disturbance  from 
the  effects  of  war,  contributed  to  render  the  outlook  so 
grave  that  men  feared  that  industrial  unrest  would  be 
followed  by  national  ruin. 

Contemporary  opinion  failed  to  realise  that,  in  liberating 
Europe  by  the  use  of  sea  power,  this  country  had  created 
the  foundations  upon  which  it  might  build  on  the  ruins 
of  the  war  a  new  and  better  state  of  society.  Not  only 
had  the  supremacy  of  the  seas  been  gained,  but  during 
the  long  period  covered  by  hostilities  an  organisation  had 
been  created  to  enable  the  British  people  to  take  advantage 
of  that  success,  constituting  themselves  in  process  of  time 
the  sea  carriers  of  the  world.  Both  the  Royal  Navy  and 
the  Merchant  Navy  were  stronger  when  peace  was  signed 


CH.  i]  A  MARITIME   POLICY  71 

than  they  had  been  when  it  was  broken  in  1793.  The 
Merchant  Navy  had  grown  in  spite  of  the  heavy  losses 
sustained  at  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  In  other"  words, 
as  the  conflict  by  sea  drew  to  its  close,  British  sea  power, 
notwithstanding  the  risks  to  which  it  had  been  exposed 
over  a  period  of  two  decades  and  the  losses  sustained, 
rose  to  a  greater  strength  than  it  had  before  attained. 

In  the  opening  years  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the 
British  people  were  so  impressed  with  the  miseries  which 
they  attributed  too  exclusively  to  the  war  that  they  were 
blind  to  the  promise  of  prosperity  which  their  sea  power 
assured  them  as  an  island  people.  They  had,  in  fact, 
suffered  less  in  consequence  of  the  long-drawn  struggle 
than  any  other  people  in  Europe,  owing  to  the  policy 
consistently  adopted  by  successive  Governments.  Ministers 
had  refused,  in  spite  of  temptations,  to  embark  upon  a 
policy  of  military  expansion  which  would  have  drawn 
tens  of  thousands  of  men  away  from  productive  employ- 
ment, and  in  particular  from  the  industries  specially 
associated  with  the  maintenance  of  the  country's  sea  power. 
Foreign  troops  were  subsidised,  but  the  utmost  reluctance 
was  exhibited  to  take  any  step  in  opposition  to  the  un- 
adulterated maritime  principles  of  defence  and  offence. 
Even  in  1815,  the  year  which  was  marked  by  the  overthrow 
of  Napoleon  at  Waterloo,  the  number  of  men  voted  for  the 
British  Army  was  only  275,392.  The  country  reaped  the 
full  advantage  of  this  adhesion  to  a  maritime  policy. 
While  the  war  was  still  in  progress,  and  the  population  of 
the  British  Isles  was  suffering  economically,  the  work  of 
industrial  reconstruction  was  undertaken.  The  develop- 
ment of  the  steam-engine  had  directed  attention  to  the 
vast  wealth  represented  in  the  coal  seams  in  the  northern 
counties,  and  the  opening  years  of  the  century  witnessed 
the  uprising  of  the  great  manufacturing  centres  which 
were  to  transform  England  from  a  country  in  the  main 
agricultural  into  one  distinguished  by  its  industrial 
pre-eminence.  The  foundations  on  which  the  promise  of 
the  future  rested  was  the  supremacy  of  the  Royal  Navy 
and  the  strength  of  the  Mercantile  Marine. 

Merchant  shipping  is  not  a  basic  industry  :  it  produces 
nothing.  It  is,  however,  the  conduit  pipe  of  comrnerce 
from  market  to  market.  Leaders  of  public  opinion  in  the 
early  years  of  last  century  failed  to  realise  that  a  new  age 


72         THE   MERCHANT   NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

was  dawning,  owing  to  the  invention  of  the  marine  steam- 
engine,  which  was  to  contract  the  world  and  thus  encourage 
ocean-borne  trade.  Yet  events  were  to  prove  that  this 
non-productive  industry  was  the  most  essential  element 
in  the  life  of  a  people,  living  in  a  group  of  islands,  drawing 
their  raw  materials,  in  large  measure,  from  oversea,  and 
relying  upon  oversea  markets  for  customers  to  purchase 
their  goods.  British  merchantmen  became  the  shuttles 
in  the  great  economic  loom  which  was  created  in  the  years 
following  the  conclusion  of  peace  by  slow  and  painful 
stages  and  amid  much  political  turmoil.  As  industry 
developed,  the  Merchant  Navy  supported  it  with  an 
increasing  strength  that  passed  almost  unnoticed.  The 
shipping  industry  in  those  days  owed  little  to  the  State  ; 
it  was  an  individualistic  movement,  its  inspiration  and 
mobility  due  to  far-sighted  and  resourceful  business  men 
in  the  great  sea-ports,  who  devoted  themselves  to  the 
creation,  as  a  commercial  enterprise,  of  a  great  carrying 
trade.  So  long  as  war  continued  they  had  maintained 
their  sailings,  in  spite  of  the  action  of  enemies  and  the 
interference  of  the  press-gang.  With  the  coming  of  peace, 
when  the  demands  of  the  Royal  Navy  for  men  were  no 
longer  paramount,  they  devoted  themselves  without 
embarrassment  to  the  management  of  the  British  Merchant 
Navy,  which  for  a  hundred  years  was  to  prove  the  lynch- pin 
of  the  industrial  movement  of  the  British  Isles  and  the 
foundation  of  British  economic  strength,  for  a  free  sea  and 
a  healthy  marine  were  the  bases  on  which  the  Free  Trade 
policy  of  the  latter  part  of  the  Victorian  Era  rested. 

Though  the  nation  had  preserved  its  Mercantile  Marine 
in  strength,  that  organisation  was  in  anything  but  a 
healthy  state.  The  old  Navigation  Laws — the  expression 
of  a  traditional  mercantile  policy  now  outgrown  and  soon 
to  be  changed — were  still  in  force.  They  confined  the 
import  trade  to  British  ships  or  ships  of  the  producing 
country,  restricted  to  British  ships  the  carriage  of  mer- 
chandise to  the  Colonies,  and  reserved  the  whole  of  the 
coasting  trade  to  British  vessels  navigated  by  British 
masters,  and  manned  by  crews  containing  at  least  75  per 
cent,  of  British  subjects.  The  Navigation  Laws  limited 
competition  at  a  moment  when  the  marine  steam-engine 
was  making  its  appearance,  and  the  nation  was  beginning 
to  understand  the  advantages  it  possessed  by  reason  of  its 


CH.  i]  A   COMMITTEE   OF   INQUIRY  73 

coal-fields.  It  was  apparent  to  far-seeing  men  that  the  iron 
ship  was  about  to  make  its  appearance.  Even  while  the 
war  was  still  going  on,  experiments  had  been  made  with 
iron  for  the  construction  of  ships,  and  in  1819  the  first 
vessel  built  entirely  of  iron  was  completed  on  the  Clyde. 
She  was  intended  for  carrying  coal  on  the  Forth  and  Clyde 
Canal.  In  subsequent  years  other  experiments  were  made. 
In  view  of  the  advent  of  the  steam-engine  and  the  possi- 
bility of  employing  iron  in  the  shipyards  in  place  of  wood, 
shipbuilders  thought  it  necessary  to  adopt  a  cautious  policy. 
They  could  well  afford  to  do  so,  since  they  were  protected 
from  the  full  brunt  of  foreign  competition,  at  any  rate  so 
far  as  British  and  Imperial  trade  was  concerned.1  Between 
the  signing  of  peace  in  1815  and  the  close  of  the  year  1830, 
the  British  Merchant  Navy  not  only  did  not  increase,  but 
was  thought  to  have  declined  slightly  both  in  numbers 
and  tonnage.  The  falling  off,  however,  was  more  apparent 
than  real.  In  1823  Parliament  began  the  task  of  repealing 
the  Navigation  Laws,  but  it  was  one  beset  with  many 
difficulties.  Further  evidence  of  a  national  awakening 
to  the  importance  of  the  Mercantile  Marine  was  supplied 
in  1836,  when  a  Committee  was  appointed  to  inquire 
into  the  causes  of  wrecks.  It  became  apparent  that  all 
was  not  well.  The  Committee  reported  that  the  ships 
"  were  so  faulty  in  design  and  as  sailers  so  slow,  that 
British  shipowners  feared  free  trade  because  they  knew 
that  successful  competition  on  equal  terms  with  foreign 
ships  was  impossible."  The  Committee's  report  contained 
the  following  significant  passages  : 

"  That  the  frequent  incompetency  of  masters  and 
officers  appears  to  be  admitted  on  all  hands,  this  incom- 
petency sometimes  arising  from  want  of  skill  and  know- 
ledge in  seamanship,  but  more  frequently  from  the  want 
of  an  adequate  knowledge  of  navigation,  it  being  proved 
that  some  masters  of  merchant  vessels  have  been  appointed 
to  command  after  a  very  short  time  at  sea ;  that  others 
have  hardly  known  how  to  trace  a  ship's  course  on  a  chart, 
or  how  to  ascertain  the  latitude  by  a  meridian  altitude  of 
the  sun  ;  that  many  are  unacquainted  with  the  use  of  the 
chronometer,  and  that  very  few  indeed  are  competent  to 

1  The  rule  as  to  the  employment  of  English  ships  for  imports  was  relaxed 
in  the  case  of  America  in  1796. 


74         THE   MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

ascertain  the  longitude  by  lunar  observations,  while  some 
are  appointed  to  command  merchant  vessels  at  periods 
of  such  extreme  youth  (one  instance  is  given  of  a  boy  of 
fourteen,  all  of  whose  apprentices  were  older  than  himself), 
and  others  so  wholly  destitute  of  maritime  experience 
(another  instance  being  given  of  a  porter  from  a  ship- 
owner's warehouse  who  was  made  a  captain  of  one  of  his 
ships),  that  vessels  have  been  met  with  at  sea  which  were 
out  of  their  reckoning  by  several  hundred  miles  ;  and  others 
have  been  wrecked  on  coasts  from  which  they  believed 
themselves  to  have  been  hundreds  of  miles  distant  at  the 
time. 

"  That  drunkenness,  either  in  the  masters,  officers,  or 
men,  is  a  frequent  cause  of  ships  being  wrecked,  leading 
often  to  improper  and  contradictory  orders  on  the  part 
of  the  officers ;  sleeping  on  look-out,  or  at  the  helm  among 
the  men,  occasioning  ships  to  run  foul  of  each  other  at 
night,  and  one  or  both  foundering ;  to  vessels  being  taken 
aback  or  overpowered  by  sudden  squalls,  and  sinking, 
upsetting,  or  getting  dismasted,  for  want  of  timely  vigilance 
in  preparing  for  the  danger,  and  to  the  steering  of  wrong 
courses  so  as  to  run  upon  dangers  which  might  have 
otherwise  been  avoided. 

"  That  the  practice  of  taking  large  quantities  of  ardent 
spirits  as  part  of  the  stores  of  ships,  whether  in  the  Navy 
or  in  the  Merchant  Service,  and  the  habitual  use  of  such 
spirits,  even  when  diluted  with  water,  and  in  what  is 
ordinarily  considered  the  moderate  quantity  served  to 
each  man  at  sea,  is  itself  a  very  frequent  cause  of  the  loss 
of  ships  and  crews.  Ships  frequently  taking  fire  from  the 
drawing  off  of  spirits,  which  are  always  kept  under  hold  : 
crews  frequently  getting  access  to  the  spirit  casks,  and 
becoming  intoxicated,  and  almost  all  the  cases  of  insub- 
ordination, insolence,  disobedience  of  orders,  and  refusal 
to  do  duty,  as  well  as  the  confinements  and  punishments 
enforced  as  correctives,  both  of  which  must  for  the  time 
greatly  lessen  the  efficiency  of  the  crews,  being  clearly 
traceable  to  the  intoxicating  influence  of  the  spirits  used 
by  the  officers  and  men." 

The  maritime  position  of  the  country  was  unsound. 
Many  harbours  were  so  shallow  that  the  bottoms  of 
ships  were  specially  constructed  to  take  the  ground.  In 


CH.  i]       CONDITION   OF  MERCANTILE  MARINE        75 

spite  of  the  fact  that  some  of  the  officers  of  the  larger 
foreign-going  ships  were  men  of  the  highest  attainments 
and  of  undoubted  reputation,  drunkenness  and  incompe- 
tency  among  officers  of  average  type,  as  well  as  the  seamen, 
were  notorious.  Ships  were  provided  with  inadequate 
charts  even  where  any  charts  were  supplied.  The  Mer- 
cantile Marine  depended  largely  on  pauper  apprentices  for 
its  supply  of  seamen,  and  there  was  no  examination  of 
masters,  mates,  or  engineers,  to  test  their  professional 
skill.  Numerous  lighthouses  still  remained  the  absolute 
property  of  individuals,  or  were  leased  to  individuals  for 
their  personal  benefit,  and  surplus  light  dues  went  to 
so-called  charitable  purposes  and  were  dispersed  through 
avenues  entirely  unconnected  with  shipping.  Harbour 
dues,  town  dues,  charity  dues,  and  passing  dues 
levied  on  ships  were  similarly  diverted.  There  were  no 
harbours  which  could  be  described  as  harbours  of  refuge, 
though  a  passing  toll  had  to  be  paid  by  all  ships  off 
Whitby,  Bridlington,  Dover,  or  Ramsgate.  The  Tyne, 
Clyde,  and  Tees  were  navigable  only  by  small  vessels  even 
at  high-water,  and  many  other  ports  now  nourishing 
scarcely  existed.  "  Freight  was  the  mother  of  wages  "  ; 
payment  for  salvage  of  life  was  unknown ;  ships  did 
not  carry  side-lights  ;  no  international  rule  of  the  road 
at  sea  existed  ;  neither  reports  of  wrecks  nor  inquiries 
as  to  the  cause  of  wrecks  had  been  instituted ;  crimps 
preyed,  and  preyed  unchecked,  on  British  seamen  ;  there 
was  no  system  of  recovering  the  wages  or  effects  of 
deceased  seamen  ;  Parliament  had  not  thought  it  necessary 
to  make  any  practical  statutory  provision  as  to  the 
supply  of  food,  or  as  to  the  accommodation  of  seamen  ; 
there  were  no  checks  on  the  tyranny  of  masters  at  sea,  and 
no  provision  for  the  proper  execution  of  contracts  between 
masters  and  seamen ;  a  seaman  could  not  raise  any 
question  as  to  the  unseaworthiness  of  his  ship,  but  could 
be  sent  to  prison  as  a  deserter  if  he  went  ashore  to  com- 
plain ;  there  were  no  international  or  code  signals.1  That 
was  the  condition  of  the  British  merchant  fleet  at  the 
time  when  a  Committee  was  appointed  to  inquire  into  the 

1  This  summarised  statement  of  the  condition  of  the  Mercantile  Marine 
is  based  on  an  address  at  the  Mansion  House,  February  17th,  1887,  by 
Mr.  Thomas  Gray,  C.B.,  Assistant  Secretary,  Marine  Department,  Board 
of  Trade. 


76    THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST  [CH.  i 

causes   of  wrecks.     The   investigation   showed   that   the 
maritime  interests  of  the  nation  were  suffering,  to  the 
injury  of  trade  and  the  weakening  of  the  Imperial  system. 
The  Committee  emphasised  many  of  the  causes  of  the 
decline  of  the  shipping  industry  which  have  already  been 
summarised,  and  in  particular  remarked  on  the  increasing 
competition  with  foreign   shipowners,    "  who,    from    the 
many  advantages  enjoyed  by  them  in  the  superior  cheap- 
ness  of  the  materials  for  building,  equipping,  and   pro- 
visioning their  vessels,  are  enabled  to  realise  profits  on 
terms  of  freight  which  would  not  even  cover  the  expenses 
of  English  ships."     The  report  of  this  inquiry  went  a  long 
way  to  confirm  the  statements  which  had  been  made  by 
Mr.  Joseph  Hume,  who  from  his  place  in  the  House  of 
Commons  had  declared  that  the  British  Merchant  Navy  was 
losing  its  place  among  the  mercantile  marines  of  the  world, 
and  that  it  was  urgently  necessary  that  Parliament  should, 
in  particular,   direct   attention  to  the  administration  of 
lighthouses  around  the  coast  and  the  provision  of  harbours. 
The  public  attention  which  was  attracted  to  the  state  of 
the  Mercantile  Marine  at  this  period  at  last  led  Parliament 
to  pass  a  succession  of  acts  which,  practically  for  the  first 
time  since  the  expansion  of  the  country's  maritime  power,1 
recognised  the  principle  that  the  State  had  a  responsibility 
towards  the  shipping  industry  beyond  that  which  reflected 
the  broad  economic  policy  of  the  country,  and  that  it  was, 
especially,  bound  to  enforce  regulations  fonthe  protection  of 
the  lives  of  passengers  and  seamen.     Measures  were  passed 
regulating  the  conditions  under  which  emigrants  travelled, 
establishing  a  registry  office  for  seamen,  and  transferring  to 
Trinity  House  a  number  of  lighthouses  which  formed  part 
of  the  hereditary  estate  of  the  Crown,  and  steps  were  also 
taken  to  provide  better  harbours.     In  1846  further  progress 
was  made  to  insure  greater  safety  at  sea.     It  was  enacted 
that  all  iron  steamers  should  be  divided  by  watertight 
compartments   into   three    divisions ;    that    all   sea-going 
vessels  should  be  provided  with  boats  in  proportion  to  their 
tonnage ;    that  steamers  should  pass  to  the  port  side  of 
each  other ;    that  steamers  when  within  twenty  miles  of 
the   coast   should   carry  lights   to   be   prescribed   by  the 
Admiralty ;    that  passenger  steamers  should  be  surveyed 

1  The  essential  fact  seems  to  have  been  that  shipping  expanded  so 
enormously  as  to  render  existing  regulations  out  of  date. 


CH.  i]  CONSULAR  REPORTS  77 

half-yearly  by  surveyors  to  be  approved  by  the  Board  of 
Trade  ;  that  accidents  to  steamers  should  be  reported  to 
the  Board  of  Trade,  that  department  having  power  to 
inquire  into  the  cause  of  the  loss.1 

In  1843  fresh  light  had  been  thrown  upon  the  condition 
of  the  Merchant  Navy  owing  to  the  action  of  Mr.  James 
Murray,  of  the  Foreign  Office,  who,  at  the  request  of  the 
Admiralty,  addressed  a  letter  to  British  Consuls  abroad 
asking  them  to  supply  him  with  information  "  respecting 
the  character  and  conduct  of  British  ship-masters  and 
seamen."  He  added  in  his  circular  letter  that  his  object 
was  to  show  "  the  necessity  for  authoritative  steps  on 
the  part  of  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  remedy  what 
appears  to  be  an  evil  detrimental  to  and  seriously  affect- 
ing the  character  of  our  commercial  marine,  and  therefore 
advantageous  to  foreign  rivals,  whose  merchant  vessels  are 
said  to  be  exceedingly  well  manned  and  navigated." 

At  that  time  nine  separate  departments  were  concerned 
in  administrating  the  laws  affecting  the  Merchant  Navy, 
and  there  was  no  central  board  to  co-ordinate  the  work 
of  these  several  authorities,  each  department  being  left  to 
look  merely  to  those  interests  committed  to  its  charge  and 
to  its  own  convenience.  The  reports  which  were  received 
fully  confirmed  the  widespread  anxiety  which  was  enter- 
tained as  to  the  decline  of  the  character  of  the  British 
Mercantile  Marine.  Mr.  Murray  summed  up  their  general 
purport  in  the  following  statement : 

4 '  It  is  stated  from  various  parts  of  the  world  that  persons 
placed  in  command  of  British  ships  are  so  habitually 
addicted  to  drunkenness  as  to  be  unfitted  for  their  position, 
and  it  will  be  seen  that  Her  Majesty's  Consuls  allude  spe- 
cifically to  the  notorious  and  gross  intemperance,  and  to  the 
ignorance  and  brutality  of  British  ship-masters,  many  of 
whom  are  totally  void  of  education.  In  several  reports  it 
is  stated  that  there  are  honourable  exceptions  to  the 
unworthy  class  of  masters,  thus  showing  that  among 
British  masters  frequenting  foreign  ports  bad  conduct  and 
ignorance  is  the  rule,  and  intelligence  and  ability  the 
exception ;  that,  on  the  other  hand,  foreign  masters  are 

1  This  Act  is  of  interest  as  marking  the  initiation  of  a  new  policy  on  the 
part  of  the  State  in  its  relation  to  the  Mercantile  Marine.  It  has  since 
been  modified. 


78        THE   MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST      [CH.  i 

educated,  sober,  intelligent  men,  capable  of  commanding 
their  ships,  and  that  foreign  seamen  are  consequently 
more  orderly." 

Eventually  Parliament  took  action  on  the  lines  suggested 
by  Mr.  Murray,  and  in  1850  the  Marine  Department  of  the 
Board  of  Trade  was  established.  In  the  previous  year 
the  last  remains  of  the  Navigation  Laws  as  to  foreign  trade 
had  been  repealed,  to  be  followed  five  years  later  by  the 
abolition  of  the  restrictions  on  the  coasting  trade.  Almost 
simultaneously,  therefore,  the  protective  system  as  applied 
to  merchant  shipping  was  abolished,  and  a  special  office 
created  to  administer  the  varied  and  often  contradictory 
legislation  with  reference  to  the  Mercantile  Marine  which 
had  been  passed  since  the  opening  years  of  Queen  Victoria's 
reign.  Henceforward  the  confusion  which  had  hitherto 
existed  with  reference  to  the  administration  of  the  laws 
relating  to  shipping  was  mitigated,  and  there  were  many 
indications  of  increased  public  interest  in  the  industry, 
particularly  as  affecting  the  safety  of  passengers  and  crews. 

Mr.  Samuel  Plimsoll  was  largely  responsible  for  the 
movement  of  public  opinion  which  occurred  in  later  years. 
He  directed  attention,  in  particular,  to  the  number  of 
vessels  which  put  to  sea  in  an  unseaworthy  condition  and 
overloaded,  having  often  been  heavily  insured  by  their 
owners,  who  thus  stood  to  gain  in  case  of  disaster.  Mr. 
Plimsoll's  agitation  against  "  coffin-  ships  "  greatly  exag- 
gerated the  extent  of  the  evil,  but  the  evil  undoubtedly 
existed.  His  pertinacity  led  to  the  appointment  of  a 
Commission  of  Inquiry,  and  the  publicity  given  to  the 
scandal  resulted  in  the  passing  of  the  Merchant  Shipping 
Act  of  1873,  giving  stringent  powers  of  inspection  to  the 
Board  of  Trade,  and  legalising  what  is  now  known  as  the 
"Plimsoll  Mark"  as  a  protection  against  overloading. 
The  evil  was  scotched  but  not  killed,  and  the  matter 
received  further  attention  about  ten  years  later,  when 
Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain,  President  of  the  Board  of  Trade, 
introduced  into  the  House  of  Commons  a  Bill  to  provide 
for  "  greater  security  of  life  and  property  at  sea."  In 
moving  the  second  reading  of  the  Bill  on  May  19th,  1884, 
he  reverted  to  the  controversy  which  had  arisen  as  to  the 
responsibility  of  shipowners  for  the  abuses  which  had 
undoubtedly  existed  over  a  long  period.  He  made  it  clear 


CH.  i]  THE  WORK  OF  REFORM  79 

that  he  advanced  no  charge  against  shipowners  generally, 
but  was  dealing  only  with  a  minority.  He  pointed  out 
that,  according  to  Mr.  Hollams,  a  well-known  lawyer,  the 
law  as  it  then  stood  declared  to  the  shipowner,  "  buy 
your  ship  as  cheaply  as  you  can,  equip  her  as  poorly  as 
you  can,  load  her  as  fully  as  you  can,  and  send  her  to 
sea.  If  she  gets  to  the  end  of  her  voyage  you  will  make  a 
very  good  thing  of  it ;  if  she  goes  to  the  bottom  you  will 
have  made  a  very  much  better  thing  of  it.  .  .  ."  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain, referring  to  the  Report  of  the  Commission,  added : 

"  The  Commissioners  pointed  out  that  '  the  system  of 
our  marine  insurance,  while  it  protects  shipowners  against 
losses  which  would  otherwise  be  ruinous,  tends  to  render 
them  less  careful  in  the  management  of  their  ships.  .  .  . 
The  contract  of  marine  insurance  is,  in  its  essence,  a 
contract  of  indemnity,  and  the  spirit  of  the  contract  is 
violated  if  the  insured  can  make  the  occurrence  of  a  loss 
a  means  of  gain.'  The  Commissioners  added  that  '  our 
whole  system  of  insurance  law  requires  complete  revision, 
for  not  only  does  it  allow  the  shipowner  in  some  cases 
to  receive  more  than  the  amount  of  the  loss  sustained  by 
him,  but  it  also,  on  the  other  hand,  deprives  him  of  an 
indemnity  in  cases  in  which  he  ought  to  be  protected  by 
his  insurance.' ' 

Further  important  and  far-reaching  reforms  were 
introduced  towards  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
thus  completing  the  task  of  revising  and  codifying  the 
law  relating  to  the  Mercantile  Marine  which  had  been 
attempted  with  a  large  measure  of  success  in  1854. 

It  may  be  profitable  to  turn  from  this  survey  of  legis- 
lation to  an  examination  of  the  progress  of  the  Mercantile 
Marine  during  these  years  when  British  shipping,  the 
Navigation  Laws  having  been  repealed,  had  to  face 
world- competition,  when  some  of  the  burdens  imposed 
on  British  shipowners  were  lifted  from  them,  and  when 
Parliament  intervened  to  enable  the  Board  of  Trade  to 
insist  upon  the  seaworthiness  of  ships  and  the  safety  of 
passengers  and  crews.  In  1875,  Sir  Thomas  Farrer,1 
then  Secretary  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  prepared  a  memor- 
andum with  reference  to  the  "  state  of  British  shipping 

1  Afterwards  Lord  Farrer. 


80         THE   MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

and  seamen."  He  pointed  out  that  "  the  actual  increase 
of  our  Merchant  Navy  is  a  most  remarkable  fact,"  and  in 
order  to  illustrate  the  progress  gave  a  series  of  figures 
(see  below). 

Commenting  on  those  figures,  the  Secretary  of  the  Board 
of  Trade  remarked  that  they  gave  a  very  imperfect  re- 
flection of  the  increase  in  the  quality  and  quantity  of  the 
work  done  by  the  Merchant  Navy.  "  The  quantity  of  that 
work  is  to  be  measured  by  the  number  and  length  of 
voyages  made  and  the  nature  of  the  freights  carried.  It 
is  scarcely  possible  to  get  at  this  accurately,  but  some 


PROGRESS  OF  BRITISH  SHIPPING 


Years. 

Ships  belonging  to  the  British 
Empire  at  the  End  of  Each  Year. 

Ships  belonging  to  the  United 
K  In^dom  at  the  End  of  Each  Year. 

No. 

Tons. 

No. 

Tons. 

1818 

25,507 

2,674,468 

21,526 

2,426,969 

1820 

25,374 

2,648,593 

21,473 

2,412,804 

1830 

23,721 

2,531,819 

18,675 

2,168,916 

1835 

25,511 

2,783,761 

19,737 

2,320,667 

1840 

28,962 

3,311,538 

21,983 

2,724,107 

1842 

30,815 

3,619,850 

23,207 

2,990,849 

1850 

43,281 

4,232,962 

25,131 

3,504,944 

1852 

34,402 

4,424,392 

25,228 

3,698,004 

1860 

38,501 

5,710,968 

26,764 

4,586,742 

1862 

39,427 

6,041,358 

27,525 

4,860,191 

1870 

37,587 

7,149,134 

25,643 

5,617,693 

1872 

36,804 

7,213,829 

25,083 

5,681,963 

1873 

36,825 

7,294,230 

24,873 

5,736,368 

1874 

36,935 

7,533,492 

24,828 

5,912,314 

notion  of  it  may  be  found  from  the  number  of  entrances 
and  clearances.  For  the  Foreign  Trade  of  the  United 
Kingdom  we  can  give  these.  For  the  Coasting  Trade  we 
cannot,  since  a  large  proportion  of  coasting  voyages  do 
not  appear  in  the  Custom  House  books ;  nor  can  we  give 
complete  returns  of  the  employment  of  British  ships  on 
the  Foreign  Trade  of  foreign  countries."  In  order  to 
make  this  point  clear,  quotation  was  made  of  the  number 
and  tonnage  of  British  vessels  entered  and  cleared  in  the 
foreign  trade  of  the  United  Kingdom  (with  cargoes  and 
in  ballast)  between  1818  and  1874.  In  the  former  year 
the  number  of  ships  was  24,448,  with  a  tonnage  of  3,601,960; 
in  the  latter  year  the  number  was  73,534  and  the  tonnage 


CH.  i]  THE   AMERICAN   CIVIL  WAR  81 

30,089,683.  It  was  remarked  that,  "if  complete  returns 
were  available  for  the  coasting  trade  and  for  the  trade 
carried  on  between  foreign  ports  by  British  ships,  an  even 
more  remarkable  indication  of  the  progress  of  British 
shipping  would  have  been  possible,  since  the  coasting 
trade  has  been  carried  on  almost  exclusively  by  British 
ships."  From  the  statistics  given  it  was  evident  that, 
whilst  British  tonnage  nearly  trebled  between  1835  and  1874 
and  more  than  doubled  between  1842  and  1874,  the  tonnage 
entrances  and  clearances  of  British  ships  in  the  foreign  trade 
of  the  United  Kingdom  in  1872  were  about  six  times  what 
they  were  in  1835,  and  more  than  four  times  what  they 
were  in  1842.  The  explanation,  it  was  pointed  out,  was  to 
be  found  in  the  increase  of  steam-vessels,  making  many 
voyages  where  a  sailing-vessel  makes  but  one.  Statistics 
were  quoted  by  the  Secretary  to  show  the  great  growth 
of  steam  tonnage  and  the  increase  in  the  number  of  men, 
exclusive  of  masters,  in  spite  of  the  introduction  of  labour- 
saving  devices.  The  number  of  men  in  1852  was  159,563, 
and  in  1874,  203,806. 

During  the  period  when  Parliament  was  turning  its 
attention  to  the  condition  of  the  Mercantile  Marine  the 
United  States  was  developing  a  great  sea-carrying  trade. 
The  Americans  had  not  only  shown  that  they  could  build 
the  finest  and  swiftest  clipper  ships,  but  in  1814  they 
launched  their  first  steamship  on  the  great  waters  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  immediately  proceeded  to  the  development 
of  their  internal  maritime  communications  which  the  new 
propulsive  agent  made  possible.  With  a  fine  spirit  of 
enterprise  they  cultivated  their  merchant  navy  by  every 
practicable  means,  and  by  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century  were  the  most  serious  competitors  of  this  country 
for  sea  power.  By  the  early  sixties  the  British  lead 
amounted  to  little  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  million  tons. 
And  then  came  the  Civil  War.  The  North  possessed  only 
a  small  fighting  fleet,  and  in  the  emergency  the  authorities 
turned  to  the  Mercantile  Marine  to  supply  the  deficiencies 
in  order  that  economic  pressure,  by  means  of  a  blockade 
of  the  numerous  ports  of  the  Confederacy,  might  be  applied 
without  delay.  Warships  were  improvised,  but  at  a  terrible 
cost  to  the  Merchant  Marine.  Prior  to  the  Civil.  War, 
two-thirds  of  the  foreign  trade  of  the  United  States  was 
carried  in  ships  flying  the  Stars  and  Stripes.  American 


82         THE   MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

shipping  represented  5,250,000  tons.  "  The  extraordinary 
character  of  the  emergency  demanded  that  much  of  this 
tonnage  should  be  impressed  into  the  naval  and  military 
services.  One  million  eight  hundred  thousand  tons  were 
taken,  and  $100,000,000  withdrawn  from  the  capital  em- 
barked in  the  shipping  industry.  The  ALABAMA,  the  Con- 
federate tiger  of  the  sea,  destroyed  100,000  tons  of  shipping, 
and  caused  'the  owners  of  vessels  to  seek  foreign  registries 
or  tie  their  craft  to  the  dock,  rather  than  send  them  unpro- 
tected on  voyages  which  were  likely  to  end  in  the  prize 
court  or  destruction  by  fire  at  sea.  Foreign  ships  and 
foreign  capital  eagerly  entered  the  industry  which  the 
United  States  was  compelled  to  abandon.1  From  the 
damage  inflicted  upon  our  Merchant  Marine  during  the 
Civil  War  there  has  been,  as  yet,  no  full  recovery ;  and 
the  stupendous  increase  in  our  foreign  trade  is  the  more 
remarkable  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  has  been  effected  in 
spite  of  the  disadvantage  of  its  conveyance  in  ships  flying 
the  flags  of  other  nations  than  our  own."  ' 

The  American  Civil  War,  coming  in  the  very  midst  of  the 
transition  from  sails  to  steam,  removed  the  most  serious 
competitors  with  whom  British  shipowners  had  had  to 
contend.  When  in  1875  the  Secretary  of  the  Board  of 
Trade,  continuing  his  examination  of  the  state  of  British 
merchant  shipping,  investigated  the  progress  of  the 
British  Mercantile  Marine  in  relation  to  that  of  other 
countries,  he  was  able  to  paint  a  gratifying  picture.  Whilst 
the  British  tonnage  in  the  trade  of  the  United  Kingdom 
had  increased  from  65  per  cent,  of  that  trade  in  1850  to 
68  per  cent,  in  1870,  United  States  tonnage,  which  had 
60  per  cent,  of  the  trade  of  the  United  States  in  1850,  had 
only  38  per  cent,  of  it  in  1870.  French  tonnage,  which 
had  41  per  cent,  of  the  trade  of  France  in  1850,  had  only 
31  per  cent,  in  1870.  Dutch  tonnage,  which  had  42  per 
cent,  of  the  trade  of  Holland  in  1850,  had  only  28  per  cent, 
in  1870.  Prussian  tonnage,  which  had  49  per  cent,  of 
the  trade  of  Prussia  in  1850,  had  46  per  cent,  in  1870. 
Swedish  tonnage,  which  had  43  per  cent,  of  the  trade  of 
Sweden  in  1850,  had  only  32  per  cent,  in  1870.  Even  in 
the  case  of  Norway,  whose  marine  had  grown  rapidly, 

1  An  interesting  parallel  is  the  blow  to  English  merchant  shipping  as 
the  result  of  the  Wars  of  the  Roses. 

8  The  New  American  Navy,  by  the  Hon.  James  Long,  former  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  Dept.,  U.S.A.  (1903). 


CH.  i]         PROSPERITY  OF  BRITISH  SHIPPING         83 

Norwegian  tonnage,  which  had  73  per  cent,  of  the  trade 
of  Norway  in  1850,  had  decreased  to  70  per  cent,  in  1870. 
44  It  was,  of  course,  to  be  expected,"  the  Secretary  to 
the  Board  of  Trade  remarked,  "  that  when  the  foreign 
trades  of  the  different  countries  were  opened  to  foreign 
ships,  the  native  ships  of  each  country  would  do  a  smaller 
proportion  of  that  trade,  finding  their  compensation  in 
the  new  trades  between  other  countries  thus  opened  to 
them.  And  so  it  happened  in  the  case  of  all  maritime 
countries,  except  Great  Britain.  But  in  her  case,  with 
a  trade  far  exceeding  that  of  any  other  country,  and 
increasing  more  rapidly  than  that  of  most  countries,  her 
shipping  has  not  only  continued  to  do  the  same  proportion 
of  her  own  trade  as  it  did  before  the  trade  was  opened  to 
other  nations,  but  has  increased  that  proportion.  Nor  is 
this  all.  The  foreign  trade  of  each  foreign  country  has 
also  increased  very  largely ;  and  the  native  shipping  of 
each  foreign  country  no  longer  does  the  same  proportion 
of  her  own  trade  as  it  formerly  did.  The  proportion  which 
native  shipping  no  longer  does  must  be  done  by  ships  of 
some  other  flag  ;  and  though  we  have  no  complete  figures 
to  show  how  much  of  the  trade  of  each  of  these  countries 
is  done  by  the  British  and  how  much  by  other  foreign 
flags,  we  have  some  evidence  to  show  that  the  British 
flag  comes  in  for  the  lion's  share  of  it." 

Summarising  all  the  evidence  which  he  had  been  able 
to  collect,  the  Secretary  of  the  Board  of  Trade  came  to 
the  conclusion  that  "it  is  abundantly  evident,  not  only 
that  British  merchant  shipping  has,  in  the  twenty  years 
succeeding  the  repeal  of  the  Navigation  Laws,  enjoyed 
its  due  proportion  of  the  increase  in  the  trade  of  the  world, 
which  has  followed  on  free  trade  and  the  use  of  steam, 
but  that  it  has  obtained  much  more  than  its  due  pro- 
portion, and  has  outdistanced  many  of  its  once-dreaded 
competitors.  Having  special  advantages  in  the  possession 
of  coal  and  iron,  and  having  the  mechanical  genius  to 
turn  these  advantages  to  account,  it  has  led  the  way,  and 
secured  itself,  not  only  the  largest  share  of  the  carrying 
trade  of  the  world,  but  the  most  valuable  part  of  that  trade." 

The  legislation  affecting  shipping  which  was  passed 
during  the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  was 
opposed  to  the  political  sentiments  of  the  time.  State 
interference  with  trade,  either  by  land  or  by  sea,  was 


84        THE  MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST      [en.  i 

regarded  with  suspicion  and  distrust.  It  was  felt  that 
Parliament  was  treading  dangerous  ground  in  attempting 
to  regulate  industry.  A  powerful  impulse  from  without 
was  necessary  in  order  to  secure  Parliamentary  action, 
even  to  assure  the  safety  of  passengers  and  crews.  Ship- 
owners generally  were  no  doubt  guiltless  of  the  gross 
charges  which  were  levelled  against  them  as  a  class  by 
those  who  were  stirred  to  action  by  the  abuses  which 
existed  in  some  ships  of  the  Mercantile  Marine.  The 
scandals  may  have  been  due  to  the  neglect  or  criminality 
of  the  minority.  Practically  everyone  who  was  concerned 
with  financing  and  managing  the  Mercantile  Marine 
opposed  the  earlier  legislative  measures,  believing  them 
to  be  harmful  to  an  industry  which  had  hitherto  been 
individualistic.  However  exaggerated  the  statements  may 
have  been  which  were  made  by  Mr.  Joseph  King,  Mr. 
Samuel  Plimsoll,  and  others — and  most  agitations  are 
based  on  ex-parte  and  overcoloured  assertions — it  cannot 
be  doubted  that,  had  it  not  been  for  the  intervention  of 
such  public- spirited  men  and  the  success  with  which  they 
played  on  public  sympathy,  little  would  have  been  done 
by  Parliament ;  or,  at  any  rate,  action  would  have  been 
indefinitely  postponed.  On  the  other  hand,  the  pressure 
of  uninstructed  public  opinion  in  the  country  led  to  the 
passing  of  measures  without  due  consideration  of  details, 
and  a  succession  of  amending  and  consolidating  Shipping 
Acts  was  required  to  unravel  the  tangle  created  by  the 
legislation  carried  in  the  years  of  agitation.  The  move- 
ment was  not  continuous,  nor  was  it  always  wisely  directed, 
but  its  general  effect  was  good.  Stage  by  stage,  important 
powers  were  conferred  on  the  Board  of  Trade.  Its 
Marine  Department  is  a  modern  development,  created 
to  meet  modern  needs ;  its  duties,  though  numerous,  are 
clearly  defined  and  restricted.  It  is  concerned  mainly 
with  the  security  of  life  and  property  at  sea,  and  has  had, 
directly,  no  share  in  the  upbuilding  of  the  Mercantile 
Marine.  The  strength  of  the  Merchant  Navy  has  always 
depended  in  the  main  upon  the  enterprise  and  business 
ability  of  the  shipowning  community  in  meeting  the  nation's 
needs  without  State  subvention  or  State  encouragement. 

The  passage  of  merchant  shipping  legislation  between 
1880  and  1885  was  succeeded  by  a  further  period  of  great 
prosperity  for  British  shipping.  Freights,  both  homeward 


CH.  l] 


BRITISH  TONNAGE  IN  1914 


85 


and  outward,  with  some  fluctuations,  continued  high, 
reaching  their  maxima  in  1889.  The  prosperity  of  the 
industry  was  reflected  in  the  output  of  new  ships.  At  the 
turn  of  the  century  freights  fell,  pointing  to  over-produc- 
tion, and  this  was  reflected  in  the  orders  placed  in  the 
shipbuilding  yards.  On  the  eve  of  the  outbreak  of  war 
in  1914,  the  earning  capacity  of  shipping  had  for  six  years 
shown  a  gradual  but  healthy  improvement,  with  the 
result  that  fresh  capital  was  invested  in  the  industry.  Even 
shipyards  throughout  the  United  Kingdom  benefited  from 
this  recovery,  and  in  1913  were  responsible  for  nearly  two- 
thirds  of  the  world's  new  construction  in  spite  of  the 
activity  in  Germany. 

At  the  outbreak  of  war  the  British  Mercantile  Marine 
was  the  largest,  the  most  up-to-date,  and  the  most  efficient, 
of  all  the  merchant  navies  of  the  world.1  It  comprised 
nearly  one-half  of  the  world's  steam  tonnage  (12,440,000 
tons  out  of  about  26,000,000  tons  net),  and  was  four  times 
as  large  as  its  nearest  and  most  formidable  rival — the 
German  Mercantile  Marine.  The  tonnage  owned  by  the 
principal  maritime  countries  of  the  world  on  June  30th, 
1914,  is  shown  below  : 


Per  Cent. 
44.4 

3-5 
47^9" 

11-9 
4-6 
4.4 

4-2       . 
4-0 
3-5 
3-4 
16-1 

100-0 

NOTE  —This  table  was  prepared  for  the  Departmental  Committee  on 
Shipping  and  Shipbuilding,  Cd.  9092.  The  steam  tonnage  of  the  three 
Scandinavian  countries  (Norway,  Sweden,  and  Denmark)  amounted  together 
on  June  30th,  1914,  to  2,185,000  tons  net,  or  to  8-4  per  cent,  of  the  world  s 
steam  tonnage. 

1  This  review  of  the  strength  and  development  of  the  British  Mercantile 
Marine  is  based,  in  large  measure  textually,  on  the  Report  of  the  Depart- 
mental Committee  on  Shipping  and  Shipbuilding,  Cd.  9092. 

*  These  figures  do  not  include  United  States  vessels  engaged  in  trade 
on  the  Northern  Lakes  (1,693,000  tons). 


British  Empire  : 
United  Kingdoi 
Dominions  and 

Total 

Germany 
United  States1 
Norway 
France 
Japan  . 
Netherlands 
Italy   . 
Other  Countries 

Total 

n 
Colon 

STEAM-  VESSELS 

Tons  Net. 
.     11.638.000 

ies    . 

* 

902,000 

12,440,000 

3,096,000 
1,195,000 
1,153,000 
1,098,000 
1,048,000 
910,000 
871,000 
4,179,000 

.     25.990,000 

86    THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST   [CH.  i 

The  tonnage  of  the  United  Kingdom  consisted  mainly 
of  vessels  large  enough  for  ocean  voyages.  If  the  dividing- 
line  between  ocean-going  and  other  vessels  is  taken  at 
1,000  tons  net  (or  1,600  tons  gross),  it  will  be  found  that 
90  per  cent,  of  the  tonnage  of  the  United  Kingdom  was 
made  up  of  vessels  of  the  larger  type.  The  number  and 
net  tonnage  of  steam- vessels  (a)  of  less  than  1,000  tons, 
and  (b)  of  and  above  1,000  tons,  which  were  on  the  Register 
of  the  United  Kingdom  at  the  end  of  1913  were  as  follows  l : 


(a)  Steam- vessels  of  less  than  1,000  tons  net 

(b)  Steam-vessels  of  and  above  1,000  tons  net 


No. 
8,855 
3,747 

12,602 


Net  Tons. 

1,100,000 

10,173,000 

11,273,000 


It  is  thus  evident  that  the  nation  was  dependent  for 
supplies  and  trade  on  a  comparatively  small  number  of 
vessels  of  great  size — the  secret  of  success  in  peace  and 
danger  in  war.  Vessels  of  large  size  are  generally  more 
economical  than  smaller  vessels,  but  in  war  their  loss  is  the 
more  severely  felt  proportionately  as  their  number  is  limited. 
The  enemy's  submarine  warfare  became  vital  the  moment 
it  began  to  attack  the  larger  vessels  on  a  great  scale. 

Before  the  war  this  country  led  the  way  in  most  matters 
of  shipowning  and  shipbuilding ;  and  not  least  in  the 
building  of  merchant  vessels  of  large  size.  Between  the 
end  of  1910  and  the  end  of  1913  the  average  size  of  the 


Steam-Vessels  on  the  Kegister  of  the 
U.K.  on  December  31st. 

1910 

1913 

No. 

Net  Tons. 

No. 

Net  Tons. 

Of  1,000  and  under  2,000  tons  net 
Of  2,000  and  under  3,000  tons  net 
Of  3,000  and  under  5,000  tons  net 
Of  5,000  tons  net  and  above 

1,370 
1,569 
630 
148 

2,138,000 
3,878,000 
2,324,000 
994,000 

1,134s 

1,599 
804 
210 

1,751,000 
4,001,000 
2,975,000 
1,446,000 

3,717 

9,334,000 

3,747 

10,173,000 

1  In  the  more  detailed  survey  of  the  position  of  the  British  Mercantile 
Marine  before  the  war,  the  shipping  of  the  United  Kingdom,  which  repre- 
sented 93  per  cent,  of  the  Empire's  shipping,  is  generally  referred  to,  the 
reason  being  that  detailed  statistics  were  not  always  available  for  the 
remainder. 

a  The  reduction  in  the  number  of  ships  of  less  than  2,000  tons  exactly 
corresponded  with  the  increase  in  the  number  of  vessels  of  and  above 
3,000  tons. 


CH.  i]  TONNAGE  AND   SPEED  87 

"  ocean-going"  steam- vessels  on  the  register  of  the  United 
Kingdom  increased  from  2,500  to  2,700  tons  net,  a 
significant  movement. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  make  any  detailed  comparison 
between  the  British  and  other  mercantile  marines  as 
regards  the  size  of  vessels  employed.  The  average  size  of 
steam- vessels  of  and  above  100  tons  gross  (or  about  60  tons 
net)  is  a  rough  index  to  the  kind  of  trade  in  which  the 
vessels  of  the  respective  countries  were  principally 
employed  ;  and  the  average  tonnage  of  such  vessels  which 
were  on  the  Register  on  June  30th,  1914,  is  accordingly 
shown  below  : 

Net  Tom.  Net  Tons, 

United  Kingdom  .       ,350  France        .          .  1,100 


Germany    .  .  .  ,500  Denmark 

Italy            .  .  .  ,400  Norway 

Japan          .  .  ,300  Russia  . 

Netherlands  .  .  ,300  Sweden 


800 
750 
700 
600 


The  high  average  tonnage  of  German  and  Italian  vessels 
indicated  that  their  trades  were  almost  wholly  ocean,  and 
indeed  liner,  trades.  This  was  true  also,  though  in  a  lesser 
degree,  of  Japan  and  Holland.  The  low  average  tonnage 
of  Danish,  Norwegian,  Russian,  and  Swedish  vessels  was 
equally  significant  for  the  converse  reason.  This  comparison, 
moreover,  does  less  than  justice  to  the  United  Kingdom, 
because  British  ocean-going  tonnage  alone  was  more  than 
three  times  as  large  as  the  entire  German  Mercantile  Marine. 

The  British  carrying  trade  before  the  war  was  divided 
between  the  regular  lines  with  scheduled  sailings,  which 
traded  on  defined  routes,  and  owners  of  vessels  engaged 
in  general  trade,  or  "  tramp  "  owners,  whose  vessels  were 
often  chartered  to  third  parties,  and  traded  wherever  a 
cargo  might  be  found.  It  is  impossible,  however,  to  state 
how  much  tonnage  was  allocated  at  a  given  time  as  between 
44  liners "  and  44  tramps."  The  Lines  ran  passenger 
vessels  and  also  cargo  vessels,  generally  of  a  higher  type 
and  speed  than  ordinary  tramp  vessels,  but  there  was 
always  a  class  of  vessel  on  the  border-line  between  44  liners  " 
and  44  tramps  "  which  might  be  of  service  in  either  capacity, 
as  occasion  required.  The  only  available  index  of  the 
importance  of  tramp  tonnage  is  that  afforded  by  the  speed 
of  the  vessels.  Particulars  given  in  Lloyd's  Register 


88         THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

indicate  that,  of  the  steam  tonnage  owned  by  the 
British  Empire  on  June  30th,  1914,  35  per  cent,  was 
capable  of  maintaining  a  sea  speed  of  12  knots  or 
more  ;  and  probably  all  vessels  of  that  speed  were  liners. 
It  may  be  estimated  roughly  that,  of  the  total  tonnage 
of  the  United  Kingdom  before  the  war,  60  per  cent, 
consisted  of  tramps  and  40  per  cent,  of  liners. 

The  importance  of  the  tramp-owner  in  the  shipping 
economy  of  the  Empire  cannot  be  too  much  emphasised. 
"  Not  only  was  he  responsible  for  the  larger  part  of 
our  steam  tonnage,  but  we  were  dependent  on  him  for 
the  import  and  export  especially  of  what  may  be  termed 
the  rougher  class  of  bulk  cargoes,  which  are  not  as  a  rule 
suitable  for  liner  business.  It  would  be  impossible  for 
a  country  like  the  United  Kingdom,  with  its  enormous 
flow  of  trade,  to  depend  wholly  on  regular  lines  with 
scheduled  sailings."  l  It  had  been  recognised  for  many 
years  that  it  was  essential  that  there  should  be  a  large 
amount  of  "  loose "  tonnage  capable  of  supplementing 
the  liner  sailings,  and  prepared  to  trade  at  short  notice 
to  any  part  of  the  world.  "  Yet,  precisely  because  of  his 
ubiquitous  presence,  the  tramp-owner's  difficulties,"  the 
Committee  on  Shipping  and  Shipbuilding  remarked,  "  were 
the  least  easily  denned  and  met,  and  he  was  peculiarly 
susceptible  to  any  serious  modification  of  the  conditions 
under  which  shipping  is  usually  carried  on."  8 

No  account  is  taken  of  sailing  tonnage.  Its  importance 
was  small.  The  disadvantages  of  ships  dependent  on 
wind  and  weather  had  become  obvious.  Already  the 
carrying-power  of  sailing-vessels  of  a  given  tonnage  was 
incomparably  lower  than  that  of  steam- vessels  of  equivalent 
tonnage ;  and  the  error  due  to  the  omission  of  sailing 
tonnage  from  any  estimate  of  the  world's  carry  ing- power 
is  almost  negligible.  In  1890  the  United  Kingdom 
possessed  3,000,000  tons  of  sailing-vessels  ;  by  1900  the 
amount  had  declined  to  a  little  over  2,000,000  tons,  and 

1  Committee  on  Shipping  and  Shipbuilding,  Cd.  9092. 

2  The  speed  of  vessels  of  foreign  countries  did  not,  on  the  whole,  compare 
favourably  with  British  vessels.     The  proportion  of  Norwegian  vessels 
of  12  knots  and  above  was  insignificant,  but  the  number  of  Norwegian 
liners   was    small.     Only  23   per   cent,   of    German    steam   tonnage   was 
capable   of  maintaining   a  sea  speed   of   12  knots  or  more,  and  yet  the 
German  trades  were   pre-eminently   liner   trades,    their   tramp   interests 
being  small. 


CH.  i]      THE  WORLD'S  ECONOMIC  EXPANSION          89 

by  1913  to  850,000  tons.  A  similar,  though  a  somewhat 
less  rapid,  decline,  due  to  the  supersession  of  sailing  craft 
by  steam  and  other  self-propelled  vessels,  occurred  in 
the  case  also  of  other  countries. 

During  the  twenty-five  years  or  so  preceding  the  war 
there  was  an  enormous  expansion  of  the  world's  sea-borne 
commerce,  and,  consequently,  of  the  world's  tonnage,  which 
trebled  in  volume.  "  In  the  twenty  years  up  to  the  end  of 
1913  there  were  built  some  25,000,000  tons  of  steam 
shipping,  of  which  two-thirds  was  built  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and  over  one-half  for  the  British  flag.  The 
world's  shipbuilding  had  increased  progressively  from 
some  700,000  tons  net  in  1894  to  an  average  of  about 
1,000,000  tons  net  a  year  in  the  period  1894 — 1903,  to 
1,500,000  tons  net  a  year  in  the  period  1904 — 1913,  and 
to  2,000,000  tons  net  in  1913  itself.  Those  figures 
illustrate  the  growing  demand  for  shipping  that  followed 
the  world's  economic  expansion  before  the  war."  l  In 
that  period  the  steam  tonnage  of  the  United  Kingdom 
was  more  than  doubled  ;  but,  even  so,  its  rate  of  increase 
was  proportionately  not  so  rapid  as  that  of  certain 
other  countries — notably  Germany — whose  steam  tonnage 
increased  fourfold.  The  fact  that  the  volume  of  British 
shipping  did  not  grow  at  the  same  relative  rate  as  that  of 
some  other  countries  was  thus  explained  by  the  Committee 
on  Shipping  and  Shipbuilding  : 

"  (1)  It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  United  Kingdom 
could  maintain  its  great  relative  preponderance  in  the 
world's  carrying  trade  in  face  of  the  enormous  economic 
expansion  taking  place  in  such  countries  as  Germany  and 
the  United  States,  and  the  opening  up  of  new  markets  in 
all  parts  of  the  world.  It  is  not  surprising  that  the 
smaller  mercantile  marines  should  have  expanded  more 
rapidly  than  the  powerful  Mercantile  Marine  of  the  United 
Kingdom,  more  especially  in  view  of  the  maritime  efforts 
of  most  countries  in  the  period.  It  is  noteworthy  that, 
if  actual  as  opposed  to  relative  growth  be  considered,  no 
foreign  country  even  approximated  to  the  United  Kingdom.8 

1  Committee  on  Shipping  and  Shipbuilding,  Cd.  9092. 

9  The  growth  of  Germany's  mercantile  marine  was  proportionately  much 
more  rapid  than  that  of  the  United  Kingdom  ;  but  whilst  between  1900 
and  June  1914  the  United  Kingdom  added  4-3  million  tons  to  its  steam 
tonnage,  Germany  added  only  1'75  million  tons. 


90         THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE   PAST      [CH.  i 

44  (2)  Great  as  was  the  expansion  of  the  world's  tonnage 
in  the  twenty-five  years  before  the  war,  the  expansion  of 
the  world's  power  of  transportation  was  even  greater, 
owing  to  the  superiority,  first  of  steam  over  sailing  ships, 
and  then  of  improved  types  of  steamships  over  the  older 
types.  The  carrying-power  of  the  United  Kingdom 
proportionately  to  the  tonnage  on  the  Register  increased 
more  rapidly  than  that  of  other  countries.  In  any  appre- 
ciation of  the  maritime  position  of  this  country  before  the 
war,  this  factor  cannot  be  overlooked." 

The  world's  shipping  was  undergoing  a  continual  process 
of  renewal  and  replacement  in  the  years  preceding  the 
outbreak  of  war.  Immediately  before  the  war,  the 
average  annual  rate  of  expansion  of  the  world's  steam 
tonnage  as  a  whole  was  rather  less  than  5  per  cent,  of 
the  tonnage  on  the  Register.  The  output  of  new  tonnage 
amounted  to  rather  over  7  per  cent,  of  the  tonnage  on 
the  Register  ;  and  it  may  therefore  be  inferred  that  about 
2  per  cent,  of  the  world's  shipping  was  every  year  lost  or 
broken  up. 

Nearly  one-half  of  the  world's  shipping,  as  has  been 
above  indicated,  was  on  the  Register  of  the  United  King- 
dom. If  the  Mercantile  Marine  of  the  United  Kingdom 
be  taken  by  itself,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  process  of  devel- 
opment in  its  case  was  widely  different.  In  the  years 
immediately  before  the  war  the  steam  tonnage  of  the 
United  Kingdom  increased  by  not  more  than  2j  per  cent, 
annually.  But  it  is  significant  that  some  600,000  tons 
net,  or  nearly  5  J  per  cent,  of  the  total  tonnage,  was  every 
year  removed  from  the  Register  for  one  reason  or  another. 
Two-thirds,  or  400,000  tons,  was  sold  to  foreign  flags, 
the  amount  accounted  for  by  vessels  lost  or  broken  up 
averaging  only  150,000  tons.  On  the  other  hand,  additions 
to  the  Register  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  years 
1911-13  averaged  about  863,000  tons  a  year,  of  which 
93  per  cent,  comprised  vessels  newly  built. 

This  transfer  of  large  numbers  of  older  British  vessels 
to  foreign  flags  was  of  great  importance  in  connexion  with 
the  development  of  the  Mercantile  Marine.  Our  ship- 
owners were  thus  afforded  a  ready  market  for  the  disposal 
of  vessels  no  longer  satisfactory  to  them  as  a  preliminary 
to  the  ordering  of  new  vessels  better  suited  to  their 


CH.  i]          RENEWAL  OF  BRITISH  SHIPPING  91 

purpose,  and  the  merchant  tonnage  of  foreign  countries, 
as  a  whole,  was  older,  and  therefore  less  efficient,  than  the 
tonnage  of  the  British  Mercantile  Marine. 

As  a  result  of  this  process  of  sale  and  replacement, 
85  per  cent,  of  the  tonnage  on  the  Register  of  the  United 
Kingdom  at  the  end  of  1913  had  been  built  since  1895, 
including  68  per  cent,  built  since  1900,  and  44  per  cent, 
built  since  1905.  The  following  table  shows  the  distri- 
bution of  our  steam  tonnage  according  to  age  at  the  end 
of  1913  l : 


1890  and  earlier 

1891  to  1895 
1896  to  1900 
1901  to  1905 
1906  to  1910 
Since  1910 


Net  Tons. 

724,000 
930,000 
1,979,000 
2,718,000 
2,614,000 
2,308,000 

11,273,000 


Per  Cen 

6-4 

8-3 

17-6 

24-1 

23-2 

20-4 

100-0 


In  this  short  survey  no  account  has  been  taken  of 
those  personal  factors  which,  whilst  an  indispensable 
element  of  success,  are  the  most  difficult  to  appraise.  "  The 
initiative  and  enterprise  of  shipowners  and  shipbuilders 
were  a  vital  element  in  the  building  up  of  the  greatest 
carrying  trade  that  the  world  has  ever  seen.  A  further 
element  of  success,  on  which  it  is  impossible  to  lay  too 
much  stress,  was  the  skill,  efficiency,  and  seamanship  of 
the  officers  and  men  who  manned  and  navigated  our  vessels 
in  peace,  and  who  during  the  war  have,  by  their  courage 
and  devotion,  insured  the  maintenance  of  our  sea-borne 
trade."  8 

A  statistical  basis  for  estimating  the  size  and  char- 
acter of  the  target  exposed  to  enemy  attack  on  the  outbreak 
of  war  in  1914  is  supplied  by  the  calculations  on  p.  92. 

There  is  a  discrepancy  between  these  figures  and  the 
aggregate  tonnage  of  the  Mercantile  Marine  as  recorded 
by  the  Board  of  Trade  in  its  general  statement  of  the 
strength  of  the  Merchant  Fleet.  This  is  due  to  the 
exclusion  from  the  table  which  follows  of  a  large  number 
of  small  vessels,  yachts,  and  inland  navigation  vessels, 
which  are  all  counted  in  the  official  enumeration  of  tonnage 

1  Statistics  of  the  age  of  the  merchant  tonnage  of  other  countries  do  not, 
on  the  whole,  compare  favourably  with  those  for  the  United  Kingdom. 

2  Cd.  9092. 


92         THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

over  100  tons  net.  The  smaller  tonnage — of  sea-going 
trading- ships — was  the  asset  which  the  nation  had  at  its 
disposal  when  the  Great  War  occurred.  Even  this  reduced 
figure  may  be  analysed  with  profit.  The  Annual  Naviga- 
tion Statement  included,  under  the  description  of  Home 
Trade,  not  only  vessels  employed  in  the  coasting  trade  of 

SAILING  AND  STEAM  VESSELS  EMPLOYED  IN  TRADING* 


In  the  Home 
Trade. 

Partly  in  the  Home 
and  Partly  in  the 
Foreign  Trade. 

In  the  Foreign 
Trade. 

Total. 

Number 
of 
Vessels. 

Tons 
Net. 

Number 
of 
Vessels. 

Tons 
Net. 

Number 
of 
Vessels. 

Tons 
Net. 

Number 
of 
Vessels. 

Tons 
Net. 

Sail 
Steam 

1,867 
2,038 

143,335 
495,619 

37 

326 

4,783 
599,615 

177 
3,791 

275,414 
9,650,401 

2,081 
6,155 

423,532 
10,745,635 

Total 

3,905 

638,954 

363 

604,398 

3,968 

9,925,815 

8,236 

11,169,167 

the  United  Kingdom,  but  also  those  trading  with  the 
Continent  of  Europe  between  the  River  Elbe  and  Brest 
inclusive,  and  it  failed  to  distinguish  between  the  vessels 
employed  in  these  two  trades.  But  the  tables  published 
in  1913,  to  show  the  progress  of  merchant  shipping,1 
made  this  distinction,  the  number  as  on  April  3rd, 
1911,  being  : 


Foreign  Trade  within  Home  limits 
Coasting  Trade  .          .         .      '    . 


459  steamships 
1,565 

2,024 


The  2,024  steamships  above  referred  to  included  only 
the  vessels  which  on  April  3rd,  1911,  had  crews  on  board, 
and  if  allowance  be  made  for  the  ships  which  were  not  in 
commission  on  the  given  date,  it  is  probable  that  in  1911 
there  were  in  all  about  2,200  steamships  employed  in  these 
two  trades.  The  number  of  steamships  so  employed 
remained  practically  the  same  in  1913,  being  made  up  of 
2,038  vessels  described  as  employed  in  the  Home  Trade, 
and  about  one-third  of  the  326  vessels  employed  partly 
in  the  Home  and  partly  in  the  Foreign  Trade. 

1  Annual  Statement  of  the  Navigation  and  Shipping  of  the  United 
Kingdom  for  the  Year  1913,  Cd.  7616. 
a  Ibid.,  Cd.  7033. 


CH.  i]  BRITISH  TRADE   IN   1914  93 

The  total  number  of  steamships  which  on  December  31st, 
1913,  were  engaged  in  Foreign  Trade  was  therefore  about 
4,500,  made  up  as  follows  : 

(1)  In  Foreign  Trade  outside  of  Home  limits  : 

Solely  employed  .          .          .          .3,791  steamships 

Partly  employed,  say  .          .          .         209  „ 

4,000 

(2)  Foreign  Trade  within  Home  Trade  limits  : 

say        500  steamships 

4,500 

The  matter  may  be  carried  a  stage  farther.1  In  the 
oversea  trade  the  steamships  of  under  1,000  tons  net 
were  employed  principally  to  trade  with  the  Continent 
within  Home  Trade  limits,  ports  on  the  western  coast 
of  France,  and  the  Baltic  ports;  on  ocean  voyages  the 
steamship  of  under  1,000  tons  net  is  of  little  account.  Of 
the  2,038  steam-vessels  employed  in  1913  in  the  Home 
Trade,  only  54  were  of  over  1,000  tons  net.  Of  the  326 
steam- vessels  employed  in  1913,  partly  in  the  Home  Trade 
and  partly  in  Foreign  Trade,  177  were  of  over  1,000  tons 
net.  And  of  the  3,791  vessels  employed  in  1913  in  the 
Foreign  Trade,  3,444  were  of  over  1,000  tons.  The  total 
number  of  steam- vessels  of  over  1,000  tons  net  belonging 
to  the  United  Kingdom  on  December  31st,  1913,  was 
therefore  3,675,  and  the  nature  and  employment  of  these 
vessels  was  as  under : 

STEAM- VESSELS  OF  OVER  1,000  TONS  NET  EMPLOYED  IN  TRADING 

Number.  Tonnage. 

Home  Trade 54  64,820 

Partly  Home  and  partly  Foreign  Trade     .        177  529,204 

Foreign  Trade 3,444  9,443,838 

3,675 »  10,037,862 

The  number  of  vessels  belonging  to  the  United  Kingdom 
had  not  increased  on  the  date  of  the  outbreak  of  war  in 
August  1914,  although  the  aggregate  of  the  tonnage  may 
have  slightly  increased  since  December  1913.  Of  the 
vessels  of  importance  in  the  Ocean  Oversea  Trade,  the 
number  belonging  to  the  United  Kingdom  was,  therefore, 

1  Report  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Liverpool  Steamship  Owners'  Associa- 
tion, October  1915. 

2  The  average  size  of  these  vessels  was  2,731  tons  net. 


94        THE   MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE   PAST      [CH.  i 

on  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  3,600  steam-vessels  of  over 
1,000  tons  net,  their  tonnage  being  10,000,000  tons  net. 
Those  steamships  were  classified  under  two  heads — first, 
the  vessels  trading  in  regular  lines  on  fixed  routes  ;  and, 
secondly,  the  general  traders  going  wherever  cargo  offered. 
The  liners  numbered  about  1,200  and  the  general  traders 
about  2,400.  The  average  size  of  the  liner  was  3,500  tons 
net,  representing  about  5,800  tons  gross  ;  and  that  of  the 
general  trader  about  2,400  tons  net,  or  about  4,000  tons 
gross. 

It  would  be  an  error  to  assume  that  before  Parliament 
began  to  evince  an  interest  in  merchant  shipping  no  control 
of  any  kind  was  exercised  over  the  design  and  construction 
of  vessels.  Early  in  the  seventeenth  century  Lloyd's 
Coffee-House  had  become  the  recognised  headquarters  of 
maritime  business  in  London,  and  especially  of  marine 
insurance.  "  There,  whether  on  the  initiative  of  the  pro- 
prietor or  the  frequenters,  were  kept  certain  records  of 
shipping,  termed  '  ships'  lists,'  which  contained  an  account 
of  vessels  which  the  underwriters  who  met  at  the  house  were 
likely  to  have  offered  to  them  for  insurance."  This  coffee- 
house proved  the  foundation  of  a  corporation  which  was  to 
exercise  a  widespread  and  beneficial  influence  on  the  de- 
velopment of  the  industry.  The  Register  became  the  guide 
to  the  insurer  who  was  asked  to  risk  his  money,  and  ship- 
owners who  wanted  to  insure  on  advantageous  terms  found 
it  to  their  advantage  to  meet  the  views  of  the  underwriters 
when  placing  their  orders  for  vessels  to  be  built.  In  1760 
the  underwriters  established  a  society  for  their  protection, 
and  issued  a  register  which  came  to  be  known  as  the  Green 
Book.  It  was  supported  exclusively  by  underwriters,  and 
was  intended  for  their  sole  use.  At  the  end  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  the  shipowners,  who  had  long  objected  to 
the  classification  of  their  vessels  at  the  uncontrolled 
discretion  of  the  body  of  underwriters,  started  the 
Red  Book,  which  was  virtually  a  shipowners'  register. 
Not  until  1834  were  the  competing  interests  led  to 
make  an  arrangement  under  which  Lloyd's  Registry  of 
British  and  Foreign  Shipping  was  established,  a  committee 
being  appointed,  consisting  of  eight  merchants,  eight 
underwriters,  and  eight  shipowners,  with  the  chairman 
of  Lloyd's  and  of  the  General  Shipowners'  Society  as  ex- 
officio  members.  The  general  principle  of  classification 


CH.  I] 


LLOYD'S   REGISTER 


on  which  the  Registrar  was  to  act  was  to  assign  characters 
which  should  be  as  nearly  as  possible  "  a  correct  indication 
of  the  real  and  intrinsic  quality  of  the  ship"  ;  the  practice 
of  classing  vessels  according  to  place  of  build  or  the 
decision  of  the  surveyors  was  to  be  abandoned,  and  all 
characters  were  to  be  granted  only  by  the  Committee 
"  after  due  inspection  of  the  report  of  the  surveyors  and 
the  documents  which  may  be  submitted  to  them."  It 
was  not  until  several  years  later  that  Lloyd's  Register 
obtained  an  assured  position,  and  was  able  to  exercise 
a  compelling  influence  on  ship-construction. 

In  the  meantime,  the  industry  was  undergoing  a  revolu- 
tion. First,  the  marine  steam-engine  had  made  its  appear- 
ance ;  and,  secondly,  experiments  in  building  ships  of 
iron  instead  of  wood  gave  rise  to  a  controversy  which 
divided  the  shipowning  class  into  different  camps,  and 
interfered  with  the  efficient  discharge  by  the  Registry 
of  its  responsibilities  towards  underwriters,  merchants, 
and  shipowners.  Experience  with  the  steam-engine  had 
to  be  acquired  and  a  new  class  of  seamen  educated.  Later 
on,  when  the  iron  ship  took  the  waters,  a  somewhat 
similar  situation  developed.  During  those  years  of  tran- 
sition the  control  exercised  by  Lloyd's  Register  was 
subject  to  fluctuations,  and  it  was  only  gradually  that  a 
volume  of  experience  was  built  up,  enabling  the  Society 
to  lay  down  definite  rules  calculated  to  protect  the  interests 
of  those  intimately  associated  with  the  industry  and  to 
satisfy  the  natural  concern  of  the  nation  at  large — particu- 
larly that  part  of  it  accustomed  to  travel  by  sea — for 
the  safety  of  ocean-going  vessels.  Lloyd's  Register,  in 
process  of  time,  became  the  supreme  arbiter  in  ship-con- 
struction, not  only  in  this  country,  but,  to  a  large  extent, 
abroad.1  In  the  first  instance,  the  plans  of  vessels  and 
of  boilers  of  steamers  for  which  the  Society's  classification 
is  sought  are  sent  for  approval.  Clearly,  if  a  vessel  is  in- 

1  Lloyd's  Register  is  the  oldest  Society  of  this  description  in  the  world. 
Next  to  Lloyd's  Register  in  point  of  antiquity  conies  the  Bureau  Veritas, 
of  Paris,  founded  in  1828.  The  Norske  Veritas,  of  Christiania,  was  founded 
in  1864;  the  Germanischer  Lloyd,  of  Berlin,  in  1867;  the  Record  of 
American  and  Foreign  Shipping,  of  New  York,  in  the  same  year  ;  the 
Registro  Italiano,  of  Genoa,  in  1870  ;  the  Veritas  Austro-Ungarico,  of 
Trieste,  in  1858  ;  and  the  British  Corporation  for  the  Survey  and  Registry 
of  Shipping,  with  its  headquarters  at  Glasgow,  in  1890.  In  addition  may- 
be mentioned  the  Liverpool  Underwriters'  Registry  for  Iron  Vessels,  which 
was  established  in  1862  and  amalgamated  with  Lloyd's  Register  in  1885. 

8 


96         THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

tended  for  general  trade,  no  class  can  be  assigned  unless 
she  conforms  to  the  standard  of  strength  set  up  by  the 
Rules  as  requisite  for  vessels  intended  to  go  anywhere  and 
do  anything — though  how  that  strength  is  attained  may 
be  immaterial.  If,  however,  a  vessel  is  intended  for  a 
special  trade,  she  can  receive  a  class  for  that  trade,  if  her 
scantlings  and  arrangements  are  considered  suitable, 
quite  irrespective  of  the  Rules  governing  the  classification 
of  general  traders.  The  construction  of  vessels,  including 
the  machinery  and  boilers  of  steamers,  then  proceeds  from 
start  to  finish  under  the  Society's  inspection,  no  steel 
being  used  which  has  not  been  produced  at  approved 
works  and  tested  at  the  manufactories  by  the  surveyors 
to  Lloyd's  Register.  For  the  examination  of  large  forgings 
to  be  employed  in  the  structure  of  the  vessels  the  Society 
employs  specially  trained  and  experienced  men,  who 
carefully  inspect  them  while  in  process  of  manufacture,  in 
order  to  detect  defects  which  could  not  be  observed  in 
their  finished  state  after  delivery.  Similarly,  all  heavy 
steel  castings  are  carefully  tested  before  they  are  accepted 
for  use  in  a  classed  vessel.  The  surveyors  see  that  the 
equipment  of  anchors  and  chain  cables  corresponds  with 
the  Rules,  and  that  they  have  been  tested  in  accordance 
with  statutory  requirements  at  public  proving-houses,  all 
of  which  are  under  the  superintendence  of  the  Committee 
of  Lloyd's  Register.  Beyond  the  statutory  requirements, 
all  cast-steel  anchors  are  required  to  undergo  special  tests  at 
the  manufactory  in  the  presence  of  the  Society's  surveyors. 
Finally,  detailed  reports  are  sent  to  headquarters,  where 
they  are  examined  by  the  technical  staff,  being  submitted 
to  the  Committee  with  a  view  to  classes  being  assigned.1 
In  any  effort  to  indicate  the  progress  of  the  British 
Mercantile  Marine  since  the  opening  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  it  is  impossible  to  ignore  the  influence  which 
Lloyd's  Register  exercised  during  the  critical  period  when 
the  industry  was  undergoing  a  succession  of  revolutions 
owing  to  the  application  of  physical  science  to  ship  pro- 
pulsion, construction,  and  equipment.  Lloyd's  Register 
was  the  necessary  counterpart  to  the  responsibilities  which 
were  thrown  by  legislation  on  the  Board  of  Trade.  It 

1  "  The  Classification  of  Merchant  Shipping,"  a  paper  read  by  Mr.  H.  J. 
Cornish,  Chief  Surveyor  to  Lloyd's  Register,  at  the  summer  meeting 
of  the  Institution  of  Naval  Architects,  1905. 


CH.  i]  THE  TWO   SERVICES  97 

may,  indeed,  be  said  that,  if  it  had  not  been  for  Lloyd's 
Register,  Parliament  would  have  been  unable  to  take 
effective  steps  to  enforce  its  will.  During  the  sixty  years 
preceding  the  outbreak  of  war,  the  Board  of  Trade  and 
Lloyd's  Register,  in  association  with  other  classification 
societies  and  the  shipowners,  shaped  the  valuable  economic 
and  warlike  weapon  which  proved  an  essential  element 
to  victory  when  at  last  the  Great  War  opened. 

IV 

THE  MEN  OF  THE  MERCHANT  NAVY 

WITH  the  introduction,  in  1853,  of  a  system  of  continuous 
service  for  the  Royal  Navy,  the  relations  between  the 
fighting  service  and  the  Mercantile  Marine  underwent  a 
radical  change.  Hitherto,  on  the  first  whisper  of  war, 
the  Admiralty  had  exercised  its  constitutional  right  to 
impress  seamen  for  service  in  the  Fleet.  The  established 
principle  was  that  the  Navy  should  normally  be  maintained 
on  a  peace  footing,  and  that  it  should  draw  additional 
men  from  the  Mercantile  Marine  in  order  to  enable  the 
men-of-war  in  reserve  to  be  commissioned.  Impressment 
was,  in  fact,  the  last  remaining  link  in  that  connection 
between  the  two  services  the  developments  of  which 
have  already  been  outlined.  The  resources  of  the 
country  were  large,  and  down  to  the  close  of  the 
Napoleonic  War  not  only  were  these  islands  largely  inde- 
pendent of  overseas  supplies  for  the  necessaries  of  life, 
but  means  of  inland  transport  were  so  defective  that 
counties  were  in  large  measure  self-contained  economic 
units.  The  population  of  the  country,  in  short,  could  exist 
in  some  measure  of  comfort  even  though  ocean .  com- 
munications were  arrested  and  the  cumbersome  means  of 
conveying  goods  on  land  restricted.  The  naval  authori- 
ties were  able  to  exercise  their  power  of  impressment  with- 
out serious  injury  to  national  interests.  The  Mercantile 
Marine  was  not  at  that  time  the  loom  of  a  great  and  essential 
world  commerce,  interference  with  which  would  mean 
starvation  for  the  people  of  the  British  Isles  and  a  complete 
dislocation  of  British  industry.  On  the  contrary,  sea- 
borne commerce  at  the  time  of  the  last  Great  War,  which 
closed  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  was 
desirable  because  it  was  the  foundation  of  the  country's 


98         THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

internal  commerce ;  but  the  British  industrial  machine 
could  exist  for  a  long  period  in  spite  of  the  laying  up  of 
large  numbers  of  merchant  ships.  The  naval  authorities, 
from  the  earliest  times  down  to  the  peace  of  1815,  con- 
tinued, without  injury  to  vital  interests,  to  regard  the 
Merchant  Service  as  a  reservoir  upon  which  almost  un- 
limited drafts  could  be  made  for  men. 

But  from  the  period  of  the  French  Revolution  onward 
the  custom  of  impressing  men  of  the  Merchant  Service  for 
the  Royal  Navy  became  increasingly  unpopular.  For 
some  years  prior  to  the  passing  of  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832, 
a  strong  feeling  existed  in  the  country  against  the  Royal 
Prerogative,  and  no  sooner  was  the  Reform  Act  in  operation 
than  expression  was  given  to  that  feeling.  Many  Members 
were  returned  to  the  new  Parliament  pledged  to  do  all  in 
their  power  to  procure  the  abolition  of  the  press-gang, 
and  the  adoption  of  a  system  of  recruiting  for  the  Navy 
less  at  variance,  it  was  claimed,  with  the  spirit  of  the  British 
Constitution.  A  Bill  dealing  with  the  Merchant  Service 
was  accordingly  introduced  into  Parliament,  in  1834,  by 
the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  Sir  James  Graham.  It 
was  drawn  up  with  a  view  to  increasing  the  number  of 
merchant  seamen  by  improving  their  position,  and  to 
providing  a  system  of  registration  which  would  secure  the 
services  of  maritime  persons  generally  in  the  event  of  an 
emergency.  Their  identity  was  to  be  established  by 
means  of  a  register  ticket,  "  in  conformity  with  an  opinion 
expressed  by  Lord  Nelson  in  a  letter  to  Lord  St.  Vincent 
in  1803,  that  that  system  of  registration  was  of  great  effect, 
and,  in  his  opinion,  indispensable."1  The  Bill  as  first 
drafted  was  not  proceeded  with  ;  but  in  1835,  the  Merchant 
Seamen's  Act,  5  &  6  Will.  IV,  cap.  19,  was  passed,  contain- 
ing the  provisions  of  the  original  measure,  except  that  a 
register  of  the  names  of  seamen  was  substituted  for  the 
personal  register  at  first  contemplated.  The  alteration 
was  made  after  much  deliberation ;  it  being  finally  con- 
sidered advisable  not  to  attempt  too  much  in  that 
direction  in  the  first  instance.  The  full  title  was  "  An 
Act  to  amend  and  consolidate  the  Laws  relating  to 
the  Merchant  Seamen  of  the  United  Kingdom,  and  for 
forming  and  maintaining  a  Register  of  all  the  Men  engaged 
in  that  Service." 

1  Evidence  of  Sir  J.  Graham  before  Manning  Commission  in  1858,  p.  52. 


CH.I]  SEAMEN  AND  THE  STATE  99 

In  the  same  session  was  passed  "  An  Act  for  the  en- 
couragement of  voluntary  enlistment  of  seamen,  and  to 
make  regulations  for  the  more  effectual  manning  of  His 
Majesty's  Navy"  (5  &  6  Will.  IV,  cap.  24).  The 
Act  reaffirmed  the  mediaeval  principle  of  compulsion  by 
giving  a  "  statutory  sanction  to  the  power  of  the  King 
to  call  for  the  services  of  seafaring  men  in  the  event  of  an 
emergency."  The  policy  of  the  Government,  as  enunciated 
by  Sir  James  Graham,  was  to  maintain  the  prerogative  of 
impressment,  but  "  to  take  every  measure  which  might 
render  the  use  of  the  power  of  impressment  even  in 
time  of  war  an  exception  to  the  rule,  based  only  upon 
urgent  necessity."  Provision  was  made  for  exemp- 
ting from  further  impressment  men  who  had  once  been 
pressed,  and  had  served  at  sea  for  a  period  of  five  years. 
This  Act  was  a  measure  of  expediency  and  compromise, 
and  the  Government,  doubtless,  were  justified  for  a  time 
in  feeling  their  way;  but,  seeing  that  the  system  of 
impressment  was  so  widely  condemned,  a  grave  responsi- 
bility was  incurred  by  those  in  authority  in  allowing  a 
quarter  of  a  century  to  elapse  before  another  recognised 
system  of  providing  seamen  at  short  notice  was  substituted. 
Happily,  no  national  emergency  arose  during  the  period ; 
and,  ultimately,  the  system  of  registry,  with  the  necessary 
machinery,  initiated  by  Sir  James  Graham's  Act,  resulted 
in  bringing  the  sailor  under  official  control,  and  afforded 
a  means  of  securing  his  service  when  occasion  required. 

This  legislation  marked  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the 
system  of  impressment,  but  an  old  custom  was  slow  to  die. 
Senior  officers  of  the  Navy  who  had  served  throughout 
the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Wars  were  unwilling 
to  agree  to  any  weakening  of  the  power  of  the  Admiralty 
to  make  whatever  claims  it  deemed  fit  upon  the  Merchant 
Service  in  time  of  war  ;  and,  in  point  of  fact,  the  right  of 
the  Crown  to  call  upon  seamen  to  serve  the  State  was 
never  abandoned.  What  happened  was  that  the  intro- 
duction on  February  14th,  1853,  of  a  system  of  continuous 
service  for  seamen  in  the  Navy — representing  the  last  word 
in  that  process  of  specialisation  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
dated  from  the  reign  of  Henry  VIII — gradually  provided 
the  fighting  arm  of  the  country  with  a  well-trained 
personnel.  Prior  to  this  event,  it  had  become  apparent 
that  the  Royal  Navy  and  the  Merchant  Navy  were  de- 


100        THE   MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST    [CH.  i 

veloping  on  different  lines.  The  fighting  service  was 
responding  to  new  demands  arising  from  the  application 
of  physical  science  to  naval  warfare,  while  the  Merchant 
Service  was  also  undergoing  a  change  in  character.  The 
growth  of  international  commerce  was  leading  to  the 
foundation  of  great  shipping  companies,  making  regular 
sailings  over  prescribed  routes  at  definite  times,  and  it  was 
dawning  on  the  authorities  that  even  in  war  the  mainten- 
ance of  these  communications  would  be  essential.  Owing 
to  the  rapid  industrialism  of  England  and  the  conse- 
quent depression  of  agriculture,  the  population  was 
becoming  increasingly  dependent  on  overseas  supplies. 
In  short,  the  former  haphazard  manner  of  manning  the 
fighting  service  was  unsuited  to  conditions  at  sea,  which 
required  that  men  of  the  Fleet  should  be  carefully  trained 
over  a  long  period  of  years,  in  order  to  enable  them  to 
handle  the  increasingly  complicated  weapons  of  warfare 
which  were  being  introduced,  while  the  country  was 
becoming  so  dependent  on  oversea  supplies  that  the 
possibility  of  laying  up  any  portion  of  the  Merchant  Navy 
in  order  to  complete  the  manning  of  the  Royal  Navy 
suggested  peril. 

Before  the  introduction  of  long  service  in  the  Navy, 
attention  had  been  directed  to  the  deterioration  of  the 
personnel  of  the  Merchant  Fleet,  and  no  doubt  those 
revelations  were  not  without  their  influence  upon  the 
course  eventually  taken  by  the  Admiralty  in  providing 
the  Royal  Navy  with  a  body  of  specially  trained  men  who 
engaged  to  serve  continuously,  with  the  prospect  of  pension. 
Reference  has  already  been  made  l  to  the  circulars  issued 
from  the  Foreign  Office  in  1843  to  British  Consuls  abroad 
as  to  the  manning  of  the  Merchant  Fleet.  In  order  to 
obtain  a  correct  view  of  the  progress  of  the  Merchant 
Service  between  the  close  of  the  last  Great  War  and  the 
opening  of  hostilities  in  1914,  it  may,  perhaps,  be  of 
interest  to  quote  from  some  of  the  reports  sent  to  the 
Foreign  Office,  which  had  their  influence  on  the  develop- 
ment of  the  two  Services  : 

"  Our  merchant  seamen  are  picked  up  as  they  may  be 
found.  On  discharge  no  writing  of  character  is  given  ;  on 
re -engagement,  of  course,  no  such  certificate  can  be 

»  &fe  p.  77. 


CH.I]  CONSULAR  CRITICISMS  101 

required.  How  can  the  good  or  bad  character  of  a  man 
be  known  ?  Certificates  may  be  false,  incomplete,  not 
well  drawn  up ;  but  they  have  been  useful  in  the  Navy, 
and  they  might,  I  imagine,  be  tried  in  the  Merchant 
Service.  .  .  .  Competition  and  low  wages,  in  the  maddest 
excess,  are  the  order  of  the  day,  and,  of  course,  vessels  are 
worse  manned  and  navigated  than  formerly." — Gothen- 
burg. 

"  Another  very  material  point  to  which  more  attention 
should  be  given  is  the,  more  frequent  than  otherwise, 
lamentable  condition  of  apprentices  in  these  small  traders, 
many  of  them  probably  more  neglected  and  ill-used  than 
a  West  Indian  slave  formerly,  the  interest  of  the  owner 
of  the  latter  being  more  at  stake.  These  forlorn  objects 
(here  again  we  must  not  forget  exceptions)  often  seek 
relief  from  their  Consul  without  his  being  able  to  afford 
it ;  for  unless  some  glaring  act  of  brutality  is  observable, 
the  unhappy  sufferer  is  sure  to  be  in  the  wrong,  and  the 
treatment  he  receives  is  merely  '  deserved  wholesome 
correction ! '  which  power  is  certainly  desirable  for 
masters  to  possess.  No  wonder  such  apprentices  produce 
seamen  disposed  to  all  sorts  of  irregularities,  and  sometimes 
captains  a  very  few  degrees  better.  Boys  ought  not  to  be 
bound  without  first  having  been  at  school,  to  learn  at 
least  right  from  wrong,  and  the  rudiments  of  education 
fitted  for  their  station.  When  out  of  service  they  should 
be  compelled  to  attend  school,  and  by  having  their  am- 
bition awakened,  they  would  thus  be  prepared  for  obtaining 
the  petty  officer's  or  mate's  certificate.  I  know  the  Marine 
Society,  Bishopsgate  Street ;  such  establishments,  as  to 
principle,  should  exist  in  every  port  in  Britain." — 
Danzig. 

"  The  conduct  of  British  shipmasters  and  seamen  in  this 
port,  in  general,  is  very  disorderly,  specially  those  belonging 
to  vessels  proceeding  from  the  northern  ports— Sunder- 
land,  Newcastle,  Shields,  etc.  It  arises  principally  from 
the  rough  and  uneducated  character  of  both  masters  and 
men ;  their  great  tendency  of  intoxication  ;  the  facility 
of  obtaining  wine  and  spirits  in  this  port ;  and  the  little 
restraint  held  over  them  by  the  local  authorities  or  power 
of  the  Consulate,  in  case  of  misbehaviour,  to  exercise 
control  over  them. 

"  During  the  outward  voyage  both  masters  and  men 


102       THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

become  irritated  against  each  other  in  consequence  of 
harsh  and  violent  conduct  shown  on  one  side,  and  dis- 
content, ill-humour,  and  insubordination,  on  the  other. 
Their  mutual  animosities  are,  however,  in  general,  sup- 
pressed, and  kept  within  certain  bounds  by  necessity 
during  the  time  they  are  at  sea.  On  their  arrival  in  port 
their  first  thought  (too  generally,  of  masters  as  well  as 
men)  seems  to  be  to  get  drunk.  All  their  animosities  then 
break  out  with  redoubled  violence,  and  quarrelling, 
fighting,  and  other  disgraceful  scenes  ensue,  which  bring 
discredit  upon  their  country,  equally  with  themselves.  .  .  . 

"  Motives  of  economy  are,  amongst  some,  a  source  of 
disturbance.  On  arriving  in  British  ports  many  masters 
discharge  almost  all  their  crew,  in  order  not  to  be  at  the 
charge  of  maintaining  and  paying  them  while  they  are 
in  port.  They  do  not  fill  up  their  complements  until 
they  are  just  on  the  point  of  sailing  again  on  their  outward 
voyage ;  they  are  then  obliged  to  take  the  first  persons 
they  can  find,  who  frequently  prove  not  to  be  seamen,  or 
very  inefficient  men,  and  often  turn  out  to  be  very  bad 
characters,  and  cause  a  great  deal  of  trouble." — Con- 
stantinople. 

"  In  point  of  intelligence,  address,  and  conduct,  they— 
British  masters — are  the  inferior  to  the  American  ship- 
masters, and,  in  consequence  of  their  intemperance  when 
in  port,  great  dissatisfaction  is  expressed  by  their  crews. 
What  their  knowledge  of  c  practical  navigation  and 
seamanship '  may  be,  I  am  not  competent  to  say,  having 
always  preferred,  when  visiting  England,  taking  a  passage 
in  an  American  vessel ;  but  I  have  observed  that  desertions 
very  seldom  occur,  or  only  to  a  limited  extent,  from  vessels 
commanded  by  superior  men,  while  less  efficient  masters 
not  infrequently  lose  their  entire  crews. 

"  I  have  in  a  former  year  ascertained  the  amount  dis- 
bursed by  every  British  and  every  American  vessel  fre- 
quenting this  port,  and  the  expenditure  of  the  British 
was  from  30  to  50  per  cent,  greater  than  the  American. 
The  British  master  seldom  receives  more  than  £10  per 
month  whilst  afloat,  and  consequently  prefers  a  long  to 
a  short  voyage.  The  wages  of  an  American  master,  with 
his  perquisites,  are  nearly  treble  that  amount ;  he  has, 
therefore,  no  inducement  to  dishonesty  to  support  himself. 
The  British  masters,  I  have  been  credibly  informed,  run 


CH.  i]         BRITISH  AND  AMERICAN  MASTERS          103 

up  longer  bills  with  the  different  tradesmen,  and  after 
payment  of  them,  and  a  receipt  in  full  taken,  many  articles 
are  sent  back,  and  the  cost  of  them,  as  charged  in  the  bill, 
refunded  to  the  master  ;  the  inference  is,  that  the  owners 
of  the  vessels  never  receive  credit  for  the  articles  so  re- 
turned . ' ' — Savann  ah . 

"  There  does  not  appear  to  be  the  same  encouragement 
extended  to  British  masters  as  there  is  to  American.  The 
average  wages  per  month  (in  this  trade)  paid  to  the  former 
is  £8  105.,  together  with  the  average  of  his  proportion  of 
the  cabin  freight,  £2,  is  equal  to  say  £10  10s.  per  month  ; 
while  to  the  latter,  including  all  his  perquisites,  say  £20 
per  month.  It  is  very  usual  for  the  American  master  to 
have  an  interest  of  an  one-eighth  to  one-fourth  in  the 
vessel  under  his  command,  and  owners  of  vessels,  being 
so  convinced  that  it  is  to  their  advantage  that  the  master 
should  be  so  interested,  frequently  give  them  a  share  on 
credit.  As  a  proof  that  the  character  of  British  shipping 
has  declined,  I  would  instance  the  fact,  that  almost  in- 
variably, American  ships  not  only  obtain  a  decided  prefer- 
ence over  British  ships,  but  generally  a  higher  rate  of 
freight." — Norfolk,  Virginia. 

"  If  I  were  to  mention  the  names  of  those  persons  whom 
I  deem  unfitted  for  command,  I  fear  I  should  include 
the  whole  of  the  remaining  traders  to  this  port.  With  the 
former  exceptions  (mentioned  earlier  in  the  report),  I  do 
not  think  that  a  British  vessel  arrives  at  Pernambuco  with- 
out some  complaint  being  made  to  me  from  the  men,  of 
brutality,  starvation,  insulting  language,  overwork,  or 
want  of  sufficient  hands.  In  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  I  am 
obliged  to  decide  in  favour  of  the  men ;  and  what  is  the 
consequence  ?  Why,  that  armed  with  no  specific  powers, 
the  master  laughs  at  the  decision  which  he  himself  has 
oftentimes  invoked ;  even  here,  where  the  Commercial 
Treaty  makes  Her  Majesty's  Consuls  arbitrators  in  the 
disputes  of  their  countrymen,  no  powers  of  enforcing  them 
are  conferred." — Pernambuco. 

Mr.  James  Murray,  in  a  memorandum  dated  Novem- 
ber 22nd,  1847,  declared  that  "  the  condition  of  British 
Shipping,  according  to  evidence  from  the  ports  of  foreign 
States,  may  not  unjustly  be  termed  discreditable  to 
this  country.  No  sufficient  efforts  appear  to  have  been 


104        THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

made  in  Great  Britain  to  remedy  the  existing  evils  ; 
while  pains  have  been  taken  by  foreign  Governments,  and 
with  success,  to  improve  the  condition  of  their  Mercantile 
Marine." 

We  may  turn  from  the  evils  so  fully  illustrated  in 
these  reports,  and  so  clearly  emphasised  in  Mr.  James 
Murray's  memorandum,  based  upon  them,  to  the  related 
question  of  the  ineffective  control  by  the  State  of  the 
manning  of  the  Mercantile  Marine.  Beyond  the  muster 
rolls  required  since  1747,  by  the  Seamen's  Relief  Act 
(20th  of  Geo.  II,  cap.  38)  and  subsequent  Statutes,  to 
be  kept  on  board  merchant  ships,  and  the  duplicates  to 
be  rendered  to  the  collectors  of  Customs,  in  connection 
with  the  Merchant  Seamen's  Fund,1  no  records  of  the 
crews  of  British  vessels  were  in  existence  ;  and  apparently 
no  statistical  use  was  made  of  the  accounts  so  rendered. 
The  only  published  figures  in  connection  with  the  Merchant 
Service  were  contained  in  the  Parliamentary  Return, 
prepared  by  the  Registrar-General  of  Seamen,  subse- 
quently of  Shipping  and  Seamen,  who  was  for  many 
years  an  officer  of  the  Admiralty,  and  afterwards  of  the 
Board  of  Trade,  showing  the  number  of  vessels,  with  the 
amount  of  their  tonnage,  and  the  aggregate  number  of 
men  and  boys  usually  employed  in  navigating  them, 
that  belonged  to  the  several  ports  of  the  British 
Empire  on  December  31st  in  each  year.  The  Admiralty 
had  thus  but  a  vague  knowledge  of  the  source  from  which 
the  Navy  was  partly  manned  in  time  of  peace,  and  from 
which  it  would  be  recruited  in  time  of  war.  In  short, 
the  constitution  of  the  Mercantile  Marine  was  a  matter 
of  surmise  and  assumption,  offering  no  basis  for  a  scheme 
by  which  the  supply  of  seamen  could  be  increased. 

1  This  was  a  fund  established  with  a  view  to  granting  pensions  to  seamen. 
All  seamen  were  compelled  to  contribute  to  it.  After  a  long  period  of 
mismanagement  it  became  insolvent.  By  an  Act  introduced  by  Mr. 
Labouchere  in  1851,  the  Government  undertook  to  remove  the  great 
grievance  to  seamen  by  winding  up  the  fund  at  the  cost  of  the  country. 
The  principle  adopted  was  to  take  all  existing  assets  ;  to  pay  all  existing 
pensions  or  claims  to  pension  ;  and  to  allow  existing  contributors  to 
continue  their  contributions  with  the  prospect  of  a  pension.  The  amount 
of  future  pensions  was  determined  by  taking  the  average  of  then  existing 
pensions,  which,  besides  being  frequently  withheld  from  want  of  funds, 
differed  in  amount  at  the  different  ports.  The  difference  between  assets 
and  liabilities  was  paid  out  of  the  Public  Exchequer.  The  winding  up 
ctett  thte  State  aboiit  £1,500,(M). 


CH.  i]  SIR  JAMES   GRAHAM'S  ACT  105 

In  those  circumstances  the  nominal  register  of  the 
seamen  belonging  to  the  United  Kingdom,  provided  by 
Sir  James  Graham's  Act — though,  of  course,  it  could  be  of 
no  direct  service  in  manning  the  Navy — was  calculated  to 
be  of  value  statistically.  The  Act  came  into  operation 
on  July  31st,  1835  ;  and,  under  it,  masters  of  British  ships 
were  required  to  deposit  with  the  Officers  of  Customs  at 
the  several  ports  of  the  United  Kingdom  returns  of  the 
names  and  description  of  their  crews  at  the  commencement 
and  termination  of  voyages,  in  the  case  of  foreign-going 
vessels  ;  and  half-yearly,  in  the  case  of  Home  Trade  and 
fishing  vessels.  For  the  due  supervision,  scrutiny,  and 
custody  of  these  documents,  sect,  xix  provided  for  the 
establishment  of  "  The  General  Register  Office  of  Merchant 
Seamen,"  under  the  control  of  the  Admiralty.  From  the 
lists  of  crews  forwarded  to  that  office,  the  name  of  each 
seaman  was  entered  alphabetically  into  a  general  register, 
with  his  age,  place  of  birth,  previous  ship  and  latest  voyage ; 
a  separate  book  was  kept  for  apprentices.  Besides  afford- 
ing the  Admiralty  useful  and  necessary  information 
respecting  the  numbers,  ages,  ratings,  and  whereabouts 
of  merchant  seamen,  this  register  proved  itself  of  import- 
ance in  bringing  to  light  the  fact  that  the  law  respecting 
the  compulsory  employment  of  apprentices  was  largely 
ignored.1  It  was  found  that  only  some  5,000  apprentices 
were  registered,  although  the  number  to  be  maintained, 
according  to  the  tonnage  scale,  was  nearly  14,000.  By 
the  establishment  of  an  office  to  insure  that  the  laws  for 
the  Increase  and  Encouragement  of  Seamen  were  duly 
carried  out,  a  material  change  was  effected ;  in  seven 
years  from  the  coming  into  operation  of  Sir  James  Graham's 
Act,  more  than  40,000  apprentices  were  registered,  being 
at  the  rate  of  over  5,000  per  annum. 

The  legislation  of  1835  was  generally  understood  to  be 
an  instalment  only.  The  Merchant  Seamen's  Act  was 
useful,  since  under  its  operation  there  was  a  continual 
influx  of  young  blood  into  the  Service,  but  it  did  nothing 
directly  towards  obviating  the  necessity  for  impressment. 
In  reply  to  awkward  questions  in  Parliament  as  to  what 
was  to  come  of  the  registration,  it  was  officially  stated 
that  "  so  many  more  thousand  apprentices "  served  for 
a  time  ;  but,  in  view  of  promises  given,  uneasiness  presently 

i  4  Geo.  IV,  cfop.  19. 


106        THE   MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

prevailed  at  the  Admiralty  lest  the  necessity  for  issuing 
Press  Warrants  should  arise  before  milder  and  wiser  methods 
had  been  tried. 

The  Registrar-General  of  Seamen  was,  in  consequence, 
called  upon  by  the  Admiralty,  in  October  1838,  to  state 
whether  he  was  "  prepared  to  recommend  any  measure 
to  insure  the  power  of  procuring  a  certain  number  of 
men  for  filling  up  the  ships  at  short  notice."  Captain 
Brown,  R.N.,  the  Registrar-General,  at  once  submitted 
his  views,  setting  forth,  as  the  result  of  his  experience, 
two  remedies  for  forcible  impressment : 

41  (1)  A  general  personal  registry  of  all  mariners  of  every 
degree,  taking  minute  individual  description  of  each  as 
to  age,  capacity,  etc.,  and  after  rejecting  the  aged  and 
incapable  from  the  list,  to  draught  or  ballot  a  certain 
number  at  fixed  periods ;  the  names  of  men  so  drawn  to 
be  exhibited  at  every  Custom  House,  with  notice  to  come 
forward,  under  certain  penalties  for  refusal  or  neglect, 
when  called  on  by  Proclamation. 

"  (2)  To  form  a  reserve  of  men  either  in  one,  two  or 
three  classes,  which  may  be  distinguished  as  the  '  Naval 
Reserve.'  " 

He  pointed  out,  however,  many  serious  objections  to 
the  first  plan,  and  warmly  advocated  the  adoption  of  the 
second. 

The  matter  remained  in  abeyance  till  1842,1  when,  in 
connection  with  the  Merchant  Seamen's  Fund,  the  question 
of  establishing  a  test  of  identity  for  each  British  seaman 
was  considered  by  a  Parliamentary  Committee  appointed 
to  inquire  into  the  working  of  that  Fund.  It  was  at 
length  resolved  to  amend  the  Merchant  Seamen's  Act,  and 
to  inaugurate  a  new  system  of  registry,  with  a  twofold 
object:  first,  to  benefit  seamen  by  affording  them  a  ready 
means  of  establishing  their  claims  for  relief  or  support 
from  the  Merchant  Seamen's  Fund ;  and,  secondly,  to 
provide  for  the  abstraction  of  classes  of  seamen  from  the 
general  body,  without  resorting  to  indiscriminate  impress- 
ment. A  measure  was  accordingly  prepared,  which  passed 
into  law  on  September  5th,  1844,  entitled,  "An  Act  to 

1  This  was  the  year  in  which  the  Foreign  Office,  at  the  request  of  the 
Admiralty,  called  for  reports  as  to  the  manning  of  the  Mercantile  Marine. 


CH.  i]  THE  SEAMAN'S  TICKET  10T 

amend  and  consolidate  the  Laws  relating  to  Merchant 
Seamen,  and  for  keeping  a  Register  of  Seamen"  (7  &  8 
Viet.,  cap.  112).  The  Act  provided  for  the  adoption  of  the 
register  ticket,  and  Sir  James  Graham  declared  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  when  the  Bill  was  read  a  third  time, 
that  this  provision  formed  part  of  his  original  intention. 
Under  the  new  law,  no  person,  except  a  master  or  surgeon, 
being  a  British  subject,  was  to  serve  on  board  ship  without 
a  ticket  bearing  his  name  and  description.  This  ticket 
each  seaman  was  required  to  deposit  with  the  master  of 
the  vessel  in  which  he  engaged  when  signing  articles,  and 
the  master  was  required  to  return  it  to  the  seaman  at  the 
expiration  of  his  agreement. 

The  Registrar-General  of  Seamen  was  deputed  to  carry 
the  measure  into  effect,  and  it  fell  to  the  Officers  of  Customs 
at  the  several  ports  to  issue  the  tickets.  Each  ticket  was 
distinguished  by  a  number  from  "  1 "  upwards,  and  bore 
the  stamp  of  the  "  General  Register  and  Record  Office 
of  Seamen" — the  words  "and  Record"  having  been 
added  to  the  title  by  the  new  Act.1  A  numerical  register 
was  opened  in  that  Office  in  which  were  recorded  the 
particulars  of  the  men  to  whom  the  register  tickets  were 
issued,  and  their  subsequent  movements  were  duly  entered 
thereon,  from  the  crew  lists  furnished  as  heretofore,  with 
the  addition  of  each  man's  especial  number.  To  quote 
from  a  report  by  Captain  Brown,  dated  November  24th, 
1847,  "  the  measure  as  carried  into  effect  became  popular 
with  the  seamen,  who  adopted  the  opinion  that  the  ticket, 
being  issued  to  British  subjects  only,  would  prevent 
foreigners  from  usurping  their  berths."  At  this  time,  and 
until  1853,  no  foreigners  were  allowed  to  serve  in  coasting 
vessels,  and  not  more  than  25  per  cent,  of  the  crew  in  foreign- 
going  vessels.  It  also  appears  from  the  report  that  the 
measure  was  generally  popular  with  the  shipowners,  "  be- 
cause they  considered  that  the  deposit  of  the  ticket  with  the 
masters  of  vessels  during  the  terms  of  a  seaman's  service 
gave  them  a  lien  upon  him  which  would  prevent  desertion." 
Disappointment  ensued,  however,  when  it  was  found  that 

1  A  further  addition  to  the  title  of  the  Office  was  made  in  1872.  Under 
the  Merchant  Shipping  Act  of  that  year,  there  was  a  transfer  of 
registry  work  from  the  Customs,  and  the  Registrar-General  of  Seamen 
became  the  Registrar-General  of  Shipping  and  Seamen.  The  office  then 
assumed  its  present  title  of  the  "  General  Register  and  Record  Office  of 
Shipping  and  Seamen." 


108        THE   MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

the  machinery  of  the  Register  Office  was  not  "to  be 
brought  to  bear  upon  deserters  to  procure  their  conviction 
and  punishment." 

However  good  the  system  was  on  paper,  it  broke  down  in 
practice  ;  mainly  because  there  was  no  direct  inducement 
for  the  men  to  take  care  of  the  tickets.  The  Merchant 
Seamen's  Fund  offered  none,  as  it  turned  out.  For  some 
time  in  an  insolvent  state,  owing  to  gross  mismanagement, 
it  was  practically  abolished,  so  far  as  nine-tenths  of  the 
Service  was  concerned,  by  the  Winding-up  Act  of  1851. 
The  majority  of  seamen  had  long  looked  upon  the  Fund 
with  suspicion  and  disgust :  money  was  stopped  from 
their  wages,  and  they  understood  not  where  the  money 
went.  Thus,  having  no  palpable  interest  in  safeguarding 
their  identity,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  seamen  resorted 
to  an  illegal  traffic  in  tickets,  in  spite  of  cautions  and 
penalties.  With  the  strength  of  the  Mercantile  Marine 
then  ranging  from  160,000  to  170,000  British  seamen 
(exclusive  of  masters),  the  issue  of  over  half  a  million 
tickets  in  the  course  of  six  years  pointed  to  the  prevalence 
of  abuses.  Indeed,  it  was  stated  in  evidence  before  the 
Lords  Committee  sitting  in  1848  to  inquire  into  the  Navi- 
gation Laws  "  that  in  the  Jews'  shops  at  Shadwell,  and 
in  similar  places  at  Bristol,  sailors  could  purchase  as  many 
register  tickets  as  they  wanted,  and  for  half  the  amount 
of  the  fine  that  would  be  asked  of  them  if  they  went  to  the 
Custom  House." 

The  repeal  in  1853  of  the  Manning  clauses  of  the  old 
Navigation  Laws,  which  excluded  foreigners  from  serving 
in  coasting  vessels  and  limited  the  number  to  be  employed 
in  foreign-going  vessels,  made  it  no  longer  necessary  to 
prove  nationality  at  time  of  engagement,  and  so  did  away 
with  what  little  value  the  ticket  still  possessed  for  a  British 
seaman.  In  the  circumstances,  there  was  but  one 
thing  to  be  done.  The  functions  and  powers  vested  in  the 
Admiralty  under  the  Merchant  Seamen's  Act  and  the 
amending  Act  of  1844  x  had  been  transferred  to  the  Board 
of  Trade  by  the  Mercantile  Marine  Act  of  1850  (13  &  14 
Viet.,  cap.  93),  with  full  powers  to  alter  or  dispense  with 
the  register-ticket  system.  Acting  on  these  powers,  the 
Board  of  Trade  formally  abolished  the  system  by  notice 
in  the  London  Gazette  of  September  30th,  1853. 

1  Acts  5  &  6  Will.  IV,  cap.  19,  and  7  &  8  Viet.,  cap.  112. 


CH.  i]  END  OF  THE  TICKET  SYSTEM  109 

But  the  story  of  the  ticket  system  was  not  thereby  closed. 
It  was  originally  framed  with  a  view  to  restricted  impress- 
ment (i.e.,  to  calling  out  merchant  seamen  of  certain  ages  for 
service  in  His  Majesty's  ships  at  short  notice),  and  it  was  not 
till  1853  that  an  Act  was  passed  empowering  the  Crown  to 
call  out  seamen  in  classes,  according  to  age,  described  in 
"  their  register  tickets,  or  otherwise."  There  was  a  virtue  in 
the  "  otherwise,"  seeing  that  register  tickets  were  then  no 
more.  In  the  absence  of  the  register  ticket,  resort  was 
had  to  the  certificate  of  discharge  given  to  every  seaman 
at  the  end  of  a  voyage.  It  is  more  than  doubtful  whether 
the  provisions  of  the  Act  in  question,  16  &  17  Viet.,  cap.  69, 
could  ever  have  been  enforced  by  means  of  this  test  of 
identity  ;  fortunately,  like  those  of  the  earlier  Proclamation 
Act,  5  &  6  Will.  IV,  cap.  24,  they  were  allowed  to  remain 
inoperative. 

Although  proved  to  be  unworkable  as  applied  to  the 
whole  Mercantile  Marine,  the  system  of  individual  regis- 
tration was  not  entirely  discarded,  but  for  "  Fund " 
purposes  was  continued  in  operation  as  regards  some 
12,000  men,  to  whom  special  tickets  were  issued  under 
the  Winding-up  Act,  14  &  15  Viet.,  cap.  102,  and  for  over 
fifty  years  it  has  been  worked  with  success  in  connection 
with  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve.  The  certificate  R  V  2, 
issued  to  each  member  of  that  force,  corresponds  to  the  old 
register  ticket,  with  the  difference  that,  whereas  the 
majority  of  men  had  little  or  no  interest  in  looking  after 
the  latter,  the  former  is  as  important  to  a  Naval  Reserve 
man  as  a  Savings  Bank  Book,  guaranteeing  to  him  so 
much  money  for  so  much  drill  performed.1 

After  1853,  however,  no  attempt  was  made  to  revive 
the  maintenance  of  an  individual  or  even  nominal  register 
of  seamen,  except  as  regards  certificated  officers,  appren- 
tices, and  Naval  Reserve  men.  The  general  body  of  seamen 
were  dealt  with  in  the  Seamen's  Registry  Office,  as  mere 
numbers  ;  they  were  noted  in  the  registers  of  ships  and 
their  voyages,  kept  since  1857,  and  were  periodically  set 

1  A  central  indexed  register  of  seamen  employed  in  foreign-going  vessels 
was  started  in  October  1913,  in  the  General  Register  and  Record  Office  of 
Shipping  and  Seamen,  and  was  found  of  great  use.  An  Order  in  Council, 
dated  August  2nd,  1918,  provided  that  "the  Shipping  Controller,  in 
conjunction  with  the  Board  of  Trade,  may  make  orders  relative  to  the 
holding  of  a  certificate  of  identity  and  service  by  every  master,  sea- 
man, or  apprentice  employed  on  a  British  ship,  and  in  relation  to 
kindred  matters." 


110        THE  MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE  PAST     [CH.  i 

forth  in  the  Shipping  and  Navigation  Returns  under  the 
head  of  "  Persons  Employed."  In  addition,  the  crew  lists 
containing  their  signatures  and  descriptions  were  filed  and 
were  available  for  reference.1 

The  breakdown  of  the  personal  test  system  led  to  the 
consideration  of  Captain  Brown's  second  plan  for  procuring 
men  for  the  Navy  at  short  notice — viz.,  the  formation  and 
maintenance  of  a  voluntary  Naval  Reserve.  In  fact, 
money  was  voted  in  the  Navy  Estimates  of  1852-3  for 
experimenting  with  the  scheme  to  the  extent  of  5,000 
men,  but  owing  to  a  change  of  Government  nothing  was 
done.  The  Admiralty,  however,  were  soon  to  experience 
the  truth  of  Captain  Brown's  dictum  that  "  the  means 
of  augmenting  our  naval  force  cannot  be  extemporised, 
but  must  be  preorganised."  According  to  the  evidence 
of  Rear- Admiral  Milne  and  Sir  James  Graham  before  the 
Commissioners  for  manning  the  Navy,  in  1858,  immense 
difficulty  was  experienced  in  1854  in  fitting  out  the  Baltic 
and  Black  Sea  Fleets.  The  operation  was  slow  in  the 
extreme ;  small  vessels  had  to  be  recalled  from  foreign 
stations,  and  their  crews  transferred  as  a  nucleus  to  the 
larger  ships.  Most  of  the  men  sent  out  to  the  Baltic  Fleet 
were  "  very  young,  and  without  experience  " — landsmen, 
in  fact.  Well  might  Admiral  Sir  Charles  Napier  complain 
of  the  delay  in  getting  his  complement  of  men,  and  of  the 
quality  of  those  he  did  get.  It  was  just  the  time  when  a 
reserve  of  seamen  would  have  been  invaluable  had  there 
been  one.  Sailors  were  urgently  needed,  and  yet  the 
situation  was  not  sufficiently  serious  to  warrant  the  issue 
of  a  proclamation,  with  all  the  inconveniences  attending 
bounties  and  embargoes.2  Even  as  it  was,  there  was  such 
a  demand  for  seamen  that  wages  increased  nearly  40  per 
cent.  With  shipowners  outbidding  the  Government,  as 

1  The  preparation  of  the  statistics  referred  to  in  this  paragraph  calls 
for  a  few  remarks.  The  first  reliable  figures  were  compiled  in  1700,  when 
the  Registrars  of  Shipping  in  England  were  required  to  send  in  lists  of  the 
vessels  on  their  registers,  with  the  numbers  of  men  usually  required  to 
man  them.  Registrars  in  Scotland  and  Ireland  were  brought  into  line 
later  on.  After  a  long  period  it  was  recognised  that  many  vessels  on  the 
register  were  either  laid  up,  employed  inland,  or  out  of  existence,  so  since 
1848,  only  those  vessels  employed  at  some  time  during  the  year  in  the 
Home  or  Foreign  Trade  or  in  Fishing  have  been  included  in  the  Annual 
Statistics.  A  more  detailed  analysis  of  ships  and  crews  has  been  made 
in  the  quinquennial  Census  returns  compiled  since  1891. 

1  Cf.  Sir  James  Graham's  evidence  before  Manning  Commission  in  1858, 
p.  63. 


CH.  i]  THE  ACT   OF   1859  HI 

they  would  have  done,  wages  must  have  gone  up  to  a 
ruinous  rate.  The  lesson  then  taught  the  authorities  was 
not  forgotten,  and  resulted  in  the  appointment  of  a  Royal 
Commission  in  1858  to  inquire  into  the  best  means  of 
manning  the  Navy.  The  Commission,  presided  over  by 
Lord  Hardwicke,  favoured  Captain  Brown's  scheme  of  a 
voluntary  Naval  Reserve.  They  proposed  in  their  Report 
the  substitution  "  of  a  system  of  defence,  voluntary  and 
effective,  for  untrained  compulsory  service."  They  were 
of  opinion  that  from  the  Merchant  Service  could  be  formed 
a  force  of  "  thorough  seamen,  trained  in  gunnery,  and 
qualified  for  immediate  service  on  board  a  ship  of  war." 
An  Act  was  accordingly  passed  in  August  1859 
(22  &  23  Viet.,  cap.  40)  giving  the  Admiralty  power  to 
raise  "  Royal  Naval  Volunteers,  not  to  exceed  30,000 
men."  The  machinery  for  the  establishment  of  the  Force 
was  ready  to  hand  in  the  General  Register  and  Record 
Office  of  Seamen  and  the  various  shipping  offices  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  Under  the  Mercantile  Marine  Act 
of  1850,  which  placed  the  management  of  matters  relating 
to  the  British  Mercantile  Marine  under  the  Board  of  Trade, 
Shipping  Masters — since  described  as  Superintendents  of 
the  Mercantile  Marine  Offices — had  recently  been  appointed 
to  superintend  the  registry,  engagement,  and  discharge 
of  seamen,  etc.,  and  their  status  and  duties  were  further 
defined  by  the  Merchant  Shipping  Act  of  1854.  These 
officers  were  necessarily  in  close  touch  with  the  seamen, 
and,  acting  under  the  direction  of  the  Registrar- General 
of  Seamen,  were  the  best  possible  agents  for  procuring 
volunteers.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  as  the  first 
suggestion  in  modern  times  to  raise  an  effective  Naval 
Reserve  originated  in  1852  with  Captain  Brown,  the  original 
holder  of  the  appointment  of  Registrar- General  of  Seamen, 
so  when  the  scheme  was  adopted  it  was  found  that  in  that 
office,  with  its  records  and  administrative  machinery 
throughout  the  country,  lay  the  hopes  of  success.  Suc- 
ceeding Registrars- General — notably  Mr.  J.  J.  Mayo,  Mr. 
H.  N.  Malan,  Mr.  John  Clark-Hall,  and  Mr.  C.  H.  Jones- 
working  in  conjunction  with  the  various  Admirals  Super- 
intendent of  Naval  Reserves  (after  1903  Admirals  Com- 
manding Coast  Guard  and  Naval  Reserves),  succeeded  in 
organising  out  of  the  personnel  of  the  Mercantile  Marine 
and  the  fishing  industry  a  large,  dependable,  and  readily 


112        THE   MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST    [CH.  i 

available  reserve  force  for  the  Royal  Navy.  Certain  alter- 
native proposals  were  brought  forward  or  given  a  trial, 
and  the  Royal  Naval  Coast  Volunteers,  established  in 
1853,  continued  in  existence  for  twenty  years ;  but 
experience  at  last  confirmed  the  wisdom  of  obtaining  a 
sea-going  force,  thus  giving  effect  to  suggestions  made 
by  leading  naval  officers  of  the  war  period,  including 
Nelson,  who  on  several  occasions  urged  on  the  naval 
authorities  the  advisability  of  fostering  the  Merchant 
Navy  as  the  source  of  a  supply  of  handy  and  experienced 
seamen  for  men-of-war  in  a  time  of  sudden  emergency. 

The  history  of  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve  has  been  a 
chequered  one.  Officers  of  the  Naval  Service  who  sat  on 
the  Board  of  Admiralty  were  apparently  impressed  increas- 
ingly, in  process  of  time,  by  the  wide  divergence  between 
the  needs  of  the  Royal  Navy  and  those  of  the  Merchant 
Service,  as  the  former  responded  to  the  impulse  of  invention 
and  developed  a  demand  for  men  of  special  training — for 
signalling,  gunnery,  torpedo  work,  and  other  duties.  At 
first  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve  consisted  only  of  lower-deck 
ratings,  and  there  was  considerable  opposition  to  the 
proposal  that  officers  of  the  Mercantile  Marine  should  be 
included  in  the  Force,  but  an  Act  was  passed  in  1861  provid- 
ing for  their  appointment.  It  was  repealed  and  fresh  pro- 
visions were  made  by  the  Act  of  1863  (26  &  27  Viet.,  cap. 69). 
Captain  H.  J.  Challis,  R.N.,  in  his  evidence  before  a  General 
Committee  of  the  Admiralty  and  Board  of  Trade  in  1869, 
stated  that  he  "  objected  altogether  to  the  principle  that 
officers  of  the  Mercantile  Marine  be  employed  in  the  Naval 
Reserve,"  adding  that  he  considered  that  there  was 
"  sufficiency  of  naval  officers  who  are  well  fitted  for  the 
work."  Captain  Challis  evidently  reflected  the  general  view 
of  the  Navy  at  the  time.1  For  many  years  the  training  of  the 
Force  was  neglected ;  officers  and  men  were  relegated 
to  shore  batteries  provided  only  with  muzzle-loading  guns 
after  the  breech-loader  had  been  adopted  for  service  at  sea. 
Generally  the  Service  suffered  from  unintelligent  dis- 
couragement. "  In  January  1889  .  .  .  there  was  not 
(except  on  board  the  District  Coastguard  ships)  a  single 
breech-loading  or  machine-gun  used  in  the  instruction  of 
the  Reserve,  but  early  in  1891  we  find  that  fourteen  5-inch 

J  Even   in    1879   Admiral    Sir   Augustus   Phillimore   urged   that   com- 
missions "  should  be  confined  to  a  very  limited  number." 


CH.  i]  TWO  NAVAL  RESERVES  113 

breech-loading  guns,  one  6-inch  breech-loading  gun,  one 
Galling,  one  Gardner,  and  sixty-seven  Nordenfeldt  machine- 
guns  were  so  employed.  Since  then  a  certain  number  of 
quick-firing  guns  have  been  supplied,  and,  doubtless, 
something  more  has  been  effected  in  the  direction  of 
increasing  the  modern  armament,  although  much  remains 
to  be  done."  x  In  spite,  however,  of  inadequate  official 
recognition,  the  Force  continued  to  expand  from  year  to 
year;  Commander  W.  R  Caborne,  C.B.,  R.N.R.,  and  others, 
continually  kept  the  subject  before  the  public,  and  slowly 
the  conditions  of  service  were  improved.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  century  the  Force  reached  its  maximum 
strength  of  ratings,  29,538  (1904).  A  few  years  previously 
the  Admiralty  had  decided  on  establishing  a  reserve  force 
of  its  own,  to  be  known  as  the  Royal  Fleet  Reserve.  It 
consisted  of  men  of  good  character  who  had  served  for  a 
term  in  the  Fleet,  and  who,  in  return  for  a  retainer,  agreed 
to  keep  themselves  efficient  for  service  afloat.  Even  so 
enthusiastic  a  supporter  of  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve  as 
Commander  Caborne  approved  this  step,  though  it  threat- 
ened the  force  hitherto  recognised.  He  admitted  that 
"  it  is  obvious,  from  what  has  gone  before,  that  the  Royal 
Fleet  Reserve,  consisting  as  it  does  of  men  who  have  seen 
long,  or  at  any  rate  considerable,  service  in  the  Royal 
Navy  and  have  been  thoroughly  trained  in  their  respective 
duties — trained  far  better  than  any  other  auxiliary  naval 
body  can  be  in  time  of  peace — must  of  necessity,  so  far 
as  ratings  are  concerned,  be  our  first  and  principal  stand-by 
in  time  of  war  for  service  in  the  Fleet." 

No  doubt  this  was  the  view  taken  by  the  Admiralty, 
for  in  consequence  of  the  success  attending  the  formation 
of  the  Royal  Fleet  Reserve,  and  also  looking  at  the  fact 
that  the  numbers  in  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve  had  reached 
probable  requirements,  recruiting  for  the  latter  body  was 
suspended  from  December  1904  until  October  1906. 
The  formation  of  the  Royal  Fleet  Reserve  was  part  of  a 
wide-sweeping  movement  for  assuring  a  supply  of  well- 
trained  seamen  for  the  Fleet,  and  the  training  of  the  Naval 
Reserve  was  x  reconsidered.  In  his  "  Statement  of 
Admiralty  Policy  "  in  1905,  the  First  Lord  (Earl  Cawdor) 
remarked  : 

1  Lecture  on  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve,  by  Commander  W.  F.  Caborne, 
R.N.R.,  May  10th,  1895. 


114      THE    MERCHANT  NAVY   OF  THE   PAST      [CH.  i 

i4  The  arrangements  for  the  drill  and  training  of  men 
of  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve  have  been  recently  reviewed 
in  order  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  this  branch  of  the 
Reserves,  and  also  to  reduce  its  cost.     Hitherto,  Royal 
Naval  Reserve  men  have  been  drilled  on  board  the  harbour 
drill-ships  and  batteries  established  round  the  coasts  of 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  a  certain  number  have  undergone 
a  period  of  naval  training  on  board  the  sea-going  drill- 
ships,  or  in  ships  of  the  Channel  Fleet.     This  system  is, 
however,  no  longer  well  adapted  to  the  requirements  of 
the  Service,  inasmuch  as  the  greater  part  of  the  drill  has 
been  devoted  to  gunnery,  a  class  of  duty  which  is  very 
unlikely  to  devolve  upon  Royal  Naval  Reserve  men  in 
war,  and  as  (except,  perhaps,  the  limited  number  of  men 
who  embark  for  nine  months  of  naval  training)  they  do 
not   acquire    and   maintain   sufficient   knowledge   of  the 
general  routine  of  a  man-of-war.     The  establishment  of 
the  divisions  of  ships  in  commission  in  reserve  has  now 
given    an    opportunity    for    affording    the    Royal   Naval 
Reserve  the  training  in  which  they  have  hitherto  been 
wanting.     These  ships  have  only  a  portion  of  their  crews 
on  board,  and  can  therefore  accommodate  a  considerable 
number  of  Reserve  men,  with  advantage  both  to  themselves 
and  their  crews.     Although  the  ships  only  go  to  sea  for 
cruises  once  a  quarter,  the  general  routine  is  much  the 
same  as  when  they  are  fully  commissioned  for  sea  service  ; 
and  since  they  will  change  frequently,  the  Reserve  men 
will  have  more  facilities  for  becoming  familiar  with  the 
internal  economy  of  a  modern  man-of-war.     It  has  ac- 
cordingly been  decided  that  from  April  1st  next,  all  drill 
at  batteries  and  in  harbour  drill-ships  shall   cease,  and 
the  establishments  will  be  closed,  except  in  a  few  cases, 
where  the  present  system  will  be  continued  a  little  longer. 
These  exceptions  are  the  drill-ships  in  London,  Aberdeen, 
Bristol,    and   Liverpool,    and   the   Royal   Naval   Reserve 
batteries    at    Penzance,    Yarmouth,     Wick,     Stornoway, 
Lerwick,    Greenock,   Upper   Cove,   and   Rosslare.     Under 
this  new  system  of  training,  the  men  will  be  expected  to 
embark  in  the  first  year  for  three  months,  and  thereafter 
for  one  month  every  alternate  year." 

The  regulations  for  carrying  into  effect  the  foregoing 
policy  were  issued  on  March  29th,  1906 ;    on  March  31st 


CH.  i]  IMPROVED   TRAINING  115 

five  harbour  drill-ships  and  five  torpedo  gunboats  were 
paid  off,  and  twenty-five  Royal  Naval  Reserve  batteries 
closed  ;  and  on  April  1st,  1906,  the  new  system  of  training 
came  into  force.  Officers  of  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve 
were  given  the  option  of  drilling  at  the  remaining  drill- 
stations  under  the  old  system  for  five  years  from  April  1st, 
1906,  but  on  promotion  they  were  required  to  embrace 
the  new  system.  Royal  Naval  Reserve  men  serving  in 
the  Force  on  April  1st,  1906,  were  given  the  option  of 
carrying  out  their  drills  at  the  remaining  harbour-ships 
or  shore  batteries  during  their  current  period  of  enrolment 
or  of  adopting  the  new  system,  but  upon  re-enrolment 
they  were  required  to  fall  in  with  the  new  system.  The  re- 
maining harbour  drill-ships  and  Royal  Naval  Reserve  bat- 
teries were  finally  paid  off  and  closed  on  March  31st,  1911. 

The  effect  of  the  formation  of  the  Royal  Fleet  Reserve 
and  the  change  in  the  system  of  training  Naval  Reservists 
reacted  on  the  strength  of  the  'latter  force,  which,  if  it 
gained  in  efficiency,  lost  in  numbers,  since  under  the  new 
system  it  was  less  convenient  for  merchant  seamen  to  put 
in  their  training  than  was  the  case  when  they  could  go  to 
a  local  battery  and  qualify.  Experience  confirmed  the 
Admiralty  in  its  opinion  of  the  new  scheme,  and  in  1910 
the  First  Lord  (Mr.  Reginald  McKenna)  announced  that 
"  the  training  in  the  ships  of  the  Home  Fleet  under  the  new 
system  is  very  valuable,  and  will  render  the  Royal  Naval 
Reserve  Force  an  efficient  portion  of  the  naval  personnel," 
as  time  was  to  show.  In  19 10  a  trawler  section  of  the  Royal 
Naval  Reserve  was  formed,  consisting  of  skippers,  second 
hands,  deck  hands,  and  engine-room  hands  of  trawlers. 

The  policy  of  the  British  Government,  which  has  been 
traced  in  brief  summary,  was  developed,  in  some  confusion, 
on  the  following  lines  : 

(1)  To  develop  the  Merchant  Service  by  means  of  the 
Navigation  Laws,  which  were  repealed  when  it  was  decided 
that  they  were  injurious. 

(2)  To  ascertain  the  number  of  ships  and  men  belonging 
to  the  Empire  by  means  of  the  laws  for  registering  ships. 

(3)  To  establish  suitable  Reserves. 

As  to  the  third  point,  the  chief  object  was  to  replace 
untrained  merchant  seamen  by  "  gunners  with  sea-legs," 


116        THE   MERCHANT  NAVY  OF  THE   PAST     [CH.  i 

which  led  to  the  formation  in  1872  of  the  old  Second-Class 
Reserve,  recruited  chiefly  from  the  fishing  industry. 

Here  we  reach  the  final  stage  in  the  secular  relations 
between  the  Navy  and  the  Mercantile  Marine.  The 
nineteenth  century  saw  the  complete  extinction  of  the 
mediaeval  system.  Yet  within  a  few  years  of  its  extinction 
it  had  begun  to  be  revived  on  new  lines  by  the  formation 
of  a  Reserve  drawn  from  the  Merchant  Service  and  in 
other  ways.  And  the  general  conclusion  to  be  noted  is  that 
long  before  the  European  War  came  upon  us  the  Admiralty, 
so  far  from  having  forgotten  the  historic  connection 
between  the  two  Services,  was  endeavouring  to  rev  ve 
it,  though  to  a  limited  extent  only,  in  a  modern  form. 

As  a  result  of  these  efforts,  when  the  storm  broke  in 
August  1914,  the  Admiralty  controlled  a  Naval  Reserve 
of  upwards  of  18,000  trained  officers  and  men  of  the 
Mercantile  Marine  and  Fishing  Industry,  besides  nearly 
24,000  officers  and  men  of  the  Royal  Fleet  Reserve.  In 
addition,  the  nation  benefited  by  the  ameliorative  measures 
affecting  the  personnel  of  the  Merchant  Navy,  which  had 
been  carried  out  in  the  preceding  fifty  years.  Whereas,  dur- 
ing the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Wars,  the  constant 
preoccupation  of  the  naval  authorities  was  the  manning 
of  the  Fleet,  as  was  also  the  case  at  the  time  of  the  Crimean 
WTar,  in  the  summer  of  1914  the  Admiralty  had  at  its 
disposal,  in  addition  to  the  regular  personnel  of  the  Royal 
Navy  with  its  own  reserve,  not  only  18,000  R.N.R. 
officers  and  men  trained  in  war  duties,  but  the  whole 
reformed  personnel  of  the  Mercantile  Marine,  consisting 
of  some  170,000  men  of  British  birth,  a  larger  number 
than  at  any  previous  date  in  British  annals,  together  with 
some  100,000  fishermen.  At  the  beginning  of  August  1914 
the  strength  of  Naval  personnel  was  147,667  ;  in  November 
1918,  when  the  Armistice  was  signed,  it  had  been  increased 
by  some  200,000  officers  and  men,  in  addition  to  the  making 
good  of  a  wastage  of  some  80,000.  It  was  largely  from  the 
170,000  men  of  British  birth  belonging  to  the  Mercantile 
Marine  and  the  100,000  men  employed  in  fishing  round 
the  coasts  of  the  United  Kingdom  that  the  required  recruits 
had  been  obtained.  The  history  of  the  Merchant  Navy's 
part  in  the  war  reveals  the  manner  in  which  these  men 
acquitted  themselves  in  face  of  dangers  unprecedented  in 
variety  and  character. 


CHAPTER    II 

ON    THE   EVE    OF   WAR 

THE  position  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  British  Mercan- 
tile Marine  on  the  outbreak  of  war  was  an  unenviable  one. 
They  had  entered  the  Service,  the  youngest  as  well  as  the 
oldest,  without  a  thought  that  any  circumstance  could 
arise  bringing  them  into  conflict  with  the  armed  forces  of 
an  enemy  in  such  a  manner  as  to  endanger  their  lives, 
although  they  must  have  been  familiar  with  the  possibility 
that  their  ships  and  the  cargoes  carried  in  them  might  in 
certain  conditions  be  seized  in  war-time.  They  had  regarded 
as  adequate  for  the  defence  of  their  lives  the  generally 
accepted  provisions  of  international  law,  and,  for  the  rest, 
had  placed  their  trust  in  the  camaraderie  of  the  sea  and 
the  spirit  of  mutual  helpfulness  whfch  had  grown  up  during 
the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  to  be  embodied  in 
regulations  universally  respected.  The  sea  had  to  be  fought, 
and  their  ships  were  built  to  enable  them  to  wage  that  form 
of  warfare  which  all  British  seamen  have  conducted  with  fine 
courage  from  age  to  age.  But  their  ships,  as  they  knew, 
were  not  constructed  for  the  organised  violence  of  war : 
they  could  not  resist  attack  by  gun  or  torpedo  ;  and,  for 
the  most  part,  the  merchantman  of  commerce  possessed 
inadequate  speed  ever  to  permit  of  escape  when  pursued. 
The  tramp,  for  instance,  was  designed  to  conform  to 
economic  conditions,  and  since  coal  is  expensive,  as  little 
as  was  compatible  with  efficient  service  as  a  trader  was 
used  to  attain  a  moderate  rate  of  steaming.  The  sailing- 
ship  was  in  a  worse  case.  On  the  other  hand,  the  leading 
liner  companies  owned  ships  capable  of  travelling  at  higher 
speeds,  and  there  were  a  comparatively  few  large  vessels, 
equipped  for  carrying  passengers,  with  power  enabling  them 
to  compete  for  the  "  blue  ribbon  of  the  Atlantic,"  to  which 
route  all  such  ocean  greyhounds  were  confined.  But  when 
those  distinctions  between  the  various  types  of  merchant- 
men have  been  admitted,  it  remains  true  that  not  one  of 

117 


118  ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  [CH.  n 

the  ships  of  the  British  Merchant  Navy  was  capable  of 
steaming  as  fast  as  the  latest  and  swiftest  cruisers  of  the 
national  fighting  fleets  of  the  Great  Powers,  quite  apart 
from  the  other  disadvantages  from  which  they  suffered. 
In  these  circumstances,  merchant  officers  and  men  con- 
fronted the  new  conditions,  realising  their  defencelessness, 
but  with  confidence  that  no  developments  were  probable 
during  the  course  of  war,  when  passions  become  excited, 
which  would  put  their  lives  in  danger  as  defenceless  non- 
combatants. 

The  sense  of  security  of  merchant  seamen  had  been 
strengthened  by  the  discussions  affecting  the  interpretation 
of  maritime  law  which  had  taken  place  at  The  Hague,  and 
later  on  during  the  Naval  Conference  in  London.     Certain 
provisions  were  accepted  without  controversy  from  any 
quarter.     Wider  recognition  was  given  to  the  distinction 
between    combatants    and   non-combatants,    and   it    was 
affirmed  that  all  the  Powers  concerned  in  these  delibera- 
tions, though  exhibiting  differences  in  approaching  some 
details,  were  united  in  their  desire  to  spare  as  much  as 
possible  the  unprotected  merchant    seamen,   whether  of 
enemy  or  neutral  nationality,  from  the  sufferings  incidental 
to  warfare  in  the  past.     An  illustration  of  the  attitude 
assumed  towards  seamen  generally  during  the  discussions 
is    furnished   by   the   remarks    of   Baron   Marschall   von 
Bieberstein  when  the  subject  of  the  laying  of  mines  was 
under  discussion  at  The  Hague  in  1907.     Admiral  Siegal, 
Germany's  naval  adviser,  objected  to  a  proposal  intended 
to  adjust  the  diversity  of  opinion  which  had  been  revealed 
in    the    Examining    Committee.     Sir    Ernest    Satow,    on 
behalf  of  the  British  Government,  followed,  contending  that 
the  draft  regulations  were  inadequate  as  a  safeguard  to 
legitimate  neutrals.     In  effect,  he  urged  amendments  in 
line   with   the    dictates    of   humanity.      Baron  Marschall 
von   Bieberstein  (Germany)  intervened,  disclaiming  that 
Germany  intended  to  demand  unlimited  liberty  in  the  use 
of  mines  or  had  any  desire  to  "  sow  mines  in  profusion  in 
all  the  seas."     The  subject  came  up  later  on  at  the  eighth 
plenary  meeting  of  the  Conference  (October   9th,  1908), 
when  he  made  the  following  amplified  statement : 

"  A  belligerent  who  lays  mines  assumes  a  very  heavy 
responsibility   towards    neutrals    and    peaceful    shipping. 


CH.  n]  GERMAN  PROTESTATIONS  no 

On  that  point  we  are  all  agreed.  No  one  will  resort  to 
such  measures  unless  for  military  reasons  of  an  absolutely 
urgent  character.  But  military  acts  are  not  governed 
solely  by  principles  of  international  law.  There  are 
other  factors  ;  conscience,  good  sense,  and  the  sentiments 
of  duty  imposed  by  principles  of  humanity  will  be  the 
surest  guide  for  the  conduct  of  sailors,  and  will  constitute 
the  most  effective  guarantee  against  abuse.  The  officers 
of  the  German  Navy,  I  emphatically  affirm  (je  le  dis  a 
voix  haute),  will  always  fulfil,  in  the  strictest  fashion,  the 
duties  which  emanate  from  the  unwritten  law  of  humanity 
and  civilisation. 

"  I  have  no  need  to  tell  you,"  he  continued,  "  that  I 
recognise  entirely  the  importance  of  the  codifications  of 
rules  to  be  followed  in  war.  But  it  would  be  well  not 
to  issue  rules  the  strict  observance  of  which  might  be 
rendered  impossible  by  the  force  of  things.  It  is  of  the 
first  importance  that  the  international  maritime  law 
which  we  desire  to  create  should  only  contain  clauses  the 
execution  of  which  is  possible  from  a  military  point  of  view, 
even  in  exceptional  circumstances.  Otherwise,  the  respect 
for  law  will  be  lessened  and  its  authority  undermined. 
Also  it  would  seem  to  us  to  be  preferable  to  preserve  at 
present  a  certain  reserve,  in  the  expectation  that  five 
years  hence  it  will  be  easier  to  find  a  solution  which  will 
be  acceptable  to  the  whole  world.  As  to  the  sentiments 
of  humanity  and  civilisation,  I  cannot  admit  that 
there  is  any  Government  or  country  which  is  superior  in 
these  sentiments  to  that  which  I  have  the  honour  to 
represent."1 

That  statement,  one  of  many  made  by  the  representa- 
tives of  Germany  and  other  maritime  Powers,  encouraged 
merchant  seamen  to  hope  that  when  war  came  it  would 
bear  less  hardly  upon  them  than  past  conflicts  by  sea  had 
done.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  merits  or  demerits 
of  the  Declaration  of  London,  it  did  at  least  confirm 
the  belief  that  hostilities  would  be  conducted  in  future 
with  less  risk  to  innocent  life. 

On  one  matter,  apart  from  mines,  doubt  existed  as  to 
the  course  which  Germany  would  adopt.  At  the  Second 

1  Part.  Papers,  Misc.,  No.  4  (1908). 


120  ON   THE   EVE   OF  WAR  [CH.  n 

Conference  at  The  Hague,  as  at  the  London  Conference, 
she  had  stoutly  opposed  the  British  proposal,  supported 
by  Japan  and  the  United  States,  which  would  have  allowed 
the  arming  of  merchant  ships  only  in  the  national  ports 
and  territorial  waters  of  the  converting  Power,  or  in  ports 
and  territorial  waters  occupied  by  that  Power.  Con- 
version on  the  high  seas  would  have  been  prohibited  in 
the  case  of  all  ships.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  stood 
for  the  utmost  measure  of  freedom.1 

Suspicions  were  subsequently  aroused  as  to  the  course 
which  Germany  intended  to  pursue  in  the  event  of  war. 
In  1912  the  Admiralty,  in  view  of  information  which  had 
reached  it,  appointed  a  Committee  to  consider  the  ad- 
visability of  defensively  arming  merchant  ships.  The 
Committee  favoured  a  scheme  of  armament,  and  in 
November  of  the  same  year  Rear- Admiral  H.  H.  Campbell, 
C.V.O.,  was  appointed  to  carry  it  out.  It  was  agreed  that 
the  weapons  should  be  mounted  aft,  so  as  to  be  available 
only  when  the  ship  was  trying  to  escape.  This  officer  de- 
termined that  nothing  should  be  done  to  affect  the  status  of 
the  ships  provided  with  guns,  and  he  decided  to  place  the 
administration  of  the  scheme  at  the  three  ports  selected  in 
the  hands  of  officers  of  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve  who  were 
already  acquainted  with  the  marine  superintendents  and 
other  officers  whose  intimate  knowledge  of  shipping  matters 
would  enable  them  to  arrange  the  training  of  the  guns' 
crews  so  as  to  cause  the  minimum  of  inconvenience  and 
loss  to  the  owners.  Liverpool,  London,  and  Southampton 
were  chosen  as  bases  for  the  trial  of  the  scheme,  because 
these  ports  were  used  by  vessels  bringing  in  frozen  meat 
from  the  Plate  and  Australia. 

Admiral  Campbell  at  once  got  into  touch  with  the  leading 
shipowners,  and  attention  was  turned  to  the  risk  of  com- 
plications abroad  which  might  arise  owing  to  this  reversion 
to  the  old  policy  of  the  British  Mercantile  Marine.  The 
Royal  Mail  Steam  Packet  Company  was  the  first  i  line 
to  be  approached.  Sir  Owen  Philipps,  the  Chairman  of 
that  company,  was  so  impressed  by  the  situation  that  he 
agreed  to  fit  guns  in  a  number  of  the  company's  big 
steamers  free  of  expense  to  the  Admiralty,  on  condition 
that  guns  and  ammunition  were  supplied.  On  April  25th, 
1913,  the  Aragon,  one  of  the  vessels  of  the  Royal  Mail 

1  The  Hague  Conference.     By  A.  Pearce  Higgins. 


CH.  n]   "KAISER  WILHELM'S"   GUN  MOUNTINGS    121 

Steam  Packet  Company,  sailed  for  South  America  armed 
with  two  4-7  inch  guns.  The  patriotic  lead  given  by 
Sir  Owen  Philipps,  the  Chairman  of  that  line,  was  not 
without  its  influence  on  other  shipowners,  many  of  whom 
promptly  took  the  same  course,  with  the  result  that  the 
work  of  arming  a  number  of  the  principal  food-carrying 
ships  went  forward  smoothly  and  rapidly.  In  the  following 
June  the  Tainui,  also  armed,  left  for  Australia,  and  in 
July  the  new  White  Star  liner  Ceramic,  which  during  con- 
struction had  been  given  two  4 -7  inch  guns  with  shields, 
carried  out  successful  firing  trials.  The  Admiralty  in  the 
meantime  had  given  to  each  of  the  companies  a  guarantee 
of  indemnity  against  all  loss  and  expense  due  to  any  re- 
straint or  detention  of  the  vessels  to  which  they  might  be 
put  in  time  of  peace  owing  to  the  ships  being  defensively 
armed. 

The  task  of  mounting  the  guns  was  carried  out  by  the 
owners  at  their  own  cost  in  accordance  with  the  advice 
given  by  the  constructive  staff  of  the  Admiralty.  A  system 
of  training  guns'  crews  was  also  introduced,  and  short 
experience  suggested  that,  if  the  higher  ratings  were  trained 
in  classes,  the  officers  could  efficiently  train  the  remainder 
of  the  men  at  sea. 

The  whole  scheme  was  making  good  progress  when  it 
received  an  impetus  from  the  discovery  that  the  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  //,  one  of  the  North  German  Lloyd  vessels,  was 
provided  with  gun  mountings.  This  German  liner  had  had 
to  put  into  Southampton  for  repairs  after  collision  in  the 
Channel,  and  evidence  was  thus  obtained  that  some  German 
ships,  as  had  been  suspected,  were  fitted  to  facilitate 
conversion  on  the  outbreak  of  war.  About  this  time, 
British  visitors  who  had  returned  from  Kiel  stated  that 
at  that  naval  establishment  they  had  seen  storehouses 
with  the  names  of  German  merchant  ships  painted  over 
the  doors.  It  was  added  that  German  officers  had  ad- 
mitted that  in  those  buildings  armament  was  kept  for 
a  number  of  merchant  ships.  Other  evidence  pointing 
to  a  settled  German  policy  in  this  respect  was  reluctantly 
received — reluctantly,  because  it  pointed  to  a  new  danger 
on  the  trade  routes  calling  for  protective  measures.  On 
March  26th,  1913,  Mr.  Churchill,  then  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty,  made  his  annual  statement  of  the  Navy  esti- 
mates, in  the  course  of  which  he  remarked  : 


122  ON  THE  EVE  OF   WAR  [CH.  n 

'  I  turn  to  one  aspect  of  trade  protection  which  requires 
special  reference.  It  was  made  clear  at  the  Second  Hague 
Conference  and  the  London  Conference,  that  certain  of 
the  Great  Powers  have  reserved  to  themselves  the  right  to 
convert  merchant  steamers  into  cruisers,  not  merely  in 
national  harbours,  but,  if  necessary,  on  the  high  seas. 
There  is  now  good  reason  to  believe  that  a  considerable 
number  of  foreign  merchant  steamers  may  be  rapidly 
converted  into  armed  ships  by  the  mounting  of  guns. 
The  sea-borne  trade  of  the  world  follows  well-marked 
routes,  upon  nearly  all  of  which  the  tonnage  of  the  British 
Mercantile  Marine  largely  predominates.  Our  food-carry- 
ing liners  and  vessels  carrying  raw  material  following 
these  trade  routes  would,  in  certain  contingencies,  meet 
foreign  vessels  armed  and  equipped  in  the  manner  described. 
If  the  British  ships  had  no  armament,  they  would  be  at 
the  mercy  of  any  foreign  liner  carrying  one  effective 
gun  and  a  few  rounds  of  ammunition.  It  would  be  ob- 
viously absurd  to  meet  the  contingency  of  considerable 
numbers  of  foreign  armed  merchant  cruisers  on  the  high 
seas  by  building  an  equal  number  of  cruisers.  That 
would  expose  this  country  to  an  expenditure  of  money 
to  meet  a  particular  danger  altogether  disproportionate 
to  the  expense  caused  to  any  foreign  Power  in  creating 
that  danger.  Hostile  cruisers,  wherever  they  are  found, 
will  be  covered  and  met  by  British  ships  of  war,  but  the 
proper  reply  to  an  armed  merchantman  is  another  mer- 
chantman armed  in  her  own  defence. 

44  This  is  the  position,"  Mr.  Churchill  added,  "  to  which 
the  Admiralty  have  felt  it  necessary  to  draw  the  attention 
of  leading  shipowners.  We  have  felt  justified  in  pointing 
out  to  them  the  danger  to  life  and  property  which  would 
be  incurred  if  their  vessels  were  totally  incapable  of  offering 
any  defence  to  an  attack.  The  shipowners  have  responded 
to  the  Admiralty  invitation  with  cordiality,  and  substantial 
progress  has  been  made  in  the  direction  of  meeting  it,  by 
preparing  as  a  defensive  measure  to  equip  a  number  of 
first-class  British  liners  to  repel  the  attack  of  armed  foreign 
merchant  cruisers.  Although  these  vessels  have,  of  course, 
a  wholly  different  status  from  that  of  the  regularly  com- 
missioned cruisers,  such  as  those  we  obtain  under  the 
Cunard  agreement,  the  Admiralty  have  felt  that  the  greater 
part  of  the  cost  of  the  necessary  equipment  should  not  fall 


CH.  n]        STATUS   OF   ARMED   MERCHANTMEN        123 

on  the  owners,  and  we  have  decided,  therefore,  to  lend  the 
necessary  guns,  to  supply  ammunition,  and  to  provide 
for  the  training  of  the  members  of  the  ^ship's  company 
to  form  the  guns'  crews.  The  owners,  on  their  part,  are 
paying  the  cost  of  the  necessary  structural  conversion, 
which  is  not  great.  The  British  Mercantile  Marine  will, 
of  course,  have  the  protection  of  the  British  Navy  under 
all  possible  circumstances,  but  it  is  obviously  impossible 
to  guarantee  individual  vessels  from  attack  when  they  are 
scattered  on  their  voyages  all  over  the  world.  No  one 
can  pretend  to  view  these  measures  without  regret,  or 
without  hoping  that  the  period  of  retrogression  all  over 
the  world,  which  has  rendered  them  necessary,  may  be 
succeeded  by  days  of  broader  international  confidence 
and  agreement  than  those  through  which  we  are 
passing."  l 

This  decision  was  welcomed  generally  in  the  House  of 
Commons  and  in  the  country.  It  was  declared  by  Lord 
Charles  Beresford  2  to  be  "  the  most  important  scheme  of 
all  those  announced  by  the  Admiralty,  even  more  important 
than  building  men-of-war,"  for,  he  added,  "  you  cannot 
build  any  more  than  you  are  doing."  Some  doubt  was 
subsequently  expressed  as  to  what  the  status  of  these 
vessels  would  be  in  the  time  of  war.  The  First  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty  explained  that  merchant  vessels  carrying 
guns  might  belong  to  one  or  other  of  two  different 
classes. 

"  The  first  class,"  he  added,  "  is  that  of  armed  merchant 
cruisers,  which  on  the  outbreak  of  war  would  be  commis- 
sioned under  the  White  Ensign,  and  would  then  be  in- 
distinguishable in  status  and  control  from  men-of-war. 
In  this  class  belong  the  Mauretania  and  the  Lusitania. 
The  second  class  consist  of  merchant  vessels  which  would 
(unless  specially  taken  up  by  the  Admiralty  for  any 
purpose)  remain  merchant  vessels  in  war,  without  any 
change  of  status,  but  have  been  equipped  by  their  owners, 
with  Admiralty  assistance,  with  a  defensive  armament 
in  order  to  exercise  their  right  of  beating  off  an  attack. 

1  Hansard,  House  of  Commons,  March  26th,  1913. 

2  Afterwards  raised  to  the  Peerage  as  Lord  Beresford. 


124  ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  [CH.  n 

There  is  no  rule  that  the  master  or  chief  officer  must  belong 
to  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve,  and  it  will  be  clear,  from 
what  I  have  said,  that  no  such  rule  is  necessary.  The 
Blue  Ensign  would  only  be  flown  if  the  vessel  had  received 
an  Admiralty  warrant.  Before  lending  the  guns,  the 
Admiralty  satisfies  itself  that  the  handling  and  firing  of 
them  will  be  carried  out  by  men  who  have  become  con- 
versant with  these  operations  through  drill."  l 

The  Admiralty  continued  to  pursue  with  renewed  energy 
and  in  face  of  a  good  deal  of  adverse  criticism  the  policy 
which  it  had  adopted,  and  at  the  opening  of  the  war  thirty- 
nine  vessels  belonging  to  the  following  companies  had  been 
defensively  armed,  each  having  been  provided  with  two 
4'7  inch  guns  : 

Ships  fitted. 

1.  White  Star  Line      .          .          .  .11 

2.  Royal  Mail  Steam  Packet  Co.    .  .     10 

3.  Federal  Houlders  Argentine  Line  .       5 

4.  G.  Thompson  &  Co.  Ltd.  .  .       3 

5.  Wilson  Line,  Hull   .          .          .  .3 

6.  New  Zealand  Shipping  Co.,  Ltd.  .       2 

7.  Federal  Steam  S.  Co.,  Ltd.        .  .       2 

8.  Shaw,  Savill  &  Albion,  Ltd.      .  .       2 

9.  Turnbull  Martin  &  Co.     .          .  .       1 

39 

In  those  circumstances  the  situation  was  full  of  unwel- 
come possibilities  when  at  length  war  was  declared.  Ger- 
many possessed  a  large  number  of  vessels  which  were 
capable  of  conversion.  There  were  about  twenty  such  ships 
in  German  ports,  including  the  following  :  Bremen  (15 
knots) ;  Cap  Finisterre  (17)  ;  Cap  Poloni  (18)  (completing 
for  sea);  Cleveland  (16);  Colva  (14'5)  ;  Graf  Waldersee 
(13) ;  Imperator  (25) ;  Kaiserin  Auguste  Victoria  (17'5) ; 
Kigoma  (15*5)  ;  Konig  Friedrich  August  (15'5)  ;  Konigin 
Luise  (15)  ;  Helsor  (12'5) ;  Pratonia  (13)  ;  Prinz  Ludwig 
(15*5) ;  Scharnhorst  (14'5) ;  and  Victoria  Luise  (18). 
The  menace  which  these  ships  suggested  was  limited  by 
the  knowledge  that  the  Grand  Fleet  had  taken  up  its 

1  Hansard,  House  of  Commons,  June  10th,  1913. 


CH.  n]        GERMANY'S   CONVERTIBLE   SHIPS  125 

station  in  the  northern  part  of  the  North  Sea,  with 
cruiser  squadrons  at  the  focal  points  of  the  trade  routes, 
and  that  the  Straits  of  Dover  were  held  by  more  or 
less  adequate  forces.  Escape  by  the  narrow  route  to  the 
southward  was  unlikely  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances, 
but  there  was  less  certainty  to  the  northward,  for  the  dis- 
tance from  the  North  of  Scotland  to  Iceland  being  450  miles, 
and  from  Iceland  to  Greenland  160  miles,  a  line  of  over 
600  miles  required  to  be  watched  by  the  Northern  Patrol. 
This  Northern  Patrol  consisted  eventually  of  twenty-four 
armed  liners,  known  as  the  10th  Cruiser  Squadron,  or 
blockading  squadron,  under  the  command  of  Rear- Admiral 
Sir  Dudley  de  Chair.  The  possibility  of  several  of  the 
swiftest  of  the  German  merchant  vessels,  their  character 
disguised,  breaking  out  in  thick  weather,  and  taking  the 
fullest  advantage  of  the  period  of  darkness,  was  one  that 
it  was  impossible  to  ignore.  In  the  outer  seas  the  danger 
was  far  greater,  as  there  were  distributed  in  neutral  ports 
a  large  number  of  ships  which  could  be  converted 
into  armed  vessels  for  use  on  the  trade  routes.  They 
included  : 

In  North  American  Ports  and  North  Atlantic : 

Friedrich  der  Grosse  (14*5  knots),  at  New  York  on 

August  4th. 

Barbarossa  (14  knots),  at  New  York  on  August  4th. 
Grosser    Kurfurst    (15' 5    knots),    at   New    York    on 

August  4th. 
Kronprinzessin    (23*5    knots),     at    New     York     on 

August  4th. 

Vaterland  (26'75  knots),  at  New  York  on  August  4th. 
President    Grant    (14*5    knots),    at    New    York    on 

August  4th. 
George  Washington    (19    knots),    arrived   New  York, 

August  5th. 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  (23'5  knots),  arrived  New  York, 

August  6th. 
President   Lincoln    (14'5    knots),    at   New   York   on 

August  4th. 
Pennsylvania     (13'5     knots),     at     New    York      on 

August  4th. 

Amerika  (17'5  knots),  at  Boston  on  August  4th. 
Cincinnati  (16  knots),  arrived  Boston,  August  8th. 


126  ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  [CH.  11 

Prinz    Oskar     (12 '5    knots),    arrived     Philadelphia, 

August  5th. 
Kronprinz  Wilhelm  (23  knots),  sailed  from  New  York, 

August  3rd,  to  meet  the  KARLSRUHE,  by  whom  she 

was  armed. 
Spreewald    (12*5   knots),    at    sea;    captured  by    the 

BERWICK,  September  12th. 

Neckar  (14  knots),  at  sea;   arrived  Baltimore,  Sep- 
tember 2nd. 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  der  Grosse  (22'5  knots),  on  her  way 

out  from  Germany  into  the  Atlantic  (movements 

unknown  at  the  time). 
Bethania  (12  knots),  on  her  way  from  Mediterranean 

to  join  the  KAISER  WILHELM  DER  GROSSE,  captured 

by  the  ESSEX,  September  7th. 

In  Spanish  and  Portuguese  Ports  : 

Westerwald  (12*5  knots),  at  Lisbon  on  August  4th. 
Goeben  (14*5  knots),  at  Vigo  on  August  4th. 
Bulow  (14'5  knots),  at  Lisbon  on  August  4th. 

In  Mediterranean  : 

Konig  Albert  (15  knots),  at  Genoa  on  August  4th. 
Moltke  (16*5  knots),  at  Genoa  on  August  4th. 

In  Sea  of  Marmora  : 

Corcovado  (13' 5  knots),  at  Panderma. 

East  of  Suez  : 

Sudmark  (12 '5  knots),  at  sea  between  Colombo  and 

Aden ;  captured  by  the  BLACK  PRINCE,  August  15th, 

in  Red  Sea. 
Zeiten   (14*5   knots),   at   sea   between   Colombo  and 

Aden,  joined  the  KONIGSBERG.     Arrived  Mozam- 
bique, August  20th. 
Kleist  (14-5  knots),  sailed  for  Colombo,  August  2nd ; 

arrived  Padang,  August  7th. 
Tabora  (14'5  knots),  at  Dar-es-Salaam.     Blocked  in 

port,  August  8th. 
Yorck  (14-5  knots),  at  Tsingtau.     Sailed,  August  4th, 

with  supplies  for  Admiral  Von  Spee. 
Prinz  Eitel  Friedrich  (15  knots),  at  Tsingtau,  sailed 

(armed),  August  6th. 


CH.  n]         GERMANY'S   CONVERTIBLE   SHIPS  127 

Princess  Alice  (15' 5  knots),  arrived  Manila,  August  5th ; 

moved  about  for  some  time  around  Philippines. 
Seydlitz  (14*5  knots),  sailed  for  Sydney,  August  8rd; 

arrived  Valparaiso,  August  20th. 

In  Suez  Canal : 

Derfflinger  (14'5  knots),  interned  by  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment. 

In  South  American  Ports  or  Waters  : 

Cap  Trafalgar  (18  knots),  at  Buenos  Ayres.      Put  to 

sea   and   armed   from   the   EBER.     Sunk    by   the 

CARMANIA,  September  14th. 
Blucher  (16*5  knots),  at  Pernambuco  on  August  4th. 

West  Coast  of  Africa  : 

Max  Brock  (11  knots),  at  Duala.     Captured  by  the 

CUMBERLAND  in  September. 
Itolo  (9  knots),  sunk  by  French  in  Corisco  Bay. 

In  British  and  Belgian  Ports  : 

Gneisenau  (14*5  knots),  at  Antwerp  on  August  4th. 

Seized  by  Belgians. 
Prinz    Adalbert    (12*5   knots),    seized   at   Falmouth, 

August  4th. 

Some  other  ships,  such  as  the  Prinz  Heinrich  at  Lisbon, 
were  also  suspected  by  the  Admiralty  of  having  been 
prepared  for  conversion. 

In  addition  to  these  German  merchantmen,  the  future 
use  of  which  was  open  to  suspicion,  there  were  a  number 
of  Austrian  ships.  Moreover,  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  had.  in  foreign  waters,  many  other  ships  which 
were  capable  of  employment  for  intelligence  purposes,  or 
might  be  used  as  store-ships  or  colliers. 

Beyond  all  these  elements  of  danger,  which  the  Admiralty 
could  not,  and  in  fact  did  not,  ignore,  there  was  a  powerful 
squadron  of  German  men-of-war  in  the  Pacific,  and  cruisers 
were  known  to  be  serving  in  other  parts  of  the  world.1 

1  Austria- Hungary  had  in  foreign  waters  only  one  man-of-war  of  im- 
portance, the  light  cruiser  KAISERIN  ELIZABETH,  3,936  tons  displacement  ; 
armed  with  eight  5 -9-inch  ;  fourteen  3-pounders  ;  1  machine-gun.  Her  sea 
speed  was  17-2  knots.  She  was  at  Tsingtau. 

10 


128 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR 


[CH.    II 

The  following  list  conveys  some  idea  of  the  added  menace 
arising  from  these  vessels1  : 


Displace- 
ment. 

Sea 
Speed. 

Armament. 

Mediterranean  : 

Tons. 

Knots. 

GOEBEN  (1911)  b.c. 

24,640 

22-8 

10-11  in.  ;  12-5-9  in  ;  12-22  pr. 

BRESLAU  (1911)  I.e. 

4,480 

24-5 

12-4-1  in.     1-7  pr.     2-m. 

Far  East: 

SCHARNHORST  (1906)  a.c. 

11,420 

20-5 

8-8-2  in.     6-5-9  in  ;  18-22  pr. 

GNEISENAU  (1906)  a.c.  . 

11,420 

20-5 

8-8-2  in.     6-5-9  in  ;  18-22  pr. 

EMDEN  (1908)  I.e. 

3,592 

21-8 

10-4-1  in.     1-7  pr.     2-m. 

lLTis(1898)g.b.    . 

885 

14-0 

4-15  pr.     6-1  pr.     2-m. 

JAGUAR  (1  898  )g.b. 

885 

14-0 

4-15  pr.     6-1  pr.     2-m. 

TIGER  (1  899)  g.b. 

885 

14-0 

2-4-1  in.     6-1  pr.     2-m. 

LucHS(1899)  g.b. 

885 

14-0 

2-4-1  in.     6-1  pr.     2m. 

CORMORAN(1892)  g.b.     . 

1,602 

16-0 

8-4-1  in.     5-1  pr.     2-m. 

TsiNGTAU(1903)r.g.b.  . 

220 

13-0 

1-4  pr.  ;  2-m.  ;  1-1  5  pr. 

VATERLAND  (1903)  r.g.b. 

220 

13-0 

1-4  pr.  ;  2-m.  ;  1-1  5  pr. 

OTTER  (1  909)  r.g.b. 

265 

15-0 

2-4  pr.  ;  3-m. 

TAKU(  1898)  t.b.d. 

276 

30-0 

2-4  pr. 

"  S.90  "  (1899)  t.b.d.     . 

394 

26-0 

3-4  pr.  ;  2-m. 

East  Pacific  : 

NURNBERG  (1906)  I.e.    . 

3,400 

21-6 

10-4-1  in.  ;  1-7  pr.  ;  2-m. 

LEIPZIG  (1905)  I.e. 

3,200 

20-0 

10-4-1  in.;  1-7  pr.  ;  2-m. 

Australian  Waters  : 

GEIER(  1894)  g.b. 

1,590 

16-0 

8-4-1  in.  ;  5-1  pr.  ;  2-m. 

PLANET  (1905)  s.v. 

650 

9-5 

3-1  pr.  ;  2-m. 

West  Coast  of  Africa  : 

EBER(  1903)  g.b.  . 

984 

14-0 

2-4-1  in.  ;  6-1  pr.  ;  2-m. 

East  Coast  of  Africa  : 

KONIGSBERG  (1905)  1.0. 

3,350 

21-3 

10-4-1  in.  ;  1-7  pr.  ;  2-m. 

West  Atlantic  : 

KARLSRUHE  (1912)  I.e. 

5,500 

27-25 

12-41  in.  ;  2-m. 

DRESDEN  (1907)  I.e.      . 

4,520 

24'0 

10-41  ;  in  2-m. 

The  sheet  anchor  of  British  merchant  seamen,  con-4 
fronted  by  the  unknown  possibilities  of  war,  was  the 
increased  regard  which  all  the  polite  nations  of  the  world 
had  paid  to  international  law  for  many  years,  and  the 
anxiety  which  had  been  expressed  by  them  to  make  their 
acts  conform  to  the  unwritten  code — the  dictates  of 
humanity. 

1  b.c  — battle  cruiser  ;  a.c. — armoured  cruiser  ;  I.e. — light  cruiser  ; 
g.b — gunboat;  r.g.b. — river  gunboat;  t.b.d. — torpedo-boat  destroyer; 
a.v. — surveying  vessel. 


CH.  n]          INSTRUCTIONS   TO   GERMAN   SHIPS         129 

The  evidence  as  to  the  German  policy  of  arming  merchant 
ships  on  a  large  scale  on  the  outbreak  of  war  was  not 
confirmed  by  subsequent  experience.  Diplomatic  docu- 
ments since  published  suggest  that  Germany  did  not 
expect  that  the  United  Kingdom  would  intervene,  and 
she  was  convinced  that  in  any  event  the  British  Navy 
would  not  be  mobilised  rapidly,  and  that  she  would  have 
ample  time  to  carry  out  the  scheme  of  conversion.  The 
British  Admiralty  was  ready  for  eventualities,  with  the 
result  that  the  German  Fleet  was  at  once  thrown  back  on 
the  defensive,  not  only  in  the  North  Sea,  but  in  every  sea 
in  which  German  men-of-war  were  stationed,  and  neither 
time  nor  opportunity  permitted  full  advantage  being  taken 
of  the  large  scheme  for  attacking  British  commerce.  In 
February  1914,  the  Nautical  Division  of  the  Norddeutscher 
Lloyd  issued  instructions  of  a  general  character  to  all 
merchant  vessels  equipped  with  wireless  installation.  They 
were  told  that  if  war  broke  out  they  would  be  informed 
by  wireless.  This  action  suggested  that  preliminary 
arrangements  were  then  being  made  by  the  German  naval 
authorities  for  securing  the  safety  of  the  general  body  of 
German  merchant  shipping  and  releasing  other  vessels  for 
offensive  operations.  But  towards  the  end  of  July  of  the 
same  year,  the  only  official  instructions,  so  far  as  is  known, 
which  were  issued,  were  to  the  effect  that  masters  should 
make  for  the  nearest  neutral  port.  These  orders  were  to 
the  following  effect : 

"  Although  there  are  at  present  no  reasons  whatever 
to  fear  war  complications  with  any  other  Power,  still  it 
appears  desirable  to  us  to  issue  the  following  instructions, 
which  are  to  be  strictly  observed  : 

"  (Unless  Requisitioned) 

'  We  hereby  prescribe  that,  in  case  of  war  or  compli- 
cations threatening  war,  you,  with  the  ship  entrusted  to 
you,  when  lying  in  a  neutral  port,  will  remain  there  or 
will  immediately  endeavour  to  reach  the  nearest  neutral 
port  or  neutral  territory.  You  will  then  await  there  the 
further  course  of  things,  and  we  shall  then  transmit  to  you 
further  instructions  direct  or  through  our  representatives." 

Before  declarations   of  war  began   to  issue  from  the 


130  ON  THE  EVE   OF  WAR  [CH.  n 

capitals  of  Europe,  German  merchantmen  were  already 
running  in  all  haste  to  safety.     On  the  other  hand,  the 
German  authorities,   ignoring  the  precedent  they  set  in 
1870,1  revealed  by  their  acts  that  they  intended  to   put 
every  obstacle  in  the  way  of  British  merchant  ships  leaving 
German  ports.     In  some  cases  the  instructions  may  have 
been  exceeded  owing  to  the  zeal  of  the  local  authorities, 
but  it  was   subsequently  established  that  the  Imperial 
Government  had  intervened  to  stop  sailings.     On  August 
1st,  Sir  Edward  Grey  sent  a  dispatch  to  the  British  Am- 
bassador at  Berlin,  in  which  he  reported  that  information 
had  reached  the  Foreign  Office  that  the  "  authorities  at 
Hamburg  had  forcibly  detained  a  steamer  belonging  to  the 
Great  Central  Railway  Company  and  other  British  mer- 
chant ships."    Surprise  was  expressed  at  this  action,  and  Sir 
E.  Goschen  was  asked  to  request  the  German  Government 
to  send  immediate  orders  that  vessels  should  be  allowed 
to  proceed  without  delay,  it  being  added  that  "  the  effect 
on  public  opinion  here  would  be  deplorable  unless  this  is 
done."     An  immediate  reply  was  received  from  Berlin 
stating    that   "  the   Secretary   of    State,    who   expressed 
greatest  surprise  and  annoyance,   has  promised  to  send 
orders  at  once  to  allow  steamers  to  proceed  without  delay." 
In  a  subsequent  telegram,  Sir  E.  Goschen  added  that  the 
"  Secretary  of  State  informs  me  that  orders  were  sent  last 
night  to  allow  British  ships  in  Hamburg  to  proceed  on 
their  way.     He  says  that  this  must  be  regarded  as  a  special 
favour  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  as  no  other  foreign 
ships  have  been  allowed  to  leave.     Reason  of  detention 
was  that  mines  were  being  laid  and  other  precautions 
being  taken  " — a  mere  cloak  for  illegality.     On  the  same 
day  (August  2nd)  the  Foreign  Office  sent  to  Berlin  another 
telegram  to  the  following  effect :     "I  regret  to  learn  that 
100  tons  of  sugar  were  compulsorily  unloaded  from  the 
British   steamship  Sappho   at   Hamburg,    and   detained. 
Similar  action  appears  to  have  been  taken  with  regard  to 
other   British   vessels    loaded   with   sugar.     You    should 
inform  Secretary  of  State  that,  for  reasons  stated  in  my 
telegram  of  August  1st,  I  most  earnestly  trust  that  the 
orders  already  sent  to  Hamburg  to  allow  the  clearance  of 
British  ships  covers  also  the  release  of  their  cargoes,  the 

1  Days  of  grace,  running  to  a  period  of  six  weeks,  were  extended  to  enemy 
merchant  ships  to  enable  them  to  leave  German  ports. 


CH.  n]  GERMANY'S   ILLEGAL  ACTS  131 

detention  of  which  cannot  be  justified."     Sir  E.  Goschen 
replied  on  the  following  day  that  "  no  information  was 
available."      On  August  4th,  Sir  E.  Grey  sent    another 
message  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin  stating  : 
"  I  continue  to  receive  numerous  complaints  from  British 
firms  as  to  the  detention  of  their  ships  at  Hamburg,  Cux- 
haven,  and  other  German  ports.     This  action  on  the  part 
of  the  German  authorities  is  totally  unjustifiable.     It  is 
in  direct  contravention  of  international  law  and  of  the 
assurances   given   to  Your   Excellency  by  the   Imperial 
Chancellor.     You  should  demand  the  release  of  all  British 
ships,  if  such  release  has  not  yet  been  given."  l     On  the 
same  day  the  German  Ambassador  in  London  issued  the 
following  explanation,  which,  it  will  be  seen,  avoided  the 
fact  that  a  general  policy  of  detention  had  been  adopted : 
"  The  Wilson  liner  Castro  was  in  Kiel  Canal,  and  was 
ordered  by  the  German  authorities  to  proceed  to  Hamburg 
for  military  reasons,  as  it  was  not  desirable  that  any  com- 
mercial vessel  should  be  in  the  canal  at  present.      As 
regards  the  second  case,  the  Government  had  purchased 
coal  shipped  for  Germany  to  a  private  firm,  and  the  order 
was  given  for  the  ship  to  proceed  to  Hamburg  with  her 
cargo.     It  was  solely  a  matter  of  changing  its  destination. 
In  both  cases  there  was  no  intention  whatever  of  inter- 
fering with  the  property  of  the  vessels.     It  was  simply 
a  police  measure."     It  was  subsequently  ascertained  that 
in  many  of  the  German  ports  every  possible  obstacle  had 
been  put  in  the  way  of  the  British  shipmasters  to  prevent 
them  taking  their  ships  to  sea,  before  war  had  begun ; 
in  some  cases  guards  were  mounted  while  the  two  countries 
still  maintained  friendly  relations,  and  threats  were  made 
to  deter  masters  from  communicating  with  their  owners. 
Many  of  the  merchantmen  prisoners  who  for  many  weary 
months,  some  almost  for  the  entire  duration  of  the  war, 
languished  in  German  camps  belonged  to  vessels  which  had 
thus  been  detained  contrary  to  the  recognised  practice.  The 
enemy  treated  these  seamen  with  great  harshness,  as  was 
revealed  when  their  miserable  experiences  were  subsequently 
recounted.     Some  of  them  were  maimed  for  life,  owing  to 
injury  inflicted  upon  them  by  their  guards,  and  others 
never  recovered  from  the  effects  of  bad  food,  damp  and 
exposure.     The  Germans  detained  no  fewer  than  eighty 

*  Cd.  7860. 


132  ON  THE  EVE   OF  WAR  [CH.  n 

British  ships.1  Unfortunately,  the  action  cannot  be  at- 
tributed to  over-zeal  of  the  officials  of  one  port,  for  the 
detentions  were  enforced  in  practically  all  German  ports. 

This  early  indication  of  the  contempt  of  the  German 
Government  for  international  law  may  be  contrasted  with 
the  attitude  of  the  officers  of  the  German  men-of-war 
during  the  first  phase  of  the  conflict.  So  far  as  is  known, 
they  received  no  special  instructions  as  to  the  treatment 
of  enemy  merchantmen,  but  were  left  to  act  in  accor- 
dance with  the  Naval  Prize  Code,  based  generally  on  the 
provisions  of  the  Declaration  of  London.  Under  the  first 
article  it  was  laid  down  that  *  :  "  During  a  war  the  com- 
manders of  His  Majesty's  ships  of  war  have  the  right  to  stop 
and  search  enemy  and  neutral  merchant  vessels,  and  to  seize 
— and,  in  exceptional  cases,  to  destroy — the  same,  together 
with  the  enemy  and  neutral  goods  found  thereon."  The 
limits  to  the  right  of  capture  were  dealt  with  at  length, 
and  in  describing  the  object  of  stoppage  and  search  it 
was  declared  that — "  The  stoppage  and  search  shall  take 
place  only  if  the  commander  deems  that  it  will  be  success- 
ful." It  was  added  :  "^All  acts  shall  be  done  in  such  a 
manner — even  against  the  enemy — as  to  be  compatible 
with  the  honour  of  the  German  Empire,  and  with  such 
regard  towards  neutrals  as  may  be  in  conformity  with  the 
law  of  nations  and  the  interests  of  Germany."  The  ships 
specifically  mentioned  as  being  free  from  capture  included 
hospital  ships  and  vessels  engaged  exclusively  in  coastwise 
fishery  or  in  the  small  local  shipping  trade,  so  long  as  they 
did  not  in  any  manner  participate  in  the  hostilities. 
"  Coastwise  fishery  is  not  confined  to  the  territorial  waters 
of  a  particular  State.  It  is  deemed  to  include  all  fishing, 
with  the  exception  of  what  is  clearly  deep-sea  fishing." 
Enemy  merchant  vessels  which  at  the  beginning  of  hostili- 
ties were  on  a  voyage  from  a  German  port  or  the  port  of 
an  Ally  to  their  port  of  destination,  or  to  such  other  port 
as  might  have  been  designated  to  them,  and  were  in 

1  On  August  4th,  1914,  a  proposal  from  Germany,  made  simultaneously 
to  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  and  Belgium,  that  days  of  grace  should 
be  recognised  reciprocally,  was  received  by  the  British  Government.     A 
counter-proposal,  incorporated  in  the  London  Gazette  of  August  4th,  was 
communicated  to  Germany,  the  offer  expiring  on  the  7th.     The  suggestion 
was  not  received  in  Berlin  until  the  8th,  and  nothing  came  of  the  matter. 

2  The  Prize  Code  of  September  30th,  1909 ;   Bulletin  of  Laws  of  August 
3rd,  1914,  amended  to  July  1st,  1915.    (German  Prize  Law,  Huberich  and 
King.     London:  Stevens  &  Co.) 


CH.  ii]  GERMAN   PRIZE   CODE  133 

possession  of  a  pass — provided,  however,  that  they  had 
not  deviated  from  the  course  prescribed  to  them,  unless 
they  could  explain  such  deviation  in  a  satisfactory  manner 
—were  also  exempt  from  capture. 

The  Prize  Code  set  out  the  procedure  to  be  followed  in 
case  of  stoppage  and  capture,  in  accordance  with  inter- 
national precedent,  and  several  paragraphs  were  devoted 
to  the  treatment  of   crews  and  passengers    of   captured 
vessels.     It  was  laid  down  that,  if  a  vessel  were  captured 
while  making  armed  resistance  or  participating  in  belli- 
gerent operations,  "  persons  on  board  thereof  not  embodied 
in  the  armed  forces,  who  have  participated  in  the  belli- 
gerent operations  or  offered  armed  resistance,  are  dealt 
with   according   to   the   usages   of   war.     Other   persons 
belonging  to  the  crew  are  made  prisoners  of  war."      In 
the  case  of  capture  of  an  enemy  vessel  or  a  neutral  vessel 
rendering  unneutral  service,    "the   master,   officers,  and 
crew,  if  subjects  of  an  enemy  State,  are  not  to  be  made 
prisoners  of  war,  providing  they  enter  into  a  formal  written 
engagement    not   to   undertake    any    services    connected 
with  the  belligerent  operations  of  the  enemy  during  the 
pendency  of  the  war.     Members  of  the  crew  who  are  sub- 
jects of  a  neutral  State  must  be  released  without  the  im- 
position of  any  conditions.     If  the  master  and  officers 
are  subjects  of  a  neutral  State,  they  are  to  be  released, 
provided  they  give  a  formal  written  promise  not  to  accept 
service  on  board  any  enemy  vessel  during  the  pendency 
of  the  war."     It  was  furthermore  declared  that  "  passen- 
gers on  board  captured  vessels  are  not  to  be  deprived  of 
their  liberty,  and  are  to  be  released  as  soon  as  possible, 
unless  required  as  witnesses."     It  was  added  that  the 
treatment  of  prisoners  of  war  should,  so  far  as  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  naval  warfare  permit,  be  in  conformity 
with  Articles  4   to  20   of  the  Appendix  to  Convention 
IV  of  the  Second  Hague  Conference.     It  was  also  provided 
that  "  the  master  and  crew  of  a  captured  vessel,  unless 
they  are  prisoners  of  war,  shall  continue  to  perform  their 
former  duties  until  they  are  released.     So  far  as  possible 
the  use  of  force  is  to  be  avoided.     In  so  far  as  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  war  permit,  they  remain  in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  their  rights."     It  was  further  laid  down  that  "  the 
rights  of  the  passengers  on  board  captured  vessels  shall 
be  restricted  only  in  urgent  cases — e.g.,  on  account  of 


134  ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  LCH.  n 

unneutral  acts."  Persons  on  board  a  captured  vessel 
might  be  placed  on  board  another  vessel,  even  the  war- 
vessel,  if  the  circumstances  required  such  a  course,  re- 
maining on  board  the  war- vessel  "  only  so  long  as  this  is 
absolutely  necessary." 

Other  clauses  of  the  Prize  Code  covered  the  method 
of  dealing  with  captured  vessels  and  seized  cargoes.  The 
commander,  it  was  declared,  "  provides  for  bringing  the 
vessel  into  a  German  port  or  the  port  of  an  Ally  with  all 
possible  despatch  and  safety.  A  prize  may  be  brought 
into  a  neutral  port  only  if  the  neutral  Power  permits  the 
bringing  in  of  prizes.  A  prize  may  be  taken  into  a  neutral 
port  on  account  of  unseaworthiness,  stress  of  weather, 
or  lack  of  fuel  or  supplies.  In  the  latter  cases  she  must 
leave  as  soon  as  the  cause  justifying  her  entrance  ceases 
to  exist."  The  commander  was  instructed  to  give  to  the 
officer  of  the  prize  crew  the  necessary  written  instructions 
in  regard  to  the  voyage,  and  to  make  up  the  crew  so  as  to 
enable  the  officer  to  bring  in  the  vessel.  It  was  added  that, 
"  before  proceeding  to  the  destruction  of  a  vessel,  the 
safety  of  all  persons  on  board,  and,  so  far  as  possible, 
their  effects,  is  to  be  provided  for,  and  all  ship's  papers 
and  other  evidentiary  material,  which,  according  to  the 
views  of  the  persons  at  interest,  is  of  value  for  the  for- 
mulation of  the  judgment  of  the  Prize  Court,  are  to  be 
taken  over  by  the  commander."  A  section  of  the  Prize 
Code  was  also  devoted  to  the  rights  and  duties  of  officers 
of  a  prize  crew,  it  being  added  that  "  unnecessary  measures 
of  force  are  to  be  avoided."1 

On  June  22nd,  1914,  the  Chief  of  the  Admiralty  Staff 
of  the  German  Navy  addressed  an  order  to  the  commanding 
officers  and  commanders  in  respect  of  their  conduct  when 
encountering  armed  merchant  vessels  during  war.  It  was 
therein  stated  that : 

"  The  exercise  of'  the  right  of  stoppage,  search,  and 
capture,  as  well  as  any  attack  made,  by  an  armed  merchant 
vessel  against  a  German  or  neutral  merchant  vessel,  is 
piracy.  The  crew  are  to  be  dealt  with  under  the  ordinance 
relating  to  extraordinary  martial  law. 

"If  an   armed   enemy  merchant  vessel    offers    armed 

1  Prize  Code  of  the  German  Empire  as  in  force  July  1915  (London  : 
Stevens  &  Co.). 


CH.  n]  A   SIGNIFICANT  NAVAL   ORDER  135 

resistance  against  measures  taken  under  the  law  of  prize, 
such  resistance  is  to  be  overcome  with  all  means  available. 
The  enemy  Government  bears  all  responsibility  for  any 
damages  to  the  vessel,  cargo,  and  passengers.  The  crew 
are  to  be  taken  as  prisoners  of  war.  The  passengers  are 
to  be  left  to  go  free,  unless  it  appears  that  they  partici- 
pated in  the  resistance.  In  the  latter  case  they  may  be 
proceeded  against  under  extraordinary  martial  law." 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  on  the  eve  of  hostilities  the 
enemy  declared  that  the  crews  of  merchant  vessels  were 
to  be  treated  as  prisoners  of  war  if  they  resisted  capture, 
and  that  the  passengers,  in  case  of  resistance,  might  be 
proceeded  against  "  under  extraordinary  martial  law." 
That  exposure  of  policy  is  the  primary  factor  in  the  under- 
standing of  the  German  attitude,  and  an  essential  element 
in  the  due  appreciation  of  the  danger  to  which  merchant 
seamen  were  exposed.  Such  was  the  position  at  sea  when 
the  war  opened,  which  was  to  convert  Europe  into  a  vast 
battle-field  and  strew  the  seas  with  the  bodies  of  defenceless 
men,  weak  women,  and  innocent  children. 

On  a  date  preceding  the  British  declaration  of  war, 
August  3rd,  evidence  was  supplied  that  Germany  had 
already  completed  measures  for  the  defence  of  her  ports. 
On  August  3rd,  the  steamship  San  Wilfrido  (6,458  tons) 
was  in  the  River  Elbe,  about  eight  miles  above  Bruns- 
buttel,  when  orders  were  received  that  she  might  proceed 
on  her  voyage,  calling  at  Cuxhaven.  No  pilot  was  avail- 
able to  take  her  through  the  minefield  which  had  already 
been  laid  at  Cuxhaven,  so  the  San  Wilfrido  followed  the 
usual  channel.  The  men  in  charge  of  the  harbour  tugs, 
who  were  watching  her  progress,  realised  that  the  ship 
was  in  danger,  and  shouted  to  the  master,  who  immediately 
attempted  to  go  full  speed  astern.  Before  way  was  off 
the  ship,  she  was  caught  by  the  strong  ebb  tide  and 
drifted  into  the  mine  zone.  Three  explosions  occurred, 
and  then  the  steamship  began  to  settle  down  by  the  stern, 
taking  a  heavy  list  to  port.  A  German  tug  went  along- 
side to  take  off  the  crew,  and  shortly  afterwards  the  San 
Wilfrido  was  firmly  aground.  Two  days  later  a  somewhat 
similar  incident  occurred  to  the  steamship  Craigforth 
(2,900  tons),  which  had  shipped  a  cargo  of  wheat  at  Ghe- 
nichesk  consigned  to  Hamburg.  She  was  proceeding 


136  ON  THE   EVE   OF  WAR  [CH.  n 

on  her  voyage  in  the  Bosphorus  when  she  struck  a  mine. 
A  patrol  steamer  came  to  her  assistance,  and  the  vessel 
was  beached.  While  temporary  repairs  were  being  carried 
out  the  Turkish  authorities  seized  the  cargo.  Within  a 
week  the  Craigforth  was  refloated,  and  was  about  to  resume 
her  voyage  to  Hamburg  when  the  master  and  crew  were 
ordered  by  the  British  Consul  to  leave  her.  These  two 
minor  incidents,  however,  conveyed  no  suggestion  of  the 
experiences  which  were  to  befall  British  merchant  seamen 
during  the  first  phase  of  the  enemy's  operations  against 
sea-borne  commerce.  Both  ships  had  suffered  injury  in 
territorial  waters.  But,  in  the  meantime,  an  event  had 
occurred  in  the  North  Sea  which  indicated  that  the 
Germans  intended  to  take  the  fullest  advantage  of  a  mining 
policy,  the  Konigin  Luise  being  caught  off  Aldeburgh,  on 
the  morning  of  August  5th,  laying  mines  in  the  track  of 
merchantmen.  In  spite  of  these  developments,  shipping 
in  British  waters  was  conducted  for  several  weeks  without 
mishap,  except  for  the  damage  from  a  mine  sustained  by 
the  Oakby  off  Seaham  on  August  30th ;  that  vessel, 
however,  succeeded  in  reaching  the  Tyne. 


CHAPTER   III 

CRUISER   ATTACKS    ON   SHIPPING 

WITHIN  less  than  two  days  of  the  outbreak  of  war  an 
incident  occurred  off  the  Gulf  of  Aden  which  showed  that 
enemy  cruisers  which  were  at  large  in  the  outer  seas  in- 
tended to  make  the  best  of  what  was  to  prove  a  compara- 
tively short  period  of  freedom  from  interference.  For 
as  soon  as  war  was  declared,  the  Admiralty  put  into  opera- 
tion the  plans  for  the  protection  of  merchant  shipping 
which  had  been  prepared  in  advance. 

On  July  23rd,  the  s.s.  City  of  Winchester  (6,601  tons), 
of  the  Hall  Line,  had  left  Calcutta  with  a  general  cargo 
for  London  and  Dunkirk.  The  voyage  was  marked  by  no 
notable  incident  until  the  evening  of  August  5th,  when 
the  master  (Mr.  George  R.  Boyck)  received  news  of  the 
outbreak  of  war  in  a  dramatic  manner.  At  8.30  p.m., 
when  the  vessel  was  steaming  at  full  speed  in  the  Gulf 
of  Aden,  a  strange  cruiser,  afterwards  recognised  as  the 
KONIGSBERG,  drew  towards  her,  making  no  signal  and  firing 
no  gun.  The  significance  of  the  movement  was  not  missed 
by  the  captain  of  the  British  vessel.  The  warship's  guns 
could  be  seen  in  the  moonlight  trained  upon  the  defenceless 
merchant  ship,  and,  when  the  signal  was  received  to 
stop,  Captain  Boyck  had  no  alternative  but  to  comply. 
A  boat  was  immediately  sent  off  from  the  KONIGSBERG 
with  an  armed  crew,  and  after  the  ship's  papers  had  been 
seized,  and  the  ship's  wireless  installation  destroyed, 
orders  were  given  for  her  to  proceed  in  accordance  with 
direct  ions  received  from  theK6NiGSBERG,an  officer  and  four 
men  remaining  on  board  to  insure  obedience.  During 
the  whole  of  that  night  and  until  the  afternoon  of  the 
next  day,  the  captain,  the  first  British  merchant  officer 
on  the  high  seas  to  experience  the  annoyances  and  delays 
of  war,  was  directed  to  steam  various  courses,  bu£  always 
to  the  westward,  until  anchor  was  at  last  dropped  in  the  bay 

137 


138  CRUISER  ATTACKS   ON   SHIPPING        [CH.  m 

of  the  small  port  of  Makalla,  about  200  miles  from  Aden 
on  the  Arabian  coast.     At  this  point  the  KONIGSBERG  was 
joined  by  the    Norddeutscher    Lloyd    steamship    Zieten, 
and  the  Ostmark,  of  the  Hamburg  Amerika  Line,  acting 
as  supply  ships.     A  steam- pinnace,  with  an  officer  and  a 
party  of  men,   was  then  sent  to  the  City  of  Winchester, 
and  they  took  away  all  the  charts  and  sailing  directions. 
Another  prize  crew,  consisting  of  two    lieutenants   and 
fifteen  men,  all  well  armed,  was  placed  on  board,  and 
that  evening  the  four  ships  put  to   sea  with  all  lights 
out,   the  Zieten  leading.      After  leaving    the    bay,    the 
KONIGSBERG  and  Ostmark  disappeared,  and  for  the  time 
nothing  more  was  seen  of  them.     For  the  next  two  days 
the   City  of  Winchester  continued  to  follow  the  Zieten, 
always  making  to  the  north-east,  until  anchor  was  cast 
in    the    north-east  bay  of  Hallaniya,   the   largest   island 
of  the  Khorya  Morya  group.     On  the  following  morning 
the  Zieten  went  alongside  the  City  of  Winchester  and  com- 
menced to  take  about  300  tons  of  her  bunker  coal,  as  well 
as  her  stores  of  food  and  drink.     In  the  meantime  the  cap- 
tain and  the  European  crew,  with  the  exception  of  the 
second  officer,  the  third  engineer,  and  the  carpenter,  were 
transferred  to  the  German  ship,  and  early  on  the  following 
morning,   the   coaling   being   completed,   the   Zieten   dis- 
appeared  in   the  darkness.     During   the   day   the   prize 
crew  completed  the  task  of  seizing  all  the  foodstuffs  to 
be  found  in  the  cargo.     The  same  afternoon  the  KONIGS- 
BERG reappeared,  and,  making  fast  on  the  port  side  of  the 
City  of  Winchester,  took  the  remainder  of  the  coal  (about 
250  tons),  all  the  fresh  water,  and  what  was  left  of  foodstuffs. 
Throughout   the   night,    work   continued   with   carefully 
screened    lights.     At    4.30    on    the    following    morning, 
August  12th,  the  remaining  officers  and  the  lascar  crew 
were  ordered  on  board  the  cruiser  with  their  personal 
belongings.     While  the  third  engineer,  under  compulsion, 
was  pointing  out  to  the  German  officer  the  steps  which 
could  be  taken  to  flood  the  ship,  the  task  of  dismantling 
all  that  was  portable  of  her  equipment  was  completed  by 
the    enemy.      In    a    short    space    measures    were    taken 
to  insure  the  sinking  of  the  vessel,  and  then  the  KONIGS- 
BERG, having   embarked   the   boarding- party,   stood   off, 
fired  three  shells  into  the  abandoned  vessel,  and  steamed 
away.     Two  hours  later,  the  KONIGSBERG  reached  a  bay 


CH.III]    END  OF  THE  "CITY  OF  WINCHESTER"    13d 

of  Soda  Island,  where  she  met  the  German  merchant 
ship  Goldenfels,  which  was  encountered  at  a  convenient 
moment  when  homeward  bound  from  Hankow ;  to  her  the 
second  officer,  the  third  engineer,  the  carpenter,  and 
the  lascars,  were  transferred.  For  some  unexplained 
reason  the  Goldenfels  then  returned  to  the  spot  where 
the  City  of  Winchester  had  been  left  in  a  sinking  con- 
dition. It  was  the  unhappy  experience  of  the  former 
officers  and  men  of  this  ship  to  spend  the  remainder 
of  the  day  watching  her  founder  until  only  the  black 
top  of  the  funnel,  the  wireless  mast,  and  part  of  the 
top  of  the  mast  remained  in  view.  The  elaborate 
and  lengthy  ritual  had  at  last  been  completed  after  an 
interval  of  a  week.  "  We  were  afterwards  conveyed  in 
the  Goldenfels  to  Sabang,  where,"  the  second  officer  re- 
corded in  his  report  to  the  owners,  "  I  safely  arrived 
with  all  my  men,  and  I  have  obtained  a  paper  from  the 
master  of  the  Goldenfels  certifying  that  he  saw  the  ship 
sink ;  it  is  witnessed  by  the  commander  of  a  Dutch  gun- 
boat." The  Zieten  reached  Mozambique  with  her  funnels 
disguised  so  as  to  represent  a  vessel  of  the  British  India 
Steam  Navigation  Company,  and  sfye  hoisted  the  British 
red  ensign  on  entering  the  port.  In  the  meantime,  the 
master  and  his  companions  had  already  been  landed  at 
Mozambique,  leaving  on  record  that  he  and  his  companions 
"  were  treated  with  every  civility  and  respect  by  the 
Germans."  l 

While  these  adventures  were  befalling  the  officers  and 
men  of  the  City  of  Winchester,  the  German  cruiser  DRESDEN 
had  begun  her  short  career  as  a  commerce  destroyer, 
making  her  presence  felt  on  the  trade  route  from  South 
America  to  the  United  States.  Two  days  after  the  opening 
of  the  war,  she  fell  in  with  three  British  vessels,  the 
Drumcliffe  (4,072  tons),  the  Lynton  Grange  (4,252  tons), 
and  the  Hostilius  (3,325  tons).  The  first  of  these  vessels 
had  left  Buenos  Ayres  in  ballast  on  July  24th  with  in- 
structions to  call  at  Trinidad  to  replenish  her  bunkers 
for  her  voyage  to  New  York.  Captain  Evans  was  un- 
aware of  the  outbreak  of  war,  and  was  proceeding  on  his 

1  The  City  of  Winchester  was  the  only  capture  of  the  KONIGSBERO.  At 
the  end  of  October  1914,  this  German  cruiser  was  found  to  have  taken 
refuge  in  the  Rufigi  River  (German  East  Africa).  There  she  was  blockaded, 
and  in  the  following  July  she  was  destroyed  by  British  men-of-war. 


140          CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON   SHIPPING          [CH.  m 

course,  unconcerned,  when  he  was  stopped  by  a  strange 
man-of-war  off  the  mouth  of  the  Amazon.  The  warship 
proved  to  be  the  German  light  cruiser  DRESDEN  on  her  way 
round  the  Horn  to  the  Pacific,  possibly  intending  to  join 
Admiral  von  Spee,  commanding  the  German  Pacific 
Squadron.  The  meeting  was  as  unwelcome  to  her  captain 
as  it  was  to  the  master  of  the  Drumcliffe,  who  had  on 
board  his  wife  and  child.  The  British  seaman  had,  of 
course,  received  no  instructions  from  the  Admiralty, 
while  Captain  Liidecke  found  himself  in  a  situation 
which  had  not  been  anticipated  in  his  orders.  A  party 
was  sent  to  the  Drumcliffe,  and  it  was  at  once  reported 
that  a  woman  and  child  were  on  board.  Three  courses 
were  open  to  the  German  officer  conversant  with  the 
humane  sentiments  expressed  at  The  Hague  Conference, 
and  embodied  in  the  German  Naval  Prize  Code.  He  could 
either  send  the  Drumcliffe  with  a  prize  crew  into  port, 
but  none  of  a  suitable  character  existed  in  the  vicinity ; 
he  could  order  the  ship  to  follow  his  movements  ;  or  he 
could  release  her  on  parole.  He  chose  the  last  course. 
The  vessel's  wireless  installation  was  dismantled,  and  the 
officers  and  crew  were  called  upon  to  sign  a  declaration 
not  to  take  service  against  Germany  during  the  war. 
Captain  Evans  feared  that  a  refusal  to  comply  with  this 
demand  might  jeopardise  the  safety  of  his  wife  and  child, 
and  he  and  his  men  gave  the  necessary  undertaking. 
Within  two  hours  or  so  the  Drumcliffe  was  again  under  way. 
The  troubles  of  the  captain  of  the  DRESDEN  were  not 
yet  at  an  end.  The  Drumcliffe  having  been  released  at 
3.40  on  the  afternoon  of  August  6th,  it  was  his  misfortune 
at  4.45  to  fall  in  with  the  Houlder  liner  Lynton  Grange, 
on  passage  from  Rosario  to  Barbadoes.  By  signal 
from  the  DRESDEN,  the  master  of  the  Lynton  Grange 
(Mr.  H.  L.  Simpson)  learnt  that  a  state  of  war  existed 
between  his  country  and  Germany.  While  the  signals 
were  passing  between  the  two  ships,  the  Houston  liner 
Hostilius,  on  her  voyage  from  Montevideo  to  Cienfuegos, 
Cuba,  via  Barbadoes,  came  in  view.  She  also  had  put  to 
sea  before  the  outbreak  of  war,  and  was  proceeding  in 
company  with  the  Lynton  Grange.  The  captain  of  the 
DRESDEN  sent  boarding-parties  to  both  ships.  In  the 
case  of  the  Lynton  Grange  the  ship's  papers  were  examined 
on  board  the  cruiser,  and  then  a  naval  officer  returned 


CH.III]  "HOSTILIUS"  RELEASED  WITHOUT  PAROLE  141 

and  required  that  the  British  officers  and  men  should 
sign  a  declaration  to  the  following  effect : 

"  We,  the  captain,  officers,  and  crew  of  the  s.s.  Lynton 
Grange,  declare  formally  that  we  will  not  do  any  service 
in  the  British  Navy  or  Army,  and  will  not  give  any  assis- 
tance to  the  British  Government  against  Germany  during 
the  present  war." 

A  threat  was  made  that,  if  the  declaration  was  not 
signed,  the  officers  and  men  would  be  taken  on  board  the 
cruiser  as  prisoners  of  war,  and  the  Lynton  Grange  sunk. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  pledge  were  given  and  subse- 
quently contraband  were  carried  during  the  war,  the  crew, 
if  caught,  would  be  shot  and  their  vessel  destroyed.  In 
the  circumstances,  the  master  and  the  other  officers 
and  the  men  decided  to  comply  with  the  demand,  and  the 
vessel  was  released.  In  the  case  of  the  Hostilius,  the 
boarding  officer  took  the  papers,  which  were  in  Spanish, 
back  to  the  cruiser  to  be  translated.  He  returned  with 
them  in  about  an  hour,  bringing  with  him  the  form  of 
parole.  The  master  (Mr.  James  Jones)  conferred  with  his 
officers,  and  told  them  that  he  himself  would  not  sign  this 
document.  It  was  then  agreed  to  refuse  unanimously  to 
give  the  parole.  The  German  boarding  officer,  on  being 
informed  of  that  decision,  himself  called  the  crew  together 
and  read  the  document  to  them.  The  men  stated  that  they 
would  stand  by  Captain  Jones.  A  signal  was  then  made  to 
the  DRESDEN,  and,  to  the  surprise  of  everyone  on  board, 
the  ship  was  ordered  to  be  released.  Before  the  boarding 
officer  left,  however,  he  made  the  following  entry  in  the 
chief  officer's  log  book  : 

"  Hostilius. 

"  Held  up  by  S.M.S.  DRESDEN  :  Commander-Frigate 
Captain  Liidecke. 

"Lat.  1°  21"  N.,  long.  45°  1"  W.  Held  up,  August  6th, 
1914,  5.20  p.m.;  let  go,  August  6th,  1914,  7.40  p.m. 

"Let  go  because  her  destruction  did  not  seem  worth 
while. 

"(Signed)  FRIED  RICH  BURCHART, 
"  Lieut.  Captain," 

The   first  ship  to  be  sunk  by  the  DRESDEN  was  the 


142          CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON  SHIPPING         [CH.  in 

s.s.  Hyades  (3, .352  tons),  which  left  Pernambuco  on  August 
14th,  the  master  having  put  into  that  port  for  instructions 
on  his  passage  from  Rosario  to  Rotterdam  with  a  cargo 
of    maize    and    foodstuffs    shipped   by   a    German  firm. 
She  was   not  fitted  with  wireless,   but   the  master  (Mr. 
John  Morrison)  had  fallen  in  with  the  cruiser  GLASGOW 
on  August  8th,  and,  as  a  result  of  the  warning  given,  put 
into  Pernambuco  on  the  10th.     The  Vice-Consul  at  Per- 
nambuco had  taken  some  pains  to  ascertain  the  extent 
of  the  danger  threatening  British  ships,  having  interro- 
gated   masters    of    three    British    vessels    arriving    from 
British  or  American  ports.     The  reply  in  each  case  was 
identical :    nothing    had    been    seen    of   enemy    cruisers. 
In  the  meantime  the  agent   of  the  Houston  Company, 
in  reply  to  an  inquiry,  had  received  a  telegram  from  the 
owners  stating  that,  unless  the  British  authorities  specially 
detained   the   steamer,  he   was   to   instruct    the    master 
to   proceed   to   Las    Palmas,   adding,    "  German  cruisers 
allowing  British  steamers  proceed  unmolested,  with  ex- 
ception removing  wireless  apparatus."     The  master  was 
therefore  directed  to  avoid  the  regular  route.    The  ship  was 
considerably  to  the  eastward  of  the  most  easterly  track  to 
Brazilian  ports  and  River  Plate  from  the  Canary  Islands, 
when  smoke  was  seen  on  the  horizon  off  the  port  bow. 
The  smoke,  it  was  found,  came  from  the  German  cruiser 
DRESDEN,    which    was    accompanied    by    two    tenders, 
the  Baden  and  Prussia.     As  the  DRESDEN  approached, 
she  was  seen  to  be  flying  the  French  flag,  a  familiar  decoy, 
but  this  was  replaced  by  the  German  ensign  when  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  distant.     The  Hyades  continued  on  her 
course  until  signalled  to  stop.     A  boarding- party  took  the 
ship's  papers,  and  Captain  Morrison  was  told  that  it  would 
be  impossible  for  him  to  reach  Rotterdam,  as  he  would 
be  diverted  to  a  British  port  on  entering  the  Channel. 
The  officers  and  men  were  given  an  hour  to  leave  the  ship 
with  their  effects,  and  boats  from  the  DRESDEN  conveyed 
them  to  the  Prussia.     The  Hyades  was  afterwards  sunk 
by  gunfire,  explosives  having  been  previously  placed  on 
board  and  the  covers  taken  off  the  condensers.  The  Prussia, 
accompanied  by  the  DRESDEN  and  Baden,  then  proceeded 
south.     As  the  Hyades  carried  a  cargo  destined  for  Ger- 
many, the  loss  of  the  vessel,  as  the  British  Consul  at  Buenos 
Ayres    remarked,    was    "  not    an    unmixed    evil."     The 


CH.  in]     THE   "KATHARINE  PARK'S"   RELEASE    143 

gunnery  of  the  DRESDEN,  according  to  the  master's  state- 
ment, was  "noticeably  bad";  the  sea  at  the  time  the 
Hyades  was  sunk  was  quite  calm,  the  range  was  barely 
a  quarter  of  a  mile,  yet  it  took  the  DRESDEN  some  forty 
minutes  to  sink  her.  The  officers  and  crew  of  the  Hyades 
were  landed  at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  the  master  leaving  it  on 
record  that  "  he  and  his  men  were  well  and  kindly  treated 
while  on  board  the  s.s.  Prussia." 

Before  the  Prussia  parted  company  with  the  DRESDEN, 
that  cruiser  met  the  s.s.  Siamese  Prince  (4,847  tons),  on 
her  way  from  London  to  the  River  Plate  with  a  neutral 
cargo.  The  vessel  was  stopped  and  boarded,  but  after 
a  delay  of  two  hours  was  allowed  to  proceed,  this  leniency 
being  apparently  due  to  the  character  of  her  cargo. 

At  this  period  in  her  career,  the  DRESDEN  fell  in  with 
only  two  other  British  ships,  the  Holm-wood  (4,223  tons), 
outward  bound  form  Newport  with  coal  for  Bahia  Blanca, 
and  the  Katharine  Park  (4,854  tons),  on  passage  from  Santa 
F6  and  Buenos  Ayres  to  New  York.   Both  ships  were  off  the 
usual  track  in  accordance  with  Admiralty  instructions.  The 
story  of  the  experiences  of  these  two  ships  became  known 
when  the  Katharine  Park  (master,  Mr.  H.  Paterson)  put  into 
Rio  de  Janeiro  on  August  30th  for  the  purpose  of  landing 
the  captain  and  crew  of  the  Holmwood.     It  was  then  re- 
ported that  the  Holmwood  (master,  Mr.  R.  H.  Hill)  had  put 
into  Las  Palmas  and  had  met  with  no  incident  at  sea 
on  leaving  that  port  until  the  morning  of  August  26th, 
when  she  encountered  the  DRESDEN.    The  German  officer 
of  the  boarding-party  which  went  on  board  ordered  the 
captain  and  crew  to  collect  their  personal  effects  and  to 
proceed  on  board  the  Baden,  a  tender  which  was  standing 
by.     After  these  instructions  had  been  carried  out  and 
some  provisions  had  been  transferred  to  the  DRESDEN, 
a  mine  which  had  been  placed  in  the  Holmwood  was  ex- 
ploded and  the  vessel  sunk.     At  the  moment  when  this 
ship  was  being  despatched,  the  Katharine  Park  arrived  on 
the  scene.    The  DRESDEN  immediately  sent  a  party  on 
board,  the  ship's  papers  were  examined,  half  an  hour 
was  given  to  the  surprised  master  and  crew  to  pack  their 
belongings,  and  preparations  were  made  to  sink  the  ship. 
As  an  alternative,  the  captain  was  told  he  would  be  re- 
leased if  he  and  his  men  entered  into  the  usual  parole. 
The  latter  course  was  adopted,  and  forthwith  the  master 

11 


144  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON  SHIPPING        [CH.  in 

and  crew  of  the  Holmwood  were  transferred  to  the  Katharine 
Park,  which  owed  her  release  to  the  fact  that  she  carried 
an  American  cargo.  The  DRESDEN  and  her  supply  ship 
then  made  off. 

The  captain  of  the  DRESDEN  was  denied  a  further  success 
owing  to  the  competency  with  which  the  Pacific  Steam 
Navigation  Company's  s.s.  Ortega  (8,075  tons)  was  handled. 
She  escaped  capture  and  destruction  in  circumstances 
which  later  on  drew  from  the  Admiralty,  in  a  letter  to  the 
owners,  a  glowing  appreciation  "  of  the  courageous  con- 
duct of  the  master,  Capain  Douglas  R.  Kinneir,  in  throwing 
off  his  pursuers  by  successfully  navigating  the  uncharted 
and  dangerous  passage  of  Nelson's  Strait."  Three  hun- 
dred Frenchmen  were  thus  saved  from  becoming  prisoners 
of  war,  and  eventually  joined  the  Army  of  our  Ally. 
Nothing  might  have  been  known  of  this  incident  but  for  the 
action  of  His  Majesty's  Consul-General  at  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
who,  learning  the  details,  embodied  them  in  a  despatch  to 
the  Foreign  Office.  In  this  statement  he  recalled  that  the 
Ortega  sailed  from  Valparaiso  with  some  300  French 
Reservists  on  board  towards  the  close  of  September. 
These  men  were  in  considerable  danger  of  falling  into  the 
hands  of  any  enemy  cruiser  which  sighted  the  Ortega,  as 
the  ship  possessed  a  speed  of  only  about  14  knots,  whereas, 
as  has  been  noted  already,  the  Germans  had  at  sea  a  number 
of  ships  of  twenty  or  more  knots.  When  the  British 
vessel  was  close  to  the  western  entrance  of  the  Magellan 
Straits,  a  German  man-of-war,  which  was  subsequently 
identified  as  the  DRESDEN,  appeared  and  gave  chase.  The 
Ortega,  being  the  slower  ship,  ought  speedily  to  have  been 
captured,  but,  in  fact,  she  made  her  escape  in  the  manner 
narrated  by  the  Consul-General  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  : 

"  Under  these  circumstances  the  master  of  the  Ortega 
took  a  heroic  resolve.  He  called  for  volunteers  to  assist 
in  stoking  his  vessel :  that  appeal  met  with  hearty  re- 
sponse :  firemen,  engineers,  and  volunteers,  stripped  to 
the  waist,  set  to  work  with  a  will,  and  the  master  assured 
me  that  they  actually  succeeded  in  whacking  the  old  ship 
(she  was  built  in  1906)  up  to  a  good  18  knots  :  the  master 
headed  his  ship  straight  for  the  entrance  of  a  passage 
known  as  Nelson's  Strait ;  and  he  made  for  the  Strait 
at  full  speed,  hotly  pursued  by  the  German  cruiser,  which 


CH.  m]     CAPTAIN  KINNEIR'S  DARING  FEAT          145 

kept  firing  at  him  with  two  heavy  bow  guns.  Luckily 
none  of  the  shot  took  effect,  and  the  Ortega  succeeded 
in  entering  Nelson's  Strait,  where  the  German  cruiser  did 
not  dare  to  follow  her. 

44  In  order  to  realise  the  hardihood  of  this  action  upon 
the  part  of  the  master  of  the  Ortega,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  Nelson's  Strait  is  entirely  uncharted,  and  that  the 
narrow,  tortuous  passage  in  question  constitutes  a  veri- 
table nightmare  for  navigators,  bristling  as  it  does  with 
reefs  and  pinnacle  rock,  swept  by  fierce  currents  and  tide- 
rips,  and  with  the  cliffs  on  either  side  sheer-to,  without 
any  anchorage.  I  can  speak  from  personal  experience  as 
to  the  terrifying  nature  of  the  navigation  of  Nelson's 
Strait,  having  once  passed  through  it  many  years  ago  in 
a  small  sealing  schooner. 

44  However,  the  master  of  the  Ortega  managed  to  get 
his  vessel  safely  through  this  dangerous  passage,  employing 
the  device  of  sending  boats  ahead,  to  sound  every  yard 
of  the  passage.  Eventually,  by  a  miracle  of  luck  and  good 
seamanship,  he  worked  his  way  into  Smyth's  Channel, 
without  having  sustained  even  a  scratch  to  his  plates, 
and  finally  brought  his  vessel  to  this  port." 

It  will  be  admitted  that  to  take  an  8, 000 -ton  steamer 
safely  through  so  perilous  a  passage  constituted  a  most 
notable  feat  of  pluck  and  skilful  seamanship.  Captain 
Kinneir,  confronted  with  the  possibility  of  falling  the 
victim  of  an  enemy  cruiser,  had  exhibited  once  more 
the  resourcefulness,  daring,  and  skill  which  British  sea- 
men have  so  frequently  displayed,  to  the  admiration  of 
the  world.  The  publication  of  the  story  of  his  escape 
raised  the  spirits  of  the  nation  at  a  moment  when, 
unaccustomed  to  the  hazards  of  naval  warfare,  it  was 
inclined  to  wonder  what  further  misfortune  was  to 
happen,  while  at  the  same  time  it  inspired  the  whole 
Merchant  Navy  with  a  high  pride  in  its  mission. 

Before  her  career  ended,  the  DRESDEN  encountered 
two  other  British  ships,  the  s.s.  North  Wales  (3,661  tons ; 
master,  Mr.  G.  Owen)  ;  and  the  Conway  Castle  (1,694 
tons;  master,  Mr.  J.  Williams).  The  former  vessel  was 
on  passage  from  Juan  Fernandez  Island,  on  charter  by  the 
Admiralty,  with  704  tons  of  coal  for  the  Falkland  Islands, 
when  she  was  captured  by  the  DRESDEN  on  the  morning  of 


146          CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  in 

November  16th,  in  lat.  37°  30'  S.,  long.  77°  0'  W.  The 
day  had  just  dawned  when  the  lookout  of  the  North 
Wales  noticed  what  he  took  to  be  two  war- vessels  on  the 
starboard  bow,  distant  about  nine  miles.  The  British 
vessel  immediately  altered  course,  hoping  to  avoid  being 
seen  by  the  two  strange  ships,  which,  in  fact,  kept  on  their 
course  until  about  6.30  a.m.,  as  though  not  noticing  the 
merchantman,  when  one  of  them,  which  proved  to  be  the 
DRESDEN,  turned  towards  the  North  Wales.  An  hour 
later  she  signalled  to  her  to  stop.  The  order  was  obeyed, 
and  the  British  ensign  was  hoisted  under  the  impression 
that  the  strange  ship  was  a  Japanese  cruiser.  As  the 
master  had  been  observing  the  Admiralty's  instructions, 
steering  a  course  which  took  him  well  clear  of  the  trade 
route,  the  encounter  with  the  DRESDEN  was  an  unfortunate 
sequel  to  his  well-directed  efforts  to  avoid  enemy  ships. 
As  soon  as  the  German  boarding-party  had  examined 
the  ship's  papers,  the  master  was  informed  that  the  vessel 
would  be  sunk,  time  being  allowed  for  the  officers  and 
men  to  collect  their  clothes  '  and  personal  effects.  Half 
an  hour  later  the  North  Wales  was  sunk,  and  on  the  follow- 
ing day  the  crew  were  transferred  to  the  German 
s.s.  Rhakotis,  which  was  in  company  with  the  DRESDEN. 
Several  days  later  an  officer  from  the  DRESDEN  demanded 
that  the  master  and  men  should  sign  a  formal  declaration 
to  take  no  part  in  the  war,  and  they  were  subsequently 
landed  by  the  Rhakotis  at  Callao  on  December  14th.  The 
master  of  the  North  Wales,  putting  a  strict  interpretation 
on  the  parole  into  which  he  had  entered,  refused  to  give  any 
information  to  the  British  Consul  at  the  port  as  to  what 
had  happened  on  board  the  Rhakotis  during  the  inter- 
vening weeks  since  the  capture  of  his  ship,  beyond  stating 
that  "  during  our  whole  time  on  board  the  s.s.  Rhakotis 
we  were  very  well  treated." 

The  last  vessel  to  be  captured  by  the  DRESDEN  was  the 
sailing-vessel  Conway  Castle,  which  had  left  Valparaiso  on 
February  17th,  1915,  for  Queenstown,  with  a  cargo  of  barley. 
All  went  well  for  ten  days.  In  lat.  37°21/S.,  long.  81°  58'W., 
the  DRESDEN  appeared,  and  when  still  three  miles 
distant  exchanged  signals,  ordering  the  ship  to  stop. 
The  boarding-party  then  proceeded  on  board,  and  after 
the  ship's  stores  and  provisions  had  been  transferred  to 
the  DRESDEN,  to  which  the  crew  had  been  ordered  to  row 


CH.  in]     "  KAISER    WILHELM    DER    GROSSE "         147 

in  their  own  boat,  the  Conway  Castle  was  sunk.  On 
March  7th,  master  (Mr.  John  Williams)  and  men  were 
transferred  to  the  Peruvian  barque  LORTON,  and  reached 
Valparaiso  five  days  later.  This  proved  to  be  the  last 
exploit  of  the  DRESDEN,  which  was  sunk  at  Juan  Fer- 
nandez Island  on  March  14th  by  British  cruisers.  The 
narrative  of  the  experiences  of  British  shipmasters  shows 
that  the  captain  of  the  DRESDEN  had  a  proper  appreciation 
of  the  mandates  of  humanity,  and  respected  them  in  his 
dealings  with  the  unfortunate  officers  and  men  of  British 
merchant  ships  which  he  encountered  during  his  cruise 
as  a  corsair. 

Nor  does  the  story  of  the  career  of  the  armed  merchant 
cruiser  KAISER  WILHELM  DER  GROSSE  reveal  any  less 
respect  for  the  laws  of  the  brotherhood  of  the  sea  which 
had  obtained  general  acceptance  throughout  the  world 
before  the  outbreak  of  war.     Of  the  swift  merchant  ships 
in  German  ports  which  were  capable  of  offensive  use  on 
the  trade  routes,  this  was  the  only  one  to  put  to  sea  in 
the  early  days  of  the  war.     It  is  probable  that  she  was 
despatched  in  order  to  test  the  efficiency  of  the  British 
control  of  the  seas.     She  must  have  moved  up  the  Nor- 
wegian coast  at  full  speed,  taking  the  fullest  advantage 
of  the  darkness,  and  proceeded  on  an  extreme  northerly 
route,  since  at  7  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  August  7th  she 
came  upon  the  British  steam  trawler  Tubal  Cain  (227  tons). 
A  heavy  sea  was  running,  and  the  skipper  of  the  Tubal 
Cain  (Mr.  Charles  Smith)  had  just  got  his  gear  on  board 
and  was  preparing  to  light  a  buoy  near  which  he  intended  to 
"  dodge,"  when  the  KAISER  WILHELM  DER  GROSSE  ap- 
peared. The  scene  of  the  incident  was  about  fifty  miles  west- 
north-west  from  Staalbierghuk,  on  the  west  coast  of  Iceland. 
The  German  vessel  put  out  a  boat,  and  two  officers  boarded 
the  Tubal  Cain.     They  asked  the  skipper  if  he  had  heard 
that  war  had  broken  out  between  Germany  and  England. 
The  reply  was  in  the  affirmative,  as  he  had  heard  it  two 
days  ago,  although  the  ketch  had  left  Grimsby  on  July  25th. 
A  demand  was  made  for  the  ship's  papers,  and  the  crew  of 
fourteen  hands  was  directed  to  get  into  the  trawler's  small 
boat  and  proceed  on  board  the  KAISER  WILHELM  DER 
GROSSE.    As  there  was  a  heavy  sea  running  with  a  strong 
wind,  two  journeys  had  to  be  made,  but  by  9  o'clock 
the  transfer  had  been  completed,  and  then  the  KAISER 


148  CRUISER  ATTACKS   ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  in 

WILHELM  DER  GROSSE  moved  a  short  distance  from  the 
Tubal  Cain  and  began  firing.  Altogether  forty-eight  shots 
were  fired  before  the  vessel  was  sunk.  The  firing  officer 
remarked  to  the  skipper  by  way  of  apology  for  the  bad 
gunnery,  that  "  the  trawler,  being  British,  took  a  lot  of 
sinking."  The  skipper  and  the  chief  engineer  were 
taken  to  the  officers'  quarters,  an  act  of  consideration 
which  was  appreciated,  but  the  rest  of  the  crew  were 
sent  below. 

In  those  circumstances  the  KAISER  WILHELM  DER 
GROSSE  began  her  career,  in  the  course  of  which  she  was 
attended  from  time  to  time  by  at  least  four  supply  ships, 
and  sank  only  two  British  merchantmen.  On  August  15th 
she  fell  in  with  the  Union  Castle  liner  Galician  (6,762  tons), 
which  had  left  Table  Bay  on  July  28th  for  London.  The 
Galician  was  in  lat.  27°  30'  N.,  long.  18°  W.,  being  about 
sixty  miles  off  the  usual  track  from  South  Africa  to 
Tenerife,  when  the  KAISER  WILHELM  DER  GROSSE  over- 
hauled her.  According  to  the  German  officers,  the  pre- 
sence of  the  liner  had  been  revealed  by  a  wireless  message 
which  she  had  sent.  The  narrative  of  events  can  best 
be  given  in  the  words  of  Captain  E.  M.  Day,  the  master 
of  the  Galician  : 

"  On  August  15th,  at  2.45  p.m.  in  lat.  27°  30'  N.,  long. 
18°  W.,  we  were  overhauled  by  the  German  armed  cruiser 
KAISER  WILHELM  DER  GROSSE,  who  signalled,  '  If  you 
communicate  by  wireless  I  will  sink  you.'  He  then 
ordered  us  to  lower  our  aerial  and  to  follow  him  at  full 
speed.  At  3.15  p.m.  we  were  ordered  to  stop.  The  cruiser 
then  sent  a  boat  manned  by  two  officers  and  men  who 
destroyed  the  wireless,  inspected  the  ship's  papers,  and 
mustered  and  inspected  all  passengers  and  crew.  At 
5.30  p.m.  the  Germans  left  the  ship,  taking  with  them 
Lieutenant  Deane,  first-class  passenger,  and  C.  Sheerman 
(gunner),  third-class  passenger,  also  all  ship's  papers  and 
documents,  etc.  At  5.40  p.m.  we  were  ordered  to  precede 
cruiser  at  full  speed  and  to  steer  S.  25°  W.  (magnetic). 
At  6  p.m.  we  received  orders  to  keep  all  lights  extinguished, 
and  to  have  all  effects  belonging  to  passengers  and  crew 
ready  on  deck,  to  provision  all  boats,  and  to  have  every- 
thing in  order  for  leaving  the  ship  at  daylight.  At  8.30 
we  were  ordered  to  alter  course  to  S.  17°  E.  (magnetic), 


CH.  m]  RELEASING  A  PRIZE 

on  which  course  we  continued  until  3.40,  August  16th, 
when  we  received  orders  to  steer  S.  45°  W.  (magnetic), 
the  cruiser  throughout  following  closely  in  our  wake. 
At  5  a.m.  the  cruiser  sent  the  following  message :  '  To 
Captain  Day  :  I  will  not  destroy  your  ship  on  account 
of  the  women  and  children  on  board — you  are  dismissed 
— good-bye.'  To  which  the  following  reply  was  sent : 
4  To  German  Captain — Most  grateful  thanks  from  passengers 
and  crew— good-bye.'  Lat.  25°  25'  N.,  long.  17°  20'  W. 
The  cruiser  then  left  us  at  full  speed,  and  we  turned  ship 
and  shaped  a  course  for  Tenerife." 

A  further  statement  was  made  by  Captain  Day  in  the 
following  terms  : 

"Having  made  a  verbal  report  this  forenoon  at  the 
Admiralty,  I  now  beg  to  add  the  following  observations 
regarding  the  points  with  which  I  was  then  desired  by 
Captain  Webb  l  to  deal  specially  in  my  formal  report : 

"  Courses. — The  KAISER  WILHELM  DER  GROSSE  did  not 
approach  the  Galician  directly,  but  at  first  kept  wide  of 
us  on  a  parallel  course,  flying  no  colours,  and  it  was  only 
when  turning  in  towards  us  that  she  hoisted  the  German 
ensign.  I  then  ran  up  the  Red  Ensign,  and  it  was  at  this 
time  the  German  cruiser  threatened  to  sink  me  unless 
I  stopped  wireless  communication.  The  commander  of 
the  cruiser  then  ordered  me  to  follow  him,  and  ultimately 
to  come  alongside  on  his  starboard  side. 

"  As  will  be  seen  from  my  report  above,  after  the  German 
officer  had  taken  away  my  papers,  we  were  ordered  to 
alter  our  courses  from  time  to  time,  at  a  speed  of  12  knots, 
in  such  a  way  that  we  steered  three  triangular  courses, 
obviously  as  if  the  cruiser  were  looking  out  for  some  other 
vessels,  and  it  was  possibly  owing  to  failing  in  this  attempt 
that  he  at  last  dismissed  my  ship  and  allowed  me  to  pro- 
ceed on  my  voyage. 

"  Wireless  Apparatus. — The  manner  in  which  I  was 
boarded  has  already  been  dealt  with,  but  I  may  now  say 
that,  after  my  aerials  had  been  sent  down,  the  wireless 
installation  was  broken  up  by  the  Germans.  I  am  pleased 
to  add  that,  as  our  aerials  had  not  been  thrown  overboard, 
the  Senior  Marconi  Operator  of  my  ship  went  ashore, 

1  Director  of  the  Trade  Division  of  the  War  Staff,  now  Rear-Admiral 
Sir  Richard  Webb,  K.C.M.G.,  C.B, 


150  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  in 

upon  our  arrival  at  Tenerife,  and  obtained  some  spare 
parts  which  enabled  him  to  fit  up  an  emergency  apparatus 
of  moderate  power.  When  this  had  been  done,  I  instructed 
him  that,  while  he  should  take  every  opportunity  of 
receiving  messages,  he  was  on  no  account  to  transmit 
any  messages  or  to  communicate  with  other  ships  until 
we  reached  the  English  Channel.  The  fitting  of  this 
temporary  apparatus  enabled  me  later  on  to  communicate 
with  my  owners.  In  my  opinion  great  credit  is  due  to  the 
operator  for  the  steps  he  took  to  enable  me  thus  to  maintain 
communication,  and  I  have  every  reason  to  believe,  not 
only  that  he  strictly  carried  out  my  orders  in  listening  for 
messages,  as  we  afterwards  received  several,  but  that  he 
also  avoided  sending  any  messages  without  my  authority. 

"  Tobacco. — Having  heard  that  some  of  the  German 
boatmen  were  trying  to  purchase  cigars  and  cigarettes 
from  our  men  on  the  lower  deck,  I  passed  along  word  that 
there  must  be  no  trading  with  this  German  ship,  and  this 
I  believe  was  also  done  by  the  German  officer  who  was 
then  in  my  cabin.  After  the  mustering  of  the  crew  and 
passengers,  and  the  examination  and  removal  of  the  ship' s 
papers,  I  asked  the  German  officer  if  he  would  take  a  cigar, 
and  he  laughingly  observed,  '  Yes,  we  have  no  cigars  left.' 
This  I  felt  to  be  a  convenient  opportunity  for  showing 
my  sense  of  the  courtesy  with  which  this  individual  officer 
had  treated  myself  and  my  ship,  and  I  said  to  him,  4  If 
you  will  have  a  few  cigars  or  cigarettes,  I  shall  be  very 
pleased.'  I  then  sent  a  steward  to  fetch  300  cigars  and 
1,200  cigarettes,  which  I  asked  the  officer  to  accept,  and 
he  expressed  his  thanks  for  this  act  of  courtesy. 

"  In  this  connection  I  may  add  that,  after  the  German 
cruiser  had  left  us,  I  was  told  by  several  of  my  first-class 
passengers  that  the  men  in  the  German  boat  did  not  appear 
to  relish  their  task,  and  that  when  asking  for  cigarettes 
and  tobacco  they  said,  in  what  appeared  almost  a  state 
of  trembling  anxiety :  '  We  do  not  want  to  fight ;  we  have 
no  grudge  against  your  English  ships.' 

"  Medical  Stores. — From  casual  conversation  afterwards 
with  passengers,  I  learned  that  some  of  them  had  been 
told  by  the  men  in  the  German  boat  alongside  that  the 
KAISER  WILHELM  DER  GROSSE  had  a  crew  of  about  450 
men,  very  largely  R.N.R.  men,  and  it  is  significant  of  the 
possibility  of  a  considerable  amount  of  sickness  being  on 


CH.  in]  ANOTHER  SHIP  RELEASED  151 

board  that  the  German  officer  in  charge  of  the  boat's  crew 
took  away  all  the  quinine  from  the  surgery  of  my  ship."  * 

Early  on  the  morning  of  August  16th,  when  the  New 
Zealand  Shipping  Company's  s.s.  Kaipara  (7,392  tons) 
was  on  passage  to  England  from  Montevideo  with  a  large 
cargo,  the  KAISER  WILHELM  DER  GROSSE,  which  had  just 
released  the  Galician,  appeared,  making  signals  which  the 
master  (Mr.  H.  Makepeace)  "  could  not  understand." 
He  realised,  however,  that  he  was  in  danger.  He  was 
sending  wireless  messages  for  assistance  when  the  KAISER 
WILHELM  DER  GROSSE  steamed  up  and  hailed  him  through 
a  megaphone :  "  Stop  your  wireless  or  I  will  sink  you." 
A  boarding- party  then  went  on  board,  threw  several  parts 
of  the  wireless  apparatus  overboard,  examined  the  ship's 
papers,  and,  sending  the  officers  and  men  on  board 
the  merchant  cruiser,  sank  the  British  vessel.  A  charge 
of  gun-cotton  was  put  in  the  stokehole,  the  condenser 
doors  were  opened,  and  then  fifty-three  shots  were  fired. 

On  the  following  day  the  Royal  Mail  Steam  Packet  Com- 
pany's liner  Arlanza  (15,044  tons)  was  intercepted  on  her 
voyage  from  Buenos  Ayres  to  Southampton.  She  had  left 
the  former  port  on  July  31st,  and  was  in  lat.  24°  40'  N.,  long. 
17°  14'  W.  The  procedure  in  the  case  of  the  Galician  was 
repeated.  The  Arlanza  first  received  a  signal,  "  Heave 
to,  or  I  will  fire  into  you."  When  that  order  had  been 
complied  with,  the  enemy  vessel,  which  was  then  within 
200  or  300  yards,  sent  another  signal :  "  Lower  away 
and  throw  overboard  all  your  wireless  installation."  A 
later  inquiry  elicited  the  fact  that  the  Arlanza  was  carrying 
a  number  of  passengers.  That  was  followed  by  the  wel- 
come notification  :  "  Dismissed  on  account  of  your  having 
women  and  children  on  board."  That  signal  was  twice 
repeated.  Then  came  the  final  message  :  "  I  have  no 
further  commands  for  your  captain."  Commander  C.  E. 
Down,  in  a  report  to  his  owners,  stated  that  his  passen- 
gers were  naturally  rather  excited  during  the  exchange 

1  In  his  report  to  the  Union  Castle  Steamship  Company,  Captain  Day 
recorded  that  "  the  German  officers  were  most  courteous  throughout." 
The  Admiralty  sent  through  the  Union  Castle  Mail  Steamship  Company 
a  special  message  of  commendation  to  Captain  Day  and  the  wireless  opera- 
tor of  the  Galician  :  "To  the  former  for  the  tact  which  he  had  displayed  in 
difficult  circumstances,  and  to  the  latter  for  the  promptitude  and  resource 
with  which  he  replaced  the  wireless  installation." 


152  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON   SHIPPING        [CH.  in 

of  signals,  wondering  what  their  fate  would  be;  "but 
there  was  no  panic  or  noise,  and  the  relief  was  very  marked 
when  they  heard  the  verdict  that  we  could  proceed." 
The  Arlanza  reached  Las  Palmas  at  7  a.m.  on  the  following 
morning,  having  by  8  p.m.  on  the  preceding  night,  or 
six  hours  after  the  arrest,  fitted  up  and  put  in  working 
order  the  ship's  duplicate  wireless  set  and  sent  warning 
messages  to  the  cruiser  CORNWALL,  which  was  known  to 
be  cruising  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Canary  Islands, 
and  that  vessel  passed  them  on  to  the  CUMBERLAND. 

The  KAISER  WILHELM  DER  GROSSE  next  fell  in  with 
the  Elder  liner  Nyanga  (3,066  tons).  That  vessel  had 
sailed  from  Calabar,  on  the  West  Coast  of  Africa,  on 
July  28th  with  a  cargo  of  African  produce  for  Hamburg ; 
but  on  arrival  at  Sierra  Leone,  the  master  (Mr.  C.  H. 
Jones)  received  orders  to  proceed  to  Liverpool,  war 
having  broken  out.  The  Nyanga  was  about  230  miles 
south-west  of  Cape  Blanco,  being  to  the  eastward  of  the 
usual  track,  when  the  German  cruiser  was  reported  about 
seven  miles  on  her  port  bow,  drawing  in.  A  short  time 
afterwards  the  Nyanga  was  ordered  to  stop,  and,  after 
the  preliminary  inquiries  had  been  answered  by  signal, 
a  boarding-party  instructed  the  officers  and  crew  to  collect 
their  belongings  and  proceed  on  board  the  KAISER 
WILHELM  DER  GROSSE.  »The  sea-cocks  were  opened,  the 
condenser  covers  removed,  and  the  Nyanga  was  then 
sunk  by  means  of  a  dynamite  charge,  which  blew  the 
ship's  side  out.1 

While  the  KAISER  WILHELM  DER  GROSSE  was  operating, 
with  small  results,  in  the  south-east  Atlantic,  the  German 
cruiser  KARLSRUHE,  the  whereabouts  of  which  had  been  for 
some  time  the  subject  of  anxiety  to  the  Admiralty,  was 
busy  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  West  Indies,  afterwards 
reaching  out  to  South  American  waters.  Elaborate 
arrangements  had  been  made  to  insure  adequate  supplies 
of  coal  and  stores,  tenders  being  placed  under  orders  to 
meet  the  warship  as  directed  from  time  to  time.  The 
cruise  of  the  KARLSRUHE  stands  out  from  the  history  of 
the  warfare  on  commerce  as  a  notable  success  achieved 
by  a  weak  sea  power  in  face  of  superior  force.  After 

1  The  crews  of  the  Kaipara  and  Nyanga  were  sent  off  in  the  German 
tender  Arucas  before  the  action  with  the  HIGHFLYER  and  landed  at  Las 
Palmas  on  August  28th. 


CH.  in]         THE   •'  KARLSRUHE'S "   CAREER  153 

escaping  from  Rear- Admiral  Cradock's  squadron  in  the 
West  Indies  on  August  6th,  she  revealed  her  presence  to 
the  east  of  Barbadoes  on  August  18th.  The  steamship 
Bowes  Castle  (4,650  tons),  of  the  Lancashire  Shipping 
Company,  had  left  Montevideo  for  New  York  on  the  very 
day  war  was  declared.  Three  days  later  the  ship  was 
stopped  by  the  British  cruiser  GLASGOW  and  warned 
that,  as  war  had  broken  out,  she  should  proceed  direct 
to  New  York,  avoiding  the  usual  course  and  screening 
lights.  On  noticing  a  warship  of  unknown  nationality 
at  sea,  about  ten  miles  away  on  the  port  bow,  the 
master  of  the  Bowes  Castle  (Mr.  E.  Howe)  apparently 
thought  little  of  the  incident,  and  proceeded  on  his 
course.  The  strange  ship,  however,  gradually  drew  in, 
and  at  length  fired  a  shot  as  a  warning  to  the  Bowes 
Castle  to  stop.  This  signal  was  immediately  complied 
with,  and  it  was  then  found  that  the  stranger  was 
the  KARLSRUHE.  The  usual  routine  with  which  other 
masters  had  already  become  familiar  was  then  followed. 
The  crew  was  sent  on  board  the  supply  ship  Patagonia, 
and  the  Bowes  Castle  was  sunk  by  explosive  charges. 
The  Patagonia,  with  her  involuntary  passengers,  subse- 
quently followed  the  movements  of  the  KARLSRUHE, 
and  on  the  21st  the  two  ships  anchored  off  Maraca  Island, 
at  the  mouth  of  the  River  Amazon,  and  the  cruiser  pro- 
ceeded to  coal  from  the  Patagonia.  Six  days  later  the 
British  seamen  were  transferred  to  another  of  the  KARLS- 
RUHE'S attendant  ships,  the  collier  Stadt  Schleswig,  and 
were  eventually  landed  at  Maranham  on  September  2nd. 
The  German  cruiser's  bunkers  having  been  filled,  she 
resumed  her  career  of  commerce  destruction.  On 
the  evening  of  August  31st,  at  5  p.m.,  she  fell  in  with  the 
steamship  Strathroy  (4,336  tons)  120  miles  N.N.E.  of  Cape 
St.  Roque.  This  Glasgow-owned  vessel  was  a  valuable 
prize,  as  she  was  carrying  a  large  cargo  of  coal  from  Nor- 
folk, Virginia,  to  Rio  de  Janeiro.  She  left  the  former 
port  on  August  15th.  The  Strathroy  was  overhauled 
by  the  warship  and  ordered  to  follow  her  to  the  lee  side 
of  Rocas  Island,  where  anchor  was  cast  about  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  from  the  shore.  An  armed  guard  then 
proceeded  on  board  the  Strathroy  and  took  possession  of 
her,  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  the  master  (Mr.  J.  Mason), 
who  urged  that  the  ship  was  in  neutral  waters.  The 


154  CRUISER  ATTACKS   ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  m 

officer  in  command  of  the  guard  disregarded  this  plea. 
Possibly  in  a  spirit  of  bluff,  he  explained  that  the  enemy 
had  learnt  of  the  ship's  departure  from  Norfolk,  and 
that  her  coal  was  badly  needed,  adding  that  he  could 
not  let  legal  trifles  stand  in  his  way  when  the  success 
of  the  cruiser's  operations  was  at  stake.  All  the  crew, 
with  the  exception  of  some  Chinamen,  who  were  retained 
to  transfer  a  portion  of  the  coal  to  the  KARLSRUHE,  were 
ordered  to  leave  the  ship,  which  was  taken  away  and  sunk 
some  days  later  when  she  had  served  the  enemy's  purpose. 

Her  bunkers  replenished,'  the  KARLSRUHE  again  put 
to  sea  and  overhauled  the  s.s.  Maple  Branch  (4,338  tons), 
on  passage  from  Liverpool  to  Punta  Arenas,  Chile.  Al- 
though the  Maple  Branch  carried  a  valuable  cargo  of  2,000 
tons  and  prize  cattle  stated  to  be  worth  £4,0.00,  the  ship 
was  destroyed  without  compunction,  the  master  and  crew 
being  removed  to  the  Crefeld,  of  Bremen,  which  was  in 
company  with  the  KARLSRUHE.  For  service  as  scouts, 
the  captain  of  the  KARLSRUHE  kept  in  attendance  on 
him  two  other  vessels,  the  Rio  Negro  and  Asuncion,  both 
being  fitted  with  wireless,  thus  facilitating  their  use  for 
intelligence  purposes.  Provided  with  eyes  and  ears,  the 
KARLSRUHE  remained  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Pernam- 
buco,  where  she  had  already  done  so  well,  and  in  the 
second  fortnight  of  September  added  four  more  large 
ships  to  her  list  of  captures — the  Highland  Hope  (5,150 
tons),  the  Indrani  (5,706  tons) ;  the  Cornish  City  (3,816 
tons) ;  and  the  Rio  Iguassu  (3,817  tons).  All  these  ships, 
except  the  Indrani,  which,  under  the  name  of  Hoffnung, 
joined  the  KARLSRUHE'S  force  of  supply  ships,  were  sunk. 

When  the  Germans  boarded  the  Highland  Hope,  Lieu- 
tenant Shrovder,  with  his  armed  party  standing  behind 
him,  confronted  the  British  captain  in  his  cabin.  He  de- 
manded in  a  peremptory  manner  why  the  Highland  Hope 
had  not  stopped  when  requested  to  do  so ;  his  displeasure 
probably  was  not  lessened  by  an  arresting  caricature 
of  the  Kaiser  which  could  hardly  have  escaped  his  notice. 
He  was  so  incensed  that  he  threatened  to  have  the  master 
(Mr.  J.  B.  Thompson)  taken  to  the  cruiser  and  put  in 
irons.  This  intention  was  not,  however,  carried  out,  but 
officers  and  men  were  directed  to  get  their  personal 
belongings  together,  and  in  the  meantime  the  German 
seamen  rummaged  the  ship,  eating  anything  they  could 


CH.  in]  A  SUCCESSION   OF  PRIZES  155 

lay  their  hands  on.  The  transfer  to  the  Crefeld  was  not 
effected  without  difficulty,  and  the  engineer,  weighing 
about  seventeen  stone,  in  climbing  up  the  rope  ladder 
while  the  ship  was  rising  and  falling  in  the  swell,  fell 
back  on  the  captain,  who  was  attempting  to  help  him. 
The  British  seamen  joined  on  board  this  German  vessel 
the  captured  crews  of  the  Straihroy  and  the  Maple 
Branch.  The  men  fairly  took  charge  of  the  ship,  all 
hands  singing,  "  It's  a  long  way  to  Tipper ary."  Thus 
these  brothers  in  misfortune  began  their  enforced  cruise 
in  the  Crefeld.  The  cruiser  remained  stationary  while 
the  Crefeld  steamed  to  the  west  and  the  Rio  Negro 
steamed  to  the  east,  at  distances  enabling  them  to  keep 
in  visual  touch  with  the  cruiser.  Owing  to  the  clear 
atmosphere  and  the  crow's  nests  at  the  mastheads,  the 
enemy  covered  a  field  with  a  front  of  about  140  miles. 
On  the  17th  the  Indrani  l  was  captured,  and  then  the 
scouting  was  resumed.  On  the  21st  the  Dutch  steamer 
Maria,  laden  with  wheat,  from  Portland,  Oregon,  for 
Belfast  and  Dublin,  was  captured.8  The  crew,  consisting 
of  a  motley  crowd  of  Greeks,  Chilians,  and  Arabs,  had  little 
time  to  make  their  final  preparations  ;  some  of  them 
arrived  on  board  the  Crefeld  in  hard  hats  and  wearing 
their  best  suits  ;  others  had  no  shirts  or  singlets,  and  were 
without  stockings.  Some  of  the  firemen  had  been  called 
straight  from  the  stokehold,  and  were  black  with  grime. 
These  men,  like  those  of  the  Indrani,  were  greeted  on 
board  with  the  singing  of  "  It's  a  long  way  to  Tipperary," 
and  were  then  submitted  to  close  questioning  to  learn  the 
latest  news  of  the  progress  of  the  war. 

A  further  interesting  sidelight  on  the  procedure  followed 
by  the  KARLSRUHE  is  furnished  by  the  master  of  the 
Cornish  City  (Mr.  J.  Bethke),  who,  together  with  his  crew, 
was  taken  on  board  the  Rio  Negro,  where  they  were 
"  received  with  all  friendliness"  : 

"  By  this  time  the  cruiser's  crew  were  busy  connecting 
fuses,  etc.,  from  the  ship  to  the  cruiser  ready  for  blowing 
up  the  Cornish  City.  The  sea-cocks  had  already  been 

1  Master,-  Mr.  N.  B.  Pilcher. 

a  The  Maria  left  Punta  Arenas  with  a  cargo  of  wheat  for  Belfast  and 
Dublin.  She  was  sailing  under  the  Dutch  flag,  and  was  subsequently 
condemned  by  the  German  Prize  Court  on  the  plea  that  Belfast,  the  first 
port  of  destination,  had  been  declared  a  naval  harbour  on  August  14th. 


!56  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON  SHIPPING        [CH.  ui 

opened,  and  already  the  steamer  could  be  seen  to  settle 
down  slowly.  About  this  time  we  were  joined  by  another 
German  steamer,  the  Crefeld,  who,  we  were  told,  had 
already  on  board  five  British  crews  of  steamers  that  had 
been  captured  and  sunk.  Only  the  same  morning  she 
had  taken  a  crew  off  a  steamer  which  was  found  to  be 
carrying  contraband,  and  therefore  sunk.  All  our  crew 
were  standing  about  the  deck  waiting  to  see  the  last  of 
the  Cornish  City,  but  only  a  small  hole  two  feet  square 
had  been  blown  into  her,  and  she  took  a  long  time  to  sink, 
and  when  she  did  finally  take  her  last  dive  it  was  too  dark 
to  see  anything  of  her.  She  sank  at  7.35  p.m.  At  9  p.m. 
the  cruiser  KARLSRUHE  proceeded  again,  followed  by  the 
Crefeld  and  the  Rio  Negro,  steaming  to  the  southward. 
As  I  have  already  said,  we  were  received  with  the  utmost 
kindness  on  board  the  Rio  Negro  and  made  as  comfortable 
as  possible.  This  steamer  is  a  passenger  boat  fitted  to 
carry  60  first-class  and  200  second-class  passengers.  We 
were  all  given  first-class  berths,  with  the  exception  of  the 
sailors  and  firemen,  who  were  put  into  the  third-class.  Far 
from  being  regarded  as  prisoners  of  war,  we  were  treated 
like  first-class  passengers  throughout,  everybody  on  board 
combining  to  make  us  comfortable. 

"  September  22nd. — On  this  day,  at  5  a.m.,  the  cruisers 
stopped  an  Italian  and  an  Austrian  steamer,  but,  after 
being  examined,  they  were  allowed  to  proceed.  At  7  a.m. 
another  steamer  was  sighted ;  this  turned  out  to  be  the 
Rio  Iguassu,1  a  British  steamer  loaded  with  coal.  She 
was  stopped  and  examined  and  the  crew  told  to  clear  out. 
But  just  then  a  Swedish  steamer  came  along,  and  she  must 
have  given  the  cruiser  some  information  about  a  British 
cruiser,  for  a  few  minutes  later  we  were  all  under  way  again, 
followed  by  the  Rio  Iguassu,  and  steering  due  west  to 
get  clear  of  the  track.  As  in  the  case  of  the  Cornish  City, 
these  steamers  were  held  up  right  in  the  usual  shipping 
track,  where  at  any  moment  a  British  cruiser  might  have 
turned  up.  We  steamed  west  until  1  p.m.,  when  a  stop 
was  made  and  the  cruiser  went  alongside  the  Rio  Iguassu 
to  bunker.  Owing  to  the  heavy  swell,  she  found  this  to 
be  impossible,  and  she  cast  off  again  at  2  p.m.,  after  which 
a  crowd  of  marines  were  sent  on  board  to  take  off  any 
provisions.  Several  boat-loads  were  taken  away,  and  then 
1  Master,  Mr.  George  Johnstone. 


CH.  m]  SIX   CAPTURED   CREWS  157 

she  too  was  made  ready  to  be  blown  up.  The  crew  were 
transferred  to  the  Crefeld.  Her  sea-cocks  were  opened, 
and  at  5  p.m.  she  began  to  settle  down  by  the  stern.  At 
5.30  p.m.  a  hole  was  blown  in  her,  and  now  she  seemed  to 
be  heeling  over  to  port  rapidly.  We  had  a  good  view  of 
this  steamer,  and  could  see  her  going  over  all  the  time. 
At  6  p.m.  she  suddenly  turned  right  over  on  her  beam 
ends,  and  then,  with  a  noise  like  a  last  groan,  disappeared 
beneath  the  water  head  first.  It  was  a  pitiful  sight  to  see 
a  good  ship  like  that  destroyed,  and  it  made  us  wish  that 
a  British  cruiser  would  come  along  and  put  a  stop  to  this 
ruthless  and  absolutely  useless  destruction  of  British 
merchant  ships.  However,  we  were  helpless  in  this  matter, 
and  must  put  up  with  it.  This  evening  we  passed  in 
the  saloon  playing  cards,  draughts,  and  chess,  with  the 
officers  of  this  steamer,  and  we  had  a  very  pleasant  time. 
We  are  now  beginning  to  wonder  what  they  intend  to  do 
with  us,  and  when  and  where  we  are  likely  to  be  landed.  The 
worst  trouble  is  that  there  is  no  means  of  letting  our  families 
know  what  has  happened,  and  we  are  afraid  that  if  we  do 
not  arrive  at  Rio  by  next  Monday  or  Tuesday  they  will 
begin  to  wonder,  and  of  course  at  once  imagine  the  worst. 
We  hope  now  that  the  Crefeld,  having  six  crews  on  board, 
must  be  nearly  full,  and  that  they  will  therefore  transfer 
us  to  her  and  send  us  in  to  one  of  the  Brazilian  ports. 

"  September  23rd. — Nothing  of  any  consequence  occurred 
to-day.  The  cruiser  and  her  two  consorts  are  cruising 
about  all  day  looking  for  any  foreign  steamers,  but  none 
are  to  be  seen.  A  masthead  lookout  is  being  kept  on  board 
the  steamer  continuously  day  and  night.  We  are  hoping 
a  British  cruiser  will  come  along  soon,  but  it  looks  as  if 
we  were  fixed  here  for  some  time  to  come.  We  are  passing 
our  time  playing  shuffleboard  on  deck  in  daytime,  and  cards 
or  chess  in  the  cabin  at  nights.  The  captain  and  the 
second  mate  are  the  only  deck  officers  left  on  board  here 
now,  and  they  are  keeping  an  hour  watch,  as  the  chief 
mate  and  the  third  mate  were  left  in  charge  of  a  British 
steamer  in  some  port  on  the  African  coast,  where  they 
are  waiting  ready  to  coal  the  cruiser  if  she  should  run  short 
of  bunkers.  I  can't  find  out  the  name  of  this  steamer, 
but  I  have  heard  it  is  one  of  the  Wilson  liners.  The  crew 
of  her  are  on  board  the  Crefeld. 

"  September  24>th. — Everybody  is  beginning  to  feel  pretty 


158  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  in 

sick  at  being  held  up  like  this,  as  there  seems  no  chance 
of  our  being  set  ashore  anywhere  for  some  time.  We  are 
still  being  treated  as  well  as  we  could  wish,  but  the  time 
hangs  heavily  on  our  hands,  and  we  want  to  be  on  our 
way  home  again.  Even  this  steamer's  crew  wish  a  British 
cruiser  would  come  along  and  capture  us,  as  they  have 
been  out  here  cruising  around  for  the  last  seven  weeks, 
and  they  begin  to  get  tired  of  it,  and  they  think,  if  a  British 
cruiser  would  capture  us,  she  would  send  them  all  home. 
This  afternoon  the  news  got  around  that  the  KARLSRUHE 
is  only  looking  for  one  more  capture  before  sending  us 
all  to  Para,  and  nothing  would  suit  us  better  if  it  were 
only  true.  But  I  am  afraid  things  will  be  pretty  bad  at 
Para  too,  and  we  shall  have  a  good  deal  of  trouble  to  get 
home  from  there.  Well,  we  are  hoping  for  the  best,  and 
if  we  have  to  stay  here  for  a  month  or  so  we  shall  be  half 
dead  with  ennui. 

"  September  25th. — This  seems  to  be  a  day  of  rest,  as 
the  cruiser  and  her  two  escorts  are  lying  still  and  not 
moving  through  the  water  for  once.  It  appears  that  the 
former  is  cleaning  out  some  of  her  boilers.  Our  boats 
have  been  over  to  her  several  times  to-day  taking  pro- 
visions, such  as  flour,  beef,  and  sugar,  and  have  brought 
back  an  injured  sailor  for  attendance  by  the  doctor.  Of 
course,  they  have  a  surgeon  on  board  the  cruiser,  but  I 
take  it  they  wish  to  keep  their  hospitals  clear,  and  have  no 
sick  people  on  board,  in  case  they  should  have  to  fight. 

44  September  26th. — The  three  of  us  are  still  lying  motion- 
less in  the  same  place,  apparently  while  the  cruiser  is 
executing  repairs.  I  wish  I  could  find  out  our  where- 
abouts, but  the  movements  are  kept  very  close.  I  think 
we  should  be  very  near  the  Rocas  and  to  the  westward 
of  them,  as  we  have  been  steering  to  the  westward  since 
we  left  the  track.  The  time  passes  very  slowly  with  us 
all,  and  we  shall  be  glad  when  they  land  us. 

44  Sunday,  September  27th. — This  is  the  first  Sunday 
we  have  spent  as  prisoners  of  war,  and  we  earnestly  hope 
it  will  be  the  last,  and  that  before  next  Sunday  we  shall 
all  have  been  landed  at  some  port  where  we  shall  be  able 
to  get  a  steamer  for  home.  We  have  been  lying  idle  all 
the  morning  again,  but  at  2  p.m.  we  commenced  to  steam 
again,  taking  a  course  to  the  southward.  I  heard  there 
was  a  steamer  in  some  port  on  the  South  American  coast, 


CH.  m]  ANXIOUS   PRISONERS  159 

or  rather  in  some  unfrequented  bay,  where  we  are  to  go 
to  coal  the  cruiser.  This  may  be  true  or  not ;  we  hear 
so  many  tales  that  we  can't  tell  which  to  believe.  If  it 
is  true,  we  should  reach  the  coast  some  time  to-morrow — 
that  is,  if  I  am  right  in  my  approximate  position  of  the 
ship.  We  are  now  twenty-four  days  out  from  home,  and 
to-morrow  the  owners  will  be  expecting  to  hear  of  our  arrival 
at  Rio  de  Janeiro.  It's  not  likely  they  will  have  heard  of 
our  capture,  but  if  they  don't  hear  by  Wednesday  they  will 
probably  imagine  something  of  the  sort.  I  wish  it  were 
possible  to  let  them  know  about  our  being  safe,  because 
our  people  will  be  sure  to  begin  inquiring  of  the  owners, 
and  if  they  can't  hear  anything  definite  about  us  they  will 
begin  to  worry  about  our  safety.  But  we  must  wait 
until  we  get  to  some  port  from  where  I  can  cable  home. 
Let's  hope  that  it  won't  be  too  long  to  wait. 

"  September  28th. — We  kept  steaming  all  this  morning 
to  the  southward,  and  at  10  a.m.  stopped,  and  the  three 
ships  spread  out  so  that  each  ship  was  just  within  sight 
of  one  of  the  others.  This  looked  as  if  we  were  looking 
for  something,  and  sure  enough,  at  2  a.m.,  we  met  another 
German  steamer,  the  Asuncion,  of  this  same  company. 
Until  5  p.m.  she  kept  in  constant  communication  with 
the  cruiser  and  the  Crefeld,  and  then  she  again  steamed 
away  the  same  way  she  had  come.  We  then  remained 
stationary  for  the  remainder  of  the  day  and  part  of  the 
night. 

44  September  2Qth. — In  the  early  morning  of  this  day  we 
again  began  to  steam,  but  this  time  to  the  south-east, 
and  proceeded  until  2  p.m.,  when  we  were  again  joined  by 
two  other  steamers.  One  of  these  steamers  had  the  prize 
crew  of  the  Strathroy  on  board.  She  (the  KARLSRUHE)  had 
taken  the  last  of  the  coal  out  of  her,  and  then,  after 
taking  the  prize  crew  off,  had  scuttled  her.  The  Strathroy 
is  another  British  steamer  the  Germans  had  captured 
and  hid  away  in  one  of  the  many  unfrequented  bays  on 
the  North  Brazilian  coast,  to  wait  until  her  cargo  of 
coal  would  be  wanted.  Her  original  crew  is  on  the 
Crefeld  now.  At  3  p.m.  the  cruiser  and  the  two  strangers 
steamed  away,  leaving  the  Crefeld  and  ourselves  here  to 
wait  for  orders. 

"September  30th. — This  day  has  been  a  very  gloomy 
one  for  everyone  on  board,  and  has  left  everyone  feeling 

12 


160  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON  SHIPPING        [CH.  m 

pretty  miserable.  At  7  o'clock  this  morning,  whilst  some 
beef  and  potatoes  were  being  sent  over  from  our  ship  to 
the  Crefeld,  the  boat  capsized  and  all  the  provisions  were 
spilt  into  the  sea.  This  happened  while  the  boat  was  being 
lowered  into  the  water,  so  that,  luckily,  no  men  were  in  her 
and  no  lives  were  lost.  At  10  a.m.  the  ship's  doctor  was 
found  dead  in  his  room  next  to  mine.  He  had  been  com- 
plaining for  a  long  time  about  a  severe  pain  in  his  chest, 
but  no  one  dreamt  that  he  was  seriously  ill,  because  he 
always  used  to  be  about  joking  and  playing  with  everyone. 
It  appears,  however,  that  he  had  been  unable  to  sleep 
at  nights  for  some  time,  and  was  in  the  habit  of  taking 
morphia  to  induce  sleep,  and,  his  heart  being  weak,  it  was 
unable  to  stand  it.  When  he  was  found  he  had  not  been 
dead  for  more  than  half  an  hour  or  so,  but  although  the 
doctor  from  the  Crefeld  came  over  at  once,  he  was  not  able 
to  do  anything.  We  buried  him  at  5  p.m.,  his  body  being 
laid  in  a  teak  wood  coffin  and,  covered  with  a  German  flag, 
lowered  into  the  sea.  We  feel  awfully  sorry  for  him,  be- 
cause he  was  a  well-to-do  man  who  only  came  to  sea  for 
the  benefit  of  his  health,  and  was  kept  at  sea  owing  to 
the  war. 

"  October  1st. — At  daylight  we  were  joined  again  by  the 
Asuncion,  and  she  remained  with  us  all  day.  We  were 
continually  steaming  at  about  half-speed  all  day,  waiting 
for  the  cruiser  to  return,  but  all  we  saw  were  one  or  two 
merchant  vessels,  who  got  away  all  right,  as  there  was  no 
one  to  chase  them.  We  are  all  longing  to  hear  some  news 
from  home,  and  how  the  war  is  getting  on.  Yesterday 
the  doctor  and  the  mate  of  the  Crefeld  told  us  that  the 
Germans  had  taken  Paris  and  had  driven  the  Russians 
out  of  East  Prussia  altogether,  but,  of  course,  we  don't 
know  how  much  of  this  is  true. 

"  October  2nd. — At  9  o'clock  this  morning  we  sighted 
the  cruiser,  accompanied  by  another  large  steamer,  coming 
towards  us.  This  steamer  turned  out  to  be  the  Indrani, 
of  Liverpool.  She  is  a  large  cargo  steamer,  and  was  cap- 
tured by  these  people  some  weeks  ago.  Laden  with 
coal,  she  had  been  kept  out  of  the  way  somewhere  as  a 
collier  for  the  cruiser,  and  a  new  name  painted  on  her  bows, 
the  Hoffnung.  I  suppose,  after  bunkering  out  of  her, 
the  cruiser  brought  her  back  to  act  as  a  kind  of  scout 
for  us,  for  after  getting  under  way  for  the  track  again, 


CH.  m]  "A  KIND  OF  HOTEL  LIFE'*  161 

about  noon,  the  Asuncion  steamed  away  to  the  northward, 
while  the  Indrani  went  to  the  southward,  both  steamers 
keeping  just  within  sight  on  the  horizon.  To-day  we  heard 
that  a  big  battle  has  been  won  by  the  Germans  against 
the  British  Fleet,  where  the  former  are  supposed  to  have 
lost  twenty-five  torpedo-boats,  while  the  losses  of  the 
British  were  ninety  torpedo-boats  and  six  Dreadnoughts 
and  cruisers.  I  suspect  these  news  are  like  all  the  war  news 
we  get  here,  specially  got  up  to  cheer  the  hearts  of  the 
Germans,  and  we  don't  take  much  notice  of  them.  We 
are  now  cruising  around  looking  for  other  harmless  mer- 
chant vessels  to  sink  ;  wish  we  could  run  against  the 
GLASGOW  or  some  other  British  cruiser,  to  put  an  end  to 
this  destruction  of  British  ships  and  send  us  home.  There 
has  been  no  more  talk  as  to  when  we  are  likely  to  be  trans- 
ferred and  sent  into  a  neutral  port,  so  we  have  to  just 
sit  and  wait. 

"  October  3rd. — Nothing  of  any  consequence  occurred 
to-day.  The  cruiser  and  her  consorts  were  steaming  due 
east  again  until  5  p.m.,  when  she  stopped  for  the  night, 
apparently  near  the  track.  Of  the  Asuncion  and  the 
Hoffnung  we  have  seen  nothing  all  day ;  they  have  prob- 
ably gone  back  to  shelter. 

"  October  4th. — This  is  the  second  Sunday  since  we 
came  on  board  here,  and  everyone  wishes  they  were  at 
home  instead.  As  far  as  comfort  is  concerned,  we  have 
nothing  to  complain  about ;  we  have  first-class  cabins 
and  are  having  splendid  food ;  in  fact,  are  living  a  kind  of 
hotel  life,  with  nothing  to  do  save  eat,  sleep,  and  drink. 
There  is  no  doubt  we  are  a  jolly  sight  better  off  than  the 
crews  on  board  the  Crefeld.  Exclusive  of  her  own  crew, 
there  are  now  six  other  crews,  of  steamers  that  have  been 
sunk,  on  board  her,  in  all  about  200  people.  She  is  so 
crowded  that  we  have  heard  the  captains  and  officers 
have  to  have  their  meals  on  deck ;  and  as  she  is  only  fitted 
out  for  forty  first-class  passengers,  a  good  few  of  them  have 
to  sleep  in  the  steerage.  Besides  this,  she  has  no  refri- 
gerating machinery,  being  a  much  older  ship  than  this, 
so  that  they  have  to  live  on  salt  provisions  practically. 
Once  or  twice  a  week  we  send  some  fresh  beef  over  to 
her  from  this  ship,  and  a  few  potatoes,  but  that, is  all. 
Now  we  are  getting  everything  of  the  very  best — fresh 
provisions  and  fresh  fruit  every  day,  and  can  have  as 


162  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON  SHIPPING        [CH.  in 

much  beer  as  we  want.  So  we  really  have  nothing 
much  to  complain  about;  but  we  wish  to  get  home, 
and  even  good  living  does  not  make  up  for  that.  We 
are  in  the  track  again  now  looking  for  ships,  but  there 
do  not  seem  to  be  any  about.  The  three  ships  are  lying 
scattered  all  day,  but  before  dark  they  are  all  close 
together  and  lie  all  night.  The  weather  is  keeping  very 
warm  and  fine. 

44  October  5th. — Still  lying  scattered  looking  for  ships, 
the  three  ships  just  within  sight  of  one  another.  At 
4  p.m.  the  cruiser  sighted  something,  for  she  was  off  in 
chase  of  some  steamer,  ourselves  following  at  full  speed. 
At  6  o'clock  the  cruiser  caught  her  quarry  and  stopped  her, 
but  we  did  not  get  up  to  her  until  7  p.m.,  and  by  this  time 
it  was  too  dark  to  see  who  the  steamer  was.  She  seemed  a 
large  boat,  and  must  have  been  either  English  or  French, 
but  the  crew  was  transferred  to  the  Crefeld  and  a  prize 
crew  put  on  board  to  take  charge.  We  heard  she  was 
laden  with  coal,  so  they  probably  intend  to  keep  her 
for  bunkering  purposes  like  the  Indrani.  At  midnight 
she  steamed  away,  leaving  the  cruiser  and  her  two  escorts 
behind,  and  we  stopped  where  we  were  all  night.  I 
wonder  if  they  will  transfer  us  now  and  send  us  in  to  be 
landed;  as  I  mentioned  some  time  ago,  there  has  been 
some  talk  of  the  Crefeld  being  nearly  full  of  prisoners, 
and  that  as  soon  as  one  more  steamer  was  caught  and 
captured,  we  should  be  transferred  to  her  and  the  lot  of 
us  sent  to  be  landed  at  a  South  American  port.  I  only 
hope  it  will  turn  out  to  be  true. 

"  October  6th. — This  morning  we  heard  that  the  steamer 
caught  last  night  was  the  JParn,1  outward  bound  from 
Cardiff.  We  had  expected  that  she  might  have  some  news 
about  the  war,  but  if  she  had  it  has  been  suppressed,  and 
we  have  heard  nothing.  The  crew  may  have  been  able 
to  tell  us  something,  but,  as  I  have  said,  they  have  been 
sent  to  the  Crefeld.  We  were  cruising  around  again  this 
morning  looking  for  steamers,  and  at  3  p.m.  one  was  sighted 

1  After  her  capture  the  Farn  (4,393  tons ;  master,  Mr.  G.  T.  Alleyne) 
put  into  San  Juan  (Porto  Rico)  on  January  llth,  1915,  under  the 
command  of  a  lieutenant  taken  out  of  the  cruiser  KARLSRUHE,  her 
mission  being  to  obtain  'provisions.  The  State  Department  at  Washington 
declared  that  she  was  to  be  regarded  as  a  naval  tender,  and  twenty-four 
hours  were  given  for  her  to  leave.  At  the  end  of  that  period  the  vessel 
was  interned. 


CH.  in]   THE  OVERCROWDED  "  CREFELD  "     163 

steering  to  the  north-eastwards.  She  turned  out  to  be  the 
Niceto  de  Larrinaga, l  of  Liverpool,  homeward  bound  from 
the  River  Plate  with  a  cargo  of  foodstuffs.  She  was  sighted 
from  this  ship  first,  and  the  signal  given  to  the  cruiser,  who 
at  once  set  off  in  chase.  At  5  p.m.  we  came  up  with  her, 
a  boat  from  the  cruiser  boarded  her,  and  a  little  afterwards 
we  could  see  all  the  crew  getting  ready  to  leave  the  ship. 
She  is  a  fine  steamer  and  looked  nearly  new,  but  of  course, 
being  laden  with  grain,  she  was  of  no  use  to  the  cruiser, 
and  had  to  be  sunk.  It  is  a  shame  to  see  so  many  fine 
steamers  sunk,  but  so  long  as  no  British  cruisers  come  here 
to  put  a  stop  to  it,  they  will  no  doubt  continue.  A  lot 
of  time  was  taken  up  taking  stores  out  of  the  ship  for  the 
cruiser,  especially  potatoes,  of  which  these  ships  are  run- 
oing  short.  At  9  p.m.  the  steamer  began  to  settle,  but  the 
hole  blown  into  her  must  have  been  very  small,  for  she  was 
a  long  time  going  down,  taking  a  list  first  one  way  and  then 
the  other.  She  settled  down  bodily  until  her  engine- 
room  skylight  was  awash,  after  which  she  went  down  by 
the  head.  I  suppose  her  cargo  helped  to  keep  her  afloat, 
because  it  was  2  p.m.  when  at  last  she  took  her  last 
dive. 

"  October  7th. — This  morning  we  could  still  see  a  lot  of 
wreckage  floating  around  belonging  to  the  steamer  sunk 
last  night,  such  as  boats,  spars,  and  boxes.  At  8  a.m.  two 
other  steamers  were  seen,  and  the  cruiser  set  off  after 
one  of  them,  ourselves  following  him.  The  other  steamer, 
of  course,  managed  to  get  away,  so  she  had  something  to  be 
thankful  for,  because  if  the  two  of  them  had  not  happened 
to  be  seen  together,  at  the  same  time,  both  of  them  would 
have  been  caught.  The  one  we  followed  was  the  Lyn- 
rott'an,8  of  Liverpool,  also  homeward  bound  from  the  River 
Plate,  and  laden  with  sugar,  oats,  etc.  She  also  was 
condemned  and  the  crew  transferred  to  the  Crefeld,  like 
the  crew  of  the  steamer  caught  last  night.  Among  her 
crew  were  two  ladies,  and  I  was  surprised  they  were  taken 
to  the  Crefeld,  because  that  steamer  must  be  getting  pretty 
overcrowded  with  all  her  '  prisoners  of  war.'  She  must 
have  at  least  300  on  board  now,  and,  seeing  that  this 
steamer  is  bigger  and  better  than  she  is,  it  seems  strange 
that  they  should  overcrowd  her  like  that  and  leave  this 

1  Niceto  de  Larrinaga  (5,018  tons;  master,  Mr.  R  F  Nagle). 
1  Lynrowan  (3,384  tons ;  master,  Mr.  Arthur  Jones). 


164  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON  SHIPPING       [CH.  in 

steamer  with  only  one  ship's  crew  on  board.  As  far  as 
we  are  concerned,  we  should  welcome  some  new  arrivals, 
for  we  may  get  some  fresh  news  from  them,  but  I  suppose 
they  have  their  reasons  for  putting  all  the  people  on  board 
there.  Each  of  the  three  steamers  took  a  couple  of  boat- 
loads of  sugar  out  of  the  ship,  and  at  11  a.m.  all  the  crew 
were  away  and  the  ship  ready  for  sinking.  We  did  not 
get  a  chance  to  see  her  sink  at  close  quarters,  because 
both  the  Crefeld  and  the  Rio  Negro — that  is,  ourselves — 
were  ordered  away  to  look  for  other  steamers.  However, 
we  could  see  from  a  distance  that  the  cruiser  was  using 
her  for  target  practice,  and  was  shooting  at  her.  She 
sank  at  2  p.m. — this  is  now  two  ships  sunk  within 
three  days,  and  another  one  captured  and  detained,  and 
it  seems  strange  to  us  that  this  should  be  allowed  to  go  on. 
Surely  long  before  this  the  news  must  have  reached  home, 
if  not  definitely,  still,  so  many  ships  being  so  long  overdue 
must  have  given  them  some  idea  of  what  is  going  on  here. 
And  yet  the  track  is  said  to  be  clear — clear  of  British  ship- 
ping ;  it  will  be  before  long  if  this  goes  on  much  longer. 
We  hear  that  there  are  some  British  cruisers  on  the  South 
American  coast,  and  indeed  there  must  be,  for  so  many  ships 
to  get  as  far  as  this  in  safety  only  to  be  caught  here ;  but 
it  is  sure  enough  there  is  no  British  cruiser  anywhere 
around  here,  or  it  could  not  help  spotting  us,  for  we  seldom 
go  far  off  the  track. 

44  October  8th. — At  6  a.m.  a  steamer  was  sighted,  and  the 
cruiser  set  off  in  chase  of  her,  bringing  her  up  about  8  a.m. 
She  turned  out  to  be  the  s.s.  Cervantes,1  of  Liverpool, 
bound  from  the  West  Coast  to  Liverpool.  Crew  was 
ordered  off  the  ship ;  the  cruiser  took  a  lot  of  provisions 
off,  and  a  hole  was  blown  into  her.  At  11  a.m.  she  began 
to  sink.  We  were  then  ordered  away  to  scout,  and  at 
12.40  p.m.  saw  her  disappear  stern  first.  At  1  p.m.  our 
crew  received  orders  to  hold  ourselves  in  readiness  to  be 
transferred  to  the  s.s.  Crefeld.  All  this  afternoon  the  Rio 
Negro  was  away  scouting,  while  the  cruiser  and  the  Crefeld 
kept  close  together.  At  6  p.m.  closed  up  for  the  night. 

44  October  9th. — At  1  a.m.  another  steamer  was  sighted, 
and  stopped  by  a  shot  across  her  bows,  turning  out  to  be 
the  s.s.  Pruth,*  of  London,  on  a  voyage  from  the  West 

1  Cervantes  (4,635  tons;  master,  Mr.  E.  J.  Holton). 
a  Pruth  (4,408  tons;  master,  Mr.  J.  Evans). 


CH.  in]  THE   "  FARN  "   AS   A  DECOY  i65 

Coast  to  St.  Vincent  for  orders,  with  a  cargo  of  nitrate. 
Crew  ordered  to  leave  :  at  6  a.m.  crew  transferred  to  the 
s.s.  Crefeld,  and  at  8  a.m.  ourselves  were  ordered  to  be 
sent  across  to  the  same  steamer.  By  the  time  we  came 
on  board,  the  Pruth  was  abandoned,  and  fuses  fixed. 
Two  explosions  occurred,  one  at  10.30  a.m.  and  the  second 
at  10.45,  in  the  after  part  of  the  ship.  She  then  began 
to  settle  down  rapidly,  and  at  11.20  sank  stern  first. 
1  p.m.,  steaming  to  westward  for  scouting  purposes. 
At  4  p.m.  turned  to  east-south-east.  7.30  p.m.  we  joined  the 
cruiser  for  the  night.  (3  p.m.,  stopped  a  large  Spanish 
steamer  and  examined  her,  but  she  was  allowed  to  proceed 
homeward. ) 

"  October  10th. — At  3  a.m.  the  cruiser  stopped  and 
examined  an  Italian  steamer,  allowing  her  to  proceed 
at  4  a.m. ;  9.30  a.m.  the  Cre/eld  steamed  away  for  scouting 
purposes ;  5.45  rejoined  the  cruiser  and  the  s.s.  Rio 
Negro  and  set  a  westerly  course.  Continued  steaming  all 
night,  apparently  for  the  Rocas  Islands  to  bunker  the 
cruiser. 

"  October  llth. — Still  steaming  to  westward  at  full 
speed,  about  twelve  miles  per  hour.  We  are  finding  a 
great  difference  in  the  food  and  quarters  to  those  we  had 
on  the  Rio  Negro,  but  this  is  probably  due  to  the  great 
number  of  prisoners  of  war  and  the  fact  that  there  is  no 
refrigerating  machinery  on  board  here.  There  are  now 
about  389  people  on  board  here,  prisoners  of  war,  besides 
the  crew  belonging  to  this  steamer,  so  it  can  be  imagined 
that  the  ship  is  pretty  crowded.  5  p.m.  we  came  up 
to  the  Farn.  She  was  lying  in  company  with  a  British 
steamer,  the  Condor,1  bound  from  New  York  to  the  West 
Coast  with  a  general  cargo.  It  appears  that  she  found  the 
Farn  flying  the  British  flag,  and  signalled,  asking  the 
Condor  to  stand  by  her,  as  she  had  trouble  with  her  machin- 
ery. The  Farn  is,  of  course,  a  British  steamer  of  that 
name,  which  was  captured  on  October  5th  and  put  under 

1  The  s.s.  Condor  (3,053  tons ;  master,  Mr.  S.  Purdy)  constituted  some- 
what of  a  problem  for  the  captain  of  the  KARLSRUHE,  as  she  carried  a 
general  cargo  of  about  4,000  tons  belonging  to  neutrals.  At  first  it  was 
decided  that,  in  view  of  the  ownership  of  the  cargo,  the  ship  should  not 
be  sunk.  In  the  meantime,  the  work  of  discharging  such  goods  as  the 
KARLSRUHE  required  went  on  by  day  and  by  night  on  October  12th  and 
13th.  The  captain  of  the  KARLSRUHE  took  the  master  and  crew  out 
of  the  ship  later  on,  and  on  the  13th  they  left  in  the  Crefeld,  in  company 
with  the  other  British  seamen,  for  Tenerife. 


166  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  m 

the  German  flag.  She  knew  that  the  cruiser  was  due  to 
arrive  here,  and  tried  to  detain  the  Condor  so  that  she 
would  be  captured.  Anyway,  the  ruse  succeeded,  and  then 
the  cruiser  came  on  the  scene  just  in  time.  She  then 
boarded  her,  and  the  crew  was  ordered  to  leave  her.  She 
was  abandoned  at  8  p.m.,  and  the  steamer  kept  till  the 
morning,  to  allow  the  crew  of  the  cruiser  to  get  at  some 
of  the  cargo. 

"  October  12th. — The  cruiser  is  busy  all  this  morning 
getting  some  of  the  cargo  out  of  the  Condor.  She  has  a 
lot  of  oils  and  milk  among  her  cargo,  and  this  is  just 
what  the  cruiser  and  her  escorts  need.  Our  boats  are  help- 
ing her,  so  there  seems  no  chance  of  getting  away  to-day. 

"  October  I3th. — Boats  still  busy  this  morning  getting 
cargo  from  the  Condor.  11.30  a.m.,  heard  that  we  are 
to  leave  at  4  o'clock  this  afternoon.  4  p.m.,  cruiser 
hoisted  signals  L  E  X  &  T  D  L,  which  meant  4  Dismissed ; 
wish  you  a  pleasant  voyage.'  Began  our  homeward  jour- 
ney at  4.30  p.m.,  steering  to  the  north-eastward,  bound 
for  Tenerife." 

The  cruise  of  the  KARLSRUHE  was  nearing  its  end. 
Reports  of  the  destruction  she  was  spreading  had  already 
led  to  the  necessary  measures  being  taken  by  the  British 
naval  authorities  to  put  a  stop  to  her  career.  But  before 
the  end  came  she  effected  three  more  captures — the 
Glanton  (3,021  tons)  on  October  18th;  the  Hurstdale 
(2,752  tons)  on  the  23rd ;  and  the  Vandyck  (10,328  tons) 
on  the  26th,  the  last-named  being  captured  410  miles 
from  Cape  St.  Roque.  The  Glanton  (master,  Mr.  George 
Arthur)  had  shipped  a  cargo  of  coal  and  general  merchandise 
from  Barry  to  Montevideo.  When  she  was  overhauled 
by  the  KARLSRUHE,  at  10  a.m.  on  October  18th,  the  vessel 
was  on  the  usual  trade  route  between  Cape  Verde  Islands 
and  Fernando  Noronha.  After  the  master  and  crew  had 
been  taken  off,  and  everything  in  the  shape  of  oil,  stores, 
rope,  etc.,  had  been  commandeered,  the  Glanton  was  sunk 
by  explosive  charges.  The  KARLSRUHE  then  resumed  her 
cruise,  and  five  days  later  fell  in  with  the  Hurstdale  (master, 
Mr.  John  Williams),  which  was  on  passage  from  Rosario 
to  Bristol  with  maize ;  and  three  days  afterwards  she  came 
across  the  Vandyck  (master,  Mr.  Anthony  Cadogan),  which 
was  proceeding  to  New  York.  She  shared  the  same  fate 


CH.  in]      THE   4l  KARLSRUHE'S  "   LAST  PRIZE  16T 

as  the  other  ships.  If  it  were  only  because  the  Vandyck 
was  the  KARLSRUHE'S  last  success,  her  fate  and  the  ex- 
periences of  those  on  board  would  be  of  interest ;  and  it 
happens  that  in  this  instance  some  notes  are  available 
of  an  American  citizen  who  was  travelling  on  board  this 
British  ship  at  the  time : 

44  Our  ship  Vandyck,  captured  October  26th,  lat. 
1°  14'  S.  and  long.  40°  42'  W.,  by  the  German  cruiser 
KARLSRUHE. 

44  All  on  board  the  Vandyck  were  transferred  to  the  old 
(1895)  Hamburg  South  American  cargo-boat  Ascuncion. 

44  If  you  refer  to  Register  of  Shipping,  you  will  appreciate 
the  conditions  confronting  our  passengers  and  crew  of 
410  souls,  added  to  fifty-one  officers  and  crew  of  two  pre- 
viously captured  British  cargo  steamers,  together  with 
fifty  officers  and  crew  of  the  said  Asuncion. 

44  Under  stress,  men  alone  usually  fear  for  themselves 
and  say  little  about  it,  but  when  you  realise  that  more 
than  fifty  of  the  people  sent  on  board  the  old  Asuncion 
were  women  and  children,  most  of  them  ladies  unaccus- 
tomed to  those  roughest  of  conditions,  you  will  understand 
the  intolerable  state  of  affairs  that  met  them  when  the 
transfer  was  made  from  the  Vandyck  to  the  Asuncion. 
The  nearest  port — Para — could  have  been  reached  in  thirty 
hours  ;  instead  of  which  the  Asuncion  was  kept  going  at 
about  2  knots  per  hour,  on  longitude  (more  or  less)  45° 
W.,  just  above  the  Equator,  until  our  days  of  probation 
were  ended,  and  we  were  landed  at  Para,  November  2nd. 
44  The  women  behaved  remarkably  well  from  the  first 
shock  of  being  under  the  guns  of  the  man-of-war  until  the 
end,  relying  on  the  men  who  surrounded  them — and 
their  faith  was  not  misplaced. 

44  Once  on  board  the  Asuncion,  the  women  and  children 
were  packed  in  the  few  cabins  on  board,  including  the 
officers'  quarters,  and  the  men  slept  on  the  decks  and  any- 
where they  could  find  stowage  place. 

44  Food  was  brought  on  board  from  the  Vandyck  and 
cooked  as  best  might  be,  and  served  by  the  volunteer 
cooks  and  stewards  of  our  English  crew — all  praise  be 
given  to  them  for  the  fact ! 

44  The  officers  of  the  KARLSRUHE,  as  well  as  of  the 
Asuncion,  were  courteous — but  then,  Navy  men  and 


108  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON  SHIPPING        [CH.  in 

sailors  aie  gentlemen  all  over  the  world,  and  live  up  to  the 
standard,  particularly  where  ladies  are  concerned.  .  .  . 

44  When  captured  we  were  on  the  accustomed  route 
from  Cape  St.  Roque  to  Trinidad,  and  had  steamed  all 
our  voyage  in  darkness  at  night — all  to  no  avail,  as  we 
were  captured  in  full  daylight,  11.30  a.m. 

44  The  five  merchant  steamers  (captured  or  otherwise) 
spread  out,  and  scouting  in  zigzag,  in  touch  by  wireless 
with  the  KARLSRUHE,  formed  a  net  impossible  to  evade, 
no  matter  what  course  we  might  have  made. 

44  KARLSRUHE  has  no  intention  of  fighting,  her  mission 
is  to  destroy  shipping.  She  can  easily  escape  anything 
so  far  sent  after  her.  From  horizon  to  being  under  her  guns 
she  was  twenty-six  minutes.  She  came  down  on  us  at 
the  rate  of  28  knots.  They  say  she  can  do  30 — despite 
her  months  in  commission  and  consequent  fouling. 

44  She  has  captured,  up  to  October  24th,  sixteen  British 
cargo  steamers,  having  sunk  all  but  three.  Vandyck  was 
number  seventeen — October  26th. 

44  The  weather  was  good  during  our  cruise  about  the 
Equator — fortunately  so,  as  the  old  Asuncion  was  flying 
light,  very  little  coal,  no  ballast  excepting  some  hard- 
wood beams  (for  gun  mounting)  on  the  main  deck  just 
where  they  would  do  the  most  damage  in  case  of  bad 
weather.  As  much  as  was  possible  we  were  kept  in  ignor- 
ance of  our  ship's  position,  probable  port  of  landing 
and  date  of  same,  until  the  night  of  October  31st,  when  we 
bore  away  to  the  westward — for  Para — and  finally  landed 
there  on  November  2nd.  Two  hotels  were  presented  for 
our  passengers,  and  the  good  people  on  shore  lent  every 
assistance.  It  was  a  new  lease  of  life  to  all  of  us.  Some 
of  the  ladies  collapsed  when  relieved  of  the  greater  strain, 
but  finally  they  recovered. 

44  Six  days  more  of  waiting  cheerfully  passed,  despite 
the  great  heat,  and  on  November  8th,  the  Brazilian 
steamer  San  Paulo  took  on  board  all  of  the  ladies  and  chil- 
ren  (excepting  fotfr  couples  who  chose  to  remain  for  the 
next  boat),  together  with  the  men  to  the  extent  of  fifty 
more  than  the  San  Paulo's  passenger  certificate  as  arranged 
officially.  The  men  continued  to  sleep  on  the  deck  and 
in  the  passages. 

44  We  arrived  New  York,  November  19th,  and  were  thank- 
ful. S.s.  Byron  and  s.s.  Sceptre  bring  on  remainder  of 


CH.  in]    HOW  "  ROYAL  SCEPTRE  "  WAS  SAVED       169 

our  passengers,  crews,  and  third  class — all  of  whom  were 
comfortably  cared  for  in  the  meantime. 

*'  A  tribute  is  certainly  due  to  our  English  officers 
and  crew  of  the  Vandyck,  also  to  the  owners,  Lamport  & 
Holt,  who,  although  there  was  no  legal  obligation  whatever 
to  do  so,  paid  our  ordinary  hotel  expenses  at  Para  and  our 
passage  to  New  York." 

Before  she  was  at  length  forced  to  abandon  her 
career,  the  KARLSRUHE  came  across  the  steamer  Royal 
Sceptre  (3,838  tons)  on  passage  from  Santos,  Brazil,  to 
New  York,  with  a  cargo  of  coffee  valued  at  £230,000. 
The  master  (Mr.  W.  H.  Estill)  was  successful  in  saving 
not  only  the  ship,  but  the  cargo.  He  was  proceeding 
on  his  course  on  the  night  of  October  27th  when,  under 
the  light  of  the  moon,  a  four- funnelled  warship,  accom- 
panied by  three  steamers,  was  noticed.  They  appeared 
to  be  stopped  and  showed  no  lights.  "  I  suspected," 
the  master  afterwards  stated,  "that  the  former  was  a 
German  vessel;  but  thinking  any  attempt  on  my  part 
to  elude  it  was  only  the  more  likely  to  cause  suspicion, 
I  decided  to  keep  on  my  course.  On  getting  closer, 
my  suspicions  were  confirmed,  and  when  abeam  of  her 
at  11.30  p.m.  I  was  ordered  to  stop.  An  officer  and 
an  armed  guard  were  put  on  board,  the  former  informing 
me  I  was  stopped  by  the  German  cruiser  KARLSRUHE." 
And  then  the  master  gave  particulars  of  how  he  outwitted 
the  enemy :  "  Previous  to  this,  I  must  state,  I  had  taken 
the  precaution  to  hide  my  seventy-five  Bills  of  Lading 
and  other  papers  relating  to  the  cargo,  relying  for  exami- 
nation on  my  Brazilian  clearance,  Brazilian  and  American 
Bills  of  Health,  detailed  manifest  of  cargo  for  Customs 
New  York  Register,  and  Articles.  Seeing  that  60,025 
bags  of  coffee  were  via  New  York  in  transit  for  Toronto, 
Canada,  and  were  specified  to  this  effect  on  Bills  of  Lading, 
I  felt  sure  it  would  be  disastrous  to  the  ship  if  they  were  seen 
by  the  Germans;  hence  my  reason  for  this  action.  On 
being  asked  by  the  officer  for  my  papers,  etc.,  I  produced 
the  aforementioned,  and  after  replying  to  the  numerous 
questions  re  cargo,  etc.,  in  a  way  I  thought  suitable  for 
the  occasion,  and,  if  not  altogether  truthful,  quite  in  order 
considering  the  serious  position  I  was  in,  he  appeared 
satisfied  that  the  cargo  was  for  New  York  only,  and  even- 


170  CRUISER  ATTACKS   ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  in 

tually  conveyed  the  necessary  information  to  the  captain 
of  the  "KARLSRUHE.  At  12.30  a.m.  on  October  28th,  I 
was  informed  I  could  proceed,  and  at  once  ran  full  speed 
ahead  again,  thinking  I  was  very  lucky,  which  was  the  last 
remark  the  officer  made  as  he  left  me." 

The  cruiser  was  fortunate  in  intercepting  a  number  of 
large  coal  cargoes,  and  the  captain  obtained,  in  all, 
nearly  20,000  tons  of  coal  from  his  prizes.  Similarly, 
from  all  the  ships  which  were  intercepted,  stores,  foodstuffs, 
and  wines  were  abstracted  in  order  to  replenish  the  cruiser's 
supplies,  as  well  as  any  plate  or  crockery  which  took  the 
fancy  of  the  boarding-parties.  The  Germans,  as  has  been 
indicated,  treated  the  captured  crews  generally  with 
courtesy,  and  returned  to  the  merchant  officers  all  their 
private  property,  including  their  revolvers  and  guns. 

Before  passing  on  to  describe  the  memorable  exploits 
of  the  German  cruiser  EMDEN,  some  reference  must  be 
made  to  another  corsair,  the  armed  merchant  cruiser 
KRONPRINZ  WILHELM.  On  the  outbreak  of  war  the  Nord- 
deutscher  liner  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  was  one  of  the  large 
German  ships  in  New  York  Harbour  which  caused  the 
Admiralty  a  good  deal  of  anxiety  in  view  of  the  reports 
that  they  were  being  armed  and  might  put  to  sea  at  any 
moment.  These  rumours  had  various  sources,  and  they 
seemed  to  fit  in  with  the  theoiies  which  had  inspired  Ger- 
many's action  at  The  Hague  Conference,  and  later  on  at 
the  Naval  Conference  at  London.  The  KRONPRINZ  WIL- 
HELM, however,  was  the  only  one  of  the  enemy  ships 
which  got  to  sea  from  New  York,  and  she  broke  out  on 
the  eve  of  the  British  declaration  of  war,  before  the  Ameri- 
can authorities  had  perfected  their  arrangements  for  watch- 
ing enemy  shipping.  This  liner,  indeed,  left  as  though 
she  had  no  belligerent  purpose.  All  doubts,  however, 
as  to  her  mission  were  set  at  rest  on  August  6th,  when 
Rear-Admiral  Christopher  Cradock,  with  his  flag  in  the 
cruiser  SUFFOLK,  came  upon  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM, 
about  120  miles  north-east  of  Watling  Island,  in  the  West 
Indies,  in  company  with  the  cruiser  KARLSRUHE.  Guns 
and  guns'  crews  were  being  transferred  when  the  SUFFOLK, 
in  company  with  the  light  cruiser  BRISTOL,  appeared. 
The  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  made  off  in  one  direction,  and 
her  consort  in  the  other.  The  British  Admiral  had  to  make 
choice  of  his  quarry,  and  he  selected  the  man-of-war, 


CH.  in]  "  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM'S  "  OPERATIONS     171 

sending  the  BRISTOL  on  ahead  at  full  speed,  and  at  the 
same  time  calling  up  by  wireless  the  armoured  cruiser 
BERWICK.  Neither  of  the  British  ships  equalled  the 
speed  of  the  German  cruiser,  which  was  consequently 
able  to  elude  capture,  though  she  nearly  fell  to  the  BER- 
WICK, as  subsequently  appeared.  The  KRONPRINZ  WIL- 
HELM  seems  then  to  have  coaled  from  the  Walhalla  off 
the  Azores,  and  on  September  19th  took  her  first  prize— 
the  s.s.  Indian  Prince  (2,846  tons).  The  capture  took  place 
210  miles  east  of  Pernambuco,  indicating  that  the  liner 
was  operating  in  the  same  waters  as  the  KARLSRUHE. 
The  Indian  Prince  left  the  port  of  Bahia,  Brazil,  on  Sep- 
tember 2nd,  for  New  York.  On  the  evening  of  Septem- 
ber 4th,  when  the  Indian  Prince  was  well  off  the  usual 
trade  route,  in  accordance  with  Admiralty  instructions, 
the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  was  sighted.  No  resistance  to 
capture  was  made,  the  British  vessel  steaming  ahead  of 
the  German  auxiliary  cruiser  throughout  the  night.  The 
following  day  two  German  naval  officers  boarded  the 
Indian  Prince  and  took  away  with  them  her  papers,  as 
well  as  all  charts,  chronometers,  binoculars,  rockets, 
blue  lights,  and  the  British  Ensign.  In  accordance  with 
orders  from  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM,  the  British  vessel 
steered  on  various  courses  until  September  8th,  when  she 
was  directed  to  stop  in  mid-ocean  and  the  German  auxi- 
liary cruiser  came  alongside.  An  officer,  accompanied  by 
an  armed  guard,  proceeded  on  board,  and  handed  the  master 
(Mr.  J.  R.  Gray)  a  notification  in  German,  accompanied 
by  an  English  translation,  as  follows  : 

" 1  hereby  give  you  the  official  proclamation : 
"  1.  Your  ship  is  hostile. 
"  2.  The  cargo  of  your  ship  are  hostile  goods. 
"3.  You  must  immediately  go  with  all  your  crew  on 
board  of  the  auxiliary.     Personal  goods  may  be  taken 
along. 

"4.  Resistance  will  result  compulsion  (sic). 

"  (Signed)  THIERFELDER, 

* '  Lieutenant  Commander. ' ' 

The  crew,  passengers,  and  effects  having  been  transferred 
to  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM,  the  work  of  looting  the  ship 
was  begun,  and  continued  throughout  the  night,  all  the 


172  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  in 

stores  and  coal  being  transferred  to  the  KRONPRINZ  WIL- 
HELM.     Finally  the  British  vessel  was  sunk. 

More  than  a  month  elapsed  before  this  German  auxiliary 
cruiser  captured  another  British  vessel.  The  s.s.  La 
Correntina  (8,529  tons),  the  Vice-Consul  at  La  Plata 
having  stated  that  no  local  danger  had  been  reported, 
was  on  her  way  to  Liverpool  with  a  cargo  of  frozen 
meat  weighing  3,500  tons,  the  property  of  the  British 
military  authorities,  when  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  was 
sighted  early  on  the  morning  of  October  7th.  "  I  then 
kept  the  ship  away  to  the  eastward,"  the  master  (Mr. 
A.  Murrison)  subsequently  recorded,  "  to  see  if  the 
vessel  would  follow.  He  still  kept  end  on  and  ap- 
peared to  be  steaming  slowly  towards  us,  allowing  us  to 
pass.  Consequently  I  took  him  to  be  a  British  or  French 
auxiliary  cruiser.  But  when  well  astern  on  our  port  quarter 
he  came  rushing  on  at  full  speed  and,  when  half  a  mile 
off,  he  opened  out  his  starboard  side,  and  at  the  same  time 
signalled  to  us  to  stop  instantly.  He  also  hoisted  his 
ensign,  and  then  we  found  he  was  a  German.  I  complied 
and  stopped  our  ship,  and  he  came  alongside  our  port 
side  (about  fifty  yards),  and  I  then  found  that  he  had  about 
200  men  with  rifles,  and  other  men  stationed  at  two 
12-pounders  on  his  forecastle  head,  covering  our  ship 
fore  and  aft."  The  wireless  operator  of  the  La  Correntina 
sent  out  a  signal  for  help,  but  no  reply  was  received. 
The  ship  was  subsequently  ordered  to  be  abandoned,  the 
passengers  and  crew  being  transferred,  with  their  personal 
belongings,  to  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM,  as  the  ship,  so 
it  was  stated,  would  be  sunk  in  an  hour.  However,  they 
did  not  sink  her  as  threatened.  "In  the  meantime 
the  cruiser  backed  astern  and  came  up  on  our  starboard 
side,  smashing  our  boats  and  davits  and  bridge  deck, 
and  her  men  swarmed  on  board  and  took  charge  of  the 
bridge,  engine-room,  and  the  ship  generally.  Then  a  gang- 
way was  put  out  between  the  vessels,  and  passengers  and 
crew  and  their  baggage  were  transferred  to  the  cruiser, 
after  which  the  ships  parted  and  steamed  away  to  the 
eastward  in  company."  l  The  British  vessel  was  sunk  on 

1  The  crew  and  passengers  of  La  Correntina  were  transferred  about  a 
week  later  to  the  supply  ship  Sierra  Cordoba,  which  met  the  KBONPBINZ 
WILHELM  at  a  rendezvous  with  a  quantity  of  coal,  but  it  was  not  until 
November  9th  that  the  two  vessels  parted  company,  the  Sierra  Cordoba 
eventually  landing  her  British  passengers  at  Montevideo  on  the  22nd. 


CH.  in]  "LA   CORRENTINA'S "   GUNS  173 

October  14th,  after  being  stripped  of  all  the  stores  and  a  good 
deal  of  coal,  besides  some  deck  gear,  provisions,  and  guns. 

This  vessel  was  one  of  the  ships  embraced  in  the  Ad- 
miralty scheme  of  defensive  armament.  When  she  left 
Liverpool  on  her  voyage  to  La  Plata,  she  mounted  two 
4 "7-inch  guns  aft,  and  was  provided  with  complete  gun 
crews ;  but,  having  sailed  before  the  outbreak  of  war,  she 
had  no  ammunition  on  board.  This  was  an  unfortunate 
circumstance,  as  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  had  only  a 
light  armament.  In  his  report  the  master  stated  that, 
"  owing  to  the  suddenness  of  the  attack,  the  two  4 "7-inch 
guns  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands  complete,  as  we  had  no 
time  to  disable  them."  A  bag  of  dispatches  from  the 
British  Legation  was,  however,  weighted  and  thrown 
overboard  in  accordance  with  instructions  received  from 
the  Consul-General  of  Buenos  Ayres.  After  the  British 
ship  had  been  sunk,  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  steamed 
north-westward,  making  for  Cape  Frio,  off  which  she 
arrived  about  midnight  on  October  16th.  She  was  appar- 
ently on  the  lookout  for  another  vessel.  From  statements 
made  by  the  captain  of  the  s.s.  Niceto  de  Larranaga, 
the  suspicion  was  strengthened  that  the  German  ships 
operating  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Pernambuco  were  kept 
closely  informed  of  the  names  of  steamers  traversing  the 
American  and  English  tracks  to  and  from  the  River  Plate, 
learning  their  dates  of  departure  as  well  as  the  character 
of  their  cargoes.  The  enemy,  it  was  alleged,  was  aware 
that  the  s.s.  La  Correntina  had  no  ammunition  on  board.1 

The  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  did  not  capture  another  British 
ship  until  December  4th.  She  then  met  the  Bellevue  (3,814 
tons).  This  vessel  was  well  laden  with  a  coal  and  general 
cargo,  and  was  on  her  way  from  Glasgow  to  Montevideo. 
The  Bellevue  (master,  Mr.  Iver  Iversen)  was  about  forty-six 
miles  east- north- east  of  Pernambuco  when  the  German  mer- 
chant cruiser  overtook  her  at  full  speed  in  the  early  morning. 
The  usual  routine  was  followed,  the  crew  was  transferred 

1  On  August  4th,  as  soon  as  war  was  declared,  Messrs.  Houlder  Bros., 
the  owners  of  the  La  Correntina  and  other  ships  of  the  same  line,  wrote 
to  the  Admiralty  suggesting  that  the  ammunition  for  La  Correntina 
should  be  sent  to  Buenos  Ayres  by  their  La  Roserina,  leaving  Liverpool  on 
August  8th  and  due  at  Buenos  Ayres  on  August  30th.  This  arrangement 
was  approved,  but  the  ammunition  on  board  the  La  Roserina  was  unshipped 
in  the  belief  that  she  would  not  reach  the  Plate  before  the  sailing  of  the 
La  Correntina. 


174  CRUISER  ATTACKS   ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  in 

to  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM,  and  the  British  ship,  navi- 
gated by  a  prize  crew,  was  taken  to  the  westward,  when  the 
work  of  transhipping  the  cargo  and  stores  to  the  cruiser 
was  begun.  This  operation  lasted  from  December  8th 
to  20th,  when  the  Bellevue  was  sunk.  In  this  case,  the 
ship  had  been  kept  well  off  the  usual  trade  route,  and  the 
master  was  complimented  by  the  Admiralty  on  the  manner 
in  which  he  had  conformed  to  Admiralty  instructions. 
The  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  rounded  off  the  month  with 
another  capture  not  far  from  the  scene  of  her  meeting 
with  the  Bellevue.  The  Hemisphere  (3,486  tons ;  master, 
Mr.  Richard  Jones)  was  on  passage  from  Hull  to  Buenos 
Ayres  with  coal  when  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  headed 
for  her  on  the  28th.  After  the  capture  had  been  effected, 
both  vessels  steamed  away  to  the  eastward  until  early  in 
the  morning  of  December  30th,  when  the  Hemisphere  was 
brought  alongside  the  cruiser  and  her  cargo,  stores,  and 
most  useful  fittings  were  taken  on  board  the.  KRONPRINZ 
WILHELM.  In  this  case,  as  in  others,  the  master  and 
crew  were  called  upon  to  sign  a  declaration  undertaking 
not  to  take  up  arms  against  the  German  Empire  during 
the  war.  The  German  vessel  was  joined  by  her  tender, 
the  s.s.  Holger,  to  which  the  Hemisphere's  officers  and 
men  were  transferred,  after  which  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM 
steamed  away  to  the  northward. 

About  this  time  the  Royal  Mail  Steamship  Company's 
s.s.  Potaro  (4,419  tons),  which  had  left  Liverpool  in 
ballast  on  December  25th,  was  on  her  way  to  Monte- 
video. Half  an  hour  after  midnight  on  January  10th, 
she  sighted,  at  a  distance  of  about  three  miles,  a  large 
steamer,  which  turned  out  to  be  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM. 
The  British  master's  attempt  to  escape  failed,  and  after 
an  hour's  chase  the  Potaro  was  captured.  A  call  for 
help  was  sent  out  three  times  during  the  pursuit,  but 
the  wireless  operator  of  the  German  ship  jambed  all 
messages.  A  prize  crew  having  been  placed  on  board, 
the  two  vessels  proceeded  in  a  south-easterly  direction, 
and  the  same  afternoon  the  master  and  crew  were  trans- 
ferred to  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM.  The  Potaro  then 
steamed  away,  and  according  to  the  master  (Mr.  Henry 
J.  Bennett)  was  not  seen  again  till  January  19th.  Then 
she  appeared  with  everything  painted  man-of-war  colour 
and  with  extra  aerials  aloft.  In  the  meantime  the 


CH.  m]  A  STUBBORN  LITTLE  CRAFT  175 

German  ship  had  secured  two  more  prizes — the  s.s.  Highland 
Brae  (7,634  tons;  master,  Mr.  R.  R.  Pond),  which  was 
on  passage  from  Gravesend  to  Buenos  Ayres,  and  the 
sailing-ship  Wilfrid  M.  (258  tons  ;  master,  Mr.  C.  W. 
Parks),  proceeding  to  Bahia  from  St.  John's,  Newfound- 
land. The  former  ship  was  taken  by  surprise.  She  was 
well  off  the  usual  track,  in  obedience  to  Admiralty  in- 
structions, when  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  appeared 
"  keeping  end  on  and  enveloped  in  smoke,  so  that  we  were 
unable  to  distinguish  whether  she  was  British  or  German 
until  within  half  or  three-quarters  of  a  mile  off,  when  she 
hoisted  the  German  ensign,  fired  a  gun,  and  signalled  to 
us  to  stop."  Subsequently  a  prize  crew  was  put  on  board, 
and  the  two  steamers  proceeded  in  company  until  the  Wilfrid 
M.  was  sighted.  The  captain  of  the  German  ship  could 
not  resist  the  temptation  to  intercept  this  vessel,  small 
as  she  was,  but  later  on  he  probably  regretted  his  decision. 
She  was  carrying  a  cargo  of  dried  fish.  The  gunners  of 
the  German  ship  had  already  proved,  by  demonstration, 
their  inefficiency,  and  there  was  a  shortage  of  ammunition. 
At  any  rate,  it  was  decided  to  ram  the  small  wooden  vessel. 
Probably  the  subsequent  course  of  events  constitutes  one 
of  the  most  curious  incidents  in  this  war.  After  the  crew 
had  been  taken  on  board,  the  great  German  liner  proceeded 
to  ram  the  Wilfrid  M.  Four  times  in  succession  the  bow 
of  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  was  driven  into  the  little 
ship,  and  even  then  she  was  not  sunk.  At  the  end  of  April 
1915,  the  General  Registrar  of  Shipping  at  Grenada 
reported  to  the  Board  of  Trade  that  "  a  large  portion  of 
a  derelict  ship  was  seen  drifting  off  the  south  coast  of 
the  Island  of  Carriacou,  a  dependency  of  the  Government 
of  this  island,  which  finally  settled  off  the  reef  of  Dumfries 
Bay,  about  600  yards  from  shore."  On  examination  it 
was  found  to  be  the  remains  of  the  Wilfrid  M.9  which  the 
German  liner,  in  spite  of  all  her  efforts,  had  failed  to  sink. 
During  the  rest  of  January  the  Germans  were  busy 
looting  the  Highland  Brae,  and  afterwards  the  Potaro 
was  dealt  with  in  the  same  way.  Early  in  February  the 
four-masted  Norwegian  barque  Semantha,  carrying  grain 
from  Portland,  Oregon,  to  Falmouth  or  Queenstown  for 
orders,  was  captured  and  afterwards  sunk,  the  crew  having 
been  transferred  to  the  German  vessel.  In  this  instance 
again  the  gunners  of  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  showed  a 

13 


176  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON  SHIPPING        [CH.  m 

lack  of  practice,  since,  of  the  thirteen  shots  which  were 
fired  at  the  barque,  only  one  took  effect.  The  looting  of 
the  Potaro  was  then  resumed,  and  on  February  12th  the 
tender  Holger  was  brought  alongside  ;  a  high  sea  was 
running,  and  the  two  ships  bumped  heavily  as  the 
transfer  of  passengers  took  place.  The  transhipment 
proved  a  dangerous  task,  but  was  at  last  completed,  and 
then  the  Holger  parted  company,  landing  her  passengers,  on 
February  18th,  at  Buenos  Ayres,  where  she  was  interned. 

The  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  met  with  no  further  success 
until  February  22nd,  when  the  British  s.s.  Chasehill 
(4,583  tons)  was  intercepted  on  her  passage  from  Newport 
News  to  Zarate,  La  Plata,  with  coal.  The  master  (Mr. 
R.  H.  Kidd)  and  the  crew  were  transferred  to  the  KRON- 
PRINZ WILHELM,  and  a  prize  crew  was  put  on  board  the 
Chasehill.  The  German  vessel  then  took  out  of  the  British 
ship  practically  all  the  coal.  On  March  9th  the  crew  were 
retransferred  to  the  Chasehill,  together  with  the  crew 
and  passengers  of  the  French  mail  steamer  Guadaloupe, 
which  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  had  captured  some  days 
before,  to  find  that  their  ship  had  been  much  damaged 
during  the  process  of  transhipping  the  coal.  The  Chasehill, 
with  her  French  passengers  and  seamen,  reached  Pernam- 
buco  early  on  the  morning  of  March  12th. 

It  appeared  later  on  that  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM, 
though  she  had  obtained  considerable  quantities  of  coal 
and  general  stores  which  would  have  enabled  her  to  seek 
fresh  scenes  of  activity,  still  continued  her  depredations 
on  the  trade  route  which  had  already  proved  so  fruitful. 
On  March  24th,  the  Royal  Mail  Steam  Packet  Company's 
s.s.  Tamar  (3,207  tons),  with  a  large  cargo  of  coffee,  from 
Santos  to  Havre,  was  captured.  On  sailing,  the  master 
(Mr.  F.  S.  Hannan)  was  warned  to  stand  to  the  eastward, 
and  was  attempting  to  avoid  danger  when  he  was  over- 
hauled by  the  German  raider.  As  usual,  the  British  crew 
were  transferred,  and  then  the  Tamar  was  sunk  by  gun- 
fire. A  declaration  of  neutrality  during  the  war  was 
required  from  the  crew  and  passengers.  The  KRONPRINZ 
WILHELM  then  resumed  her  course,  and  on  the  27th  fell 
in  with  the  British  s.s.  Coleby  (3,824  tons),  which  was  bound 
from  Rosario  with  a  cargo  of  wheat.  By  this  time, 
according  to  the  master  of  the  Tamar,  the  KRONPRINZ 
WILHELM  showed  signs  of  damage  through  having  several 


CH.  in]         THE   "  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH  "          177 

vessels  lashed  alongside  of  her,  and  practically  every  plate 
on  the  port  side  was  standing  out  throughout  her  length. 
In  this  case  also  the  capture  was  due  to  mischance,  as  the 
master  of  the  Coleby  (Mr.  William  Crighton)  was  well  off 
the  usual  track.  With  the  sinking  of  this  vessel  the 
active  career  of  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM  came  to  an  end. 
Her  captain,  in  view  of  her  condition,  including  shortage 
of  coal  and  stores,  decided  to  abandon  his  depredations. 
The  cruiser  cast  anchor  in  Hampden  Roads  on  April  llth, 
after  a  cruise  covering  a  period  of  over  eight  months. 
A  fortnight  later  she  was  interned  at  Newport  News.1 

The  only  other  German  liner  which  engaged  in  commerce- 
destruction  was  the  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH,  which  got 
out  of  Tsingtau  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  and  finally  reached 
Newport  News,  Virginia,  on  March  llth,  1915,  after  a  cruise 
of  seven  months,  during  which  she  sank  five  British  mer- 
chant ships,  and  in  addition  excited  American  public 
opinion  by  destroying  the  United  States'  William  P. 
Frye.  The  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH  was  homeward  bound 
at  the  end  of  July  when  she  was  recalled  to  Tsingtau, 
and,  mails  and  passengers  having  been  disembarked,  she 
was  filled  up  with  coal,  armed  with  guns  taken  from 
the  gunboats  LUCHS  and  TIGER,  repainted,  and  sent  to 
sea,  proceeding  to  the  Mariana  Islands,  where  she  joined 
the  ScHARNfloRST,  GNEISENAU,  and  other  German  men- 
of-war.  Her  subsequent  career  was,  in  the  main,  dis- 
appointing to  the  Germans.  She  joined  von  Spee  at  the 
Marshall  Islands,  and  was  detached  by  him  in  company 
with  the  CORMORAN  (ex  RIASAN),  a  Russian  capture  made 
by  the  EMDEN  and  armed  at  Tsingtau,  for  commerce- 
destruction.  After  an  unsuccessful  cruise  she  went  to 
look  for  coal  among  the  German  Pacific  Islands,  and  finally 
obtained  some  at  Malekula  (Pelew  Islands).  Then  she 
rejoined  von  Spee  off  Valparaiso,  but  parted  from  him  before 
the  Falklands  action.  Though  she  had  chased  the  British 
s.s.  Colusa  on  November  1st,  it  was  not  until  December  5th 
that  the  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH  made  her  first  capture. 

1  In  order  to  enable  a  good  lookout  to  be  kept,  the  captain  of  the  KRON- 
PRINZ WILHELM  had  a  barrel  lashed  to  the  mast  about  200  feet  above  sea- 
level,  and  later  on  another  barrel  was  lashed  to  the  mainmast,  and  thus 
a  double  lookout  was  kept  by  men  provided  with  powerful  glasses.  Ac- 
cording to  the  master  of  the  Bellevue,  an  officer  of  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM 
stated  that  British  cruisers  had  been  seen  on  several  occasions,  but  the 
German  corsair  had  not  been  observed  by  them,  and  had  had  time  to  run 
away. 


178  CRUISER  ATTACKS   ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  in 

She  was  cruising  about  seventy  miles  south  of  Valparaiso, 
in  a  fog,  when  she  came  upon  the  British  s.s.  Charcas 
(5,067  tons),  steaming  from  Corral  to  Guayacan,  Chile, 
en  route  to  New  York,  with  a  small  load  of  nitrate  of 
soda.  The  master  (Mr.  A.  C.  Norris)  was  hugging  the  shore 
as  closely  as  possible  when  the  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH 
intercepted  her,  following  the  same  routine  as  in  the  case 
of  the  other  raider's.  On  December  12th  the  German  ship 
fell  in  with  the  sailing-vessel  Kildalton,  on  passage  from 
Liverpool  to  Callao.  Before  the  ship  was  sunk,  the  master 
(Mr.  W.  Sharp)  and  crew  were  taken  on  board  the  cruiser 
and  eventually  landed  at  Easter  Island.  There  they  re- 
mained marooned  from  the  last  day  of  the  year  which  had 
seen  the  outbreak  of  the  war  till  February  26th,  when  they 
were  taken  off  by  a  Swedish  steamer  and  landed  at  Panama 
on  March  12th. 

Exactly  two  months  elapsed  before  the  PRINZ  EITEL 
FRIEDRICH  had  another  success,  and  again  her  capture 
was  a  small  ship — the  s.v.  Invercoe  (1,421  tons),  which  was 
carrying  wheat  from  Portland,  Oregon,  to  a  British  port. 
This  proved  an  easy  capture,  and  after  the  master  (Mr. 
Wm.   J.   King)  and  crew  had  been  transferred,  she  was 
sunk.     Less  than  a  week  later  the  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH 
had  better  fortune.     When  off  Pernambuco,  in  the  area 
in  which  the  KARLSRUHE  and  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM 
had  operated  with  such  effect,  she  fell  in  with  the  s.s. 
Mary  Ada  Short  (3,605  tons ;   master,   Mr.   A.   E.    Bob- 
bing) on  February  18th.      This  ship,  loaded  with  maize, 
was  proceeding  from  Rosario  and  St.  Nicholas  (St.  Vin- 
cent) for  orders,  when  the  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH  was 
sighted.      After  provisions  had   been   removed,  a  dyna- 
mite charge  was  placed  in  the  engine-room,  and,  as  this 
proved  ineffective,   two   shots   were  fired  into  the   hull, 
and  the  vessel  then  disappeared.     Two  days  later  it  was 
the  ill-fortune  of  the  s.s.  Willerby  (3,630  tons)  to  be  en- 
countered by  the  German  merchant  cruiser  while  proceed- 
ing from  Marseilles  to  Buenos  Ayres  in  water  ballast.     All 
went  well  until  February  20th,   when  the  master   (Mr. 
J.  Wedgwood)  was  ordered  by  the  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH 
to  stop.     He  ignored  the  signal,  but  three-quarters  of  an 
hour  later  was  overhauled.     On  March  llth,  the  PRINZ 
EITEL  FRIEDRICH,   whose  cruise  had  been  barren  since 
the  capture  of  the  Willerby,  put  into  Newport  News  for 


CH.  m]         COMMERCE-DESTROYER   INTERNED         179 

repairs.  On  arrival  the  captain  found  he  had  gravely 
prejudiced  himself  in  the  eyes  of  the  American  public  by 
sinking  the  American  s.s.  William  P.  Frye,  which  had  on 
board  wheat  consigned  to  a  British  port.  The  story  of 
the  destruction  of  this  ship,  though  she  was  not  of  British 
nationality,  is  of  such  historical  importance  from  many 
points  of  view  that  it  may  be  of  interest  to  give  the  state- 
ment made  by  her  captain  (Mr.  H.  H.  Kiehne)  after  he 
had  been  landed  by  the  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH  at  New- 
port News. 

On  January  27th  he  was  approached  by  the  PRINZ 
EITEL  FRIEDRICH  in  the  South  Atlantic.  Having  made 
the  usual  inquiries,  the  German  captain  told  him  that  he 
deemed  his  cargo  contraband,  and  proposed  to  destroy 
it.  Captain  Kiehne  protested,  but  German  officers  and 
men  came  on  board  and  began  to  jettison  the  grain. 
The  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH  then  disappeared  after 
another  ship,  and  when  she  reappeared,  to  use  Captain 
Kiehne's  words,  "  evidently  the  grain  was  not  being 
thrown  overboard  fast  enough  to  suit  the  German  skipper, 
for  he  sent  half  a  hundred  men  aboard  soon  afterwards, 
and  the  work  went  on  for  hours  without  interruption. 
However,  it  was  slow  at  the  best,  and  I  was  informed  the 
next  morning  that  my  ship  would  be  sent  to  the  bottom. 
It  was  originally  the  intention  of  the  German  captain  to 
leave  enough  cargo  in  the  hold  of  the  ship  for  ballast. 
That  part  of  the  grain  was  to  be  rendered  useless  by  salt 
water.  As  soon  as  I  was  informed  that  my  ship  was  to  be 
sent  to  the  bottom,  I  and  my  wife,  with  our  two  boys 
and  the  crew,  made  for  the  German  steamer  in  our  own 
boats.  We  were  taken  on  board  and  shown  every  courtesy 
throughout  the  remainder  of  the  voyage." 

Investigation  after  her  arrival  at  Newport  News  showed 
that  the  PRINZ  EITEL  FRIEDRICH  required  new  boilers, 
and  on  April  8th  she  was  interned  on  the  application  of 
her  captain,  who  handed  to  the  collector  of  the  port  the 
following  statement : 

"  I  inform  you  that  I  intend  to  intern  S.M.S.  PRINZ 
EITEL  FRIEDRICH.  The  relief  I  expected  appear  not  to 
arrive  in  time,  so  number  and  force  of  enemy  cruisers 
watching  the  entrance  of  the  bay  makes  to  me  impossible 
the  dash  for  the  open  sea  with  any  ho^e  of  success.  I 


180  CRUISER  ATTACKS   ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  in 

have  decided  not  to  deliver  the  crew  and  the  ship  to  fruit- 
less and  certain  destruction.  Being  obliged  for  the 
courtesy  shown  by  all  the  United  States  authorities,  I  am 
expecting  your  orders.  I  have  sent  same  information  to 
Rear- Admiral  Helm,  of  the  United  States  ship  ALABAMA." 

Another  commerce-destroyer  was  the  cruiser  LEIPZIG, 
a  vessel  of  small  tonnage  which  formed  one  of  the  units 
under  the  command  of  Admiral  von  Spee.  Within  about 
six  weeks  of  the  opening  of  the  war,  the  LEIPZIG  made 
her  first  capture.  On  September  llth  the  s.s.  Elsinore 
(6,542  tons)  was  on  her  passage  from  Corinto  to  San  Luis 
Obispo,  California,  in  ballast,  when  she  was  encountered 
by  the  LEIPZIG,  a  warning  shot  announcing  that  the 
stranger  was  a  foreign  cruiser.  In  this  case  the  master 
(Mr.  J.  Roberts)  was  taken  on  board  the  German  ship, 
and  received  orders  to  return  and  navigate  his  vessel 
in  accordance  with  instructions  received  from  the  German 
commander.  Various  courses  were  then  steered,  the 
German  s.s.  Marie  being  at  that  time  in  company  with 
the  LEIPZIG.  Captain  Roberts  made  the  following  state- 
ment as  to  his  experience,  which  indicates  the  course 
pursued  by  the  commander  of  the  LEIPZIG  in  his  efforts 
to  intercept  British  merchantmen  : 

"  September  llth. — At  4.10  a.m.  I  arrived  on  board  of 
my  own  vessel,  and  set  the  engines  at  full  speed  and  course 
was  set  N.  62°  E. 

"  5.20  a.m.  I  was  signalled  by  Morse  to  alter  my  course 
to  S.  15°  E.,  and  again  at  9.25  a.m.  was  signalled  to  steer 
S.  45°  E. ;  then  I  began  to  get  anxious  wondering  when  we 
were  to  leave  (the  ship),  as  I  was  at  this  time  fifty  miles 
from  the  land. 

"  At  10.10  a.m.  I  was  signalled  to  make  the  best  possible 
speed,  and  at  10.30  a.m.  we  sighted  a  cargo  steamer  ahead 
which  proved  to  be  a  German  ship  named  the  Marie, 
but  which  at  first  I  thought  to  be  a  poor  unfortunate 
like  myself  owing  to  his  movements,  but  I  afterwards 
found  out  that  he  was  only  obeying  orders  from  the 
LEIPZIG,  and  that  the  meeting  was  prearranged,  and  that 
the  Marie  was  in  company  with  the  LEIPZIG,  supplying 
her  with  coal  and  stores. 

"  At  11.15  a.m.  I  was  again  signalled  to  heave  to  and  to 


CH.  m]  A  MASTER'S   DIARY  181 

proceed  on  board  of  the  Marie,  taking  sufficient  stores  for 
eight  days,  and  they  allowed  us  two  hours  to  be  out  of  the 
vessel,  so  I  immediately  proceeded  to  carry  out  these 
orders  ;  in  the  meantime  a  number  of  armed  officers 
and  men  from  the  LEIPZIG  came  on  board  and  commenced 
ransacking  the  ship,  taking  all  stores  and  articles  which 
were  of  any  use  to  them,  and  they  also  took  our  boats 
and  hoisted  them  up  in  the  davits  of  the  Marie  ;  our 
position  at  this  time  was  19°  31'  00"  N.,  and  105°  56'  00"  W. 

"  At  12.30  p.m.  myself  and  crew  boarded  the  Marie, 
and  at  1.10  p.m.  the  cruiser  commenced  firing  upon  the 
Elsinore  at  about  a  mile  distant ;  the  sight  was  too  heart- 
breaking for  me  to  witness,  so  I  kept  to  my  room,  but  my 
officers  afterwards  informed  me  that  (they)  put  twelve 
shots  into  her  and  she  became  ablaze,  and  that  she  sank 
stern  first ;  before  my  vessel  sank  the  captain  of  the 
Marie  was  ordered  to  go  full  speed  on  a  south-easterly 
course  ;  and  so  came  the  end  of  one  of  the  finest  oil- 
steamers  on  the  Pacific  Coast. 

"  When  first  taken  prisoner  by  the  Germans,  the  com- 
mander promised  to  cast  me  off  a  few  mites  from  Cape 
Corrientes,  which  he  afterwards  failed  to  do,  and  I  think 
the  reason  was  that  he  was  rather  anxious  for  his  own 
safety. 

"  September  12th. — The  Marie  proceeding  on  the  same 
course  S.E.,  and  during  the  day  the  cruiser  would  lead 
ahead  at  about  three  miles  distant,  and  by  night  about 
the  same  distance  astern.  There  was  an  armed  crew  of 
about  fourteen  men  placed  on  board  the  Marie  from  the 
cruiser  to  guard  my  men.  The  commander  of  the  cruiser 
signalled  to  the  officer  in  charge  to  treat  my  men  as  well 
as  possible. 

"  September  13th. — Ordered  to  stop  by  the  cruiser,  when 
they  passed  several  hundred  coal-bags  on  board  to  be 
filled  by  my  men,  whom  they  would  pay  their  usual  rate  of 
wages.  Both  ships  proceeding  same  course  and  direction. 

"  September  I4>th. — Again  stopped  by  cruiser,  and  more 
coal-bags  passed  on  board  to  be  filled  by  my  men  :  ship's 
course  the  same  and  convoyed  by  the  cruiser. 

"  September  15th  and  16th. — Proceeding  same  and  posi- 
tion of  ship  the  same  ;  we  are  steering  for  the  Galapagos 
Islands. 

"  September  17th. — Sighted  Galapagos  Islands,  7  a.m. ; 


182  CRUISER  ATTACKS   ON   SHIPPING         [CH.  m 

came  to  anchor  in  Tagus  Cove,  Atternave  Island,  and  at 
11.30  p.m.  the  cruiser  came  alongside  and  commenced  to 
bunker.  7  p.m.,  owing  to  cove  being  so  small,  the  cruiser 
cast  off  and  went  to  a  safer  anchorage.  Previous  to  her 
going  away  the  commander  sent  for  me  to  come  on  board  ; 
he  then  told  me  that  he  would  faithfully  land  us  all  safe 
at  Callao,  and  how  sorry  he  felt  for  me  in  such  a  position, 
and,  being  a  sailor  himself,  he  was  sorry  that  he  had  been 
obliged  to  destroy  such  a  fine  ship.  Then  I  informed  him 
that  I  had  a  bag  of  mail  on  board  from  the  American 
cruiser  DENVER  for  San  Francisco,  which  he  promised  he 
would  safely  deliver. 

"  September  18th; — The  cruiser  came  alongside  at  6  a.m., 
and  again  commenced  to  bunker,  and  at  9  a.m.  completed 
500  tons.  At  11.30  a.m.  both  ships  got  under  weigh 
and  proceeded  out  of  the  cove  at  full  speed,  and  course 
was  set  south. 

44  September  19th. — Came  to  anchor  off  Hood  Island, 
Galapagos,  at  8.80  a.m.,  and  the  cruiser  left  and  proceeded 
for  Chatham  Island  for  fresh  provisions,  which  I  still 
believe  was  not  necessary,  as  he  had  more  important 
business  in  view. 

"  September  2Qth. — Ship  still  at  anchor  off  Hood  Island, 
and  at  6  p.m.  I  am  positive  I  saw  two  distinct  smokes 
from  steamers  in  the  direction  of  Chatham  Island,  and  this 
proved  to  be  correct,  as  the  cruiser  had  another  steamer 
awaiting  with  her  stores,  etc.,  and  equipped  with  wireless. 

"  At  6  p.m.  the  cruiser  returned  and  anchored  close  to, 
and  signalled  that  the  commander  would  send  his  boat  to 
take  me  on  board,  as  he  wished  to  speak  to  me.  On  arrival 
on  board  of  the  cruiser,  he  informed  me  that,  owing  to 
information  he  had  received,  he  was  unable  to  fulfil  his 
promise  to  land  me  at  Callao,  but  he  had  made  arrange- 
ments at  Chatham  Island  for  our  board,  etc.,  and  that  after 
fourteen  days  a  vessel  would  take  us  off  for  Guayaquil, 
and  I  was  to  prepare  to  leave  at  8.30  the  following  morning. 
The  commander  now  seemed  to  be  working  in  some 
mysterious  way  as  if  he  were  anxious  to  get  clear  of  us. 
He  invited  me  to  take  dinner  with  him,  but  I  was  obliged 
to  refuse,  owing  to  being  so  depressed  to  find  the  precarious 
position  that  Fate  had  placed  both  my  crew  and  myself 
in,  so  I  came  back  on  board  and  called  my  officers  together 
and  told  them  the  exact  words  the  commander  of  the 


CH.  in]      LANDED  ON  CHATHAM  ISLAND     183 

LEIPZIG  had  said ;  and  when  the  crew  were  informed 
they  became  very  dissatisfied,  which  caused  the  cruiser's 
people  to  double  up  the  armed  guard,  but,  however,  the 
night  passed  quietly. 

44  September  21st. — At  3  a.m.  both  ships  got  under  way 
and  proceeded  towards  Chatham  Island,  and  at  7  a.m. 
came  to  anchor  in  the  roadstead. 

"At  8  a.m.  we  all  embarked  in  the  cruiser's  boats  with 
our  remaining  effects  and  small  amount  of  provisions, 
and  at  9  a.m.  we  landed  on  Chatham  Island,  with  only 
two  houses  in  sight  and  a  large  store  shed,  in  which  place 
the  crew  were  lodged.  (This  island  belongs  to  Ecuador, 
and  is  used  as  a  convict  station.) 

"  I  arranged  for  two  officers  to  remain  with  the  crew 
to  keep  order,  and  taking  the  chief  officer,  chief  signaller, 
and  second  engineer,  we  rode  on  horseback  to  the  settle- 
ment six  miles  inland  (a  sugar  and  coffee  plantation), 
and  even  here  we  fared  very  badly  with  regard  to  food  and 
beds ;  but  the  crew  fared  very  bad,  as  the  provisions  were 
very  scarce  and  had  to  be  carefully  rationed. 

44  September  22nd. — This  day  passed  away  after  many 
troubles  regarding  sleeping  accommodation,  etc.,  but  my 
crew  seemed  to  be  getting  very  dissatisfied,  though  up  to  the 
present  they  had  borne  the  hardships  bravely. 

44  September  24£h. — To-day  I  made  arrangements  with 
the  Governor  of  the  Island,  a  Mr.  Araz,  to  take  me  and 
half  of  the  crew  to  Ecuador,  as  this  was  the  only  means  of 
getting  into  communication  and  reporting  the  loss  of  my 
ship ;  and  he  arranged  to  send  us  away  in  a  small  sloop 
of  fifty  tons,  the  distance  to  Guayaquil  being  about  670 
miles,  so  he  provisioned  her  accordingly,  she  being  about 
half  loaded  with  a  cargo  of  dried  fish  and  hides,  and  ordin- 
arily would  not  have  sailed  for  another  ten  days. 

44  The  commander  of  the  LEIPZIG'S  intention  was  to 
detain  me  on  the  island  as  long  as  possible,  so  as  to  prevent 
me  communicating  with  the  authorities  and  spoiling 
his  chances  of  sinking  merchant  vessels,  for  when  the 
Governor  of  the  island  offered  to  assist  me,  one  of  the 
German  officers  remaining  on  the  island  strongly  objected; 
but  the  Governor  insisted  on  our  leaving  owing  to  the 
scarcity  of  food,  there  not  being  sufficient  to  keep  all  the 
men  for  any  length  of  time,  and  also  owing  to  his  good 
feeling  towards  us. 


184  CRUISER  ATTACKS  ON  SHIPPING        [CH.  in 

"  So,  after  some  considerable  trouble,  I  picked  out  half 
of  the  crew  that  was  to  accompany  me  on  what  turned 
out  to  be  one  of  the  most  monotonous  and  hardest  five 
days  at  sea  I  ever  experienced.  The  accommodation  for 
the  crew  was  in  the  hold,  where  they  slept  on  the  hides 
and  dried  fish,  and  the  smell  at  times  was  something 
terrible. 

"So  at  3  p.m.,  after  saying  good-bye  to  the  remaining 
crew,  we  boarded  our  small  craft,  lifted  anchor  and 
set  sail  for  Guayaquil.  I  may  mention  that  this  is  the 
most  isolated  and  unfrequented  stretch  of  water  in  the 
world. 

"  Mr.  Araz,  the  Governor,  accompanied  us,  and  we  occu- 
pied the  cabin  together,  and  he  was  most  kind  and  con- 
siderate to  us  all  right  through  the  trip  and  did  all  possible 
for  our  comfort. 

"  October  1st. — This  day  we  arrived  at  Guayaquil,  after 
a  most  eventful  trip  in  many  ways  ;  the  total  number  of 
persons  on  board  the  small  craft  was  twenty-nine,  so  our 
comfort  and  living  can  be  better  imagined  than  described." l 

As  soon  as  the  Elsinore  had  been  dispatched,  the 
LEIPZIG  again  got  to  work,  and  in  the  Gulf  of  Guaya- 
quil, on  September  25th,  she  met  the  s.s.  Bankfields 
(3,763  tons ;  master,  Mr.  John  Ingham)  just  out  of 
Eten  bound  for  a  British  port  with  a  cargo  of  sugar 
and  copper  ore.  Rumours  had  already  reached  Callao 
that  a  German  cruiser  was  off  the  Peruvian  coast, 
but  the  warning,  which  was  immediately  issued,  did  not 
reach  Eten  until  some  hours  after  the  Bankfields  had  left, 
the  official  telegram  being  delayed  in  transit.  Thus  it 
happened  that  this  fine  British  ship  fell  an  easy  prey 
to  the  LEIPZIG,  by  whom  she  was  forthwith  sunk.  The 
rather  unprofitable  career  of  the  LEIPZIG  was  next  varied 
by  the  capture  of  the  sailing-vesselDrwrttrawr  (1,844  tons), 
on  December  2nd,  when  off  Staten  Island  near  Cape  Horn. 
She  was  carrying  a  cargo  of  anthracite  coal,  which  was 
too  valuable  to  be  sunk,  so  she  was  taken  to  the  east 
side  of  Picton  Island,  about  one  mile  from  the  shore. 

1  The  remainder  of  the  crew  of  the  Elsinore  left  Chatham  Island  a  few 
days  after  the  departure  of  the  master  ;  they  were  conveyed  to  Panama 
in  the  s.s.  Ecuador,  and  proceeded  thence  to  Colon,  arriving  in  London  on 
November  25th  by  the  Royal  Mail  Steam  Packet  Company's  Danube, 


CH.  m]      BATTLE   OF  THE  FALKLAND   ISLANDS     185 

The  coal  transports  Baden  and  Santa  Isabel,  which  were 
in  attendance  upon  the  German  cruiser,  were  placed  one 
on  each  side  of  the  Drummuir,  and  the  cargo  of  coal  was 
discharged.  The  ship  was  then  ransacked  for  food, 
stores,  and  other  things  which  might  be  of  use  to  the 
Germans,  and  was  sunk  four  days  after  her  seizure,  the 
master  (Mr.  J.  C.  Eagles)  and  crew  having  in  the  meantime 
been  transferred  to  the  Norddeutscher  Lloyd  s.s.  Seydlitz, 
which  was  in  company  with  the  LEIPZIG.  The  capture 
had  been  effected  on  the  very  eve  of  what  was  to  prove 
one  of  the  most  decisive  events  of  the  war  by  sea,  for 
two  days  after  the  Drummuir  was  sunk  the  battle  of 
the  Falkland  Islands  occurred,  the  LEIPZIG  sharing  the 
fate  of  all  the  other  ships  under  Admiral  von  Spec's  flag, 
except  the  DRESDEN,  which,  as  has  already  been  noted, 
came  to  her  end  early  in  the  following  year.  The  Baden 
and  Santa  Isabel  were  sunk  by  the  cruiser  BRISTOL,  but 
the  Seydlitz  managed  to  escape,  and  on  December 
18th  she  arrived  with  British  seamen  at  San  Antonio, 
Patagonia.  According  to  the  master  of  the  Drummuir, 
the  loss  of  that  vessel  prevented  the  Germans  capturing 
the  Falkland  Islands,  as  the  days  which  were  occu- 
pied in  looting  the  ship  gave  Admiral  Sturdee  time  to 
reach  the  islands.  "  I  understand,"  the  captain  declared 
in  a  subsequent  statement,  "  that  there  were  men  armed 
ready  to  occupy  the  islands  as  soon  as  they  had  been  taken 
by  the  fleet,  and  if  this  is  the  case,  the  loss  of  the  Drum- 
muir was  a  providential  act." 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   EXPLOITS    OF  THE    "  EMDEN  " 

THE  story  of  the  raids  on  British  shipping  by  the  German 
cruiser  EMDEN  still  remains  to  be  told.  It  is  perhaps  an 
advantage  that  the  experiences  of  merchant  seamen  at 
the  hands  of  other  enemy  vessels  should  have  already  been 
described.  A  standard  had  thus  been  afforded  by  which 
the  ingenuity,  resourcefulness,  and  humanity  of  Captain 
von  Miiller  of  the  EMDEN  can  be  measured.  When  brief 
particulars  of  his  exploits  were  first  published  in  England, 
there  was  a  tendency  to  regard  this  German  naval  officer's 
consideration  towards  the  passengers  and  crews  of  cap- 
tured merchant  ships  as  quite  exceptional.  The  legend 
also  grew  up  that  the  EMDEN  alone  among  the  German 
ships  had  succeeded  in  carrying  on  commerce-destruction 
with  any  considerable  degree  of  success.  In  the  light  of 
the  fuller  revelation  of  the  operations  of  German  men-of- 
war  and  converted  merchantmen,  we  are  able  to  correct 
the  somewhat  exaggerated  estimate  which  was  formed  by 
contemporary  British  opinion  of  the  resource  and  sea- 
manship of  Captain  von  Miiller.  He  did  better  than  his 
compeers,  but  will  hold  no  such  place  in  the  history  of 
this  war  as  was  accorded  to  Captain  Semmes  in  the 
American  Civil  War,  and  to  Captain  Paul  Jones  in  the 
War  of  Independence. 

Captain  von  Miiller  struck  where  he  could  produce  the 
maximum  effects,  political  and  commercial,  though  he 
profited  by  an  element  of  luck.  Moreover,  he,  like  the 
officers  who  commanded  other  German  men-of-war 
during  the  period  when  attack  was  being  made  on  British 
merchant  shipping  by  surface  ships,  besmirched  his  repu- 
tation with  no  act  contrary  to  the  principles  of  the 
brotherhood  of  the  sea,  or  opposed  to  the  dictates  of  human- 

186 


CH.  iv]  IN  THE  BAY   OF  BENGAL  187 

ity.  The  day  was  to  come  when  German  naval  officers 
and  men  were  to  earn  the  contempt  of  other  seamen 
owing  to  the  callousness  and  inhumanity  which  many  of 
them  exhibited.  During  the  opening  phase  of  the  war 
the  world  welcomed  many  indications  of  an  intention, 
so  far  as  naval  hostilities  were  concerned,  to  fulfil  the 
undertakings  which  Germany's  representatives  had  given 
at  The  Hague  and  at  London,  when  the  rules  governing 
the  conduct  of  war  were  discussed. 

In  the  course  of  her  career,  the  EMDEN  captured  and 
sank   fifteen  merchant   ships,   the  same  number  as   the 
KARLSRUHE  :  she  overhauled  seven  other  vessels,  of  which 
one  escaped,  two  were  captured  and  utilised,  and  the  other 
four  were  released.      The  story  of  the  EMDEN'S  operations, 
therefore,  resolves  itself  into  the   narrative  of  the  ex- 
periences of  the  officers  and  men  of  twenty-two  British 
merchant  ships.     From  the  time  when  the  cruiser,  on  the 
eve  of  the  war,  was  reported  to  be  at  Tsingtau  until  she 
appeared  dramatically  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal,  little  or  no 
authentic  information  had  reached  the  British  Admiralty 
as  to  her  whereabouts.     The  war  had  run  its  course  for 
a  period  of  over  a  month  before  the  Indian  Government 
was   suddenly  forced  to   admit  that  it   was   confronted 
with  a  situation  which  had  not  been  foreseen,  and  against 
which   no   adequate   precautions   had   been   taken.     Re- 
viewing the  depredations  of  the  EMDEN  in  the  light  of 
the    subsequent    attack    on    ocean-borne    commerce    as 
waged  by  the  enemy,  and  the  heavy  losses  inflicted,  the 
widespread  irritation  which  she  occasioned  both  in  the 
Eastern   and   Western  world  is   notable.     The  first  full 
and  authentic  news  of  the   character   of  the   EMDEN'S 
operations  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal  to  reach  England  was  a 
message  to  the  Morning  Post  of  September  19th.     The 
Colombo  correspondent  of  that  journal  related  an  inter- 
view which  he  had  had  with  a  passenger  in  the  s.s.  Dip- 
lomat (7,615  tons),  which  had  sailed  from  that  port  on 
the   previous  Friday.     Squally  weather  had   been   expe- 
rienced in  the  Bay  of  Bengal  for  some  weeks  before  the 
EMDEN  appeared,  and  that  condition  contributed  to  the 
enemy's  success.     "  From  the  morning  when  we  left  the 
Sand  Heads  and  dropped  our  pilot  until  the  moment  when, 
eighteen  hours  later,  the  EMDEN  captured  us  by  Puri, 
there  were  intermittent  rain  showers,  when  it  was  impossible 


188  EXPLOITS  OF  THE  "  EMDEN  "  [CH.  iv 

to  see  fifty  yards  ahead.  On  the  Saturday  night  we  never 
troubled  to  extinguish  lights,  so  confident  were  we,  although 
we  subsequently  learnt  that  three  British  ships —  the  Indus, 
Lovat,  and  Killin — had  already  been  sunk. "  Continuing  his 
narrative,  this  passenger  stated  that :  "  About  noon  on 
Sunday  we  saw  ahead  a  group  of  four  vessels,  in  the  centre 
of  which  was  a  warship,  which  the  first  officer  on  our 
bridge  supposed  to  be  British,  with  convoys.  The  manner 
in  which  the  supposed  convoys  were  lying  raised  our 
suspicions,  however,  and  these  were  subsequently  con- 
firmed by  the  sight  of  the  Prussian  Eagle  on  the  EMDEN'S 
bows,  and  the  shell  which  whistled  across  our  bows.  An 
officer,  late  of  the  Hamburg- Amerika  Line,  who  was 
serving  his  two  months'  annual  reserve  training  when  war 
broke  out,  was  deputed  to  board  us.  The  boat's  crew 
carried  Mausers  and  side-arms.  The  first  act  was  to  hoist 
the  German  flag  in  the  Diplomat,  and  the  next  to  smash 
our  wireless.  Otherwise  every  courtesy  was  shown,  and 
we  were  allowed  to  take  our  personal  effects  on  board  the 
previously- captured  Kabinga,  which  subsequently  brought 
us  back.  The  EMDEN  was  in  a  dreadfully  dirty  con- 
dition, having  been  seven  weeks  at  sea  without  touching 
port." 

Some  time  elapsed  before  it  was  possible  to  piece  to- 
gether the  story  of  the  EMDEN'S  attack  upon  British 
shipping  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal.  An  account  of  her  ex- 
periences, the  general  accuracy  of  which  was  subsequently 
confirmed,  was  obtained  later  on  from  the  diary  of  a 
German  petty  officer  of  the  EMDEN  who  became  a 
prisoner  of  war.  The  EMDEN  was  ordered  to  prepare  for 
war  on  July  28th ;  she  was  then  lying  at  Tsingtau.  Thirty- 
six  hours  later,  in  the  evening,  she  put  to  sea  with  all 
lights  out.  The  early  days  of  August,  when  the  German 
cruiser  was  moving  in  Japanese  waters,  were  comparatively 
uneventful.  The  only  variation  of  the  monotony  was  the 
capture  of  the  Russian  volunteer  ship  RiASAN,1  which, 
being  without  guns  or  ammunition,  became  an  easy  prize, 
and.  was  taken  back  to  Tsingtau.  War  with  England 
having  been  declared,  the  EMDEN  again  put  to  sea,  on  the 
evening  of  August  6th,  in  company  with  the  collier  Marko- 
mannia,  loaded  with  6,000  tons  of  coal  and  1,000  tons  of 
provisions.  Evening  was  chosen  as  the  time  for  departure, 
1  Renamed  CORMORAN  and  utilised.  See  p.  177. 


CH.  iv]  THE  FIRST   CAPTURES  189 

and  the  ships  showed  no  lights  as  they  crept  out  of  the 
harbour.  During  subsequent  days  the  EMDEN  was  intent 
upon  avoiding  the  British  China  Squadron,  and  passage 
was  made  into  the  Bay  of  Bengal  by  a  circuitous  route, 
so  as  to  cut  across  the  network  of  converging  trade  routes. 
The  Indian  port  authorities  had  no  suspicion  of  the  danger 
which  threatened  shipping,  and  consequently  British 
vessels  in  those  waters  received  no  special  warning,  and 
proceeded  on  their  voyages  in  a  false  sense  of  security. 
Captain  von  Miiller  was  favoured  in  this,  as  in  other  respects. 
The  first  vessel  he  met  was  the  Greek  steamer  Pontoporos, 
which  was  on  her  way  from  Calcutta  to  Karachi  with  a 
cargo  of  Bengal  coal.  The  ship  was  retained,  and  shortly 
afterwards  the  British  steamer  Indus  (3,393  tons ;  master, 
Mr.  H.  S.  Smaridge)  hove  in  sight.  She  had  left  Calcutta 
on  September  7th  for  Bombay,  in  ballast,  and  was  three 
days  out  when  a  man-of-war  was  sighted.  Captain  Sma- 
ridge, convinced  that  she  was  of  British  nationality, 
made  no  attempt  to  escape  until  it  was  too  late,  and  thus 
he  fell  an  unresisting  victim  to  the  enemy,  who  dismantled 
the  wireless,  transhipped  several  cases  of  soap,  put  the 
crew  on  board  the  Markomannia,  and  then  sank  the  ship, 
after  firing  ten  shots.  On  the  following  afternoon  the 
EMDEN  had  a  further  success  in  similar  circumstances. 
The  Lovat  (6,102  tons)  had  left  Calcutta  for  Bombay 
two  days  after  the  Indus.  She  had,  like  the  Indus,  been 
fitted  up  as  a  transport.  Late  in  the  afternoon  the  man-of- 
war,  accompanied  by  two  steamers,  was  sighted,  and  the 
master  of  the  Lovat  (Mr.  Robert  Clegg)  also  assumed  that 
the  stranger  was  British,  and  that  the  two  steamers  formed 
part  of  a  convoy  which  he  should  join.  Unsuspectingly, 
therefore,  he  continued  on  his  course.  As  the  unknown 
cruiser  drew  in,  however,  the  German  ensign  was  run  up, 
a  signal  to  stop  was  broken,  and  a  blank  shot  fired  across 
the  bows  of  the  Lovat.  Within  a  short  time  the  crew  had 
been  transferred  to  the  Markomannia,  with  the  exception 
of  six  Indian  firemen,  who  were  sent  to  the  Pontoporos, 
and  the  Lovat  was  sunk  by  gunfire. 

The  EMDEN  then  resumed  her  cruise.  She  steamed  in 
the  centre,  with  the  Markomannia  on  one  side  and  the 
Pontoporos  on  the  other  at  a  considerable  distance,  but 
within  signalling  range.  Captain  von  Miiller  was  con- 
vinced that  he  was  in  a  good  position  for  reaping  a  rich 


190  EXPLOITS   OF  THE   "  EMDEN  "  [CH.  iv 

harvest,  and  his  judgment  was  confirmed  on  the  following 
night — September  12th — when  he  captured  the  Kabinga 
(4,657  tons).  This  ship  had  left  Calcutta  for  Colombo  the 
previous  day,  and  was  almost  on  the  usual  track,  steering  a 
south-south-westerly  course  from  the  Sand  Heads  with  lights 
burning,  when  at  11  o'clock  the  EMDEN  appeared.  At  the 
time  the  Kabinga  put  to  sea  there  was  still  no  suspicion  at 
Calcutta  of  the  EMDEN'S  presence  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal,  so 
her  captain  had  no  idea  that  he  was  running  any  particular 
danger.  Suddenly  the  flash  of  gunfire  pierced  the  darkness 
and  a  cruiser  was  observed  on  the  port  quarter,  signalling 
to  the  merchantman  to  stop  instantly  and  not  to  use  her 
wireless.  Shortly  afterwards  a  boar  ding- party  reached 
the  Kabinga,  her  wireless  installation  was  damaged,  and 
orders  were  given  to  the  officers  and  men  to  leave  the  ship 
in  two  hours,  as  it  was  intended  to  sink  her.  The  weather 
was  bad  at  the  time.  The  crew  was  forthwith  mustered 
in  readiness  to  take  to  the  boats.  The  boarding  officer 
then  discovered  that  the  captain  (Mr.  Thomas  Robinson) 
had  his  wife  and  child  on  board.  A  signal  was  at  once 
made  to  the  EMDEN,  and  a  reply  received  that  the  transfer 
would  not  be  made  that  night  in  consideration  of  the 
rough  sea  and  the  hardship  which  the  woman  and  child 
would  suffer.  It  was,  however,  anticipated  that  the 
order  to  destroy  the  ship  would  be  carried  out  on  the 
following  morning,  but  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning 
the  Glasgow  steamer  Killin  (3,544  tons;  master,  Mr.  J.  K. 
Wilson),  which  was  on  her  way  from  Calcutta  to  Colombo, 
loomed  out  of  the  darkness  and  nearly  ran  into  the  EMDEN. 
She  was  carrying  4,980  tons  of  Bengal  coal.  At  the 
moment  the  EMDEN  was  well  supplied  with  fuel,  so  the 
Kabinga  was  ordered  to  receive  the  Killings  crew  on  board, 
and  the  latter  ship  was  sunk.'  Accompanied  by  her  two 
improvised  tenders  and  the  Kabinga,  the  EMDEN  cruised 
until  noon,  when  the  Harrison  liner  Diplomat  (7,615  tons) 
was  captured  on  her  way  from  Colombo  to  London  with 
a  valuable  consignment  of  tea.  When  she  left  the  former 
port  on  the  evening  of  September  12th,  the  master  (Mr. 
R.  J.  Thompson)  had  seen  an  official  message  from  Simla 
in  the  office  of  the  Calcutta  agent  of  his  firm  to  the  effect 
that  navigation  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal  was  reasonably 
safe.  Captain  Thompson,  like  other  masters,  appears  to 
have  accepted  this  assurance  as  a  guarantee  of  security, 


CH.  iv]     MISTAKEN    FOR   A    BRITISH    CRUISER      191 

which  was  not  the  meaning  it  really  bore.     When  shortly 
before  noon  on  September  13th  a  cruiser,  followed  by  three 
merchant  ships,  came  in  sight,  he  at  once  assumed  that 
the  man-of-war  was  British  and  that  she  was  bringing 
in  three  German  prizes.     He  was  supported  in  this  belief 
by  a  report  which  had  reached  Calcutta  before  he  had  left. 
He  was  more  or  less  on  the  trade  route  when  the  EMDEN 
appeared  on  the  Diplomat's  starboard  quarter,   fired  a 
warning  shot,  and  at  the  same  time  hoisted  the  German 
ensign.      On   the   boarding-party  reaching  the  Diplomat, 
the  officer  in  command  informed  the  master  that  the 
British  vessel  was  an  hour  late.     The  crew  were  permitted 
to  collect  some  clothes  and  were  then  taken  on  board  the 
Kabinga,  and    the    Diplomat    was    sunk.     The    Trabboch 
(4,014  tons)  was  the  next  British  ship  to  fall  a  victim  to 
the  raider.     She  was  proceeding  in  ballast  from  Negapatam 
to  Calcutta.     At  6  p.m.  on  September  14th  she  came  out 
of  a  rain  squall  and  the  chief  officer  reported  land  on  the 
port  bow,  but,  to  his  unspeakable  surprise,  "  the  land " 
proved  to  be  a  cruiser  in  company  with  three  other  ships. 
The  master  (Mr.  W.  H.  Ross)  of  the  Trabboch  made  the 
same  error  as  other  masters  in  thinking  that  he  had  fallen 
in  with  a  British  cruiser  with  prizes  bound  for  Colombo. 
When    the    unrecognised    man-of-war   was   about  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  distant,  she  fired  a  shot,  ran  up  the 
German  ensign,  made  a  signal  to  stop,  and  the  Trabboch 
was  then  rounded  up  close  to  the  other  strange  ships. 
In  this   manner    another  success   was   achieved  by  the 
EMDEN,  more  by  luck  than  judgment,  and,  the  crew  of 
the  merchantman  having  been  transferred  to  the  Kabinga, 
which  was  already  crowded,  the  Trabboch  was  sunk. 

Just  before  this  the  Italian  steamer  Loredano  had  ap- 
peared. Captain  von  Miiller  asked  the  master,  Captain 
Giacopolo,  to  take  off  all  the  crews  now  assembled  on  board 
the  Kabinga,  and  stated  that  he  was  about  to  sink  that 
vessel.  The  captain  of  the  Loredano  refused  to  comply 
with  the  request,  pleading  that  he  had  insufficient  room 
on  board  his  ship.  In  the  circumstances,  therefore,  Captain 
von  Miiller  had  no  alternative  but  to  release  this  neutral 
vessel,  which  proceeded  on  her  voyage  and,  in  fact,  con- 
veyed to  the  Indian  Port  authorities  information  of  the 
EMDEN'S  activities,  enabling  them  to  take  precautionary 
measures  which  resulted  in  the  saving  of  a  considerable 

14 


192  EXPLOITS  OF  THE  "  EMDEN  "  [CH.  IV 

volume  of  tonnage  from  capture.1  The  captain  of  the 
EMDEN  apparently  realised  that  he  could  not  much  longer 
keep  his  movements  secret,  since  it  was  essential  that  the 
Kabinga,  with  the  captured  crews  on  board,  should  be 
sent  into  a  neighbouring  port.  He  doubtless  regarded  any 
action  taken  by  the  Italian  merchant  officer  as  of  little 
importance.  At  any  rate,  the  crews  of  the  Indus  and 
Lovat,  who  had  been  on  board  the  Markomannia,  were 
transferred  to  the  Kabinga,  and  that  ship  was  released  to 
proceed  to  Calcutta ;  her  captain  2  was  warned  to  "  take 
care  when  approaching  Sand  Heads,  as  the  lights  are 
out."  That  caution  was  typical  of  the  consideration 
which  Captain  von  Muller  exhibited  throughout  his  raiding 
cruise. 

Just  after  the  Kabinga  had  been  released,  the  EMDEN 
sighted  the  Clan  Matheson  (4,775  tons)  coming  up  to  the 
eastward.  When  she  left  Madras  on  September  12th, 
the  Bay  of  Bengal  was  still  believed  to  be  fairly  safe. 
Captain  William  Harris,  in  an  interview  with  Lloyd's 
agent  at  Rangoon,  subsequently  gave  the  following  details 
of  the  circumstances  in  which  he  was  captured  : 

"  The  steamer  was  bound  from  Madras  to  Calcutta. 
On  Monday,  the  14th,  the  third  officer  called  me  and  re- 
ported that  a  steamer  on  the  port  beam  had  shown  a  red 
flare.  I  went  out  on  deck  and  saw  a  steamer  on  the  port 
beam,  some  distance  away,  with  two  masthead  lights 
showing  clearly.  There  was  a  steamer  on  the  port  bow 
with  all  lights  showing,  both  at  the  masthead  and  on 
deck.  It  was  about  four  miles  distant.  Both  vessels 
were  apparently  heading  the  same  course  as  ourselves. 
About  11.30  I  perceived  some  signals  from  a  point  on  the 
port  quarter,  but  the  midshipman  on  watch  could  not 
read  them,  as  they  seemed  to  say  4  Do  as,'  repeated  again 
and  again.  At  11.40  there  was  a  gunshot  on  the  port 

1  Captain  Giacopolo,  of  the  Loredano,  made  every  effort  to  warn  British 
shipping  of  the  danger,  and  he  succeeded  in  stopping  the  City  of  Rangoon. 
His  information  was  passed  on  to  other  vessels,  and  gave  sufficient  warning 
to  prevent  the  Itonus,  Lotusmere,  and  Rajput  from  falling  into  the  enemy's 
hands.     This  Italian  captain's  action  also  enabled  the  port  officer  at  Cal- 
cutta to  withdraw  the  pilot  vessel,  to  extinguish  the  trading  lights  in 
channels,   and  to  warn   Akyab,   Chittagong,  False  Point,   Vizagapatam, 
and  Cocanada. 

2  Captain  Robinson  and  the  wireless  operator  (Mr.  A.  Weselly)  of  the 
Kabinga  showed   considerable  enterprise  and  ingenuity  in  restoring  the 
wireless  installation,  enabling  messages  to  be  sent  to  Calcutta. 


CH.  iv]       THE   "CLAN  MATHESON'S "   FATE  193 

quarter,  apparently  aimed  at  the  steamer.  A  few  minutes 
later  a  second  shot  came  from  the  same  position.  I  rang 
'  Stand  by,'  and  after  another  short  interval  a  third  gun 
was  fired,  the  shot  passing  across  the  steamer's  bows. 
A  few  minutes  later  a  large  three-funnelled  cruiser  ranged 
up  alongside  with  all  lights  out,  signalling  by  Morse,  4  Stop 
at  once ;  do  not  use  wireless ;  I  will  send  a  boat.'  An 
armed  boat  with  three  lieutenants  and  some  fifteen  or 
twenty  men  came  alongside,  but  not  until  that  moment 
did  we  realise  that  the  vessel  was  a  German  cruiser.  The 
senior  officer  inspected  the  ship's  papers  and  signalled  to 
the  warship,  thereafter  announcing  to  me  that  the  crew 
would  be  transferred  to  a  German  transport  immediately 
and  the  ship  sunk.  I  was  informed  that  the  crew  would  be 
allowed  to  take  part  of  their  effects,  personal  property 
only.  The  whole  of  the  steamer's  crew,  with  such  of 
their  effects  as  they  wanted  most,  were  then  transferred 
to  the  s.s.  Markomannia  in  the  boats  of  the  EMDEN.  This 
was  at  2  a.m.  on  September  15th.  In  the  meantime 
dynamite  charges  were  placed  in  several  positions  in  the 
steamer's  hold,  and  these  were  fired,  and  the  ship  not 
sinking  sufficiently  quickly  for  the  Germans'  purposes, 
the  vessel  was  fired  upon  by  the  cruiser  four  times,  their 
searchlight  playing  upon  her  meanwhile.  Thereafter  the 
steamer  sank  by  the  head,  and  finally,  at  2.35  a.m.,  all 
lights  went  out  and  the  vessel  disappeared. 

"At  4  p.m.  on  September  17th  steamer's  smoke  was 
sighted  on  the  eastern  horizon,  and  the  course  was  altered 
to  cut  her  off.  At  6  p.m.  the  cruiser  stopped  the  Nor- 
wegian s.s.  Dovre,  and  signalled  the  Markomannia  to 
ship  the  Clan  Mathesori's  crew,  which  work  was  started 
at  7.15  and  finished  at  8  p.m.  The  whole  seventy  men 
were  carried  in  the  EMDEN'S  boats.  The  Dovre  arrived 
at  Rangoon  on  the  morning  of  September  19th." 

On  September  15th  the  EMDEN  still  continued  her  north- 
ward cruise,  steaming  to  within  forty  miles  of  Calcutta. 
She  then  turned  south-east  in  the  direction  of  Rangoon. 
By  this  time  the  captain  of  the  EMDEN  appears  to  have 
conjectured  that  he  might  be  interrupted  by  British 
cruisers.  He  determined,  however,  to  carry  out  a  dramatic 
coup  intended  to  produce  psychological  effects  along  the 
Indian  coast.  At  the  entrance  to  Madras  Harbour  there 


194  EXPLOITS   OF  THE   "  EMDEN  "  [CH.  iv 

were  a  number  of  oil-tanks ;  Captain  von  Miiller  decided 
to  fire  into  them.  At  9.30  on  the  evening  of  September 
22nd,  the  cruiser  therefore  crept  in  towards  the  harbour, 
and,  playing  her  searchlights  on  the  tanks,  fired  some 
preliminary  shots  in  order  to  get  the  range.  The  search- 
lights were  then  turned  off,  leaving  the  cruiser  in  darkness, 
and  the  EMDEN  poured  in  a  series  of  broadsides,  altogether 
125  shells.  Within  a  short  time  the  harbour  was  lighted 
up  by  the  fierce  flames  of  the  burning  oil.  The  British 
s.s.  Chupra  was  among  the  vessels  in  harbour  which 
suffered  damage  by  gunfire.  Her  dramatic  purpose 
achieved,  the  German  cruiser  then  steamed  away  at  full 
speed  in  a  north-easterly  direction,  the  forts  on  shore 
opening  fire  without  effect.  The  intention  of  Captain 
von  Miiller  was  to  suggest  that  he  was  proceeding 
towards  Calcutta,  but  when  well  out  of  touch  with  land 
he  turned  south,  sailing  round  the  east  coast  of  Ceylon. 
At  the  same  time  the  Pontoporos  was  sent  away  to  a 
rendezvous.  Good  fortune  again  attended  his  cruise,  for 
the  EMDEN  encountered  the  King  Lud  (3,650  tons),  on 
passage  from  Alexandria  for  Calcutta.  The  ship  was  on 
time  charter,  and,  at  Perim,  Lloyd's  signal-station  signalled 
that  the  King  Lud  was  to  proceed  as  fast  as  possible  to 
Calcutta,  in  order  to  reach  that  port  on  September  30th. 
Captain  David  Harris  subsequently  stated  that  he  under- 
stood that  "the  road  was  reasonably  safe."  He  met 
with  no  incident  until  he  arrived  off  Point  de  Galle,  Ceylon, 
when  the  EMDEN  hove  in  sight,  flying  no  flag,  and  ordered 
the  British  merchant  ship  to  stop.  The  usual  routine 
was  followed,  the  King  Lud  being  sunk  after  the  removal 
of  her  officers  and  men  to  the  German  tender  Marko- 
mannia,  where,  according  to  Captain  Harris,  "  we  were  all 
well  treated." 

Off  Colombo  the  following  day  (September  25th)  the 
EMDEN  saw  the  British  steamer  Tymeric  (3,314  tons)  just 
coming  out  of  harbour  and  followed  her  to  about  forty 
miles  west.  The  Tymeric  was  carrying  a  cargo  of  sugar 
from  Java  to  England,  with  orders  to  call  at  Falmouth 
for  orders.  The  master  (Mr.  T.  T.  Tulloch)  was  taken 
by  surprise,  as  he  had  not  anticipated  trouble.  He  was 
continuing  his  course  to  Minikoi  when,  shortly  before 
midnight,  he  saw  a  vessel,  showing  no  lights,  coming  up 
on  the  port  quarter,  only  two  or  three  miles  distant.  The 


CH.  iv]   THE  "  GRYFEVALE'S  "  ADVENTURE     195 

stranger,  which  proved  to  be  the  German  cruiser,  drew 
in  and  then  sent  the  familiar  signal.  An  armed  party  from 
the  EMDEN  afterwards  took  possession  of  the  merchant- 
man, and  Captain  Tulloch  was  instructed  to  follow  the 
EMDEN.  This  he  refused  to  do,  saying  that  his  captors 
must  navigate  the  ship  themselves.  An  exchange  of 
signals  took  place.  The  captain  of  the  EMDEN  decided 
to  sink  the  Tymeric  as  soon  as  the  officers  and  men  had  been 
removed  to  the  Markomannia,  the  captain  himself  being 
taken  on  board  the  EMDEN,  from  whose  quarter-deck 
he  watched  his  ship  settle  down.  On  the  following  day 
the  German  cruiser  met  the  Gryfevale  (4,424  tons),  which 
was  proceeding  from  Bombay  to  Colombo  in  ballast.  The 
Gryjevale  had  been  detained  in  Bombay  owing  to  reports 
of  the  presence  of  an  enemy  cruiser  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal ; 
on  September  22nd,  however,  clearance  was  given  as  far 
as  Colombo.  The  ship,  therefore,  put  to  sea  on  the  23rd ; 
a  good  lookout  was  kept,  and  no  lights  were  shown  at  night. 
At  midday  on  the  26th,  when  about  thirty-five  miles  to 
the  south-east  of  Cape  Comorin,  a  man-of-war  was  sighted, 
and  an  hour  later  a  signal  to  stop  was  received.  In 
these  circumstances  the  EMDEN  made  another  capture. 
Captain  Steel  was  told  that  he  might  either  follow 
the  cruiser  or  have  his  ship  sunk.  He  accepted  the  former 
alternative. 

"  We  steamed  out  to  the  westward  until  1  a.m.,"  he 
stated  in  a  subsequent  report  to  his  owners,  "  when  lights 
were  sighted,  and  shortly  afterwards  the  Admiralty- char- 
tered collier  Buresk  was  stopped.1  This  was  a  valuable 
prize  for  the  Germans.  The  crew,  with  the  exception  of 
the  captain,  chief  officer,  chief  and  second  engineers,  steward 
and  cook,  were  sent  on  board  us,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  prisoners  from  the  Markomannia  were  sent  on  board  ; 
they  consisted  of  the  crew  of  the  King  Lud  (sunk  on  the 
25th  off  Galle,  Ceylon)  and  part  of  the  crew  of  the  Tymeric 
(sunk  outside  Colombo  at  midnight  on  the  25th),  third 
officer,  fourth  engineer,  and  carpenter ;  the  captain  and 
chief  engineer  were  prisoners  on  board  the  EMDEN,  and  the 

1  The  Buresk  (4,337  tons)  was  on  passage  from  Barry  to  Hong  Kong  with 
coal.  She  was  utilised  by  the  captain  of  the  EMDEN  during  the  remainder 
of  his  cruise,  and  was  eventually  sunk  on  November  9th,  1914,  off  North 
Keeling  Island,  Cocos  Islands,  when  the  Australian  cruiser  SYDNEY  defeated 
and  sank  the  EMDEN.  Such  of  the  officers  and  men  as  had  not  already 
been  landed  by  the  Germans  were  rescued  by  the  SYDNEY. 


196  EXPLOITS   OF  THE   "  EMDEN  "  [CH.  iv 

Chinese  crew  were  transferred  to  the  Buresk.  It  appears 
that  the  captain  and  chief  engineer  of  the  Tymeric  had 
refused  to  follow  the  EMDEN  ;  they  were  given  ten  minutes 
to  get  their  boats  out  and  leave  the  ship  ;  the  ship  was  sunk 
at  once.  In  all  other  cases  where  the  crews  made  no 
trouble,  but  submitted  to  the  orders  given,  the  crews  were 
allowed  from  one  to  three  hours  to  pack  up  their  effects 
and  leave  the  ship.  About  4  a.m.  we  steamed  out  to  the 
westward,  the  Buresk  accompanying  us.  Shortly  after 
daylight  the  Ribera l  in  ballast  was  stopped,  the  crew 
transferred  to  us,  and  the  ship  sunk  by  shell  fire.  The 
course  was  again  set  to  the  westward,  it  evidently  being 
the  intention  to  get  us  as  far  as  possible  from  Colombo 
before  releasing  us.  Before  dark  another  vessel,  which 
proved  to  be  the  Foyle,*  from  Malta  to  Rangoon,  light, 
was  stopped,  the  crew  transhipped  to  us,  and  the  vessel 
sunk.  At  10  o'clock — much  to  my  relief,  you  may  be  sure 
— I  was  told  that  we  were  free  to  resume  our  voyage.  I 
wish  here  to  say  that  I  appreciate  very  much  the  courtesy 
shown  to  us  by  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  prize  crew,  and 
also  the  good  behaviour  of  the  men ;  they  one  and  all 
performed  their  duties  with  every  consideration  for  every- 
one on  board." 

Interesting  sidelights  on  the  proceedings  of  the  EMDEN 
in  her  attacks  upon  commerce  were  afterwards  furnished 
by  a  diary  which  was  kept  by  the  master  of  the  Buresk 
(Mr.  F.  G.  Taylor),  in  which  he  recounted  his  remarkable 
experiences  during  the  period  when  he  was  compelled  to 
accompany  the  EMDEN  : 

"  September  27th. — 1  a.m.  stopped  by  German  cruiser 
EMDEN  ;  officers  came  aboard  and  told  crew  to  go  on  board 
Gryfevale.  2  a.m.  proceeded  full  speed  after  EMDEN  ; 
9  a.m.  sank  Ribera,  proceeded  west  towards  Minikoi. 

1  The  Ribera  (3,500  tons;  master,  Mr.  John  Isdale)  was  proceeding  in 
ballast  from  Glasgow  to  Batavia  when  she  encountered  the  EMDEN,  north- 
west of  Colombo. 

2  The  Foyle  (4,147   tons)   was   on  passage  from   Dunstan-on-Tyne  to 
Colombo  and  Rangoon  in  water  ballast.     According  to  Captain  W.  H. 
Gibson,  he  was  informed  at  the  Admiral  Superintendent's  office  at  Malta 
that  "  the  eastern  route  was  all  clear,"  and,  calling  at  Port  Said,  he  received 
no  instructions,  and  sailed  on   September  llth  "with  every  confidence 
that  the  route  was  clear,  having  received  no  information  to  the  contrary." 
The  normal  conditions  in  the  Arabian  Sea  contributed  to  a  false  sense  of 
safety. 


en.  iv]  FOLLOWING  THE   "  EMDEN  "  197 

9  p.m.  sank  Foyle ;  10  p.m.  released  Gryjevale ;  EMDEN 
proceeded  south  full  speed,  Buresk  and  Markomannia 
following. 

"  September  28th. — Proceeding  south  full  speed. 

44  September  29th. — Arrived  off  group  Maldive  Islands  ; 

9  a.m.   EMDEN  took  coal    from  Markomannia ;    9  p.m. 
stopped  coaling  and  proceeded  south. 

44  September  30th. — Stopped  off  Maldive  group  ;  Marko- 
mannia came  alongside  Buresk  with  engine-oil  and  water 
for  boilers ;  1  p.m.  Markomannia  went  alongside  EMDEN 
to  coal;  9  p.m.  Markomannia  left  EMDEN  and  proceeded 
east ;  EMDEN  proceeded  south. 

"October  1st. — Steaming  south  to  Australian  route. 

"October  2nd. — Steaming  south;  EMDEN  receiving  wire- 
less that  trade  route  from  Aden  to  Colombo  was  clear  for 
commerce. 

"  October  3rd. — EMDEN  steering  on  route  from  Aden  to 
Cape  Lemvin,  south  of  Chagos  Islands. 

44  October  4>th. — Steaming  on  route,  having  big  gun 
practice  in  the  afternoon. 

44  October  5th. — Steaming  slow  all  day  on  trade  route, 
first  north-west  and  then  south-west,  having  rifle 
practice,  etc. ;  also  in  wireless  communication  with 

KONIGSBERG. 

"  October  6th. — Steaming  zigzag  on  trade  route. 

"  October  7th. — Steaming  zigzag  on  trade  route,  having 
target  practice  with  big  guns ;  shooting  good  and  quick. 

"  October  8th. — Still  cruising  on  trade  route. 

"  October  9th. — Arrived  in  Diego  Garcia  at  7  a.m.  ; 
anchored ;  EMDEN  scrubbed  bottom  and  painted  boot 
topping  with  paint  taken  from  Buresk  ;  at  2  p.m.  finished 
painting,  came  alongside  Buresk  and  took  coal  on  board  ; 

10  p.m.  stopped  coaling  for  the  night. 

"  October  10th. — Coaling  continued  ;  noon,  completed 
coaling,  1,300  tons  coal  on  board ;  hove  up  anchors  and 
proceeded  north  full  speed. 

"October  llth. — Proceeding  north  full  speed,  fresh  wind 
and  rain. 

"  October  12th. — Steering  north  full  speed,  crossed  the  line 
6  p.m.  Heavy  rain  and  strong  winds. 

"  October  13th. — Similar  conditions,  still  steaming 
north. 

"  October  14>th, — Steaming  for  the  north  group  of  the 


198  EXPLOITS  OF  THE   "  EMDEN  "  [CH.  iv 

Maldives  to  coal ;  received  wireless  that  HAMPSHIRE  was  500 
miles  off,  also  cruisers  DUKE  OF  EDINBURGH,  CHATHAM, 
WEYMOUTH  were  searching  for  them  but  knew  their 
positions  ;  also  got  wireless  that  Antwerp  had  fallen  and 
Russians  driven  back  to  Warsaw. 

"  October  15th. — Arrived  in  the  north  group  of  Maldives 
to  coal  at  8  a.m.  ;  left  at  4  p.m.  and  steered  for  Minikoi 
Light. 

"  October  16th. — Captured  at  1  a.m.  the  Clan  Grant 1  and 
dredger  Ponrabbel?  also  Benmohr  *  at  10  a.m.  All  sunk 
same  day. 

"  October  17th. — Cruising  round  Minikoi  Light. 

"  October  ISth. — Noon,  received  wireless  that  steamers 
were  steering  sixty  miles  north  of  track  ;  EMDEN  proceeded 
north  and  captured  Troilus  4  at  3  p.m.,  and  St.  Egbert  at 
9  p.m. 

"  October  19th. — 1  a.m.  captured  Eccford ;  sank  Troilus 
and  Chilkana 8  at  4  p.m  .  ;  released  St.  Egbert  at  6  p.m." 

Another  first-hand  story  of  the  EMDEN  is  that  of  Mr. 
Somers  Ellis,  who  was  one  of  the  seven  passengers  on 

1  The  Clan  Grant  (3,948  tons;  master,  Mr.  N.  Leslie)  was  on  the  track 
Minikoi  to  Colombo  when  captured,  shortly  after  midnight  on  October  16th. 
She  was  proceeding  from  Glasgow  to  Liverpool  to  Colombo  with  a  general 
cargo. 

2  The  dredger  Ponrdbbel  (473  tons;  master,  Mr.  E.  G.  Gare)  left  Barry 
Dock  on  August  23rd,  and  was  captured  when  eighteen  miles  north-west 
of  Minikoi  Lighthouse. 

3  The  Benmohr  (4,806  tons)  left  Leith  on  September  4th  for  Yokohama. 
The  EMDEN,  showing  no  lights,  was  indistinguishable  in  the  darkness, 
when  the  British  vessel  was  hailed.    It  was  not  until  the  boarding-party 
had  examined  the  ship's  papers   and  asked  a  number  of  questions  in 
perfect  English  that  the  identity  of  the  raider  was  revealed.     Captain  J.  B. 
Sarchet,  in  reporting  his  experiences,  subsequently  stated  :   "  I  steered  the 
usual  track  from  Suez  to  Guardafui.     From  there  I  shaped  my  course  to 
pass  about  thirty-five  miles  north  of  Minikoi.     I  inquired  at  the  British 
Consul,  Port  Said,  if  they  had  any  instructions  to  give  me  ;   they  told  me 
'  No,'  but  I  was  to  signal  at  Perim  or  Aden  for  instructions.     I  stopped  at 
Perim  in  the  afternoon  and  signalled,  asking  if  they  had  any  instructions 
to  give  ;   their  reply  was  '  No.'     I  then  asked  if  there  was  any  war  news  ; 
they  also  replied  '  No.'     My  intention  was  to  ask  at  Colombo  or  Point  de 
Galle  for  instructions.     In  all  previous  voyages  I  have  always  shaped  my 
course,  after  passing  Guardafui,  to  pass  five  miles  south  of  Minikoi.     I 
calculate  I  was  about  forty  miles  to  the  north  of  my  usual  track  when  the 
Benmohr  was  captured." 

4  The  Troilus  (7,562  tons)  cleared  Colombo  on  October  17th  for  London 
with  a  general  cargo.     The  master  affirmed  that  he  was  carrying  out  the 
instructions  received  from  the  Intelligence  Officer  at  Colombo  when  he 
met  the  EMDEN. 

6  The  Chilkana  (3,244  tons;  master,  Mr.  L.  N.  Archdeacon)  was  making 
for  Calcutta  when  she  encountered  the  EMDEN  off  Minikoi  and  was  sunk. 


CH.  iv]  A  PASSENGER'S   STORY  199 

board  the   Troilus,  and   was   accompanied   by   his   wife. 
According  to  Mr.  Ellis  : 

"  Captain  Long  called  on  the  Naval  Intelligence  Officer 
twice  while  at  Colombo — the  last  time  just  before  leaving 
— and  was  told  that  the  route  to  Aden  was  clear  and  safe, 
but  that,  as  an  additional  precaution,  it  would  be  well 
for  him  to  go  about  forty  miles  north  of  the  usual  track 
by  Minikoi,  first  passing  near  Cape  Comorin,  and  then 
setting  a  course  parallel  to  the  regular  route.  Captain 
Long  carried  out  these  instructions  exactly,  and  informed 
me  on  Sunday  morning  that  he  had  sighted  the  light  on 
Cape  Comorin  during  the  night,  and  was  then  about  forty 
miles  north  of  the  direct  track  from  Colombo  to  Minikoi. 

"  Sunday,  the  18th  instant,  was  a  brilliantly  clear  day  after 
rain  at  early  morning.  At  about  2  p.m.  Captain  Long 
said  to  me  that  a  suspicious-looking  vessel  was  approaching 
from  the  south ;  and  after  a  short  time  we  were  able  to 
identify  it  as  a  German  cruiser  of  the  EMDEN  type.  A 
little  behind  her  was  a  merchant  vessel,  afterwards  found 
to  be  the  British  coal  transport  steamer  Buresk.  The 
EMDEN  rapidly  came  on,  in  a  direction  calculated  to  cut 
us  off  (an  officer  afterwards  told  me  that  they  were  steam- 
ing at  19  knots),  and  when  between  one  and  two  miles 
away  hoisted  signal  flags,  which  we  could  not  at  once 
identify.  We  were  afterwards  told  that  they  signified 
'  Don't  use  your  wireless,'  and  then  '  Stop.'  The  EMDEN 
then  fired  a  blank  shot,  and  the  engines  of  the  Troilus 
were  promptly  stopped,  at  about  2.40  p.m.  When  about 
a  quarter  of  a  mile  away,  the  EMDEN  lowered  a  boat  and  we 
were  boarded  by  a  lieutenant,  a  petty  officer,  and  (I  think) 
twelve  men,  including  artificers,  who  took  charge  of  the 
engine-room.  I  did  not  hear  the  instructions  given,  but 
a  commencement  was  at  once  made  to  swing  out  six  boats 
and  lower  them  to  the  level  of  the  upper  deck,  where  they 
were  left  hanging  from  the  davits  and  lashed  to  prevent 
swinging.  This  operation  was  carried  out  smartly  and 
well.  We  passengers  were  told  to  prepare  all  our  private 
effects  for  transhipment  to  another  vessel.  Towards 
evening  the  German  officer  in  command  told  us  that  the 
captured  collier  in  attendance  on  the  EMDEN  had  already 
several  crews  on  board,  and  that  the  accommodation  was 
very  poor,  so  that  we  might  remain  on  the  Troilus  that  night. 


200  EXPLOITS  OF  THE   "  EMDEN  "  [CH.  IT 

He  said  that  they  expected  another  vessel  that  evening 
with  better  accommodation,  and  that  we  should  probably 
be  moved  to  her  in  the  morning.  This  officer,  a  Naval 
Reserve  lieutenant,  Lauterbach  by  name,  had  been  for 
some  years  in  command  of  Hamburg- Amerika  coasting 
steamers  running  between  Shanghai  and  Tientsin,  and  knew 
both  Captain  Long  (of  the  s.s.  Troilus)  and  myself  by  name. 

"  They  obviously  expected  the  Troilus,  and  as  obviously 
knew  the  course  we  (and  other  ships)  were  likely  to  take 
if  not  on  the  direct  run  to  Minikoi. 

"  Immediately  the  boarding-party  had  taken  charge, 
the  head  of  the  Troilus  was  turned  round  to  a  little  south 
of  east,  and  we  proceeded  at  half  speed  for  nearly  six  hours 
(say  from  2.50  to  8.50  p.m.)  in  nearly  the  same  direction  in 
company  with  the  EMDEN  and  Buresk.  At  about  8.30  p.m. 
a  light  was  seen  on  the  horizon  to  eastward,  and  the 
Troilus  and  Buresk  were  shortly  afterwards  stopped  (we 
had  all  lights  out),  while  the  EMDEN  went  forward  and 
captured  the  expected  vessel,  the  St.  Egbert,  bound  (last) 
from  Colombo  for  Aden  and  New  York.  We  all  then  went 
about  south-south-east,  slow,  and  at  about  1  a.m.  next 
morning  the  British  collier  Exford,1  outward  bound  with  6,000 
tons  Welsh  coal,  was  captured.  .  .  . 

"  At  6  a.m.  on  the  19th  we  commenced  to  load  the  boats 
with  baggage,  and  at  about  7  a.m.  we  transferred  therein 
to  the  St.  Egbert,  and  met  with  the  most  kind  attention 
from  her  commander,  Captain  Barr. 

"  The  sea  was  smooth,  with  a  south-east  swell,  and  a  gang- 
way was  lowered  on  both  boats  for  my  wife's  use.  Previous 
to  our  leaving  the  Troilus,  twelve  Chinese  firemen  and  a 
Chinese  steward  were  sent  to  the  Buresk  by  the  German 
officer's  orders,  and  twelve  other  firemen  were  afterwards 
sent  to  the  Exford.  These  men  were  promised  the  same 
pay  as  before. 

"  At  about  7.30  a.m.  smoke  was  seen  on  the  horizon, 
and  the  EMDEN  went  away  to  welcome  the  British  India 
boat  Chilkana,  a  new  ship  of  6,000  tons,8  outward  bound. 

"  We    soon    afterwards    received    her    captain,    twelve 

1  The  Exford  (4,542  tons ;  master,  Mr.  W.  C.  Donovan)  was  on  passage 
from  Cardiff  to  Hong  Kong  under  Admiralty  sealed  orders.     The  vessel 
was  presumably  expected  by  the  enemy;   at  any  rate,  her  commander 
was  greeted  by  name  by  the  EMDEN'S  officer  who  boarded  her. 

2  The  s.s.  Chilkana  (3,244  gross  tons)  was  sunk  by  gun-fire,  110  miles 
E.N.E.  from  Minikoi. 


CH.  iv]  "ST.   EGBERT'     RELEASED  201 

passengers  (all  company's  employees)  and  crew  on  the 
St.  Egbert,  and  afterwards  the  captains  and  crews  of  the 
Buresk  and  of  the  Benmohr,  Clan  Grant,  and  a  Tasmanian 
dredger,  all  of  whom  were  on  the  Buresk. 

"  At  10.40  a.m.  (on  the  19th)  the  EMDEN  fired  three 
shells  at  the  water-line  of  the  Troilus,  all  forward  (I  think) 
of  the  bridge.  She  sank  very  slowly,  and  at  1.30  the 
EMDEN  fired  another  shell  or  two  forward,  and  one  aft  ; 
all  shots  were  on  the  port  side.  At  2.40  p.m.  the  Troilus 
sank,  after  listing  heavily  and  then  rolling  over  to  her  port 
side  and  diving  stem  first.  It  was  a  most  distressing 
sight.  The  B.I.  steamer  Chilkana  was  sunk  (in  half  an 
hour  after  being  fired  on)  just  before  sunset.  At  about 
7  p.m.  the  captain  of  the  St.  Egbert  was  told  to  set  a  course 
for  the  Indian  Ocean  between  Calicut  and  Tuticorin, 
and  we  reached  Cochin  at  6  p.m.  on  the  20th  instant.  The 
Buresk  and  Exford  were  kept  with  the  EMDEN,  each  having 
about  6,000  tons  of  coal  on  board.  The  St.  Egbert  was 
spared  owing  to  her  cargo  being  for  the  U.S.A."  Mr.  Ellis 
added  that :  "  We  have  met  with  the  utmost  kindness 
and  consideration  from  all  concerned,  including  the  officers 
of  the  EMDEN." 

The  experience  of  the  St.  Egbert  (5,596  tons),  mentioned 
in  Mr.  Ellis' s  statement,  was  exceptional.  The  ship  had 
a  neutral  cargo  for  American  consignees,  and  was  on  her 
passage  from  Yokohama  to  New  York.  She  left  the  former 
port  on  July  18th,  and  therefore  before  the  declaration  of 
war,  and,  calling  at  Colombo,  sailed  thence  on  October  17th. 
Captain  Barr  learnt  at  Colombo  that  the  route  was 
reasonably  safe,  and  was  advised  to  keep  close  to  Cape 
Comorin,  and  from  thence  to  shape  a  course  to  pass  forty 
miles  north  of  Minikoi  Island.  The  St.  Egbert  steered  the 
course  recommended,  but  at  9.30  p.m.  on  the  following 
day  the  EMDEN  stopped  and  boarded  her.  In  the  course 
of  conversation  with  Captain  Barr,  the  lieutenant  who  was 
in  charge  of  the  prize  crew  stated  that  the  Germans  had 
learnt  of  his  departure  from  Colombo  on  the  previous 
day,  and  were  aware  that  he  had  received  orders  "  to 
proceed  on  a  more  northerly  track  than  usual,"  adding 
that  he  had  been  informed  that  the  British  cruiser 
HAMPSHIRE  had  arrived  at  Colombo  that  morning,  and 


202  EXPLOITS  OF  THE   "  EMDEN  "  [CH.-IT 

that  her  crew  were  ashore  playing  football.  This  em- 
broidery, as  in  so  many  similar  instances,  was  probably 
mere  bluff.  The  next  morning  the  EMDEN  rounded  up 
the  captured  vessels,  and  all  the  passengers  and  crews 
of  the  steamers  Benmohr,  Clan  Grant,  Buresk,  Troilus, 
Exford,  Chilkana,  and  Ponrabbel,  were  sent  on  board  the 
St.  Egbert,  which  was  released  on  October  19th  with  orders 
to  proceed  to  Aden.  In  view  of  the  large  number  of 
persons  on  board  and  consequent  restricted  accommodation 
and  food-supplies,  Captain  Barr  was  subsequently  per- 
mitted to  make  for  Cochin,  where  he  arrived  on  the 
morning  of  October  20th. 

The  month  of  October  was  drawing  to  its  close,  and  the 
captain  of  the  EMDEN  suspected  that  news  of  his  captures 
must  have  become  known  on  shore,  and  suitable  measures 
taken  by  the  British  naval  authorities  to  arrest  his  career 
of  destruction.  He  determined  to  pay  a  visit  to  Penang 
and  see  what  mischief  he  could  do  there.  The  EMDEN, 
as  on  the  occasion  of  the  Madras  raid,  erected  a  dummy 
funnel  made  of  canvas,  in  the  hope  that  she  might  be 
mistaken  for  one  of  the  British  cruisers  which  Captain  von 
Miiller  thought  to  be  in  the  vicinity  of  Penang.  It  is 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  book  to  describe  in  detail  the 
torpedoing  of  the  Russian  cruiser  ZHEMCHUG,  which  was 
lying  in  the  harbour.  The  EMDEN,  having  completed  that 
task,  turned  and  steamed  out  of  the  harbour  at  full  speed. 
Outside  she  encountered  the  Glenturret  (4,696  tons),  which 
had  left  London  on  September  23rd  for  Yokohama,  calling 
at  Penang,  Singapore,  and  Hong  Kong.  She  was  loaded 
with  Government  munitions  and  explosives,  and  would 
have  proved  a  valuable  capture  for  the  Germans.  On 
the  night  of  October  26th,  when  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Sabang,  the  Glenturret  sent  a  wireless  signal  that  she 
would  arrive  at  Penang  on  October  28th,  and  asking  that 
a  lighter  should  be  provided  to  take  off  twenty  tons  of 
explosives.  Arriving  off  the  entrance  to  Penang  Harbour 
in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning  of  the  27th,  the  Glen- 
turret stopped,  the  master  (Mr.  H.  Jones)  deciding  to  wait 
until  daylight  before  entering.  She  was  on  her  way  into 
the  harbour  later  in  the  morning,  with  the  B  flag  (ex- 
plosives) flying,  when  the  EMDEN  ranged  alongside  her, 
being  only  about  thirty  feet  distant.  Captain  Jones 
was  hailed  in  English  and  asked  his  reasons  for  flying  the 


THE   WHITE   STAB  LINER   "OLYMPIC"   (FROM   THE   AIR). 


202] 


CH.  ivj          CRUISER  VERSUS  DESTROYER  203 

B  flag.  He  replied  that  the  Glenturret  was  carrying 
paraffin.  The  EMDEN  then  lowered  a  boat  for  the  pur- 
pose of  boarding  her,  when  the  French  destroyer  MOUS- 
QUET, which  had  been  in  Penang  Harbour,  appeared.  In 
the  circumstances  the  captain  of  the  EMDEN  had  no  further 
interest  in  the  Glenturret,  but  immediately  made  off  to 
ascertain  the  identity  of  the  strange  destroyer  on  the 
horizon.  Captain  von  Miiller  did  not  know  what  to  make 
of  the  intruder,  for  at  6,000  yards  the  strange  man-of- 
war  appeared  much  larger  than  she  really  was,  owing  to 
the  mirage  of  the  early  morning.  As  the  EMDEN  closed 
in  to  about  4,800  yards,  she  was  recognised  as  the  French 
torpedo-boat  destroyer  MOUSQUET.  The  subsequent  fight 
was  an  unequal  one.  As  the  destroyer  sank,  the  EMDEN 
rescued  the  crew,  numbering  in  all  thirty-six,  three  of 
whom  afterwards  died  in  the  EMDEN  owing  to  the  severity 
of  their  wounds.  The  EMDEN  had  lost  much  time  in  deal- 
ing with  the  MOUSQUET,  and  now  saw  a  torpedo-boat  ap- 
proaching her  from  Penang,  so  she  at  once  steamed  for 
the  Indian  Ocean  at  full  speed  with  the  torpedo-boat  in 
chase.  After  being  pursued  for  four  hours,  she  lost  sight 
of  the  torpedo-boat  in  heavy  rain,  and  was  free  to  proceed 
to  her  collier. 

In  the  meantime  the  Glenturret  had  made  her  escape, 
but  on  the  following  day  the  EMDEN  came  across  the 
s.s.  Newburn  (3,554  tons;  master,  Mr.  J.  R.  Matthews),  on 
passage  from  the  Tyne  to  Singapore  and  Samarang.  She 
was  carrying  a  neutral  cargo,  so  the  captain  of  the  EMDEN 
decided  to  release  her.  Before  doing  so,  however,  he  put 
the  survivors  of  the  MOUSQUET  on  board,  and  the  Newburn 
reached  Penang  on  October  31st. 

The  cruise  of  the  EMDEN  was  now  nearing  its  close. 
Captain  von  Miiller,  suspecting  that  a  hue  and  cry  had 
been  raised,  decided  that  he  would  do  well  to  change  the 
scene  of  his  activities.  With  the  idea  of  cutting  the  cable, 
he  steamed  for  Cocos  Islands,  which  were  reached  on  Sun- 
day evening,  November  8th.  The  German  cruiser  sailed 
round  the  islands  in  order  to  see  that  everything  was 
clear,  and  then  proceeded  towards  Direction  Island,  the 
dummy  funnel  being  again  in  place,  and  landed  a  party 
of  fifty  men  with  instructions  to  destroy  the  wireless 
station  and  cut  the  cable.  In  the  meantime,  the  wireless 
station  had  sent  out  an  urgent  message  for  help ;  it  was 


204  EXPLOITS  OF  THE  "  EMDEN  "  [CH.  iv 

picked  up  by  the  Allied  men-of-war  on  convoy  duty  with 
the  First  Australian  Contingent.  On  instructions  from 
the  senior  officer,  H.M.A.S.  SYDNEY  raised  steam  for  full 
speed  and  proceeded  to  Direction  Island.  The  story 
of  the  destruction  of  the  EMDEN  does  not  come  within 
the  scope  of  this  history :  it  is  sufficient  to  add  that  the 
German  cruiser's  career  was  brought  to  an  end,  the  men 
on  board  the  Buresk  being  rescued.  When  Captain  Glossop 
reached  this  ship,  he  found  that  she  was  sinking,  as  the 
Kingston  had  been  "  knocked  out  and  damaged  to  prevent 
repairing." 

The  story  of  the  first  phase  of  the  attack  on  British 
commerce  would  be  incomplete  were  no  reference  made 
to  the  circumstances  in  which  the  gunboat  GEIER  captured 
the  s.s.  Southport  (3,588  tons).  The  adventurous  story, 
which  afterwards  moved  the  Admiralty  to  express  their 
approbation  of  the  action  of  Captain  A.  Clopet  and  the 
officers  and  men,  cannot  be  better  told  than  in  the  form 
of  a  paraphrase  of  the  narrative  as  related  by  the  first- 
named. 

The  s.s.  Southport  left  Auckland,  New  Zealand,  on 
June  12th,  to  load  a  cargo  of  phosphates  for  the  Pacific 
Phosphate  Company  at  Nauru,  calling  at  Ocean  Island 
for  orders.  The  voyage  was  uneventful.  Off  Nauru, 
information  was  sent  by  the  manager  of  the  Phosphate 
Company  that  loading  had  been  delayed,  owing  to  dan- 
gerous weather,  strong  currents,  and  the  exposed  position 
of  the  island,  and  that,  in  consequence  of  tonnage 
having  precedence  over  the  Southport,  that  vessel  need 
not  present  herself  for  loading  for  some  time.  Captain 
Clopet  decided  to  follow  the  example  of  other  captains 
placed  in  similar  circumstances,  and  wait  at  Tarawa 
(Gilbert  Islands),  where  further  orders  could  be  conveyed 
to  him,  in  preference  to  steaming  round  the  island  against 
the  strong  prevailing  easterly  current.  The  Southport 
returned  to  Nauru  on  July  28th.  The  captain  found  that 
only  some  450  tons  of  phosphates  had  been  loaded,  and 
there  was  still  a  balance  of  13,000  tons  to  be  shipped  before 
the  Southport  would  be  required.  In  order  to  save  coal, 
he  decided  to  bear  up  for  Kusaie,  the  most  easterly  island 
in  the  Caroline  group  (German),  where  the  conditions 
appeared  to  be  better  than  at  Taraiva.  It  was  also 
arranged  that  the  manager  at  Nauru  should  forward  loading 


CH.  iv]      CAPTURE  OF  THE  "  SOUTHPORT "  205 

orders  by  the  steamer  Germania,  due  at  Kusaie  on  August 
28th.  The  Southport  arrived  at  Kusaie  on  August  4th, 
and  remained  there  awaiting  instructions.  The  non-arrival 
of  the  Germania  on  the  stipulated  date  caused  surprise, 
owing  to  the  regularity  of  her  previous  voyages.  No 
news  being  forthcoming,  it  was  decided  to  sail  for  Nauru 
on  September  6th.  On  the  4th,  the  captain  being  ashore 
at  the  time,  the  German  gunboat  GEIER  and  the  transport 
Tsintau,  of  Bremen,  came  to  anchor  in  the  harbour,  and 
a  boat  full  of  armed  officers  and  sailors  put  off  from  the 
GEIER  and  boarded  the  British  ship.  Captain  Clopet,  on 
returning  on  board  his  ship  shortly  afterwards,  was  in- 
formed by  the  German  officers  that,  "  war  having  been 
declared  by  England  on  Germany,"  they  demanded  that 
all  the  ship's  papers,  register,  ship's  articles,  load-line, 
etc.,  be  handed  over.  It  was  explained  that  the  ship 
was  chartered  to  load  phosphates  at  Nauru  for  Stettin. 
The  engineers  of  the  warship  then  came  on  board  and 
began  disabling  the  vessel,  principally  by  removing  the 
four  eccentrics  of  the  L.P.  and  H.P.  engines  and  other 
connected  parts,  as  well  as  the  intermediate  stop  valve. 
The  following  day  the  transport  Tsintau  proceeded  along- 
side and  started  transhipping  the  Southport's  coal  into 
her  bunkers,  the  work  continuing  until  6  a.m.  on 
August  7th  (Monday).  The  same  day  at  10  a.m.  a  boat 
full  of  armed  officers  and  men  boarded  the  Southport  and 
came  on  the  lower  bridge,  when  a  formal  act  of  seizure 
was  read  over  to  the  captain  by  the  officer  in  charge, 
appropriating  the  vessel  to  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment. The  armed  sailors  were  lined  up  on  one  side  of 
the  lower  bridge,  and,  the  British  ensign  having  been 
previously  hauled  down,  the  German  naval  ensign  was 
hoisted  on  1^ie  flagstaff,  the  German  officers  and  sailors 
saluting  theiteflag.  Everything  was  done  in  the  most 
formal  manner,  as  though  the  scene  were  being  enacted 
on  the  stage  before  an  appreciative  audience.  Captain 
Clopet  was  subsequently  informed  that  he  would  remain 
in  charge  of  the  ship  and  responsible  for  it,  as  well  as  for 
the  discipline  of  the  crew,  pending  any  future  action  on 
the  part  of  the  German  Government.  It  should  be  men- 
tioned that  the  commander  of  the  GEIER  at  first  decided 
to  sink  the  Southport.  He  learnt  afterwards  that,  owing 
to  the  non-arrival  of  the  Germania  with  provisions,  the 


206  EXPLOITS  OF  THE   "  EMDEN  "  [CH.  iv 

Southport  was  exceedingly  short  of  food,  and  he  was  told 
that  the  crew  would  be  faced  with  starvation  unless  the 
situation  was  relieved.  The  German  officer  was  not  un- 
sympathetic, but  urged  that  he  could  not  send  provisions, 
having  himself  an  insufficient  supply.  Ultimately  he  did 
in  fact  send  four  loaves  of  bread,  which  were  accepted. 
But  his  more  effective  aid  took  the  form  of  an  order  on 
the  King  of  Kusaie,  in  the  name  of  the  Imperial  German 
Government,  to  supply  the  ship  with  such  food  as  the 
island  produced. 

The  GEIER  and  Tsintau  left  on  the  afternoon  of  the  7th, 
the  Germans  apparently  satisfied  that  the  Southport  could 
not  move  ;  they  disappeared  in  a  south-easterly  direction. 
After  their  departure,  the  captain  consulted  the  chief 
engineer  (Mr.  J.  C.  Dodd)  as  to  the  possibility  of  repairing  the 
engines  in  such  a  manner  as  to  enable  the  Southport  to  put  to 
sea.  Mr.  Dodd,  nothing  daunted  by  the  damage  which  had 
been  done,  decided  that  the  position  was  not  hopeless.  His 
confidence  was  justified.  The  work  of  repair  was  carried 
on  from  day  to  day  until  September  15th,  when  Captain 
Clopet  had  the  satisfaction  of  learning  that  the  engines 
were  ready.  Steam  was  raised  and  orders  were  given  for 
a  trial  that  night.  The  trial  began  shortly  after  midnight, 
the  captain  being  present  in  the  engine-room  in  order  to 
judge  the  reliability  of  the  engines.  After  two  attempts 
the  engines  started.  They  were  stopped  after  a  few 
revolutions,  the  chief  engineer  stating  that  he  was  confident 
that  everything  was  as  satisfactory  as  could  be  expected. 
A  statement  was  handed  to  the  captain  in  confirmation 
of  this  opinion.  The  following  evening,  Captain  Clopet 
called  the  officers  and  engineers  of  the  ship  to  the  cabin, 
and  then  told  them  that  he  intended  to  make  an  attempt 
to  recapture  the  steamer  and  take  her  into  Australian 
waters,  Brisbane  being  the  nearest  port.  As  an  alternative, 
it  was  suggested  that  the  vessel  might  remain  in  Kusaie 
until  the  end  of  hostilities,  when  in  all  probability  an  ex- 
change of  vessels  would  take  place  between  England  and 
Germany.  Captain  Clopet  pointed  out,  however,  that  the 
value  represented  by  the  Southport  was  at  stake,  and  that 
at  that  moment,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  the  ship 
was  the  property  of  the  German  Government ;  if  the 
attempt  to  bring  the  vessel  to  a  safe  Australian  port  was 
successful,  the  money  represented  in  the  ship  would  revert 


CH.  iv]  A  BOLD   STROKE  207 

to  the  original  flag.  The  captain's  decision  was  unani- 
mously accepted  by  the  officers  present,  and  on  the  following 
morning  the  crew  gave  their  support.  In  anticipation  of 
the  voyage,  since  there  was  a  shortage  of  provisions,  the 
captain  obtained  from  the  shore  some  400  pounds  of  roots, 
which  are  used  by  the  natives  only  when  on  the  verge  of 
starvation,  besides  about  350  cocoanuts,  the  latter  being 
provided  by  the  King  of  Kusaie,  who  was  by  this  time 
aware  that  an  attempt  to  escape  was  to  be  made.  Though 
other  provisions  were  taken  on  board  as  a  precautionary 
measure,  the  voyage  was  begun  on  straitened  rations. 

A  word  may  be  added  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the 
engines  were  repaired.  The  German  engineers  had  left 
the  two  eccentric  rods  for  the  L.P.  engines  ;  one  of  these 
was  put  on  the  ahead  sheave  of  the  H.P.  engine,  the  other 
rod  being  kept  in  place  on  the  ahead  sheave  of  the  L.P. 
engine.  Thus  the  engineers  were  able  to  work  the  engines 
subject  to  the  disadvantage  that  they  could  move  only 
in  one  direction,  i.e.,  ahead ;  it  was  impossible  to  reverse 
the  engines,  however  great  the  need.  There  was  also  some 
difficulty  in  restarting  the  engines  once  they  were  stopped. 
These  circumstances  rendered  the  task  of  handling  the 
ship  difficult.  The  attempt  to  move  the  Southport  was 
made  early  on  the  morning  of  September  8th.  The 
harbour  of  Kusaie  is  very  small,  having  on  one  side  land 
and  on  the  other  a  coral  reef.  It  provided  barely  sufficient 
room  for  the  steamer  to  swing,  and  at  the  time  of 
starting,  Captain  Clopet  swung  her  stem  towards  the 
entrance,  the  channel  having  been  buoyed  by  his  orders 
previous  to  heaving  up  the  anchor.  With  the  assistance 
of  warps,  the  steamer's  stern  was  brought  into  the  wind, 
the  anchor  hove  barely  clear  of  the  bottom,  and  her  head 
started  to  pay  off  with  the  wind  towards  the  entrance. 
When  nearly  square  in  the  channel,  the  telegraph  was  rung 
"  Full  ahead,"  and  the  last  rope  was  let  go  as  soon  as  the 
engines  started. 

The  voyage  was  uneventful;  lights  were  carefully  screened 
up  to  9  p.m.,  when  they  were  put  out.  The  steamer 
passed  to  the  westward  of  San  Christoval  (Solomon  Islands) 
on  September  23rd,  and  arrived  to  the  north-east  of  Sandy 
Cape  on  September  28th — when,  in  reply  to  inquiries, 
the  s.s.  Westminster  reported  the  coast  clear  of  enemy 
ships.  A  course  was  then  shaped  towards  Brisbane. 

15 


208  EXPLOITS  OF  THE  "  EMDEN  "  [CH.  iv 

On  the  same  day  the  Southport  observed  the  Dutch  steamer 
Tasman,  of  Batavia,  altering  her  course  towards  the  coast, 
and  shortly  afterwards  a  steamer  ashore  at  right  angles 
to  the  beach  was  observed.  The  Southport  also  turned 
towards  the  steamer,  which  was  flying  the  International 
Distress  Signal  N.C.  ("  Want  immediate  assistance "). 
The  vessel  was  the  s.s.  Marlvo.  As  the  first  impression 
conveyed  by  the  steamer's  position  was  that  she  must 
have  gone  ashore  during  the  night,  the  captain  of  the 
Southport  decided  to  come  to  anchor  in  a  position  to  render 
help.  It  was  a  characteristic  act  on  the  part  of  a  British 
seaman  who  had  so  recently  been  himself  in  trouble. 
The  Southport  drew  in  between  the  Tasman  and  the 
stranded  vessel.  Assistance  had  unfortunately  come  too 
late,  for  the  Marlvo  already  had  her  after  compartments 
full  of  water,  through  striking  some  obstruction  off  Sandy 
Cape.  Her  passengers  were  transferred  to  the  Tasman, 
and  the  Southport  proceeded  on  her  voyage  to  Brisbane. 
She  completed  the  passage  without  further  incident.  In 
these  circumstances  the  GEIER  was  deprived  of  the  only 
prize  which  she  made  during  her  career  as  a  commerce- 
destroyer. 

Though  the  enemy's  attack  on  merchant  shipping  in 
the  early  days  of  the  war  was  conducted  on  a  much  smaller 
scale  than  had  been  anticipated  by  many  students  of 
German  naval  policy  in  pre-war  days,  the  measure  of 
success  which  was  attained  made  a  deep  impression  on 
the  public  mind  unaccustomed  to  the  vicissitudes  of  naval 
warfare.  The  injury  inflicted  was,  however,  slight  when 
studied  in  relation  to  the  experiences  of  British  shipping 
during  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Wars,  the 
varied  resources  of  the  German  Navy,  or  the  size  of  the 
target  offered  by  the  British  Mercantile  Marine,  comprising 
44*4  per  cent,  of  sea-going  steam- vessels  of  the  world, 
or  47* 9  per  cent,  if  the  tonnage  of  the  Dominions  be  in- 
cluded. At  the  end  of  the  first  quarter  of  1915  the  volume 
of  British  tonnage  which  had  been  lost  through  the 
agency  of  enemy  vessels  and  mines  since  the  opening 
of  the  war  was  only  232,824  gross  tons,1  a  very  small 
percentage  of  the  tonnage  afloat.  Seventy-two  vessels  8 

1  Merchant  Shipping  (Losses),  199. 

2  Excluding  the  small  sailing-vessels  Frau  Minna  Petersen  (captured 
by  a  torpedo-boat  on  August  7th)  and  Ayesha  (captured  November  9th). 


CH.  iv]      RESULT    OF    THE    CRUISER    RAIDS          209 

were  captured  by  enemy  cruisers  and  armed  merchantmen, 
including  the  Glenturret,  which  was  not  actually  boarded, 
and  the  Southport,  which  escaped.  The  depredations  were 
inflicted  upon  the  Merchant  Navy  without  the  sacrifice  of 
a  single  life.  More  than  that,  officers  and  men  of  the 
German  ships,  whether  men-of-war  or  auxiliary  cruisers, 
exhibited  a  high  respect  for  the  dictates  of  humanity,  and 
showed  to  passengers  and  crews  a  consideration  and  a 
courtesy  which,  in  view  of  later  events,  deserve  to  be 
recorded. 


Name  of  Vessel. 

Sunk. 

Released. 

Escaped. 

Utilised. 

TOTAL. 

Remarks. 

EMDEN 

151 

4 

1 

22 

22 

1  The  total  ex- 

eludes     the 

small    sailing- 

vessel  Ayesha, 

captured      by 

the    EMDEN'S 

landing-party. 

2  TheExford  was 

recaptured. 

KONIGSBERQ  . 

1 

— 

— 

— 

1 

GETER  . 



— 

1 

— 

1 

KARLSRUHE  . 

15  1 

1 

— 

1 

17 

i  The/rcdramwas 

utilised    and 

subsequently 

KRONPRINZ     WIL- 

sunk. 

HELM 

91 

1 

— 

— 

10 

1  The  Potara  was 

utilised    and 

subsequently 

PRINZ  EITEL 

5 

— 

— 

— 

5 

sunk. 

DRESDEN 

4 

5 

— 

— 

9 

LEIPZIG 

3 

— 

— 

— 

3 

KAISER  WILHELM  . 

2 

2 

— 

— 

4 

54 

13 

2 

3 

72 

CHAPTER    V 

THE    PROTECTION    OF    MERCHANT   SHIPPING 

THE  opening  phase  of  the  war  by  sea  was  marked  by 
an  attack  by  German  cruisers  and  armed  merchant  ships 
upon  British  shipping.  The  effects  of  that  campaign 
have  already  been  described.  It  would  be  unfair  to  leave 
the  records  of  the  sinkings  of  British  merchant  tonnage 
during  these  early  days  without  some  reference  to  the  steps 
taken  by  the  Admiralty  and  other  departments  to  afford 
protection  to  the  Mercantile  Marine.  Strategical  and  tacti- 
cal considerations  are  dealt  with  elsewhere,1  but  it  is 
appropriate  to  an  account  of  the  part  taken  by  the  Mer- 
chant Navy  in  the  war  to  examine  the  bases  of  national 
policy  as  determined  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

I.     STRATEGIC  POLICY 

Time  and  again  the  subject  of  the  relation  of  the  Royal 
and  Merchant  Navies  was  considered,  either  directly  or 
indirectly,  by  Royal  Commissions  and  Select  Committees. 
In  particular,  the  responsibility  of  the  Navy  for  the  security 
of  British  ocean-borne  commerce  came  under  examination 
by  the  Royal  Commission  on  the  Supply  of  Food  and  Raw 
Material  in  Time  of  War,  which  was  appointed  on  April  27th, 
1903.  The  trading  community  was  largely  represented, 
and  among  the  members  were  Vice- Admiral — afterwards 
Admiral — Sir  Gerard  H.  U.  Noel  (who  was  succeeded 
in  January  1904  by  Admiral  Sir  Day  Hort  Bosanquet) 
and  Sir  John  C.  R.  Colomb,  M.P.,  who  had  devoted  great 
attention  to  the  matters  with  which  the  Commission 
was  instructed  to  deal.  The  Commissioners  were  in  con- 
stant communication  with  the  Admiralty,  and  examined 
a  number  of  naval  officers  of  standing,  including  Captain 

1  Cf.  Naval  Operations,  by  Sir  Julian  Corbett. 
210 


CH.  v]  A  MEMORABLE  REPORT  211 

Prince  Louis  of  Battenberg— later  Admiral  the  Marquis 
of  Milford  Haven — who  was  then  Director  of  Naval  In- 
telligence, Admiral  Sir  John  O.  Hopkins,  who  had  held 
the  command  of  the  Mediterranean  Fleet,  and  Admiral 
Sir  Cyprian  A.  G.  Bridge,  a  former  Director  of  Naval 
Intelligence,  who  was  in  command  of  His  Majesty's  ships 
in  the  China  Seas  at  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  Russia  and  Japan. 

The  Report  of  the  Commission  was  issued  in  1905,  and 
it  is  of  interest  in  that  it  provides  evidence  of  the  attention 
which  was  then  being  given  by  the  naval  authorities  to 
the  protection  of  the  Mercantile  Marine.  The  Commission 
was  appointed  to  inquire  into  the  supplies  of  food  and  raw 
material  in  time  of  war  and,  inter  alia,  "  to  advise  whether 
it  is  desirable  to  adopt  any  measures,  in  addition  to  the 
maintenance  of  a  strong  fleet,  by  which  such  supplies 
can  be  better  secured  and  violent  fluctuations  avoided." 
It  was  assumed  by  the  Commissioners  that  the  term  "  a 
strong  fleet  "  might  be  taken  to  imply  the  maintenance 
of  the  fleet  at  such  a  level  of  strength,  compared  with  that 
of  other  nations,  that  there  was  no  reasonable  prospect 
of  this  country's  maritime  supremacy  in  time  of  war  being 
seriously  in  danger.  It  was  on  that  assumption  that  the 
inquiry  was  conducted. 

At  the  very  outset,  the  Commissioners  were  at  pains 
to  explain,  after  hearing  a  considerable  body  of  expert 
evidence,  the  standpoint  from  which  they  approached  this 
particular  branch  of  their  investigation.  "  We  do  not 
fail  to  take  into  account,"  they  declared,  "  that  a  little 
time  might  elapse  after  the  outbreak  of  war  before  our 
Navy  was  able  to  assert  its  supremacy,  nor  that  at  a  later 
date  some  reverse  might  take  place.  However  great  our 
confidence  in  the  Navy  may  be,  such  a  contingency  as 
a  reverse  is  not  impossible  ;  but  it  is  necessary  to  define 
very  carefully  what  we  mean  by  the  term.  A  reverse 
may  be  of  varying  degrees  of  importance  ;  it  may  affect 
a  particular  fleet  or  only  a  detached  squadron ;  but 
broadly,  for  our  purpose,  it  is  only  necessary  to  distinguish 
between  a  reverse  that  would  cost  us  the  command  of  the 
sea,  and  one  which  would  not.  The  former,  which  would 
place  our  whole  maritime  trade  at  the  mercy  of  an  enemy, 
would  be  a  disaster  of  the  gravest  possible  character. 
Any  lesser  calamity,  from  the  very  fact  that  it  would  not 


212  PROTECTION   OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

cost  us  the  command  of  the  sea,  would  not  produce  a  set 
of  circumstances  so  far  different  from  those  with  which 
we  are  now  about  to  deal  as  to  require  separate  considera- 
tion." 

The  report  emphasised  the  fact  that  the  Admiralty  had 
constantly,  and  with  ever-increasing  solicitude,  considered 
the  steps  to  .be  taken  to  afford  adequate  protection  to 
the  Merchant  Service.  In  this  connection  the  Com- 
missioners remarked  that  there  was  a  certain  degree  of 
misconception  in  some  quarters  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
protection  which  could  be  afforded  by  the  Navy,  or  rather 
in  respect  to  the  methods  by  which  it  could  be  given. 
"  It  has  sometimes  been  assumed  that  such  protection 
can  only  be  given  either  by  sending  a  number  of  cruisers 
to  protect  the  trade  routes  or  by  a  system  of  convoy." 
The  Commissioners,  having  had  the  advantage  of  con- 
sulting with  the  Admiralty,  made  a  comment  which,  in 
the  light  of  war  experience,  was  significant.  In  their 
opinion  protection  of  commerce  could  often  be  more 
adequately  given  in  other  ways.  They  were  impressed 
by  the  knowledge  that  the  supplies  of  food  and  raw 
material  on  passage  to  the  United  Kingdom  were  distributed 
among  many  ships  rather  than  concentrated  in  a  few,  and 
that  the  trade  itself  was  conducted  in  a  fairly  constant 
stream,  and  was  not  confined  either  to  one  period  of  the 
year  or  to  a  single  route.  "  These  facts,  especially  when 
taken  in  conjunction  with  the  power  afforded  by  steam  of 
varying  the  routes  according  to  the  necessities  of  any  given 
period,  make  the  conditions  of  the  chief  trade  routes 
an  extremely  favourable  one  for  successful  defence." 
The  possibility  of  an  effective  blockade  of  the  United 
Kingdom  was  dismissed ;  at  that  time  the  submarine 
had  only  recently  appeared  on  the  naval  horizon,  the 
small  vessels  of  the  type  being  always  accompanied 
by  "  parent  ships,"  and  possessing  only  limited  radius 
of  action  and  low  speed. 

This  conclusion  having  been  reached,  the  ground  was 
cleared  for  an  investigation  of  the  important  problem — 
the  protection  which  could  be  afforded  to  the  Mercantile 
Marine  on  the  trade  routes.  Two  general  principles  were 
accepted.  The  first  was  that  the  command  of  the  sea  is 
essential  for  the  successful  attack  or  defence  of  commerce, 
and  should,  therefore,  be  the  primary  aim.  The  second 


CH.V]  CONCENTRATION   OF  FORCE  213 

was  that  the  attack  on,  or  defence  of,  commerce  is  best 
effected  by  concentration  of  force,  and  that  a  dispersion 
of  strength  for  either  of  those  objects  is  the  strategy  of 
the  weak,  and  cannot  materially  influence  the  ultimate 
results  of  the  war.  They  remarked  that  "  best  opinions 
all  tend  in  the  direction  that  the  first  and  principal  object 
on  both  sides,  in  case  of  future  maritime  war,  will  be 
to  obtain  command  of  the  sea." 

Reviewing  the  volume  of  authoritative  evidence  sub- 
mitted to  them,  the  Commissioners  reached  the  following 
conclusion  :  "It  follows  from  this  that  concentration  of 
our  forces  will  be  the  most  effective  protection  that  can 
be  given  to  our  trade  from  attack  by  the  regular  men-of- 
war  of  the  enemy  during,  at  any  rate,  the  initial  stages 
of  a  maritime  contest,  and  that  the  policy  of  an  organised 
attack  on  our  commerce,  if  adopted,  is  not  likely  to  meet 
with  any  great  measure  of  success.  The  enemy,  in  fact, 
would  find  himself  in  this  dilemma:  on  the  one  hand, 
if  he  should  endeavour  to  organise  an  extensive  attack 
on  our  trade,  the  inevitable  result  would  be  the  serious 
weakening  of  his  fleet  in  the  contest  for  the  really  decisive 
factor — namely,  the  command  of  the  seas  :  on  the  other, 
if  he  should  merely  detach  one  or  two  cruisers  for  haras- 
sing our  commerce,  and  if  these  cruisers  should  escape 
from  the  surveillance  of  our  squadrons,  the  Admiralty 
have  pointed  out  .  .  .  that  we  could  always  spare  a  superior 
number  of  vessels  to  follow  them.  No  doubt  a  considerable 
number  of  ships  might  be  required  to  effect  the  actual 
capture  of  a  single  hostile  commerce- destroyer,  so  long 
at  least  as  her  coal  lasted ;  but  it  has  been  explained  to 
us  by  Sir  Cyprian  Bridge  that,  even  if  only  one  of  our 
cruisers  were  in  pursuit,  it  could  be  made  too  dangerous 
for  a  hostile  cruiser  to  remain  on  or  about  a  trade  route. 
Obviously,  under  these  circumstances,  her  freedom  of 
action  would  be  much  hampered,  and  the  damage  she  would 
be  able  to  inflict  would  be  limited.  It  is,  however,  right 
to  mention  that  Sir  Cyprian  Bridge  pointed  out  that  it 
is  possible  to  overdo  concentration,  and  he  instanced  the 
mistaken  policy  of  the  Federal  States  in  allowing  the 
ALABAMA  to  remain  at  sea  practically  unmolested.  His 
view  was  that  protection  can  be  best  assured  by  having 
sufficient  cruisers  to  keep  the  enemy's  commerce- destroyers 
continually  on  the  lookout  for  their  own  safety,  while 


214  PROTECTION  OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

concentrating  the  main  force  in  the  right  place  from  a 
purely  strategic  point  of  view." 

Some  members  of  the  Royal  Commission  were  still  in 
doubt  as  to  the  ability  of  the  Fleet  to  fulfil  its  mission 
of  protection,  assuming  the  country  to  be  at  war  with  any 
two  of  the  great  ^maritime  Powers.  So  a  communication 
was  made  to  the  Admiralty,  in  reply  to  which  the  Admiralty 
stated  that  no  guarantee  could  be  given  that  no  capture 
whatever  could  be  made  by  the  enemy — "  a  position 
impossible  to  maintain  in  argument  " — but  it  was  believed 
that  there  would  be  no  material -diminution  in  the  supply 
of  wheat  and  flour  reaching  the  United  Kingdom.  Finally, 
in  commenting  upon  the  apprehension  that  the  disposition 
of  the  British  Fleet,  squadrons,  or  ships  might  be  adversely 
affected  and  the  free  action  of  the  Admiralty  impaired 
by  popular  pressure,  exercised  through  Parliament  upon 
the  Government,  thus  influencing  the  Admiralty  in- 
structions to  the  admirals,  it  was  remarked  that  the  Ad- 
miralty could  never  allow  their  action  to  be  influenced 
by  any  pressure,  and  yet  consent  to  remain  responsible 
for  the  conduct  of  war. 

The  Commissioners  afterwards  turned  to  another  aspect 
of  the  question — viz.,  the  policy  which  would  most  likely 
be  adopted  by  shipowners  either  voluntarily  or  by  stress 
of  circumstances  during  a  naval  war.  The  evidence  sub- 
mitted on  this  question  showed  conclusively  that  any 
general  laying-up  of  steamers,  either  liners  or  tramps, 
need  not  be  expected,  although  a  general  rise  in  freights 
would  occur.  Assuming,  as  the  Commissioners  generally 
assumed,  that  shipowners  would  do  their  best  to  keep 
their  vessels  running,  attention  was  then  directed  to  the 
influence  of  steam  on  the  enemy's  operations  against 
merchantmen.  This  section  of  the  report  reflected  the 
best  naval  opinion  of  the  day,  and  it  is  instructive,  in 
the  light  of  actual  war  experience,  to  recall  the  views 
which  were  expressed  :  "  It  is  an  interesting  subject  for 
conjecture,  whether  the  change  from  sails  to  steam  will 
or  will  not  tell  in  favour  of  the  chances  of  capture  of  mer- 
chant vessels  at  sea.  If  it  stood  alone,  it  is  probable  that 
the  balance  of  evidence  would  tell  in  the  direction  of  greater 
immunity  from  capture.  A  steamer  has  freedom  to  choose 
the  least  dangerous  route,  and  to  enter  at  the  least  danger- 
ous time  upon  the  area  of  the  sea  most  likely  to  be  in- 


CH.  v]  INFLUENCE   OF   STEAM  215 

fested  with  hostile  cruisers  ;  and,  moreover,  when  such 
an  area  is  entered,  it  can  be  passed  through  with  greater 
rapidity  and  certainty  than  was  ever  possible  in  the  case 
of  a  sailing-vessel.  It  seems  also  obvious  that  a  steamer 
is  exposed  to  less  danger  than  a  sailing-vessel,  which  was 
always  at  the  mercy  of  winds  and  currents,  and  whose 
escape  was  always  barred  for  twelve  points  out  of  the 
thirty- two  of  the  compass.  Moreover,  the  merchant  vessel 
can  now  change  her  course  at  will,  and,  by  leaving  directly 
astern  any  possible  pursuer  so  soon  as  sighted,  can  lengthen 
the  chase  to  the  utmost  possible  limit. 

"  These  considerations,"  it  was  added,  "  tell  powerfully 
in  favour  of  the  merchant  vessel,  though  it  may  be  said 
that,  if  flight  can  be  taken  in  any  direction,  attack  may  now 
also  come  from  any  quarter  so  far  as  weather  is  concerned. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  telegraph  is  a  powerful  ally  to  the 
attacking  force,  because  it  is  now  much  less  possible  to 
conceal  the  movements  of  important  merchant  vessels. 
Without  doubt,  the  telegraph  will  also  to  a  certain  extent 
disclose  the  movements  of  the  attacking  force,  but  we  think 
the  balance  of  advantage  will  be  against  the  private 
owners.  In  any  case,  the  existence  of  submarine  telegraphy 
has  probably  put  an  end  to  the  old  system  of  collecting 
merchant  vessels  together  for  the  purpose  of  giving  them 
protection  under  the  convoy  of  men-of-war.  No  assembly 
of  vessels  for  convoy  can  be  kept  secret,  and  the  enemy 
would,  therefore,  have  an  excellent  chance  of  preparing 
an  attack.  The  Admiralty  pointed  out  to  us  that  a  mass 
of  smoke  by  day,  and  even  at  times  by  night,  would  attract 
any  hostile  cruiser  that  might  be  about.  It  may  be  added 
that  for  commercial  reasons  the  convoy  system  would  not 
now  be  of  advantage,  owing  to  the  loss  of  time  involved 
in  waiting  for  an  escort,  as  well  as  to  the  fact  that  the 
speed  of  the  whole  convoy  would  have  to  be  regulated  to 
suit  that  of  the  slowest  vessel." 

Attention  was  also  directed  to  another  consideration. 
"  Engines  and  machinery  have  reduced  the  space  available 
for  the  personnel  of  warships  as  compared  to  that  available 
in  the  days  of  sailing-ships.  A  modern  warship  could 
only  to  a  very  limited  extent  furnish  prize  crews,  and  she 
would  impair  her  fighting  and  steaming  efficiency  by  so 
doing."  The  restricted  accommodation  available  for  the 
crews  of  captured  merchantmen  was  also  commented  on. 


216  PROTECTION  OF   SHIPPING  [CH.  T 

It  was  declared  that  "  modern  conditions  tend  to  limit  the 
capturing-power  of  regular  war  cruisers,  it  being  remarked 
that  these  observations  do  not,  however,  apply  to  ocean- 
trading  steamers  converted  and  armed  for  the  purpose  of 
attacking  commerce."  It  was  added  that  torpedo-craft 
(i.e.  destroyers  and  torpedo-boats)  can  neither  spare  prize 
crews  nor  accommodate  anyone  above  their  complement 
numbers.  "  If,  therefore,  employed  against  commerce,  for 
which  they  were  never  intended,  such  craft  could  only 
compel  merchant  ships  to  follow  them  into  port  under 
threat  of  being  torpedoed.  Moreover,  these  craft  can  only 
operate  within  a  comparatively  short  distance  of  their 
shore  bases." 

After  noting  that  the  Admiralty  had  in  process  of  for- 
mation an  organisation  for  keeping  in  touch  with,  and 
giving  advice  to,  the  Mercantile  Marine  in  the  event  of 
an  outbreak  of  hostilities,  and  urging  that  the  matter 
"  should  receive  the  earnest  attention  of  those  in  authority, 
as  well  on  the  part  of  the  civil  community  as  the  Ad- 
miralty," the  Commissioners  proceeded  to  sum  up  their 
conclusions.  They  remarked  that — "  It  must  not  be  thought 
from  anything  we  have  said  that  we  are  of  opinion  that 
there  will  be  no  capture  of  British  ships  engaged  in  the 
carrying  trade.  Whatever  our  naval  strength  might  be, 
some  captures,  as  has  already  been  pointed  out,  would 
certainly  take  place.  But  with  a  strong  fleet  we  find  no 
reason  to  fear  such  an  interruption  of  our  supplies  as  would 
lead  to  the  starvation  of  our  people,  nor  do  we  see  any 
evidence  that  there  is  likely  to  be  any  serious  shortage."  l 
At  that  time  the  submarine  was  as  yet  in  its  infancy, 
and  few  craft  of  this  type  had  been  built  by  any 
country,  though  in  the  year  in  which  the  Commission 
reported  Germany  launched  an  experimental  submarine 
from  the  Germania  Yard,  Kiel. 


II.     PRE-WAR  ARRANGEMENTS 

During  the  nine  years  which  intervened  between  the 
publication  of  the  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission  on 
Supply  of  Food  and  Raw  Material  in  Time  of  War  and  the 

1  Minority  reports  were  issued  :  the  quotations  given  are  from  the  main 
report  of  the  Royal  Commission. 


CH.  v]       A  PRINCIPLE   OF  NAVAL  DEFENCE  217 

actual  outbreak  of  hostilities,  in  August  1914,  considerable 
attention  was  devoted  to  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  safe- 
guard merchant  shipping.  In  particular,  the  Committee 
of  Imperial  Defence  dealt  with  the  matter  in  the  course 
of  the  elaboration  of  steps  to  be  adopted  to  protect  British 
interests  overseas.  On  May  19th,  1896,  the  Colonial 
Defence  Committee,  which  subsequently  became  a  sub- 
ordinate branch  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence, 
had  laid  down  the  principle  that — "  The  maintenance 
of  sea  supremacy  has  been  assumed  as  the  basis  of  the 
system  of  Imperial  Defence  against  attack  from  over  the 
sea.  This  is  the  determinating  factor  in  shaping  the  whole 
defensive  policy  of  the  Empire,  and  is  fully  recognised  by 
the  Admiralty,  who  have  accepted  the  responsibility  of 
protecting  all  British  territory  abroad  against  organised 
invasion  from  the  sea.  To  fulfil  this  great  charge,  they 
claim  the  absolute  power  of  disposing  of  their  forces  in 
the  manner  they  consider  most  certain  to  secure  success, 
and  object  to  limit  the  action  of  any  part  of  them  to  the 
immediate  neighbourhood  of  places  which  they  consider 
may  be  more  effectively  protected  by  operations  at  a 
distance." 

That  principle  became  the  foundation  upon  which  all 
questions  affecting  the  Mercantile  Marine  were  considered. 
As  a  consequence,  the  scale  of  defence  to  be  provided  at 
oversea  ports  of  the  British  Empire,  which  might  be  used 
by  merchant  ships  as  well  as  men-of-war,  was  considered 
in  the  light  of  that  primary  understanding.  At  the  same 
time,  it  was  recognised  that  His  Majesty's  ships  engaged 
in  seeking  out  and  destroying  the  squadrons  of  an  enemy 
might  not  be  in  a  position  to  prevent  predatory  raids  on 
British  ports  by  hostile  cruisers,  which  might  temporarily 
have  succeeded  in  eluding  their  vigilance,  and  that 
the  capture  of  British  shipping  had  also  to  be  provided 
against.  It  was  also  essential  that  the  squadrons  of  His 
Majesty's  ships  engaged  in  defending  the  trade  routes 
against  such  raids  should  have  adequately  defended  bases. 
"The  object  of  the  coast  defences,"  it  was  declared,  "is 
to  deter  attack  by  a  hostile  fleet  not  supreme  at  sea,  and 
therefore  not  in  a  position  to  risk  serious  loss  of  fighting 
efficiency.  Such  defences  must,  therefore,  be  strong  enough 
to  be  able  to  inflict  substantial  damage  upon  a  squadron 
suddenly  attacking  them ;  but  they  are  not  required  to 


218  PROTECTION    OF   SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

sustain  a  deliberate  duel  between  forts  and  ships  for  a 
prolonged  period." 

The  whole  subject  of  oversea  port  defence  was  recon- 
sidered by  the  Colonial  Defence  Committee  in  1910.  The 
assurance  was  then  given  that  the  Admiralty  were  of  the 
opinion  that,  so  long  as  the  then  existing  standard  of  naval 
strength  was  maintained,  British  fleets  would  be  in  a 
position  effectually  to  frustrate  any  movements  of  enemy 
ships  on  a  large  scale  within  a  comparatively  brief  period 
of  their  commencement,  and  it  was  assumed  that  any 
movement  of  enemy  ships  on  a  large  scale  would  be  followed 
up  by  a  British  foice  with  the  least  possible  delay.  It 
was  added  in  this  connection  that  "  the  decisive  advantages 
accruing  to  the  belligerent  who  succeeds  in  establishing 
sea  supremacy  over  his  opponent  are  now  well  understood  ; 
and  it  is  to  be  expected  that  any  naval  Powers  hoping  to 
inflict  serious  injury  upon  us  will,  on  the  outbreak  of  war, 
attempt  to  neutralise  our  naval  superiority,  and,  if  possible, 
wrest  from  us  the  command  of  the  sea.  This  object  can 
only  be  attained  as  the  result  of  great  naval  battles,  in 
which  the  main  fleets  of  the  contending  Powers  are  con- 
centrated for  decisive  encounters.  It  is  immaterial  where 
the  great  battles  are  fought.  In  whatever  waters  they 
may  take  place,  the  result  will  be  felt  throughout  the 
world ;  for  after  having  disposed  of  the  battle  squadrons 
of  the  enemy,  the  victor  will  be  able  to  spread  his  force 
with  a  view  to  capturing  or  destroying  any  detached  force 
of  the  enemy  that  may  remain  at  sea.  He  will  then  be 
in  a  position  to  gather  the  fruits  of  victory,  in  the  shape 
of  the  enemy's  outlying  possessions  and  his  shipping  and 
commerce,  or  to  prosecute  an  overseas  campaign." 

In  the  succeeding  paragraph  of  the  Committee's  report, 
attention  was  directed  to  a  danger  which  the  public,  in 
the  early  period  of  the  war  which  was  to  break  out  in  the 
summer  of  1914,  was  inclined  to  overlook.  It  was  remarked 
that,  with  a  view  to  impairing  the  measures  of  concentration 
in  war  and  inducing  a  weakening  of  the  main  fleets,  an 
enemy  might  endeavour  to  create  a  widespread  feeling  of 
insecurity  and  alarm  throughout  the  Empire  by  utilising 
such  classes  of  vessels  as  were  unfitted  for  taking  part 
in  the  decisive  actions  in  raiding  British  sea-borne  trade 
and  threatening  distant  portions  of  the  Empire.  It  was 
recognised  that  in  themselves  such  raiding  operations 


CH.  v]  TRADE   IN  DISTANT   SEAS  219 

would  be  of  only  secondary  importance,  since  the  ultimate 
issue  of  a  naval  war  must  depend  on  the  result  of  the 
fleet  actions.  It  would,  however,  be  necessary,  it 
was  admitted,  to  take  a  vigorous  offensive  against  all 
such  outlying  raiding  vessels  in  order  to  prevent  the 
demoralisation  and  disturbance  of  trade  due  to  their 
depredations. 

The  intelligence  organisation  which  was  maintained  in 
time  of  peace  would,  it  was  believed,  enable  the  Admiralty 
to  learn  the  distribution  at  any  moment  of  foreign  navies, 
and  of  all  foreign  merchant  vessels  likely  to  be  employed 
as  armed  auxiliaries.  During  the  period  of  strained 
relations  preceding  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  every  effort 
would  be  made,  it  was  assumed,  to  keep  the  ships  of  the 
prospective  enemy  under  observation.  The  great  increase 
in  the  rapidity  and  certainty  of  transmission  of  intelligence 
consequent  upon  the  development  of  submarine  cables 
and  radio-telegraphy  were  held  to  add  to  the  difficulties  of 
raiding  operations,  depending  for  success,  as  they  would, 
on  tactics  of  evasion  and  surprise.  "  Having  regard  to 
our  present  naval  strength  and  dispositions,  attacks  on 
floating  trade  in  distant  seas  will  offer  to  an  enemy  but 
slight  prospect  of  any  but  transitory  successes." 

The  policy  elaborated  by  the  Colonial  Defence  Com- 
mittee, and  endorsed  by  the  Committee  of  Imperial  De- 
fence, was  accepted  by  the  Government  of  the  day  for  its 
guidance  in  framing  the  general  defence  policy  not  only 
of  the  Empire,  but  of  the  Merchant  Navy,  its  life-line. 
Emphasis  was  laid  upon  the  false  strategy  which  might 
lead  to  the  premature  dispatch  of  reinforcements  to  distant 
seas,  instead  of  delaying  till  a  force  could  be  sent  so 
superior  to  the  squadrons  of  the  enemy  that  there  would 
be  practical  certainty  of  engaging  them  with  success.  In 
order  to  avoid  exposing  fleets  to  the  risk  of  suffering 
defeat  in  detail,  naval  action  in  remote  waters,  it  was 
admitted,  might  have  to  be  postponed  until,  by  the  clearing 
of  the  situation  in  home  waters,  adequate  naval  force  could 
be  brought  to  bear. 

Attention  was  devoted  to  local  defences  both  by  naval 
and  military  forces,  and  to  the  necessity  which  might  arise 
for  establishing  temporary  naval  bases,  and  the  require- 
ments in  the  matter  of  defence  of  commercial  ports  were 
also  considered.  In  this  connection  the  conclusions  of  the 


220  PROTECTION  OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

Committee,  endorsed  at  the  time  by  naval  and  military 
opinion,  have  a  peculiar  interest  in  view  of  the  course 
adopted  by  the  enemy  after  the  declaration  of  war.  "  An 
enemy  possessing  a  powerful  battle  fleet  is  unlikely  to 
undertake  organised  attacks  on  commerce  in  commercial 
ports  until  an  attempt  at  least  has  been  made  to  cripple 
our  naval  power,  for  which  purpose  his  cruisers  are  likely 
to  be  required,  in  the  first  instance,  to  act  in  conjunction 
with  his  battleships.  Isolated  attacks  on  merchant 
vessels  met  during  the  progress  of  some  strategic  move- 
ments may  indeed  occur,  but  regular  attacks  on  commerce 
in  distant  waters,  if  they  take  place  at  all  at  the  beginning 
of  a  war,  are  more  likely  to  be  carried  out  by  armed  mer- 
chant vessels  than  by  hostile  cruisers,  which  are  not 
likely,  at  that  stage,  to  be  available  for  such  service.  In 
view  of  the  supreme  value  of  armoured  vessels  in  war, 
and  of  their  great  cost  and  consequent  small  numbers, 
it  is  improbable  that  a  squadron  would  undertake  a  sub- 
sidiary operation  such  as  the  attack  on  a  commercial  port, 
if  the  defence  were  of  such  a  nature  that  the  attackers 
would  run  the  risk  of  losing  even  one  of  their  number, 
or  of  receiving  such  injuries  as  to  involve  risk  of  capture 
or  immediate  return  to  a  base.  Of  recent  years,  foreign 
naval  Powers  have  almost  without  exception  ceased  to 
lay  down  any  but  small  unarmoured  cruisers,  and  the 
armoured  cruisers  now  under  construction  approximate 
to  the  battleship  type.  The  great  value  of  such  armoured 
vessels  as  adjuncts  to  the  battle  fleet  renders  it  improbable 
that  they  would  be  detached  for  attacks  on  commerce 
or  on  commerical  ports  until  the  struggle  for  the  command 
of  the  sea  has  been  decided.  The  older  types  of  armoured 
cruisers  may,  however,  become  available  in  the  future 
for  subsidiary  operations  of  this  nature." 

An  attempt  was  made  to  forecast  the  probable  policy 
of  the  enemy  with  a  view  to  suggesting  the  measures 
which  should  be  taken  by  the  British  Government  to  frus- 
trate attempts  to  interfere  with  merchant  shipping.  The 
British  naval  reply  to  attacks  on  commerce,  it  was  re- 
marked, would  probably  involve  extended  operations 
with  cruiser  squadrons  and  single  ships,  taking  full  advan- 
tage of  the  facilities  afforded  by  our  numerous  commercial 
ports  as  coaling  places  and  as  centres  for  the  collection 
and  distribution  of  intelligence  relating  to  the  movements 


CH.  v]  THE   "WAR-BOOK"  221 

of  the  enemy.  In  the  circumstances  anticipated,  it  was 
decided  that  certain  fortified  commercial  ports  on  fre- 
quented trade  routes  would  be  useful  as  coaling-stations 
and  harbours  of  refuge,  where  merchant  vessels  could,  in 
case  of  need,  seek  protection  from  capture  or  molestation, 
and  await  a  favourable  opportunity  of  proceeding  on 
their  voyages.  The  need  for  fixed  defence  at  certain  great 
commercial  ports  was  also  admitted.  The  measure  of 
protection,  it  was  suggested,  should  be  such  as  would 
"involve  such  risk  of  injury  to  the  attacking  cruiser  as 
would  not,  in  the  opinion  of  a  naval  commander,  be  justi- 
fied by  the  possible  advantages  to  be  obtained." 

These  statements  are  of  interest  as  an  indication  that 
long  before  the  probability  of  war  was  realised  by  the  nation 
generally,  and  certainly  before  public  attention  had  been 
directed  to  the  dangers  which  would  threaten  merchant 
shipping  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  the  Government 
of  the  day,  acting  through  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence,  had  been  studying  all  the  associated  problems 
with  a  view  of  proper  action  being  taken  to  support  the 
influence  exercised  by  the  Fleet. 

Furthermore,  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  set 
up  a  number  of  Sub- committees  which  considered  the  re- 
sponsibilities which  would  be  thrown  upon  the  various 
departments  of  the  Government  at  the  outbreak  of  war. 
With  the  assistance  of  these  bodies,  upon  which  the  Ad- 
miralty, the  Board  of  Trade,  and  the  Post  Office  were 
represented,  as  well  as  the  shipping  industry,  the  Standing 
Sub- committee  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence 
gradually  built  up  what  afterwards  came  to  be  known  as  the 
4  War- Book."  The  object  was  to  co-ordinate  depart- 
mental action  on  the  occurrence  of  (a)  strained  relations 
and  (b)  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  volume  covered  a 
wide  field.  But  the  present  purpose  is  merely  to  refer  to 
that  portion  which  dealt  with  British  Merchant  Shipping. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  consider  in  detail  the  large  number 
of  orders  which  had  been  prepared  in  advance  in  order 
to  protect  merchantmen  cruising  in  distant  waters,  but 
it  is  of  interest  to  recall  that  provision  was  made  for 
appropriate  action.  On  receipt  of  the  notification  of  the 
outbreak  of  war,  His  Majesty's  diplomatic  representatives 
abroad  had  instructions  to  telegraph  to  every  consular 
officer  stationed  at  a  port  in  the  country  in  which  he 


222  PROTECTION   OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

resided  or  its  colonial  possessions,  directing  warnings  to  be 
given  to  British  merchant  ships  not  to  proceed  to  or 
enter  enemy  ports.  Similar  provision  was  made  for  the 
warning  of  vessels  in  ports  of  British  possessions  abroad. 
Steps  were  also  taken  for  instructing  representatives 
abroad  in  the  responsibilities  with  reference  to  merchant 
shipping  which  would  devolve  upon  them  as  soon  as 
war  was  declared,  with  a  view  to  safeguarding  British 
merchant  ships. 

In  the  view  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence, 
the  main  security  to  the  Mercantile  Marine  was  to  be 
found  in  the  general  naval  arrangements  made  by  the 
Admiralty  in  the  years  preceding  the  outbreak  of  war. 
In  reply  to  Germany's  policy  of  naval  concentration, 
the  Grand  Fleet,  as  it  was  subsequently  described,  came 
into  existence,  changing  the  whole  character  of  the 
problem  of  providing  for  the  safety  of  British  merchant 
shipping.  The  aim  of  the  naval  authorities  was  not  to 
blockade  the  enemy  fleet — an  intention  which  Nelson 
always  disclaimed — but  to  make  such  a  disposition  of  the 
main  forces  of  the  country  as  to  reduce  to  a  minimum  the 
probability  of  cruisers  concentrated  in  the  North  Sea  or 
Baltic  ports  of  Germany  escaping  on  to  the  trade  routes. 
That  object  became  in  the  course  of  time  the  decisive 
principle  of  Admiralty  policy.  Admiral  Sir  Arthur  Wilson, 
who  succeeded  Lord  Fisher  as  First  Sea  Lord,  was  led  to 
give  an  exposition  of  the  views  of  the  Admiralty  when 
the  question  of  the  possibility  of  invasion  by  the  enemy 
was  agitating  the  public  mind.  In  a  memorandum  which 
he  prepared  for  the  Army  Council  in  November  1910,  he 
declared  that  "  the  really  serious  danger  that  this  country 
has  to  guard  against  in  war  is  not  invasion,  but  interruption 
of  our  trade  and  the  destruction  of  our  merchant  shipping." 
In  the  light  of  that  conclusion,  which  reinforced  the 
views  of  previous  Boards  of  Admiralty,  he  remarked 
that  "  the  strength  of  our  fleet  is  determined  by  what  is 
necessary  to  protect  our  trade,  and,  if  it  is  sufficient  for 
that,  it  will  be  almost  necessarily  sufficient  to  prevent 
invasion,  since  the  same  disposition  of  the  ships  to  a  great 
extent  answers  both  purposes."  That  exposition  of 
policy  showed  that,  even  four  years  before  the  outbreak 
of  war,  the  Admiralty  possessed  what  events  were  to  show 
to  be  a  correct  perception  of  the  main  duty  which, 


en.  v]  THE   TRADE  ROUTES  228 

in  the  event  of  war,  would  devolve  upon  the  fleet  of  a 
sea- dependent  country,  itself  the  centre  of  a  maritime 
empire. 

The  adoption  of  the  principle  of  concentration  of  naval 
force  in  the  main  theatre  of  war  reduced  the  proportions 
of  the  problem  of  protecting  merchant  shipping,  but  it 
did  not  eliminate  that  problem.  The  Admiralty  provided 
for  squadrons  to  be  stationed  in  the  outer  seas  under  peace 
conditions.  Plans  were  also  drawn  up  for  commissioning 
special  squadrons  which  on  the  outbreak  of  war  would  be 
dispatched  for  the  patrol  of  the  areas  where  the  great  trade 
routes,  in  turning  in  towards  the  British  Isles,  converge. 
The  accompanying  charts  give  a  general  idea  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  naval  force  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  and  carry 
a  reminder  of  the  vast  area  of  the  sea,  water  covering 
nearly  three-quarters  of  the  earth's  surface,  and  of  the 
limited  influence  exerted  by  the  restricted  number  of  cruisers 
available  after  provision  had  been  made  for  the  needs  of 
the  Grand  Fleet.  Reference  to  those  charts  supplies  the 
necessary  corrective  to  any  opinion  unfavourable  to  the 
naval  authorities  which  the  narrative  of  the  capture  of 
British  shipping  during  the  early  period  of  hostilities 
may  have  suggested.  As  has  been  indicated,  both  from 
the  declaration  of  policy  made  by  the  Admiralty  to  the 
Royal  Commission  on  Supply  of  Food  and  Raw  Material 
in  time  of  War,  and  from  the  reports  of  the  Committee 
of  Imperial  Defence  which  have  already  been  quoted, 
the  naval  authorities  gave  no  guarantee,  and  believed 
that  no  guarantee  could  be  given,  that  British  merchant 
shipping  would  not  suffer  loss  before  enemy  cruisers 
in  distant  seas  could  be  rounded  up  and  destroyed. 
It  was  foreseen  that  a  considerable  period  might  elapse 
before  this  object  could  be  achieved,  since  the  enemy 
would  operate  with  many  advantages  in  a  trackless  waste, 
and  the  Admiralty  also  foresaw  that  ships  engaged  in 
raiding  British  ocean-borne  commerce  might  extend  their 
careers  by  living  upon  merchant  shipping  captured, 
taking  from  such  vessels  coal,  food,  and  stores,  and  then 
destroying  the  hulls. 


16 


224  PROTECTION  OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

III.     THE   CREATION   OF  THE  TRADE  DIVISION 
OF  THE  WAR   STAFF 

During  the  proceedings  of  the  Royal  Commission  on 
Supply  of  Food  and  Raw  Materials  in  Time  of  War,  at- 
tention was  drawn  to  the  need  of  an  organisation  at  the 
Admiralty  to  receive  from  the  shipping  community  in- 
formation as  to  the  movements  of  merchant  ships,  and  to 
give  advice  to  shipowners,  in  the  event  of  an  outbreak  of 
hostilities,  as  to  the  voyages  which  their  vessels  might 
undertake  with  comparative  safety,  with  more  special 
reference  to  those  points  at  which  such  vessels  might  expect 
to  find  protection.  It  was  then  stated  by  the  Admiralty 
— that  is,  ten  years  before  the  opening  of  the  war — that 
44  an  organisation  of  the  kind  is  now  in  process  of  forma- 
tion." The  Commissioners  stated  that  they  were  not 
satisfied  that  the  means  of  communication  between  the 
Royal  Navy  and  the  Mercantile  Fleet  would  on  the  out- 
break of  war  be  found  sufficient  to  enable  information 
to  be  conveyed  to  merchant  vessels  at  sea,  or  that  the 
orders  of  the  Admiralty  conveyed  through  the  admirals 
by  His  Majesty's  ships  to  merchant  vessels  would  be  under- 
stood. In  the  main  report  of  the  Commission  a  strong 
recommendation  was  made  that  "  this  matter  should 
receive  the  early  attention  of  those  in  authority,  as  well 
on  the  part  of  the  shipping  community  as  on  the  part  of 
the  Admiralty." 

The  problem  of  the  best  means  of  protecting  trade 
continued  under  almost  uninterrupted  consideration  by 
successive  Directors  of  the  Naval  Intelligence  Department. 
The  matter  was  one  which  fell  specially  within  the  pro- 
vince of  the  Trade  Division  of  that  Department.  During 
the  early  phases  of  the  investigation,  Captain  Inglefield, 
Captain  Harry  Jones,  and  Captain  Scott  were  concerned  in 
the  matter.  In  August  1906,  Captain  Henry  Campbell  was 
appointed  to  the  Trade  Division,  and  he  at  once  began  a 
very  thorough  investigation  of  the  whole  subject,  Captain 
Charles  Ottley  having  become  Director  of  Naval  Intelli- 
gence. Some  progress  was  made,  but  it  was  not  until 
Captain  Edmond  Slade  became  Director  of  Naval  Intelli- 
gence that  a  practicable  scheme  began  to  take  shape.  In 
March  1908,  Captain  Campbell  submitted  a  memorandum 
consisting  of  a  complete  and  detailed  examination  of  the 


CH.  v]  AN   INTELLIGENCE  SCHEME  225 

problem.  He  received  orders  from  the  Director  to  amplify 
his  arguments  in  favour  of  a  system  of  advice,  assistance, 
and  decentralisation,  in  association  with  an  intelligence 
scheme  on  the  main  trade  routes.  Captain  Campbell 
suggested  that  "  by  leaving  the  owners  in  charge  of  their 
own  ships,  the  control  would  be  sectional ;  every  vessel 
would  have  its  own  brain,  so  to  speak,  working  out  its 
own  safety."  He  urged  that  under  war  conditions  the 
owners,  captains,  and  crews  of  merchant  ships  would  be 
all  personally  interested  in  the  safe  arrivals  of  the  vessels. 
"  If  they  could  be  given  some  idea  of  what  and  where  the 
dangers  awaiting  them  were  .  .  .  they  would  be  perfectly 
capable  of  avoiding  and  running  through  those  dangers, 
for  that  is,  after  all,  what  their  ordinary  life  is  daily  fitting 
them  to  do.  And  they  would  know,  too,  not  only  what  was 
the  best  method  of  getting  home,  but  also  probably  the 
quickest,  and  each  would  do  this  for  his  own  individual 
case,  and  never  bother  with  generalities."  The  purpose 
of  this  intelligence  scheme  was  to  obtain  information, 
both  positive  and  negative,  from  as  wide  an  area  as  possible 
in  order  to  make  the  best  use  of  the  protective  force  avail- 
able and  give  advice  to  shipping.  The  aim  was  to  provide 
the  nucleus  of  an  organisation,  practised  and  developed 
in  peace-time,  which  would  combine  all  the  facilities  for 
receiving  and  disseminating  intelligence  through  various 
channels — naval,  diplomatic,  Indian,  Colonial,  Customs, 
Lloyd's  and  other  commercial  organisations — and  it  was 
proposed  to  operate  it  by  appointing  officers  at  the 
principal  commercial  ports  throughout  the  world,  who 
would  form  a  complete  system  of  information  bureaux. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  action  taken  in  this 
direction  before  the  opening  of  the  war  saved  the  country 
from  heavy  loss,  and  at  the  same  time  enabled  the  trade 
routes  to  be  kept  open. 

The  nucleus  of  an  organisation  having  been  formed,  the 
Trade  Division  was  abolished  in  October  1909  and  not 
resuscitated  until  August  1913,  when  it  was  re-formed  as 
the  Trade  Branch  of  the  Operations  Division  of  the 
recently  formed  War  Staff,  being  placed  under  Captain 
Richard  Webb,  assisted  by  a  small  staff.  The  reconstitution 
of  this  branch  of  the  War  Staff  indicated  that  the  naval 
authorities  had  finally  come  to  the  conclusion  that  special 
provision  was  necessary  for  dealing  with  matters  affecting 


226  PROTECTION   OF   SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

merchant  shipping  when  war  occurred,  but  the  smallness 
of  the  personnel  might  have  suggested  that  there  was  an 
inadequate  appreciation  of  the  number  and  complexity  of 
the  problems  which  war  would  raise  in  an  acute  form. 
On  the  other  hand,  such  an  organisation  under  peace 
conditions  was  necessarily  on  a  modest  scale,  as  its 
duty  consisted  merely  in  laying  the  foundations  for 
action  after  hostilities  had  broken  out ;  it  formed  the 
nucleus  upon  which  an  adequately-staffed  branch  of 
the  War  Staff  could  be  built  up  when  the  necessity 
arose.  Before  the  end  of  August  1914  it  was,  how- 
ever, found  necessary  to  expand  this  branch  of  the 
Operations  Division  into  a  separate  division  of  the  War 
Staff,  known  as  the  Trade  Division.  As  the  war  pro- 
gressed, its  personnel  was  gradually  increased  in  order  to 
enable  it  to  deal  with  this  aspect  of  the  war,  and,  in 
particular,  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  Mercantile 
Marine,  the  fishing  industry,  and  the  blockade  of  the 
enemy.  As  the  organisation  grew,  the  division  was  split 
up  into  separate  sections  to  deal  with  various  phases 
of  the  work,  and,  owing  to  the  decision  to  institute  a  general 
system  of  Convoys  which  had  been  arrived  at  in  June 
1917,  the  Route-giving  Section  of  the  Trade  Division 
was,  at  the  end  of  September  1917,  placed  under  Captain 
Frederic  A.  Whitehead  as  Director  of  Mercantile  Move- 
ments, as  was  also  the  Convoy  organisation  for  which 
Paymaster-Captain  H.  Eldon  Manisty  had  been  directly 
responsible  since  his  appointment  as  Organising  Manager 
of  Convoys  on  June  25th,  1917.  Under  Captain  Alan 
Hotham,  who  at  the  same  time  succeeded  Captain  Webb, 
the  duties  of  the  Trade  Division  were  grouped  into  three 
main  sections,  each  under  a  Captain  R.N.,  to  deal  with 
(a)  Trade  and  Blockade ;  (b)  Equipment  of  Ships  and 
Instruction  of  Personnel ;  (c)  Shipping  Intelligence, 
Casualties,  etc.  No  department  of  the  Admiralty  responded 
more  efficiently  to  the  urgent  demands  of  war  than  the 
Trade  Division  of  the  War  Staff  in  the  early  phase 
of  the  operations  at  sea  and  during  its  subsequent 
course.  Step  by  step,  as  the  necessity  demanded,  the 
organisation  was  strengthened,  until  it  became  in 
time  one  of  the  most  important  divisions  of  the  War 
Staff. 

Previous  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  with  the  exception 


CH.V]      THE  MERCHANT  NAVY'S   PERSONNEL       227 

of  R.N.R.  officers  and  naval  chief  petty  officers  ap- 
pointed for  duties  with  defensively  armed  merchant 
vessels  at  the  ports  of  London,  Liverpool,  and  Southamp- 
ton, no  direct  link  existed  between  the  Admiralty  and  the 
Mercantile  Marine ;  officers  and  men  of  the  Royal  Naval 
Reserve  came,  of  course,  under  Admiralty  instructions 
when  under  training,  and  when  called  up  for  war  service, 
but  the  Mercantile  Marine  itself  carried  out  its  operations 
without  naval  control  or  jurisdiction.  It  was  subject  only 
to  the  Board  of  Trade,  and  the  duties  of  that  department, 
as  has  already  been  stated,  were  confined  generally  to 
enforcing  provision  for  the  safety  of  life  and  the  proper 
treatment  of  seamen.  The  Merchant  Service  was  regarded 
as  a  trade  organisation,  and  the  influence  of  legislation  for 
some  years  previous  to  the  opening  of  the  war  had  been 
in  the  direction  of  weakening  the  disciplinary  authority 
of  masters  over  their  crews.  In  a  military  sense,  the 
Merchant  Navy  was  an  undisciplined  force.  While  the 
great  shipping  firms  maintained  a  regular  body  of  officers, 
they  drew  upon  the  labour  market  as  necessary  for  man- 
ning the  ships,  men  in  the  oversea  trade  signing  on  for  the 
voyage  and  then  being  discharged. 

The  occurrence  of  war  revealed  the  rather  unsatisfactory 
character  of  the  limited  control  exercised  over  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  Merchant  Navy.  The  Admiralty  had  at 
once  to  take  up  a  large  number  of  ships  for  fleet  purposes, 
apart  from  the  vessels  required  as  transports,  and  the  naval 
authorities  had  also  to  accept  responsibility  for  the  safety 
of  about  half  the  mercantile  shipping  of  the  world, 
which  was  at  once  exposed  to  enemy  attack.  Ten  years 
previously  the  Admiralty  had  stated  that  "  the  number  of 
British  merchant  steamers  which  would  be  taken  up  by 
the  Government  in  war-time  is  so  small,  compared  to  the 
total  number  available,  that  it  is  not  believed  that  the 
British  carrying  trade  could  be  seriously  interfered  with."  l 
At  that  time  the  Grand  Fleet  did  not  exist,  and  the  Ex- 
peditionary Force  had  not  been  organised.  The  naval 
and  military  conditions  affecting  shipping  had  undergone 
a  radical  change  by  the  time  hostilities  opened.  In  ad- 
dition, Germany  had  revealed  herself  as  the  probable 
enemy  in  the  event  of  war,  and  she  had  gradually  increased 

1  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission  on  Supply  of  Food  and  Raw  Material 
in  Time  of  War,  vol.  i,  Annex  A. 


228  PROTECTION   OF   SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

her  naval  representation  in  foreign  waters.  The  menace 
to  the  British  Mercantile  Marine  from  German  men-of-war 
had  consequently  increased  by  1914,  apart  from  the 
threat  which  the  Austro-Hungarian  Fleet  offered  in  the 
Mediterranean. 


IV.     THE  WAR  INSURANCE  SCHEMES 

The  Admiralty's  admission  that  a  guarantee  could  not 
be  given  that  no  merchant  ships  would  be  sunk  by  an 
enemy  brought  home  to  the  Government  and  the  shipping 
industry  a  clearer  apprehension  of  the  conditions  which 
would  exist  in  the  event  of  war.  The  Royal  Commission 
on  Supply  of  Food  and  Raw  Material  in  Time  of  War 
had  expressed  the  belief  that  a  guarded  and  well-con- 
sidered scheme  of  national  indemnity  would  act  as  a 
powerful  addition  to  our  resources,  but  a  Treasury  Com- 
mittee, appointed  in  1907  with  Mr.  Austen  Chamberlain 
as  Chairman,  declined  to  recommend  the  adoption  of 
any  form  of  national  guarantee  against  the  war  risks 
of  shipping  and  maritime  trade  "except  that  which 
is  provided  by  the  maintenance  of  a  powerful  navy." 
While  Sir  Frederick  Bolton,  of  Lloyd's,  was  quietly 
working  on  the  problem  at  the  Admiralty,  shipowners, 
in  order  to  meet  the  situation  which  they  feared 
would  be  created  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  determined 
to  organise  themselves,  following  the  example  already 
set  by  the  North  of  England  Association.  On  the 
outbreak  of  war  nearly  three-fourths  of  the  British 
steamship  tonnage  employed  in  the  overseas  trade  was 
embraced  in  the  various  War  Risks  Insurance  Clubs  or 
Associations. 

In  May  1913  the  Prime  Minister  formed  a  Sub- com- 
mittee of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  "  to  consider 
the  insurance  of  British  ships  in  time  of  war."  This 
Committee  consisted  of  the  Right  Honourable  F.  Huth 
Jackson,  Lord  Inchcape,  Sir  Norman  Hill,  Secretary  of 
the  Liverpool  Steamship  Owners'  Association,  Sir  Ray- 
mond Beck,  Deputy  Chairman  of  Lloyd's,  and  Mr.  Arthur 
Lindley,  with  Captain  Maurice  Hankey J  as  Secretary, 

i  Now  Lieut. -Col.  Sir  M.  P.  A.  Hankey,  G.C.B, 


CH.  v]  BASIS   OF  THE   PROBLEM  229 

It  adopted  a  series  of  general  principles  in  the  following 
terms  : 

(1)  As  laid  down  in  the  terms  of  reference,  the  scheme 
must  be  on  the  basis  of  reasonable  contributions  being 
paid  by  the  owners  of  ships  and  cargoes  towards  the  cost 
of  insurance. 

(2)  The  main  object  of  the  State  is  to  keep  the  trade  of 
the  country  going,  and  not  to  make  a  profit. 

(3)  Nevertheless,  it  is  necessary  to  safeguard  the  State 
against  incalculable  financial  liabilities,  and  more  particu- 
larly against  fraud. 

(4)  If  the  scheme  is  to  have  any  prospect  of  success, 
it    is    essential   to    avoid   the    hostility   of   any   of  the 
interests  concerned.      It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  avoid 
any  step  prejudicial  to  the  legitimate  business  of  ship- 
owners, insurance    brokers,    underwriters,  merchants,  or 
bankers. 

(5)  The   scheme   should    avoid    the    appearance    of    a 
gratuitous   gift  from   the   State   to    a    particular   trade, 
at    a    time    when    all    branches   of  trade   will   be   very 
much  hampered,   and  every  class  of  the  population  will 
be     subject    to    unforeseen    and    incalculable    risks    of 
loss. 

(6)  It  should,  on  the  other  hand,  avoid  disclosing  to 
the  enemy  the  real  conditions  prevailing  at  any  moment, 
by  the  quotation  of  official  rates  of  insurance  corresponding 
to  the  actual  risks  as  known  to  the  Admiralty. 

(7)  It  should  avoid  or  minimise,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
administrative  difficulties  which  will  fall  upon  the  State — 
e.g.,  of  valuation,  avoidance  of  fraud,  congestion  of  business, 
etc. 

At  the  outset  it  was  apparent  that  the  formation  of 
the  mutual  insurance  associations,  or  clubs,  had  eliminated 
some  of  the  difficulties  which  had  hindered  action  in  the 
past.  The  North  of  England  Protecting  and  Indemnity 
Association  comprised,  in  its  war  risks  class,  steamers  of 
a  value  of  about  £30,000,000.  The  London  group  of  War 
Risks  Associations  had  steamers  of  a  value  of  £27,000,000 
on  its  books.  The  London  and  Liverpool  War  Risks 
Insurance  Association  (Limited)  comprised  steamers  of  a 
value  of  about  £60,000,000,  Thus  the  total  values  insured, 


230  PROTECTION  OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

in  these  three  associations  amounted  to  about  £87,000,000, 
while  the  total  steamer  tonnage  of  the  United  Kingdom 
engaged  in  foreign  trade  was  valued  in  1911  at  £127,000,000. 
The  risks  covered  by  these  associations  differed  somewhat  in 
detail,  but  the  main  principles  embodied  in  their  insurance 
were  the  same.  They  covered  fully  the  risks  incident  to 
a  war,  so  long  as  the  United  Kingdom  was  neutral,  but  the 
risks  covered  incident  to  a  war  in  which  this  country 
was  a  party  were  strictly  limited. 

In  its  report,  this  Sub-committee  of  the  Committee  of 
Imperial  Defence  pointed  out  that  "  the  losses  and  claims 
to  meet  which  these  Insurance  Clubs  were  formed  are  those 
which  are  excluded  from  the  ordinary  marine  insurance 
policy  by  the  following,  or  similar  clause  :    4  Warranted 
free  from  capture,  seizure,  and  detention,  and  the  con- 
sequences   thereof,    or    any    attempt    thereat,    barratry, 
piracy,  riots,  and   civil  commotions  excepted,   and  also 
from  all  consequences  of  hostilities  or  warlike  operations, 
whether  before  or  after  declaration  of  war.' '      This  cover 
applied  both  in  the  case  of  war  between  two  foreign  nations, 
and  also  when  Great  Britain  was  one  of  the  belligerents ; 
but  when  Great  Britain  was  at  war  the  cover  was  limited 
in  the  case  of  vessels  actually  at   sea,  or  in   any  enemy 
port,  on  the  declaration  of  war  or  the  outbreak  of  hostilities, 
until  the  time  of  first  arrival  at  a  British  or  neutral  port 
which  was  a  safe  port  for  the  ship  to  lie  in.     The  period 
of  cover  while  in  such  safe  places  varied.     In  one  Club  it  was 
limited  to  ten  days,  in  another  to  thirty  days,  while  in  a 
third  it  extended  to  the  date   of  expiry  of  the  policy. 
Vessels  which  were  not  at  sea  on  the  outbreak  of  hostilities, 
but  were  in  a  safe  port,  were  held  insured  while  they  re- 
mained there,   for   a   similar  period.     Every  vessel  was 
deemed  to  be  insured  against  all  perils  covered  by  an  or- 
dinary marine  insurance  policy,  so  long,  of  course,  as  it 
sailed  under  the  British  flag.      There  were  a  number  of 
other  conditions  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  mention  in 
detail.     Only  a  nominal  initial  premium,  amounting  to 
a  few  pence  per  cent,  on  the  value  entered,  was  charged 
to  cover  the  expenses  of  management,  but  the  members 
shared  all  losses  on  the  basis  of  the  insured  values.     The 
Club    insurances    were    effected    on    February    20th    in 
each  year,  running  until  the  same  date  in  the  following 
year,  when,  in  ordinary  circumstances,  the  policies  were 


CH.  v]  INCOMPLETED   VOYAGES  231 

automatically  renewed  for  another  year.  One  essential 
fact  emphasised  by  the  Sub-committee  was  this — that  it 
might  happen  that,  "  within  a  very  short  period  after  the 
outbreak  of  war  in  which  we  were  one  of  the  belligerents, 
the  movements  of  practically  the  whole  of  the  shipping 
under  the  British  flag  would  be  arrested,  except,  perhaps, 
in  such  areas  (if  any)  as  were  outside  the  possibility  of 
interference  by  the  enemy." 

The  first  point,  then,  to  claim  the  Sub-committee's 
attention  was  the  provision  for  the  completion  of  voyages 
current  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  which  would  be  automati- 
cally interrupted  under  the  mutual  insurance  arrangements. 
Sir  Norman  Hill,  the  Secretary  of  the  Liverpool  and  Lon- 
don War  Risks  Insurance  Association,  suggested  that  the 
Associations  might  be  induced  to  run  a  maximum  of  20 
per  cent,  of  the  total  King's  enemy  risks  on  current  voy- 
ages, on  condition  that  the  State  undertook  the  remaining 
80  per  cent,  of  these  risks.  He  was  quite  convinced  that 
shipowners  would  not  be  prepared  to  pay  any  premium 
to  cover  these  additional  risks  which  they  would  be  under 
no  obligation  to  incur  at  a  time  when,  for  the  most  part, 
they  would  be  running  at  peace  freights.  Under  the 
conditions  of  many  bills  of  lading,  they  could,  on  the  out- 
break of  war,  discharge  their  cargo  at  a  safe  port,  and  start 
on  a  new  voyage,  at  war  rates  of  freight,  as  soon  as  in- 
surance could  be  arranged.  Failing  this,  it  would  probably 
suit  them  better,  it  was  added,  to  lay  up  their  ships  for  six 
or  twelve  months — a  policy  which  some  firms  had  adopted 
in  recent  years  when  they  had  been  unable  to  obtain 
remunerative  freights.  The  Sub-committee  were  in- 
formed that  "  managers  of  shipping  companies  might  con- 
sider themselves  under  an  obligation  to  their  shareholders 
not  to  send  ships  to  sea  without  war  risk  insurance,  and 
that  every  mortgage  deed  or  debenture  bond  had  a 
stipulation  of  some  kind  that  the  vessel  shall  be  amply 
insured." 

Passing  on  to  a  closer  examination  of  the  problem, 
the  Sub- committee  thought  it  desirable  to  consider 
whether  any  scheme  was  possible  which  would  avoid 
publicity  before  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  plan  that 
suggested  itself  was  that  the  State  should,  immediately 
on  the  opening  of  war,  make  a  public  announcement  that 
it  was  willing  to  accept  80  per  cent,  of  the  King's  enemy 


232  PROTECTION  OF   SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

risks  for  the  completion  of  all  current  voyages  from  the 
time  when  the  cover  provided  by  the  Club  policies  ceased. 
The  difficulties  which  this  scheme  raised  were  weighed 
by  the  Sub-committee,  and  eventually  it  was  decided 
to  propose  that  the  existing  standard  form  of  policy  of 
the  Associations  should  be  altered  so  as  to  include  the 
additional  risks  involved.  This  new  form  of  policy  would 
run  from  year  to  year  as  was  at  the  time  the  case,  a  list 
of  the  policies  issued  by  each  Club  being  given  to  the  State 
every  year.  The  State  would  enter  into  a  general  agree- 
ment with  each  Association,  accepting  responsibility  for 
80  per  cent,  of  the  King's  enemy  losses  incurred  under 
these  policies  in  the  case  of  a  war  in  which  we  were  one 
of  the  belligerents.  The  insurance  would  remain  in  force 
for  ten  clear  days  following  the  arrival  of  the  ship  at  her 
port  of  destination.  The  war  risks,  other  than  King's 
enemy  risks,  would  be  covered  under  the  same  Club  policy, 
but  for  these  the  Club  would  alone  be  responsible. 

Going  a  step  further,  the  Sub-committee  agreed  that 
words  should  be  introduced  into  the  new  policies  providing 
a  warranty  that  after  the  outbreak  of  war  ships  should, 
as  far  as  possible,  carry  out  any  orders  that  the 
Admiralty  might  give  in  regard  to  routes,  ports  of  call,  and 
stoppages.  If  they  failed  to  carry  out  the  orders,  it  was 
provided  that  they  should  lose  the  benefit  of  insurance, 
unless  the  insured  could  satisfy  the  Committee  of  the  Club 
that  the  breach  of  orders  happened  without  the  fault 
or  privity  of  the  assured  and  of  the  owners  and  of  the 
managers  of  the  ship.  Even  in  those  circumstances,  it 
was  thought  that  the  shipowners  should  be  liable  to  some 
penalty,  and  it  was  suggested  that  the  State  should  require 
that  the  rules  of  every  approved  Club  should  contain 
provision  for  an  appropriate  penalty,  taking  the  form  of  a 
levy  of  an  extra  premium  payable  by  the  member  to  the 
Club  on  the  insured  value  of  the  ship  in  which  the  breach 
had  taken  place,  or  of  a  deduction  in  the  settlement  of 
a  claim  of  an  amount  to  be  fixed,  within  reasonable  limits, 
by  the  Committee  of  the  Club.  In  extreme  cases,  the 
Committee,  it  was  suggested,  might  have  the  power  of 
expelling  a  member  from  the  Club. 

The  Sub- committee,  in  its  recommendations  relating  to 
ships  afloat  at  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  war,  considered 
that  the  fact  that  the  Clubs,  and  through  them  the  ship- 


CH.  v]  INSURANCE   OF  NEW  VOYAGES  233 

owners,  would  retain  20  per  cent,  of  the  risks  involved,  and 
pay  the  whole  cost  of  administration,  might  be  looked  upon 
as  a  "reasonable  contribution  to  wards  the  cost  of  insurance." 
The  managers  of  the  Clubs  stated  that  some  arrangement 
for  the  completion  of  the  current  voyages  without  payment 
of  premium  would  probably  be  necessary  as  an  inducement 
to  the  members  of  the  Clubs  to  accept  the  proposals  for 
covering  the  insurance  of  vessels  starting  after  the  out- 
break of  war.  It  was  calculated  that  the  scheme  would 
involve  a  State  liability  of  £3,000,000.  In  explanation  of 
its  recommendations,  the  Sub-committee  added :  "  It 
may  be  argued  that,  even  if  our  suggestions  are  adopted, 
they  will  not  compel  any  ship  to  complete  its  voyage  after 
the  outbreak  of  war.  It  will  still  be  optional  for  the  ship- 
owner to  give  directions  that  his  ship  is  to  go  to  a  safe  port 
and  remain  there  until  the  war  is  over.  We  admit  that, 
if  this  policy  were  generally  adopted,  our  scheme  would 
fail  in  its  main  object ;  but  we  think  that  few,  if  any, 
shipowners  are  likely  to  adopt  this  policy.  In  the  first 
place,  the  vessels  on  voyages  current  at  the  outbreak  of 
war  will  only  be  earning  peace  freights,  and  it  will  be  a 
strong  inducement  to  the  owner  to  get  his  present  voyage 
completed,  so  that  he  may  be  able  to  take  advantage  of 
the  higher  freights  for  new  voyages  which  would  pre- 
sumably be  offered  after  the  outbreak  of  war.  And, 
further,  the  shipowner  would  realise  that,  even  if  he  laid 
up  his  ship,  he  would  not  thereby  escape  his  liability  to 
contribute  pro  rata  to  the  loss  of  other  ships  insured  in 
his  Club  which  had  run  the  risks  he  was  afraid  of." 

Turning  to  the  insurance  of  hulls  of  ships  on  voyages 
commenced  after  the  outbreak'  of  hostilities,  it  was  pro- 
posed that  these  should  be  similarly  insured  by  the  As- 
sociations, and  reinsured  by  the  State  to  the  extent  of 
80  per  cent,  of  such  risks.  The  premiums  would  be 
collected  by  the  Associations  when  issuing  their  policies, 
and  80  per  cent,  of  them  would  be  accounted  for  to  the 
State  in  consideration  of  its  taking  80  per  cent,  of  the  risks 
insured  under  the  Club  policies,  "  a  warranty  being  in- 
serted that  ships  will  not  sail  when  ordered  by  His  Majesty's 
Government  not  to  do' so."  The  Sub-committee  proposed 
that  the  rates  of  premium  for  such  new  voyages  should 
be  fixed  by  the  State,  varied  from  time  to  time,  and  it  was 
added  :  "  It  will,  in  our  opinion,  be  necessary  to  have 


234  PROTECTION  OF   SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

different  rates  of  premium  for  different  zones,  and  it  may  be 
found  advisable,  during  the  course  of  the  war,  to  change  the 
rates  for  certain  of  these  zones.  But  we  are  strongly  of 
opinion  that  the  different  rates  should  be  as  few  as  possible, 
and  also  that  the  changes  in  these  rates  should  be  as  in- 
frequent as  possible.  It  is  admitted  that  the  State  is 
not  undertaking  this  business  with  a  view  to  making  a 
profit  out  of  it,  but  solely  with  the  object  of  preventing 
the  interruption  of  our  overseas  commerce  in  time  of  war, 
owing  to  inability  to  insure  against  war  risks  through  the 
usual  channels.  The  rates  charged  by  the  State  must  not, 
therefore,  be  so  low  as  to  compete  with  the  rates  that  the 
insurance  market  may  be  willing  to  quote,  nor  must  they 
be  so  high  as  to  be  prohibitive,  or  materially  to  affect 
the  cost  of  the  food  or  other  merchandise  being  brought 
to  or  carried  from  these  shores.  At  the  same  time,  it 
would  be  obviously  unfair  to  the  State's  partners  in  this 
business — the  individual  shipowners  in  the  Clubs — that 
they  should  be  called  upon  either  to  pay  premiums  out  of  all 
proportion  to  the  risks  of  the  voyages  undertaken,  or  to 
bear  their  share  of  losses  in  respect  of  voyages  insured  at 
much  too  low  a  premium.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  we 
recommend  that  the  premium  charged  should  to  some 
extent  depend  upon  the  risks  involved.  But  we  should 
like  to  suggest  that  the  maximum  rate  for  any  voyage 
should  be  5  per  cent.,  and  the  minimum  rate  1  per  cent., 
and  that  any  rate  accepted  for  a  particular  voyage  shall 
hold  good,  provided  that  the  ship  starts  within  fourteen 
days  after  acceptance  of  the  risk." 

Provision  was  suggested  for  representation  of  the  State 
on  the  Committee  of  each  Club  or  Association  :  the  claims, 
it  was  added,  would  be  dealt  with  by  the  Committee  of  the 
Club.  Some  difference  of  opinion  was  expressed  as  to  when 
and  how  payment  of  claims  should  be  made.  On  this 
matter  the  Sub-committee  reported  that  "  the  general 
principle  underlying  the  proposed  arrangements  between 
the  State  and  the  Clubs  is  that  the  Clubs  take  the  whole 
of  the  risks,  and  reinsure  80  per  cent,  of  them  with  the 
State.  A  Club  would,  therefore,  be  primarily  liable  for 
the  settlement  of  the  amount  involved."  The  conclusion 
was  reached  that  "  the  State  had  no  concern  with  the  in- 
ternal arrangements  of  the  Clubs  with  regard  to  the 
collection  of  the  contributions  from  their  members  to  an 


CH.  vj  METHOD   OF  PAYMENT  285 

ascertained  loss.  Even  if  the  Club  were  unable  to  collect 
from  its  members  the  whole  amount  required,  this  would 
not  affect  the  State's  liability  to  pay  over  its  80  per  cent, 
of  an  agreed  claim  to  the  Club."  The  rules  of  all  the 
Clubs  then  existing  provided  that  if  a  ship  were  captured, 
seized,  or  detained,  the  owner  should  have  no  claim  for 
total  loss  unless  the  capture,  seizure,  or  detention,  should 
have  continued  for  a  certain  period.  This  period  varied 
in  the  different  Clubs  from  one  month  to  six  months. 
The  Sub-committee  proposed  that,  under  the  arrangement 
with  the  State,  the  Clubs  should  not  be  bound  to  pay  a 
total  loss  if  the  ship  were  recaptured,  released,  or  restored 
to  the  owner  within  six  months  of  the  date  of  capture  ; 
but  if  the  vessel  was  restored,  the  Club  should  pay  the 
cost  of  repair  or  damage  to  and  expenses  incurred  by 
the  ship  by  reason  of  such  capture,  together  with  a  sum 
equal  to  10  per  cent,  per  annum  on  the  insured  value  from 
the  date  of  capture.  Also,  in  the  event  of  loss  by  destruc- 
tion, it  was  decided  that  no  payment  should  be  made 
within  a  period  of  six  months  of  the  loss.  It  followed, 
therefore,  that  the  earliest  time  of  payment  by  the  State 
for  a  total  loss  or  capture  would  be  six  months  after  the 
event.  In  those  circumstances,  the  Sub-committee  recom- 
mended that  the  liability  of  the  State  should  be  dis- 
charged in  three  equal  instalments  :  at  six,  nine,  and 
twelve  months  from  the  date  of  loss  or  capture,  with  in- 
terest at  the  rate  of  4  per  cent,  per  annum.  One  of  the 
principal  objects  in  suggesting  deferred  payments  was  to 
relieve  the  State  as  far  as  possible  from  immediate  and, 
perhaps,  heavy  calls  on  its  resources  to  meet  these  losses, 
at  a  time  when  its  revenue  would  be  strained  to  the  ut- 
most to  meet  the  expense  of  carrying  on  the  war. 

Turning  to  the  basis  of  the  value  of  shipping  for  the 
purpose  of  war  risks  insurance  which  should  be  accepted, 
the  Sub-committee  found  that  the  practice  of  the  various 
Associations  differed  in  this  respect.  "  We  suggest  that, 
for  the  purposes  of  this  arrangement,  the  basis  of  values 
should  be  the  first  cost  of  the  vessel,  without  allowance 
for  the  cost  of  alterations  or  additions,  less  depreciation 
at  the  rate  of  4  per  cent,  per  annum,  but  without  any 
minimum  limit  per  ton.  This  is  the  basis  accepted  for 
income-tax  purposes,  and  we  consider  it  a  reasonable 
one  ;  but  we  think  the  Committee  of  each  Club  should  have 


236  PROTECTION  OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

the  right,  at  its  discretion,  to  refuse  to  accept  a  vessel 
for  insurance  on  this  basis,  if  they  are  of  opinion  that  the 
value  thus  arrived  at  is  excessive.  The  agreement  for 
valuation  on  this  basis  will  be  provided  for  in  the  articles 
of  association  or  rules  of  the  Club  which  will,  in  accordance 
with  the  practice  of  the  Clubs,  be  incorporated  in  the 
policies." 

It  is  unnecessary  in  this  connection  to  deal  at  length 
with  the  proposals  for  the  insurance  of  cargoes.1  The 
Sub-committee,  in  the  concluding  remarks  in  its  Report, 
dated  April  30th,  1914,  suggested  that,  if  its  proposals 
were  approved,  they  should  be  made  public  as  soon  as 
possible.  It  was  urged  that  the  earliest  possible  publicity 
was  essential,  "  not  only  in  order  that  the  necessary 
changes  in  the  present  arrangements  for  mutual  insurance 
of  hulls  should  be  made  by  the  Clubs,  but  also  in  order 
that  the  details  of  our  proposals  for  insuring  cargoes 
may  be  carefully  prepared  and  periodically  revised  by 
the  Board  of  Advisers  which  we  recommend  should  be 
appointed  for  the  purpose."  While  admitting  that,  in  the 
absence  of  experience  of  the  effect  of  naval  warfare  on 
British  overseas  trade,  it  was  impossible  to  form  any 
reliable  estimate  of  the  State's  liability,  it  was  estimated 
that  "  the  total  losses  on  hulls  insured  against  premiums 
would  be  £6,133,750,  and  the  State's  share  of  those  losses 
would  be  £4,907,000."  "  We  estimate  the  value  of  the 
steamship  tonnage  remaining  available  for  foreign  trade 
during  the  six  months  following  the  outbreak  of  war  at 
£122,675,000.  Under  normal  conditions  each  vessel  in 
that  part  of  our  foreign  trade  which  is  with  the  United 
Kingdom  makes,  on  the  average,  ten  voyages  each  year, 
counting  each  outward  and  inward  voyage  as  a  separate 
voyage.  If  that  average  can  be  taken  as  generally  ap- 
plicable, and  if  the  number  of  voyages  be  maintained 
after  the  outbreak  of  war,  premiums  at  the  average  rate 
of  1  per  cent,  per  voyage  on  the  new  voyages  would  in  six 
months  be  sufficient  to  cover  the  whole  of  the  losses  on  hulls 
insured  against  premiums."  The  difficulty  of  estimating 
the  total  value  of  cargoes  carried  in  British  steam- 
ships in  foreign  trade  during  the  six  months  following 
the  outbreak  of  war  was  greater.  In  the  circumstances, 
the  Sub-committee  accepted,  as  a  basis  for  its  calculations, 

1  Cf.  Seaborne  Trade,  by  Mr.  C.  E.  Fayle. 


CH.  v]  A  PRACTICAL  SCHEME  23? 

that  the  values  would  be  £800,000,000.  If  the  whole  of 
these  cargoes  were  insured  with  the  State  Office,  the  as- 
sumed loss  would  be  covered  by  premiums  at  the  rate 
of  1  per  cent,  per  voyage.  It  was  added  that,  "  It  is  pro- 
bable that  at  average  premiums  of  1  per  cent,  per  voyage 
the  greater  part  of  the  hulls  would,  through  the  Clubs, 
be  insured  with  the  State,  but  the  amount  of  cargo  so 
insured,  and  therefore  the  amount  of  cargo  at  the  risk 
of  the  State,  would  depend  largely  on  the  facilities  offered 
by  the  insurance  market."  Finally,  it  was  remarked 
that,  "  when  every  allowance  is  made,  it  will  be  seen  that, 
even  on  an  assumed  loss  of  nearly  10  per  cent,  of  all 
British  steamers  employed  in  our  foreign  trade,  which 
on  the  outbreak  of  war,  and  for  six  months  thereafter, 
are  at  risk,  the  claim  on  the  State  in  respect  of  hulls  and 
cargo  would  be  but  a  very  small  percentage  on  the  total 
volume  of  our  trade." 

In  concluding  its  report,  the  Sub-committee  submitted 
that  they  had  prepared  "  an  administratively  practicable 
scheme."  "  We  believe  that  it  will  secure  that,  in  case 
of  war,  British  steamships  will  not  be  generally  laid  up, 
and  that  oversea  commerce  will  not  be  interrupted,  by 
reason  of  the  inability  to  cover  the  war  risks  of  ships  and 
cargoes  by  insurance.  Even  if  the  maximum  premium 
of  5  per  cent,  on  ships  and  of  5  per  cent,  on  cargoes  is 
charged  for  all  voyages,  and  the  whole  of  this  premium 
is  borne  by  cargoes,  the  total  increased  cost  of  such  cargoes, 
on  account  of  war  risk  insurance,  will  not  be  excessive, 
and  will  not,  in  our  opinion,  approach  the  extreme  fluctu- 
ation in  prices  of  many  articles,  especially  of  articles  of 
food,  in  recent  years." 

It  was  a  fortunate  circumstance  that  the  subject  of  war 
risk  insurance  had  been  considered,  and  a  practical  scheme 
dealing  with  hulls  and  cargoes  drawn  up,  before  the  shadow 
of  war  was  thrown  across  the  country.  As  the  report 
of  the  Sub-committee  had  not  been  published,  the  nation 
generally  was  in  ignorance  of  the  steps  which  had  been 
taken  to  grapple  with  the  situation  which  rapidly  de- 
veloped towards  the  end  of  July  1914.  The  Board  of 
Trade  kept  itself  informed  of  the  trend  of  events,  and  during 
the  days  of  uncertainty  as  to  the  issue  of  the  action  which 
diplomatists  were  taking,  it  was  in  constant  communication 
with  the  managers  of  the  three  Clubs  to  which  reference 


238  PROTECTION   OF   SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

has  been  made.  On  Saturday,  July  31st,  Sir  H.  Llewelyn 
Smith,  the  Secretary  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  informed 
them  that  the  Government  had  determined  to  adopt 
the  scheme  of  the  reinsurance  of  hulls,  and  requested  them 
to  arrange  at  once  for  the  issue  of  revised  forms  of  policy. 
This  was  done  with  the  utmost  dispatch.  As  an  illustra- 
tion, it  may  be  added  that  on  August  4th,  when  the  British 
declaration  of  war  expired,  Sir  Norman  Hill  addressed  a 
circular  to  the  members  of  the  Liverpool  Association 
explaining  the  Government  scheme,  and  stating  that  his 
Committee  had  decided  to  bring  the  new  forms  of  insurance 
into  operation  "  without  waiting  for  completion  of  legal 
formalities  as  to  the  actual  issue  of  the  new  form  of 
policies."  He  added  that,  "  pending  the  completion  of 
all  such  formalities,  an  undertaking  had  been  given  on 
behalf  of  the  Government  that  the  State  will  hold  itself 
bound  as  if  the  reinsurance  had  been  given." 

The  prompt  action  of  the  Government,  in  association 
with  a  certain  feeling  of  nervousness,  led  many  large 
firms  who  had  previously  effected  their  own  insurances 
to  join  the  Clubs.  In  this  way,  practically  the  whole 
work  of  reinsurance  of  steamships  under  the  Government 
scheme  was  conducted  from  the  first  by  the  three 
Associations.  Forms  of  policy  were  immediately  drawn  up 
by  the  Clubs  for  issue  to  their  members  for  current  and 
new  voyages,  together  with  a  form  of  reinsurance  in  regard 
to  each  such  policy  as  between  the  Board  of  Trade  and  the 
Associations.  In  illustration  of  the  celerity  with  which  the 
scheme  was  put  into  operation,  it  may  be  added  that  the 
agreement  between  the  Board  of  Trade  and  the  Associations 
was  dated  August  14th,  1914,  although  some  of  its  details 
were  not  completed  until  a  few  weeks  later.  This  delay 
did  not  interfere  with  the  operations  of  the  scheme,  which 
from  the  first  centred  in  the  Marine  Department  of  the 
Board  of  Trade.  The  managers  of  the  various  Associations 
rendered  the  most  efficient  help  in  this  department.  Sir 
Maurice  Hill,  K.C.,  placed  his  services  at  the  disposal 
of  the  Board  as  a  legal  adviser,  and  gave  valuable  assistance 
both  in  drafting  and  in  interpreting.  From  the  very 
outset  the  relations  between  the  central  department  and  the 
Associations  were  placed  on  a  satisfactory  footing,  with 
the  result  that  the  scheme  worked  smoothly  and  the  danger- 
ous dislocation  of  ocean-borne  commerce  which  the  enemy 


CH.  v]    A  WORLD-WIDE  INTELLIGENCE  SERVICE  239 

no  doubt  hoped  to  produce  was  averted.  As  to  cargoes, 
it  need  only  be  added  that  the  Sub- committee's  recom- 
mendations were  also  adopted,  the  Advisory  Committee 
for  the  National  Insurance  of  British  Shipping,  with  Mr. 
(afterwards  Sir)  Douglas  Owen  as  Chairman,  holding  its 
first  meeting  on  August  5th,  and  a  War  Risks  Insurance 
Office  was  opened  forthwith  at  Cannon  Street  Hotel,  to  be 
moved  later  on  to  33-35  King  William  Street. 

The  precautionary  measures  adopted  by  the  Admiralty, 
and  the  prompt  action  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  saved  the 
situation.  Shipowners,  charterers,  masters  and  men  were 
given  confidence  at  a  moment  when  there  was  a  possibility 
of  panic,  and  from  the  first  day  of  hostilities  the  British 
Mercantile  Marine  continued  its  sailings  under  Admiralty 
advice  with  almost  the  same  freedom  as  under  the  con- 
ditions of  peace. 


V.     ADMIRALTY  DIRECTIONS  TO  SHIPPING 

The  imminence  of  hostilities  in  July  1914  prompted  the 
Admiralty  to  get  into  direct  touch  with  the  shipping 
community  as  soon  as  possible.  In  the  emergency,  the 
Customs,  Lloyd's,  and  the  War  Risks  Clubs,  as  well  as  the 
Brethren  of  Trinity  House,  rendered  invaluable  aid ;  all 
their  resources  were  placed  unreservedly  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Admiralty.  The  officers  at  Whitehall  dealing  with 
trade  matters  were  thus  enabled  to  get  at  once  into  com- 
munication with  ships  and  shipowners  more  quickly  and 
with  more  satisfactory  results  than  would  otherwise  have 
been  the  case.  It  is  impossible  to  lay  too  much  stress  on 
the  salutary  influence  of  the  close  relations  between  the 
naval  authorities  and  the  shipping  industry  which  came 
into  existence  in  the  summer  of  1914.  The  Consular  and 
Colonial  services  also  gave  great  assistance,  and  the  Foreign, 
Colonial,  and  Indian  Offices  promptly  transmitted  Ad- 
miralty instructions  to  their  officials  for  the  information 
of  ships  in  distant  waters,  through  the  medium  of  the 
Intelligence  Scheme  already  described,  thus  enabling  the 
Admiralty  to  establish  a  very  complete  chain  of  commu- 
nications all  over  the  world.  That  intelligence  service, 
varied  in  character  and  efficient  in  operation,  proved  of 
incalculable  value. 

The  first  and  most  urgent  necessity  which  confronted 

17 


240  PROTECTION  OF  SHIPPING  [en.  v 

the  Admiralty  was  to  convey  to  the  British  Mercantile 
Marine,  distributed  in  all  the  seas,  short  and  compre- 
hensive instructions  embodying  the  policy  of  the  naval 
authorities  in  relation  to  the  protection  of  trade.  Orders 
to  His  Majesty's  ships  operating  in  and  about  the  trade 
routes  had  been  in  existence  for  some  time,  and  they  formed 
the  basis  on  which  the  early  directions  to  merchant  ship- 
ping were  framed.  As  a  normal  matter  of  peace  routine, 
commanders-in- chief  and  senior  officers  of  British  naval 
forces  had  received  instructions  from  the  Admiralty  as 
to  the  action  to  be  taken  in  the  event  of  war  in  order  to 
afford  protection  to  merchant  shipping.  These  orders 
were  based  upon  the  well-established  principle  that  the 
surest  way  of  striking  an  effective  blow  at  the  enemy,  and 
at  the  same  time  safeguarding  tonnage  and  territory, 
was  a  prompt  attack  upon  the  enemy's  fighting-ships. 
That  principle  had  guided  British  policy  for  centuries. 
The  primary  object — the  annihilation  of  the  enemy's 
forces — included  the  secondary,  the  security  of  British 
ocean-borne  commerce.  Subsidiary  to  both  those  objects 
was  the  capture  of  enemy  merchant  vessels  with  the 
object  of  stopping  his  trade  and  all  contraband  destined 
for  his  use.  It  was  suggested  by  the  Admiralty,  in  its 
earliest  orders,  that  the  patrolling  of  areas  or  routes  on 
the  chance  of  meeting  an  enemy  on  them  was  not  feasible, 
and  the  allotting  of  single  vessels  along  the  routes  was 
also  condemned.  It  was  declared  that  the  salient  points 
and  the  confluences  of  the  various  ocean  routes  used  by  the 
British  Merchant  Marine  were  the  most  profitable  places 
for  its  destruction  by  enemy  vessels,  and  if  those  points 
were  in  W.T.  communication  with  British  W.T.  stations, 
they  were  the  best  positions  in  which  to  work  and  await  in- 
telligence of  the  enemy's  movements.  It  was  added  that 
the  forces  employed  in  company  should  be  of  such  a 
strength  as  to  afford  reasonable  prospects  of  searching  for 
and  engaging  the  enemy  with  success.  Those  instructions 
embodied  rudimentary  principles.  Their  restatement  was 
necessary  in  view  of  the  tendency  to  confusion  of  thought 
which  had  occurred  since  the  steam-engine  made  its 
appearance,  suggesting  that  the  character  of  the  menace 
offered  by  enemy  ships,  and  the  best  means  of  combating 
that  menace,  had  undergone  changes  deep,  permanent, 
and  revolutionary.  However  widespread  those  opinions 


CH.  v]  COUNSELS   OF  WEAKNESS  241 

may  have  been  during  the  Victorian  period,  the  clouds 
of  doubt  had  been  dispersed  long  before  the  opening  of 
hostilities.  It  is  apparent,  from  the  action  of  Admirals 
and  other  senior  officers  during  the  opening  phase  of  the 
war,  that  the  naval  authorities  had  reached  a  right  con- 
clusion as  to  the  policy  to  be  adopted  by  a  supreme 
navy  in  protecting  the  Mercantile  Marine  under  its 
national  flag. 

Although  the  possibility  that  the  enemy  might  employ 
submarines  to  prey  on  commerce  could  not  be  ignored 
after  the  sinking  of  the  HOGUE,  CRESSY,  and  ABOUKIR  on 
September  22nd,  1914,  and  the  destruction  of  the  merchant 
ship  Glitra  in  the  following  October,  the  primary  concern  of 
the  Admiralty  during  the  early  phase  of  the  war  was  for 
the  safety  of  vessels,  both  naval  and  mercantile,  attacked 
by  enemy  cruisers.  The  naval  authorities  had  always 
admitted  that,  if  sailings  were  maintained  during  the  first 
few  weeks  of  war,  some  losses  were  inevitable.  It  had  been 
suggested  in  some  quarters  that  it  might  be  advisable 
for  all  ships,  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  to  be  warned  to  put 
into  the  nearest  friendly  port,  and  remain  there  until  a 
guarantee  of  safety  could  be  given  by  the  Admiralty. 
That  policy  would  have  freed  the  naval  authorities  from 
a  heavy  responsibility,  while  attention  was  devoted  ex- 
clusively to  hunting  down  enemy  cruisers  and  providing 
escort  for  the  transports  which  were  on  passage  from  India, 
the  Dominions,  the  Crown  Colonies,  and  the  Dependencies. 
These  counsels  were,  however,  rejected.  The  bold 
policy  was  adopted  of  urging  merchant  shipping  to 
continue  its  operations.  In  these  circumstances,  the 
Admiralty  had  to  choose  between  three  courses.  The 
first  was  the  concentration  of  trade  on  definite  fixed 
routes,  these  routes  being  closely  patrolled  by  British 
cruisers ;  the  second,  a  dispersal  of  trade  away  from 
the  usual  routes,  thus  taking  advantage  of  the  vast  tracts 
of  ocean  as  a  means  of  protection,  and  leaving  British 
cruisers  free  to  hunt  down  enemy  warships.  The  third 
course  consisted  of  either  of  the  alternatives  men- 
tioned in  association  with  convoy.  That  policy,  how- 
ever, would  have  involved  a  weakening  of  the  offensive 
action  against  the  enemy  in  order  to  provide  direct  pro- 
tection to  shipping.  Shipowners  and  masters  were 
generally  opposed  to  a  system  of  convoys,  while  naval 


242  PROTECTION  OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

opinion  as  to  its  wisdom  was  divided.  Reviewing  the 
situation  broadly,  and  having  regard  to  the  limited  number 
of  cruisers  available  for  trade  protection,  the  Admiralty 
decided  upon  as  wide  a  dispersal  of  ships  as  possible  during 
the  period  when  enemy  cruisers  were  being  tracked  down. 
Orders  were  promulgated  to  the  Mercantile  Marine  in 
accordance  with  this  decision  through  the  channels  of 
communication  then  available  at  home  and  abroad. 

In  order  to  convey  to  the  Mercantile  Shipping  the  In- 
structions, Route  Orders,  and  Advice  necessary  to  enable 
vessels  to  navigate  with  the  least  possible  risk,  both  from 
direct  enemy  action  and  also  from  mines,  a  number  of 
Shipping  Intelligence  Officers  were  appointed  at  the  prin- 
l  cipal  commercial  home  ports,  and  the  system  was  gradually 
\  extended  to  other  ports  in  the  United  Kingdom.  These 
\  officers  were  in  direct  touch  with  the  Admiralty  (Trade 
\Division),  and  received  instructions  from  time  to  time  as  to 
y*outes  to  be  followed,  etc.,  while  somewhat  similar  arrange- 
jnents  were  made  at  ports  abroad  so  that  masters  could 
obtain  the  latest  Admiralty  instructions  as  to  their  routes 
from  reporting  officers,  who  were  usually  Consular  or 
Colonial  officers.  As  has  already  been  pointed  out,  Lloyd's 
and  the  War  Risks  Clubs  were  also  used  as  channels 
of  communication  where  this  was  the  most  convenient 
means,  the  existing  channels  being  gradually  co-ordinated 
to  form  a  rapid  means  of  communication  between  the 
Admiralty  and  the  Mercantile  Marine.  The  Board  of 
Customs  and  Excise  likewise  placed  their  entire  organisa- 
tions at  the  disposal  of  the  Admiralty,  and  throughout  the 
war  rendered  invaluable  assistance  in  the  dissemination 
of  "  Traffic  Instructions  "  to  merchant  vessels.  These 
Traffic  Instructions  consisted  principally  of  directions  for 
coastal  voyages,  which  every  vessel  had  to  obtain  from 
the  Customs  Authorities  at  the  port  of  departure  im- 
mediately before  sailing.  It  is  impossible  to  speak 
too  highly  of  the  cordial  support  and  co-operation  re- 
ceived by  the  Admiralty  from  the  Board  of  Customs  and 
Excise. 

Except  on  special  short  sea  and  coastal  routes  where 
concentration  of  naval  forces  was  possible,  the  convoy 
system  was  not  employed  for  merchant  ships  in  the  early 
part  of  the  war ;  this  was  due  partly  to  delays  regarded 
as  inevitable  with  any  system  of  convoy,  and  partly  to 


CH.  v]  THE   POLICY   OF  DISPERSAL  243 

the  congestion  which  it  was  considered  would  have  been 
caused  in  British  ports  by  the  sudden  entry  of  large 
convoys  ;  but  the  chief  obstacle,  as  already  indicated, 
was  the  lack  of  protective  vessels.  When  the  Admiralty 
found  themselves  in  a  position  to  spare  destroyers  and 
cruisers  for  convoy  work,  due  to  the  increased  output  of 
destroyers  and  the  advent  of  the  United  States  of  America 
into  the  war,  the  convoy  system  for  overseas  trade  was 
adopted,  and  gradually  increased  to  include  practically  all 
vessels  trading  to  and  from  the  United  Kingdom.  After 
the  system  had  become  properly  organised  it  was  found 
that  delays  in  the  voyages  of  ships  were  not  in  fact 
greater  than  had  been  experienced  by  ships  sailing  indi- 
vidually under  war  conditions,  which  entailed  the  periodi- 
cal suspension  of  sailings  in  certain  areas  owing  to  enemy 
activity,  and  the  lengthening  of  voyages  due  to  diversion 
and  the  necessity  for  observance  of  Admiralty  instructions 
for  the  protection  of  merchant  ships  in  the  danger  area. 
Partly  for  the  same  reason,  but  mainly  due  to  the  sailing 
of  convoys  at  more  frequent  intervals  as  a  greater  number 
of  escort  vessels  became  available,  no  appreciable  difference 
was  experienced  in  the  conditions  obtaining  at  the  principal 
commercial  ports  for  dealing  with  the  cargoes  of  the  ships 
as  they  arrived. 

In  conformity  with  the  Admiralty  decision  to  adopt  the 
policy  of  dispersal,  the  Trade  Division,  on  August  3rd, 
sent  out  an  instruction  to  Lloyd's  and  the  War  Risks 
Clubs  in  the  following  terms  : 

"  Advise  British  shipping  to  abandon  regular  tracks. 
Complete  voyages  without  bunkering,  if  possible;  reduce 
brilliancy  of  lights.  Make  use  of  territorial  waters  when 
possible.  Homeward-bound  vessels  call  for  orders  at 
any  Signal-station  on  South  coast  of  Devon  or  Cornwall, 
or  on  South  or  North  or  West  coasts  of  Ireland.  Pass  this 
as  far  as  possible  to  all  British  ships." 

On  the  following  day  a  short  message  in  the  same  sense 
was  dispatched  by  cable  or  wireless  telegraph  to  Lloyd's 
agents  in  all  parts  of  the  world,  numbering  265.  Orders 
of  a  somewhat  more  detailed  character  were  issued  simul- 
taneously to  all  Intelligence  Officers  and  Reporting  Officers 
to  the  following  effect : 


244  PROTECTION  OF   SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

44  Advise  British  shipping  to  steer  course  parallel  to 
and  from  80  to  150  miles  distant  from  regular  track. 
Endeavour  to  fill  up  sufficiently  with  coal  to  avoid  bunker- 
ing on  passage.  Reduce  brilliancy  of  lights.  When 
obliged  to  pass  through  localities  where  traffic  is  most  con- 
gested, endeavour  to  do  so  at  night.  Use  neutral  territorial 
waters  when  possible.  Homeward-bound  vessels  call  for 
orders  at  any  Signal-station  on  South  coast  of  Devon  or 
Cornwall,  or  on  South,  North,  or  West  coasts  of  Ireland. 
Pass  this  secretly  by  visual  to  any  British  ships  met  with." 

During  the  succeeding  week  it  became  apparent  that, 
in  spite  of  the  action  of  the  naval  authorities  and  the  cover 
provided  under  the  War  Insurance  scheme,  some  ships 
were  being  held  up.  Further  instructions  to  check  this 
development  were  decided  upon  on  August  13th,  and  com- 
municated to  all  British  possessions  and  to  His  Majesty's 
representatives  and  others  throughout  the  world.  After  re- 
commending that  navigation  lights  should  be  extinguished 
only  when  an  immediate  attack  was  apprehended,  and 
that,  the  danger  passed,  they  should  be  relighted,  the  Ad- 
miralty added  that  it  was  most  important  that  British 
trade  should  be  interrupted  as  little  as  possible,  and  that 
"  British  vessels  should  not  be  held  up  nor  advised  to 
remain  in  port  unless  such  a  course  should  be  deemed  abso- 
lutely necessary."  A  week  later,  an  enemy  armed  merchant 
cruiser  having  interfered  with  vessels  south  of  the  Canaries, 
it  was  suggested  to  Lines  using  this  route  that,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances then  existing,  vessels  should  be  directed  where 
possible  to  avoid  passing  the  Canaries,  and  that  in  other 
cases  they  should  go  well  clear  to  the  westward  of  those 
islands,  the  exact  distance  depending  upon  the  importance 
of  the  voyage,  the  amount  of  coal  available,  and  other 
special  considerations.  "  If  ships  are  so  diverted,"  it  was 
added,  "  it  is  considered  that  the  chance  of  capture  will 
be  considerably  modified." 

In  spite  of  the  action  which  the  Admiralty  had  taken, 
a  feeling  of  nervousness  in  commercial  circles  still  existed 
owing  to  news  of  captures  by  the  KONIGSBERG,  DRESDEN, 
KARLSRUHE,  and  KAISER  WILHELM  DER  GROSSE.  In  order 
to  arrest  anything  approaching  a  feeling  of  panic  as  to  the 
danger  on  the  trade  routes,  fresh  instructions  were  issued 
to  the  Intelligence  Officers  on  August  29th,  advising  them 


CH.  v]  "  SEA   IS   FREE   TO   ALL "  245 

not  to  hold  up  British  shipping  except  for  good  reasons, 
it  being  added  that  "  the  Government  Insurance  Scheme 
provides  for  a  small  percentage  of  loss,  and  it  is  most 
important  to  keep  the  trade  moving,  even  if  slight  loss 
is  incurred."  In  further  reference  to  the  same  tendency 
to  check  the  flow  of  shipping,  and  therefore  of  trade, 
another  telegram  was  dispatched  on  the  following  day  to 
all  Naval,  Indian,  and  Colonial  authorities  in  the  East. 
Reference  was  made  in  that  message  to  the  continual 
complaints  received  from  shipowners  as  to  their  vessels 
being  detained,  "  especially  in  Far  Eastern  and  Australian 
waters,"  and  it  was  added  that  the  "  essential  trade  of 
the  Empire  should  continue  uninterrupted."  The  tele- 
gram added  that,  "  If  vessels  sail  after  dark,  make  good 
offing,  avoid  regular  tracks,  danger  of  capture  small. 
Most  essential  impress  this  on  all  concerned.  No  ships 
should  ever  be  detained  unless  definite  news  of  presence 
enemy's  cruisers  in  immediate  vicinity."  In  order  that 
commercial  communities  throughout  the  Empire  should 
be  in  no  doubt  as  to  the  policy  which  was  being  pursued 
by  the  naval  authorities,  a  statement  was  drawn  up  headed 
44  Sea  is  free  to  all."  It  appeared  in  the  newspapers  on 
September  3rd  : 

44  There  appears  to  be  an  impression  in  shipping  circles 
that  the  Admiralty  have  prohibited  the  use  of  certain 
trade  routes  for  mercantile  shipping.  This  is  quite  erro- 
neous. The  Admiralty  policy  is  that  the  sea  is  free  to 
all.  Any  limitations  which  the  Admiralty  may  advise  are 
intended  solely  to  assist  shipowners  in  safeguarding  their 
vessels,  and  no  routes  are  prohibited. 

44  Owing  to  the  German  policy  of  laying  mines  in  waters 
principally  frequented  by  peaceful  trading  vessels,  and 
other  threats  to  the  safety  of  shipping,  the  Admiralty 
have,  in  some  cases,  considered  it  advisable  to  warn  ship- 
owners that  certain  routes  are  exceptionally  dangerous, 
and  are,  therefore,  not  covered  by  the  War  Risks  Insurance 
scheme.  But  should  the  shipowners  decide  to  use  those 
routes,  there  is  no  desire  on  the  part  of  the  Admiralty  to 
interfere  with  the  shipowners'  absolute  discretion  in  the 
matter." 

By  the  following  day  the  Trade  Division  was  able  tg 


246  PROTECTION  OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

modify  the  advice  previously  given  with  reference  to  the 
Canary  Islands,  since  its  information  suggested  that  the 
danger  was  not  for  the  time  so  acute  as  formerly.  Ship- 
owners desirous  of  sending  their  vessels  to  the  Canaries  were 
therefore  informed  that  they  could  do  so  without  undue  risk. 
Knowledge  of  the  activities  of  the  KARLSRUHE  led  the  Trade 
Division  to  issue  an  instruction  to  the  effect  that,  in  the 
absence  of  definite  news  of  the  presence  of  enemy  cruisers 
in  the  vicinity  of  ports,  ships  should  not  be  detained. 

By  these  measures  the  Trade  Division  endeavoured  to 
give   shipowners    confidence  to    continue    running  their 
vessels  in  order  that  the  maritime  trade  of  the  Empire 
might  not  be  endangered  during  the  critical  period  of  the 
transition  from  the  conditions  of  peace  to  the  conditions 
of  war.     By  the  end  of  September,  although  in  the  mean- 
time the  EMDEN  had  made  her  appearance  off  Madras, 
the  War  Staff  was  encouraged  to  issue  a  further  instruc- 
tion to  His  Majesty's  representatives  abroad.     They  were 
advised  that  the  experience  of  the  first  two  months  of 
the  war  had  shown  that "  no  increase  in  the  loss  of  merchant 
shipping  will  be  incurred  by  always  keeping  trade  routes 
open.     When  a  hostile  cruiser  makes  her  presence  known 
by  sending  crews  or  prizes  into  port,  she  is  unlikely  to 
remain  on  the  same  route ;    short  of  closing  all  routes 
for  indefinite  time,  there  is  no  remedy,  as  next  point  of 
attack  is  matter  for  conjecture."     It  was  also  pointed  out 
that  "  the  detention  of  insured  vessels  in  port  was  ex- 
tremely costly  to  owners  and  merchants,  and  if  continued 
defeats  the   object  of   Government   Insurance   Scheme.'* 
That  British  representatives  abroad  might  have  confidence, 
they  were  reminded  that  "  vessels  sailing  after  dark  and 
making  good  offing  with  dimmed  lights  run  little  chance 
of  capture."     So  insistent  was  the  Trade  Division  on  the 
absolute  necessity    of  checking    any  nervous  action  on 
the  part  of  British  representatives  abroad,  that  instruc- 
tions were  issued  "  that  any  detention  of  shipping  should 
at  once  be  reported  by  cable."     That  instruction  conveyed 
to  His  Majesty's  representatives  an  intimation  that  deten- 
tion of  shipping    was   to   be   regarded   as   justified    only 
in  very  exceptional  circumstances,  and  that  the  policy 
should   not   be    adopted   unless   it   became   imperatively 
necessary    owing    to    local   conditions.     Similar    warning 
notices  were  sent  through  the  Colonial  Office  to  all  self- 


CH.  v]  AN  ADMIRALTY  MEMORANDUM  247 

governing    Dominions      and     to     the     principal    Crown 
Colonies. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Trade  Division  had  drawn  up  a 
Memorandum  in  which  it  set  forth  the  conclusions  which 
had  been  reached  as  to  the  best  course  to  be  adopted  for 
securing  the  safety  of  British  shipping  : 

"  The  experience  gained  during  the  first  two  months  of 
war  clearly  proves  that  the  most  effective  manner  of 
evading  capture  is  by  a  complete  abandonment  of  the 
regular  tracks.  Closely  associated  with  this  is  the  neces- 
sity for  reducing  the  number  of  lights  carried  by  vessels 
at  night  to  a  minimum,  and  for  dimming  their  brilliancy 
as  much  as  possible  consistent  with  safety  of  navigation. 

'4  Vessels  should  always  endeavour  to  pass  through  focal 
areas  at  night. 

44  When  leaving  a  port  in  the  vicinity  of  which  an  enemy 
cruiser  is  suspected  of  operating,  the  departure  should 
be  made  soon  after  dark,  the  intention  to  sail  being  kept  as 
secret  as  possible.  A  good  offing  should  be  made  during 
the  night,  care  being  taken  to  be  well  off  the  usual  route 
at  daylight. 

44  Similarly,  it  is  advisable  to  make  a  port  at  or  just 
before  daylight,  thus  insuring  that  the  usual  route  is  only 
approached  in  the  dark,  and  at  the  latest  possible  moment. 

44  Masters  should  be  warned,  when  abandoning  a  track, 
to  make  sure  that  such  deviation  does  not  place  them  on 
other  routes.  Neglect  of  this  precaution  has  been  the 
immediate  cause  of  at  least  three  captures  in  the  Atlantic. 

*4  In  the  case  of  the  EMDEN'S  recent  captures  in  Indian 
waters,  two  main  features  present  themselves  : 

44  (1)  So  far  as  can  be  ascertained  at  present,  the  vessels 
themselves,  when  captured,  were  adhering  very  closely 
to  the  usual  trade  routes. 

44  (2)  No  attempt  seems  to  have  been  made  by  the  vessels 
in  the  way  of  obscuring  'lights,  or  of  otherwise  avoiding 
capture. 

44  (The  only  exception  seems  to  have  been  the  Gryfevale, 
which  made  a  practice  of  putting  out  her  lights.  This 
vessel,  however,  was  captured  during  daylight,  but  it  is 
satisfactory  to  know  that  she  was  released.) 

14  The  EMDEN  was  thus  enabled  to  effect  more  captures 
in  Indian  waters  in  the  space  of  a  few  days  than  all 


248  PROTECTION  OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  T 

the  German  cruisers  in  the  Atlantic  have  hitherto 
made. 

"  Trade  routes  in  the  Indian  Ocean  are  admittedly 
somewhat  more  constricted  than  in  the  Atlantic,  but  a 
divergence  of  100  miles  from  the  normal  course  would  have 
probably  ensured  safety,  except  in  the  case  of  three  vessels 
captured  near  ports. 

"  Several  reports  which  have  reached  the  Admiralty  of 
late  point  to  the  fact  that  the  comparatively  small  number 
of  captures  is  inducing  some  masters  to  return  more  nearly 
to  the  usual  trade  routes. 

"  Masters  should  be  constantly  reminded  that  the 
farther  from  the  trade  routes,  the  greater  will  be  the 
safety ;  this  will  continue  throughout  the  war. 

"  Wireless  communication  should  be  reduced  to  a  mini- 
mum, and  the  vessel's  position  and  future  movements 
should  always  be  kept  secret. 

44  It  is  assumed  that  no  vessel  carries  any  enemy  subject 
as  part  of  her  crew,  and  that  no  enemy  subjects  are  em- 
ployed in  any  capacity  by  owners  whose  vessels  are 
covered  by  the  Government  Insurance  Scheme. 

"  It  is  pointed  out  that  even  one  spy  in  a  vessel  would 
most  seriously  compromise  the  secrecy  of  instructions  upon 
which  the  safety  of  British  shipping  so  largely  depends." 

This  Memorandum  was  immediately  given  wide  cir- 
culation among  His  Majesty's  diplomatic  representatives 
and  Reporting  Officers  in  British  Dominions,  Colonies,  and 
Protectorates. 

The  Trade  Division,  in  spite  of  all  the  action  which  had 
been  taken,  was  still  not  fully  satisfied,  in  view  of  the 
day-to-day  reports  which  reached  it,  that  its  policy  was 
clearly  understood.  So,  on  October  26th,  further  instruc- 
tions were  issued  all  over  the  world  as  to  the  necessity  of 
keeping  open  the  trade  routes.  At  that  time  the  KARLS- 
RUHE and  EMDEN  were  busy,  the  former  off  Pernambuco 
and  the  latter  off  Minikoi.  "  It  is  undesirable,"  it  was 
remarked,  4t  that  vessels  on  passage  should  be  directed 
to  converge  on  focal  points  such  as  Colombo  or  Singapore 
merely  for  orders,  and  unless  absolutely  necessary.  Ship- 
ping must  be  more  scattered  off  the  routes,  and  where  a 
choice  of  passages  exists,  this  should  be  taken  full  advantage 
of.  As  enemy  is  evidently  aware  of  present  scattering 


CH.  v]  INSTRUCTIONS  AND  WARNINGS  249 

limits,  substitute  general  order  that  vessels  must  scatter 
widely  both  sides  of  usual  track,  so  that  distribution  of 
shipping  shall  be  as  effective  as  possible.  Instructions 
by  Reporting  or  Intelligence  Officers  should,  wherever 
possible,  be  handed  to  the  masters  in  writing,  and  a  record 
of  such  instructions  should  be  kept.  Masters  must  be 
warned  to  destroy  these  instructions  if  in  danger  of  capture. 
Colours  are  no  indication  of  nationality  until  the  vessel 
opens  fire.  It  must,  therefore,  be  impressed  on  all  masters 
that  measures  should  be  taken  to  avoid  vessels  directly 
they,  or  their  smoke,  are  sighted.  All  lights  except 
Navigation  Lights  should  be  hidden,  and  Navigation 
Lights  should  not  exceed  brilliancy  laid  down  in  Rules 
for  Prevention  of  Collisions  at  Sea.  The  second  mast- 
head light  is  unnecessary."  On  the  following  day  instruc- 
tions of  a  very  similar  character  were  issued  to  His  Majesty's 
representatives  in  the  areas  chiefly  affected  by  the  opera- 
tions of  enemy  ships.  An  additional  paragraph  suggested 
that  an  endeavour  should  be  made  to  advise  British 
shipping  secretly  of  the  best  measures  of  evading  capture 
by  hostile  vessels. 

At  the  opening  of  the  new  year  the  naval  situation 
changed  for  the  better,  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM,  PRINZ 
EITEL  FRIEDRICH,  and  the  DRESDEN  being  the  only  enemy 
vessels  known  then  to  be  at  large.  In  the  meantime, 
shipowners  had  made  complaints  that  merchant  vessels 
had  been  captured  very  shortly  after  official  advice  had 
been  given  that  certain  routes  were  "  safe  "  or  *'  clear."  In 
a  telegram  to  Intelligence  Officers  at  the  ports  most  affected, 
the  Trade  Division  remarked  that  such  statements  could 
only  be  personal  opinions,  which  might  be  formed  on 
unavoidably  imperfect  information.  "  These  and  similar 
expressions  should  never  Ipe  used  J)y  anyone  sgiving  advice 
or  instructions  as  to  routes.  They  imply  assurances  of 
security  which  are  obviously  impossible  in  war-time ; 
this  tends  to  discredit  the  value  of  Admiralty  advice. 
Events  have  proved  that  such  statements  may  be  mis- 
leading, may  cause  relaxation  of  the  vigilance  which  is 
so  essential,  and  may  -cause  serious  disaster.  Advice 
should  be  confined  to  statement  of  facts  as  to  course  to 
steer  and  similar  matters.  Any  helpful  information  should 
be  given  which  does  not  disclose  our  plans  or  the  position 
of  our  own  war-vessels." 


250  PROTECTION  OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  v 

While  the  Trade  Division  was  advising  and  shepherding 
the  Merchant  Navy  during  these  early  days  of  the  war, 
the  Operations  Division  of  the  War  Staff,  under  Rear- 
Admiral  Arthur  C.  Leveson,  was  also  busy  in  its  own 
particular  sphere.  The  Operations  Division  was  charged 
with  taking  a  wide  survey  of  the  naval  situation,  and  close 
touch  was  maintained  between  it  and  the  Intelligence  and 
Trade  Divisions.  From  August  5th  onwards,  the  Trade 
Division  was  in  a  position  to  issue  daily  voyage  notices,1 
specifying  the  passages  forbidden  under  the  War  Insurance 
Scheme  in  view  of  the  Admiralty's  knowledge  of  the  enemy's 
actions  and  probable  plans.  The  character  of  the  services 
which  this  branch  of  the  War  Staff  rendered  in  this  respect 
may  best  be  illustrated  by  the  "  daily  voyage  notice  "  of 
August  5th,  in  which  passages  were  forbidden  to  the 
Baltic,  to  the  North  Sea  Continental  ports  east  and  north 
of  Dunkirk,  the  North  Atlantic,  from  Canadian  ports 
and  ports  of  the  United  States  as  far  south  as,  but  not 
including,  Philadelphia,  and  trade  on  the  North  Pacific 
coast.  It  would  be  tedious  and  unnecessary  to  trace  the 
gradual  development  of  this  work  during  succeeding 
months  as  the  British  naval  authorities  gained  a  fuller 
appreciation  of  the  situation.  It  may  be  of  interest, 
however,  to  give  by  way  of  contrast  the  daily  voyage 
notice  which  was  issued  on  the  last  day  of  1914 : 

"  For  the  purposes  of  the  Government  War  Insurance 
scheme,  the  Admiralty  consider  all  voyages  may  be 
undertaken  subject  to  local  conditions,  except  the  follow- 
ing: 

"  (1)  All  ports  in  Belgium,  Holland,  Denmark,  and  Ger- 
many. 

"  (2),  All  ports  in  Sweden,  except  Gothenburg. 

"  (3)  All  Russian  Baltic  ports. 

"  (4)  Adriatic,  North  of  Viesti. 

"  (5)  All  Black  Sea  and  Turkish  ports. 

"  Note  1. — Vessels  from  the  Atlantic  bound  to  Gothen- 
burg or  Norwegian  ports  are  required  to  call  at  a  port 
in  the  United  Kingdom  for  orders,  before  proceeding  to 
destination. 

"  Note  2. — Owners  whose  ships  are  trading  to  and  from 

1  The  daily  voyage  notices  subsequently  became  known  as  "  Standing 
Orders  under  the  Government  War  Insurance  Scheme." 


CH.  v]  PRECAUTIONS   INSISTED  ON  251 

Norwegian  ports  or  Gothenburg  should  send  a  representa- 
tive to  the  Trade  Division,  Admiralty,  for  special  instruc- 
tions. 

"Note  3. — A  mine  area  exists  between  lat.  51°  15'  N. 
and  51°  40'  N.,  and  between  long.  1°  35'  E.  and  3°  E. 

"  Note  4. — Vessels  trading  to  Gothenburg  and  Norwegian 
ports  are  warned  that  it  is  unlawful  to  carry  goods  that 
are  contraband  of  war  or  the  export  of  which  is  prohibited, 
unless  they  have  a  licence  from  the  Privy  Council  to  do  so. 
Very  serious  consequences  may  ensue  if  vessels  knowingly 
carry  such  cargo. 

"  Note  5. — The  route  along  the  East  Coast  is  now  open. 
When  passing  coast  between  Filey  Brig  and  Scarborough, 
vessels  must  do  so  during  daylight  only.  They  must 
keep  as  close  to  the  shore  as  possible,  and  must  pass  to 
the  westward  of  the  position  1 J  miles  E.  by  S.  Scarborough 
Rock  and  1  mile  N.E.  J  E.  Filey  Brig  Buoy. 

"  Note  6. — No  Atlantic  traffic  is  to  pass  round  North  of 
Ireland  until  further  orders." 

With  the  rounding  up  of  the  enemy's  cruisers  and 
armed  merchantmen,  a  feeling  of  security  began  to  in- 
fluence shipowners  and  masters.  It  was  assumed  by  some 
of  them  that  no  further  trouble  was  to  be  apprehended, 
and  that  the  precautions  hitherto  observed  might  there- 
fore be  disregarded.  The  Trade  Division  considered  it 
desirable  to  check  without  delay  the  growth  of  any  such 
idea.  They  let  it  be  known  that  "  the  suggestion  that 
certain  routes  are  now  safe,  and  that  vessels  can  safely 
follow  the  usual  route,  is  a  most  dangerous  one,  and  should 
be  combated  whenever  it  is  mooted,  either  formally  or  in 
conversation."  It  was  pointed  out  that  it  would  never 
be  known  from  day  to  day  when  German  vessels  might 
break  out  through  the  North  Sea  and  appear  suddenly  upon 
the  great  trade  routes.  The  shipping  interest  was  re- 
minded that  the  surest  way  of  encouraging  such  raids 
was  to  let  it  be  generally  known  that  precautions  had  been 
relaxed :  "If  precautions  are  in  any  way  relaxed,  enor- 
mous losses  might  be  inflicted  on  trade  in  a  few  days 
before  we  were  even  aware  that  raiders  had  escaped." 

Wise  as  these  precautions  were,  experience  was  to  show 
that  the  Admiralty  credited  the  enemy  with  a  greater 
degree  of  enterprise  than  he  had,  in  fact,  any  intention 


252  PROTECTION  OF  SHIPPING  [CH.  * 

of  exhibiting.  During  the  whole  of  March,  only  two 
vessels  were  destroyed  by  enemy  surface  vessels — the 
Tamar  (3,207  tons)  on  the  25th,  and  the  Coleby  (3,824 
tons)  two  days  later,  both  by  the  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM 
and  both  off  Pernambuco.  These  two  incidents  marked 
the  end  of  the  enemy's  cruiser  warfare,  and  in  subsequent 
months  the  Admiralty's  main  preoccupation  was  the 
protection  of  merchant  shipping  against  submarine 
attacks. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    ORGANISATION    OF    THE    AUXILIARY    PATROL 

IT  may  be  said  of  the  Admiralties  of  the  world,  even 
those  responsible  for  ocean  commerce  on  a  large  scale, 
that  none  foresaw  the  course  which  the  war  by  sea  would 
take,  and  consequently  there  was  a  good  deal  of  hasty 
improvisation  to  meet  its  needs,  particularly  on  the  part 
of  the  Entente  navies,  which  had  to  keep  open  the  maritime 
communications  of  armies  and  peoples.  For  ten  years 
or  more  attention  had  been  directed  almost  exclusively 
to  the  building  of  big  men-of-war,  battleships,  and  battle 
cruisers ;  and  in  1914  the  number  of  small  craft — light 
cruisers,  destroyers,  and  torpedo-boats — possessed  by  the 
Great  Powers,  not  excluding  Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary, was  relatively  small.  That  was  a  matter  of  slight 
importance  to  the  enemy,  because  he  relinquished,  almost 
from  the  first,  all  attempt  to  use  the  sea  for  military  or 
economic  purposes ;  but  it  would  have  proved  a  grave 
embarrassment  to  the  Entente  Powers  if  they  had  not 
had  a  reserve,  to  be  called  upon  as  required,  consisting 
of  the  unconsidered  and  uncatalogued  latent  elements  of 
naval  power  possessed  by  the  British  people  with  ancient  sea 
traditions.  Because  it  was  responsible  for  protecting  about 
half  the  ocean  tonnage  of  the  world,  and  was  better  pro- 
vided with  small  craft  than  the  French  or  Italian  navies, 
the  burden  of  sea  command  bore  mainly  on  the  British 
Fleet  throughout  the  war.  It  had  not  been  foreseen  that 
it  would  be  necessary  to  organise  what  at  length  reached 
the  proportions  of  a  second  fleet  under  Admiralty  control, 
consisting  of  craft  which  were  never  intended  for  the 
violence  of  warfare,  but  when  the  need  arose  it  was  met 
with  complete  success. 

There  had  been  no  intention  of  making  heavy  demands 
upon  the  ships  or  men  of  the  Mercantile  Marine,  though 

253 


254  THE  AUXILIARY  PATROL  [CH.  vi 

the  Admiralty  was  prepared  to  take  up  a  limited  number 
of  steamships  for  use  as  store,  ammunition,  and  hospital 
ships,  while  other  vessels  were  held  available  for  employ- 
ment as  auxiliary  cruisers  and  transports.  The  necessity 
for  organising  a  great  auxiliary  fleet  would  not  have 
arisen,  or,  at  any  rate,  it  would  not  have  assumed  such 
large  proportions  as  it  did  assume,  had  it  not  been  for 
the  enemy's  decision  to  dispatch  submarines  to  attack 
merchant  shipping.  That  policy  was  an  afterthought. 
It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that  before  the  outbreak 
of  war  no  naval  officer,  whatever  his  nationality, 
seriously  contemplated  the  possibility  of  vessels  being 
used  for  attacking  ocean-borne  commerce  which  could 
not  supply  prize  crews  or  make  provision,  in  case  the 
prize  was  destroyed,  for  the  safety  of  the  crew  as  well  as 
passengers,  if  passengers  were  carried.  For  a  number  of 
years  torpedo-boats,  swift  and  carrying  guns  as  well  as 
torpedoes,  had  been  in  commission,  but  it  had  never  been 
suggested  that  these  small  vessels,  the  forerunners  of  the 
submarines,  should  be  pressed  into  such  service,  because 
it  was  realised  that  such  a  departure  involved  the  in- 
fraction of  the  generally-accepted  law  of  nations,  and,  if 
human  life  was  lost,  the  flouting  of  the  dictates  of  hu- 
manity. The  Germans  themselves  entertained  no  such 
proposal.  When  the  submarine  appeared  and  proved  its 
efficiency,  no  idea  was  held  of  converting  it  into  an  in- 
strument for  attacking  commerce,  as  is  proved  by  the  fact 
that  in  the  summer  of  1914  the  enemy  possessed  only 
twenty-eight  completed  vessels  of  this  type.  If  any  such 
scheme  had  been  determined  upon  as  part  of  the  war  plans 
of  the  Germans,  many  more  submarines  would  certainly 
have  been  in  readiness  to  be  thrown  into  the  war  when  the 
struggle  by  sea  opened.  It  was  not  until  after  the  British 
cruisers  HOGUE,  CRESS Y,  and  ABOUKIR  had  been  sunk 
by  U9,  and  the  German  flag  had  been  banished  from 
the  outer  seas,  that  the  idea  was  conceived  that,  if  men-of- 
war,  armed  and  armoured  and  with  highly  trained  crews, 
could  be  so  easily  destroyed  as  experience  had  shown, 
submarines  should  be  employed  against  unarmed  merchant- 
men, manned  by  crews  unfamiliar  with  war  conditions. 

That  determination  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  reached 
in  the  late  autumn  of  1914,  vitally  affected  the  naval 
situation  as  it  had  been  studied  by  the  British  naval 


CH.  vi]  A  SUPPLEMENTARY  FLEET  255 

authorities  in  pre-war  days.  It  forced  them  to  assume  an 
added  responsibility,  as  unexpected  as  it  was  embarrassing. 
The  Fleet  had  been  organised  to  take  its  part  in  surface 
warfare  ;  within  a  few  months  it  had  to  adapt  itself  to  a 
new  form  of  warfare,  pursued  by  the  enemy  with  determina- 
tion, with  vessels  capable  of  operating  below  the  surface. 

In  conjunction  with  the  appearance  of  the  submarine 
the  enemy's  resort  to  indiscriminate  mining  changed  the 
character  of  the  British  naval  problem,  and  thus  it  came 
about  that  gradually  a  supplementary  fleet  was  evolved — 
the  Auxiliary  Patrol.  It  eventually  consistted  of  a  great 
assemblage  of  small  vessels  of  varied  types — trawlers, 
whalers,  drifters,  steam-yachts,  paddle-steamers,  motor- 
launches,  and  motor-boats.  Those  vessels  were  manned  by 
merchant  seamen,  fishermen,  yachtsmen,  and  naval  en- 
thusiasts drawn  promiscuously  from  the  coast  and  inland 
towns  and  villages,  from  counting-house  and  shop  and 
factory.  Few  persons  before  the  war  imagined  that  the 
stately  white  enamelled  yachts  seen  in  the  Solent  during 
Cowes  Week  would  one  day  be  painted  grey,  and,  mounting 
guns  fore  and  aft,  would  be  commissioned  under  the  White 
Ensign  to  hunt  German  submarines  and  assist  in  patrolling 
the  ocean  highways.  Certainly  the  fishermen  of  the  North 
Sea,  the  Irish  Sea,  and  the  English  Channel  did  not  fore- 
see that  they  would  spend  several  of  the  best  years  of 
their  lives  in  sweeping  up  German  mines  and  assuring  the 
safety  of  merchant  shipping  from  a  deadly  peril,  besides 
assisting  to  bring  to  the  British  Isles  the  food  and  raw 
material  required  by  the  crowded  population.  Similarly, 
none  of  the  yachtsmen  who  sought  service  under  the 
Admiralty  later  dreamed  that  the  summer  cruises  which 
they  had  been  accustomed  to  make  would  furnish  sea 
training  and  sea  experience  to  fit  them  to  take  a  foremost 
part  in  the  world  war.  And  yet,  owing  to  the  force 
of  circumstances,  this  apparently  miscellaneous  collection 
of  ships  and  men  was  to  be  welded  together  into  a  great 
disciplined  force  which  bore  no  mean  share  of  the  burden 
of  the  war  by  sea  during  the  whole  of  the  long  period 
covered  by  hostilities. 

It  was  because  the  Royal  Navy  was  so  powerful  that 
it  needed  these  small  ships,  claiming  them  as  necessary 
auxiliaries,  arming  them  and  sending  them  to  sea  in  all 
weathers  to  fight  the  enemy  and  to  assist  in  protecting 

18 


256 1  THE  AUXILIARY  PATROL  [CH.  VI 

the  supreme  weapon — the  Grand  Fleet — on  which  the 
fortunes  of  war  mainly  depended.  Owing  to  the  prepon- 
derating strength  of  the  Grand  Fleet  over  the  High  Sea 
Fleet,  the  enemy,  thrown  back  on  the  defensive,  decided  to 
rely  almost  exclusively  on  two  methods  of  offence,  the  mine 
and,  afterwards,  the  submarine.  They  constituted  deadly 
perils,  not  only  to  ships  of  commerce,  but  to  men-of-war, 
and  it  was  realised  from  the  first  that  battleships,  battle 
cruisers,  and  light  cruisers  were  unsuited  to  offer  an 
adequate  defence  against  such  instruments  of  warfare.  A 
battleship  or  cruiser  carries  too  many  lives  in  her  vul- 
nerable hull,  is  too  costly  to  build,  is  too  difficult  to  re- 
place, and  has  too  great  a  turning  circle,  to  engage  in 
harrying,  chasing,  and  sinking  submarines.  Destroyers 
were  admirably  suited  to  the  work,  but  they  were  required 
as  screens  for  the  battle  and  cruiser  squadrons,  and  the 
British  Navy,  in  common  with  the  other  Allied  navies, 
was  short  of  these  small  craft.  It  soon  became  apparent 
that  the  Navy  must  have  assistance,  and,  once  the  need 
was  recognised,  it  was  met  by  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
voluntary  movements  for  which  the  war  was  responsible. 
The  unexpected  development  of  the  enemy's  naval  policy 
suggested  the  employment  in  this  service  of  the  steam- 
yacht,  the  paddle-steamer  with  its  moderate  draught, 
the  motor- vessel,  the  drifter,  and  the  trawler,  thus  utilising 
in  fighting  at  sea  the  tonnage  of  the  country  which  in  normal 
times  was  used  either  in  the  pursuit  of  pleasure  or  in  the 
fisheries.  Fishing  vessels  were  admirably  adapted  to  meet 
the  Navy's  urgent  requirements,  carrying  small  crews, 
being  handy  in  a  seaway,  drawing  little  water,  and  being 
cheap  to  build.  These  were  the  ships  which  were  con- 
sequently taken  up  soon  after  the  outbreak  of  war,  fitted 
out,  and  placed  on  duty  in  the  waters  surrounding  the 
British  Isles.  On  these  vessels  devolved  the  duty  of 
examining  and  controlling  millions  of  tons  of  shipping 
passing  through  the  narrow  seas  ;  day  by  day  they  swept 
channels  of  safety,  destroying  thousands  of  mines  in  the 
process;  they  encircled  the  British  Isles  with  their  ever- 
vigilant  patrol,  in  fog  and  in  storm,  in  summer  and  in 
winter ;  they  escorted  merchant  ships,  warning  them 
from  dangerous  areas ;  they  towed  torpedoed  vessels 
into  safety ;  they  sent  enemy  submarines  to  their 
doom  by  ramming,  shelling,  dropping  explosives,  or 


CH.  vi]          MINE-SWEEPING  EXPERIMENTS  257 

other  means.  These  auxiliary  craft  proved  the  salvation 
of  the  Royal  Navy  as  of  the  Merchant  Fleet.  Gradually 
the  sphere  of  operations  of  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  was  ex- 
tended as  far  north  as  the  White  Sea,  as  far  south  as  the 
Mediterranean  and  JSgean,  and  as  far  west  as  the  West 
Indies.  Wherever  these  vessels  were  employed,  their 
officers  and  men  performed  redoubtable  service  in  the 
common  cause.  They  were  the  heroes  of  some  of  the  most 
gallant  exploits  in  naval  history,  as  was  attested  by  the 
long  list  of  decorations  won  in  unequal  contests  against 
the  mine  and  submarine.  The  story  of  the  part  taken  in 
the  naval  war  by  the  Auxiliary  Patrol,  consisting  of  nearly 
4,000  vessels  and  manned  by  nearly  50,000  officers  and 
men,  constitutes  a  chapter  in  our  naval  annals  of  im- 
perishable renown.  It  is  a  story  which  proves  that 
the  British  seaman,  even  in  the  days  of  highly  developed 
mechanically-driven  ships,  has  nothing  to  fear  by  com* 
parison  with  the  standards  of  the  golden  age  of  the  sailing- 
ship.  Side  by  side  with  the  personal  achievements  of  the 
seamen,  an  endeavour  will  be  made  to  show  how  a  fortuitous 
and  unorganised  assemblage  of  shipping,  with  crews  un- 
disciplined to  the  demands  of  war,  developed  into  what 
was  in  effect  a  supplementary  navy. 

When  the  war  broke  out  in  August  1914,  a  modest 
organisation  was  already  in  existence  for  the  employment 
of  fishing  craft  under  the  White  Ensign,  which  enabled 
trawlers  to  be  dispatched  within  a  few  hours  to  sweep 
up  the  first  minefield  laid  by  the  enemy  off  our  coast. 

In  1907  Admiral  Lord  Charles  Beresford  was  Com- 
mander-in-  Chief  of  the  Channel  Fleet,  with  his  flag  in  the 
KING  EDWARD  VII.  For  some  time  past  he  had  been 
concerned  with  the  best  method  of  clearing  a  channel  for 
a  battle-fleet  leaving  harbour  during  strained  relations  or 
in  time  of  war.  When  earlier  he  had  been  Commander- 
in-  Chief  of  the  Mediterranean  Fleet  he  had  tried  sweeping 
experiments  with  tugs  and  destroyers,  but  both  classes  of 
vessels  were  found  to  be  unsuitable.  Whilst  on  a  visit  to 
Grimsby  he  saw  about  800  trawlers  congregated  in  the 
harbour.  He  inspected  some  of  them,  and  talked  with 
the  skippers.  Here  were  men  accustomed  to  deal  with 
trawl-ropes  and  trawls,  the  equivalent  to  mine-sweeps. 
These  fishermen  were  so  expert  at  their  work  that  they 
never  fouled  their  screws  with  the  wire  ropes,  and  their 


258  THE  AUXILIARY  PATROL  [CH.  vi 

ships  were  fitted  with  steam  winches  and  all  the  necessary 
gear  required  for  sweeping.  What  could  be  more  suitable 
than  these  ships  and  men  for  mine-sweeping  ?  In  July 
1907  he  therefore  suggested  to  the  Admiralty  that  a  trial 
should  be  made  with  these  craft,  and,  further,  that,  if  suc- 
cessful, a  certain  number  of  trawlers  should  be  requisitioned 
for  the  different  ports  so  as  to  be  ready  for  service  when  the 
period  of  strained  relations  with  a  foreign  Power  arrived. 

In  response  to  this  suggestion,  the  Admiralty  approved 
of  Lord  Charles  making  a  practical  test.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  following  year,  Commander  E.  L.  Booty  of  the 
KING  EDWARD  VII  was  sent  to  Grimsby,  where  he  selected 
two  typical  steam  trawlers,  the  Andes  and  Algoma.  They 
reached  Portland  on  February  5th,  with  their  skippers 
and  crews  of  nine  apiece ;  and  for  the  next  eight  days 
they  proceeded  to  sweep  up  dummy  mines.  The  trials 
were  carried  out  under  the  supervision  of  a  Channel 
Fleet  Mining  Committee,  of  which  Captain  F.  C.  D. 
Sturdee,1  then  commanding  officer  of  the  NEW  ZEALAND, 
was  President.  Associated  with  him  were  Captain 
R.  F.  Phillimore  and  two  torpedo  lieutenants,  together 
with  a  mining  expert  from  the  VERNON.  The  Committee 
reported  that  the  experiments  had  proved  sufficiently  satis- 
factory to  justify  the  taking  up  of  trawlers  for  service  in 
war,  to  assist  in  keeping  clear  the  approaches  to  harbours 
that  were  likely  to  be  mined.  Lord  Charles  Beresford 
stated  in  his  report  that  the  trawlers  would  prove  in- 
valuable for  sweeping  duties,  as  the  crews  had  been  accus- 
tomed to  earning  their  livelihood  by  this  class  of  work. 
Skippers  and  crews  had  entered  into  the  trials  with  both 
enthusiasm  and  delight ;  as  to  the  trawlers  themselves, 
their  shape  and  build  rendered  sweeping  easy,  and  prac- 
tically no  additional  gear  was  required.  In  other  words, 
a  trawler  with  its  crew,  when  ready  to  proceed  to  the 
fishing-grounds,  was  equally  prepared  for  mine-sweeping. 

As  these  trials  actually  brought  about  the  creation  of 
the  mine-sweeping  service,  which  rendered  such  gallant 
assistance  throughout  the  war,  it  may  be  not  out  of  place 
to  set  down  the  details  of  the  Andes  and  Algoma.  They 
measured  105  feet  in  length,  21  feet  beam,  with  a  draught 
of  13  feet  aft  and  about  9  feet  forward.  Their  speed  was 
8j  knots  ;  i.h.p.  240,  and  they  carried  80  tons  of  coal, 
1  Afterwards  Admiral  Sir  Doveton  Sturdee. 


CH.  vi]  RESULTS   OF  THE   TRIALS  259 

having  an  expenditure  of  five  to  six  tons  a  day.  Each 
trawl  warp  consisted  of  250  fathoms  of  3-inch  wire,  and 
at  first  the  trawlers'  own  otter-boards  were  used  as  kites, 
though  later,  after  further  experiments,  the  right  size  and 
type  of  kite  for  mine-sweeping  was  evolved.  The  crew  in 
each  case  consisted  of  skipper,  mate,  third  hand,  two  deck 
hands,  steward,  chief  engineer,  second  engineer,  and 
trimmer.  After  the  outbreak  of  war,  when  fishing  trawlers 
became  His  Majesty's  ships,  the  Admiralty  made  the 
fewest  possible  modifications  in  the  personnel  and  the 
running  of  these  vessels. 

The  result  of  the  experiments  at  Portland  was  to  con- 
vince the  Admiralty  that  trawlers  could  be  depended  on 
to  clear  a  channel  with  practically  only  their  own  resources. 
One  distinguished  officer,  Captain  Bernard  Currey  (after- 
wards Director  of  Naval  Ordnance),  pointed  out  that  they 
would  be  indispensable  in  war-time  as  an  Auxiliary  Sweep- 
ing Service,  and  suggested  the  desirability  of  preparing 
a  contract  with  the  trawler-owners  so  as  to  enable  a 
number  of  these  craft  to  be  taken  up  on  the  Approach  of 
war.  With  this  suggestion  Captain  E.  J.  W.  Slade,1  then 
Director  of  Naval  Intelligence,  concurred,  and  he  further 
emphasised  the  fact  that  trawls  were  obviously  more 
efficiently  worked  by  men  accustomed  to  their  use  than 
by  untrained  crews.  The  solution  of  the  manning  problem, 
therefore,  appeared  to  lie  in  employing  Royal  Naval 
Reserve  men,  of  whom  a  large  number  were  fishermen. 
The  proposal  was  approved  by  Admiral  Sir  John  Fisher, 
the  First  Sea  Lord. 

On  August  1st,  1908,  five  months  afterwards,  an  im- 
portant Mining  Committee  was  formed  at  the  Admiralty 
under  the  presidency  of  Rear- Admiral  G.  A.  Callaghan  to 
consider  the  general  question  of  mine-laying  and  mine- 
clearing.  It  was  evident  to  anyone  able  to  read  the  signs 
of  the  times  that  war  with  Germany  was  sooner  or  later 
possible,  and  that  mines  might  play  no  inconsiderable 
part  in  the  enemy's  operations.  Hitherto  the  method  of 
destroying  a  minefield  was  to  countermine.  But  after 
going  into  the  matter  very  carefully,  the  Committee  recom- 
mended that  a  mine-sweeping  service  should  be  instituted 
in  lieu  of  countermining ;  that  the  wire-sweep  should  be 
adopted  ;  that  6-foot  kites  should  be  used  for  small  craft, 
1  Afterwards  Admiral  Sir  Edmond  J.  W.  Slade. 


260  THE  AUXILIARY  PATROL  [CH.  vi 

and  9-foot  kites,  or  even  12-foot,  for  larger  craft.  They 
further  suggested  that  six  trawlers  should  be  purchased 
immediately  for  experimental  and  instructional  service, 
and  that  trawler-owners  should  be  approached  by  the 
Admiralty  to  ascertain  if  they  could  provide  crews  in  peace- 
time for  instruction,  as  well  as  in  war-time  for  sweeping 
mines. 

Little  time  was  wasted,  for  by  the  middle  of  August 
both  Sir  John  Fisher  and  the  First  Lord,  Mr.  Reginald 
McKenna,  had  approved  of  six  trawlers  being  obtained 
(two  for  each  of  the  three  Torpedo  Schools)  in  order  to 
enable  instruction  in  mine-sweeping  to  proceed  without 
delay.  There  was  still  much  to  be  learnt  in  regard  to  the 
best  types  of  kites  and  the  most  suitable  wires,  and,  further- 
more, officers  and  men  required  a  certain  amount  of  in- 
struction. The  urgency  of  the  matter  arose  from  the 
fact  that  foreign  Powers  were  known  to  be  increasing  the 
numbers  of  their  blockade  mines.  There  was  the  conse- 
quential danger  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war  the  British 
Fleet  might  be  taken  by  surprise,  blockaded  by  mine- 
fields, and  unable  to  emerge  from  its  bases. 

In  spite  of  the  urgency  of  the  matter,  there  followed 
some  delay  in  obtaining  financial  sanction  for  the  pur- 
chase of  these  trawlers  ;  but  in  the  Naval  Estimates  for 
1909-10  this  was  provided  for.  In  March  1910  Mr. 
McKenna  stated  that  during  the  year  great  attention  had 
been  paid  to  mine-sweeping,  and  that  six  trawlers  had 
been  bought  for  "  subsidiary  services."  More  than  this 
was  not  revealed  publicly,  as  there  was  a  desire  to  keep  all 
mine-sweeping  details  secret.  The  first  four  trawlers  were 
purchased  in  April  1909,  their  names  being  the  Spider, 
Sparrow,  Seaflower,  and  Seamew.  From  this  date  prac- 
tice and  experimental  work  in  mine-sweeping  were  carried 
out  continuously,  and  the  results  were  eminently  satis- 
factory. In  December  it  was  decided  to  allocate  the 
Sparrow  and  Spider  to  the  VERNON  at  Portsmouth,  the 
Seamew  and  Seaflower  to  the  ACTION  at  the  Nore,  whilst 
the  two  others  still  to  be  bought  were  to  be  attached  to 
the  DEFIANCE  at  Devonport.  But  from  June  to  the  end 
of  September  every  year  these  six  trawlers  were  to  be 
used  for  visiting  the  fishing  ports  and  training  ratings. 

The  Admiralty  having  obtained  these  trawlers,  the 
next  step  was  to  secure  the  personnel.  It  was  necessary 


CH.  vi]  NAVAL   OFFICERS   TRAINED  261 

to  detail  naval  officers  to  take  charge  of  the  units  of 
trawlers  when  sweeping,  but  a  difficulty  arose.  In  the 
first  place  there  were  very  few  officers  who  had  experi- 
ence of  sweeping,  and  it  was  clear  that  in  time  of  war 
every  available  officer  on  the  active  list  would  be  required 
for  service  in  the  Royal  Navy.  The  difficulty  was  met 
when  it  was  decided,  early  in  1910,  to  detail  and  train 
certain  officers  on  the  emergency  and  retired  lists  for  this 
special  purpose.  At  the  outset  twenty-two  lieutenants 
or  commanders  were  required,  each  of  whom  in  time  of 
war  would  command  a  unit  consisting  of  six  trawlers. 
Of  those  who  were  invited,  about  twenty  commanders 
and  lieutenants  accepted  the  call  and  underwent  a  fourteen 
days'  course  in  the  VERNON.  This  was  soon  followed  by 
another  course  for  an  additional  number,  and  thus  a  fairly 
big  nucleus  of  trained  officers  became  available.  These 
details  of  organisation  were  arranged  none  too  early. 
Since  the  year  1906,  Germany  had  been  expending  large 
sums  of  money  on  the  construction  of  mine-layers,  the 
manufacture  of  mines,  and  the  training  of  officers  and 
men  in  mine-laying.  The  Russo-Japanese  War  had 
shown  the  value  of  mines,  for  no  fewer  than  thirty-seven 
craft,  from  battleships  to  picket-boats,  had  struck  mines, 
and  there  were  also  losses  to  merchant  shipping. 

Officers  for  the  units  having  been  obtained,  the  next 
step  was  to  get  together  a  special  section  of  the  Royal 
Naval  Reserve,  to  be  known  as  the  Trawler  Section,  which 
would  man  these  craft.  Men  were  not  to  be  drawn  from 
the  existing  Royal  Naval  Reserve,  as  obviously  such  a 
step  would  interfere  with  the  manning  of  some  of  the 
bigger  ships  in  time  of  war.  The  regulations  for  this 
Trawler  Section  were  drawn  up  in  October  1910.  It 
was  decided  to  retain  for  the  men  their  existing  titles 
of  ranks  and  ratings — "  Skipper,"  "  Second-hand,"  and 
so  on.  The  pay  was  based  on  the  wages  normally  ob- 
taining in  the  trawling  industry,  but  about  20  per  cent, 
lower.  The  skipper  was  to  be  given  the  rank  of  a 
warrant  officer ;  it  was  determined  that  he  must  have 
commanded  a  trawler  for  at  least  two  years,  possess  a 
Board  of  Trade  certificate,  and  before  receiving  the 
Admiralty  warrant  must  undergo  eight  days'  training  in 
one  of  His  Majesty's  steam  trawlers. 

The  slack  season  in  the  trawling  trade  occurs  immedi- 


262  THE  AUXILIARY  PATROL  [CH.  vi 

ately  after  Lent,  especially  between  June  and  September, 
and  the  decision  was  made  that  the  training  season 
should  coincide  with  the  slack  season  as  far  as  possible. 
The  first  enrolment  of  fishermen  for  the  Royal  Naval 
Reserve  (T.)  was  postponed  until  the  beginning  of  1911, 
when  the  Admiralty  endeavoured  to  obtain  fifty  skippers 
and  fifty  second-hands.  The  training  was  to  be 
carried  out  on  board  the  six  trawlers  now  attached  to 
the  Torpedo  Schools,  the  names  of  the  recently-added 
pair  being  the  Rose  and  Driver,  attached  to  Devonport. 
For  the  commencement  of  this  training  Aberdeen  was 
selected,  and  there  the  six  Admiralty  trawlers  were  to 
assemble,  together  with  H.M.S.  JASON  and  CIRCE,  those 
two  gunboats  having  been  selected  by  reason  of  the 
training  and  experience  of  their  commanding  officers  in 
mine-sweeping.  The  first  course  at  Aberdeen  began  on 
January  30,  1911,  and  ended  by  the  middle  of  April, 
during  which  time  twenty-eight  skippers,  twenty-seven 
second-hands,  twenty  deck-hands,  twenty-one  engineers, 
and  twenty  trimmers,  had  been  recruited  and  trained. 
Thus  the  first  batch  of  the  Trawler  Reserve  was  ob- 
tained. Commander  Holland  of  the  CIRCE  afterwards 
reported  that  the  class  of  men  enrolled  was  very  good, 
and  much  better  than  had  been  expected;  they  all 
took  very  keen  interest  in  their  work,  and  were  amenable 
to  discipline.  The  eight  days'  instruction  included 
sweeping  independently  in  pairs,  reeving  sweeps,  wheeling 
and  slipping  the  sweep,  sweeping  up  dummy  mines,  and 
so  on. 

At  the  beginning  of  April  recruiting  began  at  Grimsby, 
but  the  results  were  by  no  means  encouraging.  Not  more 
than  a  dozen  men  volunteered,  and  not  one  of  these  was 
a  skipper.  There  was  no  disguising  the  fact  that  Grimsby, 
which  had  been  the  birthplace  of  this  Trawler  Reserve 
scheme,  and  was  also  the  home  of  the  great  fishing  industry, 
showed  itself  very  far  from  enthusiastic.  There  was 
something  not  quite  as  it  should  be.  What  was  it  ? 
Anyone  acquainted  with  these  rough,  hearty  fishermen 
knows  that  in  many  ways  they  are  just  delightful  big 
children.  If  one  man  "  throws  his  hand  in,"  practically 
the  whole  crew  will  do  the  same.  The  trouble  in  this 
case  began  with  the  skippers,  some  of  whom  made  what 
the  seaman  calls  "  a  bit  of  a  moan  "  over  some  apparent 


CH.  vi]  DIFFICULTIES   OVERCOME  263 

injustice.  Most  of  their  companions  took  up  the  same 
attitude,  and  the  result  was  failure.  It  is  only  fair  to 
state  that  there  were  defects  in  the  scheme,  which,  con- 
sidering its  novelty,  was  scarcely  surprising.  For  instance, 
the  Admiralty  had  made  the  age  limit  for  skippers  twenty- 
five  to  thirty- five.  The  Grimsby  men  objected  to  this  as 
being  too  young,  seeing  that  the  best  skippers  in  the  port 
were  much  older  than  thirty-five.  Another  grievance 
was  that  the  pay  was  not  attractive.  The  Admiralty 
were  quick  to  see  where  the  trouble  lay,  and  a  number  of 
modifications  were  devised  to  meet  the  difficulty.  It 
was  afterwards  possible  to  smile  at  all  this,  since 
throughout  the  long  war  which  was  to  follow  no  men 
did  more  gallant  and  persevering  service  in  the  mine- 
fields and  on  patrol  than  the  Grimsby  skippers  and 
Grimsby  crews.  These  men  revealed  themselves  as  no 
sea-lawyers,  but  the  bravest  of  the  brave.  Time  after 
time  a  Grimsby  trawler  foundered  on  a  mine,  and  the 
first  thing  that  the  sole  survivor  did  on  getting  back  to 
his  port  was  to  sign  on  for  a  mine-sweeping  job.  And  as 
to  the  skippers'  ages — well,  many  of  the  best  men  were  of 
the  same  age  as  some  of  the  best  Admirals  ! 

Down  to  the  autumn  of  1911  the  recruiting  and  training 
went  on.  In  addition  to  Aberdeen  and  Grimsby,  the 
fishing  ports  of  Hull,  Fleetwood,  and  Milford  were  visited. 
From  these  there  were  obtained  52  skippers,  94  second- 
hands,  198  deck-hands,  88  enginemen,  and  94  trimmers  ;  a 
total  of  526. 

This  was  the  nucleus  of  what  was  to  develop  into  a 
great  Auxiliary  Navy.  But  it  was  patent  that  its  useful- 
ness would  depend  very  considerably  on  the  rapidity 
with  which  it  could  be  mobilised  at  the  time  of  war's 
approach.  The  sphere  of  utility  for  these  trawlers,  as 
conceived  in  the  mind  of  the  Admiralty,  was  not  to  act 
as  fleet  sweepers — that  is,  sweeping  ahead  of  the  Grand 
Fleet.  For  this  purpose  the  trawlers  were  too  slow  of 
speed,  and  a  number  of  old  gunboats  were  already  ear- 
marked for  that  duty.  But  it  was  for  clearing  the 
entrances  to  harbours  and  fairways  that  the  trawlers  were 
to  be  relied  on.  The  moment  war  was  declared  the  enemy 
might  lay  his  mines  off  the  entrances  to  our  East  Coast 
ports  ;  perhaps  he  would  not  even  wait  for  the  declara- 
tion of  war.  Unless  ships  were  to  be  either  blown  up  or 


264  THE  AUXILIARY  PATROL  [CH.  vi 

virtually   blockaded,   sweepers   must  be   ready  to  work 
almost  at  once. 

The  Admiralty  realised  in  November  of  this  same  year 
that  there  should  be  appointed  for  each  of  these  trawler- 
ports  a  mobilising  officer,  whose  duty  was  laid  down. 
Just  before  the  outbreak  of  war  this  officer  would,  on 
receipt  of  a  telegram  ordering  him  to  take  up  his  mobilisa- 
tion appointment,  proceed  to  his  assigned  port.  There 
he  would  receive  in  due  course  another  telegram  ordering 
him  to  take  up  so  many  trawlers,  call  on  the  Registrar  of 
the  Royal  Naval  Reserve  for  that  port,  and  warn  him  to 
prepare  crews  for  these  craft.  The  Registrar  of  Shipping 
and  Seamen  would  furnish  the  mobilising  officer  with  a  list 
of  the  trawlers  in  port,  or  likely  to  arrive  very  shortly. 
Arrangements  would  be  made  to  have  these  craft  prepared 
for  sea,  coaled,  and  filled  up  with  water,  oil,  and  provisions 
to  last  seven  days.  The  owners  were  to  take  out  all  the 
fish,  the  ice,  and  the  fishing-gear,  excepting  the  warps. 
Having  selected  from  the  available  trawlers  those  which 
were  suitable,  the  mobilising  officer  was  to  give  the  skippers 
their  charts  and  sailing  orders,  and  away  they  would  sail 
to  their  port.  Having  proceeded  thither  at  full  speed, 
the  trawler's  skipper  would  then  draw  his  special  sweep- 
ing stores,  such  as  his  kite,  White  Ensign,  flags,  cone, 
and  signal  book,  and  be  informed  to  which  group  of 
sweepers  he  was  to  belong,  as  well  as  the  name  of  the 
parent  ship  of  the  officer  in  charge  of  his  group.  He 
would  also  be  given  a  number,  which  was  to  be  painted 
n  white  figures  two  feet  long  on  each  bow,  and  his  ship 
would  in  future  be  known  officially  by  that  number. 
His  fishing  letters  and  number  were  to  be  painted  out.  A 
naval  petty  officer  would  also  join  the  trawler  in  order 
to  assist  the  skipper  with  advice,  especially  in  purely 
naval  matters,  in  signalling  and  keeping  accounts ;  and  this 
petty  officer  would  be  third  in  command.  By  this  time 
the  ship  would  also  have  been  painted  a  navy  grey  and 
be  flying  the  White  Ensign ;  she  would,  in  fact,  have 
changed  her  character  from  that  of  a  peaceful  fisherman 
to  a  man-of-war. 

Mention  must  not  be  omitted  of  the  arrangement 
which  had  been  made,  also  prior  to  the  war,  between  the 
Admiralty  and  the  trawler-owners.  It  was  realised  that 
in  the  event  of  hostilities  the  fishing  industry  would, 


CH.  vi]        ARRANGEMENT  WITH  THE  OWNERS      265 

except  in  certain  areas  removed  from  the  theatre  of 
operations,  automatically  stop  ;  that  the  trawlers  would 
have  to  remain  in  port,  and  therefore  the  owners  would 
cease  to  receive  dividends.  The  Admiralty  scheme,  by 
taking  over  these  vessels  in  war-time  at  a  certain  rate  of 
hire,  was  to  be  considered  as  offering  a  sound  business 
proposition.  Before  the  war  an  arrangement  existed 
between  certain  owners  and  the  naval  authorities  whereby 
such  vessels  would  be  chartered  in  priority  of  any  other 
trawlers  in  the  event  of  hostilities.  The  owners  agreed  that 
as  soon  as  possible  after  receipt  of  notice  they  would  hire 
their  vessels  to  the  Navy  upon  terms  which  had  already 
been  arranged.  The  payment  in  respect  of  hire  was  to 
be  12  per  cent,  per  annum  on  the  then  value  of  the  trawler. 
The  first  cost  was  to  be  ascertained  by  valuing  the  hull 
and  outfit  at  £18  per  ton  of  the  gross  tonnage  on  the 
Board  of  Trade  certificate,  and  the  machinery  and  boilers 
at  £40  per  nominal  horse-power.  This  estimated  first 
cost  was  to  be  depreciated  at  the  rate  of  4  per  cent,  for 
every  year  of  the  trawler's  age  ;  the  class  of  vessel  aimed 
at  was  craft  not  more  than  ten  years  old,  and  able  to 
carry  enough  coal  to  steam  at  least  1,000  miles  at  8  knots. 
In  the  month  of  March  1912,  a  number  of  retired  naval 
officers  were  selected  to  take  charge  of  mine-sweeping 
trawlers  at  Sheerness,  the  Firth  of  Forth,  Dover,  Ports- 
mouth, Portland,  Devonport,  and  Milford.  As  soon  as 
these  officers  should  receive  a  telegram  ordering  them  to 
mobilise,  they  were  to  proceed  to  their  respective  ports. 
They  were  not,  of  course,  the  mobilising  officers,  but  were 
to  go  to  sea  in  charge  of  their  respective  groups  of  sweepers. 
In  July  of  that  year  a  further  number  were  also  selected 
as  mobilising  officers  at  Aberdeen,  Hull,  Grimsby,  Milford 
Haven,  North  Shields,  Granton  (near  Leith),  and  Fleet- 
wood  ;  and,  in  order  to  leave  no  loophole  for  misunder- 
standings, these  officers  were  required  to  undergo  an 
annual  course  of  three  days  at  their  appointed  ports  with 
a  view  to  getting  in  touch  with  the  Registrars  of  the  Royal 
Naval  Reserve,  the  local  harbour  authorities,  and  trawler- 
owners,  and  in  order  to  become  acquainted  generally  with 
the  docks  and  locality.  Prior  to  these  three  days,  they 
were  to  visit  the  Admiralty  for  one  day  each  year 
in  order  to  confer  with  the  Inspecting  Captain  of  Mine- 
sweeping. 


266  THE  AUXILIARY  PATROL  [CH.  vi 

It  will  be  seen  with  what  meticulous  care  the  Navy  had 
prepared  against  one  particular  form  of  warfare  which  it 
was  suspected  the  enemy  would  pursue.  For  years  these 
preparations  had  continued,  but  they  were  not  complete. 
In  September  of  1912  another  stage  was  reached,  when 
an  allocation  of  mine-sweeping  trawlers  was  made  right 
away  down  the  coast  from  Scotland  along  the  North  Sea, 
down  the  Channel,  up  the  Irish  Sea  to  Milford  Haven,  and 
even  as  far  west  as  Queenstown.  In  November  there  were 
sixty-four  trawlers  on  the  Admiralty  list,  each  allocated  to 
one  of  these  ports,  each  with  its  skipper  and  crew  trained 
for  sweeping,  and  with  a  naval  officer  ready  to  take 
charge  of  a  group  whenever  ordered  to  leave  his  retire- 
ment and  go  to  sea.  The  crew  was  to  consist  of  the 
skipper,  second-hand,  four  deck-hands,  two  enginemen, 
and  one  trimmer,  in  addition  to  one  naval  petty  officer, 
whose  knowledge  of  signalling  would  be  found  not  the 
least  useful  of  his  qualifications. 

By  August  1914  the  Trawler  Section  had  so  far  ad- 
vanced that  there  were  already  eighty-two  trawlers  under 
the  above  arrangement,  to  be  based  on  Cromarty,  the  Firth 
of  Forth,  North  Shields,  the  Humber,  Harwich,  the 
Nore,  Dover,  Portsmouth,  Portland,  and  Devonport. 
In  addition  to  these  eighty-two  fishing  trawlers,  there 
were,  of  course,  the  six  Admiralty-owned  trawlers  already 
mentioned,  as  well  as  the  surveying  trawlers  Esther  and 
Daisy  which  appeared  in  the  Navy  List,  for  some  years 
before  the  war,  as  surveying-vessels.  It  was  intended 
that  on  the  outbreak  of  war  these  two  should  sweep  at  the 
Nore,  but  as  soon  as  they  were  relieved  by  hired  trawlers 
they  were  to  proceed,  the  one  to  Harwich  and  the  other 
to  the  Humber.  Thus  the  commanding  officers  of  both 
the  Daisy  and  Esther  were  each  able  to  take  charge  of  a 
unit  of  detached  trawlers. 

The  Admiralty  also  owned  the  trawlers  Javelin,  Jasper, 
Janus,  and  had  chartered  some  time  prior  to  the  war  the 
trawlers  Alnmouth,  Xylopia,  Daniel  Stroud,  and  Osborne 
Stroud.  These  had  been  employed  in  peace-time  in  tow- 
ing targets,  and  were  at  that  period  commanded  by  war- 
rant officers  of  the  Royal  Navy.  Nor  was  the  Admiralty 
ignorant  of  the  mining  preparations  which  Germany  had 
been  making  stealthily  and  determinedly  during  the 
years  of  peace.  It  was  known  that  practically  every 


CH.  vi]  READY  FOR   WAR  267 

German  man-of-war,  from  battleship  to  torpedo-boat, 
had  been  fitted  to  carry  mines  ;  and  for  a  long  time  the 
personnel  of  the  German  torpedo- craft  had  been  trained 
in  mine-laying.  It  was  known,  also, -that  our  future  enemy 
possessed  over  10,000  mines,  chiefly  of  the  horned  type, 
ready  to  be  scattered  at  our  very  doors  at  the  earliest 
moment.  The  naval  authorities  were  prepared  for  this. 
On  the  other  hand,  whilst  it  was  realised  that  the  mine 
would  be  a  serious  menace,  no  one  could  have  foreseen 
that  it  would  usurp  to  itself,  in  conjunction  with  the  sub- 
marine, the  task  of  carrying  out  the  main  operations  of 
the  enemy  by  sea. 

Such,  then,  was  the  situation  at  the  outbreak  of  hos- 
tilities. The  country  possessed  a  defensive  organisation 
when  the  first  act  of  warfare  by  sea  occurred  in  the  laying 
of  the  minefield  off  the  Suffolk  coast  by  the  enemy.  This 
organisation  had  taken  just  seven  years  to  create  and 
to  perfect.  During  those  years  great  difficulties  had  been 
overcome,  for  unsuspected  obstacles  were  continually  arising. 
To  have  created  a  mine-sweeping  fleet  ready  for  service 
as  a  reserve  force  with  a  minimum  of  cost  to  the  country 
was  indeed  no  mean  achievement.  It  is  not  possible  to 
realise  how  shipping  could  have  gone  up  and  down  the 
North  Sea  as  it  did  during  the  first  few  months  of  the  war 
if  it  had  not  been  for  this  trawler  organisation.  Within 
ten  days  of  the  declaration  of  hostilities  there  were  100  of 
these  fishing- vessels  serving  under  the  White  Ensign. 
They  kept  a  channel  up  the  coast  swept  clear  for  tramp 
steamer  and  man-of-war  alike.  They  had  come  straight 
in  from  their  fishing-grounds,  landed  their  catch  and  their 
gear,  coaled,  turned  round,  and  away  they  had  gone  to  sea 
again,  with  the  least  possible  delay,  to  begin  one  of  the 
most  dangerous  occupations  which,  in  the  whole  history 
of  marine  warfare,  has  ever  been  devised  by  the  wit  of 
man.  To  these  men  the  country  owes  an  immeasurable 
debt. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE 

THE  Germans  must  have  realised  at  an  early  stage  in  the 
war  that  they  could  not  hope  seriously  to  interrupt  British 
sea-borne  traffic,  immense  in  volume  and  widely  distri- 
buted, with  the  comparatively  few  men-of-war  and  armed 
merchantmen  which  they  had  operating  on  the  trade 
routes.  The  ultimate  fate  of  those  enemy  vessels  was  also 
certain  in  view  of  the  large  forces  which  the  Allied  fleets 
were  able  to  employ  in  hunting  them  down.  The  Germans 
may  also  have  been  impressed  by  the  confident  statements 
issued  by  the  British  Admiralty  from  time  to  time  as  to 
the  flow  of  traffic,  and  must  have  foreseen  that  month  by 
month  the  Allies,  drawing  from  the  inexhaustible  resources 
of  the  sea,  would  continue  to  grow  in  strength,  while  Ger- 
many and  the  Powers  associated  with  her  would  suffer 
from  increasing  exhaustion  due  to  the  slow  but  relentless 
pressure  of  superior  sea-power.  Before  hostilities  had  been 
in  progress  three  months,  there  were  indications  that  the 
German  naval  authorities  were  searching  for  some  means 
by  which  they  could  strike  an  effective  blow  at  the  mer- 
chant shipping  of  the  Allies,  and  the  United  Kingdom  in 
particular,  without  endangering  the  existence  of  the  High 
Sea  Fleet. 

The  whole  civilised  world  was  shocked,  towards  the  end 
of  October  1914,  by  the  story  of  the  barbarous  attack  by  a 
German  submarine  upon  the  French  s.s.  Amiral  Ganteaume, 
crowded  with  Belgian  refugees,  about  forty  of  whom  were 
killed.1  A  charitable  view  was  at  first  taken  of  the 
incident,  it  being  assumed  that  this  attempt  to  sink  a 
vessel  engaged  on  an  errand  of  mercy  was  due  to  the  ill- 
considered  act  of  an  individual  naval  officer.  That  opinion 

1  Subsequent  examination  of  one  of  the  damaged  lifeboats  of  the  Amiral 
Oanteaume  led  to  the  discovery  of  the  fragment  of  a  German  torpedo. 

268 


CH.VH]  THE  FIRST  VICTIM  269 

had,  however,  to  be  abandoned  subsequently  in  face  of 
incidents  which  indicated  that  the  Germans  were  defin- 
itely testing  the  suitability  of  the  submarine  for  cutting 
the  sea  communications  of  the  Allies. 

Six  days  before  this  incident,  on  October  20th,  the  British 
steamship  Glitra,  866  tons,  had  been  attacked  in  the  North 
Sea.  That  ship,  which  was  old,  slow,  and,  of  course,  un- 
armed, left  Grangemouth,  at  the  head  of  the  Firth  of 
Forth,  for  Stavanger  on  October  18th  with  a  general  cargo ; 
the  crew  numbered  seventeen.  She  followed  the  route  laid 
down  by  the  Admiralty,  steaming  at  about  8  knots.  When 
some  fourteen  miles  west-south-west  from  Skudesnaes  on 
the  Norwegian  coast,  at  noon  on  the  21st,  she  unsuspect- 
ingly hoisted  the  signal  for  a  pilot,  for  no  suspicious  vessel 
was  in  view.  The  response  was  instant.  But  as  the 
motor  pilot-boat  approached  a  low,  long  object,  about 
three  miles  to  the  seaward,  was  observed  by  the  Glitra's 
master  (Mr.  L.  A.  Johnston)  and  chief  officer,  who  were 
on  the  bridge.  It  proved  to  be  Ul7  (Oberleutnant  z.  S. 
Feldkirchner).  The  pilot-boat  turned  back,  evidently 
fearing  trouble,  and  the  master  of  the  Glitra  altered  course 
more  to  the  north,  in  order  to  increase  the  distance  be- 
tween himself  and  the  submarine.  He  had  no  reason  to 
anticipate  molestation  by  the  submarine,  a  thing  unheard 
of  hitherto.  The  submarine,  which  had  5  knots  superior 
speed,  followed  the  Glitra,  subsequently  describing  a  com- 
plete circle  round  the  defenceless  merchant  ship,  and 
carrying  out  a  leisurely  inspection.  A  gun  mounted  abaft 
the  conning-tower  of  the  submarine  was  then  fired,  and 
on  the  Glitra  stopping,  the  Germans  approached  within 
a  ship's  length  and  launched  a  collapsible  boat.  An  officer 
and  two  men  forthwith  boarded  the  merchantman.  They 
were  fully  armed  and  evidently  in  ruthless  mood.  The 
master  of  the  Glitra  was  immediately  ordered  off  the 
bridge,  the  German  officer  placing  the  muzzle  of  a  re- 
volver against  his  neck  and  excitedly  warning  him  in 
passable  English  that  he  would  be  allowed  ten  minutes 
in  which  to  get  his  crew  away  in  the  boats,  and  that  then 
his  ship  would  be  sunk. 

While  preparations  were  being  made  to  leave  the  ship, 
the  Germans  covered  the  crew  with  revolvers,  and  two 
guns  mounted  in  the  submarine  were  trained  threaten- 
ingly on  the  vessel.  Captain  Johnston  and  his  men 


270        APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

were  refused  permission  to  collect  their  clothes  and  other 
belongings,  and  the  Germans,  having  seized  the  ship's 
papers,  lowered  the  British  flag,  which  was  torn  to 
pieces  and  trampled  underfoot  with  maniacal  rage. 
These  actions  were  indicative  of  the  spirit  of  the  enemy's 
seamen  on  entering  upon  the  new  campaign.  As  soon  as 
the  crew  had  taken  to  the  boats,  the  Germans  transferred 
to  the  submarine  the  charts  and  compasses  of  the  Glitra, 
without  a  word  of  apology  for  such  acts  of  theft.  In  the 
meantime,  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Ul7  had  sent 
an  engineer  into  the  engine-room,  evidently  to  open  the 
valves,  for  shortly  afterwards  the  ship  began  to  settle 
down,  her  late  crew  being  helpless  spectators.  The  sub- 
marine towed  the  crowded  boats  for  about  a  quarter  of 
an  hour,  and,  having  then  cast  them  loose  with  direc- 
tions to  the  men  to  row  towards  the  land,  returned 
to  complete  the  destruction  of  the  Glitra.  The  pilot-boat 
subsequently  came  to  the  rescue  of  the  abandoned  sea- 
men and  towed  the  boats  until  the  Norwegian  torpedo- 
boat  Hai  appeared.  This  craft  eventually  landed  Captain 
Johnston  and  his  men  at  Skudesnaes,  from  which  place 
they  were  taken  on  by  a  passenger  steamer  to  Stavanger. 
At  the  time  this  action  of  the  Germans  was  regarded  as 
merely  an  isolated  outrage  of  a  despicable  character,  but 
later  events  contradicted  that  impression.  That  the 
officer  commanding  U17  had  acted  on  instructions  received 
from  superior  authority,  and  that  a  definite  policy  of  attack 
was  being  tested  before  its  adoption  on  a  larger  scale,  was 
afterwards  suggested  by  the  fate  of  the  s.s.  Malachite  (718 
tons).  This  vessel  left  Liverpool  on  November  19th  for 
Havre  with  a  general  cargo.  She  was  about  four  miles 
north  by  west  from  Cape  la  H&ve  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
23rd  when  she  sighted  U21,  commanded  by  Kapitan- 
Leutnant  Otto  Hersing,  about  two  miles  away  on  the  star- 
board beam.  Warned  by  a  shot  fired  across  his  bow,  the 
British  master  (Mr.  Stephen  Masson)  stopped  his  engines. 
The  submarine  then  closed  in,  and  particulars  of  the 
voyage  and  the  cargo  were  demanded  in  English.  Question 
and  answer  were  shouted  from  deck  to  deck.  The  Germans, 
realising  that  they  had  the  British  seamen  at  their  mercy, 
then  hoisted  their  ensign,  and  directed  the  master  to 
carry  all  his  papers  to  the  enemy  ship.  When  the  crew  were 
taking  to  the  boats,  the  officer  remarked,  as  though 


CH.  vn]  U21'S  TEST  CRUISE  271 

ashamed  of  his  conduct,  that  he  was  sorry  he  could  not 
accommodate  the  men  on  board  the  submarine,  but  "  war 
is  war."  Meantime  the  master  had  asked  permission  to 
retain  the  logbook  and  the  ship's  articles.  The  request  was 
refused.  When  the  men  were  clear  of  the  ship,  the  sub- 
marine began  firing  at  the  Malachite  at  a  range  of  about 
200  yards  with  a  gun  mounted  abaft  the  conning-tower. 
As  the  boats  were  being  rowed  towards  Havre,  which  was 
reached  the  same  evening,  the  Germans  were  still  firing 
on  the  Malachite,  and  incidentally  on  the  German  flag, 
which  the  doomed  vessel  continued  to  fly.  It  was  after- 
wards ascertained  that  the  ship  remained  afloat  and  on 
fire  for  twenty-four  hours. 

Three  days  later  the  same  submarine  encountered  the 
Primo  (1,366  tons),  which  was  on  passage  from  Jarrow-on- 
Tyne  to  Rouen  with  coal.  She  was  six  miles  north-west  by 
north  from  Cape  d'Antifer  when  the  submarine,  flying  no 
flag,  appeared.  As  in  the  case  of  the  Glitra  and  Malachite, 
the  attack  was  made  by  daylight,  the  Primo  falling  in  with 
the  submarine  at  about  8  a.m.  The  captain  of  the  sub- 
marine adopted  the  same  procedure  as  before,  apologising 
shamefacedly  to  the  master  (Mr.  C.  A.  Whincop)  for 
the  trouble  caused,  remarking  that  "  This  is  war."  The 
master  and  crew,  cast  adrift  in  their  boats,  endeavoured 
to  reach  a  steamer  which  they  saw  at  some  distance,  but 
on  hearing  the  firing  of  the  submarine  directed  on  the 
Primo,  that  vessel  sheered  off  in  order  to  avoid  sharing  the 
Primo 's  fate.  The  seamen  then  rowed  towards  Fecamp, 
and  about  two  hours  later  were  picked  up  by  the  s.s. 
Clermiston  and  put  ashore.  The  captain  of  the  U21  ex- 
perienced considerable  difficulty  in  sinking  the  Primo. 
Gunfire  failed  to  achieve  the  purpose.  When  Captain 
Whincop  and  his  men  last  saw  the  vessel,  she  was  still 
afloat  with  the  submarine  standing  by.  Two  days  later 
various  vessels  reported  her  as  on  fire  and  adrift. 
The  French  naval  authorities  at  Boulogne,  learning  that 
an  abandoned  ship  was  afloat,  a  danger  to  traffic,  dis- 
patched a  division  of  torpedo-boats  on  the  last  day  of  the 
month  to  carry  out  a  search.  According  to  a  report  from 
the  Vice-Consul  at  Tre*port,  the  battered  Primo  was 
ultimately  sunk  by  a  French  torpedo-boat. 

The  sinking  of  these  two  merchant  ships  was  the  result 
of  the  first  cruise  for  commerce-destruction  carried  out 

19 


272        APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE       [CH»  vit 

in  the  Channel  by  Kapitan-Leutnant  Hersing.  He  was 
dispatched,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe,  to  test 
the  adaptability  of  the  submarine  to  a  campaign  on  mer- 
chant shipping,  being  chosen  for  this  mission  by  reason  of 
the  success  which  he  had  already  achieved  in  the  North 
Sea.  About  the  same  time  rumours  were  current  of  a 
German  plan  to  establish  submarine  bases  in  Flanders, 
which  had  recently  passed  into  the  enemy's  possession; 
this  intention,  however,  did  not  materialise  until  the  fol- 
lowing spring,  and  no  other  merchant  ship  was  destroyed 
before  the  close  of  the  year,  though  one  vessel  had  a 
narrow  escape.  On  December  llth,  the  Colchester  (1,209 
tons),  a  passenger  vessel  of  the  Great  Eastern  Railway 
Company,  with  a  speed  of  about  13  knots,  was  crossing  from 
Rotterdam  to  Parkeston  Quay,  Harwich.  When  some 
twenty-two  miles  from  the  Hook  of  Holland,  at  8.20  a.m., 
she  saw  a  submarine  on  the  starboard  bow  steering  approxi- 
mately south-west  by  west.  The  master  (Mr.  F.  Lawrence), 
being  at  first  doubtful  of  the  nationality  of  the  stranger 
which  was  closing  on  his  ship,  ported  his  helm,  bringing 
the  submarine  on  the  starboard  bow.  The  submarine 
then  turned  to  starboard  and  steamed  direct  for  the 
Colchester,  at  the  same  time  rising  well  out  of  the  water. 
The  Germans  began  to  signal,  but  Captain  Lawrence  was 
too  busy  watching  his  pursuer  to  pay  attention  to 
signals,  and  in  any  case  he  was  determined  to  spare  no 
effort  to  escape.  As  the  submarine  turned  towards  his 
ship,  he  ported  his  helm  again  so  as  to  bring  the  enemy 
astern  of  him.  His  seaman's  instinct  prompted  him  to 
turn  out  all  the  stokers,  and  the  fires  were  double-banked 
to  obtain  the  utmost  speed.  In  these  exciting  conditions 
the  chase  continued  for  about  twenty  minutes.  Finding 
the  British  vessel  was  drawing  away  from  her,  the  sub- 
marine at  last  steered  away  south-west.  The  Admiralty 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  submarine  was  a  German 
vessel,  and  commended  the  master  of  the  Colchester  for  his 
spirited  action. 

These  incidents  indicated  the  policy  which  the  enemy 
had  determined  to  adopt.  The  High  Sea  Fleet  dared  not 
face  a  general  action  against  superior  forces  ;  the  whole 
Austrian  Navy  was  held  firmly  in  the  Adriatic ;  the 
enemy  cruisers — armed  merchantmen  as  well  as  men-of- 
war — had  been  nearly  all  rounded  up,  and  enemy  com- 


CH.  vn]  THE   END  AND  THE  MEANS  273 

merce  had  been  swept  off  the  seas.  Driven  to  desperation 
by  the  complete  failure  to  interfere  with  the  transport  of 
the  British  Army  or  to  interrupt  seriously  British  ocean 
commerce,  the  German  authorities  had  searched  round  for 
some  method  of  striking  a  vital  blow  at  the  one  Power 
which,  encompassed  by  the  sea,  they  could  not  reach 
with  their  army  or  navy.  When  the  war  opened  Ger- 
many possessed  only  twenty-eight  submarines  ;  the  oldest 
of  these  craft,  eighteen  in  number,  were  built  between 
1905  and  1912,  but  ten  of  them,  U19  to  U28,  of  later  and 
improved  construction,  were  thoroughly  reliable  vessels. 

During  the  early  phase  of  hostilities,  the  German  General 
Staff  was  encouraged  by  events,  judging  by  the  comments 
in  the  German  newspapers,  to  believe  that,  with  the  aid 
of  the  submarine,  a  war  of  attrition  could  be  pursued 
until  at  last  the  two  fighting  fleets — the  Grand  Fleet  and 
the  High  Sea  Fleet — stood  at  something  approaching 
parity  in  strength.  As  early  as  September  5th,  the 
light  cruiser  PATHFINDER  had  been  sunk  at  the  entrance  to 
the  Firth  of  Forth  by  U21.  Later  in  the  same  month  a 
single  submarine,  U9,  under  the  command  of  Otto  von 
Weddigen,  had  destroyed  in  rapid  succession  the  armoured 
cruisers  HOGUE,  CRESSY,  and  ABOUKIR,  with  heavy  loss  of 
life.  These  successes  produced  a  great  effect  on  German 
opinion,  and  it  was  intensified  when,  on  October  15th, 
the  cruiser  HAWKE  was  sunk  in  the  North  Sea.  Orders 
must  almost  immediately  have  been  given  to  a  certain 
number  of  submarine  commanders  to  prove  whether 
U-boats  might  be  employed  against  merchant  shipping. 
The  incidents  already  recorded  brought  conviction  to  the 
German  Naval  Staff  that  submarines  could,  at  one  and 
the  same  time,  wage  war  against  the  British  Navy  and 
the  British  Mercantile  Marine,  thus  week  by  week  wearing 
down  the  essential  sea  power  of  the  British  people. 

The  attack  upon  commerce  involved  the  infraction  of 
international  law  and  a  denial  of  the  common  dictates  of 
humanity,  since  submarines,  owing  to  their  limited 
accommodation,  could  not  become  "  places  of  safety " 
for  the  crews  of  the  ships  destroyed.  But  those  were  not 
matters  to  trouble  the  Germans,  ready  to  believe  that  the 
end — a  German  victory — would  justify  the  means.  .  The 
subsequent  action  of  the  German  Government  and  the 
character  of  its  pronouncements  support  the  impression 


274        APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

that  the  belief  existed  that  the  mere  threat  of  a  sub- 
marine campaign,  supported  by  a  comparatively  few  ruth- 
less acts,  would  intimidate  British  seamen,  with  the  result 
that  the  seas  would  be  cleared  of  British  shipping,  thus 
preparing  the  foundations  for  the  conclusion  of  a  German 
peace.  By  that  time  it  had  become  apparent  to  the 
German  authorities  that  their  military  machine  had  failed 
to  realise  the  hopes  which  rested  in  it  within  the  limit  of 
time  laid  down  by  the  General  Staff.  Germany  had  become 
involved,  not  in  a  short  campaign  resembling  those  waged 
in  1864,  in  1866,  and  in  1870-1,  but,  owing  to  the  inter- 
vention of  British  sea  power,  in  a  long  and  exhausting  war, 
the  issue  of  which  was  uncertain.  They  had  under-esti- 
mated the  influence  of  sea  power,  and  they  hailed  the 
submarine  as  offering  them  an  escape  from  an  exceedingly 
embarrassing  situation. 

In  these  circumstances,  the  submarine,  with  all  it  im- 
plied of  inhuman  terrorism,  was  adopted  as  giving  the 
promise  of  an  early  peace  on  Germany's  own  terms.  The 
enemy's  growing  intention  was  revealed  before  the  end 
of  the  year  in  an  interview  with  Grand-Admiral  von 
Tirpitz,  then  Naval  Secretary,  which  was  published  in  the 
New  York  Sun  on  December  22nd.  Referring  to  the 
possibilities  of  a  submarine  campaign,  he  declared,  "  It 
is  difficult  to  draw  conclusions  just  yet,  but  it  is  unques- 
tionable that  submarines  are  a  new  and  powerful  weapon 
of  naval  warfare."  At  the  same  time  he  confessed — and 
the  confession  indicates  the  restrictions  which  it  was  then 
believed  limited  the  activity  of  these  craft — "  One  must 
not  forget  that  submarines  do  their  best  work  along  the 
coast  and  in  shallow  waters,  and  that  for  this  reason  the 
Channel  is  particularly  suitable  for  this  craft.  The  suc- 
cesses which  have  been  achieved  hitherto  do  not  warrant 
the  conclusion  that  the  day  of  large  ships  is  past.  It  is 
still  questionable  whether  submarines  would  have  made 
such  a  fine  show  in  other  waters.  We  have  learnt  a  good 
deal  about  submarines  in  this  war.  We  thought  that 
they  would  not  be  able  to  remain  much  longer  than  three 
days  away  from  their  base,  as  the  crews  would  then  neces- 
sarily be  exhausted.  But  we  soon  learnt  that  the  larger 
type  of  these  boats  can  navigate  round  the  whole  of 
England,  and  can  remain  absent  as  long  as  a  fortnight. 
All  that  is  necessary  is  that  the  crew  gets  an  opportunity 


CH.  vii]  U19  AND  THE   "  DUE  WARD  "  275 

of  resting  and  recuperating,  and  this  opportunity  can  be 
afforded  the  men  by  taking  the  boat  to  the  shallow  and 
still  waters,  where  it  can  rest  on  the  bottom  and,  remain- 
ing still  in  the  water,  the  crew  can  have  a  good  sleep. 
This  is  only  possible  where  the  water  is  comparatively 
shallow."  He  put  the  further  query,  "  What  would 
America  say  if  Germany  should  declare  a  submarine  war 
against  all  enemy  trading  vessels  ?  " 

That  this  was  something  more  than  a  mere  academic 
expression  of  professional  views  became  clear  in  the  light 
of  later  events.  After  the  appearance  of  this  interview, 
which  was  no  doubt  intended  to  test  public  opinion  in  the 
United  States  and  other  neutral  countries,  a  period  of 
nearly  a  month  occurred,  during  which  no  British  vessel 
was  attacked  by  a  submarine.  It  was  soon  apparent 
that  the  enemy  had  devoted  attention  to  the  study  of  the 
problem  which  the  new  policy,  directly  foreshadowed  by 
Grand- Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  presented.  German  sub- 
marines were  provided  with  bombs  to  be  used  in  circum- 
stances in  which  such  comparatively  cheap  and  light 
weapons  could  be  employed,  thus  economising  the  expendi- 
ture of  torpedoes,  of  which  each  vessel  could  carry  only  a 
few.  At  this  stage  of  the  war,  therefore,  the  German  sub- 
marines, particularly  susceptible  to  surface  attack  owing 
to  the  vulnerability  of  their  hulls,  depended  for  offensive 
purposes  on  the  bomb,  and  in  the  last  resort  on  the  tor- 
pedo, though  some  of  them  were  provided  with  light  guns. 

On  January  21st,  1915,  in  rainy  but  clear  weather,  the 
s.s.  Durward  (1,301  tons)  was  two  days  out  from  Leith, 
on  passage  to  Rotterdam,  when  the  chief  officer,  who 
was  on  the  bridge,  reported  to  the  master  (Mr.  John 
Wood)  that  a  suspicious  submarine  was  about  Ij  points 
before  the  steamer's  starboard  beam.  On  going  on  deck 
and  looking  through  his  glasses, ^Captain  Wood  saw  that  the 
strange  ship  was  flying  the  signal  to  stop  instantly.  The 
submarine  was  only  about  a  mile  and  a  half  distant  and 
was  showing  no  colours  ;  she  was  steaming  towards  the 
Durward  on  an  opposite  course.  The  British  ship  was 
travelling  at  about  12  knots.  Captain  Wood  at  once 
determined  to  ignore  the  signal,  and,  going  into  the 
engine-room,  gave  directions  to  put  on  all  possible  speed. 
When  he  returned  to  the  deck,  he  saw  that  the  submarine 
had  altered  course  and  was  heading  for  the  Durward's 


276        APPEARANCE  OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

starboard  side,  at  the  same  time  flying  the  signal  "  Stop, 
or  I  fire."  Within  half  an  hour  of  the  first  sighting  of 
the  enemy  craft,  the  submarine,  in  spite  of  the  best  endea- 
vours of  the  Durward's  engine-room  staff,  had  managed  to 
get  under  the  ship's  starboard  quarter,  and  shortly  after- 
wards a  warning  rocket  was  fired.  Captain  Wood  realised 
that  further  effort  to  escape  was  impossible,  and  stopped 
his  engines.  The  submarine  proved  to  be  U19  (which  had 
recently  been  rammed  by  H.M.S.  BADGER),  and  the  conduct 
of  the  commanding  officer,  Oberleutnant  Kolbe,  towards 
the  British  seamen  merits  being  recalled  in  view  of  later 
events.  In  reply  to  a  signal,  the  chief  officer  of  the  Dur- 
ward  and  three  men  of  the  crew  carried  the  ship's  papers  on 
board  the  submarine.  As  soon  as  the  boat  got  alongside 
the  enemy  vessel,  a  group  of  German  seamen  put  off,  them- 
selves using  the  Durwctrd's  boat,  and  an  officer,  speaking 
in  good  English,  ordered  Captain  Wood  to  get  everyone 
into  the  boats  as  quickly  as  possible.  After  the  crew 
had  left  and  while  the  British  master  was  on  board  U19, 
to  which  he  had  been  taken,  the  boarding-party  placed 
two  bombs  against  the  ship's  side.  About  twenty  minutes 
afterwards  explosions  occurred,  the  vessel  beginning  at 
once  to  settle  down  in  the  water,  to  the  grief  and  con- 
sternation of  the  British  seamen.  The  German  commander 
towed  the  two  British  boats  for  about  half  an  hour  in  a 
northerly  direction.  Casting  them  adrift,  he  went  back 
to  the  Durward,  subsequently  returning  to  give  a  further 
tow  until  he  was  within  one  mile  north  of  the  Maas  light- 
ship, as  though  anxious  to  do  what  he  could  for  members 
of  the  same  great  brotherhood  of  the  sea  while  conform- 
ing to  the  orders  he  had  received  from  his  superiors.  From 
first  to  last  the  British  seamen  had  been  well  treated,  and, 
having  been  placed  in  a  position  of  comparative  safety, 
they  were  left  to  their  own  resources.  Eventually  a 
Dutch  pilot  steamer  took  them  on  board  and  towed  the 
two  boats  as  far  as  the  Hook  of  Holland.  The  craft  were 
returned  later  on  to  their  owners,  and,  apart  from  the 
loss  of  the  ship  and  the  crews'  effects,  the  incident  was 
marked  by  no  exhibition  of  Prussianism. 

On  the  last  day  of  January  no  fewer  than  seven  ships 
were  attacked,  and  only  one,  the  Graphic  (1,871  tons), 
escaped.  Of  the  six  vessels  which  were  destroyed,  three 
were  intercepted  by  the  enemy  outside  Liverpool,  point- 


CH.  vn]          OPERATIONS   OFF  LIVERPOOL  277 

ing  to  a  carefully  prepared  plan  of  attack  by  the  submarine 
under  Kapitan-Leutnant  Hersing  to  test  the  possibilities  of 
virtually  blockading  a  great  commercial  port.  At  10. 30  a.  m. 
the  Ben  Cruachan  (3,092  tons ;  master,  Mr.  D.  W.  Heggie) 
was  sunk  by  bombs,  the  crew,  who  had  taken  to  the  two 
lifeboats,  being  directed  to  steer  towards  the  sailing  trawler 
Margaret,  by  which  they  were  landed  at  Fleetwood.  About 
an  hour  later  the  same  submarine,  U21,  fell  in  with  the 
Linda  Blanche,  a  small  steamer  of  369  tons.  The  pro- 
cedure was  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  the  Ben  Cruachan, 
the  crew  being  advised  to  steer  towards  the  trawler  Niblet, 
by  which  they  were  taken  to  Fleetwood.  When  the 
boarding-party  reached  the  Linda  Blanche,  some  of  the 
Germans  gave  cigars  and  cigarettes  to  the  British  crew,  as 
though  to  indicate  that  they  did  not  care  for  their  work. 
At  1.30  p.m.  the  s.s.  Kilcoan  was  sunk.  The  mate,  who  was 
on  deck  in  charge  of  this  little  ship  of  456  tons,  shouted 
down  to  the  master  (Mr.  James  Maneely)  to  come  on 
deck,  as  a  submarine  wished  to  speak  to  him.  On  going 
up,  Captain  Maneely  found  the  submarine  close  to  the 
starboard  side,  with  a  machine-gun  trained  on  the  Kilcoan. 
Her  hull  was  painted  a  dull  white,  the  conning-tower 
being  of  a  darker  colour.  Ten  men  stood  on  the  deck  of 
the  enemy  craft,  most  of  them  armed  with  revolvers,  but 
two  carrying  rifles.  In  face  of  this  menacing  exhibition, 
what  could  the  British  seaman  do  but  comply  with  any 
demands  ?  Kapitan-Leutnant  Hersing  shouted  in  English, 
"  Get  into  your  boats."  The  men  promptly  launched  the 
starboard  and  port  boats,  and  all  hands  took  their  places. 
The  boats  were  then  ordered  alongside  the  submarine,  and 
the  crew  were  directed  to  get  on  board.  The  master  was 
asked  peremptorily  for  his  papers  and,  as  he  had  not  brought 
them  with  him,  he  was  sent  for  them.  Four  fully  armed 
German  seamen,  carrying  an  explosive  bomb  fitted  with 
about  two  yards  of  fuse,  accompanied  him.  The  Germans 
remained  on  deck  while  the  master  went  below  to  obtain 
the  ship's  certificate  of  register  and  other  papers,  which 
he  handed  over  to  a  petty  officer.  The  logbook  was  saved, 
Captain  Maneely  suggesting  in  his  answers  to  questions 
that  he  did  not  know  where  it  was.  The  enemy,  however, 
secured  the  ship's  ensign  and  the  Union  Jack. 

In  the  meantime,  one  of  the  German  seamen  had  fixed 
the  bomb  amidship  and  set  the  fuse  alight.     The  skipper 


278        APPEARANCE   OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

and  the  boarding-party  then  left  the  Kilcoan  to  return  to 
the  submarine.  While  they  were  on  their  way  back,  the 
bomb  exploded,  tearing  a  hole  in  the  port  side  of  the 
steamer.  The  members  of  the  crew  of  the  British  ship, 
still  on  board  the  submarine  and  wondering  what  their 
fate  would  be,  were  ordered  back  into  their  boats.  Then 
occurred  an  unexpected  diversion.  In  the  distance  the 
German  officer  discerned  the  steamer  Gladys  from  Liverpool 
to  Douglas.  He  made  off  towards  her  and  directed  her 
captain  to  pick  up  the  Kilcoaris  men.  He  then  returned 
to  the  Kilcoan  and  fired  at  that  vessel  in  order  to  hasten 
her  destruction.  The  submarine  at  length  disappeared, 
and  late  that  night  the  British  seamen's  adventure  ended 
when  they  were  landed  at  Fleetwood  without  further 
mishap.  On  the  same  day  the  Graphic,  twenty-two  miles 
from  Liverpool  Bar  light-vessel,  was  chased,  but,  thanks 
to  her  speed,  succeeded  in  making  her  escape. 

In  the  meantime,  another  submarine — U20 — was  busy 
farther  south,  pursuing  a  policy  of  torpedoing  ships  at  sight, 
no  warning  of  any  kind  being  given.  The  Shaw  Savill  liner 
Tokomaru  (6,084  tons)  was  sunk  seven  miles  north-west 
from  Havre  light- vessel,  and  the  Ikaria  (4,335  tons)  nearly 
twenty  miles  farther  away,  both  on  January  30th.  The 
former  vessel  was  on  her  way  from  Wellington,  New  Zea- 
land, and  Tenerife.  At  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  that 
day,  in  fine,  clear  weather,  the  sea  being  smooth,  she  was 
slowly  steaming  towards  Havre  looking  for  a  pilot.  The 
master  (Mr.  Francis  Greene)  had  no  suspicion  of  the  menace 
which  threatened  him.  He  was  on  the  bridge,  with  the 
second  and  third  mates,  an  A.B.  being  on  the  lookout  for- 
ward. Suddenly  an  explosion  occurred  on  the  port  side, 
sending  the  water  up  over  the  bridge  and  filling  the  stoke- 
hold. The  ship  at  once  listed  heavily  and  commenced  to 
sink.  It  was  evident  that  the  submarine  was  watching  the 
effect  of  its  torpedo,  for  a  periscope  was  seen  by  Captain 
Greene  three  cables  away.  The  commander  of  the  sub- 
marine, his  act  of  savagery  consummated,  then  disappeared, 
caring  nothing  as  to  the  fate  of  the  British  sailors.  The 
experience  of  the  Tokomaru 's  crew  was  one  which  no  sea- 
man had  hitherto  suffered,  but  nevertheless  discipline  was 
maintained  and  all  the  hands  succeeded  in  getting  into 
the  boats — the  captain  going  over  the  side  last  in  accord- 
ance with  tradition.  Within  an  hour  the  men  were 


CH.  vn]         TORPEDOED   WITHOUT  WARNING          279 

safely  on  board  the  French  mine-sweeper  Saint  Pierre. 
Before  being  landed  at  Havre,  Captain  Greene  and  his 
companions  saw  their  ship  disappear  beneath  the 
water. 

Shortly  after  noon  on  the  same  day  the  Leyland  liner 
Ikaria,  which  left  Santos  and  other  South  American  ports  for 
Havre,  stopped  off  Cape  la  Heve  to  pick  up  a  pilot.  The 
ship  still  had  slight  headway  on  her  when  the  master  (Mr. 
Matthew  Robertson),  who  was  on  the  bridge,  saw  the  wake 
of  a  torpedo,  fired,  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt,  by  U20. 
There  was  no  time  to  use  the  helm,  for  almost  immediately 
afterwards  the  vessel  was  struck  on  the  port  side  abreast 
of  No.  1  hatch  and  began  to  sink  gradually  by  the  head. 
The  boats  were  ordered  out  and  the  officers  and  men 
proceeded  on  board  a  tug  which  happened,  fortunately, 
to  be  close  by.  About  an  hour  later,  the  Ikaria  being  still 
afloat,  Captain  Robertson,  with  some  of  his  men,  boarded 
her.  He  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  ship  could  be 
saved.  She  was  only  about  twenty-five  miles  from 
Havre,  the  sea  was  smooth  and  there  was  no  wind.  With 
the  assistance  of  a  tug,  the  Ikaria  was  got  into  Havre  and 
berthed  alongside  Quai  d'Escale,  where  she  remained 
until  midday  on  January  31st.  The  port  authorities, 
becoming  nervous  lest  she  should  sink  and  thus  impede 
traffic,  removed  her  to  the  west  of  the  Avant  Port,  to- 
wards the  breakwater,  where  she  sank  on  February  2nd, 
leaving  her  afterpart  showing. 

There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  General  Steam 
Navigation  Company's  steamer  Oriole  (1,489  tons)  met 
her  fate  also  at  the  hands  of  U20,  but  her  end  was  mysteri- 
ous.  The  Oriole  left  London  for  Havre  on  January  29th, 
and  passed  the  s.s.  London  Trader  off  Dungeness  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  following  day.  The  distance  from  Dunge- 
ness  to  Havre  being  from  ninety  to  ninety-five  miles,  the 
Oriole  should  have  reached  the  latter  port  about  ten  o'clock 
that  evening.  She  was  never  heard  of  again.  Later  in  the 
year,  Mr.  Justice  Bailhache  had  to  decide  in  the  High 
Court  the  fate  of  the  vessel.  In  the  course  of  his  judg- 
ment, he  told  of  two  pathetic  incidents.  On  February  6th, 
two  lifebuoys  were  found  on  the  coast  between  Hastings 
and  Dymchurch,  a  little  seaside  place  to  the  north  of 
Dungeness.  The  name  Oriole  was  painted  upon  them.  In 
the  following  month — on  March  20th — a  Guernsey  fisher- 


280  APPEARANCE  OF  THE   SUBMARINE    [CH.  vn 

man  picked  out  of  the  sea  an  ordinary  beer-bottle  con- 
taining a  piece  of  paper.  On  the  bottle  being  broken, 
the  paper  was  found  to  be  an  envelope  embossed  with 
the  name  of  the  General  Steam  Navigation  Company, 
and  written  in  pencil  was  the  message,  "Oriole  tor- 
pedoed— sinking."  The  widow  of  the  ship's  carpenter 
identified  the  handwriting  as  that  of  her  husband.  After 
considering  all  the  evidence,  Mr.  Justice  Bailhache  came  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  only  reasonable  explanation  of  the 
disappearance  of  the  Oriole  was  that  she  was  torpedoed 
by  the  enemy,  the  master  (Mr.  William  G.  Dale)  and  his 
crew  of  twenty  men  perishing.  The  story  has  an  historical 
interest  since,  whereas  the  Glitra  was  the  first  vessel  to 
be  sunk  by  a  submarine — on  October  20th,  1914 — the 
Tokomaru  and  the  Ikaria  were  the  first  to  be  torpedoed 
without  warning,  while  the  Oriole9  destroyed  in  the  same 
barbarous  way,  was  the  first  British  loss  which  involved 
the  death  of  the  crew.  Later  events  were  to  overshadow 
this  tragedy  of  the  war,  presenting  a  picture  of  such  large, 
dramatic,  and  terrible  proportions  that  in  a  few  months 
the  story  of  the  fate  of  these  defenceless  British  seamen 
shrank  into  comparative  oblivion. 

These  first  outbursts  of  terrorism  by  sea,  though  suc- 
ceeded by  an  interval  of  a  fortnight  during  which  no 
British  vessel  was  sunk  and  only  two  were  attacked,  proved 
merely  the  preliminary  acts  to  the  declaration  of  a  definite 
policy  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  Since  the  sinking  of 
the  Glitra  the  practicability  of  employing  submarines  in 
attacking  commerce  had  been  tested  under  varying  con- 
ditions. The  reports  received  had  encouraged  hopes  that 
at  last  a  means  had  been  discovered  for  bringing  the  war 
to  a  speedy  end.  A  good  deal  had  been  written  of  the 
submarine  and  its  psychological  influence,  and  the  enemy 
embarked  upon  the  new  policy  in  full  confidence  that 
the  war  would  be  ended  by  the  severance  of  the  maritime 
communications  of  the  British  people,  even  if  the  mere 
announcement  of  the  intention  to  employ  submarines 
on  a  large  scale  in  an  attack  upon  British  shipping 
did  not  break  the  courage  of  the  officers  and  men. 
Accordingly,  on  February  4th,  1915,  the  following  memo- 
randum was  issued  by  the  German  Government: 

"  Since  the  commencement  of  the  present  war  Great 


cir.  vn]  THE   GERMAN  DECLARATION  281 

Britain's  conduct  of  commercial  warfare  against  Germany 
has  been  a  mockery  of  all  the  principles  of  the  law 
of  nations.  While  the  British  Government  have  by 
several  orders  declared  that  their  naval  forces  should 
be  guided  by  the  stipulations  of  the  Declaration  of  Lon- 
don, they  have  in  reality  repudiated  this  declaration  in 
the  most  essential  points,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
their  own  delegates  at  the  Maritime  Conference  of  London 
acknowledged  its  acts  as  forming  part  of  existing  inter- 
national law.  The  British  Government  have  placed  a 
number  of  articles  on  the  contraband  list  which  are  not 
at  all,  or  only  very  indirectly,  capable  of  use  in  warfare, 
and  consequently  cannot  be  treated  as  contraband  either 
under  the  Declaration  of  London  or  under  the  generally 
acknowledged  rules  of  international  law. 

"  In  addition,  they  have  in  fact  obliterated  the  dis- 
tinction between  absolute  and  conditional  contraband 
by  confiscating  all  articles  of  conditional  contraband 
destined  for  Germany,  whatever  may  be  the  port  where 
these  articles  are  to  be  unloaded,  and  without  regard 
to  whether  they  are  destined  for  uses  of  war  or  peace. 
They  have  not  even  hesitated  to  violate  the  Declaration  of 
Paris,  since  their  naval  forces  have  captured  on  neutral 
ships  German  property  which  was  not  contraband  of  war. 
Furthermore,  they  have  gone  further  than  their  own  orders 
respecting  the  Declaration  of  London,  and  caused  numerous 
German  subjects  capable  of  bearing  arms  to  be  taken  from 
neutral  ships  and  made  prisoners  of  war. 

"  Finally,  they  have  declared  the  North  Sea  in  its  whole 
extent  to  be  the  seat  of  war,  thereby  rendering  difficult 
and  extremely  dangerous,  if  not  impossible,  all  navigation 
on  the  high  seas  between  Scotland  and  Norway,  so  that 
they  have  in  a  way  established  a  blockade  of  neutral  coasts 
and  ports,  which  is  contrary  to  the  elementary  principles 
of  generally  accepted  international  law.  Clearly  all  these 
measures  are  part  of  a  plan  to  strike  not  only  at  the  Ger- 
man military  operations,  but  also  at  the  economic  system 
of  Germany,  and  in  the  end  to  deliver  the  whole  German 
people  to  reduction  by  famine,  by  intercepting  legitimate 
neutral  commerce  by  methods  contrary  to  international 
law. 

"  The  neutral  Powers  have  in  the  main  acquiesced  in 
the  measures  of  the  British  Government ;  in  particular 


282        APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

they  have  not  been  successful  in  securing  the  release  by  the 
British  Government  of  the  German  subjects  and  German 
merchandise  illegally  taken  from  their  vessels.  To  a  cer- 
tain extent  they  have  even  contributed  towards  the 
execution  of  the  measures  adopted  by  England  in  defiance 
of  the  principle  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  by  prohibiting 
the  export  and  transit  of  goods  destined  for  peaceable 
purposes  in  Germany,  thus  evidently  yielding  to  pressure 
by  England. 

"  The  German  Government  have  in  vain  called  the 
attention  of  the  neutral  Powers  to  the  fact  that  Germany 
must  seriously  question  whether  it  can  any  longer  adhere 
to  the  stipulations  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  hitherto 
strictly  observed  by  it,  in  case  England  continues  to 
adhere  to  its  practice,  and  the  neutral  Powers  persist  in 
looking  with  indulgence  upon  all  these  violations  of 
neutrality  to  the  detriment  of  Germany.  Great  Britain 
invokes  the  vital  interest  of  the  British  Empire  which 
are  at  stake  in  justification  of  its  violations  of  the  law  of 
nations,  and  the  neutral  Powers  appear  to  be  satisfied 
with  theoretical  protests,  thus  actually  admitting  the 
vital  interests  of  a  belligerent  as  a  sufficient  excuse  for 
methods  of  waging  war  of  whatever  description. 

"  The  time  has  now  come  for  Germany  also  to  invoke 
such  vital  interests.  It  therefore  finds  itself  under  the 
necessity,  to  its  regret,  of  taking  military  measures  against 
England  in  retaliation  of  the  practice  followed  by  England. 
Just  as  England  declared  the  whole  North  Sea  between 
Scotland  and  Norway  to  be  comprised  within  the  seat  of 
war,  so  does  Germany  now  declare  the  waters  surrounding 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  including  the  whole  English 
Channel,  to  be  comprised  within  the  seat  of  war,  and  will 
prevent  by  all  the  military  means  at  its  disposal  all  navi- 
gation by  the  enemy  in  those  waters. 

"  To  this  end  it  will  endeavour  to  destroy,  after  Feb- 
ruary 18th  next,  any  merchant  vessels  of  the  enemy 
which  present  themselves  at  the  seat  of  war  above 
indicated,  although  it  may  not  always  be  possible  to  avert 
the  dangers  which  may  menace  persons  and  merchandise. 

"  Neutral  Powers  are  accordingly  forewarned  not  to 
continue  to  entrust  their  crews,  passengers,  or  merchandise 
to  such  vessels.  Their  attention  is  furthermore  called  to 
the  fact  that  it  is  of  urgency  to  recommend  to  their  own 


CH.  vn]  THE   "WAR  ZONE"  283 

vessels  to  steer  clear  of  these  waters.  It  is  true  that  the 
German  Navy  has  received  instructions  to  abstain  from 
all  violence  against  neutral  vessels  recognisable  as  such ; 
but  in  view  of  the  hazards  of  war,  and  of  the  misuse  of  the 
neutral  flag  ordered  by  the  British  Government,  it  will 
not  always  be  possible  to  prevent  a  neutral  vessel  from 
becoming  the  victim  of  an  attack  intended  to  be  directed 
against  a  vessel  of  the  enemy.  It  is  expressly  declared  that 
navigation  in  waters  north  of  the  Shetland  Islands  is  out- 
side the  danger  zone,  as  well  as  navigation  in  the  eastern 
part  of  the  North  Sea  and  in  a  zone  thirty  miles  wide 
along  the  Dutch  coast. 

"  The  German  Government  announces  this  measure  at 
a  time  permitting  enemy  and  neutral  ships  to  make  the 
necessary  arrangements  to  reach  the  ports  situated  at 
the  seat  of  war.  They  hope  that  the  neutral  Powers  will 
accord  consideration  to  the  vital  interests  of  Germany 
equally  with  those  of  England,  and  will  on  their  part  assist 
in  keeping  their  subjects  and  their  goods  far  from  the 
seat  of  war  :  the  more  so  since  they  likewise  have  a  great 
interest  in  seeing  the  termination  at  an  early  day  of  the 
war  now  raging. — Berlin,  February  4th,  1915." 

This  declaration  was  epitomised  in  a  proclamation  of 
the  same  date,  signed  by  Admiral  von  Pohl,  Chief  of  the 
Admiralty  Staff  of  the  German  Navy,  in  the  following 
terms  : 

"1.  The  waters  surrounding  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
including  the  whole  English  Channel,  are  hereby  declared 
to  be  a  War  Zone.  On  and  after  February  18th,  1915,  every 
enemy  merchant  ship  found  in  the  said  war  zone  will  be 
destroyed  without  it  being  always  possible  to  avert  the 
dangers  threatening  the  crews  and  passengers  on  that 
account. 

"  2.  Even  neutral  ships  are  exposed  to  danger  in  the 
war  zone,  as  in  view  of  the  misuse  of  neutral  flags  ordered 
on  January  31st  by  the  British  Government,  and  of  the 
accidents  of  naval  war,  it  cannot  always  be  avoided  to 
strike  even  neutral  ships  in  attacks  that  are  directed  on 
enemy  ships. 

"  3.  Northward  navigation  around  the  Shetland  Islands, 
in  the  eastern  waters  of  the  North  Sea,  and  in  a  strip  of 


284      APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE        [CH.  YII 

not  less  than  thirty  miles  width  from  the  northward  coast, 
is  in  no  danger. 

"VON    POHL, 

"  Chief  of  the  Admiralty  Staff  of  the  Navy. 

"BEBLIN, 

"February  4th,  1915."  l 

To  this  announcement  the  British  Government  issued 
the  following  reply  on  March  1st,  1915  : 

"  Germany  has  declared  that  the  English  Channel,  the 
north  and  west  coasts  of  France,  and  the  waters  round 
the  British  Isles  are  a  '  war  area,'  and  has  officially  notified 
that '  all  enemy  ships  found  in  that  area  will  be  destroyed.' 
This  is,  in  effect,  a  claim  to  torpedo  at  sight,  without  re- 
gard to  the  safety  of  the  crew  or  passengers,  any  merchant 
vessel  under  any  flag.  As  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the 
German  Admiralty  to  maintain  any  surface  craft  in  these 
waters,  this  attack  can  only  be  delivered  by  submarine 
agency.  The  law  and  custom  of  nations  in  regard  to 
attacks  on  commerce  have  always  presumed  that  the  first 
duty  of  the  captor  of  a  merchant  vessel  is  to  bring  it 
before  a  Prize  Court,  where  it  may  be  tried,  where  the 
regularity  of  the  capture  may  be  challenged,  and  where 
neutrals  may  recover  their  cargoes. 

"  The  sinking  of  prizes  is,  in  itself,  a  questionable  act, 
to  be  resorted  to  only  in  extraordinary  circumstances,  and 
after  provision  has  been  made  for  the  safety  of  all  the 
crew  or  passengers  (if  there  are  passengers  on  board). 
The  responsibility  for  discriminating  between  neutral  and 
enemy  vessels,  and  between  neutral  and  enemy  cargo, 
obviously  rests  with  the  attacking  ship,  whose  duty 
it  is  to  verify  the  status  and  character  of  the  vessel  and 
cargo  and  to  preserve  all  papers  before  sinking  or  even 
capturing  it.  So  also  is  the  humane  duty  of  providing 
for  the  safety  of  the  crews  of  merchant  vessels,  whether 
neutral  or  enemy,  an  obligation  upon  every  belligerent. 
It  is  upon  this  basis  that  all  previous  discussions  of  the 
law  for  regulating  warfare  at  sea  have  proceeded. 

"  A  German  submarine,  however,  fulfils  none  of  these 

1  A  translation  accompanying  the  dispatch  of  Ambassador  Gerard  to 
the  Secretary  of  State,  February  6th,  1915.  This  proclamation  was  pub- 
lished in  the  Reichsanzeiger  of  February  4th,  1915.  (No.  29.) 


CH.  vn]       "INDISCRIMINATE  DESTRUCTION"          285 

obligations.  She  enjoys  no  local  command  of  the  waters 
in  which  she  operates.  She  does  not  take  her  captures 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  Prize  Court.  She  carries  no 
prize  crew  which  she  can  put  on  board  a  prize.  She  uses 
no  effective  means  of  discriminating  between  a  neutral 
and  an  enemy  vessel.  She  does  not  receive  on  board  for 
safety  the  crew  of  the  vessel  she  sinks.  Her  methods  of 
warfare  are,  therefore,  entirely  outside  the  scope  of  any  of 
the  international  instruments  regulating  operations  against 
commerce  in  time  of  war.  The  German  declaration  sub- 
stitutes indiscriminate  destruction  for  regulated  capture. 

"  Germany  is  adopting  these  methods  against  peaceful 
traders  and  non-combatant  crews  with  the  avowed  object 
of  preventing  commodities  of  all  kinds  (including  food 
for  the  civil  population)  from  reaching  or  leaving  the 
British  Isles  or  Northern  France.  Her  opponents  are, 
therefore,  driven  to  frame  retaliatory  measures  in  order 
in  their  turn  to  prevent  commodities  of  any  kind  from 
reaching  or  leaving  Germany.  These  measures  will,  how- 
ever, be  enforced  by  the  British  and  French  Governments 
without  risk  to  neutral  ships  or  to  neutral  or  non-com- 
batant life,  and  in  strict  observance  of  the  dictates  of 
humanity.  ..." 

As  already  stated,  it  was  evidently  anticipated  by  the 
Germans  that  the  announcement  of  their  intention  to 
employ  submarines  in  an  attack  upon  British  shipping 
would  break  the  courage  of  officers  and  men.  That  this 
expectation  was  ill-founded  was  proved  by  the  continued 
flow  of  traffic  to  and  from  the  British  Isles,  and  the 
hardihood  and  seamanship  which  were  exhibited  during 
the  next  few  weeks,  not  by  one  ship  merely,  but  by  many. 
Between  the  beginning  of  February  and  the  end  of  May, 
123  vessels  were  molested  by  submarines,  and  more  than 
half  of  them — sixty-four  to  be  exact — managed  to  escape. 
Thirty-one  of  these  ships,  slow  tramps  though  they  were 
for  the  most  part,  owed  their  good  fortune  to  their  speed, 
of  which  the  captains  took  the  fullest  advantage.  At  this 
period  of  the  war  the  Germans  were  able  to  employ  only  a 
comparatively  small  number  of  submarines,  and  the  surface 
speed  of  these  was  slow.  After  Grand- Admiral  von  Tirpitz 
had  relinquished  office  some  months  later,  he  was  severely 
criticised  for  having  failed  to  provide  a  sufficient  number 


286        APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

of  submarines  of  suitable  types  to  insure  the  success  of 
Germany's  policy.  Down  to  the  end  of  April  the  loss  of 
British  tonnage,  in  comparison  with  the  great  volume 
operating  in  the  waters  surrounding  the  British  Isles, 
proved  a  great  disappointment  to  the  eneiny,  who  was 
compelled  to  readjust  his  estimate  of  the  character  of  the 
British  seamen  and  their  seamanlike  qualities. 

The  story  of  the  Laertes  (4,541  tons)  provided  a  con- 
spicuous illustration  of  the  spirit  which  animated  the 
service.  This  ship  (master,  Mr.  William  H.  Propert)  left 
Liverpool  on  Sunday,  February  7th,  with  a  general  cargo 
for  Java,  being  under  orders  to  call  at  Amsterdam.  Captain 
Propert  had  been  in  charge  of  the  ship  for  two  voyages  to 
the  Far  East,  and  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
vessel's  best  speed  was  llf  knots.  The  vessel  had  a  crew 
of  fifty-one  officers  and  men,  including  twenty-four  Chinese. 
By  four  o'clock  on  the  10th,  the  Laertes  reached  a  point 
about  twelve  miles  from  the  Schouwen  Bank  lightship.  The 
master  and  the  second  officer  were  on  the  bridge,  a  good 
lookout  was  being  kept  by  men  stationed  on  the  poop 
and  in  the  crow's-nest  on  the  foremast,  and  the  ship  was 
making  her  best  speed,  when  a  submarine  was  seen  about 
v  three  miles  away  bearing  two  points  on  the  starboard 
bow.  Captain  Propert  promptly  ordered  the  helm  to  be 
starboarded  one  point,  and  almost  at  the  same  moment 
the  submarine  hoisted  a  signal  directing  the  vessel  to 
heave  to,  and  threatening  to  fire  if  the  order  was  not 
obeyed.  Captain  Propert  ignored  the  signal  and  deter- 
mined to  make  an  effort  to  escape  ;  the  enemy  submarine 
made  straight  for  the  Laertes  at  top  speed.  What  happened 
can,  perhaps,  best  be  told  in  Captain  Propert's  own  words : 

"  My  engines  were  well  opened  out,  and  I  kept  star- 
boarding my  helm  to  avoid  him,  but  he  gained  steadily ; 
and  at  4.15  p.m.,  when  he  was  about  one  point  and  a  half 
on  the  starboard  quarter,  distant  about  three-quarters 
of  a  mile,  he  opened  fire  with  a  machine-gun,  directing  his 
fire  on  the  bridge.  I  then  starboarded  further  and  brought 
him  right  astern,  keeping  the  ship  going  at  the  highest 
speed  she  could  make.  Just  at  this  time  four  or  five 
single  shots  were  heard,  indicating  that  we  were  also 
being  subjected  to  rifle  fire.  (Three  bullets  of  different 
kinds  were  found  later  in  various  parts  of  the  ship.) 


CH.  vn]         HOW  THE   "  LAERTES  "   ESCAPED          287 

'  This  was  about  4.20  p.m.,  and  the  firing  was  kept  up 
continuously  until  about  5.15  p.m.,  the  submarine  being 
kept  all  the  time  as  much  astern  as  possible  by  the  use  of 
our  helm.  In  order  to  deceive  him,  I  also  hoisted  the 
answering  pennant  indicating  that  I  had  read  his  signals. 
This  I  did  twice,  but  he  did  not  appear  to  reduce  his 
speed,  and  when  he  had  come  within  less  than  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  from  the  Laertes,  at  about  5.15,  he  gave  one 
continued  discharge  from  the  machine-gun  and  then  fell 
astern.  About  six  minutes  later,  when  he  was  well  astern 
slightly  on  our  starboard  quarter,  I  ported  the  helm  one 
point  and  immediately  noticed  a  torpedo  coming  straight 
for  the  ship  about  two  cables  off  on  the  starboard  quarter. 
My  helm  was  at  once  put  hard  aport,  and  the  torpedo 
passed  astern  very  close  to  the  ship. 

;t  The  submarine  at  this  time  was  enveloped  in  a  cloud 
of  steam  and  appeared  to  be  in  difficulties.  It  was  dusk 
by  this  time,  and  a  steamer,  which  came  up  on  my  port 
side  steering  directly  towards  the  submarine,  was  given 
the  signal,  '  You  are  steering  into  danger.'  The  other 
ship  altered  her  course,  but  appeared  to  resume  the  former 
course  a  little  later.  I  had  no  means  of  ascertaining  the 
name  of  the  other  vessel,  and  she  made  no  attempt  to 
speak  further  with  us. 

"  I  now  hauled  the  Laertes  round  and  steered  in  a 
northerly  direction,  gradually  swinging  her  in  towards 
the  land  and  taking  continual  soundings  as  we  approached. 
When  we  had  reached  a  point  about  seventeen  miles  off 
Ymuiden,  a  green  light  appeared  on  my  port  bow  three 
miles  distant.  I  put  the  helm  hard  astarboard,  and  the 
light  suddenly  disappeared  and  was  not  seen  again.  As 
this  was  suspicious,  I  put  the  helm  hard  aport,  but  no 
further  lights  were  observed.  I  then  took  in  the  regula- 
tion lights,  and,  while  they  were  kept  ready  at  hand, 
they  were  not  again  exhibited  until  we  had  come  close  to 
Ymuiden,  which  port  we  reached  at  about  10.30  p.m. 
on  February  10th.  No  lives  were  lost  and  no  injury 
received  by  any  person  on  board  the  Laertes.  The  upper 
bridge,  the  casing  of  the  standard  compass,  two  boats, 
several  ventilators,  the  main  funnel,  donkey  funnel,  and 
exhaust  pipe,  were  pierced  by  bullets,  and  there  may  be 
some  further  damage.  I  cannot  estimate  the  amount 
of  this  damage.  The  Dutch  flag  had  been  hoisted  at 

20 


288        APPEARANCE   OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

about  4  p.m.  on  February  9th,  and  was  kept  con- 
tinually flying  during  daylight.  The  name  of  the  port 
of  registry  had  also  been  obscured.  Two  boats  had  been 
swung  out  ready  for  loading  and  two  lifted  from  the  chocks 
on  February  9th." 

That  is  the  modest  record  of  an  escape  from  the  enemy 
which  suggested,  in  association  with  a  hundred  other 
incidents,  that  British  seamen  were  not  prepared  to  sur- 
render to  the  enemy  without  a  struggle.  The  Admiralty 
marked  their  appreciation  of  Captain  Propert's  "  gallant 
and  spirited  conduct "  by  granting  him  a  temporary 
commission  as  lieutenant  in  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve, 
and  awarding  him  the  Distinguished  Service  Cross  ;  a 
gold  watch,  with  a  letter  of  commendation,  was  presented 
to  each  of  the  officers,  and  a  complimentary  grant  of  £3 
was  made  to  every  member  of  the  crew. 

By  this  time  it  was  evident  that  the  enemy,  with  limited 
resources — how  limited  was  not  known  to  the  British 
Government  at  the  time — was  determined  to  make  a 
desperate  attack  on  the  British  Mercantile  Marine,  paying 
no  regard  to  the  ordinary  humanities  which  in  previous 
wars  had  restricted  the  action  of  belligerents.  The 
number  of  cases  in  which  torpedoes  were  fired  against 
ships  unarmed,  and  therefore  incapable  of  resisting 
visit  and  search,  steadily  increased.  The  Membland 
(3,027  tons)  was  destroyed  in  the  North  Sea  either  by 
mine  or  by  submarine  ;  she  disappeared  about  Febru- 
ary 15th,  together  with  her  officers  and  men,  numbering 
twenty,  and  the  cause  of  the  loss  of  this  valuable  cargo- 
carrier  and  the  destruction  of  so  many  lives  will  probably 
never  be  known.  Nothing,  perhaps,  is  more  remarkable 
than  the  comparatively  small  loss  of  life  which,  in  fact, 
occurred  during  this  early  period  of  the  submarine  cam- 
paign. That  immunity  must  be  attributed  to  the  high 
standard  of  seamanship  maintained  in  the  British  Mer- 
cantile Marine,  and  the  skill  exhibited  by  officers  and  men 
in  the  management  of  the  small  boats  to  which  they 
were  compelled  to  confide  their  fortunes  after  their  ships 
had  sunk.  Typical  illustrations  of  the  hazardous  ex- 
periences which  fell  to  the  crews  of  ships  destroyed  at 
sight  are  supplied  by  the  stories  of  the  Dulwich  (3,289 
tons)  and  Cambank  (3,112  tons),  the  former  attacked 


CH.  vii]  LOSS   OF   LIFE  289 

off  Cape  la  Heve  on  February  15th,  and  the  latter  ten 
miles  east  of  Lynns  Point,  on  the  north-eastern  coast  of 
Anglesey.  The  Dulwich  was  on  her  way  to  Rouen,  when 
an  explosion  occurred  on  the  starboard  side.  Night  had 
descended,  and  it  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  the  momentary 
consternation  which  was  caused  as  the  ship  listed  slightly 
to  starboard,  and  then  began  to  settle  by  the  stern. 
Fortunately,  the  boats  had  been  swung  out  and  were 
uninjured.  The  master  (Mr.  J.  A.  Hunter)  soon  had  his 
men  transhipped,  twenty-two  being  allotted  to  one  boat 
and  nine  to  the  other.  Within  about  twenty  minutes 
the  Dulwich  had  disappeared  in  a  swirl  of  foaming  water, 
and  then  a  submarine  was  dimly  seen  travelling  on  the 
surface  of  the  water,  a  menacing  spectacle  for  the  British 
seamen  who  had  been  left  to  the  mercy  of  the  sea  on  this 
winter's  night.  The  enemy,  callous  as  to  the  fate  of  these 
men,  was  evidently  watching  the  effects  of  the  explosion 
—making  sure  that  the  ship  sank.  The  boats  soon  after- 
wards became  separated.  A  French  torpedo-destroyer 
picked  up  the  master  and  his  twenty-one  companions 
shortly  after  eight  o'clock  that  night  and  took  them  into 
Havre.  The  other  boat,  with  only  seven  men  on  board, 
reached  Fecamp,  and  thus  two  lives  were  added  to  the 
death  roll  of  the  campaign.  How  these  two  men  came  to 
their  end  is  uncertain,  as  they  were  seen  leaving  the  fore- 
castle to  enter  the  boats  by  Captain  Hunter  when  he  and 
the  chief  officer  made  their  final  round  of  inspection. 

The  loss  of  life  in  the  case  of  the  s.s.  Cambank  was 
heavier.  This  ship  was  on  passage  from  Huelva  to  Liverpool 
with  a  cargo  of  copper  and  sulphur  ore.  The  voyage 
proceeded  uneventfully  until  February  12th.  At  mid- 
night on  that  date  a  gale  from  the  south-west  sprang  up 
and  continued  to  blow  throughout  the  following  day. 
Early  on  the  14th  the  wind  shifted  to  the  north-west. 
A  heavy  sea  struck  the  ship  at  9  a.m.  on  the  port  side, 
staving  in  No.  1  hatch.  The  master  (Mr.  T.  R.  Prescott) 
kept  his  vessel  away  before  the  wind  and  sea  and  was  able 
to  reach  Falmouth.  Temporary  repairs  were  effected 
at  that  port,  and  on  the  17th  the  vessel  left  to  resume 
her  voyage.  Three  days  later,  after  taking  up  a  pilot 
at  Lynns  Point,  the  Cambank  saw  the  periscope  of  a  sub- 
marine 1  about  250  yards  on  the  port  beam,  and  immediately 
1  U30,  according  to  German  accounts. 


290        APPEARANCE  OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

afterwards  the  track  of  a  torpedo  was  noticed  making  for 
the  merchantman.  The  Cambank's  helm  was  put  hard 
aport,  but,  before  the  ship  could  answer,  the  torpedo 
struck  her  near  the  engine-room.  It  was  at  once  evident 
to  Captain  Prescott  that  the  vessel  would  speedily  sink, 
and  he  ordered  the  crew  to  take  to  the  boats.  Midnight, 
the  enemy  near  at  hand,  and  their  ship  so  fatally 
damaged  that  officers  and  men  had  no  choice  but  to  confide 
their  lives  to  frail  boats !  The  starboard  lifeboat  was 
successfully  lowered,  and  into  her  scrambled  twenty-one 
of  the  twenty-five  men  on  board,  including  the  pilot. 
What  happened  to  the  other  four  men  is  a  matter  of 
speculation.  For  a  quarter  of  an  hour  the  survivors  lay 
off  the  doomed  ship,  which  at  last  broke  in  two  amidships 
and  was  swallowed  up  in  the  waters.  Eventually  these 
men,  having  been  buffeted  in  a  hurricane  and  then  at- 
tacked by  the  enemy,  succeeded  in  reaching  port. 

On  the  evening  of  the  same  day  the  steam  collier  Down- 
shire  (337  tons)  was  steaming  at  about  10  knots  off  the  Calf 
of  Man,  when  she  saw  a  submarine  standing  to  the  north- 
ward on  the  starboard  bow,  being  about  one  and  a  half 
to  two  miles  distant.  The  enemy  gained  rapidly  on  the 
British  ship  and,  when  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  away, 
fired  a  shot  from  a  gun  on  the  fore-deck.  The  master 
of  the  Downshire  (Mr.  W.  H.  Connor)  ignored  the  warning, 
and  then  a  second  shot  was  fired.  The  collier,  which 
was  travelling  at  full  speed,  still  stood  on  her  course. 
A  third  shot  followed.  The  submarine  was  then  close 
up,  and  as  it  was  apparent  that  escape  was  impossible  the 
engines  were  stopped.  The  crew  were  ordered  to  the  boats, 
a  bomb  was  placed  against  the  side  of  the  vessel  by  the  Ger- 
mans, and  the  ship  was  sunk.  Fortunately  in  this  instance 
there  was  no>  loss  of  life,  but  that  was  due  to  no  considera- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  commander  of  the  submarine. 

Three  days  later — on  February  23rd — two  vessels  were 
sunk  without  warning,  the  Oakby  (1,976  tons ;  master,  Mr. 
F.  J.  Bartlett),  off  the  Royal  Sovereign  light- vessel,  and  the 
Branksome  Chine  (2,026  tons ;  master,  Mr.  F.  J.  Anstey), 
six  miles  E.  by  S.  f  S.  from  Beachy  Head — evidently  by 
the  same  submarine.  Within  five  minutes  of  the  torpedo 
striking  the  port  side  of  the  Oakby,  the  forecastle  was  level 
with  the  water.  It  seemed  as  though  the  ship  must 
founder  rapidly.  Nevertheless,  the  second  engineer  went 


CH.  vii]         TORPEDOED   IN  THE   CHANNEL  291 

below  and  stopped  the  engines  so  as  to  enable  the  boats 
to  be  lowered.1  The  vessel  took  so  long  in  settling 
down  that  an  attempt  was  made  by  the  patrol-boat  ISLE 
OF  MAN,  which  had  come  on  the  scene,  to  tow  her  to 
Dover.  The  effort  was  unsuccessful,  the  Oakby  sinking 
near  the  Varne  Lightship.  The  loss  of  the  Branksome 
Chine  was  marked  by  no  noticeable  incident,  the  crew 
managing  to  make  their  escape  in  safety. 

On  the  following  day  undoubted  evidence  was  furnished 
that  an  enemy  submarine,  commanded  by  an  experienced 
and  daring,  if  callous,  officer,  was  operating  in  this  part 
of  the  English  Channel,  the  Rio  Parana  (4,015  tons)  and 
the  Western  Coast  (1,165  tons)  being  destroyed  off  Beachy 
Head.  In  the  first  case  no  submarine  was  sighted,  but 
the  ship  was  struck  on  the  starboard  side,  with  the  result 
that  ports  and  doors  were  stove  in,  jammed,  or  broken, 
and  a  great  volume  of  water  entered  the  saloon.  In  these 
conditions,  the  master  (Mr.  J.  Williams)  and  the  crew 
prepared  to  abandon  the  ship.  By  the  time  their  prepara- 
tions were  completed,  the  ship  was  considerably  down  at 
the  head,  and  the  water  was  flush  with  her  deck.  It  was 
at  first  suggested  that  the  casualty  was  due  to  a  mine, 
but  the  Admiralty,  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances,  came 
to  a  contrary  conclusion.  This  was  supported  by  in- 
telligence as  to  the  fate  of  the  Western  Coast.  This 
vessel  was  on  her  way  from  London  to  Plymouth, 
where  warnings  of  the  presence  of  enemy  submarines  were 
given  by  a  destroyer,  and  shortly  afterwards  a  ship  in 
distress  was  noticed.  The  second  officer  of  the  Western 
Coast  (master,  Mr.  J.  Ratcliffe)  was  on  his  way  to  report 
the  incident  when  an  explosion  occurred,  a  column  of  water 
rising  forty  or  fifty  feet.  The  ship  immediately  began  to 
settle  down,  but,  though  she  sank  in  two  or  three  minutes, 
Captain  Ratcliffe  and  his  men  managed  to  make  their 
escape.  The  month's  losses  closed  with  the  sinking  of 
another  ship — the  Harpalion  (5,867  tons  ;  master,  Mr.  A. 
Widders) — not  far  from  the  Royal  Sovereign  light -vessel. 
A  violent  explosion  occurred  which  killed  three  firemen, 
and  then  the  ship  was  enveloped  in  steam  and  water 
poured  over  the  port  side. 

Though  enemy  submarines  secured  eight  British  ships 

1  The  second  engineer,  Mr.  Stanley  Robinson,  was  awarded  the  Bronze 
Medal  for  gallantry  in  saving  life  at  sea. 


292        APPEARANCE  OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

during  the  month  of  February,  ten  succeeded  in  escaping. 
Of  these,  in  addition  to  the  Laertes,  a  notable  experience  was 
that  of  the  master  and  men  of  the  Thordis  (501  tons).  Her 
case  attracted  a  good  deal  of  attention  at  the  time  owing  to 
the  fine  spirit  exhibited  by  master  and  men.  The  Thordis 
(master,  Mr.  J.  W.  Bell)  left  Blyth  on  the  afternoon  of 
February  24th,  with  a  cargo  of  coal  for  Plymouth.  Every- 
thing went  well  until  the  28th,  when  the  ship  was  about 
eight  or  ten  miles  off  Beachy  Head,  which  bore  north-east 
by  east.  The  Thordis  was  steaming  at  about  5  knots, 
her  maximum  being  10 \  knots.  A  heavy  head  sea  was  run- 
ning, and  Captain  Bell,  who  was  on  the  bridge,  noticed 
what  he  thought  to  be  a  periscope  on  the  starboard  bow, 
twenty  or  thirty  yards  away.  Then  began  a  contest  be- 
tween the  little  steamer  and  the  enemy  craft,  which  ended 
in  the  discomfiture  of  the  latter.  Captain  Bell  instantly 
gave  instructions  for  full  speed  and  all  hands  were  ordered 
on  deck.  The  submarine  crossed  the  bow  of  the  Thordist 
taking  up  a  position  thirty  or  forty  yards  on  her  port  side. 
Shortly  afterwards  Captain  Bell  noticed  the  wake  of  a 
torpedo  on  the  starboard  beam.  He  put  the  helm 
hard  over  to  starboard,  the  engines  in  the  meantime 
going  full  speed.  The  Thordis  responded  well  and  ran 
over  the  submarine's  periscope.  Everyone  on  board  the 
merchantman  heard  a  crash,  and  an  oily  substance  was 
afterwards  noticed  on  the  surface  of  the  water.  The  sub- 
marine was  not  seen  again.  The  severity  of  the  blow 
which  the  Thordis  had  dealt  the  submarine  was  suggested 
by  the  damage  to  the  keel  and  propeller,  revealed  when  the 
vessel  was  docked  immediately  afterwards  at  Devonport. 
The  Germans  subsequently  asserted  that  the  submarine, 
though  put  out  of  action,  had  managed  to  return  to  port.  If 
that  was  so,  she  must  have  been  badly  damaged.  The 
Admiralty  marked  their  high  appreciation  of  the  master's 
conduct  by  conferring  on  him  a  commission  in  the 
Royal  Naval  Reserve,  and  awarding  him  the  Distinguished 
Service  Cross,  and  £200  was  distributed  among  the  officers 
and  men  of  the  ship,  Captain  Bell — or,  rather,  Lieutenant 
Bell,  R.N.R.,  as  he  had  become — receiving  half  that  sum.1 
The  month  of  February  furnished  another  conspicuous 
example  of  British  seamanship.!  On  the  17th  the  Col- 

1  A  reward  of  £500  offered  by  The  Syren  and  Shipping  for  the  destruction 
•f  an  enemy  submarine  was  also  paid  to  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Thordis. 


CH.  vn]      CAPTAIN  FRYATT'S   PROMPTITUDE  293 

Chester,  which  had  already  been  under  attack,  again  escaped 
from  the  enemy  when  on  passage  from  Parkeston  Quay  to 
Rotterdam,  Captain  Charles  A.  Fryatt,  who  afterwards  be- 
came the  victim  of  one  of  the  foulest  crimes  committed  by 
the  Germans,  having  in  the  meantime  succeeded  to  the  com- 
mand. During  a  southerly  gale,  with  heavy  seas  and  thick 
rain,  a  submarine  was  sighted  about  two  miles  ahead  of  the 
ship.  The  submarine  was  steering  about  W.S.W.  and  the 
British  vessel  E.  J  S.  Captain  Fryatt  had  only  a  moment 
in  which  to  decide  what  he  should  do.  In  a  report  to  the 
British  Consulate  at  Rotterdam  he  explained  how,  by 
prompt  action,  he  had  saved  his  ship  :  "  I  at  once  altered 
my  ship's  course  until  her  head  was  north-west  by  the  com- 
pass on  the  bridge,  so  I  brought  the  submarine  right  astern 
of  me,  and  I  ordered  the  chief  engineer  to  get  all  the  steam 
he  could  and  get  all  the  speed  he  could  with  the  engines, 
and  after  about  fifteen  minutes  steaming  north-west,  I 
lost  sight  of  the  submarine  in  the  thick  rain.  I  then 
brought  my  ship  gradually  back  to  her  course  again 
E.  J  S.,  and  proceeded  on  my  passage,  and  I  never  saw 
the  submarine  again." 

During  March  and  April  the  enemy  campaign  was  evi- 
dently conducted  with  all  his  available  resources,  the  officers 
commanding  submarines  apparently  receiving  instructions 
to  use  their  torpedoes  freely,  discharging  them  without 
warning,  and  without  consideration  for  the  lives  of  British 
seamen,  who  had  treated  all  previous  threats  and  acts 
with  contempt.  No  fewer  than  sixty-seven  ships  were 
attacked  by  submarines  during  that  period.  Aircraft  were 
also  called  in  aid  to  intensify  the  sense  of  terror  which  it 
was  intended  to  create,  and  ten  vessels  were  bombed  by  aero- 
planes near  the  North  Hinder  and  Galloper  light- vessels. 
But  of  the  ships  attacked,  all  those  which  were  molested 
by  aircraft,  as  well  as  thirty-five  which  attracted  the 
attention  of  submarines,  escaped,  in  addition  to  a  mined 
ship,  which  was  towed  in,  and  a  merchantman  which  a 
Turkish  torpedo-boat  vainly  chased  in  the  Mediterranean. 

It  is  difficult  to  judge  the  motives  which  inspire  a 
nation's  policy  in  time  of  war,  but  there  are  indications 
which  suggest  that  the  Germans  anticipated  that  the 
aeroplane,  or  seaplane,  would  prove  a  valuable  comple- 
ment to  the  submarine  in  closing  the  North  Sea  against 
Allied  merchantmen.  It  was  only  when  the  new  ruthless, 


294        APPEARANCE  OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

submarine  policy  had  failed  to  intimidate  British  seamen 
that  attacks  by  enemy  aircraft  began.  The  first  ship  to 
be  molested  was  the  Blonde  (613  tons;  master,  Mr.  A. 
B.  Milne),  on  her  way  from  Cowes  to  the  Tyne  in  ballast. 
On  the  morning  of  March  15th  the  ship  was  about  three 
miles  to  the  eastward  of  the  North  Foreland,  when 
the  second  mate,  who  was  on  the  bridge,  noticed  an 
aeroplane  approaching  from  the  east.  The  master  at 
the  time  was  down  below  looking  for  a  screwdriver,  as 
was  afterwards  explained,  when  he  heard  the  sound  of 
an  explosion  which  caused  him  to  run  to  the  engine-room 
door,  thinking  that  something  was  wrong  with  the  engines. 
The  engineer  had  reached  the  same  conclusion,  and  im- 
mediately stopped  the  engines.  This  officer  was  engaged 
in  searching  for  the  damage  when  the  second  mate,  running 
along  the  deck,  called  out  that  an  aeroplane  of  enemy 
nationality  was  dropping  bombs.  It  was  a  novel  ex- 
perience for  these  seamen,  who  had  certainly  never  given 
a  thought  to  such  a  possibility — representing  a  fresh 
menace  to  navigation.  Captain  Milne  at  once  gave  orders 
for  full  speed.  The  first  two  bombs  fell  about  twenty  feet 
astern,  exploding  on  reaching  the  water,  and  the  next 
about  the  same  distance  ahead.  During  this  attack 
on  the  vessel,  the  aeroplane  circled  about  the  ship,  en- 
deavouring to  get  immediately  above  her.  The  fifth 
bomb  was  dropped  even  closer  on  the  starboard  side. 
The  utmost  endeavours  of  the  airmen,  however,  failed. 
Captain  Milne,  realising  his  danger,  adopted  a  zigzag 
course,  and  in  the  meantime  kept  his  whistle  blowing. 
His  distress  call  attracted  the  attention  of  a  trawler,  a 
single  shot  from  which  caused  the  aeroplane  to  disappear. 
The  Elfland  (4,190  tons),  a  Belgian  relief  ship,  was  at- 
tacked in  very  similar  circumstances  off  the  North  Hinder 
on  the  21st,  and  the  Lestris  (1,384  tons)  fourteen  miles 
east  of  the  Galloper  on  the  same  day,  when  the  Pandion 
(1,279  tons)  was  also  bombed  without  result.  On  the  two 
following  days  the  Osceola  (393  tons)  and  the  Teal 
(764  tons)  shared  the  same  experience.  The  Ousel  (1,284 
tons)  was  attacked  on  the  29th,  and  the  Staffa  (1,008 
tons)  on  the  30th. 

On  April  llth  the  Serula  (1,388  tons)  was  exposed  to 
a  determined  attack,  two  machines  concentrating  on 
Jier.  The  ship  was  five  miles  west  of  the  North  Hinder 


CH.  vn]      ATTACKED  BY  SEAPLANES        295 

light- vessel  at  3.50  p.m.,  when  a  seaplane  of  large  size 
and  one  smaller  machine  appeared.  The  large  one  was 
first  seen  coming  down  towards  the  ship  from  high  up 
on  the  starboard  side  abaft  the  beam,  and  dropped  a  small 
bomb  showing  a  white  trail  of  smoke,  followed  by  three 
bombs  which  fell  just  before  the  bridge  on  the  starboard 
side.  The  undismayed  master  (Mr.  J.  T.  Sharp)  ordered 
the  helm  to  be  put  hard  aport.  Shortly  afterwards  three 
more  bombs  came  down  on  the  port  side,  also  on  the  fore- 
side  of  the  bridge,  distant  about  twenty-five  feet.  The 
smaller  machine,  following  the  example  of  the  larger  one, 
started  to  come  lower  down  to  co-operate  in  the  attack, 
but,  being  met  with  rifle  fire  from  the  ship,  she  straightened 
up  and  flew  across,  dropping  bombs  on  each  side  of  the 
vessel.  The  two  machines  then  proceeded  aft,  on  the  port 
side,  turned,  and  came  back  together,  evidently  with  the 
intention  of  dropping  bombs  all  along  the  steamer.  The 
ship's  course  was  altered  backwards  and  forwards  from 
port  to  starboard,  so  as  to  confuse  the  airmen.  At  last 
Captain  Sharp  got  both  machines  on  the  starboard  side, 
and  then  the  helm  was  put  hard  aport  and  the  engines 
full  astern.  Both  airmen  dropped  their  bombs  on  the 
port  side  forward. 

So  far  the  enemy  airmen  had  failed,  but  they  were  not 
discouraged.  The  machines  again  went  aft  and  attacked 
a  third  time.  On  this  occasion  they  came  singly  and 
dropped  bombs  on  each  side  of  the  bridge,  doing  no  damage 
to  the  ship.  On  the  last  occasion  the  smaller  aeroplane, 
on  passing  over  the  vessel,  appeared  to  have  been  struck 
by  the  rifle  fire  which  was  then  being  maintained  from  the 
Serula,  as  she  tilted  up,  then  recovered  herself,  and  flew 
directly  away  to  the  south  with  part  of  the  left  wing  hang- 
ing down.  The  larger  seaplane  remained  around  the  ship 
for  about  ten  minutes  longer,  and  then,  passing  over  a 
Dutch  ship  which  was  close  by,  disappeared  to  the  south- 
ward. The  attack  lasted  from  3.50  to  4.30,  and  twelve 
shots  were  fired  at  the  two  machines,  one  rocket  distress 
signal  also  being  sent  up.  Later  events  suggested  that 
the  Germans  regarded  these  attempts  with  aircraft  as 
unsatisfactory,  and  this  conclusion  reacted  on  their  policy, 
for  such  attacks  were  in  future  spasmodic — mere  casual 
incidents  of  the  war  in  the  North  Sea. 

To  return  to  the  submarine  campaign,  the  fact  that  so 


296        APPEARANCE   OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

large  a  proportion  of  the  vessels  attacked  made  good 
their  escape  from  under-water  craft  was  evidently  noted 
by  the  German  Naval  Staff.  Hitherto  crowded  passenger 
liners  had  not  been  interfered  with,  but  the  failure 
of  the  campaign  during  March  and  April  to  realise  the 
expectations  formed  in  Berlin  was  to  lead  to  a  change  of 
policy  in  this  respect.  During  the  first  week  of  March 
the  enemy  secured  only  one  vessel — the  Bengrove  (3,840 
tons),  which  was  destroyed  five  miles  north-north-east 
from  Ilfracombe  on  the  7th.  During  the  same  period 
three  other  vessels  succeeded  in  escaping — the  Wrexham 
(1,414  tons)  in  the  North  Sea  on  March  2nd ;  iheiNingchow 
(9,021  tons)  in  the  Bristol  Channel  on  the  4th  ;  and  the 
Lydia  (1,138  tons)  in  the  English  Channel  on  the  5th. 

The  experience  of  the  Wrexham  attracted  the  attention 
of  the  Admiralty  owing  to  the  spirited  manner  in  which 
the  enemy  was  eluded.  The  Wrexham  (master,  Mr. 
Charles  A.  Fryatt)1  was  one  of  the  Great  Eastern 
Railway  Company's  vessels,  running  between  Harwich 
and  Rotterdam,  and  this  further  attack  on  a  ship  of  this 
line  supports  the  belief  that  the  enemy  was  endeavouring 
to  cut  communications  between  England  and  Holland. 
The  submarine  appeared  at  thirty-five  minutes  after  noon 
on  March  2nd,  when  the  Wrexham  was  approximately 
in  lat.  51°  50'  N.,  long.  3°  0'  E.  The  enemy  circled 
to  the  northward,  and  then  made  towards  the  British 
ship.  Captain  Fryatt  immediately  altered  course  to 
south-east  by  south,  and  ordered  the  engineer  to  increase 
speed  to  the  utmost.  Deck  hands  were  mustered  and  sent 
below  to  assist  the  firemen,  everyone  realising  that  a  chase 
for  life  had  begun.  Under  ordinary  conditions  the  Wrex- 
ham was  capable  of  about  14  knots.  But,  in  the  face  of 
such  a  peril,  she  was  soon  travelling  at  nearly  16  knots 
through  the  heavy,  northerly  swell.  In  these  circum- 
stances the  chase  continued,  the  submarine  in  the 
meantime  flying  imperative  signals.  Though  the  weather 
was  fine  and  clear,  Captain  Fryatt  kept  his  ship  so  far 
away  that  the  signals  could  not  be  read.  No  doubt  they 
were  calling  upon  him  to  stop,  but  this  was  the  last  thing 
he  had  in  his  mind,  as  the  Wrexham  slowly  drew  away 

1  Captain  Fryatt  (whose  spirited  action  on  February  17th  has  already 
been  mentioned)  was  taken  prisoner  by  the  Germans  on  June  23rd,  1916, 
when  in  command  of  s.s.  Brussels,  and  afterwards  shot. 


CH.  vn]  SEAMANSHIP   AND   PLUCK  297 

from  the  submarine.  The  British  skipper  had  to  exhibit 
a  high  standard  of  seamanship  owing  to  the  proximity 
of  the  Schouwen  Bank  on  his  starboard  hand.  The 
course  was  altered  time  after  time  so  as  to  keep  the  enemy 
on  the  port  beam  (abaft),  and  at  a  distance  of  about  one 
and  a  half  miles.  For  about  forty  miles  the  Germans 
maintained  the  chase,  and  only  abandoned  it  when  the 
Wrexham  had  approached  within  a  mile  of  the  Maas 
light-vessel.  The  incident  provided  a  fine  demonstration 
of  British  seamanship  and  British  pluck.  In  making  his 
report  to  his  owners,  Captain  Fryatt  remarked  :  "  Had 
it  not  been  for  the  good  work  put  in  by  the  engineers 
and  the  men  firing,  and  the  speed  they  were  thus  able 
to  get  up,  I  could  not  have  escaped,  as  the  submarine  was 
doing  well  over  14  knots  and  chased  us  for  about  forty 
miles,  only  giving  up  when  we  were  safe  in  Dutch  waters." 
The  Admiralty  commended  the  conduct  of  the  master, 
officers,  and  crew  of  the  Wrexham,  laying  special  emphasis 
on  the  spirit  exhibited  by  the  engine-room  com- 
plement ;  the  chief  engineer,  Mr.  F.  A.  Goddison,  was 
"  mentioned  "  in  the  London  Gazette. 

Throughout  the  remainder  of  the  month  the  enemy 
maintained  a  vigorous  attack  upon  merchant  shipping, 
alike  in  the  North  Sea,  in  the  Irish  Sea,  and  in  the  English 
Channel.  Two  ships  were  sunk  without  warning  on  March 
9th — the  Princess  Victoria  (1,108  tons ;  master,  Mr.  John 
Cubbin),  sixteen  miles  north-west  by  north  from  Liverpool 
Bar  light- vessel ;  and  the  Blackwood  (1,230  tons ;  master, 
Mr.  John  Souter),  eighteen  miles  south-west  by  south  from 
Dungeness.  On  the  same  day  the  Tangistan  (3,738  tons) 
foundered  nine  miles  north  from  Flamborough  Head.  The 
sinking  of  the  last  ship  was  accompanied  by  the  heaviest 
loss  of  life  which  had  hitherto  occurred,  whether  due  to 
enemy  cruiser,  submarine,  or  mine.  The  Tangistan  was 
on  passage  from  Ben-isaf  to  Middlesbrough  with  a  cargo 
of  iron  ore.  The  voyage  from  the  Mediterranean  had  been 
like  scores  of  other  voyages  which  the  crew  had  previously 
made ;  they  had  seen  no  enemy  ships,  and  they  had  run 
into  no  mines.  As  the  ship  approached  Middlesbrough, 
it  was  realised  that  she  was  early  for  the  tide,  so  speed 
was  reduced.  Night  fell,  and  all  on  board  were  anticipating 
their  early  arrival  in  port,  when  suddenly  the  ship 
trembled  from  end  to  end  and  then  stopped.  The  hour 


298        APPEARANCE  OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

of  midnight  was  just  striking ;  the  lights  went  out.  All 
hands  rushed  up  on  deck,  to  find  the  Tangistan  was  rapidly 
sinking  under  their  feet.  There  was  little  or  no  confusion 
as  orders  were  shouted  from  the  bridge  for  the  boats  to 
be  lowered.  Before  this  could  be  done,  however,  the 
tragedy  was  completed  ;  the  Tangistan,  on  an  even  keel, 
disappeared  in  the  dark  waters,  with  all  on  board.  Several 
of  the  men  came  to  the  surface,  and  cries  rang  out  in  the 
night,  but  only  one  of  them  survived  the  night's  horror — a 
seaman  named  J.  C.  Toole.  He  managed  to  secure  a 
spar,  and  he  clung  to  it  in  desperation  as  offering  him  the 
only  hope  of  life.  Benumbed  with  the  cold,  he  noticed 
the  other  voices  around  him  were  soon  silenced,  and  he 
remained  the  lonely  survivor  of  the  whole  ship's  company  ! 
All  he  could  do  was  to  shout  in  the  hope  that  he  might 
attract  the  attention  of  some  passing  steamer,  and  this 
he  did  with  all  his  remaining  strength.  One  ship  had 
passed  in  the  night  soon  after  he  had  reached  the  surface, 
and  then  he  descried  yet  another  vessel,  but  failed  to 
attract  her  attention.  Three  times  hope  of  rescue  was 
excited,  but  each  time  the  desperate  man  was  disappointed. 
He  had  been  in  the  water  for  two  hours  when  at  last  the 
s.s.  Woodville  passed  near  him,  heard  his  cries,  now  faint 
with  increasing  exhaustion,  and  picked  him  up.  He  was 
afterwards  landed  at  West  Hartlepool.  Of  the  crew  of 
thirty-nine,  consequently,  only  one  man  survived  to  tell 
the  tale  of  the  loss  of  the  Tangistan.  Whether  the  Tangi- 
stan  was,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Princess  Victoria  and 
Blackwood,  the  victim  of  a  submarine,  or  whether  she 
exploded  a  mine,  was  a  matter  of  some  doubt,  but  it 
is  significant  that  "  Die  Deutschen  U-Boote  in  ihrer 
Kriegsfiihrung,  1914-18  "  claims  the  Tangistan  as  a  victim 
of  U12,  whose  destruction  the  following  day  is  described 
in  a  later  chapter  (p.  390). 

It  was  indubitably  a  submarine  which  was  responsible 
for  the  destruction  two  days  later  of  the  Florazan  (4,658 
tons;  master,  Mr.  E.  J.  Cawsey)  when  fifty-three  miles 
N.E.  J  E.  from  the  Longships,  the  lighthouse  which 
stands  on  the  rocks  off  Land's  End.  In  this  instance  the 
violence  of  the  explosion  of  the  torpedo  not  only  gave  the 
ship  a  list  to  port,  but  lifted  the  oil  lamps  in  the  cabins 
from  their  sockets,  with  the  result  that  the  ship  was  soon 
ablaze  amidships  as  she  began  to  settle  slowly  by  the  head. 


CH.  vn]         THE   "ADENWEN'S"   ADVENTURE  299 

Fortunately  the  steam  drifter  Wenlock,  then  about  two 
miles  away,  noticed  that  the  Florazan  was  in  distress, 
and  rescued  all  the  officers  and  men,  who  in  the  meantime 
had  taken  to  the  boats,  with  the  exception  of  one  fireman, 
who  was  presumably  killed  by  the  explosion.  The  survivors 
stood  by  the  burning  vessel  for  two  or  three  hours,  but  it 
was  impossible  to  board  her  on  account  of  the  flames, 
and,  no  sign  of  life  being  observable,  the  Wenlock  con- 
tinued on  her  course.  On  the  following  day  the  Florazan 
was  still  afloat  and  was  taken  in  tow  by  eight  drifters, 
but  she  sank  on  the  morning  of  the  18th. 

On  the  same  day  the  Adenwen  (3,798  tons)  had  a  curious 
experience  off  the  Casquets.  In  the  early  morning  light, 
submarine  U29  appeared,  and  firing  rockets  ordered  the 
merchantman  to  stop.  The  master  (Mr.  W.  H.  Ladd) 
paid  no  attention  to  what  was  intended  to  be  a  peremptory 
injunction,  but,  on  the  contrary,  increased  speed  and 
steered  varying  courses  in  order  to  keep  the  submarine 
right  astern.  Again  the  signals  were  made,  and  again 
they  were  ignored.  But  the  chase  was  a  hopeless  one, 
for  the  submarine  had  the  advantage  of  speed  and  soon 
overhauled  the  Adenwen.  Speaking  through  a  mega- 
phone, the  commander  of  U29  threatened  to  torpedo  the 
ship  unless  she  was  stopped.  There  was  no  alternative 
but  compliance  with  this  order.  In  a  few  minutes  the 
crew  had  taken  to  the  boats,  and  a  German  party  pro- 
ceeded on  board  the  Adenwen  and  placed  bombs  in  the  hold, 
which  subsequently  exploded.  The  crew  were  towed  by 
the  submarine  for  some  time,  and  were  then  transferred 
to  the  Norwegian  s.s.  Bothnia,  which  landed  them  at 
Brixham  the  same  afternoon.  The  enemy  assumed  that 
the  British  ship  would  sink,  but,  on  the  contrary,  she 
remained  afloat,  was  noticed  by  the  French  destroyer 
CLAYMORE  later  in  the  day,  and,  having  been  towed 
into  Cherbourg  and  temporarily  repaired,  arrived  at 
Cardiff  on  April  1st,  to  be  taken  later  on  into  the  Admiralty 
service. 

The  campaign  continued  on  the  12th,  when  five  ships 
were  attacked,  four  being  sunk.  One,  the  Invergyle  (1,794 
tons ;  master,  Mr.  D.  K.  Minto),  was  torpedoed  off  the 
Tyne,  and  the  other  three  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
Scilly  Islands.  This  group  consisted  of  the  Headlands 
(2,988  tons),  the  Indian  City  (4,645  tons;  master,  Mr. 


300        APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

John  Williams),  and  the  Andalusian  (2,349  tons;  master, 
Mr.  L.  Malley),  and  they  were  all  sunk  by  the  U29  under 
the  redoubtable  Otto  Weddigen.  As  in  the  case  of  the 
three  armoured  cruisers  ABOUKIR,  CRESSY,  and  HOGUE, 
this  officer  profited  by  the  code  of  humanity  which 
the  seamen  of  the  great  maritime  Powers  had  always 
hitherto  observed.  The  s.s.  Headlands  was  entering 
the  English  Channel  from  the  west  when  the  master 
(Mr.  Herbert  Lugg)  saw  a  burning  ship  about  five  miles 
away  to  the  eastward.  Without  a  thought  except  for  the 
men  of  the  vessel  from  which  the  smoke  was  rising,  he 
altered  course  in  the  hope  that  he  might  be  able  to  save  the 
lives  of  brother  seamen.  He  had  been  steaming  towards 
the  mass  of  smoke  for  a  matter  of  twenty  minutes,  when 
he  observed  a  submarine  approaching  him  at  full  speed. 
In  the  track  of  the  submarine  was  a  patrol-boat,  and  inter- 
mittently flashes  of  gunfire  reminded  him  that  in  obeying 
the  humane  custom  of  the  sea  he  had  run  into  danger. 
When  his  own  ship  had  disappeared,  he  learnt  that  the  U29 
had  attacked  the  Indian  City,  which  had  been  torpedoed 
when  the  patrol-boat  came  on  the  scene.  As  the  Indian 
City,  which  did  not  sink  until  the  following  day,  was  in 
no  immediate  danger,  the  patrol-vessel  had  given  chase 
to  the  submarine.  By  keeping  on  the  surface,  at  the  risk 
of  being  hit  by  a  shell,  the  German  commander  was  able 
to  outdistance  his  pursuer.  As  soon  as  Captain  Lugg 
realised  the  danger,  he  put  his  helm  hard  astarboard 
in  the  hope  of  avoiding  pursuit.  Owing  to  the  Headlands9 
slow  speed,  it  was  soon  apparent  that  his  case  was  hopeless. 
The  merchant  ship  was  still  holding  to  her  course  when 
the  submarine  commander  drew  up  close  astern  and  shouted 
to  the  Headlands  to  stop.  The  challenge  was  unheeded. 
The  submarine  then  manoeuvred  for  position  and  fired  a 
torpedo,  which  struck  the  Headlands  abaft  the  engine-room. 
The  ship  began  to  settle  down  as  the  submarine,  with  a  group 
of  patrol  vessels  in  pursuit,  made  off  at  high  speed.  Within 
a  few  minutes  everyone  on  board  the  Headlands  had  taken 
to  the  boats,  which  were  afterwards  towed  into  port  by 
a  patrol  craft.1 

1  On  March  18th,  1915,  Otto  Weddigen,  who,  as  a  reward  for  his 
successes,  had  been  promoted  from  U9  to  U29  since  he  began  his  raids 
on  commerce,  attempted  to  attack  one  of  the  battle  squadrons  of 
the  Grand  Fleet,  and  was  appropriately  rammed  and  sunk  by  H.M.S. 
DREADNOUGHT — "  Picked  up  on  her  ram  like  a  winkle  on  a  pin,"  as  an 


CH.  vn]  A  GUNNERY  DUEL  301 

On  the  following  day  the  Hartdale  (3,839  tons ;  master, 
Mr.  Thomas  Martin),  after  being  chased  off  the  coast  of 
County  Down,  was  torpedoed,  two  lives  being  lost.  Four 
ships  were  attacked  on  the  14th  ;  none  was  sunk,  and  all 
managed  to  escape  uninjured  except  the  Atalanta  (519 
tons).  This  ship  was  the  first  defensively  armed  British 
merchantman  to  fall  in  with  a  submarine.  She  was  on 
passage  from  Galway  to  Glasgow,  and  was  steaming  about 
eleven  miles  off  Inishturk  Island,  which  lies  about  half-way 
between  Blacksod  Bay  and  Styne  Head,  when  she  sighted  a 
submarine  which  was  coming  up  astern  and  gaining  rapidly 
on  her.  The  master  (Mr.  J.  MacLarnon)  decided  to  withhold 
his  fire.  But  when  the  submarine  had  come  within  a 
range  of  three  or  four  thousand  yards,  the  marine  gunners 
could  be  restrained  no  longer  and  action  was  opened,  the 
submarine  replying  with  guns  and  rifle.  By  the  time  four 
rounds  had  been  fired  by  the  Atalantcfs  gunners,  the  ship 
stopped,  rolling  heavily  in  the  swell.  The  submarine,  con- 
cluding that  the  short  chase  was  over,  came  abreast  of  her 
on  the  port  beam.  As  the  12-pounder  gun  could  not  be 
brought  to  bear  owing  to  the  ship  having  stopped,  Private 
Gilgallon  blew  away  a  davit  by  gunfire  ;  three  more  rounds 
were  then  fired,  causing  the  submarine  to  submerge.  Ac- 
cording to  a  statement  subsequently  made  by  the  two 
marine  gunners,  the  boats  had  in  the  meantime  been 
lowered;  officers  and  crew  got  into  them  and  rowed 
away  from  the  ship,  with  the  exception  of  Mr.  Mackey, 
first  mate,  who  remained  on  the  bridge  and  rang  orders 
to  the  engine-room  for  steam  until  it  was  found  that  all 
the  men  had  left ;  and,  as  the  vessel  was  now  helpless, 
and  the  submarine  appeared  to  be  preparing  to  discharge  a 
torpedo  at  short  range  from  a  position  in  which  she  could 
not  be  fired  on,  the  mate  and  two  marines  got  into  a  boat 
which  was  lying  alongside  and  shoved  off.  According  to 
the  report  of  the  chief  engineer,  Mr.  James  Fraser,  the 
master,  after  he  had  got  into  the  port  boat,  went  on  board 
the  Atalanta  again,  and  while  he  was  there  the  submarine 
appeared  on  the  starboard  bow.  "When  the  boat  got 
round  the  starboard  side  and  the  master  got  on  deck, 

eyewitness  expressed  it.  This  incident,  one  of  the  most  striking  in  the 
whole  history  of  submarine  warfare,  was  kept  secret  from  the  Germans, 
who  never  tired  of  inquiring  the  fate  of  Otto  Weddigen,  though  thousands 
of  people  in  and  out  of  the  Grand  Fleet  must  have  known  the  facts* 


302        APPEARANCE   OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

he  called  on  those  in  the  boat  to  go  on  board,  but  those 
who  had  the  oars  would  not  pull  back."  Captain  Mac- 
Larnon  then  left  the  ship  with  the  rest  of  the  hands. 
The  crew  were  eventually  landed  at  Inishturk  Island. 
In  the  meantime  the  enemy  devoted  attention  to  the  ship, 
which  was  soon  well  afire.  She  was  subsequently  found 
adrift  by  the  patrol-boat  Greta  and  towed  into  Cleggan 
Bay,  about  ten  miles  to  the  southward,  where,  already 
gutted  by  the  flames,  she  was  beached. 

During  the  remainder  of  the  month  of  March  the  cam- 
paign was  pressed  by  the  enemy  with  energy  and  eleven 
ships  were  lost,  together  with  115  lives.  Eighteen  other 
vessels  were  attacked,  but  •  managed  to  escape.  None 
of  these  ships  possessed  any  armament,  but  owed  their 
safety  in  most  cases  to  speed  and  good  seamanship.  A 
typical  illustration  of  resourcefulness  under  adverse  con- 
ditions was  furnished  by  the  master  (Mr.  John  Home) 
of  the  Hyndford  (4,286  tons).  The  Hyndford  was  on  her 
way  home  from  Bahia  with  a  cargo  of  wheat  and  oats. 
On  the  afternoon  of  March  15th  she  was  steaming  up- 
Channel  at  full  speed,  making  for  London,  and  when  about 
twelve  miles  south  of  Beachy  Head  an  explosion  occurred. 
The  weather  was  fine  and  there  was  a  smooth  sea.  The 
ship  shook  from  end  to  end.  On  rushing  out  of  the  chart- 
house,  the  master  encountered  a  great  volume  of  falling 
water  and  debris.  After  a  moment's  delay  he  was,  how- 
ever, able  to  reach  the  bridge  in  time  to  see  the  wake  of 
a  submarine,  with  its  periscope  showing.  The  enemy  vessel 
was  going  away  from  the  ship  in  a  south-westerly  direction, 
and  soon  disappeared  beneath  the  water.  The  second 
officer  had  also  seen  the  periscope,  and  there  was  no  doubt, 
therefore,  that  the  vessel  had  been  attacked  by  a  sub- 
marine without  warning.  The  outrage  was  so  unexpected 
that  considerable  confusion  occurred  on  board  the 
Hyndford.  As  the  ship's  head  was  sinking  fast,  the 
engineers  left  the  engine-room,  and  the  crew  were  hurrying 
towards  the  boats,  which  had  already  been  swung  out, 
when  the  master  took  command  of  the  situation.  He 
immediately  directed  that  the  boats  were  not  to  be 
lowered,  but,  owing  to  an  accident,  the  port  lifeboat  slipped 
and  two  hands  were  thrown  into  the  water.  Captain  Home 
then  endeavoured  to  calm  the  men  and  ordered  an  engineer 
to  stop  the  engines.  As  soon  as  way  was  sufficiently  off 


CH.  vn]        THE  u  LIZZIE'S "  RESCUE  WORK  303 

the  ship,  a  boat  was  put  out  to  rescue  the  two  men  who 
had  fallen  into  the  water,  and  one  of  them  was,  in  fact, 
saved.  Gradually  more  or  less  normal  conditions  were 
established  on  board.  In  the  meantime  it  had  been  found 
that  water  in  the  fore  hold  was  at  sea-level,  but  No.  2  hold 
was  dry,  so,  firing  two  rockets  of  distress,  Captain  Home 
put  his  engines  half  speed  ahead  for  ten  minutes  as  a  test, 
and,  finding  the  bulkhead  stood  the  strain,  he  proceeded 
at  full  speed  towards  the  Downs,  filling  the  after  ballast 
tanks  in  order  to  trim  the  ship.  The  Hyndford  arrived 
at  the  Downs  half  an  hour  after  midnight  on  March  16th, 
and  eventually  was  towed  to  Gray's  Flats  and  beached 
for  temporary  repairs. 

The  attack  on  the  Delmira  (3,459  tons)  on  the  25th 
attracted  the  special  attention  of  the  Admiralty  owing 
to  the  pluck  and  resource  exhibited  by  Mr.  Jonathan 
Evans,  the  master  of  the  s.s.  Lizzie  (802  tons).  The 
Delmira  had  a  crew  of  thirty-two  hands,  but  only  eight 
of  these  were  English,  the  rest  being  Chinese.  She  was 
proceeding  from  Boulogne  to  Port  Talbot,  and  was  twenty- 
three  miles  north-north-east  from  Cape  d'Antifer,  when  the 
U37  appeared  aft  at  a  distance  of  about  two  miles.  The 
master  of  the  large  British  merchant  ship  (Mr.  William 
Lancefield)  took  no  notice  of  a  signal  directing  him  to 
stop,  and  the  Germans  then  began  firing  and  gradually 
gained  on  the  Delmira,  which  was  making  only  about 
9  knots.  The  usual  procedure  was  followed,  but  in  this  case 
the  commander  of  the  U-boat  showed  consideration  for 
the  officers  and  men.  He  volunteered  to  tow  their  boats 
until  some  vessel  was  met  with  to  which  they  could  transfer. 
For  an  hour  and  a  half  the  little  procession,  consisting 
of  the  submarine  and  the  three  boats  of  the  Delmira, 
maintained  its  course  towards  the  English  coast,  and  then 
the  s.s.  Lizzie  appeared  to  the  eastward.  The  submarine 
immediately  cut  the  tow  and  began  to  dive  in  the  direction  of 
the  Lizzie.  The  master  of  the  little  British  vessel  promptly 
steamed  full  speed  towards  the  submarine  with  the  intention 
of  ramming  her.  The  Lizzie  passed  over  the  enemy  vessel, 
but  felt  no  shock,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  even  the  periscope 
was  struck.  In  spite  of  the  danger  which  the  presence 
of  the  enemy  boat  must  have  suggested,  Captain  Evans 
of  the  Lizzie  stopped  his  ship  and  picked  up  the  men  out 
of  the  three  boats,  who  were  eventually  landed  at  Ports- 
21 


304        APPEARANCE  OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

mouth.     The  Delmira  grounded  later  on  at  Cape  La  Hogue, 
where  temporary  repairs  were  carried  out. 

By  this  time  evidence  was  accumulating  of  the  deter- 
mination of  the  enemy  to  break,  if  he  could,  the  spirit  of 
British  merchant  seamen,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
stories  that  reached  the  Admiralty  bore  testimony  to  the 
dogged  courage  with  which  these  men,  in  face  of  unparal- 
leled dangers,  continued  to  go  about  the  nation's  business. 
Almost  every  incident  suggested  that  no  amount  of  fright- 
fulness  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  would  succeed  in  terroris- 
ing the  descendants  of  the  men  who  had  thrown  open  the 
navigation  of  the  seas  freely  to  the  nations  of  the  world. 
The  record  of  these  days  of  heroic  resistance  to  a  cruel 
campaign  must  be  studied  in  the  knowledge  that  these 
men,  untrained  for  the  violence  of  war,  were  also,  for  the 
most  part,  unprovided  with  armament  to  enable  them  to 
defend  themselves  and  their  vessels  against  craft  possessing, 
in  addition  to  the  powers  of  submergence,  powerful  guns, 
deadly  torpedoes,  and  easily  portable  bombs.  It  was  an 
unequal  contest,  but  British  seamen  pursued  it  with 
high  courage  and  tenacity.  The  official  records  reveal 
the  generous  feeling  of  admiration  excited  in  naval  officers 
serving  at  the  Admiralty  as  tale  after  tale  came  in  from 
the  sea. 

A  particularly  noteworthy  story  is  that  of  the  Vosges 
(1,295  tons).  She  was  on  passage  from  Bordeaux  to 
Liverpool,  carrying  a  general  cargo,  with  two  first-class 
passengers  and  five  consular  passengers,  when  she  was 
attacked  on  March  27th,  1915,  at  10.15  a.m.,  by  a  German 
submarine  in  lat.  50°  27',  long.  6°  W.  The  merchant- 
man was  unarmed.  Immediately  the  submarine  came 
into  view  the  master  (Mr.  John  R.  Green)  ordered  all 
the  firemen  below  and  asked  the  consular  passengers  to 
volunteer  to  assist  in  maintaining  steam  pressure.  This 
aid  was  willingly  given.  A  fight  was  in  prospect  that  made 
the  blood  course  freely  through  the  veins  of  every  man 
on  board.  The  submarine  opened  fire  from  astern,  the 
first  shot  being  immediately  followed  by  one  which  hit 
the  British  vessel  aft.  In  the  meantime  the  Vosges 
was  steaming  at  her  highest  speed,  Captain  Green  altering 
course  as  necessary  to  keep  the  enemy  behind  him,  and 
with  her  head  to  the  sea,  so  that  she  could  not  use  her  gun. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  submarine  was  all  the  time  en- 


CH.  vii]  A   GALLANT  STRUGGLE  305 

deavouring  to  get  on  the  beam  of  the  merchantman,  so  as 
to  obtain  a  good  target  for  his  torpedoes.  This  manoeuv- 
ring and  counter-manoeuvring  continued  for  an  hour 
and  a  half,  the  enemy,  firing  as  opportunity  offered, 
refusing  to  abandon  her  quarry.  The  British  vessel  was 
struck  repeatedly  by  shells,  a  round  hole  about  two  feet 
in  diameter  being  made  in  the  starboard  side,  and  another 
about  one  foot  in  diameter  being  pierced  on  the  starboard 
quarter ;  there  were  other  small  holes  about  the  waterline 
aft.  The  funnel  was  riddled,  the  bridgehouse  smashed, 
and  the  engine-room  badly  holed.  The  chief  engineer, 
Mr.  Harry  Davies,  was  killed  instantaneously  when 
standing  near  the  stokehold  door  exhorting  the  firemen 
and  volunteers  to  further  efforts,  a  shell  striking  him  in 
the  chest.  The  second  mate  was  hit  on  the  arm  while 
on  the  bridge ;  a  fireman  was  injured  in  the  wrist ;  the 
mess-room  boy  had  a  leg  hurt ;  the  mate  was  slightly 
wounded  in  the  hand  ;  and  splinters  grazed  the  captain's 
hand.  Among  the  passengers,  the  only  injury  suffered 
was  in  the  case  of  a  lady  who  was  struck  in  the  foot. 

At  about  a  quarter  to  twelve,  the  submarine,  having 
failed  to  effect  her  purpose  owing  to  the  skill  of  Captain 
Green  and  the  manner  in  which  he  was  supported  in  the 
engine-room,  sheered  off.  It  was  hoped  that  it  would  be 
possible  to  get  the  damaged  vessel  into  Milford  Haven. 
Water,  however,  was  gaining  rapidly  on  the  pumps, 
and  it  became  evident  that  the  ship  was  sinking.  At 
this  moment,  the  armed  yacht  Wintonia  (Lieutenant- 
Commander  W.  E.  Kelway,  R.N.R.)  was  sighted  about 
twenty -two  miles  north-west  of  Trevose  Head.  This 
vessel  immediately  bore  down  on  the  Vosges,  and  shortly 
afterwards  the  boats  were  manned  and  lowered,  and, 
by  the  captain's  orders,  officers  and  men  took  their 
places.  There  was  no  fuss  or  excitement  in  spite  of 
the  unnerving  experience  through  which  everyone  on 
board  had  so  recently  passed.  After  making  sure  that 
everyone  else  had  left  the  ship,  Captain  Green  cast 
off  both  painters,  and,  getting  into  the  starboard  lifeboat, 
rowed  over  to  the  patrol  yacht.  In  spite  of  the  strong 
wind  and  heavy  rain,  everyone  got  on  board — a  difficult 
operation  in  the  circumstances.  "  The  only  remark  I  have 
to  make,"  Captain  Green  reported,  "  is  that,  had  I  had  a 
gun,  I  have  not  the  slightest  doubt  but  that  I  should  have 


306        APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

sunk  the  submarine."  The  Vosges  disappeared  bow  first 
at  2  o'clock  after  an  explosion  had  occurred.  "  Gentlemen, 
I  did  not  give  her  away,"  the  captain  concluded  in  his 
report  to  his  owners.  The  Admiralty,  on  receiving  in- 
formation, at  once  expressed  their  appreciation  of  the 
conduct  of  all  concerned,  it  being  remarked  that  "  the 
chief  engineer,  both  by  his  energy  and  his  example,  was 
largely  instrumental  in  enabling  the  vessel  to  shake  off 
the  submarine."  Official  appreciation  was  afterwards 
formally  expressed  of  the  gallantry  of  officers  and  crew  : 
Captain  Green  was  awarded  a  commission  in  the  Royal 
Naval  Reserve  and  received  the  D.S.O.  for  "  his  gallant 
and  resolute  conduct "  ;  gold  watches  were  presented 
to  the  other  officers,  the  widow  of  chief  engineer  Harry 
Davies  receiving  the  gold  watch  which  would  have  been 
handed  to  her  husband  if  he  had  lived ;  and  the  members 
of  the  crew  were  paid  a  gratuity  of  £3  each. 

A  duel  lasting  ninety  minutes  between  an  old  British 
merchant  ship  and  a  German  submarine  occurred  at  this 
period  of  the  war,  reflecting  the  utmost  credit  on  British 
seamanship.  The  City  of  Cambridge  was  a  four-masted 
ship  of  3,844  tons,  and  her  compound  engines  gave  her  a 
normal  speed  when  loaded  of  about  10  knots.  She  was 
thirty-three  years  old,  having  been  built  by  Messrs.  Work- 
men, Clark  &  Co.  at  Belfast  in  1882.  She  left  Alexandria 
for  Liverpool  on  March  16th  with  a  general  cargo.  The 
master  (Mr.  Alfred  C.  Fry)  was  determined  not  to  be 
caught  unprepared  for  an  emergency,  and  on  the  27th  he 
mustered  all  hands  at  their  respective  boat  stations  in 
order  that  every  officer  and  man  should  practise  putting 
on  his  life-belt  in  its  proper  position,  "  for,  believe  me," 
Captain  Fry  afterwards  remarked,  "  familiarity  breeds 
contempt,  and  there  are  numbers  of  persons  on  board 
most  ships  who  do  not  know  how  to  put  on  life-belts 
properly."  Strong  north-east  winds  were  encountered  in 
crossing  the  Bay,  and  at  4.30  on  the  following  afternoon, 
the  City  of  Cambridge  passed  Bishop  Rock  at  a  distance 
of  about  thirty-eight  miles,  and  course  was  then  altered 
to  pass  about  twenty  miles  west  of  the  Smalls,  to  the 
westward  of  Milford  Haven.  At  noon  Captain  Fry  had 
doubled  the  lookout,  and  he  "  kept  his  eye  skinned " 
for  any  suspicious  craft  or  for  the  sight  of  a  periscope. 
At  6.30,  nothing  being  observable  on  the  horizon,  he 


CH.  vii]  BAFFLING  A   SUBMARINE  307 

left  the  bridge  to  go  down  to  dinner,  the  third 
officer  with  the  lookout  men  and  the  man  at  the  wheel 
remaining  on  the  bridge.  He  had  just  sat  down  with 
the  chief  and  second  officers,  when  a  sharp  report  was 
heard  on  the  starboard  side  of  the  vessel.  "  I  raced 
from  the  table  to  the  bridge,"  he  stated  in  his  subsequent 
narrative  of  events,  "  and  did  it,  I  think,  in  record  time- 
say  fifteen  seconds.  I  climbed  the  port  ladder  and  rushed 
to  the  wheel.  Looking  over  the  side,  I  saw  close  to  us, 
say  half  a  ship's  length  away,  the  conning  tower  of  a 
submarine  with  several  men  in  it.  She  was  heading  the 
same  way  as  ourselves.  I  at  once  myself  pulled  the  wheel 
over  to  the  starboard,  shaking  them  up  below  at  the  same 
time;  then,  knowing  that  the  bridge  would  be  fired  at, 
I  lay  flat  for  a  minute.  The  chief  and  second  officers 
were  with  me  by  this  time,  and  the  second  officer  took 
the  wheel  and  kept  it  for  the  rest  of  the  time  of  our  trial. 
After  a  short  time  I  looked  for  the  enemy/and  found  that 
he  was  a  couple  of  points  or  so  on  the  starboard  quarter 
and  our  own  ship  swinging  off  good  to  port.  This  gave 
us  courage  and  the  hope  that  he  would  not  have  it  all 
his  own  way ;  if  we  could  only  keep  her  going  and  the 
enemy  astern,  we  had  a  good  chance  of  getting  away, 
unless  holed  below  the  water-line.  As  soon  as  he  under- 
stood we  were  going  to  make  a  try  for  it,  he  fired  a  shell, 
and  then  for  an  hour  and  a  half  it  was  very  hot  work. 
He  would  gain  on  us  till  one  could  count  the  heads  in 
the  conning  tower.  At  one  time  I  think  he  could  not  have 
been  200  feet  from  us,  a  mass  of  foam  with  just  the  top 
of  the  tower  showing,  and  then  he  was  hard  aport  or  star- 
board (generally  port)  till  he  stood  at  right  angles,  trying 
to  get  far  enough  out  to  smash  the  bridge,  at  the  same 
time  he  was  shepherding  us  so  that  we  were  before  the 
wind  and  swell,  which,  although  it  was  small,  probably  upset 
his  shooting  platform.  We  managed  to  baffle  him  at 
every  move.  At  one  time  I  was  afraid  our  speed  was 
going  down,  but  with  the  best  of  firemen  below  and  the 
mighty  efforts  of  the  engineers,  we  recovered  speed  and 
worked  her  up  to  a  little  over  13  knots  (our  top  speed). 
At  this  time  we  were  heading  into  both  wind  and  sea 
(he  had  forced  us  to  turn  round  the  compass  twice)  and 
going  slowly  away  from  him.  The  light  by  now  had 
settled  into  a  bright  moonlight  night,  and  as  he  got 


308        APPEARANCE   OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

farther  astern  we  gradually  lost  sight  of  him,  but  he  gave 
us  one  parting  shot,  which  did  a  lot  of  damage. 

"  That  ninety  minutes  was  such  as  I  do  not  wish  to 
experience  again.  Thinking  it  possible  that  some  of  our 
armed  ships  might  be  within  range,  I  fired  two  distress 
signals  one  after  another  to  attract  their  attention.  Then 
he  brought  a  Morse  lamp  on  deck  and  started  Morsing, 
but  knowing  this  was  only  a  trick  to  divert  our  attention, 
I  took  no  notice  of  it." 

For  the  courage  and  resource  exhibited  in  face  of  the 
enemy,  Captain  Fry  was  presented  with  a  gold  watch 
from  the  Admiralty  as  well  as  Lloyd's  Medal,  and  was 
commended  in  the  London  Gazette,  besides  receiving  a 
reward  from  the  War  Risks  Association.  Though  his 
ship  was  entirely  without  armament,  he  had  opposed  his 
seamanship  to  all  the  offensive  qualities  possessed  by  the 
submarine,  and,  splendidly  supported  by  his  officers  and 
the  staff  in  the  engine-room,  he  had  won.  The  devotion 
of  the  master,  officers,  and  engineers  saved  the  ship  and 
its  cargo,  but  the  City  oj  Cambridge  did  not  escape  unin- 
jured. One  German  shell  carried  away  a  6j-inch  davit, 
destroying  the  boat  which  it  helped  to  support.  Another 
penetrated  the  boatswain's  room  and  part  of  the  lamp 
locker,  one  of  these  holes  being  about  30  inches  by  50  inches. 
The  after-works  were  injured,  and  one  shell  which  passed 
over  the  bridge  carried  away  the  signal  halyard.  "  This 
was  a  close  call,"  Captain  Fry  remarked,  "  as,  had  it  struck 
any  of  the  short  awning  spars,  it  would  have  exploded, 
and  that  would  have  finished  us."  Except  for  a  slight 
splinter  wound  sustained  by  a  fireman,  no  one  was  the 
worse  for  the  encounter.  "  With  a  bit  of  luck  and  owing 
to  the  hard  determination  of  the  officers  and  men  above 
and  below  deck,"  the  master  related  afterwards,  "  we 
managed  to  bring  our  ship  home."  l 

Another  incident  which  occurred  in  the  closing  days  of 
March  must  be  noted,  because,  apart  from  the  loss  of  life 
involved,  it  figured  in  the  Notes  which  afterwards  passed 
between  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  Germany, 
and  was  the  subject  of  a  special  inquiry  by  the  Board 
of  Trade.  When  approximately  sixty  miles  W.  J  N. 

1  The  City  of  Cambridge,  after  a  second  escape  from  a  submarine  in 
the  same  year,  was  sunk  in  the  Mediterranean  (July  3rd,  1917)  when 
under  the  command  of  another  master. 


CH.  vn]  STORY  OF  THE   "  FALABA "  309 

off  St.  Ann's  Head  at  12.30  p.m.  on  March  27th,  the 
master  (Mr.  George  Wright)  of  the  Eileen  Emma,  who  was 
fishing  from  Milford  Haven,  sighted  the  periscope  of  a 
submarine.  He  immediately  rang  for  full  speed  and  tried 
to  cut  her  off.  The  enemy,  realising  what  was  happening, 
altered  course  again  and  again,  trying  to  avoid  collision. 
The  speeds  of  the  two  ships  were  about  equal,  and  for  some 
time  these  manoeuvres  continued,  until  a  steamer  appeared 
on  the  horizon  steering  south-west.  The  submarine  then 
increased  her  buoyancy  until  she  was  well  above  the  water, 
and  in  this  trim  outpaced  the  Eileen  Emma  and  proceeded 
towards  a  steamship  which  proved  to  be  the  Falaba 
(4,806  tons ;  master,  Mr.  F.  J.  Davies).  She  was  unarmed, 
and  had  on  board  a  crew  of  ninety-five  men  and  147 
passengers,  including  seven  women  and  an  American 
citizen,  when  she  left  Liverpool  on  the  previous  evening 
on  her  passage  to  Sierra  Leone.  Passengers  and  crew  had 
had  insufficient  time  to  adjust  themselves  to  war  condi- 
tions when  they  sighted  the  submarine  about  two  points 
abaft  the  starboard  beam  and  three  miles  distant.  In 
approaching  the  Falaba  the  submarine  at  first  showed  a 
British  ensign,  for  which  the  German  colours  were  after- 
wards substituted.  She  was  noticed  by  Mr.  Pengilly,  the 
Falaba9 s  third  officer,  at  11.40  a.m.  The  sequence  of 
later  events  was  settled  by  the  considered  judgment  of 
Lord  Mersey,  acting  as  Wreck  Commissioner : 

"  The  captain  immediately  altered  the  course  of  the 
Falaba  so  as  to  get  the  submarine  directly  astern,  and 
at  the  same  time  he  rang  up  the  engine-room  to  in- 
crease the  speed.  The  best  was  done  in  the  engine- 
room  to  respond  to  this  call,  but  it  was  found  impossible 
to  effect  any  material  improvement  in  the  short  time 
available.  The  captain  then  sent  Baxter  to  instruct 
the  Marconi  operator  to  signal  all  stations  as  follows  : 
'  Submarine  overhauling  us  ;  flying  British  flag.  51°  32', 
6°  86'.'  This  message  was  sent  out  at  11.50  a.m.  Baxter 
then  obtained  a  telescope  and  observed  that  the  sub- 
marine was  flying  a  German  ensign.  It  is,  in  my 
opinion,  uncertain  whether  the  ensign  had  been  changed, 
or  whether  the  ensign  already  observed  was  not,  in 
fact,  a  German  flag.  The  point,  however,  is  not  material, 
because  from  the  first  the  captain  believed  the  submarine 


310        APPEARANCE  OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

to  be  an  enemy  craft.     The  submarine  was  at  this  time 
making  about  18  knots  and  was  rapidly  overhauling  the 
Faldba.     Shortly  before  noon  she  fired  a  detonating  signal 
to  call  attention,  and  by  flags  signalled  the  Faldba  to  '  stop 
and  abandon  ship.'     The  Faldba  did  not  stop,  but  still 
manoeuvred  to  keep  the  submarine  astern.     The  submarine 
then  signalled  '  Stop  or  I  fire.'     The  captain  and  the  chief 
officer  then  conferred  and  decided  that  it  was  impossible 
to   escape.     They  accordingly   rang  to  the   engine-room 
to  stop  the  engines.     The  signal '  Stop  or  I  fire  '  was  given 
a  minute  or  two  before  noon.     The  submarine  then  sig- 
nalled '  Abandon  ship  immediately,'  and  hailed  through  a 
megaphone  to  the  Faldba  to  take  to  the  boats,  as  they  were 
going  '  to  sink  the  ship   in  five   minutes.'     The   captain 
answered  that  he  was  taking  to  the  boats.     The  Marconi 
operator  heard  the  hail,  and  sent  out  a  second  message, 
'  Position  51°  32'  N.,  6°  36'  W. ;   torpedo  ;   going  boats/ 
The  warning  that  the  submarine  was  going  to  sink  the  ship 
in  five  minutes  was  given  as  nearly  as  possible  at  noon. 
The  Faldba  stopped  at  12.4  or  12.5,  and  at  12.10  the  sub- 
marine fired  a  torpedo  into  her.     At  this  moment  the  sub- 
marine was  within  about  100  yards  of  the  Faldba.     The 
torpedo  struck  the  Faldba  on  the  starboard  side  by  No.  3 
hatch  aft  of  No.  1  lifeboat  and   just  alongside  the  Mar- 
coni house.     The  blow  was  fatal.     The  Faldba  at  once 
took  a  list  to  starboard,  and  in  eight  minutes  (namely, 
at   12.18)   she   sank.     This   was   within   twenty   minutes 
of  the  notice  from  the  submarine  of  her  intention  to  sink 
the  ship.     An  affidavit  by  Mr.  Baxter,  the  chief  officer, 
which  had  been  put  in  has  satisfied  me  that  no  rockets 
or  other  signals  were  fired  or  shown  from  the  Faldba  on 
March  28th." 

Lord  Mersey  held  that  he  was  not  required  to  find 
whether  the  submarine  was  within  her  rights  as  an  enemy 
craft  in  sinking  the  Falaba,  but  he  was  called  upon  to  as- 
sume that  "  in  any  event  she  was  bound  to  afford  the  men 
and  women  on  board  a  reasonable  opportunity  of  getting 
to  the  boats  and  of  saving  their  lives.  This  those  in  charge 
of  the  submarine  did  not  do.  And  so  grossly  insufficient 
was  the  opportunity  in  fact  afforded  that  I  am  driven 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  captain  of  the  submarine 
desired  and  designed  not  merely  to  sink  the  ship,  but,  in 


CH.  vii]  GERMAN  BARBARITY  311 

doing  so,  also  to  sacrifice  the  lives  of  the  passengers  and 
crew."  The  Wreck  Commissioner  added  that  evidence 
was  given  by  the  witnesses  of  laughing  and  jeering  from 
the  submarine  while  the  men  and  women  from  the  Falaba 
were  struggling  in  the  water,  but  Lord  Mersey  stated 
that  he  preferred  to  hope  that  the  witnesses  were  mis- 
taken. Corporal  Turnbull  of  the  Royal  Army  Medical 
Corps,  one  of  the  survivors,  in  a  statement  to  the  Press,1 
said  that  "  the  barbarity  of  the  crew  of  the  submarine 
was  frightful.  They  waited  to  see  the  last  of  the  Falaba 
before  they  dived,  but,  of  course,  they  made  no  attempt 
to  save  any  of  us.  That  was  not  the  worst  part.  The  most 
maddening  thing  was  to  see  the  crew  of  the  submarine 
after  they  had  torpedoed  us.  The  Falaba  listed  over, 
and  the  passengers  and  crew  were  clinging  like  flies  trying 
to  get  a  grip  of  the  deck,  and  dropping  one  by  one  into  the 
water,  while  the  crew  of  the  submarine  laughed  and  jeered 
at  them."  The  ascertained  loss  of  life  was  104. 

Continuing  his  judgment,  Lord  Mersey  added  that, 
"  between  the  first  signal  of  the  submarine  to  stop  and  the 
actual  stopping  of  the  Falaba,  the  chief  officer  directed 
the  first  and  second  stewards  to  assemble  the  passengers 
on  deck  and  to  tell  them  to  put  on  their  life-belts.  The 
captain  also  sent  the  fourth  officer  below  to  see  that  these 
orders  were  carried  out.  After  the  engines  were  stopped, 
the  chief  engineer  and  the  third  engineer  ordered  all  men 
in  the  engine-room  and  stokehold  on  deck,  and  the  order 
was  obeyed.  By  the  time  the  Falaba  was  stopped,  a 
large  number  of  the  passengers  were  already  on  the  boat 
deck.  The  captain  was  on  the  bridge.  He  sent  the  third 
officer  and  the  quartermaster  to  see  to  the  lowering  and 
filling  of  the  boats,  and  the  order  to  man  the  boats  was 
passed  round  the  ship."  The  Wreck  Commissioner  then 
dealt  with  the  "  serious  complaints  which  were  made  by 
some  of  the  witnesses  as  to  the  condition  of  the  boats 
and  as  to  the  launching  of  them."  After  referring  to  these 
statements  and  to  the  technical  evidence  given  before 
him,  he  said  that  he  was  satisfied  "  that  the  witnesses 
who  described  the  boats  as  having  been  '  rotten '  are 
mistaken,  and  that,  in  truth,  the  boats  were  sound  and 
in  good  order  up  to  the  time  of  the  attack  by  the  submarine. 
What?  however,  the  witnesses  probably  mean,  when  they 
*  Times,  March  30th,  1915, 


312        APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

say  the  boats  were  rotten,  is  that  when  afloat  some  of  them 
were  found  to  be  unseaworthy.  And  this,  no  doubt,  is 
true.  But  this  condition  of  things  was,  in  my  opinion, 
wholly  due  to  the  damage  sustained  by  the  boats  after 
the  operation  of  launching  began,  and  not  to  any  previous 
defect.  Upon  the  subject  of  the  launching,  it  is,  therefore, 
necessary  to  say  a  few  words.  It  is  to  be  remembered 
that  the  submarine  had  given  the  Falaba  only  about 
five  minutes  in  which  to  man,  to  fill,  and  to  launch  these 
boats  ;  in  which,  in  short,  to  save  the  lives  of  242  persons. 
This  was  an  operation  quite  incapable  of  efficient  perfor- 
mance in  anything  like  that  short  space  of  time.  There 
was  unavoidable  hurry  and  disorder ;  the  falls  of  one 
of  the  boats  slipped :  the  falls  of  another  jammed ; 
some  boats  were  dashed  against  the  side  of  the  ship  and 
damaged  ;  one  (No.  8)  was  seriously  injured  by  the  ex- 
plosion of  the  torpedo  while  still  hanging  from  the  davits. 
It  is  in  these  circumstances  that  some  of  the  witnesses 
apparently  desire  me  to  find  that  the  damage  done  to  the 
boats  was  due  to  the  neglect  of  the  officers  and  crew  in 
connection  with  the  launching.  I  cannot  do  this.  I 
have  no  doubt  that,  had  there  been  more  time  for  the 
work,  it  might  have  been  better  carried  out,  but,  in  my 
opinion,  all  on  board — captain,  officers,  crew,  and  passengers 
— did  their  very  best.  People  were  fighting  for  their  lives 
and  for  the  lives  of  others  about  them,  and  in  the  struggle 
the  captain,  half  the  crew,  and  a  large  number  of  the  pas- 
sengers were  drowned.  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  fix 
any  man  on  board  the  ship  with  a  failure  of  duty  or  with 
incompetence.  The  responsibility  for  the  consequences 
of  this  catastrophe  must  rest  exclusively  with  the  officers 
and  crew  of  the  German  submarine." 

Two  more  ships  were  sunk  on  the  last  two  days  of 
March,  happily  without  loss  of  life.  The  Flaminian 
(3,500  tons ;  master,  Mr.  David  Cruikshank)  was  destroyed 
on  the  29th  by  gunfire,  fifty  miles  south-west  by  west  from 
the  Scilly  Isles,  and  the  Crown  of  Castile  (4,505  tons; 
master,  Mr.  T.  S.  Fyfe)  on  the  30th,  when  thirty-one  miles 
south-west  from  the  Bishop  Rock.  Submarine  U28  was 
responsible  for  the  sinking  of  both  vessels. 

By  the  end  of  March  the  depredations  of  enemy  surface 
craft  had  ceased,  and  no  further  losses  on  this  account  were 
incurred  until  the  following  January  ;  the  mine  peril  had 


CH.  vn]  A  TUG'S   PLUCKY  FIGHT  313 

been  for  the  moment  checked  ;  but  the  destruction  due  to 
submarines,  which  had  amounted  to  17,126  tons  in  January, 
with  a  loss  of  twenty-one  lives,  and  had  reached  only 
21,787  tons,  with  the  death  of  nine  persons,  in  February, 
had  suddenly  jumped  up  to  64,448  tons,  and  the  number 
of  lives  lost  was  161.  After  this  exhibition  of  frightful- 
ness,  the  intensity  of  the  attack  became  for  a  time  less 
marked.  During  April  only  22,453  tons  were  destroyed, 
thirty-eight  lives  being  lost,  and  only  six  other  ships 
were  molested.  On  the  first  day  of  the  month  the  Seven 
Seas  (1,194  tons ;  master,  Mr.  Barnes)  was  about  six  miles 
south  of  Beachy  Head  when  an  explosion  occurred  forward, 
the  vessel  sinking  almost  immediately.  The  destroyer 
FLIRT  picked  up  nine  of  the  crew,  but  the  captain,  chief 
engineer,  both  mates,  steward,  three  seamen  and  a  boy 
were  drowned.  No  doubt  existed  that  the  ship  was 
torpedoed  without  warning.  The  Lochwood  (2,042  tons; 
master,  Mr.  T.  H.  Scott)  fell  a  victim  to  the  enemy  on  the 
following  day  off  the  Start.  On  the  4th  four  more  lives 
were  lost  in  the  City  of  Bremen  (1,258  tons  ;  master,  Mr. 
Richard  Martin),  which  was  destroyed  twenty  miles  south 
by  west  from  the  Wolf  Rock,  and  the  same  day  the  Olivine 
(634  tons1;  master,  Mr.  A.  Lament)  also  went  down  near 
St.  Catherine's  Point.  The  Northlands  (2,776  tons ;  master, 
Mr.  A.  S.  Taylor)  came  to  a  similar  end  off  Beachy  Head 
on  the  5th,  and  then  an  interval  occurred  of  four  clear 
days,  the  only  noticeable  incident  being  the  escape  of 
the  tug  Homer,  which  furnished  further  confirmatory 
evidence  of  the  spirit  in  which  British  seamen  were  deter- 
mined to  meet  the  enemy's  threats  and  murderous  acts. 

The  Homer  (150  tons)  was  proceeding  from  Queenstown 
to  Sunderland  towing  the  French  barque  General  de  Santos. 
On  the  afternoon  of  April  8th,  twenty-five  miles  south- 
west by  south  from  the  Owers  Lightship,  a  German 
submarine  approached  within  three  or  four  hundred  yards 
of  the  Homer's  port  side.  The  enemy  vessel  was  travelling 
on  the  surface,  and  hoisted  a  signal  which  the  master 
of  the  Homer  (Mr.  H.  J.  Gibson)  ignored,  although  an 
officer  in  the  submarine  shouted  and  pointed  at  the  flags. 
The  submarine  then  steamed  round  the  bow  of  the  tug, 
speed  in  the  British  vessel  having  in  the  meantime  been 
eased.  She  soon  came  up  on  the  starboard  side,  both 
vessels  steaming  in  the  same  direction.  A  shot  was  fired 


314        APPEARANCE   OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vii 

over  the  Homer  and  the  German  officer  resumed  shouting 
in  English,  ordering  Captain  Gibson  to  get  into  his  boat. 
The  enemy  craft,  considering  the  issue  practically  decided, 
came  within  a  hundred  yards,  and  then  the  Homer,  having 
cast  loose  the  General  de  Santos,  turned  towards  her.  It 
was  a  critical  moment.  As  soon  as  the  enemy  realised 
the  intention  of  the  master  of  the  Homer,  he  put  his  helm 
hard  aport  and  opened  fire,  continuing  a  desperate  attack 
until  the  Homer  was  almost  on  top  of  him,  missing  his 
stern  by  about  three  feet.  The  Homer's  head  was  then 
reversed,  and,  the  submarine  still  firing,  the  vessel  pro- 
ceeded in  the  direction  of  the  Owers.  The  submarine 
followed,  firing  a  torpedo  which  passed  close  to  the  British 
vessel's  starboard  quarter.  At  this  time  the  Homer  was 
travelling  at  about  12  knots.  The  submarine  continued 
to  chase  her  for  half  an  hour,  but  had  fallen  half  a  mile 
astern  when  she  abandoned  the  pursuit  and  turned  back, 
evidently  with  the  intention  of  dealing  with  a  French 
barque  which  was  in  sight.  The  tug,  with  seven  holes  as 
evidence  of  the  enemy's  persistency,  reached  Bembridge 
some  time  later.  The  Admiralty  marked  their  appreciation 
of  the  resource  and  courage  of  the  master  by  presenting 
him  with  a  gold  watch  and  a  letter  on  vellum. 

Five  other  ships  managed  to  make  their  escape  during 
April,  La  Rosarina  (8,332  tons)  experiencing  a  narrow 
escape  on  the  17th,  when  she  was  chased  by  a  submarine, 
and  beat  off  the  attack  by  gunfire.  But  during  the  last 
twenty  days  of  April  the  Harpalyce  (5,940  tons),  The 
President  (647  tons ;  master,  Mr.  Neil  Robertson),  Ptar- 
migan (784  tons;  master,  Mr.  W.  A.  W.  Hore),  Mobile 
(1,950  tons;  master,  Mr.  W.  C.  Fortune),  Cherbury  (3,220 
tons;  master,  Mr.  James  Davidson),  and  Fulgent  (2,008 
tons)  were  all  sunk,  with  loss  of  life  in  the  case  of  the 
Harpalyce,  Ptarmigan,  and  Fulgent.  The  end  of  the 
Harpalyce  (master,  Mr.  Wawn)  was  marked  by  some 
features  which  appeared  particularly  revolting  to  still 
tender  consciences  at  that  early  period  of  the  struggle. 
This  ship  was  working  for  the  Commission  of  Relief 
in  Belgium.  When  she  left  Rotterdam  for  Norfolk, 
Virginia,  U.S.A.,  in  addition  to  her  Red  Ensign  she 
was  flying  the  large  flag  of  the  Commission,  and  painted 
on  her  sides  in  large  letters  was  the  name  of  the  Com- 
mission. Her  status  had  been  recognised  by  the  German 


CH.  vn]  A  RELIEF   SHIP'S   FATE  315 

Minister  at  The  Hague,  who  had  issued  a  safe-conduct, 
covering  risks  from  attack  by  German  submarines  during 
her  voyage.  This  permit  was  of  the  most  specific  character, 
but  contained  a  warning  "against  navigating  the  waters 
declared  by  Germany  to  be  a  war  zone,"  especially  through 
the  English  Channel.  In  those  circumstances  there  should 
have  been  no  cause  for  anxiety.  The  Harpalyce  left  Rot- 
terdam about  2.30  a.m.  on  Saturday  morning,  April  10th, 
and  all  went  well  until  the  ship  was  about  seven  miles 
south-south-east  from  the  North  Hinder  light-vessel, 
when  at  10  a.m.  a  loud  report  was  heard  on  the  starboard 
quarter.  An  explosion  had  blown  in  the  ship's  side. 
In  less  than  two  minutes  the  whole  of  the  poop  and  after- 
well  deck  were  submerged.  The  ship  was  doomed.  Ac- 
cording to  the  statements  of  the  second  officer  (Mr.  W.  J. 
George)  and  the  second  engineer  (Mr.  J.  S.  Turnbull), 
"  It  was  impossible  to  swing  out  the  boats,  as  by  now  the 
top  of  the  funnel  was  nearly  in  the  water,  the  engine- 
room  being  filled  up  and  the  decks  beginning  to  blow  up." 
Within  a  short  time  the  ship  went  down.  The  crew 
consisted  of  forty-four  officers  and  men,  including  thirty- 
three  Chinese  hands.  They  would  all  undoubtedly  have 
been  drowned  but  for  the  fortunate  appearance  upon  the 
scene  of  the  Netherlands  s.s.  Elizabeth  and  s.s.  Con- 
stance Catherine,  which,  in  company  with  the  United  States 
schooner  Ruby,  managed  to  save  all  but  fifteen  of  the  crew. 
These  neutral  vessels  not  only  exhibited  fine  seamanship 
during  this  rescue  work,  but  illustrated  that  chivalry  of 
the  sea  which,  prior  to  Germany's  decision,  had  united 
the  seamen  of  the  world.  Two  possibilities  called  for 
investigation.  In  the  first  place,  it  had  to  be  settled 
whether  the  ship  had  been  sunk  by  mine  or  torpedo.  As 
to  that,  not  only  was  it  improbable  that  a  mine  would 
strike  the  vessel  on  the  starboard  quarter,  as  was  the  case, 
but  the  second  mate  distinctly  saw  the  periscope  of  a  sub- 
marine and  its  wash  as  it  made  off  to  the  northwards; 
corroborative  evidence  on  this  point  was  also  given  by 
the  master  of  the  Elizabeth.  Nor  was  there  any  lack  of 
testimony  as  to  the  position  in  which  the  Harpalyce  was 
sunk — well  outside  the  so-called  German  war  zone.  No 
doubt  existed  that  this  vessel,  engaged  on  an  errand  of 
mercy  to  "  the  suffering  civil  population  of  Belgium," 
to  quote  from  the  German  permit,  was  torpedoed  without 


316        APPEARANCE  OF  THE   SUBMARINE       [CH.  vn 

warning  and  in  broad  daylight  outside  the  area  designated 
by  the  enemy,  although  she  carried  every  mark  of  her 
distinctive  mission. 

The  last  day  of  April  was  marked  by  a  tragedy  which, 
conspicuous  at  the  moment,  was  afterwards  to  be  com- 
pletely overshadowed  by  events  which  focused  the  at- 
tention of  the  world  on  the  enemy's  inhuman  campaign. 
The  Fulgent  sailed  from  Cardiff  on  the  evening  of  April 
28th  under  Admiralty  orders  for  Scapa  Flow.  She  was 
taking  a  roundabout  course  for  safety,  evidently  under 
orders,  and  had  passed  the  Blaskets  Lighthouse,  off  the 
coast  of  Kerry,  on  the  morning  of  April  30th,  when 
the  silence  was  broken  by  the  report  of  a  gun.  It 
was  then  noticed  that,  unobserved  by  anyone  on  board, 
a  submarine  had  crept  up  within  about  200  yards  of  the 
Fulgent.  The  master  of  the  merchantman  (Mr.  C.  W. 
Brown)  at  once  realised  the  peril  in  which  he  stood,  and 
began  zigzagging  in  order  to  keep  the  enemy  vessel 
astern  of  him  and  thus  in  an  unfavourable  position 
for  attack.  The  contest,  however,  was  an  unequal  one, 
as  the  submarine,  stated  to  be  the  U7,  had  the  advantage 
of  speed.  Captain  Brown,  with  dogged  courage,  refused 
to  believe  that  his  position  was  hopeless.  Even  when  the 
submarine  had  gained  a  position  about  three  points  on 
the  port  quarter,  he  continued  to  handle  his  ship  with 
courage  and  competency.  A  flash  from  the  gun  mounted 
on  the  deck  of  the  submarine  told  him  that  a  shot  had  been 
fired.  A  few  seconds  later  the  vessel's  funnel  and  chart- 
room  had  been  shattered,  an  A.B.  named  Williams, 
who  was  at  the  wheel,  being  killed,  and  Captain  Brown 
himself  being  mortally  injured.  The  struggle  was  then 
over,  and  all  that  could  be  done  was  to  get  out  the  boats 
with  all  speed,  in  order  that  the  remaining  officers  and  men 
might  leave  the  doomed  ship.  Without  a  thought  for 
the  British  seamen,  the  officer  commanding  the  submarine 
then  sank  the  Fulgent  out  of  hand  and  disappeared, 
leaving  these  unfortunate  men  to  whatever  fate  might 
overtake  them.  During  the  remainder  of  the  day  the 
two  boats  managed  to  keep  together  and  then  night  fell, 
and  in  the  darkness  they  got  separated.  The  most  slug- 
gish imagination  can  fill  in  the  broad  details  of  the  sufferings 
of  these  men  as  hour  after  hour  passed  and  hope  of  rescue 
rose  and  fell  as  ships  appeared  on  the  horizon,  to  disappear 


CH.  vn]      DESTRUCTION  OF  THE   "  FULGENT  "       317 

again  unconscious  of  these  men's  distress.  But  at  last, 
on  Sunday,  May  2nd,  the  s.s.  Tosto  of  Newcastle  picked 
up  the  first  mate  and  eight  hands,  exhausted  physically  and 
mentally  by  the  ordeal  through  which  they  had  passed, 
and  the  trawler  Angle  landed  nine  other  men  at  Cappa 
(Kilrush),  where  the  body  of  Captain  Brown  was  silently 
borne  ashore. 

The  destruction  of  the  Fulgent  provided  an  extreme 
example  of  the  fate  to  which  at  this  period  the  seamen  of 
torpedoed  merchant  vessels  were  liable,  and  in  considering 
the  first  stage  of  Germany's  submarine  campaign  as  here 
described  it  is  necessary,  in  view  of  the  subsequent  develop- 
ments, to  preserve  a  sense  of  proportion.  Grievous  as 
were  the  experiences  of  crews  set  adrift  in  open  boats,  their 
sufferings,  generally  speaking,  were  as  nothing  in  comparison 
with  those  endured  later  in  the  war  by  survivors  from  ships 
torpedoed  in  mid- Atlantic — a  phase  of  the  enemy's  savage 
warfare  by  sea  which  is  dealt  with  in  the  second  volume 
of  this  work. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   AUXILIARY   PATROL   AT   WORK 

IN  those  fateful  summer  days  which  immediately  preceded 
the  British  ultimatum  to  Germany  little  information  was 
revealed  as  to  the  preparations  of  the  Royal  Navy.  Of 
the  steps  which  were  taken  none  was,  in  fact,  more  thorough 
than  the  precautions  against  our  fleets  being  blockaded 
by  means  of  a  potential  enemy's  mine-fields.  But  the 
vigilant  work  of  the  destroyer  flotillas  off  the  coast  does  not 
come  within  the  scope  of  this  history. 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  flotilla  of  old 
gunboats,  whose  duty  was  to  attend  on  the  Grand  Fleet, 
while  the  trawlers  were  relied  upon  to  keep  the  channels 
and  harbour  approaches  swept  clear.  As  far  back  as 
July  28th,  1914,  Commander  Lionel  Preston,  R.N., 
had  received  his  orders  to  take  charge  of  these  gunboats 
and  to  assemble  them  at  Dover.  On  the  first  day  of 
August  they  steamed  away  from  that  great  national  harbour 
for  Queensferry,  having  been  instructed  by  Admiral  Sir 
George  Callaghan,  then  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Grand 
Fleet,  to  begin  sweeping  on  their  way  north  as  soon  as 
they  got  to  the  Inner  Dowsing,  near  the  Wash.  And 
it  was  on  this  same  day  that  the  inspecting  Captain  of 
Mine-sweepers  received  his  orders  in  regard  to  the  traw- 
lers. The  Admiralty  had  decided  to  charter  these  for 
mine- sweeping,  and  preparations  were  to  be  made  so  that 
they  could  be  sent  to  their  assigned  ports  as  soon  as  possible. 
There  were  then  eighty-two  such  vessels  on  the  Ad- 
miralty list,  and  the  ranks  and  ratings  of  the  trawler  section 
numbered  1,025. 

On  the  next  day  the  Admiralty-chartered  trawlers, 
which  had  been  usually  employed  in  towing  targets,  were 
ordered  to  the  Nore  from  their  various  ports,  where, 
being  completed  with  mine-sweeping  stores,  they  were 

318 


CH.  vin]  THE  FIRST  MINE-FIELD  319 

ready  for  eventualities.  On  the  coast  of  Scotland,  and  at 
the  fishing  ports  of  the  North  Sea  and  West  of  England, 
steam  trawlers  were  being  taken  in  hand  as  they  came  in 
from  their  fishing,  though  it  had  been  foreseen  that  probably 
25  per  cent,  of  these  would  not  have  succeeded  in  getting 
back  from  Iceland  and  other  fishing  waters  in  time  for 
the  commencement  of  hostilities.  Meanwhile  Germany 
was  also  availing  herself  of  her  fishing  fleets,  and  on 
August  3rd,  a  telegram  from  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin 
announced  that  that  country  had  obtained  thirty  trawlers 
from  Geestemunde,  and  was  equipping  them  with  a  couple 
of  searchlights  each,  and  fitting  them  out  as  mine-layers. 

The  first  mine-field  to  be  discovered  was  that  which  was 
laid  by  the  KONIGIN  LUISE,  an  auxiliary  vessel  of  the 
German  Navy  resembling  one  of  the  steamers  that  had  been 
on  the  service  between  Harwich  and  the  Hook  of  Holland. 
At  ten  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  August  5th  she  was  seen 
laying  mines  not  far  from  Orfordness,  and  was  herself  sunk 
by  the  Third  Destroyer  Flotilla,  issuing  from  Harwich.  She 
had  not  quite  completed  her  work  when  her  career  so 
suddenly  terminated,  for  survivors  stated  that  many  mines 
were  still  aboard  her.  They  further  asserted  that  she  had 
laid  a  long  line  of  mines  from  a  position  in  lat.  52°  10'  N., 
long.  2°  25'  E.,  to  the  eastward.  This  position  is  about 
thirty  miles  to  the  eastward  of  Orfordness,  and  it  is  clear 
enough  that  such  mines  were  laid  for  the  express  purpose 
of  sinking  any  British  forces  proceeding  from  Harwich 
towards  Germany.  In  this  intention  they  partially 
succeeded,  for  H.M.S.  AMPHION  foundered  on  one  of  them 
the  next  day. 

Meanwhile  the  Senior  Naval  Officer  at  Harwich  was 
ordered  to  hasten  the  preparation  of  the  mine-sweeping 
trawlers.  On  August  6th  they  put  to  sea  and  proceeded 
to  sweep  from  Orfordness  to  Southwold.  The  Admiral 
of  the  patrols  was  also  directed  to  send  Grimsby  trawlers 
to  sweep  off  Aldeburgh  as  soon  as  possible.  Nothing 
could  have  given  a  greater  impetus  to  the  work  of  the  traw- 
lers than  the  discovery  of  a  mine-field  on  the  first  morning 
of  the  war.  From  the  Firth  of  Forth,  Admiral  Lowry, 
the  Senior  Officer  on  the  coast  of  Scotland,  telegraphed 
to  say  that  the  mine-sweepers  which  he  had  taken  up 
had  almost  completed  their  equipment  at  Queensferry 
and  Invergordon,  and  he  had  given  orders  that  as  many 

22 


320  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT   WORK         [CH.  vm 

trawlers  as  possible  should  be  commissioned  from  the 
northern  Scottish  ports  for  patrolling  the  Moray  Firth. 
Such  was  the  call  on  the  destroyer  flotillas  that  there 
was  only  one  torpedo  craft  patrolling  that  big  bay.  To 
Devonport,  Portsmouth,  and  Portland  urgent  telegrams 
were  dispatched  by  the  Admiralty  for  the  temporary  loan 
of  trawlers  for  mine-sweeping,  and  meantime  shipping  had 
been  warned  that  mines  had  been  laid  off  the  Suffolk 
coast  as  far  seaward  as  the  third  meridian  East,  and  all 
vessels  were  ordered  not  to  enter  the  North  Sea  without 
calling  for  orders  at  a  South  Coast  port. 

On  the  third  day  of  the  war,  Admiral  Sir  John  Jellicoe 
was  informed  that  a  permanent  mine-sweeping  flotilla 
of  trawlers  was  being  established  with  a  view  to  ensuring 
a  clear  channel  from  the  Outer  Dowsing  to  the  South 
Goodwins.  This  extensive  lane  would  mean  that  mer- 
chant ships  could  be  guaranteed  a  safe  journey  from  the 
eastern  entrance  of  the  English  Channel  almost  as  far 
north  as  the  Humber.  The  flotilla  was  to  consist  of 
eighty  trawlers,  to  be  formed  as  vessels  became  available. 
Captain  Ellison  was  summoned  to  the  Admiralty,  and 
instructed  to  bring  this  huge  flotilla  into  being.  He  was 
at  the  time  commanding  officer  of  the  HALCYON,  the 
senior  ship  of  the  North  Sea  Fisheries,  based  on  Lowestoft. 
He  immediately  began  to  get  together  suitable  fishing- 
craft,  and  in  a  short  time  the  North  Sea  became  again 
a  safe  highway.  The  trawlers  got  to  work  with  such 
zeal  that  by  August  llth  they  had  swept  a  channel  four 
cables  wide  from  as  far  south  as  the  North  Foreland  to 
as  far  north  as  Southwold.  From  that  night,  also,  the 
whole  channel  from  the  Outer  Dowsing  light- vessel  to  the 
Downs  began  to  be  patrolled  by  steam  drifters,  manned  by 
Trawler  Reserve  officers  and  men  and  flying  the  White 
Ensign.  Night  and  day,  without  so  much  a*?  a  gun  with 
which  to  defend  themselves,  these  little  craft  kept  up 
their  patrol,  ever  on  the  alert  against  enemy  mine-laying 
vessels.  No  one  who  passed  up  the  North  Sea  about  this 
time  will  ever  forget  the  sight  of  this  continuous  patrol 
of  little  vessels  engaged  on  a  new  sphere  of  work. 

And  whilst  Lowestoft  was  busily  getting  craft  together, 
Chatham  was  also  rapidly  fitting  out  mine-sweeping  trawlers, 
so  that  in  about  a  fortnight  seventy-four  hired  and  other 
trawlers  had  been  equipped  on  the  Medway.  Some  of 


CH.  vni]  DRIFTERS   ON  PATROL  321 

these  were  engaged  in  sweeping  the  Thames  Estuary ; 
others  were  dispatched  to  Lowestoft ;  some  to  Peterhead. 
These  trawlers  had  been  provided  with  their  mine-sweeping 
gear,  given  a  month's  consumable  stores,  coal  and  water, 
as  well  as  rifles,  ammunition,  charts,  tide-tables,  Morse 
lamps,  and  so  on.  Free  kits  had  been  issued  to  all  deck- 
hands and  trimmers,  and  a  week's  pay  advanced.  Before 
sailing,  both  skippers  and  crews  had  been  taken  out  in 
the  Admiralty  trawlers  Seamew  or  Seaflower  and  instructed 
in  sweeping,  reeving  of  gear,  and  station-keeping. 

By  the  middle  of  August  the  special  channel  from  the 
Outer  Dowsing  to  the  Downs  was  already  buoyed,  and 
thirty  steam  drifters,  equally  spaced,  were  patrolling  it 
from  end  to  end.  Such  duty  essentially  belonged  to  our 
torpedo  flotillas,  and  not  to  the  smallest  type  of  fishing 
steamers,  but  what  did  it  matter,  seeing  that  the  destroyers 
and  torpedo-boats  were  wanted  elsewhere,  and  that  drifters 
were  the  finest  little  steamships  ever  built  to  withstand 
bad  weather  ?  But  besides  these  Lowestoft  drifters, 
other  drifters  were  being  taken  up  on  the  north-east 
corner  of  Scotland.  From  Banff,  Fraserburgh,  Port 
Mahomack,  and  Wick,  they  were  being  speedily  sent  to  sea 
to  look  for  mine-layers,  and  thus  afford  some  protection 
to  Moray  Firth.  The  task  which  was  imposed  on  some 
of  these  Scotch  crews  was  anything  but  safe.  They  were 
unarmed,  they  were  to  perform  no  hostile  act,  and  if 
captured  were  to  give  no  indication  of  their  being  in 
the  Government  service.  Their  duty  was  simply  to  pose 
as  fishermen,  keeping  their  fishing  gear  on  board  and  their 
eyes  open.  The  moment  they  sighted  any  suspicious 
movement  of  ships,  they  were  to  run  into  harbour  as  fast 
as  they  could  and  report  the  facts. 

At  Lowestoft  great  activity  continued.  The  Com- 
mander-in- Chief  was  calling  for  more  mine-sweeping 
trawlers  for  the  North.  Eight  he  wanted  to  sweep  round 
Kinnaird  Head,  in  addition  to  those  already  sent  to  Cro- 
marty.  These  were  being  fitted  out  at  Lowestoft,  besides 
some  more  for  the  Humber  and  elsewhere.  When  on 
August  15th  the  Grand  Fleet  made  its  sweep  down  the 
North  Sea,  the  mine-sweeping  gunboats  went  ahead  of 
the  battle-cruisers  and  battleships,  leaving  the  trawlers 
to  keep  clear  of  mines  the  approaches  to  the  Grand  Fleet's 
base,  and  to  sweep  the  Pentlands  daily. 


322  AUXILIARY  PATROL   AT  WORK          [CH.  vm 

Notwithstanding  the  large  number  of  vessels  which 
had  now  been  taken  up,  and  the  speed  with  which  they 
were  being  sent  forth  on  their  duties,  the  demand  was 
still  far  in  excess  of  the  supply.  For  towards  the  end  of 
August  the  enemy's  mine-layers  had  been  very  busy. 
On  the  27th  the  steam  drifter  Barley  Rig  had  been  blown 
up  about  thirty-five  miles  E.  \  S.  of  Blyth,  and  thus 
the  existence  of  the  Tyne  mine-field  was  discovered.  Two 
mine-sweeping  trawlers,  the  Thomas  W.  Irvine  and  the 
Crathie,  were  also  blown  up  whilst  endeavouring  to  sweep 
this  new  field.  H.M.  Torpedo-boat  No.  13  found  her- 
self surrounded  by  mines,  being  unable  to  discover  a  way 
out,  and  the  same  day  a  mine-field  was  discovered  also 
off  the  Humber.  On  the  top  of  this  intelligence  came  a 
request  for  four  trawlers  to  be  sent  to  Admiral  Christian, 
who  was  flying  his  flag  in  the  EURYALUS,  and  was  engaged 
in  operations  off  Ostend.  He  urgently  required  sweepers, 
as  the  weather  had  recently  been  particularly  suitable 
for  mine-laying.  These  trawlers  were  therefore  sent  to 
him;  they  left  Lowestoft  in  charge  of  the  navigating 
officer  of  the  HALCYON,  but  the  next  day  Captain  Ellison 
was  compelled  to  request  their  return,  as  it  was  impossible 
to  carry  on  without  them.  On  the  day  that  this  request 
reached  Ostend,  Admiral  Jellicoe  was  also  asking  for 
twenty  more  trawlers,  and  two  days  later  he  expressed 
a  desire  for  a  score  of  drifters  to  act  as  lookouts  to 
Scapa  Flow,  since  the  enemy  was  now  mining  the  salient 
points  of  the  coast. 

The  mine-sweeping  trawlers  were  doing  yeoman  service. 
Their  draught  of  water,  which  was  in  many  cases  as  much 
as  fifteen  feet,  made  them  dangerous  to  themselves  in  a 
mine-field,  but  they  went  about  their  work  with  fine  dis- 
regard of  their  own  peril.  Already  the  Humber  trawlers 
had  been  able  to  sweep  from  Spurn  Head  to  the  Outer 
Dowsing,  and  thus  connect  up  with  the  swept  channel 
running  down  to  the  North  Foreland,  ensuring  a  safe 
passage  for  the  heavy  traffic  from  the  English  Channel 
to  Hull.  In  the  north,  the  trawlers  based  on  Granton, 
in  the  Firth  of  Forth,  had  swept  fifteen  miles  to  the 
eastward  of  St.  Abb's  Head,  and  the  Scapa  trawlers 
had  swept  a  channel  for  the  Third  Battle  Squadron  into 
Scapa. 

It  had  been  suggested  that  the  opening  phase  of  the  war 


CH.  vin]  SUBMARINES   AND  THE   GRAND   FLEET  323 

would  be  marked  by  a  determined  torpedo  attack  by  the 
enemy,  pushed  right  into  the  base  where  the  British  Fleet 
might  be  lying,  ready  to  strike.  It  was  urged  that  enemy 
destroyers  would  rush  across  the  North  Sea,  penetrate 
the  British  line  of  patrols,  torpedo  one  or  two  capital 
ships,  and  then  dash  out  again.  Probably  a  whole  division 
of  German  destroyers  would  be  lost  in  the  attempt,  but 
the  loss  to  the  enemy  would  be  well  worth  the  gain. 

It  is  clear  that  something  of  this  strategy  was  actually 
attempted,  but  with  two  differences  :  First,  the  attack 
was  timed  to  take  place  only  after  the  first  mine-laying 
had  been  carried  out ;  and,  secondly,  the  torpedoes  were 
to  be  fired  by  submarines  and  not  destroyers.  Within 
four  days  of  the  outbreak  of  war  enemy  submarines  were 
assuredly  seeking  out  the  Grand  Fleet.  Of  this  there  is 
no  doubt,  for  on  August  8th  the  battleships  MONARCH, 
ORION,  AJAX,  DREADNOUGHT,  and  IRON  DUKE,  the  last- 
named  being  Admiral  Jellicoe's  flagship,  each  reported 
having  sighted  a  submarine.  It  was  impossible  that  the 
lookouts  of  all  these  ships  should  have  been  mistaken, 
and  their  reports  were  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  H.M.S. 
BIRMINGHAM  early  the  next  morning,  when  off  the  north- 
east coast  of  Scotland,  rammed  and  sank  U15. 

It  was  obvious  enough  that  the  Navy  could  not  afford 
to  take  unnecessary  risks.  Admiral  Sir  John  Jellicoe  was 
forthwith  ordered  to  move  all  his  heavy  ships  at  once  to 
the  western  side  of  the  Orkneys,  and  a  few  days  later  he 
expressed  the  opinion  that,  when  the  Grand  Fleet  went  to 
sea,  its  object  should  be  definite,  and  as  soon  as  that  object 
was  accomplished,  it  should  withdraw  ;  for  the  risk  of 
mines  and  submarines  was  not  to  be  regarded  lightly. 
The  enemy  had  already  discovered  that  Scapa  Flow  was 
the  main  anchorage  of  the  Grand  Fleet,  and  a  base  at  Loch 
Ewe  had  now  to  be  established. 

But  that  was  only  a  temporary  measure.  A  definite, 
settled  defensive  policy  was  necessary,  and  in  this  respect 
the  trawlers  and  their  fishing  crews  were  to  prove  invalu- 
able, not  merely  for  mine-sweeping,  but  in  protecting  the 
Grand  Fleet  from  the  stealthy  under-sea  boat.  A  fort- 
night after  hostilities  began,  on  August  17th,  the  Ad- 
miralty decided  to  form  the  Northern  Trawler  Flotilla. 
This  was  to  consist  of  sixteen  trawlers,  each  one  fitted  with 
a  modified  sweep,  and  in  addition  each  vessel  was  to  carry  a 


324  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK         [CH.  vin 

couple  of  3-pounders.  These  trawlers  were  to  be  based  on 
Scapa,  and  to  be  used  for  the  special  service  of  hunting  sub- 
marines off  the  Eastern  Orkneys.  Orders  were  promptly 
sent  to  Lowestoft,  where  the  craft  were  fitted  out  and 
manned  by  ratings  of  the  Trawler  Section,  Royal  Naval 
Reserve.  It  was  a  sound  scheme,  and  their  presence 
fulfilled  a  real  need  in  the  north,  for  only  the  day  previous 
the  battle-cruiser  NEW  ZEALAND  had  sighted  another  sub- 
marine in  the  North  Sea,  with  her  deck  almost  awash. 
Within  ten  days  the  first  six  ships  of  this  Northern  Trawler 
Flotilla  were  on  their  way  to  Scapa. 

This,  then,  was  an  entirely  new  r61e  for  the  trawlers  to 
play,  and  one  that  had  not  been  contemplated  prior  to  the 
war.  It  meant  that  actually  they  were  to  perform  the 
duties  of  destroyers.  Inferior  to  the  latter  as  regards 
speed,  they  possessed  much  superior  sea-keeping  ability ; 
and  their  hardy  crews,  accustomed  to  North  Sea  weather 
and  possessing  an  excellent  fighting  spirit,  now  found  their 
vessels  transformed  into  lightly-armed  men-of-war.  The 
decision  to  employ  fishing-vessels  to  hunt  submarines  was 
justified  by  subsequent  events.  Within  a  week  the  Ad- 
miralty were  considering  the  advisability  of  employing  even 
steam-yachts  as  patrol  craft,  and  Admiral  Sir  John  Jellicoe 
favoured  the  suggestion.  It  was  most  important  that  as 
many  small  craft  as  possible  should  be  taken  up  and  used 
as  mine-sweepers  or  as  submarine-chasers.  Before  the  end 
of  August  the  Commander-in-Chief  informed  the  Admiralty 
that  trawlers  were  much  required  off  the  Orkneys,  as  the 
danger  of  mine-laying  in  that  area  was  increasing.  He 
wanted  twenty  more  at  once.  All  that  the  Admiralty 
could  inform  Sir  John  Jellicoe  was  that  they  were  arming 
trawlers  for  patrol  duties  as  quickly  as  possible ;  and 
meantime  Lowestoft  was  working  at  high  pressure  and 
doing  the  best  to  meet  the  heavy  demands. 

Thus  for  two  purposes  the  Royal  Navy  was  hastily  taking 
up  trawlers,  first  for  mine-sweeping,  secondly  for  harrying 
submarines  and  mine-layers.  But  before  the  first  month 
of  hostilities  had  come  to  an  end,  it  was  clear  enough  that 
this  was  to  be,  in  the  main,  a  war  of  small  craft.  The 
Admiralty  therefore  determined  at  the  beginning  of  Sep- 
tember to  utilise  all  available  steam-yachts,  trawlers,  and 
motor-boats,  and  to  form  these  into  units  ;  each  unit 
was  to  consist  of  one  yacht,  four  trawlers,  and  four  motor- 


CH.  vm]  STEAM- YACHTS   TAKEN  UP  325 

boats,  which  were  to  be  sent  where  they  were  required. 
The  first  places  would  be  Scapa,  Loch  Ewe,  Rosyth, 
Humber,  and  Cromarty.  As  more  vessels  became  avail- 
able, additional  units  were  to  be  formed.  The  yachts' 
and  trawlers'  armament  would  be  either  3-pounders  or 
6-pounders,  the  yachts  having  two  guns  and  the  trawlers 
one. 

Forthwith  the  Admiralty  began  to  take  up  all  the  steam- 
yachts  fit  for  service,  and  to  send  them  to  Portsmouth 
and  Devonport,  to  have  their  gun-mountings  placed  for- 
ward and  aft.  Many  of  these  yachts  had  but  recently 
finished  their  summer  cruising,  and  as  soon  as  their  guns 
were  in  position,  their  hulls  painted  grey,  and  their  wireless 
gear  installed,  they  were  dispatched  to  the  North  Sea. 
Prior  to  this  decision,  two  yachts  had  already  been  taken  up 
for  other  services.  The  s.y.  Venetia  had  been  commis- 
sioned at  the  commencement  of  hostilities  and  sent  to 
Scapa  Flow,  where,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant- 
Commander  A.  T.  Wilson,  R.N.,  she  was  looking  after 
the  Northern  Trawler  Flotilla.  The  s.y.  Zarefah,  com- 
manded by  Lieutenant-Commander  Stuart  Garnett,  and 
officered  and  manned  almost  entirely  by  Cambridge  rowing 
men  and  Ratcliffe  sea  scouts,  was  at  work  in  the  North 
Sea  in  connection  with  the  swept  channel. 

These  additional  yachts  which  were  now  to  be  taken  up 
were  to  work  inshore,  thus  enabling  the  destroyer  patrol 
flotillas  to  go  farther  out  to  sea,  and  they  were  to  capture 
any  vessel,  of  whatever  nationality,  suspected  of  laying 
mines.  At  this  time  the  amount  of  traffic,  both  merchant 
ships  and  fishing  craft,  using  the  North  Sea  was  consider- 
able. The  destroyers  and  torpedo-boats  were  doing  their 
best,  but  they  could  not  board  and  examine  more  than  a 
small  percentage  of  suspicious  ships.  At  first  these  yachts 
were  lent  by  their  owners  free  of  charge,  the  Admiralty 
paying  all  expenses  of  equipment  and  running.  At  the 
end  of  three  months,  provided  the  yachts  were  found 
suitable  for  service,  they  were  chartered  at  an  agreed  rate 
per  ton  per  month.  Owners  who  possessed  the  necessary 
qualifications  were  invited  to  take  command  and  accept 
commissions  as  lieutenants  of  the  Royal  Naval  Volunteer 
Reserve,  though  subsequently  they  were  transferred  to  the 
Royal  Naval  Reserve. 

As  to  the  motor-boats,  there  was  already  an  organisation. 


826  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK          [CH.  vin 

in  existence.  Its  origin  dated  back  a  year  or  two  before 
the  European  crisis  developed,  and  a  working  scheme  was 
just  being  completed  when  hostilities  began.  For  a  long 
time  past  yachtsmen  in  England  and  Scotland  had  been 
anxious  to  place  their  sea  experience  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Royal  Navy  in  the  event  of  war.  The  difficulty  was 
to  ^discover  a  way  in  which  their  enthusiasm  and  ability 
could  be  utilised.  Most  of  these  yachtsmen  were  experts 
in  the  art  of  handling  sailing  craft,  but  the  age  of  sail 
in  the  Royal  Navy  had  long  since  passed.  A  suggestion, 
however,  came  from  the  principal  motor-yacht  clubs  that 
in  the  event  of  war  the  Navy  might  find  it  useful  to  have  a 
number  of  motor  craft  at  their  disposal,  officered  by  yachts- 
men, and  that  these  craft  might  prove  of  service  in  various 
capacities  round  our  coasts.  Already  there  were  in  exis- 
tence roughly  three  types.  First  was  the  cruiser  type  of 
motor-yacht,  able  to  keep  the  sea  in  moderate  weather 
and  capable  of  being  armed  so  as  to  act  as  a  scout  against 
submarines.  Secondly  there  was  the  small  type  of  craft, 
about  the  size  of  a  picket-boat,  which  would  be  useful  for 
patrolling  harbour  mouths  and  estuaries.  Finally  came  the 
small  motor-boat  which  could  be  used  in  a  dozen  ways  for 
policing  harbours,  taking  despatches  to  shipping  in  the 
roads,  and  in  other  miscellaneous  duties. 

The  Admiralty  were  approached  on  the  matter,  and  were 
so  far  interested  that  they  formed  a  Motor-Boat  Reserve 
Committee,  under  the  presidency  of  Admiral  Sir  Frederick 
S.  Inglefield,  which  was  instructed  to  report  on  the  motor- 
boats  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  for  what  services  in  war 
they  could  be  utilised.  This  was  in  November  1912,  and 
in  the  following  March,  Admiral  Inglefield  reported  that 
the  boats  would  be  capable  of  patrolling  and  performing 
examination  service  in  estuaries  and  harbours  ;  assisting 
in  controlling  traffic,  berthing  and  detaining  merchant 
shipping  in  ports  ;  detecting  hostile  submarines  that  might 
endeavour  to  enter  a  harbour ;  acting  as  dispatch-boats 
to  ships  in  roadsteads ;  attending  on  aircraft ;  and, 
finally,  augmenting  the  present  torpedo  flotillas.  This 
corps,  it  was  suggested,  should  consist  of  commanding 
officers  of  divisions,  with  the  rank  of  Commander  ;  owners 
of  boats  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant ;  and  their  assistants 
with  the  rank  of  sub-lieutenant.  The  whole  organisation 
was  to  be  a  volunteer  reserve.  As  a  result  of  the  first 


CH.  vin]         THE  MOTOR-BOAT  RESERVE  327 

report  the  Admiralty  were  so  favourably  impressed  that  in 
January  1914  they  proposed  that  the  Motor-Boat  Reserve 
should  be  affiliated  to  the  Royal  Naval  Volunteer  Reserve, 
and  they  requested  the  Committee  to  send  a  further 
report. 

In  the  meantime,  Admiral  de  Robeck,  who  was  about 
to  relinquish  his  appointment  as  Admiral  of  Patrols,  made 
a  number  of  suggestions  and  worked  out  a  scheme  of 
organisation  and  of  training  for  both  officers  and  men  in 
the  Motor-Boat  Reserve.  This  was  to  include  small-arm 
drill,  3-pounder  and  machine-gun  drill,  signalling,  tor- 
pedoes, detection  of  submarines,  wireless  telegraphy, 
visits  to  war-stations,  lectures  on  International  Law,  and 
so  on.  It  was  realised  that  a  highly  educated  and  intelli- 
gent personnel  would  be  available,  and  that  a  few  would  go 
through  a  longer  course  equivalent  to  the  short  course 
undertaken  by  naval  officers.  Admiral  de  Robeck  further 
showed  his  interest  by  attending  a  Motor-Boat  Reserve 
Committee  in  March  1914,  when  the  various  suggestions 
which  had  been  put  forward  were  considered.  The  result 
was  so  encouraging  that  just  before  the  end  of  July  the 
Admiralty  appointed  a  small  Committee  to  draw  up  a 
detailed  scheme  for  the  training  and  organisation  of  the 
Motor-Boat  Section  of  the  Royal  Naval  Volunteer  Re- 
serve. It  was  to  be  under  the  chairmanship  of  Commodore 
George  Ballard,  the  new  Admiral  of  Patrols,  and  included 
officers  of  the  three  leading  British  Motor- Yacht  Clubs. 

That  stage  of  affairs  had  been  reached  when  suddenly 
the  country  was  plunged  into  the  European  War.  The 
scheme  for  training  had  to  be  dropped,  and  there  were 
other  duties  to  occupy  the  attention  of  the  Admiral  of 
Patrols.  Still,  it  was  fortunate  that  the  organisation  had 
been  developed  so  far,  for  the  time  had  arrived  to  act ; 
and,  unless  this  preliminary  spade-work  had  been  done 
quietly  and  thoughtfully  in  peace,  it  would  have  been 
impossible  to  produce  at  once  so  useful  an  organisation. 
Motor-boats  were  forthwith  lent  by  their  owners,  and 
during  the  first  few  days  of  the  war  the  little  craft  were 
employed  principally  in  acting  as  despatch-boats  in  con- 
nection with  the  transports  that  were  carrying  the  British 
Army  from  Southampton  across  to  France.  But  towards 
the  end  of  September  1914,  the  first  eight  armed  auxiliary 
patrol  units  had  been  established  at  Loch  Ewe,  Dover,  the 


328  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT   WORK         [CH.  vm 

Humber,  the  Tyne,  the  Shetlands,  and  at  Cromarty.  The 
biggest  and  best  sea-going  motor-yachts  were  selected  and 
sent  to  these  stations.  The  officers  had  been  given  com- 
missions in  the  Royal  Naval  Volunteer  Reserve,  the  ratings 
being  known  as  motor-boatmen. 

Arrived  at  their  bases,  these  motor  craft  patrolled 
the  harbours,  estuaries,  and  coasts  in  conjunction  with 
the  steam-yachts  and  trawlers.  There  was  work  enough 
for  every  sort  and  description  of  vessel,  for  the  enemy  was 
engaged  in  extensive  operations  with  both  submarines 
and  mine-layers.  Before  the  end  of  August  already  three 
known  German  mine-fields  had  been  laid.  There  was  the 
Southwold  mine-field,  of  which  the  first  mines  had  been  laid 
by  the  KONIGIN  LUISE  ;  then  the  Tyne  mine-field  ;  and, 
lastly,  the  mine-fields  off  Flamborough  and  the  Humber. 
It  is  true  that  a  swept  and  buoyed  channel  existed  at  the 
beginning  of  September  from  the  Goodwins  as  far  north 
as  Flamborough,  and  was  being  patrolled.  But  outside 
this  narrow  lane,  four  cables  wide,  the  risks  to  shipping 
were  considerable.  On  September  3rd  the  patrol  drifter 
Linsdell  had  struck  a  mine  near  the  Outer  Dowsing  (that 
is,  to  the  eastward  of  the  Humber)  and  sunk ;  fifteen 
minutes  later  the  gunboat  SPEEDY  also  struck  a  mine, 
with  fatal  results.  Reports  were  received  that  this  Humber 
mine  area  was  an  extensive  one,  the  mines  being  within 
three  feet  of  the  surface.  Similarly,  from  Newcastle 
came  the  significant  news  that  four  vessels,  apparently 
drifters,  had  been  seen  forty-four  miles  east-south-east  of 
the  Tyne,  and  three  more  thirty-five  miles  off.  This  was 
on  September  7th ;  and  inasmuch  as  there  are  no  herrings 
in  that  part  of  the  North  Sea  at  that  season,  the  local 
fishermen  drew  their  own  conclusions.  British  fishing 
skippers  recognised  them  as  vessels  which  three  months 
before  were  German,  and  were  fishing  in  the  North  Sea. 
Now,  in  the  track  of  merchant  shipping,  they  were 
laying  mines. 

Four  days  after  the  loss  of  the  SPEEDY  and  Linsdell,  the 
fishing- vessel  Revigo  foundered  on  this  Humber  mine-field, 
and  the  s.s.  Runo  had  just  been  sunk  on  the  Tyne  mine-field, 
a  disaster  that  was  followed  next  day  by  the  loss  of  the 
fishing-vessel  Imperialist  in  the  same  manner  forty  miles 
east-north-east  of  the  Tyne.  Admiral  Jellicoe  pointed  out 
that  the  difficulty  of  keeping  the  North  Sea  clear  of  mines 


CH.  vin]      THE   FIRST   U-BOAT   SUCCESSES  329 

was  rendered  more  difficult  because  of  the  impossibility 
of  boarding  and  examining  the  East  Coast  shipping.  His 
opinion  was  that  mine-laying  would  never  be  stopped  until 
the  East  Coast  traffic  was  diminished. 

The  work  of  the  armed  units  of  the  Auxiliary  Patrol 
became  now  more  strenuous  than  ever.  Up  to  this  time 
the  submarine  had  been  a  menace — a  most  serious 
menace — but  nothing  more.  But  on  September  5th  the 
first  submarine  success  by  the  enemy  was  achieved  when 
H.M.S.  PATHFINDER  was  torpedoed  ten  miles  south-east  of 
May  Island,  off  the  entrance  to  the  Firth  of  Forth.  At 
first  it  was  believed  that  the  loss  had  been  caused  by 
a  mine,  but  the  mine-sweeping  trawlers  sent  out  by 
Admiral  Lowry  from  the  Forth  swept  from  Inchkeith 
to  May  Island,  then  on  to  Bell  Rock  and  all  round  the 
position  where  the  PATHFINDER  had  struck,  and  not  a  single 
mine  was  found.  It  was  evident  that  a  submarine  had  been 
lying  in  wait  off  the  Forth  in  the  hope  of  catching  a  warship 
bound  to  or  from  Rosyth,  and  it  was  afterwards  established 
that  a  torpedo  from  U21  sank  the  PATHFINDER.  Only  a  few 
days  later,  a  fishing- vessel  called  the  Defender  unmistakably 
sighted  a  submarine  eleven  miles  east  by  south  of  the  Isle 
of  May,  in  practically  the  same  spot  where  the  PATHFINDER 
had  sunk ;  and,  true  to  her  name,  this  trawler  determined  to 
protect  the  Navy  as  far  as  she  could.  Leaving  her  fishing, 
she  at  once  hurried  westward,  gave  the  information  to 
Torpedo-Boat  32,  and  went  up  to  the  Forth  to  report  the 
fact  also  to  H.M.S.  RINGDOVE.  She  thus  lost  her  day's 
catch,  but  she  had  done  the  right  thing,  and  the  Admiralty 
awarded  her  the  sum  of  £62  for  having  so  promptly  given 
valuable  intelligence. 

Three  days  later  another  submarine — or  perhaps  the  same 
one — fired  a  couple  of  torpedoes  at  the  destroyer  CHEERFUL 
three  miles  west  of  Fidra,  in  the  Firth  of  Forth ;  the 
destroyer  STAG  had  also  reported  that  torpedoes  had  been 
aimed  at  her  a  few  hours  before  off  the  Isle  of  May.  But 
nothing  brought  home  the  submarine  peril  more  acutely 
than  the  loss  of  the  three  big  cruisers  HOGUE,  ABOUKIR, 
and  CRESS Y,  which  were  sunk  in  the  southern  portion  of 
the  North  Sea  by  U9  on  September  22nd.  This  triple 
disaster  showed  to  what  dangers  British  ships  were  exposed. 
More  than  ever  the  demand  was  for  small  armed  craft. 

On  the  Humber  a  special  anti-submarine  trawler  flotilla 


330  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK         [CH.  vm 

was  being  got  ready.  From  Grimsby,  too,  four  more 
trawlers,  specially  fitted  with  a  modified  explosive  sweep, 
were  sent  to  the  Forth  to  act  as  submarine-hunters.  These 
were  additional  to  the  armed  patrol.  Rear-Admiral 
George  Ballard,1  the  Admiral  of  Patrols,  was  ordered  to 
have  the  entrance  to  the  Humber  patrolled  by  trawlers 
with  their  modified  sweep  in  addition  to  his  armed  trawlers  ; 
and  finally,  with  a  view  to  checking  mine-laying  and  the 
dissemination  of  information  useful  to  the  enemy,  the  Ad- 
miralty announced  on  September  27th  that  all  East  Coast 
ports  would  be  closed  to  neutral  fishing  craft  from  Octo- 
ber 1st.  This  was  a  sharp  measure,  but  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  if  success  was  to  attend  the  plans  for  dealing  with 
mine-layers  and  potential  supply-ships  acting  as  tenders 
to  German  submarines. 

When  Sir  John  Jellicoe  informed  the  Admiralty  that 
his  destroyers  were  all  too  few  for  stopping  and  examining 
traffic,  he  advocated  the  employment  of  armed  trawlers, 
fitted  with  wireless,  in  certain  areas.  He  expressed  his 
belief  in  the  freest  possible  use  of  these  vessels.  Some,  he 
urged,  should  be  armed,  but  as  their  stems  were  a  good 
weapon  for  ramming,  it  was  not  necessary  to  arm  all,  and 
there  were  not  at  the  time  sufficient  guns  to  go  round. 
The  Germans,  he  remarked,  were  making  the  greatest  use 
of  trawlers,  and  we  should  do  the  same.  Much  the  same 
opinion  came  from  Admiral  Lowry  at  Rosyth,  in  whose 
area  the  submarine  activity  in  the  Firth  of  Forth  still 
continued.  On  September  29th  one  submarine  had  been 
seen  as  far  up  the  Forth  as  Burntisland,  and,  owing  to  this 
and  other  incidents,  he  had  been  compelled  to  suspend 
in  that  neighbourhood  all  mine-sweeping  operations. 
Altogether  no  fewer  than  nine  torpedoes  had  within  a 
few  days  been  fired  at  British  torpedo  craft  in  the  Forth, 
and  in  view  of  the  value  of  such  vessels  and  their  numerous 
crews,  he  considered  it  was  advisable  to  replace  them  by 
armed  trawlers  or  drifters  as  far  as  possible.  Nor  was  the 
menace  confined  to  the  North  Sea ;  for  on  September  27th, 
H.M.S.  ATTENTIVE  had  been  attacked  by  two  submarines 
in  the  Straits  of  Dover. 

Mines  were  being  reported  frequently  in  the  North  Sea, 
and  steamers  were  still  foundering  on  them.  But  by  this 
date  the  whole  organisation  for  dealing  with  mines,  mine- 

i  Now  Vice-Admiral  George  Ballard,  C.B. 


CH.  vm]        THE  MINE-SWEEPING  SERVICE  331 

layers,  and  submarines  was  well  in  hand.  So  important 
had  the  mine-sweeping  service  become  that  it  had  been 
decided  to  appoint  a  flag  officer  in  charge,  and  Rear- 
Admiral  E.  F.  B.  Charlton,  C.B.,1  was  selected,  with  the 
title  "  A.M.S."  (Admiral  of  the  East  Coast  Mine-sweepers). 
This  was  in  the  middle  of  September. 

Under  this  scheme  the  Mine-sweeping  Service  was  to 
consist  of  gunboats,  drifters,  trawlers,  and  other  vessels 
employed  in  mine-sweeping ;  the  sphere  of  operations 
extending  from  St.  Abb's  Head  to  the  South  Goodwins, 
exclusive  of  the  Nore  and  Harwich  areas.  Under  Admiral 
Charlton  were  the  Port  Mine- sweeping  Officers  at  Lowes- 
toft,  Eyemouth,  Grimsby,  and  North  Shields,  the  In- 
specting Captain  of  Mine- sweepers  continuing  his  duties 
in  connection  with  the  chartering  of  trawlers  as  before. 
This  concentration  of  the  whole  of  the  mine-sweeping 
on  the  East  Coast  under  one  senior  officer  was  essential, 
owing  to  the  very  large  increase  in  mine- sweeping  trawlers 
and  other  vessels.  It  was  a  service  quite  distinct  from 
the  armed  patrol  trawlers,  yachts,  and  motor  craft.  It 
did,  however,  include  the  drifters  and  armed  trawlers 
which  were  engaged  in  watching  the  swept  channels. 

During  this  first  autumn  no  seamen  more  thoroughly 
earned  the  gratitude  of  their  nation  than  those  of  the  busy 
mine-sweepers,  whose  work  was  never  finished.  From  each 
East  Coast  port,  day  after  day,  six  of  them  steamed  out  in 
line  ahead  just  before  dawn  to  their  stations  ;  and  then 
they  would  get  sweeps  out  and  go  rolling  down  the  North 
Sea  until  relieved  a  few  days  later  by  another  six  ;  all  the 
time  they  offered  an  easy  target  for  the  enemy's  submarines, 
and  were  equally  liable  to  be  blown  up  on  an  unseen  mine. 

From  the  North  Foreland  to  Flamborough  Head  they 
were  now  hard  at  work,  keeping  a  clean  highway  a  couple 
of  hundred  miles  long  and  eight  hundred  yards  wide. 
Every  day  this  long  road  was  swept  twice.  In  the  extreme 
north,  three  pairs  of  trawlers  were  sweeping  two  channels 
at  each  end  of  the  boisterous  Pentland  Firth  twice  daily, 
necessitating  an  actual  steaming  distance  of  eighty-five 
miles  for  each  trawler  during  the  daylight  hours  of  a  short 
autumn  day.  The  Cromarty  and  Peterhead  trawlers 
were  sweeping  round  the  headlands  of  their  own  area,  lest 
the  enemy  should  have  laid  his  snares ;  and  all  down  the 

1  Now  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Edward  F.  B.  Charlton,  K.C.M.G.,  C.B. 


332  AUXILIARY   PATROL  AT   WORK         [CH.  vm 

coast — from  the  Forth,  the  Tyne,  the  Humber,  Lowestoft, 
Harwich,  the  Nore,  Dover,  Portsmouth,  Portland,  and 
Devonport — they  issued  forth  on  their  monotonous  and 
dangerous  routine. 

The  sea  was  witnessing  some  strange  sights.  Scarcely 
had  the  excursion  paddle-steamers  which  used  to  ply 
from  so  many  piers  been  laid  up,  little  expecting  to  be 
brought  into  use  until  the  return  of  peace,  than  they  were 
placed  under  the  White  Ensign.  What  earthly  good  did 
the  Navy  expect  to  find  in  a  Bank  Holiday  paddler  ? 
When  the  first  of  these  ships  came  churning  up  the  muddy 
waters  of  the  Humber  and  bumped  into  Grimsby  Docks 
alongside  the  steel  trawlers,  every  seaman  rubbed  his  eyes 
and  wondered.  And  yet  those  craft,  drawing  only  about 
seven  and  a  half  feet,  did  splendid  work  as  mine-sweepers. 
They  could  go  into  a  mine-field  with  half  the  risk  of  the 
deep-draught  trawler,  and  they  could  steam  at  good 
speed.  The  result  was  that  two  or  three  pairs  soon 
cleared  up  any  suspected  area  and  set  merchant  ships 
free  to  proceed  to  their  destinations.  The  first  of  these 
paddle  sweepers  to  be  taken  up  were  the  Brighton  Queen 
and  Devonia.  They  were  sent  round  from  Bristol  to 
Devonport,  where  they  were  fitted  out,  and  thence  they 
steamed  up  the  Channel  and  North  Sea,  encountering 
very  heavy  weather  on  the  way.  In  this  manner  still 
another  type  of  small  craft  was  pressed  into  the  Service. 
Built  for  the  purpose  of  giving  pleasure,  they  were  now 
engaged  in  war.  Some  of  them  ended  their  days  on  mines, 
but  not  before  they  had  been  the  means  of  thwarting 
certain  of  the  enemy's  best-laid  schemes. 

By  the  end  of  September  good  progress  had  been  made 
in  adding  to  the  number  of  auxiliary  craft.  Already  fifteen 
armed  yachts  were  in  commission,  and  about  another 
fifteen  were  being  fitted  out.  There  were  roughly  300 
trawlers  and  drifters  and  100  motor  craft  at  work,  but 
all  the  while  the  enemy  was  increasing  his  activities. 
It  was  impossible  to  estimate  exactly  the  intensity  of  the 
submarine  warfare,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  submarines 
were  mostly  invisible.  The  only  absolute  evidence  of 
their  activities  was  found  in  the  number  of  ships  sunk, 
the  number  of  times  such  craft  were  sighted,  or  in  the 
number  of  torpedoes  whose  wake  might  momentarily  be 
seen.  It  was  equally  impossible  to  say  whether  in  a 


CH.  vm]  SUBMARINES   ACTIVITIES  333 

given  area,  at  a  given  time,  these  attacks  were  the  work 
of  one  or  more  submarines. 

But  the  next  month  brought  ample  indication  that 
Germany  was  embarking  whole-heartedly  on  a  submarine 
campaign  of  great  dimensions,  and  scarcely  a  day  went  by 
without  supplying  evidence.  On  the  2nd,  5th,  6th,  7th, 
9th,  llth,  12th,  13th,  15th,  16th,  17th,  21st,  and  24th  of 
October,  His  Majesty's  ships  either  sighted  or  were 
attacked  by  enemy  under-water  craft.  In  this  one  month 
alone  enemy  submarines  made  attempts  on  such  varied 
types  of  British  warships  as  cruisers,  destroyers,  a  gun- 
boat, a  monitor,  a  torpedo-boat,  and  a  submarine,  apart 
from  the  refugee  ship  Amiral  Ganteaume  and  s.s.  Glitra, 
mentioned  in  a  previous  chapter.  Nor  was  this  danger 
in  one  area  only,  for  in  the  Dover  Straits  the  British  sub- 
marine B3  was  attacked  on  October  2nd.  During  the  next 
few  days  in  the  same  locality  the  destroyers  COQUETTE 
and  MOHAWK  chased  submarines ;  several  drifters  sighted 
a  submarine  off  the  Smith's  Knoll  Buoy — that  is,  off 
Great  Yarmouth ;  and  a  submarine  was  seen  in  Loch  Ewe. 
On  the  9th,  the  cruiser  ANTRIM  was  attacked  off 
Skudesnaes,  and  the  next  day  the  destroyer  ATTACK  off 
the  Schouwen  Bank  had  a  similar  experience.  A  few 
hours  later  a  British  torpedo-boat  chased  a  submarine 
off  the  Isle  of  Wight,  the  monitor  SEVERN  was  attacked 
in  the  Straits  of  Dover,  and  the  destroyer  GOSHAWK  was 
molested  off  the  Dutch  coast.  On  the  15th  the  cruiser 
HAWKE  was  sunk  in  the  North  Sea,  and  the  THESEUS, 
another  cruiser,  was  molested,  both  vessels  belonging  to 
the  Tenth  Cruiser  Squadron;  and  the  destroyer  leader 
SWIFT  was  actually  attacked  three  times  whilst  engaged 
in  picking  up  the  HAWKE'S  survivors.  Next  day  the 
destroyer  ALARM  just  missed  being  hit  by  a  torpedo,  and 
the  destroyer  NYMPHE,  off  the  Orkneys,  possibly  struck 
a  submarine.  On  the  17th  the  mine-sweeping  gunboat 
LEDA,  and  again  the  SWIFT,  had  torpedoes  fired  at  them 
whilst  entering  Scapa  Flow,  and  on  the  21st  the  destroyer 
LYNX  saw  a  submarine  off  Cromarty  Firth.  Three  days 
later  the  destroyer  BADGER  was  fired  at.  The  torpedo 
missed  her,  and  the  destroyer  managed  to  ram  the  sub- 
marine. Although  the  BADGER'S  bows  were  damaged,  the 
enemy  claimed  that  the  submarine  got  home  safely,  and  this 
seems  probable.  The  same  day  submarines  were  seen  off  the 


334  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK         [CH.  vm 

west  coast  of  Scotland  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Loch  Ewe 
and  Loch  Shell.  Finally,  on  the  31st  the  seaplane-carrier 
HERMES  was  torpedoed  and  sunk  not  far  from  Dunkirk. 

Such,  then,  was  the  enemy  with  whom  the  British  Navy 
had  to  contend.  He  showed  respect  neither  for  a  refugee 
ship  nor  for  a  merchant  ship.  What  were  the  steps  taken 
to  meet  this  violence  ?  All  that  could  be  done,  besides 
laying  a  British  mine-field  across  the  Straits  of  Dover 
at  the  beginning  of  the  month  and  extinguishing  all  lights 
on  the  East  Coast  at  the  end  of  the  month,  from  Orfordness 
to  Wick,  was  to  strengthen  the  armed  auxiliary  patrol 
in  every  way  possible — in  numbers,  in  organisation,  and 
in  offensive  devices.  More  and  more  guns  were  wanted  for 
these  craft,  but,  unfortunately,  they  were  not  available. 
The  Royal  Navy  had  never  counted  on  so  many  demands 
being  made  upon  it,  and  the  Army  in  France  called  for 
every  gun  that  could  be  turned  out.  But  as  an  anti- 
submarine device,  the  Admiralty  attached  great  importance 
to  the  explosive  sweep.  These  sweeps  were  being  made 
in  large  numbers,  and  fitted  to  patrol  trawlers.  At  Ports- 
mouth alone  fifty  trawlers  were  thus  being  fitted,  two 
dozen  more  were  prepared  at  Lowestoft,  and  Commander 
L.  A.  B.  Donaldson,  R.N.,  was  specially  appointed  to 
the  Admiralty  to  look  after  this  device,  his  title  being 
"  Commander  Superintendent  of  Modified  Sweeping." 

Similarly,  an  improvement  was  made  in  jurisdiction, 
the  Dover  and  the  East  Coast  being  divided  into  two  sepa- 
rate commands.  On  October  12th  Rear- Admiral  the  Hon. 
H.  L.  A.  Hood  was  appointed  in  command  of  the  Dover 
Patrol  as  Senior  Naval  Officer  at  Dover.  In  addition 
to  a  destroyer  flotilla  and  two  submarine  flotillas,  he  had 
some  trawlers  and  drifters  placed  in  his  command,  and  the 
latter  were  presently  to  increase  to  considerable  numbers. 
Rear-Admiral  George  Ballard,  the  Admiral  of  Patrols, 
now  became  responsible  for  the  area  extending  from  the 
Naze  to  St.  Abb's  Head,  an  area  in  which  were  working 
many  trawlers  fitted  with  explosive  sweeps. 

Admiral  Jellicoe  continued  to  ask  for  more  trawlers  for 
Scapa  Flow,  Pentland  Firth,  Loch  Ewe,  and  Moray 
Firth.  Submarines  were  still  reported  off  the  Grand 
Fleet's  northern  base  and  in  the  Minch.  Destroyers,  he 
said,  were  unsuitable  for  searching  out  the  lochs  and  creeks, 
and  only  got  badly  knocked  about ;  he  also  wanted  trawlers 


CH.  vni]  A  NEW  NAVY  FORMING  335 

for  examining  neutral  ships  in  the"Minch  and  vicinity  of 
Pentland  Firth,  as  the  submarines  prevented  such  work 
being  done  by  cruisers.  Small  flotillas  of  trawlers  working 
under  a  yacht  were  required,  and  so,  on  October  23rd,  a 
yacht  and  the  trawlers  were  sent  to  him. 

Three  trawlers  specially  fitted  with  the  explosive  sweep 
were  also  sent  to  the  Straits  of  Dover  under  Lieutenant- 
Commander  George  E.  Tillard,  R.N.,  to  hunt  submarines. 
More  motor-boats  were  being  fitted  out  and  sent  to 
the  East  Coast  to  examine  the  estuaries,  harbours, 
and  inlets,  but  the  demand  still  exceeded  the  supply. 
Seven  were  working  at  Scapa  Flow  in  connection  with  the 
local  defences,  and  the  Rear-Admiral  at  Cromarty  was 
asking  for  eight  to  perform  the  duties  of  the  Auxiliary 
Patrol.  Before  the  end  of  the  month,  the  Admiralty  were 
able  to  inform  Sir  John  Jellicoe  that  they  were  increasing 
the  number  of  armed  trawlers  at  Cromarty,  Peterhead, 
Methil  (Firth  of  Forth),  Scapa,  Rosyth,  Loch  Ewe,  Great 
Yarmouth,  and  Dover.  The  geographical  position  of 
these  places  is  a  sufficient  indication  of  their  strategical 
value  in  regard  to  submarines.  As  more  trawlers  became 
available,  they  were  armed  with  one  or  more  guns  and  an 
explosive  sweep,  and  organised  into  divisions  of  six 
trawlers  to  the  unit.  From  each  unit  one  trawler  was  to 
be  selected  as  divisional  leader.  She  was  to  be  fitted 
up  with  a  suitable  officer's  cabin,  then  placed  under  the 
command  of  a  lieutenant  or  sub-lieutenant  of  the  Royal 
Naval  Reserve,  and  to  be  given  also  wireless  telegraphy. 
In  addition,  an  armed  yacht  was  to  be  attached  to  each 
unit,  and  at  certain  important  bases  captains-in-charge 
were  to  be  appointed. 

Granton,  on  the  Forth,  was  becoming  an  important 
war  base  for  trawlers  and  yachts,  and  was  destined  soon 
to  be  one  of  the  largest  auxiliary  stations  on  the  coast. 
Sixty  additional  trawlers  were  now  taken  up  as  armed 
patrol  vessels.  There  were  a  hundred  of  these  already 
in  the  Service  or  being  fitted  out,  and  the  full  160  were 
being  organised  into  twenty-six  divisions  of  six  vessels 
each,  and  one  of  four  vessels.  These,  of  course,  were  quite 
apart  from  the  mine-sweeping  trawlers  and  the  watching 
drifters.  In  fact,  before  October  was  ended — that  is  to 
say,  within  less  than  three  months  of  the  declaration 
of  war — there  were  130  armed  trawlers  either  in  commission 
23 


336  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK       [CH.  vm 

or  nearly  ready ;  and  thirty-seven  armed  yachts  either 
patrolling  or  fitting  out,  in  addition  to  246  mine-sweeping 
trawlers,  two  paddle  mine-sweepers,  and  forty-two  drifters. 
With  admirable  zeal  and  energy  a  new  navy  had  been 
created  in  a  few  weeks  which  already  exceeded  in  numbers 
the  navy  that  flew  the  White  Ensign  at  the  beginning  of 
August.  In  spite  of  the  haste  with  which  the  ships  and 
men  had  been  assembled  and  sent  out  to  their  strange 
duties,  in  spite  of  the  dangers  from  weather,  fogs,  sub- 
marines, and  mines,  only  half  a  dozen  trawlers  and  drifters 
had  been  lost  during  the  period.  The  decision  to  use  for 
warlike  purposes,  under  modern  conditions,  ships  which 
were  never  intended  for  the  contest  of  organised  violence, 
and  men  without  war  training,  had  abundantly  justified 
itself,  to  the  great  advantage  of  the  country  and  the 
welfare  of  British  shipping. 

Warfare  by  means  of  the  mine,  and  warfare  by  means 
of  the  submarine,  are  practically  identical.  The  aim  in 
each  case  is  to  sink  the  ship  attacked  by  a  violent  explosive 
without  the  victim  having  so  much  as  a  chance  of  escaping. 
The  only  difference  between  the  torpedo  and  the  mine 
is  that  the  former  goes  to  meet  the  ship,  and  the  latter 
waits  for  the  ship's  coming.  The  result  in  the  two  cases 
is  the  same. 

There  were  only  two  courses  open  to  the  Admiralty. 
The  first  was  to  make  mine-laying  for  the  enemy  as 
difficult  as  possible,  and  the  second  was  to  continue  in- 
creasing the  resources  of  mine-sweeping.  These  obvious 
measures  were  carried  out.  To  begin  with,  not  only  had 
all  the  East  Coast  ports  been  closed  to  neutral  fishing- 
vessels  from  October  1st,  but  any  neutral  fishing- vessel 
found  fishing  west  of  a  certain  line  in  the  North  Sea  was 
regarded  as  under  suspicion  of  mine-laying.  The  British 
Government  were  determined  to  take  no  half-measures, 
and  gave  warning  that  any  trawlers  not  in  the  exclusive 
employment  of  the  German  Government  found  illicitly 
laying  mines  would  be  sunk,  while  their  crews  would  be 
liable  to  be  treated  as  war  criminals  and  shot  after  trial 
by  court  martial. 

It  will  be  recollected  that  when  discussing  the  pre-war 
arrangements  the  Admiralty  had  established  the  principle 
that  trawlers  were  suitable  for  sweeping  fairways  and 
the  entrances  to  harbours,  but  not  for  sweeping  ahead 


CH.  vin]  MINE-LAYING  RAIDS  337 

of  the  Fleet,  owing  to  their  comparatively  slow  speed. 
Before  the  end  of  the  autumn,  after  Commander  Preston's 
gunboats  had  been  doing  much  service  in  the  North, 
Admiral  Jellicoe  asked  for  some  Fleet  sweepers.  He  in- 
sisted that  they  should  possess  good  speed  and  be  sea- 
worthy, and  be  capable  of  standing  the  heavy  weather  which 
prevails  off  the  north  of  Scotland.  The  Admiralty,  there- 
fore, took  up  four  pairs  of  steamers  owned  by  various  rail- 
way companies  and  fitted  them  out  with  the  requisite  gear. 
These  vessels  were  the  Reindeer,  the  Roebuck,  the  Lynx, 
and  Gazelle,  all  owned  by  the  Great  Western  Railway  ; 
the  Folkestone  and  Hythe  belonging  to  the  South-Eastern 
and  Chatham  Company,  and  the  Clacton  and  Newmarket, 
which  were  the  property  of  the  Great  Eastern  Company. 
The  first  pair  was  taken  in  hand  at  the  beginning  of  October. 
The  policy  adopted  by  the  Admiralty  in  regard  to  the 
mine-fields  was  as  follows :  The  trawlers  were  to  sweep 
the  North  Foreland  to  Flamborough  Head  channel  clear 
and  safe  ;  the  limits  of  all  suspicious  areas  were  to  be 
defined  and  therefore  avoided  ;  the  mine-fields,  once  their 
extent  and  position  had  been  discovered,  were  to  be  left 
intact,  and  not  swept  up.  Thus  the  three  mine-fields  off 
the  East  Coast  acted  as  a  means  of  protection  against  the 
enemy's  possible  aggression.  Inasmuch  as  the  safe  channel 
for  shipping  ran  between  the  coast  and  the  mine-field,  it 
was  obvious  that  the  enemy  was  doing  us  a  good  turn  in 
laying  mines,  when  once  the  limitations  of  these  areas 
had  been  ascertained.  For  his  measures  to  be  effective, 
he  should  have  gone  close  inshore  and  fouled  the  swept 
channel.  But  to  lay  mines  inshore  was  not  so  easy  as 
it  seemed,  for  there  were  only  three  possible  methods. 
The  first  was  to  employ  small  craft,  especially  fishing- vessels, 
but  this  sort  of  thing  had  already  been  rendered  too  risky 
a  proceeding,  owing  to  the  careful  watch  maintained  by 
the  British  patrols.  The  second  method  was  to  lay  the 
mines  invisibly,  but  the  submarine  mine-layer  had  still  to 
be  commissioned.  Lastly,  there  was  always  a  possibility  of 
a  strong  raiding  force  coming  across  and  overpowering  the 
British  patrols,  leaving  German  mine-layers  free  to  do  what 
they  liked.  It  was  this  third  alternative  which  was  adopted 
by  the  enemy  at  the  time  of  the  Scarborough  and  Gorleston 
raids,  when,  under  the  feint  of  bombarding  the  cbast, 
dangerous  mine  areas  were  laid.  These  developments  will 


838  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT   WORK       [CH.  vin 

be  considered  separately  in  so  far  as  they  concern  this 
History,  but  for  the  moment  attention  must  be  devoted 
to  another  locality. 

Germany  now  developed  on  fresh  lines  her  campaign 
against  ocean  traffic.  From  the  Dominion  of  Canada  a 
number  of  transports  would  soon  be  crossing  the  Atlantic 
on  their  way  to  England,  bringing  troops  to  aid  British 
arms.  If  Germany  could  lay  a  mine-field  in  the  path  of 
these  vessels,  and  blow  any  of  them  up,  that  would  be  sound 
strategy.  It  was  on  October  3rd  that  the  first  Canadian 
convoy  left  Canadian  waters,  and  on  the  very  day  that  this 
convoy  began  to  arrive  in  Plymouth  Sound  an  exception- 
ally large  mine-layer  was  leaving  Germany.  This  auxiliary 
vessel  was  the  Norddeutscher  Lloyd  liner  BERLIN,  of 
over  17,000  registered  tonnage,  and  a  speed  of  about 
17  knots.  In  peace-time  she  had  been  well  known  on  the 
New  York  service,  and  the  reasons  for  employing  her  in 
mine-laying  were  twofold.  If  she  were  seen  in  the  track 
of  Atlantic  shipping  she  would  not  excite  much  suspicion, 
for  she  looked  what  she  was — an  Atlantic  liner.  More- 
over, she  had  ample  capacity  for  carrying  many  hundreds 
of  mines,  and  a  long  after-deck  from  which  to  lay  them. 
She  was,  however,  a  little  unfortunate  at  first,  for  she  acted 
on  faulty  information.  She  arrived  too  late  to  interfere 
with  the  big  convoy  of  thirty-one  transports,  and  she 
had  erroneously  assumed  that  the  transports  would  come 
to  Liverpool  via  the  North  of  Ireland. 

She  had  already  made  one  attempt  to  pass  through  the 
North  Sea  at  the  end  of  September,  when,  having  got 
up  towards  the  Norwegian  coast,  she  sighted  a  number 
of  British  men-of-war,  and  therefore  put  back  to  Germany. 
On  October  14th,  however,  she  steamed  away  from  Wil- 
helmshaven  with  2,000  mines  on  board,  being  escorted 
by  a  couple  of  submarines.  Passing  round  the  north 
and  west  of  Scotland,  she  arrived  off  the  North  of  Ireland 
and  laid  a  big  mine-field  off  Tory  Island  on  October  22nd 
and  23rd.  It  happened  that  there  steamed  out  of  the 
Manchester  Ship  Canal,  on  October  24th,  a  5,000  ton 
steamship  called  the  Manchester  Commerce,  bound  for  the 
River  St.  Lawrence,  whence  the  Canadian  convoy  had 
started,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  27th  she  struck  one 
of  the  mines  off  Tory  Island  and  sank ;  the  explosion 
occurred  between  Nos.  2  and  3  holds,  the  ship  drawing 


CH.  vin]       THE  TORY  ISLAND   MINE-FIELD  339 

at  the  time  19  feet  5  inches  forward  and  22  J  feet  aft. 
Next  day  at  9  a.m.,  whilst  the  Second  Battle  Squadron 
was  steaming  in  this  locality,  the  third  ship  in  the 
line,  H.M.S.  AUDACIOUS,  struck  a  mine  and  eventually 
foundered. 

This  event  suggested  more  work  for  the  trawlers  in  an 
unexpected  quarter.  It  happened  that  at  this  time 
part  of  the  Grand  Fleet,  with  Admiral  Jellicoe's  flagship, 
had  anchored  in  Lough  Swilly,  and  until  this  mine-field 
was  cleared  the  ships  were  practically  blockaded — the  very 
thing,  as  has  been  explained  already,  that  was  feared  would 
happen  when  war  broke  out.  Admiral  Jellicoe  the  same 
day  telegraphed  to  the  Admiralty  asking  for  eight  mine- 
sweeping  trawlers  to  be  sent  to  Lough  Swilly  at  once. 
Nothing  was  then  known  about  the  Berlin  having  been 
there ;  the  only  information  was  that  a  mine-field  was  in 
existence  about  eighteen  to  twenty  miles  N.  ^  E.  of  Tory 
Island.  To  what  extent  and  in  what  direction  it  spread, 
absolutely  no  information  was  available.  In  response  to 
the  Commander-in-Chief's  request,  four  mine-sweeping 
trawlers  were  at  once  ordered  to  leave  Milford  Haven  for 
Lough  Swilly.  For  an  enemy  wishing  to  mine  the  shipping 
track  to  Liverpool  and  the  Atlantic  the  obvious  strategic 
points  are  firstly  that  strip  of  sea  called  the  North  Channel 
between  the  north-east  coast  of  Ireland  and  the  Mull  of 
Cantyre ;  and,  secondly,  the  St.  George's  Channel.  As 
it  was  suspected  that  the  enemy  might  have  fouled  these 
approaches,  orders  were  sent  the  day  after  the  disaster 
to  the  AUDACIOUS  that  two  groups  of  six  trawlers,  each 
attended  by  an  armed  vessel,  were  to  be  dispatched  from 
Lowestoft  to  the  westward.  Of  these  two  groups,  one 
was  to  proceed  to  Larne  in  order  to  sweep  the  North 
Channel,  the  other  was  to  go  to  Milford  to  sweep  the  St. 
George's  Channel.  Nor  was  this  all.  The  Admiralty 
decided  at  once  that  energetic  action  was  essential 
in  order  to  cope  with  this  mine-laying  on  the  West  Coast 
and  on  the  trade  approaches.  Two  additional  squadrons 
of  about  twenty  trawlers  each,  with  a  proportion  of  mine- 
sweepers, were  to  be  formed  without  delay  for  the  purpose 
of  searching  and  picketing  these  areas. 

As  this  dramatic  revelation  of  the  Tory  Island  death- 
trap suggested  that  other  new  mine-fields  might  be  laid 
off  the  anchorages  used  by  the  Grand  Fleet,  Sir  John 


340  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK      [CH.  vin 

Jellicoe,  on  October  28th,  ordered  the  Vice-Admiral 
commanding  the  Orkneys  and  Shetlands  to  send  trawlers 
to  sweep  for  mines  up  to  within  thirty  miles  of  the  bases. 
The  same  day,  also,  special  instructions  were  sent  to  the 
Senior  Naval  Officer  at  Liverpool  to  proceed  with  the 
utmost  dispatch  with  the  organisation  of  a  special 
auxiliary  patrol  for  the  prevention  of  mine -lay  ing.  Thus 
yet  another  type  of  merchant  vessel  came  to  be  pressed 
suddenly  into  the  war.  Who  is  there  familiar  with  ships 
and  seafaring  matters  that  has  not  heard  of  the  wonderful 
achievements  of  the  famous  Liverpool  tugs,  which  can  go 
anywhere  and  do  almost  anything  ?  These  powerful 
little  craft  have  made  some  wonderful  voyages  across  the 
world  towing  floating  docks,  disabled  liners,  or  dismasted 
sailing-ships.  The  war  was  certainly  becoming  far-reach- 
ing when  it  needed  these  craft.  However,  two  days  after 
the  AUDACIOUS  had  foundered,  a  dozen  of  these  Liverpool 
tugs  were  commandeered,  six  of  them  to  patrol  the  North 
Channel,  board  suspicious  ships  and  prevent  mine-laying, 
while  the  other  six  were  to  be  sent  to  Milford  to  patrol  the 
southern  part  of  the  Irish  Sea.  This  was  only  a  temporary 
measure  until  more  trawlers  could  be  chartered,  and  before 
the  end  of  the  year  the  tugs  were  sent  back  to  Liverpool. 
Meanwhile,  in  addition  to  the  tugs,  the  armed  yacht 
Oriana  and  a  number  of  drifters  were  ordered  to  patrol 
the  vicinity  of  the  Mull  of  Cantyre,  and  to  search  such 
places  as  Loch  Indail,  the  west  coast  of  Islay,  and  its 
northern  side. 

Within  three  days  of  the  AUDACIOUS  disaster,  six  mine- 
sweeping  trawlers  were  hard  at  work  sweeping  from 
Lough  Swilly  entrance  to  the  west  and  south  of  Tory 
Island,  but  found  no  mines  ;  they  had  yet  to  learn  that 
the  mines  were  farther  to  the  northward,  but  their  first 
duty  was  to  insure  a  safe  channel  close  to  the  coast. 
While  the  Grand  Fleet  was  unable  to  leave  its  anchorage, 
the  entrance  to  Lough  Swilly  was  being  patrolled  by  the 
armed  yacht  Lorna  and  six  trawlers ;  more  drifters 
were  also  taken  up  at  Kingstown  and  sent  to  swell  the 
list  of  small  craft.  The  experience  of  war  had  upset 
many  preconceived  ideas,  but  it  was  a  strange  fact  that, 
while  yachts,  tugs,  trawlers,  and  drifters  could  use  the 
sea,  it  was  not  safe  for  battleships  and  cruisers  to  venture 
forth. 


CH.  vm]   WEAKNESS  OF  THE  WESTERN  PATROL    341 

An  inquiry  into  the  manner  by  which  the  BERLIN 
managed  to  pass  through  the  North  Sea  and  down  the 
Atlantic  right  to  the  coast  of  Ireland,  without  being 
intercepted  by  any  of  the  vessels  belonging  to  the  Grand 
Fleet,  would  yield  interesting  reading,  but  it  is  foreign 
to  the  present  purpose.  It  is,  however,  pertinent  to  ask 
what  our  Auxiliary  Patrol  vessels  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Ireland  were  doing  at  the  time  the  Berlin  was  acting 
as  she  pleased.  The  answer  is  simple.  This  incident 
happened  within  the  first  few  weeks  of  the  war,  when  every 
available  patrol  craft  had  been  sent  to  the  North  Sea, 
for  the  obvious  reason  that  that  was  the  main  theatre  of 
war.  It  had  scarcely  seemed  credible  then  that  the  coast  of 
Ireland  could  have  much  strategical  value,  and  the  western 
areas  were  almost  bare  in  respect  of  patrols.  At  the  time 
when  the  Berlin  paid  her  visit,  the  only  auxiliary  craft  in 
Ireland  were :  at  Queenstown,  an  armed  yacht,  four 
drifters,  and  two  or  three  motor-boats  ;  and  at  Belfast,  the 
armed  yacht  Ilex  and  four  armed  trawlers.  That  was  all. 
There  were  two  bigger  craft  patrolling  to  the  westward 
and  eastward  of  the  North  of  Ireland.  The  old-fashioned 
light  cruiser  Isis  was  cruising  about  remarkably  close  to 
where  the  mine-layer  had  been ;  for  the  noon  position  of 
the  Isis  on  October  22nd  was  seventy  miles  west  of  Tory 
Island,  and  at  noon  of  the  following  day  she  was  forty- 
five  miles  west  by  north  of  Bloody  Foreland.  The  Tar  a, 
another  of  the  commissioned  railway  steamers,  was  also 
patrolling  the  North  Channel,  and  she  proceeded  to  Larne 
on  the  21st  to  coal.  To  the  north  was  the  armed  yacht 
Hersilia,  on  her  way  from  Peterhead  to  Loch  Ewe,  her 
station  ;  on  the  24th  she  sighted  a  submarine  off  Loch 
Shell,  and  the  same  day  a  submarine  had  also  been  sighted 
five  miles  north-east  of  lona  Island.  It  is  probable  that 
these  were  the  two  submarines  which  had  accompanied  the 
Berlin. 

There  were,  too,  four  armed  trawlers  and  four  motor- 
boats  based  on  Loch  Ewe,  but  there  were  only  the  armed 
yacht  Oriana  and  four  drifters  working  out  from  Liver- 
pool. The  auxiliary  force,  then,  was  inadequate  for  keep- 
ing the  trade  approaches  in  this  part  of  the  British  Isles 
well  patrolled  and  shipping  watched  for  suspicious  move- 
ments. But  the  foundering  of  the  Manchester  Commerce 
and  AUDACIOUS  had  shown  that  it  was  impossible  to 


342  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT   WORK       [CH.  vm 

treat  this  area  as  almost  negligible  ;  it  needed  plenty  of 
patrol  craft  and  proper  organisation.  So  Commander  H. 
Berkeley,  R.N.,  was  selected  and  sent  to  Larne  to  act 
as  Senior  Naval  Officer,  and  to  organise  for  the  North 
Channel  the  patrol  force  now  being  dispatched.  At 
first  he  had  only  the  Oriana  and  her  four  drifters  and 
six  Liverpool  tugs,  until  other  vessels  could  be  obtained. 
While  each  drifter  carried  a  3-pounder  gun,  the  tugs  had 
nothing  beyond  rifles  for  weapons,  but  they  had  been 
provided  with  explosive  signals  and  flares,  so  that,  if  a 
mine-layer  or  other  suspicious  ship  was  sighted,  they  could 
instantly  warn  the  other  patrols. 

Meanwhile,  the  greatest  activity  was  being  manifested 
to  increase  the  patrols  at  the  most  important  points. 
Four  more  yachts  and  forty-eight  additional  trawlers 
were  ordered  to  Scapa  from  various  ports  within  a  week 
of  the  Manchester  Commerce's  sinking,  and  the  dockyards 
were  being  asked  how  many  trawlers  they  could  fit  out 
for  service.  It  was  no  easy  problem  for  the  Admiralty, 
as  already  the  resources  of  our  fishing  fleets  had  been 
called  upon  to  an  extraordinary  extent.  More  patrol 
vessels,  the  Director  of  Operations  pointed  out,  were 
required  for  the  West,  but  he  confessed  'that  it  was  diffi- 
cult to  see  where  they  could  be  obtained.  Considerable 
progress  was  being  made  with  the  manufacture  of  the 
modified  sweep  explosive  charges  for  dealing  with  the 
submarines.  These  sweeps  were  being  prepared  for 
another  seventy  trawlers,  and  orders  had  been  placed 
for  a  still  further  supply  of  sixty  ;  but  the  manufacture 
took  time,  and  Woolwich  could  not  turn  out  more  than 
a  hundred  a  week. 

The  Admiralty  needed  nearly  a  couple  of  hundred  more 
trawlers,  despite  the  large  number  of  the  little  ships  they 
had  already  chartered.  It  was  a  strange  experience 
for  these  fishing  craft  suddenly  to  find  themselves  every- 
where in  so  much  demand.  Off  the  North  Irish  coast 
they  were  having  a  strenuous  time  sweeping  for  mines 
in  the  heavy  Atlantic  swell ;  it  was  certainly  no  yachting 
trip,  and  presently  a  long  series  of  gales  interfered  con- 
siderably with  their  operations.  Some  of  Commander 
Preston's  old  mine-sweepers  had  been  sent  down  from 
Scapa  to  assist.  The  CIRCE  and  LEDA  came  first,  and  by 
October  29th  they  had  been  joined  at  Lough  Swilly  by  the 


CH.  vm]          LOCATING  THE  MINE-FIELD  343 

JASON,  the  SPEEDWELL,  and  the  SKIPJACK,  which  swept 
the  channel  along  the  shore  to  the  east  and  west  of  the 
entrance  of  Lough  Swilly.  Thus  at  length  a  safe  passage 
inshore  of  Tory  Island  and  Inishtrahull  could  be  guaran- 
teed, and  the  Grand  Fleet  was  freed  to  put  to  sea  once 
more. 

On  November  2nd  six  trawlers  again  endeavoured  to  find 
where  the  BERLIN'S   mine-field  began  and  ended.     They 
made  an  exploratory  sweep  from  Fanad  Point,  the  western 
headland  of  Lough  Swilly,  well  out  into  the  Atlantic,  but 
found  nothing ;  and  then,  having  swept  out  as  far  north  as 
the  fifty  fathom  line,  they  swept  in  three  directions  from 
Tory  Island,   north-north-west,   north,   and   north-north- 
east, but  still  without  result.     Six  drifters,  which  had  been 
sent  with  their  nets  to  search  for  mines,  had  no  better 
fortune.     In  the  last  week  of  November  another  six  mine- 
sweeping'rMtrawlers  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  Sir 
James   Domville,   Bart.,  R.N.,  arrived.     These  craft  had 
come  from  Scapa  Flow  to  locate  the  mine-field.     It  was 
important  that  no  time  should  be  lost,  but  exceptionally 
heavy  weather  set  in,  and  it  was  not  till  late  in  December 
that  the  trawlers  could  get  to  work  again.     A  special  sweep 
was  carried  out  from  Skerryvore  to  the  Mull  of  Cantyre, 
a  route  likely  to  have  been  fouled  because  it  was  that 
traversed  by   Grand  Fleet  ships  bound  for  Liverpool  for 
docking  Jor  repairs.     No   mines   were   found.      Then,   on 
December    19th,    another  disaster    occurred,    when    the 
Donaldson  liner  Tritonia  foundered  on  a  mine  in  almost 
the  same  spot  where  the  AUDACIOUS  and  Manchester  Com- 
merce had  been  sunk. 

Fortunately  during  the  next  three  days  the  trawlers 
at  last  succeeded  in  finding  the  dangerous  area,  a  task 
that  is  far  harder  than  may  be  realised  by  those  unfamiliar 
with  such  work.  Search  for  mines  in  the  Atlantic  in 
the  winter,  and  never  finding  them  until  they  suddenly 
appear  in  the  sweep  or  blow  the  trawler  to  destruction,  is 
an  operation  not  to  be  undertaken  either  lightly  or  inad- 
visedly. It  needs  determination  to  stick  it  out,  enduring 
the  monotonous  routine  and  boisterous  weather ;  but  it 
also  needs  pluck  to  go  blindly  where  mines  may  be  found, 
and  a  special  kind  of  intuition  to  guess  where  the  enemy 
may  have  laid  them.  Between  December  20th  and  22nd, 
Sir  James  Domville's  trawlers  managed  to  sweep  up  and 


344  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT   WORK        [CH.  vin 

explode  no  fewer  than  a  dozen  of  the  Berlin's  mines. 
Five  of  them  were  discovered  sixteen  miles  north-east 
by  north  of  Tory  Island,  and  three  more  eighteen  miles 
north-north-east  of  the  same  island.  It  was  many  weeks 
before  the  whole  mine-field  was  completely  cleared  up,  but 
a  good  beginning  had  been  made,  and  the  trawlers  kept 
doggedly  at  work.  The  danger  was  increased  by  the 
heavy  weather,  which  had  caused  many  of  the  mines  to  drift 
in  roughly  a  north-easterly  direction.  On  December  2nd 
one  was  even  found  by  the  battleship  NEPTUNE  on  the 
direct  line  between  Oronsay  and  Skerryvore,  and  was 
sunk  by  her,  but  others  drifted  up  the  west  coast  of  Scot- 
land. 

And  whilst  all  this  increased  activity  in  regard  to  patrols 
and  mine-sweepers  was  proceeding  in  the  North  of  Ireland, 
a  similar  impetus  had  been  created  also  in  the  south  of 
the  Irish  Sea.  About  the  time  when  Commander  Berkeley 
was  appointed  to  Larne,  the  Admiralty  instituted  another 
base  for  auxiliary  craft.  This  was  at  Milford,  and 
thither  Captain  K.  C.  Gibbons,  R.N.,  was  sent  to  take 
charge  of  the  patrol  vessels  working  the  St.  George's 
Channel  and  the  outer  part  of  the  Bristol  Channel. 
Milford  began  [to  [develop  into  a  most  important  base, 
and  before  very  long  its  spacious  haven  was  alive  with 
all  sorts  of  auxiliary  craft.  As  a  beginning,  twenty 
armed  trawlers,  in  addition  to  some  mine-sweepers  and 
armed  yachts,  were  ordered  there,  as  well  as  six  Liverpool 
tugs.  The  armed  yachts  Aster  and  Greta,  both  small 
enough  for  the  work,  and  typical  fine-weather  pleasure 
vessels,  were  based  on  Milford  temporarily.  But  the 
mine-sweeping  trawlers  had  an  equally  important  office 
to  perform  as  soon  as  they  could  get  to  sea.  It  was  essen- 
tial that  they  should  ascertain  whether  the  enemy  had  laid 
a  mine-field  in  the  south  of  the  Irish  Sea,  as  he  had  in  the 
north.  They  were  accordingly  ordered  to  sweep  the 
Irish  coast  from  the  Tuskar  and  Coningbeg  against  the  tide, 
and  then  work  across  the  St.  George's  Channel  in  about 
six  tides.  This  exploratory  sweep  was  duly  carried  out, 
but  happily  no  mines  had  been  laid  there. 

Reference  has  been  made  to  the  increasing  difficulty 
which  the  enemy  was  finding  in  laying  mine-fields  in  the 
North  Sea,  consequent  on  the  improvement  of  the  British 
patrols.     The  line  of  demarcation  which  the  Admiralty 


CH.  vin]         SPIRIT   OF  THE   FISHERMEN  345 

had  ruled  down  this  sea  suffered  neutral  fishing  craft  to 
proceed  no  farther  west  than  the  Dogger  Bank,  unless  they 
wished  to  be  treated  as  suspicious  ships.  The  Dogger 
Bank  for  hundreds  of  years  has  been  one  of  the  most 
productive  fishing  areas  in  the  world,  and  the  British 
fisherman  continued  to  use  it  in  war-time,  even  though  he 
went  there  knowing  full  well  the  risks  he  ran.  Farther 
down  the  coast,  the  Lowestoft  and  Yarmouth  men  went 
on  fishing  pretty  much  as  usual,  and  the  Ramsgate 
smacks  also  sailed  up  the  coast,  trawling  as  they  went. 
These  men  had  nothing  to  gain  by  the  war,  and  everything 
to  lose,  for  if  the  freedom  of  the  seas  were  denied  to  them, 
their  means  of  livelihood  disappeared  and  people  ashore 
would  have  no  fish.  As  the  demand  for  crews  and  ships 
increased,  the  younger  men  joined  the  Trawler  Section  of 
the  Royal  Naval  Reserve,  but  the  older  men  carried  on 
with  that  fine  spirit  which  had  always  been  the  glory  of 
British  seamanhood.  Their  co-operation  with  the  British 
Navy  was  admirable.  They  realised  all  that  the  war 
by  sea  meant  to  them.  Moreover,  their  spirit  had  been 
roused  by  the  way  the  enemy  had  laid  his  mines  in  the 
areas  which  they,  as  peaceful  fishermen,  had  always 
frequented,  and  though  these  fishermen  had  little  regard 
for  the  niceties  of  international  law  and  the  subtleties 
of  regulations,  they  were  determined  to  do  their  utmost 
to  hinder  the  enemy  to  the  full  extent  of  their  ability. 

At  the  beginning  of  November  there  existed  in  the 
North  Sea  one  British  and  three  German  mine-fields. 
There  was  the  Tyne  area,  the  Flamborough  Head  to  the 
Spurn  area,  the  Southwold  area,  and  the  area  which  in- 
cluded the  British  mines  laid  across  the  Dover  Straits. 
But  it  had  become  evident  towards  the  end  of  October 
that  the  enemy  was  at  work  on  some  undefined  fresh 
attack.  Three  suspicious  vessels  had  been  seen  to  the 
north  of  the  area  where  the  upper  end  of  the  Southwold 
mine  ended — that  is  to  say,  not  far  from  Smith's  Knoll,  in 
the  vicinity  of  Yarmouth.  A  report  came  in  that,  when  a 
Ramsgate  smack  which  was  fishing  in  that  neighbourhood 
approached  these  suspicious  ships,  she  was  fired  on.  Very 
shortly  afterwards  this  smack,  whilst  sailing  about,  got 
a  couple  of  mines  in  her  trawl,  and  one  of  the  mines  blew 
up.  The  incident  was  a  little  mysterious  at  the  .time, 
but  in  the  light  of  after-events  it  became  intelligible. 


346  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK         [CH.  vin 

A  few  miles  off  Yarmouth  is  the  Smith's  Knoll  shoal, 
which  runs  parallel  with  the  shore.  It  was  marked  by 
a  lighted  buoy  at  its  southern  end.  From  this  buoy  a 
short  channel  had  been  kept  swept,  so  that  it  formed  a 
safe  highway  for  ships  from  the  North  Sea  into  the  other 
swept  channel  which  ran  from  the  North  Foreland  to 
Flamborough.  It  was  evident,  from  what  subsequently 
occurred,  that  the  enemy  had  obtained  information  of  this 
secret  channel,  and  he  certainly  was  about  to  make  use 
of  it  in  connection  with  the  Gorleston  raid.  It  is  signi- 
ficant of  both  the  raid  on  Gorleston,  and  that  which  oc- 
curred a  few  weeks  later  on  the  Yorkshire  coast,  that  the 
actual  bombardment  was  of  secondary  importance,  and 
the  laying  of  mines  was  the  main  object,  for  the  enemy 
realised  that  as  soon  as  he  opened  fire  on  the  shore  the 
British  naval  forces  would  be  sent  to  attack  the  Germans. 
In  other  words,  it  was  an  obvious  invitation  to  battle, 
but  without  any  intention  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to 
fight ;  since  before  the  two  forces  could  engage,  the  Ger- 
man squadron  would  have  scattered  plenty  of  mines 
across  the  line  of  pursuit,  thus  imperilling  valuable  war- 
ships whose  loss  we  could  not  afford. 

The  scheme  also  included  the  laying  of  additional 
mine-fields  just  before  the  raid  took  place,  with  the  same 
intention  of  entrapping  His  Majesty's  ships.  Thus  the 
enemy  hoped  to  inflict  on  us  losses  from  three  separate 
traps.  He  reasoned  that,  as  soon  as  the  news  of  his  bom- 
bardment was  telegraphed  up  and  down  the  country, 
some  of  the  Grand  Fleet  squadrons  and  flotillas  would 
come  steaming  down  from  the  North  across  the  Dogger 
Bank  ;  local  patrol- ships  would  emerge  in  haste  from 
Yarmouth ;  and  some  of  Commodore  Tyrwhitt's  destroyer 
force  would  steam  north  from  Harwich  up  the  Suffolk 
coast  to  the  scene  of  the  bombardment.  For  each  of 
these  three  forces  a  mine-field  was  to  be  laid,  and  there 
is  circumstantial  evidence  that  this  project  was  carried 
out. 

The  suspicious  ships  seen  by  the  Ramsgate  trawler 
had  almost  certainly  been  laying  some  of  the  mines.  It 
was  the  definite  opinion  of  Admiral  Charlton,  in  charge 
of  the  East  Coast  mine-sweepers,  that  the  mines,  on  which 
later  on  the  British  submarine  D5  foundered,  had  been  laid 
just  prior  to  the  raid,  "  with  the  intention  of  trapping 


CH.  vni]  A   SUSPICIOUS   DRIFTER  347 

any  of  our  vessels  leaving  Yarmouth  in  pursuit."  Be 
that  as  it  may,  on  November  2nd,  the  Smith's  Knoll  Light 
Buoy  was  found  to  have  mysteriously  disappeared,  and 
that  same  afternoon  a  so-called  "neutral"  fishing- vessel 
was  reported  in  circumstances  which  were  at  least 
suspicious.  The  spot  was  sixty-five  miles  north-east  of 
the  Spurn,  at  the  south-west  corner  of  the  Dogger  Bank. 
It  was  just  inside  the  imaginary  line  drawn  by  the 
Admiralty,  so  neutral  fishing-vessels  sighted  were  not 
necessarily  suspected  as  mine-layers. 

About  three  o'clock  the  Hull  steam  trawler  Alonso 
was  in  that  neighbourhood.  She  was  not  a  patrol  vessel, 
but  had  come  out  there  to  fish,  and  as  she  was  steaming, 
her  skipper,  Mr.  Charles  Read,  who  was  on  the  bridge, 
noticed  another  vessel  about  four  miles  away  to  the  south- 
ward with  her  mainsail  and  mizzen  set.  She  appeared 
to  be  a  foreign  sailing  drifter.  It  was  a  hazy  afternoon 
and  there  were  no  other  vessels  in  sight,  but  when  half 
an  hour  later  he  got  nearer  he  noticed  that  the  strange  ship 
had  steam  as  well  as  sail  and  that  she  had  white  bows. 
She  had  lowered  her  mainsail  and  hoisted  a  flag  on  her 
mizzen.  Skipper  Read,  having  been  all  his  life  familiar 
with  the  ways  of  trawlers  and  drifters,  decided  in  his 
own  mind  that  she  was  acting  suspiciously.  He  there- 
fore steamed  up  to  her  and  found  that  she  was  riding  to  a 
floating  anchor.  She  had  no  nets  out,  nor  were  there  any 
buoys  or  pellets  visible  such  as  one  would  expect  to  find 
on  a  drifter's  deck.  The  Alonso  passed  right  under  her 
stern,  and  her  skipper  noticed  that  the  drifter  had  a  derrick 
swung  out  from  her  bridge  with  a  tackle  from  the  end  of 
the  derrick  to  the  mizzenmast  head.  This  derrick, 
which  reached  out  from  the  ship's  rail  about  eight  feet, 
was  made  either  of  iron  or  steel,  and  caused  the  vessel 
to  appear  still  more  suspicious. 

What  was  the  obvious  inference  to  be  drawn  from  a 
drifter  with  no  nets,  lying  practically  stationary,  and  with 
a  heavy  derrick  already  swung  out  for  use  ?  Appearances 
suggested  to  Skipper  Read  that  she  was  there  for  the 
purpose  of  laying  mines  during  the  haze.  For  twenty- 
five  years  he  had  been  fishing,  but  he  had  never  before 
seen  a  drifter  with  a  derrick;  "Nor,"  he  remarked,  "is 
a  derrick  used  by  drifters  in  their  fishing."  He  expressed 
his  suspicions  to  his  crew,  and  suggested  that  the  best 


348  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK         [CH.  vm 

thing  to  do  would  be  to  run  her  down.  The  evidence, 
however,  was  insufficient  to  warrant  his  taking  such  a 
drastic  step,  so,  to  quote  his  own  words,  "  As  I  could  not 
see  any  mines  I  decided  not  to  do  this,  but  to  break  my 
voyage  by  ceasing  fishing  operations  and  make  for  the 
Humber  as  quickly  as  possible,  to  give  the  information 
to  one  of  the  Admiralty  vessels."  He  steamed  back  to 
the  Spurn  and  came  up  the  Humber,  where  H.M.S.  VIC- 
TORIOUS was  lying  as  guardship,  and  gave  her  the  informa- 
tion. He  had  done  the  right  thing,  had  patriotically 
sacrificed  his  fishing,  and  wasted  no  time.  The  Admiralty 
showed  their  appreciation  of  his  devotion  to  duty  by 
making  a  present  of  £25  to  the  skipper  and  crew,  in 
addition  to  another  £25  to  the  owners. 

The  next  morning  the  Gorleston  raid  occurred.1  Briefly, 
the  facts  are  as  follows  :  Just  after  seven  o'clock  in  the 
morning  of  November  3rd,  H.M.S.  HALCYON,  which  had 
just  left  Yarmouth  to  look  for  mines,  sighted  a  four- 
funnelled  cruiser  steering  south- south- west  towards  the 
shore,  and  two  minutes  later  there  appeared  four  German 
Dreadnought  vessels  as  well.  This  was  an  enemy  squadron, 
which  is  supposed  to  have  left  Heligoland  Bight  the  pre- 
vious evening.  Within  a  quarter  of  an  hour  of  being 
sighted  the  enemy  opened  fire,  and  it  was  seen  that  there 
were  two  cruisers  following  astern  of  the  Dreadnoughts. 
About  the  same  time  two  British  destroyers,  the  LIVELY 
and  LEOPARD,  also  came  under  fire,  but  the  former  made 
a  smoke-screen  to  windward  of  HALCYON  and  thus  shielded 
her.  At  twenty  minutes  to  eight,  by  which  time  the 
HALCYON'S  steering  compass  had  been  shot  away,  but 
practically  no  other  damage  done,  the  enemy  ceased  fire, 
and  was  seen  to  be  steering  to  the  south-eastward.  Shortly 
afterwards  the  squadron  was  lost  sight  of.  The  enemy  had 
come  down  from  Smith's  Knoll,  and  having  proceeded 
thence  towards  the  shore,  had  begun  to  lay  mines  from  the 
rearmost  ship  just  before  altering  course  to  the  south-east. 
The  LEOPARD  endeavoured  to  keep  in  touch  with  the 
enemy,  but  he  was  soon  lost  to  sight.  Presently  the 
submarine  D5  came  out  from  Yarmouth  in  pursuit,  but 
she  had  only  covered  a  couple  of  miles  south-east  of  the 
South  Cross  Sand  when  she  struck  a  mine  and  was  lost. 

1  Fuller  and  later  information  supported  the  conclusion  that  all  the 
mines  discovered  after  the  Gorleston  raid  were  laid  by  enemy  men-of-war. 


CH.  vra]      SWEEPING  UP  THE  NEW  MINES  349 

As  to  the  raiding  squadron,  they  had  apparently 
dropped  mines  as  they  approached  Smith's  Knoll, 
then  all  the  way  down  the  swept  Smith's  Knoll  passage, 
for  six  or  seven  miles  towards  the  Cross  Sand  Lightship  ; 
and,  having  altered  course,  they  continued  to  lay  mines 
as  they  proceeded  seawards.  They  had  thus  laid  a  veri- 
table trap,  but  again  a  fisherman,  by  his  intelligence, 
rendered  excellent  service  and  saved  valuable  lives  and 
ships.  About  3.30  in  the  afternoon  a  fishing-vessel  re- 
turned to  Lowestoft,  and  her  skipper  reported  that  the 
enemy  had  laid  these  mines.  He  had  seen  the  Germans 
engaged  in  the  very  act,  and  had  observed  that  one  of 
the  ships  had  her  quarter-deck  covered  with  mines  ready 
to  be  dropped  overboard. 

The  object  of  the  enemy  became  clear.  He  had  fouled 
the  Smith's  Knoll  passage,  and  had  scattered  mines  in  the 
track  of  any  pursuers.  The  actual  shore  bombardment  had 
been  little  more  than  a  blind.  For  our  part,  the  first  duty 
was  to  save  British  ships,  and  the  Columbia  was  forthwith 
recalled  to  Lowestoft,  bringing  with  her  all  the  mine- 
sweepers available,  and  ordered  to  keep  well  to  the  north- 
ward of  the  Smith's  Knoll  buoy.  Unfortunately,  three 
fishing-vessels  the  same  day  foundered  on  this  new  mine- 
field ;  but  the  next  day  the  mine-sweeping  trawlers  went 
out  on  their  dangerous  job,  groping  about  to  find  where 
the  mines  had  been  strewn.  To  add  to  their  dangers 
a  fog  settled  down,  and  on  the  following  day,  November  5th, 
the  Mary,  one  of  the  mine-sweeping  trawlers,  struck  a 
mine  whilst  at  work  and  sank.  This  put  an  end  tempor- 
arily to  the  sweeping  operations,  but  before  long  the  passage 
was  cleared  and  a  new  channel  was  in  existence.  Once 
again  the  best-laid  scheme  of  a  ruthless  enemy  had  been 
brought  to  naught  by  the  good  work  oi*  the  trawlers, 
though  at  the  expense  of  valuable  lives.  Not  a  single 
merchant  ship  or  big  man-of-war  had  fallen  into  the 
trap,  though,  unhappily,  a  submarine,  besides  several 
fishing  craft,  had  been  lost. 

So  much  for  the  mine-laying  efforts  of  the  enemy. 
During  the  first  week  of  November  the  Admiralty  became 
aware  that  he  was  increasing  his  submarine  attacks. 
Almost  simultaneously  twenty  armed  trawlers  reached 
Scapa  Flow  for  local  defence,  but  still  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  required  more.  Eighteen  he  was  using  to  work 


350  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT   WORK        [CH.  vm 

in  the  Minch  and  between  Cape  Wrath  and  Pentland 
Firth,  those  wild,  boisterous  waters  where  seaworthy, 
well-built  craft  are  thoroughly  tried.  The  Shetlands 
Patrol  had  been  further  strengthened  by  six  trawlers, 
but  another  dozen  trawlers  were  required  for  the  Moray 
Firth,  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  the  battle  cruisers. 
Nor  was  this  all.  The  Admiralty  began  to  take  up  a 
number  of  stoutly-built  Scotch  motor  fishing-boats  for 
patrol  work.  They  are  wonderful  sea-boats,  double  ended, 
though  rather  slow.  Sixteen  of  them  were  soon  put  into 
service  by  the  Motor-Boat  Reserve,  each  manned  by  a 
crew  of  five  hardy  Scotch  fishermen,  with  two  officers 
of  the  Royal  Naval  Volunteer  Reserve.  These  boats 
were  about  sixty  feet  long,  and  were  sent  to  Lerwick, 
Scapa,  Cromarty,  and  the  Firth  of  Forth,  but  presently 
there  were  also  to  be  based  on  Cromarty  three  armed 
yachts  with  wireless,  and  eighteen  trawlers  fitted  with 
the  explosive  sweep,  in  addition  to  ten  motor-boats  for 
patrolling  narrow  waters.  Granton,  too,  now  became 
a  very  important  naval  base  for  trawlers,  under  Captain 
Cecil  Fox ;  and  having  regard  to  the  extent  to  which 
submarines  had  frequented  the  vicinity  of  the  Firth  of 
Forth,  its  development  was  undertaken  none  too  soon. 
Within  eight  weeks  eighteen  enemy  submarines  had  been 
sighted  inside  the  limits  of  Rosyth  Naval  Centre,  apart 
from  those  which  had  been  seen  up  the  Forth  itself.  At 
least  six  submarines  had  been  identified  near  the  Long- 
stone,  and  it  seemed  probable  that  they  were  using  this 
spot  for  making  the  land.  Though  the  Longstone  light 
had  been  extinguished  in  the  first  week  of  September, 
submarines  continued  to  be  sighted  off  there  during  the 
next  two  months. 

Before  attention  is  devoted  to  the  North,  something 
must  be  said  of  what  was  happening  in  the  English  Channel. 
It  was  expected  that  submarines  were  about  to  operate 
off  the  South  Coast,  and  with  the  limited  available  auxiliary 
patrols  efforts  were  made  to  cope  with  this  activity. 
The  task  was  most  difficult.  Prior  to  the  war  there  had 
been  a  disposition  to  underrate  the  capacity  of  the  sub- 
marine, and  when  its  offensive  ability  was  demonstrate 
only  too  forcibly,  it  was  painfully  realised  that  our  countei 
measures  were  by  no  means  adequate.  The  Grand  Fle< 
had  to  be  preserved  intact,  at  all  costs,  on  the  principl 


CH.  vin]    INCREASED   NEED  FOR  AUXILIARIES     351 

that  the  final  contest  is  decided  by  the  capital  ship.  Con- 
sequently, nearly  all  the  destroyers,  and  a  great  part  of 
the  armed  auxiliary  patrols,  were  attracted  to  northern 
latitudes.  Small  ships  on  the  South  Coast  were  few  in 
numbers,  and  the  problem  to  be  solved  was  rendered  no 
easier  by  the  fact  that  the  enemy  had  developed  a  type 
of  mine-laying  submarine  which  could  do  its  work  without 
breaking  the  surface. 

Portsmouth  was  asking  for  eight  drifters  to  patrol 
outside  the  Solent ;  Portland  required  trawler  patrols 
for  the  Dorset  coast ;  and  we  were  compelled  to  invite 
the  French  to  organise  a  trawler  patrol  in  order  to  pursue 
submarines  by  day  and  night  in  the  area  between  the  lines 
Dungeness-Boulogne  and  Beachy  Head-Dieppe.  The  sub- 
marine came  and  went  like  a  will-o'-the-wisp.  On 
November  6th  three  torpedoes  were  fired  at  H.M. 
Torpedo-boat  91  while  patrolling  off  the  Girdler  in  the 
Thames  Estuary ;  the  same  day  H.M.S.  DRAKE  sighted  a 
periscope  off  Hoy  Sound  at  the  western  entrance  to  Scapa 
Flow.  Five  days  later  H.M.S.  NIGER,  an  old-fashioned 
gunboat,  was  torpedoed  close  to  Deal  Pier.  On  the  18th 
H.M.S.  SKIPJACK  chased  a  submarine  north  of  the  Orkneys. 
Submarines  continued  to  be  reported  off  the  Hebrides  and 
Cape  Wrath.  H.M.S.  AJAX  also  sighted  a  periscope  about 
midway  between  the  Faroe  Islands  and  Cape  Wrath. 

These  incidents  in  no  wise  lessened  the  demand  for 
auxiliary  craft.  Yet  again  the  Commander-in-Chief  asked 
for  more  and  more  trawlers — twelve  to  be  based  on  Storn- 
oway  for  patrolling  the  east  coast  of  the  Hebrides  and  the 
west  coast  of  Skye  and  Mull ;  six  to  be  based  on  West  Loch 
Tarbert  for  the  west  coast  of  the  Hebrides ;  and  twelve  to 
be  at  Loch  Ewe  for  the  outer  coast  of  Scotland.  He  also 
desired  one  yacht  for  the  west  coast  of  the  Hebrides,  one  at 
Stornoway,  and  one  at  Loch  Ewe.  But  already  the  Ad- 
miralty was  working  out  a  bold  and  comprehensive  scheme 
for  dealing  with  the  whole  coast-line,  and  meanwhile  every- 
thing possible  was  done  by  improvisation  to  strengthen 
our  defensive  measures  against  the  mine  and  submarine. 
Instructions  were  issued  to  accelerate  the  fitting  out  of 
trawlers  with  modified  explosive  sweeps.  Admiral  Sir 
Percy  Scott,  who,  just  prior  to  the  war,  had  suggested  in 
the  face  of  some  criticism  the  great  possibilities  of  the  sub- 
marine, was  in  the  middle  of  November  appointed  to  the 
24 


352  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK        [CH.  vni 

Admiralty  to  investigate  the  best  methods  for  counter- 
acting this  invisible  vessel.  As  a  further  step,  the  Ad- 
miralty elaborated  a  scheme  for  modifying  the  lighting 
and  buoyage  from  Great  Yarmouth  to  the  Isle  of  Wight, 
and  this  came  into  force  early  in  December. 

Meanwhile  the  task  of  the  mine-sweeping  trawlers  grew 
no  lighter.  For,  besides  keeping  clear  that  long  lane  from 
the  North  Foreland  to  Flamborough  Head,  they  had  to 
meet  many  demands  made  upon  them.  Towards  the 
end  of  November  Rear- Admiral  Stuart  Nicholson  had  been 
directed  to  bombard  Zeebrugge  with  the  battleships 
RUSSELL  and  EXMOUTH.  To  sweep  ahead  of  his  ships 
he  required  eight  trawlers,  and  so,  at  a  time  when  they 
could  ill  be  spared,  four  had  to  be  sent  from  Lowestoft 
and  another  four  from  Great  Yarmouth.  They  proceeded 
to  Dover  and  thence  to  Dunkirk,  sweeping  a  clear  way  for 
the  battleships,  but  such  craft  were  hardly  suited  for  this 
kind  of  work,  as  they  were  wanting  in  speed.  Presently 
trawlers  were  sent  from  Dunkirk  to  sweep  the  West  Deep, 
off  Nieuport,  clear  of  floating  mines,  work  which  they  could 
perform  admirably.  But  the  strain  put  upon  the  East 
Coast  mine-sweepers  became  intolerably  heavy.  Many  of 
them  had  been  taken  away  to  Lough  Swilly,  to  Milford, 
and  now  to  the  Belgian  coast,  with  the  result  that  it  was 
possible  to  sweep  the  North  Foreland-Flamborough  lane 
only  once  a  day  instead  of  twice.  This,  of  course,  increased 
the  risks  to  our  coastwise  traffic,  but  in  view  of  the  limited 
number  of  trawlers  and  the  demands  made  upon  their 
services,  such  risks  could  not  be  avoided. 

On  November  17th,  1914,  there  came  out  from  Heligo- 
land a  submarine  with  the  number  "  U18  "  painted  on 
the  hull.  Never  did  a  craft  leave  port  with  so  much 
hatred  of  her  enemy,  nor  with  greater  assurance  of  achiev- 
ing success.  She  was  a  vessel  of  about  200  feet  length, 
with  surface  speed  of  20  knots  and  radius  of  3,000  miles. 
Her  crew  consisted  of  a  Kapitan-Leutnant,  a  Leutnant 
zur  Zee,  and  a  Marine  Oberingenieur  as  officers,  am 
twenty-four  ratings.  All  were  animated  with  the 
intention  of  seeking  out  the  Grand  Fleet  and  attacl 
it,  no  matter  at  what  cost.  Proceeding  across  the  Noi 
Sea,  the  submarine  arrived  off  the  southern  end  of  t] 
Dogger  Bank  at  night,  running  on  the  surface,  but  when 
British  destroyer  approached  at  high  speed  soon  aft 


CH.  vni]  UlS'S   DISAPPOINTMENT  353 

4  a.m.,  she  was  compelled  to  submerge  to  a  depth  of 
9j  fathoms,  and  did  not  dare  to  rise  again  to  the  surface 
until  about  half-past  eight.  While  awash  she  had  sighted 
many  fishing  craft  on  the  Dogger  Bank,  and  had  avoided 
them  successfully,  though  one  had  signalled  to  her.  At 
nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  U18  was  off 
Whitby,  and  she  continued  on  her  northerly  journey, 
coming  up  to  the  surface  every  hour  for  her  commander  to 
look  round  and  take  bearings.  Two  days  later  she  was  off 
the  Moray  Firth,  and  patrolled  there  all  day  at  slow  speed, 
sighting  one  of  the  mine-sweeping  gunboats  in  the  distance. 

Off  the  Pentland  Firth  the  submarine  observed  the  armed 
trawlers  towing  their  explosive  sweeps,  and  saw  also  some 
destroyers.  Then  her  commander  perceived  how  difficult 
it  would  be  for  him  to  penetrate  the  close  screen  protecting 
the  Grand  Fleet.  In  Germany  among  naval  officers  no 
place  was  so  much  talked  about  at  this  time  as  Scapa  Flow, 
but  so  far  no  submarine  had  succeeded  in  getting  right 
inside.  It  was  the  fixed  intention  of  this  U-boat  captain 
to  succeed  where  others  had  failed,  and  to  torpedo  the 
IRON  DUKE.  Having  proceeded  farther  north,  the  sub- 
marine was  off  Fair  Island  about  midnight  of  Novem- 
ber 22nd-23rd,  and  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning, 
whilst  it  was  still  dark,  she  passed  through  the  British 
patrol  lines  and  made  towards  Scapa  Flow.  At  7.30  a.m. 
she  entered  Pentland  Firth,  having  waited  till  slack  water, 
and  then,  in  the  sure  hope  of  finding  the  Grand  Fleet 
and  of  attacking  it,  passed  north  of  the  Pentland  Skerries. 
A  steamer  was  seen  to  be  heading  for  Scapa  Flow,  so  the 
submarine  followed  in  her  wake,  making  for  the  entrance, 
and  hoping  to  be  able  to  slip  into  the  harbour  astern  of  her 
unobserved.  Looking  through  his  periscope,  the  German 
captain  noticed  that  Scapa  Flow  was  protected  by  means 
of  an  anti-submarine  boom,  and  he  took  his  craft  close  up 
towards  it  until  he  could  scan  the  whole  of  the  harbour. 

This  was  the  crest  of  his  success  and  the  beginning  of 
his  downfall ;  for  the  nest  which  he  had  hoped  to  foul 
was  empty ;  the  Grand  Fleet  was  not  there  !  It  was  a 
bitter  disappointment  after  so  long  and  trying  a  voyage. 
The  men  had  not  been  out  of  their  clothes  since  leaving 
Heligoland.  The  captain  at  once  surmised  that  the  Fleet 
was  at  Cromarty,  and  he  determined  to  follow  there. 
His  supposition  was  incorrect ;  for,  had  he  but  known  it, 


354  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK        [CH.  vin 

the  Grand  Fleet  had  coaled  during  the  night  of  the  21st 
and  put  to  sea  early  on  the  following  morning,  to 
make  a  sweep  down  the  North  Sea  towards  Heligoland. 
The  helm  of  the  U18  was  now  put  hard  over,  and  she 
came  out  again,  intending  to  get  to  the  Moray  Firth.  She 
had  not  run  more  than  about  a  mile  and  a  quarter  from 
Hoxa  Head,  which  is  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  entrance 
to  Scapa  Flow,  when  suddenly  a  violent  blow  was  felt. 
The  captain  and  first  lieutenant  realised  the  situation 
when  the  submarine  took  a  list  of  fifteen  degrees.  What 
was  worst,  the  most  effective  periscope  had  been  carried 
away.  The  fact  was  that  above  them,  on  the  surface, 
thanks  to  a  good  lookout  and  skilful  handling,  the  Scapa 
mine-sweeper  Dorothy  Gray  had  been  able  to  ram  the 
periscope,  bending  it  over,  and  to  strike  the  submarine's 
hull  aft,  causing  considerable  damage.  Another  trawler, 
the  Tokio,  had  been  the  first  to  see  the  periscope.  The 
Dorothy  Gray,  being  nearer,  acted  promptly  and  effectively. 
The  ramming  happened  at  12.20  p.m.,  and  the  submarine 
was  not  seen  again  for  another  hour,  during  which  time 
twenty-seven  German  officers  and  men  spent  some  of  the 
most  anxious  and  exciting  moments  of  their  lives. 

After  the  blow  struck  by  the  Dorothy  Gray,  the  lower 
tube  of  the  damaged  periscope  at  once  filled  with  water, 
but  the  submarine  went  on  in  a  mad  endeavour  to  escape. 
She  submerged  to  eleven  fathoms.  Half  an  hour  later 
she  managed  to  fix  her  position,  and  then,  getting  on  to 
her  course,  submerged  again  to  the  previous  depth.  Life 
thereafter  to  those  confined  in  U18  became  an  unceasing 
struggle  to  escape  from  the  most  horrible  of  deaths.  The 
trawler's  attack  had  put  much  of  her  mechanism  out  of 
gear.  First,  the  hydroplane  motor  gave  out  and  suddenly 
jammed.  The  result  was  that  the  craft  could  not  be  con- 
trolled to  a  normal  depth.  She  rose  and  sank  erratically, 
at  alarming  angles,  so  that  at  one  time  she  was  rushing 
upwards  and  about  to  break  surface,  whilst  the  next 
moment  the  vessel  nose-dived  towards  the  bed  of  the  sea. 
Tanks  were  emptied  and  again  flooded ;  the  submarine 
descended  to  27  J  fathoms — 165  feet !  Then  twice  in  quick 
succession  there  came  a  bump,  indicating  that  the  hull  had 
touched  the  hard  bottom  of  the  sea.  Up  the  submarine 
came  to  the  surface,  and  then  followed  another  crash. 
This  time  she  had  been  rammed  by  the  destroyer  GABBY. 


CH.  vm]  THE  DOOMED  U-BOAT  855 

What  happened  during  the  ensuing  period  is  best  de- 
scribed in  the  words  of  Oberleutnant  Neuerburg,  second 
in  command :  "  The  boat  shot  upwards  and  down- 
wards ;  the  men  rushed  forward  and  aft ;  the  flooring 
became  slippery  with  the  oil  carried  out  of  the  engine- 
room  by  the  men's  feet ;  the  men  slipped."  Down  the 
craft  went  again,  striking  the  sea  bottom,  then  rose,  and 
descended  once  more,  this  time  to  over  230  feet.  "  Then," 
declared  Oberleutnant  Neuerburg  in  his  narrative,  "  we 
shot  upwards  so  violently  that  I  gave  up  all  hope.  .  .  . 
From  the  conning-tower  came  the  report,  '  Steering  gear 
jammed — man  the  hand  wheel.'  And  then  from  the 
engine-room  :  *  The  motors  have  broken  down  ! '  "  The 
boat  eventually  began  to  rise,  and  then  suddenly  the  cap- 
tain pushed  open  the  conning-tower  hatch.  She  had  a 
heavy  list,  a  hole  torn  in  her  starboard  tanks,  rudder 
gone,  propellers  badly  damaged.  "  As  I  came  on  deck 
I  saw  how  the  periscope  was  almost  broken  off  short.  .  .  . 
Suddenly  there  was  a  smell  of  burning.  Someone  shouted, 
'  The  battery  is  on  fire  ! '  The  captain  gave  orders  that 
the  boat  was  to  be  sunk.  We  drifted  helplessly  in  the 
currents  of  Pentland  Skerries.  No.  2  fired  star-signals 
to  draw  the  attention  of  the  signal-station  .  .  .  two 
destroyers  were  approaching  at  full  speed.  The  captain 
fired  off  the  stern  torpedoes  in  order  to  allow  the  water 
to  enter  through  the  tubes.  .  .  .  Spreuger  (the  engineer 
officer)  tore  open  the  flooding  valves  .  .  .  then  the  boat 
sank.  ..." 

It  was  at  1.30  p.m.  that  the  submarine  had  for  the  last 
time  come  to  the  surface,  and  the  crew  were  seen  on  deck 
with  a  white  flag  flying.  She  had  foundered  about  five 
miles  east  by  south  of  Muckle  Skerry,  the  largest  of  the 
group  of  rocks  which  lie  at  the  eastern  entrance  to  the 
Pentland  Firth.  The  two  destroyers  which  came  up  were 
the  ERNE,  with  Admiral  Sir  Stanley  Colville  on  board, 
and  the  GAKRY.  The  latter  picked  up  all  the  officers 
and  men  with  the  exception  of  one  man,  a  stoker,  who 
was  drowned.  So  ended  the  career  of  the  craft  which 
had  proposed  to  sink  Admiral  Jellicoe's  flagship.1  Up 

1  "  Bi«  Deutschen  U-Boot»  in  ihrer  Kriegsfftkrung,  1914-18,"  states 
(vol.  i,  p.  18)  that  U18,  as  she  was  returning  from  Scapa  Flow,  was  sighted 
a*d  chased,  and  that  she  struck  the  rocks  whilst  proceeding  submerged, 
and  was  compelled  to  come  to  the  surface  and  surrender  ewing  to  the 
damage  sustained. 


356  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK        [CH.  vin 

to  this  date,  though  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  had  been 
doing  most  excellent  work,  no  chance  had  come  their  way 
of  sinking  a  submarine,  and  to  trawler  Dorothy  Gray, 
No.  96,  belonged  the  honour  of  being  the  first  auxiliary 
vessel  in  naval  history  to  achieve  such  a  feat.  This  in- 
cident was  most  wholesome  in  its  effect ;  it  convinced 
the  Admiralty  that  these  small  ships  and  fishermen  crews 
could  do  all  that  might  be  asked  of  them,  and  to  the  crews 
themselves  it  imparted  an  increased  confidence  in  their 
ability.  A  healthy  spirit  of  rivalry  was  excited,  and 
amidst  the  depressing  monotony  of  the  patrol  there  was 
no  man  who  was  not  cheered  by  the  belief  that  some  day 
he  might  help  to  send  a  submarine  to  the  bottom. 

"  I  wish,"  wrote  Admiral  Colville  to  the  Admiralty, 
44  to  draw  their  lordships'  attention  to  the  excellent  work 
done  by  Trawler  No.  96,  the  skipper  of  which  worked  his 
craft  most  successfully  in  chasing  and  ramming  the 
submarine."  4C  Hearty  congratulations  to  Trawler  96," 
telegraphed  the  First  Lord,  "  for  brilliant  service,  which 
their  lordships  will  mark  by  a  substantial  reward."  In  due 
time  came  the  reward :  £500  to  the  skipper  (Chief  Skipper  A. 
Youngson,  R.N.R.)  and  crew  of  the  Dorothy  Gray,  and  £100 
to  Tokio.  But,  apart  from  any  pecuniary  prize,  there  was  the 
knowledge  that  a  fishing- vessel,  manned  by  a  fishing  crew, 
had  performed  distinguished  service  in  ridding  the  sea  of 
a  dangerous  enemy,  and  had  created  a  most  encouraging 
precedent.  That  the  enemy  was  determined  to  penetrate 
into  the  area  known  to  be  frequented  by  the  Grand  Fleet 
was  made  evident  by  the  persistence  with  which  submarines 
cruised  off  the  Orkneys.  On  the  day  after  U18  was 
rammed  and  sunk  another  of  these  craft  was  seen  by 
H.M.S.  DRYAD  off  the  east  side  of  the  Orkneys,  and  again 
on  the  following  day  the  trawlers  won  the  praise  of  the 
Royal  Navy.  That  day,  off  the  same  part  of  the  coast, 
a  submarine  was  netted,  though  she  was  not  destroyed. 
As  soon  as  she  was  sighted  trawlers  gave  chase,  whilst 
an  outlying  trawler  got  the  intelligence  through  to  H.M.S. 
SKIPJACK,  which  followed  the  submarine  till,  as  she  was 
approaching  gun  range,  the  craft  dived  and  was  not  seen 
again.  "  I  consider  most  praiseworthy,"  reported  Com- 
mander Preston  of  the  incident,  "  the  way  these  two 
trawlers,  79  and  80,  carried  out  the  chase  and  promptly 
gave  information."  Such  evidence  of  the  trawler's  effec- 


CH.  vm]  THE  SCARBOROUGH  RAID  357 

tive  value  was  as  welcome  to  the  Commander-in- Chief 
as  to  Whitehall.  The  Lords  of  the  Admiralty  wrote  to 
Sir  John  Jellicoe  that  they  noted  with  satisfaction  the 
apparent  increase  in  the  value  of  the  trawler  patrols, 
and  desired  that  he  would  cause  an  expression  of  com- 
mendation to  be  transmitted  to  the  commanding  officers 
of  these  two  trawlers. 

The  raid  on  the  Yorkshire  coast  on  December  16th  was 
in  strategy,  and  to  a  great  extent  in  tactics,  practically 
a  repetition  of  the  raid  which  had  occurred  off  Gorleston 
a  few  weeks  before.  In  results,  however,  this  Yorkshire 
raid  was  the  more  serious.  Each  of  these  raids  revealed 
the  same  deliberate,  well-planned  scheme ;  in  each  oc- 
curred the  arrival  off  the  coast  at  dawn,  the  bombardment, 
and  the  endeavour  to  entice  British  squadrons  on  to 
mine-fields  in  carefully  chosen  areas,  mines  being  sown 
close  inshore  in  the  hope  of  destroying  British  flotillas 
and  light  forces,  as  well  as  out  to  sea  where  the  battle 
fleet  might  be  expected  to  pass.  But  the  mines  laid  off 
Flamborough  Head  were  far  more  numerous  than  those 
which  had  been  scattered  off  Yarmouth. 

On  the  morning  of  December  15th  a  portion  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  left  Scapa,  Cromarty,  and  Rosyth,  and  swept 
down  the  North  Sea,  accompanied  by  seven  destroyers. 
About  5  a.m.  these  destroyers  suddenly  encountered  a 
German  force,  consisting  of  cruisers  and  destroyers,  to  the 
eastward  of  the  Dogger  Bank,  proceeding  in  an  opposite 
direction — that  is  to  say,  on  a  north-westerly  course.  An 
engagement  ensued,  and  three  of  our  destroyers  were 
badly  hit,  though  one  of  the  latter  claimed  to  have  tor- 
pedoed an  enemy  cruiser.  This  proved  to  be  the  advanced 
screen  of  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet,  and  just  before  eight 
o'clock,  as  it  was  getting  light,  enemy  cruisers  appeared 
off  Scarborough.  Whilst  three  of  them  bombarded  the 
town,  the  fourth  cruiser  steamed  east- south-east  towards 
Flamborough  Head  and  laid  an  extensive  mine-field. 
These  four  ships  represented  only  part  of  the  main  force, 
for  prior  to  reaching  Scarborough  the  squadron  had  split 
up,  the  VON  DER  TANN  and  DERFFLINGER  making  for  this 
seaside  resort ;  the  other  division,  consisting  of  the 
SEYDLITZ,  MOLTKE,  and  BLUCHER,  steering  for  Hartlepool, 
which  was  also  bombarded  till  just  before  nine  o'.clock, 
when  these  vessels  made  off  to  the  eastward.  A  few 


358  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK       [CH.  vm 

minutes  later,  the  two  Scarborough  raiders  appeared  off 
Whitby  and  also  bombarded  that  place,  after  which  the 
whole  of  the  force  made  its  escape.  It  had  come  via 
the  open  passage  existing  between  the  Tyne  and  Humber 
mine-fields,  and  the  ships  which  had  gone  north  to  Whitby 
and  Hartlepool  had  kept  shoreward  of  the  Tyne  mine 
area.  But  on  their  return  journey,  between  these  two 
old  mine  areas,  the  enemy's  light  cruisers  and  destroyers, 
forming  the  German  screen,  were  sighted  and  fired  on  by 
the  British  light  cruisers  about  11.30  a.m.  Owing  to  the 
mist  they  escaped.  About  midday  the  Second  Battle 
Squadron  also  sighted  enemy  cruisers  and  destroyers 
steering  east  by  south  at  full  speed ;  and  again  the  raiders 
eluded  puisuit.  It  was  a  very  fortunate  adventure  for 
the  Germans ;  but  for  the  bad  luck  in  regard  to  the  mist 
and  rain,  they  would  have  been  severely  handled. 

This  raid  is  of  immediate  interest  as  illustrating  the 
part  which  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  had  in  the  affair.  There 
was  afterwards  reason  to  assume  that  the  force  which 
had  encountered  British  destroyers  in  the  morning 
had  steamed  up  to  the  north-west  corner  of  the 
Dogger  Bank,  and  there  laid  some  mines  to  entrap  the 
Grand  Fleet.  At  any  rate,  a  quarter-past  nine  that  morn- 
ing, the  fishing  trawler  Blanche,  which  had  come  to  the 
Dogger  Bank  to  fish,  sighted  a  mine,  the  position  being 
about  seventy  miles  N.E.  $  E.  of  Flamborough  iHead. 
The  skipper,  Mr.  John  Wilson,  took  his  ship  close  up  to 
it,  and  as  he  had  no  weapons  for  sinking  it  he  dropped 
a  dan-buoy  to  mark  it,  lay  alongside  it  for  an  hour,  and 
definitely  ascertained  that  it  was  a  moored  mine  and  that 
it  had  five  horns.  The  trawler  then  steamed  half  a  dozen 
miles,  when  she  sighted  a  destroyer ;  there  is  a  reason 
to  think  that  this  was  a  German  destroyer  which  had 
accompanied  the  first  squadron,  encountered  at  five  o'clock 
farther  to  the  south-east,  and  had  just  finished  laying 
mines.  "  As  we  altered  our  course  to  go  to  him,"  stated 
Skipper  Wilson,  "  he  steamed  away  in  the  east  by  north 
direction.  When  we  first  saw  him  he  had  his  head  on 
the  east-south-east  course,  and  the  wind  was  north-north- 
west, fine  breeze  and  rain.  I  saw  it  was  no  good  steaming 
after  him,  so  proceeded  homewards,  as  I  think  he  was  the 
one  that  laid  the  mine.  If  he  had  been  English  he  would 
have  waited,  as  he  could  see  we  altered  our  course  towards 


S51 


CH.  vni]        A  TRAWLER'S   PREDICAMENT  359 

him."     This  destroyer  had  evidently  been  in  action,  for 
her  mast  appeared  to  have  been  shot  away,  but  the  Blanche 
at  this  time  was  unaware  of  the  Scarborough  raid.     Skipper 
Wilson  acted  as  one  might  have  expected  him  to  do  ;   and 
as  he  could  not  sink  the  mine,  he  abandoned  all  thought 
of  fishing,  steamed  back  to  the  Humber,  and  gave  infor- 
mation to  the  guardship  H.M.S.  VICTORIOUS  in  the  river. 
Then  he  steamed  out  to   his  fishing-ground  again,    and 
when  about  sixty-five  miles  N.E.  J  E.  from  Flamborough, 
shot  his  trawl  and  fished  all  night.     When  daylight  came 
he  found  another  mine  waiting  for  him.     He  was  deter- 
mined to  sink  it,  though  many  men  would  have  been 
content  to  leave  it  alone.     "  We  hove  our  gear,"  he  said, 
"  and  then  made  fast  a  liver  barrel  half  filled  with  water, 
attached  to  a  50-fathom  wire  buoy- line,  and  this  we  towed 
with  the  object  of  bursting  the  mine."     The  intention  was 
by  this  means  to  strike  the  horns  and  so  explode  the  mine. 
The  attempt  was  made  four  or  five  times,  and  then,  as 
the  effort  failed  and  darkness  was  coming  on,  he  gave  it 
up,  buoyed  the  mine  with  a  dan- buoy,  and  for  the  next 
two  or  three  days  continued  fishing  in  its  vicinity.     It 
was  a  risky  thing  to  do,  for  his  ship  might  at  any  moment 
have  been  blown  up  by  striking  a  mine,  or  his  trawl  might 
have  caught  the  mooring  wire  and  brought  about  an 
explosion.     There   can  be   no   question  that  these  were 
mines.      Within  a  few  days   the  fishing- vessel  Ocana,  in 
almost  the  very  spot  where  the  Blanche  buoyed  her  first 
mine,  hit  one  of  the  horns  of  a  mine  and  foundered. 

Another  fishing  steam  trawler,  the  Cassandra,  had  an 
excellent  view  of  the  retreating  enemy  on  the  day  of 
the  raid.  This  Hull  trawler  suddenly  found  herself  in 
the  midst  of  a  modern  naval  engagement  between  powerful 
ships,  while  she  was  quietly  trawling  as  if  the  sea  were  as 
safe  as  in  peace-time.  Her  skipper,  Mr.  H.  Pegg,  after 
wards  related  his  experience  :  "  On  December  16th,  1914 
at  noon,  I  had  just  left  the  bridge  to  get  a  bit  of  tobacco, 
when  the  mate  shouted  down  the  cabin  that  he  could 
hear  the  firing  of  big  guns.  I  immediately  went  on  deck, 
and  there  rushing  towards  us  was  a  big  German  cruiser 
accompanied  by  a  torpedo  flotilla,  steaming  about  south- 
east. About  seven  or  eight  miles  to  the  westward  were 
our  Fleet,  firing  as  hard  as  they  could.  Immediately,  we 
were  surrounded  by  flying  shells.  You  could  hear  them 


360  AUXILIARY   PATROL  AT  WORK        [CH.  vm 

whistling  overhead  and  see  them  falling  all  round  us. 
As  the  Germans  were  passing  us,  the  big  cruiser  fired  a 
shot  which  passed  between  our  bridge  and  funnel  and  hit 
the  water  about  fifty  yards  away  from  us.  Simultaneously 
I  saw  two  shells  hit  one  of  their  destroyers,  and  all  I  saw 
was  a  tremendous  upheaval  of  water  and  then  nothing 
more.  This  all  lasted  about  fifteen  minutes."  By  this 
time  the  trawler's  skipper  had  got  in  his  gear  and  was 
steaming  towards  the  land.  "  About  3  p.m.,  no  warships 
then  being  in  sight,  I  saw  what  looked  like  a  mast  sticking 
up  out  of  the  water,  about  south-west  of  us,  and  immedi- 
ately bore  away  towards  it.  Getting  a  better  view,  I 
made  it  out  to  be  a  submarine  with  two  masts,  the  fore 
one  longer  than  the  after  one,  and  having  a  cross-tree 
to  it  (the  fore  one).  This  I  surmised  must  be  a  German, 
and  we  kept  after  him  for  about  a  quarter  of  an  hour, 
but  he  outdistanced  our  ship  easily.  Last  seen,  he  was 
going  about  south  by  east  to  south,  time  being  3.45  p.m." 

It  was  not  long  before  the  mine-field  laid  by  the  raiders 
off  Scarborough  began  to  bring  forth  disaster  upon  dis- 
aster. Happily  the  battleships,  battle  cruisers,  cruisers, 
and  destroyers,  in  spite  of  the  risks  they  ran  in  the  chase, 
had  escaped  the  danger.  Thus  one  portion  of  the  enemy's 
plan  had  miscarried  ;  but  the  losses  to  merchant  shipping 
were  to  be  alarming,  and  the  toll  of  human  life  was  great. 
The  enemy  had  barely  finished  laying  his  mines  when  the 
Norwegian  s.s.  Vaaren  struck  a  mine  about  three  and  a  half 
miles  north-east  by  north  of  Filey  and  foundered,  her  crew 
being  picked  up  by  the  trawler  Clon  at  9.15  a.m.  Twelve 
hours  later  the  British  s.s.  Elterwater  also  ran  on  a  mine  and 
foundered  three  miles  east  of  Scarborough  ;  and  the  same 
evening  the  Princess  Olga  went  down  five  miles  east-north- 
east of  Scarborough.  Still  further  to  increase  the  peril  to 
our  shipping,  three  German  torpedo-boats  at  sunset  laid 
more  mines  on  the  Dogger  Bank,  seventy  miles  north- 
east by  east  of  the  Spurn.  Next  day  the  City,  which 
had  on  board  several  of  the  dead  seamen  from  the  collier 
Elterwater^  reported  that  the  sea  off  Scarborough  was  strewn 
with  mines.  The  extent  and  direction  of  this  latest 
mine-field  was  then,  of  course,  unknown,  but  the  day  after 
the  raid  all  traffic  between  Flamborough  and  the  Tyne 
was  stopped,  except  during  the  hours  of  daylight. 

Down  to  the  day  of  the  Scarborough  raid,  as  has  been 


CH.  vni]  THE   FOULED   SEA-ROAD  361 

stated,  a  swept  channel  existed  from  the  North  Foreland 
to  Flamborough.  Up  and  down  this  channel  streams  of 
ships  passed.  Owing  to  the  existence  of  other  mine-fields 
already  mentioned,  vessels  were  practically  restricted  to 
this  lane.  It  had  been  swept  daily  and  patrolled  daily 
and  was  used  with  confidence.  But  now  the  enemy  had 
laid  snares  along  this  sea  road,  and  the  results  were  serious. 
Until  the  Clon  had  picked  up  the  Vaaren's  crew  it  was  not 
known  that  a  new  mine-field  had  been  laid,  and  only  the 
disappearance  of  the  other  merchant  ships  that  day  gave 
even  a  vague  indication  of  the  mine-field's  actual  position. 
It  was  now  the  duty  of  the  mine-sweepers  to  ascertain 
the  limits  of  this  danger  area,  and  to  get  rid  of  the  mines 
as  quickly  as  possible.  Orders  were  sent  by  Admiral 
Charlton  instructing  the  mine-sweepers  to  work  from 
Flamborough  Head  to  Hartlepool,  with  a  pair  of  Fleet 
sweepers,  and  destroyers  from  the  Ninth  Flotilla  were 
sent  to  sea  so  as  to  stop  all  south-going  ships  from  entering 
the  mine-field. 

Although  arrangements  were  made  to  extend  the 
swept  channel  northward  from  Flamborough,  and  the 
passage  of  merchant  shipping  was  stopped,  the  situation 
was  embarrassing.  A  hold-up  of  cargo  vessels  throttled 
trade,  besides  causing  an  inconvenient  congestion  of 
traffic  at  focal  points.  On  the  other  hand,  if  they  were 
allowed  to  proceed,  they  ran  considerable  risk.  It  was 
therefore  decided  to  make  a  compromise,  and  to  allow 
ships  to  pass  by  daylight,  warning  them  to  keep  within 
two  miles  of  the  shore.  The  actual  mine-sweeping  com- 
menced on  December  19th.  From  Grimsby  came  groups 
of  trawlers  which  not  many  weeks  ago  had  been  fishing 
for  food.  There  came,  too,  the  paddle-steamer  Brighton 
Queen,  which  had  early  that  summer  been  running  excursion 
trips  on  the  South  Coast.  From  Lowestoft  were  sent  eight 
sturdy  drifters  to  assist  in  keeping  merchant  ships  off 
the  mine-field ;  and,  as  if  to  complete  the  representative 
character  of  the  auxiliary  craft,  from  the  northward  came 
a  motor-vessel  usually  engaged  in  summer  cruising  which 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war  had  been  transferred  to  the 
White  Ensign.  H.M.S.  SKIPJACK,  under  Commander  L. 
G.  Preston,  R.N.,  also  arrived  to  assist  the  trawlers. 
The  personnel  engaged  on  this  big  scheme  had  come  from 
most  parts  of  the  world.  North  Sea  fishermen  who  had 


362  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK        [CH.  vm 

been  trawling  off  Iceland,  sportsmen  fresh  from  fishing 
in  Canadian  waters,  seamen  working  in  cross-Channel 
packets  or  liners  when  the  war  broke  out,  others,  again, 
who  were  yachting  as  recently  as  the  preceding  July,  as 
well  as  naval  officers,  were  soon  busy,  all  bearing  testimony 
to  the  great  brotherhood  of  the  sea. 

In  order  to  ascertain  how  the  mines  lay,  it  was  essential 
to  sweep  at  all  states  of  the  tide.  None  except  those  who 
have  served  off  this  inhospitable  coast  during  the  few 
daylight  hours  of  a  December  day  can  realise  the  anxieties 
and  difficulties  of  the  task.  Gales  spring  up  at  short 
warning,  and  as  Bridlington  and  Scarborough,  the  only 
adjacent  harbours,  could  not  be  entered  at  all  states  of 
the  tide,  Grimsby — involving  a  long  passage  for  small  craft 
along  an  unlighted  coast — was  the  nearest  port  available. 
Trawlers  keep  the  sea  in  almost  any  weather,  but  they 
draw  a  good  deal  of  water,  especially  aft,  and  thus  at 
any  moment  they  were  in  peril  of  falling  victims  to  the 
hidden  mines. 

Thus  the  operations  began,  Commander  R.  H. 
Walters,  R.N.,  in  the  Brighton  Queen,  being  the  officer  in 
charge.  The  trawlers  passed  out  with  their  sweeps  to 
clear  the  seas  of  hidden  death.  It  was  not  long  before 
the  inevitable  happened.  The  mine-sweeping  trawler 
Passing,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  G.  C.  Parsons,  R.N., 
ran  into  a  mine,  which  blew  a  hole  into  her  bow  so  large 
that  a  small  motor-car  could  have  been  driven  through  it. 
She  was  a  magnificent  type  of  trawler,  stoutly  built,  and 
fortunately  her  bulkheads  held.  The  Brighton  Queen  was 
able  to  take  her  in  tow  and  beached  her  on  the  Scarborough 
sands,  whence  she  returned  later  on  to  Grimsby  to  be 
repaired.  But  immediately  after  the  accident  to  the 
Passing,  the  mine-sweeping  trawler  Orianda  (Lieutenant 
H.  Boothby,  R.N.R.)  hit  a  mine  a  mile  and  a  half  south- 
east of  Scarborough  Castle  and  blew  up.  One  of  the  crew 
was  killed,  but  Lieutenant  Boothby  got  the  rest  of  his 
men  away  safely.  The  next  trawler  to  suffer  misfortune 
was  the  Star  oj  Britain  (Lieutenant  C.  V.  Crossley,  R.N.R.), 
three  violent  explosions  revealing  the  cause  of  the  injuries 
she  had  received.  On  the  first  day's  sweeping,  and  within 
ten  minutes,  three  trawlers  had  struck  German  mines. 
Commander  Preston  took  the  SKIPJACK  very  gallantly  to 
the  middle  «f  the  mine-field  where  explosions  had  taken 


CH.  vm]  SHIPPING  HELD   UP  363 

place,  and  there  anchored  his  ship  between  the  trawlers 
and  the  mines  which  had  been  swept  up.  The  mines 
which  had  occasioned  so  much  trouble  were  then  sunk. 

The  first  day's  sweeping  failed  to  define  the  extent  of 
the  dangerous  area,  but  at  least  it  was  established  that 
mines  had  been  sown  thickly  from  a  position  in  lat.  54°  18', 
long.  0°  15'  W.  to  the  shore.  Next  morning  the  sweeping 
was  continued,  and  further  disasters  occurred,  the  first 
about  9  a.m.  The  steam-yacht  Valiant,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Admiral  Barlow  (one  of  a  good  many  retired 
flag  officers  who  had  volunteered  for  this,  or  other,  perilous 
work),  on  passage  up  the  coast  on  her  way  to  Cromarty, 
struck  a  mine  near  Filey,  disabling  both  her  propellers 
and  rudder ;  she  soon  began  to  leak  badly.  Two  trawlers, 
at  no  mean  risk,  crossed  the  mine-field  to  her  assistance, 
bringing  her  to  anchor  off  Scarborough.  This  action 
was  all  the  more  meritorious  since  it  was  low  water  at 
the  time.  Next  day  the  Valiant  was  taken  in  tow  by 
the  steam-yacht  Eileen,  commanded  by  Admiral  Sir 
Alfred  Paget,  who  had  also  returned  to  the  Service  on 
the  outbreak  of  war.  After  temporary  repairs  in  the 
Humber,  she  was  towed  down  the  North  Sea  and  English 
Channel  and  up  the  Irish  Sea  for  overhaul. 

About  an  hour  after  the  Valiant's  accident,  the  armed 
patrol  trawler  Gar  mo  also  struck  a  mine  off  Scarborough. 
She  turned  right  over  and  sank,  one  officer  and  five  men 
being  lost.  So  the  dangerous  work  went  on  during  the 
cold,  depressing  December  day.  Groups  of  trawlers 
under  Lieutenant  G.  C.  Parsons,  R.N.,  and  Lieutenant- 
Commander  Bernays,  R.N.,  worked  their  hardest  under 
most  trying  conditions.  By  December  22nd,  Commander 
Walters  was  able  to  report  a  safe  passage  from  Flamborough 
Head  to  Filey  Brig  buoy  within  half  a  mile  of  the  shore ; 
but  north  of  that  point  the  channel  was  only  partially 
swept.  Meanwhile  the  Humber  had  become  crowded 
with  shipping.  Unable  to  proceed  on  their  voyages, 
merchant  vessels  had  run  up  the  river  and  come  to  anchor 
in  its  sandy  waters.  No  fewer  than  forty-eight  commer- 
cial vessels  of  all  sizes — tramp  steamers,  transports,  colliers, 
food  ships,  timber  ships,  oilers — were  waiting,  and  the 
numbers  were  daily  increasing.  But,  again,  there  was  a 
difficulty.  Serious  as  was  this  delay  financially  to-  the 
owners  and  others,  yet  it  could  not  have  been  avoided, 


364  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT  WORK        [CH.  vm 

as  was  suggested  by  the  further  report  that  the  Norwegian 
s.s.  Boston  had  struck  a  mine  three  miles  east-south-east 
of  Scarborough.  She  was  beached  on  the  north  side  of 
Filey  Brig. 

Already  a  flotilla  of  fourteen  trawlers  was  sweeping 
off  Scarborough,  in  addition  to  the  drifters  and  the  motor- 
boat  Euan  Mara.  No  fewer  than  thirty-five  mines  had 
so  far  been  destroyed,  and  it  was  impossible  to  tell  how 
many  more  might  be  hidden.  Christmas  Day,  1914, 
will  long  be  remembered  by  East  Coast  fishermen  as  a  day 
of  tribulation,  but  a  day  on  which  these  fishermen  made 
heroic  history.  At  11  a.m.,  whilst  sweeping  south  from 
Whitby,  the  trawler  Night  Hawk  struck  a  mine  and  foun- 
dered about  five  and  a  half  miles  east  of  Scarborough. 
Only  seven  of  her  crew  of  thirteen  were  saved,  including 
the  commanding  officer,  Sub-Lieutenant  W.  A.  Senior, 
R.N.R.  The  s.s.  Gem  came  along,  struck  a  mine  and  blew 
up  seven  and  a  half  miles  south-east  of  Scarborough  Rock, 
with  the  loss  of  ten  lives,  including  her  master.  The 
s.s.  Eli,  under  the  Norwegian  flag,  also  struck  a  mine  and 
eventually  sank  three  miles  south-east  of  Scarborough. 
The  day  was  marked  by  a  fine  exhibition  of  pluck  on  the 
part  of  these  Lowestoft  drifters.  The  "  Commodore " 
was  Skipper  E.  V.  Snowline,  of  the  Trawler  Reserve. 
Although  a  gale  was  blowing,  this  seaman,  instead  of 
running  for  shelter,  stuck  it  out  and  kept  his  station  in 
order  to  prevent  other  vessels  getting  into  the  mined  area. 
In  spite  of  the  heavy  seas,  his  drifter,  the  Hilda  and  Ernest, 
faced  the  weather  and  the  risk  of  being  mined  and  stood 
by  the  Gallier,  a  British  steamer  which  had  also  struck 
a  mine,  Skipper  Allerton  in  the  drifter  Eager  showing 
the  same  hardihood.  Not  to  be  outdone  by  the  drifters, 
Skipper  T.  W.  Trendall,  in  the  mine-sweeping  trawler 
Solon,  on  his  own  responsibility  went  to  the  assistance  of 
this  ship.  It  was  low  water ;  it  was  dark ;  the  Gallier 
was  showing  no  lights.  The  Solon  had  to  search  for  her 
during  the  gale  in  the  middle  of  the  mine-field,  yet  in 
the  end  she  was  safely  brought  into  Scarborough.  Never 
did  British  sailors  in  peace  or  war  perform  a  more  unselfish 
and  heroic  act  on  Christmas  night.  For  their  gallantry 
the  King  awarded  the  D.S.C.  to  both  Skipper  Snowline 
and  Skipper  Trendall. 

The  following  day  a  channel  had  been  cleared,  and  traffic 


CH.  vm]  CLEARED   AT   LAST  365 

was  permitted  to  pass,  but  only  in  daylight.  The  s.s. 
Linaria  next  foundered  two  and  a  half  miles  north-north- 
east of  Filey  Brig.  Destroyers  were  sent  from  the  seventh 
and  Ninth  Flotillas  to  patrol  the  extremity  of  the  Scar- 
borough mine-field  until  the  channel  had  been  completely 
swept  and  buoyed,  to  prevent  commercial  traffic  from  pas- 
sing through  at  night  or  by  any  unauthorised  routes,  and 
to  check  further  mine-laying.  But  on  the  last  day  of  the 
year  1914,  still  another  steamer  was  blown  up  four  miles 
north-north-east  of  Filey  Brig.  By  that  date,  however, 
a  channel  had  been  swept  and  the  principal  buoys  laid ; 
most  of  the  work  had  been  done,  and  the  paddle-steamers, 
which  drew  less  water  than  trawlers,  were  pressed  into 
the  Service.  The  trawlers  were,  indeed,  wanted  every- 
where. They  were  required  to  sweep  up  the  Tory  Island 
mine-field,  and  still  more  were  needed  for  service  in  the 
North  Sea  in  order  to  prevent  mining  activity  being 
resumed.  The  sweep  off  Scarborough  continued,  and 
on  January  6th  the  Banyers  struck  a  mine  off  that  port 
and  sank.  Her  commanding  officer,  Lieutenant  H. 
Boothby,  R.N.R.,  had  already  been  blown  up  on  December 
19th  in  the  Orianda,  but  again  he  escaped  death,  and 
afterwards  he  was  awarded  the  D.S.C.  Next  day  the  s.s. 
Eljrida  also  hit  a  mine  and  went  down  two  miles  north- 
north-east  of  Scarborough.  But  at  last,  in  spite  of  the 
hindrances  through  heavy  weather,  this  dangerous  mine- 
field was  so  far  swept  up  that  a  buoyed  channel  was 
established  right  up  to  a  point  abreast  of  Hartlepool, 
and  the  merchant  traffic,  thanks  to  the  vigilance  of  our 
patrols  and  the  daily  diligence  of  the  mine-sweepers, 
was  able  again  to  carry  on  right  away  down  the  North 
Sea  to  the  English  Channel. 

Such  is  the  narrative  of  the  Scarborough  mine-field. 
Although  it  brought  about  the  loss  of  valuable  lives,  as 
well  as  of  a  few  trawlers  and  merchant  ships,  it  did  not 
diminish  the  strength  of  the  Grand  Fleet  by  a  single  unit. 
Undoubtedly  the  laying  of  mines  on  the  Dogger  Bank, 
just  before  and  on  the  day  of  the  raid,  was  part  of  the 
scheme  to  entrap  the  Grand  Fleet.  On  December  llth 
and  the  two  following  days,  Skipper  W.  Pearce,  of  the 
fishing  steam  trawler  Dane,  sighted  seven  floating  mines 
in  various  positions  approximately  between  seventy  and 
ninety-eight  miles  north-east  by  east  of  Scarborough, 


366  AUXILIARY  PATROL  AT   WORK          [CH.  vm 

and,  as  has  already  been  mentioned,  the  trawler  Blanche 
found  a  mine  on  the  day  of  the  raid  and  a  German  destroyer 
near-by  in  a  position  roughly  seventy-five  miles  north- 
east by  east  of  Flamborough,  where  on  December  23rd 
the  trawler  Ocana  foundered  on  a  mine.  On  December 
18th  the  Blanche  observed  another  mine  in  much  the  same 
position.  On  January  31st  mines  were  also  reported 
between  eighty-five  and  100  miles  north-east  of  the  Spurn. 
These  may  or  may  not  have  been  laid  in  connection 
with  the  Scarborough  raid.  At  any  rate,  the  Dogger 
Bank  mine-field  was  in  existence,  in  addition  to  the  other 
areas,  and  thus  the  lot  of  the  fisherman  was  rendered 
still  more  dangerous. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE 

As  the  war  progressed,  the  Royal  Navy  became  increas- 
ingly dependent  upon  the  ships  of  the  Auxiliary  Patrol. 
The  chances  of  the  Grand  Fleet  ever  meeting  the  High 
Sea  Fleet  in  decisive  action,  so  long  as  German  hopes 
rested  on  the  war  of  attrition,  grew  more  than  ever  remote. 
Warfare  by  means  of  mine  and  submarine  was  seen  to  be 
the  enemy's  settled  policy,  and  therefore  the  demand  for 
small  craft  continued  unabated.  The  trawlers  and  paddle 
craft,  employed  in  great  numbers,  were  proving  effective 
in  keeping  down  the  mines,  but  the  problem  of  the  sub- 
marine presented  greater  difficulties.  In  November  1914 
it  became  manifest  that  the  Germans  were  about  to 
make  a  determined  attack  on  vessels  using  the  English 
Channel ;  in  other  words,  they  would  try  to  cut  the  lines 
of  communication  with  France,  and  thus  strike  a  deadly 
blow  at  the  British  armies. 

The  object  of  the  Germans,  apart  from  any  damage 
which  they  might  inflict  upon  merchant  ships  and  trans- 
ports, was  to  draw  away  to  the  south  anti-submarine 
craft  which  could  not  be  spared  from  the  north,  and 
thus  cause  a  dispersion  of  British  effort.  The  naval 
authorities  were  consequently  confronted  with  an  em- 
barrassing situation,  for  the  condition  in  northern  waters 
had  not  improved.  As  an  illustration,  on  December  3rd 
another  effort  was  made  by  the  enemy  to  attack  the 
Grand  Fleet,  when  a  submarine  penetrated  the  eastern 
entrance  of  Scapa  Flow.  The  patrol  was  on  the  alert ; 
the  destroyer  GARRY,  which  had  been  in  at  the  death  of 
Ul8,  engaged  this  other  submarine  twice.  The  enemy 
fired  a  torpedo  and  then  managed  to  escape.  Simul- 
taneously, therefore,  the  war  of  attrition  was  being  con- 
ducted with  energy  in  the  North  Sea  as  well  as  in  the 
25  367 


368     GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

English  Channel.  The  immediate  needs  of  the  Grand 
Fleet,  so  far  as  enemy  mining  operations  were  concerned, 
was  met  by  dispatching  further  railway  steamers  to  act 
as  Fleet  sweepers,  and  in  the  meantime  attention  was  also 
directed  to  the  protection  of  the  main  base  of  the  Fleet 
against  submarines. 

An  incident  on  November  23rd  concentrated  attention 
on  the  English  Channel.  On  the  afternoon  of  that  day 
submarine  U21  sank  by  gunfire  the  s.s.  Malachite,  near 
Havre.  Two  days  later  three  trawlers,  Cleopatra,  Jackdaw, 
and  Warier  Priory  >  were  ordered  from  Yarmouth  to  Ports- 
mouth, with  three  R.N.R.  officers  in  command.  Twelve 
armed  trawlers  fitted  with  guns  and  the  modified  explosive 
sweep  were  also  sent.  This  flotilla  was  intended  to 
operate  in  the  English  Channel  against  submarines,  to 
sink  drifting  mines,  and  to  board  any  suspicious  small 
craft  which  might  be  supplying  submarines.  These 
trawlers  were  directed  to  patrol  the  transport  route  between 
Spithead  and  Havre.  Thus  began  a  new  system  of  coastal 
patrols  which  was  to  make  for  increased  efficiency  in 
combating  the  submarine. 

By  the  first  week  of  December  about  sixty  lieutenants 
and  sub-lieutenants  R.N.R.,  trained  in  the  Merchant 
Service,  had  been  drafted  to  bases  of  the  Auxiliary  Patrol 
for  the  command  of  armed  trawlers  and  as  leaders  of 
units  ;  another  fifty  officers  of  the  same  force  were  also 
undergoing  instruction  in  Torpedo  School  ships  prepara- 
tory to  being  sent  to  trawlers.  In  vessels  where  there  was 
no  suitable  cabin  a  temporary  cabin  was  being  erected, 
and  one  in  every  six  trawlers  was  fitted  with  wireless 
telegraphy,  although  the  supply  of  telegraphists  had 
become  temporarily  exhausted.  Trawlers  were  still  being 
taken  up  and  fitted  out  with  the  utmost  dispatch.  Four 
were  sent  to  Queenstown,  though  some  time  was  yet  to 
pass  before  submarines  penetrated  Irish  waters. 

Prior  to  the  war,  there  existed  at  the  Admiralty  a 
Committee  which  dealt  with  the  submarine  problem ; 
but  for  some  reason  this  had  been  disbanded  when  hos- 
tilities broke  out.  It  was  now  obvious  that  the  submarine 
menace  had  to  be  carefully  studied  and  guarded  against. 
Early  in  December  a  Submarine  Attack  Committee  was 
setup  at  the  Admiralty,  Captain  Leonard  A.  B.  Donaldson, 
R.N.,  being  president.  At  this  date  there  were  only  four 


CH.  ix]  INDICATOR  NETS  369 

known  methods  of  dealing  with  the  submarine.  A  patrol 
vessel  could  sink  it  by  ramming ;  she  could  blow  it  up 
with  the  explosive  sweep ;  she  could  sink  it  by  gunfire  ; 
or  she  could  entrap  it  by  means  of  nets,  which  were 
then  being  evolved.  Owing  to  the  shortage  of  guns, 
many  patrol  vessels  were  still  unarmed,  and  thus  their 
only  weapon  was  their  stem.  But  ramming,  as  every 
student  of  past  naval  history  is  aware,  is  a  far  more 
difficult  operation  than  appears  at  first  sight.  Modified 
sweeps,  for  the  purpose  of  exploding  over  a  submarine, 
were  being  supplied  as  fast  as  possible,  but  before  an 
enemy  can  be  blown  up  it  must  be  known  where  he  is. 
It  was  on  the  development  of  the  net  that  attention  was 
now  centred.  Preliminary  experiments  had  been  going 
on  for  some  time.  As  far  back  as  October  a  scheme 
had  been  suggested  by  Captain  H.  M.  Doughty,  the 
commanding  officer  of  the  Devonport  Gunnery  School, 
for  the  employment  of  nets  and  floating  buoys  with  or 
without  explosives ;  and  experiments  with  nets  were 
made  at  Harwich  and  Lowestoft  under  Captain  Ellison 
and  Lieutenant  Menzies,  the  original  idea  being  to  employ 
fishing-nets  such  as  are  used  by  drifters.  These  soon 
developed  into  what  were  technically  known  as  "  indi- 
cator nets,"  the  purpose  of  the  buoys  being  to  indicate  or 
"  watch "  as  soon  as  the  submarine  got  into  the  net. 
The  idea  was  that  when  a  submarine  became  entangled, 
the  section  of  the  mesh  would  be  broken  off  and  thus  the 
propeller  would  be  fouled.  Simultaneously,  the  sub- 
marine would  announce  its  presence  by  causing  the  buoys 
to  "  watch."  Nets  are  employed  in  peace-time  by 
drifters  which  put  to  sea  for  the  herring  fishery.  Drift-net 
fishing  is  quite  different  from  trawling  along  the  sea-bed. 
Just  as  the  trawlermen's  experience  had  so  happily  fitted 
them  for  sweeping  up  mines,  so  the  driftermen  with  their 
ships  were  the  experts  at  hand  to  go  out  and  entrap  sub- 
marines. During  the  winter  of  1914-15  the  Admiralty 
took  up  a  considerable  number  of  drifters  from  the  east 
coast,  forty-four  being  hired  from  the  little  port  of  Lossie- 
mouth  alone.  Instructions  were  sent  to  Lowestoft  that 
these  craft  were  to  be  fitted  out  with  the  utmost  dispatch. 
This  task  was  to  go  on  day  and  night,  all  other  work  being 
deferred  if  necessary.  Thus  by  January  the  Admiralty 
had  quite  a  large  flotilla  of  these  vessels  ready  for  service. 


370    GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

The  increasing  efficiency  of  the  yacht  and  trawler 
patrols  had  already  impressed  the  Board  of  Admiralty, 
and  a  scheme  was  planned  for  the  armed  patrol  of  the 
entire  coasts  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  by  auxiliary 
craft.  It  had  been  drawn  up  by  the  Admiralty  in  con- 
junction with  the  War  Staff,  and  was  modified  slightly  in 
detail  to  meet  the  criticisms  of  Admiral  Jellicoe.  In  the 
fewest  words,  the  scheme  divided  the  British  Isles  into 
twenty-one  areas,  plus  the  Clyde  and  the  Nore  areas. 
These  different  areas  were  to  be  patrolled  by  74  yachts 
and  462  trawlers  and  drifters.  Their  duty  was  to  pre- 
vent mine-laying,  and  capture  or  destroy  mine-layers  ; 
prevent  the  operations  of  submarines  and  destroy  such 
craft ;  prevent  spying  and  capture  spies.  Motor-boats 
were  to  assist  in  these  duties  in  sheltered  waters.  The 
needs  of  each  area  strategically  were  carefully  considered, 
regard  being  paid  to  the  indented  nature  of  the  coastline, 
the  proximity  of  trade  routes,  and  the  opportunities  for 
submarine  activity  and  successful  mine-laying.  Under 
the  scheme  every  part  of  the  British  Isles  would  be  sys- 
tematically patrolled,  thus  making  the  work  of  the  enemy 
more  difficult.  With  this  improved  organisation  was 
instituted  a  general  revision  of  the  allocation  of  auxiliary 
ships.  Some  stations  had  their  numbers  increased,  others 
had  vessels  taken  away,  according  to  the  strategical  neces- 
sity. The  Northern  Trawler  Flotilla  came  under  the  same 
control  as  the  Scapa  Flow  Flotilla,  thus  making  it  possible 
for  trawlers  to  be  detached  in  case  the  Grand  Fleet  left 
the  Scapa  base.  The  following  were  the  areas  now  con- 
stituted, provision  being  made  to  ensure  rapid  trans- 
mission of  the  intelligence  gained  by  the  yachts  and 
trawlers  : 


I.  Loch  Ewe  and  Stor- 

noway. 
II.  Shetland  Islands. 

III.  Orkney  Islands. 

IV.  Cromarty. 
V.  Peterhead. 

VI.  Rosyth. 
VII.  Granton. 
VIII.  Tyne. 
IX.  Humber. 


X.  Yarmouth  and  Har- 
wich. 

XI.  Dover. 
XII.  Portsmouth. 

XIII.  Portland. 

XIV.  Devonport. 

XV.  Milford  (with  base  at 

Rosslare). 
XVI.  Liverpool,  Kingstown. 

and  Belfast. 


CH.  ix]          SUBMARINES    IN   THE   CHANNEL  371 

XVII.  Lough  Lame.  XX.  Galway  Bay. 

XVIII.  Lough  Swilly.  XXI.  Queenstown          and 

XIX.  Blacksod  Bay.  Berehaven. 

In  addition  there  were  the  Clyde    and    Nore    areas,  as 
already  mentioned. 

Submarine  activity  rather  than  mine-laying  was  at  this 
period  causing  the  Admiralty  the  greatest  amount  of 
anxiety,  and  especially  in  the  English  Channel.  At  one 
time  it  had  seemed  almost  unthinkable  that  German  sub- 
marines would  dare  to  penetrate  the  Straits  of  Dover  and 
sink  merchant  and  passenger  ships  at  their  will.  Gradu- 
ally the  awakening  came.  First  on  October  14th  a  sub- 
marine torpedoed  the  Amiral  Ganteaume  carrying  refugees 
from  Calais  to  Havre;  on  October  31st  H.M.S.  HERMES 
was  torpedoed  in  the  Dover  Straits  ;  then  on  November  llth 
H.M.S.  NIGER  was  torpedoed  close  inshore  near  Deal; 
on  November  23rd  the  Malachite  was  sunk,  as  has  been 
already  mentioned,  not  by  torpedo,  but  by  a  submarine's 
gunfire  near  Havre  ;  and  finally,  on  November  26th,  the 
s.s.  Primo  was  destroyed  also  by  submarine  gunfire  off 
Cape  d'Antifer.  These  incidents,  which  have  already  been 
described,  showed  that  the  enemy  was  able  to  disregard 
the  British  mine-field  across  the  Dover  Straits,  and  was 
determined  to  attack  any  kind  of  ship,  without  restricting 
himself  to  the  recognised  limitations  of  legitimate  warfare. 
On  December  22nd  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  forecasted  a 
submarine  campaign  against  our  commerce.  The  crisis 
was  reached  when  in  the  dark  hours  of  the  morning  of 
January  1st  H.M.S.  FORMIDABLE  was  sunk  off  the  Devon- 
shire coast  by  U24.  Thus  the  submarine  operations  had 
developed  in  a  brief  space  from  a  dangerous  menace  into 
an  offensive  campaign  of  a  deadly  nature.  If,  for  the 
moment,  the  English  Channel  seemed  to  be  the  chief  area 
of  attack,  evidence  was  not  wanting  that  the  North  Sea 
was  not  being  neglected.  On  Christmas  Day  two  torpedo- 
boats  patrolling  well  up  the  Firth  of  Forth  had  torpedoes 
fired  at  them,  and  submarines  were  sighted  out  at  sea  by 
three  of  the  Town  class  light  cruisers  which  had  come  from 
Rosyth.  Such  places  as  the  Fame  Islands  in  Area  VIII, 
Kinnaird  and  Rattray  Heads  were  being  used  as  points 
of  arrival  by  enemy  U-boats  from  the  other  side  of  the 
sea.  There  was,  therefore,  wide  scope  for  the  work  of 


372     GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

the  Auxiliary  Patrol  in  watching  wherever  submarines 
were  likely  to  operate.  In  the  twenty-three  areas  men- 
tioned patrol  vessels  maintained  constant  vigilance,  and 
in  addition  to  these  the  mine-sweepers  carried  on  their 
routine  duties  wherever  required.  Thus,  by  the  end  of 
the  year  1914  there  were  in  all  750  yachts,  patrol  trawlers, 
mine-sweeping  trawlers,  drifters,  paddle  sweepers,  motor- 
drifters,  and  motor-boats,  in  which  190  officers  of  the 
Royal  Navy  and  Royal  Naval  Reserve  and  250  officers  of 
the  Royal  Naval  Volunteer  Reserve  were  serving.  Officers 
and  men  were  keen  and  needed  only  improved  devices 
for  the  arduous  work  entrusted  to  them,  and  these  gradually 
were  perfected. 

On  January  2nd,  1915,  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty 
(Mr.  Winston  Churchill)  made  a  request  for  four  drifters 
to  be  sent  to  Dover.  They  were  to  carry  out  a  number 
of  experiments  under  Captain  E.  C.  Carver,  R.N.,  in  the 
laying  of  nets  under  a  system  devised  by  Admiral  of  the 
Fleet  Sir  A.  Wilson.  Four  drifters  were  accordingly  ordered 
next  day  from  Lowestoft,  and  formed  the  nucleus  of  a  huge 
fleet  which  was  presently  to  be  transferred  to  the  White 
Ensign  for  the  special  service  of  entrapping  submarines. 

To  those  unfamiliar  with  ships  the  difference  between 
a  trawler  and  a  drifter  may  not  be  evident.  They  are 
built  for  entirely  different  purposes,  and  have  distinctive 
features  in  size,  construction,  design,  and  personnel.  The 
drifter  is  smaller  than  the  trawler,  and  usually  is  built  of 
wood,  though  a  few  are  of  steel ;  she  has  no  powerful 
winches  and  but  one  capstan ;  in  lines  she  is  but  slightly 
modified  from  the  old  sailing  drifters ;  and,  unlike  the 
steam  trawlers,  she  relies  very  much  on  her  mizzen,  not 
for  speed,  but  for  sea-keeping  ability  in  bad  weather  and 
for  riding  to  her  nets.  Her  engine  speed  is  rarely  more 
than  9  knots,  and  she  puts  ito  sea  for  only  a  few  days 
at  a  time,  returning  to  port  to  land  her  fish  and  take  in 
coal  and  water  before  going  out  again.  The  drifter's 
crew  is  small,  usually  numbering  not  more  than  eight  or 
nine  all  told ;  and  she  is  more  often  than  not  manned  by 
members  of  one  family.  Frequently  the  skipper  is  the 
father  or  father-in-law  of  the  mate.  The  engine-man  is  as 
likely  as  not  the  latter' s  cousin,  and  the  rest  of  the  crew, 
if  not  having  some  sort  of  relationship  to  the  skipper,  at 
least  come  from  the  same  fishing-village.  The  result  in 


CH.  ix]          DRIFTERS   AND   THEIR   CREWS  373 

working  is  that  the  drifter,  while  nominally  in  command  of 
the  skipper,  is  actually  run  by  a  kind  of  committee.  To 
split  up  this  co-operation  would  have  impaired  the  efficiency 
of  the  ship.  Consequently,  when  the  Admiralty  took  over 
hundreds  of  drifters  they  usually  accepted  the  crews  en  bloc, 
and  the  men  served  in  most  cases  till  the  end  of  the  war. 

Nothing  afloat  is  more  clannish  than  a  drifter  crew, 
especially  if  the  men  happen  to  come  from  the  same 
village  on  the  north-east  coast  of  Scotland.  The  very 
names  of  the  drifters  are  typical  of  the  crews — a  curious 
mixture  of  Old  Testament  piety  blended  with  modern 
ambitions  and  family  pride.  Such  names  as  Integrity, 
Breadwinner,  Courage,  Diligence,  Direct  Me,  Effort,  Enter- 
prise, Faithful  Friend,  Friendly  Star,  Girl  Margaret,  Boy 
Bob,  Golden  Effort,  Good  Tidings,  Hope,  Peacemaker, 
Present  Help,  Protect  Me,  Star  of  Faith,  Sublime,  suggest 
the  simple,  straightforward,  plucky,  homely  men  usually 
found  in  these  craft.  The  four  drifters  sent  to  Dover  as 
the  forerunners  of  the  great  fleet  that  was  to  follow  were 
the  Young  Fisherman,  Sedulous9  Nine  Sisters,  and  Ocean 
Comrade.  Dover  became  the  cradle  of  the  indicator-net 
method  of  anti-submarine  warfare.  Large  numbers  of 
drifters  were  taken  up  at  Lowestoft  and  Yarmouth,  thirty 
of  which  were  sent  to  Dover  alone. 

Their  arrival,  fresh  from  their  fishing  occupation,  came 
rather  as  a  surprise  to  naval  men  at  Dover,  accustomed  to 
smartness  and  well-found  gear.  These  were  an  ordinary 
group  of  fishermen  in  their  warm  jumpers,  without  naval 
kit,  unaccustomed  to  discipline,  and  banded  together  in 
ships  that  obviously  needed  a  refit,  for  they  had  defects 
in  hull  and  machinery  and  were  ill-found  in  respect  of 
lamps,  warps,  and  other  gear  of  the  sea.  But  the  main 
thing  was  to  get  the  ships  to  Dover,  and  then  as  soon  as 
possible  to  train  the  crews,  so  that  with  no  avoidable 
delay  nets  might  be  strung  across  the  Dover  Straits  and 
submarines  prevented  from  entering  the  Channel  to  sink 
our  shipping.  Captain  Humphrey  W.  Bowring,  R.N., 
was  appointed  to  take  charge  of  this  new  drifter  organisa- 
tion, and  the  first  trial  at  shooting  indicator  nets  from 
these  craft  was  made  on  January  15th,  1915,  under  the 
superintendence  of  Rear- Admiral  the  Hon.  Horace  Hood,1 

1  Rear-Admiral  the  Hon.  Horace  L.  A.  Hood,  C.B.,  M.V.O.,  D.'S.O. 

lost  his  life  in  the  Battle  of  Jutland. 


374     GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

commanding  the  Dover  Patrol.  Day  after  day  the 
drifters  went  out  into  the  Channel  to  learn  their  lesson, 
and  as  if  to  show  the  urgent  need  for  nets,  submarines  were 
being  reported  from  all  parts  of  the  English  Channel — 
from  Christchurch  Bay,  the  Channel  Islands,  West  Bay, 
Berry  Head,  and  elsewhere. 

A  hundred  miles  of  nets  were  sent  to  Dover.  More  and 
more  drifters  kept  arriving,  together  with  sinkers  with 
which  to  moor  the  nets,  dan-buoys  with  which  to  mark 
them,  clips  with  which  to  secure  them.  There  were  all 
sorts  of  difficulties  to  overcome.  The  clips,  for  instance, 
were  a  constant  source  of  trouble.  They  had  to  be  strong 
to  stand  the  strain  when  the  nets  were  being  hauled  in  ; 
at  the  same  time  it  was  necessary  that  they  should  be 
weak  enough  to  carry  away  as  soon  as  the  strain  of  the 
submarine  in  the  nets  came.  Then  there  were  the  strong 
tides  in  the  Dover  Straits  to  contend  with.  Nets  dis- 
appeared under  the  water  and  were  carried  away ;  others 
caught  on  wreckage.  For  a  time  the  whole  scheme 
seemed  doomed  to  failure.  However,  by  dint  of  dogged 
perseverance,  the  co-operation  of  many  brains,  and  the 
adaptability  of  the  fishing  crews,  one  after  another  of  the 
problems  approached  solution.  By  the  middle  of  January 
nets  had  been  moored  just  N.N.E.  of  the  Varne  Buoy, 
and  it  was  found  that  a  drifter  could  shoot  300  yards 
of  nets  in  a  heavy  sea  within  half  an  hour,  though  even- 
tually this  time  was  very  considerably  shortened.  By 
the  end  of  January  Dover  Harbour  was  becoming  pretty 
full  of  these  small  craft ;  for  there  were  already  fifty  or 
sixty  drifters  and  more  were  arriving. 

A  really  satisfactory  net- ship  had  yet  to  be  designed, 
but  with  improvements  in  apparatus  and  training  it  had 
become  possible  to  shoot  800  yards  of  nets  in  eight  minutes. 
At  that  speed  a  submarine  could  quickly  be  surrounded 
by  an  awkward  mesh.  Preparations  were  soon  on  foot 
to  send  a  few  of  these  drifters  to  lay  their  nets  off  the 
Belgian  coast.  On  February  3rd  the  Sedulous  and  four 
other  drifters,  escorted  by  destroyers,  left  Dover  in  charge 
of  Captain  Bowring  for  a  rendezvous  two  miles  south  of 
the  North  Hinder  Lightship,  where  they  arrived  early  next 
morning.  The  drifters  shot  their  nets  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Thornton  Ridge,  the  destroyers  meanwhile 
patrolling.  On  the  5th  the  drifters  returned  to  Dover. 


CH.  ix]  NETS   ACROSS   THE   STRAITS  375 

No  submarines  had  been  trapped,  but  valuable  experience 
had  been  gained.  Next  day  a  conference  took  place  at 
the  Admiralty  on  the  laying  of  indicator  nets,  at  which 
Admiral  Hood  was  present,  and  a  week  later  the  Dover 
Net  Drifter  Flotilla  was  in  full  working  order,  endeavour- 
ing to  close  the  Straits  to  hostile  submarines.  Thirty 
little  drifters  stretched  across  the  Channel,  riding  to  their 
nets  and  forming  a  curtain  between  England  and  France 
in  the  strong  tideway  that  goes  rushing  by.  Every 
evening  the  drifters  took  their  nets  aboard,  and  at  day- 
light shot  them  again.  Having  regard  to  the  force  of  the 
tides,  the  bad  weather,  and  the  difficulties  of  working  the 
nets,  the  Admiralty  considered  the  progress  made  to  be 
encouraging.  It  was  determined  to  employ  drifters  and 
indicator  nets  in  other  areas  as  well.  Preparations  were 
made  for  establishing  net -bases  at  Cromarty,  Peterhead, 
Firth  of  Forth,  Yarmouth,  Harwich,  the  Nore,  Portsmouth, 
Portland,  Poole,  Falmouth,  and  Devonport.  The  nets  used 
were  of  two  types,  one  30  feet  deep  and  the  other  60  feet 
deep,  each  net  being  100  yards  in  length.  So  quickly  did 
the  organisations  grow  that  by  the  third  week  in  January 
there  were  sixty-three  drifters  stationed  at  Poole,  twenty 
at  Falmouth,  fifty-four  at  Dover,  a  dozen  at  Scapa,  and 
four  each  at  Portsmouth,  Firth  of  Forth,  and  Cromarty. 
Sixteen  drifters  were  also  sent  to  Harwich  to  lay  eight 
miles  of  indicator  nets  two  miles  on  either  side  of  the 
Cork  Lightship  in  case  a  submarine  were  to  be  sighted 
inside  the  Cork,  and  two  miles  on  either  side  of  the  Ship- 
wash  in  case  the  U-boats  were  seen  inside  the  Sunk. 

It  appeared  for  a  time  as  if  the  Navy  had  in  the  indicator 
net  the  solution  of  the  main  submarine  problem.  The 
Admiralty  wasted  not  a  moment  in  equipping  every  suit- 
able base.  And  then  occurred  a  series  of  events,  sudden 
and  ominous,  which  gave  a  still  further  impetus  to  this 
newly- adopted  device.  Hitherto  submarines  had  pene- 
trated to  the  north  of  Scotland  and  well  down  the  English 
Channel,  but  at  last  a  submarine  appeared  in  the  Irish 
Sea  and  acted  pretty  much  as  she  liked.  On  January  28th 
the  armed  drifter  R.R.S.,  when  about  three  miles  north- 
west of  Bardsey  Island,  sighted  what  she  believed  to  be 
two  submarines.  Next  day,  at  1.45  p.m.,  Walney  Island 
Battery,  Barrow,  sighted  a  submarine  about  7,000  yards 
out  at  sea.  The  enemy  craft  opened  fire,  but  all  her 


376    GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

shots  fell  short.     The  battery  returned  the  fire  with  eleven 
rounds,  and  the  submarine  disappeared. 

It  proved  to  have  been  the  U21,  commanded  by  that 
enterprising  officer,  Kapitan-Leutnant  Hersing,  whose 
destruction  of  the  Malachite  and  Primo  in  the  English 
Channel  has  already  been  described.  She  had  travelled 
much  farther  to  the  westward  than  a  submarine  had 
attempted  before.  U21  was  not  long  in  the  Irish  Sea, 
but  during  her  stay  she  caused  havoc  and  consternation. 
From  Walney  Island  she  cruised  about  for  a  while, 
and  on  the  next  day,  January  30th,  hovered  off  the 
approaches  to  Liverpool  and  sank  three  merchant  ships, 
the  Ben  Cruachan,  the  Linda  Blanche,  and  Kilcoan, 
in  practically  the  same  position.  From  there  she  may 
have  taken  a  tack  over  towards  the  Irish  coast,  for  on 
January  31st  the  Holyhead- Kingstown  packet  Leinster, 
which  was  at  last  torpedoed  and  sunk  in  the  autumn  of 
1918,  sighted  a  submarine  twenty  miles  east  of  the  Kish 
Lightship.  Thence  the  U21  probably  cruised  south,  for 
at  8.30  a.m.  on  February  1st  she  had  an  unsuccessful 
encounter  with  a  vessel  of  the  Auxiliary  Patrol.  The 
yacht  Vanduara  was  on  passage  from  the  Clyde  to  Ports- 
mouth, and,  when  well  down  the  Irish  Sea,  about  thirty- 
three  miles  north-west  of  Fishguard,  she  sighted  a  sub- 
marine on  the  surface,  trying  to  head  her  off.  The  sea 
at  the  time  was  fairly  smooth.  The  Vanduara  altered 
course  so  as  to  bring  the  yacht's  bow  on  to  the  enemy, 
and  the  submarine  began  to  submerge.  The  yacht  opened 
fire  at  3,000  yards,  and  finally  closed  at  2,000  yards,  her 
last  four  shots  falling  extremely  close.  The  submarine, 
however,  was  not  hit,  and  got  back  safely  to  Germany,  to 
spread  a  false  report  that  the  "  auxiliary  war  vessel "  did 
not  hoist  the  British  "  war  flag."  This  was  denied  by 
the  British  Admiralty  on  the  strength  of  a  statement  by 
the  Vanduard's  captain :  "I  was  flying  no  colours,  but 
hoisted  the  White  Ensign  before  opening  fire." 

It  was  reported  that  all  the  crew  of  U21  received  from 
the  Kaiser  the  Iron  Cross  as  a  reward  for  their  work  for 
the  Fatherland.  This  cruise  undoubtedly  gave  a  great 
stimulus  to  the  enemy  and  suggested  endless  possibilities 
for  the  overseas  submarine.  The  immediate  affect  was 
twofold.  All  shipping  was  forbidden  to  enter  or  leave 
Liverpool,  and  the  Holy  head- Kingstown  service  was 


CH.  ix]  MORE  YACHTS   COMMISSIONED  377 

suspended  for  the  next  few  days.  It  proved  also  the 
necessity  of  strengthening  the  patrols  in  an  area  in 
which  under-water  craft  had  not  been  expected.  Admiral 
Jellicoe  suggested  the  use  of  indicator  nets  across  the 
North  Channel,  to  which  the  Admiralty  agreed.  Mean- 
while, British  merchantmen  were  instructed  to  keep  a 
sharp  lookout  for  submarines,  display  the  ensign  of  a 
neutral  country,  and  show  neither  house-flag  nor  identifi- 
cation marks. 

On  January  21st  submarine  U19  had  overhauled  and 
sunk  by  bombs  the  s.s.  Durward,  twenty-two  miles  north- 
west of  the  Maas  Lightship — that  is,  well  off  the  Hook  of 
Holland.  Admiral  Hood  stated  that  there  was  little 
doubt  that  enemy  submarines  were  passing  through  the 
Downs  at  night-time,  and  one  was  reported  every  few 
days.  On  February  1st,  the  day  of  the  Vanduarcfs 
engagement,  the  hospital  ship  Asturias  was  attacked  by 
submarines  fifteen  miles  north-north-east  of  Havre,  but 
happily  the  torpedo  missed.  On  the  following  day 
trawlers  fired  on  a  submarine  off  Dieppe. 

Evidence  accumulated  on  every  hand  that  submarine 
warfare  was  increasing  in  intensity.  At  the  beginning  of 
February  three  large  submarines  left  Cuxhaven  to  operate 
in  British  waters.  It  was  well  known  to  the  British 
Admiralty  that  Germany  had  become  possessed  of  sub- 
marines capable  of  going  to  and  operating  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean. This  was  not  a  little  alarming,  and  to  meet  the 
menace  still  more  small  craft  were  required.  Many 
yachts  had  voluntarily  been  offered  for  charter,  others 
had  to  be  requisitioned  ;  and  of  these  last  one  fine  vessel 
was  taken  compulsorily  because  the  owner,  a  lady  with 
a  fine  spirit,  refused  to  let  the  yacht  go  unless  she  was 
allowed  herself  "  to  share  the  perils  of  the  crew."  As  the 
number  of  yachts  in  the  service  increased,  the  shortage 
of  guns  became  an  embarrassment,  and  some  of  the  bigger 
yachts  had  to  surrender  part  of  their  armament.  No 
yacht  could  be  spared  more  than  a  couple  of  guns,  and 
the  net  drifters  received  none.  Some  drifters  were  given 
the  modified  explosive  sweeps,  and  all  were  supplied  with 
bombs. 

Not  only  was  the  number  of  patrol  vessels  increased, 
but  simultaneously  improvements  were  made  in .  the 
organisation  of  patrol  areas.  For  instance,  Area  I,  which 


378     GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

had  been  originally  based  on  Aultbea,  an  out-of-the-way 
place  forty  miles  from  the  nearest  railway-station,  was 
now  based  on  Stornoway,  and  Admiral  Sir  Reginald  Tupper 
was  appointed  in  charge  there.  Alterations  were  also 
made  in  Areas  IV,  V,  and  VI,  it  being  realised  that  enemy 
submarines  desiring  to  attack  British  warships  in  Cromarty 
or  Scapa  Flow  would  probably  seek  the  very  convenient 
landfall  in  the  vicinity  of  Buchan  Ness,  Rattray  Head, 
and  Kinnaird  Head,  after  the  voyage  across  the  North 
Sea  from  Heligoland  or  the  Skaw.  By  placing  the  various 
units  of  Auxiliary  Patrol  craft  in  the  modified  Areas  V 
and  VII,  an  off-shore  squadron  was  available  to  prevent 
submarines  making  a  landfall  or  entering  Areas  IV  and  VI. 
The  Admiral  of  Patrols  was  relieved  of  the  control  of  all 
auxiliary  vessels  in  Area  X,  these  being  placed  under 
Commodore  George  C.  Cayley l  at  Harwich,  whilst  the 
northern  portion  was  allotted  to  Captain  Alfred  A.  Ellison, 
C.B.,  at  Lowestoft. 

Simultaneously  with  a  careful  reconsideration  of  anti- 
submarine patrols,  the  ever-present  mine  question  had 
to  be  studied  afresh.  In  order  to  safeguard  ships,  especi- 
ally mine-sweepers,  various  mine-catching  devices  were 
tried,  affixed  to  the  ships'  bows,  but  they  were  clumsy 
and  in  bad  weather  soon  carried  away.  Mines  were  being 
found  in  unexpected  places,  some  of  them  having  drifted 
from  their  original  areas.  From  the  Tory  Island  field 
mines  had  been  carried  up  the  west  coast  of  Scotland 
and  had  become  a  menace  to  the  Tenth  Cruiser  Squadron, 
employed  on  important  patrol  duties  ;  several  ships  had 
sighted  and  sunk  some  of  them ;  and  the  armed  merchant 
cruiser  CLAN  MACNAUGHTON  of  this  squadron,  which 
mysteriously  disappeared  on  the  night  of  February  2nd, 
1915,  almost  certainly  struck  one  of  these  mines  off  the 
Hebrides.  Mines  were  reported  off  Whitby.  Some  had 
exploded  in  fishermen's  nets  out  in  the  Nortu  Sea  twenty- 
four  miles  east-north-east  of  Smith's  Knoll.  The  sailing 
trawler  Fleurette  caught  mines  in  her  trawl  whilst  fishing 
forty  miles  east  of  Lowestoft. 

Early  in  February  the  Admiralty  commissioned  at 
Barrow  two  paddle  steamers,  the  Queen  Victoria  and  Prince 
Edward,  and  fitted  them  to  lay  nets  on  a  very  extensive 
scale.  Each  could  carry  no  less  than  4,680  feet  of  net 

1  Afterwards  Rear- Admiral  George  C.  Cayley,  C.B. 


CH.  ix]  ORGANISATION  OF  PATROLS  379 

of  a  specially  designed  heavy  mesh,  with  sinkers  and 
buoys  complete.  The  intention  was  to  lay  the  net  in 
the  quickest  possible  time  without  stopping.  The  secret 
of  quick  net-laying  is  to  arrange  that  the  net  shall  run 
out  freely  without  any  check.  For  this  purpose  these 
two  vessels  had  all  superstructures  removed,  and  special 
troughs  were  fitted  from  which  the  nets  could  run  out 
over  the  stern  whilst  under  way.  Acetylene  lamps,  care- 
fully screened,  were  provided,  as  the  net-laying  was  to 
be  done  at  night. 

After  six  months  of  war  Germany's  naval  position  was 
already  determined,  and  then  came  the  "  war  zone " 
declaration  of  February  1915.  The  British  Admiralty 
was  not  unprepared  for  this  development.  All  round  the 
coasts  of  the  British  Isles  the  various  patrols  were  active, 
having  had  the  advantage  of  several  months'  experience 
in  their  duties.  Two  routes  were  possible  for  enemy 
submarines  seeking  to  get  far  afield.  They  would  penetrate 
either  via  the  North  of  Scotland  or  through  the  Dover 
Straits.  The  organisation  at  the  time  was  as  follows  : 
Assuming  the  enemy  should  proceed  north  of  the  Shet- 
lands,  .the  Shetlands  Patrol,  consisting  of  three  yachts 
and  eighteen  trawlers,  was  on  duty.  It  was  considered 
more  likely  that  a  submarine  would  pass  through  the  Fair 
Island  Channel,  the  north  side  of  which  formed  part  of 
the  Shetlands  Patrol  area,  the  southern  part  being  con- 
trolled by  the  Orkneys  Auxiliary  Patrol.  The  duty  in 
this  area  was  divided  among  three  patrols  :  the  Northern, 
the  Western,  and  the  Southern  Patrols,  based  on  Kirk- 
wall,  Stromness,  and  Longhope  respectively.  These  three 
patrols  comprised  between  them  no  fewer  than  ten  yachts 
and  seventy-two  trawlers.  Drifters  with  indicator  nets 
were  also  employed  in  the  northern  portion  of  the  Orkneys 
and  at  the  entrance  to  Scapa  Flow.  As  it  was  known  that 
enemy  submarines  were  accustomed  to  dive  to  about 
eleven  fathoms  when  harassed  by  small  craft,  the  patrol 
vessels  fitted  with  the  single  sweep  were  ordered  to  tow 
it  at  this  depth. 

Similarly  in  the  South  of  England  there  was  a  detailed 
organisation.  Besides  the  British  mine-field  across  the 
Dover  Straits,  which  actually  proved  of  little  practical  or 
moral  effect,  for  the  reason  that  most  of  the  mines  drifted 
away,  there  were  a  number  of  armed  drifters  guarding 


380     GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

the  northern  approach  to  the  Downs,  patrolling  north 
and  south  in  line  abreast.  These  craft,  under  Captain 
H.  E.  Grace,  R.N.,  were  based  on  Ramsgate.  They  were 
worked  in  three  divisions,  each  under  its  own  leader,  and 
two  divisions  were  always  on  patrol,  the  third  resting  in 
harbour.  They  patrolled  four  days  and  nights,  spending 
the  two  next  in  port.  A  few  miles  below  them  was  the 
Dover  Net  Flotilla,  riding  to  their  nets  across  the  Straits. 

Having  received  intelligence  of  impending  activity  in 
the  English  Channel,  the  Admiralty  issued  instructions 
on  February  llth  warning  the  bases  that  submarines  were 
expected  to  pass  through  the  Straits  on  the  next  and 
following  days,  and  that  they  had  been  lately  making 
the  Varne  Lightship  and  Buoy  when  so  passing  into  the 
Channel.  Captain  E.  C.  Carver,  R.N.,  was  given  orders 
to  keep  as  many  as  possible  of  his  Poole  drifters  cruising 
on  February  12th  and  the  following  days  between  St. 
Alban's  Head  and  St.  Catherine's  and  twenty  miles  to 
seaward.  The  Commodore  at  Portland  was  similarly 
advised  that  his  trawlers  should  cruise  between  Portland 
Bill  and  St.  Alban's  Head  and  twenty  miles  to  seaward. 
The  Commander-in- Chief  at  Devonport  was  directed  to 
have  his  trawlers  patrolling  between  the  Eddystone  and 
Start  and  twenty  miles  to  the  seaward.  But,  in  spite 
of  this  vigilance,  submarines  passed  through  the  patrols. 
On  the  13th  one  was  sighted  off  St.  Valery-en-Caux,  and 
another  twenty- five  miles  west- south- west  of  Cape  Gris 
Nez.  On  the  15th  U16,  while  on  her  way  south  from 
Heligoland,  chased  the  s.s.  Laertes  between  the  Schouwen 
Bank  and  the  Maas,  after  having  been  compelled  to 
remain  submerged  for  some  hours  owing  to  fog  off  Calais 
afterwards  torpedoing  the  British  collier  Dulwich 
miles  north  of  Cape  d'Antifer.  On  the  same  day  H.M.I 
UNDAUNTED  and  eight  destroyers  had  a  torpedo  fired 
them  when  off  Dungeness.  Next  day,  ai  2  p.m.,  UK 
sank  the  French  steamship  Ville  de  Lille  close  to  Caj 
Barfleur.  On  February  18th  she  torpedoed  the  Fren< 
s.s.  Dinorah  north  of  Dieppe,  and  then  returned 
Heligoland. 

Already   twenty- five   net   drifters   were   on   their   wa] 
from  Falmouth  to  Larne,  where  they  were  to  operate  ii 
the   North   Channel,    as    suggested   by  Admiral  Jellicoe, 
and  to  deny  that  passage  to  submarines.     They  stai 


CH.  ix]  IN   IRISH  WATERS  381 

with  only  their  fishing-nets  on  board,  but  as  soon  as 
they  could  be  supplied  wire  indicator  nets  were  to  be 
sent.  Another  twenty-five  drifters  were  under  orders 
for  Milford,  this  number  being  increased  eventually  to 
fifty.  Their  mission  was  to  foil  the  enemy  at  the  southern 
end  of  St.  George's  Channel.  Indicator  nets  were  also 
laid  in  the  Firth  of  Forth,  from  the  east  end  of  Inchgarvie 
to  Longcraig  Pier. 

On  the  day  that  the  German  submarine  blockade  began 
the  Admiralty  were  already  making  bold  alterations  in 
the  organisation  of  the  Auxiliary  Patrols,  in  order  to  meet 
this  intensive  warfare.  It  was  obvious  from  recent  events 
that  the  patrols  in  the  Irish  Sea  required  strengthening  con- 
siderably. Rear- Admiral  H.  H.  Stileman,1  of  Liverpool, 
had  enough  to  do  in  looking  after  the  local  Liverpool  area, 
for  which  duty  his  force  consisted  of  a  yacht,  two  armed 
trawlers,  and  ten  armed  drifters.  Hitherto  he  had  been 
in  command  also  of  the  Kingstown  and  Belfast  patrol 
craft,  but  these  areas  were  to  be  modified  as  follows  : 
The  Auxiliary  Patrol  force  in  Area  XVII  (Larne)  was 
placed  under  a  flag  officer,  Admiral  C.  J.  Barlow,  late  in 
command  of  the  yacht  Valiant,  being  appointed.  He 
was  stationed  at  Larne  and  given  general  control  of  Areas 
XV  and  XVI— that  is  to  say,  the  whole  Irish  Sea.  At 
his  disposal  was  a  "  flying  squadron  "  of  six  large  armed 
yachts,  in  addition  to  his  other  auxiliary  craft.  These 
were  the  Valiant,  Jeanette,  Marynthea,  Medusa,  Narcissus, 
and  Sapphire,  based  on  Belfast,  but  available  for  use 
anywhere  in  Areas  XV,  XVI,  and  XVII  for  concerted 
action  or  otherwise.  The  motor-boats  at  Belfast  remained 
there,  but  the  Belfast  Patrol  unit  was  withdrawn  to 
Kingstown,  where  Rear- Admiral  E.  R.  Le  Marchant 2  was 
appointed  in  charge  of  the  base  and  in  immediate  com- 
mand of  Area  XVI.  For  this  purpose  he  was  allotted 
three  yachts  and  eighteen  trawlers,  with  an  additional  two 
dozen  drifters  shortly  to  be  sent  out  to  him.  Besides 
these  two  flag  appointments,  Rear-Admiral  Charles  H. 
Dare  3  was  appointed  to  command  the  auxiliary  base  at 
Milford  Haven  and  in  immediate  charge  of  Area  XV,  the 
force  assigned  to  him  being  four  yachts,  twenty- four 

1  Afterwards  Rear-Admiral  Sir  H.  H.  Stileman,  K.B.E. 

2  Afterwards  Vice- Admiral  E.  B.  Le  Marchant,  D.S.O. 

3  Afterwards  Admiral  Sir  Charles  H.  Dare,  K.C.M.G.,  C.B.,  M.V.O. 


382     GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

trawlers,  and  fifty  drifters  ;  ten  of  the  latter  were 
armed. 

Strategically  the  North  Channel  between  Antrim  and 
the  Mull  of  Cantyre  resembles  the  Straits  of  Dover  between 
England  and  France.  The  instructions  to  Admiral  Barlow 
were  to  deny  the  North  Channel  to  enemy  submarines  and 
mine-layers.  For  this  purpose  he  was  to  have  a  yacht, 
eighty  drifters,  and  eighteen  armed  trawlers,  and  from 
February  22nd  all  merchant  ships  were  forbidden  to  use 
the  channel.  These  drifters  were  to  be  disposed  about 
a  parallelogram  thirty  miles  long  and  twenty- two  miles 
wide,  towing  their  nets  across  the  channel,  thus  making  it 
a  very  unhealthy  place  for  a  U-boat.  A  five-mile  space  at 
each  end  of  the  area  was  to  be  occupied  by  advanced 
patrol  lines.  Thus,  it  was  hoped,  a  submarine  would 
either  have  to  pass  through  the  channel  south  of  Rathlin 
Island,  or  else,  having  dived  to  a  depth  of  90  feet,  would 
reach  the  vicinity  of  Lough  Larne  almost  at  the  end  of 
her  diving  powers.  Orders  were  given  that  the  passage 
south  of  Rathlin  Island  should  be  thoroughly  patrolled 
and  denied  absolutely  to  the  enemy.  Each  drifter  carried 
at  least  800  yards  of  net,  which  when  laid  out  would  be 
almost  invisible  to  a  submarine  at  a  distance  of  three 
cables. 

The  instructions  to  Admiral  Le  Marchant  were  that  his 
principal  duty  was  to  watch  the  mail  route  from  Holyhead 
to  Kingstown  against  submarines  and  mine-layers. 
Admiral  Dare  was  to  hold  the  southern  end  of  the  Irish 
Sea  and  the  Bristol  Channel,  and  always  to  have  nets 
down  in  positions  where  submarines  might  be  expected  to 
make  landfalls.  When  opportunity  offered,  the  St. 
George's  Channel  was  to  be  netted,  and  he  was  to  be  ready 
to  send  out  all  his  drifters  to  shoot  their  nets  across  this 
channel.  On  March  15th  it  was  decided  to  establish  a 
sub-base  for  the  Auxiliary  Patrols  at  Rosslare.  Larne 
and  Dover,  because  of  their  strategical  similarity,  now 
became  the  two  greatest  net-bases.  In  both  areas  net- 
drifters  were  at  work  in  a  strong  tideway,  at  the  entrance 
to  a  region  where  submarines  had  proved  exceptionally 
dangerous.  The  tactical  principle  was  identical  in  the 
two  areas.  If  the  submarine  should  get  into  the  nets, 
each  section  of  net  was  so  easily  detached  that  the  one  in 
which  the  craft  was  entoiled  would  come  away  from  the 


CH.  ix]  THE   DRIFTERS   AT   WORK  383 

rest  and  foul  the  propellers,  causing  the  enemy  craft  to 
rise  to  the  surface.  For  this  purpose  two  things  were 
necessary  :  satisfactory  clips  that  would  allow  the  nets 
to  be  detached  at  the  right  amount  of  strain,  and  indicator 
buoys  to  announce  that  the  net  was  about  the  U-boat. 
It  was  only  after  weeks  and  months  of  experience  and 
much  experimenting  that  these  two  essentials  were 
achieved. 

By  the  last  week  of  February  the  nets  were  in  operation. 
Across  the  Dover  Straits  they  were  kept  in  position  by 
night  as  well  as  day,  except  in  bad  weather.  Each  drifter 
watched  its  own  eight  nets,  and  altogether  there  were 
many  miles  of  nets  in  use.  Across  the  North  Channel  the 
nets  were  working  satisfactorily,  except  that  the  kapok 
floats  soon  became  waterlogged.  This  difficulty  was 
experienced  in  many  other  areas,  so  gradually  kapok  gave 
way  to  small  glass  globes,  which  answered  the  purpose 
very  well. 

The  working  of  the  indicator  nets  was  a  task  entirely 
new  to  officers  of  the  Royal  Navy  ;  the  only  people  who 
were  at  all  expert  were  the  drifter  crews  themselves,  and 
to  their  suggestions  and  skill  the  success  achieved  was 
largely  due.  Without  the  fisherman  and  his  drifter,  it 
would  have  been  impossible  to  carry  out  this  particular 
method  of  harassing  the  submarine.  Before  February  was 
out,  the  merchant  steamers  on  their  way  up  and  down 
the  English  Channel  and  North  Sea  saw  these  wooden 
ships  with  mizzen  set  looking  after  their  nets  near  the 
Shipwash  Lightship,  the  Downs,  Dover  Straits,  St.  Alban's 
Head,  Start  Bay,  and  in  the  vicinity  of  Falmouth,  as  well 
as  up  the  Irish  Sea  off  the  Smalls  and  North  Channel. 

There  were  many  difficulties  to  contend  with  apart  from 
the  securing  of  efficient  clips  and  indicator  buoys.  Nets 
were  frequently  lost  in  bad  weather ;  at  Dover  no  fewer 
than  ninety  nets  were  lost  in  a  three  days'  gale.  Another 
sixty- eight  nets  were  lost  within  two  days  and  nights  of 
fine  weather  owing  to  various  causes,  especially  by  fouling 
submerged  objects.  There  was,  moreover,  a  shortage  of 
officers,  most  of  whom  were  junior  Royal  Naval  Reserve 
officers,  to  take  charge  of  drifter  divisions.  The  drifter 
skippers  themselves  were  found,  generally  speaking,  to  be 
good,  competent  men,  keen  and  enthusiastic  in  their  work. 
They  stuck  to  their  job  in  all  sorts  of  weather,  risking 
26 


384    GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH,  ix 

destruction  from  mines  and  submarines,  and  keeping  a 
vigilant  watch  for  the  enemy. 

The  outlook  was  promising  at  this  period.  On  Feb- 
ruary 20th  a  submarine  was  reported  by  H.M.  Destroyer 
VIKING  to  be  in  the  nets  near  the  Varne.  "It  is 
quite  certain,"  stated  Admiral  Hood,  "  that  a  submarine 
was  in  the  net  when  it  moved  away  from  the  VIKING. 
I  believe  the  net  tore  away,  and  when  the  buoy  stopped, 
the  submarine  got  away."  Nor  was  this  the  only  incident 
of  the  kind  at  this  early  stage.  Information  came  to 
hand  that  a  submarine  had  been  sighted  fifteen  miles 
south  of  St.  Alban's  Head,  and  on  February  19th  a 
Royal  Naval  Reserve  sub-lieutenant  was  sent  from  Poole 
with  three  drifters  to  lie  to  their  nets  near  this  spot  for 
twenty-four  hours.  They  shot  the  nets  about  2.30  p.m. 
Nothing  occurred  until  about  twelve  hours  later,  when 
the  skipper  of  the  drifter  White  Oak  saw  a  bright  white 
light  to  the  northward  crossing  his  bows  to  the  west- 
north-west.  It  was  visible  for  a  quarter  of  an  hour, 
and  then  disappeared.  Twenty  minutes  later  he  saw  a 
dark  object  moving  towards  him,  and  called  the  ship's 
boy  to  confirm  his  opinion.  The  indicating  buoy  of 
the  net  next  to  the  drifter  then  flashed,  thus  showing 
there  was  something  foul  of  the  nets.  The  skipper  called 
the  sub-lieutenant.  For  five  minutes  the  light  burned, 
and  then  disappeared,  and  the  nets  seemed  to  move 
towards  the  White  Oak,  the  engines  of  which  were  moved 
slowly  astern  for  a  couple  of  minutes  to  keep  clear.  Shortly 
after  this  the  warp  began  to  tauten,  and  in  order  to 
prevent  its  parting,  three  bladders  were  bent  on  to  the 
warp  and  the  end  let  go.  While  this  was  being  done, 
several  more  lights  were  seen  flashing  in  the  direction  of 
the  nets,  but  these  and  the  buoyed  end  of  the  warp  dis- 
appeared almost  at  once.  The  drifter  was  then  turned 
to  the  eastward,  and  when  daylight  came  she  steamed 
round  about,  but  nothing  more  was  seen  of  the  buoys  or 
nets.  Next  day  the  same  officer  was  again  sent  to  the 
spot,  and  repeated  the  procedure  at  7.30  a.m.  on  the 
following  morning.  He  shot  his  nets,  and  they  again 
fouled  some  obstruction.  This  incident,  though  not  con- 
clusive, made  it  highly  probable  that  a  submarine  had  got 
entangled  in  the  nets.  At  the  least,  it  afforded  some 
encouragement  to  the  drifters.  This  was  by  no  means 


CH.  ix]  A  SUBMARINE  NETTED  385 

unwelcome,  for  the  submarines  were  unusually  active. 
Steamships  were  being  attacked  in  the  English  Channel 
and  the  Irish  Sea.  The  neighbourhood  of  Beachy  Head 
was  becoming  a  favourite  resort  for  the  enemy,  five  ships 
having  been  sunk  in  that  locality  within  two  days.  The 
hospital  ship  St.  Andrew  was  attacked  ten  miles  north- 
west by  west  from  Boulogne,  probably  by  one  of  the 
same  submarines,  and  three  days  later  the  s.s.  Thordis 
had  an  experience  which  has  already  been  described. 

In  another  area  a  trawler  sealed  the  fate  of  a  submarine 
in  somewhat  exceptional  circumstances.  At  about  3  p.m. 
on  February  23rd  the  steam  trawler  Alex  Hastie,  though 
a  Government  vessel,  was  fishing  105  miles  east- north- 
east of  the  Longstone  Lighthouse.  She  had  recently  put 
down  her  trawl,  and  all  available  hands  were  working 
at  the  catch  which  had  just  been  hauled  in,  when  a  peri- 
scope was  seen  approaching  at  great  speed.  It  was  too 
late  to  slip  the  fishing-gear  and  try  to  ram.  The  sub- 
marine's captain  must  have  been  either  very  inexperi- 
enced or  else  certain  that  this  was  a  disguised  trawler, 
and  showed  anxiety  to  keep  astern  of  her,  so  that  the 
trawler's  gun  would  not  bear.  The  Alex  Hastie,  however, 
was  neither  disguised  nor  armed.  The  submarine,  in 
attempting  to  pass  close  under  the  trawler's  stern,  appar- 
ently did  not  count  upon  the  trawl  wires  leading  down 
from  the  ship  many  feet  below  the  surface.  Suddenly 
she  fouled  the  wires,  and  on  board  the  trawler  the  crew 
listened  expectantly  to  the  twanging  and  creaking  of  the 
!  gear  as  it  withstood  the  heavy  strain.  Then  after  a  brief 
I  interval  there  rose  to  the  surface  a  strange  object,  with 
i  no  periscope  or  conning-tower  showing.  The  U-boat  was 
on  her  beam  ends.  Having  been  caught  in  the  trawl 
wires,  she  had  capsized,  and  twenty  minutes  later  she 
sank  to  the  bottom,  leaving  a  large  quantity  of  oil  on  the 
j  water. 

What  had  probably  happened  was  that  the  submarine 
| had  caught  her  periscopes  in  the  wires.  As  trawler  wires 
jare  of  2  J  inch,  they  stand  a  good  deal  of  tension.  There- 
upon the  periscopes  were  badly  strained,  causing  the 
glands  through  which  they  pass  into  the  hull  to  leak. 
Water  poured  into  the  vessel,  and  prevented  her  attaining 
her  upright  position  on  coming  to  the  surface.  Further^ 
!nore,  whilst  on  her  beam  ends  the  batteries  would  have 


386    GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

capsized  their  contents,  and  before  long  the  ship's  company 
must  have  been  asphyxiated.  The  Alex  Hastie  came  into 
port  a  proud  ship,  having  by  good  fortune  performed  a 
most  valuable  service,  and  the  Admiralty  divided  £100 
between  the  owners  and  crew. 

This  experience  was  followed  by  another  curious  incident. 
On  the  last  day  of  February  1915,  a  number  of  drifters, 
based  on  Portland,  shot  their  nets  at  daylight  in  a  position 
between  the  Skerries  Buoy  and  Combe  Point,  Start  Bay. 
This  was  an  area  which  it  was  believed  was  being  used 
by  submarines.  These  drifters  were  under  the  command 
of  Sub- Lieutenant  E.  L.  Owen,  R.N.R.  About  4  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  of  March  1st,  when  twenty  nets  were 
down,  a  section  of  them  was  seen  to  sink,  form  a  bight, 
and  then  travel  in  a  south-west  direction.  This  was  an 
extraordinary  phenomenon,  because  the  wind  was  blowing 
from  the  west,  "and  the  west- going  tide  had  not  yet  begun 
to  make.  There  was  no  possibility  of  mistake,  for  the 
nets  travelled  about  a  mile  and  a  half,  and  then  were 
found  to  be  foul  and  could  not  be  hauled  in.  Occasionally 
they  had  to  be  veered  out  in  response  to  violent  pulls,  as 
if  playing  a  fish.  Vibration  also  was  noticeable.  A  cast 
taken  with  the  lead  showed  only  six  fathoms,  whereas  the 
chart  gave  nine  and  a  half  fathoms  at  that  spot.  It  was 
noticed,  moreover,  that  the  lead  struck  something  hard. 
This  was  followed  by  a  sharp  pull  on  the  net,  about 
thirty  yards  being  suddenly  dragged  out  of  the  hold.  A 
dan-buoy  was  made  fast  to  the  net,  which  was  then  let 
go.  The  nets  continued  to  travel  to  the  south-west  inside 
the  Skerries  until  about  10.30  p.m.,  when  they  were 
made  fast  to  the  stem  of  the  drifter  Sarepta,  and  she 
anchored. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  March  2nd  Sub- Lieutenant 
Owen  proceeded  into  Dartmouth  in  the  drifter  The  Boys 
to  make  his  report,  and  then  returned  to  the  Sarepta, 
finding  her  still  at  anchor  with  the  strain  on  the  nets.  He 
presently  ordered  her  to  let  the  nets  go.  At  one  end  of 
the  nets  the  armed  trawler  SHELOMI  had  been  patrolling. 
An  explosive  charge  was  made  fast  to  her  sweep  wire, 
with  a  If-cwt.  sinker.  This  was  towed  over  the  position 
marked  by  the  dan-buoy.  About  noon  the  wire  fouled 
twenty  yards  south- south- west  of  the  buoy,  and  the 
charge  was  exploded.  A  black  patch  of  oil  then  came 


CH.  ix]  THE   STORY   OF  U8  387 

to  the  surface,  and  widened  to  an  area  of  over  a  hundred 
yards  in  diameter.  Two  more  ships  also  fired  their  explo- 
sive sweeps  over  the  spot.  A  diver  was  sent  down  on  the 
following  day,  and  was  unable  to  find  anything ;  yet  it 
seems  extremely  likely  that  a  submarine  had  been  in  the 
nets  and  was  blown  up,  for  oil  was  observed  two  days 
after  the  explosion  in  thick  patches  about  a  mile  away 
from  the  spot,  and  large  bubbles  about  a  foot  in  diameter 
rose  and  burst,  spreading  oil  on  the  surface.  Sweeping 
operations  continued  throughout  the  day,  but  no  obstruc- 
tion was  found.  This  was  one  instance  in  a  long  list  of 
highly  probable  sinkings  of  submarines,  though  the  fate 
of  the  craft  could  not  be  ascertained  with  certainty. 

On  the  day  that  these  operations  closed,  another  enemy 
submarine  farther  up  the  Channel  met  with  certain 
destruction,  the  best  possible  evidence  being  forthcoming 
in  the  shape  of  German  prisoners.  The  craft  was  U8, 
commanded  by  Kapitan-Leutnant  Stoss,  the  second  in 
command  being  Leutnant  Morgenroth.  The  captain 
was  a  very  experienced  submarine  officer,  having  been 
in  that  branch  of  the  service  for  seven  years.  U8  was  a 
vessel  of  about  800  tons,  fitted  with  four  torpedo  tubes, 
and  at  various  times  she  had  been  in  most  of  the  waters 
of  the  British  Isles.  She  had  come  out  of  Ostend  in  com- 
pany with  another  submarine,  and  the  sequence  of  events 
was  interesting.  March  4th  was  a  day  such  as  is  often 
experienced  in  the  English  Channel  during  the  early  spring. 
Periodically  fog  settled  down.  About  1  p.m.,  during  a 
sudden  lift,  a  submarine  was  sighted  five  miles  east-north- 
east of  the  north-east  Varne  Buoy,  by  the  officer  of  the 
watch  in  the  destroyer  VIKING,  whose  captain  at  the  time 
was  Commander  E.  R.  G.  R.  Evans,  second  in  command 
of  Scott's  last  Antarctic  Expedition,  who  was  destined 
to  add  to  his  laurels  in  the  famous  BROKE  and  SWIFT 
destroyer  action  in  1917.  As  soon  as  the  VIKING  saw 
the  submarine  out  of  the  fog,  she  attempted  to  ram  her, 
and  promptly  opened  fire  with  the  foremost  gun.  It  was 
too  late,  however,  as  the  U-boat  dived  immediately.  The 
destroyer  circled  round,  passed  over  the  submarine's 
wash,  and  began  to  follow  a  series  of  swirling  pools  which 
moved  north-west  slowly  for  half  an  hour.  The  pools 
then  turned  to  the  westward,  and  were  followed  for  fifteen 
minutes,  when  they  turned  west-south-west  until  about 


388     GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

4  p.m.  The  sea  was  calm,  and  the  track  of  the  under- 
water craft  was  quite  clear,  so  the  modified  explosive  sweep 
was  fired  by  the  first  lieutenant.  The  swirl  continued 
for  about  150  yards,  and  then  ceased.  Although  the 
VIKING  waited  near  the  spot  for  forty  minutes,  nothing 
more  was  seen  except  some  patches  of  oil.  This  may 
have  been  the  companion  vessel  of  the  U8,  as  Admiral 
Hood  suggested  on  examination  of  all  the  available  facts. 
No  corroborative  evidence,  however,  exists  as  to  the 
sinking  of  any  U-boat  as  a  result  of  this  operation. 

As  to  the  U8  herself,  the  first  incident  in  the  narrative 
is  that  the  drifter  Roburn  got  separated  from  the  rest  of 
the  drifters.  When  found,  she  was  four  miles  south-east 
of  Dover,  and  she  reported  that  about  12.30  p.m.  she  saw 
a  line  of  five  pellets  proceeding  in  a  westerly  direction 
against  the  tide  at  about  four  knots.  The  skipper  in- 
formed the  destroyer  COSSACK,  giving  the  bearing  of  the 
object  when  last  sighted.  Undoubtedly  there  must  have 
been  a  submarine  in  the  nets,  for  the  movements  of  the 
pellets  indicated  the  struggle  made  by  a  U-boat  to  get 
clear  by  going  ahead  and  astern.  At  1.15  p.m.  wireless 
signals  from  the  VIKING  concerning  her  submarine  reached 
Dover,  and  the  stand-by  destroyers  of  the  Sixth  Flotilla 
at  once  proceeded  to  sea. 

The  information  to  the  COSSACK  was  that  a  drifter  had 
caught  something  in  her  nets  six  miles  north-east  from 
the  north-east  Varne  Buoy.  When  Captain  C.  D.  Johnson, 
in  the  destroyer  MAORI,  with  the  stand-by  destroyers  left 
Dover,  he  found  the  VIKING  getting  out  her  sweep.  At 
2.17  the  destroyer  KANGAROO  sighted  a  buoy  moving 
fast  to  the  eastward.  An  hour  later  a  periscope  was 
sighted  one  mile  north  of  the  north-east  Varne  Buoy,  and 
at  3.51  the  VIKING  exploded  her  sweep  four  and  a  half 
miles  N.  30  E.  of  the  north-east  Varne  Buoy.  Five 
minutes  later  a  periscope  was  again  sighted  one  mile 
N.  20  E.  of  the  centre  Varne  Buoy.  The  destroyers  were 
now  ordered  to  close  on  this  position,  and  at  4.10  a  peri- 
scope was  seen  a  mile  from  the  centre  Varne  Buoy.  The 
destroyer  GHURKA  got  out  her  explosive  sweep  and  ran 
on  a  line  of  bearing  north-west  from  the  Varne  Lightship 
at  right  angles  to  the  submarine's  course,  which  was 
signalled  as  S.  65  W.,  speed  about  six  knots.  At  4.40  the 
MAORI  again  sighted  a  periscope  proceeding  in  the  same 


CH.  ix]        THE   SUBMARINE'S   DESTRUCTION  389 

direction.  At  5  p.m.  the  GHURKA  fired  her  explosive 
sweep.  Half  a  minute  later  the  stern  of  the  submarine — 
U8 — appeared  out  of  the  water  at  an  angle  of  45  degrees. 
Then  gradually  she  came  to  an  even  keel,  with  her  conning- 
tower  showing.  The  MAORI  and  the  GHURKA  each  fired 
a  shot,  hitting  the  conning-tower.  Several  Germans  came 
on  deck,  holding  up  their  hands  in  token  of  surrender, 
whereupon  the  order  to  cease  fire  was  given.  The  de- 
stroyers closed  to  the  rescue,  as  the  submarine's  crew, 
emerging  from  the  conning-tower,  rapidly  followed  one 
another  on  to  the  deck.  A  German  officer  was  seen  to 
throw  documents  overboard.  The  submarine  sank  within 
ten  minutes  of  breaking  the  surface.  Meanwhile,  ten  men 
were  taken  off  by  the  destroyer  NUBIAN'S  boat,  and  four 
officers  and  fifteen  men  by  the  MAORI'S  boat.  These 
twenty- nine,  the  German  captain  declared,  composed  the 
whole  of  the  crew. 

After  the  submarine  went  down,  a  large  quantity  of  air 
rose  to  the  surface,  but  no  oil.  The  pris6ners  admitted 
that  for  four  hours  they  had  been  chased  by  destroyers. 
Whilst  U8  was  travelling  submerged  at  a  depth  of  65  feet, 
an  external  noise  was  heard,  which  some  of  the  men 
likened  to  a  slight  explosion  and  others  to  a  jar,  as  if  a 
lump  of  iron  had  been  dropped  on  the  deck.  Later  a 
violent  explosion  occurred,  which  had  the  effect  of  causing 
the  vessel  to  leak.  Water  entered  two  compartments, 
and  there  was  a  bad  hole  in  the  ship's  hull.  Orders  were 
given  to  blow  out  the  main  ballast  tank,  whereupon  the 
submarine  came  to  the  surface,  the  second  engineer  re- 
maining below  to  sink  her  after  the  rest  of  the  crew  had 
made  sure  of  their  lives.  The  captain  appears  to  have 
lost  his  presence  of  mind,  the  explosion  having  been  so 
violent  that  the  bull's-eyes  of  the  conning-tower  were 
either  cracked  or  blown  in ;  some  sea- water  connection 
was  also  shattered  ;  and,  owing  to  a  short  circuit,  the 
engine  suddenly  stopped.  Though  the  drifters  had  not 
actually  sunk  the  U8,  they  had  rendered  most  valuable 
help  in  her  destruction.  It  was  the  opinion  of  Admiral 
Hood  that  she  had  got  foul  of  the  drifters'  nets,  and  so 
eventually  was  forced  to  come  to  the  surface.  "  The 
destruction  of  the  submarine,"  wrote  the  Admiral,  "  is 
a  great  proof  of  the  value  of  the  modified  sweep.  It 
appears  that,  in  conjunction  with  the  indicator  nets,  it  is 


390    GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  TX 

of  the  greatest  value."  The  Admiralty  rightly  considered 
that  the  crews  of  the  trawlers  and  drifters  which  took 
part  in  the  hunt  had  contributed  to  the  destruction  of 
the  submarine,  and  they  awarded  £500  to  be  distributed 
among  them. 

A  day  or  two  later  Admiral  Hood  reported  that  eleven 
miles  of  net  had  been  laid  across  the  Straits.  "  I  am  quite 
confident,"  he  stated,  "  that  they  form  a  real  obstacle  for 
the  enemy's  submarines  in  the  Straits.  I  was  sure  of  this 
before  the  destruction  of  U8,  and  I  am  quite  certain  now. 
One  of  the  most  certain  reports  received  from  prisoners 
of  U8  was  that  she  had  been  harried  for  a  considerable 
time ;  she  can  only  have  been  harried  by  the  drifter  fleet 
and  their  destroyer  support.  .  .  .  The  destruction  of  U8  has 
caused  a  real  encouragement  to  the  officers  and  men  of 
the  flotilla." 

Six  days  after  the  sinking  of  U8,  another  enemy  sub- 
marine, U12,  met  with  a  like  fate.  Again  the  Auxiliary 
Patrol  co-operated  with  the  destroyers.  For  the  best 
part  of  four  days  the  patrol  yachts  and  trawlers  hunted 
this  craft,  the  chase  extending  over  120  miles,  until  at 
last,  on  March  10th,  U12  was  rammed  by  the  destroyer 
ARIEL  outside  the  Firth  of  Forth  and  sunk.  "  Great 
perseverance  and  skill,"  wrote  Admiral  Lowry  to  the 
Admiralty,  "  were  displayed  by  the  officers  and  men  of 
the  yachts  and  trawlers  concerned.  .  .  .  The  yachts  and 
trawlers,  by  their  skill  and  steady  persistence  in  antici- 
pating the  probable  movements  of  the  submarine,  and 
sighting  her  when  she  again  came  to  the  surface,  materially 
contributed  to  her  destruction."  Not  only  the  Auxiliary 
Patrol  vessels,  but  private  fishing  trawlers  as  well,  helped 
in  bringing  about  this  satisfactory  result  of  a  long  chase. 
It  was  directly  owing  to  information  given  by  the  private 
trawler  May  Island  that  the  submarine  was  sunk,  and 
to  her  owners  and  crew  the  Admiralty  awarded  £500. 
To  each  of  the  three  private  trawlers  Straihisla,  Ben 
Strome,  and  Olive  Branch  they  sent  £62.  In  addition, 
five  vessels  of  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  received  awards.  The 
armed  trawlers  Duster,  Coote,  Chester,  and  Martin  were 
each  paid  £62,  and  a  similar  amount  went  to  the  armed 
yacht  Portia. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  on  the  day  when  the 
ARIEL  sank  the  U12,  still  another  submarine  was  destroyed 


CH.  ix]       A  DRIFTER     SKIPPER'S  DARING  391 

in  the  Dover  Straits.  On  the  previous  day  a  submarine 
had  shelled  and  sunk  the  French  steam  fishing- vessel 
Grisnez,  belonging  to  Boulogne,  at  a  spot  twenty  miles 
west- south- west  of  Beachy  Head.  On  the  same  day, 
also,  the  s.s.  Blackwood  was  torpedoed  eighteen  miles 
south-west  by  south  of  Dungeness,  and  five  minutes  later 
a  second  submarine  was  sighted.  There  was,  therefore, 
plenty  of  evidence  that  the  enemy  was  still  able  to  use 
the  Straits.  Commander  Evans,  of  the  VIKING,  observed 
a  chain  of  swirling  pools  one  mile  north-east  of  the  north- 
east Varne  Buoy,  and  he  proceeded  to  follow  them.  This 
was  at  1  p.m.  At  4.8  p.m.  the  destroyer  GHURKA  came 
along  to  assist,  and  the  swirls  eventually  settled  down  to 
a  course  N.  75  E.  Both  ships  got  out  modified  explosive 
sweeps,  and  at  4.25  p.m.  the  GHURKA  fired  hers  right  in 
line  of  the  track  three  miles  from  the  Varne  Buoy.  The 
track  immediately  ceased.  All  the  circumstances  were 
thus  similar  to  those  of  the  second  submarine  encounter 
of  March  4th.  Again  the  drifters  gave  help.  They  were 
with  their  nets  to  the  east  of  the  Varne,  and  the  peculiar 
track  of  the  submarine  suggested  that  she  was  trying  to 
avoid  them  on  the  west  side  of  the  Buoy. 

The  fighting  spirit  of  the  fishermen  could  scarcely  have 
been  better  in  any  age  of  our  country's  history.  There 
is  something  suggestive  of  Elizabethan  sea-hardihood  in 
some  of  these  fights  against  heavy  odds.  Nothing  is  more 
typical  of  their  daring  than  the  cool  audacity  of  the  un- 
armed drifter  Rival.  In  the  month  of  March  submarines 
were  again  infesting  the  Irish  Sea,  and  in  order  to  thwart 
them,  drifters  were  operating  off  the  Smalls.  One  of  these 
was  the  Rival.  On  March  16th  reports  were  received  of  a 
submarine  which  obviously  was  lying  in  wait  for  a  large 
steamer  that  was  making  up -Channel.  The  Rival,  though 
she  had  no  gun,  determined  to  attack  the  enemy  with  her 
stem,  and  the  skipper  did  his  best  to  ram  with  such  deter- 
mination that  twice  she  narrowly  missed  hitting  the  sub- 
marine, which,  after  a  pursuit  lasting  a  quarter  of  an  hour, 
dived  and  was  not  seen  again.  The  Admiralty  so  highly 
regarded  this  prompt  action  that  they  sent  the  skipper 
an  expression  of  their  appreciation. 

By  the  end  of  March  the  issue  was  made  to  Auxiliary 
Patrol  vessels  of  bomb- lances  intended  to  be  thrown  at 
submarines  whenever  the  latter  came  near  enough.  Mean- 


392     GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

while  an  improved  type  of  indicator  buoy  was  required, 
and  experiments  were  being  made  at  various  bases.  The 
difficulty  was  to  devise  a  buoy  that  would  not  strip  its 
piece  of  tin  in  a  tideway  and  so  expose  its  calcium  phos- 
phide, thus  causing  a  light,  and  yet  would  strip  and  show 
the  light  at  the  slow  speed  of  a  submarine  dragging  on 
the  nets. 

There  are  no  fishermen  more  hardy  than  those  who 
earn  their  livelihood  in  drifters  ;  they  are  unacquainted 
with  fear,  and  their  ships,  with  their  bold  sheer  and 
pleasing  lines  and  easy  behaviour  in  a  seaway,  are  exactly 
suited  for  the  crews  who  sail  in  them.  April  3rd  supplied 
an  illustration  of  courage  and  resource  on  the  part  of 
one  of  these  crews.  The  drifter  Boy  Willie  was  proceeding 
down  the  English  Channel  bound  for  Milford,  where  a 
very  large  flotilla  of  these  craft  were  collecting  to  serve 
under  Admiral  Dare.  It  was  a  wild  day,  with  a  westerly 
gale  blowing,  showers  of  heavy  rain,  and  thick  weather 
generally.  At  8.30  a.m.,  the  Boy  Willie,  when  five  miles 
west- north- west  of  the  Lizard,  sighted  a  submarine.  Near 
the  enemy  vessel  was  a  neutral  steamer,  whose  conduct 
seemed  suspicious  to  the  skipper  of  the  drifter.  The 
submarine  was  travelling  at  such  a  pace  that  chase  was 
useless  ;  the  drifter,  too,  had  no  gun,  so  the  only  thing  to 
do  was  to  pass  the  news  on.  The  Boy  Willie  put  her 
helm  hard  over,  and  hastened  to  inform  the  Falmouth 
net- drifters  which  were  operating  off  the  Lizard.  They  set 
to  work  to  look  for  the  enemy  in  spite  of  the  nasty  sea 
that  was  running.  At  1.30  p.m.  a  submarine  was  reported 
off  the  Runnelstone.  Four  hours  later  she  was  again 
sighted,  the  vessels  of  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  keeping  her 
busy.  Orders  were  sent  for  ten  drifters  to  lay  nets  from 
Lamorna  Cove  to  the  south-west  before  daylight,  in  case 
the  enemy  craft  should  go  into  Penzance  Bay.  Nothing 
was  actually  found,  but  one  of  the  drifters,  the  Lily  Oak, 
on  returning  from  patrol  the  next  day,  brought  convincing 
evidence  that  a  submarine  had  gone  through  her  nets  on 
April  4th,  causing  damage. 

It  was  known  at  the  Admiralty  that  in  consequence  of 
our  use  of  indicator  nets  the  German  submarines  were 
being  fitted  with  a  net- cutting  device  at  the  bows,  by 
means  of  which  it  was  hoped  to  cut  a  way  through  these 
entanglements.  On  more  than  one  occasion  a  U-boat 


CH.  ix]  A  NARROW  ESCAPE  393 

made  her  escape  by  this  means,-  after  having  been  well 
caught  in  the  nets.  In  other  instances  the  submarine 
seems  to  have  got  away  with  the  nets  about  her,  either 
to  sink  or,  with  good  fortune,  to  manoeuvre  herself  free. 
Some  such  escapes  were  narrowly  separated  from  total 
destruction.  Three  days  before  the  submarine  had  got 
entangled  in  the  Lily  Oak's  nets,  the  drifter  Jeannies, 
based  on  Yarmouth,  Isle  of  Wight,  was  operating  off 
Christchurch  Head  in  company  with  Torpedo-boat  No.  027. 
At  6.30  p.m.  she  had  shot  her  nets.  Two  hours  later  the 
Jeannies'  skipper  was  standing  by,  when  he  noticed  a 
violent  tug  on  the  net  wire.  This  could  only  mean  a 
submarine.  The  fast-revolving  propellers  were  at  the 
same  time  distinctly  heard,  as  if  a  submarine  were  right 
underneath  the  drifter.  Everyone  familiar  with  the  sea 
knows  that  down  in  the  hull  of  a  ship  sounds  can  be  heard 
much  more  distinctly  than  on  deck.  Wooden  ships  have 
been  known  to  pick  up  warning  signals  in  foggy  weather 
by  sending  a  man  below,  when  nothing  was  audible  above. 
In  this  case  so  clearly  were  the  noises  heard  in  the  drifter's 
hull  that  the  engineer  came  running  up  on  deck,  expecting 
the  ship  every  moment  to  be  rammed  by  an  approaching 
vessel.  The  skipper  fired  a  couple  of  green  rockets  to 
inform  the  torpedo-boat  that  a  submarine  was  in  the 
nets.  The  searchlight  was  switched  on,  whereupon  the 
submarine's  engines  stopped  immediately  and  were  not 
heard  again.  It  was  found  that  the  strain  on  the  wire 
warp  had  gone,  and  when  it  was  hauled  in  the  nets  were 
gone  also.  Unfortunately  at  this  early  period  in  the  war 
the  depth-charge  was  not  in  use,  or  another  would  cer- 
tainly have  been  added  to  the  long  list  of  destroyed 
submarines. 

Attention  must  now  be  turned  to  another  aspect  of 
the  enemy's  offensive.  German  seamen  were  never  favour- 
ites with  British  sailors.  Among  the  "  square-heads," 
to  use  sea  language,  there  were  undoubtedly  some  first- 
rate  sailors,  principally  to  be  found  in  full- rigged  ships 
trading  across  the  Atlantic,  round  the  Horn,  and  up  the 
west  coast  of  South  America.  But  these  men  were  the 
exception.  The  outrages  and  horrors  committed  by 
the  German  Army  in  its  advance  towards  Paris,  the  sink- 
ing of  peaceful  craft,  with  their  passengers  and  crews,  by 
submarines,  and  the  losses  caused  by  the  German  raiders 


394     GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

on  the  high  seas — all  these  incidents  served  to  increase  the 
dislike  of  British  seamen  of  everyone  and  everything  of 
German  origin.  In  proportion  as  the  submarines  sank 
British  trawlers  engaged  in  fishing,  so  the  racial  antipathy 
deepened.  The  flame  of  resentment  burnt  not  only  among 
the  fishermen  crews ;  it  was  not  less  strong  with  the 
trawler- owners.  One  firm  wrote  to  the  Admiralty  :  "  We 
beg  respectfully  to  suggest  that  an  Admiralty  representative 
at  the  principal  fishing-ports  might  have  the  trawler 
skippers  before  them,  and  instruct  them  as  to  how  they 
should  act  on  sighting  a  submarine."  This  was  a  prac- 
tical suggestion,  and  the  Admiralty  at  once  acted  on  it. 
Arrangements  were  made  to  give  instruction  to  skippers 
of  fishing- vessels  in  anti-submarine  tactics.  They  were 
advised  not  to  work  alone,  but  to  navigate  and  fish  in 
close  company  for  mutual  support.  They  were  warned 
to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  and  maintain  a  good  head  of 
steam,  always  being  prepared  to  cut  away  their  gear  ; 
if  a  periscope  were  sighted,  the  trawler  was  to  be  headed 
straight  for  the  submarine.  Where  ramming  was  im- 
practicable, the  skipper  of  a  trawler  was  advised  to  blow 
his  whistle,  fire  a  rocket,  steer  to  windward  of  the  enemy, 
and  stoke  the  furnaces  so  as  to  place  a  dense  cloud  of 
smoke  between  the  submarine  and  trawler,  thus  increasing 
the  chances  of  escape. 

The  sinking  of  our  fishing  craft  during  the  spring  and 
summer  of  1915  became  a  most  serious  menace,  not  only 
because  of  the  loss  of  ships,  often  accompanied  by  valuable 
lives,  but  for  the  reason  that  it  might  cripple  the  fishing 
industry,  already  reduced  by  the  requisitioning  of  so 
many  hundreds  of  fishing-vessels  for  Admiralty  service. 
Between  April  18th  and  May  4th  eighteen  fishing-vessels 
had  been  lost  in  the  North  Sea  by  the  action  of  submarines. 
How  to  protect  the  industry  was  not  an  easy  problem  to 
solve.  There  were  two  alternatives  :  either  all  the 
fishing-vessels  must  be  concentrated  into  a  very  few 
fleets,  with  an  Auxiliary  Patrol  operating  close  to  hand, 
or  else,  in  order  to  prevent  further  disasters,  they  must  be 
kept  in  port.  This  second  alternative,  if  adopted,  would 
have  deprived  the  country  of  a  valuable  food  commodity, 
caused  distress  along  the  coast,  and  ruined  trades  depen- 
dent on  fishing ;  in  short,  it  would  have  brought  about  the 
very  conditions  which  the  enemy  was  anxious  to  produce. 


en.  ix]    PROTECTING  THE  FISHING  FLEETS  395 

In  these  circumstances  a  conference  was  held  on  May  8th, 
1915,  at  the  Admiralty.  Officials  from  the  British  Vessels 
War  Risks  Club  of  Hull,  from  the  Board  of  Trade  and 
the  Board  of  Agriculture  and  Fisheries  were  present,  in 
addition  to  the  Admirals  of  Patrols  and  the  Fourth  Sea 
Lord.  The  whole  subject  of  naval  protection  of  fishing- 
vessels  of  the  North  Sea  was  thoroughly  investigated. 
Roughly,  the  North  Sea  fishing  craft  were  divided  into 
four  classes,  each  of  which  required  special  consideration. 
The  largest  number  of  craft  were  those  which  fished  on 
the  Dogger  Bank.  These  fleets  comprised  150  to  200 
vessels,  and  so  far  neither  mines  nor  submarines  nor  enemy 
warships  had  prevented  them  from  going  about  their 
business.  It  was  decided  that  the  best  means  to  protect 
the  Dogger  Bank  craft  was  to  have  naval  patrols  ;  later 
Auxiliary  Patrol  trawlers  and  steam-yachts  were  sent  out 
to  ensure  their  safety. 

The  Aberdeen  Fleet  of  about  seventy  vessels  presented 
somewhat  different  conditions.  These  vessels  were  accus- 
tomed to  fishing  some  distance  off  the  coast,  and  arrange- 
ments were  made  to  protect  them  by  two  or  three  of 
Admiral  Simpson's  armed  trawlers  from  Peterhead.  The 
Grant  on  and  Dundee  fleets,  it  was  suggested,  should  be 
concentrated  near  Bell  Rock.  These  vessels  numbered 
about  forty- five.  Finally,  there  were  some  fifty  English 
vessels  working  from  Scarborough,  Shields,  Hartlepool, 
and  Sunderland,  which  fished  between  Sunderland  and 
Whitby.  These  also  had  to  be  concentrated  in  a  place 
convenient  for  patrol  vessels.  Experience  had  shown  that 
submarines  usually  avoided  fishing  fleets  which  kept  well 
together.  Thus,  in  addition  to  its  special  work  of  hunting 
and  destroying  submarines,  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  was  now 
charged  with  the  duty  of  protecting  the  fishing  fleets. 

The  need  for  protection  had  been  brought  home  by 
several  unhappy  experiences.  A  case  in  point  may  be 
cited.  On  May  3rd  the  steam  trawler  Coquet  was  fishing 
160  miles  north-east  of  the  Spurn.  It  was  a  fine,  clear 
day,  with  a  light  north-east  breeze  and  a  moderate 
swell.  Two  miles  away  in  one  direction  was  the  trawler 
Progress,  while  the  Hector  was  two  and  a  half  miles  distant 
in  another.  During  the  afternoon  the  Coquet  was  steaming 
ahead  at  3  knots,  with  her  trawl  out,  when  the  conning- 
tower  of  a  submarine  came  up  a  mile  away.  The  German 


396     GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

vessel  headed  straight  for  the  trawler,  and  brought  up 
quickly  on  the  Coquet' 's  port  beam,  with  engines  going 
astern  and  deck  awash.  On  the  submarine's  deck  were 
seven  men,  holding  on  to  the  wire  lifelines  which  ran 
from  the  top  and  on  the  conning- tower  to  each  end  of 
the  craft.  In  the  conning-tower  were  five  others, 
who  were  peering  through  Zeiss  glasses.  The  submarine 
captain  hailed  Skipper  Odell,  saying  in  good  English,  "  I 
will  give  you  five  minutes  to  leave  your  ship  and  come 
on  board  here."  The  skipper  stopped  his  engines  and 
the  crew  of  nine  got  the  trawler's  boat  over  the  side,  amid 
repeated  shouts  to  them  to  "  hurry  up,"  and  rowed 
alongside  the  submarine,  the  men  being  then  hauled  up 
on  her  deck.  Five  of  the  submarine's  crew  thereupon 
jumped  into  the  boat  with  an  explosive  charge  and  a 
coil  of  time  fuse.  Meanwhile  the  submarine  headed  for 
the  trawler  Progress,  who  had  taken  her  for  a  British 
submarine.  The  Progress  now  realised  her  mistake,  and 
getting  in  her  trawl  steamed  away  as  hard  as  she  could 
go.  For  a  while  it  was  a  keen  chase,  but  the  submarine 
soon  overhauled  her.  Skipper  Odell  and  his  men  were 
cleared  from  forward  of  the  conning-tower  to  aft,  as  the 
submarine  was  about  to  use  her  gun.  During  this  chase 
the  water  was  washing  the  Coquet's  men  up  to  their 
waists,  their  hold  on  the  lifelines  alone  preventing  them 
from  being  washed  overboard. 

When  at  effective  range  of  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  the 
submarine  fired  four  shots  at  the  Progress,  whereupon 
the  latter  stopped  her  engines,  and  the  submarine 
brought  up  about  twenty  feet  off  the  trawler's  starboard 
side.  Again  the  submarine  gave  the  trawler's  men  five 
minutes  in  which  to  leave  their  ship,  and  removed  them 
to  the  U-boat,  from  which  a  demolition  party  set  off. 
After  the  Germans  had  returned  to  the  submarine,  the 
Progress's  crew  pulled  away  in  their  own  boat,  and  when 
300  yards  away  they  saw  the  port  side  of  their  ship  blown 
right  out,  and  she  sank  like  a  stone.  The  submarine 
returned  to  the  Coquet,  having  been  away  half  an  hour. 
The  demolition  party  had  rummaged  the  ship,  and  brought 
off  all  the  charts,  including  one  of  the  North  Sea  which 
had  marked  upon  it  all  mine-fields,  both  German  and 
British,  as  well  as  the  fishing-areas.  This  chart  the  sub- 
marine captain  opened  and  scanned  with  great  interest. 


CH.  ix]  "  SARNIA'S "   GALLANT  FIGHT  397 

Then,  having  taken  the  trawler's  provisions  and  other 
articles,  the  Germans  gave  the  men  a  few  biscuits  and 
some  butter  and  milk,  in  addition  to  the  binnacle  compass, 
and  cast  them  off  in  their  own  boat.  The  Coquet  sank, 
and  the  submarine,  staying  only  to  send  the  Hector  to 
the  bottom  with  twenty  rounds  of  gunfire,  made  away 
to  chase  two  more  craft  to  the  north-west.  This  in- 
cident furnishes  a  typical  instance  of  the  way  the  enemy 
sank  fishing  craft  and  cast  their  crews  adrift.  Such 
conduct  fired  these  fishermen's  patriotic  endeavours  to 
co-operate  with  the  Navy. 

Enthusiasm  in  the  work  was  exhibited  as  much  by 
the  Brixham  smacks  as  by  the  Humber  steam  trawlers. 
Information  given  by  the  Brixham  smack  Addax,  when 
fishing  in  the  English  Channel,  to  the  armed  boarding 
steamer  Sarnia  brought  about  a  spirited  engagement 
with  under-water  craft.  The  submarine  was  not  sunk, 
but,  thanks  to  the  prompt  intelligence  given,  a  valuable 
ship  was  saved.  The  smack  reported  at  7  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  April  llth  that  half  an  hour  previously  she 
had  seen  a  submarine  following  a  steamship  going  south- 
east. The  Sarnia  made  off  at  full  speed  to  search  for 
the  enemy,  and  soon  after  7.30  sighted  the  French  s.s. 
Frederic  Franck,  bound  for  London.  The  crew  had 
already  left  her,  and  were  in  the  boats,  and  a  submarine, 
U24,  was  seen  alongside  the  steamer,  then  about  three 
and  a  half  miles  off.  As  soon  as  the  Sarnia  approached, 
the  enemy  submerged.  The  Sarnia  then  commenced  to 
circle  round  the  steamer  at  20  knots.  At  8.15  the  peri- 
scope was  seen  about  800  yards  away  two  points  abaft 
the  port  beam.  Fire  was  opened  on  the  U-boat,  and  the 
Sarnia  made  towards  her,  but  the  periscope  disappeared. 
At  8.20  the  periscope  again  appeared  700  yards  distant 
six  points  on  the  Sarnid's  port  beam,  and  a  torpedo 
was  fired  which  the  vessel  avoided  by  skilful  use  of  the 
helm.  The  wake  of  a  second  torpedo  was  recognised,  and 
this  torpedo  was  also  avoided  by  the  use  of  the  helm 
and  engines.  This  torpedo,  the  Sarnia 's  captain  reported, 
"  would  have  been  a  certain  hit  had  there  been  one 
moment's  delay  in  carrying  out  my  orders  either  with 
helm  or  engines."  The  Sarnia  then  made  a  signal  by 
wireless  for  destroyers  to  come  to  her  assistance,  and 
proceeded  to  zigzag  at  full  speed  close  to  the  Frederic 


398    GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

Franck  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  completing  the 
destruction  of  the  French  ship,  and  to  keep  him  from 
attacking  other  steamers  which  were  passing  within  a 
short  distance,  one  of  them  being  a  Donaldson  liner  bound 
down-Channel. 

Every  time  the  captain  of  the  Sarnia  sighted  a  peri- 
scope he  did  his  best  to  ram,  but  without  success.  At  9.15 
it  became  certain  that  two  submarines  were  operating,  as 
the  periscopes  of  both  were  seen  simultaneously,  one  four 
points  on  the  port  bow  and  the  other  two  points  on  the 
port  quarter.  Fire  was  opened,  and  the  Sarnia  turned 
to  starboard  to  avoid  exposing  her  beam  to  either  enemy. 
A  shot  from  the  after-gun  struck  the  periscope  of  one  of 
the  submarines,  and  a  few  seconds  later  the  conning-tower 
was  just  awash.  The  second  shot  fell  a  little  short.  Nothing 
else  occurred  until  9.55  a.m.,  when  the  Sarnia  missed 
ramming  one  periscope  by  only  a  few  seconds.  The 
Sarnia' s  captain  concluded  that  the  submarine  with  the 
damaged  periscope  then  headed  away,  and  the  second  also 
broke  off  the  action,  for  after  10.20  a.m.  no  trace  was 
seen  of  either  of  them.  The  destroyers  presently  arrived 
and  took  the  crew  of  the  French  ship  on  board.  The 
destroyer  BITTERN  towed  the  Frederic  Franck  until  a 
couple  of  tugs  came  out  and  brought  her  safely  into 
Plymouth.  The  Sarnia's  captain,  Commander  H.  G. 
Muir,  R.N.R.,  had  fought  his  ship  with  great  skill  and 
determination,  and  received  an  expression  of  appreciation 
from  the  Lords  of  the  Admiralty.  The  Addax  having  given 
accurate  information  which  enabled  the  Frederic  Franck  to 
be  salved,  the  Admiralty  awarded  the  Brixham  men  £120. 

These  incidents  illustrate  the  manner  in  which  every 
branch  of  the  nation's  sea  services  contributed  to  harass 
and  defeat  the  enemy.  Fishermen,  with  their  wonderful 
eyesight,  combined  with  alertness  of  movement  and 
quickness  of  decision,  supported  with  fine  loyalty  the 
Royal  Naval  Reserve  officers,  themselves  possessed  of  an 
intimate  knowledge  of  merchant  shipping  and  its  ways; 
destroyer  officers  and  men  showed  a  devotion  beyond 
praise  ;  the  masters  and  men  of  handy  tugs  marshalled 
all  their  peculiar  knowledge  and  experience  in  coaxing 
into  port  ships  which  could  scarcely  float;  and  finally, 
officers  and  crews  of  merchant  ships,  threading  their  way 
among  unforeseen  perils,  played  their  part  nobly  in  the 


CH.  ix]   THE  WESTERN  END  OF  THE  CHANNEL  39$ 

struggle.  Never  before  in  the  world-seas  had  the  great 
brotherhood  of  seamen  co-operated  with  such  singleness 
of  purpose. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  nothing  was  known 
of  the  enemy's  submarine  strategy  and  tactics,  and  it  was 
only  after  many  losses  had  been  incurred  and  much  careful 
consideration  given  to  the  facts  disclosed  that  these 
began  to  be  revealed.  It  was  made  clear  by  actual  events 
that  Germany  regulated  her  submarine  operations  with 
characteristic  thoroughness  and  system.  The  persistence 
with  which  her  under-water  craft  endeavoured  to  pene- 
trate into  the  northern  bases  of  the  Grand  Fleet,  and 
waited  day  after  day  to  entrap  squadrons  and  single  ships, 
showed  that  part  of  her  plan  was  to  reduce  our  prepon- 
derance in  sea- power.  Collaterally  with  this  attack  on 
the  men-of-war  she  designed  to  destroy  merchant  shipping. 
To  this  end  Germany  sent  her  U-boats  to  operate  off  those 
points  where  merchant  vessels  most  thickly  congregated— 
off  the  approaches  to  Liverpool,  at  the  western  mouth  of 
the  English  Channel,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Beachy 
Head  and  Dungeness. 

The  enemy's  plan  having  been  revealed,  at  least  par- 
tially, the  task  which  fell  upon  the  Admiralty  was  so  to 
arrange  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  as  to  defeat  the  submarine 
strategy.  To  be  strong  at  every  part  of  the  coast  was 
impossible,  but  to  have  strong  concentrations  at  likely 
points  of  attack  was  at  least  feasible.  The  great  drawback 
was  that  the  naval  authorities  were  compelled  to  act 
largely  on  the  defensive.  The  defence  of  the  English 
Channel  at  its  eastern  end  became  daily  more  efficient 
through  the  increased  activity  of  the  patrols  and  the  use 
of  the  indicator  nets.  In  order  to  improve  conditions  at 
the  western  end,  trawlers  were  ordered  to  hasten  from 
Devonport  to  the  Scillies,  where  shipping  was  being  sunk 
with  impunity.  By  the  middle  of  April  a  complete  re- 
organisation had  been  made  of  Area  XIV,  which  included 
the  Scillies  and  the  Plymouth  neighbourhood.  Falmouth 
became  the  headquarters  for  the  yachts,  trawlers,  and 
drifters,  Captain  V.  E.  B.  Phillimore,  R.N.,  being  placed 
in  charge  of  them.  In  this  reorganisation  the  principle 
of  decentralisation  was  carried  out.  The  area  was  sub- 
divided into  four  sections  :  (a)  Newquay  to  the  Lizard  ; 
(b)  Lizard  to  Looe ;  (c)  Looe  to  Dartmouth ;  (d)  the 

27 


400    GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

Scilly  Islands.  To  each  of  these  sections  was  allotted  a 
steam-yacht  and  one  and  a  half  trawler  units,  excepting 
the  Scillies,  which  had  two  and  a  half  trawler  units.  A 
wireless  station  was  installed  at  St.  Mary's,  Scilly. 

Similarly,  the  Beachy  Head  vicinity  in  Area  XII  was 
reorganised.  This  section  extended  from  St.  Alban's 
Head  to  Dungeness.  In  order  to  strengthen  it,  the  yacht 
Conqueror  and  two  divisions  of  trawlers  were  sent  from 
Great  Yarmouth  to  Newhaven.  From  St.  Alban's  Head 
to  St.  Catherine's  the  patrol  of  the  area  was  maintained  by 
patrol  drifters  ;  from  St.  Catherine's  to  Beachy  Head  by 
a  division  of  six  trawlers  ;  from  Beachy  Head  to  Dunge- 
ness by  two  divisions  of  eight  trawlers.  In  addition,  the 
northern  section  of  the  transport  route  from  Spithead  to 
France  was  watched  by  a  division  of  six  trawlers,  and  an 
anti- submarine  boom  across  the  Channel  from  Folkestone 
to  Gris  Nez  was  being  constructed,  to  be  watched  by  the 
yacht  Diane  and  her  armed  trawlers.  From  Dover  nearly 
200  trawlers  and  drifters  were  working  in  the  Straits  by 
the  beginning  of  April.  But  though  the  improvement  in 
the  working  of  the  nets  there  caused  enemy  submarines 
to  get  caught  and  run  away  with  the  nets  almost  every 
day,  yet,  as  no  satisfactory  type  of  indicator  buoy  had  been 
evolved,  it  was  almost  impossible  to  tell  when  the  sub- 
marine had  fouled  the  nets.  However,  in  the  course  of 
time  the  right  kind  of  buoy  was  devised. 

The  Admiralty  concluded  that,  since  the  sinkings  off 
Beachy  Head  had  become  so  numerous,  submarines  were 
accustomed  to  go  to  ground  for  the  night  in  an  eleven- 
fathom  hole  two  miles  west  of  the  Horse  of  Willingdon 
Shoal.  Before  April  was  out  they  laid  a  number  of  sub- 
Merged  mines  off  Beachy  Head,  hoping  thereby  to  destroy 
the  enemy.  These  mines  were  safe  for  vessels  travelling 
on  the  surface,  but  dangerous  for  any  submerged  vessel 
or  for  one  anchoring  or  fishing.  The  area  was  consequently 
forbidden  for  the  last-named  purposes.  At  tiie  same  time 
still  more  fishing-vessels  were  being  taken  up  for  the 
patrols.  A  hundred  were  ordered  to  increase  the  Dover 
Fleet.  It  was  estimated  that  the  total  available  number 
of  steam-trawlers  in  the  United  Kingdom  was  about 
1,400.  Of  these  the  Admiralty  had  already  taken  up  975. 
In  some  ports  as  much  as  90  per  cent,  of  the  fishery  fleets 
had  thus  been  requisitioned,  in  others  practically  the 


CH.  ix]  LAYING  NETS  OFF   OSTEND  401 

whole  number.  Admiral  Jellicoe  again  telegraphed  that 
the  apparent  increase  in  the  number  of  enemy  submarines 
passing  north  about  rendered  the  Orkneys,  Shetland,  and 
Stornoway  patrol  specially  important,  and  he  asked  for 
more  trawlers.  The  vicinity  of  the  Butt  of  Lewis  and 
Cape  Wrath  required  strong  forces  to  protect  the  colliers 
and  other  ships  which  supplied  the  Grand  Fleet.  On 
April  29th  the  collier  Mobile  had  been  sunk  by  a  submarine 
oft  the  Butt  of  Lewis,  although  a  special  patrol  had  been 
established  in  that  vicinity. 

With  the  design  of  entrapping  enemy  submarines  as 
they  emerged  from  their  own  waters,  the  two  paddle- 
steamers,  the  Queen  Victoria  and  Prince  Edward,  already 
mentioned,  were  employed  in  April  in  a  special  operation. 
On  the  evening  of  April  7th  they  left  Harwich  under  Com- 
mander Maurice  Evans,  R.N.,  escorted  by  the  destroyers 
LAERTES  and  LYSANDER,  with  orders  to  lay  their  nets  off 
the  Belgian  coast.  For  this  operation  they  had  long  been 
rehearsing.  During  the  night  they  reached  the  Belgian 
coast,  but  it  was  not  possible  to  begin  work  until  dawn, 
as  all  the  sea-marks  had  been  removed.  At  4.50  a.m.  a 
mile  and  a  half  of  nets  were  laid  off  Ostend  in  twelve 
minutes,  the  nets  being  24  feet  deep.  Then,  just  as  the 
paddlers  were  finishing  their  task,  the  enemy's  forts  opened 
fire  and  got  off  a  hundred  rounds  at  the  Queen  Victoria 
and  Prince  Edward  and  the  destroyers,  as  it  happened 
without  causing  damage.  The  intended  surprise  failed, 
but  the  paddle-steamers  and  their  escort  made  home 
safely.  On  April  12th  the  Prince  Edward  laid  a  "trot" 
a  mile  long  east  of  the  South  Goodwins,  to  which  in- 
dicator nets  were  presently  moored. 

While  developing  their  submarine  attacks  upon  the 
British  merchant  ships,  the  Germans  in  no  way  relaxed 
their  activities  in  mine-laying,  and  to  meet  the  menace 
the  British  Admiralty,  by  the  summer  of  1915,  had  five 
separate  classes  of  mine- sweepers  in  the  Service.  They 
were  (1)  the  Fleet  sweepers,  including  the  old  gunboats 
SKIPJACK  and  JASON  ;  (2)  eight  auxiliary  sweepers  char- 
tered from  the  railway  companies  for  the  Grand  Fleet ; 
(3)  the  paddle-steamers  which  had  been  taken  up  for 
rapid  sweeping  near  the  coast;  (4)  the  mine-sweeping 
trawlers ;  and  (5)  another  class  lately  introduced  bearing 
the  old  historic  name  of  "  sloop." 


402    GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

It  being  known  to  Germany  that  the  armed  merchant 
cruisers  of  the  Tenth  Cruiser  Squadron,  engaged  upon  its 
assigned  mission  to  the  north  of  Scotland  in  intercepting 
ships,  were  using  Liverpool  for  coaling  and  refitting,  it 
was  deemed  likely  that  mines  would  be  laid  on  the  route 
to  this  base.  The  duty  accordingly  fell  to  the  Lough 
Swilly  sweepers  from  Barra  Head  to  Inistrahull  periodi- 
cally to  sweep  this  area.  There  was  also  reason  to  suspect 
that  mines  had  been  laid  between  the  Humber  and 
Southwold  mine-fields,  and  on  April  17th  the  suspected 
area  was  swept.  No  mines  were  discovered,  though  on 
the  way  out  from  Grimsby,  whilst  crossing  the  centre  of 
the  Humber  area,  the  paddle- ships  destroyed  five  moored 
mines.  A  curious  incident  occurred  on  the  day  following 
the  exploratory  sweep.  Near  the  spot  where  the  five 
mines  were  found,  two  British  trawlers,  the  Vanilla  and 
Fermo,  were  fishing.  Three  miles  south-west  of  the  Swarte 
Bank  a  submarine  torpedoed  the  Vanilla.  The  Fermo  was 
only  300  yards  off,  and  she  immediately  went  to  pick 
up  survivors  ;  whereupon  the  submarine  fired  a  torpedo 
also  at  her,  forcing  her  to  abandon  the  rescue  and 
escape.  The  explanation  of  this  incident  was  that  the 
Vanilla  was  suspected  to  have  witnessed  the  laying  of  the 
mines,  and  for  this  reason  the  enemy  was  determined 
that  none  of  her  crew  should  live  to  tell  the  tale.  From 
quarters  far  and  near  the  enemy's  activities  in  mine- 
laying  were  continually  being  reported.  On  April  26th 
the  British  fishing  trawler  Recolo  foundered  on  a  mine 
south  of  the  Dogger  Bank. 

In  preparation  for  an  intended  bombardment  of  the 
Belgian  coast  from  the  sea,  four  Grimsby  paddle-steamers 
were  sent  to  sweep  from  April  26th  to  28th,  and  on  their 
way  back  across  the  North  Sea  they  commenced  a  sweep 
four  cables  wide  in  an  area  where  the  Sutterton  had  found 
a  mine  in  her  trawl  a  few  days  before:  Whilst  the  Sagitta 
and  Westward  Ho  !  were  turning  south,  a  mine  exploded 
in  their  sweep.  A  few  minutes  later  another  mine  rose 
to  the  surface  in  the  same  sweep.  It  was  very  desirable 
that  a  specimen  of  these  mines  should  be  salved  for 
examination  by  British  naval  experts.  The  commanding 
officer  of  the  Sagitta  was  Lieutenant- Commander  W.  H.  S. 
Garnett,  R.N.R.,  a  Cambridge  wrangler  and  an  enthu- 
siastic yachtsman,  who  had  volunteered  and  received  a 


CH.  ix]  AN  OFFICER'S  PLUCKY  ACT  403 

commission  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  This  gallant 
officer,  disregarding  the  peril,  went  overboard,  swam  to 
the  mine,  and  dexterously  cut  the  electric  wires  about 
it,  after  which  it  was  hoisted  inboard  without  further 
incident.  For  this  plucky  act  the  Admiralty  sent  him  an 
expression  of  appreciation.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that 
some  months  later  Lieutenant- Commander  Garnett,  having 
in  the  meantime  transferred  to  the  Royal  Flying  Corps, 
met  his  death  in  a  flying  accident. 

From  the  condition  of  the  paint  on  these  Swarte  mines, 
it  was  evident  that  they  had  been  laid  quite  recently. 
Meanwhile  the  Tory  Island  mine-field  was  being  swept  up ; 
seven  more  mines  had  been  destroyed  by  the  Lough 
Swilly  sweepers,  and  altogether  forty-five  mines  had 
been  accounted  for  in  the  mine-field,  seventy- one  others 
having  drifted  away  and  been  destroyed  on  the  Irish  and 
Scottish  coasts.  On  April  23rd  still  another  ship  had 
blundered  into  the  field,  hit  a  mine,  and  foundered.  This 
was  the  Norwegian  s.s.  Caprivi,  which  was  sixteen  miles 
north- north- east  of  Tory  Island  at  the  time,  just  a  mile 
to  westward  of  where  the  sweeping  was  going  on.  Although 
the  eastern  part  of  the  area  had  been  pretty  well  cleared, 
yet  many  mines  still  remained,  and  prolonged  spells  of 
bad  weather  did  not  lessen  the  difficulties  of  the  task. 

In  the  meantime,  enemy  submarines  were  engaged  upon 
many  daring  enterprises,  in  spite  of  the  persistency  of  the 
patrols.  They  were  seen  south  of  the  Goodwins  and  near 
the  Lizard  ;  a  ship  was  torpedoed  off  the  Start,  in  a  strong 
south-west  wind  and  rough  sea.  They  were  operating 
successfully  off  the  French  coast,  and  in  mid- Channel, 
and  a  ship  was  chased  twenty  miles  south  of  the  Eddystone. 
Other  merchant  ships  were  sunk  south  of  St.  Catherine's, 
off  the  Wolf  Rock,  and  off  Beachy  Head.  Submarines 
were  reported  in  the  Irish  Sea,  off  the  entrance  to  the 
Bristol  Channel,  and  off  the  Owers.  A  cork  life-jacket 
picked  up  at  Trevose  Head,  Padstow,  marked  U21,  with 
an  impression  of  the  Iron  Cross,  and  a  torpedo  picked 
up  off  Farn  by  a  steamer  and  marked  U22,  showed  where 
the  enemy  had  been.  Off  Hartlepool  two  trawlers  sighted 
U16  on  the  surface  about  the  middle  of  April ;  another 
trawler  sighted  a  submarine  east  of  Aberdeen ;  an  armed 
yacht  attacked  still  another  near  May  Island  ;  the  New- 
haven  Patrol  vessels  had  chased  yet  another  off  Beachy 


404    GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

Head ;     and   a   Falmouth   drifter   pursued   one   for   two 
hours,  a  torpedo  being  fired  at  her  which  passed  under  her 
forefoot.     On  the  same  day  a  trawler  reported  having 
seen  and  run  over  a  submarine  off  Land's  End.     It  was 
even  reported,  with  some  show  of  credibility,  that  two 
German  officers  had  come  ashore  in  a  collapsible  boat 
and  landed  at  Cairn  Ryan,  near  Stranraer.     Ships  were 
being  attacked  or  sunk  near  the  North  Hinder  and  other 
parts  of  the  North  Sea.     Auxiliary  Patrol  vessels  were  in 
action  with  submarines  off  Fair  Island  and  Anvil  Point ; 
and  off  St.  Abb's  Head  the  trawler  Ben  Lawers  fired  forty 
rounds  at  an  enemy  craft  and  claimed  to  have  hit  her. 
Dense   black   smoke   was   observed,  and   the   submarine, 
apparently    damaged,    made    off,    being    chased    by    the 
trawler  until  lost  to  sight.     She  was  unable  to  dive,  and 
only  her  fast  surface  speed  saved  her.     At  the  end  of  April 
the  enemy  sank  a  couple  of  ships  off  the  west  coast  of 
Ireland,  near  the  Blaskets,  supplying  further  evidence  of 
the  radius  of  action  of  these  craft.     The  Auxiliary  Patrol 
in   these   embarrassing   conditions    had   to   maintain   its 
operations  with  vigilance  and  alertness.     Surprise  followed 
surprise,  but  it  was  never  long  before  each  new  develop- 
ment was  countered  by  fresh  strategy,  novel  tactics,  or 
improved    weapons.      Scarcely   had   the    patrols   become 
accustomed  to  mine  and  submarine  warfare  than  they 
had  to  prepare  for  offence  and  defence  against  aeroplanes 
and  Zeppelins.     Harwich  and  Lowestoft  trawlers,  in  con- 
sequence of  repeated  flights  of  Zeppelins  over  Lowestoft 
and  the  neighbourhood   of  Orfordness,  were  fitted  with 
anti-aircraft  guns.     By  night  and  by  day,  below  the  sur- 
face and  on  the  surface,  there  was  little  rest  for  the  already 
overworked  patrol  craft,  and  to  their  routine  duties  was 
added,  this  month  of  April  1915,  and  in  the  first  days  of 
May,  that  of  protecting  the  lines  of  communication  when 
the  10th  Division  of  the  British  Army  crossed  the  Irish 
Sea  from  Kingstown  to  Holyhead.     The  whole  of  this 
route  was  carefully  patrolled  by  auxiliary  ships  in  the 
following  manner : 

At  intervals  a  chain  of  trawlers  was  placed  just  outside 
Kingstown,  past  the  Kish  Lightship  right  across  until 
near  Holyhead.  In  addition,  five  steam-yachts  guarded 
the  route,  while  a  division  of  drifters,  with  their  indicator 
nets,  were  stationed  to  the  west  of  the  South  Stack  (at  the 


CH.  ix]    TROOPS  SAFELY  TRANSPORTED      405 

approach  to  Holyhead)  and  off  the  Codling  Bank,  to  the 
southward  of  the  Kish.  Actually  no  transport  was  tor- 
pedoed, but  on  the  day  when  the  last  of  the  troops  crossed, 
a  submarine  was  seen  by  the  trawler  Garu  three  miles 
west-north-west  of  the  South  Stack,  that  is  close  to  the 
route  of  passenger  ships.  The  trawler  gave  chase,  but 
the  enemy  dived. 

That  these  troops  were  moved  without  the  loss  of  a 
single    life    furnished    further    proof   of    the    increasing 
efficiency  of  the  patrols  and  of  the  respect  in  which  these 
craft  were  held  by  the  enemy.     The  keenness  exhibited 
by  the  crews  was  all  the  more  notable  in  view  of  the 
exacting  conditions  of  service  which  war  imposed  upon 
them,  in  association  with  many  days  on  end  unvaried  by 
any  incident  to  relieve  the  creeping  feeling  of  boredom. 
But  the  imagination  of  these  fishermen  had  been  stirred 
by  events  at  sea  since  the  opening  of  hostilities,  and  they 
did  not  fail  to  realise  the  possibilities  of  disaster  associated 
with  the  passage  of  this  division  of  the  British  Army, 
whose  safe  crossing  from  Ireland  to  England  constituted 
a  further  conspicuous  success  to  the  credit  of  this  impro- 
vised  force   which   had   already   shown   its   value   as   an 
extension  of  the  long  arm  of  the  British  Fleet.     From  the 
outbreak  of  war  down  to  the  end  of  April  1915,  twenty- seven 
trawlers  and  three  drifters  of  the  great  fleet  of  auxiliary 
craft  engaged  in  fighting  the  enemy  had  become  total 
losses.     Having  regard  to  the  risks  of  mine- sweeping  in 
dangerous  areas,  attacks  by  submarines,  and  losses  inci- 
dental to  navigation  during  winter  months  off  unlighted 
coasts,  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  had  been  fortunate  in  suffering 
so  lightly.     The  immunity  which  the  vast  majority  of 
these  vessels  had  experienced  was  due  not  to  any  want  of 
daring  and  resource  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  but  to  the 
seamanship,  courage,  and  adaptability  which  the  officers 
and  men  of  these  British  auxiliary  craft  had  exhibited  in 
conditions  of  uninterrupted  danger  and  difficulty. 

With  the  passing  of  the  long  nights  of  the  winter  of 
1914-15  and  an  improvement  in  weather  conditions  at 
sea,  it  was  expected  that  the  enemy  would  redouble  his 
attack  upon  sea-borne  commerce.  The  construction  of 
better  types  of  submarines  and  the  manufacture  of  thou- 
sands of  additional  mines  had  kept  the  German  shipyards 
and  engineering  shops  busy  since  the  outbreak  of  war. 


406     GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

Simultaneously  the  strength  of  the  British  patrols  had 
increased  as  fast  as  ships,  guns,  and  men  were  available. 
In  the  summer  of  1915  a  new  type  of  British  mine — the 
"  Cruiser "  mine,  which  was  the  direct  ancestor  of  the 
depth-charge — was  being  distributed  among  trawlers  and 
drifters,  the  idea  being  that,  when  circumstances  were 
favourable,  it  should  be  dropped  upon  submarines  from 
shoots  specially  fitted  for  the  purpose.  In  the  North 
Channel  a  dozen  sections  of  net  drifters  were  denying  the 
passage  to  the  enemy,  each  section  consisting  of  ten  or 
eleven  drifters,  commanded  by  a  sub- lieutenant  Royal 
Naval  Reserve,  whose  ship  was  armed  with  a  gun,  a  bomb, 
a  mine,  and,  later,  with  the  depth-charge ;  so  that  the 
chances  of  escape  of  any  submarine  which  found  itself 
entangled  in  the  nets  became  fewer. 

The  whole  organisation  was  improving  and  increasing. 
At  the  end  of  the  first  nine  months  of  war  there  were 
either  at  their  stations  or  fitting-out  63  armed  yachts 
and  524  trawlers  and  drifters  ;  arrangements  were  in  hand 
to  increase  the  number  to  83  and  631  respectively.  Apart 
from  these,  about  350  trawlers  and  drifters  were  employed 
in  mine- sweeping  and  watching  the  cleared  channels,  the 
auxiliary  craft  were  co-operating  in  the  Dardanelles  opera- 
tions, and  there  were  the  motor-boats. 

At  Dover  Rear-Admiral  Hood  had  been  succeeded  by 
Rear-Admiral  R.  H.  S.  Bacon,  D.S.O.,1  who  had  disposed 
his  drifters  in  a  four- sided  area  in  the  Straits  where 
submarines  were  very  likely  to  be  caught.  The  limits 
of  this  area  were  : 

(a)  Lat.  51°  3'  10",  long.  1°  19'  0"  E. 

(b)  Lat.  51°  8'  50",  long.  1°  29'  10"  E. 

(c)  Lat.  51°  5'  20",  long.  1°  51'  30"  E. 

(d)  Lat.  50°  54'  30",  long.  1°  31'  20"  E. 

The  Scarborough  area,  after  being  most  carefully  swept, 
was  by  the  end  of  April  declared  free  of  mines.  The  clear- 
ing-up  had  been  a  long  and  arduous  task,  but  it  was  a  satis- 
faction to  know  that  the  passage  of  this  Yorkshire  coast 
was  at  length  freed  from  the  mine  peril.  Almost  simul- 
taneously with  the  elimination  of  this  mine-field  it  became 
known  that  another  had  been  laid  in  the  Swarte  area,  the 
beginning  of  which  has  already  been  noticed.  It  was 

i  Afterwards  Admiral  Sir  Reginald  H.  Bacon,  K.C.B.,  D.S.O. 


CH.  ix]    SWEEPING  THE   SWARTE  MINE-FIELD       407 

discovered,  as  has  been  stated,  by  the  trawler  Sutterton. 
Apparently  the  enemy  had  assumed  that  this  channel 
was  being  used  by  vessels  of  the  Grand  Fleet,  or  at  least 
of  Commodore  Tyrwhitt's  Harwich  force,  as  a  short-cut 
when  bound  north.  Possibly  the  new  mine-field  was  laid 
with  the  intention  of  another  raid,  or  the  design  was  to 
entice  out  the  capital  ships  and  thus  cause  losses.  It  was 
significant  that  the  mines  were  found  at  a  greater  depth 
than  was  usual,  allowing  merchant  ships — mostly  neutral 
—which  were  accustomed  to  pass  along  this  route  in 
considerable  numbers,  to  steam  over  them  in  safety. 
Obviously  it  was  desirable,  from  the  enemy's  point  of  view, 
that  nothing  should  happen  which  would  cause  the  new 
mine-field  to  be  prematurely  revealed.  The  chance  dis- 
covery by  the  Sutterton  of  a  mine  in  her  trawl  disclosed 
the  enemy's  plan,  and  was  the  means  of  saving  lives  and 
ships,  although  not  before  two  British  fishing  craft  had 
foundered  in  the  field.  On  May  3rd  the  trawler  Uxbridge 
caught  a  mine  in  her  trawl  and  the  explosion  destroyed 
the  ship.  Three  days  later,  very  near  to  the  same  position, 
the  trawler  Don  shared  a  like  fate. 

On  the  Swarte  mine -field  being  reported,  large  numbers 
of  the  auxiliary  craft  were  sent  out  to  ascertain  its  boun- 
daries, and  meantime  merchant  traffic  between  Britain 
and  Holland  was  suspended.  The  northern  limit  was 
found  to  be  somewhere  south  of  lat.  53°  32',  and  the 
eastern  limit  to  be  long.  2°  40'  E.  Mines  were  destroyed 
in  plenty.  The  effect  of  the  enemy's  activity  was  to  dis- 
arrange the  routine  work  in  the  swept  channel  on  which 
the  coastwise  traffic  was  dependent.  The  menace  of  the 
Swarte  area  was  met  with  imagination  and  insight,  and  it 
soon  became  known  that  the  lines  of  mines  had  been  laid 
in  an  easterly  direction  from  a  position  in  lat.  53°  26', 
long.  2°  25'  E.  By  the  end  of  the  first  week  in  May  most 
of  the  mines  for  the  first  seventeen  miles  had  been  destroyed, 
the  only  other  casualty  being  the  loss  of  the  fishing-trawler 
Hellenic,  which  had  blown  up  with  a  mine  in  her  trawl.  The 
mines  were  observed  to  be  newly  painted,  and  of  a  type 
hitherto  unknown.  The  line  extended  for  about  thirty 
miles. 

Other  areas  at  the  same  time  required  constant  attention. 
The  Northern  Dogger  Bank  area  was  examined  and 
found  to  be  clear ;  but  there  was  a  very  large  area  under 


408    GROWTH  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  MENACE    [CH.  ix 

suspicion  right  in  the  middle  of  the  North  Sea,  bounded 
by  lat.  54°  40'  and  56°,  and  long.  2°  30'  E.  and  5°  E.,  and 
covering  a  space  of  6,000  square  miles. '  From  this  it 
may  be  seen  with  what  thoroughness  and  sound  strategy 
the  enemy  had  laid  his  mines.  Lines  joining  the  points 
given  bring  out  a  four- sided  area  embracing  that  through 
which  the  Grand  Fleet  must  have  passed  in  making  a 
sweep  towards  Heligoland  down  the  North  Sea.  Had  the 
High  Sea  Fleet  come  out  as  far  as  the  southern  boundary 
of  this  area,  refused  action,  and  then  run  back  home,  the 
mine-field,  it  was  calculated,  would  have  caused  heavy 
losses  to  the  Grand  Fleet  engaged  in  the  pursuit. 

Large  numbers  of  mines  were  found.  In  addition  to 
forty- one  mines  which  quite  early  had  been  swept  up  and 
exploded,  the  trawler  Reverto  on  May  18th  fished  up  a 
newly-painted  mine  in  her  trawl.  The  gear  was  cut 
away  and  the  mine  sank  without  exploding.  Two  days 
later  the  s.s.  Maricopa  struck  a  mine  in  the  field,  but 
did  not  sink.  The  Sagitta  and  her  group  of  trawlers  pro- 
ceeded to  sweep  from  close  to  where  the  Maricopa  had 
struck,  and  promptly  destroyed  forty- three  mines.  This 
was  on  May  23rd.  Next  day  ten  more  mines  were 
accounted  for.  Two  were  actually  brought  into  port 
by  the  Sagitta,  having  been  found  floating,  only  just 
awash  and  nearly  full  of  water.  They  had  been  set  to  a 
depth  of  5*4  metres.  Mine-sweeping  gunboats,  which 
also  were  engaged  in  the  search,  destroyed  a  number  of 
mines.  Once  more  the  new  Navy  was  in  the  happy  posi- 
tion of  having  saved  the  old  from  possible  disaster.  For 
some  days  the  Sagitta  and  her  paddlers  continued  to  search 
the  field,  escorted  by  destroyers  and  supported  by  light 
cruisers,  the  destroyers  being  of  great  service  in  examining 
and  warning  passing  vessels.  By  the  end  of  May  eighty- 
six  mines  had  been  swept  up  between  lat.  54°  40',  lat. 
55°  20',  and  long.  3°  E.  to  3°  20'  E.  The  lines  of  mines 
had  been  laid  just  inside  the  20- fathom  line,  with  a  very 
pronounced  tongue  running  diagonally  across  the  great 
area  throughout  its  whole  breadth. 

The  Lough  Swilly  sweepers  proceeded  to  clear  the  area 
west  of  Tory  Island  before  continuing  to  sweep  the  northern 
part,  in  order  to  ensure  a  passage  across  the  field  on  an 
east  and  west  course  passing  within  thirteen  miles  of  the 
island.  This  work  was  desirable,  it  being  seven  months 


CH.  ix]          FISHING- VESSELS   DESTROYED  409 

since  this  field  had  been  laid  ;  several  ships  had  foundered 
upon  it,  and  the  mine-field  was  placed  in  a  most  important 
position.  Bad  weather  during  the  winter  months  had 
interrupted  operations. 

Simultaneously  with  more  intensified  mine-laying,  the 
enemy's  submarine  activities  became  more  pronounced. 
During  May  submarines  sank  fishing-vessels  in  the  North 
Sea,  and  merchant  ships  in  areas  as  widely  scattered  as 
the  North  Sea,  off  the  Scillies,  the  south  of  Ireland,  the 
Irish  Sea,  Bristol  Channel,  and  the  western  end  of  the 
English  Channel.  Six  fishing-vessels  were  sunk  on 
May  2nd  off  Aberdeen  and  May  Island  ;  eight  more  the 
next  day  off  the  Dogger  Bank  and  east  Scottish  coast,  all 
by  submarines.  Between  May  13th  and  May  18th  four 
more  trawlers  met  the  same  fate  near  the  north-west 
corner  of  the  Dogger  Bank,  the  crews  being  taken 
prisoners.  Altogether  there  were  no  fewer  than  twenty- 
two  fishing-vessels  destroyed  in  the  North  Sea  in  the 
month  of  May. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   SINKING   OF   THE   "  LUSITANIA " 

THE  month  of  April  1915  had  proved  an  unsatisfactory 
month  for  the  enemy ;  only  seventeen  merchant  ships 
had  been  attacked,  and  of  these  six  had  escaped.  It 
must  have  been  apparent  to  the  German  authorities  that 
neither  the  threats  nor  the  acts  in  which  they  had  indulged 
had  produced  the  desired  effect  on  British  merchant 
seamen.  Hitherto  the  farthest  the  declared  policy  of 
Germany  had  gone  was  the  announcement  that,  "  on  and 
after  February  18th,  1915,  every  enemy  merchant  ship 
found  in  the  said  War  Zone  will  be  destroyed  without  it 
being  always  possible  to  avoid  the  dangers  threatening 
the  crews  and  passengers  on  that  account."  The  sug- 
gestion was  that  loss  of  life  would  be  due  to  accidental 
causes,  and  would  not  be  deliberately  pursued  as  a  feature 
of  German  submarine  policy.  But  towards  the  end  of 
April  a  demonstration  of  "  frightfulness,"  exceeding  any- 
thing hitherto  recorded,  was  determined  upon,  and  on 
May  7th  the  great  Cunard  liner  Lusitania  was  sunk 
without  warning  by  U20,  commanded  by  Kapitan- 
Leutnant  Schwieger,  resulting  in  the  loss  of  1,198  lives. 
During  the  six  preceding  days  the  enemy  had  destroyed  six 
ships,  of  which  three  went  down  on  the  6th.  In  only  one 
case  did  loss  of  life  result,  two  of  the  crew  of  the  Minterne 
(3,018  tons)  being  drowned  on  the  3rd  of  the  month. 
There  was  evidence,  however,  that  enemy  submarines 
were  working  off  the  Irish  coast,  for  the  s.v.  Earl  of  Lathom 
(132  tons)  was  sunk  eight  miles  south  by  west  from  Old 
Head  of  Kinsale,  where,  two  days  later,  was  enacted  the 
greatest  maritime  crime  in  history,  revealing  the  full 
significance  of  Germany's  new  policy.  It  would  scarcely 
be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  no  single  event  of  the  whole 
war,  whether  by  sea,  by  land,  or  in  the  air,  produced 

410 


CH.  x]       DETAILS   OF  THE   GREAT   LINER  411 

such  an  instant  universal  and  ineffaceable  impression, 
or  was  more  pregnant  in  its  moral  and  ultimate  political 
significance,  since  it  was  probably  the  determining  factor 
in  America's  decision  to  intervene  on  the  side  of  the 
Entente  Powers,  although  this  event  did  not  actually 
take  effect  for  another  two  years. 

Several  factors  combined  to  make  the  sinking  of  the 
Lusitania  the  touchstone,  as  it  were,  of  civilisation's 
judgment,  and  to  confer  upon  the  event  a  tragic  repre- 
sentative value  in  respect  of  Germany's  whole  assault 
upon  merchant  shipping.  One  of  the  largest,  swiftest, 
and  most  lavishly  equipped  vessels  afloat,  the  Lusitania 
at  the  time  of  her  sinking  was  only  eight  years  old.  Built 
by  Messrs.  John  Brown  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  of  Clydebank,  in 
1907,  she  was  a  vessel  of  30,393  gross  tonnage.  She  was 
785  feet  in  length,  88  feet  in  breadth,  60  feet  4j  inches 
in  depth,  and  with  a  load  draught  of  36  feet,  her  displace- 
ment being  41,440  tons.  She  had  nine  decks,  including 
the  hold,  and  accommodation  for  550  first-class,  500  second- 
class,  and  1,300  third-class  passengers.  The  crew  num- 
bered 750  in  normal  conditions,  and  with  all  berths  filled 
the  Lusitania  could  therefore  carry  a  population  of  no 
fewer  than  3,100  persons.  Built  to  attain  a  speed  of 
25  knots,  she  was  driven  by  six  Parsons  turbines,  four 
ahead  and  two  astern,  the  former  being  capable  of 
developing  68,000  indicated  horse-power.  The  twenty- 
five  boilers,  twenty-three  of  them  double-ended,  were 
fitted  with  eight  furnaces  apiece,  the  boilers  being  divided 
into  four  groups,  and  each  stokehold  having  its  uptake  with 
a  funnel.  The  four  funnels  rose  to  a  height  of  184  feet 
above  the  keel,  their  diameter  being  24  feet.  The  navi- 
gating bridge  stood  110  feet  above  the  keel,  while  the 
masts  were  210  feet  high.  The  initial  cost  of  this  great 
vessel  was  estimated  at  £1,250,000,  and  insurance,  main- 
tenance, depreciation  and  other  charges  amounted  to 
£30,000  per  month.  As  a  moderate  estimate,  the  cost  of 
running  the  Lusitania  on  a  voyage  to  New  York  and  back, 
including  wages,  victualling,  and  coal  supplies,  was  about 
£20,000,  and  an  agreement  with  the  British  Government 
stipulated  that  at  least  three-quarters  of  the  crew  must 
be  British  subjects.  With  her  sister-ship,  the  Mauretania, 
she  had  been  built  at  the  suggestion  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment at  a  time  when  the  North-German  and  Hamburg- 


412  SINKING  OF  THE   "  LUSITANIA  "          [CH.  x 

American  liners  were  making  a  strong  bid  for  the  com- 
mercial mastery  of  the  Atlantic ;  and  though  she  was  not, 
in  the  acutal  event,  employed  on  war  service,  she  had 
been  definitely  subsidised  as  a  reserve  merchant  cruiser, 
the  Government  having  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Cu- 
nard  Company,  at  a  moderate  rate  of  interest,  the  sum  of 
£2,600,000  for  her  construction  and  that  of  the  Mauretania. 
The  Lusitania  stood,  therefore,  for  somewhat  more  than 
a  merely  up-to-date  Atlantic  liner,  in  that  by  her  means 
the  British  Mercantile  Marine  had  regained  what  was 
known  at  the  time  as  the  "  blue  ribbon  "  of  the  Atlantic. 

Though  little  heed  was  paid  to  the  matter  either  by  the 
general  public  or  even  by  responsible  persons,  rumours 
had  been  very  widely  spread  in  New  York  that  the  Lusi- 
tania  was  to  be  attacked,  and  indeed  an  advertisement 
had  appeared  in  several  American  newspapers  on  May  1st 
in  the  following  terms  : 

"  NOTICE. — Travellers  intending  to  embark  on  Atlantic 
voyages  are  reminded  that  the  state  of  war  exists  between 
Germany  and  her  Allies  and  Great  Britain  and  her  Allies  ; 
that  the  zone  of  war  includes  the  waters  adjacent  to  the 
British  Isles ;  that  in  accordance  with  formal  notice  given 
by  the  Imperial  German  Government  vessels  flying  the 
flag  of  Great  Britain  or  of  any  of  her  Allies  are  liable  to 
destruction  in  those  waters;  and  that  travellers  sailing 
in  the  war  zone  in  ships  of  Great  Britain  or  her  Allies 
do  so  at  their  own  risk. — Imperial  German  Embassy, 
Washington,  B.C.,  April,  22nd,  1915." 

No  direct  warning  was  given  either  to  the  Cunard 
Company  or  to  the  captain  of  the  Lusitania.  Judge 
Mayer,  of  the  Federal  District  Court  of  New  York,  was 
subsequently  called  upon  to  investigate  the  circumstances 
of  the  sailing  of  the  Lusitania,  a  petition  having  been 
lodged  by  the  Cunard  Steamship  Company,  Ltd.,  for 
limitation  of  liability.  In  the  course  of  his  judgment  on 
August  24th,  1918,  Judge  Mayer  stated  that  "  the  captain 
was  fully  justified  in  sailing  on  the  appointed  day  from 
a  neutral  port  with  many  neutral  and  non-combatant 
passengers,  unless  he  and  his  company  were  willing  to 
yield  to  the  attempt  of  the  German  Government  to  terrify 
British  shipping.  No  one  familiar  with  the  British  char- 


CH.  x]  GERMANY'S   FALSE  CHARGES  413 

acter  would  expect  that  such  a  threat  would  accomplish 
more  than  to  emphasise  the  necessity  of  taking  every 
precaution  to  protect  life  and  property  which  the  exercise 
of  judgment  would  invite.  And  so  the  Lusitania  sailed 
undisguised,  with  her  four  funnels,  and  a  figure  so  familiar 
as  to  be  readily  discernible  not  only  by  naval  officers 
and  mariners,  but  by  the  ocean-going  public  generally." 
Few  intending  passengers  of  any  nationality  believed 
that  such  a  threat  as  had  been  made  by  the  Germans 
could  be  meant  seriously  or  would  ever  be  carried  out. 
When  the  Lusitania  sailed,  it  was  with  a  total  of  1,959 
people  on  board,  including  440  women  and  children.  The 
crew  on  this  voyage  numbered  702  instead  of  750. 
With  regard  to  the  cargo,  this  was  a  general  one  of 
the  usual  kind,  but,  as  was  entered  on  the  ship's  manifest, 
a  certain  number  of  cartridges  were  carried.  These  were 
stowed  well  forward  in  the  ship  on  the  orlop  and  lower 
decks  and  about  fifty  yards  away  from  where  the  torpedo 
struck  the  vessel.  There  was  no  other  explosive  on 
board. 

It  was  afterwards  alleged  by  the  German  Government 
that  the  Lusitania  was  equipped  with  guns,  trained  gunners, 
and  special  ammunition,  that  she  was  transporting  Cana- 
dian troops,  and  that  she  was  violating  the  laws  of  the 
United  States.  The  investigation  subsequently  held  by 
Lord  Mersey  proved  that  all  these  statements  were  untrue. 
The  Lusitania,  in  fact,  carried  neither  guns  nor  gunners,  and 
no  troops,  and  in  no  wise  violated  the  laws  of  the  United 
States.  In  response  to  the  suggestion  of  the  German 
Government,  the  United  States  in  a  subsequent  note 
stated : 

"  Fortunately  these  are  matters  concerning  which  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  is  in  a  position  to  give 
the  Imperial  German  Government  official  information. 
Of  the  facts  alleged  in  Your  Excellency's  Note,  if  true, 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  have  been 
bound  to  take  official  cognizance.  Performing  its  recog- 
nised duty  as  a  neutral  Power  and  enforcing  its  national 
laws,  it  was  its  duty  to  see  to  it  that  the  Lusitania  was  not 
armed  for  offensive  action,  that  she  was  not  serving  as  a 
transport,  that  she  did  not  carry  cargo  prohibited  by  the 
statutes  of  the  United  States,  and  that  if,  in  fact,  she  was 


414  SINKING  OF  THE   "LUSITANIA"         [CH.  x 

a  naval  vessel  of  Great  Britain,  she  should  not  receive 
a  clearance  as  a  merchantman.  It  performed  that  duty. 
It  enforced  its  statutes  with  scrupulous  vigilance  through 
its  regularly  constituted  officials,  and  it  is  able  there- 
fore to  assure  the  Imperial  German  Government  that  it 
has  been  misinformed.  If  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment should  deem  itself  to  be  in  possession  of  convincing 
evidence  that  the  officials  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  did  not  perform  these  duties  with  thoroughness, 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  sincerely  hopes 
that  it  will  submit  that  evidence  for  consideration. 
Whatever  may  be  the  contentions  of  the  Imperial  German 
Government  regarding  the  carriage  of  contraband  of  war 
on  board  the  Lusitania  or  regarding  the  explosion  of  that 
material  by  a  torpedo,  it  need  only  be  said  that  in  the 
view  of  this  Government  these  contentions  are  irrelevant 
to  the  question  of  the  legality  of  the  methods  used  by  the 
German  naval  authorities  in  sinking  the  vessel." 

Judge  Mayer,  of  the  Federal  District  Court  of  New 
York,  referring  to  this  allegation  by  the  Germans,  declared 
that  the  Lusitania  did  carry  some  eighteen  fuse  cases  and 
125  shrapnel  cases  consisting  merely  of  empty  shells 
without  any  powder  charges,  4,200  cases  of  safety  cart- 
ridges, and  189  cases  of  infantry  equipment,  such  as  leather 
fittings,  pouches,  and  the  like.  All  these  were  for  delivery 
abroad,  but  none  of  these  munitions  could  be  exploded 
by  setting  them  on  fire  in  mass  or  in  bulk,  nor  by  sub- 
jecting them  to  impact.  He  learnt  in  evidence  that  the 
ship  "  had  been  duly  inspected  on  March  17th,  April  15th, 
16th,  and  17th,  all  in  1915,  and  before  she  left  New  York 
the  boat  gear  and  boats  were  examined,  overhauled, 
checked  up,  and  defective  articles  properly  replaced." 

The  great  liner  set  out  from  New  York  on  May  1st,  under 
the  command  of  Captain  W.  T.  Turner,  an  old  and  trusted 
servant  of  the  Cunard  Company.  The  voyage  across  the 
Atlantic  was  uneventful,  and  was  accompanied  by  smooth 
seas  and  fine  weather.  The  name  of  the  ship  and  port  of 
registry  were  painted  out  in  accordance  with  Admiralty 
advice  to  merchant  shipping  generally;  no  flag,  not 
even  the  house  flag,  was  flown.  An  average  speed  of 
about  21  knots  was  maintained  throughout  the  Atlantic 
crossing.  This  was  lower  than  the  usual  pre-war  speed 


CH.  x]       ADMIRALTY  NOTICES  TO  MASTERS  415 

of  the  Lusitania,  for  reasons  that  were  made  clear  by  Mr. 
(afterwards  Sir)  Alfred  Allen  Booth,  Chairman  of  the 
Cunard  Company,  in  his  evidence  before  Lord  Mersey's 
Commission,  on  June  16th,  1915.  From  this  it  appeared 
that,  after  the  rush  of  homeward-bound  American  traffic 
was  over,  towards  the  end  of  October  1914,  it  had  become 
a  serious  question  as  to  whether  or  not  the  Cunard  Company 
could  continue  to  run  their  two  large  steamers,  the  Lusi- 
tania and  the  Mauretania.  Having  gone  into  the  matter 
very  carefully,  the  directors  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
it  would  be  possible  to  continue  running  one  of  these  vessels 
at  a  reduced  speed,  once  a  month,  paying  expenses,  but 
without  the  hope  of  making  a  profit.  They  decided, 
therefore,  to  run  the  Lusitania  with  eighteen  boilers  out 
of  the  total  of  twenty-four,  reducing  the  speed  from  24 
to  21  knots,  this  reduction,  however,  still  leaving  the 
Lusitania  considerably  the  fastest  steamer  in  the  Atlantic 
trade. 

In  common  with  other  masters,  Captain  Turner  was, 
of  course,  familiar  with  the  various  Admiralty  Notices 
to  responsible  officers  of  the  Mercantile  Marine  that  were 
periodically  issued  for  purposes  of  advice.  Dealing  gener- 
ally with  such  matters  as  that  of  the  number  of  lights 
to  be  shown,  precautions  as  to  lifeboats,  and  various  other 
matters,  these  Admiralty  Notices  embodied  the  growing 
experience  of  those  who  were  responsible  for  studying 
and  combating  the  German  methods  of  submarine  war- 
fare. In  view,  however,  of  what  happened,  and  of  certain 
criticisms  to  which  the  master  of  the  Lusitania  was  after- 
wards subjected,  one  such  notice  is  particularly  important. 

On  March  22nd  a  warning  had  been  issued  from  the 
Admiralty  in  the  following  terms :  "  Warn  homeward- 
bound  British  merchant  ships  that  when  making  principal 
landfalls  at  night  they  should  not  approach  nearer  than  is 
absolutely  necessary  for  safe  navigation.  Most  important 
that  vessels  passing  up  the  Irish  or  English  Channel  should 
keep  mid-channel  course.  War  experience  has  shown  that 
fast  steamers  can  considerably  reduce  the  chance  of  a  suc- 
cessful surprise  submarine  attack  by  zigzagging — that  is 
to  say,  altering  course  at  short  and  irregular  intervals, 
say  ten  minutes  to  half  an  hour.  This  course  is  almost 
invariably  adopted  by  warships  when  cruising  in  an  area 
known  to  be  infested  by  submarines.  The  under- wlater 

28 


416  SINKING  OF  THE   "  LUSITANIA  "  [CH.  x 

speed  of  a  submarine  is  very  low,  and  it  is  exceedingly 
difficult  for  her  to  get  into  position  to  deliver  an  attack 
unless  she  can  observe  and  predict  the  course  of  the  ship 
attacked.  It  is  believed  that  the  regulations  of  many 
steamship  lines  prescribe  that  the  master  shall  be  on  deck 
whenever  course  is  altered.  It  is  for  the  consideration  of 
owners  whether,  in  the  present  circumstances,  some  re- 
laxation of  rules  of  this  character  is  not  advisable  in  the 
case  of  fast  ships,  in  order  to  admit  zigzagging  being  carried 
out  without  throwing  an  undue  strain  upon  the  master." 
At  the  same  time  it  has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  these 
notifications  were  in  the  nature  of  general  advice  rather 
than  imperative  orders,  and  were  not  intended  to  cramp 
the  initiative  of  responsible  masters. 

By  May  6th  the  Lusitania  was  approaching  dangerous 
waters,  and  at  5.30  a.m.  on  that  day  all  the  lifeboats 
under  davits  were  swung  out.  All  bulk-head  doors  were 
subsequently  closed,  except  such  as  were  required  to 
be  kept  open  in  order  to  work  the  ship.  Scuttles  were 
closed.  The  lookout  on  the  ship  was  doubled,  two  men 
being  sent  to  the  crow's-nest  and  two  men  to  the  "  eyes  "  of 
the  ship.  Two  officers  were  always  on  the  bridge,  and  a 
quartermaster  on  either  side,  with  instructions  to  watch 
for  submarines.  That  these  were  indeed  to  be  feared 
became  clear  just  before  8  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  that 
day,  the  Admiral  commanding  at  Queenstown  having 
signalled  to  the  Lusitania  that  submarines  were  active 
off  the  south  coast  of  Ireland,  and  had  been  reported 
four  miles  to  the  south-west  of  Copper  Point,  near  Castle- 
haven.  A  little  later  on  the  same  night  a  second  wireless 
message  was  received  by  the  Lusitania  in  the  following 
terms  :  "  Take  Liverpool  pilot  at  Bar  and  avoid  headlands. 
Pass  harbours  at  full  speed,  steer  mid-channel  course ; 
submarines  at  Fastnet." 

From  lat.  40°  10'  N.  and  long.  49°  W.,  the  Lusitania 
was  navigated  on  a  great  circle  in  the  direction  of  Fastnet, 
and  upon  a  course  that,  when  approaching  Ireland,  would 
take  her  some  twenty  miles  distant  from  this  point.  At 
8  a.m.  on  May  7th,  for  reasons  that  will  be  referred  to  later, 
her  speed  was  reduced  to  18  knots  ;  and  shortly  after 
this,  owing  to  the  presence  of  fog,  her  speed  was  further 
reduced  for  awhile  to  15  knots.  About  11  o'clock  the 
fog  began  to  clear,  and  speed  was  again  increased  to  18 


CH.  x]  THE   "  LUSITANIA'S "   COURSE  417 

knots.  At  11.30  an  Admiralty  wireless  message  was  re- 
ceived from  Valentia :  "  Submarines  active  in  the  south 
part  of  Irish  Channel  and  last  heard  of  twenty  miles  south 
of  Coningbeg."  The  Lusitania  was  then  on  a  course 
S.  87  E.  magnetic,  and  land  was  sighted  at  about  12.10  p.m., 
two  points  abaft  the  beam,  and  about  twenty-six  miles 
distant.  Although  the  weather  was  clear,  Fastnet,  owing 
to  the  distance,  had  not  been  sighted,  and  the  land  seen 
was  believed,  and  probably  rightly  so,  to  be  Brow  Head, 
the  next  headland  after  Mizen  Head.  The  sea  was 
smooth,  there  was  a  light  breeze,  and  this  course  of 
S.  87  E.  was  maintained  until  12.40  p.m.,  when  Galley 
Head  was  sighted,  a  long  distance  away,  on  the  port 
bow.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  submarines  had  been  re- 
ported twenty  miles  south  of  Coningbeg,  and  thus  about 
midway  between  the  Tuskar  and  the  Smalls,  the  channel 
up  which  the  Lusitania  must  pass  on  her  way  to  Liverpool, 
Captain  Turner  had  now  decided,  when  he  had  assured 
himself  of  the  exact  position  of  his  vessel,  to  steer  a  course 
that  would  bring  him  past  Coningbeg,  some  half  a  mile 
south  of  the  lightship,  thus  giving  as  wide  a  berth  as  possible 
to  the  enemy  submarines  of  whose  presence  he  had  been 
notified.  At  12.40  p.m.,  therefore,  and  in  order  to  fix 
his  position  as  exactly  as  possible,  he  gradually  altered 
course  thirty  degrees  more  to  the  northward  to  N.  63  E. 
magnetic.  Shortly  before  1  p.m.  he  received  another 
wireless  Admiralty  message  to  the  effect  that  sub- 
marines had  been  sighted  off  Cape  Clear,  near  Fastnet, 
at  10  a.m.,  when  they  were  heading  for  the  westward. 
This  point  was,  of  course,  now  behind  him  ;  he  was  pro- 
ceeding himself  in  an  opposite  direction  ;  and  he  therefore 
concluded  that  at  any  rate  he  had  escaped  these  particular 
submarines.  At  1.40  p.m.  the  Old  Head  of  Kinsale  was 
in  sight  on  the  port  bow,  about  ten  miles  distant,  and 
Captain  Turner  then  altered  his  course  back  to  S.  87  E., 
intending  to  take  a  four-point  bearing  off  the  Old  Head  of 
Kinsale  before  altering  his  course  to  the  Coningbeg  light- 
vessel,  which  he  had  resolved,  as  has  been  indicated,  to 
leave  about  half  a  mile  on  his  port  hand.  The  twelve  to 
four  watch  was  that  of  the  Lusitania 's  first  officer,  Mr. 
Arthur  Rowland  Jones,  who  was  relieved  at  1.40  p.m., 
the  second  officer,  Mr.  Hefford,  who  was  unfortunately 
drowned,  and  the  junior  third  officer,  Mr.  Albert  Arthur 


418  SINKING  OF  THE   "  LUSITANIA "         [CH.  x 

Bestic,  being  on  the  bridge.  The  latter,  who  was  engaged 
in  taking  the  four-point  bearing,  was  relieved  at  2  p.m. 
by  another  officer,  Mr.  Stephens,  also  afterwards  drowned, 
and  it  was  while  the  four-point  bearing  was  still  being 
taken,  approximately  at  a  quarter-past  two,  that  the 
ship  was  torpedoed. 

The  first  torpedo  struck  the  ship  on  the  starboard  side, 
somewhere  between  the  third  and  fourth  funnels,  breaking, 
as  it  did  so,  one  of  the  lifeboats  to  pieces.  The  second 
torpedo  struck  the  ship  almost  immediately  afterwards, 
apparently  about  100  feet  aft  of  the  first.1  Both  torpedoes 
exploded  with  terrible  effect,  the  engine-rooms  being  almost 
immediately  flooded,  thus  making  it  impossible  to  take 
way  off  the  ship,  and  thereby  considerably  adding  to  the 
great  difficulties  of  launching  the  lifeboats.  This  was 
further  increased  by  the  listing  of  the  ship  to  the  starboard 
side,  thus  causing  all  the  port  side  lifeboats  to  swing  in- 
board, and  those  on  the  starboard  side  to  swing  outwards 
to  distances  that  made  it  very  difficult  for  passengers  to 
be  placed  in  them.  Wireless  messages  for  help  were  at 
once  dispatched,  received,  and  answered,  but  no  vessel 
of  any  sort,  as  it  happened,  was  near  the  scene  of  the  dis- 
aster, and  within  twenty  minutes  the  great  liner  had  dis- 
appeared beneath  the  waves. 

One  of  the  most  graphic  narratives  of  the  course  of 
events  was  that  of  Mr.  James  Brooks,  of  Bridgeport, 
Connecticut,  an  American  business  man,  who  was  a  saloon 
passenger,  and  who  described  his  experiences  as  follows  : 

"  None  of  my  fellow-passengers,"  said  Mr.  Brooks,  "  re- 
garded a  submarine  attack  as  a  serious  possibility,  and  we 
had  a  very  comfortable  voyage,  favoured  by  pleasant 

1  We  have  a  German  denial  of  the  fact  that  a  second  torpedo  was  fired. 
In  a  publication  entitled  "Die  deutschen  U-Boote  in  ihrer  Kriegsfiihrung, 
1914-18,"  by  Kapitan-Leutnant  A,  Gayer,  it  is  stated:  "  On  May  7th, 
between  2  and  3  p.m.,  Schwieger  sighted  in  fine  clear  weather  on  the  south 
coast  of  Ireland,  near  the  Old  Head  of  Kinsale,  so  many  masts  and  funnels 
that  he  thought  at  first  he  had  before  him  a  first-rate  destroyer  flotilla 
proceeding  in  line  ahead."  But  it  soon  appeared  that  "  all  belonged  to  one 
steamer  only."  But  the  commander  was  not  able  to  make  sure  that  it  was 
the  Luaitania  before  the  shot  had  already  hit.  Although  the  sinking  of  the 
ship  was  doubtful  at  first,  Schwieger  did  not  allow  the  second  torpedo, 
which  was  all  ready,  to  be  fired,  as  he  saw  that  there  were  an  immense  crowd 
of  passengers  to  be  saved.  As  though  he  had  a  foreboding  of  the  tragedy 
which  lay  in  his  success,  he  went  with  his  boat  to  a  depth  of  twenty  metres, 
"  moved  by  mixed  feelings." 


CH.  xj  A   PASSENGER'S   NARRATIVE  419 

weather.      A   good   many  passengers  were  still   at  lunch 
when,  on  Friday  afternoon,  the  attack  came  in  reality. 
I  had  just  finished  a  run  on  deck,  and  had  reached  the 
Marconi  deck,  when  I  glanced  out  over  the  water.     It 
was    perfectly    smooth.     My    eyes    alighted    on    a    white 
streak  making  its  way  with  lightning-like  rapidity  towards 
the  ship.     I  was  so  high,  in  that  position,  above  the  surface 
of  the  water  that  I  could  make  out  the  outline  of   the 
torpedo.     It  appeared  to  be  about  twelve  feet  long,  and 
came  along  possibly  three  feet  below  the  surface,  its  sides 
white   with    bubbles    of   foam.     I    watched    its    passage, 
fascinated,  until  it  passed  out  of  sight  behind  the  bridge, 
and  in  another  moment  came  the  explosion.      The  ship, 
recoiling  under  the  force  of  the  blow,  was  jarred  and  lifted, 
as  if  it  had  struck  an  immovable  object.     A  column  of 
water  shot  up  to  the  bridge  deck,  carrying  with  it  a  lot 
of  debris,  and,  despite  the  fact  that  I  must  have  been 
twenty  yards  from  the  spot  at  which  the  torpedo  struck, 
I  was  knocked  off  my  feet.     Before  I  could  recover  my- 
self, the  iron  forepart  of  the  ship  was  enveloped  in  a  blind- 
ing cloud  of  steam,  due,  not,  I  think,  to  the  explosion  of 
a  second  torpedo,  as  some  thought,  but  to  the  fact  that  the 
two    forehold    boilers    had  been  jammed  close  together 
and  '  jack-knifed  '  upwards.     This  I  was  told  by  a  stoker 
afterwards.     We  had  been  in  sight  of  land  for  some  time, 
and  the  head  of  the  ship,  which  had  already  begun  to 
settle,  was  turned  towards  the  Old  Head  of  Kinsale.     All 
the  boats  on  the  ship  had  been  swung  out  the  day  previous, 
and  the  work  of  launching  them  was  at  once  commenced. 
The  attempt  in  the  case  of  the  first  boat  was  a  tragic  failure. 
The  women  and  children  were  taken  first,  and  the  boat 
was  practically  filled  with  them,  there  being  only  a  few 
men.     The  boat  was  lowered  until  within  its  own  length 
of  the  water,  when  the  forward  tackle  jammed,  and  the 
whole  of  its  occupants,  with  the  exception  of  three,  were 
thrown  into  the  water.     The  Lusitania  was  then  on  an 
even  keel.     On  the  decks  of  the  doomed  vessel  absolute 
coolness    prevailed.     There    was    no   rushing   about,  and 
nothing    remotely    resembling    a    panic.     In    just    a    few 
isolated  cases  there  were  signs  of  hysteria  on  the  part  of 
the  women,  but  that  was  all." 

Captain  Anderson,  the  second-in-command,  who  was  lost, 


420  SINKING  OF    THE   "  LUSITANIA "         [CH.  x 

and  whose  body  was  afterwards  recovered,  appeared  on 
the  bridge  deck  as  soon  as  he  could  reach  it,  and  informed 
the  saloon  passengers  that  there  was  no  immediate  danger, 
for  everyone  was  confident  that  the  ship  would  remain 
afloat,  in  spite  of  the  damage  received.  Everybody  had,  of 
course,  rushed  on  deck,  and  this  statement  was  reassuring. 

"  Meanwhile,"  said  Mr.  Brooks,  "  the  ship  had  taken  a 
decided  list,  and  was  sinking  rapidly  by  the  head.  The 
efforts  made  to  lower  the  boats  had  apparently  not  met 
with  much  success.  Those  on  the  port  side  had  swung 
inboard  and  could  not  be  used,  while  the  collapsible 
boats,  which  were  lashed  beneath  them,  could  not  be  got 
at.  The  ladies  were  standing  quite  coolly,  waiting  on  board 
to  enter  the  boats,  when  they  could  be  released  by  the  men 
from  the  davits.  The  davits,  by  this  time,  were  them- 
selves touching  the  water,  the  ship  having  sunk  so  low  that 
the  bridge  deck  was  only  four  feet  or  so  from  the  surface 
of  the  sea.  Losing  no  time,  the  men  passed  the  women 
rapidly  into  the  boats,  and  places  had  been  found  by  now 
for  all  the  people  about  the  midship  section.  I  stepped 
into  one  of  the  lifeboats  and  attempted  to  assist  in  getting 
it  clear.  I  saw  the  list  was  so  great  that  the  davits  pinched 
the  gear,  rendering  it  improbable  that  they  could  be  got 
away  when  the  ship  went  down,  so  I  stepped  on  to  the  gun- 
wale and  dived  into  the  water.  I  had  no  lifebelt  and  am 
not  a  good  swimmer,  but  I  decided  to  take  the  risk.  I 
had  been  wetted  right  through  when  the  explosion  oc- 
curred, and  I  believe  that,  had  I  gone  in  dry,  I  should 
have  swallowed  so  much  water  that  I  should  not  have 
lasted  long.  I  swam  as  hard  as  I  could  away  from  the 
vessel,  and  noticed  with  feelings  of  apprehension  the  men- 
acing bulk  of  the  huge  funnels  as  they  loomed  up  over 
my  head.  I  expected  them  momentarily  to  fall  on  me 
and  crush  me  as  I  swam,  but  at  last  I  judged  myself  to  be 
clear,  and  I  turned  around  and  trod  the  water  in  order 
to  watch  the  great  hull  heel  over.  The  monster  took  a 
sudden  plunge,  and,  noting  the  crowd  still  on  her  decks, 
and  the  heavily-laden  boats  filling  with  helpless  women 
and  children  yet  glued  to  her  side,  I  sickened  with  horror 
at  the  sight.  The  liner's  stern  rose  high  out  of  the  water  ; 
there  was  a  thunderous  roar  as  of  the  collapse  of  a  great 
building  during  a  fire  ;  and  then  jshe  disappeared,  drag- 


CH.  x]  THE   FIRST   RESCUES  421 

ging  hundreds  of  fellow-creatures  into  the  water.  Many 
never  rose  again  to  the  surface,  but  the  sea  rapidly  grew 
black  with  the  figures  of  struggling  men,  women,  and 
children.  The  wireless  installation  came  over  with  a  crash 
into  the  sea.  It  struck  my  uplifted  arm  as  it  fell,  and  I 
felt  it  pass  over  my  body  as  it  sank,  almost  dragging  me 
under. 

"  The  rush  of  water  over  the  steamer's  decks  swept  away 
a  collapsible  boat,  and  I  swam  towards  it.  Another  man 
reached  it  shortly  after,  and,  after  we  were  rescued,  I 
found  him  to  be  Mr.  Charles  E.  Lauriat  junior,  of  Boston. 
Two  seamen  also  managed  to  swim  to  the  boat  and  to 
climb  on  it.  One  had  a  knife,  and  the  other  asked  me 
for  mine,  and  together  they  set  about  cutting  away  the 
canvas  cover  of  the  boat.  When  they  had  finished,  I 
climbed  inside,  and  the  two  of  them  followed  me.  We 
started  to  rescue  the  unfortunate  people  in  the  water, 
or  at  least  those  of  them  who  were  still  living.  We  quickly 
had  about  thirty  of  them  in  the  little  craft.  Around  us 
in  the  water  were  scores  of  boats.  There  were  no  oars 
in  our  boat.  We  managed  to  raise  the  sides  of  the  boat 
as  they  should  be  raised  when  the  boat  is  in  use,  and  we 
collected  five  oars  from  the  mass  of  floating  timber  in  the 
water.  Then  we  started  to  row  towards  the  lighthouse, 
which  we  could  see  in  the  distance.  At  the  time  the  liner 
was  torpedoed  there  was  absolutely  no  ship  of  any  kind 
in  sight,  with  the  exception  of  a  trawler,  the  Peel  12,  of 
Glasgow.  She  was  close  inshore  under  the  lighthouse, 
and,  owing  to  the  lightness  of  the  wind,  she  was  of  no  use 
so  far  as  the  rescue  of  persons  actually  in  the  sea  was  con- 
cerned. She  came  along  as  fast  as  she  could,  however,  and 
was  able  to  pick  up  about  110  persons  from  lifeboats  and 
life-rafts.  Her  limited  capacity  was  pushed  to  the  utmost, 
and  I  even  had  to  sit  with  one  leg  hanging  over  the  side 
because  there  was  no  room  to  put  it  on  the  inside.  We  took 
in  tow  a  lifeboat  and  a  raft,  which  were  also  filled  to  the 
gunwale,  and,  when  the  occupants  were  able  to  be  taken 
out,  they  were  cast  off.  The  auxiliary  boat  Indian  Prince 
had  arrived  by  that  time  from  Queenstown.  The  Peel  12 
was  the  first  boat  on  the  scene,  and  she  was  followed  by 
a  tramp  Greek  steamer,  which  came  up  from  the  west, 
and  was  able  to  pick  up  several  lifeboats  which  had  got 
away." 


422  SINKING  OF  THE   "  LUSITANIA "         [CH.  x 

From  this  account  given  by  an  American,  and  then 
neutral,  eyewitness,  it  is  clear  that  there  was  neither 
any  warning  from  the  submarine  nor  any  opportunity 
afforded  either  to  the  passengers  or  crew  of  the  Lusitania 
to  secure  their  personal  safety  before  the  ship  was  sunk  ; 
and  these  facts  were  further  confirmed  at  the  official 
investigation  by  Lord  Mersey  in  the  following  June. 
Material  witnesses  to  this,  apart  from  Captain  Turner, 
who  was  on  the  bridge  at  the  time,  were,  of  course,  the 
seamen  on  the  lookout,  all  of  whom  acted  with  admirable 
courage  and  promptitude,  and  of  whom  one  especially, 
Leslie  N.  Morton,  an  able  seaman,  only  eighteen  years  of 
age,  was  singled  out  in  the  Commissioner's  Report  for  the 
highest  commendation. 

Morton,  whose  first  voyage  it  was  on  the  Lusitania — 
he  had  previously  been  an  apprentice  for  four  years  on 
the  sailing-ship  J.  B.  Walmsley — was  an  extra  lookout 
on  the  forecastle  head,  starboard  side,  during  the  two  to 
four  watch,  and  seems  to  have  been  the  first  person  actually 
to  observe  the  approach  of  the  two  torpedoes.  This 
began,  as  he  described  it,  with  a  "  big  burst  of  foam  about 
500  yards  away."  This  was  followed  by  a  "  thin  streak 
of  foam,"  as  he  said,  "  making  for  the  ship  at  a  rapid 
speed,"  followed  by  another,  "  going  parallel  with  the  first 
one  and  a  little  behind  it."  Having  reported  this  to  the 
bridge  with  a  megaphone,  Morton  then  made  for  the  fore- 
castle to  go  down  below  to  call  his  brother,  who  was  asleep 
at  the  time  ;  and  on  the  way  there  he  saw  what  appeared 
to  him  to  be  the  conning-tower  of  the  submarine  just 
submerging. 

Having  called  his  brother,  Morton  returned  to  the  deck 
to  give  assistance  in  lowering  the  boats  and  rescuing  the 
passengers.  Having  helped  to  fill  No.  11  boat,  he  then 
went  to  another  boat,  into  which  he  scrambled,  after 
passengers  had  taken  their  places,  and  which  he  endeavoured 
to  launch.  Unfortunately,  owing  to  the  well-mtentioned 
but  ill-directed  efforts  of  some  of  the  passengers,  this  boat 
was  capsized,  and,  just  before  she  turned  over,  Morton, 
in  his  own  words,  "  swam  for  it."  After  swimming  for 
some  little  time,  he  saw  an  empty  collapsible  boat,  and, 
with  a  sailor  named  Parry,  he  climbed  into  it.  Having 
done  so,  he  ripped  part  of  the  cover  off,  and  picked  up 
about  fifty  persons.  With  these  on  board,  he  then  made 


CH.  x]       FIRST  OFFICER'S   SPLENDID   WORK          423 

for  a  fishing-ketch,  about  five  miles  away,  which  he  suc- 
cessfully reached,  and  in  which  he  placed  his  passengers. 
He  then  dropped  astern  from  this  smack,  and  took  another 
twenty  or  thirty  people  from  a  lifeboat  that  was  sinking, 
Parry  and  himself  and  his  second  boat-load  of  passengers 
being  then  picked  up  by  a  mine-sweeper  which  had  arrived 
on  the  scene  as  the  result  of  the  wireless  messages.  In 
all,  these  two  boys  saved  nearly  100  lives. 

Equally  noteworthy  for  courage,  judgment,  and  a  fine 
display  of  seamanship,  was  the  conduct  of  Mr.  Arthur 
Rowland  Jones,  the  Lusitanicfs  first  officer.  This  officer, 
who  had  been  in  the  Cunard  Company's  service  for  seven 
years,  was  in  the  first-class  dining-saloon  at  the  time  of 
the  explosion.  Going  immediately  on  deck,  he  found  that 
the  ship  was  already  severely  listing,  and  he  was  only 
able  to  make  his  way  to  his  boat-station  hanging  on  to 
the  rail  and  with  great  difficulty.  He  loaded  two  boats, 
one  with  eighty,  and  one  with  about  sixty-five  passengers, 
and  successfully  lowered  both  of  them,  entering  the  latter 
himself,  just  as  the  boat  deck  of  the  Lusitania  was  level 
with  the  water,  and  only  about  fifteen  seconds  before  she 
actually  went  down.  With  very  great  skill,  he  enabled 
his  boat  to  keep  afloat  in  spite  of  the  tremendous  suction 
and  turmoil  caused  by  the  sinking  liner,  and  the  fact 
that  the  Marconi  aerial  wire  came  down  across  the  top 
of  his  boat  and  very  nearly  sank  it.  After  that,  having 
observed  near  him  an  almost  empty  boat,  he  secured  this, 
and,  manning  her  with  the  boatswain's  mate,  a  seaman, 
the  assistant  purser,  and  about  ten  stewards,  he  counted 
out  about  thirty  passengers  from  his  own  overcrowded 
boat  and  put  them  in  it.  He  then  ordered  them  to  go 
back  to  the  wreck  in  order  to  pick  up  as  many  people 
as  possible,  and  this  they  did,  saving  a  good  many  lives. 
Taking  his  own  boat  back  again,  he  once  more  filled  her 
up,  and  then  pushed  off  to  the  Bluebell,  a  little  fishing- 
smack  about  five  miles  away,  in  which  he  placed  his 
passengers. 

Having  thus  emptied  his  boat  of  passengers,  he  again 
pulled  back  towards  the  wreck,  and,  after  having  made 
about  two  and  a  half  miles,  he  fell  in  with  a  broken  col- 
lapsible boat  in  a  bad  condition,  with  about  thirty-five 
injured  and  exhausted  people  lying  in  its  bottom.  All 
these  he  took  on  board  his  own  boat,  the  collapsible  boat 


424  SINKING  OF  THE   "  LUSITANIA "         [CH.  x 

then  drifting  away  in  a  sinking  state.  Shortly  after  this  he 
was  overhauled  by  a  trawler,  in  which  he  placed  all  these 
people.  This  trawler  took  him  in  tow,  Mr.  Jones  himself 
remaining  in  the  lifeboat  until  the  spot  was  reached  where 
the  Lusitania  had  sunk.  He  then  pulled  off  and  saved 
another  ten  people,  two  of  whom,  however,  died  before 
he  could  get  them  ashore.  These  he  placed  on  board 
the  Flying  Fox,  a  Queenstown  tender.  By  this  time, 
nearly  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening,  his  crew  was  at  the 
last  point  of  exhaustion,  and,  since  a  large  number  of 
cruisers,  destroyers,  and  patrol-boats  had  in  the  mean- 
time arrived  on  the  scene,  Mr.  Jones  took  his  men  on  board 
the  Flying  Fox,  ultimately  reaching  Queenstown  about 
eleven  o'clock  at  night. 

From  the  foregoing  narratives,  which  are  typical  of 
the  behaviour  of  the  whole  crew,  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
high  standard  of  courage  of  the  British  Mercantile  Marine 
was  never  more  signally  illustrated  than  in  the  case  of 
the  Lusitania ;  and  this  was  all  the  more  admirable  when 
it  is  remembered  that,  at  the  commencement  of  the  war, 
the  Cunard  Company  had  lost  all  its  Royal  Naval  Reserve 
and  Fleet  Reserve  men,  and  the  managers  had  had  to 
engage  the  best  men  they  could  get,  and  to  train  them  as 
well  as  possible  in  the  time  at  their  disposal. 

With  regard  to  Captain  Turner,  certain  criticisms, 
as  already  stated,  were  afterwards  made  as  to  his  judg- 
ment in  handling  his  vessel  before  the  disaster  occurred. 
These  were  mainly  based  upon  four  considerations — that 
he  had  approached  somewhat  near  to  the  neighbouring 
headlands,  that  he  had  reduced  speed  to  18  knots,  that  he 
was  not  pursuing  a  mid-channel  course,  and  that  he  had 
not,  as  the  Admiralty  had  advised,  zigzagged  his  vessel. 
In  reply  to  these  criticisms  Captain  Turner  asserted  that 
he  had  reduced  speed  in  order  that  he  should  not  have  to 
delay  outside  the  Bar  at  Liverpool,  in  a  position  where 
he  had  reason  to  believe  he  might  be  especially  vulner- 
able to  enemy  submarines ;  that  he  had  remained  at 
what  he  believed  to  be  a  safe  distance  from  headlands 
consistent  with  obtaining  an  accurate  knowledge  of  his 
vessel's  position,  and  that,  in  view  of  the  Admiralty 
message  as  to  the  submarines  that  had  been  sighted 
twenty  miles  off  Coningbeg,  he  was  fully  justified  in  re- 
solving upon  a  course  that  would  bring  him  close  to  the 


CH.  x]  LORD   MERSEY'S   CONCLUSION  425 

lightship  and  as  far  as  possible  from  the  enemy  submarines. 
In  respect  to  the  advice  as  to  zigzagging,  Captain  Turner 
admitted  that  he  had  misunderstood  the  Admiralty  notice, 
believing  that  these  tactics  were  to  be  adopted  only 
in  the  actual  presence  of  hostile  submarines,  and  not 
also  in  waters  where  they  were  merely  suspected  to  be 
operating.  After  the  disaster  occurred  Captain  Turner, 
as  was  unanimously  admitted,  bore  himself  according  to 
the  best  traditions  of  the  British  Mercantile  Marine.  He 
was  on  the  bridge  when  the  vessel  was  struck,  and  he 
remained  there  to  the  last,  going  down  with  his  vessel. 
His  first  order  was  to  lower  all  the  boats  to  the  rail — a 
command  obeyed  as  far  as  possible — and  he  then  ordered 
4  Women  and  children  first."  He  also  had  the  ship's 
head  turned  towards  the  land,  but  the  vessel  had 
become  unmanageable  owing  to  the  damage  to  the 
engine-room.  It  was  not  until  he  had  been  in  the  water 
for  three  hours  that  Captain  Turner  was  rescued. 

On  the  question  of  his  conduct  in  view  of  the  various 
Admiralty  Notices,  Lord  Mersey,  after  expert  advice, 
expressed  himself  in  the  following  terms : 

"  The  conclusion  at  which  I  have  arrived  is  that  blame 
ought  not  to  be  imputed  to  the  captain.  The  advice 
given  to  him,  although  meant  for  his  most  serious 
and  careful  consideration,  was  not  intended  to  deprive 
him  of  the  right  to  exercise  his  skilled  judgment  in 
the  difficult  questions  that  might  arise  from  time 
to  time  in  the  navigation  of  his  ship.  His  omission 
to  follow  the  advice  in  all  respects  cannot  fairly 
be  attributed  either  to  negligence  or  to  incompetence. 
He  exercised  his  judgment  for  the  best.  It  was  the  judg- 
ment of  a  skilled  and  experienced  man,  and  although 
others  might  have  acted  differently  and  perhaps  more 
successfully,  he  ought  not,  in  my  opinion,  to  be  blamed. 
The  whole  blame  for  the  cruel  destruction  of  life  in  this 
catastrophe  must  rest  solely  with  those  who  plotted  and 
with  those  who  committed  the  crime." 

Such  was  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  and  its  effect 
upon  the  whole  civilised  world  was  immediate  and  un- 
forgettable. As  the  late  Mr.  Theodore  Roosevelt  said,  it 
represented  "  not  merely  piracy,  but  piracy  on  a  vaster 


426  SINKING  OF  THE   "  LUSITANIA  "  [CH.  x 

scale  of  murder  than  any  old-time  pirate  ever  practised." 
This  was  the  verdict  of  practically  every  neutral  nation, 
vividly  reflected  in  the  almost  universal  condemnation 
of  their  representative  Press  organs.  Thus  the  well-known 
Dutch  newspaper  the  Handels  Blad  stated,  "  This  act  is 
opposed  to  every  law  and  every  sentiment  of  humanity, 
and  we  raise  our  voice,  however  powerless  it  may  be, 
in  protest.  A  seafaring  people  which  has  any  self-respect 
does  not  make  war  of  annihilation  against  defenceless 
people."  The  Swedish  paper,  the  Nya  Dagligt  Allehanda, 
condemned  it  as  an  "  unpardonable  crime  against  human- 
ity," and  a  Norwegian  paper,  the  Aften  Posten,  spoke 
for  them  all  in  saying,  "  The  mad  and  reckless  action  of 
the  German  submarine  has  now  reached  its  culminating 
point.  The  whole  world  looks  with  horror  and  detestation 
on  the  event." 

In  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  the  sinking  of  the 
Lusitania  was  received  with  practically  unanimous  ap- 
proval. In  the  words  of  Mr.  J.  W.  Gerard,  then  American 
Ambassador  in  Berlin,  "A  great  wave  of  exultation  swept 
over  Germany.  It  was  felt  that  this  was  a  master-stroke, 
that  victory  was  appreciably  nearer,  and  that  no  power 
on  earth  could  withstand  the  brute  power  of  the  Empire." 
The  Kolnische  Volkszeitung  of  May  10th,  1915,  said : 
"  The  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  is  a  success  for  our  sub- 
marines which  must  be  placed  beside  the  greatest 
achievements  of  the  naval  war.  .  .  .  The  sinking  of  the 
great  British  steamer  is  a  success  the  moral  significance  of 
which  is  still  greater  than  the  material  success.  With 
joyful  pride  we  contemplate  this  latest  deed  of  our  Navy, 
and  it  will  not  be  the  last."  Five  days  later,  the  Kolnische 
Zeitung  endorsed  this  statement  by  proclaiming  that 
"  the  news  will  be  received  by  the  German  people  with 
unanimous  satisfaction,  since  it  proves  to  England  and 
the  whole  world  that  Germany  is  quite  in  earnest  with 
regard  to  her  submarine  warfare." 

Not  only  did  the  city  of  Magdeburg  propose  to  honour 
the  officers  and  men  who  had  committed  this  murder, 
but  a  committee  was  actually  formed  there  for  the  purpose 
of  collecting  money  as  a  national  gift  for  those  who  had 
thus  slaughtered  so  many  hundreds  of  helpless  men, 
women,  and  children,  and  inflicted  the  anguish  of  bereave- 
ment on  so  many  hundreds  more.  Nor  was  that  all, 


CH.  x]         THE   AUTHORS   OF  THE   CRIME  427 

for  a  medal  was  struck  in  Munich,  and  widely  distributed 
throughout  the  whole  of  Germany,  in  commemoration 
of  an  act  which,  outside  its  borders,  had  brought  down 
upon  the  German  peoples  the  execration  of  the  world. 

Upon  whom  ultimately  the  responsibility  for  issuing 
the  order  that  led  to  this  tragedy  must  rest  may  never 
with  certainty  be  known.  But,  according  to  Mr.  J.  W. 
Gerard,  there  was  no  question  of  a  mistake,  or  of  orders 
exceeded  or  disobeyed.1  Count  von  Bernstorff  had,  in 
Mr.  Gerard's  words,  "  Frankly,  boldly,  definitely,  and 
impudently  advised  to  the  world,  with  the  authority  of 
the  German  Government,  that  the  attempt  to  sink  the 
Lusitania  would  be  made."  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  "  openly 
showed  his  approval  of  the  act,  and  threw  all  his  influence 
in  favour  of  a  continuation  of  the  ruthless  tactics.  But  a 
question  that  involved  a  breach  of  International  Law,  a 
possible  break  with  a  friendly  Power,  could  not  be  decided 
by  even  the  Foreign  Office  and  Navy  together.  .  .  .  All 
the  evidence  points  to  the  Emperor  himself  as  the  respon- 
sible head  who,  at  this  time,  ordered  or  permitted  this 
form  of  murder.  The  orders  were  given  at  a  time  when 
the  Emperor  dominated  the  General  Staff,  not  in  one  of 
those  periods  when  the  General  Staff,  as  at  present,  domin- 
ated the  Emperor.  When  I  saw  the  Kaiser  in  October 
1915,  he  said  that  he  would  not  have  sunk  the  Lusitania, 
that  no  gentleman  would  ever  kill  so  many  women  and 
children.  Yet  he  never  disapproved  the  order.  ...  A 
man  is  responsible  for  the  logical  results  of  his  own  acts. 
It  may  be,  too,  that  Charles  IX,  when  he  ordered,  perhaps 
reluctantly,  the  massacre  of  Saint  Bartholomew,  did  not 
know  that  so  many  would  be  killed,  but  there  can  be  no 
Pilate-washing-of-the-hands ;  the  Emperor  William  was 
responsible,  he  must  bear  the  blame  before  the  world." 

This  record  of  one  of  the  foulest  crimes  in  the  history 
of  the  war  would  be  incomplete  were  nothing  said  of  the 
fate  of  the  German  Kapitan-Leutnant  Schwieger,  who  was 
responsible  for  the  loss  of  so  many  lives.  In  September 
1917  he  was  in  command  of  U88  and  the  hero  of  the  Ger- 
man people,  having  stepped  into  the  place  occupied  at 
an  earlier  stage  by  Otto  Weddigen.  U88  was  pro- 
ceeding in  company  with  another  submarine  from  a  Ger- 
man port  when  she  entered  a  mine-field.  The  escort  having 
1  Four  Years  in  Germany,  by  J.  W.  Gerard. 


428  SINKING   OF  THE   "  LUSITANIA  "          [CH.  x 

left  them,  both  the  submersible  vessels  were  travelling 
submerged.  What  happened  to  the  U88  is  uncertain, 
but  the  commander  of  the  other  submarine  afterwards 
reported  that  he  found  his  vessel  embarrassed  by  a  heavy 
chain,  suggesting  to  him  that  he  had  invaded  a  recently- 
laid  British  mine-field.  He  was  about  to  rise  to  the  surface, 
his  only  chance  of  safety,  when  he  felt  a  heavy  explosion. 
On  reaching  the  surface,  he  tried  to  communicate  by  wire- 
less and  other  signals  with  U88,  but  got  no  replies.  Noth- 
ing was  ever  heard  of  the  vessel.  Presumably  Kapitan- 
Leutnant  Schwieger,  in  company  with  his  crew,  paid  the 
full  penalty  for  the  ocean  crimes  which,  with  unexampled 
ferocity  and  callousness,  he  had  committed. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE    ADVENT    OF    THE    OCEAN-GOING    SUBMARINE 

DURING  the  winter  of  1914-15  Germany  had  built  a  number 
of  ocean-going  submarines,  able  to  keep  at  sea  for  longer 
periods  and  more  formidably  armed  than  those  with  which 
she  commenced  the  war.  By  the  end  of  April  these  improved 
craft  had  begun  to  pass  down  the  west  coast  of  Ireland; 
with  results  on  British  shipping  which  have  already  been 
indicated.  Submarines  were  also  seen  off  the  approaches 
to  Queenstown  and  the  River  Shannon.  But  all  the 
embarrassing  incidents  of  these  days  with  which  the 
Auxiliary  Patrol  grappled  manfully  were  to  be  over- 
shadowed by  the  work  which  the  sinking  of  the  Cunard 
liner  Lusitania  threw  on  these  craft. 

There  was  ample  evidence  that  submarines  were  hovering 
about  the  south  coast  of  Ireland.  As  early  as  3.30  a.m. 
on  the  day  of  the  disaster,  a  U-boat  was  seen  near  Dun- 
more,  Waterford ;  a  second  at  the  entrance  to  Gascanane 
Sound,  just  to  the  east  of  Cape  Clear,  where  such  low-lying 
craft  could  easily  hide  behind  rocks;  and  at  5.40  a.m. 
a  submarine  was  sighted — probably  the  one  that  was  near 
Gascanane  Sound — eight  miles  north-west  of  Brow  Head 
going  north-west,  possibly  to  meet  the  Lusitania  as  she 
approached  the  latitude  of  Mizen  Head.  Still  another  was 
seen  at  4.30  a.m.  near  Castlehaven,  proceeding  slowly, 
this  probably  being  the  one  which  was  reported  five  hours 
later  by  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  Motor-boat  No.  47  off  Cape 
Clear.  At  1.45  p.m.  a  submarine  was  seen  off  the  entrance 
to  Glandore  Harbour.  Meanwhile  the  great  Cunarder  was 
approaching  land,  and  before  another  hour  had  passed  the 
Lusitania  had  been  torpedoed  and  sunk,  probably  by  the 
U-boat  which  was  cruising  off  Glandore,  which  lies  between 
Galley  Head,  and  Castlehaven. 

The  disposition  of  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  vessels  in  this 

429 


430  THE  OCEAN-GOING  SUBMARINE          [CH.  xi 

area  was  as  follows ;  the  Queenstown  trawlers  Sarba,  Blue- 
bell, and  Heron,  under  the  orders  of  Admiral  Coke,  Vice- 
Admiral  commanding  the  coast  of  Ireland,  patrolling 
between  Kinsale  and  Ballycottin,  and  the  trawlers  Indian 
Empire,  Clifton,  Maximus,  and  Reliance  between  Bally- 
cottin and  Carnsore  Point.  The  area  through  which  the 
Lusitania  passed,  Mizen  Head  to  Kinsale,  was  patrolled  by 
the  trawlers  Freesia,  Verbena,  and  Restango.  Motor-boat 
No.  47,  Seagull,  had  at  9.50  a.m.  chased  a  submarine  for  ten 
minutes  five  miles  south  of  Cape  Clear,  and  then  gone  into 
Baltimore  to  report  this  fact.  This  information  was  sent  by 
wireless  to  the  Lusitania  at  1  p.m.,  but  was  not  acknow- 
ledged by  her.  In  addition  to  the  above  craft,  the  trawler 
Luneda,  based  on  Berehaven,  was  patrolling  off  the  Mizen. 
With  the  exception  of  the  above  vessels  and  the  motor-boat 
Aptera,  which  was  somewhere  near  Kinsale,  there  were  no 
other  patrols  in  the  neighbourhood,  as,  at  the  time,  the 
yachts  Greta  and  Aster  were  undergoing  repairs ;  the 
trawlers  Brock,  Margate,  and  Bradford  were  coaling ;  and  the 
trawlers  Congo,  Ebro,  Reindeer  II,  and  Lucida  were  also 
in  port  owing  to  defects. 

At  eleven  minutes  past  two  o'clock  the  Valentia  wireless 
station  picked  up  the  Lusitania's  "  S.O.S."  signal,  and 
a  few  minutes  later  Queenstown  received  the  message. 
All  tugs  and  small  craft  and  the  Queenstown  trawlers 
on  patrol  were  ordered  to  proceed  immediately  to  the 
rescue.  The  Admiralty  tugs  Stormcock  and  Warrior  were 
the  first  to  get  out  of  Queenstown,  but  the  trawler  Brock 
(Lieutenant-Commander  T.  B.  H.  Whytehead,  R.N.R.), 
which  was  coaling  at  the  time,  got  away  very  smartly, 
and  the  Queenstown  drifter  Golden  Effort  (Commander 
Birchan,  R.N.V.R.)  was  also  soon  under  way.  In  addition 
the  trawler  Bradford,  the  tug  Flying  Fox,  the  examination 
ship  Julia,  and  three  torpedo-boats  proceeded  to  the  spot. 
Some  time  was  taken  in  informing  the  trawlers  at  sea,  the 
Indian  Empire  being  the  only  vessel  of  this  class  near 
Queenstown  which  was  fitted  with  wireless. 

No  time  was  lost  in  getting  to  the  scene  of  the  disaster 
and  picking  up  survivors.  At  8.30  p.m.  the  Stormcock 
arrived  back  with  her  complement,  followed  by  the  Indian 
Empire  (Lieutenant  W.  H.  Wood,  R.N.R.),  which  had  on 
board  170  souls,  the  largest  number  of  survivors  brought 
in  by  any  one  vessel.  In  this  party  were  only  three  of 


CH.  xi]     A  PATROL-VESSEL  TO  THE  RESCUE         431 

her  crew,  the  remainder  having  been  left  behind  in 
boats.  These  trawlers  had  seen  many  dead  bodies ;  and 
men  and  women  with  little  clothing  left  to  them,  whom  they 
picked  up,  they  readily  furnished  with  their  own  blankets 
and  most  of  their  clothing.  The  trawler  Bluebell  arrived 
in  port  bringing  Captain  Turner,  the  master  of  the  Lusitania, 
together  with  another  officer  and  some  passengers.  Later 
another  trawler  rescued  the  third  intermediate  officer. 

The  patrol- vessels  had  done  all  that  was  possible  having 
regard  to  the  paucity  of  their  numbers.  In  the  original 
disposition  of  the  vessels  throughout  the  British  Isles 
none  could  have  foreseen  that  within  a  year  of  the  war 
this  area  about  Ireland  would  become  such  an  important 
zone.  Elsewhere  the  demands  for  destroyers  and  auxiliary 
patrol  craft  was  so  incessant  that  few  could  be  spared. 
Now  that  the  enemy  had  shown  that  he  had  ocean-going 
submarines,  and  was  determined  to  use  them  ruthlessly 
so  far  away  from  his  base,  the  Admiralty  had  to  reconsider 
the  whole  subject,  and  make  important  modifications. 

In  the  afternoon  and  evening  following  the  sinking 
of  the  Lusitania  submarines  were  sighted  several  times 
between  Baltimore  and  Kin  sale  off  the  coast.  Four  days 
later  the  trawler  Brock  saw  the  conning-tower  and  wash  of 
a  submarine  four  miles  south-west  of  Daunt  Rock  Light- 
ship, at  the  entrance  to  Queenstown,  and  fired  on  her.  On 
May  25th  another  steamship — an  American — was  torpedoed 
off  the  Atlantic  coast.  This  happened  at  8.24  p.m.,  fifty 
miles  west  of  the  Fastnet.  The  Nebraskan  had  left  Liverpool 
the  day  before  in  ballast.  Suddenly  a  violent  explosion 
occurred,  bursting  the  hatch  and  deck  at  No.  1  hold,  and 
throwing  the  cargo  derrick  thirty  feet  into  the  air.  No 
submarine  was  seen,  but  the  chief  engineer  had  sighted  the 
wake  of  a  torpedo.  An  S.O.S.  signal  was  sent  out,  and  at 
9.30  p.m.  the  patrol-vessel  Scadaun,  a  drifter  converted 
into  a  yacht  and  commanded  by  Lieutenant  W.  Olphert, 
R.N.R.,  picked  up  the  message  from  the  Nebraskan  asking 
for  help.  The  Scadaun  at  the  time  was  patrolling  off  Castle- 
haven  not  far  from  where  the  Lusitania  had  been  torpedoed, 
and  instantly  proceeded  at  full  speed,  meeting  the  Nebraskan 
twenty-six  miles  west  of  the  Fastnet.  Instructing  the 
American  ship  to  obscure  all  lights,  the  Scadaun's  com- 
mander informed  her  that  he  would  stand  by  her,  and  then, 
steaming  at  9J  knots,  he  escorted  her  to  Liverpool,,  where 
29 


432  THE  OCEAN-GOING   SUBMARINE          [CH.  xi 

she  arrived  well  down  by  the  head.  Probably  it  was  the 
same  submarine  which  fourteen  hours  later  torpedoed 
the  s.s.  Morwenna  when  160  miles  west  by  south  of  St. 
Ann's  Head,  at  the  entrance  to  Milford  Haven. 

The  incident  has  significance,  as  once  again  an  unarmed 
fishing  vessel  was  able  to  render  magnificent  service.  The 
Morwenna  was  bound  from  Cardiff  to  Sydney,  Cape  Breton, 
Canada,  when  she  sighted  the  conning- tower  of  a  submarine. 
Course  was  immediately  altered  to  get  the  submarine 
right  astern,  extra  firemen  were  sent  below,  and  the  engineer 
was  ordered  to  get  a  full  pressure  of  steam.  In  spite  of 
these  efforts,  the  submarine  gained  upon  the  merchant- 
man, and  fired  shots  at  a  range  of  about  three-quarters  of 
a  mile,  signalling  the  steamer  to  stop.  Already  one  man 
had  been  killed  and  two  others  x  wounded  when  a  vessel 
was  sighted  on  the  starboard  bow,  making  straight  for 
the  Morwenna.  Thereupon  the  enemy  fired  a  couple  of 
shells  at  the  approaching  ship,  which  turned  out  to  be  the 
Belgian  fishing  trawler  Jacqueline,  of  Ostend,  which  had 
been  fishing  out  of  Milford.  Both  the  submarine  and  the 
Morwenna  took  her  to  be  a  patrol  trawler.  Whilst  the 
submarine  continued  to  fire,  the  Morwenna  was  able  to 
get  out  her  boats,  and  thus  save  her  crew.  After  having 
torpedoed  the  Morwenna  the  submarine  made  off,  still 
firing  at  the  Belgian,  and  then  submerged.  The  skipper 
of  the  trawler,  Eugene  Blonde,  had  performed  a  most 
plucky  act  in  coming  to  the  rescue,  having  no  other  weapon 
than  the  stem  of  his  ship.  Although  provided  with  neutral 
flags  by  his  agent  at  Milford  to  display  in  the  presence  of 
an  enemy  submarine,  he  proudly  hoisted  his  national 
colours,  and  advanced  to  attack  with  the  greatest  de- 
termination and  courage,  as  Admiral  Dare  bore  testi- 
mony. "  I  consider  the  action  of  Captain  Blonde  of  the 
Jacqueline  was  most  creditable,"  wrote  the  Morwenna' s 
captain,  "  his  intention  being  to  ram  the  submarine  if 
possible  ;  and  the  courageous  manner  in  which  he  kept 
running  evidently  gave  the  German  commander  the  im- 
pression that  the  trawler  was  armed,  as  when  they  were 
about  200  yards  from  each  other,  the  submarine  made  off 
with  all  speed,  and  shortly  after  dived  out  of  sight.  Then 
the  trawler  picked  up  the  boats,  and  after  getting  all  on 
board,  including  the  body  of  one  sailor  killed,  proceeded 
to  Milford  Haven."  For  this  gallant  act  in  life-saving, 


CH.  xi]  SUBMARINE   ROUTES  433 

skipper  Blonde  was  awarded  the  silver  medal  of  the  Royal 
Humane  Society,  and  the  sum  of  £2  was  sent  to  each  of  his 
crew.  "  I  regret,"  wrote  this  Belgian  skipper,  "  that  I  had 
no  gun  on  board  of  my  ship  ;  otherwise  the  submarine  had 
been  sunk  without  doubt,  our  speed  being  insufficient  to 
ram  her.  I  beg  to  submit  to  the  competent  authority  the 
proposal  to  put  a  gun  on  board  of  my  vessel,"  one  more 
proof  that  fishermen  are  much  the  same  all  the  world  over. 
It  was  just  such  a  petition  that  our  own  fishermen  were 
always  presenting,  and  they  showed  themselves  ready 
enough  to  attack  the  enemy,  even  though  no  gun  could  be 
afforded  them.  The  school  of  the  sea  is  the  finest  of  all 
for  the  development  of  character  and  courage. 

And  now  we  may  pause  to  take  a  survey  of  the  acti- 
vities of  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  at  this  period  of  the  war. 
Two  routes  only  were  available  to  the  enemy  by  which 
to  get  out  to  the  Atlantic  approach — either  by  way  of  the 
Dover  Straits,  or  by  a  course  round  the  north  of  Scotland. 
In  the  latter  case  there  was  a  choice  of  coming  down  the 
west  coast  of  Ireland  and  continuing  to  the  latitude  of 
the  Fastnet,  and  so  to  the  Scillies ;  or  alternatively,  after 
leaving  Scottish  waters,  of  negotiating  the  North  Channel, 
thence  passing  down  the  Irish  Sea  and  St.  George's  Channel 
and  on  to  the  Scillies. 

Many  difficulties  beset  the  submarine  on  these  routes. 
Local  destroyer  and  torpedo-boat  patrols  might  at  any 
time  be  met  issuing  from  various  bases,  and  apart  from 
all  attacks  on  the  way  by  these  craft,  the  penetration  of 
the  Dover  Straits,  when  reached,  was  a  most  perilous 
undertaking.  Off  the  East  Goodwins  were  armed  drifters  ; 
another  division  patrolled  near  the  Ruytingen  shoal ; 
a  third  division  guarded  a  boom  in  the  Downs  ;  whilst  yet 
a  fourth  division  was  on  patrol  at  the  northern  end  of  the 
Downs.  A  British  mine-field  lay  across  the  Straits,  and 
the  Dover  drifters  with  their  nets  stretched  towards 
the  French  coast,  the  nets  at  this  time  being  made  more 
dangerous  by  the  attachment  of  explosive  mines.  The 
German  Intelligence  Service  was  good ;  the  general  position 
of  the  net  area  no  doubt  was  known  to  the  enemy,  and 
those  submarines  which  operated  well  up  the  English 
Channel  most  likely  felt  their  way  through  the  obstacle 
by  night,  travelling  semi-submerged,  taking  account  of 


434  THE  OCEAN-GOING  SUBMARINE          [CH.  xi 

the  period  of  the  moon  and  the  state  of  the  tide  when  choos- 
ing the  most  suitable  opportunity.  It  was  an  exceedingly 
difficult  task  to  detect  a  submarine  at  night  in  this  trim. 
As  a  means  of  assisting  the  patrols,  instruments  known 
as  hydrophones  were  early  in  May  installed  in  the  Gull, 
South  Goodwin,  and  Varne  Lightships.  These  hydro- 
phones were  a  scientific  contrivance  by  means  of  which  the 
movements  of  a  submarine  could  be  heard.  A  long  series 
of  experiments  had  been  carried  out  in  the  Firth  of 
Forth  ;  the  instruments  were  not  yet  thoroughly  efficient, 
and  it  was  not  until  a  later  date  that  they  became  of 
importance  for  trapping  the  U-boat. 

As  the  submarine  came  down  the  English  Channel 
westward  bound,  there  were  armed  yachts  and  trawlers 
based  on  Dover,  Newhaven,  and  Portsmouth  to  be  evaded. 
If  a  course  were  taken  past  the  Wight,  drifter  nets  lay  out 
in  Christchurch  Bay,  where  the  craft  might  be  tempted 
to  rest  at  night.  Inshore,  towards  Anvil  Point,  off  Poole, 
two  motor-boats  made  a  nightly  patrol  in  case  a  submarine 
should  be  on  the  surface  charging  batteries  or  communi- 
cating with  the  land.  To  seaward  towards  Portland  the 
Poole  drifters  worked  their  nets ;  over  a  hundred  of  these 
vessels  operated  in  relays,  one  section  relieving  the  other 
for  return  to  harbour  to  replenish  and  refit.  Beyond 
this  area  were  the  Portland  drifters  and  trawlers.  The 
former  cast  their  nets  across  the  Channel  from  Portland 
to  the  Casquets  ;  and  at  the  centre  of  the  Channel — that 
is  to  say,  about  twenty  miles  south  of  the  line  joining  Start 
Point  to  St.  Catherine's  Point — which  wras  known  to  be  fre- 
quented by  submarines,  the  Portland  trawlers  patrolled. 
Similarly,  while  protecting  their  part  of  the  trade  route, 
Portsmouth  craft  were  watching  the  route  between  twenty 
miles  south  of  St.  Catherine's  and  twenty  miles  south  o 
Beachy  Head. 

Off  Plymouth  were  the  local  auxiliary  craft,  and  farther 
west  the  Falmouth  trawlers  slowly  beat  up  and  down  the 
Channel.  These  Falmouth  vessels  worked  in  pairs,  and 
as  far  as  possible  steered  the  same  course  (or  its  con- 
trary) as  the  merchant  steamers,  so  as  to  be  in  any  neigh- 
bourhood where  an  attack  by  submarines  was  likely  to 
occur.  Between  the  Lizard  and  Gribbin  Head,  the  coast 
was  patrolled  by  the  Falmouth  drifters  to  a  distance  of 
five  miles  from  the  shore,  trawlers  operating  outside 


CH.  xi]       BRISTOL  CHANNEL   AND   IRISH  SEA         435 

that  line.  All  patrols  were  ordered  to  be  not  more 
than  a  mile  apart  from  each  other.  Submarines  when  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  the  Scillies  were  hunted  by  armed 
yachts,  trawlers,  and  drifters  ;  whilst  in  Admiral  Dare's 
area  between  the  Welsh  and  Irish  coasts  were  the  Milford 
patrol- vessels.  These  were  on  duty  from  the  Coningbeg 
Lightship  to  Newquay  ;  from  the  Smalls  to  the  Barrells 
off  Carnson  Point ;  from  Coningbeg  northward  along  the 
Irish  Coast  to  Wicklow  Head ;  from  the  Smalls  northward 
through  Cardigan  Bay  to  Bardsey  Island  and  across  to 
Wicklow  Head  ;  and  from  St.  Go  van's  Lightship  to  Lundy 
Island  and  Hartland  Point.  For  this  purpose  the  Admiral 
had  under  his  command  a  couple  of  armed  yachts,  two 
dozen  armed  trawlers,  and  forty-nine  net-drifters — a 
complete  striking  force  with  which  he  could  always  keep 
in  communication  by  means  of  signal- stations  and  wireless 
telegraphy.  In  addition,  the  Belfast  yacht  squadron,  con- 
sisting of  the  armed  yachts  Marynthea,  Jeanette,  Sapphire, 
Medusa,  Narcissus,  and  Valiant,  was  before  the  end  of 
May  placed  under  Admiral  Dare's  orders.  These  six 
yachts  worked  wherever  submarines  might  be  reported 
in  the  area  east  of  long.  10°  30'  W.  and  north  of  lat. 
50°  N.  Their  duty  was  to  prevent  submarines  from  fre- 
quenting any  particular  locality  or  destroying  successive 
merchant  ships  ;  and  the  yachts,  armed  with  12 -pounders, 
and  remaining  six  days  at  sea,  followed  by  two  days  in 
harbour,  were  so  stationed  as  to  harass  the  enemy  and 
keep  him  continually  on  the  move. 

Farther  up  the  Irish  Sea,  drifters  worked  their  nets 
between  twenty  and  thirty  miles  north-east  of  Great 
Orme's  Head,  attended  by  armed  craft,  and  some  more 
drifters  operated  their  nets  five  miles  off  the  Liverpool 
Bar.  Thus  any  renewed  attacks  on  Liverpool  shipping 
would  be  greatly  hindered.  Nets  were  also  used  off 
Holyhead,  off  the  Calf  of  Man,  and  off  the  Mull  of 
Galloway.  Between  Dublin  and  the  Kish  Lightship  one 
unit  patrolled  each  night  from  six  o'clock  till  10.30  p.m., 
acting  as  scouts  prior  to  the  departure  of  the  cross-Channel 
steamers  from  Dublin  to  Holyhead.  During  the  daytime 
this  unit  patrolled  the  Irish  coast  from  St.  John's  Point 
to  Wicklow  Head. 

It  is  extremely  doubtful  if  submarines  were  able  to 
penetrate  the  netted  area  of  the_North  Channel.  -Nine 


436  THE  OCEAN-GOING   SUBMARINE          [CH.  XT 

sections  of  twelve  drifters  guarded  this  area,  some  of  them 
having  been  fitted  with  "cruiser"  mines,  ready  to  be  dropped 
on  any  submarine  which  might  get  foul  of  the  nets.  The 
drifters,  now  using  the  glass  balls  instead  of  the  kapok, 
steamed  continuously  towing  their  nets  across,  so  as  to 
form  a  perpetual  double  line  by  day  and  by  night.  By 
these  means  the  whole  of  the  English  Channel  and  the 
Irish  Sea  was  rendered  as  dangerous  for  submarines  as 
was  possible,  although  it  proved  difficult  in  practice  to 
shut  out  a  foe  that  could  render  himself  invisible  by 
submersion.  Along  the  south  and  west  coasts  of  Ireland, 
from  Carnsore  Point  away  to  Sybil  Point,  there  were  only 
four  units  ;  the  leader  of  each  unit  disposed  his  ships, 
according  to  the  number  available,  by  sections  of  three, 
each  section  cruising  in  line  abreast  two  miles  apart  in 
fine  weather.  The  general  principle  observed  was  to  keep 
out  during  the  daytime  on  a  line  of  traffic  averaging 
from  ten  to  fifteen  miles  off  the  coast,  and  to  close  the 
land  and  patrol  the  coast  and  bays  during  the  night. 

In  the  North  Sea,  whilst  the  trawler  mine-sweepers 
continued  to  keep  clear  the  channels  along  the  shore,  and 
the  paddlers  and  other  craft  swept  up  mine-fields  laid  farther 
out,  patrol- vessels  navigating  the  waters  from  the  Downs  to 
the  Orkneys  maintained  incessant  watch  for  the  appearance 
of  U-boats.  In  order  to  'avoid  such  patrols,  the  enemy, 
bound  via  the  North  of  Scotland  for  his  cruising-ground  off 
Ireland,  was  forced  to  keep  well  away  from  the  Scottish 
shore  until  he  made  the  land  about  Rattray  Head.  From 
there  northward  to  Lerwick  the  submarines  operated, 
and  they  were  able,  not  without  difficulty,  to  push  through 
the  Fair  Isle  Channel  and  so  round  the  north  of  Scotland 
and  past  the  Hebrides  to  Ireland.  To  counteract  this 
movement,  trawlers  were  sent  to  cruise  well  eastward 
of  Rattray  Head,  in  the  expectation  that  they  might  pick 
up  the  enemy  before  he  altered  course  for  the  northward ; 
and  in  order  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  patrols  in 
the  Fair  Isle  Channel  and  strengthen  the  Shetlands  Patrol, 
drifters  were  sent  with  indicator  nets  into  these  waters. 

In  short,  wherever  the  enemy  went,  whether  proceeding 
north  or  south,  he  was  beset  by  vessels  of  an  enormous 
new  navy,  manned  by  officers  and  men  possessing  the 
British  fighting  spirit,  though  not  yet  supplied  with  the 
apperfected  paratus  which  three  years  later  proved  the 


CH.  xi]          TRAWLER'S   SUCCESSFUL  ACTION  487 

most  effectual  means  of  combating  the  submarine.  The 
Royal  Navy  had  been  prepared  by  long  years  of  study 
and  experience  for  fleet  actions  and  for  destroyer  engage- 
ments, but  for  a  long  submarine  war  it  possessed  neither 
the  data  from  which  to  deduce  principles  nor  the  means 
to  put  such  principles  into  practice.  Much  shipping  was 
lost,  many  valuable  lives  were  sacrificed,  before  a  really 
satisfactory  method  of  attacking  the  submarine  was 
evolved.  Circumstances  necessitated  that  the  Navy 
should  carry  on  a  new  form  of  sea  warfare  with  its  old 
weapons  until  new  and  more  effective  ones  could  be 
devised. 

In  spite  of  all  these  drawbacks,  the  Auxiliary  Patrol 
did  remarkably  well  and  maintained  the  best  traditions 
of  the  older  Navy  whenever  opportunity  presented  itself. 
Such  occasions  were  frequent.  The  spirit  animating  the 
Service,  of  determination  to  make  the  best  use  of  its 
available  resources  and  to  miss  no  opportunity  for  battle, 
whatever  the  odds,  was  well  displayed  in  an  engagement 
in  which  the  armed  trawler  Limewold  figured.  On 
May  8th  she  was  patrolling  twenty  miles  east  of  Peter- 
head.  Her  own  commanding  officer  being  on  shore  sick, 
the  trawler  was  in  charge  of  Acting  Skipper  C.  C.  Bond. 

At  4.30  in  the  morning,  Mr.  Bond,  when  on  duty  in  the 
wheel-house,  was  startled  by  the  bursting  of  a  shell  close  to 
his  bows,  causing  water  to  splash  aboard.  He  then  saw  a 
submarine  about  a  mile  and  a  half  away  right  astern, 
overhauling  him  fast.  The  skipper  at  once  manned  his 
6-pounder,  brought  his  ship  three  points  to  port  so  that 
the  gun  would  bear,  and  proceeded  to  engage  the  enemy. 
Before  the  trawler  was  able  to  get  into  action,  the  sub- 
marine fired  her  second  shot,  which  again  passed  very 
near.  A  third  shot  from  the  German  was  well  directed, 
passing  between  the  Limewold's  bridge  and  mast.  The 
trawler's  first  two  or  three  shots  fell  just  over  her  op- 
ponent. By  this  time  the  alteration  of  the  patrol- vessel's 
position  and  the  sheering  about  of  the  submarine  to  star- 
board, in  order  to  keep  herself  astern  of  the  trawler, 
exposed  the  German's  port  side.  The  trawler's  fifth  shot 
hit  the  submarine  square  on  the  water-line,  abreast  of 
the  conning-tower,  the  shell  bursting  with  a  cloud  of 
flame  and  black  smoke.  The  distance  was  600  yards,  an 
effective  range  for  a  6-pounder.  A  few  seconds  later, 


438  THE   OCEAN-GOING    SUBMARINE         [CH.  xi 

as  the  trawler  fired  her  sixth  shot,  the  submarine  sub- 
merged, her  stern  having  risen  fifteen  feet  into  the  air, 
and  was  not  seen  again.  The  Limewold  sounded  her 
steam  whistle  to  attract  other  vessels,  and  proceeded  to 
the  spot  where  the  enemy  had  been  last  seen,  then  making 
for  Peterhead.  The  circumstances  were  investigated, 
and  were  not  deemed  to  afford  conclusive  evidence  that 
the  submarine  had  been  sunk.  The  Admiralty  sent  an 
expression  of  their  appreciation  to  Acting  Skipper  Bond 
and  the  crew,  together  with  a  sum  of  £100  to  be  divided 
among  them. 

A  fortnight  later  the  trawler  Ontario  (Skipper  G.  Gar- 
land), patrolling  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Fair  Isle  Channel, 
sighted  a  submarine  steering  to  the  south-west,  about 
four  miles  off.  The  trawler  put  on  full  speed,  and  at  a 
range  of  3,000  yards  opened  fire  with  her  starboard  gun. 
It  could  be  seen  that  the  submarine  was  a  vessel  of  a 
large  type,  painted  a  slate  grey,  with  a  gun  abaft  the  con- 
ning-tower.  The  Ontario's  shots  fell  all  round  the  enemy 
ship,  and  the  eighth  and  eleventh  appeared  to  strike  the 
hull  and  explode  there,  though  there  was  doubt  about 
the  matter.  No  fewer  than  twenty-one  rounds  in  all  were 
fired  by  the  trawler.  Finally  the  submarine  made  away 
on  the  surface  at  high  speed. 

On  the  evening  of  May  25th,  net- drifter  Unity  left 
Yarmouth,  Isle  of  Wight,  for  her  station,  and  at  8.30  p.m. 
shot  her  mine  nets  three  miles  south-south-west  of  the 
Needles,  and  drifted  with  them  through  the  night.  Next 
morning  she  commenced  to  haul  the  nets  aboard,  but  when 
most  of  them  were  got  in,  a  violent  pull  was  felt, 
the  force  being  so  great  that  the  Unity  was  towed  stern 
first  through  the  water  until  the  2j-inch  strop,  to  which 
the  nets  were  secured,  parted.  Three  nets  then  ran  out 
rapidly  back  into  the  sea,  but  they  were  cut  adrift. 
Before  the  strop  had  parted,  the  warp  and  foot-rope, 
which  had  been  secured  together,  were  seen  to  be  taut 
on  the  top  of  the  water,  and  a  swirling  eddy  such  as  would 
be  caused  by  a  revolving  propeller  was  also  observed. 
Furthermore,  a  dan-buoy  which  had  been  made  fast  to 
the  end  of  the  net  was  towed  under  water  for  a  short 
distance  and  then  reappeared  and  remained  stationary. 
In  order  to  mark  the  spot,  the  skipper  dropped  another 
dan-buoy  with  its  sinker,  and  being  quite  certain  that  a 


CH.  xi]         AN  ESCAPE  FROM  THE  NETS  439 

submarine  was  foul  of  the  nets,  fired  seven  rockets  and  two 
sound  rockets.  Unfortunately  these  were  not  observed. 
The  drifter  New  Dawn  being,  sighted  two  miles  off,  the 
skipper  steamed  up  to  her  and  requested  her  to  report  the 
incident  to  the  signal-station.  The  Unity  then  returned 
to  her  nets  and  remained  steaming  round  them,  assisted 
later  by  the  New  Dawn.  Subsequently  the  senior  naval 
officer  from  Yarmouth  arrived,  and  seven  torpedo-boats 
and  three  destroyers  made  search  for  some  miles  around, 
but  nothing  was  discovered. 

Examination  of  the  nets  revealed  the  fact  that  fifty 
yards  of  the  lower  half  of  the  end  net  had  been  completely 
torn  away,  the  foot-rope  had  been  broken  away  from  the 
warp,  and  nearly  all  the  broken  parts  of  the  net  showed 
distinct  signs  of  having  been  cut  by  a  sharp  instrument, 
the  towing-rope  being  marked  in  several  places.  There 
was  no  question  whatever  that  a  submarine  had  passed 
through  the  nets,  that  the  nets  had  held  him  for  a  few 
minutes,  and  that  the  cutting  of  the  wires  of  the  net  had 
been  done  by  a  sharp  net- cutter  fitted  for  this  purpose 
to  the  submarine.  It  had  saved  the  U-boat  on  this 
occasion  ;  and  when  nearly  four  years  later  the  great  sur- 
render of  the  German  Navy  took  place,  a  swan-like 
erection  was  noticed  on  some  of  the  U-boats,  securely 
fastened  at  the  bows  on  deck,  with  a  series  of  knife-like 
cutters.  This  was  the  German's  antidote  to  one  of  our 
most  exasperating  traps.  Had  depth  charges  been  in  use 
at  this  time,  certainly  one  more  German  submarine  would 
have  failed  to  return  to  its  base. 

Experience  had  proved  the  value  of  light- draught 
paddle  excursion  steamers  for  mine-sweeping,  their  speed 
enabling  them  to  make  a  sweep  of  495  miles  on  the  Dogger 
Bank  area  in  four  days,  and  four  more  of  these  craft  were 
taken  up  and  fitted  out  at  the  Royal  Albert  Docks,  London, 
and  manned  by  ratings  of  the  Trawler  Reserve.  The 
ships  were  sent  subsequently  to  Dover.  Later  one  of 
the  paddle- steamers  was  sweeping  when  a  mine  exploded 
under  her  stern  with  such  force  that  her  hull  was  damaged 
and  the  remains  of  her  kite  were  sent  up  into  the  air,  to 
come  crashing  down  over  the  engine-room  just  above  the 
head  of  the  assistant  engineer,  Royal  Naval  Reserve, 
making  a  hole  six  feet  by  four.  The  assistant  engineer 
fortunately  escaped. 


440  THE   OCEAN-GOING   SUBMARINE          [CH.  xi 

Throughout  this  period,  when  the  enemy  was  waging 
war  with  mine  and  submarine  with  ruthless  persistency, 
fishermen  in  the  North  Sea  still  continued  to  bring  back 
the  fish  which  the  nation  so  badly  needed.  Every  voyage 
was  accompanied  by  risk,  for  many  trawlers  had  foundered 
on  mines,  or  were  taken  unawares  by  submarines,  as  we 
have  already  recorded.  The  danger  was  reduced  as  far 
as  possible  by  the  plans  which  the  Admiralty,  realising 
the  need,  had  made.  Armed  yachts  and  armed  trawlers, 
the  latter  disguised  to  resemble  fishing  craft,  operated  on 
the  Dogger  Bank  with  such  alertness  that  the  enemy 
considered  discretion  the  better  part  of  valour  and  rarely 
attacked.  Farther  north  in  Scottish  waters,  where 
fishing  continued,  a  Peterhead  trawler  was  detailed  to 
steam  off  the  coast  between  Aberdeen  and  Buchaness, 
and  to  use  her  trawl  occasionally  in  order  to  entice  a 
submarine.  Two  other  trawlers  were  stationed  among 
the  Aberdeen  fishing  fleet,  making  themselves  units  of 
the  fleet  for  the  same  purpose.  For  during  May  submarines 
had  been  sinking  vessels  from  fourteen  to  seventy  miles 
east  of  Aberdeen,  and  forty  miles  to  the  south-east  of 
Peterhead. 

May  Day,  1915,  was  marked  by  "  a  certain  liveliness  " 
— the  phrase  of  the  First  Lord — in  the  southern  portion 
of  the  North  Sea.  During  the  forenoon  the  British  de- 
stroyer RECRUIT  was  torpedoed  and  sunk  by  a  submarine 
two  miles  east-south-east  of  the  Galloper  Lightship,  but 
rescuing  trawlers  saved  many  of  the  crew.  The  same 
afternoon  another  loss  occurred,  this  time  a  trawler  and 
her  gallant  crew,  farther  across  the  North  Sea.  Four 
trawlers  were  on  patrol:  the  Miura  (Sub-Lieutenant  L. 
W.  Kersley,  R.N.R.)  was  on  a  course  a  little  to  the  north- 
east of  the  North  Hinder  Lightship;  the  Chirsit  (Sub- 
Lieutenant  A.  Stablefold,  R.N.R.)  a  little  farther  to  the 
south-east  of  the  lightship ;  and  the  Columbia  (Lieutenant- 
Commander  W.  H.  Hawthorne,  R.N.R.)  about  four  miles 
to  the  west-north-west  of  the  position.  Beyond  the 
Columbia  still  farther  to  the  west-north-west  was  the 
trawler  Barbados,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Sir  James 
Domville,  Bart.,  R.N.,  the  senior  ship  of  the  four.  The 
division  was  searching  for  a  German  submarine  which  had 
fired  a  torpedo  at  the  Columbia  that  morning  off  Thornton 
Ridge.  About  3  p.m.  a  couple  of  torpedo-bpats  were 


CH.  xi]  TRAWLERS   IN  ACTION  441 

sighted  approaching  from  the  west-south-west,  in  quarter- 
line  formation,  flying  no  ensign.  When  little  more  than 
500  yards  distant  they  hoisted  the  German  flag,  and  the 
leader  fired  a  torpedo  at  the  Columbia,  which  missed. 
Thereupon  Sir  James  Domville,  from  the  Barbados, 
opened  fire.  Very  shortly  afterwards  a  second  torpedo 
was  fired  at  the  Columbia,  striking  on  the  port  side  abreast 
of  the  wheel-house,  and  she  sank.  Two  torpedoes  were 
also  aimed  at  the  Barbados,  but  just  missed,  and  a  heavy 
fire  was  kept  up  by  the  enemy  from  machine  guns  and 
6- pounders.  By  this  time  the  trawlers  Chirsit  and  the 
Miura  also  joined  in  the  action  at  long  range,  whereupon 
one  of  the  torpedo-boats  sheered  off  towards  the  Chirsit, 

It  was  an  unequal  fight  from  the  beginning,  but  the 
little  trawlers,  their  Royal  Naval  Reserve  officers,  and  their 
senior  officer,  Lieutenant  Sir  James  Domville,  fought  with 
characteristic  spirit.  At  the  outset  the  skipper  of  the 
Barbados  was  wounded,  so  that  Sir  James  Domville 
had  to  carry  on  in  the  wheel-house  by  himself.  This  part 
of  the  ship  was  the  enemy's  target,  and  inside  this  structure 
Lieutenant  Domville  was  being  hit  by  splinters.  On 
several  occasions  he  was  knocked  down.  But  the  trawlers 
put  up  such  a  stiff  fight  that  after  twenty  minutes  the 
nearer  of  the  torpedo-boats  was  compelled  to  increase 
the  range  to  1,200  yards.  Shortly  afterwards  volumes 
of  steam  were  seen  issuing  from  her  and  she  stopped. 
The  Barbados  then  closed  her,  but  the  German  craft 
got  her  machinery  going,  and  together  with  the  other  tor- 
pedo-boat escaped  to  the  south-south-east.  Had  the 
affair  finished  there,  it  would  have  been  a  victory  for  the 
trawlers,  who  with  inferior  speed  and  armament  kept  the 
enemy  engaged  until  he  declined  to  fight  any  longer.  But 
this  was  not  the  end. 

Half  an  hour  later,  the  Barbados,  by  firing  her  gun 
and  blowing  her  siren,  was  able  to  attract  the  attention 
of  the  destroyer  LEONIDAS,  which  came  up  from  the  south- 
west and  was  informed  of  what  had  occurred.  Thereupon 
the  LEONIDAS  and  two  other  destroyers  gave  chase,  whilst 
the  Barbados  returned  to  where  the  Columbia  had  been 
sunk,  and  discovered  that  only  one  survivor  had  been 
saved,  the  man,  a  deck-hand,  having  been  picked  up  by 
the  Miura.  The  destroyers  pursuing  the  enemy  torpedo- 
boats  succeeded  in  sinking  both  of  thera ;  so  retribution 


442  THE  OCEAN-GOING   SUBMARINE          [CH.  xi 

came  quickly.  In  accordance  with  British  ideas  of  the 
chivalry  of  the  sea,  efforts  were  at  once  made  to  save 
human  life.  Lieutenant  Hartnoll  himself  went  into  the 
water  to  rescue  a  German. 

Two  officers  and  forty-four  men  of  the  German  torpedo- 
boats,  out  of  a  total  of  fifty-nine,  were  picked  up,  and 
from  these  prisoners  was  learnt  something  of  the  callous- 
ness of  the  Germans  to  the  sense  of  honour  respected  by 
seamen.  They  admitted  that  from  the  Columbia  they 
had  picked  up  a  "  two-striped  officer "  and  two  men. 
This  officer  must  have  been  Lieutenant- Commander  Haw- 
thorne, but  when  asked  what  had  become  of  him  they 
casually  remarked  that  their  prisoners  were  below  and  time 
was  short ;  so  whilst  they  took  the  first  opportunity  to 
save  themselves,  they  left  three  British  sailors  to  their 
fate. 

Another  member  of  the  German  crews  saved  had  had 
an  extraordinary  experience.  As  the  German  torpedo- 
boats  were  altering  course,  this  man  was  swept  overboard 
by  the  wash.  A  lifebuoy  marked  "  A6 "  was  thrown 
to  him,  and  picked  up.  He  was  then  rescued  by  the 
Norwegian  s.s.  Varild,  which  happened  to  be  passing,  and 
from  her  he  was  handed  over  to  the  Miura.  This 
prisoner  stated  that  the  torpedo-craft  had  come  out  from 
Zeebrugge  at  noon  that  day.  It  was  learnt  from  the 
solitary  British  survivor  that  when  struck  the  Columbia 
immediately  broke  in  half,  and  sank  in  less  than  a 
minute,  whilst  the  enemy  all  the  time  kept  up  fire  from 
his  machine  guns  and  six  guns,  and  did  not  neglect  to 
fire  even  on  a  few  men  in  the  water  who  were  endeavouring 
to  save  themselves. 

The  death  of  Lieutenant -Commander  Hawthorne  was 
a  great  loss  to  the  Auxiliary  Patrol  Service.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  war  he  had  come  to  England  from  Canada 
at  his  own  expense  as  a  volunteer,  and  he  had  been  con- 
stantly employed  in  most  dangerous  work  ever  since. 
The  trawlers  had  fought  most  gallantly.  In  the  Barbados 
the  little  3-pounder  was  fired  with  excellent  direction  and 
rapidity  by  Petty  Officer  A.  H.  Hallett ;  the  deck-hands 
and  engine-room  staff  showed  conspicuous  courage.  The 
Miura  and  Chirsit,  by  their  effective  long-range  gunnery, 
had  undoubtedly  helped  to  save  the  Barbados  and  to 
cause  the  enemy  to  retire.  The  Admiralty  expressed 


CH.  xi]  A   COWARDLY  FOE  443 

their  appreciation  of  the  way  in  which  the  trawlers  had 
fought  a  superior  force,  and  sent  a  letter  on  vellum  to 
Lieutenant  Sir  James  Domville,  at  the  same  time  awarding 
Petty  Officer  Hallett  the  D.S.M.  It  remains  only  to 
observe  that  this  incident  was  intended  as  another  of 
those  "  tip-and-run  "  expeditions  favoured  by  the  enemy. 
During  the  forenoon  considerable  activity  by  hostile 
aircraft  had  been  noticed,  and  undoubtedly  the  latter 
had  informed  Zeebrugge,  from  whence  had  been  dispatched 
the  two  torpedo-boats  with  the  intention  of  destroying 
all  four  trawlers. 

In  order  to  confuse  the  enemy  when  endeavouring  to 
decide  what  craft  was  a  fishing  trawler,  and  what  an  armed 
trawler,  various  methods  were  adopted  for  concealing  the 
gun.  In  some  cases  this  was  done  by  the  addition  of  a 
foresail.  Some  of  the  Portsmouth  trawlers  thus  added 
to  their  disguise,  and  they  also  painted  the  gun  with  an 
ingenious  patchwork,  according  to  primitive  ideas  of 
camouflage,  which  later  were  so  much  developed.  There 
was  always  a  hope  that  by  hiding  the  gun  a  trawler  might 
lure  the  submarine  on  till  the  latter  was  within  range  of 
gun-fire.  , 

The  enemy  proved  often  enough  the  truth  of  the  axiom 
that  the  bully  is  generally  a  coward.  What,  for  instance, 
could  be  more  cowardly  than  the  following  incident  ? 
The  steam-trawler  Victoria  had  left  Milford  Haven  on 
May  25th  bound  for  the  Labadie  Bank,  where  she  was 
going  to  trawl.  About  five  in  the  evening  of  June  1st 
the  sound  of  firing  was  heard  astern,  and  a  submarine 
was  observed  a  long  distance  away.  The  Victoria  was  at 
the  time  about  130  miles  west  by  south  of  St.  Ann's 
Head.  The  submarine  was  painted  grey,  and  as  she  had 
a  mizzen  set  she  had  the  appearance  of  a  drifter.  Without 
giving  the  trawler's  crew  time  to  leave  the  ship,  the  Ger- 
mans shelled  her.  Even  after  the  Victoria  had  stopped, 
the  submarine,  from  a  range  of  a  mile  and  a  half,  maintained 
a  rapid  fire.  By  this  time  the  scene  on  board  the  fishing- 
vessel  was  heartrending.  A  boy  named  Jones,  who  had 
come  with  the  skipper  for  the  pleasure  of  the  trip,  and 
had  been  sent  on  to  the  bridge,  was  killed.  The  skipper 
and  chief  engineer  were  also  killed,  both  by  one  shell. 
In  addition  another  shell  struck  the  mate  and  the 
trimmer*  who  were  also  killed,  a  deck-hand  being  wounded. 


444  THE  OCEAN-GOING  SUBMARINE          [CH.  xi 

Those  who  survived  found  themselves  caught  in  a  trap, 
as  they  could  not  get  away  from  the  ship,  their  boat  having 
been  smashed  by  the  enemy's  shells.  They  therefore 
jumped  overboard  with  planks  to  save  themselves. 

The  submarine  went  alongside  the  trawler,  placed 
explosive  charges  aboard,  removed  the  wounded  deck-hand, 
and  picked  up  the  other  survivors  after  they  had  been  an 
hour  and  a  half  in  the  water.  Having  been  cross-examined 
as  to  whether  they  were  in  the  Navy,  whether  there  were 
any  arms  on  board,  and  whether  they  had  seen  any  patrol- 
boats,  these  unhappy  men  were  sent  below.  During  the 
night  they  were  given  coffee  and  a  biscuit  each,  and  the 
deck-hand  had  his  wounds  dressed.  All  night  they  re- 
mained aft  near  the  submarine's  engines,  and  next  morning 
to  their  surprise  were  joined  by  some  more  British  fisher- 
men from  another  West  Country  trawler,  which  had  steamed 
out  of  Cardiff  the  previous  day.  This  was  the  Hirose,  a 
vessel  built  only  that  year.  At  5.30  a.m.,  when  about  130 
miles  west  by  south  of  Lundy  Island  bound  for  her  fishing- 
grounds,  her  career  was  brought  to  a  quick  end.  She  was 
proceeding  at  a  steady  9  knots,  the  third  hand  and  the 
boatswain  being  on  watch.  Her  skipper,  Mr.  Francis  Ward, 
was  below  and  was  called  by  the  boatswain,  who  shouted  : 
"  Come  up,  skipper.  There  are  shells  flying  all  round." 
He  immediately  came  on  deck,  ordered  all  hands  to  be 
called,  and  rang  down  for  the  engines  to  be  stopped. 
The  shelling  then  ceased.  The  skipper  rang  down  again 
for  full  speed  ahead,  but  again  the  enemy  put  him  under 
a  heavy  fire.  Once  more  the  trawler's  engines  were  stopped, 
and  the  boat  was  ordered  out.  The  submarine  came  up 
astern,  and  a  man  in  the  conning-tower  called  out  to  the 
men  to  leave  the  ship  within  five  minutes.  The  crew  got 
into  their  boat  and  were  ordered  to  the  submarine,  where 
they  found  the  four  men  from  the  trawler  Victoria. 
Three  of  the  submarine's  crew  were  sent  with  bombs  to 
destroy  the  trawler,  and  brought  back  with  them  the  chart - 
room  clock  and  binoculars.  Then,  about  6  a.m.,  the  ten 
men  from  the  Hirose,  with  four  from  the  Victoria,  were  put 
into  the  boat  of  the  Hirose  and  cast  adrift  to  manage  as 
best  they  could.  They  rigged  up  a  sail  with  the  boat's 
cover  and  hoisted  an  oar  for  a  mast.  Under  this  rig  they 
ran  all  day,  before  a  strong  west-south-west  wind  and  a 
heavy  sea.  Twenty-four  hours  later  they  were  sighted  by 


CH.  xi]       THE   SINKING  OF  FISHING  CRAFT  445 

the  s.s.  Ballater,  of  Liverpool,  who  picked  them  up  with 
difficulty,  owing  to  the  heavy  sea  running,  and  landed 
them  at  Milford  at  four  the  same  afternoon.  The  men 
were  found  by  the  Ballater  just  in  time,  for  they  were  in 
an  exhausted  state,  consequent  on  exposure  in  an  open 
boat  at  the  mercy  of  rough  seas,  with  food  that  was 
sodden  by  the  salt  water.  The  submarine  was  U34,  whose 
commanding  officer  had  added  one  more  to  the  long  list 
of  crimes  committed  by  Germany  on  the  high  seas. 

On  the  day  that  the  Hirose  was  sunk,  a  submarine 
destroyed  the  Belgian  fishing  trawler  Delta  B,  about  ten 
miles  south-west  of  the  Bishop  Rock.  In  the  North  Sea 
the  attacks  upon  fishermen  were  even  more  frequent 
than  in  western  waters.  Altogether  no  fewer  than  forty- 
eight  fishing- vessels  were  sunk  during  June  by  submarines, 
the  principal  localities  being  off  the  north-east  coast  of 
Scotland,  fifty  miles  east  of  Lowestoft.  and  off  the  Dogger 
Bank ;  though  sinkings  of  these  craft  also  took  place  forty 
miles  south-west  of  the  Lizard,  at  the  approaches  to  the 
Bristol  Channel,  and  at  the  mouth  of  the  English  Channel. 

A  few  examples  of  these  attacks  on  fishing  craft  may 
be  taken  as  typical  of  the  rest.  On  June  4th  the  Aberdeen 
fishing-trawler  Explorer,  when  about  seventy-three  miles 
north-east  by  north  of  Buchaness,  saw  a  big  submarine 
come  under  her  stern.  It  was  7.30  p.m.  A  shot  having 
been  fired,  the  submarine  commander  called  out  to  the 
skipper  in  good  English  :  "  Get  your  boat  out  at  once. 
I  have  no  time  to  lose."  Left  without  choice,  the  trawler's 
crew  had  no  course  but  to  obey.  Launching  their  boat, 
they  pulled  clear,  when  the  U-boat  promptly  sank  the 
fishing-vessel  with  eight  shots  and  then  disappeared  to 
the  north-east.  The  castaways  were  afterwards  picked 
up  by  the  sloop  ACACIA. 

On  June  5th  the  fishing-trawler  Japonica,  forty-five  miles 
north-east  of  Kinnaird  Head,  was  also  attacked  and  sunk 
by  a  submarine.  The  story  is  best  told  in  the  words  of 
her  skipper,  Mr.  William  Henry  Butler : 

"  It  was  about  eleven  o'clock  at  night,  and  we  were  just 
shifting  watches.  The  mate  had  just  got  on  to  the  bridge,  and 
we  heard  a  gun  fire.  Looking  to  starboard,  we  saw  a  shell 
explode  ahead,  which  shook  the  ship.  All  hands  got  aft  to 
get  the  boat  out,  the  submarine  coming  along  at  full  speed. 


446  THE  OCEAN-GOING  SUBMARINE          [CH.  xl 

The  captain  of  the  submarine  sang  out, '  Hurry  up !  Clear 
out !  I'm  going  to  sink  you.'  We  all  got  into  the  boat 
and  pulled  towards  him,  and  he  said,  '  I  don't  want  you 
here.  Clear  out ! '  4  Can  I  go  back  and  get  some  sails 
or  some  food  ?  '  I  asked.  '  No,'  he  answered  ;  '  clear 
to  —  —  out  of  it ! '  He  was  about  200  yards  from  the  ship, 
and  fired  two  shots,  which  both  missed.  The  third  one 
went  through  the  cabin,  and  the  next  one  went  through 
the  boiler.  She  sank  at  twenty-five  minutes  past  eleven." 

On  the  following  day  H.M.S.  ACACIA  picked  up  the 
Japonica's  crew  and  took  them  into  port.  That  same  day 
U14  was  sunk  off  Peterhead.  Later  the  five  Peterhead 
patrol  trawlers  Limewold,  Hawk,  Oceanic  II,  Vigilant, 
and  Gull  received  the  sum  of  £932  to  be  divided  between 
them  for  their  success  in  bringing  about  her  destruction. 

Also  on  June  5th,  another  patrol  trawler,  which  was 
destined  to  perform  magnificent  work  during  the  war 
until  she  foundered  on  a  mine  many  months  later, 
did  conspicuous  service.  There  is  reason  to  believe 
that  the  enemy  assumed  at  first  that  this  vessel  was  a 
fishing-boat,  whereas  she  had  a  12-pounder  mounted 
forward.  The  incident  occurred  at  7  p.m.  about  eleven 
miles  west  of  Mizen  Head.  The  trawler  Ina  Williams 
was  steaming  towards  the  Cahirmore  Signal- Station, 
which  is  perched  on  a  high  hill  a  few  miles  to  the  west 
of  Berehaven.  A  large  submarine  came  to  the  surface 
about  a  couple  of  miles  away  on  the  port  beam.  The 
trawler's  commanding  officer,  Sub-Lieutenant  Nettle- 
ingham,  R.N.R.,  at  once  mustered  his  crew  and  headed 
for  the  enemy  with  all  possible  speed,  whereupon  the  U- 
boat  quickly  fired  four  or  five  shots.  All  these  fell  short 
on  the  starboard  side.  She  next  fired  a  torpedo,  which 
was  seen  to  pass  within  ten  feet  of  the  Ina  Williams' 
starboard  quarter.  The  trawler  fired  six  shots  in  rapid 
succession.  Of  these  the  first  three  fell  astern  of  the 
submarine,  but  each  shot  got  nearer.  The  enemy,  be- 
coming nervous,  called  his  guns'  crews  in,  but  the  trawler's 
fourth  shot  struck  the  submarine  squarely  at  the  water-line 
about  half-way  between  the  conning-tower  and  the  stern. 
The  fifth  shot  also  appeared  to  strike,  just  abaft  the 
conning-tower.  The  submarine  was  going  down  when  the 
sixth  shot  hit  her  again  at  the  water-line  by  the  conning- 


CH.  xi]  U-BOAT  PUT  TO  FLIGHT  447 

tower,  the  decks  being  awash.  This  last  shot  was  fired  at 
3,400  yards,  the  engagement  having  lasted  about  fifteen 
minutes.  The  trawler  then  steamed  over  the  position, 
and  bubbles  of  air  and  a  large  quantity  of  oil  were 
seen  to  rise.  For  an  hour  the  Ina  Williams  continued 
to  cruise  round  the  spot ;  and  at  the  end  of  that  time 
there  were  still  bubbles  coming  up,  and  the  oil  had  spread 
over  about  500  yards.  The  fight,  short  and  sharp,  was 
much  appreciated  by  the  Admiralty,  who  considered  the 
shooting  remarkable,  although  there  was  afterwards  reason 
to  believe  that  the  submarine  was  not  sunk.  Mr.  Nettle- 
ingham  received  the  D.S.C.  and  was  promoted  Lieutenant, 
and  the  seaman  gunner  was  also  decorated  with  a  D.S.M. 
and  promoted. 

On  June  10th,  at  1.30  afternoon,  the  armed  trawler 
Yokohama,  commanded  by  Sub-Lieutenant  C.  C.  Hum- 
phreys, R.N.R.,  and  based  on  Stornoway,  was  on  patrol 
west  of  the  Butt  of  Lewis.  Submarines  had  been  fre- 
quenting these  waters,  lying  in  wait  for  supply  ships 
bound  for  the  Grand  Fleet,  or  passing  to  or  from  the  West 
of  Ireland.  The  Yokohama  sighted  a  submarine  on 
the  starboard  bow  three  miles  towards  the  land.  Both 
vessels  opened  fire  at  the  same  time,  the  trawler  having 
nothing  better  than  a  3-pounder.  The  enemy  had  partially 
submerged  so  as  to  decrease  the  target.  The  firing  was 
the  extreme  range  for  the  3-pounder,  and  the  first  few 
shots  seemed  to  fall  close.  This  annoyed  the  enemy, 
who  rose  fully  out  of  the  water,  discharging  a  torpedo 
which  passed  some  ten  feet  ahead  of  the  trawler.  A 
second  torpedo  was  also  fired,  and  went  under  the  hull 
aft.  It  was  the  narrowest  possible  escape,  for  the  track 
was  seen  by  two  of  the  crew  aft  making  straight  for 
the  ship,  and  the  engineer,  who  was  on  watch,  heard 
the  torpedo  scrape  the  bottom  of  the  trawler.  There- 
after the  enemy  made  away  to  the  westward  at  high  speed, 
firing  as  he  went.  Altogether  the  Germans  had  fired  about 
thirty  rounds,  not  one  of  which  had  hit ;  her  gun  was  of 
a  size  corresponding  to  our  12-pounder.  Some  of  the  shells, 
however,  had  passed  near  the  trawler ;  one  went  between 
the  trawler's  bridge  and  the  funnel,  and  another  passed 
just  under  the  mizzen,  which  happened  to  be  set  at  the  time. 
As  soon  as  the  U-boat  made^  off,  the  Yokohama  gave  chase, 
but  owing  to  her  inferior  speed  was  soon  left  behind. 
30 


448  THE  OCEAN-GOING  SUBMARINE         [CH.  xi 

The    Yokohama's   conduct   was   considered   by    the    Ad- 
miralty to  merit  a  monetary  reward. 

Like  the  trawlers,  the  gallant  little  drifters  never  showed 
hesitation  in  doing  their  utmost  to  defeat  the  enemy. 
An  example  may  be  cited  of  the  way  they  saved  a  valuable 
ship  and  still  more  valuable  cargo. 

On  June  12th  the  U35  was  operating  about  seventy 
miles  west-south-west  of  St.  Ann's  Head,  in  which  neigh- 
bourhood were  two  fine  barques,  the  Crown  of  India  and 
the  Bellglade.  The  former  was  British.  She  had  left 
Barry  Dock  on  the  previous  day  bound  for  Pernambuco 
with  3,000  tons  of  coal.  Unfortunately  light  southerly 
winds  had  prevailed,  with  misty  weather.  Owing  to  these 
circumstances  and  the  strong  set  to  the  northward,  her 
master,  Captain  C.  Branch,  had  endeavoured  to  keep 
well  off  the  island ;  otherwise  he  would  have  hugged  the 
shore  and  evaded  attack.  A  submarine  opened  fire 
upon  the  Crown  of  India  from  half  a  mile  distant.  The 
sailing-ship  was  defenceless,  and  the  crew  hoisted  out 
their  two  boats,  in  which  all  twenty-three  men  took  refuge, 
and,  abandoning  their  vessel,  rowed  away  towards  a  Nor- 
wegian barque,  the  Bellglade,  which  was  lying  practically 
becalmed  about  three  miles  away.  The  submarine  fired 
again  at  the  Crown  of  India,  which  she  sank  within  half 
an  hour.  Not  content  with  this  destruction,  U35  then 
approached  the  Norwegian,  a  vessel  which  was  bound 
from  Halifax,  Novia  Scotia,  for  Sharpness  with  a  cargo 
of  timber,  and  her  master  was  ordered  to  come  aboard 
and  bring  his  papers.  This  was  done,  and  the  Norwegian 
master  was  examined.  He  was  then  ordered  to  abandon 
his  ship,  and  the  submarine  proceeded  to  fire  three  shots 
amidships  and  then  one  at  the  stern.  As  the  German 
was  so  engaged  a  steam  fishing  drifter,  the  Queen  Alexandra, 
was  seen  approaching.  The  submarine,  mistaking  her  for 
a  patrol- vessel,  abandoned  the  Bellglade  and  disappeared. 

The  drifter  picked  up  the  crews  of  both  sailing-ships 
and  brought  them  into  Milford,  leaving  the  Bellglade  still 
afloat.  About  11.30  the  same  morning  she  was  sighted 
by  Milford  patrol-vessels,  who  boarded  her  and  found 
her  stern  submerged  to  a  depth  of  four  feet.  Three  Milford 
drifters,  the  Cromorna  (Sub-Lieutenant  Prestridge,  R.N.R.), 
Ivy  Green,  and  Marys,  all  vessels  which  had  been  taken  up 
from  Scottish  fishing  ports,  determined  to  try  and  save 


CH.  xi]  THE   "  BELLGLADE "   SALVED  449 

her  if  possible.  With  a  hundred-fathom  tow  rope  of 
three-inch  wire,  the  Cromorna  and  Marys  towed  ahead, 
the  Ivy  Green  keeping  a  lookout  astern  for  submarines, 
and  in  this  way  the  Bellglade  succeeded  in  making  about 
4  knots.  The  wind  was  now  easterly,  and  there  was  a 
moderate  sea.  At  five  o'clock  next  morning  the  hawser > 
parted.  Efforts  were  made  under  very  trying  conditions 
to  resume  the  towage,  but  the  barque  listed  heavily  in 
the  trough  of  the  sea  and  capsized,  turning  keel  up.  The 
party  which  had  been  placed  on  board  her  managed  to 
scramble  off  and  were  all  picked  up.  More  could  not  be 
done  by  the  drifters  ;  but  seven  days  later  the  derelict 
was  towed  into  St.  Bride's  Bay,  where  she  was  anchored. 


[END  OF  VOLUME  I] 


INDEX 


Aberdeen,  course  of  training,  262, 
265  ;  vessels  at,  395 

ABOUKIR,  H.M.S.,  sunk,  241,  254, 
273  329 

ACACIA,  H.M.S.,  445,  446 

ACTION,  H.M.S.,  260 

Addax,  the  Brixham  smack,  397, 
398 

Aden,  Gulf  of,  137 

Adenwen,  the  s.s.,  experience  of, 
299 

Admiralty,  relations  with  the  Mer- 
chant Navy,  227  ;  directions  to 
shipping,  239,  415  ;  policy,  241, 
245 ;  dispersal  of  ships,  243  ; 
charters  trawlers  for  mine-sweep- 
ing, 260,  265,  318  ;  conferences, 
375,  395 

Aeroplanes,  German,  bomb  British 
ships,  293-5,  404 

AJAX,  H.M.S.,  323,  351 

Alabama,  the  s.s.,  82,  180,  213 

ALARM,  the  destroyer,  333 

Aldeburgh,  319 

Alex  Hastie,  the  trawler,  sinks  a 
submarine,  385 

Algoma,  the  trawler,  experiments 
with  mine- sweeping,  258  ;  size 
and  speed,  258  ;  crew,  259 

Allerton,  — ,  skipper  of  the  drifter 
Edgar,  364 

Alleyne,  G.  T.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Farn,  162  note 

Alnmouth,  the  trawler,  266 

Alonso,  the,  347 

Alva,  Duke  of,  massacres,  24 

Amazon  River,  140,  153 

America,  discovery  of,  19 

Amerika,  the  German  s.s.,  125 

Amiens,  Peace  of,  46 

Amiral  Ganteaume,  the  s.s,  sunk, 
268,  333,  371 

AMPHION,  H.M.S.,  founders,  319 

Andalusian,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  300 

Anderson,  — ,  assistant  master  of 
the  s.s.  Lusitania,  drowned,  419 


Andes,    the    trawler,    experiments 

with   mine-sweeping,    258  ;     size 

and  speed,  258  ;    crew,  259 
Angle,  the  trawler,  317 
Anstey,    F.    J.,   master  of   the  s.s. 

Branksome  Chine,  290 
Antelope,    the    Falmouth    packet, 

action,  60 

Antifer,  Cape  d',  271,  303 
ANTRIM,    H.M.S.,    attacked    by    a 

submarine,  333 
Antwerp,  16  ;   fall  of,  198 
Anvil  Point,  404 
Apprentices,  register  of,   105 
Aptera,  the  motor-boat,  430 
Aragon,  the  s.s.,  armed,  120 
Araz,   Mr.,    Governor  of   Chatham 

Island,  183 
Archangel,  22 
Archdeacon,  L.  N.,  master  of  the 

s.s.  Chilkana,  198  note 
ARIEL,   the  destroyer,   sinks    U12, 

390 

Arlanza,  the  s.s.,  released,  151 
Armada,  Spanish,  defeat  of  the,  38 
Arthur,  George,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Glanton,  166 
Arucas,    the    German   tender,    152 

note 

Aster,  the  armed  yacht,  344,  430 
Asturias,    the    hospital    ship,    at- 
tacked by  a  submarine,  377 
Asuncion,  the  German  s.s.,  154,  159, 

160,  167 
Atalanta,   the  s.s.,   attacked  by   a 

submarine,  301  ;    beached,  302 
Athelstan,  King,  naval  policy,   8, 

10 

Atlante,  the  French  privateer,  60 
ATTACK,  the  destroyer,  attacked  by 

a  submarine,  333 
ATTENTIVE,    H.M.S.,    attacked    by 

submarines,  330 
Atternave  Island,  182 
AUDACIOUS,  H.M.S.,  founders,  339, 
341 


451 


452 


INDEX 


Aultbea,  378 

Austria-Hungary,  man-of-war  in 
foreign  waters,  127  note 

Auxiliary  Patrol,  vii ;  organisa- 
tion, 6,  255-7,  406  ;  work, 
329,  404 ;  changes,  381  ;  issue 
of  bomb-lances,  391  ;  protection 
of  fishing  fleets,  395  ;  efficiency, 
405  ;  disposition  of  vessels,  430, 
433-6 ;  measures  against  the 
submarine,  433-6 ;  spirit  of 
the,  437 

Ayesha,  the  s.v.,  capture  of,  208, 
209  note 

Azores,  the,  28 


B3,    British   submarine,    attacked, 

333 

Bacon,  Admiral  Sir  Reginald,  406 
Baden,  the  German  s.s.,  142,  143  ; 

sunk,  185 

BADGER,  the  destroyer,  rams  a  sub- 
marine, 276,  333 
Bailhache,  Mr.  Justice,  on  the  fate 

of  the  s.s.  Oriole,  279 
Ballard,  Rear-Admiral  George,  Ad- 
miral of  Patrols,  327,  330 
Ballater,  the  s.s.,  445 
Ballycottin,  430 
Baltic  Fleet,  110 
Baltic,  the,   10;    trade  with,  23 
Banff,  321 

Bank  fields,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  184 
Banyers,  the  trawler,  sunk,  365 
Barbados,  the  trawler,  440 
Barbarossa,  the  German  s.s.,  125 
Bardsey  Island,  375 
Barfleur,  Cape,  380 
Barley  Rig,  the  drifter,  blown  up, 

322 
Barlow,  Admiral  C.  J.,  in  command 

of  the  steam  yacht  Valiant,  363  ; 

in  command  of  Larne  Area,  381  ; 

instructions  to,  382 
Barnes,   — ,    master   of   the   Seven 

Seas,  313 
Barr,    H.,   master   of    the    s.s.   St. 

Egbert,  200,  201 
Barra  Head,  402 
Barry  Dock,  448 
Bartlett,  F.  J.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Oakby,  290 
Battenberg,   Prince  Louis  of,  211 ; 

see  Milford  Haven 
Battleships  and  submarines,  256 
Beachy  Head,  47,  64,  290,  302,  385, 

403  ;   patrol  area,  400 
Beck,  Sir  Raymond,  member  of  the 


Committee  on  insurance  of  ships 

in  war,  228 

Belfast,  patrol,  341,  435 
Bell,  J.  W.,  master  of  the  Thordis, 

damages      a     submarine,      292  ; 

awarded  the    D.S.C.    and  made 

Lieutenant  R.N.R.,   292 
Bell  Rock,  329,  395 
Bellevue,  the  s.s.,  capture  of,  173  ; 

sunk,  174 
Bellglade,    the    Norwegian  barque, 

attacked  by  a  submarine,   448  ; 

fate  of,  449 
Bembridge,  314 
Ben  Cruachan,  the  s.s.,  sunk,   277, 

376 
Ben  Lawers,  the  trawler,  attacks  a 

submarine,  404 
Ben  Strome,  tho  trawler,  390 
Bengal,  Bay  of,  187 
Bengrove,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  296 
Ben-isaf,  297 

Benmohr,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  198 
Bennett,  Henry  J.,  master  of  the 

s.s.  Potaro,  174 
Berehaven,  430,  446 
Beresford,  Admiral  Lord,  123  ;  Com- 

mander-in- Chief  of  the  Channel 

Fleet,  257 
Berkeley,    Commander    H.,    R.N., 

342 

Berlin  and  Milan  Decrees,  58,  67 
Berlin,  the  German  s.s.,  lays  mines, 

338  ;    escapes,  341 
Bernays,     Lieutenant-Commander, 

R.N.,  363 
Bernsdorff,     Count    von,     on    the 

sinking  of  the  s.s.  Lusitania,  427 
Berry  Head,  374 
BERWICK,  H.M.S.,  126,  171 
Bestic,  Albert  Arthur,  third  officer 

of  the  s.s.  Lusitania,  418 
Bethania,  the  German  s.s.,  126 
Bethke,    J.,    master    of    the    s.s. 
Cornish  City,  diary  on  board  the 
s.s.  Rio    Negro,    155-66 ;    trans- 
ferred to  the  German  s.s.  Crefeld, 
165 
Bieberstein,   Baro*.*  Marschall  von, 

at  The  Hague  Conference,  118 
Birchan,     Commander,     R.N.V.R., 

430 
BIRMINGHAM,    H.M.S.,    rams    U15 

submarine,  322 
Biscay,  Bay  of,  10 
Bishop  Rock,  312 
BITTERN,  the  destroyer,   398 
BLACK  PRINCE,  H.M.S.,  126 
Black  Sea  Fleet,  110 


INDEX 


453 


Blacksod  Bay,  301  ;    armed  patrol 

at,  371 
Blackwood,  the  s.s.,  torpedoed,  297, 

391 

Blanche,  the  trawler,  358,  366 
Blaskets  Lighthouse,  316,  404 
Blonde,  Eugene,  skipper  of  the 

Belgian  trawler  Jacqueline,  432  ; 

awarded  a  medal,  433 
Blonde,    the    s.s.,    bombed    by    an 

aeroplane,  294 
Bloody  Foreland,  341 
Blucher,  the  German  s.s.,  127,  357 
Bluebell,  the  fishing  smack,  423,  430 
Blyth,  322 

Bolton,  Sir  Frederick,  228 
Bomb  lances,  issue  of,  391 
Bond,  Acting-Skipper  C.  C.,  of  the 

trawler  Limewold,  437 
Booth,  Sir  Alfred  Allen,  Chairman 

of    the    Cunard    Company,    evi- 
dence, 415 
Boothby,  Lieutenant  H.,  R.N.R.,  of 

the  trawler  Orianda,  362 ;  awarded 

the  D.S.C.,  365 
Booty,  Commander  E.  L.,  R.N.,  of 

H.M.S.  KING  EDWARD  VII,  258 
Bordeaux,  equips  corsairs,  46 
Bordelais,  the  privateer,  46 
Bosanquet,  Admiral  Sir  Day  Hort, 

210 

Boston,  the  s.s.,  strikes  a  mine,  364 
Bothnia,  the  s.s.,  299 
Boulogne,  47,  64 
Bowes  Castle,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  153 
Bo  wring,  Captain   Humphrey  W., 

R.N.,  in  charge  of  drifters,  373, 

374 

Boy  Willie,  the  drifter,  392 
Boyck,   George  R.,   master  of  the 

s.s.  City  of  Winchester,  137 
Boys,  The,  the  drifter,  386 
Bradford,  the  trawler,  430 
Branch,  C.,  master  of  the  barque 

Crown  of  India,   448 
Branksome    Chine,    the    s.s.,    sunk, 

290 
Brazil,    Island    of,    expedition    in 

search  of,   19 

Bremen,  the  German  s.s.,  124 
Brenton,    Captain,   Naval   History, 

48  note,  58  note 

BRESLAU,  the  German  cruiser,  128 
Brest,  blockade  of,  47 
Bridge,  Admiral  Sir  Cyprian  A.  G., 

211  ;    on  the  protection  of  ship- 
ping, 213 

Brighton  Queen,  the  s.s.,  as  mine- 
sweeper, 332,  361 


Bristol,  13,  19 

Bristol  Channel,  submarine  in,  409 

BRISTOL,  H.M.S.,  170,  185 

British  Army,  71  ;  the  10th  Divi- 
sion of  the,  cross  the  Irish  Sea, 
404 

British  commerce,  campaign 
against,  in  the  Revolutionary 
and  Napoleonic  Wars,  44-6, 
50,  57 

British  Corporation  for  the  Survey 
and  Registry  of  Shipping,  95 
note 

British  Government,  reply  to  Ger- 
many, 284 

British  Isles,  system  of  patrol,  370 

British  Merchant  Navy  ;  see 
Merchant  Navy 

British  Museum,  gold  noble  of 
Edward  III,  15 

Brock,  the  trawler,  430 

Brooks,  James,  on  the  sinking  of 
the  s.s.  Lusitania,  418-21 

Brow  Head,  417,  429 

Brown,  Captain,  R.N.,  Registrar- 
General  of  Seamen,  scheme  of  a 
voluntary  Naval  Reserve,  106, 
111;  report  on  the  register  ticket, 
107 

Brown,  C.  W.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Fulgent,  316  ;  killed,  316 

Bruges,  16 

Buchan  Ness,  378,  445 

Bulow,  the  German  s.s.,  126 

Burchart,  Friedrich,  Lieutenant- 
Captain,  of  the  German  cruiser 
DRESDEN,  141 

Buresk,  the  s.s.,  199  ;  capture  of, 
195  ;  sunk,  195  note 

Burgh,  Herbert  de,  9 

Burntisland,  330 

Butler,  William  Henry,  skipper, 
on  the  sinking  of  the  trawler 
Japonica,  445 

Butt  of  Lewis,  401,  447 

Byron,  the  s.s.,   168 

Caborne,  Commander  W.  F.,  R.N.R., 
113  ;  lecture  on  the  Royal  Naval 
Reserve,  113  note 

Cabot,  John,  voyages,  19 

Cabot,  Sebastian,  voyage,  21 

Cadogan,  Anthony,  master  of  the 
s.s.  Vandyck,  166 

Cairn  Ryan,  404 

Calais,  47,  64  ;   loss  of,  23 

Calcutta,   193 

Calf  of  Man,  290,  435 

Callaghan,  Admiral  Sir  George  A., 


454 


INDEX 


President  of  the  Mining  Com- 
mittee, 259  ;  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Grand  Fleet,  318 

Callao,  146 

Cambank,  the  fl.s.,  288  ;  attacked 
by  a  submarine,  289  ;  sunk,  290 

Campbell,  Rear-Admiral  Henry, 
appointed  to  the  Trade  Division, 
224 ;  memorandum,  120,  225 

Canada,  transports  from,  338 

Canary  Islands,  27,  244,  246 

Candish,  Thomas,  voyages,  39 

Canynges,  William,  fleet,  18 

Cap  Finisterre,  the  German  s.s., 
124 

Cap  Poloni,  the  German  s.s.,  124 

Cap  Trafalgar,  the  German  s.s., 
127 

Cape  of  Good  Hope,  37,  40 

Cape  Verde  Islands,  28 

Caprivi,  the  s.s.,  founders,  403 

Cardiff,  13 

Cardigan  Bay,  435 

Cargoes,  insurance  of,  236  ;  total 
value  of,  236 

Carmania,  the  s.s.,  127 

Carnsore  Point,  430,  435,  436 

Caroline  Islands,  204 

Carthagena,  30,  35 

Carver,  Captain  E.  C.,  R.N.,  372, 
380 

Caspian  Sea,  23 

Cassandra,  the  trawler,  359 

Castle  of  Comfort  (Hawkins's  ship), 
28 

Castlehaven,  429 

Castro,  the  s.s.,  case  of,  131 

Cawdor,  Lord,  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty,  "  Statement  of  Ad- 
miralty Policy,"  113 

Cawsey,  E.  J.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Florazan,  298 

Cayley,  Rear- Admiral  George  C.,  378 

Ceramic,  the  s.s.,  121 

Cervantes,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  164 

Ceylon,   194 

Chagos  Islands,  197 

Chair,  Rear- Admiral  Sir  Dudley  de, 
in  command  of  the  Tenth  Cruiser 
Squadron,  125 

Chalcheford  or  Calshot  Castle,  15 
note 

Challis,  Captain  H.  J.,  R.N.,  112 

Chamberlain,  Rt.  Hon.  Austen, 
Committee  on  War  Insurance  of 
Shipping,  228 

Chamberlain,     Rt.     Hon.     Joseph, 

Shipping  Bill,  78 
Chancellor,    Richard,    Pilot-Major, 


21  ;  Arctic  voyage,  21  ;  at  Arch- 
angel, 22  ;  Moscow,  22  ;  wrecked, 

22 

Channel  Fleet,  47 
Channel    Islands,    submarines    in, 

374 

Chapra,  the  s.s.,  194 
Charcas,  the  s.s.,  capture  of,  178 
Charles  I,  naval  policy,  44 
Charlton,  Vice- Admiral  Sir  E.  F.  B., 

appointed  Admiral  of  the  East 

Coast  Mine-Sweepers,  331,  346 
Chasehill,  the  s.s.,  capture  of,  176 
Chatham     equips      mine- sweeping 

trawlers,  320 
CHATHAM,  H.M.S.,  198 
Chatham  Island,  182,  183 
CHEERFUL,  the  destroyer,  329 
Cherbourg,  47 
Cherbury,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  314 
Chester,  the  trawler,  390 
Chili,  37 
Chilkana,  the  s.s.,  captured,    198  ; 

sunk,   201 
China,  39 
Chirsit,    the    trawler,    440 ;     fight 

with  a  submarine,  441 
Christchurch  Bay,   submarines  in, 

374 
Christian,  Admiral  A.  H.,  request 

for  trawlers,  322 
Christiania,  the  Norske  Veritas,  95 

note 
Churchill,  Rt.  Hon.  Winston,  First 

Lord    of    the    Admiralty,    Navy 

Estimates,    121-4 ;     request   for 

drifters,  372 

Cincinnati,  the  German  s.s.,  125 
Cinque  Ports  Fleet,   9  ;    defeat  of 

the  French  Armada,  9  ;  continual 

feuds,  10 

CIRCE,  H.M.S.,  262,  342 
City  of  Bremen,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  313 
City  of  Cambridge,  the  s.s.,  attacked 

by  a  submarine,   306-8  ;    sunk, 

308  note 

City  of  Rangoon,  the  s.s.,  192  note 
City   of    Winchester,   the  s.s.,   cap- 
tured, 137  ;    sunk.  139 
Clacton,  the  s.s.,  337 
Clan  Grant,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  198 
CLAN    MACNAUGHTON,   the    armed 
merchant  cruiser,  founders,  378 
Clan  Matheson,  the  s.s.,  captured, 

192;    sunk,  193 
Clark-Hall,  John,  Registrar- General 

of  Seamen,  111 

CLAYMOBB,  the  French  destroyer, 
299 


INDEX 


455 


Clear,  Cape,  417,  429 

Clegg,  Robert,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Lovat,  189 

Cleggan  Bay,  302 

Cleopatra,  the  trawler,  368 

Clermiston,  the  s.s.,  271 

Cleveland,  the  German  s.s.,  124 

Clifton,  the  trawler,  430 

Clon,  the  trawler,  360 

Clopet,  A.,  master  of  the  s.s.  South- 
port,  204 

Clyde,  the,  75  ;  armed  patrol  at, 
370,  371 

Coastal  patrols,  new  system  of, 
368 

Coastal  shipping,  losses  in  French 
wars,  62 

Coasters,  size  of,  55 

Coasting  trade,  80 

Coasts,  ancient  system  of  protec- 
tion by  contract,  17 

Cochin,  201 

Cocos  Islands,  195  note,  203 

Codling  Bank,  405 

"  Coffin-ships,"  78 

Coke,  Admiral  Sir  Charles  H.,  430 

Colchester,  the  s.s.,  escapes  from  a 
submarine,  272,  293 

Coleby,  the  s.s.,  captured,  176  ;  sunk, 
177,  252 

Collingwood,  Admiral  Lord,  59 

Colomb,  Sir  John  C.  R.,  210 

Colomb,  Vice- Admiral  P.  H.,  Essays 
on  Naval  Defence,  68  note 

Colonial  Defence  Committee,  policy, 
217-19 

Columbia,  the  trawler,  349,  440; 
attacked  by  a  submarine,  441  ; 
sunk,  441,  442 

Colusa,  the  s.s.,  177 

Colva,  the  German  s.s.,  124 

Colville,  Admiral  Hon.  Sir  Stanley, 
355 

Commerce,  international,  expan- 
sion of,  89,  100 

Comorin,  Cape,  195,  201 

Comoro  Islands,  40 

Condor,  the  s.s.,  captured,  165 

Congo,  the  trawler,  430 

Coningbeg,  417,  435 

Connor,  W.  H.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Down.«hire,  290 

Conqueror,  the  armed  yacht,  400 

Conscription,  result  of,  4 

Constance  Catherine,  the  s.s.,  315 

Constantinople,  report  of  the  Bri- 
tish Consul  on  the  merchant 
seamen,  102 

Consuls,    British,    reports    on    the 


condition  of  the  Merchant  Navy, 
100-103 

Convoy  Acts,  52 
Convoys,    British,    system    of,    52, 

215,  226,  241,  242 
Conway  Castle,  the  s.s.,  145  ;    cap- 
tured   by    the    German    cruiser 
DRESDEN,  146 ;    sunk,  147 
Coote,  the  trawler,  390 
Copper  Point,  416 
Coquet,    the    trawler,    395 ;     sunk, 

397 
COQUETTE,    the    destroyer,    chases 

submarines,  333 

Corbett,  Sir  Julian  S.,  vi ;  Drake  and 
the    Tudor   Navy,    29    note,    31  ; 
Naval     Operations,      210     note ; 
Official  Memorandum,  66  note 
Corcovado,  the  German  s.s.,  126 
Cordilleras,  the,  35 
CORMORAN,   the   German  gunboat, 

128,  177,  188 
Cornish  City,  the  s.s.,  captured,  154 ; 

sunk,  156 

CORNWALL,  H.M.S.,  152 
Cornwallis,  Admiral,  48 
Correntina,  La,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  172 
COSSACK,  the  destroyer,  388 
Courage,  the  drifter,  373 
Cradock,  Admiral  Sir  Christopher, 

153,  170 

Craigforth,  the  s.s.,  135 
Crathie,  the  trawler,  blown  up,  322 
Crefeld,  the  German  s.s.,  154-65 
CRESSY,  H.M.S.,  sunk,  241,  254, 273, 

329 
Crighton,  William,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Coleby,  177 

Cromarty,    armed   patrol   at,    266, 
328,  335,  370 ;   net-bases  at,  375 
Cromorna,  the  drifter,  448 
Cromwell,  Oliver,  naval  policy,  43, 

44 
Crossley,  Lieutenant  C.  V.,  R.N.R., 

362 

Crown  of  Castile,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  312 
Crown  of  India,  the  barque,  sunk, 

448 
Cruikshank,  David,  master  of  the 

s.s.  Flaminian,  312 
"Cruiser"  mine,  406 
Cruiser  Squadron,  the  Tenth,  125 
Cruisers  and  submarines,  256 
Cruisers  on  service,  1804-14,  59 
Cubbin,   John,   master  of  the  s.s. 

Princess  Victoria,  297 
CUMBERLAND,  H.M.S.,  127,  152 
Currey,     Captain     Bernard,     R.N., 
Director  of  Naval^Ordnance,  259 


456 


INDEX 


Customs  and  Excise,  Board  of,  242 
Cutters   in  the  Revolutionary  and 

Napoleonic  Wars,  64 
Cuxhaven,  minefield,   135 

D5,    British   submarine,    founders, 

346,  348 

Daisy,  the  surveying  trawler,  266 
Dale,  William  G.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Oriole,  279  ;    torpedoed,  280 
Dane,  the  trawler,  365 
Daniel  Stroud,  the  trawler,  266 
Danube,  the  s.s.,  184  note 
Danzig,  report  of  the  British  Consul 

on  the  merchant  seamen,  101 
Dare,  Admiral    Sir    Charles   H.,  in 

command  of  Milford  Haven  Area, 

381,  435  ;    instructions  to,  382 
Darien,  Gulf  of,  32,  35 
Dartmouth,  13,  399 
Daunt  Rock  Lightship,  submarine 

at,  431 
Davidson,    James,    master    of    the 

s.s.  Cherbury,  314 
Davies,   F.   J.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Falaba,  309 
Davies,    Harry,    chief   engineer    of 

the  s.s.  Vosges,  killed,  305 
Davis,  John,  voyages,  39,  41 
Day,    E.    M.,    master    of    the    s.s. 

Galician,  report  on  the  capture 

by  the  German  armed  merchant 

cruiser    KAISER    WILHELM    DEB 

GROSSE,  148-51 
Declaration  of  London,    119,   281, 

282 
Defence,   Imperial,   Committee   of, 

217,  219-23,    228;    report,    230- 

37;    "War-Book,"  221 
DEFIANCE,  H.M.S.,  260 
Delmira,  the  s.s.,   attacked    by    a 

submarine,  303  ;    grounded,  304 
Delta  B,  the  trawler,  sunk,  445 
DENVER,  the  cruiser  (U.S.A.),  182 
Deptford,  42  ;  Naval  Arsenal  at,  21 
Depth-charge,  406 
Derfflinger,   the   German  s.s.,    127, 

357 

Destroyers,  shortage,  256 
Devonia,  the  s.s.,  332 
Devonport,   armed  patrol  at,   265, 

266,  370  ;    net-bases  at,  375 
Dewar,  Captain  K.  G.  B.,  R.N.,  66, 

68 

Diane,  the  armed  yacht,  400 
Diego,  a  runaway  slave,  35 
Diego  Garcia,  197 
Dieppe,  64 
Diligence,  the  drifter,  373 


Dinorah,  the  s.s.,  torpedoed,  380 

Diplomat,  the  s.s.,  captured,  187, 
190;  sunk,  191 

Direction  Island,  203 

Dobbing,  A.  E.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Mary  Ada  Short,  178 

Dodd,  J.  C.,  chief  engineer  of  the 
s.s.  So'ithport,  206 

Dogger  Bank,  345,  352,  357,  395  ; 
clear  from  mines,  407 

Domville,  Lieutenant  Sir  James, 
R.N.,  in  command  of  mine- 
sweeping  trawlers,  343  ;  of  the 
trawler  Barbados,  440 

Don,  the  trawler,  sunk,  407 

Donaldson,  Captain  L.  A.  B.,  R.N., 
appointed  "  Commander  Super- 
intendent of  Modified  Sweep- 
ing," 334  ;  President  of  the  Sub- 
marine Attack  Committee,  368 

Donovan,  W.  C.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Exford,  200 

Dorothy  Gray,  the  mine-sweeper, 
rams  U18  submarine,  354,  356  ; 
rewarded,  356 

Doughty,  Captain  H.  M.,  R.N.,  in 
command  of  the  Devonport  Gun- 
nery School,  369 

Doughty,  Thomas,  executed,  36 

Dover  Cinque  Port,  9,  13  ;  armed 
patrol  at,  265,  266,  327,  335,  370  ; 
drifters  at,  373  ;  net-bases  at, 
382 

Dover  Net  Drifter  Flotilla,  375 

Dover  Straits,  British  minefield, 
379,  433  ;  netting  the,  373,  383 

Dovre,  the  Norwegian  s.s.,  193 

Down,  Commander  C.  E.,  R.N.R., 
master  of  the  s.s.  Arlanza,  151 

Downs,  the,  47,  383 

Downshire,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  290 

DRAKE,  H.M.S.,  351 

Drake,  Sir  Francis,  11  ;  in  com- 
mand of  the  Judith,  •  29  ; 
voyages,  32-6  ;  wounded,  34 ; 
knighted,  37  ;  reprisals  on  the 
Spanish  Indies,  38 

DREADNOUGHT,  H.M.S.,  323  ;  sinks 
U29  submarine,  300  note 

DRESDEN,  the  German  cruiser,  128, 
249  ;  captures  and  sinks  British 
ships,  139-47,  208,  244;  sunk, 
147 

Drifters,  255,  369  ;  patrol,  320, 
321  ;  construction,  372  ;  speed 
and  crew,  372  ;  names,  373  ; 
number,  380 ;  skippers,  383  ; 
work,  435 

Drift-net  fishing,  369 


INDEX 


457 


Driver,  the  trawler,  262 

Drumcliffe,  the  s.s.,  captured,  139  ; 
released,  140 

Drummuir,  the  s.v.,  captured,  184  ; 
sunk,  185 

Drunkenness  in  the  Merchant  Ser- 
vice, 74,  77 

DRYAD,  H.M.S.,  356 

DUKE  OF  EDINBURGH,  H.M.S.,  198 

Dulwich,  the  s.s.,  attacked  by  a 
submarine,  288  ;  sunk,  289,  380 

Dungeness,  64,  279,  400 

Dunkirk,  26,  47,  64 

Dunmore  (Waterford),  429 

Durward,  the  s.s.,  captured,  275  ; 
sunk,  276,  377  - 

Duster,  the  trawler,  390 

Dymchurch,  279 

Eager,  the  drifter,  364 

Eagles,   J.    C.,   master  of  the  s.v. 

Drummuir,  185 

Earl  of  Lalhom,  the  s.v.,  sunk,  410 
East  Coast  ports,  closed  to  neutral 

fishing-vessels,  336 
East  India  Company,  39,  41  ;  ships, 
42,  48  ;    size  of,  54 ;    tonnage,  55 
East  Indies,  39  ;  trade  with  the,  40 
Easter  Island,  178 
EBER,  the  German  gunboat,    127, 

128 

Ebro,  the  trawler,  430 
Ecuador,  the  s.s.,  184  note 
Edward  I,  14 

Edward  III,  victory  of  Sluys,  13  ; 
sovereignty     of     the     sea,     15  ; 
commercial  policy,   16 
Edward    IV,    commercial   treaties, 

19 

Eileen,  the  steam  yacht,  363 
Eileen  Emma,  the  trawler,  309 
Elbe  River,  135 
Elfland,    the    Belgian    relief    ship, 

bombed  by  an  aeroplane,  294 
Elfrida,  the  s.s.,  strikes  a  mine,  365 
Eli,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  364 
Elizabeth,    Queen,    18  ;     accession, 
23 ;      foreign     policy,     24,     28  ; 
navy,    25 ;     plot  to   assassinate, 
32 

Elizabeth,  the  (Wynter's  ship),  37 
Elizabeth,  the  s.s.,  315 
Ellis,   Somers,   on  the   capture   of 

the  s.s.  Troilus,  198-201 
Ellison,  Captain   Alfred  A.,   R.N., 
320,  322,  378  ;  experiments  with 
nets,  369 

Elsinore,  the  s.s.,  captured,  180 
Elterwater,  the  s.s.,  founders,  360 


EMDEN,  the  German  cruiser,  128, 
170,  186,  246;  sinks  British 
ships,  187-204,  208,  247,  248; 
destruction,  204 

England,  expansion  of  sea  power, 
43;  naval  supremacy,  45,  57; 
privations  of  the  lower  classes, 
70 

English  Channel,  350,  368  ;  infested 
by  French  buccaneers,  20  ;  mine- 
laying  in  the,  371  ;  submarines, 
374  ;  defence  of,  399 

ENTERPRIZE,  H.M.S.,  57 

ERNE,  the  destroyer,  355 

ESSEX,  H.M.S.,  126 

Esther,  the  trawler,  266 

Estill,  W.  H.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Royal  Sceptre,  saves  the  ship, 
169 

Eten,  184 

Euan  Mara,  the  motor-boat,  364 

EURYALUS,  H.M.S.,  322 

Eustace  the  Monk,  in  command  of 
the  French  Armada,  9 

Evans,  — ,  master  of  the  s.s.  Drum- 
cliffe, 139 

Evans,  Commander  E.  R.  G.  R., 
R.N.,  in  command  of  the  de- 
stroyer VIKING,  387 

Evans,  J.,  master  of  s.s.  Pruth,  164 
note 

Evans,  Jonathan,  master  of  the 
s.s.  Lizzie,  303 

Evans,  Commander  Maurice,  R.N., 
401 

Exford,  the  s.s.,  captured,  198,  200, 
208 

EXMOUTH,  H.M.S.,  352 

Exmouth,  Lord,  51 

Explorer,  the  trawler,  sunk,  445 

Fair  Island,  353,  404 ;  Channel, 
379,  436 

Falaba,  the  s.s.,  attacked  by  a  sub- 
marine, 309  ;  sunk,  310-12 

Falkland  Islands,  battle  of  the,  185 

Falmouth,  net-bases  at,  375 ; 
patrol,  399 

Fanad  Point,  343 

Far  Cathay,  19,  22 

Farn,  the  s.s.,  165  ;   captured,  162 

Fame  Islands,  371 

Faroe  Islands,  351 

Farrer,  Lord,  memorandum  on  the 
state  of  British  shipping,  79 

Fasnet,  416 

Fecamp,  271,  289 

Federal  Houlders  Argentine  Line, 
ships  fitted  with  guns,  124 


458 


INDEX 


Federal  Steam  S.  Co.,  ships  fitted 
with  guns,  124 

Feldkirchner,  Oberleutnant  z.  S., 
269 

Fenner,  Thomas,  trading  expedi- 
tion, 28 

Feria,  Spanish  Ambassador,  24 

Fermo,  the  trawler,  escapes  from  a 
submarine,  402 

Fidra,  329 

Filey,  360 

Filey  Brig,  363,  365 

Fisher,  Admiral  Sir  John  (Lord 
Fisher),  First  Sea  Lord,  259 

Fishermen,  characteristics,  398 

Fishing  fleet  at  work,  440 

Fishing-vessels,  patrol  duty,  256  ; 
sunk,  349,  394,  409,  445 

Flamborough  Head,  297,  331,  337  ; 
minefield,  328,  357 

Flaminian,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  312 

Flanders,  wool  trade,  10;  sub- 
marine bases  in,  272 

Fleetwood,  263,  265 

Fleurette,  the  trawler,  catches  mines, 
378 

FLIRT,  the  destroyer,  313 

Florazan,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  298 

Flying  Fox,  the  Queenstown  tender, 
424,  430 

Folkestone,  the  s.s.,  337 

FORMIDABLE,  H.M.S.,  sunk,  371 

Forth,  Firth  of,  mine-sweeping 
trawlers  at,  265,  266 ;  net-bases 
at,  375 

Fortune,  W.  C.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Mobile,  314 

Fowey,  importance,  13 

Fox,  Captain  Cecil,  R.N.,  350 

Foyle,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  196 

France,  invasion  of,  in  1415,  14  ; 
revolution,  44 ;  capture  of  Bri- 
tish merchant  ships,  44  ;  guerre 
de  course,  45,  58 ;  tonnage  of 
ships,  82,  85,  87 

Franco-Prussian  War,  4 

Fraser,  James,  chief  engineer  of 
the  s.s.  Atalanta,  301 

Fraserburgh,  321 

Fraternity  of  the  Holy  Trinity, 
21 

Frau  Minna  Peter  sen,  German  s.v., 
captured,  209  note 

Frederic  Franck,  the  s.s.,  397,  398 

Freesia,  the  trawler,  430 

French  Armada,  defeat,  9  ;  bucca- 
neers infest  the  Channel,  20 ; 
rivalry  on  the  seas,  43  ;  corsairs, 
46 ;  fleet,  58 ;  marauding  ex- 


peditions, 17  ;  depredations  of 
privateers,  63-6 

Friedrich  der  Grosse,  the  German 
s.s.,  125 

Frio,  Cape,  173 

Frobisher,  Sir  Martin,  37,  38  ; 
voyages,  39 

Froissart,  Jean,  on  the  battle  of 
Sluys,  13 

Fry,  Alfred  C.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
City  of  Cambridge,  on  the  attack 
of  a  submarine,  306-8 ;  pre- 
sented with  a  watch,  308 

Fryatt,  Charles  A.,  master  of  the 
s.s.  Colchester,  293  ;  of  the  s.s. 
Wrexham.,  296 ;  taken  prisoner 
and  shot,  296  note 

Fulgent,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  314,  316 

Fyfe,  T.  S.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Crown  of  Castile,  312 


Galapagos  Islands,  181 

Galician,  the  s.s.,  captured,  148  ;  re- 
leased, 149 

Galley,  the  oared,  24 

Galley  Head,  417,  429 

Gallier,  the  s.s.,  strikes  a  mine,  364 

Galway  Bay,  armed  patrol  at,  371 

Gama,  Vasco  da,  rounds  the  Cape, 
19 

Gare,  E.  G.,  master  of  the  dredger 
Ponrabbel,  198  note 

Garland,  G.,  skipper  of  the  trawler 
Ontario,  438 

Garmo,  the  trawler,  sunk,  363 

Garnett,  Lieutenant-Commander 
Stuart  W.  H.,  R.N.R.,  in  command 
of  s.y.  Zarefah,  325,  402  ;  plucky 
act,  403 

GARRY,  the  destroyer,  attacks  a 
submarine,  354,  367 

Garu,  the  trawler,  405 

Gascanane  Sound,  429 

Gayer,  Kapitan-Leutnant  A.,  418 
note 

Gazette,  the  s.s.,  337 

GEIER,  the  German  gunboat,  128  ; 
captures  British  sLips,  204,  208 

Gem,  the  s.s.,  blown  up,  364 

General  de  Santos,  the  French 
barque,  313 

George  V,  King,  tribute  to  the  Mer- 
chant Navy,  2 

George,  W.  J.,  second  officer  of  the 
s.s.  Harpalyce,  315 

George  Washington,  the  German  s.s., 
125 

Gerard,  J.  W.,  American  Ambassa- 


INDEX 


459 


dor  in  Berlin,  on  the  sinking  of 
the  s.s.  Lusitania,  426 ;  Four 
Years  in  Germany,  427 

Germania,  the  German  s.s.,  205 

Germanischer  Lloyd  of  Berlin,  95 
note 

Germany,  submarine  policy,  v-vii, 
399,  410;  warfare,  54,  268-80, 
285-93,  296-317,  329,  332,  371, 
376,  380,  385,  395-7,  402-5, 
409,  431-3,  440,  443-9  ; 
tonnage  of  ships,  85,  87,  89  ; 
preparations  for  war,  121  ;  armed 
merchant  ships,  125-8  ;  in- 
structions to,  129  ;  treatment  of 
British  ships,  130  ;  naval  order, 
134  ;  declares  war,  135  ;  naval 
policy,  222,  256,  323,  367  ;  sub- 
marines, 254,  273  ;  net-cutting 
device,  392 ;  measures  against, 
433-7  ;  construction  of  mine- 
layers, 261,  266;  High  Sea 
Fleet,  272,  357  ;  memorandum 
on  the  "  War  Zone,"  280-83, 
379,  410 ;  equips  trawlers  for 
mine-laying,  319  ;  minefields, 
328,  337,  346-9 ;  reception  of 
the  news  of  the  sinking  of  the 
s.s.  Lusitania,  426 

GHURKA,  the  destroyer,  388,  391 

Giacopolo,  — ,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Loredano,  191 ;  warnings  to  British 
shipping,  192  note 

Gibbons,  Captain  K.  C.,  R.N.,  in 
charge  of  patrol  vessels,  344 

Gibson,  H.  J.,  master  of  the  tug 
Homer,  313  ;  presented  with  a 
watch,  314 

Gibson,  W.  H.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Foyle,  196  note 

Gilbert,  Sir  Humphrey,  expedition 
to  Newfoundland,  39 

Gilbert  Islands,  204 

Gilgallon,  Private,  301 

Gladys,  the  s.s.,  278 

Glandore  Harbour,  429 

Glanton,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  166 

GLASGOW,  H.M.S.,  142,  153 

Glenturret,  the  s.s.,  202  ;  captured, 
209 

Glitra,  the  s.s.,  241  ;  captured,  269  ; 
sunk,  270,  333 

Glossop,  Captain  J.  C.  T.,  B.N.,  of 
H.M.A.S.  SYDNEY,  204 

GNEISENATJ,  the  German  cruiser, 
128,  177 

Gneisenau,  the  German  s.s.,  127 

Goddison,  F.  A.,  chief  engineer  of 
the  s.8.  Wrexham,  297 


GOEBEN,  the  German  battle-cruiser, 
128 

Goeben,  the  German  s.s.,  126 

Golden  Effort,  the  drifter,  373, 
430 

Golden  Hind,  the,  37 

Golden / 'els,  the  German  s.s.,  139 

Goodwins,  submarines  in  the,  403 

Gorleston,  raid  on,  337,  346,  348 

Goschen,  Sir  E.,  130 

GOSHAWK,  the  destroyer,  attacked 
by  a  submarine,  333 

Gothenburg,  report  of  the  British 
Consul  on  the  merchant  sea- 
men, 101 

Grace,  Captain  H.  E.,  R.N.,  in  com- 
mand of  armed  drifters,  380 

Graham,  Sir  James,  First  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty,  Merchant  Ser- 
vice Bill,  98,  105 

Grand  Fleet,  the,  222,  256 ;  mobi- 
lised, 6  ;  sweep  down  the  North 
Sea,  321,  357  ; '  anchored  in 
Lough  Swilly,  339 ;  at  sea,  354 

Grangemouth,   269 

Granton,  265  ;  base  for  trawlers, 
335,  350  ;  armed  patrol  at,  370 

Graphic,  the  s.s.,  escapes  from  a 
submarine,  276,  278 

Gravelines,  38 

Gravesend,  20 

Gray,  J.  R.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Indian  Prince,  171 

Gray,  Thomas  (Board  of  Trade), 
on  the  condition  of  the  Mercan- 
tile Marine,  75  note 

Great  Britain,  tonnage  of  steam- 
vessels,  85,  87,  88-94;  declares 
war  against  Germany,  135 

Great  Orme's  Head,  435 

Green,  John  R.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Vosges,  attacked  by  a  submarine, 
304-6;  awarded  the  D.S.O., 
306 

Green  Book,  the,  94 

Greene,  Francis,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Tokomaru,  278 

Gresham,  Sir  Thomas,  Ambassador 
at  Antwerp,  25 

Greta,  the  armed  yacht,  344,  430 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  dispatches  from, 
130,  131 

Grimsby,  265  ;  recruiting  for  the 
Trawler  Reserve,  262 

Gris  Nez,  Cape,  380 

Grisnez,  the  fishing-vessel,  sunk, 
391 

Grosser  Kurfurst,  the  German  s.s., 
125 


460 


INDEX 


Gryfevale,  the  s.s.,  captured,  195  ; 
released,  197,  247 

Guadaloupe,  the  French  s.s.,  cap- 
tured, 176 

Guayaquil,  Gulf  of,  184 

Gueran,  Spanish  Ambassador,  25 

Gull  Lightship,  hydrophone  in- 
stalled, 434 

Gull,  the  trawler,  446 

Haddock,  Captain  H.  J.,  R.N.R.,  2 
Hague,  The,  Conferences,  118,  120, 

122 

Hakluyt,  Richard,  21,  27  note,  40 
HALCYON,  H.M.S.,  320,  348 
Hallaniya,  Bay  of,  138 
Hallett,  Petty  Officer  A.  H.,  442  ; 

awarded  the  D.S.M.,  443 
Hamburg,   British  merchant  ships 

detained,  130 

HAMPSHIBE,  H.M.S.,  198,  201 
Hankey,  Lieut.-Col.  Sir  M.  P.  A., 

Secretary  of  the  Committee  on 

insurance  of  ships  in  war,  228 
Hannan,  F.  S.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Tamar,  176 

Hanseatic  League,  16  ;    decline,  19 
Harbours,  74,  76 
Harpalion,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  291 
Harpalyce,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  314,  315 
Harris,  David,  master  of  the  s.s. 

King  Lud,  194 
Harris,  William,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Clan  Maiheson,  on  his  capture, 

192 

Hartdale,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  301 
Hartland  Point,  435 
Hartlepool,  bombardment  of,  357 
Hartnoll,Lieutenant  H.  J.,R.N.,  442 
Harwich,  mine-sweeping  trawler  at, 

266  ;    net-bases  at,  375 
Havana,  sacked,  26 
Havre,  47,  270,  279,  289 
Hawk,  the  trawler,  446 
HAWKE,  H.M.S.,  sunk,  273,  333 
Hawkins,    John,    voyages,   26-32; 

fight  at  San  Juan  de  Ulua,  30-32 
Hawthorne,  Lieutenant-Commander 

W.  H.,  R.N.,  440  ;   drowned,  442 
Headlands,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  299,  300 
Hebrides,  the,  351 
Hector,  the  trawler,  395  ;   sunk,  397 
Hefford,  — ,  second   officer  of    the 

s.s.  Lusitania,  drowned,  417 
Heggie,  D.  W.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Ben  Cruachan,  277 
Heligoland,  352 

Hellenic,  the  trawler,  blown  up,  407 
Helsor,  the  German  s.s.,  124 


Hemisphere,  the  s.s.,  captured,  174 

Henry  IV,  18 

Henry  V,  17  ;  invasion  of  France, 
14 

Henry  VI,  17 

Henry  VIII,  establishment  of  the 
Royal  Navy,  20 ;  the  Great 
Harry,  20  ;  fleet,  20,  25  ;  mea- 
sures of  defence,  20 

HERMES,  H.M.S.,  torpedoed,  334, 
371 

Heron,  the  trawler,  430 

Hersilia,  the  armed  yacht,  341 

Hersing,  Kapitan-Leutnant  Otto, 
in  command  of  U21,  270,  277, 
376 

Heve,  Cape  la,  270,  289 

Highland  Brae,  the  s.s.,  captured, 
175 

Highland  Hope,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  154 

Hilda  and  Ernest,  the  drifter,  364 

Hill,  Sir  Maurice,  238 

Hill,  Sir  Norman,  member  of  the 
Committee  on  insurance  of  ships 
in  war,  228,  231,  238 

Hill,  R.  H.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Holmwood,  143 

Hirose,  the  trawler,  attacked  by  a 
submarine,  444  ;  sunk,  445 

Hoffnung,  the  s.s.  (Indrani),  154, 
160 

HOGUE,  H.M.S.,  sunk,  241,  254, 
273,  329 

Holger,  the  s.s.,  174,  176 

Holland,  Hook  of,  272,  276 

Holland,  rivalry  on  the  seas,  43  ; 
tonnage  of  ships,  82  ;  merchant 
traffic  with,  suspended,  407 

Holmwood,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  143 

Holton,  E.  J.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Cervantes,  164  note 

Holyhead,  404 ;  to  Kingstown 
service,  suspended,  376 

Homer,  the  tug,  attacked  by  a  sub- 
marine, 313 

Hood  Island,  182 

Hood,  Rear-Admiral  the  Hon. 
Horace  L.  A.,  appointed  in  com- 
mand of  the  Do  .  er  Patrol,  334  ; 
experiments  on  indicator  nets, 
373  ;  on  the  sinking  of  U8 
submarine,  389 

Hopkins,  Admiral  Sir  John  O.,  211 

Hore,  W.  A.  W.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Ptarmigan,  314 

Home,  John,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Hyndford,  302 

Hospital  carriers,  6 

Hostilius,  the  s.s.,  139,  140 


INDEX 


461 


Hotham,  Captain  Alan,  R.N.,  226 
Howe,  E.,  master  of  the  s.s.  Bowes 

Castle,  153 
Hoxa  Head,  354 
Hoy  Sound,  351 
Huelva,  289 
Hull,  263,  265 
Humber,  the,  armed  patrol  at,  266, 

320,   328,    370 ;    minefield,   322, 

328  ;    shipping  in,  363 
Hume,   Joseph,    on  the   Merchant 

Navy,  76,  84 
Humphreys,  Sub-Lieutenant  C.  C., 

R.N.R.,     in    command    of    the 

trawler  Yokohama,  447 
Hundred  Years'  War,  4,  13 
Hunter,  J.   A.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Dulwich,  289 

Hurstdale,  the  s.s.,  captured,  166 
Hyades,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  142 
Hydrophones,  use  of,  434 
Hyndford,  the  s.s.,  attacked  by  a 

submarine,  302 
Hythe,  number  of  ships,  13 
Hythe,  the  s.s.,  337 

Ikaria,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  278,  279 

Ilex,  the  armed  yacht,  341 

ILTIS,  the  German  gunboat,  128 

Imperator,  the  German  s.s.,  124 

Imperialist,  the  fishing- vessel,  sunk, 
328 

Impressment,  system  of,  55-7,  97, 
99  ;  unpopularity,  98 

Ina  Williams,  the  trawler,  attacked 
by  a  submarine,  446 

Inchcape,  Lord,  member  of  the 
Committee  on  insurance  of  ships 
in  war,  228 

Inchgarvie,  381 

Inchkeith,  329 

Indian  City,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  299,  300 

Indian  Empire,  the  trawler,  430 

Indian  Prince,  the  s.s.,  421  ;  cap- 
tured, 171  ;  sunk,  172 

Indicator  nets,  use  of,  369  ;  ex- 
periments with,  374 ;  working 
the,  383  ;  number  lost,  383 

Indrani,  the  s.s.,  captured,  155, 160  ; 
sunk,  208 

Indus,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  188,  189 

Ingham,  John,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Bank  fields,  184 

Inglefield,  Admiral  Sir  Edward 
E.  F.,  224 

Inglefield,  Admiral  Sir  Frederick  S., 
President  of  the  Motor-Boat 
Reserve  Committee,  326 

Inishtrahull,  343,  402 


Inishturk  Island,  301 

Insurance  Clubs  or  Associations, 
228-39  ;  forms  of  policy,  238 

Inrercoe,  the  s.v.,  sunk,  178 

Invergyle,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  299 

lona  Island,  341 

Ireland,  mine-sweeping,  341-4 ; 
submarines,  429 

Irish  Sea,  266,  344,  383  ;  sub- 
marines in  the,  375,  403,  409  ; 
patrol,  435 

IRON  DUKE,  H.M.S.,  323,  353 

Iron  ships,  73,  95 

Isdale,  John,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Ribera,  196  note 

Isis,  the  armed  yacht,  341 

Isle  of  Man,  the  patrol-boat,  291 

Isle  of  Wight,  14,  47 

Italy,  tonnage  of  ships,  85,  87 

Itolo,  the  German  s.s.,  127 

Itonus,  the  s.s.,  192  note 

Iversen,  Iver,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Bellevue,  173 

Ivy  Greeny  the  drifter,  448 


Jackdaw,  the  trawler,  368 

Jackson,  Rt.  Hon.  F.  Huth,  mem- 
ber of  the  Committee  on  insur- 
ance of  ships  in  war,  228 

Jacqueline,  the  Belgian  trawler,  432 

JAGUAR,  the  German  gunboat,  128 

Janus,  the  trawler,  266 

Japan,  tonnage  of  ships,  85,  87 

Japonica,  the  trawler,  sunk,  445 

JASON,  H.M.S.,  262,  343,  401 

Jasper,  the  trawler,  266 

Java,  41 

Javelin,  the  trawler,  266 

Jeanette,  the  armed  yacht,  381,  435 

Jeannies,  the  drifter,  393 

Jellicoe,  Admiral  Sir  John  (Lord 
Jellicoe),  320  ;  on  the  employ- 
ment of  armed  trawlers,  324, 
330  ;  demand  for  trawlers,  334, 
401  ;  for  Fleet  sweepers,  337 

Jenkinson,  Anthony,  mission  to 
Persia,  23 

John  Company,  41 

Johnson,  Captain  C.  D.,  R.N.,  388 

Johnston,  L.  A.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Olitra,  269 

Johnstone,  George,  master  of  the 
s.s.  Rio  Ignassu,  156 

Jones,  Arthur,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Lynrowan,  163  note 

Jones,  A.  R.,  first  officer  of  the  s.s. 
Lusitania,  417  ;  rescues  passen- 
gers, 423 


462 


INDEX 


Jones,  C.  H.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Nyanga,  152 

Jones,  C.  H.,  Registrar-General  of 
Seamen,  111 

Jones,  H.,  master  of  the  s.s.  Glen- 
turret,  202 

Jones,  Captain  Harry,  R.N.,  224 

Jones,  James,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Hostilius,  141 

Jones,  Richard,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Hemisphere,  174 

Journal  of  Royal  United  Service 
Institution,  58  note,  66  note,  68 

Juan  Fernandez  Island,  145 

Julia,  the,  430 

Kabinga,   the   s.s.,    captured,    188, 
P»  190  ;   released,  192 
Kaipara,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  151 
KAISER  WILHELM  DEB,  GROSSE,  the 

German  armed  merchant  cruiser, 

126  ;    captures  and  sinks  British 

ships,   147,   151,   152,  208,   244; 

releases  the   s.s.    Galician,    149- 

51 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  II,  the  German  s.s., 

125  ;    gun  mountings,  121 
Kaiserin  Auguste  Victoria,  the  Ger- 
man s.s.,  124 
KAISEEIN  ELIZABETH,  the  Austro- 

Hungarian  cruiser,  127  note 
KANGAROO,  the  destroyer,  388 
KARLSRUHE,   the   German  cruiser, 

126,     128,     152  ;     captures    and 

sinks  British  ships,  153-69,  170, 

208,  244,  246,  248 
Katharine  Park,  the  s.s.,  143 
Kelway,       Lieutenant-Commander 

W.  E.,  R.N.R.,  305 
Kersley,    Sub- Lieutenant    L.    W., 

R.N.R.,  440 
Kidd,   R.    H.,   master   of  the   s.s. 

Chasehill,  176 
Kiehne,  H.  H.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

William  P.  Frye,  179 
Kigoma,  the  German  s.s.,  124 
Kilcoan,   the   s.s.,   captured,    277  ; 

sunk,  278,  376 

Kildalton,  the  s.v.,  sunk,  178, 
Killin,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  188,  190 
KING  EDWARD  VII,  H.M.S.,  257 
King  Lud,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  196 
King,   W.    J.,   master   of   the   s.v. 

Invercoe,  178 
Kingstown,  404 
Kinnaird  Head,  321,  371,  378 
Kinneir,  Douglas  R.,  master  of  the 

s.s.  Ortega,  144  ;   skill,  145 
Kinsale,  430 


Kirkwall,  379 

Kleist,  the  German  s.s.,  126 

Kolbe,  Oberleutnant,  276 

Kdnig  Albert,  the  German  s.s.,  126 

Konig  Friedrich  August,  the  Ger- 
man s.s.,  124 

KONIGIN  LUISE,  the  German  mine- 
layer, 124  ;  lays  mines,  136,  319, 
328  ;  sunk,  319 

KONIGSBERG,  the  German  cruiser, 
126,  128 ;  captures  and  sinks 
British  ships,  137-9,  208,  244 

KRONPRINZ  WILHELM,  the  German 
armed  merchant  cruiser,  126, 
170,  249  ;  sinks  British  ships, 
171-7,  208,  252 ;  interned,  177 

Kronprinzessin,  the  German  s.s.,  125 

Kusaie  Island,  204 


Labadie  Bank,  443 

Labrador,  19 

Ladd,  W.   H.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Adenwen,  299 
Laertes,  the  s.s.,  401  ;  chased  by  a 

submarine,  286-8,  292,  380 
La  Hogue,  Cape,  304 
Lament,    A.,    master    of    the    s.s. 

Olivine,  313 
Lamorna  Cove,  392 
Lancaster,  James,  voyages,  40,  41 
Lancefield,  William,  master  of  the 

s.s.   Delmira,   303 
Land's  End,  298,  404= 
Lame,  339 

Lauriat,  Charles  E.,  421 
Lawrence,   F.,   master   of   the   s.s. 

Colchester,  272 
LEDA,  the  gunboat,  attacked  by  a 

submarine,  333 
Leinster,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  376 
LEIPZIG,  the  German  cruiser,  128  ; 

captures    British    ships,   180-85, 

208 
Le  Marchant,  Vice- Admiral  E.  R.,  in 

command    of    Kingstown    area, 

381  ;    instructions  to,  382 
Lemvin,  Cape,  197 
LEONIDAS,  the  destroyer,  441 
LEOPARD,  the  destroyer,  348 
Lepanto,  Bay  of,  24 
Lerwick,  436 
Leslie,  N.,  master  of  the  s.s.  Clan 

Grant,  198 

Lestris,  the  s.s.,  bombed  by  an  aero- 
plane, 294 

Letters  of  marque,  14-16 
Levant,  the,  10 
Leveson,    Vice- Admiral  Sir  A.    C., 


INDEX 


463 


head  of  the  Operations  Division 

of  the  War  Staff,  250 
Lighthouses  and  Trinity  House,  76 
Lily  Oak,  the  drifter,  392 
Limewold,  the  trawler,  fight  with  a 

submarine,  437,  446 
Linaria,  the  s.s.,  founders,  365 
Linda  Blanche,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  277, 

376 
Lindley,    Arthur,    member    of    the 

Committee  on  insurance  of  ships 

in  war,  228 
Liners  and  tramps,  in  the  British 

Mercantile  Marine,  87 
Linsdell,  the  drifter,  sunk,  328 
Lisbon,  the  commercial  depot  for 

Western  Europe,  19 
LIVELY,  the  destroyer,  348 
Liverpool,    13,    289 ;     number    of 

privateers,     45 ;      Underwriters' 

Registry    for    Iron    Vessels,    95 

note ;     work   of   the   tugs,    340 ; 

armed  patrol  at,  370 
Lizard,  the,  392,  399 
Lizzie,  the  s.s.,  303 
Lloyd's    Register    of    British    and 

Foreign  Shipping,  94-7  ;   "  ships' 

lists,"  94 
Loch  Ewe,  322,  333  ;   armed  patrol 

at,  327,  335,  341,  351,  370 
Loch  Indail,  340 
Loch  Shell,  341 
Lockivood,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  313 
London,  measures  of  defence,  20  ; 

the  trading  centre  of  the  world, 

63  ;    Naval  Conference  in,   118, 

122 

London  Trader,  the  s.s.,  279 
Long,  — ,  master  of  the  s.s.  Troilus, 

199 

Longcraig  Pier,  381 
Longhope,   379 
Looe,  13,  399 

Loredano,  the  Italian  s.s.,  191 
Lorna,  the  armed  yacht,  340 
Lorton,  the  Peruvian  barque,  147 
Lossiemouth,  369 
Lotusmere,  the  s.s.,  192  note 
Lough  Larne,  armed  patrol  at,  370  ; 

net-bases  at,  382 
Lough     Swilly,     minefield,      339  ; 

armed  patrol  at,  370 
Lovat,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  188,  189 
Lowestoft,  320 
Lowry,   Admiral   Sir  Robert,    319, 

330,  390 
LUCHS,  the  German  gunboat,   128, 

177 
Lucida,  the  trawler,  430 

31 


Liidecke,  Captain  (DRESDEN),  140 

Lugg,  Herbert,  master  of  s.s.  Head- 
lands, 300 

Lundy  Island,  435,  444 

Luneda,  the  trawler,  430 

Lusitania,    the    s.s.,     123  ;      sunk, 
410-27  ;   construction   and  cost 
411  ;     rumours   of   attack,    412 
cargo,       413,       414 ;       voyage 
414-18;       torpedoed,      418-21 
"  S.O.S."  signal,  430  ;    rescue  of 
passengers,  430 

Lydia,  the  s.s.,  captured,  163  ; 
sunk,  164 

Lynns  Point,  289 

Lynton  Orange,  the  s.s.,  139,  140 

LYNX,  the  destroyer,  333,  337 

LYSANDEB,  the  destroyer,  401 

Maas  lightship,  276 

McKenna,  Rt.  Hon.  Reginald,  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  115,  260 

Mackey,  — ,  first  mate  of  the  s.s. 
Atalanta,  301 

MacLarnon,  J.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Atalanta,  301 

Madras  Harbour,  attack  on  oil- 
tanks,  193 

Magellan  Straits,  36,  39,  144 

Mahan,  Admiral,  Naval  Strategy, 
extracts  from,  3,  4,  5  ;  Influence 
of  Sea  Power  on  the  French  Revo- 
lution, 51,  65  note,  66  note,  67 
note 

Makalla,  port  of,  138 

Makepeace,  H.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Kaipara,  151 

Malacca  Straits,  40 

Malachite,  the  s.s.,  captured,  270  ; 
sunk,  271,  368,  371,  376 

Maldive  Islands,  197 

Malekula,  177 

Malley,  L.,  master  of  the  s.s.  Anda- 
lusian,  300 

Manchester  Commerce,  the  s.s., 
sunk,  338,  341 

Maneely,  James,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Kilcoan,  277 

Manisty,  Paymaster-Captain  H. 
Elden,  R.N.,  Organising  Manager 
of  Convoys  226 

MAORI,  the  destroyer,  388 

Maple  Branch,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  154 

Maraca  Island,  153 

Margaret,  the  trawler,  277 

Margate,  the  trawler,  430 

Maria,  the  Dutch  s.s.,  captured, 
155 

Mariana  Islands,  177 


464 


INDEX 


Maricopa,  the  s.s.,  strikes  a  mine, 
408 

Marie,  the  German  s.s.,  180  ;  sunk, 
181 

Marine  insurance,  system  of,  criti- 
cised (1884),  79 

Markomannia,  the  German  s.s.,  188 

Marlvo,  the  s.s.,  stranded,  208 

Marshall  Islands,  177 

Martin,  Richard,  master  of  the  s.s. 
City  of  Bremen,  313 

Martin,  Thomas,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Hartdale,  301 

Martin,  the  trawler,  390 

Mary  Ada  Short,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  178 

Mary,  the  trawler,  strikes  a  mine, 
349 

Marynthea,  the  armed  yacht,  381, 
435 

Marys,  the  drifter,  448 

Mason,  J.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Strathroy,  153 

Masson,  Stephen,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Malachite,  270 

Master  (Laws  of  Oleron),  qualifica- 
tions, 10  ;  duties,  11  ;  relations 
with  the  crew,  11 

Matthews,  J.  R.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Newburn,  203 

Mauretania,  the  s.s.,  123,  411 

Max  Brock,  the  German  s.s.,  127 

Maximus,  the  trawler,  430 

May  Island,  329 

May  Island,  the  trawler,  390 

Mayer,  Judge,  judgment  on  the  s.s. 
Lusitania,  412,  414 

Medusa,  the  armed  yacht,  381,  435 

Medway,  the,  320 

Membland,  the  s.s.,  fate  of,  288 

Mercantile  Marine  Act  of  1540,  21  ; 
of  1850,  111 

Merchant  Adventurers,  Association 
of,  18,  21,  22 

Merchant  Navy,  British,  forerunner 
of  the  Royal  Navy,  vii  ;  history, 
1,  8  ;  tributes  to,  2  ;  responsi- 
bilities on  the  outbreak  of  war, 
6  ;  growth,  71  ;  report  on  the 
condition,  73-8,  100-103;  re- 
forms, 79  ;  progress,  80 ;  per- 
sonnel, 100,  116  ;  measures  for 
protecting,  210-16 ;  defence 
policy,  216-23 ;  relations  with 
the  Admiralty,  227  ;  War  In- 
surance Schemes,  228-39 

Merchant  seamen,campaign  against, 
v  ;  patriotism,  vi,  1,  2  ;  charac- 
teristics, vii,  1,  2,  304 ;  record 
of  services  in  wars,  7  ;  actions 


with  privateers,  48 ;  peril  of 
capture,  54  ;  seized  by  the  press- 
gang,  55  ;  General  Register  Office 
of,  105,  107  ;  register  ticket, 
107  ;  abolished,  108 ;  taken 
prisoners,  131  ;  antipathy  to 
Germans,  393 

Merchant  Seamen's  Act  of  1835, 
98,  105  ;  Fund,  104,  106  ;  wound 
up,  104  note,  108 

Merchant  Shipping  Act  of  1854, 
111;  of  1873,  78 

Mersey,  Lord,  Wreck  Commissioner, 
judgment  on  the  s.s.  Falaba, 
309-12 ;  on  the  s.s.  Lusitania, 
422 ;  on  the  conduct  of  the 
master,  425 

Methil,  armed  trawlers  at,  335 

Middlesbrough,  297 

Middleton,  John,  Vice- Admiral,  41 

Milford  Haven,  263,  266;  armed 
patrol  at,  265,  344,  370 

Milford  Haven,  Admiral  the  Marquis 
of,  Director  of  Naval  Intelli- 
gence, 211 

Milne,  A.  B.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Blonde,  294 

Minch,  the,  334,  350 

Mine,  the  "  Cruiser,"  406 

Minefields,  267,  319,  322,  328,  337, 
338,  339,  344,  345,  357,  360, 
402,  406-9  ;  method  of  de- 
stroying, 259 

Mines,  laying  of,  118,  135 ;  de- 
struction of,  364,  403,  407,  408 

Mine-sweepers,  British,  320  ;  work 
of  the,  331,  343,  361  ;  five  classes 
of,  401 

Mine-sweeping,  experiments  with, 
258  ;  instruction,  260 

Minikoi  Island,  194,  196,  201 

Mining  Committee,  259 

Minterne,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  410 

Minto,  D.  K.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Invergyle,  299 

Mississippi,  the,  81 

Miura,  the  trawler,  440 ;  fight 
with  a  submarine,  441 

Mizen  Head,  417,  i29,  446 

Mobile,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  314,  401 

MOHAWK,  the  destroyer,  chase  of 
submarines,  333 

Moltke,  Count  von,  on  wars,  4 

MOLTKE,  the  German  battle-cruiser, 
357 

Moltke,  the  German  s.s.,  126 

MONARCH,  H.M.S.,  323 

Moray  Firth,  patrol  of  the,  320, 
350 


INDEX 


465 


Morgenroth,  Leutnant  (U8),  387 

Morrison,  John,  master  of  s.s. 
Hyades,  142 

Morton,  Leslie  N.,  rescues  passen- 
gers from  the  s.s.  Lusitania,  422 

Morwenna,  the  s.s.,  torpedoed,  432 

Motor-Boat  Reserve,  326 ;  Com- 
mittee, 326 ;  organisation,  327 

Motor-boats,  255,  325 ;  launches, 
255 

Mounts  Bay,  20 

MOUSQUET,  the  French  destroyer, 
sunk,  203 

Mozambique,  139 

Muckle  Skerry,  355 

Muir,  Commander  H.  G.,  R.N.R., 
of  the  boarding-steamer  Sarnia, 
398 

Mull  of  Cantyre,  339,  340,  343 

Mull  of  Galloway,  435 

Miiller,  Captain  von,  of  the  German 
cruiser  EMDEN,  186,  202 

Murray,  Sir  James  (Foreign  Office), 
report  on  the  decline  of  the  ship- 
ping industry,  77,  103 

Murrison,  A.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
La  Correntina,  172 


Nagle,  R.  F.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Niceto  de  Larrinaga,  163  note 

Napoleon,  Emperor,  method  of 
raising  an  army,  3  ;  exile,  44 ; 
declares  a  blockade  of  Great 
Britain,  58  ;  defeated  at  Water- 
loo, 71 

Narcissus,  the  armed  yacht,  381, 
435 

Nauru,  204 

Naval  and  Mercantile  Services,  dif- 
ference between,  20,  43 

Naval  Chronicle,  47  note,  49  note, 
50  note,  64  note,  66  note 

Naval  Intelligence  Department,  224 

Navigation  Acts,  16,  43 ;  Laws, 
72  ;  repeal  of  the,  73,  78  ;  re- 
peal of  the  Manning  clauses,  108 

Navy,  British  Merchant  ;  see 
Merchant  Navy 

Navy  Estimates,  110,  121,  260 

Navy,  Royal,  creation,  vii,  1,  20  ; 
system  of  continuous  service,  3, 
97,  99 ;  inadequate  resources, 
6  ;  impress  service,  56 

Naze,  the,  334 

Nebraskan,  the  American  s.s.,  tor- 
pedoed, 431 

Neckar,  the  German  s.s.,  126 

Nelson,  Lord,  policy,  5  ;    demand 


for  frigates,  58  ;    on  the  system 

of  registration,  98 
Nelson's    Strait,    144 ;     navigation 

of,  145 

NEPTUNE,  H.M.S.,  344 
Netherlands,  the,   16  ;    tonnage  of 

ships,  85,  87 

Nets,  indicator,  use  of,  369  ;    ex- 
periments  with,    374 ;     working 

the,  383  ;   number  lost,  383 
Nettleingham,        Sub  -  Lieutenant, 

R.N.R.,       446  ;      awarded      the 

D.S.C.,  447 
Neuerburg,    Oberleutnant,    on   the 

sinking  of  the  U18,  355 
Newburn,  the  s.s.,  203 
New  Dawn,  the  drifter,  439 
Newfoundland,  39 
Newhaven,  47 
Newmarket,  the  s.s.,  337 
Newquay,  399 

NEW  ZEALAND,  H.M.S.,  258,  324 
New  Zealand  Shipping  Co.,   ships 

fitted  with  guns,  124 
Niblet,  the  trawler,  277 
Niceto  de  Larrinaga,  the  s.s.,  sunk, 

163 
Nicholson,    Rear-Admiral     Stuart, 

bombardment  of  Zeebrugge,  352 
Nicobar  Islands,  40 
NIGER,  H.M.S.,  torpedoed,  351,  371 
Night  Hawk,  the  trawler,  founders, 

364 

Nine  Sisters,  the  drifter,  373 
Ningchow,  the  s.s.,  escapes  from  a 

submarine,  296 

Noel,  Admiral  Sir  Gerard  H.  W.,  210 
Nombre  de  Dios,  expedition  against, 

32 
Nore,  the,  armed  patrol  at,  266, 318, 

370,  371  ;    net-bases  at,  375 
Norfolk,    Virginia,    report    of    the 

British  Consul  on  the  merchant 

seamen,  103 
Norman   corsairs,    activity   of,    14 

note 

Normandy,  47 
Norris,   A.   C.,   master  of  the  s.s. 

Charcas,  178 
North  Channel,  339  ;    nets  in  the, 

383  ;    patrol,  435 
North    Foreland,    294,    320,    331, 

337 

North  Keeling  Island,  195  note 
North    Sea,    47,    266,    320,  ,344, 

357  ;  minefields,  345,  408 ;  sub- 
marines in,  404,  409  ;  patrol,  436 
North  Shields,   265 ;    mine-sweep- 
ing trawler  at,  266 


466 


INDEX 


North  Wales,  the  s.s.,  145  ;    sunk, 

146 

Northern  Patrol,  125 
Northlands,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  313 
Nor  way,  tonnage  of  ships,  82,  85,  87 
NUBIAN,  the  destroyer,  389 
NURNBERG,    the    German    cruiser, 

128 

Nyanga,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  152 
NYMPHE,  the  destroyer,   strikes  a 

submarine,  333 

Oakby,  the  s.s.,  136  ;   sunk,  291 
Ocana,  the  fishing-vessel,  founders, 

359,  366 

Ocean  Island,  204 
Oceanic  II,  the  trawler,  446 
Odell,  — ,   skipper   of  the   trawler 

Coquet,  396 

Old  Head  of  Kinsale,  410,  417 
Oleron,  Laws  of,  10 
Olive  Branch,  the  trawler,  390 
Olivine,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  313 
Ontario,  the  trawler,  fight  with  a 

submarine,  438 
Orfordness,  63,  319 
Oriana,  the  armed  yacht,  340,  341, 

342 
Orianda,    the   trawler,    blown   up, 

362,  365 

Oriole,  the  s.s.,  fate  of,  279 
ORION,  H.M.S.,  323 
Orkney  Islands,  323  ;  armed  patrol 

at,  370,  379 
Oronsay,  344 

Ortega,  the  s.s.,  escapes  capture,  144 
Osborne  Stroud,  the  trawler,  266 
Osceola,   the   s.s.,   bombed   by   an 

aeroplane,  294 

Ostend,  322  ;   nets  laid  off,  401 
Ostmark,  the  German  s.s.,  138 
OTTER,  the  German  river-gunboat, 

128 
Ottley,  Bear- Admiral  Sir  Charles  O., 

Director   of   Naval   Intelligence, 

224 

Ousel,  the  s.s.,  bombed  by  an  aero- 
plane, 294 
Outer    Dowsing    lightvessel,    320, 

321,  322 

Owen,  Sir  Douglas,  239 
Owen,      Sub-Lieutenant      E.      L., 

B.N.B.,  in  command  of  drifters, 

386 

Owen,  G.,  master  of  the  s.s.  North 
Wales,  145 

Paddle-steamers  as  mine-sweepers. 
255,  332,  401,  439 


Paget,  Admiral  Sir  Alfred,  in  com- 
mand of  the  steam-yacht  Eileen, 
363 

Pandion,  the  s.s.,  bombed  by  an 
aeroplane,  294 

Para,  158,  JL68 

Parker,  Admiral  'Sir  William, 
description  of  a  convoy,  52 

Parks,  C.  W.,  master  of  the  s.v. 
Wilfrid  M.,  175 

Parsons,  Lieutenant  G.  C.,  B.N.,  in 
command  of  the  trawler  Passing, 
362 

Pascoe,  John,  61 

Passing,  the  trawler,  strikes  a 
mine,  362 

Patagonia,  the  s.s.,  153 

Paterson,  H.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Katharine  Park,  143 

PATHFINDER,  H.M.S.,  sunk,  273, 
329 

Pearce,  W.,  skipper  of  the  trawler 
Dane,  365 

Peel  12,  the,  421 

Pegg,  H.,  skipper  of  the  trawler 
Cassandra,  in  a  naval  engage- 
ment, 359 

Pellew,  Bear-Admiral  Sir  Edward, 
51 ;  see  H.M.S.  EXMOUTH 

Penang,  202 

Pengilly,  third  officer  of  the  s.s. 
Falaba,  309 

Pennsylvania,  the  German  s.s.,  125 

Pentland  Firth,  331,  350,  353 

Penzance  Bay,  392 

Pernambuco,  142,  448  ;  report  of 
the  British  Consul  on  the  treat- 
ment of  the  merchant  seamen, 
103 

Peru,  37 

Peterhead,  armed  patrols  at,  321, 
335,  370;  rewarded,  446;  net- 
bases  at,  375 

Philip  of  Spain,  marriage,  24 ; 
seizes  English  vessels,  27 

Philipps,  Sir  Owen,  Chairman  of 
the  Boyal  Mail  Steam  Packet 
Co.,  120 

Phillimore,  Admiral  Sir  Augustus, 
112  note 

Phillimore,  A.,  Life  of  Admiral  Sir 
William  Parker,  53  note,  55  note 

Phillimore,  Captain  B.  F.,  258 

Phillimore,  Captain  V.  E.  B.,  in 
charge  of  patrol  at  Falmouth, 
399 

Picton  Island,  184 

Pilcher,  N.  B.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Indrani,  155 


INDEX 


467 


Pilot,  a  defaulting,  punishment  of, 

12 

Pine  Islands,  33 
Piracy,  practice  of,  in  home  waters, 

10,  14,  26 

Pisa,  first  English  Consul  at,  19 
Plimsoll,  Samuel,  on  "  coffin-ships," 

78 

Plymouth,  13,  29  ;    patrol  at,  434 
Pohl,  Admiral  von,  Chief  of  the  Ad- 
miralty   Staff    of    the    German 
Navy,  proclamation,  283 
Pond,   R.    R.,   master   of   the   s.s. 

Highland  Brae,  175 
Ponrabbel,  the  dredger,  sunk,  198 
Pontoporos,    the    Greek    s.s.,   cap- 
tured, 189,  194 
Poole,  net-bases  at,  375  ;  patrol  at, 

434 
Pope,   the,   partition   of  the   New 

World,  23 

Port  Mahomack,  321 
Portia,  the  armed  yacht,  390 
Portland,    64 ;     experiments    with 
mine-sweepers    at,    258  ;     armed 
patrol,  265,  266,  370,  434;    de- 
mand   for    trawlers,    351  ;     net- 
bases  at,  375 
Porto  Rico,  41 

Portsmouth,  47  ;    armed  patrol  at, 
265,     266,     370 ;      demand     for 
drifters,  351  ;   net-bases  at,  375 
Portugal,  the  first  maritime  Power, 

19 
Potaro,    the    s.s.,    captured,    174 ; 

looted,  175,  176  ;  sunk,  208 
Pratonia,  the  German  s.s.,  124 
Prescott,  T.  R.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Cambank,  289 

President,  The,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  314 
President  Grant,  the  s.s.,  125 
President  Lincoln,  the  s.s.,  125 
Press-gang,  methods  of,  55  ;   aboli- 
tion, 98 

Preston,    Commander    Lionel    G., 
R.K,    in    charge    of     gunboats, 
318,  361 
Prestridge,  Sub-Lieutenant,  R.N.R. , 

448 

Primo,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  271,  371,  376 
Prince  Edward,  the  paddle-steamer, 

378  ;    lays  nets  off  Ostend,  401 
Princess  Alice,  the  German  s.s.,  127 
Princess    Olga,   the   s.s.,   founders, 

360 
Princess    Victoria,   the   s.s.,    sunk, 

297 

Prinz   Adalbert,   the   German   s.s., 
127 


PRINZ  EITEL   FRIEDRICH,  the  Ger- 
man armed  merchant  cruiser,  126, 
249  ;  sinks  British  ships,   177-9, 
208  ;  interned,  179 
Prinz   Heinrick,   the   German   s.s., 

127 

Prinz  Ludwig,  the  German  s.s.,  124 
Prinz  OsTcar,  the  German  s.s.,  126 
Privateering,   system  of,  legalised, 

14 
Privateers,  French,  actions  against 

British  ships,  48-50 
Prize     Code,     132-4 ;      procedure, 

133 

Progress,  the  trawler,  395  ;    chased 
by  a  submarine,  396  ;    sunk,  396 
Propert,  William  H.,  master  of  the 
s.s.  Laertes,  286  ;    account  of  the 
escape  from  a  submarine,  286-8  ; 
awarded  the   D.S.C.    and  made 
Lieutenant  R.N.R.,  288 
Prussia,  tonnage  of  ships,  82 
Prussia,  the  German  s.s.,  142 
Pruth,    the    s.s.,     captured,     164 ; 

sunk,  165 

Ptarmigan,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  314 
Purdy,  S.,  master  of  the  s.s.  Conder, 
165  note 

Queen  Alexandra,  the  drifter,  448 
Queen  Victoria,  the  paddle-steamer, 

378  ;  lays  nets  off  Ostend,  401 
Queenstown,  armed  patrol  at,  266, 

341,  371 

RACOON,  H.M.S.,  66 

Rajput,  the  s.s.,  192  note 

Raleigh,  Sir  Walter,  39 

Ramsgate,  63 

Rangoon,  193 

Ratcliffe,    J.,    master    of    the    s.s. 

Western  Coast,  291 
Rathlin  Island,  382 
Rattray  Head,  371,  378,  436 
Read,     Charles,     skipper     of     the 

trawler  Alonso,  347  ;   gift  to,  348 
Recolo,  the  trawler,  founders,  402 
Record  of  American  and  Foreign 

Shipping,  95  note 
RECRUIT,  the  destroyer,  torpedoed, 

440 

Red  Boole,  94 
Reform  Bill  of  1832,  98 
Reindeer,  the  s.s.,  337,  430 
Reliance,  the  trawler,  430 
Restango,  the  trawler,  430 
Reverto,  the  trawler,  408 
Revigo,  the  fishing- vessel,  founders, 

328 


468 


INDEX 


Rhakotis,  the  s.s.,  146 

RIASAN,  the  Russian  volunteer  s.s., 
captured  and  renamed  CORMORAN, 

188  Ribera,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  196 

Richard  I,  expedition  to  the  Holy 
Land,  9  ;  last  crusade,  10 

RINGDOVE,  H.M.S.,  329 

Rio  de  la  Hacha,  29,  30 

Rio  Iguassu,  the  s.s.,  captured,  154, 
156;  sunk,  157 

Rio  Negro,  the  s.s.,  154,  155,  156 

Rio  Parana,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  291 

Rival,  the  drifter,  attacks  a  sub- 
marine, 391 

Robeck,  Admiral  Sir  John  M.  de, 
scheme  of  organisation  for  the 
Motor-Boat  Reserve,  327 

Roberts,  J.,  of  the  s.s.  Elsinore, 
taken  prisoner  by  the  German 
cruiser  LEIPZIG,  180 ;  trans- 
ferred to  the  German  s.s.  Marie, 
181-3 ;  at  Chatham  Island, 
183";  Guayaquil,  184 

Robertson,  Matthew,  master  of  the 
s.s.  IJcaria,  279 

Robertson,  Neil,  master  of  the  s.s. 
The  President,  314 

Robinson,  Stanley,  of  the  s.s.  Oakby, 
awarded  the  Bronze  Medal,  291 

Robinson,  Thomas,  master  of  the 
s.s.  Kabinga,  190,  192  note 

Roburn,  the  drifter,  388 

Rodjestvensky,  Admiral,  coaling 
difficulties,  5 

Roebuck,  the  s.s.,  337 

Romney  Cinque  Port,  9 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  on  the  sink- 
ing of  the  s.s.  Lusitania,  425 

Rosarina,  La,  the  s.s.,  chased  by 
a  submarine,  173  note,  314 

Rose,  the  trawler,  262 

Roses,  Wars  of  the,  13,  82  note 

Ross,  Sir  John,  Memoirs  and  Corre- 
spondence of  Admiral  Lord  de 
Saumarez,  53  note 

Ross,  W.  H.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Trabboch,  191 

Rosslare,  submarine  base  at,  382 

Rosyth,  329  ;  armed  patrol  at,  335, 
370 

Row,  Sir  Thomas,  Ambassador  to 
the  Grand  Mogul,  43 

Rowe,  James,  History  of.  Flushing, 
61  note 

Royal  Fleet  Reserve,  113,  115 

Royal  Mail  Steam  Packet  Co.,  120  ; 
ships  fitted  with  guns,  124 

Royal  Naval  Coast  Volunteers,  112 

Royal    Naval    Reserve,    issue    of 


tickets,     109 ;     formation    of    a 

voluntary,     110,    111  ;     history, 

112  ;    system  of  training,  114 
Royal  Navy;  see  Navy 
Royal  Sceptre,  the  s.s.,  169 
Royal    Sovereign,    the    lightvessel, 

290,  291 

Ruby,  the  schooner  (U.S.A.),  315 
Runnelstone,  392 
Runo,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  328 
RUSSELL,  H.M.S.,  352 
Russia,   isolation,    7 ;     tonnage    of 

ships,     87 
Russo-Japanese     War,     value     of 

mines,  261 
Rye,    41  ;      Cinque    Port,    9,    13  ; 

ravaged  by  a  French  fleet,  17 


"  S90,"  the  German  destroyer,  128 

Sabang,  139 

Sagitta,  the  armed  yacht,  402,  408 

Sailing-vessels,  crews,  53  ;  -  ton- 
nage, 88 ;  number  of  trading, 
92  ;  speed,  117 

Sailors,  impressment  of,  12 

St.  Abb's  Head,  322,  331,  334 

St.  Alban's  Head,  380,  383,  400 

St.  Andrew,  the  hospital  ship,  at- 
tacked by  a  submarine,  385 

St.  Ann's  Head,  309,  443,  448 

St.  Bride's  Bay,  449 

St.  Catherine's  Point,  313,  380,  400 

St.  Egbert,  the  s.s.,  captured,  198, 
200;  released,  198,  202 

St.  George's  Channel,  339  ;  netted, 
382 

St.  Go  van's  Lightship,  435 

St.  Jean  de  Luz,  46 

St.  John's  Point,  435 

St.  Julian,  port,  36 

St.  Malo,  47  ;  siege  of,  17,  18 

St.  Nicholas,  Bay  of,  22 

Saint  Pierre,  French  mine-sweeper, 
279 

St.  Valery-en-Caux,  380 

Salisbury,  Earl  of,  appointed  Com- 
missioner, 17 

San  Antonio,  18 J 

San  Christoval,  207 

San  Juan  de  Ulua,  30 

San  Paulo,  the  Brazilian  s.s.,  168 

San  Wilfrido,  the  s.s.,  135 

Sandwich  Cinque  Port,  9,  13 ; 
battle,  9 

Sandy  Cape,  207 

Santa  Isabel,  the  German  s.s.,  185  ; 
sunk,  185 

Sapphire,  the  armed  yacht,  381,  435 


INDEX 


469 


Sappho,  the  s.s.,  detained  at  Ham- 
burg, 130 

Sarba,  the  trawler,  430 

Sarchet,  J.  B.,  of  the  s.s.  Benmohr, 
198  note 

Sarepta,  the  drifter,  386 

Sarnia,the  armed  boarding-steamer, 
attacked  by  a  submarine,  397 

Satow,  Sir  Ernest,  at  The  Hague 
Conference,  118 

Saumarez,  Admiral  Lord  de,  53 

Savannah,  report  of  the  British 
Consul  on  the  merchant  seamen, 
103 

Scadaun,  the  drifter,  431 

Scapa  Flow,  322,  353 ;  armed 
trawlers  at,  335,  349 

Scarborough,  raid  on,  337,  357  ; 
minefield,  360-66  ;  free  of  mines, 
406 

Sceptre,  the  s.s.,  168 

SCHABNHORST,  the  German  battle- 
cruiser,  124,  128,  177 

Schouwen  Bank,  286,  333 

Schwieger,  Kapitan-Leutnant,  in 
command  of  U20,  410 ;  sinks 
the  s.s.  Lusitania,  418  note  ;  in 
command  of  U88,  427  ;  drowned, 
428 

Scilly  Islands,  299,  400;  wireless 
station  at  St.  Mary's,  400 

Scotch  motor  fishing-boats,  350 

Scott,  Admiral  Sir  Percy,  351 

Scott,  Captain  R.  F.,  224 

Scott,  T.  H.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Lochwood,  313 

Sea  power,  influence  of,  3 

Seaflower,  the  trawler,  260,  321 

Seagull,  the  motor-boat,  430 

Seamen  of  the  Cinque  Ports,  9  ; 
privileges,  9  ;  period  of  ser- 
vice, 9 

Seamew,  the  trawler,"  2 60,  321 

Sedulous,  the  drifter,  373,  374 

Selsey  Bill,  47,  63 

Semantha,  the  Norwegian  barque, 
sunk,  175 

Semmes,  Captain,  186 

Senior,  Sub-Lieutenant "  W.  A., 
R.N.R.,  364 

Serula,  the  s.s.,  bombed  by  an 
aeroplane,  294 

Seven  Seas,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  313 

Severn,  the  s.s.,  attacked  by  a  sub- 
marine, 333 

SEYDLITZ,  the  German  battle- 
cruiser,  357 

Seydlitz,  the  German  s.s.,  127,  185 

Shannon  River,  429 


Sharp,  J.  T.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Serula,  295 

Sharp,  W.,  master  of  the  s.s.  Kil- 
dalton,  178 

Sharpness,  448 

Shaw,  Savill  and  Albion,  Ltd.,  ships 
fitted  with  guns,  124 

Sheerman,  C.  (gunner),   148 

Sheerness,  mine-sweeping  trawler 
at,  263 

Shelomi,  the  trawler,  386 

Shetlands,  the,  armed  patrol  at, 
328,  350,  370,  379 

Ship  money,  institution  of,  43 

Shipbuilding,  17,  42,  58,  85 

Shipowners,  charges  against,  84 ; 
policy  in  a  naval  war,  214  ;  Red 
Book,  94 

Shipping  Acts,  78,  84,  111 

Shipping,  Admiralty  directions  to, 
239 

Shipping  and  Shipbuilding,  Report 
of  the  Committee  on,  85  note, 
88,  89 

Shipping  industry,  72 ;  cause  of 
the  decline,  73-8 ;  progress, 
80,  84 ;  records,  94 ;  measures 
of  protection,  210,  212,  220 ; 
war  insurance  schemes,  228 ; 
instructions  against  detention, 
246 ;  issue  of  daily  voyage 
notices,  250 

Shipping  Intelligence  Officers,  ap- 
pointed, 242 ;  instructions, 
243-5 

Shipping,  memorandum  on  the 
safety,  247 

Shipping,  Registers  of,  110  note 

Ships,  merchant,  regulations,  10-1 3  ; 
captured  in  the  Revolutionary 
and  Napoleonic  Wars,  44,  46,  48  ; 
tonnage,  54,  68  note,  80,  82,  85- 
94  ;  losses,  57,  62,  66-9  ;  regis- 
tered during  the  Revolutionary 
and  Napoleonic  Wars,  69  ; 
wrecked,report  of  the  Committee, 
73,  76 ;  armament  of,  120 ; 
fitted  with  guns,  124  ;  detained 
at  Hamburg,  130;  "Traffic  In- 
structions," 242  ;  policy  of  dis- 
persal, 242,  243  ;  attacked  by 
submarines,  133-209,  268-80, 
285-93,  296-317,  330,  333,  416- 
18,  443-6 ;  by  aeroplanes, 
293-5  ;  strike  mines,  328,  339, 
343,  349,  359-65,  402-4,  407, 
409,  410,  440 

Ships  of  the  Line,  number  of,  1804- 
1814,  59 


470 


INDEX 


Ship  wash  Lightship,  383 
Shrewsbury,     Earl     of,     appointed 

Commissioner,  17 

Shrovder,    Lieutenant,  of  the  Ger- 
man cruiser  KARLSRUHE,  154 
Siamese  Prince,  the  s.s.,  143 
Sidonia,  Medina,  defeat  of,  38 
Siegal,  Admiral  (German),  118 
Sierra    Cordoba,    the    German   s.s., 

172  note 

Sierra  Leone,  27 
Simpson,  H.  L.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Lynton  Orange,  140 
Skerryvore,  343,  344 
SKIPJACK,  H.M.S.,   343,   351,   356, 

361,  362,  401 
Skudesnaes,  269,  333 
Slade,  Admiral  Sir  Edmond  J.  W., 

Director   of   Naval   Intelligence, 

224,  259 

Slavery,  custom  of,  26 
Sloops,  64  ;    mine-sweepers,  401 
Sluys,  Battle  of,  13 
Smaridge,  H.  S.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Indus,  189 
Smith,     Charles,     skipper    of    the 

trawler  Tubal  Cain,  147 
Smith,  Sir  H.  Llewelyn,  Secretary 

of  the  Board  of  Trade,  238 
Smith's  Knoll,  345,  346,  348,  349 
Smyth's  Channel,  145 
Snowline,    E.    V.,    skipper   of    the 

drifter        Hilda       and       Ernest, 

gallantry,     364 ;      awarded    the 

D.S.C.,  364 
Soda  Island,   139 
Solent,  the,  255,  351 
Solomon  Islands,  207 
Solon,  the  trawler,  364 
Souter,    John,   master   of   the   s.s. 

Blackwood,  297 
Southampton,  ships  at,  17 
South  Cross  Sand,  348 
South  Goodwin  Lightship,  hydro- 
phone installed,  434 
South  Goodwins,  320,  331 
Southporty  the  s.s.,  escape  of  the, 

204-9 

South  Sea,  36 
South  Stack,  404 
Southwold,    319,    320;     minefield, 

328 

Spanish  Armada,  defeat  of  the,  38 
Spanish  Indies,  reprisals  on,  38 
Sparrow,  the  trawler,  260 
Spee,    Admiral   von,   in   command 

of  the  German  Pacific  Squadron, 

140  ;  at  the  Marshall  Islands,  177 
SPEEDWELL,  H.M.S.,  343 


SPEEDY,  the  gunboat,  sunk,  328 

Spider,  the  trawler,  260 

Spithead,  47,  400  ;   fleet  at,  20 

Spreewald,  the  German  s.s.,  126 

Spurn  Head,  322,  347,  360,  395 

Staalbierghuk,   147 

Stablefold,  Sub-Lieutenant  A., 
R.N.R.,  440 

Stadt  Schleswig,  the  German  s.s., 
153 

Staffa,  the  s.s.,  bombed  by  an  aero- 
plane, 294 

STAG,  the  destroyer,  329 

Star  of  Britain,  the  trawler,  strikes 
a  mine,  362 

Start  Bay,  383 

Staten  Island,   184 

Stavanger,  269 

Steam-engine,  2,  4,  95  ;  invention, 
72 

Steam- vessels,  tonnage,  81,  85-7, 
90-94,  236  ;  average  size,  87  ; 
number  of  trading,  92-4 

Steam-yachts,  255 

Steel,  — ,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Gryfevale,  account  of  his  capture, 
195 

Steel's  Navy  List,  56  note 

Stephens,  — ,  of  the  s.s.  Lusi- 
tania,  drowned,  418 

Stileman,  Rear- Admiral  Sir  H.  H., 
in  command  of  Liverpool  Area, 
381 

Store  ships,  6 

Stormcock,  the  Admiralty  tug,  430 

Stornoway,  base  at,  351,  378 

Stoss,  Kapitan-Leutnant,  of  the 
U8,  387 

Strathisla,  the  trawler,  390 

Strathroy,  the  s.s.,  captured,  153  ; 
sunk,  154,  159 

Stromness,  379 

Sturdee,  Admiral  Sir  Doveton, 
President  of  the  Channel  Fleet 
Committee,  258 

Sturton,  Lord,  appointed  Commis- 
sioner, 17 

Styne  Head,  301 

Submarine  Attach,  Committee  on, 
368 

Submarines,  German,  212,  216, 
254  ;  number  of,  273  ;  warfare, 
v,  54,  268-80,  285,  293,  296- 
317,  329,  332,  371,  376,  380,  385, 
395-7,  402-5,  409,  431-3,  440, 
443-9;  sunk,  385-91,  441, 
446;  net-cutting  device,  392; 
measures  against,  433-7 

Sudmark,  the  German  s.s.,  126 


INDEX 


471 


Suffolk  coast,  minefield,  267,  320 

SUFFOLK,  H.M.S.,  170 

Supply  of  Food  and  Raw  Material 
in  Time  of  War,  Report  on,  210- 
16,  224,  227,  228 

Surcouf,  Robert,  48 

Sutterton,  the  trawler,  402,  407 

Swansea,  13 

Swarte  area,  minefield,  403,  406 

Sweden,  tonnage  of  ships,  82,  85, 
87 

SWIFT,  H.M.S.,  attacked  by  a  sub- 
marine, 333 

Sybil  Point,  436 

SYDNEY,  H.M.A.S.,  204  ;  sinks  the 
EMDEN,  195  note 

Table  Bay,  40 

Tabor  a,  the  German  s.s.,  126 

Tagus  Cove,  182 

Tainui,  the  s.s.,  armed,  121 

TAKU,  the  German  destroyer,  128 

Tamar,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  176,  252 

Tangistan,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  297 

Tara,  the  s.s.,  341 

Tarawa,  204 

Tasman,  the  Dutch  s.s.,  208 

Taylor,   A.   S.,   master  of  the  s.s. 

Northlands,  313 
Taylor,   F.    G.,   master  of  the  s.s. 

Buresk,  account  of  the  EMDEN, 

196-8 

Tees,  the,  75 
Territorial  Army,  2 
Thames,  the,  63,  321 
THESEUS,   H.M.S.,    attacked   by   a 

submarine,   333 
Thierfelder,Lieutenant-Commander, 

of  the  German  armed  merchant 

cruiser  KRONPRINZ  WILHELM,  171 
Thomas  W.  Irvine,  the  s.s.,  blown 

up,  322 
Thompson,  G.,  and  Co.,  ships  fitted 

with  guns,  124 
Thompson,  J.  B.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Highland  Hope,   154 
Thompson,  R.  J.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Diplomat,  190 
Thordis,  the  s.s.,  385  ;    damages  a 

submarine,  292 
Thornton  Ridge,  374,  440 
TIGER,  the  German  gunboat,   128, 

177 

Tillard,      Lieutenant  -  Commander 
,  George  E.,  R.N.,  335 
Tirpitz,  Admiral  von,  on  the  sub- 
marine policy,  274  ;    approval  of 

the  sinking  of  the  s.s.  Lusitania, 

427 


Tokio,  the  trawler,  354  ;  rewarded, 
356 

Tokomaru,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  278 

Toole,  J.  C.,  sole  survivor  of  the 
s.s.  Tangistan,  298 

Torbay,  47,  52 

Torpedo-boat  No.  13,  surrounded 
by  mines,  322  ;  No.  027,  399  ; 
No.  91,  attacked  by  torpedoes,  351 

Tory  Island,  40 ;  minefield,  338, 
378,  403,  408 

Tosto,  the  s.s.,  317 

Trabboch,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  191 

Trade,  Board  of,  administration  of 
the  Merchant  Navy,  1,  227  ; 
Marine  Department,  78,  84,  238  ; 
report  on  shipping,  82 

Trade  Division  of  the  War  Staff, 
creation  of  the,  224  ;  abolished, 
225  ;  reformed,  225,  226 ;  in- 
structions to  shipowners,  243, 
246,  248  ;  memorandum  on  the 
safety  of  British  shipping,  247  ; 
issue  of  daily  voyage  notices,  250 

Trafalgar,  victory  at,  44,  57 

Tramps,  87  ;  value  of,  88 ;  rate 
of  steaming,  117 

Trawler  Flotilla,  the  Northern,  323, 
370 

Trawler  Reserve,  recruiting,  262 

Trawler  Section,  regulations,  261 

Trawlers,  255,  257  ;  experiments 
with,  258  ;  chartered  for  mine- 
sweeping,  260,  265,  318,  320 ; 
scheme  of  mobilisation,  264 ; 
number  of,  260,  335,  372,  400  ; 
work  of  the,  320,  322,  352,  361, 
362,  401  ;  demand  for,  322,  324, 
334,  342,  351  ;  armed,  330,  335, 
368  ;  fitted  with  explosive  sweeps, 
334,  351  ;  strike  mines,  362  ; 
methods  of  disguise,  443 

Trendall,  T.  W.,  skipper  of  the 
trawler  Solon,  awarded  the 
D.S.C.,  364 

Trevose  Head,  305 

Tritonia,  the  s.s.,  founders,  343 

Troilus,  the  s.s.,  captured,  198-200  ; 
sunk,  201 

TSINGTAU,  the  German  gunboat, 
128,  205,  206 

Tubal  Cain,  the  trawler,  captured, 
147;  sunk,  148 

Tulloch,  T.  T.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Tymeric,  194 

Tupper,  Admiral  Sir  Reginald,  in 
charge  of  Area  I,  378 

Turnbull,  Corporal,  R.A.M.C.,  on 
German  atrocity,  311 


472 


INDEX 


Turnbull,  J.  S.,  second  engineer  of 

the  s.s.  Harpalyce,  315 
Turnbull   Martin  &  Co.,  ship  fitted 

with  guns,  124 
Turner,     W.    T.,    master    of     the 

s.s.  Luaitania,  414  ;  criticisms  on, 

424  ;    rescued,  425 
Tymeric,  the  s.s.,  194  ;    sunk,  195, 

196 
Tyne,  the,  75,  299  ;   minefield,  322, 

328  ;    armed  patrol  at,  328,  370 
Tyrwhitt,  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Regi- 
nald, Bt.,  346 

U7,  submarine,  sinks  British  ship, 

316 

U8,  sunk,  387,  389 
U9,  sinks  British  ships,  254,  273, 

329 
U12,  sinks  British  ship,  298  ;  sunk, 

390 

U14,  sunk,  446 
U15,  sunk,  322 
U16,  sinks  British  ships,  380 
U17,  captures  the  s.s.  Olitra,  269 
U18,      career,      352-4 ;       rammed, 

354;    sunk,  355 

U19,  sinks  British  ships,  276,  377 
U20,  sinks  British  ships,  278,  410 
U21,  sinks  British  ships,  270,  271, 

273,  277,  329,  368,  376 
U24,  sinks  British  ship,  371 
U28,  sinks  British  ships,  312 
U29,  sinks  British  ships,  299,  300  ; 

sunk,  300  note 
U30,  sinks  British  ship,  289 
U34,  sinks  British  ships,  445 
U35,  sinks  British  ships,  448 
U37,  sinks  British  ships,  303 
U88,  427  ;   sunk,  428 
UNDAUNTED,  H.M.S.,  attacked  by 

a  submarine,  380 
Underwriters,  Green  Book,  94 
United  States,  Merchant  Navy,  81  ; 

Civil  War,  81  ;   tonnage,  82,  85 
Unity,  the  drifter,  438 
Uxbridge,  the  trawler,  sunk,  407 

Vaaren,  the  s.s.,  founders,  360 

Valiant,  the  armed  yacht,  381,  435  ; 
strikes  a  mine,  363 

Vanduara,  the  s.s.,  fires  on  a  sub- 
marine, 376 

Vandyck,  the  s.s.,  captured,  166-8 

Vanilla,  the  trawler,  torpedoed,  402 

Varild,  the  s.s.,  442 

Varne  Buoy,  388  ;  Lightship,  hy- 
drophone installed,  434 


VATEBLAND,  the  German  gunboat, 
128 

Vaterland,  the  German  s.s.,  125 

Venetia,  the  armed  yacht,  325 

Vera  Cruz,  30 

Verbena,  the  trawler,  430 

VERNON,  H.M.S.,  258,  260 

Victoria,  the  trawler,  attacked  by 
a  submarine,  443  ;  sunk,  444 

Victoria  Luise,  the  German  s.s.,  124 

VICTORIOUS,  H.M.S.,  348,  359 

Vigilant,  the  trawler,  446 

VIKING,  the  destroyer,  384,  387, 
391 

Ville  de  Lille,  the  French  s.s.,  sunk, 
380 

VON  DER  TANN,  the  German  battle- 
cruiser,  357 

Vosges,  the  s.s.,  attacked  by  a  sub- 
marine, 304-6 ;  sunk,  306 


Walhalla,  the  German  s.s.,  171 

Walmesley,  J.  B.,  the  s.v.,  422 

Walney  Island,  375 

Walters,  Commander  R.  H.,  R.N., 
of  the  s.s.  Brighton  Queen,  362 

War-Book,'  the,  221 

War  Risks  Insurance  Clubs  or  Asso- 
ciations, 228-39  ;  forms  of 
policy,  238 

War  Risks  Insurance  Office,  239 

War  Staff,  Trade  Branch  of  the 
Operations  Division  of  the,  225, 
250  ;  Trade  Division,  226 

Ward,  Francis,  skipper  of  the 
trawler  Hirose,  444 

Warrior,  the  Admiralty  tug,  430 

Warter  Priory,  the  trawler,  368 

Wash,  the,  318 

Waterloo,  Battle  of,  71 

Watling  Island,  170 

Wawn,  — ,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Harpalyce,  314 

Webb,  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Richard, 
Director  of  the  Trade  Division  of 
the  War  Staff,  149  note,  225,  226 

Weddigen,  Otto  von,  273,  300 

Wedgwood,  J.,  master  of  the  s.s. 
Willerby,  178 

Wenlock,  the  drifter,  299 

Weselly,  A.,  wireless  operator  of 
the  s.s.  Kabinga,  192  note 

Western  Coast,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  291 

Westerwald,  the  German  s.s.,  126 

West  India  Islands,  French,  50 

West  Loch  Tarbert,  351 
Westminster,  the  s.s.,  207 

WEYMOUTH,  H.M.S.,  198 


INDEX 


473 


Whincop,  C.  A.,  master  of  the  s.s. 

Primo,  271 

Whitby,  bombardment  of,  358 
White  Oak,  the  drifter,  384 
White  Star  Line,  ships  fitted  with 

guns,  124 
Whitehead,    Captain    Frederic    A., 

R.N.,     Director     of     Mercantile 

Movements,  226 
Whytehead,  Lieutenant-Commander 

T.  B.  H.,  R.N.,  430 
Wick,  321 
Wicklow  Head,  435 
Widders,    A.,    master    of    the    s.s. 

Harpalion,  291 
Wilfrid  M.,  the  s.v.,  captured,  175  ; 

fate  of,  175 

Willerby,  the  s.s.,  captured,  178 
William    I,    incorporation    of    the 

Cinque  Ports,  9 
William  II,  Emperor  of  Germany, 

responsibility  for  the  sinking  of 

the  s.s.  Lusitania,  427 
William  F.  Frye,  the  s.s.,  sunk,  177, 


Williams,    J.,    master    of    the    B.S. 

Conway  Castle,  145,  147 
Williams,    J.,    master    of    the    s.s. 

Hurstdale,  166 
Williams,  J.,  master  of  the  s.s.  Rio 

Parana,  291 
Williams,    J.,    master    of    the    s.s. 

Indian  City,  300 
Willingdon  Shoal,  400 
Willoughby,  Sir  Hugh,  Arctic  voy- 

age, 21  ;   in  Lapland,  22 
Wilson,   Admiral   of  the  Fleet  Sir 

Arthur,   372;    on  the  policy  of 

the  Admiralty,  222 
Wilson,       Lieutenant  -  Commander 

A.  T.,  R.N.,  in  command  of  the 

armedyacht  Venetia,  325 


Wilson,  John,  skipper  of  the  trawler 

Blanche,  358 
Wilson  Line,  ships  fitted  with  guns, 

124 

Winchelsea  Cinque  Port,  9,  13 
Wintonia,  the  armed  yacht,  305 
Wolf  Rock,  313 
Wood,    John,    master    of   the    s.s. 

Durward,  275  ;    efforts  to  escape 

a  submarine,  276 
Wood,  Lieutenant  W.  H.,  R.N.R., 

430 

Woodville,  the  s.s.,  298 
Woolwich,  41 
Wrath,  Cape,  350,  351 
Wrexham,  the  s.s.,  escapes  from  a 

submarine,  296 
Wright,     George,    master    of    the 

trawler  Eileen  Emma,  309 

Xylopia,  the  trawler,  266 

Yachts,    requisitioned,    325,    377  ; 

number  of  armed,  332,  372 
Yarmouth,   armed  patrol  at,   335, 

370  ;   net-bases  at,  375 
Ymuiden,  287 
Yokohama,  the  trawler,  fight  with 

a  submarine,  447 
Yorck,  the  German  s.s.,  126 
Yorkshire  coast,  raid  on,  357 
Younger,    A.,   the   skipper   of  the 

mine-sweeper  Dorothy  Gray,   356 

Zanzibar,  40 

Zarefah,  the  armed  yacht,  325 
Zeebrugge,  bombardment  of,  352 
Zeiten,  the  German  s.s.,  126,  138 
Zeppelins,  raids,  404 
ZHEMCHUQ,    the    Russian    cruiser, 
torpedoed,  202 


Printed  by  Hasell,  Watson  &   Viney,  Ld.t  London  and  Aylesbury,  England. 


D       Kurd,  (Sir)  Archibald  Spicer 

581        The  merchant  navy 

H7 

v.1 


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