^
.V
THE MERCHANT NAVY
BY THE SAME AUTHOR
THE MERCHANT NAVY. Vol. I.
With Illustrations. z\s. net.
{History of ihe Great War.)
By ARCHIBALD HURD and
H. CASTLE
GERMAN SEA-POWER : Its Rise,
Progress, and Economic Basis.
With Maps and Appendices giving
the Fleet Laws, etc. 15^. net.
By PERCY HURD and
ARCHIBALD HURD
THE NEW EMPIRE PARTNER-
SHIP : Defence, Commerce,
Policy, ^s. 6d. net.
All Rights Reserved
HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
BY DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
THE
MERCHANT NAVY
Vol. II
BY
ARCHIBALD HURD
LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1924
H'/
The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
have given the author access to official docu-
ments in the preparation of this work, but
they are in no way responsible for the ac-
curacy of its statements or the presentation
of the facts.
Printed in Great Britain hy
Bazell, Watson <t Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.
PREFACE
In the first volume of this History of the part which the
Merchant Navy took in the Great War, the record was
carried down to the early months of 1915, when the con-
science of the world was shocked by the torpedoing of
the Lusitania, with a loss of nearly 1,200 lives. The
present volume continues the narrative to the eve of the
German Declaration of " unrestricted submarine warfare "
on February 1st, 1917.
During this period of twenty months the war at sea
passed through what may be called an intermediate stage.
In the spring of 1915 the American President came for-
ward as the general advocate of neutral rights at sea.
Although he confined his protests to cases in which the
sovereign rights of the United States had been disregarded,
Mr. Wilson none the less became, in effect, the spokesman
of all neutrals. The sinking of the Arabic in September
brought on a crisis between America and Germany, and
at the end of the month the Imperial Government stated
that it " regretted and disapproved " the incident. No
guarantee for the future was given ; but the American
Government was satisfied, knowing, probably, that the
apology meant more than appeared. Washington had,
in fact, scored a diplomatic victory ; for the German
Government had ordered their submarine commanders to
" cease from any form of submarine war on the West
Coast of Great Britain or in the Channel." In the Medi-
terranean, sinkings went on much as usual, as there was
here less chance of injuring American citizens. For the
rest of the year a restricted form of submarine warfare,
against which the American Government made no protest,
continued in the zone of operations.
The High Naval Command at Berlin obeyed these
restrictions most reluctantly, and pressed their Govern-
ment for wider powers. Early in the new year the Chief
of the Great General Staff, von Falkenhayn, reported to
vi PREFACE
the Emperor that the army would not be able to force
a decision without naval assistance, and this admission
seems to have given new force to the naval arguments
for unrestricted submarine warfare. During February
1916 the restrictive rules under which submarine com-
manders were acting were cancelled ; and on March 24th
the steamer Sussex, which had a number of American
citizens on board, was torpedoed without warning in the
English Channel.
Thoroughly exasperated, the American Government now
issued what amounted to an ultimatum. The Germans
gave way, and early in May Count Bernstorff presented
a Note in which his Government promised that henceforth
the campaign would be conducted in accordance with the
general principles of international law, and that no vessel
would be sunk until some provision had been made for
the safety of the passengers and crew.
These concessions ushered in a new phase of the con-
flict. The Imperial Chancellor had yielded to the American
demands in the teeth of fierce opposition from the officers
of the naval and military commands. The thought of
loyally supporting the Government in the attitude it had
adopted evidently never entered their minds, as the events
recorded in this volume attest ; and for the rest of the
year they strove, by making progressive encroachments
upon the pledges given, to restore the submarine campaign
to the position which it had lost. They were tolerably
successful ; for at the end of 1916 merchant vessels were
being sunk without warning in the Atlantic and North
Sea as well as the Mediterranean : in January 1917 the
number of lives lost in British merchant ships was 276,
and 245 of these died as a result of the submarine campaign.
When, a few weeks later, the German Government declared
unrestricted submarine war, it was practically announcing
an accomplished fact, but the decision proved the final
influence which brought the United States into the war.
In this volume an attempt has been made to reflect
the course of events as they affected merchant seamen,
and all who were forced by circumstances to travel by
sea. It traces the gradual crescendo of callousness ex-
hibited by the enemy seamen, and of the necessarily slow
evolution of measures of defence.
Provision had been made by the Admiralty against
PREFACE vii
enemy cruisers which might escape on the high seas, and
that these measures were not inadequate experience
proved. By the end of March 1915, as has been recorded,
this menace had been laid, and during the period covered
by this volume the only losses inflicted by enemy surface
craft on merchant shipping were due to the spasmodic
appearance of raiders whose depredations furnish a narra-
tive of permanent interest to the student of war. The
Admiralty had repeatedly warned the nation that it could
give no guarantee that no enemy vessel would ever
succeed in breaking through, by night or in thick weather,
the cordon provided by the Grand Fleet and its auxiliary
forces.
The success which attended the dispositions of the
Admiralty after the institution of the patrol by the Tenth
Cruiser Squadron exceeded all expectations. The stoppage
of seaborne supplies combined with the system of com-
mercial embargo which had been slowly elaborated,
became so effective, in spite of political action initiated
by neutral States, that the Germans were commercially
isolated from the rest of the world, except in so far as
they were able to obtain supplies overland from neighbour-
ing countries, and were in a position to take the fullest
advantage of the protests of neutrals against the strict
enforcement of the blockade.
It is perhaps not generally realised that the blockade,
supported by the ships of the Grand Fleet, was actually
enforced by merchant ships which, though under the
command of naval officers, who had under them a nucleus
of active service ratings and men from the Royal Fleet
Reserve, were principally manned by merchant seamen.
The spirit in which these operations were prosecuted in
fair weather and in foul, and in high latitudes where cold
and fog prevail, constitutes the supreme vindication of
the character and seamanlike qualities of the Merchant
Navy, which was to be re-enforced before the war came to
its close by thousands of incidents of splendid and daring
heroism in face of hopeless odds, and noble self-sacrifice
in the common cause. Captain Charles Fryatt, in par-
ticular, supplied his fellow-seamen in these anxious months
with a noble example of unflinching courage and un-
wavering dignity in face of accusers who were determined,
as is revealed in these pages, to encompass his death at any
viii PREFACE
cost of honour — little thinking what influence the judicial
murder of this merchant captain would have in crystal-
lising neutral opinion against Germany. Captain Fryatt
came to be accepted throughout the civilised world as the
typical figure of the British merchant seamen. Their
fellow-countrymen were dependent for life on their staunch-
ness and seamanlike skill, and the trust was gloriously
vindicated.
Nor in reviewing the part which the Merchant Navy
bore during the war can we ignore its services in meeting
the constant demands of the Royal Navy, or its essential
contribution in the movement of troops. A fighting fleet
without the support of a merchant navy must be demobi-
lised. Moreover, an island State, if it would exercise
military influence overseas, is dependent upon the efficiency
of its sea communications, and in the chapter which deals
with the transport of the first million troops posterity
is provided with a classic example of how the seas can be
bridged and increasing armies kept supplied with muni-
tions, food, and all their various requirements.
But while the Merchant Navy was supporting the
Royal Navy, as well as the new armies, in near and many
distant theatres, it was also fighting its own battles, almost
defenceless though it was. The extent to which the sub-
marine would be pressed into the service of a belligerent
State had not been foreseen in any country. The mere
fact that the Germans possessed only about a score of
submarines when hostilities opened, and that at Inter-
national Conferences the conditions under which warfare
on seaborne commerce might be conducted had been
accepted by all maritime Powers, had contributed to a
feeling of security which events were speedily to dissipate.
The record of the sufferings of the merchant seamen,
as set forth in official and other documents which have
been placed under contribution in the preparation of this
volume, constitutes an epic of the sea to which history
provides no parallel. For many months the men of the
Merchant Service were without any semblance of defence.
At the very moment when armament was required for the
Mercantile Marine, the new armies had to be fitted out,
while the Royal Navy itself also required guns and other
equipment. The British Government, confronted with the
treble demands for guns and ammunition as well as for
PREFACE ix
trained gunners, was powerless to do all that the desperate
situation of the merchant seamen suggested as desirable.
But by the opening of the year 1916, a considerable pro-
portion of the larger and most essential ships of the Mer-
cantile Marine had been defensively armed. The progress
in this respect was not, as will be seen, without its influence
on enemy policy. The success with which defensively
armed ships beat off attack, and in many cases inflicted
serious loss on the enemy, defeated the enemy tactics, and
their increasing embarrassment was at last to find expres-
sion in the declaration from Berlin on February 1st, 1917,
inaugurating the intensive submarine campaign in defiance
of international law and the code of humanity, as well as
the pledges which had been repeatedly given.
In the varying circumstances of the twenty months
with which this volume deals, merchant seamen not only
maintained in efficiency the antennae of the blockade
operations, while at the same time supporting the Navy
and the armies confronting the enemy overseas, and
supplying the 45,000,000 people of the United Kingdom
with food, but also formed the backbone of the Auxiliary
Patrol. In this new navy, amateurs and professionals —
in fact, anyone who had acquired familiarity with sea
conditions — were mobilised. The record of the Auxiliary
Patrol is an enheartening revelation of the sea aptitudes
of the British people. Acknowledgment is again made of
the assistance of Lieutenant-Commander E. Keble Chat-
terton, R.N.V.R., in the preparation of this portion of
the History.
The Admiralty, the Board of Trade, and many ship-
owners have unreservedly placed their records under con-
tribution for this History. Without their assistance it
would have been impossible to present this narrative of
the ordeal, without its parallel in the long and varied
records of humanity, to which merchant seamen were
submitted during the Great War.
CONTENTS
Preface ....... pp. v-ix
CHAPTER I
SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS
The United States and the sinking of the Lusitania — ^The brotherhood
of the sea vindicated — -An enemy stratagem — ^The sinking of the s.s. Strath-
naim with a loss of twenty-one lives — ^The ordeal of the s.s. Armenian — •
A British master's humanity towards his dog — The fate of the s.s. Anglo-
Californian — No mercy by the enemy for women and children — 248 lives
lost in August 1915 — The destruction of the liner Arabic — Experience of
the crew of the s.s. Diomed — The liner Hesperian sunk — Irritation in
America — ^The enemy's campaign on the West Coast and in the English
Channel temporarily abandoned ...... pp. 1-41
CHAPTER II
AUXILIARY craft's FIGHT AGAINST THE SUBMARINES
Varied tasks of the Auxiliary Patrol — Submarine on passage to the
Mediterranean — Zeppelin raid on Dover— The trawler AmadavaVs inter-
vention saves a merchant ship — Excursion steamer's fight with a sub-
marine— The Inverlyoyi's fight with a Flanders submarine — Raid off the
Irish coast — Beaten by high seas — Attack on an oil-tanker . pp. 42-49
CHAPTER III
THE fishermen's ORDEAL
The importance of the fishing industry — Defencelessness of the trawler
— Wholesale destruction of fishing-craft — Ingenious disguises to trap the
enemy — Submarine versus submarine — The destruction of U40 — An
attack on fishing-vessels off the Hebrides — A long duel — The misfortunes
of U41 — Admiral Startin's stratagem — Heavy losses of sailing-ships — -The
salvage of the s.v. Kotka — Mine-sweeping operations^ — Keeping open the
Archangel route — Success of a Lowestoft smack — The Admiralty's attitude
to the fishing industry ....... pp. 50-73
xi
xii CONTENTS
CHAPTER IV
THE SEA TRANSPORT OF THE FIRST MILLION TROOPS
The British Army dependent on merchant shipping for transport over-
seas and on the Navy for protection — Interdependence of naval and mili-
tary poUcy — Previous transport movements — Creation of the Expedi-
tionary Force — Its quick mobilisation — Embarrassments of a defensive
policy .......... pp. 74-81
(a) The Expeditionary Force dispatched to France
The cross-Channel movement — Pre-war plans — A change of base —
Navigational difficulties — Moral of a mistake— Attempt to relieve
Antwerp — Unexpected demands on the Merchant Service — Scenes at
Ostend — Distress of the refugees ..... pp. 81-88
(6) The Ejipire Mobilisation
Lord Kitchener's decision to mobilise trained troops in France —
Troops dispatched from Egypt, Malta, and Gibraltar — The New Zealand
Expeditionary Force — Territorial troops sent oversea — First contingent
of the Australian Expeditionary Force — Movement of Canada's Expedi-
tionary Force — Egyptian garrison's voyage to England — ^Wessex and
Home Counties Territorial Divisions sent to India — British troops brought
home from India — Reinforcements from New Zealand and Australia —
Wessex Reserve Territorial Division moved to India. . . pp. 89-96
(c) The Dardanelles Expedition
Orders for 29th Division and Naval Division to sail for the Mediter-
ranean— Rapid embarkation and errors in packing the holds of transports
— Nineteen transports and five store transports employed — Concentra'tion
at Alexandria — The 2nd Mounted Division moved to Egypt — Transports
for Australian and New Zealand troops — Completing the First Million —
The Merchant Service's record — No lives lost . . . pp. 96-99
CHAPTER V
MERCHANT SEAMEN AND THE BLOCKADE
The blockade of Germany instituted by a squadron of old cruisers —
Early capture of a German vessel — Difficulties of examination of suspected
ships at sea — Reconstruction of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron — Liners
requisitioned — Retention of Mercantile Marine crews — Arduous and
perilous work — -Increasing danger from submarine and mines^The
Viknor sunk by a mine — Admiralty appreciation of work of Northern
Patrol — Disposal of Patrol in January 1915 — Difficulties of maintaining
the Patrol — Sinking of the Bayano by a submarine— Foundering of the
Clan Macnaughton — Strengthening of the Squadron and increased effi-
ciency of the Patrol — Aid rendered by the Patrol to neutral shipping —
Running the blockade — A ruse to trap a suspected vessel — New base in the
Shetland Islands — Installation of the wireless direction finder — The
CONTENTS xiii
India torpedoed — -The coal problem — Seamanship and courage of prize
commanders and crews — Eventful voyages — Admiral Jellicoe's tribute
to the work of the Patrol — -Action of the Alcantara and Andes with the
German raider Grief — Curiosities of contraband — Change in the command
of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron — Tribute to Rear-Admiral de Chair
pp. 100-156
CHAPTER VI
THE AUXILIARY PATROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
The attack on Gallipoli — Activity of submarines — ^The problem of the
Straits of Otranto — Mine-sweeping vessels for the Dardanelles — Trawlers
at work in the Straits of Gallipoli — Enforced retirement under heavy fire —
Another unsuccessful attempt — -A change in tactics — Essential aid to the
army — -The anti-submarine patrol — Rescue of the Serbian army— Sinking
of an Austrian U-boat — Defending the Otranto Straits — The situation in
the Mediterranean — Overworked fishermen relieved . pp. 157-176
CHAPTER VII
SUBMARINE INVASION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
German successes in the Mediterranean — Concentration of the enemy
in southern waters — Merchant vessels svmk without warning — Action of
the Woodfield with a submarine — Spirited fight by the City of Marseilles —
The enemy's blows at the communications of the Allies — The experience
of the Clan Macleod — Sinking of the Clan Macfarlane — ^Terrible experi-
ences of the crew at sea — Adrift for seven days. . . pp. 177-203
CHAPTER VIII
THE SINKING OF THE P. & O. LINER " PERSIA "
Torpedoed without warning — -Breach of pledge to the United States — •
A tragic scene — -334 lives lost — An American passenger's experiences —
Another passenger's ordeal — Lord Montagu's tribute to the crew — ^Thirty
hours without food or water ...... pp. 204-215
CHAPTER IX
IN THE HANDS OF THE BEDOUINS
The sinking of the Coquet — Callous conduct of a submarine commander
— Cast adrift 200 miles from the nearest land — " Nothing short of murder "
— Terrible experiences at sea — One boat lost — Landing on the desolate
African coast — Attacked by Bedouins — An unequal fight — Survivors taken
prisoner — Wanderings in captivity — Release after nearly eight months
pp. 216-230
CHAPTER X
THE MERCHANT SERVICE ON THE DEFENSIVE
The policy of supplying guns and ammunition to merchant ships for
defensive piu:poses — x4.ttitude of the United States Government to the
xiv CONTENTS
use of American ports by armed vessels — Proclamation by Germany of
" war zone " — A new problem — The extension of defensive armament
policy — Admiralty instructions to masters of armed merchant ships — ■
Status of armed vessels — Gunnery training of merchant seamen — Right
of self-defence — Memoranda of the United States respecting armed mer-
chant vessels — Attitude of neutral countries towards entry of armed
vessels into their ports ....... pp. 231-246
CHAPTER XI
THE WAR. OFF THE FLANDERS COAST, WITH SOME ACCOUNT
OF THE enemy's MINE-LAYING ACTIVITY
Importance of Ostend and Zeebrugge to the enemy — First attack on
Zeebrugge by the Dover Patrol — Employment of pleastire steamers and
drifters — Second attack on Flemish coast — Ordeal of the fishermen — Work
of the Auxiliary Patrol — Laying and maintaining the mine barrage off
the Flemish coast — A difficult operation — Destruction of submarines
bj"- drifters — Gallant work of drifters in range of enemy batteries — Destruc-
tion of the armed yacht Sanda — Tribute of Admiral Bacon to the courage
of officers and crews of drifters and trawlers — -Loss of the Brighton Queen
by mine — Difficulties of the campaign off the Flemish coast — Co-operation
of the Army essential to success— Enemy's violation of neutral waters —
Enemy's mine-laying — Trawlers sunk — Mine-field across the Moray Firth
— A widespread campaign — Trawlers working double " tides " — 4,574
mines destroyed — Reorganisation of the mine-sweeping service — Enemy
activity overseas — Salving a mine ..... pp. 247-265
CHAPTER XII
FISHING-CRAFT ON WAR SERVICE, 1915-16
Work of the Royal Naval Motor-Boat Reserve — More seaworthy craft
required — Orders for 550 motor-launches — Varied tasks of the new type
of craft — First effective barrage — Not a complete success — The barrage
abandoned — Assisting the French Navy — Successful operations by
drifters against a submarine — Rescue of German seamen — The enemy taken
by surprise — U74 destroyed by trawlers — Enemy's dead set on trawlers —
A fisherman's " battle " — Mine-laying submarine destroyed — An enemy
raid on the fishing-fleets ...... pp. 266-282
CHAPTER XIII
RAIDS ON DOVER STRAITS AND OTHER INCIDENTS
German destroyers based on Zeebrugge — Raid on the drifters guarding
the Dover barrage — Attack on the Tenth Drifter Division — A second
attack — Heavy British casualties — Another attempted raid — German
plans miscarry — Creation of the Anti-Submarine Department — Difficulties
in the English Channel — An armed trawler to the rescue — A German
prisoner's good fortune ....... pp. 283-289
CONTENTS XV
CHAPTER XIV
RESUMPTION OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN IN BRITISH
WATERS
Confusion of policy in Germany — Sinking of a merchant ship 236 miles
from the nearest land — Brotherhood of the sea — Ship sunk at anchor by
a Zeppelin — The s.s. Teutonian destroyed off the Fastnet — Progress of the
campaign in British waters — Vessels torpedoed without warning — ^The
escape of an oil-tanker — Value of defensive armament — Loss of the
Minneapolis — The G old mouth'' s unequal duel — ^Torpedoing of the Sussex —
The German Government's pledge ..... pp. 290-306
CHAPTER XV
THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT
The ordeal of the s.s. Brussels — Communications in the North Sea —
Shipmaster's "highly meritorious and courageous conduct" — Escape of
the Brussels — Captain Fryatt's manoeuvre — The Admiralty's congratula-
tions— Capture of the Brussels — Captain Fryatt and the first officer made
prisoners — Solitary coniinenient for cross-examination — Trial by coiort-
martial — Fruitless request for postponement from Berlin — The case for
the defence — American intervention — Captain Fryatt's heroic death —
Neutral condemnation of German action — Court of inquiry in Berlin — •
Captain Fryatt condemned as " a franc-tireur of the seas " — Lord Stowell's
judgment — " Defence is a natural right " — American rulings, pp. 307-336
CHAPTER XVI
THE enemy's FINAL PLUNGE
Division of opinion in Germany on the use of submarines — Temporary
success of the Imperial Chancellor — Activities in the Mediterranean —
A defenceless ship, the Destro, saved by speed — The hopeless duel of the
Roddam — Abandonment thirty-five miles from land — -Enemy operations
in the Arctic Ocean — The policy of spurlos versenkt — ^The loss of the Rappa-
hannock— A demonstration off the North American coast — Sinkings in
British waters — The problem of the passenger ship— A German com-
mander's humanity — Over thirty hours in the boats — The fate of the s.s.
Cabot ia — The Fabian under fire — Prisoners on board a submarine — ^The
sink-at-sight campaign in the Mediterranean — P. & O. liner Arabia tor-
pedoed without warning — Increasing disregard at sea of German pledges — •
The destruction of the City of Birmingham — A Clan liner's fight — The
escape of the s.s. Palm Branch — Experiences of the crews of German sub-
marines— Mounting losses of merchant ships — Successful action of the
Caledonia — The oil-tanker Conch set on fire in the English Cliannel — An
exhibition of fine seamanship — The eneraj^'s guile — The hard fate of the
Artist — On the eve of the intensive campaign . . . pp. 337-379
xvi CONTENTS
CHAPTER XVII
CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS
I. The "Mowe"
False sense of security at sea — Warnings of the Admiralty — Escape of
the Mowe from Hamburg — First capture off Cape Finisterre — Utilisation
of British cargo of coal — Looting of the Author — The Elder Dempster
steamship Appam captured — Gallant fighting of the Clan Mactavish —
Dispatch of the Appam to Newport News with prisoners — Action of the
United States authorities — Raider's seizure of the Westbum — Prisoners
placed on board the Westburyi for purposes of release — Arrival at Santa
Cruz — Ship scuttled by Germans — Return of the Mowe to Germany —
Second cruise begun — Spirited action of the Mount Temple— The
Yarrowdale intercepted and used as an auxiliary — Crowded with
prisoners, the Yarrowdale is dispatched to Swinemiinde — ^The misfortiines
of the Dramatist — An Admiralty collier svmk — 300 prisoners placed on
board the Hudson Maru and landed at Pernambuco — Fate of the
Netherby Hall — Fine resistance by the Otaki — Posthumous Victoria
Cross awarded to Lieutenant Bisset Smith, R.N.R., the master of the
Otaki — Retvirn of the Mowe to Germany .... pp. 380-415
n. The "Seeadler"
American sailing-ship converted into a raider and fitted with a motor — ■
Gallant attempt of the Gladys Royle to escape — -Chase of the Lundy Island
— A British captain's experience on his honeymoon — The Horngarth under
fire for nearly an hom* — British seamen prisoners placed on board a cap-
tured French vessel and sent to Rio de Janeiro — Wreck of the Seeadler off
Mopelia Island ........ pp. 415-422
in. The "Wolf"
The s.s. Wachenfels, equipped with mines, guns, and torpedoes and
provided with a seaplane, is sent to sea as a raider — Seizure of the
Turritella and use as an auxiliary raider — ^The captured ship intercepted
by H.M.S. Odin and then scuttled by the Germans — The misfortune of the
Jumna — Master's diary of life on board the raider — -Prisoners' uncomfort-
able quarters — Extensive mine-laying by the Wolf— A. forttmate meeting
— The Wairuna chased by the raider's seaplane and captured — Mine-laying
in New Zealand waters— -The raider in hiding with her latest prize — A
narrow escape — The Spanish steamer Igotz Mendi seized and used as a
prison ship — Homeward journey of the Wolf in company with the Igotz
Mendi — Stranding of the Igotz Mendi — Merchant ships damaged or sunk
by the Wolf's mine-fields ...... pp. 422-435
APPENDIX A. Instructions to Merchant Captains . pp. 436-440
„ B. Interpretation of same by German
Court of Inquiry . . . p. 441
,, C. Analysis of Vessels Intercepted . pp. 442-443
INDEX pp. 444-464
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
The Loss of a British Merchant Ship
An Armed Drifter .....
On Watch in the Arctic ....
A Boarding Boat on Duty
On the Forecastle of an Armed Merchant
Cruiser ......
Left in an Open Boat ....
Drifters Hoisting in a Torpedo
Armed Trawlers in the North Sea
Releasing a Depth Charge from a Drifter
Vessel Hit by a German Submarine
Sunk without Warning ....
The Sinking of the "Georgic"
PAOINQ PAGE
36
70
100
112
124
218
268
272
284
358
376
400
MAPS
The Tenth Cruiser Squadron in the Autumn
of 1915 ......
The Mine Peril in Home Waters
Statistical Diagram of Blockade Operations
ING OF THE Blockade in 1915 .
156
265
At end c]
The Tenth Cruiser Squadron, the Work- \''°t"'l
' ' with Ap-
pendices.
n— 2
XVll
THE
MERCHANT NAVY
CHAPTER I
SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS
The sinking of the Lusitania, in circumstances which have
already been described, involving the loss of 1,198 lives,
focused the attention of the world upon the character of
the war upon commerce which the enemy was prosecuting,
and emphasised the fundamental characteristics which
differentiated it from commerce destruction as practised
by belligerents in former wars. The United States Govern-
ment, already disturbed by the destruction of the Falaba
and other ships conveying American citizens, could not
avoid taking official notice of the sinking of a great liner
which had left one of its ports, carrying a large number
of Americans, with a guarantee that it was a peaceful
vessel of commerce. Within less than a week of the
disaster, the State Department at Washington had drafted
and forwarded to Berlin an explicit protest. In this
Note, dated May 13th, 1915, the United States Government
stated that
" It assumes . . . that the Imperial Government accept,
as of course, the rule that the lives of non-combatants,
whether they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one
of the nations at war, cannot lawfully or rightly be put
in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unarmed
merchantman, and recognise also, as all other nations do,
the obligation to take the usual precautions of visit and
search to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is
in fact of belligerent nationality, or is in fact carrying
contraband of war under a neutral flag,"
The attention of the Imperial Government was called
with the utmost earnestness to the fact that "the
2 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
objection to their present method of attack against
the trade of their enemies Hes in the practical impos-
sibihty of employing submarines in the destruction of
commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness,
reason, justice, and humanity, which all modern opinion
regards as imperative. It is practically impossible for
the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at
sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically
impossible for them to make a prize of her, and, if they
cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink
her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the
mercy of the sea in her small boats."
In some instances, it was added, " time enough for even
that poor measure of safety was not given," and it was
finally declared that it was manifest that " submarines
cannot be used against merchantmen, as the last few
weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of
many sacred principles of justice and humanity." This
Note was something more than a mere assertion of the
right of American citizens to use the seas : it constituted
an indictment of the principles governing the submarine
war, reminding the nations of the world, whether belli-
gerent or neutral, of the unprecedented character of the
ordeal to which British merchant seamen in particular
were being exposed.
In contrast with the savagery which had marked the
destruction of the Lusitania, an example of the sentiments
of brotherhood which continued to move the seamen of
the old maritime races to assist comrades in distress,
irrespective of race, language, or creed, was furnished by
the crew of a Norwegian steamer less than a fortnight after
the sinking of the Cunard liner. The steamer Drumcree
(4,052 tons) was passing Trevose Head on May 18th when
a violent explosion occurred. Though a double watch
on the bridge had been maintained since leaving port,
no one had seen a submarine, but the wake of a torpedo
had been observed about 100 yards away off on the star-
board beam. Time did not permit of the helm being used
successfully, and the vessel was struck near the cross
bunker. She was wrecked from practically No. 2 hold
to the engine-room ; she had gaping holes in her side and
deck ; the deck-plates were buckled and the beams twisted
CH. ij LOSS OF THE " DRUMCREE " 3
into strange shapes. The water poured into the hold, as
well as into the engine- and boiler-rooms. The wireless-room
and its installations were reduced to ruins, but the operator,
though he had been injured, remained at his post until
the master (Mr. A. Hodgson), having satisfied himself
that it was impossible to make a call for assistance, sent
him to his boat. Fortunately all the boats had been swung
out when the Drumcree left Barry Dock, and as the ship
lost way they were lowered and quickly manned and then
stood by.
In the meantime Captain Hodgson, in company with
the chief officer, had made a hasty survey and had
satisfied himself that there was still a chance of saving
the ship, although the water had risen to sea level
in the injured compartments. In spite of the warning
signal which Captain Hodgson had hoisted, several vessels,
regardless of danger to themselves, closed on the Drumcree.
The Norwegian steamer Ponto was hailed by Captain
Hodgson, and the master was told that the Drumcree was
in no immediate danger of foundering in the moderate
weather which then prevailed. He was asked to give
a tow in the direction of Cardiff, keeping close to the land
on the English side of the Channel. Though the neutral
master cannot have been unconscious of the peril in which
he stood, he readily agreed to render this service and
brought his ship smartly into position under the bow of the
Drumcree. With the help of the two crews, hawsers were
made secure, and then the Ponto, having taken sixteen of
the crew of the Drumcree out of one of the lifeboats, began
to tow the damaged steamer. That the position of the
Ponto was an unenviable one was shown shortly afterwards
when a second attack was made on the crippled ship,
a torpedo striking her farther aft than on the first occasion.
Another explosion occurred, throwing the hatch coverings
of No. 3 hold and other wreckage into the air, whilst
a column of water rose as high as the mast. The ship
began to settle by the stern with a list to starboard, and
it looked as though she would sink at once. The Ponto
had no recourse but to free herself from her dangerous
companion. Captain Hodgson ordered the remainder of
the officers and men of the Drumcree into the lifeboat
which was lying alongside. A hasty inspection of the
after part of the vessel showed that the water was still
4 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
rising, so at last Captain Hodgson joined his men, intending
to remain in the vicinity until his vessel disappeared.
" The submarine, however, now appeared, showing only
the periscope, close to the stern of the ship and man-
oeuvred," as Captain Hodgson afterwards recorded, " as
if bent on further mischief. We therefore pulled to the
Ponto, which was standing by, and relieved our boat of
most of its load. Then, as the captain of the Ponto was
naturally anxious about the safety of his own ship, some
of the officers and engineers volunteered to remain by
the ship [the Drumcree] in the boat with me until she should
sink or so that we might at least (in the unlikely event of
her remaining afloat) hoist a night warning signal. The
Ponto's people, however, warned me that the submarine
was again in sight close to us, and I therefore felt compelled
to abandon her and boarded the Ponto with my officers
at 5 p.m."
The signal station at Lundy was told of the position
of the derelict, since she might become a danger to navi-
gation in the darkness. In recounting the circumstances
in which his ship was lost, Captain Hodgson remarked
that " the captain of the Ponto is, in my opinion, deserving
of very great credit for the resolute manner in which he
stood by us, at no small risk to himself and his own crew,
as also for the courtesy and consideration with which he
received us on board and provided for our wants, which
has been deeply appreciated by us all." Though his ship
had gone down, the master had the satisfaction of testifying
that his crew had behaved well and had carried out orders
without confusion, although they were new to the vessel
and had had but one opportunity of carrying out boat
drill. " The officers and men," he added, " I will not
attempt to praise ; they worked with me to the last
in endeavouring to bring the ship to port and were as
reluctant as I to abandon her."
Though the submarine war was still in its early stage,
merchant seamen were learning that the enemy was adopt-
ing every expedient of which he could think to lure them
to destruction. On the last day of May, when the Royal
Mail Steam Packet Company's ship Z)emerara (11,484 tons),
on passage from Liverpool to Lisbon, was off the south
CH. i] ENEMY SUBMARINE DECOY 5
coast of Ireland, what appeared to be a mine was observed
floating on the surface of the water. The master [Lieu-
tenant G, S. Gillard, R.N.R. (retired)], recognising that
a mine was a danger to navigation, approached to within
200 yards. Rifle fire was then directed on the supposed
mine, which was hit several times. The bullets of the
•45 Martini appeared to produce no effect, so Captain
Gillard decided to use his 4-7-inch gun. One shell
fell close to the supposed mine but failed to detonate it.
An hour after this attempt had been made to destroy
what was thought to be a danger to shipping, the periscope
of a submarine was seen on the starboard quarter. The
enemy vessel at once pursued the British ship, firing from
time to time. The Demerara put on her best speed and
the enemy's fire was returned at 1,000 yards, the British
red ensign having been hoisted. The submarine then
dived. The Demerara was manoeuvred with skill so as
to keep the submarine on the quarter between the wake
and bow waves. Periodically the submarine showed her
periscope, and each time fire was opened by the British
ship. In all thirteen rounds were discharged. The thir-
teenth was a lucky shot. It appeared to strike the top
of the periscope. As it did not ricochet, the captain of
the Demerara assumed that the periscope had been hit.
Whether that was the case or not, at any rate nothing
further was seen of the submarine. Events supported
the conjecture that the mine which the Demerara had tried
to destroy was merely a decoy.
The incident had a curious sequel. On September 6th
the German Legation at Buenos Aires delivered a note
verbale to the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs to
the effect that
" The steamer of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company
Demerara, which will arrive here probably to-morrow, the
7th, was guilty of attacking the armed forces of His
Majesty the German Emperor. It is thus demonstrated
that her armament was not mounted for purposes of
defence. For this reason the Imperial Legation begs the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic to be good
enough to take the requisite steps in order that the com-
petent authorities shall apply the treatment of war vessels,
from every point of view, to the said vessel on her arrival."
6 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
The British Government was able to show that the
British vessel had employed its guns merely for the purpose
of offering defence against an attack carried out, moreover,
under cover of a decoy mine. Captain Gillard was men-
tioned in despatches in recognition of the skilful manner
in which he had saved his vessel.
When May closed the record showed that in that month
nineteen ships, of 84,025 tons, had been sunk. In the
amount of tonnage destroyed, as well as in the number
of men, women, and children killed, this month was the
worst which had yet been experienced, and in no corre-
sponding period during the remainder of the war did
the destruction of human life reach so high a figure. In
addition to the shipping destroyed, nineteen vessels, of
117,591 tons, were damaged or molested by enemy sub-
marines. No losses were sustained owing to the action of
mines or aircraft.
During the early months of the summer events were
to show that the protest of the United States Government,
the sense of brotherhood exhibited by neutral seamen,
and the pluck, skill, and endurance of British officers and
men were producing no effect on the official mind of Ger-
many. It was still believed in Berlin that the submarine
would prove the instrument of speedy victory, and then
Germany would be free to deal with neutrals, and in parti-
cular with the United States. So the campaign against
merchant shipping was pursued with a relentless insen-
sibility to all human instincts. On the opening day of
June eight men were killed when the Saidieh (3,803 tons)
was sunk. On June 9th the Lady Salisbury (1,446 tons)
went down, three men losing their lives, and six days later
the master of the Strathnairn (4,336 tons), as well as
twenty of his companions, was drowned. The month
closed with the sinking of the Armenian (8,825 tons) with
the loss of twenty-nine lives, of the Scottish Monarch
(5,043 tons) with a loss of fifteen lives, and of the Lomas
(3,048 tons) with the loss of one life. The blowing up of
the Am dale (3,583 tons) by a mine at the entrance to the
White Sea, when three were killed, raised the death roll
for the month of June to eighty-one.
Ample evidence was forthcoming that the Germans,
in spite of their protestations, had no intention of
abandoning the practice of torpedoing ships without
CH. I] THE " SAIDIEH " AND " STRATHNAIRN " 7
warning. The Saidieh was on her way from Alexandria
to Hull when she met her fate near the Elbow Buoy in
the North Sea at 2 p.m. on June 2nd. She was unarmed,
and had almost completed her voyage when a shock was
felt from stem to stern and volumes of water rose on the
starboard side. The chief mate (Mr. Daniel Jenkins),
standing on the bridge with the Trinity pilot, who had
been taken aboard at Deal, at once sounded the whistle
and ordered all hands to get ready to lower the boats.
Two minutes previously the master (Mr. J. R. Ryall) had
gone into his cabin. He rushed to the deck when he felt
the concussion. The ship was rapidly sinking, and Mdthin
six minutes had disappeared beneath the waters. In
addition to her crew of forty-one officers and men, she
had on board eight distressed seamen. When the boats
were swung out, six firemen and an A.B. were reported
as missing, and the presumption was that they had been
killed by the explosion. While No. 3 boat, which con-
tained several members of the crew and the stewardess,
was being lowered an accident occurred. One of the falls
had been cut by a Greek seaman, the boat capsized, and
the occupants were thrown into the water. They were
fortunately rescued, patrol-vessels having quickly come
to the scene. While these events were occurring, the
chief mate noticed a submarine's periscope 50 or 100
yards distant, but the enemy had no compassion on the
unfortunate mariners and their companions. After being
rescued, the stewardess died from the shock she had
sustained. The survivors and the body of the dead
stewardess were landed at Chatham.
The sinking of the Straihnairn caused heavier casualties
than had occurred in any ordinary trading-vessel since
the Tangistan went down on March 9th. The Straihnairn
(master, Mr. John Browne) was bound from Penarth to
Archangel with coal. At 9.30 p.m. on June 15th, when
the vessel was twenty-five miles N, by E. from Bishop and
Clerks, the second mate (Mr. J. H. Wood), who was asleep
in his cabin, after being relieved by the chief officer, was
thrown out of his bunk by an explosion. When he
reached the deck he noticed that, although way was still
on the ship, a lifeboat and a gig had been lowered and had
been smashed against the vessel's side. Captain Browne
came to the conclusion that the vessel was sinking and
8 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
slipped down a lifeline into a lifeboat which had been
lowered with a number of Chinese seamen in it. Owing to
the boat's painter being cut before the boat had been
released from the dropping gear, it also collided with the
vessel's side and all the occupants were washed out of it.
Realising the error which had been made in lowering the
boats too soon, Mr, Wood waited until the ship was stopped
before launching the remaining gig. Fortunately the
Strathnairn, though a little deeper in the water, had taken
only a slight list to port, and the gig was successfully
launched with the assistance of the remaining ten China-
men on board. Mr. Wood allowed the gig to drift astern
in the hope of picking up the captain, but was disappointed.
At this moment he saw the periscope of a submarine mov-
ing round the stern of the vessel, taking no interest in the
plight of the unhappy survivors. For some time the gig
remained near the doomed ship, and then Mr. Wood decided
to row to the eastward. Early on the following morning,
after a night of many vicissitudes, he and his companions
were picked up by the Amanda of Padstow, and later in
the day reached Milford Haven. The experience of the
first engineer (Mr. J. C. Smith) and the Chinese carpenter
was less happy. The former jumped overboard with the
Chinaman and throughout the night the two men, white
man and yellow man, clung for life to a capsized boat.
Not until 6.30 on the following morning, after nine hours'
physical and mental agony, were they picked up by the
Ahhotsford of Glasgov/ and landed at Swansea.
These two vessels, together with the Inkum (4,747 tons),
the Strathcarron (4,374 tons), the Lady Salisbury (1,446
tons), the Erna Boldt (1,731 tons), the Leuctra (3,027 tons),
the Dulcie (2,033 tons), the Tunisiana (4,220 tons), and the
Dumfriesshire (2,622 tons), were all torpedoed without
warning. The Armenia?!, the Scottish Monarch, and the
Lomas were, however, captured before being sunk. Never-
theless the loss of life was heavy. The first-named vessel,
of the Leyland Line, was on voyage from Newport News
to Avonmouth with 1,422 mules for H.M. Government.
Shortly after noon on June 28th, she was steering to pass
ten miles north of Lundy Island when she received a wire-
less message from Crookhaven stating that submarines
were active south of the Smalls. The master (Mr. James
Irickey) determined to make for Trevose Head. At 6.40
CH. i] THE " ARMENIAN'S " GALLANT FIGHT 9
p.m., when twenty miles west of this point, a submarine
was sighted on the port bow, about three miles away,
steaming towards the Armenian on the surface. As the
British ship, though unarmed, had a speed of 14| knots,
Captain Irickey decided to make a fight for it.
He accordingly headed for the submarine with the in-
tention of ramming her. The enemy, however, opened
fire and Captain Irickey turned his ship stern on to the
submarine so as to decrease the target. Several shots fell
ahead and astern of the merchantman until the range was
found, when the wireless telegraph house was wrecked. An-
other shell entered the firehold and started a fire. Captain
Irickey with his officers and men set to work to subdue the
flames, but other fires weve caused by subsequent shells.
One struck the steering gear, putting it out of action, and
another fell on the engine-room hatch, sending debris on
to the engines, which were, however, kept at full speed.
During this phase of the one-sided action twelve of the
crew were killed and others injured. Captain Irickey still
held on to his course.
When the unequal ordeal had lasted nearly an hour,
the funnel was struck, the shell passing down into the
body of the ship. The stokehold was put in darkness
and the boilers were so damaged that steam could not be
maintained. The master then realised that escape was
impossible. He hoisted the white flag and blew the ship's
whistle in token of surrender, preparations being made
simultaneously to abandon ship. Whether the submarine
failed to notice the British signals or was determined to
punish to the uttermost so persistent an opponent will
never be known. At any rate the shells continued to fall
on the crippled vessel, damaging the boats' falls and
causing some of the boats to hang by one fall only, with the
result that many men were thrown into the water. Even-
tually all the surviving members of the crew were able to
get away. The captain, satisfied that no one was on board,
himself left. But shortly afterwards an improvised raft
was seen leaving the Armenian with the chief engineer,
the veterinary surgeon, and the purser ; they also were
rescued. When all six boats were clear of the ship, the
submarine approached and, getting into position on the
port quarter, fired a torpedo into the Armenian. Under
Captain Irickey's orders, the hatches of the lower hold had
10 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
previously been battened down, the ballast tanks pumped
out, and the refrigerator boxes secured, thus giving addi-
tional buoyancy to the vessel. Consequently the first
torpedo left the Armenian still afloat and another was
discharged, this time into the stokehold, with the result
that the ship forthwith began to sink rapidly. Owing to
the action of the captain, the enemy had to expend about
fifty shells, as well as two torpedoes. As she sank rapidly
the Armenian, with a length of 530 feet, presented a re-
markable spectacle ; half her length was reared into the
air.
The ship having been dispatched, the submarine —
U38 — dived and disappeared. The commander showed,
however, a measure of humanity ; before diving he rescued
three or four men from the water. Captain Irickey's boat
being the only one with a compass, the other boats Avere
collected and connected astern. A course was then made
for land under sail. At 7 o'clock the following morning the
Belgian steam trawler President Stein took the men on
board and at noon turned them over to the destroyers
Mansfield and Milne, which landed them at Avonmouth
that afternoon. The unequal action resulted in the loss
of twenty-nine lives, including the fourth engineer and
twenty American cattle attendants. The Admiralty
marked their appreciation of the master's efforts to save
his ship and its valuable cargo by conferring upon him
the Distinguished Service Cross. The quartermaster,
W. A. Goss, and two firemen, T. Davies and E. G. Talbot,
received the D.S.M., and the second officer, Mr. H. O.
Davies, and the chief engineer, Mr. J. Crighton, obtained
"mentions."
The Scottish Monarch was a slower ship than the Arme-
nian, but nevertheless the master (Mr. R. H. Potter) made
a determined effort to get away from the enemy. The
vessel was forty miles south of Ballycottin Light, County
Cork, when the third officer sighted two submarines
about two miles off on the starboard beam. They were
flying the German ensign. Captain Potter immediately
went on the bridge and starboarded his helm so as to bring
the submarines astern of him. He proceeded to steer a
zigzag course at about 11| knots. One of the submarines
then disappeared, but the other quickly overhauled the
Scottish Monarch and when about a mile away opened fire.
CH. i] THE " SCOTTISH MONARCH " TORPEDOED 11
The first shell did little damage, but three later ones, fired
at close quarters, made a hole in the port side of the vessel.
There was nothing for it but to stop the engines and lower
the boats, into which the crew made their escape. Captain
Potter, however, remained on the bridge while the sub-
marine continued firing at intervals, holding the starboard
side. When the decks of the Scottish Monarch were
awash, the master got into his own boat during an interval
in the attack, and three-quarters of an hour later the
Scottish Monarch sank out of sight. Captain Potter and
nineteen of the crew were picked up by the Miami of
Glasgow, about thirty miles south of Hook Point, early
on the following morning and landed the same day.
The submarine's attack had caused no casualties, but in
leaving all these men afloat far from land the enemy became
responsible for the loss of fifteen lives. The sea was
choppy and the two boats which were still afloat
remained in company for some time, but soon the one
under the first mate (Mr. J. Gabrielsen) capsized. All
the hands managed to regain the boat, but she was full
of water and the tanks were adrift on the starboard side.
In the meantime sight had been lost of the master's boat.
The unfortunate men, with the first mate, were left without
hope of succour in their waterlogged craft. Before mid-
night she had capsized three times more and only four
men were left — the first mate, the carpenter (Michael App-
son), and two seamen, all of them with lifebelts on. On
the following morning a vessel was seen, and the carpenter
hoisted a handkerchief on a stick hoping to attract attention.
Although the strange ship passed close by the boat, the
pitiful signal of distress was evidently not seen. Then
the two seamen became exhausted and were washed over-
board. Vessels appeared on the horizon and disappeared,
since there was no means of attracting their attention.
About five o'clock that afternoon, after weary hours of
hope unfulfilled, the first mate, who was sitting aft, dropped
with exhaustion into the water which filled the boat, and
died. The Scottish Monarch having gone down on the
evening of June 29th, it was not until eight o'clock on the
evening of July 1st that the carpenter, the sole survivor
of the boatload, was picked up by a fishing-boat and landed
on the following afternoon at St. Ives, where the body of
the first mate was quietly carried ashore. Among the
12 SUBIVIARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
flotsam and jetsam washed up at He de Batz nearly a
fortnight later was a cylindrical lifebuoy bearing the name
of the sunken ship, all that remained of the Scottish Monarch
of Glasgow.
The experience of the Lomas, to the sinking of which
reference has been made, was happily less tragic. All
went well on her voyage from Buenos Aires to Belfast
until June 30th, when the vessel was some distance off
Bishop Rock. The master (Mr. Phillip Evans) was on the
bridge when, in the clear morning light, he saw a sub-
marine about two miles astern of him well exposed on the
surface. He at once gave orders for all possible speed
and steered so as to keep the enemy ship astern of him.
The submarine gave chase, and when she had drawn within
two miles of the Lomas began firing.
Captain Evans still held on his course, counting
the shells as they fell. Seventeen shells were fired and
nine of them hit the vessel, the second mate being
killed. The Lomas was only making about 7^ knots,
so, as escape was impossible, the master stopped the
ship after an ordeal which had lasted an hour and a
half. The submarine was then almost alongside the
vessel. When the crew had left the ship in the boats,
the enemy vessel set to work to sink her by gunfire
and torpedo. As the Lomas began to settle down, the
submarine commander hailed the lifeboats to put the
inquiries which, according to established custom, should
have preceded offensive action. What was the name of
the vessel and her nationality, her tonnage and cargo ;
where did she come from and where was she bound ?
All these questions having been answered, and the Lomas
having gone down, the submarine disappeared. One man
had been killed during the stern chase, but the master and
the rest of the crew were fortunate in being picked up
within an hour and landed at Milford Haven.
These were a few of the tragic incidents which marked
the progress of the submarine campaign during the month
following upon the destruction of the Lusitania and the
dispatch of the Note of protest by the United States
Government. The record would be incomplete were there
no reference to the circumstances which attended the
destruction of the lona (3,344 tons) on June 3rd. The
Io7m was twenty- two miles off Fair Island (lat. 59° 13' N,
CH. i] HEAVY LOSSES ON JULY 1 13
and long. 1° 12' W.) when she was pursued by a submarine.
The master (Mr. D. Ritchie) had hopes of escape and
ordered all possible speed. The submarine then began
firing, one shot passing through the after wheel-house,
and a second striking the port side of the saloon. Captain
Ritchie's own cabin was wrecked and a fireman was
injured. Realising that it was hopeless to make further
resistance, the master stopped the ship and the crew took
to the boats. While the men were taking their places,
the enemy ship continued firing, one shot injuring the
second mate ; the steward was also slightly wounded.
The ship was then sunk by a torpedo. The shipless officers
and men were thus left afloat without apparent hope of
rescue. The submarine, after sinking the lona, destroyed
a trawler which was in the vicinity, and the merchant
seamen and fishermen then joined company and shaped
a course for land. They rowed in desperation through
the night, and happily on the following morning were
sighted by the patrol trawler Dover and taken into
Kirkwall.
The month of July opened badly for the British Mer-
cantile Marine, no fewer than seven vessels being destroyed
on the first day. Of these two were attacked near the
Fastnet and the remainder at the entrance of the English
Channel. The enemy continued to exhibit a wide catho-
licity, not disdaining to sink comparatively small sailing-
vessels, at a great expenditure of time, labour, and ex-
plosives. The enemy's methods in this respect were
illustrated in the case of the sailing-vessel L. C. Tower
(518 tons). This little four-mast schooner (master, Mr.
L. C. Tower) was on her way to Newport, Monmouthshire,
with timber when she fell in with a submarine. With all
sails set, she was making a course towards Lundy Island.
It must have been apparent to the Germans that the
vessel was of comparative unimportance, but, nevertheless,
they overhauled the L. C. Tower at their best speed, ordered
the vessel to be abandoned, and then expended a good
deal of trouble in setting her on fire. The crew got ashore
at Crookhaven in their motor-boat, and the vessel, burnt
to the water's edge, was afterwards towed into Berehaven.
On the afternoon of the same day the Welhury (3,591 tons)
was sunk in the same locality. The master (Mr. Robert
Newton), on noticing that the enemy was trying to signal
14 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
" Abandon ship immediately," tm-ned his vessel's head
towards the nearest point of land. The submarine, noticing
the mancEuvre, proceeded to cut the Welbury off, and then
discharged a warning gun. The pursuit was a short one,
as the enemy craft had the advantage of speed, and,
moreover, maintained a steady fire on the vessel, not
ceasing even after she had stopped. One shot went
through the engine-room. Whereas in the case of the
L. C. Tower the British flag was confiscated, no step was
taken to obtain such a souvenir out of the Welbury.
More serious events were in the meantime happening
at the entrance to the Channel ; the Gadshy (3,497 tons),
the Craigard (3,286 tons), and the Richmond (3,214 tons)
being sunk off the Wolf Rock, and the Caucasian (4,656
tons) and the Inglernoor (4,331 tons) captured and destroyed
off the Lizard. In the case of the Gadshy (master, Mr. St.
John Olive) the submarine commander showed unexpected
consideration for the men whom he was leaving afloat in
their small boats ; he inquired whether they had pro-
visions and sails, and then, giving them the position —
which proved to be incorrect — torpedoed the merchant
ship and disappeared. Fortunately the crew was soon
afterwards picked up by a Greek steamer and landed at
Londonderry, without further misadventure, two days
later.
At this early date in the submarine campaign, British
seamen were irritated by the ignominious fate which was
dogging them ; their vessels were in most cases of slow
speed and they were, in accordance with the custom of
many years, without any means of defence. The story
of the Craigard (master, Mr. A. McCuUough) may be given
as typical of the misfortunes which often faced the dauntless
men of the British Merchant Navy. From the beginning
of his voyage, from Galveston (Texas) to Le Havre, nothing
but disaster had befaflen him. On June 16th the high-
pressure engine broke down. That seemed the crowning
disaster. After a stoppage of ten hours. Captain McCul-
lough was able to proceed at an average speed of 7| knots.
His troubles, however, were not over.
" At about 8.30 p.m. July 1st and in lat. 49° 8', long.
6° 10' W. I saw," he afterwards declared, " to the south-
ward of us, and at a distance of about six to seven miles.
CH. I] A CURIOUS INCIDENT 15
what seemed to me something like a torpedo-boat coming
up to us very fast, a dense volume of smoke coming from
the craft. I had my doubts what this stranger might be ;
however, I was not long kept in suspense, for without any
warning whatever the stranger commenced firing at us,
and as he came nearer he displayed a signal to get into the
boats at once, and at the same time he hoisted the German
flag. When he commenced firing I ordered the helm
hard a-starboard, stopped my engines, and ordered the
boats to be lowered, keeping the craft as well astern as
possible. He kept firing away at us until he saw the
boats in the water. Then he went on the port quarter
and let us have a few more on the port side. He then
left us and went after another steamer about a mile to the
north of us and commenced shelling this steamer, putting
about a dozen shells into her on both sides. Afterwards
he returned to my steamer and finished her off about 9 p.m.
of the same date ; it being dark at the time, I do not
know whether he boarded her or not, as we were about a
mile away from the steamer when a terrific explosion
occurred at the hour named above. Thus I was forced
to abandon my ship tlirough not having any arms on
board to retaliate or defend ourselves, and, being in a help-
less state as regards speed, I could not do more than I did."
The crew were more fortunate than perhaps they
realised at the time. None of them was injured, and eight
hours after they had taken to the boats they were picked
up by one of His Majesty's ships and landed at Plymouth.
The sinking of the Caucasian and the Inglemoor took
place in the early morning, and was marked by an incident
suggesting that, though the enemy was bent on ignoring
the higher code of humanity, some of the German sea-
men still retained, curiously enough, a kindly feeling
towards dumb animals. The Caucasian (master, Mr. F. H.
Robinson), on voyage from London to Norfolk and Jack-
sonville, U.S.A., was about eighty miles south of the
Lizard when at 5,45 a.m. a submarine was sighted in
the clear morning light. She was on the surface and
was coming at full speed towards the merchantman. She
signalled "Abandon ship at once," but Captain Robinson,
though his vessel could not do more than about 9 knots,
ignored the order and steered a zigzag course, hoping to
II — 3
16 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
keep the enemy astern. The submarine then opened fire,
the shells falling all round the Caucasian, and at last the
steersman left the wheel. The master, who had been
on the upper bridge watching the movements of the
submarine, descended to the lower bridge and took the
wheel, while the second mate remained on the lookout.
After a chase of sixty-five minutes, the seventeenth shell
struck the compass stand and steering standard, with
disastrous results, the vessel becoming unmanageable.
When the crew had taken to the boats, the enemy com-
mander came alongside and declared that he intended to
sink even the lifeboats, because his order to stop had not
been obeyed. At that moment Captain Robinson's dog
fell overboard, and instinctively he jumped into the water
to save it. He was clinging to the rails of the submarine,
when the German commander exclaimed with surprise,
"You jump overboard to save a dog!" The master
made no reply, but the commander, evidently moved
at Captain Robinson's affection for his dog, announced
that the boats could proceed. That there was a limit
to the enemy's consideration was, however, proved a
short time afterwards when the Inglemoor (master,
Mr. A. W. Stonehouse) appeared on the scene. Captain
Stonehouse, noticing the two boats full of men with
a submarine near-bv, decided to rescue the distressed
mariners ; he hoped that the enemy would, in the circum-
stances, spare his own vessel. He was, however, to be
disappointed. He was compelled to abandon the Ingle-
moor under heavy fire. He reminded the enemy com-
mander that the crews of the two vessels amounted to
about one hundred men, and asked permission for them
to go on board the motor-barge he had been towing. The
request was granted. The submarine then torpedoed
the Inglemoor and nothing more was seen of her. Jury-
sails were rigged on the barge, the master and men of the
Caucasian were picked up, and later on the motor engine
was started. These companions in misfortune fortunately
fell in with a patrol-vessel soon after noon and were even-
tually taken in to Penzance, thankful that they had fared
no worse than they had done. Captain Robinson was
awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.
In one day upwards of 23,000 tons of shipping had been
sunk, but fortunately the enemy was unable to maintain
CH. I] ACTIVITIES OF U39 17
this high standard of destruction during the remainder
of the month, which closed with a total loss of less than
49,000 tons owing to the submarine campaign. On July
3rd only two ships, the Renfrew (3,488 tons) and the
Larchmore (4,355 tons), were captured, both of them being
sunk by gunfire off the Wolf Rock, an area which had
already yielded the enemy so many prizes. The master
of the latter ship (Mr. Isaac Jones) afterwards put on
record a succinct, but none the less eloquent, account of
his experiences. In the early morning he heard two muffled
reports to the east-south-east, apparently some distance
away. Shortly afterwards two destroyers crossed his bow
going full speed towards the firing, and the Larchmore
forthwith hoisted her colours. This dramatic incident
occurred at 5.30 in the morning, and suggested that U39,
which had already done so much injury, was being hotly
pursued. The Larchmore proceeded on her voyage, the
course of events suggesting that immediate danger of an
attack was over. Shortly after seven o'clock, however, the
submarine appeared again, half submerged, two to two and
a half miles away. She at once rose to the surface and
opened fire. A rapid succession of shots fell on the mer-
chant ship, and Captain Jones was thrown down by the
concussion, injuring his knee. For a quarter of an hour
the firing was vigorously maintained as the submarine
drew in towards the doomed vessel. One shell killed the
donkeyman, and the ship was holed in several places.
Escape was impossible, so the crew took to the boats,
shells falling round them as they sought this miserable
means of safety. The submarine afterwards approached
the boats where the dying donkeyman lay, and Captain
Jones was cross-examined. This minor ordeal was soon
over, and the submarine resumed firing into the merchant
vessel. He was busily engaged in this task when a cruiser
appeared on the horizon. Assistance had come too late
to save the ship, but at least the crew were assured of their
own safety. Captain Isaac Jones, who was mentioned in
despatches, was, in company with the other survivors,
afterwards landed at Falmouth, together with the master
(Mr. J. F. Stevenson) of the Renfrew, which had also
been submitted to a heavy bombardment because the
master had refused to capitulate at the first signal which
U39 had made. Two other ships, the Arabia (7,933 tons)
18 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
and the Guido (2,093 tons), were also chased on this day,
but managed to escape.
Only two ships were attacked on July 4th, and one of
these, the little sailing-vessel Sunbeam (132 tons), was
captured off Wick. A conspicuous vindication of the
resourcefulness and high courage of British merchant
seamen was supplied by the officers and men of the Anglo-
Californian (7,333 tons). At 8.30 a.m. this vessel, on
passage from Montreal with a large number of horses, was
about ninety miles south of Queenstown when an enemy
submarine was sighted breaking surface on the port beam
about three miles away. The master (Mr. Frederick
Parslow) immediately realised the imminent danger which
confronted him. Every effort was made to increase speed,
and the ship was manoeuvred so as to bring the enemy
astern. An S.O.S. signal was sent out, and to the relief
of everyone on board was at once answered by a British
man-of-war. For half an hour the submarine continued
to chase the Anglo-Calif ornian, gaining on her rapidly.
At last the enemy came within firing distance, and then
for an hour and a half, while the merchantman zigzagged
backwards and forwards to confuse the aim of the enemy,
a steady fire was maintained. The British vessel was
frequently hit, and in order to save life Captain Parslow
decided to obey the signal to abandon ship. The engines
were stopped and the boats manned : the port after-
lifeboat was successfully lowered, but one of the falls of
the starboard boat was struck by a shell, with the result
that the boat fell aM'ay and capsized. The submarine at
last ceased firing and then closed. Captain Parslow's
courage in maintaining the chase had not, however, been
fruitless, for at this juncture an armed ship, the Princess
Ena, which had been slowly overhauling the submarine,
opened fire at 9,000 yards, to the consternation of the
enemy. The shot fell short, but a wireless message from
a destroyer " to hold on " gave Captain Parslow fresh
courage. The course of events seemed to be favouring
him, so the firemen who were in the boat still on the davits
were ordered to go once more below, and orders were given
for the ship to get under way. The men responded with
fine spirit to the master's orders. The submarine, fearing
that after all the ship might escape, opened fire at close
range on the bridge and boats, rifles as well as the vessel's
CH. I] AN EPIC OF THE SEA 19
guns being brought into use. Captain Parslow and his
men were without any means of defence. In a few
moments the upper bridge had been wrecked and the master
killed ; the steering wheel and compass had been damaged
and one of the port davits smashed, causing a boat to
drop into the sea, together with all its occupants. The
chief officer again ordered the ship to be abandoned, the
firemen came up from below, and the remaining boats
were manned and lowered. The outlook seemed black
when suddenly the destroyers Mentor and Miranda
steamed up. The submarine, counting discretion the
better part of valour, dived out of sight. The Anglo-
Californian then proceeded under escort to Queenstown,
which was reached in safety.
Captain Parslow had succeeded in saving his ship, but
at the sacrifice of his own life, and twenty members of his
crew were also killed, seven others being wounded. Every-
one on board, from the master downward, had exhibited
pluck and coolness, as well as seamanlike competency, in
the emergency. Frederick Parslow, the son of the master,
had remained on the upper bridge with his father through-
out the action, steering the ship. By little short of a
miracle, he was unwounded, although one of the spokes
of the wheel was blown away and the bridge was riddled.
Under the unnerving circumstances which confronted him
down below, the chief engineer (who, with Mr. Frederick
Parslow, afterwards received the Distinguished Service
Cross) maintained discipline. Throughout the fierce
fusillade the wireless telegraph operator stuck to his post
on the lower bridge, sending and receiving accurately a
number of messages. A veterinary surgeon (Mr. F. Neal),
who was in charge of the 900 horses on board, not only
rendered aid to the animals, of which twenty were killed,
but under heavy fire attended to wounded members of
the crew. The chief officer (Mr. H. O. Read), who in the
later phase of the action, after the death of the master,
acquitted himself well, was, in common with the second
engineer (Mr. H. F. Suddes) and the wireless operator,
awarded a mention in despatches. As long as the memory
of these early days of the submarine campaign persists,
the story of the unequal fight put up by the unarmed
Anglo-Calif or nian under her heroic captain will be retold
as an epic of the war by sea.
20 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
That the Germans had lost respect for the common
humanities to which civihsed seamen of all nationalities,
not excluding avowed pirates of earlier days, had always
paid respect, was shown by the circumstances in which
the Meadowfield (2,750 tons) was destroyed on July 9th.
The four preceding days had been disappointing for the
enemy. On the 5th, on the 6th, and on the 7th not a single
vessel had been captured. Aircraft had unsuccessfully
attacked the Groningen (988 tons) four miles off the Gal-
loper, but the bombs had missed their objective and she
had escaped unscathed. The 8th was also a poor one
for the Germans, for only one ship, the Guido (2,093
tons), was torpedoed off Rattray Head. The Traquair
(1,067 tons) was chased on the same day near Knock Deep,
but her speed enabled her to escape. The submarine
commanders must have known that the German Admiralty
were anxiously looking for better results than were being
achieved, and it may be that irritation under failure
accounted for the callousness exhibited by the submarine
which fell in with the Meadowfield on the afternoon of
July 9th. She was a Glasgow vessel and was carrying
copper ore from Huelva. She had started on her voyage
on July 3rd, and was fifty miles south-west of the Tuskar
when the master (Mr. Thomas Dunbar) heard the sound of
a shot. He took up his glasses to ascertain whence it
had come. Just as he had picked up the outline of a
submarine on the port quarter, another shot was fired
which wrecked the chart-room under the bridge as well as
the wheel-house, killing Neil McLean, who was at the wheel.
Captain Dunbar immediately ordered the engines to be
stopped. In addition to his crew he was carrying five
passengers, including two ladies and two children, and
he could not put their lives in added danger by resistance.
He had confidence that if the Germans realised that the
Meadowfield had on board children as well as women they
would at least cease firing while the boats were lowered.
So the two children were held up and must have been seen
by two of the officers of the submarine who were watching
all that was happening on board the vessel through their
glasses. That they had no mercy was proved by the fact
that the shelling of the merchant-ship still continued. In
a statement which he subsequently made on oath, Captain
Dunbar recorded subsequent events :
CH. I] AN UNEQUAL STRUGGLE 21
" Deponent ordered the boats out, and the mate and
fourteen hands got into the port boat and deponent and
the remainder of those on board, who included two lady-
passengers, one male passenger, and two children, got into
the second boat, which was the starboard lifeboat. As
the port boat was being lowered the submarine ceased
firing, but as soon as she got clear recommenced, and con-
tinued firing during the time deponent's boat was being
lowered and got away."
Thus Captain Dunbar found himself in charge of two
heavily laden boats, which included among their freights
two women and two children, forty-two miles from the
nearest land. The submarine continued to shell the
Meadowfield until she sank, and then disappeared. For-
tunately at 9 o'clock that night the two boats were seen
by the Grimsby trawler Majestic, and Captain Dunbar
and his companions were safely landed at Holyhead
shortly after midnight. That the sinking of the Meadow-
field resulted in the loss of only one hfe was due to no
consideration on the part of the Germans.
On the same day the Ellesmere (1,170 tons) was torpedoed
forty-eight miles from the Smalls, apparently by the same
submarine. The master (Mr. C. W. Heslop) was on passage
to Liverpool when the enemy was sighted two miles on the
starboard bow. Captain Heslop brought the submarine
astern of him and then the shells began to fall. The
second one carried away the after davit of the starboard
lifeboat. Four other shells afterwards struck the ship,
but still the master hoped against hope that he might
save his ship. With shells falling around him, he still
held on his course. At last a shell passed through the
bridge deck, killing one man and shattering the left arm
of another. The firemen down below were in no mood to
continue the unequal struggle, and, as there was no place
from which to navigate the vessel, the master ordered the
Red Ensign to be lowered in token of surrender. A few
minutes later, after the crew had got away, the Ellesmere
was torpedoed. Captain Heslop, who was subsequently
" mentioned " for his spirited conduct, had made a plucky
effort to save his ship, and in his sworn statement after he
and his companions had been rescued by the armed
trawler Osprey II, he declared that the casualty " might
22 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
have been avoided by having a gun and a gun's crew on
board the Ellesmere.^' That was the cry of many ships'
masters at this period, but new armies were being raised
and equipped and required all the armament which the
country could provide.
These were the only two vessels which were sunk on
July 9th ; two other ships were attacked, but effected their
escape. The Pacific Steam Navigation Company's Orduna
(15,499 tons) was molested by gunfire and torpedo off
Queenstown ; the gunfire was ineffective, and the torpedo
missed the target. For the second time the master (T. M.
Taylor) could congratulate himself on the skilful and
successful handling of the great liner he commanded, for
on the 28th of the previous month he had been chased
off the Smalls. Another vessel which was also brought
safely into port on July 9th was the Leyland liner Etonian
(6,438 tons), which, having eluded the enemy near Queens-
town on May 7th, was again chased by a submarine off
the south of Ireland. Competent use of her high speed
saved her from destruction.
The master (J. C. Murray) of the Winlaton (3,270 tons)
showed on Jul}^ 10th how even a slow ship handled with
determination could worst the enemj^ The afternoon was
far spent when a submarine was seen steaming hard towards
the merchantman with the evident intention of cutting
her off. The Winlaton had little speed, and her master
dismissed the idea of a chase. He decided that his only
course was to steer straight for the enemy. This he pro-
ceeded to do, to the evident surprise of the officers of the
submarine. The Germans watched the merchantman for
some time, and when she was about a mile away from them
they put the nose of the submarine down and were soon
out of sight. Twenty minutes later the submarine again
appeared on the surface, well astern of the Winlaton, but
after a short interval steamed slowly away. This was
the first instance reported to the Admiralty of a slow ship
sighting a submarine at a distance and by steering straight
for her causing her to dive and decline action. In recogni-
tion of his initiative and courage, Captain Murray was
given a commission as a Lieutenant, R.N.R. and a " men-
tion."
During the remainder of the month, though thirteen
ships were chased by submarines, only six of them were
CH. I] THE TOLL OF JULY 23
destroyed, and of these but two — the Grangewood (3,422
tons) and the Iberian (5,223 tons) — exceeded 2,000 tons.
The master of the last-named ship (Mr. Thomas B. Jago)
attempted to get away. Circumstances seemed to favour
him, for the submarine was about seven miles distant when
first sighted in a position over seventy miles south of the
Fastnet. He had under his orders a well-found ship with
a turn for speed, and when he gave orders for a full head
of steam he received excellent support from the engine-
room. The enemy, however, had evidently noticed that
the Iberian was unarmed, and he had no hesitation, there-
fore, in attempting to overhaul her. As he gained upon
the merchantman, shells began to fall, and one of them
pierced the deck and decapitated four men besides wound-
ing several others. The next shell struck in the same
place and blew one man to pieces. Captain Jago realised
that he could not expose his crew to further risk of death,
and accordingly he ordered the ship to be stopped. Leav-
ing behind the bodies of the four men who had been killed,
but taking with them the eight wounded, the officers and
remaining men manned the boats and were soon clear of
the doomed vessel. The submarine then closed in and
discharged a torpedo into the Iberian. The commander,
having reproached Captain Jago with running away,
provided bandages and lint for the wounded, and then,
having discharged another torpedo into the port side of
the merchantman, disappeared. "Had I had a gun," the
master afterwards recorded, " I would have sunk the
submarine and certainly the Iberian would have escaped."
Late that night the boats attracted the attention of a
steamer, which took the exhausted officers and men on
board. Before Queenstown was reached two of the
wounded seamen died. Captain Jago was " mentioned "
for his service.
During the remaining days of the month sixteen more
lives were lost, four on board the Firth (406 tons), which
was sunk near Aldeburgh Napes buoy, and eleven in the
Mangara (1,821 tons), which was destroyed near Sizewell
buoy, Aldeburgh. Both vessels were torpedoed without
warning. The other casualty occurred in the Turquoise
(486 tons). This ship, together with the Nugget (405
tons), was captured and sunk by gunfire off the Scillies.
The month of July closed with the loss of twenty ships,
24 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
of 52,847 tons, the African Monarch (4,003 tons) having
been blown up by a mine on the 6th of the month at the
entrance of the White Sea and two men killed. Nineteen
other ships, of 88,886 tons, had been molested or damaged,
including two which struck mines and the one, already
mentioned, which had been attacked by aircraft. The
deaths reached a total of fifty-nine.
During August enemy submarines made a determined
attempt to justify the high hopes which the Germans had
entertained when they determined to employ submarines,
as well as mines, in attacking ocean-borne trade. Before
the month closed forty-nine vessels of the British Mercan-
tile Marine, of 147,122 tons, had been sunk with a loss of
no fewer than 248 lives. Twenty-one other ships had
escaped, but nevertheless the toll exacted of men and ships
was a heavy one. So far as tonnage is concerned, it was
indeed the most successful month the Germans had
hitherto experienced, and it was apparent that exceptional
efforts were being made to support public confidence
throughout Germany in the ultimate victory of the Central
Powers as the result of the campaign. Although seven
ships disappeared after striking mines, the great bulk of
the tonnage fell to the submarine. August 1915 was in-
deed a black month for British shipowners and British
seamen.
On August 1st the Clintonia (3,830 tons), after a
spirited defence by her master (Mr. Geoffrey Donnelly)
under a heavy fire, was sunk thirty miles from Ushant ;
five Europeans and five Lascars were drowned owing to
the capsizing of a ship's boat, and a number of men were
wounded during the running fire which the submarine
maintained before Captain Donnelly ordered his engines
to be stopped.
On the same day three more casualties from drowning
occurred when the Banza (2,320 tons) was overtaken
off Ushant by U68. After the ship had been abandoned
and had disappeared beneath the waves and the sub-
marine had gone away, the shipless crew hoisted sail.
One of the boats capsized ; she was righted with diffi-
culty, but was still waterlogged and the sails had been
lost. About an hour later she again capsized and was
once more righted. For six hours the unfortunate seamen,
when they were not fighting for life in the water, were
CH. I] AN OUTSTANDING CRIME 25
sitting in the boat with the water covering them up to the
chest. One fireman became dehrious and fell to the
bottom of the boat and was drowned before he could be
picked up. His body was quietly lowered over the side.
Fortunately, during the evening of this tragic Sunday a
French fishing-boat rescued the twelve survivors. The
other boat of the Ranza was picked up by a Dutch vessel.
During the succeeding days of August the losses of
tonnage continued to mount up, many useful vessels of
considerable tonnage being destroyed. On the 3rd inst.
the Costello (1,591 tons) was sunk by gunfire ninety-five
miles W. by S. from Bishop Rock, with a loss of one life ;
two men were killed in the Glenhy (2,196 tons) thirty miles
N. from the Smalls ; two seamen were killed in the Dunsley
(4,930 tons), which was sunk off the Old Head of Kinsale ;
and then occurred one of the outstanding crimes of the
submarine campaign when the White Star Company's
liner Arabic (15,801 tons) was sunk by U24. The enemy
craft had bombarded the naphtha tanks near Harrington
on August 16th, and then, proceeding by way of the St.
George's Channel, had reached a position where the
Atlantic traffic was thick. The Arabic had left Liverpool
early in the afternoon of August 18th with 137 cabin
passengers and forty-nine third-class passengers, of whom
many were of neutral nationality. They included twenty-
six Americans, as well as French, Russians, Belgians, Swiss
and Spanish travellers, with a German who possessed a
Home Office permit. The crew numbered 248. As the
vessel was outward bound to the United States, there was
no possibility that she carried ammunition. All the boats
were fully equipped and carried compasses, oilbags, oil
lamps, sea anchors, and matches, and were in a thoroughly
seaworthy condition. The boats were carried inboard
on their chocks, and all rafts and patent boats were un-
lashed and ready to float off. Six hundred lifebelts had
been placed about the decks, fore and aft, so as to be handy
in case of an emergency. The watertight doors had been
closed, as wtII as the doors of the shaft tunnel, and the
lower deck ports had been secured. Every precaution
had, in fact, been taken to secure the safety of the ship
and all on board.
About 9 o'clock on the following morning, when the
vessel was about fifty miles off the Old Head of Kinsale,
26 SUBIVIARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
a steamer was sighted five miles away on the starboard
bow. The Arabic was zigzagging, in view of the general
peril to which British ships were exposed in these
waters, and the general direction of her course gradually
brought her nearer to what was evidently a British mer-
chant ship, which was stopped. It was noticed that two
boats under sail, full of men, were making towards the
land, which was, of course, out of sight. Observers on
board the Arabic saw that the steamer was well down by
the head, and realised at once that she had been torpedoed
by the enemy. This vessel was the Dunsley of London,
which had been subjected to a heavy shelling for twenty
minutes — two men being killed, as already stated, and six
others injured before the master (Mr. P. L. Arkley) aban-
doned hope of saving his ship.
The chief officer and the second officer were on watch
on the bridge of the Arabic when the sinking Dunsley
came into sight. The master of the Arabic (Mr. W. Finch)
concluded that the Dunsley had been torpedoed, so he
altered course about three points to the southward,
intending to keep well clear of the area in which a sub-
marine might be lurking. For some time the liner con-
tinued on her new course, still zigzagging, and a wireless
message was promptly dispatched notifying the fate
which had overtaken the Dunsley. No submarine, how-
ever, was seen at this period either from the bridge or
by the lookout men. The passengers and others who
were watching the Dunsley sinking lower and lower in the
water were hoping that after all the Arabic would escape
molestation, when the ship was shaken from end to end
by an explosion, the wireless-room being wrecked and the
aerial carried away. The second officer (Mr. F. F. Steele)
had just moved to the starboard end of the bridge when
a line of air-bubbles on the starboard bow, about 100
yards away, caught his attention. He instantly realised
that a torpedo had been discharged at the liner, and he
shouted to the master, " Here he is, sir. He has let go at
us. Hard a-starboard ! " Captain Finch, who had also
observed the menacing streak, at once gave orders for a
full head of steam and the helm was put over. Everyone
on board who was aware of the impending crisis anxiously
waited to see if the ship would clear the torpedo. Doubt
was quickly resolved, the vessel being struck aft, almost
CH. I] U24 SINKS THE " ARABIC " 27
abreast of the jigger mast. The Arabic was doomed ;
the second officer put the engine-room telegraph to " Stop "
and then to " Full speed astern" so as to get way off her,
and thus enable the boats to be launched. Captain Finch,
noticing that the ship was beginning to list to port, ordered
everyone to the boats, for there was no time to be lost.
It is unnecessary to describe the scene on board when
the passengers, who included a large number of women
and children, realised that within a few minutes the
Arabic would probably sink. The sequel showed that the
ship had been well organised for an emergency ; while
of the crew of 243, 21 lost their lives, only 18 passengers
— 12 cabin and 6 steerage — were reported missing, so
efficiently and quickly were the boats swung out, lowered,
and filled. Seeing that the time which separated the
impact of the torpedo and the sinking of the Arabic
amounted to only eight minutes, it was due to no act of
mercy on the part of the enemy that the death-roll was
not far greater. Captain Finch remained on the bridge
directing operations for the saving of life, and when the
Arabic sank, having righted herself before she plunged
stern first, he went down with her. A few seconds later
he rose to the surface, to discover that his vessel had
completely disappeared. A man of robust build, of about
seventeen stone, he managed to cling to a raft from
which, exhausted though he was, he swam to a boat. He
helped a fireman into her and then picked up a woman
and a baby before he himself sought this poor means of
safety. After another fireman had been rescued, the whole
of the little company transferred to a lifeboat which was
near-by, and Captain Finch took command of all the craft
which were afloat among the wreckage. Mr. Bowen,
chief officer, and Mr. Oliver, first officer, had also re-
mained in the ship until the last, Mr. Oliver diving over-
board from the forward part of B Deck on the starboard
side, while Mr. Bowen slid down the after fall of No. 1
emergency boat, to be picked up by one of the boats
already in the water.
As soon as the engines had stopped, all hands left the
stokehold except one man who was standing by the tele-
graphs and a junior engineer (Mr. P. G. Logan). No
purpose was to be served in remaining, so they too began
to climb up to the deck. What happened to the fireman
28 SUBIVIARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
is uncertain, but Mr. Logan escaped and was afterwards
able to give an account of his experiences. He left the
engine-room on the port side of the deck below the main
deck. Securing a lifebelt, he ran along the port alley-
way. When he had advanced a short distance, the water
met him and he threw the lifebelt away, as it impeded his
progress. At last he was able to reach the companionway
to the poop, which was already three feet under water.
On the starboard side a boat, with about a dozen persons
in it, was already afloat on the falls, indicating the rapidity
with which the Arabic was sinking. Mr. Logan unhooked
the forward fall and a quartermaster released the after
fall. The boat was thus got clear of the vessel, which
disappeared a few minutes later. Just as the Arabic was
sinking, Mr. Logan saw a collapsible boat with six or seven
persons in her, who were apparently unable to control her.
As the boat was only ten or fifteen yards away, he took off
his boots and boiler suit and swam towards her, and then
took charge. With the aid of his companions, he pulled
towards the wreckage and fourteen persons were rescued
from the water.
In the meantime Mr. Steele, the second officer, had
taken charge of No. 11 boat, which was safely lowered
with thirty-seven occupants. The first officer had found
temporary safety in this overcrowded boat, but a
few minutes later he transferred to another, while the
third officer went to a collapsible boat which was
near-by. Apparently a large proportion of the deaths
were due to the capsizing of No. 16 boat. This craft was
drawn by the suction of the water towards the rapidly
sinking Arabic, which had assumed an almost perpendi-
cular position. A davit caught the boat and smashed
it into pieces. Forty-two or forty-three people were con-
sequently thrown into the water. An able seaman
managed to reach one of the rafts, with which the White
Star Line had recently equipped the Arabic as well as other
vessels under their control, and from this position of com-
parative safety he effected a number of rescues. The
carpenter of the Arabic, Norman MacAuley, was also
responsible for saving a number of lives. As soon as the
fate of the vessel was certain, he went to the saloon door
on Deck C and assisted some ladies in putting on their
lifebelts. He then plunged down to the after part of
CH. I] BRITISH SPIRITS 29
E Deck to investigate the damage which had been done
there, but he was driven back by the flow of water. Going
to the boat deck, he was able to give aid to a number of
other lady passengers and subsequently returned to
Deck C. He afterwards gave an account of his later
experiences :
" My boat station was No. 7. I helped people into No.
7 boat and then, as there were plenty of hands there,
I assisted others into No. 5 and No. 3 boats. The water
was now coming over the stern, and C Deck was submerged
for a considerable distance. No. 3 boat was filled up, and
as no passengers were to be seen on deck, I took my place
in this lifeboat and kept her clear of the ship's side as she
was lowered. The boat reached the water safely. My
boat picked up two other persons — one steward and one
passenger — after the boat had sailed four times through
the wreckage."
These chance stories of the manner in which the Arabic,
with her freight of 429 persons, was abandoned in the
urgent emergency convey some conception of the fine spirit
exhibited by officers and men, from Captain Finch down-
wards, in their care of those confided to their charge.
Fortunately the S.O.S. signal which had been sent out by
the liner when the Dunsley was seen to be in distress was
responded to quickly by patrol vessels, and all the sur-
vivors, numbering 390, were landed at Queenstown.
The remainder of the month yielded other incidents to
show that nothing that had yet occurred by sea had
broken the spirit of British merchant seamen. They
would not admit defeat even when, unarmed themselves,
they were confronted by a desperate enemy possessing
gun and torpedo in association with power of submergence,
enabling him to deal stealthy and mortal blows. Among
the narratives of this period there stands out the case of
the Eimstad (689 tons). A submarine hailed the ship
off Cross Sand Light- vessel on August 17th, at the
same time opening fire with both guns. None of the
eleven shells hit the Eimstad. Then a torpedo was fired,
which missed. In the meantime the master (Mr. F. A.
Holder) had all lights doused, himself cutting the steam-
light halyards. An attempt to ram the submarine failed.
30 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
but the spirit which was exhibited eventually caused the
enemy to abandon the contest and he disappeared. Cap-
tain Holder was " mentioned " for saving his ship. An-
other conspicuous case of resistance was that of the Dioined
(4,672 tons), belonging to Messrs. Alfred Holt & Co. This
ship (master, Mr. J. Myles) was outward bound from Liver-
pool to Shanghai. She carried a crew of fifty-three hands,
and had on board a mixed cargo of about 8,000 tons.
At 11 o'clock on the morning of August 22nd the Diomed
was about fifty-seven miles W.N.W. from the Scillies
— an area in which very heavy losses were sustained during
this month— when a submarine was observed. Captain
Myles was on the bridge with the chief officer, and as the
Diomed could steam at about 13| knots and the enemy
was distant at least six miles, he determined to make a
fight for his vessel and all that she carried. So the helm
was ported and very soon the submarine was lost to sight.
It looked as though the Diomed would escape. But
after she had run for a considerable time in a westerly
direction, a submarine — whether the same one as had
been first sighted or another is uncertain — was observed on
the port beam. The distance was again estimated at
about six miles. Once more the helm was ported in order
to bring the submarine astern. These incidents occupied
three-quarters of an hour, and the immunity they had
hitherto rewarded his efforts gave Captain Myles fresh
confidence. But at last the enemy lessened the distance
separating her from the merchantman and opened fire.
The range was about three miles. For over two hours
the chase had been in progress when the shot began to
break up the stern of the ship ; fire was then concentrated
on the fore part of the vessel, and then it was directed
against the bridge. The enemy had made no signal and
was flying no flag. The first victim was the third steward,
who was killed while standing on the fore part of the ship.
Shortly after two o'clock Captain Myles was mortally
wounded as well as the quartermaster, while the chief
officer (Mr. F. A. McGowan Richardson), on whom the
command had now devolved, was himself seriously injured.
By this time the position of the Diomed had become
hopeless, and the chief officer ordered the vessel to be
abandoned. Two boats on the port side had been
reduced to matchwood by the shell- fire, and of the two
CH. I] AN ADMIRALTY COMMENDATION 31
boats on the starboard side one had been holed. This
damage was unfortunately not observed until the boat
had been lowered into the water with twenty men in her,
when she rapidly filled and capsized. Mr. John Rennie,
the second mate, took charge of the uninjured starboard
boat, but an internal explosion in the engine-room of the
Diomed resulted in a quantity of water being shipped. In
these circumstances the prospect of any of the officers
and men being saved seemed slight.
The Germans on board the attacking submarine
evinced no interest in their fate. The damaged star-
board boat had capsized, and the unfortunate men
who had been in her were left to the mercy of the
waves. Mr. Rennie, fully realising his responsibility,
succeeded in getting his boat baled out, and then the
men in the water were picked up. Those who were
clinging to the capsized boat had to be left for the
time being, as Mr. Rennie, with thirty-four men in his
charge, could do nothing for them. He had hopes of
getting out the gig before the Diomed sank, and with this
intention drew in towards the doomed vessel. The sub-
marine had apparently disappeared, but as soon as Mr.
Rennie approached the Diomed, the enemy reappeared on
the surface and made towards him, compelling him to
abandon his purpose. In the circumstances nothing
more could be done, and a few minutes later the Diomed
disappeared beneath the waves. Mr. Rennie in his heavily
laden boat then headed for the Irish coast. At about
six o'clock he fell in with a destroyer, which promptly
returned to the spot where the Diomed had been sunk and
picked up the survivors on the capsized starboard boat.
In the deposition which he subsequently made Mr. Rennie
stated that the " submarine rendered no assistance. The
Commander looked at the men in the water and shook his
fist at me, saying something in German." The splendid
resistance which Captain Myles and his officers and men
had made in the effort to save their ship was highly com-
mended by the Admiralty, and the Distinguished Service
Cross was conferred on the chief officer. The toll of life
lost was ten, the master and two others being killed by
the shell-fire and seven being drowned through the cap-
sizing of the starboard lifeboat, which the enemy's shell-fire
had rendered unseaworthy.
II — 4
32 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
Three other incidents find place in the record of this
month, and they all occurred on August 21st at the
entrance to the Channel. The Cober (3,060 tons) and the
Ruel (4,029 tons) were sunk, but the other vessel, the
San Melito (10,160 tons), was rescued. The master (Mr,
John J. Peterfield) of the former put up a plucky fight on
this summer day. He came across a submarine when
forty-five miles S.S.W. from the Scillies. He promptly
brought her astern of him and a chase lasting an hour
ensued, during which the enemy maintained an inter-
mittent fire of high-explosive shells. At last the poop
was struck and considerable damage was done. Some of
the men of the Cober, without waiting for orders, rushed
the boats and tried to lower one of them, with the result
that several of them were thrown into the water. Captain
Peterfield still continued on his course, ordering the cliief
officer to endeavour, in another boat, to rescue the men who
were fighting for life about two miles off. In this he
succeeded against heavy odds. All hope of saving the
Cober had been abandoned, and Captain Peterfield, bowing
before the inevitable, at last prepared to abandon his ship.
The submarine had submerged, and as he left the ship at
1.20 p.m. a torpedo struck the Cober on the port side, and
in a short time she sunk. Fortunately for Captain Peter-
field, who was " mentioned " for his conduct, as well as
for his companions, they were soon afterwards picked up
by the Dutch steamer Monnikeandam and were landed
at Falmouth.
The Cober was a slow ship, but the San Melito
(master, Mr. James D. Jackson) was one of the Eagle Oil
Transport fleet with a turn for speed. She was seventy
miles S.W. from the Lizard when a submarine appeared.
Captain Jackson manoeuvred his ship to bring the enemy
astern at 2.50 p.m., and in the meantime ordered full
speed. An official record of subsequent events is to the
following effect :
" The San Melito was struck on the starboard side by
a shell, the concussion stunning the master, and at the
same time the quartermaster left the wheel, which was
taken by the chief officer (Mr. W. Piper) for the remainder
of the action. The submarine continued to chase and
shell the San Melito until about 3.30 p.m., doing slight
CH. I] A BRUTAL DEED 33
damage to the ship, but causing no casualties among the
crew. Patrol craft then appearing about five miles off,
the submarine dived and disappeared."
In these circumstances, owing to the courage and deter-
mination of Captain Jackson and his officers and men, the
San Melito was saved. Captain Jackson, the chief officer,
and the chief engineer (Mr. W. Morralee) were mentioned
in despatches, and Captain Jackson was also given a com-
mission as Lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve.
The officers and men of the Ruel were singled out for
a demonstration by the enemy of the brutal methods he
was prepared to adopt in the hope of breaking the spirit
of the British merchant seaman. This ship left Gibraltar
on August 16th for Barry Roads, in ballast, and on the
afternoon of August 21st a submarine appeared on the
starboard quarter and opened fire at a range of about three
miles. The master (Mr. Henry Story) altered his ship's
course to westward and, raising all steam, which gave him
a speed of 8j knots, managed to keep the submarine
astern of him. A chase ensued which lasted for one and
a half hours, when a shell passed through the RueVs stern,
another bursting over the bridge. By this time the enemy
was only a mile away, and the crew of the Ruel took to
the two boats. The submarine then closed in and fired
six effective shots. The enemy had killed one man, a
steward, and had wounded eight others, but he was still
unsatisfied and proceeded to fire on the boats, the sub-
marine commander picking men off with his revolver.
Captain Story, the second officer (Mr. W. J. Stenhouse),
and Lieutenant D. Blair, R.N.R., subsequently made a
statement on oath to the effect that " when in the act of
abandoning the steamer Ruel in a sinking condition due
to attack by a German submarine, we were fired on while
alongside and pulling away from the above vessel, the
wounds of those injured showing that both shrapnel and
rifle bullets were used." They added that " the submarine
was distant about 150 yards, and close enough for the crew
to observe that we and the remainder of the crew of the
steamer Ruel were abandoning the ship and had given up
any further attempts to escape." The Ruel sank forty-
five miles S.W. from Bishop Rock, and the survivors were
fortunate in that as she disappeared the armed trawler
34 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
Dewsland appeared upon the scene, accompanied by the
drifter Campania. These two craft, though they arrived
too late to save the Ruel from destruction, drove off the
submarine and rescued Captain Story and his companions,
who were landed, without further incident, at St. Mar, in
the Scillies.
For reasons which were afterwards to be revealed, the
losses from submarine attack both of ships and men
during September were far less heavy than in the preceding
month. The number of ships — eight, of 11,997 tons —
blown up was, however, the highest hitherto recorded,
suggesting that the enemy had been devoting increased
attention to the laying of minefields. In all seventy-seven
men were killed and the thirty ships which were sunk were
of 101,690 tons. A further indication of a temporary lull
in the submarine campaign in the waters surrounding the
British Isles was furnished by the small number of ships
which were molested by the enemy but succeeded in making
their escape.
Twenty-seven vessels were interfered with by sub-
marines, and their records furnish a number of illus-
trations of the spirit exhibited by officers and men in the
unequal contest. The master (Mr. Henry John) of the
Whitefield (2,422 tons) made a spirited effort, under a
running fire, to elude capture off Cape Wrath, on the
north-west coast of Scotland, on September 1st, while on
his way from Archangel to Nice. On the following day
the Roumanie (2,599 tons), also outward bound from
Archangel, was captured and destroyed by bombs off St.
Kilda. Although the Churston (2,470 tons) was mined
off Orfordness, four men being killed, on September 3rd,
the British Mercantile Marine suffered no other loss on
that day. Within twenty-four hours, however, enemy
submarines had obtained full compensation for this failure ;
three large ships met their end off the Fastnet, the Cymbe-
line (4,505 tons), the Mimosa (3,466 tons), and the Allan
liner Hesperian (10,920 tons).
In the case of the first ship six lives out of a total crew
of thirty-seven were lost owing to the action of the
enemy commander. He had kept the vessel under fire for
about half an hour, and then as the crew were leaving the
ship a torpedo was discharged which hit the vessel amid-
ship on the port side under the bridge. One of the boats
CH. I] ANOTHER UNUSUAL INCIDENT 35
was smashed by the explosion and six men were killed,
the remainder being fortunately picked up by the other
boat. For sixteen hours the survivors were buffeted
about by the waves, wondering whether they would ever
see land again. Five of their number had been injured by
the explosion, one of them seriously. The submarine had
made off as soon as it was certain that the Cymbeline could
not survive. By a happy chance these distressed mariners
in sad plight were observed by the Swedish barque Alhatros,
and at last they reached Brandon Quay. One incident
of interest marked the destruction of the Mimosa, one of
the vessels of the Anglo-American Oil Company. When
the master (Mr. T. N. Hugo) had taken to the boats,
the commander of the submarine, apparently feeling some
pity for his victims, cast adrift 137 miles S.W. by W. from
the Fastnet, told Captain Hugo that he would tell the
first trawler he saw to pick them up.
The sinking of the Hesperian, a great passenger liner
with over 600 persons on board, again attracted attention
to the callous inhumanity with which the campaign was
being conducted by the enemy. Only a few days before
Count Bernsdorff, the German Ambassador, had assured
the United States Government that " passenger liners
will not be sunk without warning and without insuring the
safety of the non-combatants aboard providing that the
liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." The
Hesperian was nevertheless sunk. She was outward bound
from Liverpool to Quebec and Montreal, with a general
cargo, and carried about 300 passengers. There was no
suspicion, therefore, that she had on board either munitions
or troops, but nevertheless she was torpedoed without
warning. It was a fortunate circumstance, and to the
credit of her owners, that she had sufficient lifeboat accom-
modation for more than three times as many persons as
were on board, and that there was a liberal supply of life-
buoys and lifebelts, otherwise the death-roll would have
been far heavier than it was.
The vessel was going at full speed, zigzagging on her
course, when she was struck. That the subsequent
explosion was due to a torpedo and not to a mine was
proved by fragments of the missile which were secured by
the master (Mr. W. S. Main) and by members of his crew.
The attack on the Hesperian was therefore a flagrant viola-
36 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ck. i
tion of the pledge which the enemy had so recently given
to the United States. The impact of the torpedo and the
explosion which followed stopped the vessel, and Captain
Main sounded the boats-station signal on the steam
whistle and ordered the chief officer to get the passengers
into the boats. Of the 314 passengers a large number
were women and children, and the order went forth,
" Women and children first," the crew being instructed
to stand by their stations. The ship, after shivering fore
and aft under the impact, had listed ten degrees to the
starboard and sank by the head. A column of water and
debris was thrown up into the air a distance of about
100 feet and fell on to the deck and bridge. The hatches
on No. 2 deck were blown up and considerable damage
was done to the second cabin and bridge decks. For-
tunately none of the boats had been damaged or their
fittings injured, and, in spite of the terrifying experience
which had suddenly confronted them, the passengers
evinced no signs of panic. They must have realised that
they were in desperate straits, but nevertheless they
remained cool and collected. The boats were filled and
got away safely. The torpedo had been discharged at
8.30 p.m., and within an hour the boats were clear of the
vessel. After the attack had taken place. Captain Main
had ordered an S.O.S. call to be sent out, and within a
short time rescuing vessels were on the spot.
The master afterwards mustered those who remained on
board the Hesperian and found that, including himself,
there were thirteen — three officers, three engineers, two
Marconi operators, the boatswain, the carpenter, and
two seamen. The night was far advanced, and the ship
was very much down by the head. There seemed a
chance, however, that she might be saved, and continued
efforts were made to tow her into Queenstown from the
early morning of September 5th onwards by the naval
vessels which had responded to the signal. During the
afternoon the liner became unmanageable ; time and again
the towing ropes carried away, and then a southerly gale
sprang up and high seas were encountered. Throughout
the long day the master and his companions, reinforced
by some of the crew who had returned to the Hesperian' s
assistance, strove to save the injured vessel. As night
came on the gale increased and the seas rose higher. The
CH. I] THE SINKING OF THE " HESPERIAN " 37
vessel was labouring heavily and the list had increased,
suggesting that she was gradually sinking. Captain Main
at last came to the conclusion that in the interests of the
lives in his charge — over thirty officers and men who had
stood by him on board in the emergency — it was his duty
to order everyone to take to the lifeboats. He himself
at last submitted to the inevitable and also took shelter
on board H.M.S. Veronica.
With searchhghts playing upon the Hesperian, the
Veronica remained close to the doomed ship throughout
the night of anxious watching. Early on the succeeding
morning, although the gale at sea had not abated, Captain
Main and ten of his crew again boarded the Hesperian.
Their worst fears were confirmed ; the ship was rapidly
sinking, and nothing could be done to save her. She went
down at 7.47 a.m. on September 6th, within twelve minutes
of the master passing over the side for the last time. The
sinking of the Lusitania, with a loss of 1,198 lives, had
shocked the conscience of the world ; the destruction of
the Arabic had drawn from the United States a Note of
protest to Germany; and now, in defiance of the pledge
given by Count Bernsdorff, the Allan liner Hesperian
had been attacked without warning eighty-five miles from
the nearest point of land and thirty-two lives had been
sacrificed. It was realised that the comparative smallness
of the death-roll was due, not to any consideration on the
part of the enemy submarine, but rather to the admirable
construction of the ship, the life-saving appliances with
which she had been provided by her owners, and the calm
way in which officers and men, as well as the passengers,
had behaved in the great hour of emergency.
The spirit of desperation with which the Germans were
conducting the submarine campaign was again illustrated
when the loss of the Ashmore (2,519 tons) was reported.
This was a well-found vessel of Aberdeen which had been
chartered by the Belgian Relief Commission to bring a
cargo of maize from Rosario to the distressed population
of the country which the enemy had overrun in the early
days of the war. Her voyage was uneventful as far as
Dover, where the master (Mr. G. A. Noble) received
instructions, on resuming his passage to Rotterdam, to
keep on a line between Elbow buoy and the Kentish Knock
Lightship. Captain Noble, having taken a pilot on board,
38 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
put out from Dover at 5 a.m. on September 12th. Three
and a half hours later, when the Ashmore was steaming
between the Kentish Knock and the Galloper Lightship,
the boatswain, who was on the after deck, noticed the track
of a torpedo approaching the ship. Before he could give
the alarm the vessel was struck. Nothing was seen of
a submarine, but the naval authorities were satisfied that
the ship had not struck a mine, but had been torpedoed
without warning.
The stricken Ashmore began at once to settle down
after the explosion, which apparently had killed four
men in the engine-room and stokehold. Captain Noble
tried to go below to ascertain the fate of these men,
but he found that the water had already risen to a height
of about 20 feet, while steam was escaping from the boilers.
Everything suggested that the four men had been killed
outright. The majority of the crew were ordered away in
the two lifeboats, but Captain Noble with the second
officer, the carpenter, and steward remained on board.
The master went in search of the ship's papers, but his
cabin had been completely wrecked. The ship had taken
a heavy list by this time, so at last Captain Noble and his
companions passed over into one of the lifeboats which
had been called alongside, and ten minutes later nothing
was to be seen of the Ashmore. The crew were fortunate
in being almost immediately afterwards rescued by mine-
sweepers, and were soon afterwards landed at Chatham
by a patrol-steamer to which they had been transferred.
Three days later the Patagonia (6,011 tons) was also
torpedoed without warning. She was on passage from
Odessa to Nicolaieff in ballast, and within an hour
and a half after leaving port she was struck aft. The
second officer, who was on watch at the time, saw the
torpedo approaching and instantly ordered the helm to
be put hard aport. If it had not been for this prompt
order the ship would have been hit amidships. The
master (Mr. D. T. Davies) was well supported by his officers
and crew in the emergency, with the result that no lives
were lost. A similar immunity from casualties fortunately
attended the destruction of three ships on September
23rd off the Fastnet. At 8.30 a.m. the Anglo-Columhian
(4,792 tons) was nearing the end of her voyage from Mon-
treal to Avonmouth with a large number of horses when
CH. i] AMERICAN PROTESTS 39
she was shelled by a submarine and eventually sunk.
Early on the same afternoon the Chancellor (4,586 tons)
shared the same fate in this locality, though the master
(Mr. R. N. Donald) put on all speed in the attempt to
escape. He was carrying a general cargo from Liverpool
to New Orleans, and in view of the slowness of his own ship
and the speed of the enemy his position from the first was
almost hopeless. That evening the master (Mr. R. Steel)
of the Hesione (3,663 tons) noticed a ship's lifeboat
crowded with men evidently in distress. This proved to
be a lifeboat of the Chancellor in charge of the chief officer
(Mr. R. H. Herbert). Captain Steel's natural instinct was
to bear down on the boat and rescue the men. This he
did. He then reduced speed in order to effect the rescue.
Mr. Herbert, warned by the fact that the submarine was
still on the surface and conscious of the heavy price which
might be exacted of the rescuing vessel, signalled to the
Hesione to proceed. By this time Captain Steel had also
sighted the submarine and realised the danger into which
he had run by acting in accordance with the code of the
brotherhood of the sea. He called down to the engine-
room for all possible speed and thus brought the submarine
right astern of him. A strong wind was blowing and the
seas were running high, and try as they might the engine-
room staff could not obtain more than 7 knots, whereas
the Hesione was capable, under more favourable conditions,
of 10^ knots. The submarine opened fire, but Captain
Steel still held on his course. At length he realised that
the contest was hopeless and he ordered the ship to stop.
In a short time the crew had taken to the boats, and then
the Hesione was sunk by gunfire. The firing had attracted
patrol-vessels to the spot and both crews were rescued.
With the sinking of the Urbino (6,651 tons) off the Bishop
Rock on September 24th, the submarine campaign in the
waters round the British Isles was suspended for the time
being. The American protests which followed the sinking
of the Arabic and the Hesperian were too serious to be
ignored, and during the months of October and November
not a single merchant ship was either molested or sunk,
and it was not until the end of the first quarter of the fol-
lowing year that merchant seamen in these areas were
again confronted with this particular form of attack.
The enemy had decided to shift the scene of his operations
40 SUBMARINES IN BRITISH WATERS [ch. i
to other waters which promised to yield good results in
association with less chances of becoming embroiled with
the United States or of arousing other neutrals to com-
bined action. The submarine campaign was forthwith
transferred to the Mediterranean, in which few ships
carrying American passengers were likely to be encountered.
This decision represented the triumph, if only temporary
triumph, of British merchant seamen. They had refused
at Germany's dictation, and in spite of Germany's unprece-
dented acts, to keep out of that part of the " war zone "
which embraced the waters round the British Isles. If
they had, cravenly, avoided the manifold perils of which
they had had such ample evidence, the enemy would have
encountered none of the difficulties which arose with
neutrals, and particularly with the United States, and he
would have won the war owing to the starvation of the
people of the United Kingdom, and the cutting of the com-
munications with the armies engaged in Belgium and
France. But, owing to the dogged persistence of British
merchant seamen, Germany's diplomatic troubles in-
creased. On June 6th orders had been issued that no
large passenger ship, whatever her flag, should be
attacked. As we have seen, these instructions were not
obeyed. Immediately after the sinking of the Arabic,
Count Bernsdorff informed the United States Government
— to the great indignation of the German naval authorities
responsible for the operations at sea, but with the full
approval of the Imperial Chancellor — that the submarine
commander who had been responsible for that loss would
be punished. The differences of opinion between the
naval and civil elements in Germany were sharply accen-
tuated by this action. On August 27th instructions were
issued that no further submarines were to be sent to sea
for attacking merchantmen until the diplomatic position
had been cleared up.
Three days later it w^as decided that until further
notice no small passenger ships were to be sunk without
warning and without steps being taken to rescue the crew.
On the 1st of the following month the Naval Secretary
telegraphed to the Chief of the Cabinet, for submission
to the Emperor, that " this order could only be
carried out at the utmost danger to the submarines, for
which he could not be responsible." He asked per-
CH. I] NEW GERMAN ORDERS 41
mission to resign his office, but this was refused. On
September 18th the decision was reached that the
" general position necessitated that for the next few weeks
all risks should be avoided of breaches of regulations laid
down for the campaign." i Orders M^ere accordingly
given to suspend all submarine activities of any sort on
the west coast of the British Isles and in the English Chan-
nel, and to carry on operations in the North Sea only in
accordance with the ordinary prize regulations.
1 My Memoirs, by Grand- Admiral von Tirpitz.
CHAPTER II
AUXILIARY craft's FIGHT AGAINST THE SUBMARINES
Before the German Emperor's decision was reached to
limit submarine operations, so as not to arouse further
American opposition, the intensity of the enemy's attack
on merchant shipping was imposing heavy burdens on
the AuxiHary Patrol. During the month of August 1915
shipping was being destroyed off Ushant, off the Norfolk
coast, off the Scillies, off the south-west coast of Ireland,
off St. Abb's Head, off the Lofoten Islands, and the Old
Head of Kinsale, in the ^gean, off the Tuskar, in the Irish
Sea and elsewhere. The campaign had assumed a threefold
character. First, there was the steady submarine warfare
going on in the North Sea and off the western coasts as
a matter of almost established routine. Secondly, a con-
centration was being made on what may be described as
the south-western approaches, i.e. the track followed by
shipping entering the English or Irish Channel from
the Atlantic or Bay of Biscay. Finally, there were the
episodic attacks by submarines on their way out from
Germany to the Mediterranean, where, as will be seen
later, the enemy was concentrating his forces.
Everywhere the Auxiliary Patrol was working at its
maximum efficiency. New plans were continually being
tested in order to defeat the enemy. In the Irish Sea,
for instance, three armed yachts, the Lady Blanche,
Sabrina, and Bacchante, were patrolling between the Tuskar
and Bardsey Island. Between the Tuskar and the Smalls
nets were being towed by a long line of drifters, reinforced
by half a dozen armed trawlers. Four other units of
six trawlers were patrolling the area between Youghal-
Tuskar-Bristol-Channel-Scillies, with the armed yacht
Jeanette exercising a general supervision and the armed
yacht Sapphire, patrolling between Minehead and Trevose
Head, acting as a wireless link. A new Commander-in-
Chief, Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, had been appointed
42
CH. II] GERMAN CONFIDENCE 43
to take charge of the Irish area. This officer, who had had
experience both in the Grand Fleet and as President of the
War College, went to Queenstown when the south-western
approaches were becoming the principal area of the enemy's
activity. His was a difficult task, made none the easier
by the fact that his forces consisted only of a small flotilla
of the newly built sloops (originally intended for mine-
sweeping), in addition to trawlers, drifters, armed yachts
and motor-boats.
It is impossible to deal at length with every incident of
the operations of the Auxiliary Patrol during this period,
but it is essential to convey a correct appreciation of the
character and extent of the German operations in home
waters. The most experienced submarine officers were
doing their utmost to support German confidence. U22
left Borkum at the beginning of August and sank the
armed merchant cruiser India off Westfjord, Norway, on
August 8th. On August 4th U27 left for the Irish
coast, but was sunk by the decoy ship Baralong on the
19th. U38 also proceeded to the south-west approaches
and within five days sank twenty-two cargo vessels, five
trawlers, and three sailing-ships, chiefly by gunfire during
thick weather. On August 4th U34 and U35 left Heligo-
land for the Mediterranean with orders to wage war only
as far as the latitude of the English Channel and then
proceed without delay for Cattaro, which was reached on
August 23rd. On August 5th U24 and U25 were also
operating, the former proceeding round the north of
Scotland and the west and south of Ireland, up the Irish
Sea, sinking, as has been stated, the White Star liner
Arabic. Before the end of the month U33 and U39
were ordered to leave Germany for the Dardanelles,
spreading destruction around them on passage. The
former passed out of Borkum on August 28th, north about,
sank a steamer off Cape Wrath, then came down the
west coast of Ireland on September 4th and sank the
Cymbeline off the Fastnet. On her southerly progress she
also sank the Mimosa, the Storcsand, a Norwegian sailing-
ship, and finally the John Hardie, ninety-eight miles W.
by S. of Cape Finisterre on September 6th. She then
continued her voyage without further incident, passed
through the Gibraltar Straits and, having arrived in the
Mediterranean, was sighted and attacked by H.M. Torpedo-
44 AUXILIARY CRAFT AND SUBIVIARINES [ch, ii
Boat 95 six times on September 9th, when fifty miles
west of Alboran island ; but she reached Cattaro on Sep-
tember 16th, and then began to carry out the task for
which she had been selected — the sinking of enemy shipping
in the Mediterranean. Similarly U39 left Germany on
August 27th, proceeded north about on September 2nd,
attacked the sailing-ship William T. Lewis ninety-five miles
west of the Fastnet, and then carried on for the Straits
of Gibraltar without further adventure. Having entered
the Mediterranean, this vessel was sighted on September
8th about 130 miles east of Cartagena going south-east.
She sank several more vessels, and reached Cattaro on
September 13th. Such, then, was the new position at sea.
The solution of the submarine problem had become more
difficult than ever, apart from the increasing trouble due
to mines ; off the south-east coast of England UC 1, 3,
5, 6, and 7 were particularly busy mine-laying.
In these new conditions the trawlers of the Auxiliary
Patrol were leading a varied life. Some Portsmouth
trawlers had to be used for escort work across the English
Channel owing to the scarcity of destroyers ; off the
Lowestoft coast other trawlers were employed in protecting
the " War Channel," along which sixty merchant ships,
on an average, daily passed escorted by these fishing-craft ;
and wherever submarines were likely to operate, drifters
laid their nets. Even when patrol-vessels returned to
port, there was frequently no rest for them. On August
10th, Just after midnight, a Zeppelin appeared over Dover
harbour dropping bombs, one of which exploded on
striking the water and damaged the armed trawler
Equinox, then lying at anchor, hitting her in forty-three
places. Three of her crew who were in their bunks asleep
were wounded. Another armed trawler, the Cleon, not
far off, was also damaged.
The alertness of the vessels of the Auxiliary Patrol made
the submarine's life more exciting than comfortable.
Owing to the enemy's superiority in speed on the surface
and his more powerful guns, it often enough happened that
the submarine escaped ; but if the trawler or yacht could
not claim to have sunk the U-boat, at least many a mer-
chant ship was spared from destruction owing to the
enemy's attention being distracted. An incident in the
summer of 1915 illustrated this fact. On August 14th
CH. II] THE SAVING OF THE " MAXTON " 45
the trawler Amadavat (Skipper P. P. Glanville),
based on Milford, was patrolling about 3.45 p.m. ten miles
south-south-east of the Tuskar. She was armed with one
6-pounder. A submarine was seen a mile away on the
port bow. The Amadavat proceeded at full speed (8 knots)
towards her and fired a couple of shots. This made the
enemy submerge. The Amadavat then headed for the line
of drifters and warned them of the danger in which they
were standing, and afterwards proceeded north-north-west
towards the position where the U-boat had last been seen.
The enemy craft was discovered half a mile astern of a big
steamer. The trawler again opened fire, and after four
shots the submarine disappeared. Skipper Glanville then
wisely surmised that the enemy would appear the next time
ahead of the steamer, so the gunner of the Amadavat was
ordered to train his 6-pounder on the bow of the merchant-
man. The submarine did appear as expected, whereupon
the trawler fired two more shots which dropped very close,
causing the submarine to alter course away from the
trawler. The Amadavat continued firing, the third shot
smothering the enemy conning-tower with spray. After
this narrow escape the submarine disappeared. The trawler
forthwith picked up the steamer's boats and resumed
the patrol. By persistency and eagerness, combined with
courage and common sense. Skipper Glanville had un-
doubtedly saved this vessel — the Maxton. He was after-
wards commended for his promptness and foresight, even
though the submarine had escaped.
Curiously enough, on the next afternoon a somewhat
similar incident occurred in the North Sea. Near Smith's
Knoll, off the East Anglian coast, the four Grimsby paddle-
steamers, Brighton Queen, Westward Ho !, Glen Avon, and
Cambridge, were engaged mine-sweeping. Not far away
were some Lowestoft smacks, which had become favourite
targets for the enemy submarines. Suddenly, at 2.15 p.m.,
the paddlers sighted a submarine of the UB type. Sweeps
were immediately slipped, and the once familiar excursion
steamers chased the submarine, opening a brisk fire with
their guns. On board the Brighton Queen it was thought
that the third round hit the enemy's conning-tower. It
is amusing to picture an excursion paddle-steamer putting
a warship to flight. That is, however, what happened.
This prompt action, though it did not lead to the destruc-
46 AUXILIARY CRAFT AND SUBMARINES [ch. ii
tion of the German submarine, certainly saved the fishing-
smacks.
But the submarine had not made good her escape, for on
that same Saturday night she fell to one of the disguised
Lowestoft fishing- smacks to which reference has already
been made. This was the ketch Inverlyon, which had
been armed with a 3-pounder. Her crew comprised her
fishing skipper and three hands, all enrolled temporarily
in the Royal Naval Reserve (Trawler Section). Her
fighting crew consisted of a gunner R.N. (Mr. E. M.
Jehan), who had with him four R.N. ratings. At 8.20
p.m. this sailing-smack was trawling three miles north by
east of Smith's Knoll spar buoy when she sighted U4.
When the enemy had got within thirty yards the German
ensign was observed, and an officer was heard shouting
something about " boat " — most probably ordering the
Inverlyon to launch her boat and come alongside. The
submarine then stopped. The smack promptly hoisted
the White Ensign and Mr. Jehan discharged his revolver
at the German officer, this being the signal for the naval
ratings to open fire from the 3-pounder. Nine rounds
were promptly got off, of which the first and third shots
were thought to have pierced the centre of the conning-
tower and exploded inside ; the second shot cleared
away the after part of the conning-tower, as well as the
German ensign. The German officer fell overboard on
the starboard side, probably dead. The submarine then
came round the Inverlyon's side with the tide, so that
she was distant only about ten yards. At this extremely
short range six more shots were fired from the smack,
the first striking the conning-tower, the second and fourth
going over it, and the third, fifth, and sixth hitting the
hull. The submarine went down at a very sharp
angle, and it was confidently assumed that she had been
fatally injured. The bodies of three men, who were still
outside when the U-boat submerged, came to the surface ;
one of the Germans was still alive and was shouting
appealingly to be rescued. Skipper Phillips, in the
Inverlyon, with instinctive gallantry and humanity, un-
dressed and swam off with a lifebuoy, but the man sank
before he could reach him. The Admiralty awarded Mr.
Jehan a Distinguished Service Cross for this smart and
successful action.
cii. ii] SUBMARINES OFF IRELAND 47
A short, sharp submarine raid off the Irish coast, lasting
from December 25th to December 28th, occurred with
dramatic suddenness at the end of 1915. Comparative
peace had settled down since September, and this outburst
was an unpleasant surprise. If enemy craft on their way
to the Mediterranean had imagined that the vigilance
of the patrol craft would be relaxed during Christ-
mastide, they were mistaken. At 1.35 p.m. on Christmas
Day, when about nine miles W. by S. of the Smalls,
the Van Stirum, used as an Admiralty transport, was
attacked. She endeavoured to escape and sent out dis-
tress calls. At 2.20 p.m. she wirelessed the message :
" Done for ; pick me up five miles south of the Smalls.'*
One shell had struck her on the starboard quarter and
another had brought down her aerials. At 2.35 p.m. she
was abandoned and the submarine torpedoed her. The
torpedo passed under a partly lowered boat and struck the
ship abreast the engine-room, blowing the American
boatswain to pieces. At 4.15 p.m. the submarine returned
to the ship and shelled her. At this point the enemy
noticed three fishing-vessels approaching at high speed,
the first vessel being the Belgian trawler Nadine, which
was fishing out of Milford. Her skipper, on hearing the
firing, hauled up his trawl, steamed in the direction of the
sound, and w^as able to take on board the entire crew of
the Van Stirum, whom he brought into Milford just before
midnight. It was pure chance that the Belgian was
fishing in that neighbourhood, but it was very fortunate
for the men of the merchantman.
The next thing was to find the Van Stirum, if still afloat.
At 8.30 next morning the trawler Evangel (Lieutenant
W. A. Peter, R.N.R.) discovered her with a heavy list
eighteen miles south-east of the Tuskar, a pathetic derelict.
A fine effort was made to save the ship. The Evangel
launched her boat and put four of her men on board the
Van Stirum to handle the tow ropes. There was no steam
for the steering-wheel or means of putting in the hand-
steering gear, so the vessel could not be controlled. At
10 a.m. the drifter Lupina arrived, together with her group
of Milford drifters. These craft were ordered to act as
follows : One was directed to proceed to Rosslare so as
to get a report through to Admiral Dare at Milford ; one
was to cruise towards the Tuskar and one towards Milford
II— 5
48 AUXILIARY CRAFT AND SUBMARINES [ch. ii
to obtain towing assistance. At 10.20 a.m. the trawler
Loch Awe came on the scene and took a tow rope from the
Van Stirum's quarter in order to steer her, but this rope
soon parted. The Loch Awe then changed positions with
the Evangel, which had been towing ahead.
The Evangel had buoyed the wire tow rope for the
Lujnna to pick up, but the latter in doing so unfortun-
ately fouled her own propeller. This was cut clear and a
rope was then taken from the derelict's quarter. About
11.80 a.m. the Loch Awe and Lujnna were towing ahead
with the Evangel steering astern, the intention being to
make the Blackwater, on the Irish coast. At 4 p.m., after
repeatedly carrying away wires, the disabled ship fouled
her propeller. Two hours later another vessel of the
Auxiliary Patrol, the Osprey, arrived and managed to get
a wire from forward.
At midnight the wind freshened, with rain and
increasing sea, and the Van Stirum fell into the trough
of the sea, while the Evangel repeatedly parted her wires in
a vain attempt to keep the ship end on to the waves. By
3 a.m. there was a strong south-east wind and rough sea,
and by the look of things the conditions were going to get
much worse. At 6 a.m. the Evangel parted her last wire
and informed the Osprey of the fact, reporting that the
derelict was in a perilous condition. The Evangel then
returned to the stricken vessel and, finding that she was
likely to sink at any moment, endeavoured to go alongside
and take the men off from the quarter. Owing to the
heavy sea running this was not successful : in fact the
EvangeVs starboard bow collided so heavily with the
Van Stiruni's quarter as to start some of the trawler's
rivets. Matters now became critical. The Evangel
launched her boat and by means of a heaving line was
able to pass this boat alongside the derelict. The latter's
forward bulkhead had now collapsed, so that she had
sunk by the head and remained with her nose on the
bottom and her stern in the air for about a minute. She
finally disappeared at 7.10 a.m. This incident occurred
about eight miles S.E. by S. of South Arklow lightship.
The Evangel then proceeded to search for the Van Stirurn's
boat and found her half full of water, but she also
found that the men had fortunately managed to get into
her just in the nick of time. The sea was running so
CH. II] FRUITLESS SALVAGE EFFORTS 49
wildly that it was impossible to pick the boat up, so
after getting the men safely on board it was abandoned.
The attempt to salve the steamer had failed, but it had
been a glorious failure, which only the bad weather had
spoiled, A letter of appreciation came from the Admiralty
to the officers and men of the Auxiliary Patrol who had so
nearly succeeded in their purpose.
Similar misfortune frustrated the efforts farther round
the coast to rob the enemy of the fruits of his campaign.
At 6.30 a.m. on December 28th an S.O.S. call was received
at Queenstown from the oil tanker El Zorro off the Old
Head of Kinsale. She was full of oil, badly needed for
the prosecution of the war. She had safely crossed the
Atlantic, but had been torpedoed in sight of port. The
armed yacht Greta and a couple of obsolete torpedo-boats
were at once dispatched to the scene, but by this time the
submarine had made off westward. Two tugs were sent
out, but could not make much headway owing to the sea.
That night it blew a gale. The El Zorro anchored
and the crew were taken off during the night by the
trawler Freesia. The gale increased and no further steps
could be taken to salve the ship. The El Zorro dragged
her anchor, and went ashore a little way west of Queens-
town. Still pursuing her way westward down the coast,
the submarine three hours later was seen by another oiler,
the Viturvia, but fortunately the enemy did not molest
her. At 8 a.m. (December 28th) the light cruiser
Adventure, with Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly himself on
board, had left Queenstown and proceeded down the
coast to hunt the submarine between Kinsale and the
Fastnet. At 12,45 p,m. the Adventure picked up an
S.O.S. from the Leyland liner Huronian, proceeded
towards her at 22 knots, closed her about 1 p,m,, and
found that she had been torpedoed. The Adventure
then searched the vicinity and undoubtedly frightened
the enemy away, with the result that the Huronian was
successfully escorted by sloops and the trawler Bempton
into Berehaven, where she was eventually patched up
sufficiently for her to proceed to Liverpool with her valuable
cargo of cotton and grain.
CHAPTER III
THE fishermen's ORDEAL
While passenger ships, cargo liners, and tramps were
maintaining the country's oversea communications, the
hardy seamen engaged in the fishing industry continued
to ply their trade round the British coasts and farther
afield. In the year 1913 the harvest of the sea had
amounted to 1,202,453 tons, exclusive of salmon and shell-
fish. The crowded population of the British Isles would
have been reduced to sore straits in the matter of food if
supplies of fish had been entirely cut off after the out-
break of war. As has been recorded, the Admiralty at an
early stage in the contest realised the value of fishing-
craft, with their experienced crews, as supports of the
Royal Navy, and gradually built up the Auxiliary Patrol.
The crews of those vessels which remained free to continue
their fishing operations were rendering no mean service
to the community in supplying it with good food, as was
generally recognised at the time, but there was little appre-
ciation of the fact that the fishing-craft, in pursuing their
peaceful functions, were not only running great risks,
but were promoting the common cause.
The fine spirit exhibited by the fishermen and the
utility of their craft were fully appreciated by the enemy.
In the middle of June 1915 a German retired admiral
reviewed the situation at sea in the Vossische Zeitung, and
advocated the indiscriminate destruction of British fishing-
vessels on the ground that they formed an important
auxiliary arm of the Royal Navy, and he added, with
truth, that most of the nation's steam trawlers were already
in the service of the Admiralty. But it was not merely
the craft of the Auxiliary Patrol which greatly alarmed
the U-boats. The unarmed and uncommissioned trawlers,
while fishing or on voyage between their fishing-grounds
and home ports, proved an increasing embarrassment, often
60
CH. Ill] U-BOATS AND FISHING TRAWLERS 51
causing the German submarine officers to break off a fight
and even run away on some occasions. It was one of the
surprises of the war that, as a rule, U-boats attacked
trawlers with a conspicuous lack of determination. There
were some outstanding exceptions, but these serve only to
accentuate the cautious tactics usually employed. It might
have been thought that, since they could sink passenger
ships with such ease, they would have made bolder efforts
to destroy the small fisher vessels. But it was the mobility
of the latter, and the realisation that the trawler's steel
forefoot represented an effective weapon for ramming,
that made the enemy play for safety and rely on long-dis-
tance attack.
The fishing-trawler was otherwise defenceless. If the
enemy, by skilful manoeuvring, evaded those defensive-
offensive tactics, the fishermen had to rely for safety on
their own personal skill and seamanship. As the trawler
was not a fighting ship, but was at sea solely for the purpose
of bringing fish to market, the first duty of the crew in
the presence of a submarine was to save the ship. Thus
it was with the fishing-trawler Phosbe, which had left
I Fleetwood bound for the Iceland fishing-grounds. On
June 18th, while passing Barra Head, she was stopped
by a patrol-boat and warned that submarines were about.
The Phoebe's skipper (Mr. J. W. Golding) therefore
doubled the lookout. In the early hours of the next
morning he was again stopped by a patrol-boat off St.
Kilda, and informed that two vessels had been sunk off
the Butt of Lewis. The Phoebe continued her voyage,
laying a course for Iceland, and after steaming another
fifty-five miles by the log a suspicious object was sighted.
It was now 8.20 a.m. and the mate was in the wheel-house.
He did not waste time in speculation, but promptly called
the skipper from his cabin, telling him that he had sighted
what he took to be a submarine about a mile and a half
to the eastward, with periscope and conning-tower show-
ing and hull awash. The submarine was heading north-
north-west and the trawler N. J E.
Skipper Golding spoke down the tube to the chief en-
gineer and, directing him to give the trawler all possible
steam, he altered course so as to go head-on for the enemy's
conning-tower. The submarine then steered more westerly,
and away went the Phoebe likewise for about twenty
52 THE FISHERMEN'S ORDEAL [ch. m
minutes, the U-boat in the meantime gradually rising to the
surface. The enemy next hauled off to the southward,
stopped, and at a distance of a mile opened fire ; the first
shell dropped about fifty yards short on the trawler's
starboard bow. Skipper Golding's duty now was obvious.
His ship was unarmed and, if he remained where he was,
she would almost certainly be sunk. Therefore, having
failed to ram the enemy, he used his utmost endeavours
to save his owner's property. It was a fine clear
morning, and he could see the smoke of a couple of
vessels to the eastward and another couple to the south-
ward. He accordingly kept his vessel going, blew his steam
whistle continuously, showed his stern to the submarine,
and zigzagged his course. The second shell dropped into
the sea only twenty yards short ; the third whizzed close
over the wheel-house ; the fourth fell just short of the
stern. It was a pretty close thing, but by clever handling
the skipper brought his vessel safely out of the fray ; he
succeeded in running the U-boat out of sight, and even-
tually got to St. Kilda, where he reported his adventure.
When the full account of this incident reached the
Admiralty, their Lordships sent Skipper Golding an
expression of their appreciation of his courageous action
in attempting to ram, and in his success in avoiding the
loss of his ship. They also awarded the sum of £55 to be
divided between owners, skipper, mate, and crew.
The sinkings of ordinary fishing-vessels became
numerous as the summer of 1915 advanced. Ten were
sunk in April, twenty-two in May, and fifty-eight in June,
this month marking the " peak " of the curve ; there
were thirty-six sinkings in July and August respectively,
and only six in September. No such incidents occurred
again until January 1916, when seven were sunk, the
greatest number attained that year being thirty-eight in
the month of September. In July U3 succeeded in
destroying a number of fishing-trawlers belonging to Hull,
Grimsby, Aberdeen, and North Shields. To combat these
tactics of the enemy in attacking ordinary fishing-vessels,
disguised trawlers were being used with the fishing-fleets,
but enough patrol-trawlers were not available to provide
complete protection. The Fishing Vessels' Owners' Asso-
ciations at both Hull and Grimsby were protesting at this
period against the Admiralty requisitioning any more
CH. Ill] " WHERE IGNORANCE IS BLISS " 53
trawlers for the naval service. For a time some East
Coast fishing-craft were allowed to carry pigeons for send-
ing information ashore of enemy activities, but this method
of passing in intelligence was found slow and unreliable.
The two armed yachts Eileen and Mekong were charged
with the duty of keeping an eye on East Coast fishing-fleets
and used to go out to about long. 2° 25' E,, where the Hull
fishing-fleet of trawlers was at work in September. Three
armed trawlers fitted with wireless were also dispatched
patrolling off the Dogger Bank.
About 350 fishing-trawlers continued, in spite of the
war, to fish in the North Sea ; the steam fish- carriers went
out to meet them as in normal times and conveyed the
catches to London. In spite of the losses sustained, the
fishermen continued to go to sea with complete disregard
of all danger. Some of the " yarns " current during the
war concerning the casual regard which the North Sea
fisherman had for mines must be dismissed as apocryphal.
But in the late summer of 1915 two cases did occur which
support the adage that fact is stranger than fiction. One
day, for instance, a fisherman came into Grimsby towing
a German mine which had all its horns knocked off. He
explained that as he had heard that the horns were the
dangerous parts he had knocked them off with a boat-
hook ! Another fisherman one night made fast to what
he thought was a buoy ; but at daylight it turned out to
be a mine ! Fortunately, efficient as undoubtedly the
German mines usually were, in many instances they failed
to act ; otherwise neither of these fishermen would have
seen his home port again.
The mastering of the submarine menace now needed
something else besides seamanship and gallantry. British
seamen were opposed to the best brains of the German
Navy and the most enterprising of its personnel. It was
obvious, therefore, that to bravery had to be added subtlety
and to daring cunning. If it is impossible to catch a
pest by ordinary means, a trap for him must be baited ;
in other words, he must be taken off his guard. That is
precisely what now had to be done in the North Sea.
The best form of trap was to disguise the armament of a
patrol-trawler, leaving her paint and fishing numbers and
the deck appointments, her masts and funnels, just as they
were in peace-time, and send her to sea among the fishing-
64 THE FISHERMEN'S ORDEAL [ch. iii
fleets, on the pretence of fishing, in the hope that the enemy
would appear and attack her. The armed trawlers would
then cease pretending and open fire at the enemy. This
stratagem was being tried in the early months of 1915, for
instance, by Humber armed trawlers among the Dogger
Bank fishing-craft, but so far no submarine had been sunk.
But a more ingenious device was subsequently evolved,
which was as successful as it was clever. The idea was
to send an apparently innocent fishing-trawler in those
waters off the north-east Scottish coast where fishing-craft
had actually been sunk. Attack was invited. This was
the bait. Astern of the trawler was one of the C-class of
submarines, submerged, but towed by the trawler. This
was the trap. An elastic cable and telephones were in-
stalled in order to keep up communication, and thus the
trawler could keep the submarine informed of the enemy's
movements, so that, at the precise moment, the British
submarine could cast off tow rope and cable, and attack
her " opposite number," the U-boat. This scheme was
first suggested by Acting-Paymaster F. T. Spickernell,
R.N., Admiral Beatty's secretary, but the details were
worked out by Captain V. H. S. Haggard, R.N., who was
in command of H.M.S. Vulcan, the submarine depot
ship, lying in Leith docks, where a flotilla of submarines
was stationed for the defence of the Firth of Forth.
The senior officer of these submarines was Lieutenant-
Commander H. O. Edwards, R.N., afterwards killed, and
he, together with the other submarine officers, exercised
their crews for a whole month, going out to sea and in-
viting attack. No success was achieved until June 8th.
C27 was operating in the manner indicated with the dis-
guised armed trawler Taranaki, and the submarine was just
about to fire her torpedo when it was realised that the
U-boat was too near. It was feared at the time that the
enemy had seen C27 and that thus Germany would learn
of this new ruse. The greatest care was therefore
necessary in any future attempt.
At 1 a.m. on June 23rd H.M. Submarine C24, under
the command of Lieutenant F. H. Taylor, R.N., stole
out of Aberdeen in company with the armed trawler
Taranalii and shaped a south-easterly course. Five hours
later the trawler (Lieutenant-Commander Edwards) took
the submarine in tow. The latter then submerged to
CH. Ill] C24 SINKS U40 55
thirty feet. At 9.30 a.m. a U-boat rose to the surface
fifty miles S.E. by S. of Girdleness and fired a gun across the
trawler's bows at a distance of about 2,000 yards, the shell
bursting about twenty yards ahead. Three minutes later
C24 was informed by telephone that the enemy was 1,000
yards astern. Thereupon Lieutenant Taylor gave orders to
slip the tow, but unfortunately, by the worst of luck, the
tow rope jammed and could not be slipped. Finally, at 9.45
a.m. the trawler slipped her end of the rope and stopped.
The enemy also stopped, being on the trawler's starboard
beam, about a thousand yards off ; she was trimmed ready
for instant diving. Clearly the German scented the trap,
so in order to entice him Lieutenant- Commander Edwards
ordered out the trawler's boat as if he were abandoning ship.
Meanwhile C24 had gone ahead with helm a-starboard to
attack the U-boat. Again, by bad luck, the British
submarine became unhandy and immediately sank to thirty-
eight feet, and it took some time to get her trim right again.
The cause of this mishap was presently discovered.
One hundred fathoms of 3|-inch towing wire and some 8-inch
coir hawser, in addition to a hundred fathoms of telephone
cable, were still fast to the bows. In spite of this, the two
coxswains of C24 steered and trimmed her so ably that she
never broke surface. Meanwhile Lieutenant Taylor, using
his periscope little and seldom, eventually sighted the
enemy's conning-tower and gun, and closed to 500 yards.
He then manoeuvred to get in a beam shot, and at 9.55 a.m.
fired at the conning-tower. To the joy of the Taranaki's
crew, the torpedo was seen to explode under the conning-
tower and the U-boat instantly sank, never again to rise.
C24 then came to the surface and picked up the German
commanding officer, while the Taranaki rescued another
officer and one petty officer. Nothing else remained of
this enemy craft — U40 — except a lifebuoy and a bucket.
When C24 tried to go astern it was discovered that the
propeller refused to move, having twenty turns of tele-
phone cable round the shaft. However, having transferred
the German prisoners to the trawler, C24 was taken in tow
again and safely reached Aberdeen. Everyone had done
well in the Taranaki and C24, in spite of difficulties, and
one of the latest and most successful U-boats had been
accounted for. For this service Lieutenant-Commander
Edwards received the D.S.O., and Lieutenant Taylor the
56 THE FISHERMEN'S ORDEAL [ch. iii
D.S.C., and each coxswain a D.S.M. It is interesting to
note that the captain of U40 admitted that he had been
watching the Taranaki all the moVning and had been
completely deceived, so excellent was the disguise.
On the same morning that this incident occurred, another
trawler engagement was being fought off the Hebrides far
from the scene of the Phcebe^s encounter. It was eleven
o'clock, and the armed trawler Bush (Skipper G. King)
was on patrol about eight miles north-north-west of the
Butt of Lewis. Two drifters with their nets down were
three miles inside of her at the time, and it was blowing
hard from east-north-east with considerable sea. Sud-
denly from windward a shell fell about fifty yards
short of the wheel-house of the Bush, which was head-
ing about south-east. Skipper King went full speed
ahead, altered course, and saw a submarine travel-
ling about north-north-west. Whilst in the act of turn-
ing, a second shot was fired and this also missed. The
Bush now used her rocket distress signal, hoisted the
signal " Submarine in sight," and fired her 12-pounder.
This first shot from the trawler fell short ; the second shot
was very close, but also short. The third shot was so
close that the enemy made a smoke screen and under
cover of this dived and disappeared. For two hours search
was made in the heavy sea, but the enemy was not seen
again. Shortly afterwards the Bush met the Norwegian
s.s. Bianca, bound from Archangel, and directed her down
the Minch, thus saving her from the submarine. The
Bush was only slightly damaged by the six shots fired at
her. Of these the last three were hits, the fourth having
passed between the gunlayer and breechworker. Two
large pieces of shell were picked up which indicated that
the enemy's gun — the equivalent of 3|-inch — was decidedly
superior to that of the trawler's. The submarine was not
sunk, but a trawler had shown the enemy that fishermen
were fighters. The incident pleased both Admiral Jellicoe
and the Admiralty, and from the latter came an expression
of appreciation and the sum of £60 for the crew of the
Bush.
About a month later there followed yet another trawler-
submarine engagement off the Hebrides, but this time
it was at the southern end, in the neighbourhood of Barra
Head. If it be matter for surprise that German submarines
CH, III] THE FIGHT OF THE " PEARL " 57
at this time should have hovered about the Hebrides,
the reason is not far to seek. The Grand Fleet in Scapa
Flow required an enormous amount of coal and other
stores. These supplies had to be brought in merchant
ships which came up the West Coast so as to avoid the
submarines operating in the North Sea. In addition,
there was a good deal of other traffic by merchant ships,
especially to Archangel, through which we were supplying
war material to the Russians. Moreover, both Barra
Head in the south, the Butt of Lewis in the north, and the
island of St, Kilda in the west were landmarks, navigation-
ally most useful to the U-boats proceeding to and from the
coast of Ireland. It followed, then, that the craft of the
Auxiliary Patrol based on Stornoway had no easy time.
On July 27th, at 4 a.m. — just that time when nature
is at its lowest and when, therefore, the best lookout is not
always maintained — the armed trawler Pearl was patrolling
off Barra Head. The weather was not pleasant, for the
wind was freshening from the south-east and it was thick ;
there was a moderate south-west swell coming in from
the Atlantic ; almost certainly a gale was brewing. At
4.15 a.m. a small object was sighted four points on the
starboard bow, about 5,280 yards away. Course was altered
towards it, and five minutes afterwards, as it appeared to
be a submarine on the surface, heading south, the trawler
cleared for action. The Pearl was commanded by Sub-
Lieutenant A. C. Allman, R.N.R., and carried also a skipper
in addition to her crew.
With all hands at their stations, the skipper at the
wheel, and full speed on the engine-room telegraph,
the Pearl made for the enemy vessel, which altered
course to south-south-west. The trawler had nothing
better than a little 3-pounder gun, so Sub-Lieutenant
Allman instructed his petty officer not to open fire
until the range was down to 1,000 yards. At 4.25 a.m.
the submarine was only 500 yards off, but travelling
at high speed and firing across the trawler's bows.
The Pearl altered course and prepared to ram, at the same
time bringing her gun to bear. The first two shots dropped
very close to the submarine's stern ; the fifth and sixth
seemed to hit. It was a short range ; the gun's crew were
working quickly and the shooting was good, but within
five minutes the gun no longer bore. The submarine was
58 THE FISHERMEN'S ORDEAL [ch. iii
compelled hurriedly to dive, crossing close to the trawler's
bows. Sub-Lieutenant Allman put his helm hard a-star-
board and made a great effort to ram, but missed the
enemy by about forty feet. In a short time the periscope
was seen, so the petty officer at the gun took careful aim
and with his second shot hit and broke off the periscope,
after which the U-boat submerged completely, leaving on
the surface a thick oily wake.
This was to prove an exceptionally long duel, one of the
very longest in the whole of the submarine war, and it
speaks well for the dogged determination of the officer
in charge and his crew that with such inferior armament
they were able to dominate an enemy equipped with a
more powerful gun, as well as torpedoes, and possessing
the ability to choose his own range. It is known now that
the submarine was U41 and that her captain was one of
the most efficient officers of his service. At 4.35 a.m.
she was heading south-west, doing about 7 knots, so the
Pearl took a position on her opponent's starboard bow,
kept a parallel course, and, with her gun bearing, was
ready to ram should the U-boat come to the surface.
This went on until an hour later, when the enemy altered
course to north-east, with speed unchanged. At 6.15 a.m.
the U-boat again altered course, this time to north-west,
and eased to 4 knots. It was obvious that the Pearl, by
keeping up the chase, was causing the enemy's batteries
to run down and all the while the trawler kept closing in,
alert for the first chance of ramming. Unfortunately, a
quarter of an hour later the weather came on thick, rain
falling, but at 9.15 a.m. the submarine came close to the
surface, though without showing herself. Still refusing
to lose any possible chance, the trawler carried on, and at
11 a.m. endeavoured to fire her explosive sweep about 500
feet ahead of the oily wave, but by a piece of bad luck the
electric cable was so injured in getting it over the side that
it would not fire. Troubles did not come singly, for, after
chasing for another hour, the chief engineer reported that
one of his pumps was out of order and that it would be
necessary to stop in an hour's time for a repairing job
which would take three hours.
It was a most disappointing incident, yet there was no
possible alternative but to give up the chase, which had
now brought the Pearl to a position thirty-eight miles
CH. Ill] THE LAST OF U41 59
S.W. by W. of St. Kilda. The Pearl managed to get into
St. Kilda that same afternoon, but with scarcely any water
in her boiler. She had maintained a spirited hunt after the
submarine over a period of nearly eight hours, during which
the trawler had exercised her will-power over the enemy
simply by sheer blunt determination. Had the Pearl really
damaged U41 ? At the time it was thought that the enemy
had been holed in an oil-tank in his outer skin and that this
accounted for the oily wake. Four shots had been fired by
the submarine and thirty-four by the trawler, so at short
range some could not have failed to hit. It was after-
wards ascertained that U41 was seriously injured in the
conning-tower, so that, although she was outward bound,
she was compelled to break off her voyage and return home.
This was to be no pleasure cruise for the U-boat, for,
having arrived at St. Kilda, the Pearl made her report,
and later on in the day a wireless message informing the
patrols was picked up by the armed yacht Vanessa, which
immediately altered course to cut off the retreating enemy.
At 9.10 p.m. she actually sighted her and chased her till
after ten o'clock, but then the enemy got away and was
seen no more that day. At four the next morning she was
sighted still farther north by the armed trawler Stanley
Weyman, by the armed yacht Maid of Honour, and by the
armed trawler Swan, and chased for the best part of two
hours, but U41 evaded them and got safely back to Ger-
many. This submarine was in charge of Lieutenant-
Commander Hansen, who had already had experience of
the offensive- defensive value of the ram. For U41 was
just out from the dockyard after repairs caused by
being rammed on July 16th by the mine-sweeping gun-
boat Speedwell, which on this day had sighted U41
only 250 yards away, and had gone for her with full speed
on both engines and struck her with such force as to cause
the Speedwell to heel over, her bottom plating being
damaged. The incident had occurred north of the Shet-
lands and had damaged both periscopes of the submarine,
so that she had to make her way back across the North
Sea, reaching Germany on July 19th. The moral effect
on the crew of the PearVs success in sending her home for
repairs a second time within the same month can well be
imagined. U41 was sent to her grave by a British man-
of-war a few weeks later. As to the PearVs exploit, the
60 THE FISHERMEN'S ORDEAL [ch. hi
Admiralty praised her commanding officer and crew,
awarding them the sum of £150 and promoting Sub-
Licutcnant Allman to Lieutenant, with seniority dating
from the day on which he had engaged the submarine.
On the southern side of the Firth of Forth is the port of
Granton, which by the spring of 1915 had developed into
a most important naval base, crowded with all kinds of
vessels of the Auxiliary Patrol. The senior naval officer
was Admiral James Startin, who, having ended his time
on the active list before the war opened, had come back
to serve as a R.N.R. officer. To his infectious enthusiasm
and powers as an organiser were due in large measure the
successes which were achieved by the vessels using this
base. He had been struck during the early summer by
the number of molestations by submarines of neutral
merchant traffic in the North Sea. On July 9th a U-boat
had held up four steamers about forty miles east of Fifeness,
but had bolted as soon as the armed yacht Minona had
come into sight. The Admiral therefore resolved to
carry out a stratagem. Among his vessels were two fine
trawlers, the Quickly and the Gunner. The former had
already been disguised so cleverly that she had been taken
by one of our own destroyers for a Danish cargo steamer.
He now improved her disguise, replaced her 3-pounder
by a 12-pounder, mounted a 6-pounder aft, and sent her
off to St. Andrew's Bay. The trawler Gunner he also
disguised, giving her a deck cargo made up of an empty
hawser reel, a hundred bags of sawdust, some empty
crates, and some timber. The Gunner joined the Quickly
in St. Andrew's Bay and to her transferred the cargo.
Four naval ratings as guns' crew had been put on board
these two ships, and on July 19th the vessels left the bay,
Admiral Startin himself being in the Quickly, and steamed
towards Bell Rock, where target practice was carried out
until the Admiral was satisfied that both vessels could
make good shooting.
They then proceeded to their rendezvous where sub-
marines had recently been at work, and during the after-
noon the Quickly completed her disguise as a Norwegian
cargo boat, Norwegian colours being hoisted at the mizzen
masthead and also painted on prepared slips of canvas
which were placed on each side amidships. To make the
disguise perfect, a couple of derricks were placed on the
CH. Ill] THE FIGHT OF THE " QUICKLY " 61
foremast. She thus resembled one of those numerous
Norse traders which could be seen any day in the North
Sea. At 9 a.m. on July 20th the Quickly arrived at the
rendezvous, and just one hour later a large submarine was
sighted on the surface with two masts and two guns.
Ten minutes afterwards both the " Norwegian " vessel
and the U-boat were steering parallel courses, the inter-
vening distance being about four miles. For a short
period the U-boat scrutinised the Quickly, then altered
course to cut her off, lowering both masts. At 10.24 the
enemy had closed to about 1,500 yards and hoisted the
international signal to stop. Five minutes later she fired
the first shot at the trawler ; but already the latter's gun
crew had been preparing for action under cover. The
Norwegian flag was now hauled down, the White Ensign
run up, the strips of canvas taken off, and at 10.32 the
Quickly returned the fire from her 12-pounder with a shot
that struck the enemy's hull abaft the conning-tower,
much smoke being seen to issue from her. The 6-pounder
then opened fire, and the enemy returned it, but her shots
fell either short or over. Admiral Startin himself stated :
" The 6-pounder claims to have put her foremost gun
out of action. The third shot from the 12-pounder struck
the submarine right forward, and flames were seen by
myself and everybody coming from her bows."
At 10.50 a.m. the U-boat submerged until her conning-
tower was awash, but came to the surface again and began
to steam away in that condition. By this time the Gunner,
which had been following astern, arrived on the scene and
also opened fire. The German craft steamed away very
slowly, being at times enveloped in smoke. Another shot
from the Quickly^s 12-pounder shattered the conning-tower
and the Gunner also hit her. The two ships then closed
the enemy with a view to ramming her, but she submerged
and at first could be clearly seen by them. There was much
oil and there were many bubbles ; so a depth charge was
exploded. Nothing came to the surface to suggest that
it was effective. After remaining in the neighbourhood
for another couple of hours, the two British craft left the
scene. It was afterwards learnt that the submarine was
not sunk ; she had managed to get home in a wounded
condition. There are on record other equally amaz-
62 THE FISHERMEN'S ORDEAL [ch. hi
ingly narrow escapes where U-boats, after being quite
as severely punished, managed to make really long voyages
safely back to Germany. No one, however, will begrudge
the commendation which the Admiralty bestowed on
Admiral Startin, the officers and crews of these two ships,
nor the sum of £500 which was awarded to be divided
among the crews. To Lieutenant T. E. Price, R.N.R.,
the commanding officer of the Quickly, was given the
D.S.C., and a similar decoration was conferred on Sub-
Lieutenant C. H. Hudson, R.N.R., who was in command
of the Gunner. The D.S.M. was conferred on the captains
of the 12-pounder and the 6-pounder guns respectively,
and also on the Admiral's coxswain, who spotted for the
6-inch gun in the Quickly.
Whilst such engagements as these were going on, the
fishermen, who were still pursuing their calling, showed
that they were ready for any emergency with which the
fate of war might confront them. At the end of June
the Norwegian barque Kotka, an iron-built vessel of just
under a thousand tons, had the misfortune to fall in with
a submarine in the Atlantic off the south-west Irish coast.
But for the Hull fishing-trawler Rambler she could never
have been saved ; and in order rightly to appreciate the
circumstances it is necessary first to realise what were the
hazards which sailing-ships were at this time compelled
to support.
Owing to the scarcity of tonnage, the demand for such
sailing-ships as could carry oversea cargoes was now very
great. The Government had taken up a large number of
steamships as war auxiliaries, transports, supply ships,
colliers. At the same time there was greater need for
tonnage in which to bring across the ocean food, timber,
and other commodities to meet national and military
needs. In these circumstances, the despised sailing-ship,
even though old, entered on a fresh lease of life. The
British register was swelled by many German sailing-ships
which had been captured and sold to British or neutral
firms and were now engaged in carrying grain. But the
U-boat was no longer confined to the North Sea : she
too was an ocean-going craft which could go round the
north of Scotland, into the Atlantic, down the Irish
coast, and operate off the western approaches of the
British Isles. No easier prey could be afforded the sub-
CH. Ill] AN IMPORTANT CONFERENCE 63
marine than the home-coming saihng-ship ; she was in
the nature almost of a gift to any U-boat that might come
along. Thus, during the first half of June in the south-
west approaches to the British Isles, no fewer than five
British, three Allied, and two neutral sailing-ships were
sunk, most of them carrying valuable cargoes of raw
materials. A spell of easterly winds, such as is usual
during this month, exposed these craft to considerable
risks, and therefore the Mercantile Marine Service Associa-
tion of Liverpool suggested to the Admiralty the desira-
bility of providing free towage into port of such sailing-
ships as arrived off our coasts. Tugs, it was urged, should
be stationed at Queenstown and Falmouth to assist them
into port.
It was whilst the Admiralty were considering this matter
that the fine four-masted barque Dumfriesshire of Glasgow
(2,622 tons) was torpedoed and sunk on June 28th, twenty-
five miles south-west of the Smalls. She had left San
Francisco with 4,100 tons of barley and had reached
Falmouth on June 25th. From there she had been ordered
to Dublin, and on her way was destroyed. In July Lloyd's
also wrote to the Admiralty giving a list of sailing-vessels
sunk by submarines since March 31st, and made the
suggestion that sailing-vessels should be warned, when
approaching the United Kingdom, of the safest routes.
From March 31st to July 2nd, it was pointed out, forty-
three of these craft had been sunk by U-boats off the
British Isles, and on July 6th there were at sea bound from
American ports for the United Kingdom no fewer than 138
sailing-ships with such valuable cargoes as grain, timber,
and nitrate.
The difficulty was that there were no such things
as safe routes : wherever a sailing-ship went she was
in grave danger. A conference was therefore held,
presided over by the Fourth Sea Lord, with representatives
of the Board of Trade, the Sailing- Ship Association, and
the Trade Division of the Admiralty. This took place
on July 16th, and it was decided that the Admiralty should
be asked to send a cruiser to meet all in-coming ships and
indicate to them a port of discharge, whence they might
be convoyed ; that the Admiralty should be requested
to telegraph to the various Consuls directing them to advise
the masters of saiHng-ships to stop outside the 100-fathom
II— 6
64 THE FISHERMEN'S ORDEAL [ch. hi
line and there await a westerly wind, then running straight
to their port of discharge : that westerly ports should,
where possible, be used for discharge : that the Admiralty
should locally provide the necessary tugs subject to the
exigencies of the naval service. The outcome of this
was the issue of an order that when towage was urgently
needed for sailing-ships it should be provided ; and In-
telligence Officers were advised by telegraph all over the
world to warn British and Allied sailing-ships to keep
west of the 100-fathom line until a favourable wind should
enable them to lay a direct course for their destination.
Such, then, was the degree of risk which awaited the
home-coming sailing-ship. The Hull steam-trawler
Rambler had left Liverpool for her fishing- grounds off the
south-west of Ireland, and in the early hours of the morning
was engaged in fishing when she sighted the Kotka about
seven miles off. Something in her appearance was evidently
wrong, so at 6 a.m. the trawler hove up her gear and
steamed towards her. It was at once obvious that there
was not a soul on board : it was equally evident that she
had been holed. What actually had happened was that,
when thirty miles south-west of the Bull Rock, a submarine
had shelled her and then the crew had abandoned ship.
She was an iron ship, bound from Maine to Cork, and it
was pathetic that, after safely crossing the Atlantic, she
should have fallen a victim so near to her port of destina-
tion. Skipper Richmond launched the Rambler's boat,
and sent the mate, second engineer, boatswain, and cook
to investigate, but on account of the heavy sea they were
unable to get on board. However, five hours later the
boat was again launched and Skipper Richmond went
himself, together with the second engineer and a deck
hand, to see what could be done. He found the barque
was under water forward and the only part of her hull
that was clear was her poop. He decided to try and take
her in tow as the weather was moderating, and in the
meantime returned to his trawler. At six o'clock that
evening the wind had died down, though there was a big
ocean swell, and the operation began.
The position of the two ships was now about thirty or
thirty-five miles south-south-west of Galley Head. It
was quite possible that a submarine might suddenly appear
from nowhere and sink both trawler and barque. The
CH. Ill] TRAWLERS' SUCCESS 65
salving of the latter was, therefore, no ordinary hazard.
Fishermen, as a class, are not distinguished navigators,
but they do number among them some of the finest
exponents of seamanship, and this latter art was well
exhibited on this occasion. The mate, chief engineer, and
deck hand boarded the Kotka, and got a wire hawser off
a reel which was on the barque's after deck-house. This
wire they floated down to the Rambler by supporting the
wire with the Kotka's buoys and lifebelts, one end of it
being secured to the barque. The trawler then steamed
as near as possible to the floats, and a wire from the
Rambler was made fast to the end of the Kotka' s wire;
the former then shackled her trawl warps on to it. By
this time it was 7.30 p.m. and towing commenced, the
barque being towed stern first because of the damage
she had sustained forward. All went well during the
night, and at four the following morning the trawler
signalled the Old Head of Kinsale asking that an Admiralty
tug should be sent from Queenstown. At 10 a.m. the
armed trawler Heron arrived from that port. She made
fast to the Kotka's port quarter, but her warps parted
twice. The Rambler then shortened her warp, but this
caused it to part also, after which it was decided to tow
the barque bow first. Some of the Heron's and Rambler's
crew were put aboard her, and from 11 a.m. the Heron
towed ahead, with the Rambler astern steering. An horn-
later the Admiralty tug Warrior from Queenstown arrived
and took the Heron's place, and in the evening a second
Admiralty tug came on the scene and lashed alongside.
In a short time the barque was got safely into Queenstown
Harbour, and beached after a fifty-mile tow.
Thus once more trawlers, manned by men of stubborn
purpose, had defeated the machinations of the enemy's
submarine warfare. The sea is the strictest of schools,
and the fisherman spends most of his life learning its
lessons. If the fishing industry of the British Isles had
not existed in a flourishing state, it would have been
impossible to deal with the submarine menace : the U-boats
would have acted almost as they pleased. More food-
carrying steamers would have been sunk, greater hard-
ships would have had to be endured ashore, and the armies
would have lacked adequate supplies. Gales of wind,
thick weather, dark nights, intricate pilotage, ship-salving
66 THE FISHERMEN'S ORDEAL [ch. m
on the high seas, ship-handHng in narrow waters — these
are the common experiences of fishermen and keep ahve
that spirit which has meant, and will continue to mean,
so much to an island people. The liner, the tramp, the
trawler and drifter are all part of the nation's essential sea
services.
But the work of the trawlers was not confined merely
to the thwarting of submarines : the insidious mine
throughout the war remained a standing menace to the
ships of the Grand Fleet and Merchant Navy alike. In
April the Swarte Bank mine-field had been laid ; about
the end of next month or the beginning of June the Outer
Silver Pit mine-field had been laid ; and on the night of
May 17th-18ththe Dogger Bank mine-field came into exist-
ence, the enemy's hope being to entrap the Grand Fleet
on its periodical sweeps towards the Heligoland Bight.
Most wisely the Admiralty policy had been to allow the
fishing-trawlers the widest possible freedom in fishing,
realising that so long as the fishermen were permitted
to go about their work unfettered, the country had the
advantage of an improvised sweeping-fleet scouting, as it
were, for these hidden mines. The fishermen wanted
nothing but their freedom, and this was conceded to
them in large measure. The Swarte Bank mine-field had
been discovered by fishing-trawlers, so had the Outer Silver
Pit mine-field ; so, too, was the Dogger Bank mine-field
in the month of May. In effect, fishing-trawlers, dragging
their gear along the bed of the sea, proved to be the out-
posts of the mine-sweeping fleet. When once these mine-
fields had been discovered, there followed months of
wearisome work for the paddlers and trawlers engaged
in sweeping up the laid mines. As to the Tory Island
mine-field, laid as far back as the autumn of 1914, the
clearance continued to be made under difficult circum-
stances. During the comparatively fine weather of June
much progress was made, and by the first week of July
it was comparatively clear, though not till the following
March was it definitely swept up completely for all ships.
By the summer of 1915 two facts had been grasped.
Up to June 1st all the enemy mines off our coasts had
been laid by surface ships ; but from that date onwards
the position was complicated by the advent of the UC-
boats, based on Flanders, which laid their mines off pro-
CH. Ill] VALUE OF AUXILIARY PATROL 67
minent headlands and lightships in the southern portion
of the North Sea. Off such places as the Thames Estuary,
Lowestoft, and the Kentish coast, they endeavoured to
block up well-used channels. The result was, obviously,
to put a good deal of increased work on the trawlers and
paddlers. This new phase of the enemy's policy em-
phasised still more the high value of the Auxiliary
Patrol, which enabled shipping to pursue its way with the
minimum of risk. It is inconceivable that the port of
London, for instance, could have received and dispatched
so much shipping — and therefore goods — had it not been
for the reliance placed on the mine-sweeping force to
seaward. It is unnecessary to refer to the increased strain
on material and personnel which this work involved,
because that is obvious. The arrangements had to be
adjusted, as well as might be, to the new conditions.
Neither destroyers nor torpedo craft could be spared.
Engines can be run only for a certain length of time ;
ships need a refit every half-year : in like manner, the
human machine, tuned up to the maximum of efficiency,
can do only a limited amount of work and then it, too,
must have a rest or break down utterly. All the time,
however, cargoes of mines were being brought across from
Bruges by way of Zeebrugge, dumped down off the south-
east coast lightships, headlands, buoys, and landmarks in
such a manner that special sweeping had to be constantly
carried out. Men " groused," and officers complained, of
this ceaseless nerve-wracking turmoil ; but each and all
realised that the job had to be done and they alone could
do it. Let these facts stand on record.
But that was not all. Russia was still our Ally and had
to be supplied with many important munitions of war.
All this traffic depended on the Russian approaches being
kept clear of mines. The Germans were not slow to
appreciate this fact also, and in June sent up the auxiliary
cruiser Meteor (of which we shall have something to say
later) on a mining enterprise to the White Sea. This
vessel left Germany escorted by a submarine and laid
285 mines on the track to Archangel, about the
beginning of June. The first intimation of this new
mine-field was the blowing up of the steamer Arndale
on June 11th, causing the loss of three lives. Between
that date and the end of September nine other merchant
68 THE FISHERMEN'S ORDEAL [ch. in
ships, of British, Russian, Norwegian, and American
nationality, were either damaged or lost. The enemy's
intention was obvious : he realised the value of the Russian
offensive, and the importance of the sea lane by which
military supplies were being sent into Russia through
Archangel.
In another area far to the north the battle between the
mine and the sweeper had, therefore, been joined. The
enemy had laid the mines, would probably lay more, and
it was the duty of British auxiliary vessels to assist the
Russians in sweeping them up and keeping open a
clear channel as long as the ice allowed. Therefore once
more the much-wanted, hard-worked trawler was called
in to bear the brunt of warfare. At Lowestoft an ex-
pedition was fitted out consisting of half a dozen trawlers
and a couple of supply ships, each trawler being armed
with a 12- pounder gun, and the supply ships carrying stores
for three months. These trawlers Avere the Bombardier,
Sir Mark Sykes, T. R. Ferens, Granton, Lord Denman, and
St. Cyr, the first-mentioned being fitted with wireless
telegraphy. Commander L. A. Bernays, R.N., was
placed in charge of the force. He was unfortunately
afterwards killed when in command of a different type of
ship ; he had left the Navy and emigrated to Canada,
where he was living after the war had broken out. He
returned to the Navy, and had from the first succeeded
in infusing something of his own enthusiasm into the
Grimsby trawlermen, who were sent with him to sweep
up the Scarborough mine-field, laid in December 1914.
Commander Bernays had a curious manner of maintaining
discipline, and his naval outlook had been tempered by
long residence in Canada, but his rough crews understood
and respected him. After sweeping in the North Sea,
he had been employed clearing up the Tory Island mine-
field, whither he had insisted on taking his Grimsby
trawlermen, rugged like himself in speech and character.
When the Admiralty ordered Commander Bernays to
undertake this Russian mine-sweeping expedition, they
were well inspired.
It was on June 22nd that the vessels left Lowestoft
bound first for Lerwick, whence they crossed the North
Sea, reaching Alexandrovsk on July 6th. They began
immediately their mine-sweeping operations. By July
CH. Ill] DESTRUCTION OF MINES 69
9th several mines had been destroyed ; four days later
the trawler T. R. Ferens struck a mine herself; but by
the eighteenth of July this expedition had done such good
work that fifty mines had been destroyed. By August
10th the force had been increased by the arrival of two
more trawlers from Lowestoft, besides a collier. By the
middle of August there were still no Russian patrol- vessels,
for there was, at Archangel, no fishing industry on which
they could draw, and only one weak little steamer was
engaged in stopping ships off Svyatoi Nos. The enemy
had laid his mines cunningly off headlands and athwart
the course which would be taken by shipping between
these headlands. In September Commander Bernays was
recalled to be employed in home waters.
On October 2nd the armed yacht Mgusa (afterwards
lost in the Mediterranean) arrived at Yukanskie from
Aberdeen with Rear-Admiral Philhmore, who reported
that by the middle of October 150 mines had been de-
stroyed by our White Sea trawlers and a few by the Russians,
but it would be impossible to destroy all the remaining
mines before the ice set in. In November the ice set in
and put an end to that year's campaign. It happened
to be a very severe and early winter.
In home waters there was so much work for the fishermen
and their craft that the dispatch of additional vessels to
the Baltic could not be justified. The attack on our
fishing-fleets by August had become serious, and the
fine weather was all in favour of the smaller sub-
marines which came over the North Sea from Flanders.
Especially was this the case in the vicinity of Lowestoft,
where the fishing-fleet was scattered from Smith's Knoll
all round the banks to the northward. Again, therefore,
subtlety had to be allied with courage. The Senior Naval
Officer at Lowestoft decided to commission four fishing-
smacks, arm them with a 3-pounder each and send them
off to the fishing- grounds so that it was impossible for
even a friend, let alone a foe, to discriminate between
armed decoy smacks and those unarmed. The following
incident, the first of its Ivind, well illustrates the class
of work which these sailing-vessels carried out. Incident-
ally it is pertinent to remark that a year previously no one
would have dared to have suggested that a fore and aft
rigged sailing-vessel could ever again become a man-of-war.
70 THE FISHERMEN'S ORDEAL [cu. iii
By August 8tli four of these sailing fishing-smacks had
been commissioned. They left Lowestoft with their
crews dressed in all respects like fishermen, and with
nothing on deck or as to their rig suggesting that they
were other than peaceful craft, meet victims for the first
enemy submarine which might come along. Thus on
the 11th of August the Lowestoft smack G. and E. put to
sea. Her crew consisted of Lieutenant C. E. Hamond,
R.N., her real skipper (F. W. Moxey) temporarily enrolled
as second hand R.N.R. (T.), Petty Officer Elhs, R.N.,
Second-hand Page, temporarily enrolled as deck hand
R.N.R. (T.), Leading Seaman J. Warman, R.N., as gun-
layer, Third-hand H. Alexander, temporarily enrolled as
deck hand R.N.R. (T.), and Able Seaman K. Hammond,
R.N. There was thus an admixture of her original crew
with experienced naval fighting men. At 1 p.m. this
smack was about five miles south of Smith's Knoll Buoy
when a submarine came to the surface three miles south-east
of the smack Leader, which was a mile south of the G. and E.
First of all the enemy closed the Leader and ordered the crew
to launch their boat and go alongside the submarine. The
enemy then made use of this boat to place a bomb in the
Leader, which blew up, after which the fishermen were
again placed in their boat and cast adrift. " So far so
good," thought the Germans ; "we shall now deal with the
smack G. and E. in the same manner." As the submarine
was seen approaching this smack, the crew of the G. and E.
pretended to be getting out their rowing-boat, and this
business was kept up until the enemy had closed to some
forty yards and had slewed to a position parallel with her
intended victim.
This was the smack's opportunity. Lieutenant Hamond
issued a short sharp order, up went the White Ensign,
and off went the gun. There was not a moment's
delay. No one could afford to make a mistake ; they
were at too close quarters for that ; and one of the
two was certain to perish speedily. The duel, in fact,
was so short that the smack fired only five rounds from
her little 3-pounder. Three of these shots penetrated the
conning-tower — for it was impossible at that point-blank
range to miss — but the gun had to be depressed so much
that the fourth and fifth shots actually struck the smack's
rail, though one afterwards penetrated the base of the
H
p
«
w
cii. Ill] FISHING SMACK V. SUBMARINE 71
conning-tower. Petty Officer Ellis also succeeded in
killing with his rifle one man who was in the conning-
tower. With great rapidity the submarine dived at a
very high angle, nose first, having been taken completely
by surprise. So great was her hurry to submerge that she
left the body of this man on the conning-tower. She never
came up again. There was great joy among the Lowes-
toft fishermen that this small but dangerous German war-
ship from the Flemish coast had been got rid of so neatly.
There were other instances of this successful armed
smack warfare, and they certainly taught the invaders of
Belgium that British seamen were skilful in stratagem as
well as brave. A well-deserved D.S.C. was awarded to
Lieutenant Hamond. This engagement furnished an
admirable example of the way in which the Royal
Navy and the Merchant Navy co-operated during the
war with the sole object of defeating the Germans.
To the plain, blunt seamanship of the latter came the
aid of the former's fighting skill. Such was the peculiar
temperament of the German, however, that he became
very angry when he learned of the way mere sailing-smacks
were destroying his ingeniously built craft, and threats
were sent in to Lowestoft by other submarines through
the medium of the crews of our fishing-vessels which were
sunk later on. But not even these threats prevented the
hardy North Sea- men from going about their work. Nelson
himself was an East Anglian. In years to come descend-
ants of the men of the twentieth century who confronted
the enemy by sea will be moved to wonder and admir-
ation when they realise that, in spite of the progress of
physical science, little sailing-ships of wood, without
mechanical power, met in close combat and destroyed
steel vessels which could alike go ahead or astern, and
make themselves invisible.
The problem of the fisherman from the beginning to the
end of the war was no easy one. If the naval authorities
had stopped all fishing a most important industry
would have been killed, causing distress and unem-
ployment, besides depriving the nation of one of its
principal articles of food. On the other hand, if they
allowed fishing to continue, losses from mines, torpedoes,
and gunfire and bombs could not be avoided. There is
a tendency to minimise the value of the fishing trade.
72 THE FISHERMEN'S ORDEAL [en. iii
At the beginning of the war it employed in England and
Wales alone 44,000 men and about 216,000 tons of sea-
going craft. In addition, there must be reckoned many
thousands of persons engaged in the distribution and
curing of fish, The fish supply was the equivalent, accord-
ing to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, of nearly
half the total amount of meat annually consumed in the
British Isles, and of this supply about seven-eighths were
landed at coast ports. It came to this then, that these
fishermen were, after the declaration of war, pursuing their
calling in what a soldier would designate " no man's land,"
After the first few months of hostilities most of the best
ships and the most active personnel had joined the Navy.
Approximately 50 per cent, of the fishermen were serving
under the White Ensign, and the rest had to carry on their
work among mines and submarines as best they could.
The ordinary dangers of the sea were, of course, present
as before ; but owing to the removal of the lightships, and
the dowsing of innumerable shore lights, the absence of
buoys, and the introduction of new channels and routes,
their lot was not made any the easier.
Inasmuch as the North Sea was the main naval theatre
of the war, until the submarines started operating off the
western side of the British Isles, from a strictly naval point
of view there would have been advantages in forbidding
any fishing-craft from working in that area. It would
have certainly made matters easier for the Grand Fleet
in its periodical sweeps down the North Sea, and it would
have lightened the duties of the patrols. It must be
admitted that at the beginning of the war the Navy
looked upon these craft rather as a nuisance ; but when
it was found that these trawlers were the means of dis-
covering unsuspected mine-fields, they were regarded in
a very different light.
Once definite conclusions had been reached as to the
usefulness of the fishermen, the craft had to be pro-
tected in some way. It was the Navy's duty to see
that this was done, but that meant detaching vessels
from purely offensive operations. During the summer
of the year 1915 the losses of both steam and sailing
fishing-craft were very heavy, and insurance rates soared
up. In August the question was again raised as to whether,
from the naval point of view, it was desirable to allow these
CH. Ill] NAVAL CONTROL OF FISHING FLEETS 73
vessels to continue their fishing. The whole matter was
carefully investigated by the Admiralty afresh. Admiral
Ballard, who was commanding most of the East Coast area,
stated very truly that fishing-trawlers were keenly on the
lookout for anything suspicious and offered considerable
obstacles to the free navigation of enemy submarines.
Every trawl, warp, or drift net was a potential source of
trouble, and in at least one case a U-boat got her periscope
foul of a trawler's wire and was thrown on her beam ends.
The Dutch fishing- fleets were still allowed to work in the
North Sea, and if British fishing-fleets were withdrawn,
it would mean that we should require at least 150 more
armed patrols.
At this time the total number of trawlers fishing off
the East Coast was about 350, most of which belonged
to the Humber. The Hull fleet was under the control
of a fishing " Admiral," and every morning fish-carriers
met the vessels at sea and took the fish to London ;
otherwise trawlers fished independently. The obvious
solution of the difficulty was some sort of control over
these fleets under Admiralty organisation. This Admiral
Jellicoe advocated. Both he and Commodore Tyrwhitt
were in favour of allowing the trawlers to continue fishing.
But the regulation and control of their movements were
not easy, though eventually the difficulties were sur-
mounted. For the present it was clear that the advantages
of maintaining fishing-fleets at sea were sufficient to war-
rant the insurance of these vessels at a premium lower than
what would be justified from the purely financial point of
view, and this was the decision to which the Admiralty
came in the middle of October. In the year 1917 a really
satisfactory system was introduced, by which these vessels
fished together in groups under Naval control, a sufficient
number in each group being armed at least to enable some
sort of fight to be put up with any submarine that came
along ; one of the trawlers was also fitted with wireless.
This meant commissioning the trawlers and placing them
under the command of the Senior Naval Officers of their
respective ports and they thus became, in fact though not
in name, part of the Auxiliary Patrol. But this evolution
took time, and it was only as the result of many hardly
learned lessons that it came about.
CHAPTER IV
THE SEA TRANSPORT OF THE FIRST MILLION TROOPS
If an adequate conception is to be formed of the manner
in which the Mercantile Marine supported the national
effort by sea and by land in the early days of the war, some
account must be given of the movement of troops oversea.
The transport of war is the merchant ship of peace, usually
a passenger vessel when the change of status occurs ;
the crew of merchant officers and men remains. It was
not the policy of this country to support a separate and
distinct transport service, though it could use its army,
apart from the needs of home defence, only if it had facili-
ties for moving it by sea. Reliance was placed on the
authority of the Admiralty to requisition whatever tonnage
was required for the movement of troops when the emer-
gency arose.
The army of an island Power, the axis of a maritime
Empire embracing nearly one-quarter of the land surface
of the globe, is dependent for movement upon merchant
shipping, and for protection while afloat the heavily laden
transports must rely upon the Navy confronted with many
other duties. As events were to show, the enemy con-
ducted his operations below the surface as well as on
the surface. In that respect, as well as in others, the
transport movement, which began in August 1914, differed
from anything which had been attempted before.
The mobilisation of the military forces on August 4th
brought into operation, under conditions which it had
been impossible to foresee in anything approaching com-
pleteness, the plans for transport oversea, which had been
prepared by the Admiralty in consultation with the War
Office. The interdependence of naval and military policy
was speedily demonstrated in a manner of which the public
generally had no knowledge at the time, for, after the
British ultimatum had been dispatched to Germany,
74
CH. IV] PROBLEMS OF OVERSEA TRANSPORT 75
complete secrecy was observed as to the naval and military
arrangements which were speedily carried out in order to
put the British Empire on a war footing. The silence
suggested that the country had been caught unprepared ;
but behind the fog of war a transport movement was
inaugurated, unparalleled in character and extent in the
history of any country. The reorganisation of the British
Army, which had been in progress from 1902 down to the
opening of the war, suddenly, though not unexpectedly
to the departments concerned, reacted on naval conditions,
and within a few weeks a large number of merchant ships
were engaged in a great transport movement, world-wide
in its extent, in face of the undefeated naval forces of the
second greatest sea Power in the world.
The oversea transport of large military forces calls for
the closest co-operation between naval and military depart-
ments, and demands, perhaps, a higher degree of technical
efficiency in all the elements concerned than any other
operation of war, particularly if the movement is carried
out in face of an enemy fleet which has not revealed its
intentions. The operation is facilitated when the soldiers
can be disembarked on a friendly shore, but even in that
case there remain the perils of the oversea passage, the
imminence of which so impressed many British seamen
that, down to the summer of 1914, it was an axiom, accepted
by many high authorities, that troops should not be
moved by sea until the enemy's naval forces had been
either defeated or definitely thrown back on the defensive.
In the early days of August 1914 the strategic policy to
be adopted at sea by the enemy was undisclosed, but
British merchant seamen, placing complete reliance on
the sufficiency and efficiency of the British Fleet, co-
operated in the great transport movement with singleness
of purpose, confidence in the adequacy of the arrangements
for their safe passage, and complete subordination of
their own interests to the interests of the State.
Many expeditions across the sea had been carried out
since the close of the Napoleonic struggle, but, down to
the South African War, in only four instances had the
number of troops been considerable. The French dis-
patched on the short voyage to Algeria in 1830 37,000
infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and a proportionate number of
guns ; for the invasion of the Crimea in 1854 the forces
76 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [cii. iv
of the Allies numbered about 53,000 men ; the army of the
Potomac, which was transported from Washington to
Fort Monroe in 1861, was relatively a small one ; and
for the British expedition to Egypt in 1882 85,720 officers
and men were landed at Alexandria, Ismailia, and Suez.
During the South African War, 1899-1902, 396,021 officers
and men were carried to South Africa from the British
Isles, India, and the Colonies, but that movement was
spread over a period of two years and eight months. The
first orders for the reinforcements were on a small scale,
and were carried out slowly.
" The decision to reinforce the British troops in Natal
was arrived at by the Cabinet on the 8th of September.
More than a month later, October 12th, the first shot was
fired ; but not till six weeks after the decision to reinforce
did units from home begin to leave the country, and these
troops had to travel more than 7,000 miles before they
could affect the situation at the front. At this crisis
the whole force available at home was dispatched. It
consisted of two battalions of infantry and a brigade
division (three batteries) of field artillery." ^
At the close of the South African War, steps were taken
to remodel the army, and these measures reacted on the
transport arrangements. It was originally proposed to
provide a " striking force " of 80,000 men, and plans were
considered for organising the necessary sea transport
on that basis. After Lord Haldane became Secretary of
State for War, an Imperial General Staff was developed,
the oversea force was further expanded to 164,000 officers
and men, and the watchword of the new military regime
was " quick mobilisation." It was realised that the
value of the Expeditionary Force would depend largely
on the rapidity with which it could be mobilised and
embarked for oversea passage. The plans of the military
authorities having been prepared and tested, as far as that
was possible, it rested with the Transport Department of
the Admiralty to complete the scheme by providing
adequate and suitable transport for the troops as soon as
they reached the water side, thus avoiding delay.
1 The Army in 1906, by the Rt. Hon. H. O. Arnold Foster, late Secretary
of State for War.
cii. IV] EARLY UNCERTAINTIES 77
A country which embarks upon an aggressive war can
fix the date for the declaration of the opening of hostihties,
and lay its plans many months ahead, drawing up a
schedule for the mobilisation and transport of troops.
A Power which acts on the defensive is necessarily at a
disadvantage. But, apart from the uncertainty as to
when the ships, ordinary merchant ships engaged in
peaceful trading, would be required, the difficulties asso-
ciated with British military transport in 1914 were not
lessened by the necessary absence of full knowledge in
preceding months of the part which the British Army
might have to take in war, whether in defending oversea
portions of the Empire or in supporting the French Army
on the Continent.
In the years before the opening of the war, the Govern-
ment had definitely refrained from giving a pledge of
military support to France. But on August 3rd, 1914, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, in the course of a speech
in the House of Commons, that for many months previously
" conversations had taken place between the chief naval
and military experts of Great Britain and France with a
view to joint action if the necessity should arise." On
this occasion the Foreign Minister read a letter which he
had addressed to the French Ambassador on November
22nd, 1912, in proof that " these conversations were not
binding on the freedom of either Government." In that
letter, in the terms of which the French Government
concurred, the Foreign Minister stated : " I agree that
if either Government have grave reasons to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third Power or something which
threatens the general peace, it should immediately discuss
with the other whether both Governments should not act
together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and
if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in
common."
That, as the Foreign Minister pointed out, was the start-
ing-point for the Government when the crisis developed
in the summer of 1914. " The Government," he declared,
"remain perfectly free." He added that "the Triple
Entente was not an alliance but a diplomatic group,"
and " we do not construe anything which has previously
taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers
in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government
78 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [ch. iv
to decide what action it should take now or restricting the
freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their
action shall be." It was in these political circumstances
that the plans for the transport of British military forces
in the event of war had to be prepared. The point is of
some importance, since it illustrates the embarrassments
which an uncertain outlook in the diplomatic field, in
association with a defensive policy, may throw upon
public departments, which in case of failure must be pre-
pared to accept censure.
The transport of the British Army must always be of a
complicated character, owing to the responsibility for
garrisoning oversea bases, and the necessity of keeping a
large force of British troops in India. The Army Estimates
for the financial year 1914-15 made provision for 727,232
officers and men, besides 75,987 British troops on the
Indian establishment. That aggregate included the
Regular Forces, the Army Reserve, the Special Reserves,
the Militia, and the Territorial Force. The Regular Army
was distributed between Home and Foreign stations as
follows :
At Home.
Abroad.
Total.
Cavalry Regiments
19
12
31
R.H.A. Batteries
13
12
25
R.F.A. Batteries .
99
48
147
Mountain Batteries.
—
9
9
Garrison Artillery Companies
43
56
99
R.E. Companies
56
21
77
Guards Battalions .
9
—
9
Infantry Battalions
74
74
148
The Indian Army establishments consisted of 2,751
officers and 161,081 other ranks, with 35,700 Reservists.
In addition, there were an Indian Volunteer Force, con-
sisting of Europeans and Anglo-Indians, of about 1,500
officers and 37,000 other ranks, and about 20,000 Imperial
Service Troops. Each of the British Dominions also
possessed the nucleus of a military force.
Immediately war was declared, the predominant problem
was how the varied and not inconsiderable, if, in some
respects, untrained, military resources of the Empire could
be best utilised for the defence of the world-wide Empire
CH. IV] THE PART OF THE JMERCHANT NAVY 79
itself against possible dangers and for the promotion of the
Allied cause. The impression, current at the outbreak of
war, that the Merchant Navy became responsible only
for the movement of the Expeditionary Force to France
was based upon a misapprehension, both of the prepara-
tions which had been made by the Transport Department
of the Admiralty, and of the plans which Lord Kitchener
drew up on taking office as Secretary of State for War on
August 5th for the redistribution of the military forces of
the Empire. The Secretary of State for War accepted the
transport arrangements which had already been made for
carrying the Expeditionary Force across the Channel, and
he conceived a further plan of imperial mobilisation which
threw upon the Merchant Navy a greatly increased and
unexpected burden. Finally, after consultation between
the Mother Country and the Dominions, the Dominion
authorities prepared plans for bringing considerable bodies
of newly raised troops from Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, further increasing the responsibilities of the
Mercantile Marine as well as the Royal Navy. In effect,
Lord Kitchener determined, while throwing the Expedi-
tionary Force on the Continent, to carry out a " general
post " of the military forces of the Empire, involving a
widespread movement of transports crowded with officers
and men in all the seas and oceans of the world at a time
when the enemy fleets were still undefeated.
The power of moving armies across the sea was a deciding
factor in the victory of the Allied and Associated Powers
in the Great War. The problem presented two difficulties :
(1) ensuring the security of the troops in transit against
danger from enemy surface craft, submarines, and sub-
marine mines, and (2) the provision and handling of
shipping to accommodate the military personnel, animals,
vehicles, and stores of all kinds required for military use.
The first problem was one for the Navy, and this important
phase of naval strategy is dealt with elsewhere. ^ It is
proposed to deal here with the part taken by the British
Mercantile Marine in overcoming the second difficulty, the
provision and handling of shipping and the essential
auxiliary services.
By the last month of the war about 520 British vessels,
ranging from ships of 500 tons gross to the largest passenger
^ Naval Operations, by Sir Julian Corbett.
II— 7
80 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [ch. iv
liners, were being employed on British military services.
Their tonnage was about 1,750,000 gross, and that repre-
sented approximately the average amount of tonnage
continuously devoted to this service throughout the war,
excepting in the very early stages when the armies operating
overseas were smaller, and less tonnage sufficed to meet
their requirements. A very important principle to be
borne in mind when deciding upon an oversea military
operation is that it is not only a question of providing
tonnage once for all for the actual troop movements ;
there must always be an aftermath of demands for trans-
port of stores, ammunition, and reinforcing drafts in one
direction, and of sick and wounded, and maybe prisoners
of war, in the other. The proportion of tonnage required
for these purposes depends upon the nature of the military
forces employed, of the character of the operations upon
which they are engaged, and upon the nature of the
theatre of war in which they are to operate. There is
much to be learned from the numbers of men and weights
of stores transported from a land base to and from an army
in the field by railways, motor lorries, horsed wagons,
and other forms of land transport. This information,
which has an important bearing upon land strategy, does
not, however, come within the scope of this history. We
are, however, concerned with another aspect of the matter.
After an army has been landed at an oversea base, the
responsibility for maintaining this constant stream of
traffic across the sea falls upon the Mercantile Marine,
which links up the oversea army with the home country.
In such circumstances the commanders of an insular
army are as dependent upon shipping for their strategy
as they are upon railways and other forms of land transport.
The military strategist handling an army in a peninsula
or other theatre of war with a large proportion of coast-
line can sometimes take advantage of sea command to
change his base of operations ; he can thus shorten his
lines of communications and alter their direction. Acting
on these principles in the Peninsular War, Wellington,
commanding a comparatively small military force, changed
his base from Lisbon to Santander and other ports on the
north coast of Spain. In the Egyptian War of 1882 the
British base was changed suddenly from Alexandria to
Ismailia. Kuroki, in the Russo-Japanese War, would
CH. IV] TENTATIVE PREPARATIONS 81
have been unable to advance through Korea from Chemulpo
to the Yalu had it not been for constant changes of
base to other more northerly places on the coast, and
history affords many similar examples. It is doubtful
whether the British Army could have intervened in the
first battle of the Marne had it not been for the help of
the Mercantile Marine in the change of base from Havre
to St. Nazaire and Nantes on the River Loire, to which
important operation special reference must be made later.
A just appreciation of the services which the Mercantile
Marine rendered in the transport of troops can be formed
only in the knowledge that by land and sea, lines of com-
munication for armies reveal the same principle ; the
longer the line, the greater the amount of transport
required in proportion to the strength of the army.
Although the actual amount of tonnage per man and
horse may be the same for the troops actually transported,
the number of ships required for subsequent services in-
creases enormously with the distance of the oversea theatre
of war from the home base. The operations in France
and Flanders were vastly more economical in shipping
and protective measures than the operations in distant
theatres.
(a) The Expeditionary Force to France (B.E.F.)
As has been indicated, the only operation for which
it had been possible to make preparations, and those
of a tentative character, was the transport of the
original British Expeditionary Force across the Channel.
When the emergency occurred, it was only necessary to
bring the scheme up-to-date, to ascertain the names of
vessels available in home waters at the time, and to
introduce a few amendments necessitated by original over-
estimates of the capacity of the French harbours for
handling the traffic with sufficient speed. Orders were
issued on August 5th, 1914, for the scheme to be put into
execution. It was at first intended that August 7th
should be the first day of embarkation, but ultimately
the date was fixed as August 9th. The original plan
provided for the embarkation of six divisions, cavalry and
line of communication troops, but two divisions (the 4th
and 6th) were taken out of the scheme when the order to
82 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [ch. iv
embark was issued. The 4th Division was subsequently
reinstated on the hst and began to embark on August 22nd,
and fought at Le Cateau on the 26th ; and the 6th Division,
from Ireland, was transported to England and conveyed
to France on September 8th and 9th. The Merchant Ser-
vice rose to the occasion so well that the necessary trans-
ports were ready, as a rule, the day before they were required,
although in some cases the necessary refitting of vessels
for the carriage of men and horses occupied from two to six
days. As the embarkation proceeded, it was found to be
possible to expedite the programme. The moves originally
fixed for the 13th day were carried out on the 12th day,
and those for the 14th on the 13th day. In other respects
the embarkation followed exactly the lines originally laid
down. In actual experience the military were in charge
of the troops, equipment, etc., until the wharves were
reached. The Navy's responsibility began when the troops
were on board and ended when they had been landed on
the overseas wharves.
Up to August 23rd the troops and military resources
were landed at Boulogne, Le Havre, and Rouen. From that
date until August 31st at Le Havre and Rouen. Then came
the change of base, of vital importance to the British war
strategy, to which reference has already been made.
Between August 31st and September 16th the disembarka-
tion ports were St. Nazaire and Nantes on the River Loire.
From September 16th, owing to the more favourable situa-
tion resulting from the first battle of the Marne, the service
to Le Havre and Rouen was partially resumed.
Southampton was the principal port of embarkation for
troops. The following table shows the numbers embarked
at English and Irish ports between August 9th and
September 21st :
Port.
Officers.
Other Ranks.
Horses.
Nursing Sisters
and Civilians.
Southampton
Newhaven .
Avonmouth .
Liverpool
Devonport .
Dublin . . (
Belfast . . }
Queenstown . . [
5,028
66
58
16
30
826
171,708
409
4,547
1,741
844
25,921
51,434
421
10,184
1,389
9
Totals
6,024
205,040
62,039
1,398
CH. IV] FIRST MOVEMENTS 83
These figures give some idea of the strain brought upon
the British Mercantile Marine to meet the demand for
transference of the Expeditionary Force to France. In
addition to personnel and horses, 93,364 tons is a minimum
estimate of the amount of ammunition, stores, vehicles,
etc., carried to the same destination for the Army, distri-
buted as follows : Ammunition for guns : 3,984 tons, for
small arms 2,185 tons ; food : 31,509 tons ; forage :
21,364 tons ; petrol : 1,006,462 gallons ; vehicles : 12,162
tons ; stores : 25,080 tons. These figures were dwarfed
by the vast amount of tonnage occupied for military pur-
poses when the large new armies took the field on the
Western Front and in other theatres of war ; when ex-
penditure of ammunition was on a scale undreamed of,
and trench stores, new weapons, and tanks were intro-
duced ; but the figures serve as a useful corrective to the
prevalent idea that sea transport of armies is a simple
matter of embarking and disembarking personnel and
horses.
The general allocation to various ports of embarkation
had been arranged as follows : — Southampton, Dublin,
Glasgow, Queenstown, Belfast, and Jersey : troops and
horses ; Newhaven : stores ; Liverpool : mechanical
transport and frozen meat ; Avonmouth : mechanical
transport and petrol ; London : stevedores ; Devonport ;
Siege Brigade ; Dover : Naval Brigade.
On the first day (August 9th) six transports, with a
total of 5,361 tons gross, left. The numbers varied during
the period, the maximum number being reached on
August 14th (forty-four vessels, gross tonnage 154,361),
and the maximum tonnage on August 16th (thirty-nine
vessels, gross tonnage 171,188). On the last day of the
period, September 20th, six transports, of a total gross
tonnage of 43,409, left. The movements were worked
on the ferry system, the same vessels doing from a single
voyage up to nine voyages during the period ; the whole
movement was completed in 570 trips, and the ship-tonnage
clearing from the ports totalled 2,241,389 tons gross.
The daily average of sailings was thirteen vessels, of 52,125
gross tonnage.
As typical of the zeal with which the personnel of the
Merchant Service worked to keep the programme up to
time, and so contribute to the success of our army in the
84 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [ch. iv
field, one incident may be mentioned. When sudden
orders were received to evacuate Le Havre, two Leyland
liners were at Southampton at No. 47 berth, coaling.
In the middle of the night orders were given to stop coaling
and to sail at once to Le Havre. The coaling was stopped,
but a difficulty occurred in closing the coaling ports, which
had to be secured by bolts from the outside. The ships'
officers and engineers went over the side on stages to
effect this, and, as the ships steamed away into the dark-
ness, these men could be seen hanging on the ships' sides,
only a few feet from the water, putting in a few bolts to
ensure the safety of their ships ; by their action much
time was saved.
This leads us to the rapid evacuation of Le Havre, upon
which the speedy recuperation of our army after the retreat
from Mons so largely depended. The need to make pro-
vision for the ordered movements hitherto described had,
as we have noticed, been foreseen. Owing to the adverse
military situation, first Boulogne had to be abandoned
as a port of disembarkation, then Le Havre, the main base of
the British Army. The order for the evacuation of the
latter port was received on August 30th. On that day
about 60,000 tons of military stores were lying on the
wharves. This immense amount of stores, 21,000 troops,
and 7,000 horses were conveyed by sea from Le Havre to
the River Loire by the Mercantile Marine, and as a result
the British Army, reinforced and re-equipped, was able
to cross the Marne on September 9th, and continue its
advance subsequently. By the 16th the transfer had
been completed.
It is not easy to find any historic precedent which
applies to this successful effort. The official history of
the Egyptian War of 1882 mentions the transfer of a
base of a much smaller British army from Alexandria
to Ismailia. The comparison is hardly a fair one, because
Alexandria was not evacuated, but retained as the main
base of the army, Ismailia being used as the forward base.
Moreover, the scale of army equipment was not so lavish
in those days, and the army itself had not lost heavily in
guns and stores in a rapid retreat. The official history
tells us that, although the plans for the change of base
were completed by August 16th, 1882, and the necessary
orders issued, matters had not progressed sufficiently for
CH. IV] AN INCroENT IN THE " INVENTOR " 85
operations from Ismailia to commence until September
9th, twenty-four days, compared with eighteen days when
the emergency occurred at the beginning of the Great War,
a result of which a large share of the credit falls upon the
efforts of the Merchant Service to cope with the emergency.
It is claimed that over 7,500 tons of stores were cleared
daily from Le Havre, in addition to 10,000 tons taken from
Rouen in two days ; 2,000 Belgian troops, with guns and
2,000 horses, were also cleared from Rouen. An idea of
the comparative magnitude of the effort can be gleaned
from the figures for Richborough, a model port of em-
barkation, after twenty-eight months of work and about
£1,750,000 in money had been expended upon facilities
there for loading war-like stores. A report of Lieutenant-
General Sir H. Lawson, dated October 24th, 1918, stated
that the average daily shipment of stores at Richborough
amounted to about 3,000 tons ; the maximum had been
6,000 tons.
The navigational difficulties, which w^ere very serious,
were on the whole successfully surmounted. The ships
were not in all cases suitable for the ports of the Loire,
which were not as capable as Le Havre of accommodating
vessels of large displacements. One vessel, the Inventor,
described as the most important storeship of all, was the
largest that had ever reached Nantes. Such heavy ships
could only come up on the top of the tide, and they had
to be berthed against an island where the w^ater was
deepest ; even there they settled and heeled over at low
tide. The carrying capacity of the Inventor was 10,800
tons, and her holds were 40 feet deep. She was berthed
at Nantes late on September 7th and, owing to the poor
local facilities which existed, it took over ten days to
clear her holds, in spite of the utmost exertions. Her
case is referred to in some detail because of an incident
during her unloading. The incident furnishes an illus-
tration of the great complication of the question of sea
transport of military stores, and its influence upon the
fighting efficiency of armies.
A small consignment, of about a quarter of a ton, on
board this vessel, contained the boxes and belts of
machine-guns urgently required by the fighting troops in
replacement of losses. This consignment was buried under
about 10,000 tons of other stores of all kinds. Whether
86 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [ch. iv
this was due to an order given to load the most important
stores first at Le Havre to avoid capture, or to the original
stowage of the hold at Southampton, is a matter on which
no light can be shed. As soon as the change of base from
Le Havre was ordered, the machine-guns to replace losses
in the Mons retreat were sent by rail as urgent stores to
the new advanced base, but they were useless without the
belts and boxes. These were not found, near the bottom
of the Inventor'' s cargo, until September 17th, and the urgent
demands by the Army for machine-guns were consequently
not satisfied until after long delay. At that period no
vouchers accompanied ordnance stores to France, and
there were no supercargoes in charge of them. The in-
cident in no way reflects upon the Merchant Service, and
is quoted in order to place on record for future guidance
that the issue of an action may depend upon the receipt
in the right sequence at the front of a quarter of a ton of
technical stores out of the hold of a storeship containing
nearly 11,000 tons, and difficulties multiply when all
packages are not clearly marked with the nature of their
contents. At a later date " convoymen " accompanied
cargoes, and vouchers came through with the military
stores.
This account of the work done by the Mercantile Marine
in connection with the transport of the original Expedi-
tionary Force to France would not be complete without
a reference to the sudden strain caused unexpectedly by
the decision to attempt the relief of Antwerp. The move-
ment of the Royal Marine Brigade to and from Ostend
in August 1914 was carried out by war-vessels, so is out-
side the scope of this chapter. We need not pause to
deal in detail with the transport of the Royal Naval
Brigade to Dunkirk in September 1914, of the Royal
Naval Artillery to the same destination in October, and
of the 7th Division and Naval Division to Belgium, but
the complication of the service subsequently undertaken
cannot be over-emphasised. The 7th Division was landed
at Ostend and Zeebrugge. Transports arrived at Ostend
on October 7th and 8th, and the landing of troops and
stores was at once proceeded with. On Saturday, October
10th, when most of the stores had been landed, orders
were given to evacuate Ostend in forty-eight hours' time,
to re-embark all stores, and to make every effort to get
CH. IV] A FOUR DAYS' RECORD 87
the ships away to prevent their falHng into the hands of
the enemy. About twenty-four transports were in the
port, many of them in the tidal basin, which only about
six ships could leave on one tide.
Then the Naval Division, the Marine Brigade, the
refugees, and Belgian troops began to pour in, and
owed a deep debt of gratitude to the masters and
crews of the transports who gave them shelter, hot
cocoa, and sorely needed food. Refugees and troops
blocked all approaches. Only comparatively few steve-
dores could be obtained, twenty-eight on one day and
seven on another. Practically the whole of the loading
of British army stores was done by the officers and crews
of the transports, who put in extraordinarily long hours of
work, and by British soldiers ; the Belgian cranemen and
men on the lock-gates also worked continuously without
reliefs. Amongst the loads were heavy guns, a 9 •2-inch
weighing thirty-eight tons, two 6-inch, and six 4-7-inch,
besides two steam tractors and a good deal of ammunition.
There were no suitable slings, but the transport Artist had
a spare new wire hawser of which the master (Mr. Mills)
and his chief officer made use and personally slung the
steam tractors, thus saving these valuable stores from
capture, a most noteworthy performance.
Between October 10th and 13th, 6,000 Naval Division,
1,000 Belgian wounded, and one shipload of horses,
carriages, 'and other things belonging to the King of the
Belgians, were transported from Ostend to England ; 440
British troops and two shiploads of Belgian stores were
moved from Ostend to Boulogne; 1,500 Belgian troops
from Ostend to Cherbourg ; 2,000 Belgian refugees from
Zeebrugge to Calais and Cherbourg, 1,200 Royal Naval
forces and 6,000 Belgian wounded from Dunkirk to
England, 11,000 Belgian troops from Dunkirk to Cher-
bourg. Between October 17th and 18th 17,900 Belgian
troops were transported from Dunkirk to Calais, and 3,000
from Boulogne to Dunkirk. In addition, about 1,000
Russian refugees from Belgium and England were carried
to Archangel, and a number of emergency coast moves
were carried out. Thirty thousand French troops were
also moved from Le Havre to La Pallice, and 10,000 from
Calais to Cherbourg, in British ships.
The scene at Ostend, at the time when the troop move-
88 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [ch. iv
merits were taking place, may be gathered from the
following account :
" On October 14th it was announced that the vessels
sent to Ostend were evacuating refugees at the rate of
5,000 a day ; a previous report had stated that the roads
leading to the port were black with refugees flocking
towards it. The number of these unfortunate people
awaiting embarkation on October 13th was 20,000, and a
destroyer escort was requisitioned to protect the crowded
transports. The Belgian packet-boat helped materially
in the work of transference across the Channel, assisted
by the English passenger ships Invicta, Queen, and Vic-
toria."
Zeebrugge port was closed down on October 10th, and
Ostend on the 14th. Speed had to take precedence of
organisation, as may be gathered from a report from the
Naval Transport Officer at Dover on October 15th, that
" half the refugees that had arrived there were wounded
soldiers, etc., all mixed up hopelessly." There was un-
avoidable . overcrowding, and the varied personnel was
taken to Dover faster than it could be handled there ;
but the matter was urgent, and the way in which the
British Merchant Service rose to the occasion and dealt
with the difficult situation without disaster from marine
risks or overcrowding earned the highest praise of the
naval and military authorities.
At first Belgian pilots were employed to pilot the vessels
as far as Dunkirk, but owing to the congestion they could
not get back to Ostend. The navigation of these waters
is always difficult, and the prevailing foggy weather
increased the difficulties and risk. Luckily some of the
transports had Trinity House pilots on board. Any
master who did not elect to sail without a pilot was given
one of these, and his ship led a string of three or four
transports until open waters were reached. The whole
operation was conducted without mishap, and only one
vessel, the Coath, an ammunition ship, was delayed near
Malo-les-Bains, where she was ordered to anchor by a
French patrol-boat and apparently forgotten. She
reached Dunkirk two days later.
CH. IV] A GREAT STRAIN 89
(b) The Empire Military Mobilisation ^
Having dealt briefly with the sea transport of the
British Expeditionary Force to France, for which pre-
parations had been made in pre-war days, and with the
variation in the plans which occurred, we can now pass to
the unexpected and unprepared movements of troops which
threw such a heavy strain upon the Merchant Service in the
early days of the war. Owing to the doubt which prevailed
as to whether troops from the self-governing Dominions and
India would participate with the British Army in a great
war, no detailed preparations had been made for their
sea transport, and there had been no study of the influence
of the withdrawal of British merchant shipping for this
purpose upon the economic position in Great Britain.
The point is mentioned to emphasise the serious nature of
the strain brought to bear upon the Merchant Service in
meeting the sudden demand for tonnage for troop trans-
port, while at the same time making every effort to main-
tain the supply to the British Isles of the food and raw
material needed by the population. The transports for
the short cross-Channel movement were worked, as we have
seen, on the ferry system, and one vessel did as many as
nine voyages in about three weeks. This conveys some
measure of the difference in the number of vessels required
for long voyages occupying several weeks, or even months.
Lord Kitchener determined to concentrate all the highly
trained forces of the Empire in France, replacing them by
less well trained units. It was a bold stroke of policy,
and its success depended on the efficiency of the transport
arrangements and the devotion of officers and men of the
Merchant Service. When the great military mobilisation
began to take effect, the chief movements were, in sequence
of the orders received for their execution : (1) August 19th :
the removal of part of the garrisons of Egypt, Malta, and
Gibraltar to the United Kingdom ; (2) August 25th : the
movement of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force ;
(3) August 29th : the transfer of Territorial troops to Egypt,
Malta, and Gibraltar ; (4) SejJtember 4th : the movement
of the first contingent of the Australian Expeditionary
Force .* (5) September 9th : the movement of the First
Canadian Expeditionary Force ; (6) September 13th : the
^ Direct movements to enemy territory are not included in this section.
90 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [ch. iv
dispatch of transports from Egypt to India, and con-
veyance of Egyptian garrison to England ; (7) September
23rd : the transfer of Wessex Territorial Division to India ;
(8) October 10th : the movement of British troops to India ;
(9) October 14th: the transfer of Home Counties Territorial
13ivision to India ; (10) November Srd : the movement of
the second contingents, Australia and New Zealand
Expeditionary Forces ; (11) November 11th: the transfer
of Wessex (Reserve) Territorial Division to India,
We will take these movements in succession in order to
reflect the character and extent of the burden which was
thrown on the Mercantile Marine, for they involved the
use of a great volume of shipping.
(1) Removal to the United Kingdom of Trooj^s from. Egypt,
Malta, and Gibraltar.— The grand total of these movements
amounted to 7,355 officers and men, 711 horses, and 278
mules. The troops moved from Egypt included 1 cavalry
regiment, 3 battalions of infantry, 1 battery of R.H.A.,
1 Field Company R.E., and details of the Army Service
Corps, Veterinary Department, and Ordnance Corps ;
from Malta 3 battalions of infantry, and details ; from
Gibraltar 1 battalion of infantry, and details. There
were also large numbers of women and children at all
those Mediterranean garrisons. The movement was fore-
shadowed on August 19th. It was carried out between
September 13th and October 16th by nine transports,
with a total gross tonnage of about 80,000. On August
28th further information was received through the General
Officer commanding in Egypt that the whole Egyptian
garrison would eventually be removed excepting a few
minor details, its place being taken by a Territorial divi-
sion. Indian troops would require transport from Egypt
to Marseilles.
(2) Movement of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. —
On August 25th notice was received of the approaching
movement of the original New Zealand Expeditionary
Force, On August 31st the New Zealand Minister of
Defence announced that the force was ready to embark,
and on September 12th that the reinforcements for this
main force would be ready to follow about six weeks after
its departure. The first convoy, containing nine transports
(72,800 tons gross), left Wellington on October 16th, 1914,
and arrived in Egypt on December 1st. On November
CH. IV] A VAST VOLUME OF SHIPPING 91
Ilth provisional arrangements for the dispatch of the
reinforcements were forwarded to New Zealand. On
December 12th the Admiralty gave permission for the
three transports carrying them to steam without escort
as far as Aden, although enemy cruisers were known to
be at large. They left on December 14th and arrived in
Egypt on January 31st, 1915. The strength of the New
Zealand Expeditionary Force was 7,670 officers and men
with 3,467 animals, and the reinforcements numbered
1,971 officers and men wuth 959 animals, and were carried
in three transports, of about 20,350 tons gross. In addition
to these troops, 200 Maoris, offered by New Zealand and
accepted by the Army Council, were transported to Egypt,
and 147 British Army Reservists were conveyed without
escort round the Horn, arriving in England on December
20th.
(3) Transfer of Territorial Troops from England to Gibral-
tar, Malta, and Egypt. — On August 29th a demand was
received from the War Office for the dispatch of a Terri-
torial division and 2 regiments of Yeomanry to Egypt,
an infantry brigade to Malta, and 2 battalions to Gibraltar,
the estimated total numbers amounting to 490 officers,
14,372 other ranks, and 363 horses. Thirteen merchant
vessels were selected to carry the troops, and seven were
requisitioned for the horses, etc. It was understood that
the existing garrison of Egypt would be brought to Eng-
land in these transports, Avhen it was relieved. By Sep-
tember 4th nineteen vessels (155,500 tons gross) had been
appropriated. The first of these left Southampton on
that day, and the last arrived at Alexandria on Sep-
tember 25th. One vessel, the Grantully Castle, proceeded
through the Canal to Port Sudan, carrying about 1,900
troops.
(4) Movement of the First Contingent of the Australian
Expeditionary Force. — On September 4th, 1914, the
Australian Government sanctioned the requisition of
detained enemy ships for use as transports, and on Sep-
tember 5th announced that all the units of the first Aus-
tralian contingent would be ready to embark within six
weeks, at the same time representing to the Board of
Trade that it was important, so far as practicable, that
the transports should also carry cargo on the voyage to
England. On September 8th the Admiralty announced
92 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [ch. iv
that by October 7th an escort for the convoy would be
ready at Fremantle, and that the New Zealand reinforce-
ments would join the convoy. The Australian Navy
Office reported on September 9th that twenty-seven trans-
ports would assemble at St. George's Sound by October
5th. The Miltiades, conveying British Army reservists,
left Australia on October 23rd. On November 1st thirty-
six transports left for Colombo. It had been decided on
October 26th that the Australian and New Zealand convoy
should come to England by the Cape of Good Hope route,
but on November 21st the decision was reached to land the
contingents in Egypt to complete their training and for
defence of the country, then threatened by an invasion
by Turkish troops, Turkey having by this time joined the
Central Powers. The British Army reservists were to be
sent on to England. This change in the arrangements
threw an extra strain upon the Merchant Service, and
much correspondence ensued about the destination of the
various vessels unexpectedly liberated by the new scheme
of disembarkation. The convoys arrived in Egypt on
December 1st, 1914, without mishap or delay. The only
adverse incident which occurred was that one transport,
the Anglo-Egyptian, touched the breakwater at Colombo,
but the damage was not sufficient to delay the vessel.
Throughout the course of these unprepared troop move-
ments, it is noticeable that, although so many merchant
ships, liners and cargo-vessels were diverted from their
usual routes, they were handled safely by good seaman-
ship in harbours with which the captains and crews were
not familiar. Twenty-eight vessels for troops (gross ton-
nage 244,500) and fifteen for details, stores, etc., were
employed to transfer the Australian contingent to Egypt.
The total military personnel carried numbered 21,429
officers and men, with 8,000 animals.
(5) Movement of the First Canadian Expeditionary Force
across the Atlantic. — This movement of large numbers of
valuable transports loaded with troops into the war area
infested with submarines and mines, while sea command
was in dispute, threw a great strain upon the seamanship
and resourcefulness of the Merchant Service. The first
papers on the subject in the transport department are
dated September 9th, 1914. The arrangements for the
organisation of the convoys and provision for their safety
CH. IV] THE CANADIAN FORCE 93
by the Navy are beyond the scope of this history. Secrecy
was all-important. Quebec was the port of embarkation,
and subsequently assembly took place in Gaspe Bay.
The movements of 18,000 -ton vessels of 17- knot speed had
to be synchronised with those of 3,000-ton vessels with a
speed of 10 knots. Southampton was first selected as
the port of disembarkation, and Liverpool was also sug-
gested. The transport of the First Canadian Division was
rendered more difficult by its inflated numbers, which
amounted to 31,200 officers and men and 7,300 horses.
The convoys left on October 3rd. During the voyage
many changes were made in the proposed ports of dis-
embarkation, but finally Devonport was selected. By
October 15th all the transports, excepting one, the Ma?i-
hattan, which sailed separately, had reached Plymouth
Sound, and they had been unloaded on October 22nd.
In view of the want of previous practice in station- keeping
between merchant ships of such widely divergent speed
and size, the safe transport of this heterogeneous convoy
reflected great credit upon the masters and watch-keeping
officers of the merchant ships. Thirty-one vessels (total
gross tonnage 321,000) carried the Canadian troops ; two
more, with the Newfoundland contingent and a British
infantry battalion (2nd Lincolnshire) accompanied the
convoys on October 3rd, and four cargo vessels left
independently between October 7th and November 7th.
There were only a few minor claims for damage to trans-
ports, and only one adverse incident ; some rifles were
carried on to Glasgow by one of the transports after
the disembarkation at Devonport.
(6) Dispatch of Transports from Egypt to India, and
Conveyance of Egyptian Garrison to England. — On September
12th the Viceroy of India made representations to the
War Office on the subject of requirements in transports,
and it was suggested that the twenty then on their way
to Egypt with Territorial troops should go on to India for
use of the military authorities. Between September 26th
and 28th nine transports were sent on to India from Egypt,
and one vessel from Marseilles. Four transports (gross
tonnage 38,240) left Alexandria for England with the
original Egyptian garrison (strength 78 officers, 3,074 other
ranks, including 220 natives with 625 animals), on Septem-
ber 30th, and one transport left Port Sudan, carrying a
94 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [ch. iv
British battalion (1st Suffolk), on October 3rd, arriving
at Southampton on October 11th.
(7) Transfer of Wessex Territorial Division to hidia. —
On September 23rd a demand was received to move this
division to India, the numbers being estimated at 490
officers, 14,372 other ranks, and 363 horses. Four trans-
ports were detained at Southampton for the purpose.
The troops embarked on October 9th in nine transports,
total gross tonnage 73,000. Two hundred and twenty-
naval ratings were sent to Malta in one of the transports,
the Ingonia, which would otherwise have proceeded empty
to India. The convoy arrived at Bombay and Karachi
on November 9th-llth.
(8) Movement of British Troops from India. — This move-
ment was initiated on October 10th, 1914. The first group,
consisting of 5 battalions of infantry, 11 R.F.A. batteries,
3 R.G.A. heavy batteries, details, and women and children
(the troops totalling 227 officers and 11,500 men), left
Bombay on October 16th in seven transports (total gross
tonnage 62,000) and arrived safely at Plymouth on
November 16th with the exception of the Dunera, which
put into Southampton the same day, having run con-
siderable risk of being torpedoed by submarines on her
way up- Channel. She was the only transport in the convoy
not fitted with wireless telegraphy. This need was supplied
before her next voyage.
The second group, of 9 battalions of infantry and 2
R.H.A. and 2 R.F.A. batteries, 3 companies of R.G.A,,
women, children, and horses (the troops totalling 332
officers and 11,887 men), left Bombay and Karachi on
November 19th and 20th in nine transports (total gross
tonnage 79,700) and arrived at Devonport on December
22nd. The handling of these loads while on board by the
Merchant Service engaged in the transport work may be
judged from the smooth disembarkation of the whole in
forty hours, which elicited from the admiral of the port the
expression " admirably carried out."
The third group of 5 battalions, accompanied by details
and by very large numbers of women and children, besides
the personnel of 2 Indian hospital ships and an Indian
general hospital (the troops totalling 182 officers and
5,412 men), left Bombay and Karachi on December 9th
and 10th in seven transports (total gross tonnage
CH. IV] TERRITORIALS MOVED TO INDIA 95
63,700) and arrived at Avonmouth on January 10th,
1915.
The fourth group, of 1 battahon, with women and
children (the troops totalHng 52 officers and 1,420 men),
left Bombay in one transport of 8,092 tons gross and
arrived at Avonmouth on February 1st.
The fifth group, with details of numerous regiments left
behind, women, children, and ordnance stores (the troops
totalling 33 officers and 651 men), left India on February
23rd in four transports, of 34,000 tons gross ; two were
detained in Egyptian waters, one of these, the Ionian,
being requisitioned for the General Officer Commanding.
The two sent on, the Caledonia and Aragon, after detention
at Gibraltar owing to the danger attending upon the full
moon and possibility of enemy attack, arrived at Avon-
mouth on March 12th. There was an outbreak of measles
amongst the children in these ships to add to the worries
of mothers and officers. Nearly 100 cases occurred, of
which 75 were in the Caledonia. The remaining transport,
the Saturnia, ultimately came on to Avonmouth via
Marseilles.
(9) Transfer of Home Counties Territorial Division to
India. — The first intimation of this move was contained
in a letter from the War Office dated October 14th, 1914,
in which the hope was expressed that the division could
be moved on October 25th. Three days later the number
of troops was given as 457 officers and 12,112 men, of
which number 36 officers and 800 men would be dropped
at Aden. There was serious congestion of shipping at Ply-
mouth at the time, causing delay in unloading shipping, so
the port of Southampton was chosen and October 29th was
the date selected for the convoy to leave. In spite of
delays due to one transport, the Dilwara, developing a fire
in her bunkers, and to another, the Corsica?!, grounding
in Southampton Water, the convoy of ten transports
(gross tonnage 90,500) left Southampton on September
29th and 30th. Owing to the political situation in Egypt,
it was detained there to enable the convoy from India, due
at Suez on November 18th, to be nearer Egypt. This en-
abled the Dilwara to join up, and the whole convoy arrived
at Bombay between December 1st and 3rd. The revised
numbers carried were 444 officers and 11,838 men.
(10) Movement of New Zealand Reinforcements, and the
II— 8
96 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [ch. iv
Second Australian Contingent and Reinforcements. — On
November 3rd, 1914, transports were requisitioned. On
November 6th the date of departure was fixed provisionally
for the middle of December. A hospital ship, the Kyarra,
sailed on December 14th and the convoy left Albany on
December 31st, consisting of nineteen transports, of which
three (gross tonnage 20,350) carried the New Zealand
reinforcements (strength 1,971), and sixteen (gross tonnage
149,700) the Australian second contingent and reinforce-
ments (strength 9,453 officers and men and 4,609 animals).
The convoy arrived at Suez on January 30th, 1915, at
which time the attack by the Turks upon the Suez Canal
was developing. One of the transports, the Themistocles,
came on to England, calling at Malta to bring 184 details
to England and at Gibraltar to take on board 392 details.
(11) Transport of Wessex Reserve Territorial Division to
India, etc. — On November 11th, 1914, the War Office
asked for transport to India for the Welsh Territorial
Division, but the Wessex Reserve Territorial Division
was afterwards substituted, and the date of dispatch fixed
as December 12th. Five transports (total gross tonnage
47,000) were employed. The numbers of troops were
338 officers and 10,057 other ranks. The vessels arrived
at Bombay and Karachi between January 4th and 8th,
1915. The Scottish Women's Hospital, destined for
Serbia, was dropped at Malta.
This movement may be said to have completed the
original military mobilisation of the Empire.
(c) The Dardanelles Expedition
The transfer of the British Army to France was, as we
have seen, an operation for which preparations had pre-
viously been made. The extemporised arrangements in
connection with the relief of Antwerp followed. The
character of the work thrown on the Mercantile Marine
in these operations can be gathered from the brief details
which have been given, and some estimate can also be
formed of the stupendous effort involved in carrying out
the sea movements required to mobilise and to distribute,
in the first instance, the military forces and resources of
the Empire. Details of the tonnage of transports have
been added as a guide for estimates of the amount of
CH. IV] TRANSPORTS FOR THE DARDANELLES 97
shipping required to move military units and drafts
respectively for long or short voyages, a question of con-
siderable importance to an island Power, from the point
of view both of defence and of attack. In order to com-
plete the detailed account of the movement of the " first
million," it is necessary to give some account of the initial
movements entailed by the decision to send troops from
the United Kingdom to the Mediterranean with an ultimate
destination in hostile territory, the Gallipoli Peninsula,
together with some preliminary events leading up to that
operation.
On February 11th, 1915, three transports were requisi-
tioned to move 2,800 Royal Marines and details from
Southampton to Mombasa, starting on February 17th.
Eight hundred men were subsequently deducted from this
number, and about 220 Artillery and Engineers were
added. The requisitioning of two of the transports, the
Alnwick Castle and Dunluce Castle, was cancelled, and
another— the Grantully Castle — substituted. A further
demand for one ship to be fitted partly as a hospital ship
led to the requisitioning of the Grantully Castle being
cancelled and the Somali and Alnwick Castle (again) being
taken up, the SomaWs hospital fittings to be erected on
the voyage out. Some horse-boats and guns were to be
taken. As an example of the uncertainties with which
the movement of troops was attended owing to changes
in the political and military situations, on February 16th
all these arrangements were cancelled, and it was decided
to send the Royal Naval Division and the 29th Division
to the Mediterranean. On February 20th a requisition
was received for the transport of 7 battalions of the
Naval Division, and about 8,000 officers and men, to leave
Avonmouth on February 27th for Lemnos. Thirteen
transports were employed in this convoy, one of them
carrying mule transport, one a Naval Air Force unit, and
four of them stores. Four ships were ordered to leave on
February 27th, and four on the 28th.
In connection with this rapid embarkation (which led to
subsequent delay owing to the packing of the holds of the
transports), it may be noted that it was not realised that the
troops embarked were likely to take part at once in an
opposed landing on a hostile coast. The complication of
the needs of troops in action or who were likely to be in
98 SEA TRANSPORT OF FIRST TROOPS [ch. iv
action, as affecting the packing of holds, has already been
touched upon when dealing with the transfer of base of
the British Army in France from Le Havre to St. Nazaire
and Nantes. While the rapid embarkation of the troops
and stores reflected great credit upon those concerned,
it may be put on record that extra time spent in
packing the holds of transports, under expert military
supervision, if proceeding to a destination in hostile terri-
tory, may cause delay at the time, but such delay at the
outset is well repaid subsequently by the saving of time
and losses in carrying out such a delicate operation as
landing troops in face of opposition.
The numbers in the 29th Division were at first estimated
at 717 officers, 21,971 other ranks, and 6,391 horses ; the
numbers actually carried were 705 officers, 20,533 men,
and 6,522 animals. Nineteen transports were employed,
and five store transports, one, the Inkonka, carrying an
Air Force unit. The vessels sailed, separately, for
Alexandria at intervals between February 27th and March
15th, 1915, arriving on various dates from March 14th
onwards.
The 2nd Mounted Division was directed to follow as
soon as possible after the 29th Division. The approximate
numbers were 525 officers, 9,470 men, and 9,585 horses.
No remount ships were available. Nineteen transports
were appropriated, and the vessels sailed in groups
between April 8th and 13th, calling at Malta for orders.
Three transports were kept for subsequent embarkations
on April 15th, and one transport, with the G.H.Q. signal
company, was ordered direct to Lemnos. The transports
began to arrive at Alexandria on April 20th.
In the meantime twelve transports containing horse-
boats, fittings, and crews for them, with their rations, had
been dispatched from Portsmouth singly by coastwise
route for Alexandria, where they were urgently needed,
a demand for the transport of 10,000 men of the Australian
and New Zealand forces from that port on February 27th
having been received.
By midnight on March 21st/22nd, 1915, the numbers
of British Dominion, Colonial, and Indian troops which
had been transported by sea by the British Mercantile
Marine amounted to about 1,039,300. This figure repre-
sents effectives. 137,169 sick and wounded had also been
CH. IV] A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT 99
carried. Within six months of the declaration of war,
therefore, well over a million armed combatants of the
British Empire, with their equipment and stores, had
been transported across the world's oceans and seas, an
achievement without precedent in history. Out of the
first million there were no casualties amongst the troops,
either from marine risk or from enemy action. When
the constant transfer of shipping from familiar to un-
familiar voyages is considered, and account is taken of
the navigational and the other difficulties, there is no
need to emphasise the enterprise and organising power of
British shipowners, or the seamanship, resourcefulness,
and zeal of the masters and crews. One and all, they
served the nation well in the hour when it was confronted
with a situation the gravity of which, in view of many
unknown factors, it had been impossible fully to foresee.
Apart from the tentative plans for the transport of the
Expeditionary Force, the movements by sea of the military
forces in accordance with the wishes of the War Office
had to be provided for at a few days' notice. Arrangements
had to be improvised as each emergency arose, and every
call which was made on the shipping firms or the crews of
the ships concerned was met promptly and efficiently.
No contract, written or implied, existed between the State
and the Mercantile Marine, but nevertheless the whole
of its resources, material and personnel, were instantly and
ungrudgingly placed at the service of the nation. The
success achieved in face of constantly changing conditions
by sea and by land was in no small measure due to the
Naval Transport Department, which requisitioned and
loaded the ships. And, as has been indicated, the Navy,
on which devolved the responsibility of protecting the
transports while on passage in face of undeveloped enemy
forces, fulfilled its mission. The pride in the transporta-
tion of the first million troops without the loss of a single
life is shared by the men who served under the Red and
White Ensigns.
CHAPTER V
MERCHANT SEAMEN AND THE BLOCKADE
The blockade of Germany, which was instituted im-
mediately after the declaration of war, differed in many
important respects from the blockade maintained during
the long struggle with J'rance in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, with the result that from 1914 onwards
merchant ships and merchant seamen w^ere required to
bear no mean share of the burden. Students are familiar
with the strain which was imposed upon blockaders in
the past owing to the uncertainties of wind and sea. In
the sailing-ship era, although the blockade was maintained
as close to the enemy's shores as possible, there was no
guarantee that enemy ships would not escape from port, and
that incoming ships, favoured by the fortune of wind, would
not succeed in eluding the vigilance of the blockaders.
On three occasions the French fleet at Toulon managed
to escape in spite of Nelson's vigilance, and frigates and
privateers frequently broke out singly, inflicting heavy
losses on British merchant vessels.
During the period which intervened between the close
of the Napoleonic Wars and the opening of the Great
War in 1914, it had come to be recognised that the advent
of the steam engine, the increased range of the high-
power gun mounted on shore, and the evolution of the
torpedo in destroyer and submarine had radically affected
the whole problem of maintaining a blockade. Whereas
the sailing man-of-war, moreover, was a self-contained
unit of power, with water and provisions sufficient for
the needs of the officers and men for a period ranging
from three to six months, the modern man-of-war had
become dependent on auxiliaries for food and stores, and
radius of action was restricted by limited capacity for
carrying fuel. In these circumstances the blockade of
Germany was maintained at long range ; the ships of the
100
H
55
o
o
CH. V] BLOCKj^DE difficulties 101
Grand Fleet were based on Scapa Flow, Cromarty, and the
Firth of Forth, and from time to time they left harbour
to carry out what were known as " sweeps " in the North
Sea.
Before hostilities opened, the naval authorities had
realised that forces would be necessary to keep the seas
in all weathers, acting as the antennae of the Grand
Fleet and maintaining a constant patrol in order to prevent
contraband being conveyed into Germany. At first this
arduous duty was confided to groups of the older cruisers
of the Navy, but eventually, owing to the unseaworthi-
ness of these vessels and their restricted fuel capacity and
to their being required for other services, it devolved
upon armed merchant ships, which, though commanded
by naval officers, were manned by seamen of the Mercan-
tile Marine. Long before the war came to its close the
active blockade of Germany was being maintained by
the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, consisting of twenty-five
large merchant ships, and it may always be a source of
pride to shipowners, and in particular to the officers and
men of the Mercantile Marine, that merchant ships bore
the responsibility which in former days had been dis-
charged by frigates of the Navy, and that the character
of the ships, in association with the high standard of
seamanship of the crews, enabled a more successful
blockade to be sustained in conditions of great difficulty
than had been known in any previous war. The significance
of that success can be appreciated only in knowledge of
the conditions in which it was achieved.
There were two channels by which goods might enter
Germany either direct or by way of the northern countries
of Europe : one was through the Straits of Dover and
the other round the north of Scotland. The laying of a
large mine-field in the extreme southern portion of the
North Sea compelled all vessels to go through the Downs,
and thus it was possible to intercept and examine every
ship which passed up and down the English Channel.
The problem presented by the northern route was far
more difficult of solution. The distance from the north
of Scotland to Iceland is 450 miles, and from Iceland to
Greenland another 160 miles. Once vessels had passed
this line and made the coast of Norway inward bound,
they could proceed to their destinations inside territorial
102 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCIvADE [ch. v
waters where they could not be stopped and examined.
Ships which were outward bound could also take advantage
of the territorial waters of Norway, and then, favoured by
darkness, mist, or fog, could make a dash for the Atlantic
with some confidence of escaping observation unless the
patrols were numerous and vigilant. The problem set
to the Northern Patrol, consisting of the Tenth Cruiser
Squadron, became, therefore, one of watching an area of
over 200,000 square miles, the size of which was somewhat
reduced during the winter months by ice. The patrol
was maintained under many difficulties, since the vessels
had necessarily to work at great distances from their bases
and, owing to their limited number, were a long way out
of sight of each other. During the winter, gales are
almost incessant in this northern latitude, and when the
wind falls fogs of varying density often shroud the sea.
Finally, long before the submarine campaign on merchant
shipping was embarked upon by the enemy systematically,
submersible craft were engaged in searching for and
attacking the ships which were maintaining the blockade.
In these circumstances of danger from the forces of nature
as well as from the stratagems of the enemy, a relentless
economic constriction was imposed on Germany. The
service involved officers and men in hardships with which
British seamen had for many years been unfamiliar, many
of the blockading vessels remaining at sea in spite of gales,
fogs, and submarines for as long as a month or more at a
stretch.
On the Saturday before the outbreak of war Rear-
Admiral Dudley de Chair received orders from the
Admiralty to mobilise the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, hoisting
his flag on board the Crescent at Portsmouth. The
other cruisers chosen to form the Squadron consisted of
the sister ships Edgar and Grafton, which were also at
Portsmouth, the Endymion, Theseus, and Gibraltar,
which were at Devonport, and the Royal Arthur, which
was at Chatham ; the Hawke, which was also to join the
Squadron, was refitting at Queenstown. The gunboat
Dryad was included in the command. The eight cruisers
were old ships ; they had been laid down under the Naval
Defence Act of 1889, All of them, except the Gibraltar,
which was of 7,700 tons, displaced 7,350 tons. When
new, they had attained speeds somewhat exceeding 19
CH. v] TWO GERMAN VESSELS CAPTURED 103
knots ; they had a normal coal capacity of 850 tons, with
a full load of 1,200 tons. The vessels, owing to their age,
had been relegated to the Third Fleet of the Home Fleets
before the opening of the war and were provided with
nucleus crews on the lowest category, provision being
made to complete the complement mainly from the Royal
Naval Reserve. The Rear-Admiral commanding, on
reaching Portsmouth, had without delay to mobilise this
homogeneous and obsolete group of cruisers and take his
force to sea in face of the enemy with officers and men
drawn in the main from the Royal Naval Reserve, and
therefore consisting mainly of merchant seamen.
As a result of extraordinary efforts the Crescent,
Grafton, and Edgar were ready by August 3rd, and
Admiral de Chair proceeded at once, hoping to be joined
off Plymouth by the Endymion, Theseus, and Gibraltar.
In this he M'as disappointed, as these three ships were
delayed, but, signalling to them to follow with all dispatch,
he pressed on, passing up the West Coast of England on
August 4th to Scapa Flow.
At midnight orders were received to commence hos-
tilities against Germany, and early on the following
morning, when off the Mull of Cantire, the first blow against
the enemy was struck when the Grafton, in accordance
with the Admiral's orders, chased and captured the
German s.s, Wilhelm Behrens (750 tons) and sent her into
Greenock with a prize crew. The German steamer Marie
Glaeser was also captured by the Tenth Cruiser Squadron
later in the same day off the Isle of Man. On the following
day the Endymion and Theseus joined the flag at Scapa
Flow, and late in the same day the Crescent and Edgar
put to sea, where the Admiral was joined later on by the
other ships of his command. In accordance with the
orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, the
Rear-Admiral proceeded, by way of the westward of the
Orkneys, to the area allotted to him in his war orders ;
and thus began the work of patrol which was to be main-
tained without intermission until January 1918, in face of
difficulties and hardships which no one at that period
could have, foreseen.
Throughout the period of hostilities the embarrassments
which would in any circumstances have arisen in main-
taining the patrol were increased owing to the decision
104 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
of the British Government that it was undesirable to
declare a blockade in accordance with the generally recog-
nised tenets of international law. It was determined to
act under Orders in Council, the provisions of which were
naturally criticised in neutral countries and particularly
in the United States. For in endeavouring to cut off all
Germany's supplies, it followed inevitably that the
neutral States bordering on the enemy's territory suffered
inconvenience through their traders, who under normal
conditions carried on an active commerce with the United
States and other countries on the American continent.
Though the officers commanding the Tenth Cruiser
Squadron, and the senior officers of the other naval forces
which co-operated with them during the early period of the
war, had no concern with questions of international politics
or law, the existence in the background of controversies
with other countries demanded that the utmost discretion
and tact should be exercised in applying economic pressure
upon Germany.
In the unparalleled circumstances in which the blockade
of Germany was instituted, novel forms of procedure were
evolved as a result of experience, and it soon became the
established practice to send suspicious vessels into a
neighbouring port for examination. This procedure was
the subject of a good many protests on the part of neutrals,
but it was an inevitable feature of a blockade under modern
conditions, as it was difficult to open hatches in heavy
weather without wetting the cargo, and an order to sift
the cargo to the bottom meant hoisting it all on deck and
keeping the ship in submarine waters many days — a source
of danger the neutral ships did not care to accept.
Experience proved that it was safer and more humane
in view of the dangers of fog and of storm, apart from the
activities of the enemy, to take neutral ships into a pro-
tected port for examination even if the difficulties of
examination by sea had not been insuperable. Moreover,
the British method contrasted favourably with that
adopted by the Germans, who seldom, even in the North
Sea, attempted to take a suspicious ship, neutral or allied,
into port, but made it an almost invariable practice to
sink her at sight, leaving the crew to fare as best they might
in small boats. The enemy's actions were in striking
contrast with the orders issued at the beginning of the
CH. v] A COMPLICATED TASK 105
war by the Admiralty. These directed that officers and
men engaged in blockade work were to treat the captains
and crews of suspected neutral ships with the utmost
courtesy and consideration, and to place them and their
vessel in as little danger or inconvenience as was consistent
with the efficient maintenance of the blockade.
At first the work of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron was
carried out under conditions of peculiar difficulty. The
Rear-Admiral commanding had been provided with a
number of old cruisers with newly mobilised crews ; the
force had to be transformed into an efficient and well-
disciplined unit, and provision had to be made for keeping
the vessels supplied with coal and stores. The Admiral
had also to consider the problem of securing convenient
and suitable bases. Over and above all this, the work of
the Squadron was subject to interruption owing to the
demands which were made upon it. Early in the month
of August it was, for instance, required to act as the
advance screen of the Grand Fleet during a sweep in the
North Sea ; it steamed four miles ahead of the Grand
Fleet, the whole force proceeding in the direction of the
Skagerrak on the lookout for the enemy's fleet. At this
period, moreover, reports were repeatedly reaching the
Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet of the proposed
movement of German men-of-war and armed merchant-
men, of suspicious happenings in the islands to the north
of Scotland, as well as of floating mines which often proved
to be merely fishing-buoys. For these and other reasons
ships had to be repeatedly detached from the patrol, and
it proved no easy matter in the circumstances to carry
out the duties assigned to the Squadron, which, owing to
the absence of vessels coaling or undergoing repairs, was
never at its full strength. The Admiral had also to
improvise a defensive system at Lerwick, guns being
landed from his squadron to enable the harbour to resist
an enemy raid. Great anxiety prevailed lest the enemy
should land a large force on the Shetlands, and on
several occasions rumours of German transports full of
troops having passed out of the Baltic were received.
Provision had also to be made for protecting the sup-
plies of coal which were being dispatched to the White
Sea for the use of the Russians.
By the middle of August the Tenth Cruiser Squadron
106 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
began to undergo a gradual change in its composition,
which was eventually to lead to its reconstruction. On
the 18th the armed merchant cruiser Alsatian, one of the
liners of the Allan Line, joined the flag, and about a week
later the Mantua reported to the Rear-Admiral for patrol
duty, and she, again, was joined by the Oceanic before the
end of the month. The arduous and dangerous character
of the work which had been assigned the Squadron was
soon made apparent by a series of untoward incidents.
On September 8th the Admiral commanding received
information that the Oceanic was ashore at Hoevdi Grund
in a dense fog, two and a half miles E. by S. from
South Ness, Foula Island, in the Shetlands. This liner
unfortunately became a total wreck, the crew being
rescued by the Alsatian and landed at Liverpool.
The arrival of the armed merchant cruiser Teutonic on
September 20th was a welcome accession to the strength
of the Squadron, but the anxieties of Admiral de Chair
were not lessening, for from day to day reports reached him
of the increasing activity of enemy submarines. That
the menace to his ships, in spite of the fact that zigzagging
had become a matter of daily routine, was a real one was
soon to be proved by an event which robbed the patrol
of one of its units and resulted in the loss of 560 lives. On
the afternoon of October 15th the Theseus reported the
presence of submarines on the patrol line on which she was
operating in company with the Edgar, Theseus, and
Hawke. a torpedo had been fired at her, passing astern
without doing any damage. The senior officer promptly
ordered all the cruisers to proceed north-west at full speed.
At that time the Hawke was not in sight. Earlier in the
morning she had been observed steaming to the south-west
to examine a steamer, and that proved to be the last that
was seen of the ship. At 4.30 that afternoon Admiral
de Chair endeavoured to get into touch with the Hawke
by wireless, but without result. He immediately reported
the ominous silence to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Grand Fleet, and the Swift was directed to proceed from
Scapa at high speed to search for the Hawke in the
position from which she had last been reported. Two
divisions of destroyers were afterwards dispatched from
Scapa to search for the vessel. On the following day the
Swift picked up a raft with an officer and twenty men —
CH. V] LOSS OF THE " HAWKE " 107
the sole survivors of the Hawke, which, it was then learnt,
had been sunk by a submarine.
Within a short time of the raft being sighted, the
Swift herself was attacked by one or more submarines
while engaged in her work of rescue, several torpedoes
being fired at her. It was only with great difficulty that
the Swift, manoeuvring at high speed amid the wreckage,
with destroyers screening her, succeeded in rescuing these
survivors. In spite of the danger in which he stood.
Captain Charles T. Wintour remained on the scene of the
disaster until he was satisfied that there was no one else
to be picked up.
The loss of the Hawke convinced the Commander-
in-Chief of the Grand Fleet that these large and old
cruisers were being risked unduly by employment without
destroyers in the central part of the North Sea. It was
decided, therefore, to withdraw the ships to a better
strategic position to the northward and eastward of the
Shetland Islands, the smaller craft being directed to watch
the Fair Island Channel and the Pentland Firth approaches
to the North Sea. At the same time it was arranged that
the Battle Fleet, when possible, should be kept to the
westward of the Orkneys, forming at once a support for
the cruisers and a second blockade line, or that it should
cruise to the north and east of the Shetland Islands with
its destroyer screen, the cruisers patrolling farther south.
As the winter closed in reports from the patrols indicated
that the cruisers of the Edgar class were ill-fitted for the
arduous sea work that had been assigned to them, particu-
larly as in chasing suspicious merchant vessels it was often
necessary that their old boilers and engines should be hard
pressed. Frequent gales with high seas running also
contributed to the conviction that the vessels were un-
suited for patrol duties in these latitudes. On October
29th the Grafton reported that her main condenser was
leaking, that her funnels were showing signs of weakness,
and that it was feared that the copper expansion ring at
the back of the port high-pressure slide was fractured.
On the same day, during a combined movement to cut off
a suspicious steamer, the Theseus signalled that she had
broken down and had had to ease steam owing to engine
defects. In spite of these misfortunes this steamer, which
proved to be the Bergensjiord, was captured by the
108 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [cir. v
Endymion. She had on board the German Consul-
General from Seoul, Korea, together with six German
stowaways. She was on passage from New York to
Bergen with mails and passengers and general cargo, and
a quantity of crude rubber and copper. The ship was
sent into Kirkwall for examination. On the following
day the troubles of the Squadron were increased, when
the Endymion reported serious defects, and the Crescent
also was experiencing mechanical troubles. Early in
November the Grafton, which had already developed
engine defects, had to leave the patrol for five days, owing
to a number of rivets connecting the furnace and combus-
tion chamber in one of her boilers becoming loose. She
was followed the next day into port by the Endymion,
with several perforations in the inner bottom over the
feed tank.
Confronted with these difficulties, Admiral de Chair,
in spite of heavy seas and strong wind, struggled to
maintain the patrol as best he could. On November
11th, the Edgar having developed engine defects, the
Admiral proceeded with his depleted force to take up the
work of the northern patrol once more, when he encoun-
tered a storm to the west of the Shetlands which led even-
tually to the decision to withdraw all these old cruisers
from this arduous work. The sea conditions were such
that the Squadron had to heave to owing to the fierceness
of the gale. During the forenoon heavy seas swept over
the fore part of the Crescent (flag-ship), wrecking the
fore bridge, sweeping overboard the Admiral's sea cabin,
carrying away the ventilating cowls of the foremost stoke-
holds— a considerable amount of water passing downwards
and putting the fires out — breaking hammock nettings,
seriously damaging the port cutters, besides removing
bodily a whaler, and tearing away hawser reels and deck
fittings owing to the rotten state of the woodwork. The
Edgar lost an able seaman, who was swept overboard,
and a cutter was damaged. She also sustained other
injuries. The Theseus, which was nearer under the lee
of the Shetland Islands, suffered less seriously. After
temporary repairs had been effected to the Crescent at
Swarbacks Minn, Rear-Admiral de Chair proceeded to
Scapa Flow.
On arrival he was informed by the Commander-in-
CH. V]
SQUADRON RECONSTITUTED
109
Chief that it had been decided to send half the ships
of his squadron to the Clyde Yard for refit. A few
days later conferences were held with the Admiralty
officials as to the amount of work which was to be done
in the Crescent, Royal Arthur, and Grafton. The
whole work was to be completed by December 7th. In the
meantime, however, the future of the Tenth Cruiser
Squadron was reviewed by the Admiralty, and on Novem-
ber 20th it was decided that the seven Edgar cruisers,
whose unfitness for the work of the patrol had been fully
demonstrated, should return at once to their home port
and pay off. The experiment of utilising these old ships
had not succeeded, and in light of the experience which
had already been gained with armed merchant cruisers,
possessing good sea-keeping qualities, it was determined
to reconstitute the Tenth Cruiser Squadron.
Rear- Admiral de Chair hoisted his flag in the Alsatian,
at Liverpool, on December 4th, in command of his new
force, which it was arranged should consist of the following
twenty-four armed merchant cruisers :
Alsatian (Flag)
Eskimo .
Caribbean
Ambrose
Oropesa
Hilary .
Hildebrand
Virginian
Cedric .
Orotava .
Clan Macnaughton
Digby .
Otway .
Patia
Patuca .
Bayano .
Motagua
Changuinola
Calyx
Viknor
Columbella
Teutonic
Mantua
Laurentie
Re-arming with 6- inch guns at Liverpool.
-Fitting out at Liverpool.
-Fitting out at London.
■Fitting out at Avonmouth.
Fitting out at Hull.
Fitting out on the Tyne.
Fitting out on the Clyde.
-On the Northern Patrol.
Was employed on special service proceeding to
west coast of Africa, with orders to join Admiral
de Chair's flag on her return.
For the time being, though other naval forces were being
temporarily pressed into the service, the blockade of the
110 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
enemy was somewhat relaxed. The presence at sea of
the reconstituted Tenth Cruiser Squadron was urgently-
necessary, but unfortunately the work of fitting out was
subject to repeated delays, partially due to recurrent
labour troubles. At Liverpool, as well as at London
and Avonmouth, constant pressure had to be exerted by
the commanding officers and the officers superintending
the work on board. The first ship to be completed was the
Cedric, which was finished on December 11th, but it was
not until January 16th that the Motagua was ready for sea.
The change in the character of the Squadron also involved
a great many alterations in the administration. One of
the most difficult problems was connected with coaling,
and a roster had to be established to enable the ships to
proceed in proper rotation to Liverpool or Glasgow for
this purpose. On passage to the Mersey and Clyde, it was
recognised that they were exposed to the considerable
risk of being torpedoed. This disadvantage had to be
accepted. Owing to the many demands which were then
being made upon the light craft of the Navy, it was impos-
sible to provide an escort at any stage of the voyage.
That losses were not incurred was due largely to the fine
spirit exhibited by officers and men, and to the sense of
discipline and esprit de corps which was rapidly developed
under very unusual conditions. For the personnel of the
Squadron consisted only of a leavening of naval officers
and men accustomed to the naval routine, and for the rest
the crews consisted of ratings of the Royal Naval Reserve
and the Mercantile Marine, in addition to the small
number of men of the Royal Fleet Reserve. The higher
signal ratings were drawn from the Navy, and these were
assisted by Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve men. The
wireless installations were in charge of naval ratings,
largely reinforced by Marconi operators. The ships were
under the command of naval officers, but for navigational
purposes the masters, accustomed to handling them, were
in most cases retained, together with a large proportion
of the other mercantile officers. Among the crews were
a large number of men who had served in the ships under
peace conditions, and the commanding officers, realising
the ordeal to which these merchant seamen were submit-
ting with splendid devotion, adopted every possible
measure to ameliorate the conditions in which they lived.
CH. v] IMPROVED LIVING CONDITIONS 111
In such large passenger ships as had been requisitioned
for patrol duty, the provision of ample cabin space is
generally recognised as of the first importance if the
vessels are to be run at a profit, and consequently the
quarters of the crew are often cramped and uncomfortable.
The men under peace conditions are at sea only for a
comparatively short period, and find compensations for
the discomforts experienced afloat during their frequent
periods of relaxation ashore. The patrol service on which
these ships were engaged involved, on the other hand,
lengthy periods at sea under exceptionally arduous con-
ditions, and it was found feasible to increase the accom-
modation of the men and to improve the amenities of life.
A special effort was made to minister to the comfort of
the firemen. Under ordinary conditions of service, the
fireman of the Mercantile Marine seldom troubled to
change his clothes, although the Board of Trade regula-
tions require that washing facilities shall be provided.
During a cross-Atlantic trip many of these men are con-
tent to sleep in the clothes in which they work, and
owing to the state of their bedding at the end of the
voyage, it is frequently burnt. The captains of the ships
of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron saw to it that every
facility was provided to encourage the men to wash and
to shift into clean rig as soon as their work was done.
It became the aim of the officers, in short, to introduce
naval routine, which meant that the men were shifted
into clean rig after each spell of work, and were en-
couraged to make the most of their leisure time. In
addition to improved living-quarters, they were given
an airy smoking-room in each vessel. In the Alsatian
this smoking-room became one of the " show places "
in the ship, and the men exhibited great pride in its
cleanliness and decoration.
The conditions under which patrol was maintained at
the turn of the years 1914-15 is reflected in the diary
of the Admiral commanding :
" Tuesday, December 29th. — Left ' A ' Patrol in Alsatian
and proceeded south of Faeroe Islands to ' B ' Patrol in
order to get into touch with Cedric and Hildebrand.
Calyx searched for mine (probably one of those laid off
Tory Island) reported west of Hebrides. Information
II— 9
112 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
was received of arrival of Teutonic at Liverpool and
sailing of Viknor from Tyne.
" Wednesday, December 30th. — Wind from S.S.W. back-
ing to S.S.E., force 7 and squally, heavy sea, but several
neutral steamers were intercepted by Squadron. It was
too rough to board, but ships were taken under lee of the
land and prize crews put on board. They were then sent
in to Kirkwall. Calyx was ordered to Liverpool to coal.
" Thursday, December Slst. — Wind still southerly, blow-
ing hard, hail and snow squalls, heavy sea. Eleven
ships on patrol ; five coaling and four not yet joined.
Ships at Tilbury and Avonmouth still delayed by labour
disputes and strikes.
" Friday, January 1st, 1915. — Heavy gale from south,
backing to south-east. Glass fell to 28-50° ; very heavy
sea. Detached Virginian to patrol north of Iceland to see
if shipping were passing that way, and also to report if
passage were blocked with ice. Mantua patrolling passage
between Iceland and Faeroes. Alsatian reinforced ' C '
Patrol as Otway was escorting ships to Kirkwall. Hilary
was ordered to stand by dismantled Norwegian sailing-
ship till gale moderated.
" Viknor joined ' B ' Patrol, but owing to damage sus-
tained in gale, had to take shelter in Burra Sound.
" Impressed the importance of armed merchant cruisers
of not interfering with neutral ships' colours, and also of
treating them with courtesy.
" Saturday, January 2nd. — Wind in south-east, force 9,
heavy sea. Glass fell to 28-10°. Hilary reported that at
1.15 a.m., while towing Norwegian barque Marietta, which
had been dismasted, the vessel sprang a leak and foundered.
Her crew took to the boats, but one boat capsized and
only six men were saved. Among those drowned were
Sub-Lieutenant Oswald E. Miles, R.N.R., and Frank
Scott, Signalman, O.N.D.J. 5747, of Hilary.
" Cedric was lying to with prize, weather being too
bad to board. Hilary proceeded to Kirkwall to land
survivors of Norwegian barque.
" Sunday, January Srd. — Gale moderating, glass rising,
weather clearing. Each ship of ' D ' Patrol having two
prize crews away, also several prize crews being away from
ships of ' B ' and ' C ' Patrols, arranged for Hilary to
bring them out and distribute them. Was informed
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CH. V] AN ADMIRAL'S DIARY 113
by the Admiral at Queenstown that Orotava had left that
port to join my flag. This armed merchant cruiser had
left London about December 24th, but, owing to incom-
plete state and defects developed, she had put into Queens-
town for necessary repairs, etc.
" Monday, January 4th. — Bayano arrived and was placed
under orders of Otway on ' C ' Patrol.
" Virginian was detached to Liverpool to coal, with
orders to return as soon as possible in readiness to join
special patrol with Teutonic and Mantua off Norway,
ordered by Commander-in-Chief for January 10th.
" Digby reported sailing from Thames to join my flag.
" Tuesday, January 5th. — Mantua was detached to
Liverpool to coal, with orders similar to those given to
Virginian.
" Directed the senior officers of ' B ' and ' C ' Patrols to
shift their respective base-lines twenty miles to the west-
ward at 8 a.m., at the same time warning them of the
reported presence of submarines off the Shetlands.
" Hildebrand reported that in consequence of the sub-
marine menace she was unable to go to Kirkwall, and
that destroyers were being sent to bring in the steamer
Denver, which she was escorting. I therefore directed
Hilary, which was still at Kirkwall, to bring out all prize
crews and distribute them to their own ships, leaving the
harbour after dark.
" Wednesday, January 6th. — Orotava joined ' B ' Patrol
and Oropesa returned to ' C ' Patrol.
" Paiia was reported leaving Avonmouth and Virginian
arrived at Liverpool. Detached Caribbean to Liverpool
to coal. Hilary proceeded to St. Kilda, where she trans-
ferred ' D ' Patrol prize crews to Hildebrand.
" Alsatian was working to westward of ' C ' Patrol on
a track approximating to the Atlantic route used by
vessels passing north of Shetlands.
" Thursday, January 7th. — Changuinola was reported
leaving Avonmouth, and Mantua arrived at Liver-
pool.
" Alsatian proceeded to westward as far as St. Kilda
to communicate with ' D ' Patrol and returned towards
' B ' Patrol at night.
" Cedric reported an accident which occurred when
hoisting in her motor-boat after boarding ; four seamen
114 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
were injured and the boat had to be abandoned as a total
wreck.
" Friday, January 8th. — ^Directed the senior officer of
' C ' Patrol {Otway temporarily) to extend his patrol from
lat. 59° 30' N. to lat. 61° 10' N.
" During the forenoon I communicated by boat with
Cedric and gave her the necessary directions for carrying
out her patrol,
" Saturday, January 9th. — With the approval of the
Commander-in-Chief, I remained south of the Faeroe
Islands in order to direct patrol, and with the special
purpose of insuring the interception of the Norwegian
mail steamer Bergensfjord, which M^as expected to pass
through patrol areas between January 9th and 13th, and
was reported to have German reservists on board, travel-
ling under neutral passports.
" Hildehrand reported that all prize crews had been
distributed to their ships.
" Clan Macnaughton was reported to be unable to attain
a speed of more than 11|^ knots.
" Mantua at Liverpool informed me that she had devel-
oped a leak which necessitated docking her ; she would
not be ready to sail till about 19th.
" Digby arrived from London and joined ' B ' Patrol.
" Find it very difficult to keep touch with other patrols
when north of the Faeroes, due to the short range and small
power of the Marconi W/T apparatus with which the
armed merchant cruisers are fitted."
On the day on which the Admiral commanding the
Tenth Cruiser Squadron learnt that the Motagua, the
last of the armed merchant cruisers to be completed, was
leaving Avonmouth to join his flag, news was received
that the Viknor had not reached Liverpool with the
prisoners taken out of the Norwegian steamer Bergensfjord,
The Viknor had intercepted this vessel in lat. 62° 10' N.,
long. 2° 24' W. On learning of this success, the Rear-
Admiral, in the Alsatian, at once proceeded to this position
in company with the Patia and the Teutonic. He found
the Viknor standing by the Norwegian ship, having
arrested a passenger on board who was travelling under
the name of Spero with a neutral passport. This pas-
senger admitted that his real name was Baron Hans
CH. v] MINES IN THE NORTH SEA 115
Adam von Wedel, who was wanted by the British Govern-
ment on suspicion of being a German secret agent. He
claimed American citizenship. Six stowaways and a
passenger who were beheved to be German reservists
were also arrested and removed to the Viknor. The cir-
cumstances in which the Bergensfjord had been inter-
cepted had aroused suspicion. She had passed north
of the Faeroes by night, evidently with the purpose of
avoiding the patrol, and had no intention of calling at
Kirkwall for examination in accordance with the now
established routine. A prize crew was put on board,
and the Viknor was directed to escort the Bergensfjord to
Kirkwall, afterwards proceeding herself to Liverpool to
land her prisoners and complete with coal. The Alsatian
took up a position on the other beam, and in this fashion
the Norwegian ship was taken towards the Scottish port.
On the following day the Viknor made her position
through Malin Head signal station. Three days later
Rear- Admiral Henry Stileman, senior officer at Liverpool,
reported that the Viknor had not arrived at that
port. A report subsequently received from Port Rush
suggested that she had struck a mine off the north coast of
Scotland and had been lost with all hands. At this
period, in addition to the menace of the submarine, the
ships of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron had to face a deter-
mined attempt by the enemy to mine the waters in which
the Northern Patrol was being maintained. Day after
day mines were being reported in the North Sea, as well
as on the west coasts of Scotland and Ireland, and it was
assumed that many of them were mines which had broken
adrift from their moorings during the gales which had
recently been experienced. As they were not provided
with safety appliances, as provided for under the Hague
Convention, they were a constant source of danger to
shipping, naval and mercantile, especially at night. In
spite, however, of all the difficulties with which it was
faced the Tenth Cruiser Squadron was maintaining the
blockade in greater efficiency than ever ; between Decem-
ber 26th and January 18th no fewer than eighty ships
were intercepted, of which fifty-two had been eastward
bound. It was a source of encouragement to officers and
men that the Admiralty was seized with a due appreciation
of the work that was done. They placed on record at
116 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
this time their high opinion of the manner in which the
operation was being carried out, stating that " the work
of the vessels of the Northern Patrol is an extremely
arduous one. Winter gales are incessant ; four vessels
have gone down — two with all hands and the others with
heavy loss of life." It was added that "the approach
of long summer days increases enormously the submarine
risk. No blockade in history has ever been so effective
from a naval point of view, or so full of unexpected
dangers."
At the end of January the Tenth Cruiser Squadron was
disposed on the following lines :
" A " Patrol.
North of the Faeroes.
Alsatian (Flag).
Otway.
Columbella.
Mantua.
Virginian.
" B " Patrol.
North of Shetlands.
Teutonic (Senior Officer).
Cedric.
Patia.
Caribbean.
Orotava.
Viknor.
" C " Patrol.
South of Sydero.
Motagua (Senior Officer).
Baijano.
Oropesa.
Changuinola.
Hilary.
Digby.
" D " Patrol.
West of Hebrides.
Hildebrand (Senior Officer).
Patuca.
Eskimo.
Calyx.
Ambrose.
Clan Macnaughton.
This disposition had been found the most effective for
intercepting blockade-runners attempting to break through
going east or enemy raiders and mine-layers going west.
The principle on which this new organisation was based
was that the actual lines of patrols were sufficiently far
apart to ensure that those ships which passed one line
by night were almost certain to be intercepted by the
other during daylight. The ships on each line of patrol
were, as a rule, thirty miles apart and kept a uniform
speed of 13 knots in the same direction, altering course
16 points every three hours ; by this means it was impos-
CH. v] INCREASED EFFICIENCY 117
sible for any blockade-runner to get through a Hne in
clear weather during the hours of daylight, the end ships
of the patrol being in sight of land for the required time.
The following form of signal made to any group of ships
was quite sufficient to place them on any patrol in the
shortest possible time.
From To
S.O. 10th C.S. Cedric. " C" Patrol cross line 34°fromlat. 58° 35' N.,
Victorian. long. Q° W., at 10 a.m. and 2 a.m. daily,
Patia. steering 240° and 60° respectively 25 miles
Orotava. apart from the south, Cedric, Victorian,
Teutonic. Patia, Orotava, Teutonic, Alcantara ; speed
Alcantara. 14 knots. Assume this order at 6 p.m.
to-night, Monday.
The reconstruction of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron
tended to render the blockade far more efficient, owing
to the better seaworthy qualities of the armed merchant
cruisers as compared with the ships of the Edgar class.
But the boarding of steamers in stormy weather still
imposed upon officers and men arduous and perilous
duties. It was often a matter of considerable danger
to place a prize crew on board a ship which had been
intercepted and which it was thought advisable to send
into port for examination. In the third week in February
1915 it was indeed a matter of great difficulty to main-
tain the efficiency of the patrol. On the 17th a heavy gale
from the south-east, backing to E. by N., was experienced
in the northern latitudes in which the squadron was
working. The glass fell rapidly from 29-80° to 28-56° and
snow and hail in heavy showers descended. A number of
the ships had to lie to owing to the force of the storm.
The Columhella was unable to steer the course assigned
to her, and the Calyx had to run to the west of Loch
Tarbert for shelter. To add to the troubles of these
merchant seamen on war duty, it was reported that five
submarines had been seen not far from Cape Wrath making
west, apparently in order to harass British shipping.
The gale continued throughout the following day, the wind
coming from the east-south-east ; from time to time there
were snow squalls, and it was too rough to lower boats.
The conditions confronting the Admiral commanding
constituted a nice problem in seamanship and exercised his
judgment to the utmost. As an illustration we have the
118 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
case of the Ccesarea when she was about to leave Scapa
with thirteen prize crews, which eight vessels of the
squadron had placed on board neutral ships which had
been sent into port. Owing to weather conditions, the
speed of the squadron having been reduced, and in several
cases ships having been compelled to lie to, he signalled
to the Ccesarea postponing her departure as there was no
possibility of transferring the men to their ships. The
Ccesarea had, however, already sailed. In due course
she reached the arranged rendezvous with her prize
crews, but owing to the state of the sea it was impossible
to launch a boat and consequently she had to return to
Scapa. By the close of the week, in spite of all the diffi-
culties experienced, no fewer than fifty-one ships, an
average of over seven a day, had been intercepted, of
which twelve had been sent into port with prize crews.
By the week-end, indeed, the Rear-Admiral found that
fifteen prize crews were away from their ships, and that
owing to the weather there was no immediate hope of
their return.
The arduous conditions of service began to tell on
some of the men. A number of mercantile ratings who
had signed on for three months expressed themselves
unwilling to re-engage, thus raising a new problem which
had not been foreseen. It was one, however, for which
a remedy was found. An idea of the lives these men
were leading can be obtained not only from what has
been stated as to weather conditions, but is typified in the
experience of the Caribbean. This vessel, on February
24th, was proving unsuitable for patrol work, as she was
old and slow, and rolled badly in the heavy weather
generally experienced in these latitudes. On February 24th
she reported that one dynamo was completely disabled,
and that her foremost funnel had shifted owing to heavy
rolling ; the roll in each direction sometimes exceeded
40°, and occasionally reached 50°, and not infrequently
a gunwale was submerged. Towards the end of the month
another heavy southerly gale with big seas was experienced.
Once again it proved impossible to distribute prize crews
among the ships to which they belonged, and the vessels
of the patrol had to lie to.
The problems with which the captains of the ships
of the squadron had sometimes to deal may be gathered
CH. V] "PATUCA " INTERCEPTS THE " NAVAHOE " 119
from an incident which occurred on February 27th. At
2.25 a.m. the Patuca had intercepted the American
s.s. Navahoe, from Bremen bound for Norfolk (U.S.A.),
steering west with side Hghts, but no steaming Hghts.
When she was sighted, she altered course 16 points. On
being overhauled she stopped, but as it was too rough
to board she was signalled to follow the Patuca under the
lee of the land, where examination of papers might be
carried out. On this the captain reported his condenser
broken, and added that it would take three hours to
repair it. Later he made the following signal : " Con-
denser ready; no contraband; refuse to follow you."
The Patuca was ordered to retain her until the weather
moderated, and to board and examine her when possible.
At 5 p.m. the Patuca reported that the Navahoe signalled
" Lead," and was following her towards St. Kilda. On
the following morning, at 3,50 the Patuca boarded the
Navahoe under the lee of St. Kilda. In a very heavy
squall the boarding boat was swamped alongside and had
to be cut adrift, but the officers and crew managed to get
on board the steamer. The Patuca then proceeded with
the Navahoe and hove to thirty-three miles north of the
island. As the state of the weather — a gale was blowing
from the north-west — prevented hatches being lifted for
examination, and the captain said he would require drink-
ing and boiler water shortly, the Admiral directed the
Patuca to take the Navahoe to Stornoway, the nearest
port, and carry out the examination there. It was reported
later that no mines or oil fuel were discovered at this
examination, and the ship appeared to be in ballast, so all
ended well. This incident followed closely upon the
untimely death from exposure of the commanding officer
of the Patuca, Commander France-Hayhurst, R.N. He
died at Glasgow on the 24th.
Soon after March opened, intelligence was received of
the sinking of one of the ships of the squadron — the
Bayano. On the 10th there were no fewer than five armed
merchant cruisers in the Clyde, a port that had for some
time been utilised by a portion of the squadron for coaling
and repairs. That night, which was very dark, the Bayano
put to sea without lights to rejoin the flag. At 5.15 a.m.
she was attacked by a submarine ten miles S.E. by E.
from Corsewall Point off the Galway coast and sunk with
120 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
a heavy loss of life. On the same day the Ambrose, on
reaching Liverpool, reported that she had been attacked
off Oversay Island by a submarine on three separate
occasions. Two torpedoes were fired, one in the first
and one in the second attack, but on the third occasion
the conning-tower of the submarine was seen about 400
yards on the port quarter. Fire was at once opened,
and a hit was apparently scored after eight or nine rounds.
The first successful shot threw up a thick water mist, and
on two subsequent projectiles striking the water in the
same place, a thick oily-looking spray appeared. Nothing
more was seen of the enemy craft. The Ambrose was of
slow speed and her escape was undoubtedly due to the
skilful manner in which Commander Bruton manoeuvred
the vessel, and to the accuracy of the fire of the gunners.
Three days later, while proceeding north from the Clyde,
the Digby was also chased by a submarine off Skerryvore.
She took refuge in Tobermory Harbour, but on the following
day, having obtained a destroyer escort, she proceeded
in safety to her patrol area.
On February 2nd the squadron suffered a serious loss.
The Clan Macnaughton, on the extreme end of the Western
Patrol, foundered in lat. 58° 47' N., long. 9° 27' W. with
all hands. She was unable to signal any call for help.
Such a call, however, would have been of little use, as all
the ships that night on patrol were doing their best to look
after themselves. The}'^ were having a most trying experi-
ence, as all lights sighted, even in the worst weather, had to
be investigated and kept in sight till the weather moderated
sufficiently to enable signals to be made. This was often
difficult, especially in the case of sailing-ships driving
before the gale under bare poles, and it is feared that in
some such endeavour the Clan Macnaughton may have
gone down. Two ships searched for three days in the
vicinity, but no trace of life or wreckage was found.
About this time the Admiralty withdrew the Calyx
and Esquimo from the squadron owing to the unfavourable
reports which had been made upon them by the Rear-
Admiral commanding. They were old boats of slow
speed. The Admiralty were requested to requisition six
more large ships for duty with the squadron in view of the
stream of traffic through the patrol areas. On March 26th
no fewer than eleven steamers were intercepted, of which
CH. v] AN ANXIOUS TIME 121
it was considered necessary to send seven into Kirkwall
with prize crews. Day by day incidents proved that the
eighteen ships which now constituted the squadron were
inadequate for the work which had to be done. The bad
weather at this period added to the difficulties. " The
weather became very bad and prevented boarding in the
open sea," Admiral de Chair reported on April 3rd, " but
by taking ships under the lee of the nearest land, prize
crews were put on board where required, and all vessels
intercepted were dealt with. In some cases it was neces-
sary to turn an intercepted vessel over from one ship
to another of the patrol, as no more prize crews could be
spared from the first ship's company. The Patia had
six prize crews away. In all twenty-one prize crews
were away from the squadron."
On rejoining the squadron after recoaling, the Colum-
hella reported that the heavy seas experienced on the
previous night had carried away her gun-shelter, and had
put out of action the ammunition supply and communica-
tions on the forecastle. The Ambrose, which had left
Liverpool to rejoin the patrol, was for a time the cause
of considerable anxiety at this time, but it was after-
wards found that she had had to put into Belfast on
account of heavy weather. These conditions led to a
collision between the Patia and a Norwegian steamer
during boarding operations, a plate of the British ship
being started and a frame bent. To add to the troubles
of the Admiral, news was received on April 17th that the
Virginian had run ashore in the Clyde, opposite Govan
Ferry, blocking the river and delaying the Oropesa on
her way back to the patrol. While the squadron was
contending with fierce gales in the more southerly waters
in which the patrol was being maintained, farther north
the ships were seriously embarrassed by the drift ice ;
as late as the end of May floes about one square mile in
extent separated from the pack, suggesting that the ice
was about to break up, and simultaneously the temperature
of the water rose an average of 4° F.
In the meantime, however, the squadron had been
strengthened by the six additional ships which the Admir-
alty had agreed to allot to the patrol service. These
vessels were the Alcantara, the Orcoma, the Andes, the
Arlanza, the India, and the Ebro. These measures
122 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
resulted in the squadron being at last brought up to the
strength which it had originally been intended should be
attained.
By the spring of 1915 — before the loss of the Viknor,
Bayano, and Clan Macnaughion — the Tenth Cruiser
Squadron consisted of the following vessels, particulars
being given of the owners, the naval officers in command,
and the masters who were retained after the vessels had
been requisitioned by the Admiralty :
Ship.
Owners.
Captain (R.N.)
(in Command).
Masters (B.N.E.).
Alcantara
Royal Mail Steam
Cdr. T. E. Wardle
Lt.-Cdr. F. M.
Packet Co.
Main
Alsatian
Allan Line Steam-
Capt. G. Trewby
Cdr. Edmund Out-
ship Co.
ram
Ambrose
Booth Steamship
Cdr. C. W. Bru-
Lt. Bernard H.
Co.
ton (after May
1915 Cdr. V. L.
Bowring)
Symns
Andes .
Pacific Steam Na-
Cdr. C. W. Trous-
Lt. Richard L.
vigation Co., Ltd.
dale (after Jan.
1916 Cdr. C. B,
Young)
Fortier
Arlanza
Royal Mail Steam
Packet Co.
Capt. D. T. Norris
Lt. C. J. Goble
Bayano
Elders & Fyffes,
Cdr. H. C. Carr
Lt. Bernard Dun-
Ltd.
phy
Caribbean
Royal Mail Steam
Cdr. F. H. Walter
Lt.-Cdr. Chas. H.
Packet Co.
M. Woods
Cedric .
Oceanic Steam Na-
Capt. R. Benson
Cdr. James 0.
vigation Co.
Carter
Changuinola
Elders & Fyfies,
Cdr. H. Brockle-
Lt.-Cdr. Arthur H.
Ltd.
bank
Reade
Clan Mac-
Clan Line (Irvine,
Cdr. R. Jeffreys
Lt. George J. Wel-
naughton
Cayzer & Co.)
drick
Columbella .
Anchor Line (Hen-
Capt. H. Heard
Lt. Raymond H.
derson Bros.)
(after July 1915
Capt. A. Brom-
ley)
A. Dunn
Digby .
Furness, Withy &
Capt. R. F. Mahon
Lt. Hamilton M.
Co.
(after Oct. 1915
Cdr. A. Warren
and after Dec.
1915 French offi-
cers and crew)
Hely
Ebro .
Royal Mail Steam
Cdr. E. V. Dug-
Lt. Leopold G. P.
Packet Co.
more
Vereker
Hilary
Booth Steamship
Co.
Booth Steamship
Cdr. Bather
Lt. Chas M. Wray.
Hildebrand .
Capt. H. Edwards
Lt. Henry P. B.
Co.
(after Dec. 1915
Capt. J. Grant
Dalton)
Smith
CH. V] FOREIGN OFFICE BLOCKjVDE POLICY 123
Ship.
Owners.
Captain (R.N.).
(in command).
Masters (R.N.R.).
India .
P. & O. Steam
Cdr. W. G. Ken-
Lt. Richard G.
Navigation Co.
nedy
Groundwater
Mantua
P. & 0. Steam
Capt. C. Tibbetts
Capt. Frederick W.
Navigation Co.
Vibert
Motagua
Elders & Fyffes,
Capt. V. Philli-
Lt.-Cdr. Robert
Ltd.
more (after Feb.
1915 Capt. J.
Webster)
Wallace
Oceanic
Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co.
Capt. W. F. Slater
Cdr. H. Smith
Orcoma
Pacific Steam
Cdr. C. W. Bruton
Lt.-Cdr. John A.
Navigation Co.
(after May 1915)
Holland
Oropesa
Pacific Steam
Cdr. N. L. Stanley
Lt. Frederick W.
Navigation Co.
(after Dec. 1915
French officers
and crew)
Robinson
Orotava
Royal Mail Steam
Cdr. G. E. Corbett
Lt. Reginald S.
Packet Co.
Ward
Otway .
Orient Steam Na-
Capt. E. L. Booty
Cdr. Hugh G.
vigation Co.
Staunton
Patia .
Elders & Fyffes,
Capt. G. W. Vi-
Lt.-Cdr. Chas. H.
Ltd.
vian (after 1914
Cdr. V. L. Bow-
ring)
Oxlade
Patuca .
Elders & Fyffes,
Cdr. C. H. France
Lt.-Cdr. Sidney K.
Ltd.
Hay hurst (after
May 1915 Cdr.
P. G. Brown and
after Sept. 1915
Cdr. T. Dann-
reuther)
Bacon
Teutonic
Oceanic Steam
Capt. H. Chatter-
Cdr. Hugh F.
Navigation Co.
ton (after Oct.
1915 Cdr. A. H.
Snyth)
David
Victorian
Allan Line Steam-
ship Co.
Cdr. F. H. Walter
Cdr. E. Cook
Viknor
The Viking Cruis-
Cdr. E. C. Ballan-
Lt. W. CM. John-
ing Co.
tyne
son
Virginian
Allan Line Steam-
Cdr. H. H. Smith
Cdr. Alexander
ship Co,
Rennie
A far more efficient patrol became possible as a result
of the allocation of these additional ships to the squadron.
The improvement threw into prominence the divergence
of policy between the naval forces, intent only upon put-
ting constriction upon the enemy, and the Foreign Office,
anxious so to regulate the blockade as not to give neutral
states justifiable cause of dissatisfaction. There was
something to be said from both points of view. The
action of the Foreign Office was the subject of not a little
124 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
criticism on the part of the naval authorities at Whitehall,
as well as by officers who were submitting to service of
unparalleled hardship only to see diplomatic action rob-
bing them of the fruits of their vigilance. In the early
months of the year 1915 two instances occurred which
suggested that undue leniency was being exhibited to
neutral vessels. In the first instance, the American
s.s. Greenbriar, which had been taken into Kirkwall and
then released by superior orders, reached Bremen, where
fourteen Germans were taken out of her and the chief
engineer, an Englishman, promptly imprisoned. The
American papers at first expressed indignation at the cap-
ture of this ship, but they speedily changed their tone
when they learnt that she had Germans on board and was
full of contraband cargo. For the fourth time the steamer
Bergensfjord was intercepted, and, to the chagrin of the
Tenth Cruiser Squadron, was again released.
On May 10th Rear-Admiral de Chair steamed towards
Denmark Strait to investigate the icefield which had
been reported in that vicinity. He found a large field
of closely packed ice drifting south-east. The edge was
traced from lat. 66° 48' N., long. 16° 12' W., to lat. 68° N.,
long. 13° 2' W. No passage could be discovered, and the
captain of a steamer stated that no vessels were passing
to the north of Iceland, news which was not unwelcome
to the crews of the ships of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron.
As the summer opened the menace of German sub-
marines steadily increased, and from time to time the
Admiral commanding had considerably to vary the areas
patrolled in order to reduce the chances of his ships,
offering large targets for attack, being sunk. Conclusive
evidence of the dangers which had to be incurred was
supplied by incidents which occurred in the month of
June. Submarines, while on the look-out for vessels of
the patrol themselves, stopped two steamers near St. Kilda.
On June 14th the Motagua, while boarding the British
steamer Goathland in lat. 58° 22' N., long. 8° 15' W.,
had a narrow escape. She observed an unknown steamer
being sunk by a large submarine. She at once pro-
ceeded towards the distressed vessel, driving the submarine
off by gunfire. Her arrival was too late, however, to save
the ship, the identity of which was then unknown. On
the same day the India was attacked in lat. 59° 20' N.,
p5
a
m
O
H
td
o
•A
73
O
CH. v] AN EXAMINATION 125
long. 7° 52' W. The periscope of an enemy submarine
was sighted right aft of the port quarter. After discharg-
ing a torpedo, which just missed the ship, the submarine
dived, and the India completed her voyage to the Clyde
to coal in safety. At this period submarines were also
reported three miles west of Rathlin O'Beirne Island, off
Barra Head, and to the westward of Flannan Island. An
illustration of the services which patrols were rendering
to neutral shipping was furnished by the action of the
Orotava. On June 15th she sighted a submarine close to
the Danish steamer Russ. That ship was stopped, and had
her boats half lowered, as if she were about to abandon ship.
The Orotava promptly went to her rescue, and opening fire
on the submarine, drove the enemy away. The Danish
vessel was then escorted to a place of safety, the Orotava
screening her from the possibility of further attack. In
consequence of the activity of submarines, a change had to
be made at this period in the routes given for British and
Allied vessels bound for Archangel from British ports,
it being considered unsafe for them to pass south of
Holyhead.
As the summer drew on, it became more than ever
evident that large sums of money were being offered to
enterprising skippers to go through the blockade. It was
rightly assumed that some would endeavour to pass well
north of Iceland into the Arctic Circle, making the extreme
north of Norway and getting south inside territorial waters,
and consequently the Admiral had to send ships to watch
these waters. As a further complication a captured ship
stated that submarines were using Jan Mayen Island
(500 miles north of Iceland) as a base for attacking the ships
of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, and so the Alcantara
went round the island and landed a party of seamen to
investigate. Nothing, however, was found except some
German huts and three black fox cubs, which were
promptly captured and brought on board to become ships'
pets ; but they did not live long.
On June 17th the flagship proceeded to the eastward, in
order to get into touch with one of the patrols and incident-
ally to intercept the Norwegian steamer Kristianiafjord,
which was reported to have left Bergen on the previous
day. The Kristiajiiafjord was heard signalling with Bergen
early in the morning and at frequent intervals afterwards,
126 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
so orders were given from the Alsatian to the Tenth
Cruiser Squadron to stop signaUing by wireless. It was
noticed that the Norwegian vessel's replies to Bergen
were very short and made quickly ; this rendered it
difficult to obtain a reading by the direction-finder which
had been fitted in the Alsatian. It was also observed
that the strength of the Kristianiajjord' s signals did not
alter appreciably throughout the day, and it was assumed
that this stratagem was adopted in order to prevent an
estimate of her movements being formed. After about
five hours, during which the Kristianiajjord was also
working with the wireless of another Norwegian ship,
the line on which she was steaming was roughly located
by means of the direction-finder, but not her exact position.
At 9.45 p.m., however, a message from her was inter-
cepted stating that she was 370 miles from Bergen. The
Alsatian then recommenced signalling on full power, and
the ships on patrol in the vicinity were directed to make
no wireless signals. The Norwegian vessel was thus given
no opportunity of locating these vessels by means of her
direction-finders, and in trying to avoid the Alsatian she
ran into the other ships of the patrol. As a result of this
skilful handling of the situation, the Kristianiafjord, with
544 passengers on board, was intercepted by the Mantua
in lat. 60° 42' N., long. 11° 37' W., at 10.30 a.m. of
June 18th, and was sent into Stornoway with an armed
guard. This incident furnished an interesting illustration
of the efficiency of the patrol, since within a short time of
the Admiralty telegram being received to stop her, the
suspected vessel had been rounded up and was on her
way to port for examination.
By this time it became apparent that the squadron
was in need of a more convenient base, so in compliance
with a signal from the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand
Fleet, the Admiral proceeded to Swarbacks Minn, in the
Shetlands, to examine that anchorage in order that he might
judge its suitability as a northern base. Sir Dudley
found there was room for seven of his cruisers to lie at
single anchor, and while there he was able to carry out
a practical demonstration of the value of its central
position. At noon on May 6th he received a report that
an oil-tank steamer had been sighted in lat. 60° 30' N.,
long. 4° 20' W., steering north-east, having apparently
CH. v] A NEW BASE 127
evaded the patrols. Hastening from the harbour at 18
knots, the Alsatian captured the tanker at 3.30 p.m. on the
same day, and sent her into Kirkwall with a prize crew.
A plan was drawn up for the defence of Swarbacks Minn, and
arrangements were made with representatives of the Works
and Stores Department, who joined in the conference, for
coaling and watering twenty-four ships. It was con-
sidered necessary, in view of the large coal consumption
of the squadron (1,600 tons per diem), that four colliers
should always be available for immediate use, besides
a moored coal-hulk for supplying the yachts and drifters
which had been associated with the squadron, as well as
for the harbour craft.
The question of water supply was one of considerable
difficulty. It w^as estimated that 150 tons a day would
be necessary for refilling the boilers of the visiting ships.
A loch above the whaling station in Olna Firth was
eventually selected, since it yielded a fair drinking water
of peaty character free from contamination, and arrange-
ments were made for laying a pipe-line to the shore,
whence lighters would convey it to the ships. The old
cruiser Gibraltar had been fitted as a depot and repair
ship and orders were given that she should be stationed
at the base, moored so that her guns could defend the
boom from attack. The Admiralty was requested to
dispatch from 200 to 300 firemen, in addition to her
reduced complement, so that personnel might be available
to assist in coaling ships. At the same time it was reported
that a hospital ship and a frozen-meat ship would be
required at the base, and it was urged that, as a precaution
against the enemy laying mines off Swarbacks Minn, a
couple of sweeping trawlers should be sent northward to
keep the channel open.
As the month of June drew to a close, two incidents
occurred marking the difficulties under which the patrol
was carrying out its duties. On June 21st the Alsatian
intercepted the Norwegian sailing-ship Bessfield, with
wheat from South America for Norway. The master
reported that when about thirty miles from Mizzen Head,
U34 stopped the ship by exploding a shell above her deck,
pieces of the shell falling on board. The German officer
ordered the Bessfield not to call at any British port, and
the master, before being released, was given written orders
11—10
128 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
not to call at any British port but to proceed direct to
Bergen, it being added that if he was found off his course
he would be shot. The Alsatian nevertheless sent the vessel
into Lerwick.
On the following day, when the Teutonic was off the
Norwegian coast, she sighted the German steamer Konsul
Schulize, at a distance of thirteen miles. The vessel
was off Kya Island. The Teutonic immediately gave
chase and drew in to eight miles, still outside gun
range. The German vessel then altered course and ran
for territorial waters to the north-east of the island.
On learning what had happened, Admiral de Chair directed
the Teutonic to keep the German ship in sight, and to call
up the Victorian to watch the other side of the island.
Later the Teutonic reported to the Admiral that the
Konsul Schultze had proceeded in a north-easterly direc-
tion towards Folden Fjord. A report was at once made
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, and the
Teutonic was ordered to patrol about lat. 64° 22' N.,
long. 9° 34' E., with the Victorian in support of her to try
and get the steamer to come out. If a submarine had been
available this German ship would probably have been
captured. The watch was maintained throughout the
following day, but the German vessel was not again
sighted, and it was afterwards ascertained she had gone
into Trondhjem.
German submarines in the meantime were actively
engaged intercepting ships off the Butt of Lewis, sinking
many of them without warning. The enemy's success
did not pass unnoticed, and on June 25th Admiral de
Chair learnt that an " E " class submarine had been
directed to cruise off Stadlandet, thus supplying a long-
felt want. At this period a number of German steamers
were being sighted in territorial waters, to the chagrin
of the officers and men of the patrolling ships. What-
ever the patrol lacked in efficient constriction on the
enemy was certainly not due to want of vigilance on the
part of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron. During the six months
which had intervened since December 1914, the distance
covered by the flagship had been 35,738 miles, the expendi-
ture of coal and water amounting to 20,796 tons and
13,382 tons respectively. The figures of the flagship
were typical of all the other ships of the squadron, and a
CH. V] A SERIOUS COLLISION 129
current estimate put the annual consumption of coal of
the twenty-four ships at 598,000 tons. During the week
ending June 26th no fewer than seventy-one vessels were
intercepted and examined, fourteen of them being sent
into port with armed guards.
The month of July opened with an accident to the
PaUica, which served as a reminder of the hazardous
character of the work which the vessels of the patrol were
carrying out. Orders had been received from the Admir-
alty that the Swedish steamer Oscar II, on passage from
Buenos Aires to Christiania with a cargo of coffee, hides,
etc., should be sent into port if she was met with. The
Patuca fell in with this vessel early on the morning of
July 1st, with disastrous results. The Oscar II struck the
Patuca on the starboard bow, crushing her own bow, and
then, rubbing alongside, she was holed in the engine-room
by the patrol ship's propeller. Some plates of the Patuca
were injured, and the flange of her propeller was badly
bent, but collision mats were requisitioned, and by shoring
up her side and filling in the spaces between the damaged
plates with cement, she was made sufficiently seaworthy
to proceed to the Clyde at 14 knots.
The damage sustained by the Swedish ship was more
serious, and she started making water badly. The engine-
room filled, putting out the fires, and the crew abandoned
her and went on board the Patuca. The Admiral com-
manding immediately ordered the Columbella and Digby to
the scene of the accident, and the Royal Scot was detached
to tow the Oscar II to Stornoway. The Commander-in-
Chief of the Grand Fleet, on receiving intelligence of the
mishap, announced that destroyers would be in readiness
off the Butt of Lewis. The Royal Scot took the injured
vessel in tow, the Digby acting as escort. At 1 p.m. the
Digby reported that the upper deck of the Swedish vessel
was awash, and that the tow had parted. Three hours
later the Royal Scot had the steamer again in tow, but
the voyage promised to be a long lone, as no higher speed
than 4 knots could be made.
Early the following morning the Digby reported that
another towing hawser had given out and that the wind
and sea were rising. The tug Plover was forthwith
dispatched from Stornoway to go to the assistance of the
Oscar II, but failed to locate her. Shortly before noon
130 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [cii. v
the Royal Scot was still struggling with her burden, making
about 3| knots. Subsequently, OAving to the condition
of the damaged ship, all hands had to leave her. At
1.30 p.m. the tow again parted, but was once more picked
up by the Royal Scot. By this time the destroyers Staunch
and Fury had joined the escort. At 5 o'clock that afternoon
the towing operations had to be suspended, and an hour
later the tow once more parted. At 8.35 p.m. the Digby
reported that she was experiencing great difficulty in towing
as all the wires had gone except that attached to the cable
of the derelict, adding that there was no steam or hand
gear on her capstan. Early the following morning the
Oscar II, though completely water-logged, was still in
tow of the Royal Scot. At 6 a.m. the ships reached
lat. 59° 11' N., long. 7° 42' W., when steering became
difficult through the yawing of the derelict. At 9 a.m.
the tow again parted, the bollards having drawn and the
wires gone, and as further towing by the Royal Scot was
impracticable, that ship was sent to Stornoway to fill up
with water. The Digby, assisted by the Fury, then
attempted to pick up the tow, but unsuccessfully. By
this time the Oscar II had developed a list of 40 degrees
and the seas were sweeping over her. At 7 p.m. she sank,
and the Digby then returned to her patrol and the Royal
Scot went to Scapa Flow.
The incident is of interest as a reflection of the devotion
to duty exhibited by the officers and men of the Tenth
Cruiser Squadron in carrying out the patrol with a deter-
mination to inflict as little inconvenience and loss on
neutrals as possible. They were tireless in adapting
their procedure to circumstances. In contrast with the
efforts made to save the Oscar II is the record of the
prompt measures adopted on July 8th in the case of the
German Friedrich Arp. The Tenby Castle, one of the
armed trawlers attached to the Tenth Cruiser Squadron,
sighted the enemy ship, outward bound from Stettin to
Narvik with a cargo of magnetic ore, off the Norwegian
coast. The Tenby Castle fired a shot across her bow and
ordered her to steer S.W. by W. The master refused to
obey and steamed towards the land. The trawler then
fired a shot into the steamer's stern. She stopped, but
still refused to steer as directed. The trawler then gave
warning that she would be sunk unless she obeyed orders.
CH. v] AN ARMED GUARD DISGUISED 131
Again she made for the shore. ReaHsing that decisive
measures were necessary, the Tenby Castle fired sixteen
rounds into her starboard quarter, and she sank in lat.
67° 47' N., long. 14° 15' E. The crew, as well as the pilot,
were rescued and transferred to the India. At this period
there was a further marked recrudescence of submarine
activity, but nevertheless in the week ending July 24th
115 vessels were intercepted, of which 17 were sent into
port with armed guards.
The closing days of the month provided an incident
which proved at once the activity of the enemy and the
stratagem to which resort was had in defeating him.
On July 29th information was received of the sinking
of the Norwegian steamer Trondhjemsfjord in lat. 61° 30' N.,
long. 3° 42' W., by a German submarine on July 26th.
This vessel was proceeding to Kirkwall in charge of an
armed guard from the Hildebrand, when she was fired at
by the submarine, the shot passing over the bows. The
master altered course to bring the submarine astern and
proceeded at full speed. After a chase of half an hour,
the submarine fired a second shot and the Trondhjemsfjord,
which was being rapidly overhauled, stopped. The master
was ordered on board the submarine with the ship's
papers, but before leaving he arranged for the disguise
of the armed guard, his wife, who was on board, providing
the oflicer (Lieutenant Crawford, R.N.R.) with some of
her husband's clothes in place of his own, which she packed
with her own effects for removal. The rifles, etc., belong-
ing to the guard were concealed in the fore peak. Soon
after the master got on board the submarine the crew
of the Trondhjemsfjord were directed to abandon ship
immediately. When all the boats were clear of the ship
the submarine fired a torpedo amidships from a dis-
tance of about 130 yards, and the Trondhjemsfjord listed
heavily to port. Amongst other cargo this steamer was
carrying a large quantity of sulphuric acid, which burst
with a loud explosion and flew to the height of the
mastheads on the ship being hit by the torpedo. After
the vessel had sunk, the submarine towed the crew
and armed guard in their boats about four miles to
the southward, where the Norwegian barque Glance was
met with and ordered by the German officer to embark
them. The submarine was of the latest type, being
182 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
about 200 feet long, with two masts, fitted with wireless,
and was armed with a 12-pounder gun forward and a
6-pounder gun aft. The hull was grey, and her number
was painted out. Her commander was a young man
about twenty-five, who treated the master of the Nor-
wegian steamer with courtesy. He explained that his
chief reason for sinking the Trondhjemsfjord was that she
was an English steamer bought by a Norwegian Company
since the commencement of hostilities. He also said
that he was looking for the Drammenfjord, which he was
instructed to sink on account of her British origin. The
master of the Trondhjemsfjord (Captain Bang) and his
wife appear to have behaved in a most circumspect manner
throughout. Whilst on board the submarine, the former
denied that he had an armed guard on board his ship
or that he had been boarded by a British patrol vessel.
The crew and armed guard were first transferred to the
Swedish steamer Orlando, bound for Sweden, and the
armed guard eventually reached Thurso in the trawler
Princess Juliana, the master and crew of the Trond-
hjemsfjord remained in the Orlando.
While practical experience of war conditions in the block-
ading areas had shown the necessity for an alteration in
the types of vessels employed, it had to be remembered
that throughout the whole of the Empire's sea service
unprecedented conditions were bringing about almost
daily changes in the sphere of scientific equipment. From
these experiments the Tenth Cruiser Squadron was not
exempt, and an interesting little note of the Admiral in
command, under the date of August 21st, 1915,^ reveals
that his flagship, the Alsatian, had been fitted up during
July with a new wireless telegraph direction-finder,
designed by the National Physical Laboratory. Trials
were to be given to this, and a later note, of September 7th,
shows that during a thick fog, in which the Hildebrand
and Teutonic were to be met at a prearranged rendezvous,
the new direction-finder proved very useful in determining
their position. It is a matter of no great historical import-
ance, but it is a vivid indication that, pressed as they were
by circumstances, the scientific spirit of the officers of
^ At this period of 1915 the Alsatian reported that she had experienced
nearly twelve complete days of continuous fog and mist when on patrol
to the south of Iceland.
CH. v] GERMANY AND THE BLOCKADE 133
the new navy, as well as the old navy, was as alive in the
Tenth Cruiser Squadron as in any other division of the
naval and mercantile services.
On July 19th, 1915, the flagship Alsatian, after coal-
ing and repairing at Liverpool, proceeded to rejoin the
squadron, which had by this time been welded into a
thoroughly efficient blockading force. During the later
part of this month enemy submarines in these southern
seas had become very active ; the Columbella was
attacked on the 22nd in lat. 60° 26' N., long. 4° 42' W.,
but the enemy was avoided ; this submarine craft, after
making the attack, dived and came up again five miles
astern, whether or not with the idea of attacking a Danish
schooner in the vicinity was uncertain. At any rate,
both the British patrol steamer and the Danish vessel
escaped. On the same day, however, a trawler and a
Russian collier were sunk, and the French ship Dance
on the 23rd by one of the submarines operating in lat.
59° 15' N., long. 7° 20' W. On July 26th the Teutonic
reported that she had intercepted the Norwegian steamer
Bianca, which had also been stopped by a German sub-
marine carrying two guns, twenty-five miles N.W.
by W. from Foula Island ; the British steamer Grange-
wood, which had been intercepted by the Patuca on the
24th, was also destroyed twenty miles east-north-east
from Muckle Flugga in the Shetlands.
The Germans were evidently studying with jealous
eye the success with which the blockade was being main-
tained, and the goodwill by which it was regarded by many
neutral seamen. " Ruthlessness " was the German
watchword. An indication of the enemy's counteraction
was furnished towards the end of July, when the Nor-
wegian steamer Fimreite, with an armed guard on board
(furnished by the patrol ship Motagua), was torpedoed.
At 4.14 a.m. on the 23rd, when about lat. 60° 15' N., long.
8° 45' W., a submarine was sighted on the port bow
making for the Fimreite at high speed. She fired a gun
and ordered the steamer to stop and send a boat. While
the master was on board the submarine, the officer in
charge of the armed guard (Mr. P. B. Clarke, Midshipman
R.N.R.) ordered his men to take off their uniforms and
help to put the boats out.
On his return to the ship the master of the Fimreite
134 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
stated that he had been questioned as to his destina-
tion, and had given it as Hull ; asked if he were going
direct, he had replied " via Kirkwall." Pie was then
asked if he had a prize crew aboard, and answered,
" Yes ; one officer and four soldiers." The Germans told
him they would sink him for trading with the English, and
told him not to let the Englishmen get into the boats,
as they w^ere to sink with the ship. The officer of the
guard, thinking the Germans might search the boats,
ordered his men to remove every scrap of uniform and to
disguise themselves as much as possible, taking their
revolvers in their pockets. As soon as the boats were
clear of the ship, the submarine opened fire on her with
what looked like a 6- or 12-pounder gun. She fired about
fifteen projectiles, one of which struck the boilers, and the
Fimreite sank bow first. There were twenty-nine men seen
on board the submarine watching the shooting, most of
them dressed in duffle suits. The submarine had one
mast amidships and a black patch forward where her
number had probably been painted out. After sinking
the Fimreite, she dived, heading in a westerly direction.
The crew and guard were in the boats from 4.45 a.m. till
3.30 p.m., when they were picked up by the Norwegian
barque Springband, which transferred them to the Caliban
for passage to Stornoway.
The work of the patrol was now in full swing : the
organisation, considering the novelty of the conditions,
the seas in which operations were being carried out, and
the complications provided by the German submarines,
was working smoothly. Some idea of the amount of work
being done at this period may be gathered from the fact
that during the last week of July sixty-nine ships were
intercepted and examined, twelve of them being sent
into port with armed guards, while during the first week
of August sixty-four vessels were intercepted, the same
number as before being sent into port.
The most memorable incident, perhaps, of this month
was the disaster which overtook the India while on patrol
duty off the Norwegian coast some six or seven miles
north-north-west from Heligver Light on the afternoon of
August 8th. On the morning of this day the s.s. Gloria, a
Swedish ship, had been sighted by the India to the north-
ward, accompanied by two armed trawlers, the Saxon and
CH. v] THE " INDIA " TORPEDOED 135
the Newland. The Indians course was altered to meet them,
and an officer went on board to examine the Swedish vessel.
A search lasting about one and a half hours was made. The
Gloria was allowed to proceed at about 10 a.m., a report
upon her cargo being made by wireless to the senior
officer of the patrol in the Virginian. The India then
altered her course to the south-west, at a speed of 14 knots,
zigzagging according to orders, and at 11 a.m. sighted
another ship making for Taen Island. As she was inside
the three-mile territorial limit, the officer in charge of
the India, Commander W. G. A. Kennedy, R.N., closed
her and followed her to the northward for purposes of
identification. This again took the India several miles
north of her patrol line into the West Fjord. The vessel
proved to be a Swedish steamship, Atland. Once more
course was altered for the patrol line, and at about noon
an urgent wireless message was received from the Vir-
ginian ordering Commander Kennedy to send the Swedish
ship Gloria into Kirkwall. Once more, therefore, he had
to alter course, increasing his speed to 16| knots, with the
hope of again intercepting this vessel. At 2 p.m., how-
ever, he had seen nothing of her, and being then well to
the north of his patrol line, he again turned south, and
zigzagged at a speed of 14 knots. An hour later a
steamer was observed inshore, just to the northward of
Taen Island, and the India altered her course so as to
intercept her, coming up with her about 4 p.m. Being
just inside the territorial limit. Commander Kennedy
could not interfere with her, but on signalling she replied
that she was the s.s. Hillhouse, bound from South Shields
to Archangel in ballast, and she hoisted the Red Ensign.
As she had no name visible anywhere, Commander Ken-
nedy considered her to be very suspicious, but was obliged
to leave her alone. Yet again, therefore, having sighted
and signalled the armed trawler Saxon, he altered his course
back to the centre of the patrol line, soon afterwards
perceiving another steamer making towards Taen Island.
Course was again altered in order to try to intercept the
new-comer, and Commander Kennedy then left the bridge
for a few minutes to go to the wireless house, passing
thence to the hurricane deck. Within a few minutes the
alarm gong sounded, and returning to the bridge he saw
the track of a torpedo approaching the India from an
136 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCI^DE [ch. v
angle of about 80 degrees on the starboard bow. Orders
were given " Full speed ahead " and " Hard aport." Com-
mander Kennedy hoped that the torpedo had safely
passed under the ship, as her track had reached the vessel's
side before the explosion. Unfortunately this was not the
case, the India being struck on the starboard side between
the after companion-way and the after gun on the star-
board side.
The great vessel at once began to settle by the stern,
and the order was given to abandon ship. Seven of
the ship's lifeboats — four on the starboard and three on
the port side — had been kept lowered in view of such
an eventuality, and though six of them were fully and
successfully manned, one of the port boats capsized,
owing to a great deal of way being still on the ship. The
starboard boats were being thrown into hopeless con-
fusion, owing to the first lifeboat's foremost fall freeing
itself and causing her to swing round and foul the third life-
boat and first whaler ; the first cutter was, it was believed,
stove in against the ship's side whilst being lowered.
" I very much regret," Commander Kennedy reported,
" that all the efforts which were made to save life by means
of the boats actually caused the great loss of life." Of
the number saved, namely 189 officers and men, no less
than 19 officers and 138 men had all dived into the sea,
or gone down with the ship. As the vessel sank in less
than five minutes after the explosion, all efforts to get
the rafts out were unavailing. Commander Kennedy went
down with his ship, and eventually floated up amongst
the wreckage. Throughout the trying ordeal, discipline
was splendidly maintained. " I wish to place on record,"
Commander Kennedy stated in his report, " my admiration
of the magnificent behaviour of the officers and men ;
notwithstanding the appalling swiftness of the catas-
trophe, the most perfect discipline prevailed until the end."
The survivors were subsequently picked up by the Swedish
steamer Gotaland and the armed trawler Saxon, and were
landed in Norway ; they were removed to an internment
camp at Jorstadmoen. The total number of lives lost
was 9 officers and 107 men.
Meanwhile the work of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron,
temporarily short of three of its units, continued to
increase, in face of great submarine activity on the part
CH. v] THE NEW BASE DEVELOPED 137
of the enemy, which necessitated frequent variations of
the patrolHng. During the first week of September 1915,
no less than eighty-nine vessels were intercepted and
examined, fourteen being sent into port with armed
guards. The development of the new base at Swar-
backs Minn became a matter of the first importance in
view of the role which the squadron M^as filling. On
September 9th Admiral de Chair accordingly landed to
inspect, in company with Rear-Admiral Fawckner, the
progress of its coaling and watering plant and other local
arrangements. He found that the rate of coaling had
increased with experience and was now averaging from
50 to 60 tons per hour, while a plentiful supply of boiler
water was procurable. Ships of the Tenth Cruiser
Squadron were being sent in to coal singly, taking about
1,000 tons each, but the resources of the base were being so
developed as to allow, it was hoped, of several ships
being coaled simultaneously. A further technical improve-
ment had also been brought about by the fitting of a
second look-out crow's-nest on the foremast of all ships
of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron. This, being placed well
above the height of the funnels, gave them a very good
range of vision, and ensured that other ships could be
sighted before the patrol vessels were themselves seen.
Ships of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron had thus become
readily recognisable by the two crows'-nests on their funnels.
Great trouble was now being experienced through fog
in these far northern seas, and this resulted, on September
11th, in an unfortunate collision between two vessels of
the patrol, the Patia and the Oropesa, both of which had,
in consequence, to be sent into the Clyde for repairs ;
the Patia was attacked en route by a submarine, happily
without injury. The Patia adventure was a curious one.
The injury suffered by the vessel's stern had been so
considerable that the water rose to the collision bulkhead.
The bulkhead was shored up and the ballast shifted aft,
so as to bring her bow up, and the captain decided to
steam stern first, with the Ebro as escort. In these
circumstances slow progress was made, so Rear-Admiral
de Chair submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Grand Fleet that assistance should be sent. The sug-
gestion was adopted, the Patia being ordered to proceed
to East Loch Roag, in the Hebrides. Early on the morn-
138 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
ing of the following day — September ISth — the Ehro
reported that she had sighted a submarine in lat. 58° 5' N.,
long. 10° 5' W., steering north. From later reports from
this vessel and the Patia, it appeared that they had both
observed the lights of a supposed steamer, which the
Ebro went to investigate. It was very dark. The chase
proved to be a submarine, but her identity was not estab-
lished until the Ebro was so close that she could not depress
her guns sufficiently to fire, when the submarine dived.
After a short interval she rose again and showed a light.
The Ebro attempted to ram her, but she had disappeared
when the ship arrived on the spot. Meanwhile the Patia,
which had hitherto been proceeding stern first at 3 knots,
reversed her engines and went ahead at 12 to 13 knots to
clear the dangerous area. At 6.30 a.m. she reported
that she was proceeding east at 13 knots and that her
shored-up bulkhead was intact, collision mats in place,
and 200 tons of ballast shifted aft. In view of these
favourable conditions, she requested permission to pro-
ceed direct to the Clyde, instead of putting into East Loch
Roag, and, this course havang been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, she changed course to the south
with the Ebro in company.
In spite of fog and the bad weather which continued
almost without intermission throughout the month, the
work of the patrol went forward ; 51 vessels were inter-
cepted during this week, 9 of them being sent into port
with armed guards ; while during the following week these
numbers increased again to 77 and 14 respectively, and
on the last day of the month no less than 8 steamers
were sent within twenty-four hours into Kirkwall and
Lerwick under armed guard, 2 of them being found to
contain German subjects.
Beset by fogs, often so dense as to obscure all vision,
and with German submarines still active, the patrol con-
tinued its difficult and arduous task. One dark night,
with a breeze blowing, wireless telegraphy signals w^ere
received from a ship on " C " patrol to the effect that the
captain and officers' watch could smell petrol. As none
of the ships carried petrol, it was concluded that a sub-
marine had just passed to windward of this ship, probably
waiting for daylight to get a shot at the vessels on that
patrol line. On receiving this signal the Admiral moved
CH. v] A TYPICAL INSTANCE OF HEROISM 139
the whole line thirty miles to the westward during the
night, which avoided that submarine, while at the same
time not impairing the efficiency of the patrol. One can
imagine the disgust of the commander of the submarine,
after all his trouble to locate the patrol, when he realised
that he had been outwitted. The place of the India had
in the meantime been filled by the Almanzora. In the
course of their work the ships were repeatedly succouring
neutrals, as well as British and Allied ships.
Instances of individual heroism and seamanship on the
part of officers and men of the vessels of the patrol were
of such daily occurrence as to forbid any attempt at a
complete record. A typical instance of the sort of prob-
lems set to and solved by even the youngest officers of the
Tenth Cruiser Squadron may, however, be cited in the
experience of Midshipman C. A. Bamford, R.N.R., and
Sub-Lieutenant D. L. Edwards, R.N.R., during two
voyages, each beginning on September 16th. On this
day Mr. Bamford had been placed in charge of an armed
guard on board the Swedish topsail schooner Valand,
bound from Iceland to Leith with a cargo of herrings,
with orders to take the schooner to Lerwick, making
Muckle Flugga during the dark hours, if possible. A
light fair wind was experienced until the morning of the
following day, when the wind began to haul easterly.
At half-past nine the next morning Myggenaes, in the
Faeroes, was sighted, bearing S.E. by S. By the evening
of this day, however, the wind had increased to a strong
south-easterly gale, and on the morning of the 20th the
gale had become so high that, after consultation between
the captain of the Valand and Mr. Bamford, it was resolved
to heave to.
As the wind continued to increase, the only course then
seemed to be to run north and sail down the eastern
side of the Faeroes. This was accordingly done, and
at 8 p.m. on September 21st Myggenaes was once more
sighted, this time bearing S. by W. At this point the
Valand^s steering gear broke down, but fortunately the
gale had somewhat moderated, and in a few hours
the necessary repairs had been effected. On the 22nd
the little vessel was becalmed, but on the following day
a head wind was encountered, accompanied by dense
banks of fog. On the 25th the fog had cleared, and there
140 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [en. v
was a moderate east-north-east wind. By this time pro-
visions had been almost exhausted and rehance had to be
placed mainly on salt herrings from the cargo. At noon
the wind once more began to blow from the north-east, and
by evening the vessel was again labouring in a strong
north-easterly gale. At 8 o'clock Muckle Flugga was
sighted, but owing to the fierceness of the storm and the
absence of coast lights, and the improbability of sighting
any of the patrol near Lerwick, it was decided to steer a
course farther eastward rather than to attempt to make
port.
At 1 o'clock on the morning of the 26th the fore rigging
carried away, and the foremast itself nearly went over-
board, but by knocking away the bulwarks on the port
side, passing wire stropes round the ribs of the ship, and
rigging up temporary stays, the damage was repaired in
a few hours' time. On the evening of September 27th
Mr. Bam ford determined to make another attempt to
get to Lerwick, and accordingly sailed northward on the
port tack. At 4 o'clock in the morning of the following
day the starboard anchor was carried overboard, but was
eventually got on board again without doing any damage
beyond making a dent in the ship's side. An hour later
land was sighted, and at 8 o'clock it was discovered that
the ship was between the Fair Island and Sumburgh Head,
the north-east gale having set the vessel to the westward.
As it was then clearly impossible to get to Lerwick, and,
in view of the wind, dangerous to attempt to reach Kirk-
wall, the ship's gear being in a rotten condition — sails
and ropes carrying away incessantly — Mr. Bamford now
decided to run before the gale and try to make Leith.
On September 29th land was sighted bearing west-
north-west, and at 4 p.m. the storm-beaten V aland passed
close to a town which her master thought was Aberdeen.
Sail was reduced accordingly in order to make Bell Rock
by dayhght. As there were, however, no proper charts
or navigation instruments on board, and as the sun
had not been visible since the Shetlands had been left
behind, it was not surprising that an error in the vessel's
bearing was made, the town which had been sighted
being Montrose and not Aberdeen. At 4 o'clock on the
morning of September 30th the Valand attempted to
go through the southern channel of the Forth between
cii. v] THE " HAUGAR'S " EXPERIENCES 141
May Island and Dunbar, but was instructed by destroyers
to enter by the northern channel. Owing to the wind,
May Island was not weathered until 5 o'clock that evening,
when the vessel proceeded up the Forth as far as Largo
Bay and anchored for the night, to proceed next morning
into Leith Roads after an experience that none on board
was likely to forget.
Somewhat similar were the adventures of Sub-Lieutenant
D. L. Edwards, who was in charge of an armed guard
on board the Norwegian brigantine Hangar, also bound
from Iceland, with a cargo of herrings, to the port of
Haugesund. With similar orders to take the vessel into
Lerwick, Lieutenant Edwards set his course accordingly,
and on September 18th, at daybreak, sighted the Faeroes.
Here, however, caught in the same gale as the Valand
was experiencing, he agreed with her master that the
only course to adopt was to heave the vessel to. The
seas were running so high that the pump had to be worked
continually ; the ship, which was over fifty years old, was
leaking badly, and the water in her, in spite of all efforts,
was increasing rapidly. While the original crew of the
Hangar were manning the pumps. Lieutenant Edwards,
with the armed guard, trimmed the sails as necessary.
Throughout the next day the gale continued unabated,
heavy seas being continually shipped. The topmast back-
stay was carried away and a preventor rigged.
On September 20th the vessel was in the neighbourhood
of Faeroe Bank, and, the wind decreasing a little, a course
was set on the starboard tack. At 9 o'clock next morning
the Faeroes were again sighted ; the ship was headed
for Dimon Fjord, the wind being south-south-east. As it
was essential to weather the Faeroes, and not anticipating a
change of wind before they could tack clear of them. Lieu-
tenant Edwards and the master of the Hangar decided to go
through the fjord and thus save considerable time. By
8 o'clock they were due north of Sydero Island, where they
were becalmed and drifted out to sea again. At 7 o'clock
in the evening a south-westerly wind sprang up, and they
again attempted to go through the fjord, but when only
half a mile from the high land the wind dropped and the
tide carried the ship landward. By then it was quite
dark, no lights were visible and the vessel was near the
rocks. Drifting west, and almost sweeping against the
142 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
rocks, there now became visible to leeward a ledge of
rocks running out to sea, and as it seemed impossible that
the ship would be able to clear them. Lieutenant Edwards,
after consulting with the master, decided that the ship
would have to be abandoned. The lifeboat was accord-
ingly hoisted out with topsail halyards, and as it was not
provisioned, Lieutenant Edwards put his remaining
stores into it. The boat was then pulled off a little way,
there being no place where a landing was possible, and
those on board watched the ship drift towards the rocks.
To everyone's surprise, however, she passed clear of them,
so they once more re-embarked from the boat, which was
itself leaking so badly that it had to be continually baled.
On once more getting on board the Haugar, Lieutenant
Edwards found that the compass had been broken to
pieces by the main boom, but luckily there was a spare
compass, which he succeeded in rigging up. A breeze now
sprang up from the south-south-west, and the Haugar pro-
ceeded to tack to the south of Sydero. By September 22nd
the provisions which Lieutenant Edwards had brought
with him had been finished and the ship had not much
left in the way of stores. Those on board had therefore
to subsist almost entirely on hard bread and salt fish.
On September 23rd they were once more becalmed, and
Lieutenant Edwards, from aloft, sighted the Faeroes.
At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 24th a breeze sprang up
from the north-north-east, which freshened towards evening.
The ship would not head up so high as Muckle Flugga,
but it was found that the course would take them south
of the Shetlands, and that they could thus make Kirkwall
instead of Lerwick. The next day the wind increased to
such an extent that at 8 o'clock in the evening they had
once more to heave to. Towards night the weather grew
steadily worse. Part of the bulwarks were stove in and
the jib and stay sail were blown away. The old ship was
now labouring heavily and making water fast ; the armed
guard were helping at the pumps and rendering every
assistance possible to the Hangar's crew. On the next
day the weather began once more to moderate, and by
3 o'clock land was sighted, which was made out to be
Papa Westra Island, north of the Orkneys. Being unable
to pass north of it, however, the ship stood out again, and on
the 27th the wind, which was now north-north-east, again
CH. V] ARMED GUARDS' DIFFICULTIES 143
rose. Lieutenant Edwards, however, advised the master
to proceed on their course in the hope of sighting land before
dark, which, however, they did not do. The heavy
squalls were now straining the ship in every part. Seas
were being continually shipped, and pumping was very
difficult. At daybreak land was sighted, the wind still being
in the north-north-west and blowing in violent squalls.
Sule Skerry was, however, successfully rounded at 10 o'clock
in the morning, and the port of Kirkwall made by 6 in the
evening, the Haugar then having four feet of water in her
holds. Throughout this period of stress and storm, the
conduct of all on board was beyond praise. Continually wet
through, and frequently only able to snatch their sleep
in saturated clothes, the highest standard of courage and
seamanship was maintained.
Another incident at this period further indicates the
difficulties with which the young officers in charge of the
armed guards had to deal. On September 30th Sub-
Lieutenant Alfred M. Easty, R.N.R., boarded the Swedish
steamer Avesta in lat. 60° 46' N., long. 13° 26' W., and
proceeded towards Kirkwall, the course being set to make
the Butt of Lewis. At 6.45 a.m. on October 1st, in lat.
59° 54' N., long. 10° 40' W., an enemy submarine was
sighted by T. Watson, A.B. (who was then on watch),
about two points on the port bow. This was immediately
reported to Mr. Easty. The ship was then steering S.E.
by S. (magnetic) and steaming at about 8 knots. When
sighted, the submarine appeared to be steering to the
southward. About 7 a.m. she altered course to the south-
south-east. She did not appear to be capable of any great
speed, as, although closing the Avesta, she was drawing
astern all the time. She was also evidently either using
an excess of oil or having some engine trouble, as she was
smoking slightly. The Avesta hoisted the Swedish colours
on sighting the enemy. Mr. Easty ordered the guard to
keep out of sight and to hide their uniforms as much as
possible, he himself removing his cap and jacket. The
captain was instructed to keep a steady course and speed
as long as possible, and was told that should he be com-
pelled to stop, he was to make no mention of having an
armed guard on board. He replied that he would probably
have to give some reason for his present course, as apparently
the Germans were aware that the vessels of his line (A.
11—11
144 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCI^DE [ch. v
Johnson, Stockholm) made a northerly course on their
homeward voyage.
II
I accordingly instructed him," Mr. Easty recorded
afterwards, " to inform the submarine commander that
he was proceeding to Kirkwall voluntarily. Probably,
had we been examined, a German, who was a member
of the crew, would have informed the enemy of our
presence. It was useless to attempt to hide him, as
his name and nationality appeared on the crew list.
I must here remark that the Swedish captain behaved
with great courtesy and seemed only too anxious
to do all he could for us. Meanwhile the submarine was
closing us, and about 7.30 a.m. she was about 3 points
abaft the port beam, distant about one mile. She then
hoisted a signal . . . but as we could not clearly dis-
tinguish the flags, we kept our course and speed. Just at
this time smoke appeared to the eastward, and a vessel
looking remarkably like a cruiser was apparently approach-
ing. The submarine also saw this vessel, and evidently
thought her to be a cruiser, for she turned and, without
bothering further about us, made off in a north-westerly
direction, and was soon lost in a rain squall. She was
seen again later, proceeding slowly in a westerly direction.
The approaching vessel proved to be the American
s.s. Polarine of New York — an oil-carrier. She was
light, and steering W. by S. She appeared to be
keeping a steady course and speed so long as she was in
sight.
" The submarine appeared to be one of the modern
large ones. She was on the surface the whole time. I
was unable to ascertain whether she carried a gun or not,
but she appeared to have been at sea for a considerable
time. She was covered with rust, and looked something
like a ' drifter ' at a distance. She was last seen at about
7.50 a.m. steering west at a slow speed. I reported having
sighted a submarine — giving the position and direction
she was last seen heading— by semaphore to one of the
armed trawlers (fitted with W/T) which stopped me off
Cape Wrath at 8 a.m. on October 2nd. We arrived at
Kirkwall at 6.30 on October 2nd, and myself and armed
guard returned to H.M.S. Mantua at 4 p.m. on
October 7th."
CH. v] DARING SEAMANSHIP 145
Yet another example of outstanding seamanship, this
time on the part of one of the larger vessels of the Tenth
Cruiser Squadron, was that of the Hildebrand, which inter-
cepted and boarded on October 16th the Norwegian
steamer Corona, bound from Baltimore to Bergen with a
load of grain. Her master having stated that his ship had
sprung a leak and was sinking, the crew of the Corona
was taken on board the Hildebrand, which stood by the
damaged vessel. The crew were thoroughly examined,
six of them, who had joined at Baltimore, being placed
under arrest on account of their suspicious character.
In the meanwhile the Otway had been directed to proceed
at full speed to assume charge of possible salvage opera-
tions, intercepting en route, and sending into Kirkwall
with an armed guard, the Danish steamer United States,
which was proceeding east with 312 passengers, amongst
whom was a well-known Austrian aviator, Guido von
Georgevitch.
It was at midnight that the Corona had first been inter-
cepted by the Hildebrand, and by half-past eight the
next morning it was discovered that she had made
18 inches of water above the stokehold. The leak, how-
ever, appeared to be a small one and confined to the
engine-room and stokehold, and accordingly an attempt
at towing was undertaken at a quarter to one. At half-
past five the steamer's cable, which was being used in con-
junction with the wire hawsers, parted, but in spite of the
very heavy sea that was running at the time, she was
once more taken in tow shortly before 9 o'clock and
headed for Stornoway. In view of the darkness of the
night, the heavy seas that were running, and the presence
of possible submarines, this was an exceptionally skilful
and daring piece of seamanship on the part of Captain
Edwards, R.N., to which the attention of the Admiralty
was afterwards drawn by Admiral Jellicoe, in command
of the Grand Fleet. Unfortunately Captain Edwards'
efforts were not destined to be successful, and at 11
o'clock on the following morning the Corona had to be
sunk, as she was likely to become a danger to navigation.
That the Hildebrand, and indeed all the vessels of the
Tenth Cruiser Squadron, were often, in spite of their
policing functions, friends in need, was again made clear
when, on October 30th, this vessel intercepted the Danish
146 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKA.DE [ch. v
sailing-ship Haracaibo and supplied her with eight days'
provisions, the heavy south-easterly gales having pre-
vented her from making any headway towards Lerwick,
her port of destination.
Throughout the rest of October, and indeed at frequent
intervals throughout the whole of the following two
months, the patrol work of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron
was carried on in the face of such weather as has already
been described in the experiences of the preceding three
officers. Vessels to be examined were almost daily boarded
under conditions of wind and sea that in ordinary times
would have seemed to involve the highest degree of risk.
Often the weather was so bad that even by the storm-ex-
perienced boarding-parties of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron,
it was found impossible to get a footing upon suspected
vessels ; and on these occasions it was frequently found
necessary to follow such vessels and, in some cases, to lie
to while keeping them in company. In a letter to the
Admiralty at this period Lord Jellicoe drew attention to
the fact that " very heavy weather was experienced by
the patrols " and that " a number of ships were boarded
and armed guards placed on board in most difficult
circumstances."
Another type of difficulty, and one that illustrates the
tax that was at all times placed upon the tact and
initiative of the responsible officers, may be exemplified
in the experience of the armed guard from the Columbella,
which was placed on board the American sailing-ship
Andrew Welch on November 2nd. After sighting several
submarines, the Andrew Welch rounded Muckle Flugga
on November 6th, in an attempt to make Lerwick, under
the usual stormy conditions. She spoke to a patrol-boat
off Noss Head, which directed her to heave to, but dis-
appeared again from sight without rendering her any
assistance. The weather becoming worse, the master of
the Andrew Welch wished to make for the port of Helm-
stadt, in Norway, and on the refusal of the officer in
charge of the armed guard to allow this, the crew of the
Andrew Welch struck work. As the armed guard was,
of course, quite insufficient for working the ship, a com-
promise had necessarily to be made, and the officer in
charge agreed to try and attempt to make the port of
Aberdeen. On November 11th the little vessel accord-
CH. V] A GREAT RECORD 147
ingly arrived off Girdleness, where signals were made for
a pilot and a small steamer was spoken, which promised
to send out a tug. The tug did not arrive, however, and the
heavy gale from the north-north-west obliged the Andrew
Welch to remain hove to for three whole days and nights.
Once more the crew refused to work, and as the water supply
was getting very low and the pumps were failing to draw,
the officer of the guard was at last obliged to run for the
nearest Norwegian port, Christiansund, where he put
himself into communication with the British Consul, and
whence, with his armed guard, he was subsequently allowed
to return home. That such instances of insubordination
were rare is perhaps the best tribute to the firmness and
humour with which these officers, many of them little
more than boys, carried out their difficult and delicate
tasks.
The transition year of 1915, during which, as we have
seen, the nature, personnel, and technical equipment of the
patrol had had to be very considerably modified as well
as amplified owing to the unprecedented and unforeseen
exigencies of a sea blockade under modern war conditions,
was now drawing to an end, and Admiral de Chair was able
to give a summary of the work done under these trying
conditions. Despite the weather, the almost constant
presence of enemy submarines, the losses of time and
material as the result of inevitable accidents, and the
primitive nature of the island bases upon which the patrol
largely depended, the ships of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron
had patrolled, without intermission, an area of 220,000
square miles. During this time 3,068 ships had been
intercepted on the high seas and carefully examined.
Of this number, 743 were found to be carrying contraband
and otherwise suspicious cargoes, and had been in conse-
quence sent to British ports for examination and confis-
cation of cargo as considered desirable by the authorities
in charge.
During the twelve months, the Tenth Cruiser Squadron
had lost two ships by submarine attack, the Bayano and
India ; two by mines, the Viknor and the Arlanza ; and
one by foundering at sea in heavy weather, the Clan
Macnaughton.'^ With these ships there had gone down
some 63 officers and 800 men. With regard to the armed
1 The Arlanza was brought into harbour.
148 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
guards placed on intercepted vessels, some typical experi-
ences of which have already been recorded, the casualties
sustained by these were remarkably few, only one guard
being taken prisoner, while two had their prizes sunk under
them by submarines. Of the vessels intercepted, 90
were American, 857 Norwegian, 300 Swedish, 606 Danish,
8 Dutch, 1 Spanish, and 1 Argentine. In addition 264
British vessels, 17 French, 124 Russian, 2 Belgian, and
1 Italian were examined, while 7 other vessels of unknown
nationality were also intercepted. In addition to these,
817 fishing-craft of seven different nationalities came
under notice and were examined.
Even more, perhaps, to the Tenth Cruiser Squadron
than to any other portion of the British sea services
during the war was the value of wireless telegraphy under
modern war conditions apparent. Continually moving
from place to place in the course of their patrol, covering
in so doing enormous distances, and seldom in sight of one
another, the efficient control of the ships of the Tenth
Cruiser Squadron would have been impossible without the
aid of wireless telegraphy. How great a reliance was
placed upon it during the year 1915 may be gathered
from the fact that a daily average of twenty-one signals
was sent and forty-six signals received by the one senior
officer alone of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, an average,
throughout the year, of one signal every twenty-one
minutes, although the amount of such signalling was
strictly reduced to the smallest possible minimum.
Throughout the year, except during brief periods in
M^hich she had to go to port for coaling and repairs,
the Alsatian remained the flagship of the Tenth
Cruiser Squadron, under the command of Rear-Admiral
Dudley de Chair, Commodore Benson taking over the
command in his absence. For 262 days the Alsatian
was at sea, steaming during that time 71,500 miles and
using 40,287 tons of coal, a record that may be taken as
typical of the work of each ship of the squadron.
The year went out in gales. The character of the
weather is reflected in the story of the wreck of the
British steamer Morning in lat. 62° 21' N., long. 6° W.,
when the patrol-ship Cedric rescued the master (Mr. Andrew
Smith) and the second officer (Mr. Joe Hansen). The
steamer — a Dundee whaler — was loaded with ammunition
CH. V] ADMIRAL JELLICOE'S PRAISE 149
at Brest and was on her way to Archangel. She left
Queenstown on December 21st, and after bunkering in
the Faeroes was spoken by the Alsatian on December 22nd
during a south-easterly gale. The master stated that
after leaking for two days, due to working of ship, she
foundered on the morning of December 24th in lat.
64° 15' N., long. 7° W. With the exception of the second
mate and himself, the crew were drowned, the boats being
stove in. Both men were much exhausted, having been
four days in an open boat in bad and very cold weather.
Admiral Jellicoe was in no doubt as to the devotion
exhibited by officers and men of the Tenth Cruiser
Squadron. He reported to the Admiralty at the close of
1915 that he was " fully in agreement " with Rear-Admiral
de Chair in praising the work which they had done under
conditions of much difficulty and in the face of great
dangers. " The work of officers and men," he remarked,
" merits the highest commendation."
As the Old Year closed in gales, so did 1916 open with
fierce winds and high seas. The Tenth Cruiser Squadron,
in maintaining the blockade of the enemy, had to struggle
against a variety of difficulties during winter days and
nights. Under such circumstances it was not, therefore,
surprising that orders could not sometimes be carried out,
and in a typical failure to do so, owing to overwhelming
handicaps, the significance of the work successfully accom-
plished can better perhaps be appreciated. As an example
we have the adventures of a young officer of the Royal
Naval Reserve, Lieutenant S. F. Carter, who had been
placed, on December 21st, in charge of an armed guard
consisting of one midshipman and four seamen, on board
the Norwegian barque Skomvaer. Provided with supplies
for eight days, and with orders to take the Skomvaer into
Lerwick, it was not until January 1st, owing to the strong
easterly winds, that Lieutenant Carter was able at last
to make a run for this port. During the interval, in which
he had been beating about, he had fallen in with other
vessels of the patrol, the Orotava on December 26th, who
had supplied him with provisions for a further eight days,
and the Cedric on January 1st, who had given him pro-
visions for another five days. On January 1st, the wind
veering to the south-west, he was able at last to run toward
Lerwick, passing Muckle Flugga two days later at 2.30
150 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
p.m., and arriving off Lerwick in the first watch. For
five whole days, however, it w^as a case of being so near
and yet so far, and owing to the contrary and baffling
winds, he was unable actually to get into port. By
January 8th, so fierce was the gale blowing from the
northward, that he decided at last to run his vessel into
Kirkwall, but on the evening of the next day the wind
fell back to the south-west, and he once more headed,
according to his orders, for Lerwick.
On January 10th a gale was blowing from the west-north-
w^est, and in the forenoon the master informed him that
provisions, water, and oil were all running short, and the crew
complained to the master respecting the safety of the ship.
The sea was then running so high that at 5 p.m. the master
insisted that the ship must run for safety, and Lieutenant
Carter reluctantly consented, and accordingly ran to the
south-eastward. On the next day the Norwegian coast
was sighted, in a period of calm between heavy snow
squalls, and on January 12th, shortly after noon, a pilot
w^as picked up. The Skomvaer then tried to make either
the port of Stavanger or Haugesund, but was eventually
taken in tow by two small tugs on January 13th and towed
into Flekkefjord, where she arrived early in the morning
of January 14th, more than three weeks after Lieutenant
Carter had boarded her with his armed guard.
On January 15th the weather was once more so bad
that the patrols were forced to lie to, the wind increasing
to hurricane force. So fierce was the gale that the Orotava,
which was at Swarbacks Minn for the purpose of coaling,
dragged both anchors and was unable to complete her
coaling. The boom-gate vessel of the port also dragged
her anchors, so that the entrance to the harbour was
temporarily blocked, while the shore end of the boom net
defence, which was secured round a large rock, was carried
away owing to the splitting of the rock under the enor-
mous strain. Four days later the Duke of Cornwall,
which had left Swarbacks Minn to return to Longhope with
despatches, was also forced to put back to harbour owing
to the heavy seas running, while ships coaling at Busta
Voe were obliged to stop coaling and raise steam, some of
them dragging their anchors, although all had two anchors
down. The next day the Patia reported that, while hove
to, she had shipped so heavy a sea that her bridge had
CH. v] DAMAGE AT SWARBACKS MINN 151
been seriously damaged and an officer injured, while at
Swarbacks Minn, in going alongside the Artois, the collier
came into collision with her, making a hole in the port
bow with the crown of her starboard anchor. On
January 21st the Orotava reported that her wheelhouse
and all bridge fittings had been smashed by a heavy sea,
and that she had been obliged to run before the gale,
endeavouring, but unsuccessfully, to use her hand-
steering gear. On Januarj'^ 22nd, owing to the heavy
weather, the gate of the boom at Swarbacks Minn was
damaged and sank below the surface in the centre and
could not be opened, while the main deck in the store-
room passage on the starboard side of the Orcoma was
buckled by about seven-eighths of an inch. The persist-
ence of the patrol in continuing its work under such
conditions is perhaps evidenced by the fact that no less
than ten vessels were intercepted in that stormy week,
eight of them being sent into port.
Of the skill and stout-heartedness that made such a
record possible in such conditions, an admirable instance
is afforded by the experience, a day or two later, of the
Ebro. This vessel, on January 24th, intercepted the
Norwegian barque Beechbank, with an armed guard on
board, in lat. 61° 25' N., long. 1° 50' E. The barque was
trying to make Lerwick, but had lost her fore and maintop
masts, her mizzen and top-gallant mast, and nearly all
her sails and boats. As the barque herself was com-
paratively undamaged, however, the Ebro resolved to
endeavour to take her in tow, but could not at first suc-
ceed in doing so, owing to the heavy weather. There was
nothing for it, therefore, but for the Ebro to stand by till
morning, the crew of the Beechbank proving themselves
somewhat difficult to handle and refusing to go aloft.
The cutting away of the mizzen and top sail and other
work aloft had, therefore, to be carried out by the Royal
Naval Reserve officers of the armed guard. Lieutenant
Wynn, and the master of the ship, Lieutenant Wynn
taking complete charge after the dismantling had been
accomplished.
On the following day the weather continued very bad,
with a gale from the west-south-west, and the sea ran
so high that it was found impossible to communicate by
boat, while the Ebro herself, being in light condition, with
152 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
only 22 per cent, of coal remaining, became somewhat
unmanageable. This difficulty was overcome by veering
an anchor and six shackles of cable, a dangerous experi-
ment, but one that justified itself in steadying the Ebro
and enabling hawsers to be got on board the other vessel
by means of a rocket and a buoyed line drifting to
windward.
The Beechbank was thus eventually got into tow with
a 6-inch and 5 i -inch wire and 90 fathoms of her chain
cable. By half an hour after noon, the Ebro and Beech-
bank were on their way to Lerwick at a maximum speed
of 2 knots, with the Alcantara standing by as a defence
against submarine attack. Throughout the night, in
spite of heavy weather, the Ebro succeeded in towing
the Beechbank towards her destination, and was at last
successful in reaching Lerwick at 10 o'clock on the morning
of January 27th. Had Commander Dugmore of the
Ebro not succeeded in taking the Beechbank in tow, she
would almost inevitably have been lost, as she was being
driven by the gale on to a lee shore. For their work in
this connection. Commander Dugmore, R.N., of the
Ebro, and Lieutenant Wynn, R.N.R., in charge of the
armed guard in the Beechbank, received the special com-
mendation of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
Till the end of the month the weather continued rough
and difficult, but nevertheless during the last seven days
of January twenty-one vessels were intercepted and
examined and five sent into port. Nor did February
open more auspiciously, as can be gathered from the
incidents that followed the interception, on February 2nd,
of the Danish sailing-ship Vigilant by the patrol-vessel
Artois. At the first attempt of the latter to send a party
on board, there was an accident with the boat and a
man fell overboard. He was picked up, however, and
the Vigilant was safely reached. It was found that her
foremast was gone, and her rigging in such a bad state
that the master requested that he and his crew should be
taken on board the Artois. This was done with very
great difficulty, owing to the weather, and an attempt
was then made to tow the derelict vessel, which was
loaded with wood and leaking badly. The weather became
worse, however, and it was found impossible to get the
Vigilant in tow, the Artois consequently standing by her
CH. V] A STERN FIGHT 153
for the night. As the Vigilant had been bound for
Morocco, and as it was considered most desirable to get her
to Stornoway in order that she might be well searched,
in view of the possibility that she might be carrying
stores for enemy submarines in the Mediterranean, the
Orco7na was also sent by Rear-Admiral de Chair to
stand b^^
Throughout the next day the Artois continued to keep
in touch with the Vigilant, but was unable to take her
in tow on account of the high seas. On February 4th
the weather improved a little and the Or coma helped
the Artois in taking the Vigilant in tow, and they pro-
ceeded towards Stornoway at a speed of 4 knots, the
Mantua subsequently joining them in order to protect
them from submarine attack. On February 5th, owing
to the gale increasing again, the Artois's speed was reduced
to 1 knot, a further escort consisting of a yacht, two
whalers, and a tug, which had been ordered out from
Stornoway, being unable to join them owing to the stormy
weather. On the evening of that day the Artois arrived
under the lee of the Butt of Lewis, and at last, on
February 6th, she succeeded, in spite of the force of a
full gale, in safely arriving with her prize at Stornoway.
Great care had to be taken in overhauling and boarding
prizes in case they might be raiders in disguise.
While the work of the patrol was thus continuing, under
conditions of the utmost difficulty, the cliief event of the
month was the action which took place on Tuesday,
February 29th, between the Alcantara and Andes and the
German raider Greif, which resulted in the loss of the
Alcantara after a fierce and plucky fight, and the subse-
quent destruction of the Greif hy the guns of the Andes.
On February 29th, 1916, at 8.45 a.m., the Alcantara,
when on patrol, sighted smoke on her port beam and,
steering towards it, sighted a steamer flying the Nor-
wegian flag and steaming north-east. Acting under
previous orders. Captain Wardle took care to find out
all about her before getting within 4,000 yards. He
inquired her name by signals, and was told she was the
Rena from South America with a cargo of coffee. Lloyd's
Register proved the existence of a ship of that name, so
Captain Wardle closed, signalling to the stranger to stop
her engines. When she had done so, the Alcantara,
154 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
getting M'ithin 2,000 yards, with her guns manned and
all ready for action, examined her carefully, and approached
from right astern to board. When about 1,000 yards
distant, the Rena's ensign staff, carrying the Norwegian
flag, dropped over the stern, her steering house on the poop
disappeared, disclosing a gun ; flaps fell down on the ship's
side, and guns opened fire, the German ensign being
hoisted at the moment. The Alcantara replied at once
with her bow guns. The opposing vessel was hit repeatedly,
receiving serious injury. In desperation the mysterious
vessel discharged torpedoes, but without success.
The action had lasted about forty minutes, when the
enemy abandoned ship owing to the fierce fires which
had broken out, and Captain Wardle ceased firing. The
Alcantara had been badly holed in the water-line, and,
listing to port, turned on her side and sank at 11 a.m.
The Andes, being the next ship on patrol, had closed on
receiving the Alcantara's signals, and came up in time to
take part in the action and sink the enemy. The Comus
and MuNSTER, which had also arrived on the scene, helped
to finish off the enemy and pick up survivors. An officer
and 110 men of the enemy ship were rescued. The
German prisoners admitted that the sunken vessel was
the Greif. She had been secretly converted into a raider
at Hamburg, and was carrying a crew of 360 officers and
men. She had left Germany a few days earlier and was
making for the Atlantic to raid commerce. She had not
reckoned on the vigilance of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron,
and her loss was a severe disappointment to the Germans.
By this time the blockade was proving highly efficient.
It was not until it had been in operation for some time
that smooth working was secured. The whole system
represented an innovation, and day by day experience
suggested ways in which the efficiency of the system could
be improved. At first the Customs House officers, accus-
tomed to the routine of a Free Trade policy, found it
difficult to adjust themselves to new conditions. It had
hitherto been their habit to board incoming merchant
ships and to content themselves with a formal inquiry
for dutiable wines, spirits, or cigars, making examinations
only when the circumstances were suspicious. When the
new regime of the blockade was introduced, some of the
masters of neutral ships, familiar with the ordinary routine.
CH. V] INGENIOUS DEVICES FAIL 155
would produce a few bottles of whisky and allow the
Customs officers formally to seal them. This apparent
honesty, there was afterwards reason to believe, was
intended to divert attention from contraband carefully
hidden away in the bottom of the hold. A few weeks
of experience of the blockade worked wonders, and the
Customs officers were so " knowing " that all the devices
adopted to elude the blockade proved fruitless. Probably
never before did an enemy, and those in collusion with
him, adopt so many ingenious ruses. Among them a
few may be mentioned as a matter of interest :
(1) Double bottoms, decks, and bulkheads, concealed
guns, rifles, and other firearms and ammunition.
(2) Copper keels and copper plates on sailing-ships.
(3) Hollow masts.
(4) Rubber onions. These were discovered when a
British officer dropped one on the deck. " The onion
bounced 10 feet into the air."
(5) Rubber concealed in coffee sacks.
(6) Cotton concealed in barrels of flour.
(7) Rubber honey, made in the form of honeycomb
filled with a curious liquid mixture.
(8) False manifests. This was the most frequent form
of "faking." In several instances, where the captain of
the neutral realised that the " game was up," he produced
both the genuine and the false manifests for boarding-
officers to compare ; a form of frankness not without its
element of humour.
But, in spite of every artifice, and in spite also of gales
of wind, high seas, fogs, and a variety of difficulties, the
Tenth Cruiser Squadron had succeeded in interrupting
most of the trade by sea which the enemy was endeavouring
to carry on.
The success of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron and the
course of events generally since the war had opened had
created a new situation as far as the blockade was con-
cerned. At the outbreak of war absolute contraband
consisted only of those articles which were exclusively
of military character, such as guns, ammunition, etc.
Conditional contraband included foodstuffs, but they
had to be destined for the use of the fleets and armies of
the enemy. This left many of the important articles
included under the heading of raw materials quite free.
156 MERCHANT SEAMEN AND BLOCKADE [ch. v
and it was only gradually that such were restricted. During
this time the arduous work of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron
was, in a great measure, being nullified by the release of
ships carrying necessaries for the enemy, but finally the
extreme dissatisfaction of the Navy (especially of the
officers and men employed in the blockade) became ap-
parent to the Government, and the establishment of a
Ministry of Blockade, with headquarters at the Foreign
Office, was determined upon. In March 1916 it was de-
cided to appoint Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair as naval
adviser in order to bring his great experience to bear on
the problem, and try to make the blockade work of the
Navy more directly effective. Consequently, on March
6th, 1916, he hauled down his flag to take up his tem-
porary appointment at the Foreign Office, subsequently
being selected to represent the British Navy on Mr.
Balfour's War Mission to the United States of America
in 1917.
In a speech at Montreal University on May 31st, 1917,
on the occasion of the Honorary Degree of LL.D. being
conferred on Admiral de Chair, Mr. A. J. Balfour, who
had served for some months as First Lord of the Ad-
miralty, recalled that that officer, during " the long early
months of the war," was in command of the Tenth Cruiser
Squadron, " which practically carried out, single-handed,
the blockade of Germany — night and day through summer
and winter in the stormiest seas to be found anywhere on
the face of the globe." "The Squadron under his com-
mand," Mr. Balfour added, " carried out, untiring, un-
checked, and with unqualified success, the great task with
which they had been entrusted. While we remember and
know these things, there are two great branches on which,
perhaps, our ordinary thoughts are least occupied. One
is the unflinching service rendered by our Merchant Marine
in the face of dangers never contemplated as incident to
the life of a sailor, and not less than this is the work of that
Cruiser Squadron to which I have referred, whose labours
were more continuous, more important, and more successful
than any other branch of His Majesty's naval forces."
Sir Dudley de Chair was succeeded in command of the
Tenth Cruiser Squadron by Vice- Admiral Reginald Tupper.
P1CIVRED IN TH£ HISTORICAL SECTION Of THE COMMITTeE OFIMPERItL DEFENCE
CHAPTER VI
THE AUXILIARY PATROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
An incomplete picture of the extent and character of the
operations of the AuxiHary Patrol would be presented if
the impression were conveyed that its work was confined
to the waters around the British Isles. From a compara-
tively early date in the war, a demand for auxiliary craft
came from the Mediterranean. At the beginning of
November 1914 the Turkish forts on the Gallipoli Penin-
sula had been bombarded for a short time, and in the
following February a determined movement to force the
Straits was initiated. It soon became apparent that
the men-of-war engaged in this operation were as
dependent for safety on mine-sweeping trawlers as were
the vessels of the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. Hopes
of forcing the Dardanelles rested on the success of trawlers
in sweeping a clear passage for the battleships, cruisers,
and destroyers, for the entrance was strongly defended
by successive mine-fields. The demand for auxiliary
craft in the Mediterranean became more insistent later on,
when it became impossible to sweep in face of heavy fire
from the shore batteries, and the men-of-war had to be
content with rendering aid to the Allied military forces
by distant bombardment of the Turkish batteries and
positions. This change of tactics oflered to the enemy
the opportunity of employing submarines, and several
of these craft issued from the Adriatic to attack the
bombarding vessels. The need thus arose for patrol
trawlers and drifters provided with nets to assure the
safety of the men-of-war.
Another stage in the operations opened on Italy entering
the war on the side of the Entente on May 23rd, 1915.
By this time German and Austrian submarines, operating
from Cattaro, had been encouraged by the disadvantages
which the neutrality of Italy had inflicted on the Allies,
157
158 PATROLLING THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vi
to attack the maritime lines of communication between
the Straits of Gibraltar and the Dardanelles, thronged
with men-of-war and supply ships, and eventually they
threatened the trade route between the northern end
of the Suez Canal and the Atlantic, over which essential
supplies of goods of various kinds were being conveyed
from the Far East and the Antipodes. This phase of the
enemy's activities led to a determined attempt on the part
of the Allies to restrict the use of the submarine bases
on Cattaro and Pola, an operation facilitated by Italy's
entrance into the war. This problem closely resembled
those presented, respectively, by the Straits of Dover and
the North Channel, to which allusion has already been
made. Whilst Cattaro in the Adriatic corresponded
roughly to the position of Zeebrugge in the Straits of
Dover, in the case of the North Channel the enemy's
submarine bases were several hundred miles distant.
Since the problem of defending these three Straits had
much in common, the tactics adopted were very similar.
When the position in the Mediterranean became critical,
drifters were dispatched by the Admiralty to shoot their
nets in the Adriatic as they had done at the southern
exit of the Irish Sea, as well as off Zeebrugge, in the hope
of denying passage to the enemy submarines issuing
from the Austrian ports. The defensive measures in the
Mediterranean had, of course, to be varied owing to
differences in depths and distances, but generally the
problems of the three straits were identical in character.
The various stages in the operations of the auxiliary
craft in the Mediterranean may be stated with advantage
in chronological order. On January 19th, 1915, arrange-
ments were made by the Admiralty to collect twenty-one
mine-sweeping trawlers as soon as possible and dispatch
them to the Dardanelles. They were to be sent first to
Devonport, to be coaled and provisioned. Of this twenty-
one, seven were selected from Grimsby and fourteen from
Lowestoft. On January 28th thirteen of them set out from
Devonport under Commander William Mellor, in the traw-
ler Escallonia, and the remaining eight followed a few
days later, after remedying certain engine-room defects.
The first trawlers began to arrive at Gibraltar on
February 3rd, and the next day left for Malta. Four days
later these vessels put into Malta, where they were fitted
CH. VI] SWEEPING THE DARDANELLES 159
out for the dangerous work that was awaiting them.
The Dardanelles campaign could not begin — so telegraphed
the Commander-in-Chief — until the arrival of these craft,
so important had the fishing-vessel become in modern
naval warfare. By February 21st the whole of the twenty-
one trawlers had assembled at Malta, of which four had
sailed for the Dardanelles on February 15th and another
four two days later.
On February 25th the trawlers began their task of
sweeping at the entrance to the Dardanelles, covered
by a division of battleships accompanied by destroyers.
Within two days they had swept a distance of four miles
from the entrance of the Straits, no mines having been
found. The plan was that the trawlers should first clear
areas in which the battleships could manoeuvre for the
purpose of bombarding the enemy's forts. But it was when
the sweepers approached the Narrows that the trouble
began, for at this position the enemy had laid line after
line of mines between the Asiatic and European shores.
Furthermore he had protected these mines by batteries
and searchlights. There was a strong current running
down towards the Dardanelles Straits further impeding
the work of the trawlers. The undertaking of the trawlers
was therefore difficult as well as dangerous and, as events
were to prove, impossible in spite of all the courage,
seamanship, and tenacity of purpose exhibited by the
fishermen in face of dangers they had never thought to
confront. On March 1st these little ships steamed up
under cover of darkness, protected by destroyers. They
swept to within three thousand yards of Kephez Point.
It was a bright moonlit night. When abreast of the
Suandere Biver, the enemy's batteries opened such a
fierce bombardment that the trawlers had to retire, the
destroyers aiding their withdrawal by making a smoke
screen. Fortunately none of the trawlers was hit, and
Admiral Carden telegraphed to the Admiralty that the
sweepers were doing excellent work.
But at this date neither the magnitude of the Dardanelles
task nor the hopelessness of the mine-sweeping trawlers'
efforts was appreciated. The key to the ' problem of
advance was the mine-fields at the Narrows. The battle-
ships and cruisers were held up till the fishermen, recently
arrived from the North Sea, could clear a wide channel
11—12
160 PATROLLING THE IMEDITERRANEAN [ch. vi
in the face of powerful batteries and forts. During the
night of March 6th-7th the sweepers, protected by the
light cruiser Amethyst and destroyers, again essayed the
task, and were once more driven back by the enemy's
guns. During the night of March lOth-llth seven more
trawlers, attended by two picket-boats fitted with explosive
creeps, and supported by H.M.S. Canopus, Amethyst,
and destroyers, once more entered the Dardanelles and
proceeded up the Straits. The protecting vessels opened
fire on the batteries and searchlights which guarded the
Kephez mine-fields, but it proved impossible to extinguish
the lights by gunfire. In spite of the enemy's heavy fire,
the trawlers Escallonia, Avon, Manx Hero, Syringa,
Beatrice II, Gwenllian, and Soldier Prince, together with
the picket-boats, succeeded in getting above the mine-field,
the intention being to sweep down with the current.
In this inferno of invisible mines, blinding searchlights,
and bursting shells, the position of the trawlermen was not
an enviable one. The result was that only one pair of
sweepers succeeded in getting out their sweep, securing a
couple of mines. The trawler Manx Hero struck a mine,
blew up, and sank, though the crew were picked up.
Two trawlers were struck by shells and a couple of men
wounded. It is remarkable that any of these dauntless
men escaped the ordeal, for all the vessels were under
heavy fire from 6-inch guns and weapons of lesser calibre.
Although the first pair of trawlers had succeeded in getting
out their sweep, it is matter for little surprise that both
the second and third pair failed to run a proper sweep,
with the result that little progress was made that night.
On the following night another group of trawlers made the
effort, and in view of their experience their names should be
perpetuated. They consisted of the Restrivo, Vidonia,
Star of the Emjnre, Frascati, Fentonian, Strathlossie, and
Strathord. The plan was to be the same as had been
adopted on the previous night. Similar misfortunes were
again encountered. As soon as the sweepers entered the
rays of the searchlights, the enemy's guns opened fire
and seven shells dropped over the trawlers. The sweepers,
realising the odds which were against them, absolutely
defenceless against such attack, turned sixteen points and
retired. But let no one dare to call these men cowards !
Throughout the whole war these fishermen and their
CH. VI] ADMIRATION OF NAVAL AUTHORITIES 161
R.N.R. officers were never frightened of mines or sub-
marines, which they attacked with the greatest possible
gallantry whenever they encountered them ; but it was
quite another matter to take these men straight from
the North Sea and turn them, ordinary fishermen, into
conspicuous targets for field-guns and forts. No harder
or more dispiriting a task was ever set the vessels of
the Auxiliary Patrol throughout the war than that of
sweeping the Dardanelles Straits. The dice were so
loaded against them that the sweepers had no chance.
To have been successful the operation required very fast
craft fitted with efficient gear, and very highly and speci-
ally trained crews ; moreover, the work had to be done
by day, if at all. As it was, the sweeping was carried
out by night by slow trawlers handicapped by the current,
whose officers and men were inexperienced and had never
before been under shell fire.
In the circumstances, it was decided to stiffen the crews
with volunteer officers and men from the Royal Navy,
and volunteers were speedily forthcoming. But not even
with this aid was it possible to get to Kephez. On
March 18th the Restrivo and five sister vessels made the
attempt — by daylight this time. One pair got out their
sweep, but owing to the fire from howitzers and field
guns they were unable to reach Kephez. The reorganisa-
tion of the mine-sweeping flotilla at the Dardanelles indeed
was to prove a lengthy operation. Many of the original
crews who had brought out these trawlers were unwilling
to continue sweeping under heavy fire and were sent back
to home waters, where they performed excellent work.
Their places were taken by volunteer crews. Roughly
about half of the original trawler ratings were recalled home
— to the number of about one hundred. There were plenty
left behind to continue to assist in the work. The
admiration of the naval authorities found expression in
the recommendation by Admiral de Robeck to the Admir-
alty for the award of a D.S.O. to Skipper Alfred Swain,
of the trawler Escallonia, and Skipper Alfred E. Berry,
of the trawler Frascaii. These skippers and their men
had been constantly under fire, but still continued to serve
in the Dardanelles campaign. By April 7th the Com-
mander-in-Chief had discontinued mine-sweeping inside
the Straits, as he considered that the results did not
162 PATROLLING THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vi
justify the risks which had to be run from the fire of the
enemy. Thus, until the end of the war, these mines were
never swept, and therefore the fleet never penetrated
the Narrows. A change in tactics occurred and the work
of the Navy consisted in supporting the Army.
This change involved further work for the trawlers,
though of a different character. They were required to
carry out all sorts of unfamiliar duties in support of the
naval operations. As an illustration, some account may be
given of the events of April 25th, a day which will always
be known in the Antipodes as " Anzac Day." The first
landing of the Australian and New Zealand troops north
of Gaba Tepe was carried out under the orders of Rear-
Admiral Cecil F. Thursby, with whose squadron fifteen
trawlers were associated. In reporting upon this opera-
tion, Admiral de Robeck wrote : "I should like to place
on record the good service performed by the vessels
employed in landing the second part of the covering force :
the seamanship displayed and the rapidity with which so
large a force was thrown on the beach is deserving of the
highest praise." Similarly at the southern extremity of
the Gallipoli Peninsula the fourteen trawlers under Rear-
Admiral R. E. Wemyss performed excellent work. By
this time the Admiralty were dispatching reinforcements
from England to Admiral de Robeck's fleet. On March
15th Lowestoft had been ordered to send thirty of the
fastest mine-sweeping trawlers to Falmouth, en route
for Gibraltar, Malta, and Lemnos. Eight fleet-sweepers,
including railway steamers which had been attached to the
Grand Fleet in the early stages of the war, but had been
found unsuitable for the duty, were now dispatched to the
Dardanelles, calling at Plymouth. On March 17th the
Lowestoft trawlers left and they reached Plymouth two
days later. At Malta they were fitted with armour-
plating to protect winches and wheelhouses, and then they
continued their voyage to the Dardanelles.
But in addition to the trawlers needed by the Army
for many services, there presently devolved on them the
duty of maintaining an anti-submarine patrol. Germany
had come to realise how seriously her war plans would be
affected if success attended the effort to force a way through
the Dardanelles. So she determined that she herself
would supplement the submarines which Austria-Hungary
CH. VI] THE U21'S SUCCESS 163
had hitherto been operating. At first she dispatched
only small submarines of the U-boat type. These craft
had to be sent out in sections overland to Austria and
were put together there. They were based on Cattaro
and operated in the -<Egean. One of these vessels, UB3,
perished on a mine-field off Smyrna soon after she had
been put afloat.
In view of the grave construction which was put upon
the Allies' plans for bringing pressure on Turkey, the
Germans decided on a yet more ambitious attempt to
intervene. U21 was dispatched from Ems on Anzac Day
(April 25th) under Lieutenant-Commander Hersing. He
shaped a course round Scotland. He was to test the
practicability of conducting a submarine campaign in
the Mediterranean with submarines which had hitherto
operated in the waters surrounding the British Isles.
The event is important inasmuch as it marked a new
epoch in the use of the submarine. U21 was the first
German submarine to proceed to the Mediterranean under
her own power, and it was the longest voyage which
any such craft had hitherto accomplished unaccompanied
and under war conditions. On May 13th she reached
Cattaro, and a week later left there for the Dardanelles,
where, on May 25th, she torpedoed and sunk H.M.S,
Triumph, and two days later destroyed H.M.S. Majestic.
On June 5th she proceeded to Constantinople.
The result of this fresh development of the submarine
campaign was that new and extended plans had to be
made for protecting the bombarding ships. It was at
once decided to send out twenty more trawlers, as well
as thirty net drifters. From Poole thirty drifters, with
nets, indicator buoys, fourteen days' coal — half a dozen
of them being also armed with a 3-pounder apiece — ■
started out for the Dardanelles in the early hours of
June 5th, reached Gibraltar on June 13th ; they left for
the eastward two days later. The twenty trawlers had to
be taken up specially. They were sent to Falmouth,
where each was armed either with a 3-pounder or a
6-pounder gun and given extra crew accommodation ;
the ventilating arrangements were improved and wind sails
were provided so as to fit them for service in the heat of
the ^gean. By June 9th these twenty vessels had started
for the voyage south.
164 PATROLLING THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vi
Some idea of the work which fell to these Dardanelles
trawlers may be conveyed in a few sentences. On
July 4th the trawler Lord Wimborne was engaged from
9.30 p.m. until 5.30 the following morning landing troops
alongside the River Clyde. She was compelled to make
seven different attempts, but each time was spotted by the
powerful searchlight mounted in Chanak, and promptly
shelled. The trawlers and trawlermen were the admira-
tion of the soldiers whom they saved during the preceding
weeks from starvation. Throughout the month of July
the greatest strain of the Dardanelles naval warfare was
borne by the trawlers employed in towing barges and
transporting wounded men, loading ammunition by night
for the Peninsula. The men had little chance of getting
sleep, and the craft were infested most of the time with
flies, which spoiled the crews' food.
So rapidly had this auxiliary force grown, that at the
beginning of July Admiral de Robeck had under his
command 47 trawler mine-sweepers, 31 net-drifters, 20
armed trawlers, 7 fleet-sweepers, and 4 motor patrol-
boats, of which 3 had come out from England. One
of the fleet-sweepers had been equipped for mine-laying.
On June 2nd a blockade of Smyrna had been declared,
and it was being maintained by a destroyer and various
other craft, including a couple of trawlers and two motor
gunboats of the Royal Naval Motor-Boat Reserve, com-
manded by R.N.V.R. officers. Within a few weeks U21
had been followed by other U-boats from Germany, bound
for Cattaro, and thence to the Dardanelles, and by the
end of August every available trawler in the ^gean,
which was not employed either in handling supplies for
the army or in escorting transports, was out on patrol
searching for enemy submarines ; and net-drifters were
also at work with their nets, protected by trawlers
moving on an outer circle.
During the autumn additional drifters and trawlers
were sent out and employed in connection with the
operations in Salonika ; while during the last months of the
year auxiliary craft continued to perform other tasks,
especially in regard to protecting the transports. During
the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac, which took place on
December 19th-20th, these small craft again proved indis-
pensable, no fewer than 42,700 troops being taken off by the
CH. VI] SUBMARINES IN THE ADRIATIC 165
trawlers and fleet-sweepers. Meanwhile it was the duty of
the net-drifters to protect the monitors and battleships
while bombarding the enemy's coast. Finally, on January
7th, 1916, and the following day, came the evacuation of
Cape Helles, in which the trawlers took their full share of
the work, being once again subjected to heavy shell-fire.
But even with the evacuations from Gallipoli, the task
of the trawlers was not ended. Daily at dawn they swept
from Mudros boom defence for fifteen miles, and so serious
was the menace to British merchant ships that a complete
chain of patrols had to be maintained from JMalta to the
JEge&n and all round the islands. Trawlers and drifters
were compelled to pass monotonous days in carrying out
these essential duties. They were well organised, armed
with guns and lance bombs, and most of them also now had
depth charges.
Attention must now be turned to the Adriatic, where
the trend of events had also made enormous demands on the
craft of the Auxiliary Patrol. Three days after Italy's
intervention in the war, Rear-Admiral Thursby had
reached Taranto with a division of battleships. From
the very first it was realised that it was absolutely neces-
sary that the Austrian and German submarines based on
Pola and Cattaro should, as far as possible, be thwarted.
The Otranto Straits had to be denied to them. The
intention was to station in these straits as many fishing-
craft as could be provided, equipped with nets, just as
in the Dover Straits, and supported by destroyers based
on Brindisi and Valona, the operations being covered by
aircraft. As has been stated, U21 had reached Cattaro
on May 13th by sea, and previous to this date other
submarines had arrived in the Adriatic overland. During
the month of June these Adriatic submarines were most
active. On June 9th H.M.S. Dublin, a light cruiser
which had joined the Adriatic Squadron, was torpedoed
whilst returning from the Albanian coast, but managed
to reach Brindisi under her own steam. In the same
week the Italian submarine Medusa was torpedoed by
UBl5 and sunk whilst on her way to Venice. On
July 7th the same submarine sank the Italian cruiser
Amalfi. It was therefore evident that it was high
time nets were at work to make the Otranto Straits
impassable.
166 PATROLLING THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vi
At the end of August it was decided to send out drifters
from England to the Adriatic. The necessity arose at an
inopportune moment, for, owing to the great outburst
of submarine activity during this month off the south-
western approaches to the Enghsh Channel, more rather
than fewer Auxiliary Patrol vessels were needed in home
waters. However, drifter fishing was about to come to
an end, and the opportunity was seized to take up
some more Of these craft. The result was that sixty
drifters were got ready for the Adriatic, Commander O.
Hatcher, R.N., being appointed to command them. On
the last day of August the first batch left Falmouth for
the Adriatic, via Gibraltar, and by September 10th the
whole of the sixty had arrived at Gibraltar. By the end
of the month the last of the flotillas had reached Taranto,
and by September 25th the first two divisions had been
dispatched to lay their nets across the Otranto Straits.
It was on October 12th that the first dramatic incident
occurred to these craft. The line of drifters with their nets
were laid across the Straits -v^'ithin but fifty miles of the
enemy's base at Cattaro. At 8 o'clock that morning
the drifter Restore was separated about three miles from the
other drifters. She had for armament only a few rifles,
and therefore was no match for the modern submarine
with her gun or even guns. With the odds heavily
against the little fishing-craft, an enemy U-boat, about
four miles away, began to shell the Restore with two guns.
The drifter was, of course, quite unable to maintain any
engagement, so she blew her whistle, sent up rockets, and
steamed towards Saseno Island to the north-eastward.
Unfortunately one shell passed through the Restore,
exploding in the engine-room, and disabled her. The
drifter's crew had no alternative but to get into their
boat, after which the U-boat, from about two miles, closed
to twenty yards and again shelled the ship, sinking her
within three minutes. Having attacked three other
drifters, the U-boat steamed northward towards Cattaro.
This experience was not without its sequel, for by
November 13th all the Adriatic drifters had been armed.
Admiral Thursby had sent a request to the Admiralty
for more of these drifters. From Poole and Milford, where
they had been serving, additional craft accordingly steamed
to Falmouth, and a few days before Christmas thirty-five
CH. VI] ITALIAN LOSSES 167
had reached Brindisi to supplement the work of the
original sixty vessels.
But in the meantime events of the first importance
had been taking place ashore, no less than afloat. On
the last day of November the Serbian army began its
pathetic retreat through Albania towards the sea, and
thenceforward the British drifters in the Adriatic had an
exceptionally strenuous and hazardous time until the end
of February. Vessels of the Auxiliary Patrol were indis-
pensable at this most critical period in the fortunes of the
Serbians, To these drifters fell the duty of assisting in
the evacuation of the Serbian army and thousands of
refugees ; they were present at the landing of Italian
troops at Valona ; and they were at hand at all times
to succour disabled ships. Thus on December 4th, 1915,
the Italian transport Re Umberto, while carrying troops to
Valona, struck a mine off Cape Linguetta. In the vicinity
were the drifters Evening Star and Lottie Leask, which
proceeded alongside the sinking steamship. They threw
all available ropes to her decks, and over five hundred
soldiers were thus enabled to swarm on to the decks of
the two drifters before the transport sank. Just in time
to avoid disaster, the drifters succeeded in chopping away
the ropes as the transport disappeared. In this way
many lives were saved. " The fact that any were saved,"
wrote Admiral Thursby, " is due solely to the courage
and gallantry displayed by the skippers and crews of
these drifters." On the same day the Italian destroyer
Intrepido was mined at the entrance to Valona, but the
drifter Manzanita was close by, and her commanding
officer, Lieutenant H. C. C. Fry, R.N.R., placed her
alongside the destroyer, notwithstanding the risk of
mines, and took off both officers and men.
These small craft were always more or less directly
exposed to attack by the enemy. For instance, on
December 18th the drifter Lottie Leask, when twenty miles
west-north-west of Saseno Island, was shelled by two
submarines. The drifter was able to fire five rounds,
but, after being hit as many times, began to sink and
had to be promptly abandoned. After rowing about for
all one night in their small boat, the crew landed on a
sandy beach and stayed that night at a shepherd's hut ;
they then wandered farther on till they came to a
168 PATROLLING THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vi
monastery; thence, after passing through swamps in the
darkness, on December 22nd they fell in with some
Italian soldiers, who gave them biscuits and enabled them
to reach an Italian camp. Thence they marched with
a hundred Serbians to Valona, and eventually got afloat
again.
The value of the drifters in defending the Adriatic was
proving inestimable, and by the beginning of January
1916 another fifty had to come out from England. Mines
for their nets were also beginning to arrive, so that if an
enemy submarine should foul their nets it was hoped
that the U-boat would be destroyed.
Thus the dual work of these little ships went on. To
them fell the lot of saving life and destroying submarines.
On January 8th, 1916, the Italian transport Cittd di
Palermo, carrying, among others, 150 British troops,
struck a mine about ten miles from Brindisi. Notwith-
standing the obvious risk, twenty-one drifters which hap-
pened to be in the vicinity at once steamed into the danger
zone to her assistance and were able to pick up about a
hundred survivors. While so doing, two of the drifters,
the Freuchny and Morning Star, themselves ran on to
mines and blew up, but the rest of the flotilla, undaunted
by these disasters, continued their search for survivors.
At this period Durazzo was full of Serbian troops who,
having retreated, were embarking to a place of safety,
and the drifters were kept busy with their nets off this
section of the coast. The route from Valona to Corfu
had to be actively protected by them during the move-
ment of troops to the latter place. In fact so much protec-
tion had to be afforded that these British fishermen had
scarcely any opportunity for rest, and even when they
were able to get a nominal respite in port, they were
liable to be sent out at four hours' notice in the event of
sudden attack by the enemy. The Otranto drifters were,
in short, performing the most active and important work
in the Mediterranean area at this period.
So far, however, they had not enjoyed the desire of every
patrol .vessel, which was to destroy an enemy submarine,
but this stroke of good fortune was to come. On January
20th, 1916, when about seven miles west-south-west
of Cape Laghi, an engagement occurred between the
drifter Garrigill and a U-boat, in which the latter broke
CH. VI] A GOOD CATCH 169
off the fight. Eight days later the Heatherhloom certainly
had a submarine in her nets and dropped depth charges
on her, but with no result. On February 8th the drifter
Lily Reaich, too, had a similar experience ; before the end
of the month this drifter had foundered on a mine off
Durazzo. Several other drifters perished likewise on
mines about this time. The danger suggested the defence,
and by the middle of March vessels of this class, light
though they were and slow, were therefore sent from
Brindisi to sweep up mines. On I^Iay 13th, after months of
weary waiting, of monotonous routine, of varied dangers and
keen effort, there came at last to the drifters a well-deserved
reward. It happened in this wise. At a quarter-past nine
in the evening, when about twelve miles east-north-east
of Cape Otranto, the drifter Calistoga (Skipper William
Stephens, R.N.R.) had just finished towing her nets into
position when an indicator buoy was fired and such a
strain came on the nets that the Calistoga's head was
towed round.
It was fairly obvious that a submarine was foul of
the nets, so the skipper took a bearing of the buoy and
found it was altering rapidly. He then fired a warning
rocket signal, slipped the nets, and gave chase to the
buoy. About a thousand yards away was the drifter
Dulcie Doris, which also slipped her nets and w^ent after
the buoy. Presently a submarine came up about five
hundred yards ahead. The Dulcie Doris opened fire on
her at point-blank range, hitting her three times under
the conning-tower. A third drifter, the Evening Star,
which was seven hundred yards south-west of the Dulcie
Doris, on seeing the indicator buoy flare, also slipped her
nets, went in pursuit, and fired at the enemy, hitting her
twice. The submarine listed over and began to sink,
and the enemy crew was seen to take to the water. Boats
were then launched from the drifters, and the commander
and tw^o other officers were picked up, as well as seventeen
men. They were taken as prisoners into Brindisi. Next
day the second in command admitted that they had been
caught half an hour in the net by the propellers, and could
not get clear. By this date the depth of the nets had
been increased to 120 feet, which it was thought would
be the farthest depth to which submarines would dare to
dive. Thus ended the life of the Austrian U-boat No. VI.
170 PATROLLING THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vi
For this fine service the sum of £1,000 was awarded for
division between the three drifters mentioned.
On July 9th, however, the enemy had his revenge,
when at four in the morning a group of five drifters,
based on Brindisi, were attacked by an Austrian cruiser,
with the result that the two drifters Astrum Spei and
Claim were lost. After this incident it became necessary
to shift the drifter line farther south down the Straits,
thus making it less easy for the raiders to interfere with
them with little risk to themselves. Before the end of
July the armed yacht Catania (Commander the Duke of
Sutherland, R.N.R.) arrived at Taranto in advance of a
number of motor-launches which were coming out from
England to patrol the Otranto Straits. The drifters
were badly in need of all the help which could be given.
They had, however, further evidence about this time of
the success which was attending their hazardous and
monotonous work. About 6.30 a.m. on July 30th, U44
got foul of the nets of the Quarry Knowe, which signalled
the Garrigill. The latter dropped depth charges, and
eventually the nets, which had evidently enveloped the
submarine, went to the bottom. The career of this vessel
was ended. About a month later the enemy retaliated
by sending three aeroplanes over the drifter line and
sank the Rosies with the second bomb. During the
autumn the drifter base was transferred from Brindisi
to Taranto, as these craft were operating now farther
to the southward across the Otranto Straits. The mine-
layers, too, were based nearer their patrol area, being
given the use of Tricase Harbour, which was specially
deepened for them.
In spite of every effort, there was no doubt that sub-
marines on their way to and from Cattaro were succeeding
in avoiding the nets, chiefly by crossing the line at night
on the surface. Bad weather, especially on a dark night,
when the drifter line would become more or less scattered,
was welcomed by the enemy submarines working in the
Mediterranean. When once they had negotiated this
nominal barrage of the Otranto Straits, they had a clear
run, and only the right weather and the right time were
needed to enable an enterprising submarine commander
to get through. Indeed, it is remarkable in the circum-
stances that any U-boats were sunk. In face of many
CH. VI] AUSTRIAN SUBMARINE DESTROYED 171
difficulties, the little steam vessels — most of them built
of wood — of the Auxiliary Patrol did maintain a barrier
that was at least tiresome, often dangerous, and at times
fatal, to the enemy's under-water craft. Exposed to
attack from cruisers, aeroplanes, and submarines, and
with the lightest of weapons with which to reply, these
fishermen and junior officers of the Royal Naval Reserve
deserved well of the Allies. The French and Italians,
less familiar than the British seamen with the conditions
of such warfare as the enemy was waging, were not
protecting the drifters quite as well as might have been
expected, although various conferences between admirals
of the various nationalities took place now and again.
The strain on the fishermen, the wear and tear of drifters
toAving their 180-foot-deep nets, and the large number of
reliefs, together with costly shore establishments, indicated
how enthusiastically Great Britain had come to the sup-
port of the common cause in foreign waters.
The conferences were not fruitless, and by the middle of
December six Italian destroyers were patrolling in the
Straits. On December 17th the Adriatic drifters definitely
sank yet another submarine ; this time it was the Austrian
U-boat No. XX which was destroyed. The enemy craft
fouled the 180-foot-deep nets of the drifter Fisher Girl,
and after a number of depth charges had been dropped
by the drifters, she sank to the bottom of the Adriatic,
never again to be seen on the surface. Five days later
the enemy replied by attempting to raid the drifter line
by means of a force consisting of a light cruiser and three
or four destroyers. This incident occurred at 9.30 p.m.
Two drifters, the Gowan Lea and Our Allies, were shelled,
the former being hit several times and severely injured,
though there were no casualties. Fortunately the enemy
force was seen by six French destroyers, which were not
on patrol, but happened to be passing the drifter line
en route from Brindisi for Taranto. The enemy was
immediately chased by the French vessels to the north-
ward until 2 a.m. From Brindisi some Italian destroyers
and H.M.S. Gloucester also put to sea at 11.30 p.m.,
but the enemy was able to escape. Although the Austrians
had failed in their plan, it was only by a lucky chance
that several of these British fishing-craft were saved from
destruction. The defence of the drifters indeed consti-
172 PATROLLING THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vi
tuted a difficult problem. The drifters were required
because the submarines had to be hindered, and the actual
losses of the latter through the tactics of the drifters
showed what good work was being done. At the same time
they furnished an easy target on any night that the
Austrians might select. It was therefore decided to vary
the position of the net line from time to time and to place
it still farther to the southward ; the previous line had
extended from a position fifteen miles east of Cape Otranto
to Strade Blanche, the nets being used whenever the
weather permitted.
We must now leave the Adriatic and the Dardanelles
and see what was happening in the rest of the Mediter-
ranean. The position in the late summer of 1915 may
be briefly summarised. The Germans were still nervous
of the possible result of the Dardanelles campaign. If
the British forces after all succeeded in breaking through,
Germany would have virtually lost the war. The Germans
accordingly began to send submarines to hinder the
operations. The pioneer voyage of Hersing in U21 was
followed by Riicker and Kophamel in U34 and U35.
They set out from Germany on August 4th, and reached
Cattaro three weeks later. They were followed by U39
and U33, which left Germany on August 27th and 28th,
and reached Cattaro on September 15th and 16th, Orders
were also given for other oversea submarines to follow.
For a time, then, the scene of greatest submarine activity,
irrespective of mine-layers, shifted from the British Isles
to the Mediterranean. Through that sea passed not
merely transports, but passenger liners and cargo carriers
from the Suez Canal. It was the policy of the enemy to
wage a keen submarine warfare against Allied mercantile
traffic in this southern sea. The torpedoing of the
transport Royal Edward in the -^gean by UB14 on
August 13th, whilst this submarine was on passage from
Cattaro to Constantinople, showed what could be expected.
It was to be anticipated, also, that as the submarine
mine-layer off the south-eastern English coast had begun
to be very active, before long there would be submarine
mine-layers in the Mediterranean. If mines were dropped
off Malta — an obvious position — there would be serious
danger to His Majesty's ships and transports, so it was
CH. VI] ANTI-SUBMARINE PATROLS 173
decided in August to send six trawlers from the Nore
area to Malta for mine-sweeping and patrol, the first four
setting out on August 14th.
During the autumn a number of trawlers were pur-
chased from Portugal and, after being commissioned,
were based on Gibraltar. During November a dozen
German trawlers, which had been captured by Captain
Tyrwhitt's Harwich force in the Heligoland Bight, ^vere
sent to Lowestoft, fitted out for the Mediterranean, and
armed with 12-pounder guns. Other trawlers were simi-
larly prepared and sent to Falmouth, where they steamed
to the Mediterranean. Some of the craft were dispatched
to Port Said, some to Malta, the others to Alexandria,
In addition, the squadron of fast armed yachts, which
had been patrolling in the Irish Sea, left early in November
for the Mediterranean, where, at first, they were lent to
the French. Vessels of the Auxiliary Patrol were at this
period being put to all sorts of uses. At the end of
November, for instance, troops were being sent from
Egypt to Marsa Matruh in trawlers owing to the Senussi
rising. The demand for armed trawlers was so insistent
that by December another sixty-six had to be withdrawn
from their patrol work off the British coast and sent to the
Mediterranean, thirty-six being sent to Alexandria and
thirty to Malta. The ex-German trawlers gave a good
deal of trouble, owing to their defects, but at Lowestoft
and Falmouth, Gibraltar and Malta, they were eventually
made serviceable.
To organise these numerous patrol-vessels, Rear- Admiral
le Marchant, who had had experience with them at
Kingstown, was appointed to Malta. A few more yachts,
such as the ^gusa and Safa-el-Bahr, were also dis-
patched to the Mediterranean before the end of 1915.
It was decided on December 23rd that the Gibraltar,
Malta, and Egypt anti-submarine patrols should be
arranged as follows : Gibraltar was to have the yacht
squadron, as well as eight other yachts and six sloops ;
Malta was to have four destroyers, twelve sloops, two
yachts, and forty-eight trawlers ; Egypt was to have a
dozen sloops, besides her group of trawlers. These elabo-
rate arrangements were necessary for the reason that the
submarine sinkings in the Mediterranean were becoming
serious. It was unfortunate that when already there were
174 PATROLLING THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vi
too few Auxiliary Patrol craft in the British Isles the
number had to be depleted. They brought with them
south that same eager, fighting spirit that they had
exhibited in British waters ; they had to endure months of
monotonous boredom, broken only occasionally by a
short sharp burst of excitement, such as occurred to the
yacht JEgusa on April 13th, 1916.
This yacht (Captain T. P. Walker, R.N.R.) received
a wireless intercepted message that about 8 a.m. a sub-
marine had been sighted in lat. 37° 18' N., long. 15° 57' E.
The yEgusa at once proceeded towards this position
and shortly after 1 p.m., before arriving there, received
news that the enemy had apparently gone towards
the Adriatic. Captain Walker assumed that her track
would be to the north-east, and shaped his course accord-
ingly, hoping to catch her before sunset. At 5.35 p.m.
a steamer was observed about five miles off, and almost
immediately afterwards a submarine was seen coming
away from the steamer. The submarine fired a torpedo,
which caused the ship to heel over and sink. In the
meantime the Mgusa had opened a deliberate fire at
8,000 yards. The enemy was making off at full speed on
the surface in an easterly direction, and soon submerged,
thus escaping. A fortnight later the Mgusa was lost off
Malta, having been either torpedoed or mined.
During the early months of 1916 the submarine menace
in the Mediterranean developed apace. Some idea of the
success that fell to the enemy may be obtained from the
record of U35 during the month of June of that year.
This craft had changed her commander, Kophamel having
been succeeded by Arnauld de la Periere, a German naval
officer whose father was French and had fought against
Germany in the Franco-Prussian War. This submarine
officer, owing to the thoroughness of his work in the
Mediterranean, earned a high reputation among his fellow
countrymen. He sank no fewer than forty-one ships
between June 10th and 29th, twenty of them being
steamers and twenty-one sailing-craft.
In the middle of June, in order to keep abreast of the
mine-sweeping necessities in the Mediterranean, six paddle-
steamers (well-known liitherto to excursionists at British
seaside resorts) were collected at Falmouth and thence
sent south. Many of the Auxiliary Patrol vessels had been
CH. VI] ENEMY ACTIVITY MAINTAINED 175
out in the Mediterranean since the early months of the war
and were needing a rest. There is a sea-saying that " ships
and men always rot in port." But it is not less true that,
unless they are both relieved at the end of a definite
time, they will go to pieces. The crews had not been able
to visit their homes and relations for a long while, whereas
their brethren serving in the waters of the British Isles
had been able to get a few days' leave at least twice a
year. On July 28th, 1916, the first group of a dozen
trawlers was ordered home from the Mediterranean so that
the crews might be rested and the ships refitted, and
further groups were to be sent home in the same way as
opportunity offered. To replace these, another dozen
craft were sent out from Falmouth and Portland at the
end of July. The first of the home-coming trawlers began
to reach Falmouth at the beginning of October from
Mudros, and proceeded to Lowestoft for refit and some
of them were afterwards sent to the White Sea. Thus
from the Dardanelles to the north of Russia the trawlers
extended their daily duties. Similarly with the drifters
which had been out for a long time, being based on Mudros.
In November orders were issued to select good steel drifters
from the English patrol bases and to send them to Fal-
mouth, where they were fitted with guns, nets, depth
charges, bombs, and one month's stores. They then
proceeded to Mudros via Gibraltar. These steel craft
were to relieve twenty-four wooden drifters which were
directed to return to England.
As further additions were made to the auxiliary defence
force in the Mediterranean, so also did the enemy continue
to maintain his activity.
Thus the contest went on between the submarine and
anti-submarine. The Malta Auxiliary Patrol craft were
doing their best to make it safe for the transports outward
and homeward bound, but it was a vast undertaking.
From Malta to Cerigotto Channel is a distance of 420 miles,
and this transport route was patrolled by the trawlers
to the east, and from Malta to the westward as far as
Pantellaria, a further 130 miles. Other trawlers as well
as some paddlers, were engaged in mine-sweeping ; M.L.s
and trawlers were patrolling off the Maltese coast ; whilst
other trawlers still, with some armed yachts, were busy
doing escort work. Such was the position at the beginning
11—13
176 PATROLLING THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vi
of 1917, a year that was to witness a record number of
sinkings. For Malta it began badly enough, for on
January 9th, 1917, H.M.S. Cornwallis, which had fired
the first shell on the first day's bombardment of the outer
forts of the Dardanelles and took part in that campaign
for a longer period than any other battleship, was tor-
pedoed and sunk by a submarine off Malta. There was
no respite for anyone from the peril of the torpedo.
Battleship or transport, armed yacht or trawler, it was
all the same. Ships and men of all sorts were doing their
best, but Germany had sent her very best U-boat officers
to the Mediterranean, and these submarines, besides their
ability to become invisible, were also better armed on the
surface than were our small craft, suffering from the unsatis-
fied demands of the new British armies for equipment.
Arnauld de la Periere, the " star turn " of the enemy
flotilla, was a believer in attacking his victims by long-
distance gunnery ; and because of his gun's superiority
of range he could do pretty much as he liked. It may
now be confessed that the information which these submar-
ines possessed of the tracks of the British merchant ships
was remarkably accurate, since they had little difficulty
in finding their prey. That having been done, the rest was
easy, and many a mercantile officer was compelled to see
his ship floundering in her death agony whilst on his way
to Cattaro as a prisoner of war.
CHAPTER VII
SUBMARINE INVASION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
During the early months of 1915 the German Admiralty
Staff, impressed by the freedom of communications which
the Allies were enjoying in the Mediterranean, and particu-
larly by the possibilities which resided in the attack on the
Dardanelles, had been studying the situation in southern
waters. It was assumed that the Allies would be unpre-
pared for an extension of the submarine campaign and
that, at first, counter-measures, such as were being
developed in home waters, would be lacking. Moreover,
the geographical formation of, and high visibility in, the
Mediterranean were regarded as favouring submarine
operations. Arrangements were accordingly made, as
has been indicated in the preceding chapter, to send
six small " B " submarines and four boats of the " C "
class by rail in sections to Pola and to put them
together at the Austrian port. Towards the end of May
the sinking of H.M.S. Triumph and H.M.S. Majestic
encouraged the enemy to further efforts. Kapitan-Leut-
nant Otto Hersing volunteered to take U21 round from the
North Sea to the Mediterranean in order to prove the
feasibility of submarines making so long a journey,
unattended, under war conditions. The journey was
successfully completed, and U21 was followed by other
craft.
The news of the sinking of the transport Royal Edward
on August 13th, with the loss of 132 lives, reached Germany
at a moment when a fierce controversy between the naval
and civil authorities was proceeding as to the wisdom
of antagonising neutrals, and particularly the Americans,
by attacks on merchant shipping round the British Isles.
On September 18th, as already stated, the order limiting
the operation of submarines in home waters was issued,
and the scene of activity shifted to the Mediterranean.
177
178 SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
Events had convinced the Germans that the Mediter-
ranean offered favourable conditions for attacking the
communications of the Alhes. On September 4th the
Natal Transport (4,107 tons) had been destroyed. This
vessel was on passage from Bombay to Liverpool with a
general cargo. She had left Port Said early in the after-
noon of September 2nd and, in view of the rumours that
submarines had appeared in the Mediterranean, a sharp
lookout was kept. When the ship had been at sea two
days and was off Gavdo Island, Crete, the chief officer
(Mr. J. T. Jones) heard the sound of a gun, and looking
astern, saw a shot drop into the sea about one mile away.
A submarine was then observed three or four miles astern.
The master (Mr. W. C. Davison) was in his cabin on the
bridge, and at once took charge on hearing the firing,
ordering a full head of steam. Two more shots followed,
one astern and the other ahead of the vessel, and then
the forecastle head was hit, the projectile penetrating the
two decks and entering the fore peak. The unequal struggle
had lasted about a quarter of an hour, and Captain
Davison, responsible for the lives of the crew of thirty-
three hands, felt that he had no alternative but to stop.
The submarine continued firing while the crew were taking
to the boats, but they got away safely. While the ship
was being abandoned, another submarine rose to the
surface two or three miles away and fired a rocket signal
to her companion and firing ceased. As the boats pulled
away to the north, the Natal TransjJort — which had been
holed in many places — presented a sad spectacle ; she had
a list to port and smoke was issuing from the ventilators
of the holds. In the darkness the boats proceeded toward
the coast of Crete, and, with assistance sent to them by
the British Consul at Canea, the officers and men got
ashore.
The destruction of the Natal Transport was followed
on September 7th by the sinking of the Caroni (2,652 tons),
which was torpedoed fifteen miles west from Chassiron
in the Bay of Biscay. She was shelled as the evening was
closing in, and the crew were left to their fate fifteen
miles from land. The Mora (3,047 tons) was destroyed
by gunfire on the following day sixty-eight miles W.
by S. from Belle Isle off the Brittany coast, and on
the 9th the Cornubia (1,736 tons) met the same end
CH. VII] ENEMY ACTIVITY INCREASED 179
seventy-five miles S.E. by S. from Cartagena. After
sailing and pulling for twenty-eight hours in a rough sea,
with a high wind, the crew landed at Puerto de Mazarron.
These three ships fell the victims to submarines which
were outward bound to the Mediterranean. Ten days
later the transport Ramazan (3,477 tons), carrying Indian
troops, was shelled and sunk off Cerigotto Island with a
loss of 315 lives, including 314 Indians. The Linkmoor
(4,306 tons) was destroyed off Cape Matapan less than
twenty-four hours later. Then came the sinking of the
H. C. Henry (4,219 tons) in almost the same position on
the 28th, and the Haydn (3,923 tons) went down off Crete
on the 29th. The last-named vessel was bound from
Karachi to Glasgow. The crew, under orders from the
enemy craft, left the ship in two boats as darkness fell.
The submarine, having completed her work, disappeared
without offering assistance. The master (Mr. J. W.
Learmouth) decided to remain in the vicinity until the
next day, when it was agreed that both boats should steer
for the nearest British port on the homeward voyage, a
distance of five hundred miles. During the following
night the boats lost sight of each other. Captain Lear-
mouth's boat was picked up on October 3rd and brought
into Malta. The remainder of the crew had been in their
open boat for forty-eight hours before they were rescued
by the s.s. Trafalgar and landed at Port Said.
These events occurred during the period when the enemy
was reconsidering the submarine campaign in the light
of American protests, and with the close of September he
determined to concentrate his resources on an attack upon
the lines of communication of the Allies in the Mediter-
ranean. Henceforward British and other seamen were
confronted with dangers in the Mediterranean resembling
those with which events had made them familiar in home
waters. The Germans had learnt that submarines could
make the long passage from the North Sea to these
southern waters, and every available craft of suitable
design was dispatched to spread destruction in the
Mediterranean.
With the opening of the month of October the sub-
marine campaign in southern waters began in deadly
earnest, with dire results to British shipping and British
merchant seamen. In all ten ships were accounted for by
180 SUBIMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
the enemy and thirty-five Hves were lost during that month.
On the 2nd the Sailor Prince (3,144 tons) was intercepted
off Cape Sidero, Crete. Though the ship was forty-eight
miles from land, the crew were ordered to take to the boats,
but fortunately eight hours later they were rescued by the
s.s. Borulos. As soon as he got on board the master of
the Sailor Prince (Mr. J. Chilvers) told the story of his
experiences, confident that he had nothing more to fear.
That the submarine was still watching the course of events
became apparent, however, about two hours later, when
she made an attack on the Borulos. The steamer had on
board about three hundred passengers, including a good
many women and children, and when the submarine re-
vealed its intention a panic broke out, some persons
jumping overboard. Captain Chilvers immediately went
to the bridge and hoisted a signal stating that the vessel
carried passengers, including women and children. The
Greek flag was afterwards hoisted, and then the sub-
marine closed in. In the meantime as many passengers
as possible had been rescued from the water and placed
on board the enemy craft, but it was afterwards found that
twenty-five had been drowned in spite of the efforts of
two British firemen, named Barker and Crocker, who lost
their lives in endeavouring to save women and children
from drowning. Before the submarine could carry out
its apparent purpose of sinking the Borulos, the second
officer of that ship bore the visiting-card of Prince Mahmoud
to the commander, at the same time telling him that the
Prince and his family were on board. He also informed
him that there were Greek passengers in the Borulos
and appealed to him to spare the ship. Greece, though
a small country, was neutral ; the Borulos was spared
and reached Alexandria without further incident.
The Arabian (2,744 tons) was sunk on the same day as
the Sailor Prince, and the Craigston (2,617 tons) two
days later, and then on the 5th the Bursfield (4,037 tons)
was overhauled by a submarine seventy miles west of
Cape Matapan. The master (Mr. A. L. Hunt), the fourth
engineer, a messroom steward, and a fireman were killed
by gunfire during the chase which took place before the
vessel was overtaken by the enemy.
The ordeal to which merchant seamen had been con-
demned by the enemy is reflected in the following sum-
CH. VII] A MONTH'S HEAVY LOSSES 181
maries of the records of steamships sunk between October
6th and October 23rd, when the Marquette (7,057 tons)
went down with a loss of twenty-nine hves.
The Silvcrash (3,753 tons) was overhauled by a sub-
marine on the 6th when about 190 miles east from Malta.
The master (Mr. John Parry Jones) decided that escape
was impossible. The crew took to the boats, which were
afterwards picked up by the steamer Remembrance.
The Scaivby (3,658 tons) was stopped by a submarine
at 2.30 p.m. on the same day when 220 miles from the
nearest land — I\Ialta. The crew were ordered to abandon
ship, and the submarine, having exploded a bomb by the
vessel's side, went off after another steamer. As there
appeared some hope that the Scawhy might not sink,
the master (Mr. M. M. A. Fisker) ordered the boats to stand
by. The submarine, observing the intention to reboard
the vessel, returned and began firing with rifles at the
boats as they were approaching the ship. Nothing fur-
ther could be done, so the boats set sail in the direction
of land. They were picked up the following morning —
one at 6 o'clock and the other at 9 o'clock.
The Halizones (5,093 tons) was intercepted by a sub-
marine off Cape Martello, Crete, on the 7th. The master
(Mr. W. J. Eynon) put on full speed, but, after seven
shots had been fired by the enemy, gave up the hopeless
effort to escape, and the crew were ordered to abandon
ship when 120 miles from the nearest practical landing-
place. After being in their boats for seventy-two hours,
they reached land on Sunday afternoon, October 10th.
The Thorpwood (3,184 tons) was also off Cape Martello
when, on the morning of October 8th, she was chased by
a submarine, which flew the French colours until the
first shot had been fired, when the German ensign was
hoisted. The pursuit was a short one. The master
(Mr. Henry V. Adams), after consulting with his officers,
decided that escape was impossible. Though there was
no landing-place nearer than 125 miles, the crew were
ordered to abandon ship.
The Apollo (3,774 tons) was off Gavdo Island, Crete,
on October 9th, when she was overhauled by a sub-
marine. The master (Mr. M. J. Redmond) had no recourse
but to stop the ship. The nearest land was sixty-five
miles distant. The crew was nevertheless ordered to
182 SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
take to their small boats, and the only consideration
extended to them was permission to take with them a
chart and provisions. One boat was forty-nine hours
before reaching land, and the other was fifty-two hours.
During November the enemy's anticipation of reaping
a rich harvest in the Mediterranean was partially con-
firmed. In addition to nine ships, of 9,677 tons, which
were sunk by mines in various areas, with a loss of no
fewer than ninety-three lives, the submarines operating
in the Mediterranean accounted for twenty-three vessels,
of 84,816 tons, with casualties numbering twenty- five.
Consequently during those weeks the British Mercantile
Marine was deprived of thirty-two vessels (94,493 tons).
In addition, submarines molested eleven ships, of 64,460
tons. The experience of the Woodfield (3,584 tons)
furnished evidence of the effective use which could have
been made of long-range defensive armament if it had
been available at this period. This vessel carried only a
small gun, and the attacking submarine kept at a safe
distance. The Woodfield (master, Mr. Robert Hughes) was
on her way from Avonmouth to Malta when, in the early
morning of the 3rd, the stillness was broken by the sound of
gun-fire, two shots passing across the vessel's bow. Far
away in the distance, Captain Hughes then saw a submarine
steaming towards him. The vessel was at once put stern
on to the enemv.
As soon as the merchant captain's intention to evade
capture became apparent to the commander of the
submarine, he opened fire again and for two hours the
fusillade continued, the British merchant captain, un-
daunted by the odds against him, still holding on his
course. The ship was hit several times ; seven men
were killed and the carpenter was fatally wounded. When
Captain Hughes, who, with thirteen others, had been
wounded, realised that his vessel was in a sinking condition,
he ordered the port and starboard lifeboats to get aAvay.
He had in his charge, in addition to his crew of thirty-four
hands, thirty-one passengers, and seven of these were
among the injured. All who remained alive got away
safely in the two boats. When everyone had left the ship
except the captain, the gunner, and a soldier, the sub-
marine ceased firing, submerged, and came up on the
starboard beam, A torpedo Mas then fired, which struck
CH. VII] TWO SUCCESSFUL ESCAPES 183
the vessel amidship. Not, however, until two more shots
had been fired did the Woodjield sink. The master and
his two companions were the last to leave the ship ;
they took refuge on a raft, which was picked up by the
second mate's boat, which safely reached the coast of
Morocco. Captain Hughes had not succeeded in saving
his ship, but he had at least sold it at a high price in view
of the large number of shells, besides a torpedo, which
the enemy had had to expend. The incident took place
out of sight of land, about forty miles east of Ceuta.
On the same day the Woolwich (2,936 tons) was captured
and destroyed 100 miles south from Cape Sidero, Crete,
and but for the manner in which the transports Jajjanese
Prince (4,876 tons) and the 3Iercian (6,305 tons) were
handled on the same day, these two vessels would have
shared the same fate, with probably heavy loss of life.
The escape of the Japanese Prince illustrated what
could be done by good seamanship, for the vessel was
unarmed and had no wireless. For over four hours the
submarine chased this transport. She fired about forty-
five shells, but fortunately none of them caused casual-
ties, although many pieces of shell were picked up on the
decks. This immunity was due to the skill with which
the master (Mr. A. H. Jenkins) manoeuvred his ship,
earning recognition at the hands of the Admiralty. He
was awarded a lieutenant's commission in the R.N.R.,
and he, as well as the chief engineer (Mr. C. James), was
mentioned in despatches. Speed and skilful manoeuvring
also saved the Mercian (Captain Walker). This ship,
like the Japanese Prince, was steaming in the Mediter-
ranean, proceeding with 500 troops from Gibraltar to
Malta. At 2.15 p.m. an enemy submarine was sighted
about two miles on the starboard quarter. The sub-
marine immediately opened fire with two guns, one being
a 3-4-inch, the first shot striking the foremast, the second
the mainmast, and the third wrecked the wireless tele-
graph house. The master then zigzagged his ship to try
and dodge the shells. About this time the master sent
the quartermaster from the wheel to find out the damage
done to the wireless telegraph house ; this man did not
return, and in consequence the master had to take the
wheel for over an hour of the action until relieved by
Private Thompson. The master ordered the two Maxims
184 SUBIVIARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
to open fire as soon as the submarine came within range,
but these naturally were of small use against a 3-4-inch
gun. The submarine fired about 100 shells, of which
twenty to thirty struck the ship, causing twenty-three
deaths and fifty-five wounded. At 3 p.m. a patrol-vessel
hove in sight, and soon afterwards the submarine ceased
firing and disappeared. The master, who was awarded the
D.S.C., was ably seconded by the chief engineer and his staff.
Five ships, including the transport Moorina (4,994
tons), were attacked by submarines on the 5th. The
escape of the Cittj of York (7,834 tons) and the Huntsman
(7,460 tons) was due to the effective use which was made
of the two guns with which these vessels had been armed ;
while the Lady Plymouth (3,521 tons) got away owing to her
speed. She was fired on again on the following day as
she was proceeding along the coast of Algiers, but once
more showed her heels to the enemy. The Pola (3,061
tons) also escaped by good fortune and good seamanship
off Tukush Island, Algeria, on the 6th, when four other
vessels, including the Lumina (5,950 tons), which was
defensively armed, were destroyed.
On the following day an enemy submarine in the course
of six hours sank off Cape Martello, Crete, two good
British vessels of an aggregate of nearly 8,000 tons. The
weather was fine, the sea was fairly smooth, and there
was little wind. By chance the two ships steamed within
the area under the observation of the submarine under
these favourable conditions for attack. The Clan
Macalister (4,835 tons), on passage from Liverpool to
Indian ports with a general cargo of about 6,600 tons,
was proceeding at full speed, at about 10 knots, and was
some 120 miles south-east from Cape Martello when her
master (Lieutenant-Commander J. W. Taylor, R.N.R.,
retired) noticed a vessel sinking about eight miles away.
While heading in the steamer's direction in accordance
with the immemorial rule observed by seamen of what
Nelson described as " the polite nations," he saw the
vessel disappear. Two minutes later his eye was arrested
by what he took to be the bow wave of a submarine,
some seven miles away on a south-south-easterly bearing.
Putting on full speed, Captain Taylor went off to the
north-north-west, placing the enemy astern of him.
In the stokehold and engine-room all the hands were
CH.vn] "CLAN MACALISTER" AND "CARIA" SUNK 185
working hard to keep a full head of steam, but, in
spite of their efforts, the submarine gradually gained
on the Clan Macalister. When about two and a half
miles distant the enemy began firing, using shell first
of all and afterwards shell and shrapnel promiscuously.
The vessel was hit several times, but as the damage
inflicted was not serious, Captain Taylor ignored the
enemy's signal to stop and continued on his course.
For over an hour and a half the chase was maintained,
and then the chief engineer reported that the lascars
in the stokehold, frightened by the firing, to which the
Clan Macalister could make no reply, had left their
stations and that steam was rapidly falling. The vessel
was by this time being shelled at close range, and
Captain Taylor was forced to the conclusion that no-
thing more could be done to save his ship. The engines
were stopped and all hands were ordered to the boats,
the enemy continuing his bombardment while this was
being done. A torpedo finally settled the fate of this
unit of the Clan Line.
While this ship was being disposed of, the Caria (3,032
tons) came on the scene. She was proceeding in ballast
from Naples to Alexandria, when the second officer,
who was on the bridge, heard a shot and at once called
the master (Mr. J. A. Wolfe). A submarine was then
observed about two points on the starboard bow, two miles
away, astern of the Clan Macalister, which was heading
on an opposite course to the Caria. Captain Wolfe
became the passive m itness of the final phase of Captain
Taylor's plucky attempt to escape. While chasing the
Clan liner, the enemy devoted attention also to the other
merchant ship. Having dispatched the Clan Macalister,
the submarine returned to the Caria, which, owing to her
light condition, was able to steam at considerably less
than full speed, the propeller being half out of the water.
Captain Wolfe had no hope of escape, so the ship was
abandoned and forthwith sunk by gunfire. By a happy
chance the boats of the two ships fell in with the steamer
Frankenfels on the following morning, and thus the crews
reached Malta in safety.
This double success encouraged the enemy to hang
about off Cape Martello, and two days later the Den of
Crombie (4,949 tons), homeward bound from Far Eastern
186 SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
ports with a general cargo of 7,100 tons, came in sight.
Shots began to fall near her, and then the submarine
was observed on the port beam. The Den of Crombie
was unarmed, and the master (Mr. H. C. Hemming)
decided he had no alternative but to stop. The ship
was immediately abandoned, and after the enemy had
fired about a dozen shots the Den of Crombie disappeared
and the submarine made off. The four boats kept com-
pany during the day. After darkness had closed in, a
steamer's lights were seen approaching. Captain Hemming
ordered flares to be burnt, but the strange vessel, evidently
suspicious that an attempt was being made to lure her to
destruction, shut down all lights and altered course when
M'ithin about a mile of the chief officer's boat and dis-
appeared to the eastward, to the dismay of the distressed
seamen. During the ensuing night the boats lost touch
with each other and became separated. Fortunately, on
the following morning the troop transport Royal George
hove in sight of the chief officer's boat, and an hour
later came across Captain Hemming and his companions.
The boats of the second and third officers were also picked
up, with the result that all the crew of the Den of Crombie
got ashore.
On the same day the master (Mr. Howard Tindle) of
the Sir Richard Awdry (2,234 tons) had the mortification
of being compelled to surrender his vessel off Gavdo
Island, Crete. He was on passage from Saigon to Mar-
seilles with a cargo of rice, and all had gone well for over
a month, when he fell in with the submarine which was
to bring about the destruction of the ship under his com-
mand. Captain Tindle, on observing the enemy, altered
course in the hope of getting away. The submarine then
began firing somewhat wildly. A signal for help was
promptly sent out, and as events were to prove would
have resulted in saving the ship but for circumstances
beyond Captain Tindle's control. At last the submarine
obtained the range, with the result that the wireless
aerials were destroyed ; other shots passed through the
funnel and ventilators and shrapnel burst around the
bridge. Captain Tindle was still maintaining a full head
of steam, when the Chinamen down below became panic-
stricken and deserted the stokehold. Speed at once began
to fall off, so the ship was stopped. In spite of this action
CH. VII] A FOUR DAYS' REST 187
the submarine continued firing and, drawing in, dis-
charged six shots at point-blank range into the engine-
room. The chief and fourth mates were sHghtly wounded.
The Chinese seamen by this time had got beyond control,
and all of them, with the exception of four, took to the
boats without waiting for orders. Captain Tindle had
to admit that the position was hopeless, so he and his
officers and the four remaining Chinamen passed over the
side into a small boat as the ship was settling down by
the stern. Though the Sir Richard Awdry was not a large
vessel, she was sinking slowly, so the Germans discharged
a torpedo, which caused her to heel over and disappear
in seven minutes. The French trawler Marie Frederic,
in response to the signal for help, appeared on the scene
at this moment and drove away the enemy ; but, owing
to the conduct of the Chinese stokers, she arrived too late
to save the ship from destruction. Though they little
deserved their good fortune, all these men, except a
Chinese cook, were saved. On the following day the
Californian (6,223 tons) was torpedoed ofl' Cape Matapan.
She was steaming at 12 knots at the time, and, unlike
the other vessels mentioned, was under escort, being
accompanied by a French torpedo-boat. When the
Californian was struck at 7.45 a.m. a French patrol-boat
took her in tow, and there seemed some chance that she
might get into port, but unhappily shortly after 1 o'clock
the rope broke. Efforts were being made to resume
towing, when a second torpedo hit the ship and she at
once began to make water fast. The master (Mr. W.
Masters), with his crew, remained by the ship for seven
hours from the time that the first attack was made, but
their devotion and all the efforts of the French seamen
were unavailing. Fortunately, in spite of the extensive
damage done by the torpedo, only one life was lost.
Four days passed, during which British merchant
shipping in the Mediterranean was unmolested, and then,
on November 14th, the losses began once more. The
Treneglos (3,886 tons) was proceeding at full speed seventy
miles west-south-west from Gavdo Island, off Crete, when
a terrific explosion occurred in the engine-room, killing
outright the third engineer and two firemen, and smashing
the port lifeboat. It was at once apparent that the ship was
doomed. The master (Mr. S. P. Beale) ordered the boats
188 SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
to get away as quickly as possible, and hardly were they
clear of the ship when she sank. From first to last
nothing was seen of the submarine. On the following
day, within a few miles of the spot where the Treneglos had
disappeared, the Orange Prince (3,583 tons) was also
torpedoed without warning, and in this case also three
lives were lost. The vessel was going at full speed when
the torpedo burst into the stokehold, killing three men.
Everyone, except the master (Mr. J. Holloway) and the
chief officer, took to the boats, and a few minutes later
a second torpedo struck the ship. Captain Hollow^ay
and the chief officer had barely time to escape before
their vessel disappeared below the water.
Little more than half the month had passed, and already
the enemy had destroyed thirteen British merchant ships,
and there was no respite for British seamen. On Novem-
ber 18th the Enosis (3,409 tons) came under a heavy
shell-fire when 150 miles east-south-east from Malta. A
submarine was observed on the starboard beam flying no
flag and bearing no number or other distinguishing mark.
The range was soon obtained ; one shot fell on the fore-
castle just as the men had left it, and another struck the
bridge, mortally wounding the master (Mr. Alfred Bowling).
The chief officer (Mr. J. Condon) was attending to lowering
the boats, but he at once went to the assistance of Captain
Bowling ; the master had been terribly injured and,
although still living, was past human aid. As the boats
were being put into the water, another shell exploded
near the chart-room, doing further damage and putting
the master out of his suffering. As soon as the boats
were clear of the Enosis, she was torpedoed out of hand
and sank, the body of Captain Bowling going down with
her. Though the ship was destroyed far from land,
the crew fortunately got ashore in safety. On the 19th
the Hallamshire (4,420 tons) was torpedoed without
warning when off Cerigotto at 2.20 p.m. The submarine
apparently stood by to await events, and as the vessel
was not sinking fast enough, she was attacked by shell-
fire shortly after 4 o'clock. The submarine failed to
show any flag in accordance with the rules of warfare.
By 5 o'clock nothing was to be seen of the Hallamshire,
with her cargo of 5,600 tons of coal. A French destroyer
picked up the master (Mr. A. G. Clark) and his men.
CH. VII] A VIVID NARRATIVE 189
The Merganser (1,905 tons) met a like end off Gozo on
November 20th. The ship was steaming at just under
10 knots, but the master (Mr. J. T. Sharp), in his effort
to escape, managed to get 13 knots out of her. Even
this speed, however, was not sufficient to take the Mer-
ganser out of gun range. Once more a French torpedo-
boat was the means of saving the hves of the crew. After
an interval of six days the Tringa (2,154 tons) was cap-
tured thirty miles from Galata Island and sunk by gun-
fire, with a loss of three lives ; on the following day the
Tanis (3,665 tons) and the Kingsway (3,647 tons) were
sunk by gunfire, the former three miles north from
Zembra Island, and the latter off Cape Bon, Tunis.
The latter ship was in ballast, and was making little head-
way owing to the gale which was blowing, accompanied
by high head seas. She was on her way from Malta to
Huelva, Spain, when gunfire was heard. The narrative
of events afterwards given by the master (Mr. Walter
Langford) conveys an impression of the character of the
ordeal to which British seamen were condemned :
" I was in the saloon at the time and went on deck
immediately. The third officer met me on the bridge
ladder and reported that a shot had been fired which had
struck the water about 15 feet ahead of the ship. I ran
to the bridge and ordered him to stop the engines. At
this time another shot was fired, which passed a few feet
over the ship's No. 4 derrick. I could see no sign of any
submarine owing to the heavy sea. Realising that it was
impossible to escape when the second shot was fired, I
blew three short blasts on the whistle to indicate that my
engines were going astern, and I immediately ordered all
the boats to be lowered and the crews to get into them
as quickly as possible. The firing ceased for about five
minutes.
" I ordered the chief officer to take ten men into the
port lifeboat and to get clear. The second officer
was directed to take charge of the starboard lifeboat
and took twelve men with him. The remaining four
were told to get into the starboard jolly-boat, and
I got into this myself, intending to change afterwards
into one of the lifeboats. By this time the submarine,
which was now seen for the first time, had come close
190 SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. viz
in on the port side, and before all the crew had time to
get into the boats she fired three shots in quick succession
at Nos. 2, 8, and 4 holds. These went right through the
ship — in one side and out the other. After considerable
difficulty, all the crew got away in one lifeboat and two
jolly-boats, the other lifeboat having been smashed by
the action of the submarine. The submarine rounded
the vessel twice, firing at her continually, and she sank
at 0.30 p.m. on the same day. The submarine immedi-
ately disappeared. She was about 250 feet long, was
painted a light bluish-grey and was apparently quite new.
The gun appeared to be a 6-inch howitzer, mounted on a
pedestal about 12 feet abaft the conning-tower, and seemed
to be fired from the conning-tower, having recoil cylinders
on either side. No letters or numbers were seen, but one
man in her held a small Austrian hand-flag."
Captain Langford and his men got ashore safely. The
loss of this ship was afterwards the subject of a Court of
Inquiry, which decided that " after the first shot to call
attention to the presence of the enemy submarine, this
was so close that the Kingsway, more especially having
regard to the conditions of weather prevailing at the time
and the lightness of the ship, could not possibly have
escaped."
A welcome relief to the rising record of shipping losses
was provided by the spirited and successful fight, on
November 23rd, which was made by the City of Mar-
seilles (8,250 tons), when on her way from Liverpool to
Bombay via Marseilles. She had been given a 4-7-inch
gun, and with this one weapon she drove off the enemy.
Three weeks earlier the Kashgar (8,840 tons) had per-
formed a similar feat, and as already noted, the Antilo-
chus (9,039 tons) had also used her gun with good effect.
The experience of the City of Marseilles supplied con-
firmatory evidence of the value of such defensive arma-
ment as the Admiralty was able to provide at a time
when, owing to the growth of the Army and expansion of
the Navy, there was a serious shortage of guns.
The Ellerman liner (master, Mr. B. Dowse) was steaming
at 12 knots at 10 a.m. when a submarine was sighted four
miles on the port beam ; the enemy was flying no colours
and made no signals. Captain Dowse, realising the
CH. VII] AN EXCITING DUEL 191
peril in which he stood, put on speed and the ship
was soon steaming at 16| knots. There seemed good
hope of bringing the submarine on the port quarter.
The passengers on board, as well as the officers and men,
were not unconscious of the emergency which had arisen,
but exhibited praiseworthy pluck. There was no other
vessel in sight, and unless the submarine was driven olT
reliance would have to be placed on the ship's boats for
safety. A S.O.S. call was sent out by emergency code,
fixing the position of the City of Marseilles, in the faint
hope of help being forthcoming. The only reply received
was, however, from an Italian hospital ship, stating
that she had no code, but offering to stand by. As it was
considered inadvisable to send messages en clair, this
chivalrous response was not acknowledged. If the City
of Marseilles was to be saved, it had to be by her own
exertions.
The duel between the merchant ship with her one gun
and the submarine with its concentrated offensive power
opened at a range of about three miles. The enemy
fired about seven rounds at the British vessel without
doing serious damage, although splinters of shell fell on
board. The British gun's crew made a spirited reply.
Their seventh shot ricochetted and appeared to hit the
submarine. The enemy craft at any rate took a list to
port and, turning round sharply, abandoned the chase.
When last seen the submarine was steering in a north-
easterly direction and had a list of about 25 degrees to port,
which brought a large area of her starboard side out of
water. The City of Marseilles proceeded on her passage,
the passengers overjoyed at the success with which the
ship had been handled and the spirit shown by the men
manning her one gun.
On the last two days of the month four more ships,
all of them unarmed, were destroyed ; three of them —
the Malinche (1,868 tons), the Colenso (3,861 tons), and the
Langton Hall (4,437 tons) — were sunk off Malta, while the
Middleion (2,560 tons) was destroyed by gunfire seventy
miles from Gavdo Island, which had become a favourite
cruising-ground with the enemy. The last ship was on her
way from Mudros to Alexandria, when a suspicious object
was seen about three miles astern. At first the master (Mr.
H. Rattray) was not sure what it was. Then a shell
11—14
192 SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
passed over the ship and doubt was resolved into certainty.
The Middleton at her best could steam only about 7 knots,
but nevertheless Captain Rattray held on his course,
zigzagging in order to confuse the enemy's fire. About
twenty minutes after fire had been opened, seven of the
crew were struck by shrapnel, one of them being killed out-
right. Escape was impossible, so Captain Rattray stopped
the ship. As soon as the crew had taken to the boats,
the enemy sank the Middleton by gunfire and then
disappeared. An appeal by the second mate for bandages
for the injured men was ignored. Captain Rattray
found himself in a situation which called for all his
resource. During the day two of his men died of their
wounds. It was not until night was falling that the
Clan Maclaren hove in sight and rescued the survivors.
The casualty list was not, however, yet complete, for
another man died on board the Clan liner before she
reached Malta.
The year 1915 closed with a series of tragedies which
cost the British Merchant Navy twenty-one ships, but still
more grievous was the loss of 419 lives, of which all but
three, caused by mine explosions, were traceable to the
operations of enemy submarines in the Mediterranean.
Apart from this terrible story of the destruction of the
P. & O. liner Persia, which is dealt with in a subsequent
chapter, incidents occurred which stand out conspicu-
ously in the record of the enemy's attempt, at any cost
of life and property, to interrupt the communications of
the Allies in the Mediterranean. On the first day of the
month, the Clan Macleod (4,796 tons) was sunk by gunfire
no less than 100 miles east -south-east from Malta. She
was on her way home from Calcutta with a general cargo
of about 6,000 tons. The master (Mr. H. S. Southward)
was steering towards Malta when, in the clear morning
light, the chief officer sighted smoke on the port quarter.
He assumed that it was a destroyer and, as the enemy
had no surface craft at sea, nothing was to be feared.
About twenty minutes later a shot came out of nowhere,
falling short of the Clan Macleod. Captain Southward
at once altered course so as to put the smoke patch well
astern of him, the engines were opened out, and all the
firemen were sent below in order to get as much steam
as possible.
CH. VII] A COURAGEOUS ATTEMPT 193
Though the British merchant ship was unarmed,
Captain Southward was not without hopes of saving
his ship. The submarine headed three or four times
towards the vessel's port quarter, firing as she did so.
The shots fell ahead, and Captain Southward, his deter-
mination still firm, continued to manoeuvre his ship
dexterously, the submarine maintaining a hot pursuit.
It was soon apparent that the enemy had the advantage
of speed. Shortly before 10 o'clock she had approached
to within half a mile of the Clan Macleod. She then again
opened fire, and the eighth shot struck the vessel. What
happened afterwards can be best told in Captain South-
ward's own words :
" About this time I realised that I could not save the
steamer, hoisted international signal of surrender, stopped
the engines, and rounded to, bringing the submarine on the
starboard side. The crew were sent to boat stations,
but to my surprise the submarine started to shell the
bridge, doing considerable damage. I was struck by the
first shell. He then started to shell the boats and boat
crews, killing nine men, wounding six (three fatally), and
smashing the starboard boats. During this shelling the
crew had all been sent to the port boats, which were
manned and lowered without any casualty. After the
boats were lowered the chief officer and myself had a
look round the decks, but could not see anyone alive,
so we then left the steamer.
" After the boats left the steamer the gun of the sub-
marine was pointed towards the lifeboat and the com-
mander shouted for me. As the second officer told him
I was in the other boat, he turned the gun away and told
him he need not be afraid. The submarine was flying
the German naval flag. When the other boat appeared
in view of the submarine, I was ordered to go on board.
I did so, and found the commander and lieutenant in a
furious rage with me because I had not stopped sooner.
The commander rushed down from the conning- tower,
shook his fist in my face, and said, ' Why did you not
stop ? ' I replied that I wanted to save my ship. He
then said, ' Why did you not stop when I fired ? ' I
replied that my instructions were to escape if possible.
The commander said, ' Never mind your instructions ;
194 SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
you must obey my orders.' I replied that I did not know
anything about his orders. His next remark was, ' I
can shoot you as a franc-iireur.^ I said, ' I don't think
so.' He said, ' You are assisting my enemy.' I replied,
' I am your enemy.'
" The commander then said, ' Had you stopped when
I fired three shots you would not have had this,' pointing
to a wound in my hand. I replied that it was my
misfortune.
*' I was then ordered back into the boat, and the sub-
marine at once proceeded to sink the steamer by shell-
fire. After firing a couple of shots into every compart-
ment, he returned to the boats and I was again ordered
on board. I was asked for my instructions, which I said
I had destroyed. I was also asked for the register, and
told him it was on board the steamer.
" The lieutenant dressed my hand, pointed out that
my foot was wounded, and gave me packets of dressing
for mv foot and for some of the wounded. Before I left
the submarine he told me to inform all captains I met
that they would be fired upon if they tried to escape.
I told him that that would be their business and had
nothing to do with me. He also asked me the position,
and I said I had not had a position for some time.
" We then parted company, and after I had picked
up two wounded men, who had evidently stowed them-
selves away, the two boats set sail for Malta, the chief
officer having charge of the cutter with nineteen men on
board, and myself in charge of the lifeboat, with fifty
men on board. The submarine kept about half a mile
south of the boats with only the periscope showing for
three or four hours, when he disappeared.
" The lifeboat's crew were picked up by the steamship
Lord Cromer, of Liverpool, on the following day at 6 p.m.,
and landed at Algiers on December 5th. The cutter's
crew were rescued at 2 a.m. on December 4th, and were
landed at Malta the same day."
One of the injured men died of his wounds. For
several months Captain Southward was in hospital,
recovering slowly from the injuries he had received during
his courageous and skilful attempt to save his ship.
Within twenty-four hours two other large ships had
CH. VII] GALLANT CONDUCT OF " BENALLA " 195
fallen victims to the same submarine — the Umeia (5,312
tons) on the same day, and the Commodore (5,858 tons)
(master, Mr. H. Russell) early on the following morning.
The submarine continued to fire on the former vessel
after the master (Mr. W. Moxon) had stopped his engines.
Fortunately, none of the boats was injured and everyone
on board got away in safety, except one lascar who re-
fused to leave, and an engine fireman who died of thirst
and exposure in one of the boats. The Umeta was sunk
112 miles east -south-east of Malta, and when the enemy
had disappeared, leaving the British seamen to their own
resources. Captain Moxon gave the boats a course for that
port. During the night they became separated. The
master and his companions were drifting about at the
mercy of the waves until the afternoon of the 5th, when
they were fortunately rescued by the Greek steamer
Massalia and landed at Algiers. The rest of the crew
also found safety. The Com,modore was even farther
from the nearest land — 160 miles — when she was over-
hauled. For half an hour she was kept under a heavy
fire, which was not abated even when the men on board
were taking to the boats. One man had already been
killed, and another severely wounded, and while the
boats were being lowered five more hands were injured —
two of them severely. The survivors were adrift for
twenty-eight hours before they were picked up by a
Belgian steamer. On the following day the Helmsmuir
(4,111 tons) was torpedoed off Gavdo Island, and three
other ships were chased.
The attention of the naval authorities was attracted
in particular to the conduct of the P. & O. Benalla (11,118
tons). She was proceeding from Alexandria to Malta
with troops, when a wireless call was received from the
transport Torrilla (5,205 tons), with 2,000 soldiers on
board. The Benalla was carrying a 4'7-inch gun, and her
master (Commander C, W. Cockman, R.N.R., retired)
immediately proceeded to her assistance at full speed.
He found that the Torrilla was being shelled by a sub-
marine, and, as she carried only a 3-pounder gun, was
being outranged by the enemy. Captain Cockman,
exhibiting fine courage and a high sense of the comrade-
ship of the sea, at once brought his 4-7-inch gun into
action at a range of 8,200 yards. His intervention was
196 SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
almost immediately successful, for after the third round
the submarine submerged and made off. For thus saving
a valuable ship, as well as many lives, Captain Cockburn
was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.
For a period of three days British seamen in the
Mediterranean, as well as in other waters, enjoyed com-
plete immunity from molestation, and then on the 7th
a loss was again reported. The Cunard steamship Veria
(3,229 tons) was steaming towards Alexandria and was
within twenty-four miles of that port — almost safe from
danger — when she was intercepted by a submarine and
destroyed. On the following day the Tintoretto (4,181
tons) had a narrow escape in the same locality. At
9.30 a.m. a torpedo was fired at her, but fortunately
missed the ship astern. The master (Mr. W. Tranter),
sustained by the presence on board of a 12-pounder gun,
brought the submarine astern of him, and when the
enemy opened fire returned it vigorously. A running
fight was kept up'for nearly four hours, pieces of shell falling
on board the merchantman, but causing no damage.
At last the Tintoretto^s gun hit the submarine at extreme
range, and this success brought the action to a close.
Captain Tranter, as well as the chief engineer, Mr. J. P.
Rich, received " mentions," and the Clasp of the Mercan-
tile Marine Medal, which had by this time been instituted,
was awarded to this Lambert & Holt liner in recognition
of the fine defence which had been made against the
enemy's attack. The same good fortune did not attend
the Busiris (2,705 tons) on the following day, when she
was sunk by gunfire 190 miles west-north-west from
Alexandria, and the Orteric (6,535 tons) was torpedoed by
the enemy off Gavdo Island. In both cases a deter-
mined effort was made to escape, in spite of the heavy fire
to which the vessels were exposed. The master of the
latter vessel (Mr. G. B. McGill) was encouraged to hold on
his course by the reply to his wireless signal for help which
he received from a man-of-war. At last, after the ship
had been struck eight times, Captain McGill ordered the
boats to be lowered. While this was being done one
boat was hit, two men being killed outright and four
others seriously injured. When the three lifeboats had
dropped half a mile astern of the Orteric, the submarine
opened fire on the craft in wliich the chief engineer and
CH. VII] ACTIVITY IN HOME WATERS 197
sixteen hands had taken refuge, but fortunately the
shots missed their target. It was the good fortune of the
survivors, left afloat 140 miles from the nearest land,
to be rescued within an hour and a half.
Another interlude then occurred during which the
enemy met with no success. On the 13th the Cawdor
Castle (6,243 tons) escaped by the use of her gun ; on the
16th the Teucer (9,045 tons) outpaced the submarine by
which she was attacked ; and then on the 24th sub-
marines began once more to take toll of British merchant
shipping. In the meantime there had been a spasmodic
outbreak of activity in the English Channel. The Hunily
(1,153 tons) and Belford (516 tons) were torpedoed without
warning off Boulogne, and before the month closed sub-
marines had secured the Van Stirum (3,284 tons) off the
Smalls, and the Coitingham (513 tons) off Lundy Island ;
while on the 28th the El Zorro (5,989 tons) was sunk
near the Old Head of Kinsale, eleven lives altogether
being lost. The Cottingham was on passage from Rouen
to Swansea on December 26th, when a submarine opened
fire on her. It was soon apparent that escape was impos-
sible, so the engines were stopped and the boats filled.
The master (Mr. C. Mitchell) was picked up by a patrol-
boat the same evening, but nothing was ever heard of the
chief officer and the six men who were with him in the
other boat, though the Cottingham was sunk within
sixteen miles of Lundy Island.
This outburst of activity in the waters surrounding
the British Isles was of short duration, and in the mean-
time the enemy continued to pursue his campaign in the
Mediterranean. On Christmas Eve the Yeddo (4,563
tons) was captured and bombed off Cape Matapan ; the
Abelia (3,650 tons) was sunk by gunfire 152 miles from
Gavdo Island ; and then on the 30th, as the Old Year
passed into history, the P. & O. liner Persia (7,974 tons)
and the Clan Macfarlaiie (4,823 tons) were torpedoed
without warning with a loss of 386 lives. In recognition
of his services Kapitan-Leutnant Max Valentiner was
awarded the Ordre pour le Merite.
The story of the experiences of the officers and men of
the Clan Macfarlane furnishes the climax of the record
of the sufferings inflicted on British merchant seamen
during the year 1915. This defenceless ship was en-
198 SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
gaged in her lawful occupation, having left Birkenhead
on December 16th with a general cargo of about 7,400
tons. She was on passage to Bombay, and all went
well until the afternoon of December 30th, when the
vessel was sixty-three miles S.E. by S. from Cape Mar-
tello. A good lookout was being maintained as the ship
pursued her voyage at an average speed of 10 knots.
Though the atmosphere was clear and there was little
sea, nothing was seen of enemy submarines. The Clan
Macfarlane safely navigated the areas associated with
the greatest danger, and it seemed as though she might
make Alexandria in safety.
The master (Mr. James White Swanston) was among the
fifty-two victims whose lives were sacrificed as the result
of enemy action, and consequently we are dependent on
the information, very full and circumstantial, afterwards
supplied by the chief officer (Mr. F. J. Hawley). He was
just going on duty at 4 p.m. when the ship was shaken
by a terrific explosion. He immediately rushed on deck
and found that the upper hatches of No. 5 hold, which
had been battened down on leaving Liverpool, had been
blown out. It was at once apparent that the ship had been
torpedoed. She carried, fortunately, no passengers ; but
the crew were largely composed of Indians, and that
the loss of life was not heavier was due in no slight
degree to the courage and discipline exhibited by these
natives under nerve-racking conditions. Mr. Hawley,
having first ordered the boats to be lowered below the
level of the harbour deck, sounded No. 5 hold and dis-
covered that the water had already risen to a height of
18 inches and that part of the cargo was floating out of
the steamer through the gaping hole which the enemy's
torpedo had pierced. A search was made of the fore-
castles in order to make sure that no one remained in
them, and then, after conferring with Captain Swanston,
instructions were given that this fine steamer should be
abandoned. She was already settling down by the stern
and darkness was coming on. There was no time to be
lost.
With splendid composure officers and men left the
steamer in six boats shortly after 5 o'clock and rowed
to the north so as to keep clear of the sinkin^ ship. After
an interval of rather more than half an hour, a submarine
CH. vii] A TERRIBLE ORDEAL 199
appeared from the southward and fired six shots into the
Clan Macfaiiane on the port side forward. The sub-
marine commander made the usual inquiries, and then
disappeared without a thought for the safety of the men
in the boats. As the darkness of night fell around him,
Captain Swanston, undismayed by his misfortune, ordered
all boats to be placed in line and made fast astern his
own boat, in order to ensure their keeping together during
the oncoming night. Fortunately they had all been
provided with sails, and each man had a lifebelt. So
masts were stepped and a course was set for Crete, up-
wards of sixty miles distant. With the wind blowing
from the west, the little boats continued to sail through-
out that night and during the succeeding day, the sea
happily remaining comparatively calm.
In the course of the afternoon land was sighted and
the spirits of all on board rose. The survivors continued
on their course in the expectation of speedy deliverance,
but in the early hours of New Year's Day the wind
dropped. Captain Swanston held a conference with his
officers, and it was decided to separate the boats and
take to oars. In these conditions some progress was
made. By 10 o'clock that morning a light wind had
sprung up and the craft once more set their sails. As
evening closed in the boats were again made fast together
astern of the captain's boat, in order that they might
not lose touch with each other during the night. Early
on the morning of January 2nd a glimpse was caught
of the north-east corner of the island of Crete, but in
the meantime the wind had risen and the sea was be-
coming rough, so sail was shortened and a course was
set along the coast. A landing could not be effected
owing to the high sea which was running ; it was
therefore determined to hug the coast at a distance of
three or four miles on the chance of the weather condi-
tions improving.
By this time the unfortunate men had become exhausted
by exposure, and to add to their troubles a tow-rope
parted, with the result that the third officer's and second
engineer's boats went adrift. The captain, seized with
a high sense of his duty, cast off his boat to go in search
of the missing craft. It was an almost hopeless task in
the darkness which prevailed. Mr. Hawley, the chief
200 SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
officer, lay to with the other boats throughout the night.
The weather, far from improving, became increasingly
bad, and weary and dispirited as they were, the men
had to bale continually. In the meantime death claimed
five of the natives in the chief officer's boat and one died
in the second engineer's boat.
At daylight on January 3rd the captain's boat was
sighted. The search had failed. Three more native
seamen had succumbed owing to exposure. The outlook
was desperate as the remaining boats were once more
made fast to one another. That afternoon it was regretfully
realised that one of the boats was unseaworthy, so it was
abandoned ; the fourth engineer and six natives were
transferred to the chief officer's boat, and two other
natives went into the captain's boat. Hardly had this re-
adjustment of the burden been completed, when the
rudder of the captain's craft was carried away. So Cap-
tain Swanston cast off and made fast to the stern of the
second officer's boat, and the chief officer was left at the
head of the pitiful procession of little boats, buffeted
by wind and wave. Late that afternoon, owing to the
rising wind and sea, the surviving boats were once more
in danger of being swamped. The captain, therefore,
lay to and set a reefed jib, an oar being used for steering,
while the chief officer's boat also lay to with its sea anchor
down.
Throughout the night the little craft, labouring
heavily, continued to ship seas and the men were kept
hard at work baling out the water. With characteristic
courage they fought the elements throughout the night,
and then at dawn were distressed to find the captain's
boat was missing. At noon, however, it was sighted,
making in a westerly direction. Mr. Hawley decided
to follow, and set jib and reefed lug sail for that purpose.
As he had the second officer's boat in tow, he could make
little headway. Efforts to attract Captain Swanston's
attention failed, and as darkness fell the master's boat
was lost sight of. It was not seen again, and it will
never be known how this undaunted seaman and his
companions, adrift in their rudderless boat on a distressed
sea, met their end.
Early on the morning of January 5th Mr. Hawley
was forced by circumstances to abandon another boat.
CH. VII] " CROWN OF ARAGON " TO THE RESCUE 201
and the second officer and the fifth engineer, together
with seven natives, passed over to the chief officer's
boat. The operation was a hazardous one, and in the
process the rudder of the chief officer's boat was carried
away. High seas were running and the outlook was as
black as it could well be. As the light broke over the
waters the survivors of the Clan Macfarlane found them-
selves fighting grimly for life as the waves broke over the
bulwarks of their frail craft. Hope revived at noon as
the smoke of a steamer was seen at a distance, but the
vessel disappeared. Thus another day passed and night
fell.
Early the following morning, January 6th, the second
cook, who had died from exposure, was buried, and before
noon one of the boys and a native fireman had also suc-
cumbed to the ordeal to which they had been exposed
by the enemy's inhumanity. It seemed as though the
struggle was hopeless, but at last wind and sea began to
moderate, and Mr. Hawley was seized with the faint belief
that he might make the Port of Alexandria, which he
reckoned to be about 250 miles off. So, with the reef lug
sail set, he steered his little boat as well as he could with
an oar on an east-north-easterly course. Throughout that
night the chief officer and the second officer took alter-
nate watches, and noticed with returning confidence that
the sea was becoming quieter. Their hopes were again
dashed ; as daylight came the wind shifted and the sea
began to rise once more. The little company was now a
small one, for another native had died from exposure,
and the captain's boy had also fallen into his last sleep.
It seemed as though there might not be a single sur-
vivor. Just when hope had been wellnigh abandoned, a
steamer was sighted about three miles distant. The dis-
tressed seamen had no means of attracting her attention
except by waving articles of clothing. Would the signals
be seen ? Doubt was soon resolved into certainty as the
strange vessel, which was revealed as the Crown of Aragon,
bore down to perform her errand of mercy.
Mr. Hawley and his companions had been adrift in
their small boats for seven days and seven nights, and the
only wonder was that any of them had survived to tell
the tale of their sufferings. During the passage of the
Crown of Aragon to Malta t\vo more natives died, worn
202 SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
out by all they had gone through. The voyage to Malta
was marked by an incident which raised fears that after
all the rescue might prove vain. For a submarine was
sighted as the Crown of Aragon was making her way to
Malta. The vessel carried a 12-pounder gun. So the
master turned the stern of his ship on the enemy and
prepared to fight if need be. The submarine, taking note
of this manoeuvre, submerged and made off. In this way
the twenty-four remaining members of the crew of the
Clan Macfarlane, six Europeans and eighteen natives,
escaped almost as by a miracle from the fate which had
overwhelmed fifty-two of their companions.
Though the Germans continued from time to time to
harry British merchant ships in the southern part of the
North Sea by aircraft attack during the period when
operations by submarines in British waters were sus-
pended, they met with no success. The story of the
General Steam Navigation Company's steamer Balgownie
(1,061 tons) reveals the spirit with which masters and men
stood up against this new form of warfare. This vessel
was on passage from London to Rotterdam in the closing
days of November, when she was surprised by the enemy.
Captain Goodson's resource and courage led to the pre-
sentation to him of a cheque for one hundred guineas
from the War Risks Association, a similar sum being
distributed among the crew. In making the presentation
to Captain Goodson, Sir Kenneth Anderson, President of
the Chamber of Shipping, briefly recalled the facts as
they had been modestly recorded in the Captain's log. At
about 2.30 p.m. on November 27ththecrewof the Balgownie
were surprised by the rapid approach from the south-east
of three flying machines, which dropped about twenty-
three bombs, some of which fell within half a ship's length
of the vessel. After attacking for about twenty minutes
and using up all their bombs, two of the aircraft continued
to fire with machine guns until their ammunition was
exhausted, the bullets dropping on and around the ship
like rain. The vessel kept on a zigzag course at full
speed, the only weapon being the ship's distress rockets, of
which the fullest use was made, and the captain fired
over fifty rounds from his rifle. Although the shots did
not strike the machines, they made them fly higher, and
no doubt saved the ship.
CH. vii] ATTACKED FROM THE AIR 203
During the closing months of 1915, when the enemy
desisted from employing submarines in home waters, a
number of other merchant vessels were attacked by air-
craft in the vicinity of the Belgian coast, but all the
bombs which they dropped fell harmlessly in the water,
though all the vessels were unarmed and were therefore
unable to prevent the aeroplanes from approaching close
to them.
CHAPTER VIII
THE SINKING OF THE " PERSIA "
The ordeal in the Mediterranean which British seamen
were confronting with characteristic courage had attracted
httle attention until the P. & O. liner Persia was sunk on
December 30th, 1915. In the case of the Lusitania, the
enemy claimed that she had been built as an auxiliary
cruiser of the British Fleet, that she was armed, and that
she was carrying ammunition from the United States to
a British port. These excuses for an act of inhumanity
which shocked the civilised world have already been
discussed.^ The Persia was admittedly nothing more than
an ordinary passenger ship, and the Germans had promised
that passenger ships should not be molested ; she was on
her way from England to Indian ports and was under no
suspicion of carrying munitions ; she mounted a small
gun aft, but it was available only for defence and, in the
sudden emergency on December 30th, proved useless.
Yet, in face of the pledges which had been given to the
American Government, she was torpedoed without warn-
ing, and such was the eflect of the explosion that within
five minutes she had disappeared in the waters of the
Mediterranean. Her destruction resulted in the loss of
334 lives.
The Persia (7,974 tons) had been built at Greenock
in 1900, and was a sister ship of the Egypt, Arabia, China,
and India, belonging to a class of vessel which was, at
the time of building, the largest in the P. & O. Company's
service. She held a passenger certificate issued by the
Government of Bombay, allowing 530 passengers and
300 crew. The lifeboat accommodation, consisting of
eighteen lifeboats capable of accommodating 830 persons,
was far more than sufficient for all persons on board at
the time of the casualty, and the large loss of life was
1 Vol. I., pp. 410-28.
204
CH. VIII] TORPEDOED WITHOUT WARNING 205
accounted for by the fact that the vessel took a sudden
list after being torpedoed and sank within five minutes.
Owing to the list it was not possible to lower the star-
board boats, and owing to the short time she remained
afloat only five or six of the port boats could be lowered.
The Persia left Tilbury on December 18th with 201
passengers, including many women and children, and had
a crew of 317. She was bound for Port Said, Aden, and
Bombay, and in addition to mails carried a general cargo.
The early stage of the voyage was uneventful ; the Persia
called en route at Gibraltar and Marseilles, and then at
Malta, where five of the passengers and two of the crew
were landed.
On Thursday, December 30th, at about ten minutes
past one in the afternoon, when the Persia (master,
Mr. W. H. S. Hall) had reached a position about lat.
34° 1' N., long. 26° 0' E., she was torpedoed, without
warning, by a German submarine. The passengers were
at lunch at the time, the second officer, Mr. Harold Geof-
frey Stephen Wood, was in charge on the bridge, Captain
Hall and the chief officer, Mr. Gerald Clark, both being
in their cabins. As usual precautions against the sub-
marine menace had been adopted. On the previous day
everyone on board had been assigned to a boat and drill
had taken place. Instructions had been issued that all
passengers in case of emergency were to assemble on the
promenade deck, the boats, it was added, would be let
down from the boat deck above until they reached the level
of the promenade deck, when the passengers would get
into them. There was no thought that only a matter of
five minutes would be available for saving everyone on
board.
At the moment of the explosion a native seaman was
on the lookout forward ; another native seaman was
in the crow's-nest, while a British able seaman and a
native were on the lookout on the lower bridge. A
British able seaman was at the wheel. There was a
moderate breeze blowing west by north, and a certain
amount of swell, and the ship was proceeding at her full
speed of about 16 knots, when the first warning of any-
thing untoward came. The second officer caught sight
of the wake of a torpedo rapidly approaching the Persia
about four points on the port bow. It was so close that
206 SINKING OF THE " PERSIA " [ch. viii
before Mr. Wood could turn to put the helm hard a-star-
board the vessel had been struck — just abaft the forward
funnel on the port side, a violent explosion shaking the
ship from stem to stern. This explosion was immediately
followed by a second one, due to the blowing up of the
boilers.
The second officer immediately went to the whistle,
intending to sound the prearranged emergency signal, but
found that all steam had gone. He then ran down to
Captain Hall, who had left his cabin and come to the lower
bridge, and Captain Hall ordered him to get the boats out.
Mr. Wood hurried at once to his station on the poop,
noticing on his way that there was a great hole in the
hurricane deck on the port side, presumably due to the ex-
plosion of a boiler. The ship was then listing heavily to
port, and continued to heel over until she lay on her port
side, before disappearing within only about five minutes of
the explosion of the torpedo. Within this brief time, how-
ever, Mr. Wood was able to see to the lowering of two
port boats on the poop deck, which were loaded with
men and women passengers and a few of the crew. He
then loosened the gripes of two inboard boats and
attempted to lower a starboard boat, which was found
to be impossible owing to the list which the Persia had
taken. One of the port poop boats floated clear, but the
other was pressed down by the davits as the ship turned
over. The Persia was still making way, although with
lessening speed, which rendered the lowering of the boats
a difficult operation.
Meanwhile the chief officer (Mr. Gerald Clark), who had
been momentarily dazed through having been struck by
some of the furniture shaken from the walls of his cabin,
had seized a lifebelt and axe and ran up to the boat deck.
There he saw that the boats from the poop deck were
already being lowered, and he at once, therefore, went to
the assistance of those who were attempting to lower the
boats from the boat deck, using his axe, where necessary,
in order to clear the boats as quickly as possible. He
remained on the boat deck freeing the boats as fast as
this could be done, in the hope that, although there was
no time to load them, they might be of service in picking
up survivors from the water. He was occupied in this
way until the listing of the vessel became so steep that
CH. VIII] DOWN WITH HIS SHIP 207
he found it impossible to keep his feet any longer, where-
upon he slid into the water, to be eventually picked up
by No. 2 boat.
The second officer had also slipped into the water, and
had succeeded in swimming to an empty boat, into which
he climbed himself, afterwards saving several lives. This
boat was one of the inboard boats which he himself had
helped to loosen, and both of them had fortunately floated
clear. Ultimately Mr. Wood succeeded in getting forty-
three people into his boat, the chief officer afterwards
sending across five more from No. 2 boat. Unfortunately,
owing to the fact that the Persia was still under way,
most of the boats that had been loosened were swamped,
torn away, or capsized. Only five got finally free of
the rapidly sinking ship. Four of these boats were
afterwards joined together and an attempt was made to
row back to the scene of the Persians disappearance, but
in view of the overladen condition of the boats and the
contrary wind and swell, this was found to be impossible.
The boats had all been swung out from the davits at
the time of the explosion, and the understanding with
the engine-room staff had been that in the event of the
ship being struck by a mine or torpedo, the engines were
to be instantly stopped. Unfortunately it seems probable
that the engineers were in the stokehold at the time,
superintending the cleaning of the fires, and were either
killed by the explosion of the torpedo or as the result of the
boiler explosion that followed. Altogether, out of the
total number of 501 persons on board the Persia, only
167 were saved, 65 being passengers, including 2 children,
and 102 crew ; 121 passengers and 213 of the crew were
lost. Throughout the afternoon and the following night
the four boats remained together, and were finally picked
up about 7 o'clock in the evening of December 31st
by the mine-sweeper Mallow, which took the survivors
to Alexandria. None of the ship's papers could be saved,
and nothing was seen of Captain Hall, who presumably
went down with his ship.
In view of the fact that most of the passengers were
below at lunch when the explosion occurred, that the
engine-room instructions could not be carried out, and
that within five minutes of the impact the vessel had
disappeared, it is a striking tribute to the courage, quick-
11—15
208 SINKING OF THE " PERSIA " [ch. vm
wittedness, discipline, and seamanship of the surviving
officers and crew that so many lives were ultimately
saved. An impression of the scene on board the vessel
and of the subsequent experiences of those on board is
conveyed in a graphic statement of Mr. Grant, an American
business man, who, with two of his fellow-countrymen,
was on board the Persia. The American Consul at Aden
was among those drowned.
" I was sitting," said Mr. Grant, " in the dining saloon
at five minutes past one, and had just finished my soup.
The steward was asking me what I would take as a
second course, when there was a terrific explosion, and the
saloon was filled with broken glass, and with smoke and
steam from the boiler, which seemed to have burst.
There was no panic. We went on deck as if we were at
boat drill, and I reported myself at my lifeboat on the
starboard side. The vessel was listing to port and I clung
on to the rail. . . . The vessel gradually listed more and
more, and it was impossible to launch any of the starboard
boats. Finally I climbed over the starboard rail and
slid down into the water. I was sucked down and got
caught in a rope, which pulled off my shoe, but, breaking
loose, I got to the surface again and clambered on to
some wreckage, to which I clung. The last I saw of the
Persia was her bow pointing high in the air, and that
was only five minutes after the explosion. While thus
supporting myself, I managed to collect other wreckage
for others to cling to. It was past 4 o'clock before I
was picked up by a boat. I then saw that there were
five boats pulling around in search of any other persons
who might still be struggling in the water. Some of
the boats were overloaded, and subsequently there was
a redistribution of their occupants. Four of the boats
were then tied together by their painters. The fifth
was some distance away. At half-past three the following
morning my boat separated from the others to search
for help in a more frequented channel. We rowed for
three hours, and at last saw a cruiser. We called out
' We are English,' and explained that we were survivors
from the Persia, which had been sunk. We also gave
particulars as to the whereabouts of the other boats.
These were found about 7 o'clock, and the occupants
CH. viii] EYE-WITNESSES' NARRATIVES 209
were taken off by the English sailors. The end was a
horrible scene. The water was as black as ink. Some
of the people were screaming ; others were saying good-
bye to each other ; while those in one of the boats were
singing hymns."
The torpedoing of the Persia was viewed from another
angle by Mr. Walter Ernest Smith, assistant engineer
of the condenser plant, Port Said. He was travelling
second class, sharing his cabin with a friend, Mr. Knight.
He was in his cabin washing his hands for lunch when
there was an explosion.
" I immediately got hold of a lifebelt and started to
make my way up on deck. On my way I came across
a lady I had met on the boat who was standing dazed,
doing nothing. I asked why she did not get her belt
on, and seeing that she was stupefied, I gave her mine
and went back to my cabin to get my own life-saving
jacket ; she was not amongst those who were saved.
When I left my cabin the second time, I noticed that
women and children were lying about, some evidently
in a dead faint and others moaning and crying out. One
woman I remember particularly, a Frenchwoman, who
was leaning up against the rail in the corridor outside
the cabins, was quite dazed. Seeing she was not in a
fit state to help herself, I pushed her along, and that
seemed to rouse her. I practically got her on to the
deck, where someone else took the lifebelt from her,
fastened it on her, and pushed her overboard. She was
saved,
" When I got up to the boat deck I found Knight and
another man in one end of our boat, and the carpenter
and another sailor in the other end. They were trying
to get her away. The three pins had been displaced
and the fourth had stuck, as we had foreseen. Knight
said 'An axe. Smith; this is jammed.' There were no
axes in the boat. I was then in the boat and looked
around and picked up a broken oar and handed it to him,
and he gave the pin a whack with it. The pin luckily
gave way and the last lashing was free. By this time
the Persia was at a big angle, leaning over to the port
side, that is, on the side the torpedo had struck her,
210 SINKING OF THE " PERSIA " [ch. viii
and so when we freed the last lashing our boat swung
out from the side of the vessel and then bumped back
again into her side. We all lost our feet in the boat,
and one man was pitched over the side into the sea.
Knight was pitched out of the boat, and I could only see
his finger-tips above the side of the boat as he clung on.
He managed to scramble on board our boat again.
" By this time the stern of the Persia was settling
down. While I was helping in our boat I saw a boat
next to us, full of people, being lowered down. All of a
sudden one of the davit ropes broke, and that end of the
boat fell down and everyone and everything fell straight
into the sea. The other davit rope then gave way, and
the boat landed in the water right way up and quite dry,
but no one was in her. People then, who, I supposed,
had jumped off the Persia farther forward, began to climb
into this empty boat until, I suppose, there were about
twenty to thirty people in her. She had remained fast
to the Persia by her painter or one of her davit ropes.
I then saw another boat empty of people fall right on
the top of the boat in the water, and it appeared to me
that most of the people in her must have been crushed.
I saw some of them pinned between the two boats. We
had failed to get the davit ropes of our boat loose in time,
and the stern of the Persia was now low in the water.
We waited until our boat touched the water, and then, as
the Persia still sank, we unhooked the hooks of our davit
ropes from the davits and thought we were free. Knight,
however, cried out, ' A knife. Smith ; the painter is
fastened.' He said the davit had caught our painter.
I gave him my pocket-knife and he cut the painter with
it and we were free. We then were sucked right across
the stern of the sinking Persia. We were then in the
boat six — three passengers and three crew, the latter
all white.
" We were fascinated by the sinking Persia, and also
we were kept over the sinking boat by the suction. After
she had sunk, we got out the oars and pulled out of the
way of the \\Teckage. We immediately started to pull
people in. There were a good many people in the water.
All people we picked up had lifebelts. After some time
we got in, I suppose, nearly fifty people. Among them
were five women. There was not room in the boats for
CH, VIII] A GRAPHIC STORY 211
all the people in the water. Five boats altogether, I
believe, got away, but I only saw four — that is to say
our own, No. 14, and No. 14a, which was next to ours on
the Persia and must have floated off when the Persia
sank. There was also No. 16 and the accident-boat,
which was under the command of the chief officer. He
took charge of all the boats, but we never had anyone
who actually took charge in our boat. There were
several seamen, besides the carpenter, but as there was
no officer in the boat, the seamen were reluctant to obey
in particular one of themselves, and if any one of the pas-
sengers offered a suggestion he was told to shut up. Some
time after we had got clear I saw a small boat away on
my side of the boat and Knight saw one also on his side.
I saw a boat, too, which I took to be a tramp, and as I
watched her — this was about 4.30 p.m. — I saw an explosion
take place forward of her foremast. She did not sink
at once, as we watched her for an hour or more, but
the next morning she was no longer there. Before night-
fall the chief officer ordered us to make an anchor, which
we let down, and the other boats were moored to us in
a line.
" After dark we saw the lights of a vessel, and we
burnt our flares, but she took no notice of us. The next
morning we saw a large Cunarder. Directly we saw her
the chief officer instructed the second officer to set sail
and head her off. This he did and got close to her, but
directly she saw him she sheered off. This he told us
afterwards. In the afternoon the chief officer, who had
kept the best men in his boat — I think they were mostly
passengers — said he was going to row in the direction of
Port Said. This was about 3 p.m. After dark we saw
the head light of a vessel. We watched it anxiously and
burnt our flares. Finally we also saw the starboard light,
and then the port light, and we knew she was heading
towards us. When she got fairly close to us all the people
in our boat got up, and as no one controlled our boat, she
was soon broadside on to the sea. I do not know why
we did not capsize. Knight was shouting to everyone
to sit down. Finally we got alongside. There was a
bit of a sea running, and they were only able to let down
a rope ladder. We had some difficulty in getting the
women up ; one of them stuck halfway up, and I thought
212 SINKING OF THE " PERSIA " [ch. viii
she would get crushed the next time we rose on a wave,
but Knight and I managed to push her up. Knight and
I then scrambled on board. The ship was the Mallow,
one of H.M. ships."
A noteworthy tribute to the discipline and promptitude
of the crew was paid by Lord Montagu of Beauheu, one
of the passengers, who was for some time presumed to
have been drowned. Lord Montagu was at luncheon
with the rest of the passengers when the explosion occurred,
and at once went to the station which had been allotted
to him in No. 6 boat on the port side in case of emergency.
He saw that the boats were already being lowered. He
realised, however, in view of the rapid heeling over of
the vessel, that it would probably be impossible to get
into them, and therefore, with great difficulty, he started
to climb up the starboard side, trying to pull up with
him his lady secretary, who happened to be standing by.
He was then swept off his feet by the rush of water along
the promenade deck, and the next moment he was over-
board. The ship then sank, and he was sucked down
a long way, striking his head and body against several
pieces of wreckage. He ultimately came to the surface
again, thanks in part to the buoyancy of the life-saving
waistcoat which he was wearing at the time. " So far
as I am a judge," said Lord Montagu, " I am convinced
that the commander, the officers, and the crew did all
that was possible to be done under the terrible circum-
stances."
When he had sufficiently recovered his senses to look
around. Lord Montagu saw that the sea was covered
with struggling human beings, but comparatively little
wreckage. He swam towards a signal locker that he
observed near-by, but found the ship's doctor chnging to
this, apparently in a stunned condition and with an
injury to his head. The locker being only sufficient to
support one person. Lord Montagu then swam towards a
boat floating upside-down some fifty yards away. A
number of native seamen were clinging to this boat, a
larger number than it was properly able to support.
Eventually, however. Lord Montagu managed to climb
up and get astride of the keel band on the extreme end
aft, and from this position saw a boat only half filled
CH. VIII] LORD MONTAGU'S EXPERIENCE 213
a short distance away. He shouted, but without
succeeding in drawing the attention of the occupants,
to whom frantic cries for help were rising up from all
sides.
" About an hour after the disaster," Lord Montagu said,
" there were left on the upturned boat six Europeans
and about a score of the native crew. The others had
dropped off as they became too weak to hold on. At
this time the boat was suddenly righted by a big wave,
and with great difficulty we scrambled into her. I then
discovered that not only had she a large hole in the bot-
tom, but that her bows were split open as well. She
was in a state of extreme instability, for some of the air
tanks, which showed me that she was one of the lifeboats,
were smashed, and others were perforated. The smallest
weight on the starboard side tended to capsize her again.
This, indeed, happened many times before we were picked
up, and added very greatly to our sufferings. By sunset
most of us were sitting up to our knees in water. When
the sun went down on the first day there remained of the
original party in the boat, thirteen native seamen and
firemen, two native stewards, an English steward
named Martin, an Italian second-class passenger, Mr. Alex-
ander Clark (a Scottish second-class passenger), and
myself. If it had not been for Mr. Clark and Martin,
the steward, who more than once helped us to climb
back into the boat when she capsized, I should have had
little chance of surviving. Though there was not much
wind, there was a considerable swell, and nearly all the
time the sea was breaking over us. Before the night
was half gone several more natives died from exhaustion,
and as the bodies were washed about in the boat we made
efforts to throw them overboard. The night seemed
interminable. About 8 p.m. a steamer, with her saloon
lights all showing, passed about one mile to the southward.
I think she must have been a neutral boat. We tried to
attract her attention by shouting, and the other ship's
boat to the eastward burned two red flares ; but no
notice was taken, a submarine ruse probably being
suspected. At dawn next morning there were only eleven
all told left in the boat. About three hours after sunrise
we saw a two-funnelled and two-masted steamer away
214 SINKING OF THE " PERSIA " [ch. vm
to the southward, and our hopes were again raised. We
hoisted a piece of torn flag on the one oar left in the boat,
and the other ship's boat, which seemed to be floating
high and well, also signalled. The ship, however, passed
westward bound, about three miles away. For the rest
of the day we saw nothing. One of the native crew about
noon managed to get a tin of biscuits from the locker in
the boat under the thwarts, and we ate a little of this,
though it was spoilt by the salt water.
" We had then been nearly thirty hours without food
or water. I myself had had nothing but a cup of tea
and a biscuit since dinner on the 29th. I felt the heat
of the sun a good deal, as I had only a small khaki scarf
for protection. At sunset on Friday we had practically
given up all hope of being saved. ... I found it a great
struggle to keep awake. The tendency to drowsiness
was almost irresistible, but to fall asleep would have
meant the end. We capsized once more about 7
o'clock through the Italian turning light-headed. He had
yielded to the temptation to drink salt water. In this
accident we lost the tin of biscuits and the red flares
we had hoped to use during the night. Then about 8
o'clock we saw the masthead lights of a steamer away
to the eastward. At first I thought it was only a rising
star, for there was very clear visibility that evening.
Presently I could discern her side lights, which suggested
that she was coming pretty nearly straight for us. When
she came closer we started shouting in unison. . . . When
the ship was half a mile away, she ported her helm, stopped
her engines, and appeared to be listening. We knew
then that, like other ships, she expected a ruse and dare
not approach until she had made further investigations.
" After some time she came nearer and we heard a shout
from her bridge. Then her steam whistle was blown. I
dared to hope, though hope had almost died within us. We
tried to explain that we were helpless and had no means
of getting alongside. Eventually the captain of this
ship — Captain Allen — which proved to be the Alfred Holt
steamer Ning Chow, bound from China to London, very
cleverly manoeuvred her alongside our wreckage. We
were by this time like a cracked eggshell. Bow lines were
passed round us by a plucky Russian and an English
quartermaster, and we were eventually hoisted on board.
CH. viii] PARLIAJVIENTARY APPRECIATION 215
The captain and his officers did all they could for us.
I should like to mention that it was Mr. Allan Maclean —
a Maclean of Duart, Island of Mull — the third officer of
the ship, who was the officer of the watch at the time,
and he first appears to have heard our cries. His alert-
ness and keen sense of hearing were our salvation. I
consider it was a very courageous thing for the captain
to stop for us, as he and his officers knew they were in the
danger zone, and ran the risk of being torpedoed them-
selves while they were helping us. Once on board we
began slowly to recover from the exposure and our
injuries. We arrived at Malta at dawn on January 3rd."
In a lesser degree, the harrowing experience of Lord
Montagu and his companions were those of all other
survivors, exposed as they were, in a drenched condition,
for over thirty hours in open boats, while the fate of the
others shocked the whole civilised world. As in the case
of the Lusitania and of the many similar, if less conspicu-
ous, outrages that were to follow, the traditions of the
British Mercantile Marine were nobly exemplified, both
in respect of decision in emergency and instant readiness
for self-sacrifice.
It should be added that, although the Persia was armed
with one gun for purposes of defence, this was not used, the
Persia neither threatening to attack nor trying to escape
from the submarine responsible for her loss, which was
never seen by anybody on board, and from which no
warning was received.
In replying to a number of questions in the House of
Commons on March 8th, 1916, with reference to the sink-
ing of the Persia, the President of the Board of Trade
(Mr. Walter llunciman) said :
" I would like to add a word of appreciation, in which
I am sure the House would like to join me, of the coolness
and courage of the passengers and crew and the discipline
of the ship maintained in face of this sudden and appal-
ling disaster. I am told that the captain, officers, and
engineers of the Persia had spent their lives in the com-
pany's service, and all had unblemished records. The
country is deeply indebted to those who are facing the
perils to which our merchant ships are being subjected."
CHAPTER IX
IN THE HANDS OF THE BEDOUINS
In the early days of 1916 a merchant ship on her way
from the Spanish coast to India was destroyed by the
enemy, and her officers and men left adrift in their small
boats on a stormy sea 200 miles from the nearest land ;
the one boat which survived the fierce onslaught of the
natural forces reached the North African coast at Ras
Amana after six days. Events were to prove that the
unfortunate men had only escaped from the merciless
sea to be attacked by marauding Bedouins. Three men
were killed, two were wounded, and ten others were
carried away as prisoners by the Bedouins, to suffer in
captivity for a period of nearly eight months.
The steamer Coquet (4,396 tons) put out from Torrevieja,
on the Spanish coast, on the last day of the Old Year
with 6,200 tons of salt, which she was to land at Rangoon.
The ship was well found, the officers and men were com-
petent, and until just before noon on January 4th the
voyage proved uneventful. The master (Mr. Arnold
C. B. Groom) had adopted the usual precautions. A
seaman was on the lookout forward, the two lifeboats
were slung out ready for lowering, and a man at the wheel
kept his eyes skinned. The third officer was in charge
on the bridge. Captain Groom was in the saloon when he
heard a gunshot, and as he ran on deck there was another
report, two shells passing across the steamer's bow. Though
the breeze was only moderate, there was a heavy swell,
and from the deck of the Coquet the captain was able to
make out very indistinctly the form of a submarine on
the port quarter, but several of the crew had noticed
another submarine on the port bow. Confronted with
two of the most highly developed scientific weapons for
making war by sea, the captain instantly realised that his
only course was to stop his engines and order the boats
216
CH. IX] CROSS-EXAMINATION 217
to be got ready. The Coquet was already losing way when
the master hurriedly placed his confidential papers in the
galley fire. When he next looked out over the tossing
waters he saw that one of the submarines (the other having
disappeared) was flying a signal to abandon ship immedi-
ately.
The master, with his officers and men, at once
got into the two boats, and the submarine then opened
a fusillade on the merchantman ; eight shots were fired
at the ship, but not a single one hit her. The enemy
craft drew in closer and ordered the boats to proceed
alongside. " This was a dangerous proceeding," Captain
Groom afterwards recorded, " as the submarine's deck was
just awash and there was a big swell." At any moment
the frail boats might have been dashed to pieces, and as it
was they suffered considerable injury, which afterwards
contributed to the sufferings of the survivors of this
outrage on the high seas. Captain Groom was ordered
on board the submarine, to discover that she was
manned, in the main, by officers and men who were
wearing Austrian uniform. A boarding party, armed
with revolvers and cutlasses, got into the two boats and
they were ordered to return to the Coquet. All hands
were given twenty minutes in which to collect what
they wanted to take with them. At the same time the
captors ransacked the ship and lowered one of the small
boats, in readiness to carry away them and their loot.
When they had got all they wanted, they ordered the two
lifeboats to return to the submarine, set two time-fuse
bombs under water abreast Nos. 1 and 2 holds of the
merchant man, and left the ship themselves. Shortly
afterwards there were two explosions, and the ship settled
down by the head. Within four or five minutes the
Coquet lifted her stern high in the air, something hit the
whistle lanyard, and with a pitiful scream the Coquet
disappeared.
During these proceedings Captain Groom had been
under close cross-examination by the commander of the
submarine, who spoke passable English. He was plied
with questions as to the progress of the war, but managed
to parry the inquiries, probably conveying the impression
that he was not a very intelligent officer of the British
Mercantile Marine. The one-sided conversation was still
218 IN THE HANDS OF THE BEDOUINS [ch. ix
in progress when the two hfeboats returned, the men
vigorously using buckets to bale out the water which was
finding its way into the injured craft. Captain Groom
pointed out to the commander of the enemy submarine
that the bilge planks of both boats had most likely been
sprung while they were alongside his awash deck. " I
told him it was nothing short of murder to send thirty-one
men away like that, in the middle of winter and so far
from land. He laughed and said he would save the next
ship and send her to look for us." The thought that these
unfortunate mariners were about to be cast adrift on the
wide expanse of the heaving seas of the Mediterranean must
have seemed to Captain Groom demoniacal. The captors,
however, were in no mood for mercy. As soon as the boats
were alongside, they searched them for anything appealing
to their fancy, taking chronometers, sextants, and charts,
and every scrap of paper they could find, including the
master's "account of wages." Captain Groom was then
directed to take his place in one of the boats, and the
submarine made off, having added a fresh page to the
record of inhumanity by sea which was being compiled by
the men to whom the prosecution of the submarine cam-
paign had been entrusted.
Only those who are familiar with the Mediterranean in
its angrier moods can appreciate the feelings of the master
of the Coquet as he looked over the heaving waters and
realised how much depended upon his own personal
courage, seamanlike skill, and tempered judgment. The
nearest land was 200 miles distant. What hope was there
that the two boats, with their load of thirty-one men,
could reach it ?
" As we were well to the northward," he has stated,
" I deemed it wisest to steer south (especially as the wind
was freshening from the north to north-north-west), as we
should then be running right across all the tracks of the
steamers between Port Said and Alexandria and Malta.
We ran so until nearly dark, when a steamer was sighted.
We saw her hull. The mate's boat, which was a good bit
nearer to her than we were, showed three red flares,
and we showed one, but if she saw them — and I don't
see how she could have failed to do so if any lookout
at all were being kept — she took no notice of us. The
O
Pi
o
i?
CH. IX] SIX DAYS IN OPEN BOATS 219
sea was getting too dangerous to sail any longer, so mast
and sail were taken down and sea anchor put out ; the
latter, although of ' B.O.T.' dimensions, proved very
inefficient as regards keeping the boat head on to the sea ;
latterly we used the mast instead. We were very soon
all wet through, and remained so practically for the next
six days (the whole of the time we were in the boat).
" Heavy weather, with a cold northerly and westerly
wind, continued all that night. ' Allowance ' of biscuits
and water was started right away that night, viz., two
and a half biscuits and two gills of water per man per day ;
latterly I increased the water allowance, finding it was
not enough with so much salt spray about. All the
able-bodied men had to take their turn at baling, two at
a time ; the steward, who firstly was old, and secondly
ill, I made exempt from this work, also the four boys I
had, who were very young, also seasick and somewhat
frightened, I fancy. The boat was very overloaded with
seventeen in it, and was ankle-deep in water, in spite of
vigorous baling with the two buckets. The next day, the
5th, I got the carpenter to take out three of the water-
tight tanks on the side where the plank was split, and
caulk it roughly from inside with bits of shirt ; this stopped
the leaking a little."
Throughout that day and the following night the
weather continued stormy, and all hopes of being picked
up by a passing steamer had been abandoned, when just
before daylight on the 6th Captain Groom was encouraged
by the sight of a dark object which was disclosed, away
to the seaward, as his boat rose on the crest of the waves.
It appeared and then disappeared, and at last he con-
cluded that it might be a steamer creeping along with
everj^hing darkened, so he lighted a red flare. In reply
a red flare duly appeared, and hopes ran high. But the
signal which had given such joy proved to have been
made from the mate's boat. There was consolation in
company, but the chances of falling in with shipping
were reduced if the two boats kept together, so as the
mate drew in towards him. Captain Groom shouted out
that he had better keep some distance away in order to
increase the possibility of rescue. So the two boats
drifted apart, and the mate and his companions were
220 IN THE HANDS OF THE BEDOUINS [ch. ix
never seen again. What happened to them remains a
matter of sad surmise.
" The weather got a little worse that night and we used
the oil-bag with good effect in keeping the breaking sea-
tops flat. No change on the day or night of the 7th ;
everybody chilled to the bone with that northerly wind
blowing right through our saturated clothes ; we all used
to look forward to the daylight coming, in the hopes of
seeing a little sun ; but it was nearly always covered
with clouds. Several of us had excruciating pains in the
ankles, knees, and wrists ; the poor little Italian boy was
crying all one night with them in his sleep, and, of course,
I could do absolutely nothing for him ; I had them badly
myself.
" In the early morning of the 8th the weather moderated
somewhat, and I decided to set sail and make for the
African coast. I reckoned that we had drifted across
all the steamer tracks by this time, and with the sea then
running it would have been entirely out of the question
to try and sail back over them again. So we steered
south again, and made fairly good weather of it. During
the day the wind ' backed ' to west-north-west. This did
not make things any more comfortable ; however, we
continued on our course.
" During the day of the 9th the wind ' backed ' still
more, and during the rest of the day and that night I
was only able to make south-east instead of south course.
However, just after midnight, I made out land to the south-
ward, and just then the wind started to freshen consider-
ably and sliifted to the south. Such a bad and dangerous
short sea rose that I had to take in the sail (I had tried
reefing it at first), and got the mast and a couple of oars
out as a sea anchor ; such a disappointment when land
was so near and our water so low, but there was nothing
else for it. About 5 a.m. the wind moderated a little,
also the sea ; so we set our sail again and started to battle
against a nearly dead head wind ; a very hopeless job
in a steamer's lifeboat with a ' regulation ' lug (sail).
We slowly banged and punched on a diagonal course for
the shore all day, and then, as we got nearer, the wind
fell lighter and lighter, and this nasty lumpy swell still in
evidence ! "
CH. IX] A NIGHT OF MISERY 221
Land was in sight, but could they reach it in the calm
which had succeeded the high winds ? The men were
exhausted owing to the successive days of exposure and
the absence of nourishing food. It was with difficulty
that some handled the oars, while others continued to
bale out the water ; but at last the boat crept into a
little bay, with houses dimly discernible in the back-
ground. The boat was nearly swamped on two occasions,
but at last everybody got ashore and the boat was made
safe for the night.
What a night of misery it proved to these unhappy
men, after six days of indescribable suffering in their
little boat ! Captain Groom has left us the simple but
harrowing narrative of their experiences :
" We slept on the sands that night, after having slaked
our thirst with some well water and eaten a quantity
of limpets from the rocks with our biscuits. There were
a quantity of cave-dwellings around the bay ; but they
were all so damp and smelly that we deemed it wiser to
sleep in the open on the sandy beach, thinking that the
sand would have retained some of the sun's heat. This
conjecture proved faulty, however ; there was a chill
dampness which struck up through the sand, and, having
only our wet clothes to cover us, we woke up chilled
through and through, with every bone acliing ; we slept,
owing to the fact that it was the first opportunity we
had had of sleeping since leaving the ship. The buildings
we had seen from the sea proved to be long-deserted ruins,
and there was no sign of life any^vhere. The two engineers,
the second mate, and I kept watch by turns during the
night."
On the following morning, as the light was breaking,
Captain Groom reviewed the situation — a merchant
officer without a ship, marooned on the inhospitable shores
of the African continent. He came to the conclusion
that, as there was plenty of water, as well as shellfish,
with which life could be supported, it would be unwise
to stir until he knew exactly where he was and the direc-
tion in which the nearest port lay, at which he could
obtain succour for himself and his men. There was little
or no wind, so if the boat was to be employed in a recon-
222 IN THE HANDS OF THE BEDOUINS [ch. ix
noitring expedition it would be necessary to use the oars.
Neither the master nor his companions, completely
exhausted by the late ordeal, were tempted to re-embark
with this prospect. So after breakfast Captain Groom
set out with three men to ascertain what their surroundings
were like, hoping that, perchance, they might discover
some civilised human habitation.
" It was very bad walking, sometimes rough, muddy
ground, strewn with big stones, and hills with ankle-
deep sand, etc. We felt it terribly owing to having been
cramped up in the boat so long and deprived of the use
of our legs. We plodded on until about noon without
seeing anything that we wanted, and were just giving up
hopes when a very tall Arab appeared. He came back
to the camp with us. One of the firemen, a Greek, could
speak Arabic, and when it was made known to the Arab
what we wanted he wanted us to get into the boat then
and there and he would pilot us to the nearest port.
This, alas ! was impossible. When I left in the morning
I had told the second mate to get the boat properly baled
out, and, if possible, list her over so that the carpenter
could make a better job of stopping the leak. He tried
to do all this, but with all balers at work they could make
no impression on the amount of water in the boat ; it
came in as fast as they baled it out. The keel had evi-
dently been set up, as the planks each side of it were
badly broken, and entirely beyond any repair that we
could do to them. So the project was put an end to.
The Arab suggested that I should go with him to the
nearest town on foot ; this I could not do, as I was
utterly done up with the six or seven hours' walking
that day ; but I eventually sent two Greek firemen with
him (one spoke Italian and the other Arabic), and told
them to try and get some boats to take us out of this as
soon as possible."
With the departure of these two men another chapter
in the experiences of the remnant of the crew of the
steamship Coquet opened.
" That night the rest of us — fifteen — slept in one of
the cave-dwellings with a big wood fire in the centre ;
we had dried our clothes somewhat during the day and
CH. IX] THE " GENTLE " BEDOUIN 223
the fire helped to keep us warm during the night ; the
floor, however, was very hard and damp. After ' break-
fast ' we began looking out longingly for signs of a boat
coming ; some of us had a wash in a muddy river-bed.
I was just going off to this pool about 9,45 a.m., thinking
to have a bathe, when we were all surprised by several
bullets whizzing round us. On looking, we found that
they came from two Arabs on a hill some distance inland,
who, between shooting at us, were dancing wildly and
laughing and yelling. Thinking they were two Arab
boys who had got hold of rifles somehow and were just
amusing themselves, I told our people to take cover,
which we did in a deep trench formed by the ruins of
some old building, right at the water's edge ; in fact the
sea came well up in the trench at one end. I could watch
the two Arabs from where we were, and they soon went
away, but I thought it wise to keep down there for a bit.
" Half an hour after that about fifteen Arabs, with rifles,
suddenly appeared over the edge of our trench and, after
giving a preliminary yell, began jabbering hard in Arabic
at us. The two closest to me had their rifles all ready
to fire. I held up my hands to indicate that I was
unarmed ; one of them still jabbered at me, but the other
took careful aim at my head ; I ducked forward and to
one side a little at just about the same instant that he
pulled the trigger, so the bullet took a track through the
flesh across the back of my shoulders, instead of hitting
my head. The Arab was only about six feet from me
when he fired ; the force of the shock knocked me back-
wards. I remember falling and my head hitting the sand.
After that I must have lost consciousness, as when I
awoke everything was quiet except for the groaning of
the carpenter, who was rolling between me and the edge
of the water, about six feet. I found he was horribly
mutilated, but still alive. He asked me to drag him away
from the sea ; I tried to, but he was a big man and my
wound was very painful. A little way out in the water
the steward was floating, face downwards ; whether he
was shot or drowned, or both, I do not know. Farther
up the beach the little Italian messroom boy was lying
dead. I could see nothing of anybody else, and was
afraid to go out of the trench, thinking that if the Bedouins
saw me alive they would come back to finish me off."
11—16
224 IN THE HANDS OF THE BEDOUINS [ch. ix
It must have seemed to this courageous and hardly
tried merchant officer that he was doomed to die on this
sandy beach, either from exposure or by the hands of
the Arabs if they chanced to return. His sole companion
was apparently the carpenter, to whom he gave drinks
of water from a bucket, which they had brought to the
trench, in the hope of alleviating his agony. At last a
patch of smoke appeared on the horizon, and then the
outline of a small steamer appeared and Captain Groom
realised that help was at last to hand. The vessel was
flying the Italian flag. She had sailed from Ania promptly
in response to the appeals of the two Greek firemen.
Could she arrive before the Bedouins returned ?
" When she headed into the bay and her boat was
coming ashore, I came out from the trench. There was
not a sign of the Bedouins or the rest of our people, except
a sailor named Lord, who was lying on the sand some
distance from the trench most brutally wounded by
both bullet and bayonet. He said that the others, ten
of them, had been carried off as prisoners by the Bedouins,
after having had everything of any value taken off them :
they were taking him also, but he thinks they thought
that he was so wounded that he would be a hindrance to
them, and so tried to finish liim off on the spot and left
him for dead.
" When the boat landed, the commander of the Fort of
Marsa Susa came ashore with a party of his Arab soldiers,
who quickly ran to the tops of the nearest hills to look
for the Bedouins, but they had had too long a time and
had got out of sight. The soldiers then made a thorough
search in the vicinity, but found no trace of the Bedouins
or their captives. The commander of the Fort of Marsa
Susa then took us aboard the little steamer, also the
bodies of the steward and messroom boy, and our wounds
were washed and bandaged as well as was possible. The
carpenter died just as we were starting to wash his wounds."
What had happened to the men whom the Bedouins
had carried off ? The captors had lined up the survivors
of the seamen, taken from them everything of value wliich
they possessed, and then driven them off into the hills,
using their bayonets and shouting vigorously. They
CH. IX] A TRYING MARCH 225
afterwards kept these unhappy men at the jog-trot for
about an hour until they reached a valley, where they
found, to their satisfaction, tiny pools of water among the
rocks. The water was very lively with little hairy, red,
crawling " bichos," but nevertheless the tliirsty men
were very thankful for it. After about a quarter of an
hour's rest, the Bedouins set off again, and their prisoners
were forced to imitate mountain goats all day until about
9 p.m., when the party came to a few caves which were
being used as an encampment. There their captors
brought them before a big, fat Arab, who appeared to be
a chief. He could speak a little French, so some sort of
a conversation was carried on through the Greek sailor.
When this pow-wow came to an end after midnight,
they were given a meal, consisting of boiled goats' flesh
and very fresh, heavy bread. This was the first food they
had had since eating a few limpets before the Bedouins
attacked them,
" Early next morning, after a tiny glass of Turkish
coffee," one of the party recorded afterwards, " we set off
in a heavy downpour of rain, most of us on foot, but one
of our party, who had a hole in his leg as the result of
a bullet, was on a camel. As it was his first attempt at
imitating a Camel Corps trooper, he was quite amusing to
watch until he got used to the motion. I don't mean
that he was sick or anything like that, but he was nearly
off several times, which added to our mirth and his
annoyance. At about noon we came to a lone tent, where
we stopped for refreshments, which turned up at long
last and proved to be a big, flat, round bowl of boiled
rice, which we ate, sitting on our haunches in true Arab
style, with our hands instead of spoons. When we had
eaten as much of it as we could get down, which was not
very much, as one can't eat much rice at the first sitting,
our host threw in what appeared to be some bones with
a little meat on them, which we sucked and gnawed at
until there was no meat left. We learnt afterwards
that these bones were goats' ribs."
A fresh move was begun after a short rest, and a three-
hours' trudge brought the party to another cave camp.
As the Arab women were housed in the largest cave, which
226 IN THE HANDS OF THE BEDOUINS [ch. ix
was the only one large enough to contain all the prisoners,
they had to turn out, taking their goods and chattels with
them. They left very comfortable sleeping-quarters,
which the seamen were very glad to occupy, having been
served with another meal of meat and rice.
" This journeying went on for another few days, until
we came to quite a large native camp, where we were kept
in the prison tent along with other malefactors for nearly
a week. We thought we were very badly off then, but
we found out later that that was the best time we had in
all our sojourn.
" One day, the big sheikh whom we had met before
came to us and told us that we were going to be taken
to a big town by the sea and given clothes, boots, and all
wearing apparel and revolvers, amongst other things,
and were going to be sent away in a ship. We were very
much elated, and followed him in liigh spirits for several
days, stopping here for a meal and there for the night,
until we fell in with a large gathering of people who
seemed to be going on some pilgrimage. At last we
emerged into a vast plain, with what we took to be a
small town in the centre, to which we came, ushered in
to the strains of martial music, including the ' British
Grenadiers,' played by a brass band composed of Arabs,
Turks, and Italian deserters."
After a time the men were led before Sidi Idris, the
legitimate head of the Senussi tribes, and through the
interpreters he asked them if they would like to be sent
straight home or kept to the end of the war, to which they
made the obvious answer. Next day they set off once
more, mounted on camels, in company with a big caravan,
and travelled all that day and for many subsequent days,
sometimes with the caravan and sometimes by themselves
under guard, until they came to an abandoned block-
house, called Sklydeema, where they remained two days
to rest.
" There a Turk took a fancy to my wrist-watch, which
I had worn and kept going ever since the Coquet went down.
He asked me what 1 wanted for it, and I told him eighty
francs, so he gave me five to go on with. When I asked
CH. IX] ARRIVAL AT JEDABIA 227
him for the residue, he swore he had given me the fair
price and I never got any more for it. I learnt after-
wards that it stopped soon after he got it, so he sold it
to one of Sidi Idris's stewards, whom I saw wearing it
months after, but of course it was broken and of no use
to him. We left one of our party, a fireman, in Sklydeema,
who was dying of tetanus, induced by a bad bullet wound
in his arm. He died two days after we left."
After another week's travelling these harried seamen
came to their final lodgment at Jedabia. They arrived
there on the evening of February 4th, exactly a month after
they had left the sinking Coquet.
" We were first housed in a room with four walls, a
roof, and a concrete floor, and were quite well looked
after for a few days. A party of Italian prisoners were
brought in on the fourth day, and that evening we were
all put together in a compound. Our party, comprising
twenty-three men, were lodged in another hut facing us
across the courtyard. Of course we got into communica-
tion, as one of the Italians spoke French very well, and
we could understand that. They asked us if we had
been made to do any work, and were surprised to hear
that we had not. Next day, however, an Arab guard
came and took us all out to work together, and that was
the beginning of our troubles.
" That same evening two Italians prevailed upon our
Greek sailor to try to escape, to which he agreed. So
about midnight they all climbed the wall of the compound,
which was right on the outskirts of the fortified block-
house of Jedabia. They climbed to the top all right,
with much puffing and blowing, and the first man to drop
down on the other side fell on some rusty tins and rub-
bish, making a frightful row, and we all thought that the
whole lot would be caught, but nothing stirred, so they
set off on foot. Of course the next day the Arabs dis-
covered the escape, and some of them set off in pursuit
on fast racing camels, and soon came up to the fugitives
and brought them back.
" Then all we prisoners, British and Italian, were
lined up and given a lecture by the Commandant of
Jedabia upon the evils of trying to escape. He asked
228 IN THE HANDS OF THE BEDOUINS [ch. ix
who was the instigator of the attempt, and all the blame
was put on the poor Greek sailor. The two Italians
were given twenty lashes with the kurbash and the Greek
was given fifty lashes and condemned to be chained to
a six-foot chain pegged into the ground for two months,
and he was also handcuffed. Whenever he wanted to
move about, the second mate had to take a turn round his
(the Greek's) neck with the chain and keep hold of the
peg, and peg him up securely again when he came back.
The Commandant also warned us that the next person
or persons attempting to escape would, if caught, be
shot.
" Soon after this we had to make a kind of room of
corrugated iron at one end of a demolished barrack.
I must mention that Jedabia was an Italian block-house,
or fort, which the garrison had to evacuate and which they
demolished with dynamite as far as possible before they
did so. When we had finished our new prison, we moved
into it, and a guard of six Arabs, under an effendi, was
posted ; they were housed in a small species of dug-out
right alongside the only exit from the prison yard.
" From now on until the end of July we lived, fed, and had
our being in this corrugated-iron room, and our duties
became more or less regular. At sunrise the effendi
(captain) of the guard would beat on the iron door with
his kurbash (whip) and repeat the summons to rise and
get to work, and we would all troop out, except the sick
or exempted ones. Our jobs were various, but they
all had to do with rebuilding Jedabia. Some mixed
mortar ; others got big and little stones ; others again
assisted the native masons and bricklayers. For a month
or so all our food was cooked for us by Arabs belonging
to Sidi Idris's retinue of servants, and at noon one of us
was told to go and get the food and the rest went home.
Our food consisted, for the most part, of boiled goats'
meat and rice that had been boiled in the soup, which was
very good, but there was never enough of that. After
about two hours' siesta, we were led out again and con-
tinued our various labours till sunset, when another meal
was provided of the same character, after which we
usually went to bed. Our beds consisted of grass mats
spread over the earthen floor, with a conveniently shaped
stone for a pillow, and our covering was a number of date
CH. IX] TREATMENT IN JEDABIA 229
sacks made of camel's hair, sewn together. We had to
sleep very close together to keep warm for the first few
months, as the nights were very cold ; in fact, it was
always pretty chilly at night time.
" We saw many instances of the Arab's love of pomp
and show when any notability came into Jedabia. Sidi
Idris came in one evening shortly after we were installed
in our permanent prison. The whole population turned
out to watch the procession of gorgeously dressed sheikhs,
riding on beautifully caparisoned Arab horses, whose
saddles and bridles had gold buckles, etc., with stirruj^s
of gold. One morning in April we were surprised to see
small European tents and camp equipment of green
canvas and white men moving amongst them. We
learnt that these were some German officers, who had just
landed on the coast fifteen miles away from a submarine.
On further acquaintance they proved to be very agreeable,
and expressed much sympathy at our plight. With them
was one Nuri Bey, brother of Enver Bey, of Turkish
Army fame. He, so we learnt, had managed to escape
from the English and had found his way to Jedabia.
The Germans used to give the second mate five francs
per week for tobacco for our party, and Nuri used to give
the same for tea.
" Towards the end of the Ramadan the Italians were
all marched off to another block-house, called Jalo, which
was eight days' journey farther to the southward, and
where there was no permanent water supply and the con-
ditions far worse than those at Jedabia. The day after
their departure we did not have to go out to work, and
Nuri Bey called us to his tent and presented us each
with thirty francs Turkish, as, he explained, payment
for work done for the Turkish Government. The same
day a small parcel came through to us from the British
Consul, which proved to contain money, cigarettes, and
letters. Marvellous to relate, all the money and cigarettes
came through intact, which speaks well for the power of
Sidi Idris, who, I believe, knew that the parcel was coming.
" The next day an Italian deserter joined our party,
which was the signal for us to go out to work again.
However, it was not for very long, as two nights after his
appearance we were sent for while he slept and were
brought before some Egyptian potentates, who said that
230 IN THE HANDS OF THE BEDOUINS [ch. ix
we were going to be sent home the next day. Next
evening we were each given a complete outfit of Arab
clothes, including a burnous and tarboosh. A crowd
of camels having been brought round to us, we each
mounted one and set off under the escort of four niggers
and arrived at an inhabited Italian block-house early next
morning, where we received very kind treatment for two
days, when we boarded a coasting steamer going to
Bengazi. Here we were given a complete European
outfit and entertained by the British Consul for ten days,
when we took ship for Malta."
And thus, in due course, these seamen, after a series of
adventures and trials suggesting that truth is sometimes
stranger than fiction, reached London on the morning of
August 29th, seven months and twenty-five days from the
sinking of the Coquet.
CHAPTER X
THE MERCHANT SERVICE ON THE DEFENSIVE
The need for arming all merchant vessels in a great war
at sea was foreseen in the year 1881 by the late Sir John
Colomb, M.P., who had served at sea as an officer in the
Royal Marine Artillery. In a lecture delivered at the
Royal United Service Institution in May of that year he
predicted
" that the exigencies of maritime war will necessitate
our arming not merely a careful selection of the best, but
every ocean-going British steamer. We must prepare
in peace to give them, at home and abroad, armaments
and trained instructors, and then on the declaration of
war bid them follow their avocations and let our enemies
know that we mean to carry on our sea trade ' in spite
of their teeth,' under the banner, if you like, of ' Defence
not Defiance.' "
Active steps were taken by the Admiralty in 1912, as
described in Volume I of this history, to put a similar
policy in practice on a small scale, but the vessels supplied
with defensive armament in time of peace carried no
ammunition. On August 5th, 1914, the Admiralty decided
to make arrangements to place ammunition on board, and
informed the Foreign Office as follows :
" In view of existing circumstances. My Lords have
deemed it desirable to arrange for the ammunition for
the Admiralty guns to be placed on board the ships as
soon as opportunity offers. The names of the ships so
supplied, with particulars as to their proposed destination
and ports of call, will be communicated to the Secretary
of State as soon as possible in each case. For the vessels
so fitted, the authority to state that no ammunition is on
board could no longer stand, but My Lords trust that in
231
282 MERCHANT SERVICE ON DEFENSIVE [ch. x
issuing instructions to the Diplomatic and Consular
representatives on the point, directions may be included
that every assistance should be afforded to the masters
of ships so as to avoid or minimise inconvenience or delay."
On the same date the Board of Customs and Excise
were notified to the same effect, and asked to do every-
thing in their power to avoid inconvenience and delay.
Arrangements were also made for the necessary order of
a Secretary of State for explosives to be carried in emi-
grant ships, and the Board of Trade, in view of the fitting
of cooled magazines to Admiralty specification, waived
their pre-war objection to explosives being carried in
passenger vessels. It is interesting to note that, out of
the thousands of British merchant vessels which were
subsequently armed without being fitted with proper
magazines, not a single case of spontaneous combustion
occurred amongst all the ammunition carried.
On September 3rd, 1914, the Government decided to
abandon running defensively armed merchant ships to
United States ports, without in any way waiving the
principle involved. The Admiralty accepted the Foreign
Secretary's view that the position must be reconsidered,
and they were prepared to concur with him that, under
protest and without surrendering the principle of interna-
tional law on which they had acted, H.M. Ambassador
should be instructed to inform the United States Govern-
ment that, under the existing conditions, defensively
armed merchant vessels would not be employed in trading
with United States ports.
Between the outbreak of war and September 3rd,
the date of the Government decision, ten large vessels, in
addition to those already armed, had been selected by the
Admiralty to receive defensive armament of 6-inch guns.
These vessels were the Grampian and Scotian (Allen Line) ;
the Montreal, Manitoba, and Montezuma (C.P.R.) ; the
Arabic, Adriatic, and Baltic (White Star) ; and the Haver-
ford and Merion (International Navigation Company). The
armament of these vessels was either in place, or in pro-
cess of being mounted, at the time, but they were then
disarmed or work was suspended on them. Three of the
ships armed before the war, the Idaho, Colorado, and
Francisco, were also disarmed for the same reason.
CH. x] DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT PROBLEMS 233
In January 1915 the developing menace of submarine
attack wrought a revolution in the problem of defending
merchant shipping at a time when the utmost pressure
was being put on the armament firms for guns for the
naval and military forces. On February 4th, 1915, the
Germans issued the proclamation declaring certain waters
to be a "war-zone," within which all merchant vessels
would be destroyed. This action raised an imperative
need for additional protection for British merchant ship-
ping ; but although the proclamation modified in detail the
problem of defensive armament, the essential principles
were unchanged. The origin of defensive armament was
to enable merchant ships to defend themselves from the
attacks of enemy armed merchantmen, improvised as
raiders. The additional danger, after the proclamation,
arose chiefly from the fact that submarines carrying guns
could approach without being seen and disappear at will.
Even with a very light gun, a submarine could force an
armed merchant ship to surrender, unless the merchant-
man could either outstrip the enemy or could be protected
by an armed vessel. It was still the problem of a mer-
chant ship attacked by a lightly armed raider of a different
description. If the merchant ship could be armed, even
lightly, the submarine would be faced with difficulties in
attacking an unarmed enemy with a higher and steadier
gun-platform and better facilities for observation. The
merchant ship, it is true, presented a larger target, but a
single hit on the submarine stood a good chance of sinking
her, or of making it impossible for her to dive. Another
advantage of defensive armament was that it prevented
the submarine from approaching to close range, and it is
not easy at long ranges to sink a merchant vessel by light
gunfire. For such reasons the defensive armament of
merchant ships necessitated an increase in the size and
weight of armament carried by the submarine, in order to
ensure superiority. This margin could only be obtained
at the expense of other fighting qualities of the submarine,
such as speed. It was not until 1916, when a year's
experience had been obtained, that all these advantages
were fully realised. Statistics showing the rapid exten-
sion of the policy of armament are given in the succeeding
chapter, on training the Merchant Service to fight.
An explanation of the Admiralty policy of extending
234 MERCHANT SERVICE ON DEFENSIVE [ch. x
the defensive armament of merchant shipping in February
1915 was sent to shipowners in the following secret
circular :
" It has been decided to arm defensively vessels engaged
in local trade, with one 12-pounder gun aft for defence
against submarine attack. The Admiralty will pay for
the cost of mounting the guns, providing the mazagines,
and for any movements of the ships necessary for the work
to be done. They will not pay any compensation for
delay in resuming trade.
" A gun's crew of two men will be supplied by the
Admiralty for each gun ; these men will be paid by the
company, the money being refunded by the Admiralty.
The status of these ships will be the same as defen-
sively armed merchantmen. They will not be com-
missioned and will fly the Red Ensign.
" About one-half of these ships will be selected from
Admiralty chartered colliers and store-carriers running
between east and west coasts and France. The remainder
will be selected from local coast trades. The Admiralty
will pay for replacement after the removal of the gun."
When, in April 1915, a few more guns were available,
it was decided to extend the principle of defensive arma-
ment from vessels on coastal voyages to some of the larger
classes of merchant ships engaged in oversea trade. A
similar circular was then issued to shipowners, containing
additional information about the method of transferring
guns from one ship to another. As far as practicable,
arrangements were made to prepare the vessels thus
affected before they left the United Kingdom, or their
terminal ports abroad, for receiving their guns. The
general situation in July 1915 was that British vessels
trading in the Mediterranean had at their disposal, at
Gibraltar and Port Said, fifty- two guns of 4-7-inch calibre,
which were embarked on entering the station and disem-
barked for the use of other vessels before leaving. Guns
of the same calibre were mounted permanently in 8 colliers,
59 meat-carrying vessels trading with the Argentine,
Australia, and New Zealand, and 9 supply ships and trans-
ports carrying military stores. Twelve-pounder guns of
12 cwt. or of 8 cwt. were mounted in coastal vessels
CH. x] ADMIRALTY INSTRUCTIONS 235
trading around the coast of the United Kingdom and to
ports in the North of France, and similar guns in collier
transports and in transports with military stores. The
system of armament was gradually extended, as guns and
mountings became available by the methods subsequently
described.
From the outset, the instructions issued to the masters
of defensively armed vessels contained a clause to the
effect that the guns were placed on board for defence, not
for offence, and that they were intended as an effective
help in the prosecution of the voyages, the main object
in view.
On October 20th, 1915, the instructions were amplified.
The defensive nature of the armament was further
emphasised, and the following principles were laid down:
" The Status of Armed Merchant Ships
" (1) The right of the crew of a merchant vessel forcibly
to resist visit and search, and to fight in self-defence, is
well recognised in International Law, and is expressly
admitted by the German Prize Regulations in an adden-
dum issued in June 1914, at a time when it was known
that numerous vessels were being armed in self-defence.
" (2) The armament is supplied solely for the purpose
of resisting attack by an armed vessel of the enemy.
It must not be used for any other purpose whatsoever.
" (3) An armed merchant vessel, therefore, must not
in any circumstances interfere with or obstruct the free
passage of other merchant vessels or fishing-craft, whether
these are friendly, neutral, or hostile.
" (4) The status of a British armed merchant vessel
cannot be changed upon the high seas."
" Rules to be Observed in the Exercise of the Right of
Self-defence.
" (1) The master or officer in command is responsible
for opening and ceasing fire.
" (2) Participation in armed resistance must be con-
fined to persons acting under the orders of the master or
officer in command.
" (3) Before opening fire the British colours must be
hoisted.
236 MERCHANT SERVICE ON DEFENSIVE [ch. x
" (4) Fire must not be opened or continued from a
vessel which has stopped, hauled down her flag, or other-
wise indicated her intention to surrender,
" (5) The expression ' armament ' in these instructions
includes not only cannon, but also rifles and machine-
guns where these are supplied.
" (6) The ammunition used in rifles and machine-guns
must conform to Article 23, Hague Convention IV, 1907 ;
that is to say, the bullets must be encased in nickel or
other hard substance, and must not be split or cut in
such a way as to cause them to expand or set up on
striking a man. The use of explosive bullets is forbidden.
" Circumstances under which the Armament should he
Employed
" (1) The armament is supplied for the purpose of
defence only, and the object of the master should be to
avoid action whenever possible.
" (2) Experience has shown that hostile submarines and
aircraft have frequently attacked merchant vessels with-
out warning. It is important, therefore, that craft of
this description should not be allowed to approach to a
short range, at which a torpedo or a bomb launched
without notice would almost certainly take effect.
" British and Allied submarines and aircraft have
orders not to approach merchant vessels. Consequently
it may be presumed that any submarine or aircraft which
deliberately approaches or pursues a merchant vessel does
so with hostile intention. In such cases fire may be
opened in self-defence in order to prevent the hostile
craft closing to a range at wliich resistance to a sudden
attack with bomb or torpedo would be impossible.
" (3) An armed merchant vessel proceeding to render
assistance to the crew of a vessel in distress must not
seek action with any hostile craft, though, if she herself
is attacked while so doing, fire may be opened in self-
defence.
" (4) It should be remembered that the flag is no guide
to nationality. German submarines and armed merchant
vessels have frequently employed British, Allied, or neutral
colours in order to approach undetected. Though, how-
ever, the use of disguise and false colours in order to avoid
CH. x] EXTENT OF DEFENSIVE ARMING 237
capture is a legitimate ruse de guerre, its adoption by
defensively armed merchant ships may easily lead to
misconception. Such vessels, therefore, are forbidden to
adopt any form of disguise which might cause them to be
mistaken for neutral ships."
These instructions were subsequently revised, amplified,
and finally embodied in " War Instructions for Defen-
sively Armed Merchant Ships."
At first, owing to the urgency of the menace to mer-
chant shipping, it was necessary to supply merchant ships
with such guns as could be obtained. Guns of eighteen
different types, British, French, Russian, and Japanese,
from 6-inch to 2|-pounders, were issued in the first
instance. This obviously led to great complications in
ammunition supply and was a most undesirable system,
but the only practicable one until sufficient guns of stan-
dard types could be procured. The matter became still more
urgent when the Germans used more heavily armoured
submarines, carrying heavier guns of 5-9-inch calibre ; but
it was not until September 1917 that sufficient British
guns became available to enable the Admiralty to adopt
a standard system of defensive armament.
When war broke out in August 1914, the service of
defensively armed merchant ships was in the hands of
three officers and about twelve other ranks ; 747 officers
and men were employed on shore duties in connection
with defensively armed merchant ships on November 15th,
1918, and 11,537 as guns' crews for the ships — the increase
reflecting the lengths to which this development was
carried under the compelling influence of war. The
policy was originally adopted, as we have seen, as a
defence against surface craft, in view of information
received that the Germans intended to arm their merchant
ships as commerce raiders in time of war. In February
1915 the U-boat campaign was launched against merchant
shipping. By the middle of May in that year, 149 British
merchant ships had been fitted with defensive armament.
By November 1918 5,887 ships had been so fitted, and
1,684 of them had been lost, leaving a balance of 4,203.
Of these, nearly 2,500 carried guns of 4-inch calibre or
of larger size. By the date of the Armistice, 6,067 guns
and 806 howitzers had been mounted in merchant ships.
238 MERCHANT SERVICE ON DEFENSIVE [ch. x
On November 16th, 1918, when the Armistice was signed,
4,079 were afloat actually carrying armament. The follow-
ing table shows the numbers of British merchant ships
fitted for defensive armament that were afloat on different
selected dates up to the end of 1915 :
Datfr— 1915.
No. of ships fitted
May 14th ....
. 149
June 25th
. 212
September 24th.
. 219
November 6th .
. 401
December 25th .
. 766
After the frozen-meat vessels, the first ships to be armed
defensively, as we have seen, were those engaged in coastal
traffic, and proceeding from the Irish Channel round
the South Coast of England to London. Very few guns
were available at first, and only a small proportion of them
could be spared for vessels on the East Coast, which was
then comparatively safe. The Channel was not so danger-
ous as it became at a later period. This was the policy
up to the middle of May 1915, when the fitting of the
following lines was ordered :
Orient
Anchor
P. & O.
British India
Anchor Brocklebank
Clan.
City.
Hail.
T. and J. Harrison.
Blue Fimnel (Holt Line).
Defensive armament saved a number of ships at this
period, some by actual gunfire, some by moral effect ;
more guns were allocated as they became available, and
more coastal craft were armed. At first there were not
enough guns to send overseas, so all guns, by a system
of transfer, were kept in the submarine zone, which was
restricted at the outset, and the guns were transferred,
as has been already stated, from one ship to another for
the voyage. For ocean voyages one gun was then taken
out of each of the thirty-seven frozen-meat ships origin-
ally armed, and transferred to others. In May 1915
some of these guns were sent out to Gibraltar and to
Port Said, and in the following November to Dakar, to
be mounted for the homeward voyage and replaced
by returning ships, and this policy was subsequently
applied to other overseas ports : Halifax, Sierra Leone,
and Cape Town. The thirty-seven guns were thus made
CH. X] PATRIOTISM OF SHIPOWNERS 239
to serve the requirements of a large number of vessels.
In spite of certain mechanical difficulties, such as the
designing of special deck-plates to suit both the seating
and the gun when different natures of ordnance were being
exchanged from one ship to another, the matter of supply-
ing material was a comparatively simple one compared
with training the Merchant Service to fight their ships
and to handle the guns when attacked. The training of
a sea-gunner in the Royal Navy in normal times occupies
several months, and it is superimposed on a disciplinary
training extending over many years. There was no time
to apply such a system to merchant crews, but while
skill in gunnery and facilities for enforcement of discipline
were lacking in the Mercantile Marine, heroism was not
wanting.
A special system of training the Merchant Service to
fight their own ships when encountering submarines w^as
established by the Admiralty in 1917. In the meanwhile
tribute must be paid to the patriotism of shipowners who,
in pre-war days, held out inducements to their officers to
join the Royal Naval Reserve. The fruits of their efforts
were apparent when the time arrived for extending the
system of arming merchant ships as the submarine
menace developed. For many years some companies, by
cash allowances to their officers whilst undergoing drill,
by giving permission to serve with the Navy for long
periods (up to two years) at a stretch without loss of
seniority, and by affording other facilities, were able to
boast of a large number of R.N.R. officers. In July
1916 the Admiralty arranged for additional officers of the
Mercantile Marine to undergo a short course of gunnery at
the Naval Gunnery School at Chatham.
At first a few naval ratings were lent to fight the guns
in the few merchant ships that could be supplied with
armament. Two gunners, the majority being pensioners
or Royal Fleet Reserve men of the Royal Marine Artillery
and Infantry, were sent to each ship to carry out the duties
requiring a special gunnery training, and to assist the ship's
crew. These men actually joined the Merchant Service
as part of the crew, and were paid by the shipowners
concerned, and a small inspecting and training staff was
established to superintend matters. By statistics previ-
ously given, we have seen that the number of defensively
ir— 17
240 MERCHANT SERVICE ON DEFENSIVE [ch. x
armed merchant ships had risen from thirty-nine at the
outbreak of war to 766 at the end of the year 1915 ; the
numbers continually increased as guns became available,
and from the following statistics it is easy to realise how
history repeated itself, and why British merchant seamen,
like their ancestors of old, were called upon to defend
their own vessels from the King's enemies. The Royal
and Merchant Navies, which had drifted apart during
many years of peace on the high seas, were again knit
together by the bond of defence against a common danger.
The figures appended give the number of British merchant
vessels afloat, fitted with defensive armament, on certain
selected dates up to September 1916 :
Date — 1916. No. of defensively armed
ships afloat.
Febniary 15th. . . . . .991
April 12th 1,109
September 18th 1,749
Apart from the question of gun armament, shipowners
were recommended by the Admiralty from the earliest days
of the war to provide their vessels with rifles for use
against aircraft and submarines, and for the purpose of
sinking any mines that might be sighted. Pistols were
also recommended for use in emergencies. Special instruc-
tions bearing on this point were issued on April 26th,
1915. The right, under International Law, of resistance
and of fighting in self-defence was explained in these
instructions, which contained, amongst others, the follow-
ing clauses :
" Participation in armed resistance should be confined
to persons acting under the orders of the master or officer
in command. . , .
" The ammunition supplied for rifles and machine-
guns must conform to the requirements of Article 23,
Hague Convention IV, 1907, that is to say, the bullets
must be cased in nickel or other hard substance, and must
not be split or cut in such a way as to cause them to
expand or set up on striking a man. . . .
" Masters of ships to which rifles are issued must exer-
cise a proper control over their employment, and are
responsible for opening and ceasing fire. Fire must not
CH. X] DIFFICULTIES RAISED BY NEUTRALS 241
be opened from a vessel which has stopped, hauled down
her flag, or otherwise indicated to the submarine her
intention to surrender."
Other clauses of a general nature were similar in the
instructions, specially issued on April 26th, 1915, for the
use of small arms, to those issued on October 20th of the
same year for defensive armament in general, as quoted
in extenso above.
On May 31st, 1915, a special memorandum was issued
to.masters of transports carrying troops. This memorandum
pointed out that heavy rifle or machine-gun fire would
make it more difficult for a submarine to make a successful
shot with a torpedo. If submerged, no injury would be
done to her, but a good volume of fire falling just short
of the periscope would make splashes, thus hampering an
observer on board the submarine in seeing clearly through
his periscope. It was enjoined that military officers should
be in command of the men to control both rifle and
machine-gun fire, and a military officer on watch should
be in command of the troops on deck, but he should not
order fire to be opened upon a hostile submarine or torpedo
vessel without the previous assent of the master or his
representative — the ship's officer of the watch. The use
of field-guns was not recommended.
Such were the main features of the policy adopted up
to the end of 1916 for employing guns, small arms, and
machine-guns to enable British merchant ships to defend
themselves from attack. They were supplemented, about
the middle of 1916, by the supply of apparatus for the
manufacture of smoke-screens to be used as an aid to
escape. There remains the important question of the
attitude of neutrals, without whose concurrence in the
use of their harbours by defensively armed merchant
shipping this policy would have lost much of its effect.
The right of merchant ships to carry defensive armament
on the high seas is one of long standing, and this right
has been admitted by the jurists of all nations. The
subject is discussed exhaustively in a pamphlet entitled
Defensively Armed Merchant Ships and Submarine Warfare.
Owing, however, to difficulties raised by certain neutral
countries to the entry of armed merchant ships into their
ports, the Admiralty found it desirable to issue a special
242 MERCHANT SERVICE ON DEFENSIVE [ch. x
form of indemnification to owners of the defensively
armed vessels, reading as follows :
" I am commanded by My Lords of the Admiralty
to inform you that in consideration of your having, as
arranged, fitted guns and mountings in your s.s. ,
and of your carrying ammunition supplied by the Admir-
alty for the service of the same, for the purpose of providing
for her defence in case of war, My Lords will keep you
indemnified against all loss and expense by reason thereof
to which you may be put."
Between August 7th and 11th, 1914, telegrams were
sent to H.M. representatives at all the capitals in Europe
and in North and South America directing them to point
out, in the event of any question being raised as to the
position of British armed merchantmen, that these vessels
were armed solely for defence and could not be converted
into warships on the high seas, because Great Britain did
not admit the right of any Power to do this. Therefore,
there could be no right on the part of any neutral Govern-
ment to intern British armed merchantmen or to require
them to land their guns, seeing that the neutral Govern-
ment's duty in regard to belligerent vessels is limited
solely to actual or potential warships.
The United States, on August 8th, 1914, issued instruc-
tions about the clearance of merchant ships belonging to
belligerent Powers, but these instructions made no special
mention of defensively armed ships. On August 21st
the State Department intimated that each case would be
dealt with on its merits, and that it would be a great
help if the British Minister would give a written guarantee
that these vessels were armed only in self-defence, and
would never attack. This was agreed to. On September 1st
a difficulty arose over the s.s. Adriatic, w^hich was armed
at the time with four guns, and was incorrectly believed
to be proceeding to Halifax for troops ; as well as over the
s.s. Merion, which arrived at Philadelphia mounting four
guns. The action taken on September 3rd by the British
Government as a result, and its influence upon the defensive
armament of British merchant shipping, have already
been described. On September 19th, 1915, the United
States Government issued detailed conditions governing
CH. x] ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 243
the treatment of defensively armed merchant ships, the
main purpose of which was to assimilate them completely
to ordinary merchant vessels. Should any doubt arise as
to the defensive character of the armament, the onus
proba7idi was to fall on the masters and owners.
A considerable number of vessels, under these regula-
tions, cleared from New York with their guns mounted
aft, but in August 1915 the s.s. Waimana was held up
at Newport News. She had been chartered for two
voyages from the River Plate to Marseilles with meat
and general cargo. One voyage had been completed,
and she was proceeding from Marseilles to Buenos Aires
on the second voyage via Newport News for coaling
purposes. Her speed was moderate, and she was a
trading vessel with only defensive armament of one
4-7-inch gun, which had been fitted in her in London
in April 1915, Two naval ratings were included in her
crew. She arrived at Newport News at 8 a.m. on August
26th, was ready to proceed after bunkering at noon on
August 28th, but was detained by the action of the United
States Government until September 22nd, and clearance
was not given until her gun had been landed.
On March 25th, 1916, the United States Government
published a further memorandum on the status of armed
merchant vessels, considering the subject from two points
of view : firstly, from that of a neutral when such vessels
enter his ports ; secondly, from the point of view of an
enemy when they are on the high seas. The following
summary was attached :
" The status of an armed merchant vessel as a warship
in neutral waters may be determined, in the absence of
documentary proof or conclusive evidence of previous
aggressive conduct, by presumption derived from all the
circumstances of the case.
" The status of such vessel as a warship on the high
seas must be determined only by conclusive evidence of
aggressive purpose, in the absence of which it is to be
presumed that the vessel has a private and peaceable
character, and it should be so treated by an enemy warship.
" In brief, a neutral Government may proceed upon the
presumption that an armed merchant ship of belligerent
244 MERCHANT SERVICE ON DEFENSIVE [ch. x
nationality is armed for aggression, while a belligerent
should proceed on the assumption that the vessel is
armed for protection. Both of these presumptions may
be overcome by evidence : the first by secondary or col-
lateral evidence, since the fact to be established is negative
in character ; the second by primary and direct evidence,
since the fact to be established is positive in character."
In the course of the memorandum it was clearly laid
down as a principle that merchantmen of belligerent
nationality, armed only for the purposes of protection
against the enemy, were entitled to enter and leave
neutral ports without hindrance in the course of legitimate
trade, and that, as affecting the high seas, "• Enemy
merchant ships have the right to arm for purposes of
self-protection." ^
Holland, from the outset, refused to admit such vessels
to her ports, and this attitude was maintained until the
Armistice was signed in November 1918, although it was
pointed out that all other Governments were admitting
ships so armed to their ports on the same footing as
ordinary merchant ships.
Spain at an early stage admitted that merchant ships
might carry guns without acquiring the character of ships
of war, but nevertheless the Spanish Government raised
difficulties from time to time. On May 31st, 1915, how-
ever, they issued a Decree requiring the master of an armed
merchant ship to declare in writing that his vessel was
destined exclusively for commerce, that she would not
be transformed into a ship of war before returning to her
own country, and that the arms and ammunition on board
had been, and would be, employed only for the defence
of the vessel if attacked. This arrangement was adhered
to throughout the war, each difficulty as it arose being
made the subject of diplomatic correspondence.
In Norway a working arrangement was come to. Armed
ships did not visit her ports at first, but by 1916 it became
necessary to reconsider the position in view of the increased
activity of German submarines and the extended arming
of the Merchant Service.*
^ Revised regxilations were issued when the United States entered the war.
* The new arrangement was not put into writing until November 1916,
and more exhaustively in 1918.
CH. x] ATTITUDE OF SOUTH AMERICAN STATES 245
Other European countries made no objection, but
some of the South American RepubHcs raised difficulties.
Uruguay, on August 7th, 1914, issued a decree which
was considered satisfactory. Peru was not approached
on the subject until later (May 1917). Chile made no
objections, but in 1915 required the arrival of a defensively
armed merchant ship to be notified beforehand to the
Chilian Government. (This was cancelled in November
1918.) The Argentine Republic ordered defensively armed
vessels to discharge ammunition before entering Buenos
Aires or La Plata, and no armed merchantman was
permitted to leave port within twenty-four hours of an
enemy merchantman. (Even in normal times no mer-
chant vessel was allowed to enter any Argentine port
with ammunition on board.) Brazil, on September 5th,
1914, while not regarding armed merchant ships as priva-
teers, saw certain objections, and suggested that the
vast naval power of Great Britain could find other means
of protecting her Mercantile Marine. Cuba, in April
1916, issued a special decree on the subject, much on the
lines of the United States conditions of September 19th,
1915.1
Such, in brief terms, were the measures taken by the
Admiralty, up to the middle of 1916, to arm the Merchant
Service for self-protection, and the steps taken by the
British Government to ensure that vessels so protected
would be able to proceed upon their lawful occasions
with the necessary access to neutral harbours. The
effect upon the Mercantile Marine itself was conspicuous.
The line of demarcation between the Royal Navy and the
Merchant Service was more closely marked on the eve
of the war than at any previous date in our naval history.
Each had its own functions to perform, and each performed
them in its own way. That the two services would, or
indeed could, co-operate closely in defeating the enemy
at sea had not been seriously regarded by either. The
masters and other officers of the Mercantile Marine,
excepting those who belonged to the Royal Naval Reserve,
would most certainly have resented any suggestion that
they should pass under the tutelage of officers whom they
regarded as belonging to an entirely distinct organisation,
^ A brief memorandum of the attitude and requirements of various
neutral countries was subsequently issued by the Admiralty.
246 MERCHANT SERVICE ON DEFENSIVE [ch. x
with which merchant seamen had Httle concern. The
officers of the Royal Navy, on the other hand, never
contemplated in pre-war days the possibility of instructing
their brethren of the Merchant Service in the best methods
of defeating the enemy for themselves. Owing to the
policy of supplying defensive armament to merchant
ships, the relationship underwent a change under the
influence of war conditions. The old barriers which had
arisen during the long period of peace were gradually
broken down, and naval and merchant seamen, with a new
sympathy for each other, worked whole-heartedly together
in the common cause. Without such a sentiment inspiring
both services, little success could have attended the various
courses which were first contemplated in 1916, established
in 1917, and constantly developed in usefulness and
interest until the conclusion of the war. The nation can
contemplate with pride the splendid manner in which the
officers and men of the British Merchant Service, old men
well advanced in years as well as young men, strained
every effort to fit themselves to meet the new and unex-
pected conditions with which they were confronted.
CHAPTER XI
THE WAR OFF THE FLANDERS COAST, WITH SOME ACCOUNT
OF THE enemy's MINE-LAYING ACTIVITY
The relation of Zecbrugge to the Dover Straits resembled
strategically, as has been stated, that which Cattaro bore
to the Straits of Otranto. Happily during the war the
enemy never succeeded in capturing the Channel ports,
but it was sufficiently embarrassing that Zecbrugge and
Ostend remained for practically the whole of the period
of hostilities in German hands. Zecbrugge became an
important base for U-craft from the spring of 1915
onward. With the introduction of the smaller types of
submarines, designated UB and UC, increasingly effec-
tive use could be made of the Belgian port. The latter
were mine-layers, and from the beginning of June they
carried on an almost continuous policy of laying mines
off the south-eastern coast of England, selecting well-
known lightships, prominent headlands, narrow channels,
and certain navigational buoys for their operations. In
the course of the early summer, however, the Dover
drifters had enforced such a measure of respect on the
enemy that submarines were forbidden to attempt the
Dover Straits passage. The more valuable U-boats especi-
ally were directed to go north-about into the Atlantic,
usually through the Fair Island Channel.
The constriction from which the enemy was suffering
was so severely felt that on August 20th another effort
was made to break tlirough Dover Straits, The sub-
marine selected was the mine-laver UC5, which had
reached Zecbrugge from Germany on July 27th and then
commenced a series of mine-laying voyages to the south-
east coast of England. Eventually, on April 27th, 1916,
she got ashore on the Shipwash and was captured ; but
that is anticipating events. On August 20th, 1915, at
247
248 THE WAR OFF THE FLANDERS COAST [ch. xi
6.40 a.m., she left Bruges, having taken on board her
cargo of mines, and proceeded through Zeebrugge lock,
thence passing down the Belgian coast. At 10.20 p.m., at
her utmost speed, she crossed the Dover net barrage by
No. 3 buoy, on the surface, and laid a dozen mines at
6.30 a.m. next day off Boulogne. The Germans in
Flanders regarded this as the first actual submarine success
beyond the Dover-Calais line. Up to this date no German
mine -layer had been able to penetrate the Straits. The
immediate result was that the s.s. William Dawson got on
these mines and blew up.
Had the Germans not been in occupation of the Flemish
coast, much of our trouble with submarines would have
never existed. Many plans, much effort, a large fleet of
various types of ships (especially Auxiliary Patrol craft),
and many valuable officers and men were used to check-
mate the enemy's operations from these ports, and it could
never be said that the door had been effectually closed,
shutting in the U-boats there. Two days after UC5 had
negotiated Dover Straits, Vice- Admiral Bacon left Dover
with a force of seventy-nine ships to attack the harbours
and defences of Zeebrugge. In this operation were in-
cluded such different types as monitors, destroyers, and
gunboats, as well as an aeroplane ship, four vessels carrying
observation towers for spotting, nine paddle-steamers and
many drifters.
The monitors were the bombarding force, the paddlers
acted as the mine-sweepers, and the drifters laid their nets
round the monitors as a protection against submarine at-
tack. Four of the paddlers, including the Brighton Queen,
were drawn from Grimsby ; they met Admiral Bacon's
fleet off the Galloper Lightship, took station ahead and
began sweeping from five miles south-east of North Hinder
Lightship to one mile south-west of Thornton Ridge.
Two of the observation towers w^ere dropped five miles
N. by W. and the other two six miles north-north-east
respectively off Zeebrugge pier. The five paddlers from
Dover swept ahead of the eastern ships, and the Grimsby
paddlers swept ahead of the western ships. When the
observation towers had been placed in position and the
sweepers were in the middle of turning, the enemy batteries
opened fire and continued a fusillade for fifteen minutes.
No damage was done to any of the British ships, but three
CH. XI] BELGIAN COAST BOMBARDED 249
of the Grimsby paddlers had narrow escapes, then' kites
being shot away.
All the sweepers then swept round the monitors inside
the drift nets until 9 a.m., when course was shaped
for the North Hinder Lightship, the paddlers again
sweeping ahead of the fleet. These four Grimsby paddlers
performed most useful work in sweeping and piloting
the observation ships into prearranged positions, and
received about a dozen salvoes, several of which strad-
dled the sweepers. The drifters, to the number of about
fifty, formed a kind of " zareba " round the monitors
and enabled the latter to bombard Zeebrugge from 5.30
a.m. for two and a half hours at 16,000 yards, the scheme
being to destroy, if possible, both lockgates and submarine
base. Soon after 8 a.m., all the objectives aimed at
having been either damaged or destroyed, the operation
ended and the fleet returned to their bases.
On this occasion the Flanders submarines did not attack
any vessel of the British force, probably because the enemy
feared a landing was about to take place and, therefore,
was keeping back his UB boats till a later stage in the
proceedings. From the middle of August they were much
used by the Germans as advance patrols off the Flanders
coast owing to the disturbing effect which Admiral Bacon's
continual bombardment was having on the Teuton nerves.
To thwart our monitors, the UC boats had to be content
to confine themselves to mining the narrow passages
between the banks off the Belgian and French coasts.
On September 6th the Admiral again took his ships
over to the Flemish coast. At 11.30 p.m., having reached
the appointed position, sweeping operations began and
went on throughout the night until five in the morning.
Misty weather interfered with the scheme, but at 8 a.m.
the paddlers from Grimsby proceeded ahead of the fleet to
the anchorage whence the bombardment was to take place.
What work for ordinary fishermen ! At noon the paddlers
were attacked by enemy aircraft, two bombs dropping
close to the starboard sponson of one of the vessels. An
hour later the fleet weighed again, and proceeded to an
area off Ostend, the paddlers sweeping ahead and being
subjected to heavy fire from guns of large calibre ; two
shells fell close under the counter of one paddler, severely
jarring the ship. After not quite an hour, the fleet ceased
250 THE WAR OFF THE FLANDERS COAST [ch. xi
firing and shaped a course for the North Foreland, the
paddlers sweeping ahead of them once more. Again the
monitors had damaged the submarine workshops and
harbour works, and again it was reported that " the assist-
ance rendered by the auxihary craft was most valuable."
But almost simultaneously UC5 had been at work. At
6.48 a.m. on September 7th she had laid half a dozen mines
off Boulogne and another six that night off the " Folke-
stone Gate," which was used to regulate the traffic passing
off that part of the coast. As a result the cable-ship
Monarch next day was blown up and sunk. Here, as
usual, the armed trawlers were on the spot to do their
duty, and by this means seventy-five survivors were
brought into Dover. Assisted by the trawler Neptunian,
Lieutenant Alfred H. Barnes, R.N.R., commanding officer
of the trawler Macfarlane, did excellent work in rescuing
the Monarch'' s crew by his coolness and good organisation.
The result of Admiral Bacon's attacks on the Flemish
coast was, as has since become known from German sources,
that UB boats had to be kept as permanent outposts by
Middelkerke and the Thornton Ridge buoy. In this way
the UB boats were prevented from operating on the
merchant shipping tracks and the enemy had to rely on
his mine-laying UC boats. At the end of September
severe I attacks on the UBs and UCs, both outgoing and
homecoming, were made by British craft, one boat of
each type being damaged. On September 25th Admiral
Bacon again bombarded the enemy's coast, the object
being to feign a landing and thereby aid Sir John French,
who was about to launch an attack on land farther to the
southward. Once more the Auxiliary Patrol craft did
their share of the work. The monitors bombarded Knocke,
Heyst, Zeebrugge, and Blankenberghe, during which
operations drifters used their nets. It was while the
drifters were boarding their nets later on that the Hyacinth
was shelled, fifteen 6-inch projectiles falling so close that
they deluged the drifter with water. Notwithstanding
this. Skipper Laurence Scarlett, ably assisted by his
second hand, T. J. Prior, and the crew, stuck to the
work and safely got all the nets and net-mines aboard
before leaving. " I would submit," wrote Admiral Bacon
to the Admiralty, " that this skipper's work is worthy of
the best traditions of the sea service, more especially as
CH. XI] ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES 251
his instructions admitted of his sHpping his nets and re-
tiring without them." This gallant skipper was awarded
a D.S.C. and Prior received a D.S.M.
During the winter it was not possible to do much off the
Belgian coast owing to unfavourable weather conditions,
but operations were resumed in the following April. The
total number of vessels of the Auxiliary Patrol serving in
the various areas and zones at sea had reached 2,236, and
included yachts, whalers, trawlers, drifters, paddlers,
" M.L.s," motor-drifters, and motor-boats. Of the craft
a considerable proportion were based on Dover, where
during the winter Admiral Bacon had been making elabo-
rate plans for a new effort to checkmate the enemy's
Flemish submarine flotilla, and his other craft. These
plans began to be put into effect on April 24th, 1916, so
as to restrict the movements of the Flemish naval forces
to one small channel off West Capelle on the Dutch coast.
Thus, instead of having to keep watch on the whole coast,
the egress and ingress of submarines and other vessels
could be checked at this one " gate." To the enemy
these measures, it was assumed, would be inconvenient
in that 120 miles would be added to the length of a sub-
marine's round trip from Ostend to the English Channel.
The barrage, it was realised, would need to be patrolled
so as to prevent the enemy from damaging the line of nets,
or attacking the drifters who would have to keep the
nets in good condition, but that responsibility was ac-
cepted.
The mine-nets, then, were to be laid so as to restrict the
activities of enemy craft, British destroyers protecting the
drifters and their nets. But the enemy's destroyers had
a gun-range of 2,000 yards' superiority over that of the
British destroyers, mounting 4-inch guns. In these cir-
cumstances it was decided to station monitors with a view
to their engaging the enemy's destroyers and acting as
a rallying-point for the British destroyers. It was recog-
nised that the enemy destroyers could always retreat
under the protection of the coast batteries ashore. This
would not matter, however, as the purpose in view was
the preservation of the barrage. There was, of course,
the possibility of the enemy's destroyers trying to rush
the monitors, but the British destroyers were charged
with the duty of preventing this as well as warding off
252 THE WAR OFF THE FLANDERS COAST [ch. xi
attacks by submarines. Later on " M.L.s " and coastal
motor-boats were also used for patrolling the barrage.
It would have been incorrect to call this arrangement a
blockade for the reason that it was not technically effective.
The absence of a perpetual night patrol and the existence
of an exit by Dutch territorial waters made it not impossible
for enemy craft to emerge from Zeebrugge. That the
barrage accomplished all that was hoped cannot, with
the knowledge which has since become available, be
claimed. This much, however, may be said. It caused
the enemy to be on the qui vive all the time, interfered
with his free navigation, and definitely brought about the
loss of several submarines. On the other hand, it em-
ployed scores of ships, with their crews numbering hundreds
of men, which might have been employed in more active
operations. The net-line was examined daily, weather
permitting, and whenever possible the 15-inch monitors
fired a few rounds at Ostend and Zeebrugge. Our patrols
were ordered to keep outside the range of 18,000 yards ; the
shooting of the shore batteries was excellent up to a much
greater range. M.L.s were used to make smoke screens
with which to hide the targets. The shore batteries, in
turn, used smoke screens to hide themselves from the
monitors. The conditions were those of an elaborately
staged game of hide-and-seek in which the fishermen stood
to suffer most.
It had been intended to lay this barrage on April 8th,
but the scheme had to be postponed until April 24th.
The plan of the barrage involved the use of mines and net-
mines. The mines were to be laid by the mine -layers
Orvieto, Paris, Princess Margaret, and Biarritz, all being
merchant ships taken up for the period of hostilities.
The eastern end of the line of mines was to be laid by the
trawlers Welheck, Carmania, Osta, Shackleton, Ostrich, and
Russell, which could go into the shoal water which was
impossible for the bigger mine-layers and could advance
to within four miles of Dutch territorial waters. To
seaward of, and covering, the line of mines, the drifters
laid their explosive nets, while farther to seaward, still
other drifters had been ordered to lay their nets parallel
with the West Hinder shoal, about thirty miles from
Ostend, in order to catch home-coming U-boats. The
last-mentioned were indicator nets, and were not part of
CH. XI] UBS, UIO AND UC5 CAUGHT 253
the barrage, which was laid 27,000 yards from the Tirpitz
batteries at Ostend. These batteries straddled the
monitor General Wolfe at 32,000 yards on the very
day the barrage began to be laid, an incident wliich conveys
some idea of the dangers which were run by the men
engaged on the barrage.
The preliminaries began on April 21st, when paddlers
swept the channel between the Dyck and Inner Ratel,
as well as other channels, on the eve of a startling move.
This precaution was adopted because it was expected that
an enemy mine-layer had been at work : six German mines
were thus accounted for. To assist the navigation of the
mine-layers, dan buoys were laid by drifters and M.L.s.
The bigger mine-layers which have been mentioned laid
their 1,421 mines in the line planned, beginning at 5 a.m.,
April 24th ; they steamed at 14 knots in a smooth sea.
At 10.30 a.m. the six trawlers began to lay their mines
at 6 knots, each trawler laying twenty-four. During the
month of May these ex-merchantmen and trawlers pro-
longed the western end of the double line of mines laid on
this day, and filled in the gaps between the shoals south-
ward to the Belgian coast off Furnes. The general effect
was thus to make a barrage from La Panne to the Dutch
waters. It was a great undertaking — daring and original
— but it required a great deal of constant attention to
maintain it in an efficient state. The weather was not
helpful in this respect, and there was always the possibility
of the enemy coming out and tampering with nets or net-
mines, so that constant vigilance had to be observed.
Two submarines, UBS and UlO, were destroyed by this
means, in addition to UC5, which was caught in a mine
but extricated herself. The loss of UBS was solely and
entirely due to the drifters. On April 24th, Sir Reginald
Bacon had placed a number of drifters about thirty miles
off Ostend, parallel with the West Hinder shoal. Here
they anchored with their indicator nets out, flanking the
lines of mines and mine-nets which were being laid a little
nearer the shore, the intention being to entrap any Flanders
submarines that might be making for Ostend or Zeebrugge.
At 2.51 p.m. the drifter Gleaner of the Sea was lying at
anchor in lat. 51° 31' N., long. 2° 50' 20" E., with her nets
out astern. To the north-east and south-west of her
were other drifters similarly disposed, the whole line
254 THE WAR OFF THE FLANDERS COAST [ch. xi
extending about fourteen miles. At this precise moment
UBS endeavoured to get through the Hne, but fouled the
cable of the Gleaner of the Sea, which was riding to fifteen
fathoms of chain with twenty-five fathoms of wire shackled
on, as drifters often did, the water at this spot being about
ten fathoms. Suddenly the watch on deck heard an
unusual noise — the sound of something grinding on the
wire, and at once went forward to see what was the matter.
Then UBS was observed on the wire. Skipper R. G.
Hurren was called from below and rushed up on deck.
He seized a lance-bomb and threw it on the foredeck of
the submarine, causing a great explosion, the water flying
over the drifter's deck forward. The submarine sank at
once down the wire, which parted, and then she went to
the bottom, a hole having been blown in her. Skipper
Hurren immediately ordered " Full speed ahead " and
fired a signal rocket, his idea being to tow his nets round
the spot where the submarine had sunk, and thus imprison
her. But on looking astern and seeing a large " boil of
water," he thought UBS was coming up to the surface.
He therefore ordered the nets to be slipped, as he was
going to ram the enemy. On steering over the spot it
was obvious that the German had settled down, and that
air was coming up. He therefore dropped another lance-
bomb and marked the place with a dan buoy.
Presently the drifter E.E.S. (Lieutenant R. J. Har-
land, R.N.R.) arrived and dropped four more bombs,
one of which exploded. After the explosion oil and
bubbles came to the surface. At 3.55 p.m. Destroyer
Afridi arrived on the scene and fired her explosive sweep
over the spot where the oil was still coming up. Thus
ended the life of another submarine, thanks to the Auxiliary
Patrol. The Admiralty awarded Skipper Hurren a D.S.C.,
and a D.S.M. was given to one of his crew. The sum of
£1,000 was also awarded to the fishermen, of which a
special share was apportioned to Skipper Hurren for his
prompt action. This share amounted to £389.
In addition to the actual destruction of one submarine,
the day's operations had been successful, for a double
line of mines fifteen miles long had been laid, and
thirteen and a half miles of moored nets besides fourteen
light buoys which were to define the barrage for the safety
of the craft ordered on patrol during the ensuing months.
CH. XI] AN ENCOURAGING DISCOVERY 255
This Belgian barrage was completed later on. If the
officers and men who had been employed in laying and
maintaining the barrage required encouragement, they
obtained it from the destruction of UlO. A fleet of mine-
nets had been laid by drifters on May 7th, 1916, reinforcing
this barrage line in a position due north of Ostend. There
they remained until July 15th, when the drifters were
sent to replace them with new ones. While the original
mines were being hauled aboard, the eighth net was found
to be missing, the mines in it having been fired. It was
evident that a submarine had tried to break through,
fouled the net, and been blown up by the net-mines. As
the drifter's crew went on hauling the remaining nets,
there came to the surface the body of a German petty
officer, dressed in a double-breasted coat with white
metal buttons. He was a naval telegraphist. Together
with the body were found the man's pass issued by the
harbour-master at Bruges, his identity disk, and so on.
The name of the man was thus discovered. Three days
after this the German naval casualty list of July 18th
contained the name of this man as well as twenty-nine
others as " missing, probably dead." It is now known
that this submarine was UlO, though it is impossible to
say on which of the days between May 7th and July 15th
she actually succumbed to the drifter's nets.
By May 26th the whole of this barrage had been
laid. Thirty little drifters, most of them built of wood
and able to steam not more than 8 knots, or 9 at their
very best, had gone shooting and repairing these nets
within fifteen miles of the enemy's coast with its powerful
batteries. It was a great achievement, and one which
exactly suited the training and temperament of these
fishermen. Losses, of course, there were, both this year
and during the preceding autumn. Having regard to the
proximity of the enemy's naval forces, his well-placed
shore guns, and his mines, this was to be expected ; the
surprising part is that so few ships were lost. On the
occasion of the bombardment of September 25th, 1915,
already referred to, the armed yacht Sanda was struck by
gunfire and sunk with the loss of four officers and eleven
men. Her crew belonged to the Mercantile Service, but
her captain was Lieutenant-Commander H. T. Gartside-
Tipping, R.N., who had been retired from active service in
11—18
256 THE WAR OFF THE FLANDERS COAST [ch. xi
the Navy many years before the opening of the war. In
his retirement he had shown an enthusiastic interest in
the Royal National Lifeboat service. On the outbreak
of war he had come back to sea, in spite of his advanced
years, and served in the Auxiliary Patrol in command of
this yacht, being the oldest naval officer afloat. Thus
perished a very gallant and patriotic gentleman.
The operations off the Belgian coast for 1915 had ended
on November 19th. In summing up what had been
accomplished, Admiral Bacon remarked :
"... But more remarkable still, in my opinion, is the
aptitude shown by the officers and crews of the drifters and
trawlers, who in difficult waters, under conditions totally
strange to them, have maintained their allotted stations
without a single accident. Moreover, these men under
fire have exhibited a coolness well worthy of the personnel
of a service inured by discipline. The results show how
deeply sea adaptability is ingrained in the seafaring race
of these islands. . . . The mine-sweepers under Commander
W. G. Rigg, R.N., have indefatigably carried out their
dangerous duties."
Such was the verdict upon the part taken by the fisher-
men in the 1915 campaign. We had lost, unfortunately,
the paddler Brighton Queen. At two in the morning of
October 6th, 1915, when mine -sweeping off Nieuport, she
was about to head for Dunkirk when she struck a mine
which exploded under her paddle-box. Boats were at
once lowered from all the other ships, but seven lives were
lost. Mine-sweeping during the hours of darkness always
proved an intensely nerve -wracking and perilous operation.
On different occasions long-distance torpedoes were fired
at these paddlers while sweeping, and on this particular
night several star-shells were discharged from the shore,
brilliantly lighting up the ships and rendering them easily
recognisable targets.
The loss of the Brighton Queen was a matter of peculiar
regret. This excursion steamer had been the first paddler
to be taken up in September 1914, and had during the
following months assisted in the destruction of mines
whose total value was much greater than her own. She
had been the means of saving a considerable amount of
CH. XI] A LESSON IN STRATEGY 257
shipping as well as many lives, and had been most busily-
employed in many parts of the North Sea — wherever,
indeed, a new mine-field had to be swept up. As the
Admiral in charge of the mine-sweepers remarked : " With
mine below and bombs from above, in addition to torpedoes
from submarines and heavy gunfire from the shore, these
sweepers have so far borne somewhat of a charmed life
which could hardly be expected to continue indefinitely."
The Brighton Queen was called upon to pay the price.
In the laying of the barrage on April 24th, 1916, one
drifter was also lost. A division of these craft, under
Lieutenant Crafter, R.N.R., had been engaged laying their
mine-nets at the eastern end of the line so as to catch
any submarines which might try to work round the flank
of the light buoys and attack the forces operating. The
division consisted of eight drifters which, owing to a
mistake, were left during the night at the far end of the
line without support. The result was that they had to
steam forty-five miles down a hostile coast to Dunkirk.
During this passage they were chased by three German
destroyers. One of the drifters, the Au Fait, was severely
damaged by shell-fire and was captured, the crew being
taken prisoners. The drifter Clover Bank, whilst laying
nets on the same day, ran over some of the mines which
had just been laid, and was blown up. A mistake had
been made, for the nets should have been laid half a mile
seaward of the lines of mines.
The Belgian coast barrage was maintained until the bad
weather set in during October 1916. In the meantime it
had been reinforced by mine-fields and mine-nets. It
had been patrolled except when weather conditions were
unfavourable ; but notwithstanding it was a great incon-
venience to the enemy, it had not assisted the Allied
cause very materially. Admiral Bacon realised this, and in
his appreciation of the situation informed the Admiralty :
" The situation on the Belgian coast can be summed
up briefly by saying that we can do no real good from
the sea until backed up by an advance on land ... no
permanent damage can be done by gunfire ; it can only
be looked on as a preparation to assist a force which will
permanently occupy the damaged positions."
This lesson in strategy had been expounded years
258 THE WAR OFF THE FLANDERS COAST [ch. xi
before the war, and the difficulty as perceived afresh off
the Belgian coast was identically that which made of no
avail the work of our naval forces at the Dardanelles.
It is appropriate to add that it had been realised, as soon
as the enemy captured the Belgian coastline, that the
eventual success of any naval operations depended on the
co-operation of the Army. Unfortunately the Army was
not free to take its share in the work, and so the auxiliary
craft, in association with the vessels of the Dover Patrol,
had to do as best they might under adverse conditions.
" The drifters," Admiral Bacon remarked, " have laid out,
weighed, and dealt with the moored nets off the enemy's
coast partially under the range of their batteries, and have
watched the nets under conditions when it was possible to
afford them little support, but their duties have always
been well and promptly carried out."
From October 1916 the barrage remained unpatrolled ;
the nets were left to look after themselves ; and the enemy
could, and doubtless did, interfere with it and make gaps
for his submarines to pass tlirough. It was not until the
summer of 1917 that it was once more rendered efficient.
To criticise this campaign off the Flemish coast would be
e£,sy enough, and in the light of later study of the plans
and operations there are lessons to be learned and faults
to be avoided. But the situation was a difficult one and
the general outlook was none too hopeful. The Allied
armies could not advance along the coast, and therefore the
defended base of the enemy submarines could not be
destroyed. Even if the barrage had been made of solid
concrete instead of more or less frail nets, the submarines
could never have been contained within Flemish waters.
They had to go a long way out of their way close to the
south-western coast of Holland, and these submarine
tracks became known to the naval authorities. In the
later stages of the war an attempt was made to mine this
exit just short of neutral seas ; but it was just this neutral
stretch of Dutch waterway which made the whole idea of
the barrage impracticable. In pre -submarine days it
would not have mattered much. In the case of any surface
ship using territorial waters she could have been seen.
But the U-boats at Zeebrugge could negotiate the Dutch
channels between the sandbanks, either by day or by night.
If by day, they would be submerged and unseen ; if by
CH. XI] ENEMY MINE-FIELDS 259
night they would be very difficult to observe, and at any
moment could dive to periscope depth and evade the
neutral patrol, however vigilant. Thus a German advanced
base existed almost at the eastern mouth of the English
Channel : it was like bringing Heligoland so many miles
nearer England. The base could not be wiped out ; it
succoured, refitted, revictualled, replenished with mines
and ammunition, and refreshed the tired crews of the
U-boats, UBs, UCs, just as often as they had orders to
come in and out of Zeebrugge and up to Bruges. Strategic-
ally this base was well placed for offensive operations,
either by mine or torpedo, or by machine-gun or heavier
armament upon the swept channel which began at the
Downs and extended north to about the Firth of Forth.
It was difficult enough to prevent such attacks, for the
reason that the naval authorities were short of ships.
The demand for destroyers and craft for the Auxiliary
Patrol went on incessantly : the most that could be done
in those critical times was to carry on with exiguous forces.
The Auxiliary Patrol was concerned with mines as well
as submarines. The enemy's mine-laying operations
throughout the war may be divided into two periods.
From August 1914 until June 1915 all the mines were laid
by surface ships. From June 1915 to the end of hostilities
practically all the mine-fields were laid by submarines,
though there were several important exceptions. The
Southwold mine-field had been allowed to remain practically
intact except for certain passages through it which were
swept, unknown to the enemy, as a matter of convenience.
The Humber mine-field continued to exist, though parts
of it were swept in the spring and early summer of 1916,
the trawlers Or cades and Alberta being mined and sunk in
the process. The Tyne mine-field remained as before.
On June 11th, 1915, the Outer Silver Pit mine-field was
discovered by the foundering of the fishing-trawler Dovey.
It was wrongly supposed, at first, that this was part of the
Humber mine-field, the north-west portion of which was
swept up in June 1915,^ The Tory Island mine-field, laid
in the autumn of 1914, continued to give a good deal of
trouble to the sweepers, and it was not until March 1916
that it was declared clear. The Scarborough mine-field
^ The south-east end was swept up a year later, by which time several
other fishing-trawlers had been blown up in the field.
260 THE WAR OFF THE FLANDERS COAST [ch. xi
had long since been dealt with, though an odd mine was
found off that part of the Yorkshire coast in September
1915. The Swarte Bank mine-field continued in existence
during the summer of 1915, but was cleared by the middle
of August. The Dogger Bank mine-field, laid fork-shaped
in the middle of the North Sea towards the end of May 1915
and discovered by fishing-trawlers, had been defined by
the sweepers, and as late as September 1915 the Dutch
s.s. Eemdijk foundered on it. Thanks, however, to the
work of the trawlers, the enemy's object — the entrapping
of the Grand Fleet — had been frustrated.
On either August 7th or 8th, 1915, a big mine-field was
laid across the Moray Firth by the German armed auxiliary
Meteor, which sank the armed boarding-steamer The
Ramsay. Nearly 400 mines were laid in zigzag lines.
The mine-field was soon discovered and no harm came to
any portion of the Grand Fleet. It involved, of course,
heavy and dangerous work for trawlers, paddlers, and
sloops, but by the middle of October of the same year
249 mines had been destroyed — a very fin,e record ! On
New Year's Day 1916 the raider Mowe laid about 200
mines between Sule Skerry and Cape Wrath in a rough
semicircle, thus fouling the western approach to Scapa
Flow, and causing the loss of the battleship King
Edward VII five days later. In this instance also
the mine-sweepers had the difficult job of carrying out
their work exposed to the full force of the Atlantic, as
had been the case off Tory Island. It was a slow, tedious
process.
The proceedings of the mine-laying craft became so
persistent and thorough, when once they had begun in
June 1915, that it is impossible to deal with them in detail.
With the regularity almost of a freighter, the UC-boats
would load up with mines at Bruges, pass out through the
Zeebrugge locks, cross the North Sea, and lay the mines
off such positions as the Shipwash, Sunk, South Goodwin,
Kentish Knock, Stanford Channel, Elbow Buoy, Le Havre,
Boulogne, Black Deep, Edinburgh Lightship, Aldeburgh
Napes, and so on. Having deposited their cargoes, they
would go back to Bruges and come out with another lot.
In this way not only were heavy losses caused to British
and neutral shipping, but the demands on the trawler and
paddler mine-sweepers rapidly increased. The neighbour-
CH. xi] EXTENSIVE MINE-LAYING 261
hood of important lightships and headlands had to be
swept regularly ; long traffic lanes up the coast had to be
maintained in a swept condition ; and the casualty lists
of the sweepers and crews began to mount up. The loss
of life came with appalling suddenness. Dutch mail-
steamers, Trinity House pilot-ships, British hghtships,
steamers of all sizes, including the P. & O. liner Maloja,
were blown up and many lives sacrificed.
All sections of the Auxiliary Patrol, which were not
employed in sweeping, were necessarily engaged in
locating these mine-layers. Drifters laid their nets in
likely areas, and occasionally the enemy would either be
destroyed or he would founder on his own mines, as was
the case with UC9 in October 1916. Mines are blind ;
they have no respect for one particular ship more than
another. On November 17th, 1915, the hospital ship
Anglia foundered on mines laid off Dover by UC5. This
had the effect of stopping for a while all cross-Channel
traffic, and the enemy thus assisted his own armies. On the
same day that the Anglia blew up, a Greek steamer and a
Norwegian vessel hit mines off the Galloper Lightship.
The essential effect of all this intensive mine-laying by
the enemy was that patrol-trawlers had to be ready to
turn over to mine-sweeping when required and thus " work
double tides." Gradually the mining areas spread as far
north as the Humber and as far west as the Needles.
Then from April 1916 there appeared the first U-boat
mine -layers, who could go farther afield and carry more
mines than the Flanders boats. Mines were now laid off
the Firth of Forth, off the Orkneys (causing the loss of
H.M.S. Hampshire with Lord Kitchener on board).
Thence onwards the campaign extended to almost every
area of the British Isles where shipping was wont to
voyage. The north of Scotland, west and south of Ireland,
and the Irish Sea were affected ; mines were laid off the
port of Liverpool ; the Isle of Man ; in the Bristol Channel ;
off the various headlands and harbour entrances of the
English Channel ; the overseas submarines were able to
deposit their explosive cargoes even off certain ports in
the Bay of Biscay as well as in the Mediterranean, whereas
at one time the UC-boats based on Flanders had been
limited to the south-eastern ports of the English coast.
The latter had begun by carrying only a dozen mines,
262 THE WAR OFF THE FLANDERS COAST [ch. xi
but the U-boat mine-layers which made their appearance
early in 1916 had space for as many as thirty-four. Even-
tually they were able to lay mines in districts so far apart
as the White Sea in the north and the west coast of Africa
in the south.
The Admiralty had good reason to commend the
persistent work of the mine-sweepers during the first two
years of the war ; for in this period they succeeded in
destroying 3,567 German mines. By the end of the year
1916 the number had been increased to 4,574, figures which
indicate sufficiently the thoroughness of the mine-sweepers'
operations ; but nearly 400 vessels had been sunk or
damaged in carrying out the work. Some idea of the
enemy's persistency can be formed when it is stated that
between the Sunk and Cross Sands Lightships — a regular
traffic lane where ships were passing at almost every hour of
the day — thirty-one German mines were destroyed. In the
Harwich area the enemy was, of course, aiming, not
merely at the merchant shipping, but at Commodore
Tyrwhitt's light cruisers and destroyers. The Germans
therefore plastered these shallow waters pretty thoroughly
as soon as suitable submarine mine-layers were available,
and during the year 1916 the sweepers in this area alone
destroyed over 400 mines ; U-boats during the same year
laid exactly seventy-two mines in the White Sea, and all
but thirty of them were located by trawlers and destroyed
during the same season before the ice froze in. Operations
had to cease on December 1st, some of the trawlers and
colliers going to Romanoff, while the rest crossed the
North Sea to Lerwick. The traffic in the White Sea was
heavy at this stage, as the enemy had surmised, and the
trawlers well deserved the extra week's leave which was
awarded them on their return for their good service.
Before the end of the year, an alteration had been made
in the administration of the mine-sweeping. Originally
Admiral Charlton had been in charge of the mine-sweeping
department at the Admiralty. He had been succeeded
by another Admiral ; but from December 18th, 1916, these
operations were delegated to a Captain of Mine-sweeping
under the new Anti- Submarine Division. The title
" Captain of Mine-sweeping " was later on altered to
" Superintendent of Mine-sweeping," and in October 1917
the mine -sweeping operations came under a " Director of
CH. XI] MINE-SWEEPERS' VIGILANCE 263
Mine-sweeping," who controlled all mine-sweeping in home
waters, was responsible for the distribution of mine-sweep-
ing vessels, and advised the naval staff at the Admiralty
on the subject of mine-sweeping abroad, for during 1916
the enemy submarines had been laying mines off the
Italian and French ports, especially off Genoa, Marseilles,
Taranto, Gallipoli (Italy), Brindisi, Venice, Valona, Corfu,
Bizerta and Oran. Similarly off Cretan ports, off Milo,
in the Zea Channel, off Salonika, Mudros, Port Said,
Alexandria, and Malta these unwelcome cargoes were
deposited with disastrous results to merchant shipping.
Paddlers and trawlers and M.L.s, as well as drifters, were
being dispatched from England, but the enemy was also
replenishing his forces by sending out more submarines
from Germany.
At home serious losses of mine-sweeping craft were being
sustained. Trawlers are comparatively deep-draught
vessels, especially aft, and risks had to be accepted as
inevitable. Paddlers were being employed more and
more because of the shallowness of their hulls, and they
were on the whole not unlucky. But this is not to say that
they did not suffer ; when the fatal moment came for them
it arrived quickly, as in the case of the two paddlers Totnes
and Ludlow. Four days after Christmas they were sweep-
ing off the ShipAvash Lightship when both were mined
within a few minutes of each other. The former had her
bows blown off and the latter lost her stern. The Totnes
was towed into Harwich, but the Ludlow sank during the
night.
The bra very of the mine-sweepers constitutes a fine record
of the war. From the moment that the ship put to sea
in the early morning before the other craft were allowed
to move, she was really in action. When and where or at
what depth below the surface mines would be found it
was impossible to say. There was no preliminary bom-
bardment to announce the enemy's oncoming ; there were
no scouting forces to foretell an engagement. The trawlers
might sweep for a week and not find a mine, and then of a
sudden, in an unusual place, they would come upon a little
patch ; some of the mines would be caught in the wire
sweeps, but others, or perhaps a stray mine, would just
be close enough to catch the trawler's heel, and up she
would go, and after the column of black smoke had
264 THE WAR OFF THE FLANDERS COAST [ch. xi
disappeared to leeward, there would be no trawler ; only a
few bits of wreckage would remain with two or three of
the crew in life-saving belts swimming near them ; a stray
corpse or two would be seen going silently down with the
tide. To see such things happen, and to go out day after
day, for months on end, doing the same risky work, perhaps
being fired at by a submarine in the distance, required
courage and grit. But it did not end there. At times
more than this was required, and this little bit more meant
a good deal to the winning of the war. In the first part
of the campaign the British mines were not satisfactory,
and a good deal could be learnt from the enemy. Orders
were issued, therefore, that, if possible, a German mine was
to be removed whole so that it might be examined by the
British experts. The recovery of such a dangerous thing
as a mine is a very different thing from merely destroying
it, especially as it was known that about the only inefficient
thing about a German mine was the safety device. Never-
theless the task had to be done, and the following incident
illustrates the way the mine-sweeping personnel furnished
knowledge to the Admiralty.
In the course of sweeping the Moray Firth in September
1916, a mine was caught in Cullen Bay and buoyed. The
next procedure was to get it into shallow water. This
was accomplished by employing rowing-boats, which passed
a wire with a long loop of chain round the mine and thus
swept it up to the surface. Then, with considerable risk
and no little skill, the mine was cut from its moorings and,
in spite of a heavy autumn swell, was towed into Burghead
Bay and moored. After darkness had set in, the paddler
Glen Usk kept her searchlight playing on the mine and
warned off approaching vessels. On the following day
the mine was safely towed towards the shore by the boats
of the two paddlers, St. Elvies and Glen Usk, and beached.
The whole operation of lifting the mine on to the shore was
very dangerous, especially when it was discovered that
the detonator was jammed, but both mine and sinker were
recovered complete. This was a notable achievement,
inasmuch as many attempts had previously been made to
salve sinkers, but without success. The naval authorities,
as a result of this successful and plucky operation,
were able to carry out some highly satisfactory experi-
ments.
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Headquarters of the Auxil/iary Patrol Aress m Red
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PREPA RED IN THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
CH. XI] DANGEROUS WORK 265
" I beg respectfully," wrote Commander Gervase W. H.
Heaton, R.N., who was in charge of these paddlers, " to
bring to your notice the magnificent work of the individual
boats' crews, who when within feet of the mine carried
out their work jokingly — and especially the names of
Temporary Lieutenant William Highton, R.N.R., of the
St. Elvies, and William Westborough, C.P.O., of the St.
Elvies. This officer and petty officer never left the mine
for a moment, and by their resource and endeavours were
mainly responsible for the safe accomplishment of the
undertaking."
" Much ingenuity, pluck, and good seamanship were
shown," wrote Admiral Jellicoe to the Admiralty, " and
all parts of the mine and sinker were recovered." '' The
general tone of those present," reported Captain L. G.
Preston, R.N., who was in charge of the Fleet Sweepers,
" struck me in the light of a picnic-party." The Admiralty
sent a letter of appreciation to these gallant mine-sweepers,
who, had they been asked, would have stated that they
preferred this sort of dangerous " picnic " every day of
the war rather than the uneventful monotony which was
the main characteristic of their routine, week after week.
CHAPTER XII
FISHING-CRAFT ON WAR SERVICE, 1915-16
In an earlier chapter particulars were given of the develop-
ment before the war of the Royal Naval Motor-Boat Re-
serve. By February 1915 188 of these craft had been
pressed into the national service. Scotch motor fishing-
boats were also included in the force. With it were associ-
ated 272 R.N.V.R. officers and about 450 motor mechanics
ratings and skippers. They were employed at such differ-
ent stations as Scapa Flow, Cromarty, Firth of Forth,
Humber, Great Yarmouth, Harwich, Dover, Portsmouth,
Plymouth, on the seaward end of the army's line in
Flanders (based on Dunkirk), and eventually in Egypt,
Malta, and Smyrna. Originally they were intended to
examine the coasts and inlets, but it was realised in
March 1915 that not in every case were they so employed.
Being built originally for summer yachting, they were
not seaworthy enough at sea, fast enough for offensive
work, nor sufficiently stoutly built to carry armament
even if such had been available. For the most part
they were being employed during these early months
for such duties as dispatch-carrying, harbour-policing,
traffic control, boarding, and so on. These amateur sailors
had created a most favourable impression and were
obviously suited for better craft. In July of this year it
was decided that the Royal Naval Motor-Boat Reserve,
which had been administered by a separate committee
at the Admiralty, should be amalgamated with the organi-
sation known as the Yacht Patrol, which, in turn, presently
changed its official name to the Auxiliary Patrol.
The need for more seaworthy, faster, and better-armed
motor-craft began to be considered in the spring of 1915
during Lord Fisher's regime as First Sea Lord. The result
was that on April 9th, 1915, a contract was signed for fifty
motor-launches — to be built on the other side of the North
266
CH. XII] M.L.s VARIED DUTIES 267
Atlantic. Three months later the number on order was
increased to 550. The pattern boat was built at Bayonne,
New Jersey, U.S.A., where all the initial work was carried
out. The twin sets of engines were also made in the United
States, but the assembling of the craft was done at Quebec
and Montreal. The later M.L.s (after the first fifty had
been begun) were slightly longer, being 80 feet long, and
each boat was fitted with a pair of 220-h.p. motors, twin
screws. The M.L.s were afterwards put in cradles and
shipped to England, four at a time, on the decks of trans-
ports. It is a notable fact that the whole 550 M.L.s were
built in 488 days. As these craft began to arrive, they
found their crews awaiting them. By the end of August
1915 R.N.V.R. officers were being recalled from the R.N.
motor-boats for courses of instruction at Portsmouth for
service in the M.L.s.
On September 1st six of these M.L.s reached Ports-
mouth from the other side of the Atlantic. The engines
were overhauled, and a fortnight later the trials of the
13-pounder guns mounted in them took place. Experi-
ments were made with these M.L.s at sea soon after
arrival, and it was ascertained that with careful handling
they could keep the sea in fair weather, but that with a
following sea great caution would be required. Their
fine form forward and the flat transom stern aft caused
them to bury their bows and broach to. However, the
primary aim of the design was speed — to rush towards
a submarine — and it is not easy to obtain in an 80-foot
boat accommodation for officers and men, extreme
mobility, good sea-keeping qualities, and the stoutness
requisite for mounting a gun forward. Like all other
ships that have ever been built, the M.L.s were a com-
promise. They were not ideal craft, but in the hands of
trained yachtsmen, with crews of fishermen and others,
they performed really excellent work during the war.
They were ableto sweep up mine-fields where deeper-draught
craft dared not venture : they maintained a patrol all
round the coast, as well as in the Mediterranean, in the
Otranto Straits, in Egyptian waters, in the West Indies,
and so on ; they assisted in convoying merchant ships ;
when organised into hydrophone hunting flotillas, they
harried the U-boats, and, as is known from enemy sources,
were much feared by the German seamen. Apart from
268 FISHING-CRAFT ON WAR SERVICE [ch. xii
contributing indirectly to the destruction of various sub-
marines, the M.L.s on more than one occasion did
definitely and directly send enemy submarines to their
doom. On October 14th M.L.s 1, 2, and 3 were com-
missioned at Portsmouth. On the 21st M.L.4 left Ports-
mouth, reached London the following day, and was in-
spected off the Thames Embankment by representatives
of the Admiralty. During that autumn and the early
months of the next year, Portsmouth continued to fit out
these craft, and gradually every base in the Auxiliary
Patrol areas had its own M.L. flotilla. Some were shipped
again aboard transports and sent out to the Suez Canal
and Adriatic. Others proceeded on their own power, by
way of the French canals, to the Mediterranean. In these
various ways a new force was added to the Royal Navy
in home as well as distant waters.
In no area were M.L.s more useful than in the Dover
Patrol, especially in connection with the Belgian coast
barrage and the Dover barrage. During the autumn of
1914 British and French mines had been laid in the southern
part of the North Sea for the protection of the Dover
Straits and English Channel against possible attack on
the cross-Channel transports by means of surface vessels.
At that time the British mines were not very satisfactory,
and many of these so-called mine-fields had broken adrift
owing to the weak character of the mooring wires. In
January 1915 Lord Fisher advocated further mining of the
Dover Straits, and on the 4th of the following month the
laying of the first Dover barrage was begun. The scheme
was that mines should stretch irregularly from north of
Dunkirk across the Straits to a little east of Elbow Buoy,
near Broadstairs. The operation was completed by
February 16th. This barrage was well to the north-east-
ward of the Straits. Nominally it existed until the spring
of 1918, but on sweeping over it the barrage was found to
be non-existent, and it may be assumed now that, for the
reason just mentioned, it existed only on paper except
for a very short period. To the south-west of this barrage
was the line of Dover drifters riding to their nets across
the Straits. Although for a time these nets did actually
foil the enemy submarines and deny to them the passage
of the Straits, yet, by the autumn of 1915, the enemy
had learned the trick of dodging these nets at night ; he
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CH. xii] THE DOVER BARRAGE 269
succeeded, in fact, in finding gaps, of which he made use.
It was all very well to take a chart and draw a line across
the Straits and point to the fact that the straight line
represented an obstruction of nets. In practice this did
not exist. The tides in the Straits are strong, and the
nets had to be towed across the tide ; therefore, what
with this natural disadvantage, and the fouling of nets
on submerged wreckage which had existed for many years,
in association with the difficulties caused by darkness and
bad weather, it was not possible to regard this net barrage
as a rigid, inflexible, impenetrable barrier.
The first really effective cross-Channel barrage was that
which was laid between December 17th, 1916, and February
8th, 1917. This extended from the South Goodwins to
the Snow and consisted of moored mine-nets and deep
mines. The mine-nets, instead of being towed by the
drifters, were secured to buoys and were thus securely
sustained. These buoys were numbered OA, lA, 2A, and
so on, smaller buoys being laid in between them. On the
southern side were placed a line of light buoys every three
miles, the object being to prevent the patrols getting foul
of this barrage. Secret gaps were left to permit craft to
go across to the Belgian coast in safety, and these were
frequently changed so as to deceive the enemy. The
laying and maintaining of this net barrage was the work
of the Dover drifters. It was kept patrolled by about
twenty-four drifters, by the Dover M.L.s, and by other
craft. Thirty more drifters were used for laying the nets.
Thus, theoretically, by the use of lines of mines, lines of
nets, and patrol-vessels the Dover Straits were rendered
impassable to enemy craft.
In actual experience, it should be added, this Dover
barrage was not a complete success. Owing to bad
weather and the strong tides, the nets could never
be maintained in an efficient condition. Moreover, the
German submarines were able, by picking their way
at night, to cross the nets, usually by drifting over them
at high water. Secondly, the mines unfortunately dragged
their moorings and fouled the nets, and by the spring of
1917 became a serious danger to our vessels working about
the nets. When, eventually, in the early part of 1918, it
was established beyond all manner of doubt that this
cross-Channel barrage was not stopping the submarines,
270 FISHmC-CRAFT ON WAR SERVICE [ch. xii
it was abandoned. The buoys and nets — or as many as
still existed — were left in position and not replaced when
they broke adrift. This decision naturally released a large
number of small craft for other work. " There is no doubt,"
Admiral Bacon has stated in The Dover Patrol 1915-17,
that " this barrage never stopped submarines passing . . .
it was an undoubted deterrent to destroyers." It may be
added that it was not until we became possessed of efficient
mines and gear that it was possible to make the straits a
terror to German submarines. When improved mines
were available, the laying of the Folkestone-Grisnez deep
mine-field was undertaken — in the winter of 1917-18. It
had not been quite completed by the time the Armistice
arrived, but it may be said at once that, owing to this
very thorough barrage and the restless activity of the
vigilant destroyers and small craft of the Auxiliary Patrol,
the passage of the Dover Straits by enemy submarines was
made as nearly as possible a superhuman task.
On the other side of the Channel, vessels of the Auxiliary
Patrol were assisting the French Navy and protecting from
submarines transports which were sustaining the Allied
armies. The approaches to Le Havre, for very obvious
reasons, M'ere a favourite region for German submarines.
It was their practice to lie about in this area, lay mines,
and attack incoming steamers carrying stores for the
Western Front. A number of British drifters had there-
fore been based on this harbour. Just before 5 o'clock
on the morning of April 5th, 1916, Lieutenant J. M'Lough-
lin, R.N.R., who was in charge of half a dozen British net
drifters at Havre, was informed by the French authorities
that a submarine had been sighted in the Roads near the
Whistling Buoy. He immediately ordered the Endurance,
Welcome Star, Stately, Comrades, Pleiades, and Pleasance,
to proceed to sea as soon as the tide served. At 7.40 a.m.
they left port and at 10.15 a.m. the Pleiades shot her net
two miles west of the Whistling Buoy, the other drifters
following suit.
Just as the net drifter Endurance was shooting her
nets, there were indications that a submarine had fouled
the nets. She therefore sent up a rocket distress signal
to that effect. Immediately before this incident occurred,
the Comrades had felt a shock underneath her hull, accom-
panied by a bumping on the ship's bottom. It was
CH. XII] A STRIKING CONTRAST 271
evident that a submarine was in trouble, for the next
incident was the periscope of a submarine striking the
rudder of the Endurance, so heavily as to put the rudder
out of action. Still bungling on her way, the submarine
ran foul of so much of the Endurance's net as had been
shot. Like a skilful angler playing a fish at the end of
his line, the skipper of the Endurance now paid out the
rest of his nets as rapidly as the submarine was taking them.
The result was that the German craft became completely
enveloped in the nets, heading off in a north-easterly direc-
tion. The Endurance was compelled to let go the last of her
nets, as, owing to her damaged rudder, she was unable to
manoeuvre.
On hearing the rocket distress signal fired, the rest
of the drifters had closed on the Endurance so as to
encircle the submarine. The enemy was now caught in a
trap and the prisoner of these fishermen. Not all his wiles
could avail him, for he had been definitely outmanoeuvred.
All that remained was to give the death-blow. The French
torpedo-boat Le Trombe was soon on the scene and quickly
got into position close to the Endurance. Having sighted
the indicator buoy of the net marking the submarine's
apparent position, the Le Trombe dropped three bombs,
which had the desired effect. The enemy decided to come
to the surface and surrender. Some of the German crew
jumped overboard, but they were picked up by the Welcome
Star and the Le Trombe. The former saved five Germans
by means of a fine and buoy, and then, launching her boat,
took three German officers from the submarine and put
them on board the torpedo-boat. Seven more Germans
were saved by the drifter Stately. This saving of life of a
defeated enemy was, of course, only in accordance with
the humane traditions of the brotherhood of the sea, and
the action of the Allies in this respect contrasted with the
callousness of certain commanders of German submarines
in allowing non-combatant passengers as well as crews of
merchant ships to perish.
But, to conclude this inspiriting story, after the
German prisoners had been accounted for, the Stately and
Welcome Star remained with the submarine until French
trawlers arrived to take the German prize in tow, assisted
by the Comrades. The Endurance, owing to her damaged
rudder, had to be towed in by the Pleasance. On the way
11—19
272 FISHING-CRAFT ON WAR SERVICE [ch. xii
the submarine sank, but in shoal water, so that that mis-
fortune was of httle account. It had been a great day for
the drifters, and both the British and the French naval
authorities took favourable notice of the exploit. The
former highly commended "the excellent work done by the
drifters " on this occasion, and referred to the destruction
of the submarine as having been due entirely to the promp-
titude of Lieutenant M'Loughlin and the skill of Skipper
T. C. Wylie, who had so handled the Endurance's nets
that the submarine could not tear her way through. The
Admiralty decorated both these officers with the D.S.C.,
whilst two ratings received the D.S.M. In addition, the
Admiralty awarded the sum of £1,000 to be divided between
the six drifters, to which the French Government con-
tributed a further sum of 8,000 francs. These drifters
had arrived on the station but a day or two previously,
and were a distinct asset at a most important point along the
lines of communications. The submarine sunk was UB26.
She had left the Ems in the afternoon of March 19th, kept
two or three miles off the Dutch coast, and reached Zee-
brugge on the morning of March 21st. At the end of the
month, being based on Flanders, she had set out from
Zeebrugge and begun operating in the English Channel.
In her were found German charts which showed among
other things that the enemy knew the position of the net
barrage across Dover Straits — from the South Goodwins
to the Snow. The submarine had crossed this barrage
about midway between the South Goodwins and the
Outer Ruytingen.
It must not, however, be assumed that the vessels of
the Auxiliary Patrol were active or efficient only in those
areas where they succeeded in fighting and sinking the
enemy. " Happy," it might have been declared, " was
the patrol area that had no history." For, if the patrols
were absolutely and entirely efficient, they should at all
times have succeeded in keeping the submarine under
water ; no ships would have been sunk and none attacked.
There were, however, for certain geographical or strategical
reasons, certain areas which were bound to come into
prominence. The Dover Straits have been specially
mentioned, because that was the eastern entrance to the
highway leading from Germany to the Atlantic. Another
way was across the North Sea and round the north of
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CH. XII] A SURPRISED ENEMY 273
Scotland, and for that reason the north-east coast was also
a busy sphere. In trying to forestall an enemy's move-
ments and intentions, it has been regarded as a good rule
" to put yourself in his place." There was reason, for
example, on examining the north-east coast situation, to
expect that submarines would operate on or near the
Tyne-to-Bergen trade route. That was a reasonable
supposition, because the enemy knew well how important
in the prosecution of the war this particular trade route
was. In the month of May 1916 Rear- Admiral Simpson,
the Senior Naval Officer at Peterhead, was directing his
trawlers on patrol to pay especial attention to that area.
Thus it occurred that on May 27th, when in lat. 57° 10' N.,
long. 1° 20' E., half an hour after noon, the trawler
Searanger (Lieutenant H. J. Bray, R.N.R.) was patrolling
when the commanding officer sighted a sail and smoke to
the northward, proceeding eastward. Lieutenant Bray
ordered full speed ahead and, on proceeding to investigate,
found that the sail and smoke had revealed the presence
of a submarine. This stratagem had been tried before,
and under certain atmospheric conditions it was successful
if the patrols were not particularly watchful and inquisitive.
By 12.45 p.m. events had happened so quickly that the
Searanger and two accompanying trawlers, the Oku and
Rodino, had opened fire on the submarine at a range
of 4,000 yards. The sea being smooth, it was not long
before the exact distance was found and one shot was
seen to strike the submarine aft. She was a big craft,
with a large conning-tower and wireless installation.
The submarine presumed that these trawlers belonged
to the group of Hull fishing-fleet which had scattered earlier
in the day on her approach. In accordance with Admiral
Simpson's orders, the patrol unit was cruising in no
formation, but was dispersed as if fishing. The enemy,
taken by surprise by the gunfire, at once lowered sail
and, having one gun forward and one aft, returned the
trawlers' fire. The submarine began by concentrating the
shells from both guns alternately on a trawler, but all the
time the trawlers were closing in upon their prey. In
a little while the enemy's after gun had apparently become
damaged, for fire ceased and reopened only with the for-
ward gun, the shots falling short. It was observed on
board both the Searanger and Rodino that the periscope
274 FISHING-CRAFT ON WAR SERVICE [ch. xii
had been partially shot away. It was soon evident that
the enemy was already tired of the engagement, for he
ceased fire altogether, and made an effort to escape by
submerging.
By this time the unit of trawlers had more than half
encircled the submarine and shell after shell was being
placed with admirable accuracy. The submarine at length
rose well out of the water with a heavy list to port, like
a wounded thing, and an endeavour was made to finish
her off. Both the Oku and Searanger did their best to
ram her, but she was making an erratic course towards
the centre of the unit, apparently trying to get alongside
the trawler Kimberley, the fourth vessel of the group.
As the submarine came within eight feet of the latter, it
was impossible to ram, but as she passed the Kimberley
fired three shots into her. By this time the submarine
was heeling over to port and sinking stern first. Finally,
after a shot from the Kimberley, she sank out of sight,
leaving a large quantity of oil on the surface.
It was now 1.30 p.m., and the unit continued to cruise
about in the vicinity until 3 p.m., when the quantity of
oil on the surface had considerably increased. In this
way the career was ended of U74 ; having been seriously
damaged by the first three trawlers, she was given the
coup de grace by the Kimberley. It was an almost ideal
engagement, the fighting trawlers utilising their guns in
association with the courage and plain common-sense
tactics of the crews against the German U-boat, with her
superior gun-power and her torpedoes. It was well,
indeed, that U74 had been destroyed, for this was the craft
which had but a few weeks before laid a dangerous mine-
field in the Firth of Forth, and would doubtless have con-
tinued her mining warfare at a later date.
This engagement occurred four days before the Battle
of Jutland, and it may be asked : Were the vessels of the
Auxiliary Patrol able, on that historic day, to render any
service ? Obviously such craft could have no part in a
fleet action, nor could they operate so far from their base
as the coast of Jutland. The duty of the vessels of the
Auxiliary Patrol were carried out within easy distance
of the British coast, and it was just when the Grand Fleet
would be making the land on its return from battle,
probably with some ships badly wounded, that the smaller
CH. XII] EVOLUTION OF ENEMY MINE-LAYERS 275
craft might be useful in repelling the attacks of submarines
lying in wait. Thus, on June 1st, three armed trawlers
from Granton were dispatched on the information that
three torpedoes had been fired at an incoming ship. Later
in the same day submarines were reported off May Island,
and the yacht Mingary sighted a submarine that was trying
to intercept H.M.S. Warspite returning with her scars
received in the Jutland battle. The Mingary and her
unit at once gave chase to the submarine, but it submerged
and escaped. On the night of May 31st, in consequence
of the news which he had received. Admiral Startin
dispatched from Granton every available armed yacht,
armed trawler, and mine-sweeping trawler to positions
which these craft were ordered to occupy in the event of a
fleet action. He sent also fourteen of his drifters up the
Forth to Rosyth with cots ready to land the wounded from
the men-of-war as soon as they should arrive. So carefully,
indeed, had everything been foreseen that during the
previous weeks Admiral Startin had instituted special
classes at Granton for the instruction of the drifter men in
the transport of wounded and in general first aid. Thus
a fortnight before the Battle of Jutland forty-four skippers
and second hands had qualified for certificates.
The loss of U74 mentioned on the opposite page was
important not merely because she was a submarine, but
because she was probably the first to operate according to a
new plan. At the beginning of the war, as has been stated,
enemy mine-laying was done by surface ships. Then came
the UC-boats which, based on Flanders, laid their mines
off the south-east coast of England. As the commanders
of these craft became more daring and efficient, they laid
the mines as far north as Flamborough and as far west as
Land's End. Such was their success that a bigger type of
mine-layer was evolved, which could go farther distances.
These were the U- mine -layers and belonged, not to the
Flanders Flotilla, but to the High Sea Fleet. From about
April 1916 until the end of the war, these U-mine-layers,
based on the Elbe, laid their mines off various parts of the
British Isles, including even the west of Ireland, but not
in the Flamborough-south-east coast-Land's End area,
which was reserved for the UC-boats from Flanders.
It is not possible to state which was the first mine-field
that can be attributed to these U-boats, nor on what date
276 FISHING-CRAFT ON WAR SERVICE [ch. xii
it M^as laid. But it is certain, however, that the Firth of
Forth mine-field was the first and that it was laid on or
about April 18th, 1916, by U74. Other U-boat mine-
fields were laid soon afterwards, as for example that of
the Brough of Birsay causing the loss of H.M.S. Hampshire
and the death of Lord Kitchener ; the Moray Firth,
Southern Channel, Tyne, Skerryvore, South of Ireland,
Bristol Channel, Clyde approaches, Isle of Man, and off
the north-east English ports. The effect of this increased
mining activity was to scatter the mine-sweeping forces
by causing a unit of mine-sweepers to be located at every
port. Seeing that the number of Auxiliary Patrol ships
and men was limited, and the more of them were em-
ployed in mine-sweeping the fewer could be employed in
the purely offensive duty of harrying submarines, this was
sound strategy on the part of the enemy. What happened
was that a large part of the available force was diverted
to defensive duties — into sweeping clear passages for
merchant ships ; whereas the U-boat, having once de-
posited her cargo of mines, could begin to torpedo shipping
at will and without so much interference by armed trawlers
and M.L.s.
How consistently and persistently this policy was
carried out in the summer of 1916 is revealed by the bare
record of the attacks on fishing-trawlers. During the
night of July 5th-6th a German submarine sank no fewer
than seven Scotch drifters off the Tyne. During the
preceding week a large fleet of Scotch drifters had been
working off this coast, following the herrings. On this
night the fleet was very much spread when first attacked,
and the Senior Naval Officer at the Tyne had allotted every
available vessel of the newly armed drifters as well as
some armed trawlers of the Auxiliary Patrol to go to sea
with the fishermen and bring them home in safety. These
methods appeared to be successful in stopping raids on
fishing-fleets, but some trawlers and drifters afterwards
fell victims to the enemy. Two torpedo-boats also operated
in the fishing area, and visited the fleets every morning
and evening. Another fishing-vessel was sunk on July 10th ;
three days later four more were sunk off Scarborough and
Whitby ; next day five more off the Tyne ; three more
on July 27th ; six on the day following ; and three more
on the last day of July. Thus in one month a total of
CH. XII] A DOUBLE CHASE 277
twenty-five fishing-craft were sunk off the Tyne alone.
It was reported that the submarines concerned were large,
possessing a couple of wireless masts and a gun. The
situation was so serious that at the beginning of August
the area had to be patrolled by H.M.S. Active or Light-
foot, with six destroyers of the Fourth Flotilla. In spite
of the Active and destroyers, the enemy began by setting
fire to a steamer off Coquet Island. On August 6th twelve
armed trawlers and twenty-four drifters with mine-nets
reached the Tyne. Until their arrival the work of
escorting shipping had been so heavy that practically no
patrolling could be done by trawlers ; whatever armed
trawlers were available were sent to protect the drifter
fishing-fleets. These newly arrived drifters were at once
employed as a disguised fishing-fleet and sent to a position
fifteen miles east-north-east of the Tyne, convoyed by
armed trawlers. This was about the position where the
fishing-drifters had been sunk at the end of July. The
attacks now ceased, but began again on September 23rd.
A dead-set was clearly being made on all trawlers and
drifters, whether of the fishing-fleets or of the Auxiliary
Patrol. Perhaps this development was due to the annoy-
ance of the enemy at the splendid way in which fishermen,
enrolled in His Majesty's service, were helping the Navy
and fighting the submarine as well as the mine ; perhaps
it was mere " frightfulness," fed by a desire to intimidate
men who had been using the sea all their lives, from leaving
port again. In any case, it had no permanent effect.
On July 7th, farther up the North Sea, a unit of armed
trawlers from Peterhead, consisting of the Martin, Glamis
Castle, Ibis, Editor, Albatross, and Consort, were at 7.15 a.m.
in lat. 58° 20' N., long. 0° 48' E., when a submarine
was sighted to the north-west. Twenty- five minutes later
a second submarine was sighted to the north-east. The
first was now chased by the Consort and Glamis Castle ;
whilst the Martin, Albatross, and Editor pursued the second,
opening fire on her and causing her to submerge. At
11.30 a.m. the Consort and Glamis Castle returned from their
chase, having lost sight of their quarry after twenty miles.
But at 7 p.m. the unit again sighted a submarine about
six miles south of the position where the enemy had been
fired on during the morning. At 8 o'clock the Albatross,
which was ahead, opened fire. The submarine returned
278 FISHING-CRAFT ON WAR SERVICE [ch. xii
the fire, closed the Albatross, and subjected her to a heavy
bombardment until the Martin came up and started firing.
This caused the submarine to direct her fire on the Martin.
She used both guns, the projectiles falling close around
both these trawlers. The seventeenth round from the
Albatross appeared to strike the enemy craft forward.
The submarine then made a black smoke-screen, turned
end on, and still firing from the after gun, made off quickly
to the eastward and was lost sight of about 9.40 p.m.
Next day, not far from that locality, a submarine, with
one gun, was sighted with her wireless masts up. This
was at 2.30 a.m., but when the unit closed her she
made off to the eastward and, when shells from the
Martin, Consort, and Editor began to fall around her,
she submerged.
Four days later another Peterhead unit, consisting of
the armed trawlers Onward, Nellie Nutten, and Era, fought
a most gallant fight, a fight against overwhelming strength
which ended disastrously. It was, however, a fishermen's
battle that will certainly be long remembered. These
three trawlers were but poorly armed ; the Onward had
a 12-pounder gun, the other two had one 3-pomider gun
apiece. Events suggested that the enemy had been mak-
ing a concentration in order to wipe out these Peterhead
trawlers which had shown such complete disrespect for the
superior armed submarines, causing them to seek flight
when encountered separately. For on July 11th, at a
quarter-past five in the afternoon, when about 120 miles
east-south-east of Girdleness, the OnrL'ard( Lieutenant Claude
Asquith, R.N.R.), leader of the unit, hoisted her signal
that a submarine was in sight. Thereupon the Nellie
Nutten (Skipper C. Angus) bore down towards his leader.
The Onward had already opened fire, and now the Nellie
Nutten began, but after firing a considerable time, her
little 3-pounder being utterly outranged by the enemy,
she saw a second submarine approaching from the north-
east and a third coming up from the south-east. The
Onward then altered course to port and the Nellie Nutten
to starboard.
The three submarines, which were now keeping to port
and starboard of the unit, maintained a fire at long range.
After proceeding in a west -south-westerly direction for an
hour, the Nellie Nutten received a shot through her stern
CH. XII] FOUR SUBIVIARINES TOGETHER 279
and the next shot disabled her altogether. In the distance
the Era was seen to be on fire with a couple of submarines
alongside her. Owing to the long range, all three trawlers
had been firing at the enemy without effect, and the
action was rapidly coming to its inevitable conclusion.
Finding herself in a helpless condition, the Xellie Nutten
steered towards a Dutch lugger, and just as the maimed
trawler sank, all the crew jumped overboard and were
picked up by the Dutchman. When last seen the Onward
was obviously out of control and in flames. The Era, too,
had been sunk, but all three had made an heroic fight.
The Dutch lugger (the Doggerbank of Scheveningen)
brought the Nellie Nutten into Aberdeen. The Dutch
skipper stated that four German submarines, painted grey,
and each armed with two guns, had been engaged ; and
that they opened fire on the trawlers at a distance of three
miles. Not even this exhibition on the part of the enemy
kept the Peterhead patrols from performing their duty,
though they thought that their craft should have been
better armed. Admiral Jellicoe suggested that this should
be remedied and, as a result, fifty-seven 12-pounder guns
were forthwith supplied to East Coast trawlers.
Of the Nellie Nutten' s crew eleven were saved ; the chief
engineer was killed, and one trimmer seriously wounded.
One of the " hands " was also wounded. The whole of the
Onward's crew, numbering sixteen, were taken prisoners,
including Lieutenant Asquith, who was awarded the D.S.C.
for his gallantry during the action. It was evident that
in chasing the first submarine he was led into the vicinity
of the other three and completely outmatched. Skipper
Angus was commended for the skilful and seamanlike
manner in which he had manoeuvred his ship when dis-
abled, thus saving practically all his ship's company.
The whole of the Era's crew were taken prisoners. In
peace-time, both she and the Onward belonged to Hull ;
the Nellie Nutten was a Grimsby trawler before the war.
It is now possible to state that the four submarines were
U46, U49, U52, and U69. Of these four U69 was sunk
just a year later — on July 12th, 1917 — by H.M.S. Patriot ;
U49 was sunk by the steamship British Transport on
September 11th, 1917 ; and the other two surrendered
at Harwich in November 1918.
At the time when the enemy was sinking the Scotch
280 FISHING-CRAFT ON WAR SERVICE [ch. xii
drifters off the Tyne, another submarine — from Flanders —
was operating off Lowestoft. This was UClO. A little
before midnight on July 6th a small motor-boat named
the Salmon, under the command of Sub-Lieutenant E. T.
West, R.N.V.R., was on patrol off Lowestoft. The
Salmon was not a M.L., but a day-boat without a cabin.
She was 40 feet long with 8-foot beam, with a cockpit aft
and a certain amount of space forward of the engine-room
where a couple of men could turn in. She had, however,
a very powerful Stirling motor, developing 135 h.p., which
gave her a speed of 20 knots. The Salmon was one of
six boats which had been presented to the Admiralty by
Mr. Cochrane, an American yachtsman, who had formerly
owned the celebrated schooner Westward. The Salmon
was a comparatively new boat, having been built in 1915.
To many it might have seemed that such a frail boat could
scarcely expect to be of much use in a naval war. How-
ever, there were many things which had to be unlearned
during those fateful years, and this was another instance.
At this period the Salmon was on the lookout for a
submarine, which was suspected of being near the " War
Channel." For about an hour she kept hearing buzzing
sounds at intervals on her hydrophones. At 1.30 a.m.
(July 7th) the buzzing recommenced. It was apparently
much nearer and was rapidly approaching, the sound
resembling that of a dynamo running. Within a few
minutes it seemed to be right under the boat, so the Salmon
put her engines full speed ahead and dropped a depth
charge, which exploded. Almost immediately a much
more violent explosion followed, throwing up a column
of water 50 feet high. A large number of bubbles came
to the surface together with wreckage, consisting of pieces
of wood painted white and a grating. A strong smell of
gas was also noticed. What had happened was that the
mine-laying UClO had been bombed and her own mines
had then exploded. She and her crew were thus prevented
from doing further damage to merchant shipping.
Determined to deal British fishing-craft a heavy blow
before the autumn, Germany made a heavy submarine
raid on the fleets on September 23rd, 24th, and 25th, 1916.
On September 23rd there was an airship raid on the East
Coast and London involving serious casualties, and on the
morning of that day, about 10.30, began the East Coast
CH. XII] A HEAVY SUBMARINE RAID 281
fishing-raid which resulted in the destruction of thirty-
craft, a disaster involving a financial loss, to speak of no
other, of £100,000. This raid resolved itself into two
periods. The first was from 10.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m. of
September 23rd, during which fishing-vessels were sunk
in an area from thirty to sixty-five miles south-east of the
Humber. There followed an interval during the night,
which was apparently occupied by the submarine steering
northwards up the Yorkshire coast, but a good way oft
the land. The second period began on September 24th
at 8 a.m. and closed at 11 a.m. on the following day. At
8.30 p.m. on the former day the enemy craft captured
the steam fishing-trawler Fisher Prince, belonging to
Scarborough, the capture taking place about twenty miles
to the north-east of that port. A German lieutenant and
a prize crew of eight men then boarded her, and the two
cruised in company. A number of other fishing-craft
were captured, including the Scarborough steam fishing-
trawler Otter, the crew being put aboard the Fisher Prince.
The submarine continued to sink other craft until 9.50 a.m.,
when the Norwegian s.s. Tromp came in sight and was
stopped. All the fishing crews were put aboard the Nor-
wegian vessel, and the Fisher Prince was sunk, together
with the trawler Seal.
In a period of forty-eight hours the raid had taken
place over an area between sixty-five miles S.E. by E.
of the Humber and thirty-three miles E. by S. of Hartle-
pool. It is true that on the night of September 24th,
whilst escorting a drifter fleet, the trawler Rigoletto
heard heavy firing to the eastward, but she rightly decided
that her first duty was to stand by her own craft and she
refused to be enticed away. It was, indeed, fortunate
for the enemy that no destroyers or patrol-craft had been
met with, but the misty weather, so typical of the month
of September, had assisted him greatly. The whole situa-
tion from the British point of view was most difficult.
So many patrol-vessels were required now for protecting
fishing- fleets, for patrolling on the lookout for lurking sub-
marines, for convoying merchant ships, for sweeping up
mines, and for various special services, that it was quite
impossible to prevent these raids occurring now and again.
To be strong at every point was not practicable, any more
than the Grand Fleet could prevent the coast from being
282 FISHING-CRAFT ON WAR SERVICE [ch. xii
bombarded by German battle-cruisers occasionally. The
most that could be done was not to allow the enemy, by
his exasperating pin-pricks, to upset the general strategic
scheme. Men and ships were being overworked, there
was another long, trying winter just beginning, the
conditions on the various fronts were not too favourable,
but satisfaction was to be extracted from the knowledge
that we were grappling with the submarine menace.
Enemy craft were being sunk now by all sorts of Auxiliary
Patrol vessels, and the depth charges and hydrophones
were revealing their usefulness. At the Admiralty fresh
schemes were being adopted for intensifying the war
against submarines. Fishermen and yachtsmen and men
of the Mercantile Marine were showing that they could be
depended upon in all emergencies to exhibit undaunted
spirit. Fishermen, too old to fight, whose sons and brothers
and sons-in-law were either serving afloat or in the trenches,
refused to be frightened off the sea even when their ships
were taken from them. With this fine British courage
animating all ranks and ratings there was ground for
confidence.
CHAPTER XIII
RAIDS ON DOVER STRAITS AND OTHER INCIDENTS
Some details have been given of the evolution of the
Dover barrage, with its mines, its mine-nets, and its
system of buoys. It was patrolled by drifters, and each
Drifter Division was commanded by a Lieutenant R.N.R.
Owing to the shortage of guns at the period, most of these
drifters were unarmed, and none had wireless telegraphy,
but they were supported by armed yachts and trawlers.
Towards the end of October 1916 a German flotilla of
destroyers reached Zeebrugge to reinforce the Flanders
flotillas. On the night of the 26th-27th these destroyers
made a raid on the Dover Straits, which had a serious
effect on the drifters. Between Buoys OA and 20A were
disposed the eight, tenth, sixteenth, and twelfth divisions
of Dover drifters, a total of twenty-three craft. They
were supported by the trawler H. E. Stroud, armed with a
3-pounder and fitted with wireless ; by the armed yacht
Ombra, armed with a couple of 3-pounders ; and by the
M.L. 103 and M.L. 252, each of wliich had a 13-pounder
Of the twenty-three drifters five alone were armed, each
with a 3-pounder. The barrage was, therefore, held en-
tirely by Auxiliary Patrol vessels, the destroyer forces
being required to defend the Downs and to protect Dunkirk,
an essential reserve force remaining in Dover Harbour for
contingencies.
The night of October 26th-27th was very dark, and it
was just half an hour before high water in Dover Straits
when suddenly the Tenth Drifter Division, at ten minutes
past ten, sighted destroyers coming up astern, steering
about west-north-west and parallel with the barrage. The
first four destroyers passed close to the leader of the Drifter
Division. The drifters made the challenge and fired a
couple of rifle shots at them, but the four destroyers passed
on without reply. But immediately astern came more
283
284 RAIDS ON DOVER STRAITS [ch. xiii
German destroyers, which opened fire on the Tenth Drifter
Division, hitting all the drifters except one, which made off
to the north-west. The drifters Spotless Prince, Datum,
and Gleaner of the Sea were sunk, and the Waveney set on
fire. Later on the Waveney, shattered by shell-fire and a
mere derelict, was towed into the Downs, but owing to
bad weather coming on could not be salved.
At about 11.10 p.m. the next attack occurred. This
was directed against the Eighth Drifter Division, which
was off the west end of the barrage. Of these six, the
Rohiirn was sunk and the Pleasants damaged ; the rest
escaped towards the Goodwins, their leader firing several
rockets to give the alarm. Meanwhile the armed yacht
Ombra sent wireless signals into Dover and proceeded
to get into touch with the Sixteenth Drifter Division,
which she ordered into Dover. But shortly afterwards —
about 11.15 p.m. — this division ran into the enemy, with
the result that the two drifters Ajax and Launch Out
were sunk, and the E.B.C. damaged. The Fifteenth
Division was not attacked. The transport Queen hap-
pened to be on her way at this time from Boulogne, and
three of the German destroyers came up on her starboard
and another three on her port side, made her stop, boarded
her, destroyed herwireless, and caused herto be abandoned,
eventually shelling her so that she sank.
The entire German force had consisted probably of
eleven destroyers, which when near the north-east end
of the barrage had separated into two divisions. Both
divisions appear to have found the east end of the net
barrage, which at this date extended no farther east than
the Ruytingen Shoal. One division of five destroyers
then proceeded south-west towards Grisnez, the other
going towards Dover. The first division boarded the
Queen, and the second attacked the Tenth and Eighth
Drifter Divisions, then turned east and met the Sixteenth
Division and went off to the north-east. The Ombra' s
signal at 10.30 p.m. caused Admiral Bacon to send out six
of the Tribal class of destroyers from Dover. Of these
six, the Nubian fell in with five German destroyers who
at short range shelled the Nubian's port side. In vain
the Nubian attempted to ram the last ship of the enemy's
line, but was torpedoed and caught on fire. Another of
the Dover destroyers, the Amazon, was struck in the
<
<
CH. XIII] STEADY COURAGE 285
boiler-room by a shell, and a third, the Mohawk, was hit
so that her helm jambed.
As for the trawler H. E. Stroud, she had been ordered
by wireless to send into Dover all drifters and M.L.s, and
was proceeding at full speed to carry out these orders when
she met four German destroyers, each enemy craft giving
the trawler one round in passing. The H. E. Stroud's
commanding officer. Lieutenant J. R. McClory, R.N.R.,
was killed, as well as the helmsman, two of the crew were
wounded and the bridge wrecked. Six drifters had been
sunk, three severely damaged, fifty-five officers and men
killed or missing, and five wounded. Such was the toll
of the enemy's night raid ! Of these fifty-five seamen, ten
were subsequently found to have been taken prisoners.
It was a heavy blow ; nevertheless the sudden fierce
onslaught, devastating as it had been, in no way dis-
heartened the fishermen crews of the Dover drifters. The
most formidable weapon which most of these ships pos-
sessed was a rifle with a few rounds of ammunition, but in
spite of this disability for a contest against modern de-
stroyers the men were undaunted. A report got about in
Dover that in future the drifters would not care about
watching their nets at night. Thereupon the drifter
skippers. Admiral Bacon has recorded, went in a body to
the Captain of the Dover Patrol and stated that, so far
from not liking to do night patrolling, they were ready,
should the Admiral wish it, to lay their nets and watch
them off Zeebrugge.
" I have already had occasion," wrote the Admiral to
the Admiralty a few days after this raid, " to call Their
Lordships' attention to the steady courage and gallantry
with which the men of our little auxiliaries constantly
face dangerous positions and difficult situations. The
conduct on Thursday night was again a brilliant example."
About a month later, on the night of November 23rd,
the enemy, doubtless pleased by his success against the
drifters, essayed another raid on the Straits. It was
about an hour after high water, there was a south-westerly
breeze with mist and slight rain when, at 10.40 p.m., six
German destroyers appeared at the northern approach
to the Downs, where they were sighted by the armed
286 RAIDS ON DOVER STRAITS [ch. xiii
drifters, who were based on Ramsgate. These craft, with
a 6-pounder each, performed the duty of guarding the
area from the North Foreland to the North Goodwin
Lightship. A division of Dover destroyers was also
anchored in the Downs ready for an emergency. The
enemy appear to have come on a south-easterly course
from a little distance off Broadstairs to between the
north-eastern edge of the Downs and North Goodwin
Lightship. They were sighted at 10.50 p.m., when a mile
north-east of the Broadstairs Knoll buoy, by the drifter
Acceptable (Sub-Lieutenant W. F. Fitzgerald, R.N.R.).
The enemy passed under the AcceytabW s stern only a
hundred and fifty yards away, and the last destroyer fired.
So the Acceptable went full speed ahead to the north-west
to get clear, but her starboard sidelight and stern light
were blown away by the enemy's ten rounds, which
smashed the dinghy, damaged the mast, the gallery and
engine-room casing, though fortunately there were no
casualties. The drifter Buckler was also fired on. The
Acceptable sent in a message by her wireless, but, the
alarm having been raised by the drifters and a warning
rocket fired, the Germans realised that their plan had
miscarried and that it would be useless for them to try
and break through the Straits that night. They therefore
decided to retire before the Downs destroyers could arrive
on the spot. Thus the raid was futile, though the enemy
claimed to have bombarded Ramsgate. It may be added
that no shots fell on shore.
Thus the work of the Auxiliary Patrol went on through
another winter. More and still more trawlers were
required, and the demand was never completely met.
New trawlers were being requisitioned as quickly as they
were built, but what with the sinking from mines, sub-
marines, and the ordinary perils of the sea, there was little
or no surplus after losses had been made good. In Decem-
ber 1916 began the system of protected sailings for the
Scandinavian ships, whose cargoes were so essential at
this critical period. These vessels would have refused to
cross the North Sea but for protection, and this had to be
afforded by vessels of the Shetlands Auxiliary Patrol Area.
Owing to the demands on trawlers for mine -sweeping and
for patrolling the Fair Island passage (a regular highway
for U-boats) and for various other reasons, there remained
CH. xiii] FURTHER ANTI-SUB]\IARINE MEASURES 287
few trawlers available for a regular escorting system.
The result was that the dispositions of the vessels of the
Auxiliary Patrol in both the Shetlands and Orkneys areas
had to be reorganised in February 1917 so that trawlers
and whalers might be available to escort neutral traffic for
Scandinavia to three selected rendezvous midway between
the Shetlands and Norway. The German response to this
arrangement was to concentrate their submarines off the
entrances to Norwegian ports. Finally, in April 1917, an
escort of destroyers had to be provided right up to Nor-
wegian territorial waters so as further to ensure the safety
of merchant shipping.
By December 1916 the peril arising from the destruction
brought about by the U-boats had attained such magnitude
that the Admiralty were driven to creating a special depart-
ment called the Anti-submarine Division to co-ordinate
existing measures and devise new ones for combating
the enemy's campaign. At the head of this section of the
naval staff was placed Admiral A. L, Duff. Among other
things this organisation sought to increase the supplies
of depth-charges, develop the hydrophone, arm defensively
the whole Mercantile Marine, and provide ships with
trained guns' crews ; to extend the supply and use of
smoke-screen apparatus ; to concentrate the patrols on
the traffic routes and reorganise the work of the Auxiliary
Patrol throughout all the areas on one system ; and later
to institute the convoy system. Admiral Duff recognised
that the vessels of the Auxiliary Patrol had so well pro-
tected merchant shipping on coastwise passage and
approaching bases that the U-boat had now found it more
profitable to operate outside the normal patrol limits. In
the northern part of the North Sea, for instance, enemy
submarines no longer approached close to the coast, except
for mine-laying and to waylay crippled ships returning
to their bases after a Fleet action. Trade in the English
Channel was confined to a route passing close to the coast,
guarded by these patrol -vessels, and the crossing of the
English Channel was limited to the hours of darkness.
From Queenstown Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly reported that
" an immense quantity of traffic to and from the English
Channel, Bristol Channel, and Irish Sea is now passing
along the south coast of Ireland."
Everywhere round the coasts the trawlers and yachts,
11—20
288 RAIDS ON DOVER STRAITS [ch. xiii
the drifters and M.L.s, the paddlers and other craft were
hard at it patrolling, sweeping, convoying, salving, and
doing a multitude of jobs throughout the third winter of
the war. Whilst the small craft and their crews were
doing all that could be done, scientific minds on shore
were seeking to devise or improve anti-submarine methods.
This meant a series of experiments, which in turn meant
months of delay before the Auxiliary Patrol could avail
themselves of such aids. While in the Mediterranean and
Adriatic the patrols were toiling with their peculiar phase
of the submarine problem, each area of the British Isles
was using its scant forces as best it could. Irish waters,
by reason of the approaches to our western ports being
so tempting a bait, were being patrolled by sloops and
trawlers, drifters, an armed yacht or two, flotillas of M.L.s,
and decoy-ships. The English Channel, in view of its
contiguity to France, presented special difficulties. From
Le Havre worked six armed trawlers, four mine-sweeping
trawlers, and twenty-six net drifters. The last named
were eventually based on Trouville and rode to their nets
on the flank of the transport channel off the entrance to
Le Havre. In the North Sea the routine was adapted to
the special needs. Grimsby mine-sw'eepers, for example,
were always at sea sweeping the " War Channel " from the
Spurn to Whitby. Every day the paddlers swept the
Humber, its approaches, and the Inner Dowsing Channel.
Armed trawlers were patrolling from Scarborough to the
Haisborough ; net drifters with their nets were ten miles
seaward of Flamborough to harass submarines making
their land-fall thereabout ; south of Flamborough head
and north of Cromer other armed trawlers were stationed
to look out for Zeppelins, and M.L.s were off the Spm-n
doing their patrol and regulating traffic.
The year 1917 did not open auspiciously for us.
Almost as soon as it began a submarine sank by gun-
fire six fishing-smacks and one Ostend trawler off Trevose
Head, Cornwall, and two more smacks were sunk a couple
of days later. Off the north-east English coast the enemy
still made his assaults on our fishing -fleets and on individual
trawlers. Food in the British Isles, but more particularly
in Great Britain, was beginning to get scarce, and the
importance of fish was increasingly realised day by day.
The Germans w^ere not unconscious of the fact and devoted
CH. XIII] A LUCKY GERMAN 289
a good deal of attention to the trawlers, whether commis-
sioned units of His Majesty's Navy or peaceful harvesters
of the sea. In the forenoon of January 28th the fishing
steam-trawler Alexandra was homeward bound with her
cargo of fish and in another five or six hours was expecting
to make the land. When she was about sixty miles east
of the Longstone, UC32 stopped her, took her skipper
prisoner, placed the rest of the fishing crew on board a
neutral ship and, having sunk the Alexandra, went on
her way. A few hours later this submarine sighted a few
more trawlers at their work, amongst them being the
Thistle, Petrel, and Mayfly. She waited until daylight and
then came close to the PetreVs boat, ordered it alongside,
and put Warrant Officer Bernhard Haack into it with
some bombs, a revolver, and a bandolier. UC32 proceeded
to sink the Thistle, while Haack was rowed off towards the
Mayfly two miles to the south-east in order to sink her
with his explosives. In this plan he never succeeded ; for
with dramatic suddenness there now appeared on the scene
the armed trawler Speedwell. The submarine opened fire,
and the Speedwell replied vigorously. This was too much
for the enemy craft, which hurriedly dived with a heavy
list, due, no doubt, to having put her helm hard over.
This left Warrant Officer Haack in a most ridiculous
plight ! He had a bag full of bombs, but his ship had gone
without him, and he was left among a lot of trawlermen
whose affection he had scarcely won. With Teutonic
impudence he requested the trawler skippers to put him
on board a certain Scandinavian steamer which was in
sight. Needless to say this request was not granted. He
was taken below on board one of the trawlers, desperately
perturbed as to what fate awaited him, a hearty North Sea
skipper following behind him. Then, abandoning his
bombs, his revolver, and his bandolier to the Thistle's
skipper, he became the prisoner instead of the captor. At
four in the afternoon he was handed over to a patrol-boat.
His fate was indeed a fortunate one, for about a month
later UC32 came to her end and her crew was destroyed
with her.
CHAPTER XIV
RESUMPTION OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN IN BRITISH
WATERS
At the beginning of 1916 controversy still raged in Ger-
many as to the advisability of employing submarines
against commerce, not only in the Mediterranean, but
in British waters, alike ignoring the rules the German
Government had promised to observe and the protests
of neutrals. The torpedoing under peculiarly dis-
tressing circumstances of the Italian liner Ancona on
November 7th by a submarine flying the Austrian flag
had again roused widespread indignation. In the closing
months of 1915 Admiral Bachmann had been succeeded
as Chief of the Naval Staff by Admiral von Holtzendorf,
who busied himself preparing a series of memoranda,
insisting on the necessity of unrestricted submarine opera-
tions. On February 1st he assured Admiral Scheer, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet, that the unre-
stricted U-boat campaign would be inaugurated on March
1st. The Germans had been watching the development of
British policy of arming merchant ships, and on February
10th the Germans sent a Note to the United States stating
that defensively armed merchant ships would from March
1st be regarded as warships. The argument was quite
unsound. For centuries trading ships have always had
the right to arm in their own defence without changing
their status as merchantmen, and when the German Note
was presented there was not a government in the world
which would have endorsed its reasoning. British armed
liners were at this time visiting the ports of every neutral
country in the world, and in no case were they treated like
warships. The United States Government a fortnight
later informed Germany that she would not in any way
290
CH. XIV] A HOPELESS EFFORT 291
abrogate the right of American citizens in the matter of
traveUing by sea.
The German Emperor, as well as the Chancellor, still
entertained doubts as to the wisdom of the course which it
was proposed to adopt, but in the meantime, as events
were to show, the submarine commanders were themselves
taking action at sea. Early in March a meeting was held
at General Headquarters, and, in spite of all the pressure
exerted by the naval authorities, decisive action was post-
poned. Admiral von Tirpitz was ignored by the Emperor
during this crisis, and a few days later resigned and was
succeeded by Admiral von Capelle.
The month of January had proved a disappointing one
for the enemy's submarines in the Mediterranean, and
February was little better, but the Germans found some
consolation in the early captures which were made by
the Mowe off Finisterre. Only four ships besides the
Coquet were sunk by enemy submarines during January.
Among these was the steamer Marere (6,443 tons). She
had been given a 3-pounder Hotchkiss gun, and when a
submarine was observed on the morning of January 18th
the master (Mr. P. E. Mello) determined to make a fight for
his ship. Malta, the nearest landfall, was 236 miles dis-
tant. As soon as the enemy was sighted, course was
altered to bring the submarine astern ; all hands were
called to their stations ; the gun was manned ; instructions
were given for the highest possible speed, and a wireless
call for assistance was dispatched. Within about a
quarter of an hour an answering signal was received from
Malta. After the position and course of the Marere had
been given, the following reply came : " If you fire you
will compel him to dive and you will be safe, as his speed
under water is small : you must not surrender." Captain
Mello was soon compelled to put this advice to the test.
The submarine had been gaining upon him, and at
length dropped a shell one hundred yards astern. The
Marere replied immediately with her little gun, but, owing
to the superior armament of the enemy, the duel was
hopeless. The 3-pounder shells fell far short of the enemy,
who maintained a continuous fire. His shells fell all round
the merchantman and sent spray over the bridge and
deck, but failed to hit her. Immediately the Marere's
first shot had been fired, it was noticed that the bolts
292 RESUMPTION OF SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN [ch. xiv
holding down the Hotchkiss gun were beginning to give.
Under this handicap, the Marine gunners fired about ten
rounds at the extreme range. With each shot the stability
of the gun became worse, and not a single projectile
dropped anywhere near the enemy. At last the corporal
reported to Captain Mello that the gun was out of action,
and at that moment the ship was struck. Nothing more
could be done, so the boats were ordered out and every
preparation was made to abandon ship. During the few
anxious minutes w^hich followed, shells continued to fall
on the doomed steamer. " On observing the boats pull
away," Captain Mello afterwards stated, "the submarine
fired several rounds at the boats, fortunately missing."
The hospital ship Neuralia had by this time come upon
the scene, and the loaded boats turned towards her, while
the submarine, having fired two torpedoes, both of which
missed, dived out of sight. The enemy, however, soon
reappeared and fire was again opened on the Marere, which
was down by the head and listing badly when last seen by
her crew. The loss of this ship revealed the ineffectiveness
of the 3-pounder gun when opposed by a well-handled
submarine, carrying a more powerful armament. To make
matters worse, this particular 3-pounder had, as events
showed, a defective mounting. In contrast with the fate
of the Marere, seven other defensively armed ships suc-
ceeded during January in effecting their escape from
submarines. By this time an increasing number of mer-
chant ships had been provided with guns, and experience
was showing that an armament, if sufficiently powerful,
was of considerable value, apart from its psychological
influence in giving confidence to the merchant seamen
when suddenly attacked by submarines.
The loss of shipping from the submarine campaign was
again comparatively light in the month of February ; seven
vessels, of 24,059 tons, were sunk with a loss of thirty-
four lives, as compared with five, of 27,974 tons, in the
preceding month, when the death-roll was twenty-eight.
The activities of the enemy raider Mowe, in association
with sinkings on mines and the destruction of a small
vessel off the Kentish Knock by a Zeppelin, raised the
casualties to twenty-six ships, of 75,860 tons, and the
death-roll leapt up to 291. For this sudden upward
movement, the destruction of the Maloja (12,431 tons)
CH. xiv] A GALLANT SACRIFICE 293
by a mine two miles south from Dover Pier, with a casualty-
list of 122, was mainly responsible. The Empress of Fort
William (2,181 tons) and the Thornaby (1,732 tons) met a
similar fate, the master of the latter ship, as well as eighteen
of his crew, being killed.
The manner in which merchant seamen were adapting
the laws of the brotherhood of the sea to the novel and
unnerving situation which confronted them was illustrated
by the plucky action of the master (Mr. R. Buckley) of
the small steamship Cedarwood (654 tons). With a crew
of twelve hands he was creeping down the East Coast on
February 12th with a cargo of pig iron consigned to a
French port, and had reached a position off Aldeburgh
Napes when his eye lighted on a mine, which gleamed
bright red with the rise and fall of the sea. The wind was
high and the choppy sea revealed and hid it from time to
time. Was this evidence of the existence of an enemy
mine-field ? Captain Buckley decided that, if he erred,
it should be on the safe side. Over a dozen other ships
were following in his track, so he hoisted signal flags to
warn them of submarine mines and also had his steam
whistle sounded. Furthermore, he kept the Cedarwood
steaming round the mine he had discovered in the con-
fident expectation that a patrol-boat would come on the
scene and destroy it.
In saving the other ships he sealed the fate of the
Cedarwood. For suddenly there was an explosion :
the fore end of his vessel rose in the air and the
upper bridge, on which he was standing with the mate,
seemed to fall away from under his feet, and he found
himself in the water, clinging to the flagstaff on the stern
of the Cedarwood. He must have been carried right aft by
the force of the water. He was sucked beneath the waves,
but when he reached the surface again managed to reach
a hatch which was floating near at hand. Several members
of the crew had also secured pieces of wreckage, and
eventually six survivors were rescued by boats of the
Binavor, which, very fortuitously, reached them before
they had succumbed to the cold and exposure. Captain
Buckley's prompt signals were probably the means of sav-
ing several of the ships astern of him from destruction,
and in recognition of his thoughtful action he was pre-
sented with a gold watch by the London Group of War
294 RESUMPTION OF SUB]\L4RINE CAMPAIGN [ch. xiv
Risk Associations. So much for the mine-fields, which
in this month, as has been stated, were responsible for the
loss of a good deal of merchant shipping ; but, so far as
the submarine campaign was concerned, February was
a poor month for the enemy.
One incident in the month, however, stands out from
the official records — the destruction of the Franz Fischer
(970 tons) by a Zeppelin south of the Kentish Knock.
It was the first success achieved by an airship operating
against a merchant vessel. This little ship — an ex-German
collier — ^was making her way from Hartlepool to Cowes,
when on the evening of February 1st, which was very
dark, the master was warned by a patrol-boat that there
were mines ahead of him. So, as it was difficult to see
anything, he decided to anchor for the night. The engines
had been stopped by 10 o'clock and the Franz Fischer
anchored about eight miles north of the Kentish Knock,
where a number of other ships were already lying. The
chief engineer (Mr. J. H. Birch), having pumped up liis
boilers, closed all connections. Satisfied that everytliing
was snug for the night, he joined the captain in his
cabin and there the two seamen sat talking. Suddenly
a noise was heard overhead, wliich it was at first thought
proceeded from an aeroplane. It gradually increased.
As one of the able seamen remarked afterwards, " The
sound was like several express trains crossing a bridge
together."
The noise attracted the attention of the two officers
in the cabin, and then the mate, who had come off
the bridge, knocked against the bulkhead and asked the
captain if he had heard the strange sounds. " Yes ; what
is it ? " was the reply. The mate did not hazard an
opinion, but as the noise increased the master decided to
go himself on deck and see what was happening. So,
followed by the chief engineer, he left the cabin, but by
that time silence reigned once more. The Zeppelin had
evidently stopped her engines in order to take a sitting
shot. Then a violent explosion occurred, due to a bomb
which had hit the Frariz Fischer amidships on the port
side. The master and his companion were knocked down
by a column of water which fell upon them, but shortly
afterwards they succeeded in reaching the bridge deck.
The ship had been shaken from end to end, but nothing
CH. XIV] A ZEPPELIN ATTACK 295
suggested that she had been mortally injured. Neverthe-
less, the chief engineer called the men up from below, and
in a few minutes the hands — all, except those who had
been on watch, practically naked — had assembled by the
boats. The boats were got out, but some difficulty was
experienced in cutting away the falls. A man ran to the
galley for a knife, but before he returned the ship turned
over on her port side and went down by her head " like a
stone," everyone being flung into the water.
Owing to the suddenness of the emergency and the
darkness, it seemed as though the whole crew must be
drowned, and there were indeed only three survivors.
When the chief engineer rose to the surf ace, his eyes, piercing
the darkness, fell on a lifebelt box, which had usually
stood on the bridge ; it was floating not far away. He
swam towards it and fomid temporary safety. He was
joined on this piece of wreckage by other members of the
crew, until there were no fewer than eight of them, in-
cluding the second mate, hanging on for very life. Some
of the men endeavoured to climb on to the top of the box,
with the result that it rolled over. This experience was
repeated several times, and each time one or more of the
men were missing. At last the chief engineer decided to
seek some surer means of safety and he swam towards a
lifebelt. He secured it, put it around him as best he
could and, with this aid, swimming a little now and again,
he managed to keep afloat. He afterwards lost conscious-
ness, and when he recovered found that he was in a life-
boat belonging to the Belgian steamer Paul.
In the meantime, the desperate men clinging to the
lifebelt box dropped off one after the other until only Able
Seaman Hillier and the donkey-man remained. They
were in the last stages of exhaustion, and at last Hillier
alone remained. Fortunately the PauVs boat reached him
just in time. It was not known until afterwards that the
Paul had been lying at anchor about a mile away from
the Franz Fischer when the bomb exploded on the latter
ship. As soon as the cries for help from the distressed
seamen struggling in the water were heard, the Paul
tried to heave her anchor, but without success. A boat
was then lowered and put out into the pitchy darkness.
Cries could be heard, but it was impossible to see anj'thing.
But at length the Belgians came across the only three
296 RESUMPTION OF SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN [ch. xiv
siirvivors^ — the able seaman desperately clinging to the box,
the chief engineer, looking as though he were already dead,
and the steward, who had also kept himself afloat by means
of a lifebelt, in the last stages of collapse. The troubles
of these unfortunate men were not yet ended. For the
boat, manned by the mate, the boatswain, a seaman and
a fireman of the Paid, was carried out to sea by the tide.
Signals convinced the master that the boat could make no
headway against the current, and at last, despite a series
of mishaps, he got under way. It was still very dark,
and not until three hours had passed did he succeed in
picking up the boat. By that time the three men of the
Franz Fischer appeared more dead than alive, but warm
drinks and food soon enabled them to recover.
As a footnote to this record of the end of the Franz
Fischer, it is interesting to recall the sequence of events.
On January 31st the enemy had carried out an airship raid
on England, penetrating farther westward than ever
before ; on the succeeding day one of the airships — the
Ll9, as was afterwards learnt — had destroyed the Franz
Fischer with a loss of thirteen lives, including the master ;
and early on the morning of February 2nd the Ll9 herself,
a miserable tangle of wreckage, foundered in the North
Sea. In this way retribution was exacted for the heavy
loss of life which resulted from the raid on shore and the
bombing of the defenceless Franz Fischer.
The capture of the Teutonian (4,824 tons) by a sub-
marine, March 4th, was the first evidence that the sub-
marine campaign in home waters was being resumed by
the German naval authorities, despite the hesitation of the
Kaiser and the Imperial Chancellor. This vessel (master,
Mr. R. D. Collins) was on voyage from Sabine, Newport
News, to Avonmouth. All had gone well until the morning
of the 4th. She was then thirty-six miles S.W. by W. of
the Fastnet when the officer on the bridge reported a sub-
marine on the starboard quarter. Judging by the widely
advertised orders of the German Government no attack
was to be expected, but Captain Collins rang for " Full
speed ahead." Thus a chase began, for the submarine
gradually overhauled the merchantman. The enemy
fired three shots, and in response to this warning the engines
of the Teutonian were stopped. The submarine, after
taking up a position on the port beam, forthwith sub-
CH. xivj SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN REOPENED 297
merged, and without more ado, fired a torpedo which
struck the vessel forward. Fortunately the master had
already ordered the crew into the boats, and as soon as
he realised that his vessel was doomed, he himself slid down
the ship's side into the water and swam towards one of
the boats, which took him on board. The submarine re-
appeared on the surface and fired thirty-six shells, which
caused the Teutonian to burst into flames, which burnt
fiercely until she sank a little short of three and a half hours
from the opening of the attack. By a happy chance a patrol-
boat soon came on the scene and rescued the crew, landing
them in due course at Berehaven, so no one was much the
worse for the adventure, though everyone lost all his
belongings and the ship had disappeared.
In thus wise the submarine campaign in British waters
was reopened, despite restraining influences in Germany,
from the Kaiser and the Imperial Chancellor downwards.
As the experience of the Teutonian had revealed, the
enemy commanders had determined to treat prize law with
contempt and to sink merchant vessels out of hand wherever
they were encountered, without regard for the safety of
the crews on board. On the following day the Rothesay
(2,007 tons) was torpedoed thirty miles from the Bishop
Rock ; on the 8th the Harmatres (6,387 tons) was destroyed
without warning near Boulogne breakwater, four men
being killed ; on the 16th the little saihng-vessel Willie
(185 tons) was sunk by gunfire off the Fastnet ; two days
later the Lowlands (1,789 tons) was torpedoed without
warning of any kind eight miles N.E. by E. from the
North Foreland, and then occurred the sinking of the
Port Dalhousie (1,744 tons), with the loss of eleven of her
crew, as well as the master. This vessel was on her way
from Middlesbrough to Nantes, and on the advice of the
pilot, who had come on board at Yarmouth, the master
dropped anchor on the evening of March 18th about two
miles N. by E. from the Kentish Knock Light-vessel.
Shortly after midnight she was torpedoed. In the words
of the chief officer (Mr. W. F, Spurr) :
" The Port Dalhousie was lying to her anchor, the sea
watch being continued, when a loud hissing was heard
by me and I looked to see what it was caused by. Almost
immediately the ship was struck by, I believe, a torpedo
298 RESUMPTION OF SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN [ch. xiv
amidships on the port side. She sank within one minute.
Only myself, three seamen, and two firemen were saved by
jumping into the water or being washed off the deck as
the ship submerged and then seizing floating hatches.
We were in the water one and three-quarter hours, and
were rescued by the steamer Jessie and transferred to a
patrol-boat and landed at Ramsgate at 11 p.m. yesterday
(March 19th)."
That is the unadorned record by a seaman of the end
of his ship and the deaths of twelve of his fellows. What-
ever might be the confusion of policy in Germany, there
was no doubt by this time of the character of the acts by
sea of the submarine commanders.
An effective contrast to many stories of sinkings which
were being received by the Admiralty was provided by the
escape of the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company's oil-tanker
Turbo (4,782 tons), which gained for the master (Mr. J.
Hill) a mention in despatches. This vessel had been given
a 12-pounder gun, and though she had a speed of only
about 10 knots, she managed to outmanoeuvre the enemy.
Early in the morning of March 1st — at 5.45, to be exact —
when she was in the Mediterranean, on passage from Port
Said to London, a submarine, four miles distant on the
port bow, opened fire on her. Altering course in order to
bring the enemy astern of him, Captain Hill ordered the
fire to be returned. The situation was a trying one, for
the Turbo's crew consisted of fifty-three Chinese and only
nine British. Soon after the duel opened, the Chinamen
almost got out of hand, but owing to the firmness of the
master and the influence of British members of the crew,
they were induced to keep at their stations. For upwards
of half an hour the enemy continued the chase, gradually
lessening the distance separating the two vessels and firing
intermittently. Fortunately none of the twenty rounds
struck the merchantman, while the Turbo's gunners got
at last so close to the submarine that she suddenly aban-
doned the action. Captain Hill completed his voyage in
safety, his ship being undamaged and his crew uninjured.
In this instance speed and good handling proved the means
of salvation of a valuable ship.
Another conspicuous example of pluck and good sea-
manship, which gained for the master the D.S.C., besides
CH. XIV] AN ABANDONED CHASE 299
recognition for other officers and the quartermaster,
was the Duendes (4,602 tons). This vessel was home-
ward bound from St. Johns, N.B., to Plymouth, and
was seventy miles west from the Scillies at 5.40 on the
morning of March 13th when a shot fell astern of her.
The vessel was unarmed and her best speed was only
about 10 1 knots. With hardly a thought of the odds
against him, the master (Mr. Albert Chittenden) decided
he would resist capture. So he pressed on all speed and
brought the enemy astern of him. His efforts were
splendidly seconded by the chief officer (Mr. J. Blacklock),
the chief engineer (Mr. W. Cameron), Cadet F. Bennion
and Quartermasters E. Dobbins and T. Taylor. For an
hour the Difendes outmanoeuvred the submarine, which
maintained a continuous fire. The vessel was hit nine
times, the wireless house, as well as the bridge, was struck
and the wireless apparatus put out of action for a time, but
otherwise the vessel was uninjured. The submarine
commander at length came to the conclusion that his
efforts were doomed to failure. So he abandoned the chase
and the Duendes reached her destination without further
molestation. In the case of the Cunard steamer Phrygia
(3,353 tons), on the 24th, a 6-pounder gun, admirably
fought, in combination with a heavy sea, was responsible
for a fortunate escape. The submarine could not get on
her target, while the gunners of the Phrygia, at a range of
1,500 yards, hit the enemy twice. The first shot caused
her to emit a thick cloud of smoke and to list heavily to
starboard. She then up-ended, and while in this position
was struck again, and nothing more was seen of her.
The master (Mr. F. Manley) was mentioned in despatches
for saving his ship.
During the latter part of the month the mine peril
became very serious. Two of the most conspicuous
disasters must be mentioned. The Sea Serpent (902 tons)
went down on the 23rd off Folkestone Pier, with the result
that the master (Mr, W. Philps) and thirteen of his crew
were killed ; and on the last day of the month the
Alacrity (1,080 tons) disappeared in mysterious circum-
stances. She sailed in ballast from Le Havre for Seaham
Harbour on the 29th, passed through the Downs on the
night of the 30th-31st, and then all trace of her was lost.
She was an old ship, having been built in 1883, but on the
300 RESUMPTION OF SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN [ch. xiv
eve of the war she had been thoroughly overhauled by her
owners, so that there was every reason to assume that
she was seaworthy. Evidence eventually pointed un-
mistakably to the conclusion that she had struck a mine
and had sunk, carrying with her the master (Mr. J. Dickin-
son) as well as the crew of thirteen hands.
The enemy's submarine operations during March also
led to considerable loss of life, the most serious case being
that of the Minneapolis (13,543 tons). The depositions
of the master (Mr. F. O. Hasker) suggest vividly the condi-
tions which then prevailed at sea. For several weeks past
the enemy submarines had met with little success in the
Mediterranean, but the usual precautions had been en-
forced on all masters. The Minneapolis left Marseilles
for Alexandria on March 20th. She followed the course
given her by the Divisional Naval Transport Officer. All
the usual water-tight doors were closed ; boats were
swung out, lowered half-way, and then f rapped in to
secure them ; and Captain Hasker issued a general caution
that a good lookout should be maintained. The Minne-
apolis was proceeding at full speed on the morning of the
23rd, and zigzagging in accordance with Admiralty in-
structions, when an explosion occurred in the forward
end of the engine-room on the port side. No submarine
had been observed. The second officer was in charge on
the bridge, an A.B. was stationed on the fo'c'sle head,
another A.B. was in the crow's-nest, and there was of course
a quartermaster at the wheel. The ship was travelling at
between 15 to 15| knots. The second officer saw a torpedo
approaching the vessel at right angles, but it was too late
to do anything beyond sounding the whistle for stations
before the Minneapolis reeled under the explosion. Cap-
tain Hasker, who had been on the lower bridge, then took
charge.
On going below, the chief engineer (Mr. R. P. Palmer)
found the engine-room flooded, the water having already
risen to within two feet of the top of the engines.
Measures were immediately taken to close the remaining
water-tight doors, which had been left open to enable the
ship to be worked. In spite of every precaution, however,
the ship gradually sank by the stern, while the engines
stopped of their own accord. Nine of the staff who were
down below at the time of the explosion were apparently
CH. XIV] LOSS OF THE "MINNEAPOLIS" 301
killed instantly when the vessel was struck. In a com-
paratively short time, most of the crew had taken to the
boats or rafts ; the master, with the otherofficers, engineers,
and the carpenter's mate, remained for the time on board
the vessel. Fortunately, early in the afternoon two men-
of-war came to the assistance of the distressed seamen,
and an attempt was made to tow the Minneapolis. For a
time the operation was continued with some success, but
at 11 o'clock that night the rope parted, and it broke
again early the following morning. At last H.M.S.
Nasturtium took over the task of towing the ship from
H.M.S. Lydiard. Assisted by a trawler made fast on
each quarter of the Minneapolis, the Nasturtium stuck
to the job until midnight and it was then apparent that
the vessel could not remain much longer afloat. Shortly
after midnight this anticipation was fulfilled and she sank
stern first, three men, in addition to the nine engine-room
hands, having lost their lives as the result of the enemy's
criminal act. From first to last nothing was seen of the
submarine.
This tragedy occurred 195 miles E. | N. from Malta,
and on the following day the Englishman (5,257 tons)
was sunk by a submarine thirty miles north-east from
Malin Head, supplying evidence, supported by the sink-
ing on the same day off Dungcness and Bishop Rock
respectively of the Salybia (3,352 tons) and the Fenay
Bridge (3,838 tons), that the enemy was working simul-
taneously in British waters as well as in the Mediterranean.
The Englishman (master, Mr. W. A. Moorehouse) sailed
from Avonmouth for Portland, Mayne, on the 22nd, and
on the morning of the second day out passed Oversay,
Isle of Islay, steering, in accordance with Admiralty in-
structions, in a north-westerly direction. Shortly after
noon Captain Moorehouse sighted a submarine on the
surface, one point on the starboard quarter about a mile
away. The weather was fine and clear. The enemy was
flying flags, evidently attempting to signal, but the master
was determined not to sacrifice his ship without making,
at any rate, an attempt to escape. So he put his helm to
starboard and rang for extra speed, thus bringing the
submarine right astern of him. The submarine also
altered course and, giving chase, opened a steady fire
upon the merchantman.
302 RESUMPTION OF SUBINIARINE CAMPAIGN [ch. xiv
Captain Moorehouse, realising the desperate position
in which he stood, ordered the boats to be lowered to
the rail and all the members of the crew who were off duty
to stand by them. Within a quarter of an hour of the
opening of the chase, the davits of boats Nos. 3 and 5 on
the starboard side were shot away, causing the boats to
fall into the water, together with about thirty men. The
ship was then stopped, and an attempt made to pick
up the seamen who were fighting for life in the water.
Ten of them were rescued and then the ship was abandoned.
The submarine, coming in close, fired two torpedoes into
her, one on the starboard and the other on the port side,
and continued to fire into her until she sank at 2.30 p.m.
Though the Englishman and ten of her crew were destroyed,
the enemy expended two torpedoes and about forty shots
in the operation, and then, still on the surface, she dis-
appeared. Three days later the Manchester Engineer
(4,302 tons) was torpedoed near Coningbeg Light -vessel ;
on the following day the Eagle Point (5,222 tons) and the
Rio Tiete (7,464 tons) were captured in the vicinity of
Bishop Rock and Ushant respectively, and then occurred
the spirited attempt of the Goldmouth (7,446 tons) to elude
capture.
This vessel was bringing home a cargo of oil from Tara-
kar, Borneo, when she fell in with a submarine while
crossing the Bay of Biscay. The Goldmouth had been
provided with a small gun, so when the submarine's
conning-tower was observed emerging out of the water
about three miles away on the starboard beam, the master
(Mr. R. L. Allinson) determined to make a fight for his
ship, his cargo, and the lives of his crew. As soon as the
submarine had reached the surface, she opened fire from
her two guns. Everything was in her favour, for she out-
ranged the little gun of the British merchantman, with
the result that the two gunners of the Goldmouth fought
under a continuous fire to which they could make no effec-
tive reply. They continued, however, undaunted. At
last one of the enemy's shells struck the bridge, on which
the captain was standing ; another wTccked the officers'
cabin ; and yet another, penetrating the deck, exploded
in an oil-tank. The main steam-pipe was damaged, and
the speed of the Goldmotith, as she struggled through the
oil-covered water, fell off to 3 or 4 knots. It seemed hope-
CH. xiv] THE "SUSSEX" INCmENT 303
less that she could escape, but the master remained on
the bridge with unconquerable pluck, while the wireless
operator continued to send out calls for help.
At last an answer in code was received from a distant
patrol-vessel, but by that time the master, having given
up hope of escape, had, in accordance with Admiralty
instructions, thrown the weighted code -book overboard
with his other confidential papers. At last the wireless
operator had his foot shot away ; Captain Allinson also
learnt that the gunners had used their last shot, having
fired sixty altogether. They had been out-gunned and
out-ranged and, though they had succeeded in keeping
the enemy at a distance, they had not secured a single hit.
Against overwhelming odds — for the enemy fired about
200 shots and hit the vessel twenty times — the master had
made a fine attempt to save his ship. His crew consisted
of forty-seven Chinese and twelve British seamen, and " all
behaved well, especially the British," during an ordeal
which lasted for over an hour. Only two boats remained,
and into these the crew took their places as soon as the
order to abandon ship had been given. The submarine
then drew in and the master was called to go on board,
where, having been roundly cursed by the German com-
mander, he was made prisoner. In one of the boats was
the wounded wireless operator, as well as a Chinaman who
had had a finger shot away, but an appeal for first-aid
dressings was callously refused. The boats were ordered
to clear out, and then two torpedoes were put into the
Goldmouth, which was simultaneously submitted to a
heavy gunfire. As the ship sank, the submarine dis-
appeared. After three hours' pulling the boats were, by
a happy chance, picked up by a trawler. Captain Allinson
was awarded the D.S.C. and the chief officer (Mr. D.
Pearce) and the wireless operator (Mr. R. C. Older) were
mentioned in despatches.
During March an incident occurred which was to have
considerable influence on the enemy submarine war. In
the late afternoon on March 24th, 1916, the French cross-
Channel packet Smsex was making her way between
England and France when she was torpedoed in lat.
50° 42' N., long. 1° 11' E. She was hit forward, her bows
being blown completely off as far aft as the foremast.
A French trawler came on the scene as well as the British
11—21
304 RESUMPTION OF SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN [ch. xiv
destroyer Afridi, and these two vessels took off the
survivors. Among the passengers aboard the Sussex
were many Americans, of whom several were killed. The
torpedoing of this vessel, in face of German pledges, again
roused the United States. The American Government
sent to Germany a sharp Note protesting against the
wrongfulness of the submarine campaign against com-
merce and threatening to break off diplomatic relations.
The result of this Note, presented on April 20th, was that
the German Government capitulated, and ordered the
Naval Staff to see that henceforward submarine warfare
was carried out in accordance with Prize Law ; that is to
say, the U-boats would, before sinking a merchant ship,
come to the surface, stop the prize, examine her papers,
and cause all passengers and crew to leave her. This
decision was diametrically opposed to the views of naval
officers connected with the submarine service, who realised
that, what with the proximity of destroyers, trawlers,
motor-launches, decoys, and other craft, they would be
exposed to the greatest danger, and the submarine cam-
paign, which was intended to bring Great Britain to her
knees, must fail. The U-boats operating against British
commerce in British waters were, therefore, recalled on
April 25th, though of course the East Coast mine-laying
submarines and the submarines in the Mediterranean
carried on as before.
Before the new orders reached the commanders at sea,
they had been very busy, paying no regard to Prize Law
or other considerations. In the month of April fifty-six
British merchant vessels were intercepted, and forty-
three, of 141,193 tons, were sunk, with a loss of 131 lives,
all but six, which struck mines, being the victims of
submarines. The spirit of the seamen, in spite of the
latest threat of the Germans to treat defensively armed
vessels as men-of-war, was unbroken. Indeed, whether
a gun was or was not available, several of the masters
put up fine fights. One event occurred on the first of the
month which attracted the notice of the Admiralty. The
Australian Steamship Company's Ashburton (4,445 tons),
when on voyage from Wellington, N.Z., to London, was
about 180 miles south-east from Land's End when the
master (Mr. C. Matthews) was called to the upper bridge.
Suspicions had been aroused by a " stick," which appeared
CH. XIV] MANY SHIPPING LOSSES 305
to be attached to a pear-shaped buoy standing vertically
about 40 feet distant ; it was stationary. Captain Mat-
thews brought the " stick " astern and then stood watch-
ing it through his glasses. All doubts as to what it
indicated were soon set at rest, for it rose to the surface
and it was realised that the Ashburton was confronted
with a submarine. A distress call was immediately
dispatched, and although the enemy signalled Captain
Matthews to stop, he continued on his course at full
speed, sending everyone available into the engine-room
to help with the fires. The submarine, after a short delay,
opened fire ; fifteen shots hit the Ashburton. She gradu-
ally drew in close and Captain Matthews had to admit
that escape was hopeless : the mast and wireless gear
had been shot away ; the funnel, boats, and deck-house
had been badly damaged ; and five of the crew had been
wounded during the fusillade, which had lasted twenty
minutes. The ship was stopped and the usual formalities
were observed. A torpedo dispatched the Ashburton,
and the crew, in their two boats, were left to fare as best
they might. Happily help was at hand and no lives were
lost. Captain Matthews was mentioned in despatches for
his attempt to save his ship.
On the same day the Perth (653 tons) was torpedoed with-
out warning, with a loss of six lives, when one mile S.E.
by E. from Cross Sand Light-vessel, as well as the sailing-
vessel Bengairn (2,127 tons), 165 miles west -south-west
from the Fastnet. The former vessel was at anchor,
when at midnight she was split in two by a torpedo,
the fore part sinking at once with the chief engineer and
four of the crew. A somewhat similar fate overtook the
P. & O. liner Simla (5,884 tons) on the following day.
She was acting as an Admiralty transport and had been
provided with a gun. This weapon proved valueless,
for when she was off Gozo she was struck without
warning on the port side, the stokehold being pierced
and ten of the engine-room staff killed outright. The
survivors were rescued by a French patrol -boat and landed
at Malta. On the following day, April 3rd, the Clan
Campbell (5,897 tons), also defensively armed, was
destroyed with a similar lack of ceremony and humanity
twenty-nine miles south-east of Cape Bon, happily with-
out loss of life ; and on the 5th the Chantala (4,951 tons)
306 RESUMPTION OF SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN [ch. xiv
disappeared fifteen miles north of Cape Bengut, nine of
the crew being killed.
A far more grievous sacrifice of human life attended
the sinking of the Zent (3,890 tons). This vessel was
also torpedoed without warning. She was outward
bound in ballast from Liverpool to Santa Marta, and
on the night of the 5th, at 10.15, she had reached
a position twenty-eight miles W. by S. i S. from the
Fastnet, when a torpedo penetrated the engine-room,
and was followed by a second, which struck the vessel
near No. 3 hatch. No ship could withstand such in-
juries as the Zent had sustained, and in two minutes
nothing was to be seen of her ; her end came so swiftly
that three boats, in which men had already taken their
places, capsized as the steamer took her dive. From
one cause and another the death-roll mounted to forty-
nine ; among the lives lost being that of a stowaway, a
black, who had thought to cross the sea safely, and at no
charge, in this fine ship of the British India Steam
Navigation Company.
CHAPTER XV
THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT
When the German Government first declared that all
vessels found in the war zone round the British Islands
would be torpedoed without warning, the route which
runs across the southern end of the North Sea, between
Parkeston and Rotterdam, was, perhaps, more immedi-
ately threatened than any of the approaches to British
harbours. Zeebrugge, the base of the Flanders Flotilla,
is thirty-five miles to the southward of the central part
of the track, which was thus a first point of attack for
all submarines on their outward trips ; and every vessel
plying along the route was in greatest danger when she
was in the middle of her voyage, farthest away from land
or naval assistance. The duty of maintaining this danger-
ous service fell, mainly, upon the captains of the Great
Eastern Railway Company's steamers, who soon got an
accurate picture of the risks involved. Between March
and July 1915 the steamship Brussels was attacked
five times : once when she was commanded by Captain
Fryatt, twice when Captain Hartnell was in charge, and
twice when she was under Captain Beeching. The
captains were quite unflinching ; they carried the extra
weight of their responsibilities without complaint ; and all
the steamers of the company sailed at their appointed
times, week after week and month after month.
The service rendered by these men was of the first
importance. War against commerce is made effective
almost as much by holding up sailings as by sinking
or capturing ships, and when the German Government
started their war upon sea-borne trade it was feared that
one of its most serious consequences would be that of
suspended sailings. The spring of 1915 was thus a highly
critical time ; and during the first months of the cam-
paign communications with Holland were threatened by
307
308 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
the fact that a considerable number of neutral vessels
refused to sail. The captains of the Great Eastern Rail-
way Company's steamers were not, however, intimidated.
Early in April our Consul-General at Rotterdam wrote to
the Foreign Office calling attention to the " highly meri-
torious and courageous conduct " of the captains of the
Brussels, the Colchester, the Cromer, and the Wrexham,
and added that the regular sailings and arrivals of the
steamers had produced a great moral effect locally, at
a time when Dutch and other steamships had ceased
running owing to the nervousness of their commanders
and owners. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
and the Admiralty wrote to the company and asked that
their appreciation should be conveyed to all concerned.
This was the second time on which the Admiralty had
expressed their admiration ; for they had already con-
gratulated Captain Fryatt for his conduct in circum-
stances which must be closely examined. Early in the
afternoon of March 28th, 1915, when the Brussels was
approaching the Maas Lightship, on passage from
Parkeston to Rotterdam, Captain Fryatt sighted a large
submarine on his starboard bow. She was U33, just
starting out for the English Channel, under the command
of Kapitan-Leutnant Gansser, who signalled to the
Brussels, which was unarmed, to stop. It was Captain
Fryatt's plain duty to escape capture if he could, and his
obligation was the more binding in that the Admiralty
had instructed all merchant captains to thwart sub-
marine attacks by every means in their power. Apart
from this, Captain Fryatt was quite justified in thinking
that Captain Gansser's signals were a treacherous ruse to
make torpedoing easier.
In any case he was not the man to hesitate ; he had
been attacked once before, and his seamanship and know-
ledge of his vessel told him that, though the danger was
great, he might still avoid it. He judged, at once, that
he had no time to turn and escape by flight, and so altered
course to pass under the submarine's stern. U33 moved
across the bows of the approaching ship so as to torpedo
her when she opened her port side, after the turn was
completed. The two vessels were thus approaching very
fast, and the danger to the Brussels increased with every
second. Captain Fryatt was quick to see that his first
CH. XV] AN EARLY ENCOUNTER 309
manoeuvre had been countered, but he had another ready.
As the submarine crossed his bows he put his helm hard
a-starboard and made straight towards her. Captain
Gansscr was, apparently, not in the conning-tower at the
moment, and the officer in charge gave the order to
submerge. It was at once obeyed ; the Brussels passed
about 50 yards under U33's stern when she was about
25 feet below the water ; and Captain Gansser did not
break surface again until Captain Fryatt's ship was five
miles away. The entry in the Brussels^ s log is of great
importance, as it was made at a moment when Captain
Fryatt's recollection of what had happened was still
fresh and vivid. It ran thus :
" 1.10 p.m. sighted submarine two points on starboard
bow. I altered my course to go under his stern. He then
turned round and crossed my bow from starboard to port.
When he saw me starboard my helm he started to sub-
merge, and I steered straight for him. At 1.30 his peri-
scope came up under my bows, port side, about 6 feet
from the side and passed astern. Although a good look-
out was kept, I saw nothing else of him. I was steering
an E. by S. course at the time of sighting him, and brought
my ship to a north-easterly course when I was over the
top of him. The lat. was 51° 08' N., long. 3° 41' E."
It was a modest way of recording the achievement.
At the lowest estimate of the risks involved. Captain
Fryatt had saved several hundreds of his countrymen
from imprisonment or worse and his ship from capture ;
assuming that Captain Gansser intended to act on the
proclamation of his Government, every person in the
Brussels had been rescued from imminent danger.^
1 Captain Gansser's impressions differed from those of Captain Fryatt,
as was, perhaps, not tmnatural in the circumstances. The entry in USS's
log was as follows : " 28. 3. 15. North Sea, light northerly breezes,
visibility eight miles. 2.20 p.m. steering for the Noord Hinder Lightship.
Sighted a steamer . . . heading for the Maas Lightship at full speed, and
showing no flags. At a distance of four mUes I signalled — Stop im-
mediately or I fire ! — at the same time altering my course towards the
steamer. At a distance of one mile, I cleared one tube for action. The
steamer neither altered its coin"se nor speed. U33 making direct for the
steamer. At a distance of 500 M (metres) , and only a few seconds before the
shot was to have been fired, the steamer put her helm over, and came at
U33 with the manifest intention of ramming us. In view of her high speed
and the large arc described by the steamer, it was not possible for me to
310 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
Four years later Captain Gansser stated on oath that
he had seriously thought of taking the Brussels into port
as a prize. It was not, however, Captain Fryatt's duty
to speculate on the nature of the danger, but to avoid it ;
and how could he, with several hundreds of utterly defence-
less persons under his charge, have trusted to the humanity
of a German submarine commander at such a moment ?
The exact nature of the threat to the Brussels is, moreover,
immaterial, for whether it were capture or destruction,
Captain Fryatt had an equal right, and an equal duty,
to act as he did.
The courage and skill with which the Brussels had been
handled did not pass unnoticed. The Admiralty con-
gratulated the master warmly and presented him with
a gold watch ; and on April 28th his name was mentioned
in the House of Commons in answer to a question by
Lord Charles Beresford.
During the next year Captain Fryatt continued in
command of the Brussels. His record of service would
make monotonous reading, but it was by no means
uneventful to him. His ship, like the other vessels of the
company, was often attacked ; and a high testimony to
Captain Fryatt and his brother-captains is to be found
in the fact that, by June 1916, the Germans had, appar-
ently, given up all hope of interrupting the Rotterdam
service by submarines.
Then occurred the incident which led to events that
moved the world to indignation. Late in the afternoon
of June 22nd, 1916, the Brussels left Rotterdam for Tilbury.
Captain Fryatt had orders to stop at the Hook of Hol-
land to pick up mails, which he accordingly did. By
11 o'clock he was under way again, steering for the
Thames. There was a large number of escaped Russian
prisoners and Belgians on board, and before leaving
Rotterdam the British Consul-General, Mr. Maxse, placed
an important diplomatic mail in Captain Fryatt's charge.
As they left the Hook, both the captain and his first
officer, Mr. Hartnell, noticed strange rocket lights in the
make sure of striking her with a torpedo. As observed through the
periscope, the steamer passed us at a distance of from twenty to thirty
metres, after which she resumed her former course at high speed. . , ,
2.40 came to the surface." The difference in the times recorded by U33
and the Brussels is not a discrepancy between the two accounts. U33
yire^s keeping Mid-European time and the Brussels Greenwich time.
CH. XV] THE CAPTURE 311
direction of the shore ; and when twelve miles west of
the Maas Lightship they distinctly saw " a very small
craft, probably a submarine not submerged," morsing the
letter *■' S." It was clear that the ship was being watched,
and Captain Fryatt issued strict orders that all lights
were to be put out and the passengers kept below. The
enemy was not his only anxiety, for he knew that another
steamer was very near him, steering the same course
without lights. He could not get a sight of her, in spite
of a very sharp lookout, and at half-past twelve he
switched on port and starboard lights for a few minutes.
At a quarter to one Captain Fryatt became aware that
his ship was surrounded by German destroyers, and stopped
her when warned that they were about to fire. He
probably hoped to escape to the very last, for Mr. Hartnell,
the first officer, seemed surprised that no firing occurred.
Captain Fryatt was calm and mindful of his duty.
His first care was to have the diplomatic mail destroyed
in the engine-room furnaces, after which he warned the
passengers to be ready to take to the boats if necessary.
As the last mail-bag was reduced to ashes, the Germans
came over the side with revolvers and bombs. The crew
were pushed into destroyers pretty roughly. Mr. Hart-
nell refused to follow them and was ordered to the bridge,
where he joined Captain Fryatt.
The German officers who took charge of the ship were
very nervous and excited. The senior one of them at
once put the engine-room telegraph to " Full speed ahead,"
but as the stokers and engineers were prisoners in the
destroyers, the stokeholds were deserted and nothing
happened. The German officer then drew his revolver,
pointed it at Captain Fryatt, and threatened to shoot him
dead if he obstructed the navigation of the ship. The
captors were persuaded, very reluctantly, that the fault
did not lie with Captain Fryatt, after which they ordered
their own men to go down and work the engines. They
rushed below and, being unable to read the engine-room
telegraph, put the engines to full speed astern.
The Brussels reached the Schouwenbank Lightship
some time after daybreak, when the German flag was
hoisted. Soon afterwards the Flushing mail-boat passed
close by, and Captain Fryatt remarked, as he saw her,
that the capture of the Brussels would be reported early.
312 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
He was evidently thinking of how anxiety and worry
would spread at home when once his ship was reported
overdue. During the forenoon the Brussels arrived at
Zeebrugge, and after a stay of five hours was sent on
up the canal to Bruges. Both banks were crowded with
Landsturm and soldiers of the Marine Corps as she
passed up.
At Bruges the prisoners were landed and distributed
at various prison camps, after they had been transported
over Germany in cattle-trucks and publicly exhibited in
the towns through which they passed.
On June 28th Captain Fryatt and Mr. Hartnell were
put into the camp at Ruhleben. Barrack No. 1, to which
Captain Fryatt was consigned, was in charge of an
Englishman called Turnbull, a man who owned a business
in Hamburg, where he had lived for a number of years.
He had been dubbed a pro-German by his fellow-
prisoners, and rumour credited him with having played a
very sinister part in what followed : that of getting
Captain Fryatt to talk freely, by being kind and friendly
to him, and laying the information so obtained with the
German authorities. Of this there is no evidence at all.
Turnbull was certainly kind to Fryatt — very likely
because he was lonely and dejected at the ostracism to
which he was subjected — and it is equally certain that
Fryatt never concealed the fact that he had several times
saved the Brussels from submarine attacks ; but there is
no trace at all of any information ever having been lodged
by Turnbull with the German authorities.
The Germans had enough information for their pur-
pose without tapping new sources. They had carefully
noted the statements made in the House of Commons,
when Captain Fryatt's name was mentioned ; Captain
Gansser's report of what had happened on March 28th,
1915, had been in their hands for over a year; and the
High Naval Command was painfully aware of the part
which the Merchant Service had played in thwarting
their plans. These three things — not one of which gave
him the slightest reason to be ashamed — were the cause
of Captain Fryatt's subsequent death.
On June 30th Captain Fryatt and Mr. Hartnell were
given orders to leave the camp under escort. They were
told that they would only be away for a few days ; but
CH. XV] A VINDICTIVE PLOT 313
the instant they passed the camp gates they were for-
bidden to speak to one another and treated as ordinary
prisoners. Their arrest may, therefore, be said to have
taken place at Ruhleben on June 30th, and it will be shown
later that this is an important point. On July 2nd the
two prisoners arrived at Bruges and were thrown into
jail, though no charge was brought against them. What
happened to Captain Fryatt during the next three weeks
is known only in its barest outlines. He was kept in a
cell by himself, although allowed, for a time, to speak to
Mr. Hartnell, and was frequently visited and cross-
questioned by German officials. During those visits he
never concealed the fact that he had been in danger of
attack from a German submarine a year before and had
escaped by steering straight for her and compelling her
to dive. Never once, as far as is known, was he warned
that what he said might be used against him, nor was
any legal adviser instructed to act on his behalf and warn
him of the consequences of anything that he might say.
Did Captain Fryatt, none the less, guess that he was stand-
ing into danger ? He may have drawn his own conclu-
sions from being treated as an ordinary prisoner and
from the repeated cross-questionings. If he did, the
fearlessness with which he faced what was coming does
him the highest honour, for we can only see, in the frank-
ness with which he supplied the material for his own
condemnation, a determination to take all upon himself
and a resolute purpose that he, and he only, should be
enmeshed in the cowardly and vindictive plot which was
maturing.
These long cross-questionings raise another question :
Who was the directing genius of this sinister, methodical
plan to encompass Captain Fryatt's death ? All the
evidence available points to Admiral von Schroder, the
officer in command of the Marine Corps on the Belgian
coast. The laws of the German Empire allowed local com-
manders, in time of war, to bring foreign enemy subjects
before courts martial, without reference to the Central
Government or General Headquarters ; and Bruges, where
the trial took place and where Fryatt was subjected
to those interminable cross-questionings, was within the
limits of Schroder's command. Years later, moreover,
the president of the court — Dr. Zapfel — stated positively
314 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
that the trial had been ordered by Admiral von Schroder,
and added that, in his capacity as Court Martial Officer
(Kriegsgerichtsassessor), he recognised no other authority.
Nor is this all. The case of Captain Fryatt became
engraved on the minds of the local population, and
when the German armies finally retired, Schroder's name
was the centre of a cycle of ugly stories. According
to one. Dr. Zapfel had expressed regret at what had
happened, saying that he was powerless in the matter — a
curious remark from a trained lawyer who, as presi-
dent of the court martial, was responsible that justice
should be properly administered. Bad as the stories
were, there was a peculiar consistency in them ; even
the terrible accusation that Admiral von Schroder said
openly that, by a certain date, he desired that Captain
Fryatt should have ceased to live, assumes a sinister
probability in the light of what happened later. Was
the proceeding of Schroder's sole planning, or were
the high authorities at Berlin consenting parties ? This
question is not so easy to answer, but such material as we
do possess is significant enough. Towards the middle of
July the British Consul-General at Rotterdam informed
the Foreign Office that Captain Fryatt would shortly
be brought before a court martial, and Lord Grey at once
asked the American Ambassador at Berlin to engage a
competent counsel. His Excellency, Mr. Gerard, brought
the matter to the attention of the Imperial Foreign Office
on July 20th. He received no answer, and sent in a fur-
ther Note verbale, marked " Very Urgent," on July 22nd.
Only on the afternoon of the 26th was he told that the
trial would take place on the following day. Why was
there this delay of six whole days in answering ?
On July 24th, whilst Mr. Gerard was still pressing for
a reply, the two prisoners at Bruges were cross-questioned
for the last time, and when the examination was over,
Captain Fryatt was warned that he would be tried by
court martial. His candour and fearlessness had pro-
duced one result : that he alone was charged in the
indictment.
But the vindictive diligence of Schroder and his
subordinates did not limit itself to amassing material
for the trial. They knew, well enough, how their case
would be torn in pieces by an experienced counsel who
CH. XV] THE TRIAL 315
had been given time to prepare his brief ; and, for the
next three days, Captain Fryatt was kept in his cell
without advice or assistance.
At nine o'clock in the morning of July 27th, Captain
Fryatt and Mr. Hartnell were taken to a waiting-room of
the prison, where, to their surprise, they met four members
of the BrusseWs crew. Three hours later they were all
taken to a private house near the town hall, where the
court had assembled. It was called a Corps Gericht des
Marine Corps, and differed from what is known as a field
court martial in that its sentence could be appealed against.
It consisted of a president. Dr. Zapfel, a trained lawyer,
of five officers whose names have not been divulged, and
a secretary.
Before the trial opened, each member was sworn in by
an oath adapted to the duties of a military court : " I
swear by God Almighty that, having given due considera-
tion to the judicial duties imposed upon me, I will adminis-
ter justice in accordance with my conscientious convictions,
so help me God." The formula, therefore, imposed no
obligation to administer the law, and showed that Fryatt
was not arraigned for any offence against a written criminal
code. The enactment of the German Empire which gave
the court its jurisdiction was, in fact, one which made
certain rules of international law binding upon its officers ;
and it was by the set of customs and usages known as the
law of nations, in that it derived its binding force from
the established practice of civilised peoples, that Captain
Fryatt was to be tried. Had it been administered he could
never have been condemned.
As the prisoner and witnesses entered the court, an
officer in uniform told Captain Fryatt that he had been
ordered to defend him. This man's name was Major
Naumann ; he had held a subordinate position in the
Imperial Courts before the war, and it should be said of
him that he strove conscientiously to do his duty.
The charge against Captain Fryatt was that he was
" strongly suspected of having attempted to cause injury
to the forces of Germany " ; and that his action on
March 28th of the previous year came within the mean-
ing of a proclamation issued to the population on land :
" All persons, not being members of the enemy forces,
including civil servants of the enemy government, render
316 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
themselves liable to the death penalty if they undertake
to advantage the enemy state or to do injury to Germany
or her allies."
After the indictment had been read out, the president
laid before the court a telegram from the Foreign Office
at Berlin, asking that the trial should be postponed.
Major Naumann at once seconded the request, by pressing
for a stay in the proceedings, and asked that the American
Embassy should be allowed to appoint a counsel, in view
of the political significance which attached to the trial.
Unfortunately, the matter had already been decided.
Admiral von Schroder had replied, before the court opened,
that the trial could not be delayed, and Dr. Zapfel was not
the kind of man to resist him. The court did, it is true,
adjourn to consider Major Naumann's plea ; but they
reassembled after a few minutes and rejected it.
The prosecution relied, in the first place, upon the direct
testimony of Lieutenant Wieder and a seaman called
Richter, both of whom had been in U33 on March 28th,
1915, and, in the second, upon a written statement by
Captain Gansser, who was then serving in the Mediter-
ranean, and upon extracts from certain Dutch and English
newspapers. The war diary of U33 was the only document
contemporary with the event which was produced in
court : the log of the Brussels was not exhibited, although
it had been in German hands for more than a month.
Captain Fryatt's defence might have been based upon two
pleas : it might have been shown, first, that as he had
been instructed by the Admiralty to resist submarine
attack by steering direct for the submarine if needs be,
he was outside the rules relating to those who carry on
unauthorised warfare ; and it might have been shown,
in the second place, that, in every age, merchant captains
have had the right to resist capture, and that the defensive
arming of merchantmen had been recognised as only an
assertion of that general right.
Had these arguments been presented, no court could
have resisted them ; but it had been the particular care of
Admiral von Schroder and Dr. Zapfel to make a defence on
such lines impossible. There is no reason to doubt that,
given time for preparing such arguments, and facilities for
seeing and consulting with the man whom he was called
upon to defend, Major Naumann would have made out an
CH. XV] A TRAVESTY OF JUSTICE 317
overwhelming case : it was, therefore, carefully arranged
that he should have neither the one nor the other.
Still, he did his best. When the court subjected Captain
Fryatt to a long cross-questioning, he objected to whatever
he thought unfair, and he protested strongly against
admitting Captain Gansser's statement — which does not
appear to have been an affidavit — when Captain Gansser
himself could not be cross-examined. His objections were,
in every case, overruled, and Captain Fryatt had to face
the trained legal skill of Dr. Zapfel almost unaided. His
answers were a perfect reflection of the man's nature :
even in the mutilated, shortened form in which they have
survived, they echo the undaunted courage which animated
him to the last. He never denied that he had steered
straight for the submarine ; but he was never tricked into
admitting that he had tried to sink her. He saw that there
was a difference between thwarting a submarine by com-
pelling her to dive, and attacking her outright, and he
clung to it firmly. He spoke with pride of the watch
which the Admiralty had given him ; but pointed out that
it had been given him for saving his ship from a submarine
and nothing else. One of the most pathetic things in the
trial was the way in which the man's loyalty hampered his
defence. Had he shown, as he could easily have done,
that he had acted strictly on Admiralty instructions in
steering for the submarine, he would probably have been
acquitted ; for when once he had proved that he had
received orders, or something resembling orders, the
accusation of being a franc-tireur would have fallen to
pieces. But those instructions in which his salvation lay
had been issued to him confidentially, and he never so
much as hinted at their bare existence.
Several times the Court strove to get answers from him
which would have implicated the captains of the Cromer
and the Colchester, and presented the prisoner with an
extract from the Yarmouth Mercury which must have
been disconcerting. Captain Fryatt refused to admit a
syllable ; and his answer breathed contempt for a Court
which could admit matter so irrelevant and untrust-
worthy : "I heard the Cromer had been close to a U-boat.
It is not right that such things should be published. Re-
porters make mountains out of the most trivial matters."
Time and time again Dr. Zapfel tried to make Captain
318 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
Fryatt admit responsibility for the stories which were
current in Rotterdam : every time he got back the same
proud answer : "I never boasted that I had rammed a
submarine."
After the last witness had been examined, Major Nau-
mann made his final effort on behalf of the prisoner. There
was no proof, he said, that Captain Fryatt had tried to
ram the submarine, and in its absence, he was entitled to
be acquitted. Should the Court take an opposite view,
judgment ought, none the less, to be postponed. The
evidence of the two eye-witnesses to the event, Lieutenant
Wieder and Seaman Richter, conflicted, for they each
described how the submarine had been manoeuvred, in
a different way. Until Captain Gansser could attend and
clear up the points in dispute, the Court had neither the
right nor the material to decide finally. When he had
done speaking Captain Fryatt rose and stated firmly, but
without defiance, that " he had done no wrong." " I was,
and am still, proud of Captain Fryatt's manly behaviour,"
wrote Mr. Hartnell ; " and when he rose to his feet to speak
for himself there was not a German present who could
face him."
After deliberating for only a few minutes, the Court
returned and found Fryatt guilty. It was then about
4 o'clock in the afternoon.
The Court had persistently refused to listen to any
plea of postponement ; but there was still a loophole of
escape open to Captain Fryatt : an appeal for mercy. ^ He
rejected it, without explaining why ; but his reason is
clear. There was something so base in asking for pardon
from men who, to him, seemed so mean and cowardly that
death was preferable : better, a thousand times, to stand
by his last proud claim that he had done no wrong, and
lay it, intact, before a Higher Tribunal.
Captain Fryatt was taken back to the prison and warned
that he would be shot on the following day ; but by this
1 There is a certain amount of doubt as to whether Captain Fryatt was
ever given a chance of appealing at all. There is no suggestion of an
appeal in the minutes of the coui't martial, and neither Mr. Hartnell nor
the Belgian officials at the execution knew anything about it. It is
certainly most curious that Captain Fryatt should never have mentioned
his reason for not appealing to Mr. Hartnell ; but, on the other hand, the
German Committee of jurists who inquired into the matter in 1919 stated,
positively, that Captain Fryatt was given the chance of appealing and
rejected it.
CH. XV] BRUTAL COWARDICE 319
time Admiral von Schroder was getting anxious. The
telegram from the Foreign Office showed him, clearly
enough, that the American Government was taking steps
to secure a fair trial, and having completely thwarted
them in this, he was anxious that no further move from
high places should come between him and the final accom-
plishment of the work which he had set himself to do.
Orders were therefore issued that Captain Fryatt was to
be shot that evening ; and not even the committee of
German lawyers who, years later, exerted their ingenuity
and learning in excusing the whole business, and relieving
everybody of blame, could find one shadow of excuse for
Schroder's decision.
The findings of this body will be dealt with later ; but
one of its statements should be noted at once : " In re-
viewing the case, the commission has gained the impression
that the military authorities, though they proceeded
rigorously, never failed to respect the manly courage of
Captain Fryatt." If that is so, it is the greater shame to
them that they denied him the rights of a man about to
die, and surrounded his death with brutality and outrage.
After the trial was over, Captain Fryatt was put under
the charge of Mr. Vergaelen, the governor of the prison,
and was allowed for a few minutes to walk about the prison
yard. Mr. Schaloigne, a political prisoner, strove to
comfort him, and Mademoiselle Arens de Berteghem, a
Belgian lady of noble family, who had earned imprison-
ment by acts of compassion to prisoners and soldiers,
seized his hands and promised that she would remain
with him to the end. As they were talking, two German
officers entered the yard and walked up to Captain Fryatt :
unnerved by the long trial, he clutched Mr. Schaloigne's
arm, and asked whether they were going to shoot him
outright. But the two officers had come only to watch
the nervous tension of a man under sentence of death, and
when they started to mock and jibe at him, Captain Fryatt
turned away with a gesture of scorn. At 5 o'clock the
prisoner was taken back to his cell and Mr. Hartnell was
allowed to talk to him.
He had faced death so often, in the course of his life,
that he viewed what was coming calmly ; but *' he was
deeply upset," Mr. Hartnell has recorded, " at the
unfair and cowardly way in which everything had been
11—22
320 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
done." Captain Fryatt was still under the impression
that he would not be shot until the following morning, and
it was only towards 6 o'clock that a Lutheran minister
entered the cell and told him to prepare for death at once.
Naval Chaplain Koehne had half an hour in which to bring
comfort to the doomed man ; and he seems to have spent
a good part of it in trying to persuade him that he had been
justly condemned for an offence against the laws of civilised
warfare. Fryatt, it is recorded, nodded, and said that he
was ready to answer for what he had done. The chaplain
did, then, try to perform the solemn duty which had been
laid upon him. He read over the twenty-third Psalm
with him ; and so it was that, during his last hour of life,
Captain Fryatt heard words which must have recalled the
green woods and pastures of England to his mind, though
they were uttered in the accents of his enemies. Had he
wished to be assured of the mercy of God, he would not
have gone to Naval Chaplain Koehne for guidance ; and
his last thoughts were for his family, not for himself. To
the harsh, unfeeling stranger who stood beside him he
confided the names of his children, and he asked of him
where his body would lie ; when told that it would be in
Bruges cemetery, he begged that a photograph of it should
be sent to his wife. He could not know that whilst it lay
there it would be tended, and covered with flowers, by
Belgian ladies, until the day should come when it would
be carried back with honour to the land which he had
served so faithfully. Finally he asked the chaplain to
write to his wife : a duty which was scrupulously per-
formed in a letter of 400 words, of which nearly half were
devoted to explaining that Captain Fryatt had been justly
sentenced.
Just before half-past six Captain Fryatt was led away.
Mademoiselle Arens de Berteghem was on the watch,
and spoke to him as he went out, at the greatest risk to
herself, for he was then under an armed escort of German
soldiers.
To the very end the Germans strove to insult a courage
which they could not break. Captain Fryatt was taken
to the Caserne d'Infanterie, up the long avenue of shady
trees that passes in front of it, with a brass band play-
ing at the head of the firing party. They led him through
the gateway under the two-storied house which stands
CH. XV] A DELIBERATE MURDER 321
on one side of the barrack yard, where the senior officer
present— Colonel von Bottelar — stood smoking a cigar,
with a sporting dog on a leash beside him, and then tied
him to an execution post which had been set up in the
filthiest corner of the yard, near a manure heap. Nothing
shook the prisoner's composure, and he received twelve
bullets in his chest without flinching.
If, in the vast staff which the German Government
employed to spread propaganda abroad, there existed some
honest and dispassionate -minded man, who traced the
impression left on neutrals by German methods of war,
the effect of Captain Fryatt's execution must have filled
him with grief and shame. In America, the single voice
which spoke in defence of the German court martial
only served to make the opposite opinion more emphatic.
The entire press of the capital condemned what had
happened in the severest terms, and the New York Times
described it as " a deliberate murder." American opinion
was not moved by one of those gusts of feeling which
exhaust themselves in the clamour of the daily press.
The country was deeply stirred : the case was examined
by the most learned and eminent jurists in the land, and
their sentence was unanimous. Dr. Monroe Smith, after
weighing every argument that either side could advance,
concluded that Germany was " endeavouring to remodel
the existing code of naval warfare, in its own immediate
interest, and by its sole authority," and that " the state
which assumes to be a law to itself puts itself outside
the law." Dr. Ellery Stowell was just as impartial in
examining the circumstances, and equally firm in his
conclusions : " The execution of Captain Fryatt, under
the circumstances reported in the press, is an inten-
tional taking of human life without justification in
law."
The private leagues and associations of America consti-
tute one of the strongest motive forces of its public
opinion : it must, therefore, have been with mixed feel-
ings that German residents in America read a stirring
manifesto issued by the American Rights League :
" Although the Fryatt case is not more shocking than
many other acts of the German Government, it is a clear
reminder that Germany still defies our ideas of law and
322 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
righteousness . . . and we believe that American citizens
ought to consider the Fryatt case, and take whatever
action is within their power to keep it unforgotten in the
pubHc conscience. Will you write, or, better, telegraph,
to your Congress man at Washington, to your Senator,
and to the State Department, protesting against the execu-
tion of Captain Fryatt ? And will you also, by personal
interview or by letter, bring the matter before your
local newspaper again ? You will be told that its news
value has passed ; will you answer that its moral chal-
lenge has not passed ? "
In Holland the Press was unanimous ; not even those
sections of it which had shown German sympathies could
find a word of excuse. The Nieuwe Rotter dams die
Courant could only say that it would " disgust neutrals
and arouse fresh hatred and bitterness in Britain." In
Norway and Denmark opinion expressed itself in the same
way. What can have been the feelings of those Germans
who had seen the brains and treasure expended without
stint upon propaganda, as this thunder of disapproval
rolled in on their ears from every country in the two
hemispheres ?
It was possibly Admiral von Schroder's wish to impress
the world with the relentless character of German
power, when he brought Captain Fryatt to trial by
methods which disregarded the form and substance of
justice. If so, his advice was singularly unfortunate, for
all it did was to spread over the whole German adminis-
tration a dishonour which should have attached to him
and Dr. Zapfel alone. If the trial and execution were
intended as a deterrent to British seamen, the plan was
as contemptible as it was cruel, for the case of Captain
Fryatt, his trial and death, set up a standard of conduct
which every British captain strove to copy.
In England the news of Captain Fryatt's death was
received with indignation and horror ; and we can do
him no higher honour than to show that our first feelings
have been justified by time and knowledge, and that he
earned his death by asserting a principle embedded in our
rights as a Sea Power.
The task has been simplified by the German Govern-
ment. In April 1919 a special Committee of Inquiry
CH. XV] THE COM^IITTEE'S " FINDINGS " 323
assembled in Berlin to see whether international law had
been violated by the trial and sentence of Captain Fryatt.
In their opinion it had not : nothing in the whole affair
called for the mildest censure, except the haste with
which the execution had been carried out. Obviously,
then, Captain Fryatt's best defence consists in answering
those who have continued to assert that he was justly
condemned.
First, the Committee examined the technical procedure
of the court martial at Bruges, to see whether it had
been competent to try the case. They found that the
Court was competent, in that it was empowered, by an
Imperial Edict, to try prisoners of war and foreigners
not belonging to the armed forces of the enemy, and that
the procedure laid down for the arrest and detention of
persons about to be brought to trial had been complied
with. On the first head the Committee was probably
right ; but their ruling on the second calls for comment.
Paragraph 4 of the Imperial Edict runs thus ; " The
first consideration with regard to the competence of an
authority is that the accused shall have been arrested
by its subordinates." The Committee of Inquiry stated,
with regard to this, that Captain Fryatt had been ar-
rested early in July 1916, " within the jurisdiction of
the Admiral Commanding the Marine Corps," and that
" the competence of this command was not prejudiced
in that Captain Fryatt was first taken to the civilian
camp at Ruhleben, and thence transferred to Bruges."
All available evidence tends to show that this was not so.
As far as we can tell, Captain Fryatt was arrested at the
gates of Ruhleben Camp — which was not in the jurisdic-
tion of Admiral von Schroder — and there is no proof at
all that those who arrested him belonged to the Marine
Corps. The Committee's findings are therefore suspect
from the start.
The Committee next dealt with the question of Captain
Fryatt's defence ; but it is not possible to criticise this part
of their findings without a brief examination of German
procedure. A long preliminary inquiry takes place before
anybody can be brought before a German court martial.
Those who conduct it are appointed by the local com-
mander-in-chief ; and it is their duty to discover whether
sufficient material exists to support an indictment and
324 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
a prosecution. Their powers are very wide ; for they can
examine witnesses in secret, and have full right of access
to the accused man if he is under arrest. When they
have finished, an indictment is made out upon their report
and a day fixed for trial. Both the indictment and the
date of the trial must at once be communicated to the
accused person. As the results of this inquiry generally
constitute the matter for the prosecution, a prisoner ought,
obviously, to be allowed the advice of a counsel whilst it
is being conducted ; but this the German law denies him.
He is only allowed to consult an adviser if witnesses, who
will not be present at the court martial, are examined at
the preliminary proceedings. In all other cases, he must
face the inquisition by himself.
It is not quite clear whether Captain Fryatt should have
been given the benefit of this permission. If Captain
Gansser was examined by the officers of the preliminary
inquiry, he was certainly entitled to it ; for Captain
Gansser's evidence at the court martial was given in
writing. But the minutes of the court martial do not
explain how the evidence was originally obtained. All
we know for certain is that Major Naumann thought it
most suspicious, and maintained stoutly that it ought
never to have been admitted. It is therefore not possible
to settle the point outright on the available material ;
but we can say that Captain Fryatt was denied the oppor-
tunities of defence which the German law allows.
When the preliminary inquiry is over, the prisoner is
allowed to choose his own defender ; if he does not do so,
the local commander-in-chief must appoint one ; but,
even in this case, he must consult the prisoner's wishes.^
These regulations were absolutely set at nought by
Admiral von Schroder, first, because he never gave Captain
Fryatt any opportunity of appointing his own defender,
and, secondly, because he never gave him the choice
between being defended by Major Naumann or by
the counsel whom the American Embassy would have
employed.
The German Court of Investigation decided that there
was " no rule of International Law " obliging the court
martial to accede to the American Embassy's request.
I German Military Court Regulations {MilitarstraJ Gerichtsordnung),
§§ 337, 338, 342.
CH. XV] GERMAN LEGAL PROCEDURE 325
Possibly not, but that does not excuse them for disguising
that their own procedure had been violated.
Harsh and rigorous as the German military law seems
to us, it assures an accused person a proper means of defend-
ing himself.^ First, a whole week must elapse between
the date on which the indictment is communicated to him
and the day of the trial, and the period can only be
shortened with his consent. Secondly, he must be allowed,
during that period, to communicate with his defender by
word of mouth and in writing. Thirdly, his defender must
have all the documents of the preliminary inquiry sent to
him as soon as it is over. Fourthly, if the trial takes
place before a week has elapsed since the accused man
was first shown the indictment, the president of the court
martial must let him know that he has a right to ask for a
delay in the proceedings. Fifthly, it is particularly laid
down that if the defence of the accused person has been
hampered he may appeal.'
The accused man is, however, deprived of nearly all
these safeguards if the court martial is held " in the field,"
and, as these words are of great importance, it is made to
be quite clear about their meaning. They were defined
by a German law of 1898 in the following manner. The
regulations governing the procedure of the military criminal
courts held in the field hold good : (i) for the duration of
the " mobile condition " of the army or navy, or isolated
parts of the army or navy, and (ii) for the garrison of a forti-
fied place, threatened by the enemy so long as the beginning
and the end of this condition (of being threatened) has been
notified by the governor or commandant, and (iii) for
prisoners in enemy country, or theatres of operation,
depots or sea and coastal war zones. This, then, is the
clause upon which so much depends. So long as Captain
Fryatt was at Ruhleben, or the military district in which
Ruhleben lies, he could certainly be court martialled, but
he would then be protected by all the rules of ordinary
procedure. Once he had been removed from thence
and carried within the limits of Admiral von Schroder's
command, he was deprived of them all. No restrictions
^ German Military Court Regulations {Militarstraf Gerichtsordnung),
§§ 226, 267.
* German Military Court Regulations (Militarstraf Gerichtsordnung),
§§ 345, 275, 400.
326 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
would then be imposed upon the Admiral and his sub-
ordinates ; they could prepare their case as slowly and
methodically as they wished, they could hurry on the trial
and the sentence as much as they chose, and they could
take full advantage of all those rules, which for the sake
of ensuring a rapid procedure, make it so easy for the
prosecution to obtain a conviction and so hard for an
innocent man to prove his innocence.
Captain Fryatt was, as we know, taken from Ruhleben
to Bruges, and the Court of Investigation never once asked
whether his removal was justified or necessary ; that is,
they refused to admit any discussion as to whether justice
had been administered in the abstract or according to the
letter of their own code ; for Admiral von Schroder was not
content with trying the prisoner by extraordinary martial
law, he actually broke its provisions in his eagerness to
obtain a conviction.
It cannot be denied that the field procedure cancels all
right of appeal and makes it unnecessary that a week
should elapse between the indictment and the trial ; but
it still allows a prisoner the right to choose his counsel,
and to consult with him "if circumstances permit."^
Circumstances did permit and Captain Fryatt was denied
both.
Nor is this all, the court left it on record elsewhere that
the court martial procedure laid down in the edict was
based on the assumption that it would be put into force
under conditions of moving warfare, and was careful to
add that due allowance should have been made for the fact
that these conditions did not obtain at Bruges. Now, a
regulation which lays down that those who defend court-
martial prisoners must be on the spot is obviously one
which assumes a state of moving warfare ; for proceedings
cannot be postponed, whilst armies are on the march, in
order to allow a prisoner to consult a counsel who has to
be sent for from a place several hundreds of miles away.
As the court brought forward this argument when they
considered the execution, and ignored it when they
considered the defence, their findings are both suspect and
slovenly.
Next the Committee considered whether the sentence
1 German Military Court Regiilations (MilitarstraJ Gerichtsordnung),
§348.
CH. XV] A BIASSED COMMITTEE 327
of the Court Martial at Bruges had been in accordance
with the evidence available at the time. The question
before them was whether Captain Fryatt's action had
been in the nature of an attack or a defence. They
decided that, as he had sighted the submarine at a greater
distance than he admitted, and that, as he could have
escaped by flight, he attacked from the moment when he
steered straight for her. In their opinion the judgment
agreed with the evidence. That was not a proper way
of deciding whether Captain Fryatt attacked the sub-
marine or defended himself. The heart of the question
lies in the German proclamation with regard to submarine
war. According to it submarine commanders had orders
to attack all merchant vessels at sight, so that the mere
appearance of a German submarine was in the nature of
an attack, regardless of its distance away ; and Captain
Fryatt, in command of a defenceless ship, was under no
obligation to limit his own means of thwarting it. The
Committee never once discussed either the proclamation
or its consequences, and stated, merely, that Captain
Fryatt's " last manoeuvre, carried out against a totally
defenceless opponent, was in the nature of an attack."
When a submarine, with torpedoes in the firing position,
meets an unarmed merchantman at sea, she may be out-
manoeuvred, but she is never wholly defenceless, and a
body which uses language of the kind is not impartial.
The Committee then raised a further question : Whether
anything which affected the Court Martial's finding had
been brought to light since the trial took place. Two
documents which had not been produced before were
examined : the log of the Brussels and the Admiralty
instructions to merchant captains. They decided that
the entry in the BrusseWs log supported, rather than
weakened, the main contention. The essential part of
that entry was that the Brussels had been " steered
straight for the submarine " ; and it is quite reasonable
to say that words of the kind imply an intention to
attack.
The Admiralty instructions raised a much bigger ques-
tion : they cut at the very root of the indictment against
Captain Fryatt, and cleared him of the charge which had
been laid against him. The instructions were in two
sections. In the first merchant captains were given a
328 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
general warning about the areas in which German sub-
marines were likely to be met, and a set of sketches were
added, to enable them to be distinguished at sight. Sec-
tion II dealt with the best means of escaping from an
attack, and opened with the sentence, " No British mer-
chant vessel should ever tamely surrender to a sub-
marine, but should do her utmost to escape." There
were two ways of doing this : (i) by bringing the sub-
marine astern, and making for the nearest land, and
(ii) by steering straight for her if she was sighted ahead.
Now these instructions destroyed the whole case against
Captain Fryatt. The German military code states ex-
plicitly that civilians who make war under the direction of
a " war lord " cannot be regarded as francs -tirenrs ; so that,
even admitting that Captain Fryatt had attacked the
submarine when he steered for her, he was justified by the
mere fact that he was acting under Admiralty instructions.
How did the Committee get over the difficulty ? By the
simple device of discussing that part of the Admiralty
instructions which advised escape by flight ; by omitting
all mention of the other, and by adding to the findings of
the Court a mutilated copy of the instructions, from which
every syllable which went against their contention had
previously been expunged.^ The Committee was, there-
fore, as dishonest as it was prejudiced, and its proceedings
are the more disgraceful in that they were largely directed
by men of high legal position in a country justly famous
for the learning of its jurists and the gravity of its Courts.
But Captain Fryatt's defence is not exhausted by the
mere exposure of the subterfuges of this Committee. He
was justified in acting as he did by the laws of England
and the law of nations, and we must now go back to those
first principles of reason and justice which establish his
innocence.
In one of its last conclusions, the Committee of Inquiry
held that the Court Martial at Bruges was right in con-
demning Captain Fryatt as a "" franc-tireur of the seas."
There is no such thing. The guilt of a franc-tireur springs
from the manner in which land war is carried on, and any
attempt to draw analogies from war by land to war at sea
breaks down utterly. When the armies of two nations
are at war, all belligerent acts are directed against the
1 See Appendices A and B.
CH. XV] LAWS OF MARITIME WARFARE 329
regular forces of each side ; and a general agreement exists
that the civilian population shall be exempted as far as
possible. It is quite true that this rule is very often vio-
lated ; but breaches do not destroy a principle, any more
than successful thieves invalidate the law against theft, and
this general principle involves certain consequences. The
first and most important of these is that, as the lives and
property of civilians are to be respected by hostile armies,
then civilians must respect the exemption which they
enjoy. In other words, they must not take up arms.
Those who disregard this obligation are francs -tireurs ; and
their action is, in a certain sense, similar to that of a man
who assaults another without provocation. But if no
such convention existed, if a civilian's life and property
were threatened from the moment he saw an enemy
soldier, there would be no such thing as a franc-tireur .
Would anybody suggest that a man who had no choice
but to fight, or receive a bayonet in his body, would
commit a crime if he chose to fight ? Or does any sane
person contend that a man would have no right to de-
fend his property if the first enemy soldier he met had
the right to destroy or confiscate it ? Obviously not ; a
man so placed might lose his life in defending his house and
chattels : he would never be 3. franc-tireur .
Now it is precisely because sea warfare is governed by
no convention similar to the one which obtains in war
by land, that the conduct of civilians and non-combatants
at sea is subject to a wholly different set of rules. The
convention with regard to property at sea is, that an enemy
may confiscate it if he finds it, and the natural corollary
to this is, that the owners of such property, or the persons
into whose hands it has been confided, may defend it by
arms if they chose to take the risk. That risk is, either
that they may be killed outright, or made prisoners of war
if captured. The general law of nations acknowledges
this right to resist, but imposes no obligation. The Eng-
lishstatute and common law go farther : not onlyis a master
obliged to resist ; but he is allowed to compel all passengers
on board to assist him, and to punish them if they refuse.^
There is, none the less, such a thing as illegal sea warfare.
If the captain of a merchantman sailed about seizing and
^ " The Master Mariner's Authority," WilHam Senior, Law Quarterly
Review.
330 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
overpowering enemy merchant vessels, without any com-
mission from his government, he would be guilty of piracy.
But piracy involves the question of robbery, and is possible
in war as well as peace : a pirate is not a franc-tireur,
and there is no use in suggesting that the offence of the
one is the same as the offence of the other (as the Com-
mittee of Inquiry did) because the death sentence attaches
to both. A franc-iireur of the seas would be a man who,
without authority, cruised about the seas in war-time,
sinking all enemy ships which he could find, simply for the
sake of destroying them and taking life. To suggest that
Captain Fryatt's action in March 1915 in any way re-
sembled such a line of conduct was contrary to the known
facts.
There is, thus, no rule of reason which forbids a merchant
captain to resist capture at sea, and his right to do so has
been fully admitted in practice. In the year 1799, a case
of salvage claims arising out of the recapture of a prize
was argued in the Admiralty Court. The claims them-
selves do not concern us ; but the words of Sir William
Scott, afterwards Lord Stowell, upon the right of resistance
to capture are very relevant :
" It is a meritorious act to join in such attempts ; and
if there are any persons who entertain doubts as to whether
it ought to be so regarded, I desire not to be considered
as one of the persons who entertain any such doubts."
This judgment was no expression of a merely personal
opinion nor a statement of the English common law ; for,
in the very same case. Sir William Scott described the
Court over which he presided as a " Court of the law of
nations."
In the year 1804, another case, involving the same
general principle, was brought up for decision, the question
being whether an enemy merchant captain who had seized
his captor's ship thereby rendered his entire cargo, whether
enemy or neutral, subject to condemnation. After hearing
the arguments of both parties. Lord Stowell stated the
general principle in the widest and most emphatic terms,
and gave judgment accordingly :
" That there is any ground for condemnation of the
CH. XV] THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE 331
cargo in the conduct of the master cannot be maintained.
It could only be the hostile act of a hostile person who was
a prisoner of war, and who, unless under parole, had a
perfect right to emancipate himself by seizing his own
vessel. ... If a neutral attempts a rescue he violates a
duty imposed upon him by the law of nations. . . . With
an enemy master, the case is very different. No duty is
violated by such an act on his part."
In other countries, the same question has been decided
in the same way. During the Napoleonic wars the case of
the Pegou was brought before the Court of Cassation in
Paris. The vessel flew the American flag, and had been con-
demned as a prize in the Court of First Instance at Lorient
on the ground that she had been armed for war, without
any commission from her Government, with " ten guns of
different calibres, musketry, and munitions of war." The
ease was learnedly and elaborately argued, and, in giving
judgment, Portalis was as careful in stating the basic
principle involved, as Lord Stowell had been in the British
Court. " Defence is a natural right, and means of defence
are legitimate in voyages at sea, as in all other dangerous
occupations." ^
The Courts of America have been equally firm. In the
year 1815 the case of the Nereide was brought before the
Supreme Court on appeal. The question for decision was
whether neutral goods which had been put on board an
armed merchant vessel, flying the flag of a country at war,
had thereby been tainted with belligerency. On this
point the judges could not agree ; but they were quite
decided on the question whether resistance to capture was
lawful. The majority of the Court, in giving judgment,
stated that : "A belligerent [merchant] vessel had a
perfect right to arm in his own self-defence," and the judge
who disagreed with the general conclusion of the Court was
careful to say, in his dissenting judgment, that a belligerent
merchant ship " may lawfully resist search." ' This
general right has not only been asserted in Prize Courts : it
has been regarded as so inherent in every merchant captain
engaged in trading and trafficking upon the high seas that
it has influenced policy.
* Pistoye et Duverdy : Traite de Prises Maritimes, vol. ii, p. 51.
* Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vii, p. 488.
332 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the revolt
of the Spanish colonies in South America started a des-
perate guerilla warfare at sea. Being unable to equip ships
themselves, the revolutionary Governments encouraged
American adventurers to man and arm vessels in their
own country, and then to sail for some harbour in the
revolted colonies. After receiving letters of marque from
the revolutionary Governments, they preyed upon Spanish
commerce from one end of the Atlantic to the other. There
was, in all this, much that was unlawful ; but, although
the Supreme Court often refused to admit as prizes vessels
which the Courts of the revolted colonies had declared to
be so, and though many restitutions were ordered, the
American Government never prevented the arming and
equipping of these privateers. So long as there was a
reasonable chance that the arms and munitions supplied
were to be used in defending lawful commerce, the right
of self-defence could not be tampered with for reasons of
policy.^
It would be enough to limit quotations to the cases
cited ; for the law of nations is a set of customs, and not
a written code : it is composed of what has been done and
not of what has been written. Still, the opinions of high
authorities are valuable, for they may draw from cases
and judgments consequences that may not be apparent
at a first inspection. In this matter, however, expert
opinion neither widens nor restricts the general principle.
It merely reasserts it ; and Oppenheim sums up the con-
sidered opinion of the jurists — British, American, French,
and Italian — when he states that —
" Enemy merchant ships may be attacked only if they
refuse to submit to visit, after having been duly signalled
to do so. No duty exists for an enemy merchantman to
submit to visit ; on the contrary she may refuse, and
defend herself ' against an attack.' "
German opinion was quite as firm. Perels stated the
general rule without the least equivocation ; Dr. Wehberg
repeated it in terms equally emphatic :
" The enemy merchant ship has then the right of defence
1 See Decisions of the Supreme Court of the U.S.A., vol. v, p. 307.
CH. XV] ARMED MERCHANTMEN 333
against an enemy attack, and this right it can exercise
against visitation, for this is, indeed, the first act of capture."
But the German contention is not yet answered: This
right of resistance might be admitted, the Committee stated,
but only in the case of armed merchantmen ; unarmed
vessels like the Brussels must submit. There is only one
test to this argument : Do modern states divide merchant
vessels into two classes, each with its own status, duties,
and privileges ? If they did, the German plea would be
sound ; but the question has been most elaborately dis-
cussed, and the decision come to is in exactly the opposite
sense. Previous to 1914, the British Government had
mounted guns for defensive purposes in a number of large
liners. As soon as the country was at war, British repre-
sentatives abroad were instructed to explain to neutral
Governments that such armament as might be found on
board liners visiting their harbours was for defence alone.
Those liners were still merchantmen, and would not be
converted into auxiliary cruisers.
The neutral Governments of Europe and America at
once examined this declaration. The smaller states of
South America made practically no comment on it, and
admitted armed merchant vessels to their harbours as
ordinary trading- vessels. The Government of the Argen-
tine was more particular, and strictly enforced their port
regulations with regard to munitions and explosives when
armed merchantmen visited Buenos Aires ; but on the
general principle they were most explicit :
" Foreign merchantmen, which, without having been
officially declared auxiliary cruisers, none the less carry
guns for their defence, may not use them within the
territorial waters of the State . . . but, as these vessels
have not been given the legal position of men-of-war, any
act of hostility which they may commit within the territorial
waters of the State will be regarded as a criminal action,
falling to be judged by the laws of the nation."
Nothing could be clearer : armed merchantmen are
simply merchant vessels. This admirable declaration seems
to have guided the other large states of South America ;
for the Governments of Chile and Brazil informed the
334 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
British Foreign Office soon after that they were satisfied
with the assurance given.
In the United States the British declaration was
examined with the greatest care. The question made
feeling run high, and, in the House of Representatives,
one member after another urged that British armed
merchantmen should only be admitted to American ports
as auxiliary cruisers. For a time it seemed as though
the Secretary of State might bow before the storm ;
but Senators Sterling and Lodge caused the question to
be examined afresh, and when at last the Administration
made up its mind, the decision given was singularly
emphatic : " Merchantmen of belligerent nationality,
armed only for purposes of protection against the enemy,
are entitled to enter and leave neutral ports without
hindrance in the course of their legitimate trade." That
is, a merchantman does not change its character by the
mere fact that it is defensively armed, and the rights,
privileges, and status of merchantmen are uniform.
The neutral states of Europe decided in the same way ;
the Spanish Government simply made the captains of
armed merchant vessels give assurances that they would
not use their weapons for offensive purposes, and treated
their ships like ordinary traders ; the Scandinavian
Government accepted the British declaration without
comment. There was, it is true, one exception. The
Netherlands Government refused to admit armed merchant-
men to their European ports in war-time ; but the reasons
for that refusal, on examination, leave the basic question
quite untouched. The Netherlands Government never
suggested that armed and unarmed merchantmen had a
different legal status, but stated simply that the position
of Holland in the North Sea made it imperative that the
Government should protect its territorial waters from being
the theatre of temporary hostilities. The British Govern-
ment did not like it at the time, but the argument was
reasonable. An armed merchantman in the Flanders
bight, steaming from a submarine at the top of her speed,
might easily be carried over to the Dutch shore. Shots
would certainly be exchanged during the pursuit, and all
the tiresome consequences of acts of war committed in
neutral waters would follow. The rule of the Netherlands
Government was therefore based upon policy and con-
CH. XV] A FALSE DISTINCTION 335
venience, and, to make its position quite clear, armed
merchant vessels were admitted to harbours in the Dutch
colonies on the same terms as ordinary trading-vessels.
Europe reached the same conclusions as the American
states, and the distinction which the German Committee
of Inquiry strove to make between armed and unarmed
merchantmen was no distinction at all. They only
attempted to make it because the German prize code
allows the right of an armed merchantman to resist
capture, and they did not dare face the consequences of
their own rule of war. The right to arm is meaningless
unless the wider right of self-defence is admitted, and an
impartial body would have confessed outright that Captain
Fryatt's action was justified by reason, by practice, and by
the laws of the German Empire.
How did the German Committee of Inquiry escape from
this cataract of testimony ? It argued that a merchant
captain's right to resist capture was still undecided, not
because Prize Courts had disputed it, or because it had
been questioned in practice, but because some writers
had asserted the contrary. Upon what writers did they
rely ? Upon two delegates at the meeting of the Institut
du Droit International at Oxford in 1913, whose reserva-
tion on the matter disputed could not have been extended
to submarine warfare ; upon a few isolated writers in the
British daily press ; upon a contributor to a publication
called Concord; and upon Dr. Schramm, who, "as con-
fidential adviser to the German Admiralty, voiced the
opinion of the German Naval Staff." Having confronted
the accumulated judgment of centuries with these con-
trary opinions, the Committee of Inquiry decided that
the Court Martial at Bruges committed no breach of in-
ternational law in following Dr. Schramm upon a point
so keenly disputed. If the import and meaning of the
law of nations are to be thus expounded ; if it is to be
open to all who wish to settle a point, to pick out
opinions favourable to their own view from the enormous
literature of international law, and call them proof of
a contention, then, what has hitherto been called the
science of international jurisprudence becomes, at once, a
vast system of casuistry, which awaits the coming of a
second Pascal to fall into universal contempt.
But international law is not built up of " probable
II- 23
336 THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT [ch. xv
opinions," nor is it the product of learned minds. It is
the recorded custom of civihsed peoples, and the true
meaning of those customs may be rightly or wrongly in-
terpreted. Captain Fryatt's innocence is alike attested by
British history, by British laws, and by British privileges
at sea. He upheld a right which is vital to those who
go down to the sea, and defended it with constancy,
loyalty, and unflinching courage. His body now rests
in the cemetery at Harwich, and a memorial at Bruges
commemorates his life and death. He committed no
crime in national or international law, and the British
people instinctively have paid, and will continue to pay,
high honour to his memory as a martyr to a great cause.
CHAPTER XVI
THE enemy's final PLUNGE
When the German Government abandoned what was
in fact, if not in name, unrestricted submarine warfare in
the spring of 1916, its Ministers and advisers were divided
into three groups of opinion. First, the Imperial Chan-
cellor and some of his assistants, like Helfferich, looked upon
the concession as a first step towards a general peace
to be effected by President Wilson's mediation ; secondly,
there was a powerful group of military men who, though
they did not like submitting to American pressure, none
the less admitted that it was the best course to take ;
thirdly, there was the solid block of naval officers holding
high rank who bitterly regretted the Chancellor's con-
cession, and were determined to reverse it if they could.
It was only natural, perhaps, that the officers of the
German Navy should have been deeply stirred by the
prospect which had opened before their eyes. Early in the
year the Chief of the Staff, General von Falkenhayn,
had stated that the German Army could not finish the
war without naval co-operation ; and the assistance for
which he craved was an attack on the Allied, and particu-
larly the British, lines of communication so powerful
that it would sensibly diminish the volume of military
supplies to the chief theatres of war.
Falkenhayn's appeal had produced a remarkable effect
on naval opinion, and particularly on the junior officers
and no small proportion of the men. He had suggested
that the hour had struck for the young German Navy to
win lasting glory. It had lived since its birth in humiliating
subordination to the other service, and now saw a unique
opportunity in the Chief of the Staff's admission. Could
they but carry through the task assigned to them, the
share of German naval officers would be equal to that of
the leaders of the Army ; they would rank in fame with the
337
338 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
Roman Consul who " had not despaired of the repubhc "
in her darkest hours ; they would be raised to an equal
place in German history with the Scharnhorsts, the
Derfiaingers, and the Bluchers ; and they would live in
future years as the men whom Imperial Germany delighted
to honour.
During the ten months between May 1916 and February
1917, two of these currents of opinion struggled for mas-
tery, for the military party, which " pursued the middle
course," soon disappeared and was replaced by another
which became the chief advocate of the strictly naval
standpoint. The Chancellor, striving for a negotiated
peace, was thus confronted with a navy, supported in
influential quarters, demanding submarine warfare on
a scale which would make negotiations impossible. In
the end the Navy won ; but it was only by a narrow
margin.
It is not within the scope of this history to trace the
diplomatic negotiations carried on by the Chancellor and
Count Bernstorff during this ten months ; both men
pressed them forward steadily and ably, and, as they
worked with the Emperor's full approval, they were able
to keep naval pressure in check, so long as they had the
smallest hope of success. The naval leaders thus saw
the splendid perspective, which had been opened to them
by General von Falkenhayn's appreciation, grow fainter
and more distant, but they never despaired of reaching
their goal, and the history of the submarine campaign
between April 1916 and February 1917 is the history of
the German Navy's effort to make its will prevail in the
Empire's councils.
At the outset they had to secure union amongst them-
selves, for they were sharply divided. Admiral Scheer,
in command of the High Seas Fleet, hoped to force the
hand of those with whom the decision lay, by refusing
to allow the submarines to operate against commerce like
surface cruisers, claiming that the conditions exposed
officers and men to risks which they should not be called
upon to face, and that, in any event, the limited warfare
could not attain its objective. By sullenly adopting an
" all or nothing " attitude, and by keeping the submarine
flotillas idle at their moorings in the Jade and the Ems,
he seems to have hoped that he would raise such in-
CH. XVI] " UNRESTRICTED " WARFARE 339
dignation in the hard-pressed Fatherland that the
Chancellor would be compelled to give way. Admiral
von Holtzendorff was convinced that such an attitude
was unwise. He was in favour of keeping the submarines
at work in order to make their achievements the basis
of a demand for greater latitude. His view prevailed,
and the first phase of this new period is the one in which
the German submarines adapted themselves to their new
orders, and endeavoured to show what results they could
achieve in spite of their adherence, more or less strictly,
to the restrictions of cruiser warfare. This phase stretched
right on into the autumn of the year 1916, by which time
the U-boats had crawled down the trade routes and were
operating off the Azores, on the track to Archangel, in the
White Sea, and on the western side of the Atlantic. The
British Naval Staff in Whitehall had watched their prog-
ress with the anxiety of a physician who studies the steady,
unrelenting spread of a harmful symptom.
In the next phase the U-boats closed up their areas of
activity slightly ; and in the third and last they steadily
and persistently intensified their efforts in the theatres
which their experience had shown to be most promising.
This final period simply marks an effort on the part of the
Navy to break through the restrictions by which they
were bound. Its incidents supply proof of what Karl
Helfferich had foreseen when he said : "I could never
get it out of my mind that when the Lords of the Navy
said extended submarine warfare, they meant unrestricted
submarine warfare." The remark was true. During
the autumn months of 1916 the number of vessels
sunk without warning rose steadily, until, at the begin-
ning of the New Year, the pretence of attacking com-
merce according to the rules of cruiser warfare had worn
very thin ; and when, in February 1917, the Chancellor
announced that Germany was compelled to resume
intensive submarine warfare owing to the rejection of her
peace proposals, he was announcing what had, to all
intents and purposes, become an accomplished fact.
The execution of Captain Fryatt at the end of July,
and the indignation which that event aroused throughout
the civilised world, was not without its influence, as has
been suggested, on the enemy's submarine policy. The
result of the Battle of Jutland had prompted Admiral
340 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
Scheer to renew his representations to the Emperor.
" A victorious end to the war at not too distant a date,"
he wrote, " can only be looked for by the crushing of
English economic life through U-boat action against
English commerce." The advice of the Commander-
in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet in favour of intensive
warfare was, however, unacceptable at the moment, and
the record of ship sinkings during the month of August
reflected the confusion of policy which prevailed in
the official world of Germany at this period. During
August only twenty-two ships, of 42,553 tons, were sunk
by submarine, with the loss of five lives. The one vessel
which was torpedoed without warning was the Aaro
(2,603 tons). A wireless message from Berlin announced,
in pursuance with the official German policy of the
moment, that the Aaro had been blown up by a " war-
ship," it being added that " there seems to be little hope
of anyone being saved." The deliberate misrepresenta-
tion was only revealed later on. While on a voyage to
Christiania the ship was sunk in the North Sea by a
submarine. Only three lives were, in fact, lost, and the
remainder, including the master (Mr. Harry Newton),
were taken prisoners and interned at Tielmen. On the
same day the Heighington (2,800 tons) was captured and
torpedoed off Cape Serrat. On succeeding days a number
of small ships were secured by the enemy, but in no case
were any members of the crew either killed or taken
prisoner.
During this period the enemy still continued his activities
in the Mediterranean. The remainder of the month sup-
plied only two outstanding incidents — the destruction of
the Swedish Prince (3,712 tons) in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, when on passage to Bizerta, and the loss of the
Duart (3,108 tons) off the Algerian coast on the 31st. On
the morning of the 17th the former vessel was steaming
in company with the Astereas when a submarine was seen.
The Swedish Prince, which had a gun on board, immediately
warned her unarmed companion of the submarine's
presence, and both vessels altered course to southward at
full speed. Within a quarter of an hour a duel had
developed between the enemy and the defensively armed
merchantman, but the 3-pounder gun of the British
vessel proved useless at the range selected by the sub-
CH. XVI] SHIPS ESCAPE CAPTURE 341
marine. Nine or ten shots struck the Swedish Prince, the
second officer receiving wounds from which he afterwards
died. The contest was a hopeless one, so the master (Mr.
J. A. Halloway) at last ordered the engines to be stopped.
While preparations were being made to abandon the ship,
the submarine continued firing, and then, coming alongside
the ship's boats to which the crew had taken refuge, made
Captain Halloway, the chief engineer (Mr. William Poole),
and the gunner, a Frenchman, prisoners. The chief
officer and the remainder of the crew eventually reached
Port Pantellaria without further misadventure. The
Duart on the last day of the month fell a victim to an
Austrian submarine.
Of the thirteen ships, of 34,862 tons, which escaped cap-
ture in August, possibly the most notable case was that
of the little Hull steamer, the Destro (859 tons). On the
afternoon of August 3rd, when nine miles N.E. by E.
of Coquet Island, a submarine opened fire from her
two guns. The master of the Destro (Mr. Edward B.
Johnson) had no defence except his speed, but he at once
brought the submarine astern of him. Time and again
the Destro was hit. The enemy repeatedly manoeuvred to
get on the quarter of the British vessel. At last Captain
Johnson thought an opportunity offered to ram the enemy,
so he put his helm hard over, but the submarine did the
same. As a result of this manoeuvre, the Destro gained an
increased lead, but it was not until the unequal action had
lasted fifty minutes that the enemy abandoned the chase.
By that time the ship's boats had been badly damaged by
gunfire and the funnel had been holed, making stoking
very difficult, while the bridge and deck-house, as well as
the ladders and compass, had all suffered in greater or less
degree. Captain Johnson was awarded the D.S.C. for his
determined resistance, and the chief engineer (Mr. T,
Martin) was mentioned in despatches.
Another illustration of the fine courage which British
seamen were exhibiting was furnished by the Strathness
(4,345 tons). She was in the Mediterranean when she was
attacked at a range of 5,000 yards. The enemy dis-
charged thirty shots without hitting the ship, and the
Strathness, with her 15-pounder, replied with twenty-five
rounds ; one of them struck the submarine and caused a
large volume of smoke to rise from her. Her captain
342 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
evidently concluded that he had met a tartar and made
off. For the second time in the course of a short period,
the master (Mr. David Thompson) had fought a successful
action against submarines, and he was mentioned in
despatches.
The losses in September rose ; thirty-four ships, of 84,596
tons, were destroyed by submarines and sixteen lives were
sacrificed. Nine ships were sunk without warning, supply-
ing an indication of the little respect which some of the
German officers operating at sea had for the superior
orders which they had received. All these infractions of
the rules of cruiser warfare happened in the Mediterranean.
The heaviest loss of life occurred in the latter half of the
month, when the enemy exhibited a new phase of ruthless-
ness. Six members of the crew of the Inverbervie (4,309
tons) were killed on the 14th, and three days later the Lord
Tredegar (3,856 tons) and the Dewa (3,802 tons) went down
off Malta, four lives and three lives respectively being lost.
Throughout the month the enemy pursued the new policy
of making prisoners, taking off defensively armed ships
the gunners as well as the masters.
The story of the circumstances in which the Roddam
(3,218 tons) was captured seventy-six miles east-south-
east from Barcelona may serve as an example of the
conditions in which merchant shipping at this period
was carried on. On the morning of September 26th
the Roddam was making her way home to England,
when a French torpedo-boat destroyer signalled that
a submarine had been seen some hours before, making
a course which would bring her near the Roddam. The
master changed his course and went on his way. A
short time afterwards another French destroyer issued
another warning, and gave the master a change of
course which would, it was thought, ensure the safety
of his ship. As soon as she was well away on her new
course, a submarine opened fire at long range. The
weather was fine and the atmosphere clear, but the captain,
though he must have realised the penalty he was incurring
at the hands of the enemy — the submarine was flying the
Austrian flag — ran up his ensign and replied with the one
little gun available. The resistance was, of course, hope-
less, but it was characteristic of the spirit in which merchant
seamen of this period were confronting the enemy. We
CH. XVI] A PLAIN TALE FROM THE SEA 343
have in the sworn statement of the second officer, Mr. A. A.
French, an unadorned record of the way in which the ship
met her fate :
" At 4 o'clock p.m. I was reheved from the bridge and
went below at about half -past four. I heard a shell come
across the bridge, and I then ran up to the bridge and saw
the submarine at about 4.35 p.m. The captain gave me
the order to keep the ship's stern to the submarine and
ordered the gunners to return fire, which was done. We
ran for about fifteen minutes until a shell exploded in the
chart-house. The captain then ordered the boats to be
got ready. The gunners came aft and reported that we
were hopelessly outranged. The ship was stopped and
the boats pulled away.
" The submarine when first seen was three and a half to
four miles away, and remained at that distance ; the range
of our gun, which was a 6-pounder, was only two miles, and
all our shots dropped short. The submarine fired some
twenty shots at us and we fired about ten in return. The
submarine came up to my boat (the master's boat) and
told the captain he was a prisoner for having fired upon
him. The commander of the submarine then took the
captain on board and sent him below. Noticing that our
boat was holed, the submarine towed us back to our ship,
allowing us to go on board to get another boat as long as
we kept away from the gun platform. We went on board
and lowered the motor-boat out, into which I placed eight
men. About this time we lost sight of the mate's boat
and did not see her again. When we were off the ship the
submarine approached and fired four shots into the
Roddam ; when we last saw her at 7 p.m., when it fell
dark, she had a very heavy list and was sinking. We
were picked up by the French motor patrol Frippone next
day at 1 p.m., and taken to Marseilles. . . . When I
went on board I found the cabin saloon and chart-house
all smashed up by the shell which struck us."
Whether any of the officers and men of the Roddam
would live to tell the tale of their adventures must have
seemed at one time doubtful. Darkness had fallen and
a gale had sprung up. The two well-laden boats were
thirty-five miles away from the nearest land, and they
344 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
soon became separated. Mr. French has described how
he and his companions were rescued, but it was not until
some time later that news reached the Admiralty that the
chief officer's boat had been picked up by a neutral vessel
and taken into Valentia. That any of the crew survived
was due to the fine seamanship exhibited by the chief
officer and the second officer as they struggled in conditions
of sea and weather which might well have paralysed the
initiative and courage of less dauntless men.
If the sinkings during the month were heavy, the number
of vessels which escaped — twenty-nine, of 122,933 tons —
was also large. The captain of the Bellview (Mr. James
S. Churchill) in particular well earned the D.S.C. which
was conferred upon him in recognition of the manner in
which he saved his ship. When on passage from Malta
to Port Said on the 17th, a submarine was sighted on the
starboard beam only three miles away. Captain Churchill
followed what had now become the well-established routine
in the service, putting on full steam and bringing the
enemy astern of him. The submarine dived, but ten
minutes later came up again on the starboard quarter.
Though the range was 6,000 yards, the British vessel
opened fire with the one 15-pounder gun which she mounted.
By a happy chance the Bellview (3,567 tons) was carrying
four motor-launches, and the 13-pounder guns in two of
these little ships were brought into action. It was well
that the Bellview possessed this additional defence, for
after ten rounds had been fired, her 15-pounder became
disabled, and the safety of the ship then depended upon
the efficient use of the 13-pounders, which continued to fire
unremittingly. Three hours after the submarine had been
sighted a shell struck one of the motor-launches and,
passing through her, penetrated the ship's hold. But
events were to show that the Bellview had fired better in
the contest than the enemy, who at half -past one, having
apparently been hit, turned broadside to the ship and
" when last seen appeared to be sinking by the stern."
About a week later another merchant officer, the master
(Mr. G. R. Thompson) of the Dunrobin (3,617 tons), also
gained the D.S.C. for the manner in which he fought his
ship, a vessel capable of steaming only 7| knots and carry-
ing only one 15-pounder gun. It was on the morning of
the 26th when a submarine appeared two miles distant
CH. XVI] RANGE OF ACTIVITY EXTENDED 345
from the British vessel, and Captain Thompson had barely
succeeded in bringing the enemy astern, when a determined
duel opened. After an interval of forty-five minutes the
submarine appeared to be in difficulties and ceased firing.
A high-explosive shell was then discharged by the Dunrohin
and it struck the submarine near the conning-tower,
causing an explosion ; smoke rose in the air to a height of
30 feet. As the smoke cleared away it was seen that the
conning-towTr had been injured, and three common shells
in quick succession were fired, and fired so accurately that
each of them found its target. The submarine's stern by
this time was high out of the water, and the last that was
seen of her was when she was diving in haste at an angle of
45 degrees. Though the Dunrobin was hit once, she
emerged from the action triumphant, having suffered no
casualties.
Before the month was out the Strathness again came
under attack, Captain Thompson having since the last
occasion been succeeded by Captain L. Barnett. Once
more the value of her 15-pounder gun under efficient
control was illustrated. For an hour and a half she was
under fire off Dragonera Island, and though she fired
only 57 rounds to the enemy's 150 rounds, she won the
action.
The German naval authorities, having successfully in-
vaded the Mediterranean, were intent at this stage of the
war on demonstrating in the eyes of the world the extended
range of their newer and larger type of submarine. In
the autumn of 1916, to the unbounded satisfaction of the
people of the Fatherland, they were able to produce
evidence that these vessels could be employed not merely
in the Arctic Ocean, but even as far away as the coast of
America. Indications of submarine activity on the route
to Archangel — a route of great importance to this country
owing to the necessity of importing pit-props — were
furnished in the early days of October by the disappear-
ance of the Brantingham (2,617 tons). Of the fate of this
ship no positive evidence was ever received. She left
Archangel on October 2nd and presumably she was tor-
pedoed without warning, the master and his twenty-three
companions being drowned. At this period German sub-
marines were known to be off the coast of Lapland, and
several Allied and neutral ships had been attacked and, in
346 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
some cases, sunk. The state of the weather was not such
as to support the beHef that the Brantingham had foun-
dered. Other ships, including the Petunia and the Mordant,
which subsequently passed over much the same route, saw
no vestige of wreckage of any description. All reasonable
doubt as to the fate of the Brantingham was subsequently
dispelled by the admission of the German wireless that
she had been torpedoed on October 4th. ,
Whether the complete disappearance of this ship and
all on board her was part of a deliberate policy which was
being pursued by some of the enemy submarines is open
to doubt, but at any rate about this time the German
charge d'affaires in the Argentine suggested that merchant
ships of the friendly country to which he was accredited
should be spurlos versenkt — sunk without leaving a trace.
This policy had already been recommended by a German
professor. Discussing the methods to be adopted by
submarines at sea. Professor Flamm, of Charlottenberg,
had declared that " the best would be if destroyed neutral
ships disappeared without leaving a trace, and with every-
thing on board, because terror would very soon keep sea-
men and travellers away from the danger zones and thus
save a number of lives." To what extent this advice,
which found official expression in the message from Count
Luxburg, the charge d'affaires in the Argentine, was acted
upon can be judged only by events. That this barbarous
policy was pursued in the case of the Rappahannock
(3,871 tons) was placed, in any event, beyond question.
This vessel sailed from Halifax on October 17th and she
was never heard of again. Evidence eventually reached
the Admiralty which led to the conviction that the Rap-
pahannock (master, Mr. Richard Garrett) was destroyed
on October 26th seventy miles from the Scillies. Of the
officers and men on board, including the master, who
numbered thirty-seven, not one survived. The Germans
in this, as in many other cases, assumed that " dead men
tell no tales" ; but in fact these men, though dead, continued
to bear damning evidence to the methods which the enemy
was pursuing at sea, for the Germans admitted, through
their wireless, that she had been sunk by a submarine, and
the conclusion as to how she had been destroyed was
obvious to all Allied and neutral countries. Towards the
end of the month the North Wales (4,072 tons, master,
CH. xvi] THE SUBMARINE " DEUTSCHLAND " 347
Mr. G. Owen) also disappeared without trace, and the only
evidence of her fate was supplied a month later by the
washing ashore of one of her boats at Penzance, and several
bodies were also cast up by the sea and identified as those
of members of the crew. In this case, as well as in others,
these murdered seamen bore damning evidence against
the Germans.
The loss of life which accompanied the sinking of the
Astoria (4,262 tons) was also heavy. The ship fell in with
two submarines on October 9th. Hardly had she stopped
in answer to the peremptory signal, when a torpedo was
put into her and she disappeared 120 miles from Vardo.
The enemy had no consideration for these hapless seamen,
and the wonder is that half survived the ordeal to which
they were submitted in these Arctic waters.
The month of October was also notable by reason of the
destruction of three British, as well as several neutral,
ships off the American coast. The German naval authori-
ties had determined to demonstrate to the American
people the long range of action possessed by such a sub-
marine as the U53, with a displacement of 700 tons. If
the Americans were thereby frightened into silence regard-
ing the German barbarities at sea, so much the less chance
of their intervening in the war. On September 17th Hans
Rose, in command of this submarine, was directed to cross
the Atlantic and to lie off the American coast in anticipa-
tion of the passage to the United States of the merchant
submarine Bremen. When the war broke out Germany
was building a number of large submarines for the
Argentine. They had been designed for operating in
the Atlantic, and consequently were considerably larger
than the type which was being passed into the German
Navy — having a displacement of 1,500 to 2,000 tons.
The success with which these vessels had been used by
the Germans, in military operations, suggested the fitting
out of two of them, the Bremen and the Deutschland, as
cargo -carrying craft, in the hope that they might not only
bring back to Germany much-needed supplies of various
easily transportable materials, but might produce a psycho-
logical effect on the minds of neutrals, and particularly
of the Americans. The Deutschland made the passage
with success, bringing back a limited quantity of dyes, of
which the Germans were in great need. She returned
348 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
home on August 24th, and her running of the blockade ^
prompted the fitting out of the Bremen.
The Bremen was dispatched from Germany in the fall
of 1916, and U53 was sent in advance in order that she
might search for and attack Allied vessels which, it was
anticipated, would be waiting off New London with the
intention of intercepting the submarine merchantman.
The U-boat, when this task was completed, was to proceed
to Newport, Rhode Island, and then, after as short a delay-
as possible, was to return to Germany. The Bremen
failed to reach her destination and the Germans had to
mourn another serious loss. U53 saw and heard nothing
of her, and in due course entered the harbour of Newport.
Having paid a number of official visits, she reached Nan-
tucket Lightship early on the morning of October 8th on
her way home. Commander Rose calculated that in the
clear, calm weather which prevailed, he might give an
exhibition of the powers of long-range action which resided
in the submarine which he commanded. He was not
disappointed. In the course of the day he stopped no
fewer than seven steamers, and among them were three
British ships, the Strathdene (4,321 tons), the West Point
(3,847 tons), and the Stephana (3,449 tons). Happily,
owing to the precautions which had been adopted by the
American naval authorities, the destruction of these three
fine ships was accompanied by no loss of life.
Commander Rose, acting in marked contrast to many of
his companions in the German submarine service, behaved
with a certain measure of humanity. In the case of the
Stephana, the enemy was confronted with the problem of
dealing with a well-laden passenger ship. A Paul Jones
would have let her pass, even though he were not prompted
to that course by political considerations. Commander
Rose, however, could not resist the temptation of teaching
the Americans a lesson in ruthlessness, for most of the
passengers, who numbered ninety-three, were returning
to New York from a holiday cruise to Newfoundland.
Time was allowed for the passengers and crew to lower the
boats and leave the ship, and they were immediately
accommodated on board the United States destroyers
which were in the vicinity. The American naval authorities
^ On setting out on a second voyage across the Atlantic, the Deutschland
was sunk by a British patrol.
CH. xvi] A FINE EXAMPLE 349
had, indeed, sent out several small craft on the assumption
that American men-of-war could at least assist in saving
life, though they could not interfere with operations
carried on outside the three-mile limit. In the case of the
Strathdene (master, Mr. George Wilson), U53, observing
another ship to the westward, left the crew to make
their way as best they could in their own boat towards
Nantucket Lightship, and they were eventually rescued
by an American destroyer. Later in the morning, how-
ever, when the West Point (master, Mr. F. J. Harnden)
was intercepted, U53 showed a greater measure of con-
sideration, though Captain Harnden had given no little
trouble before surrendering. After the merchantman had
been sunk by gunfire, the submarine took in tow the two
lifeboats, and did not leave Captain Harnden and his
companions until they were within about six miles of the
lightship. That evening they were all taken on board an
American destroyer and reached New York in safety.
While these events were occurring in the Arctic Ocean
and off the American coast, the enemy was still at work in
the waters surrounding the British Isles, as well as in the
Mediterranean. In several instances the circumstances
in which ships were destroyed exhibited the insubordination
of German submarine officers, in relation to the Imperial
orders they had received, if, indeed, those orders were
intended to be taken literally. In the case of the British
India steamship Momhassa (master. Commander R. F.
Thomson, R.N.R.) a fine example of life-saving work was
supplied. The Momhassa left London on October 11th,
and, after calling at Gibraltar for instructions on the 16th,
proceeded on her voyage. Early on the morning of the
20th a French destroyer signalled "What ship?" On
the signal being answered, the destroyer reduced her
speed to that of the liner and proceeded to bear her
company. This protection proved of no avail in saving
the Momhassa, for a few minutes later an explosion shook
the vessel from stem to stern. She had been torpedoed
without warning, although she carried nineteen pas-
sengers, as well as a crew of 109. A wireless call was sent
out, passengers were roused, and the boats were speedily
manned. Within five minutes of the Momhassa being
struck, all the boats were clear of the ship, which four
minutes later disappeared. Captain Thomson, having
850 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
directed these operations successfully, was himself the last
to leave the vessel ; he dived overboard and was picked
up by one of the boats. One secunni, who must have
hidden himself away, lost his life, but the rest of the crew,
as well as the passengers, were taken into Bougie by the
French destroyer and received the kindest treatment from
the inhabitants, as well as from the Italian Consul, From
first to last nothing was seen of the submarine. A Naval
Court was afterwards held, and it found that, as the vessel
was torpedoed without any warning, no blame attached
to Captain Thomson or anyone else, and that everything
was done to save life. The expedition with which the
ship was cleared was held to have been " a masterly per-
formance." It was added that " particular credit must
be given to Mr. Russell, second engineer, who, knowing
from the inrush of water into the funnel that the vessel
was doomed, used his own discretion to stop the ship
before the receipt of orders from the bridge, and was thus
undoubtedly instrumental in saving many lives." The
Court recorded that " the chief sarang and some members
of the native crew appeared to have done their duty.
The passengers, men and women alike, behaved in an
exemplary manner."
Another vessel which suffered from the complete dis-
regard of the superior German orders, which had been so
industriously advertised to the world, was the Marina
(5,204 tons). She was on her way from Glasgow to the
United States, and was off the Fastnet on the afternoon
of October 28th when she was torpedoed without warn-
ing. Of the crew of 104, eighteen were drowned. This
ship had on board a number of American citizens, and
they and the other survivors were in the ship's boats
for over thirty hours before they were picked up by a
patrol-vessel and landed in Ireland. Nothing was seen
of the submarine before the attack. The first intimation
that the ship was in danger came when a torpedo struck
the Marina amidships on the starboard side. Though
the British vessel was defensively armed, she had no
chance of putting up a defence. There seemed some hope
that she might still survive in spite of the heavy seas
that were running, but ten minutes later a second torpedo
struck her on the port side and the blow proved mortal,
the ship breaking in two and going down almost at once.
CH. XVI] THE "CABOTIA'S" EFFORT 351
The submarine came to the surface, and her officers and
men watched impassively the consummation of their deadly-
work, and then disappeared without offering succour to
the seamen and passengers in the dire emergency which
confronted them. As one American passenger afterwards
remarked : " They did not give warning, nor did they
warn us either when the submarine came round to fire on
the port side, while we were in the lifeboats and almost
beside the sinking ship. I guess that is not playing the
game." The destruction of the Marina attracted the
attention, as might be expected, of the American Govern-
ment, and the unsatisfactory explanation furnished by
the enemy of this breaking of the pledge which had been
so solemnly given was not without its influence on public
opinion in the United States.
With the record of the unhappy fate of the crews of
the Cabotia (4,309 tons) and the Marchioness (553 tons) the
story of the experiences of British merchant seamen in the
month of October must close. Towards the former ship
no mercy was shown either by the sea or by the enemy.
She fought a gale across the Atlantic on her way to Liver-
pool, but she fought it with success, though she was con-
tinually swept by the angry seas. On October 20th,
as she was labouring heavily, a fierce wind blowing from
the south-west, a submarine was sighted on the starboard
bow, and at once opened fire with her forward gun. The
Cabotia was 120 miles from Tory Island, and she possessed
no armament with which her crew could attempt to pur-
chase, at however great a risk, immunity from the hard-
ships which the taking to their small boats suggested.
They were twelve hours' steaming from the nearest land,
and whether they could reach it in such frail craft as they
had at their command was the thought which must have
passed through the minds of a good many of the little
company on board, numbering seventy-four, as the first
shot struck the steamer about midship on the starboard
side.
There was no possibility of effective defence, but the
master nevertheless turned the Cabotid's stern to the
submarine and put on full speed. Every five minutes
the submarine fired a shot, and she secured four hits.
The captain then ordered all the boats to be swung out,
though everyone realised that they could not live long in
11—24
352 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
such a sea. In the meantime the Cabotia managed to
keep the enemy astern, but gradually the distance between
the two vessels was lessening. The position was seen to
be hopeless. The engines were stopped and four boats
were lowered, manned, and got clear of the steamer without
mishap. The submarine, having given the Cabotia
another shot, went alongside another steamer which was
approaching. The boats proceeded in the same direction,
hoping to be picked up ; but the stranger, after com-
municating with the U-boat, blew two blasts on her whistle
and continued on her course, without a thought for the
mariners fighting for life in the heavy seas which were
running.
Two of the boats of the Cabotia were never seen again,
and small wonder in view of the storm which was raging.
It was little short of a miracle that the other two boats
survived. Throughout the night the second officer and
his companions pulled steadily with faint hope, for they
realised that the nearest land was 120 miles away ; but as
the dawn was breaking it became possible to set a sail,
and a few hours later a patrol-boat appeared and the
little group of seamen, drenched to the skin, cold to the
marrow, and exhausted by their labours, found safety.
A search for the other three boats was then begun, and
twenty minutes later the chief officer's boat was sighted
and its occupants were also rescued. Throughout that
day and all the succeeding night, and on the following
day, a patrol- vessel thrashed the waters, hoping against
hope to find the master's and third officer's boats, but
no trace of them could be discovered. In these circum-
stances thirty-two more men were murdered as a result
of the ruthless policy pursued by the enemy's officers in
face of the protestations which had been made in the ears
of Americans and other neutrals.
But not a few British ships evaded the enemy during the
month of October. Thirty-two, of 125,770 tons, though
molested, escaped. It would be to do an injustice to the
officers and crews of these ships to omit mention of the
fine defence put up by the Ellerman liner Fabian (2,246
tons). This ship (master, Mr. W. J. Price) left Almeria
on October 19th bound for Manchester. After passing
about fifteen miles to westward of Ushant six days later,
a heavy west-north-westerly gale sprang up with very
CH. xvi] A BRAVE DEFENCE 353
thick weather. Captain Price thought it too dangerous
to pass between the ScilHes and Land's End, so the vessel
was headed to pass outside the SciUies. The wind con-
tinued to back, and the Fabian passed ten miles west of
the Bishop Rock at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 26th,
making about 6 knots. What happened afterwards
Captain Price himself subsequently recorded:
" After passing Bishop Rock the course was shaped for
the Smalls, and at 7.10 a.m. on the 26th a shot was fired,
Avhich struck the water about fifty yards on the port beam.
A submarine was then observed about one and three-
quarter miles on the port beam, proceeding on the same
course as the Fabian. The helm was at once put hard
to port to bring the submarine astern, and whilst the vessel
was swinging on her helm a second shot was fired, which
passed over the bridge. A third shot was then fired,
which struck the ship on the port side in the bunkers.
By this time our gun, which was a 3-pounder Vickers-
Maxiin quick-firer, was able to bear and fire was opened
on the submarine at a range of about two miles. The
submarine then gave chase to the ship, and an exchange
of shots took place, but, owing to the rough state of the sea,
aiming was difficult. The ship was manoeuvred to keep the
submarine astern as nearly as possible and to avoid the
submarine coming up on the beam, which she tried to do.
Her fourth shot struck the Fabian on the starboard side
in the wake of the main rigging, carrying away the three
shrouds and bulwarks, portions of the shell pitting the
deck-house. Unfortunately this shell killed the third
officer. The firing was still continued on both sides,
but no fmlher shots struck the Fabian. After about
fifty minutes' running fight, our thirteenth shot appeared
to strike the submarine, which was then distant about
two miles. The submarine then submerged ; but five
minutes later she reappeared on the surface broadside on
to the Fabian and stationary, and she fired no further
shots. Another shot (the fourteenth) was fired by the
Fabian, which appeared to us to strike the submarine,
and she disappeared, nothing further being seen of lier,
though a very careful watch was kept to see if she would
come to the surface again. I feel strongly of opinion that
either the submarine had been injured by our shots, or
354 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
she was in too disabled a condition to continue the
fight."
The Fabian was then headed for Milford Haven.
" Throughout the whole of the fight," Captain Price added,
" the crew behaved very well indeed, each man being at his
proper station and carrying out all orders promptly.
I wish to express my appreciation of the services of the
engineer staff, who all worked well to keep the ship run-
ning at her utmost speed."
The month of November provided a curious illustration
of the varying methods which enemy craft were employing
at sea, and incidentally the commander of one submarine
revealed how submarines might be employed without
inhumanity. On the morning of November 1st the
Seatonia (3,533 tons) discovered, as she was steaming in
the North Atlantic swell, that she had become the target
of an invisible enemy. For nearly three hours she was
kept under fire, her master (Mr. Arthur Pattison) in the
meantime zigzagging in the hope of lessening the chance
of the Seatonia being hit. Immediately the crew were
afloat in the ship's boats, the one in charge of Captain
Pattison was hailed alongside the submarine and all the
seventeen occupants were taken on board and sent below.
In the meantime the chief officer (Mr. Henry Davies)
in the other boat shaped a course E. by N., and was picked
up by a neutral steamer.
In these circumstances the captain and his sixteen
companions found themselves shipmates with the enemy
as the submarine, having sunk the Seatonia, left the
scene of her triumph. Within the limited space which
the U-boat provided, sixty-three men were huddled
together, yet room remained for the Germans to go about
their business. The prisoners made the best of their
misfortune during the night, and on the following morning
Captain Pattison was ordered on deck. Three steam
trawlers under the British colours were labouring in a
heavy sea not far away, and he was directed to visit and
search these vessels, and himself sink the' two which
had least coal in their bunkers. What was he to do but
obey ? While he was afloat in one of the trawler's boats,
the submarine made short work of the Kyoto with a
single shell. At this moment another trawler, fl>ing
CH. XVI] UNDESIRABLE QUARTERS 355
the Danish ensign, came on the scene. This vessel, the
Brigi, had, it appeared, already been captured by the
enemy and was under the command of a German officer,
who had under him an armed guard. The Brigi had
been selected to act as the submarine's consort, so all
belonging to the Seatonia, as well as to the three trawlers,
were set to work to remove the coal from the Casswell
and Harfat Castle. For six hours the British seamen, in
a heavy sea, passed to and fro with their burdens, the
Germans in the meantime complacently looking on. At
last the task was completed and the weary men were
ordered to go on board the Brigi, but the master was still
kept a prisoner on board the submarine — an undesired
distinction.
Within a short time the surviving trawlers, having been
gutted of coal and stores, were sunk and the Brigi, with
their boats on board, disappeared. One can imagine
the feelings of the master of the Seatonia as he realised
that he was about to become the enforced observer of
German methods of commerce-destruction by sea. If
the submarine were destroyed, he would lose his life, but
if she carried on her work without mishap he might hope
to escape, with his life at least. For nine days he
remained in captivity, during which the American s.s,
Columbian was sunk, as well as the Norwegian steamer
Balto. And then at last, with all the other seamen of the
Seatonia, he was sent on board the Swedish steamer
Varing, which had been placed in charge of a prize crew.
On November 10th the Varing put into a neutral port
and her passengers were landed. The master of the
Seatonia and his companions were treated with no harsh-
ness, as were so many others, at the hands of the enemy,
but received a large measure of consideration. In the
meantime the Brigi, having fulfilled her mission, was
dismissed, and the exciting experiences at the hands of
this particular craft, in which so many British and neutral
seamen had had to take a part, came to an end.
On the day following the sinking of the Seatonia, the
Statesman (6,153 tons) was sunk without warning by a
torpedo 200 miles east from Malta, with a loss of six lives,
and on the 4th, in practically the same position, the
Clan Leslie (3,937 tons) and the Huntsvale (5,398 tons)
were also destroyed without warning ; in the former case
356 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
three lives were lost and in the latter seven, including
the master. Both these ships were defensively armed,
but in the conditions in which they were attacked their
guns were valueless. An incident not without psycho-
logical interest occurred after the Huntsvale had received
the mortal blow which carried away her stern and caused
her to sink in a space of two minutes. The sea was
strewn with wreckage, to which a number of British
seamen were clinging in desperation, and two boats which
had been hastily launched were passing to and fro pick-
ing up survivors.
The scene would have been a pitiable one to other
than German eyes, but two of the officers of the enemy
submarine decided that it offered an opportunity of en-
heartening their fellow-countrymen. So, standing on the
deck of their vessel, they took a series of photographs,
evidently with a view of placing on record the success
with which submarines were not merely sinking ships,
but practising the policy of ruthlessness in spite of all
the declarations of the German authorities that the cam-
paign was being conducted in accordance with the
generally recognised rules of cruiser warfare. These damag-
ing pictures having been secured, the enemy vessel
disappeared, leaving the survivors of the Huntsvale afloat
in two boats, far distant from the nearest land. Even
in these conditions these British seamen were not unmind-
ful of their obligations to others. The master (Mr. J.
Edmondson) had, as has been stated, been killed, but the
chief officer, who remained in command of the two boats,
casting his eye over the sea, noticed two steamers coming
up. So, ignoring the risk that the submarine might
return and wreak vengeance on him and his companions,
he burnt warning flares and was thus probably responsible
for robbing the enemy of two victims. Throughout the
night the chief officer and his comrades, soaked to the
skin and suffering from the cold, confronted the prospect
of death ; but early on the following morning, after nine
hours' exposure, the hospital ship Valdavia came to their
rescue. That they did not all perish, leaving no trace
of the enemy's crime, was due to no consideration on the
part of the officers of the submarine, who, having secured
their photographs, cared not one jot what fate overtook
these forty seamen of the great brotherhood of the sea.
CH. XVI] THE " ARABIA'S " FATE 357
Though a certain measure of respect to superior orders
was being paid by submarine officers around the British
Isles, where there was danger of encountering American
citizens, in the Mediterranean the sink-at-sight poUcy
was at this period being apphed, not merely to ordinary
cargo boats, but even to heavily laden passenger ships.
On November 6th the P. & O. liner Arabia (7,933 tons)
was homeward bound from Australia and Colombo to
London when she was torpedoed without warning, though
she had on board 743 persons, for she carried, in addition
to the crew, a complement of no fewer than 439 passengers,
of whom 169 were women and children. The master
(Mr. Walter B. Palmer) was not unconscious of the diffi-
cult task which was allotted him of bringing his ship in
safety through the Mediterranean, and he took every
possible precaution.
On the morning of November 6th this liner was steaming
on a zigzag course at a speed of about 17 knots ; the
chief and third mates were on the bridge, a quartermaster
being at the wheel ; another quartermaster was on the
lookout on the forecastle head, and a lascar was stationed
in the crow's-nest ; the defensive armament with which
the ship had been provided was ready for any emergency.
It was all in vain. Though the atmosphere was clear and
the sea smooth, not a trace of a submarine was seen until
a torpedo had been fired, striking the Arabia on the
starboard side. At the moment Captain Palmer was in
his cabin ; he went instantly to the bridge with the in-
tention of stopping the engines, but he was too late ; the
explosion had already smashed them, and smoke was
Issuing from the engine-room skylight. The wireless
aerials had also been put out of action, so no signal for
help could be sent out.
An adequate explanation of the disaster was provided
as the periscope of a submarine appeared about six
hundred yards distant. A moment later a second tor-
pedo was fired, without success. Then the enemy made
off. Captain Palmer instantly realised the heavy responsi-
bility thrust upon him. He sounded five short blasts on
the ship's whistle to announce to passengers and crew
that the ship must be instantly abandoned. The boats
had already been swung out and, as soon as sufficient way
was off the ship, they were lowered safely, and within a
358 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
few minutes everyone on board had left the Arabia,
with the exception of eleven of the engine-room staff —
natives — who were presumably killed by the explosion ;
and then the master himself surrendered his command.
By a fortunate circumstance, within a few minutes three
British armed trawlers arrived on the scene, and the
Ellerman liner City of Marseilles, outward bound, joined
in the work of rescue, in which later on a French man-of-
war assisted. Within less than an hour and a half the
Arabia had disappeared, and Captain Palmer, though he
had lost his ship, could congratulate himself that, owing to
the organisation on board which he had instituted and the
manner in which passengers, officers, and men had behaved
in face of the disaster, every living soul, except the unfor-
tunate natives of the engine-room staff, had been brought
out of danger. Many hours' exposure had to be faced,
however, before these unhappy people, cold and hungry
and exhausted, at last were got ashore.
That enemy submarines were now disregarding more
and more the assurances which the German authorities
had given to the United States and other neutral Govern-
ments became increasingly apparent as the month passed.
On November 12th the Kayunda (3,383 tons) was torpedoed
without warning 205 miles east-south-east from Malta, and
the Brierton (3,255 tons), the City of Birmingham (7,498
tons), the Reaywell (3,417 tons), the King Malcolm (3,351
tons), and the Moresby (1,763 tons) were all surprised and
sunk in the Mediterranean before the month was closed.
Each of these vessels was defensively armed, as was also
the F. Matarazzo (2,823 tons), which was also torpedoed
without warning twenty miles south from Littlehampton.
That these ships were destroyed without mercy for anyone
on board was, of course, a matter not of chance but of
deliberate policy.
The story of the sinking of the City of Birmingham is
one of the enheartening incidents of this sad record of
the submarine war, showing how, in face of danger,
delicate women can triumph over their fears in an emer-
gency. Of the 170 passengers on board the ship, no
fewer than 100 were women and children ; including the
crew, the City of Birmingham had on board 317 persons,
of whom 115 were native seamen. She was outward bound
for Bombay and Karachi. On November 22nd she left
I. ^
! i
CH. XVI] THE " CITY OF BIRMINGHAM " SUNK 359
Gibraltar, having received orders as to the course to be
followed to Port Said. Five days later a terrific explosion
occurred near the bulkhead between Nos. 5 and 6 holds,
destroying one of the lifeboats. The master (Mr. Wilfred
J. Haughton) had taken every precaution against disaster.
He had prevailed upon every passenger to wear a life-
belt at all times ; boat lists had been posted about the
ship ; large numbered indicators had been attached to
each boat ; and he had introduced a special system of
boat-station identification tags. At the moment when
the ship was struck, and water and wreckage were flung
upwards. Captain Haughton was going round the ship with
the chief officer, assured that a good lookout for the
enemy was being maintained ; the third officer, with a
naval cadet on the lookout, was in charge of the bridge,
and a lascar was on the forecastle head ; a white quarter-
master was in the crow's-nest, and a naval cadet and a
gunner stood ready by the 4-7-inch gun. The ship was
proceeding on zigzag courses at a speed of about 13| knots ;
the wTathcr was fine and clear, with a heavy north-westerly
swell. Those on board were justified in believing that
everything possible had been done to ensure the safety
of the ship. No submarine, however, was seen ; only
the explosion gave notice that the vessel had been marked
down for destruction.
It was soon apparent that there was little time to lose,
for the ship immediately took a heavy list. Captain
Haughton was equal to the emergency. The engines
were stopped and then reversed, wireless signals for help
were sent out, and all on board were ordered to the boats.
There was no panic. The captain on the bridge remained
in command of the situation, and his coolness and courage
were communicated to passengers and crew. Within ten
minutes of the explosion all the boats had been got away,
though a mishap occurred to one Of them owing to the
falls jamming. Captain Haughton alone remained on
board the doomed vessel as she sank steadily stern first.
Another ten minutes elapsed, and then the City of Bir-
mingham took a final plunge, carrying with her this
typical British seaman who, having assured the safety
of everyone in his charge, determined to retain his com-
mand until the seas robbed him of it. As he rose to the
surface and struck out towards some floating planks,
360 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
the sound of women singing an enheartening hymn reached
his ears. In spite of all they had gone through, and
regardless of the danger which still threatened them adrift
in the Mediterranean in mid-winter, ninety miles from
Malta, these women still had heart to raise their voices
in song. Although seven boats heavily laden were
afloat in the vicinity, half an hour passed before the master
was seen and could be rescued. Drenched to the skin
and exhausted though he was, Captain Haughton immedi-
ately resumed command as soon as he was on board
one of the boats. Happily the ordeal of all these pas-
sengers and seamen was to prove of comparatively short
duration. The City of Birmingham had sunk shortly
before noon, and soon after 4 o'clock Captain Haughton,
on board the hospital ship Letitia, mustered his crew and
called the roll of passengers. Only four failed to answer —
the doctor, a man well advanced in years ; the barman,
who had fallen into the water and been drowned ; and
two lascars. In the report which he afterwards wrote
the master recorded that " the women especially showed a
good example by the way in which they took their places
in the boats, as calmly as if they were going down to their
meals, and when in the boats they began singing."
It would be to convey a wrong impression of the course
of the submarine war at this period were nothing said
of the thirty-six ships, of 157,633 tons, which, though
attacked, managed to escape during this month of
November. Month by month, as the intensity of the
enemy's attack and the volume of the sinkings of merchant
shipping mounted up, the number of vessels which,
though interfered with by submarines, managed to escape
steadily increased. In September the tonnage which,
owing to good seamanship or defensive armament, reached
port after molestation had been 122,933 tons. In October
the figure was 124,770, and in November reached another
high-water mark — 157,633 tons. The defensive armament
of merchant shipping had by this time made considerable
progress, and of the thirty-six vessels which escaped during
November two-thirds had been provided with guns. The
success of British seamen in eluding the enemy was all the
more remarkable in view of the various stratagems which
the submarine commanders were adopting. An example
of this resourcefulness was revealed shortly after midnight
CH. XVI] HUNTING IN COUPLES 361
on October 1st, when the Lindenhall (4,003 tons) was
steaming to the westward of Sicily. The master (Mr,
Evan Thomas) saw a vessel three points on the starboard
bow — apparently a sailing-craft. There was nothing to
arouse suspicion, as sailing-vessels are often encountered
in these waters ; but the master watched the stranger
carefully. Though there was no wind, she was moving
through the water at a rapid rate. He came to the con-
clusion that the sailing-craft was in fact a submarine
disguised^ Shortly afterwards a live shell plunged into
the water about forty yards off the starboard bow of the
Lindenhall. In the official record which Captain Thomas
afterwards made of the incident he stated that —
" The helm was put hard a -starboard to bring the sub-
marine astern, and when the steamer was broadside on two
shells passed over, one of them only just clearing the upper
bridge. We then returned her fire, which had the effect
of causing the submarine to raise her speed and increase
her distance from us. She kept shelling us with two guns
for one hour fifty-five minutes. No one counted the
number of shells fired by the submarine, but it could not
be less than 200, as she was firing two shells for every one
we fired, and firing more rapidly. The steamer fired
eighty-six shells and had only fourteen left. When we
were about seven miles off the island and proceeding
direct for it, the submarine submerged and we saw no
more of her. Some deck damage was caused, the port
lifeboat was holed and the bridge damaged by pieces of
shells. The officers, engineers, stewards, carpenter, cook,
and gunners deserve credit, as they fought and steamed
her without any assistance from the sailors and firemen,
they having refused to do anything."
Another not infrequent device of the enemy was to hunt
in couples in the expectation that, while the defensively
armed ship was engaged with one submarine, the other
might succeed in getting in sufficiently close to fire a
torpedo with the assurance that the target would be
hit. Even this manoeuvre did not always succeed, as the
master (Mr. P. Urquhert) proved when the Clan Chisholm
was attacked off Finisterre on November 13th. Shortly
after 1 o'clock a topsail schooner was sighted one point
362 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
on the starboard bow ; a submarine was alongside her,
and another submarine was steering eastward across
the bows of the Clan Chisholm. It must have seemed as
though this ship was doomed. What happened ? We
have the modest story of this plucky master, and it well
deserves to be placed on permanent record.
" We were zigzagging at the time. The nearer submarine
was evidently getting into position for the next southerly
course of the Clan Chisholm. I swung the steamer under
port helm, whistled to the gunner, and pointed to the
submarine, ringing the engine telegraph to an agreed
signal, every man rushing to stations. The ship seemed
to jump as the engineers opened her out, black smoke
pouring from the funnel. The submarines evidently did
not realise we were on the turn, so we gained a little on
them ; however, soon they were round and after us ;
then they opened fire, and we answered them with our
4-7 gun (at the same time hoisting ensign on triatic stay
and kept flying throughout action) — a steady and well-
directed fire. They were opening out to get one on each
quarter, so I kept one astern, and the gunner attended
to the one on the port quarter, the fourth shot at 6,100
yards sending her under ; and she must have blown up, as
there was a great volume of water. The one astern turned
and went in the direction of the sunk submarine, I suppose
to pick up any men. We gave her two parting shots, but
missed.
" The chase and action only lasted about twenty minutes.
We fired six shots to their three, and their nearest shot
was about 200 yards short, a column of black smoke
rising from where the shots entered the water. I wish
to draw your attention to the splendid response Mr.
Russel and his engineers gave to my appeal for speed
and more speed — a case of burst the engines or be sunk.
Also to the two gunners, who were cool and collected, and
their gun crew, steward and carpenter, who served them
well. These gunners were of the greatest assistance to the
chief officer during the night of heavy gale, November
8th and 9th, extricating the horses from underneath broken
boxes and leading them over wire lashings and flooded
decks to alleyways. The chief and third officers got
boats ready and crew under shelter, and then assisted the
CH. XVI] DECEMBER'S TOLL 363
second officer and myself on the bridge. The above is a
true statement of all that happened."
But even unarmed ships were effecting their escape.
The officers and crew of the Palm Branch (3,891 tons)
gave an exhibition of courage and dauntlessness on
November 21st, the only spectators being the out-
manoeuvred crew of the submarine. The Palm Branch
was in the English Channel at the time, not far from the
French coast, when a submarine arose from the water and
opened fire at close range. The master of this unarmed
ship determined to see whether his ship, dexterously
handled, could be saved. It was a tremendous risk,
but he took it. He put his helm over to get the
submarine astern of him, and the chief engineer rushed
down to the stokehold to encourage the firemen to
do their best. Everyone, from the captain downwards,
realised that it was a fight for life against heavy odds, but
they were not afraid, though shells began to fall round
them and some of them hit the ship. The port lifeboat
was soon shot away, and the starboard lifeboat holed ;
the bridge was struck and a seaman wounded. The
quarters of the crew aft were wrecked ; and a splinter hit
the apprentice on the head, but, though blood was stream-
ing down his face, he remained at the wheel. At last
fire broke out in the forecastle. Throughout the ordeal
the captain, enheartened by the spirit exhibited by every-
one on board, continued to swing his ship first to port and
then to starboard so as to prevent the enemy getting
broadside on. For half an hour this unarmed ship out-
manoeuvred the submarine with her high speed, her guns,
and her torpedoes. At last the enemy abandoned the
contest, and the Palm Branch, after effecting repairs at
a French port, reached the United States to supply the
Americans with conclusive evidence that British seamen,
though defenceless, were continuing to go about their
business.
In the last month of the year enemy submarines, mines,
and raiders took heavy toll of British shipping ; fifty-six
vessels were sunk with a loss of 186 lives, and of these
thirty-six ships fell to submarines, the death-roll being
ninety-one. The policy of sinking ships without warning
was still being pursued, and proved effective in fourteen
364 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
instances. We have in the story of the Istrar (4,582 tons)
an example of the manner in which the naval authorities
were continuing to co-operate to ensure the safety of the
Merchant Fleet, for the Istrar was defensively armed and
the master (Mr. Maxwell M. Jacob) was supplied with all
the information which the Admiralty had at its disposal as
to the safest course. Captain Jacobs' narrative constitutes
a picture of sea conditions at this time which could not well
be improved upon.
" I had been eleven and a half years in command of the
Istrar when she was sunk. We sailed from Liverpool on
November 2nd, 1916, with a crew of seventy-two, of
whom fifty-nine were lascars. We ran into very heavy
weather shortly after clearing the English coast, and had
to put back to Plymouth to repair. We arrived there on
November 6th and left again on the 18th for Calcutta.
I had obtained instructions as to my route as far as Gibral-
tar at Liverpool, and at Falmouth I obtained fresh instruc-
tions which were sent to me from the Admiralty Office at
Plymouth. These instructions were carried out and the
vessel arrived safely at Gibraltar on November 24th.
I then obtained from the Routing Officer on the Examina-
tion Vessel at Gibraltar the route instructions for Port
Said.
" All went well until December 2nd. On that day, at
1.15 p.m., when we were in a position lat. 33° 5' N.,
long. 28° 40' E., the third officer being on watch and the
usual men at stations, I heard the explosion, the vessel
sustaining a very heavy shock. I went on the bridge at
once and stopped the engines. The third officer told me
that he had seen the wake of a torpedo about 300 yards
away, coming towards the vessel on the starboard side and
heading towards midships. He at once ordered the helm
hard a-port and, as the vessel answered quickly, the torpedo
struck her on the starboard quarter. The vessel at once
took a list to port and the crew came up. The crews'
quarters were aft, and it was found that one native had
been killed and five injured by the flying debris after the
explosion. The vessel carried a 4-7-inch gun which was
displaced by the explosion. It was fine and clear at the
time. We were proceeding at 10 1 knots on No. 2 zigzag
and were on the appointed course of S. 40 E. There was
CH. XVI] A PICTURE OF SEA CONDITIONS 365
not much trouble with the crew, and the boats were lowered
safely with the exception of my boat, which remained
alongside.
*' The first step which I took was to collect all the
secret instructions and code-book, and these I threw over-
side. The loose papers I collected together and put on
the galley fire, and then, after searching the vessel to
see that all were clear, I got into my boat. The vessel
was settling very slowly, no doubt owing to the fact
that the hatches and ventilators were sealed and the escape
of air was slow. Before the vessel was abandoned, an
S.O.S, signal was sent off giving our position, but we did
not receive any reply before we left. I ascertained after-
wards that the message had been received. Not long
after we were clear, the submarine came to the surface on
the port quarter and, coming close, put ten shots into the
port side. The vessel then commenced to sink very rapidly.
" My boat was on the starboard side and the chief
officer's boat on the port side. The submarine first spoke
to the chief officer's boat and asked for me. I ordered sail
to be made in my boat and tried to get clear, but the sub-
marine caught us up and ordered us alongside. We were
first asked for our papers, and the submarine's commander
was told that anything that had not been destroyed was
on the vessel. The submarine did not attempt to take me
prisoner, but asked for the chief engineer, who was in my
boat, and on his answering he ordered him on board the
submarine, saying that they were taking the chief as they
heard that England was getting short of engineers, and
added that it did not much matter, because England would
not have any ships left soon, as they were sinking three
every day. The commander then said : ' You won't be
long in the boats ; there are plenty of patrol-vessels about.'
He then wished us a Merry Christmas and a Happy New
Year. I thanked him, and then shoved off. There were
two other captains on board the submarine, the captain
of the Reapwell and the captain of the King Malcolm.
They were allowed, when the chief officer's boat was along-
side the submarine, to speak to the chief officer and to
give him telegrams to be sent home. We were told that
there were two other captains down below. When my
chief engineer was sent below, the commander made me
promise to send word to his people that he was safe. The
366 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
submarine had no flag flying and no mark or number
showing. We counted thirteen people on her decks, of
whom two were officers. The submarine went away to
the northward. The Istrar had been settling all the time
with an increasing list to port, but very little by the stern,
and at 2.25 we saw her capsize, the tops of the masts being
the last thing visible. I gave the boats their course and
we made sail, being picked up at 5 o'clock by the sloop
Asphodel, which was on patrol duty. The sloop com-
municated by wireless with Alexandria and was told to
bring us in, and we were then put on board H.M.S.
Hannibal."
How were the crews of the submarines faring at this
period of the war ? It would be an error to assume that,
because they were meeting with a certain measure of suc-
cess, they were not suffering great hardships. We have
fortunately the narratives of two British captains who were
taken prisoners after their ships had been sunk in December
which supply evidence of the harassing life which enemy
seamen were supporting. As the defensive measures
consorted for the protection of British merchant shipping
improved, the strain on the enemy crews increased in
intensity until at length it became no easy matter to obtain
crews, and at last the spirit of the men engaged in this
hazardous service broke, as we shall see later on. It is
indeed a reasonable hypothesis that, even if the Armistice
had not come in November 1918, the intensive submarine
campaign would have had to be abandoned owing to the
difficulty of securing trained and willing crews to face
the risk of death in conditions of horror to which warfare
in earlier centuries had provided no parallel. But this is
to anticipate the course of events, and we are concerned
at this moment with the experiences of the submarine
crews in December 1916, when the struggle still had twenty-
three months to go. On December 4th U65 torpedoed
without warning the Caledonia (9,223 tons) when she
was 125 miles E. by S. from Malta. The defensive
armament with which this Anchor liner had been provided
proved useless. Out of the nowhere a torpedo struck her
a glancing blow on the starboard side of No. 3 hold, and
she sank in three-quarters of an hour. The master (Mr,
James Blaikie) tried to ram the submarine, and struck her,
CH. XVI] U65 CRIPPLED BY THE " CALEDONIA " 367
but the impact was insufficient to sink her. After the
crew were in the boat, the submarine appeared and took
off the master as well as two Army officers who were on
board.
Some time later Captain Blaikie was able to give some
account of his experiences on board this submarine — a.
large vessel, fitted with four torpedo tubes and carrying
eight torpedoes, besides mounting a gun on the fore -deck.
Though the submarine was not destroyed when the Cale-
donia ran over her, she was flattened out on the port side
forward for about 130 feet to a depth of 1| feet ; the
stem had been bent to starboard, the periscope doubled
up, and the wireless gear on the port side carried away.
These injuries resulted in leakage around some of the
plates, and after the submarine had gained the surface she
was unable to submerge. Temporary repairs were at
once undertaken, and on th» following day an experimental
dive was tried, but the boat threatened to get out of hand,
and the commander decided that his only course was to
make his way back to Cattaro on the surface. About
three hours before reaching port two Austrian torpedo-
boat destroyers came out to act as escort. Though the
Caledonia had only succeeded in crippling U65, the damage
to the submarine was sufficiently serious to entail repairs
which were not completed until the following April.
Another master who had his ship sunk under him, and
who was also taken prisoner, subsequently put on record
his experiences. The Apsleyhall (3,382 tons) was twenty-
eight miles W. by N. from Gozo when she was struck.
The ship was going at full speed when a torpedo hit
her on the port side. Her case was hopeless. After
Captain Higginbottom had stopped the engines and ordered
the boats out, another torpedo struck the ship on the port
side, and in ten minutes the Apsleyhall had disappeared,
but fortunately no lives were lost. As the vessel was
going down, submarine UC22 appeared on the surface and
ordered Captain Higginbottom on board. He was directed
to go below, where he found Captain T. R. Borthwick, of
the Glasgow steamer Oronsay (3,761 tons), which had been
sunk two days before off Malta. Captain Higginbottom
learnt that he was on board a submarine engaged in
laying mines round Malta, and that she carried twenty-one
mine-tubes. Each cruise occupied from fifteen to twenty
n— 25
368 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
days. She was also armed with a gun on the fore-deck,
capable of firing effectively at a six-mile range. She carried
five torpedoes, but these were not used until after the mines
had been sown, since it was feared that the concussion
might fire the mines and thus destroy the submarine.
Captain Higginbottom has supplied a picture of the routine
followed by this mine-laying submarine.
" Learnt that commanders and crews of all submarines
dread the system of nets and trawlers across the Gulf of
Otranto, and preferred to have dirty dark nights in that
part and to navigate on the surface to submerging so as
to pass under the net. When no object was in sight I was
allowed on deck twice a day for a fcAV minutes for air, and
I noticed that the submarine was zigzagging. She carried
two collapsible boats in a casing on the fore-deck, and
was fitted with wireless to enable her to remain in touch
with Berlin and Cattaro during each cruise."
A few days later the Baycraig (7,316 tons) was also
torpedoed without warning off Malta, and her master
(Mr. Bertram Edmonds) joined the other two captains con-
fined in the submarine. The temper of the submarine
officers at this stage of the war was illustrated by the
conduct of the commander of the UC22 when Captain
Edmonds got on board. The commander met him at
the conning-tower and, waving a small revolver, which had
been thrown overboard in the British master's overcoat,
in his face, remarked menacingly, " You remember Captain
Fryatt ? ' ' Under all the trials which the submarine
crews were supporting, they were, however, encouraged
by the belief that their eventual success was certain.
Whether this attitude was assumed by the officers in order
to encourage the men under them or was genuine must
remain a matter of speculation, but at any rate, when the
old year died the Kaiser's health was toasted and it was
declared that within a few months victory was assured.
The men of the submarine ser\4ce, hard pressed already
by the various defensive measures adopted by the
Admiralty, and opposed by the invincible spirit of British
seamen, did not realise that the worst of their trials still
lay ahead.
How invincible was the spirit which British merchant
CH. XVI] AN OIL-TANKER ON FIRE 369
seamen, on the other hand, were exhibiting, though con-
fronted with terrors of which they had been able to form
no conception when in pre-war days conversation had
turned to the dangers of war, was shown by the experiences
of the officers and men of the Conch (5,620 tons). This
vessel was an oil-tanker belonging to the Anglo-Saxon
Petroleum Company. She was off Anvil Point when she
was struck by a torpedo on the night of December 7th.
The Conch was carrying 7,000 tons of benzine and the
explosion caused this oil to ignite, and within a few minutes
the water was lighted up by leaping flames which spouted
from her port side. The master (Mr. Edwin Slott) did not
survive to tell the tale ; of the twelve British officers only
three, indeed, in addition to twenty-five Chinamen out of
the forty-four which were on board, escaped with their
lives. Contrary to the normal experience under such
conditions, it was the three engineer officers who were
spared the worst contagion of fire.
As the Conch was making her way down-Channel in the
brilliant moonlight, the routine precautions were adopted.
At 8 o'clock the watch had been changed, the master and
the third officer going on the bridge ; two quartermasters
were at the wheel ; a lookout man was stationed on the
forecastle head, and a gunner with the wireless operator
stood by the gun, mounted aft, ready for an emergency.
A zigzag course was, of course, steered, but these measures
were in vain. At half-past ten the chief engineer (Mr.
H. L. Raffray), when in his cabin, felt the ship shake from
stem to stern ; she listed a little to port and then righted
herself. He at once went to the engine-room, where the
fourth engineer was on watch. There were no signs there
that an}i:hing untoward had happened ; the telegraph
dial still spoke full speed, and the ship was in fact travelling
at the rate of 10 knots. What had happened ? The
fourth engineer, as he ran to call his two companions,
speedily discovered that the ship was on fire. As he
passed along the alleyway he was met by flames and
smoke. He persevered in spite of burns on his arms and
hands, and was soon back in the engine-room with the
two other engineers. It soon became apparent that the
afterpart of the ship had become a furnace. " The ex-
plosion," Mr. Raffray afterwards suggested, " must have
either blown up the deck or blown the tank tops off and
370 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
sent a column of burning oil over the bridge and poop,
killing everyone on duty on the bridge." But the officers
and their staff in the engine-room were in ignorance of
what had happened. They tried to get instructions from
the bridge, but could get no reply. So they kept the
engines working, as it was assumed if, as seemed evident,
the oil was alight, it was better to keep the ship moving
so as to prevent the flaming oil collecting round her,
rather than to stop her.
Attempts were made to reach the deck, but they were
unavailing. An hour passed in vain efforts to ascertain
what was happening, and during that period the ship,
licked by the flames, continued to steam at 10 knots. At
length, half an hour after the clocks had struck midnight
ashore, the second engineer managed to reach the deck.
His companions shortly afterwards joined him, to discover
to their horror that they were imprisoned in a burning
charnel-house ; the four lifeboats had disappeared, nothing
remaining but the davits ; the bridge was in ruins, and
fore and aft flames were leaping upward, devouring every-
thing they touched.
The Conch had become a great funeral pile, as she still
steamed up-Channel in the moonlight, with her pennants
of smoke and flame. It was impossible to regain the
engine-room in order to stop the engines, for the fire barred
the way, and the only hope of safety lay in the dinghy,
which still remained on the well deck. What were the
thoughts which flashed through the minds of those on
board, British officers and Chinamen, as they confronted
their fate ? Time was pressing if anyone was to survive.
Four terrified Chinamen slid down the falls and reached
the dinghy, which had been hoisted out, only to fill im-
mediately with water. They had been followed by the
fourth engineer, but he, badly wounded in the hand as he
was, dropped into the sea like a stone and was not again
seen. A few minutes later the chief engineer succeeded in
joining the four Chinamen, and then the dinghy broke
adrift before the two other engineer officers could follow ;
and the ship still steamed ahead, a mass of flames, at a
steady 10 knots. Though the unfortunate seamen, as
their boat lost distance, did not realise it, a patrol-vessel
on duty inshore had noticed the flames and had been
chasing the Conch at full speed. The chief engineer and
CH. XVI] A THRILLING RESCUE 371
his companions had all they could do to keep the dinghy
afloat by baling. They were still fighting for their lives
when the steamer Rattray Head bore down upon them and
rescued them from what seemed certain death.
The chief engineer had soon told his tragic story on board
the Rattray Head, and the steamer set off in pursuit of the
burning ship in the hope that further lives might be saved.
But by good fortune a trawler had already rushed to the
rescue, and the two engineers, jumping overboard from the
Conch, found safety.
Through the early hours of the morning the Conch, still
pursuing her course up-Channel, attracted the attention of
Lieutenant Grough Scott of the destroyer Nymphe. At
great risk to his vessel, he approached the doomed ship,
by this time a mass of contagious flame. It would have
meant disaster to himself and his crew to try to go alongside
the Conch, which had been converted into a furnace. So
he threw overboard life-saving rafts, lifebelts, and lifebuoys
as he steamed past the stern, and then called to the crowd
of terrified Chinamen who stood amid the flames on the
forepeak to jump into the water. He repeated this
manoeuvre three times, and at last had the satisfaction of
picking up all except nine of the Cliinamen, who still
remained paralysed upon the ship. They would not or
could not save themselves, but the naval officer would not
abandon them. They were only Chinamen, men of a
foreign nation, but he determined to face the risk of going
alongside the burning ship, though she was out of control
and a danger to any vessel which approached her. It was
a task that demanded seamanship of the highest order, but
it was carried out with little injury to the destroyer, and
the nine Chinamen were roused to action by the courage
and daring exhibited on their behalf, and summoned suffi-
cient energy to drop down one by one on to the deck of
the destroyer. By the time these last rescues had been
made, the steamer which had picked up the chief engineer
and his companions, and two patrol-boats, had rescued
other men from the water. And thus it happened that
out of a complement of fifty-six seamen, white and yellow,
no fewer than half were almost miraculously saved from
death in circumstances of terror calculated to rob any
men, however brave, of their power of intelligent action.
The career of the Conch, without officers and men on board
372 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
to control her erratic course, came to an end next morning
when she foundered.
With the close of 1916, the Germans, rendered desperate
by the failure of their methods of terror by land and by sea,
were preparing to throw off the pretence that the submarine
campaign was being conducted in accordance with the rules
governing cruiser warfare. They realised that British
merchant seamen were still fighting against heavy odds
owing to the inadequacy of the armament which the
authorities could spare for their defence, and urged on the
German Government that a swift blow should be struck.
The crisis of the naval war was at hand.
During January, in spite of all the exhibitions of ruthless-
ness, a far larger volume of tonnage, though molested, had
managed to elude destruction than the enemy succeeded
in sinking — 140,722 tons molested as compared with 109,954
tons sunk. But the death-roll of the month was heavy :
245 British seamen were forced to surrender their lives in
defence of their King and Country.
At this period the German naval personnel was evidently
satisfied that the submarine campaign could, and would, be
pressed home and that victory would be achieved. The de-
fensive armament, though quite inadequate, was evidently
proving a great embarrassment ; of the twenty-nine
ships which escaped, all but eight were defensively armed.
The practice of takingprisoner the masters of the defensively
armed ships which were destroyed was being generally
adopted. Under these trying conditions these merchant
captains bore themselves with dignity and courage. For
instance, when the master (Mr. James A. Taylor) of the
Mohacsfield (3,678 tons) reached the submarine U35, which
had destroyed his ship, he was told that he was a prisoner
of war. He noticed a small Austrian flag had been placed
near him. He regarded that as a misrepresentation, and
turning round, he pulled it out of its position, exclaiming,
" This is an Austrian flag ! You are not Austrians, you are
Germans." The commanding officer protested that,
though he was a German, the crew were Austrian. This
modified statement, however, was also untrue, as Captain
Taylor discovered soon afterwards. This ended the con-
versation for the moment.
" Getting below at the after end of the submarine, close
CH. XVI] COURAGE IS STRENGTH 373
to the after torpedo-tube," Captain Taylor afterwards
recorded, " I found Captain Fry, of the Lesbian, a prisoner
of war.^ He was wounded, and lying on a small locker and
some biscuit tins. I had to sit down alongside of him as
there was no accommodation in these quarters. All the
cooking of the ship was done here. I was given a blanket
and had to make the best of the small space allowed to us.
That evening the commanding officer called me a pirate
and asked me why I fired. In reply I said I was no
pirate, but that he was the pirate, and he had fired at me
first. ' If a man strikes you, would you not strike him back? '
adding that unfortunately he, the German, had had the
upper hand owing to the possession of a larger gun. He
declared that he would shoot me. I replied, ' Remember,
I have got the British nation behind me.' "
Captain Taylor's bearing evidently impressed the German,
and he even permitted him to write a few lines to his home
and promised that he would see that the letter was duly
dispatched. On the following day the Andoni (3,188 tons)
(master, Mr. W. S, Dennis) was dispatched, being
torpedoed without warning, and the Lynfield (3,023 tons)
shared the same fate. The submarine then turned towards
Cattaro. She arrived off the Gulf on the morning of
January 13th with her four prisoners, and was received in
triumph as she made her way into the port. The ships
were manned and a band played. " The four prisoners
were placed on her after-deck, with their eight days' dirt
upon them, for we had not been allowed to wash." They
had had little food, and none of the ordinary conveniences
of life ; they were forthwith dispatched to a prisoners' camp
to endure even worse torments than they had experienced
at sea.
The manner in which some of the enemy's submarines
were being operated at this stage in the campaign was
illustrated by the experiences which fell to the master
(Mr. T. H. Stretting) of the Jevington (2,747 tons) and his
crew. This ship was crossing the Bay of Biscay on the
afternoon of January 23rd, when the chief officer, who
was resting in his cabin, was thrown out of his bed
by a violent explosion. About two hours earlier in the
'■ The Lesbian (2,555 tons) had been captured and destroyed two days
previously, 125 miles E. by S. from Malta.
374 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
afternoon Captain Stretting had noticed a little steamer
about five miles distant. The Bay was in an angry mood,
the weather was misty, and a few minutes later the strange
craft disappeared in the driving rain which was falling.
Not long afterwards Captain Stretting saw what appeared
to be a fishing-vessel, with two lug sails, steering north-
wards. It occurred to him that she might have been
communicating with the strange steamer. She altered
course as though to cross the bows of the Jevington. Then
she disappeared in a rainstorm. Whether the appearance
of this strange steamer in some sort of association with a
vessel looking like a fishing-craft had any special significance
in the Bay of Biscay, it was difficult to determine.
Nothing occurred for an hour and a half to clear up
the mystery, and then a submarine rose to the surface
200 yards on the port bow and fired on the Jevington.
The shot hit the ship on the port side. There was nothing
for it but to reverse the engines, so as to get way off the
ship, and to order all hands into the boats. It was one
thing to decide on the abandonment of the ship, and
quite another, in the heavy seas which were running, to
get the boats away in safety. But at last everyone had
left and the ship rode on the heaving waters, a deserted
derelict, already sinking by the head. The forward deck
was nearly awash, and the propeller was well out of the
water. The two boats were pulled away from the
Jevington, but on catching sight of the submarine a mile
away, the chief officer (Mr. J. C. Ross) pulled towards her.
Struck by the miserable clothes in which some of the crew
were dressed, the enemy passed over to the other boat
a quantity of clothes. Captain Stretting was afterwards
taken on board and cross-examined and then sent back
again, being informed that later on he would be made a
prisoner. The submarine, with two sails up, which caused
her to resemble a fishing-boat, then disappeared.
At this moment the shipwrecked British seamen saw
with delight a steamer not far away, so they pulled towards
her. She proved to be the Donstad, a Norwegian vesseL
Everyone clambered on board, only to discover that the
vessel was in charge of an armed party of Germans. She
had been captured earlier in the day and was being em-
ployed as a decoy. The British seamen recognised her as
the vessel which had been lost in the mist soon after the
CH. XVI] THE RITUAL OF DESTRUCTION 375
dinner-hour, while the submarine was evidently the fishing-
vessel which had tried to cross the bows of the Jevington.
Shortly afterwards the chief officer and his companions
were joined on board the Donstad by the master and the
men who were with him in his boat. By this time the
submarine reappeared, accompanied by a Spanish vessel,
the Leonora, which she had intercepted by way of an inter-
lude in the ritual which was to attend the destruction of
the Jevington.
Night had fallen by this time. On the heaving waters
of the Bay of Biscay the doomed vessel rolled and pitched
as though every moment would be her last — a black
blot on the seascape. Within sight of her lay the sub-
marine with sidelights burning, keeping guard over the
two neutral steamers which, with lights ablaze, she had
pressed into her service. The German commander then
ordered the master to proceed on board the submarine.
He informed him that he had captured the Spanish steam-
ship in order that she might convey the other officers of the
Jevington, as well as the crew, to Liverpool, but that in
accordance with his latest instructions Captain Stretting
himself would be kept on board the submarine and would
eventually be sent to a prison camp in Germany. In
due course the chief officer and his companions were
transferred from the Donstad to the Leonora, which then
disappeared into the blackness of night. For some
unexplained reason the master had been told to return
to the Donstad. While climbing up that ship's side an
escape of steam from a leaking pipe scalded his leg. This
looked like a misfortune, but it proved a stroke of good
luck.
From the deck of the Donstad, Captain Stretting was
able during the next few days to study the tactics of the
enemy. The steamer cruised about the Bay on the look-
out for ships, while the submarine made herself as incon-
spicuous as possible until her prey was assured. The
Donstad each evening had all her lights burning with the
evident intention of attracting as much notice as possible.
Early on the 27th Captain Stretting was told that he and
everyone else in the Norwegian ship were to cross over to
the submarine, and as soon as the last boat had left, bombs
which had been placed on board by the prize crew were
exploded and the Donstad sank.
376 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
On reaching the submarine Captain Stretting informed
the commanding officer of the injury to his leg, and added
that he was in a good deal of pain. Might he lie down ?
Let it be stated to the credit of this German that his
sympathy led him to give instructions that the wound
should be dressed and that this British merchant officer
should be given the berth of one of his own officers. Lying
in this bunk, the British shipmaster watched with fascina-
tion the submarine tracking down a strange vessel by the
aid of the periscope. The stranger proved to be the
Fulton, of Bergen. It was forthwith placed in charge
of a prize crew. She had been commandeered by this
considerate German in order that she might convey his
unwilling guests to a neighbouring Spanish port. The
sufferings of the master had appealed to the heart of this
naval officer. In any case, so many visitors on board the
submarine were proving an inconvenience. It may be that
this officer's motives were of a mixed character, but at any
rate that evening Captain Stretting and the crew of the
Donstad were, to their great joy, landed at Cape Finisterre.
In the last week before the enemy flung political caution
to the wind and determined on a ruthless and relentless
attack on merchant shipping, without any pretence of
respect for the rules governing cruiser warfare, 167 mer-
chant seamen were brought to their deaths. In two cases
— those of the Ava (5,076 tons) and the Lux (2,621 tons) —
the exact cause of sinking must always remain a matter of
surmise, for no officer or man survived to shed any light
on the fate of either ship. They were both well found and
they both disappeared. It is to re-create something of the
atmosphere of the war to quote the terms of the ominous
notice with which members of Lloyd's were to become only
too familiar, which was exhibited in " the Room " on
May 16th :
" Ava of Glasgow, official No. 124135, Forson master,
sailed from Liverpool for Dakar and Rangoon on the 26th
January 1917, with a cargo of coal and general, and has
not since been heard of.
" (Signed) E. F. Inglefield,
" Secretary.""
That is the whole story, to which no addition was
SUXK WITHOUT WARNING.
3 70]
CH. xvi] TORPEDOED IN A GALE 377
subsequently made. With ninety-two officers and men,
the Ava sailed from Birkenhead in charge of an experienced
pilot, who left her inside the Bar Lightship, well satisfied
in his own mind she was a trustworthy ship, well equipped
and efficiently loaded. No word of her was afterwards
received, and at last the presumption was accepted that
she had been torpedoed without warning. The story of
the Lux (master, Mr. F. H. Robinson) is much the same. She
left New York on January 20th, and then the great silence
fell upon her, broken only by the discovery early in the
following month of two bodies off the Irish coast in the
neighbourhood of Cork. One was that of the chief engineer,
Vivian Oldry Lawson, and the other that of the chief
officer, James Parry Thomas.
In the case of the Artist (3,570 tons) little short of a
miracle accounted for the survival of nine of her comple-
ment of thirty- five men. January 27th was a dirty day
in the North Atlantic, and as the Artist (master, Mr, G.
Mills) drew in towards the Fastnet, she encountered the
full force of an easterly gale which swept her from stem to
stern. She had battled her way across the Atlantic, having
been hove to for three nights and two days, and it may
well have seemed to Captain Mills and his little company
that in M^eather which had so severely tested the seaworthi-
ness of their big ship no smaller enemy craft could live.
But about 8 o'clock in the morning the confused noise
of wind and sea was drowned by the sound of an explosion.
A torpedo had torn a great hole in the vessel on the star-
board side. It was soon apparent that, in such a sea, the
damaged ship could live only a few minutes. It was a
desperate situation for all on board, for as they turned to
the task of launching the boats water poured over the
decks as the Artist began to settle down by the head.
But these men were not to be easily daunted, and all three
boats were in a few minutes safely in the water and the
stricken vessel was deserted.
The master, with the second and third officers and a
portion of the crew, was in one boat, the chief engineer
was in charge of another, and a cadet was put in control
of a third : and it was the last of these boats which survived
the ordeal. The chief officer with his companions dis-
appeared almost at once in the raging tumult of the
waters. But Captain INIills and the cadet managed to
378 THE ENEMY'S FINAL PLUNGE [ch. xvi
get clear of the doomed ship, and throughout that day,
with sea anchors laid out, they drifted. Throughout the
night the gale increased in violence, the thermometer
dropping to 37°. Those who have never spent a
night in mid- winter in an open boat cannot by any stretch
of imagination picture the horrors which these men en-
dured as they devoted themselves to the task of baling
out the water which broke over the gunwales. Wet to
the skin and cold to the marrow, they must have realised
how wellnigh hopeless was the prospect that they would
survive. By the following morning nothing was to be
seen of the captain's boat ; it had disappeared, and
nothing was ever heard of it or its occupants. The cadet
and his little group of companions alone survived.
They were the sole remnant of the forty-five men who
had put out on the voyage. They knew that the wireless
operator had sent out a call for help when the Artist
had been struck, but what prospect was there that help
could reach them in such weather ? Moreover, though the
Artist had been sunk fifty-eight miles W. ^ S. from the
Smalls, the position of their little boat as she had drifted
hour by hour was unknown to anyone. Throughout the
Sunday, all the following day, and until long after dawn
on the Tuesday, the boat was at the mercy of wind, tide,
and wave. Men died and their bodies were committed to
the deep ; others sustained various injuries, and all suffered
the agonies of cold, wet, and physicaland mental exhaustion.
Were there not overwhelming official evidence, as well as
the narratives of the survivors, it would be almost past
belief that any men could have existed throughout those
three days and three nights. But, at last, the wind
dropped and the sea began to subside. With unspeakable
relief their tired, overstrained eyes picked up in the far
distance lights which spoke of land being nigh. A short
time afterwards a steamer outward bound bore down upon
them, but there remained of the original crew of sixteen
persons only ten in the boat, and one of these was rigid
in death. In calmer seas it proved a simple matter to
transfer the survivors to the patrol-boat, and thus in due
course they were conveyed ashore to receive at the hands
of the Shipwrecked Mariners' Society the succour of which
they stood in such dire need.
A brief account of the sinking of the Artist was issued
CH. xvi] CALLOUS BRUTALITY 379
shortly afterwards by the Admiralty, and in this statement
it was remarked that " the pledge given by Germany to
the United States not to sink merchant ships without
ensuring the safety of the passengers and crews had been
broken before, but never in circumstances of more cold-
blooded brutality."
A new chapter in sea warfare without parallel in history
had already opened.
CHAPTER XVII
THE CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS
I. The Mo WE
With the clearing of the trade routes of the earUer German
raiders, in circumstances already recorded, British merchant
ships went about their business unmolested for many
months outside the war zone which the enemy had
declared. Since the steamship Colehy had been captured
by the armed merchant cruiser Kron Prinz Wilhelm on
March 27th, 1915, no injury had been suffered from enemy
surface vessels ; indeed, there was good reason for belie\dng
that there was none at sea. This state of things contri-
buted to create a false sense of confidence on the part of
the masters of vessels in the British Merchant Navy. In
spite of the warnings issued from time to time by the
Admiralty, many of them were led to the conclusion that
there M^as no cause to fear further trouble, apart, of course,
from the menace which submarines and mines represented
in the waters around the British Isles. The naval authori-
ties repeatedly stated that, although the enemy was being
blockaded as effectively as possible, the conditions under
which that operation was being carried out militated
against any hard-and-fast guarantee being given that
one or more German vessels, whether disguised men-of-war
or auxiliaries, would not break out upon the trade routes
either from the Baltic or from Germany's North Sea ports.
The blockade was being conducted at long range and in
latitudes in which fogs were frequently experienced, and
during the winter months the dark nights offered oppor-
tunities for isolated ships to escape the vigilance of the
British naval forces. That these warnings were fully
justified events were soon to disclose, for a few days before
the close of the year 1915, a raider steamed out of Hamburg
cleverly disguised as an ordinary cargo-vessel ; within a
380
CH. XVII] THE " MOWE " SLIPS OUT 381
few hours she was engaged in the work of mine-laying, and
then began a systematic course of commerce-destruction.
This vessel was the Mowe, under the command of Kor-
vetten-Kapitan Burggraf Graf Nikolaus zu Dohna-Schlo-
dien, a determined, skilful, and, as events were to show,
humane officer, whose record stands out in marked contrast
to that of many of his companions in the submarine branch
of the German naval service. When Count zu Dohna-
Schlodien received his orders to " lay mines in various
places along the enemy's coast and then carry on cruiser
warfare," the Moive had already been equipped with guns
and provided with mine-laying apparatus, and her disguise
was complete. She had been painted black-and-white,
and a Swedish ensign had been emblazoned on each side
just before the foremost hatch. Her armament had been
placed behind high bulwarks which were, of course, move-
able, and nothing was to be seen of her mines. She had
the appearance of an ordinary Swedish merchant ship,
distinguished only by a fairly large crow's-nest on the fore-
mast and a rather high ventilating cowl in front of the
poop. Thick and stormy weather facilitated the slipping
of this disguised vessel through the British patrols. She
crept northwards up the Norwegian coast, and thus passed
out into the Atlantic after laying two mine-fields —one
across the Pentland Firth in a gale of wind and snow,^ and
the other off La Rochelle. She remained at large, capturing
one British merchantman after another, for a period of
a month before the Admiralty received information as to
her doings, and even then the intelligence was of a some-
what indefinite character.
On the afternoon of January 11th, 1916, the Farringford
(3,146 tons) was on passage from Huelva to Liverpool with
a cargo of copper ore when she sighted two steamers on her
port bow. The Farringford was about 160 miles to the
west of Cape Finisterre at the time — well outside the war
zone. The nearer of the two steamers was about three
miles distant ; she was flying the Red Ensign and nothing
in her appearance suggested that she was anything but
the ordinary merchant ship engaged in peaceful com-
merce. Suddenly, however, this apparently harmless
vessel, which was in fact the Mowe, signalled " What ship
^ H.M.S. King Edward VII was shortly afterwards sunk on this mine-
field.
382 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvn
is that ? " The master of the Farringford (Mr. Jolin Parry
Jones) at once hoisted the Red Ensign and was about to
put up the number of his vessel when the stranger inter-
vened with two further signals, " Stop immediately ! " and
" Abandon ship ! " On making these demands the
mysterious vessel lowered the Red Ensign, and to Captain
Jones's amazement ran up in its place the German flag,
at the same time unmasking a powerful battery.
The British master, realising at once that he had
no hope of escape, stopped his vessel, and the Mowe,
turning on her starboard helm, approached close to him.
Captain Jones then ordered his men to man and fill the
boats and pull towards the German raider. As soon as
the crew were aboard, they were placed between decks
under an armed guard and informed that they were
prisoners of war ; Captain Jones himself was taken to
the bridge, where he had the sad ordeal of witnessing
his vessel being shelled by the Mowe. The hull was
penetrated near the water's edge close to the boilers
and engines, but the Farringford did not immediately
sink, and was still afloat when Captain Jones last saw
her.
In the meantime, the captain of the Mowe had turned
about to pay attention to the other vessel already sighted
by Captain Jones, which proved to be the Corbridge (3,687
tons) on passage to Rosario with 5,000 tons of coal from
Barry. The master (Mr. David Barton) had already, of
course, by the action of the strange vessel on his port bow
towards the unfortunate Farringford, perceived her true
nature. He too had received similar signals and had been
commanded to stop by the German raider. Seeing, how-
ever, that her attention was for the moment directed
towards the Farringford, he decided for the present to hold
upon his course, although several warning shots had been
fired at him. Soon after 5 o'clock, however, he realised
that ultimate escape was impossible, and, a shell from one
of the Mowe's guns passing over his funnel, he deemed it
his duty to stop his engines. Darkness had now fallen,
and the Mowe's captain lowered a boat and sent a couple
of officers and an armed crew aboard the British vessel.
Finding that she was carrying what was, for the Mowe,
a particularly valuable cargo of coal, the German captain
decided that he would not immediately sink the Corbridge ;
CH. xvii] THE RAroER'S ARMAMENT 383
Captain Barton and eighteen of his men were transferred
to the raider, and a German prize crew consisting of two
officers and six men was placed in charge of the captured
vessel. The Corbridge was then ordered to follow in the
wake of the Mowe, which once more returned to the spot
where the Farringford had last been seen. In spite of the
bright moonlight, however, no vestige of her was found,
and there was no doubt that she had ultimately sunk as
the result of her earlier shelling.
Thus began the first cruise of the German raider Mowe,
now revealed to the two unfortunate British captains
imprisoned on board her as a vessel of some 4,500 tons,
not very speedy ; she possessed four decks, with two
torpedo-tubes on the fore deck, four 5* 9-inch guns mounted
forward, two guns of similar calibre mounted aft, and one
smaller gun. She had been fitted with rails for mine-laying.
She also carried a powerful wireless installation. It was
apparent to observers that a good deal of ingenuity had
been exhibited in concealing her comparatively heavy
armament.
The Farringford having been sunk, the Corbridge, under
her German prize crew, was dispatched towards an
arranged rendezvous on the coast of Brazil, where the
Mowe intended to coal from her at a later date. On the
following day, therefore (January 12th), at about 4 p.m.,
Captain Barton saw his vessel disappearing into the
south-west. This was the day before the next victim
was destined to fall to the Mowe, namely the Dromonby
(3,627 tons), carrying between five and six thousand tons
of coal from Cardiff to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands.
This West Hartlepool vessel had been at sea for five
days, when her master (Mr. John Brockett), while in his
cabin, heard a shot fired. Going on deck immediately, he
saw an armed merchantman, flying the German ensign,
about a ship's length away on his port side. He imme-
diately put his vessel full speed astern and blew three
blasts on the wliistle. The German vessel hoisted the
customary signal " What ship is that ? " to which Captain
Brockett replied by hoisting the number of his vessel.
The Mowe immediately signalled " Stop instantly! " and
"Abandon ship!" and realising, as the masters of the
Farringford and Corbridge had previously done, that any
resistance would be hopeless, the British captain swung
n— 26
384 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
out his boats and ordered his crew to leave the ship. The
captain of the Mowe then sent three or four boatfuls of
armed men to examine the Dromonby's cargo and her
papers, which were taken aboard the German vessel.
The Dromonhy was subsequently sunk, in a position about
140 miles W. by N. from Cape Finisterre, by explosive
charges laid and fired by a German demolition party.
Captain Brockett and his crew had previously been sent
below decks on board the Mowe to join the other British
prisoners, and therefore were spared the sight of their
vessel's destruction. It was an unfortunate loss, as the
Dromonhy's cargo of coal was destined for the British
Naval Squadron working in South American waters.
Scarcely had the Dromonhy gone down when a column
of smoke to the northward proclaimed to those on board
the Mowe the approach of yet another possible victim.
This was the British steamer Author, of Liverpool (3,490
tons). She was carrying a general cargo of about 5,200
tons, consigned to various firms at Durban, Delagoa Bay,
and Vigo, and had left London on January 8th. It was
about half -past three in the afternoon of January 13th, the
weather being fine and clear and the sea smooth, when the
second officer of the Author reported to her master (Mr.
Ralph Yeates) that a German cruiser was alongside. She
had approached the Author with the British Ensign flying,
but had hauled this down when abreast of the British
vessel, displaying in its stead the German Naval Ensign.
Captain Yeates immediately went on deck to find the
raider on his port beam, with her torpedo-tubes showing,
and two of her 5*9 guns trained on his vessel. As in the
other cases, it was at once obvious that he had no choice
but to obey orders. Armed crews from three of the
Mowe's boats boarded the Author, and, having examined
her cargo, began to transfer stores to the German vessel,
some of these, particularly the sheep, hens, and eggs, prov-
ing naturally a tempting prize to the enemy. After these
stores had been removed and the Author'' s crew, consisting
of eleven Englishmen and between forty and fifty Lascars,
had been taken aboard the Mowe to join the swelling
number of prisoners already incarcerated there, the sea-
cocks of the unlucky British vessel were opened and
explosive charges, with time fuses, were laid to effect
her sinking. Owing to the foresight of Captain Yeates,
CH. xvii] HER METHOD OF DESTRUCTION 385
the ship's confidential papers had already been burnt in
the ship's galley.
Little realising what was happening so comparatively
near at hand, another British steamship, the Trader
(3,608 tons), was now approaching, on her way to Falmouth
with a cargo of sugar from Peru. Employed on Admiralty
service, she had left St. Vincent on January 3rd. She was
travelling at about 6| knots when her master (Mr. Evan
Jones) sighted a steamer almost ahead, slightly on his star-
board bow and about three miles distant. Quite ignorant,
of course, of what had so lately happened to the unfortunate
Author, Captain Jones at first saw notliing in her of a
suspicious character. Suddenly, however, she stopped,
and immediately afterwards he received the signal " What
ship is that ? " He replied, and then received further
questions, " Where from ? " and " Where bound for ? "
He then himself signalled the stranger, " Who are you ? "
whereupon he received the reply, " A German cruiser,"
and orders were given to " Stop at once " and to " Abandon
ship." Like the Farringford, Corhridge, Dromonhy, and
Author, the Trader was unarmed even for defence, and
Captain Jones therefore ordered his boats out, and the
ship was soon almost deserted. He himself remained on
board with his chief officer and two seamen, while the
German cruiser sent across a boatful of armed men and
ordered the Trader's boats to go across to the Mowe.
The German boarding-party then came aboard the Trader
and began to search for papers, but only succeeded in
finding the official log and the bills of lading. They placed
explosive charges in the Trader's No. 2 hold, engine-room,
and No. 3 hold, and re-embarked, taking with them
Captain Yeates, his chief officer and the two seamen.
The Trader sank as a result of three explosions before her
captain had reached the side of the German vessel.
There were now some 150 British prisoners on board the
Mowe under conditions of crowding and ventilation that
were far from pleasant, and were in fact also becoming
something of a menace to the captain of the Mowe himself,
who, it should be added, did what he could to mitigate
the hardships of his " passengers " by separating the
white seamen from the black and giving permission to the
men to go on deck from time to time to get some fresh air.
For two days no further prey fell to the enemy ; and it
886 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAffiERS [ch. xvii
was not until about 7 o'clock on the morning of January
15th that the next victim, the British steamship Ariadne
(3,035 tons), sighted the Mowe about 120 miles north of
the Canaries. This vessel was carrying a cargo of maize
from Rosario to Nantes. She had been at sea since
December 6th and was now nearing her destination, so
that the feelings of her master (Mr. Robert Reed) and crew
can well be imagined when what was apparently an
innocent British steamer, flying the Red Ensign, suddenly
altered her course to pass under the Ariadne's stern, and
coming up on her starboard side, lowered the Red Ensign,
hoisted the German flag, and revealed her armament of
guns. The usual procedure followed : Captain Reed
stopped his engines, and the raider sent an armed boat's
crew aboard, who ordered him to put out his own boats
and abandon his ship. Captain Reed and his chief en-
gineer alone were retained on board while the explosive
charges and time fuses were fixed, and were then taken
back as prisoners to the Mowe. In this instance, however,
the explosions did not take place as arranged, and the
Mowe was in consequence forced to sacrifice one of her
torpedoes in order to sink the Ariadne, after previously
firing some dozen shots at her.
The scene of operations was well chosen from the Mowers
point of view. Hardly had the Ariadne disappeared than
a column of smoke was sighted from the deck of the Mowe,
this time to the starboard. It proceeded from the funnels
of a British steamship that was presently destined, for
many weary months, to be the subject of world-wide
interest in maritime legal circles and to prove a test case
of America's attitude towards one phase of modern sea
warfare. The vessel was the Elder Dempster steamship
Appam (7,781 tons), and she was carrying a considerable
number of passengers, including some invalided soldiers
and naval ratings, as well as a score of German prisoners
of war, from the Cameroons Defence Force, Among her
civilian passengers were Sir E. M. Merewether, Governor
of Sierra Leone, and Mr. F. S. James, C.M.G., Administrator
of Nigeria. The Appam (master, Mr. H. C. Harrison) had
left Freetown for Plymouth on January 9th, calling two
days later at Dakar, where a 3-pounder gun had been
shipped and mounted aft. She was some sixty miles to
the north of Madeira, when, early in the afternoon of
CH. xvii] EASY VICTIMS 387
January 15th, an ordinary cargo -steamer was observed
approaching from the north-east. Having already that
same day passed a British cargo- boat outward bound in
the same direction, the natural assumption of those on
board was that this was but another merchant vessel of
the same character. At half-past two, as the stranger
appeared to be crossing the Appani's course, the second
officer, who was in charge of the Elder Dempster vessel
at the time, altered his course a little so as to clear. She
was then seen to be flying the signal to stop.
On this being reported to Captain Harrison, he hurried
to the bridge and saw to his dismay that the approaching
ship was heavily armed and was flying the German En-
sign. Having at his disposal nothing more powerful than
his 3-pounder gun. Captain Harrison realised at once that
he would be rendering a disastrous disservice to the pas-
sengers, both men and women, whom he had on board
if he attempted resistance. He accordingly stopped his
ship. While Lieutenant Lamble, R.N.R., was attempting
to remove the breech-block of the 3-pounder, he was
observed by the Germans, who fired two shots at him,
happily without result. The Appam was then boarded
by an armed boat's crew from the raider, the Mowe keeping
close to the British vessel, with her guns trained on her.
The German officer in charge of the boat's crew made full
inquiries as to the ship's passengers, cargo, coal, speed,
etc., and then placed the master under arrest, telling him
to pack up his effects. He was subsequently sent on board
the Mowe. Although the Appam carried a wireless
installation, the close neighbourhood of the German
raider and her overpowering armament rendered this
practically useless for purposes of defence. The Appam,
therefore, fell into the German's hands as easily as her
unfortunate predecessors had done. It was now quite
impossible for the Mowe, glutted as she was with prisoners
from her already captured victims, to accommodate on
board the crew and passengers of the Appam, and the
commanding officer accordingly decided to send her, in
charge of a prize crew, to a neutral port.
Before doing so, however, the Appam was ordered to
remain for a couple of days in company with her captor ;
and she thus became the witness of a very plucky effort
at resistance made by the next victim of the Mowe, wliich
388 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAffiERS [ch. xvii
turned out to be the Clan Mactavish. This Clan liner
had been built as recently as the first year of the war.
With a valuable cargo, including wool, frozen mutton,
copper, M'heat, leather, and canned meats, she had left
Fremantle, in Australia, on December 9th. Arriving at
Durban on December 23rd, she had there landed mails
and cargo, taking on board some more wool. She had
afterwards put into Cape Town, sailing thence on the last
day of the year, with orders to call at Dakar and ship
a gun. Here she arrived on January 12th, a 6-pounder
was mounted, and two naval ratings were shipped to take
charge of this meagre armament. Leaving Dakar on
January 13th, the Clan Mactavish (5,816 tons) (master,
Mr. W. N. Oliver) had shaped her course to pass westward
of the Canary Islands. Her gun, which stood on a platform
fixed on the port quarter, was only useful for protecting
one side of the vessel and her stern, the starboard side
being totally undefended.
Passing the Island of Palma early on January 16th, it
was not until 5 o'clock in the evening that she sighted
a vessel about three points on her port bow, a second vessel
showing up soon afterwards in the same direction. They
both appeared to be ordinary merchant vessels, and from
the direction in which they were steaming, Captain Oliver
came to the conclusion that they were probably bound
from some South American port and were making for the
Mediterranean. Just as dusk was falling, however, the
nearer of the two vessels began to approach so close that
Captain Oliver ordered his helm to be ported, as the strange
ship showed no signs of giving way, although under the
circumstances it was her duty to have done so. A message
was then received, morsed by lamp, " What ship is that ? "
Captain Oliver at once replied by asking the stranger to
report her own name. The answer came, "The Trader, of
Liverpool," and, as this vessel was known to Captain
Oliver, he replied by gi'sdng the name of the Clan Mactavish.
The two vessels were steaming side by side, some 300
yards apart, the Mowe, as she in fact was, being on the
port side of the Clan Mactavish. Within a few minutes
Captain Oliver received the signal " Stop at once ! I am
a German cruiser." Captain Oliver, with his instinctive
courage, instantly ordered full speed ahead and sent the
gun's crew to their stations : he was determined to make
CH. XVII] AN UNFORTUNATE MISCHANCE 389
a fight for his ship. The wireless operator of the Clan
Mactavish instantly dispatched a signal for help : "I am in
imminent danger of capture by the enemy in lat. 30° 40' N.,
long. 17° 10' W. — Clan Mactavish^ It was taken in on
board H.M.S. Essex, but was not reported to the decoding
officer, and thus by this mischance the Mowe gained a
further lease of life. The signal was the first news of the
movements of the raider, and owing to the failure of two
bluejackets it was of no avail. Whether it would have
enabled the British naval forces to capture the Mowe is,
however, a matter of doubt.
When the German raider perceived that the warning to
stop was being ignored, she fired a shot across the bows
of the Clan Mactavish, followed by another. One shell
landed on the fore-deck of the Clan Mactavish, close to
her windlass, killing the man in the lookout. Captain
Oliver ordered that the enemy's fire should be returned,
not realising at first that the Mowe's armament was of such
a powerful nature, but presuming it probably to be of
somewhat the same calibre as his own. The enemy shells
now began to rain heavily upon the British vessel. One,
landing on the fiddly deck, killed seven men ; a second
holed the ship's side in the neighbourhood of the bridge,
wrecking the stewards' room and damaging the second
officer's cabin, as well as blowing away the ship's gig ;
a third holed the Clan Mactavish below the water-line ;
and a final one burst the main steam-pipe and thus put
her engines out of action. Captain Oliver was accordingly
left with no alternative than to cease firing, and he signalled
the raider to that effect, having sustained a loss of eighteen
Lascars killed and five or six wounded.
The Moive then signalled to know if there were any
wounded on board, to which Captain Oliver replied that
there were. He received an order for all his boats to be
lowered, and just as he had done so, a boat from the Mowe
came alongside under the command of a lieutenant. The
crew of the Clan Mactavish were lined up on deck, and
directed to take their places in the boats. Bombs were
placed on board the captured British vessel in order to
effect her sinking speedily, and Captain Oliver, together
with his chief engineer and wireless operator, was taken
over to the Mowe in the German boat. All confidential
documents had previously been destroyed, and the breech-
390 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
block of the gun and all rifle ammunition had been thrown
overboard. One of the first sights that met Captain
Oliver's eyes when he reached the Mowe was that of the
bodies of three Germans being carried aft for burial.
Before returning to the adventures of the Appam, it may
here be stated that Captain Oliver, his native crew and his
two naval ratings, were retained on board the Mowe till
the end of her first cruise, when she returned safely to
Germany. Captain Oliver was then interned in a prison
camp at Hameln, where he remained in captivity for two
years. He was afterwards decorated on his return to
England with the D.S.C.
During these weeks of activity on the part of the Mowe,
anxiety was felt in England as to the fate of a number of
ships. The finding of a lifeboat marked Appam by
the steamer Tregantle suggested that the vessel had en-
countered bad weather and had been at least delayed.
For at this time nothing was known of the escape of the
Mowe, much less of her movements at sea. But the veil Mas
about to be lifted. Count zu Dohna-Schlodien had so many
prisoners that he had to get rid of them. By mischance
British cruisers were active in every area except those in
which the Mowe, unknown to anyone, was operating.
The Clan Mactavish was sunk on Sunday, January 16th,
about 120 miles S. by W. (true) from Funchal, and on the
day after her destruction the final arrangements for sending
the Appam to a neutral port, then undisclosed, were made.
At about 5 o'clock on the evening of January 17th, certain
officers and men from some of the vessels previously
captured by the Mowe were transferred to the Appam.,
and at about 9 o'clock the two ships parted company, the
Appam, proceeding in a westerly direction.
She arrived under the command of one of the Mowe's
officers. Lieutenant Berg, and in charge of a prize crew, at
Hampton Roads, Virginia, on February 1st. No passen-
gers were allowed to land, and no communication with
the shore was permitted, but at 6 o'clock in the evening
Sir Edward Merewether, Mr. James, and one or two others
were allowed to land at Old Point Comfort in order to
confer with the Naval Attache to the British Embassy and
the Vice-Consul of North Virginia. It was then declared
that all passengers were free to leave the ship with the
exception of the naval and military officers and men on
CH. XVII] A VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY 891
board, whose release had been objected to by the German
Ambassador.
On the following day, February 3rd, the Appam was
taken up to Newport News, and there ensued a long
series of communications between the various Foreign
Offices concerned as to the future of the ship and those
still on board her. It was finally decided on July 29th,
1916, by Judge Waddell, that the Appam had lost her
status as prize when she entered American territorial
waters to remain indefinitely ; that the manner of bringing
her, as well as her prisoners, into the waters of the United
States constituted a violation of the neutrality of the
United States ; that she had come in without bidding or
permission ; that she had remained in violation of the law ;
that she was unable to leave for lack of crew, which she
could not provide or augment without further violation
of neutrality ; that in her present condition she was with-
out a lawful right to be or.- remain in the waters of the
United States ; and that she should therefore be returned
to her owners. An appeal was made to the Supreme
Court of the United States, but the decision was upheld in
a judgment delivered on March 6th, 1917. It was estab-
lished that the Appam was not brought into an American
port otherwise than as a prize, captured at sea by a cruiser
of the German Navy. It was held that the true rule of
International Law was that a prize could only be brought
into a neutral port on account of unseaworthiness, stress
of weather, or want of fuel or provisions. The Court
decided that the use of an American port by the Germans
in which they might store prizes indefinitely was in fact
a violation of neutrality, and that it could not be justified
by existing treaties between America and Germany. The
appeal was accordingly dismissed and the decrees for the
restitution of the vessel, with the cargo, to the owners
were affirmed.
To return to the Mowe, it will be recalled that her second
capture, the Corbridge, with her cargo of coal, had been
dispatched south to an appointed rendezvous, where the
captain of the Mowe proposed later to meet her, for coaling
purposes. After the capture of the Appam and the
sinking of the Clan Mactavish, the Mowe accordingly pro-
ceeded southwards with this object. On January 22nd
she was sighted by a three-masted British barque, the
392 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAffiERS [ch. xvii
Edinburgh, of Glasgow. With a gross tonnage of a little
over 1,400, she was an iron-built vessel, some thirty years
old, and was proceeding with a cargo of rice meal from
Rangoon to Liverpool, having left the former port on
September 22nd, 1915. She had reached a point some
700 miles W. by S. | S. (true) from St. Vincent, Cape
Verde Islands, and all was well. It was 4.30 in the after-
noon that her master (Mr. Samuel W. Burnley) first sighted
the German raider on his starboard side, some six miles
away.
He proceeded on his course unsuspectingly. The strange
steamer came up under his stern, hailed him, and asked
him to show his distinguishing flag. Before he had time
to do so, however, the mysterious vessel signalled that a
boat was being sent across. Captain Burnley backed his
mainyard, and two boats, full of armed men, came along-
side. They were in charge of a lieutenant, who told Captain
Burnley that they were about to sink his ship. After
allowing time for him and his crewto collecttheir belongings,
the German officer then took them, together with all avail-
able provisions, aboard the German raider. Before doing
so, fuse bombs had been placed in each of the three hatches,
and about 8 o'clock in the evening the old Edinburgh
slowly disappeared from sight, a tragic spectacle for her
master to witness in the bright moonlight of a tropical
night. Six days later, on January 28th, the Corbridge
w^as again sighted off Maraca Island, and for three days
the German raider proceeded to coal from her, after which
she was towed into deep water and sunk. Count zu
Dohna-Schlodien realised that the news of his activities had
by this time got abroad, so he steamed to the vicinity
of the Rocas.
On February 4th the Mowe sank a Belgian steamship,
the Luxembourg, carrying nearly 6,000 tons of coal to
Buenos Aires, in a position about eighty miles to the east-
ward of Fernando Noronha, and then Count zu Dohna
steamed slowly to the north-west. On the 6th the Mowe
was seen by the British steamship Flamenco, some two
miles distant on the port side. The Flamenco (4,629 tons)
was bound, with a cargo of coal, from Newport to Santos.
Noticing that the approaching vessel appeared to be
getting too close to him, the master of the Flamenco
(Mr. Norman Martorell) ported his helm in order to avoid
CH. xvii] A CLOSE CALL 393
her. The Flamenco, which was carrying a wireless instal-
lation, then received two signals, " Stop immediately ! "
and " Do not telegraph ! " and at the same time saw the
German Naval Ensign flying from the strange vessel's
mast. Simultaneously a shot passed across the bows of
the British vessel. Captain Martorell, disregarding the
enemy's warning, immediately sent out wireless mes-
sages, upon which the raider fired five more shells, three
holing the British vessel amidships, one striking her just
under the bridge and another under the wireless cabin.
Captain Martorell could do no more. He ordered his
crew to the boats, which were swung out and lowered,
but unfortunately one of these got into difficulties and
was capsized, a fireman being drowned. The boats pulled
away from the ship's side, and an armed boat's crew from
the raider came alongside. Picking up the survivors of
the crew of the capsized dinghy, the Germans proceeded
on board, put Captain Martorell under arrest and took
him across to the Mbwe. The Flamenco was now in flames
and rapidly sinking, and a second boat's crew from the
German vessel finished her destruction with a bomb, the
vessel sinking at a point about 310 miles N.E. by N. (true)
from Pernambuco. How near the Mowe had come, at this
point, to the end of her predatory career may be gathered
from the fact that the Flamenco had been in touch with the
British cruiser Glasgow only the day before. There is
reason to believe that the Glasgow and the Mowe had
passed each other during the previous afternoon, and had
the Glasgow been near enough to see the enemy raider,
the exploits of the Mowe might have had a different ending.
That was on February 6th, and two days later, on
February 8th, the Mowe was sighted at about 5.30 p.m.
by the British steamer Westhurn. This was a com-
paratively old and slow vessel (3,300 tons), and was bound
with a cargo of nearly 4,000 tons of coal from Cardiff to
Buenos Aires, She had left Cardiff on December 28th,
but had been forced, as a result of damage sustained
during bad weather, to put into Liverpool on January
4th, where she had remained till the 21st. Since leaving
Liverpool all had gone well, and the weather was fine and
clear when, in the position lat. 0° 11' N., long. 31° 30' W., the
chief ofl^icer (Mr. George Wilkinson), who was on the bridge,
saw a strange vessel, which was in fact the Mowe, about
394 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAffiERS [ch. xvii
four points on his starboard bow and some seven miles
away, steering straight towards him.
An hour later, when it was nearly dark, the strange
vessel, then only about a mile away on his port beam,
began to signal asking for the name of his ship. The
master of the Westburn (Mr. A. T. Campbell) had now
joined the chief officer on the bridge. Both of them were
very suspicious of the other vessel's movements. Captain
Campbell replied to the German signals, describing himself
as the master of a Danish vessel. The Westburn was
accordingly allowed to proceed, but, at about a quarter
to eight, she was again signalled by the enemy and told
to stop, a gun being fired as a peremptory warning. Cap-
tain Campbell at once stopped the Westburn, and a motor-
boat came across to him from the raider. The lieutenant
in charge made the usual inquiries. The Westburn's boats
were promptly lowered and her crew and officers sent
across to the Mbwe, the captain soon afterwards following
in charge of the German lieutenant. The Westburn was
not, however, immediately sunk, as the commander of the
Mowe evidently had other views about her ; and those
who were taken captive from her became the witnesses,
at 5.30 o'clock the next morning, of the capture of the
steamship Horace (3,335 tons), of Liverpool.
This vessel (master, Mr. D. William Hughes) was bound
with a general cargo to Buenos Aires. The Mowe was
within about three-quarters of a mile of her, when the
Horace received the usual signal to stop. Captain Hughes
immediately altered his course westward in order to avoid
a collision. The Mowe responded by firing a shot across
his poop, hoisting at the same time the German Naval
Ensign. Captain Hughes then stopped and hoisted the
British Ensign, and ten minutes later the Mowe signalled
that she was sending a boat to him. At 6 o'clock an
armed guard boarded his vessel and took charge. At
first Captain Hughes was told that the Horace would be
used to convey some of the prisoners now crowding the
Mowe to Brazil, but, finding that she was carrying among
other things a consignment of copper, the commander of
the Mbwe ordered her to be sunk. Captain Hughes and
his men were accordingly taken off the Horace and put on
board the Westburn, which had now come up in charge of
her German prize crew. At 11 o'clock explosive charges
CH.xvii] CONDITIONS IN THE " WESTBURN " 395
were fired on board the Horace, and an hour later she had
disappeared from sight.
It was now clear that Count zu Dohna intended to use
the Westburn, much as he had used the Appam, to free
himself from his very congested cargo of British captives.
Those who remained, therefore, of the crews of the pre-
viously captured Edinburgh, Flamenco, Clan Mactavish,
Horace, and Corbridge, in company with the officers and
men of the Belgian steamship Luxembourg, which had also
been captured by the Mowe, were placed on board the
Westburn, and told that they would be landed. Accord-
ingly the Westburn was placed in charge of Lieutenant
Badewitz and a German prize crew, together with some
neutrals to assist in navigating the vessel, and on February
9th she left the Mowe with about 200 prisoner passengers
on board. The captured British naval and military
officers, together with some naval ratings and coolies, and
the master and second mate of the Westburn, as well as the
master of the Clan Mactavish, were retained on board
the Mowe.
The Westburn was near the Equator when she was cast
off, and she was steered in the direction of the Cape Verde
Islands. On February 15th the vessel again turned south,
suggesting that the commanding officer was intending to
break the pledge which Count zu Dohna had given. On
the following day, therefore, the masters of the captured
vessels addressed the following letter to the German officer
in charge.
" The commander of the Mowe told us we should be
landed in five days and we are still at sea. At your
request we provided engineers and firemen, without
promise of payment and against their wishes, to run this
vessel. During the past two days the men have com-
plained that the food is not sufficient. We shall be pleased,
therefore, if you will kindly let us know your intentions
as to when and where you propose to land us that we can
let the men know and relieve their anxiety."
The merchant seamen were, in fact, existing in the
hold in conditions of great hardship : they had little
ventilation, their food was badly cooked, and the heat
was insufferable.
396 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
Lieutenant Badewitz then came aft and informed the
masters that he would take them either to Las Palmas or
Tenerife if they so desired, or that he would land them
earlier on a desert island. To this they replied that they
would prefer to be taken to Las Palmas or Tenerife. The
course of the Westburn was then directed towards the latter
island, and it was about half -past two in the afternoon of
February 22nd that she entered the port of Santa Cruz,
flying the German Naval Flag. To Lieutenant Badewitz's
amazement, the British armoured cruiser H.M.S. Sutlej
happened also to be in the harbour. The Port Authorities
and the German Consul immediately went off to the cap-
tured merchantman, and returned with the information
that the German commander of the Westburn had come
to the port in order to land his prisoners and obtain pro-
visions.
At the moment of the Westburn's entrance. Captain
Basil H. Fanshawe, in command of the Sutlej, with
three of his officers, were in the British Consulate, but
on receiving the information that a steamship under the
German Ensign was entering the harbour from the south,
they immediately returned on board and the Sutlej
shortly afterwards got up steam and got out of territorial
waters so as to watch proceedings. There then followed
various negotiations as to the status of the Westburn and
her treatment by the Spanish authorities, during which
the British Consul was allowed to send provisions on
board her for the prisoners, who by that time had be-
come seriously short of food. On the next day, Feb-
ruary 23rd, all the British prisoners were handed over
to the British Consul and the bulk of them were later
transferred to the R.M.S, Athenic, which had arrived at
Santa Cruz en route for England. Later in the day, the
Westburn was observed to be moving from her original
anchorage and she proceeded about a mile along the coast,
where she anchored some three-quarters of a mile from
the shore ; she was followed by the German Coaling Com-
pany's steam-launch and a tug-boat. Soon afterwards
she was noticed to be settling down, and about half an hour
afterwards she sank. The German crew left the ship in
the steam-launch, having, as was afterwards affirmed,
deliberately scuttled the vessel in Spanish territorial
waters.
CH. xvii] A SUCCESSFUL CRUISE 397
The Mowe was now nearing the end of her cruise.
Count zu Dohna must have reahsed that a hue and cry had
been raised and that AUied men-of-war were seeking for
him. So on or about February 10th he turned homewards.
On the 24th a French vessel, the Maroni, was captured
and sunk while bound from Bordeaux to New York with a
general cargo, and then, some 620 miles west (true) from the
Fastnet, the last of the Mowe's British victims, during this,
her first, cruise, fell in with her. This was the Saxon Prince
(3,471 tons). This Prince liner (master, Mr. W. S. Jame-
son) was homeward bound from Norfolk, Virginia, to
Manchester with a cargo of some 5,000 tons of steel,
cotton, and grain. She was unarmed and carried no muni-
tions, guns, or explosives. Leaving Norfolk on February
13th, the voyage proceeded without incident until about
6 o'clock in the morning of February 25th, when a steamer
approaching from the northward on the port side was
reported by the lookout. Two flags were hoisted on board
the strange vessel, but owing to the fact that they were
end on to the Saxon Prince, their nature could not be
determined.
Gradually approaching until within about half a mile,
the mysterious ship fired a blank shot at the Saxo?i Prince
as a signal to stop. Captain Jameson had no alternative
but to obey. The unknown vessel approached closer, and
it was then seen that she was flying the German Ensign.
An armed crew boarded the Saxon Prince, Having ex-
amined the cargo and ship's papers, all on board the
Saxon Prince were ordered into the boats, and bombs
were placed on the deck of the British vessel. These were
exploded as soon as the boats had left, the Saxon Prince
at once listing to port and beginning to sink ; she dis-
appeared in less than an hour. With the commander of
the Saxon Prince (Captain Jameson) on board, together
with the British crew, the Mowe now succeeded, largely
aided by the rough weather, dense snow-squalls, and
driving fog-banks, in eluding the patrol-vessels of the
Tenth Cruiser Squadron, and reached German territorial
waters without adventure. Captain Jameson and the
British crew of the Saxon Prince were landed at Wilhelms-
haven on March 4th, and were subsequently interned, the
neutrals of the crew, tliree Danish seamen, being afterwards
sent to their homes.
398 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
No more was heard of the Mowe for several months,
and in the meantime the Germans made the most, for
propagandist purposes in neutral countries, of Count zu
Dohna's success. In a spirit of bravado, the enemy de-
cided to send the Mowe roving once more, and on Decem-
ber 2nd, 1916, a British vessel fell in with her, to become
the first victim of her second and last cruise. As it after-
wards appeared, the Mowe, once again disguised as an
innocent cargo-steamer, had left Germany in the last
week of November and had succeeded, again aided by fog
and darkness, in breaking through the patrol upon the
trade routes of the North Atlantic. The British vessel
which was to afford the first evidence of this success was
the steamer Voltaire (8,618 tons), outward bound from
Liverpool to New York, via Halifax, in ballast. Leaving
the former port on November 28th, this Lamport & Holt
vessel carried a crew of ninety-four men and was armed
with one 4* 7-inch gun. Following the track advised
by the Naval Intelligence Officer at Liverpool, it was at
7.30 o'clock on the morning of December 2nd, just as light
was breaking, that she was overtaken by the Mowe, which
signalled her to stop immediately, and ordered that the
ship should be abandoned. The master of the Voltaire
(Mr. R. A. Knight), however, at once altered his course
to bring the enemy vessel astern, sending out a wireless
emergency call. This call the Mowe proceeded to block,
and opened fire with all the guns that she could train upon
the Voltaire. Four shells, fired at close range, struck the
vessel, many other salvoes going over her owing to the
rough sea in which the short action was being fought. At
last, finding that he was completely outgunned and had
not the necessary speed to escape from the Mowe, Captain
Knight ordered his engines to be stopped, and the crew
to leave the vessel in the lifeboats. The Mowe then sent
an armed crew to the Voltaire, who placed bombs in her
holds, which were afterwards exploded, the vessel sinking
about noon, 650 miles W. \ N. (true) from the Fastnet.
Excellent discipline was preserved on board the Voltaire,
and although the sea was very rough at the time, and the
crew in their frail craft were under fire, the boats were
safely got away and no lives were lost. Captain Knight
and his men were afterwards picked up and detained as
prisoners on the Mowe. They were landed later, together
CH. xvii] THE " MO WE " OUT AGAIN 399
with various other officers and crews, at Swinemiinde, and
were interned until the end of the war.
The next vessel to be lost was the steamship Mount
Temple (9,792 tons), which was en route from Quebec to
Brest, with a general cargo of wheat, flour, corn, lumber,
bacon, cheese, canned goods, and other things, amounting
to some 8,000 tons, as well as a consignment of over 700
horses for the French Government. Leaving Quebec on
November 28th, this unit of the fleet of the Canadian
Pacific Railway fell in with the Mowe on December 6th,
four days after the capture of the Voltaire. Her com-
mander (Mr. A. H. Sergeant), unaware of the character
of the armament opposed to him, made a plucky effort
to save his ship. On discovering the true nature of the
Mowe, he ordered his single stern gun to be manned and
trained on the German raider. Upon this, the Mowe at
once opened fire at a range of less than a quarter of a mile,
inflicting three casualties on the Mount Temple's crew.
It was evident that resistance was useless, and the order
was given for the Mount Temple's engines to be stopped
and the boats to be lowered. A few minutes later an
armed crew from the Mowe placed bombs in position so
as to effect the speedy destruction of the merchantman.
Captain Sergeant and the survivors of the crew were then
taken on board the Mowe and detained as prisoners.
The Mount Temple sank soon afterwards in a position some
620 miles W. | S. (true) from the Fastnet, carrying with her
the bodies of the three men killed during the short action.
That was on December 6th, and two days later, on
December 8th, another British vessel fell into the Mowe's
clutches. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon the steamer King
George (3,852 tons) sighted the raider. Leaving Phila-
delphia on November 29th with a general cargo for Man-
chester, the voyage had been as peaceful as could have been
desired until the Mowe was sighted right ahead. The
King George altered her course a little in order to keep
her on the port side. No suspicions were entertained as
to the strange vessel's hostile character ; she appeared,
until her bulwarks were lowered, to be an ordinary tramp
ship of somewhere about 10,000 tons. When she came
abeam, she hoisted the German Naval Ensign and sig-
nalled to the King George to stop, afterwards steaming
round her stern and approaching her on the starboard
11—27
400 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
side. Caught as he was at a hopeless disadvantage, the
master (Mr. John Burnett) had no choice but to order his
hfeboats out. The crew embarked in them, while the Mozve
sent off two boats manned with some twenty to twenty-five
armed men. On boarding the King George, some of the
latter's crew were ordered into the starboard lifeboat, the
rest being sent into one of the German boats. Bombs
were then placed in position and exploded. The King
George sank before 5 o'clock, in a position some 700 miles
E. ^ N. (true) from Cape Race, her master, officers, and
crew becoming prisoners in the Mowe. The whole ritual
was thus completed in less than an hour. It was also
upon this day, and in almost the same position, that the
Duchess of Cornwall, a small British sailing-vessel of 152
tons, bound for Gibraltar with salt meat, was sunk by
the raider, her crew being captured.
Within twenty-four hours the Mowe secured another
ship, the Cambrian Range (4,234 tons). She Avas carrying
two passengers, a crew of thirty-seven, and a miscellaneous
cargo of some 6,000 tons, and was homeward bound to
Liverpool from Baltimore. She had sailed from the latter
port on November 29th, and at 7 o'clock on the morning
of December 9th the Mowe was observed on her port bow ;
her smoke and masts alone were visible, and her course
was apparently such as would bring her across the bow
of the Cambrian Range. A couple of hours later she was
observed to be closing the Cambrian Range upon the same
course, but soon afterwards altered her direction so as to
pass the British vessel steaming upon an opposite course.
When some 300 yards distant on the starboard bow, she
hoisted the German Naval Ensign and fired a couple of
shots, one passing over the ship and the other falling
short. At the same time she signalled to the Cambrian
Range to stop and abandon ship. Being unarmed, the
master (Mr. W. E. J. Moore), ha\dng ordered a wireless
message for help to be sent out, which was immediately
jammed by the Germans, stopped his ship. Two lifeboats
were lowered and the crew of the Cambrian Range sent
across to the raider, Captain Moore alone remaining on
board. A German boat's crew then crossed to the Cam-
brian Range, placed bombs in her, according to the Mowe's
usual procedure, and brought Captain Moore back to the
raider. About five minutes later an explosion occurred
■w#»
■^,
THE SINKING OF THE GEORGIC.
400]
CH. XVII] THE " GEORGIC " TORPEDOED 401
and the Camhrian Range disappeared in a position some
610 miles E. | S. (true) from Cape Race.
On the following day the steamer Georgic (10,077 tons),
larger than any of the vessels that had yet been captured
by the Mowe, was overhauled. She had left Philadelphia
for Brest on December 2nd, with a general cargo as well
as some 1,300 horses for the French Government, and at
7 o'clock on the morning of the 10th the Mowe, which had
already been sighted, was observed to turn and head
towards the Georgic. When within some 1,000 yards'
range, the Mowe turned sharply on a parallel course, and
immediately afterwards a warning shot was fired from
her. The master of the Georgic (Mr. A. H. Summers) at
once tried to bring his ship round so as to place the German
raider astern, at the same time ordering his gun to be
manned and brought to bear on the Mowe. Upon this,
the German vessel closed to within a range of some 200
to 300 yards and opened a heavy fire, her first shot destroy-
ing the Georgic' s wireless, her second shot putting the
British ship's gun out of action, and her third and fourth
shots destroying tliree lifeboats and damaging the funnels.
Fortunately only one life was lost. It was evident that
the duel could have only one result, so Captain Summers
gave orders for the engines to be stopped. While the
undamaged lifeboats were being lowered, some forty to
fifty of the Georgic' s crew fell into the water, owing to the
davits having been injured by the Mowe's gunfire. All
were safely picked up, however, and brought on board the
raider. By 9 a.m. explosive charges which had been
placed on board the Georgic by the raider's armed crew
were fired, but owing to the large cargo of cotton on
board, the vessel was very slow in sinking and was accord-
ingly torpedoed at noon ; she disappeared at half-past two,
with the 1,300 horses on board, in a position 590 miles
east-south-east (true) from Cape Race.
With the addition of the 142 officers and men from the
Georgic, there were now some 400 British prisoners confined
under conditions of extreme discomfort on board the
Mowe, and the next British vessel to be captured, the
Yarrowdale (4,652 tons), was destined to be taken, in con-
sequence, into a German port as a prison ship. She was
a comparatively new vessel, having been completed in
1912. Bound, with a general cargo, including 100 motor-
402 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
cars and 3,200 tons of steel, from New York to Havre, it
was at 8 o'clock on December 11th that the Mowe was
seen approaching on the starboard bow, some half a mile
distant. She was flying no flag, but a few minutes later
she fired a shot across the Yarrowdale's bows, hoisted the
German Naval Ensign, and signalled the British steamer
to stop. A party of armed Germans went on board and
took possession of her as a prize, the Yarrowdale being
ordered to keep company with the Mowe.
The weather was very bad ; highseas were running, with
rain, wind, and fog. At 8.30 a.m. of the following day,
the Saint Theodore (4,992 tons) was sighted by the Mowe.
She was on her way from Norfolk, Virginia, with coal for
Savona, Italy. She was some 520 miles W. I S. (true) from
Flores, when the Mowe came into sight about one and a
half to two miles astern, proceeding in the same direction.
She was to all appearances an ordinary merchant vessel
innocent of offence. Overhauling the Saint Theodore, she
hoisted the German naval colours as she approached, and
signalled to the British vessel to stop instantly. The
British master (Mr. G. Hallam) noticed men standing by
what appeared to be guns on the stranger's forward deck.
He called all hands to boat stations, but, this movement
being observed on board the raider, he received a signal
not to abandon his ship. The Mowe then endeavoured to
launch a boat, but the weather was so bad that the idea
of doing so was abandoned. Captain Hallam was accord-
ingly ordered to proceed, steering westward. At about
4 p.m. he was stopped again. An armed prize crew was
put on board, but he was instructed to continue working
the steamer, and the Saint Theodore proceeded on a
southerly course throughout the night.
On the 13th, the weather having improved, the vessel
was ordered to lay to, and the Yarrowdale, which was also
in company with the raider, spent most of the day taking
on board the crews of the Voltaire, Mount Temple, King
George, Cambrian Range, and Georgia. Having sufficient
coal for four weeks, the Yarrowdale was then placed in
charge of an armed crew, with Lieutenant Badewitz in
command. This was the same German officer who had,
on the Mowe's first voyage, taken the Westhurn into Santa
Cruz. He had been interned by the Spanish authorities,
but had succeeded in making his way back into Germany
CH. xvii] THE " YARROWDALE " CONVERTED 403
and rejoining the Mowe for her second voyage under
the same commander, Burggraf Graf Nikolaus zu Dohna-
Schlodien.
Proceeding north past Iceland, the Yarrowdale came to
anchor in Swedish territorial waters, opposite the Island
of Hven, on December 29th, where she was met by a
German patrol-boat. While she was at anchor, two of
the yomiger English prisoners jumped overboard in an
endeavour to escape. Swimming strongly, one of them
had actually succeeded in reaching a point little more than
200 yards away from the coast, when he was picked up by
a searchlight and pursued and brought back with his daring
companion. On December 30th the Yarrowdale again
anchored in Swedish territorial waters, south of Drogden,
and on January 1st, 1917, arrived at the port of Swine-
miinde by way of the Kattegat and the Sound. The British
officers and crews were interned, first at Ostawine, and
thence were transferred to the Neustrelitz Camp. The
Yarrowdale was subsequently fitted out as a German
commerce raider, and was sunk on March 16th, 1917, a
little to the north of the Shetland Islands, after an action
lasting for nearly fifty minutes, by H.M.S. Achilles and
Dundee, all her hands going down with her.
By this time the Mowe had captured or sunk, in the
waters of the North Atlantic, nearly 50,000 tons of ship-
ping, and Captain zu Dohna-Schlodien decided to transfer
his operations to more southerly seas. For this purpose,
the collier Saint Theodore was dispatched, under the
command of Lieutenant Kohler and a German crew,
together with a number of neutrals who were already
serving on board, to a rendezvous at which the raider
intended to pick her up at a later date. To tliis end,
Captain Hallam, together with his men, twenty-four in
number, with two stowaways, were taken on board the
Mowe on the evening of December 13th, after the Yarrow-
dale had been dispatched with her prisoners to Germany.
The Saint Theodore then parted company from the Moive.
It was thus, 490 miles S.W. | S. (true) from Flores on
December 18th, 1916, that the Dramatist (5,415 tons) fell
a victim of the German raider. This Liverpool steamer
(master, Mr. W. J. Harris) had left the port of San Fran-
cisco on November 13th with a general cargo, bound for
Liverpool via the Panama Canal. She had reached Bilbao
404 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
on December 1st and arrived at Colon at 8 o'clock in the
evening of the same day. Leaving Colon two days later,
with instructions to coal at Hampton Roads, she received
an Admiralty warning from Jamaica on the morning of
December 4th, to the effect that German submarines might
be met anywhere in the Atlantic in the vicinity of the
United States coast, and in the approaches of Jamaica,
and that she was to keep a good lookout and avoid all
trade routes.
For several days, at intervals, this urgent warning was
repeated, and as the course to Hampton Roads would
have brought the Dramatist close to Jamaica, Captain
Harris decided that it would be more prudent to divert his
vessel to Saint Lucia in order to coal, and altered his
course accordingly. On December 7th he received a
warning from Bermuda saying that submarines might be
met anywhere in the Atlantic to west of 60° W. and that
he was to show no unnecessary lights, and avoid all trade
routes and converging points. He navigated at night
with his vessel completely darkened, and arrived safely
on December 10th at Saint Lucia, where he coaled, re-
suming his voyage to Liverpool the same day. All
went well until December 18th, when, in lat. 33° 8' N.,
long. 37° 32' W., about midday, a vessel was sighted,
three points before the port beam ; she was on the same
course as the Dramatist, but closing in towards Captain
Harris's vessel. She was distant about seven miles.
Half an hour later the stranger — no other, of course,
than the Mowe — altered course, apparently to cross the
stern of the Dramatist, at the same time increasing speed.
At 1.15 p.m. she rounded to alongside, broke out the
German Naval Ensign, and signalled to the Dramatist to
stop immediately and silence her wireless. At the same
time her bulwarks were dropped, revealing her guns all
trained upon the British vessel. The Dramatist was
accordingly stopped, and soon after half-past one an
armed crew from the German vessel boarded her ; Captain
Harris, his officers, engineers, and a portion of his crew,
were conveyed a few minutes later on board the German
vessel ; the rest of the crew were removed about 7 o'clock
in the evening. An hour and a half later the Dramatist
was sunk by explosives which had been placed in_ her
engine-room. The captain and crew of the Dramatist thus
CH. xvii] ON THE BRAZILIAN ROUTE 405
became fellow-prisoners with the men of the Saint
Theodore.
On December 23rd the Mowe reached the prearranged
rendezvous and joined the Saint Theodore. During the
next few days the Saint Theodore was fitted out with guns
and wireless, evidently with the intention of converting
her into a raider. While this work was in progress a
French sailing-ship, the Nantes, was sighted, captured, and
sunk. By December 28th the Saint Theodore had been
transformed, and the two vessels parted company, the
latter having been renamed, as afterwards became known,
as the Auxiliary Cruiser Geier and placed under the
command of Lieutenant-Commander Wolf. On January
2nd another French sailing-vessel, the Asnieres, with a
cargo of wheat, was also sunk by the Mowe, and a few days
later a Japanese vessel, the Hudson Maru, was captured
and taken in charge by this German raider.
The German raider was now operating on the Brazilian
route. One hundred and ten miles east (true) from Per-
bambuco, on January 7th, 1917, the Royal Mail Steam
Packet Company's steamer Radnorshire (4,310 tons) was
captured. This vessel (master, Mr. X. L. Willats) was
carrying a full cargo of coffee from Bahia to London.
Steaming at full speed, without showing any lights, and
making a little under 10 knots, it was at about half-past
ten at night, on January 7th, the moon being full and the
weather very fine and clear, that Captain Willats sighted
the Mowe ahead of him, some two or three degrees off his
port bow. Having been warned of the possible presence
of a German raider, he at once altered his course to port,
bringing the strange vessel upon his starboard beam and
keeping her under very close observation. She then pre-
sented the appearance of an ordinary merchantman. The
stranger followed suit by altering her course, thus bringing
the Radnorshire right ahead of her. Captain Willats
altered his course further, and noticed that he was being
rapidly overhauled.
Although he still remained uncertain of the new-comer's
identity. Captain Willats sounded the alarm, brought
all hands on deck with lifebelts, and prepared everything
in case the vessel should prove to be of enemy origin.
His gunners loaded and stood by the one gun, all secret
papers were brought to him on the bridge and packed into
406 CRUISES OF THE GERJMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
weighted bags, while, in order to test whether the un-
known vessel was really chasing him, Captain Willats
again altered his course, bringing her off his port quarter.
To this she at once responded by altering her course once
more, and Captain Willats then began sending wireless
messages, calling for help from any British men-of-war
which might be in the neighbourhood. The suspected
ship was then only about a mile away from him. The
Mbwe had at once tried to jam these messages while
steadily drawing over to the Radnorshire's starboard
quarter and firing a shell across her. At the same time
the Mowe morsed signals that the British vessel was to
stop instantly and cease sending wireless messages, while
she switched her searchlight on to the Radnorshire's gun.
The Mowe's bulwarks were then dropped and Captain
Willats could see her heavy armament in the bright
moonlight.
Having already been warned as to the weight and range
of the Mowe's guns, Captain Willats realised it would be
useless to fire. The raider was within half a mile of
him, so he ordered his gunners to unship and throw over-
board their breech-block. This was very pluckily done in
the full glare of the enemy searchlight, and simultaneously
Captain Willats stopped his engines and took way off the
ship. The Mowe then lowered two boats to send across
a boarding-party of some six officers and twenty men,
all fully armed with revolvers. The German officer in
charge. Lieutenant Paulman, ascended the bridge and,
after asking Captain Willats various questions as to the
destination and nature of his cargo, informed him he was
going to sink the ship, but that the officers and crew would
be given time in which to pack their personal belongings
before being removed as prisoners to the German cruiser.
Captain Willats was the last to leave the vessel, in company
with Lieutenant Paulman, and about two minutes after
he had done so, the bombs that had been placed just out-
side the port side of the stokehold exploded, the vessel
finally sinking at 2.45 the next morning. Some time
before this. Captain Willats had noticed the presence of
the Hudson Maru in company with the raider, and he was
now informed that, in a few days' time, he and his men
would be placed on board her. He was then conducted
below to the Mowe's after between-decks, where, together
CH. XVII] THE " MOWE " SINKS A COLLIER 407
with his men and the prisoners, both EngUsh and French,
that had been accumulated since the departure of the
Yarrowdale, he was confined within watertight doors.
The next British vessel to fall into the hands of the
Mozoe was the collier Minieh (3,806 tons), which had been
employed in coaling H.M.S. Amethyst. With this
vessel she had been on patrol in the South Atlantic for
some weeks, and on January 8th, she had coaled the
Amethyst for what was to prove the last time. At 6 p.m.
on that day the master of the Minieh (Mr. J. R. Williams)
had received orders from the commander of the Amethyst
to proceed at 6 knots to an appointed rendezvous, the
Amethyst herself following in the same direction some
twenty miles astern. At daybreak on the morning of
January 9th Captain Williams sighted the cruiser on his
port quarter, about eight miles away, but soon afterwards
she dropped astern until she was out of sight. At 4 p.m.
on the same day the merchant officer saw smoke ahead,
and, standing on, presently made out a steamer steering
in the opposite direction, with a tall funnel, and two high
straight masts fitted with wireless ; she was moving at
about 9 knots.
When she was abeam of the Minieh, and about half a
mile distant, the vessel suddenly hoisted the " Stop in-
stantly! " signal, and ordered that the Minieh should cease
wireless communication. At the same time the German
Naval Ensign was broken out from the stranger's flagstaff ;
her bulwarks fell down, her guns were swung out forward
and a torpedo-tube aft revealed. Captain Williams stopped
his steamer and ordered the wireless operator to send out
the code signal asking, " What ship is that ? " The
operator, however, returned and said that, although he
had sent out this signal three times, he was afraid that it
would not be readable as the German vessel was jamming
his wireless. Captain Williams then told him to try and
send out the S.O.S. signal, but as he was endeavouring to
do this, the Mowe fired a shot across his bows, and the
operator reported that the wireless had broken down.
The Mowe then brought up on the starboard side of the
Minieh, about a ship's length away, and lowered three
boats, whose crews proceeded to board the British collier.
Captain Williams was ordered to swing his own boats in
and make them secure, and to tell his crew that they
408 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
were to get into the German boats and proceed to the
raider.
The German officer in charge of the boarding-party
had meanwhile kept the master on the bridge, while the
German sailors were searching the ship and looting every-
thing that they could carry away. Captain Williams had
taken the precaution of destroying all his papers, and
nothing of any great value was discovered by the Germans.
At 7 p.m. Captain Williams left the Minieh in the last boat,
with the German officer, and when half-way across to the
Mowe, heard two explosions of the bombs that had been
placed on board his vessel in order to sink her. On arriving
on board the Mowe, he was at once taken to Count Nikolaus
zu Dohna-Schlodien, who conducted him into the chart-
room and questioned him closely about the cruiser which
he had last coaled. Captain Williams replied that he had
coaled the Amethyst on the day before, but when the
Mowe's commander asked him where she was, he replied
that he did not know, as he had left her and was bound
for Pernambuco to finish discharging and to clean ship.
Captain Williams was then taken below to join the other
prisoners. The Minieh sank about 9 o'clock in the evening.
On the following day, January 10th, the British steam-
ship Netherby Hall (4,461 tons) was added to the list of the
German raider's captures. This Ellerman vessel (master,
Mr. J. W. Jenks) had left Calcutta on December 3rd, 1916,
with a general cargo of about 6,000 tons for various West
Indian and Cuban ports. She had called at Delagoa Bay
on December 22nd, arriving at Cape Town on the 28th.
The same evening she sailed for Trinidad, passing St.
Helena on January 3rd on a direct course for Cape San
Roque. The voyage had been without incident. On
January 10th, when her position at noon was lat. 7° 13' S.,
long. 29° 47' W., Captain Jenks went down to lunch, and on
coming up again was informed that there was a steamer
in sight on the Netherby HalVs port bow. The Netherby
Hall was at that time steering a course N. 67 (true).
Captain Jenks was unable to see the steamer distinctly, and
concluded that it was probably bound for South America,
proceeding to the northward. He altered course and
brought the steamer right ahead, watching her for a few
minutes to ascertain her character. She still appeared
to be taking a northward course and there was nothing to
CH. XVII] CONTINUED SUCCESS 409
suggest danger. Captain Jenks, however, brought her a
Httle on his starboard bow in the effort to make out her
outhne clearly, and then, coming to the conclusion that
she was an innocent merchant steamer, he swung his
ship back to her former course. At about 1.45 p.m. the
distant vessel was on the Netherby HalVs starboard bow,
about a mile away.
The mysterious ship suddenly altered course, running
up the German Naval Ensign, and hoisting signals which
could not be made out. Captain Jenks ordered his helm
to be put hard to starboard, and rushed down below to
get his secret code and other papers out of his cabin.
He threw these overboard and was relieved to see them
sink. He then called the Marconi operator and ordered
him to send out a signal to the effect that he was being
chased by a raider in lat. 7° S., long. 30° W. These precau-
tions completed, he went back to the bridge and saw the
German raider with her forward gangway down and a
gun trained on the Netherby Hall ; the " Stop instantly ! "
signal was up. The Marconi operator at this moment
appeared to tell the usual story : his wireless signals were
being jammed and the German had threatened to sink
the Netherby Hall if attempts to call aid were not at once
discontinued. A shot was now fired across the British
vessel's bows, and, being by this time at point-blank range,
Captain Jenks ordered his engines to be stopped, told the
operator to discontinue his efforts, and had the lifeboat
swung out. The Mowe was now lowering boats, and
signalled to Captain Jenks to lower his port lifeboat.
Three boats from the Mowe immediately came across and
the Netherby Hall was boarded. The officer in charge
of the German crew, having made inquiries as to his ports
of origin and destination, told Captain Jenks to prepare
to abandon his ship. At about 3.45 p.m. all the Netherby
HalVs crew and certain stores had been transhipped to
the Mowe, and Captain Jenks was ordered to get into one
of the German boats. Bombs were placed on board, and
soon afterwards Captain Jenks heard two explosions and
saw his ship give a slight roll. After being questioned by
the Mowe's commander, Captain Jenks saw that the
Netherby Hall was still afloat with a freeboard of about
five feet, and that the Germans were training a gun upon
her from a distance of about three cables. A shot was
410 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
fired at her, and a second from about two cables' length
a few minutes later. A third shot holed her below the
water-line, and in a little while she had sunk by the head.
There were by this time well over 300 prisoners on board
the Mowe, including the masters and crews of the Saint
Theodore, Dramatist, Radnorshire, Minieh, and Netherby
Hall, and two days later most of these were transferred to
the Japanese steamer Hudson Maru, which had been kept
in company with the German raider. This task was
effected early in the morning of January 12th, the Japanese
commander of the Hudson Maru being ordered to follow
the Mowe, but at 6 p.m. he received orders to proceed to
Pernambuco, which was safely made by sundown on
January 15th.
On January 17th the Mowe reached the rendezvous to
which the Saint Theodore, now known as the Geier, had
been dispatched, the latter having captured in the mean-
while only one small Canadian sailing-vessel of 180 tons.
Having coaled from the Geier, the latter was again dis-
patched as an auxiliary German raider, but when she was
rejoined by the Mowe on February 11th, she had again
only secured one small sailing-vessel, with a cargo of whale
oil. She had, however, done better than the Mowe, which
had made no additions to her list of captures. On
February 14th, the rest of the coal on board the Geier was
transferred to the Mowe, the late Saint Theodore being then
sunk at about 1 o'clock.
That incident occurred on February 14th, and on the
following day the steamer Brecknockshire (8,423 tons) was
captured. This Royal Mail Steam Packet Company's
vessel (master, Mr. J. G. A. Mackenzie) had left Liverpool
on January 24th for Rio de Janeiro, and it was when she
arrived at a position 1,200 miles south of the Equator and
some hundreds of miles east of the usual trade route, upon
the course prescribed by the Admiralty, that at about
3 o'clock in the afternoon Captain Mackenzie sighted a
steamer almost directly ahead of him ; the two vessels
were roughly some 490 miles E. by N. (true) from Cape
Frio, Brazil. Being suspicious of the stranger's character.
Captain Mackenzie altered his course so as to place the
new-comer astern of him, at the same time ordering full
speed. Soon afterwards a shell passed over the Brecknock-
shire, followed by others w^hich fell increasingly near the
CH. XVII] FOUR MORE VICTIMS 411
ship, and Captain Mackenzie, realising that he was hope-
lessly outgunned and outranged, had no alternative but
to stop. When about three miles distant, the approaching
vessel hoisted the British Ensign and signalled " Stop
instantly ! " and " Want coal immediately."
For a few moments Captain Mackenzie believed that
the vessel chasing him might, after all, be a British cruiser
in disguise, needing coal. But, when half a mile distant,
the true character of the approaching vessel became
clear ; she dropped her bulwarks, revealing her full
armament, and broke the German Naval Ensign, at the
same time hoisting a signal to the effect that Captain
Mackenzie must prepare to abandon his ship. He had
succeeded in sinking all confidential papers and had got
out his boats before a boarding-party from the Mowe drew
alongside. The officer in charge ordered the crew of the
Brecknockshire to proceed at once on board the raider in
their own boats. Having searched the ship and removed
a considerable amount of stores, bombs were placed on
board and Captain Mackenzie was directed to leave in the
last of the German boats. Soon after leaving the Breck-
nockshire, the bombs were exploded and, while Captain
Mackenzie was interviewing the Mowers commander on
the bridge of the latter vessel, he saw his own ship sinking
by the bows.
On the same day, and in practically the same position,
the French Prince (4,766 tons) met a similar fate. This
Prince Line vessel was in Admiralty employment, and she
had left Plymouth on December 22nd, 1916, and Bahia
Blanca on February 6th, 1917. Her master (Mr. H. Jef-
fries-Da\is) and crew, thirty-nine in number, were placed
on board the Mowe. On the next day, in a position about
550 miles N.E. by E. f E. (true) from Cape Frio, Brazil,
the steamship Eddie (2,652 tons) became the Mowe's next
victim. This vessel (master, Mr. Richard Bradley) had left
Cardiff on the September 16th, and at the time of her
capture was bound from Saint Vincent to Fraybentos,
River Plate, with a cargo of some 5,000 tons of coal. Her
master and crew, twenty-five in number, joined the other
British seamen on board the Mowe.
During the following seven days no other British vessels
were lost to the German raider, but on February 23rd she
captured the steamer Kaiherine (2,926 tons). This vessel,
412 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [cii. xvii
which was in Admiralty employment, was carrying a
cargo of grain, and had sailed from Rosario, Argentine,
on the 4th of the month. It was at a point some 200
miles N.E. by N. f N. (true) from St. Paul Rocks that
she was sunk, her master (Mr. Alexander Hall) and crew
of twenty-four being added to the prisoners accumulated
between-decks in the German raider.
This was the last British steamer sunk in the South
Atlantic, and the Mbwe, as afterwards became known, set
her course once more for Germany. Her next capture
was the steamer Rhodanthe (3,061 tons), which was sunk
on March 4th, 1917, at a point 330 miles north-north-west
(true) from Saint Vincent, in the Cape Verde Islands, her
crew being taken on board the Mbwe as prisoners. Not
for more than a fortnight did another British vessel fall
in with the Mbwe, and then the Pacific Steam Navigation
Company's steamer Esmeraldas (4,678 tons) was intercepted.
She was bound to Newport News, U.S.A., having left
Liverpool on February 24th. The Esmeraldas (master,
Mr. F. W. Malin) was in ballast, and she had on board, in
addition to her crew of fifty-six, some American and
Dutch sailors returning home, as well as fifty-two American
cattlemen. Navigating without lights, it was not until
the Mbwe's searchlights played upon her that Captain
Malin became aware of the raider's nature. She was
signalled to stop immediately. The Esmeraldas carried a
small gun, but resistance was, of course, hopeless, and,
her crew and passengers having been transferred to the
Mbwe, she was sunk in a position approximately 420
miles W. by N. (true) from Lisbon.
That incident occurred early in the morning of March
10th, in weather that was rapidly becoming very bad,
and it was during a succession of heavy rain-squalls on the
same day that the Otaki (9,575 tons) fought one of the
pluckiest actions of the war against a German raider. This
New Zealand Shipping Company's ship (master, Lieutenant
Archibald Bisset Smith, R.N.R.) was travelling in ballast
from London to New York, with a crew of seventy-one.
She was about 350 miles east of St, Miguel, in the Azores,
and was proceeding at about 15 knots, when, at 2.30 p.m.,
she sighted the Mbwe. For some time the German vessel
kept her under observation ; the raider's speed enabled
her, in spite of the heavy sea, to gain upon the Otaki.
CH. XVII] A VERY GALLANT ACTION 413
The commander of the Mowe at last signalled to the Otaki
to stop, which Captain Smith refused to do. The Mowe
thereupon opened fire. To this the Otaki at once replied.
She carried only one 4* 7-inch stern gun, as opposed to the
four 5" 9-inch, one 4*1 -inch, and two 22-pounder guns of
the Mowe, but as it was a stern chase only a part of the
armament could be brought to bear.
With just a little more luck, the Otaki might well have
sunk the German raider. For twenty minutes the duel
continued, at a range of about 2,000 yards, and during
this time the Otaki scored several hits on the Mowe,
causing considerable damage, and starting a serious fire
which was only put out with difficulty. Firing nine
rounds in all, the OtakVs shells killed five of the raider's
crew and wounded ten others. She had, however, to
sustain no less than thirty rounds from the guns of the
Mowe, which also discharged torpedoes, and she lost,
during the action, four of her crew, including the third
engineer, two apprentices — one of whom, Basil Kilner,
was killed while serving at the gun — and a deck boy ;
while nine others were wounded more or less seriously.
By this time the Otaki was heavily on fire, and Captain
Smith had no choice but to give orders for the boats to be
lowered so that the survivors of the crew might have a
chance at least of being rescued, although a very heavy
sea was running and darkness was approaching.
The men, including the wounded, were at once transferred
to the boats, Captain Smith, the chief officer (Mr. Roland
L. H. McNish), and the carpenter remaining on board the
Otaki for half an hour afterwards ; the chief steward
(Mr. F. Willis) had previously jumped from the vessel and
was unfortunately drowned before he could be picked up.
Mr. McNish and the carpenter then jumped together,
thinking that Captain Smith was doing the same, but they
never saw him again, and the presumption is that he had
entered his cabin and went down with the ship that he had
so pluckily fought in a forelorn hope. The Otaki dis-
appeared with her colours still flying, Mr. McNish and the
carpenter being picked up in about half an hour by one
of the boats and taken aboard the German raider. For
this action the captain of the Otaki was awarded a post-
humous Victoria Cross, " for conspicuous bravery and
devotion to the country in the presence of the enemy when
414 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAffiERS [ch. xvii
he fought a very gallant action against overwhelming odds
and all but succeeded in destroying the enemy, finally
going down in his ship with the British colours still flying."
This was one of the only two Victoria Crosses awarded
during the whole course of the war to the Merchant Service.
The chief officer was made a Companion of the Distin-
guished Service Order, and two members of the gun's
crew, Acting Leading Seaman Alfred Fulwood Worth,
Royal Fleet Reserve, and Able Seaman Ellis Jackson,
R.N.V.R., received the Distinguished Service Medal ; the
two apprentices (W. E. Martin and B. Kilner) and the
carpenter were mentioned in despatches.
Several of the Otaki's shells had caused considerable
damage to the Mowe, and by the end of the action she was
making w^ater rather rapidly. The leaks were, however,
repaired, and the fires that had been started were got
under control and finally extinguished, and, with the
weather improving, she overtook the steamer Demeterton
(6,048 tons) on March 13th. Employed by the Admiralty,
this ship had left the port of Halifax, Nova Scotia, on
March 6th, with a crew of thirty-three, including two
gunners. She was carrying a cargo of timber, and when
the Mbwe was first sighted right ahead, the master of the
Demeterton (Mr. A. Spencer) entertained no suspicions as
to her real character. The raider was, at the time, steam-
ing slowly, and was subsequently overhauled by the
Demeterton ; she did not reveal her true character until
the latter vessel was within about 1,000 yards. The Mowe
then suddenly increased her speed and put her helm hard
over. Captain Spencer thereupon at once altered his
course, whereupon the Mowe ran up the German Naval
Ensign and signalled to the Demeterton to stop, firing a
shot across her bows. Captain Spencer, seeing that resist-
ance would be useless, brought his vessel to a standstill.
A boarding-party from the Mowe placed explosive charges
in the vessel, as, owing to her cargo, it was obvious that
she would be difficult to sink. Captain Spencer and his
crew having been removed to the Mowe, these charges
were fired, and when last seen the Demeterton was observed
to be floating bottom up, about 730 miles E. by N. (true)
from Cape Race.
This was the last \4ctim but one that was destined to
fall to the Mowe, her final capture being the Governor
CH. xvii] THE " MOWE " RETURNS HOME 415
(5,524 tons), employed on Admiralty service. This vessel
(master, Mr. G. Packc) had left Liverpool on March 9th,
and it was on the 14th, at about 10.30 a.m., 930 miles
W. I S. (true) from the Fastnet, that she was captured.
Captain Packe made a very plucky attempt to escape,
and did not surrender until his gun had been put out of
action by the Mowers first salvo, and the navigation bridge
had sustained heavy damage. Four members of the
crew were killed, including one of the gunners, nine others,
including the chief officer and second officer, being more
or less seriously wounded. The survivors, including the
wounded, were transferred to the now densely crowded
German raider, and the Governor was sunk by a torpedo.
Once again the Mowe succeeded in eluding the patrol-
vessels, and arrived at Kiel on March 20th, 1917, with the
officers and crew of the Brecknockshire, French Prince,
Eddie, Katherine, Esmeraldas , Otaki, Demeterton, and
Governor on board. These British seamen were sent to
various internment camps to join the victims of the Mowers
first cruise.
II. The " Seeadler"
Early in the war an old American sailing-ship, the Pass
of Balmaha, a three-master, was intercepted by one of the
vessels of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, and an officer and
armed escort were put aboard with instructions to take
her into Kirkwall for examination. While on the way to
Kirkwall, the vessel was captured by an enemy submarine
and taken into Bremerhaven, and it was decided by the
German Government, after the Battle of Jutland, to fit
her out as a German raider. She was accordingly placed
under the command of Count Felix von Luckner and
equipped with two 4' 2-inch guns, two machine-guns, a
large supply of small arms and ammunition, a powerful
wireless plant, and a 1,500 horse-power Diesel engine,
capable of ensuring a speed of 14 knots. Various altera-
tions were also made so as to make her resemble the Irma,
a Norwegian ship. Early in November 1916 she was
loaded with a cargo of heavy timber. False papers were
then prepared and the crew carefully rehearsed in order
that they might instantly obey the orders, all of which
were to be given in the Norwegian language. On December
n— 28
416 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAffiERS [ch. xvii
21st, 1916, the Seeadler, previously the Pass of Balmaha,
sailed from Germany. She was examined by a British
cruiser on December 25th, 1916, when about 180 miles
south of Iceland, but her disguise was sufficiently ingenious
to prevent any suspicion being entertained as to her real
character, and it was not until January 9th, 1917, that
the loss of the steamer Gladys Royle furnished the evidence
that another enemy raider had succeeded in escaping on
to the trade routes.
The Gladys Royle (3,268 gross tons) was bound with a
cargo of 4,300 tons of coal from Cardiff to Buenos Aires.
Leaving the former port on January 2nd, 1917, the voyage
was peaceful until Tuesday, January 9th, when at
9.30 a.m., in clear but showery weather, with a fresh breeze
blowing from the west, an apparentl}^ innocent sailing-
vessel was sighted about five miles away, on the starboard
bow. She was steering S. I W. (true) at about 7| knots,
had the Norwegian Ensign flying, and had Norwegian flags
painted on her sides. When the two vessels had closed,
she signalled the Gladys Royle, asking for a chronometer
correction. The master of the British vessel (Mr. W. S.
Shewan) replied, and the sailing-ship immediately ran
up the German Naval Ensign, covered the Norwegian
colours painted on the side, and fired a shot across the
bows of the Gladys Royle, at the same time signalling to
Captain Shewan to surrender his vessel. Captain Shewan
took no notice, but ordered full steam ahead ; he headed
up the wind as the best means of escape, assuming that
the German vessel had only sails to rely on. The Seeadler,
however, at once lowered her sails, and utilising her motor
engines, chased the Gladys Royle, opening fire when about
half a mile off. Three of the raider's shells hit the British
merchantman, one amidships and the others aft, the
captain's cabin being set on fire. Fortunately nobody
was hurt. As the raider was coming up fast and there
was no chance of escape, the Gladys Royle was obliged to
stop. The incident had closed at 11 o'clock. After being
taken some way out of her course, the ship was sunk by
bombs about 9 p.m., and the captain and crew, as well as
some of the stores, wx^re taken on board the Seeadler.
The policy of the Seeadler, in view of her rig, was appar-
ently to come up in the wind on sighting an approaching
vessel and wait ; and the next day the Lundy Island
CH. xvii] THE " SEEADLER'S " FIRST SUCCESSES 417
(3,095 tons) fell a victim to the same manoeuvre as brought
about the loss of the Gladys Royle. This Cardiff vessel
was bound with a cargo of 4,500 tons of sugar from Mauri-
tius to Nantes, for the French Government. She had left
Manchester on November 29th, 1916, calling at Durban
and Saint Vincent, and had sailed from the latter port on
January 3rd. The Lundy Island steered a course north
and east at an average speed of some 7| knots, and the
voyage was uneventful until about 9 o'clock on January
10th, when she sighted a sail on her port bow, some five or
six miles distant. An hour later the strange vessel drew
close to the Lundy Island, with Norwegian colours painted
on her sides, and showing the Norwegian flag. The usual
courtesies of the sea were exchanged, and then the captain
of the sailing-ship asked, as he had done in the case of the
Gladys Royle, for a comparison of chronometers.
As soon as the Lundy Island had crossed his bows, he
covered the Norwegian colours with canvas, hoisted the
German Naval Ensign, and ordered her to stop. The
master of the Limdy Island (Mr. David Barton) rang his
telegraph for more speed, whereupon the German raider
at once opened fire, his first shots passing astern of the
Lundy Island. Though the British vessel was unarmed,
the chase continued for about three-quarters of an hour ;
the Seeadler, having clewed her sails up, pursued under
her motor power. While being chased, thirty-one shells
were fired at the Lundy Island. Three of them struck
the vessel ; one of them holed her below the water-line
astern, while another threw the steering-gear out of order
and obliged Captain Barton to stop his vessel. During
the bombardment the Lundy Island was also subjected
to machine-gun fire. The master was then ordered at
once to abandon his ship, but he had time to go below and
destroy all confidential papers by burning them in the
galley fire. Whilst he was doing this, his crew embarked
in the two lifeboats, leaving Captain Barton alone on
board. Upon his reappearance on deck, the captain of
the Seeadler ordered one of his own boats to return for him,
which it did. As soon as the Lundy Island's boats were
clear, the Seeadler began a bombardment of the vessel,
the German commander not troubling to send a boarding-
party. After several rounds had been fired, the Lundy
Island sank at about noon, 190 miles S.E. | E. (true) from
418 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
Santa Maria, in the Azores. Captain Barton, who had
made a fine effort to escape, was singularly unfortunate
in that he had been captured before by the Mowe, while
commanding the Corbridge.
It was not until January 28th that another British
vessel fell into the hands of the Seeadlcr, which had, how-
ever, captured in the meantime a French vessel, the
Charles Gournard, on January 19th. This was the wooden
sailing-vessel Perce, of Liverpool (364tons), bound to Santos,
with a load of fish in drums and a big load of lumber. She
was about 150 miles N.E. by N. (true) from St. Paul Rocks
when the Seeadler appeared on the scene. Two shots were
fired across her bow, and the master (Mr. Carl J. Kohler)
had no alternative but to bring down his topsails, heave
his vessel to, and surrender. The German raider then
signalled to him that he must bring his crew on board, but
Captain Kohler, who had just been married and had his
wife aboard, signalled that this was impossible ; a heavy
sea was running at the time and the water was infested
with sharks. The commander of the Seeadler accordingly
sent across his motor-launch and brought the whole party
on board, Mrs. Kohler being the first woman to be cap-
tured by the Seeadler. It is a tribute to Captain von
Luckner's consideration that, on learning that Captain
and Mrs. Kohler were on their honeymoon, he provided
them with a special state-room. Bombs were then placed
aboard the Perce and exploded, but when last seen by
Captain Kohler from the deck of the Seeadler, the next
morning, she was still afloat, after having been on fire
throughout the night. On April 15th she was sighted by
the Benedict in a derelict condition ; the Benedict at-
tempted unsuccessfully to sink her.
The French barque Antoine, of Dunkirk, was run down
by the raider a few days later, and on February 19th the
British schooner Pinmore (2,431 tons) was captured by
the Seeadler at a point 540 miles N.W. \ N. (true) from
St. Paul Rocks, while bound from Buenos Aires to England
with a cargo of saltpetre. Having brought her master
(Mr. Mullings) and her crew, mostly Norwegians, on board
the Seeadler, Captain von Luckner placed a prize crew
on board the Pinmore, and, being then only 100 miles
from Rio, himself sailed the vessel into this port, imper-
sonating Captain Mullings. While ashore he succeeded in
CH. xvii] TWO WOMEN PRISONERS 419
learning news of the movements of the British cruisers
Glasgow and Amethyst, which he afterwards wirelessed
to the Mowe. He also secured various supplies for which
his chief officer signed on behalf of the British owners.
Captain von Luckner had placed his right arm in a sling
in order to afford a reasonable pretext for not signing the
documents in a handwriting which might be recognised
as not that of the man he was pretending to be. Three
days later he brought the Pinmore back to the Seeadler
and the former vessel was sunk by bombs.
A week after the Seeadler had seized the Italian ship
Buenos Ayres, bound from Iquique to Gibraltar with a
cargo of saltpetre, the British Yeoman (1,953 tons) fell in
with her. She had sailed from Buenos Aires on January
4th, in fine weather, with a cargo of some 3,000 tons of
wheat from Buenos Aires to Nantes, for the British
Government, and all had gone well until February 26th.
At 4 p.m., in lat. 4° N., long. 32° W., approximately, while
proceeding in a north-westerly direction with all sails set,
the master (Mr, H. E. Neilson) observed a full-rigged ship
under sail heading to the south. She was about five miles
away on the starboard side, but approached quickly,
coming round the stern of the British Yeoman, close up on
the weather side. Then, to the consternation of everyone
on board the British ship, she dropped a section of her
bulwark on the port side forward, revealing a large gun,
at the same time breaking out the German Ensign. Cap-
tain Neilson was directed to clew up the sails and abandon
his ship. At 5 p.m. the raider sent across a German prize
officer, who claimed the British Yeoman and hoisted the
German Ensign at her masthead. Captain Neilson decided
that he had no alternative but to order his crew to take
whatever belongings they could and get the boat out, and
by 6 p.m. all were safely transhipped to the German raider.
The Germans busied themselves in taking a large quantity
of stores from the British Yeoman ; the last boat left her
at half -past eight, when four bombs were placed in her
lower forward hold. They exploded eight minutes later,
and the British Yeoman disappeared. Captain Neilson,
like Captain Kohler of the Perce, had his wife on board, and
Mrs. Neilson accordingly became the second woman to
undergo imprisonment on board the Seeadler.
Two hours later the Seeadler captured the French barque
420 CRUISES OF THE GERiMAN RAmERS [ch. xvii
La Roche Jaucauet, and five days afterwards another
French barque, the Duplex, and then she secured the
Horngarth (3,609 tons). This vessel was in Admiralty
employment, and was bound from Monte Video to Ply-
mouth with a cargo of some 5,650 tons of maize. She
carried a crew of thirty-two. While steaming north-east,
with a fresh south-east ^^'ind blowing, she sighted the
raider at 8.30 a.m. It was not, however, until 3.20 p.m.
that the mysterious vessel was near enough to be recof?-
nised as a full-rigged sailing-ship ; she was then about
four points on the starboard bow. At 4 p.m. she was
seen to be drawing nearer, and the second officer reported
to the master (Mr. I. N. Stainthorp) that she was flying a
signal which could not be distinctly made out on account
of her sails. Twenty minutes later smoke was seen, and
Captain Stainthorp became suspicious and ordered his
firemen and engineers to cram on as much speed as they
could, and at the same time he ordered an urgent wireless
message to be dispatched. Immediately afterwards, on
getting to windward of the strange vessel, she was per-
ceived to be flying British colours, with a signal to the
effect that she had a message for the Horngarth.
Captain Stainthorp, unsuspecting, replied, whereupon the
stranger's signal flags were at once lowered, German colours
broken out and fire opened. The raider was astern when
this happened, and the shot passed close to the British
ship. Captain Stainthorp, however, kept the Horngarth
on her course, and a further shot from the Seeadler smashed
the wireless house and unhappily also killed an apprentice.
Captain Stainthorp continued at full speed under both shell
and machine-gun fire until damage to his boilers caused
these to give out ; the engineers were forced to leave the
engine-room, as they were unable to shut off steam. For
nearly an hour Captain Stainthorp had manoeuvred his
vessel in a gallant attempt to escape, but now he was
obliged to hoist a white sheet, as he was unable to get to
his chart-house and signal-box. The raider thereupon
ceased for a time to fire, but as it was not possible to stop
the HorngartKs engines, firing soon commenced again.
Two shells passed through the Horngarth's stern, the
lifeboat being shot away. Twenty-four rounds in all
were fired at her from the Seeadler' s big gun. It was not
until about 6 p.m. that the engines eased down and the
CH. xvii] " SEEADLER'S " LAST BRITISH VICTIM 421
German prize crew came on board. His quarters having
been burned to pieces, Captain Stainthorp was not able to
save much of his personal property. He and the sur-
vivors of the crew were safely transferred to the Seeadler^
and the Horngarth was sunk by bombs a little after 10 p.m.
in a position some 220 miles cast-north-east (true) from St.
Paul Rocks. Before being captured, Captain Stainthorp
had succeeded in sinking all confidential instructions in
weighted bags.
So far as British shipping was concerned, the career of
the Seeadler was now at an end, although she afterwards
captured one French and three American vessels. The
French vessel, the Cambronne, was captured on March
21st, and then all the prisoners on board the raider were
ordered to pack their effects and to make ready for tran-
shipment to the French barque. Before being allowed to
part company from the raider, however, the crew of the
Horngarth, who were the first to be transferred, had to
begin unloading the Cambronne, other crews being sub-
sequently sent over to assist in this work. The British
seamen were also obliged to throw overboard all spare
sails, while the German prize crew sawed through the
spare and top-gallant masts. The commander of the
Seeadler subsequently sent aboard enough stores to last
for eight days, this being considered sufficient, with what
was on board the Cambronne, for the released prisoners
until they should arrive at Rio de Janeiro. At half-past
eight the German officer in charge of the prize crew on
board the Cambronne mustered all hands on deck, formally
released the prisoners, and made a speech directing the
course that was to be taken to Rio de Janeiro ; he then
hauled down the German Ensign, and placed the ship in
charge of the senior British master. The British Ensign
was hoisted amidst thunderous cheers, to the accompani-
ment of a band playing on the Seeadlefs deck, and the
Cambronne made sail and stood on her course, the raider
steering in the same direction under motor power. At
1.30 a.m. on the 22nd the raider passed out of sight
steering eastward, and nine days later the Cambronne
arrived safely at Rio de Janeiro, having on board nearly
300 souls.
After capturing the small American vessels, the com-
mander of the Seeadler took his vessel, for purposes of
422 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
renovating and cleaning, to Mopelia Island, a remote and
seldom-visited member of the Society Group, where, how-
ever, she was wrecked upon a coral reef by a tidal wave.
Captain von Luckner, with a part of his crew, subsequently
fitted out the whaleboat, with the intention of capturing
a sailing-vessel and returning to Mopelia for the rest of his
party. After various adventures, he was captured on
September 25th, while at Wakaya Island, by Mr. Hills, an
officer of the Fiji Constabulary, and ultimately removed
to Auckland, New Zealand. Meanwhile Lieutenant Kling,
who had been left in charge of the party on Mopelia Island,
had captured a French schooner from Papeete, the Lutece,
and this vessel, renamed the Fortuna, arrived at Easter
Island on October 4th, 1917, being subsequently taken to
Chile in January 1918. Of the remaining American
prisoners who had been left on the island of Mopelia, with
a small boat, four of them made their way to Pago, arriving
there on September 29th, 1917, and the others were sub-
sequently rescued as the result of the information thus
provided of their whereabouts.
III. The " Wolf "
The third and last of the German raiders was the
auxiliary cruiser Wolf, a vessel of about 6,000 gross ton-
nage. She had formerly been a German merchant steam-
ship, known as the Wachenfels. Loaded with some 500
mines and armed with five 7* 6-inch guns and four 18-inch
torpedo-tubes, she was distinguished from her sister-
raiders in that she carried a seaplane known as the
Wolfchen. Sailing from Hamburg on December 17th,
1916, under the command of Captain Nerger, she suc-
ceeded in breaking through the British patrol line, and
escaped into the Atlantic by way of Iceland, and then
proceeded south to the neighbourhood of Cape Town,
where she placed her first mine-field near Dassen Island.
She then laid two small mine-fields in the region of Cape
Agulhas, and on February 27th was sighted by a British
steamship, the Turritella (5,528 tons), which she afterwards
captured. This vessel, which was in Admiralty employ-
ment, was carrying some 7,600 tons of fuel oil, and had
sailed from Singapore on January 13th, calling at Colombo
on February 23rd. She was bound to Port Said for orders
CH. XVII] THE " WOLF " BREAKS OUT 423
when she fell in with the raider. The Turritella having
stopped, in accordance with the orders signalled from the
Wolf, her master (Mr. T. G. Meadows) and all her officers
were ordered on board the German ship ; forty to fifty
firemen were left behind in order to work the vessel with
the prize crew which Captain Nergcr had placed on board.
A number of mines were afterwards transferred from the
Wolf to Turritella, and the latter vessel then proceeded
towards Aden, where the mines were to be laid. She
succeeded in reaching the neighbourhood of this port and
laying her mine-field, but was sighted about 9.40 p.m. on
March 4th by H.M.S. Odin (Lieutenant- Commander E. N.
Palmer).
The Odin was in a position some six miles south of
Elephants Bank, and the Turritella about four or five
miles away on her starboard bow, proceeding on a south-
westerly course at about 11 knots. She was showing no
lights and appeared to be holding a steady course for pro-
ceeding up the Gulf of Aden. Commander Palmer altered
his course in order to communicate with her, at the same
time increasing his speed, although at that time he had no
other grounds for suspicions than the fact that the steamer
he had sighted was showing no lights. Between 10 and
11 p.m. he got into communication with her, and was
informed that she was the Turritella, of London, a British
ship under Admiralty charter proceeding to Port Said for
orders. The spelling of some of the words in her signals,
and the hesitation sho\\Ti in making them, as well as
certain peculiarities of phraseology, further aroused Com-
mander Palmer's suspicions, and he continued to alter his
course so as to keep the vessel on his port bow, working
up to full speed as she began to draw away from him.
At 11 p.m. he ordered her to stop and received a reply,
" Why did you not stop me when I passed Aden ? Meadows
— master." It was not an unnatural signal for a British
merchantman to make if he were suspicious that he was
being followed by a German raider. Unfortunately, how-
ever, for the Turritella in her new guise of German mine-
layer, the signaller had made the small sHp of spelling
Aden mth a " t " instead of a " d." Commander Palmer,
therefore, determined to keep the vessel under observation
during the night, and either overtake her, or if he were
unable j to do this, to have her stopped at Perim. At
424 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
2 a.m., therefore, he signalled his position, course, and
speed to all men-of-war, reporting that he was following
a suspicious steamer.
In these circumstances he kept on a parallel course,
inshore of the Turritella, which was some two points off his
port bow. The distance between the ships, both of which
were travelling about 13 knots, was not altered appreciably
until about 4 o'clock in the morning, when the British
cruiser began to overhaul the Turritella. At 4.30 a.m.
Commander Palmer signalled to her that if she did not
stop he would open fire. On receiving a reply that she
was stopping at once, he ordered her to switch on her
navigation lights, which she did. Commander Palmer
brought his searchlight to bear on her, and signalled her
to remain where she was as he was going to board her at
daylight. He then steamed round to the northward of
her, preparing to lower a boat in order to send a boarding-
party over to her. The moon had now gone down, and it
was very dark, but as soon as daylight came it was observed
that there were boats in the water full of men, and soon
afterwards, about 5.45 a.m., two loud explosions were
heard. Within half an hour the Turritella had sunk in
a position 600 miles W. | S. (true) from Minikoi. The
first boatload from her to come alongside the Odin con-
sisted of Chinamen, and they immediately informed
Commander Palmer of the true character of the abandoned
vessel. By 7 o'clock two other boats had been picked up
and the whole of the Turritella' s crew had been safely
taken on board the Odin. The Germans, who had been
the last to leave the vessel, were made prisoners. Learning
that the Turritella, which with her single 2-inch stern
gun had been, of course, quite unable to resist the
Wolf, had been laying mines in the neighbourhood of
Aden, Commander Palmer at once signalled back this
information so that all necessary precautions could be
taken.
It is interesting to note that the Turritella, which had
been rechristened the litis by the German prize crew, had
originally been the Gutenfels, a sister-ship of the Wolf.
She had belonged to the Hansa Company of Bremen, and
had been seized by the British Government, at the out-
break of war, in the Suez Canal.
In the meantime the Wolf had not been inactive. On
CH. XVII] IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 425
March 1st she captured in the Indian Ocean the steamer
Jumna (4,152 tons). Carrying a cargo of salt, this ship
had sailed for Calcutta from Torresvieja, in Spain, on
February 2nd, 1917, and had left Suez on the 22nd of the
same month, the master (Mr. W. S. Wickman) having
received route instructions from the naval authorities at
that port. Passing down the Red Sea, she entered the
Indian Ocean, and it was towards 6 o'clock on the morning
of March 1st, in a position some 650 miles west (true) from
Minikoi, that she fell into the hands of the enemy. Captain
Wickman subsequently placed on record an account of
his experiences, constituting a unique story of a captive
on board a German raider.
" About 5.30 a.m. I was in my bath when I heard the
report of a heavy gun quite close. I naturally thought
it was one of our own patrol cruisers, heaving us to in order
to examine our papers — especially as I had been told at
Suez there was no enemy vessel in the Indian Ocean.
With this in mind, I took my time dressing to go on deck,
thinking my chief officer would attend to the usual routine
of the vessel, and answer the signals. After one or two
minutes another shell came singing over the bridge, and
there were no signs of my ship stopping. By this time I
had arrived on the bridge, and at the first glance saw that
it was a German-built ship and flying the German Naval
Ensign. She was passing from port to starboard across
my bows, and as I saw that everything was against us,
and a German prison or the boats on a wide ocean in view,
I tried to use my stem and followed her up at full speed,
but she proved too fast for the slow Jumna and easily
eluded us.
" The German commander, seeing my manoeuvre, ordered
the port after-gun to fire at my bridge. In their hurry,
before the gun was properly trained and breech closed, the
shell exploded, killing four of their own men and seriously
wounding about twenty-eight others, shattering most of
their port after-bulwarks, main rigging, and destroying an
18-inch torpedo which was on deck, just missing the war
charge. It also riddled their motor pinnace which was
on No. 5 hatch, and the fragments of the shell perforated
two large mines in the poop deck, also doing other serious
damage about the decks. On board of the Jumna we saw
426 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
the flash and heard the report, but could not make head
or tail of it, as no shell came our wav.
" Seeing the game was up and it would have only been
murder and suicide on my part to persist in resistance, I
had the ship stopped and signalled ' All stopped.' When
the enemy boarding officer came on board, which he
did after about an hour's circling around us, he informed
me of the accident, and told me that my bridge and myself
would have gone if the accident had not occurred. He
asked me why I had tried to ram the ship ; of course I
said I never thought of such a thing, but that something
had gone wrong with the steering, and I could not keep
the ship sheering towards them. They were very sus-
picious, and kept my crew and self under very keen obser-
vation for some time. They were very bitter against us,
and blamed us for the accident which caused such serious
damage. They took my officers and self on board the
Wolf at once, but kept the petty officers and crew to work
ship and help in gutting her out. I will say that the
crew had to do this against their wills, with guards at
their elbows with orders to shoot if they disobeyed the
orders.
" We were captured no March 1st, 1917, and after gut-
ting the ship of all coal, stores, and everything of value in
the engine-room — copper pipes, brass fittings, and a lot of
steel and iron gear— they sunk the old ship on March 4th,
by blowing in her sides at the engine-room and No. 2 hold.
" Our accommodation and treatment on board the Wolf
for the first week or so was very hard, and we felt it acutely.
Evidently the raider was not prepared for taking prisoners
so soon, for they said they had other work to do first. I
found out that this work meant the laying of mines at
most of our principal Eastern sea ports and routes. In
fact they informed me quite openly that the mine-laying
was the main object of the expedition, and that they
were greatly surprised when they found the steamers
Turritella and Jumna so far out of the general track.
The Wolf was dodging and hiding in these latitudes after
laying mine-fields at Colombo and Bombay.
" We were quartered in No. 5 'tween-decks, which was
full of old lumber, rails, lime, and also all sorts of old
rubbish. They had been carrying coal here, which added
to our discomfort in a tropical climate, and we had not
CH. xvii] A DETAILED STORY 427
much water to wash with. We ourselves set to and gave
the place a thorough clean out. At all times there was
a strong guard over us. We slept in hammocks and were
ordered into them about 8 p.m.
" The food at first was very bad both in quantity and
quality, but later it improved, after complaining to the
raider's commander. I should say this, that the com-
mander himself tried to treat us fairly well, although his
officers and most of his men were up against us. He took
great precautions for his own safety, but his officers and
men took huge delight in our annoyance and added to it
whenever possible.
" We were in the tropics, and the atmosphere in the
'tween-decks, our quarters, was about 100° Fahr. when
battened down, as we were every night, for the weather
was very hot and stiffing. We had a large fan in the
'tween-decks for giving us fresh air, but it was not of much
use, as it was continually under repair.
" Considering the length of time we were on board —
my crew and self were over twelve months — the health
of my people was good. We were allowed on deck from
8 a.m. to 8 p.m. in the tropics, when there was no danger
to themselves or anything in sight. W^hen anything was
sighted, or coming along, we were all driven below like a
flock of sheep and battened down like rats in a trap, and
a strong guard with hand-grenades and arms was placed
over the small hatch, which was our only way out. I
heard afterwards that they never intended us to get out
if they had to fight or were captured. They never gave
us an opportunity to try and break out, and in any case
it would only have been a slaughter-house.
" We heard that the Turritella, which had been sent
away to lay mine-fields off Aden, had been captured, and
then the Wolf made full speed due south, knowing full
well there would be a lot of vessels searching for her, as
the Chinese crew would give a good description of her.
Steaming down, about March 10th, bound for Australian
waters, we quickly overhauled the British steamer Words-
worth (3,509 tons), of London, bound from Burmah with
a full cargo of rice around the Cape of Good Hope to
London. We came upon her very quickly, for she was not
making much speed. I heard afterwards from the master
and chief engineer that the coal they had received in
428 CRUISES OF THE GERIVIAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
Colombo would hardly burn, and in no possible way could
they get a head of speed. I think, if they had had good
coal and made their average runs, the Wordsworth would
have been well clear of the track that the Wolf came
down on.
" The master of steamer Wordsworth proved to be my
cousin, J. W. Shields, of South Shields, whom I had not
met for a number of years. We met on his coming on
board of the Wolf, just as if it was a common thing to meet
on raiders. For the rest of our voyage, and also during
our internment in Germany, we stuck together like limpets,
and as all Shieldsmen or ' Geordies ' do, we used to have
a good ' dust-up ' to break the monotony. Of course, I
did the honours, and found him a good place to sling his
hammock, and it was close to mine, so that we could talk
about old times.
*' The Wordsworth was a hard ship to board, for every
time the Germans tried to get alongside with the Wolf to
loot some of the cargo, she would commence to roll, and
she kept it up for ten days or so, until they got tired and
sunk her, after taking several tons of rice with boats.
" Getting down in the track from Good Hope to Aus-
tralia, the raider seized and sunk a small Mauritius barque
called the Dee. The master of her was a typical old
windbag skipper, and he had not much use for we poor
steam skippers."
The captain of the PFoZ/had now decided not to operate
any more in the Indian Ocean for a time, as it was assumed
that the area was becoming dangerous ; and keeping out
of the track of vessels, he searched the Pacific in the hope
of capturing some ship from which he could supply himself
with coal. For several weeks, however, no vessel was
sighted, and, as the Wolf's boilers were leaking badly,
Captain Nerger decided to bring his vessel into harbour in
Sunday Island (one of the Kermadec Islands) for refitting
and repair. It was while l}ang here, on June 2nd, 1917,
that the Wairuna (3,947 tons) passed close by, to the great
consternation at first of the captain and crew of the Wolf,
who believed her to be a British cruiser. This vessel,
belonging to the Union Steamship Company of New Zea-
land, was bound from Auckland, New Zealand, to San
Francisco and was carrying a cargo of coal. Kauri gum.
CH. xvii] MINES OFF NEW ZEAL-\ND 429
pelts, and copra. The (iermans were not slow to realise
their mistake. Another victim had been delivered into
their hands !
Unconscious that she had been seen and was in im-
minent danger, the Wairuna proceeded on her com'se,
whereupon the Wolf sent after her the seaplane, which,
flying low, dropped a canvas bag on the deck of the
Wairuna. On being opened, this was found to contain
a message, " Stop immediately — take orders from German
cruiser. Do not use your wireless or I will bomb you."
Upon this the captain of the Wairuna ordered his engines
to ease down, but the vessel was not stopped until the
enemy seaplane had dropped a bomb just ahead of her.
By this time the Wolf herself had put to sea and was
making a course to head the Wairuna off. The latter had,
therefore, no alternative but to surrender. An armed
prize crew proceeded on board with orders that the English
vessel was to be brought under the lee of Sunday Island
and there to anchor. All her officers, except the master
(Mr. Harold Crichton Samiders), were then transferred to
the raider, and upon the following day, owing to the wind
changing, the Wairuna, in company with the Wolf, pro-
ceeded to the other side of the island, where the two vessels
anchored, the Wairuna being secured alongside her captor.
A large amount of pro\'isions, vegetables, and some forty
sheep were then transferred from the Wairu?ia to the Wolf,
the work of transhipment lasting for about a fortnight
owing to the variability of the weather. Preparations
were forthwith made to sink the Wairuna, whose hatches
were battened down, her cabin doors nailed up, and her
lifeboats smashed. She was taken out to sea, but a sailing
vessel was sighted, so the Wairuna was brought back to
her anchorage. The enemy seaplane was then sent after
the schooner, which was the American sailing-vessel
Winslow, bound for Samoa, with a cargo of coal, case oil,
and fire bricks. The Wi)ulow having been captured, the
Wairuna was again taken out to sea early the next morning
and sunk by gunfire, the bombs which had been previously
placed on board having failed to destroy her.
Soon after tliis the Wolf, with all her prisoners on board,
left Sunday Island and headed for North Island, New
Zealand, where mines were laid in the neighboiu'hood of
Three Kings Island. The raider then made her way to
430 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
Cook Strait, where another mine-field was laid, and from
thence she sailed to the Australian coast, laying some
further mines in the region of the Gabo Islands. During
this time, as the prisoners discovered when they were
next allowed on deck, the ship's appearance had been
altered, her masts and funnel having been shortened, and
her paint-work coloured black. Two more American sail-
ing-vessels were captured in these waters, and then the
raider made her way towards New Guinea and the Solomon
Islands. While on this passage she tapped a wireless
message announcing that the steamer Matunga (1,608 tons)
was on her way from various Australian ports to what
had been German New Guinea. This vessel was on
Admiralty charter, carrying coal and stores, as well as
some passengers and an Australian military contingent for
German New Guinea. The weather had become very
cold, and the Wolf's prisoners, soon to be joined by the
crew of the Matunga, felt it keenly after being so long in
the tropics.
Unconscious that her whereabouts were known to the
German raider and that her cargo of coal was particularly
desired by the latter, no particular suspicion was aroused
on board the Matunga (master, Mr. H. Donaldson) when,
on the morning of August 6th, she first sighted what was
presumably an ordinary merchant tramp steamer. Her
true character was, however, soon revealed when the
German Naval Ensign suddenly broke out from the Wolf's
mast, and her forward bulwarks dropped, exposing her
guns ; a shot was fired across the bows of the JMatunga.
This was followed by a seaplane reconnaissance on the
part of the Wolfchen, and soon afterwards an armed guard
came alongside to take possession of the vessel. Before
they arrived, however, all the Matungd's code-books and
confidential papers had been thrown overboard. The
Matunga was now ordered to keep company with the
Wolf, and the two vessels proceeded together to a remote
and well-concealed natural harbour on the north coast of
Dutch New Guinea. Surrounded by high hills, and with
an almost invisible entrance, this lagoon proved an almost
ideal hiding-place from the German commander's point of
view.
Upon one of the high surrounding hills a wireless
plant was set up, and the Wolf's seaplane maintained a
CH. XVII] A HAPPY ESCAPE 431
patrol far out at sea. In this solitude the Wolf was
cleaned, her hull scraped of barnacles, and several hun-
dred tons of coal transferred to her from the Matunga's
bunkers.
It was not until August 26th that the fFoZ/ again put to
sea in company with the Matunga, which she sank by-
bombs a few miles out. The raider now proceeded due
west, passing through the Java Sea towards Singapore,
in the vicinity of which port she planned to lay the re-
mainder of her stock of mines. She ran up the Carimata
Strait without meeting any vessel, and was nearing her
destination when an alarm was raised on board and all
hands were piped to their stations. It afterwards became
known to the seamen prisoners that the cause of anxiety
was the sight of a British cruiser of the Juno class, but the
attention of this man-of-war was attracted by another
steamer which came up with all lights burning. It was
a happy escape for the raider as well as for the seamen
prisoners on board her, for if she had been sunk in action
they would all inevitably have been killed, as they were at
this time battened down below.
It was during this period that a little incident occurred
that is perhaps worthy of mention. One of the prisoners
on board succeeded in dropping, unperceived, a bottle
into the sea containing the following two messages :
" Prisoners on board German raider. Will finder please
notify British authorities that German raider passed
Celebes this day, 29th August, on her way, we presume, to
mine Singapore, Pedra Blanca, having previously mined
Cape Town, Bombay, Colombo, and North Island, New
Zealand, Cook Strait, Gabo Islands. Crews of the follow-
ing vessels are on board : Tiirritella, Jumna, Wordsworth,
Dee, Wairuna, Winslow, Valaga, Encore, Matunga. She
has on board 110 mines to mine, we think, Rangoon, Cal-
cutta. She was formerly Wachenfels of German merchant
service." The second message was a descriptive drawing
of the vessel, giving particulars of her rig and armament.
This bottle was found in the sea off Tolitoli, Celebes, by
some natives on December 9th. It was afterwards for-
warded to the naval commander-in-chief on the China
Station by the Consul-General at Batavia.
We have Captain Wickman's diary for the events which
now occurred :
11—29
432 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
" September 4th, 1917, 9 p.m. — Commenced laying mine-
field in the neighbourhood of Singapore Straits, China Sea
entrance, and completed same by 4 o'clock next morning.
About 140 to 150 mines in all Avere dropped in groups of
fives. Tliis finished her complement of mines with which
she left Kiel. I understand she left there with 500 on
board. The Wolf, after completing her deadly task, ran
back the way she came up, namely Carimata Straits,
making for the Indian Ocean and passing through Lombok
or Atlas Straits.
" In the vicinity of 1|° degree Channel in the Indian
Ocean, she rounded up the Hitachi Maru, a Japanese
steamer bound from the East to London with all sorts of
goods and eatables for the Christmas markets. She had
a very valuable cargo on board as well as a great number
of passengers bound to Europe. The Japanese master
made a mistake when he sighted the raider, for he had on
board a British 4-7 gun and he could have made a good
running fight and done him a lot of damage, but he came
alongside, lowered some of his boats with the passengers in,
and then sent his crew aft to work the gun. He never had
a ghost of a chance, for as soon as they (the officers of
raider) saw what he was after, they peppered him with
four of their 5-9-inch guns, and made great havoc and
damage on board. The Germans were very poor shots, and
I think any ship with a couple of guns on board would
have given them all the}' required as long as they kept
clear of the torpedoes. The Japanese vessel was looted,
and all the old men and boys and w^omen and children
from the Matunga, the barque Dee, and the Hitachi Maru
were put on board and she was sent away to a rendezvous
until further notice.
" The Wolf was now on the lookout for prey and
especially for a coal ship, for her bunkers w- anted replenish-
ing to get back to Europe. Nothing came along, so
she cruised towards Mauritius and Dclagoa Bay, where she
seized the Spanish steamer Igotz Mendi. Just before the
capture of the Spaniard, things were looking so black
for the Wolf regarding coal, that he (the commander) had
to sink the Hitachi Maru, for he could not keep two ships
running on his supply, and he was getting short. He fully
intended to try and take the Japanese ship to Kiel with
him, if he had had fuel. The Germans cursed their luck
CH. XVII] A PRISONER'S DIARY 433
when the Spaniard turned up one or two days late. After
coaHng from the Spaniard, all the young and old, children,
women, and sick were again transferred, this time to the
Igotz Mendi, for now the German commander was going
to try and make his way to Germany. They all seemed
to be in doubt about reaching there, and so were we
prisoners, but the Wolfs commander had made up his
mind to try.
" Our quarters had undergone a great change since I
had first arrived on board. Now they were all painted
white and kept scrupulously clean. Both the after 'tween-
decks were used for captured crews. Masters, officers, and
men were kept separate. Up to the present, I should
think there would be about 400 prisoners on board, and of
all nationalities — Japs, blacks, Scandinavians, Chilians,
Chinese, lascars, Mauritius boys, and mixed Americans,
but the majority of us were British. Preparations were
made for our benefit for cold weather. Pipes for steam
heating were laid throughout the after 'tween-decks, and
later on, while trying to get through the Straits of Denmark
(between Iceland and Greenland), we quite appreciated it.
In fact we should have all died with the cold if there had
not been some artificial heating apparatus ; for the ther-
mometer was always below freezing-point in the Arctic
Seas,
" We rounded Cape of Good Hope, keeping a good
distance off and well clear of everything. We kept Mid-
Atlantic, coaled several times from the Igotz Mendi, and
eventually made the south part of Iceland and the Straits
of Denmark on February 6th, 1918, which was full of pack-
ice and small bergs. The raider tried to force his way
through the ice for several days, but gave it up and turned
back, to coast the south of Iceland. One night, when
amongst the ice, the Japanese captain took it into his
head to commit suicide, for he said he could not bear the
disgrace of his ship being captured while he had a good gun
on board, and also of going into Germany.
" The officers and crew of the Wolf did not like the idea
of cruising around Iceland, for they were awfully nervous
about our cruisers, and also about falling in with our
patrols. As far as we knew, nothing was sighted while
running the blockade until we made the Norwegian coast,
in the vicinity of Bergen. The connnander kept well
434 CRUISES OF THE GERMAN RAIDERS [ch. xvii
within the three-mile Hmit all the way down the coast, for
we could see the land close aboard, through the cracks in
the poop doors. We were not allowed on deck from Ice-
land until we made the Little Belt, which we did on
February 18th, 1918. We dropped anchor and lay in a
German bay — the name escapes my memory — and lay
several days waiting for the Igotz Mendi to turn up. The
commander wanted to enter the port of Kiel with his
prize and all his bunting flying, after his great adventure.
The German Naval Authorities could not believe the Wolf
had returned after being away nearly two years, for reports
said she had been sunk. After lying about a week, news
leaked through that the prize Igotz Mendi under the
command of Lieutenant Rosa, with all the sick prisoners,
old men, women, and children had gone ashore on or near
the Skaw — so near and yet so far from her port of destina-
tion ! Some of the German warships tried to get her off,
but the Danish Government interfered, and she was in-
terned, and all the prisoners on board were taken care of
and afterwards sent to England.
" With the news of the stranding of the Igotz Mendi
the Wolf hoYQ up anchor, and proceeded into Kiel Harbour
amidst quantities of flying bunting and with great blowing
of steam sirens from other warships and motor-craft.
There was also a great demonstration of air- and sea-planes
doing all sorts of stunts to welcome Commander Nerger
back after his voyage. Luck attended him all through,
even when the British and Japanese cruisers, which were
close to him at times, were scouring the seas in search of
him.
" For a few days we were the show-ship of the harbour,
and thousands of people and naval officers visited the
vessel to gaze and gloat over the prisoners, like animals in
cages. Even the cinema people came on board and took
films from the bridge, and all the prisoners were chased on
deck so they could take the decks full. These pictures
were shown on the screens all over Germany afterwards."
In addition to the vessels thus captured by the Wolf,
the following were lost in the neighbourhood of the Cape
of Good Hope as a result of the mines that she had laid :
the Matheran (7,654 tons) on January 26tli, 1917 ; the
Cilicia (3,750 tons) on February 12th, 1917, and the City
CH. xvii] TOLL OF THE " WOLF'S " MINES 435
of Athens (5,604 tons) on August 10th, 1917. The Tyn-
dareus (11,000 tons) and the Bhamo (5,244 tons) were also
damaged by mines in the same neighbourhood, the former
on February 6th and the latter on August 26th. Both,
however, were successfully towed to Cape Town. In the
Colombo mine -field the Worcestershire (7,174 tons) was lost
on February 17th, 1917, and the Perseus (6,728 tons) on the
21st of the same month. In the Bombay mine-field, the
Cittj of Exeter (9,373 tons) was injured on June 11th, 1917,
but succeeded in reaching Bombay ; the Mongolia (9,505
tons) was sunk on June 24th, 1917, and the Okhla (5,288
tons) on July 29th, 1917. The Croxteth Hall (5,872 tons)
struck a mine on July 6th, 1917, and was beached, but
sank five days later while being towed into harbour. In
Cook Strait, New Zealand, the Port Kembla (4,700 tons)
was sunk on September 18th, 1917.
APPENDIX A
COPY OF INSTRUCTIONS TO MERCHANT CAPTAINS AS
ISSUED BY THE ADMIRALTY
Confidential.
In no Circumstances is this Paper to be allowed to fall into the
Hands of the Enemy.
This paper is for the Master's personal information. It is
not to be copied, and when not actually in use is to be kept in
safety in a place where it can be destroyed at a moment's
notice.
All previous orders on this subject are hereby cancelled.
Such portions as call for immediate action may be com-
municated verbally to the officers concerned.
10th February 1915.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR OWNERS AND MASTERS OF
BRITISH MERCHANT SHIPS ISSUED WITH REFER-
ENCE TO THE OPERATIONS OF GERMAN SUB-
MARINES AGAINST BRITISH SHIPPING
Sec. 1. — Information Respecting Submarines
A. British and French submarines have orders not to
approach or communicate with merchant vessels (other than
fishing- vessels) within the following area :
Latitude 43° N. to Latitude 63° N.
Longitude 4° E. to Longitude 13° W.
Within these limits any submarine which shows by her
action that she is attempting to close or communicate with a
merchant vessel should be treated as hostile.
B. Block sketches of British, French, and German sub-
marines will be found in a pamphlet entitled " Submarines in
Home Waters," issued confidentially to British ships through
the Board of Trade. Every vessel navigating in home waters
should have a copy of this pamphlet on board.
C. French submarines are likely to be met with off the French
ports. British submarines may be met with east of Portland
or south of Aberdeen, also off Devonport and in the Firth of
436
INSTRUCTIONS TO MERCHANT CAPTAINS 437
Clyde. Beyond these limits the probability is that any sub-
marine seen is German,
D. The speed of a German submarine on the surface exceeds
that of the average merchant ship, but the speed under water
is low. A submarine cannot see under water. When sub-
merged she is obliged at frequent intervals to put up a long
tube, known as a periscope, in order to see where she is going.
Some submarines are armed with a gun, but this is an inferior
weapon, incapable of inflicting serious injury upon an iron
steamer manned by a resolute crew.
All submarines carry torpedoes, but their supply is limited,
and they will be very averse from firing them at merchant
vessels. It is very difficult for a submarine to hit a moving
ship with a torpedo, especially if she is kept nearly end on, and
experience has shown that a great many torpedoes are fired
without any result. In case the ship u struck by a torpedo,
there will generally be ample time for the crew to escape in
the boats, if the latter are kept ready for service.
Sec. 2. — Procedure if an Enemy Submarine is Sighted
A. No British merchant vessel should ever tamely surrender
to a submarine, but should do her utmost to escape. A vessel
which surrenders is certain to be sunk, and the crew cast adrift
in their boats. A vessel which makes a determined attempt
to escape has an excellent chance of doing so. Even should
she fail, and be unlucky enough to be struck by one of the
enemy's torpedoes, the crew will, in most cases, have ample
time to man their boats.
B. If a submarine is seen at a distance and on the surface,
or if a periscope is sighted, alter course to bring the boat astern
and proceed at full speed. If the boat follows you on the sur-
face, make for the nearest land or shallow water, always keeping
your stern towards her. If the boat opens fire with a gun,
continue on your course at all costs — if you stop you will
certainly be torpedoed. Gunfire from most submarines is not
dangerous. When under fire the crew should go below, and
be ready to plug any shot-holes near the water-line. If the
submarine does not fire you may assume she has no gun, and
in this case she cannot injure you if you keep your stern towards
her and keep a sharp lookout for any torpedo. With the
submarine in this position a touch of the helm will enable you
to avoid the torpedo, the trail of which can be seen by a line
of bubbles on the water.
C. If a submarine comes up suddenly close ahead of you
with obvious hostile intention, steer straight for her at your
utmost speed, altering course as necessary to keep her ahead.
438 APPENDIX A
She will probably then dive, in which ease you will have ensured
your safety, as she will be compelled to come up astern of you.
Arrange with your engine-room staff to have a turn of
speed ready for emergency. A few minutes may be sufficient
to save your ship.
D. A ship which is being pursued by, or is escaping from,
a submarine should fly the largest ensign available half-mast
at the foremast head or triatic stay.
E. No ocean-going British merchant vessel is permitted to
go to the assistance of a ship which has been torpedoed by a
submarine. Small coasting craft, trawlers, and other small
vessels of light draught should give all the assistance they can.
F. Any vessel in the submarine area which is observed to be
making signals of distress without obvious cause should be
treated with suspicion and approached with caution, as it is
possible she may be acting as a decoy for a submarine.
Sec. 3. — Approaching or Leaving British or French Ports
A. Between Latitude 43° N. and Latitude 63° N., and east
of Longitude 13° W., a sharp lookout should be kept for sub-
marines, and vessels navigating in this area should have their
boats turned out, full-provisioned, and ready for lowering.
The danger is in the vicinity of the ports and off the prominent
headlands on the coast. Important landfalls in this area should
be made after dark whenever possible.
B. Submarines do not willingly operate by day in jhallow
water. Advantage should be taken of this whenever possible.
At night submarines are likely to be found close inshore in
sheltered water, and vessels are advised to keep well out.
C. So far as is consistent with particular trades and state of
tides, vessels should ^ail at dusk and make their ports at dawn.
If obliged to wait outside a port, keep under way, steam fast,
and alter course at short intervals.
Sec. 4. — Lighting, Colours, etc.
A. At night it is important that British ships should as
closely resemble neutrals as possible. Navigation lights should
not exceed the brilliancy prescribed by statute. No bright
lights should show about the ship, but in most cases it will not
be advisable to darken ships completely. Should neutral ships
adopt any particular system of lighting, this should be copied
by IBritish vessels.
B. The use of false colours and disguises by merchant vessels
attempting to escape capture is a well-established custom in the
history of naval war. It is not in any way dishonourable.
Owners and masters will therefore be within their rights if they
INSTRUCTIONS TO MERCHANT CAPTAINS 439
use every device to mislead the enemy and induce him to con-
fuse British vessels with neutrals. Exceptional methods of
painting and conspicuous funnel marks, not resembling those
of neutrals, should be avoided.
In cases where the build of the vessel or the service on which
she is employed precludes any possibility of deceiving the
enemy, no disguise should be attempted and a foreign ensign
should not be worn.
Customs and other officials will be instructed not to interfere
with the discretion of masters and owners in altering the
appearance of their ships according to their judgment in the
manner best calculated to deceive our unscrupulous enemy.
When ordered to stop by a British or Allied warship, or
upon entering or leaving neutral port, the red ensign must
be hoisted.
Sec. 5. — Wireless Telegraphy
Hitherto British ships have not been allowed to use wireless
telegraphy, or hoist their aerials, in British or Allied territorial
waters.
In the interest of safety this prohibition will be relaxed in
the case of particular ships, and subject to the following con-
ditions :
1. When within 100 miles of any part of the British coast
no wireless signals are to be made unless the ship is in grave
danger either from the enemy or from natural causes.
2. A constant listening watch is to be kept as far as is
possible with the operators on board.
3. A British ship fitted with wireless telegraphy which is
attacked by a submarine and in need of assistance should make
the S.O.S. signal, followed by a series of S's, to differentiate the
call from a signal of distress due to natural causes.
On the receipt of this signal armed assistance will be sent,
but large British merchant ships should not approach the
vicinity.
Ships which desire to avail themselves of this privilege must
make application to the Admiralty, when permission will be
granted, subject to the condition that a switch, controllable
only by the master, is fitted in the power leads of the wireless
telegraphy apparatus in such a manner that no message can
be sent from the ship without the master's knowledge and
approval.
Ships to which this privilege is granted will be allowed to
hoist their aerials shortly before clearing from British ports,
and when homeward bound will be permitted to retain their
aerials aloft until their arrival in port.
440
APPENDIX A
Sec. 6. — List of Ports at which Armed Assistance is
Usually Available, and to which Merchant Vessels
CAN Retreat if Pursued by a Hostile Submarine
River Tyne
River Humber
Great Yarmouth
Lowestoft
Harwich
The Clyde
(Ardrossan)
S tor no way
Queenstown
Berehaven
Galway Bay
Dunkirk
Calais
Boulogne
Dieppe
Fecamp
England and Wales
Sheerness
Ramsgate
Dover
Inside Isle of
Wight
Scotland
Kirkwall (Orkney
Islands)
Lerwick (Shetland
Islands)
Ireland
Blacksod Bay
Lough Swilly
Larne Harbour
France
Le Havre
Cherbourg
St. Malo
Brest
Portland Harbour
Plymouth Harbour
Falmouth Harbour
Milford Haven
Liverpool
Peterhead
Dundee
Firth of Forth
Belfast
Kingstown
Rosslare
Lorient
St. Nazaire
La Pallice
Mouth of Gironde
In addition to the assistance available at the above-mentioned
ports, the narrow seas of Great Britain and France are con-
stantly patrolled by armed vessels, so that effective help in
submarine waters is never far distant.
APPENDIX B
THE GERMAN COURT OF INQUIRY'S METHOD OF INTER-
PRETING THESE ADMIRALTY INSTRUCTIONS
EXTRACT FROM THE FINDINGS OF THE GERMAN
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY (OFFICIAL TRANSLATION)
" The entire conception of Fryatt's manoeuvre points to his
having attempted to ram.
" In conclusion, it speaks for the accuracy of the conclusions
arrived at by the Court, that Fryatt did not act in accordance
with the regulations issued by the British Admiralty. Had
he done so, he would have made every effort to escape from
the U-boat.
" The Secret Instructions issued by the British Admiralty
dated 10th February, 1915, Section A, provide that :
(See Annex A)
" Section 2 B provides that :
(See Annex A)
^ ANNEX A
A. No British merchant vessel should ever tamely surrender
to a submarine, but should do her utmost to escape. A vessel
which surrenders is certain to be sunk and the crew cast adrift
in their boats. A vessel which makes a determined attempt
to escape has an excellent chance of doing so.
B. If a submarine is seen at a distance and on the surface,
or if a periscope is sighted, alter course to bring the boat astern
and proceed at full speed. If the boat follows you on the
surface, make for the nearest land or shallow water, alwaj^s
keeping your stern towards her. If the boat opens fire with a
gun, continue on your course at all costs — if you stop you will
certainly be torpedoed. Gunfire from most submarines is not
dangerous. When under fire the crew should go below, and
be ready to plug any shot-holes near the water-line. If the
submarine does not fire you may assume she has no gun, and
in this case she cannot injure you if you keep your stern towards
her and keep a sharp lookout for any torpedo. With the
submarine in this position a touch of the helm will enable you
to avoid the torpedo, the trail of which can be seen by a line
of bubbles on the water.
The German translation of the above, which is an extract
from the original, is correct.
441
APPENDIX C
ANALYSIS OF VESSELS INTERCEPTED AND SENT IN BY
THE TENTH CRUISER SQUADRON DURING THE YEAR 1915
Nationility.
American :
Eastbound
Westbound
Other Neutrals
Norwegian :
Eastbound
Westbound
Direction unknoTrn ,
Swedish :
Eastbound
Westbound
Danish :
Eastbound
Westbound
Direction unknown ,
Dutch :
Eastbound
Westbound
Spanish :
Eastbound
Westbound
Argentine :
Eastbound
Westbound
British and Allied :
British :
Eastbovind
Westbound
Direction unknown ,
France :
Eastbound
Westbound
135
124
6
7
10
Intercepted.
Sent In.
55
47
35
7
469
271
380
25
8
—
183
131
117
35
845
191
259
20
2
1
6
3
3
—
442
TENTH CRUISER SQUADRON. STATISTICAL DIAGRAM OF BLOCKADE OPFRATinNQ iqii;
JANU.Ry FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE" JULY AUGUST SEPTEMRpp *^'^'^- ' *^' ''•
IZqI g 3 » 5 6 7 a 9 10 II I? 13 I* is 16 17 18 19 20 2\ 22 23 24 ^S 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 3a « /„ ., °''08ER NOVEMBER DECEMBER
I ' ' '■ ■ ' ^^^ i ■ • T T — ^ *" * 42 43 u 4'; 4fi 47 48 43 so 51 52
110
120
A. Vessels intercepted by Tenth CruiserSquadron
B. Vessels sent into RDrt by Tenth CruiserSquadron
V-. Ships of Tenth Cruiser Squadron on patrol
/I
i\
I I
NOTE.
menever a deep depression occurs in line A. it can
usually be attributed to Mck or fo^gy weather
J 110
100
12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER
TENTH CRUISER SQUADRON.
THE WORKING OF THE BLOCKADE IN 1915.
Ships intercepted are shown in Red thus*
NORWAY W COAST,
"Clll. PATROL'.'
in- '"■'.'^
ViSW« Is i^
•(ya i
.^^m
:r,NOHWAY
Svdorb
'\
• •
• • •••.• •••••••••• V • • • • • •
• ••.•••• H^%.%vX*.-.:.: . . /. •
. •••••• •i*A*«*« • • •••• • ••-,••
.• • ..:•%••••• • .•;:•• • •
• ••;.•.•••:•::.•.••• v:
• ••••••• • • • .•
.•• •••••••-••• •'^"'^
• • Ydl .Sound , I '.t-'
Siiliiliii|-;yi llil
.■Hilr Wf
^ j tf N- Konalilsviv
A. iT'""
,■—'--1 ^Tl.
, S.,l.-Sk..ir>- ( :j-?j -.'OHKNKY Is.
• •
• • • •
Rocltall
Rockall Bank
2^;<4^
* Ab«'rilei'ii
Sl(iiil('j*iiii'«fr(ir(L ''^'
16*
ir
^"}mAi sicTicK or inLCOMMnres ormps/tiM D£fenC£.
ANALYSIS OF VESSELS INTERCEPTED
443
Nationalitj.
Sent in.
Russia :
Eastbound
Westbound
Direction unknown ,
Belgian :
Eastbound
Westbovuid
Italian :
Eastbound
Westbound
Direction unknown .
Nationality Unknown
Eastbo\ind
Westbound
Direction unknown .
Fishing Craft :
Norwegian ,
Swedish
Danish
Dutch
British
French
Russian
Enemy Vessels :
Oerman :
Westbound
Totals
1 38 without armed guards.
INDEX
Aaro, the s.s., torpedoed, 340
Abbotsford, the s.s., 8
Abelia, the s.s., sunk, 197
Acceptable, the drifter, attacked, 286
Achilles, H.M.S., 403
Active, H.M.S., 277
Adams, Captain Henry V., master
of the s.s. Thorpwood, 181
Admiralty, the, poHcy of extending
the defensive armament of mer-
chant shipping, 231-5 ; instruc-
tions, 235-7, 240, 436-9
Adriatic, the, demand for auxihary
craft, 165 ; drifters sent to, 166
Adriatic, the s.s., armed, 232 ; case
of, 242
Adventure, H.M.S., 49
^gean, the, 42
jEgusa, the armed yacht, 69, 173,
174
Africa, South, troops dispatched to,
76
African Monarch, the s.s., blown up,
24
Ateidi, H.M.S., 254, 304
Agulhas, Cape, 422
Ajax, the drifter, sunk, 284
Alacrity, the s.s., disappearance of,
299 ; sunk, 300
Albany, W. Australia, 96
AJhatros, the s.v., 35
Albatross, the armed trawler, 277-8
Alberta, the trawler, sunk, 259
Alboran Island, 44
Alcantara, the s.s., 121, 122, 125 ;
action against the Oreif, 153 ;
sunk, 154
Aldebm-gh Napes, 23, 260, 293
Alexander, H., 70
Alexandria, 84, 98
Alexandria, the trawler, sunk, 289
Alexandrovsk, 68
Algeria, dispatch of French troops
to, 75
Allen, Captain, master of the s.s.
Ning Chow, 214
Allinson, Captain R. L., master of
the s.s. Goldmouth, 302 ; awarded
the D.S.C., 303
Allman, Sub-Lieutenant A. C, in
command of the Pearl, 57 ; pro-
moted Lieutenant, 60
Alma7izora, the s.s., 139
Alniuich Castle, the s.s., 97
Alsatian, the s.s., 106 ; flagship,
109, 113, 116, 122, 126, 127, 148;
smoking-room, 111 ; new wire-
less telegraph direction-finder in-
stalled, 132
Aynadavat, the armed trawler, 45
Amalfi, the Italian cruiser, sunk,
165
Amanda, the, 8
Amazon, H.M.S., attacked, 284
Ambrose, the s.s., 109, 116, 121, 122;
attacked by a submarine, 120
America, South, admission of
armed merchantmen to harbours,
333
America, United States of, protests
against submarine warfare, 1, 12,
39, 304 ; regulations on armed
merchant ships, 242-4, 334
American Rights League, protest
against the execution of Captain
Fryatt, 321
Amethyst, H.M.S., 160, 407, 419
Ancona, the Italian s.s., torpedoed,
290
Anderson, Sir Kenneth, President
of the Chamber of Shipping, 202
Andes, the s.s., 121, 122 ; action
against the Greif, 153
Andoni, the s.s., torpedoed, 373
Andrew Welch, the American s.v.,
146
Anglia, the hospital ship, sunk, 261
Anglo- Calif omian, s.s., attacked by
a submarine, 18
Anglo-Columbian, the s.s., 38 ;
sunk, 39
Anglo- Egyptian, the s.s., 92
Angus, Skipper C, in command of
the Nellie Nutten, 278
444
INDEX
445
Antilochus, the s.s., 190
Anti-submarine Division, 287
Antoitie, the French s.v., captured,
418
Antwerp, relief of, 86, 96
Anvil Point, 369
Anzac Da}', 162
Apollo, the S.S., sunk, 181
Appam, the s.s., 386 ; captured by
the Mowe, 387 ; at Virginia, 390 ;
Newport News, 391 ; decree for
the restitution, 391
Appson, Michael, 11
Apsleyhall, the s.s., sunk, 367
Arabia, the s.s., 17 ; torpedoed, 357
Arabian, the s.s., sunk, ISO
Arabic, the s.s., v, 25 ; attacked
bv a submarine, 26 ; sunk,
27-9, 43 ; armed, 232
Aragon, the s.s., 95
Archangel, 57, 67, 345
Arctic Ocean, submarine warfare, 345
Argentine Republic, regulation on
armed merchantmen, 245, 333
Ariadne, the s.s., sunk, 386
Arkley, Captain P. L., master of
the s.s. Dunsley, 26
Ai-klow, South, lightship, 48
Arlanza, the s.s., 121, 122; mined,
147
Armenian, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 6, 8-10 ; sunk, 10
Arm}', Britisia, mobilisation, 74, 89 ;
transport, 75, 78, 93 ; distribu-
tion, 78 ; transferred from Egypt,
90 ; from India, 94
Army Estimates for 1914-15, 78
Amdale, the s.s., blown up, 6, 67
Artist, the transport, 87 ; tor-
pedoed, 377-9
Artois, the s.s., 151, 152
Ashburton, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 304 ; sunk, 305
Ashmore, the s.s., 37 ; attacked by
a submarine, 38 ; sunk, 38
Asni^res, the French s.v., siink, 405
Asphodel, H.M.S., 366
Asquith, Lieutenant Claude, in
command of the Onward, 278 ;
awarded the D.S.C., 279
Astereas, the, 340
Astoria, the s.s., sunk, 347
Astrum Spei, the drifter, sunk, 170
Athenic, R.M.S., 396
Atland, the Swedish s.s., 135
Au Fait, the drifter, 257
Australian Expeditionary Force,
transport of, 89, 91, 96 ; land at
Gallipoh, 162
Austrian U-boats, sunk, 169, 171
Author, the s.s., looted and sunk,
384
Auxiliary Patrol, 266 ; work of the,
42, 67, 250, 259, 286-8 ; mine-
sweeping in the Mediterranean,
158-65 ; in the Adriatic, 165 ;
number of vessels, 251
Ava, the s.s., svmk, 376
Avesia, the Swedish s.s., 143
Avon, the trawler, 160
Avonmouth, 8, 10, 95, 97
Bacchante, the armed yacht, 42
Bachmann, Admiral, 290
Bacon, Admiral Sir Reginald, 253 ;
attack on Zeebrugge, 248-50 ;
anti-submarine measures, 251 ;
tribute to the crews of the
drifters, 256, 285 ; on the result
of the mine barrage, 257, 258,
270
Bacon, Lieutenant-Commander S.
K., master of the s.s. Patuca, 123
Badewitz, Lieutenant, 395, 402
Balfour, Earl, mission to the
United States, 156 ; tribute to
Admiral Sir D. de Chair, 156
Balgoxvnie, the s.s., attacked by air-
craft, 202
Ballantyne, Commander E. C, in
command of the Viknor, 123
Ballard, Admiral, 73
Ballycottin Light, 10
Baltic, the s.s., armed, 232
Balto, the Norwegian s.s., sunk, 355
Bamford, Midshipman C. A., 139
Bang, Captain, master of the
Trondhjemsjjord, 132
Baralong, the s.s., 43
Bardsey Island, 42
Barnes, Lieutenant Alfred H., 250
Barnett, Captain L., master of the
Strathness, 345
Barra Head, 51, 56, 125
Barry Roads, 33
Barton, Captain David, master
of the Corbridge, 382 ; taken
prisoner, 383, 418 ; master of
the Lundy Island, 417
Bather, Commander, in command of
the Hilary, 122
Batz, He de, 12
Bayano, the s.s., 109, 113, 116, 122 ;
sunk, 119, 147
Baycraig, the s.s., torpedoed, 368
Bayly, Admiral Sir Lewis, 42, 49,
287
446
INDEX
Beale, Captain S. P., master of
the Treneglos, 187
Beatrice II, the trawler, 160
Bedouins, take seamen prisoners,
223-30
Beechbank, the Norwegian s.v., 151
Beeehing, Captain, master of the
Brussels, 307
Belford, the s.s., torpedoed, 197
Belgian refugees, number of, 88 ;
troops, transport of, 87
Bell Rock, 60, 140
Belle Isle, 178
Bellview, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 344
Bempton, the trawler, 49
Benalla, the s.s., attacks a sub-
marine, 195
Benedict, the s.s., 418
Bengut, Cape, 306
Bennion, Cadet F., 299
Benson, Captain R., in command of
the Cedric, 122
Benson, Commodore, 148
Berehaven, 13, 49, 297
Bergen, 433
Bergensfjord, the Norwegian s.s.,
captured, 107, 114, 124
Bernaj^s, Commander L. A., in
command of the mine-sweeping
expedition, 68
Bernstorff, Comit, vi, 35, 40, 338
Berry, Skipper Alfred E., awarded
the D.S.O., 161
Berteghem, Mile Arens de, 319, 320
Bessfield, the Norwegian s.v., 127
Bhanio, the s.s., damaged by mines,
435
Bianca, the s.s., 56, 133
Biarritz, the mine-layer, 252
Binavor, the, 293
Birch, Captain J. H., master of the
Franz Fischer, 294
Biscay, Bay of, 178, 373
Bishop Rock, 12, 25, 33, 39, 297,
353
Blackloch, J., 299
Blaikie, Captain James, master of
the Caledonia, 366
Blair, Lieutenant D., 33
Blockade, Ministry of, 156
Bombardier, the trawler, 68
Bombay, 94 ; mine-field off, 435
Bon, Cape, 189
Booty, Captain E. L., in command
of the Otway, 123
Borkinn, 43
Borthwick, Captain T. R., taken
prisoner, 367
Borulos, the s.s., attacked by a sub-
marine, 180
Bottelar, Colonel von, 321
Bougie, 350
Boulogne, 82, 84
Bowen, Mr., 27
Bowling, Captain Alfred, master of
the Enosis, killed, 188
Bowring, Commander V. L., in
command of the Atnbrose, 122 ;
of the Patia, 123
Bradley, Captain Richard, master
of the Eddie, 411
Brandon Quay, 35
Brantingham, the s.s., fate of, 345 ;
torpedoed, 346
Bray, Lieutenant H. J., in command
of the Searanger, 273
Brazil, attitude to armed merchant
ships, 245, 333
Brecknockshire, the s.s., attacked
by a submarine, 410 ; sunk,
411
Bremen, the German commercial
submarine, 347 ; sunk, 348
Bricrton, the s.s., simk, 358
Brighton Queen, the paddle-steamer,
45, 248 ; sunk, 256
Brigi, the trawler, captured, 355
British Army, mobilisation, 74, 89 ;
transport, 75, 78, 93 ; dispatched
to Egypt, 76 ; distribution, 78 ;
transferred from Egypt, 90 ; from
India, 94
British Empire, the, military mo-
bilisation of, 89-96
British Transport, the s.s., 279
British Yeoman, the s.s., sunk, 419
Broadstairs, 286
Brockett, Captain John, master of
the Dromonby, 383
Brocklebank, Commander H., in
command of the C'hanguinola, 122
Bromley, Captain A., in command
of the Columbella, 122
Brown, Commander P. G., in com-
mand of the Patuca, 123
Browne, Captain John, master of
the Strathyiavin, 7
Bruges, 67, 312
Brunton, Commander C. W., in
command of the Ambrose, 120,
122 ; of the Orcoma, 123
Brussels, the s.s., attacked by
submarines, 307-11 ; captured,
311
Buckkr, the drifter, attacked, 286
Buckley, Captain R., master of the
Cedarwood, 293
INDEX
447
Buenos Ayres, the Italian s.v.,
captured, 419
Biill Rock, 64
Burghead Bay, 264
Burnett, Captain John, master of
the King George, 400
Burnley, Captain Samuel W.,
master of the Edinburgh, taken
prisoner, 392
Bursfield, the s.s., sunk, 180
Bush, the armed trawler, 56 ;
attacked by a submarine, 56
Busiris, the s.s., sunk, 196
Busta Voe, 150
C24, H.M., submarine, 54
C27, H.M., submarine, 54
Cabotia, s.s., attacked by a sub-
marine, 351
Ccesarea, the, case of, 118
Caledonia, the s.s., 95 ; torpedoed,
366
Caliban, the, 134
Califomian, the s.s., torpedoed, 187
Cali^toga, the drifter, 169
Calyx, the s.s., 109, 111, 112, 116;
withdrawn, 120
Cambrian Range, the s.s., captured
by the Mowe, 400 ; sunk, 401
Cambridge, the paddle-steamer, 45
Cambronne, the French s.v., cap-
tured, 421
Cameron, W., 299
Campania, the drifter, 34
Campbell, Captain A. T., master of
the Westbum, 394
Canadian Expeditionary Force,
transport of, 89, 92
Canopus, H.M.S., 160
Cantire, Mull of, 103
Cape Verde Islands, 395
Capelle, Admiral von, 291
Capelle, West, 251
Garden, Admiral, 159
Caria, the s.s., sunk, 185
Caribbean, the, 109, 113, 116, 118,
122
Carimata Strait, 431, 432
Carmania, the trawler, 252
Caroni, the s.s., sunk, 178
Carr, Commander H. C, in com-
mand of the Bayano, 122
Cartagena, 179
Carter, Commander J. O., master
of the Cedric, 122
Carter, Lieutenant S. F., 149
Casswell, the trawler, sunk, 355
Catania, the armed yacht, 170
Cattaro, 43, 44, 158, 172
11—30
Caucasian, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 14-16 ; smak, 16
Cawdor Castle, the s.s., escapes from
a submarine, 197
Cedarwood, the s.s., blown up, 293
Cedric, the s.s., 109, 110, 111, 112,
113, 114, 116, 122
Cerigotto Channel, 175 ; Island,
179, 188
Ceuta, 183
Chancellor, the s.s., sunk, 39
Changuinola, the s.s., 109, 113, 116,
122
Chantala, the s.s., 305 ; sunk, 306
Charles Ooumard, the, captured,
418
Charlton, Admiral, 262
Chassiron, 178
Chatterton, Captain H., in command
of the Teutonic, 123
Chatterton, Lieutenant-Commander
E. Keble, ix
Chile, attitude to armed merchant
ships, 245, 333
Chilvers, Captain J., master of the
Sailor Prince, 180
Chittenden, Captain Albert, master
of the Duendes, 299 ; awarded
the D.S.C., 298
Christiansimd, 147
Churchill, Captain James S., master
of the Bellview, 344 ; awarded
the D.S.C., 344
Churston, the s.s., sunk, 34
Cilicia, the s.s., sunk, 434
Cittd, di Palermo, the Italian trans-
port, strikes a mine, 168
City of Athens, the s.s., sunk, 435
City of Birmingham, the s.s., sunk,
358-60
City of Exeter, the s.s., 435
City of Marseilles, the s.s., 358 ;
attacked by a submarine, 190
City of York, the s.s., escapes from
a submarine, 184
Clan Campbell, the s.s., sunk, 305
Clan Chisholm, the s.s., attacked
by submarines, 361-3
Clan Leslie, the s.s., sunk, 355
Clan Macalister, the s.s., 184 ; sunk,
185
Clan Macfarlane, the s.s., attacked
by a submarine, 197, 198 ; suffer-
ings of the crew, 198-202
Clan Maclaren, the s.s., 192
Clan Macleod, the s.s., sunk, 192
Clan Macnaughton, the s.s., 109,
114, 116, 122; fotmders, 120, 147
Clan Mactavish, the s.s., 388 ;
448
INDEX
attacked by a submarine, 389 ;
sunk, 390
Clark, Alexander, 213
Clark, Captain A. G., master of the
Hallamshire, 188
Clark, Gerald, 205
Clarke, P. B., 133
Clavis, the drifter, sunk, 170
Cleon, the armed trawler, 44
Clintonia, the s.s., sunk, 24
Clover Bank, the drifter, 257
Clyde, the, 120
Coath, the s.s., 88
Cober, the s.s., sunk, 32
Cockman, Commander C. W.,
master of the BenaUa, 195 ;
awarded the D.S.C., 196
Colchester, the s.s., 308
Coleby, the s.s., captured, 380
Colenso, the s.s., sunk, 191
CoUins, Captain R. D., master of
the Teutonian, 296
Colomb, Sir John, on the need for
arming merchant vessels, 231
Colombo, mine-field o2, 435
Colorado, the s.s., 232
Columbella, the s.s., 109, 116, 121,
122, 133
Commodore, the a.s., sunk, 195
Comrades, the drifter, 270, 271
CoMxrs, H.M.S., 154
Conch, the oil-tanker, on fire, 369-
72; founders, 372
Condon, J., 188
Consort, the trawler, 277
Cook, Commander E., master of
the Victorian, 123
Cook Strait, 430, 435
Coquet, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 216; sunk, 217, 291;
sufierings of the crew, 218-21 ;
taken prisoners by the Bedouins,
223-30
Corbett, Commander G. E., in com-
mand of the Orotava, 123
Corbett, Sir Julian, Naval Opera-
tions, 79 note
Corbridge, the s.s., captured, 382,
391 ; sunk, 392
Comubia, the s.s., sunk, 178
CoKNWAiLis, H.M.S., torpedoed,
176
Corona, the Norwegian s.s., 146
CorsewaU Point, 119
Corsican, the s.s,, 95
Costello, the s.s., sunk, 25
Cottingham, the s.s., sunk, 197
Crafter, Lieutenant, 257
Craigard, the s.s., sunk, 14
Craigston, the s.s., sunk, 180
Crawford, Lieutenant, 131
Crescent, H.M.S., 102, 108
Crete, 178
Crighton, J., 10
Crimea, troops dispatched to, 75
Cromer, the s.s., 308
Crookhaven, 13
Cross Sand Light- vessel, 305
Croum of Aragon, the s.s., 201-2
Croxteth Hall, the s.s., sunk, 435
Cruiser Squadron, the Tenth, vii,
122 ; blockade of Germany, 101
mobilisation, 102 ; duties, 105
reconstruction, 106, 109, 117
condition of the ships, 108
crews, 110; patrol work, 115
124-56 ; disposition of the ships,
116; additional ships, 121
new base, 126, 127 ; loss of ships,
147 ; value of wireless tele-
graphy, 148 ; analysis of vessels
intercepted, 442
Cuba, attitude to armed merchant
ships, 245
Cullen Bay, 264
Cymheline, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 34 ; sunk, 35, 43
Dance, the French s.s., sunk, 133
Dannreuther, Commander T., in
command of the Patuca, 123
Dardanelles Expedition, 96 ; mine-
sweeping trawlers, 158-65
Dare, Admiral, 47
Dassen Island, 422
Datum, the drifter, sunk, 284
David, Commander H. F., master of
the Teutonic, 123
Davies, Captain D. T., master of
the Patagonia, 38
Davies, H. O., 10
Davies, Henry, 354
Davies, T., awarded the D.S.M., 10
Davison, Captain W. C, master of
the Natal Transport, 178
de Chair, Admiral Sir Dudley, in
command of the Tenth Cruiser
Squadron, 102 ; condition of his
ships, 108 ; flagship the Alsatian,
109, 148 ; extract from his
diary, 111-14; inspection of the
new base, 137 ; naval adviser
to the Ministry of Blockade,
156 ; LL.D. conferred, 156 ;
tribute to, 156
Decisions of the Supreme Court of
the U.S.A., 332 note
Dee, the s.v., sunk, 428
INDEX
U9
Defensively Atnted Merchant Ships
and Submarine Warfare, 241
Demerara, the s.s., 4 ; attacked by
a submarine, 5
Demeterton, the s.s., sunk, 414
Deyi of Crombie, the s.s., 185 ; sunk,
186
Denmark, Straits of, 124, 433
Dennis, Captain W. S., master of
the Andoni, 373
Denver, the s.s., 113
de Robeck, Admiral, 161, 162
Destro, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 341
Deutschland, the German com-
mercial submarine, 347 ; sunk,
348 note
Devonport, 93
Dewa, the s.s., sunk, 342
Dewsland, the armed trawler, 34
Dickinson, Captain J., master of
the Alacrity, 300
Digby, the s.s., 109, 113, 114, 116,
122, 129, 130; attacked by a
submarine, 120
Dilwara, the transport, 95
Dinion Fjord, 141
Diomed, s.s., attacked by a sub-
marine, 30 ; sunk, 31
Dobbins, Quartermaster E., 299
Dogger Bank, mine-field, 53, 66, 266
Doggerbank, the Dutch lugger, 279
Dohna-Schlodien, Korvetten-Kapi-
tan Burggraf Graf Nicholaus zu,
in command of the Mowe, 381
Donald, Captain R. N., master of
the Chancellor, 39
Donaldson, Captain H., master of
the Matunga, 430
Donnelly, Captain Geoffrey, master
of the Clintonia, 24
Donstad, the Norwegian s.s., 374;
sunk, 375
Dover, raids on, 44, 283-6 ; bar-
rage, 268-70
Dover, the patrol trawler, 13
Dovey, the trawler, founders, 259
Dowse, Captain B., master of the
City of Marseilles, 190
Dragonera Island, 345
Dramatist, the s.s., 403 ; sunk, 404
Drammenjjord, the s.s., 132
Drifter Divisions, 283, 284
Drifters, sent to the Adriatic, 166 ;
duties, 167; work of, 253;
tribute to, 256 ; operations
against submarines, 270 ; sunk,
276
Drogden, 403
11—30*
Dromonby, the s.s., attacked, 383
sunk, 384
Drumcree, the s.s., sunk, 2-4
Dryad, H.M.S., 102
Duart, the s.s., sunk, 340, 341
Dublin, H.M.S., torpedoed, 165
Duchess of Cornwall, the s.v., sunk,
400
Duendes, the s.s., escapes from a
submarine, 299
Duff, Admiral A. L., head of the
Anti-submarine Division, 287
Dugmore, Commander E. V., in
command of the Ebro, 122, 152
Duke of Cornwall, the s.s., 150
Dulcie, the s.s., torpedoed, 8
Dulcie Doris, the drifter, 169
Dumfriesshire, the s.s., sunk, 8, 63
Dunbar, 141
Dunbar, Captain Thomas, master of
the Meadowfield, 20
Dunera, the transport, 94
Dunkirk, 88
Dunluce Castle, the transport, 97
Dunn, Lieutenant R. H. A., master
of the Columbella, 122
Dunphy, Lieutenant B., master of
the Bayano, 122
Dunrobin, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 344
Dunsley, the s.s., sunk, 25, 26
Duplex, the French s.v., captured,
420
Durazzo, 168
E.B.C., the drifter, damaged, 284
E.E.S., the drifter, 254
Eagle Point, the s.s., captured, 302
East Loch Roag, 137
Easter Island, 422
Easty, Sub-Lieutenant Alfred M.,
143, 144
Ebro, the s.s., 121, 122, 137, 151-2
Eddie, the s.s., captured by the
Mowe, 411
Er)G.\R, H.M.S., 102, 106, 107. 108
Edinburgh, the s.v., sunk, 392
Editor, the trawler, 277
Edmonds, Captain Bertram, master
of the Baycraig, 368
Edmondson, Captain J., master of
the Huntsvale, killed, 356
Edwards, Captain H., in command
of the Hildebrand, 122
Edwards, Lieutenant-Commander
H. O., 54 ; awarded the D.S.O.,
55
Edwards, Sub-Lieutenant D. L.,
139, 141-3
450
INDEX
Eemdijk, the Dutch s.s., founders,
260
Egypt, British expedition to, 76 ;
anti-submarine patrols, 173
Egyptian War, 80, 84
Eileen, the, armed yacht, 53
Eimstad, the s.s., case of, 29
Ellesmere, the s.s., torpedoed, 21
Ellis, Petty Officer, 70
El Zorro, the oil-tanker, simk, 49,
197
Empress of Fort William, the s.s.,
sunk, 293
Endurance, the drifter, catches a
submarine, 270, 271, 272
Endymion, H.M.S., 102 ; captures
the Bergensfiord, 108
English Channel, 43, 101 ; sub-
marines in the, 197
Englishman, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 301 ; sunk, 302
Enosis, the, s.s., torpedoed, 188
Equinox, the armed trawler, 44
Era, the trawler, 278 ; sunk, 279
Ema Boldt, the s.s., torpedoed, 8
EscaUonia, the trawler, 158, 160
Eskimo, the s.s., 109, 116; with-
drawal, 120
Esmeraldo, the s.s., sunk, 412
Essex, H.M.S., 389
Etonian, the s.s., chased by a sub-
marine, 22
Evangel, the trawler, 47
Evans, Captain Phillip, master of
the Lomas, 12
Evening Star, the drifter, 167, 169
Expeditionary Force, British, mo-
bilisation, 76 ; sent to France,
81 ; numbers embarked, 82, 83
Eynon, Captain W. J., master of
the Halizones, 181
Fabian, the s.s., 352; attacked by
a submarine, 353
Faeroe Islands, 111, 114, 116, 141
Fair Island, 12, 107, 140, 247
Falaba, the s.s., sunk, 1.
Falkenhayn, General von. Chief of
the Great General Staff, v ;
appeal for naval co-operation,
337
Falmouth, 63
Fanshawe, Captain Basil H., in
command of H.M.S. Sutlej, 396
Farringford, the s.s., 381 ; siink, 382
Fasnet, the, 13, 23, 34, 35, 38, 43,
296, 305, 306, 350, 397, 415
Fawckner, Rear-Admiral, 137
Fenay Bridge, the s.s., sunk, 301
Fentonian, the trawler, 160
Ferens, T. R., the trawler, 68, 69
Fernando Noronha, 392
Fimreite, the s.s., torpedoed, 133
Finch, Captain W., master of the
Arabic, 26
Finisterre, Cape, 43, 376, 384
Firth, the s.s., sunk, 23
Fish, supply of, 50, 72
Fisher, Admiral of the Fleet, Vis-
count, First Sea Lord, 266
Fisher Girl, the drifter, 171
Fisher Prince, the trawler, sunk,
281
Fishing industry, 71
Fishing-smacks, attack on sub-
marines, 70
Fishing-trawlers, value of, 50 ;
number sunk, 52, 276, 281;
armed, 53 ; number of, 73
Fisker, Captain M. M. A., master
of the *Scau'6.v, 181
Fitzgerald, Sub-Lieutenant W. F.,
286
Flamborough, 275
Flamenco, the s.s., 392 ; attacked
by a submarine, 393 ; sunk, 393
Flamm, Professor, 346
Flannan Island, 125
Flekkefjord, 150
Flemish coast, mine-barrage, 251-8
F. Matarazzo, the s.s., torpedoed,
358
Folden Fjord, 128
Folkestone-Grisnez mine-field, 270
Forth, the, 141 ; Firth of, 60, 261 ;
mine-field, 276
Fortier, Lieutenant R. L., master
of the Andes, 122
Fortuna, the s.v. [e-K-Lutece), 422
Foster, Rt. Hon. H. O. Arnold,
The Army in 1906, 76 note
Foula Island, 106, 133
France, alliance with England, 77
France-Hayhurst, Commander C.
H., in command of the Fatuca,
119, 123; death, 119
Francisco, the s.s., 232
Frankenfels, the s.s., 185
Franz Fischer, the s.s., destroyed
by a Zeppelin, 294-6
Frascati, the trawler, 160
Freesia, the trawler, 49
French, Mr. A. A., on the sinking
of the Roddam, 343
French Prince, the s.s., sutnk, 411
French troops, dispatched to
Algeria, 75 ; transport of, 87
French, Viscount, 250
INDEX
451
Freuchny, the drifter, bIo\^ii up,
168
Friedri-ch Arp, the German s.s.,
sunk, 130
Frio, Cape, 410
Frippone, the French patrol vessel,
343
Fry, Captain, master of the Les-
bian, taken prisoner, 373
Fry, Lieutenant H. C. C, 167
Fryatt, Captain Cliarles, master of
the Brussels, 307 ; attacked by
a submarine, 307-11 ; taken
prisoner, 311-15; trial, 315-18;
condemned to death, vii, 318-21 ;
shot, 321 ; German Committee
of Inquiry on his trial, 322-9,
441
Fulton, the Norwegian s.s., 376
Funchnl, 390
Furnes, 253
FcBY, H.M.S., 130
O. and E., the trawler crew, 70 ;
attack on a submarine, 70
Gaba Tepe, 162
Gabo Islands, 430
Gabrielsen, J., drowned, 11
Gadsby, the s.s., sunk, 14
Galata Island, 189
Galley Head, 64
Gallipoli, attack on, 157
Galloper Lightship, 248
Gansser, Kapitan-Leutnant, in com-
mand of U33, 308, 309
Garrett, Captain Richard, master
of the Rappahannock, 346
Oarrigill, the drifter, 168, 170
Gartside-Tipping, Lieutenant-Com-
mander H. T., captain of the
Sanda, 255 ; drowned, 250
Gaspe Bay, 93
Gavdo Island, 178, 181, 186, 191,
196, 197
Geier, the s.s. (e's.-Samt Theodore)
405 ; sunk, 410
Geheral Wolfe, the monitor, 253,
Georgevitch, Guido von, 145
Georgic, the s.s., torpedoed, 401
Gerard, Mr., 314
Germany, submarine warfare, 1 ;
devices, 360 ; condition of the
crews, 366 ; protest from the
United States, 1, 12 ; blockade
of, 100, 104 ; operations of the
Grand Fleet, 101 ; watchword
" ruthlessness," 133 ; failure of
ingenious ruses, 155 ; proclama-
tion of war-zones, 233 ; number
of mines sunk, 253, 262 ; mine-
laying, 259-63, 275 ; raids on
Dover Straits, 283-6 ; Com-
mittee of Inquiry into the case
of Captain Fryatt, 322-9, 335,
441 ; policy of spurlos versenkt,
346
Gibraltar Straits, 43 ; anti-sub-
marine patrols, 173
Gibraltar, H.M.S., 102, 127
Gillard, Lieutenant G. S., master
of the Demerara, 5
Girdleness, 55, 147, 278
Gladys Royle, the s.s., siink, 416
Glamis Castle, the trawler, 277
Glayice, the Norwegian s.v., 131
GlanviUe, Skipper P. P., 45
Glasgow, H.M.S., 393, 419
Gleaner of the Sea, the drifter, 253 ;
sunk, 284
Glen Avon, the paddle steamer, 45
Glen Usk, the paddler, 264
Glenby, the s.s., 25
Gloria, the s.s., 134
Gloucester, H.M.S., 171
Goathlayid, the s.s., 124
Goble, Lieutenant C. J., master of
the Arlanza, 122
Golding, Skipper J. W., 61
Goldmouth, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 302 ; sunk, 303
Good Hope, Cape of, 433
Goodson, Captain, master of the
Balgownie, 202
Goodwins, South, 269, 272
Goss, W. A., quartermaster of the
Armenian, awarded the D.S.M.,
10
Gotaland, the Swedish s.s., 136
Go van Ferry, 121
Governor, the s.s., captured by the
Mowe, 414 ; sunk, 415
Gowan Lea, the drifter, shelled, 171
Gozo, 367
Grapton, H.M.S., 102, 107, 108;
captures the Wilhelm Behrens,
103
Grampian, the s.s., armed, 232
Grayigewood, the s.s., sunk, 23, 133
Grant, ilr., account of the tor-
pedoing of the Persia, 208
Grant Dalton, Captain J., in com-
mand of the Hildebrand, 122
Granton, 276 ; port of, naval bane,
60
Granton, the trawler, 68
Grantully Castle, the transport, 91,
97
Greenbriar, the s.s., 124
452
INDEX
Greenland, 101
Greif, the German raider, action
against the Alcantara, 153 ; sunk,
IS'f
Greta, the armed yacht, 49
Grey, Lord, 314
Grisnez, 284
Groningen, the s.s., 20
Groom, Captain Arnold C. B.,
master of the Coquet, 216 ; cast
adrift, 218-21 ; reaches land, 221
Groundwater, Lieutenant E. G.,
master of the India, 123
Guido, the s.s., 18 ; torpedoed, 20
Gunner, the armed trawler, attack
on a submarine, 60-2
Gutenfels, the German s.s, ; see
Turritella
Gwenllian, the trawler, 160
Haack, Bernhard, taken prisoner,
289
Haggard, Captain V. H. S., in com-
mand of H.M.S. Vulcan, 64
Haldane, Lord, Secretary of State
for War, 76
Hall, Captain Alexander, master
of the Katherine, 412
Hall, Captain W. H. S., master of
the Persia, 205
Hallam, Captain G., master of the
Saint Theodore, 402
Hallamshire, the s.s., torpedoed, 188
Halloway, Captain J. A., master
of the Swedish Prince, 341 ;
taken prisoner, 341
Hameln, prison camp at, 390
Hammond, Able Seaman K., 70
Hamond, Lieutenant C. E., 70 ;
awarded the D.S.C., 71
Hampshire, H.M.S., sunk, 261, 276
Hannibal, H.M.S., 366
Hansen, Joe, 148
Hansen, Lieutenant-Commander, 59
Haracaiho, the Danish s.v., 146
Harfat Castle, the trawler, sunk, 355
Harland, Lieutenant R. J., 254
Harmaires, the s.s., sunk, 297
Harnden, Captain F. J., master of
the West Point, 349
Harris, Captain W. J., master of
the Dramatist, 403
Harrison, Captain H. C, master of
the Appam, 386 ; taken prisoner,
387
Hartlepool, 281
Hartnell, Captain, master of the
Brussels, 307 ; taken prisoner,
311-15
Hasker, Captain F. O., master of
the Minneapolis, 300
Hatcher, Commander O., in cobq-
mand of the drifters, 166
Hangar, the Norwegian s.v., 141-3
Haughton, Captain Wilfred J.,
master of the City of Birmingham,
359
Haverford, the s.s., armed, 232
Havre, 82 ; evacuation of, 84, 85
Hawke, H.M.S., 102, 106; sunk,
107
Hawley, F. J., 198
Haydn, the s.s., sunk, 179
H. C. Henry, the s.s., sunk, 179
Heard, Captain H., in command of
the Columbella, 122
Heatherbloom, the drifter, 169
Heaton, Commander Gervase W. H.,
tribute to the mine-sweepers, 265
Hebrides, the, 56, 116
Heighington, the s.s., torpedoed, 340
Helfferich, Karl, 339
Heligoland, 43
Heligver Light, 134
Helizones, the s.s., sunk, 181
Helles, Cape, evacuation of, 165
Helmsmuir, the s.s., torpedoed, 195
Hely, Lieutenant H. M., master of
the Dighy, 122
Hemming, Captain H. C, master
of the Den of Crombie, 186
Herbert, R. H., 39
Heron, the armed trawler, 65
Hersing, Kapitan-Leutnant Otto,
177
Hesione, the s.s., sunk, 39
Heslop, Captain C. W, master of
the Ellesmere, 21
Hesperian, the s.s., 34 ; attacked
by a submarine, 35-7 ; sunk, 37
H. E. Stroud, the armed trawler,
283, 285
Higginbottom, Captain, master of
the Apsleyhall, 367 ; taken pris-
oner, 367
Highton, Lieutenant William, 265
Hilary, the s.s., 109, 112, 116, 122
Hildebrand, the s.s., 109, 111, 113,
114, 116, 122, 131, 145
Hill, Captain J., master of the
Turbo, 298
Hillhouse, the s.s., 135
Hillier, Able Seaman, 295
Hills, Mr., 422
Hitachi Maru, the Japanese s.s.,
captiored, 432 ; sunk, 432
Hodgson, Captain A., master of
the Drumcree, 3
INDEX
453
Hcevdi Grund, 106
Holder, Captain F. A., master of
the Eimstad, 29
Holland, attitude to armed mer-
chant ships, 244 ; on the execu-
tion of Captain Fryatt, 322
Hollo way. Captain J., master of
the Orange Prince, 188
Holland, Lieutenant-Commander
J. A., master of the Orcoma, 123
Holtzendorf, Admiral von. Chief of
the Naval Staff, 290, 339
Holyhead, 21
Home Counties Territorial Division,
transferred to India, 90 ; trans-
port of, 95, 96
Hook Point, 11
Horace, the s.s., captured, 394 ;
sunk, 395
Horngarth, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 420 ; sunk, 421
Hudson, Sub-Lieutenant C. H., in
command of the Gunner, 62 ;
awarded the D.S.C., 62
Hudson Maru, the Japanese s.s.,
prisoners transferred to, 410
Hughes, Captain D. William,
master of the Horace, 394
Hughes, Captain Robert, master
of the Woodfield, 182
Hugo, Captain T. N., master of the
Mimosa, 35
Humber, the, 73, 261, 281 ; mine-
field, 259
Hunt, Captain A. L., master of the
Bursfield, 180
Huntly, the s.s., torpedoed, 197
Huntsman, the s.s., escapes from a
submarine, 184
Huntsvale, the s.s., sunk, 355
Huronian, the s.s., torpedoed, 49
Hurren, Skipper R. G., 254 ;
awarded the D.S.C., 254
Hven, Island of, 403
Hyacinth, the drifter, shelled, 250
Iberian, the s.s., simk, 23
Ibis, the trawler, 277
Iceland, 51, 101, 433
Idaho, the s.s., 232
Igotz Mendi, the Spanish s.s.,
captured, 432 ; interned, 434
litis, the German raider ; see Turri-
tella
India, the s.s., 43, 121, 123 ; at-
tacked by a submarine, 124 ;
torpedoed, 134-6, 147
Indian Army, 78
Indian Ocean, 425
Inglefield, E. F., 376
Inglemoor, the s.s., sunk, 14, 16
Ingonia, the transport, 94
Inkonka, the transport, 98
Inkum, the s.s., torpedoed, 8
Inteepido, the Italian destroyer,
sunk, 167
Inventor, the storeship, case of, 85
Inverberire, the s.s., 342
Inverlyon, the ketch, attacked by
a submarine, 46
Invicta, the s.s., 88
lona, the s.s., 12 ; sunk, 13
Ionian, the transport, 95
Irickey, Captain James, master of
the Armenian, 8 ; awarded the
D.S.C., 10
Irish coast, submarine raid, 47
Irish Sea, 42
Irma, the Norwegian s,s., 415
Islay, Isle of, 301
Ismailia, 84
Istrar, the s.s., sunk, 364-6
Italy, result of the policy of
neutrahty, 157 ; entry into the
war, 158 ; loss of ships, 167
Jackson, Able Seaman Ellis,
awarded the D.S.M., 414
Jackson, Captain James D., master
of the San Melito, 32 ; Lieutenant
in the Royal Naval Reserve, 33
Jacob, Captain Maxwell M., master
of the Istrar, 364 ; account of the
sinking, 364-6
Jago, Captain Thomas B., master
of the Iberian, 23
Jalo, 229
James, C, 183
James, F. S., Administrator of
Nigeria, on board the Appam,
386 ; allowed to land, 390
Jameson, Captain W. S., master of
the Saxon Prince, 397 ; interned,
397
Jan Mayen Island, 125
Japanese Prince, the transport,
escapes from a submarine, 183
Java Sea, 431
Jeanette, the, armed yacht, 42
Jedabia, 227
Jeffreys, Commander R., in com-
mand of the Clan Macnaughton,
122
Jelifries-Davis, Captain H., master
of the French Prince, 411
Jehan, E. M., 46 ; awarded the
D.S.C., 46
454
INDEX
Jellicoe, Admiral of the Fleet, Vis-
count, 56, 73, 145, 149, 265
Jenkins, Captain! A. H., master of
the Japanese Prince, 183
Jenkins, Daniel, mate of the Saidieh,
7
Jenks, Captain J. W., master of the
Netherby Hall, 408
Jessie, the s.s., 298
Jevington, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 373 ; sunk, 374
John, Captain Henry, master of
the Whiteficld, 34
John Hardie, the s.s., simk, 43
Johnson, Captain Edward B.,
master of the Destro, 341 ;
awarded the D.S.C., 341
Johnson, Lieutenant W. C. M.,
master of the Viknor, 123
Jones, Captain Evan, master of the
Trader, 385
Jones, Captain Isaac, master of the
Larchmore, 17
Jones, J. T., 178
Jones, Captain John Parry, master
of the Marquette, 181 ; of the
Farringjord, 382 ; taken prisoner,
382
Jorstadmoen, internment camp, 136
Jumna, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 425 ; sunk, 426
Jutland, battle of, 274, 339
Kapunda, the s.s., torpedoed, 358
Karachi, 94
Kashgar, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 190
Katherine, the s.s., captiu^ed by the
Mowe, 411 ; sunk, 412
Kermedy, Commander W. G., in
command of the India, 123, 135
Kentish Knock, 294
Kephez Point, 159
Kermadec Islands, 428
Kiel Harbour, 434
Kilner, Basil, kiUed, 413
Kimherley, the trawler, 274
King, Skipper G., 56
King Edwakd VII, H.M.S., sunk,
260, 381
King George, the s.s., 399 ; sunk,
400
King Malcolm, the s.s., sunk, 358,
365
Kingsway, the s.s., sunk, 189
Kirkwall, 13, 143, 144
Kitchener, Field-Marshal Earl, Sec-
retary of State for War, 79 ;
military policy, 89 ; drowned,
261, 276
Kling, Lieutenant, 422
Knight, Captain R. A., master of
the Voltaire, 398 ; interned, 399
Koeline, Naval Chaplain, 320
Kohler, Captain Carl J., master of
the Perce, 418 ; taken prisoner,
418
Kohler, Lieutenant, 403
Kohler, Mrs., taken prisoner, 418
Konsul Schultze, the German s.s., 128
Kophamel, in command of U35,
172, 174
Kotka, the Norwegian e.v., attacked
by a submarine, 62, 64 ; towed
into Queenstown harbour, 65
Kristianiafjord, the Norwegian s.s.,
125
Kron Prinz Wilhelm, the German
raider, 380
Kuroki, General, 80
Kya Island, 128
Kyarra, the hospital ship, 96
Kyoto, the trawler, sunk, 354
Lady Blanche, the, armed yacht, 42
Lady Plymouth, the s.s., escapes
from a submarine, 184
Lady Salisbury, the s.s., sunk, 6, 8
Laghi, Cape, 168
Lan:ible, Lieutenant, 387
Land's End, 275, 304
Langford, Captain Walter, master
of the Kingsway, 189
Langton Hall, the s.s., sunk, 191
La Panne, 253
Lapland, 345
Larchmore, the s.s., sunk, 17
Largo Bay, 141
La Roche Javcanet, French s.v.,
captured, 420
Launch Out, the drifter, sunk, 284
Laurentic, the s.s., 109
Lawson, Lieutenant-General Sir H.,
85
Lawson, Vivian Oldry, 377
Leader, the smack, 70
Lear mouth. Captain J. W., master
of the Haydn, 179
Le Cateau, battle of, 82
L. C. Tower, the s.v., 13
Leith Roads, 141
le Marchant, Rear- Admiral, 173
Lemnos, 97
Leonora, the Spanish s.s., 375
Lerwick, 68, 105, 139, 149, 150, 152
Lesbian, the s.s., sunk, 373
Letitia, the hospital ship, 360
INDEX
455
Le Trombe, the French torpedo-
boat, 271
Leuctra, the s.s., torpedoed, 8
Lewis, Butt of, 51, 56, 57, 128, 153
LiGHTFOOT, H.M.S., 277
Lily Reaich, the drifter, foxinders,
169
Lindenhall, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 361
Linguetta, Cape, 167
Linkmoor, the s.s., sunk, 179
Lizard, the, 15, 32
Loch Awe, the trawler, 48
Lofoten Islands, 42
Logan, P. G., 27
Loire, River, 82, 84
Lomas, the s.s., sunk, 6, 8, 12
Lombok or Atlas Straits, 432
Lord Cromer, the s.s., 194
Lord Denman, the trawler, 68
Lord Tredegar, the s.s., sunk, 342
Lord Wi7)^orne, the trawler, 164
Lottie Leask, the drifter, sunk, 167
Lowestoft, 68, 69
Lowlands, the s.s., torpedoed, 297
Luckner, Count Felix von, in com-
mand of the Seeadler, 415, 418;
taken prisoner, 422
Ludlow, the paddler, sunk, 263
Lumina, the s.s., sunk, 184
Lundy Island, 8, 197
Lundy Island, the s.s., 416 ; sunk,
417
Lupina, the drifter, 47
Lusitania, the s.s., sunk, v, 1, 12,
204
Lutece, the s.v. (renamed Forturui),
captured, 422
Lux, the S.S., sunk, 377
Luxembourg, the Belgian s.s., sunk,
392
Lydiabd, H.M.S., 301
Lynfield, the s.s., torpedoed, 373
MacAuley, Norman, 28
Macfarlane, the trawler, 250
Mackenzie, Captain G. A., master
of the Brecknockshire, 410
Maclean, Allan, 215
Mahmoud, Prince, 180
Mahon, Captain R. F., in command
of the Digby, 122
Maid of Honour, the armed j'acht,
59
Main, Captain W. S., master of
the Hesperian, 35
Main, Lieutenant-Commander F.
M., master of the Alcantara, 122
Majestic, H.M.S., 21 ; sunk, 163,
177
Mahn, Captain F. W., master of
the Esmcraldas, 412
Mahn Head, 115, 301
Malinche, the, sunk, 191
Mallow, the mine-sweeper, 207, 212
Malo-les-Bains, 88
Maloja, the s.s., simk, 261, 292
Malta, anti-submarine patrols, 173,
175
Mayichester Engineer, the s.s., tor-
pedoed, 302
Mangara, the s.s., sunk, 23
Manhattan, the transport, 93
Manitoba, the s.s., armed, 232
Manley, Captain F., master of the
Phrygia, 299
Majn'sfield, H.M.S., 10
Mantua, the s.s., 106, 109, 112, 113,
114, 116, 123, 126
Manx Hero, the trawler, 160 ;
sunk, 160
Manzanita, the drifter, 167
Maraca Island, 392
Marere, the s.s., attacked by a sub-
marine, 291 ; sunk, 292
Marie Frederic, the French trawler,
187
Marie Glaeser, the German s.s.,
captured, 103
Marietta, the Norwegian s.v., 112
Marina, the s.s., torpedoed, 350
Marne, battle of the, 8 1, 82
Maroni, the French s.s., sunk, 397
Marquette, the s.s., sunk, 181
Martello, Cape, 181, 184
Martin, T., 341
Martin, W. E., 414
Martin, the trawler, 277
Martorell, Captain Norman, master
of the Flamenco, 392 ; taken
prisoner, 393
Massalia, the Greek s.s., 195
Masters, Captain W., master of the
Californian, 187
Matapan, Cape, 179, 180, 187, 197
Matheran, the s.s., sunk, 434
Matthews, Captain C, master of
the Ashburton, 304
Matunga, the s.s., captured, 430 ;
sunk, 431
Maxse, Mr., 310
Maxton, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 45
May Island, 141, 275
Mayfly, the trawler, 289
McClory, Lieutenant J. R., killed,
285
456
INDEX
McCullough, Captain A., master of
the Craigard, 14
McGill, Captain G. B., master of
the Orteric, 196
McLean, Neil, killed, 20
M'Loughlin, Lieutenant J., 270 ;
awarded the D.S.C., 272
McNish, Roland L. H., 413
Meadowfield, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 20 ; sunk, 21
Meadows, Captain T. G., master of
the Turritella, 423
Mediterranean, the, 43 ; demand
for auxiliary craft, 157 ; sub-
marine warfare, 172 ; trawlers
sent to, 173
Medusa, the Italian submarine, tor-
pedoed, 165
Mekong, the armed yacht, 63
Mello, Captain P. E., master of the
Marere, 291
Mellor, Commander William, in
command of the trawler Escal-
lonia, 158
Mentor, H.M.S., 19
Mercantile Marine, work of trans-
porting troops, 79-81, 83, 8G,
89-99 ; number of troop? trans-
ported, 98 ; blockade of Ger-
many, 101 ; number of ships
sunk, 182, 304 ; relations with
the Royal Navy, 245
Merchant ships, system of defensive
armament, 231-5 ; instructions,
235-7, 240, 436-9 ; number
armed, 237-40 ; system of train-
ing, 239 ; attitude of neutrals,
241-5, 333-5 ; result of armed,
360 ; list of ports, 440
Mercian, the transport, escapes
from a submarine, 183
Merewether, Sir E. M., Governor
of Sierra Leone, on board the
Appam, 386 ; allowed to land,
390
Merganser, the s.s., sunk, 189
Mcrion, s.s., armed, 232 ; case of,
242
Meteor, the German minelayer, 67,
260
Miami, the s.s., 11
Middleton, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 191 ; sunk, 192
Miles, Sub-Lieutenant Oswald E.,
drowned, 112
Milford Haven, 12
Mills, Captain G., master of the
Arfist, 87, 377
Milne, H.M.S., 10
MiUiades, the s.s., 92
Mimosa, the s.s., 34 ; sunk, 35, 43
Mine, salving a, 264
Mine-fields, 66-9, 159, 248, 253,
259-63, 268, 276, 381, 422, 429
Minehead, 42
Mine-sweepers, work of the, 66-9,
262-5
Mingary, the yacht, 275
Minieh, the collier, attacked by a
submarine, 407 ; sunk, 407
Minikoi, 424
Minneapolis, the s.s., attacked by
a submarine, 300 ; sunk, 301
Minona, the, armed yacht, 60
Miranda, H.M.S., 19
Mitchell, Captain C, master of the
Cottingham, 197
Mizzen Head, 127
Mohacsfidd, the s.s., sunk, 372
MoiTAWK, H.M.S., attacked, 285
Mombassa, the s.s., torpedoed, 349
Monarch, the cable ship, blown up,
250
Mongolia, the s.s., sunk, 435
Monnikeandam, the Dutch s.s., 32
Mens, retreat from, 84
Montagu of Beaulieu, Lord, account
of the torpedoing of the Persia,
212-15 ; tribute to the crew, 212
Montezuma, the s.s., armed, 232
Montreal, the s.s., armed, 232
Moore, John B., Digest of Inter-
national Law, 331 note
Moore, Captain W. E. J., master
of the Cambrian Range, 400
Moorhouse, Captain W. A., master
of the Englishman, 301
Moorina, the transport, attacked
by a submarine, 184
Mopelia Island, 422
Mora, the s.s., sunk, 178
Moray Firth, mine-field oS, 260
Mordant, the, 346
Moresby, the s.s., sunk, 358
Morni7ig, the s.s., vsTeck of, 148
Morning Star, the drifter, blown
up, 168
Morralee, W., 33
Motagua, the s.s., 109, 110, 114,
116, 123, 124
Motor-launches, number of, 266-8 ;
work of, 267
Moxtnt Temple, the s.s., sunk, 399
Mowe, the German raider, 260, 291,
292 ; cruises of, 380-415
Moxey, F. W., 70
Moxon, Captain W., master of the
Umeta,, 195
INDEX
457
Muckle Flugga, 133, 139, 149
Miillings, Captain, master of the
Pinmore, 418
MtJNSTER, H.M.S., 154
Murray, Captain J. C, master of
the Winlaton, 22
Mj'ggenaes, 139
Myles, Captain J., master of the
Diomed, killed, 30
Nadine, the Belgian trawler, 47
Nantes, 82
Na7ifes, the French s.v., sunk, 405
Narrows, the, mine-fields, 159
Nasturtium, H.M.S., 301
Natal Transport, the s.s., svmk, 178
Naumann, Major, 315
Navahoe, the American s.s., 119
Neal, F., 19
Needles, the, 261
Neilson, Captain H. E., master of
the British Yeoman, 419
Neilson, Mrs., taken prisoner, 419
Nellie Nutten, the trawler, 278 ;
simk, 279
Neptunian, the trawler, 250
Ncreide, the, case of, 331
Nerper, Captain, in command of
the Wolf, 422 ; returns to Ger-
many, 434
Netherby Hall, the s.s., 408 ; at-
tacked b3^ a submarine, 409 ;
sunk, 410
Netherlands, the, refusal to admit
armed merchantmen, 334
Neuralia, the hospital ship, 292
Neustrelitz camp, 403
New Zealand, 429 ; Expeditionary
Force, transport of, 89, 90, 95
Newland, the armed trawler, 135
Newport News, 391
Newton, Captain Harry, master of
the Aaro, taken prisoner, 340
Newton, Captain Robert, master of
the Welbury, 13
Ning Chow, the s.s., 214
Noble, Captain G. A., master of
the Ashmore, 37
Norris, Captain D. T., in command
of the Arlama, 122
North Hinder Lightship, 248
North Island, 429
North Sea, 7, 45, 53, 68, 72, 107
North Wales, the s.s., 346 ; fate of,
347
Norway, attitude to armed mer-
chant ships, 244
Nubian, H.M.S., torpedoed, 284
Nugget, the s.s., sunk, 23
Nuri Bey, 229
Nymphe, H.M.S.,
371
Oceanic, the s.s., 123 ; wrecked, 106
OoiN, H.M.S., 423
Okhla, the s.s., sunk, 435
OA-w, the trawler, 273
Old Head of Kinsale, 25, 42, 49,
65, 197
Older, R. C, 303
Olive, Captain St. John, master of
the Gadshy, 14
Oliver, Captain W. N., master of
the Clan Mactavish, 388 ; taken
prisoner, 389; awarded the
D.S.C., 390
Oliver, Mr., 27
Olna Firth, 127
Ornbra, the armed yacht, 283, 284
Onward, the trawler, 278 ; sunk,
279
Oppenheim, Mr., on the right of
resistance to capture, 332
Orange Prince, the s.s., torpedoed,
188
Orcades, the trawler, sunk, 259
Orcoma, the s.s., 121, 123
Orduna, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 22
Orfordness, 34
Orkneys, the, 261
Orlando, the Swedish s.s., 132
Orcnsay, the s.s., sunk, 367
Oropesa, the s.s., 109, 113, 116,
121, 123 ; collision with the
Patia, 137
Orotava, the s.s., 109, 113, 116, 123,
125, 150 ; damaged, 151
Orteric, the s.s., torpedoed, 196
Orvieto, the mine-layer, 262
Oscar II, the Swedish s.s., coUision
with the Patuca., 129
Osprey, the patrol-vessel, 48
Osprey II, the trawler, 21
Osta, the trawler, 252
Ostawine camp, 403
Ostend, evacuation of, 86-8
Ostrich, the trawler, 252
Otaki, the s.s., 412 ; attacked by a
submarine, 413 ; sunk, 413
Otranto, Cape, 172 ; Straits, 165
Otter, the trawler, sunk, 281
Otway, thes.s., 109, 112, 116, 123
Our Allies, the drifter, shelled, 171
Outer Silver Pit mine-field, 66, 259
Outram, Commander E., master of
the Alsatian, 122
Oversay Island, 120, 301
458
INDEX
Oversea transport, problems of,
75, 79
Owen, Captain G., master of the
Islorth. Wales, 347
Oxlade, Lieutenant-Commander C.
H., master of the Patia, 123
Pacific, the, 428
Packe, Captain G., master of the
Oovernor, 415
Paddle-steamers, sent to the
Mediterranean, 176
Page, Second-hand, 70
Pago, 422
Palm Branch, s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 363
Pahicia, Island of, 388
Palmer, Captain Walter B., master
of the Arabia, 357
Palmer, Lieutenant-Commander E.
N., in command of H.M.S. Odin,
423
Palmer, R. P., 300
Pantellaria, 175
Papa Westra Island, 142
Parslow, Captain Frederick, master
of the Anglo-Calif ornian, 18 ;
killed, 19
Parslow, Frederick, awarded the
D.S.C., 19
Pass of Balmaha, the American s.v.,
converted into a German raider,
415 ; see Seeadler
Patagonia, the s.s., torpedoed, 38
Patia, the s.s., 109, 113, 114, 116;
121, 123 ; collision with the
Oropesa, 137 ; damaged, 150
Patriot, H.M.S., 279
Pattison, Captain Arthur, master
of the Seatonia, 354 ; taken
prisoner, 354
Patitca, thes.s., 109, 116, 119, 123;
collision with Oscar II, 129
Paul, the Belgian s.s., 295
Paulman, Lieutenant, 406
Pearce, D., 303
Pearl, the armed trawler, attack on
U41, 57-9
Pegou, the, case of, 331
Peninsula War, 80
Pentland Firth, 107
Perce, the s.v., attacked by a sub-
marine, 418
Periere, Arnauld de la, in command
of U35, 174, 176
Pernambuco, 393
Perseus, the s.s., sunk, 435
Persia, the s.s., 204 ; torpedoed,
192, 197, 204-15
Perth, the s.s., torpedoed, 305
Peru, 245
Peter, Lieutenant W. A., 47
Peterfield, Captain John J., master
of the Cober, 32
Peterhead, 277
Petrel, the trawler, 289
Petunia, the s.s., 346
PhiUimore, Captain V., in command
of the Motagua, 123
PhiUimore, Rear-Admiral, 69
Phillips, Skipper, 46
Philps, Captain W., master of the
Sea Serpent, killed, 299
Phoebe, the fishing-trawler, fight
with a submarine, 51
Phrygia, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 299
Pinmore, the s.v., captured, 418 ;
smik, 419
Piper, W., 32
Pistoye et Duverdy, Traite de
Prises Maritimes, 331 note
Pleasance, the drifter, 270, 271
Pleasants, the drifter, 284
Pleiades, the drifter, 270
Plover, the tug, 129
Plymouth Sound, 93
Pola, 158
Pola, the S.S., escapes from a sub-
marine, 184
Polarine, American s.s., 144
Ponto, the Norwegian s.s., 3
Poole, William, taken prisoner,
341
Port Dalhousie, the s.s., torpedoed,
297
Port Kembla, the s.s., sunk, 435
Port Pantellaria, 341
Port Rush, 115
Potomac, army dispatched to, 76
Potter, Captain R. H., master of
the Scottish Monarch, 10
President Stein, the Belgian trawler,
10
Preston, Captain L. G., 265
Price, Captain W. J., master of the
Fabian, 352 ; account of the sub-
marine attack, 353
Price, Lieutenant T. E., in com-
mand of the Quickly, 62 ;
awarded the D.S.C., 62
Princess Ena, H.M.S. , 18
Princess Juliana, the trawler, 132
Princess Margaret, the mine-layer,
252
Prior, T. J., 250 ; awarded the
D.S.M., 251
Puerto de Mazarron, 179
INDEX
459
Quarry Knowe, the drifter, 170
Quebec, 93
Queen, the s.s., 88 ; sunk, 284
Queenstown harbour, 29, 49, 65
Quickly, the armed trawler, attack
on a submarine, 60-62
Race, Cape, 401, 414
Radnorshire, the s.s., 405 ; sunk,
406
Rafiray, H. L., 369
Ramazan, the transport, sunk, 179
Rambler, the trawler, 62, 64 ;
tows the s.v. Kotka, 65
Ramsgate, raid on, 286
Ranza, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 24
Rappahanyiock, the s.s., sunk, 346
Ras Amana, 216
Rathlin O'Beirne Island, 125
Rattray, Captain H., master of the
Middleton, 191
Rattray Head, 20
Rattray Head, the s.s., 371
Read, H. O., 19
Reade, Lieutenant-Commander A.
H., master of the Changuinola,
122
Reapwell, the s.s., sunk, 358, 365
Redmond, Captain M. J., master
of the Apollo, 181
Reed, Captain Robert, master of
the Ariadne, 386
Remembrance, the s.s., 181
Rena, the German s.s., 153
Renfrew, the s.s., sunk, 17
Rennie, Commander A., master of
the Virginian, 123
Rennie, John, 31
Restore, the drifter, attacked by a
submarine, 166
Restrivo, the trawler, 160, 161
Re Umber to, the Italian transport,
sunk, 167
Rhodanthe, the s.s., sunk, 412
Rich, J. P., 196
Richardson, F. A. McGowan, 30 ;
awarded the D.S.C., 31
Richborough, 85
Richmond, Skipper, 64
Richmond, the s.s., sunk, 14
Rigg, Commander W. G., 256
Rigoletto, the trawler, 281
Rio de Janeiro, 421
Rio Tiete, the s.s., captured, 302
Ritchie, Captain D., master of the
lona, 13
River Clyde, the s.s., 164
Robinson, Captain F. H,, master
of the Caucasian, 15 ; saves his
dog, 16 ; awarded the D.S.C.,
16 ; master of the Lux, 377
Robinson, Lieutenant F. W.,
master of the Oropesa, 123
Robum, the drifter, sunk, 284
Roddam, the s.s., attacked by a
siibmarine, 342 ; sunk, 343
Rodino, the trawler, 273
Rosa, Lieutenant, 433
Rose, Commander Hans, in com-
mand of U53, 347 ; humanity,
348
Rosies, the drifter, sunk, 170
Ross, J. C, 374
Rosslare, 47
Rothesay, the s.s., torpedoed, 297
Rouen, 82, 85
Roumanie, the s.s., simk, 34
Royal Arthur, H.M.S., 102
Royal Edward, the transport sunk,
172, 177
Royal George, the transport, 186
Royal Naval Motor-Boat Reserve,
266 ; work of the, 266
Royal Scot, the s.s., 129, 130
Ruel, the s.s., attacked by a sub-
marine, 32, 33 ; sunk, 33
Ruble ben camp, 312
Rimciman, Rt. Hon. Walter, on
the sinking of the Persia, 215
Russ, the Danish s.s., 125
RusseU, Captain H., master of the
Com,modore, 195
Russell, Mr., 350, 362
Russell, the trawler, 252
Russian refugees, 87
Russo-Japanese War, 80
Ruytingen Shoal, 284
Ryali, Captain J. R., master of the
Saidieh, 7
Sabrina, the armed yacht, 42
Safa-el-Bahr, the yacht, 173
Saidieh, the s.s., sunk, 6, 7
Sailing-ships, demand for, 62;
number svuik, 63
Sailor Prince, the s.s., sunk, 180
St. Abb's Head, 42
St. Andrew's Bay, 60
St. Cyr, the trawler, 68
St. Elvies, the paddler, 264
St. George's Channel, 25
St. Ives, 11
St. Kilda, Island of, 34, 51, 57, 124
Saint Lucia, 404
St. Mar, 34
St. Nazaire, 82
460
INDEX
St. Paul Rocks, 412, 418, 421
Saint Theodore, the s.s., captiored
by the Mowe, 402 ; converted
into a German raider and re-
named Geier, 405 ; sunk, 410
St. Vincent, 392, 412
Salmon, the motor-boat, 280
Salonika, aioxiliary patrol at, 164
Salybia, the s.s., sunk, 301
San Francisco, 63
San Melito, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 32
Sanda, the armed yacht, sunk, 255
Santa Cruz, 396
Santa Maria, 418
Sapphire, the armed yacht, 42
Sasseno Island, 167
Saturnia, the transport, 95
Saunders, Captain Harold Crichton,
master of the Wairuna, 429
Saxon, the armed trawler, 134, 136
Saxon Prince, the s.s., sunk, 397
Scapa Flow, 57, 103
Scarborough, mine-field off, 68, 259
Scarlett, Skipper Lavirence, 250 ;
awarded the D.S.C., 251
Scawby, the s.s., sunk, 181
Schalvigne, Mr., 319
Scheer, Admiral, in command of the
High Seas Fleet, 290, 338
Schonwenbank Lightship, 311
Schraum, Dr., 335
Schroder, Admiral von, 313
Scillies, the, 32, 42, 346
Scotian, the s.s., armed, 232
Scott, Frank, drowned, 112
Scott, Lieutenant Grough, 371
Scott, Sir William, 330 ; see Stowell
Scottish Monarch, the s.s., 6 ; at-
tacked by a submarine, 8, 10 ;
sunk, 11
Sea Serpent, the s.s., sunk, 299
Seal, the trawler, svmk, 28 1
Searanger, the trawler, 273
Seatonia, the s.s., sunk, 354
Seeadler, the German raider (ex-
Pass of Balmaha), 415 ; captures
ships, 415-21 ; wrecked, 422
Senior, William, The Master
Mariner s Authority, 329 note
Senussi, rising, 173
Serbian Army, Auxiliary Patrol
assists evacuation of, 167
Sergeant, Captain A. H., in com-
mand of the Mount Temple, 399
Serrat, Cape, 340
Shackleton, the trawler, 252
Sharp, Captain J. T., master of the
Merganser, 189
Shetland Islands, 59, 106, 107, 116,
403
Shewan, Captain W. S., master of
the Oladys Royle, 416
Shields, Captain J. W., master of
the Wordsworth, 428 ; taken
prisoner, 428
Shipping Conference, 63
Ships, number sunk, 6, 16, 24, 34,
39, 181, 182, 339, 340, 342, 363,
376
Shipwash Lightship, 263
Sidero, Cape, 180, 183
Sidi Idris, head of the Senussi
tribes, 226
Simla, the s.s., torpedoed, 305
Simpson, Rear-Admiral, 273
Singapore, 431
Sir Mark Sykes, the trawler, 68
Sir Richard Awdry, the s.s., at-
tacked by a submarine, 18^ ;
sunk, 187
Sizewell buoy, 23
Skagerrak, 105
Skerry vore, 120
Sklydeema, 226
Skomvaer, the Norwegian s.v., 149
Slater, Captain W. F., in command
of the Oceanic, 123
Slott, Captain Edwin, master of the
Conch, killed, 369
Smalls, the, 63, 197, 353, 378
Smith, Andrew, master of the
Morning, 148
Smith, Commander H., master of
the Oceanic, 123
Smith, Commander H. H., in com-
mand of the Virginian, 123
Smith, Lieutenant Archibald Bisset,
master of the Otaki, 412 ;
drowned, 413 ; awarded the V.C,
413
Smith, Lieutenant H. P. B., master
of the Hildebrand, 122
Smith, J. C, first engineer of the
Strathnairn, 8
Smith, Dr. Monroe, on the execu-
tion of Captain Frj^att, 321
Smith, Walter Ernest, accoimt of
the torpedoing of the Persia,
209—12
Smith's Knoll, 45, 46, 69, 70
Smyrna, blockade of, 164
Snyth, Commander A. H., in
command of the Teutonic, 123
Soldier Prince, the trawler, 160
Somali, the hospital ship, 97
South Ness, 106
Southampton, 82, 95
INDEX
461
Southward, Captain H. S., master
of the Clan Macleod, 192 ;
wounded, 193, 194
Southwold mine-field, 259
Spain, attitude to armed merchant
ships, 244
Speedwell, the trawler, 59 ; attack
on a submarine, 289
Spencer, Captain A., master of the
Demeterton, 414
Spiekernell, Acting- Paymaster F. T.,
54
Spotless Prince, the drifter, 284
Springband, the Norwegians. v., 134
Spurr, W. F., 297
Stadlandet, 128
Stainthorp, Captain I. N., master
of the Horngarth, 420
Stanley, Commander N. L., in
command of the Oropesa, 123
Stanley Weyman, the armed
trawler, 59
Star of the Empire, the trawler, 160
Startin, Admiral James, 275 ; suc-
cess of his stratagem, 60-2
Stately, the drifter, 270
Statesman, the s.s., sunk, 355
Staunch, H.M.S., 130
Staunton, Commander H, G.,
master of the Otway, 123
Steel, Captain R., master of the
Hesione, 39
Steele, F. F., 26, 28
Stenhouse, W. J., 33
Stephana, the s.s., sunk, 348
Stephens, Skipper William, 169
Stevenson, Captain J. F., master
of the Renfrew, 17
Stileman, Rear- Admiral Henry, 115
Stonehouse, Captain A. W., master
of the Inglemoor, 16
Storesand, the Norwegian s.v., sunk,
43
Stornoway, 126, 145
Story, Captain Henry, master of
the Ruel, 33
Stowell, Dr. Ellery, on the execu-
tion of Captain Fryatt, 321
Stowell, Lord, on the right of
resistance to capture, 330 ; see
Scott
Strade Bianchi, 172
Strathcarron, the s.s., torpedoed, 8
Strathdene, the s.s., sunk, 348
Strathlossie, the trawler, 160
Strathnavin, s.s., sunk, 6, 7
Strathness, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 341, 345
Strathord, the trawler, 160
Stretting, Captain T. H., master
of the Jevington, 373 ; taken
prisoner, 374 ; landed at Cape
Finisterre, 376
Suandere river, 159
Submarine warfare, 1, 163, 165, 166,
172, 247, 338
Submarines, German, stmk, 55, 254,
271, 274 ; fight with trawlers,
277-9 ; raid on fishing-craft,
281 ; devices, 360 ; condition of
the crews, 366
Suddes, H. F., 19
Suez, 96
Sule Skerry, 143, 260
Summers, Captain A. H., master
of the Oeorgic, 401
Sunbeam, the s.v., captured, 18
Sunday Island, 428
Sussex, the French s.s., torpedoed,
vi, 303
Sutherland, Duke of, in conunand of
the Catania, 170
SxjTLEj, H.M.S., at Santa Cruz, 396
Suvla, evacuation of, 164
Swain, Skipper Alfred, awarded the
D.S.O., 161
Swan, the armed trawler, 59
Swanston, Captain F. J., master
of the Clan Macfarlane, drowned,
198-200
Swarbacks Minn, 126, 137, 150
Swarte Bank mine-field, 66, 260
Swedish Prince, the s.s., attacked
by a submarine, 340 ; sunk, 341
Swift, H.M.S., 106 ; attacked by a
submarine, 107
Swinemiinde, 399, 403
Sydero Island, 116, 141
Symns, Lieutenant B. H., master
of the Ambrose, 122
Syringa, the trawler, 160
Taen Island, 135
Talbot, E. G., awarded the D.S.M.,
10
Tangistan, the s.s., sunk, 7
Tunis, the s.s., svmk, 189
Taranaki, the armed trawler, 54
Taranto, 165, 166, 170
Tarbert, Loch, 117
Taylor, Lieutenant F. H., in com-
mand of H.M. Submarine C24, 54 ;
awarded the D.S.C., 55
Taylor, Captain James A., master
of the Mohacsfield, 372 ; taken
prisoner, 372
Taylor, Lieutenant - Commander
462
INDEX
J. W., master of the Clan Mac-
alister, 184
Taylor, Quartermaster T., 299
Taylor, Captain T. M., master of
the Orduna, 22
Tenby Castle, the armed trawler,
130
Territorial Force, replace garrisons
at Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt,
89, 91 ; replace Indian troops,
90, 9-1, 95, 96
Teucer, the s.s., escapes from a
submarine, 197
Teittonian, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 296 ; sunk, 297
Teutonic, the s.s., 106, 109, 112,
113, 114, 116, 123, 128, 133
The Marchioness, the s.s., 351
Themistocles, the transport, 96
The Ramsay, armed boarding
steamer, 260
Theseus, H.M.S., 102, 106, 107,
108
Thistle, the trawler, sunk, 289
Thomas, Captain Evan, master of
the Lindenhall, 361
Thomas, James Parry, 377
Thompson, Captain David, 342
Thompson, Captain G. R., master
of the iXinrobin, 344 ; awarded
the D.S.C., 344
Thomson, Captain R. F., master
of the Mombassa, 349
Thornaby, the s.s., sunk, 293
Thornton Ridge, 248
Thorpwood, the s.s., sunk, 181
Three Kings Island, 429
Thursby, Rear-Admiral Cecil F.,
162, 165
Tibbetts, Captain C, in command
of the Mantua, 123
Tielmen, 340
Tindle, Captain Howard, master of
the Sir Richard Awdry, 186
Tintoretto, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 196
Tirpitz, Grand-Admiral von. My
Memoirs, 41 ; resignation, 291
Tobermory harbour, 120
Tolitoli, 431
Torpedo-boat 95, H.M., 43
Torre vieja, 216
Torrilla, the transport, attacked by
a submarine, 195
Tory Island, 351 ; mine-field, 66,
68, 259
Totnes, the paddler, mined, 263
Trader, the s.s., sunk, 385
Trafalgar, the s.s., 179
Tranter, Captain W., master of the
Tintoretto, 196
Traquair, the s.s., 20
Trawlers, work of the, 44, 288 ;
armed, 53 ; submarine warfare,
54, 277 ; mine-sweeping, 68,
158-72 ; demand for, 173, 286 ;
sent to the Mediterranean, 173
Tregantle, the s.s., 390
Treneglos, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 187 ; sunk, 188
Trevose Head, 2, 8, 42, 288
Trewly, Captain G., in command of
the Alsatian, 122
Tricase harbour, 170
Tringa, the s.s., sunk, 189
Triumph, H.M.S., sunk, 163, 177
Tramp, the s.s., 281
Trondhjemsjj ord, the Norwegian
S.S., attacked by a submarine, 131
Tronsdale, Commander C. W., in
command of the Andes, 122
Tukush Island, 184
Tunisiana, the s.s., torpedoed, 8
Tupper, Vice-Admiral Reginald, in
command of the Tenth Cruiser
Squadron, 156
Turbo, the oil-tanker, escapes from
a submarine, 298
Turnbull, 312
Turquoise, the s.s., sunk, 23
Turritella, the s.s. (e'x.-Gutenfels,
renamed Itlis), captured, 422 ;
sunk, 424
Tuskar, the, 20, 42, 47
Tyndareus, the s.s., damaged by
mines, 435
Tyne, the, 276 ; mine-field, 259
Tyrwhitt, Commodore, 73
U3 submarine, 52 ; U4. 46 ; UIO
sunk, 253, 255; U21, 163, 165
172; U22, 43; U24, 25, 43
U25, 43 ; U27, sunk, 43 ; U33
43, 172, 308; U34, 43, 127, 172
U35, 43, 172, 174, 372; U38
10, 43; U39, 17. 43, 172; U40
sunk, 55; U41, 57-9; U44
sunk, 170; U46, 279; U49
simk, 279 ; U52, 279 ; U53, 347
U65, 366 ; U68, 24 ; U69, simk
279 ; U74, sunk, 274
U-BoAT VI, Austrian, sunk, 169
XX, sunk, 171
UB3, sunk, 163, 253, 254; UB14
172; UB15, 165; UB26, sunk
272
UC-boats, mine-laying, 66, 275
UC5, 247, 250 ; sunk, 253
INDEX
463
UC9, sunk, 261 ; UCIO, sunk,
280; UC22, 367, 368; UC32,
sunk, 289
Vmeta, the s.s., sunk, 195
United States, the Danish s.s., 145
Urbino, the s.s., sunk, 39
Urquhert, Captain P., master of
the Clan Chisholm, 361 ; on the
submarine attack, 362
Uruguay, attitude to armed mer-
chant ships, 246
Ushant, 24, 42
Valand, the Swedish s.v., 139-41
Valdavia, the hospital ship, 356
Valentiner, Kapitan-Leutnant Max,
awarded the Order pour le Merite,
197
Van Stirum, the transport, attacked
by a submarine, 47 ; sunk, 48,
197
Vanessa, the armed yacht, 59
Vardo, 347
Varing, the Swedish s.s., 355
Vereker, Lieutenant L. G. P., mas-
ter of the Ebro, 122
Vergaelen, Mr., 319
Veria, the s.s., sunk, 196
Veronica, H.M.S., 37
Vibert, Captain F. W., master of
the Mantua, 123
Victoria, the s.s., 88
Victorian, the s.s., 123, 128
Vidonia, the trawler, 160
Vigilant, the Danish s.v., 152
Viknor, the s.s., 109, 112, 114, 116,
123 ; sunk, 147
Virginia, 390
Virginian, the s.s., 109, 112, 113,
116, 123 ; runs ashore, 121
Viturvia, the oiler, 49
Vivian, Captain G. W., in command
of the Patia, 123
Voltaire, the s.s., sunk, 398
Vossische Zeitung, the, 50
Vulcan, H.M.S., 54
Wachenfels, the German s.s ; see
Wolf
Waddell, Judge, 391
Wai')nana, the s.s., case of, 243
WaiT^na, the s.s., 428 ; sunk, 429
Wakaya Island, 422
Walker, Captain, master of the
Mercian, 183 ; awarded the
D.S.C., 184
Walker, Captain T. P., in command
of the JEgusa, 174
Wallace, Lieutenant-Commander
R., master of the Motagua, 123
Walter, Commander F. H., in com-
mand of the Caribbean, 122 ; of
the Victorian, 123
Ward, Lieutenant R. S., master of
the Orotava, 123
Wardle, Captain 153
Wardle, Commander T. E., in com-
mand of the Alcantara, 122
Warman, J., 70
Warren, Commander A., in com-
mand of the Digby, 122
Warrior, the tug, 65
Wakspite, H.M.S., 275
Watson, T., 143
Wavemy, the drifter, sunk, 284
Webster, Captain J., in command
of the Motagua, 123
Wedel, Baron Hans Adam von,
arrested, 115
Wehberg, Dr., on the right of
defence, 333
Welbeck, the trawler, 252
Welbiiry, the s.s., sunk, 13, 14
Welcome Star, the drifter, 270
Weldrich, Lieutenant G. J., master
of the Clan Macnaughton, 122
Wellington, Duke of, 80
Wemyss, Rear- Admiral R. E., 162
Wessex Territorial Division, trans-
ferred to India, 90 ; transport,
of, 94
West, Sub-Lieutenant E. T., 280
West Point, the s.s., sunk, 348
Westborough, WiUiam, 265
Westbum, the s.s., 393 ; captured,
394 ; used for prisoners, 395 ;
at Santa Cruz, 396 ; sunk, 396
Westfjord, 43
Westward Ho / the paddle-steamer,
45
Whistling buoy, 270
Whitefield, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 34
White Sea, 67 ; mine-field, 262
Wickman, Captain W. S., master
of the Jum,na, 425 ; taken
prisoner, 426-8 ; extracts from
his diary, 431-4
Wieder, Lievitenant, 316
Wilhelm Behrens, the German s.s.,
captured, 103
Wilkinson, George, 393
Willats, Captain X. L., master of
the Radnorshire, 405; taken
prisoner, 406
William Dawson, the s.s., blown up,
248
464
INDEX
William T. Lewis, the s.v., 44
Williams, Captain J. R., master of
the Minieh, 407
Willie, the s.v., sunk, 297
Willis, F., drowned, 413
Wilson, Captain George, master of
the Strathdene, 349
Wilson, President, protests against
the submarine warfare, v
Winlaton, the s.s., 22
Winslow, the American s.v., cap-
tured, 429
Wintour, Captain Charles T., 107
Wireless telegraphy, value of, 148
Wolf, Lieutenant-Commander, 405
Wolf Rock, 14, 17
Wolf, the German raider (ex-
Wachenfels), 422 ; captures ships,
422-35 ; number of prisoners,
433 ; at Kiel harbour, 434
Wolfe, Captain J. A., master of the
Caria, 185
Wood, H. G. S., 205
Wood, J. H., 7
Woodfield, the s.s., attacked by a
submarine, 182; sunk, 183
Woods, Lieutenant-Commander C.
H. M., master of the Caribbean,
122
Woolwich, the s.s., sunk, 183
Worcestershire, the s.s., sunk, 435
Wordsworth, the s.s., 427 ; sixnk,
428
Worth, Alfred Fulwood, awarded
the D.S.M., 414
Wrath, Cape, 34, 43, 117, 260
Wray, Lieutenant C. M., master of
the Hilary, 122
Wrexham, the s.s., 308
Wylie, Skipper T. C, 272
Wj'nn, Lieutenant, 151, 152
Yacht Patrol, 266
Yarrowdale, the s.s., captured by
the Mowe, 401 ; sent to Swine-
miinde, 403 ; converted into a
German raider, 403 ; sunk, 403
Yeats, Captain Ralpli, master of
the Author, 384
Yeddo, the s.s., sunk, 197
Young, Commander C. B., in com-
mand of the Andes, 122
Yukanskie, 69
Zapfel, Dr., 313
Zeebrugge, 67, 307 ; port closed,
88; base for U-craft, 247;
attack on, 248-50
Zembra Island, 189
Zent, the s.s., sunk, 306
Zeppelin raid, 44 ; LI 9, founders,
296
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