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Philosopl^ 6f Religion in the 21st Century

Ciiiremont Studies in the Philosophy ofRdi^ion

Genera] Editors: D. Z. Phillips, Rush Rhees Research Proff^swjr. Uni^^ersSl^ibt
Wale?^, ^iv^nsea and Dan^orth Pfofessor of the Philosophy of Reiigio]!^ the

Claremont GiatJuate School^ California; Timothy Tcs.sin

At a tJme^vhen discussions of reiigion are becoming increasingly s^ectalizeJ and
determmed by religious affiliations^ at 1^ ampoTtant to mdintain a forum for

philosophical discussion ^vhich transcejitl^ the allegiances oJ l>[^lief and unbelief.
Thts series affords aai opportunity" for philosophers of ^videEy differing
persuasions to explore central issues in Clie philosophy of rehgion.

Tlti^s mciuiii^:

Stephen T Davis (f t/jtt?r>

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOCi[CAL DISCOURSE.

D- Z- Philips {etiilon

CAN RELIGION EEEXPLAENED AWAY?

D_ Z_ Philips andTimothy Tessin (cJjro?:s)
KA^"^ AND KEERKEGAARD ON RELIGION
PHILOSOPHY Ol- RELIGION IN THE 2LST tIEMTURY
RLLKiK)N WETHOUT TRANStZENDENCE?
RELIGION AND HUME-S LEGACY

Timothy Tessin and Mario von der Ruhr \trtiitofs)
PHILOSOPHY AND THE GRAMMAR Ot RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Strits SitjndinH <Jrdtr ]Sli^ (f-lili :i-7i 46?^-2
{OutirJc Ntiriii A*fit'riia only)

ViiHi am recdvc future tiilc^ in this series a^ tht^v' art: published by pladn^ ^ ^t^nding <yrdtt.
Mtast contact your bookseller or, in iiast oi dilffit^Ety, Write to ui dt tt]t addrtfiS !>t(ow Witt]
yuur naitjc Lj]Ld aJdFLsS, tlic tatltoJ thi: StrtCit and fEii; JlifiN quoted aS>ove_

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Philosophy of Rehgion in
the 21st Century

Edited bv

D.Z. Phillips

Dnufvrih Froft^ssor of Pliihsoptiy of Re!i^oi\^ Chjremonl Gnuliutt^ Uiu\^rsity
ami Rush Rhees Research I^ofessor^ U^m^ersity of Wahs>^ Swansea

and

TiiTkothy Tiissui

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Philosophy of religion in the 21st century / edited by D. Z. Phillips
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Includes bibliographical references and index.

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Contents

A ckf lowiedxL'maits

vLi

Notes ofi the Contfibutors

viii

lutjodiictiof}

Part I Philosophical Theism

_ _ ^ _

1 ^hi osophLcal Theism

■3:

Ridmnf Swinbtinie

2 Phi osophica] Theology at the End of the Centufy

WilUam [. Wninwngiit

3 Voices in Discussion

D.Z.PhiU!ps

Part II Rtftinntd Episteiiioiogj^

4 Rcforine<J fepistcniology

Nidioliii WttitcFstorff

5 On Behalf of the Evidcntialist - a Response to

WolEcrstorff

Stephen). Wykst3{\

6 Voices in Discussion

D.Z. mtisps

Part III Wittgtnitein and Wittgensteinianism

7 Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion

Staphm MiiihaH

S Wittgenstein and tlie Philosophy of Religion:

a Reply to Stephen Nlulhall

119

Walfoni Gealy

9 Voices Ht'i^ei^on

144

D.Z. Piiiltips

vi Cfl/ifmts

Pari IV Postnio tier n ism

151

10 Mcsstantc Postmodernism

15:?

foisfs D. Caputo

11 The Oihcr without History and Society - a Dialogic

with Dcrrida

167

Anselrn Kyon^sak Mhi

12 Voices In Discussion

186

D.Z. Phiiiips

Part V Critltal Tlit-ory

191

13 Critical Theory and Religion

193

Miitthkis Liitz-Ikidummii

14 Critical Theory and Religion

211

Mneve Cooka

15 Voices Ln Discussion

244

D.Z. Phillip!;

Pari VI Process Thought

249

1 6 Ptocess Thought

251

foisis R Cobb, /r

17 Process Thouglit - a Response to John B. Cobb, Jr

266

Schubert M. Osiien

18 Voices in Discussion

281

D.Z. PhiUipa

19 Voices in Discussion

28&

_ , _ _ p

D.Z. Phimps

Index

291

Acknowledgements

I Am happy (o acknowledge the financial support given to llie
Conference by Clarcinont Graduate University^ Pomona Collcj^c and
Qaremont McKcnna College. I am grateful Eo the partlelpants who
contributed to the funding of future conferences by waiving their
claim lo royallies. Admtiiistratively, I acn indebted to Helen Baldwin
and Jackie Huntzingcr^ secretaries to the Department; of Philosophy at
the Unlvcrsily of WalcSj Swansea and lo the Department of Religion aE
Clarcinont Graduate University^ respectively. Graduate students helped
during the conference In transporting ihe parlicipanls to various
venues. They were organized by my abJe research, assistant Richard
Amcsbury, who was also responsible fot tyj^ing my Introduction and
the various Voices In discussion'_ I am cxtremf^iy grateful to him for his
help in this and other contoLts. Finally, I thank my co-editor Tiinolhy
Tessin for proof-reading the collection and for seeing it through its
various stages of publicalion.

D.Z.P.

vJl

Notes on the Contributors

John B. Cobh, Jr is Profos^or Emeritus of Theology at the Cteremont
School ofThcology ^^^^ of Religion at Clarcmont Graduate University.
He continues as co^dlrcctoi of llio Ccnlrc for Process Studies. Among
his books arc A Chrhtitu! Naturai Theology Based on the Thought of Alfred
North Whitehead, Christ in {i Pim^ilistic Age, The Striscture of Chnj;thm
Existence, Process Tfieolo^': an Jfitrod:ictory Exposition (with David
GrLtfinj, The Liberation of Life (wLlh Charles Birch).

Maeve f^ookc is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Gciman at

University Colk^^e, Dublin. She is the author of Lan^nugi.' iwd Reason: a
Study of Haberm^s^:? Pnigmatics and editor of a collection of Habernias's
writings on language and communicatiDn: On the Prtigrnt^tics of
Cotfununicatioii.

John D. Caputo is David R. Cook Professor of Philosophy at Villanova
University- He is the author of The Prayers atid Tears off^eqaes Dtrrida:
Reli^iofi without Religion, Decom^tfuetion hi a Nntsh^U: a Conversation witfi
facques DerridHj, Radiad Hcrm^netitics: Repetition^ Deconstriatiofiy and tise
Hermefteiitic Project, Against Ethics: Contrlhtttions to a Pttetics ofONi^ution
with Con 5ta}st Reference to Dcconstiuction, DemytJ!oio^izhsg Helde^er.

Walford Gealy was Senior Lecturer in the Department of Extra-Mural

Studies at University of Wales^ Aberystwyth. He is the author oi
Witt^i'f}stein, written in Welsh, and co-editor of the journal EfiydiiUi
AtimmyJdoi (PliLiosophlcal Studies). He Is the autitor of over fifty artl-
cles, most of them tact ng in Welsh, his native language.

Ma Ltliias Lutz-fiachniatin is Pro fessor of Phi t osophy at Goe t he-
University in Franl^furt^ Gertmany. His puhlications include Kritisclfe

nieone and Rciision, l^ietaphysUcktitik-Ethiia-'ReUsion (editorj, frieden dnreh
Reciit fco-editorln and Perpetna! Pence: Ei^says on Kant^s Cosmopolitan Ideal
(co-editor).

Anselm Kyonf^suk Min is Professor of Religion and Theology at

Clareniont Graduate University. He is the author of Dialectic of
Salvation: Issues if} Theolo^' of Liberation. He is currently working on a

new theological paradigm^ Solidarity of OthcrSj as a theology after
postmodernism.

vliS

JVc?fe.^ ow the Conthbuiars ix

Stephen MuLhalL is a PgIIow and Tutor in Philosophy at New College,

Oxford- J lis recent publications include Fuiti! and Reujion^ He'uii^g^Tt ami
^Beif^ tmd Tsmc\ and The CaveU Rctfder (cdMoi:).

Schiihcrt M. O^dcn is University Distinguished Professor of Theo^o^
Emeritus^ Southern \iethodi5t University, liis most recent books
Include Is Tli^re Only One Ttue Religion or Are Then' Many? And Doing
Tlieology Toddy.

D.Z. Phillips is Danforth Professor of the Philosophy of Religion,

Clareinoiit Gradu^TLc UniversiLy and [tush Rhees Research Professor,
University of Wales^ Swansea. He is the author of The Concept ofPniyei',
Faith and PfnIo:ii}pi!fi:ai Enquiry, Death ami Iinnwttafity, Morn} Pnictices
(with H-O- Mouncc), Sense and Ddnsion (with 11 ham Dilman),
Athi'onyddn Ans Grefyihi, Rdigion without Exphuiatht}, Dnnmu Owaniyn
Piirr}\ Beliefs Change and Fonfis of Ufe, Through a Darkenhig Giass,
RS. Tiiomns: Foet of the lildda^ Gtfii, F^iith after Foundatitmaiiiin, From
Fantasy to Faith, Interventions in Ethics, Wittgenstein and Reiigion, Writers
of Wales: J.R. fones, Lstroducing Riiiiosophy, Recoi'erifig Religious Concepts^
Philosophy's Cool Place. He is editor of i^i'tiii^fj Studies in Philosophy and
co-editor of Chiremont Studies in the Philosophy ofReiigion piLblishcd by
Patgrave. He is also editor of the journal. Philosophical hivesti^ationa.

Rjehard Swhihurtie is Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the
Christian Rehgion at the University of Oxford^ and a Fellow of the
British Academy. He is the author of Space and Time, an It^trodtu^tion to
Confirmation Theory, The Coherence of Theism, The Existence of God, Faith
and Reason, The Evolution of the Sotd. Responsib'tiity and Atonement,
Reveiation, The Christian God^ Is There a God?, Providence and tlie Probieni
of Evil.

Tlinothy Tessin [s co-editor of Philosophy ami the Grammar ofRdigicus
Belief He is also co-editor of Ciaremont Stiulies in the Philosophy of
Religion and associate editor of Philosophical huestigations.

V^W^m }. Wainwrisht is Distin^lshed Professor of Philosophy at
the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee- His publications include
Philosophy of Religion: an Amwtated Bibliography, Mysticism, Philosophy of
Religion, Reason and tlxe Heart, God, Philosophy and Academic Culture. He
Is a former editor of Faith and Philosophy.

Mchotas Wolterstorff is Noali Porter Professor of Philosophical
Theology Emeritus at Vale Divinity School and was adjunct professor in
the Departments of Philosophy and Religious Studies. He is the author

of Works and Worlds of Art, Art in Action^ Rea^ort within the Limits of
Relighnj^ fohi Locke and tJw Ethks ofHeiiif, Di\^ine Di!^coijrse l\99^ Wilde
Lectures ar Oxford), Until fustice nnd Peace Embrace, Religion m the Fui?ifc
Square, and World, fvliad ^wd Entltiement to Believe {199^ Gifford Lectures
at St Andrews) and Thorrtas Reid and tiie Story of Epsj^terr^oh^. He has
been PrcsidcnL of the American Philosophical AssocLalLon (Central
Division) and of the Socicly of Christian Plii!o5oplicrs.

Stephen T- Wykstra is Professor of Philosophy at Cahln College. He
has ptihlishcd articles in history and philosophy of science, and in the
philosophy of fcli^Lon.

Introduction

D.Z. PhUiips

The syinposm and discussions picscnicd here represent the proceedings
of the 1999 anniial philosophy of religion conference which took place
at Clarcinont Graduate Unlvcislty- Previous publlcaLioiis in the scries
Clarcmont Studies In the Philosophy of Reltj^ion are: Philosophy and the
Gnmumn of Reli^hus Belief; Rdi^iofs ami Kioniiityy Cnn Rciigioii Bt
Exphiine^i Aw^y7; Religion without T^iI^sce}ld^!I€e?; Rehsion and Hmne^s
LegiKiy; and Kwit amf Kk^rkegaani sm Rt^iigio^i. k was thought appropriate
in 1999 to prepare tor the year 2000 by presenting a volume on the
present state of philosophy of rehgion. It was impossil:?le to include
evcryilihig, so choice was made on the basis of movements wlilch it
was thouglit had to be represerLtcd, On the other hand, the conference
was arranged with consLdcrablc trepidation^ since tlicrc was always the
danger that tlic six philosophical schools wojid pass each other by like
ships in the night. The message in my Thai fortune-cookie, opened in
the closing banquet of the conference, would have summed up my
foreboding at its outset. Ic read, 'Vou would be wise not to seek too
much from others at this time/ For once my fortune- cookie w-as not
uncannily revelatory since, as the discussions reveal^ genuine attempts
were made to probe and explore difficulties connected wUh each point
of view. I am not Roing to rehea:sc these in this introduction. Instead,
I am going to single out a feature of the conference which struck me
most forcibly as its organizer

Tlic papers in the conference represent, not simply differences on
specific topics, but differences concerning the very conception of philo-
sophical enquiry. In one sense, it would be foolish to try to determine
the nature of philosophy since, descriptively, this w^ould be a hitile exer-
cise. Wliy insist that philosophy or philosophy of religion can only be
done in one way^ when it is obviously practised in a number of ways?

xii Introduction

It is tempting to take a [olcram attitude and simply say 'Lci a thousand
flowers bloom/ liut^ in another scnse^ ihat cannot be allowed withouL
denying a considerable part of plitlosoph>''s history^ Tliis is Ijecausc the
nature of philosopliy is itself a philosophical question and great
philosophers have bt^^n critical o( thdr pjcdcccssors' conception of ihc
subject.

In the papers in this collection we are presented with marked differ-
ences in one's coneepLlon of the tasks which philosophy of religion
can and should peiforin.

According to Richard Swinburne, philosophy of religion has^ at its
heartr the rational assessment of religious beliefs. They are to be assessed^
as he would say any belief must, in terms of the probability of their
being true. Swinburne holds that the truth and rationality of religious
beliefs can be assessed in this way.

While WilliaiTL Wainwright is generally sympathetic to SwLn[:Jurne, he
is sceptical about the efficacy of probabiliLy arguments for most educated
audiences today. This is because, he ar^jies^ we need a properly disposed
lieart in order to assess the evidence- The vital issue^ as VVainwright
recognizes, then becomes one of showing how these antecedent judge-
nicnts are related to the evidence on has to consider.

Nicholas Woltcrstorf f coi^dones Reformed Epistcmology's rejection ol
the Enlightenment ideal of a rational religion. Something does not
have to be grounded in ojrder to be rational. As a result of a world-
transforming cjcpcrience, the Christian philosopher in tliis tradition
offers, not a philosophy of religion^ but a religious philosophy, its aim
is to see all aspects of tiuman life, intellectual and non-intellectual, in
the light of faith. It docs not subject religion to the test of so-called
neutral evidence.

Stephen Wykstra wonders whether this rejection of cvidentialisTn
itself comes from a too narrow conception of evidence, namely; inferen-
tial evidence. He hnds the rejection unrealistic in a world in which faith
is challenged in maity ways. It may not be necessaiy for an individual
believer to consider Lhcse challenges in detail^ but unless someone in
the coinmunity does so, he argues, it is too easy eo see faith as slniply
-l?urying onp's head in the sand. One is robbed of th& much-nEcded
resources one has to Ljrn to in face of Lhcsc challenges.

Stephen Mulhall In expounding Wittgenstein on religion and
Wittgcnstcinianism, emphasizes the contemplative character of philo-
sophical enquiry- The main interest here is in giving a just account of reli-
gious belief by seeing to it that it is not confused with beliefs of another
kind. This inteiesi: iiselT has a demanding ethic and is connected, he

claims^ with a cert.iin kind of spiritual concern in ihc enquirer. This is
because wc cannot be true to ourselves unless we are true to our words.

Walford Gealy emphasizes that some of \"\^irtgenstein"'s early remarks
on religion take the form ihat they do because of views of language he
held at the time and which he rejected later. This should be remembered
when these remarks are discussed. Like Mulhall, Gealy too argues thai
the charge that Wittgenstein i a ns hold that religion is immune to criti-
cism is absurd. Both writers give examples to counter this charge. On the
other hand^ he insists that whatever is meant by spirituality in philo-
sophical enquiry, this should not be compared with religious spirituality.
Philosophy's concerns come from its own problems and puzzlements.

John -Caputo emphasizes postmodernism's rejection of the
Enlightenment dream of universal reason. We muse recognize that 'rea-
son' means something different in different modes of thou^^hE and at
different times and places. We must not seek a premature closure on
questions of meriting and value. Some have scen^ in L>crrida, a form-
less, chaotic, openness to everything in these emphases. Caputo denies
this and sees in Derrida^s opeiiness a concern with fustice for the ollicrj
which involves listening to what wc do not want to hear, the prepared-
ness to be liurprised^ and to take risks in i^uch encounters.

Ansctm Min is more sceptical about these latter claims, seeing in
Derridaj the constant appeal to openness as being uninformed by spe-
cific moral or political values. In emphasizing the tmpossibUity of
arriving at a final statement of justice, something Min endorses, there
Is the danger of the dream of the impossibie ttjrning us aside irom tlie
actions that are required of us now.

Again, in expoundiitg critical theor}^, Matthias Lutz-Bachmann
ctnphasizes its rejection of the objectifying tendency one finds In meta-
physics. Reasoning knows no absolute. Yetj Horkhcimer and Habermas
want to invoke 'tlie unconditional' as a regulative ideal that calls us on to
Improve the worlds without any conception of a. final goal. Religion may
assist this task at certain times, but this is a contmgent facL Religion is
replaceable by secular hopes for a better world. Lately, Habermas has
come to sec that religious meanings may be sui generis, irreducible to
any secular substitute. Lutz-Bachmann argues^ however^ tliat as long as
Habermas bases human progress^ not on values, but on what human
interests happen to be, he cannot avail himself of any positive concep-
tion of justice.

Maeve Cooke recognizes the lensioits in Habermas's thought which
Lulz-liachmann emphasizes. He wants his conception of truth to be
pragmatic and yet absolute. It is difficult to sec how rcUgious tnjth can

xiv Introikiction

bo accommodated In his system, she argues^ because his criteria of vin-

dication demand piLblicly assessable c\^dcncc and a public agreement^
which is hard to iina^Lnc in the case of religious belief.

John Cohh emphasizes the ivay in which Process Thought calls ihe
assumptions of classical metaphysics Into question. It argues that
'becoming' is more fundamental than 'being' and that 'events' are more
fundamental than 'substances'. Following Whitehead, Cobb argues Ehat
science is the tnosi fehabie guide lo what wc are given, as long as it is
not permeated by the assumptions of classical metaphysics. Religion
explores the more subjective side ot human nature.

Cobb is sceptical about the possibility of neutral philosophy. Foi himn
any Olympian height Is such within a system. Thus he acknowledges
that his Process system has its presuppositions and that these play a
vital role not only in the assessment of data^ but in the very possibility
of seeing the data In a certain way_

Schubert Ogdcn insists that although philosophy is motivated by the
existential questions concerning the meaning of existence, it is not
constituted by them. Its task is to elucidate the necessary conditions of
human discourse, and to reflect on the meanings which discourse actu-
ally has. This latter task Includes rellectton on the dLstinclive claims of
Christianity, one in which philosophy and theology come together.
Ogden thinks that the existential questions and theologicai reflections
are furthered best in Process thought. On one central issue, however^
he differs from most Process philosophers and theologians. They,
Whitehead and Hartshorne included^ treat the conditions for the possi-
bility of discourse^ or ultimate reality, as though these were a further
5uper-fact. This confusion is found when myth is treated as a fact or
when God, as ultimate reality, is treated as though it were a fact. ""God
exists' is not a statement of fact.

It is clear from this brief survey of points of view represented in this
collection that there are wide differences between them in their con-
ception of philosophy. In some ways, the Wlttgenstelnian tradition of
contemplative philosophy seems an odd one out, but w-ould claim to
l)c as old as Plato. In what sense does philosophy investigate reality? If,
like the Presocr.itics, we try to give substantive account? of 'the rcaT in
terms of, for example^ water or aloms^ ihc problem arises of what account
can be given of the reality of the water or atoms. Plato came to see that a
philosophical account of reality cannot lead to answers of that kind. The
philosophical interest is a conceptual one; the question of what it means
to distinguish l>etween the rcai or the unreal. Ihu.-i, on this view, philoso-
phy is not Itself a ^vay of reaching the substantive judgements, but an

enquiry into what iE means to reach conclusions of this kind. Unlike
Plato, Wittgenstein did not think that this question admitted of a sin-
gle answer. Hence his promise to teach us differences.

This perspective raises questions about Swinhiirtic^s assuniptloii that
all behefs are matters of probability. Are all beliefs of the same kind? Is
belief in generosity the expression of a conviction or a matter of proha-
bility? Further^ is it a mere probability that we had a Conference at
Clarcniont? If I could be convinced otherwise would J sav that 1 had
miscalculated probabilities^ or that 1 was ;^oing insane? Is trusting God
a probability?

W^illiam Wafnwri^ht is bothered^ too^ by some of these questions. He
emphasizes that we make antecedent judgements in terms of which we
see the data wc are to assess. How are these antecedent judgements to be
understood? The suggestion that w-e can make them wlien our faculties
are working property seems a Lime analogy, since, normally^ the notion
of 'proper functioning' is normative and, in that sense, independent of
tlic individual. Further, there is usually agreement on the notion of
proper functioning, as the case of eyesight illustrates. Is Lt like this in
the case of the clash between belief and unbelief?

There is another difficulty which relates to the contemplative conccp
tion of philosophy. U what can be seen is linked to the personal appro-
priation of the perspective in question^ or to the ""proper functioning^
of faculties, how Is it possible to contemplate, and give an accouiit of,
different perspcctivci? Further, someone who docs not embrace a per-
spectivc may give a better pliiiosophical account of its character than
one who docs not embrace it.

In Reformed Epistemology a world-transforming religious experience
is at the toot of the religiously orientated philosophical vocation to sec
tlic world in the light of faith. Obviously, such a use can be made of
philosophy, or this is what philosophy can amount to for someone, but
what is its relation to the contemplative conception of philosophy? Can
It admit that a non-beiievcr can give a better philosophical accoLtnt of
religious belief than a believer? What sort of claim docs a religious
philosophy make? Is it a theoretical claim? If something is seen in the
light of faith, how is that 'seeing' related to other non-rehgious 'sceings'?
Can there be a philosophical interest In these differences wliich is not
a further form of such 'seeing^?

In Postmodernism and in Critical Theory wc have attacks on the
ambitions of a universal metaphysics, and a recognition of differences.
The question arises, however^ wliether in the ethical concerns of Dcrrida
or Habermas, an ethical insight is appropriated which cannot be derived

xva Introduction

from their phiiosophical critique. Having abolished a universal meta-
physics, there scctn^ to be a desire to replace U with an attitude which
is equally universal even when Lt calls itself ^^open' and denies the pos-
sibiUty of closure.

Again^ in Process Thought^ we have a similar attack ou classical meta-
physics. This attack may be upheld in many respects, but questions may
be asked as to wlicthcf one set of ulrimates, 'becoming^ and 'events' has
now replaced another, Also, as Cobb admits, eertaiii presuppositions are
'l>rought to bear on the data in interpreting them and he denies the
possibility of a neutral philosophy. Does this mean that Process
Thought can argue against this possibility? If so, there is at least one
pcrspecllvc It seems to deny when, at other times^ It seems to recognize
a plurality of systems of interpretation. Ogdcn says that Process
Thought is the best theological system in answering central existential
questions about the meaning of existcnce_ How would this be argued
in relation lo different theological and atheistic perspectives? Are they
shown to be conceptually confused in some sense?

Ogdcn recognizes, along with Wittgcnsteinians, that the investigation
of the conditions of discourse is not an investigation of some super-fact.
On the other hand, he speaks of the necessary conditions of discourse.

00 they form a single class? He also speaks of God as 'uUtmate reality',
and says ihat ihis^ too, docs not refer to a matter of fact. How is this
notion of reality related to the necessarv^ conditions of discourse? Arc
they the same? If so, as in the case of Reformed Epistcmologj', here,
too, we would have a religious conception of reality.

These questions are prompted by philosophical considerations which
axe familiar to students of Wittgenstein, but questions can be asked ol
Wittgensteinianistn too. Is the anato^ between language and games
an adequate one? After all, all games do not make up one big gamc^
whereas all language ;^ames occur within the same language. What
account is to be given of the unity or identity of language? Does that
lead back to a single account of reality? Without such an account is not
the sense of life and living compartmentalized in unacceptable waj^?

The questions asked of Wittgensteintanism can and have been
addressed, for example, by Rush Rbces. No doubt the questions I have
asked of the other points ol view can and have been addressed too.

1 mention them here as questions with which the conference meeting
left us. TIiuSh this introduction gives an indication^ not of where we
started, but of the points at which we would have liked to have gone on.

If philosophical enquiry is conceptual and contemplative, and recog-
nizes the conceptual variety In human discourse, no single account of

reality can be given. The enquiry will be molivaled by wonder at the
ivorld ^nd the desire lo do justice to Its variety in the account we ^tvc.
For others^ this is the road to relativism and they seek a religious concep-
tion of reality whicli, in some way, can be shown to be more rational
thai^i any secular akcrnativc. Altcmativelyj there iirc those who argue
that allhougli tlie sense of things is open to a change and development
to which philosophy cannot assign a closure, that development is itself
to be informed by certain ethical and polltieal values.

Perhaps one major difference which needs to be explored is this: are
all perspectives on reality interpretations or expressions of interest, or
Is there such a tiling in philosophy as disinterested enquiry? [s disinter-
ested inquiry anotlier interest, alongside others^ Tcllgious and secular,
or is it a different kind of interest, an interest m the variety of those
religious and secular interests and the relation between rhem? Is an
Olympian view alw^ays one from within some system or other?

Many of the participants expressed the view at the end of the confer-
ence that we needed to address these issues further If we did so in
another conference^ perhaps its topic would be: Presuppositions.

Finally, a word is necessary concerning the ^Voices in Discussion'.
These are notes I took In the course of the discussions which followed
each session- They do not purport to be absolutely accurate, although
I have aimed at reporting the course of arguments as closely as possible.
This is why the names of speakers have not been used. Readers of pre-
vious volumes have had some fun In identifying the speakers. In the
case of the participants this is not difficult because they be^in each
discussion. Some reviewers were puzzled by the fact that the number
of speakers outnumbered the participants. This is truer than ever on
this occasion. This is because those wiio chair the session need not be
paper-readers. Also^ at the end of each session discussion was opened
up to the wider audience present. Reviewers have w^elcomed 'V^otccs
In Discussion' as an addition to the collection, so I have decided to
continue this practice. No account has been taken, of course, of any
revisions made to the papers after the conference.

My major aim in the conferences 1 organize is to brin^ together
representatives of widely differing views, so keeping alive an older
tradition in the philosophy of religion which, sadly, has declined.
I only hope that the result of their discussions proves as valuable for
readers as it did for those of us who participated in them.

Parti

Philosophical Theism

Richard Swmbuitie

1 History of the jjro^rainmfi

I shall understand by 'philosophical theism' the programme of gmng a
dear coherent account of the nature of God (broadly consonant with
what has been believed about him by Christian, Islamic and Jewish
thinkers of tiic past two niillciiiiia^^ and ptovidLng cogciilaigumciits for
the existence of such a God.

Prcrvlding ar^mcnts - or^ more loose [y^ reasons - for the existence of
God has been a concern of many theologians of the Christian tradition
|[over the whole ot this period}. S\ V^uVs comment that 'the tnvLsibtc
things' of God 'are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that
are niadc'J gave Christian backing to the message of the middle chap-
ters of the Old Testament TVLSffflm of Solomon that the existence and
order of the Universe shows it to be the work oi a divine creator This
Biblical tradition merged in the Hellenistic world with the arguments of
Plato to th[> idea of the good and to tlic Dcmiuirge, atid with the argu-
ments of Arlsloiile to the existence of the First Mover And so manv
ClirLstlan theologians of the first millennium had their paragraph or two
summarizing a cosmolo^cal argument or an argument from design. But
it is normally only a paragraph or two,- and the reasoning is quick- My
explanation of why they directed so little energ\^ to this issue is that they
felt no need to do more. Most of their contemporaries accepted that
thete was something like a god; what the thcotogians needed to argue
for were tlie specially Chtlsttan doctrines about him-

But in the medieval west theologians be^an to produce arguments
for the existence of God at considerable length and with coi^tsiderable
rigour; and they did their best lo give a coherent account of the nature
of the God whose existence was purpottcdly demonstrated by these

4 PhiiosGphy of Rifii^ion m itie 2istCi'}st\iry

ai^monts- Tlic opening questions of St Thomas Aquinas's Smr^m^i
T!ieoh^i{ie provide Lhc paradigm of medieval philosophical theism. The
prc-K*intlan I^otcstant tradition also had a concern with this activity -
more with arguments, Ihaii wiEh clarifying the divine nature^ and the
arguments tended lo be less rigorous. The classical Protestants thought
that while there were good argument for the existence of God, for rather
more loosely^ Ihat nature showed clearly its creator) this w^as of little use
to humans corrupted by siit.^ Lit>eral Proleslants, by contrast, argued at
some len^h 'from nature up to Nature's God' and thought their argu-
ments important. It was only with the arrival of Hume and Kant that
some major parts of Che Cliristian tradition abandoned the pro|ect of
natural theolog)'^ and they were in my view- ill-advised to do so.

It needs to be emphasized that none of those thinkers in the first
1750 years of Christiaiiity who thought that there arc good arguments
fof the existence of God, thought that alJ or most believers ought to
believe on the basis of those arguments, nor thai conversion required
accepting those arguments as cogent.^ To be a Cliristian docs involve
believing that there is a God, but most Christians may well have taken
-God's existence for granted. Most converts may have belie\'ed bcfore-
liand that there is a God; their conversion involved accepting more
detailed claims about him. And if they did not initially believe that
there is a God, ihey may have come to believe on the basis of religious
experience in some sense rather than as the basis of natural theology.
Nevertheless^ most Christian thinkefs before 17S0 held ihat there are
these arguments availahlen and that those who do not initially believe
thai there is a God and are rational can be brought Losee that there is a
God by means of them.^

It is an interesting question why so much energy was put into the
project of philosophical theology in the medieval west, when one might
suppose that there was no more need of it than in earlier centuries -
there were no rnore sophisticated atheists around^ one supposes. But the
answer^ I susjx^ct, is ihat there is a bit of the sophisticated atheist in
most believers^ and St Thomas and. Duns Scotus were providing tools
to deal with that, however, as wc alJ know, atheism went public and
expanded in the eighteenth century; until in out day in the West a
large proportion of the population are atheists, and quire a lot of those
who practise a theistie religion have serious doubts about whether there
is a God- Yet the practices of the religion only have a point if there Ls a
Ciod - there is no point in worshipping a non existent creator 6r asl^ing
him to do something on Earth or take us to Heaven if he does i:tot
exist; or trying lo hve our lives in accord with his will, If he has no will.

If someone is to be rational in practising the Christian, Islamic or Jew-
ish iciigionn he needs to believe (to some degree; the crcdal claims
which undcrhc the practice. These claims include as their central
clainij one presupposed by all the other claims, the claim that there is a
God- If someone does not believe or only half -believes, the faithful are
required (as part of Ihetr religious practice) to help. Help may take vari-
ous forms. If wc can help someone to have a deep and cognitively
compelling religious experience, let us do so; but religious expcfiences
cannot be guaranteed, And the only way which requires the non-
believer simply to exercise his existing faculties in the pursuit of some-
thing which he is almost bound to regard as a good thing (to discover
whether or not there Is a God), is to present him with arguments whose
premises are things evident to the non-believer and whose principles of
Inference are ones he accepts^ and to take him through them. And the
oiily premises evident to ^ill non-beHe\'ers are the typical premises of
rational iheolog)^ - the existence of the worlds its orderliness^ the exis-
tence of human beings and so on. Tn our age. above all ages, theistie
religion needs to have available natural theology. And since the rcasoits
why people do not believe are not just the lack of positive grounds for
believing^ but because they believe {or suspect) that there are internal
incoherences in the concept of God, or that the existence of suffcrins
disconfirms the existence of God, the believer needs to help them to
see that this is not so. There are other means which might have success
in our day - the need for philosophical theism is great - if in fact there
is a God.

But atheists are also interested in these questions, and they endeavour
to show that there is no God; and since showing that an argument is
not cogent or a concept is not coherent Involves the same techniques as
the contrary endeavour, we may also call their activity ^philosophical
tl:^eism^ Aaid if, in fact, thcrc is no God, it is good that some shall help
others to a ri^ht ^iew of this matter, both for Its oww sake and also to
save tliem from spending their time in pointless actlvity

Such is the history and utility of philosophical theology How is it pur-
sued today and what are its prospects? A lot of very thorough, detailed
and rigorous work has been done with the aid of all the tools of analyti-
cal philosophy in attempting to clarify what ^^ould he involved In there
being a God, and atteinpting to show the claim tliat there is a God to be
coherent or incoherent^ As regards positive arguments for the existence of
God, different philosophers of today have revived different kinds of argu-
ment from the past. Some have revived ontological argjments^ either
producing variants of one or more classical arguments or producing

6 Pfuiosophy of Ri^ii^ion m itie 2istCi'}stiiry

some entirely new ontological argument. Omological arguments of
course differ from all Lhc other traditional argumcnls Lii that they starts
nor from something observable, but from purported logically necessary
truths, [t is easy enough Co produce an onlological argument with ihe
premises evident to all; and easy enough to produce a (deductively) valid
ontologieal argimient. liul It is very hard indeed - iii my view quite
impossible - to produce an ontological argument with both characleris-
lies- It seems to me fairly evident that ihe proposition 'there is no God'
while perli£ips false and even in some sense demonstrably false^ is not
LncoherenL It does not contain any internal conlradLctton- And If that
is so^ there could not be a valid ar^ment from logically necessary
faiths to the existence of God. For 11: ihete were such an argument the
existence of God would be logically necessary and its negation self-
contradlccory-

Then there is the tradition of attempting to produce deductiveiy
valid arguments from prcmiici evident to the senses. It is a not unreason-
able interprclatioii of Aquinas's 5wmfHf? Thivfosi^e L2.3- that he sought
there to give five such arguments. TItose in our day who have sought to
give such arguments have for the most part tried to do so with the aid
of Thomist (or neo-Thomist> terminology. But the enterprise of produc-
ing such arguments is also, I think, an enterprise doomed to failure.
For if it could be achieved, then a proposition which was a conjunction
of the evident premises together with "^thcrc Is no God' would be Inco-
herent, would involve self-contradiction. But again propositions such
as 'there is a Universe^ but there is no God\ though perhaps false and
even in some sense dcmonstrahly false, seem fairly evidently coherent-

So my own preference ts for the third tradition of natural theology.
This begins from premises evident to the senses and claims that they
make probable the existence of God. Such arguments purport to be
Inductively cogent^ not deductively valid arguments. Arguinents of
scientist; or historians from their data of observation to their general
tlieorles or claims about the past or the future, also do not purport
to be deductively valid^ merely inductively cogent. Thinkers were
not very clear about the distinction between inductive and deductive
arguments during the first one thousand years of the Christian era,
and not much clearer until the eighteenth century. So it would be
anachronistic to say that the patristic writers were seeking to give
InductivCj or alternatively deductive arguments. But the arguments of
so many British empiricists of the eighteenth century, culminating in
Paley's Ni\tiin\i Theoio^, do seem to me fairly clearly and intentionally
inductive.

Rkfipni Swinbunje 7

Arguments against the existence of God of all three kinds have also
been produecd in our day^ but - i'or reasons of time - 1 shail concenliate
on the positive.

2 My own vetsl^

I model my own arguments for the existence of God on those of the
third tradition, iiaeh of the various arguments from various observable
phenomena does^ I argue^^ give some support to the claims that there
is a God; and, taken to^etlicr^ they make It 'si^ificanii^- more probable
than not'.

1 have sought to show this with the aid of confirmation &>eory
(that LEj the calculus of probability, used as a calculus for stating rela-
tions of evidential support between propositions. 1 represent by P{p/q)
the probability of a proposition p on evidence q- 1 use liayes^s Theorem,

P(h;e&k>=P(e/h&k) ^^^,

P(e/fc)

to elucidate the relation between the probability of a hypothesis h on
evidence of observation e and background knowledge k^ and other
probabilities. To use this calculus does not involve supposinjij that exact
values can very oftc:n be given to the probabilities involved. That exact
values caiinot often be given is evident enough even when h is some
paradigm scientific theory. It would be very odd to say that the proba-
bility of Quantum Theory on the evidence of the photoelectric effect
was U-'^2l7- Some probabilities can be given exact values - but this usu-
ally happens only when the probability is 1, or 1/2. More often ^ all wc
can say is that some probability has some rough value - more than this
and less than that and that in consequence some other probability' has
some other rough value - close to U or fairly high or less tlian ihai. My
cbricem has been to prove that svhcn e is a conjunctiori oT propositions
which set out the publicly available evidence which has been used in
arguments for and against the existence of God, and k is tautological
background evidence (viz. contains nothing relevant to h) and h Is the
existence of God, P(h/e^k) is 'significantly greater titan 1/2'.

All thai the calculus does Ls to set out in a rigorous formal way the fac-
tors which determine how observational evidence stipports more general
theory. The rclevaiit points can be made easily enough in words^ but less
rigorously and with tlieir implications less clear. \Miat the calculus
brings out is that a general theory h is rendered probable by obser^'a-
tlonal evidence e ( and if we put k as a tautolog\^ we can now ignore

B PhiiosGphy of Ri^ii^ion m itie 21st Ci'}!tury

it)^ insofar as (1) P(e/h&k) (the posterior probability of c J is high, (2)

P(h/kJ (the prior probabilSty of h) is high^ and (S) P(c/k) (the prior
probability of c) is low. The first condition Is satisfied to the extent to
ivhicli you would expect to find e if h is true- Obviously a scientifie or
historical theorj^ is rendered probable, insofar as the e^rjdencc Ls such as
you would expect to find if the theory is true. (1 can say "'the theory is
rendered probable insofar as it yields true predictions' but only if it is
understood that the 'predictions' may be evidence observed cither
before or after the theory was formulated. It seems irrelevant lo
whether evidence supports a theory whether it is 'iiew' evidence found
by testing a theory^ or 'old' evidence which the new tlieory explains.")

However^ for any e you can dcvtsc an infinite number of different
incompatible theories h whicli are such tliat for each P(e/h&k> is high
but which make totally different predictions from each olher for the
future (that is, predictions additional to e). Let c be ail tlie observations
made relev'ant to your favourite theory of mechanics - let's say General
Relativity (GTR). Then you can complicate GTR in innumerable ways
such that the resulting new theories all predict e but maite wildly diffe-
rent predictions about what will happen tomorrow. The jjrounds for
believing that GTR is the true theory is chat GTR is the simplest theory.
P(h/k) means the a priori probability that h is true, or - put less
challengingly - is the measure of the strength of the a priori factors
relevant to the probability of h. The major such a priori factor is sim-
plicity. The simplicity of a theory is something internal to that theory^
not a matter of the relation of the theory to external evidence. Another
a priori factor is content - the bigger a theory, the more and more pre-
cise claims it makes, the less likely it is to be true. But we can ignore
this factor if we are comparing theories of similar content.

P(e/k) is a measure of how likely e is to occur if we do not assume any
particular theory to be true. The iiormai effect of this term in assessing
the probability' of any particular theory h^ is that e does not render h very
probable if you would expect to find e anyw^ay [for example^ if it was also
predicted by the main rivals to h which had signifieant prior probability).

for the purpose of applying this apparatus to assessing the theory
that there is a God, the philosophical theist needs to spell out what is
meant by tliis claim. God is supposed to be roughly a person without a
body, essentially omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly free, perfectly good,
creator and suslaincr of any universe there may be, a source of moral
obligation, eternal and necessary.^ It needs to be spelled out what each
of these properties amounts to, and to be shown that possession of
each is compatible with possession of the others. Inevitably^ to talk of
the source of all being involves using words in somewhat stictched

senses - just as^ in a humbler way^ doc5 talk about photons and pto-
tons. liut it needs to he tnadc to some extent clear just what the
stretching amounts to in each case, and to be made plausible that when
ivords arc used in the stretched sense^ the claims about God made with
their aid are coherent. It's no good saving 'aJl our talk about God is
metaphorical'. For [f anyone is even to have a belief that there is a God,
let alone have grounds for that l>clicf^ there must be some difference
betw-een that belief and the belief that there is no God, or the l>cliel" that
there is a Great Pumpkin^ or whatever And to explain to a non-believer
what that belief is, one must use words which she understands.
That involves inakiii^ it clear when words are being used in stretched
senses and - insotar as it can be done - what are the boundaries of
these senses. The claim that there is a God may of course not be a
fully clear claim, but unless II is moderately clear, it cannot provide
backing for the practice of religion nor can arguments be given for or
against it.

I argue that any being who is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and
perfectly free, and cvcrlasliiig necessarily has the other divine properties^
and that the cited properties fit together in a very Jieat way so that the
claim that there is a God is a very simple claim^ because it is a claim for
the existence of the simplest kind of person there could be, Persons are
beings with power to bring about effects intentionally, beliefs ^true or
false) about how things are, and some degree of freedom to exercise
thetr power God is postulated as a being with zero limits to his pow^ern
to his true beliefs^ and to his freedom. Scientists and others always pre-
fer on grounds of sunplicity hypotheses which postulate one entity
rather than manyn and entities with zero or infinite degrees of their
properties rather than some finite degree thereof. They postulate that
photons have zero mass (rattier tiian some very small mass, equally
compatible with obsetvations); and they used to postulate liiaL light
and the gravitational force travel with infinite velocity [rather than
sonic very large finite velocity, equally compatible irVitli observations;
until observations forced a differeiil theory' on them. Although the exis-
tence of anything at all Is perhaps enormously improbable a priori, the
existence of a very simple being lias a far higher prior probabLlit}^ than
does the existence of anything else (except insofar as the latter is ren-
dered probable by the former),

Yci Lf there i^ a Ciod^ it is not improbable that he should create a uni-
verse, an orderly universe, and within it embodied rational creatures such
as huniaiis- For God Ix^ing good will seek to bring about good things. It is
good that there should be a beautiful universe, lieautj' arises from order
of some kind - the orderly interactions and movcmenli of objects in

accord with natural lairvs is beautiful indeed; and even more beautiful
are ihc plants and animals which evolved on Earth. It is a further good
that ihere should be human beln^ who can eboose between good and
bad, choose whether to grow in power and knowledge, and %o choose
ivhclher or not to enter into a loving relationship with God himself.
Humans have limited power over their bodies :ind acquire naturally
some knowledge of how the world worts. Wc have to know which bod-
ily movements will make what difference - and thai involves Ihere
being regularities in the worM which we can grasp. The movements of
solid bodies in empty space follow (apptoximaicly) S'ewion's laws.
Given such simple rc^laritics, we can discern them and use them to
increase our power over the universe - to develop our agriculture, to
make houses and bridges^ to send humans to the moon. So God lias a
futthet reason to create a universe orderly in Its conformity to rational
laws - in giving huanajis significant choices which affect themselves,
each other and their relation to God.

But unless there is a God, it is most unlikelv that there would bt a
universe at alL The jniversc is a big thing consisting of very many sepa-
rate objects of varying finite size and mass. That it should exist on its
own, uncreated- is therefore - bv normal scientific criteria - verv much
less Wkdy than that God should exist. And it Is most unlikely that the
Universe would come into existence caused by anything else than God^
because any other possible cause is much less simple than God. And it
is immensely unlikely that if there is a Universe^ it should be governed
by simple natural laws. For natural laws are not entities- To say that all
objects obey Newton^s laws is just to say that each obj^^ct in the
Universe behaves in a way that Newton's taws state, that is^ has exactly
the same properties of movement in reaction to the presence of other
objects^ as does every other object- It is immensely unlikely that every
otiicr object should behave In exactly the same way - a priori, unless
there was a common cause of their having ttie properties they do. And
any other possible cause is much less simple than God. (Even it" you
suppose some impersonal cause to be just as simple a postulate as God,
there is no reason why it should bring about this sort of universe.}

$o the h^'pothesis of theism satisfies the three criteria which I have
drawn from D ay cs's Theorem and arc independently plausihlen for the
probability of a theory_ The only evidence which I have mentioned is
that of the existence of the .Universe and its 'conformity to natural
laws'. Tn my books I have also adduced much further evidence- the ini-
tial slate of the Universe being such and the laws having such character-
istics as to bring" about somewhere in the Unlveise animals and humans

Ricfmni Swinbunnf 1 1

(the ^fine-tuning' of the Universe}; the cjcistcnce of consciousness^
vaiious providcmml aspects of nature^ the public evidence about the
lifCf death and purported resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, other
reports of niiraclcSn and the very widespread phenomenon of ■" religious
experiences', in ihc sense of experiences vvliich seem lo their subjects
to he expcrLcncK of God_ The case for the existence of God wliich I
have just iuminarized is a ajmulative one from many pieces of evi-
dence. Arguments against the existence of God (for otamplen from evil)
have also to be brought into the equation^ and it needs to be shown
that the hypothesis of theism rcLains its probabilily despite thcsc.

3 Objt<:tii>ns

What of objections? Ever since people have given arguments for the
exisiencc of God, others have uied to find fallacies In them. There are
innumerable objections l>otli to tlie general programme and to particu-
lar versions of it. 1 confine myself lo objections to the arguments for the
cL^tni that there is God, and - for reasons of time - shall not consider
objcetions to the colictcnce of that claim. I begin with objections to the
geneial programme.

Fiistn there is the objccUon that if arguments for the existence of God
(and certain claims about wliat he has done) are cogent^ then a prudent
person will try to do what is good out of self-interest - for (probal^lyj
God will approve such behaviour and reward it. The total eommitmcnt
demanded by religious faith would no longer be virtuous- Kierkegaard
wrote that the suggestion that faith might be replaced by 'probabilities
and guarantees' is for the believer 'a temptation to be resisted with all
liis strength\^ Of course religion involves commitment^ that is, living
by Lhe assumpiion that tlic relevant religious system is true- But tl:icre
is always risk in a commitment to an assumption which may be false -
you may spend your life pursuing good Ltiin^ which you will never
attain, and lose good things which you could have attained- Yet if the
former good things are good enough - and plausibly the licatitic Vision
of God in the company ot the saints for yourself and your fellows fas
Avetl as many earthly good thingsj is good enough, it is a risk worth
taking. The prudence of seeking such a ^ood, despite risk of failure, is
virluous- And if it is probable ^though not certain) Lhat there Ls a God,
it is probable that you have a duty to commit yourself to God. But
there is nothing virtuous in living your life on an assumption which is
certainly false - for that is pointless. Given that there is some risk that

12 Phih.wphy (yfRdi^iois in f/re 21ii Century

there is no God likely to reward yov, as the third tradition of ar^nient
allows^ this criticism fails.

Then there Is Kierkegaard's ob]ectioii from the opposite angle, direeted
at I he third tradition of argument, that it would leave us with an uncer-
tain beltet open to revision - and lliat religion requires raore.^ I do not
ihink that rcli;^ion does require more - by way of belief. St Paul
reminded us tliat Ve see in a mirror darkly^ but then face lo face: now
I know in pari; buL then siialf I know even as also I have been known/^"^
and that ^by hope were we saved: but hope that Is seen is not hope: for
who hopcth for that which he seelh?'^' Religion requires more than
tentative commitment^ but there is no diffieulty in giving that com-
mitment to a system which is only probably true.

Then there is the objection that arguments for the existence of God,
especially ones which involve probabilities, are sophisticated things;
and only iiitellcctuais can understand them. Even if this were true, it is
no good objection to the project - intellectuals need their views on reli-
gion by which to live as much as does anyone else; and if their need
alone can be satisfied, that is something. But in fact 1 suj^gest that almost
all traditional arguments for lite existence of God (apart from the onto-
logical argument) codify in a more rigorous form the vague feeling of so
many humans that the existence of the world with its various particular
features cries out for an explanation^ and thai God^s action in creating
and sustaining it provides that explanation. That feeling is then open
to various atheistic objections which can be dealt with in turn by more
rigorous formulation ai:td defence.

Then tiiere is the LEarthian objection that philosophical thciiim has
too anthropomorphic a view of God. liut the Christian view of God is
in ctuciai respects anthropomorphic. It is central lo the Christian tradi-
tion (as to the Jewish and Islamic traditions) that God ^created man in
his own image',^- and the very many theologians of the tw^o Christian
millennia who have dwelt on these words have seen the ^image^ as pri-
marily a matter of rationality and free will (and so of power and knowl-
edgeX that is^ properties contingently present in humans in a small
degree which are necessarily present in God in an inrinite degree. God
is like man because man is like God. if we are to be concerned with
arguments for the existence of the God of Christianity^ w-c must - with
all the qualifications about stretched language mentioned earlier - be
anthropomorphic about God.

There are many other general objections to the programme of philo-
sophical theism - I findn for example^ t^lgbt separate ones^ in Hume's
Dialogues. But my view is that most such objections derive any force

Ricfitini Swinbuniif 13

that the^' may have fiom a positivism now largely rejected in philosophy

generally (aiidj in parllcular, in philosophy of science)- Tticre is, for
example, the view that causation concerns patterns of regularity in
obiservahlc objects, and ihere is no sense hi lalLing of ihe unobscfvahle
cause of a unique ohjcct. Eul while no object (even God) is unique in
all respects, all objects arc unique in some respects; and science is
findinj^ out rather a lot about the unobscrvable causes of the obscrv-
able. I think that there is little force in any of these general objections
to the programme of philosophical theism. Wliat 1 believe to be much
more Important are detailed objections designed to shoiv that some
particular theistic claim is incoherent^ or that all available versions of
tlietstic arguments do not work. It" 1 am right in my ciaim that the
probability calculus captures the prLnclpies of inductive inference in a
precise form, then If someone can find a fault in my version of the pro-
gramme, that wtll suffice to render the whole programme worthless.

There arc objeaions to each of my claims about the three elements on
the right hand side of Eayes's Theorem, when this is applied to assessing
tlie probabilily of the existence of God (hj on the evidence of observa-
tion (e) and tautoloj^eal background evidence fk). Rrst, the objector
claims that P(c/h & k) is very low indeed^ because of the problem of cvil^
including pain and other suffering, which is vcEy - if not totally -
improbable if there is a God. In my view the problem of evil consti-
tutes the most substantial of all objections to tlie existence of God. But
even to begin to meet it, my paper would need to deal solely w^ith it. So
all that I have space to do here is to say that some evils are necessary
conditions of greater goods- It is not improbable lliat God will bestow
on some creatures not merely the ^ood of pleasure; but the goods of a
free choice of good or evil u^hleli makes a significaait difference to tlic
worlds the opportunity to show patience, courage and compassion, and
tlie privilege of making it possible (by our suffering) for oLhcrs to evince
these virtues, and much else. T claim that God (logically') cannot pro-
vide us with these good things without causing or allowing suffering,
and that it would not be wrong of him to cause or allow the suffering
for a limited period in a limited way for the sake of the goods which it
makes possible. But to show this at adequate length requires a very
substantial theodicy, for which 1 can only put dow^n a markcrJ*

Then, the objector claims that Pfh/k) is low^ because the hypothesis
of theism is not nearly as simple as 1 suggest, and the hypothesis makes
such big claims (its content is so laTg:el- 1 do think that this is a very
substantial objection^ allhou;jh in the end mistaken. The content of
any hypothesis able to explain the existence of the Universe will have

14 Phihwpby iyfRtli^iGU Pf? the 21.'ht Century

to be pfotty large. The hypothesis of theism postulates one God of infi-
nite powcr^ knowledge and so on, rather than one or many finite ones- In
the course of a very Interesting paper Mark Wynn has pointed out (hat
there are very many diftereitt possible hypotheses^ eaeh postulating dif-
ferent numbers ol" gods wiili different powers, whereas there is only one
hypothesis poslutatin^ one God of infinite power, flcnce, he claims,
although each of the former hypotheses mi^ht be less probahle a priori
than ihe hypothesis of theisnin the disjunction of the former is plausibly
more probable than the hypothesis of theismJ"^ liut if the order of the
world is to be explained by many gods, then some explanation Is
required for how and why they cooperate Lii producing the same pat-^
terns ot order throughout the Universe. This becomes a new datum
requiring explanation for the same reason as the fact of order itself. The
need for further explanation ends when we postulate one l>elng who is
the cause of the existence of all otliers^ and the simplest conceivable
such - J urge - is God.

Finally there is the objection that we can pass no judgement on thf^
value of P(c/k). WhaL possible factots couid lead us to a view about
how likely it would be that there w^ould be a universe, whether or not
there is a God? Bui that is easy enouj^h to answer. The probability of e
is the sum of probabilities of the different ways in which c can come
about^ that iSj the sum of the probabilities of c on each fival hypothe-
sis, multiplied by the prior probability of that rival hypothesis. P(c/k] =
P(e/h&k) I\h/k)-hP(e/ht&k) P(hi/k) + P^e/h2£:k) P^h2/k}... and so on.
By earlier arguments, all hypotheses of similar content which lead us to
expect e arc much less simple than h. h] and the others are such that
P{h!/k)«P{h/k) Hence P(e/k) is not too much larger than Pfe/h&k)
Pth/k). When we pass judgemeni on the probability of any scientific
theory for which there is no greatly relevant contingent background
evldciicc k, wc pass just this sort of judgement.

4 Rival pro^i^rainmes

How has the programme of philosophical theism engaged with other
programmes represented at this conference? Ey far the closest prog-
ramme is that of keformed Episiemology. Jitdeed, 1 do not regard it as a
separate programme, but rather as one end ot a spectrum, of which phLto
sophicai theism is the other end of a spectrum of programmes defending
the rationality of belief in a liraditional Christian God (on a uhTvocal
understaiidin^ of 'rationality. The canonical presentation of Reformed
EpLstemology is the volume edited by Plantiitga and Woherstorff, Fuith

Rictitini Swinbuniif \S

{\!id R{itior^aiity.^^ These writers, and all who have followed them, have
used all the tools of inodcrn aiirLlytic philosophy, as have I and many
others who have tried to develop philosophical theism. 'IVhal is central
to Reformed Epislemology is the claim Lhat ihe belief thai there is a God
can be entirely rational without being feased on arguments from evh
dence; it may bo 'properly basic^ the sort of belief which, like mundane
perceptual beliefs such as 1 sec a dcsk'j Is ralionaHy believed without being
based on oiher beliefs. I agree with thaL - behef lhat there is a God can
be, for some people^ properly basic. And almost all philosophical the>
ologlans of the past i\^o millennia would think that loo. So long as it
stares you in the face that some belief is true and you have no contrary
evidence^ then that belief is pmperly basic^ and if anyone today is in
that position witli regard to their belief that there is a God^ that belief iSj
for them properly basic. Bat one difference between myself and many
Reformed Epistemoloj;jists is that in n:Ly view the number of people in
the western world in Lbis situation tn 1999 is fairly small. Most people
today need something by way of positive argument for then thefstk
belief to be rational. But this difference concerns merely the utility of
the programme of Reformed Epistemologyn not the truth of its doctrines,
Some Reformed lipistemolo^sts however seem to be saying that there
arc no good arguments for the existence of God - and there of course I
disagree for reasons given earlier in this paper- Sometimes also they seem
to be mo\rcng towards the claim that it is not rational to believe in God
on the basis of arguments; and of course here too 1 disagree.

Until 1986, the main clatm of Reformed Epistemology was simply the
negative claim that the claim of others that 'there is no God' is not prop-
erly basic for anyone who had no good justification. Since then Plantinga
has dev'cloped his theory of warrant, warrant being whatever it is that
turns true belief into knowledge J^ According to this theorj' a belief B is
warranted if it satisfies a number of conditions, the crucial one of which
is that ^the cognitive faculties involved in the production of B are func-
tioning properlyV^ *Lnd that means functioning the way your creator
intended them to function (if you have a creator)^ or (if you do not liave
a creator) functioning the way evolution in some seasc Intended' you to
function. The application of Plantinga's theory of w^arrant to religious
belief has the consequences that if ihcre is a God, it is probable thai
a belief that there is a God is warranted- and if tliere is no God, it is
probable thai a belief that there is a God is not warranted. Even if this
conclusion Is corfect, it is of httle use to us, unless wq have reason to
believe that there is (or is not) a God, and that involves having a belief
about the issue which is rational in a different sense from Plantin^a's

16 Phih^optiy (yfRdi^iois in tfi^ 21ii Century

'warranted'. In this alternative sense our beliefs are rational If they are

probable on the evidence available to us (which will include ihe appar-
■?nt dclivcranecs of religious experience, as well as publicly available evi-
dence}- The probabiliLy involved here is the logical or cpislcniic kind
with which T was operating earlier. The rationality of his or her beliefs
in this sense is sometiilri;^ internally accessible to the subject and uo a
considerable degree) to everyone else as well. A reformed epistemolo-
gist needs to hold tliat theistic beliefs afe rational in this sense, if he is
to justify his claim (to himself and the world) that they are probably
true. 1 hope tl^al Reformed Episleniolo^, all of whose tools and many
of whose results 1 endorse^ will recognize the need for this strong inter-
nalist kind of rationality and not saddle itself with an exclusively exter-
nalist epistemology.

flow does Philosophical Tlielsm inieraet with Wittgeitstcin?
Wittgenstein is of course one of the great philosophers of all time, recog-^
nized as such by both the analytic and continental traditions of philos-
ophy. Any philosopher must take account of Wittgenstein; and I like to
think that I have learnt a little from htm and applied it to one or two par-
ticular issues. As we know, he wrote very little directly about reli^on, and
his main influence on the philosophy of religion has been through the
application by others (and especially D.Z. Phillips) of what he %vrotc
about language In developing those few explicit remarks about religion.
The resulting position has often l>cen called 'Wittgenstein! an fidcism'.
Now the way in which I, or indeed most analytical philosophers,
approach some writer is to try to analyse what they have written in
terms of a few philosophical claims and various supporlin^ ar^ments;
and then to attack or defend these claims by further arguments. To
approach any VVittgcnstcinian in this way can be a frusti'ating experience.
One is told that one's account of the philosophical claims Is far too naive^
and that to produce head-on arguments for or against such claims is a
naive way to deal with them. One is finalEy left with the Impression that
one can only understand what the writer is saying If one endorses It.

My account of what D.Z. Phillips has been claiming over many years
in fidelity to Wittgenstein's few explicit remarks on the subject, Is that
religion Is a self-contained practice Cof prayer, worship, public and
private conduct, and the way we think about thin^sj^ comtnitmenL to
which involves no metaphysical or historical beliefs different from those
of people who do not practise llie religion. As an account of the Christian
reli^on, as it has been practised by so many over two millennia, this
seems manifestly false. Of course there have been a few sophisticated
modern people who have gone through the motions of prayer and
worshipj and taken Christian stances on particular moral IssueSj without

16 Phih^optiy (yfRdi^iois in tfi^ 21ii Century

'warranted'. In this alternative sense our beliefs are rational If they are

Ricfitini Swinbuniif 17

having any specifically Christian historical or metaphorical hclicfs.

Some have even used the traditional language - for example^ 'Last Judge-
men T - in some waj^ utterly different from the ways of the normal
Christian. liut lo understand Christiamty^ ifs no good rcadinj; only
Simonc Weil - you need to read St Paul, IrenaeuSn and Gregory of Nyssa
and Luther and Francis dc Sales and so on, and so on_ WiUgen stein ian
philosoptiy of rdigion suffers from a very one-sided diet of examples.
I know that there are differences between the writers I nientionn but
they are as nothinj^ compared with ihe difference between them and,
say, Don Cupitt. But having written this, 1 know that 1 shall be accused
of failing to understand the subtleties of lan;^age and religion; and
I await the accusation with due trepidation.

Then we come to Process Thought. I have always found the few writ-
ings of Process tli Inkers which 1 have read ^despite the complexities of
Whitehead's metaphysics), relatively dear But they expound a meta-
ph)^ic which seems to me a lot less probable than a more uaditional
Christian one. The attempt by Process Thought to dispense with the
category of substance seems to mc to fail, in particular lit its account of
persons. A subsequent person betn^ me is not a matter of its causal rela-
tions or relations of similarity to earlier events. Many different series of
subsequent events could have very close such relations to tlie earlier
events which svere mine. Yet - with immense plausibility - there would
be a truth about which series of subsequent events were mine. Being me
can^ in consequence, only be analysed as being the same continuing
substance (that is^ soul). The category of substance is unavoidable; and
one everlasting 5u[>stance on which all depends is required Lo make
sense of the world. While in this way, like all philosophical thcistSn
I object Lo h'ocess Theolo^'s conceptual scheme; unlike some philo-
sophical theistSn ] accept from Process Theology certain more particular
view^s about God. God is not outside time; and God docs not know
infallibly the future free choices of creatures.

And finally what of Post- Modernism and Critical Theory? I am alas
too ignorant of critical theory to have engaged with it. In philosophy
generally I think of post-Modemism as the view that there is no truth,
there are just sentences expressed In different circumstances to which
people react in different ways and then utter more sentences^ and I find
this \1cw in the little I have read of Dcrrida. As I have read so little of
the Continental philosophy from which post-Niodcrnism emerged^ like
so many other analytic philosophcrSn what I have jusf written may l>e a
poor caricature; and^ if so^ I apologize - I am here to learn better..

But if post-Mode niism is the view which I have stated, it seems to me
manifestly false, l^or how couid it be a vicw^ a. belief about how things

L8 Phih.wptiy (yfRdi^iois in tlj^ 21ii Cei^tury

arCn unless cilhcr it Is true or il is false? And in that case there Is truth -
cither the truth of post-Modernism, or the truth thai post-Modernism is
false. If the former, then post-Modemism contradicts Itself; and hence
only the lalter Is possible. Now maybe post-Modernism is a bit subtler
than 1 have rGpresented It. Maybe ii claims that tlierc are some truths
but not many. But it seems lo me far more obvious than most things,
that a lot of modern science is true, that tlic world is very old, that there
are people beside myself and so on. These ihings are far more obvious
than any philosophical doctrine. We have an enonnous nLimbcr of true
beliefs. Posi-Modernism may be warning us that different groups have
different criteria of rationality and that there is not one true set of crite-
ria. Although there are small diffeteiices between groups as to ivhat they
take as evidence for what^ T do not myself believe that those differences
ihcre arc greatly significant; humans have very similar criteria to each
other. This is a contingent claim and I could Ix^ wrong. But if I am
ivrong, that does not damage my claim that there is one true set of criie-
ria. They are those of my group, which - 1 am quite sure - arc those of all
who will hear or read ibis pajKr. We all have the modern scientific crite-
ria of what ts evidence for what, and to say that we have these criteria is
just to say that we believe that the results which they yield about what is
probable to be correct results, [f we thought that there are no true crite-
ria of what is evidence tor what, we would think it just as likely that If
we jump froni a window we will fl% as that we will fall to the ground.
Our conduct shows that we do not so think One can however take a
post-Modernist view about religion without becoming susceptible to the
difficulties of a more general post-Modernism. One can claim that there
are no icligtous truths (l>ccausc religious claims are incoherent), or tliat -
if there are - it is equally rational to hold any religious belief. The answer
to this more detailed claim (itself presumably purportedly true and
assei'led as ralionaL) Is the detailed programme of philosophical theism
sketched earlier. Detailed challenges to ttie coherence of traditional the-
ism can Ix^ met, and it can be shown probable^ and so more rational lo
believe than its negation^ by correct criteria of rationality.

Notts

L Epistle to the Romans l.m

Z. For a iilghlly longer form of argument iivm design tbr the existence oJ' God^

and arguiTient thereffom ^bout the nature of God^ jfe theoi?ening chapters of

St John of Damascus, Exp^^.iition t?fihe Gittro^oM Faith.

Rictitini Swinbunnf 19

3. 5W John Calvin^ Initilutes of theChiisEian Religion^ Book l^ ch_ 5_

4. Cx>iivers3on of course involves not mere5y coming to believe ceitain propo-
sitions, but netting yourself To act on them in certain wav^- l^ut my concern
here is only witl^ the former necessary Isut not suffEcient element in conver-
sion. Hence I ^-iTlie of the person who does practise a rehgion as 'ttie
believer' and the one who dr^es not a=^ 'the non -believer'.

5. 'Not that the same method of instructics]i will be suitable in the case of all
who approach the Word... tlie method oJ r^jcovery must be adapted to the
form of the disease ___ pi] is necessary to regard the opinions which the per-
sons have taiien up, and so frame your aigumeni in accordance with the
error into ^viiich eacli have fa3[enr by advancing in each discussion certain
principles and reasonable propositions, that thus^ through \vhat is agreed
on both sides^ the tnjth may conclusively be brought to light. Should fyour
d|)ipDnents] say there is no God^ then^ from the consideration of the skilful
and wise economy of the Universe he will tyi brought to acknowledge that
there is a certain overmastering power manifested throuj^^h these channels/ -
St Gregory of Nyssa, The Great Catechism^ Prologue (trans. W_ N/foore and H.A.
Wilson, tn Selected Wnti^ig.'i ofGre^o^y ofJ^y^a, Parker and Co., Oxford, lS9;i^.

6. 5e^ my E:xistcfitrc of Goti, Clarendon Prei^^. revised edilion^ 1990 land the
short simplBhed version, Is There ii G^kf^^ Oxford University Press^ 1996).

7. In the Christian tradition Cod is 'three persons in one substance' - that is.
three p^irsons ^ach of whom has the lifted divine characteristics - the Son
and the Spirit being eternany and necessarily caused to e_xi:^t by tlie Father.
Argurnent^ to the existence of Cod are then best construed as argLiments to
the existence of God the Father, from which the existence of Son and Spirit
follow - in my view by logical entailment. Ilie simp3icity of God which
I consider in the text is the simplicity of God the FaCl^er - that a simple
theory 3ias complicated consequences does not make it any less simple.
T ignore this complication in subsequent discussion^ for the sake of ease
of exiH>sition_ Tor my own developed account of the divine nature see TIst
Coht^re}ice ofTtieh^n, CJarendon Press, revised editions^ 1993: and The Chnr^l-
itni Goti^ Clarendon Press^ 1594.

a. S. Kierkejaaid. C{tffchii-fing Un.'ieieutific F^yst^crfpt {trans. H. V. and EM. j-iongj^
[*ilnceion University Press^ 1992, p. IL

9. Tor reference to this objection of Kierkegaard both to uatural theology and to
historical arguments about the life and teaching of Jesus, and for a developed
response both to this objection and to the previous Kierkegaardian objection^
5*^^ Robert M. Adams, 'Kierkegaard's Arguments against Ohjectlv^: Reasoning
Jn I^JEgLon', in his The Viniie of faith, Oxford University Press^ t9S7_
10- I Corinthians 13-12-

11_ Romans R.24_

12- Genesis 1.Z7.-..

L3- I devoted two and half chapters o^ Tiie Ejiisttnct of Gad to theodicy (pp.
1S2-60 and chs- 10 and 11). but feeling the need for more extensive treat-
nientj have noiv written a full-length book on this - Pnfvideric*: {;nd the Frob-

tetuofEvii, Clarendon Pte^s, 199B_
14- "Mark Wynn. 'Some Reflections on Richard Swinburne's Argument from
Design'^ R^h^ioiis Smiiies 29 il99ipj,, 1^25-35- Wynn points out that I need to

20 Phih^ophy (yfRdi^iois in f/re 21ii Century

make this kind of Twovt in a different connection in order to defeat an
earlit^r objection of Mackic.

15. A_ Plantinga and N_ "Wolterstorff, Ffiith ami Rcithmuhiy^ Univeisiiy of Notre
Danrie Press^ \9SA

16. 5d^ rlanEinga's generaS ttieory of episrenioSog/ in Vl^^^iurnnrr the Current Debate
and lVrtmi?;f i^nJ Fwpi^r Fimctiim^ Oxford Universit/ PresSr 199;i; and itsappli-
cations to t^hiiitian belief, in WiUJtmte^i Chmthm Beiief, Oxford University

Press, 2CKH>.
L7. IVcrrrff/iC fj/arf Propter fiifictior^^ p. 194_

Voices in Discussion

U: In the firs! iliroe symposia wc heard a lot about the relation between
rcligtotis expcricncG and reason, I doubt whether wg can generalize
about this, I was brought up in a pious Southern MctliodisL home in
Japan. I was socialized iiito Cliristianlty. Wy world was theocentrtc_
While in the army 1 not only had ordinary religiou-S expcricnccSj but
also some dramatic ones. One of the latter was a call to be a minister.
I thoughtj however^ that I ought to study objections to ChrisLianity
l>efore answering it. Most of the people I had met in the army were
Roman Catholics^ as different from Southern Methodists as one could
imagine«

In the university I studied models of analysis of ideas and methods. I
was taught by Richard McKcon, who never accepted what any student
said- 1 kept as quiet as I could- McKeon taught the history of philoso-
phy. He put the patterns of thought of the different philosophers on
the blackboard. What emerged was a pluralist history. There was no
question of truth and falsity^ but only of which pattern was most
appropriate for our day. Each system w^as sclf<ontaiiiedj, as though this
were a basic way of organizing thought.

I now Lhink more in historical terms. I believe that the w-ay the mind
works is determined by the questions people ask. The mind cannot
generate a universal^ right [ihjiosophy. This reflects my attitude to what
philosophy can and cannot do. Some claim to he arguing from a neutral
position. 1 am not con\1nced. It is an Olympian height only within that
s\^stcm, rhilosnphy caiinot tdi theology what to think or vice versa.

I found objections to Christianity in modern thought. But it wasn't
so much that I found good arguments and assessed evidence, hut that I
found that my formci faith simply was not there. It wasn't a matter of
choice. I could remember my former experiences, but they now made

2BJ

2S2 Phih.^ophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

belief impossible. So I experienced a shift of world-vieWj from a pLoiis
one to a secular one. I lost any idea that philosophy could provide nie
with a rational foundation for faith.

Thcii I came into contact with Charles Hartshorne^ as different a
philosopher from McKeon as one could get Understanding reality was
his life. His classes were an introduction into his conversation with
himself on these matters, one that was Roing on before the class started^
and continued after It ended. I was attracted to this immediately, and,
over the years, this attraction grew. I became aware that one didn^t
have to choose between different world-views. There was a third wayp
one that took advances In modernity seriously - a process way of
studying reality, In which 'taeconiing' Is more important than 'bclng^
and 'events^ are more important than 'substances'. God was now In
everything, but not in a pietistic way. I didn't want to evaluate tL too
quickly like McKcon and say This Is just another system/ On the other
liand, I adantt that what I go on lo say is confessional I speak as a
ft"ocess thinker.

Hartshorne emphasized arguments^ but in a context where the data
seemed to support them. I( depends on seeing the world in a certain
w^ay. What attracted me was not the arguments so much as the world-
view. Is that reasonable? I won't pursue the larger tale which would
have to be told to answer that question.

I then became aware of differences between Hartshorne and White-
head. I wa& learning about the latter through the formcrj and my
teachers were neo-naturallsts. These teachers said that changes In the
twentieth century opened up the world In a new way. The process thus
revealed Included human beings. They called this process 'God'. 1 was
helped more by Hartshorne than by Wieman and wrote my master's
thesis criticizing the latter in a way 1 w^ould modify today- So I was
exposed to disputes within the Process family,

I find Whitehead's speculative philosophy congenial. It is a philosophy
which advances hypotheses. Vou study a particular Held as rigorously
as you can (although you have your presuppositions). You appreciate
some factors and then see that a full apprcclaLion of them takes you
into another field of study. This is an endless task. It Is a cosmological
task. For Whitehead, science gives us the most reliable basis for judge-
ment concerning what we arc given, Tlie subjective side of things is
explained more tuUy in religion.

Religion is a global phenomenon. We cannot confine ourselves In our
studies to traditional Christianity. If you look at physics^ the current
theories are aheady loaded with presuppositions. Many of them owe

Dz. niiiiip^ 2s;^

their form to substance-thinking. Paradoxes arise from that conccptu-
alUy. So wc don^t settle for prcsonl hypollicscs^ but check to see whether
you can arrive at better ones. This is true of religion, too, so the task is
essentially tevisioiiist.

For WTiitehead and Harthsorne, to be is to be constituted by all that
ha5 happened in the past, and one must form oneself creatively out of
that- I find an analog in Buddhism^ with its non-substantial vievs' of
rchRLon. We are Johnny-come-latelj^'s in this respect. God is the
supremely inclusive real. All that happens in the world happens in
God. This is radical interactive thinking. It could be argued that so far
from being revisionist^ this is a more faithful reflection of Biblical
thought than classical tbcisrn.

E: I want to make four points on matters not said in my paper-
First, what is philosophy of religion? This involves asking, WTiat is
philosophy? As I understand it, li is motivated by an existential question
which asks whether existence has a meaning as part of an encompassing
whole, how should wc conduct ourselves given that this is our lot?
Philosophy attempts to clarify these questions.

But although philosophy is motivated by these questions, it is not
conslitLUed by them. It is constituted by theoretical questions about
the meaning of our various practices. Reflection sees whether these are
valid- Here I am indehted to Habermas's conception of philosophy as
criUcally motivated self-understanding. This U love of wisdom or
authentic self-understanding.

Philosophy has two related taskis. First, it has a purely analytic task,
that of elucidating tlie conditions for the possibility of self-understand-
ing. Thi^i task results in a transcendental metaphysics, because IL is an
attempt to elucidate the necessary conditions of human discourse
as such- Second, it has the task of crilically evaluating the various
answers which have been given to the existential question I mentioned
at the outset. I want to formulate an answer to that question. Here^
philosophy and theology have a mutual contact.

My second point arises out of my preoccupation as a Christian the-
ologian. Theology or philosophical theolog;^^ is reflection on a religious
tradition. So the data here are already religious. My particular concern
is with the distinctive claims clauiied to be valid by Christian witness.
Here wc have to do with the claim which is specific in Us content
Involvlnj^ a reference to Jesus Christ. This witness is possible for any
person by our common experience. So this claim necessarily involves
philosophical reflection- Christian witness is historically determined

2S4 Pfiihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%t Century

and must be dealt with histoFicaLly, but it also involves asking what
kind of meaning this witness involves. This task is iio( only theological^
but eminently philosophical Arc Christian claims as valid as they
claim to be? These ciaims are validated in the same \^'ay as wc validate
other claims.

Third, given that I am a Process theologian, let mc say a few things
about that. Process philosophy seems to nic to Ik the right philosophy-
right, not because I am a Christian, but because it articulates better
than any other philosophy^ the understanding of existenccj and the
necessary conditions of that existence- Here 1 think of it as my
primary source. It continues to prove itself in my task as a Christian
theologian.

Fourtlij let mc indicate where I find myself at odds with most of my
fellow Process philosophers and theologians. Process thought has a
transcendental metaphysics. Because ft is an answer to an existential
question it implies both a metaphysics and an ethics. Metaphysics is an
explanation of ultimate reality_ But, thcn^ it is essential not to confuse
the metaphysical conditions with factual slaLcs of affairs. This is a lesson
to be learned from VVittgenstein-

Takc the example of myth. A myth is the condition of certain facts
being the case, but it is not itself a further fact. We see the trouble that
conies from treating; metaphysics as a fact in the worl; of T hales and
other pre-Socratics- This is precisely the confusion we find in White-
lieadf but it persists even mote in Hartshorne in his notion of a
psychicalist ontology. My own w^ay has been to concentrate on those
questions which arc of concern to everyone. We see this not only in
Kant^ but also in Duns Scotus.

V: Wouldn't you say that a general ontology and metaphysics is neces-
sary for the Christian faith, but not the categorical metaphysics we are
offered?

E'. The consequence of the metaphysics wc are offered so often is that it
does not recognize that God is not a fact, taut the condition of the pos=
sibility of any fact- So ^God exists' is not a statement of fact

A\ U says that T^ecoming' is more Important than 'taeing', and that
'Gvents' are more important than substances_ Vou also say that every
event is internally related to its past. 1 find that wildly implausible. The
world may have started in a different way but 1 can't see that that
affects who I am. You say that ihis reasoning has its ancestry in Hcgcl^
but that doesn't make it less criticizable.

Wc have lo distinguish between things. Is a tabic an event? It is an

instantiation of various properties. Bui this is not iruc of other things.
Am I just a bundle of feelings? If my brain is transplanted In another
pcrsonj have 1 survived the operation?

Ui As long as you think in lenns of substances and attributes you can't
see the problem. Take an cjcampte from physics. It was thought that
tlic understanding of light as light waves required the postulation of
ether - there must he a substance uitderlying the events. There is no
ether, but people still talk of tight waves. Uul the notion of 'waves^
itself comes from substance-thinking. We must ask whether we can
have events without postulating substances, and some are now
retelling quantum theory from this point of vicw.

Now think of a moment in human experience. Antecedent moments
are ftjnclionin^ in that moment. When we hear a word, there is the
relation of the present to antecedent experiences. That is an itilcrnal
relation which enters into memory; perception and causality^ and
which differs fiom postulating or thinking of an underlying T

E: I am puzzled by Fs distinction l:^ctvrecn necessary conditions and
factually. Are there necessary propositions that arc facts? As loi^g as a
statement is not a fact it cannot have existential import. Can't we say
that what is necessarily true exists, but is not a faci?

Ml I criticize the metaphysics out of which your question ariS^. I want
to re-emphasize the importance of internal rehlions as U did to A. For
examplCn it throw-s hght on the doctrine of the Trinity. VVc can be
brought to see that each person of the Trinity has no identity apart
from the others.

A: That notion is congenial to mCj and I have argued as much. The Son is
the Son by virtue of the Father, and the Holy Spirit Is what It is by virtue
of the Father and the Son. But this is not an example of a metaphysical
truth wliich would hold in all cases.

D: U says in his paper, 'It is true that coercive power can destroy and
kill, but only persuasive power can give life and evoke love.' [ do not
see this_ Surely coercive or persuasive power may destroy and kill.

U: I agree the matter is more coi^iiplex tlian tire way I put it 'Persuasive
power' is a shorthand way of referring to something I want to empha-
size. Much ot" what we are at present has been determined by the past,
but there is also the possibility of the novel in the occasion. This

2S6 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

depends on creative responses lo the possibilities which present them-

■^olvps from thr nsst.

selves from the past.

C: 1 think that tay persuasive power you mean a ceriain kind of power^
not ihc one poi%Tr whicli may be used persuasively or cocrcivcly. I am
reminded of Kierkegaard's remark liiaL love cannot conquer by force.
That marks out the kind of power love has.

f/r Agreed.

C: But now, correct me if I am wrong, 1 have heard Process theologians
speak in b way which disturbs me about God being limiEcd in what he
can do, as though this were a limitation- liut if God's only power is the
pow^ei of love, and love cannot eonquei by force (tliat is^ that sugges-
tion does not make sense), then it is highly misleading to call that a
ilmitatioTi, or to say, as some do, that God does the best he can, or that
God has jjood days and bad days.

U: 1 think the theologians you refer to arc anxious to rid us of a magical

conception of power where God is concerned.

C: I understand that, and accept the negative point. It has ahvays
seemed to me a jarring aspect of the Passion story when Jesus sa>^ that
If he wanted to he could call a legion of angels to get him off the cross.
It seems like a religious version of those bad films which end with
'Here comes the cavalry'.

No, It is the positive account of Process theologians which worries n\e
when they refer to limitations in God, and so forth. If love cannot con-
quer by force, it follows that it can be rejected. At the heart of Chris-
tlanlty is a radical rejection of love? a rejection so severe that it involves
tlie one w^ho reveals the love being deprived of an informed deadi, such
as that of Socrates. Instead he cries out, ^My God, my God, why hast
thou abandoned me?"" To reveal how^ far love can go, Jesus becocnes the
transparent vehicle for it, the price of w^hich is his sense of abandon-
ment. I am unhappy at calling this a limitation since, rather, it Is the
paradigm of the expression of what divine compassion is. So far from
being a llinilationj it Is said to be a full and final revelation.

I: In your autobiographical account [/, you told us of how you moved
beyond your early pietism, how you came to embrace a secular per-
spective, but, then, in time, moved beyond that. You gave up your old
objectivism and practised theological praxis. Why, then, have you
come to rest in Process thought? This seems to be a final resting place.

D,Z. niiilip^ 2S7

But, dialect ically, a genuine pluralism would ask to continue stTugglmK-
Arc you still struggling?

U: That^s fine. You speak as one who is open to wh^it Is new. So you're a
process thinker whether you like it or not. Bui, seriously, Tm certainly
seHI struggling. I want things to change- In these latter days 1 have
devoted more attention to economic factors than to technical issues in
philosophy and thcolog^^ There arc new movements I l:fcad to come to
grips with- Feminism made me rethink many questions. But I suppose
tlie biggest hurdle I had to face was Black Theology. 1 am a descendant of
a slave-owning family who were leaders of the Confederacy 5o these
matters w^erc painful for me. 1 was made to realize how many of our the=
ological calcgocies reflect certain assumptions ahoul White supremacy-
I could deal with Latin American economic issues far more easily than

1 could face up to Black Theology. So I am sLtll struggling. There arc
movements represented in Lhis conference, such as Postmodernism,
which I recognize as ha\1ng major implications for our times. If I were a
younger man I would have attempted to address It thoroughly. So 1 am
not complacent at alL

Voices in Discussion

D.Z. Philtips

In the last discussion session graduate studcnis adtiicsscd six questions
to some of the participants.

V: I have a question l:or V. When you arc attracted to notions of empti-
ness in Buddhism you seem tp see them as reflecting stales of reality
which are truer than other states of a more substantive kind. But isn^l the
reference to ^^cmptUies^' part of the giammar of a Buddhist pcrspccLlve
which is one among many?

U: You may well l>e rights and you ale ccr tainl)' entitled to advance that
view- All I can say by way of reply is that in my expertence the teachings
about 'emptiness' or the experience of it do not seem to be captured by;
your su^j^estion.

W: I spoke of a liberating totality in liberaticn theology. V™o-fe to
decide what is liberating? What oitc regards as liberating progress^
another may icgard as decline.

/: This reference owes much to the tradition of Hegel and Marx in
which society is seen as a totahty. LJut that totality' may be oppressive
and totalitarian. Now^ to the extent that there is a society at all there
will be a certain amount of agreeinent in language, law, customs, and
so on. But there will also be the cry of the oppressed^ since some laws
may be oppressive. A philosopher reflcciing on these soczial realiiieSn on
the importance of tradition and consensus, can also be a political
activist who seeks to bring about changes In those iaws.

X: I want to ask a related question of F. When Levlnas speaks of under-
standing and responding to the othcr^ the face of the other is the face of
the widow and the orphan. This pves the response a concrete context.

2SS

DZ. niiilip^ 2S9

But with Derrida, the matter seems open-ended, and so chaolic. ITie
face of llic other is any face. But what if it is the face of a killer?

F: Dcrrida does derive his views from Levin as. But he savs that there is
no set of rules which determines these matters. There is no hospitality
williout risk- It is not a formal notion. The homicidal rapist is not the
other. The otiier is tlie one who requires help.

5: As K pointed out in his paper, there are many concepts of truth in
rclij^toii. [ want to ask O and H, tlierelorej wliy this point cannot be an
answer to the difficullics of HalKrmas's criteria of vindication with
respect to religious belief,

O: I tliink the reason wliy I don^t want to embrace that response is that
it privatizes truth. Public vindication seems to be surrendered.

$: But, surely, yoti don't think that makes it a free-for-alL There are crite-
ria whicli arc internal to perspectives. People may take an absolute stand
oai ihese^ since^ as i said before 'absolute^ need not mean ^universat'.

O: I agree, but the evidence would stLll be extremely difficutt to assess.

H: 1 think the question shows the need for a critique of Habermas. How
do we look for a vindication of religious expcitence? it is not going to be
a matter of sLcaightfoiward inference. This is because it brings something
which cannot l>e found in the worlds but belongs to a notion of the lim-
its of the world- Habermas's public criteria need to be supplemented by
inner criteria which recognize the affective character of religious belief.
These criteria will involve spiritual and ethical values. Habernias can
never arrive at tliese as long as he bases future progress on whatever
the interests of people happen to be.

Y: I want to askA and K about their different notions of the relations
between belief and practice.

A: I want to distinguish between belief and practice, because what 1 do
about the beliefs I have is always a further question- Some beliefs are
more relevant to my purposes than others. I may learn as part of my
education that William the Conqueror invaded Britain in 1066^ but
that belief may have Jittle to do with my immediate purposes. 1/ I
believe in God I must still decide what I am goiiig to do al^out my
belief. The most natural and rational response is worship, but that is
only one response among a number to thai belief-

K: I think there arc important diffe^h^s tKtiveen t>elicfs- There are
thousands of empirical beliefs that 1 have which 1 am indifferent to.

290 Pfiih.wp!iy ofRi'lii^mr m ttn! 21%i Century

They have lltHc^ if any^ effect on mc. With others, like belief in ^avitYf
1 am certain and have no choice. With moral and religious beliefs it is
different a^ain. HerCn there are internal relations between belief and
practice. So I disagree with A. You can^t dislinguish beti^vcen a belief in
generosity and what you do about it. If I am never generous, then I
can't be said to believe in generosity, since to Ix^licvc in generosity is to
be generous- Belief in God is like this toOn since its primary form is
'trust in God'. This is ivhat believing in God comes to.

Z: Throughout the conference we have had different views expressed
about the relation of philosophy to religion. T want to ask A, U, G and /
to say what they think philosophy can do in tliis context.

A: Philosophy can help religion in a number of eonlexts. Firstp it can
clarify the crcdai elements in religion. Second^ it can assess arguments
for or against the tnith of religion. Gregory of J^yssa is a model in this
respect. Thirds a lot will depend on the way philosophy is practised- If
it Is done with analytic rigour, philosophy can help by giving a clear
presentation of the ideas involved in religion. So altliough religion does
not need philosophy's help In all contexts, it certainly does in some.

U: The strong separation of philosophy from religion is a problem of
modernity. If we look to India or China we see that piiilosophy is a
way of life. I prefer the ancient view to the modern akernative. I
believe philosophy can help us to say 'Christ is Lord of air, and that
dierefore there are gocxl philosophical reasons for saying diis.

G: Philosophy can certainly lielp rcltgjon in meeting ad ftoc objections
to it. But philosophers aren't omnicompetent in this respect. If, for
example^ someone tries to iink a religious movement w^ith economic
decline^ then what I need is not a philosopher, but an economist.
Simtlarly, philosophers can't tackle the problems of delinquency.

More positively, the model i am attracted to is that of Clement of
Alexandria, who saw the life of the mind, in our case philosophy, as
itself a mode of worship and thanks^javing. So to do one's best to
display what Christ's Lordship means for art. justice, and so forth, is, for
me, at the heart of my calling as a phalosophet. On the other hand, it is
important to recognize that philosophy can't save you,

J: I just want to re-emphasize two things I have said before. First, in
what philosophical attenticn asks of us in relation to the world, there
is a spiritual dimension. Second, in giving this attention there is often
a need to save religion from what philosophy has done to it. Hcre^ we
need philosophy to overcome philosophy-

Index

Abraham, 15S, 163, 179

anthropology,

■ L ^ -

acqu^iintance

psychology 197

belief, 54-5

teliyioHr 50^ 56

deductive argumentSr 54

anthropomorphism, IZ. Z55-6

entities, 53

apologetic arjfumients, 24-6, Mi

facts, S.^-4

apophaticSj ISB^ 174, 253

Addiiis^ MaiiSyn^ 22-i!i

Aquinas, Thomas (St},

Adams, l^bextf 24

deductive aryuirients, 6, 31

Adorno, Theodor W,^

existence of God, 104, 109-10, 2^

art, 221. 248

faith, 25, 32 '

Califcrnian exile, 19B

first principles, '^6

determinQle negation. 199. 219

methodoiog}^, 246

En Lighten mem, 199, 244

philosophical tlieism^ 4, 22

Frankfurt .Scl-Loof, 19:^

Aristotle,

Habeima-s, 2()h5-7, 221-2

creativity, 27

Hegel, 199-200

First Mover, 3

identity, 205

inference, 77

inatejia3i_sm. 205-6

metaphysics, 1S6

metaphysics, Zt>S

moral reasoning, 33

JiegatEve dialectics, 205

art, 200,221,233-4, 24H

positivism. 2(K>-1

athieism,

leflection and knowledge, 200

atrocities, 205

ae^hetics, z:^t)^ ZJSJi-5

InEeSlectua] passivity, 214

al-GhazalE, Abu Hamid Mohamraed^

Marxism, 198

metaphy.^Ecs^ 254

AJslon, William P., 2^i. 40, 51-2, 65

methodoJogica] atheism, 2J?0, 235j

American Academy of RelEgion. 263

246-7

analytical pJnLcxsophy,

pha3oso[^J:iicat theism, 5, 36

Continental ph][osophy, 17

sophistication, 4, 26

Tion-theastic religion, 33

theism compared, 2<>4

ontological arguments, 5, '^5

Wittgensteinianism, 4S, SS

RefoFQied Epi5temology, 15

Atonement^ 23-4

theistic re ij:ion. ?.?j, 65

Audi, Robert, 7S

Wiltgenstein^ 16

Augustine of Hippo (St),

Anselm CSt)j

behef, 56

belief, 109

CiV^fcssionSj 159

contempEation, 26

con temp ation^ 26

existence of God, 34^ 104

Derrida, 159-60

faith, 35

faith, 42, 49, SS

inquiry, 26-7

love of God, 1 74

ontclogical arguments, _1I4-Sj 110

Austin, Jolm Langsham, 164

religious fraiiLework^ -^^

Averroes, Ibn Kushd, 26

antecedent judgements, xii^ xv^ 32

A\'icenna (ibn 5ina), 26
291

292 Index

awareness, acquaintance Vkith entEtieSj

lequirements, 12

testimony, 77-S
tnith-reievant merits, 42-3

Barth, Karl, IZ

warrant see warrant theory'

basic beiief^

Way of Ideas theorists^ 50

ambiguous usaj^e, 46-7

Wittgenstein, 44, 46-7, 10<>-2,

ccmpetmijbeliefs. 90

127-8, 38-9

immediate heJief, 4Sj 47, 9L

belief formation,

lEiediationr 91

excellences, 69

properly basic, 15, 45, 79-BO, K6-B

inference, 5 1

wanant theory, 45^ 77

mediate/immediate processes, 32,

bnsica ists.

see aiso Reformed Epistemology

modes, 37

evidence, 66

Eentham^ Jeremy, 121

non-inferentaal justlhers, 57

Eerkeiey, George, 33, 121

Baudrillard, Jean. 155

Bernstein, Richard. 1S2

Bavinck, Herman, 42

Bible,

Bayes'5 Theorem^ 7, 10, i::^, 21, 32

apocalypse, 257

Beardslee, William A., 263

Bible God, 236, 259

belief.

Epistles see EpisEies

acquaintance, 34-5

graven images. 2<X1

basic 5ff basic belief

NT see New Testament

comnriunitv, 136

OT see 03d Te5tame]it

ccntinuity, 136

philosophical sense, 186

depth of ingressicn, 46-7

pnDcess thought, 253

empiricssm, 97, 102, 122

BlanchoE, 157, 161

evaluation, niodes, S7

Bloom, Allan, 1 56

evidentialisE challenge, 4K-30

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 163, 255

folly/foolishness, 1Z7-S

boundary, Zi:)4

hard-wired, 50, 90

Bouwsma, O.K., 4S-9, 86, R9

historic facE^, 1 35

Boyle ectuve5„ 24

ideally formed, 53—4

Brahman, 256

immediate see immediate belief

Bruce, RD., 91

inductive, 53

Buddhism. 256. 260, 273, 2S3, 2S8

Inference, 31, 34, 51, 77

jnstlflcation^ 73

Calvin^ John,,

mediate, 46, 51-2

faith, 25, 32

Hieiits set' doxastic m;erit5

religious anthropology, 50, 56

metaphysics, 34, 1<K>, 146-7

religious, knowing, 65

normal/ordinary/ieascnable, 127-S,

Calvin College, 4^ 49,86

L3C

' ■ r F ,

Calvin ians,

-■- - • • .

probability^ xia, xv, 7-11, 13-14, 23,

foundationaEism, 79-80, S7

32, 97, 122

neo-Calvanism, 41-2, 4^-9, 64, K3

pmpositional content, 54-6

Caputo^John D.. XEii, 153-66^, 167^

rational grounding. 43, 4S, 56

174, 176

rationality^, xii, 15j 34-5

Cartesian arguments, J^O-1, 157-3^

reasons, 43-4

199

Reformed Epistemology, 15, 27, 44

Cathoiics, 66, 2S1

leligious experience^ 31

causality, 25S, 261

Index 293

Cavell, Stanley, ! 16-17, 145, 147^

Wittgenstein ianism, 16, 103, U>6

ceitatnty.

Churchill, Winston S,, 89

fakh, 32, 137

Clarke, Samuel, 21-2, 24

fundamenEa isnir 167

classical foundationali^m, 41 j 4S,

unceitam beljef^ 12

4^-50, 52, SB

choBCEr order in the world, 32

Clement of .Alexandria, 42, BS, 290

Chopp, Rebecca. 155

CEimacus, 102

Cluislianr William A_, 178

Cobb, John B.^ xiv, xvi, 251-65,

Christian phalosopherSr rt-Jij^ious

266-73, 275, 277-6

philosophy, ku

coheFentist th^eory, 46, 52

Christian EheologianSr

ColeridjDre, 24

Atonement, 23

community,

cosmoSog)^, vi

belief, 136

desi^j^r 3

Derfidj. 162, li^l, 187

eschatcjoyVr l^i-'*

hospitality, 162

God's image, 12

pub ic interest, IBl

Lncanidtlonj 2?p

con^sion, 145^ 147

process thought, 252. 261. 266, 2B4

contempbtion,

Trinitv. 2:^ "

inquiry, 26

ChiistianiEyr

Plato, 90

Byddhism compjred, 260

prayer, 26

Calvinism sei^ Cdlvmians

Wittgenstein, 9CJ

C-aEholks, 66, ZSl

Wittgensteinianism, Kii, xiv

"CoheFeni worfdvleiv^ 265

Cooke, Maeve, xlli, 211-43

conversions, 4, 137

Copernicus, Nicolas^ 81

credibilitv,. 17S
J -

cosmo og>^

esi:hato]og5."r 133, 176-7

Christian theologians, 3

exEernal criticism;, 106

existence of God, 110, 131

Horkheimei, 214

Kalam, 26

intellectuals, 42

process thought, 251-2, 261-3, 2^8

Jesus Jt-f Jesus Chiist

Cieduiity' Principle^ 72

Judgement Day. 02-3, 146, 193

Critical Theory,

love, 2S6

Adorno see Adoino. Theodor W.

martyrdom, 23

discussion, 244-H

Method] sEs, 281

economic necessity, 196

Nietzsche, 106. 15t, 1B6

Frankfujt School, 193

perfectionism, 147

tiabcrmas .^t^e Habermas, Jiirgen

Puritans, i^Z

historical wrongs, 206

reasonableness^ 122

Hovkheimer ^ee Hoikheimer, Max

redemption, 128

justice, 211

fefofmed-Presbyterian tradition. 41

knowledge, 21 1

levelation of God, 2.SS, 25S

metaphysics, xiii, xv

salvation, 1 ZH, 1 i^S, 245

open project, 1 93

sJn, 116

practical intent, 21 1-43

suffering, 255

reason, 163

theism, 6S

reJiglon, 193-243

Trinity-, 23, 2£55

riva] programmes, 1 7

witness, 23:i

truth, 211

Wiltgenstein, 1^2-4, 137

cults, predictions, 132-3
293

294 Imii^x

cultural studies, 155

■^my leligion", 159

Cupitt. Don, 17

negative Eheo3og>^ 160, 167-9

c),"nkism^ 204

ontotheolog}-', 16K-9
openness to everything, xiii

Day, Doiothy, 16JE

Other without history and society.

d€ EoQT, Jesse^ 87

167-85

deconstmction^

postmodernism, 48, 158^^^

affirmaEion of imposBible^ 160-1

leligion as messianic hope^

ccncrete messiiinismi, 163

169-8?!^

detenninate it'Li>;ii;'nr 177

^I^on without religion, 15fi-9.

fajth, 175

174, 76, 187, 189-90

feminism. 2fi3

SE Augustine, 159-60

God, 169

spntencesj 17

hi^toric^i ur^encieSr 1713—4

singulaiity, 170-1, 177, 179, 1S2,

messsanic poitmodernism, 159, 161

187

modernist critiques, 158

Descartes^ Rene,

negativ^e theo3ogyr 16S^9

autonomous subject, 189

poiitics^ 178

Cartesian arguments, 80-1, 157-S,

proiiess thoughi, 26^^

199

scepticism, 14S, 182

criEicai of given, 17J5

totalities, 167, 1S2

design argument 3,, 110

wholly other, 161

determinacy, 169, 171, 174, 176-7,

iieduclive aiguments, 6, M^ 54

183

De3euze,GiJies, 155, 157

deEerminate negation. 199,206-7,

democracy, 156, 172-3, 177, 179, 1S6

212, 21S-9

DemociiEus, 99-130

determinism. 257

Denida, Jacques,

Dewey, John, 219

CirctimffssiGfs^ 155

diaEectics,

community, 162^ li^l, JS7

dialectical materialism, ZlZ-15

concrete messianisms. 163

Enlightenment, 19S-9

democracy 172-:^, 177, 179

negative dialectics^ 205

detemiinacy, 169, 171, 174, 176-7

difference.

diffefence, 16G^9, 171, J?:^, 175,

Derrlda, 168-9, 171, 173, 175, ISS.

IK.^, 1R6-S

1K6-S

discussion, li46-90

postmodernism, is:-i-4j 156-7

dogmflj ISS

WIttgensteinj xv, 1KB

ethical concerniir xv

disrourse.

^ait]-i, 179

5ff tiho Janguflge

hospitality. 159. 162, 164, 189

illogicahty. U>7-8

hyperousiokjgy, 16tJ, 16S

kenosis, 16S

impossible/possaHe, 161, 169

meaningfulness. 21

in-coming, 161-2

morality, 2S6

jQiJai:>m, 159-60, 16^

necessary conditions, xiv

justice. 162, 171-2, 177, 1K2, ISS

negative theo]ogy, 168

Levinas, 15H, ISO, 1B6-7, 289

postmodernism, 164-3

liberatioTi Eheology, 187

process thought, xiv

Jibing with other^ 187

super-facft, xvi

metaphysics, 1K6, 1S8

theology, 235

moral aporia, 181

Wittgensteinianism, kVi

Itui^x 295

divine,

en lilies^

^ff also God

acquaintance^ 53

-covenant. 13-3

existent things, 99-lCK>

mutabiht}'';, 254

epistemologyi

necessity^ ^^^^

sff atso foundationalism

omnipotenize, 258-9, 267, 269-70

empiricism, 121-2

omniiCBence, 256-7^ Z59, 267

epistemic hookup. 7^^., 75

simpJicity^ 42

epLstemic practices^ 57

dogma.

Kant, 20:i

Deirldla, 158

knowJedje, 121

dogmatizatlon, 167

meta-epistemology, 41, ^).

HoTkheimer, 198

psyche ogT.', 12^!>

RefoFTTied Eplatemology, 44

reformed sue Reformed

doxdslic evaluation, 58

Epistemologji-

DoxastEC Ideal^ 54-6

scepticism, 201-2, 205

doxastic meriti.

EplstJes^

evidence, 72

Corinthians, 12, 127-B, 13S, 150

foundationaiiani. 51-Z

Ephesians, 82

immediate belled, 44, 46-7^ 52

Romans, 3, 12, a2, 140

natural theoloj^^^ 44

St Augustine, 56

non-foundataonahst, 46^ 51

eschatoSogjr, 133-4, 169. 172, 176-7,

p3uraljty/mu[t][j]6city, 4.^., 6S

182

raEionaEit}-;, 6^

essentiahsm, 133

doxasiic pracEiC'CS^ Bti

ethics, 171,233, 2544

doxastlc sickness^ 69

Evans, C, Stephen, 27, 32

doxastic sin, 69

evidence,

Draper, P^ul. 23

antecedent udgements^ Kii, 32

Duns Scotus. John, 4, 284

basjca lists, 66

communitarian relation, 72, S6

Eckhart, Johannes (Measterj^ ISOf

criteria. IS

275

cumulative effect, 31

Edwards, Jonathan, 21-2, 2S, 27, i^Z

doxastic merits^ 72

EitiotEon, i^llh, J^C*

e>Li5tence of God, 7-8, 13, 31

^nipincisniij

inference^ 66-7, 69, 76-K

behet 97, 102, 122

Jesus Christ, 11, 66

British phi oRophy, 121

language, 133—4

empirical laws, 24

neutral evidence, xii

epistemiology, 121-2

predictions, 132

■eKisteniie of God^ 109

reasons, 97-8

process thought, Z51. 26B-9

theisEic beliefs, 66

emptiness, 256, 28S

warrant theory, S6

Engeis, Friedrich, 19S

evtdentialism,

Enlightenitientj

challenge, 48-50

dialectic, 198-9

deficiencies, 65

morality. 230

foundationahsm. 76. 79, 87

nan'ow concept, 2f)L

nanow conception, xii

negation of optimism^ 244

persuasive argument, 32

pessimism, I9S

polemical partners, 66, 76

lationaEity, xii, 4i, 153, 177

rationality-evidentiahsmj 69-71, 76

296 Jmii^x

e^identialism - contimitd

justification, 103!

lesiTonse to Wolteri^trifff, 64-82

ontotheology, 16H-9

sensib e evidenti^ i^m, 72^3, 75-6,

process thought, 252

Bl-Z

seeing jtv

warrani theory^ 73-6

theoretical activitj", 51

ei-il^

virtue^ 11, 25

evidential prob em, 2j

faUit/^ 14fi.279

God's tzlnizum^ 2i

feminism, 262-3, 2S7

greater goods, 13

feuerbachj Ludwig, 197, 24J

moral re&ponseivr 144

fideism, 16, 103, lOB, 125, 130-1

existence of God^

Flew^ Andrew, 2

Christian theologians^ ■^^

Flint, Thomas. ZI-2

confirmation theory, 7

Foucault, Michel^ J5S

cosmoloj^^, IU\ 131

foundationalism^

cred^E Llatiiss^ 5

bipartite structure definitive, 52

deductive arguments, 6, li]

Calvinians, 79-80, 87

empirical hypofhesiSj 109

classical, 41, 45. 49^0, 52, SB

evidence, 7, 8, i:^, 31

doxastic merits. 51-2

HorkheinseT, 205

evidentiaEism, 76, 79^ 87

inductive arguments, 6, ':^\

evidentialist ciiallenge, 50

inference, il, 34

mediate/immediate distinction, 46,

logical necessity, S. ]54

52,91

natural tlieolog>^, S, 6, 7-L4

Tion-founda£iona9ism, 46, 51

objections, 1 1-4

opposition, 45-6, 49

onEological arguments see

Reformed Episteitiolog}", 76, 87

onlclogical arguments

franc Es de Sales, 17

Protestants, 4

Francis of Assise ^5t:i, 148

sophisEicated arguments, 12

Freddoso, Alfred, 21-2

Wittgenstein, 9S-3^ 100-L

Frege, Friedrich, 120

existential questions.

Freud, Siginund, 65, 106, 144

plnEosapliv. xiv, 268-9

fundamentalism, certainty, 167

process thought^ xiv^ xvi, 26S-9^

27S

Gealy, Waiford, xiii, 119-43

externalism, 73-6, SO-1

Genera Relativity iGTR^ 8
Gier, Nicholas, 264

iacls,

God,

acquaintance, 53-4

see also theism

anthropology, 5C, 56

sacrifice, obhgations, 179-80

Buddhism, 256, 260, 275, 2S3, 2SS

St Anselm see AnseEm

Christian see Christianity

St Augustine sef Augustine of Hippo

Critical Theory, 193-24S

St Francis of j\ssist, 14S '

Deirida, 158, 169-83, 187, 1S9-90

St Irenaeus, 17

306 Jjet/fJt

St Paul,

Socrates, 114, 164, 2S6

belief, 12

Sokal, Alan, 155^6

Chrastaanlty, 17

^nui. substance, 17, 104

docCrmal falsityr J46

Special K, 75, 79

Epistles iee Episiles

Stalin, Joseph, 19S

'mvis!bEe things' of Gotf, H

Stump, Eleonore, 21

natural] theoJogy, H2

suffering and pain, 13,23, 113-14,

wis-dom, 12K

255

St Thomas see Aquinas, Thomas

super-facts, discourse, xv\

sca].iegoat ritCj lOS-6

superstition, 104, 106-7, 109-10,

sceptitism^

146

deconstmctioax. I4S. I8Z

Swinburn-e^, Richard, xli, xv, ^-21, 2.3,

eplstemology, 201-2, 205

25^,91

Horkheimer, 201-5, 244

Hume, IZZ

TayEor. MarkC-, 155

pessimism, 203

teleoiogicaE argument, 131

sin, ]40, 145, 147

Thales, 2i^4

Scheler, Max, 194

thcismj

Stlilei-etmacher^ FriedrJch, 24

scff tiho God

scholastics, 21

analytical pJiiiosophy, 22, 65

Schopenhauer, Arthur, 19K, 201, 203^

Christianity, 55

205-6, 244

doctrines/proofs, 2'^4

science,

Hartshorne, 264

rvewton'i Jaws, 10

Hume, 12

philosophy, 269

language, 62-3

positivism, 200-1

naEura] theology, 5, 82

posEniCMlernisnfi, 1 55-6

philosophical theology, ]-20

probaL>i;illy^ i^'A

Teligions, 5, 22^ 31^, 65-6, S2

Quantum Theory, 7

St Thomas Aquinas^ 4^ 22

scientism, 122

theology.

Whitehead, xiv, 282

btack theo]og>; 287

S€afle,John, 164, IKS

Christian see Christian theologians

secular hopes, better world, xiii

discouf se^ 235

seeing, taith, xv

liberation theolog}^, 187, 262-S, 2B8

self-lnteiesE, goodness, 11, 25

natural see natural theology

sensations, 50, 90

negative theology, 160, 167-9, 174

' SilesiuSj Angelus, 1 60

ontotheology, 168-9

simplicity.

philosophicaS stv philosophical

disposition. Bl

theology

divine simpEtcitVr 42

Wittgenstein. 131-7

plau5ibilaty, ^^5

Tillich, Paul Johannes, 60, 175, 204,

sinfuEne:>s,

271, 275

divine covenant^ 13J-J

totalitarian oppiesyon, 179^ 1B2

fieedom from sin, 106

totalities.

human disposition, 116

deconstniction, 167, 1B2

Original Sin, 117, 140, 145

Identity. 1S7

scepticism, 140, 145, 147

liberation theo3og)v 288

singuiaFir>', 170-1, 179, 18Z, 1S7

Trinity, Z3, 283

Siva, 26

tnisl, xv^ 49

Itui^x 307

truthj

creativity, 256, 271

CiUicaJ Theory, 211 .

criticism of abstractions, 26S

Habeimas, XEii, 207-S, 221, 224-7,

deconstniction, 26J-5

23 1-7, 245, Zfi9

diiine muEabilitj', 254

Horkheimei, 196, 20:i-4, 213-Zl,

experience, 272-3

225^, 23]

God, 255-6, 270-1

'Janus-face', 225, 232

metaphysics, 17, 271, 278

postmodernism, 17^ IS

ontological arguiTientSj 271

pragmatism, 187^ 224^ 22S, 231-2^

physical prehensions, 253, 25£ii^ 272

245

process thought^ 251. 266

Kllgious truth, 231-7, 245

science, xiy 2S2

truth-relevant merirs, 42-3

specu]ative phi cisrsphy, 282

unconditionaJity. 22S-6

whol3y othcr^

Wjltgejisleinianisiiiy 146

sff also oth^r
deco]"istmction, 161

Udayana, 26

determinacy 171. 176

ultimate rea ity, process thought, xiv

God, 169-70, 1B6

universe^

hospitality, 162

beauty 9-10

messianic, 177

large hypothesis, 13-14

negative theology", 168, 174

natural laws, ]f)-ll

paradox, 157

unobser\'able causes, 13

prayer, 170

utopianism^ 221-2, 245

religion, 169

d'n''"Vi

Wieman, Henry Nelson, 251, 2S2

Vedanta^ 256

Winch, Peter, 8S, 111-15, 117, 124,

Vedas, 26

140, 145, 148

virtue.

wisdom, 12K, 2K3

faith, 11, 25

wise men, 34, 128

warranted beSlef^ 27

Winsenschaflsiebre, 51, 5?^
Wittgenstein, Ludwig,

Wainwright, WlMlamJ_, xii, xv, 21-30

beEtef, 44, 46-7, lGO-2, 127-8,

warrant theory^

13Ei^9

basic belinf^ 45, 77

Biblical texl: misunderstood, 127-S

cognitive fatilities, IS

Rtuc and Bro\\'n Boaki, 12?

DoxastEC Ideal, 56

Christianity, 1:^2-4, 137

entir ementj 73

commitmenE, 100

evidence^ 86

contemplation, 9i>

evldentiaJisiit, 7.-^-^

Citttitre ami Vahit^, 96, 9S, 100, 137

p]i]l<jsc"jphical actounts^ 13^ 51-2

difference, kv. 188, 246

TaEionaiit^', 15-16, 75

discussion, 144-50

reliabihst theories, 7'A

eariy views, xiil. 120

virtue, 27

i'ltie ExhtenZj 99-100

Way of Edeas theorists, 50

cpistemology, 120

Weil, Simone, 17

existence of God, 9R-101

Welch, Sharon, 155

intelligibihty, 122^^, 130

Weston, Michael, 1S8

interpretation of religion, 96-103

Whitehead, AlfrudNorth^

know3*:dge, 115-16, 120-1

causahty 258

language, 15, 4^, 47, 111, 120. 122,

cosmology, 252

124-7

?t08 Imii^x

Witlgenstein, Ludwig - ■fONtTFJUfrf

Tjod-^talk^ 57, 60-2

Lecturer and Couwi'sati^u^, 96-7. 99>

human life, 59

124-9, 131-4, 144-7

interpretation of reJagion, 103-1 L

language, 47, 59, 6Z-3

logical positivism^ 4/

language gaaites see language

metaphy-sics, 1(K>, 147, 284

games

morality, \??4, 140

methodology. 95

0}2 Certamty, 46-7, BB, 129

ontoiogica^ aigumentSj 1 10

philosophers, 90

Phillips, 16,44^, 57^2, 103-6,

riuiosopiiiait Im'esti^atiofis, MZ,

11(3-11

125-7, 129-31, 133-4, 141, 147

phi osophy of rehRion, 58

pictures, 99, 107

process fhouglit, 264, 26K

polemical partner, 47

lefertln^ toGod, SH

predictions, 3^^1-3

Reformed Episteniology

psycholGgjr^ 120

distinguis led, 4K^9, 5S, 61-Z,

feasonableaiess, 127-8, U(J, 132

a5^, 81i

Reroihctions cfWittgensteifi, 96

TeLigion Immune to criticism, xiii^

religioEi. xii, 16, 46-7, 9S-117^

103, i08, 144

119^3

Tival programmes, 16-17

TCttgious contepEs, 97

self-contained religion, 16

leMgious interpretations, 111-17

superstition, 104, 106-7, 109-10

fesponse to MulhaJI, 119-43

the] Stic languLige, 62-3

spiritual fervour, 1 1 1

truth/falsicy, 146

taken foi grant-ed, 47

worship^ 59

theoJogVr 131-7

Wcllerstorff. Nicholas, scil, 14, 39-63,

rmifr^ffcd.s. 122, 125-7, 129, l?ll.

64^, 68, 73, 78-80

137, 141, 145, 147

Wood, Jay, 27

wisdom of the wise, 12a

worship. Wattgensteinlanisnij 59

Wittgenstein ianism,

Wykstra, Stephen, xii, ^9, 64-B4

atheism, 4S, fiS

Wynn, Mark. 14

belief, 47

Christianity, 16, 103, i06

Yankelevitch, VJadimar, 157

ccnteiciplative character, xii, xiv

discourse, xvi

Zagzetaski, Linda, 27

fideism, 16, 103, 108, 125, 130-1,

ZaraEhustra, 161

144

Zen, 256

JoimD. Capiito 161

'the impossible^ The impossible Is to be distinguished from the ^possi-
ble', which means lor lilm the 'relatively' othcr^ ivh^iL Is no move Lhan
3 new move in an old Ramc, the future that 15 foreseeable, plannable,
programmable- Deconstruetion is the affirmation of the 'wliolly oilier^
of a new ^mc altogether, of an unforeseeable surprise, in virtue of
which ibe current order is kept in principle 'open^ or ■'deconstmcttble'.
To the coming of tiiis wholly othcr^ wc say 'yes', and 'yes' again^ oui,
oui, since every yes demands a follow throuj^h which keeps its hands to
tlie ptougli, lest the resolve slacken or the repetition become rote.
Deconstruetion says yes to Tifsventhn de i'iiiiire\ where hiventiofi should
not be translated as 'Invention', which would surest the Dionysian
play of Nictzsehean fictions, but tendered tather in messianic terms, as
the 1n-com1ng of the others in keeping with its Latin roots, uf-veiiiem.
In the military if someone shouts 'incoming', everyone heads tor cover.
But, in messianic postmodernism to shout ^incoming' is to proclaim
the good news, which Is why the proper response 10 the incoming, and
the first, last and constant prayer of deconstruetion, is to shout, to
pray, 'viej^-f, i?ur, oul'.

According to an old rabbinical story that Derrida finds Iq Bianchot,
the Messiah never arrives. His vtry meaning is to be always^ structurally
to come, a ve}isf, so that if he ever showed up, ever actuaHy appeared, he
would ruin everylhing.^^^ The coming (Vi.'j»it^) of the Mcssiaii, lilanchot
said, must never be confused with his actual presence (presence).
Indeed^ if one day he did show up incognito, we w-ould ask hiin 'When
will you come?' The coming of the Messiah belongs to what Derrida
calls the ^absolulc^ future, the future which is structurally futural,
always to come^ hot the future present, the future that will roll around
into presence sooner or later. For If the Messiah ever came into tiie
present, history would close and we would have no more futuie, no
more hope. What would there be left to come? {to adapt Zaratliustra's
complaint). Even in Christianity, which from the point of view of the
rabbis is too impalient^ wheie It is believed that the Messiah actually
did come, everyone now^ wants to know, 'when will he come again?'
For it belotigs to the very idea of the future^ of hopc^ of historyn that the
>v^essiah is still to cof^e. Furthermore, and this is a point of great impor-
tance for Derrida^ if the Messiah were actually to come, to become pre-
sent, a war would surely break out over what language he spoke, what
nation he visited^ where his capital is to be ii^slalledn who is to be his
vicar and hold his ke^^, who is authorized to speak In his name, who is
authorized to say wliat he said and what he meant, or to translate it into

162 Phihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

Other languages, and who has the power to exclude and excommunicate
those who disagree with (he authorized interpretation of what he said.
(If the absolute truth ever amvedj who could he trusted with it?).

The affirnialion of llie iii-coming of the wholly other, Derrida will
now sa^j is the affirmation of the 'justice' tocomCj where justice has the
sense not of a Greek universal hut of the justice due lo the 'singutar'
qhEh to the one whose every tear and every hair has been counted by
God, to the outcast, the outsider, the 'widow, the orphan, and the
stranger'j to use the biblical figure that Levinas invokes. In deconstruct
tioiij the 'kingdom of God' would be a kingdom of nobodies^ of what
t*au! called hi me o^ta. The point of Etenida's messianic is to hold the
present up against the white light of absolute future, of absolute justice,
which means the justice which is ahvays to come, wliich prevents the
present order from closing over on itself and declaring itself just, or well
on the way to justice, in a perfidious asymptotic progress that tolerates
an intolerable amount of misery."^ The affirmation of justice in decon-
struction is the affirmation of 'hospitality' to the other, of making the
other welcome. LSut to offer hospitality to the 'wholly other' is to
expose yourself to a 'surprise', to being overtaken by what you did not
see comings to get more than you bargained foi, since liospitality is not
supposed to be a bargain but a gift. The notion of hospitality puts a
stress on the idea of a 'community^ which on one etymology means
com-mtmir^, to butM a defence (miimre) around (com) oneself, lo protect
oneself against the other Tliat is the very opposite of deconstruction
whose very idea is to make the other welcome, the wholly other, the
other whom I cannot circumscritae in advance by preconditions. Uut
liow can one welcome the other 'unconditionally'? Are we to open the
banquet to every passer-by? Whoever heard of such a thing? But then
againj how could one he conditioiiatly hospitable, 'welcoming^ only
those wliom one has carefully chosen in advance and only subject to
certain conditions? Tliac is not a true welcoming but a closing off, a pri-
vate list, a closed circle of Invitees. Conditional hospitality is as incoher-
ent as conditional love, as loving someone but only up to a point, after
which w^e lose interest.

Thus, far from being a philosophy of despair, as its critics claim, this
form of postmodernism turns on messianic hope ivictis). Far from l^Ncing
nihihstic, it is deeply affirmative, otii, out Far from being rclativistlc and
capricious, it insists upon the uncircumventable responsibility of the
subject to the other From reducing everything to subjectivistic play of
traces or sigtiifiers, it is organized around alterity, indeed around the
wholly other.

foSmD. Caputo 163

A problem

The largest sticking pointy the main difficulty, ivhich racssmnic post-
modernism poses to 'the philosophy of religion' has to do with Dcrrida's
intractable suspicion of what he calls the 'eoncjetc messianisms\ the
historical religions of the Book, which on Dcrrlda's account have a his-
tory of violence built righl into them. The power ol" the messianic on
Derrida's accounling is precisely its indeterminacy, Its structural emptl-
nesSj the resistance it puts up against Ihe closure of the present or
prevailing orders that blocks off in advance any claims of exclusivity on
the part of any religion or of any determinate body of dogmatic claims
that may take itself to be tise icvcalcd word of God. As an Algerian
(Arab) Jew- who speaks (Christian Latin) French, Elerrida ts deeply
impressed by the capacity of the reli^ons of the Book to wage war on
one another, on the ability of the children of Abraham to slaughter one
another tn the name of God. If his disUnction between Ihe concrete
messlanlsms and the formal messianic does not mduce to a dlstLncllon
bctw^een war and peace^ that is at least an important part of its import.
The ;.»'H possible, the justice to noma, precludes in advance che claim of
any confession or any tradition to exclusive or definitive truth. One
needs Lo proceed witli caution here. On the one hand^ one needs to
avoid dismissive gestures that would ignore the pow='erful force for jus-
tice that stirs w^itliln the concrete iiicssianisms, a force that nourished
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Martin Luther Kin^, and Dorothy Day and count-
less otlierSn famous and unknown alike. On the olher hand^ such wit-
nessing strengthens faith, but it does not pass over ii^to knowledge^
because people can witness with their lives and deaths to entirely
different things. In a deconstructlve philosophy of religion, the con-
crete messianisms might be tmique but never exdusive or defiifitlw, each
longing and sighing in its own way for the tout uutre, each praying and
weeping in its own way over the name of God. Bui none of them is
relieved of the need to ask^ without having a secret answer up its
sleeve^ ^md f^tj iutm, cum liettm meum umo?

Convergences

The line of thought that runs through this second^ messianic version of
posttnodernism converges with other approaches on at leasl tw^o points.

(1) Postmodernism does not reject reason^ as Us critics charge^ but
rather, like critical theory, postmodernism has redescritKd ^reason' in

164 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

intcrsub|ccHvc terms. Reason in postmodcrntsm is not a subject-
object iclationship enacted within the solilaryj nionological confines
of a 'pure' reason, whose very purity removes it from history, lan^age
and the human community. Rallicr^ like critical theory^ 'reason^ for
posmiodcrnists ts a relationship of spcakinj; subject with speaking
subject and so reason has the sense of 'reasoning together^ But by
rejecting the solitary ahistorical subject^ postmo-dernhniH unlike critical
theorists^ go on to reject the Tmnscemk'tit^iU^m of liabermas's notion of
communicative rationalit)', the notion that intersubjective communi-
cation is guided from wiihin by ahistorical laws of rationality, which
it regards as just so much ahistorical modernism or neo- Kantianism.
Furthermore^ postmodernists regard consensus not as the goal of
communicationj but simply as a temporary pause in the conversation-
Otherwise, the goal of communication would be silence. Were every-
ojic saying the same thing, there would be no reason to say an^^^hing.
The idea behind the multiplication of voices - chc story of Babel - can
liardly be to speak nfin \^oce, for where there is one voice there is no
voicCj where there is only one mterpretationj no interpretation is
allowed. The idea of ^reason' that is astir in postmodernism turns on
the idea Ihat the hiti^uage of the wholly other is the lan^age of the
whoUy other, that Iho wholly other always offers a surprise. These words
come to me from the other shore; they arc not my words^ not some-
tiling 1 already know in principle. The idea of reason in postmod-
ernism is deeply opposed to any version, direct or indirect^ of Socratic
tmijeiitks, but rather, like Kierkegaard, it turns on the model of the
teacher, the one wlio comes over me with something 1 do not know, so
tiiat reason means learning how to welcome the wholly othcr^ and rea-
son is a form of hospitality.^-

(2) The attempt to open up a post-secular discourse, to repeat or
rcinstitute religion in a post-critical or post-modern way to re-establish
the rights of religious discourse after modernist critiques have run
their course, is closely tied up with the notion of laaiguage games ii:L
Wittgenstim. That claim is documcntable in Derrida^s early interest
in Austin, which Scarle uttcfly confounds^ and It Is quite exphcit In
Lyotard. who makes extensive use of \\^ittgen stein in The Post7t\0{ieni
CamUthfi, fast dmung, and The Different I'he point is plain. Religious
discourse is another and irreducible way to think and speak, religtous
practices anotherj irreducible way to tx^. Postmodernism resists mightily
the hegemony of o^'crarchlng discourses or metalanguages into ■which
other discourses are to be assimilated, reduced^ or translated without
remainder. Postmodernists are committed to the irreducible plurality of

foSmD. Caputo 165

discursive practices and rules^ and they resist at c^'ciy turn (he notion
that there is a privileged access to ihc things tiictiisclves that is the
exclusive province of a particular discipline, natural language, iTaditlon^
mysLical experience, or religious faith^ which is why in postmodernism
'religious discourse' itself refers to a plurality of language games, to
many dilferenl traditions, saying many different things. Postmodernists
think that there are many way^ for tilings to be and many ways to
speak- The story of the lower of Babel is one of their favourite biblical
narratives, putting God^ as it does^ on tiic side of the deconstructors of
tall towers^ monolingualismj and univocity.

in tiie end, to come bacl^ to my initial distinction between Dionysian
and messianic postmodernism^ one would not gel things right until
one could see the porousness of this distmctionn the way these two

bleed into and coniniunicate with each olher^ the way if I niay say so^
the postmodern religious sage would have to take the impudent form
of a Dionysian rabbi-

Notes

1. Mark C- Taylor and Jose Marquez, 7>]f K^at: Lais Vegas^ NV. A CD-ROM.
(Chicago: University of ChEcago Viesf^, 1998]_

2_ Cambrklge: Harvard University Pres5^ 199S.

3- Brian Ingiattla, Pa'itniOiieni Theory iuict Bihiicai Theijh^' (C^ainbriJgeL Cam-
bridge University Press^ 1995 >_ Conlrarv' lo hi^ title^ Ingraiha presents us with
a rigorous either/or: eittier poslniodem theory or biblical theoSogy, but no
mBKin^! His criticisms of Derrida make the staaidard mistake cf assimiEjiting
Derricia to Nietzschean postmodernism and mining Derrida's 'messianic' side.

4. Emmanuel Levinas, Totniiity an^i I^ifjtiityt trans. A_ Lingis (Pittsburgh:
Duque'ine UniversEty Press, 19S93, p. 64_

5_ Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Detiti}, iran:^- David Wilb (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1995], p. 49.

6_ In these thinkers both premodem religious, and postmodern themes are
made to Intermingle in a fascinatrng way. an intermingling aptly captured by
the phrase 'post-secuEar'. Post-secuiar thinking rejecis the narrow, abstract
and ahistorical concept of rationality put forth by the Enlighteaiment^ and in
particular the reduclionistic tendencies of Enlightenment rationality. TotaJiz-
ing. elaminationist^ reduction istic critiques of leltgkon, whether based upo]i
the universal sweep of physics i naturalisml. econonnics (Marji), or the uncon-
scious (freudlj are just more tentacles of th^ Aufkiciruti,^ 'rying to consume
everything on its plate.

7. At this point T am only adumbrating an argument de^^^d[oped in detail in
John D- Caputo, Tiie Prayers nmi Tet^rs of JiWi^m's Derriihi: Reil^io!} wittioiil

166 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

Rt'ii^^Um (Bloomington: Tndiana Univeisity Press^ I???]; foi a correlative but
more mtrnrMluctory s-tudy to the lat-er Derrida, which is where these religious
thematics aie to be founds see /Jfro?f5tn/4."Ceflj? j>] n \htt*^fir^U! ti ('om'ersntii^n
with factju^i D^niiiii, edited with £k comnii^ntary by John D_ Caputo iNew
Yoik: Fofdham Unaversity Press, 1997J.

K. 5£'f Jacques Durrtda and Geoffrey Bennin^on, Jiici^ies Dcrmlu, trans. Geoffrey
KL']:iniiTigton (Chicago! University of Chicago Press^ 1993.1^ pp. IS^^S. Tor a
lengthier commentary an Circonfessiou, 5^ my Prayers lij?J Te^irs of J{icijues
D]frrkt€if VI, 'CQnfession\ To this pcstrriodern interest in Augustine should
be added the work of the lare Jean-Framfois l.yotard, who at the tir:ie of liis
death was writing a lx>ok about St Augustin-e's Confe.'i.-iWiss, the work of the
ILiigtish theologian John Mtthank, and the recent publication in the (ii^:uws'
tnii.'s^abt of Heidegger's 1920-21 lectures on the Lett£rs to the Tiiessah^iitins
and the Tenth Book of the CGufessian^f commentaries which 9ie at the heart
of the 'genesis' ot Heiug (\ntl T!n?e.

9. iVf Caputo, Ttie P^aj.'en iimi Tea^s offac^jues Derrudu^ 1^ The Apophatic\

10. See NsitiMi, pp. 24^5, 156-SO.

11- T3ial is the argument of Specters ofK-Iarx fKew York^ Routledge, 1 994 J against
the liberal euphoria of the new world order, invoking the :>pectre of Marx. Ln
messianic terms thai go back to Waiter benjamin.

12- See Levinas, Totaiity ami Infinity, pp. ZOl-4, 216-19, 252.

The Other without History and
Society - a Dialogue with Derrida

Let mc begin by congraiulaling Professor Capuco for his very lucid pre-
sentation of postmodernism and its potential as a f philosophy of religion.
I also want to thank him for writing two very helpful hiLioduc Lions and
commentaries on Derrida, Decofistivction in a Nut^ht'H: a Conversation witli
fiiafiics Demdti and The Fmycrs lusti Ttws of Jciajues Desmhi: KcU^hu witlscut
Reli^^ion^ Pnjyers and Teiirs, espccia^y, is a masterpiece of exposition.
anal)^is^ andcomposilion, which 1 would erilhusiaslically recommend lo
aU students of Derrida. So much of what lie says in the paper presupposes
his much more elaborate and exleiisive analyses in ihese two works. My
dialogue will be primarily with Dcriida and his worlvS^ and with Professor
Caputo in his two works as interpreter and defender of Derrida.

The spectre of Derrida has Ijccn haunting the western intellectual
world for some three decades now. His iTicssagc has been getting across.
Totalities tend to totalize and oppress. Identities tend to exclude
and marginalize, Dogmas dogmatize, and systems produce closure-
Messianic claims spill blood. Fundamentalist claims to certainty and
definitivcness create hell on earth. Hence the need to subvert total [ties,
disrupt the same^ complicate simplicities^ problematizc the complacent
contaminaLe the pure, and destabilize alt systems and fundamentalisms,
by exposing them to the shock of alterltyj the demand of the other^ the
trauma of the uiiexpected. 1'hat ts^ to deconstruct. Deconslruction is
'the delimitation of totalization in aM its forms^^ the thought of 'an
absolute heterogeneity that unsettles all the assurances of the same
witliin which we comfortably ensconce ourselves'.^

In the area of [eii^icn Derrida's deconstiuctlon has been most chal-
lenging in his treatments of negative dieologv^ and the messianic, Ehe
first showing what God should not be, the second what (jod should be
without being.

167

168 Phih.'iGplTy ofRi'lightu m the 21it Century

Derrlda's deconstruction of nej^ative theology

Deirida discerns two different voices in iiegaEive theology. The first

voice is hypcrousiology. Even though negative theology denies the
possibility of attiibuting names to God and places God beyond all
iiames, it docs not stop at negation but affirms God precisely in God's
hypcresscntial reality. It is a higher^ more refined niodalizalion of
ontotheology, a variation en the metapliysics of presence.'* For all Its
negations, it claims deep down Lo 'know' what God is. The God of
negative thcologj"^ in facl^ turns out to be 'a transcendental signified^
die dream of being without diffenuKi^, of bein^ outside the text, outside
the general tcxtj outside the play of traces'/^ Negative theolog>^ feels as
secure in its possession of an object as positive theology; it is a triumph
of presence over representation.^

There is^ however, another voice in ne;^ative theology. As an inuption
from the depth, it expresses a yearnings a movement^ a passion for the
wholly other of which we all dream and by whicli wc iccl addressed, a
deeply affirmative desire for 'something always essentially other than
the prevailing regime of presence^ something tout autie'7 It embodies a
passion for the impossible, a movement of transgression over and
beyond the present, a response to a primordial promise. It embodies
the spirit of relentless critical negation tn pursuit of an ultimate that
always remains wholly other^ a kind of a generalized apophatics^ a
Tcenosis of discourse'.** Everything must pass through 'the aporias of
negative theolog\^'', and only a discourse 'contaminated^ by negative
theology can be trusted.^

What does deconstruction do for negative theology? Deconstruction
does not provide a secuic foundation or a horizon for the intelligibility
of tlie content of negative theology- Instead, by reinscribing or resituat-
Ing negative theology within tlie general movement of the trace^ dif-
fera}fc^, and undccidability, within all the multiplicities and ambiguities
of language and history, the basic situation of all human exfKrienee
according to Derrida, deconstruction preserves faith as faith, as some-
thing 'blind^ without the privilege of savoir, avoir, nthi voir^ both accen-
tuating the passion of faith as faith struggles to take a leap and decide
for the impossible in the midst of the very undecidability that consti-
tutes its vcrj' structure^ and maintaining faith as an indeterminate,
open-ended groping and hope in the wholly other Difference precludes
the possibility of knowledge, vision, or face-to-face tuilon with God, as
it always recontextualizcs faith, exposing it to indefinite substitutions,
translations, aiid interpretations. Ontothcology takes faith as a mode

^?j_«J^?j Kyo^i:s;^uk Miu 169

of presence outside the movement of diffemnce and the play of traces and
turns it into something secure^ positive and closed^ geiiciaLmg the pcrnU
etous dangers of absolutism and triumph alism inherent in all fundamen-
talisms and all 'doternii liable' faiths. "'Closure spells trouble, ...closure
spells exclusion, cxclusiveness; closure spills blood, doctrinal, confcs-
stnnsi, theological, poliMcatj LnslUutional bloody and eventuially^ it
never fails, real blood/*"^

Rtliijion as messianic lit>pe

For Derrida, religion is a response to the call and demand of the wholly
other, an invocation or prayer ('comcD for its advent, and the mes-
sianic praxis of justice here and now corresponding to that invocation
and demand.

The 'object' or 'God' of this religion remains the Vholly olher^
resisting all reduction lo a humaii concept, category or horizon. It lies
beyond all human imagination, credibility, graspability or deter-
minability, beyond all human logos, tclcologicajj, eschatological and
otherwise. In contrast to the God of ontotheolog}^ who remains Infi-
nlteiy and eternally the Same'^^ and in fact ^thc name of indifference
itsetr,*^ the God of de construction is:

the name of the impossible, of novelty, of the coming of the Other,
of the tout rtiibi, of what is coming with the shock of an absolute
surprise, wiih the trauma of absolute hclero^cneiry\ Gast in a decon-
structivc slant, God is not the p-ossibJe but the imjx>ssiblCj not the

eternal but the futural.-^'^

There is no transcendental horizon within which God can be awaited,

expcctedp or made knowable; God shatters all human horizons.

Dcrrida is especially insistent that the wholly other is beyond all
determination or determinacy. A determinable future, with a deter-
minable telos, is a future that can be anticipated within the horizon of
a particular aim, of what Is possible, and thus a future as present- Pres-
ence, possibility, determinacy: these arc, for Dcrrida, one and the same-
The fumre of the wholly other Ls an 'absolute" future, a future absolved
from the regime and horizon of presence and identity, from whatever
is presentable, programmable, imaginable, foreseeable, beyond the tra-
ditional dualisms of essence and existence, universal and particular,
Ideal and real. The wholly other is 'structurally' and therefore ""aiways'
to come. It is precisely the function of the wholly other to shatter and

170 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

shock the horizon of the same and forcscciiblc and open up the
promise and possibility of something wholly other The wholly other is
Identifiable with neiiliet a determinable faith nor a determinable
messiah nor a determinable end of hisLory nor a determinable degree
of justice. It is also to be distinguished from any Utopian or Kantian
re^lative ideal, which foo has its own determinate conlent. The
whoHy other is stiiiply (he beyond^ the aU'delA. It is impossible to
measure the extent lo which the wholly other is being approximated
or realized in a society. ^^

Reli^ioji addresses its prayer, its 'comeJ' to this wholly otiier in
response to the latter's solicitation and demand.

To call upon God, to call God^s name^ to pray and w^eep and have a
passioii for God Is to call for the tout autie, for something that
breaks up the hohum homogeneity of the same and all but knocks
us dead. The name of God is a name that calls for the other, that
calls from the other, the name that the other calls, that calls upon
us like Elijah at the doofj and that calls for things ncw^^^

The invocation is a primordial affirmation based on faith and hope that
the impossible will be possible, the impossibility of a saving breach in
the chain of presence and totality, of a liberating breakthrough in the
oppressive horizon of the same, of the messianic emergence of the
novum beyond al] human expectations and calculations.

Outside all human mastery and control vlea.^ hofpes for a break
within the interstices of the laws of regularity^ an outbreak of
chance within the crevices of tiie continuous flow of presence.

It 'siiently teai's open lived time and ordinary language/ 'renders them
always already structurally open to what is coming^ and 'prohibits
{piu!} closure while soliciting transcendence {Se p:i^)\^^ ii is 'the order^
or disorder^ of messianic tinie^ of v^nir and m^e^iir, that disturbs the
order of presence'.'^ This messianic Invocation of the wholly other
Embodies ^a certain structural wakefulness or openness to an impossi-
ble breach of the present, shattering the conditions of possibility, by
which we are presently circumscribed'.'^

For Derridaj tout imtrc est tviit aattv. The wholly other is every other.
The wholly other is not only God but also every human bein^. As Lcv-
inas saySn TnfiniLe alterily^ or 'absolute singularity^ belongs to both God
and human beings. For Derrida, this invalidates both the Kierkegaardian

^?j_«J^?j Kyo^i:s;^uk Min 171

distinction between the ethical (the finite relationship to the finite)
and the religious [the infinite relationship lo the infinite) and the
Lcvlnasian distinction between ethics and religion. ^^ Religion U not
separable from ethics nor, for that inattcrp from political and legal
matters. Wherc^^er infinite alterity is at issue, there is religion. This is
why the hope in tlie wholly other is also a nicssianic hope for a 'uni-
versal culture of singularities'^ in which justice will be done to the
other in its itreducibic singularity-
Messianic time internjpts the living present with the demand for
justice. Messianic lime is prophetic Lime, ihe time of justice which is
always to come yet issues a call for justice here and now. Justice
deferred is justice denied. Deconstruction 1s not meant to be a soft
sighing for the future, but a way of deciding now and being impas-
sioned In the mcmcnl^^^ Dijferaiice:

docs not mean only deferral^ delay, and procrastination, but the
spacing out, the extension between memory and promise or a-ienir,
which opens up the hcre-now In all of its urgency and absolute
singularity, in the imminence of the instant. The call of what is
coming calls for action now.^^

Justice docs not tolerate present injustice in the name of a gradual

approximation of an ideal but demands justice here and now. It is
by definilion 'impatient, uncompromising, and unconditional. No dif-

ferance without alterity, no alterity ivlthout stngu[arity^ no singularity
without here-now/^^

The freedom of the wholly other from all determinate contents makes
Derrtda's religion ""a messlanism without religion. ...even a messianic
without mcssianism\^"* a faith without dogma, a religiozi without reli-
gion. It is a commitment to the wholly other In all its nominaUst free-
dom and absolute heterogeneity without an equal commitment to the
determinate content of a particular rclij;;ion, dogma, institution or
programme. Such a commitment to determinacy, for Derrlda, entails
totalitarian reduction of the other to the same and generates violence
and Tvar^^ The 'call for a fixed and identifiable other, foreseeable and
foregraspable.-. would release the manic aggression of a program^ the
mania of an all-out rush for a future-present.^^* Thias, deconstruction
'liccps a safe distance from ever letting its faith be a faith in a determi-
nate thing or person, from ever contracting the tout autre within the
horizons of the same^^^ The invocation for the coming of the other is
an apocalyptic prayer for the advent of messianic time, but it is an

172 Pfiih.'inphy ofRi'fii^ou m tta^ 21%i Century

apocalypse without (determinate) visioRj truEh, or revelation, an apoc-
alypse without apocaly'pse.

This description of Derridean rcli^iosi should also make clear the
minimal character of its content. The heart of that religion lies in its
mcsslanicit>' or its prophetic passion for justice, 'the infriitle respect of
the singularity itnd iiiflnLte alterlty of the other'r^ This is where religion
and deconstructlon conYcrgc- It Is the very nature ot messianiclty;
howe\^er, to shatter all determinate horizons with their delerminate
contents and llius to exclude all detcrminatCj particular^ historical
religions and messianisrns. Dcrnda's messianic hope and promise
always remain ''absolutely undetermined'' and 'eschatologlcal'.-^ To
endorse a determinate 3'c3iglon is to spell closure and to spill blood- It Is
important to purify the messianic of all determinate contents by epttche
and abstraction so as to intensify its urgency, but this also amounts to
''desertification* or rendering of religion into a diy and barren desert,
deprived of its specific comforts and intelligLbllities and reduced lo a
universal, formal structure with a minimal content, 'the messianic in
general, as a thinking of the other and of the event to comeV^^^ 'the
opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the advent of
justice^ bLLt without horizon of expectation and without prophetic
prefiguration',"*^ a primordial Idea of justice and democracy to come -
to be distinguished from any of their current coiiceptions - as the
Irreducible and undeconstructlbic ultimate- Religion is reduced to the
bare minimum of an atheologtcal, open-ended, negative^ or apophattc
process of justice, a movement toward a New International as 'a
community without communitj^^^ or 'the friendship of an alliance
without tnstitution^^^ Particular religions are nourished by their
''place\ theit history, tradition, nation, language and people, and gener-
ate the ^politics of place and the wars over placed ^^ Derrida seeks to
liberate the messianic of universal justice from such politics and wars
by turning it into a desert, 'a kind of placelcss, displaciit;^ place - or
a place for the displaced', ^^ a postgeographical, universal religion, a
'religion for all and evcrvTvhere','^^ a Derridean equivalent of the Kantian
'rellgioti within the limits of reason alone", although reason is never
without faith.

Living together with those wiio are different, especially with respect for
their difference^ has always been a central problem of human history.
Individually and collectively our instinct has hccn to subjugate them

to our system of identity that makes no room for their difference, and
to reduce and violate them in their iiiLegrity as the other. This occurs at
all levels of human existence, individual and social^ in aJI spheres of
society^ economics, politics and culture^ and with consequences in all
areas of philosophy, ontolog}^, epistcmolog^^, ethics^ aesthetics and
philosophy of religion_ What Emmanuel Lcvinas calls the 'horror of
the othcr"-^" and its correlative^ the tenor of the same have been as
pervasive, as destructive, and as compelling as any original sin in
liuman history. The t^-\'o global wars of the present century, the many
regional and local conflicts from the Korean War to Bosnia, the count-
less racist^ ethnic and religious strifes from the Jewish holocaust to
South African apartheid and racism in the United States to the bloody
struggles between Jews and Arahs in Palestine^ asid the growing recog-
nition of the sexist violation of women throughout human history: all
of these have deepened our awareness, and intensified the urgency in
dealing with the problem of the other in our century. On the eve of the
twenty-first century most societies also increasingly face the problem
of living together under conditions of religious and cultural plurality.
Global capitalism has been bringing together different cultures
and making them interdependentj relativizing all cultural absolutes^
compelling all to become aware of the problem of the other, and
imposing the political hnpcrativc of dialogue-
Given these historical urgencies, it is no exaggeration to say that
today we cannot live without a heav^ dose of what deconstruct ion
stands for^ its critique of the terror of tlie same in all its forms^ and its
vision of justice and democracy. All modern philosophies have been
critical of the given, from f>cscartes through Kant, Hegel and Marx
to pragmatism and critical theory. Deconstruction has few peers, how-
ever^ in the single-mi ndedness of its attention to the problem of the
other, in its universalization of thai problem, and in the radicaiity vs^ith
which it subverts all traditional ideologies from Plato to Heidegger. To
enter the world of deconstruction is to enter a world without absolute
principles, horizons, foundations^ and centres from which to judge the
other^ to relnscribe or rcsltuate all our t>eliefs within the general move-
ment of difference that renders all identities heterogeneous and defers
all presences to the play of traces, and to live accordingly^ without nos-
talgia for absolute certainties but also with respect for difference and
always with hope - in the case of messianic postmodernism - in the
coming of the absolutely other. Nothing can boast of pure idcntltyn
nothing can insist on pure presence, all reality is marked by differenti-
ation and deferral. In an age that has suffered so rauch from the terror

174 PfjihsGphy ofRi'lii^mr m tin: 21%i Century

of ihe same, a! a time when a pluralist scnsibtlit)^ is de n^uair for
survival and peace on earth, in a world where the 'sacrifice of Isaac
continues every day\^^ dcconstruction should remain, even for those
of us who do not accepc it, a thorn in our side, a perjx^tua! reminder of
the dangers into which monocentrism can plunge the world, keeping
us in a state of 'vigilant Insomnia' (Levinas)-^^ for the cry of the other_

In this spirit, much of Dcrrtda's philosophy of religion dcscr^'cs and
demands attentive and respectftjl meditation. His de cons l rue I ion of
negative theolo^^ and determinate rclij^tons, his description of the
messianic as the wholly other, his refusal to separate reli^ioii and poli-
tics, messianicity and justice: thc:>c are important antidotes against
the terror of the same luaking In religion, in its claim to closure, its
dogmatism, its fundamentalism, its totalitarianism. Left to themseh'eSf
religions, including believing philosophers and theologians, delude
themselves into thinking that they 'knoTV^ wiio God is, with only
lip service to the classical thesis of the 'incomprehensibility' of
God. Augustine's question, which 15 also Derrida's, remains and should
remain conipclling in its very challenger What exactly Is tl lliat I love
when I love my God? In this regard, Caputo is quite right in locating
the specific contribution of dcconslruclion in providing for the reli-
gious believer 'a saving apophatics, a certain salutary:' purgation of the
posittviLy of belief^ wliich reminds us all that we do not know what
Is coming, what is tout autre' ^^^ A periodic ' contamination ■" of religion
with negative theology should he a wholesome exercise that would
also challenge each religion to transcend its determinacy and prohc
its own messianic depth for the impossible possibility of the wholly
other.

What can we say about Dcrftda's 'religion without religion'? Derrida's
religion is deliberately minimal in its content, It consists in an existen-
tial commitment to the impossible possibility of the absolutely other,
in a prayerful invocation for the advent of the wholly other beyond all
human reason, calculation and imagination, and in the praxis of jus-
tice in response to the call and demand of that other. It Is a deliberate,
extreme abstraction from the content of all determinate atid deter-
minable religions, their dogmas, rituals and institutions, and therefore
also an intellectual and emotional desert wilhout ilie nourishing com-
forts of tradition and communit^^ It places itself beyond the distinc-
tions of theism and atheism, religion and seeularisnij as different
therefore from the atheism of Enlightenment rationalism as it is from
traditional religious faith. One could say that it is the 'logical' expres-
sion of the faith of the modern Western intellectual who has been

^?j_«J^?j Kyo^i:s;^uk Min 175

thoroughly alienated from all institutional rcli^ons as well as from all
traditional ralionalitics yd who cannot stmpiy surrender themselves to
sheer, destructive nihilism and irresponsible rclati^^snl- Even in thor-
ough alienation and utter blindness one still hopes and gropes, beyond
all reason and faith, for tlic possibility of the impossible, for something
ultimate and undcconstructible, tlie advent of messianic justice, with-
out quite knowing what to call it. II is 'a search without hope for
hope', in a space where the prophets arc not far away'.^^ Derrida's reli-
gion is perhaps the last refuge of the Western intellectual elite commit-
ted to l>olh the protest of modern atheism and the Blochian spirit of
Utopian hope.

I do not say this in disparagement The cultural situation Derrida
depicts is not hctiona!. It is a situation that has been facing Western intel-
lectuals for some time and that is now increasingly facing intellectuals in
the rest of the world as wcIL It is no wonder that Christian theology has
likewise beeii trying to cope precisely with that situation in some of its
representatives such as Paul Tillich and Karl Rahncr It is quite relevant
here to mention Tillich "s dcconstruclion of traditional faith into
'absolute faith', which is not faith in a determinate object but a state of
being grasped by the power of bcing-itsclfp which in turn is neither
personal nor pantheistic but goes beyond both, wliich can only be
called ^the God above Go-d'.^^ Rahner^s increasiiigly iiegativc reference
to God as 'al^solute', 'incomprehensible mystery' and 'absolute future'
is likewise an attempt to make Cliristianity credible hi the present
intellectual climate^ as is his minimalisi, existential dcfmiilon of the
Christian content as the commitment that Ve are inetuctably engaged
by the incomprehensible mystery whom we call God^ and who cease-
lessly and silently grasps us and ehallenges our hope and love even
when we show little concern for him in the practice of our lives or
even actually deny him in theory' .^"^

This is alsOj however^ precisely where the issue lies. Neither Tillich
nor Rahncr goes on to propose, as docs Derrida, an extreme al:kstraction
from the concrete content of determinate Christian faith. They may try
to criticize and sublate the determinate historical content ol" Christian
faith into something more credible and relevant through existential or
transcendental herniencutic; it is not their intention to do away vslth
the essential mediation of faith bv determinate historical contents and
produce a rcSij^ion without religion^ which Dcrrida does. Granted that
we cannot live without deconstnjctloii today, as I believe we cannot,
granted that we have to reinscribe relation and politics within the
general movement of diffi'nvjce, can we live on deconstructlon alone?

176 Pfiihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

1 do not think wc can. The very strcn^h of dc construction, the radical-
ity ofits negations, may also be its very weakness.

Let me begin with Derrida's depreciation of determinate religion.
Derrtda has nothing l>uL aversion for concrete, detcmiinale religions
with their historical content. They are simply identified witli reiflca-
tion and closure and as so many sources of nl>solutism, Iriumphaltsm
and bloody coiiOicts. It is not that some determinate religions are
triuniphalislic or thaL all determinate religions ^omctifiia; generate
triumph alism and absolutism; it is rather that the very idea of determi-
nation or dctermttiability entails presence, identity, and the imperial-
ism of the same. Even though Dcrrida himself derives his concept of
the messianic from existing, determinate Jewish and Christian escha-
tologics by bending and repeating them 'with a difference^ and even
though Caputo himself admits that Derrida's own messianic religion
has all the marks of a determinate religion and can survive only wltli
the support of determinate, instituttonalizcd messianic eschatologies/^
still, determinate religions remain only 'consummately dangcrous',^^
with no positive virtues to show. As a non-cssentialist, Derrida may not
say, but he docs imply, pace Caputo^ that 'theology or religion always
and essentially means bad ncws^ the 6U}<:ien re^ime^ a reactionary, world-
negattng, and fear-driven pathology'.*^

This means t^vo things. On the one hand^ the wholly other of mcsslan^
Icity cannot and should not become actual and concrete through incarna-
tion in a determinate loJighJti. The only relation bctu^een messianicity
and determinate messianic religions is one of relentless negation, period.
The messianic is not what a determiciale religion is. The messianic is
nowhere embodied because it is not in principle embodiable- It is not
only that the messianic always transcends any of its concretizing histori-
cal mediations but also that it should not be so mediated because such
mediation necessarily involves a fall, a corruption.

On the other hand, it also means that determinate historical religions
have no positive mediaLing function to provide precisely in tlie service
of the messianic, the wiiolly other in terms of nourishing faith and
praxis. As modes of frozen presence and idenlityn determinate religions
have no principle of self-transcendence, self-criticism, and self-reform
within themselves; there are no resources of a dialectic between the
present and the future, the determinate and the determining in histor-
ical religions. Between the wholly other aiid historical religions there is
no mediation, only radical otherness.

Derrida's own religion without religion, therefore^ can remain pure
and holy only because it is nowhere embodied or institutionalized in a

^?j_«J^?j Kyo^i:s;^uk Min 177

dctcrmlnaEc religion. It en^a^es in the dcconstmction of all dcterml-
iialc religions from the transcendent heigliL of purc^ disembodied^
angelic ideality, jjust as Enllf;htenment rationalism has l>cen engaging
Ln the eritieal dismissal of all religions from the self-legitimating height
of piarc, uninstttutionalizedn ahistorieal reason. Instead of advising con-
crete religions^ therefore^ on how to bear bcller witness to the wholly
other under the conditions of history and necessary institutionaliza-
tJonn it simply says no! indiscriminately to all determinate religions
regardless of their differences in the degree and kind of witnessing they
do. It is a yes! to the messianic hut a noJ to all historical attempts to
embody it. Derrida's messianic reservation, like the Christian cschato-
logical prov'iso, ts more interested in condemning religions for what in
any event they cannot do, that is^ achieve a perfect realization of the
messianic on earth, ihaii iii empowering them to do what they can,
that is, bear a more effective ivitness to the messianic even if no
wLtnesstng will ever measure up to the full demand of ihe messianic.
Derrida's rehgion without rcIig"ion remains an ahistorieal abstraction.

The messianic wholly other impinges on our history, therefore, only in
the mode of interruption, disruptionn discontinuity, surprise and opposi-
tion^ and only in the experience of the impossible, unimaginable^ unfore-
seeable and unproRrammable. What we can do by our own power and
with our own foresight and planning and wliat we experience within the
realm of the possible and the foreseeable, within what Derrlda callSj with
sweeping generality^ tlie horizon of the same: these have no messianic or
religious significance. That is to say, our moral and political actions in
history have no religious weight because we undertake most of them
with our own responsihilityf with our own knowledge of what is possible
and what is noi^ and with our own freedom to risk the unknown but
always with caution and prudence. The ancient dualism of body and soul
returns in the guise of a new opposition of what is determinate and
what is indeterminate, what is possible and what is Impossible^ what is
foreseeable and what is unforeseeable- We encounter the God of decon-
struction only as a matter of 'absolute surprised

What Derrlda says about dclermiiiaLc religions also applies to deter-
minate pohtical praxis. The messianic as such - the ^universal culture
of singularities'- or justice and democracy are 'structurally" and there-
fore ^always' to come, and should not be identified with a determinate
present form of law or political structure. Although the perfection of the
messianic lies in the 'absolute' future^ not in a fiiture that can l>ccome
present^ its demand is for justice ^hcrc and now'. The messianic
provides the light in wliich all present forms of justice and democracy

178 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%t Century

however pcrfccEj wilt be judged and challenged lo transcend ihem-
sclves- Messianic politics lies in the hope for ^an lEiipossiblc breach of
die present, shaciering die conditions of possibility^ by which we are
presently CKCumscribcd\'*^

The messianic rhetoric of 'shatterin^j 'new'H ^unforeseeabk^ and so
on creates the impression of a 'radical' politics as appropriate praxis for
die messianic hope that deconstniction constantly evokes. When it
comes to political praxis, however, it is anylhin^ but radical. Dccon-
structive politics involves operating withu} the conventions and rules
of the prevailing order - there is no other place to operate - "'tKnding"'
and 'repeating' them 'widi a difference^ and 'twisting free of the samQj
altering It just enough to let a little alterlt)^ loose', which is different
from ^straightforward opposition, confrontational countering, which
succumbs to dialectical assimilation'-'^* Furthermore, we 'can only
prepare for the incoming of the other^ but we cannot invent it, cannot
effect it, bring it about, by a cunning deconstructive agency. Wc arc
called upon, paradoxically, to prepare for the incalculable, to prepare
without calculating In advance^ The 'only' concern of dcconstructlon
is the time to come: 'allowing the adventure or the event of the tout
autre to conic \^^

Deconstructive poHtical praxis, then, conies down to 'hoping' for an
impossible breach of the present, 'bending' and 'twisLing free' of the
present rules and conventions to let a little aiterity loose', and thus
'preparing^ for the coming of justice, which we cannot 'calculate' or
'program' or 'contror. It is opposed to 'confrontational countering'
because it would ^succumb to dialectical assimilaLion^ At best, we have
a 'politics of exodus, of the emigre^ 'a subversion of fixed assumptions
and a privileging of disorder', or 'responsible anarchy'-^'-Must as dccon-
structlon reduces rchgion to a minimal content, so it reduces politics to
the passive minimum of hoping, bending a [illle, and waiting- There is
no substantive, systematic reflection on the djiiamics and trends of
contemporary history, on the possibilities they contain for liberation
and oppression^ on prospects for political mobilization for the libera-
tion of the oppressed and marginalized others that dcconsiiuction
seems so much to care for, nor on political "structures that mediate
between the messianic ideal always to come and present political
praxis that will concretize for a societj^ and for a time at least the
demand of the messianic.

This is not accidental. Politics in the classical sense presupposes that
human beings can, collectively^ as a community, acquire the knowl-
edge of their historical situation and mobilize themselves to produce a

Au.'u:!^^} Ky^yyi^-iuk Men 179

political structure that will bost embody thctr fprevallm^) ideals of
justice in that situation according to their knowledge. This is predicated
on faith and hope In the possibility of collective human action and col-
lective human wisdom. This faith and hope have soanelimes been viiidi-
cated by history, as witness the gradual, often, uphill, but^ by htstortcal
standards, truly significant achievements in democratic institutions, as
they have also sometiines been contradicted by iiistory, as witness the
many violations of human rights and the often incalculal>le suffering
brought about by totalitarian regimes. Wc do not, however, hare much
choice here. It lakes precisely collective actioii and collective wisdom to
combat the terror of totalitarian oppression^ as history has also amply
demonstrated; the only alternative to the oppression by a totalitarian
regime is to set up a democratic regime. In any event, classical politics
presupposes tliis faiih and ho|x^ In collective action and collective
wisdom.

It is precisely this faith that Dcrrida lacks, as is evident in his 'histor-
ical and politicar investigation into the seciret of responsibility in The
Gift of D^iitti.^^ Dcrrida defines duty or responsibilily as a relation
between a person in his or her 'absolute singularity^ and the other in
his or her equally 'absolute singularity'/^ This cthicai relationship^
however, immediately exposes me to the risk of absolute sacrifice
because J cannot at ihc same time respond to the call of all the other
others, an infinite numlx^r of them, vs^ho are also addressing an
absolute appeal to me in their respective infinite singularities . This is
the paradox, scandal and aporia of the concept of responsibility, which
reveals the concept at Its limit and fmitude.

'As soon as I enter into a reiatioai wiLh the other, with the gaze, [ook,
request, lo\'e, command, or call of the other, I kncrw^ that 1 can respond
only by sacrificing ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever obliges me to
also respond, in the same way, in the same instaitt, to all the others.
I offer a gift of death, I betray, 1 don't need to raise my knile over my
son on Mount \loriah for that. Day and night, at every instant, on all
t]ie Mount Moriahs of this worlds I am doing that, raising my knife
over what I love and must love, over those to whom I owe absolute
fidelity, Incommensurably. Abraham is faithful to God only in his
absolute treachery, in the betrayal of his own and of the uniqueness of
each one of thcm^ exemplified here in his only beloved son/^^

Fulfilling an obligation to an other entails sacrificing and betraying
all other obligations to all the other others including those dying of

180 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

stan'atlon and sickness. Everyone is being sacriTiccd to c^^cr)^one else in
'this land of Moriah Lliat is our hahilat cvury second of everyday'.^"* The
aporia of responsibility is thai there Is no Justification for sacrificing
all ihcse others^ the 'ethical or political gencralitj^.^^ Dcrrida asks^
'How would you e^'cr justif):^ the fact that you sacrifice all the cats in
the world to the cat that you feed at home every morniii;^ for years,
whereas other cats die of hunger at every instant? Not Lo mention
other people?'^^ in this sense, then, the sacrifice of Isaac, a beloved
son, the infinite other to whom 1 owe an absolute duty, is ^inscribed in
tlie structure of our cxistcncc'--^^ Likewise, behind the appearances of
normality' and legitimacy, of moral discourse and good conscience^
society organizes and participates in the death and sickness of millions
of children through tlic very structure of its market, mechanisms of its
external debt, and other inequities. We allow the sacrifice of others in
order to avoid being sacrificed ourselves. ^^

VVhatn then, can one do about this ethical scandal? That Derrida pro-
vides no answer is pt^rhaps indicative of the limits of his horizon_ One
can say that he provides no answer because 'this land of Moriah' is \iur
verj^ habitat', because such a scandal is '[nscrihcd in the structure
of our existence^ about which, therefore, we cannot do anything.
His interest is lii accentuating the aporia of moral experience and com-
plicating our moral simplicities, within the structural limits of our exis-
tence. Is such a sandal, however^ really 'inscribed in the structure of
our existence ? Or, does U pointy rather^ to the limits of Dcrrida's own
-deconstructlonist horizon?

Deirlda's horizon, as that of his two mentors, Kierkegaard and
Levinas, is that of tlie individual in her 'absolute' and 'infinite' 'singu-
larity'. As a moral agent each of us is 'infinitely other in Its absolute
singularity, inaccessible^ solitaryn transcendent, nonmanifest, originar-
ily nonpiesent to my ego\^^ From this perspective of the isolated
individual, Derrida goes on to ask^ What can 7 do^ precisely in my
abjioiiste siti^tiiwity und isoSatioii, to avoid the suiiering of millions of
starving children and millions of cats other than mine^ since I cannot
respond 'hi the same way, in the same Instaiit, lo all the others?^"^ The
answ^er, of course, has to be 'not much . An individual as such cannot
respond to all these moral appeals in the same way at the same time^
nor does she have the resources to respond to many of them with any
adequacy even if she has the time to respond. The assumption, how-
ever, is false.

Modern history amply demonstrates that In situations where w^hat is
at stake is the ivelfare of a large number of people serious enough to

constitute the 'public' interest or common good, the appropriate a^ent
is nol the isolated individual but ihe political communily as such.
Whenever our serious welfare is at stake and we cannot attend to that
Avelfare as isolated individuals, wc do so as united individuals^ togethern
tliat iSn as a community. We cannot protect our security individually^
so UT do so as a communily by insliluting the police and the military
as organs of the state. Wc cannot provid(^ education for ouj^clvcs indi-
vidually, so we do so as a community t>y establishing public education.
We cannot guarantee minimum welfare for ourselves individually,
so wc do so as a eommunit)^ by making sure that Ihe economy is ade-
quately fui:ictioning through monetary, fiscal and other policies, by
establishing minimum wage laws, and by instituting social security
for old age and times of sickness. This common or collective care
for the common good is precisely what Is meant by politics in the
classical sense. What we cannot do iiidividually we do together, that
iSj politically^*

If wc change the horizon from that of the isolated individual to that
of the polilical community, from the lone 'I lo the 'wc'^ and ask not^
'What can J do as iin imiividu^if?' but rather 'What can we do to^etherT
the moral aporia that Derrida weeps over need not be as great or as
scandalous as he makes it out to be. Wc together, that is, various coun-
tries and private associations including the United NaUons^ have been
alleviating the suffering o( millions of starving and sick children. 1 as
an individual do my part by paying my fair share of taxes and making
my fair share of contributions, which will both hire aitd enable other
Individuals, that Ls, relief workers and government agents, to provide
the relief. If 30 many cats other than mine arc sufferinj; as to constitute
their relief a matter of the public interest, we can, through the govern-
ment^ organize such relief by setting up shehcrs for cats, as many com-
munities arc already doing. The fact that our existing political means
are not adequate to match outstanding needs is no argument against
the poliLical solution; it is an argument for improving it.

This 'politicar approach does not eliminate the moral aporia that so
concerns Dcrrida. In some sensCj given the existential limitations of

"1 '1 '1 "' - - r b'i^

the moral and material resources of humanity, sucli a moral aporia will
indeed alwa^'s remain. Such an aporia, howevcFn can be exaggerated
when it i5 approached only from the individual perspective, and
become ideologically pernicious when it Ls used as an argumcitt for
political fatalism and neglect of available political means. It is critical
to remember how much humanity has achicv'cd by working to^etherH
collectively, that is, politically: elimination of hunger, illiteracy and

182 Pfiih.'iophy of Ri'lii^f^ir m tta^ 21%i Century

many forms of epidemic in many parts of the world is, by historical
standards^ an achievement too j^real and too noble to be merely humil-
iated by a misplaced messianic or escliatological proviso, alchougli it
Ls not great enough and often too ideologically tainted to serve moral
complacency among us.

However, it is precisely this 'politicar horizon with its faith and hope
ill ihe possibility of collective action and collective wisdom that
DeiTida lacks. Derrida's emphasis on the Infinite singularity' of the indi--
vidual and his deconstruetionist distrust of totaUtyj community^ and
unity for fear of 'fusion"^^ do not provide confidence in the possibility
of 'collective' action: such an action is either too ridden with otherness
and division to be genuinely collective or too totalitarian to respect the
infinite alterity of the agents, ^-^ Derrida Is more interested in unmasli-
ing hidden oppressions in a totality than in encouraging wholesome
collective action_ lii^cwlse, his emphasis on the absolute transcendence
of the messianic and its radical discontinuity with any dcternlinal:^lc
political structure or institution or law does not encourage mobiliza-
tion of collective wisdom in the interest of a determinate reform or rev-
olution as a historically appropriate institutionalization of messianic
justice. Instead, Derrida is more interested in condemning current
Institutions for jwt being a perfect model of justice than in providing a
vision of hctter institutioiis that they am become or judicious reflec-
tions on the how of the justice that must Indeed be done here and
now. As inftnite asvrametrv of the relalion to the other'- as 'incalcula-
bility of the gift and singularity of the an-economic ex-position to
others',^"* justice lies in principle ''beyond' all right, calculation, com-
merce, beyond ^juridicat-moral rules^ norms, or representations^ within
an Inevitable totalizing horizon'.**^ In this sense, it is difficult to dis-
agree with Richard Dernstcin when he accuses Derrtda's idea of a
'democracy to come' of hcin^ 'an impotent, vague abstraction', or with
Thomas McCarthy when he accuses Derrida of bein^ more interested
in destabilizing universalist structures than In reconstructing protective
institutions for rights and dignity.^*

VVilliam James once spoke of two attitudes towards Inith and error-
One attiEudc is that of the sceptic, who ts driven by an obsessive fear of
falling into error and docs not want to beltcve in anything except on
sufficient evidence. The other is the attitude of the pragmatist, svho is
more driven by the hope of finding truth thati hy the fear of falling
into error and is therefore willing to risk even believing in error in
order to find truth-^^ Deconstruction is more like the sceptic than the
pragmatist. it is fundamentally fearful of all determinate embodiments

of human sociality in history because of the terror of the same. It may
offer prayers and tears for the coming of the wholly other and its mes
sianic lustlcCr but it does not want to dirty its liands by working at
«stahlislijng determinate institutions of rcHgion and politics. In the
name of diffemuce it flees from the liistorical dcterminacy of matter,
body, senses, objectivity and sociality, the world of presence, identity
and totality^ and takes refuge in the dream of the impossil^lc. Perhaps
deconst ruction should inscribe itself In the quite possible dialectic
of the determinable within history so as to keep its difference human,
not angehc. Please remember: in human history all negations arc
determhmte negations.^

Notti

1^ j-Bhn L>- C^puto (ed_)j Decoustnictio}^ Ui 4? NuisfK^Si: tj Convers^ition witfi j^icqites
Deiritia (Ne\s York^ Foidham University Press^ I???), and John D. Caputo^
The Prijy^5 ami Teur^ tifjncqites. Denhiu:^ Rdigk\}? withoiit Reiigim} ^Blooming-
ton: Indiana University PresSj 19975.

Z. Frayt^fs, 126.

4^ Jacques E>erradar Mar;fi}i5 of PhUo^opf^'', trans. A3an Bass (Chicago: The
LTniver^aty oi Chicago Pfes^, 19S2p^ 6; Jacques Derrida, On f/fc I^cuue^ ed.
Thomas Dutoat and trans. DavEd Wood, John P Leavey, Jr_ and Ian McLeod
(Stanford: Stanford University Pieas^ 1995), 6Bj Jacques Derrida^ 'How Lo
Avcid Speaking: Denials'^ in HaroJd Coward and Toby Foshay (eds^ Ot^rnda
and Negiitive TiieoiGsy i^ib^^y: SV[\Y riess, 1992^ 77-83.

5- Pruyt^ts, 1 1.

6. Ibid-, 6-7, 10-] 1.

7. ibad, ZH

S- On the Ncmn^, SO; Pf^iyers, Z7-S.

9. Of} the NiWft^, Ki i]ia 69.
10- Prayers, 6; also 11,12, 47-8, 57, 6:^-
11. Ibid-, 113. .

IZ- Jacques Derrida, Of Grnmmtiwfo^, trans, Gayatrl Chakravony SpSvak
(Baltimore^ The Johns Hopkins University Press^ 1974; corrected edationjj 7 L
13. Frayei\ 113-

14- Ibid-, 73-56, UK, 129.

15- Ibid-, 113.

16- Ibid-, H6.

17- Ibid-, B6.

18. Tbid, 96

19- Jacques Derrida. Thf Gift of Denthj, t^^, David Wills (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 199SJ, S3-4-

20- Prayers, 155-

21- Ibid-, 125.

184 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

22. Ibid.^ 124; see tifjo Jacquizs DeFrLda^ Ttie Specters ofMtifx, trans. Pe^y Kamuf

(New Torki Roatledge, 1994], 3L.
2-;-i. Specters of Marx, ^1.

24. Specters of Mtirji, 59; Gift of D^tithj 49} Jacques Derrida, Taith and KnowJ*
edge- the Two Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits of Reason Alone'. In
Jacques Derrlda and Gianni Vattimo (eds], Ri'Ugion {Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1998), 17-18-

25. Pmvers, 12iJ-

26. ibcd., 99,

27. ibid., 150-

28- Specters of Marx, 65 _

29 Ibid.

30. Pmyeis, 12S-

31. Taith and Knowledge', 17-
M. PriiverSf 13L

3i\. Specters of Marx, ^6.

34, Prayers, 1S4_

35. Ibid.

:«. Ibid,, 155-

37- Emmanuel Levinas^ 'The Trate of the Other', in Mark C. Tayior (ed.)^ Decon^
stnictsGU iu Context: Lit^r{7tiire and NUiosophy {Chicago: University nf Chicago

Brei^s. 1986]. 'A46.

38- nicGif^ofDenth.VQ.

39. Sean Hand <ed.j, Tfie Leviim.'^ Retidtrr {Oxford: Eaackwell, 19S9>, 28-

40. Prayers, 150-

41. Jacques Derrida^ 'Deconstruction and the Other'^ in Richard Kearney
ted_)j Diah^ne.'i with Cotfteuipi}rary Ca^ituieutai Tf linkers (Manchester, UK:
Manchester University Tress, 1984J, 119-

42. PauJ TUlcch, Tfre Coisrage to Be (New Haven. CT: Yale University Press, J 95ZJ.
4;i. Karl Rahner, Prtiyers aud MediTalit?us iNew York" Seabury Pre^vs., 19K0)j 35.

44. Caputo. Prayers, 12S and 150.

45. Ibid., 128-

46. Ibid., 148-

47. Ibid., 96

48. rbid., 75.

49. [bid., 76.

50. Derfida, 'Deconstruction and the Other^ 12C-

51. The Gift ofDtfiilh,^:^.
52- Ibid., 6K.

5:i. Ibid., 68.

54 Ibid., 69.

55, Ibid., 70-

56- Ibid., 71.

57- Ibid., 85-

58. Ibid., 86.

59. Ibid., 7S.

60. Ibid.. 6K-

61- For an etalwrataon of ihe concept and morahEy of collective action as

distinguEshed fiom those of mdiviiiijal action, aee An^ivn Kyongf^uk Mm,
Dufle^itic of StjSv£itiot^i h^ue^ in TfieoSo^^ afU!:^intwu {Albany: State Lrni%^ef^ity
of New York [^ress, J9S9j, 1Q4-1S.

eZ- On the Ntmie, 46.

63_ Dcam!imtctum in i^ NiitshcU, 13-14-

64- Specttfvs {}fMiirx, ZZ-ii.

SS. Ib^d., 2^' Di2comPHCtum in ij Nutshcil, 17-lH, li4-5.

66- Richard J. Be^nstean^ 'An AlJegory of Modernity/Postmodernityi Habemias
and Derrida', an Gar\^ E. Madison [eclj, Workin,^ through Demrfrt lEvan^Ton;
Northwestern Unaveriiity PresSj 19^;^). 227; Thomas McCarthy, The Potitics
of the Ineffable: Deriida's Decoiiitiuctionism'j Hif PfiihiGpliiait Fomm 21:

1-2 {Fall-Winter, 1939-90), 146-6K.

67- William James^ T^ef Will to B^lii^ve itfsd Otijer Essays in Popithfv Philo:SGphy
(Hew York! Dover Publications^ 1956; originally published tiy Longmans,
Green ti Co-, 1897), 17-19.

6S_ For my similar critique of Emmanuel Levina?, ^t^ my Toward a Dialectic
of Totality and Infinity: Reflections on Emmanuel Levinas'^ The Joirmiil of
R^Stgioi? 7S:4 (October 199KJ, 571-92.

Voices in Discussion

D.Z. Philtips

F: Dcrrida is well received by Lhcologians, but among philosophers he
is not so fortunate. Perhaps this is because he attacks eighteenth-
ccsiiury rational Micolog^'H ^^ attack which extends into a eriLicLun of
Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics_ He talks in terms of postmodern
Hcideggcrian rcflecnonSj and his work has been influenced by Lcvinas-
His work can be related, with profit, to that of J.-L. Marion.

What arc the main ohjeetions to his views? li is better to leave the
term postmodern to itself, since It is used so loosely now. It is better (o
talk of posL-structuratism. tn this the pbtloso[^liy of iliffl^rence is the
main heuristic device, it falls under two denominations. One empha-
sizes polymorphic plurality and goes back lo Nietzsche. The other goes
Jpack to Kierkegaard and is Influenced by Lcvinas who is anything but
postmodern. Levinas is a conservative, Jewish Rabbinical scholar-

For Nietzsche wc are confronted by the innocent play of forces, Imth
noble and ignoble. This is the play of necessity for which no one is
responsible. Nazis are like waves whicli crash on the shore and break
houses down. Some try to dcmocraiize this on the Nictzschean left.

Nietzsche shows us what we do not want Christianity to h<i. Here we
can be self-destructive with the notion of ^uilt. Much of the abuse is
aimed at this tradition.

The otlier tradition goes back to Kie^^gaard and emphasizes God as
the wholly other to which wc are subject as the measure of truth.
Levinas introduced ihe prophets to Paris of all places, where so many
exotic philosophical plants ^ow. If the Bible makes sense it should make
philosophical sciisCj and io Levinas uses Plato to emphasize the ethical
relation to the neighbour Me sa)3 that the face of the other is the trace
God leaves of himself as he withdi'aws from the world. Philosophers
took notice of these Biblical categories, amon^ them Derrida. He is

1S6

DZ. rtiiHip^ 1&7

seriously interested in Lcvinas in his emphasis on justice, Ehc gift
(grace) and hospitality, the most venerable of the Nomadic virtues.
This year he is to give a series of lectures on forgiveness. He is inter-
ested in matters chat can he put to work. Me is not interested tn the
philosophy of religion.

I: I have no quarrel with F^s interpretation of Derrida, so T will go
sLraiglil to my criticisms.

First, iiving witli the otlier' is central In Derrida's work. It is aprdh-
1cm which is likely to increase in our global world. No one has raised
this problem so intensely as Derrida. Lcvinas stressed that a concern
wUh the other cannot be reduced to sclf-ititcrcst. For Dcrrida the other
has a self-negating transcendence^ and so purifies us of dogmatism and
cultural particularity. So he seeks a 'religion without icllgjon'- Religions
are criticized for not living up to this ideal. Dcrrida tends to ignore
possibilities for self-iranslormation Vn^ithin specific faiths. Instead^ he
criticizes them for what they caniiot be. He doesn't tell us how to
improve them. Derrida's speculations are beyond positive law and pos-
itive rights. So he has been accused of impotent dclitKrations, Tticse
problems are not resolved in The Foiitics of Friendship because he has a
fear of community, hence his emphasis on iUffereiKe. The social is
always seen as an oppressive, exclusive singularity. Dcrrida cannot have
a theor)^of political action.

How do I relate Dcrrida lo liberation theology? In this latter context
I emphasize the infinite dignity of the individual, as in the classical
tradition. By 'totality' I mean any system of identity. It may or may not
be oppressive depending on the attention it gives to infinity. RnalEy,
I emphasize ^solidartty^ the mutual rcspoi^se to our dependence on
each other. But without lotalityj informed by inhnity, this becomes an
empty ideah

I distinguish betwTcn the sceptic who, Ix^causc of the fear of errors
denies truths and the pragmatist who will risk error for the sake of
truth. Dcrrida is more like the sceptic. He flees from our difficulties and
takes refuge in a dream of the impossible. Difference is not human, but
angelic.

F: I liked your paper up to a point; that point was when you beg^
crificfzin^ rael 1 don't recognize Dcrrida in your criticisms. He does not
have a dream of the impossible. On the contrary, he insists that specu-
lation should begin from where wc are. The singularity he emphasizes
is not that of the self, but of the other. He is seriously concerned with
justice, but it is not a goal svhich can be sj>ecified once and for all and

188 Pfiihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

then sought after It is a iicvcrcnding ideal He is not condemning par-
Ncular institulions^ but he is critical oi crude solutions and anxious to
see that they are not thought to be the ideal. Our institutions are for-
ever answerable to an unending ideaL

C: I want to compare Derrida's emphasis on differe-i'ice with WittgcnsteiiT's
promise to teach us differences. MieliacI Weston iii his Kierke^mmi ami
ContuiL'ntiii P}}i}oiophy argues that ^;ietzsche, Heidegger and Dcrridan
although avowedly anti-mctaphysieal, eannot resist the temptation to
put some general attitude in its place- This somctliing is subiimed ahovc
tlie differences. Do you think that is a Just accusation?

F: Deeision in'UsMda is neither wanton nor pointless. Tlie 'suhliinc"" is
welcomed sinee it is what we arc not. The new age is not here. VVe
must always respond critically to the present.

/: Isn't there a difference in the later Derrida? In his early work he
responds to specifie texts and destabilizes them, liut now eomes a con-
cern with justice. Why justice? Justice presupposes p^ticular institutions^
whereas his general position only supports destabilizatton.

F: I don^t think the early texts arc wanton^ but he did nol think they
coutd be made objective by closed rules.

/: Which is why he thought Scark was so awry.

F: Exactly. How many ways can a text be opened up? He finds as many
as he can. But the expectation of a new^ way saves it from heing played
around-

G: But hasn^t an act of subversion taken place in The Gift of Death?
1 feed my cat while thousands of other cats are starving. So it is with
humans. So I cannot fulfil my obligatton at all if 1 start w^ith one. 1 also
make ihe other dependent on mc.

F: The late writings are often said to be open to this objection. But

Derrida wants to describe a self-limiting set. What we want from a gift
makes it Impossible. What 1 actually do is to produce a del?t of grati-
tude in the recipient, and a feeling of jjcnerosity in myself. But his
argument is not: therefore no gift, but a tccognition thai this is the
human situation, a sclf-hmiting set, Derrida is telling us to understand
this and then act - understanding our Limilalions. U we ignore the
logic of the gift it has an unfortunate effect on us. Know what it is to
give; know the inherent difficulty in a gift. The limitation is structural^

not personal.

DZ. rtiiilip^ 189

G: But as long as there arc cats I can't fecdn ^ilt is built in, structurally^
to my act-

F; But ] must act.

G: 1 doubt that Is his \1cw.

F: I don't accept that

D: Arc you saying that these insi^^lits into our limitations are better
achieved by his philosophy than any other kind of philosophy^ say,
Process Thought or analytic philosophy?

F: No, I didn't mean to. But Dorrida does attack the notion of the
autonomous subjccl. in philosophy which you find from Descartes^
through Kant to Husserh hi Levinas we arc called forth by the law, but
this is not equated with reason as it is in Kant.

B: But responding to the other is not independent of rulcSn is it?; rules
that can bo extended in various ways la meet new situations?

F: Derrlda has hrokcn with the Heideggerian conception of language.
He wants to say that we must go beyond rules in recognizing liial the
other may surprise you- You have to listen to something you didn^t sec
coming. Tlie otiier knows something you don't- So the Messiali cannot

turn up, for then Uiere would he no more surprises. Derrida is always
open to a new game.

B: Is what is to be accepted as a new game entirely up to me?

F: No, it depends on the conditions of discourse.

B: Tliat sounds like Korty.

F: NOh I do not find Dcrrida's seriousness in Rdrty.

O: Whv should niv relation to the otiier be ethical? What about sexual
relations?

F: Dcrrida is more poUtical than ethlcaL We'd have to look at the
details of particular cases. Unjust laws are answerable to the demands
of hospitality.

F: Arcn^t the terms of the equation in Derrida too simplistic? On the
one handj ycu have certain demands which belong to specific religious
traditions- On the other hand, you have his emphasis on 'religion
without reli^ion^ flow arc these to Ix: combined? There seems to be an
un re solvable tension between thcni.

L90 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

F: There is no reason why one shouldn't consider the relation bchvccn

these emphases in specific contexts. He is not talking of an abstract
impossibility. The difficulty of the oilier is always in the present. We
must begin where we are. Derrida detests the late twentieth-century
view of democracy^ as tliough ihc answer has arrived. What he wants
u^ to do is lo view any situation in a critical tension between what we
arc and what wc arc not.

PartV
Critical Theory

Critical Theory and Religion

MtJ tth /ii5 Li itz-Bach umu i j

I r - ^

TliQ'^Crltlcal Theory' of the Kankfurt School was conceived in parLtcular

by its fouiidcrs Max Horkhcimer and Thcodor W. Adorno, as an 'opGn
project': that Ls^ more a phiiosophlcalJy funded search for a theory of
society than a unified doctrine or teaching. Il h not therefore surprising
that the positions taken by critical theorists on Lhe question of religion
differ significantly from one another in their details.

hi my paper, thereforCj I wish to examine a few selected texts by pro-
ponents of the 'Critical Theory'. 1 shall first discuss the critical impulse
of the philosophy of Max Horklieifner from his early period in the
19j50s (1); second, the fundamental aims and philosophical programme
in the 'Dialectic of Enhghtenmcnt^ by Horkheimer and Adorno (2);
third, the relation of the later critical theory of Horkheimer and Adorno
to religion and what they called 'theology' after the Second World War
(3> and fourthj 1 shall refer to a criticism of these general theses of
Horkheimer by Jiii'geai Habermas (4j.

Max I'lorkhcimer In 1957 wrote-

Critical Tlieory displaced thcolog)^ but has found no new Heaveii to
which to point, not even an earthly Heaven. But critical theory can-
not erase the memory of Heaven and will always be asked the way
that leads there, as if it weren't already a discover)? that a heaven, to

which one can point thcway^ ts none at alh^

This short description of his philosophical convictions makes clear the
Importance of the theme of religion in Horkhcimer's work. It penetrates

19J

194 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'fii^smr m tta^ 21%i Century

his entire thought aiid cannot be separated from his central concerns. If
in his final creative period he was perhaps more clearly concerned with
the object of religion than previously, It can be argued conversely, that
the religious problematic is already closely connected with his writings
of the 19ms.

Horkheimer-s early work for the Zeitsihrlft fiir Sozkifforschuiig, like his pro-
gramniatic inaugural lecture at the University of Frankfurt and his 1931
lecture as Director of the Institute for Social Research, are characterized by
the attempt to reflect philosophical]}^ on an empirical and at the same time
historical conception of social research. l-iorkheimer sees 'the present situ-
ation ot social philosophy' as the title of his lS)?j\ lecture puts It^ as char-
acterized by an unfruitful side-by-side of positi\^stlc social science^ on
the one hand, and a kind of social philosophy^ on the other^ which looks
to a Uranspersonal sphere" of ideally constituted slate or humanity or a
'value ill itself and \iews these as 'more essential, meaningfLj] and sub-
stantiar than the empirically accessible ordinary world of the IndtviduaL
For Horkheimer the criticisms of a positivistic philosophy modelled on
the social sciences that were advanced by the Marburgcr neo-Kantians as
well as by Hans Kelsen, \Iax Scheler or Nicolai Hartmann were insuffi-
cient since they criticized neither its methodology^ nor its concept of
facts, but rather they set them more or less constiuctivcly, more or less
'^philosophically^' over against Ideas, essences, totalities, independent
spheres of objective Spirit^ unities of meaning, ''national characters'" ^tc,
which' they considered 'equally foundational - Indeed^ ""more authen-
dc"" - elements of bclng/^

Horkiieinier opposes such a concept of ptiilosophy since the relation:

between philosophical and corresponding specialized scientific dis-
ciplines cannot be conceived as though philosophy deals with the
really decisive problems ...while on the other side empirical research
carries out long^ boring, individuaT studies that split up into a thou-
sand partial questions^ culminatirig in a chaos of cotintless enclaves
of specialists.^

In contrast, for the Institute for Social Research, Horkheimer pro-
poses a programme of 'a conilnuouSr dialectical penetration and dcvel-
opmcnt of philosophical theory and specialized scientific praxis^"^ to
which:

-■ •,

philosophers^ sociologists^ economists^ historians^ and psychologists
are brought together in permanent collaboration to undertake in

common thai whicli can be carried out individually in the lal>oralory
in other fields. In short, the task is to do whal all Ituc researchers
have always done: namely, to pursue their brger philosophical ques-
tions on tlie basis of the niosl precise scientific methods^ to revise
and refine their questions in the course of their subst*intiye work^
and to develop new methods without losin;^ ^^^ht of llie larger
context.^

With the concept of a dialeetical mediation of the Individual sciences
and the philosophical question ahout the totality, Hotkheimer returns
to some hasic elements of Hcgers philosophy, insofar as these had
been incorporated into Marxist theory. In contrast to Georg Lukacs^
Horkheiiner's reception of HegeFs philosophy does not extend so far as
to ground a materially oriented universal history and an 'absolute
knowled^' of it. Horkhcimcr's relation to Hegel is much more deter-
mined by tlie insight that the doctrine of identity has long broken down
and Avith it Hcgers system of idealistic phiIosophy_ But, as Horkhcimcr
poinls oat, 'it is easily forgotttin all of wliat it Ijuricd mth it'-^

For Horkheimer an accurate concept of history must t^hi as its start-
ing point a historical-malerial analysis of human labour in history such
as that of Marx and Engels. In his essay History imd Pj;ycholo^ pub-
lished in 19'^2 ill the first volume of the Zeitscbrifi fiir Sozkilforsclimig,
Horkhcimer wrote:

Marx and Engels took up the dialectic (of Hegel) in a materialist
sense- They remained faithful to l-legeTs bcliet in the existence of

suprain dividual dynamic structures and tendencies in historical
development, but rejected the belief in an independent spiritual
power operating in history. According to them, there is nothing at
the root of history, and nothing is expressed in history that could be
interpreted as comprehensive meanings as unif)ing force^ as moti-
vating Reason^ as immanent telos/

It Is not difficult to see in such formulations the revival of the thought
of Marx and Engels Germaf} Jiieolog}K When Horkhetmef describes
historical materialism as that view of history in which 'the turn from
metaphysics to scientific theory^ is realized, he acknowledges that even
such an accurate inlcfprctation ts vulnerable to being torn apart by
dogmatists. Such dogmatism is always a threat to historical materialism
as Marx understood it. Against Marxist orthodoxy Horkheimer points
out: 'Marx insists that no insight logically prior to history offers

196 Pfiihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%t Century

the key to its undcrst^inding/^ Ho underscores both the continuing
indccisivcncss and the historical condilioncdncss of a materialist view
of historv as well as its critical function. This is evident when
Hoikheimer^ in the face of an economic dctcrminisc view of history
continued lo maintain that human f>eLngs are producers of the entire
historical shape of their human life even if this takes place in a con-
strained and irrational form. In this way, Horkheimcr shows that ;he
economic necessity proclaimed by Critical Theory i5 not as invariant
natural or historical law but the diagnosis of a wrong structure of soci-
ety wliich has to be overcome, hi his programmatic article 'Traditional
and Critical Tlicory' Horkhcinicr explained that the concept of necessity
is not a descriptive concept but a normative one. I'liat means it presup-
poses the idea of human autonomy as historically possible but not yet
realized in a capitalistic economy. Here Horklieimcr returned to insights
of Kant's philosophy of history^ holding to the idea of a future societ}^ as
a community of free men.^ Kant's employment of reason tor tlie purpose
of judging and grounding correct action is^ like for Hegel and Marx,
reiransportcd into the sphere of historical deveiopmcnL HorkJieimcr
explains that Critical Theory is linked to tlic interest of the oppressed In
overcoming the class rule. Foi him that is the negative circumscription
of the materialistic content of the idealistic concept of reason.

Reason and truth are concepts that Horklieimcr^s Critical Tlieorj' docs
not wish to do mthout, while not thereby simply returning to the
version of these concepts worked out by Kant and HegeL Horkhcimcr is
ne\'ertheless aware of the Inevitable problems posed to historical materi-
alism by historical relativism and pragmatism which inform his critique
and renunciation of metaphysics. He attempts to avoid these problems
by holding to a negative notion of tnitli in the form of a true theory of a
false state of affairs. Tlic model of such a thcor\^' is, as he writes in his
1935 essay. The I^roblem of Tiuth'^ Karl Marx's systematic presentation
and critique of the bourgeois economy- For Marx 'reason^ takes the form
of a dialectical critique of the determinations of 'understanding'' and the
economic categories. This process is in principle infinite since in theory
tliere is no possibility of reconciling the contradictions which arise in
society. Horkheimer j^oes beyoiid the theory itself and looks to the
historicat stage when he writes that:

the truth advanced because the human beings who possess it stand
by it unbendingly, apply it and c^rry it through, act according to it,
and briti^ it to povs^er against tlic resistance of reactionarVn narrow^
one-sided points of vicw.^"^

The question of the truth of thinking has now widened to include the
problem of the iruth of historical rcality.

Thc question ol the historical foim of rctl^ion and its claims to truth
is discussed in a scries of essays published b)^ f-Iorkheimer in the
Zeitsdnift fiir Sozlalfvr^chtwg against the background of liis reception of
historical materialism. In this respect they differ from Horkhcimer's
earlier literary essays, for instance tlie anonymously published collec-
tion of aphorisms Diwunemnsm 1934. Ilencc Horicheimer could write
in his short 1934 article entitled Tlioughts on Religion' that Ehc con-
cept of God includes the idea of a better world. And he concludes that
if justice has to be thought of as identical with God it could not be
present in the world: 'If justice resides with God^ then it is not to be
found in the same measure in the world. Religion is the record ot the
wishes, desires, and accusations of counlless generations/*^ Ludwig
Feuerbach^s theory of religion as espoused in the Essence ofReii^^mi is
reproduced by Horkheimer in terms of an analysis of history. Marx in
his Ifitfotiucthn to the Crlti^jiie ofHegei^s Piiilowphy ofRl^ht, had already
referred to religion as the expression o( the suffering of the creature
and the protest against it and so attempted to describe its relative justi-
fication and at the same lime illusory character. Horkhcimer's own
formulations in these years come relatively close to such jud^enicnts.
But in contrast to Marx^ Horkheimer^s retlections on tlie illusory char-
acter of religion do not stop there in order to move on to a critique of
law or politics. Horkheimer holds to a notion of God which is not
solely reducible lo psychological anthropology^ psychology or socially
critical praxis. He writes that we find in "^God^ tlie picture of the idea of
'a perfect justice^ but that idea can never be realized in history since a
better society would never compensate for the suffering of tlie past. For
HorkhcimcFH the idea of 'God' represents certainly an illusion^ but the
concept of God at the same lime articulates the lasting universal
human hope for fiilfihnent beyond the bounds of nature and history:
'What distinguishes the progressive type of man from the retrogressive
is not the refusal of the idea but the understanding of the limits set to
its fulfilment.' ^^

The theoretically important idea of the 'infinite' points to a historical
openness, indeed a metaphysical pessimism already evidenced in his
essays from the 1930s, which is not easy to reconcile with the \farxisl
faith in the progressive march of history. In his 1936 review of Theodor
Haecket's book The Christuvj mitl f/f.^toy, Horkheimer notes that the
striving for a universal justice is something about which Marxists agree
with religious people. Horkhetmer's critique of religion in the 1930s

19S Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'fii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

did not lead to a new dogmatism or a confession of atheism, which
was propagated by the official Marxism of the day. Ratlier It was more a
pari of his efforts to contribute to a philosophical critique of the limits
of human theoretical or metaphysical knowledge in general. This
moves his philosophy, still concerned as it is like Marx's wltli the
capacity of human beings to change the course of historj' through
their actions, in Lhc direction of Artliur Schopenhauer It is the dog-
matic optimism of an 'absolute knowledge' and the human pride
reflected in the attempt to overcome the limits of human knowledge
which Horkheimer criticizes, in i-iegei's philosophy and in doetrinal
religion as well as in a dogmatic understanding of Marxist theory. His
materialism reflects the ^consciousness of the finitude of human action
and human insight' and the 'bitterness of the death' as he formulated
It. Precisely such know^ledge belongs to the 'essence' of materialistic
thinking, since the indignation at the suffering of the majority of
liuman beings originates in the experience of the uniqueness of
human life and happiness. Horkheimer opposed 'the ideas of the resur-
rection of the death, the last judgment and eternal life as dogmatisms'
while nevertheless holding to thcra as expressions of the general
human wish for 'eternal bcalitiadc'f 'universal justice and goodncss\
enabling a critique of the status quo and Infinitely increasing the soli-
darity witli all living tilings^

Horkheimcr's further philosophical de^^elopmciit is marked by the con-
sciousness of an unavoidable sadness and an attitude of enlightened
pessimism. This mentality mirrors the historical catastrophes of the
twentieth century: the terror and state-oi^ganized Holocaust by National
Socialists in Germany but also Stalin's regime and the machinery of
annihilation of the Second World Wai which continued until the drop-
ping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1.945- These
events form the backdrop for the 'Dialectic of Enlightenment' which
Horkheimer wrotc^ together with Thcodor W. Adorno^ while in exile in
California. The book begins with the assertion:

In the most general seniit of progressive thought^ the Enligiitcnment
has ahva^^ aimed at liberating men from fear and estabhshing
their sovereignty. Vet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster
triumphanL^^

Hence it is the intention of Max Horkhciiner and Thecxior VV. Adorno to

Lnvcstigalc llie connection between the catastrophes of the twentieth
century and tlie programme of Enlightenment. Mistakenly, tlie cssa^^ in
the ■'DialecUc of EnligliteiimenL' liavc repeatedly been linked to the post-
modern attaciv on llie modern (Cartesian! notion of the subject and the
ideals of the European and American traditions of the Enliglitenraent-^^
By contrast^ Horkhciracr and Adorno arc concerned with salvaging the
programme of tlie Enlightenment in the face of their current ambiva-
lence and internal contradictions. Thus they write in their introductory
chapter:

The dilemma that faced us iti our ivorkpnjved lo be the first phenom-
tuion for investigation: the self-destruction of tlie Enlightenment. V^
■arc wholly convinced - and therein lies o\ifpetitio principii - tliat social
freedom is inseparable from enlightened tliought- >veverthetess. we
believe that we have just as clearly recognized that the notion of this
very way of tliinktng, no less than the actual historic forms - the
50cial institutions - with which it is interwoven, already contains
the seed of the reversal universally apparent today.^^

Therein the atJthors draw the concltision:

If enlightenment docs not accommodate reflection on this recidivist
clement, then it seals its own fate. If consideration of the destructive

aspect of progress is left to its enemies, blindly pragmatized thought
loses its transcending quality and- its relation to truthJ*

Horkheimcr and Adorno seek to secure the relation of their thought to
"truth^ through recourse to HegcHan philosophy: from an analysts of
the 'Concept of Enlightenment' its inner 'dialectic' as well as its histor-
ical and social reality is to be reconstructed. This method of intellectual
reconstruction of central concepts ts taken from Megcl and attempts to
encapsulate the entire historical epoch of modernity and demonstrates
the fundamental contradictions within this concept. Hegel loo speaks
of a conceptual unity of '"presentation and critique' and employs the
notion of a 'detemiinaie negation'- But in contrast to Kegel - and here
once again HorkhciiTLcr and Adorno follow Marx - they do not expect
a 'detcrniiriaLc negation' to overcome and reconqilc ail contradictions
in the manner of a speculative concept.

In the fundanicntal programmatic first cliaplcr o( the Dialectic of
Eriiighteumeyit entitled The Concept of EnUghteninent', Horkheimcr

200 Pfiih.^ophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

and Adorno idcntif)^ three historical forms of reflection and knowledge
which they recognize as having the potential to break through
the blind inextricable development of the contradictory processes of
Western raLionahty: thc^eare 'art'^ 'critical thinliing' and "religion'. Here
too we have an analogy with Hegel and the stages of 'absolute Spirir'
found in his Encydopeiiin}'' Vet in contrast to Hcgct, these moments do
not form a reflectively closed wholc^ whose highest form is represented
by philosophical thinking- As a result of their critique of Hegeln
Horkhefmer and Adorno give a different valuation and assessment of
these concepts from those of HegcL By 'art' tl:iey mean authentic
^vorks of art^ which were to be found especially but not exclusively in
Modern Art and its abstract form of representation- Commenting on
such 'authentic' works of att^ they write; 'With the progress of enlighten-
ment, only authentic works of art were able to avoid the mere imitalion
of that whicl:^ already is/*'^ It is c\adent that Horkheimer and Adorno rec-
ognize in art a claim to knowledge, in accord ivith an acknowledgement
of the bibltcaf iitjunction prohibiting graven images: The justness of the
image is preserved in the faithtLil pursuit of its prohibition/*^ That
quality links modern art with the tradition of religion. It is above all
Uiis insight into tlic Jewish tradillon thai appears to be capable of
breaking through a false enlightenment w^hich Horkheimer and
Adorno see in the positlvistic creed prevalent in modern scientific
enterprise. This has become a new myth and led to an enormous
increase in domination. In contrast, Jewish religion broke the power of
the ancient pagan myths by their negation in the name of God:

Jewish religion allow^s no word that would ahcvLate the despair of all
that is mortal- It associates hope only with the prohtbilion against
calling on what is false as God^ against invoking the finite as the
infinite, ties as truth. The guarantee of salvation lies in the rejection
of any l:k&lief tliat would replace it: it is knowledge obtained in the
denunciation of illusion-^

These two forms of knowledge, 'art' and (Jewish! 'religion^ point the
way to a philosophical 'critique' of the unreason of tlie positivistlc sci-
ence and have the power to break through the system, ^the absurdity of
a stale of affairs in which the enforced power of the system over men
grows with eyery step that takes it out of the power of nature'.-^ This
critique 'denounces the rationaliiy of the rational society as obsolete.
Its necessity is illusive, no less than, the freedom of the entrepreneurs

who ultimatdy reveal their compulsive nature in liicir inevitable wars
and conLracts/^
In conclusion^ the goal of Horkhelmcrand Adorno's study is to show

that:

a thinkings Ln whose mechaniam of compulsive nature is reflected
and persists, inescapably reflects Us very own self as its own forgot-
ten nature - as a mechanism of compulsion.^^

This dc-mytl^oiogizatton of positivistic thinking is an expression of the
tiopc by Horkheimcr and Adorno to transcend what they call ^thc false
absolute' that means the principle of domination.

After his return from exile one searches in vain in Horkheimer^s philo-
sophical writings (oi a programmatic work expressive of his primary
philosophical concerns. His countless essays and lectures from the
period^ often occasional pieces dictated by Ehe demands of the
moment, are materially closely related to his writings in the ^Dialectic
of Enlightcnmciit'. This holds true for his personally reflective 'Notes:
1949-1969' which despite thetr lack of systematic character are not
without philosophical sharpness.

In his writings after 1950 one is confronted with an increasingly
radical episteniological scepticism and a pessimism about the prospects of
theoretical and practical philosophy- Here one must not forget that
Horklicimer's interest in philosophy was awakened by his early reading of
Schopenhauer. It was only after his confrontation with Edmund Husserl
and Jmmanuel Kant that the young I [orkheimer turned to Hegelian phi-
losophy and its critical reception by Marx. His philosophy remained
indebted, even in his appeal to the notion of 'critical social research"", to
Marxian materialism, Kantian criticism and Schopenhauerian pessimism.
Thc resulting enlightened 'sceptical niateilalism' forms the foil to his
philosophy of religion.

Horkheimer's concept of philosophy shows itself. In consequence of
his critiqties of both a too narrow concept of European Enlightenment
and of the positivism of the scipnccSj as beholden to a notion of ratio-
nality which holds to the idea of an absolute truth is nevertheless
in principle unattainable to finite human understanding. This corre-
sponds to Schopenhauer's epistemologically critical insight that the

202 Pfiih.wp!iy ofRi'lii^smr m ttn! 21%i Century

world is appearance. The 'in itself of things - thai iSj their essence
remains unknowable. For Horkheimer every form of metaphysics which
makes claims to knowledge of essences is fundamenlaOy impossible
since it docs not correspond to tlic capacilics of finite human under-
standing. Howi^i'er HorklicLmcr sees that this epistemological scepticism
Is subject to an objcotioit which for ^ood reason he does not wish to
contest. Writing with a view to liis critique of knowledge he notes that
the entire reflection on the impossibility of philosophy falls under its
own verdict of which it itself consists.^* He admits philosophy against
itself is impossible because it asserts the truth of that which il never-
theless dcnies.^^ Yet this aporeric inslglit into the impossibility of
somelhing like a final truth for philosophy. Is not itself claimed to l>e a
final Eruth- TItat conclusion would be an 'idealistic dead-end^ a tres-
passing of the limits and competence of finite human understanding.
■"Can we concluded Horkheimer asksr

that because scepticism confl^cttcts itself that some non-sceptical
philosophy, religion or some faith is perhaps justified? No, there is
another conclusion to be drawn: to keep silent. That which has
always been said, is never really said, since he who ought to hear it,
the fnfinitc One, does not hear il.'^^

Since Horkheimer ties the philosophical idea of a positive fulfilment of
truth claims in human language to the attainment of ^The Infinite' but
thinks that this is something reason can neither prove nor positively
deny, human langtiage loses its claim to truth even while ordinary
language and the positive sciences remain bewitched by such language.
As he writes in his 'Notes':

language in the emphatic sense, language that wants to claim Lruth,
is babbling silence^ nobody speaks and language does not speak
to anyone- Therefore nothii:ig is true. Not even that we are in the
darkness of night fs true^ not even that it is not true, is truc.^^

Horkheimer interpreted the logical positivist denial of a transcendental
meaning to the world and the binding character of truth as a sign of the
inevitable decline of the grand tradition of European philosophy That
this critique of positivism was not linked to the Western tradition of
metaphysics is owing to his cpistemological sccpUcism. His scepticism
resisted affirming that being has the same ejctcnsion as goodness and

truthn a conviction oi Thomistic as wcH as Hegelian philosophy. In
accord with the finite consLitulion of human bein^ and the conditions
of human knowledge which makes (he metaphysical knowledge of
essences impossible^ the philosopher cannot presuppose any final
unity of being, truth and goodness. That this was done, especially in
the neo-Plalonic tradition of metaphysics, is to be explained by the
human desire for consolation lakcn over from leligion by philosophy.
But the fundamental fact of conditioned finite human knowledge is
the fact of death which is constitutive of the 'essence' of human
knowledge. In continuity with the ancient tradition of inatcrtalisUe
philosophyj Horkheimcr contends that his philosophy does not over-
look human mortality.

Kant's theoretical philosophy is for Horkhcimer in a decisive respect
more honest than the tradition of ratlonallsllc metaphysics, against
which Kant's ^Critique of Pure Reason' is directed. But Schopenhauer's
metaphysical pessimism which Horkheimcr recognizes as having a
high degree of initial plausibility in the face of the actual course of
historical events^ trespasses the limits set by Kant's epistcniology in
finding 'solace' in the apparent unity of the 'essence of the world as
wLir- Schopenhauer's metaphysical pessimism turns into its opposite^
namely into an 'optimistic' philosopliy

In contrast, Horkheimcr, in his 'Xotes' defends a sceptically grounded
pessimism, which alone corresponds to the materialistic foundations of
philosophy, liul in contrast to the essentially 'religious' pessimism of
Arthur Schopenhauer, he insists on a 'philosophical reflection' which
forthrightly acknowledges the limits of the realization of human striv-
ing toward knowledge and happiness. Assertions about a reality other
than the apparent, teal world refer to a region into which one Is in
principle unable to entcL^**

For Horkheimcr, the philosophical doctrine of the unknowability of
essences or the things themselves and the impossibility of 'absolute
knowledge' does not mean that a philosophical notion of truth should
be replaced by a pragmatic notion of 'correctness^ Firsts maintaining
the philosophical pursuit of "idea of absolute truth' while recognizing
the impossibility of Its attainment, qualifies Horkheimer's thought as
pessimistic, as if characterized by a persistent sense of sadness.
Horkheimcr speaks, in reference to his thought of a phlTosophlcal
Insight into the powcrlcssness of the inLellectuar.^''' He interprets this
as the 'last and fiiia!' insight of which critical philosophy is capable
'Ihis is the point at which materialism and serious theolog^^ coin-
cide'-^" What Horkhcimer means by this might be explained by a

204 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%t Century

remark he made in reference to Paul Tlllich's notion of the concept of a
'boundary'- In his essay 'Remembering Paul Tillich^ Horklieinicr writes:

I have always understood the concept of boundary such that the
philosopher should ahvays see reality as relative which mcaiiSn that
a!l of our judgments about reality are not abi^olule and that the
world, itself rcLalLveH presupposes an absolute chat we nevertheless
are unable lo grasp.^^

Yet preciseiy his philosophical insight into the Inevitable relati'^ity of
human knowledge presupposes the idea of an 'absolute trudi' which
the sceptic must nevertheless regard ti.s 'pure idea'^ thai is, as beyond
the tulftlment of finite individuals. This pessimistic or sceptical strain
in HorkheiincE^s philosophy, viz.^ of an absolute truth as a non-^
relativist ic 'other' to the space-time world lias affinities with theology
and stands in contrast both to an idealistic metaphysics and a posithns-
tlc science. HorUicimer argues that without the idea of an absolute truth
and Its conditions, knowledge of its opposite, that Is 'the dcsolateness of
the human being\ is unthinkable. Ilorkheimer^s philosophy is pes-
simistic, but not cynical- Cynical, by contrast, are those philosophical
doctrines that beyond claiming the end of metaphysics, proclaim the
end of 'reason^ 'the subject' and the ideas of 'humanity' and 'justice^

The idea of truth, to which Horkheimer holds despite his insight into
Its unattainabtlitv takes on a critical function within scientific discourse.
Philosophy rejects the assertion of the finite reality as an ultimate deter-
mination and the fulfilment of the concept of t:uth. This indispensable
and yet unattainable notion of truth is indebted at least to the concept
and the idea of God- With the notion that the unconditioned truth cor-
responds to the coiicept of God, Horkheimer transcends l>ehind the
contrast between belief and denial of God^ or in his words: the false
alternative bet"\veen theism and atheism- In the past, atheism some-
times has been thought of as a document of freedom of spirit as 'a wit-
ness to the inner independence and indescribable courage', but today
theism has taken its place. And indeed, compared with atheism, theism
has had at least one decisive advantage in terms of its iiiner conceptual
determination- in principle, theism never allowed hatred in the name
of God while hatred and murder can in theory coexist with and some-
times follow from an atheistic view^ of the world. This judgement does
not undo the injustices perpetrated in the name of God^ but it allows a
degree of criticisin which does not seem possible for an atheistic reign

of Icrror. Atrocities committed in the name of atheism do not necessary
conflict with its fundamental philosopliical Icncnts.

The concept of God like that of 'the truth itself cannot be given a
dcfinile content, indeed Lt is fundamentally unknowable. Therefore for
HorkhcimcF, assertions about the existence of God^ the Creator of the
world and the !iaviour of humanity arc philosophically illcgitiniate. But
according to Horkhctnicr within our knowledge of Ihe finite state of the
world an idea of an InfiuUc is already presupposed. This idea gets its prac-
tical fclcvance in the 'human desire for the totally Other' as well as in the
polilical struggle for iusticc and a belter world. The practical relevance of
the idea of God which totally coincides with the ideas of the good and
the just does not concede anything to his fundamentally sceptical posi-
tion. Horkheimer^s philosophical objection to a positive? human knowl-
edge of God articulates the central concern of his cpistemolo^ical
scepticism and his Schopcnhauerian and Marxist-oriented materialism,
namely the philosophical insight into the finitudc of human knowledge,
the limit? of reason and limits to human self-realization as a whole.

In his principal philosophical work^ "'Negative Dialectics' published
In 1966, Theodor W. Adorno speaks of a 'Passage to Materialism'-*^
which runs like a thread through his entire j^hilosophy. This turn to
materiahsm is for Adorno a result of a successful search for the true
form oc the objectivity of the worlds as it is realized in metaphysics and
idealistic philosophy: The innervation that metaphj-'sics might win
only by discarding itself applies to such other truth, and it is not the
last among the motivations for the passage to materialism/^^ And
Adorno does not shy away from describing his philosophical position
In paradoxical terms: 'If negative dialectics calls for the self-reflection
of ihinkingj the tangible implication is that If thinking is to be true - if
It 15 to be true today, in any case - it must also he a thinking against
Itself/'"^"* Thus for Adorno the concept of ^matter' is a place holder for a
concept of realit)^^ ideahstic philosophy can only formulate as some-
thing non-intellectual- for Adorno, the concept of 'nonidentily still
obeys the measure of Identity- Emancipated from that measure^ the
nonldcntical moments show up as matter^ or as Inseparably fused with
material thlngs/-^^

This Insight allows Adoriio's passage to materialism in the sense of a
priority of the object wtthln the mediation of Subject-Ob] ect_ This
position agrees with Lhcolog)' Insofar as it holds to a hope in a resurrec-
tion of the deaths. 'At its most materialistic, materialism comes to agree
wilh theology. Its great desire would be the resurrection of the flesh, a
desire utterly foreign to idealism, the realm of the absolute spirit. The

206 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

perspective vanishing point of historic materialism would tac its self-

^subUmatioiri^ the spirtt^s liberation from the prLinacy of the material
needs in their state of fuUihncnt.^^

hi his discussion of the philosophical development of Horkhcimcr and
Adorno's thought since tlie 1940Sj Jurgcn HatKrmas points to some fun-
damental difficulties and apoietic argumenLs of the so-called 'older crit-
ical theor)''. It is primarily tliese difficulties which make Horkheimer
and Adorno's appeal to the concepts and symbols of religion under-
standable; novGrthclcss Hai>ermas attempts to avoid the difficulties
involved in Horkheimer and Adorno's arguments by appealing to a
universal pragmatics of language. As a rc5uk, Habermas comes to a dif-
ferent conclusion about the function of icligion. hi his understanding
'religion' is not able to compensate for the difficulties or limits of phi-
losophy as it seems to do in the case of Horkheimer and Adorno. For
HabermaSj 'religton' neither competes with philosophical rationaUty
nor claims the ability to resolve tlie problems of a post-metaphysical
tlieorv of reason.

Habermas offers his critique of Horklicitncr's phHaophy of religion in
his criticism of the representative essay Theism-Atheism' published In
1^63- There Horkheimer contends that it is Vain to attempt to try to pre-
serve absolute meaning svithout God'.^^ Habermas rejects Horkheimer's
argumentation as inappropriate. According to Habermas, Horkhcimer's
philosophical position Is based on the practical idea that the darkness
which casts its long shadow upon world history should not have the
last word. In Habermas's view^ Horkheimer thereby shifts the burden of
explaining the historical catastrophes of the twentieth century to the
concept of reason itself so that^ indebted to Arthur Schopenhauer as he
is, he no longer trusts a philosophical concept of reason to he able lo
pK>s]tivcly ground the morally good or at least the morally better act.
SOj tn llorkheimer^s thought, it is the task of a critical theory of society
to d&scribc historical wrongs or injustices In accordance with the view
that historical materialism is a theory that describes successive condi-
tions that need to be overcome, it is the task of Critical Theory to con-
tribute to the improvement of the conditions of society by identifying
societal evils and llieir 'determinate negation'- It is the weak point in
Horkhcimer's argument that he doesn^t realize that the possibility^ of
describing something as evil already presupposes the capacity to dehne

M^itlsw.\ Lutz-Rtii-hmm^? 207

the content of the concept of the good or to describe the differences
belwt2C!"L ^good' and 'qviW

Nevertheless, Habcrmas believes this typ^ of argument confronts
Horkheiincr^s philosophiciilly funded Critical Theory of society faced
with 3 serious dilemma. In comparison with his earlier and seemingly
less presumpluous moral philosophy, the language about an injustice or
wroii;^ which Is abolished through a 'determinate negation' neverthe-
less presupposes, simply at the level of the description of just or unjust
conditions^ the validity of a normative measure of value that must be
philosophically explicated. However, Horkheimer, in Habermas's view,
fundamcntaDy denies human understanding such a capacit^^ because it
falls under the rule of an entirely formal, instrumental rationality Since
Horkheiiner nevertheless docs not want to give up his intention to con-
tribute to the amelioration of social conditions through a critical theory
of soclet\^ yet no longer trusts human reason to pro\Kde a justification
of such improved or normatlvely valid conditions. Hence Horkheimer
inu5t according to Habcrmas, borroAV the now antiquated forms of
rationality from a concept of theology amalgamated with an at least
iieo-pl atonic philosophy. This protects the inheritance of an already
obsolete forni of 'substantial reason'/*^ Even Horklieimcr sees that his
own notion of 'objective rcason'^^ is an appeal to a form of rationality
which had been surpassed by the critiques of eighteenth-century ratio-
nalism, transcendental philosophy and idealism and which would
never again gain ascendancy. Hence Horkheimer is not oblivious to the
philosophical problems of ImplementiBig his own proposal. Yet he sees
no alternative to such an 'anamnetic recourse to the substantial reason
of metaphysical and rclig^ious views of lifc'^ in the attempt to search
for an alternative to instrumental reason. Since Horkheimer does not
have anv illusions about the inconsistcnev and fruitlessness of his
appeal to 'objective reason', his philosophy offers an ambivalent mes-
sage swingings as it docs, bchveen his own complete despair In reason
and a 'return to ihe faith of his foicfathers'."*^

In contrast to Horkheimer and Adorno^ Habermas adheres to a con-
cept of truth set in terms of his own language-based, pragjnatic theory
with the goal of 'interpreting the resolution of a claim to truth under
tlie conditions of an ideal communication situation, iliat is, in an ide-
ally extended social and historical community'.'"^ In the context of an
argumentative exchange between interlocutors whose goal is under-
standing, flabcrmas maintains that assertions or practical statements
imply validity claims which extend beyond a particular time and place.
hi such utterances there is a 'moment of uncondttionedness' that is

208 Pfiih.^ophy ofRi'lii^ou m ttn! 21%i Century

■"deeply embedded in the process of underslandtiig'-^'* For Mabermas
tlicre is in the very character of the communicative situaUoiij a Lran-
seendence of [aiigua^c which points lo a possible understanding inchi-
5ive of future communication partners.

These few remarks about Hal>erraas's pragmatic interpretation of rea-
son and truth within tlie context of his ^theory of cominunicaEive
action' suffice to make clear that for Habeniias, in contrast to
Horkheinier, 'post-metaphysical thinking^ does not require recourse to
'God or an Absolute"^^ in order to preserve a 'meaning of the uncondi-
tioned' .^^^ Rather this 'unconditioned' is immanent in the use of lan-
guage ttself and the claims to truth and to coiiectncss implicit in the
process of communtcative acting. Uut the 'unconditioned' only has
cognitive import if it is 'justified before the forum of reasoned
speeeh"^'^ or exposed to discursive scrutiny without quahficatlon. Yet
one iTiust distinguish between what Jial>crmas means by the 'meaning
of the unconditioned' and what Horklieimer called 'the unconditioned
meaning^; for Habermas^ tlie failure of metaphysics since liej^el means
that philosophy can no longer appeal to such a sense of the whole.
Rather, this can only be mediated by religion where people provide
comfort to each othcr^ a task philosophy cannot and does not intend
to replace. Such consolation is that which takes 'the unavoidable and
innocent injustice^ the contingency of misery^ loneliness^ sickness and
death and throws a different tight on it, teaching one to bear it'.'*'' But
in a further sense Mabermas can imagine that talk of an ^uncondi-
tioiied meaning' without reference to God is 'vain'. In that case we are
not concerned with the possibility of gaining and grounding a funda-
mental normative insight, wliich Is strictly tlic task of a communica-
tively constituted reason, but witli providing a 'motivating answer' to
the question why we should act according to our best moral insights,
including tlic question: wiiy be moral at all?"*'^ hi view of this funda-
mental ethicat problem, Habermas suggests he can 'perhaps' affirm the
indispensable 'meaning of the uncondiiioned\ explained within the
work and through the tradition of biblical Religion-"*^

Translated bv Michael Parker

Notes

1, S^ Ma3c Horkheamerr 'Notizen 1930 bis 1969"'^ in: G^iammt'ite Schnfi^fti,
\ol_ 6, ed. A. Schmidt and G. SchmidNoeiTr Frankfurt am Main, 1991, p. 253_

■MaStliws. L uiz-Bairiiimmn 209

5.
6.

2. Max Horkheimer, 'The Present Situaticn of Social Philoscphy and the Tasks of

an InstElule for Social Research', in: Max HoikheEmer, JJi-'fiv-w?; nnks-iiiphy and

Satrinf Sirience, Sek'ct^ii Etirty Writings, trans, by G.R Hunter I't ts}., Cambridge^

199:-^, p. 7.

Ibid., p. 9.

Ibid.

i'i'f Majt Horkheimcr, He^I miti ihti Pmblt-'ns lit^r Mt^tuphyiik, Frankfurt, 197 L,

p. 90. ' '

Max Horkheimeij 'History and Psycholcg}'^,, In: Between PffHowptty and Social
Science, op. ciE., p. 1 16.
B. Ibjd.

9. See Max Horkheimerj Traditionelle und Kriti^che Theorie'r In: Criticai Theory.

Selected Es^ay:^, trans, by M J. O'Connelt et tii., Ne^v York, 15^95, pp. lEiS-243.
10. Max Hcjrktieimerj 'On tfie Problem of TrutlV, in: Retwejui FliUosopliy and

Ssmial Seieiice, op. ch., p. 19J-i.
11_ See Max Horkheimer, 'Thoughts on Religion', in: Cfiticnt Theory. Selected

Ess{iys, op. cit.r p, 129.

12. Ibid., p. Ua.

13. Horkheimer/Adorno, Diulecitc of Entigfitenmeni, traru. by John dimming^
New York, 1994, p. 3„

T4_ See. for instance, Jiirgen Habermas, Der phifamp!ji<;i-he Dhktm der Mmfenie,
Frankfurt, 19SS, pp. O0-.S7.

15. Horkhe imei, Adoriio, Diakciit trf Enli^hteniuentf op. tit., p. xiti.

16. Ibid.

17. See G.W.]'. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of tiie Philosopfiieal Si'iences m Outline,
§S 553-77.

IB. Horkheimei/Adorno, ibid., p. IS.

19. Ibid., p. 24.

20. Ibid., p. 23.

21. Ibid., p. 38.

22. Ibid., p. 38 f.

23. Ibid., p. 39.

24. See Max Horkheimer, 'Nolizen 1950 bis 1969', op. cit, p. 320.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 321.

27. Ibid.

2B. HorkheimeT, 'Schopenhauer als Optimist', in: 'Notizen 1950 bis 1969',

op. cit., pp. 3B7-8.

29. Hoikheimer, 'Gegen dit Philosophte', in: 'Notizen 1930 bis 1969', op. dt.,

p 2R1

30. Ibid.

31. See Horkheimei", 'Erinneruiig an Paul Tidich', in: Ge^iimmiiite Sdmften, Bd. 7,
KrankfuTt, I9SS, p. 279.

32. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans, by E.B. Ashton, New York,
1992, p_ 192.

33. Ibid., p. 36J f.

34. Ibid., p. 365.

35. Ibid., p. 193.

2iO Pfiih.^ophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

S6, rbid., p. 207.

37. See Max Horkheimer^ 'TJtieism and Atheism^ in" Crrf;jjz;f of fn^tmrnenti}!

Rta'ian, trans, by M. O'Conn^Cl t'tni., Neiv York, 1974, p. 47.

38. See jiirgen Habermas^ 'Einen unbecimg;ten Sinn zu retten ohne Gott i5t
eiieV, in! M. Lurz-Bachmann^G. Schmid Noeir^ Kiiris^fii'i Mateiluiismus,
Municli, 1^1, pp. 125-42.

39. See Max Horktieimer, "Zur Krittk Jer instrumentellen Vemunft^ in : ^sss^tnr-

iiii^iie Schfif^?!. VQ\. 6, Frankfurt/M., 1591, esp. pp. 27-74, 165-S6.

40. Jtirgen Kabcrmas, op_ cit.. p. 134_

41. Ibid., p- 131.

42. Ibid., p. 139.
4:i. IbEd., p- 140-

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., p- 141-

46. IbLd.

47. Ibid.
4K. Ibid.

49- SeeJuf^En Habermas, 'Israe! und Athen odei: Wem gehort lYie anamnelische
Vernuj]tt?'r i^^ Diu^noseu z^tf Zeil, DusseldGrf, 1994, pp. 57-64.

Critical Theory and Religion

Maeve Cooke

Critical Ihcorv^ is a ihcory of society with a 'practical intent': a theory
concerned with investigating the potentials for freedom, justice and
happiness in actual historical social sysiems with a view to iransforniing
them accordingly. As a normative theory of society it trolli diagnoses
the causes of social evils and points the way towards better - more
rational - forms of social life. This holds both for ear^v criticaJ theorists
such as Max Horkheimer as well as for contemporary heirs to the tradi-
tion such as JiJrgcn Habcrmas- Critical theory is thus not primarily a
theory of knowled;^c or a theory of truth - indeed, not even primarily a
theory of justice or of freedom - although sucli theories form an
important part of its endeavours. Bearing in mind iLs practical orienta-
tion towards society as a whole, my essay initially focuses on the fol-
lowing question: what distifictive cofftnhiitfon, if any, docs religion make
to a critieaL social theory? Here I concentrate on the work of (the early)
Horkheimer. in the second section, I consider some points of conver-
gence between Horkheimer and llabcrmas. Here, the problem of truth
emerges as a potential challenge for critical theory.

A concern with religion is evident throuj^hout Horkhcimer's writings
although, as a number of commentators have obser\^cd, it appears to
play a more prominent role in his later writings than in his earlier
ones.^ Howcverj 1 leave aside questions concerning the development of
Horkhcimer's thought in the following, histcad I want to draw atten-
tion to the principal t'unclions that he assigns to religion and to the
idea of God, respectively, and consider their ^itatus w^ithin his critical

211

212 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

theory of society- This will necessitate, in imn, ^ brief discussion of
what he undcrslaiids by malcrialism.

Dialectical materialism and the social contribution
of religion

It is striking how often religion features in Horkhcimcr's essays of
the 19'^0s- Although only a few of these arc concerned primarily with
the question of religion^ refeteiices to religion can be found in almost
all of his essays on topics as diverse as the 'problem cf truth', 'philo-
sophical anthropology^ "^matcrialism and morality'^ 'materialism and
metaphysics', or 'egoism and the liberation movement'. It is also striking
that these remarks are almost equally critical of religion and favourable
to it. This is at least partly explicable In terms of his dialectical material-
ist standpoint- In keeping %vith this standpoint, Horkheimcr assesses
religion as either a progressive or regressive social forces depending on
the specific functions it assumes in concrete historical circumstances.
Since in the present context ivc are considering the question of religion's
distinctive contribution to a critical theory of society; my focus is on its
progressive aspects. I argue that rcligioni even when it assumes progres-
sive social functions, either makes no distinctive contribution to critical
social theory as conceived by liorkheimer or inakes one that is highly
ambivalent. The idea of God, by contrast, plays a crucial role in his
critical theory - but mainly I contend^ in a negative sense, released
from a positive religious framework.

Horkheimer^s assessment of the function of religion must be under-
stood against the background of his dialectical materialism. His version
of tbis theory owes evident debts to the thinking of Megel and Marx, It
follows Hegel in its adoption of the method of determinate negation as
central for the process of ascertaining truth. Determinate negation is a
critical method that starts by exposing the one-sided and conditioned
character ot concepts, proceeding then to re-examine and reinterpret
these concepts in light of their limitations^ through reference to a gen-
eral (normative) theory.- It follows Marx in its rejection of idealism.
Materialism rejects the view that conceptually grasping the condi-
tioned and transitory naLure of prcvaiiing ideas is synonymous with
overcoming them. Instead it emphasizes transformatory praxis: it
insists on the necessity and possibility of overcoming existing condi-
tions of suffering and oppression through collective human action.^
However^ Horkheimcr not only follows Marx in his materialist^ praxis*
oriented, Interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic, he also diverges from

iWiicv^ Cookt^ 213

Hc^cl in a second respect- In contrast to Hcgcl - and some versions of
Marxism - he stresses that the dialectie is in principle opcn-ciidcd-"^
When he writes Ihat 'In materialism the dialectic Is not deemed to be
concluded^ lie not only rejects idcaHsm: he also affirms the notion of
a Ji^x-c^fiv^ dialectic that maintains an insurmountable discrepancy
between human thought and reality? According to this negative inter-
pretation of the dialectic, the progress of history is a struggle to realize
human Ideas in praxis Ihat can ^?t■^■^:7■bc concluded. As we shall see, this
assertion of an ineiadtcablc disjunction between concept and object is
one reason why the idea of God is held to cinbody a moment of truth.

The starting point for T-forkheimer^s version of dialectical materialism
is the need for a better order of things to be achieved through transfor-
mation of existing historical reality. This better order of things - which
is the normative notion guiding the dialectical method of determinate
negation - is conceived neither formally nor abstractly,^ Rather^ it is
given a concrete content and shape by ihe interests and desires of
actual human beings as they have been arttcutated in historical strug-
gles to overcome suffering and oppression/ On Elorkhcimcr's reading
of history, human beings have historically been motivated by the
desire for justice in the sense of overcoming inequality'^ - a desire that
has been given a universalist interpretation only under conditions of
modernity'^ - and by a longing for liappiness and frccdoin.^*'' There can^
of course, be no guarantee that future generations will continue to be
Inspired by these ainis"^ -this aspect of materialist theory is one reason
for Horkheimcr's pessimism in his later writings. However, in the
essavs written in the I9;^0s- Horklieimcr is confident that affcctivelv
based motivation of this kind is widespread:'^ he discerns In Ixjurgeois
society a moral feeling akin to love that desires the free development of
the potcntiafitics of each and every human being, and that finds
expression ii*^ the twin reactions of sympathy for ncediness and suffer-
ing and a politics aimed at the happiness of human beings in gencraL^^

Dialectical materialism is primarily a theory of transformalory praxis.
Nonetheless, its view of knowledge as guided by human interests,
which both arise out of, and iiave the power to transform, historical real-
ity, has implications for the perspective It takes on religion. On the
dialectical materialist view, the reciprocal conditioning of knowledge
and reality has a double aspect! on the one hand, it has a gerealogicat
aspect in that it refers to the origins of concepts aaid theories in iiistori-
cally specific social constellations; on the other hand, it has a rwrmatsve
aspect^ for it requires ideas and theories to respond appropriately to the
fhistorically specific) interests and desires of human beings, [f we keep

2i4 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

these two aspects distinct wc can sec that dialectical matcilalism docs

not reduce the spiritual to the materialj even though it often gives a
niaterialist explanation of the genesis and development of religious
(and moral) beliefs and practices- For example^ Horkhetnier on occa-
sion offers a materialist account of the historical connection bchvecn
icceping promises and llie econoniic relations of capitalisnij^'^ bclween
the modern conception of God and the capitalist principle of
exchange,'^ and between religious faith and the failure to transform
undesirable social structures^'^ importantly, however, he distinguishes
between a materialist account of the hlslarical roots of morality and reli-
gion and the question of the vaiue of the beliefs and practices he men-
tions. For florliheimei:, the value or significance of any ideaSn ptlnciples,
theories, knowledge, and so on depends on the overall state of society
and on the concrete situation to which they belong. ^'" More fundamen-
tally, as we have seen, the ultimate point of reference for determining
value or significance is a normative, htsiorically grounded, theory of
human interests and desires, and of the kind of social structure deemed
appiopriate for their satisfaction.^^

■It is clear from the foregoing, therefore, that^ according to
Horicheimer^s materialist view, there can be no obstruct answer to the
question of whether religious faith is a positive or nej;ative social force.
The value ot significance of religious beliefs and practices always
depends on the historically specific social situation in wliich they are
formulated. For this reason, it comes as no surprise that in his various
writings Horkheimer both criticizes relif^ion and draws attention to its
positive potentials. For example, he is critical of religion insofar as it plays
down the importance of insight into the earthly order of things (thus rel-
egating social problems to second place), by lurning the minds of human
beings towards a more essential order.** Or^ again^ he questions Christian
claims to selflessness, arguing that supposedly selEless Christians are in
fact more egoistic than atheistic freedom fighters who, by renouncing
tlie hope ot reivard in an afterlife, are willing to sacrifice their lives
for the good of human beings in generaL^** In addition, he criticizes
ChrisLianlty's unwillingness to acknowledge the brutality that has been
part of human nature historically; instead it has justified its own brutal
acts through appeal lo the 'name of Cod", leading to a repression of
brutality rather than an attempt to deal with it rationally_^^ On the
other hand, Horkheimer acknowledges that atheism can tic sympto-
matic of a kind of Intellectual passivity that fails to recognize what is
ivrong with the bourgeois social order and lacks any desire to change

Lt.^^ Implicit in this assessment of atheism is the hasic yardstick used by
Horkhelmcr to measure the social contribution of rcJigton.

As he sees itn rcll^on can be regarded as a positive social force on
tivo main couiils. The first has to do with its moral message, the sec-
ond with its orientation cowards an idea of the absolute.

Keligion's moral message

Religion is a progressive social force insofar as it preaches a moral message
of human dignlLy and universal solidarity thai inspires ciiticisni of pre-
vailing suffering and oppression. For Horkhclmer, the proclamation of
the infinite value of the human person^ of the innate rights of the indi-
vidual, Lhe fight against ideologies of race, nation and 'Fuhrertum', are
part of a humanistic message propagated by some strands of Christianity
that can motivate social struggle for a better society.^-^ It should be noted
here that Horkheimcr distances himself from the spiritual fiiatifiaitiim
offered m support of religiously motivated messages of human dignity
and solidarity, Insisting that the struggle for a better order of things has
no need of appeals to absolute mcanlng^"^ or to an absolute demand
{Fortknufs) upon human beings- ^'^ He sees 'man's striving for happiness
[as] a natural fact requiring no justification'.^ feelings of revulsion
against, and solidarity \vith, suffering and oppression are sufficient - feel-
ings that neither require nor permit justillcatlon-^^ Indeed^ Horkhcinier
is emphatic that morality cannot be justifted - neither through intu-
ition nor through arguments.^ As he sees It^ nil value judgments are
unfounded.^^ There are no binding moral commands: 'Materiahsm dis-
cerns no authority transcending human beings that could distinguish
between helpfulness and greed for profit, goodness and brutality^
covetousness and seif-sacriflce.^^'^ All religious attempts to find a divine
justification of morality arc thus ideologtcaL Nonetheless, Horkheitner
recognizes that under certain circumstances religious messages can
serve to reinforce the desire for happiness and feelings of solidarity
with suffering, thereby strengtheniiig the incentive for social transfor-
mation- In such situations a temporary alliance between materialist
thinkers and religious thinkers may be desirable - but only insofar as
both aim for a better society.-^^ For our present purposes^ two points are
particularly fele\^ant. First of aJlp religion's progressive social function is
conditiofial: the value of its moral messag-.- depends on whether or not
It links up with the above-mentioned feeiings to inspire transformatory
praxis. In Horkheiiner^s view^ this link is purely contingent for^ like
every Idealistic philosophy, religious Ideas can easily Justifj^ any kimi of

2i6 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

attitude to existing society - a critical or an apologcllc, a reactionary or

a rebellious one.-^^ Second, religion is ftfiaceiibie as the vehicle of the
moral message of universal human dignity and soUdariiy. Even if^ his-
torically, religion has been one of the most powerful means of convey-
ing this message^ the truth of the message is dependent on religion
neither for its justification nor for lis dissemination. As we have seen^
Horkheimcr holds thai molality cannot be justified, hi addition^ tliere
Is nothin;^ about religion that makes it inherently belter suited than
non-religious belief systems to act as a vehicle for moral ideas; indeed^
Its intrinsic idealistic clement makes it kss suited to this La^k than
materialism Is. When^ in 19.^5, Horkheimcr writes that, today, 'good
wIIIh solidarity with misery and the stri\1iig for a better world have cast
off their religious mantle'^ he clearly approves of the development.^^

Reliyiuii's orit:ntatioii tawards tht idta of God

Religion docs, however^ have one distinctive characteristic - a feature
pcculiai to religious belief - that makes it a potejitlally progressive social
force. This is its orientation towards the idea of God, Unfortunately, it is
precisely this characteristic thai makes it equally a potential force for
social regre!^j;fO!i. Horkheimcr asserts an intiinate connection between
the idea of God and the idea of the absolute: that ISj projections of
absolute meaning, final knowledge, perfect justice, ultimate truth and
so on. There is an oft-cited phrase from his later writings that runs:
'Without God one will try in vain to preserve absolute nieanin;^/'^ For
the early Horkheimcr, at teast, the relationship between materialism
and absolute meaning is highly ambivalent; furthermore, his approval
of the idea of God, insofar as it is unconditional, is an approval of a
negatively construed idea of God that is essentially non-religious.

From the point of view of Horkheimer's critical social theory^ the
idea of the absolute is both desirable and dangerous. On the one hand,
the idea of the absolute expresses the longing of human beings for
perfection - a longing that is the Utopian counterpart to the feelings
(of desire for happiness or of solidarity with suffering] that Horkheimcr
presents as historically articulated psychological attributes of human
bettigs.;^^ it is the idea of an alternative, better order of things: 'For a
long time the concept of God preserved the idea that there are alterna-
tive standards to those that find expression In the operations of nature
and society.,- Religion records the wishes, desires and proLests of
countless generations/^^ Even materialists - who know that the idea of
perfection is a potentially ideological illusion - long for eternal, perfect

M^t\^ Cookt^ 217

justice for all human bcin^s.^^ The uiidcflyin^ impulse towards tran-
scending the given - or even the possible - in thought is regarded by
Horkhcimer as part of what is to be human (which, of course^ is a
historical caLej^ory).-^'^ As he sees it, wliat distinguishes the progres-
s!vc type of liuraan being from the retrogressive one is not rejection
of visions of transcendence but rather recognition tliat perfection
can never be achieved/^^ ThuSn for example^ like Walter Benjamin,
Horkhehner maintains that perfect justice can never be realized in the
worlds for even if contemporary injustice were to give way to a more
lust social order, the misery of bygone generations would not have
been made good and the suffering of the rest of nature would still
remain."^' In conlrasL to religious thinkerSj materialists acknowledge
that the demand for perfection can never be fulfilled; Horkheimcr
maintains that this accounts for a certain melancholy discernible in
materialist writings, while insisting that melancholy feelings do not
constitute a reason for continuing to embrace the Illusion.'^" At least in
liis early writings, Horkheimcr holds that materialists must acknowl-
edge the tllusionary charaetcr of their longing for perfection, retaining
only tbe valuable impulse at the heart of it- This is the impulse towards
social struggle to overcome the imperfections of existing social reality.

However, the idea of the absolute is also an illusion that is poten-
tially ideological and dangerous. In affirming the idea of salvation in
the hereafter, it directs attention away from suffering and oppression
in concrete social reality and runs the risk of making religion a cog in
the wheel of the totalisttc state [totaier Staat)^^ Furthermore, the idea
of the absolute as a meaningful object of human knowledge rests on the
assumption of a possible reconciliation between concept and object
that effects a closure of the dialectical process of history. To be sure, the
idea of God can also prevent closure. As we shall see, when integrated
within a materialist theory, the idea of the absolute is precisely the idea
that there is no end-point of history. Paradoxically, how^evcr, the idea
of God contains a moment of truth only when it is construed nega-
tively and released from its connection with positive religious beliefs,
rituals and practices.

Again, two points should be emphasized here. The first is that, for
Horkhelmet, the value of the religious idea of God is ^onditioiuii: it is
dependent on whether the idea of an alternative to the existing order
translates into actual transformatory social action. To be sure, under
certain social conditions ffor instancen twentieth-century consumer
capitalism) feelings of solidarity with suffering and desire for happi-
ness, which are the main motivation for transformatory praxis, may

218 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

wane or even disappear. In such situations the religious idea of God
cannol easily connect up with these feelings^ and struggle to overcome
suffering and oppression is unlikely to result. Even here^ however, reli-
gion's usefulness remains linked to the idea of tiansforinatory struggle^
for the religious idea of God is valuable only insofar as it keeps alive
the insight that an aiternativc to the existing social order is a possibil-
ity for human action.^^ The second point is that the religious idea of
God, although it expresses a genumc human longing for eternity and
pcffection, is an ilhmion. Unlike the content of reli^on's moral mes-
sage, the religious idea of God has an miiereiitly idealistic element that
makes it ideological- This Is the cause of its ambivalence. It is because it
is so ambivalent that Horkheimer advises maictialists to recognize that
their longing for the absolute cannot be satisfied. They should relin-
quish the illusion^ retaining only its fruitful impulse: the need for a
dynamic transcending of the existing order through transformatory
prajcis.

1 have suggested that, for Horkheimer the ideological character of
the religious idea of God IhrcaLens to obscure its moment of validity.
In his vicWh in order to presence its valid insight the idea of God has to
be released from its positive religious framework. Only as a negatively
construed, non-religious Idea of the absolute does it play a central role
in Horkhcimer's dialectical materialism. To grasp this role we must take
a brief look at his theory of truth.

Ilorkhtitner's theory t>f truth

According to this theory^ truth can never be defined in abstraction
from the historically arliculated interests and desires of human beings:
truth is always historically conditioned^ it is never abstract or timeless;
furthermore, the process of cognition includes actual historical action
just as much as experience and understanding.^"* Horkhelmer's theory
of truLh is guided by this emphasis on historically based UiLerestSn
desires and actions and has two important components- The first of
these Is tlic notion of 'cor^obc^ration■' {BemHwuns), the second is the
method of determinate negation.

The pragmatist idea of Bemihnms - the view that something Is irue
only insofar as it can be corroborated, in the sense of 'proves its worthy
'turns out to be irue'^-'' - plays a central role in Horklicimer's materialist
theory.^ With its emphasis on concrete historical action and Its refer-
ence to human interests and desires^ it is easy to see why this idea is
congenial to materialism. Horkheimer refers to the American pragmatist

iVfcTCVf Cookf 219

philosophers John Dcwcy and William James, while acknowledging that

the idea of Ik^wiiiimn^ goes back much furllier In the recent German
tradition he ciles Goethe and Nietzsche as proponents of it: both regard
something as itue only insofar as It proves to be fmttt'ul^ connects up
with other true beliefs and is life-enhancing.^^ Horkhetmer, too, insists
that ttie verification and truth of ideas pertaining to human beings and
social orders docs not simplj^ consist in laboratory experiments or in
research activity but in historical struggles in which convictions play
an essential role.'^'^ He maintains ihat 'so lon^ as experiences gained
through perception and Inference, methodical research and historical
events^ everyday work and political struggles, withstand the cognitive
tests available at any given time, they are irue/^^ He sees the notion of
Bewiihnwg as particularly important for materialist theory in that it
acts as a weapon against all forms of myslictsm: it attacks the thesis of
a transcendent, superhuman truth that, instead of being accessible in
principle to experience and praxis, remains iIk- preserve of the revealed
knowledge of a chosen few_^ Despite the clear affinities between this
aspect of materialist theory and the American piagmaLtsts, however,
Horkheimer underscores a fundamental distinction. As he sees it, con-
temporary pragmalists such as Dewey and James hold a view of social
reality that is too harmonious. He attributes to them a boundless con-
fidence in the world as it actually exists.^^ Far from constituting the
theory's organizing principle, the need for change, if it is perceived at
all, is seen as a subjective preference.^^ I-rom the point of view of male-
rialism, the crucial dcfictency of contemporary pragmatism is Its lack
of reference to a general (normative) theory of society-^-^ Such a theory
Is necessary if the notion of Bewiihmng is to avoid the twin dangers of
subiectivism and uncritical affirmation of the status quo. for this reason,
Horkheimer joins the idea of Bewiihrtmg to the dialectical method.

As WQ have seen, this operates by way of dcLcrminate negation. The
dialectical materialist starts with the conceptual principles and stan-
dards oi an object, unfolding their implications and consequences. It
then re-examines and reassesses the object in light of these implica-
tions and consequences. The result Is a new understanding of the
object in which the original image of the object is transcended and the
object itself is brought into flux- As Morkhcimer (with Adorno) formu-
lates it detcTininate negation rejects defective ideas of the absolute by
' interpreting every image as writing' - by showing how the admission
of its falsity is to be read in the lines of Its features. ^^ This process of
critical examination and reinlerpretation of concepts is guided by a
gencTal theory, in Horkhcimcr's case, the normative component of the

220 Pfiih.^ophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

theory is derived from an account of human interests and desires, as
these have been Ekrticulatcd hislorically.-^^ As we have also secn^ this
theory is progrcssiye but open-ended: absolute knowledge - and, in
consequence^ an ciidpoint of history - is inconceivable, l-loweveip
although Horkheimer, at least in his early writings, rcjccis the idea of
absolute knowledge as an achievable - or even meaningful - goal of
human action^ the idea of the absolute does play a role in his negative
dialectics.

Absolute knowledge is inconceivable for human beings and unat-
tainable through human action. As such it is not a meaningful goal for
materialists, Nonetheless^ despite its [llusory (and^ as we have seen,
potentially ideological) character, it plays a role in materialist theory.
Its significance is that it marks the impossibility of closure. The essen-
tial open-en dcdness of the progress of history means that human
beings^ desire to overcome the limitations of their given historical con-
dition through transformaiory praxis can never be satisl'ied. hi contrast
to religious thinking, in which the idea of the absolute signifies the^
possibility of eternal^ perfect truth, jusUcCn or meaning, tt has a nega-
tivCn critical, function in materialist thinking, [n illustration
tlorkheimer gives the example of the Jewish prohibition against nam-
ing the absolute with names: the 'prohibition against calhng on what
is false as God^ against invoking the finite as the infinite^ lies as
truth'.^*" Thus, tlie idea of God as it functions within Horkheimcr's ver-
sion of dialectical materialism is a negative image thai can be described
as religious only in a derivative sense. More precisely^ despite its reli-
gious origins, it can be described as a negatively construed, non-
religious idea of God insofar as it lacks the framework of positive belief
and concrete rituals and practices in v%i"jich it has always bccti embed-
ded in the main religious traditions-
Summary

Summarizing, it can tae seen that religion either makes no distinctive

contribution to a critical theory of society as conceived by Horkhciimer
or elae. one that is highly ambivalent- Although under certain condi-
tions it may assume the role of a progressive social force, its value and
significance is continj^cnt on a number of factors. In addition, it is
rtplaceabJe by non-religious kinds of beliefs a^ a vehicle for progressive
social action. Finallyn it caii just as easily inhibit the struggle for more
rational forms of social life as promote it. By contrast^ an idea of God
plays a crucial role In his critical social theory insofar as it marks the

Mtiew Cooke 221

impossibntly of closure^ theretay testifying to the need for iicvcr-cnding

struggle to achieve a better order of things. Due to the inherently idco-
lo^cal character of religious interpretations of Ihc idea of the absolute^
however^ this idea is most useful when it is released from its religious
framework and understood in a purely negative, critical way.

Habertiias's critique of Ilorkheimfr's idea of God

h has been argued, howe^'er, that the idea of God fulfils positive func-
tions in Horkheimer's later writings. The later Morkheinicr, it is claimed,
asserts a connection between absolute ^'alidity and unconditional
meaning and the idea of God as arbiter of validity and bestower of
such meaning- Habermas, for example^ reads the later Horkhelmer in
tills way. As a result, he accuses him of bad utopianism.

Habermas criticizes the role played by rctigion in Horkheimcr's latei
work. He attributes to him the position that truth and meaning have a
necessary connection with the idea of God. He takes this idea to com-
prise at least two positive componcnts.^-^

The first of these is the idea of God as arbiter of truth (understood as
validity in general). As flabermas reads the later Horkheimern when
critical theory loses its basis in the philosophy of history and when
reason in its context-transcendent sense has been eclipsed completely
by instrumental reason, religion remains as the sole authority that^ if
only it were recognized as such, would permit distinction between
what is true and what is false, betivecn what is moral and what is
immoral.^" Thus, oil llabermas^s reading, the later Morkheinicr anchors
truth (including moral truth) tmttfhglaUly in a divine power^^ The
second component is the idea of God as beslower of comfort or conso-
lation:^^ the idea of God, when construed in a positive A-vay as salva-
tion, draws togelher the disparate elements of human life to form a
meaningful totality; its integrating power serves to reassure human
beings that life is ultimately meaningtuL^^ Again, when critical theory
can no longer find potentials for transforinatory social struggles in the
philosophy of history and rationality is reduced to iiistrumental reason^
religion remaisis as the sole authority that mi^it be able to give a
meaning lo life beyond that of mere self-preservaiion.*'^

On Habcrmas^s reading, Horkhcimer is guilty of bad utopianism.^^
He regards his recourse to a positive idqa of God as an escape from
history to messianic visions, comparing it to Adorno's messianic inter-
pretation of the truLh of ait. For Adorno the Utopian content of the truth
of art preserves a form of knowledge that, because it is dependent for

222 PfjitD.^ophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%t Century

its iFansfonnatory power on imcrprctation by pliilosophic^Ll reason^
constitutes a genuine yet impotant alternative to ihe iiistrunicnlal ratio-
nality pervading all aspects of social life In the contemporary world-^^
Such utopianisni is bad utopianism to the extent thai it explodes the
contiiiuuin of historj^: religion or art arc assigned a purely messianic
power for rcdempLion thai has no roots in the concrete social piaellces
of real historical human beings, Such a notion of redemptive reason is
aporctic insofar as it fails to link up with reason as embodied in the
historical world of speech and action. The difficulties arising from this
view of reason conslUtite Uie main reason for Hahermas's endeavour
to lead critical theory out of what he sees as a theoretical impasse -
an impasse into winch It was led by Horfcheimer and Adorno with ihctr
jointly written Dialectic of EtiUghtei^ment.^^ Once Horklieinier and
Adorno;

'lost their his tori co-philosophical faiLh in the rational potential of
bourgeois culture which was to be set free in social movements
under tlic pressure of developed forces of production.., the principal
'i^vcr' of the tiicory was also lost-.. instrumental reason, having
become totals embodies itself in totalitarian societ)^. With this the
classical form of critical theory fell apart/^^

In response to this collapse, Habermas attempts to show that a poten-
tial for non-tnstrunicnlal rationality is inherent in the real historical
world of human speech and action; his strategy initially lakes the form
of a theory of knowledge and human intere5ts,'^^ and suhsequently that
of a linguistic thcor)=': the programme of formal pragmatLcs.^^

By contrast with what he sees as Horkheinicr's anchoring of reason in
the di\ine^ Habermas defends the possibility of a notion of reason
anchored in everyday communication, whose context-ltansccnding
power derives from the necessary presuppositions of discursive practices
that have iheir basis in the everyday linguistic Ix^haviour of historically
situated agents. In his tiew, such a conception of communicative ratio-
nality preserves the meaning of the absolute without recourse to
metaphysics. ^^ Its transcendent character is a transcendence not from
and into the Beyond^ but a transcendence from within and into the
lifeworld.^fl

Insofar as his reading of him is corrcctj Ilabermas's rejection of the
later Horbheimer's position is understandable- From the point of view
of a materialist social theory concerned with bringing about more
rational forms of human life, the connection of truth and meaning

with a positively construed idea of God is potentially risky. One possible
danger is that the truth of the theory^, having lost its empirical anchor
In historically articulated human desires^ needs and feelings, might
become accessible only to religious believers. Another is thai appeal to
a positively construed idea of the absolute might encourage belief that
the progress of history is divinely guaranteed, thus inducing passivity
and impeding transformatory social praxis. Much depends, however^
on the precise Interpretation that normative social theory gives to a
positively construed idea of God. For example^ it makes an important
difference whether kmtwiai^e of the divine will or being is conceived as
subject to the constraints of history and context. For the assumption
that the hand of God guides the progress of history is readily compati-
ble with the view that human beings gain knowledge of God's guiding
hand only by way of essentially fallible processes of interpretation.
It also makes a difference whether or not free will is attributed to
human beings- For the above assumption is equally compatible with
the view that human beings have the freedom to disregard the divine
guidance offticd/^ For ibis reason^ it is relatively unimportant whether
Habermas's reading of Horkheimcr is the most plausible one.'^ The
point is ihat even a positively construed idea of the absolute docs not
imply that human beings can have absolute knowledge of it; nor does
it imply that the progress of history is guaranteed independent of
human agency,

Habernias's critical social theory shares with Horkheimcr the practical

aim of bringing about more rational forms of human life. It also shates
one central element of what Habermas refers to as the postmetaphyisical
impulse. This is Its concern to examine the possibilities for a better life
for human beings wrthont relying primarily on philosophical insight
for justification of ihc enterprise: for both, philosophy has lost its
traditional status as a mode of knowledge w^th special insight into the
nature of ihe hunian/-^ Despite tlieir common aim and overlapping
strategy, however, Ihe tW'O projects differ in a number of crucial ways-
For example, despite a shared emphasis on the need for cooperation
with the social sciences/^ Horkheimer and Habermas pursue different
strategics when it comes to finding an alternative mode of grounding
for their theory. Whereas Horkheimer, as we have seen, derives the
normative basis for his critical theory from human Interests and desires
as articulated over the course of history in social stmggles, Habermas

224 Phih.'iophy ofRi'fii^oir m tta^ 21%i Century

hopes that the ration^il rcccnstruction of everyday linguistic behaviour
will pro\ide a norinaLive underpinning for his theory/^ Since a full
exploration of the various points of divergence is beyond the scope of
the present chapter^ my discussion focuses primarily on some points of
convergence and divergence between Horklieimer and Haherinas with
respect to religion and the idea of the absolute_ I first show how Haber-
mas^ like HorkhcimciH maintains a connection between Ihc idea of
truth and a negatively construed idea of absolute- Unlike liorkhciiner,
however, Habcrmas insists that it is also possible and desirable to
connect truth with a positively comtmeil yvt pasttudaphysknl Idea of
tlie absolute. J argue that Habcrmas^s attempt to salvage a postmeta-
physical conception of the positive aspect of truth is not succcsstuL
! then draw attcn tion to some poin ts of agrc einen t between
Horkheimer and Habermas concerning the question of the validity of
religious ideas. However, here loo there is an important disagrcemcnt.
Unlike MorkhcimeiH Maberinas concedes ihe possibility of religious
truth. I argue, hoivever, that aecommodatins such a notion would entail
substanlial levislon of his formal pragmatic theory of validity elaims.

Habennas's tlitorv of truth

Discussion of Habermas^s theory of truth is hampered by the fact that

he has substantially amended the thcor^^ of truth which he presented
in his 1973 essay^ 'Wahrheitstheorien\ without having fully developed
a new, revised vcrsion7^ However, some of his recent essays cai:i be
seen as part of an endeavour to make good this deficiency. -^^ For our
present purposes^ it is especially important that Habermas continues to
emphasize the ditfcrenee between justification and truth.^* fo? exam-
ple, in a recent critique of Richard Rorty^ ffabeimas associates liimself
with korly's pragmatist understanding of truth, wbile accusing him of
a problematic naturalization of it7^ Rorty is criticized for reducing
truth to justiflcalionH thus losing sight of the potential power of
validity claims to explode actual contexts of justification. Habermas, by
contrast, wants to hold onto the moment of 'uncondltionality" {Unbeii~
h^thelt) that he regards as inherent in the idea of truth, while retaining
an internal relation bcnvcen truth and justifiability. Habermas's aim, in
other words, is to work out a theory of tiuth that is inherently pra^-
nialic yet relalns the notion of trutb as a claim to 'unconditionality'
that reaches beyond all the evidence available to us at any given time.
Although his emphasis on the unconditional nature of truth has
remained unaltered, Habermas has recently moved away from his

wcH-known account of truth as idealized rcitional iicccptability.^" He
now proposes a view of truth as a concept that has a 'J^^us-facc\ On
this understanding, the concept of truth lias two aspects: a discursive
one and a pra^Jiiatic, lifeworld one. On the one hand^ truth is the
concern of participants in certain kinds of rational discourse who are
guidtd by the idc*i lliat a proposition, if truc^ would withstand any
attempts to refute it under idea! justificatoty conditions. On the ether
hand, truth is a pragmatic presupposition of participants in everyday
communicative practices in the hfcworld who are guided by tlie need
for behavioural certaintv. Ttuth's "Janus-face' tcfers to tlie dvnamic
interplay between everyday behavioural certainties and the process of
cntLcal rational discus^iion of tliese certainties once they fail to prove
reliable as a basis for action in the lifeworld; the fallible results of such
processes ol rational discussion ('discourses') are fed back as 'truths'
into the eveiyday communicative practices of the lifeworld. They then
provide a reliable basis fot action until, for contin;^ent empirical
reasons, they no longer ''lA^ork' - that is, no ton^cr prove their truth
{skh bi'waluiui) by being proof against disappointment - and have to be
reassessed discursively in the light of the new evidence and insight.

The idea of truth as a Janus-faced concept is supposed to show wliy
truth is distinct from justification. It is helpful here to distinguish
between tsvo aspects of Habetmas's idea of truth as justifLcation-tcan-
scendent^^ Tlic first aspect is its c^u^oinin' function: the concept of
truth warns us that even propositions that are justified under the best
possible argumentative conditions may turn out to be fahc. Here, the
context-transccndcnl power of truth is interpreted iiegatiwSy as a warn-
ing about the fallibility of knowledge. The second aspect is the sense of
uucofuUthimlity we attach to truth: truth is a property that cannot be
lost.^^ Here, the context-transcendent powder of truth is interpreted
positively as the idea of perfection. One advantage of this distinction
hct^vccn a positive and negative aspect of Habermas's idea of the
justification-transcendent character of trut^ Is that it enables us to sec
clearly how his coneept converges with^ and diverges from, the nega-
tive and positive intetpa'etatlons of the idea of the absolute offered by
liorkheimer

There are evident links between Hotkheimer's defence of the idea of
God in its negative, non-rcligEous interpretation and Hahermas's
defence of the 'cautionary' function of the truth predicate. This is one
of the main agreements between Horkheimer and Habermas as regards
the function of the concept of truth. On my readings both theorists
uphold a negative interpretation of the idea of the absolute. For

226 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^o}r m tto! 21%i Century

Horkhcimcr, a negatively construed idea ol God reminds us of the

42ssentJal open-cndcdiiess of the diatectLcal process and marks the
ImpossLbLliry of closure. For Hatacrmas^ the 'cauiionary' use of tlic truth
predicate u^arns us that even lationally justified propositions may turn
out to be false^ slgnif\'ing the fallibihty of human knowledge. lioll^i
agree, Lhercforc, that Che concept ol Lculh reminds us of human imper-
fection, liut there is also an important point of c^hagrecmcnt. This con-
cerns truth in its positive aspcct.

I have attributed to Horkheimer the view that, in its positive inter-
pretation, the idea of the absolute promises perfecLLon. 1 Lhen argued
that - at least in his early writings - he ultimately rejects a positive
interpretation of Che Idea of the absolute on the grounds that It is iilu-
sory and potentially ideological. There are evident links between
Horkhcimcr's idea of [lie absolute as perfection and liatacrmas's idea of
'unconditionality'- However, whereas Horkheimer thinks the dangers
of the idea of perfection outweigh its ackno^'vtedgcd attractions and
merits, Habcrmas proposes a poslmetaphysical interpretation of this
idea. But even Horkheimer^s rejection of a positively construed concep-
tion of truth is not straightforward- As we have seen, tie is deeply
ambivalent about the idea of the absolute as perfection. Althoughj at
least in his early writings, he ultimately recommends that materialists
relinquish a positively construed idea of the absolute on grounds of
Its illusory, potentially Ideological character, he fully acknowledges the
attraction of the idea: even materialists, he writes, long foi eternal, perfect
justice for all human beings. This longing expresses an impulse towards
transcending the given that is pan of what it means to be human and
can have positive, trans formatory, social effects. Horkheimer^s ambiva-
lence here suggests that he would welcome the possihlliLy of a
non-illusory - and^ for him^ this means materialist - conception of the
absolute In its positive aspect. Habcrmas's poslmetaphysical tnterprcta-
tioD of the idea of 'unconditionalitj^' can be regarded as an attempt to
pro\rtde such a conception.

As we knoWj Habcrmas claims that the idea of the absolute must be
conceived as ''transcendence ftom witliin tm:} into thi' SifcworU\ Our
specific concern in the present instance is with the idea of the absolute
in its positive interpretation^ as expressed by his idea of 'uncondilional-
ity\ As we also know, Habcrmas now conceives of truth as a Janus faced
concept that faces in the direction both of lalional discourses and of
the lifeworld. Whereas discourses remind us of the fiillibilil}' of knowl-
edge (the negative aspect of the idea of the absolutely the lifeworld
reassures us of the nfKonditiofiaUt}' of truth {which I have referred to as

iVfcTCVf CooSf 227

Its positive aspect}. Wc could also say: it reassures us of tlic cbfectivity -
of the necessity and uiiivcrsalily - of the tiuc [>ropositions that are the
pragmatic basis for the behavioural certainties that guide us in our
everyday practices in the lifcvvorld.^-^ Habermas stresses that action
rsxjuires us to assume the uncondLtional truth of what wc take to be
true. ""Wc would step on no bridge, use no car. undergo no operation,
not even cat an exquisitely prepared meal if wc did not consider the
knowledge used lo be safeguaa'ded, if we did not hold the assumptions
employed in the production and execution of our actions to be inje/^^
There is Lhus "'a prnirtkul necessity to rely intuitively on what is uncon-
ditionally held-to-be-true'.*^ He also expresses this as the need for par-
ticipants in hfeworld action-contexts to he realists:

BeGLUse acting subjects have to cope with ""the world"" [that is, with a
world presumed to be objective in the sense of Identical for every-
one and not at anyone's disposal - MC], they cannot avoid l>eing
realists iii the context of their lifcworld_ Moreover, they are allowed
to be realists because ihcii language games and practices^ so long as
they function in a way that is proof against dlsappointmentH 'prove
their truth' [sich bewiihren] in being carried on."^*

Critique of Habtrmas's postinetaphysital 'idea of God'

However, Habermas^s attempt to salvage a positively constmcd idea of
the absolute without recourse to metaphysics is not successfiil.^^ His
idea of 'unconditionality^ appeals to a normative notion of 'coping
with reality' that relies in turn on what he calls a 'weak' naturalist -
and ultimately metaphysical - assumption about the progress of
liistory. In order to see this we inust look more cioscly at his prag'mati-
cally tooled notion of ' mi conditio iiaiiiy '-

Habermas argues correctly that everyday action in the lifeworld
requires us to behave rt.s tfiou^h we arc realLstSn in the sense of pras^nati-
calty supposm^ the existence of an objective worlds that is^ of a single
worlds essentiatly identical fot all of us and with some independence of
our observations. At the sainc time, as he himself acknowledges, the
fallibilist consciousness that ^ides participants in discourse also reacts
back upon everyday practices without thereby destroying the dopna-
tlsm of the lifeworld: 'For actors, who as panicipants in argumentation
have learned that no conviction is proof against criticismn develop in the
lifeworld, too^ rather less dogmatic attitudes lowaid their problematizcd
convictions/^^ Here, too, Habermas is correct. Human agents, when

228 Phihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%t Century

they act as participants In everyday pracUccs in the lifcworld, have to
presuppose uncondiUonal (ruth for pragmalic reasons; however^ Ihey

can also be aware rcflcxively of the pragmatic reasons motivating their
assumplioii- hi other words^ it is not just behavioural certainties that
have to 'work' in the sense of enabling agents to cope with reality; the
idea of ^unconditionatily' itself lias to 'work' in the same sense. If it no
longer enabled human agents to cope with reality^ they would be justi-
fied in abandoning It. Pul in this way the problem Is clear: in Haber-
nias's account the positive aspect of the concept of truth has its basis
in a pragmatic notion of coping with reality This notion is, however,
neither self-evident nor normatively neutral but rather an evaluative
standard that itself requires justification- 'Coping with reality" implies
that there are better and worse ways of relating to reahty. Our concep-
tlons of what counts as better and worse ways depend In turn on
evaluative interpretations of human flourishing, which themselves
depend on some kind of normative - and ultimately metaphysically
b,iscd - theory of the progress of history. The normative theory on
which Mabermas relies is a 'weak' naturalist onc-

The theory is mitnmiht insofar as it relies on the basic assumption
'that the organic equipment and cultural way of life of homo Si^pleiss
have a 'natural' origin and are accessible in principle to explanation by
evolutionary tlieory'.'^^ Its naturalism is 'weak' insofar as it is nonreduc-
tionist. It docs not rephice conceptual analysis with natural scienHfic
explanation; nor does it reduce the communicative practices of the life-
world to, for example, neurologically orblogenetically explicable opera-
tions of the human brain."^ Habeimas claims that his 'wTak' naturalism
makes just one fundamental metathcoretical assumption, ft assumes
that 'our' learning processes - those possible within the framework of
socio-cultural forms of life - in a certain way merely continue
antecedent ^evolutionary learning processes' that have in turn given
rise to the structures of our forms of life»^*

Mowevern even this 'weak' natjralist account of the progress of history
relies on a metaphysical assumption. We can see this if we look more
closely at Malx^rmas's argumeiHj which appears to have the following
logic. On Habermas's account, natural evolutionary processes are
'coping' processes - processes of solving problems and dealing with dis-
appointed expectations - that lead to ever more complex levels of devel-
opment. Whereas these processes may in fact be purely contingenlj we
impute to them a cognitive context This supposition is necessary if we
are to be able to conceive of socio-cultural processes as learning
processes, hi other words, the attribution of a cognitive content to the

practices that make possible 'our' soclonziiUural forms of life requires us
to impjEG a cognitive content to naturEil cvolulionary processes.

However, as is evidcnL from [he above reconstruction, Habermas's
argument does not explain why we arc entitled to speak of ^learning^ in
cither case. Rather^ it relics on the metaphysical assumption that
htiman bein;^s unavoidably conceive of the progress of history as kiun-
In^ - as a pnDccss of acquiring knowledge - and not as a cognitively
irrelevant, purely contingent shift horn one perspective to another It is
this 'mctaphyslcar assumption that underlies Habermas's 'mctatheo-
rctlcar assumption of the continuity between socio-cultural and evolu-
tionary learning processes as a first principle that cannot be disproved.

[n the end, therefore, llahcrmas Is unable to salvage the positive
aspect of the idea of absolute - the idea of 'unconditional! ty^ or perfec-
tion - without recourse to metaphysics- However, as 1 have suggested
in the first section, this need not be cause for concern. It is not the fact
that iiormative social theory ulUmatcly relics on metaphysics that is
problematic but the tendency to deny the effects of history and con-
tcjtt and the Importance of human free wllL It is not metaphysics that
normative sociat theorj^ has to guard against but rather the view that
access to perfect knowledge is available and the view that the progress
of history towards perfect knowledge and perfect justice is ^mmnteed.

For our present purposes, this rehabilitation of metaphysics has an
important consequence. It opens the possibility of debate as to the
respective merits of the various kinds of metaphysical assumptions that
unavoidably underlie the Idea of the process of history. For there Is^ of
course, no need to accept the particular metaphysical assumption on
which Habermas's theory relics. What is required, rather, are processes
of unconstrained, hermeneutlcally oriented dialogue with those who
hold competing views of the progress of historj'. Such dialogues would
permit discussion of the advantages and limitations of Habermas's
"w^eak' naturalist position vis a vis other normative accounts of the
progress of history - including ones that assume the benign guidance
of a divine will or being.

Habermas and the validitv of the seinantk contents

of rtligioii

There arc also points of convergence and divergence between
Horkhclmer and Habcrmas with regard to the validity of religious
Ideas. Both agree that the valldit>^ of the semantic contents of religion

ZiO Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

is independent of the religious context in which ihcy originated. How-
evcfH only Habermas concedes the possibilily of religious trulh.

Habermas and Horkhcimer agree that the value or importance of the
semantic contents of religion is indcjx^ndent of the origins of these con-
tents. For example, the validity of moral ideas of human dignity and
universal solidarity can l>c assessed quite independently of the religious
framework m which they were initially formulated. More comprehen-
sively than 1 torkheimcr, who tends to focus on religiDusly based inonil
ideaSn Hahermas recognizes the religious origins of the key normative
conceptions guiding the project of a critical theory of society. Ilabcrinas
acknowledges that normative ideas of fundamental importance to
modern Western self-under standing (and to a critical theory concerned
to explore the emancipatory potenhats of thisli such as ethics and
morality, person and individualitVj freedom and emancipation, cannot
be grasped without 'appropriating the substance of tiie Judaco-Christian
understanding of history in terms of salvation'- ^^ He refers to this as a
''semantic reservoir (of potential meanings')' t^emantisch^a PoU'utml) that
has to l>e mastered anew by every generation/^-^ At the same time^ how-
ever, Habermas, like Morkheimcr, distinguishes between the ori^ms of
ideas - tlieir genealogy - and their iiJipoftdt^ce. Moreover^ like
Horkheimer - althou-^h for different reasons^ - he holds that rclij^ious
justifications of moral ideas are not possible: the disenchantment of the
world that follow^s in the wake of the European Eiillghtenment means
that morality can no longer look to religion for support for the truth of
its cliiiins. According to the post -Enlightenment picture, reason is dif-
fercnliatcd, splil up into various momenta of rationality: for Habermas^
the Kantian trio of truth, morality and taste is paradigmatic for this
differentiation. As a result of the disintegration of reason into its vari-
ous moments, claims to moral vaMditj^ - like truth and aesthetic valid-
ity - now constitute a distinct mode of tationality with its own internal
standards of justification. For this reason, under conditions of moder-
nit% moral (and other) insights orighially articulated in a religious
framework must be subjected to a process of critical appropriation and
transformation if they are to be recuperated within the universe of
justificatory modes of speech.^-^ This holds not fust for moral ideas but
for semantic contents in gencraL Habermas refers to the need for
fy^ethodologknl i]theism in dealing with the semantic contents of reli-
gion: under conditions of modernity^ neither philosophy nor critical
fheology^^ can simply appeal to divine revelation for justification of
religious Ideas but must rather subject thcni to argumentative testing
in the appropriate types of discourse.^^

At limes Hahcrmas has suggested thaE the philosophical task of critical
approprialion and transformation of the semantic contents of rflLf^ion
Is now concluded - that the valuable content of religion has been
translated without remainder into the l>asLC principles of a univcrsalist
ethics of the type he proposes. ^^ More reccntlyj there is evidence of
willingness to acknowledge that the task i5 ^Lill ongoing: The process
of critical appropriation of the essential contents of the religious tradi-
tion is still in process, its results hard to foresee/'""^ He allow^s thaL j>ost-
mcLaphysieal philosophy will be able iieithcr to replace nor displace
religion so long as the language of religion carries with it inspirational
ofj possibly^ even indispensable semantic contents that cannot - per-
haps - be fully captured by philosophical language and still await
translation into justificatory discoursesJ"^

Habtrmas'i formal pragmatics ami rtiigioiis truth

If wc consider niore closelj;' what is at issue here^ we can sec that it is
the question of reli^ous truth. From the point of view of Habermas's
tiieory^ semantic contents may be of ditTcrcnt types: they can^ for
example, be moral, aesthetic, or religious. We may presume that the
predicate Veligious^ applies when Uic experience from which they
derive is a religious one; let us further presume that religious experi-
ences can be described in positive terms, for example^ as the fceHng
that there is an ultimate purpose to human life that makes It meaning-
ful. Such experiences cannot as a rule be replaced by arguments:
no-onc who is unconvinced of the existence of God^ for instancCj is
hkely to be convinced of it solely through participation in discourse.
Tleligious conviction seems to rely on an indispensable dimension of
pefsoiml experience that is a necessary precondition for participation in
discussion on matters of religious validityj and that provides the
motivating force for argument. It is for this reason that reiigious truth
is deemed to lay claim to a kind of validity that is only partially dis-
cursive. Thus, when Habernias concedes the possibility of specifically
rchgioijs semantic contents that taiII always in part resist attempts to
translate them into the language of justificatory discourse, he appears
to be conceding the possibllitj^ of religious truth. If this Is thp case, it
would constitute a further important difference between llorkhelmcr
and Hal>crmas. Although Horkheimer, as we have seen, asserts a con-
nection between truth and a iiegathrfy construed idea of the absolute^
at least in his early writings he argues against a theory of truth that

232 Pfiih.^ophy ofRi'lii^mr m tto! 21%i Century

relics on a positiveiy construed idea. His theory thus rules out any posi-
tive conception of religious truthJ*^*

in conclusion, I would like to make two points- The first - shorter -
point is that there is an uninistakabte note of caution in llabcimas^s
writings as regards the possibility' of non-discursivcl)^ recuperalile
semantic contentSj and parLicLj]a]]y' so when he refers to religious ones.
At mostp Halx^mias concedes the possibiilty of specifically religious
semantic contents that would always resist translation into the language
of justification: he by no means agrees that such contents exist. ^"^^
At best, his posiLion Vhltli regard to the question of religious truth
seems to be that the jury is still out on whether it should be taken scri-
ousiy. The second - longer - point is that it is far from clear how the
notion of religious truth can be accommiCKiated within the framework
of Habermas's critical theory.

The challenge posed by religious truth

Habennas proposes a schema of validity claims Lhat arguably fails to do
justice to the multiplicity of modes of potentially rational everyday
language usc-^"-^'^ Tlic question of religious truth higlilights some of the
difficuItEes of his schema.

For our present purposes^ the main dif ficuhy with Habermas's theory
of validity claims is that the c!atms to religious truth raised by religious
believers do not fct easily into either of the two broad categories identi-
fied by Habermas- Habermas distinguishes broadly l?ctween validity
claim? that c^in h^ vindicated in discourse and those that cannot. This
distinction corresponds to his distinction between universal and non-
universal validity claims. Discursively redeemable validity claims are
universal in that they rest on the assumption that, if valid^ everyone
who participated in a discourse satisf)1ng certain demanding condi-
tions would have to agree with this judgement.*'-^ It is important to
HQte here that^ on Habermas's conception, agreement reached between
participants in discourse is always agreement in a strong sense: partici-
pants agree to accept a validity claim for the .'^ame reasom}^^^ Non-
discursivcly rcdcemabic validity claims are non-universal in the sense
thai ihcy do not rest on this assumption of universal agrcenicnt-
Habermas sees empirical and theoretical truth claims, on the one hand,
and claims to moral validity^ on the other, as examples of discursively
redeemable - universal - validity claims. We will recall that for Haber-
mas, one aspect of the Janus-faced concept of truth is that w^e deem a
proposition true if it withstands all attempts to refute it under the

dein^Lnding condilions of rational argumc illation. The connection
bcuvccn moral truth and argumcniation is even mote iiiLimatc as
Habermas asserts an mtenuil link between the two. On his account, Hie
moral validity of a norm or principle is conceptually tied to a discur-
sively achieved consensus to ihc effect tliai it is equally in the interests
of all affected. In the case of question? of moral validity universal agree-
ment achieved under ideal fustifieatory conditions does not simph-
iuithorize validity, it sunrantees the Tightness of moral judgefnents.
In shorty whereas Habcrmas insists on the disjunction between truth
and justification, he defends a purely cpistemic conception of moral
truth. Idealized rational acceptability exlmust-i the meaning of moral
validity. ^*^^

By contrast^ claims to aesthetic and to cthicai validity fall into the
category of n on -discursively redeemable elainis. For Habermas, ethical
(as opposed to moral] validity claims cannot be vindicated discursively
because they are always hound to the subjective perspective of a partic-
ular individual (or col[ectiv[ty>.^°^ Ethical deliberation involves the
herniencutic clarification of an individuars (oi collectivity's) self-
understanding and raises chnical questions of a happy or not-failed
life.^^ Ethical validity claims are thus always context-specific. They are
not capable of commanding argumentatively achieved universal agree-
ment hut oniyn at most^ the agreement of a particular group that shares
a horizon of contingent cultural values."*"^

Ilabermas also characterizes aesthetic validitv claims as context-
specific. Like ethical claims they are held to depend on particulartst
cultural values and thus not to trajiscend local boundaries- for tiiis
reason they do not coi^tstitute universal validity claims that can be vin-
dicated in discourse.^"-* In addition, Habcrmas now emphasizes the
world'disclosing function of works of art and literature. If I understand
him correctly, this wo rid- disclosing function sujjgests a further reason
whv aesthetic validitv claims cannot be vindicated in discouVse fwe
shali see that the argument here is also relevant in tlie ease of religious
validity claims).

In recent years Habcrmas has repeatedly drawn attention to the
power of works of art fahd literature) to disclose the world in a new
IV av- Aesthetic claims refer lo semantic contents that cast a new^ light on
all aspects of reality and that have to he experienced personally as
wot id-disc Insure before they can be understood. Tlie validity of aes-
thetic claims thus refers to the work of art's 'sin^larly illuminating
power to open our eyes to T,vhat is seemingly familiar, to disclose anew
an apparently familiar reality This validity claim. .-. stands for ^.potential

2J.4 Pfiihsnphy ofRi'fii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

for ^'truth'' that can be released only in the whole complexity of life-
cxpcriencc-^^^^ Although Habcfinas has not worked out the details of
this conception of aesthetic validity, the logic of the argument seems
clear. 1 take tiis argLinient to run as follows.

Xf aesthetic validity claims refer primarily to an experience that shows
us (he world in a new way, potentially changing every a.spcct of our
everyday life^ th^^ conditions for achie^^ng agreement in discourse
become even more demanding. In addition to satisfying presuppositions
governing the conduct of argumentation (such as the requirement that
only the force of the better argument obtains), participants would have
to have undergone a similar world-disclosing experience that resulted
in Mieit seeing the world in a similar (new) w-ay. Furthermore, this
similar experience would have to be translatable for all affected by it
into a mutually intelligible discursive language- Otherwise, discursively
achieved universal agreement on the ^truth' of the work of art would
be impossible. The difficulties involved in meeling these addiUonal
conditions make aesthetic claims unsuitable candidates for inclusion in
the catcKor)' of claims that can be vindicated in discourse. Whereas dis-
cursively reached universal agreement as to the validity of aesthetic
claims is not in principle impossible, it would be so difficult to achieve
that the idea of an idealized rational consensus would be robbed of its
purpose: it could no longer serve as a criterion - or even guideline - for
adjudicating aesthetic validity.

Their unsuitability as objects of a discursively acliieved consensus
means that aesthetic validity claims cannot, for Habermas, count as uni-
vcrsal-^^^ j-lowever, he does not appear to see this as cause for concern.
Indeed, Habermas reinforces the thesis of their non-untvcrsality insofar
as he seems to confine the svorld -disclosing power of works of art and
literature to a culture of experts^ maintaining that it requires transla-
tiDii hy such experts before it can be made accessible for lay persons.
More precisely^ In the modern world, aesthetic experience is held to be
the object of the specialized discourses of experts (in this case^ literary
or art critics} and thus spUt off from everyday life-experience.-^*^ It
requires niiidiation by literary or art criticism hcfore it can have an
impact on everyday language and beha\^oiirJ^'* Such criticism ^acconi-
plls[:Les a process of translation of a unique kind. It draws the experien-
tial content of the work of art into normal language ..This innovative
potential then finds expression in the changed composition gf an
evaluative vocabulary - m the renovation of value-orientations and
need interpretations - which alters the tincture of modes of life
through alterinj^ modes of perception/'^^

iWcTcv^ Cooke Z^S

T do not want to pursue the question of Avhcthcr Habermas's character-
izalion of aesthetic validUy claims is convincing. My inain point in the
present context is that Habermas explicitly compares and contrasts reli-
gious validity claims with aesthetic oncs.^^^ On his-admiLtcdly sketchy -
account, reli^ous claims^ like aesthetic ones, refer to an experience of
world-disclosure that, as I have shown, creates problems so far as their
possible vindication in discourse is concerned. Because claims to religious
validity, like aesthetic claimSn presuppose a personal world-disclosing
experience as a necessary condition for participation In argumentation^
the likelihood (under conditions of modernity) of achieving universal
agreement in discourse is so remote as to make nonsense of universal
consensus as a criterion of religious truth - or even as a guideline tor
ascertaining it However^ although a common reference to world-
disclosing experience connects religious claims wUh aesthetic ones,
there are also two important points of difference.

First of all, by contrast w-ith aesthetic claims (as conceived by
Habermas}, religfous claims are not the prerogative of experts in a par-
ticular field of specialization but are raised by ordinary participants in
everyday practices of speech and action. Habermas acknowledges that
the claims to religious truth raised by religious believers take place
within the lifeworld, that is, on the level of everyday communication
and action. To confine world-disclosing religious experience to the spe-
cialized discourses of experts fin this case, theologians} would amount
to a complete neutralization of its experiential content: if its experien-
tial content is not lo be neutralized, therefore, religion has to assert its
holistk position in the lifeworld.^'^

Secondly^ religious claims^ unlike aesthetic ones^ are not bound to
the contingent subjective values of individuals or groups but are rather
universal in aspiration. Habermas explicitly acknowledges the universal
orientation of theological claims.^ ^^ Admittedly, as a discourse among
experts^ (criticah theology fulfils the Habcrmasian requirement that
truth claims be formulated In the specialized language of discursive jus-
tification. But, as Habermas clearly recognizes^ theological discourses,
If they are to be distinguishable from philosophical discourseSj have to
take seriously tlie claims to truth raised by religious believers. Tf theology
were to adopt the 'methodoiDgical atheism"" appropriate for philosophy
In dealing with religious semantic contents, it would undermine the
entire theological enterprise. For this reason^ at least sonic of the truth
claims raised by theology merely articulate at a higher level the claims
to truth raised by religious believers in their everyday lives. In other
words, the theological claims that articulate religious validity claims

236 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'fii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

are structurally similar to them. Tlicrcforc, what holds for theological
vaUdlty claims must also hold for rehgious claims: ihcii claim to valid-
ity Is not restricted a priori to the experiential basis of a particular culture
or context but transcends all purely local boundaries. This crcales
problems for Habermas's theory^ however, for truth on his view must
be capable of being vindicated in discoursed ^^ Religious experiences
would thus have to be translatable inlo the language of scientific
discourse - and, as we have seenn there arc serious difficulties here.
From the point of view of Habermas^s theory of validity claims, the
main problem is the following: The claims of religious believers (which
form the basis for many theological claims} cannot be ^nndicated in dis-
course and are thus non-universal. Tor this reason they cannot be com-
pared with claims to theoretical or empirical truths or with claims to
moral validit>'^ At the same time, as he acknowledges, they are neither the
prerogative of a specialized culture nor are they bound to particularist
and contingent cultural values. For this reason Lhey cannot be com-
pared with claims to ethical and to aesthetic validity- Habermas is thus
left in the position of apparently recognizing the holistic and universal
tlirust of rehgious validity claims while denj^ng them their entitiement
to the predicate 'truth'.

As I see it, there are two paths open to Habermas here. One possibility
is to ieavc his schema of validity claims as it is and find some way -
however awkward - of subsuming religious validity into one or other
of his two broad categories. The second possibility^ which 1 favour^ is a
fundamental reconsideration of his theory of validity. Although I have
not been able to show this in the present context, 1 think there arc
serious piobknis, in particular^ with his accounts of ethical and of
aesthetic validity One problem here is his tendency to reduce the
notion of ^experience' to empirical experience based on observation or
controlled scientific experiment. Only experience of this i^ind is admit-
ted by Habermas as evidence for argument in spcciahzed discourses
concerned wUh truth claims. In his recent ivritin^s^ however, he seems
to hold a broader view of the kind of e\adcnce that may count as a reason
in discursive processes of justification- In the case of moral discourse^ for
example, he now acknowledges that moral feelings count as relevant
reasons. ^^^-^ This suggests that ethical, acsthetiCH and religious feelings
and experiences might also count as evidence when participants in dis-
courses argue on disputed matters of validity. Admittedly, the question
of how such evidence can be processed is a difficult one. For, against
Horkheimer, it can be argued that the mere psesence of a feeling or
assertion of an experience is not sufficient: we need to find a vantage
point that would permit a criiical perspective on subjective feelings

iWiicv^ Cooke 237

and<?xpericnccs.^^^ Nonetheless, if Habcrmas's theory is to do justice to

clhlcalj acslhctiQ and religious trulli [\ must penetrate deeper into the
relationship between argument and the varieties of human experience.

Notts

1* Mjtlnas Lutz-Eachniiinn offers a good overview of the develofka^iit of
Horkht^imtr's thinking with respect to leligioEii. dia^ving attenEion both to
the line of continuity between the early and la(er Horkheimei and the
pessimistk turn that characterizes his philosophy In the later period. Si't
M. Lutz-Bachm^nn, ""HiiiTaanEtat und KuLiglon. Zu Max Horkhtiniers DeuCung
de::> ChristentLims', in A. Schmidt und N. Aitwicker {eds^ Mra Horklmfuer
ht'ute:^ WeFi: itud Wirkimg, Frankfurt am Main, 19S6 and M_ Lutz-Bachmann^
'ETkenntniskritik unJ Cottej;idee im Spawerk Max Horkheimerf^', in M_ L.utz-
Bachmann Cedj^ Kritische TUt^arit wkI Keii^km, WiJrzburgr 1^7. 5ff aha
J_ Jiabennas^ "Max Horkheimer: Zur EntwkkJungsgeschichte s&ines Werfcs' in
his Texts ami KoiJtexte, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp^ 1991_

2. A^ far as f can see^ thi^ general Elic?firv', as cnnceived by HorkheimeT^ has a
diagnostic component and a nonnLitlve one. Its diagnostic component
requires of ll interdiiciplinaFy rescardi methods: in order to ascertS:in correctly
the causes of social evils it must enter into a relationship of cooperation with
the social sciences (cf, M_ Horkheimer. 'Critical Theory and Traditional
Theorj^, ui his Critii-ni Thi'or}'^ trans, by M. CCcnnellr New York: tj:>n tinuum,
1972^, p. 233^). Its normative component requires of it an account of human
interests and desSTes^ as these have been articulated historically in social
struggles [:s^i' note 51 belowj^ and an acc1:^unt of the social stmcEures most
appropriate for satisfy'ing these. Particularly in the case of the latter, critical
theory draws on the methods and findings of various social sciences^ for
eKamplCr on those of political economy i^tre. for example^ M. Horkheimer^
'Materialism and Metaphysics"", in Cnticai T/]fory, pp_ 42-6i_

3. Horkheimer insists Eliat mattrialisT theory is primarily a theor>" of transforma-
tory praxis. He criticizes the frequent misinterpretation of it as a response to
metaphysical questions ^foi example^ as an attempt to explain the 'enigma of
beEng'^_ It is then reduced to the simpSe claim that only matter and its move-
ments are real. Against thES^ Horkheimer stresses ttiat materialism is defined
principally in tenns of the ft;5jts it sets itseif, specifically the overcoming of
human suffering and oppression. (See his 'Materialism and Metaphysics'^
pp- 10^2 L>

4. HorkheiBTier accuses Hegel of maintaining the pcsssLbility of a perfect reconcil-
iation bet^veen concept and object^ and hence of concluding the dialectical
process of thought or history \see, for example, M. Horkheimer, 'Ptoblem
der Wahrheit'^ in his Kr?tL'H*:he Tfieane^ voL 1, edited by A. Schmidt. Frankfurt
am Main: E"iischer U96S>; M_ Horkheimer and T. \V_ Adorno^ Diat^tic of
Enii^hit'mnent, trans, by John Gumming, New 7orfc: Continuum^ 197Z. p. 24.
I leave open the question of whether his interpretation of Hegel is coirect_

5- Horkheimer, 'Problem der Wahrheit; pp. 242-3.

238 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

6. Horkheimer is criticat of Kantian foimalism, claiminj^ that the emptiness oi
its conception of moraUEy is one reason why people seek to escape from it
to more substantial religious views ^ct. Tmblem der Wahrlieit'^ pp. 236t.)_

7- Horkheimer^ 'Materialism and Metaphysics'^ pp- 45-6; M_ Horkheimer^
'Matenalismus und MoraS\ in Kntische Tti^orie, voL 1, pp. lOS-9-

B. Horklieimer, 'MaEertalismus und Moral", p. 97ff.

9. Ibid, p- KKh

LO. M_ Horkhfiimer, 'E£?merkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie"^ in
Kxitiache Tlitrone^ voL 1. p- 2L0 (cf. also 'Mateiialism and Melaphy^iics'^ p, 44>-

11. Horkheimer, 'Bemerkuni^n zur philosophlschen AnthrcpoEogie'r p. ZOH_

12. Horkheimer does sugg^est that this incentive is felt particulaily stFongly by
the social cla=LS tJiat suffers moit from the capitalist system - which in the
19305 he held lo be the proletariat {d. 'Materia lismus und Vloral'^ p. I04)j
nonetheless^ he does not restrict the desire for a better order of things to
this social clasfi.

13. Horkheimer^ 'Materiallsnius und Moral, p. 94ff_

14. Horkheimei offers such an explanation in 'Bemerkungen zur philo&ophischen
Anthropologic', p. 213_

15. Horkheimer suggests that the prEnc3p]€ of free and e-i^ua] economic
e_xchange leads to an idea of human beings as beings without a name or a
place or a specific destin)^ an idea that is essential to the modern conception
at God: see his 'Zu Theodor Haeckers "Der Christ und die Geschichte'""r i"
Khtischi; TheonL\ voL 1^ p. 371.

16. Horkheimer, Tioblem der Wahrheit'. p. 234_

L7. Horkhcimei^ 'Problem der Wahrheit^ P- 245; 'Materialism and Metaphysics'^

P llff'

L8_ Cf. Horkheimer^ 'Probtem der Wahrheit''^ pp_ 25S^?; 'Materialismus und

Moral', pp- lC)B-9.

19. Horkheimer^ 'Materialism and Metaphysics', p_ 26_

20. Horkheimer, 'Zu Theodor Haeckers "Der Chr[st und die GeschkhEe^"^

pp 370-1

21. M_ Horkheinierr 'Ejoismus und Freiheitsbewegung', in KntiscSie Tiieorie,
voL 2^ edited by A. 3chniidtr Frankfurt am Main: Fischer^ 1968^ p. St)_

22. Horkheimer, 'Egoismus und Treiheitsbewej^ng', p. 47. The phrase used by
Horkheimer here is 'AtheisE aus inteilektueller BeLturtni5losigkeit\

23. Horkheimer, 'Zu Theodor Haeckers "Der Christ und die Geschichte"^
pp. 36S-6_

24- Horklieimer, 'Kemerkunj^en zur philosophlschen i\,nthrcpo[ogif''r P- 207.
ZS, Horkheimer, 'Materialism and Metaphysics'^ p_ 27; ''BemerkQ]igen zur
philosophischen AnChropologie', p. ZIK

26. Horkheimer, 'Materialasm and Metaphysics', p_ 44_

27. Horkheimer, 'Materialism and Metaphysics'^ p- 45; 'Eemerkungon zur
phtlosophiscJien AnthropoJogie', p, 21 1; 'MatcrSaEismus undTvloial'^ p- lOfi.

2S. Horklieimer^ 'Materialismus und Morale p. 93,

29- Horklieimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Ejiiif^itcnrj^re^it P- 54.

30- Horkheimer, ' Material] smus und Moral', p. 93,

31. HorkheimeFj 'l^oblem der WalirJiuif, pp. 275-6; cf. also 'Zu Theodor Etaeckers
"Der Christ und die Geschichte", p. 366.

32. Horkheimer, 'Zu Theodor Haeckers "Der Christ and die Geschichte'^'j p. 366_

Mtiew Cookt^ 2J!9

33. M. Horkheimer^ 'Gedanke zur RelEgion', In Kriti.^ihe Thr^oiie, vol. 1^ p. 373,

34. M. HorEvheimerr Theism and Atheism^, in his Critiijue of IfLWitmeiitut Reti.'iOfj,
trans- by M_ O'ConneSJ and others^ Kew York: C2ontinuum, 1974^ p_ 47.

35. Cf_ Horkheimer, "Materaaiismus unJ Moial^, p_ 93-
^6. Horkheimei. 'Gedanke zut Religion^ p. 374-

37- Horkheimer, 'Zu Theodor Haeckers "Der Christ und die Gea:hachte'-"\ p. 37Z
3S, HoTkheimei, 'Gedaaike zur lltligion'^ p. 37S.

39- Ibid-

40- IbSd- For a brief di^cu^^lon of Bea^janiln's Jiotion of anamnetk soladarit)'^ see
J- Habermas, 'A Reply to my Critics"^ in J-B. Thompson and D. Head (eds)^
Habenmu: Cntii-al D^l:hil(^.\ Cambradge, MA: M[T Presi, I9S1. j^p. 246-7.

41 _ HoTkheimer, 'Zu Theodor Haeckers"Der Christ und die Geschichte"', p_ j?72.
42_ Horkheimef. 'Gedanke zut ReHgaon'r pp- 375-6.

43- Hoikheinser, Theism and Atheism'r pp^ 47ff-

44- Hoikheimer, Trobleni der Wah^heit^ p. 247.

45- The German term '^kb bcmihre^i' may be translated as 'corroboration' or
'proving to be true', in the sense of turning out to be tnie^ standing the test^
withstanding critical s^crutany [note its connection with wahr. tme)- "Where
confuivion is likeJv I use the German term.

46- Horkheimer, Troblem der Wahrheit^ pp. Z49ff-
47. Ibid-, pp 249-50.

4H. !bad-, p- 245.
49. Ibid-, p- 246.

50- Ibid-, p-254.

51- Ibid-j PP- 25 Iff- It could be argued that in taking its orientation from histor-
ically articulated interests and de:vares Horkheimer^s own theory is open to
the chaige he levels against pragmatism Uliat is^ of boundless confidence in
the world as at actually exists). In my view Horkheamer avoids this accusa-
tion insofar as he insists on a discrepancy betLveen human interests and
desires and Ehear satasfaction under given social conditions. Social struggles
are practical teitimony to the gap between aspiration and actualization; the
method of determinate negation is the theoretical tool designed to expose
it- To be suiCr the possibihrv- of this gap rests on certain - possibly con-
tentious - normative^ natursJE^t presuppositions about the moral validity ol
desires and teelings-

52. Horkheimer, Troblem der Wahrheit', p. Z52.

53. Ibid-, p- 253.

54- Horkheimer and Adorno, Dkdcctic *ff Et^iighwsmait, p. 24.

55- Set' notes 2 and 51 above-

56u Horkheimer and Adorno, Diafeclic ^f Enii^i^tstt^nmeiil:, pp- 23ff.
57. Hahermas, Tf.Yff umi Kontexte, pp- llO^f.
SS- Ibid-, pp 105-6-

59. Ibid-, p- 119.

60. Ibid-, p- 125.

61. Habermas emphasizes the influence on Horkheimer of Schopenhauer's thesis
ot the unity of ail forms of life {see Texte umi Idmtexte, p. I20j. Although he
does not draw this conclusion explicitly, one could say that in the modern
world the function of the idea of God as co^rwkitiof! Ls connected not just
with its abiliU' to project a reconciliation beriveen the individual and the

240 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

collectivity but also islth its abiJity to effect a unity between the disparate

a5.pecE5 of an individual human life.

62. Habeimas^ Texte mid Koiitext^F. pj"). lQS-6.
6:i. Ibid.^ p. 97.

64. Ibid., p- K)3.

65. i"ff J. Habcirmss. The Tkmry of Comnmni^ative Action, vol. 1^ tran:v_ by
T McCarthy, Cambritlge, MA: MIT Press, 19B4, pp. 'S77tL

66. HabtrmaSj 'A RepEy to my Critics'^ p_ 232.

57. J_ Habermas, Kriowiedf^c and Hmnan J>itfrejts, tran5. by J_ Shapiro, Londnn:

Heinemannr 1972_
6S_ J, HaL>ermas, 'What is Universal Prjigmatics?' in M, CcK>ke (eti.), Hubernhis:

On the Prti^mtitici of Cmiimunifrtitiaii^ Cambridge, MAr MIT Pres^, 1^9f4,

pp- 21-104.

69. Habermas, Tcxte uml Kotftextt'. pp. 1 19-2()_

70. The tatJe of Habermas'i essay in his Ti^xlt wnl Kimtexti' is; 'Transzendenz von
innen, Transzendenz ins diesseks'. An approximate translation is: Tran-
scendence from within, transcendence into this world'.

71 . It also makes a daffercnce at which ^e^'ei the idea of God enters the theorv Else-
where I have arjued thac normative social theory requires a r^vo-step juiEifica-
tory strategy. In addicton to a mode of justification LJidi appeals to normative
standards, immanentto a given cukural and socjal context, it must aSso justify
these fundamental normative standards through reference to a normative
account of the progress of history I contend. furtiienT^ore^ that a normative
account of the progress of history ultimaiely cannot avoid reMng on a meta-
physical assumption, be this a naturalistj rationalist or religious one. At this
le\'e], the metapliysicat assumption of a divine wilt or a divine being competes^
for eKampie, with a metaphysical assumption of the necessary evolution of tlie
species. St^e M. Cooke, 'Bet^veen "Contextuallsm" and "Objectivism": the
Nonnatlve Toundations of Social rhilosophy"^ Criticut Honzosi^k, I, 2 *2(K)0|i_

72. In my \ieiv. there is a line of continuity mnning through Hcrkheimer's
writings that enabtes us to interpret e%^en the later Horkheimer'5 notion of
absolute meaning in a purely negative way: as signifying the impossibility
of closure. However^ since this issue is likely to be of interest mainly to
scholars of Horkheimer, E do not wisli to pursue it further ]iere.

7^. Habermas stresses this atfinity between his theory and Horkheimer^s when
he writes: Tor Horkiieimer " mater ialism'"^ always also had the connotation
of being criticat of philosophy: It stood for fN}.^ti}ietaphysiail thinking/ {Texte
liiui KtvUi^xtt, p. 92t-

74. Both Horkheimer and Habermas share an emphasis on the need for an
inteidiscipiinary approach to a critical theory of society {iftr, for example,
Horkheimer^ 'Traditional and Critical T^ieory'^ p^ 23!^; J. Habermas^ Tliiloso-
phy as Stand-in and Interpreter' in his I\^iorai Ca^iSL-iou.'inc.'is ami Co/uimmica'
ttve Ai'twn, trans, by C_ Lenhardi and S. Weber Nichoisen, Cambridgej MA:
MIT Press, 1990, pp. 1-20).

75. See Habermas, 'What is Universal Pragmatics?' For a discussion of Habermas's

■ BnguEstic grounding of critical theory st^e my Language ami Ri^astjiU! a ^n^ciy
of HateriHa^y's fanu^fl I'*ragi}iittics. Cambridge^ M.\: MIT Press, 1994,

76. J_ Habemias, 'Wahrheitstheorlen', reprinted in his Vbrstcitfit^j imd Er^anzimj^en
zjrr TheGiie des koi7Ji!iiinikatiyeii Handeins'. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp^ 1984_

Mcrevf Cookf 241

77_ The relevant essays can be fGund m J_ HabermaSr IVfEft^/jfaY umi Rechtferti^i^ag,
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp^ 1999. One of these, "'Rkharti Rorty's Prag*
matlc Turn', is tran slated in Cooke ied_), Htiben^ma: ou t!ii3 Pr^i^fmttics of

Cofuimms cation, pp. 343-E52.

7a_ This Is not a new deparEure. AJlhough Habermaa in his earlier ^vritmgs
defended i\ basicaHy episfi^mk view of truth ai idealized rational acceptabil-
ity, he was uiualiy also concurneJ to emphae^aze the difference between
truth and JQF;tificatio]i by dramn^ atlention to the unconditional charactei
we attribute to truth- However, up to recently it was quite unclear what
kind of poscnnetaphysical basas could be found for our understanding oE
truth as a property that cannot be lost.

79. See note 77 above,

SO. From the early 19KOs onwards^ Habermas appeared to hold a view of truth as
JdeaEi^d rationa] acceptability^ According to this position, a proposition is
tme ifit could be iustified under the conditions of the ideal speech situation.
Truth is a rej^Jl^tive idea, the anticipation of an infinite rational consensus.
In his more recent writings {see note 77 abo^-ej^ however^ Habermas
acknovi^iedges convincing objections to this conception.

ai_ There is r^o evidence that Habermas iiimself disttnguiSihes between these
two aspects. It should be noted^ therefore^ that both the distinction
beiween. and description of the two aspects as a 'negative' and a 'positive
on^'r respectively^ is based on }uy reading of his work.

HZ_ Habernias^ Wahrtreit umi Ri^cktfi^ftigii^iSj pp. 31^ 247; Habermas^ 'Rorty's Trag-
matic Turn'r p :p5S.

83. Cf- Habermas^ Wi:ihriieit. imd Rechtfertigitng, p. 293.

B4_ Habermas, 'Rorty's Pragmatic Turn', p. 364; cf. Habermas^ WaM}^it und

Rt^ciiifi^rti^mi^. p. 253-
85. tiabermaSj 'Rojty's PragmatEC Turn'r p. ii72.

S6_ Ibid-, p. :J7(>; si?e aiio Hatermias, Wtihrheil und Rechtfirtigimg pp. iZ-S^

291-3.
87. The same can l>e ^aiJ of his proposed postmetaphysical interpretation of

the ^legtitive aspect of the idea of the absolute^ as expressed by the notion of

fa!hbihty_ Howervet^ I cannot pursue this matter here.

S3L Habermas^ "Rorty's Pragmatic larn'r p. .^7] .

H9_ Hal>ermas, W^ilsrfa^it and R^chtf'^nipmg, p_ 38_

90 Ibid

91. Ibid-, p- 37-

92- J- Habernsas, PostfuetaphyTiictil Tf\iHkii\i^, irans- by W.M_ Hohengartenj

Cambridge, MA: Mil" Press, L992, p. 15.
93. Ibid-, p- 15-

94- "We have seen that Hortheimer holds that justification of moral beliefs is
neither necessary nor pos:>ibte. Instead he appeals Eo historically articulated
feelings, for example, ot sohdarity or of desire for happiness- 5qcIi feelings
are 'natural facts' requiring no justification.

95- Habermas, Tfxti^ imd Kontextc, pp- 13S-&-

96- Ibid-, p- ]^^J^. This is theology^'s dilemma; .?£^ esp. pp. 1.^7ff.

97- Ibid-, pp 129 and J:^6-

9B- J- Habermas, Die ^leuf Unubeisiiiuiii-hki.% Frankfurt: 5uhrkamp, 19^5, p- 52-
99. Habermas, Tcxte und Kontexte, p. 141.

242 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

LOO. Ibid,^ pp. 141f. Originally in P^ysttJieti^phy^iciil Tliinkui^, p_ 5L

lOL v\Fguably, Horkheimer's theory has no room caiia'p^tdity for a nDtion of
specBfi-caliy retigious truth insofar as it tails to recognize jnodiEmiEy's. ditferen-
tiation of substantive reason into varionjij fomuJLy conceived^ dimensions of
vahdity. If Vk^ accept the basic premise of Habennas's vie^v^ whkh is that reli-
gious tnjth 3ays claim to validity that is of a different kind fromj for example,
thevalidicy ctaims raised bj' physics, historv", the Law or literature, it as -easy to
agree that Horkheimer's conception of truth is too undiffeiti:ntiatfid to aJlow
fof significant differences in modes of justification, Admiltediy^ acceptance
of Habemias-'s thesis regarding the modern differentiation of reason raises
complex issues about the relationship between the moments oi rationaEity;
in particular, it raises the question of whether these moments can L>e rein*
tegrated without recourse to metaphysics,

102. When conceding the possibility oJ' jelagious semantic contents that cannot
be retrieved discursively. Habermas tends to suggest that the existence of
such semantic contents is doubtful ae^, for example^ Pa^Uhi'taphyniofi
Tiiinking. p_ 51^ where he refers to a lellgious semantic content that 'eludes
{for the time hei^j^?\ the explanatory force of philosophical language and
continues to resist translaiicn into reasoniiig discourses". ILmphasis added.]
A rare example ot engagement with the question of rehgious truth can be
found in his reply to some critics at a theotogica! conference held in i98B
at the University- of Chicago {s^ Texte iimt Kontexte^ pp. 127-56). Here^
Habermas argues that theology tias to take seriously the validity claims of
religion - and criticizes some theologians for failing to do so. At ihe same
time^ he acknowledges the difficulties connected with any such attempt -
without^ however, indicating any solution.

Wii, See my L<uigii{tge ami R^asiin, ch. 3. My discussion in the following draws
on the argument in this chapter.

104, Such condEtions include^ for example, the necessary presuppositions that
only the force of the better argument prevails, or that everyone concerned
is entitled to participate on an equal basis.

105, Cooke (ed.)p Hubenuas: oh the Pnigmatics DfCo^uiuiiitiSiatit?ii^ pp_ 320-1.

106. KabeimaSj Wtihriieit und Rt^chtferti^iHg. p. 297.

107. Habermas, Tt'xte wkS Koi^ttrxte. p. 149_

lOS- J. Hal>ermas, } notification und Appifcatio}!, trans, by C Cronin, CambS^ge^

MA: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 1-17_
L09_ [n 'Realizing the Post-Conventional Self [Philosophy anti !i-(H'iat Critici^m^
vol. 20, no- 1/2 (1994^ pp. 67-101). [ argue that HahenHas's account of eth-
ical va] id Et}*^ claims is unsatisfactory in that it tails to distinguish ad^iquately
bet^veeai two senses in which validity c3aims can be context-specific.
Cf. also my 'Are Etiiical Conflicts Irreconcilable?" in Ptiiloii^>phy and Socini
Cnticisf}f, vol- 2J5, no- 2 ^ 1997:i, pp. l-19j-
110. Habermas, Tii^uiy ^f Commwucatsv^ Ai'tion, Yol. 1^ p- 42-
Ll 1. Cooke (ed.), Habenmi.'i' on ^le Pnj;puatics GfCofurminia^tion, p, 415, Habermas
here cites Albrecht Wellmer's essay. Truths SemhEance, Reconciliation', in
his The Per.'iistence of h-ioiiennty, trans, by D. Midgely, Cambridge^ MAi MIT
Press, 1991.

112, ClearJy^ this contrasts with Kanf^s position on the universality of aesthetic
judgements in his Cntiijiie of Jiid;^]ei!t, trans- by W-S. Pluhar, Indianapolis:
Hackett rubEishingCo-, 1987-

Lt3. HaberniaSj Texte umi Kotitexte, pp_ 146fl_

LI4. Cxyoke (edj, HifhL'niins: on :he Prci^iinmtics ofCos^whink'atiois, pp. 396^f_
lis. rbid-, p- :i97-

116. Habermaij Ti^xte wni Kiyntext*;, pp_ 146-7.

117. Ibid., p_ 147. Of course the same can be said of aesthetic experience.
Indeed, Wellmer- whomHjbt^rmas cites appmvingty in this legard - seems
to be emphasizing precisely the liolistlc aspect of aesthetic experience [set
Wellmer^ TVuth. Semblance^ ReconciJJation').

LIS. Hjbermas {YVjrfe iirui K^fiti^jcttfj p. 140J acknowledges thai tlias must t>e true
for theological cEaims tjun valicliEy claims. It must therefore also ho3d i^or
religious claims qua validity cEaims.

119. rbid_, p_ 1^7_

12(>. Habcrmas^ Wahrhcit xmd Rcchtfcrti^m^^ pp. Z77-&.

IZL 5f4/ Cooke^ 'Between "ConteAtuaiism"* and ■'Objectivism"^: the Normative
Toundations of Social Philosophy'.

Voices in Discussion

D.Z. Phillips

H: I have endeavoured (q expound critical theory through the
developments in the work of Horkhcimer He gave this title to his the-
ory to distinguish it from orthodox Marxism. Mis v^'orlc went through
three phases. His work dufiiig llic first pha^e can be compared to that
of Fcuerbach and Mar.x- Once wc have thrown off its religious s^ise^
the essence of reltj^on can be seen as the struj^gle for a better world. He
did not agree with tlic Leninist view tliat telipon was an oppressive
institution- Instead, he emphasized llie finitude of life, and thought
ihat religion saves us from a Lhou^hUcss oplamisni. In this lie was
influenced by the pessimism of Schopenhauer

In his second phase, Horkhcimer cooperated with Adorno in a critique
of the Enlightenment, by emphasizing the negative aspects of Judaism.
The ne^atioii of optimism is not Leased any longer on a conception of
absolute reasoning.

In his Lhird phase, influenced by Kant, Morkheimer is far more scep-
tical He said that ^the tiling in itself is unknowable. He did not trust
liuman language or cognition- I-iis notioii of 'the unconditioned' must
be thought of in a regulative, Kantian sense. As in Kant's First Critique
it is not an actuai reality^ but a necessary feature of human reasoning.
For the late Horkhcimer the religious and the philosophical concept of
God is onc^ via the notion of justice. The hope is for a better world-

O: iL is essential Lo recognize tliat critical iheor)'' is a practically oriented
philosophy, rather than a speculative thcor>^ On the one hand,
Horkhcimer Lhoughl tliat teltf^ion is a regressive force if people arc dep-
endent on it. The better order he longed for was to be shaped by people"^
actual interests- Tliis is tlic only way to overcome oppression. On the
other liand, religion can liave real dignity if it comes out from

244

DZ. rtiiHip^ 245

the niidsl of this oppression and furthers progressive interests. B\3t

Horkheiiner thought that this link was contingent^ stnce^ like all ideahst
philosophies, religious concepts can mean anyihing. So religion is
replaceable- The better order does not need an appeal to the absolute-
It may liavc an important rote at a certain time in histoiy^ but^ again^
this is contingent. Furlhcrniore, its promise of salvation is an illusion
aiid turns us away from llie practical problems that need to be
addressed. We need to be released from the doctrinal and institutional
aspects of reiigion. Idealists and materialists alike need to recognize
that an appeal to the absolute cannot be maintained- At Jast^
Horkhcimer sees the value of religion as a call for ne\^er-ending change^
but he is ambivalent towaids It since its value will always depend on
circumstances-

Habennas thought that Horkhcimer was more positive towards jcli-
gion He accuses him of utopianism and of turning away from the
impcrtant issues. Ilabcrtnas docs not think that social action needs
philosophical justification. Despite a common aim their purposes differ,
but 1 shaEl concentrate on what Ilabermas says about their convergence.

Habermas has an idea of truth which is pragmatic and yet absolute
in that it calis one beyond the present situation. No closure is possil"?ie.
But this role is not rch^ous. He is also interested in the semantic
content of reHfrion, and argues that its moral ideas are independent of
their religious form. Reason ts differentiated In different modes of
reasoning. Therefore, we need a nieliiodologLcal atheism to deal with reli-
gion. Habermas thought that this critique has been concluded and that
the hope lies in a universal human ethics. Lately, however, Habermas has
changed his mind and said that this critique has not been fulfilled and
that it may not lie possible lo capture religious truths in some philo-
sophical form equivalent to them.

Can Habermas accommodate religious truth? The tfiSftculty lies in
his theory of validated claims. He argued that while empirical and
moral claims can be vindicated in discourse, this cannot be said of
aesthetic and rehgious claims.

Habermas said that ccriain aesthetic and ethical claims are specific in
content, b^ing dependent on cultural values- Sut he also recognized that
art and literature can open up new worlds, but must l?c experienced to
be understood- The conditions for vindication here are impossibly hij^h,
since all people would have to sec the world in the same way. So it is in
religion - it offers a world-view- But there are important differences.
There are no experts in reli;;;aon as there arc in aesthetics. It concerns
the everyday world. The trouble with philosophical arguments is that

246 Pfiihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

thc}^ negate the existential import of religion. The value of religion is
not confined to the individual, but is universal in its aspiration.

Yet, there is a prnblem, sIiicGh obviously, llieology caniiol adopt
methodological atheism. How is religious truth to be vindicated in dis-
course? As far as I can see there arc only two possible ways ahead for
Habf rmas in this respect. Mrsl, he can retain his criteria of vindication
and try to subsume religion under them. Second, he should revise his
criteria of vindication and make them more flexible to accommodate
different modes of thought. 1 hope this second course will be adopted.

D: You have presented two ways of assessing rehgi^^ One is to ask
whether religious claims are tiue. The second is to ask whellicjr thcie
claims can be translated without remainder Into mora! or political
terms. Obviously, the latter alternative will conimEnd itsdf more to
tliosc who aic non-religious.

H: 1 do not think one begins with religious experience. Oitc must have
the requisite concepts to have the experience. All %ve mean by method-
ological atheism is a methodological approach to these concepts^ so
you could say that you find it in Aquinas, liut^ of course^ Habcrmas is
discussing it in the context of post- metaphysical philosophy.

C; I have a question and a puzzle wliich I want to address to H and 0.
My question is whether Habcrmas has now gone further and said that
in the cultural conversation rcli^ous meanings have to be recognized
as suigeixeris and cannot be analysed away in other terms.

My puzzle concerns the use of 'methodological atheism"". 1 can see
that it meant to deliver the enquiry from the framework of religious
idealism. But If the aim is to do justice to different modes of thought,
why is atheism privileged in ttiat way? It should be one mode of
thought among others. The aim would be to do justice to the world in
all its variety. Once again, I thought of Wittgenstein's '111 teach you
differences/ Instead of ^nethodotogical atheism/ why not speak of
disinterested enquiry or neutral enquiry?

H: I accept entirely what you say about 'methodological atheism . It is
an unfortunate term for the reasons you give and should be dropped.

As to your first question, again you are right. ?Tabermas now recognizes
that icligious content is sui ^aitris,

O: The only thing I'd add to Hahermas's recognition of the distinctive
character of religious mcaniiigSj is the qualification that he'd wisli it

was not true.

DZ. niiilip^ 247

G: You spoke of Ihe 'world-transforming' experiences of aesthetics and

rciigion. You also said tliat relij^ion does not depend on experts as aes-
thetics does, and lliat lis claims are more universal.

Now, what it that 'world-transforming' experience of a religious kind
happened to a philosopher? Wouldn't that mean that he would see all
things, induding philosophy, rcli^ously? But your method or, at least,
that of Habermas, insists that philosophy must be pluraltst So what is

beiiig advocated is a philosophy for the non-'religLous.

. - - #.

O: The experience you talk of would have extensive implications which
could not be contained in Halx^nnas's system. One could not maintain
methodolo-^ical athctsm. Of course, in the end, everything depends on
one's philosophy.

B: But Is it simply a ffce-for-all as far as which philosophies are or are
not included?

H: For Horkheimer there was a criterion by which philosophy is to he
assessed^ namely, whether it furthered sympathy (or the oppressed.
Furthering the moral law^ gives the opportunity for political action. But
there is a problem once you recognize, as Habermas did, that there are
different conceptions of justice.

M: It is difficuh to get people to aim for an ideal when they are victims
of oppression. The issue is how the claims of the innocent are to be
heard.

O: Horkheimer recognized that^ hence his denial that there can he
closure on the call for justice. He hccomcs worried that any consensus
reached will, in fact, fail to fceognize the sufferings of some minorily.
Habermas recognizes this criticism, but chooses to disregard it.

H: Horkheimer Is, in some ways, more realistic than Ilabetmas- The
latter hopes that the universal embraces everyone. He has a transcen-
dental notion of consensus. It is a formal idea that is a precondition tor
any moral dispute. It is not that we know the goal and arc w^orklng
towards it^ but it denies closure to the moral q^ucst.

/: You say that it is not a theory of justice, but that it Is normative
nevertheless. I do not thlnlv that will be 'cooF enough for C

O: ll^bermas's view is based on his notion of the nocinativity of lan-
guage. The precondition for communlt)^, he thinks, means that certain
Implicit standards are already in place. These don't specify how wc

must act. They don't wield powder.

248 Pfiihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

f: The matter scorns rather schizophrenic. The incthtxl is supposed to be

neutral with respect^ say^ to relijjion, and j^'ct it is not a nculral ^uidc.

O: Haberinas wouid want to argue that his methods are neutral, but that
their findings arc not.

J: It also seems to me that if no instance of justice is sufficient^ this is a
version of perfectionism.

S: I think that part of the difficulty comes from thinking that 'absolute'
entails univcrsaltty-

O: If it is true, lie argued^ it must be true for everyone and affect every

aspect of life.

S: 1 do not see wliy tlie fact that there are views other than my own is
sufficient in itself to make me doubt my own.

* - ■ ■

O: I agree that is the de fadn situatloHj but 1 do find it difficuk. If wc
ivant lo speak of absolute truth what does 'true^ mean?

H: We must remember that riorkhclmcr and Habcrmas were influenced
by HegeL For them, art is not subjective preference. Art Is one stage at
which truth appears. This emphasis is still in Adorno. Art and music
are a kind of knoisiedge of the world. They arc not private spheres.

O: Habermas seems to depart from this.

H: Yes and that is problematic, since you can give no account of moral
judgement if you say that the way forward is to be determined simply

b\^ people's interests.

Q: 1 read Mabermas as a kind of Kantian. He argues for universality as a
regulative ideal^ but what he actually looks for is different, namely^ an
appioximatioji to the good, Anyone should in principle be able to sec
that and criticize it. So the aim shouldn't be identified with anything
like the hig;iiest^ood.

* - ^ ^

H: 1 think that is correct.

Part VI

Process Thought

John B. Cobb, Jr

'Process Lhought' can include a wade range of piiilosopSilcs and theologies.
Hegel, for example, is clearly a process thinker. But the term has hcen
used in receni limes to refer especially to the ideas of Alfred Xorih
Whitehead and those who have heen influenced by him. In the philos-
ophy of religion, the key figure beyond Whitehead has been Charles
Hartshorne. In this essay I T.vill limit myself to those who associate
themselves chiefly with the thought of IVhilehead and Hartshorne.
This is the branch of process thought committed to cosmology or
metaphysics.

I thereby omit from consideration major schools of philosophy of
rclijTLon closely related to process thought and sometimes included
under the term. In the generation of HartshornCr there were also Henry
Xefson Wieman, Bernard Meland and Bernard Loomer, all of whom
found much of value in Whitehead, but drew equally on other sources.
They, toOp continue to be intluential in the American scene. Some of
their followers arc among the most articulate critics of the metaphysical
and cosmological forms of process thought that i will repicscnt-

The accent In this group is on the empiricalj the cultural and the
historical If they are theislic at all, this feature of their lliought tends
to be margiiiaL Criticisms of these branches of process thought are
likely to be quite different from criticisms of the schooi on which 1 will
focus- Nevertheless, there is a continuum between the t^vo f;roups and
also a strong sense of relatedncss in a wider context Lhat rejects or
ignores the radical empiricism and neo-naturalism that both groups
have in common.

In order to develop a focused paper, I narrow the topic still more.
Among followers of VVliilchcad^ some have little interest in religion.
Among those w^ho do, some have rejected his doctrine of God- Some of

2Si

2SZ Pfiihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

those who find much of wiluc in his cosmolo^' and metaphysics do
not want to be encumbered by any form of theism- Others w^ant lo
connect his cosmolog\^ and metaphysics to a different form of thetsm.
They play an important role in process thought^ but lo include them
here would be confusing.

There is a further difficulty in identifying the topic of fftis paper IdHfee
myself^ many of the followers of Whitehead and Hartshornc are the-
ologians rather ihan philosophers. Of course, we face both ways.
Among theologians we arc regarded as far too concerned with philo-
sophical issues. They correctly judge that for us somewhat autonomous
philosophical questions arc of crucial importance for the formulations
of lailh. Among philosophers, of course, we are viewed with suspicion
because of our theological commitments- The^^ are correct that our
pliliosophlcal rellection is ultimately in tlic service of faith, although,
in our vic^v; to be properly in the ser\ace of faith, such reflection
should toe as open and rigorous as possible-

Whitehead's latest works arc those most influential among his current
theological and philosophical followers. By the Lime he wrote these, he
was out of step with the intellectual community. Both philosophers
and theologians had rejected cosmotogical interests In favour of more
nariowly defined disciplinary ones. Dominant streams of philosophy
had become analytic or positivislic- Theology stressed its starting point
In faith and its independence from all secular disciplines including
philosopliy. Hence both philosophers and theologians criticized the
efforts of process thought to attain a coherent view of the whole that
did justice both to science and lo religion.

In the effort to attain such a \1ew, dominant formulations both in
^ience and theology had to be challenged- In otiier words^ instead of
accepting the autonomy of the several disciplines^ process thought
engages In erttictzing their assumptions and seeking to forniulale better
ones. From its point of view, most of the disciplines operate with
subsianLia^ist assumptions whlchn obviously, appear inadequate or
misleading to process thinkers. This means that the metaphysical
judgement of the primacy of event and relationship over substance
and attribute is central to the project. These metaphysical claims have
been pursued in a context in which^ in general^ both philosopticrs and
theologians have been anti-metaphysicah

jofu^B.Cohk Ir 25'i

The most serious objections to process thought should be apparent
from this account of its programme- It pursues a projeclj metaphysics^
which is supposed to have been shown to he invahdaled by David
Hume and Immanuel Kaiil and maiiy others in the past two centuries.
Ic seeks a coherent, inclusive \vtsion in a time when this has been shown
to bo impossible asid, perhaps, oppressive as well. It ignores and con-
fuses tlie boundaries bet^^cen the sciences^ philosophy and theolo^^ in
such a way as tc deny the integrity of each. In short, it continues an
effort that has been outdated since the late eightcentli century-
Have these objections been met? Obviously, one who did not thint;
so would not continue a project so out of tune with one's intellectual
surroundings. Whitehead agreed with Hume and Kant thai early mod-
em philosophy was fundamentally flawed, but he understood himself
to be providing an alternative solution to the problem, an alternative
that has been little pursued during the past tAvo centuries.

This is not the place to develop the argument In any deialL But It
may be wefl to say that Whitehead's doctrine of physical prehensions
introduces a way of thinking about causality that was nol considered
by either Hume or Kant. Those of us who arc convinced of the superi-
ority of the resulting understanding of causality are not persuaded tay
the arguments of Humeans and Kantians that cosmological and meta-
physical thinking should be abandoned- These arguinents in general
seem to be based on understandings of causality w^e do not share.

On the other hand, VVhiteheadians have also been convinced that
the cosmology and metaphysics that are now needed arc quite differ-
ent from those that were dominant in the pasL Hence they have been
critical of Thomists and others who continued to defend more tradi-
tional views. The metaphysics that seems to us viahle loday on the
basis of the evidence of both science and religious experience, as well
as Intrinsic intelligibility, is a process metaphysics. This requires quite
radical changes in the understanding of the human self and God as
well as of the natural world. Obviously, proposing major revisions
evokes ciiticisin from those who stay closer to the tradition.

This criticism is at two levels. First, there Is criticism of the whole
revisionist project. Some critics believe that the meanings of such
words as 'God' are clearly estahlished in the tradition, cspecialtyH
perhaps, hy St Thomas. The proper philosophical task is to debate the
intcihgtiity of the idea and the justification for affirmjiijj that God, so
understood, exists. Process thinkers reply that the traditional doctrine
today shows internal incoherences and that it does iiol fit well with
moral and reli^ous experience. To insist on maintaining it unchanged

254 Pfiihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

invites the atheism that has, in factj been evoked in response to it. But
to leave the allernativcs only as Itaditional philosophical theism, on
the one hand, and atheism, on the otlier, has appalling consequences.
Far more uscfLiI is the conslruclive task of tliinking about ivhat or
wliom we can trust and worship today.

At this level, the process response to the criEicisiii continues to com-
mend itself to mc. But tlnere is another level of criticism which I take
more seriously. Especially in an earlier generation, criticisms of tradi-
tional theism by process thinkers were often harsh and lacking in
nuance- Traditional theism was depicted as inflexible and monollLfiic.
We now know that its capacity for internal self-transformation is far
greater than we had supposed. We have learned that It contains greater
depths of insight and is subject to more fresh interpretations than we
had imagined- Tlie substance thinking to which it is attached does not
{^ntail all the consequences wc projected upon it. There may have been
sonic justification for the process polemic at one time^ in order Eo open
up the discussion of neglected issues, but today simphstLc formulations
of our differences from some of the revised forms of traditional theism
are anachronistic- Differences remain, but process thought may not have
provided adequate answers to ali the subtler challenges that characterize
the current discussion.

The other level of criticism is around particular doctrines of God.
These are probably tlie best known debates in philosophy of religion
invohang process thinkers. One of these is the process doctrine of divine
mu lability. Metaphysically this follovs^ in process thought from the prin-
ciple that to be actual is both to act and to l>c acted ujx>n. Every actual
entity Is internally related to tts entire past. If God is actual,
then God, too, prebends, and thereby incorporates, the past. As new
events occur^ the past incoTporated by God grows. By incorporating that
growitig past, the divine experience grows, too. Growth is a form of
change; so^ for God to grow In this way presupposes some kind of divine
mulabality-

Process thought emphasizes that this form of mutability is compat-
ible with, indeed requires^ another form of inuiiiutabLlity. God is ahvays
including whatever happens in the world. Perfect receptiiity is immu-
tably characteristic of God. It is not God's character that chanj^es, but
God's character Is such that God is responsive to w^hat happens In the
world-

Although this is a metaphysical point implicit in the primacy of
process^ both Whitehead and Hartshorne understood it to have exten-
sive religious and existential Emportance- Hence process thinkers have

jofu^B.Cohk Ir 255

often polcmicizcd against the doctrine of divine immutability for reasons
that arc not purely melaphysical. Because most of U5 aie Christian^ we
have also appealed to llie Bible for isupporl and have argued that if Jesus
reveals God^ then God suffers with us in our suffering.

Critics have objected ihai this makes God over after our ima^e. It
reduces God to finitudc_ The infintte cannot change. Tho5e for whom
God is conceived as Bein^ Itself rtjccl the idea of God changing because
it makes no metaphysical sense. They join in the charge against process
thinkers of anthropomorphism. The object of worship must be radically
differciiL trom us, not the human writ large. Also, they believe that
a personalistic doctrine of God cannot he defended against critical
questioning.

During the period in which process theologians have been fighting
this battle primairily at the philosophical level, others have done so on
primarily Biblical and existential grounds. Dietrich Bonhocffer and Jucr-
gen Moltmann are two of the most innueniial. The notion that God
suffers with us has become almost a comnionplace in many Christian
circles. HenccH at that levels the critical objections have lessened^ and
process thcologyn in this one instance, seems to be on the winning side.

The philosophical challenge, however^ remains. For many philoso-
phers of religion the only locus In which they can affirm God is that of a
metaphysical principle that is beyond all the distinctions that character-
ize creaturely things. In their eyes^ process theism treats God too much
like a creature, hideed, in Whitehead w-e read that God is a 'creature of
creativity'- Of course, that phrase is balanced by oihcrs that show bow
very dift'ctent God is from the other 'creatures' of creati\aty, but it is sig-
nificant nevertheless. For process thinkers God Is an actuality or n beings
not creativitj' or Being Itself. Although tiartsborne does not make this
distinction, for him^ too^ metaphysical principles apply alike to God
and creatures. God^s transcendence docs not have the radical metat-
physical character that many philosophical theologians have affirmed
of it. These thinkers object that such a being is not cliaracterized by the
mystery^ and docs not inspire the awe and wonder that arc essential to
the divine.

This objection is furthered by a certain form of rclij^ous experience
as well As personaiisttc, Biblical images of God have become less and
less credible with the changing worldvieiv, many who rennain belie^^crs
have accented the radical otherness and formlessness of God. The
attractiveness of apophatic raysticisra has Increased. Tills is the way of
negation. Precisely because of its negation of all images and concepts^
it is free from many of the charges of incredibility that follow any

256 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'fii^oir m tta^ 21%i Century

positive affirmations about God. It also builds bridges lo the Vcdantic
tradition in India and Lo liuddhist practice. Those who have been
socialized in this way find the affirmations of process thinkers^ at bcst^

a distraction. Tliis is a serious objection.

My own response has been to build on the distinction niade by
Whitehead between creativity and God_ Creativit)^ is the metaphysical
ultimate^ and plays^ philosophically an analogous rok in Whitehead
to Brahmati in Vedanta and Emptiness in Zen. So far as I can tell,
Whitehead did not make these connections or affirm any religious
importance to the realization that we are Brahman or Empty or
instances of creativity. But it is e^^dent from the history of rellfjion^
thai there is great Importance in this realization, it is a quite different
form of religious tife from the trust and worship that are more charac-
teristic of the Biblical tradition and lliat are directed toward One with
whom creatures have sonic interaction. Thus far 1 have found this
response to a very significant challenge satisfying.

The posittng of two ^iltimates'^ in its turn, raises a whole new set of
objections- For many people 'God' is virtually synonymous with 'The
Ultimate' or The Absolute' in awav that makes the notion of l"wo 'ulti-
mates' inconceivable- My response is that by 'ultimate' I mean onty the
end of the line In some order of questioning. If we ask after material
causes^ the ultimate in that line is different from the ultimate in the
line of efficicntj formal or final causes. 1 take it that creativity^ is the
ultimate material cause of all that is, including God. That is, God^s
'matter" is ercati\1ty. But God is ultimate in aEI the other lines of ques-
tioning, hi the Uible God is not the void or the chaos from which all
things are created. This does lead to two Gods.

A second fealure of process thought Is the denial that God knows
everything about the future- From the point of view of process thou^ht^
this is not a denial of omniscience^ since God knows all that is and the
probabiEities of the future as welL There is nothing else to know^- God
cannot know exactly what will happen in the futurCji since tiie future is
now genuinely open-

For those who defend the traditional doctrlnCj howeverj this Is a
denial of omniscience, another rejection of divine perfection on the
basis of process anthropomorphism, hor God not to know the future, it
is ar^ed, cuts against prophecy and the assurance that dhinc promises
will be fulfilled, for somCj faith is primarily the confidence that all will
come out right in the end, and for these the denial that God knows
that this will occur in the course of history is a tlat rejection of faith. For
some, omniscience is an essential attribute of God, and this necessarily

Jofm R. Cohk !i- ZS7

includes knowledge of the future. For them, the God of process

thought is not truly God at alL

Those who liold to a fully deterministic reading of history have no
difficulty ill believing in God's knowledge of the future. But many who
liold to omniscience in this sense, also affirm the reality and importance
of human freedom in shaping the future. In order to wock out the
tension between these beliefs^ some assert that from the transcendent^
divine perspective^ all time already exists. Our human experience of the
radical difference between past and future applies only to our creaturely
perspective.

Clearly^ this solution is not open to process thinkers. Neither is the
detetministic view of events. The uncertainty of the future, and there-
fore the impossibility of God's knowing exactly what will occur, are
built into process metaphysics. For the most part, this is satisfying to us
religiously and existentially as well as intellectually, [t unequivocally
accents the importance of human decisions in the shaping of history.

On the other hand, a real objection lies in the strength many gain
from the assurance that^ despite all odds and appaient improbabilities^
in tlie end truth will prevail and right will be done. Process thinkers
|oin in singing 'We Shall Overcome' as an expression of hope and
determination, but we know that for others it is an expression of coiifi-
dencc that God^s promises will he fulfilled regardless of what creatures
do- The inability to support that assurance can be painful. Those of us
ivho are Christian theologians recognize that there are biblical passages
supporting an apocalyptic fulTilment of history which we must
demythologize.

The challenge is to find other ways of providing assurance. Process
thought offers several. Firstn there is the assurance that whatever
happens God is witli us, God loves us^ God accepts us, and all that we
arc lives on in the divine life. Second, there is the assurance that in the
cbiifse of^istory all our efforts count for something, even if the particular
goals for which we strive are not attained. Third, there is the assurance
that God works with us and through us in every situation to bring
about what good there Is possible, and that this introduces surprising
new hope and promise- Fourth, some process thinkers hold out the
hope for continued personal life beyond the grave.

These responses to the objection suffice for many of us. We can also
argue thai maturity requires Lhat we accept responsibility for our world
and not expect divine intcr\Tnti6n to set tilings right or rescue us from
our destructive practices, liul whether any of this is an adequate response
to the objection is hard to say. It is adequate for my own religious needs^

ZS8 Pfiihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

but I cannot speak for those who find themselves in intolerable positions
of oppression.

Closely related to the revision of divine omniscience Is the rcjecUon
by process thinkers of the notion of divine omnipotence. We believe
that the doctrine of omnipotence rests on a philosophically outdated
understanding of causality, precisely the one that Hume and Kant
found indefensible. The VVhitchcadian doctrine of causality as physical
prehensions cannol result in a single entity being capable of totihy
controlling everything.

Causality is here understood as influence, as one entity flowing into
another and thus participating in its constitution. But every event results
from the joint inflowing of many past events. Xo one can displace all
the others.

1-iLrLhcrmore, although to a large extent an event is the product of the
joint influences of the past, it is never entirely so. There is always an
clcmeni of self -constitution as wclL That self-consLttutLon is a response
to the physical prehensions that causally inform the event, but this
response adds something, it supplements-

Finally, God's role in each event is unique- To understand it, consider
as the event in question a momentary human experience. God is not
so much one physical influence alongside the personal past, the ffcsh
impulses llirough the sense organs^ and the remainder of the body^
although God's presence may play a role of that kind. God's distinctive
role is that of making a creative response possible. God provides alterna-
dvc possibilities for response to the physically given situation and calls
the occasion of experience to realize that possibility which, in that situ-
ation^ is best. It is God's role to give freedom to that experience and
responsibiliLy as to how thai freedom is used. Thus, "whereas past events
compel us to incorporate aspects of themselves^ God^s primary role is
persuasive.

The power of persuasion is very different from the power of coercion.
If iL were possible to speak of the ideal limit of the power of persuasion
as ^omnipotcBicc'j process thinkers would be glad to appropriate this
traditional word. But we have fouiid thaL the notion of omnipotence is
bound up with that of coercive power We believe, on the other hand,
that persuasive powder is the greater power. It is true that coercive power
can destroy and kill, but only persuasive power can give life, make free,
and evoke love.

A^aln, those of us who are Christian theologians also believe that the
revelation of God in Jesus is not of a monopoly of coercive power but
of an ideal instance of persuasive power, liberating power, empowering

John R. Cohk !i- ZS9

powcjf- God's activity in huinan life sets us free and calls us to rcspons-
bLlity. We find that this revision of traditional theism brings us closer
to the Bible.

CriUcs objiecl that in the Bihlc God is depicted as 'aLmighty'. Most of
this widespread assumption follows from the translation of a proper
name for God, ^Shaddai' a? almighty. There is no justification for this
translation in the Hebrew texts. But it would be going too far to say
that the svholc of the liiblc is on our side. Wc must admit ihat some
of the actions attributed to God, especially in the earlier books of the
Old Testament, as well as the last book in Lhe \ew Testament, imply a
controlling power that does not fit well into process thought.

There is still much work to be done on these questions. Controlling
and persuasive power cannot be wholly separated, The diverse under-
standings of divine powei in the Uihle have not been fully sorted out. But
much has been done, and some advantages of process thought have been
extensively displayed with regard, for example^ ilj itie problem of e\'LL

The most serious ohjcction here, as in the case of the revised doctrine
of omniscience^ relates to the openness of the future. For some Christians
the assuraitcc that God has the posvcr needed to transform all thin;^ in
tlie end is what is chiefly at stai-^e in the claim that God is omnipotent.
Process thought cannot support that assurance.

The understanding of the self is another area in which process
thought profoundly revises the tradition. Even persons who are
attracted to other aspects of process thought often find themselves
unable to follow here. From the process point of view, this shows how
powerfully our language has caused us to adopt substance lliinking even
when wc arc not conscious of doing so.

Process metaphysics requires us to recognize that the human person
is the flow of human experiences. Alternately^ we may defmc the per-
son as the tlow ot human experiences In conjunction with atl those
other events that make up the human body, hi neither case i^ there
any underlying self or T distinct from the experiences. The self or T

I b

lies within the flow of experience.

The vast majority of Westerners habitually think of ihemselvcSn
implicitly, as the subjects of their csperiences rathcrthan as elements
within those cxpenences. if one spells out what is implicit^ the experi-
ences are attributes of a substantial self tliat remains self-identical
despite changes in the cxpcricnec^ The self that cxpcticnccs pain
in one moment is tlie same as the self that experiences joy in another.
A major objection to process thought is that it dissolves this substan-
tial, underlyinjf self into the flux of experience.

2^0 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

Have process thinkers responded adequately to this objection? If we
do not suppose that we have^ then we must recognize Ihat the basic
claim of process thought is incorrect. That has in fact led some to turn
away. Others of us find that the process view is phenomcnologieally
more accurate and that there are others who^ independently of com-
mitment to process metaphysics, are finding this to be the case. VVc
take comfort in the fact that Buddhists have supported this vicvv, lived
with itp and gained spiritually from it, for thousands of years.

This affinity of process thought witli Buddliisni provides another
ground of objection, lliis time from Christians- Is not a major differ-
ence between Buddhism and Christianity, they ast:, the depreciation of
personal existence in the former and Its affirmation In the latter? Does
not acceptance of the Buddhist denial of an underlying self lead to the
depreciation of personal existence? Can that be reconciled with Chris-
tianity?

My response to this h£^ been to agree that Christians prize personal
continuity through timc^ along with the responstbtlities that continu-
ity engenders^ in ways that Buddhists ultitnately do not. But Christians
need not understand this personal continuity as based on a self-identi-
cal self underlying ihc process- histcad, we can view each momentary
experience as maintaining continuity with a particular sequence of
predecessors^ embodying them with some peculiar completeness^, and
aiming at the continuation of this sequence Into the future.

Phenomenologically. Buddhists do not deny that this occurs. Far
from it. They know how very difficult it is to break these conncctlons-
Bul they sec the spiritual gains that occur when the lack of identity
through time is fully appreciated and the present cuts off its tics to past
and future. They develop disciplines that help this to happen. Chris-
tlanSn on the other hand^ can accent the positive values of identifying
oar personal being with a particular past, taking responsibility for it,
and committing the future of this personal being. Christianity and
liuddliisrn then appear as complementary responses to the same mcta-
pliysical situation rather than as metaphysically opposed traditions.

Perhaps the most serious objection to process thought is that it has
engaged too little with other philosophies. It has functioned too much
as a ghetto within the wider community. For example^ it has engaged
too little with the other philosophies of religion represented In this

jofu^B.Cohk Ir 261

conference. This is a valid objection, but our ftilluic in this respect has
more juslification than may Lnitialiy be recognized-
First, process thouglil in the form of process theology has engaged
quite extensively with other forms of theology. By Itself this has been
an absorbing task, and it has involved us secondarily in interaction
with philosophers of religion who enter the theological discussion. Of
course^ even here, we have by no means engaged all forms of theolo^n
and certainly we have not been remarkably successful in shaping the
mind of the church]

Second, process thought is inherently Iransdisciplinary and interested
in interaction with thinkers in many different fields. We are interested in
the implications of our basic stance for physics and biology as well as the
social sciences- We need also to sec whether developments in these fields
cut for or against our assumption of the primacy of events and relation-
ships over substances and attributes. What re\nsions in our cosmolo^'
do new developments lec^uirc? This loo is an absorbing and never com-
pleted task.

Third, process thought points toward the importance of practice. \"\t
believe that it has contributions to make not only to theology, but also to
the practical life of the church. We have written on Christian education,
pastoral counscning. church administration and preaching. Articulating
tliesc contributions and trying to implement them also take a great deal
of time- Furthermore, this work in the church is only a tiny part of the
work w^e ulsh we could do in the wider society in education^ in therapy
and in political and economic life. I personally have become particularly
absorbed in the critique of economic theory and practice and liave been
privileged to work with a W^itehcadian economist in this field.

Fourth, much philosophy, incljdlng philasophy of religion, seems to
operate within rather narrow disciplinary boundaries- Our belief that
the most important tasks confronting humanity arc not well dealt with
Ln that way tends to make the discussion with philosophers less urgent
than some other conversations. Of course, there arc many exceptions.
Fifths the discussion with philosophers that ivould be most helpful
to us would be about the points at w^hlch our brancii ot thought breaks
av^^ay from the Euro-American mainstream. In this paper 1 have
touched on that btielly with regard to the issue of causality. If other
philosophers are willing critically to evaluate the Wlitteheadian idea of
physical feelings^ we will certainly benefit from their help. But our
experience has been that when we point out the Humean or Kantian
assumptions underlying the way problems are formulated in much of
recent philosophy and propose that there are better assumptions, our

2^52 Pfiih.wphy ofRi'lii^ou m tta^ 21%t Century

contribution is rarely appreciated. On the whole, process thinkers have
dealt more scriousty with philosophers of other schools than Lhey have
dealt with us.

The criticism that Is most valuable to us is criticism of basic assuni-
tions. For this reason the most challenging cnticlsm that has developed
in recent decade? has been directed to our social location as process
thinkers. This social location has been chicfiv in the North American
university and oldlinc (read middlc-classl church. Most process
tliinkcrs have been males of European descent. In other words, most
process thought has taken place within the establishment. Further-
moTCj the effects of this location can be seen in the issues that we have
taken up and the way A-ve have dealt with them.

This kind of criticism can be simply relativizing and disempowerin^.
But it need not be IhaL White, male process thinkers can ask, and to
some extent have asked, whether process thought as such contributed
to their preoccupation with issues posed by the domitiant society or
whether ttits was the consequence of our general socialization into uni-
vcrsity and church- The answer seems to t>c mixed. On the one hand^
abstract philosophical questioning and even theological doubts are
niueh more lil^cly to take place among the privileged than among those
{hey oppress. That means that raising cosniological and metaphysical
questions at all does express the privileged social location of most
process thinkers. But ttiat social location is not responsible for the way
those questions are answ^ered. Indeed, process thinking has more ten-
denc}' to destabilize the establishment chan simply to supply justifica-
tion for it.

Furthermore^ some of the earliest stirrings of contemporary feminism
made use of process categories. Although most process thinkers are still
malCn the ideas tend to cut against stereotj'pically masculine habits of
mind and to be much more supportive of feminism. The social loca-
tion of process thought no doubt blinded most of its advocates to this
tendency^ but as we became aware of these issues^ most of us have been
supportive of the femtntst movement if not participants therein.

The initial cncounlci; with Black and liberation ihcoiogians was less
friendly. The suspicions based on our social location were justified, hut
the content of our affirmations was more supportive of their positions
than they realized- As we became clearer about the implications of our
own ideas and as llbcrationists realized that wc were supportive^
alliances have to some extent replaced opposition. Fortunately for us^
from an early date a few Blacks and liberationists saw the potential of
process thinking to contribute to their ends.

jofu} B. Cohk Ir 26^

AlihouEh Interactians with feminist and libcrationist movements
and examination of social location are not identical with wliat would
be entailed In engagement with critical theory, I describe it because it is
the closest we have come on any large scale to such engagement. This
interaction has accounted, I think, for more significant changes in
process thouglit than any otli(^r, with tite possible exception of ciivi-
ronmentalism. Together these have contributed both to emphasizing
engagement witli real issues in the world and to the approach to that
engagement. Many of us feel that in these moves we are realizing more
fully what is practically involved in our Iheoretical coinmilmcnls.

Our engagement with deceit structive postmodernism has been much
less. The pervasive importance of that movement in religious studies
programmes and in the American Academy of Religion have made it
impossible to Ignore. The use of deconslrucive melhods by feminists
and liberationists has also drawn attention to it. So most process
thinkers wMlh religious inictests have paid some attention to it.

Furthermore, there are many feature? of deconstruction that are con-
^eniah Much of what is deconstructed in ihe tradition is wliat process
thinkers also have been trying to deconstruct with less success. This
applies^ for example, to the idea of an underlying or subslaiiUal self
discussed above.

Nevertheless, there are deep differences. Deconstruct ive poslmod-
emism carries forward the Kantian trajectory against every form of
objectivity or realism- The natural world seems to exist only as it is
constructed by various humans. The process view ;hat consciousness in
general and human experience as a whole arise out of natural processes
seems virtually unfoimulatalc hi deconstructive Lernis. Furtlierniore,
tlie process project of coherent and unifying thinking is systematically
rejected both as illusory and oppressive, and Whitehead's deconstruct
tion of ordinary sensory experience into its two modes is ignored.

David Griffin has been the process thinker who has engaged this
form of postmodernism most vigorously. He has argued that by carry-
ing forward to its consistent conclusions the late modern project of
limiting reason and denying the i intelligibility of the world, it deserves
the name most-modern rather than truly postmodern. He has pro-
posed an alternative constructive postmodernism which deconsttucts
tlie basic metaphysics of both early and late modernity and proposes a
processivc alternative. The most sustained engagement of process
thinkers with the issues of postmodernism is in Vaneties of Postmodern
Theology, by David Ray Griffin^ William A. Beardslee and joe Holland
(Albany: SUXY Press, 19891-

2*4 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

Wittgenstein's Influence in the Anglo-Anicfkan phitosophicat scene in
Ihc past half-cciilLir^'^ has been so Gxtcnsivc ihat It would be impossible
not to engage it in some measure. Some process philosophers, such as
George Lucas, have tried to present process ideas In such a way Ehal they
coutd be understood and even appreciated inside the dominant discus-
sion. Others have complained abouL the linguistic turn which tends to
erect the implicit metaphysics of the Enghsh language into the ultimate
arbiler. Still others have complained that the notion of ianguage games
can be so interpreted as to provide a space for fLdelsm, But I am not
aware of an extciided study of Wittgenstein himself by a process
thinker^ svith the possible exception of Nicholas Gier

The most promising development in the dlalog^ue with Wittgen-
steinians is the serious and friendly work of Nicholas Reseller^ Process
Mi'tiiphysics. This recent effort by a participant in the philosophical
mainstream to understand and assess process thought opens the door
to a kind of interaction that has been difficult in the past. The 'Special
Focus on Analytic Philosophy' In a recent issue of Process Studies
(VoL XXV) is atso promising. Whether these developments can open
doors to worthirvhile interaction with WLltgenstemtan philosophers of
religion remains to be seen.

A good portion of the discussion of objections to process philosophy
of religion in Part I dealt with classical philosophical theism. Charles
Hartsliorne devoted extensive attention to the critique of that theism,
and over the years theie has been considerable response. I noted that
process thinkers such as he may be faulted for treating; this tradition as
monolithic and falling to consider adequately the nuances and changes
that take place tlirough time- This failure applies to some extent to
response to more recent philosophers of leligion who continue the clas-
sical tradition of philosophical theism but often with different accents
and ar;^umcnts. NeverthclesSj from the perspective of process thought,
as long as they affirm such key doctrines as divine immutability and
omnipotence, the arguments tliat have long been trademarks of the
process tradition are relevant.

Reformed Epistenioloj^, at least in the person of Alvin Plantinga, is a
contemporary exponent of classical theism. David Griffin gave consrd-
ciablc attention to Plantinga's formulations in his work on the problem
of evlL Griffin is currently dealln;^ sympathetically with Plantinga's
claims that science should free Itself from its bondage to a materialistic
worldvicw and open Itself to the h^^'pothesis of God's activity in the
world. As a process thinkerj howcverj he objects to viewing this activity

JohnR.CohkJr 265

as external disruptton, and he proposes viewing it as involvement in
each of the evenly thai make up the history of the world.

Process theology shares with Reformed Eplstemology the desire for a
coherent worldvicw that can be affirmed by Christians- It shades in the
denial that the now dominant worldview in science is required for the
advancement of science and in arguinj^ for irs reform. It shares in belief
that the ChTistian perspective can play a role in proposing ways in
which that reform can and should take place. But from the process per-
spective^ Reformed Epistemology's claim that its revelatoiy starting
point suffices for justifying its proposals^ as long as they cannot be dis-
proved, is not justified by the fact that all thinking begins with some
presijpposilions. For process thought, all proposals arise from prcsup-
positionSj l>ut each must be justified on its merits in the arena of public
discourse.

Process Thought - a Response
to John B. Cobb,Jr

Schubert M. Ogdefi

One of the merits of John Cobb^s chapter is his deft and Fair-minded
dcHinitation of what^ for his puEposes^ is to be understood by process
thought'- Accepting his delimitation, which 1 have no trouble doings
I would have to say that^ if I am a 'process thinkci' at all, I belong \d
the same group of such thinkers to which he identifies himself as
belonging, that is^ those who associate themsch'es with the thought of
Alfred North VVliitehead and Charles Hartshornc in their concern with
cosmology and metaphysics; wlio have a particuiar interest in teligion^
and thus in philosophv^ of religion and philosophical tlicolo^; and
who pursue this inlercst^ not as professional philosopliei s^ but because
of their ealting as Christian theologians. It will hardly seem strange^
then, if I also confess to sharing, to a considerable extent, the same
point of \lew that Cobb represents in his chaptcr.

Specifically, I view the place of process tlioughl on the twcntietli-
ccntury intellectual scene In very much the same way; and I, too, would
say that tlie usual objections to it are explained by its clear-cut differ-
ences, formal or material, from other modes of thought in Imth philo3=
ophy and theology^ tliat continue to be or liave become more widely
influential. Formally, its theory and praxis of philosophy in a more
classical sense as comprehensive critical reflection on human existence
as suchj and thus as perforce having a critico-constructive fuiiction
centrally involving metaphysics and etliics, put it decidedly at odds
with all understandings of philosophy as having only the one function
of analysis, as well as witli other pliilosophics thai arc anti-, non-^ or
only semi-metaphysical. Materially, its insistence that process is the
hiclusive category and that God is to be treated^ not as an exception to

266

Schuhert M. O^ien 267

metaphysical prmciptcs, but as Lhcir 'chief cxEmplification' sots it no
less sharply over agEkinsL Ehe classic^il and, in many ways^ still domi-
nant traditions in both tnctaphysLcs and theology.

But if I agree with Cobh^s account of the place of process thoijl^t
and of the usual objections to it, I also accept his distinction between
the two le^'cls at Vhlilch it is usually criticized and his differentiated
assessment of the extent to which process thinkers have adequately
responded to the criticisms. J, too, would say that the defence we have
made of what he calls ^tbe whole revisionist project^ more or less effec-
tively meets the usual objections to it^ while our responses to criticisms
of our neoclassical metapliyslcs and philosophical theology can very def-
initely be improved upon. One of the reasons for this, cei'lalnly, is just
tlie reason he gives - that we can and should be more attentive than we
have sometimes been to other revisions of classical metaphysics and
philosophical ihtoiogy thatp while scarcely neoclassical, arc not otm-
ouiily open to the same objections that have l>ccome the stock in trade
of our polemic against more traditional kinds of thought. And ! can say
this without changing my judgement that some of tlie most delil>crate
attempts, by philosophers as well as theologians, to commend some-
thing like a mediating position l^eLween classical and neoclassical types
of theism do not stand up well to careful criticism (Ogdenn 1991).

As for Cobb^s discussion of particular doctrines of process thought
that are commonly criticized and his responses to the criticisms, here,
again, there is much with which I agree. In fact, 1 feel very close to him
in his frank admissions that there arc assurances associated with tradi-
tional doctrines of God^s omniscience and omnipotence that process
thought simply caitnot offer- But^ then^ [ also find^ as he does, that
process thought Is by no means without its own assurance-i and that,
with the possibility it opens up for at last dealing with the problem of
evilj it is as satisfying religiously or existentially as It is philosophically.

[Joyond all tiiis, 1 can also accept most of what Cobb says in the
second part of his paper, including his specific responses to the third
question about the extent to which process thought has engaged with
the other points of view represented in the conference. Although I am
not bothETtd^ as he is, by philosophies that operate within ^rather
narrow disciplinary iroundarics'^ 1 do sliarc his )udgcment that process
thinkers, on the whole, ""have dealt more seriously with philosophers of
other schools than they liave dealt with us\ Not only are critics of
process thought who have first taken the trouble to understand it
exceedingly hard to come by, but some of the philosophers who have
responded to it have stooped to outright parody and ridicule, tn my

2^58 Phihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

own worK. ccrtalnLyn the critical factor determining the nature and extent
of my engagement with olher philosophical points of view lias been my
vocation and tasks as a Christian theologian. While this has in no way
precluded entering into extensive discussion with philosophers as well as
theologians, it has definitely limited such discussion to philosophers
whose wofk has been significant for the theologians who have been
my primary Gespmchs-partncf - not all of which work, mcidentallj^^ is
represented in the conference- In any case, my own engagement with
some of the points of ^icw that arc represented - notably, critical the-
ory and Wittgenstein - has been rather more extensive than Cobb indi-
cates to have been true of process thinkers generally-

For all my agreements with Cobb^s chapter, however, there are a num-
ber of ways in which my own point of view is different; and my guess
is that we would both lud^e thai at least some of the differences are
not only real but important. Thus, if he can admit to sharing 'radical
empiricism and neo-naturalism' with the other main group of process
thinkers whose accent he describes as falling on 'the empirical, the cul-
tural, and the historicar, I would have to speak more cautiously. What
most impresses me about this group is less their radical empiricism
than their p(?i?empiricism, their evident assumption that the only
meaningful assertions, apart from those of logic and mathematics, arc
empirical or merely factual assertions. And what I understand by the real-
ity of God so radically transcends evcri^^thing in nature, taken either in its
individual parts or as the collection thereof^ that any characterization of
my understanding as 'neo-naturalism' could only lead to confusion.

It is also clear to me that^ at certain points, Cobb and I have really
different understandings of philosophy, including metaphysics and
cosmology. As much as I sliarc the general Whttehcadian \^ew of
philosopiiy as the criticism of abstractions, 1 do not understand such
criticism, as he does^ to he an alternative to accepting 'the autonomy
of the several disciplines'. To be sure^ philosophy in my view does have
a proper critico-constructivc function witli respect to all answers to the
existential question, religious and theological as well as philosophical;
and. to this extent, philosophy may be said to cover some of the same
ground as theology. But Lf this means that phjlosofjhy does indeed act
as a control on die answers of theoloE5^ as wtII as of rcHsion, it in no
way denies their proper autonomy; for the converse statement is
equally true: theology and religion aTso act as a control on philosophy's

Schubert M. O^iiet^ 269

answers to the same existential question. As for the autonomy of
science or the sciences^ I see no reason at all why philosophy should be
thought to chatlcnj^c it. Even if phlEosophy may quite properly criticize
presuppositions of the sciences tliat are philosophical rather than sci-
entific^ it is [oglcally different from tlie sciences and so may neither
control nor be con l rolled by them.

Tills means, of course, that I discern a view very different from my own
ivhcii Cobb talks about process metaphysics seeming "viable today on the
basis of the evidence of Iroth science and religious expericncCj as wcU as
intrinsic intelligibilit)^'. 1 do indeed think with Whitehead thai 'the best
rendering' of 'that ultimate^ integral experience. ..whose elucidation is
the final aim of philosophy' is 'often to be found in the utterances of reli-
gious aspiration^ (M-liitchead^ 197S: 208}. And so 1^ too, would say that
religious experience as expressed through religious utterances is very
definitely primary evidence for philosophical, and, specifically, meta-
physical and ethical reflection- But I cannot say the same for science,
even though 1 quite a^ce that the conclusions of process metaphysics,
like any metaphysics^ cannot l?c viable in the long run unless they arc
compatible with the results of scientific research.

The ex^x^rience of which I understand science to be the best renderings
at the secondary level of critical reflection and proper theory, is not the
'ultimate^ integral experience' of ourseh^es and others as parts of the
encompassing whole, which 1 distinguish as our ^x!?itent!{il experience^
but rather our empirkn! experience, by which 1 mean our derived,
external perception of ourselves and the world by means of our senscs.
Thcrc is also the difference that, whereas the assertions of science,
being properly empirical, must be at some point empirically falsifiable,
the assertions of metaphysics, and therefore of process metaphysics,
cannot be empirically falsified. In fact, strictly metaphysical assertions
cannot be factually falsified at all, because theyfortnulate the necessary
conditions of the possibility not only of human existence, but of any-
thing whatever. On my understanding, then, to suppose that process
metaphysics even could be viable on the basis of the evidence of sci-
ence as well as of religious expetietice is to imply another, very differ-
ent vaew of metaphysics as, after all, an empirical, or quasi -empirical,
undertaking that differs from science only or primarily In Ehc scope of
its generalizations.

I shall say mote about this difference presently. But 1 first want to
point to a couple of others that I take to be important.

The first pertains to what Cobb speaks of as ''the rejection by most
process thinkers of the notion of divine omnipotence'. Like other such

270 Pfiih.'iophy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

thinkers - including, in soinc of his more recent statements, I regret to
say, even Hartshoriic iHartshornc, 19K4) - Cobb so discusses ihis matter
as to leave the impression that the very notion of God's omnipotence is
mistaken. There are indicalionSj of course^ that what he really objects
to is not the notion of divine omnipotencCj but rather the most com-
mon way of construing this notion, or^ if you will, the most common
way of talking about God's transcendent power According to this way,
the notion of omnipotence is bound up with talk of power as coercive,
and God is said to be capable of totally controlling everything. But foi
all Cobb clearly says to the contrary, he can be fairly taken to reject not
only this particular way of talking about divine omnipotence^ but any
other way of saying that God's power over all things is tiie power^ the
power than which none greater can be conceived. The contrast at this
point witli his earlier discussion of omniscience is striking. Whereas in
that discussion he clearly explains why, from the point of view of
process thought^ "^the denial that God knows everything about the
future... is not a denial of omniscience^ there is no comparable expla-
nation in what he has to say al:*out God's power - to the effect that the
dental that God can totally control everything is just as little a denial
of omnipotence. My vicw^^ however^ is that there can and should be
just such an explanation and that process thought at its best provides
it. Instead of making it easy for critics w-ho allege that the God of
process theism is tittle more than the well-knowii Tinite God' of certain
modern philosophers and theologians, process thinkers have again and
again made clear that and why In their understanding, the power of
God, like everything else about God, can only be spoken of in such
terms as 'ideaF, 'maximarj 'unfailing", 'infallible'j 'irresistible" - in a
word, 'unsurpassable'. Thus f larlshorne, for one, having argued that 'no
teleolog)' can exclude unfortunate accidents and frustrations, for goals
have Lo be reached ihiough mutiple acts of freedom, none of which can
Jk entirely controlled, even by God/ ^ocs on to add. The point is not
that [God] cannot control them, but that they cannot be controlled, it
is not [God's] influence which has limits, but their capacity to receive
influence- Absolute control of a free being, and there can be no others,
is sclf-contradlctorj^'" (Hartshorne, 1962: 81). But, then, omnipotence is
not a mistake; the mistake is a merely verbal constmal of omnipotence
that we have the best of reasons for rejecting even while holding that
God's power as the alt-worshipful cannot be surpassed

The other difference is closely related in that it has to do with Cobb's
endorsement of Whitehead's view ihat "'God is an actuality or u beings
not creativity or Being Itself/ He refers in this connection to Wiitehead's

Schuhert M. Ogdm 271

wclHtnown dislinctlon bct^s^ccii creativity and God and to his character-
izations of God as 3 ""creature', albeit a unique crcalurc^ of creativity.
But, surely, tf there L^ anything unchallengcably problematic in White-
head's metaphy^tcs, U is just tliese characterizations - along with his
closely parallel statements that 'God is the ultimate limitation', and
God's existence, the ultimate irrationality' (Whiteheadn 1925: 2S7).

Aside from the evident self-contradiction of saying that God is ^thc
primordial creature', or the 'primordial, non-tcmporai accident' of cre-
ativityp there is the dcepei difficuhy that neither God nor anything else
may tae properly said to be a creature of creativltyn given Whitehead's
own use of terms. He expressly states that ^creativity^ is his term for the
ultimate spoken of somehow in all philosophical theory, and he defmes
it as referring to 'the universal of universals characterizing^ ultimate mat-
ter of fact\ He is also careful to explain that tlie creaiivicy thus referred
to Is ^actua( in virtue of its accidents ... . and apart from these accidents
i^ devoid of actuality'. But, then, according to 'the general Aristotelian
principle\ or his own 'ontological principle', If there is no actual
entity, there is no reason, because 'agency belongs exclusively to actual
oecastons'p and ^apart from things that are actual, there is nothing -
nothing either in fact or in efficacy' fl978: ^l, 7, 21, 40, 18K In other
words, because 'creativity' refers to nothing actual, but only to the
utmost of abstractions, it may not be properly said to create anything,
nor may anything, God inckided, Ix^ properly said to he it^ creature.
Thus, even given the distinction betVhTcn creativity and God, the only
creators allowed for tn a consistently Whiteheadtan metaphysics are
God and those v^lto, in a unique sense, may be said to be God^^ crea-
tures, but not the creatures of creati^^ty.

But quite apart from this clear implication of WhUMi^fd's own meta-
physical principles, Hartshorne has long since given good reasons for
saj^ng that God is and tnust be not only a being, but also Uein^ Itself, or,
as he usually puts it, Troccss hsclf^ or even ^Creativity Itself. On this
point, 1 fear, Cobb is simply wrong; for flartshorne not only accepts the
distinction in question - repeatedly, in his many exchanges with Paul
Tillieh - but also insists on it as necessary to his own understanding of
God as ^the universal individual'. Tiod must, in spite of all difficulties^
he says, ""be a case under rules, he must l>c an ii~Ldividual iKing. riowevcr,
he must not be a mere, even the greatest, individual being; rather^ he
must also in some fashion coincide with heing or reality as such or in
general.... [God's] uniqueness must consist precisely in being both
reality as such and an individual reality, insofar comparable to other
in divi duals' (Hartshorne, 1967:34 fj.

272 Pfiih.^ophy ofRi'lii^mr m ttn! 21%i Century

Of course, Hartshonic's admission Lhal God qim an individual is
insofar comparable to other individuals confirms Cobb^s claim that, for
hinij too, metaphysical principles apply to God as well as to creatures,
liut it is misleading to say^ as Cobb docs, thai Hartshornc takes them \o
apply 'alike' to God and to creatures; /or nothing is more important lo
his ncoclasical Ihtism - or, I may add^ my own - than to insist that the
difference between God and any creature is itself a catcgorial, or, as
1 say, a iranscendcntaln diffcicncc. This means that God cannot be just
an exemplification^ but can only be - In tlic most exact sense of the
woids - the djjt^' exemplification, of metaphysical principles, the dif-
ference between their meaning In this application and in every other
being not merely a finite^ but an infinite difference-

How effective insistin;^ on this is likely to be in meeting the objection
that ""process theism treats God too much like a creature' may obviotjsly
be questioned. But 1 see no reason to question either the difference or
the importance of the difference between this ivay of responding to the
ob|ection and Cobb's.

Another more fundamental difference 1, at least, judge to t>c more Impor-
tant, hi this case, how'evcr, it is a difference iiot only from Cobb's point
of ^iew, but also from that of most, although not all, process thinkers^ in
the delimited sense in which I^ too^ am using the term. It is because of
this difference, indeed, that I signalled at the outset that whether i am a
process thinker even in this sense is not a closed question, liut l>e this as
it mayn the difference to which I refer pertains to yet anolher respect
ii^ which Cohh's view of meiaphysics clearly seems to be other than
mv own.

For all he says to indicate olherwise, he fully shares the same panpsy-
chlst, or, as Hartshomc prefers to say, psych icalist, metaphysics that cer-
tainly appears to be implied by Whitehead's doctrine of prehensions.
1 put it this way because some of Whitehead's formulations may be
thought free of this ImpllcatLon - as vslien he says, for example^ The way
in which one actLial entity is qualified by other actual entities Is the
"experience" of the actual world enjoyed by that actual entit};, as subfect'
(1978: 16th). On the other hand. Whitehead asserts unequivocally tiiat
'the key nolion' from which construction of a metaph)-'sical cosmology
should start is that 'the energetic activity considered in physics is the
emotional intensity entertained in life^ (1938: 231 f.); and most ol his
other fonnulations as well take 'experience' to be the expikuns, not the

Schuhert M. Ogden 27}!

exptk^f^ihtm, and may therefore be reasonably taken to assert or imply
the same psych i call sm. In any casCn Harlshome's espousal of this kind
of catc^orlal metaphysics is notorious, and, so far as 1 can sec, Cobb is
like most other process thinkers in following him in this. This means
that, as I understand it, Cotabs vIcvk^ also^ is that not only Godn but
anything else that is actual and comparably "singular, as distinct from a
TTicre a^grcgatc^ Ls, in its own content or quality in itself, some form or
other of experience.

Of course, what Ls meant by 'experience' here is not specifically human
experience, or even animal experience more generally, buL experience in
the completely penerahzed sense that Hartshorne calls ^exjx^ricncc as
such'- In other words^ the category 'experience"" so used is supposed to
function neither literally nor merely symbolically or metaphoricaUyH
but anuh^icaUy, In tJiat it Is held to apply to all the different things to
which it is applicable even within the same logical or ontologLcal type,
not in the same sense, but in different senses. This is why there can be
said to be many different forms of experience, ranging all the way from
that of the least actuality that can be conceived to that of the grcatLst -
to the experience of God.

But it is just this supposedly analogical use of 'experience', which is
required by the psychicalist metaphysics of most process thought,
including Cobb^s, that I find unaccepLable. I^or reasons that I have
developed at length elsc^^here, it is impossible to distinguish other than
verbally between a so-called analogical use of 'experience^ and other
psychical tcrmSn on the one hand, and their use merely as symbols or
metaphors, on the other (Ogden, 1984). At the same time, the meaning
of these terms when supposedly used as metaphysical 'analogies' can be
really distinguislied from the other purely formal, literal concepts that
they necessarily presuppose only by tacitly committing the pathetic
fallacy of treating a merely local variable as cosmic or universal,

Thus, to taltc Whitehead's point in the sentence quoted, one actual
entity may be said to experience another if, and only It^ it is somehow^
qualified by, and therefore Internally related to^ the other actual cntity.
In this way, the purely formal, liLeral concept ol" one actual entity's
being internally related to another is necessarily presupposed by the
meaning of one actual entiLy's experiencing another on any use of
'experience^ including its supposed analogical U5e. The difficulty with
aiiy analogical use^ however^ is that saying, as psychicalisls do, that all
actual entities 'experience' others then cither becorhes empty, saying ho
more than that all actual entities are intcfnally related to othcrSn c^r else
can he taken to say more than this only by tacitly taking 'experience' in

274 Phih.'iophy of Ri'lii^f^ir m tta^ 21%i Century

some other, less fully generalized sense, Ihercby committing the fallacy
in question.

My conclusion from this reasoning Is thai the assumption of most
process thinkers that there is a third, 'analogical use of psychicalist
terms that is just as proper as their literal and symbolic uses is mistaken.
But, then, since just such an analogicat use of somi' categoriai icrms,
physicallst if not psychicalfst^ is evidently essential to any cate^crial
metaphysics, 1 also conclude that no acceplablc metaphysics can be
catcgorial^ but must be strictly transccndentaL

This is not the place, obviously, lo explain adequately all that is
involved in this distinction. Suffice it to say that, whereas a catcgorial
metaphysics such as psychicatism or physicalism proceeds speculaLivclyr
b^^ generalizing the meaning of certain terms until they supposedly
l}ccome metaphysical analogies, a transcendental metaphysics dispenses
with such analogies and proceeds strictly analytically by analyzing the
ineaning of all terms with a \iew to explicating their necessari^^ presup-
positions, the unconditionally necessary among which it distingiilsties
as properly 'iransccndcntals'. Thus if the method of a catcgorial meta-
physics is satd to be, in Whitehead's phrase, 'imaginative gcneralization^n
the method of a transcendental metaphysics can be said to be 'presup-
posltional analysis', or, taking such transcei:tdentals into account, ■"tran-
scendental deduction' i^cf. Nygrenh

In any case, the concepts and principles that a strictly transcendental
metaphysics seeks to explicate arc purely formal, and so the terms for-
mulating them are used literally ratlier than symbolically- This means
that, within any of the different logical or ontological tjpcs in which
they are applicable, they arc always applied in the same sense, net in dif-
feretit senses. Thus, when 1 say, in the terms of my neoclassical trariscen-
dental metaphysics, that God is the universal individual, this is to be
understood quite literally, as ineaning both that God is literally an indi-
vidualn and thus a centre of interaction with itself and other individuals
and events^ ami thai God is literally universal, and so tiie individual, the
one centre whose field of interaction with self and others is unre-
Stricted and which, therefore, is just as Literally reality as such.

That I say God is literally an individual, however, does not imply that
I would call God literally 'a person'. A person must indeed he literally
an individual because being a centre of interaction with self and others
is a necessary condition of the possibility of being a person, not only
literally but even symbolically. But the converse does not hold - not
even, consistently, for psychicalists, who concede wlien pressed that
'person', Ix-in^ by its very meaning a local variable, cannot be predicated

Scbuhert M. Ogden 27S

of God cithci literally or analogically, but only symbolically or meta-
phorically. Unfofluiialclyn ihis concession docs not keep psychicalists
from reverting to their usual habits and continuing to use 'person' and
Avhat Cobb calls 'pcrsonalistiCn Biblical imaf;cs of God' generally as
though they could be something more than symbols or mctaphors.
Their justUicallon for this, presumably, is that thought and speech
about persons^ being based primarily In our original, existential experi-
ence of ourselves, others, and the whole, may indeed be held to provide
more fundamental concepts and terms for thinking and talking about
the whole than language based In out derived, empirical experience of
ourselves and the world around us. Nevertheless^ once a distinctively
analogical use of personalistic language is tuletl out as groundless and
improper^ the only other possibility is to say candidly that God is not
literally, but only symbotically or metaphorically a person.

The virtue of a iwocla^Jiic^t transcendental metaphysics, however, is
that it does not undercut, but raihct fully supports saying this, so that
'offiy symbolically or metaphorically' need not have the disparaging
implication that Paul Tillich, for one, so vigorously resisted. Because in
the terms of such a metaphysics God can be Utcrally said to be the uni-
vcrsaJ ii:idi^adual that not only unsurpassahly acts on all others as well
as itselfp but is also unsurpassahly acted on by them, any talk of God as
a person who loves and knows self and others, and so on is symboli-
cally or metapliorically apt - as it cannot be given other metaphysical
terms in w^hich God maybe lileraily said to act on all others, but is just
as ]iterally said or implied uot to be acted on by them.

But if symbolic or metaphorical talk about God as personal is fully
supported by my Iransccndental neoclassical theism, it is in no ivay
required by it. Consequently, if using 'God' in a proper iheislic sense is
deemed to require stich personalistic talk, then iny designation of the
tinivcrsal individjal integral to an adequate transcendental tnetaphysics
as 'God'' is not properly theistk. In any events taking all talk about God
as personal to be only symbolic or metaphorical obviates Cobb's
recourse to distinguishing ^tivo '""ultimatcs'"'' as tlie way to take full
account of nonthcistic as ^cll as theistlc religious ways of thinking and
speaking about strictly ultimate reality What T understand Mahayaha
Buddhists to refer to in distinguishing 'dlmrmijkiiya-iu^jiudme:^^' or, for
that matter, Mei^tcr Eckhart, in distinguishing 'deita^\ is not the mere
abstraction that crcatEvity' can alone properly refer to^ but something
eminently concrete and actual - the one strictly universal individual
that is at once the fathomless mystery and the ground of all rationality
and that, as such, is the primal source and the final end of all things.

276 Phih.'iGplTy ofRi'lightu m the 21it Century

I should add, to obviate a possible misunderstanding that, on my
analysis^ the main function of religious s^mibols or mclaphors is in any
case not metaphysical but cxistcntlaL Although religious utterances
perforce have mclapliysLcal presuppositions and impMcaEionsH but for
the truth of which they could not themselves he true^ they are properly
concerned with communicating the meaning of ultimate reality for us,
as distinct from describing even symbolically or mctaphorical]y the
structure of ultimate reality in itself. Accordingly, beyond claiming to
be authorized, finally^ by ultimate reality itself^ ihcy mainly function to
express and commend a certain way of understanding ourselves and
leading our lives as parts of that reality.

As lor the most serious objections to my view, I see two. The first is the
objection also made to Hartshorne's metaphysics that to assume^ as I do^
that among the necessaiy presuppositions of our self-ui:iderstanding and
life-praiis generally are certain unconditionally necessary ones that, as
such, imply existence is to confuse necessity lie iikto with necessity
de r?. But so far as I am able to judge, Hartshome's theory of 'objcctivo
niodality'j according to which incxlal distinctions on the logical level
correlate with temporal distinctions on the onlological level, effectively
meets this objection- After all, confusion is one thing, correlation, some-
thing else. And wliat metaphysics in my sense as well as liis assumes is
not that logical necessity simply is ontological, but only that the two are
correlative - necessary existence being what is common Lo all possibili-
ties even as necessary propositions asserlLng sucli existence are implied
by any proposition.

The other objection is the one Hartshorne himself makes to my rejec-
tion of psychicalism and the theism that is of a piece with it- To his
mind, this rejection forces one either lo accept some other much less
tenable metaphysics, that is, physicalism or dualism, or else to acquiesce
in metaphysical agnosticism. Out what I reject, of course, is not simply
psj^hicalism, but physicalism and dualism as well^ as equally unaccept-
able insofar as they, too, are categorial rather than strictly tratiscenden-
taL And so far as having to settle for agnosticism is concerned, my
response is twofold- To know only that x must be Internally related to y
is indeed not to know that x must somehow experience y. But it Is cer-
tainly not to know nothing about Jt, and so 'agnosticism' It clearly is not.
On the contrary, if 1 am right that any so-called analogical knowing is
not really knowing at all, then Hartshornc's mctapliysics, for all its
claims to know more than mine, must be equally ^agnostic'. Moreover,
if the proper concern of metaphysics, like science, is with the structure
of things, and in the case of metaphysics, their necessary structure, then

Schubert M. O^iiei? 277

it has every reason to abstract from, and in thai sense to be agnostic
aboatn not only their meaning for us, but also tiieir own content or
quality in Micmsclvcs.

Tlierc is one olhcr iinportanl difference between Cobb's point of view
and mine that has to do with the philosophy of philosophy of religion,
or^ if you will, prolegomena Eo iL, It is as clear from whal he does not say
as from what lie says that philosophy of religion, in his view, consists
primarily^ if not entirely, In the crltlco-con struct! ve task of formulating
some kind of a rettjjious, not to say thelstic, cosmology or metaphysics-
In my view, by conirasi, philosophy of religion, properly so-called, cither
also has or entirety consists in another purely analytic task - th{^ task,
namely, of critically interpreting the raeaniitg of religion, or of self-
undcrstandinj? and life-praxis as explicitly mediated by religion, in the
distinctive way in which philosophy generally critically Interprets the
different forms of cuiture and Itfc-praxis.

That way^ as 1 understand it^ is not simply to interpret the 'surface
meaning' of particular expressions, as the other humanities, in tlieir var-
ious ways, may be said to do^ but to analyze the 'deep structure^ or the
'depth grammar', of all the different femrfs of meaning, so as thereby to
disclose iheir 'tacit presuppositions' and to map their 'logical f^onlLers^
That the impulse behind such analysis, as John Passmorc insists^ is'meta-
physical not linguistic' 1 take to be perfectly clear (Passmore: 78li_ But
metaphysics is one thing, philosopiiy something else. And as certain as
I am that pliilosophy docs indeed have the critico-conslructive task
tl:tat Cobb assigns to philosopiiy of religion, and that carrying out this
task centrally involves doing metaphysics as well as ethics, I would
rather distinguish this by speaking of 'philosophical theology'. I use
'philosophy of religion", then, to refer lo what cither includes or, In the
strict sense in which 1 prefer to use the term, simply consists in philos-
ophy's other essential task of analyzing the religious kind of meaning.

The issue here, obviously, is not how we are to use certain terms. The
issue is whether wc arc somehow to recognize the importance, if not,
indeed, the primacy of this other analytic task in our discussion of
'philosophy of jpjSigion 2(HJ0\ As soon as we do reco^ize it, however,
we realize Ehat tliere arc some other and rather different things to be
said from the point of view of process thought from anything Cobb
has to say in his chapter.

278 Pfiihsnphy ofRi'lii^mr m tia^ 21%i Century

Of course, there can hardly be siich a thing as a distinctively ^process'
way of aiiaiyzing tlic kind of mcaciing expressed by religious life and
language. In direct proportion to its adequacy, any saeh analysis by a
process thinker would need to agree in all essentials with any other
adequate analyses by philosophers' working out of more or less different
points of view. Even so, process ihinkers have devoted considerable tinif^
and energy directly to the philosophical analysis of religious meanings
and some of their contributions arc^ in my judgemenl^ very much
ivorth taking into account.

Thus, for example, the South African thinker, Martin Prozeskyp
although a philosopher rather than a Christian theologian, has interests
in process cosmology and nielaphysics as well as in religion, comparable
to Cobb's or my own. But most of his work^ as represented by bis book^
Rd{^k}f} ivid Uitimnte WeU-Seins^ an EApkJtuitoiy Theory, is concerned
with analyzing Ihe meaning of religion and, as the subtitle indicates, is
particularly directed toward idenl:if)rlng the factors^ cosmological as
well as anthropological, necessary to explaining religion as a form of
life and cullurc (Prozcsky, 1984; 19S6».

Or^ again, I think especially of the work of VVilliani A. Christian, who
is also, in his way something of a process thinker^ as is clear already
from his early book on Whitehead's metaph)^ics ^Christian, 1959>.
Most of his thinking and WTiting^ however^ are concerned precisely with
what he callSj in the title of probably his best known book, 'meaning
and truth in religion' (1964). In this book and in the iwo others that
followed it, Oppa^ithfi:^ of Retigious Dcctrines {1972) and Doctrines of
Reiigiou.% Cofmmmities U^H7), Christian contributes significantly to the
purely analytic task of the philosophy of ireltj^ion- Indeed, in my own
experience and reading, his clarification of the structure of religious
inquiry and of the logic of religtous ar^ment remains unsurpassed.

iJjl still more impressive, in my judgment, is Lhe contribution that
Hartshornchas made to this others purely analytic task. At the heart of
his account of religious utterances is the recognition that they are, in
mv sense of the term, 'existentiar, and so at once clearlv different from
Strictly metaphysical assertions and closely related to them. They are
different from such assertions because, arising out of personal encounter
with 'my God^H as he likes to say, as distinct from God as such, they
either are or imply broadly factual assertions that are factually, even if
not empirically, t'alsifiable. At the same timen they arc related lo strictly
metaphorical assertions because they also imply assertions about God
as such that eaamot he falsified either factually or empirically. By then
elucidating the logical connections between these strictly metaphorical

Schubert M. O^dei? 279

assertions about God and other intuitively less problematic ones, such as
^Something exists^ Hartshornc dircctl)' challenges the most fundamental
assumption made by all parties to the debate on 'theology and falsifica-
tLon' - thatn apart from the tautologies of logic and mathematics^ the
only meaiiingful assertions arc factual assertions that can be factually,
[f not empirically, falsified But more than that, he also defines a clear
alternative to other so-called functional analyses that purport to show
the meaningfulness of religious utterances without clarif)^ng how, if at
alln their claim to truth is to be critically validated (Ogden, 1977).

These few examples will have to do to make my final point. If I am
right, they show clearly enough that process thinkers as a group^ far
from having only one string to their bow, have, in their ways^ con-
tributed tc both of the tasks of the philosophical study of religion
200tX

Bibliography

Chrislianr W.A_ ^1959] .4ia Interpretnlion of Whitehead's Metaphysics, rs'ew H^ven:

\a!c University Press.

(19&4) Metiniug ami D'ltth m Rt^U^ion^ Princeton: PrinceTnn University Press.

(1972) Opp^fsitions of Retlgious DGClmies: a Stiuiy w tije Logic of DLilo^ite

among Reiigioiii, New York: Herder and Herder.

(19B7) Doct^'iu^s ofReSl^iou^ ConfWiuiitii^s: a PhilGsophiciiI Stu^iy, New Haven:

7ale University Press.
Hartshorner C. U9623 'The Modem World and a Modern View of God'j The

Cnme Review, 4^ 2- 73-35.

11967) A Nntiiml Hieoh^fbr Our TJme, LaSalle, IL! Open Court.

(19B4) Ofjifhpot(^nce trnd Other Th^vfopcal Mii:Likes, Albany^ State University

of New Yoik Pies:*.
Nygren^ A_ U572) Meaning and Kii'thod; ProiL'gomeua to a Scientific Philosophy of

Rt'h^^io^? ami it Scte^ttsfic Thi^(A\^; trans. Philip S_ Watson. Philadelphia: Fortress

Press-
Ogden, S.M. fL977; 'Linguistic Analj^sis and Theolog>-^ Th^^olopacht^ Zeitschnfi,

(1934) 'The Experience of God^ Critical Reflections on Hartshome's Theory

of AniiEogy", in Exhtasc^ ami Actuniity: ConveFstitioiis wid} C^htirles Hmtshtm^Cf
eds j.B. Cohbj JL and i\h Gamwell, Qircago: University of Chicago Press^
16-42.
i:l991J 'MuKt God Be Really Related to Creatures?', Profe's'i Studies^ 20, l:

S4-6.
Pa^smorCr JoLiii (1961J Ffsiiosophicai Rta.itmf}i}^. London: GeraEd Duckworth & Co,
Pfozesky^ Martin (,1984) Ri'hgsQff ami Ultimate Weil-B^in,g: an Exphviatory Theory,

New Yorki SJ, MarEJn's Press.

2S0 Pfiih.wphy ofRi'lii^mr m tta^ 21%i Century

Prozesky, Maitin (1986) 'Philosophical Cosmology and Anthropology in the

Explanation of Rtrligion', Theori*?, 66: 29-39-
Whitehead, Alfred North (192-5) Scie^ict? and the Miytiem Worid, N€w York:

Macmillan Co.

(19.^S> Modci GfTfitw^^it, New York" Macmillan Co.

Il978f Prt}c^ss in Rcaiity: ^in Es.^ify in Co^niotogy, ed_ D,R. Griffin and

D.W_ Sherburne, New York: Tree Press,

Philosophical Theology at
the End of the Century

Wiiiiam /. Wainwright

Many writers have commented on the Ecvlval of philosophical Lheolog^^
that began in analytic circles in the 1960s. Those of us who received our
training in the 50s were reacting lo lwo things. Firsi, our predecessors""
preoccupation with the question of religious discourse's meanlnRfulness.
While not necessarily disagreeing ^vith Uasil MilchelFs^ say, or John
Hick's responses to Antony Flew's charge of 'death by a thousand qualifi-
cations', most of us lost interest in the debate- Second, a conviction that
Hume's and Kant's vaunted critiques of natural theology didn't with-
stand careful scrutiny. On the positive side, developments in modal
logic, probabilfty theory, and so on, offered tooh for introducing a new
clarity and rigour to traditional dispuEcs. Alvin PJanlinga's work on the
ontological argument, or Richard Swinburne's use of tJayesian tech-
niques to formulaic his cumulative argument for God's existence^ arc
paradigmatic examples-

I have no quarrel with the main outlines of Swinburne's account of
this development. Indeed, his own work is an exemplary instance of it-
I do, however, believe it is incgniplcLe in live ways.

Swinburne doesn't comment on the renewed interest in Lhe scholas-
tics, and in se\^enteenth- and eighteenth century philosophical Ihcol-
ogy. Swinburne's and Plantinga's work has hcen less visibly affected by
this current. But Norman Kretzmann's and Eleoiiorc Stump's work on
Aquinas, Alfred Frcddoso's and Thomas Flint's discussions of Molina,
William Rowe's use of Samuel Clarke, or my own examinations of
Jonathan Edwards are examples of an Important strand in contempo-
rary analj^ic philosophy of religion. In each case, analytic techniques

22 FtsUGSf?piiy ofRiiti^kvi w the 21st Century

arc employed to recover the insights of our predecessors and apply
ihem to contemporary problems.

These historical inqiiiiies were partly motivated ]jy the discovery that
issues central lo the debales of the I9b(>s and 70s had been already exam-^
ined with a depth and sophistication sorely missing from most nine-
teenth- and eariy ti%^entieth-centur)'^ discussions of the same problems.
Two examples will suffice. By the end of tlie 60s it was clear that reports
of the death of the ontologlcal armament had been greatly exaggerated.
Charles Hartshorne and ^3orman Malcolm were suddenly not alone.
A spate of articles appeared attacking and defciTiding modal versions of
the argument. Many were quite sophisticated. Yet an examination of,
say, Henry More, would have shown that Ehc authors of these arlieles
were often reinventing the whecL For an insistence on the superiority
of modal versions of the argument and the Importance of the possibil"
ity premise (that a perfect bcin^ is logically possible)^ perfect devil
objections, and so on, are all found in More's Anthiote dgninst Atiit'ism.
More^ however, is still not widely known among analytic philosophers
of reli^on, and his most important points were independently made
by contemporary philosophers of re[i;^ion- Another example, though,
illustrates how historical studies sometimes aJvaficeii contemporary
discussions. Modern interest in the freedom-foreknowledge debate
was largely reawakened by Nelson Pike's 'Divine Omniscience and
Voluntary Action' which appeared in The Philowphlcnl Review in 196S.
Marilyn Adams proposed a solution to Pike's puzzle which she (eor-'
rectly) claimed to have found in Ockham, and Ockhamist solutions
continue to constitute one major response to the problem- Alvln
Plantlnga offered another solution which turned out to have been
anticipated by Molina. Freddoso's and Flint's refinements of ^iolinism
are another popular resolution of the dilemma. With the exception of
tlie problem of eviln no other puzzle has so dominated journal litera-
ture in the past thirty years. It is therefore instructive that sophisticated
reconstructions of Oekham and Molina^ have played an important role
In this debate.

Yet there is another and, I thiiikn equally important reason for the
renewed interest in our predecessors. A significant number of analytic
pliilosophers of religion are practising Christian or Jewish theists.
Aquinas, Oekham, Maimonides, Clarke, or Edwards are attractive models
for Uiese theists for two leasons. Firsts there is a broad similarity between
their approaches to philosophy and that of our contemporaries; precise
definitions, nice distinctions and rigorous arguments are features both
of scholasticism and of analytic philosophy of religion. But, second,

the work of these predecessors was self-consciously Jc^vish or Christian.

A coiivicllon of the truth and splendour of Judaism or ChristiatiUy
ppn^ades their work. They are thus appealing models for contGmpotary

philosophical theologians with similar commitments.

Swinburne's characterization of the Ihrust of contemporary philosophical
theology (including his own important work) is inadvertently misleading
in al least one important respect. He focuses upon its attempt Lo
defend two theses: fl) That the concept of God is coherent, and that
(2) God so defined exists, fliese two concerns arc, indeed, tlic thrust of
Swinburne's own early work, and dominated discussion in the first
fifteen or so years of the period we are examining. Xor has interest in
these theses died out, or the last important word been said- (Recent
work on the evidential problem of evil by Rowe, Paul Draper, William
Alston, Peter Van inwagenn and Swinburne himself are examples. 1 It is
nonetheless true that the interests of philosophical theologians have
broadened in a number of interrelated ways.

In the first place, the array of topics is much wider than an uninfomied
reader of Swinburne^s paper might infer. Since the 1980s Christian philo-
sophical theologians have turned their atteniion to such specifically
Christian doctrines as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement-
The essays collected in i-liHosophy nixd the Chmthm Faith are one
example-^ Swinburne's ovvu w^ork on the Ttinity and the Atonement is
anotlicr.

Tn the second place, many of these philosophers wish to do more
than defend the colicrence and rational plausibtlity of the doctrines in
question. They are interested in their hcarinj; on problems internal to
tlie traditions tliat include them. Tlius^ Marilyn Adams has argued that
Christian philosophers should explore the implications of Christian
martyrdom and Chrisfs passion for the problem of eviL in tier view^
suffering can be a means of participating In Christ, thereby providing
the sufferer with insight into, and communion with, God's own inner
life. Or consider Robert Oakes^ who contends that Isaac Lucia's doctrine
of God's tzimzum (withdrawal) casts light on the existence of evil:^

Finally, a number of these philosophical theologians arc convinced
that theistic doctrines can help solve problems in other areas of philos-
ophy. For example^ Del Katzch has argued that if cialural laws are
regarded as expressions of God's settled intentions with respect to the
natural world, that is, as descriptions of His hal^itual manner of actings

24 I'hUt7^f?piiy ofRiiti^kvf w the 21st Century

one can account for their 5ub|iinctivc character (Ihc fact that empirical
laws aren't mere constant conjunctions, as Hunic thought, hut support
appropriate countcrfactuals). Christopher Menzel ha-s attempted to ^how
that numbers, sets, and other mathematical objects can be interpreted as
products of God's mental acti\1ty, and that doin;^ so illuminates them.
Robert Adams and others think that a suitably nuaiiced divine com-
mand theory can do a better job of accommodating two apparently
conflicting intuitions: that moral values exist in minds, and that
morality can command our allegiance only if it expresses a deep fact
about objective rcality,

Swinburne's account of philosophical theolog>' creates the (perhaps unin-
tended) impression that lis primary role is apologetic. Thcistic proofs,
ar^mcnts for the necessity of the Atonement, and so on^ are addressed
to non-bclievcrSj or to the non-lx^liever in us tpage 2). Yet if this is their
main purpose, their value is limited, and this for two reasons.

(1) Apologetic philosophicaE theolo^^ flourished in the early modern
period. One thinks of the lioylc [ecturcs^ for example^ or of the work of
Samuel Clarke or William Paley. ]iy the end of the eighteenth century,
however, apologetic arguments had lost much of their power to per-
suade educated audiences. Those who (like Coleridge and Schleierma-
chcr) wished to commend rcliKion to its cultured despisers^ adopted
new approaches. Their repudiation of philosophical theology was no
doubt partly due to bad philosophy. (Kant's critiques of the traditional
thcistic proofs^ for instance, aren't clearly cogent.l It was also the result
oi'a Zeitgeist Khich extolled sentiment and feeling and denigrated 'mere
ratiocination'. But whatever the causes, the fact is that the arguments of
philosophical theology no longer produced widespread convicQon in
most university-educated audiences (that is. in the very people who, b^^
education and training svcre^ one would think, best qualified to evaluate
(hem). They thereby lost a large part of their effectiveness as apologetic
tools. Whether they have regained it seems doublfuL (Note tliat this is
not an argument Ehgainst employing philosophical theology as an
apologetic took Rational arguments may persuade some, strengthen
(he conviction of others^ and convince non-believers that theistic
beiief is not irrational)

(2) A second reason for thinking that philosophical theology's apolo-
gctic value is limited is that it can't produce fhith.'^ Let me approacli
this point b)' commenting on two observations of Swinburne's. He

WiUmnf. Wciimvii^hl 25

responds to the charge thaL cogent thcistic arguments would only
persuade 'a prudent person [to] try to do what is good out of self-interest'^
by asserting that the good, while probahle, isn't certain, and ^the pru-
dence of seeking such a good despite risk of failure^ is virtuous' (page 9}.
Jonathan Edwards, however, thought that prudence or enlightened self-
interest, like natural pity^ m}7 itself virluous although its absence is a
symptom of ^icc.^ Charity, or true benevolence^ is alone truly virtu-
ous.*" Or consider Pascal who believed that a eoinmllment based on
prudence alone has no intrinsic reiighus value even though it cnti lead
to action which produces genuine faith. Properly formed rctigious
beliefs are expressions of a heart transformed by God's love. Prudential
calculations may induce people to place themselves iii positions where
God will stir their affections, but they can't do more than vliis. 1 believe
that this is correct, and that what is true of prudential arguments is
also true of the apologetic arguments of philosophical theologj^. They
can break down resistance to falth^ and even produce belief^ Cut they
cani produce the theoEogica] 'Virtue of faith. Why not?

Consider a second comment of Swinburnc^s: Religion' doesn't
'require more by way of belief than 'an uncertain belief open to revi-
sion' (psg^ ^1' Notice, though, that this is at variance with both
Aquinas^s and Calvin's insistence on faith's certainty. Thus^ Cah^in saj^
tJiat Taith is not contented with a dubious and fickle opinion.... Ilie
certainty which it tequircs must be full and dccisive.^^ Aquinas is more
careful. Even though faith is certain with respect to its object or causGn
it is not fully certain with respect to its subject- Taith may accordingly
be said to be greater in one man than another either when there is
greater certainty and firmness on the part of the intellect, or whcii
there is greater readiness, devotion^ or confidence on the part of the
wLll/^ But Aquinas, too, clearly thinks that either a lack of readiness^
devotion, or confidence on the part of the will or a lack of ceitainty
and firmness on the part of the intellect are theological ^ices. Merely
probable opinion isn't sufficient.

Now, fMce Aqutnas, this certainty and firmness can't be produced by
philosophical proofs. Calvin thought that 'without the illumination of
the Spirit^ the w^ord has no effect^^^ He would say the same, I thinks of
natural theology, ^^ My pointy again, is not that philosophical theolog^^
is useless but that its vakie is limited. A probabilistic conviction that
Qod exists, has certain attributes, and has acted in certain ways, isn't
what the tradition has meant by the intellectual component of faith.
Faith involves a firm cusunmce of God's goodness and favour towards
us, and this isn't produced by philosophical thcolog)^^^

26 fhUo.wpiiy ofR^ti^w}! w the 21st Century

Thcistic arguments can tac used apologetically hut other purposes may
be more important For example, thcistic proofs are sometimes used
to settle disputes wilhtn a common tradition. Udayana's theistic argu-
ments were not onlv addressed lo fellow devotees of Siva but to
Mimamsakas in hi^ own Hindu tradition who inlerprctod the Vtdas
athcistically. Again, al-Ghazali employed a version of tlie Kalam cosmo-
logical argument to show that Averrocs' and Avicenna's interpietation
of the Quran w^as heretic aL^^

Uut philosophical thc«lo^ is also employed devottonally. Tlius,
Udayana's Nyayakusumaniali (which can be roughly translated as a
bouquet of arguments offered Lo God) has three purposes - to convince
unbelievers, to strengthen the faithfiil, biit aho to piease Siva 'by present-
ing it as an offering at his footstools Regardless of the success Udayana's
arguments may or may not have had tn achieving his first two goals^
tl:iey have value as a gift offered to God; their construction and presen-
tation is an act of worship. Nor is that fact that Ansclm's Pmsh^ofi is
east in the form of a prayer accidental. ■^'^ His inquiry is a divine-human
collaboration in wliich he continually prays for assistance, and offers
praise and thaiik5gi\ang for the Eight he receives. Anselm^s project as a
whole is framed by a desire to 'contemplate God' or 'sec God's face'-
His attempt to understand what he believes by finding reasons lor it is
simply a me^m.^ to this end.

Swinburne w^onders 'why so much cnerg}' was put into the project of
philosophical theology-' in tlie medieval west when we might suppose
that there was no more [and perhaps less] need of it than in earlier cen-
turiesV He suggests that (he answer may be that the mcdievals were
■■providing tools to deal with' the 'bit of sophisticated atheist in most
believers' (page 2). I suspect^ however^ that the answer is quite differ-
CTTil, namely, that medieval philosophical theology wasn't primarily
apologetic in intent^-"^ but was, instead, a tool for settling intramural
disputesj^^ and (most importantly) furthering the project of contem-
plation by helping the faithful understand what they formerly only
believed. The fact that philosophical theology seems to flourish best in
ages of faith suggests that that project may be its primary purpose.

The medieval project (inquiry as a means to contemplation) has
another feature that is especially prcni[nent in Augustine and Anselni-

WiUmnf. Wciimvii^ht 27

Emotional and volitional discipline are as necessary for its success as
intcllccLLial discipline. Ansclmc's inquiry^ for Inslancc, is punclualed by
prayers to arouse his emotions and stir his wiil_ And this brings me to
the tast way in which I think Swinburne's picture of contemporary
philosophical theism is incomplete- it pays insufficient attention to the
bearing on pliilosophical theology of the episleniological turn in the
analytic phiEosophy of teligion. Reformed epistcmology's defence of
the proper basicality of theislic belief isn't the whole story. Linda
Zagzebski maintains that warranted beliefs are expressions of virtues-
C. Stephen Evans and Jay Wood suggest that faith may be a necessary
condition for appreciating certain reasons for religious belief. 1 have
argued that a properly disposed heart may be needed to apprcciaLe the
force of the evidence for theistic belief. Rea.wn {ind the Heart discusses
Jonathan Edwards', John ftenry Newman's, and William James's
reasons for Ihinl^ing that U is. Pascal^ I think, had a similar view. Pascal
believed that Christianity provides the best explanation of hunianit/s
'greatness' and 'littleness^ its wretchednesSn and the ambiguity of the
tlieistlc evidence. He also thought that there arc good arguments from
traces of design, saintly lives, and the fapparcnt) occurrence of miracles
and fulfilled prophecy. This evidence is offset by instances of apparent
disorder, evil or wasted lives^ and reasons for distrusting miracle reports
and prophetic claims, and so won't convince everyone. Nevertheless, it
IS sufficient to convince those who seek God or 'have the living faith in
tlieir hcaits\'^

T will not repeat the arguments of my book here but simply note two
relevant claims. Firsl^ what James called our 'passional nature^ unavoid-
ably inflects our assessment of complieated bodies of evidence for ethical^
metaphysical, and religious propositions.^^ Since we can't escape its
influeiice, claims to have dispassionately surveyed the evidence for
propositions like these are Illusory.^'-' ^ccond^ views lit;c Edwards's or
Kewman's or James's or Pascal's may be the only effective w^ay of defus-
ing relativism, if there really are cthlcalj metaphysical^ and religious
facts, and w^c have the ability to discern them, lack of progress and per-
sistent disagreement between equally sophisticated and w-elUdlsposed
Inquirers^* is surprising. In the absence of an explanation that is con-
sistent with the objectivity of truth and the reliability of our epistemic
facuTties, relativlstic conclusions seem called for_ Views like Pascal's or
Edwaids^s provide such an explanation. If certain dispositions of the
heart are needed to reason rightly about religious matters, then deep
disagreements are likely oven if the relevant truths are objective and
our epistemic faculties are reliable when functioning as they should.

2S rhUGSf?piiy of R^ti^kvf w the 21st Century^

For some will possess the appropriaEc dispositions and others will not-

So in the absence of a better explanation, non-rclalivists have a power-
ful motive for thinking thai some theory of this type is true.

The view I have just described is bolli similar and dissiinilar to
evidcntialist projects like Swinburne's and to Reformed epistemolog)^
(or, in any case, to Ptantmga^s version of it). It is dissimilar to the first
]&ecause it denies that arguments like Swrnburne's are sufficient to per-
suade all fair-minded inquirers who have the necessary information
and intellectual equipment.-^ It is dissimilar to the second in its insis-
tence that the properly fortiicd religious bchcfs of mature adults arc
typically based on e\1dcnce (albeit of an informal ktiid).-^ My inten-
tion here^ however^ is not to defend these views but to call attention to
the fact that the epislemological investigations of contemporary ana-
lytic philosophers of celigion have a direct tjcaring on the enterprise of
philosophical theology. If they are rights an adequate account of its
persuasiveness or lack thereof must pay due heed to the heart.

Let ine conclude with the point with which I began. 1 have no quarrel
with the vast majority of what Swinburne has said. He has accurately
described the thrust of much contemporary philosophical theology,
and his own work is an exemplary instance of It. I thinks however^ that
the contemporary scene is richer than his remarks might lead the
uninitiated to believe. I have attempted to explain why.

Notes

L A5 well as of Aquinas and Jonathan Edwards.

2. Thomas V. Morris (edj, Pfuh.iopiiy ami ti}t Christian Fiilth iKotre Dame^ IN:
Univers-ity of Notre Dame Press., 19BB)_

3- 'Creation as Theodicyi a Defense of a Kabbalistic Approach to Evi(^^ FiUtli nini
PSiHa.'iophy 14 {Octobei 1997j; 31C>-2I.

4- for Swinbiinie on faith 7ic^ hlsFaitfr amiRttison [Oxford: Clarendon rress, J9SL3_

5. V3C60U5 jiassions can blind us to our true inrerests |ust as they can sometimes
St 3 fie pity.

6. Edwards more or less makes this point in Ti\i: Niitwe t^fTniL' Virtue, in PauJ
Ramsey ^ed.^J Ethictif Writings, Works of Jonathan Edwards, voi. 8 iNe^v
leaven L Yale Univeisity Press, ]9S9>, ch_ 7.

7. Or^ perhaps more accurately^ a belief that God's exisEencSj say^ or Christian
theism is nrtore likely than not.

S. Ifiitittiti:^ ofthtf Ciuistiafi R^ii^ioif {Grand Rapids: Eerdman's, 1957J, Book iii.,
"Cli. ii. no, 15.

W^sUmnf. Wciimviigtit 29

9. Sunmm Tfji^ologica, 22ae, Q. 4, A. S, and Q. 5, A. 4.

10_ Ifutitiiti^s. Book iiir ch. ii, no_ 33_

11_ And even Akjuinas'^ opinion on thts point is. more complicated than these
remarks suggest. He sa^^s^ for exampiej that miracles and other external
signs aren't sufficient to induce belief "for of those who see one and the
same miracle, or hear the same prophecy^ some will beEieve and others will
not believe. We must therefore recognize that tlicre is an inward cause
which moves a man from witliin to assent to the tilings of faith/ 'God,
who moves us inwardly by grace^. <ST ZZae^ Q- 6, a_ 1 .} Aquinas thought
that philosophical theology- was a science whose lesults ivere demonstrably
certain, Swinburne and I land, E daresay, mosE coniemporary philosophical
theologians^ think its results are oniy probable. We also recognize that
many of our epistemic peeis find our arguments unpersuasi^'e. Shouldn^t
we conclude^ then, that people's relation to the theistic e^-ldence is veiy
much like their reiation to miiaclei and ether external sagns in Aquinas's
view?

L2. See Calvinj Institi^tes, Bonk iii^ ch, ii^ nos IS-lfi. Cf_ Ai^juinas's claim that faith
i5 'an at:E of the intehect as directed lo one object by the wiU' (ST Z2aej Q. 4,
a_ 1>_ The intellect assents because the \\i]\ deems it good to do so. So
Aquinas also thinks that faith involves a response to God as one's good-
ie. The philosophers argued that the world was eternal, and that texts like Sura
10 ('Surety your Lord is God who created heavens and the earth in six days')
should hii interpreted in a way consistent with that fact. Given the Aris-
totelian framework within which the phiEosophers were working, howeveij,
eternity and necessity are coextensi^-e. So ii God eternally creates the worlds
He necessarily creates itj and hence doesn'l freely chooive it_ A Gtsd witbout
free will^ though^ isn't a personal agent and so isn't the God of theism- Tor
my lemaiks on Udayana and aUGhazali I am indebted to John Clayton,
'Retigions^ Reasons, and Gods""^ R^iif^ioits Stiuiies 23 (1987): 1-17 and Tiety
a]iiJ the Proofs', Reli^iGiis Studies 26 n99()i: 19-42.

14_ See, for esampie, Karl Earth. A}J:seh}]: Fiiies Qiuit^retvi inteiiecUmf (Richmond,
VA: John Knox Press^ 196C); and Marilyn Adams,, Traying the Proslogiim\ in
Tliomas Senor Ced_}. Ti^e Rutiofhility ^f BeHtrf and the Phiuility of Faitfi (Ithaca:
Cornel! University Press, 1995J-

I5_ Although It sometimes was, Tliomas's S^mfWa Conira Gefitiies Is partly
directed towards Muslims and Anselm's Mt^imiogiot^ is addre^ed to the
'ignorant' as well as to his fellow monks.

1 6_ Over the nature of CSod's foreknowEedge, for example, or the Atonement. Cf_
The disputes between Thomists and Ockhamists over foreknowledge, or
between Abelard and other medievaj theologians over the nature of the

Atonement-

•i

17. Fences Z4Z. For f no f:^ ^j^r FasMt, _vw' my Pf!ifo^ophyofRet[i^on, 2nded_ tBriteflont^
CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1998), ch. 6. S^ alao Daniel Clifford Fouke,
'Argument in Pascal's F^nse^s', Histor}' af Fi7sh)sopln' Quatteriy 6 (19S9|: 57-63,

1S_ And not only for these propositions. In my view, our i"?assiona3 nature
affects almost all cumuEative case reasoning.

19_ Ahhough, of course, we c^in (and shouidj eliminate obvious prejudice, be
open to new evidence and responsive to criticism, cultivate a sense of our
o^^'n falJibilitVr and so on_

30 PtsUGSf?piiy ofRiiti^w}! w the 21st Century

20. That DS-. between equally intelligent and well-informed mquirers. who are
equipped by training to deal with the relevant issues^ and who display al3
the standard intellectuaa \nrtuL='i; i:mtellectua3 honesty, openness to criticiiinn,
even-handed treatment of the retevant evidence, and so onj_

21 . Unless I misunderstand him^ Swinburne thinks that dispositions of the heail
are^ at bes^ only accidentalEy necessary to the success of the evidentiaJist
project- AcctdentaUy necessary because^ in particular cases, they may ptay a
causafc role in eliminating prejudice^ lioslaEit^r to criticism, and other stan-
dard intellectual vices. In my view^ dispositions of the heart are essential.

22. In my opinion, properly formed religious beliefs tjpicaliy rest on inchoate
arguments o( some complexity tand^ in parEicular^ on i]:iterGnces to the hest
explanationj. Usually however^ these arguments aren't carutully articulated-
The viitue of philosophical ar^ments hke Paley's or Swinburne's is to make
these more or 3ess inarticulate arguments explicit^ and to defend them
against objections. My position on this issue has a certain similarity to
Jacques Maritain's. Maritain argues that Aquinas's five ways are a 'develop-
ment and unfolding' of a natural knowledge of God which consists of an
intuition of beings and a 'prompt, spontaneous reasoning' that is "'more or
tess involved in it'_ lAppnhiches to GOif {New York: Ccllier Books, 1962J,
cli. l.i This view differs from Plantinga's, Plantinga concedes that there is
tittfe difference between himself and those who think that theistic belief is
the product of inferences from the glories of nature, the promptings of corv*
science, and so on w^htm tho^e infen^rjce^ ure 'ipontti^iemx.^^ cm?\p^!Un^ ami iiir^ct
iu the serjse of im'oivin^ few or no iiitemieitiate steps. In my view (and [ think
also Maritain's), mature religious beliefs may be (moie or less^ spontaneous
and compelhng- But they are 3ieit3ier properly basic icuf the result of sinapSe
Immediate inferences of the sort Planttnga describes. On the contrary.
A[t]iough the inferences may be implicit^ ajid ]iot fully articulate^ they
typically involve assessments of rather complex bodies of evidence.

Voices in Discussion

D.Z. PhiUlps

A: Wc need Imp^Lrtial criteria by which to assess evidence for the Iruth
of liie proposition There is a God\ This evidence needs to be spelled
out, 1 take myself to be addressing a belief held by Christians, Jews and
Muslims, Wc need religion to be rational

People conic to religious belief in various ways. Sonic conic to it
through a religious experience. Others betlevc on the authority of the
wise men in their community^ These are perfectly natural ways of com-
ing to iKlicve. But they are less available than they once were. There are
conflicting authorities and many have not liad religious experiences. In
any case^ logically prior to these is a claim that certain propositions arc
true. How is this claim to be defended by an appeal to impartial reason?
There are three ways of doing so. The first of these is the onlological
argument according to which the statement There i^ no God' is self-
contradictor};^. Since the statement Is clearly coherent this argument
makes an inipossiblc claim. Tlie second argument is froni the world to
Godj but one which claims to be deductive. Aquinas argues that from
the fact that the world has certain features, it follows, deductively^ that it
was created by God. But since it is clearly possible that the world was not
cieatcd by God, 1 cannot see that this aigumenl works either. 1 therefore
prefer a third kind of argument from the w^orld to God which is Infer-
ential in character^ but which is an inductive argument, i think it is an
argument w^hich appeals to ordinarj^ people when they are impressed
by tlie ordinary world as a marvellous place.

The effect of the evidence is cumulative. Various kinds of evidence
vaiy in strength. It is not an all-or-nothing affair. Wc VhTEll be satisfied
with a probability of more than a half.

Let me take but one example - natural laws. Why is there such a con-
formiLy? We must ask questions like: Would you expect a phenomenon

32 FhUosoptiy ofR^ti^w}! w the 21st Century

such as this if Ihcrc were tio God? [f God is all powcilul wouldn't you
expect to find order in the world? Order Is a bcEiuUful thing.

Of course, human beings have choices. They can make bombs to
destroy people, or grow phiils to nourish theniu Bui without order that
very choice makes no sense.

If there is no God you have no reason for IhinkiniT why Ihe world
is as it is. My suggestion is that when you consider ihis question then,
as in science, you should go for the simplest cjtplanation- 1 have made
use of Hayes's theorem to show that probability is on the side of the thc-
istic explanation. 1 believe this captures what ordinary people feel when
they look at the heavens and feel that this is the 'work of a personal
desij;neL

Some people have said that whereas I only offer probability, faiili
demands certainly. Such cerlainLy would Ix^ nice, but many are not so
blessed. So in practice, less than certainty is perfectly adequate. Live on
tlie assumption that iheism is true.

Others have said that what 1 do is too complicated, but all 1 am doing
is ^ving a defence of a basic faith in face of the objections of others
against it.

B: I am in substantial agreement with A. I think that evidcntialism is a
good project. Its arguments are generally persuasive and formulate, in
more precise forms, arguments w-hich ordinary believers employ So
I do not Lhink that A is w^rong, but incomplete. Let me notc# therefore^
five ways in which I diverge from A.

firsts I am sceptical about the extent to which A^s kind of argument is
efftictivc with educated audiences today. Second^ I do not think that
these arguments produce faith. As Aquinas, Cabin, Kierkegaard and oth-
crs have pointed out, certainty is a feature of faith. Jonathan Edwards and
the Puritans disLinguished between historical faith , simply believing cer-
tain propositions atout God, and faith as a gift of grace. In this respect, I
am more Augustinian and A is more Pelagian. Third, arguments were
used to settle intra-mural religious disputes. This would be a case of try-
ing to understand what is already believed. Fourth^ A does not emplia-
size^ as Edwards did, the importance of a properly disposed heart in
assessing evidence which is, admittedly, public. These arguments con-
cern antecedent probabilities which enable one to demand less evi-
dence dian one would do otherwise.

The question of how "wc make these antecedent judgements and of
how' they relate to the evidence is a complicated one, but it is not a new
issue. 1 IkIicvc it is present in Plato's 'Seventh Letter' in the emphasis

there on the Importance of character and love of justice in judgenients.
I think it Is also involved in Aristotle's accounl of moral reasoning. The
task is to extend these insights to other fields. These issues are clearly
Important In historical judgements; for example, in wiiat one thinks of
the behaviour of the Commune in Paris after tl:ie Revolution-
Fifth, a point I did not mention in my paper There is. some sign of
philosophers applying their analytic skills to non-theistic religions.
These religions offer competing examples of the facts of human experi-
ence. I believe it is incumbent on us to give the same attention lo these
large compcLing world-views.

C: May I^ at the opening of this first session, press A and B on their philo-
sophical methods? They arc both happy with philosophy of religion
having an apologetic function. They arc concerned with the truth of the
proposition There is a GckIV But there is a contemplative tradition In
phlloiopJiy which is concerned with the sense of things. Until we
know^ the sense of a proposition we do not know how to go about
assessing its truth or falsity. Bui it will be concerned with the nature of
'truth' and what disagreements look like. I have difficulty wit It the
accounts A and B have given of disagrcenienl between believers and
unbelievers. A tells us that it is a difference In the assessment of proba-
bilities. For some scientists, for example, it is probable that the law-s of
nature testify to a designer, while for others it is not- But isn't that
itself an improbable account of disagreement? Scientists, who trade in
hypotheses and probabilities, who have been trained to do so, fail to
agree about the probability of belief in God even when confronted by
the same evidence.

Now B has an explanation for this or^ at least, is attracted by one. The
faculties of unbelievers aren^E working properly. Locke said something
similar to explain ihe limitailons in oui knowledge, but iieikelcy
responded by denying this, He said that we first throw up a dust and
then complain we cannot see. The fault is in our own conceptual confu-
sions. I think this of the anaEog\^ 'wUh faulty faculties. In the case of
eyesight. It is essential that the noim of normal eyesight is agreed on.
Thus, those who are colour-blind, or who have faulty eyesight acknowE-
edge these defects themselves, liui this is not so in the religious context.
The circularity in iJ^s argument shows that the analogy doesn't work_ it
looks as tliough we are offered an explanation: people don^t believe in
God because their faculties are not functioning properly. What do we
mean by 'not functioning properly'? That they don^t believe. Further, B
has to account for the fact that there have been philosophers W'ho have

34 ffjihsGpiiy ofRiiti^kvf w the 21st Century

seen sense in religious belief who arc fiof believers. On B's view, how is
Ihis possible? flow do you respond to these mcihodological points?

A: I do want to say that the unbcJte^^er is wrong. What stands in the way
of his agreeing with the believer? Firsl^ there is an obstacle in that people
do not like what religion asks of tlicmn the way of life it demands, and
so they resist the probability which the evidence shows. So they aren^l
fully rational when they do this.

Second, as I have said, people in some societies come to believe by
deferring to wise men. This is true of our age where people defer too
soon to scientific opinion dtcnicd to be wise. Bui these people may be
biased and so people are led astray in following them.

Thifd, let us not forget that disagreement about hypotheses occurs
wlihln science itself. Tn the case of religious belief the matter is not
obvious and involves us in metaphysical speculation.

B: I think we must own up to the danger of inteilectual phariseetsm,
and be aware of the sinhilncss of our own epistemic faculties. We can
blind ourseives to things and fall foul of self-deception «

We must also acknowledge that in our religious critique we are going
to appeal to mctapJiysical considerations. We must admit that we arc
faced with a multitude of stories which interpret the facts - metaphyslca]
world-views. Of course we have to pay attention to evidence^ but we
wili always need lo interpret it according to sonic w^orld-view^.

D: ] am no friend of the ontological argument, but 1 think A is too
iiasty in his dismissal of It. Things can seem coliercnt when they arc
not. So altliough 'There is no God' may seem coherent, it may not be.

.4: But I thint: There is no God' is obviously coherent.

E: Ontological arguments differ Instead of dealing with logically neces-^
sary truths in (he abstract, Anselm is trying to bring out certain fea-
tures of Ihe concept of God. He starts with thai concept rather than

arguing to a logically necessary truth.

A: liut the concept he starts with is of a being whose existence is logi^
cally necessary.

F: So the God you arrive at by inferred probabilities Is a different con-
C-eption from that of Anselm?

A: Yes, lie lias the notion of a logically necessary being.

uj:. i^fifitips 35

F: I think you are leaving out the rcli^lou:^ significance of what Ansclm
is wrestling with - 'that than which none greater can be conceived'.
This significance has been explored by thinkers Ukc Levlnas and
J--L- Marion, hi analytic hands, the ontological argument has become a
shadow of its historical self- It has been divorced from its religious
frameworL

A: 1 don^t deny Ansclm's religious concerns. 1 aiTii objecting to the way

he spelled them out.

G: Af w^haL is the religious import of your project? Wc need to know

this probability, you say, iii order for belief to be rational. It is supposed
to helpn but ivhat does it help?

A: Religion asks us lo live in a certain way; it demands much of us. So
wc need reasons to think that the practice of religion is worthwhile.
The more evidence w^c have the better. How much wt need depends on
circumstances^ but IVe suggested tliat over fifty per cent probability is
enough.

G: Again, I ask: 'enough for wliat? What were believers doing l>efore
tliey had your arguments to rely on?

A: I didn't give them aiiy new arguments. I simply knocked the ones they
already had into shape. 1 referred to Gregor)^ of Nyssa in this respccL

H: I w-ant to ask the same question as G. Anselm is explicating a faitli he
had already. And your last response to (j might suggest a similar posi-
tion. But your project makes a far stronger claim, It purports to start
from a neutral starling-point.

A: Where you start depends on the times and the state of the people.

f: One of the differences in our time is the plurality of plausibility-
structures. So (Kople [lave searched for a critical and evaluative science.
How is that going to come from the analytic context?

■ ^

/l For example, how is A's appeal to simplicity supposed to work?

K: And even if the probability of a first cause is established, what would
tliat have to do with religion?

B: 1 don^t think it is just an appeal to simplicit)*^ / is right to question that.
In large-scale metaphorical disputes criteria only work for those who hold
tliG metaphysical \riew in question, i confess to not being so interested in
the plausibility stnjctures that I refers to^ but I am interested in f s point

^6 I^hUosGpiiy ofR^ti^w}! w the 21st Century

about the rctation of w^orld-vicws or iiitcrprctatLons to the facts of
human cxistcncc.

L: Thai is an issue which can be raised In connccUon with all sorts of

reasoning, not simply religion. Sensitivity^ to context is important

M: In tliat connection, I don't think Aquinas was so much concerned
Willi proofs as with a theological science where first principles can be
used as principles of interpretation.

A: I certainly do not want to deny the importance of sensitivity. It is an
essential factor in being led in one direction by the data and not
olliers; for example^ in being led to Ciiristianity and not to some other
retlj^ion. On the other hand, despite tlie importance of contexts, remem-
ber that the one ] appeal to is uni^^ersal - our involvcinent in llie uni-
verse and the desire to know how it came abotit.

H: But could a believer be atlieistic with respect to theism?
A: I don't see how he couid.

Ti;

Cr I think lie means ""atheistic' tn the sense of denying the methods of
philosophical theism.

A: As I have said^ you can believe on the basis of authority. But in the
absence of authority, or faced by conflicting autliorities, we must have
reasons for embracing religious belief.

The point of religion is getting right with God. But this would have
no point if you did not believe that there is a God. You could have that
belief without any religious practice, but, nevertheless, in answer to K,
I do belicvT that that belief in God as a first cause is the same as that
held by ordinary believers in their religious practice.

Part II

Reformed Episteinology

Reformed Epistemology

The assigned task of Professor Wykstra and nfiyself is to state what we
regard as the most serious objections to Reformed Epistemology^ and
then to assess whcUierr In our judgement, those objections have been
adequately met It is our Judscmentn however, that so m^in^ objections
to Reformed Epistemology have been based on misunderstanding that
it IS necessary, before we take up the assigned task, to explain what
Reformed Epistemology is. Accordingly, our papers will not take the
form of presentation and response but lather the form of Joint presen-
tation: I will deal mainly with the nature of Reformed Epistemology^
although along the way I w-ill deal with certain objections, and Professor
Wykstjra ivill deal mainly with objections^ although along the way he
will say something about the nature.

One might articulate the natuie of Reformed Epistemology in purely
systematic fashion. On this occasion 1 instead propose doing so within
a narrative contcjct. 1 have rather often been asked what led to the
emergence of Reformed Epistcmologj' I propose interweaving an artic-
ulation of the nature of Reformed Epistemology with a narrative of
its origins. Historians have a big advantage over philosophers in that^
whereas they ahvays tiave stories to tctl^ philosoptiers only now
and then can tell stories. People love stones. Best then for philoso-
phers to tell stories when they can. LJut my reason for interweavmg
narrative with analysis is not just that this will add spice to the
discussion. 1 think one understands better ihe nature of (teformed
Epistemolo^ if one aho understands its significance- and the best way
to understand its significance is within the context of an account of its
origins. Accotdinj^ly, 1 propose introducing my discussion with an
account of the origins, the nature, and the significance of Reformed
Epistemology.

40 FtsUGSf?piiy ofRiiti^w}! w the 21st Cetitury

Reformed Epistcniology made its full appearance on the philosophical
scene wilh the publication In 198^ of the collection Ftiitii ami RutioniUity,
subtitled Reasori {imi Hetief'as God, edited by AlvLn PlanKnjja and myself J
For a good many years Plantinga and 1 had l>ecn teaching togclher in
the philosophy department at Calvin College. We had known each othet
since the time when we were students together at Calvin, in the early
1950s. Around the mid-JOs, Calvin began what it called The Calvin
Center for Christian Scholarship. The Center continues to this day; and
has by now acquired a very disttnj^uishcd historj^ in the promotion of
Christian scholarship. In its early years, the principal activity of the
Center consisted of adopting a topic for study each year, and then
assembling a team composed of a few Calvin faculty members^ along
with a few faculty members from other institutions, to spend the year
working on tlie topic, free of leaching responsibilities. Each year a few
Calvin students were also part of the team.

The topic for the year 1979-SO was Toward a Rcforaned View of Faith
and Reason'- Senior fellows for the year who were drawn from the Cahin
faculty included Plantinga and myself (along with George Marsden from
history, Robert Manw-cilcr from physics, and David liolwerda from hib-
Meal studies). During the second semester, George Mavrode^^ from the
University of Michigan, joined us as a senior fellow. And throughout
tlic year, William 1^. Alston^ itien al the University of Illinois, and tlcnk
Hait^ from the Institute of Christian Studies in Toronto, "were adjunct
senior fellows who rather frequently dropped hi for discussions. The
volume, Fmtii mid R^itionaflt}', emerged from the 'work of Ihe fellows
during tliat year^

Above, T described the publication of Faitlt and Rtitloimlity as marking
the 'full appearance' of Reformed tpistemology on the philosophical
scene, I meant thereby to suggest that earlier there had been an appear-
ance which was somewhat less than full. Or to put it in terms of
'stages': the publication of Faith ami RntiomiliPi' consiiUitcd the second
stage in the development of Reformed Epistemology. The first stage
jcame In two parts. One part consisted of some essays published by
PlanLinga in the late 1970s and early HCs - in particularn 'Is Belief
in God Properly Basic?'- The other consisted of a small book of mine,
Reason within the lk}timis of lieiigion, published in 1976/'^

Behind each of these there Avas, in turn, a pre-histoTy_ The pre-htstor^r
of Plantiiiga'scssayj 'Is Belief in God Properly Basic?' was his 1967 book,
God and Otiier !^iimh, subtitled, A Study of the Ratiomil Jta^tipcation of
Belief in GoiL^ The pre-hlstory of my own bbook, Reasoii within tlie Bounds
ofRefis;ion, was an essay published in 1964, Taith and Phtlosophy*/

Nichofds WGiter.^tojff^ 41

Why do I say that these belong to the 'pre history' of Reformed Epistc-
molog}^, rather than tliaL they consiitute the first stage in its history
proper? Essential to Reformed Epistomoto^ 15 the explicit refection of
classical fouiidationaiisnij and of the cvidciiliattsl ohjection to religious
belief (realistically understood) which is implied by classical foundation-
alism- Uut in Planliiiga^s book Gmi d!hf Ctfwr Mlmis, and in my essay
Taith and l^hilosophy'^ there was no explicit recognition of classical
foundationalisin, and hence no explicit rejection of it. Neither PlantiiiKa
nor I had yet identified classical foundationalism as SLich; neither of us
had ycL formed the concept.

In that regard, v\t vv^ere not unusuaL It was only later that mcta-
cpistemology became a mailer of serious interest to philosophers; and
only when it did become a matter of serious intercsi, sometime in the
70s, was classical foundationalism identified as one distinct style of
cpTstemoIog)^ Of course, classical foundationalism itself had been around
for centuries; what was absent, until the 1970s, was a clear Fecognltion
of its nature, and a clear recognition of the fact that it was but one of
many options for epislemological theory.

It was the emergence of meta-cpistemology, and the coitceptiializing of
classical foundationalism which accompanied that emergence - indeed,
which that emergence made possible - it was that emergence and that
concept ualizing wh ich made Re formed Epistemolog)^ possible . The
explicit use of the concept of classical foundationalism (sometimes just
called 'foundationalism""} is whal separates the first stage in the dcv'i?l-
opment of Reformed Epistemologj^^ from its prc-history.

To say that the first stage of lieformed Epistemology had a pre-
history in some earlier writings of Plantinga and myself is of course to
suggest some sort of continuity between the pre-history and the first
stage, fl should state here, lest there be any misunderstanding, that there
Ls In turn a long pre-hisLoiy behind those early writings of Platiiinga
and myselTl What was that continuity? When a clear reco^ition of
classical foundationalLsmn for what it is, appeared on the philosophical
scene, by no means did everybody thinking about the epistemolo^ of
religious belief immediately become a Reformed Epistcmologist. Why
then did Reformed Epistemology emerge wliere it did?

Plantinga and 1, from the time of our student days at Calvin College^
had been profoundly shaped by a movement within the Reformed-
Presbyterian tradition of Cliristianity; namely, the Dutch neo-Calvinist
movement of the late nineteenth century, of which the great formative
figure was the Dutch theologian, journalist, and statesman, Abraham
Kuypcr Our most influential college teachers were all 'Kuypcrians'.

42 FhUDSf?piiy ofR^ti^w}! w the 21st Century

Faith seekmg urjderstamfmg was Ehc motlo held up before us as guide
and challenge for the Christian IntcllcctuaV The motto comes of course
from Augustine, who in turn took it from Clement of Alexandria.
1 now know that the way we were taughE to understand it was not,
howevei^ the way Augustine meant It. What Augustine meant was that
the Christian intellectual seeks to understand those very things that
already he or she believes. What we were taught to understand by the
motto is that it is the calling of the Christian intellectual to conduct all
of his or hcf inquiries in the light of fahh. ^Jot to move from befU'viug,
saVp the doctrine of divine simplicUyj to iimierstiuuling that vciy same
doctrine - that would fit the Augustlnlan understanding of the motto -
but to develop history, sociolog}^, philosophy, political thcorVr and so
forth, in the light of faith.

A striking feature of this way of seeing the challenge facing the
Christian scholar and intellectual is that nothing at all is said about the
need to develop arguments for one's religious beliefs. The discussions
concerning faith and reason which have preoccupied the church down
through the centuries can pretty much all be classified as either discus-
sions concerning the proper role of reason in faith or as discussions con-
cerning the proper role of faith in one's reasoning. In the fMtch
neo-Calvinist tradition^ the attention was all on the latter. But that^ of
course, Implied something concerning the former. To urge that faith seek
understanding, while paying no attention at all to arguments for the
existence of God^ to arguments for the reliability of Scripture, and so
forth, was to take for granted that the evidentialist challenge to religious
belief (more about this shortly) does not have to be met- It was
to take for granted that the fundamentals of faith do not typically need
the support of reasoning, ol argumentatioiij for faith to l>c acceptable-
PlantingSj in his essay in Fiuth nf^d Ratio!fa{it}\ cites passages from the
Dutch neo-Calvinist theologian Herman tiaviiick which say exactly that-

In short, it would only be a slight exaggeration to say that Reformed
Epistcmology is a development that was destined to occur among
philosophers within the neo-Calvinist tradition once the concept of
^classical foundationalism l>ccamc clearly articulated.

So what then is Reformed Epistemolog)^? It will be helpful to distin-
guish between Reformed Episteniolog)'jitfafm;v^|^ iimkrsttmd, and Reformed
fepistemolog>' broadly understood. Let me here describe the former; later
1 will explain what I have in mind by 'Reformed Epistemolog)' broadly
understood'. A preliminary' observation Is iit order Beliefs have a number
of distinct truth-relevant merits: warranted, reliably formed, kno^^i^,
entitled, apt for inclusion in science^ and so forth. Until rather recently,

Nicholas Woitpr^toiff^ 4:i

twentieth century cpistcmology in the analytic tradition was con-

duclcd as if there were jusi two truih-rclcviint merits: justification, or
rationality^ plus knowledge^ this tatter being understood as what
resulted when one added tiutli to a justifiably or EaLiociaily held belief
(alternatively: what resulted when one added truth plus some Gettier-
coping property). The main disputes were understood as being disputes
concerning the correct analysis of justification, or rationatity Though T
won't l:kerc take time to argue Lhe point, the situation seems to ine
clearly Instead to. be that philosopiicrs liave implicitly tKen discussing a
number of disliaicl^ tliougli related^ merits. The relevance of this point
concerning the inultlpHclt>' of doxastic merits for our purposes here is
tliatj strictly speakings we ought not to speak of Reformed Epistemology
tout cmstt^ but of Reformed Epistemolog}^ concerning warrant, of
Reformed lLpistemolog\^ concerning entitlement, and so on. At the
beginnings however^ tliis pointy about the plurality of doxastic merits^
was not recognized; Reformed cpistcmologlsts spoke almost exclusively
about rationalitv.

I can now explain what I take Reformed Epistemology^ narrowly
understood, to be. In tlic linlightenment ttiere emerged the ideal of a
ratiomiUy groun^icd religion, tlie two great proponents of this ideal l:^cing
John Locke and Immanuel Kant. Religion as it comcs^ so it was said, is
not satisfactory; what it lacks is rational grounding. In LockCj it's clear
that tfie imiivhiiiiif believer is regarded as believing itn^sponsibly unless
his religious beliefs are all rationally grounded; in Kant^ it remains
unclear how exactly the individual believer must be related to the ideal
of rational grounding.

Reformed epistemology is the repudiation of this Enlightenment
ideal of rationally grounded religion. Let it be said as emphatically as
possible that Reformed epistemologists did not repudiate the demands
of lationality (and now, after tlie recognition of tlie diversity of doxastic
merits, do not repudiate the w^orth and the demands of warrant, entitle-
mentn and so on). What they repudiated was the claim thatj for a per-
son's religious beliefs to be rational - in particular, for their beliefs about
God to be rational - those beliefs must in their totality be rationally
grounded. Ratiofmlfty i.s \wt to bt eijuated with ratiomjl groiifhUfig. The
way the Reformed epistemologists made this point was to insist that
some religious beliefs arc rational even though they are held himfedi"
ately. To say that a person holds some belief hnmndiateiy is to say that
the belief is not held on the basis of other propositions that the person
believes, those oilier propositions functioning then as reasons for the
person's beliefs.

44 fhiiGsopiiy ofR^ti^kvi w the 21st Century

Notice thai Reformed Epistcniology docs not say Lhat c^^ciy immediate

belief about God held by anybody whalsocvej; possesses the meril
under consideration. The claim is tlic much more guarded claim tliat
soffie of the immediate beliefs about God held by some persons possess
that merit. In fact the Reformed Epistemologist is of the view that foi
every doxastic merit, there will surely be some persons who hold some
immediate beliefs about God which lack that merit, [n some such
cases, the person will have iiefaiten for the belief- lhat is to say: there
will be something in the person or the person^s situation such that,
given that factor or situation, if the person were functioning properly,
he or she would not hold that belief immediately. The defeater, in
some caseSe will be a belief of the person which is a reason against the
belief about God in question. Thus, contrary to what has sometimes
been said, Reformed Lpistcmolo^y is most certainly not a species of
religious dogmatism.

Furthermore, the character or situation of many persons Is no doubt
such thai for some proposition about God and some doxastic merit,
their belief of that proposition could not possess the merit in question
without being held for (goodl teasons. For some doxastic merits and
some propositions about God it may even be the case lhat no one could
belie^^e those propositions immediately and their belief possess that
merit. And even when a person's immediate belief about God possesses
the merit in question, the Reformed Epistcmolojjist will normally not
see anything wrong in the person also holding that belief for reasons.
Reformed Hpistemology is most definitely not opposed to offering
reasons for one's religious beliefs. The Reformed lipistemologist is not
even opposed to all forms of ivhat might be called ^natural theology'.
But if someone claims that natural theological arguments arc m'ces.'^aiy
for any belief in God to possess some doxastic merit or othcr^ then the
suspicions of the Reformed episicmologist w^ill be ineluciably aroused.

Be it noted thai Reformed Epistemolo^^ narrowly understood, is an
epistcmological claim - as indeed the name suggests. Iteformed Episte-^
molog)' has sometimes been criticized for its failure to give an account of
the nature of religious belief and of the role of religious beliefs In our
lives- AlternativeJy, it has sometimes been understood as aiming to give
such an account and then been criticized for giving a woefully inade-
quate account. One flnd^ this fatter criticism (perhaps also the former) in
D.Z. Phillips^s bookj Faith afier FouiidatsotialisitL^ How much more
adequate, exclaims Phillips^ Is the account of the role in life of religious
languai^e and belief which is to be found in Wittgenstein and his
followers. The 'elucidation of religious concepts^ E^^'I^S ^ perspicuous

Nichofds Woitpr^toiff^ 45

representation of them in their natural contejcts^ is neglected in favour
of Uic slark assertion of a l^cllcver's right to place belief in God among
hi5 foundational beliefs/ says Phillips.^

[Jut Reformed Episteniology- and it makes no difference now whether

we understand it narrowEy or broadly - Reformed Epistemolog>^ never
intended to be anj^hing other than epistcmologj^. It never aimed at
giivEng an account of the nature of religious language and belief; it never
aimed at describing the role of religious language and belief in the life of
tlie reUgtous person. It is, and always intended to be, a contribution to
cpisLcmology. (Though in many places one finds Reformed epislcmolo-
gists making remarks about role - for example, in my introduction to
Faith imd PhUuso{?hy. J

The mention of Phillips's Faith {ifi<cr Foimdntiofmlism leads me to
mention another, connected^ misunderstanding which inhabits the
first part of that book. In stating the core thesis of Reformed Episteniol-
ogy, narrowly understood^ 1 spoke of a belief which a person holds
lmmediatef}\ Call such a belief, an hmnedhite belief. Plantinga, by contrast^
lias usually used the term 'basic beliefj rather than 'immediate belief.
And whereas I have said that we must distinguish between Reformed
Epistemology concerning warrant, Reformed Epistcniology^ concerning
entitlement. Reformed Epistemology concerning aptness for theorv^ and
so forth, Plantinga has typically used the catch-all word, 'properl^^. Thus
Plantinga has typically conducted the discussion in terms of what he calls
■"properly baste' beliefs. (He has also sometimes spoken of 'taking^ beliefs
to be properly basics when all he means - contrary^ to what a good many
commentators have supposed - is that they are properly basic.)

By 'basic belief Plantinga means the very same as what I mean by
'immediate belief. The term 'basic' has certain connotations, however,
which the term 'immediate' does not have? and those connotations
have led to two all-too-typlcal misunderstandings. In the first place^ the
term 'basic' suggests that the religious beliefs in question serve as the
basiSj that is^ the foundation^ for one^s structure of warranted religious
hellcfs, for one's structure of entitled religious heltefs, or whatever. And
that has led a good many commentators to claim that the polemic of
Reformed Epistemology against classical foundattonalism is misleading.
Reformed Epislemology is opposed, indeed, lo dassicd toundationalism.
But it^s not opposed, so it is said, to foiwdationuiism as such_ It's just
another version of foundationalism^ a version somewhat more gcncmus
as to what it allows in the foundations than is classical foundationalism.
All in all, thcn^ so it is said, there is much less here than meets the eye.^
But this is all a misunderstanding- Reformed Epistemology, narrowly

46 fhUo.wpiiy ofRiiti^w}! w f/re 21st Century

uiidcrsEood, docs not commit those who embrace this thesis lo
any form of fouiidEiUoiialisni whatsoever. To acknowledge thai some
beliefs are held immediately, and to acknowledge that some of those
which arc held immediately possess the doxastic merit in question -
(hat even some immediately held beliefs about God possess the mcril
in queslion - does not commit one to foundationalism of any sort.
A cohercnlist could sav as much. Alt foundationalists do in fact make
(he mediate/immediate disiLnctioii. But they are not foundationalists
just by viiiue of nnaking the distinction; they arc foundationalists by
virtue of what they do wi(h the dislinction in articulating their cpiste-
mologies. Til explain these somewhat dark sayings shortly, when 1
argue that the positive cpistemologies which the Reformed cpistemolo-
gists have developed in the third stage of Reformed Epistemology have
in fact not been fo Linda tlonali si in their basic structure. The thesis of
Refornied Epistemolog)^ narrowly understood, though it did no( com-
mil the Reformed Epislemologlst to foundationalism, did indeed leave
open that possibility^ the Reformed epistemologists have not, in fact,
fexploilcd that opening-

In the comparison \ify DZ. Phillips of Reformed Epistcmolog>^
to VVittgei:istein's pliilosopiiy of religion, tn chapter 4 of Faith af^t^r Fomi'
diitiofhilisffi, one finds an additional misunderstanding of what
the Reformed Epistemologisl has in mind by 'basic beliefs'. Phillips
assumes there tliat the Reformed epistcmologist has his eye on the same
thing that Wittgenstein has his eye on in On Ceftuifityf when Wittgen-
stein talks about those he!ie£s that are certain for us because they are
^held fast' by all Ihat surrounds them. Given the assumption thai the
^ame thing is under cons] deration^ Phillips then criticises Reformed Epis-
icmologj' for thinking of religious beliefs in such an atomistic fashion.

But I submit that the topics here arc just different; 'basic tKlief' is
being used ambiguously The plicnomenon on which Wittgenstein had
his eye is that wliich Plantinga. in his essay in FaitJi ami R^thuatity,
calls ■'depth of ingrcssion\ Certain heliefs arc so deeply ingrcssed
within one's belief-structure that to give them up would require giving
up a vast number of other beliefs as welh The difficulty of doing that is^
then^ what holds them fast. My belief that the world began quite some
lime ago is one example of a deeply ingrcssed belief. So too^ as one of
Wittgenstein's examples suggests, is my belief that my name is
'Nicholas Woltcrstorff .

Not only is the distinction between deep and shallow ingressioh just
a different distinctioi:^ from that between immediate and mediate
beliefs; there isn't even any coincidence between thcni. Some Lmmcdiate

Nichofds Woit^rstojff^ 47

beliefs arc deeply ingrcsscd; some arc very shallowly Ingressed. [ndecd^
It's even a distortion of Wittgenstein's thought to fotniulale It in tcjms
nf beiief^. What Wittgi^nstein wa? pointing to is what wc all take for
gnintt'd in so fundamental a way thai, were wc no longer to take it for
granted^ we would have to alter vast stretches of our beliefs und pmc-
tkes. Some of w^hal wc thus take for granted will he things Iwilevt'd by
us; but much of it will never have been taken notice of sufficiently to
be believed. To what extent these ideas can be used to illuminate reli-
gious beliefs is an interesting question; I myself think that religious
beliefs are different in fundamental ways from the deeply ingressed^
unshakcable beliefs to which Wittgenstein calls attention in On Cer-
tiunt}\ Uut ill any case^ what Wittgenstein is discussing is simply differ-
ent from what the Reformed Epistemologist is talking about when he
speaks of basic, that is, immediate, beliefs.

But why, thcnj does the Reformed epistemologist talk about what he
does talk about? Why all the flurry about immediately held beliefs about
God, and whether they can possess the dojiiastie merit in question? Why,
more generally, the preoccupation with epistemology^? Why^ in short,
doesn't the Reformed epistemologist act like a good Wittgensteinian and
talk about the role of religious language and belief in life?

The answer is that the polemical partner of Reformed Epistcmologyn
narrowly understood, is not the same as the polemical partner of
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion; and that the character of both
of these is in good measure shaped by their polemical partners and by
how they have chosen to deal with those partners. In each case, absent
know^ledge of the polemical partner^ the significance of the movement
is in good measure lost ori one.

The polemical partner of Wittgenstein, in his reflections on religion,
was logical positivism. In his reflections on religion, \"\^ittgenstein chose
not to challenge positivism's criterion of cognitive mcaiiingfuJncss head
on, nor its principle of demarcation bet^veen science and 'metaphysics'
wliich made use of that criterion. Instead, he undertook to exploit a
concession which the later positlvists had themselves already made^
namely, the concession that meaningful speech is not confmed to fact-
stating speech- The challenge to which Wittgenstein addressed himself^
In his reflections on religion, was then to describe the 'meaningfulness'
of religious language - given that, so he assumed. It does not serve to
state facts, tliat is^ to make true-false claims. How does religious lan-
guage function - given that, so he assumed, it cannot be contradicted,
since nothing is said to which one can properly say, 'Tliat's false/
Wittgenstein's way of dealing with his polemical partner reijuired that

48 I^hUosoptiy ofR^ti^kvf w the 21st Century

he discuss the role of religious lanj^agc and belief in life. There was no
other way to make his polemical point.

By the time Reformed Epistemolo^^ came on the scene, !o^cal posi-
tivism was dead and buried. It wasnl yet dead and buried at the time of
the pre-hlstory of Reformed Eplstemology; Plantinga docs battle with it
at several points m God luui Otiici' K^huh. But by the l9S0s it was dead -at
kast among philosophers. What was not dead and buried was a chal-
lenge to religious belief of considerably greater antiquity than the posl-
livist claim that religious language lacks meaning - viz.^ the challenge
of which I :^pokc earlier^ that religious beliefs, to be held rationally,
must in their totality be rationally grounded. Reformed epislemologists
have ty)7ically called it the evidenti^iiist chuik'ngt^. From the insistence
that rcUgious belief is lacking in rationality warrant, entitlement^ or
whatever, if it is not held on good evidence, it just follow-s that it is
lacking in those merits if it is held Lmmediatcly. This evidentialist
challenge has been so widely held among the [ntelligenisia of the mod-
em world that it deserves to be regarded as part of the modern mind,
in response to the challenge, many have offered arguments for their
own full-blown religious betlefSp others have trimmed their religious
beliefs until they no longer go beyond what they judge the arguments
to support; yet others have contended that the arguments are so weak
(hat religious belief ought to be trimmed to tlie point of disappearance.
One way or the other^ they have accepted the kgittmacy of the chal-
lenge. The Reformed cpistemologlst, as I observed earlier^ rejects the
challenge. In so doing he is, i suppose, a 'postmodernist' of a sort. What
made ''postmodernism^ of his sort seem plausible to him^ however, w^as
not immersion in the writings of Hetdeggcff, Derrlda^ and their ilk^ but
the 'postcnodernism'' which was implicit all alon^ in the neo-Calvinist
movement which he emhraced.

What emerges from the foregoing is thai Reformed Eplsteniolog)''
and Wittgensletnian philosophy of religion have in good measure just
^been doing different things? there is no reason why each cannot regard
the other as having hnportant insights wliich ought to he incorporated
within a larger picture. It appears to me that on one absolutely central
potnc^ however, tliese two movements arc in conflict. I understand
Wittgenstein and most of his followers - O.K. Bouwsma being the signal
exception - to hold titat there is no such phenomenon as referring to
God and predicating things of that to which one has referred. Religious
language functions very^ much like the language of one's atheist friend
w^hen he exclaims, 'Thank God it's Ftiday/ The Reformed epistemologist,
by contrast, holds that we can and do refer to God, and predicate things

Nichofds WGiter^toiff^ 49

of that to which wc have referred. He furthermore holds thai these asser-
tions about God arc either true or false of God, and that ihcy arc true or
false of God because of the fact's of the matter. I Jud^e ttiis to be the
decisive issue separating Reformed Eplstemology from Wittgcnstoinian
philosophy of religion (Bouwsma excepted). I shall say a bit about the
issue at the close of my discussion.

I suggested that what distinguished the first stage of Reformed
Epistemology from its pre-hisiory was the explicit use of the concepts
of dnssic{if ^imdatiomiiism nfid evi(i£}ftinlht cimflenge. What, in turn,
distinguishes Mie second stage from (lie first es, of course^ the greater
elaboration and articulation of ideas hinted at in the frrst stage. But
something else as well. Iii the year wc spent together in the Calvin
Center for Christian Scholarship, Planlinga and I read Thomas Reid for
the first time in our hves. For me (and for Plantinga as well, I thltikK it
was the exhilarating experience of discovering a philosophical soul-
mate. What w^as it that 1 (we) found in Rcid? Tve never been able fully
to say - fully to articulate the grounds of the excitement I felt. Some-
tliing about the experience has always eluded me. But I know some of
what made me feel 1 had discovered a philosophical soul-male.

Reid was not only the first articulate opponent of classical founda-
tionalism in the history of Western philosophy; he was, at the same
time, a metaphysical realist. That's part of what captivated me; for this
was exactly the combiiiation, reiilf!^m plus nuti-dtissfcaJ-foiuuintiomiihin,
wliich I had myself been trying to work out. What also captivated nic
was the articulate picture of the human being as having a number of
distinct belief-forming faculties^ of dispositions^ and of these faculties
as being innocent until proved guilty. In his attack on the sceptic, Reid
argues powerfully that, in the nature of ihe case, suspicion^ whatever
Us relevance^ cannot be one's fundamental stance toward one's belief-
forming faculties. But neither can one give a non^ircular defence of
the rcliabihty of one's faculties. Tntst musl be one's fundamental
stance. The neo-Calvinist version of the Augustinian tradition in which
I had been reared, with Its motto of ftutli seekiiig uuderstunding and Its
tacit repudiation of cvidentialist apologetics^ had also made trust fun-
damental. So I10 doubt what also led me to sense in Rcid a philosophi-
cal soul-mate was Lhc fundamental role of trust in his tliought.
Admittedly the trust occurs at a somewhat different point, and has a
somewhat different object; nonetheless, in both cases, human exis-
tence is seen as resiing not on proof but ttust.

The center of lletd's thought Avas his polemic against the explanation
of perception offered by his predecessors, whom Rcid lumped together

50 FtsUGSf?piiy ofRiiti^w}! w the 21st Century

as theorists of what he called The Way of Ideas', and his articulation of
an alternative- The Way of Ideas theorists lield that in perceplion wc
form beliefs about our sensations, and Mien draw rational iiiferpnces
from the propositional content of those beliefs^ Eo propositions about
the external world. Reid polcmicized powerfully and relentlessly
against that account; what he put in its place was the claim that
though sensations are indeed evoked by the impact of the external
world on us in perception, those sensations imiwdh^tdy evoke in us
conceptions and beliefs about the external world- The move, from sen-
sations to perceptual beliefs, is not hy virtue of some rational inference
but by virtue of our ^hard wiring'. Ferc£ptio!i is Fiot n}tiouaf!y s^t^^^^fdedl

What this picture of perception suggested to Plantinga and myself
was a way of articulating John Calvin^s suggestion that all humanity is
naturally religious. Belief in God, so Cal\4n insisted, is not an inven-
tion; on the contrary, we are so created that, if we functioned as we
were designed lo function, wc ivould all respond to one and another
aspect of the 'desig'n' of the w^orld by immediate beliefs about God.
One cannot understand Reformed Epistemolog)', as it lias been devel-
oped, without discerning its commitment to an anthropology' of
religion of this Calviniitic sort: all htjmanily is naturally thcisttcally
religious. What accounts for the fact that not all human bein^ do in
fact believe in God is that our indigenous proclivity for fotmLtig imme-
ili^te beliefs about God has been overlaid by our fallcnness. We no
longer function as we were created to function.

Reformed Epistemolo^^ through its first two stages, was above all
a brush- clearing operation, designed to dispose of the evidcnlialist
challenge to tlicistic belief and of the classical foundational ism which
has typically motivated tlie evidentialist challenge. The third stage of
Reformed Epistemology, represented by work done since Faitif niui
iUitionaiit}-', is differeniialed from the second stage by the near-absence
of any further ground -de a ring and, in its place, the elaborate articula-
tion of positive epistemological accounts which were only hinted at in
Faith ami Ratiomilit}^. Wliat I mean by Reformed Epistemology broadly
understood is those developments in the epistemology of religious belief
which have occupied the space cleared out by Reformed Epistemology
in its earlier negative phase^ this being what 1 have had in mind by
Reformed rpistemolog)'^ f?rtrjwiv/y tmderstood.

These bioader developments have come in two areas which it is
important to distinguish- For one thing, positive cpistemologies of a
Reformcd-epistemological sort have been developed. Some of this was

Nichofds WGiter.^tojff^ 51

present already in the second stagc^ represented by Faith mhi Rationality;
but thai was onlv a foretaste of whai has come forth since then. 1 have
m mind, in particularn William Alston's account of religious experience
and the fustification it lends to religious beliers in his Ferceivu^ God;
Plantinga's account of warrant In his three volumes, l1/jmiJi£ f/jp Cur-
rent Dt'Lmte, Wifrrafxt as Proper Function, and Warranted Christian Belief,^
and my own account of entitlement in my Divine Dlscourse^^ and^
much tnore elaborately, in my forthcoming, WorUiy Mlml, atut Entitle
inent to Believe.

Secondiy, a considerable number of writings have appeared dealing
with the relevance of faith to theoretical actlvit^:^. Admittedly it stretches
the word 'epistemology^ to call these discussions, ^examples of episte-
mology'; stricliy^ they belong to Wissenschafislelfre. Yet they have been
so intimately connected with the more strictly epistemological develop-
ments of Reformed Fpistcmolog^^ that it would give a mistaken impres-
sion not to include them under tlie rubric of 'Reformed Cpistemologj^.

^Jot much of this Reformed Wlssenschaftslehre found its way into
Faltii and Ratioiuillt)'; epLstemolog\^ proper proved so fascinating during
the year which gave rise to this volume tliat it pretty much blocked out
reflections on the relevance of faith to theory. But such reflections were
present already in what I called the ^first staged In my book Reason
within tiie Bowuis ofH.tfJi^s:;itw. And tliey have appeared with fair regular-
ity m the third stage; for example^ in Plantinga^s inaugural address at
Notre Dame, ^Advice to Christian l^htlosophers^ in George Marsdcn's
recent, The Outrageous Mea of Christum Scholarship,^^ and in various
essays of my own-

1 mentioned earlier that the positive accounts of doxastic merits devel-
oped hy Reformed epistemotogists in this third sta^e have been non-
foundation a! ist in their basic structure. Let me now explain this claim.

The cognitive-psychological distinction between mediate and imnicdU
ate beliefs is one which, so it seems to me, everj^one must acknowledge.
Surely we ah have L^eliefs which we have come to hold because wc have
inferred them from other beliefs of ours. But inference cannot be the
sole mode of belief-formation. There must be some processes other
than inference that produce beliefs in us; otherwise inference would
have nothing to do its work on. Those will be processes that produce
beliefs immediately.

What disLinguishes the foundationalist from his fellow epistemolo-
gists is that he articulates his account of the presence and absents
of whatever mi^ht be the doxastic merit on which he has his eye in the

Nichofds WGiter.^tojff^ 51

S2 FtsUGSf?piiy ofR^ti^kvf w the 21st Century

following way: first he offers an account of whal brings it about that
tl:tc merit attaches to those lmmcd]alclv held beliefs to vvliieh it does
attach, and under ^^hat circumstances this is brought about. Attd then
he offers an accouiil of the circumstances under whicli inference
succeeds in transferring that merit from immediately held l>cliefs
which already possess it, to behefs inferred from those- <0f course,
some beliefs may be produced jointly by immediate-belief- formation
processes and mediate-helief-formation processes.)

This description simply does not fit tiie basic structure? of Plantinga^s
account of warrant, ol^ Alston's account of those beliefs which arc justi-
fied by their being evoked by leligious experience, nor of my account
of entitlement- Let me elaborate this claim just a bit for Plantinga^s
account of warrant.

A rou^h description of PIantin;^a's account ls this: a behef is war-
ranted just in case it is produced by faculties aimed at truth which
a;e functioning property, in situations for which those faculties were
designed to work thus. Notice that nowhere here is the distinction
between immediate and mediate beliefs appealed to. Plantinga^s account
of what brings it about that warrant accrues to a behef does not, In its
basic structure, exhibii the bipartite structure definitive of foundational-
ist accounts. Whether or not the belief under consideration is mediate or
linmcdiale, the relevant question is always and only whether It was pro-
duced by a faculty aimed at truth functioning properly in a situation for
which it was designed. The unified structure which Plantinga's theory
exhibits allies It, in this regard^ with coherentist accounts - though of
course it^s also not a coherentist theory.

It is true that something mote requires to be said. Ptantinga does
accept the distinction between mediate and immediate modes of belief-
formation, hideed, when he applies his general account of warrant to
an analysis of the proper functioniitg of our actual faculties of bclief-
formation/he finds it essential to make the distinction- At this second
level, then, hts account does exhibit a foundationalist character; noth-
\ng of the sort happens in a pure coherentist theory. Furthermore, the
outcome of his anal)^'sis at this second level is that the scope of imme-
diately formed beliefs wliich are warranted Is considerably wider than
ihc classical foundationalist would acknowledge. Nonetheless il remains
true that hi its basic stmcttue, Plantiiiga's theory is not an expanded
foundational Lsm but is not a foundationalism at alL

Let me call attention to another aspect of the significance of
Reformed Epistcniology by casting a somewhat different light on the
basic structure of the positive epistcraological theories which Itave

Nkhofds Woitprstojff^ 5:^

been developed, in this third stage of their movement, by the

Reformed epislcinologists- {\ have in mind here epistcinology proper^
not Wisseiischnfisiehre.) Ever since Flato, a certain picture of the ideally
formed belief h^is haunted Western philosophy^ and in particular^ the
philosophy of religion. Sometimes the picture has been incorporated
within a theory of knowledge, at other times, williin a theory of sci-
encc, on yet other occasions^ within a theory of entitlement - and dvcj
and over, within a theory of certitude.

Here is the picture. Fundamental in the life of the mind is acqiiainhm-ce
wUh entities, and awareness of haviitg acquainLaiice with entities. What I
call 'acquaintance"" is what Kant called Ansdnmmis - standardly, though
not very happily, translated in the English versions of Kant as ^inltiitioiV.
Or to look at the same thing from the other side: fundamental in the life
of the mind is presaice - cnLitLcs presenting themselves to us, puttii:kg
in their appearance to us. Consider the definite description: 'the dizzi-
ness you felt when you rode that merry-go-round yesterday". If you did
in fact feel dizzy upon riding a merry-go-round yesterday, then 1 can
use that definite description to pick out that particular dizziness - to
pick it out w^ell enough to make assertions about It, for example.
Nonetheless, that particular dizziness was never part of the intuitional
content of my mind; / was never acquainted with it^ it was never
presented to me. My contact with it is - and was - very different from
my contact with the dizziness / felt when / rode that merry-go-round
yesterday Thiit dizziness was present to me; I was acquainted with it.

To say it again: acquaintance, and its converse, presence^ are in their
various modes fundamental to the life of the mind. Perception has
intuitional content^ memory has intuitional content, introspeelton has
intuitional content, intellection {reason) Lias intuitional content. Surely
there could be no human inind devoid of all these; perhaps there could
Ik no such mind at all. (To assure oneself that tlie four activities just
mentioned do all have an intuitional component, contrast picking out
some entity by means of a definite description, with perceivings
remembering, introspecting, or Intellecting that entity, or an entity of
tliat sort.) VVhatevcrn if anylliing, may be true in the currently fashion-
able diatribes against presence, it cannot be that the mind is devoid of
intuitional content.

Among the entities with which wc have acquaintance are facts: I per-
ceive that the sufs is rising , 1 introspect that I am ftt/ijj^ rather dizzy ^ i
remember that the ride mmi^ me feel dizzy, I intellect that the propositioiiy
green is a cclottr, is necessarily true- And now for llie picture of the
ideally formed iKlief: sometimes^ so it has been claimed and assumed^

54 fhiiGSGptiy ofR^ti^w}! w the 21st Century

oiic^s acquaintance with some fact^ coupled^ if necessary^ with one's
awareness of that acquainLancen produces in one a belief whose propo-
sitiona! content corresponds to the fact ivith Avhich one is acquainted^
My acquaintance with the fact that 1 am fcclan^ rather dizzy produces
in me the belief that i am feeling rather dizzj^ The content of my belief
is^ as it were, read directly off liie fact with which [ have acquaintance.
How could such a belief possibly be mistaken^ Lt^s been asked. It must
be Lhe case that it is certain.

That's one type of Ideally formed belief, the first grade, as it were: the
belief formed l^jy one's acquaintance with a fact to which the pioposi-
tional content of the belief corresponds. There is a second type^ of a
■somewhat lower grade: the Iwlief formed by one's acquaintance witii
the faa that the prepositional content of the belief is logically entailed
by propositions corresponding to facts of which one is aware. In such a
case^ the certainty of one's belief concerning the premises, coupled with
the certainty of one's belief concerning the entailment, is transmitted
to one's belief of the conclusion; it too is certain for one. What
accounts for the fact that such a belief will typically be of a lower grade
than the highest is that one may tiavc acquaintance with the facts
corresponding Lo the premises in an argument, and acquaintance with
the fact that those premises deductively support the conclusion^
without having acquaintance with the fact corresponding to the con-^
elusion- Indeed, therein lies the point of such arguments- Deductive
arguments^ if grounded in acquaintance, carry us beyond aci^ualntance
while yet preserving certitude.

iSomc writers - such as John Locke - have held tliat there is a third
grade of ideally formed beliefs^ viz,, the belief formed by one's acquain-
tance with the fact thaL the propositional content of the belief ispiobiible
relative to facts with which one has acquaintance- It was especially
inductive arguments that Locke had in mind. Locke recognized that
Inductive arguments are incapable of transmitting certainty to the con^
elusion; hence beliefs thus formed are of a lois^cr grade than the others.
Nonetheless, Locke quite clearly regarded mductlve arguments as like
deductive In that, if one has collected a satisfactory body of evidence as
premises, and if one is acquainted with the facts corresponding to the
premises and witli Liie fact that the conclusion is more probable than
not on those premises, tlien one's acceptance of the conclusion is
entirely grounded in acquaintance.

One can see wliy The Doxastie Ideal has had the appeal which it has
had: there is something admirable about beliefs which measure up to
the Ideal - especially^ about beliefs which measure up to the first stage

Nicholas W:}iter.^torJf' 5S

of the Ideal. A belief evoked by acquaintance with the fact to which
the propositional content of [he belief corresponds: what could be
bctterp more satisfying, than that, and more reassuring] A Ix^licf evoked
by acquaintance with the fact that the propositional content of the
belief Is entailed by beliefs of the first sort: such a Ix^iief is on\y slightly
less satisfying- But the point to be made here is that such beliefs are
not ideal fur us Immafs bangs, in our situatio}!. What has been taken to
be The Doxa'itk kieaS is not ideal for ns. The failure of a belief to mea-
5ure up to the Ideal does not, so far forth, point to a deficiency which
we hurrsiifs beings ought to remove^ or eveit to a deficiency which it
would be iksirabk for us to remove. Our belief-forming constitution
docs not nieasute up to the supposed ideal in its indigenous workings;
nor is it possible to revise its workings so that those workings do all
measure up to the supposed ideal. And even if it were possible, even if
we could somehow mana^ to reshape our belief-forming self so that it
conformed in its workings to the supposed ideal, we would find our-
selves with too scanty a body of beliefs for life to continue. Once again^
wlien w-e look deep into human existence, we spy tmst.

It was the two great eighteenth-century Scotsmen^ David Hume and
Thomas Reid, who firstn poweaiully and directly, challenged The Doxasiic
Ideal by arguing that, whatever philosophers might prefer, our human
condiilon Is such that vast numl:kers of the beliefs we have, and with-
out which we could not live, were neither formed in accord with The
Doxastie Ideal nor could be so formed, while yet being entitled,
warranted, justified, or wliat have you.

Hume argued the case most pow^crfully for lieliefs about the fiitul^
formed by induction. 1 see that the car ahead of me has veered off the
mountain road and is now unsupported in the air; that experience
evokes in me Immediately the belief that the car will descend with
increasing rapidity. The propositional contcitt of the belief does not
correspond to the fact perceived. It may be, however, that whaL
accounts for the formation of the belief that the car will descend with
increasing rapidity is that I make a logically valid inference to this
from another belief that I surely form, namely, that the car is now
unsupported in the air - perhaps with some othe: beliefs tossed in
which 1 have arrived at by the exercise of reason? Not at all, argued
Hume. What accoimts for the formation of the belief that the car will
descend with increasing rapidity is not an exercise of reason but Just
the habit, or custom, which has been formed in me by my experience
of many similar such events. Reid fully accepted this analysis hy Hume
of the formation of inductive beliefs^ and went on to offer a broadly

56 fhUosGpiiy ofRiiti^kvf w the 21st Century

similar accounl of perceptual bcltcfSj of n^cmoiial beliefs^ iiid of l>clLcfs
fonncd by testimony- All such beliefs are formed in us by virtue of out
■"hard wiring^, not by the employment of rational inference, None h
mtiomiUy groiuhie^i.

One aspect of the significance of Reformed Eplslemolog\^, intimately
relaLcd to its use of Rcid to explicate Calvin's religious anthropology, is
that it repudiates The Doxastic Ideal gcncrallyj and repudiates it, in
particular, for religious beliefs. Consider one of Plantinga's examples.
One looks up at night and perceives a starry sky - one perceives that
there's a vast starry sky before one. That perception in turn evokes in
one immcdiatelv the belief that God must have made all this. This
latter belief may very well be warranted, Plantinga argues. Yet the
content of the belief - namely, that God must have made alt this - docs
not correspond to the fact one perceives - namely, that there's a starry
sky before one. It goes beyond that. In declaring chat the belief evoked
may well have warranty Plantinga is so far forth repudiating The
Doxasttc IdeaL

Or consider one of tlie cases I cite in my discussion of entitled rcli-^
gious tKlief in Divine Discourse. Augiistinc hears a child over the ;3^ardcn
ivall chanting lake and read, take and read'. After some quick reflecllon,
Augustine finds this uncanny. Perhaps he beliews that it is uncanny;
more likely he hears it as uucmniy. It quickly occurs to hlni that maybe
(he chant is part of a game; but he can^t think of any such game. That^s
really a throw away pointy however; it makes no difference one way or
the other. Augustine has an intimation that the words, "whatever led
the child to chant themj may well be appropriate to his condition;
that's what makes the chanting acquire an uncanny character for him.
And that experience evokes in him immediately the belief that God
is speaking to him, telling him to open his copy of Paul's Epistles
and read.

If this is liow it went - Augustine's description is too brief for us to be
sure of all the details - the resultant beliefj in its mode of formation,
certainly does not measure up to The Doxasrlc Ideal. The proposicional
content of the belief which gets formed in Augustine is that God is
speaking to him. But the fact which he hears is the fact of a child chant-
ing 'toiie lege/ or rather, the fact of the uncannincss of the child's chant-
ing 'toUe lege' within his earshot right ilien. Nonetheless Augustine was,
so I argue, entitled to the belief tlial God %vas speaking to him.

In conclusion, let me return to a point which ! raised earlier but then
reserved for later discussion. The Reformed Episteniologist regards a
great deal of religious language as being nlxmt God; that is to say^ he is

Nicholas W:}iter.^torJf' S7

of ihc view that in our use of rcli^ous language^ wc often refer to God-
He is furthermore oE the view thai often, having referred to God^ we
predicate something of that to which we referred- and he regards such
predications as true or false of God^ depending on the facts of the mat-
ter It I exclaim with the Psalmist, 'Bless the Lord, O my soul, and all
that is within me, bless God^s holy name/ I am referring to God hut
not predicating anything of God^ by no means all language about God
is assertory in character. This is a point thaL the Wittgensteinlaas are
fond of making; and the Reformed epistemologist heartil)^ agrees. Non-
assertory 'God-talk' may nonetheless incorporate references to God^ as
the example just given illustrates. And a good deal of language about
God is in fact assertory; it docs predicate something of that to which
one referred, v\z., God.

My interpretation of the mainline Wittgensteiiiians is that ihey deny
that we ever refer to God^ and also dcny^ conscqLLcntlyj that we ever
predicate things of God. ""God-talk"" Is not to be construed as Incorporat-
ing references to God and as predicating something of that to which
one referred. To conclude my discussion I propose to join the fray on
this issue - without any expectatLoi:i that my intervention will prove
decisive!

Let me approach the battleground by expressing my disagreement
wiLh Phillips on what he sees as the status of the issue within Reformed
Epistemology. At several points, Phillips describes the Reformed episte-
mologisl as trying to 'justify^ our 'epistemic practices' - by which lie
meai:fcSH trying to show that our modes of belief- formation are reliable^ in
that the beliefs they produce correspond to objective realityJ^ I submit
that the Reformed epistemologist attempts no sucli thing. To the con-
trary, Reformed cpislemologists regularly cite Reid's argument against
the sceptic to the effect that^ in the nature of the case^ such an attempt
wUl prove either arbitrary or self -^delca ting.

^EpLstemic practices' is an ambiguous term. It might mean, as I just
now, following IHiillips, took it to mean^ moiic!^ of belief fomiatlon. But it
might also mean, modes of belief evafuatiofi. It is practices of belief evalua-
tion that the Reformed epistemologist has in tl:;e centre of his attention.
We humafi beings engage in the practice of evaluating our beliefs as
warranted, as rational, as justified, as cases of knowledge, as entitled,
and so forth. The Reformed epistemologist doesn't invent these prac-
tices. He finds themn and fiiids Ehat he himself is apartlcipaiiL in diem.
And he accepts Ihcm. It's not his goat to criticize them in any general
sort of way; witness i^lantinga's 'epiitemology from below\ Though he,
like everybody elsc^ thinks that people make mistakes in what they

5S fhUo.wpiiy ofRiiti^kvf w the 21st Century

appraise as warrantcdn as entitled^ and so fojcLh^ he is not of the view
that everybody is almost entirely ivroiig about knowledge, almost
entirely wrong about entitlement and so fortli. In the first and second
:Stages of Lhc movenicnl, what the Reformed cpistemolo^ist subjected
to critique w^as not our practices of dosastic evaluation but the anaij^^is
and critique of those practices offered by the classical foundationatists.
in the third stage of the movemcntj his goal has been lo give his own
positive account of these practices of evaluation. On this point, then,
there^s no dispute betiveen the Reformed cpistemologist and the
Wiltgcnsteinian philosopher of religion.

Rather often VVitt^ensteinian philosophers of religion have been
charged vsllh offering an atheistic account of religious language.
'Absolutely not/ they say, bridling at the charge. Ifs their view that the
existence of God is taken for granted in all that the theistically religious
person believes and says. The last thing such a person will say Is^ God
does not exist/ The 'grammar^ of Ihelstic religious language requires not
5a)Tng that- Saying that would be tantamount to repudiating one's
(theislic} rcligLcn- Of course theistically religious people^ when engaged
In their religious way of life, don't go around saying, 'God exists/
Instead they praise God, hless God, pctiLion God, and so forlh_ But if
pressed on the issue^ they will say emphatically^ 'God exists' - though
it falls strangely on their ears- In shorln this way of getting at the fun-
damental issue w^hich divides Reformed epistcmologists from mainline
Wiltgenstcinian philosophers of religion proves a dead-end-
Other such dead-ends could be explored. But let me, on this occa-
sicn^ resist entering all such dead-ends and state without further ado
what r regard as tlic fundamental point of dispute. Tliat i^ this: is it
possible to refer to God; and, having referred^ is it possible to prt'dk ate
things of God?

Let^s take D.Z- Ptiillips as the paradigmatic Witlgcnsteinian philoso-
pher of religion. In some of the passages in which Phillips discusses God
and reference^ what he says, taken strictly^ is not that we cannot refer to
God, but that God is not an object to w^hich we can refer, with the con-
text suggesting that by an ^ob]cct\ i'hillips means an entity occupying
a place in space. In one passage he says^ for exanipten Talk of God^s
existence or reality cannot be considered as talk about the existence of
an object- Neither can questions about whether we mean the same by
'^Gpd'"' be construed as whether we are referring to the same object. ""^-^
Now I myself find it extremely unlikely that anybody likely to read
Phillips's w^ritings docs believe that God is an object occupying space;
accordingly^ given the rules of 'conversational implicatioii^ one asks

Nicholas W:}iter.^torJf' 59

oneself whether perhaps Phillips docsn^t mean to say oi suggest some-
thing niorCn or something else. Why bother lelling us that God Is not a
spaflal object?

This query gains added force from the rhetorical structure of some of
the relevant passa^s. Here Is an example of what 1 have in mind:

Ifn ... having heard of people praising the Creator of heaven and eajfthn
glorifying the Father of us all, feeling answerable to the t>nc ivho sees
all, someone were to say, 'But these arc only religious perspectives^
show inc what they refer to'^ this would be a misunderstandiiig of
the ^ammar of such perspective.-.. The religious pictures give one a
language in ^vhich it is possible Co think about human hfe in a ceT-
taln way. The pictures ...provide ihe logical space within which
such thoughts eaii have a place. Whcii these thoughts arc found in
worship^ the praising and the glorifying does not refer to some
object called God. Ralhcrn the expression of such praise and ^lory is
what we call the worship of God.^^

The imagined interlocutor asJa to be shown what the religious perspec-
tives refer to. Now if by 'show' he^s askhig to have the spatial object
called God displayed to him, then indeed he's deeply confused -though
to iiitcrpiet his words thus is to interpret them with a woodcnness that
Phillips would rightly leap upon if exhibited in some philosopher's
Intcrprctalion of religious language. But let Ihat pass. Phillips does not
respond to this Imaj^incd remark by correcting the confusion about
tlic nature of God which the remark (on the Interpretation being con-
S^ercd) exhibits. Instead he ma'kes quite a different point. What he
says is that 'The religious pictures give one a language in which it is
possible to think about human life in a certain way^ - not^ notice^ a
language in which it is possible to think ^bout Ooii ami Ood^s reiatkm to
human life in a certain way, but a language in which it Is possible to
think about imnkiff iifc in a certain way. So too^ after remarking, two
sentences later, that "^the praising and the glorifying does not refer
to some object called God/ he goes on to say that 'the expression of
such praise and glory is what we call the worship of God\ Tf the
mistake of the interlocutor was to suppose that God is a spatial object
which can be refcrted to, how w^ould this be an answer to that? In short,
tlie rhetorical structure of tlic passage suggests that the worship of God
has nothing at all to do with w^hethcr there's any reference to God^ and
w^hethcr praise is addressed to tlic being referred to. Worship of God
only has to do with whether certain 'thoughts are found in worship'.

60 FtsUGSf?piiy ofR^ti^w}! w f/re 21st Century

Finally, thcHj consider this passage:

In face of what is given, the believer kneels. Talk of ^God' has Its 5ense
ill this reaction. It is not the name of an individual; ll docs not refer
to anything-.-- U is all too easy to conclude Ihat ii icligious expres-
sions which involve talk of God are nol referring expres-sions, if no
object corresponds to such talk, such expressions caiinot say any-
thing nor can they be held lo be Imc. In this chapter, however^ we
have seen that this argumenL contains unwarrantable assumptions.
We have argued for olhcr possibilities. When these arc recognized we
see that religious expressions of praise, glory, etc. are not referring
expressions. These activities are expressive in character, and what
they express is called the AYorship of God. Is it reductionism to say
tiiaL wiiat is meant by the reality of God is to be foiind in certain
pictures which say themselves? ^^

Now all ambiguity has been dissipated. The word 'God' do^^ not refer
to anytfu}!^. Initially vs^e had some reason to think that the mistake
of the interlocutor was to suppose that in our use of ^God talk' we refei
to a ^piitinl oh)ect_ Noiv we see that, on Phillips'5 view, his mistake
goes deeper; he doesn't get home free by conceding that^ when using
'God talk'n we refer to a being who transcends this spatial order.
The mistake of the interlocutor wa^ in assuming that 'God talk^ is refer-
ential. Such speech is purely expressive in character; praise is expres-
sive activity- And when the one who praises uses ^God talk\ such
expressive activity fint is what constitutes ihe worsliip of God. Thcrc^s
nothing more to the worship of God than that. Now we understand
why the passages quoted earlier liave the rhetorlcai structure to whicli
I pointed-

flilllips is remarkahty chary of telling us why on his view, 'God taJk'
is purely expressive - why the w^oid ^God\ as used by religious people,
'does not refer to anj^hing^ Sometimes one gets the impression that
Jfs a doctrine of reference whicli Is at work: we can only refer to that
which occupies a place in space. At other times one gets the Impression
that what's operating is a certain theolog}^, along the lines of Plotinus,
Kant and Tlllich: God is not a one-among-others that can be picked
out_ Best not to speculate, however. Phillips never lays out his reasons;
he contents himself with lieaping ridicule on anyone wlio uses the
word Mndividuar or 'object' when speaking of God, never telling us
what word he himself prefers, If any, and on insisting that religious dis-
course is in good measure not assertory in character.

Nichofds WGiter.^tojff^ 61

Now it's possible thai Phillips didn^l really mean what he said in the
passages to which I have poinlcd from RcU^ion witiiout Exphmatioii. But
just a5 I am not aware of any pas-sage in which Phillips explains why he
holds that the word Xxod^ 'does not refer to anything'', so loo 1 am not
aware of any in which, to correct misinterpretations of his thought, he
says flat out that of course he hclieves that 'God^ is used by theists to
refer; all he ever wanted to say was that God is not a spatii}! object - or
all he ever wauled to say was that Plolluus was right in holding that
God is not a one-among-othcrs. So I think w^e have no option but to
hold that Phillips did and docs mean what he said there.

It's on this issue of reference and predication concerning God (along
with the issue of wliether theistic language implies existential quantifica-
tions over God) that Phillips's version of Wilt^enstelniantsm clashes most
directly with Reformed Epistemolo^^ For Ihc Reformed epistemologlst
understands himself^ when using 'God talk', as referring to God. And
though one can refer to God Vnlthoul predicating somelliing of God - as
when the psaEmist enjoins himself to bless God's holy name - the
Reformed epistemologist understands himself as often going on to
predicate things of Gckj^ these predications then being true or false of
God depending on the fact of the matter The Reformed epistemologlst
understands his religious cohorts as regularly doing the same things he
does - namclyj refer to God and predicate things of God. Thus the
Reformed epistemologist holds that a great deal of theistic religious
language is used refercntLally and predicalively concerning God^ and
that a great deal of it entails propositions expressed with sentences
which quantify over God- If there is no such being as Godj, thcn^ on
the account of theistic religious language wliich is taken for granted by
the Reformed epistemologlst, theistic religious language misfires in a
most radical way. For of course one cannot refer to^ and predicate
things of, what there isn't.

Who's right on this issue? No doubt there's room here for a good
deal of philosophical lo4ng and fro-ing^ each side pressing the other
for reasons for his position^ questioning those reasons, tr\1ng to extract
'absurd' consequences from the other's position, and so on. It's my
own guess, however, that when the dust has settled, it's going to come
down to what those who use Ihetstic language in a serious religious
way, and who grasp the philosophical issues at stake, understand them-
selves as intending to do when they use ^God calk'.

1 judge myself to he such a person, and my fellow Reformed episte-
mologists to be such as well. And we understand ourselves, when using
'God talk', to be intending lo refer to God and (often) lo predicate

&2 FtsUosoptiy ofRiiti^w}! w the 21st Century

things of God; likewise wc undcfstand ourselves^ when using thcistic

language, to be saying things which imply that there Is a being such
that !t is identical with God. If wc were pcRuadf^d that those intentions
were fundamentally misguided because there is no such bein;^ as God,
then we would cease using 'Gcd talk' - other than to Join our atheist
friends in exclaiming, Thank God it's Ftiday!^ WhaE^s the poinl of
talking about God saving us if theie^s no God to do the savingJ

D-Z- Phillips Ls also someone who uses theistic language in a serious
religious way, and who understands the philosophical issues at stake.
Yet he docs not understand himself to be meaning to use 'God talk' rcf-
eientially and predlcatively.

'So w^haf s the solution? One possibility is that one or the other of us
fails to understand our own intentions in using 'God talk""- What
strikes me as much more plausible is that wc simply use theistic
language in hindamentally different ways. Phillips offers what we can
assume to Ik an accurate deseriplion of how he and his fellow main-
line Wittgensteinians use theistic language; I gave what I take to be an
accurate description of how 1 and my fellow Reformed cpistemologists
use thcistic language. 5o we're both right - provided that wc Iwth
avoid univer^alization_ Philltps^s account holds for himself and main-
line Wittgensteinians^ but not for me and my fellow^ Reformed cpiste-
mologists; my account holds for myself and my fellow Reformed
epistcmologists, but not for mainline Wittgensteinians.

What holds for all the others - for all the other users of theistic
language? My own guess is that almost all of themp if they saw^ the
issue^ would say that chey meant to be using theistic language as 1 and
my fellow Reformed episteuiologists use it not as Phillips uses it.
Almost all of them would feel profoundly disillusioned if they came to
the view that God is not among that which is available for reference
and predication - for the reason that it's not true that there exists a
being which is God. If Phillips's religious use of theistic language con-
forms to his description, then his use represents a revision of how such
language has traditionally been used; his religious use of such language
is a revisionist use.

Phillips understands himself, in his 'writings^ as^ speaking not reli-
giously but philosophically; and ovef and over he sa)^ that his aim, as
philosopher, is not to revise but describe. His description does not
hold, howcvern for how Itcformed epislemologists use theistic lan-
guage; nor, I contend, for how most people use such language. His
description holds only for a ralh^r select group of Wittgensteinians and
their allies. Yet his words regularly carry the suggestion that he is

describing al! serious ictigious use of thcistic language. Accordingly^ his
description Is, for most people, a .fm^descripEion. And should his dis-
cussion succeed in getting sonio people to think they arc using thcistic
language in his way^ when in fact they have been using it in any way,
then his discussion threatens to do what he says he wants at all cost to
avoid doing; namely^ it threatens to function not as description but as
revision.

Notes

1 _ LTniveriitj^ of Notre Dame Press.

2. Nous, March 19S1.

3. Grand Rapids^ Eerdfnan:; Pubhshing C(i_

4. Ithdcaj Cornell Univer_sitv Press.

5. Grand Rapids: Eerdmanji PuhJLsiiing Co_

6. New York" Rcnitiedge, 19SB.
7 ibid-, p- 259-

B. iVf, for example^ ibid., pp- 32-3_

9. Oxford! Oxford University Prew, 1993. 1993 and IfKlO.

10- Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

LI- Oxford: O-xford University Press, 1997.

12- 5ffj for e-xample^ ibid., p- 3S-

13- RL'ii,^ia}i withoitl Expiiuiation ^Oxford: Biack^veil^ i^^^Jj P- 1^4.
14. ibid-, pp, 148-9-

Li. Ibid-, pp. 148, ISO-

On Behalf of the Evidentialist
a Response to Wolterstorff

Stephen /. tV)^A:jfm

Why don't you just scrap this God iTU^ncss, says one of my
bitter suffering friends, it's a rotten woild^ you and I have been
shafted^ and that's that.

I'm pinned down. When I survey this gigantic intricate
world, I cannot believe that it just came abouL I do not mean
that I have some good arguments for its being made and that I
beHeve in the ar^ments. 3^ mcati that ihis conviction wells up
irresistibly within me wlien 1 contemplate the world.

Nicholas Woltcistorff^ Lumeutfof a Son

Reformed epistemology as rtHgioiis philosophy

Nicholas WoltersLorff has j^iven us an illuminating account of the
development and main claims of Reformed Epistcmology- Reformed
Epistemology, he has stressed^ seeks to provide an account of the
epistcmological status of thetstic belief, not an overall philosophy
of religion. In tlic 1980s^ its project was priniartly negative aiming to
overcome the evidentialist challenge, alleging that theistic belief is
lacking in warrant or entitlement if it is not supported by good rea-
sons. So this phase was brush-clearing, seeking to clear away evidential-
ist bramble. In the 1990s, its projeit has become more positive, aiming,
we might say, to grow^ in the place of the bramble, a garden of ncw^
cpistcmologleal insights about wliat gives theistlc belief Its various
doxastlc merits, and what makes it deeply relevant to the theoretical
and interpretive disciplines.

Reformed t-pistemology iSj Wolterstorff has stressed, not a philosophy
of religion; but his description of its roots indicate that it is a religious
philosophy^ For it is rooted in the vision of nco-Calvlnism, especially as

Stephen /. tV>-"jt.sfrii 65

articulated by Abiahani Kuyper And that vision Is itself religious In
characicr. What, cpistcmolo^Leally spcakiiig, is at its heart? It is, I
think, that God Lias made each of us so that we can. through God's
regenerating and sanctifying worlt in our livcs^ increasingly come to
know God in a cognltivcly direct way- Direct does not here mean
individualistic. Reformed thinkers prize tlic Scrlpltircs, the community
wiiich is the priesthood of all bclieverSj the sacraments^ and the
preaching of the Word. So the idea of directness is not that we need
these things - the Word, the sacraments, the community less and less as
wc spiritually mature; to the contrary, we need these things more and
more. Rather^ the idea is that God has made us so that as ive mature,
our knowing God through these things rests more and more on some-
thing involving God's own testimony in our hearts, as he uses these
things 10 hring us to Himself.

This conception of religious knowing is stressed by Calvin and later
reformed theologians (thougli of course it can also be found within
other currents within the great river of Christian tradition as wcllh Tt
is itself a religious vision^ part of a religious worldview. The Reformed
Epistemologists (and here 1 mean Plantinga, Wolterstorff and William
Alston, an Episcopalian who is a kind of honorary Reformed thinker)
liave used de^^clopments In meta-cpistemology to give a philosophical
elaboration and deployment of this vision^ and used the vision to
propel new developments in epistemology. They thus tliemselves
exemplify the thesis that Christian theism is deeply relevant to tlie
theoretical and interpretative disciplines.

Objections

What, then, of objections to Reformed cpisteniology? In addition to

objections discussed by Wolterstorff, these have come from three main

quarters.

Firsc, there are objections from the quarters of analytic philosophers
who think thcistic religion is or may be unreasonable due to evidcn-
tialist deficiencies.

Second, there are objcetioiisfrom what we might call the pluralists
those who find Reformed cpistemolog)^ too complacent in what it says
or fails to say about rival sources of insight which contlict with the
deliverances of theistic practice. One group of rivals consists of other
religious traditions; another source consists of secular sources of
insight, like Nietzsche^ Freud and Marx.

&6 fhUti^^ptiy ofR^ti^w}! w the 21st Century

Thirdj there are objections from thcists vslio think Reformed episte-
molog\^ has insufflclenl appreciation for llie value of evidential support
for various theistic beliefs. Catholic critics have faulted Reformed
IhinkcTS for depreciating the role of natural theology. Evangelical critics
have pleaded /or more recognition of the importance of Christian
apDiogetics. not so much in the tradition of natural theology but in the
tradition of evidences of Christianity^ reasoned defences of the reliabil-
ity of the gospels, the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus, and so on.

These three sources of objections overlap, of course, and certain com-
mon themes emerge. In particular, many (though not all) of the critics
think that there is more to be said on behalf of e\adcntlalism than
Reformed thinkers have granted. And this is the issue 1 would like to
press. 1 shall do so in my own way, since I know it l>est. Wolterstorff
remarks that one characteristic of the positive phase of Reformed epis-
temolog\^ has been an almost total absence of further ground clearing.
There has becii little looking backward at the pile of evldentialist bram-
ble that was cleared. I shall poke around In the bramblCn to see if there
might still not be a green branch thai belongs In the Reformed garden.

What is tht real issue?

Lcfs begin by going back to the issue dividing Reformed thinkers from
their polemical partner, the cvidcntialists. That issue is whether theistic
belief needs evidence. EvidentialLsts think that it does^ Reformed episte-
mologists think that it doesn't. They urge, instead, that theistic belief, at
its epistcmic best^ Is a 'properly basic' belief^ akin to our beliefs in physi-
1^1 objects or the past or other minds. I shall call this thesis basicalism,
and shall often refer to a Reformed Epistemologlst as a basicalist. It is
perhaps an ugly term, but it provides the right contrast to evldentialist.

BasleaHsts, then, say that theistic belief does not need evidence;
belief in God, as Plantinga puts it (1983p p- 17) can be 'entirely right,
proper, and rational without any evidence or argument at all\ Now it is
crucial to realize that when basicalists say this, they are using the term
evideiice in a marrow sense. This is, as Plantitiga himself fully realizes,
a somewhat artificial sense. I believe I have two hands: do I have
evidence of mv senses. So the mitumi sense of the word evidence is
a broad sense, a sense that includes not only inferential arguments, but
also direct or immediate justificrs like sensory evidence^ memory dispo-
sitions, and so on. Reformed thinkers, however, are not using the term
in this broad sense. When they speak of evidence, they mean, almost
alwavSj inferential c^ddence. (Inferential evidence consists of other

Stephen} f. Wyt:.^trn 67

propositions wc believe^ from which wq infer the trutli of the belief in
question-) When basicalists want to speak of n on -Inferential jusUfierSn
th^^y use the term grounds rather than evidence. My belief that T have
tivo hands docs not rest on evidence^ but on grounds.

So the Great Dividing Issue between basicalists and cvidentialtsts is
this^ Docs ihci^tic behcf Ji^if^J iviiieiice iff the min'ow inferi'fitinl wnse of
evidence? Wc mi^ht think wc arc now clear about what the dividing
issue Is. But arc wc? I do not think so. The notion of needing iniercn-
tial evidence is far more slippcrj-' than one might think.

What is it for a t^clicf to need inferential evidence? Our initial grasp of
the notion tends to come from familiar examples. That the sun is shining
outside my window is something I can just tell by looking and seeing;
that 1 plus 1 is 2 IS something immediately obvious to my reason. Tliesc
claims do not need inferential evidence; they can properly b^ believed
in a basic fthat is, non infeTcntiall way. But I also believe things whose
truth Is not obvious In any such basic way - that the sun is about
9^ million miles away, or that 17 times 139 equals 2363^ or that atoms
arc made of protons^ electrons and neutrons. So such claims, if they arc
to be properly belte^'cd, need to be secured by infcEcncc of an appropri-
ale sort_ Call them property inferential proposition's.

But what docs it really mea}f, to say that these latter claims need
inferential evidence? Take the claim about the sun; wc all surely agree
that fn soTTie sense, it docs heed inferential evidence- (Wc also pre-
5uineH of course, that it Ihf-s what it needs. The v%^ord 'needs' here is used
in that sense that docs not imply a lacL The paradigm is Humans need
watcr^ iiot I need a drink.) But who needs to know this evidence? Surely
I do hot personally need to loioiv it. Certain astrDhomcrs who work on
tliese things need to know it. And similarly for my belief that atoms
arc made of electrons^ protons^ and ncutronsr for my belief to be okay^
it is not necessary for me lo know the evidence for this. Rather^ It is
certain physicists that must know^ this evidence fand, of course, T must
be in some sort of appropriate relation to them).

''I must'? - for the sake of what? Imagine we learn, ten years from
now, that scientists didn't really have this evidence for elections, but had
instead been duped by some extremely clever conmen in Copc!iha^en.
Does that mean you and 1, in 1999^ were improper in believing w-hat
we did about electrons? That doesn't seem right_ Perhaps we Qookin^
back) would say our beliefs had some sort of defect^ but the defect docs
not seem to be that we were improper in holding them.

So the notion of needing inferential evidence is slippery in. two ways-
Firsl, it is not easy to say what refution ttf the evidence is needed. And

6B fhUo.wpiiy ofRiiti^w}! w the 21st Century

second, it is nol easy to s^y what^ for the sake of winch evidence is
needed- This Is so, I am suggesting, even when one thinks about simple
scientific beliefs. EvidentLalism seems like the right stance to take
toward these beliefs: it docs seem they arc things lliat need evidence-
But it is not easy to spell out this means.

Daxastic mt-rits

Let mc now connect this to a point made by Woltcrstorff. He notes

ihaL there arc a niulliplicity of doxaslic merits lliat beiiefs can have, (hi
many twentieth-century disputes about the correct cxpltcation of what
it is for a belief to be justified, he suggests thai rival theorists actually
have different doxastic merits in niind, and thus have different expli-
canda/) In partLcular, WoltcTstorff distinguishes between the merits of
entitlement and warrant. He then proposes that Reformed epislemol-^
ogy (in Its negative phase) should be understood

to be the claim^ for some particular doxastic merits that there are
beliefs about God held immediately [non-infercntially] which possess
that merit.

Accordingly, he says^ in speaking of the negative pliase of Reformed
Epistemology:

we ou^ht not speak of Reformed Epistemolo^^ tout court, but of
Refotmcd Episteniology concerning warranty of Reformed EpisLe-
inology concerning cntitlcmcht, etc.

Tliis is surely right systematical ly. But hisLoricallyn it seems to me that
iliis particular distinction emerged only in the third positive phase of
Reformed episteniologj^ With the exception of a single footnote, I find
no cognizance of this distinction in FnitJi ami Riitioiujiity, Lhc ioctis
ci{i^siciis of Reformed eplstemolog^^ in its negative, or evidentialism-
ovcrcoming, piiasc. Xo^ in that phase iteforined thinkers aiways had in
mind the doxastic merit of sathisulity. In asserting that theistic belief
does not need evidence, they w^ere always claiming that theistic belief
does not need evidence to be mtio}Uit. The distinctions they drew were
distinctions helping to clarify the term rational, not to distinguish
it from warrant. This means they tj/^vw.^ construed evidentialism as
claiming that if the believer believes without basing his or her belief on
evidence, then he or she is in some sense iiratiorhiL

Stephen} f. Wyt:.strn 69

Ration all ty-tvidtiitial ism

Let us make this construal more expliclL Evidcntialtsm, so construed,
says thelstic belief needs cvtdcTice if theists *irc to l>c rational for to
avoid being irrational) in thcii: believing. Uut what is it^ to be ^rationar
(or 'irrationar)? Reformed thinkers considered Lwo broad possibitiiies.
The first is that being rational is a matter of fulfilling our intollcctual
duties - our duties in matters of forming and regulating our beliefs. An
irfailonal belief is one that violates these duties: irfationality, on Lhis
construal, is doxastic sin. The second possibility construes rationality
as a matter of manifesting certain 'excellences' in belie f-tormation.
Richard has a brain tumour, causing him to form paranoid beliefs that
liis wife is trying to kill him. Given the tumour^ he cannot help buL do
this. We would not blame him, thinking he is violating some duty;
nevertheless we might well call him irrational- ('How could Rich accuse
me like that?/ his wife sobs. ""Jane', the doctor replies, Vou've got to
remember the tumour is making him irrational/) Richard's believing
falls short of standards, but these standards prescribe, not duties, but
desirable or excellent ways of functioning, akin to standards informing
our judgements about health. On this second construal^ Irrationality is
not doxasric sin but doxastic sickness.

Both explications capture important ordinary uses of the term
'rational'. Moicovern they have an important commonality. On both,
to deem a person irrational i^ to diagnose something as 'going wrong^
in the subject holding the belLef. It is something in thli believ-
ing subject whether a culpable sin or a non-culpable sickness that
needs changing or fixing, if things arc to be brought up to snufL
Evaluations of rationality aitd irrationality are, wc can put it, .■jHif/i.'i.f-
f€cti:^i:d evaluations. And cvldentialism, on this construal, is thus
claiming that thcSstic belief needs Inferential evidence in order for the
believing subject to be free of doxastlc sin or doxastic sicki:tcss in his
believing.

But in requiring that theistic belief be based on evideticep what
reiatlon to evidence would such an evidentlallst then be claiming that
theistic belief ""needs? If we are taking evidence to be needed for the
sake of the rationality of the subject^ w^hat is needed is^ plausibly, that
the believing subject herself be cognizant of the evidence and its evi-
detitial bearing on the proposition she believes, and that she hold the
behef partly because of this. Putative evidence will not contribute to an
individual's being ratiomii In believing some proposition, unless this
evidence fait within that individuates cognizance. So evidentialism, as

70 FtsUosGpiiy ofR^ti^w}! w the 21st Century

addressed by Reformed epistcmologistSH was alwa)^ construed as claiming

iomclhing like iliis:

Any incfivliiual believing IhaE God exists must^ in order to be nitio-
n{il, hold this bchef on the basis of his/her ov/ii inference of tt from
evidence.

iLet us call Lhis riitloiiaJity-^vhientidllsm.

Is avtrcoinlng rationalfty-evidentialism enough?

But is rationality-evidenlialism really the right way to construe the
evidcntiahst's core intulilon that theistic belief 'needs evidence'? Here

consider Planttnga's counterexample agaitist one variety of ev'identialisi:Li
construed in this way. Plantings considers a "14 year old who believes
In God, having been raised in a community where everyone so believes.
This young man, stipulates that Plantinga (1983^ p. '^'^):

doesn't believe in God on the basis of evidence, lie has never heard
of the cosmological, teleological, or oiitological arguments; in fact
no one has ever presented him with any evidence at alL And
although he has often been told about God, lie doesn't lake that
testimony as evidence; he doesn't reason thus: everyone around
here says that God loves us and cares for us; most of what everyone
around here says is true; so probably tlnit^ true. Instead, he simply
believes what hc^'s tauglit.

Let's call this young man llanser- As Plantinga describes him. Hansel
simply believes what his elders have taught htm about God. In so
doingn is Mansel necessarily irrational? Rationality-evidcnlialism entails
that he is; but surely, says Plantinga, it is quite implausible to think
tliat in so believing, this youth is irrational in the sense of being in
violation of his doxastic duties. Plantinga seems to me right about this;
and he remains right, I believe, when v^e construe rationality In any of
its plausible senses. The case of Hansel^ then, gives us reason to re|ect
rationality-evidcntialism.

But docs it tell against evldcntialism? Docs rejecting rationaJUy-
evidenlialism mean rejecting the core intuition gf cvidentialism? To
answer this, let us return to the point I made earlier: we are, almost all
of us^ 'cvidentialists' about seme things. Almost all of us would want to
say, intuitivclyj that a claim hke "electrons exist' needs Enfcrcnttal

Stephen} f. Wyt:.^trn 71

evidence. So most of us^ even it wc are Reformed thinkers about belief
In Godp arc evldcntiallsl^ about electrons (or about the distance of the
5un from the earth, and so on}. Now, in taktng it intuitively that elec-
tron-belief 'needs evidence', arc we really endorsing ratiomiiity-tvuien'
tmdsm about electrons? Are wc^ that is^ endorsing the claim:

Any' individual believing that electrons exist must, in order to be
rational^ hold his/hei belief that electrons exist on the basis of
his/her own inference of It frotn evidence.

Sufcly not. For suppose we consider some 14 -year-old jjd who believes
that electrons exists having been raised in a community where every-
one so believes. Gretcl, as we may call her doesn't believe in electrons
on the basis of e^rEdcnce. She has ne\'er heard of the Millikan oil
drop exj.x^rlmenl, of electron-diffraction, or of the quantum-theoretic
explanations of spectroscopic data; in fact no one has ever presented
her with any evidence for electrons at alL And although she has often
been toM about electrons, she doesn't take that testimony as evidence;
she doc5n t reason thus: everyone around here says that electrons exist;
most of what everyone around here says is truc^ so probably that's true.
Instead, she simply believes what she's taught.

So Gretel, like I'lahscl, believes what her elders have taught her,
without knowing the evidence. Now in our intuitive evidential ism
about electrons, arc we saying that Grctcl is necessarily inational in
this? One hopes not. Oniy an epistcinlc Scrooge would immedialely
deem Grctcl as doxastically sick of sinful in believing her feachc^ as
she does. Gretel (like Hansel) need not be irradonal In so believing; so
fationatity-^'ideiitialism about electron belief is wrong. But docs this
inean that our mtaitive LvideiitUiSisni about electrons is WTong? Does
admitting that Grctel mi-^ht be okay entail admitting that we were
wrong in our core intuition that electron theory 'needs Inferential
evidence'? Surely not. What the case of Gretel teaches us is iwt that our
Intuitive evldentialism about electrons is wrong; what it teaches us is
that this evidenttalrsm is not faithfully captured or adequately expli-
cated by rationality-evidentialism.

But now let us suppose that what evidcntiahsts want to say about
tlieistic belief is what wc^ almost all of us^ want to say (aiid have a hard
time saying clearly) about electron-belief- Then rationality-evidentialism
also does not faithfully capture what the evldentialist really wants to
ScLV about thclstic belief.

72 FtsUGSf?piiy ofRiiti^kvi w the 21st Cetitury

Towards a more sensible evidentialism

What, thciin do we mean, when we intuiUvely take electron-belief to
'need eviideni:e7 There are two sub-quc5tlons to prc5? here. Firsts what
sort of !'t'hit:ia}i to evidence do we take electron-belief {qnii hciicving) to
need? The case of Gretel gives a clue here. She believes in electrons on
the say-so or testimony or authority of her teacher in accord with what
Rcid calls the Credulity Principle- And her teacher may have also
acquired his belief in a similar way, so there is here a chain of testi-
monial grounding. But such a chain must somewhere have an anchor:
Neils may believe in electrons by trusting the say-so of Ernst; and Ernst^
by trusting the say-:^o of Wolfgang, but somewhere this chain must be
anchored in someone's believing in electrons on a non-:estimonial
basis. And when we, as e^ldentialistSn insist Ihat belief in electrons
needs evidence, it is this ultimate anchoring iliat we have in mind.

At the heart of our cvidentialism tegarding electrons^ in other words, is
the intuition that inferential evidence for electrons needs to be available
to the comimmitv of clectron~[>clieveTS. We do not mean that each Individ^
ucii electron-believer needs to have sorted through this evidence or even
that each t>cliever is able to do so. (Hansel and Gretel may bQ so deficient
in mathematical abilitv that the e^^'ldential case for electrons will forCT^er
be beyond their grasp-} So, what is needed is that they be appropriately
connected to an e I cetron-bel levins community, that there be an infer-
ential case for electrons available to this community, and that some
appioprtate sc^^nicnt of that community have processed this evidence.
Tlie needed relation to evidence is a connmuutnihvi relation, rathe!
than an individualistic one.

The second question is this: for tlie sake of what doxastte merit Is
evidence iieeded? Reformed epistemologists construe cvidentialism as
claiming that it is needed for the sake of avoiding irrationality. But is
tliis why a communitarian relation to evidence is needed? Consider
again Gretel, believing in electrons on the say-so of her fifth grade
teacher. We prcsumCp normally^ that an evidential case for electrons is
indeed available to the community to which she and her teacher
belong. But is It tlie rutioaaiit}^ of GreteFs belief that is enhanced by this
presumed case? Well, imagine that we learn, ten years from now^ that
our presumption was mistaken - that tliere is no good evidential case
for electrons, and that the entire presumed case for electrons was an
elaborate hoax perpetrated by clever connicn in Copenhagen in the
1920s- Would learning this lead us to re\1se our judgement that Gretel
was rational - would we^ that is, deem that she was (and all along had

Stephen} f. Wyt:.^tr£i 7'^

been) imitionai in bctievinR Ln electrons on the say so of her teacher?
.Surely not. Dut this means it \s not Toi tlie sake of (he rationality of her
eloctron-^helief that we think sucti evidence i% needed.

Warrant

Wolterstorff refers to the distinction between entitlemcnl and warrant;

let us now ask i^'hcther we c^in exphcate our e\1dentlahs!n about elec-
trons in terms of warrant. The term is Plantinga's; he introduces it as a
covering term to refer to that special whatcvcr-it-is which^ when added
to a true belief, makes that true belief a case of knowledj^e. Classical
Internalists took that Special Something to be a certain high degree of
being justified in believing, where being iustified is closely allied to
being lathtuif in one's believing. Rut externalists hold that it consLsLs
in the knowing subject and known object being in a certain type of
relallonship - a relationship 1 shall call 'successful epistemie hookup'.
On 'reliabilisf theorieSn a belief has H\^rrant when it is produced by a
'reliable process', a process that produces, or would produce^ true
beliefs a sufficiently high proportion of the time. What matters^ say
reliabili^ts^ i^ the 'externar fact that the pri>cess is reliable- not that the
subject lias any awareness of or access to this reliability. Reliabihsts are
externalists Ix^cause they reject the assumption, characteristic of classi-
cal for pTC-Getticr'> internalism, that the additive that turns true belief
into knowledge must be accessible within the subject^s perspective.

To make the difference vivid (and determine whether your own
prochvities are internalist of cKternalistj consider the following scenario.
Cheech and Chong both wake up to the apparent sound of their alarm
clock buzzing, and both form the belief that their alarm is buzzing.
Now Cheech is woken by his real alarm clock actually buzzing- Chong,
In contrastn has been abducted during the night by technologically
advanced Alpha Centaurians, who have drugged him (needlessly),
taken him to a planet orbiting Alpha Centaur i, and put his brain in
a vat, waring tt to a computer which Is able to replicate precisely the
brain's being in its old body back in the Haight Chong's 'virtual real-
it)'' will, by their advanced lechnolo^p be as vivid and complete as
Cheech's real experience. The wiring completed^ the computer now
sends Chong's brain the same electrical signals that it would have
received waking up Lp the sound of his alarm clock. Chong's belief^ we
finally note, happens to be true, for just as Chong w^akes up, a child
Alpha Centauriaii has wandered into the lab, carrying Chong^s alarm
clock, which her father had brought back as a little present. She drops

74 I*hiiGSf?piiy ofRiiti^kvf w the 21st Century

the alarm, and U goes off at just the moment that Chong^ ^roggily

waking up to the computcr-gcncralcd sound of an alarm clock, forms
tlic belief 'Kiy alarm clock n ringing/ By coincidencp, Chong is thus
forming a true belief.

Now though Chong's belief is true^ most of us would intultivety say
that tn thi^ situation he does not have h^nvkd^^' Ihat his alarm clock is
ringing. The revealing question is what saying Ihis will incline us lo
say abouE Checch, waking up hack on earth to ihc real sound of his
alarm clock ringing. If we say thatChong^s belief is net knowledge, can
we sLtll affirm that Chccch's belief is kno%vlcdge? Classical internalism
creates an extremely strong conceptual pressure to answer 'No, we
cannot affirm this." For internalism holds that the justifiers that make
true beliefs ^knowledge' must be things to which the believing subject
has access. But in our scenario, Checch has access to no more or better
justifiers than docs Chong. Both Cheech and Chong^ after all, have the
same range and qualiLy of sensations, sensations of waking tJi a room
to the sound and sight of their familiar alarm clocks. There is nothing
in his experience to which Cheech can point Lhat is not also available
to Chong- Tnternalistically, the two are on epistemic par; the internalist
will thus wani: to treat them identically. Given our initial judgement
that Chong's '|ustifiers' do not make his belief knowledge, it will then
strongly seem, if we are classical internalists, that Chcech's justifiers
cannot make his Ix^Iief knowledge either.

lixternalism, in contrast, allows oiie to treat the two cases diffcrendy.
For Cheech's belief is in fact produced by the normal causal process,
whereas Ciiong^'s is not- Externalists can thus say that Cheech lias
knowledge while Chong does not, due to some evaluatively relevant
difference (say, in their objective rdinbiiit}') between the two processes.
Whether this difference was accessible within the perspective or expe-
rience of Cheecli or Chong is^ for externalists^ not important: what
matters is that the difference is actually there. If it is there, then by
externalist's lights^ Checch^s Lruc bchef can be knowledge though
Chong's is not.

Would externalists then see Cheech as lustifled in his l>eUef^ but
Chong as unjustified? This is a bit tricky. SomeEimes philosophers sim-
ply stipulate Lliat they will use 'justified' as the technical term for that
epistcmic additive, whatever it is, that turns true belief into knowledge.
In that (;vent the answer would be Tes\ liut as Alston and Plantinga
have taught us, the word ^justification', as used in ordinary English, is
laden with connotations of doing as one ougliL Externalists do not
deny that beliefs can be evaluated with respect to this; they insist only

Stephen} f. Wyt:.^trn 7S

that this is not what turns true belief into knowledge. Perspicacious
cxicrnallsis thus give a ticw name for this further thing (warr^intn
cpLsEemic adequacy, positive epislcmic status, Special KJ, allowing us to
rclaiii the old terms [rationality^ reasonableness, being justified, and so
on) for siibjecl "focused dimensions. In any case, externalists are not
offering an account of what is ordinarily called being justified; they are
offering an account of sometbing elsc^ and are claiming that it is this
something else that turns true belief into knowledge, As they see it^
Chong^5 belief is just as justified (rational) as Cbeech's belief: it faih to
be knowledge^ not because it lacks rational justification^ but because it
lacks iViifTfiiJiL

But will the two Ik enfitfily unrelated? Here, 1 think, many eKternat-
isls have gone overboard, Extcrnalism says that what soups a true belief
up into knowledge is warrant - a relationship of ^positive cj>istemie
hook"Ujj^ between the knowing subject and the known object. But a
right-headed extemalism, as I see it, will insist chat this positive epis-
temic hook-up depends on things gomg sufficiently right at both the
subject pole and object pole^ not just at the latter. Things going fight
at the subject pole, especially with respect to howcpistemically mature
subjects can be expected to perform, given what they have access to,
are matters of rationality and justification. On a right-headed account^
as 1 see it, Chong's being sufficiently rational in his believing will
remain a necessary condition for his beliefs having warrant; it is just
not a sufficient condition-
Sensible evidential Ism

Let us now return to our question. AH of us are evidentlalists about
some things, Tite belief in electrons: we intuttivelj' regard electron-
belief as needing (in a communitarian sense) evidence. But for the Siike
of ^^'hdt is this needed? We can now propose that it is needed for the
sake of electron-beliefs having warrant (or Special K). We have Jusl seen
tltat a belief can lack warrant due to malfunction either at the subieei
pole (which tj-'plcally involves Irrationality) or at the object pole
(which need not). If Gretel is a vtctini of the Copenhagen Con^ the
malfunction arises at the object pole. Gretcl could thus be entirely
n^tionai m believing in electrons; nevertheless, the evtdentialist (about
electrons) will want to s<iy that her belief is cpistemically defective
(it lacks svarrant), due to a dreadful malfunction at the ob|ect pole
outside her cognitive access. This, I propose, captures with some fidelity
what our evidentialism about electrons comes to: about electrons, we

76 fhUo.wpiiy ofRiiti^kvf w the 21st Century

arc warrant-cvidcntialisEs, not rationality for cnlitlcmcnt-) cvidentialists.
Rationality-ckadcnLiali^m abotil electrons is, as the case of Gretd helps
show, a thoroughly extravagant position. [The denial of this position
i3y accordingtyn ratlicr uninteresting-) But warrant-evidcnLialism about
electrons i5 not only truer to our intuitions^ Lt is also a lar more sensi-
ble position- I liereby dub it sensible evidentialism.

But now let us suppose that theistic cvldcntialists^ all along^ have
meant to say about belief iti God the same thing that we, all along, have
meant to say about belief in electrons. They have not been rationality-
evidentiatists; they have been warrant-evldenlialisls- (Of course they
have often sounded like rationality-cvidcntialists; but we have sounded
tlic same way talking about electrons. Thcyn like us^ did not after all have
the distinctions we now have, between rationality and warrant; so they
could express their evidentialist intuitions only through a glass darkly.)
The Reformed epistcmoiogists, in all their brush-clearings have criticized
only rationalit)''-cvidentlallsm. But they have never, so far as I can sec,
sought to clarify what cvidentialism about electrons might look like, and
to ask whether that might be what evidentialists about God arc also
trying (in their philosophically juvenile way) to say. In this rcs[>:ct,
Ihcy have indeed treated evidentialism as a polemical partner.

What is inferential evidence?

Sensible evidentialism, I have argued, holds lliat l>eliefs which need
Inferential evidence need it in a communitarian way (not an individu-
alistic wayln and need it for the sake of warrant {not for the sake of
rationalitjO. I now turn to one last question: What h this infcrentLal
evidenced lliat we may need it? Reformed epistemologists, it seems to
me^ have worked with rather impoverished notions of inferential evi-
dencCp I shall propose that this is because they^ like the cvidentialisLs
they criticize, have fallen under the spell of strong foundationalism.
Taking Reid and extcrnalism seriously^ as they ask to do, should lead us
to expand our notion of inferential evidence.

Consider again l^lantinga's 14-yeai-old thcist, brought up to believe
in God in a community where everyone so believes. He believes what
people tell him about God^ but, says Plantinga [1981^ p^ 33) he 'does
not take what people say as evidenced For:

he docs hot reason thus: everyone around lierc says that God loves
us and cares for us; most of wliat everyone around here sa)^ is true;

so probably that's true.

Stephen} f. Wyt:.^trn 77

Instcadf he simpiy heiiei'es what he's taught. Plantinga says Hansel siinply
l>cUcvcs, Mc believes in a basic or iioii-lnfcrcntml way, for, says Plantt-
nga, he 'doc^ not reason thus'. But what woiiid have to he involved, if
he were to rca:>on thus, so ihaL his bcHcf would qualify as an inferential
rather than a basic one? Reformed cpistcmolo^ists, it seems to mc, usu-
ally suppose that three things would need to be involved:

(■dl) He must expiicitly and oceurrently believe the propositions that

constitute his evidence;
iC2'} He must have some insight or puiaiive insi^^ht into a supporL-

relation between these OGTurrcntly believed propositions and the

belief he holds on their basis;
(C3) This insight or putative insighi must play a significant causal role

in generating or sustaining S's belief tJiat God exisls.

Reformed epistemologisls, I believe^ tend to regard Inferential beliefs as
requiring these conditions. On Cl, consider Plantlnga's recent discus-
sion of tivo sixth-trader Sj both believing that the earth Is round. One
of them, we miglit as well keep her as Gretel, believes tliis on the basis
of evidence, ^[^erhaps she ha5, like Aristotle, noticed how saihiig ships
drop over the visual horizon on a clear day: judging that this is l>cst
explained by supposing that the earth is foui:idH she concludes that
probably, the earth is roundj The either one, let^s keep hini a:s Hansel,
also believes that the earth is round, but he, in his usual credulous way,
just trustingly believes what his teacher tells him. Now the beliefs of
both children^ Plantinga says, may have warrant, but they get this war-
rant In quite different ways. Grctel's belief B gets warrant by way 'of
being believed on ihe (evidential) basis' of some other belief, A, and to
get warrant in this ^'ideiitinl way, she 'mu.^f believe A as well as B'.
HanscTs belief, In contrast, gets warrant in a dirfcren: testmiomid way, a
way for whichp Plantinga avers (1993b, p. 138), Hansel 'need wof explic-
itly believe chat the testifier testifies to what he does'. That thouRhtn
Plantinga explains, 'may never cross his mind; he may be paying
attention only to the testimony'. Plantinga's point is that the teacher's
testimony may occasion Hansel's forming a warranted basic belief that
the earth is rounds witJiout Hansel ever forming the belief that his
teacher has told him this_ And in exactly this respect, as 1 read him,
PLantinga means to contrast Hansers warranted basic belief with
Greters warranted inferei^thil belief . (An inferenLlal or non-basic belief
Is one that is held on the evidential basis of other heliefs.) Mansers
belief is trig^ereit by (or groundeii in) testimony^ not inffrrt'd from it: it

7R FhiiDXGphy ofR^lfg^ioi! in tSie 2isl Century

can ihus get warrant from the testimony Vithout any eKplicit belief

On Maiiscl's part lliat the teacher lias given Ihis leslimoiiy. [n contrast,
Greters belief gets its warrant evidentiijlty (or inferentially) from B; for
this to be sOh Grclel, unlike Hansel^ ''must believe R\

C2 says that for S's belief to be inferential, S musl have insight or
putative insight into a supporl- relation between the belief and its evi-
dential basis. But what is it to take some belief to support (or be good
evidence for) some other belief? I^asicalists typicall)^ construe this as a
m^Ltter of having some argument that derives the one Irom the other
Consider here a slriking passage by Wolterstorff (1987^ p, 76):

When I survey this gigantic intricate world, I cannot believe that it
lust came about. I do not mean that 1 have some good arguments
for its being made and iliat 1 believe in the arguments. I mean that
this conviction wells up irresistibly within ine when 1 contemplate
the world.

Xow of course, Wolterstorff sees his conviction as due to his appre-
hending certain features of the world; he even specifies, and so has
explicit beliefs about, wliat these features are. It is, he says, a 'gigantic
intricate world'; it is (he says a few lines laterl 'full of beauty and splen-
dor\ and so on. His belief in God thus satisfies CI. Still, he docs not see
it as inferential, for he does not 'have good arguments^ tliat get him
from these features of the world to theism. Wolterstorff, for this reasoRj
lends to think that his theistic conviction is not cvidentiallv or infer-
entially based on his beliets or apprehcndings regarding the world^s
intricacy, splendour^ and the like: it is triggered by them, but not infer-
entially based on ilicm. To be infereiitially based on them would
require him to have arguments, argument involving some rational
insight into support-relations between the world's being intricate, full
of beauty and splendour and so on, and its being made by God.

Finally, C3. C3 can be illustrated by an example I heard some years
ago from Plantinga concerning his calculator. Plantlnga believes that
liii calculator is reliable; he also perceives that his calculator indicates
funder appropriate digital manipulation) that 1 + 2 = 3. And he takes
these two things to support, by a good argument, that 1 plus 2 does
indeed equal 3_ CI and C2 are thus met for his belief that 1+2 = 3.
Nevertheless^ this belief is basic, not infcrenLial- For his 'calculator
argument' is, in Robert Audi's terminology^ a reason for wlmt he
believes [that 1+2 = 3) without being a reason for which he believes
that 1+2=3.

Stephen} f. Wyt:.strn 79

Calvinian£ as strong foundationalists

Xow there is no doutai, a non-null ^ci of beliefs that have i:lie three
features just adumbrated. But are these what make a belief 1iiferential7
That is to say: if we ate going to carve our beliefs into those thai aie
basic and those that are inferential, are these the features thai should
guide our carving?

WeH, what determines whclher a certain way of carving the turkey is
a good way or not? Classically, whal made 'Lnfercnllallty"" of Inleresl is
that it is one of those things that can confer, or help to confer, epis-
Leniic adequacy on a belief. Suppose we go along with this a moment^
and refer to a belief as 'properly inferenliar when it gets its knowledge-
statjs by virtue of being held in some appropriate infLretitUii way.
(Being 'property Infcrcntiar will ihcn be the counterpart to being
'properly baslc\ with the proviso that it Is warrant rather than entille-
ment that we have in mind by the catch-all term 'proper J In asking
ivhat it takes for a belief to be 'inferential^ then, we will have one eye
on our conception of what this Special K Is; for our question is really:
what must inference be, in order to confer on a belief this merit?

Now the Reformed Eptstemologlsts have been tireless In asserling
that bcliind evideiiLLahsm lie5 the bankrupt Zeitgeist of strong founda-
tionalism^ leading to impoverished conceplions of what beliefs can
be properly basic. When you lift an evidentialist, writes Wolterstorff
(19&1, p. 142), you almost always Tmd a strong foundationalisL I sug-
gestj in the same spirit^ that Internailstic strong foundallonalism lies
behind these overly stringent constraiitts on what can count as prop-
erly Inferential beliefs.

In Its slroiigesl formSn internalism holds that a belief-forming process
can turn a true belief iitto knowledge only if it meets two requirementsr

(Rl) It must be something to which the subject has privileged access -

something the presence of which is evident horn within the sub^
jecl's perspective.
^R2l It must be something whose relevance to truth is evident to the
subjectj so the subject can see that the presence of this feature
makes a claim worthy of assent.

These requirements say that positive epistemrc status is conferred only
by things to whose presence and tiuth-relcvancc ^^respectively) we have
privileged access. (Here we could also bring in the ideal of acquaintance
that Wolterstorff has descriliedo Liut these requirements are clearly going
to generate strictures on what can be believed In a properly inferential

BO FhUt7^f?piiy ofR^ti^w}! w the 21st Century

way^ just as they do on what can be bolicvcd in a properly basic way: a
process can give rise to properly (ihat is, wariaiil-confcmng) inferential
beliefs only if it meets requirements Rl and R2. And of course, having
a good argument (conceived along Cartcsian-Lockcan lines) meets
both requirements nicely. For such arguments rest on lational insi^lil
inio "^relations of ideas' (that is, into support-relations^ and this is both
something one can tell from the inside that one has (meeting Rl), and
something whose relevance to trutli is also evident (meeting R2}. So
the same internalism that generates ?trong-foundationalist strictures
iOii the criteria of proper basicality, will also generate these strictures
(CI, C2 and C3) on criteria of proper infercntialitj^. If a process does
not meet these conditions, a strong foundationalist will regard it as
non-inferential (since it is the essence of inferenrtality that it be some-
tliing that can confer eplstemic adcquac\^ on its products).

So let^s return to the Woltcrstorff passage with which I began this
chapter Woltcrstorffs bitter friend asks him 'Why don'^t you just scrap
this God business?' Woltcrstorff finds thai his conyiction, the convtc-
tion that God made all this^ wells up irresistibly in him as he surveys
the world. Reflecting on this convictionj he categorizes it as a basic or
non-inferential one; he can specify various features of the world giving
rise to his conviction^ but he does not have good arguments from
them, to its being so made, liul docs this establish non-intcrentiality?
It docs, if you suppose that good arguments must involve, and provide,
rational insight into support-relations - a very natural supposition from
the internallsrtc perspective of strong foundationalism. On what it
takes for something to be properly inferential^ 1 thus suggest, when you
lift a Calvinian, you almost always find a strong foundatianalist.

IIow externallsiu loustiis the strictures

But what if one is an externalist instead? I!cre one holds that what
generates warrant is^ at least in part, soinething like Goldman's 'being
produced by a reliable process', or like Plantlnga's 'working In accord
with a design plan m appropriate circumstances'. Being externalist, we
drop the requirement that something can confer warrant only if the
believing subject has privileged rcQective access to its presence or
truth-relevance. Can we not. in this event, drop some of the old stric-
tures {C1-C3} on proper inferentlality as well?

To make this suggestion more plausible, consider/ after all^ how we
evaluate scientific theories. It is widely agreed that given two Incompat-
ible Ihcories, Tl and 72^ which both fit the empirical data, Tl can be
more rational to accept on account of Its being more simpie than T2,

When someone does accept Tl over T2p it sccras clearly to be as a result

of an inferential process. l^uL at the same tlmc^ It usually rests on a
simplicity-disposition that is barely consdou?. Give science students a set
of pressure-volume dala, and ask them to sclccl between several propos-
als about how the pressure of a gas varies as a functioii of its volume.
Alniost always, they will judge that the simpler funcUon is more likely
to Ik true. But in a philosophy of science class, these same sEudents
will tnitially often dismiss a proposed simplicity criterion with disdain:
theories, they will say, must be based on obser\'ed facts^ not on some
wish for siniplLcity. So in practice, they choose^ instinctively as it were,
in accord with a norm of simplicit^v but they do not, initially at least,
feel comfortable preaching what they practise. It is only after consider-
able rencction that they come to articulate awareness and endorsement
ol" this simpliciLy insUnct in their inferential practices.

Can the inferential include such ^instinctive' dispositions? 1 believe it
can. Copernlcus's thcory-preterenee was certainly not a matter of mere
perception or memory or introspection; it was a conclusion, based in a
broadly inferential way upon apprehended considerations. As Copernicus
came to apprehend the simplicity of how heliocentrism explained vari-
ous data, he found the conviction that the earth orbits the sun w^elling
up irresistibly within him. He could specify the simple-making featuresj
caUing the attention of fellow astronomers to them. But he did not
liavc good arguments from them that would persuade sceptical friends
like Osiander-argumcntSj that is, providing rational insight - into the
bearing of simplicity considerations on truth. His con\1ction Avas infer-
ential; it rested on inferential evidence; but proper inferential! ty (like
proper basicality) iran involve other dispositions besides the ones
privileged by strong foundattonalism. IntcrnaUsm makes this difficult to
swallow, because Gopcrnicus's inference docs not rest on 'rational insighf
into a support-relation between the simplicity and the verisimilitude of a
theory- IZxternalism, however, enables us to loosen these strictures on
inferentiality without compromising the capacity of inference to con-
tribute to warrant.

Contluslon

We thus must broaden our notloti of inferential evidence. Reformed
Epistcmologists have rightly urged that humans possess a ridi array
of dispositions producing properly basic beliefs. TEiese dispositions do
not need to be justified in terms of that disposition providing rationai
insight of a Cartesian sort^ in order to be worthy of trusty and to confer
warrant. Sensible Evidentialists here ask that the processes producing

32 PtsUGSf?piiy ofRiiti^kvf w the 21st Century

iiiicjr^ntial beliefs get patity of ifoattnGnL The rich complex of inferential
disposiEionSf every bit as much as the complex of non-lnfercntial ones
that interacts with it, ultimately requires an epistemoiogy of trust. And
tliis calls us to bioadlen our criteria of pjoper InfercntialttyH just as we
broaden our criteria of proper basicality.

And when we have appropriately broadened it, I tliink it will Lurn
out that there is more to theisttc evidentialism than Calvinians have
seen. By this, I do not just mean that when we better understand what
is inferential, we will be abio to develop better inferential arguments for
tlieistic beliefs. I mean that wq will he able to discern Inferential con-
siderations which liave {il! along beer] pfnyhig ttey roles in forming, sus-
taining, and sliaping the convictions of the theistic community- (This
would fit what my colleague Stephen Evans (Evans^ 1990), appealing to
Newsman's account of the 'natural inferences'' that play a role in ordi-
nary hut mature dieistic conviction^ calls a ''natural theology in a new
key'-l Paul, tn his Letter to the Romans, says that God has made his
power and deity evident to us through the things He has made. But
how does God do this? h secnis to me as^ hicidetitally^ it seemed to
Thomas Reid, that God does so by designing us so that our cpSstemic
access to essential theistic truths involves reliance on bromUv infcren-

Hal considerations. This does not rule out important roles for immedi-
ate justlflers- Jesus came, Paul says in Ephesians 2:1K, Lhat through him
we might 1iave access in one Spirit to the Father'- this access in the
Spirit may well have a non-inferential dimension that contributes
much to the w^irrant of our beliefs. Sensible evidentialists are grateful
to Reformed Episteniologists for providing a rightt'ul plnce for these.
But sensible theistic evidentialists will urge that this experiential com-
ponent contributes hest, when there is availahle lo the community,
broadly inferential evidence for other larger theistic claims. For it is
these lar^^er claims that provide the framework within which we inter-
pret the Spirit's experiential work in our lives.

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Voices in Discussion

az. PhilUps

G: The cnligiiLcnmcnt ideal was Lhat of a science of religion — a raiional
religion. Locke and Kant loom large in this context Locke thought that
every adult must see that bchcf is Faticmally grounded, and that raLlo-
nal criteria could he used as a critique of extant religion. I'm told this
ideal continues to shape contemporary German philosophy of lelij^ion.

RGformcd Epistcmotogy rejects this demand- U rejects the ideal of a
rationally grounded religion, but docs not reject rationality Something
does not have to be grounded to be rational. This docs not mean that
every religious practice is to be acceptKi as it stands. Much in it may
not be acceptable. But If docsnt need the metaphysical grounding
provided by Locke and Kant. All this being so^ 1 need lo say more about
rationahtv.

We need to distinguish between three stages of Reformed Epistemology.
Firsts the papers which belong to the 1970s. Second, the publicafioTt of
Fiiith and Ration{i!ity in l98.'iE where the former arguments are given a
more articulate form^ now influenced by Thomas Reid. The emphasis
was mainly negaLivCj showing what Reformed Epistemology^ denied. I: is
in a Dutch neo-Calvinist tradition. Its aim is not, like Augustine, to
understand a faith already given^ but to work out a view of all things in
the ll^ht of fatth. Clement of Alexandria would be an example of such an
endeavour. Thirds after l^ti^i the emphasis is more positive: on warrant
and fustification; appltcation of these to particular features of human life;
and the bearing of one's religious commitments on one's intellectual and
non-intclIectual life. It has ne\'er been the aim of Reformed Epistemology
to give a general account of religion or religious practices. Critics have
thought that it wanted to do more, but this is not so.

I ended my paper by trying to pinpoint the differences between
Reformed Epistcniotog)' and Wittgcnstcinianism in the philosophy of

B6 fhiio.wpiiy ofRiiti^kvi w the 21st Century

idigion. The latter seems to deny that 'God' is a refening expression,

Qiat there is a 'something' which this word picks out. Bowsma was an
exception to this. I sometimes hear echoes of Kant in this vieiA^- some-
times 1 hear an insistence that one can only refer to what one can
point to; but i really don't understand why VVitlgcnsteinians deny that
we can refer to Gcid_

}^: Reformed cpistemology is to Calvin College what logical positivism
is to Vienna. I feci like a country priest asked to criticize the pope, litit
Tve been an evldenlialist since the age of fourteen. I think that the e^'i-
dentialisl Reformed Epistemolo^^ attacks is a straw man. When I looked
at the stars I thouj^hl that the question of whether Gtxi had created
them could go cither way. Why must Faiionality shun e\^tdenEiaIism by
saylngp with Platitinga^ that it all depends on what you regard as 'prop-
eriy basic7 Plancin^a uses 'evidence"" in the narrow^ sense of Lnfcrcntial
evidence- Reformed cpislemologists say that when you look at a daisy,
or^ better, a tullp^ you find welling up inside you the thought that God
is present. Similarly when one is told that God was rcconcilin;^ the
world to himself in Jesus Christ. These basic tendencies are innocent
until proved guilty^ so we can go along with these doxastic practices.
That's Calvinism.

But I think evidence is needed if I am asked to believe that matter is
composed of protons, neutrons and electrons- Other beliefs^ such as
1 have two hands' are not believed on evidence. What about religious
belief? Does it need evidence in Plantinga^s narrow sense?

I agree thai wc need to get beyond the first two negative stages of
Rcfomicd Eptstemolog^'^ to a consideration of warrant and fustification.
So what is it for a hcliet' to be rational? Rationality is a many splen-^
'<k»i^d thing, but to be irrational is to be culpable; it Is not doing your
duty by the evidence. Reformed epistemologists rightly reject inferential
evidence, for belief in God is basic. It can be reasonable to believe that
God exists. So rattona! belief does not entail evidence. Tlie same is true
in science where we choose to believe our teachers. We can sec that the
claims need evidence^ but we need not have gathered it ourselves-

The notion of warrant helps us to capture these complexittes- It oper-
ates at a subject pole. To be warranted at the object pole, things must
be as the belief claims. But this warranting need not be something
actually done at the subject pole. Vet, someone in the community must
have done so. The need for evidence, then, is not that of a specific
individual^ but that of a community If wc think of evidence in this
way different types of evidence must be brotight in.

D^. rhfilips B7

D: Since G has devoted a considerable amount of space to his disagree-

menEs with Q Vm. going to ask C to reply.

Cr First, 1 want to comment on G's claim that 1 have misunderstood
Plantin^a_ G claims that when you Lift an evidentialisi you fmd a strong
foundationalisL N lespoiids that when you lift a Calviniaii you almost
always find a strong foundationalisc. Was Plantinga an exception? Not
oil my reading of Fnith ^vid Ratioiiaiity and the early discussions of it in
The Reformat JonmaL ft is clear in thcni that the relation of Ftcformed
EpLstemologif^ to foundational ism was a central issue; especially the
claim that there arc only two kinds of foundational propositions^ the
sclf-c\'Ldcnt propositions of lo^c and mathcmatLeSp and the proposi-
tions concerning incorrigible sense experiences. Plantinga argtjed that
since there is no adequate criterion for proper basicality, thcists should
not accept this restriction. The proposttion that there are only i\wo
kinds of foundational propositions, he argued, is not itself a self-
evident pioposition. Thus, although a believer cannot demonstrate to
an unhelicvcr why he should place belief in God In the foundations of
his noetic structure, the latter has no good logicat reason to prevent
the believer from doing so. Reacting to this In The Reformed Joumai,
Jesse de Boer said: 'While Plantinga protests that foundationalistn
ought to be abandoned, w4iat he in fact does hlirLself Is to add to the
foundations our belief in God. He calls this belief ^properly basic' and
so, by the sense of his own idiom, he stays Inside the foundationalist
camp/ G denies this, but de liocr's Lind of point led to distinctions
being made belwccn classical foundationalistn - the view that there are
only two kinds of fotindational pTojxjsittons - and foundationalism.

G argues that the idiom of 'proper basicallty^ must not be used to
mean "foundaiiions'- Plantinga did not take this advice. Here he Is in the
batde for foundations: 'On this view every noetic structure has a founda-
tion; and a propositioii is rational for S^ or known by S, only if it stands
in the appropriate relati ons to the ioundation s of S's noetic
stnjcture.,- Might it not be that my Ix^licf in God is itself in the foun-
dations of my noetic structure? Perhaps it is a member of F, in which
case, of course. It will automatically be evident with respect to G/
Again, here is Plantinga responding to a classical foundationalist: ^He
means to commit himself to reason and to nothing more - belief in
God, for example - in its foundations. But here there is no reason for
the theist to follow his example; the believer is not obliged to take his
word for it. So far we have found no reason at all for excluding belief
In God from the foundations/

B8 fhUo.wpiiy ofR^ti^w}! w the 21st Century

No doubt Reformed Epistcmology has now gone in somewhat different

directions. G says that by 'basic belief Plantlnga means what he means
by ^tTnmediate belief. Perhaps - and here I speculate, G was always less
enamoured with lelalioiis hclween 'immediate belief" and 'foundational
baslcalir^'" than l^tantingan in wliich case his present comments could be
seen as an exercise in damage limitation in this area.

G gives the impression that ray criticisms depend entirely on the
issue of foundations. This is not so. I spend an equal amount of lime
criticizing the notion of ^immediate belief and its relation to authentic-
ity, I criticize, on grounds of logic^ the fatal slide from the fact that an
individual need not, in fact, check the authenticity of an experience, to
the claim that the experience is self-authenticating. Plantinga conflates
psychological and logical considerations, as when he claims that the
self-cvidcticc of tnathcmatical propositions must be relativized to
persons. Wlicther an individual grasps a mathematical proposition
docs not affect its logical status as a proposition - that ts determined by
the arilhraetical system. No matter what mathematical intuitions one
may have one must still pass the ej^amination. No matter what religious
intuitions one may have, the spirits are tested to see whether they are
of God in the wider rchgious practice. There are differences between
these cases, and no doubt between them and examples discussed in On
Gertninty, but they do net affect the logical point at issue. All these
points and quotations are made in Fdith after Foitmiationatism, and T am
disappointed that G does not address them.

Second, a w^ord about G's conception of the issue between Reformed
Epistemolog)^ and WittgcnsLcinianism: the question of whether 'there
is any such phenomenon as referrift^ to God'. He sa);^ that I deny this
and hold that there is nothing we can predicate of God for the simple
reason 'that there^s no such being as God to refer to'. Hence the cliarge
il^at 1 give an atheistic account of religious language. G says that he
could cite passage after passage to support this view, but thinks it
otiose to do so for an audience such as this, whereas^ ironically, / says
that 1 have pointed out the misunderstandings of claims like G's 'so
often and so forcefully that it would seem entirely otiose even to raise
the question again, if it were not for the fact that these rebuttals have
been so singularly unsuccessful in achieving their aim'. Why should
this be so? Because readers like G prefer to construct general theses and
propositions than pay attei^tion to the detailed grammatical analyses
which have been offered by, for example, Rush Rhces, Peter Winch
and mysclL It is only by ignoring ttiese analyses and examples that G
can accuse me of l?cing 'remarkably chary of telling us why there

DJ[. Hlfilips B9

cannot be any such phenomenon as referring to God\ So let mc
remind him of some-

Rush Rhees brings out the difference between talking about a human
being and talking about God. I may know VVin5ton Churchill vsilhout
knowing that he is Prime Minister or a company director. 1 can point
to the iT of which these ihings are true - thai cliap over there. But,
Rhees says, 1 could not know God without knowing that he was Cre-
ator and Father of all things. That would be Hke saying thaL I might
come to know Winston Churchill without knowing that he had face,
hands, body, voice or any of the attributes of a human being/ There is
an internal relation then between love, grace, majesty, and so forth,
and God's reality. It is not that these belong to a further something, a
thing, as in the case of a human being, but that these uses of 'love',
'grace' and 'majesty' are themselves the conceptual parameters of the
kind of reality God has - God is divinely real, fj is wrong in thinknig
that O.K. Bouwsma does not concur with this view. Bouwsma points
out how we can be misled by the indicative form of certaiti sentences
such as 'Great is Jehovah^ 7*^'^°^'^^ reigneth', into thinking that
they are bits of information, descriptions of an object called 'God',
whereas other sentences^ such as, 'Bless Jehovah, O niy soul', by their
imperative form, help us to avoid that misunderstanding. He asks
whether 'High is our God above all gods' is to be understood as 'fligh
is the Empire State Building above all other buildings in New York'
and, looking at the state of philosophy of religion replied sadly, Tm
afraid so/

G thinks that 1 would go to the death rather than use the word 'refer'
in relation to God, On manv occasions I have said that this is not so.
Witli iUiees I have said that if not using it leads to trouble, if it leads to
the view that talking about God doesn^t mean anything, or if it leads G
to think I hotd tliat all religious language is metaphorical - a view
I ar^e against In the last chapter of Faith after Fotmd{itionafi5nf - or more
surrealislically, if he thinks that I have reduced 'God' to an exclamation -
then by all means keep the word 'refer'. Only, don't think you have
achieved any clarificatory work hy simply putting the wotd in italics.
Consider: 1 have a hole in my heart', 'I have palpitations in my heart', 'I
liave God in my heart.' By all means say that something is referred to in
aU these cases, but it is not the word 'something' or ^reference' which
gives sense to these expressions, but the uses of these expressions, includ-
ing the uses of 'in my heart', which illuminate the grammar of 'some-
tliing' and 'reference' in these contexts- Donl fight over lalx:ls - look at
their use.

90 FtsUosGpiiy ofR^ti^kvi w the 21st Century

A final paragraph about ihc nature of philosophy. Wittgenstein
stands in a coiilcmplatlvc tradition which goes back lo Plato. As N
5ays, G's tradition offers, not a philosophy of relt^ion, but a religious
philosophy. G says that his cask is not that of seeking to understand a
faiili already givcnn but to develop history, sociology, philosophy,
poUtLcal theory, and so forth, in the iLjL^ht of faiths The nature of phi-
losopliy is itself a philosophical problem and much of its history has
been spent discussing it. In Wittgenstein, wc see a supreme example of
an attempt to teach us differences born of philosophical wonder at the
world in all its variety - the city with no main road. Thus it raises the
question oi what it is to sec all things religiously; whether that perspec-
tive is a theoretical matter. It would want to see what other perspec-
tives look Itkc and what disagreement between them amounts to. It
would deny that philosophy underwrites any of these perspectives. It
seems that in Reformed Epistemology all subjects are the handmaid of
faith which has the final say. By contrast^ from a contemplative tradi-
tion Wittgenstein says: ^A philosopher is not a citizen of any commu-
nity of Ideas. That^s what makes him a philosopher.""

F: I take G's point that belief can be shaped by tradition, but can there

be competing basic beliefs? Nietzsche looked at the sky and concluded
that the whole is a great cosmic stupidity. The universe doesn't even
know we are here. Flow^ do we solve these conflicts?

G: F is wary of leligious authority^ How do you see a person by religious

authority? This is where Rcld on perception came to my aid. For
Descartes and Locke you begin with sensations and then infer the exis-
tence of the external world. For themn perception is reasoning by infer-
ence. Reid says that our sensations carry information about the
external world. We are so 'hard-wired' that we form beliefs on the basis
of these sensations, but that there is no process of reasoning which
enables yotj to do this. We are so constructed that we trust our beliefs-
There is no non-circular argument for doing so.

So Reformed Epistemology says that a rcligtous perception of reality,
if things are working properly^ would form an idea of God. Whether we
can find good arguments for this would be an interesting qucstj as in
the case of sensations and the external world, but they can't make the
transition in themselves- Now^ N says, 'No. The proper analog)^ is not
bcCw-een religious belief and Retdian perception^ but between religious
iKlicf and explanation In science/

If we take the Reidian conception our beliefs will be due to our 'hard-
wiring' and to wiiich concepts are available to us. The concept of a

uj:. Hifilips 91

computer may not be available lo a tribe. So cvcr)'lhiiig depends

which conccDis set formed.

oti

/: You say that basic beliefs are non-inferential, but how arc they
formed? What mediating factors make them possihle? How do we
choose our basic beliefs? Aie basic beliefs frozen for all time?

G: There are many modes of media Hon, so no general talk ml] do. We
have to get away from the paradigmaUc distinction between mediate
and immediate knowledge found in Locke. The use of warrant can
appeal to a variety of iHLedialions which get us away from thinking of
the foundational aspect, th response to C's earlier comments I will
admil that Plantinga is reluctant to come straight out and admit that
this constitutes a change.

O: How docs the appeal to authority get going? Is there a necessary link
between Reformed Epistemology and the function of authority?

N: Tliis depends on what claims are being made_ I would never have
re-entered the Christian fold if I had simply been told to accept an
authority^ for example, if I had simply been told, ^Read the scriptures
and wait lor conviction/ 1 needed to read RD. Urucc and the opinion
of other scholars about Biblical documents- Ciaims sometimes depend
on their work.

O: Does that apply to ^God exists'?

jV: a believer may have an inchoate sense of the evidence, in which
case philosophers tike Swinburne can be of hcip.

G: But what is being appealed to here seems to be a hlcnd of phiLosoh'
phy and theology. Tt is essential to Reformed Epistemology that the
assessment of beliefs is carried on in the context of a livitig faith. If you
don't accept this you will be attracted to a position like Ai's. But if N
thinks that the fteidian view of perception is correct, why not apply it
to religion?

F. But what docs a child know of this inner community which recog-
nizes the need for grace? Isn't this a dogmatic, insular view which
doesn't recognize the child^'s situation^ or the various traditions of dif-
ferent countries? Reformed Epistemology seems insuJar.

N: I think you're right. The believer needs to be convinced not only at
the subject pole, but also at the object pole. He must listen to what
experts say about how things are.

92 FhUt7^f?piiy ofR^ti^w}! w the 21st Century

Q: For sophisticated people, it is claimed^ it won^t be enough to say ^He
lives In my heart/ But doesn't a lot depend on that? What would a
neutral assessment of the evidence be like?

R: Well, It's not enough for a belief to be merely In the ak A testimonial
claim can be as strong as its weakest link and indefinitely long. Some
claims go back to Christ. Don't we get a strong groundiiig for these in
tl^e community?

G: Fm not sure where W stands. At first he stresses the need for evi-
dence. But then he says that the iiifcrcncc can be highly intuitive and
need not be laid out by anyone. That would bring it close to unre-
formed canonical Reformed Cpistcmology. But then N adds that this
highly intuitive inference must be spelled out by someone in the com-
muiitty. But N would not make this added requirement in the case of
perception.

in conclusion, let me return to issues raised by Wittgensteinianism
and respond to (r's earlier comments. Take a phrase like Tathcr of all
^hings^ If C is prepared to say that this 'picks out something^ to which
i can relate my hopes and disappointments^ there is no dispute
betTAxen us.

H: But wh^t if it said that sentences in Christian beliefs are not asser-
tions, but performative utterances. How does that affect their truth?

G: They may be performative or relalional, 1>ill tiiey are still statements
that address something- In 'Bless the Lord O my soul', the Lord is still
picked out.

C: But so far we have said nothing about the grammar of either 'some-
thing' or 'pick out"" in this context.

G: Agreed. That is the point at v%^hich a detailed future discussion
betuTen us would need to begin.

Part III

Wittgenstein and
Wittgensteinianism

Wittgenstein and the Philosophy
of Religion

Stephen Mulh^ll

Wittgerislcinian approaches lo issues in the philosophy of tdi^ion have
plainly been amongst Ehe most consequential in the discipline in the
postwar period. This is nol, of course^ because a general consensus in
their favour has been established; on the contrary if anything unites
contemporary philosophers ol: rclajjionn it is their deep suspicion of both
the specific claims and the general methodology^ of those of their col-
leagues who have adopted a W'lltgcnsteinian perspective. Nevertheless.
it is rare to find a philosopher of religion who docs not define her own
position, at least in part^ by specifying the nature of and ihe grounds
for her rejection of w^ork carried out under the Wittgcnstciiiian banner
In this respect, that work conthiues to function as an essential refer-
ence point in the discipline - something that can no longer be said of
many other fields of philosophical endeavour, even in the philosophy
of mEiid or the philosophy of language fwhcri! some of Wfttgcnstein's
specific claims continue to attract interesE, but the general method-
ological principles which anchor and account for them are barely men-
tioned^ let alone specifically criticized).

Those better apprised of the radical subversion to which Wittgenstein
aimed to subject the discipline of philosophy can hardly be surprised at
the suspicion in which Wittgenstein ian approaches to religion are held;
but they are bound to Ix^ intrigued by the way in which philosophers of
rclij^ion seem far less capable than Lhcir colleagues ht cognate fields of
simply leaving those approaches behind - of treating their own suspi-
cions as adequate grounds for dismissing Wittgenstcinian approaches
ratlicr than as endlessly renewed incentives to rcnzxamine them. It is
almost as if these approaches go with the territory - as if this perspec-
tive on the philosophy of religion resonates so intimately witli some
barely registered but fundamental aspect of the domain of rchgion itself

96 fhUosGpiiy ofR^ti^kvf w the 21st Century

that those fascinated by the latter naturally find themselves unable

deflnlEivcly to dismiss the former.

I-s this scn^e of paradox intensified or dissipated if we further note
that VViLtgen stein's own remarks on the philasophy of rclif^ion are van-
ishingly slight in comparison with the sheer mass of his remarks on the
philosophy of mind or of language? Should we conclude that philoso-
phers somehow find it easier to get beyond the former than to dismiss
the latter entirely easier as tt were to stumble over a few scattered peb-
bles than to vauH over a mountain range? Or should we rather recog-
nize that the very paucity of Wittgenstein's owit remarks makes theni
difficult to construe and hence eas^^ to misconstr je? Seen in this light,
it may seem that what so many philosophers of religion stumble over is
not so much Wittgenstein's few pebbles but the complex and ramified
edifice that has been constructed from them; it may be that what they
find ob|ectionablc is not Wittgenstein but w^hat Wittgensteinians have
made of him. These opening Impressions suggest a tripartite structure
for the ensuing discussion. 1 shall begin by examining Wittgenstein's
own remarks on the philosophy of religion; then I shall look at the dis-
tinctive characteristics of Wittgensteinian approaches to this area; and J
shall conclude by raising some questions about what one might call a
religious interpretation of Wittgcnstcin^s general approach to philoso-
phy - about how one inight attempt to accoui:Lt for the spiritual fcrv^our
that so many have sensed in his ^vritings-

Wittgenstein's interpretation of religion

In attempting to elucidate Wttgenstem's philosophical view of religion
and religious belief, "^-vc must bear in mind not only that his recorded
expressions of those views are very small in number but also that few
of them were recorded by him and none were originally intended for

publication (our sources consist of 20 pages of his students' lecture notes^
and a scattering of remarks in such miscellanies as Cuiture ami Value^
and Recollixtions of WittgemtemJf hi other words^ even these apparently
direct expressions of his \aGws arc in reality multiply filtered through
the memories^ editorial proclt^ltics and linguistic sensibilities of others;
even hcrc^ separating Wittgenstein from the VVitlgenstcinians is far from
simple.

The most systematically developed of these remarks (which is not to
say that they are very systematically developed) are presented in the
notes made of three 1938 lectures. Broadly speaking, the first lecture
emphasizes important diffecences bctA'vecn religious beliefs aitd Ijctiefs

about maltcrs of fact fhistorical and empirical inaltcrs}? the second
emphasizes parallel differences between a belief in God's existence and a
bf^licf in the existence of a person or object; and the third explores the
significance of a belief in life after deaths or in the immortality of the
soul- In all three cases, Wittgenstcm engages in a gtaminatical investiga-
tion of these topics: he attempts to clarify the nature of religious [>clief by
c^^rifyin^ the use of expressions of religious belief - the place of religious
concepts and religious uses of concepts in the lives of believers and
un believe rs-

Wbat he claims to establish thereby ;jrows from one fuiidaineiital
insight - the fact that those svho hold to religious doctrines do not
treat those commitments in Uie way they would treat an empirical
claim. ITiey do not regard ihcm as hypotheses wliosc credibility s'aries
in accordance w-ith the strength of the evidence in their favour they
do not assign them degrees of probability^ and so on. Even ivith what
appear to be historical religious propositions ^for example^ concerning
Christ's existence and life on earth), says Wittgenstein, believers do not
treat them as they do other historical propositions. His point ts not ]ust
that a believer's conviction in their truth appears utterly insensitive to
the kinds of ground for donbt and caution that she would apply to
other propositions about the dim and distant past. It is rather that,
even if propositions about Christ's life in Palestine were established
beyond all reasonahle doubt in just the way tliat (for example) some
facts about Napoleon ^s life have been established, this kind of certainty
would not have the practical consequences in our lives that a religious
belief has. As Wittgenstein puts it: 'the indubi lability wouldn't be
enough to make mc change my whole life' tLC, p. 57).

In other words^ the divergence between the role played In our lives
by religious beliefs and by empifical beliefs is so systematic and pcrt^a-
sive that Lticy must be acknowledged to be very different kinds of
behcf. We would otherwise be forced to the conclusion that rehgious
believers generally act in a manner so ludicrously irrational as to strain
credibility: as blunders go, this would just be too big - certainly too big
to attribute to people who don't after all treat weather forecasts in the
way tliey treat Gospel warnings about the Last Judgement. Neither, on
the other hand^ would we want to say that religious beliefs ate
obviously rational, as if it is obviously unreasonable ro reject what faith
demands. Religious believeis base matters of great moment on evidence
that seems exceedingly flimsy by comparison with the corroboration
they require before accepting claims of far less significance for their
lives; and 'anyone who reads the Epistles will find it said: not only that

98 fhUo.wpiiy ofRiiti^kvf w the 21st Century

it is not reasonable but that tt Is folly. Not only is it not reasonable^ but

it doesn't pretend to be' \LC, p. 58). It is rather that the evidence for
religious beliefSp the doubts to which they may be subject and the cer-
tainty they may command are not species of empirical evidence, doubt
and certainty. '[Religious) controversies took quite different from any
notmal controversies. Reasons look entirely different from normal
reasons' (LC^ p. 56). From this contention^ everything else Wittgcti-
stein s*iys in these lectures can be derived. His claim that the religious
hclievGr and the atheist cannot be said to contradict one another !n the
mancier of disputants over an empirical claim^ and his observation that
a belief in the ejtistence of God plays a role entirely uiilike that of a
belief in the existence of any person or object he has ever heard of
(buttressed by pointing out that^ for example^ our ways of employing
pictures of God do not include any technique of comparing the picture
to that which it depicts}^ simply reiterate at a more concrete level his
general claim about the difference between religious [>eliefs and empir-
ical ones. And his discussion of the role played by a belief in life after
death proceeds on the assumption that this is not an empirical hypotlv
esis about the relation of minds to bodies, and asks how such a claim
might play a role in the lives of tliosc who make it^ he suggests that
this role would be clarified if, for example^ the believer connects the
idea to certain notions of ethical responsSbillty (for example, by relat-
ing the sours immortality to tlie idea of its being subject to judge-
ment). Here Wittgenstein attempts to locate one religious concept In a
grammatical network of other such concepts, and to locate that net-
work in llie context of a certain way of living - thus returning us to
tlie opening theme of his first lecture in a manner that should surprise
no-one familiar with his general methodological claim that 'to imagine
a lan^age is to imagine a form of life'.

Most of the remarks about religion scattered through the miscellanies
I mentioned earlier could also be seen simply as developiiig this same
fundamental point about ihe divergences bet^veen religious and empiri-
cal beliefs. This is particularly evident mth respect to nvo remarks from
Culture ami VaiuL' that have attracted particular attention: God's essence
is supposed to guarantee his existence -what this really means is that
what is here at issue is not the existence of something (CV, p. HI). It
strikes me that a religious belief could only he something like a pas-
sioi:iate commitment to a sj^tem of reference (CV, p. 64).

As the sentences immediately following the former remark make
clear, Wittgenstein is not denying that a belief in God^s existence is a
belief in the existence of something but rather that it is a belief En the

3ti^pfieii Mit!haif 99

existence of some thing; he isdcnyin;R;tha: God^s existence is akin to the
existence of a while cicphaiil, of 3 physical ol^ject or entUy - specifically
in the sense that God (like the white elephant) might not have existed,
that the grammar of the concept of '"God' is such as to allow us to talk
of 'what it would be like it there were (or if there were not} such a
thing as "God'^'_ As for the latter remark, it merely encapsulates
Wittgenstein ^s claims in the lecture that religious believers orient their
existence as a wiiolc by reference to what he calls 'pictures' - specific^
interrelated ways of interpreting and responding to the events and
experiences that make up their lives, ways that can only be understood
and explained in terms of religious concepts.

Strangely^ however^ mucli of the criticism directed at Wittgenstein's
views on religion has been focused on these remarks rather than upon
the more detailed and systematic Iceture notes from which they derive;
and that criticism has depended for its plausibility upon ignoring their
roots In lliat material^ as well as their more [mmcdiate contexts. For
example, John H^mian, the author of the entry on 'Wittgcnsteinianism'
(which is in fact an entry exclusively on Wittgenstein) in the recent
BSnckwt^ff CompiViion to the PhUosophy of ReUgiou,^ finds both remarks
impossible to accept.^ The former, he claims, is not supported either by
the disanalogy between Tiod exists' and existential propositions in
science or hisiory or geography, or by the doctrine that God cannot
begin or cease to exist. ""If Democritus believed that atoms cannot
begin or cease to exist, it does not follow that he did not believe that
an atom is '^einc Existenz"" - an entity; or something which exists'
(IWM, p. 261)-

The difficulty with this argument is its extreme compression^ or rather
its apparent assumption that we can tell what exactly Democritus's
beliefs about atoms amount to without far more information about
tlieir ImpUcattons. In the first place, docs his l>elief that atoms can
neither begin nor cease to exist amount to a belief in their eternal
existence or a belief in their endless duration (to employ a distinction
of Norman Malcolm's, overlooked by Hyman despite his favourable
citation of some of Malcolm's other remarks in the same cisayj?
A physical object or object-constituent might come into being at the
beginning oi the universe and remain in existence until its end; but Us
non-existence would remain conceivable, and hence Its endless dura-
tion would be no iess contingent than that of a particular white
elephant. God's existence, by contrast fas a Kierkcgaardian remark also
quoted by Hyman asseils), is eternal: his existence is not just unending
but necessary. Until we know which of these conceptions of atomic

100 Flrihiwphy of fif/;sTi^?r p;i the 21 it Century

existence Democritus favours^ we cannot assess its validity as a counter-
"iexampic, since aii endlessly enduring atom would deserve the epithel
'eine Existenz' as Wittgenstein deploys it in a way that an eternal atom
would not.

Second, even if Democritus does turn out to believe that atoms have
eternal existence, whilst still being inclined to call both atoms and white
elephants 'existent things'", this would not show that the kind of exis-^
lencc possessed by empirical Uitngs and that possessed by elernal beings
was identical. On the contrary- the fact that Democritus conceives of
atoms in such a way as to exclude cerlain possibilities that he leaves
open with respect to elephants (and vice versa) precisely implies that
ihe kind of existence he attributes to the former is very different from
that which he attributes to the latter. Whether or not he (or we) would
want to call both 'entities' or 'existent things' is entirely irrelevant;
what malters is not our inclination to use the same phrase in both con-^
texts when we give expression to our belief s^ but w^hether or not we
put it to the same kind of use.

Hyman's objections to the second remark culled from Culture and
VaUi^ arc equally unsound. ...I see no reason to accept that coming to
believe that God exists is nothing taut coining to feet 'a passionate com-
mitment to a system of reference' - that is, coming to feel committed to
leading a life in which questions will be asked, obligations will be
acknowledged, decisions taken and actions performed, which can only
be explained or understood by the use of religious concepts. For surely.
If a convert makes that commitment, perhaps because he feels com-
pelled to, bis belief that God exists will tj^ically be part of his reason for
dotn^ so. Nothing in Wittgenstein's later philosophy^ and in particular
no part of his doctrine about the relation between language and forms of
life, implies that a form of life cannot involve historical or metaphysical
beliefs (such as that Jesus rose from the dead or that the soul is Immor-
tall as well as concepts and attitudes: all of them - beliefs, concepts and
attitudes - in a mutually supporting relation {IWM, p. 260).

Note to begin with that Wittgenstein does not claim that coming to
believe that God exists is nothiag but a passionate commitment to a
system of reference; he claims that 'a religious belief could only be
something like such a commitment- One might legitimately question
Wittgenstein's impHcation that there is only one possible way of
understanding or living out a religious life, but to say that 'x is some-
thing like y' is plainly not equivalent to saying that 'x is nothing but y\
Furthermore, to equate a belief in God's existence with religious belief
per s^ makes sense only on the assumption that a religious belief or

Stephen S4iiih^{f lai

rcli^ous faith is nothing but feilhcr reducible to oi founded upon) a
bdicf in the existence of God - as if adopiing a religious form of life Is
a secondary consequence of a lo^cally prior and logically independent
existential belief. And indeed^ just such a model is presupposed by the
objection Hynian then goes on to make to Wittgenstein's claim: he
asserts that a belief in God'^ exislence is typically one's reason for com-
mitting oneself to a religious frame of reference.

But this assertion takes it for granted that we know ivhat such a
belief amounts to or signifies - what the claim to believe that God
exists (or more plausibly^ the claim to believe In God) actually means.
And on Wittgenstein's vici^^ we can only establish this by determining
how the concept of God functions in the practice and life of a leligious
believer, which means investigating the grammatical connections
between this concept and the multitude of other religious concepts in
terms of which a l>cliever interprets the events and experiences of her life.
But ifj according to this approach, no-one can so much as understand
what a belief in God's existence amounts to without grasping the IcHza-
tion of that concept in the grammatical iietwork of religious concepts
that Wittgenstein here describes as a sj^tcm of reference, it makes no
sense to think that one can first establish the truth of that belief and
then use it as a reason for adopting the s)'stcni of reference. On the
contrary^ one could nol acquire a belief in God's existence without
both understanding and committing oneself to the broader grammati-
cal system m which the concept of God has its life. Consequently^
Hyman's objection to Wittgenstein's remark simply begs the question
against Wittgenstein s whole approach - not only to the philosophy of
rc!lj;"ion but to philosophy in general.

It is worth noting that Hyman is also wrong to imply that this
approach entails eliminating either the specific belief in God's existence
or the very Idea of religious belief more generally from our conception
of what goes to make up a religious way of life- On the contrary, his
claim that religious faith involves a mutually suppoiling relation of
beliefs, concepts and attitudes is perfectly consistent with Wittgenstein's
position. For first, claiming that the concept of God forms part of
a system of religious concepts does not entail reducing that coiicept
to the other concepts to whicJi it is related^ any more than noting the
grammatical relations between psychological concepts and concepts
of behaviour entails reducing the concept of pain to dial of pain-
behaviour; the concepts arc internally related, not synonymous.
Neitlicr does VVittgenstcin^s einphasis on the system of religious concepts
entail denying that religious faith involves a multitude of specific l?ctiefs;

102 Flrihiwptiy ofReiisfou m the 21 it Century

on the contrar)^, that system of concepts is what makes it possible for
believers to give expression lo ihcir beliefs, and it is in part through thai
s]i^tem and the linguistic expressions it makes possible that reHgious atti-
tudes make themselves manifest. Wliethcr we want to say with Hymaii
that such religious beliefs are 'historical and metaphysical' depends on
precisely what these modifying adjectives imply, and whether they are
meant to constitute an exhaustive classification. Wittgenstein offers us
reason to doubt whether tcll^ious historical beliefs arc likL: other kinds
of historical belief; and whilst we have no reason to expect metaphysi-
cal beliefs to he any less liable to influence the religious thinking of
human beings than their moral or scientific thinking, we have as
yet no reason to think that they are ineliminahlc or dominant. This
question, howcvciH raises issues that can be more fruitfully pursued by
examining the uses to which Wiltgenslcinians have put Wittgenstein's
own insights.

Before we go on to that section of the paper, however^ I would like to
conclude by pointing out that the fundamental observation from
which the rest of Witlgcnstein^s claims derive - the idea that religious
beliefs arc very different from empirical bchefs - is itself hardly original
l-or it amounts Lo no more than a reiteration of the core argument In
Part I of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous text Concluding Unscientific
Postscript,*" which comprises chapters In which Climacus examines the
.pbfectivc question posed by Christianity' and concludes tfiat religious
beliefs cannot be a species of historical belief because 'the greatest
attainable certainhr' with respect to anything historical is a mere
approximaUon'. Of course^ Wittgenstein restates this claim In his own
terms, and thereby eliminates from it Climacus's dubious assumption
that tliere can be no such thing as certainty with respect to historical
beliefs; but the core of his idea remains untouched, and other themes
from the Postscript (passion, indlreci communication^ despair] pervade
the long paragraph from which Wittgenstein's remark about religious
belief as a commitment to a system of reference Is taken.

It strikes me thai a religious belief could only be something like a
passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it's
belief^ ifs really a way of livings or a way of assessing life. It's passion-
ately seizing hold of tl:ils inlcrprelatiDn. Instruction in a religious faith,
therefore, would have to take the form of a portrayal, a description, of
tliat system of reference^ while at the same time being an appeal to
conscience- And this combination would have to result in the pupil
himself, of his own accord, passionately taking hold of the system of

Stephen Miiih^tf 103

reference. It would be a5 though someone were first to let me see the
hopelessness of my stluatLon and then show me the means of rescue
until, of niy own accord, or not at any rate led to it by my instructor, I
ran to it and grasped it lC\ p. 64).

But of course, these themes wfll have been familiar to theologians
and philosophers of religion for a number of years - they constitute a
Ion S" re cognized mode of understanding Christianity and its relation
to moraliLy and philosophy, one which is certainly not universally
accepted but which is equally certainly taken to be a substantial and
respectable theological option, and which long pre-dates any influence
Wittgenstein's v^rilings and teaching have exerted. Why, then, when
WittgcnsEein restates these familiar themeSn should they have elicited
such an apparently undismissable intensity of interest and hostility
from philosophers of religion? Perhaps an examiiiation of the work of
those influenced by Wittgenstein's remarks will help to account for
this ollierwise puzzling phenomenon.

Wittgensteinian interprutations of religion

Ever since the publication of Kai Neilscn's article eiitiltcd 'Wittgenstein-
ian fideistn'/ certain fundamental misunderstandings about the nature
of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion have embedded themselves
seemingly beyond recovery in the collective philosophical unconscious.
Writers influenced by Wittgenstein - particularly D.Z. Phillips - have
identified and attempted to rebut these misconceptions so oflei^ and so
forcefully that it would seem entirely otiose c^'cn to raise the qucstiori
again, if it were not for the fact that these rebuttals have been so singu-
larly unsuccessful in achieving their aim of clarif^^ing the true implica-
tions of the Wittgensteinian approach. What 1 want to do, then, is look
at this issue one more time - not so much with the aim of tr^-'ing to
settle the dispute^ but in order to try to understand a little more clearly
why we seemed doomed endlessly to repeat the dance of mutual mis-
understanding that this dispute now seems destined to embody.

What makes the incradicabtlity of the term 'Wittgensteinian Fideism'
so puzzling is that its users manage thereby to imply two radically con-
tradictory linos of criticism simultaneously The first is that Wittgen-
steinian approaches illegitimately lender traditional rcligioti immune
to criticism; the second is that they illegitimately crilicizc traditional
religious attempts to justify faith- Niclsen^s original article focuses on

104 Fffihiwptiy of fif/i^ii^n p;i the 21 it Century

the former line of arguracntj claimmg that according to certain followers
of WiUgcnstcin:

pUiiigion] can only be understood of criticised, and then onty In a
piecemeal waVr from within this mode by someone who has a par-
ticipant's understanding of lliis mode of discourse. To argue..- thai
the very first-order discourse of this form of life is incoherent or

irrational can be nothing but a confusion, for it is this very form
of life, this very form of discourse itself, that sets its own criteria of
coherence, intelligihility or rationality. PhLJosopiiy cannot rcle-
vantly criticise relt^ion; it can only display for us the workings, the
style of functioning, of religious discourse. (WP, p. I9'i)

Hyman's article includes a trenchant version of the latter line of
argument.

[S]incc evidence and argument are not the exclusive property of
science, Witlgcnstein cannot be right to insist that if we try to prove
or support the proposition lliat God exists^ we are treating religion
as if it were science, and are therefore already trapped in confusion.
It would, 1 thinks be a mistake to maintain tliat because Anselm and
Aquinas sought to prove the existence of God, tliey were peddling a
variety of pseudo-science, a superstition which has notliing to do
with reli^ous faith. (IWM, p. 261)

It is certainly difficult to sec how anyone could maintain both lines
of argument simultaneously^ but might not one or the other of them
ne\^ertheless be sound?

It must be admitted at once that the ways in whicli some Wittgen=
stcinians liavc expressed themselves has helped to give some founda-
tion to the first of these lines of criticism. For example, Hyman is
rightly critical of D.Z. Phillips^s recently expressed, incautious bul
revealing claim that:

If the notton of an inner substance caHcd 'tlie soul' is the philo-
sophical chimera we have suggested it is, whatever is meant by the
immortahiy of the soul cannot be the continued existence of such a
substance. (DS-^ p. 2371

Since, as Hyman says, there is no obvious reason why it should be
impossible to espouse, sincerely and seriously, demonstrably incoherent

Stephen S4iiih^tf HJ5

doctrines^ Pliillips's inference is plainly invalid; and the fact that he
failed Lo notice this plausibly suggests Ihat he has a Lcndcncy to assume
that religious beliefs and forms of life are essentially not illusory (if not
necessarily beyond criticism), i^evcrlhelcss^ such remarks can and should
be dismissed as incidental sEips unless it can t>e demonstrated that a
similar tendency infects principles that arc at the heart of the VViUgcn-
steinian approacli to the philosophy of rcli^Jion; and we have good
reason for thinking that they arc not.

For example, D.Z. Phillips has repeatedly argued that Nielsen^s worries
are entirely unfounded^ because they fail to acknowledge that Witlgcii-
steinian analyses of religious belief work not by isolating religious
discourse and practice from the rest of human experience and life but
by relating them to it. The process of clarifying tlie meaning of a reli-
gious concept certainly involves relating that concept to other retigious
concepts^ and to the attitudes and beliefs that go to inakc up a religious
way of life; but it also Involves relating that system of concepts^ atti-
tudes and beliefs to more general human phenomena. Praying to God^
for example, makes sense only because human life includes experiences
and events for which God might intefligtbty be thanked, desires and
purposes about which petitions might be made^ and actioi:is and
thoughts which nnight intelligibly form the subject of a confession or
request for absolution. It is precisely because religious faith can be pre-
sented as one way of responding to the ordinary problems, perplexities
and joys which most people experience at some point in their lives
that it has the importance it does have for so many people.

[nsofar as it presents a religious system of reference in its natural
setting like thls^ a Wlttgensteinian account not only gives itself the
resources to make religious concepts intelligible to non-believers as well
as believers; it is also able to show that both groups have access to a
number of perfectly legiLlmaie ways of criticizing or rejecting modes
of life that employ religious concepts. To begin with, religious systems
of reference contain their own distinctive terms of criticism. Even
setting aside the ways In which l>cllevcrs might discriminate orthodoxy
from heresy or blasphemy, there is also the category of superstition; it
is perfectly common for believers to criticize fcllow-believcrs on the
grounds that their claims and actions manifest what one might call a
magical or sentimental conception of the deity, and it is perfectly pos-
sible for those outside the relevant religious tradition to comprehend
and endorse such criticisms, Phillips^ for example, makes much of
Wlttgenstcin^s criticisms of the scapegoat rite as described in Leviticus,
in the course of which he argues that the use of an animal to shoulder

106 Fffihiwphy of fif/igii^n p;i the 21 it Century

the peoplc^s burden of sinfulness can plausibly be rejected as einbodying
a confused and crude understanding of how freedom from sin might be
achieved.

Hcwcvcrj Phillips also famously makes rather more external criticisms
of certain mainsta)^ of traditional theoEogical and religious thinking in
Christianily^ I am thinking here of hi.s critique of traditional solutions
to the problem of evil^ or of the standard proofs of God^s existence.
Plainly, such criticisms presuppose a certain grasp of the nature and
signihcance of the religious tradition from which tlie lx:liefs and prac-
tices under criticism have emerged - how else can vvc ensure thai those
ertticisms are accurately aimed? But they do not use terms of criticism
tliat are generated or deployed exclusively by believers - importaaitly
because they depend upon invoking certain connections between
religious attitudes and the more general phenomena of human life.
Phillips^s critique of solutions to the problem of evil^ for example,
depends primarlty upon certain central moral principles concerning the
intrinsic and incommensurable value of human life^ and upon certain
ordinary human responses to the suffering of others - principles and
responses that are plainly not the cxiuslvc preserve of those within a
religious tradition.

Moreover, although Phillips does not make mucli of this possibility
in his writings^ there is no reason w^hy even more apparently externa]
modes of criticism might not be deployed against religious belief in
a manner consistent with Wittgenstein^s principles- For example^
Nietzsche's suspicions of Christianity as embodying sado-masochistic
5elf-hatrcd^ and Trcud's suspicions of institutionalized religion as pan-
dering to psychologically Immature dependence on a father-figure
should both provide food for thought even tor believers. They identify
new forms - or at leasl potentially illuminate nc\v interpretations of
old forms - of religious pathology, and help to alert a believer to per-
Jbaps unappreciated variants of the ills to which religious thought and
practice is heir

Wlttgenstelnlans would, however^ be less comfortable with the idea
tliat such theories might legitimately be used to justify a wholesale
rejection of religious belief as such - exactly the i^ind of rejection
which Ncilsen^ for example, wishes to leave open. Here again, unfortu-
nately, this discomfort has been formulated - by Witlgenstcinians and
perhaps by Wittgenstein hiniselt - in potcniially misleading ways.
Phillips, for example, quotes the following remark of Wittgenstein's as
support for his claim that^ whilst we can legitimately criticize certain
religious rituals as confused or superstitious^ we cannot make the same

Stephen S4iiihM IQ7

criticisin of religious practices as a whole. It is true that we can compare

a picture that is firmly rooted [n us to a superstition; but it i^ equally
true that we always eventually have to reach some firm ground, either
a picture or something clsc^ so that a picliirc ivhich is at the foot of
all our thinking Is to be respected and not treated as a superstition
(CV, p. &3K

The context of this remark makes it unclear exactly what Wittgenstein
has ill mind when he talks of 'a plctuic at the root of all our thinking'^
but It is surely plain that the inference he proposes is invalid if we
think of it in application to religious pictures. For ftom the fact that
certain religious pictures guide an individual's hfe, and lie at the root of
all that she says and docs, IL certainly docs not follow thai they are
worthy of respect- Why, after all, should the depth or jx^rvasive influ-
ence of a picture make it incoherent to judge that it embodies a
degrading or innmature attitude to life? What is needed for me to make
such a criticism is^ as Wittgenstein says, some firm ground from Avhich
to evaluate the rehpious picture, a competing picture or something
else of tlic kind that is fundamental to my life; but such pictures are
precisely designed to proi-ide a base from which to criticize opposing
pictures that lie at the root of other people's lives. Indeed, one of the
key facts about rclij^ous pictures nowadays is that, although they lie at
tlie root oi some people's thinking, they do not lie at the root of our
thinking, of e\'eryone's thinking: hence, unhke the pictures to which
Wittgenstein appears to be referring^ they arc precisely open to criti-
cism and lejection.

There arc^ however, other and bcLter reasons for baulking at the
thought of a wholesale re}cction of religious belief as such; for such a
rejection would fail to acknowledge even the possibility that certain
versions of such ways of life might avoid the ills to which others
succumb- It Is far from easy to see how there could be an a priori
demonstration that aU possible ways of deploying religious systems of
reference are pathological^ because tliat would amount to establisiiLng
that it is impossible even to conceive of a way of using those concepts
as part of a form of life that does not manifest the relevant attitudes
(of sado-masochism or immaturity).

These qualms become even more overwhelming when the critic
wishes - as does KaL NeLlsen - to he able to reject a religious mode of
discourse as a whole on the grounds that Lt is incoherent or irrational or
llloKtcaL There is^ of course, no difficulty with the idea that someone
might regard religious belief as imprudent ^like gambling) or oppressive
(like footbinding) or pointless (like motor racing}; and given that the

ins Flrihiwphy ofRi^Hsfou m the 21 it Century

laws of logic apply to religious discourse as they do to any others a
religious statement that is on the face of ti logically iticohcrcm (such as
■"God Is three and one') stands in need of an exptanalion which reveals
that this is not in fact so. But there can be no ground foi assuming a
priori that such an explanation cannot he forthcoming; we have to look
and sec how the statement ftinctions in the relevant context before we
can establish what it means. And shice any attempt to demonstrate the
global irrationality of religious belief as such must presuppose that the
rettgious discourse under criticism has a particular si^nfficancEp it will
fail to apply to any actual or possible inode of employing that discourse
which confers a different significance upon it.

What, then, of the opposing weakness attributed to 'Wittgcnstclnlan
Fldclsts' - their tendency not to render religious belief Immune from
radical criticism, but rather to subject traditional modes of defending
religious belief to radical criticism? Note that the real issue here is not
whether or not Wittgensteinlan accounts can consistently contlict with
what religious believers are inclined at first blush to say about theiE
beliefs aiid practices. As Phillips has repeatedly pointed out:

[Tlhe suggestion [that we should accept the believer's gloss as the
last word on the issuel is baffling. These philosophers would not
dream of advocating this procedure elsewhere In philosophy. 1 can
be told any day of the WTck In my local pub that thlitking is a state
of consciousness. Does tiiat settle the matter? (^WRj'"" p. 243)

A Wittgensteinlan ts coniniittedj not to the defence of common sense,
but to the clarification of the grammar of the words In whicli common
sense and any other inteliiglbie utterances are given expression. What
provides that clarirication In the case of leligious belief is not whatever
religious believers are at first inclined to say about themselves - that is
philosophical raw material, not its end-product - but rather how they In
fact employ religious concepts in the practices which go to make up
their lives- Any Interesting version of this line of criticism must therefore
make out a ease for the claim that WlttgensLeinian approaches arc com=
mitted to subjecting traditional religious practices to radical criticism.

Myman's way of developing this claitii unfortunately begins from a
mistaken reading of Wittgenstein's claims about this issue. His argu-
mcnt, as we saw earlier, ruiis as follows:

[Sjince evidence and argument are not the exclusive property of
science^ Wittgenstein cannot be right to insist that if we try to prove

Stephen S4iiih^{f IQ9

or support the proposition that God exists, wc arc treating rcHgion
as if it wcFC science, and arc therefore already trapped in confusion.
It would, 1 think, be a mistake to maintain that because Ansclm and
Aquinas sought to prove the existence of God, tlicy were peddling a
variety of pseudo-seicncc, a superstition which has nothing to do
Willi religious l^aith. (IWXJ^ p. 261)

Til cffeci, Hynian assumes that, because Wittgenstein in his lectures
accuses one Fatlier O'Hara of illicitly transforming religious belief into
supH^rstitionj then he is comnilued to accusing Ansclni and Aquinas of
the same error. But what Wittj^enstein actually objects to in O'Hara's
approach is that he is 'one of those people who make [religious belief]
a question of science' [LQ p. 57); in other words, he treats a belief in
God's existence as a kind of empirical hypothesis, and so treats God as
a kind of physical object oi entity. So the criticism w^ould only transfer
to Anselm or Aquinas if their attempts to defend or support religious
belief betrayed a simitar tendency. Hyman thinks that they do because
he thinks that Willgenstein regards any attempt to support religious
belief as tantamount to treating religion as if it were science, liut this
is sinipty not true: Wittgenstein thinks that it would be as misleading
to present religious belief as reasonable as it would be to describe it as
irrational^ but he docs not ililnk Lhat there is no such thing as arguing
about or offering reasons for or against religious belief. On the contrary,
he tells us that ^[religious] controverstes look quite different from any
normal controversies- Reasons look entirely different from normal rca-
scns^ (LQ p. 56) - remarks which presuppose that there are such things
as religious contTovcrsies^ and reasons for and against religious bclicL

Wliether or not Anselm and Aquinas fall foul of Wittgenstein's criti-
cism therefore depends, not on whether or not they try to defend their
religious beliefs^ but on how they do so - on whether or not they
involve treating God as a kind of physical objeetn or treating a belief in
God's existence as a kind of empirical h)^olliesis. The simple fact that
tliese proofs tend to mlntmlze as far as possible any reliance upon
empirical premiseSn and aspire to establishing certainty of a kind more
akin to that available in the realms of mathematics and logic than that
of science, suggests that there might at least be initial grounds for dis-
tinguishing Father O'Hara's efforts from tliosc of his illustrious prede-
cessors- And of course, Wittgenstcinian philosophers pf religion have
devoted much labour to the task of showing that, although traditional
proofs of God's existence of tlie kind offered by Anselm and Aquinas
can be understood as versions of Father O'Hara 's kind of thinking, they

no Flrihiwphy ofRi^iisiou m the 21 it Century

need not be. Phillips'^ analyses of the ar;^nicn1: from Design and the
Cosmologieal argument are one example of this nuanced Ireatment;
but Norman Malcohrt^s account of Ansclni^s Iwo versions of the Onto-
logical aigumciil is perhaps the single most influential and impressive
example of this kind of Wiftgensteinian work, since it aims to establish
Ihat the whole point of the Ontological argument Is to remind us that
God is not ^eine Existenz\ NevcrthelesSj insofar a^ Anselm and Aquinas
or their followers have understood their proofs to be proofs of an
empirical hypothesis, and lo have embodied such an understanding in
(heir practices, then they will indeed count as supcrstUious from a
Wittgensteinian j>crspective. And the critics take it that such a categoriza-
tton of certain religious practices and perspectives amounts to a species
of prescriptive revisionism, and so as antithetical to Wittgenstein i an
descriptive methods - as subverting their claim to be merely describing
the practices and forms of ilfe with language that are the focus of iheir
philosophical concern. Phillips has attempted to block this inference
by denying that such categorizations have an^ critical or rc\asionary
implications: ''Whether a ritual is superstitious is shown in its practice.
Philosophy, in making this explicit, is not prescriptive' (WR^ p. 245).

Thi.^ claim lacks any real plausibility, however for of course, ^ven If
the applicability of the concept of 'superstition^ to a given practice can
l>e judged only by descril?ing tiie form of that practice, the concept
Itself has a primarily critical force, and criticism implies the need for
change: superstition is, after all^ something to be avoided- So^ if Phillips
succeeded in demonstrating to the satisfaction of a given religious
believer that some aspect of their beliefs, rituals or practices deserved
to be called ^superstitious^ he would have s^ven them the best possible
reason to alter it in the direction of a more genuinely religious attitude
to life. Such believers mifjht well be grateful for the intervention. After
all, since all religious traditions alter over time (In part because of shifts
in the theological and philosophical understandings of their concepts
aiid practices)^ their adherents might actually come to embrace rcvi-
slonary accounts of their traditional self-understandings as embodying
a deeper understanding of the true nature of their inheritance- Any
such intervention would, however, undeniably be revisionary in its
consequences.

The charge of ' prescript! vism' cannot, therefore, be as easily dis-
missed as Phillips seems to think. Biit it is important to acknovslcdge
that Wittgensteinians are not here engaging in the business of using
one language game to combat another, deploying mcKies of criticism
that are entirely external or alien to the practices criticized - fox the

Stephen S4iiiimt} 111

t€rms of criticism deployed arc ones which form a more or less intimate
part of the system of reference under descFiptlon. To put tt in PhtMips's
preferred terminology: certain confusions in certain religious practices
are identified by reference to other aspects of what religious believers
say and do, both as part of their explicitly religious lives and as part
of their common moral and intellectual Inheritaiice. NeverthelesSn this
identification of confusion cannot be uncoupled from its critical or
prescriptive implications; and ihis does suggest that Wittgenstelnians
must reconcile themselves to acknowledging that there is at lea^t one
important sense iti whicli their philosophical practice does not 'leave
everj^thing as it is' - that it does not accept forms of life as given. And
since the terms of criticism employed (ones which identify confusions
as species of 'superstition^ and so on) have their original home in reli-
gious or spiritual contexts, the question arises: is there a more than
purely coincidental relation betw^een a Wittgensteinian philosophical
practice and religious forms of life? Why is It that a prescrlpUve
element tn Wittgensteinian philosophy seems to emerge most expHc-
itly and naturally with respect to religion?

Religious iuttipfitaflaons of Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein himself famously remarked: ''I am nol a religious man^
but 1 cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view'
(RW, p. 79).

This remark can only confirm the feelings of those who - in w^hat
appear to be increasing numbers in recent years - claim to detect an air
of spiritual fervour throughout Wtttgensietn's philosophical writings^
both early and late- It has recently been the focus of a wonderfully illu-
iiiinaling discussion between two of the most hi^^hly respected mem-
bers of a group of philosophers whose work was heavily influenced
by Wittgenstein's own thought- Normaii Malcolm and Peter Winch;'^^
and I would like to conclude this essay tay exploring that exchange.
Even though its full elaboration was cut short by his untimely death,
Malcohn's view of the matter is fairly clearly summarized at the end of
his essay.

[T|here are four analogies betw^ecn Witlgenstein^s conception of the
grammar of language, and his \^ew of what is paramount in a religious
life. First, in both there is an end to explanation; second, in toth
there is an inclination to be amazed at the existence of something

112 Fmitiwphy ofRi^n^ou m the 21 it Century

[language gameSj in the one casc^ and the world, in the other]; thirdj
into both there enters the notion of an ""illness'; fourth, in lioth, doiaigj
acting, takes prLor[t>^ over Lntcllectijal understanding and reasoning-
(Rf^: p. 92)

I thinlc it is fair to say thai Peter Winch's tactful but relentless essay in
response to Malcolm's own shows beyond doubt that both ihe main
elements and ihe overall approach ol Malcolm's analysis ate seriously
awry, hi particular, the claimed analogies can appear to hold only if
one Fails to acknowledge not only critical differences between the sig-
nificance of similar words employed in very different contexts, but also
what Wittgenstein would think of as critical differences between philo-
sophical and religious approaches to phenomena tn general. Thus^ for
example. Winch points out thai the first of Malcolm's four analogies
runs together two distinct points of comparison - that the expression
of religious belief is itself a language-game for which it makes no sense
to ask for an explanation, and that for the religious belie^^er within
such a language game a reference to God^s will signals ^an end to expla-
nation'- But the former point holds of all language games, and so falls
to distinguish religious practices from ^ny otheip whereas the latter
precisely marks a disanalogy beUvecn philosophy and religion, since
no VVlttgensteinlan Is, as it were, professionally committed to the view
that we must accept lan^age games as they are because their existence
and specific form are manifestations of God^s wilL On a more general
level, Winch is suspicious of the particular angle from which Malcolm
approaches the remark Wittgenstein Is reported to have made, and
which his four analogies are designed to elucidate. For^ quite apart
fiom the fact that our only evidence for its having been made is the
recollection of a friend, Winch is alert to the further fact that, as
reported^ Wittgenstein's remark identifies the religious point of \1ew as
that from which he approaches 'every problem' - not every philosoph-
ical problemj as Malcolm presupposes. At best^ therefore^ It can be held
to characterize Wittgenstein's relation to philosophical problems, and
so his philosophical practice, only insofai as it characterizes his rela-
tion to the problems of life as a whole - and not, as Malcolm assumes,
entirely Independently of that general attitude. Nevertheless, Winch is
inclined to see that something important about Wittgenstein's philo-
sophical practice is captured by the reported remark^ and he ends his
response to Matcolm by sketching in his own interpretation of it. This
sketch is more than a little difficult to render consistent in places_ For
example^ after makinj^ a connection between Wittgenstein's views of

Stephen S4iiih^{f 113

religtoii and of philosophy by talking of the passion A-vith which he
practises the latter^ and iioUng that VVtttgcnslcin follows Kierkegaard in
contrasting Ihe passion of faith with the cold passionlessness of
wisdom, Winch immediately suggests ihaL the l*hi!osophLcal hivcstiga-
tlons can tae Ihought of as expressing Wittgenstein's ideal of 'a certain
coohicss_ A temple providing a setting for the passions without
meddling with them^ (CV^ p. 1). In the end, however^ the key point
Winch wishes to make emerges quite clearly: it Involves a sense that "for
someone to whom philosophical issues matter^ a lack of clarity ahout
them can have grave implications for his or her own rclalion to life'

fRPV, p. uai ■ ^ ■ -

Winch illustrates his point by referring to a passajjc by Wittgenstein
on how the sensation of pain can have a relation to a human body.

Blit isn't it absurd to say of a body that it has pain? - And why does
one feel an absurdity in that? In w-hat sense is It true that my hand
docs not feel pain, but 1 In my hand?

What sort of issue is: Is it the body that feels pain? - How is it to
be decided? What makes it plausible to say that it is not the body? -
Well, something like this: If somcoiic has a pain in his hand^ then
the hand docs not say so (unless it writes it) and one does not com-
fort the hand, but the sufferer: one looks into his face. (PI/' ^ p. 2K6)

Winch's commentary on this passage deserves quotation in full.

That last sentence gives me a wonderful sense of a fog suddenly
hfting; the eonfused shapes that loom up and disappear again in the
familiar philosophical discussions of 'mind and body' vanish and 1
am left with a clear view of something very familiar of which 1 had
not noticed the importance- Its importance' lies in the first instance
in its relation to the philosophical discussion. At the same time in
attending to the minute detail that plays such an enormous role in
our relations to each other, my sense of the dimensions of those
relations is boQi transformed and enriched: when comforting some-
one who has been hurl, I look into the sufferer's eyes, (RPV, p. 130)

i find this passage to be just as wonderful as the passage from Wittgen-
stein to which it is a response; but it sec ins to me that two qualifications
Winch imposes on the scope of its implications are difficult to justifj^

First, we might ask: is it really plausible to restrict the transformation
and enrichment that Wittgenstcm's grammatical reminders can engender

1 14 FIriio.wphy ofRi^fi^ou Ui the 21 it Century

lo 'our sense of the dimensions of our interpersonal relations? Winch
figures WUigcnstciii'"s insights as removing the fog wliich has blocked
my view of something entirely familtarp he thereby restricts the trans-
formation those insights produce to our understanding of our lives
rather than to what is thereby understood. The idea is that philosophi-
cal confusions reside exclusively in tlie views we take of our lives, not
the lives themselves. But this seems a particularly artificial distinction
With respect to grammatical reminders about psychological concepts.
Take, for cxaniiple^ Wittgenstein's related reminders concerning the
commonly expressed philosophical view that no other person can have
exactly the same pain as me; Wittgenstein argues that this view depends
upon incoherently treating the possessor of the pain as a property of it,
and so manifests a false sense of our scparateness as persons by imposing
a non-existent uniqueness on our experience. Bui the scepticism of
which this liclief is the intellectual expression is also something that
can and does pervade our ordinary liveSn affecting not just our sense of
the dimensions of interpersonal relations but the dimensions them-
selves. We can and do exist within this mislocaled sense of our sepa-
ratencss and commonality; we live our scepticism.

Winches second qualification finds expression in his claim thai the
spiritual implications of grammatical unclarity apply only to those for
whom philosophical issues matter. This restriction is reinforced and
explained in a footnote, which reads: '1 make this qualification since
1 am sure that Wittgenstein did not - like Socrates? - want to make
philosophical clarity quite generally a sine qua non of spiritual health'
(Rpy p- 135). If lA^e question Wtcich's first qualification hy questioning
the distinction hetwecn oiLr philosophically expressed views of life and
our lives themselves, tliis second qualification will already look rather
implausible. But there are also independent grounds for concern; for
tl;ie second qualification seems to depend upon an equally artificial
distinction between those for whom philosophical Issues matter and
those for whom they do not. Firsts if Winches own line of argument
is correct, there can tae no-one who stands in need of philosophical
clarity for whom that clarity cannot matter; if yoti suffer from the
confus^on^ you need the clarity - that clarity matters to you - w^hethcr
you know it or not. So tlie distinction which his qualification really
presupposes must be one between those for whom philosophical prob-
lems arisc^ and those for whom they do not. But any such distinction
can be at best provisional, for there is no jjood reason to think that
there arc any human beings who are constitutionally immune to philo-
sophical confusions^ any creature complicated enough Co be burdened

Stephen S4iiih^t} 115

by language is necessarily vulnerable to such confusions. To be surc^ a
given person at a given time might escape contusion^ and so stand in
no need of graininaticaL clarity at that time- after all, one migtit almost
define a philosophical prohlem as one Vn^liieh is not always live for us,
but whichn once living, is undism is sable. But this temporary freedom
has nothing to do with whether or not one is a professional phUoso-
phcr^ or wcU-cducatcdj or an inhabitant of complex civilizations - as
Winch's qualification seems to nnply. The truth of the matter is that
philosophical confusions are not restricted to inhabitants of certain
disciplines^ or sectors of culture, or classes within societies^ or societies
as a whole. They are part of our inheritance as human beings; and In
this important sense, philosophical issues matter to everyone. If^ then^
we contemplate pushing beyond Winch's conclusions by removing his
two restrictions, but in the direction that those conclusions have
already sketched out^ we might feel the need to inquire a little more
closely Into the nature of the philosophical confusions agalnsL which
Wittgenstein sets the resources of his philosophical practice of remind-
ing us of what we say when, recalling us to the grammar or criteria of our
ordinary words, if such recalling is necessary, that must be because
our confusion has ted us to go beyond those criteria - to lose control of
our words, to attempt to speak outside or beyond language games. But
how and why might we make such an attempt? Why and how can oth-
erwise competent speakers suffer such a loss of control when under the
pressure to philosophize?

We know that, for Wittgenstein, that over whicli they lose control -
criteria - constitute the iimits or conditiojis of the human capacity to
knoWn think or speak about tlic world and the various things that are in
it: they are that without which human knowledge of the world would
not be possible. But of course, it is fatally easy to interpret limits as Eimi-
tationSn to experience conditions as constraints. Indeed, this is precisely
how the sceptic often understands her owtl motives^ she repudiates our
ordinary reliance upon criteria because she regards what we ordinarily
count as knowledge as itothing of the kind, as failing to put us Into
contact with the world as it really is. Liut it would only make sense to
think of the conditions of liuman kaiowlcdgc as limitatioi:fcs if we could
conceive of another cognitive perspective upon the world that did
not require them; and philosophers from Kant onwards liave variously
striven to show diat there is no such perspective - tliat tlie absqice of the
concepts or categories in terms of which we individuate olisfccts would
not clear the way for unmediated knowledge of the world, but would
rather remove the possibility cf anything that might count as knowledge.

11 "6 Flfiio.wptiy ofRi'fi^o^f p;i the 21 it Century

]n other words^ what the sceptic understands as a process of dsstllu-

sionmciiL In the name of true knoivlcdgc, Wittgcnslclii inlctprcls as an
inability or refusal to acknowledge tlic fact that liuinan knowledge -
Uie knowledge available to flnilc creatures, subjective agents m an
objective world - is necessarily conditioned. But it Is worth rccaHlng
lliat nothing is more human than llie desire lo deny the human, to
interpret limits as limitations and to repudiate (he human condition
of conditioncdness or finitude in the name of (he unconditioned,
the transcendent, the superhuman - the inhuman. On this under-
standing of criteriaj the human desire to speak outside language
games is an inflection of the pridcful human craving to be God, and
Witlgenste ill's philosophical practice aims not so much to eradicate
this ineradicable hubris but to diagnose it and track dowMi the causes
of its specific eruptions from case to case of its ^ercmilal^ endlessly
renewed realization.

An interpretation of Wittgenstein's method along these lities has
been most famously advanced and elaborated by Stanley Cayell, who
thinks of philosophy practised under such a self-understanding as a
species of perfectionism.^^ in Cavell's thought, the unending sequence
of specific manifestations of scepticism in modcrnily reveals that
human beings are possessed of a nature in which the sceptical impulse
is {apparently) ineradicably Inscribed- Whal is needed ifit is to be com-
bated is a fully acknowledged relationship with a particular human
other fthc philosopher, whether Wittgenstein or tliose who would
inherit his task) - one whose words have the power to identif^^ and
make us ashamed of our present confused and disoriented slatc^ one
ivhOj by excmplifving a further^ attainable state of clarity and self-
possession^ can attract us to it whils( respecting our autonomy and
iridi\'iduality. Now, measure this self-understanding against the follow-
ing theological structure- In Christian thought, our unending sequence
of particular sinful acts reveals that human beings are possessed of a
nature which disposes Lheni to sin and prevents them from escaping
(lielr bondage tay using their own rx^sources. \Miat they need to attain
Llieii new nature is a fully acknowledged relationship with a particular
person - one through whose words divine grace is made accessibte, one
who exemplifies the further, unattained but attainable human state to
which God wishes to attract every individual whilst respecting her
freedom to deny its attractions and spurn His grace. Against this
background^ it is not just a sense of Hic reality of our hubristic railings
against our finilude that links Wittgenstein Ian philosophy and religion.

Stephen Miiih^tf 117

but a surprisingly detailed conception of its precise forms and of the

available ways of attcmpUng lo overcome Ihem. Tlic precision of the
mapping here might well be what underlay the third of llic analogies
Malcolm wi5hcd to draw between Witt^cnstein^s view of pliilosophical
problems and religious belief, and to which Winch devotes compara-
tli'cly liLtlc attention in his response: that bctvi;ccn ihe religious atti-
tude of regarding oneself as radically imperfect or 'sick' and the idea
that philosophical puzzlement is a sympiora of a disease. It may be,
in other words, that some recognizable inflection of the notion of
Original Sin is more pertinent to the insight thai Winch himself
began lo develop than he was able to see, that he and Malcolm were in
this sense less far apart than may appear. Whatever the truth of this
matter, it seems at least arguable that if we arc to attain a deeper under-
standing of Wittgenstein's 'religious point of view', and attain thereby
a better grasp of the uncanny, undismissablc intimacy between
Wittgenstelnlan philosophy of religion and jc]]gioii itself^ we would
do well to take seriously Stanley CavelTs interpretation of the
Philosophical hivcstigations.

Notes

L in LiTiiirf.T wui Cvfivef':^^liofis Gfi At^sth^tics^ Psy^chofo^' 4Ufd Rch^ima Bi'Uef, edited
by Cyril Barrett (Lrniveisitj- o( Calikjmia Press, Berkeley, 1966) - ]iijrt:after LC,

2- Edited by G.U. von Wright and H- Nyman, trans, Peter Winch {Oxford:
Easi] B3ackwell, 19801 - hereafter CV.

3- Edited by Rush Rhte& (OKford Uiicversity Press, Oxford, 19J51 1 - hereafter RW.

4. Edited by Quinn aniJTaEiafeiro I Oxford: Elackwell, 3997>-pp. I5fJ-S.

5. In^ead of referring to lii& Companion entry, I ^hall use quotations from
Dt Hyman's earlier paper 'Immortality without Metaphysics' (pubiii^hed
in DZ_ Phj[lip5 (edj. Can R^'li,^hm Be E-xplitifud Away? (LDndoni St Martin'5
Press, 1996[ - hereaftei IWM), where he advances exactly the same lines of
argument- Since the original paper was presented at an earlier Claremont
Conference, this choice of reference point seem-ed best suited to the present
occasion,

6. Trans- H-V. an J ELH. Hong {Piincelon, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992 J -
hereafter CUR

7. Philosophy XLII, No- 1^51,July 1967 - hereafter Wl--

S. ^Dislocating the Souf , the es-say to which Hyman's own article 'Immortaliry
without Metapliyi^ics"' is a leply^ is published in the same coiiection.

9. D.Z- PhilhpSj. Witt,^e?rsteiii luid Reii^lmi (London: MacmiHan, 19931 - here^

after WR.
10- N. Malcolm, Wini{en^tehi: ti Reii^iima Poiul of View? (editcid vvkh a response
by Peter Winch) (London: RoutEedge, 19?3j - hereafter RPV-

US Flriitiwphy ofRi^Hsfou m the 21 it Century

11. L Wittgenstein (trans. C^_E_M. Anscombe^j Pfilio:!iuptiical hivestigations
COxfoid: ElackweSl, 1953)-

12- Many of the key CaveJI texts are collected in 5. Mulhall (ed.;^ The diveit
R^aJer {Oxford: Blackwell^ 19961 - see especially Essay 1 6 and the Epilogue.
Further elaboration and defence of Cavell's inteipretation of Wittgenstein
can bL" found in my Staniey CiiwU: PbUosopby's Recounting ^fttie Oniinary
tOxfofd: OKfofd University Press, 1994) - see especially ch_ IZ-

Wittgenstein and the Philosophy
of Religion: a Reply to Stephen
Mulhall

Waiford Gea}y

I waitL to begin by congta tula ting Stephen Miilhall on his beautifully
written and solidly constructed paper. The title givcn^ 'Wittgenstein
and the l-'liiiosophy of kchgion' allowed the posslbilUy of a wide
approach to be taken to the subject, and Mulhall has taken full advan-
tage of ihis space in his tripartite rciponse. The excellence of some sec-
tions of his paper has rendered any further comment on them wholly
superfluous. I have particularly in mind those parts in which Mulhalt is
critical of other writers^ such as his penetratingly astute ar^mcnts
againstjohn Hyman in both the first and second divisions or the paper.
However^ no t^vo people would have approached this set topic in the
same way^ and Lhere are some issues ivhich I would have liked to have
seen given greater emphasis, especially the assessment of Wittgenstein's
contribution to the philosophy of rcttgion. But I also think thatj in
some ways^ Mulhall could have been more critical of Witt^cnstcni's
own views on religion- 1 appreciate that these commenLs are, of course,
essentiallv evaluative, and I found it difficult to discover much that is
amiss with Mulhairs logic. In my reply I wish to concentrate primarily
on the first part of MulhalFs paper which deals specifically with
Wittgenstein^s own comments on religion, including liiose remarks
contained in the celebrated three lectures on religious belief, although
what I have to say about these has some bearing on issues raised in the
other two sections of MulhalTs essay.

If the general question were asked^ 'What has Wittgenstein contributed
to the philcfiophy of religion?' it would not he inappropriate, even for
tiiosc who have embraced his standpoint^ to answer in t^vo apparently
contradictory ways. On the one hand, it could be maintained that he
contributed next to nothing to the subject, while, on the other hand, it
could be claimed^ with some considerable justification, that no one in

119

120 Flrihiwptiy of fif/jgroiu in the 21 it Century

this century has contrihutcd more to the discipline. On the negative side,
Mulhal! refers to the 'few scauert:d pebbles' of Wittgenstein's remarks on

religious belief - and it is induhitably the case that Wittgenstein lATOte
very little about rcU^^ion- And^ in my view, what he did Avrite^ or perhaps
more accurately as a generalization, what he is reported to have saUl
aboijl religious faith, appears to me to be largely unimpressive - partic-
ularly Troni a religious perspective - and, in philosophical termSn it is
certainly not representative of, or even comparable with, wliat is best
in Wittgenstein. His comments on religion often appear idiosyncratic
and banalj and, sonicUmes, plainly incorrect. On the positive side, and
in sharp contrast to the 'pebbles' alluded to, Wittgenstein's work on
Ihe philosophy of logic and language appear, in Mulhairs own phrase,
like 'mountainous ranges', and for most Wittgcnsteinian thinkers it is
Ihe implications of this logic that makes his indirect contribuUon to
the philosophy of rehgion so invaluable. Let us then look briefly at
these different ways of evaluating Wittgenstein's contribution to this
field of philosophy beginning with the positive aspect - the claim
that, arguably^ Wittgenstein's contribution to the philosophy of reli-
gion in this centurj^ is unparalleled.

Even though it is fashtonabtc to distLnguish betis^cen the various
philosophies of Wittgenstein, there Is, throughout his thinking, one
central unif)'1ng preoccupation, l-roin Lhe very first he was solely con-
cerned with the issue of the intelligibility of symbolism or of language.
Tliis concern with the nature of language or symbolism had developed
from his initial interest in mathematics and from his subsequent read-
ing of the works of Frege and kusscIL As such, Wittgenstein's thinking
forms part of a mder philosophical movement that iTccamc ultimately
responsible for placing logical considerations at the heart of piiilosoph-
ical activity, and that for the greater part of the twentieth century
What this concern wnih logic displaced was epistemology - a discipline
which, in Wittgenstein's earlier work, was relegated to the realm of
psychology, while in his later work^ epistemology is seen to be, as most
other philosophical Issues, the product of conceptual confusion- The
traditional general question, ""What is the nature of knowledge?' is both
misleading and ambiguous. It presupposes that there is such a thing as
tlie essence of knowledge- But Wittgenstein showed that what knowl-
edge amounts to depends on the context in which thp claim to knowl-
edge is made^ and on how things 1iang together' wiLliin that specific
context. So that to know myself, for instance, or to know what pain a
person is going through, or to know that Cardiff is the capital city of

Wafforti GeaSy IZl

Wales, or that the chemical formula of salt is NaCl, or to know Godn
arc different forms of knowing. In tlie sense thai each claim is connected
with different sets of concepts that go together - so tliat what can be
said or asked about each form of knowledge differs in each case. Or^
expressed in a different way, if one were challenged to defend one's
claim to knowledge in any of these instances, tlie reply would be
different - to a greater or Eesser extent. Wittgenstein s exhortation that
we should consider if all gaines have something in common is equally
applicable to the concept of knowledge. And if we iook and sce^ we
have to arrive at the same conclusion that we 'will not sec soniclhing
that is common to all, but similarities, relationships and a whole series
of them at that^ (P.L, para 6S). Henee^ traditional epistemological sys-
tems are confused attempts to get at the essence of knowledge - an
essence that simply does not exist.

When Mulhall icfcrs to the 'radical subversion to which Wittgenstein
aimed to subject the discipline of plijlosophy" I suppose he was refer-
ringn at least in part^ to this hindamental reorientation of the discipline
away from epislemolog)' and tow-ards logic. The impact of this change
is immeasurable: it displaced the central philosophical tradition that
had heen rooted, certainly m Europe^ for ccnturics_ In Britain, for
instance^ since the dawn of modern philosophy^ the dominant phiTo*
sophical creed has been that of empiricism. From the middle of the sev-
enteenth century to the twentieth, almost without exception, leading
liritish philosophers (llobbeSn Locke, Berkeley^ HumCf Benlhamn Milln
Russell and Mooreli have been empificists. Now^ although Mulhall may^
sadly^ be perfectly correct in stating dial Wittgenstein^s work may no
longer 'hmction as an essential reference point" in many Ticlds of
philosophical endeavour' (p. l)p those who have espoused the changes
initiated by Wittgenstein sti!! perceive these as constituting the
strongest challenge to this established liritish empiricist tradition and^
Indeed, to any other philosophical tradition that has an epistemologi-
cal theory at its centte- But it may also be the ease that one reason for
the prominence gained by Wittgenstelnian writers In the field of the
philosophy of religion is that Qie implications of the Wittgenstelnian
critique of epistemologieal systems may be seen to be more effective in
this realm than in any other branch ol philosophy. And there may even
he a straightfonvard reason for this, particularly when Wittgenstein's
thinking is placed against the backgiound of British empiricism. For^
more than any other system, an empiricist epistemoIog\' has difficulty
in accommodating claims to a knowledge of God- Even in its traditional

122 Fmitiwphy ofRi^iisfou m the 21 it Century

mildest form^ as we find it^ say^ in LockCn empiricist b-eliefs are iicvei
easily fcconcitcd wtLh religious belief- despite Lockers own claim that
Christianity Is to bo embraced on account of its 'reasonabkn^ss'. Tbe
gap between the claim abouE what can be know^n with certainty
through sensation and reflection on the erne hand, and Ihe claim lo
know a transcendent DeiEy ^vhom no man hath seen', on the other
handj ahvays has to be bridged within an empiricist eptstcniologicaJ
l^ramcT.-vork. And that bridge has never been satisfactorily or consis-
tently constructed. The recourse to some alleged experiences, such as
that of a 'leap of faith' or of some "intuitive disclosures^ docs not dose
the Rap between experiences of an empirical nature and knowledge of
a God that iSj in some sense^ ^beyond' this visible^ tangible Avorld- And
neither is, in my view, what appears to be a more consistent position
from an empiricist standpoint, the claim that, on the basis of evidence^
the tmth of the belief in God is a matter of high probability^ religiously
satisfactory cither Of course, empiricism In its most virulent fomin leads
either to a Hume-type form of scepticism or, to an equally pernicious
fotm of seientLsni such as that fostered by Logical Positivism from the
1930s onwards. In the second half of this century, both forms of
empiricism^ the mild and the vitulent, have still exercised considerable
infiucncCr and I think that it is correct to say that the English have
remained true to wliaL is^ primarily, their tradition- And it is against the
background of a long- standings resistant Tiritish empiricism that one
must, at least Ln part, assess the contribution of the later Wittgenstein
to the philosophy of religion-

The emancipation of the philosophy of rcligioti from the constraints of
an empirical epistcmological sj^tcm was not Wltt^nstcin's only contri-
bution lo the philosophy of religion. Of greater importance w-as his insis-
tence on the indeterminate nature of the criteria of intelligibility- In the
Tmntatiis, Wittgenstein had attempted to lay down a single, absolute
measure of the distinction between sense and nonsense. But in the
Philamphicui Investigutions, it is maintained that it Is not always that
easy to distinguish beti^'een sense and nonsense - and this is partly the
case because of the complcjtity of that distinction. In the Piiilasaphla^l
Ifivestig^itionSf language is inextricably connected with our livings with
our day-to-day practices. The speaking of language Is part of an activ-
ity, or a form of life' (RL, para 23). Hence, understanding language
means understanding what is going on - and vice versa. What it makes
sense to say, or not to say, depends on what is the precise nature of the
activity under consideration^ And if our practices are so diverse and. In
principle, without any predetermined Ix^uiidarics (as, for instance, old

Wafforti GeaSy iz:i

practices cease to be and arc replaced by novel ones, and so there arc

constantly new ways of speaking while others hecome obsolete], then the
criteria of the intelligibility are equally indeterminate. The boundaries
of inlelligibilily are in a constant slale of flux. The expression^ This
lan^agc game Is played' encapsulates^ possibly most directly^ the new
freedom from the traditional kind of externally imposed, rigid, single
crtterlon of meaning - the kind of criterion that had been adopted by
philosophers in the past - with the inevitable consequence of artificially
limiting the possibilities of langnage. This does not mean Ihat, accord-
Lng to Ihe Piiiiosop!ui:ai Iffvejitigi^tiofis, miythiff^ goes - for there bolh are
standards within activities that detemiine what is meaningful and w^hat
Is not. Uutj also^ of paramount iniportance is the fact ihat the aclLvitles
themselves are related to eacli otiier in a variety of w^ays. They form a
'complicated netw^ork' and, as a consequence, they have a bearing on
each other. In this sense^ the intelligibility of one way of saying some-
thing Is related to the intelligibility of other ways of speaking. No single
activity, completely isolated from others, wotild be intelltgible. Now
there may be all sorts of aberrations or distortions of correct practices^
which would be deemed false or foul or unreasonable practices, and
they would be determined to be such in terms of either the standards
internal to the practices themselves ^rby bemg shown to be incompat-
ible with standards of a related practice or practices ^u^ both- it is impor-
tant to underline that practices are not isolated from each other, for its
neglect can lead to all sorts of confusion. That language games have
their owti identity is important too - for if it were not for such an iden-
tity it would be meaningless to speak of relationships. But all the prac-
tices form part of 'the stream of life' - a complex, but indetcrtninateH
cultural whole. What we have^ accordmg to Wittgenstein^ is a compli-
cated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes
overall similarities^ sometimes similarities of detail/ (RL, para 66}

Those preoccupied with religious matters, and theolo^ans In particu-
lar, who had been condemned by the Logicat Positivisits as confused
babblers, have felt emancipated as a result of the Impltcatlons of
Wittgenstein's new understanding of tl:ie conditions of intelligibility. It
Is for this reason that one wants to say that no one tn this century no
one perhaps at any timen has done a greater ser^^ee to the philosophy of
religion - for, it seems that, at no other time in the histori.^ of Western
philosophy, had religion beeti under such an acute attack as It was from
those professional practitioners of philosophy earlier in this centuryn
who had condetnned religious language as meaningless. And, by now,
over fifty years after those initial pernicious attacks on religion^ it Is often

124 Flrihiwphy ofRi^Hsfou in the 21 it Century

claimed ihat the phUosophy of religion has undergone a renaissance, par-
Ucularly in the English-speaking world. If this is [rue, as I believe it is, it is
in no small measure, a direct coniequcnce of the new life breathed into it
by tlie implications of Wittgenstein's later philosopliy.

This was an issue that 1 had wished Mutliall would have said more
about. But he may liave taken all tliis for granted. Yet, the impression
1 liave from his paper is titat Wittgenstein's sole contribution to philoso-
phy IS his method for clearing up conceptual contusion. This is a view
that is widely in vogue. Of course, It is an important part of Wittgetv
5tein^s legacyj and tlie significance of this contribution is not to be
underestimated. U is also true that, in the final part of liis paper, Mulhall
does refer to ^the transformation and enrichment that VVillgenstein^s
grammatical reminders can engender' - and he is even critical of Winch's
attempt to impose limitations on this cnrichmeni! Yet, in the paper
itself; there is very little development of what this enrichment might
mean in the realm of religion. In most of his essay^ Mulhall is content
to underlh^e the significance of the innovation that religious proposi-
tions are different from empirical propositions. But this is not to say
much. It is a negative thesis. It says nothing positive, for instance,
about the kind of language that religious language itself is. Xoi that w^e
find much of that in Wittgenstein eichcL However^ b}^ emphasizing the
indeterminacy of the logic of language, Wittgenstein was drawing our
attention to the richness and diversity of human experiences. Having
succeeded in casting off the strailjackel of a single, rigid but artificial
criterion of meaning, Wittgenstein allow^ed language to be itself in
all its diversity, richness and splendour. He waiited to show language as
it Is and also the possibilities of language that enable us to see things in
a variety of new and different ways. Logical fotmalistn with its tigidity
is banished and in its place we have diversity, fluiditv^, imagination and
creativity. It is in the opening up of these possibilities, in showing us
how human practices may be understood in different w^ays, that one
can claim that no one has contributed more in recent timcSj indirectly,
to the philosophy of religion.

Now^ let us turn to what appear to me to be some difficulties in
Wittgcnstein^s thinking about religious matters, Not that 1 wish to
suggest that everything in this field that belongs to him is problematic-
But 1 have found certain aspects of the contents of the three lectures
on religious belief (as they are found In the LC) quite unacceptable-
Some of Wittgenstein's remarks, in this specific context appear both
strange and confused - this, again^ often in stark contrast lo many of

the numerous {ni f-mc religious remarks found scattered elsewhere in his
writings. There are three basic points that I wish to make about these
LC lectures on religious belief. First, there are philosophical difficulties
here which are connected with the way Wittgenstein presents liis case:
tlie disjunction bct^vecn tlie religious and the empirical is overstated
and is far too figid. Secondly, and this is a matter of some conjecture,
these difficulties may be related to problems which Wittgenstein might
have felt at that time (around 1938), and w-hich arose directly from
his novel thinking on logic. And, finally; there seem to me to be insu-
perable difficulties with wiiat may described as Wittgenstein's 'theol-
ogy', as it is reflected in the examples given in the LC of religious
assertions.

Perhaps it is something of a surprise that someone who espouses
Wittgenstein's later philosophy should find aspects of his thought in
the LC unacceptable. Why is this the case? Is not Muthall perfectly
correct when he states that the whole of Wittgenstein's eiiterprise in
the LC has to do with highlighting the differences between empirical
statements and religious statements? And is not this emphasis^ on
showing differences, wholly in character with Wittgenstein's tliesis in
the PJuIosop!ikiii Inve^^ti^atiofi!^? ft is readily conceded that the whole
burden of Wittgenstein's later logic was 'to show differences' between
different ways of speakings or of language uses. He wished to destroy
the kind of false unity that he has ascribed to language in Lhc Tractiftns
by making that unity formal - 'the common or general form of propo-
sition', liut, as it has already been suggested, the poinE of referring to
different language games was to show^ that 'saying something' differs
from context to contextj from one acUvliy to another. But, in the LC,
at this comparatively early stage In the development of the later thesiSn
there are dangers inlierent in the way Wittgenstein presented his case,
and these may be partly responsible for much of the confusion that Is
often seen in the writings of Witigensteinian philosophers of aeligionn
and particularly the charge that their standpoint is fideistic.

What we are presented with in the LC is a dichotomy - betw^een two
ways of speakfng, between the empirical and the religious. It may be
askedj ''Why only two?^ Is our speakings our language, divided in such a
dichotoraous way? Granting that it was Wittgenstein's intention to
demonstrate the distinctiveness of a religious way of speaking, why did

126 Flrihiwphy ofRi^Hstou m the 21 it Century

he ground it on a single comparison? And why did that comparison
have to be based on differences Tviih empirical proposHions? Would
not^ and docs not such a contra-st immediately and inevitably remind

us of the Tractatiis duatisin? My impression is that the Tyiictntus casts a
heavy shadow on Ihe LC. Tliis may be discerned in Ihe Avay Wittgenstein
proceeds to make the distinction between Hicsc two ways of speaking,
and especially by the kind of language that he uses to make and
describe the distinction, h is not thaL one questions tlie validity of the
distinction itself between the empirical and the religious, but the lan-
guage that is used echoes clearly earlier ideas. If one may adopt and
adapt one of Wittgenstein's later analogies of language - that of a city
without a high road - what we have in the Tnictntns was, not so much
a city but a single throughfare. In the LC, we do haA'e a cirVp but one
that docs have a high road - and thai is the thorougiifare we had in
the Tnicti2t{is. This high road In the LC is there variously alluded to^
and described, as 'the normal', 'the ordinary everyday\ and 'the rea-
sonable'. In the first of the three lectures alone, the terms normal',
■"ordinar)^ everyday' and ^reasonable' are used on numerous occasions,
and on each of these the purpose is to contrast such a way of speaking
with tlic religious way of speaking_ I do not think for a monicnl thai
the author of the Phiiosophkal Investigations would have jx>rtrayed mat-
ters in this way There clearly language is portrayed as a city without a
high road. Naturally, if only two things arc sharply contrasted "with
each other, inevitably a dichotomy is created. But wiiat is objectionable
in the LC is that the one side of the dichotomy is exclusively identified
with 'the ordinary^ 'the normal' and 'the rcasonablc'j and hence mark-
ing It distinctly as the hi;^h road. That cannot but be highly reminls-
eetil of the Tmctutm position - except, of course, that now the religious
way is accepted as intelligible. But merely by describing one w^ay of
speaking as 'normar^ ''ordinary^ 'everyday' - even without identifying
the precise nature of that way - V%^ittgen stein has, perhaps unwittingly,
relegated uU other ways of speaking to a suburban status in our lives-
In the Tractiitiis, religious discourse was altogether outside the world,
outside the city in the LC, this way of talking is just somewhere within
the city's periphery. Furthermore^ by formulating the dichotomy in the
way he does, Wittgenstein creates the impression that what he refers to
as ^the ordinary everyday^ way of speaking is a single or unified way of
speaking - and that it stands in stark contrast with the religious way of
speaking. It is an odd city indeed, with one major thoroughfare, and
one distant side road wliieh at no point intersects with that thorough-
fare. How different this image is from that created in the L*!iiiosaphka!

Wafforti GeaSy 127

Investigations where there is insistence on both diversity of ways of
speaking and on their relalcdncss!

The manner then in which Wittgenstein mak^s and sustains his dis-
tinction between the empirical and the religious in the LC implies that^
from a certain standpoint caHcd 'normal', 'ordinary" and 'reasonable'^
religions beliefs are to be thought of as being entirely outside these
categories. Prima facie^ it would appear that the Implication is that
such religious Ixlicfs are abnormal, extra-ordinary and even unreason-
able. Indeed, be explicitly states of religious believers, 'I would say that
they are certainly not rcasonablCj that's obvious/ Uul then he proceeds
to remark^ '"Unreasonable" implies, with everyone, rebuke.' And clearly
Wittgenstein docs not, for logical reasons, wish to describe religious
belief as 'unreasonable'. But he does want to say that religious belief is
not within the realm of reason, hi the Tmctah^s, religion is not in the
realm of the intelligible- In the LC religion is not in the realm of reason.

Again, there are strong reasons for believing that the Wittgenstein of
the Philosophkal Inve^ti^nthms would not have expressed himself in this
way. HerCj in the LC^ he seems to adopt an esscnttalist conception of
'reason'^ which is synonyinous with 'tt:ie ordinary" and ^the usual'. Not
that his reniarks appear thoroughly consistent in the LC. For, as Mulhall
points out, the distinction which Wittgenstein makes al one point
between 'reasons' aiid 'normal reasons' (LQ p- 56) suggests that tliere are
different kinds of reasons. Yet, w^hat a strange distinction and dichotomy
again[ Are reasons that are not ^normal reason^ to be thought of as
abnormal? What would that mean? But the concession that there are
different kinds of reasons does at least reflect a position w^hich Is
slightly closer to that which we find in the Fiuhsophkat Tm^esti^nthns.
What he ought to liave maintained here is that which he made clear in
his later writings - that there arc multiple criteria of 'reason' or 'ratio-
nality'- fiutn here in the LC he proceeds to say: '1 want to say: they (that
is, religious believers) don't treat this as a matter of reason ability' - a
remark which is patently false. This, it seems to me^ reflects an cssen-
tlalist conception of rationality, which is completely incompatible with
Wittgenstein's later thinking.

Unfortunately^ Wittgenstein goes on to attempt to fortifj^ his claim
by makji:ig the remark: 'Anyone who reads the Epistles will find it
said: not only that it is not reasonable, but thai it is. folly' (LC, p. SS).
Wittgenstein's exegesis of the Biblical text is patently wrong. The mis-
take he first seems to make is connected with the logical point that I
wish to underline. In the text, to w^iidi I assume Wittgenstein is refer-
ring (1 Cor 1)h it is the reiigious unbeliever that calls the religious beliefs

12fi Flrihiwphy of fi^/ij^i^n p;i the 21 it Century

in question foolishness'. But to those who believe in the Christian faith,
Tvhat they believe in - that is, rcdcnipilon through the cross of Christ -
expresses the very wisdom of God. Of course, this wisdom is very
different horrid and contrasts sharply wilh 'the wisdom of the wise' -
(although, it would be a massive error to understand this wisdom here
as something which is synonyTnous with "^the emptri€al\ The issue 15
essentially religious and concerns salvation. Is salvation through man's
own wisdom or through divine grace?) Uut there is a huge gap between,
on the one hand, recognizing that there arc different kinds of wisdom
or 'reason ability' and niaintainingj on the othei hand, that btlicvers
don't treat their beliefs 'as a matter of reasonabiIit5*'^. Or that believers
■"don^t use reason here^ as Wittgenstein remarks. To extradite himself
from his confusion at this level all that he needed to say is what St Paul
himself w^as mahitalning in this context, not that wisdom is one thing,
]tut that God^s wisdom is entirely different from 'the wisdom of the
wise'. Indeed, had Wittgenstein followed strictly the apostle's reason-
ing, then he would have been led to say something that is to some
degree more in agreement with his Philosophkcii Im^stigation.-^' view\
namely that these two forms of wisdom are wholly different from each
other. For not only is the logo5 of the cross foolishness to those who do
not believe^ but It is also the case that God is said to pronounce the
'wisdom of the wise' to be 'foolishness'.

Now is ^the normal', 'the ordinary' everyday' therefore, to be deemed
to be outside this divine reasonabletiess? Ihis question Is merely indica-
tive of the absurdity of the strict dichotomous way that Wittgenstein
has presented his case Indeed, Wittgenstein^s error is even deeper than
what has already been suggested. For the 'wisdom of the wise\ in the
Scriptural context, is not contrasted at ah, as Wittgenstein has wrongly
assumed, w'ith a n on -religious form of wisdom, but with a rival form of
religious wisdom. For if the "'wisdom of the w^ise' Is at all at variance
with 'di\1ne wisdom' both forms of wisdom are within the complex of
religious lliought^ and are essentially at odds with eacli other on the issue
of human salvation. In the relevant Scriptural text, both the Jew^s and the
Giecks seek salvation in one way or another. Uiit the wise, we arc told,
h^n^e fiiiied it^ thcsr efforts to kuow God through their wisdom - and
Uiat, we are told, is as a result of divine wisdom. They have failed
therefore, in what is an essentially religious quest - that of saIvaMon„
The whole text and its reasoning has nothing whatsoever to do with
anything like 'empirical evidence' or Verification' and Ihc connection
bctu^een such concepts and tlie logic of propositions. Wittgenstein has
completely misunderstood the tcxtl

Wafforti GeaSy 1Z9

My second point is this. I believe that some of Ihe difficullies I find with
tliese lectures may be connected with tlie fact thai what wc have here
belongs to an inleini&diary period In the deTL^elopment of Wittgenstein's
later philo-sophy- VVillgcnslein was constantly reviewing^ modifying and
developing his position^ and the thinking reported in these lectures
docs not reflect the implicalions for religion of Wiltgenstein^s more
mature standpoint as wc have it^ say, in the PhUosophical iRVt'sti^nthms,
or In Oiij Ct'itiiif^t}'. These lectures on religious belief were delivered in
I95ft- The Blue ^ifhi Broiwj Books, which contain the earliest versions of
Witlgenstein's later philosophy;, were notes of lectures delivered in the
academic years 1933/4 and 1934/S respectively. The notes contained in
tlie Browji Book were revised in 1936. Yet^ despite the fact that these two
books of notes arc only separated by a short gap in timCj there appear to
be, as kush Rhces explains in the Preface to these hooks, suhslantial
modifications in Wittgenstein's views - in the way Wittgenstein speaks
of language games, for instance. And there are differences again when
we come to the PhiIo^opSm'{iI hivestigiitions itself. These differences are
not peripheral cither, but belong to ccntial nolions in Wittgenstein's
later thinking. They are connected with the whole question of the
nature of the unity of language and the intei relations hips helween vari-
ous ways of thinking - Issues which also have a direct bearing on our
understanding of the logic of religious propositions.

This may help us to explain wliy Wttgenstem underlined in such a
rigid way the distinction between the empirical and the religious. Indeed,
the rigidity of his position suggests that although he liad rejected the
formalism of llie Trrtrf^ah/i he had embraced a new fornialism - one that
allowed for diversity in terms of multifarious language gameSj but now
these forms of language have a rigidity of their own and are wholly
autonomous. Tliere seems to he nothing whatsoever in common
between the empirical and the religious. Every way of speaking is dis-
tinct. Everything again^ it seems^ must be crystal clear! Logic demands
it! Again^ J am suggesting that the Tractatus casts its shadow on the way
the dichotomy between the empirical and the religious Is presented in
tlic LC. This is even more understandable also at this stage because
Wittgenstein at this lime might st[ll have been wrestling with difficul-
ties connected with liis novel reasoning. For his new logic led
inevitably to the acceptance of realities other than simply the one real-
ity that is 'pictured^ by the empirical sciences. Did not his new think-
ings therefore, lead to the acceptance of Ihe reality of God? And did this
mean that he had lo embrace this reality? I suspect that Wittgenstein
must have Ikcu troubled by these questions. They might have appeared

130 Fmitiwphy ofReii^ou m the 21 it Century

lo him as rather unfortunate consc<]ucnccs of his novel view that the
crttcria of intclligLbility arc intcrrval to liuman practices- They ccitainly
presented a challenge- For religion, after ail^ is not a universally
embraced form of life - like, say^ the language of (alklng about ph^^ical
objects, or the language of mathematics, or even moral language. All
these forms of discourse evidently have an unquestioned rcahly of
tlieir own. But religion? Tt would seem that the most effective strategy
Wittgenstein could adopt, to extradite him from Lhis logical dilemma,
would be precisely ihe one that we find in the LC - that is, the strategy
of underlining th^l rdl^ion is so different from the 'ordinary' or 'the
reasonable' that it is not a matter of reasonableness at all to embrace it.
On the contrary, religion is a matter of passionate belief without rea-
son. All this^ I admit is a matter of conjecture on my part. But I am
looking for possible reasons Avliy WiLtgenstein created such an
unbridgeable gulf bet^veen the empirical and the religious-

It is no wonder ihat, partly as a result of the use by Wittgenstein of such
expressions as 'they (religious believers) are not reasonable - meaning they
don't use re^ison hcre^ VViltgcnstcinians have been labelled "'fideisls'. If
religious believers do not use reason, then they arc fideists. They liave
faith 'without reason' - and what kind of faith is that? Mulhall dis-
cusses this issue in the second part of his paper. 1 suspect that the pri-
mary reason why tidclsm has been condemned by most Christian
theologians is because tliey are rightly suspicious of emotfon. And the
Scriptures^ in one of the most famous parables in the New Testament,
that of the sower^ warn against a faith that Is based upon an emotional
response. Emotions, we are advised^ arc fleeting and cannot withstand
the trials and tribulations of life- As the strength of the emotion dimin-
ishes, so the faith disappears with iL Historically, of course^ fidcism has
been connected with the rejection of natural theology, and natural
tlieology has l>ccn seen as an external justification of religion through
■"the natural light of reason' - w^hatever that means- If we base our
assessment of Wittgcnstein^s position fp these issues solely on the basis
of what we find in the LC, then, in my view, he is rightly accused of
being fidcistic- However, in the light of the l^ihsophiaii hivestigtitioiis,
this view has tc be radically revised- For if Tideisra' simply means 'faith
without reason" then religion, like all other meaningful practices, has
its internal rules that determine what does, and what does not, make
3cnse- As Rhecs once put it: Theology is the j^rammar of religious
belief/ Furthermore, as it has already been emphasized, Wittgenstein
in the PSiShsophkiii lui^estigiitiom insisted that oui ianguage-games' are
related to each other - and it is because our practices are related to

Wafforti GeaSy 131

each other that they arc intelligible in our lives, kcligion is not ati
exception and licnce Is not fldeistlc in terms of the Phiio^opiiical l!ive.^ti-
gathf^s criteria - if ^fidcism^ means ^faith without reason'.

4 ■

However, tf fideisni means Taith not based on reason^ Wittgenstein's
position is more complex. For he argues ihat our language games are not
based on anything. Indeed, the whole meaning of tlie expression 'the
natural light of reason^ on ivhich^ according to traditional natural theol-
ogy, faith is supposed to rest, becomes meaningless - for it implies that
there is some rationality that is independent of, or transcends the par-
ticular practices in our lives. But, againj our reasons arc internal to the
activities: each 'game' has its own rules. This is the way we count.
These are our moral values. This is the way we speak alx>ut physical
objects. This is our religious faith. In each instance^ in each 'form of
life'' or activity, we use reason - or rather wt reason in different ways.
What then becomes of natural theology? Docs this mean that it is
necessarily meaningless? It Is possible to understand the arguments of
natural theology in a different way- not as some proofs of faith based
on considerations external to the realm oi faith^ hut rather as exercises
in the grammar of faith - and as bridges that may be used to attempt
to relate the language of faith to otiier forms of discourse. For instance,
without the theology of ^revealed religion^ which contains references
to 'the eternity of God^ that lie is 'from everlasting to everlasting', the
Ontological argument would have no meaning at all. Similarly, if it
were not for the religious helief in the goodness of God as Creator^
both the Teleological and the Cosmological arguments w^ould be reli-
giously worthless. For the idea of everything depending on son'jc
impersonal Cause is a religiously futile idea. What the believer seeks Is
not a causal explanation of existence, but rather the assurance that
existence is essentially good and, hcneen meaningful Statural theologv^
is not a matter of making inferences from the world, from outside
faith, to God, but rather it Is an attempt to show how, from the stand-
point of faith, the world is perceived.

Thirdly, let us turn to Wittgenstein's 'theology'. There is something

profoundly wrong with Wittgenstein ^s characterization of religious
beliefs in the iC. What we are presented with here are religious beliefs
as caricatures of empirical hypotheses and predietions. Again, the
Influence of the T^^jhihis is undeniably evident. In the Tmctiitii^, only
propositions which belong to the natural sciences have sense, Tn the

132 Pffiio.wphy ofRi^iisfou Ui the 21 it Century

LCf only the propositions %vhich arc supported by c\adGricc arc reason-
able. If you make predictions, say aboui the wealher or about the
strength of the pound sterling in a year's time, you may he asked to
justify your belief in terms of cerlaiii evidence. The prcdicUons may be
said to be reasonable or unreasonable depending on the evident^ or
weight of probai^ility. And, evidently, if you make predictions without
reference to any evidence, that is clearly an example of irrationality.
Now, it is significant to note that almost every example provided by
Wittgenstein of a religious belief has a form which resembles a predic-
tion. They arc supposed to be religious utterances Ijut they have the
appearance of empirical predictions - with this cruciaE difference. They
appear to be without evidence and thus totally baseless. I Icnce^ the^^
have the appearance eo being wholly irrational This is Wittgenstein's
ground for saying that they are 'not reasonable'. N'ow consider the fol-
lowing examples of ^religious^ remarks made by Wttgensteln in this
context:

T shall think of you after my death, if that should be possible^
'Suppose someone believed in the Last judgement/
■"Suppose ...another says, 'No. Particles will join together ina tliousand
years, and there will be a Resurrection of you/

T believe that so and so will happen ../

'What we call belie\1n^ in a Judgement Day or not believing in a

Judgement Day.-/

'Suppose someone dreamt of the Last Judgement.-, and said to

me .-.' 'It will be in about 2000 years ../

'Dead undergraduate speaks../

'He said that this was^ m a way, proof of the immortality of the soul.'

'Deaili'^ 'speaking after death', 'immotiallLy of the souF^ 'Last Judge^
ment', 'Judgement Day'. "'Resurrection' - these concepts reappear time
and time again in Wittgenstein's remarks on religion in this context-
And this Is profoundly misleading In two respects- First, these examples
aie formulated ii:L such a way, deliberately or out of sheer ignorance, to
appear as predictions. The references to 'a thousand ycars^ and '1000
years' reinforces this view^ Yet, in a profound sense, such allusions to a
lime-scale make them clearly pseudo-religious rci^iarks - remarks which
one normally associates with w;eiid and superstitious cults. Secondly,
they are given such, almost exclusive, prominence by Wittgenstein in
diis context, that the impression is created tiiat they are, is some sense,
typical of religious beliefs and central to the religion that is being

WGffGTii Ge^ly ISA

characterized- liut^ they are certainly not concepts that arc central in
Christian l:kclicf. On the contrary, religious believers that give such
prominence to e^chatological ideas in their thinking are normally asso-
ciated with peripheral^ heterodox sects or cults that ^cem to appear and
disappear as regularly as their false predicliotisJ Wittgenstein's preoccu-
pation wilh such examples is grossly unfortunate and betrays a sad
inLsunderstanding of the Christian faith- This is not the place to dis-
cuss the meaning ot" Christian eschatology, Imt it is at least meaningful
to ask whether or not these doctrines arc, in any sense, connected with
timCj or whether any cschatological beliefs arc essentially concerned
with hjture events. There are some Christian theologians who advocate
a belief in 'a realized eschatology^j that is, the Judgement Day is ever-
present. Mowever, even if these examples given by Wtugenstein are to
be regarded as some kind of predictions, then they are religious predic-
tions made within a religious conceptual frame^^^ork, This would make
them not unlike, say, an Old Testament prophet's prediction that
Jenjsalem would fall to an eitemy attack. Such predictions were made^
not because the prophets had some paranormal view of the fut jre^ but
simply because they believed the words of the divine covenant. God
would visit his people for their sins. The 'given^ here is a belief in a
divine covenant. It was believed that what happened to the nation was
wholly predictable - for its fate depended on its obedience or disobedi-
ence to the Law of the covenant- Such predictions, within tliat concep-
tual framework^ were nol at all unreasonable^ but were expressions of
the prophets' religious reasoning and faith.

Yet in the LC context^ whatever thtse beliefs meann they are said to
be unconnected with evidence. This, apparently^ is partly what ^ives
them their religious character and gives them the appearance of being
outside the category of the 'reasonable'. I do not beheve that the
Wittgenstein of the Fhiloscpiiiaii InvL'stigiitioiis would liavc ever main-
tained this ar^mentn for as it stands, it is a^ain contaminated by a
form of essentialisni. It is as if ^evidence' can only be one thing. But if
we speak of different language games and practices, we may also speak
of different kinds of evidence, and not only of evidence as we have it In
science, or in 'everyday beliefs^ as referred to in the LC Wittgenstein^s
whole argument militates against the language of the Christian Scrip-
tures, in which constant reference is made to 'witnesses* ^testifying' to
the truth of their claims. For instance^ one of tl:te central concepts in
the Fourth Gospel is that of 'witnesses' who ^testify' to the divinitj' of
Jesus. Again, this is not to idenLify the evidence of such witnesses with
what we call ^empirical evidence'. That would be wholly mistaken. The

134 Flfiitiwptiy ofRi^fi^ou m the 21 it Century

conceptual framework of ^JGW Tcstainent-limc observers that made it

possible for ihcin to 'sec" God in Jesus is radically diffcrcnl from the
conceptual framework that enables us to forecast tomorrow's weather
or to see that inflationary pressures within tlie economy will affect the
value of money in a year's lime. But that does not mean that the
concept of evidence is to be proscribed within religious language. That,
iiidecd, would be a piece of philosophical dogmatism'

ll seems to me thai an aspect of Wittgenstein's error in this context is
to transgress one of his own more important lessoi^s in the Philo^ophi'
cai Im^sti^utions - never to divorce assertions from their context. What-
ever is meant by the eschatologlcal concepts he so frequently referred
to^ they cannot be alienated from the central concepts of divinity as
they are understood within the Christian religion. The religious povert)'
of the LC, as reflected in the examples of religious beliefs provided, is
startling. There is nothing at all here about those things which are
unequivocally definitive of the Christian religion, such as, divine
mercy, forgiveness, love and compassion. Wittgenstein's version of
ChrLstianity is one that is cEothed in, wliat appears to be^ absurd pre-
dictions- It Is a travest}!^ of the Christian faith.

If there arc difficulties with VViiigensteisi's eschatoIo;^ieaI remarks
there arc comparable difficulties also with his remarks about the role of
historical propositions. And, at appears to me, that this Is crucial. The
interrelationships between various forms of life constitute an essential
condition of their intelligibility. The language games whose truths are
those most closely related to the Christian religion are moralitj^ and
history- Not that religious truth is idenLlcal w-ith cither of these, but
there is a close relationship between them. (Unfortunately^ there is
very little about morality in the LC Wittgenstein does suggest one eon-
nection betw^cen religion and moralit;^' when he refers to the fact that
denying the existence of God is seen as 'something bad'j and he proba-
bly would have also understood the notion of ^divine judgemenf in
some moral sense.) But Wittgenstein does raise the issue of historical
truth, again in conjunction w^ith the role of evidence in our thinking.
He admits that, even in relij^aon. 'we do talk of evidence, and do talk of
evidence by experience. We could even tall; of historical events. It has
been said that Chnstianlly rests on an historic basis-' What follows
these remarks in the LC, and indeed, the way that Mulhall also deals
with these issues, appears to me to be fundaiiientally wrong both In
terms of logic aiid in religious terms. The issues have to do with the
relationship between the historical and the religious. Here, however,

we need to restrict the sense of 'religious' to the Biblical reli^^toiis - for
bolli the religions of llie Old and New Tcstamenls claim a certain
unique relationship with historical claims - a relationship which has
been widely cither denied or mi ^understood since the middEe of the
last century. Certainly, Christianity makes the claim (and 1 believe this
is also true of Judaism), that it would be false if certain alleged histori-
eal events did not take place. [In Judaism this is connected with the
Exodus expcrieiice or deliverance of the Hebrew people from slavery in
Egypt. The identity of both the jewisli God and his people are bound
with this event. J In Chrislianityj the historical is connected with cer-
tain events in the life of Jesus and, in particular, the claim that he was
raised from the dead. ""If Christ tae not raised^ then is our preaching
vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, we are found false witnesses of
God' (A.V-1 Col IS). In other words, Cluistian tulh and histoacal
trutli are here so closelv interwoven that the historical truth has l>ecome
at least oiPc^ condltloii of tlie truth ot the religious. There Is nothing com-
parable to this in the LC. Tnsteadn what wc fiitd are ambiguous com-
ments. Wittgenstein introduces a strange, unclear distinction between ^a
belief in historic facts' and a belief in ordinary historic facts'. A distinc-
tion could not be more ambiguous. But let us suppose that he had in
inind, when referring to ^a belief in historic fact', something as extraor-
dinary as a claim that the historical Jesus was raised Irotn the dead.
Then, Wittgenstein inaintains, belief iii this claim is very different
from a belief in an ""ordinary histofical fact' - like, say^ some facts about
Napoleon. \"V^itt^en stein's point seems to be that in the latter case^ it
is^ in principle^ possible to express doubts about what happened to
Napoleon^ while, even though what happened to Jesus is so extraordi-
nary, and so vasdy remoter in time than what happened to Xapoleon,
no doubts arc ever entertained about those liistoric facts' that are at
the heart of Christian doctrines. Propositions about Jesus 'are not
treated as historicaln empirteal, propositions'. There Is a problem with
bolh the generality of this remark and also with its ambiguity. Its gen-
erality suggests either that iwifwig about Jesus is treated as eitlier his-
torical or empirical - or that propositions about lilin are never drought
of in historical or empirical terms - or both, nothing and never. All
three generalizations are patently incorrect. Tlie ambi^ity of the claim
is connected with the related idcri that the truth of bolh historical and
empirical propositions are contingent: and it is die case that when
assertions about Jesus are treated as leU^loit}; or theoioi^ki}! assertioiiSn
as dogma, then what happened to Jesus is not treated as 'liistorical,

136 Fffiitiwphy ofReiistoii m the 21 it Century

empirical^ propositions'. Contingency is inadmissible within the con-
text of faith- Religious!)-^ speaking, wh^l happened Lo Jesus, as God's
will, could not be otherwise, while, on the other hand, what happened
to Napoleon is a contingcnl niatlcr. The believer claims thai there was
divine necessity in the lite of Jesus which removes all contingencj^^ from
it. hi a religious sense the^e propositions could nol be unLrue. But
propositions ahout Jesus arc not always treated as dogma^ and any reli-
gious necessity dogmatic propositions possess docs not preclude the
possibility of asking the empirical, historical question: 'What did actu-
ally happen to Jesus?' - in which case wc arc engaged in an empirical
enquiry - and we may ask all sorts of questions about the historical
authenllcity of the Gospel records, and so on. In one context therefoEC,
what happened to Jesus Is absolutely indubitable^ while in another
related context, that of an historical enquiry, what did actually happen
to Jesus is still open to empirical investigation.

Of course, it would be wrong to separate the propositions about tlie
Jesus of history from the fact that they are propositions which form part
of church dogma whose truth is guaranteed by a body that claims
Infallibility. Or, If it is believed that it is not the church that is their guar-
antor^ then the Scriptures theniselves, believed to be God'^ VVord^ guar-
antees their truth. Hence, In this relijjtous tradition^ the truths about
Jesus are guaranteed to be. In one w^ay or another, incontrovertible by an
authority or authorities that claim to be absolute. Indeed, it is only after
the questioning of these traditional authorities of faith that doubts have
been raised about the historicity of Jesus. But the fact that such doubts
have been seen as an attack on the very basis of the Christian faith Is
indicative of the significance of the role of the historical in Christ I anitj;^.

I suspect that when Mulhall argues that If believers put so much trust
in historical truth they must be ludicrously irrational as to strain
credibility'. He also seems to have forgotten thaL these trutlis are not
believed in viicuo, but arc beliefs shared by a religious community - a
eominunlty that maintains that it has its origins in these alleged his-
torlcal events. In this context, both the concepts of 'community' and
'continuity' are important. And altliough such concepts may have
some role in secular history^ they do not, in that contextj have the
same role as they have in the religious context. Mulhall writes: 'Reli-
gious belie^^ers base matters of great moment on evidence that seems
exceedingly flimsy by cpmparison with the corroboration they require
before accepting claims of far less significance for their lives/ But this is
to exclude the central function of the role of the religious community
in the propagation of its truths - both its religious truths and those

historLccLl truths that arc bcticvcd to be inextricably connected with the
religious truths. Miilhall's remark would appear to carry more weight if
he were referring say^ to the peoples of Ephesus or Corinth in the first
century ad. Their conversion to a new faith appears more remarkahle
as they were asked to believe in certain alleged facts that look place in
a distant laiid, a generation or so earlier, and wilho Jt the weight of cen-
turies of belief in such historical truths. (But is it at all correct to
attempt to account for tlieir religious conversions while omitting alt tef-
erenc^ to the central Ri?ality of tlieir faith? I5 it nor a religious doctrine
that eternal life is given as a gift by God - and that the mystery of divine
grace surrounds the whole process?} But^ nowadays, most religious
believers are helievers in a historical, resurrected Jesus because ot their
upbringing. Within the religiotis context, thc5c truths are regarded as
the ^cettainties' of faith - ""certainties' that religious helievers were prob-
ably taught before th^ry had been introduced to, say, the certainties of
in at hematics. If^ however, the believer develops doubts alMut the valid-
ity of his faith and asks such questions as ^Why do I continue to
believe these truths?' the fact that he is surrounded by a cloud of living
witnesses, that he is part of a fellowship of saints, w^ould appear to me
to be of inestimable si^^nihcance for him. He is not an isolated believer
wlio possesses some private beliefs, liy tjuestiomng his faith, he is ques-
tioning the faith of his fellow-believers - the faith, probably, of those
who mean inosl to him as persons. He belongs to a community of faith
that claims that it has its toots in history^ and it authenticates its exis-
tence. In part, hy demonstrating the continuity between itself and the
Jesus of history-

Let us [inally turn to some of the remarks which Wittgenstein made
elsewhere in his writing, particularly those we find in Cuftmc tind Value.
I do iiot wish to coinmeiit at any length on what is in the I'mctatus, for^
although such comments are often quoted by some V\^ttgensceiniaits
when it is convenient, the remarks cannot be reconciled with anything
that is Christian. ^God does not re\^eal himself in the w^orld/ The world'
here may refer to ""everytbing that is the case', to 'the totality of facts' -
expressions which have a special meaning within the Thrcffih^s thesis, but
the import of these assertions is to place the reality of God outside intelli-
gible language. Hence, little of religious significance can l>e deduced from
tiic Tfijctntta. liut elsewhere in VVillgcnstein's writings, particularly in
Ciilture ofhf Vahie we have a variety of utterances that are deeply religious-

I3S Fmitiwphy of fif/;j7i^?r p;i the 21 it Centiiry

In most of thciTLj WittgDnstcin rightly und^2rlillGS the rQlatLonship
bcru^ccn r-cligious bcli^i and a p^2^son's understanding of the kind of
life tliat she leads and the kind of character that she is. There Is a deep
uiidcrscanditig here of the kind of experiences that can reinforce rcii-
glous betiefn or can even lead a person to religious faith. Wittgenstein is
correct to point out in the LC that it is often tlie case that 'tiie word
'^God" is amongst the earliest learnt - pictures and cateciiisms^ etc.^
(p. 59) and this is partly the impotlance of the role of a religious tradi-
tion re^ferred to above. Rut he also states that Tife can educate you to
'^believing tn God^', (CV, p. 97e) that the religious unbeliever can
come to faith through certain 'sufferings of various sorts'. 'Life can
force this concept on us^ (ibid.) and Wittgenstein adds 'So perliaps it is
like the concept of ''object"' - by which I suppose he means that the
concept t>ecomes unavoidable, the coitcept becomes a fundamental
part of a person's seeing and understanding- God becomes ^a certainty^
Wlien VVitcgensiein characterizes such experiences he Uivarial:kly thinks
of man becoming deeply^ aware of his limitations, his moral limitations
and also his inability to cope with lifers difficulties. Man can be beaten
by circumstances and may feel that he is being destroyed by them. He
can succumb to endless temptations w^hich lead to a sense of hopeless-
ness and despair. In such contexts^ a person wlio has no faith may come
to see that faith offers hope and acceptance and, through faith she may
see new possibititles, including the possibility of sonie form of renewal
(Of course^ it is also the case that the person who has faith may lose it
when faced with the vicissittides of life. A traged^^ may be felt so deeply
that tlie language of religious gratitude^ of thanking God, has become
empty and meaningless for him or her.) in one of these contexts^
Wittgenstein explains why he is tempted to hcheve in the resurrection
of Jesus- It is, perhapSj the most orthodox of Christian remarks in his
whole writings - for here he does imply that salvation, in the Christian
sense, is related to a belief in a relationship with the resurrected Christ
It is not just the case that Christians are followers of the Jesus of his-
tory who taught a certain moral code, but that they have faith, a trust,
in a person wlio sustains them in their weaknesses and fortifies them
tlirough grace against temptation. It is a reli;^iously wonderful passage
and it is astonishing to find it in Wittgenstein.

What inclines even me to believe in Christ's Resurrection? I play as
it w^ere with the thought. - If he did not rise from the dead, then he
is decomposed in the grave like every human being. He is deail
afhi dt'cotuposed. In that case he is a teacher^ like any otJier & can no

longer Jiefp: & once more wc arc orphaned & alone. And have to
make do wlili wisdom &: ,spcculalion- It is a^ though we arc in a hell^
where we can only dream & shut out ot" heaven, roofed in as it

were ...(CVj p. 38c^

Wittgenstein ^oes on to refer to the soul and its passions and states,

Only J^^^^f can believe the Resuireeiion. Or: it is love that believes the
Resurrection. One mij^ht sayr redeeming love believes even in the
Resurrection; holds fast cvcir to the Resurrection (CV^ p. 39cj.

The ideas and the language used here are reminiscent of Kterkegaard.
And it is Important lo note that ihis is one reason why It is correct to
claim that the meaning of 'believing^ in the Cliristian eontcxtn
changes in the light of the faet that the believer believes^ first and fore-
mostn in a person - in the living Christ - and believing in a person is a
very different form of believing from^ say^ believing iii any theory or in
any historical truths. To believe in a person is to say something about a
retation^hip with that person, and in the Christian conlext, this rela-
tionship is determined by its theology. Hence, the constant use of such
concepts as, Tord' and 'Saviour', 'God"" which indicalc that the believer
sees himself respectively as servant or slave of his Lord, as the one who
lias, is, will have to l>e rescued from sin by his Savtour, and as one sees
liis life in terms of submission to and the worship of God. It is within
rrfaLionship that reli^ous passion is Lo be understood^ for the relation-
ship is one of love, trust and dependence- But these passionate beliefs
are not unconnected v%^ith the belief in One who is not 'dead and
decomposed'- So although Kierkegaard was perfectly correct to underline
the passionate character of religious faith, it was his error to deny that
one condition of this faith was a behef in the tnith of certain historical
propositions - that Jesus Is not 'dead and decomposed'. Thou will not
suffer thine holy one to sec corruption/ (Acts Z)

In the final part of hi^ paper, Mulhall raises cjtjestions aftout the
l:human condition and develops an analogy, if no( something more
than an analogy, between human sinfulness and the roots of philo-
sopliLcal confusion- He does this in tJre context of Malcolm's now
famous analysis of Wittgenstein's claim tliat he could not help 'seeing

140 Flrihiwphy of fif/JgTO?j m the 21 it Century

every pr<^lGin from a religious point of vIgv/^ and Winch's ciiticaJ
response to Malcolm's cssaj^ Again, there is a ^rcal deal ihai is religiously
edifying In this third part of his paper. Like Muihall, 1 very much
approve of Winch^'s critique of Malcolm's elucidation of Wiltgen stein ^s
comment - although, personally, I have no dear understanding at all
of what Wittgenstein meant by this confession. There is no difficulty
with the first part of Wittgenstein's admission that he was 'not a reli-
gious man"" and this 1 find is easy to accept. For I do not find much
in Wittgenstein's writings that would tempt mc to describe him as
'religious' - parLicularly if 'religious' means 'Christian'. There is a super-
abundance of evidence, of course, that Wittgenstein had a passionate
concern for moral ideals and that he strove for some kind of moral per-
fection. But that is very different from being, say, a worshipper of God
or a man of prayer. A religious man, in the Christian sense, Is a holy
man - a man of God, who believes and knows that 'as many as are led
by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God (Romans, 8). Yet, there
are different forms and conceptions of spirituality and some of these
may encompass Wittgenstein's religiosity. However, the problem with
that Is that Malcolm's fouF analogies between philosophy and faith are
based on possible parallels between Chmtkm doctrines, as understood
by Malcolm, and Wittgenstein's philosophy. I accept in toto Mulhall's
approval of Winch's criticisms of Malcolm. Bui ihen^ towards the very
end of his essay, he proceeds to mate the point that there may be more
to Malcolm's llilrd analogy than wliat Winch had appreciated. Here
1 have failed to follow Mulhall's argument. Butj if 1 have not failed,
then Mulhall seems to me to be confused.

This third analogy it will be recalled, was ^betw^een the religious atti-
tude of regarding oneself as radically imperfect or "sick", and the idea
that philosophical puzzlement is a symptom of a 'Misease^ of our
thinking' {RPV^ p. liOK Mjlhall interprets Wittgenstein's notion of ^the
grammar or criteria of our ordinary words' as constituting the 'limits or
conditions of the human capacity to know, think or speak about the
world and the various things that are In it'. And the argument is devel-
oped as follows. We see these limits as Limitations. Tlmliailons' implies
imperfection and it is on this sense of imperfection that scepticism
thrives. This scepticism is analogous with our Mnablllty or refusal to
acknowledge the fact that human knowledge... Is necessarily condi-
tioned'. The desire to speak outside language games is an inflection of
the human pride to be God/ So it would seem to follow that conceptual
confusion is cL sin - part of our degenerate nature, of 'Original Sin'. And,
it is further argued that salvation from sin, in the religious context, is

Wafforti GeaSy 141

paralleled by salvation from conceptual confusion in a philosophical
context- We need a personal rclalionshlp with Christ to save us from
sin by his grace. We need a personal discourse with someone in philos-
ophy to deliver tis from the 'sLn^ of conceptual confusion-

Although 1 approve every theological remark by Mulhall, 1 believe
that his religious enthusiasm has clouded his normal philosophical per-
spicuity at this point. Of course, from a religious point of vicY?, any sort
of imperfection - ph'^^ical, spiritual^ moral and intellectual amy be
understood in terms of man's fallen nature and state- But it is equally
the case thai in the same context^ all human goodness and perfection
are seci:i as revealin;^ the general grace of God. But part of the difficulty
of amalgamating such a perspective svith philosophical considerations -
quite apart from estabhshing some identity betiveen the religious and
the philosophical - is with the generaht)'^ of the religious assertions.
One might argue, from a religious standpoint^ that all crime is the
rcsutt of sin. But that belief does not in any way help us to understand
why certain crimes are connected with, say, social or economic condi-
tions. The general does not help us to understand the particular in this
context- And, it seems to me, that the religious perception of universal
human depravity does not help us to understand either the nature of
the distinction between sense and nonsense or what conceptual clarity
amounts to^ or what are the roots of conceptual confusion. And 1 sus-
pect that Wittgenstein did not moan anything like what we have here
by his admission that he saw everything from a religious point or v'iew.

1 belie\'e that in this context^ Mulhatl has, to some degree, misrepre-
sented some of the ideas fouiid in the Phihsopiiicnl hwestigations. First
and foremost, he misconstrues the function of the notEon of a language-
gamc\ As 1 tried to make it plain in my introductory remarks, my own
conviction is that Wittgenstein introduced this notion in his work to
fulfil two specific functions only: first, to denionsLratc the diversity and
complexity of the criteria of intelligibility - and thus to contrast this
view sharply with w^hat he had said in the Tra<:tiitti^ about the single^
general condition of intelligibility and, secondly, to underline the con-
nection between language and human practices ot activities. In the
Fisihsophkc^i lavciytf^ijthfis, saying something docs not always amount
to the same thing: there is a diveisity of language games. And language
must never be separated from our doings, from human practices, Now it
may be correctly maintainedj as Mulhall states, that these language
games 'constitute the limits or conditions of the human capacity to
knoWj think or speak about the world\ Yet there are dangers here which
arise through the use of the concepts of 'limits' and 'conditions' - for

142 Flriitiwptiy ofReiistou m the 21 it Century

there is a temptation to think of thesc^ particularly in the way Mulhall
ar^es here, as bouiidatlcs ihat arc strictly set, fixed and formal And
such a vii?w would bring U5 back to the idea of language games bcinj^
rigidly autonomous. Uut this is to overlook the fluid character of Ian-
guage and practices - the fact that there is something hindamentally
indeterminate about our practices and lives. There is constant flux.
Constantly^ there arc new ways of saying and doing tilings, furthermore,
what becomes of the point, emphasized by Wittgenstein, that practices
and saving things are closely interrelated? What 1 am suggesting is that
Mulhall misrepresents the character of the boundaries of language
games. Again, it seems to be the case tliat we are confronted with a
new formalism - whereas tlic thesis presented by Wittgenstein is one of
logical informality

When anyone is conceptually confused one ro<]t of such a confiision
Is that we have taken a concept out of its natural setting, out of its
grounding activity, wtEhoul realizing it, and possibly, draw wrong
conclusions on this basis, fincfdentally this happens to all and sundry,
and it is not only to 'competent speakers' who 'suffer such a loss of
control when under pressure to philosophized It Is difficult to reconcile
Ihe specific nature of the circumstances indicated here with what
Mulhall has written Just a few lines earlier about philosophical confu-
sion not being 'rcsuicted to inhabitants of certain disciplines'.) ITie
confusion^ of course, is not in the taking of a word or concept out of its
natural habitat, but the failure to realize that when we arc doing so,
we may be usin^ the concept in an entirely neww^ay, perhaps metaphor-
ically, or even misusing the word entirclyj and consequently drawing
false inferences on that basis. Through extending the use of words wt
can easily become confused. But I am at a loss to see liow such a simple
common error ^is an inflection of the prideful human craving to be
God\ We also make all sorts of other intellectual errors, like miscalcu-
lating when doing mathematics, or committing the fallacy' of the undis-
tributed middle term in a piece of syllogistic reasoning. Are these also
aspects of our pride and depravity? Furthermore, If my language has
gone on holiday, It may suddenly occur to me that this is the case. I
may retrace my steps, and analyse my use of the relevant concepts, and
save myself from conceptual confusion - without the intervention of
either a friend or a philosopher I will have saved inyself_ But in reli-
gious language, as Mulhall underlines, the self cannot save itself from
its egocentricily Finally, not all my Ihinking, hopefully, is wholly con-
fused. Uut, religiously speaking, my depravity is total - and if^ by
chance, 1 perform any good, that is the result of the intervention of the

grace of God: 'it is iio( I, but the grace of God that was given to me'.

Here there is no analogy between the occasional conceptual virus that
one^s thinking is su^cepUhk to, and the religious condition of 5ickncs5
that leads^ without ihe iiilervcnlion of grace^ to spiritual death.

1. L. Wittgenstein^ Phitosophkut In^'e.'itigatjoils, tr G_E_M. Anscom'he, BlackweU,
19 5K

Z_ Wstl^cnst^sff^ LetrhtftTi ami Convi^rsadoti.'i ofi AfnHitriks, P'iycboiogy i^ Rj^l^toji:^:

B^itcf, ed- C Barrett^ ElackweElj i97S-
3. L Wiltgemtein, Tfse Bliit' ^smt Bi^wf Books, 'Rl^zkweii, I97S..
4_ L. WittgensteEn, Cuiture imd Vt^iite, ed. G_H_ von Wright. Rt]vi?^ed Ed it if m,

Blackwell, L993.

5. -K. Malcx^lm, Witt^en.'^tem! {i ReSi^oiis PoitJt of Vi^w, eel. P_ Winch^ Routiedge^

i95;i

6. AlE BLbJicat references are fiTjni the King James Authorized Veri^ion.

Voices in Discussion

D.Z. Phillips

}: III Ihc first part of what I had to say I concentrated on Wittgenstein's
own comments on religion. In his Lectures €}i Reiigioas R^iief, he
contrasts religious beliefs wiLh historical and cmpiiical beliefs, lie did
this In order lo rebut misunderstandings. It is temptinR^ to think that
you can investigate the existence cf God as though it weic a prior,
independent belief. Wittgenstein thought this was question-begging
because everything depends on what 'existence' means.

In the second part of my criticism I discuss ^%^ittgensteinlanlsm.
Here, in the prcseiice of D.Z. Phillips al Clarcmont, 1 fell I was bringing
coals to Newcastle. I addressed the accusation of fideism, and especially
the charge that Wittgensteinians claim IhaL religion is immune to
criticism. It is impossible to sustain that charge, as Phillips has pointed
out. First, there are terms of criticism wiLhin religious traditions.
Second^ there arercligiaus responses to aspects of life that strike every-
one- Some of these responses may be superstitious and^ hence, crlticiz-
able. Thirdj Phillips makes use of common moral responses to criticize
certain treatments of Lhe problem of evil Fourtli, although Philiips
does not press this, there is the kind of criticism that Nietzsche, Freud
and Marx made of religion. Certain forms of religion may indeed turn
out to be unhealthy masochism, economic exploitation, social and
poiitical oppression, or dependence on a fatiier figure. So possibilities
of criticism are not denied by Wittgensteinians. "What is denied is that
tlie whole of religion could be shown to he meaningless.

The third part of my paper is the most controversial and I doubt
whether it would be acceptable to Phillips. I try to see what Wittgenstein
meant when he said that although he was not a religious man he could
not help seeing every problem from a religious point of view. This
remark is discussed by Norman Malcolm in WittgL'tutt'ln - a Rdlghns

144

Point of View! And by Peter Winch in his Response in that work. I do
iiot think Malcolm's analogies bcLwcen philosophical concerns and
religious concerns work for the reasons Winch provides, but Winch
docs not dismiss the issue of spiritual concern in this context. But I am
not altogether convinced of what he goes on to say, Ho says that lack
of clarity has important consequences for life, but distinguishes, some-
what artificially in my view, between importance for the sense of life^
and 'importance for the sense of one's own life'. Take as an example
of the difference between first person and third person statements in
the philosophy of psychology. Conceptual confusion can lead to views
about private access; that there ^s something unique about one's
experience that others can't have access to- BuL is it not also possible to
live that confusion, to think Ehat one is uniqui^ beyond the reach of
others? 1 think Winch's distinction makes it look as though there are
difficulties which only belong to an exclusive class of people called
philosophers, as though others were not vulnerable [o them.

But w^hy do I think there is a genuinely religious aspect to this
philosophical concern? First, the confusion comes from the attempt
to speak outside all language ^ames; to speak outside the conditions
of sense. This can be seen as a profound dissatisfaction with life, and
aspiration to transcend the human, an impulse to go beyond it.

Second, there Is an interesting comparison between the philosopher
and his or her interlchcutor, and Christ and the belicver_ 1 suggest that
there is a parallel iKtween original sin and the role Cavcll assigns to
scepticism - the issue of what is involved in the denials of scepticism-
Spiritual issues are involved in the denial of the human. One^s concerns
may be philosophical^ but the motivation can be spiritual^ just aSj In
political theory^ Rawls can advance a theory of justice, inspired by
neutralitj^j and still be moved by a passion for justice. So 1 am suggesting
that Wittgenstein's combating confusion can have a spiritual aspect

Ki 1 am critical only of the third part of /^s paper. I don't object to the
religious comments he makes there, but T do not see how he can tink
them to a philosophical position.

When 1 read Wittgenstein's Lectures ami Conversations T was unhappy
from the outset. 1 listened with two ears: one philosophical^ the other
trained by my religious upbringing. It seemed to mc that his remarks
on religion are tied too closely to the Tn^ctiitiLS view of language- It is
unfortunate, therefore, if defenders of Wittgenstein use these very
retnarks as a general accoiuit of his views on jujjglon. I have in mind
the claim that God does not reveal himself in the worlds and that the

146 FIfiitiwphy ofReii^ou m the 21 it Century

mystical is not how the world is^ but that it is. Rhecs in Wittgenstem mul
the Posaihifity of Discourse says that even in the Inwstigutiom VVlUgcn-
5tGin 15 still influenced by the analogy between language and a calculus.
If Rhccs is rigliEj there is an interaction between language games and
there is not the sharp distinction between the empirical and the spiri-^
tuai that we have in the Lectures nmi Corwersatiotis where the concepts
of ^knowledge' and 'truth' are simply given up to the empirical realm.
Truth and falsity belong to activities and thus when we pay attention to
divine activities we open up an entirely new field of enquiry-

The charge that VYittgcnstcinianism has no room for notions of
'truth' and 'falsity' is absurd. Here arc just some examples.

Firsts Paul argued that circumcision was not necessary to be a mem-
ber of the Church. To think olhcrwisc, he said, was an error. Paul said
that this was false doctrine. So this is doctrinal falsity.

Second^ the Jews %vould condemn calling Jesus Tord^ or 'God^ To
them this is idolatry. That is another form of falsity-
Third, we have hypocrisy - another form of error.

Fourlhj there is superstition- 1 had ncvcf flown before 1 came to this
conference, 1 took my New Testament with me on the plane, 1 found
myself wondering whelher 1 was indulging in superstition, thinking
that the mere possession of the Testament would save me from harm.
So superstition is another kind of error.

Fifth, the Pharisees committed a terrible error They were not h>7i'
ocrites. They prayed sincerely, hut what they said was^ ^We thank thee
that we are not as other men are'.

Sixths to say that Jesus is not risen is false. Wittgenstein says that to
believe in the resurrection is to belie^^e that Jesiis did not decompose in
the grave like other teachers. The belief has an empirical element: god
did not suffer his holy one to see corruption.

These are simply some examples of uses of 'trutli' and 'falsity', and
yet WittRcnsteinians arc said to deny the distinction.

/: The claltn Ihat a general distinction between the empirical and the
religious is too sweeping is important. I was less worried about tiiat dis-
nnctlon, than with bringing out the religious and ethical significance
of notions like the Last Judgement which is lost if it is treated as a
merely empirical event- But I agree with K that before we say that an
event is this or tiiat, we must look to contexts to see the sense in which
they might be taken together

jB: You spoke of 'thcistic metaphysics^ What do you mean by that? Is it

(o be dismissed and not taken seriously?

D^.rmntps 147

/: I didn't make much use of that term. I did refer to Hyman^s tendency
to think that religious practices presuppose metaphysical beliefs.
I argued against that. But there is little doubt that in Wittgenstein,
'metaphj-'sics' is a term of abuse. Metaphysics is an attempt to solve
problems that don't need solving because they are the product ot
conceptual confusion.

H: Isn't tliat because^ for Wittgenstein^ what is real in religion is found
not in relation to reason, buL li^ relation to Chiist?

C: I think we have to be carehit here- Firsts I would a^ce with K that at
tlic time of the Tyactutiis or tlie Lecture on Ethics for that matter^ tlie rcli-
gious expressions he wants to use are linked to the TnKUitis^ view of
language, 1 agree that he is struggling to work his way out of that posi-
tion in the Lt^ctures and Ciniversiitions without wholly succeeding. That
is why he can't make sense of the expressions in the Tractatus and the
Lecture svhile thinkings nevertheless, that they arc extremely important.
The Importance of some of the rcmaiks, Lliercfore, sutvlves the philo-
sophical position from which they were niade. So I don^t agree with
K that tliey have little religious significance. For example, the view that
when one comes lo helieve in God^ tlie world changes as a wliole is
extremely important.

In response to B Vd say that fitixe are times when Wittgenstein gives
the impression that he Is the unconfused one^ whereas the metaphysi-
cian is confused, as though he learnt nothing from the discussion of
metaphysical theses. True^ he thinks these are confused^ but this is
something which he comes to see through struggling with metaphysi-
cal voices in the Ifwestigutioiij; which arc voices within himself. In the
maiii he never dismissed metaphysical questions. He called them the
deepest worries in philosopliy, alheit worries which we should strive to
overcome.

K: My main criticism is of the third pan of /'s paper 1 see no justification
for his analo^^ between scepticism and sin. The source of the former is
philosophical^ whereas the latter comes from the want of a proper rela-
tionship with God. Coming to terms w^iLh scepticism doesn't lurn one's
life around or bring salvation in the way in which receiving grace doe?.

/: 1 wasn^t so much equating them as suggesting that there is an issue

here to be addressed, both in relation to Christianity and Cavell's
model of perfectionism. Cavell used the term 'recognition' and ivanted
to explore what it or resistance to it involves.

D^.rmntps 147

H: Isn't tliat because^ for Wittgenstein^ what is real in religion is found
not in relation to reason, buL li^ relation to Chiist?

/: 1 wasn^t so much equating them as suggesting that there is an issue

here to be addressed, both in relation to Christianity and Cavell's
model of perfectionism. Cavell used the term 'recognition' and ivanted
to explore what it or resistance to it involves.

i4S Flriitiwptiy of fif/JgTO?j m the 21 it Century

C: Eutj ihcn^ what kind of rccogiiLtion arc wc talking about? I think

ihc similarity comes from the fact that 'the spiriluar is wider Lhan 'the
religious^ Wittgenstein said that wc must suffer in philosophy There is
an analo;5y witli moral problems here because there is a question of the
obstacle of the will involved - we wilt not give up certain w^ays of
thinking. But, liaving said that, what wc are asked to recognize is wider
than vvliat wc appropriate personally. For example^ compare St Francis
saying that llie way flowers gave glory to God put him to shame, with
Spandrel! in Huxley^s Point Cmmter Point slashing a field of flowers with
his sLLck sa>an^, 'Dainn their insolence/ What is it to see the world in
these ways? What sorl of disagreement exists between them?

Philosophy itself is a spiritual determination to sec the w^orld as it is
In all Its variety, but, for that very reason, it does not underwrite any
perspective- Cavell seems to want to advocate specific perspectives. 1 do
not think that he, or any other philosopher, can take that moral
weight on himself.

/: 1 agree with a great deal of that. I can see wtiy you say that taking on
that moral weight cannot be part of a philosophical project. On the
otlier hand, 1 was thinking of how ethical and spiritual concerns enter
tliat philosophical discussion wliich is a love of msdom. After ail^ in
some sense, you have to admit that youVe been lost. Why docs that
repeat itself again and agaiii? Some conceptual confusions are very spe-
cific, but tliey may still express the Impulse to violate criteria^ to speak
outside language, and, therefore, to deny the human.

E[ Aren't you referring to human problems^ not philosophical prob-
lems? Oi are you saying that 'the human' includes 'the plillosophlcal'?

/: Welt^ having rejected Malcolm's analogies^ Winch does not deny
that philosophy can have a spiritual concern. He thought that
Wittgenstein's investigations are suffused with It. So does a context
emerge where there is a connection between a conception of pliilosophy
and a conception of life? There is at least an issue here to be addrcssed.

S: I was puzzled why K said that belief in the Resurrection involved an
empirical element. Does he mean that you could settle the matter by
checking whether the tomb was empty? Suppose someone said that
Hitler had walked uui of an empty tomb, ^o what? What religious
significance would it have?

Pi I think we need to recognize that language games overlap in this
context. There is no sharp distinction between the empirical and the

spitituaL

K: Exactly. Tlio Giiiipirical is the condition of ihc sptritual. If Christ is
not risen, then, indeed^ our f^iUh Ls ii^ vain.

A\ If one is a religious believer one musl aslc what sort of person would
liave brought about such an event, just as one asks what sort of person
would liavc committed a crime, [f you say there can^t be any such thing
as a resurrection you1l need a lot of evidence to show this. But if you
liave a belief that it is probable that there is a God^ then you must ask
wlietlier It is reasonable and probable lliat he would do such a thing.

7^ Wittgenstein says tliat religious believers walk a tightrope with
beliefs of this kind. II: you ovcr-emphasize some aspect you fall off, but
people do manage to walk tlie tightrope.

Ct One way of falling off the tiglitiope is to say as K does that the
resurrection is the empirical condiMon of religious faith- That cannot
possibly be right because 'resurrection' is itself a religious notion.

K: But for you ^raised" simply means '"exalted'. You believe the bones of

Jesus arc somew^hcre in Palestine.

— - ^-|-.-■ -»-,-

C: You referred to Wittgenstein endorsing your view. I don't tliiiik ho

does. I believe there Is a change of direction in the passage you
referred. He says, at firsts that he plays with the thought that to be
saved he needs Jesus not lo have decomposed in the grave like any
other teacher. Now, 1 have no idea where the bones of Jesus are, but It
docs nol take love to believe that they are not in Palestine. And when
Wittgenstein turns away from the thought tbal he was playing witli^
that is what he says - that it takes love to believe that the crucified one
lias been raised on high, exalted to the right liand of God tire Father
Now If you think this invites the empirical question, 'How high was he
raised?' that is your problem. Are you going to ask the same empirical
question of the Ascension? These are rcUgious terms and must be
understood as sueh.

F: Christianity is an historical religion - things hapfx^n at a certain
time. liut it doesn't follow that svhat happened is itself lo be deter-
mined historically. The WTiters of the Gospels were not writing an his-
torical report, but proclaiming Good News. C is right, the Resurrection
is. part of that Good News. It's not as though a video camera couid
have picked it up. They arc not CNN rcporters-

D: How do you know a video camera could not have picked it up?
F: Tliat wasn't my claim - it couldn't.

150 Flrihiwphy ofReiistou m the Zlst Century

El K^ you were rcfcmng to 1 Corinlhiaiis 15. There, for Paul, without a
doubt^ resurrection and exaltation come Lo the same thing.

A: That's a disputable view; we'd need Lo look al the texts.

K: It Is certainly disputable. Paul refers uncqutvocally to the post-
resurreclion appearances^ on wl:tich the faith of the believers depends.

E: And he says that he Is passing on what lie, too, has received.

C: In other words, the sense in which Jesus appeared to him is the
5ame sense as thai in which he appeared to others.

D: I think that if you ask most Christians whether they think that they
would deny it.

C: But w^hat makes you think you can do jrfitlosophy in that way? If 1
knocked on a door in Claremont and asked the lady of the house what
she meant by 'thinkings would i take her answer to settle the matter?
One cannot do philosophy by Gallup polk

D: Why not? Wittgensteinians always claim to tell us what wc really
mean. Why not ask Christians what they do mean? If the majority says
they mean such-and-such, that settles the matter. You can do this kind
of philosophy by Gallup poll.

C: No you can^t, because when reference is made to what people mean,
the reference is to the role the w^ords play in their liveSn not to the
account they would give if asked. Notoiiouslyn In giving that account
our own words can lead us astray. That is why Wittgenstein said that
though a picture, including a religious picture, is in the foreground, its
actual application may be in the background. The matter can only be
resolved, if at all^ through discussion with one's interlocutor It cannot
be settled by Gallup polk

Part IV

Postmodernism

Messianic Postmodernism

Joluj D. Capitto

The word 'postmodernism' has come lo mean many things. So before

addressing the principal objections diat have been made against it^
particularly as regards its usefulness as a framework for a pliaJoscjpiiy of
rehgion, we would do well lo specify the sense in which we are using
this term. Very broadly conceived^ I would argue that poslmodcjrnism
is a philosophy of difference', that it emphasizes the productive role of
difference, as opposed to the 'modern' or Enlightenment predilection
for universality, commonalit)'^ consensus, and wliat modernists {rather
presumptuously) call 'rationality'. Speaking very broadly still, 1 would
say that, for our purposes here, there are (at least) two different vari-
eties of this philosophy of diffcrcncCj depending on wliJch of its two
nineteenth-century predecessors - Nietzsche or Ktcrkcigaard - one
favours. Tliesc 1 will call^ only slightly tongue in clicckj 'Dionysian'
and 'messianic' postmodernism.

[t is the thesis of the present essay that most of the objections that
are made aj^ainst postmodernism have in mind tlic EMonysian veRion^
but that they fall wide of the mark o! \hc messianic version, about
which the critics of postmodernism often seem badly informed. The
line of objections that are raised against postmodcrnisLs bear a family
resemblance: relativism^ sub|cctiv:sm, scepticism, anarcltism, antinomi-
antsm, anti-institutionaltsm, nihilism and despair- In my view^ this line
of complatnc takes its lead from the highly Nictzscheanizcd face of tlie
first version of postmodernism, but it docs not come to grips with the
Kicrtccgaardian {and Lcvinasian) face of the second version. Clearly,
were all or most of these objections valid^ postmodernism would not be
of much help to the philosophy of religion, or to anything else for that
matter, and it would be rightly denounced as mimical to God and reli-
gion. Although I will argue that when these complaints arc legitimate^

153

154 Flrihiwptiy ofRi^H^ou m the 21 it Century

they hold of its Dionysian version^ I would insist that a more nuanced
understanding of this version also reveals very interesting possibiliLics
foT religious reflection. The danger of the piescnt 'good cop^^ad cop^
strategy is that it tends to sell the Xietzschean version shortj to throw
it to the wolves of postmodern ism's critles, and to let it take a hit for
the rest of us. But be that as h may, this string of objections against
postmodernism is^ as regards the second or messianic version, false
oil its face and very likely belra^^ the critic's unfamiharlty with its reli-
gious and even bibttcal provenance-

Dionysian postmodern istn

Tlie Nietzschean version of postmodernism has grabbed most of the

headlines and has dominated its popular reception. In this version of ihe
philosophy of difference {heteros)^ difference has the sense of dh'eraitas^
the variety of forms. Here the emphasis Is placed upon the affirmation of
multiplicity, a multiplication of fomiSn a pol^^iorphic or 'heteromorphic'
pluralism of many different kinds. This goes hand iii hand with a love
of noveltyj of the Invention of as many new kinds as possible- Philo-
sophically this view draws upon Nietzsche's 'perspectLvalism', that is,
his critique of 'truth^ and the 'ascetic ideal'. Nietzsche was critical of the
classical metaphysical ideal that there is a firm centre which holdSj a
firm and immutable foundation or principle, to which all lovers of the
true or the good, of science or ethics, must rigorously (^ascelically^l
hold - whether one takes that principle to be Godn the laws of physics,
or even the laws of grammar. Indeed^ wlien Xietzsche said that 'God is
d^ad\ he meant this entire metaphysical order, any notiori of an
absolute centre or foundation. That explains wiiy he said we would not
be rid of belief in God until we had dispelled our belief in grammar,
our belief that wliat arc for him the 'fictions' - or conventions - of
.-indo-European grammar somehow give voice to the very order of
bein^ (the grammatical subject arousing faith in the personal self^ and
so forth), fn the place of this absolutism^ Nietzsche put his notion of
perspectives, that every belief^ including the propositions of physics, is
an interpretation.

For XietzscliCn the perspectives issue from the play of forces asserting
themselves, each with greater or lesser strength, each expressing its
own immanent life force to a greater ot lesser extent. Our own 'beliefs^
are the perspectives we cognitive beings impose on things to promote
tlie flourishing of our ow^n life, rather the way the trees in the forest
istruggle for light. When Nietzsche complained, 'if there were a God,

John D. Capiito 135

whzLt would Ihcrc be kft for us to create?^ he pressed the view thai the

n:iaxiniization of the invention of the perspectives required the disnian-
tling of the idea of a siimmum bommf or primmn ens in which every such
possihility would be already realized. For Nietzsche no belief or idea
enjoyed eternal or timeless validity; every such idea is invented - histor-
ically constituted - to promote the needs of life, fndecd, one is tempted
to argue that for Nietzsche such ideas are biologically constituted^ so
long as one does not forget that biology toO' is another perspective and
ought not to be turned into another ascetic ideal, lliat is, a rigorous,
absolutely true^ non-pcrspc clival science lo which cvciytliiiig caii be
systematically reduced. Ever)ihin^ is surface, surface is what is deep;
the distinction between depth and surface^ the true world and apparent,
being and appearing, comes undone. God is dead.

The most prominent 'Xietzschean' postmodernists arc Gillcs Delcuze
and Michel Foucault and nowadays, after their death, Jean Baudrillard,
ivho uses Nietzschean presuppositions In a 'postmodern' theory of
^images'. Oaudrillard represents a very importantn more broadly 'cultural'
dimension of postniodernisraj one which forces us to distinguish it from
a more technical philosophical position called post-slrjcturalism. In
Baudrillard^ postmodernism is the articulation of the culture of the
world-Vh-ide web and 'virtual realit)^ ^po^ which we have all entered^
where the distinction between image and reality, surface and depths
dissolves- As his recent CD-Rom. The Ri^nk Las Vegas, NV, illustrates
very well^ this is the 'poslmodefn' world that today interests radical
theologian Vlark C. Taylor.^ Feminist theologians like Sharon Welch
and Rebecca Chopp have made interesting use of Foucauldian inspired
'genealogical' anal}'scs to criticize the historically constituted constena-
tions of power and sexuality that have been used to oppress women
and minorities^ inside the church and without. In still another direc-
tion^ Bataille had taken up Nietzsche's notion of tlie overflowing of the
will to powder to formulate a theory of an expenditure without return
as the essence of the religious act.

On the whole, this version of postmodernism has been greeted w^ith
hostility by a wide variety of thinkers oii both the left and the right, by
scientists and humanists alike. The right wing tends to think Nietzsche
is the devil himself^ having utterly relativized^ God-Motherhood-and-
Apple-Piety. But then again so does the ^old' Olberal, modernist) left^
which has no interest in religion at all, as witness pJiysicist Alan Sokal^
who wants to restore the left to its p re-Nietzsche an senses^ has made a
reputation for himself denouncing the 'cultural studies' movement,
made up of postmodernists of the Dionysian stripe, wlio on his view

156 Flrihiwphy ofRi^H^ou Ui the 21 it Century

aK ill-tnforniGd charlatans attempting to rclaEivizG the results of mathc-
matical physics while knowing UllIc niaLhcmalics and less physics. Even
Richard Rorty^ who thinks that Nietzsche is gcKxl for use on weekends
when we arc invcnling our private selves^ is hij^hly critical of letting
Nietzsche into the workaday public sphere^ with Ihe confusion besetting
the new left, as he argues in liis recent Adiicviti^ onr Cotmtfy? Philoso-
phical theologians like Brian Ingraffia have roundly criticized Nietzsche
for having a defective understanding of Christianity and on this basis
have denounced any attompt to mix Christianity and postmod<^rnisni.-*
That is, 1 think, an ovcrreaetionj bul it is an understandable reaction
that this version of postmodernist thinking tends to bring down upon
itself- At its best, Nietzscheanized postmodernism has opened up
important genealogical investigations into the historical constitution
of power clusters that can have emancipatory effects for the oppressed,
and have paved the way for the new or what Allan B!oom grumpily
called Che 'Nietzscheanized left\ a pnliUcal result that would, needless
to say, have profoundly saddened Nietzsche himself who was deeply
antipathetic to modern democratic movements and who deeply regretted
the passing of the cmcien regm:e in France. At its worst, postmodernists
often give us the impression that they have utterly jettisoned any stan-
dard of reason^ intelligibility or argumentation; they give everyone the
distinct impression that 'anything goes' just l>ccause their texts are
written precisely as if anything does indeed go They make themselves
easy targets for people like Sokal who have neither the time, the train-
ing, nor the taste for trying to decode and decipher the excesses of
tlicir jargon. They write for an inside group of 'po-mo' academics^ bolt-
ing from one conference on postmodernism to the ncxt^ presenting
the worst but most public face of this movement.

Messianic Postmodernism

liut 'postmodernism'' is capable of assuming a second and quite different
form, one whose nineteenth-century predecessor is not Nietzsche but
Kierkegaard. Here the notion of 'difference' lakes on a significantly differ-
ent sense, where it means not divensltas, or heteromorphic diversity, but
rather tilteritus, the alteriLy of the 'other one', that one 'over there'- In the
second vers;ion, difference demands tr'imsct'fideijce, the movement fronn
the 'same^ to the ^other^^ a movement first aruiounced in philosophy by
Plato, who said that the Good is ^pikeiiias tes ottsias, beyond being, at the
end of a steep ascent^ and in religion by the transcendence of tlie Most

JoimU. Capiito 157

Highn the Holy One of Second Tsaiah^ Who said that His ways aic not
our ways. Here difrcrcncc means the One Who Is 'wholly other' {tout
autre), to use the expression that Levinas borrows from Vladimir
YankelevilchH wlio was wriliiig about the One in Plotinus^ although thai
expression is also found in Kierkegaard.

By the wholly other these thinkers inean the 'paradox^ - by which they
do not mean not some simple logical contradiction [jc and -;f) - of a con-
cept of sometlilng inconceivable^ a concept whose verj' meaning or con-
ceptual function is to indicate something beyond, something we cannot
conceive and comprehend^ not just because of present liniitatlons but
always and in principle. A classteal example of this is the Anselmian Godn
hi ijiio imijo!' neqait cogiUiti, the concept of what we cannot conceive^ of
something so surpassingly great that It is always and in principle better
than anything we can conceive. Such concepts have a principle of self-
surpassal built right into them. So^ too, the Cartesian notion in the
Third Meditation of an idea of something of which 1 can have no Idea,
an idea that has been implanted in me that 1 cannot understand, yiz.,
of an infinite God. The Svholly othci' Is always like thai. It is not going
to turn out upon further investigation to be an instance of a type of
which I already have an idea, so that I am already schematically familiar
with it. It has an un reach ability, an un attainability - an alterit\^ - built
into it, like a shore for which 1 set out but never reach. I am in relation
with it, heading for it, but the 'wholly other' is also always withdrawing
frpni this relaliotiH ^f> that^ lii principle, 1 never get there. The paradox
is encapsulated nicely in Levinas's phrase, 'a relation in which the
tersiis absolve themselves from the relation^ remain absolute within tlie
relation' p^ or in Blanchot's French qulp^ Je'pas mf-deliif taking the 'step
ipiis) beyond', which is also prohibited, the 'no-bcyond' (le 'pus. mi-iielii'),
the step not beyond, the step I ara always taking but not quite making-
There Is both a relation and a breakdown of the relation, like a desire
to have what cannot be had, or to know what cannot be known- So if
in the Dionj^ian version of postmodern difference, ^infinite' tended to
mean the unregulatable and uncontrollable play of differences spread-
ing across an infinite iiorizontal surface^ 'rliizomatically'^ as Dcleuze
would say fwhich means like crab grass)^ in this second version, infi-
nite difference has the sense of unreachable depths or heights, like the
Ancient of Days or the Most High in the Tanakh.

If tiiie Dionysian version of difference takes the form of a certain
Iteteromorphism', this second version, which I am calling ^messianic',
is best tliought of as a certain ^hcteronomism""^ where everything turns

i5S Flriitiwphy ofReiistou m the 21 it Century

oil the iaw of the other, on the disruption visited upon the 'same^ by the
'othcr'j which Is ihc language Levinas uses, adapted from Plato's Sophist
and Piirmetiuies, to express a very biblical notion. In tlii5 version, what
matters is the 'responsibihty' that 1 incur wlien the other overtakes me,
taking me tay a kind of deep surprise, one that is older than 1 can say,
prefi;^fcd in the very ^tmcture of creatio ex ffihUo, in which, in Lcvinas^s
beautiful phrase, tlie creature answers lo a call that it never heard. The
hetcronomic version is structured around llie notion of a call in which
the other lays claim to me, has always and aEready laid claim to me. Its
model and protot)'"pe is no one less than father Abraham himself, who,
called forth from the land of his fathers never to ro home again, and
called upon to sacrifice the seed of the very future he was promised
for this uprooting, could only say 'fiineiu^ 'me ^mci^ see me here,
here 1 am. In the Dionysian version of postmodernism, modernities
autonomous subject is dispersed and disseminated into a Dionysian plu-
raltty of many selves, each one of which Is historically, even grammati-
cally constituted- In the heteronomlc version, the modern autonomous
subject is taken from behind^ overtaken, by a call which it never heard,
by a command of which it is not the author^ by a past that was never
present, and reduced - led back' - to a levet of deeper subjection and
accusation, radically sinjjularizcd by an Inescapable, irrecusable responsi-
bility. The Cartesian l"" of modernity becomes a biblical ^me^ in the
accusative, accused by the call which claims it. 'Abraham!^ 'See me hereJ^
Thus far from being the nemesis of religion and ethical rcsponsibtlilyp
which is the complaint directed al its Dionysian cousin, the figures of
this postmodern ism, where the term 'postmodern^ marks a m^^ditation
^ 0n 'alterity', are distinctly ethlealn biblical and, as I will show, messianic.
Indeed, this discourse has been described by Derrlda as 'a non-dogmatic
doublet of dogma. -.a thhikm^ th^l '^repeats'' the possibility of religion
without religion""- This 'thinking', Derrida says, is 'developed witlrout
reference to reh^ion as institutional dogma,' and concerns 'the essence
of the religious that doesn^l amount to an article of faith'^ representing
a body of 'discourses that seek In our day to be religious.-. witlioul
putting forth theses or thedogems that would by their very structure
teach something corresponding to the dogmas of a given religion'.^

Although Derrida is speaking of Kierkegaard and Lcvinas,^ among
others, I have argued elsewhere and at some length that this 'religion
without religion' also befits Derrida himselfj particularly as regards the
works that have appeared since 19K07 This claim is anathema both
to secularizing deconstructionists, who on the question of religion
repeat deeply modernist critiques of religion A^'ith perfect loyalty, and

Jo)mD. Capiito 159

to religious thinkers^ who^ like Brian Ingraffia^ mislakenly identify
dGconstruction as a form of Dioiiysian rather than of messianic post-
modernism. But to the surprise and diagrin of many, Derrida, it turns
outp has religion, lA'hat he calls 'my religion^ and U can he i^ored only
at the cost of systematically misreading his work. Indeed, time and time
again the most outrageous and, one is Ecmpted to say, the most irrespoit-
siblc misrepresentations of his work appear regularly in prints grotesque
distortions of a thinker whose principal interest these days lies in such
notions as the messianic, hospitality, friendship, testimony and forgive-
ness. That is due to the fact that in Dcrrida there are important veins of
both versions of postmodernisms, very roughly approximating his ear-
lier and later writings, and that too many conimentators go by second-
liand accounts of the earlier work. Indeed, getting one's reading of
Derrida right is a good case study in being able Co identify these different
tendencies in postmodernism and the way they interact.

The prhiclpal document In w^hlch the religious, or as we shall shortly
sec, the messianic clement in Dcrrida's work most clearly emerges is
his Ciu'Offfcssum, an autobiographical book woven together with
St Augustine's Confe5:?i(}nSf wliieh appeared in 1990, on the dual occa-
sion of reaching his fiftieth year and of the death of his mother.^ Here
Derrida recounts his upbringing as an Algerian Jew and 3. pied noiif as an
Arab/Jew who speaks 'Christian Latin French' in the land w^here Augus-
tine was born (he was raised on the rue Sriihit Au^iistin). Circonfesj^ioa,
tlie confessions of a cifcumcised Augustine, a Jewish Augustine^ is an
attempt, he says, to leave nothings if possiblCj in the dark of w^hat
related me to Judaism^ alliance broken in every respect^ Of this
alliance, 'without continuity but without break', he says 'that's what
my teaders won't have known about me', 'like my religion about
wliich nobody understands anything', and the result Is tliat he is ^rcad
less and less well over almost tw'cnty years"". Jacques is also the fiiius
istiimni liicrynhinmi whose mother George tte/\Ionica, now dying oh
the shores of the other side of the Mediterranean In Nice/Ostian w^ept
and w^orrlcd over whether Jacques still believed in God, never darliig to
ask Jacques himselfn 'but she must have known that the constancy of
God in my life is called by other namcs\ even though he 'rightly passes
for an atheisf QD, pp. 154-5).

Nothing better embodies and Illustrates the convergence of religion
and postmodernism than tlie emergence of the 'religion/ of Jacques
Derrida, his 'religion without je-ligion', and nothing more effectively
lays to rest the misguided idea that religion is irrelevant to ^deconstruc-
tion' - tlie version of postmodernism 1 ayHI focus on now - and that

160 Flrihiwphy of fif/JgTO?j m the 21 it Century

deconstruction is irrelevant to religious reflection. Tlie central mterest
of the debate about Derrida and fcll^lon up to now has been the ques-
tion of negative thcology_ Tt Is certainly true that Derrida loves negative
the ology^ because it consti tutcs a paradoxical di scou rsc organized
around a self-effacing name - the name of God - a name that is betrayed
as soon as it is uttered. Nothing pleases Deriida more than Meistcr
Eckhart's beautiful and famous prayer^ 1 pray God to rid me of God.^
Derrida stands in toving awe of the resources of negative theolo^v; of
its attempt to 'go where you cannot go\ as the mystical [>oet Angekis
Silesius wrote. Negative theology is for him an ancient archive of the
deepest attempts that have been made to learn how to avoid speaking,
to speak ivilhout speakings how not to speak. Comineut }ie puj; parier?
But he differs fundamentally with negative theology, which he regards,
in one of its voices at least, as inevitably 'hypcrousiological'. However
much it protests tliat it does not know, negative theology^ always knows
In a certain way just what It does not know; and always manages to
affirm something al! the more essentially by way of its negations, Nega-
tive theolog); Derrida says^ always knows where to direct its prayers."^

Derrida is more interested in its 'other' voices the darkest night of its
soul, when it truly does not know for what it prays and w^eeps. Qttiil
ergo atiio cum dcii}}f memu timo?, St Augustine WTites. Derrida says that
he has been asking this question all his life: wliat do 1 love when I love
my God? It is not a question of wlicthcr he toves God - who would be
.^o cold of heart to deny that? - but of what he loves when he loves his
God. He has, I>errida says, all his life lon^ been 'hoping sighing dream-
ing^ of something tmit iiutre, something raaivellous to comc^ something
'undcconstnjctible' which is the heart and soul^ the prayers and tears,
the impulse and the point of de construction. Deconstruction, to the
consternation of its Nietzscheanising, secularizing admirers^ and to the
no lesser consternation of its conservative religious allies, turns out
to be a rchglon of the tout autre, a religious affirmation of w^hat is to
coine, hoping and sigliing, dreaming and praying for the coming of
the whollv other

But this religion is to be understood not in terms of i:iegative theology
but in morejewishj ^messianic' Leims. The present preoccupation with
deconstruction and negative theology fails to see that deconstruction is
more prophetic than mystical, more preoccupied with messianic peace
and justice than mystical union, more Je wash than Christian-Platonic.
Deconstruction, Derrida says, is best conceived as the affirmation of
the i4mieconstruct:b{t\ which lie also describes as the affirmation of

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