MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Y 4. IN 8/16: H 58/10
fliddle East Peace Process, 104-1 He..
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2i_733 WASHINGTON : 1996
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-052177-7
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Y 4. IN 8/16:11 58/10
fliddle East Peace Process, 104-1 He...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
21-733 WASHINGTON : 1996
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-052177-7
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
DAVID FUNDERBURK, North Carolina
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South
Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
VICTOR O. FRAZER, Virgin Islands (Ind.)
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Michael H. Van Dusen, Minority Chief of Staff
Deborah Bodlander, Professional Staff Member
Veronica A. Craig, Staff Associate
(II)
ERRATA
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Y4.IN 8/16: M 58/10/
ERRATA
Errata, Hiddle East Peace Process,
HEAKING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
DEPOSITORY
JUN 0 5 1996
Boston Public Library
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
21-733 CC WASHINGTON : 1996
ERRATA
The name of Mr. Amo Houghton was inadvertently listed as a
Democrat on the right hand column of the committee member ros-
ter. The list should read as follows:
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
HENRY J. HYDE, minois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTENEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
DAVID FUNDERBURK, North Carolina
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South
Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
VICTOR O. FRAZER, Virgin Islands (Ind.)
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. Van DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
JOHN P. MackEY, Investigative Counsel
Veronica Craig, Staff Associate
(II)
CONTENTS
WITNESSES
Wednesday, September 20, 1995: Page
The Honorable Sam Gejdenson, Member of Congress 4
The Honorable Dan Burton, Member of Congress 6
The Honorable Tom Lantos, Member of Congress 8
The Honorable Michael Forbes, Member of Congress 10
The Honorable James Saxton, Member of Congress 14
The Honorable Peter Deutsch, Member of Congress 16
The Honorable Eliot Engel, Member of Congress 44
The Honorable Howard Berman, Member of Congress 47
Mr. Joseph E. Kelley, Director-in-Charge, International Affairs Issues,
National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Ac-
counting Office 48
Mr. Dan Polisar, executive director, Peace Watch, Jerusalem, Israel 56
Mr. Robert Satloff, executive director, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy 58
Mr. Neal Sher, executive director, American Israel Public Affairs Com-
mittee 69
Dr. Mandell Ganchrow, president, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congrega-
tions of America 83
Mr. David A. Harris, executive director, American Jewish Committee 85
Dr. Jim Zogby, president, Arab American Institute 87
Mr. Rand Fishbein, board of advisors, Center for Security Policy 90
Mr. Morton Klein, president, Zionist Organization of America 93
Mr. Richard Hellman, president, Christians' Israel Public Action Cam-
paign 95
Mr. Seymour Reich, president, American Zionist Movement 97
APPENDK
Prepared statements:
Congressman Dan Burton 123
Congressman Michael Forbes 126
Congressman James Saxton 129
Congressman Peter Deutsch 138
Congressman Eliot Engel 139
Congressman Tom DeLay 144
Congressman Gary Ackerman 147
Mr. Joseph E. Kelley 148
Mr. Dan Polisar 157
Mr. Robert Satloff 170
Mr. Neal Sher 173
Dr. Mandell Ganchrow 176
Mr. David Harris 181
Dr. Jim Zogby 187
Mr. Rand Fishbein 190
Mr. Morton Klein 195
Mr. Richard Hellman 206
Mr. Herbert Zweibon, chairman, Americans for a Safe Israel 216
Ms. Gail Pressberg, director, Center for Israeli Peace and Security, Amer-
icans for Peace Now 218
The Anti-Defamation League 221
(III)
IV
Page
Prepared Materials:
Submitted by Hon. Michael Forbes:
Article by Cal Thomas entitled "Arafat Is Putting One Over on the
Israelis" 11
Article by Jamie Dettmer from Insight Magazine, "PLO Misuses
U.S. Dollars" 13
Article by Mr. Robert Satloff entitled "The Path to Peace" 223
Article by Dr. James Zogby entitled "Peace at Risk" 230
Press Releases from the Zionist Organization of America entitled:
"New Poll Shows Majority of U.S. Jews Oppose U.S. Aid to PLO
and Distrust Arafat" 232
"ZOA: U.S. Aid to PLO Must be Conditioned on PLO Pursuing Ter-
rorists Who Killed Americans" 233
"CIA Director Gave Senate Erroneous Information on Terrorism by
PLO Factions" 234
Transcripts of video tapes supplied by Hon. Peter Deutsch 17
Letter from the American Jewish Congress regarding the Middle East
Peace Process , 236
Letter from Hadassah — The Women's Zionist Organization of America
regarding the Middle East Peace Process 238
(The following materials were submitted by Mr. Rand Fishbein):
H.R. 1960, A bill to govern relations between the United States and
the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO], to enforce PLO compli-
ance with standards of international conduct, and for other purposes .... 240
Memorandum, subject: Concatenation of Palestinian Violations, IDF
Judge Advocate-General Headquarters, Assistant to the Judge Advo-
cate-General for International Law 274
Release of the Palestinian National Authority — Ministry of Information,
Ramallah, September 23, 1995 290
Palestinian National Council: PLO plan of phases, Cairo, June 9, 1974 .... 294
Article from Forward entitled "Clinton Claps Secret Cover on Report
on PLO Finances" 296
Article from The Weekly Standard by Yoram Hazony entitled "The End
of Zionism and the Last Israeli" 297
Material from BTselem (The Israeli information center for human rights
in the occupied territories) entitled "Neither Law Nor Justice" 303
Briefing paper from the National Criminal Intelligence Service [NCIS]
entitled "An Outline Assessment of the Threat and Impact by Orga-
nised/Enterprise Crime Upon United Kingdom Interests" Appendix B ... 317
Second briefing from NCIS— organised crime unit entitled "An Outline
Assessment of the Threat and Impact by Organised/Enterprise Crime
Upon United Kingdom Interests 320
The Palestine National Covenant 323
Dear Colleague letter from Senator Alfonse D'Amato regarding the Mid-
dle East Peace Compliance Act of 1995 327
PEACEWATCH press release entitled "Report on Financial Issues Facing
PA and Donors Reveals Erosion of Standards for PA's Economic Deci-
sionmaking and Accountability" 329
PEACEWATCH report entitled "Economic Issues Facing the Palestinian
Authority and the Donor Nations" 331
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 2172,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The committee will come to order. This morn-
ing's hearing is on the Middle East peace process. It is our inten-
tion to hold such a hearing at the request of a number of organiza-
tions and people who are concerned about it.
With our committee's legislative responsibilities regarding our
foreign affairs program and agencies largely completed, we are
pleased that we could schedule today's hearing despite the heavy
calendar in the Congress. We look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses.
Two years ago this month Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak
Rabin, and PLO Chairman, Yasir Arafat, signed a Declaration of
Principles on interim self-government for the disputed territories.
Since then we have seen some other positive developments in the
Middle East. Israel and Jordan have signed a peace treaty. Bilat-
eral talks have continued between Israel and Syria and between Is-
rael and Lebanon. The Gulf Cooperation Counties announced that
they were lifting the secondary and tertiary boycotts against Israel.
But the center of attention has been the negotiations between Is-
rael and the PLO. Under the declaration, Prime Minister Rabin
recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people
and agreed to negotiate with the PLO.
The PLO Chairman, Yasir Arafat, recognized Israel's right to
exist and accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
He renounced terrorism and violence, stated that language in the
Palestinian Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel was in-
valid, and promised to seek its deletion.
To support the peace process, the United States has pledged
$500 million over 5 years to the PLO as part of a $2 billion inter-
national package of economic and development assistance for the
Palestinian Authority.
The Congress adopted the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act,
known as MEPFA. That legislation enabled the administration to
provide this kind of assistance to the PLO, subject to compliance
with the commitments it undertook, and permitted the PLO to
open an office in Washington.
(l)
MEPFA also required the administration to submit periodic re-
ports to Congress stating that the PLO was adhering to the com-
mitments made under the Declaration of Principles.
Regrettably, these reports can best be described as a mixture of
naivete and optimism, perhaps borne of a desire by the administra-
tion to see matters not as they are but as they would wish them
to be.
For example, despite Mr. Arafat's commitment to end violence, it
has continued; and the Palestinian Covenant still calls for the de-
struction of the State of Israel.
While Chairman Arafat is quoted in the international news
media as deploring incidents of violence, there are numerous re-
ports that his comments are far different to Arabic audiences.
Another aspect of the peace process to be explored is the eco-
nomic aid that has been authorized under MEPFA.
There have been serious questions concerning the PLO's assets,
its ability to effectively utilize that aid, and whether aid funds will
in fact go to assist people in the self-rule areas and not be siphoned
off for other purposes.
Last year, I requested that the GAO conduct a financial survey
of the PLO in order to establish that it has the necessary structure
and could provide the accountability that is usually called for in
connection with our economic assistance activities.
Regrettably, the GAO report has been submitted, but it is classi-
fied; so we have been unable to share its findings with other inter-
ested parties. I understand that a representative of the GAO is
with us today, and hopefully he will be able to shed some light on
this situation.
The search for peace in the Middle East has been among the
most important and most contentious of the challenges facing the
international community.
The end of the cold war has brought an opportunity for peace in
that region which cannot and must not be ignored. However, there
are those who have serious concerns about the current negotia-
tions.
The purpose of today's hearing is to try to address some of those
concerns and to shed some light on these issues.
Today we will hear from a series of panels that include Members
of Congress, the General Accounting Office, research institutions,
and membership organizations.
Before introducing our first panel of witnesses, do any of my col-
leagues have opening remarks they would like to make?
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Chairman, yes, with your permission.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Hastings. Please be brief.
I would like to note that we have a very heavy schedule. We also
have a heavy schedule on the floor today. We are going to ask our
witnesses to limit their remarks to 5 minutes, and we will also re-
quest our colleagues to be as brief as possible.
Mr. Hastings. I thank the Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I am most delighted to have an opportunity to
hear from our colleagues on such an important issue.
But I do put a couple of questions. If the peace process were to
disintegrate today, what would be the result? Is it possible to re-
turn to the preaccord status?
This peace process, like this legislation, is far from perfect; but
there is no turning the clock back to, nor would anyone want to
bring back, the Intifada.
Any fair-minded person has to concede that we are better off in
the peace process today than we were 5, 3, or even 2 years ago or
even a year ago before the Oslo Agreement was signed.
Our objective should be how to make the process better, not to
how to allow fringe groups to kill it by saying we are making it bet-
ter.
There are those who say we want peace, but we are placing such
demands as to undermine the sincerity of such statements. What
we hear from some of these groups is so uncompromising as to be-
tray their true motives and undermine any claims that they make
that they truly want peace.
Most of us know Prime Minister Rabin, and I know his history.
He is not some naive dove who is going to sell out his country to
the likes of Yasir Arafat. He is a tough and proven warrior and a
tried and tested political leader.
I must say I have much more faith in his political judgment
about the current situation between the Israelis and Palestinians
and making peace with the Palestinians than I do with many of the
persons who stop by my office to complain about the process.
I believe that we are holding these hearings today because par-
tisan Israelis political pressures are spilling over into the United
States political agenda. And I believe that Israeli domestic politics
have no place in the U.S. Congress.
And I just want to say very clearly that I am shocked and ap-
palled at the blatant and disruptive lobbying that opponents of the
peace process, including persons who used to represent the Govern-
ment of Israel in -Washington, are carrying out in the U.S. Con-
gress.
We in America have a long-standing principle that politics stops
at the water's edge. How would we feel if top officials of a former
administration, such as the White House Chief of Staff, would go
to the capitals of our closest allies to lobby them to adopt legisla-
tion and pass laws that would hobble the conduct of American pol-
icy, especially policy which is vital to our national security?
We would be absolutely appalled. It is really beyond our com-
prehension. I am all for free speech and the democratic process, but
I am disgusted by the attempts by opposition parties in Israel to
manipulate the sincere concerns of many American jews in order
to further their own political agenda.
I thank the Chair.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Hastings.
We will now proceed with our congressional panel. I thank our
colleagues for taking the time to join us.
Mr. Gejdenson.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAM GEJDENSON, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, ACCOM
PANIED BY HON. DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CON-
GRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA; HON. TOM LANTOS, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALI-
FORNIA; HON. MICHAEL FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK; HON. JAMES
SAXTON, A REPRESENTAITVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY; HON. PETER DEUTSCH, A REP-
RESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA;
AND HON. ELIOT ENGEL, A REPRESENTATD7E IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
STATEMENT OF SAM GEJDENSON
Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to first commend my colleague from Florida for his state-
ment. Those of us who have spent some time watching the develop-
ments in the Middle East can remember the critics of the Camp
David process. And even after peace was achieved, there were
those who continued to criticize the quality of the peace.
But, indeed, it is that peace, the peace that began at the Camp
David process, that has enabled this administration to take the
next step in the process.
And it really has been the position of the American people,
throughout the history of this country, to support the peace process
in the Middle East. From Harry Truman's courageous act in rec-
ognizing the State of Israel to Bill Clinton and his efforts at bring-
ing Palestinians and Israelis together, the American Congress and
the American people have stood with their Presidents on this issue.
President Carter's Camp David accord, as I have said before, had
many of its critics during the process and afterwards. With some
history behind us now, we can see how critical that process at
Camp David was to developing what we have seen in the last year,
that memorable handshake at the U.S. Capitol between Prime Min-
ister Rabin and Mr. Arafat, and with President Clinton at the
White House.
The Israeli peace agreement with Jordan has taken the peace
process a major step forward, really the longest border that Israel
shares with another country.
There is now serious discussions ongoing with the Syrians.
And for the millennium that there has been conflict in the Mid-
dle East, we now have the first real opportunity to see peace, and
a lasting peace, for the people of that region.
The cost of not pursuing the peace process has risen
exponentially in recent years. In the past, we had to worry about
a hand grenade, a sniper, a shotgun in the crowd. Today, chemical
and biological weapons, nuclear weapons, put the entire populace
of the region into continuous and every-growing danger.
Without the Palestinian peace with the Israelis, there could not
have been the progress that has already occurred with the govern-
ments that Israel has now made agreements with, the Jordanians,
and with the talks going on with the Syrians.
There is always, in human nature, a resistance to moving past
the status quo. There is that feeling that if you can just hold onto
the present situation, it may be safer. That certainly is not what
history has taught us about the Soviet Union. It is not what it
taught us about the history of Yugoslavia. Strong military govern-
ments, dictatorships, held those countries together and did not re-
solve the underlying tensions; and today there is no mailing ad-
dress for the Soviet Union. There is none for Yugoslavia. Their peo-
ple live in pain and in torture.
We have seen the very difficult situations, without any question.
And there are still challenges to be met. But those challenges have
been dealt with by an able Israeli Government meeting directly
with the Palestinians.
The reference to the language in the Palestinian Charter is dealt
with by Mr. Rabin's agreement and the Israeli Government's agree-
ment with the Palestinians. It says after elections, within 2 months
of those elections, they will remove that defensive language.
Some people argue that the PLO and Mr. Arafat are not good
managers. It would leave you with the sense that if you got one of
the big accounting firms to move into the West Bank and Gaza to-
morrow, that somehow the situation would be better.
I think there are no better players at this date to bring the two
sides together to try to resolve the issues that are still outstanding.
The pain that continues affects all of us. Within recent months,
a woman from Connecticut lost her life to a terrorist incident. And
the terrorists' violence continues.
And while the incidents have been reduced, sadly the number of
people who have died has increased as a result of larger killings
in several of the incidents. But we do now have the Palestinians
and the Israelis working together to try to reduce the violence.
There has been, also, a surge, a surge by those who would want
to see the peace process disrupted. The last gasp by Hamas and
other extremists, who would like to, if they could, kill enough on
both sides to have the countries lose their resolve, have the Israelis
and the Palestinians lose their resolve in this peace process.
For the children of the region, for the grandparents of the region,
for the people of the region, it is our responsibility to provide every
possible assistance to move forward in this peace process. There is
no peace process that is an easy one, clearly not in an area with
a history as it exists in the Middle East.
But to give in to Hamas and the Islamic Jihad and other fun-
damentalist organizations who would like to go back to confronta-
tion and war and who would want to avoid a lasting peace agree-
ment between Palestinians, Israelis, and others in the region, is a
mistake.
Is this process perfect? No. But it is the best process before us.
I have heard from the opposition in Israel. Their opposition is to
the present policy. They have no alternative policy. And it is impos-
sible to turn the clock back.
I believe we need to support the President, and we need to sup-
port the Israeli Government and the leadership of the Palestinians
that are taking the tough road, taking the losses and the casual-
ties, putting the effort in to move forward in that peace process.
From the safety and security of our seats here in the Capitol,
from the security and the lack of threats that we face, we have to
be very careful as we interfere in a process that may bring peace
to the Middle East for the first time in the millennium.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Burton had made a prior request, since he is on a markup,
to go at the earliest possible time.
So with the indulgence of our colleagues, we will call on Mr. Bur-
ton next.
Mr. Burton.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA
Mr. Burton. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want
to thank you very much for having this hearing. I think it is very
timely and very important.
I do not think anybody is against the peace process, in Israel or
here in the United States. I think we all want to see peace brought
to the Middle East, to Israel, to the entire region.
The problem is what kind of land mines or risks are involved in
the current process in the way we approach it?
I remember back in the early 1980's when Ronald Reagan asked
me and you and many other members of the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee to support putting troops in Beirut as a peacekeeping force.
And we all said, well, he is our President, our Commander in
Chief, he knows best. And we went ahead and allowed several hun-
dred Marines to be placed in Beirut; and a terrorist bomber, with
a truckload of dynamite, drove through a very loose barricade and
blew up the headquarters and killed over 230 Marines.
It was a tragic day for the United States and, I think, for the
entire world.
Now we are talking about such things as putting American
troops on the Golan Heights as an intermediary or peacekeeping
force to make sure that a long-term peace agreement between Is-
rael and Syria will survive, will last.
And I want you to know that I have great reservations about
that kind of a policy, and I think anyone who really thinks about
it should have reservations.
First of all, even though the peace process has been going for-
ward between the PLO and the Israeli Government, the fact re-
mains that there have been terrorist bombings at bus stops, on
buses, at various locations in Israel. And those who oppose the
peace process are not going to stop.
And for the United States to put American troops in harm's way,
when it is not really in our national interest, is a terrible, terrible
mistake. And I can see the same thing happening on the Golan
Heights with a Hezbollah terrorist or a Hamas terrorist blowing up
a bunch of American troops, who are sitting ducks over there, that
just like that which happened back in the early 1980's in Beirut.
Now I have expressed my concern to Shimon Peres. I do not take
a back seat to anybody in this Congress in my support of Israel.
Since the day I arrived in Congress, I have been a supporter of Is-
rael, I have voted for support for Israel, and I will continue to.
But I can tell you that I truly believe if we put our troops in
harm's way and some of them get killed, there is going to be a hue
and cry in this country from the American people to curtail foreign
aid, and it will hurt our relationship with Israel. And I do not
think that that need occur.
But there are those who continue to say that we must do this in
order to further the peace process. If everything had been working
as we wanted it to and there had been no terrorist attacks, I would
say, well maybe that is something worth looking at. But today and
every single day we know terrorism still exists on the West Bank,
in Jerusalem itself, and in other parts of Israel; and I just cannot
see the logic of it.
And so I would once again say, if Mr. Peres was here, or Mr.
Rabin, I think you are making a terrible mistake; and I think our
administration here in Washington is making a terrible mistake if
we get into a quagmire that is going to involve American troops
being placed on the Golan Heights.
The Syrian military and the Israeli military are strong. The Is-
raeli military and the Syrian military and the Israeli Government
can work out an agreement where they can put a dividing line be-
tween them that will make sure that peace survives on the Golan
Heights without American troops being placed there.
If any troops are going to be placed there, they should be a mul-
tinational force and not American troops. They should be under the
auspices of some other agency.
Now, let me just talk real briefly about the PLO. The PLO, until
just the last few years, has been considered a terrorist state by the
U.S. Government. They have been listed year after year after year
by the State Department as a terrorist state.
Now, Yasir Arafat and the Government of Israel have signed an
accord. And we all applaud that. I watched with great admiration
and respect when I saw the leaders of Israel and Yasir Arafat
shake hands at the White House. I said, my gosh, maybe the mil-
lennium has come and we are going to see peace over there. So I
think we all applauded that.
But there still are major problems in the West Bank. And the
PLO still has not been able to contain or control those terrorists
that are perpetrating these attacks on various parts of Israel.
And because of that, I think we should think long and hard be-
fore we give large sums of American taxpayers' dollars to the PLO
while this kind of a problem exists.
In addition to that, and this is very important, Mr. Chairman —
British intelligence has told us that the PLO has up to $8 billion
in foreign banks, in Switzerland and elsewhere, $8 billion.
And for the United States to give them $500 million over the
next 5 years at a time when they simply do not need those re-
sources makes absolutely no sense to me.
The fact of the matter is we were under severe budgetary con-
straints here in the Congress of the United States. We are trying
to balance our Federal budget. The American people just do not
like foreign aid in any form. And those of us who support some for-
eign aid for our allies in important causes around the world are
subject to criticism on a regular basis.
How do we defend giving the PLO $500 million over the next 5
years when they have $8 billion in the bank?
8
I just do not see how you can justify that, especially with the
problems we are having fiscally here at home.
And some people say, well, they do not have $8 billion. The GAO,
as I understand it, has looked into this; and they do not refute
what British intelligence has told us. So we must go under the as-
sumption that they do have $8 billion.
And so I would just like to say in closing, Mr. Chairman, thank
you, once again for having this hearing. I think it is timely and
very, very important. And I would like to urge, urge the Congress
of the United States and the President not to put our troops on the
Golan Heights.
Support the peace process. We should do that. We should support
every avenue and make sure every avenue is explored. But do not
put our troops in harm's way like we did in the early 1980's in Bei-
rut, because I believe we will reap the whirlwind and a lot of them
will be killed, that is No. 1; and, finally, No. 2, I do not believe at
this time we should be giving $500 million to the PLO when they
have adequate resources to do the job that they want to have done.
And that does not mean in any way that I oppose the peace proc-
ess. I strongly support it. And my predecessor at this microphone
said that we were taking one side or the other in the governmental
conflict in Israel. I do not believe Likud and I do not believe Labor
are against the peace process. They just have different approaches
to solving this problem.
And so with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you once again. I appre-
ciate you putting me on the schedule early so I could get to the
floor.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GlLMAN. Thank you, Mr. Burton.
I am going to ask our panelists, if they would, stay as long as
you can so that our colleagues may be able to ask questions of you.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Chairman, may I submit the rest of my state-
ment for the record?
Chairman GlLMAN. Yes, your statement will be accepted for the
record without objection.
Mr. Lantos.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM LANTOS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
commend you for holding this hearing and for your long-standing
leadership on this issue.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by setting the framework for
my testimony. As you and some of my colleagues know, I am the
only survivor of the Holocaust ever elected to Congress, and I take
the subject of Israel's safety and future extremely seriously.
I have visited Israel on more than four dozen occasions beginning
with 1956. And during my most recent visit, I had the opportunity
for long, private meetings in the region with Mr. Asad, Mr. Arafat,
Mr. Mubarak, the Jordanian and Saudi leadership, the Sultan of
Oman, and of course the Israeli leadership on both sides of the po-
litical fence.
So I speak as a friend of Israel. But I want to approach this sub-
ject from the vantage point, which is the only proper vantage point
9
for us; namely, the United States foreign policy and national secu-
rity interests.
I stipulate at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that the criticisms that
we have heard and the criticisms that we will hear concerning Mr.
Arafat, the PLO, and others are most likely to be fully accurate.
It is very difficult not to recognize the enormous shortcomings of
the PLO side in this development.
Having said that, however, I find it inconceivable and
mindboggling that serious people would take the position of opposi-
tion to the peace process. The peace process has already brought
enormous benefits. The peace with Jordan is a major breakthrough.
Relinquishing control over Gaza has been an enormous benefit to
the State of Israel. Subsidiary benefits of establishing diplomatic
and commercial and economic relations with a tremendous range of
countries across the globe as a result of the peace process can be
invaluable in the future and are immeasurably helpful to date.
The peace process, Mr. Chairman, must continue. It is easy at a
time when we are looking at the past to conclude that it is incon-
ceivable to move in the direction of peace.
Germany and France had warfare stretching over generations,
culminating in the most horrendous war of history in the Second
World War. Yet Germany and France today are fully integrated po-
litically, economically, culturally, and socially.
I have no such illusions with respect to the Middle East. It will
take many generations before comparable developments can
emerge.
But it is self-evident that the leadership of the State of Israel,
represented by Mr. Rabin — who has devoted a lifetime, a lifetime
to the protection and building of his country — is fully conscious of
all the dangers, all of the problems and all of the difficulties that
lie along the way of the process of the peace negotiations.
If there is anything I find objectionable — because I presume ev-
erybody coming to this table comes with good intentions — it is the
virulent attacks against individuals who have devoted a lifetime to
building the State of Israel and to making it safe and secure.
I have never hesitated to take a position contrary to this admin-
istration. I have taken a position contrary to this administration on
a broad range of issues ranging from NAFTA to my resolution
passed by the Congress unanimously of issuing a visa to the Presi-
dent of Taiwan.
But I must say that in this case, the Clinton administration is
pursuing the right policy, the only rational policy, the only policy
which is in the interests of the United States, in the interests of
the State of Israel, and all elements in the Middle East that are
committed to a constructive and peaceful development.
And I want to conclude by giving my full and unqualified support
to the administration in its pursuit of supporting the peace process.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GlLMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Forbes.
10
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this oppor-
tunity.
Before I begin my testimony, I would like the opportunity to ask
the committee's indulgence to revise and extend my remarks.
And given the shortness in which we were able to pull together
testimony for this hearing, if the committee would indulge us and
allow the record to remain open for 14 days to include additional
materials, I would be most appreciative.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me this oppor-
tunity today to address this committee; and I certainly know of the
chairman's and many members of this committee's stalwart sup-
port for Israel and for a stable and lasting peace in the Middle
East, no question about it.
I would like to be aligned with my colleagues who believe, I think
unanimously, that none of us wants to see this peace process bro-
ken apart whatsoever. As a matter of fact I think that we certainly
embrace the efforts to build for a lasting peace in the Middle East.
As many of you know, I have had an intense interest in the Mid-
dle East for many years, and I am certainly a staunch supporter
of our ally, Israel.
Mr. Chairman, I, like so many other Americans, was encouraged
2 years ago with the signing of the Oslo accords. The long struggle
for peace in this troubled region was certainly a breakthrough; and
despite a lifetime of mistrust of the PLO and the revulsion toward
too many of their terrorists tactics, I originally supported the Clin-
ton administration's promise of United States assistance to the Pal-
estinians.
But, Mr. Chairman, most of us were under the impression that
the PLO would, indeed, make an effort to meet at least a minimum
standard of behavior before aid would start flowing.
Unfortunately, I am compelled to be here today because I do not
believe that this has been the case.
A minimum standard should be the tenets of the Oslo accords
themselves in which the PLO did make a number of pledges, none
of which has been met.
It is an open secret that the PLO is systematically violating the
accords, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee; yet, U.S.
taxpayer money continues to flow, much of it directly to Arafat and
his cronies. And I would like to reference and include in the com-
mittee hearing record an article by the syndicated columnist Cal
Thomas.
[The article follows:]
11
i-H
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12
Mr. Forbes. I cannot explain to my constituents, and I certainly
have trouble watching as an unrepentant enemy of Israel gets built
up with taxpayer money and continues to pose a potential threat
to our ally.
Thus I, along with my distinguished colleagues, Tom DeLay, Jim
Saxton, Cliff Stearns, Rob Andrews, and several others have intro-
duced H.R, 1960, the Middle East Peace Compliance Act, which has
been introduced in the U.S. Senate by Senator D'Amato as S. 915.
H.R. 1960 would suspend all aid to the Palestinians until they,
in fact, do comply with the provisions of the Oslo accords.
Among other items, Mr. Chairman, this would require that the
PLO amended its charter to delete the provisions calling for the de-
struction of Israel; they must cease support for terrorist organiza-
tions, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad; prosecute terrorists fully;
and cease support for the arms struggle against Israel.
These are base components so necessary to any lasting peace in
the Middle East.
If I might, Mr. Chairman, let me make clear that compliance
would still not allow for money to be channeled directly to the PLO
or any of their affiliates.
I think it is clear that our experience with government-to-govern-
ment aid around the world has not been a good one, and the evi-
dence that the PLO has diverted and misused our funds is cer-
tainly quite strong.
On that topic, I would submit for the record an August 14 article
that was in Insight magazine which documents these diversions of
U.S. aid citing internal PLO documents and, as Mr. Burton pre-
viously referred, British intelligence reports.
[The article follows:]
13
World: Mideast
PLO Misuses
U.S. Dollars
By Jamie Dertmer
Secret documents reveal that the
PLO chairman has redirected
millions in international funds.
Evidence that Palestine Liberation
Organization Chairman Yasser
Arafat allegedly has used millions
of dollars in international and US.
aid to fund clandestine political oper-
ations in Israel has been obtained by
Insight.
Copies of Palestinian Authority
correspondence show that PECDAR,
the Palestinian Economic Council for
Development and Reconstruction, a
body almost completely funded by
international donors including the
United States, has apparently on the
instructions of Arafat secretly pur-
chased large amounts of real estate in
Jerusalem in a bid to strengthen Pales-
tinian claims to the city.
The documents also purport to
show that PECDAR funds have been
used to reward Arafat's cronies and
relatives, including his mother-in-law,
and they indicate that Arafat, presi-
dent of the new Palestinian Authority
in Gaza and the West Bank, has been
determined to use international aid to
strengthen political allies at the
expense of Palestinians who are not
members of his al-Eatah faction of the
PLO.
The United States donated $100
million last fall to the Palestinian
Authority on the understanding that
the money would be used only to devel-
op the economies of the squalid Gaza
and West Bank. Republicans in Con-
gress are expressing alarm at the
increasing reports of Arafat's misuse
of international donations.
Rep. Jim Saxton, a New Jersey
Republican who has secured his own
copies of PECDAR correspondence,
condemns Arafat's diversion of aid
from the United States and the Euro-
pean Union to "projects in direct vio-
lation of the peace agreements" with
Israel. Saxton is seeking a freeze on
further U.S. donations to the fledgling
August 14, 1995
Palestinian regime — nearly $500 mil-
lion has been earmarked by the Clin-
ton administration, with $100 million
to go by Aug. 15. "I believe that before
we spend another dollar on aid to the
PLO, we need certain questions
answered — namely, how much of our
aid money is being used to advance the
condition of the Palestinians and how
much is being used to fund the pet pro-
jects of Arafat?" says Saxton.
Sen. Alfonse D'Amato and Rep.
Michael Forbes, both New York
Republicans, have introduced legisla-
tion that would cut off further US. for-
eign aid unless certain stringent con-
ditions are met.
Rep. Benjamin Gilman, a New York
Republican and chairman of the
House International Relations Com-
mittee, also has cast doubt on whether
the PLO, which governs the Palestin-
ian Authority, needs massive interna-
tional aid. Prompted by a British intel-
ligence assessment that the PLO has
assets worth $8 billion to $10 billion
and annual revenues of up to $2 billion,
Gilman last May requested a General
Accounting Office analysis of PLO
finances. The GAO report was com-
pleted in June, but in a highly unusu-
al move the CIA insisted that the doc-
ument be classified. U.S. intelligence
sources tell Insight that the analysis
basically confirms the British find-
ings. Gilman has written to the GAO
comptroller general demanding that
the report be published.
The internal documents
of the Palestinian Author-
ity secured by Insight con-
sist of correspondence be-
tween Arafat's minister of
finance, Muhammad Zuhdi
Alnashashibi, and the
PECDAR chairman. The
letters were written last
summer and fall, after the
international aid started to
flow.
One letter from Alna-
shashibi which, like all the
others, is marked "Top
Secret" and "Not to be Read
without the Permission of the
President," lists building a
PLO presence in "holy Je-
rusalem" as a high priority
and informs the PECDAR
chairman that Arafat wants to
set up a land corporation
there with an initial capital
outlay of $15 million. The cor-
poration's activities must not
be traced back to the Palestin-
ian Authority, cautions Alna-
shashibi. He writes: "We stress
that it is the desire of the com-
rade leader Abu Amar [Arafat] that
the meetings of this group should be
held secretly and its activities should
not be noticed and it should keep its
documents and registries away from
the other party [Israel] "
PECDAR correspondence also
shows that $20 million was funneled
secretly to fund covert political activ-
ities inside Israel, including the financ-
ing of politicaJ parties and re-equip-
ping a Palestinian newspaper, the
Journal of the Return. A further $12
million was allocated on the orders of
Arafat for purchasing apartments in
Jerusalem. These were to be given to
Arafat's al-Fatah loyalists.
Throughout the correspondence
Alnashashibi stresses the importance
of keeping money transfers secret; the
PECDAR chairman is keen to reassure
his boss on that front. In one letter, the
finance minister warns, "The activities
should not be noticed by the public and
they should be far and away from jour-
nalists and statesmen." The PECDAR
chairman writes: "The method of
transfer of the amount is sophisticat-
ed and convincing. The other party
[Israel] will never be able to discover
the way and method whereby the
transfer is effected."
The documents also show that
Arafat would like all PECDAR-
financed enterprises to be staffed with
"the faithful and reliable elements
from among the cadre of Fatah." •
fWo— J«"r-<
I i
-J"^*"1!
( I-**-
,U«JI JJU-O-P65
jn^i»jivu_r-
plJiS j.u.-V.-"^'--^ Vi-:-k-1
Correspondence indicates that Arafat is cheating.
Insight • 1 1
14
Mr. Forbes. While some people might dispute these accusations,
Mr. Chairman, what is indisputable is that the PLO has kept vir-
tually none of the promises that it made in the Oslo accords.
To my mind, it is nothing short of scandalous that U.S. taxpayer
moneys would continue to flow to Arafat and his anti-Israel allies
under these circumstances.
The administration insists on sweeping all of this, it seems,
under the rug, most blatantly by classifying the recent GAO report
that reportedly confirms some of our worst fears about PLO behav-
ior. I would ask that the committee press for an immediate release
of this document.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, it devolves to us in Congress to stand
up on behalf of the American taxpayer and our Israel friends.
Enough truly is enough. The PLO must live by some of these rules
if it wants to join the international community and receive Amer-
ican taxpayer support to build its infrastructure and to help build
a lasting peace in the Middle East.
I would respectfully request, Mr. Chairman, that the committee
give H.R. 1960 its full consideration.
I thank the committee and, Mr. Chairman, yourself for your in-
dulgence.
Chairman GlLMAN. Thank you, Mr. Forbes, for your statement.
Mr. Saxton.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Chairman, along with the other members who
have appeared this morning, I want to thank you for giving us the
opportunity to conduct this public dialog on the objective and goal
that we all share; and, of course, that is a true and lasting peace.
As I sat and listened to my good friend Mr. Lantos' testimony
here this morning, my mind went back a year or so to a time when
Mr. Lantos and I and, I think, you, Mr. Chairman, and probably
Mr. Deutsch, and others had the opportunity to have lunch with
President Mubarak of Egypt. And we discussed at great length at
that luncheon, as you will remember, the peace process; and he put
it in a very different context than I had thought of before.
He put it in the context — he used an example, a metaphor, I
guess, and said that the peace process is like a giant rolling stone
and that it started rolling many years ago and that sometimes it
rolls fast and sometimes it rolls slow. We went through Camp
David, and we have been through bad times; and with the signing
of the peace accords by Mr. Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin, it
was thought that this was a good time and that the stone was roll-
ing faster.
So the question to Mr. Mubarak — and I think this is an excellent
perspective within which we can deal with it is — is that the peace
process is moving forward. Sometimes we like it, sometimes we do
not. It has problems with it, but it will move forward. And it is all
of our responsibilities to see that it does so in the most expeditious
way so that we arrive at our final objective; and that, of course, is
a true and lasting peace for all of the parties in the Middle East,
which is also, I might note — needless to say to you, Mr. Chairman,
15
and the other members of this committee — very much in our na-
tional interest to share in that objective.
And so with that perspective, I think it is fair to say, make no
mistake about it, there are going to be good times and bad. And
that when we recognize bad times and things that are not going
correctly to keep that stone moving at an adequate pace, that it
seems to me that inasmuch as we have chosen to be, as a country,
involved in this process, it is our responsibility not to look the other
way when things go wrong, but quite to the contrary to try to help
smooth the road and to keep the process moving in the right direc-
tion so that we do achieve our ultimate objective.
This is not an emotional issue as some would make it, or it
should not be, at least. And it is an issue where we should recog-
nize that those people who make this process work are the people
who are mostly in the middle. In other words, they are not the rad-
ical forces of the Palestinian movement and the Hamas movement
and the Islamic Jihad movement.
And, on the other hand, it is not the far right folks who would
have the process stopped, if there are such folks. It is the people
in the middle. Those are the people that we have to deal with.
And I might say that all sides of this process have a responsibil-
ity or a set of responsibilities. The Israelis have responsibilities.
And, of course, the Palestinians, Mr. Arafat, and the PLO have re-
sponsibilities.
And the question is: When are those responsibilities met? And
when are they not?
And I think there are two very basic questions that we need to
ask ourselves and look at in terms of evaluating where we are cur-
rently in the process.
One question is: What has happened to the money that we have
sent to the PLO? Has it been used according to the provisions of
the accords? Or has it not?
And the second question is: Has the PLO lived up to the commit-
ments so far — maybe I should not say the PLO — have the parties
to the accord lived up to the commitments that they made in sign-
ing those papers?
The first question, I think, begs an answer which all of us have
tried to look at as the process has moved forward.
And of course, I guess it is also important to say here that when
the accords were signed and the PLO was promised a certain
amount of money from the American coffers that it was to be used
for a specific purpose and that was to help the Palestinian people
increase their lot collectively so that they would have a better life-
style.
And I think that it is fair to say that there has been ample evi-
dence that has emerged that says that that is, perhaps, not the
case.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has almost ended.
Would the gentleman try to wind up?
Mr. Saxton. I will certainly try to wrap this up quickly.
We know that through certain papers that were obtained from
the Palestinian Economic Council for Development Reconstruction
that — and I will submit those papers for the record, Mr. Chairman,
so that I do not need to talk about them.
16
Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
[Information not submitted.]
Mr. Saxton [continuing]. That has not been the case, that mon-
eys have been diverted for purposes unintended.
And we also know that the PLO has failed, in many instances,
to live up to the commitments they have made vis-a-vis terrorism
and other issues that are related to that.
So, yes, I have cosponsored Mr. Forbes' bill; and I have also co-
sponsored a bill by Mr. Engel. And I hope that the committee will
take seriously those efforts and provide some kind of legislation to
help us through what I view is a bad time in this process.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton appears in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. We thank the gentleman for taking the time
to appear.
Mr. Deutsch.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER DEUTSCH, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
opportunity to be here to testify and also to be back at the Inter-
national Relations Committee.
I also would ask, without objection, that a statement that I have
be submitted for the record so I can summarize that statement.
Chairman GlLMAN. Without objection.
Mr. Deutsch. And I would also ask that — a number of video
tapes and transcripts of the video tapes, which I will talk about in
a couple of minutes, could also be submitted to the record?
Chairman GlLMAN. Without objection.
If you will please, though, identify the tapes, the date, and place,
et cetera.
[The material follows:]
17
B
[1]
Speeches of Yassir Arafat
in Gaza: June-July, 1995
[2]
For Peace Education, Ltd
tel 03-695-6868
fax 03-695-0132
[3]
eulogy given by Arafat
on June 15, 1995
[4]
for Abd Al Karim
A1 Aqluq
[5]
the head of
PLO censorship division
[6]
one of the veterans
of the Fatah on the fortieth day
[7]
since his death
Gaza 19.6.95
[8]
Yassir Arafat,
[9]
a ceremony was held this evening
at University Al Azhar in Gaza
[10]
to mark the 40th day of
the death of the heroic fighter
[11]
Abd Al Karim
Al Aqluq
[12]
the man who headed
the censorship office
[13]
at the Palestine National
Authority.
[14]
President Arafat delivered
a eulogy in which he said:
[15]
we are all seekers of martyrdom
in the path of truth and right
[16]
toward Jerusalem the capital
of the State of Palestine.
[17]
the president added:
the commitment stands
[18]
and the oath is firm to continue
this long and ardous jihad
[19]
in the path of martyrdom
the path of sacrifices,
[20]
18
victory 1 glory, not only
for our Palestinian people
[21]
but for our entire Arab
and Islamic nation,
[22]
until a Palestinian child
shall raise the Palestinian flag
[23]
over the walls of Jerusalem
her mosques and churches.
[24]
"in the name of Allah
the all -merciful"
[25]
Allah has acquired from the
believers
[26]
their souls & posessions,
for they will have paradise"
[27]
my sister, Um-Al-Abd
[28]
my brother, my comrades in this
long road,
[29]
verily we all are in the
quest of the martyrdom,
[30]
in the path of truth & right
the path of this sacred cause,
[31]
the path of Jerusalem the capital
of the state of Palestine.
[32]
yes, my brothers, the dowry
of Palestine is high
[33]
and this people
is a people of giants.
[34]
Allah the exalted and almighty
has granted this nation his grace
[35]
as it says (in Quran),
"and they will stand
[36]
on the frontlines until
the judgement day"
[37]
words are too few here
in the spirit
[38]
except for the fundamental
commitment
[39]
that commitment and oath
that we have all made:
19
[40]
the commitment still stands
and the oath is firm
[41]
to continue this difficult
Jihad, in this long Jihad,
[42]
in this arduous Jihad,
in the path of martyrs,
[43]
the path of sacrifices,
[44]
but this is a path
of victory and glory
[45]
not only for
our Palestinian people
[46]
but also for our Arab
and Islamic nation.
[47]
to Islamic women's assn
in Gaza
June 18, 1995
[48]
in which arafat praises
Abir wahidi, that murdered
Zvi Klein in 1991
[49]
and Dalai Maghribi,
who participated in the 1978
bus attack on the coastal road.
[50]
you heard from Nabil Sha'ath
[51]
he spoke with Shachal,
the minister of police
[52]
about the sisters
(who are still prisoner women)
[53]
and among them Abir Wahidi.
[54]
Shachal said: Abir? She is
the most dangerous of them all -
[55]
a real man even more
than men, because
[56]
we will not forget how she led
the attack with her machine gun.
[57]
and truthfully don't forget
that she is the military commander
[58]
of the central region.
[59]
that is Abir Wahidi.
20
[60]
Dalai Magribi, the commander,
the star from among the heroes
[61]
who carried out the landing
operation on the coast.
[62]
she was the commander
of the squad that pioneered
[63]
the first Palestinian republic
[64]
on that bus!! On that bus!!
[65]
This is the Palestinian Woman,
with all its meanings
t66] ,
and implications. The woman
that we are proud of and take pride
[67]
in and compete with her glory
with other nations
[68]
and people of the world.
[69]
at the "Popular Struggle Front"
(APLO faction)
[70]
on the occaision
of its 28th anniversary.
June 19, 1995
[71]
together with us
[72]
Also to our true martyrs
and to our prisoners
[73]
and to our wounded.
[74]
Our commitment stands
and our oath is firm
[75]
to continue in this path
despite trials and tribulations
[76]
and di asters,
[77]
until a Palestinian boy
or Palestinian girl
[78]
those whom I called
the "new generals"
[79]
that is how we called them?
And why??
[80]
because they have defeated the
Israeli generals in seven years.
21
[81]
until the Palestinian boy or
Palestinian girl will
[82]
truly wave the Palestinian flag
on the walls of Jerusalem
[83]
on her mosques
and her churches.
[84]
They see it as distant
and we see it as imminent,
[85]
and verily
we are right.
[86]
"and they will enter
the mosque (Al Aqsa)
[87]
"and they will enter
the mosque (Al Aqsa)
[88]
as they have entered it the
first time" (quoting the Quran)
[89]
"Allah, Allah will not break
his promise"
[90]
will not break
his promise
[91]
that promise that was given
to us, God will ing
[92]
that Jerusalem is the capital
of the Palestinian state
[93]
whether someone likes it
or not
[94]
and as far as those
who do not like it
[95]
they can drink
from the waters of gaza...
[96]
if any of you have reservations
about the oslo accord
[97]
I have a thousand reservations
with the Oslo accord.
[98]
I know that the road has been
long and hard, my brothers,
[99]
but I say to our prisoners,
[100]
and especially to their prince,
22
Sheik Ahmad Yasin
[101]
I am saying this,
ny friends
[102]
the late mayor of nazareth
Taufiq Ziyad
[103]
that was given at
Al Azhar University
on July 16, 1995
[104]
yes the holy Palestinian stone
[105]
with the holy Palestinian stone
seven years, seven years,
[106]
blessings, seven years, Intifada
seven years, Intifada,
[107]
the Palestinian general
was victorious,
[108]
the Palestinian general
was victorious,
[109]
the Palestinian generals,
the Palestinian generaals,
[110]
they beat
the Israeli generals!!!!
[HI]
and when, my brothers,
when?
[112]
After what? After they thought
that they had finished
[113]
with the Palestine
Liberation Organization.
[114]
and after what my brothers?
[115]
after the siege of Beirut,
and after the first massacre
[116]
at Shatila (committed)
by Sharon
[117]
and after the second Shatilla
massacre
[118]
(committed) by
other Sharons
[119]
my brothers. Yes my brothers.
[120]
They thought that they
23
iad finished
[121]
vith the Palestinian
-evolution.
[122]
and truly, my brothers.
You have given them the answer.
[123]
therefore, when we say Intifada
[124]
it is not from 1967 if we want
to set the date straight,
[125]
rather, it began in 1986.
[126]
and for those who claim
that they pioneered the Intifada
[127]
no, those who began
the Intifada were
[128]
the sons and daughters
of the Fatah, brothers.
[129]
I want to remind you,
my brothers,
[130]
and I remind you my brothers
and I rememember it well,
[131]
that at the time Rabin was
he minister of defence
[132]
and he was in Washington.
[133]
they said to him that
there is an Intifada,
[134]
there is an Intifada
and Rabin said, "what Intifada??"
[135]
"two days and I will finish
them off"
[136]
"two days, i'll come back
i '11 take care of it"
[137]
I answered him:
"You'll have two days, two weeks
[138]
and two months and two years
and we are with you
[139]
and with all the time
(that you need)
[140]
and we are with you and with
all the time (that you need)
24
[141]
isn't that right?
[142]
0 mountain, no wind will
shake thee!!
[143]
Therefore I say to you,
0' Abu Amin (Toufik Zayid)
[144]
rest in peace and quiet
with the beloved ones.
[145]
the righteous martyrs
in the high heavens
[146]
with the prophets and
the righteous and the martyrs,
[147]
Let them keep you
in friendly company,
[148]
rest in peace, Abu Amin,
rest in peace,
[149]
because we will complete
the march
[150]
1 will not forget the words
that you spoke
[151]
"with my own eye lids I will
carve your path of return"
[152]
"with my eye lids I will
carve your path of return"
[153]
but he did not pave the path
with his eyelids
[154]
but he did pave the way
with his flesh and blood,
[155]
and body.
[156]
therefore I say to you
again Abu Amin
[157]
rest in peace,
[158]
because in this road, in this
road, in this road
[159]
we are marching.
[160]
Peace Education ltd
[161]
Calling from Israel
03-695-6868
25
[162]
Faxxing from Israel
03-695-0132
[163]
Call ing from abroad
972-3-695-6868
Faxxing from abroad
972-3-695-0132
[164]
[165]
[166]
[167]
[168]
[169]
26
t1]
The Institute
for Peace Education Ltd.
Tel 03-695-6868
Fax 03-695-0132
[2]
Speech by Arafat at a gathering
at the University of Al Azhar
On the occasion of Arafat's
birthday and the birth
of his daughter. August 6, 1995
[3]
<tmarg450>President Arafat emphasized
that we are going through
[4]
a critical
and decisive stage
[5]
in which we are commanded
to exert every effort and sweat
[6]
and our potential m order to
reach our ultimate goal:
[71
Jerusalem.
[8]
This message was conveyed
at a festive rally
[9]
that took place at the
Sheikh Muhammad Awad Hall
[10]
at the Al Azhar University
last night
in honor of
the President's birthday
[12]
and the occasion of the birth
of his daughter, Zahwa.
[13]
The rally was organized by the
prominent families of Rafah,
[14]
Abu Taha, Abu Asi,
Nahhal Zu'rub.
[15]
At a speech given at that
occasion, the President added
[16]
that we are "standing
on the front line
[17]
"until the Day of Judgement".
[18]
The Palestinian people have
sacrificed many sacrifices
[191
in order for the
Palestinian flag to fly
[20]
over the walls of Jerusalem,
its mosgues and its churches.
[21]
All of us shall pray
in Jerusalem,
[22]
whether anyone
likes it or not.
[23]
27
"Tne soul and the blood we shall
give for your sake, Abu'Ammar"
[24]
"The soul and the blood we shall
give for your sake, Abu Ammar"
[251
The blood of the martyrs
of the Palestinian people
[26]
that did not stop
for one moment
[27]
from his noble sacrifice
of his blood, his soul,
[28]
his money and his potential
to defend this land.
129]
A Jerusalem tradition
has it:
[30]
"There will always be a group
within my people (The Muslims)
[31]
"that will protect the faith,
..132]
ill
"and will go against
its enemy.
[33]
"They will not be harmed
by those hostile to them
134]
"and they will be victorious
with the help of Allah".
[35]
It further says:
[36]
"0 messenger of Allah,
[37]
"Who is this Muslim group
and where are they?"
[38]
And the prophet answered:
[39]
"In Jerusalem
and in its environs"
[40]
"In Jerusalem
and in its environs"
[411
"And they shall be standing
on the front line
[42]
"until the Day of Judgement".
[43]
This is the grace, my brothers
that Allah has bequeathed upon us
[44]
We are on the front lines
[45]
until the the Day
of Judgement
and it says more,
my brothers,
[47]
And to whom did the messenger
of Allah say it?
[48]
To Whom?
28
To his companions !
[491
"And one martyr
from among them
[50]
"is worth seventy martyrs".
[51]
"And one martyr
from among them
[521
is worth seventy martyrs".
[53]
Therefore my brothers
it says:
[541
"They will stand
on the front line
155]
until the Day
of Judgement
[56]
and we are on the front line,
my brothers.
[57]
We are the people
of the front line.
[58]
Therefore my brothers
it is not accidental,
[591
that a hundred years ago
they said
. [60]
at the (First) World Zionist
Congress in Basle:
[61]
"a land without a people
to a people without a homeland".
[62]
And when Golaa Meir was asked
about the Palestinian people
L63I
she said: "Where is
the Palestinian people?
[641
"Are there Palestinians?"
I am the Palestinian ! "
.[65]
Then came this agreement (Oslo;
with the good and bad in it.
[66]
And if anyone of you have
any objection to
[67]
the Oslo accord -
[68]
well, I have
a thousand objections.
[69]
But my brothers, I would like
to remind you of something.
[70]
The prophet, when he signed
the Hudaybiya accord
I want to remind you that he
wanted it to be titled:
[72]
"In the name of Allah
the All-Merciful"
29
[73]
but the tribe of Qoreish
said:
[74]
"Stop!
We do not agree to that".
[75]
Wasn't it so?
[76]
And it read also: "Muhammad
the messenger of Allah
[77]
But Qoreish said to him:
"Stop! Who told you
[78] .
"that we recognize you
as the messenger of Allah?"
[79]
So the prophet instructed All:
"Erase it! Ali, erase it!"
[80]
And put instead:
"Muhammad son of Abdallah"
[811
Omar Ibn Al Khattab
rushed to him saying:
[82]
"How can that be?
0 messenger of Allah?"
[83]
And the prophet said:
"Be Quiet"!
[84]
And wrote with his noble hand:
"Muhammad son of Abdallah" .
[85]
He himself erased it.
He asked them:
[86]
"Where is it written?
Muhammad the messenger of Allah?"
[87]
But you know that the
noble prophet was illiterate
[88]
He said: "Where is it written?
And they said, "Over here".
[89]
And he erased it himself.
And they wrote:
[90]
"Muhammad Son of Abdallah" .
[91]
And even more so,
my brothers,
[92]
the prophet agreed that whoever
comes (from Qoreish)
[93]
to convert to Islam -
will be turned back.
[94]
And whoever reneges Islam, they
will not stand in his way.
[95]
Isn't it so,
1 am only reminding you?
,. . [?61 ,
I am not bringing from my own,
I am just reminding you.
21-733 O - 96 - 2
30
[971
Omar Ibn Al Kattib
called the agreement:
[98]
"The despised agreement",
and asked:
[99]
"How can we accept such a
humiliation of our religion?"
[100]
But, my brothers,
[101]
it xs all the same with
the Palestinian people.
[1021
"And they will stand
in the front line
[1031
"until the Day of Judgement."
[104]
There were days
when they said:
[105]
"There is no
Palestinian people."
[106]
"The Palestinian people
is finished."
[107] ,
And here is
the Palestinian people.
[108]
They remain on this land,
[109]
to fight on this land
and around this land
[HOI
as it said: "And they shall
stand on the front line
[1111
"until the Day of Judgement."
[112]
The longest revolution
in the modern era
[113]
is the Palestinian
revolution.
[114]
The longest revolution,
[115]
the longest Intifada,
seven blessed years.
[116]
Isn't it so, my brothers?
[1171
Am I bringing something
of my own?
[118]
I am just sharpening
your memory. Just that.
[119]
I am saying this because we are
in the midst of negotiations now,
[120]
However (
if the Israelis think
[121]
that we have no alternatives
(to negotiations) -
[122]
31
by Allah (I swear)
that they are wrong.
[123]
The Palestinian people are
prepared to sacrifice
[1241
their last boy
and their last girl,
J12V
in order to wave
the Palestinian flag.
[126]
The soul and the blood
[127]
we shall give for your sake,
Abu Ammar,
[128]
so that the Palestinian
flag will wave
{1291
over the walls of Jerusalem,
its mosques and its churches.
[130]
"They see it as distant,
[131]
and we see it as imminent,
and verily we are right!"
[1321
"And they will enter
the Mosque (Al-Aqsa)
[133]
as they enterd it the
first time . " ( Qoran )
[1341
"And they will enter
the Mosque (Al-Aqsa)
[1351
as they did the first time" .
(Qoran)
[136]
"Allah will not break
his promise".
[1371
God willing
we shall all pray
[138]
and sit in Jerusalem
like we do now.
[139]
And I say Jerusalem.
And I say Jerusalem,
[140]
whether someone
likes it or not.
[141]
Jerusalem the capital
of the State of Palestine,
[142]
whether someone
likes it or not.
[143]
And whoever
doesn't like it -
[1441
let him drink
from the sea of Gaza!
[145]
<tmarg250>Speech delivered by Arafat
at reception held in his honor
in Gaza by the Turcman Tribe
32
from Jenin area, July 1995.
[146]
<tmarg450>I want to tell you one thing
about this Palestinian people:
[1471.
Despite their dispersion,
[148]
despite the imperialistic
attack on it,
[1491
and despite the fact that we
are fighting 100 years now,
[150] m
100 years, is it not?
[151]
Since the first Zionist
Congress in Basle, in 1897,
[152] .
and here we are in 1995,
[153]
that is to say that for 100 years
we are now. (fighting)
[154]
Therefore we pass the flag on
from generation to generation
[155]
so that this land will stay
Arab , Arab , Arab .
. [156].
From this starting point,
we want your effort,
[157]
your knowledge, your struggle
and your Jihad
[158]
so that we can build
together this state.
[159]
My brothers,
[160]
I ask of you further
patience and perseverance
[161]
and we must not
"descend from the mountain"
[162]
(we must not stop fighting)
It is an important thing.
[163]
Still we must not (descend) .
[164]
We should not act as in the
battle of Uhud
[165]
(where Muslims descended
from the mountain ) .
[166]
We are still in need of people
to stay at the
[167]
"top of the mountain" ,
Do you understand?
[168]
until we are really able
to pass over this flag
[169]
to our sons,
who are our new generals,
[170]
those whom we are so proud of.
33
who for 7 years carried
[171]
the Intifada, seven blessed
years and defeated and succeeded
[172]
in standing up against the
strongest army in the region,
[173]
and against
the Israeli generals.
[174]
Therefore I say to you:
Welcome:
[175]
And together as one man
unto Jerusalem, unto Jerusalem. . .
[176]
<tmarg200>Speech given by Arafat
at a ceremony at the concluding
program of summer camp organised
by the "Directorate of National
Guidance" of the Ministry of
Education and Culture, July 1995.
[177]
<tmarg450>"Either martyrdom ("Shahada"),
or liberation".
[178]
"Either martyrdom ("Shahada")
or liberation" .
[179]
"The soul and the blood
we will give for your sake,
[180]
"Abu Ammar" .
[181]
"For your sake Palestine."
"For your sake Palestine."
[182]
"The soul and the blood we'll
given for you Palestine.
[183]
"The soul ana the blood we'll
give for you Palestine.
[184]
"The soul and the blood we'll
give for you Palestine.
[185]
My loved ones, I am proud of you.
I thank those who participated
.[186]
in organizing these summer
camps for the Palestinian youth,
[1871
the generation of the future.
[1881.
<tmarg200>The concluding ceremony or
girls summer camp organized by
the "Directorate of National
Guidance" of Palestinian Ministry
of Education and Culture.
July 1995.
[189]
On the flag and emblem of the
"Directorate of National Guidance"
appears a map of Palestine that
encompasses the State of Israel.
[190]
<tmarg450>The last item on this edition:
[191]
The "Directorate of National
34
Guidance" held a final ceremony
[192] . -
gathering at the girls camp
neadguarters at Beit Hanoon
[193]
that featured various artistic
and cultural performances
[1941
in the presence of dignitaries
from the Palestinian Authority.
[195]
<tmarg250>Excerpts from one of
receptions held in honor of Arafat
in Gaza. July 1995.
[196]
<tmarg450>"Be blessed Gaza and celebrate,
0 Gaza 0 Gaza,
[197]
for your sons are returning
after a long separation.
[198]
0 Gaza, 0 Gaza, 0 Gaza
[199]
your sons are returning,
[200]
0 Jaffa, 0 Lod, 0 Haifa,
0 Jerusalem,
[201]
you are returning,
you are returning.
[202]
<tmarg250>Remarks by Arafat, regarding
the negotiations with Israel
and the release of Hamas
prisoners in a speech given in
Gaza, end of July, 1995.
[203]
<tmarg450>Unity, national unity!
[204]
Yes my brothers, we have
refused from the beginning
[205]
this bargaining over
our prisoners,
[206]
and I made the famous statement
that the first prisoner that
[207]
I demand to be released
is the warrior Sheich
[208]
Ahmad Yasin
[209]
Therefore my brothers, we have
refused from the beginning
[210]
and we will continue to refuse
to divide the prisoners into
[211]
categories, for they are all
prisoners of Palestine,
[212]
prisoners of the revolution,
of the Palestinian struggle
[213]
and the prisoners of
the Palestinian Intifada
[214]
and the prisoners of the
Palestinian independent decision.
35
[215]
Therefore we nave refused from
the start.
[216]
We shall continue to refuse
to bargain over any prisoner
or in any other way
that was offered to us.
[2181
For they are all, as far
as we are concerned,
[219]
prisoners of Palestine
and heroes of Palestine,
[220]
torches of Palestine
and lights of Palestine.
[221]
<tmarg200>Report on the Palestinian TV
about Arafat ' s speech at the
reception ceremony in his honor
by the Beduin tribe of Tarabin,
in July 1995.
[222]
<tmarg450>Last night, President Arafat
met with a large delegation
[223]
from the Tarabin tribe at the
Al-Azhar University in Gaza.
[224]
They came to give
their allegiance
[225]
to the honored President
and to emphasize
[226] .
that they stand behind his wise
leadership for our people.
[227]
The President said:
[2281
"Ahead of us we face a long,
a hard and a fierce battle,
[229]
"and we are in the midst of one
of our most difficult battles.
[230]
You must "not descend from the
mountain" (Do not stop fighting)
[231]
"unless (you reach) Jerusalem,
for prayer" .
[2321
The President further said that
we still face serious obstacles
[233]
over the water issue, and who
knows what the situation
[2341
will be when we discuss with
them (Israelis) the land issue.
[235]
The President emphasized that
every time we get closer
[236]
to Jerusalem, the plots
(against us) increase
[237]
and the danger to us
36
grows
[238]
The President praised
the Tarabin Tribe
[239]
who took part in all the
battles in defence
[240]
of the revolution
and the Arab nation,
[241]
and mentioned the fighter
Abir Al-Wheidi
[242]
with pride and admiration
and described her
as a heroine and
as a commander.
[244]
<tmarg250>The Institute for
Peace Education
Tel. 03-695-6868
Fax 03-695-0132
[245]
<tmarg450>
[246]
[247]
37
TRANSCRIPT OF PLO CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT'S
REMARKS AT THE 'AL FATAH* GIRLS SCHOOL
OPENING OF SCHOOL YEAR. SEPTEMBER 3 1995
Girls singing: "Our weapon, we raised it in our hand. T'was a
lengthy night of slumber, leader of the revolution, Abu Amman"
Arafat: "Yes, we are proud of the Palestinian girl, the Palestinian
woman and the Palestinian child who fulfilled these miracles. And
I say this not at all out of flattery. The Palestinian woman
participated in the Palestinian revolution. The Palestinian girl
participated in the revolution. Abir Al-Waheidi, commander of the
central region [participated in the murder of Zvi Klein,
December, 1991], Dalai Al-Maghrabi, Martyr of Palestine
[participated in the murder of Israeli civilians in coastal bus
terror attack, March, 1978], I bow in respect and admiration to
the Palestinian woman who receives her martyred son with joyful
cheering. The soul and blood for you, O Palestine!"
38
April 16 1995 speech given by Yassir Arafat
rf:lle4 «v*?>«~
n\ji 1 1 id 1333 bpeei_n given oy Tassir MraTat
at Gaza stadium, 10 days after the Cfar Darom/U/L*f< A'«$^ p(o.t>^ «-. A-«^t.
attack, on the occaision of the date that *jfk\ ff
marks Abu Jihad's 1988 assassination at the
hands of the IDF in Tunis.
This speech was reported in the media as
a speech of support for the peace process.
"In the name of Allah the all merciful,
Allah has bought from the believers
their souls and their monies
and they will indeed enter paradise.
They will fight for the cause of Allah
and they will kill and they will
be killed. That is a promise of the truth
in the Torah, in the New Testamant, and
in the Koran.
Those loyal to the commitment to Allah,
hear the good news in giving your allegience
to those with whom you gave your
allegience.
Listen to the good news.
This is a great win.
(THE CROWD): The soul and the blood we w?,ll
sacrifice for you 0' Arafat.
(Arafat) The soul and the blood we shall
sacrifice for thee 0' Palestine.
(Arafat) The soul and the blood we shall
sacrifice for thee O'Palestine.
(Arafat) The soul and the blood we shall
sacrifice for thee O'Palestine.
(Arafat) The soul and the blood we shall
sacrifice for thee O'Palestine.
(Arafat) The soul and the blood we shall
sacrifice for thee O'Palestine.
Yes my brothers my beloved, my comrades
in destiny
We look at you from Gaza and you are now
in the high heavens with the highest
of comrades . (Abu Jihad).
We look at you from the first Palestinian
liberated land that was liberated.
But we shall look at you as is destined
by the oath that still stands and by the
commitment that is still valid.
(REPEATING: "THE OATH IS VALID AND
THE COMMITMENT STANDS)
And we shall look at you tomorrow sitting
in Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine
When the prophet made the peace of Hudybiya.
I remind you and I remind all of our people,
and our Arab nation and our Islamic nation
39
that the tribe of Qureish objected to
make any mention of the title "messenger of Allah"
and the noble illiterate prophet said to scratch
out the title "messenger of the Allah" and
instead to insert the title "Muhammad Ibn Abdallah"
Omar Ibn Al-Khattab said and Ali Ibn Abi Talib said '
"how we can accept an accord like that".
Moreover, Omar called it "the despised peace"
and asked "how we can accept such humiliation
of our religion... 0 messenger of Allah"
And we when we signed the accord in Oslo, if any of you has
in objection to that agreement, I have a hundred ones
From here 0 brothers we speak
in candor and in clarity.
In Israel as I said in the beginning of
my address, there is an attempt
to obstruct the accord so as not to implement
what they have signed on.
And Unfortunately, there are some who give
them the pretext of the so-called security,
security, and security.
They kill us with the word security.
From here I say my brothers,
we managed with the help of our brothers
in the Palestinian team, the
heroes who represented Palestine.
They actually succeeded to become the
Palestnian team, not the joint Jordanian
Palestinian team. With all due respect
and appreciation to our brothers in Jordan.
But It is the right of this people we,
who for a hundred years since 1897,
since the first Zionist congress in Basel,
This people are in the frontline.
As the prophet said:
And they are in the frontline until the
judgement day.
Yes, we are for a hundred years on the front line.
The Balfour Declaration was proclaimed
and called you "minorities".
After that World War II, I am just reminding
you, nothing more.
The Yalta Conference came, not Malta,
Yalta, Malta is a different thing
and I will tell you about it later.
The Yalta Conference came and
they agreed to create the state of Israel
and they passed it in the United Nations.
With a majority of one vote, and they
postponed the voting for two days
until they got this majority.
Until they got this vote.
40
Isn't that true, this is international
legitimacy. In 1947, the partition plan,
then 56, then 67, they occupied all of
Palestine, and Golda Meir said:
" Where is the Palestinian People?
Only I am a Palestinian."
The number of Palestinian children
would make her sad.
Those who were sitting near me
just a while ago.
And those who are in front of me that
are born every day to this people.
This is the demographic bomb with
which we are confronting the enemy.
I say this because the decision was to
erase the Palestinian people,
erasing it from the political and geographic map.
so that we become just numbers
in the records of UNWRA. Nothing more.
But, brothers, the martyrs of the Palestinian
people, and their leader, the prince of
martyrs Abu Jihad, the injured of this people,
the prisoners of the Palestinian people, and
at their head my brother Sheik Ahmad Yasin.
Yes brothers, the new generals, the new
generals, who are the new generals?
It is the children of the stones
whom I named the new generals,
then the Fatah youth, the Fatah youth,
the Palestinian Army of Liberation.
Yes, the generals of the initifadah,
and the PLA, I don't want to say what
they write about them in their papers.
These heroes they have fought for
thirty years of battles on all Arab
fronts.
And when I say on all fronts I
challenge any army that fought on
all fronts like the Palestinian army.
Therefore brothers I say in the name
of this Palestinian people in the name
of the PLO.
In the name of the Palestine Authority
on the first Palestinian liberated land,
in the name of our martyrs, in the name of our injured, in
the name of our prisoners, in the name of the generals of
the stones, we shall preserve this Palestinian dream. On
this Palestinian infant, the road to the Palestinian
independent stae, and its capital Jerusalem. And when I say
its capital Jerusalem, regardless of whoever agrees to it or
rejects, and whoever doesn't like it may they drink from the
sea of Gaza.
And if he doesn't like the sea of Gaza, let him drink from
the Dead Sea.
41
B
[1]
Speeches of Yassir Arafat
in Gaza: June-July, 1995
[2]
For Peace Education, Ltd
tel 03-695-6868
fax 03-695-0132
eulogy given by Arafat
on June 15, 1995
[4]
for Abd Al Karim
Al Aqluq
[5]
the head of
PLO censorship division
[6]
one of the veterans
of the Fatah on the fortieth day
[7]
since his death
Gaza 19.6.95
[8]
Yassir Arafat,
[9]
a ceremony was held this evening
at University Al Azhar in Gaza
[10]
to mark the 40th day of
the death of the heroic fighter
[11]
Abd Al Karim
Al Aqluq
[12]
the man who headed
the censorship office
[13]
at the Palestine National
Authority.
[14]
President Arafat delivered
a eulogy in which he said:
[15]
we are all seekers of martyrdom
in the path of truth and right
[16]
toward Jerusalem the capital
of the State of Palestine.
[17]
the president added:
the commitment stands
[18]
and the oath is firm to continue
this long and ardous jihad
[19]
in the path of martyrdom
the path of sacrifices,
[20]
42
victory & glory, not only
for our Palestinian people
[21]
but for our entire Arab
and Islamic nation,
[22]
until a Palestinian child
shall raise the Palestinian flag
[23]
over the walls of Jerusalem
her mosques and churches.
[24]
"in the name of Allah
the all -merciful"
[25]
Allah has acquired from the
believers
[26]
their souls & posessions,
for they will have paradise"
[27]
my sister, Um-Al-Abd
[28]
my brother, my comrades in this
long road,
[29]
verily we all are in the
quest of the martyrdom,
[30]
in the path of truth & right
the path of this sacred cause,
[31]
the path of Jerusalem the capital
of the state of Palestine.
[32]
yes, my brothers, the dowry
of Palestine is high
[33]
and this people
is a people of giants.
[34]
Allah the exalted and almighty
has granted this nation his grace
[35]
as it says (in Quran),
"and they will stand
[36]
on the front! ines until
the judgement day"
[37]
words are too few here
in the spirit
[38]
except for the fundamental
commitment
[39]
that commitment and oath
that we have all made:
43
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you.
I think the focus of today's hearing should be — and hopefully it
will end up being — a relatively narrow focus. That focus is the
issue of the PLO compliance of the Oslo Agreement and how that
affects America's interaction to the peace process.
We are a partner in this peace process. There are many other is-
sues which are going on in the Middle East and in that region of
the world right now. Mr. Burton alluded to the issue of the poten-
tial of troops in the Golan, others have mentioned a variety of
other issues.
But I think the issue of day, the issue that is a relevant issue
at the moment — in fact, right now at this moment, is on the Senate
floor, in the Senate Foreign Operations bill with the Helms-Pell
amendment in it is the extension of the PLO Compliance Act.
This bill is being voted on without hearings ever having been
made; and without a full airing of this issue, I really believe that
we will be doing a disservice to each of our constituents and to the
country and to our role as a Congress.
It is an issue which I think needs to be aired in the light of day.
We need to hear and understand the facts on the ground of what
is going on, specifically, again, on the PLO compliance to Oslo One.
And I think that is very relevant because our commitment of
$100 million last year, our commitment of $100 million this year,
is tied to that compliance. That was the bill of goods that we were
set up with when we were asked, as Members of Congress, to ap-
propriate that amount of money toward this peace process.
And I think, as other Members have pointed out, and I think, to
some extent, the Israeli Government themselves would acknowl-
edge, the records, the facts, seem to be irrefutable and non-debat-
able, that the Palestinian Authority — we are not really talking
about the PLO, we are talking about the Palestinian Authority, be-
cause that is who, in a sense, the negotiation is with, not the Pal-
estinian National Authority, which is also a violation of the agree-
ments in terms of even calling themselves that — but that the party
to the agreement has almost, point by point, violated those agree-
ments.
Whether it is the issue of extraditing terrorists to Israel — and al-
most without exception, when the Israeli Government has given
names, even locations of specific people who are involved in terror-
ist actions, including murder, including murder of American citi-
zens, the Palestinian Authority has refused, almost without excep-
tion, to extradite those people to Israel promptly, which is a clear
violation of the agreements.
There are Palestinian Authority organizational structures within
Jerusalem. It is almost a daily thing where the Israeli Government
is going back and forth. But this also is a clear violation of what
the agreements are set out and what specifically they talk about.
I mention as well, I mean, it is almost a parody, but in terms
of what the entity is, in terms of the Palestinian Authority and Mr.
Arafat, you know, both on occasion calling himself a state or calling
himself a national authority, again, is clearly a violation.
But in some ways the most disturbing violation remains the fact
in the PLO Charter itself remains calling for the destruction of the
44
State of Israel and that the intentions of the Palestinian Authority,
of Mr. Arafat himself, I think are really still not clear.
The intentions, in his own words, are very disturbing, to say the
least. And that is the heart of the agreement, that is the heart of
the American role in this peace process
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Deutsch, your time is running-
Mr. DEUTSCH. It is going to be short. I clipped the video very
short. Let me just really get to the end of it: That the real question
is the intentions and also the ability to follow through on the inten-
tions. We all understand domestic politics; but what is disturbing
is that if Mr. Arafat is making statements to this effect, how bad
are his domestic politics that he has to do that?
And I think this Congress, this committee, has responsibility,
more than flippantly, more than in short order, really focusing on
legislation. We spent 2 weeks on Waco. We spent 2 weeks on
Branch Davidians. We spent 2 weeks on the Idaho shootings. And
we will spend no time on this.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Deutsch, your time has expired.
Mr. Deutsch. Mr. Chairman, in terms the video?
Chairman GlLMAN. We have incorporated the time for the video
in your time. The timer is off, and we are using a mechanical timer
up here.
Mr. Deutsch. OK. Mr. Chairman, then, if I can, it is only about
a minute tape, let me close with Mr. Arafat's own words.
The testimony that I submitted has statements of Mr. Arafat
starting in September, this month, going back several months to
April, as recently as September.
But on June 15 of this year, this is about a 2-minute statement;
and maybe we can just start it. Maybe less than 2 minutes.
Chairman Gilman. Would you please identify the tape?
Mr. Deutsch. It is a tape of Mr. Arafat on June 15 of this year
Al Azhar University.
[The following statement by Mr. Arafat is a translation from Ara-
bic:]
Mr. Arafat. "... words are too few here in the spirit except
for the fundamental commitment, that commitment and oath that
we have all made: The commitment still stands and the oath is
firm to continue this difficult Jihad, in this long Jihad, in this ar-
duous Jihad, in the path of martyrs, the path of sacrifices, but this
is a path of victory and glory. . . ."
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Deutsch appears in the appen-
dix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Deutsch.
Mr. Engel.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELIOT ENGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you
for holding this hearing today as you promised you would.
As the author of one of the three major bills to replace the expir-
ing Middle East Peace Facilitation Act and as cochair of the Con-
gressional Peace Accord Monitoring Group, along with Congress-
man Saxton, I am profoundly interested in the Middle East peace
45
process; and I am glad that the committee is taking time to con-
sider this issue at this critical time.
Two years and one week ago today, the world witnessed a his-
toric event: The leaders of two people's who had been at war for
almost half a century joined hands at the White House with Presi-
dent Clinton in a symbolic culmination of months of secret negotia-
tions.
I recall this day as though it was only yesterday. My wife was
8 months pregnant, could barely move, it was a very hot day, and
we remember sitting on the White House lawn feeling tremendous
joy in the hope that we were observing the end of decades of war
and terror.
Today, I look back with the awareness that much of the initial
excitement, a sense of hope which surrounded the signing of the
Declaration of Principles, has dissipated considerably. Terror has
returned as those trying to destroy the peace process strive to turn
public opinion against it with acts of random violence.
Let me be absolutely clear on where I stand. I fully support the
Middle East peace process. I have no greater desire than to see the
conflict between Israel and the Arab world consigned permanently
to the pages of history.
Moreover, I am proud that the United States has offered its
ample resources — diplomatic, technical, and financial — to help
move the negotiations along.
In short, we must do everything possible to help the peace proc-
ess succeed.
Nevertheless, I believe our support cannot be unconditional. I
firmly believe that the parties must live up to their sides of the
bargain and that we must always be mindful of the sordid history
of the PLO, a track record of some of the most heinous acts of ter-
ror committed during the 1970's and 1980's.
Prior to signing the Declaration of Principles, Israeli Prime Min-
ister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat exchanged
several commitments, solemn, bilateral duties to underpin the
peace process.
In exchange for Israel's recognition of the PLO, Yasir Arafat com-
mitted his organization: To recognize Israel's right to exist in peace
and security; to accept U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338; to renounce the use of terrorism and violence; to assume re-
sponsibility over all PLO elements in order to prevent and punish
acts of terrorism or violence; to call upon Palestinians to oppose vi-
olence and terrorism; to submit to the Palestine National Council
changes to the Palestinian National Covenant, eliminating calls for
Israel's destruction; and to implement, in good faith, the Declara-
tion of Principles.
With the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in Cairo last
year, Israel and the PLO made specific, several of the security-re-
lated commitments undertaken on the White House lawn.
In particular, it is now clear that the PLO must: Transfer sus-
pects requested by Israeli authorities; confiscate illegal weapons,
exclude terrorists from security services; and avoid the type of vit-
riolic rhetoric which only tends to incite violence.
The PLO's record in complying with its commitments is mixed at
best. On the positive side, Yasir Arafat has recognized Israel and
46
accepted Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Many news re-
ports also indicate that he has finally begun to crack down on ter-
rorists.
Nevertheless, it has demonstrated significant disregard for many
of the other obligations to which it has committed itself.
Terrorism has been rhetorically denounced, yet individual acts of
terror have gone uncondemned. And even when Yasir Arafat
speaks out in English, equivalent words in Arabic to those who
most need to hear go unspoken.
And that is not all. The following items represent some of the
more significant violations of very specific legal obligations con-
tained in the peace accords: Sections of the PLO Covenant calling
for Israel's destruction have yet to be removed; calls for jihad by
Yasir Arafat continue; the ban on unlicensed weapons goes unen-
forced; suspected terrorists have not been transferred to Israel; and
the Palestinian Authority continues to locate its institutions in Je-
rusalem.
Mr. Chairman, no nation has been more engaged in the effort to
move the peace process forward than the United States. Not only
was the historic document signed on the lawn of the White House,
but no other nation pledged $500 million over 5 years in an at-
tempt to end the historic conflict, not even the wealthy Arab states
of the Persian Gulf, who have the most to gain by the end of hos-
tilities.
I am proud of our involvement.
But the PLO should be clear that American generosity is not un-
limited. America must hold Yasir Arafat's feet to the fire and de-
mand that he and the Palestinian Authority
Chairman GlLMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Please
wind up.
Mr. ENGEL. OK. Let me submit the rest of this into the record.
And let me just say that the bottom line for me is this: If Arafat
and the PLO comply with their commitments, then U.S. money
should continue to flow. If they do not, then they will be the blame
for the destruction of peace.
I believe very carefully that a threshold ought to be set — a rea-
sonable threshold, not an unreasonable threshold — a threshold to
which the PLO and Yasir Arafat can meet if they are sincere.
I do not believe in blowing up the peace process. I think it is very
important to continue. But I think it is important that all parties
live up to what they agree to.
Again, my bill — and I hope we would mark it up in the commit-
tee— I think sets realistic thresholds that the PLO and Yasir
Arafat can meet if they so desire.
I would hope that that is what we do as we strengthen MEPFA.
And I would hope, again, that all parties concerned join the com-
mitment to the peace process.
Chairman GlLMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Berman would like to submit a statement.
Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman, I am listed as a witness. We are in
an Immigration markup. We are voting on amendments every 3
minutes or 5 minutes. So rather than testify, I would like to intro-
duce my statement into the record if I could.
Chairman GlLMAN. We appreciate the gentleman's cooperation.
47
Mr. Berman. And then I would like to make just two points.
Chairman GlLMAN. Without objection, you may submit your
statement in full.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD L. BERMAN, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Berman. Thank you.
I am on the side of wanting the peace process to continue. I want
to see MEPFA renewed for a reasonably long period of time.
But I do not agree with the notion that there is something wrong
or that it is necessarily counterproductive to raise questions about
where there has been PLO compliance and where there has not for
two reasons.
One, it is somewhat disingenuous to have these principles, these
commitments, this law, and then try to sweep it under the rug. I
do not think the process is helped by that.
And I think we can cite a number of things where there has been
compliance and where steps have been taken and where things are
improving and in other steps they are not.
The second reason is, I think we can be of assistance in promot-
ing greater compliance by virtue of raising some of these issues.
The bottom line, when it all comes down to it, at least from what
I know now, I think it is critically important that the process con-
tinue and that we extend MEPFA; and I hope that the Congress
would do that soon.
Thank you.
Chairman GlLMAN. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
Mr. Wynn. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Yes. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. Wynn.
Mr. WYNN. I would be curious as to whether we are going to
have anybody from the State Department here?
Chairman GlLMAN. Mr. Wynn, we requested that a State Depart-
ment witness appear, but we have been told that they were not
available for today.
We made a further request that if they were not available, for
them to come at a later date. No later date has been established
yet.
But we will have the State Department appearing at a subse-
quent hearing.
Mr. Wynn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Wynn.
The next witness is Mr. Kelley with the General Accounting Of-
fice.
Mr. Kelley.
The Chair would like to note that our witness, Mr. Joe Kelley,
will be retiring from the General Accounting Office on September
29, just a few days from now. He served the GAO and our Nation
for 38 years in a meritorious manner.
Joe Kelley now serves as director in charge of International Af-
fairs issues at the GAO. He spent many years working on a wide
variety of matters in the international area and has worked with
many members and staff of this committee as manager of many im-
portant GAO studies that have aided us in our oversight respon-
sibilities.
48
Mr. Kelley, I am certain that the members of the committee
would join me in paying tribute to you for your dedicated service
to the American people and in wishing you a great deal of happi-
ness and good health in your forthcoming retirement.
Mr. Kelley.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH E. KELLEY, DIRECTOR-IN-CHARGE,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Kelley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was quite surprised
with that. And I want the record to show that I am not retiring
because I am up here testifying today.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce Mr. ten Kate on my
right here. He was the gentleman that was kind of in the trenches
doing the work for us.
Chairman Gilman. What is Mr. ten Kate's title?
Mr. Kelley. He is a supervisory evaluator.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit my statement for the
record.
Chairman GlLMAN. Without objection.
Mr. Kelley. I will try to adhere to your 5-minute rule and just
go through quickly and summarize some of the salient points, espe-
cially on the issue of the classification of the report.
Our testimony discusses the audit work that supports our re-
cently issued classified report on the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation's finances.
I will also discuss in my testimony the principal cooperation is-
sues we dealt with on this assignment. And finally, my written tes-
timony covers our efforts to have this report declassified in re-
sponse to the requests from you, Mr. Chairman, and several Mem-
bers of Congress.
As far as the audit objectives, Mr. Chairman, at your request, we
reviewed the PLO's finances in connection with the decision by the
United States to help fund long-term development projects in the
West Bank and the Gaza.
With respect to the work we performed in our review we at-
tempted to obtain financial information directly from the PLO at
the outset. The PLO told us to provide written questions on the in-
formation we required and then declined to respond to them.
The PLO also chose not to respond to our written requests for
meetings with PLO and Palestinian authority officials in the self-
rule territories.
With respect to the agencies we covered, Mr. Chairman, in Wash-
ington we interviewed Palestinian affairs experts and program offi-
cials from the State Department, USAID, and several other agen-
cies, which are listed in my statement.
We also conducted work in London, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem, and
interviewed officials from essentially the same agencies.
We met with U.S. intelligence experts from State's Intelligence
and Research Bureau, the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense In-
telligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.
British intelligence officials declined our requests for meetings on
the basis that they had no useful information to share with us.
49
However, v/e were able to interview a senior official from Brit-
ain's National Criminal Intelligence Service to discuss a February
1994 estimate that the PLO had $8 to $10 billion in assets and an
annual income of $1.5 to $2 billion. This was mentioned earlier by
prior witnesses.
Citing the confidential nature of his sources, the author of this
statement declined to provide us with any data or documentation
to support this claim.
With respect to the cooperation issues, which I discuss in my
written testimony, in general, Mr. Chairman, we received good co-
operation from the agencies that I have mentioned previously in
the statement.
We did encounter some limited access to records and cooperation
problems at the State Department, CIA, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
With regards to the State Department and the CIA, the problems
we experienced did not materially affect our final report message
or conclusions.
I have listed in the statement examples where we had some
problems; but through the effort of your staff, we worked these is-
sues out at the State Department.
Initially, the CIA was unwilling to cooperate with us or share
available intelligence data about the PLO.
As you know, agency officials provided us with two background
briefings on the PLO only after you asked the CIA to cooperate
fully with us on our review.
The agency declined to facilitate contacts with foreign govern-
ments for us.
Now I would like to turn to the issue of the efforts we made to
get the report declassified.
You sent us a letter, Mr. Chairman, requesting that we take the
necessary steps to have our classified report on the PLO's finances
declassified to facilitate increasing public discussion of the topic.
This request was followed by other requests from members, total-
ing, of approximately about seven, asking us the same question, to
get the report declassified.
I would like to point out that on the classification, the GAO gen-
erates classified information derivatively; that is, the information
we use in GAO-produced documents carries the classification of the
originating source, which is within the agencies.
The GAO does not have authority to declassify or downgrade
classified information. This authority is vested solely by authorized
executive branch officials.
When there is a perceived need to downgrade or declassify infor-
mation, the originating agency's concurrence must be obtained.
And that is one of the things we have been doing with the agencies.
My statement points out that we informed the Agency and State
Department that the chairman had asked that our report on PLO's
finances be declassified.
In a letter to GAO dated September 5, 1995, the CIA responded
that, with certain minor exceptions, none of the CIA material used
in our report could be declassified.
The State Department has not yet responded to our declassifica-
tion request.
50
That summarizes my statement, Madam Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelley appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [presiding]. Thank you so much, Mr. Kelley.
We appreciate your being here. The chairman would like for me to
point out that the CIA was invited to testify, but the agency de-
clined.
The chairman would like to make sure that some questions and
especially your answers are entered into the record.
Therefore, although you might have covered some of this in your
testimony, I would like to ask you some questions for the record
today, Mr. Kelley.
Can you tell us why the PLO asset study was classified?
Mr. Kelley. It is classified, essentially — well, I really cannot re-
spond to that because the letter they sent back to me explaining
why they could not declassify it contained the reasons why they
could not do it, and they were classified. So I am having a little
difficulty here explaining that to you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So their explanation as to why it was classi-
fied is classified as well?
Mr. Kelley. Yes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Ah, it is very clear now.
Which agencies, organizations, governments, and individuals did
you contact as you worked on this investigation?
Mr. Kelley. Well, my statement lists several. State Department,
obviously; CIA; Overseas Private Investment Corporation; AID; De-
partment of Treasury; and the World Bank. We did a lot of work
with the World Bank. And then the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion.
We contacted those agencies here in Washington as well as over-
seas.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And what kind of cooperation did you receive
from those agencies or individuals?
Mr. Kelley. As my statement mentions, we had some difficulties
kind of getting started with this job with respect to the State De-
partment and the CIA.
And essentially we were delayed in getting some of the informa-
tion. We had done a cable search and listed those which we
thought would be pertinent — these are State Department cables —
pertinent to our review. It took some time to get those cables. We
had come back up and talked to the staff, Mr. Garon and the staff,
about problems, shortly thereafter, we started getting some of
these cables.
We ended up with probably a small number that we did not get.
And, essentially, the basis for that is what they call "deliberative
process." That is it has information in there of personal opinions
and things like that that really do not represent the department.
So, as I said in my statement, with respect to the State Depart-
ment and the CIA, when we sit back and analyze the data and
analyze what efforts they made, we feel that they really did not im-
pact on where we came out with respect to the issues.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Getting back to the classification question, in
spite of the absurdity of the answer that it entails, if you could
elaborate further.
51
There is a lot of anxiety in many communities about this classi-
fied document, and when you classify something, it leads to further
speculation as to what it contains. It creates quite a furor.
If you could explain just a little bit further about this controversy
of having this very important report labeled as a classified docu-
ment.
Mr. Kelley. You mean how the process works?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. How the process worked and if it was your
intention to have it classified; did you believe that it merited such
classification.
Just give us a little further insight on this controversy of the
classified document.
Mr. Kelley. Well, essentially, when we do work at the State De-
partment and DOD, primarily, I personally do not do that much
work at CIA — but we have access to classified documents.
And, essentially, we have an understanding with the agencies
that we will abide by an executive order which gives the President
the right to establish who in the executive branch can classify doc-
uments.
And we, basically, have to abide by that. And, essentially, it is
kind of a practical thing that if we are asking for classified docu-
ments in a review and then we turn around and distribute them
and make them public, we are not going to get any more docu-
ments; you can count on that.
So essentially we work on that basis. By law, we do not have
classification authority; and the classification authority, as I said
in the statement, is with the agency.
What we try to do, Madam, is, when we get the report back, if
we think there are some things in there that may be overclassified
or we could wordsmith it, so to speak, to remove some of the of-
fending information, if release would be a problem for national se-
curity purposes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. National security — if the release of that in-
formation could pose a problem for national security issues, as you
said, whose national security would you be speaking about?
Mr. Kelley. Well, the U.S. Government. I am only talking the
U.S. Government's national security.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. U.S. Government.
Of what general area would that be a threat to national security?
Mr. Kelley. Well, if there is information, for example, in DOD
on capabilities of a particular weapon system, if they are highly
sensitive.
If there is information, I guess, in the intelligence agencies that
they do not want to see released because it might reveal the
sources of the information that they obtained or the methods that
they used to obtained it.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. No, I understand that certain documents
must be classified. But this subject matter is the PLO's assets, and
it just strains the imagination to think how anything related to the
PLO's assets could be deemed as a threat to U.S. national security.
If anything, it would be quite helpful for all of us to know about
that information. Not knowing and not having that information
could, then, be a threat to U.S. national security. But certainly not
the withholding of that information.
52
I understand how some documents should be classified. But I do
not know how the PLO's assets could fall into that category.
Mr. Kelley. I think at the CIA, obviously, things they do affect
national security.
But I think that, as you know, they are a fairly secretive agency;
and information that they collect and analyze and report on is very
seldom, especially if it is involving data obtained through intel-
ligence gathering methods, they are normally not in the process of
putting that information out because, as I understand it, the other
side could figure out where their sources were or who the agents
were, I presume.
I think you are better off asking the Agency as to how that
works.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, although, I guess I would make a dis-
tinction between certain information dealing with them that would,
perhaps, be able to be classified as documents, the methods you
used to obtain the information, or the contacts.
But the information on the assets themselves, I do not see how
that would have to be classified.
Would you not agree that, perhaps, the distinction could have
been made between that information which maybe somebody could
see — methods, informants, ways of getting at it — it should be clas-
sified, but the information itself dealing with the assets, the
Mr. Kelley. Well, I am really at a disadvantage in defending
why the Agency has done this. I think that, presumably, if they
showed some numbers that it might reveal something to someone
else that they know where this information is coming from.
That is the best I can do for you on that.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you. I realize that you are not
the individual who would perhaps best answer that, and the CIA
would — we would have loved to have had them answer those de-
tailed questions about the classification.
But if the request to detail PLO assets would be made again,
how would we do this differently? How would you do it differently?
Or for the most part you would handle that investigation in the
same way? Whether it is about cooperation or classified documents
or testifying in front of committees for other agencies, what would
you do differently?
Mr. Kelley. I do not know that I would do much differently. We
as an agency do not have the basis to go out and try to gumshoe
and pin down exactly what the assets are.
As I say in my statement, we tried to use sources in Treasury
to help us out. But we as an agency basically rely on what the
other agencies have.
Now, we look at it and we try to evaluate it and make sure that
it is not off the wall; but when you get into issues relating to intel-
ligence, it does become somewhat difficult for us to take everything
apart and say, oh, right; we got our own sources out here, and we
do not think you are right.
So I do not know that I would do anything different. I think that
the team that did this work just kind of turned over every stone
we could find, as I related in the statement, and as I discussed it
with the staff, that we made every effort to try to obtain the infor-
mation on their finances.
53
We were just limited to getting the information from the CIA.
And they were, as I said, reluctant at first to provide us briefings.
But we did eventually get some very good briefings from them.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And about the seeking of documents and in-
formation, there were some allegations that the PLO had diverted
funds to a variety of projects, including housing in Jerusalem.
How did the GAO finish up that project?
Some reports have said that those documents, those letters are
fake. Others have said that they were real. Have you been able to
come to a conclusion as to the veracity of those documents, of that
information?
If those letters are real and the funds mentioned are not U.S.
funds or donor funds, could they be among the PLO's current secret
assets?
Mr. Kelley. We have received the request from the chairman on
that a month or so ago, and we have been pursuing that. We have
not reached a final conclusion on that. We are trying to get some
information from the agencies in the Middle East to try to see how
they go about verifying the expenditures.
However, we are coming to a conclusion on it, but I am not really
ready to discuss where we come out on it. We were concerned origi-
nally about whether or not the documents were valid. And I guess
the chairman had asked the Agency, the CIA, to take a look at it.
I do not know that they have completed their analysis yet.
But I am just not in a position to give you a bottom line at this
point in time. But we should be finished with that fairly soon. I
would say in another 3 weeks.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Oh, in about 3 weeks?
Mr. Kelley. I would hope so.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And you would be sharing that information
with us?
Mr. Kelley. Well, we would be sending a letter back to the
chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
About the PLO funds in general, could you give us a better idea
of who controls those funds? From where do those funds originate?
Any information that there may be on the legal holdings of the
PLO or where they are located? What is the estimated value?
Mr. Kelley. If I knew that, I would have told you when I first
sat down here.
I might have to call on my sidekick here to help me out. The
PLO, as we understand it, was obtaining a lot of funds from sev-
eral Middle Eastern countries and also some taxes coming back
from workers who worked in the Middle East.
Let me talk to my colleague here for a second.
[Pause.]
Mr. Kelley. I am told that I am straying into the classified part
of this exercise. So let me end it there.
Yes, I guess I really cannot go much further than that.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Let me ask a specific question. When Arafat
returned to Gaza in the summer of 1994, there were a lot of reports
that he had been charging journalists for interviews. Do you know
if that is true, and are the charges still being extracted from jour-
nalists?
54
There had been some reports that some large sum was paid by
an Italian magazine for an interview with Arafat about his daugh-
ter's birth.
Do you know any reports or any followup on those rumors of hav-
ing journalists pay?
Mr. KELLEY. Madam, I do not have any information on that at
all.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, we will look forward to having the
chairman share his report on the possible diversion of funds with
us in a few weeks then.
We will give you a very declassified "thank you" for your com-
ments today.
Thank you.
Mr. Kelley. Thank you, Madam.
Mr. Johnston. Madam Chair, may I ask just one or two ques-
tions?
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Oh, sorry, Mr. Johnston, I did not see you
there. The last time I glanced, I was the only one here.
Thank you.
Mr. Johnston.
Mr. Johnston. I sneaked in on you. That is all.
And I was not privy to some of your non-answers. But Mr. Bur-
ton earlier testified that British intelligence had stated that the
PLO has now $8 billion in the bank and that the GAO confirmed
that figure.
Do you have any comment on Mr. Burton's testimony?
Mr. Kelley. That we confirmed that figure?
Mr. Johnston. Yes.
Mr. Kelley. That is not the case.
In my statement there is a discussion in there about the fact that
there was a British intelligence agency that put a report out that
had those numbers in it — $8 to $10 billion I believe it was — and
Mr. ten Kate, on my right here, met the individual who prepared
that report in London; and he could not — he would not provide us
any information which would serve as a basis for his conclusions
or his numbers. And that is stated in the testimony.
Mr. Johnston. Because I have received information, unclassified,
from our intelligence that the PLO was broke and that since the
gulf war, the Arabs and the Kuwaitis have cut them off because
they chose the wrong side and that their payroll deduction plan for
Palestinians that work throughout the Middle East, particularly in
the oil areas, had been stopped.
Do you have any comment on that?
Mr. Kelley. That gets back into the area of the problem I am
having with the intelligence business.
Mr. Johnston. OK.
Mr. Kelley. Although, you say you got it unclassified. That is
kind of interesting.
Mr. Johnston. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.
Chairman Gilman [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Johnston.
Mr. Kelley, is there anything we can do to open up this report?
Mr. Kelley. Mr. Chairman, I would propose that — after we got
the turn down from the agencies, I had Mr. ten Kate go back with
55
the marked up copy that came back as to what had to remain clas-
sified, I wanted to see what we had left.
Chairman GlLMAN. So now you have received a review by the in-
telligence agency?
Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.
Chairman GlLMAN. You have a marked up copy?
Mr. KELLEY. Yes. And what I want to do is, could we go through
that and see if we have a cogent, understandable document that we
could issue.
Chairman Gilman. Right. How long would it take you to do that?
Mr. Kelley. Think it would take probably a couple of weeks.
Now, I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that the report with respect
to the key issue we have been talking about today is still not de-
classified.
The rest of it, there is a lot of information in there that is unclas-
sified that deals with how they do their budgeting and the account-
ability issues.
Chairman GlLMAN. Well, I would hope that after you go through
it — and I hope that you could do it in less than a couple of weeks —
that you would then meet with our committee so that we could ex-
plore with the intelligence agency whether more of that could be
declassified, if you would.
Mr. Kelley. The material I am talking about is excluding not
marked classified, so I do not see a problem.
They want me to come back and show them what I am going to
do if I am going to do something like this.
I think there is a lot of information in that report that would be
fairly helpful to the committee.
Chairman Gilman. Well, we would welcome being able to release
the report.
Will you be pursuing this issue any further with an attempt to
get any more information?
Mr. Kelley. There were a few things that were kind of loose
ends that I was going to have Mr. ten Kate check on. But, essen-
tially, I think we are pretty much finished with it. I do not think
it would be very productive for us to continue.
Chairman Gilman. The British intelligence agency was not will-
ing to share with you any information?
Mr. Kelley. That is correct. And I say that in my statement.
And I want to point out, too, that — I just mentioned to Mr. John-
ston— Mr. ten Kate did talk to the author of that study; and we
asked him for the backup or the basis for his numbers, $8 to $10
billion. And he said that he could not share them with us. He could
not share the basis for his report with us.
Chairman Gilman. Have you talked to anyone else in addition to
the intelligence people about trying to get a release of their infor-
mation?
Mr. Kelley. No, sir. I have dealt with the State Department and
the CIA. I have not talked to any other agency about it.
You mean outside the agencies?
Chairman Gilman. Yes, outside
Mr. Kelley. No, I have not, sir.
56
Chairman Gilman. I would urge you to try to discuss it with any
other agency of the Government that might be able to satisfy our
inquiry, if you would further pursue that.
Mr. Kelley. I can give it a try.
Chairman Gilman. Would you? Then let us know how you make
out.
Mr. Kelley. All right.
Chairman Gilman. We would welcome that.
Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions.
Mr. Kelley, I understand you will be retiring after 38 years of
service, and I just want to extend my appreciation to you for all
of the work that you have done for this committee. We have appre-
ciated that very much. It is an excellent record of service.
Mr. Kelley. Well, thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
Sometimes maybe I did not get the reports up here as soon as
you needed them, and I apologize for that; but I enjoyed working
with Mike and his team.
And I enjoyed working with your team as well as, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Well, Mr. Kelley, we wish you well in your
future endeavors. Thank you for being with us.
Mr. Kelley. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Gilman. We will now call Panel 3, Mr. Polisar of
Peace Watch, and Mr. Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, if they would please come to the table.
Both panelists, you can submit your statement in full and sum-
marize it or read your statement; but bear in mind we are under
a 5-minute rule.
So please, Mr. Polisar, proceed.
STATEMENT OF DAN POLISAR, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PEACE
WATCH, JERUSALEM, ISRAEL, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT
SATLOFF, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Polisar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am Dan Polisar, the director of Peace Watch, which is a neu-
tral, unaffiliated peace accord monitoring organization in Israel,
which monitors accords signed by Israel and its Arab neighbors, to
date, Egypt, the PLO, and Jordan.
We are in the business of giving out facts on compliance, not of
making recommendations either to the parties to the accords or to
the U.S. Government.
I want to focus just on a couple of highlights from the written
testimony. The first of those has to do with what compliance is,
which ought to be a straightforward question, but apparently it is
not.
When you are monitoring compliance, what you are looking at,
what you have to be looking at, is what are the obligations that
each side has taken upon itself? And what is their actual behavior.
That is how we do it. That is how it has traditionally been done.
There were, in recent State Department reports on this subject,
however, two alternative approaches to compliance, neither of
which really constitutes a valid way to look at it.
57
One of them is a relative standard. That is, instead of looking at
what the PLO was supposed to do and what they did, the State De-
partment gave a sort of impressionistic view of whether a particu-
lar 6-month period was better or worse than the 6-month period
prior to that. And that relative standard does not give you a good
reading on compliance.
Second, you cannot substitute the views of the parties in the con-
flict for an objective analysis of compliance.
It very often happens that Israel will demand of the PLO more
than the accords actually say. Israel will tell the PLO you cannot
talk about having Jerusalem as your capital in the future, even
though there is nothing wrong with talking about that on a future
level.
Israel will say to the PLO, you have to extradite even people
whose extradition we have not yet formally requested. The accord
does not mandate it. Israel is demanding more. Sometimes Israel
demands less, is not as stringent as the accords are, and the same
thing in the opposite direction.
Whether you are talking about Peace Watch or the U.S. Con-
gress, if you want to do an objective job of monitoring, you cannot
substitute the judgments of the sides. You have to say to yourself:
What were the parties supposed to do? And what are they actually
doing?
And that is the standard which motivates these remarks.
I want to touch on a couple of aspects of compliance. The first
of those is what I refer to as meta-compliance. That is, what is it
that the PLO leadership is saying about the most fundamental as-
pects of the accords? The recognition of Israel? The cessation of the
armed struggle? And most importantly, the sanctity of the accords
themselves?
Part of compliance has to do with a commitment that you will
comply at all times with the accords that you have signed.
And I think the most disturbing thing on this note is that more
than half a dozen times in the last several months, Chairman
Arafat has gone on public record as comparing the Oslo accords to
accords that were signed by the Prophet Muhammad with the
Tribe of Quraysh.
Now, those accords were a 10-year accord, a cease-fire; and after
2 years, when it became expedient to do so, Muhammad broke
those accords in order to defeat the Tribe of Quraysh. And that be-
speaks a very problematic attitude toward compliance. It suggests
that an accord is something you comply with when it is convenient;
and when it becomes inconvenient, you do not comply with it.
A second issue of compliance relates to the preemptive measures
which have been taken to fight against terror. There are a number
of measures that must be taken according to the accords:
confiscating weapons is part of that picture; shutting down training
grounds; also stopping an attack, when you hear about it, stopping
it before it occurs.
And I would just like to close by noting a couple of examples be-
cause Chairman Arafat and other leaders of the PLO have stated
on a number of occasions that they have stopped 10 attacks, they
have stopped 12 attacks, they have stopped 14 attacks.
58
Now, the nature of these claims is very difficult to investigate.
Someone says I stopped attacks; I cannot tell you for security rea-
sons who was going to attack and where they were going to attack;
but take my word for it, I stopped it.
Now, the three cases that we investigated indicated as follows:
No. 1, there was a case in which the claim was that
Chairman GlLMAN. Mr. Polisar, your time is rapidly expiring.
Mr. Polisar. OK. Then I will rapidly bring my remarks to a
close. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A case in which a claim was made that 440 pounds of explosives
had been destroyed. It turned out it was 440 pounds of perfectly
innocuous pesticides.
A claim that a suicide bomber on a bus was coming from Jericho
to Jerusalem. It turned out that there was no bomber, there was
no bus, there was no explosives, and there was no plan.
There was — and I will close on this note — one case in which
there was a kernel of truth to the claim. Chairman Arafat said that
a planned suicide bombing attack for a particular destination had
been thwarted. It turns out someone was in the process of being
recruited to engage in an attack at some future point, and the Pal-
estinian police arrested the recruiters. It was not exactly what was
claimed; but it was, in fact, a thwarting of a possible attack
Thank you very much, and I look forward to taking your ques-
tions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Polisar appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GlLMAN. Thank you, Mr. Polisar. We appreciate your
taking the time to be with us.
Mr. Satloff.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT SATLOFF
Mr. Satloff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the op-
portunity to provide testimony to this committee. This is my inau-
gural testimony before this committee.
Mr. Chairman, I just returned 2 days ago from leading a delega-
tion of the Washington Institute to the Middle East where we met
with senior leaders from Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestin-
ian Authority; and where we convened our annual conference in
Amman, Jordan, to discuss with 200 Arabs, Israelis, and Ameri-
cans the future of the peace process.
I bring those insights from those conversations to this testimony.
Now, Mr. Chairman, in a process replete with critical moments,
we are entering one of the most critical. Gaza- Jericho was a signal
achievement; however, it was only the first phase of an interim ar-
rangement. Despite great misgivings about the record of Oslo, both
Israel and its Palestinian partner have decided to press on to a sec-
ond-stage agreement. This will include Israeli redeployment out of
populated areas of the West Bank, elections for the first-ever Pal-
estinian Council, and the extension of the Palestinian self-govern-
ment throughout the West Bank.
This is a complex and complicated agreement. It envisions three
zones of withdrawal and differing rules for security governing these
zones. Implementing this agreement will be exponentially more dif-
ficult than implementing phase one.
59
Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, and despite the continuance of ter-
rorism by radical elements opposed to the peace process, Israel be-
lieves its best interests lie in advancing to the next stage so as to
ensure that Gaza-Jericho does not wither on the vine as many
Arab friends of the Palestinians seem willing to permit.
While there is great anxiety among the Israeli public and within
the Israeli Army about implementing the next phase, significant
majorities continue to support the government's pursuit of the
peace process.
Second, Mr. Chairman, the Palestinian Authority has had a few
good months. The Palestinian capital is reportedly beginning to ar-
rive in Gaza, $600 million since the new year. Cooperation between
the Israeli and PLO security forces has improved significantly.
Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, there is still much room for im-
provement, both in terms of promoting free market investment and
especially in terms of taking preventive and preemptive measures
to combat terrorism.
In my view, the key for the next phase will be
Chairman GlLMAN. Mr. Satloff, I am going to have to interrupt.
I have 4 minutes to get to the floor.
Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen will be returning. We will continue in
just a few minutes. In the meantime, we will recess for just a few
moments.
[Recess.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [presiding]. The committee will please come
to order. Thank you so much for the witnesses' kindness and pa-
tience.
Mr. Satloff, we apologize. I understand that you were in the mid-
dle of the beginning of your statement, let us say; and if you could
continue please.
Thank you. Mr. Satloff.
Mr. Satloff. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. If I
could just pick up where I left off.
The Palestinian Authority, Madam Chairman, has had a few
good months. The Palestinian capital is reportedly beginning to ar-
rive in Gaza, $600 million since the new year. Cooperation between
the Israeli and PLO security forces has improved significantly.
Nevertheless, there is still much room for improvement, both in
terms of promoting free market investment and especially in terms
of taking preventive and preemptive measures to combat terrorism.
In my view, Madam Chairman, the key for the next phase of
Oslo will be whether the PA adopts the Gaza model in the West
Bank or the Jericho model. The former being a laisser-faire atti-
tude toward radical groups and their possession of weapons. The
latter being an activist approach to security.
Replicating the Gaza model will be a recipe for disaster. An ac-
tivist approach may prove successful.
Third, Madam Chairman, Jordan-Israel peace. This is, perhaps,
the most hopeful element in the new Arab-Israel equation; but it
needs support lest it grows sterile.
The key theme of our conference in Amman was that this peace
is much more complex than a personal agreement between King
Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin. That personal connection may
carry the day for a period of time; but for peace to survive its ere-
60
ators, it must be bolstered by tangible changes in the lives of the
people that are affected by it, especially the Jordanians.
The success or failure of the Jordan-Israel peace should not be
left hostage to the success or failure of the Israel-Palestinian rela-
tionship.
To ensure that, it is necessary to find low-cost ways to assist the
Jordanians and to convince Jordan to turn its economic sights from
Iraq in the east to the West Bank, Israel, and the Mediterranean
in the west.
Fourth, despite all the talk about Syria's strategic choice for
peace, it is not yet clear, Madam Chairman, whether Syria is part
of the problem or part of the solution.
Syria today is the only peace process principal that continues to
entertain the use of terrorism as policy and that is engaged in ter-
rorism against the peace process it claims to support.
Today, living in Damascus or the Syrian-controlled Bekaa are
anti-peace process terrorists and anti-Turkish terrorists. Syria is
taking direct steps to undermine reconciliation among the Iraqi
Kurds; and it is flouting procedural agreements to renew peace
talks with Israel.
I can find little evidence, Madam Chairman, that repeated Unit-
ed States entreaties and demarches to Syria have brought direct
results on these issues.
Just three quick points on U.S. policy and then a final caveat.
First, the peace process is very much in American interests. With
the absence of a Soviet Union, the rationale has shifted, but it has
not diminished. It used to have a defensive rationale, keeping the
Soviets out.
It is now a more positive rationale, to create a strategic consen-
sus among moderate pro- West elements, Arabs, Israelis, and Turks,
to combat the twin threats of Iraqi's secular radicalism and Iran's
religious militancy.
Success requires American leadership to deter the region's radi-
cals. This is where the process began. This is where it must con-
tinue. Without it, the process will die.
Second, our job is to work with the peace makers.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It you could summarize, because your time
is up. Thank you.
Mr. Satloff. Yes.
We need to work with the peace makers, with the Israelis, with
the Palestinians. We have a unique role in helping to shore them
up as well as insisting on full compliance.
And let us not forget Egypt. This is the most important relation-
ship in the Arab world. We must work on it now.
With Syria, Madam Chairman, I would suggest that we need to
step back for a moment. We have shown the urgency; the Israelis
have shown the urgency; it is unclear whether the Syrians have
shown the urgency.
In next week's meeting between Secretary Christopher and For-
eign Minister Sharaa, perhaps America's own bilateral list of is-
sues— proliferation, human rights, Lebanon, narcotics, counterfeit-
ing, and Syria's role in Lebanon — should be on the agenda.
A final note, Madam Chairman, as an historian, it is important
for all of us to take the long view. Though great progress has been
61
achieved, there is still much to go. We are still in an early phase,
getting leaders to make peace. It will take years before those stra-
tegic decisions filter down to the people. Success in the peace proc-
ess is not just one shuttle mission or one signing ceremony away.
The process is not irreversible. Achievements are not irrevocable.
The process can falter. It can succumb to terrorists. Nothing is in-
evitable. Nothing is impossible. We must take nothing for granted.
For America, the key to securing its interests is to remain en-
gaged at every step, supporting the peace makers, and actively de-
terring the enemies of peace.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, for the opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Satloff appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you so
much.
I would like to ask a question to the panelists. A FBIS report of
September 1 of this year, just a few weeks ago, cites an Israeli
newspaper as saying that Arafat has transferred $20,000 to a
Hamas organization known as the Young Muslims Association
headed by Sheikh Tal'at Sadr, one of the leaders of the political
arm of this organization, via the Palestinian Sports Ministry.
And we have heard reports and indications that Arafat has
transferred funds to these Hamas-sponsored institutions.
How do you assess this report? And what does it indicate about
the relations between the PLO and Hamas?
Mr. Satloff. Madam Chairman, first of all, I do not know the
specifics of the report. I was traveling in the region at the time.
My understanding of Chairman Arafat's approach is to try to iso-
late the military wing of Hamas and to try to bring in the soft sup-
port that Hamas receives from those who are the most economi-
cally disadvantaged.
In the last 6 months, the PLO has taken great steps to isolate
the military wing of Hamas. There is, I believe, great consternation
about the relationship between Arafat and Hamas on a political
level.
I am not familiar with financial transfers between the PA and
Hamas.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And this one referred to transferring it via
this Palestinian Sports Ministry. Would you know about any
Mr. POLISAR. If I could just interject a comment?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes.
Mr. Polisar. We at Peace Watch checked out the report both on
the PLO side and on the Hamas side. And all of the parties openly
admit that that transfer, in fact, took place and that there are
other transfers like that in the offing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Would you say that the PLO and
Hamas are about to sign an agreement between them? And what
are the principles of this agreement? What will result after this is
signed?
Mr. Polisar. The PLO and Hamas have been about to sign an
agreement for about the last 8 or 9 months based on press ac-
counts, which means you cannot take them that seriously.
I know what was under negotiation as of a couple of months ago.
The deal was going to be that the PLO would agree to release all
of the Hamas people who had been convicted by Palestinian courts
62
of crimes whose sentences ranged up to life imprisonment; and
Hamas was going to agree to stop its attacks from those areas con-
trolled by the Palestinian Authority.
And it was not clear whether they were only talking about Gaza
and Jericho or whether they were talking about those areas which
would be under Palestinian control in phase two of Oslo.
But I do not believe that anybody knows what is actually going
to be in it because the sides have not signed anything on paper.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Satloff. If I could just add one note.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes.
Mr. Satloff. In fact, the PLO and Hamas have had ongoing ne-
gotiations since the early days of the Intifada that go back to 1988.
This is, at its core, an adversarial relationship that, for moments
of time, there are tactical overlaps.
So while there could very well be an agreement between the po-
litical wing of Hamas and the PA at some point, I still believe that
there is a fundamental divide that separates these two.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And about this divide, how effective would
you say that Arafat's control over the Palestinian institutions in
the self-rule areas is? And to what extent would he be vulnerable
to a challenge from Hamas or other groups that are opposed to his
policy of supposedly pursuing the peace process, in his terms?
Would his faction win in a fairly contested ballot when and if elec-
tions are held for a Palestinian Council, in your opinions?
Mr. Satloff. In my opinion, Chairman Arafat himself would win
a rather significant majority in an election for the chairmanship of
the Palestinian Council. There may not even be an opposition in
that election. The factions that support Oslo would also win the
council vote, but there would be a significant minority that would
be elected from the opposition, both from the far left and the far
right.
All the opinion polls that I have seen give Hamas somewhere
around less than 20 percent of the vote.
In terms of security, I have no doubt that should there be a secu-
rity show-down between the forces supporting Oslo and the forces
opposing it, the forces supporting Oslo would win hands down.
Mr. POLISAR. I would just add to that that the polling data show-
ing Fatah, Arafat's wing, would win as well as Arafat himself. That
data has been consistent from September 1993 through to the
present with Arafat getting stronger and stronger.
However, it is not precisely an issue of support for or opposition
to the Oslo accords. You will get in the same poll that people sup-
port Arafat, and the majority also supports the continuation of the
armed struggle against Israel. So it seems to be more on a personal
and organizational level than purely ideological.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. That is interesting. Thank you so much.
Mr. Johnston.
Mr. Johnston. Just two brief questions. And if I could have
equally brief answer, possibly.
Mr. Polisar, who underwriters Peace Watch?
Mr. Polisar. Peace Watch is underwritten by private donors and
foundations who, like its board, run the gamut in terms of their po-
litical views.
63
Mr. Johnston. OK. The other question is, in your 12 pages of
testimony you dealt almost solely with the PLO and Palestinian
Authority and things of that nature.
You are dealing, in the Oslo accord, with two adversarial parties,
Israel and the PLO. Would not the opinion of the Israeli Govern-
ment be paramount in determining whether the PLO is complying
with the Oslo Agreement?
Mr. POLISAR. The opinion of the Israeli Government is significant
for a number of things politically. But when you want to monitor
compliance, you are not monitoring what one party thinks of the
other. You are monitoring what do the accords say, and what are
the actual behaviors?
It could be the Israeli Government will say compliance is bad,
and we do not care; or compliance is great, and we want more.
They are entitled to a political opinion, and the U.S. Congress is.
But as the representative of a monitoring organization, I cannot
substitute the judgment of an interested party for an objective
analysis based on obligations and actual behavior.
Mr. Johnston. So what you are saying — and you used the term
twice — a political opinion, so the government is only issuing a polit-
ical opinion on compliance?
Mr. Polisar. It can also say compliance is good, but we think the
process should not go on. Or it could say compliance is bad, and
we think it should not.
In other words, there are two separate phases. One is the judg-
ment on compliance. The judgments on compliance of the Israeli
Government are something that we weigh just as we weigh any-
body else's judgment.
But, bottom line, we have to give our analysis of the facts. That
is our mandate. And I think that is also the mandate of anyone,
like the U.S. Congress, who wants to sit in judgment of compliance.
Mr. Johnston. How long has Peace Watch been in existence?
Mr. Polisar. Since a month after the Israel-PLO accords were
signed. That is, since October 1993.
Mr. Johnston. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Burton [presiding]. The gentleman yields back the balance
of his time.
Does the gentlemen from New York have some questions of the
panel?
Mr. Engel. Yes. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I would like to ask both of you about PLO compli-
ance. On a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being totally in compliance and
0 being totally not in compliance, how would you rate the PLO?
Can we start with Mr. Satloff?
Mr. Satloff. That is a fascinating question, Mr. Congressman.
There is a difference between effort and results. I would give the
PLO a 6 or 7 in terms of its effort and a 5 in terms of the results.
Mr. Engel. OK.
Mr. Polisar.
Mr. Polisar. I am going to duck the question with a short expla-
nation.
At Peace Watch, we scrupulously refrain from giving overall
grades. It is not our job to say this party is good in compliance or
bad. We look obligation by obligation, because that is the approach
64
that we believe helps to correct problems while highlighting what
things are going well.
So if you want to ask me about any particular area, I will rate
it 1 to 10 or 1 to 100 or tell you what I think needs to be fixed
or what is going great; but I prefer not to give an overall esti-
mation, even at the risk of losing a good headline.
Mr. Engel. What about in effort — let me just ask you, if you do
not want to give numbers — what kind of effort — because, you know,
to me effort is probably more important than results because those
of us here in Washington sometimes make a great deal of effort,
and sometimes the results are less than we would like to see. So
I think effort is usually a pretty good indication of the sincerity of
the parties involved.
What kind of an effort do you think Mr. Arafat has been making
to comply?
Mr. POLISAR. For me, or for Peace Watch, effort is the only stand-
ard. You cannot expect someone to guarantee results. He can only
guarantee his actions.
But my answer is the same: Effort is not a category in terms of
compliance. If you want to ask me about extradition, which is one
of the subjects you discussed, I will give you an answer. But I will
not give an overall rating for their effort. It is not the place of
Peace Watch, and I cannot go beyond that.
Mr. Engel. Well, please talk a little bit about overall compliance,
in terms of overall compliance, since the accords were signed on
September 15, 1993.
Mr. POLISAR. All right. I would start with what is the most im-
portant obligation, what I call meta-compliance, what attitude is
being fostered by the PLO on the basic questions of Israel's legit-
imacy and the cessation of the armed struggle.
And on that, I think we would have to give the PLO relatively
low marks. And that consists — and the reasons for that is the
speeches about jihad, the speeches comparing the Oslo accords to
an accord which was abrogated 2 years later by Muhammad, the
failure to change the Palestinian Covenant.
But more than the failure to change the covenant, which one
could argue is very difficult to do and it involves other people, there
have not been any pronouncements by Chairman Arafat to the ef-
fect that he absolutely wants to change the covenant or proposing
what those changes would be or lobbying toward those changes or
making sure that his rhetoric conforms to the covenant as it should
be amended, as opposed to the covenant as it stands right now.
Much of his rhetoric fits better in the existing covenant than it
would in the covenant that he is committed to writing. So on that,
which I think is the most significant issue, the effort is a poor ef-
fort.
You know, obviously, there are operative levels as well, where on
some things the marks are good. The Palestinians have set up a
court system which has held trials of 36 individuals, 31 of whom
were sentenced.
Now, none of the individuals sentenced were among the top 50
terrorists of Hamas or Islamic Jihad. Instead, they were the politi-
cal leaders, they were the recruiters, they were writers and jour-
65
nalists. But nonetheless the trials is one of the things that is obli-
gated by the accords, and they have taken place.
I can go through other issues, but those are some of the things
that I think are particularly significant.
Mr. Engel. We have heard recently, the past couple of months,
that the PLO is supposedly cracking down on terrorists, rounding
them up. Have you found that? Have you found a difference in
what is happening in the past couple of months?
Or is the pattern still holding where people are rounded up but
then they are released and no one is really put on trial, no one is
really convicted, it is not really being sustained?
Mr. POLISAR. The last conviction by a Palestinian court in Gaza
was May, I believe, 25th. In other words, all of the trials that were
held were from April 10 through May 25. And after that, there was
a policy of no more trials. People were generally being released at
that point rather than held up.
So from May until a couple of weeks ago there were no trials at
all. Then at that point the Palestinians held two trials in Jericho
principally, it seemed, in order to prevent Israel's extradition re-
quest for those individuals from going through.
Because there is a provision of the accords saying that if the Pal-
estinians have already tried somebody, then Israel cannot extradite
that person or cannot request the extradition. So moments after re-
ceiving Israel's extradition request, the Palestinians held 15-
minute trials for a couple of individuals and then told Israel they
are already serving jail time.
But the court system was essentially stopped as of the end of
May. So if you would have asked me the question June 1st, I would
have said there has been a significant improvement. If you ask me
the question now, I would say that they are no longer using that
particular means.
Mr. Engel. I want to ask Mr. Satloff one question.
I would like you to comment on Mr. Polisar's remarks about the
covenant because people will say that it is impossible for Arafat to
change the covenant because he needs to get so many people to-
gether.
Mr. Polisar's point was he has not even tried, or the rhetoric has
not even indicated that he would like to change the covenant.
And then I would also like to ask you: What would the affect be
if the United States were to pull out its money in the process?
Would it, in essence, collapse the entire peace process?
Mr. Satloff. Well, first about the covenant, if you can spare me
just a moment.
The difficulty that Mr. Arafat sees in amending the covenant has
to do with the structural problem inside the PLO Charter that re-
quires two-thirds of the Palestine National Council to take such a
step.
The Palestine National Council is predominantly an expatriate
organization, a diaspora group with the majority of its members
living outside the West Bank and Gaza.
Oslo is essentially an internal deal. It was to empower the West
Bankers and Gazans. Arafat essentially cut himself off from the
large majority of membership in the PNC.
66
If the PNC were to be convened tomorrow, I suspect that you
would not get the two-thirds necessary to amend the charter. And
my understanding is that is why he has not proceeded down that
path. I might not like it, I might want it to be amended tomorrow,
but I do not think he has the votes; and I suspect that is why he
has not proceeded that way.
My understanding is that a new formula is being worked out to
hopefully do this after Palestinian elections which will provide
Arafat with the first-ever Palestinian mandate to let him take such
a substantive change.
So I understand his difficulties. I do not like them, but there is
a political rationale to why the PNC has not been convened so far.
As to your second question, if the United States were to sever its
assistance to the Palestinians precisely at a time when the Israeli
Government and the Palestinian leadership were to take one step
forward in the peace process, via the second stage agreement, I be-
lieve it would send a negative signal to both the Israeli people and
the Palestinian people about the lack of confidence that the Amer-
ican Government had in the leadership of both the Israeli Govern-
ment and the Palestinians. And such a shock of lack of confidence
would have ramifications throughout the peace process.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Moran.
Mr. MORAN. I did not hear all of the testimony, Mr. Chairman,
so I will pass. But I will have some questions of subsequent wit-
nesses, though.
Mr. Burton. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman, does the gentleman from New York have any
questions or comments?
Mr. Ackerman. I do not have any questions. I would ask to in-
clude my statement into the record.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
[The information appears in the appendix:]
Mr. Burton. Let me just follow up on that because I have a
question about the $500 million that we are proposing to give to
the PLO over the next 5 years.
According to British intelligence — and the gentleman who made
the statement stands by his comments and reports — the PLO has
approximately $8 billion in various institutions around the world.
Now, we certainly do not want the peace process to collapse; but
at the same time, they really do not need that money. And your
argument is that that money is part of the glue that is holding the
agreement together and that if that money is not forthcoming, the
process might break down.
It seems to me that it is in everybody's interest for this deal to
work out regardless of the money. The PLO wants a homeland;
they want the agreement to fly; they want permanence where they
were.
It just seems to me that the argument that the money that we
are supposed to give them is absolutely essential for the peace
process to go forward does not make any sense to me. It just does
67
not make any sense, especially at a time when we have severe fis-
cal problems in this country.
If the PLO had no resources and if this was the one essential
that had to be maintained to make sure the process continued, I
would say fine. But I just do not see that. Can you explain maybe
to my satisfaction the reason of why the money should go forward?
Mr. Satloff. Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman, I hold no portfolio
on behalf of the U.S. Government, nor do I have any insider knowl-
edge about PLO finances.
My assessment of the situation is that the United States having
made a commitment and having put a dollar figure on that com-
mitment has made a commitment not just to Yasir Arafat but a
commitment to those who support this process, Israelis and Pal-
estinians alike.
A decision after the fact to stop or to sever that commitment
would have ramifications, not just to the PLO but throughout the
peace process, about the American Government's ability and will-
ingness to carry through on its commitments in that process.
It would send signals everywhere from Cairo to Amman to even
potential future partners like those in Syria.
It is perfectly legitimate to look at PLO finances and to ask ques-
tions about where the money is going and to audit and all that sort
of thing with transparency and accountability.
But there is a larger political context here. And this has to do
with the American role in the peace process and how Israelis, Pal-
estinians, and other partners in that process perceive the American
commitment.
Mr. Burton. Well, I certainly will not argue the point other than
to say I do not think that those who are negotiating for the United
States and working in the peace process were aware of the tremen-
dous amount of assets that the PLO had during that process; and
when you find out information after the fact like that, I think it
does have a bearing and should be taken into consideration. But
we will not go into that.
Let me just ask you, you were talking about the extradition, I
think, a few minutes ago; and there is some question about wheth-
er or not there is a workable extradition agreement and whether
or not the PLO is working with the authorities in Jerusalem and
Tel Aviv.
Has Jericho become a safe haven for some of these people that
are alleged terrorists and perpetrating terrorist attacks? And are
they not being allowed to be extradited for trial in Israel?
Mr. Polisar. OK. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement is extremely
clear on the subject of extradition, which they call transfer of sus-
pects since it is not dealing with two sovereign entities.
If one side gives the other a formal request backed by a warrant
from a court and backed by the signature of the attorney general,
there is no opportunity for consideration; the arrest and transfer
have to be effected immediately.
There have so far been seven cases in which Israel has put in
formal requests like that for a total of 11 suspects in murders and
attempted murders.
In those cases to date, the Palestinians have responded twice,
once to say that under their interpretation the individuals in ques-
68
tion — who, by the way, were serving in the Palestinian police force
at the time and still do — those individuals should not be extradited.
In the other case, the Palestinians responded by saying they would
like to extradite but the individuals in question are in Egypt and
not Gaza.
When it subsequently turned out and became a matter of the
public record that those individuals were, in fact, in Gaza, the Pal-
estinian Authority changed its answer and said that Israel had not
filled out the paperwork correctly. That was several months ago,
and they still have not told Israel what flaw there is.
In all of the other requests, the Palestinians have not yet given
any answer, and they have not yet extradited.
So, on the simple level, they are 0 for 11 on this.
Now, there is a second category called
Mr. Burton. They are 0 for 11?
Mr. Polisar. All of the 11 people whom Israel has requested
have not been handed over to date, although the accords are clear
that those people should be handed over.
Mr. Burton. So, in essence, what you are saying is, it appears
as though there is a violation of the agreement?
Mr. Polisar. On this, I will make a clear statement: There is a
violation of the agreement. And let me just back that up with one
other thing.
General Nasser Yusef, who heads the Palestinian police force,
said, as a matter of public record in an interview with our organi-
zation, Peace Watch, that it is the standing policy of the Palestin-
ian Authority not to hand over any suspects in any security-related
cases. And that was backed up by a statement from their lieuten-
ant director of intelligence and seems to fit the policy set on the
political level.
Mr. Burton. Well, I do not want to belabor this discussion, we
have other panels, but I would just like to say that the gentleman
who proceeded you, when I asked him about the $500 million, indi-
cated that we had to live up to the peace process and the agree-
ment, otherwise we would be looked upon as somebody who is not
trustworthy.
It seems to me that what you are saying there is the peace proc-
ess has been abrogated, at least in this instance, and they have vio-
lated the agreement. And that being the case, especially with the
tremendous substantial assets that they have around the world, it
would seem to me, since we did not have those facts before, that
we ought to use that as possibly a lever to force compliance with
every aspect of the peace process. And if they do not, we should not
give them that money.
Does anybody else have any questions?
I see the ranking democratic has arrived. Mr. Hamilton, do you
have any comment? I think everybody else has spoken.
Does the gentleman, Mr. Brownback, have any questions or com-
ments?
Mr. Sanford. Sanford.
Mr. Burton. Sanford. Excuse me. I am sorry.
Mr. Sanford. I do not have any questions. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. OK. Thank you.
69
There being no further questions of this panel, we will thank you
very much for your testifying. And we will have the next panel
come forward.
We now are joined by Mr. Neal Sher, Executive Director for the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee here in Washington.
Mr. Sher, thank you for coming today. You may go ahead and
proceed with your opening statement.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, may I make a unanimous consent
request to have testimony from the Center for Israeli Peace and Se-
curity made part of the record?
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
[The material appears in the appendix.]
STATEMENT OF NEAL SHER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
Mr. SHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this distin-
guished committee, for the opportunity to testify today before you.
As executive director of AIPAC, I recognize the critical role
that
Mr. BURTON. Excuse me. Would you care to introduce the lovely
lady next to you there?
Mr. Sher. Yes. My pleasure. Ester Kurz, who is the director of
our legislative policy.
Mr. Burton. Welcome.
Mr. Sher. We recognize that this committee plays a vital role
every year in ensuring that the United States-Israel relationship
remains strong.
We believe in the critical importance of United States relations
with Israel. And we recognize the prominent role that foreign aid
plays in accomplishing America's foreign policy objectives, not only
in Israel but around the world. And in this regard, I want to ex-
press AIPAC's strong support for a viable foreign assistance pro-
gram.
AIPAC, a domestic, nonpartisan membership organization of
American citizens, works on a daily basis with its members to nur-
ture a close and consistently strong partnership between our coun-
try and Israel.
On our executive committee sit the presidents of 50 major Amer-
ican Jewish organizations representing more than four and a half
million active members throughout the United States, as well as
leaders of the country's pro-Israel community from all 50 states.
AIPAC is the designated spokesman on Capitol Hill on behalf of
the organized American Jewish community on issues relating to
the United States-Israel relationship.
Mr. Chairman and members, we meet at an historic moment. Is-
rael and the Palestinians are about to sign a landmark agreement
which has the potential of transforming relations between the two
parties and between Israel and the wider Arab world.
A broad Arab-Israel peace would promote three key United
States foreign policy objectives: greater regional stability, contain-
ment of radical forces and states, and secure flow of Persian Gulf
oil.
This brings enormous political, economic, and strategic benefits
both to the United States and to Israel.
70
But in concluding this agreement, we have to understand that Is-
rael is taking unprecedented risks for peace, predicated on support
from its one reliable ally, the United States of America.
The alliance between the two countries serves as the bedrock of
Israel's security and the guarantee of stability in the region. Israel
is able to take the risks for peace only when she is confident that
the United States stands behind her.
United States support is vital to achieving the goals of the agree-
ment, to minimizing the risks that Israel is taking, and to making
sure that Israel is not harmed in the event that things do not go
well.
There is a wide range of opinion in the pro-Israel community, as
there is in Israel itself, regarding the best path to peace between
Israelis and Palestinians.
But there clearly is a consensus that the critical decisions re-
garding peace and security must be made by the democratically
elected Government of Israel in free and direct negotiations with
its Arab counterparts.
The Government of Israel has arrived at such a critical decision.
It is about to sign an agreement with the Palestinians committing
the State of Israel to a specific course of action.
And I am particularly pleased to be here today because the U.S.
Congress has a vital role in helping ensure the success of the im-
pending agreement.
First and foremost, it needs to support the peace process by
maintaining United States aid to Israel. As stated in a May 4,
1994, letter to Prime Minister Rabin, co-authored by Senators Dole
and George Mitchell, which 92 Senators signed, and I quote: "As
you work for peace and reconciliation, please know that we will
continue to do our best to provide Israel with the economic and de-
fense assistance it needs, because we believe a just and lasting
peace can only succeed if Israel is strong and secure."
To that end, let me take this opportunity to thank the members
of this committee for supporting the $3 billion in aid to Israel in
the fiscal year 1996 Foreign Aid Authorization bill, H.R. 1561.
Another important contribution Congress can make to the peace
process is support for the renewal and the strengthening of the
Middle East Peace Facilitation Act, known as MEPFA, as con-
tained in the Senate version of H.R. 1868.
MEPFA has already made an important contribution to the peace
process. By linking aid and overall relations with the United States
to PLO compliance with its commitments to renounce terrorism
and violence and to accept Israel's right to exist, it has provided
the Palestinian Authority, the PA, with an incentive to comply with
the PLO's commitments.
Since MEPFA was first enacted, the PLO's record of compliance,
while still far from adequate, has improved, particularly in recent
months.
The PA has reportedly prevented a number of Islamic terrorist
acts, including suicide attacks, against Israel. And there have been
consistent reports of high levels of cooperation between Palestin-
ians and Israeli security forces.
Wanted terrorists have been subjected to long prison terms by
the PA.
71
Mr. Burton. Mr. Sher, could we have you conclude relatively
soon so we could get to the questions and answers? We are trying
to stick as close as we can to the 5-minute rule.
Mr. Sher. OK. I will chop it down a bit. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
Mr. SHER. We have to make one thing very clear. We understand
that much more has to be done. There are problems. The problems
highlight, in our view, the need for tougher legislation that would
provide Congress with additional leverage to enforce PLO compli-
ance.
Arafat must understand that the U.S. Congress is closely watch-
ing his acts.
The new MEPFA, which we support is, indeed, tougher than ex-
isting legislation. In addition to certifying that the PLO continues
to comply with its commitments of September 1993, the President
would also have to certify that the PLO is complying with many
other commitments, particularly those under the Gaza-Jericho
Agreement of May 1994, which include: the prevention of acts of
terrorism; taking legal measures against terrorists; abstaining from
and preventing acts of incitement; prohibiting the possession, man-
ufacture, sale, or acquisition of weapons.
Moreover, the bill prohibits, v/ithin 6 months, any aid unless the
President further certifies six other items, including disavowal of
the covenant calling for Israel's destruction.
In addition, the bill introduces financial accountability by requir-
ing the President to certify that the U.S. assistance is spent only
for its intended purposes.
Mr. Chairman, virtually the entire organized American Jewish
community has publicly expressed support for MEPFA of 1995. In
an August 2, 1995, press release, the Conference of Presidents of
major American Jewish organizations stated, and I quote: "There
is a strong consensus among our 50 national member agencies to
support MEPFA 1995."
We at AIPAC are part of this overwhelming consensus. And we
take note as well that both the Government of Israel and our own
Administration are also supportive of MEPFA 1995.
We believe that adopting it will enhance the peace process, pro-
mote American interests. And that by rejecting the bill or adopting
proposals that would have the effect of denying any aid to the Pal-
estinians would cause serious harm.
The new bill, the new proposal would maximize the law's effec-
tiveness as a tool to ensure PLO compliance with its commitments.
An enhanced MEPFA would help demonstrate to the PA its need
to comply with its commitments.
Mr. Chairman, despite its problems, the peace process has made
dramatic progress since that unforgettable day 2 years ago when
Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat shook hands on the White House
lawn.
We must ensure that the progress we have witnessed will con-
tinue so that one day Israelis and Palestinians will live together in
peace and that Israel will have the peace and security it so des-
perately longs for and needs.
Thank you very much.
72
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sher appears in the appendix.]
Mr. BURTON. Thank you for your comments.
First of all, you indicated that the PLO has taken steps to stop
terrorist attacks against Israeli forces and positions. What docu-
mentation do you have for that?
Mr. Sher. Well, there have been several reports and, frankly,
also from meetings and conversations we have had in Israel.
But the main point that I would like to
Mr. BURTON. No. The point is that those were pretty categorical
statements that you made, and I just wondered if you had any doc-
umentation where the PLO could show that they took steps to stop
some kind of a terrorist attack. Because there have been a number
of terrorist attacks, as you
Mr. SHER. Yes, there have been terrorist attacks. Of course, the
ones they stopped did not result in terrorist attacks. And informa-
tion we have received, reports we have been given, indicate that
they have made improvements in this.
And the point that I would like to make here is that by Congress
staying engaged through MEPFA, which has as a requirement for
the continued relationship between America and the Palestinians
that they continue to comply with this commitment, that Amer-
ica— this Congress has a role in keeping their feet to the fire. And
it is a very useful tool and vehicle that would ultimately help the
peace process.
Mr. Burton. We intend to do that, I think. But you made that
statement and it kind of puzzled me.
You also said that the overwhelming percentage of the Jewish
Americans are for these accords. 1 have before me some statistics.
It says according to an American Jewish Committee survey, 71 to
17, the U.S. Jewish constituency does not believe that the PLO will
comply with commitments or will refrain from terrorism. Seventy-
one percent believe they will not comply.
And 63 percent to 30 percent oppose economic aid to the Pal-
estinians.
And 91 percent do not believe that the PLO is doing enough to
prevent terrorism.
And by a vote of 56 to 37, in this statistical study, they maintain
that the Arab's goal is the destruction of Israel.
So I do not know about these organizations that you referred
to
Mr. Sher. Well
Mr. Burton. Let me just finish.
Mr. Sher. Sure.
Mr. Burton [continuing]. But the vast majority of the Jewish
constituency and Jewish Americans do not agree with you.
Let me just ask a couple of questions here.
Mr. SHER. Mr. Chairman, first
Mr. BURTON. Well, let me just ask a couple of other questions
here, and then you can respond.
Mr. Sher. OK.
Mr. BURTON. It is my understanding that Yasir Arafat and his
organization transferred to the Hamas organization a fairly large
sum of money.
73
And it is generally believed that this organization has been at
least complicitous, if not totally responsible, for some of these acts
of terrorism.
And I do not understand how you cannot question, at least se-
verely, the leader of the signer of the peace agreement when he evi-
dently did approve of this large sum of money going to a drug ter-
rorist organization.
And one more thing, and then you can comment on all three of
them.
The previous panel talked about the, quote, unquote, extradition
agreement — which is really a transfer agreement since they are not
sovereign nations — and the PLO is 0 for 11, 0 for 11 where there
have been people who were allegedly involved directly or indirectly
in acts of terrorism and they were to be brought before the courts
of justice in Israel; and Israel has made a formal request and has
had the warrants, as I understand, in accordance with the agree-
ment sent to the PLO governing agency there in Jericho; and they
are 0 for 11.
So it seems to me that there is a violation of the agreement. It
seems to me that there is a continued support of terrorist organiza-
tions by Mr. Arafat. And at the same time that all of this is going
on, which is an abrogation of the agreement in my view, we are
supposed to go ahead with $500 million in assistance.
And also, the inconsistency between what you said about the
total support of the Jewish community for these accords when, in
fact, the polls among Jewish Americans do not seem to support
that.
If you could cover those three things, I would really appreciate
it.
Mr. Sher. I would be very happy to.
First, I think one thing has to be made clear: I am not here today
as a cheerleader for Yasir Arafat, by any stretch of the imagina-
tion. And nothing I say should be construed as such.
Are there problems? Absolutely. Everybody recognizes that. Our
organization recognizes it. The Jewish community as a whole recog-
nizes it. And frankly, some of the problems to which you have al-
luded, demonstrate quite clearly why a stronger and enhanced
MEPFA is so important.
It gives leverage to this powerful body, to our powerful govern-
ment, over Arafat to make improvements and to do what he is sup-
posed to do.
And the American Jewish community, overwhelmingly, as re-
flected by the Conference of Presidents, has supported a stronger
and enhanced MEPFA, as is reflected in what is in the Senate bill
now, H.R. 1868.
And they understand exactly what I am articulating now. And
that is that the United States has a critical role to play, and they
can have an impact upon Arafat's behavior, and that by using wise-
ly this leverage, which is what MEPFA is all about, we can do
something to help strengthen Israel, to strengthen the peace proc-
ess, and to inure to the benefit of people in the region and in the
United States.
No one says there are no problems. But we think MEPFA is a
very valuable tool in addressing those very problems.
74
Mr. Burton. Well, I thank you for your comments. I have strong
reservations, as you probably realize.
Mr. Sher. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sher, we are delighted to have you. I, of course, was inter-
ested in your support for the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act
and the strengthening of it.
Let us suppose we reject it, what happens in your judgment?
Mr. Sher. Well, without it, our entire relationship with the PLO,
including the possibility of aid, is terminated. We lose the available
leverage that I think we must retain. And if we want to be players,
we simply have to engage in this process.
It is a critical part of the process. We think that it provides the
appropriate measures to influence the problems that we are seeing
there.
Mr. Hamilton. As you know, it is supposed to expire, I think, in
a few days
Mr. Sher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. And what is your thought with re-
gard to the length of time on it for renewal?
Mr. Sher. Well, the current bill, which is on the Senate side, is
an 18-month extension.
Mr. Hamilton. You support that?
Mr. Sher. We support what has been known as the Helms-Pell
bill, yes, sir.
Mr. Hamilton. OK. And does your testimony, when you talk
about strengthening the MEPFA, spell out the conditions that you
favor to strengthen it at the bottom of page two of your testimony?
Mr. Sher. Well, we believe that the Helms-Pell bill, which is
1995, indeed, significantly strengthens the original 1994 version.
And in my testimony, sir, we articulate some of the areas that
it addresses which demonstrate that it is a significant strengthen-
ing.
Mr. Hamilton. Now, you strongly support the peace process as
it is now taking place?
Mr. Sher. Yes. We have been supportive, and we are supportive
of Israel as it pursues this course.
Mr. Hamilton. And do you think that that support is very wide-
spread in the American Jewish community?
Mr. Sher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hamilton. And you are aware, of course, that there are
voices, some we are hearing today, strongly opposed to that peace
process?
Mr. Sher. That is right.
You know, the American Jewish Committee poll, to which there
has been allusion to earlier — and I think the American Jewish
Committee itself will be testifying after I finish — reflects very large
and overwhelming support by the community.
And I think that should be not lost sight of.
And the peace process as well.
Mr. Hamilton. OK. Well, we thank you, sir, for your testimony.
We are very pleased to have you.
Mr. Sher. Thank you.
75
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.
Before I yield to the next member, let me just say the staff gave
me some information. They said that in the event that the legisla-
tion was not successful, the PLO office would be closed and U.S.
dollars to the World Bank amounting to about $40 million would
stop.
However, it would not stop our State Department's dialog with
the PLO; and U.S. dollars going to NGO's in the amount of ap-
proximately $35 million would go forward.
So it would not be a total cutoff.
Mr. Sher. But we would lose that very important leverage that
I have referenced.
Mr. BURTON. Well, I think that is a matter of
Ms. Kurz. If I could just make another point, Mr. Burton?
Mr. Burton. Yes.
Ms. Kurz. In terms of the money that goes into the World Bank,
that is money which is donor country money in which several na-
tions participate; and they very much look to U.S. leadership in
terms of their own contributions to the Palestinians.
If we were to withdraw or temporarily even pull back our money
from that multinational effort, my guess is the donor countries
would as well. They would hold back their funds. And as a result,
much more than the $40 million you are talking about would be
withheld.
Mr. Burton. I need to yield to my colleague, but let me just say
that I think that most people would agree with you as long as the
PLO is holding up their end of the bargain.
But with the terrorist attacks and the noncompliance as far as
transferring known terrorists or alleged terrorists for trial, I mean,
they are violating their agreement; and I think that that causes
some real consternation among people who are voting to support
the position that you want.
I would be happy to yield to my colleague, Mr. Sanford, who does
look a little bit like Mr. Brownback.
Mr. Sanford. I will take that as a compliment, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow back up briefly with the chairman's thoughts, in
that I suppose what we are trying to measure is violations of com-
pliance with managing the peace process.
And I am curious to know is there a line in the sand, so to speak,
in terms of noncompliance beyond which you would say: We know
longer support aid to the PLO?
Mr. Sher. Well, compliance is a process that is ongoing. And
there have been improvements. I do not think there is any ques-
tion. And I think that the United States has played a role in the
past through MEPFA 1994, which was a major reason and a con-
tribution to that.
And, frankly, we all recognize that much more has to be done.
And by our continued involvement and leadership, and leader-
ship— as my colleague has said, it is not just U.S. participation; it
is leadership. As the only super power in the world, it is very sig-
nificant that we take the prominent leadership role.
76
Mr. Sanford. I would grant that. But my question relates back
to earlier testimony that suggested that there had been too much
noncompliance.
And so my question to you is: Is there a line in the sand in terms
of noncompliance beyond which you say, no, we would not support
aid to the PLO?
Mr. Sher. Well, I mean, we are clearly looking for improvement
and significant improvement.
And this also ties into the fact that we are at an historic junc-
ture. And at this point, to just cutoff that entire relationship would
make it virtually impossible for it to continue. It would have a dra-
matic negative impact.
Mr. Sanford. I yield back.
Mr. Burton. Gentleman yields back the balance of his time.
The gentleman from Florida?
No questions.
The gentleman from New York.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Mr. Sher, I want to compliment you on an excellent
presentation, particularly your mention of foreign aid, which is
something that we have discussed and debated for a long time in
this committee and so many of us are very worried and concerned
that the foreign aid pot seems to be shrinking; and we worry that
although the foreign aid moneys to Israel have not been, if the cur-
rent Congress keeps in its direction, it is only unfortunately a mat-
ter of time until foreign aid to Israel is affected. So I think that
foreign aid ought to be strengthened, not cut back.
I also agree with you on the strengthening of MEPFA. I think
that the question really is: How do we strengthen it? And that, I
think, really where the disagreements come in.
I think that you said that we need to have additional leverage
on Mr. Arafat and that the U.S. Congress is watching his actions.
And I have, from day one, felt that that is very, very important,
that he not think that he can just do whatever he wants and people
are so anxious to have the peace process continue that things will
continue and American aid will flow regardless of whether or not
Mr. Arafat and the PLO complies.
And so I think that those points were very good.
I also want to comment on something that Mr. Burton said, be-
cause I think that the American Jewish Committee poll, which I
have here, really kind of shows the American Jewish community is
really very torn or is being pulled in a lot of different directions.
And I just wanted to mention this because I think it more accu-
rately reflects the views.
They ask: "Overall, do you support or oppose the Israeli Govern-
ment's current handling of the peace negotiations with the Arabs?"
And 68 percent support, 15 percent oppose.
"More specifically, do you support or oppose the Israeli Govern-
ment's current handling of the peace negotiations with the Pal-
estinians?"
And 64 percent support, 22 percent oppose.
However, on the other hand: "Do you think that the past 2 years
of negotiations between Israel and her Arab negotiating partners
increased the likelihood of another war, or increased the likelihood
77
of peace with the Arabs?" I should not have said "on the other
hand."
And 18 percent say increase the likelihood of war, and 66 percent
say increase likelihood of peace.
But, on the other hand, the question: "Can the PLO be relied
upon to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorist activities
against Israel?" 17 percent say yes, and 71 percent say no.
"Do you think that Palestinians are interested, or are not inter-
ested, in a true and lasting peace with Israel?" 37 percent say they
are interested. 51 percent say they are not.
And then when you ask: "Is the PLO doing enough or not doing
enough to control terrorist activity against Israel by Hamas and
other Palestinians extremist groups?" only 5 percent say doing
enough, and 91 percent not doing enough.
I could continue, but I just wanted to read those because it just
kind of shows that people want peace; but people do believe that
the PLO is not complying and really doing what they can do.
So I guess I have more of a statement than a question. If you
would like to comment on anything that I said.
Mr. Sher. All I would like to say is that I think that you deserve
to be complimented and commended for your efforts along these
lines. And we at AIPAC thank you for that.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BURTON. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Moran.
Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask you a little about what has been done to date. Have
you seen any substantial economic development in the Gaza strip,
for example?
Mr. Sher. I think there is no question there has been an im-
provement of some economic situations in the Gaza.
There has been building. There have been economic development
which can only benefit the lives of the people there.
Mr. MORAN. I understand that one of the things that was dis-
cussed early on was the development of a hotel, a Marriott Hotel
in Gaza. That is not going anywhere, I understand.
Mr. Sher. I think it is contemplated. I do not know the exact sta-
tus of it. But there certainly are intentions to build hotels there.
Mr. MORAN. Do you think OPIC has contributed as much as they
might have the resources to do to the development of the Gaza
strip?
Mr. Sher. As much as they can?
Mr. Moran. Well, as much as one would have expected, say 2
years ago?
Ms. Kurz. Just to answer, the money is certainly there. There
have been some complaints that we have heard about bureaucratic
delays in actually having the guarantees go forward. And that has
been a subject of concern. Obviously time is of the essence, and
projects take time.
But, unfortunately, the economic situation, if it continues to dete-
riorate, does have an immediate impact. So there is a problem of
immediate benefits versus the longevity of the these projects and
how long they take to actually come to fruition.
78
So there has been some concern expressed and some different
avenues pursued as to how to get quick projects on the ground that
can show immediate benefit to the people in the area.
Mr. Moran. Yeah. I do not know that there has been a lot of
that. And I am interested in people's perspective on that, whether
sufficient effort has been made.
Let me just raise one issue, and you can handle it how you
choose.
If we were to simply pull out of the peace process in terms of the
U.S. role now, as some of the groups have advocated today, do you
see any prospect for a more constructive individual or entity to be
able to negotiate with on the part of the Palestinian groups any
time in the near future?
Mr. Sher. Well, certainly the Israelis are negotiating with the
people they think they have to negotiate with. And that is a very
important point to keep in mind.
And they understand the difficulties, they understand the prob-
lems, but they are forging ahead because they think it is in their
best interests in the long run.
Mr. MORAN. So regardless of the problems we read about in all
of this voluminous data, you do not think that there is any more
constructive or better opportunity on the horizon if we wanted to
pursue peace in the Middle East than the current structure of ne-
gotiations that is transpiring now?
Mr. SHER. I do not think we have seen that.
Mr. Moran. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.
We have two votes on the floor. We will recess until the two
votes are over. We have one more member, Mr. Lantos, who would
like to question this panel, if you could wait.
And then as soon as we get back and Mr. Lantos completes his
questioning, we will go to the next panel and have them testify.
We appreciate your patience.
We will stand in recess until the votes are cast.
[Recess.]
Chairman GlLMAN [presiding]. The committee will come to order.
We interrupted the hearing in order to vote. We were in the
midst of the testimony by Neal Sher, Executive Director for the
American-Israel Public Affairs Committee.
Mr. Sher, did you finish your testimony?
Mr. Sher. Yes. I did everything, answered some questions. And
my understanding is that Congressman Lantos wanted to ask some
questions.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend Mr. Sher and Ms. Kurz for their participa-
tion. I find your testimony, Mr. Sher, very convincing and ex-
tremely realistic.
Early on when I sat at the witness table, I indicated that I have
been going to Israel since 1956 with great regularity. I have been
deeply involved in United States-Israel relations for decades.
79
I must say that the breakthroughs we have seen during the last
couple of years with all the blemishes and all the problems and all
the setbacks and all the tragedies is literally mindboggling.
And I find that even in private dialogs with Arab leaders who
have not yet come on board, like during my very lengthy private
meeting with President Asad of Syria, it is self-evident that the
peace process has had a major metamorphosis in the thinking of
even the most recalcitrant Arab players in this game.
I believe that Israel shedding Gaza has been a tremendous boon
to that country. The peace treaty with Jordan is of monumental
significance. I had the pleasure of taking the first congressional
delegation across the bridge to visit Amman, having visited Jerusa-
lem. And I have had numerous discussions with the Jordanian
leadership, and I am very encouraged by their whole attitude and
approach to a new era.
Earlier in the year, my visits in Saudi Arabia, with President
Mubarak, in Oman, and elsewhere have convinced me that this
clearly is an infinitely preferable course to follow than what would
be the breakdown of the process.
I have noted that many of my colleagues both in testimony and
in questioning from here have dealt with the desirability of the
peace process from the Israeli point of view, and I fully share those
sentiments.
But I am far more concerned with the possibility of this process
coming to a grinding halt from the point of view of U.S. national
interests. This country has invested unbelievable resources — eco-
nomic, political, military, intellectual, cultural — in moving toward
peace.
This administration, I believe, has been incredibly supportive of
the State of Israel and the creation of a somewhat more normal cli-
mate in the Middle East.
I must admit that I am a bit puzzled by those who are focusing
on the palpable flaws and deficiencies of both some of the players
and many of the developments.
I suspect I could stay here until midnight and cite problems with
Yasir Arafat. It is very easy to do so. And I have done that for dec-
ades. The fact remains that until I am shown better alternatives
in terms of the ongoing peace process, I believe it would be the
height of irresponsibility for the United States not to continue
along this path.
I would also say that I find a yardstick of perfection an unrealis-
tic one in the Middle East or, indeed, elsewhere. There will con-
tinue to be outrages and problems and violations and tragedies,
just as there are here in our own country.
If the great cities of the United States are incapable of providing
a physically safe situation for American citizens, I think it is the
height of absurdity to assume that in the turbulent Middle East
riskless, painless, tragediless months or years can lie ahead.
And I merely want to say to those who would like to see this
process halted that before they pursue that line of reasoning they
consider the alternatives, because the alternatives, under any set
of circumstances, are so infinitely less favorable than this halting,
flawed, painful, bloody, difficult, tenuous, peace process, that I
often wonder how people can take the position that an action by
80
this Congress, which would bring the process to a grinding halt,
could benefit either our friends who wish to have a civilized and
peaceful and democratic life in the region — not just in Israel but
those segments of the Palestinians and those segments in the
neighboring Arab states who feel this way — but I also wonder what
their recommendation is with respect to U.S. foreign policy at a
time when such a powerful isolationist trend is sweeping the Con-
gress and the country.
This clearly is the most reasonable — I would have to say the only
reasonable course to pursue.
I fully favor strengthening the Middle East Peace Facilitation
Act. I fully favor holding Arafat's feet to the fire at every step of
the way. I fully favor insisting that every single facet of every
agreement he has signed onto or will sign onto he will abide by.
But I also think it is self-evident that a flawed process which
pushes the ball forward is infinitely more desirable from the point
of view of U.S. national interests than a process that would come
to a grinding halt.
And I would be grateful if either you or Ms. Kurz or both of you
would comment on my statement.
Mr. Sher. Well, we, of course, as I have stated before, believe
that it is imperative that the U.S. Congress play the significant
role that it can play and has been playing in this.
And, indeed, this is the course that the peace process which the
duly elected Government of Israel has embarked upon is one which
the United States should stand with Israel on, stand behind Israel
so that the risks are minimized to every degree possible.
And does the process and does Arafat have problems? Yes. I
think we have made this very, very clear.
And I think that is all the more reason for the active participa-
tion of this body, of this Congress, in doing what it can do to help
secure peace.
Mr. Lantos. Ms. Kurz.
Ms. Kurz. I just want to commend you for your comments. They
were as always, very eloquent and to the point.
It is easy to forget the moment in history in which we are living
because we all get caught up in our day-to-day lives, and we all are
very busy in the minutia and the details of our own lives.
But the kind of moment that we are witnessing in history right
now, not just for the people of Israel, but for the world is amazing;
I do not think most of us can appreciate what exactly it is we are
witnessing.
It may come to naught. It may fall apart at any moment. There
are enormous threats. There are many, many rejectionists in the
region who want to bring this to a grinding halt, as you have indi-
cated. And there are going to be lots of problems down the road.
But to step back for a moment and look at the big picture and
what we are talking about for the people of Israel and for their ul-
timate security — and for those of us who have family and friends
who have been killed in wars in Israel, been killed in terrorist at-
tacks— it is a painful, difficult process. But as you say, the alter-
natives are far worse. And I think it is incumbent upon us, both
for American interests and for Israel's interests, to do everything
that we can to make sure that Israel's Government, which is taking
these risks at enormous risks to itself, is supported by this country,
by this Congress, that has been so tremendously supportive in the
past. And we thank you for that.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GiLMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I was not
here to listen to the testimony. I have had a chance to read the
statements.
You come out for support of MEPFA unequivocally. You point out
that MEPFA has been strengthened, this version of MEPFA has
been strengthened from earlier versions.
You want it passed soon. And you think it is a mistake to write
it in a fashion that would compel a decision to eliminate the sus-
pensions and prohibitions that MEPFA waives in existing law.
Mr. Sher. Correct.
Mr. Berman. I do not know if you spoke about the timeframe for
an extension. Some people want to do this for another 45 days, an-
other 60 days.
Do you have any thoughts about how long we should extend this
bill for?
Mr. Sher. Well, MEPFA 1995, that is H.R. 1868, talks about an
extension with the new tougher provisions for 18 months. And
hopefully this entire package can be concluded by the fiscal year
and go into effect.
Ms. Kurz. If I could add, Mr. Berman, the original MEPFA ex-
pired on June 30. We are now operating on the second of two 45-
day extensions. That means it is now 3 months that we are operat-
ing under current law. And we understand the reasons for it. There
is no Foreign Aid Authorization bill.
But it is our feeling that rather than operating under current
law, which is much weaker, which does not include any of the pro-
visions of Gaza-Jericho, which does not include much tougher lan-
guage on the covenant, which does not include the numerous provi-
sions that are in the Helms-Pell legislation, ultimately is a mis-
take. And to go for another short-term extension, the way to do
deal with this is to deal with the longer term, whether it is 18
months or whatever the decision is, but to deal with this com-
prehensively and to take action now rather than go by existing law.
We need to toughen up that law so that we do not continue to oper-
ate for another 3 months, which would be half a year, half the life
of this bill, under current law.
So the sooner it can be passed — it is now in the Senate Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill which is before the Senate at this
moment. We expect the Senate to conclude this week and go to con-
ference next week. And we are anxious to see it passed before Octo-
ber 1, which is the end of this next short-term extension.
Mr. Berman. I appreciate your thoughts on that, and I think
they are important.
Mr. Chairman, I am done except to point out one thing. And that
is, since the announcement of the Oslo Agreement and the signing
of the Declaration of Principles, there has not — first of all, the laws
that have been suspended and waived by the earlier versions of
82
MEPFA, in many cases, in most cases, perhaps in all cases, came
to the Congress at the suggestion of the organization that our wit-
nesses represent.
Second, I do not know of any organization, since September 1993,
that has spent more time dealing, at least with my office, in terms
of problems, violations, concerns, how effectively to deal with them
by the PLO.
And with that, I yield back my time.
Chairman GlLMAN. I thank the gentleman for his comments.
Just one question to Mr. Sher.
According to Peace Watch, the PLO has held 50 diplomatic meet-
ings at Orient House since the May 1994 agreement was signed.
Despite the fact that the agreement states that the Palestinian
Authority's offices will be only in Gaza or Jericho, 29 countries
have sent officials to meetings in Orient House.
Do you consider these kinds of meetings any violation of the ac-
cord? What has been the Israeli response to that? Does the United
States conduct any meetings in Orient House?
Mr. SHER. Not to my knowledge. No, the U.S. Government, to my
knowledge, does not conduct official PA business in Orient House.
And this is an issue which, in fact, the Israeli Government has
been dealing with. It has been dealt with in the Knesset, and they
recognize certain problems in that regard as well. So, you know,
this is something that has not gone unnoticed.
Ms. KuRZ. We have also, Mr. Chairman, worked very hard to in-
clude legislation that was in last year's appropriation's bill that
specifically prohibits the U.S. Government from having official
dealings on issues relating to Gaza-Jericho in Jerusalem.
Chairman GlLMAN. What is the status of that legislation?
Ms. KuRZ. That legislation is contained in both the House and
Senate Foreign Operations bills, and we expect it to pass again this
year. That is very important legislation that sends the message to
our Government that we should not be conducting any of these
meetings in Jerusalem.
Mr. Sher. This is, again, the United States doing what it can do
in preventing U.S. activities there.
Chairman GlLMAN. With regard to MEPFA, you are suggesting
that we ought to adopt the Helms-Pell proposal which was never
really debated and has an 18-month provision with a State Depart-
ment report every 6 months.
Do you not think by adopting that measure we are taking away
the leverage that we should have in the event that there is any
problem?
Mr. Sher. Because of the 18-month timeframe?
Chairman Gilman. Because of the 6 months intervals.
Mr. Sher. Well, the 6-month interval, quite frankly, does not
seem to be all that unreasonable. It calls for continuing and contin-
ual monitoring of the situation. That is built right into the lan-
guage. It is 6 months when the certification has to take place, but
the monitoring goes on continuously.
Chairman Gilman. There are many of us who have some concern
about too long a period of time. We recognize a necessity for
MEPFA, recognize that it can be helpful to the peace process; but
83
I think we should, to my mind, have a shorter fuse on it than that
lengthy period of time.
Well, we thank the panelists. We thank Neal Sher and Ester
Kurz for joining us.
We will move on to panel No. 5. I will call Dr. Mandell
Ganchrow, President, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of
America; David Harris, Executive Director, American Jewish Com-
mittee; Jim Zogby, President, Arab American Institute; Rand
Fishbein, Board of Advisors, Center for Security Policy; Mr. Morton
Klein, President, Zionist Organization of America; Mr. Richard
Hellman, President, Christian Israel Public Action Campaign; and
Mr. Seymour Reich, President, American Zionist Movement.
We thank our panelists for being patient and taking the time to
join us today. We regret we do not have one long table. We will try
to accommodate you as best we can, and our clerks will make cer-
tain there are enough seats at the table for the panelists.
Gentlemen, again, we want to urge you to be please be as brief
as possible. We have a long calendar here and a lot of votes coming
up that may interrupt our hearing.
We will go by the 5-minute rule. Once again, if you want to sub-
mit a statement in full for the record, do not hesitate to ask for
that. We will, without objection, put it into the record.
If you care to summarize your statement, we would welcome
that. But feel free to proceed in the manner best suited to you. We
will start with Dr. Mandell Ganchrow, President, Union of Ortho-
dox Jewish Congregations of America. Dr. Ganchrow.
STATEMENT OF MANDELL GANCHROW, PRESIDENT, UNION OF
ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA, ACCOM-
PANIED BY DAVID A HARRIS, EXECUTP/E DIRECTOR, AMER-
ICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE; JIM ZOGBY, PRESIDENT, ARAB
AMERICAN INSTITUTE; RAND FISHBEIN, BOARD OF ADVI-
SORS CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY; MORTON KLEIN,
PRESIDENT, ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA; RICHARD
HELLMAN, PRESIDENT, CHRISTIANS' ISRAEL PUBLIC AC-
TION CAMPAIGN; AND SEYMOUR REICH, PRESIDENT, AMER-
ICAN ZIONIST MOVEMENT
STATEMENT OF MR. MANDELL GANCHROW
Mr. Ganchrow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here this afternoon to testify.
I am the President of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
of America, the largest orthodox synagogue groups in the United
States comprising close to a thousand synagogues.
I am here today representing seven mainstream orthodox organi-
zations that comprise the united orthodox community in the United
States, including Amit, Emunah, Young Israel, Poale, Rabbinical
Council of America, Religious Zionists, and the Union.
I want to assure the members of this committee that we are all
mainstream organizations and not fringe groups. We are all mem-
bers of the Conference of Presidents of major American Jewish or-
ganizations and of AIPAC. And I myself, have been and am, for the
last 14 years, a member of the executive committee of AIPAC.
84
Chairman Gilman. Of course, you are excluding Mr. Zogby, who
is not a president of any Jewish organization.
And also Mr. Hellman.
Mr. Hellman. But I would like to be if they would let me join.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you.
Mr. Ganchrow. We have all supported the search for peace, Mr.
Chairman. We stood together on the White House lawn. We stood
together on the Jordanian-Israeli desert in the search for peace.
But this search has come at a very high price for the people of
Israel. The continued call for jihad, as we saw on tapes before — and
there are other dozens of other such tapes — the failure to return
those who engage in terrorist attacks as requested by Israel, ac-
cording to the Oslo accords, the politically inspired activities within
Jerusalem, not only in Orient House; but I myself saw 15 such in-
stitutions in Jerusalem within the last few weeks, the failure to
disarm Hamas, the failure to interdict smuggling of weaponry, and
the continued terrorist attacks all demand that we, the American
people and the American Congress, place the tightest and most
productive restrictions on United States aid to the Palestinian Au-
thority.
And it is no wonder, then, Mr. Chairman, that two-thirds of the
American-Jewish community across the board, as was mentioned
before by Mr. Burton, that two-thirds oppose any American aid to
the Palestinians at this time.
Our group has always supported this peace activity, as I noted;
and we are supporting Helms-Pell as a beginning step. But we be-
lieve that there are so many loopholes that the Palestinian Author-
ity, Mr. Arafat, can continue to get the money despite being in non-
compliance. And we have joined in stressing that this must be
tightened up.
We recommended, Mr. Chairman, that all money that is appro-
priated by the administration and by the Congress be placed into
an escrow account for 6 months, during which time the Palestin-
ians and Mr. Arafat can demonstrate their compliance with the
Oslo Agreement.
If they live up to their accords, we will happily, happily second
and support them getting their money.
And, Mr. Chairman, the proposals that I am about to mention
and the conditions are all in accordance with the AIPAC policy
statement at its convention in 1995, on page 4, calling for AIPAC
to support Spector-Shelby-Lowey and strengthening of MEPFA.
And so we feel that our recommendations are totally in accord
with the convention where 1500 of our AIPAC activists gathered to
say that MEPFA must be strengthened.
We believe that the following, Mr. Chairman, must be carried out
by the Palestinian Authority in order to warrant their receiving the
aid. Should they not do so, it would be a cause — not because of the
Sense of Congress as the current Helms-Pell, but rather because it
is a violation of U.S. law.
No. 1, the Palestinian Charter must be totally renounced and re-
pealed, not effectively superseded. If it is superseded, it could come
back into play. We believe what is worse than zionism is racism.
We believe, No. 2, they must disarm Hamas, and they must stop
the smuggling of new arms into the area.
85
No. 3, they must return the terrorists that are requested by the
Israeli Government.
No. 4, Mr. Arafat must stop the call for jihad and the inflam-
matory talk that are present on the tapes and in Arabic. And it is
going on even as we talk today. In the last few weeks, we have a
tape from this month.
All Palestinian offices in Orient House in Jerusalem must be
closed, because such activity is against the Oslo accord.
We believe Congress should investigate allegations of misuse of
funds set for housing and other purposes in Gaza and Jericho used
by the Palestinian Authority in Jerusalem to create facts on the
ground.
We believe that the Congress should not vote on MEPFA until
the GAO report is made public so every single Member of Congress
knows if they have $8 billion in the bank. And if they do, we would
not support American aid to the Palestinian Authority.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we ask that a very important provision
be added to MEPFA. And that is, that if Mr. Arafat or any Pal-
estinian Authority declares a Palestinian State, this should be
cause for automatic cutting off of all funds from the United States.
A Palestinian State would be contrary to the interests of America
and would destabilize the Middle East.
Mr. Chairman, we support peace. But it cannot be one at Amer-
ican taxpayers' expense if we support appeasement.
We support an honorable peace. American funds play a vital role
in providing incentives for Middle East countries to live up to their
obligations. Mr. Arafat has a record of murder, deceit, and duplic-
ity.
Let us work for peace by making sure that Israel's security is en-
sured and American foreign policy interests are safeguarded. It
could only be done with complete compliance on the part of the Au-
thority.
Mr. Chairman, let us send a message to Mr. Arafat: Mr. Arafat,
comply with your obligations, reassure us through words and
deeds, and we will do what we have to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to submit the entire
statement to the committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ganchrow appears in the appen-
dix.]
Chairman GlLMAN. Thank you, Dr. Ganchrow. Your statement
will be made part of the record without objection.
Mr. Burton [presiding]. Once again, the Chairman has seen fit
to yield the Chair to a young, good looking fellow like me.
We will now proceed with Mr. David Harris' statement.
Mr. Harris.
STATEMENT OF DAVID A. HARRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
AMERICAN-JEWISH COMMITTEE
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for affording the Amer-
ican-Jewish Committee this opportunity to present our perspectives
on the current process, particularly at this critical stage in its evo-
lution.
86
And I might point out, Mr. Chairman, that I will be excerpting
from our prepared statement and would wish that the entire state-
ment be submitted for the record.
Mr. Chairman, it is the belief of the American-Jewish Committee
that Israel and its Arab neighbors, however slowly, however un-
evenly, are indeed moving toward a new era in the Middle East.
The Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, which began in Madrid in
October 1991, do hold the promise of thoroughly and constructively
remaking relations between Israel and the Arab world.
Our perspective is the result of 4 years of intensive experience
with the peace process from Madrid to Moscow and some 47 years
of close involvement with Israel.
The American-Jewish Committee has monitored the peace proc-
ess from its inception and sought to advance its cause here and in
other capitals.
And, Mr. Chairman, we have engaged in regular and detailed
discussions on the process with senior officials both in Washington
and Jerusalem as well as in the governments of Arab states from
the Magreb to the Gulf.
Our analyses and our discussions with the principals engaged in
the process here and in the region lead us to one conclusion: For
all of its difficulties, Mr. Chairman, the peace process set in motion
4 years ago represents Israel's best chance to depart from the trou-
bled course of modern history and achieve peace with its neighbors.
The difficulties on that road to peace cannot be minimized. The
tragedies, the repeated terrorist attacks cannot be forgotten. Yet
our support for the peace process and our trust in the judgment of
the duly elected Government of Israel on matters pertaining to Is-
rael's security are given in full awareness of the dangers Israelis
face, indeed, have always faced in a region and among people still
largely hostile to their existence.
It is not the intention of the framers of and participants in the
peace process to simply dismiss the dangers and redefine the hos-
tility of Israel's foes. Rather, its aim is to fundamentally alter the
nature of relations between Israel and its neighbors to strengthen
Israel's present and future security.
Mr. Chairman, future generations of both Jews and Arabs de-
serve no less an attempt.
In just 2 years since the signing of the DOP, those relations have
already changed to Israel's benefit. Not only has peace been
achieved with Jordan, but in diplomatic and commercial contacts
from North Africa to the gulf have been established, eroding the
economic boycott of Israel and laying the groundwork for future po-
litical and economic cooperation in the region.
Moreover, Israel's withdrawal from Gaza more than 1 year ago
was not only an essential element in establishing a new relation-
ship with the Palestinians, but it was and remains a highly popu-
lar decisions among Israelis themselves.
Mr. Chairman, in the American-Jewish Committee's support for
the Government of Israel as it pursues peace with security, I know
that a sister organization, the American-Jewish Congress, wishes
to associate itself with my remarks today.
As we all know, progress on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks has
been particularly difficulty whereas on the Palestinian track we re-
87
main cautiously hopeful that the intensive negotiations in Taba
this week will shortly yield a second phase agreement.
We hope and expect that when concluded this critical next step
in Arab-Israeli reconciliation will increase the Palestinian stake in
forging a new and mutually beneficial coexistence with Israel.
Mr. Chairman, the American-Jewish Committee believes that the
critical role played by the United States as facilitator, as supporter,
and as honest broker for peace must be extended.
We call upon the Congress, Mr. Chairman, to continue to provide
the President with the resources and the authority he requests in
the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act and other measures that
may come before this and the other body.
We believe that these efforts by the United States must be fur-
ther enhanced by the critically important efforts of America's
friends and allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
In expressing our support for this process, Mr. Chairman, the
American-Jewish Committee articulates the views of the over-
whelming majority of American-Jews, we believe.
In an attitude survey that we sponsored and that I understand
has been the subject of some discussion here today, we found that
68 percent of American-Jews, more than four in five who expressed
a view, support the Israeli Government in its current handling of
peace negotiations. And 87 percent of the respondents endorse a
continuing American role in the peace process.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Harris, if I might interrupt. We have a pretty
large panel. And we are trying to restrict the statements to 5 min-
utes, so if you could summarize, we would appreciate that.
Mr. Harris. Very well, sir.
I should note that there are those who are choosing to read se-
lected data from our survey and employing those selected data to
justify their own views on the peace process without examining the
survey in its complex and compelling totality.
In the final analysis, regardless of their own justified fears and
concerns, which are also revealed in the survey, Mr. Chairman,
American Jews are willing to set aside those concerns in deference
to the decisions made by the democratically elected Government of
Israel.
Our survey, we believe, confirms the confidence that our commu-
nity feels in that government, and its confidence as well in Ameri-
ca's partnership with Israel in pursuit of peace.
We look to your committee, Mr. Chairman, to maintain that part-
nership; and we call on it to continue its vital support of the Gov-
ernment of Israel as it seeks and takes risks for a new era of peace
with its neighbors.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris appears in the appendix.]
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Harris.
We will now hear from Mr. Zogby.
STATEMENT OF JIM ZOGBY, PRESIDENT, ARAB AMERICAN
INSTITUTE
Mr. Zogby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is James Zogby. I am president of the Arab American
Institute, and I serve as well with a former colleague of yours, Mel
88
Levine, as co-president of a project called Builders for Peace, pro-
moting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza in sup-
port of the peace process.
Since the beginning of the peace process, it has become accepted
as axiomatic that for the process to succeed, Palestinians must ex-
perience the benefits of peace.
It was understood that merely expanding economic opportunities
would not be sufficient to make peace; but without economic
growth, achieving peace would be impossible.
Seen in this context, there is a certain tragedy in witnessing the
reality of Gaza and Jericho today. Where there was once great opti-
mism and promise, there is now cynicism and despair.
The statistics alone are staggering. Unemployment in Gaza today
stands at over 60 percent, a dramatic increase above 1993. Virtual
reality projections from international bureaucrats aside, the major
job creating infrastructure projects that were to have started have
not yet begun; and open sewage remains a serious health hazard.
And as a result of the prolonged closures of Gaza's borders with
Israel and the fact that no regular access or egress is available to
Egypt or Jordan or the outside world, commerce has not expanded.
Yes, as some of the earlier witnesses testified, there is building
in Gaza; but the buildings, like the young men in Gaza, remain
waiting. There still is no power, no phones, no sewage, and no
water.
While 2 years ago the per capita GNP of Gaza was $800 a per-
son— in contrast with $14,000 per person in Israel and $1,600 per
person in the West Bank — today Gaza is actually poorer than when
peace was signed.
Surely something is very wrong. And while there is plenty of
blame to go around, I do not believe finger pointing at the Palestin-
ian Authority is helpful or correct.
It was simply unwise to assume that the Palestinian National
Authority could create an accountable and an efficient state appa-
ratus out of whole cloth. They lacked full authority; they lacked
control over their own resources; they inherited neither a physical
nor an administrative infrastructure.
It is a wonder that they have accomplished as much as they
have. Remember, they were under occupation for 27 years.
Unlike recent transformations in South Africa, Russia, or East-
ern Europe, Palestinians inherited no state or no functioning econ-
omy that provided them any element of self-sufficiency.
What was required to assist them was a FEMA-like approach to
reconstruction. And what they got instead were observers, studies,
pledges, unfulfilled promises of projects and blame.
I am pleased to note that our own Agency for International De-
velopment has recognized both the reality and the urgency of the
crisis in Gaza and has taken steps to correct by reprogramming
funds.
But the United States cannot do the job alone. Our 75 million
sends an important signal of commitment to Palestinian society
and the peace process. What are required are the billions of dollars
that were committed but have not yet come.
89
Young Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank want nothing
more than to have a job, live a meaningful life, raise a family, pro-
vide for their children, and see their grandchildren prosper.
Their anger, all too often seen, is a product of despair. It is borne
of the fear and frustration that they have no future and that they
may not have a future.
If peace is to survive, we must attack this crisis with all the re-
sources that we have available to us. Understand that building a
comprehensive peace in the Middle East is like constructing a
building that is an inverted pyramid. The foundation, the point on
which the entire building rests, the ultimate stability of the process
itself, is embedded in the sands of Gaza and in the rocky terrain
of the West Bank.
But, unfortunately, no sooner did the process begin than atten-
tion turned to the more luxurious and promising fourth, fifth, sixth,
and seventh stories of the building in Casablanca or Amman or in
other places, while the foundation in Gaza remained unfinished.
And what was started was in danger of collapsing.
Shimon Peres, Israel's Foreign Minister has said repeatedly that
investing a dollar in the Palestinian economy is an investment in
security of Israel.
And from the Palestinian view, each job created is a vote for
peace and the leadership that made the peace possible.
If we do not do more and do it quickly, we are in danger of fur-
ther eroding confidence in the process and endangering the entire
edifice of peace.
I urge you not only to continue United States assistance to the
Palestinians, but to remove from that assistance the encumbrances
you place on it.
No sooner had the euphoria of September 13th passed when
many in this body began, once again, to use the harsh language of
the past to describe the Palestinian leadership.
That rhetoric sends the wrong message. It is neither edifying nor
helpful. It says to the Palestinians they continue to be viewed with
distrust and enmity.
To impose ever more severe compliance requirements on assist-
ance to Palestinians without similarly conditioning at all United
States assistance to Israel compromises our role.
If this body is to make a contribution to peace, it ought to send
a message of hope and healing to Israelis and Palestinians alike.
Do not import the anger and the fear of those who do not want this
process to succeed.
Export, instead, our American commitment to a new reality and
to a new relationship where Palestinian rights and security and Is-
raeli rights and security are mutually recognized and mutually re-
inforced by American support for both peoples.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zogby appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Burton. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your sticking as close
to the 5-minute time limit as possible so we can give everybody a
chance to testify.
We will now hear from Mr. Fishbein.
90
STATEMENT OF RAND FISHBEIN, BOARD OF ADVISORS
CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY
Mr. Fishbein. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask to revise and
ask extend my remarks and that my full statement be included in
the record along with some supplementary material.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
Mr. Fishbein. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, my name is Rand Fishbein. I am here represent-
ing myself and the Center for Security Policy where I serve on the
board of advisors.
Formerly, I served as the Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs to Senator Daniel K. Inouye and as a Professional Staff
Member of both the Senate Defense Appropriations and Senate
Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittees.
Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for the opportunity to ad-
dress the committee on an issue of critical importance to millions
of Americans. The issue concerns the decision of this administra-
tion, with the support of Congress, to provide $500 million in as-
sistance to the Palestine Liberation Organization.
In the 24 months since the Declaration of Principles was signed
on the White House lawn, approximately $100 million in United
States assistance has gone to support PLO activities in the admin-
istered territories of Gaza and Jericho. This has occurred without
the usual accountability demanded of other recipients of U.S. for-
eign assistance and without the usual scrutiny of Congress.
Instead, we have been witness to a grand public relations cam-
paign designed to convince even the most skeptical observers that
one of the most notorious terrorist organizations of the 20th cen-
tury has mutated into a democratic entity, respectful of law and
order and fundamental human rights. This, of course, could not be
further from the truth.
Even the chairman of this committee, Mr. Gilman, referred to a
recent State Department report on PLO compliance as nothing
more than a whitewash. A growing segment of the American pub-
lic, if not a majority, is inclined to agree with him. As hours of re-
cently recorded speeches of Yasir Arafat clearly demonstrate, he
has no intention of abiding by a peace with Israel or any of the
commitments he has made to our Government. He and his fol-
lowers are bent upon using the Oslo accords, brokered with United
States assistance, as a vehicle for waging a gradual war of annihi-
lation against the State of Israel.
Incredibly, the President and many Members of Congress are
prepared to underwrite this baffling policy by supporting an exten-
sion of the current law, the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act, or
MEPFA, which would place virtually no conditionality on U.S. as-
sistance to the PLO. Under MEPFA, the PLO is held to no clear
standard of performance. Instead, it relies on the good faith inten-
tions of the PLO. The strongest compliance provisions of MEPFA
are in a Sense of Congress section that has no enforcement author-
ity. Moreover, MEPFA permits U.S. funds to be channeled through
international organizations such as the U.N. and the World Bank.
For years, the Congress and this committee have received harsh
reports critical of the poor financial controls and widespread project
mismanagement which often have plagued these organizations. To
91
make matters worse, Yasir Arafat has shown no inclination to mod-
ify the standard PLO practice of having all PLO assets secretly
controlled and disbursed by him.
Still, the United States is prepared to support an approach that
reduces, rather than enhances, congressional oversight of funds to
the Palestinians.
The issue here is not one of the opposition to the peace process
or even dissatisfaction with Israeli Government efforts to find a
new method of coexistence with the Palestinians. Rather, the ques-
tion is whether the United States will insist upon its own stand-
ards of conduct when it is called upon to render assistance to both
parties.
I believe that it is imperative that the United States not lose
sight of the need to hold the Palestinians to a strict level of both
political and financial accountability, just as it does Israel, if the
United States is to remain a credible player in the resolution of
this and other conflicts.
However, time and again, this administration is prepared to
overlook the PLO's wholesale violations of the Declaration of Prin-
ciples in a headlong rush to float the current peace process on a
bubble of cash. Already, this bubble is on the verge of bursting as
the PLO flagrantly violates most of the solemn commitments it has
made, not only to Israel but to our President and our Vice Presi-
dent as well. In a recent Luntz poll, 78 percent of all Americans
surveyed stated that the PLO should be, "held accountable to its
commitments and comply with the peace accords as a precondition
for receiving the rest of the U.S. funds," end quote.
Simply put, should the United States buy peace at any price?
Should we continue to pay for the privilege of Yasir Arafat remain-
ing at the peace table? Or should we insist that he make good on
his obligation to halt terrorism, to apprehend and extradite PLO
members who have harmed Americans? And should he now account
for the funds now streaming into his coffers?
We are all for peace. Make no mistake about that. But without
compliance, there can be no peace.
Mr. Chairman, this committee now has before it, the opportunity
to right some of the wrongs of the past. Pending before both
Houses of Congress is the Middle East Peace Compliance Act of
1995, known as H.R. 1960 in the House and S. 915 in the Senate.
I ask that you act now and report this important piece of legisla-
tion out of committee with a strong recommendation that it be
taken up for immediate consideration on the House floor. MEPFA,
the current law allowing aid to the PLO, must be allowed to lapse
when it expires on October 1. H.R. 1960 should be enacted in its
place.
H.R. 1960, also known as the DeLay-Forbes-Saxton — and I hope,
Burton — bill would deny funds to the PLO and the Palestinian Au-
thority while permitting aid to go to the Palestinian humanitarian
projects once, "substantial, material and timely" compliance has
been achieved by the PLO. It recognizes that there is no real dis-
tinction between the PLO and the PA, both of which are controlled
by Arafat.
92
H.R. 1960 requires that all funds be channeled through U.S.
Government agencies and entities or American registered private
voluntary organizations.
H.R. 1960 is a prudent, reasonable bill. Its provisions are
grounded in precedents currently governing the allocation of U.S.
foreign assistance. The bill strengthens the peace process and en-
sures comprehensive financial and administrative accountability
over all U.S. funds flowing to territories under Palestinian control.
The bill also would require that the PLO provide compensation
to U.S. victims of PLO terrorism and assist U.S. law enforcement
in the apprehension and extradition of those responsible for such
acts. As far as I know, there is no statute of limitation on the mur-
der of Americans.
The only foundation upon which a true and lasting peace can be
built is one in which the negotiating partners comply with the let-
ter and the spirit of their commitments. The DeLay-Forbes-Saxton
bill promotes peace by providing a strong monetary incentive for
compliance. Without compliance, there can be no peace and cer-
tainly no U.S. funding.
Mr. Burton. Excuse me, Mr. Fishbein, if you could summarize.
We are trying to stay as close to the 5-minute limit as we can.
Mr. Fishbein. OK. I just have two more things.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
Mr. Fishbein. If the United States is to maintain its credibility
in fighting worldwide terrorism, it cannot be seen to reward indi-
viduals who have American blood on their hands. Despite its allur-
ing rhetoric, the PLO has proven with its deeds over the last 24
months that they are unreformed terrorists and continue to be a
menace to civil society. Arafat himself continues to praise the sui-
cide bombers of Islamic Jihad as martyrs and celebrates the spir-
itual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Yassin, as a prince.
Mr. Chairman, everywhere we turn today, the United States is
demanding that rogue states and peoples comply with their inter-
national commitments. In Iraq, we insist that Saddam Hussein
comply with U.N. resolutions. In Bosnia, we urge the Bosnian
Serbs to heed Security Council decisions. In North Korea, we re-
quire compliance with IAEA rules and regulations.
Only with the PLO do we suspend our judgment, retreat from a
moral posture, and shrink from that honorable determination that
in years past has brought respect to America.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is not too late to
chart a course that will bring honor to the United States, peace to
the Middle East, and restore the moral authority and leadership of
this illustrious legislative body in the area of foreign policy.
Your recommendation that H.R. 1960 be brought up for imme-
diate consideration on the House floor would do just that.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fishbein appears in the appen-
dix.]
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Fishbein.
We will now hear from Mr. Klein.
93
STATEMENT OF MORTON KLEIN, PRESIDENT, ZIONIST
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for the op-
portunity and the privilege of testifying before this distinguished
committee.
My name is Morton Klein. I am the national president of the Zi-
onist Organization of America. We are the oldest pro-zionist organi-
zation in the country, founded in 1897. We have over 50,000 mem-
bers.
We want and yearn for peace with all of our hearts. I happen to
be a child of Holocaust survivors. I know full well the result of ter-
ror and hatred. I have experienced it in my own family.
Until recently our own U.S. laws did not permit a dialog with the
PLO, let alone giving Yasir Arafat and the PLO $500 million in for-
eign aid.
This was because Arafat and the PLO were a group of terrorists
who had a long record of terror and murder, including the murder
of over a dozen Americans, including our Ambassador to Sudan
Cleo Noel, Leon Klinghoffer, and Gail Rubin, the niece of Senator
Abraham Ribicoff; recently Alisa Flatow was murdered by Arabs,
and the PLO refused to cooperate with FBI agents in investigating
that murder. And Joan Devanny was murdered several weeks ago
by Arabs. And the Arab PLO has refused to extradite the master-
minds of this terrible attack.
Two years ago, the President and Congress decided to waive the
laws against Arafat and the PLO believing that the PLO had sin-
cerely transformed itself.
It is now 2 years, not 2 months, since the signing of these Oslo
accords. The PLO has violated virtually every single aspect of these
accords in both spirit and deeds.
They are required to, but have not, prevent terrorism. There
have been about 200 murders of Israelis and others since the sign-
ing of the accord, a doubling of the murders of Israelis in this 2-
year period compared to any 2-year period since the founding of the
State of Israel. They have not disciplined PLO members who have
committed terrorist attacks.
There have been virtually no trials since May 25 against Arabs
who have committed attacks. And whenever there are trials, no
Arab has been charged with crimes against Israel, only crimes
against the PLO entity.
Arafat has almost never condemned attacks, two or three times
in English in one sentence, virtually never in Arabic as far as we
know. He has not changed the terrible covenant which has 33
clauses, 30 of which call for violence against Israel or the destruc-
tion of Israel.
They have not confiscated weapons from Hamas and other terror-
ists, and they have not renounced sovereignty, which is not per-
mitted in the accords.
In fact, I have stationery here from Yasir Arafat himself which
says "State of Palestine" in the upper right-hand corner, which is
against the accords. And it has a picture of all of Israel as Pal-
estine and their own emblem in the center of this. And this was
dated March 1, 1994, well after the accords were signed.
94
And in his speeches, he continues to encourage terrorism and
praise terrorists. The very night he signed the accords, he called
this the phase plan; we will destroy Israel eventually later. He said
it on Jordanian TV the night he signed the accords.
He calls for jihad via deaths. He praises terrorists as heroes and
stars regularly in these tapes that I have right here.
And he recently, only last month, called for the savage war
against Israel to continue until the last Palestinian boy and Pal-
estinian girl — he is required to change the hearts and minds of the
Palestinian people; and, instead, he incites terrorism and praises
terrorists.
Bill Clinton himself, President Clinton, said bitter words have
bitter consequences; and surely these bitter words of Arafat con-
tinue to encourage the continuing murder of Israelis.
And it is not just the PLO leadership. In polls among the Pal-
estinian Arabs, almost half of them support continued armed strug-
gle against Israelis. And two-thirds say we want to continue this
until Israel is weak enough and then we will want to eliminate Is-
rael entirely.
How is Yasir Arafat acting with respect to Hamas? He calls
Sheikh Yassin his brother, the head of Hamas, and calls for his re-
lease. He calls Abu Marzook his brother and offers him safe haven
in the territories. He is one of the founders of Hamas.
He gives significant amounts of money to Hamas. And he pub-
licly says how it is important for Hamas' attacks to continue be-
cause this helps strengthen Israel's continuing in this peace proc-
ess.
It seems to me in light of the fact that we are fighting for strong
anti-terrorism legislation, what message are we sending when we
send $500 million to the PLO which encourages terrorism and
praises terrorists?
The ZOA is against any U.S. foreign aid to be given to the PLO
as long as they do not comply with the accords, which means now.
We think there should be a period of at least 6 months where aid
is not given to see if they start to comply and show seriousness
about peace.
We commend Congressman Engel and Congressman Forbes on
bills which move in that direction.
And all we are asking is that this money be used as leverage to
ensure strict compliance. This will help ensure the integrity of the
peace process if there is to be peace.
What we are saying is that now is the time to put pressure, not
later when Arafat has more territories and less incentives to com-
ply with these accords. As long as the Arabs keep filling coffins, as
long as the PLO speeches are filled with encouraging terrorism or
praising terrorists, as long as the PLO keeps their commitments
unfulfilled, U.S. taxpayer dollars should not be filling PLO coffers
with $500 million in taxpayers' money.
If we do not hold Arafat's feet to the fire, we will continue to get
peace agreements, but we will get no peace.
Thank you very, very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Klein appears in the appendix.!
Chairman GlLMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Klein.
95
Mr. Richard Hellman, President, Christian Israel Public Action
Campaign.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD HELLMAN, PRESIDENT,
CHRISTIANS' ISRAEL PUBLIC ACTION CAMPAIGN
Mr. HELLMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be
here today.
For the record, I think that it is a shame that Mr. Neal Sher and
Ms. Ester Kurz of AIPAC had to sit alone. I would like the record
to reflect that, if requested, I would have sat with them, because
I am a broad-minded, liberal, tolerant fellow; and I think they are
good friends.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you. I do not know if they are still in
the audience, but I am sure they will appreciate that.
Mr. Hellman. Yes, Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In any event, we are the other Pro-Israel lobby. We are a reg-
istered lobby that represents the 70 million American Christians
and many Bible believing Jews who stand up for Israel's Biblical
and historic rights to all of Eretz Israel (the Biblical land of Israel).
Mr. Chairman, as my prepared statement and other materials
that I have, which I would ask to be inserted in the record, will
detail for you today, the Middle East peace process is badly flawed.
The recent maneuvers of negotiators have been marked by abject
failure in terms of real progress toward peace and security, with
the notable exception of the peace with Jordan.
In fact, the reports of the demise of the peace process may not
be exaggerated, sad as this fact is.
Thus, I urge you and your colleagues in the leadership and mem-
bership of the Congress to exercise continued and strengthened
oversight and exert leadership and policy strategy and formulation
to govern the negotiators.
And in this regard, I have a legal memorandum on the constitu-
tional authority of the Congress as a coequal foreign policymaking
body, which I will submit for the record.
[The material was not ready at the time of printing.]
Mr. Hellman. On a personal note, I was privileged to live and
work in Israel with my wife and children for almost 7 years. And
in that respect, I would like to take great exception to virtually all
of the testimony of Dr. Zogby. In fact, the Palestinian Arabs' eco-
nomic, financial, environmental, and cultural progress was nothing
short of stratospheric under the Israeli stewardship.
And the reason why they were in economic trouble is because of
their riots and civil disorder all during the Intifada and to this
present day.
To give credit where credit is due, we applaud the peace process
between Israel and Jordan. However, while Christian and Jewish
members of CIPAC nationwide and those of us in Washington con-
tinue to pray for peace, we are appalled by what, soon, sadly may
be 200 deaths, plus many injuries, and much destruction caused by
a torrent of terrorism unleashed upon Israel since the signing of
the Oslo accords.
And we also abhor the equally devastating Arab-on-Arab violence
and abuse of rights which are endemic in areas abandoned by Is-
rael, due to Chairman Arafat's secret police and military forces.
96
These are sad truths, but they are truths that I need to bring
before you today.
If this were not bad enough, when we witnessed the mild, pro
forma, public remonstrances against terror by Yasir Arafat, we
think it is most obscene of him to make these repeated comments
to Arab and Islamic audience which actually incite terror, and to
applaud and affirm the heroes and martyrs who perpetrate the in-
discriminate, wanton, death, injury, and destruction of Israelis,
Arabs, and, as we have heard today, even Americans, by bus bomb-
ings.
And so today, I would say that any of these calls for jihad or holy
war point out that Arafat really is not a man of peace. It is sad
that we have honored him. It is sad that we have given him foreign
aid.
In this respect, at this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to asso-
ciate our organization with Rand Fishbein and his remarks to
which I do not believe I could have taken any exception. I think
that his support of the DeLay-Forbes-Saxton bill is laudatory; and
we can endorse that with minor, if any, technical amendments. But
I think that this is an excellent approach to tightening up on the
funding of the PLO.
I would say, as we said in a rally and march before the White
House the last week, it is time to say: "No more U.S. dough for the
PLO! No more foreign aid for Arafat!" It is as if, after the Okla-
homa City bombing, instead of going after the perpetrators, we
were trying to figure out how to give them a piece of Michigan to
appease them.
I think it is shameful. I do not think we should do this any
longer.
Last, I want to turn to Hafiz al-Asad and the Syrian track.
Although Hafiz al-Asad, a brutal dictator, had the temerity and
gall to insult our President publicly in Damascus not so long ago,
now it seems that a well meaning but perhaps misguided Secretary
of State is going to troop to Damascus again to meet with Hafiz al-
Asad. I believe it is a shame to America. I believe it will not bring
peace. I believe it will endanger Israel and Middle East peace, pro-
ducing danger to Israel's legitimate rights and, indeed, to its na-
tional security.
And, indeed, we, Mr. Chairman, you and I and every American
taxpayer, are going to be asked to pay the bill. We are going to be
asked to put billions of dollars into that peace process to com-
pensate Israel for having to give up the natural security of the
Golan Heights and the border with Lebanon.
We also are going to be asked, as you know full well, from the
secret plans in the Pentagon, the State Department, and the CIA —
to put troops on the Golan Heights.
And I think it is time that we look at what it is going to happen
based on existing plans in the administration and the Pentagon,
State Department, other offices. There are plans. And I would like
to ask that we, at some point, Mr. Chairman, have hearings to find
out why we have not seen those plans for deployment of U.S. troops
on the Golan Heights where they will be in great danger for the
reasons we have heard today.
97
All this to appease an Arab dictator and help him obtain terri-
tory which he lost in a war of aggression in 1967, failed to hold
after a later sneak attack on Yom Kippur, 1973, and to which he
never had (and we have the historic backup on this) a legitimate,
legal, or historic right to begin with.
And our State Department is busy trying to appease him. He has
been promised a quick and easy exit from his prominent place on
State's lists of nations that sponsor terrorism, violate human
rights, traffic in international narcotics, counterfeit our currency
massively, and much more.
Even by historic standards, this will give cynical, realpolitik, di-
plomacy a bad name if the Congress lets this charade of misguided
statecraft continue without raising a loud and principled cry of out-
rage.
And anyone who thinks Hafiz — al-Asad just wants the Golan and
that this then will become a peaceful area probably would have be-
lieved that Hitler would be satisfied with the Sudetenland.
Even if we need to talk to unsavory characters to make peace,
I assure you that no smart buyer in the Middle East runs after a
merchant to shower him with concessions, nor should we run after
Asad.
Last, Mr. Chairman, I think it is time that we move our embassy
to Jerusalem immediately. And we do not need to build a new
building. You know that that this can be done, and the State De-
partment can be compelled to do so.
We should put no further aid into the PLO. But we could, of
course, as has been indicated, put it into projects under multilat-
eral development banks (MDB's) and private voluntary organiza-
tions (PVO's).
We should insist that Syria get out of Lebanon and free that
country from the illegal Syrian occupation by 40,000 troops and se-
curity officials.
And we should insist that any peace treaty with Syria and Israel
provide for Lebanon's liberation, put no troops on the Golan
Heights and insist that Asad really prove that he is a man of peace
before he gets off the list that I mentioned.
Last, Mr. Chairman, I would like to wish you Shana Tova, a
Happy New Year, to you and your colleagues and to all of Israel,
a new year of peace, prosperity, and hopefully a real and lasting
peace, not a false peace, and, God forbid, not any return to the hov-
ering clouds of war.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hellman appears in the appen-
dix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Hellman.
I know that all of the panelists join in a desire for a long-lasting
peace.
Mr. Seymour Reich, President, American Zionist Movement.
STATEMENT OF SEYMOUR REICH, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
ZIONIST MOVEMENT
Mr. Reich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
98
I am the president of the American Zionist Movement, which is
an umbrella organization for 21 Zionist American groups in the
United States.
And I am pleased to be here to support the adoption of the
Helms-Pell version of MEPFA.
The American Zionist Movement adopted a resolution to that af-
fect at its convention in January in Florida earlier this year.
I also would share with this group that I am the past president
of B'nai B'rith International. And while I do not speak for B'nai
B'rith here, I am also pleased to indicate that B'nai B'rith likewise
supports this legislation that we hope the committee will adopt.
Chairman GlLMAN. Mr. Reich, if I could interrupt, I have just
been called to a leadership meeting, and I am going to have to ex-
cuse myself from the remainder of the hearing.
I just want to take this opportunity to thank our panelists. I
know you are all busy and are all involved in very critical issues,
and I cannot tell you how much our committee appreciates your
talking the time to be here to give us the benefit of your thinking.
I am going to ask Mr. Burton, if he would be kind enough, to
take the chair for the remainder of the meeting.
And, again, for any of the other witnesses who are in the audi-
ence, we thank you for being with us today. I think it has been a
very thorough airing of some of the issues involved which will be
beneficial to our committee.
Thank you, Mr. Reich.
Mr. Reich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was saying I am also a past chairman of the Conference of
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, which is an
umbrella organization of 50 American Jewish groups in the United
States.
And the Conference of Presidents has, likewise, supported the
adoption of this MEPFA legislation.
But more than that, Mr. Chairman, we believe that it is in the
interest of the American people, the American taxpayer, that this
legislation is adopted.
To show continued support on the part of the Jewish community
for this organization, I am pleased to illustrate to this committee
that in Sunday's New York Times, this past Sunday, on the op-ed
page, there was an ad placed by a group of organizations coordi-
nated by the American Zionist Movement.
The headline says: "Prime Minister Rabin, we know that pursu-
ing peace is risky. Not pursuing it is unthinkable."
But more than that, it says:
To bring us closer to this goal, we support MEPFA, the Middle East Peace Facili-
tation Act, United States legislation which enhances Israel's security by ensuring
compliance by the Palestinians with their agreements and advancing economic de-
velopments in the West Bank and Gaza to show Palestinians that peace can im-
prove their lives.
Among the many organizations that signed this ad are the Amer-
ican Jewish Committee, Mr. David Harris to my left, who has al-
ready spoken to you; the American Jewish Congress; the Anti-Def-
amation League; B'nai B'rith, Hadassah; the National Jewish Com-
munity Relations Advisory Council; the World Jewish Congress;
and many, many more.
99
Mr. Chairman, Israel will rely on its own security for its own
protection. And while there may be distrust of the PLO and Chair-
man Arafat because he may not adhere to some of the promises
that he made in the past, Israel is in the process of negotiating an
agreement with them, the second phase.
And I think it is essential that aside from agreements there be
economic enhancements to make certain that the Palestinians have
the wherewithal, the ability to have economic benefits from this
agreement.
Peace by itself is not enough. Economic benefits enhance peace.
And the act that is before you will ensure compliance with the
many provisions in this legislation which have been expressed be-
fore, concerns about the Palestinian Authority adhering to its
agreement.
Mr. Chairman, the act contains compliance provisions. There are
provisions on the part of the State Department, the President, to
certify to the Congress whether the act is being complied with. And
we have belief that the Congress can rely on those certifications.
It is not necessary to put money in escrow. It is not necessary
to put conditions beyond that which is proposed in the Helms-Pell
bill, which is a tightening of the legislation before you.
Congressman Engel earlier today asked a question of a panelist:
If the United States pulls its money out, what impact will that
have on the peace process?
My own answer is, it will have a severe impact. And not only on
the process between Israel and the Palestinians but on our allies,
the Japanese, the Germans, who have likewise offered financial
commitments to make sure that peace is enhanced and peace is se-
cure and peace is everlasting.
And I think the United States must, as the leader of the free
world, continue to set an example with regard to peace in the Mid-
dle East.
Who said making peace is easy? But, Mr. Chairman, and this
committee, do not make is harder. Your enactment of the legisla-
tion, of MEPFA, as embodied in the Helms-Pell bill will permit you
and each of us to look at ourselves in the mirror some day in the
future and say, we gave peace a chance; we supported enactment
of this legislation which facilitated the dialog, which facilitate the
agreements and will hopefully bring everlasting peace.
There will be obstacles. There will be dangers. There will be
problems.
But we are confident in the democratically elected Government
of Israel that it can protect itself, and it can negotiate those dif-
ficulties with the Palestinians.
So we hope, Mr. Chairman, that this legislation will be enacted.
Mr. Burton [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.
I thank all of you for your comments. I will yield to my col-
leagues in just a couple of minutes. I have a couple of concerns that
I would like to express.
During a couple of the panels before I raised a couple of issues
which I will raise with you. Yasir Arafat is believed to be commit-
ted to this peace accord. However, I have read a speech. I would
like to read you just one part of it. It says:
100
The Palestinian people are prepared to sacrifice their last boy and their last girl
in order to wave the Palestinian flag. The soul and the blood we shall give for your
sake, Abu Amar, so that the Palestinian flag will wave over the walls of Jerus ilem,
its mosques and its churches. . . .
It is a very lengthy speech.
I am sure that causes a great concern to a lot of people in Israel
who have different views and objectives. And this does not sound
like a conciliatory speech. I would like to read the whole thing to
you, but I would not want to take the time to do that.
In addition to that, I brought up a while ago that Hamas and
Hezbollah, it is believed to have been involved in a number of these
terrorist attacks.
On September 1, 1995, it was reported that he gave $20,000 or
more to a Hamas youth organization which they believe may have
been involved in some of these tragedies.
One of the things that is of concern to me is support that we give
in the way of aid for building up the infrastructure of the new Pal-
estinian State at a time when these kinds of comments are being
made.
If the Helms-Pell bill is not passed, yes, there would be no sup-
port for a PLO office; and, yes, there would be no fund for the
World Bank for $40 million; but there would be a dialog with our
State Department between them and the PLO; and NGO's would
still get $35 million.
So I guess my question would be — probably to Mr. Zogby first —
is there would be money that would go forth to assist in some of
the problems that the PLO faces in the new Palestinian State.
There would not be the amount of money that we have talked
about in the past. But there are $8 billion, $8,000 million dollars,
in financial institutions around the world that is controlled by the
PLO, according to British intelligence. And we have done some
checking; and the person that wrote that report says they stand by
the report that that money is there.
Now, it seems to me, as I said before, with us having the finan-
cial difficulties we are having in this country, even though we are
committed to the peace process, and we want to work with both
sides, why should we send our money over there, especially in view
of the fact that some of these statements or documents — this
speech I was reading by Yasir Arafat was made in September, just
earlier this month.
Why should we send that money over there when they have the
money to rebuild the entire area if they choose to do so with re-
sources that they have, and at the same time we still would be
helping through PVO's.
So I would just like to ask you the question: Can you give me
a reason why you think we ought to go ahead and send the money
over under the circumstances that we currently have?
And should not we insist that Yasir Arafat temper his rhetoric
a little bit?
I mean this kind of rhetoric is inflammatory, to say the least. It
scares the dickens out of the people in this country; but I am sure
it scares a heck of a lot more in Israel.
101
I have been to Israel. I know how small the country is. The
threat of a war to once again be started to place the Palestinian
flag over Jerusalem, I mean, I am sure is of great concern.
So anyhow if you would start off by answering some of my con-
cerns, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Zogby. Mr. Congressman, I have not been to testify before
this committee for almost 13 years now.
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Zogby. And one of the reasons why is because of the enor-
mous frustration that those of us in the Arab American community
feel in attempting to deal with the huge amount of misperception,
with the difference in perspective, and with the lack of appreciation
for the reality faced by Palestinians living under occupation who
are now struggling for some normalized life with Israel.
I found it all too frustrating. And I guess I have to tell you today,
I still find it frustrating. There are so many answers I can give to
the questions that you ask. And I am not sure you have the time
to hear them all.
Mr. Burton. Do the best you can.
Mr. Zogby. Let me try with a few.
I have to tell you what an Arab-American thinks when he hears
the question asked about PLO accountability or compliance — let us
make it clear. There is not $500 million. There is $375 million. The
other $125 million is the funny money of OPIC, none of which has
been used. And some of us fear that OPIC may not be underwriting
any projects for the 5-year period. So it is only $75 million a year
and all of it is accountable. And, in fact, none of it goes directly
to the coffers of the Palestinian Authority or the PLO. As dis-
respectful as we feel that is, it does not.
It is administered by private contractors here who are sometimes
called Beltway Bandits in the States who bid on these projects,
from AID officials they are the ones who get the contracts and ad-
minister them. According to the projections of independent observ-
ers, only about 20 cents on the dollar actually hits the ground in
the West Bank and Gaza.
The money, according to AID, is fully accountable. They have a
total and complete accounting for the money. The money that has
gone to UNDP and other international agencies has similarly been
fully accounted for. There is no problem with accountability.
And in recent discussions I had under the auspices of Builders
for Peace with both the head of the World Bank Mission and the
head of the United Nations, as well as with our own AID head in
Tel Aviv, it was made very clear that they have no evidence of cor-
ruption or of a failure on the Palestinian side to account for money.
They do not get the money.
And I would say from an Arab-American perspective, there is no
accountability, as we know, for the $3 billion a year in aid that
goes to Israel. And we are not here asking for that. We are not ask-
ing for a full GAO or AID accounting or administering of that
funds in the same way that it goes to the Palestinians.
But understand that there is a problem — when Palestinians see
all of this being done over their $75 million, which they do not get,
and nothing is being said about the money for Israel. There is a
question of fairness and perspective here.
102_J
On the question of the Hamas youth organization, understand
every entity that receives money and operates in the West Bank
and Gaza is licensed by the Israeli Civil Administration or had
been licensed by the Israeli Civil Administration, including groups
that have an affiliation with Hamas.
In fact, if you read the debate in Israel today, most of the
Hamas-related entities that exist were encouraged to exist under
previous Israeli Government administrations because they viewed
the Islamic institutions as an independent alternative to the PLO
because they thought these groups would distract people from the
nationalist struggle.
All of those groups, in other words, operate with the full knowl-
edge of the Israeli Civil Administration and have been licensed by
them.
Where a group is affiliated with Hamas — and there is a very
wide ranging set of definitions that could be given to that — there
is no such thing as a Hamas youth group. What there will be is
an orphanage or a school or a mosque or a hospital, in this case,
a youth organization, that has an affiliation. In other words, it
sympathizes with or allies itself to. Just like in Israel there are
groups that will ally themselves with this or that faction or this or
that party, although they are not under a party discipline as such.
In the case you are talking about, $20,000, I understand, money
was going for a youth project. In the past, American PVO's have
contributed to some of those entities. The Israeli Government itself
has contributed to some of those entities. And now the Palestinian
Authority similarly continues the practice of giving money for oper-
ating of programs, legitimate programs, to some of those same enti-
ties. It does not go to support violence. It does not go to support
activity against the peace process.
In fact, even the witnesses here who complain about Palestinian
Authority performance on the question of extradition or whatever,
do not complain about the issue of control of anti-authority, anti-
Palestinian Authority activity. They do not allow it.
And finally on the question of Arafat's speeches, understand, un-
derstand— and I cannot impress upon you and other members of
the committee enough, you need to spend some time in Gaza. You
need to spend some time in east Jerusalem with Palestinians. You
need to go to Hebron and sit for just an afternoon in the market-
place in the center of the town and look at the stars of David and
the death to Arabs and the Goldstein lives slogans written all over
the walls, literally all over the walls, lining entire blocks of what
was the teaming market of Hebron.
Understand the despair, the anger, the frustration, and the fact
that even until this day the Palestinian Authority has no control
over resources, water, land, access, and egress to the tiny — what
one of our own American officials called little prison of the Gaza
strip, no way in, no way out.
Try to go through the check points; and to understand the anger
and the frustration that Palestinians encounter when they deal
with the humiliation of that is to understand that, at times, yes,
Arafat gives speeches that have an emotional content that say
things that make you or I maybe feel uncomfortable.
103
I do not find in his speeches either an incitement against the
peace process, against the commitment he made to make that
peace process work. When he uses the term "jihad," he means
something very different than you may understand it to mean.
And understand that the man has, in the 2 years, faced tremen-
dous threats from those who do not approve of the fact that he rec-
ognized the State of Israel and committed to live in peace with that
State of Israel.
Mr. Burton. I appreciate your comment. I am going to yield to
my colleagues just 1 second.
Mr. Fishbein. Mr. Chairman, could I just make a request?
Mr. Burton. Well, the problem is I have used up my 5 minutes.
I will come back and let you respond.
Mr. Fishbein. Well, I do not want to respond. I just simply want
to make a request that you include the comments of Mr. Arafat
that you have referred to in the records so that the public has an
opportunity to study them.
Mr. Burton. Without objection, they will be put in the record.
Mr. Fishbein. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. But let me just say one more thing, and then I will
yield to my colleagues from New York.
And that is, Muhammad Dakhlan, he is the chief of the PNA's
general security, one of the parts of the agreement was that there
would be a mechanism for people who were indicted by one govern-
ment entity to be extradited — that is not a good term — but trans-
ferred for trial by the other.
I want to read to you a statement that was made by the chief
of the PNA's general security real quickly. And this is after the
agreement was signed. And the agreement was that there would be
this transfer.
He said:
We reached the decision and it was made at the highest possible level — so I pre-
sume he means Arafat — of course on the basis of Arafat's opinion that we will not
extradite to Israel members of our people, including wanted members of Hamas. We
are not willing that in our history books it will be written that we surrendered Pal-
estinians to Israel. If we hand over members of our people to Israel, we will hurt
the interests of the Palestinian Authority at the inner-Palestinian sector and in the
Arab world and the Muslim world. Even if there is a clause in the agreement and
Yoel Singer of Israel's Foreign Ministry can specifically point to it, we will not extra-
dite members of our people to Israel. It is incumbent upon us to arrest those wanted
and bring them to justice because we are the government.
The problem is there are 11 cases right now where this agree-
ment has been violated.
I am going to have to yield to my colleagues, so we will come
back to you so you can respond to that.
And while we all want the peace process to go forward — and I
understand your concern about not wanting to testify for 13 years
because you feel this glacial effect. I think there is a lot of us that
genuinely want to see fairness, equity, and see this thing worked
out and see the peace process work.
But after having said that, when we hear somebody who has
been a terrorist in the past, Mr. Arafat, who has allegedly changed
his colors and now wants to see peace and wants to see a Palestin-
ian State work and the peace process to work, when we hear him
make these kinds of speeches and we see in writing his chief of
104
general security make the statement that, yeah, we signed an
agreement, but Arafat and I are not going to honor it, that really
causes consternation, not because we are trying to take sides with
the Israelis or with the Palestinians but because the agreement
was signed, they shook hands at the White House, the President
put his arms around both of them; and now all of a sudden we see
these violations.
So please be patient. We will let you answer in just a moment.
I will now yield to my colleague, the gentleman from New York.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I am afraid there are two of us from New York.
Mr. BURTON. The good-looking colleague, Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Engel. Oh.
Mr. Burton. They are both good looking. Cancel that last re-
mark.
Mr. ENGEL. That is all right, Mr. Burton, you will pay.
Mr. ACKERMAN. There is a price for everything, Mr. Engel.
I want to thank this very, very distinguished and articulate
panel. I have been trying to catch up on reading some of the state-
ments of those that I was not able to listen to.
After all the dialog and after we all make our political speeches
from whatever vantage points we enjoy, those of us who are on this
side of the room usually have to cast a yes or no vote on legislation
or directions. And we just have to say yes or no, and we can make
speeches and doctor it up any way we want afterward.
I am going to ask a question of the entire panel, and the question
is this: If you were voting — and I will call the roll — if you were vot-
ing as to whether or not we should continue the peace process, in
one word, would your vote be yes or no?
Mr. Reich.
Mr. Reich. Yes.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Harris.
Mr. Harris. Yes.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Klein.
Mr. Klein. Well, I
Mr. Ackerman. It is a yes or no vote. I know it is difficult; but,
you know, the bottom line is we have to do that in the end.
Mr. Klein. Well, Ezer Weizman is calling for it to be suspended.
And
Mr. Ackerman. I am not going to call his name.
Mr. Klein. I think the President of Israel
Mr. Ackerman. I am not going to call the President's name.
Mr. Klein. Pardon me?
Mr. Ackerman. I am going to call Mr. Klein's name for a yes or
no.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, I do not know how you answer that question
with
Mr. Ackerman. OK. Mr. Klein passes.
Mr. Klein. OK.
Mr. Ackerman. Dr. Ganchrow.
Mr. GANCHROW. I believe we should slow it down until we satisfy
the arrangements for a proper peace.
Over the long run, 100 percent.
Mr. Ackerman. If you had to vote right now to continue the
peace process or not to continue it
105
Mr. Ganchrow. I could not vote on that because it is not worded
in a way that I could
Mr. Ackerman. Dr. Ganchrow passes.
Mr. Hellman.
Mr. Hellman. If I may observe, Mr. Ackerman, this is some
what like, a PLO trial in Jericho: It is short and not sweet, there
is no time for discussion, and the result appears foreordained. It
does not take
Mr. Ackerman. That is what happens under the new majority.
I cannot help it.
Mr. Hellman. But it does not take place at midnight. Although
I stayed up all night to get ready because you only gave 8 hours
for preparation. So we may be better off in some other places.
Mr. Ackerman. I could appreciate the obiter dictum, but
Mr. Hellman. I would say that the peace process must
Mr. Ackerman. Yeah, listen, every
Mr. Hellman. This is a Hobson's choice, Nothing
Mr. Ackerman. OK. Mr. Hellman, if I might?
Mr. Hellman. If it is this peace process or nothing, I would say
"yes."
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Hellman.
Mr. Hellman. Yes. Even if it is this peace process
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Hellman, we all appreciate the enthusiasm
with which you responded.
Mr. Hellman. It is better "to jaw and jaw than to war and war"
as FDR said.
Mr. Dornan. Churchill.
Mr. Hellman. You are a better historian, President Dornan. I
stand corrected.
Mr. Ackerman. I believe everybody would say yes to a peace
process. I am talking whether or not to continue along the path of
this peace process.
And your answer is yes?
Mr. Zogby.
Mr. Zogby. Yes.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Fishbein.
Mr. Fishbein. Yes, but only under strong compliance standards.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much.
There seems to be a great deal of concern about dealing with Mr.
Arafat. And I am sure almost everybody has some reservations —
or very, very, very grave reservations. If we were not dealing with
Mr. Arafat, with whom should we be dealing?
Mr. Fishbein.
Mr. Fishbein. Well, I do not think that an individual who has
demonstrated a total lack of
Mr. Ackerman. That is why I ruled him out. Who should we be
dealing with?
Mr. Fishbein. Well, I think the Palestinians have not yet had
the opportunity to make that choice. Arafat has been imposed upon
the Palestinian people.
I think the Palestinians should choose an individual who, frank-
ly, has disassociated himself from terrorist acts.
But there has been no vote that has been taken in Gaza. There
has been no vote that has been taken in Jericho.
106
Mr. Ackerman. You have no individual to suggest that we
should
Mr. Fishbein. Not at this point, no.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Zogby.
Mr. Zogby. Um
Mr. Ackerman. You probably will disagree with the premise, but
that is OK.
Mr. Zogby. I do. And I, therefore, suggest that one deals with the
leadership Israel has chosen to deal with and who the Palestinian
people have affirmed in repeated international and local fora as
their leader.
We will have an election soon, hopefully, in the West Bank and
Gaza. I am confident that Arafat will win. There are imperfections
to the man, no doubt about it.
But understand that from the Palestinian perspective, they
would look at Mr. Rabin and his past record and his current com-
pliance record with the same mistrust.
These are enemies who have chosen a very brave thing, and that
is to make peace with each other. And I think we have to be re-
spectful of that and encourage both to continue on the path that
they have chosen themselves and with their people.
So I do not agree with the premise of the question. I think he
is doing as well as can be expected under the circumstances.
Mr. Ackerman. Let me ask you
Mr. Burton. I would ask you, Mr. Ackerman, to wrap up so we
can get onto Mr. Engel. Go ahead.
Mr. Ackerman. OK, Mr. Chairman.
If I might ask you, you have made the suggestion that some of
us should spend time visiting in Gaza talking to people. I did have
the opportunity to do that recently.
Also, before doing that, I met in Jerusalem with Hanan Ashwari
who had some rather critical things to say about Mr. Arafat. With-
out my repeating them all, I am sure you have seen and read much
of that.
How do you respond to that criticism? Is it accurate? Is it objec-
tive?
Mr. ZOGBY. Oh, I think there are very serious problems that the
man has in his dealings within the Palestinian community.
A part of the new paradigm that should have been developed
after September 13 is not: Can Israelis trust Arafat, but do Pal-
estinians trust Arafat?
He is the person that they need to work out a relationship with.
And, in fact, there is
Mr. ACKERMAN. Is there an answer to that question?
Mr. ZOGBY. There is a widespread — yes, I think that there is.
And I think there is a widespread debate within the Palestinian
community. And there has been a change
Mr. Ackerman. As to whether or not they trust Arafat.
Mr. Zogby. Yes, I think that there are some who do not, and
there are some who do. And there is a new working relationship.
The election of a National Council in the territories. The election
of an executive committee of that. And the empowering of min-
istries to be responsible to that consultative body, that elective
107
body I think will improve the performance of the Palestinian Au-
thority.
There is a tremendous amount of internal Palestinian discussion
about how to, in effect, rein in his arbitrary decisionmaking.
Understand there would not have been a signature in Oslo, there
would not have been a peace agreement, had he not been arbitrary
in his decisionmaking.
It never would have passed the National Council in Tunis. And
I doubt seriously whether the Palestinian diaspora would have
agreed either.
He made a courageous decision unilaterally. And Hanan dis-
agrees with him for having made peace with Israel. That is the
principal point to understand. The opposition of that secular vari-
ety, the elites in the West Bank and Gaza who are opposed to
Arafat, are in large measure opposed to him because he made an
agreement.
They did not think it was a good agreement, and they did not
think an agreement should be made at all.
Our own Government disagrees with that, Mr. Ackerman; and
the Israeli Government disagrees with it. And I think the majority
of Palestinians disagree with that assessment and are glad that he
made peace. They just want this peace to work, and they want the
fruits of peace, economic and justicewise to be delivered unto them.
Mr. Ackerman. If you would, Mr. Chairman, I just do not want
to misunderstand what Mr. Zogby is saying?
Mr. Burton. Well, if your colleague, Mr. Engel, does not mind,
we will let you go on for a little bit.
Mr. Ackerman. Oh, I just want to make sure that the Chairman
does not mind as well.
Mr. BURTON. Well, I just want to make sure that everybody gets
their time. Mr. Dornan would like to have a little time as well.
Mr. Ackerman. Eliot, would you mind if I went on for another
minute or so?
Mr. Engel. Not at all.
Mr. Ackerman. What you are suggesting is that most Palestin-
ians agree with Mr. Arafat's decision to embark upon a peace proc-
ess, but there is widespread mistrust for him?
Mr. Zogby. No, I did not say mistrust. I said there is widespread
discussion about the behavior and the performance of the Palestin-
ian Authority.
And I believe that many of the issues that are currently being
discussed, No. 1, have already produced some change in behavior
and performance.
But, second, with the election of the National Council and with
the election of the Executive Committee and the making of the var-
ious Palestinian ministries responsible to that elective body, I think
will do a lot to improve behavior and will increase Palestinian con-
fidence.
Mr. Ackerman. But does the Palestinian community trust Mr.
Arafat?
Mr. Zogby. I think that they do for the most part, yes. As much
as any people trust their elected leadership. I mean, I do not know
if we would want to have every Member of this body or our execu-
tive branch here
108
Mr. Ackerman. Well, you now have changed the premise to
elected leadership, and there is a difference I think.
Mr. ZOGBY. Yes. He will be elected though. Make no bones about
it. And I think his polling data will probably come out as good as
almost anybody's here.
Mr. Ackerman. My opponent's pollster said the same thing.
Mr. ZOGBY. Pardon?
You know, there is a problem of cynicism in society today. You
are experiencing it, no doubt, in your district and many others are
as well. And the President of this country is. And I think that we
are doing the best as we can as people in this society to deal with
it. They are trying the same over there.
What they need is to be given a bit of a break. And they have
not really been given that break.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BURTON. Let me just say before we go to Mr. Engel that all
of my constituents love and trust me.
Mr. Ackerman. That is because you tell them they are all good
looking, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Engel. Let me just say that in the time that I have listened
to the testimony, in my mind I have changed my thoughts in terms
of what I would say about 10 times because there is too much to
say, and there is too much pulling and tugging in different direc-
tions that it is very, very difficulty to really ask questions on a lim-
ited amount of time. But I do want to commend all of you, every
one of you, for coming here and articulating your positions. I think
it serves to really push the whole process forward.
Let me share a frustration that I have that those of you to whom
I have spoken know.
I believe very much in the peace process. I think there is no al-
ternative to the peace process, and I think a breakdown in the
peace process really would be unthinkable because I think a break-
down in the peace process would mean the end of the possibility
of peace in the immediate future.
On the other hand, I do feel very strongly that when you sign
commitments, you ought to, to every extent possible, adhere to
those commitments.
And while I understand the frustrations on both sides and the
disappointments on both sides and the feelings of betrayal on both
sides, I am a little bit taken aback.
I believe that leaders ought to lead. And if we all followed public
opinion polls, we could probably do very well in our districts, but
I think our people elect us to be leaders.
And it frankly disturbs me when I see those videos and see some
of the rhetoric of Mr. Arafat. It seems to me that he ought to be
leading his people in the direction of peace.
I understand that he is a politician and, like the rest of us, and
needs to say some things for public consumption. We all do that
from time to time. But one would also hope that he would be push-
ing his people's public opinion in the direction of peace if, indeed,
that is what he believes.
Now, my frustration, frankly, on this committee is that I have in-
troduced H.R. 1930, which we call the Middle East Peace Compli-
ance and PLO Accountability Act of 1995. I believe very strongly
109
that we need to set very realistic thresholds. And I think that my
approach, frankly, which has 20 bipartisan cosponsors in this
House, is a good centrist bill which sets realistic thresholds to
which Mr. Arafat can comply, and then U.S. aid will continue to
flow.
If he does not comply, well, then I think it is his own fault if the
aid stops because clearly my bill makes the threshold reasonable.
There is no hidden agenda there to try to cut off money or anything
else. I think there is a reasonable threshold.
We impose a dollar-for-dollar deduction for misspent funds,
which is not in the Helms-Pell, MEPFA bill. We permit funding
only through multilateral institutions which are transparent and
open to outside audits.
We talk about past PLO terrorism because I think in order to
have something for the future, one needs to take into account what
happened in the past. And we hold the PLO to its own commit-
ments, including the post-MEPFA Gaza-Jericho agreement of
1994. And there are other things.
My frustration has been that this committee has not marked up
any bill. And, indeed, we seem to be marching down the line of
Helms-Pell, which has originated in the Senate.
And while there was a lot of Helms-Pell to which I agree and
think that perhaps is a good basis from which to start, I think
there are other things that many of us, myself included, would like
to add to that legislation; and I do not believe the way things seem
to be going now that we are really going to have much opportunity
to do that. I think it is going to be pretty much a fait accompli
when it comes over here. And I am very saddened by it. Because
I think that we have a lot of talent on this committee on both sides
of the aisle, and I think that this committee should be really
crafting legislation. And I hoped that my bill would be the basis of
such legislation, but it does not seem likely.
I think the disagreement that many of you have, frankly, is
where to put the threshold. I do not think — and Mr. Berman said
it earlier this morning after I testified — I do not think that it is
wrong or obstructionist to point out when people are not complying
or when people are making statements that are not helpful to the
process. I do not think that ought to be swept under the rug. I
think that has to be brought out. I think that has to be part of the
equation.
On the other hand, we do not want to use that as an excuse to
blow up the process. And there is the dilemma. There is the di-
lemma that all of us are feeling.
So I do not know if I
Mr. Burton. Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. I am going to end, Mr. Chairman.
I do not know if I have a specific question other than to just
thank each of you for contributing to the process; but one of the
things that I do know is that I do not think that there can be auto-
matic extensions. I think that we need to have a compliance, some
threshold in there to make sure that everyone's feet are held to the
fire.
110
And if any of you would like to comment on what I have said,
I would be grateful. If not, again, thank you for coming and partici-
pating.
Mr. Harris. Just for a moment, Mr. Engel, with respect to your
saying that you think we all are only interested in where to set the
threshold, I thought that I had said clearly that I said I believe
that we should cut off aid to the PLO. It is time and past time.
And that any humanitarian or economic development assistance
should go through third parties where there is proper accountabil-
ity.
Mr. Engel. Well, I thought you also said in response to Mr. Ack-
erman's question that you said, yes, you wanted the process to con-
tinue, you wanted a vote for a continuation of the aid.
Mr. Harris. Well, he gave us a Hobson's choice; and I believe a
peace process and negotiations is better than none. But this is not
a very high threshold for this peace process.
It has produced some successes. Early on they picked the low
hanging fruit off of the tree; and then when they got to the tough
going, the tough shredding, it has fallen on the rocks of Mr. Ara-
fat's, I believe, willful, non-compliance, and co-option by continued
terrorist elements and also on Asad's reluctance to come to the
table unless he gets a deal like Sadat of Egypt got.
So I do not think the peace process is going anywhere. It is mori-
bund on the way to being dead, and we may be witnessing the fu-
neral here on Capitol Hill.
But I do say we should continue to negotiate, but I would say,
in closing, that there are threats not only to Jewish interests but
to christian interests. The ministers of the Palestinian Authority
have threatened anybody but Moslems. They said that we cannot
worship at holy sites like Hebron and Bethlehem and so forth un-
less we are Moslems.
Mr. Burton. You have to excuse me. We are going to miss a vote
here.
Excuse me, Mr. Engel. Mr. Dornan has been waiting for a long
time since he is not a member of the committee.
So, Mr. Dornan, let me yield to you very briefly so you can make
a comment.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Point of information, Mr. Chairman.
Will we be able to come back and continue?
Mr. Burton. If the panel does not mind, we could come back and
continue this dialog for another 15 minutes or so.
Does the panel mind if we come back?
OK. Mr. Dornan, why do not you go ahead and vote and when
you come back, we will resume.
Mr. Dornan. Mr. Chairman, let us go vote then. I thought out
of courtesy we all were going to wrap it up, and I was going to ask
two questions for the record.
Mr. Burton. Are you willing to come back, then, too?
Mr. Dornan. I will come back.
Mr. Burton. OK. Then the committee will stand in recess. We
will be back here in about 10 minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burton. The committee will be in order.
Ill
While we are waiting for our colleagues to return, I would like
to enter into the record without objection a letter that Chairman
Gilman received from mothers of children who were murdered by
terrorist activities in Israel.
I will not read the whole letter, but the reason for the letter is
to try to make sure that those who committed these atrocities are
brought to justice. And that is one of the concerns they have is that
many of those people who are alleged to have been involved in
these terrorist activities have not been returned to Israel by the
Palestinian authorities for trial. And it appears as though they will
not.
So without objection, I will enter this into the record; and, hope-
fully one day we will be able to see that they get some justice for
the loss of their loved ones.
So I will put that into the record.
[The information follows:] x
September 19, 1995.
Hon. Congressman Benjamin Gilman,
Chairman, the House Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C.
Dear Congressman, We are the mothers, grieving for our precious children, of
blessed memory, who were brutally murdered by merciless terrorists as they inno-
cently hiked the countryside of the land of Israel. We, as mothers, have never been
active politically. For year we tirelessly and lovingly dedicated ourselves to raising
our children. In one day our dreams were shattered when we received the bitter
news that unconscionable murderers, with their knives in hand, savagely butchered
our beloved offspring.
We turn to you at this critical hour as you chair the deliberations regarding the
granting of financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. We beseech your assistance
regarding one specific issue — the extradition of the murderers who were appre-
hended by the Palestinian Authority and are currently being held in Jericho.
According to the agreement signed with Mr. Arafat, the State of Israel has the
right to obtain the transfer of murderers of its citizens in order to be tried in the
courts of the State of Israel.
The State of Israel has turned to the Palestinian Authority and requested the ex-
tradition of the murderers. However, the Palestinian Authority has refused to com-
ply and transfer the killers of our children to the Israeli authorities.
We are terribly pained, anguished and distraught by the Palestinian Authority's
outright refusal to comply. We have turned to the Prime Minister, to Cabinet Min-
isters, and to members of the Knesset with our plea for compliance and justice. Yes-
terday we met with the President of Israel, Mr. Ezer Weitzman, who unequivocally
stated to us his support of halting the peace talks as long as the Palestinian Author-
ity refuses to comply and extradite the murderers to the State of Israel.
We look upon this issue of the extradition of the savage murderers of our children
as not simply a political issue, but rather as a moral issue of the highest order.
The United States of America has been courageously battling terrorism for many
years. In view of this honorable policy, it behooves this great country to insure the
extradition of terrorists as a primary condition for the continuation of aid to the Pal-
estinian Authority. Compliance with this matter by the Palestinian Authority will
be a true test of the sincerity of the PLO, heretofore a terrorist organization, now
professing to be a peace seeking organization.
We respectfully request the opportunity to appear before this most important com-
mittee which you chair. As mothers attempting to cope with the incessant pain of
our losses, we wish to have a dialogue with you and the committee members. It
would be scandalously immoral to provide the PLO with funds as long as they con-
tinue to refuse to allow the State of Israel the right to bring the terrorists to justice.
Dear Congressman, your intervention is our only hope. Oui children cannot re-
turn to us. We dare not compromise their honor.
We would like to extend to you and to your family our best wishes for a happy
and healthy New Year.
Sincerely,
Yehudit Shachor.
1 Text of this letter also submitted by Congressman Peter King.
112
BlLHA BACHRACH.
RlFKA FORER.
Batya Bachar.
Mr. Burton. Gary, did you have any more comments that you
would like to make? I will yield to you for 5 minutes while we are
waiting on Mr. Dornan, if you would like.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
One of the great difficulties in most kinds of peace processes is
that there is usually a party who is not faring well economically,
sometimes devoid of hope and often in the midst of poverty.
Many claim that the situation on the ground is due, in part, to
the fact that the Palestinian community is not faring well. And if
things were better economically, if there were more employment, if
people were more productive, if people were more engaged in the
legitimate pursuit of economic advantages that that would, in it-
self, be responsible in some measure for defocusing from strife in
this case with Israel and the Israeli authorities.
I do not know if you agree with that in total or in part. I do not
attribute all the problems to that. But certainly I think many
would say if the economic conditions on the ground improved for
Palestinians, it would be helpful in advancing the process to some
extent and bring things a little bit further.
How would you respond to that? And if you agree with it in any
way, how do you do that?
Dr. Ganchrow.
Mr. Ganchrow. Well, first of all, as far as your first point that
terrorism and fundamentalism comes strictly from economic
causes, we have seen that in Japan, that that is not exactly so. So
I do not think there is a direct ratio and relationship.
Mr. Ackerman. No, no, no. Let me just hone the premise a little
bit. That is not what I intended to convey.
What I am trying to say is that very often in a great many places
in the world, possibly in this place as well, that where people are
devoid of hope, that that is soil that allows for the fomentation of
social disruption and allows the seeds of fundamentalism to take
root. Because if people cannot put bread on the table and have no
prospect of doing so, then those who would sell them pie in the sky
and do not have to produce in this life, do not have to show any-
thing as far as what their promises and motivations and call for
actions are, have a greater chance of selling their wares.
Mr. Ganchrow. I think over the long run, if we insist on full
compliance, the economic picture for the Gaza and Jericho and
other areas will improve primarily because other countries will re-
alize that there is actually going to be peace and they are going to
certainly want to invest economically.
In addition, the Israeli people are going to realize that the Pal-
estinians mean business because they have made these steps of
compliance, and they are going to reach out for peace.
So over the long run, it is in the long-term interest of the Pal-
estinian people that there be full compliance and full carrying out
of Oslo.
Mr. Klein. May I respond to that?
Mr. Hellman. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman?
113
Mr. Hellman. I think that what has happened
Mr. Ackerman. Maybe each of you briefly.
Mr. Hellman, Mr. Zogby, Mr. Klein, Mr. Harris.
Mr. Hellman. Yes, if I may comment, I studied the situation, re-
garding the quality of life for the Palestinian Arabs in the terri-
tories, that is, in Gaza and in the West Bank — Judea and Sama-
ria— and in Jerusalem, on two occasions, for the United Nations,
under the auspices of the U.N. Environment Program; and each
time my reports were accepted by their Governing Council, which
was hardly a pro-Israel body.
And each time I found that under Israel's stewardship, the Pal-
estinian Arabs had risen economically from, in the case of Gaza,
the status of Bangladesh in 1967. They rose to the higher reaches
of the developing world economically. So it is a canard that the
problem here is economics.
In addition, what I found, which was particularly galling not only
to the United Nations, delegates of 58 countries, who had to accept
or reject my report, but also possibly problematic for Israel, was
that, somehow, Israel had done better in terms of environmental
factors considered, on an objective basis for the Palestinian Arabs
of Judea, Samaria, Gaza, et cetera than they had done within their
own pre- 1967 boundaries.
And so I think that is it not an economic question first — or even
foremost. The war in Bosnia occurred in a place where there was
a European standard of living and so I do not think that economic
development is what is needed.
I agree with Dr. Ganchrow that if there were security, if there
were peace, if Yasir Arafat was using his reported 29,000 para-
military troops to enforce security instead of to create an army to
conquer Israel, there would be peace. And in would come economic
development.
Earlier in the day, someone asked about the proposed hotel in
Gaza. I think that you need to look at the hearing record that Sen-
ator Hank Brown wrote in the Senate Middle East Subommittee.
As I recall — and I do not have that transcript before me — but I be-
lieve that Senator Hank Brown, chairman of the Middle East Sub-
committee was extremely disappointed in the ability of the Pal-
estinian Arab leadership even to mobilize funds which he had espe-
cially found for them from U.S. AID authorities.
Mr. Zogby. This is bizarre, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hellman. Excuse me. Do not interrupt me, please.
And also there is a problem — a very real human rights problem,
not just for the Palestinian Arabs; and the security police are ar-
resting Palestinian Arabs and interrogating them. There is a viola-
tion of human rights and
Mr. Ackerman. Just briefly. Because we do have a lot of-
Mr. Hellman. And Christians and Jews cannot go to the holy
sites of Judea, Samaria, much less Gaza, and tour guides will not
take you even to parts of Jerusalem, today.
And the United States State Department issued an advisory
warning against riding buses in Israel.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Hellman.
Mr. Hellman. The problem is security, not economic develop-
ment, Mr. Congressman.
114
Mr. Ackerman. I appreciate your statement. It was not nec-
essarily responsive to my question, which was basically: Is not the
soil of poverty more fertile for the spread of fundamentalism or
Mr. Hellman. No!
Mr. Ackerman. And I am not talking about religious Islam?
Mr. Hellman. And I am saying no.
Mr. ZOGBY. May I?
Mr. Klein. I thought I was next, if I may?
Mr. Ackerman. Yes, Mr. Klein. And then Mr. Zogby.
Mr. Klein. Prof. Amos Perlmutter, who teaches right here at
American University — we are in Washington, right — is editor of the
Journal of Strategic Studies recently wrote an article just on this
issue where he said the real source of conflict in Gaza is not pov-
erty or the horrible economy. He says the real problem is the rise
of a radical nationalist and decidedly rejectionist movement dedi-
cated to the destruction of peace and eventual formation of com-
plete Palestine in Israel.
Other Arab journalists recently wrote that it is nonsense to claim
that Islamic terrorism in Israel is the product of the poverty, back-
wardness, and ignorance.
He points out that there is a much larger percentage of people
among university students that are members of Hamas than
among the population as a whole. And we have seen this in past
history.
Germany in the 1920's, Woodrow Wilson and others believed that
if Germany could be reintegrated into the European economy, that
would resolve the problem of Germany's threats against other na-
tions.
And, of course, they were reintegrated. They became strong eco-
nomically. And yet, as Donald Kagan points out in his book, "On
the Origins of War," hatred, envy, honor, and other issues were
very important; and that is why the Germans continued and made
war, not the issues of economics.
The basis of the Arab war against the Jews is not economics and
economics will not resolve it.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Zogby.
Mr. Zogby. A minor point first, Mr. Ackerman. I was not only
present to testify at Mr. Brown's hearings, but I helped organize
those hearings, myself and Mel Levine, as cochairs of Builders for
Peace.
Senator Brown's anger was directed at the agencies of U.S. Gov-
ernment for not supporting a Palestinian American investor who
had mobilized American, Palestinian, and other international sup-
port for a hotel but simply needed the underwriting of an agency
of the U.S. Government to do so. His anger was not directed at Pal-
estinians.
Second, there is present in this discussion a disturbing mean
spiritedness and almost a dehumanization of Arabs and Palestin-
ians. They are being viewed as objects. There is lost in this discus-
sion the sense of
Mr. Ackerman. Just for point of clarification, are you referring
to the panel or are you referring to
115
Mr. ZOGBY. I am referring to some of the comments that the
panel has made, not yours. I think your question is an excellent
one.
And, actually, if had not heard some of what I heard, I would
have been able to very easily give an answer that I think might
have surprised some members of the panel. And that is that one
needs to look at the connection between violence and, in this case,
developing the Palestinian economy, creating, as our President,
noted when he ran in 1992, opportunity and hope, that helps com-
bat despair. There is a way of understanding this on a number of
levels.
First of all, the level of those who order the bombings. Those who
order the bombings are not dissuaded by economic development.
They have a political agenda. They manipulate the symbols of reli-
gion and distort the purposes of religion for the purpose of carrying
out a war against the leadership that made peace on the Palestin-
ian and Israeli side; and they have no political alternative to offer.
They are enemies of peace, plain and simple.
Those, on the second level, who actually carry the bombs are
greatly disturbed young people who I feel have, in fact, bought a
bill of goods, pie in the sky, as you have referred to it, the promise
of the rewards in the hereafter because they see no opportunity or
hope in their present lives.
Even in that case, economic development may not help them be-
cause in some cases their lives are so broken and distorted that
they are willing to commit suicide. Understand, they kill them-
selves as well as innocent Jews.
On the third level, which is in some ways the deeper problem,
and that is the tens of thousands of young men in Gaza, for exam-
ple, who will celebrate when the bomb goes off.
I can only remember 2 days after the signing in Oslo, Nabil
Sha'ath, who was Minister of Economic Development in the Pal-
estinian Authority, was on a TV show that I have here in Washing-
ton. And I asked him the question about violence and what he
would do.
And he said, of course, they would punish the perpetrators. But
he made this point. He said to me: "If this process works, and I
believe that it will work, a year from now our young men will have
jobs. Our farmers will have their land back. We will have water.
We will have economic development. And we will be rebuilding the
structure of our society that has been in disrepair for decades and
decades."
"When the bomb goes off, thousands of young people," he said,
"will turn against the bomber because the bomber threatens to
take from them everything that they won."
What disturbs Nabil and me and many others who support peace
today is the opposite occurs because the fruits of peace have not
been realized by those thousands and thousands of young men;
and, therefore, they have not seen progress. They have, in fact,
higher unemployment today than before. The GDP of Gaza has
gone down almost 20 percent since peace was signed.
And if you simply look at the map, the land did not return. What
returned was Gaza City and some of the refugee camps; but most
116
of the fertile land is still in the hands of the Israeli settlers and
water as well.
We can talk compliance two ways. I am not asking for compli-
ance reports against the Government of Israel. I think it would be
an interesting exercise, but I am not sure any of us wants to put
our administration or Congress through it.
However, the fact is that water has not been evenly distributed
in Gaza, even though the percentage of population in Gaza is
850,000 Palestinians to a few thousand Israeli settlers.
Land has not been returned either. And access and egress so that
people can import and export has not taken place. There is not
even egress regularized through Egypt.
There are real difficulties here. Economic development can make
a difference. It will do one thing. It will increase the legitimacy of
the Palestinian Authority, increase popular support for the peace
process and isolate the people who have a political agenda to throw
bombs. But it will not stop the actual bomb. It will isolate those
who do it, and it will increase the legitimacy of the authorities so
that the compliance you want will become easier because they will
have greater popular support and legitimacy to do those things.
Mr. Burton. Let me interrupt, Gary to allow our colleague, who
has been waiting so patiently, a Presidential candidate from the
great State of California, Congressman Dornan.
Mr. Dornan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, when one of the hard-working staffers of this com-
mittee, that I spent a decade on, brought me all this material, she
said there will be a pop quiz this evening. And all of you poured
out so much effort and work into our statements, and this is the
nature of things around here and why I am glad we went an extra
period of testimony after the last vote.
There is so much here that if we put it all together we could
have yet another excellent studious book on the Middle East.
Now I have just come back from Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Mac-
edonia, and a couple of air bases in Italy.
I made about 16 trips to Israel at every level of conflict, and
about 8 in Northern Ireland as a correspondent when you had more
freedom than as a Congressman just to be by yourself and go off.
And I can remember going to Israel — and some of you may know
these names, they are just filed in the back of my head. I have not
seen them since. God Ranan was my contact in the foreign min-
istry. He would wake me up every morning: Good morning, Bob.
This is God.
And since I was suffering jet lag, it always got my attention. He
set me up with a person described in the British manner as a Sen-
ior Arabist. And his name was Israel Stockman. I do not know if
he is still alive, but he had many friends in Nablus and Ramallah.
We visited every city up and down the West Bank, lunch, dinner,
spoke with a whole series of mayors. This was 1972.
I went back in 1977 with the chairman of this committee with
a few intervening trips in between. A senior Member, chairman of
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Lester Wolfe. We met with four mayors,
including the mayors of Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Nablus. Two of
them were murdered within a few years. One of them lost both of
his legs and lived. And I have just watched this thing fester.
117
At the end of the 1972 trip, I went to Israel Pentagon's down-
town Tel Aviv, and they said: Well, what do you think Mr. Journal-
ist? I said: Give up Gaza and give it up as far as you possibly can.
Help build them a little seaport and Mayberry-type from D-day and
help establish Gaza U.
Do you know how many people were in Gaza then?
Two hundred thousand.
Who has got the current figure? How many people in Gaza
today?
Mr. Zogby. Eight hundred thousand.
Mr. Dornan. Eight hundred thousand. In 23 years, it quadrupled
in size.
The people in the Israeli Defense Ministry agreed with me. They
said, yes, we should give this to them. It has access to the sea. It
is a tiny State. I used Luxembourg, Andora, Liechtenstein, Monaco
and San Marino as an example.
I said you are not as big as Luxembourg, but it will be bigger
than Liechtenstein. Do it.
Now we have done it way too late, and the problems in Gaza are
a reaction, an angry reaction to the difficulty of trying to work out
this confederation on the West Bank.
Now, this is my first question — because I do not think this is
going to help — and darn it, there go the bells again. I understand
that Arafat — and I have never understood a man who has as much
trouble keeping his beard cut to about an 8-day growth, to look
scruffy instead of letting it come out like a decent rabbi, monk, or
Arab leader like Anthony Quinn in "Lawrence of Arabia." Let it
grow. But do not try to look scruffy. I have never been a fan of his
imagine or his life, of course.
But he wants to appoint Abu Firas, 48, responsible for the terror-
ist attack, in the capital's Jaffa Road in 1970's and was involved
in the Munich Olympic's massacre in 1972. I was there 2 weeks be-
fore the massacre in Munich on my way to Israel. I was in Israel
when the massacre took place. Talk about a pall of sorrow coming
over a tiny country.
Then Prime Minister Golda Meir — I am quoting from 6 days ago,
front page article, Jerusalem Post, by Uri Dan and Dennis
Eisenberg, the authors of "The Mossad, the Secrets of the Israeli
Secret Service." Pretty sharp guys. I have the book. I have not had
a chance to really do anything but skim-read it.
They said that Golda Meir ordered Abu Firas and the rest of the
PLO terrorists involved in the massacre to be hunted down and
killed.
I understood that that was called Operation Gideon and that
they got everyone. But, no, it appears that only three were released
by the West Germans. But Abu Firas must have been a backup
guy. He has had at least one attempt on his life before he sought
shelter in Tunisia, and now Arafat wants to make him his chief
law man in Ramallah.
And what is happening to the other largest city, Nablus? There,
quoting the Post:
The second thug with the blood of both Jews and Arabs on his hands is Mahmoud
Al-Aloul, based in Tunisia for many years. He was the overall commander of all
PLO terrorists attacks in Sumaria. Arafat now wants him to be the boss of all police
118
and security affairs in Nablus. And he expects him to adopt the ruthless style of
Jabriel Rajube, Arafat's security chief now, for Judea and Sumaria.
What can we expect except continued horror if all of these resur-
rected first degree mass murderers are being brought back to be
the chiefs of police?
Out of fairness, if you would comment, sir, from the Alliance.
And then anybody else can take a shot at it.
Do you believe the Jerusalem Post has good intelligence here,
that these are the principal desires of Yasir Arafat to have these
people become the marshals in Dodge City here? What is this?
Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Zogby. It is the Arab-American Institute, Mr. Congressman.
And, no, I do not necessarily believe the story.
Mr. DORNAN. Does anybody else think that this may be just bad
reporting by the Post?
Mr. HELLMAN. No, I think this really is happening. I believe it
is happening. And it is sad. There is no elected government. There
is no democracy.
And in this respect, I think everyone here would say there should
be elections and the sooner the better, free and fair elections so
that the Palestinian-Arabs can choose a real government, come to
a constitution or the like, for their autonomous area. And I think
that would be the answer.
But in the meanwhile, it seems like there are all kinds of fac-
tions, including these security risks and perpetrators of terror from
the past who come back, and Yasir Arafat and others are building
power bases. And they are using for their power base the people
whom they have known and with whom they have worked over the
years.
Mr. Zogby. Those that Israel has specifically objected to, Mr.
Congressman
Mr. Ganchrow. I think it is going to be good for the economy
because they can have a convention of mass murders.
Mr. Zogby. This is disgraceful rhetoric. I really think it is dis-
graceful rhetoric, and it is not contributing one bit either to under-
standing in this body, understanding to the American people; and
it is not contributing to the peace of Israel.
And I think it is really a shame that it goes on.
Mr. Dornan. I have always had great
Mr. BURTON. I think it is time for everybody to answer the ques-
tions directly. But I hope that
Mr. Zogby. And try to be respectful.
Mr. Burton. Yes; we do not get into that.
Mr. Dornan. I have always had great respect for the Arab-Amer-
ican Alliance. I always found them to be truly dedicated to peace.
And if you say that you do not believe these stories, I know that
is your best judgment. And I hope you are right because it is not
going to solve anything to bring in people except courageous — even
if it has to be younger men who are dedicated to
Mr. Zogby. Mr. Congressman, if every story that was written
about you was without an effort on your part
Mr. Dornan. I would be a monster.
Mr. Zogby [continuing]. To be able to respond, you would be in
trouble. And we all would be in trouble.
119
The fact is that a newspaper story neither is sufficient for accu-
sation or conviction. Nor should one judge the entire process based
on Uri Dan's reporting. Uri Dan has a long record of this kind of
stuff. And the fact is that you have to look at the facts and seek
to find both sides of the story.
I cannot comment because I do not know it. But Uri Dan is noto-
rious for this.
Mr. Hellman. Mr. Dornan, I think the problem is that there is
no democracy and no respect for human rights. And without any
disrespect to my fellow panelist, Jim Zogby, something was said
that there is a hateful atmosphere or you said something about the
atmosphere being wrong. I do not believe that anybody on this
panel, much less any of the members of this committee harbor anti-
Arab or anti-Arab-American or anti-Palestinian-Arab prejudices.
The point is that the Palestinian-Arabs are the ones who are suf-
fering under these security people who have been brought in from
military organizations and from terrorist and security organiza-
tions of the past.
It is not just of the Jews who have their rights affected and it
is not just the Christians who cannot travel freely. I mean for ex-
ample, we used to go to Hebron. We do not do that any more. Be-
fore that we used to go Nablus, Sheckrem to Jacob's well. We do
not go there any more, although it is mentioned often in the Old
and the New Testament.
Today we even bypass Jericho, a lovely town. I am not saying
that it is because of Arafat or whatever, but it is because the proc-
ess is faulty, flawed, and not working.
I think there is a security vacuum and gap where nobody is pro-
tecting the people adequately, not protecting the Jews, and not the
Christians. There is a report that I could provide for the record of
someone who converted to Christianity — I do not know if his faith
was relevant or not — from Islam. And then he was persecuted in
some way. These kinds of things are happening. Due to an inter-
national outcry, he was released, and he is on the way to Canada.
But there also is persecution of Arabs who are charged with
being "collaborators," a collaborator being either someone who ac-
tively
Mr. Dornan. But that is why all these mayors were killed years
ago because
Mr. Hellman. Yes, they were either collaborators-
Mr. ZOGBY. No, that is not why the mayors were killed. They
were victims of car bombings by extremist right-wing Jews. And
the Jews were arrested for it.
Mr. Hellman. I am just saying there need to be some effective
security measures.
Mr. Dornan. Wait 1 second. Jim made a point that I did not
Mr. Zogby. Mr. Congressman, those mayors were friends of
mine. And they were killed by
Mr. Dornan. By Jewish terrorists?
Mr. Zogby. Yes.
Mr. Dornan. And there were trials?
Mr. Zogby. Jews were arrested for it. They were not killed —
Fahd Qawasme was not killed for being a collaborator. He was, in
fact, the only one of the mayors who was killed by Palestinians.
120
And we condemned that group and we still — none of us in the
Arab-American community will deal with that group because of
that heinous killing.
Mr. Dornan. Right. Let me
Mr. Zogby. But the other mayors who you are pointing to who
are killed were killed by car bombings right wing extremists in Is-
rael, and the Israeli Government arrested and punished the people
who did it.
Mr. Dornan. The bells are going to go off any time for a second
vote, and Gary Ackerman wants to do a final question.
Let me ask something — and it may have already been asked, be-
cause the chairman is doing great work on this, and I do not know
if we had a roundrobin on the panel on this or not — but British in-
telligence supposedly has ferreted out — and they will not give us
the intelligence is what I am hearing, outside of my committee re-
sponsibilities; I have not checked this out in the Intelligence Com-
mittee— but they are not telling us where they got the information,
but that the PLO has $7 or $8 billion in bank accounts around the
world.
Has this been discussed? Did you bring this up, Mr. Burton?
Mr. Hellman. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. I
Mr. Hellman. Yes, it was asked. We asked Chairman Gilman to
make that study. And, thankfully, he did. And our reports from
other witnesses and other sources are that Yasir Arafat and the
PLO have at least $8 to $10 billion as estimated by the British Na-
tional Criminal Intelligence Service and one $1.5 to $2 billion an-
nual cash-flow. And we still do not have any of the answers.
You were not here this morning, but there was a funny colloquy
between Mr. Keiley from the GAO and the chairman which basi-
cally came down to the fact that the CIA clamped a secret classi-
fication on this and, therefore
Mr. Ackerman. Excuse me. I need to interrupt.
Mr. HELLMAN. Even the letter saying why it is secret is secret.
Mr. DORNAN. I will yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chair-
man.
Mr. Burton. Well, I was just going to say, we have 5 minutes
left on this vote. So, Gary, if you have something to say, you need
to say it pretty quickly.
Mr. Dornan. Oh, that was the second bell.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I want to thank the panel. I just would like very
much, Mr. Chairman, because we have some rather strong person-
alities on this panel, some of whom have gotten generous shares
of time. Mr. Harris has not had the opportunity to say one word
here, waiting very, very patiently. And every time he is about to
speak, somebody else jumps in and takes 6 minutes to answer a
question, which is important. But I think I would like to hear
something from Mr. Harris.
Mr. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. And I would also Mr. — I guess both ends of the
spectrum and both ends of the table said very little also.
Mr. Dornan. Can we come back?
Mr. Burton. If you will let me interrupt, we have less than 5
minutes.
121
If you gentlemen are willing to come back again for the summa-
tion, that is fine with me. But the panel has been imposed upon
for some time now.
Mr. Ackerman. Well, would you folks be willing to return?
Mr. FlSHBElN. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to suggest that
we have additional sessions like this. I think this has been a very
useful hearing.
And it is unfortunate that this is the first one in 2 years to ad-
dress this issue. I think the panelists here, if I am not mistaken,
would probably like to come back another day to go through some
of these issues. They are very complex issues. And I think it is
worth the committee's time to do this on another occasion as well.
Mr. Ackerman. Can we hear from Mr. Harris?
Mr. Harris. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Does the panel want to return? Or did you want
to — I think people have flights.
Mr. Harris. My statement will be less than 30 seconds, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Burton. OK, Mr. Harris.
Mr. Harris. But I did not want the record to show that there
was a penalty for politeness.
Mr. HELLMAN. I will return if you have a panel.
Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make a conclud-
ing remark, and that is to represent, again, the views of the Amer-
ican Jewish Committee in all of this.
Perhaps, unlike some here today, we trust the Israeli democratic
process and we trust the Israeli Government. There is a lot of sec-
ond guessing here going on about the Israeli Government's strat-
egy.
I do not question the right of people to second guess; but I do
believe that in the final analysis, Israel has shown itself fully ma-
ture and capable of reaching its own decisions pertaining to its se-
curity.
I trust the Israeli Government, therefore, to pursue what it con-
siders the best path for peace. And I trust the Israeli Government
to pursue what it believes to be the best path to its own security.
There is a race against time both in the peace process and in the
Arab world as well: In the Arab world, between the so-called mod-
erates and the so-called fundamentalists.
This country, the United States, has a stake in seeking to ensure
that the moderates win. And the moderates, together with the
peace process, represent our best hope.
Therefore, while we do not get to choose the enemy with whom
we negotiate, Mr. Chairman, I believe in the final analysis, this is
the enemy, and flawed though he may be, we have an historic op-
portunity here to pursue the peace process as best we can.
And I urge, therefore, that this committee continue to do all that
it can to support that peace process and support Israel's ability to
defend and secure itself both for the pursuit of peace and the pur-
suit of its own security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BURTON. I will urge the Chairman to have further hearings
like this.
122
I thank you all for being here. You did a great job, and I am
sorry we have to rush.
[Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
HEARING ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
THANK YOU VERY MUCH MR. CHAIRMAN. I COMMEND YOU FOR CALLING THIS
HEARING ON A MATTER OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO UNITED STATES INTERESTS,
IN SUCH A TIMELY FASHION.
I THINK IT IS QUITE SAFE TO SAY THAT ALL OF US DESIRE TO SEE A REAL
PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE PEOPLE OF THAT LONG-SUFFERING REGION
DESERVE IT, AND THE WHOLE WORLD WOULD BENEFIT GREATLY FROM IT.
THE QUESTION IS: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF PEACE, AND IS THIS CURRENT
PROCESS CONTRIBUTING TO IT. WE MUST BE WARY OF POLITICAL
IMPERATIVES, WHETHER IN ISRAEL OR THE UNITED STATES, INTERJECTING
THEMSELVES AND TAKING US ALONG THE WRONG PATH, IN THE NAME OF
PEACE.
WE ARE ABOUT TO WITNESS THE SIGNING OF THE SECOND ROUND OF
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS. IT IS WORTH ASKING
OURSELVES: "HOW WELL HAVE THE AGREEMENTS WORKED THUS FAR?" I AM
AFRAID THAT THE ANSWER WOULD NOT BE A VERY ENCOURAGING ONE.
ONE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE OSLO AGREEMENT WAS THE REDUCTION
OF TERRORISM. IN FACT TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAELIS HAS INCREASED
SIGNIFICANTLY. IN THE TWO YEARS SINCE THE OSLO AGREEMENT WAS
SIGNED WITH THE PLO, THERE HAS BEEN A 73% INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF
ISRAELIS KILLED BY PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS.
THERE ARE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER THE PLO IS ACTING IN GOOD
FAITH AND REALLY COMPLYING WITH THE COMMITMENTS IT MADE IN THE OSLO
AGREEMENT. IN FACT, PEACE WATCH, AND OTHER INDEPENDENT ANALYSTS
DOCUMENT A SYSTEMATIC PATTERN OF PLO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OSLO
AGREEMENT AND OTHER COMMITMENTS.
THIS BRINGS ME TO THE CRUCIAL ROLE BEING PLAYED BY THE UNITED
STATES. IN THE EUPHORIA OF THE DAYS AFTER THE OSLO AGREEMENT WAS
SIGNED, PRESIDENT CLINTON ASKED THE CONGRESS FOR AUTHORITY TO GIVE
$500 MILLION IN ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, WHICH IS
IN ESSENCE, THE PLO. THIS AUTHORITY WAS GRANTED IN THE FORM OF THE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE FACILITATION ACT. I MIGHT ADD THAT THIS ACT WAS
PASSED BEFORE THE ELECTION OF THE REPUBLICAN MAJORITY.
I WOULD VENTURE TO GUESS THAT VERY FEW AMERICANS ARE AWARE THAT THE
ADMINISTRATION IS GIVING $500 MILLION TO THE PLO, AN ORGANIZATION
WITH A DUBIOUS TRACK RECORD TO BEGIN WITH. IF WE ARE INDEED
EMBARKED ON A NEW ROAD LEADING TO A NEW TOMORROW, WE SHOULD EXPECT
(123)
124
THE PLO TO BEHAVE VERY DIFFERENTLY FROM THE WAY THEY ARE INDEED
BEHAVING .
IF TERRORISM WAS A THING OF THE PAST, WHY IS THE PLO NOT DOING MORE
TO COMBAT TERRORISM, TO RENOUNCE TERRORISM, AND TO EDUCATE ITS
PEOPLE IN THE LANGUAGE OF PEACE? JUST A FEW WEEKS AGO, YASSER
ARAFAT WAS CAUGHT ON VIDEOTAPE EXTOLLING THE VIRTUES OF A NOTORIOUS
TERRORIST WHO PERPETRATED THE INFAMOUS COASTAL BUS MASSACRE OF
1978.
FURTHERMORE, THERE IS STRONG REASON TO SUSPECT THAT THE PLO HAS
CONSIDERABLE ASSETS OF ITS OWN STASHED AWAY. ACCORDING TO BRITISH
INTELLIGENCE, THE AMOUNT MAY BE AS HIGH AS $7 BILLION OR MORE.
LASTLY, RELIABLE REPORTS HAVE SURFACED THAT INDICATE THAT THE PLO
IS ALREADY MISUSING DONOR FUNDS AND ENGAGING IN FRAUD.
FOR THESE THREE REASONS: LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ACCORDS, THE
LIKELY POSSESSION OF CONSIDERABLE ASSETS, AND THE LACK OF
ACCOUNTABILITY, IT IS HIGHLY INAPPROPRIATE, INDEED OUTRAGEOUS, FOR
AMERICAN TAXPAYERS TO BE FUNDING THE PLO. SUCH FUNDING SHOULD BE
STOPPED IMMEDIATELY UNTIL THESE ISSUES CAN BE PROPERLY ADDRESSED.
IT IS NO LESS THAN OUR SOLEMN DUTY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO SEE TO
IT THAT THIS IS DONE.
PEACE CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY EXPECTING ALL THE PARTIES TO AN
ACCORD TO ABIDE WITH THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THEIR COMMITMENTS
AND BY REFRAINING THE SORT OF SELF-DELUSION THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED
THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO ARAB INTENTIONS TOWARDS ISRAEL.
I CANNOT CONCLUDE MY REMARKS, MR. CHAIRMAN, WITHOUT MAKING
REFERENCE TO ONE MORE ISSUE THAT IS VERY TROUBLING TO MANY OF US:
THE POSSIBILITY THAT U.S. TROOPS MAY BE DISPATCHED TO THE GOLAN
HEIGHTS .
LET ME SAY, FIRST OF ALL, THAT THIS MEMBER OF CONGRESS SEES VERY
LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT ANYTHING IS REALLY NEW IN DAMASCUS. SYRIA IS
STILL A REPRESSIVE POLICE STATE ENGAGED IN HORRIFIC VIOLATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AGAINST ITS OWN PEOPLE. HAFEZ AL-ASAD IS STILL
HEAVILY INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AS WELL AS TERRORISM.
HAMAS, HIZBULLAH, AND ISLAMIC JIHAD ARE ONLY A FEW OF THE TERRORIST
GROUPS RECEIVING AID, COMFORT, AND SAFE HAVEN FROM SYRIA.
THE NOTION THAT U.S. TROOPS MAY BE PUT IN HARMS WAY IN ANY
AGREEMENT OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, IS, TO PUT IT MILDLY, VERY
TROUBLING.
ALLOW ME TO JUST QUOTE THE CONCLUSION OF A STUDY COMMISSIONED BY
THE CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY BY 11 DISTINGUISHED DEFENSE EXPERTS,
INCLUDING 6 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: "THERE IS
NO MISSION OR RATIONALE FOR A U.S. PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON THE GOLAN
THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE RESULTING COSTS AND RISKS. INDEED, THE NET
EFFECT COULD BE NEGATIVE FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND REGIONAL
STABILITY, WHILE THE CONSEQUENCES COULD INCLUDE THE LOSS OF U.S.
LIVES AND, POSSIBLY, A CREDIBILITY- DAMAGING RETREAT OF THE U.S.
125
FORCES UNDER TERRORIST FIRE. IN ANY EVENT, SUCH A DEPLOYMENT WOULD
INCREASE THE DANGER OF DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN A FUTURE MIDDLE
EAST WAR AND UNDERMINE ISRAEL'S STANDING WITH THE U.S. PUBLIC AS A
SELF-RELIANT ALLY.
IF ISRAEL WITHDRAWS ON OR FROM THE GOLAN, IT WILL BE REQUIRED TO
ADOPT MEASURES TO COMPENSATE TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE FOR THE
MILITARY RISKS INHERENT IN RELINQUISHING THE TERRITORY. IT WILL
HAVE TO CONSIDER: INVESTMENT IN MORE SURVEILLANCE ASSETS; HIGHER
SUSTAINED READINESS FOR AIR AND OTHER FORCES; A LARGER STANDING
ARMY; AND MEANS AND METHODS TO INCREASE THE SPEED OF MILITARY
MOBILIZATION. ALL SUCH MEASURES ENTAIL LARGE COSTS --POLITICAL AND
SOCIETAL AS WELL AS FINANCIAL. A U.S. FORCE DEPLOYMENT TO THE
GOLAN WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THOSE COSTS. INDEED, ONE OF
THE DANGERS OF SUCH A DEPLOYMENT IS THAT IT MAY CREATE A FALSE
SENSE OF SECURITY IN ISRAEL AND DISCOURAGE THE INVESTMENTS
NECESSARY TO ADDRESS SUCH RISKS. THIS WOULD NOT SERVE U.S.
INTERESTS, MUCH LESS ISRAEL'S."
MR. CHAIRMAN, IT DOES NOT SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE TO IGNORE
REALITY, AS INCONVENIENT AS IT MAY BE. TRUE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF ALL THESE FACTS ARE FACED SOBERLY, AND
HONESTLY .
THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY.
11 in ,-.
126
REP. MICHAEL P. FORBES
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
Mr Chairman,
Thank you very much for allowing me this opportunity to address the committee today.
As many of you know, I have had an intense interest in the Middle East for many years and am a
staunch supporter of our ally Israel.
Mr. Chairman, L like most Americans, was delighted two years ago when the Oslo
Accords were signed and a chance for a lasting peace was finally within sight. The long struggle
for peace in this troubled yet crucially important region had finally reached a breakthrough. And
despite a lifetime of mistrust of the PLO and a revulsion toward their terrorist tactics, I originally
supported the Clinton administration's promise of U.S. assistance to the Palestinians There was
no question that the Palestinians faced severe socioeconomic problems, and anything we could
do to help solve those problems and thereby promote stability in the region seemed to be a
worthwhile gamble.
But Mr. Chairman, most of us were under the impression that the PLO would have to
meet at least a minimum standard of behavior before the aid would start flowing. Unfortunately,
that does not seem to be the case. It would seem to me that that minimum standard should be the
Oslo Accords themselves, in which the PLO made a number of pledges, none of which has been
met. It is an open secret that the PLO is systematically violating the accords, Mr. Chairman, yet
US taxpayer money continues to flow, much of it directly to Arafat and his cronies.
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I cant explain this to my constituents, nor can I bear to watch an unrepentant enemy of
Israel be built up with our money, posing a potential future threat to our ally Thus, I have
introduced HR 1960, The Middle East Peace Compliance Act, which has also been introduced as
S 915 by Senator D'Amato. HR 1960 would suspend all aid to the Palestinians until they
complied with the provisions of the Oslo Accords. Among other items, this would require that
PLO: amend its charter to delete the provisions calling for the destruction of Israel; ban terrorist
organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, prosecute terrorists and cease support for armed
struggle against Israel
Further, HR 1960 would stipulate that, even after certification that the PLO were in full
compliance with the Oslo Accords, aid would only be channelled through American government
agencies and NGOs. No money could be channelled through the PLO, the Palestinian Authority
or any of its affiliates Our experience with govemment-to-government aid around the world has
been a sorry one, and the evidence that the PLO has diverted and misused our funds is quite
strong. On that topic, I would like to submit for the record an August 14 article from Insight
magazine which documents these diversions of U.S. aid, citing internal PLO documents and
British intelligence reports.
While some people might dispute these accusations, Mr. Chairman, what is indisputable
is that the PLO has kept virtually none of the promises it made in the Oslo Accords. To my
mind, it is nothing short of scandalous that U.S. taxpayer money continues to flow to Arafat and
his anti-Israel allies under these circumstances. The administration insists on sweeping all of
this under the rug, most blatantly by classifying the recent GAO report that reportedly confirms
our worst fears about PLO behavior Therefore, Mr. Chairman, it devolves to us in Congress to
stand up on behalf of the American taxpayer and our Israeli friends. Enough is enough. The
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PLO must live by some rules if it wants to join the international community and receive
American tax dollars
I respectfully request, Mr. Chairman, that the committee give HR 1960 its every
consideration. Thank you for the time today.
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JIM SAXTON
NATIONAL SECUHTY COMMfTTOE
MILITARY PROCUREMENT
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
H Js>. $ous.e of &epresentattbes
laiastiing^on. &£ 20515
REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE
Prepared Statement of Congressman Jim Saxton (R-NJ)
Hearings on Middle East Peace Process. September 20. 1995
House Committee on International Relations
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I welcome this opportunity to address this
Committee on issues which 1 believe are critical to achieving true and lasting peace in the
Middle East.
I believe that the U.S. has a national security interest in the promotion of peace and stability
in the Middle East. A secure, lasting and verifiable peace benefits the United States, the
Palestinians, and the closest U.S. ally in the region. Israel.
I believe that requiring strict adherence by all parties to the peace agreements they signed, and
subsequent pledges made to the President and Vice-President, is in our national interest. I
believe it is a mistake to look the other way as the Palestinians fa:! to comply with their
agreemenis. Without substantial oversight and enforcement of these agreements by this
Commi.tce and indeed the entire Congress, we jeopardize the Peaci Process.
I do not have to tell this Committee that there is substantial emotion on both sides of this
issue. There are radical forces on both sides. Israeli and Palestinian, which hurt the chances
of achieving peace. I have come to this Committee not to state the emotional argument for
either side but rather, to present the facts in such a way that the Committee can make an
informed judgment about whether we need certain changes made in our current strategy.
I view the peace negotiations this way: The Peace Process was set up to be negotiations
between the PLO and Israel, with the U.S. acting as mediator, guarantor and facilitator. As
with any negotiation, there is be something to be gained and something to be lost tor each
party. In the case of Israel. I believe they want true and lasting peace, and of course Israel
has a longstanding relationship with the United States, who equally wants peace and stability
in the region. In the case of the Palestinians, they have made certain commitments to Israel
and the U.S. in exchange for receiving foreign aid and gaining peace and autonomy. In the
case of aid to the Palestinians, we intended to use the promise of aid to ensure that these
commitments are met. Unfortunately, in my view, while Israel has made a substantial effort
to abide by the peace accords, the Palestinian side has had serious problems. Some of their
commitments have not been met. while others have been purposely breached. As facilitator of
the peace process, the United States and. in particular, the U.S. Congress, has a special duty
to ensure that these conditions are met. Otherwise, we risk the appearance of complicity with
these violations, which may ultimately lead to failure of the peace process. We have a duty
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130
to ensure compliance tor Israel's behalf, on behalf of U.S. taxpayers, and on behalf of those
Palestinians who want true and lasting peace in the region.
Mr. Chairman. I am here as a Member of Congress, to discuss what we as Americans need to
consider before we send upwards of $500 million in American aid to the PLO. I am here to
present the facts, and allow \ou to make a considered judgment as to the advisability of
providing more aid to Mr. Arafat without enforcing strict compliance requirements. I hope
these hearings shed some light on PLO compliance with their commitments, and I hope that
we can agree on a strategy for re-directing the PLO towards compliance and away from the
current trend I see developing.
I do not think there is anyone who will argue with the fact that the PLO has had a poor
record of compliance with their commitments. Some blame this on Arafat's poor managerial
experience. Others say that the "trend'" has been positive, or say that Arafat is getting better
at complying. 1 think the evidence is considerable that Arafat believes that he can violate the
peace accords at will, without reprucussions from either the Israelis or the Americans. I
believe he is engaged in a strategy of playing one against the other.
Arafat consistently tests the limits of his ability to violate the agreements without incurring
any penalty. It is basically the strategy of "good-cop" "bad-cop.'' with Arafat in the position
of "good cop'" while his Ministers and associates and fundamentalist groups such as Hamas
pljying the "bad cop" role. Arafat has convinced some that, only through supporting him arid
the ;>LO. can we win over these 'had cop" elements. I believe it is a mistake to allow
ourselves to be taken in by this argument and. instead, we should send a tough ultimatum to
Arafa' to get serious about peace. Unfortunately, from what 1 have seen, there is little
evidence to support the notion that Arafat is presently determined to achieve a lasting peace
with Israel.
I believe that the present law allows far too many loopholes which Arafat has been able to
exploit, and for that reason and the reasons that follow. 1. along with Congressmen Michael
Forbes and Dan Burton, have requested that the Speaker place a hold on any further extension
of MEPFA. and that he strikes any amendment dealing with MEPFA either on the floor or in
Conference. Further, I would like to formally request that this Committee consider the
Forbes. Saxton. DeLay Bill. H.R. 1960. or the Engel. Saxton. DeLay Bill. H.R. 1930. which I
have also cosponsored. and recommend their immediate consideration by the full House.
Today I would like to address the following issues:
QUESTION #1: What has happened with the aid we have already sent to the
Palestinian Authority?
In late July, I introduced into the record certain documents I had come to possess which detail
the misuse of foreign aid money by PECDAR. the organization set up to distribute foreign aid
to the Palestinians. Many ask why this issue is so important. Well, beyond the obvious fact
that American taxpayers have a right to know where their foreign aid money is going, there is
the issue of why we gave this aid money in the first place.
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We gave this money (o assist the Palestinians rebuild their economy. Without it. we were
told, radical elements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad would take advantage of local poverty
to build suppon. thus pushing the more moderate PLO out of the picture. This aid money
was never intended to be used for bribes for loyalists to Yasser Arafat. Nor was it intended
to promote Arafat's long-term agenda of regaining control of Jerusalem as the "Capital of
Palestine.'" In fact, were he to use the money in this manner, not only would it not help the
Palestinian people deserving of assistance, it would make the success of the peace process far
less likely.
If we. as Congress, have been deceived by a recipient of foreign aid. this puts at risk all
foreign aid projects, even those most worthy. If the documents I am introducing are accurate,
and I believe they are. somebody has been asleep at the wheel and we need to reevaluate our
entire mechanism for distributing aid to the Palestinians. In this regard. I will be submitting
for the record a series of documents showing that PECDAR (The Palestinian Economic
Council for Development and Reconstruction) diverted aid away from the rebuilding programs
for which the money was intended, into pet projects such as buying apartments for Arafat
loyalists, sending money to Arafat's mother-in-law to build a propaganda center in Jerusalem,
and other such unintended projects. It is hoped that we can examine the issue of the
distribution of aid to the Palestinians far more closely, discover who or what agency is
responsible for diverting this aid. and that we can build much tougher enforcement
mechanisms into our current law. Without it. we risk the continued poverty of the Palestinian
people and their increasing turn to more radical elements Aithin their society.
QUESTION #2: Has the PLO lived up to their commitments thus far.
The PLO has made certain commitments, outlined in the September. 1993
Declaration of Principles, the Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho
of May. 1994. and subsequent agreements. Although there are numerable
instances of non-compliance. I would like to focus on those of greatest concern
to me personally — the issue of terrorism. One of the primary conditions of
our opening a dialogue and granting aid to the Palestinians has been Arafat's
express renunciation of terrorism.
I believe that if you ask the Israeli people what they consider the greatest threat
to the peace process, they will tell you it is the increasing threat of terrorism,
and the fact that Arafat has thus far been unable or unwilling to confront the
issue head-on. They will tell you that Jericho and Gaza have become safe-
havens for terrorists, and that, with the expected return of many more areas to
Palestinian control, these areas will become safe havens as well. They will tell
you their great disappointment that, thus far. Arafat has refused to turn over
suspected terrorists to Israel (as he is required to do under the accords) but
rather, has either set them free or sentenced them to minimal terms of
imprisonment. Finally, they will tell you that Arafat has done nothing
personally to stop terrorism through his speeches or interviews. Instead, he has
consistently preached violence against Israelis, made martyrs out of terrorists
and proclaimed them to be heroes, and called for "jihad" or holy war. He has
PV
132
made alliances with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. And he has thus tar refused to
disarm the militant groups in Gaza or Jericho, as required by the accords.
I can tell you trom experience that the Israeli people are frightened, and these are not
people uho get frightened easily. And their tear spans both political parties. They will tell
>ou that, at least with war. they know who the enemy is and where to find them. In the case
of terrorism, attacks can happen anytime, anywhere. On busses, in schools, on the streets of
Jerusalem. And fighting terrorism, like any war. takes full-time commitment, a strong
intelligence community, and even then, you miss a few. In the situation of Gaza and Jericho.
and soon, more areas coming under Palestinian control, unless Arafat is truly committed to
stopping terror, it is not going to happen on its own.
Simply put. if Arafat cannot be relied upon to take this issue seriously, the Peace Accords will
most certainly fail.
I believe, as Americans, we have an interest in this as well. Many Americans visit Israel
every >ear. and. unfortunately, two Americans have fallen victim to terrorist acts in Israel
over the last few months. One of these victims. Alyssia Flatow. happens to be from my home
state of New Jersey.
In an effort to make this committee aware of the extent of the PLO*s failure to adequately
address this issue. I will be introducing several instances where 1 believe the PLO has failed
to live up to their commitment to fight terror. As I stated before. I believe that Congress has
the greatest leverage over Arafat and the PLO in enforcing compliance. In many ways, even
more leverage that the Israelis themselves. If we fail to exercise this leverage to the greatest
possible extent, we risk losing all that has been gained thus far. Thus. I am submitting the
following:
A. The repeated failure to extradite suspected terrorists back to
Israel to stand trial, including Abdel-Majid Dudein. the suspected
killer of Joan Devanney. an American schoolteacher from
Connecticut. The PLO had agreed to transfer suspected terrorists
back to Israel in the peace accords (Annex 3. Article 2. clause
7). but. to date, have ignored all extradition requests. By
ignoring such requests, the PLO has. in effect, made Jericho and
Gaza into "safe havens" for suspected terrorists.
B. A statement from Muhammad Dakhlan. Chief of the Palestinian
National Authorities General Security Service, stating that "even if there
is a clause in the Agreement, we will not extradite members of our
people to Israel."
C. The expressed wishes of Mr. Arafat to name two well-renowned
terrorist leaders to head up the Palestinian Authority's new
security teams in Ramallah and Nablus.
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I am certain you will hear from those on the other side of this issue who will make various
excuses for Mr. Arafat. Or. they will stress the positive, emphasizing the steps which Arafat
has taken to stop terrorism. In my view, there is no such thing as being only " a little bit of a
terrorist." just like you cannot be "" a little bit pregnant." You either renounce it completely
or you don't. And in my view. Arafat hasn't.
AID
But first. I would like to get back to the issue of what has happened to the aid we have
already sent to Mr. Arafat's Palestinian National Authority. Some members of this Congress
believe that interfering in any way with the flow of money to the PLO is "taking sides" and is
thus destructive to the Peace Process. They are under the impression that the money we have
sent is being used to build schools, repair infrastructure, and provide for security. Some are
afraid that interfering in any way with the flow of aid will bring the Peace Process to a
screeching halt.
Unfortunately, these documents show that, not only is our aid money being used improperly,
it is being used directly contrary to our national interests and the interests of peace.
Our policy with respect to aid should be as it was with our disarmament agreements with the
Soviet Union - trust, but verify. With respect to verification, the facts speak for themselves.
PECDAR was established on November 4. 1993 as an independent body entrusted with
distributing foreign aid. Arafat and the PLO were to have no role in the administration of
PECDAR. PECDAR is supposed to be supervised by the World Bank. However, in July.
1 994. PECDAR distributed an internal chart showing it as being directly subordina'e to the
PLO.
The PECDAR documents I am introducing consist of a series of letters between the Secretary
of the Treasury of the PLO and the PNA to PECDAR. directing that PECDAR divert aid
money to specific projects not authorized by the Peace Agreements. Further correspondence
shows that PECDAR complied with the PLO requests and Arafats instructions were followed
and the money transferred. A total of 14 sets of letters, totaling some tens of millions of
dollars, were diverted through this scheme.
Some examples of these projects are:
1 . A directive to funnel $20 million to clandestine political activities inside
Israel to strengthen pro-PLO forces, including Members of Knesset and
organizations as the beginning of a PLO presence among Israeli Arabs. Such
political activity is aimed to push the Israeli Arabs toward "the establishment of
the Palestinian State that includes Jerusalem. Among the tasks include
financing political parties, social organizations and charities to push for
Palestinian statehood.
2. A directive to arrange clandestine funding to acquire land in Jerusalem.
The letter further stresses the clandestine nature of the transfer, "so as not to
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[be utilized against us) by the American Administration...''
3. A directive on behalf ot' Arafat to arrange clandestine funding for
apartments in Jerusalem to be given to loyalists. Twelve million is allocated
for this project.
4. A directive to arrange clandestine funding for Raymonda Tawil. Arafat's
mother-in-law. and Ibrihim Qarin to open a Palestinian publicity center in
Jerusalem.
5-12. Various other directives which attempt to have Arafat and the PLO gain
personal control over the local economy.
What these documents show is that we cannot trust our current system of distributing aid. and
we need to take certain substantial steps to ensure compliance.
TERRORISM
With respect to the issue of terrorism, it would be difficult to argue that Arafat has made any
serious attempt to combat acts of terrorism emanating from the areas he controls. Arafat's
continued call for jihad" among his followers. Lis refusal to transfer suspected terrorists back
to Israel to stand trial, his repeated attempts to subvert Israel's attempts to locate and try
terrorists, and his naming of known terrorists to head up his security forces belie his claims of
compliance.
Throughout the last two years. Arafat has consistently called for jihad, or holy war. against
Israel. Some have argued that, by referring to "jihad" Arafat does not mean military struggle,
but rather, spiritual struggle. But I prefer to view these speeches in a more skeptical light.
Why should we accept the argument that Arafat does not mean "jihad" when he says "jihad?"
And. in the context these speeches are made. Arafat can only be intending one thing - he
wants the Palestinian people to continue to fight, to continue to commit terrorist acts, and to
continue their military strategy to achieve their goals.
On June 18. 1995. Arafat, in a speech to the Islamic Woman's Association in Gaza, praises
Abir Wahidi. who murdered Zvi Klein in 1991 and Dalai Maghribi. who participated in the
1978 bus attack on the coastal road. Referring to Ms. Wahidi. he states that "we will not
forget how she led the attack with her machine gun. and that she is the military commander
of the central region." With regard to Ms. Maghribi. he calls her "the star from among the
heroes" and says that "this is the woman that we are proud of and take pride."
In January of this year. Arafat in a speech to Palestinian laborers in Gaza, directed his
listeners as follows: "all of us are willing to be martyrs along the way. ..let no one think they
can scare us with weapons, for we have mightier weapons - the weapons of faith, the weapon
of martyrdom, the weapon of jihad."
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As recently as August 6. 1 995. Arafat stated that, "the Palestinian people are prepared to
sacrifice the last boy and the last girl so that the Palestinian flag will be flown over the walls
and churches and mosques of Jerusalem."
I have only provided a small sampling of the kind of rhetoric Arafat consistently uses to
denigrate the very own Peace Agreements which bear his signature. In addition to the above.
Arafat has repeatedly praised Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Mousa Abu Marzook
as "brothers." compared the Oslo agreement with the pact the Prophet Mohammed made with
the tribe of Koreish (i.e. a temporary pact for convenience), referred to the PLO "phased
plan" (for Israel's destruction), and repeated his calls for armed, bloody, and violent struggle.
It is worthy to note that, in addition to conveying what are. perhaps. Arafat's true intentions,
these speeches are a direct violation of the Cairo Agreement. Article XII(l).
EXTRADITION OF TERRORISTS
Perhaps the most disturbing violation of the peace accords is Arafat's ongoing refusal to
transfer terror suspects to Israel for trial. Under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. Article 11(7) of
Annex 111. both sides are obligated to arrest and transfer suspects requested by the other side
if a formal request is submitted. As of June 29. 1995. Israel has submitted six formal
requests to the Palestinian Authority to transfer a total of ten suspects in terror attacks against
Israelis, and the Palestinian Authority refuses to turn any of these men over.
A statement made in early September. 1995. ay Muhammad Dakhlan. the Chief of the PNA's
General Security Service in Gaza, and the man lesponsible for the PNA's "struggle" against
terrorism, explains why Israel has had such a difficult time extraditing terrorists:
"We reached a decision, and it was made at the highest possible level — of
course on the basis of Arafat's opinion — that we will not extradite to Israel
members of our people, including wanted members of Hamas."
He stated further, "even if there is a clause in the Agreement [committing the
PNA to extradite wanted terrorists) ... we will not extradite members of our
people to Israel." (Source: Interview with Yediot Aharonot. September 8. 1995)
A recent event in Israel shows the nature of the PLO's "Tight" against terrorism. On
September 14. 1995. the Palestinian Authority announced that Ibrihim Naffar. a Hamas
member, was killed while handling explosives in his Gaza apartment. Naffar. the
announcement said, escaped from custody after being arrested earlier in August along with
two accomplices.
Naffar. it seems, was involved in a dramatic eight-day hunt last August, touted as an example
of the new Israeli-PA cooperation in the fight against terrorism. After his widely publicized
arrest, along with two other suspected terrorists, it was revealed that the three had surrendered
only after making a deal: Nasser would spend only a short time in jail, and his accomplices
would be released immediately. This "deal" thus allowed two terrorists free immediately,
while Naffar, after spending a short time in jail, went back to his apartment to continue
making bombs.
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Some of us remember the horror of another American killed by a terrorist bomb in early
August of this year. Her name was Joan Devanney. a school teacher from Woodbridge.
Connecticut. Last month. Abdel-Majid Dudein. who was suspected of helping plan the bus
bombing received 12 years in prison on a charge ot '"undermining Palestinian Security."
Remember, this is a man who helped kill 5 people, and injure dozens ot others. He was
sentenced, in what has become routine lor the Palestinian Authorities, in a 15 minute trial.
While wt all appreciate a speedy trial, the only reason his trial was so speedy was to prevent
Israeli Authorities from gaining his transfer, because another provision of the agreements state
that the Palestinian Authority may delay the transfer to the requesting side for the duration of
the imprisonment. Thus, he was tried and imprisoned with the express purpose of frustrating
Israeli attempts at trying him for the crime he was guilty of - murder. I might also note that
U.S. authorities, who are authorized under U.S. law to investigate terrorist acts against
Americans overseas, are similarly frustrated.
This same scenario occurred with respect to the murder of Alyssia Flatow. a student from my
home state of New Jersey. When FBI investigators went to Israel to investigate her murder.
they were refused permission to do so by the Palestinian authorities. Thus, while the U.S.
maintains sanctions against Libya for its failure to allow U.S. officials to question the two
suspects in the Pan Am bombing, we are forced to remain silent while the suspected
murderers of Joan Devanney and Alyssia Flatow are withheld from our investigators.
Evidence of Arafat's complicity with acts of terror are further demonstiated by the following:
In May. 1995 in a report by Peace Watch, this independent monitoring group reported that
the Palestinian Authority has agreed to release all Hamas and Islamic Jihad members it is
currently holding, including those tried and convicted by the State Securitv Court in Gaza. In
negotiations with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Authorities agreed to halt all trials
and arrests of the groups' members if they agree to cease terrorist attacks emanating from
Gaza and Jericho. Peace Watch estimated that some 100 Hamas and Islamic Jihad members
remain in custody. What this agreement, in effect, will do. will allow Hamas and Islamic
Jihad to operate freely and without fear of retribution in areas under Palestinian control. One
can only picture the damage these 100 terrorists are capable of once allowed to return to the
streets.
In another Peace Watch report, this one dated June 21. 1995. they determined that, one month
after the deadline for individuals to turn in their weapons, register them, or face arrest, little
had been done in the way of compliance. Peace Watch found that, since the deadline in
April. 1995. only a few dozen weapons have been confiscated. By the PLO's own accounts,
upwards of 25.000 weapons remain in the hands of potential terrorists.
Finally, I believe the following example shows clearly that Arafat continues to retain strong
ties to his former associates in the terrorist world, and cannot be trusted to confront terrorism.
A report in the Jerusalem Post of September 14. 1995 states that Arafat has recently
demanded to be allowed to appoint two known PLO killers as security chiefs in Nablus and
Ramailah- towns the Israeli government is passing over to Palestinian control. The first is
Abu Firas. who was responsible for a terrorist attack in Jerusalem's Jaffa Road in the 1970s,
137
as well as involved in the Munich massacre of 1972. The second is Mahmoud Al-Aloul. who
was the Tunisian-based commander of all PLO terrorist attacks in the West Bank.
How these two men are expected to confront terrorism is beyond my comprehension, but
nevertheless, these two men will be expected to disarm terrorists, and prevent terrorist attacks
emanating from areas they control.
In closing. I would like to thank the Committee for holding these hearings. The Chairman
and its members should be applauded for taking this decisive step in the right direction.
As I and my staff have looked at the facts of this matter. 1 believe that it is reasonable to
conclude that compliance by the PLO is at best spotty, and is at worst, an indication of an
intentional manipulation of the Peace Process. Arafat and the Palestinian Authority have
misused foreign aid. have diverted it to unauthorized projects, have actively supported
terrorists and terrorist actions, and have an abysmal record of even attempting to comply with
their agreements. Arafat has proven his ability to exploit every loophole he can find, and even
without loopholes he is clearly willing to face what he believes is minimal risk to his actions.
Therefore, to extend another 1/2 Billion dollars to the PLO. given our own domestic concerns,
and without what I view to be the strictest compliance requirements we can put into law.
would not be good stewardship.
However. 1 am willing to give Mr. Arafat one more small, limited chance, in the hope that
perhaps, with strict compliance measures in place, we will see a change in heart. Maybe, just
maybe. Anfat will come to see us as serious contenders in the peace process. Given what 1
know, however. I cannot say I am hopeful. But I know it is our only hope for true peace in
the region.
I thank the Chairman for allowing me to present these facts before the Committee, and I urge
this Committee to take every step, including reporting out H.R. I960, to ensure we meet our
duty to advance the peace process, to see a secure peace in the region, and to meet our
commitment to our constituents.
138
Statement of Peter Deutsch
Before The International Relations Committee
September 20, 1995
Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you for holding these
hearings on the Peace Process and thank you for allowing me to
testify. There can be no doubt that the extension of MEPFA and
the lack of Palestinian compliance with the Oslo Accords are very
relevant problems in both the United States and Israel.
Since the beginning of the peace negotiations, the United
States has played an integral role in the peace process. This
country and this Congress are truly partners in these peace
agreements with both Israel and the Palestinians.
The Palestinian record of compliance with the Oslo Peace
Accords up to this point has been abysmal. Clearly, the PA has
failed to live up its commitment to extradite terrorists to
Israel. Almost without exception, the PA has refused to comply
with the Israeli government's requests for extradition for a
suspects. The extradition of terrorists who seek to injure
innocent civilians is at the very heart of the Oslo Agreements
and yet they refuse to comply.
Another example of the Palestinian's blatant disregard of
the Peace Accords is their operation of PA institutions in
Jerusalem. No less than seven institutions, connected to the
Palestinian Authority operated in Jerusalem during all or part of
that time. Even though this action is clearly prohibited, the PA
continues to operate organizations in Jerusalem without recourse.
Finally, and most troubling, Yassir Arafat continues to
demagogue and call for the destruction of Israel. As recently as
June 15 of this year, Arafat said, "We are all seekers of
martyrdom in the path towards Jerusalem. . . the oath is firm to
continue this long jihad, this arduous jihad in the path of
martyrdom, the path of sacrifice." This comment was spoken at Al
Azhar University, three days before Arafat gave another speech
praising the terrorist who masterminded the 1978 hijacking of bus
of civilians.
Mr. Chairman, I support process for peace and I support the
renewal of MEPFA. However, we must closely examine the
Palestinian record of compliance in the upcoming months. We must
make it clear to the PA that our government's support of his
organization is based upon their fulfilling their obligations to
the Oslo Agreement. We must send a clear signal that the U.S.
Congress will not continue to extend MEPFA if the Palestinians
continue to refuse to comply with the Peace Accords.
139
STATEMENT OF REP. ELIOT L. ENGEL
HEARING OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ON THE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this
hearing today. As the author of one of three major bills to
replace the expiring Middle East Peace Facilitation Act and co-
chair of the congressional Peace Accord Monitoring group, I am
profoundly interested in the Middle East peace process and am
glad that the Committee is taking the time to consider the issue
at this crucial time.
Two years and one week ago today, the world witnessed an
historic event. The leaders of two peoples who had been at war
for almost half a century joined hands at the White House with
President Clinton in a symbolic culmination of months of secret
negotiations.
I recall this day as though it was only yesterday. I
remember sitting on the White House lawn feeling tremendous joy
in the hope that I was observing the end of decades of war and
terror .
Today, I look back with the awareness that much of the
initial excitement — a sense of hope which surrounded the
signing of the Declaration of Principles — has dissipated
considerably. Terror has returned as those trying to destroy the
peace process strive to turn public opinion against it with acts
of random violence.
Let me be absolutely clear: I fully support the Middle East
1
140
peace process. I have no greater desire than to see the conflict
between Israel and the Arab world consigned permanently to the
pages of history. Moreover, I am proud that the United States
has offered its ample resources — diplomatic, technical, and
financial — to help move the negotiations along. In short, we
must do everything possible to help the negotiations succeed.
Nevertheless, our support cannot not unconditional. I
firmly believe that the parties must live up to their sides of
the bargain and that we must always be mindful of the sordid
history of the PLO — a track record of some of the most heinous
acts of terror committed during the 1970s and 1980s.
Prior to signing the Declaration of Principles, Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat
exchanged several commitments — solemn bilateral duties to
underpin the peace process. In exchange for Israel's recognition
of the PLO, Yassir Arafat committed his organization to:
* Recognize Israel's right to exist in peace and security;
* Accept U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
* Renounce the use of terrorism and violence;
* Assume responsibility over all PLO elements in order to
prevent and punish acts of terrorism or violence;
* Call upon Palestinians to oppose violence and terrorism;
* Submit to the Palestine National Council changes to the
Palestinian National Covenant eliminating calls for Israel's
destruction; and
* Implement in good faith the Declaration of Principles.
With the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in Cairo last
year, Israel and the PLO made specific several of the security-
related commitments undertaken on the White House lawn. In
particular, it is now clear that the PLO must transfer suspects
requested by Israeli authorities, confiscate illegal weapons,
2
141
exclude terrorists from security services, and avoid the type of
vitriolic rhetoric which only tends to incite violence.
The PLO's record in complying with its commitments is mixed,
at best. On the positive side, Yasir Arafat has recognized
Israel and accepted Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
Many news reports also indicate that it has finally begun to
crack down on terrorists.
Nevertheless, it has demonstrated significant disregard for
many of the other the obligations to which it has committed
itself. Terrorism has been rhetorically denounced, yet
individual acts of terror have gone uncondemned. And, even when
Yasir Arafat speaks out in English, eguivalent words in Arabic —
to those who most need to hear — go unspoken.
And this is not all. The following items represent some of
the more significant violations of very specific legal
obligations contained in the peace accords:
* Sections of the PLO Covenant calling for Israel's
destruction have yet to be removed;
* Calls for Jihad by Yasir Arafat continue;
* The ban on unlicensed weapons goes unenforced;
* Suspected terrorists have not been transferred
yto Israel; and
* The Palestinian Authority continues to locate its
institutions in Jerusalem.
Mr. Chairman, no nation has been more engaged in the effort
to move the peace process forward than the United States. Not
only was the historic document signed on the lawn of the White
House, but no other nation pledged $500 million over 5 years in
an attempt to end the historic conflict — not even the wealthy
Arab states of the Persian Gulf who have the most to gain by the
3
142
end of hostilities. I am proud of our involvement.
But, the PLO should be clear that American generosity is not
unlimited. America must hold Yasir Arafat's feet to the fire and
demand that he and the Palestinian Authority live up to their
obligations. Yasir Arafat and the PLO must learn: Peace is the
only course.
The bottom line for me is this: If Arafat and the PLO
comply with their commitments, then U.S. money should continue to
flow. If they don't, then they will be to blame for the
destruction of peace. The Agreements, themselves, set realistic
thresholds to which both sides must comply — thresholds which
can be met by the Palestinians if they want to meet them.
Therefore, whether U.S. dollars continue to flow depends on their
actions.
Current law, the expiring Middle East Peace Facilitation Act
has been a useful tool. It established the principle of linkage
between PLO commitments compliance and the provision of U.S. aid.
But, circumstances have changed and the U.S. legal framework must
adjust with them.
I have, therefore, introduced, H.R. 1930, the "Middle East
Peace Compliance and PLO Accountability Act of 1995" to tighten
the conditions to which the U.S. holds the Palestinians. To
date, this bill has garnered 20 bipartisan cosponsors, including
my good friends Jim Saxton and Peter Deutsch. I ask unanimous
consent that the text of H.R. 1930 be printed in the record at
the conclusion of my testimony. In particular, this bill:
143
* Holds the PLO to its own commitments, including the post-
MEPFA Gaza Jericho Agreement of 1994.
* Imposes a dollar-f or-dollar deduction for misspent funds —
a provision not incorporated in the Senate's Helms-Pell
MEPFA bill.
* Permits funding only through multilateral institutions which
are transparent and open to outside audits.
* Begins the process of accounting for past PLO terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, without today's session, the International
Relations Committee would have held not one hearing this year
focusing on negotiations between Israel and the PLO. I commend
the Chairman for the opportunity to delve into these important
issues.
However, we are all aware that only 10 days from now, the
Middle East Peace Facilitation Act expires. We cannot continue
the terribly flawed process of passing 45-day extensions of this
law. Congress must not micro-manage U.S. foreign policy by
enacting short-term, stop-gap measures. It is Congress'
constitutional role to carefully consider legislation which sets
general policy for the executive branch. While hearings are
valuable, this constitutional requirement mandates that our
Committee schedule a mark-up to write legislation to replace the
expiring MEPFA. I hope that my bill, H.R. 1930, will serve as
the underlying mark-up vehicle.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, I support the peace process and
want nothing more than to see it succeed. But I must reiterate
my bottom line: If Arafat and the PLO comply with their
commitments, then I will support continued U.S. aid. If they
don't, then the failure of the peace process will rest on their
doorstep.
5
144
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
THE HONORABLE TOM DeLAY
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, colleagues, and friends, it is a
privilege to come before you today to address a subject of vital importance to American
national interest and to me personally. I recently returned from a visit to Israel where I
was struck by the intensity that surrounds the debate over the Middle East peace
process. While I have impressions and opinions about a number of different issues
related to the peace process, the one I would like to focus on today is the failure of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to live up to the solemn commitments to which
it agreed when it signed the Declaration of Principles (DoP) with Israel on the White
House lawn on January 13, 1993.
It has now been over two years since that historic day, a day on which the PLO
and its leader, Yasir Arafat, agreed to be held accountable for its actions by the
international community in exchange for territorial and administrative concessions by
the government of Israel.
As witness to the accord, the United States pledged its political, financial and
moral support to the peace effort, making clear that it expected the PLO to transform
itself from a terrorist organization to a lawful administrative entity to be known as the
Palestinian Authority (PA). The U.S. pledged the sum of $500 million over five years
to the PLO to assist the Palestinians living in areas controlled by the PA with their
development efforts.
What we have seen over the last two years has been a grave disappointment. Not
only has the PLO been in stark violation of its commitments under the DoP, but it has
failed to live up to most of its pledges to the President and the Vice-President.
The PLO has failed to prevent terrorism emanating from the territory it controls
and has shown little inclination to prosecute known terrorists or to extradite those
individuals allegedly responsible for criminal acts inside Israel.
As recent video tapes of Yasir Arafat clearly demonstrate, he continues to exhort
his people to violence against Israel and advocates a Jihad (or holy war) to regain
Jerusalem. In fact, since the most recent bus bombing in Jerusalem, all Arafat has done
in response is to issue a statement condemning those who committed this heinous act. It
is the Israeli government that has acted to round up the guilty parties and punish them.
Even as we speak, Arafat is building up a para-military force in Gaza nearly
three times what was permitted under the DoP, replete with automatic weapons, a
modern security apparatus and reportedly, shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles.
145
Mr. Chairman, as a representative of the American people and a strong supporter
of Israel, I cannot sit by and hope that the PLO will suddenly decide to abide by the
commitments it made two years ago. I feel it is my duty to cry foul when I believe the
American people are being had and our national interest is at stake. What we have seen
over the last two years is simply unacceptable.
The Administration has mounted a full court press to persuade Congress and the
world community that the PLO remains committed to the peace agreement even when
their violations are numerous. As a result, the PLO has learned that there are no
sanctions for violating their agreements. Indeed, they can feel free to plot and strategize
the elimination of Israel with no fear of financial, not to mention political,
repercussions.
Mr. Chairman, this is why I have agreed to cosponsor H.R. 1960, the Middle
East Peace Compliance Act of 1995, a bill introduced by the distinguished
representative from New York, Michael Forbes. The identical bill has been introduced
in the Senate as S.915 by Senator D'Amato.
In essence, the bill says that should the PLO demonstrate "substantial, material
and timely" compliance with its commitments under the DoP as well as with certain
requirements under U.S. law, then the President is authorized to transfer funds to
Palestinian institutions and activities directly, and not through the PLO or the PA. The
reason for this is to ensure that the funds reach the people for whom it is intended.
Further, the PLO would be required to assist U.S. law enforcement agencies in
the apprehension and prosecution of any member of that organization responsible for
the killing of an American citizen. This is only just. The American taxpayer should not
be asked to bankroll any individual with American blood on their hands.
I understand the Administration is supporting an amendment to the Senate FY
1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act which would authorize the President to
fund the PLO unconstrained by real congressional oversight for an astonishing 18
months ~ a period lasting through the next election with little outside scrutiny of this
most contentious policy.
Strikingly, most of the requirements placed on the PLO are contained in a non-
binding "Sense of Congress" section of the bill which is completely unenforceable.
Additionally, the requirements wouldn't even kick in for the first six months!
146
I have serious concerns about such an amendment being attached to the Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill. Rather, it is vital that this issue be considered before
the whole House so that public debate can take place. Mr. Chairman, in this vein, I
would like to formally request that this Committee hold hearings on H.R. 1960, conduct
a markup, and report the bill out for consideration by the full House of Representatives.
Open debate on this issue is long overdue.
Let there be no mistake about my position. I support peace as fervently as any
man or woman in this chamber. What I object to is the process for obtaining peace
which requires that we turn our backs on our core national values and our responsibility
as guardians of the public purse.
It is the duty of the Congress, indeed this committee, to demand accountability
of the PLO, not only for the money we have provided it, but also for the estimated $10-
$12 billion which it has reportedly stashed away in bank accounts around the world.
Popular reports suggest that a recent General Accounting Office investigation into PLO
finances merely confirms our worst suspicions about the PLO's cash-rich posture.
Unfortunately, as you may know, the CIA has classified this report.
I call upon the Administration to come clean with the American public and
immediately declassify this report. It's long overdue.
This is not, I repeat not, an issue of whether the United States will continue to
support the Israeli people in their quest for peace. Nor is it a question of our obligation
to assist in whatever way we can in the attainment of peace and security in the region.
Quite to the contrary, it is a question of the responsibility of this Congress to
ensure that our national resources are used to further our national interests. There can
be no lasting peace without accountability. If the PLO is not a true partner in peace it
does not deserve the goodwill of the American people.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I have a deep and abiding faith in the strength and
endurance of both Israeli and American democracy. I believe that the relationship our
two countries share is as strong and inviolate as any in the history of the world. We
would not be doing our duty as friend and ally if we did not raise these very pressing
concerns.
Only the people of Israel have the right to determine the course of their own
future. It is our job to see to it that when the history of this extraordinary period is
written, we, the people of the United States, have not set aside our values, or standards,
or our requirements under law to support a myth, not a fact.
Thank you.
147
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DEMOCRATIC STEERING COMMITTEE
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
HIRC HEARING ON THE MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
GARY L. ACKERMAN (D-NY)
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would like to commend you for holding
this very vital hearing on the peace process. It is imperative that we
hear as many voices as possible, particularly at this crucial stage in
the process. We need to make extremely important decisions relating to
its survival, and you have done a superior job in gathering people whose
views run the gamut. I certainly want to welcome our many distinguished
panels, and thank them for taking the time to express their thoughts to
us .
This is undeniably a very emotional issue for all sides involved.
In fact, the contention surrounding the subject of "peace in the Middle
East," has very nearly split the American Jewish community wide open.
However, a very important part of this process is dialogue, and that is
precisely what we are here for today.
However, I think it necessary to make a general plea to all those
involved. While we are debating and sharing and hashing out, I think we
need to be careful not to let our debate overshadow the actual issue of
peace- - "peace in our time," so to speak. In other words, the current
climate in relations between Israel, her neighbors and the Palestinians,
presents our best chance to hammer out a comprehensive and lasting
peace. We absolutely can not let that opportunity slip from our grasp.
At the same time, I sympathize with the many concerns that people have,
and understand the need for caution in some respects. But I think the
bottom line is this: do these people, Arabs and Jews alike, deserve
peace? And I think the answer is, yes, they absolutely do.
For the last few years the world has been sort of sailing in
uncharted waters. New countries have sprouted up where none had been
before, and other nations have changed their economies and governments
practically overnight. The sum of all this change has been conflict and
upheaval in many parts of the world. And although those images have
been synonymous with the Mideast for many years, this region has a
genuine opportunity to finally buck that trend and begin anew.
We are standing at a critical juncture where, if we turn our backs
on it now, we may never again experience an opportunity of this
magnitude. I believe therefore that it is our responsibility as
Americans, no matter our background- -simply as humans- -to help fulfill
this opportunity. Otherwise, I daresay we will carry this burden all of
our lives.
148
United Stales General Accounting Office
GAO
Testimony
Before the Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
For Release
on Delivery
Expected at
10:00 a.m. EDT
Wednesday
September 20. 1995
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Scope of Our Review of
Palestine Liberation
Organization Finances
Statement of Joseph E. Kelley, Director-in-Charge,
International Affairs Issues, National Security and International
Affairs Division
GAO/T-NSIAD-95-227
149
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am here today to discuss the audit work that supports our
recently issued classified report on the Palestine Liberation
Organization's (PLO) finances. I will also discuss the principal
cooperation issues we dealt with on this assignment. Finally, I
will discuss our efforts to have this report declassified in
response to requests from the Chairman and several other Members of
Congress. Before turning to these topics, let me briefly provide
some background information on why we did this job and what the
audit objectives on this assignment were.
AUDIT OBJECTIVES
In a letter dated May 31, 1994, you requested that we review the
PLCs finances in connection with the decision by the United States
to help fund long-term development projects in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. These funds were pledged after the government of
Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles on
September 13, 1993.
Based on discussions with Committee staff members, we agreed to (1)
assess the PLO's ability to help finance the operations of the
Palestinian Authority (the organization established to implement
self-rule), (2) ascertain whether the international donors
effectively analyzed the need to help fund the Palestinian
Authority's operating and start-up expenses, and (3) determine
150
whether appropriate controls have been implemented to ensure that
donor funds will be adequately accounted for.
AUDIT WORK PERFORMED
The starting point for our review was an attempt to obtain
financial information directly from the PLO . The PLO told us to
provide written questions on the information we required and then
declined to respond to them. The PLO also chose not to respond to
our written request for meetings with PLO and Palestinian Authority
officials in the self-rule territories. However, in the Gaza
Strip, we were able to meet with a senior Palestinian Authority
official .
In Washington, D.C., we interviewed Palestinian affairs experts and
program officials from the State Department, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
the Department of Treasury (Office of Foreign Assets Control and
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) , Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the World Bank. We also conducted fieldwork in
London, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem and interviewed officials from the
State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, Drug
Enforcement Administration, World Bank, United Nations Relief and
Works Agency, nongovernmental organizations, and private industry
in these locations. We also met with a number of private
researchers who have studied and written about the PLO's finances.
151
We reviewed relevant State Department cable traffic from January
1990 through February 1995. We also conducted a detailed search of
public articles and books on the PLO. We developed a list of
potential PLO agents and operatives using a number of
sources. We gave this list to Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, which searched its databases to identify the
personal or corporate assets of these individuals . In
collaboration with Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
we attempted to verify media reports of specific assets alleged to
be held or controlled by the PLO.
We developed a data collection instrument to collect a wide variety
of financial and operational data on the PLO. We analyzed
responses to this data collection instrument from U.S. embassies in
13 Middle Eastern States and 5 European countries. We also
received information from U.S. embassies in one Latin American
country and three African countries addressing public allegations
that the PLO owned duty-free shops in these locations.
We met with U.S. intelligence experts from (1) State's Intelligence
and Research Bureau, (2) the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), (3)
the Defense Intelligence Agency, and (4) the National Security
Agency. British intelligence officials declined our request for
meetings on the basis that they had no useful information to share.
However, we were able to interview a senior official from Britain's
National Criminal Intelligence Service to discuss a February 1994
152
estimate that the PLO had $8 billion to $10 billion in assets and
an annual income of $1.5 billion to $2 billion. Citing the
confidential nature of his sources, the author of this statement
declined to provide us with any data or documentation to support
this claim.
COOPERATION ISSUES
As detailed above, we met with or attempted to meet with officials
from a wide range of federal agencies. In general, we received
good cooperation from these agencies. We did encounter some
limited access to records and cooperation problems at the State
Department, CIA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
With regards to the State Department and CIA, the problems we
experienced did not materially affect our final report message or
conclusions. We do not know whether the FBI had any valuable
information to share with GAO since the Bureau informed us that its
review of our questions determined that either the information was
not available or could not be discussed due to its sensitive
nature .
At the State Department, we encountered a few problems gaining
access to pertinent records or getting State's cooperation with our
review. Most of these issues were resolved by working with members
of your staff and the State Department. We encountered the
following difficulties:
153
State initially withheld several cables we requested,
saying that they were "deliberative in nature" because they
represented personal opinions, options analyses, and pre-
policy dialogue. A number of these cables were later
released to us after your staff intervened with State
officials .
State was unwilling to contact host government officials on
our behalf to administer a data collection instrument we
developed to obtain a wide variety of information on the
PLCs finances. State cited (1) the sensitive nature of
such contacts and (2) the possibility that host officials
might misinterpret State's involvement in our study as a
weakening in U.S. resolve to fully support the peace accord
between the PLO and Israel. As an alternative, State
agreed that embassy staff could review pertinent files to
see whether any of the data we requested could be obtained
from internal records .
Officials from State's Intelligence and Research Bureau
told us that one of their analysts had prepared a critique
of an intelligence estimate of the PLO's assets, but could
not confirm whether the critique was in writing or not.
According to the analyst who prepared the critique, a
written memorandum about the critique had been prepared and
forwarded to the Special Middle East Coordinator. The
154
Coordinator said he "vaguely" remembered reading the
memorandum and referred us to his staff to obtain a copy.
His staff, however, was unable to locate a copy of the
memorandum or confirm its existence.
Initially, CIA officials were unwilling to cooperate with us or
share available intelligence data about the PLO. As you know,
Agency officials provided us with two background briefings on the
PLO only after you asked the CIA to cooperate fully with us on our
review. CIA declined to facilitate contacts with foreign
governments .
The State Department in April 1995 agreed to relay questions we had
on PLO finances to the Israeli government through the U.S. embassy
in Tel Aviv. A State Department official confirmed that the
embassy had passed our questions to the Israelis, but that a
response had not yet been received.
EFFORTS TO DECLASSIFY THE REPORT
In a letter dated July 17, 1995, Chairman Gilman requested that we
take the necessary steps to have our classified report on the PLCs
finances declassified to facilitate increasing public discussion of
the topic. This request was followed by a letter on July 19, 1995,
from Representative Jim Saxton, who also called for our report to
be declassified. On July 25, 1995, we received a third letter
155
signed by Representative Saxton and five other Members of Congress
calling for our report to be declasssif ied.
I should point out that GAO generates classified information
derivatively- -that is, the information we use in GAO-produced
documents carries the classification of the originating source.
GAO does not have the authority to declassify or downgrade
classified information; this authority is vested solely with
authorized executive branch officials. When there is a perceived
need to downgrade or declassify information, the originating
agency's concurrence must be obtained.
In letters dated July 25 and July 28, 1995, we informed the CIA and
State Department, respectively, that the Chairman had asked that
our report on the PLO's finances be declassified for the reasons
cited in the Chairman's letter. We asked both the CIA and State to
consider the Chairman's request with respect to the classified data
they provided to us .
156
In a letter to GAO dated September 5, 1995, the CIA responded that
with certain minor exceptions, none of the CIA material used in our
report could be declassified. The State Department has not yet
responded to our declassification request.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony.
(711159)
157
Testimony Presented to the
International Relations Committee of the
House of Representatives
Submitted by Daniel Polisar
Director of Peace Watch
Hearings on the Middle East Peace Process
September 20, 1995
158
I am Daniel Polisar, the director of Peace Watch, a non-partisan
monitoring prganization based in Jerusalem. Peace Watch examines and
reports on the compliance of all parties with accords signed between Israel
and its Arab neighbors — to date, Egypt, the PLO, and Jordan. Our board of
directors includes Israelis from the full range of the political spectrum, left to
right, who are united by a belief that scrupulous mutual compliance is an
essential ingredient to the success of the peace process.
In my testimony, I would like to focus on some of our key findings
concerning compliance with the Israel-PLO accords, starting with the
Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed here in Washington on September 13,
1993. Though this testimony is meant to survey the whole two-year period,
the emphasis is on the 16 months which have elapsed since mid-May 1994,
when the PLO received control over the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. At
that time, the obligations on both sides became more numerous, complex,
and difficult — and consequently compliance became that much more
important.
A starting point for this discussion has to be a working understanding
of what compliance is and how one measures and reports on it. For us at
Peace Watch, there is only one way to look at compliance: How does each
side's behavior compare to the commitments they took upon themselves in
the signed, legal agreements? This point is worth mentioning because there is
a tendency, for example in State Department reports on PLO compliance, to
focus on improvement in compliance rather than compliance itself. In the
State Department's June 1, 1995 report, for example, there are few attempts to
compare behavior to specific obligations. Rather, the approach seemed to be to
note the areas in which the PLO's behavior could be seen as generally better
than during the prior, six-month period. This approach does yield some
interesting and important findings about trends, but a mapping of changes
without reference to a fixed, objective standard, grounded in the accords,
cannot be said to give one a grasp on .ompliance.
A second mistake in reporting on compliance, which is likewise found
in the State Department's report, is the substitution of the parties'
assessments of one another for an actual analysis of the relationship between
obligations and behavior. This mistake can lead one to be overly harsh, or
overly lenient. There have been, for example, a number of cases in which
Israeli Government leaders have demanded more of the PLO than the accords
dictated — handing over for trial in Israel individuals whom Israel had not yet
requested formally, for example. Likewise, there have been cases in which
Israeli leaders have held the PLO to standards below what the accords spell
out — on human rights, for example, which according to the Gaza-Jericho
accords must be fully maintained in accordance with international norms. If
we want to take our monitoring of compliance seriously as third parties —
159
Peace Watch or the U.S. Congress — we have to look at how behavior squares
with obligation, rather than at what the sides think of one another's actions.
It is not our mandate at Peace Watch to give out overall marks for each
side's compliance, or to judge who has passed and who has failed. We prefer
to look at compliance category by category, to point out what has gone right,
so accomplishments can be noted, and to identify problems which need to be
corrected. In what follows, I want to look at several areas which are
particularly worthy of attention.
I want to begin with a brief survey of Israel's record, though I assume
that this committee is more interested in PLO compliance, inasmuch as there
is legislation on the books setting standards for the PLO's behavior. Fairness
dictates that we look at both sides; it is also necessary to put PLO compliance
in its proper context by first examining what Israel has and has not done.
Israel and the PLO signed the detailed accords creating a Palestinian
Authority (PA) and giving it wide-ranging powers in the Gaza Strip and the
Jericho Area on May 4, 1994. Israel complied with its most significant
obligation in these accords, which was to turn over control of these areas to
the PA. With a few exceptions, Israel has kept its troops out of those places
where the accords forbid them to reenter, and has likewise honored the
divisions of authority between the two sides in civil matters.
Israel's problematic behavior has been principally in two areas. One has
been in the economic sphere. At various times Israel has limited exports from
Gaza, especially of agricultural products, in contradiction to what the two
sides had agreed in their economic protocols. Israel has also, for security
reasons, barred or limited Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank who
sought to work in Israel. While the accords give Israel the right to use
temporary closures for security purposes, Israel's constant use of this
measure, including as part of a stated policy of "separation," has probably
exceeded what is legitimate within the framework of the accords.
The second problem with Israeli compliance was that, during a period
of several months in late 1994 and early 1995, Israel deliberately slowed the
pace of negotiations on redeployment in the West Bank, despite the fact that
the two sides were already well beyond the deadlines set by the DOP. Israel's
position was politically understandable, in that fatal terror attacks against its
civilians had set a post-1967 record, and were causing grave concerns as to
what would happen if additional territories were placed under Palestinian
control. Legally, however, Israel could not unilaterally suspend the obligation
to complete negotiations as quickly as possible, unless it first declared
formally that prior breaches of the accords by the PLO had made the
agreement no longer valid — which it chose not to do. In any case, since at
least May of 1995, Israel has been negotiating in a good-faith effort to
implement the Declaration of Principles' timetable, so this area is not
currently a concern in terms of compliance.
160
Moving to the Palestinian side, I want to start by examining something
which we at Peace Watch call "political education." I am referring here to the
message which is transmitted by the leadership of the PLO and the PA
concerning three of the cornerstones on which the accords are built: the
recognition of Israel; the cessation of the armed struggle; and the sanctity of
the accords themselves.
The message that the leaders project is significant from a compliance
perspective, not only because the Declaration of Principles and the Gaza-
Jericho accords explcitly mandate promotion of tolerance, public calls for an
end to the armed struggle, and a concerted effort to bring Palestinians towards
a recognition of Israel. A strong message from the leadership on these issues
is significant because it shapes Palestinian public opinion on all other aspects
of compliance. If the belief spreads that the armed struggle must be ended,
then provisions of the accords dealing with trials and extradition of terrorists
are more likely to be observed. If the accord itself comes to be viewed as
inviolable, then even those of its provisions which are politically inexpedient
will be honored.
On this latter point, there have been a few statements by Yasser Arafat
and other Palestinian leaders regarding the importance of keeping accords. On
March 21, 1995, after an explosive-laden truck was interdicted en route to a
suicide-bombing attack in Beersheva, Arafat said that, "The Moslem tradition
obligates the honoring of agreements. The PLO signed agreements and it will
honor them." At the same time, however, he has on a number of different
occasions, including in the last few months, compared the accords with Israel
to agreements signed by the Prophet Muhammad with the tribe of Kuraish,
which Muhammad abrogated in order to conquer that tribe two years later,
when doing so became expedient. Such statements about future abrogation do
not merely counterbalance the positive remarks about keeping to accords.
They negate them entirely, because the implication is that the pledged
allegiance to the accords is part of the same tactic as the initial signing,
whereas the real strategy is to observe the accords only while doing so
remains advantageous.
The statements about abrogation also send the signal that the
recognition of Israel and the cessation of the armed struggle are temporary, a
message which is reinforced by Chairman Arafat's repeated calls for Jihad.
Anyone who reads Chairman Arafat's speeches will see that the Jihad to
which he has referred to on several occasions, including this past summer, is
not a "peaceful" jihad, as he once suggested. In June, for example, he said:
"The commitment stands and the oath is firm to continue this long and
arduous Jihad in the path of martyrdom, the path of sacrifices...." The
reference to martyrdom makes it clear that the Jihad is violent in nature,
which is in keeping with the traditional use of the term.
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Further praise by Arafat for the armed struggle can be found in a speech
he gave before an Islamic women's group in Gaza in mid-June. He could
have spoken about any topics he chose, inasmuch as there was no particular
occasion being observed. He opted to devote part of his remarks to praising
Dalai Magribi, who was one of the perpetrators of the Coastal Road Massacre,
in which 37 Israeli civilians were murdered and more than 80 injured. He
said about her:
"Dalai Magribi, the commander, the star from among the
heroes who carried out the landing operation on the coast.
She was the commander of the squad that pioneered the first
Palestinian republic on that bus! On that bus! This is the
Palestinian woman, with all its meanings and implications.
The woman that we are proud of and take pride in and
compete with her glory with other nations and people of the
world."
The Israel-PLO accords never said that Arafat or other PLO leaders had to
repent for past acts of terror, so on its surface there is no legal violation in
celebrating Magribi as a woman whose action was appropriate, and heroic, in
its time. But by describing Magribi as the. Palestinian woman, with whose
glory the Palestinian nation competes with the world, he is going beyond
historical reflection and into the establishment of what can only be
interpreted as a model for today.
It should be stressed that the message from Chairman Arafat and other
PLO leaders concerning the armed struggle is not exclusively positive. Arafat
has repeatedly uttered his support for what he terms "the peace of the brave."
Sufyan Abu Zayidah, the head of the Israel desk in the PA, said in January
1995 that:
"We also tell Fatah members who' have reservations about
the process that violence will get us nowhere. We tell them
that it only exacerbates hatred between our two peoples. We
opted for the way of peace and must stick to it. There is no
other choice. We constantly say the same things to Hamas
and the Islamic Jihad. We really want to stop the cycle of
hatred and bloodshed."
More significantly, perhaps, at every impasse in the talks Chairman
Arafat has continued the dialogue with Israel, which sends the message that
negotiation rather than armed struggle is the appropriate means to resolving
conflicts.
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One aspect of political education on which the PLO and PA have mixed
records is in condemning specific incidents of terror. Prior to 1995, most
attacks against Israelis went without any public condemnation by the
Palestinian leadership. Particularly noticeable in his silence was Chairman
Arafat, whose few condemnations were stated through another party, and
clearly as the result of pressure. In the last several months, however, a
number of PLO and PA officials have begun consistently condemning terror
attacks in which Israelis were killed. After the August 1995 suicide attack on a
bus in Jerusalem, in which five Israelis were killed, Chairman Arafat stated to
reporters in Gaza: "I condemn the attack totally. Under any circumstances we
are against attacking innocent civilians. I hope this attack will not affect the
peace process." The next day, speaking in Arabic at a press conference with
visiting German Planning Minister Karl-Dieter Springer, Arafat added: "Once
again I condemn this attack, and join in the troubles of the families, whose
loved ones died." West Bank Palestinian Preventive Security Service Head
Jibril Rajoub, a figure respected by many Intifada veterans, stated on Israeli
Television after this same attack: "We condemn this incident. We will make
all the efforts necessary to stopt the bloodshed."
Even the recent condemnations, however, are lacking in that they
often criticize the attacks purely on pragmatic grounds, the implication being
that were circumstances to change, the attacks would not be reprehensible. In
response to the suicide bomb attack on Dan Bus 20 in Ramat Gan on July 24,
1995, for example, PA Minister of Planning and International Cooperation
Nabil Shaath stated: "We don't have in our hands any details regarding this
attack, but we condemn anything that would delay the peace process. This
action was planned to delay the PA's entry to the West Bank and delay the
release of our detainees and prisoners."
The failure of the PLO to amend the Palestinian Covenant must be
viewed as part of the overall effort at political education. In his letter of
September 9, 1993 recognizing Israel and renouncing the armed struggle,
Chairman Arafat wrote:
"(T)he PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian
Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the
provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the
commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no
longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to
the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the
necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant."
More than two years since that commitment was made, the PNC has not been
convened, and the Covenant has not been amended. Those who wish to
defend the PLO on this score point out that no deadline was set for convening
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the PNC, and that Chairman Arafat lacks the necessary 2/3 majority of that
body to ensure passage of the amendments. They claim, therefore, that it
would have been counterproductive for him to fulfill his technical obligation
to convene the PNC if by so doing he would have formalized its refusal to
back his peace initiatives with Israel, thus undermining his ability to
continuing adhering to the accords.
What is truly problematic, however, is not the failure to convene the
PNC, but rather a lack of what Peace Watch terms "maximum partial
compliance" — the taking of steps short of a PNC convention which would
have made it clear that Arafat and the PLO leadership remain committed to
changing the Covenant. First, they should have been careful to make sure
that all of their public rhetoric conformed to the Covenant as it was to be
amended, and not to the original. As pointed out above, there have been a
number of statements, particularly as regards the armed struggle, that sound
fully consistent with the original Covenant.
Second, Arafat and other top PLO leaders should have gone on the
record saying that they were personally in favor of changing the Covenant,
and detailing the changes they would make and their reasons for doing so. In
American politics, as a parallel, it is common for a candidate for high office, if
his party platform contains elements which he personally opposes, to issue
position papers spelling out his own views. A similar means has been
available to the PLO leadership for the past two years, but they have not
availed themselves of it. And third, the PLO leadership could have
conducted a campaign, both public and private, to persuade the Palestinian
population and its representatives in the PNC to back the anticipated changes
in the covenant. Although in the summer of 1994, sources close to Arafat
claimed that the Chairman was going to embark on such a tour, there has
been neither a public campaign nor lobbying of PNC delegates.
In analyzing the overall performance of the Palestinian leadership in
political education, Peace Watch's judgment is that the message has been
mixed, but has fallen well below the standard set by the accords. The
agreements with Israel both demand and depend upon a radical reorientation
of Palestinian attitudes. Such a reorientation must come from above, and it
cannot be effected if the message is mixed. Praising peace nine times and then
calling for Jihad once is not 90% compliance, because such a mix is useless in
changing longstanding views. It must be made absolutely clear to any
Palestinian still harboring positive sentiments about the armed struggle — and
extensive polling data shows that such individuals are generally in the
majority — that he has no support for his views from his own leadership. -
These meta-compliance issues have a profound impact in the fight
against terror. So, too, do the concrete, operative obligations to fight terror,
meaning the specific actions taken by the Palestinian police and court system.
It is these latter steps which are often, though erroneously, viewed as th_£
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litmus test for assessing overall PLO and PA compliance. In any event, these
operative obligations are quite extensive, in large part because of the broad
language of Article XVIII of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of May 4, 1994,
which states that:
"Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to
prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed
agains.. each other, against individuals failling under the
other's authority and against their property, and shall take
legal measures against offenders. In addition, the Palestinian
side shall take all measures necessary to prevent such hostile
acts directed against the Settlements, the infrastructure
serving them and the Military Installation Area...."
This article is all-encompassing, since it demands that the PLO and the
Palestinian Authority (as well as Israel) take any and every action needed to
combat terrorism. If a particular action is likely to be effective in preventing
terrorism, then Article XVIII mandates that it be carried out, even if there are
no specific references to this obligation. So, for example, there is no provision
in the accords which mandates that the PA shut down training camps used by
terrorists, but the obligation to do so nonetheless exists, since it is clear that
such a step is part of any serious campaign to end terror.
In addition, the Gaza-Jericho accords detail a number of specific steps,
including prevention of incitement, disarming of militias, conducting of "hot
pursuit" after terror attacks, and extradition to Israel of certain suspects in
serious crimes.
These operative steps, both those which are spelled out separately in
the accords and those which are derivative from Article XVIII, can be grouped
into: preemption, the prevention of acts of terror before they occur; and
punishment, the response to terror after the fact.
The four key areas in preemption are restriction of access to weapons;
prevention of recruiting, planning and training; the thwarting of actual,
planned attacks; and the use of negotiation to persuade terror groups not to
launch attacks. The actual records of compliance will now be viewed in each
of these areas in turn.
As regards restriction of access to weapons, the Gaza-Jericho accords
define three concrete obligations. First, the PA must disarm all armed
militias. Second, it must confiscate all weapons other than pistols, including
explosives of various types. And third, it must register all pistols, in
accordance with guidelines that were to be established jointly with Israel.
The backdrop for examining compliance on weapons-control issues is
the situation today in Gaza, 16 months after the PA has taken control.
According to informed sources in the Palestinian police and Israeli
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intelligence, there are today between 2,500 and 3,000 guns held by individuals
outside of the Palestinian police force, most of which are in the hands of the
five active militias: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP), and Fatah. Indeed, Yasser Arafat claimed in March of this year that
there are 26,000 guns in Gaza, and PA Minister of Information Yasser Abd
Rabbo said that some estimates place the figure as high as 40,000.
Smuggling of weapons into Gaza has been a widespread phenomenon,
though it is difficult to obtain reliable estimates of the pace of such smuggling.
What is clear is that there are far more guns in the hands of these armed
militias today than there were when the PA took over. Given that these
organizations' activists number in the hundreds, the implication of even the
conservative figure of 2,500 is that any activists' cell of a few people interested
in launching an attack on an Israeli target has access to several weapons with
which to do so. In addition, there has been a massive influx of bombs and
explosives of various types, via imports and local manufacturing.
To date, according to estimates made by high-ranking officers in the
Palestinian police force, the PA has registered between 400 and 800 weapons.
Since these records are not public, it is difficult to confirm that these figures
are accurate, and Israeli intelligence sources tend to put the figure lower.
What is beyond dispute is that among the weapons that have been licensed
are sub-machine-guns, a clear violation of the accords.
More important than licensing is confiscation, which if carried out on a
wide scale could make it more difficult for would-be terrorists to carry out
their attacks. To date, the number of weapons confiscated is in the dozens at
most. The policy of the Palestinian Authority, as told to Peace Watch by high-
ranking police officials, and confirmed by leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad,
is to refrain from disarming any of the five active militias. The Palestinian
Authority's Minister of Justice, Freih Abu Middein, stated this policy publicly
in May of 1995. Today, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
and Fatah all remain armed, and unhindered. There have been some efforts
to restrict the public display and use of guns at sports matches and funerals,
but even these have been only partially effective.
Recruitment, planning, and training go on in Gaza virtually
unchallenged by the PA. Almost all of the major acts of terrorism in the last
year — the kidnaping-murder of Nachshon Waxman, and the suicide-
bombings at Dizengoff Center in Tel Aviv, at Beit Lid, and at Kfar Darom, for
example — have been planned in Gaza. Training facilities are known to
operate with the knowledge of the Palestinian police, though Peace Watch
has been unable to obtain reliable information on how widespread training
activities are. Many mosques openly serve as grounds for recruitment of
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activists to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, though there have been some
limitations on these activities in the last few months.
As for the prevention of planned attacks, Palestinian officials and
especially Yasser Arafat have claimed credit for preemption in at least a dozen
cases. Given the nature of such claims, it is difficult to confirm or disconfirm,
especially since PA officials have generally been unwilling to give details.
Peace Watch was able to examine three of the claims in depth, however, and
the results of the investigations demonstrates that there is, at a minimum,
substantial gaps between the claims and the reality.
A February 14, 1995 claim to have destroyed 200 kilograms of
explosives turns out to have been an error, since the substance in question
was in fact pesticides belonging to a Mr. Majdi Abu Ralal, the owner of the
field in Khan Yunis where the "discovery" was made. An attempt to commit
a suicide-bombing using a bus wired with explosives, supposedly preempted
near Jericho in early February, was, according to Peace Watch sources, a
fabrication. There was no bus, no bomber, and no explosives.
In one other case, in Gaza, in which Chairman Arafat claimed that the
Palestinian police stopped a planned suicide-bombing attack, there was some
measure of truth to the report. A father had come to the police complaining
that his son was being pressured at the mosque at which he prayed to agree to
become a suicide bomber. The Palestinian police arrested the recruiters, and
thus stopped them from turning the complainant's son into a potential
suicide bomber. This success is noteworthy, though it is not what it was
advertised to be — the preemption of a specific, planned attack. All in all, there
is no doubt that there have been some Palestinian police successes in
preemption, but it is not possible to estimate how widespread they have been.
A fourth strategy of preemption, negotiation with the parties likely to
use violence, has been tried at times by the Palestinian Authority. From mid-
April to late July of 1995, perhaps due in part to a tacit understanding between
the PA and the Islamic terrorist organizations, there was a 99-day stretch in
which no Israelis were killed in terror attacks. Nonetheless, there were
numerous non-fatal attacks during that period. Hamas and Islamic Jihad
claimed that the hiatus was their independent initiative, based on their
calculations of the interests of the Palestinians generally, as well as their
organizations specifically. Some of the credit for the 99-day hiatus goes to
Israeli security forces, who poured what by many accounts were
unprecedented resources into preventing attacks in this period. And finally,
once the hiatus ended, the suicide bombings and other attacks resumed at
their previous intensity. Given all these factors, it is difficult to assess how
much weight to give to the PA's attempts at negotiation.
On the punishment side of the ledger, there are three areas that must
be examined. The first of these is arrests and incarceration of individuals
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involved in terrorist activities; the second is trials of individuals suspected of
particular crimes; and the third is the transfer of suspects for trial in Israel.
First of all, it can be stated categorically that from mid-May of 1994 until
after the suicide-bombing attack on Beit Lid in January of 1995, there was no
use of any of these means of punishment. The only steps that were taken
during that period were mass arrests, followed by mass releases, in what
became known as "revolving door justice." In the wake of major terror
attacks, such as the kidnaping-murder of Nachshon Waxman and the suicide-
bombing in Dizengoff Center of Tel Aviv, the PA would round up several
dozen individuals affiliated with whatever group had taken credit. Care was
generally taken to avoid arresting the members of the military wing; jails
were instead filled with the political activists from these groups. Most of
those arrested were released within a matter of hours, and the remainder
within a couple of weeks.
During the three-month period from the mid-January attack in Beit Lid
to the April suicide-bombing at the Kefar Darom settlement in the Gaza Strip
(which claimed 8 lives, including American Alisa Flatow) the PA's policy
underwent a change. For the first time, a few dozen of the individuals
arrested remained in prison for a period of months. The people thus
incarcerated were not for the most part the suspects in planning or carrying
out the raids, so it was still the case that perpetration of terror went
unpunished. Nonetheless, the policy represented a clear change in that it
demonstrated a willingness to make use of some form of punishment.
Shortly after the bombing in Kefar Darom, the PA began using its
military court system, which had been established two months earlier but had
remained inactive. These courts meted out sentences after trials that often
lasted as little as 15 minutes, and which were routinely held in the middle of
the night without the presence of a defense attorney or the family members of
the accused.
During the period from April 10, 1995 to May 26, 1995, the military
courts in Gaza held trials for 36 individuals, and handed out sentences to 31
of them. The crimes ranged from selling food which had spoiled, to writing
articles critical of the Palestinian Authority, to selling weapons illegally, to
preparing recruits to Islamic organizations to become suicide bombers. The
sentences handed down ranged from a few months in jail to life
imprisonment, though most sentences were for less than a year. After May
26th, no more trials were held in Gaza. (Two trials were held in Jericho in late
August and early September, though this was done in order to take advantage
of a provision in the accords enabling the PA to refuse to hand over for trial
in Israel someone who is serving out a sentence given by a Palestinian court.)
As with the previous patterns of "revolving door" arrests and longer-
term arrests, the people sentenced were not among the "heavyweights" of any
of the terror groups. They were principally preachers, journalists, and low-
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level recruiters, as opposed to the individuals involved in planning or
carrying out attacks. Nonetheless, the existence of the trials and sentencing
meant that the PA was willing to use a weapon beyond what many observers
anticipated, and probably served in some respects as a deterrent.
In the third area of punishment, the transfer of suspects for trial in
Israel, the PA has maintained a consistent policy of refusal. It should be noted,
in this context, that in Annex III of the Gaza-Jericho accords, which deals with
legal matters, Article II (7) sets out in unambiguous terms that: "Where an
individual suspected of, charged with or convicted of an offense that falls
within Israeli criminal jurisdiction is present in the Territory (of the PA),
Israel may request the Palestinian Authority to arrest and transfer the
individual to Israel," and that "Both sides, upon receipt of a request in
accordance with this Article, shall effect the arrest and transfer requested."
Thus, as long as Israel submits a proper request backed up by an Israeli court
and the Attorney-General's office, the PA is obligated, without exercising its
own judgment about the merits of the case, to hand over the person who has
been requested.
This clear obligation notwithstanding, the PA has not turned over any
of the 11 suspects in cases of murder or attempted murder, for whom Israel
has submitted formal requests. In the case of two of the suspects, the PA
justified its refusal on the grounds that the murder was committed before the
accords were signed between Israel and the PLO, and hence Israel was out of
bounds in making the request. This interpretation, it should be noted, does
not correspond with the plain meaning of the text of the agreement, which
draws no distinction between crimes committed before or after the date of
signing. The PA refused to hand over two other individuals, first on the
grounds that they were in Egypt and not Gaza; when it became publicly
known that they were in fact in Gaza, the PA then claimed that Israel had not
filled out the paperwork properly. In the case of the other seven suspects, the
PA has not answered the requests, and has not handed over the individuals.
In addition to its formal requests, Israel has also made informal
requests for another dozen or so suspects in terror attacks. These informal
requests, which are accompanied by substantial evidence but lack the full
documentation of the formal requests, are not binding. The PA, to date, has
also denied all of these requests, though in several cases involving criminal
acts, the PA has acceded to informal Israeli requests.
The PA's pattern of refusal is not happenstance, but is rather the
consequence of an explicit policy. Lieutenant Colenel Rashid Abu Shbak,
Deputy Commander of the Palestinian Intelligence Service in Gaza, told Peace
Watch in June of 1995 that: "No wanted suspects will be handed over to
Israel, because there now exists a new situation of peace in which one should
not look backwards." General Nasser Yussuf, the head of the Palestinian
police, confirmed this policy a few days later when he said that, "The PA's
1 1
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policy is not to carry out any transfers of security-related suspects." This
explicit policy, as well as the particular refusals that it has engendered,
constitute clear violations of the accords.
In closing this testimony, I want to cite one further issue of compliance,
this one related to Jerusalem, and not to terror. The DOP of September 13,
1993 set aside certain issues, including Jerusalem, which were to be negotiated
as part of the final-status talks slated to start by May 4, 1996. In part as a means
to prevent the establishment of facts which would prejudice the final status of
Jerusalem, the Gaza-Jericho accords also specified that: "The offices of the
Palestinian Authority shall be located in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area
pending the inauguration of the Council to be elected pursuant to the
Declaration of Principles." This prohibition, while applying to the placement
of offices anywhere outside of Gaza and Jericho, was meant in particular to
keep PA governmental offices out of Jerusalem.
Despite the existence of this clear prohibition, the PA has located no
fewer than 11 of its principal offices in Jerusalem: the Palestinian Ministry of
Religious Affairs, the Palestinian Energy Center, the Palestinian Bureau of
Statistics, the Office of the Mufti of Jerusalem, the Palestinian Economic
Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), the Palestinian
Broadcasting Corporation, the Orient House, the Palestinian Health Council,
the Palestinian Housing Council, the Institute for the Palestinian Wounded,
and the Palestinian Municipality of Jerusalem.
What is more startling than the total number of institutions is the
openness with which many of the institutions in question point to their links
to the PA. The Palestinian Minister of Religious Affairs, whose office is
located in Jerusalem's Old City, told Peace Watch that he receives his budget
and his orders from the PA. His business card reads: "Hassan Fatin Tahboub,
Minister of the Wakf and Religious Affairs, State of Palestine, Jerusalem."
PECDAR's office distributes an organizational flow chart which shows that it
is directly subordinate to the Palestinian Authority, which in turn is directly
subordinate to the PLO.
As in the case of the refusal to transfer suspects, the issue of PA
institutions features a clear obligation which goes in one direction, and an
equally clear pattern of behavior which goes precisely the opposite way. It is
worth noting that in both cases, the Government of Israel has protested the
Palestinian behavior both publicly and in direct, face-to-face talks. From a
compliance perspective, such cases are particularly troubling, since they
indicate a clear willingness to flout the accords.
There are hundreds of additional obligations, large and small, in the
accords signed to date by Israel and the PLO. The limits of time and space
preclude me from going through them one by one. I hope that the analysis
presented of several of the most significant obligations is of value to this
committee in its work of overseeing the Middle East peace process.
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TESTIMONY BY ROBERT SATLOFF
TO THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
Mr. Chairman, three days ago, I returned from an extended visit to the region, during which
time I led a fifty-member delegation from The Washington Institute that met with senior leaders
in Turkey, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. This included sessions with Turkish
President Demirel and Prime Minister Ciller; Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan and that country's
military leadership; Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, Foreign Minister Peres, Chief of Staff General
Shahak and leaders of the Likud opposition; and Palestinian Authority Minister Dr. Nabil Shaath.
A particular highlight of the trip was the convening in Amman of The Washington Institute's
annual policy conference. This year, our theme was Building on Peace, with two hundred Arab,
Israeli and American officials, diplomats, scholars and businessmen taking stock of the Jordan-Israel
peace one year on and discussing ways to capitalize on that achievement to build wider regional
security and economic growth.
With this intensive experience fresh in my mind, I would like to offer the Committee
informed assessments on such issues as the prospects for the Oslo II second-stage agreement for
Palestinian self-government; the stability of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty; the impasse in Syria-
Israel negotiations; and the challenge to the peace process posed by radical extremists. I also have
several suggestions regarding U.S. policy toward the peace process that may be of value to the
Committee.
First, in a process replete with critical moments, we are entering one of its most critical -
Gaza-Jericho was a signal achievement; however, it was only the first phase of an interim
arrangement; despite great misgivings about the record of Oslo, both Israel and its Palestinian
partner have decided to press on to a second-stage agreement; this will include Israeli redeployment
out of populated areas in the West Bank, elections for a Palestinian Council, and the extension of
Palestinian self-government throughout the West Bank. This is a complex and complicated
agreement; it envisions three zones of withdrawal and differing rules for security governing these
zones. Implementing this agreement will be exponentially more difficult than implementing Gaza-
Jericho. Nevertheless, and despite the continuance of terrorism by radical elements opposed to the
peace process, Israel believes its best interests lie in advancing to the next stage of the process so
as to ensure that Gaza-Jericho does not wither on the vine, as many Arab friends of the
Palestinians seem willing to permit. While there is great anxiety among the Israeli public and within
the Israeli army about implementing the next phase, significant majorities continue to support the
government's pursuit of the peace process.
Second, the Palestinian Authority has had a few good months - Palestinian capital is
reportedly beginning to arrive in Gaza, $600 million since the new year; cooperation between the
Israeli and PLO security forces has improved significantly. Nevertheless, there is still much room
for improvement, both in terms of promoting free market investment and, especially, in terms of
taking preventive and preemptive measures to combat terrorism. In my view, the key for the next
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phase will be whether the PA adopts the Gaza model in the West Bank or the Jericho model — the
former being a laisser-faire attitude toward radical groups and their possession of weapons, the
latter being an activist approach to security. Replicating the Gaza model will be a recipe for
disaster; an activist approach may prove successful.
Third, Jordan-Israel peace is perhaps the most hopeful element in the new Arab-Israel
equation but it needs support lest it grows sterile. The key theme of our conference in Amman was
that this peace is much more complex than a personal agreement between King Hussein and Prime
Minister Rabin; that personal connection may carry the day for a period of time, but for peace to
survive its creators, it must be bolstered by tangible changes in the lives of the people that are
affected by it — especially the Jordanians. The success or failure of the Jordan-Israel peace should
not be left hostage to the success or failure of the Israel-Palestinian relationship; to ensure that,
it is necessary to find low-cost ways to assist the Jordanians and to convince Jordan to turn its
economic sights from Iraq in the east to the West Bank, Israel and the Mediterranean in the west.
Fourth, despite all the talk about Syria's strategic choice for peace, it is not yet clear whether
Syria is part of the problem or part of the solution. Syria today is the only peace process principal
that continues to entertain the use of terrorism as policy and that is engaged in terrorism against
the process it purports to support. Today, living in Damascus or the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley,
are anti-peace process terrorists and anti-Turkish terrorists; Syria is taking direct steps to
undermine reconciliation among the Iraqi Kurds; and it is flouting procedural agreements to renew
the peace talks with Israel. I can find little evidence that repeated U.S. entreaties and demarches
to Syria have brought any results.
U.S. POLICY --
© The peace process is very much in U.S. interests. With the absence of the Soviet Union, the
rationale has shifted but has not diminished; it used to have a defensive rationale — keeping the
Soviets out — but is now more positive and forward-leaning to create a strategic consensus among
moderate, pro- West elements — Arabs, Israelis and Turks — to combat the twin threats of Iraq's
secular radicalism and Iran's religious militancy. Success will require American leadership to deter
the region's radicals, especially Iraq and Iran. This is where the process begins. Without it, the
process withers.
<D Work with the peacemakers. The partnership between Israel and Washington is an essential
ingredient in Israel's ability to take risks for peace. With the Palestinians, the U.S. has a unique
role to play in helping to shore up the pro-peace elements in the Palestinian community, while at
the same time insisting on full efforts to achieve compliance with contractual obligations. With
Jordan, the U.S. should not be penny-wise and pound-foolish; all the makings of a warm peace are
present, let's nurture them. With Egypt, great attention should be paid - this is the most important
relationship the U.S. has in the Arab world; as Egypt works through the implications of no longer
being the sole Arab state at peace with Israel, it is vital for us to work now to develop new
dimensions to the strategic relationship between our two countries.
172
® With Syria, let's step back a moment. America has proved its urgency for progress via the great
efforts undertaken by Secretary Christopher to broker a Syria-Israel deal. The Israelis have also
gone to great lengths to accommodate Syrian demands, however, there is no comparable urgency
from the Syrians. While America should stand ready to take significant steps to help achieve peace,
it need not exert greater efforts than the principals themselves. In the absence of those efforts from
Damascus, America has a long list of outstanding bilateral issues which have lain largely dormant
over the past two years -- terrorism, proliferation, Lebanon, narcotics, counterfeiting, and human
rights. With Secretary Christopher meeting Foreign Minister Sharaa next week in New York, now
is the time to move the agenda of U.S. -Syrian relations to issues of immediate American interest.
A concluding note - as an historian, let me urge all of us to take the long view. Though
great progress has been achieved, there is still very far to go. We are still in an early phase -
getting leaders to make peace and; it will take years before those strategic decisions filter down to
the people. This process has years, perhaps decades, before the conflict between Arabs and Israelis
is over; we are far from that point today. We must keep this time factor in mind. Success in the
peace process is not just one shuttle mission or one signing ceremony away.
Like the stock market, the peace process is on an upward slope but it is not immune from
great shocks. Successes are not irreversible; achievements are not irrevocable. The process can
falter; it can stop; it can succumb to terrorists; nothing is inevitable; nothing is truly impossible. We
must take nothing for granted nor can we assume that yesterday's problems will not reappear again
tomorrow. For America, the key to securing its interests is to remain engaged at every step, actively
supporting the peacemakers and actively deterring the enemies of peace.
173
TESTIMONY OF
NEAL M. SHER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (AIPAC)
BEFORE THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
Thank you, Chairman Gilman and members of this distinguished Committee,
for the opportunity to testify before you. As Executive Director of AIPAC, I
recognize the critical role this Committee plays every year in ensuring that the U.S.-
Israel relationship remains strong. Appearing with me is Ester Kurz, AIPAC s
Director for Legislative Strategy and Policy. AIPAC believes in the critical importance
of U.S. relations with Israel, and recognizes the prominent role that foreign aid plays
in accomplishing America's foreign policy objectives — not only in Israel but around
the world. In this regard, I want to express AIPAC s strong support for a viable
foreign assistance program.
AIPAC, a domestic, non-partisan membership organization of American citizens,
works on a daily basis with its members to nurture a close and consistently strong
partnership between our country and Israel. On our Executive Committee sit the
presidents of the 50 major American Jewish organizations, representing more than
four-and-a-half million active members throughout the United States, as well as leaders
of the country's pro-Israel community from all 50 states. AIPAC is the designated
spokesman on Capitol Hill on behalf of the organized American Jewish community
on issues relating to the U.S.-Israel relationship.
Mr. Chairman, we meet at an historic moment. Israel and the Palestinians are
about to sign a landmark agreement, which has the potential of transforming relations
between the two parties and between Israel and the wider Arab world. A broad Arab-
Israel peace would promote three key U.S. foreign-policy objectives: greater regional
stability, containment of radical forces and states, and secure flow of Persian Gulf oil.
These bring enormous political, economic, and strategic benefits both to the United
States and Israel.
But in concluding this agreement, Israel is taking unprecedented risks for peace,
predicated on support from its one reliable ally, the United States of America. The
alliance between the two countries serves as the bedrock of Israel's security and the
guarantee of stability in the region. Israel is able to take risks for peace only when
it is confident that the United States stands behind it. U.S. support is vital to
achieving the goals of the agreement; to minimizing the risks that Israel is taking; and
to making sure that Israel is not harmed in the event that things don't go well.
There is a wide range of opinion in the pro-Israel community, as there is in
Israel, regarding which is the best path to peace between Israelis and Palestinians. But
174
there is a consensus that the critical decisions regarding peace and security must be
made by the democratically elected Government of Israel in free and direct
negotiations with its Arab counterparts.
The Government of Israel has arrived at such a critical decision. It is about to
sign an agreement with the Palestinians committing the State of Israel to a specific
course of action.
The United States Congress has a vital role to play in helping ensure the
success of the impending agreement. First and foremost, it needs to support the peace
process by maintaining U.S. aid to Israel. As stated in a May 4, 1994 letter to Prime
Minister Rabin coauthored by Senators Robert Dole and George Mitchell, which
ninety-two senators signed: "As you work for peace and reconciliation, please know
that we will continue to do our best to provide Israel with the economic and defense
assistance it needs, because we believe a just and lasting peace can only succeed if
Israel is strong and secure." To that end, let me take this opportunity to thank the
members of this Committee for supporting $3 billion in aid to Israel in the FY 96
Foreign Aid Authorization Bill, HR 1561.
Another important contribution Congress can make to the peace process is
support for the renewal and strengthening of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act
(MEPFA) as contained in the Senate version of HR 1 868. MEPFA has already made
an important contribution to the peace process. By linking aid and overall relations
with the United States to PLO compliance with its commitments to renounce terrorism
and violence and accept Israel's right to exist, it has provided the Palestinian Authority
(PA) with an incentive to comply with the PLO's commitments.
Since MEPFA was first enacted, the PLO's record of compliance ~ while still
far from adequate — has improved, particularly in recent months. The PA has
reportedly prevented a number of Islamic terrorist acts —including suicide attacks ~
against Israel. There have been consistent reports of high levels of cooperation
between Palestinian and Israeli security forces. And wanted terrorists have been
subjected to long prison terms by the PA.
But, clearly, much more needs to be done. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat's has
delivered speeches - captured on tape -- in which he has called for jihad and praised
Palestinian terrorists of the 1970s. We have strongly condemned these outrageous
statements, which must stop. Other shortcomings include failure to transfer wanted
terrorists to Israel and to amend the Covenant. These problems highlight the need for
tougher legislation that would provide Congress with additional leverage to enforce
PLO compliance. Arafat must understand that the U.S. Congress is closely watching.
The new MEPFA is, indeed, tougher than existing legislation. In addition to
certifying that the PLO continues to comply with its commitments of September 1993,
the President would also certify that the PLO is complying with its many
commitments under the Gaza- Jericho Agreement of May 1994, including prevention
175
of acts of terrorism and taking legal measures against terrorists; abstaining from and
preventing acts of incitement; and prohibiting the possession, manufacture, sale, or
acquisition of weapons. Furthermore, the bill prohibits any aid after six months unless
the President further certifies six other items, including disavowal of the Covenant
articles calling for Israel's destruction. The bill also introduces financial
accountability by requiring the President to certify that U.S. assistance is spent for its
intended purposes.
Mr. Chairman, virtually the entire organized American Jewish community has
publicly expressed support for MEPFA 1995. In an August 2, 1995 press release, the
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations stated: "There is
a strong consensus among our 50 national member agencies to support [MEPFA
1995]." We at AIPAC are part of this overwhelming consensus. We have taken note
as well that both the Government of Israel and our own Administration are also
supportive of MEPFA 1995. We believe that adopting MEPFA 1995 will enhance the
peace process and promote American interests; rejecting the bill — or adopting
proposals that would have the effect of denying any aid to the Palestinians — would
cause serious harm.
The new, strengthened MEPFA would maximize the law's effectiveness as a
tool to ensure PLO compliance with its commitments. An enhanced MEPFA would
help demonstrate to the PA its need to comply with its commitments; were MEPFA
to be repealed, or effectively gutted through the attachment of unrealizable or
irrelevant requirements, a major incentive for PLO compliance would be lost. We are
therefore opposed to legislation that would in effect cut off funding to the PA
regardless of any improvements in its performance. Congress should renew and
strengthen MEPFA and keep the pressure on the PLO to comply with its
commitments.
Mr. Chairman, despite its problems, the peace process has made dramatic
progress since that unforgettable day two years ago when Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir
Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn. We must ensure that the progress we
have witnessed will continue, so that one day Israelis and Palestinians will live
together in peace and that Israel will have the peace and security it so desperately
longs for and needs.
176
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HAHDELL I. OAKCHROW, M.D.
Handel 1 I. Canehrow, H.D. is President of the Union of
Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America and was the
driving force behind the creation of the Institute for
Public Affairs, which acts as the orthodox Jewish
community's voice in matters of public policy. In the
past. Dr. Oanchrow served as the Chairman of the I. P. A. and
created the Washington, D.C. Summer Internship Program for
college students. This program gives young Orthodox men
and women the opportunity to become future community
leaders as they gain experience and exposure as interns for
members of Congress and the Administration.
Dr. Ganchrow has baen extremely active in communal and
religious affairs. He is the founding President of the
Hudson Valley Political Action Committee, constituting
1,600 families in Rockland County, which has become the
largest pro-Israel political action committee in the United
States, as well as the 100th largest PAC in the country.
Ha has been active in the medical division of Israel Bonds,
has served as the president of both the Community Synagogue
in Monsey and of the Adolph Schreiber Hebrew Academy of
Rockland County and is a member of the Executive Committee
of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) .
In July 1992 Hendy was appointed to the board of the
Women's College of Touro College.
Dr. Ganchrow is a graduate of Teshiva University (1958) and
Chicago Medical School (1962). Upon completion of his
residency, he served in Vietnam as a combat Surgeon. He
received an Army Accommodation Medal, a Jewish Welfare
Board Medal for serving as an active Jewish chaplain. He
was promoted to the rank of Major in Vietnam.
Following his discharge from the army, he moved to Rockland
County, NT where he established a private practice
specializing in Colon and Rectal Surgery. Dr. Ganchrow
serves as an Associate Clinical Professor of Surgery at the
New York Medical College, has written numerous medical
papers, and is a former Chief of Surgery at Good Samaritan
Hospital. In addition, he acts as the Police Surgeon for
the town of Ramapo. Dr. Ganchrow is also a member of the
Rockland County Sheriff's Bureau. In 1992, he was awarded
the Bernard Revel Award as outstanding alumnus of Teshiva
University for community service.
177
WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF
MANDELL I. GANCHROW, M.D.
PRESIDENT
UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
178
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I wish to express my sincerest
appreciation to you for allowing me to testify on the Middle East peace process,
farticularly the Palestinian track and the reauthorization of the Middle East Peace
acilitation Act My name is Dr. Mendy Ganchrow. I am the President of the
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations. Today, I represent seven Orthodox
organizations: Amit Women, Emunah of America, National Council of Young
Israel, Poalc Agudath Israel. Rabbinical Council of America, Religious Zionists of
America and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, all national
mainstream Orthodox Jewish organizations.
We are all members of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations, as well as active members of AEPAC. We have all supported the
search for Middle East peace. We stood together on the White House lawn a little
over two years ago in support of the search for peace. We stood together in the
Jordanian-Israeli desert m support of the search for peace. Yet, this search has
come at a cost so dear to the people of Israel. The continued call for jihad in Arabic
by Mr. Arafat, the poor performance of the Palestinian Authority, including its
failure to return those who engage in terrorist attacks as requested by the Israeli
authorities in accordance with the Oslo Accord, the politically sponsored activities
of the Palestinian Authority in Jerusalem and Orient House in contradiction to the
Oslo Accord, the failure to disarm Hamas in the self-rule areas, and the continued
increase in horrendous terrorist attacks against innocent Jews all require and
demand that we place the tightest and most productive restrictions on U.S. aid to
the Palestinians.
A newly published American Jewish Committee study indicates that two-thirds of
American Jews are opposed to any American aid to tne Palestinians. This despite
the fact that the overwhelming majority support the peace process.
The majority of our organizations joined the Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations in supporting Helms-Pell, which strengthens the
Middle East Peace Facilitation Act However, we believe that there are some major
loopholes which weaken this Act and that require strengthening by Congress. We
joined the Conference of Presidents in stressing the need for stronger language and
additional safeguards to guarantee that the bill's intentions are carried out to the
fullest.
We recommend that all the money that has been appropriated by the
Administration be placed into an escrow account for a period of six months, during
which the Palestinians and Mr. Arafat can demonstrate their compliance with the
Oslo agreement. If they live up to the accords, then the aid will be made available.
Our testimony is in the spirit of the resolutions adopted at the AlPAC Annual Policy
Conference of 199S that call for total compliance on the part of Mr. Arafat before
receiving U.S. funds. I quote the ATP AC Policy Statement of 1995 that "continues to
support the Spector-Shelbv-T flg^y Amendment which ties U.S. funding to the
Palestinians toPLO compliance with its commitments. AlPAC will be working with
Congress to renew and greatly strengthen the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act in
order to maximize its effectiveness as atool in pressing for PLO compliance with its
commitments to renounce and condemn terrorism, recognize Israel and negotiate
differences peacefully, prevent terrorism and prosecute terrorists, prevent
incitement to violence, bar unauthorized forces, extradite terrorists to Israel ensure
that the Palestinian police cooperate with Israel's security forces, and amend the
Palestinian covenant."
179
We must make the PLO accountable. In order to facilitate that, we suggest that all
funds for the PLO and the Palestinian Authority should be placed in escrow for six
months while the U.S. government determines that they are in compliance with their
obligations. Each of the following should take place in order for the money to be
appropriated. The failure to carry out these obligations would be cause for
withholding aid, by law, not by "sense of Congress" as contained in the Helms-Pell
reauthorization of MEPFA.
1- The PLO Charter, which is replete with calls for the destruction of Israel, must be
renounced and repealed by the Palestinian Authority in its entirety. Declaring that
it is superseded by events on the ground is not sufficient. We equate this charter
with the Zionism is Racism resolution which was repealed at the insistence of the
Congress of the United States and the citizens of this country, even though it was
insinuated that the resolution was irrelevant.
2- The failure to disarm Hamas, the presence of huge numbers of weapons held by
individuals in the area controlled by the Palestinian Authority and the failure to stop
new smuggling of arms into these areas cannot be tolerated. This should not be
considereda violation of the "sense of Congress," as stated in the bill, but should be
considered a legal cause for American aid to be terminated.
3- The Palestinian Authority must carry out the mandate of the Oslo Accord that
those who engage in terrorist attacks must be turned over when requested by Israel.
To date, not a single terrorist has been returned.
4- Mr. Arafat and the members of his cabinet must stop their inflammatory
language including calls for jihad, the destruction of Israel, the killing of Jews and
the glorification of those who have killed Jews. Recent tapes of these statements by
Arafat are available to every member of Congress. Arafat cannot continue this
incendiary rhetoric and still receive U.S. aid.
5- All Palestinian offices in Jerusalem, especially Orient House, which are there in
contravention of the Oslo Accord, should be closed. All political activity should
take place in Jericho and Gaza as stated in the agreement.
6- This Act should only be reauthorized for a maximum of 12 months or less in
order to provide full opportunity to evaluate compliance.
7- We believe that the Congress of the United States should investigate allegations
of misuse of funds intended for housing and other purposes in Gaza and Jericho by
the Palestinian Authority, and which instead may have been illegally diverted to buy
houses and property within Jerusalem in order to create facts on the ground.
8- We believe that the GAO report which was commissioned to investigate the
extent of PLO assets should be made public so that every Member of Congress can
have this information prior to voting on a MEPFA reauthorization. If it is found
that the PLO has substantial assets, we would strongly oppose any further financial
assistance by the United States to the Palestinian Authority.
All of the aforementioned should be legal grounds for termination of U.S. funds,
rather than being considered merely a violation of "a sense of the Congress."
180
Finally, we ask that Congress include a provision in MEPFA that any attempt by
Yassir Arafat or any official of the Palestinian Authority to declare a Palestinian
state be automatic cause for cutting off all funds from all sources. A Palestinian
state would be contrary to the interests of America and would destabilize the
Middle East region.
Mr. Chairman, we support the efforts for peace, but peace can not be won if
American taxpayer dollars continue to support appeasement, terrorism, and calls
for jihad, as well as the undermining of attempts at stability in this volatile area
Mr. Chq»""*"t we support an honorable and enduring peace. American funds play
a vital role in providing the incentive for Middle East parties to live up to their
obligations. Mr. Ararat has a record of murder, deceit, duplicity and non-
compliance. Let us work for peace by making sure that Israel's security is ensured.
Let us ensure that American policy interests are safeguarded. This can only be
accomplished with complete compliance on the part of the Palestinian Authority.
Let us send a message to Mr. Arafat Comply with your obligations and reassure us
through both words and your deeds that you are truly pursuing peace and we will do
our part
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy and your time.
W
4<
181
American Jewish Committee
Biographical Sketch
DAVID A. HARRIS
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
David A. Karris is the Executive Director of the American Jewish Committee. Prior
toassuraing his current post, he served in Washington as AJC's Director of Government and
Internationa) Affairs.
He was educated at the University of Pennsylvania, the London School of Economics and
Oxford University. He ilso studied in France and taught in the Soviet Union, and Is fluent In
several languages.
Mr. Harris has t 'avelled extensively to Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Latin
America on behalf of Jevish Interests - monitoring the condition of Jewish communities, combatting
anti-Semitism, enhancing understanding between Jews and other groups.
He was the National Coordinator of the historic Freedom Sunday for Sovjet Jewry rally in
Washington. D.C., in Df cerobcr 1987 that brought 250,000 pcojple to the nation's capital. In June
1990, he was named by he State Department as a Public Member of the U.S. delegation to the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
His more than ] 00 published writings on East-West relations and the Middle East have
appeared in leading mag azines and newspapers, and he is the author of three books: The Jokes of
Oppression' (Jason Arinson), "Entering A New Culture' (Liberty), and The Jewish World"
(Liberty), the latter two in English and Russian.
Mr. Harris, receitly named by Lifestyles magazine as one of 18 North American Jews "who
will serve as the leaders as we approach the 21st Century," earlier was cited by the Jewish Monthly
as one of the "rising stars" in American Jewish life.
Mr. Harris is muried to Giulietta Boukhobza. They have three sons.
182
"PERSPECTIVES ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS"
TESTIMONY OF
DAVJJ) A. HARRIS
EXECUTIVE DUIECTOR
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
Mr. Chairman, thank you for affording the American Jewish Committee this
opportunity to present our perspectives on the Middle East peace process at this critical
stage in its evolution, as well as to outline the findings of our most recent survey of
American Jewish attitudes about Israel and the peace process. Before proceeding with my
testimony, Mr. Chairman, I also wish to thank you on behalf of the American Jewish
Committee for the keen understanding you have always demonstrated of the importance of
the mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and Israel, and for your
leadership in support of Israel as it seeks to open a new era of peaceful, cooperative
relations between Arabs and Jews across the Middle East.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, it is the belief of the members and officers of the American
Jewish Committee that Israel and its Arab neighbors are moving toward a new era in the
Middle East. The Arab-Israeli peace negotiations — which began in Madrid in October
1991, passed a significant milestone with the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of
Principles in September 1993, and achieved dramatic success in the Israel-Jordan peace
treaty signed last October — hold the promise of thoroughly and constructively remaking
relations between Israel and the Arab world.
Our perspective is the result of four years of intensive experience with the peace
process, and some 47 years of close involvement with Israel. The American Jewish
Committee, dedicated to the protection of Jewish communities in Israel and around the
world and the first American Jewish organization to establish a permanent office in Israel,
has monitored the peace process from its inception and sought to advance its cause here
and in other capitals; AJC attended the Madrid conference and the January 1992 Moscow
opening of the multilateral peace talks as an observer, and we have engaged in regular and
detailed discussions on the process with senior officials of the U.S. and Israeli
Governments, and with the Governments of Arab states across the Middle East and North
Africa. Further, our confidence in this process has led us to change the scope of our
Jerusalem office from Israel alone, to Israel and the entire Middle East.
Our analyses and our discussions with the principals engaged in the process here
and in the region lead us to one conclusion: For all its difficulties, the peace process set
183
TESTIMONY OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE PAGE 2
in motion four years ago represents Israel's best chance to depart from the troubled course
of modern history and achieve peace with its neighbors.
The difficulties that have marked the road to peace cannot be minimized; the
tragedies — the repeated terror attacks by those bent on destroying the peace process —
i cannot be forgotten. Our support for the peace process, and our trust in the judgment of
jthe duly elected Government of Israel on matters of Israel's security, are given in full
awareness of the dangers Israelis face, indeed have always faced in a region and among
i people largely hostile to their existence. It is not the intention of the framers of, and
! participants in, the peace process to simply dismiss the dangers and redefine the hostility
.of Israel's foes; it is to fundamentally alter the nature of relations between Israel and its
I neighbors in order to strengthen Israel's present and future security. Future generations of
both Jews and Arabs deserve nothing less.
In just two years since the signing of the DOP, those relations have already
i changed, to Israel's benefit; not only has Israel made peace with Jordan, but it has engaged
in diplomatic and commercial contacts from North Africa to the Persian Gulf, eroding the
Arab League economic boycott of Israel and laying the groundwork for future political
| and economic cooperation throughout the region. Further, Israel's withdrawal from Gaza
more than one year ago was not only an essential element in establishing a new
1 relationship with the Palestinians, but it was and remains highly popular within Israel
(itself. And in Gaza, as anyone can attest who visited there before the transfer of authority
land has been back in recent months, there are significant indications of economic, political
land even social progress, achieved with the help of U.S. and European aid; indeed, with
(the Palestinian Authority increasingly succeeding there against the Hamas extremists for
control and popular allegiance, Gaza may be the only place in the Muslim world that has
| actually moved farther away from fundamentalism in the last year.
The Israeli Government's vision since Madrid has been bold but clear-eyed, and
ve. stand behind it in its pursuit of peace with security. Similarly, Mr. Chairman, we
Dmmend and support the continued role of the United States — this Congress and this
jvery supportive Administration — as it seeks to assure Israel's security on the perilous but
| promising road to peace. In the American Jewish Committee's support for the
Government of Israel as it pursues peace with security, and for our own Government as it
seeks to advance the peace process for the benefit of Israel and its neighbors, I know that
a sister organization, the American Jewish Congress, wishes to associate itself with iny
remarks today.
Progress in the talks between Israel and its negotiating partners has not been easy;
in fact, on two of the bilateral tracks, with Syria and Lebanon, there has been little
progress at all. On the Palestinian track, we are cautiously hopeful that the intensive
negotiations in Taba this week will shortly yield a long-sought second phase agreement
on the redeployment of Israeli forces, the transfer of broad authority to Palestinians in the
184
TESTIMONY OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE PAGE 3
West Bank, and elections to a new governing council. We hope and expect that, when
concluded, this critical next step in Arab-Israeli reconciliation will increase the
Palestinians' stake in forging a new and mutually beneficial coexistence with Israel. It
will strengthen Israel's long-term security while offering maximum protection to Jewish
communities on the West Bank.
On the Syrian track, we are disappointed by President Assad's continued failure to
fully engage Israel in direct high-level talks — even after giving assurances to do so in
meetings with senior American officials in recent months. Nevertheless, we are hopeful
that, with continued American involvement, Jerusalem's willingness to take concrete steps
to achieve a new relationship with Syria will be met with an appropriate response from
Damascus.
To strengthen the prospect of satisfactory conclusions to these negotiations, and the
achievement of true and lasting peace in the region, the American Jewish Committee
believes that the critical role played by the United States as facilitator, supporter and
honest broker for peace must be extended. We call upon the Congress, Mr. Chairman, to
continue to provide the President with the resources and the authority he requests — in
the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act and other measures that may come before this and
the other body — so that the United States may press forward in this noble endeavor for
peace. We believe that these efforts by the United States will be further enhanced by the
critically important efforts of America's friends and allies in Europe, Asia and the Middle
East
In expressing our hope and our support for the Middle East peace process and for
continued U.S. engagement in that process, Mr. Chairman, the American Jewish
Committee articulates the view of the overwhelming majority of American Jews. In an
attitude survey that we published just last week, copies of which have been made
available to the Committee, we found that 68 percent of American Jews — more than 4
in 5 who expressed a view — support the Israeli Government in its current handling of
peace negotiations; 87 percent endorse a continuing American role in the peace process. I
should note that there are those who are choosing to read selected data from our survey,
and employing those data to justify their own views on the peace process, without
examining the survey in its complex and compelling totality.
I'd like to take a moment to outline some of the key findings of our poll — our
third annual survey of American Jewish attitudes toward Israel and the peace process —
and I will then ask that the full survey report be printed in the hearing record.
First, I think it is important to address American Jewish concerns and fears for
Israel's security. In the two years since the signing of the Oslo Accord — two years of
difficult and frustrating negotiations, and repeated terrorist acts intended to destroy the
peace process — American Jewish support for the Israeli Government's handling of the
185
TESTIMONY OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE PAGE 4
negotiations has declined; the level of support was 84 percent two years ago in the
euphoria surrounding the White House signing ceremony, 77 percent one year ago, and 68
percent in our most recent poll. Further, there is widespread, persistent skepticism about
the Arabs' intentions toward Israel. Asked if they believed "the goal of the Arabs is not
the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel," 56 percent responded
in the affirmative, while 37 percent disagreed — reflecting deepening doubts since 1993,
when a similar question found 42 percent in agreement, and 50 percent in disagreement.
Asked if they believed the PLO is "doing enough to control terrorist activity against Israel
by Hamas and other Palestinian extremist groups," 91 percent answered "no," 5 percent
"yes." Asked if they believed "the Palestinians are interested, or are not interested, in a
true and lasting peace with Israel," 51 percent answered "not interested," while 37 percent
responded "interested." Asked a companion question about Syrian intentions, 45 percent
responded "not interested," 38 percent "interested." By contrast, 74 percent of American
Jews believe Jordanians are "interested in a true and lasting peace with Israel," while 17
percent do not.
The message in these numbers, I believe, is twofold: that American Jews, like their
Israeli counterparts, need far greater assurance of Arab — and particularly Palestinian —
intentions of peaceful coexistence with Israel. The rhetoric from Arab leaders has begun
to change; it must change more, and quickly. And the action by the Palestinian Authority
to control terrorism and punish its perpetrators must continue to be intensified. The
United States, this Congress, must continue to convey that message to Palestinian
leadership and to the Arab world generally. The second message in this regard from our
poll is that there is a clear differentiation by American Jews between those neighbors of
Israel — in this case Jordan — that have signed a peace treaty and made conciliatory
gestures, and those that have not.
I see no contradiction, Mr. Chairman, between American Jews' overwhelming
support for the peace process and their profound wariness about the intentions of Israel's
neighbors. Indeed, I share those two feelings. Similarly, I am not surprised by the
response to another question we posed — whether the United States should "provide
economic aid to the Palestinians"; 63 percent said "no," 30 percent "yes." I find that
result consistent not only with American Jews' skepticism about Palestinian leadership, but
consistent with general American attitudes about foreign aid to any country. Further,
based on the results of other questions we posed, when we asked respondents to weigh
their own inclinations and concerns about elements of the peace process with their
judgment about the overall merits of the process and the need to press forward in accord
with the decisions of the elected Government of Israel, we believe that if we had asked a
similarly linked question on Palestinian aid we would have recorded a substantially
different response.
But on the critical questions about the validity and the potential of the Arab-Israeli
peace process — and about the Israeli Government's responsibility to manage that process
186
TESTIMONY OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE PAGE 5
in a manner that assures its nation's security — American Jews express support for the
policies pursued jointly by Jerusalem and Washington.
Asked, for instance, if they felt the last two years of negotiations "increase the
likelihood of another war, or increase the likelihood of peace with the Arabs," 66 percent
said they viewed the process as leading to peace, 18 percent to war — a ratio of more
than 3 to 1. By nearly 3 to 1 — 66 percent versus 22 percent — American Jews support
the Israeli Government's "current handling of the peace negotiations with the Palestinians."
And although American Jews do not strongly support "the establishment of a Palestinian
state," with 46 percent in favor and 39 percent opposed, a significant margin — 62
percent versus 31 percent, or 2 to 1 — would support such a move if that should be a
"decision made by the duly elected Israeli Government."
In the final analysis, regardless of their own justified fears and concerns, American
Jews are willing to set aside those concerns in deference to the decisions made by the
democratically elected Government of Israel. Our survey confirms the confidence our
community feels in that government — and its confidence, as well, in America's
partnership with Israel in pursuit of peace in the Middle East. We look to the Committee
to maintain that partnership and we call on it to continue its critical support of the
Government of Israel as it seeks — and takes risks for — a new era of peace with its
neighbors. Thank you.
187
Testimony of Dr. James Zogby
President, Arab American Institute,
on the Middle East Peace Process,
before the House Committee on International Relations,
September 20, 1995
Since the beginning of the peace process, it has become accepted as axiomatic that for the
process to succeed, Palestinians must experience the benefit of peace. It was understood that
merely expanding economic opportunities for Palestinians would not be sufficient to make peace,
but without such growth, achieving peace would be impossible.
Seen in this context, there is a certain tragedy in witnessing the reality of Gaza and
Jericho today. Where there was great optimism and promise, there is now cynicism and despair.
The statistics are staggering. Unemployment in Gaza stands at 62%— a dramatic increase
since 1993. Virtual reality projections from international bureaucrats aside, major job creating
infrastructure projects have not begun. Open sewage remains a serious health hazard. And as
a result of the prolonged closures of Gaza's border with Israel and the fact that no regular access
or egress is available to Egypt, Jordan or the outside world, commerce has remained at a
standstill.
While two years ago the per capita GNP of Gaza was S800 (in contrast to about $14,000
for Israelis and $1,600 for West Bank Palestinians), today Gaza is actually poorer than when
peace was signed.
Surely something is very wrong. While there is plenty of blame to go around, I do not
believe that the fingerpointing at the National Authority is helpful or correct. It was simply
unwise to assume that the Palestinian National Authority could create an accountable and
efficient state apparatus out of whole cloth. Lacking full authority, control over resources and
inheriting neither a physical nor administrative infrastructure-it is a wonder that the Palestinians
have accomplished as much as they have.
Unlike recent transformations in South Africa, Russia or Eastern Europe, the Palestinians
inherited no state and no functioning economy. What was required to assist them was a FEMA-
like approach to reconstruction. What they got were observers, studies, pledges and unfulfilled
promises of projects, and blame.
188
I am pleased to note that in the past year our own Agency for International Development
(AID) has recognized this reality and the urgency of the crisis in Gaza and has taken steps to
redirect U.S. dollars in an effort to meet immediate needs.
The U.S. cannot do the job alone. But our $75 million sends an important signal of our
commitment to the development of Palestinian society and to the peace process. What, of course,
are required are the billions of dollars that were pledged by other donor nations but remain
uncollected. Even today, change can come to Gaza. Rapid implementation of a massive overhaul
of the region can save a fragile peace process.
Young Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank want nothing more than to have a job, live
a meaningful life, raise a family, provide for their children and see their grandchildren prosper.
Their anger, all too often seen, is a product of despair — it is bom of the fear and frustration that
they have no future.
If peace is to survive, we must attack this crisis with all of the resources and capabilities
we have— and without delay or encumbrances to show the Palestinian people that the promise of
peace can be realized.
Understand that building a comprehensive peace in the Middle East is much like
constructing an inverted pyramid. The foundation, the point at which the ultimate stability of the
entire enterprise rests, is embedded in the sands of Gaza and in the rocky terrain of the West
Bank.
Unfortunately, no sooner had the process begun, than attention turned to the more
glamorous and potentially lucrative sixth and seventh stories in Casablanca and Amman, while
the foundation in Gaza remained unfinished and what had been started was in danger of
crumbling under the weight of neglect.
Shimon Peres, Israel's Foreign Minister, has said repeatedly that every dollar invested in
the Palestinian economy is an investment in the security of Israel. From the Palestinian view,
each job created is a vote for peace and the leadership that made peace possible.
If we do not do more and do it quickly, we are in danger of further eroding confidence
in the process and endangering the entire edifice of peace.
I urge you not only to continue U.S. assistance to the Palestinians, but to remove from
that assistance the encumbrances you have placed on it.
No sooner had the euphoria of September 13 th passed, when many in this body began
once again to use the harsh language of the past to describe the Palestinian leadership. That
rhetoric sends the wrong message. It says to the Palestinians that they continue to be viewed
with distrust and enmity. To impose ever more severe compliance requirements on U.S.
assistance to Palestinians without similarly conditioning U.S. assistance to Israel compromises our
role as an impartial broker in the peace process.
189
If this body is to make a contribution to peace, it must send a message of hope and
healing to Israelis and Palestinians alike.
Do not import the anger and fear of those who do not want this process to succeed.
Export rather our American commitment to a new reality and a new relationship where
Palestinian rights and security and Israeli rights and security are mutually recognized and
reinforced by U.S. support for both peoples.
TI—TJO /->
190
THE
CENTER
FOR
SECURITY
POLICY
TESTIMONY
RAND H. FISHBEIN
PRESIDENT, FISHBEIN ASSOCIATES, INC.
ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
MEMBER, ADVISORY BOARD
CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
"PLO COMPLIANCE:
A PREREQUISITE FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE"
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN GILMAN, CHAIRMAN
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
WASHINGTON, D.C.
12S0 MMtaMttlVK, Sutti 350. Washington. D.C 20037 (202)466-0515 FAX (302) 466-0511
191
Before beginning my testimony, I would like to request that my revised and extended
remarks be included in the record along with supplementary material bearing on my testimony.
In addition, given the short notice which I, and the other witnesses at this hearing have had to
prepare our remarks, I would like to ask that the period for formal submission of material for
the hearing record be extended for not less than fourteen working days.
Mr. Chairman, my name is Rand H. Fishbein. I am here representing myself and the
Center for Security Policy, where I serve on the Board of Advisors. Formerly, I served as the
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to Senator Daniel K. Inouye and as a Professional
Staff Member of both the Senate Defense Appropriations and Senate Foreign Operations
Appropriations subcommittees.
Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for the opportunity to address the committee on an
issue of critical importance to millions of Americans. The issue concerns the decision of this
Administration, with the support of Congress, to provide $500 million in assistance to the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
In the twenty-four months since the Declaration of Principles was signed on the White
House lawn, approximately $100 million in U.S. assistance has gone to support PLO activities
in the administered territories of Gaza and Jericho. This has occurred without the usual
accountability demanded of other recipients of U.S. foreign assistance and without the usual
scrutiny of Congress.
Instead, we have been witness to a grand public relations campaign designed to convince
even the most skeptical observers that one of the most notorious terrorist organizations of the
twentieth century has mutated into a democratic entity respectful of law and order and
fundamental human rights. This, of course, could not be further from the truth.
Even, you, Mr. Chairman, referred to a recent State Department report on PLO
compliance as nothing more than a "whitewash. " A growing segment of the American public,
if not a majority, is inclined to agree with you. As hours of recently recorded speeches of
Yasir Arafat clearly demonstrate, he has no intention of abiding by a peace with Israel or any
of the commitments he has made to our Government. He and his followers are bent upon using
the Oslo Accords, brokered with U.S. assistance, as a vehicle for waging a gradual war of
annihilation against the State of Israel.
Incredibly, the President and many Members of Congress are prepared to underwrite this
baffling policy by supporting an extension of the current law, the Middle East Peace Facilitation
Act (MEPFA), which would place virtually no conditionality on U.S. assistance to the PLO.
Under MEPFA, the PLO is held to no clear standard of performance. Instead it relies on the
"good faith" intentions of the PLO. The strongest compliance provisions of MEPFA are in a
"Sense of Congress" section that has no enforcement authority. Moreover, MEPFA permits
U.S. funds to be channelled through international organizations such as the United Nations and
the World Bank.
192
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For years the Congress has received harsh reports critical of the poor financial controls
and widespread project mismanagement which often have plagued these organizations. To make
matters worse, Yasir Arafat has shown no inclination to modify the standard PLO practice of
having all PLO assets secretly controlled and disbursed by him.
Still, the United States is prepared to support an approach that reduces, rather than
enhances, congressional oversight of funds to the Palestinians.
The issue here is not one of opposition to the peace process or dissatisfaction with Israeli
Government efforts to find a new method of coexistence with the Palestinians. Rather, the
question is whether the United States will insist upon its own standards of conduct when it is
called upon to render assistance to both parties.
I believe that it is imperative that the U.S. not lose sight of the need to hold the
Palestinians to a strict level of both political and financial accountability, just as it does Israel,
if the United States is to remain a credible player in the resolution of mis and other conflicts.
However, time and again, this Administration is prepared to overlook the PLO's
wholesale violations of the Declaration of Principles in a headlong rush to float the current peace
process on a bubble of cash. Already, this bubble is on the verge of bursting as the PLO
flagrantly violates most of the solemn commitments it has made not only to Israel, but to our
President and the Vice-President as well. In a recent Luntz poll, 78% of all Americans surveyed
stated that the PLO should be "held accountable to its commitments and comply with the peace
accords as a precondition for receiving the rest of the (U.S.) funds."
Simply put, should the United States buy peace at any price. Should we continue to pay
for the privilege of Yasir Arafat remaining at the peace table, or should we insist that he make
good on his obligations to halt terrorism and to apprehend and extradite PLO members who have
harmed Americans and should he now account for the funds now streaming into his coffers.
We are all for peace. But without compliance there can be no peace.
In another context, Arafat's conduct would be seen as simple extortion. Yet when it
comes to the politics of the Middle East, it is viewed as the cost of doing business.
It was not too long ago that members of this very committee would have bristled at the
thought of funnelling U.S. subsidies to the Palestine Liberation Organization. If Republicans
and Democrats could find common ground on any subject, it was the dastardly nature of Arafat
himself.
In the past, many of you would have paid a king's ransom to put Arafat on trial. Now,
you are prepared to pay a king's ransom to keep him from trial. Today, the world has been
turned on its head to the point where even asking fundamental questions about PLO compliance
are taboo.
193
-3-
Has our view of responsible congressional oversight changed so profoundly that we can
no longer openly and candidly debate an issue of paramount American interest?
Why has it taken two years for this committee to take public testimony on the abysmal
record of the PLO in living up to its commitments. History will only judge our collective
silence as acquiescence to the tyranny of a process that we all hoped would bring us peace.
Mr. Chairman, this committee now has before it the opportunity to right some of the
wrongs of the past. Pending before both houses of Congress is the Middle East Peace
Compliance Act of 1995, known as H.R.1960 in the House and S.915 in the Senate.
I ask that you act now and report this important piece of legislation out of committee with
a strong recommendation that it be taken up for immediate consideration on the House floor.
MEPFA, the current law allowing aid to the PLO must be allowed to lapse when it expires on
October 1st. H.R.1960 should be enacted in its place.
H.R.1960, also known as the DeLay-Forbes-Saxton bill, would deny funds to the PLO
and the Palestinian Authority (PA) while permitting aid to go to Palestinian humanitarian projects
once "substantial, material and timely" compliance has been achieved by the PLO. It recognizes
that there is no real distinction between the PLO and the PA, both of which are controlled by
Arafat. H.R. 1960 requires that all funds be channelled through U.S. Government agencies and
entities or American registered private voluntary organizations (PVOs).
H.R.1960 is a prudent, reasonable and tightly crafted bill. Its provisions are grounded
in precedents currently governing the allocation of U.S. foreign assistance. The bill strengthens
the peace process and ensures comprehensive financial and administrative accountability over
all U.S. funds flowing to territories under Palestinian control.
The bill also would require that the PLO provide compensation to U.S. victims of PLO
terrorism and assist U.S. law enforcement in the apprehension and extradition of those
responsible for such acts. As far as I know, there is no statute of limitations on the murder of
Americans.
The only foundation upon which a true and lasting peace can be built is one in which the
negotiating partners comply with the letter and spirit of their commitments. The DeLay-Forbes-
Saxton bill promotes peace by providing a strong monetary incentive for compliance. Without
compliance, there can be no peace and certainly no U.S. funding.
If the U.S. is to maintain its credibility in fighting terrorism world-wide, it can not be
seen to reward individuals who have American blood on their hands. Despite its alluring
rhetoric, the PLO has proven with its deeds over the last twenty-four months that they are
unreformed terrorists and continue to be a menace to civil society. Arafat, himself, continues
to praise the suicide bombers of Islamic Jihad as "martyrs" and celebrates the spiritual leader
of Hamas, Sheik Yasin, as a "prince."
194
Mr. Chairman, everywhere we turn today the United States is demanding that rogue
states and peoples comply with their international commitments. In Iraq, we insist that Saddam
Hussein comply with U.N. resolutions. In Bosnia, we urge the Bosnian Serbs to heed Security
Council decisions. In North Korea we require compliance with IAEA rules and regulations.
Only with the PLO do we suspend our judgement, retreat from a moral posture, and
shrink from that honorable determination that in years past has brought respect to America.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, it is not too late to chart a course that will
bring honor to the United States, peace to the Middle East and restore the moral authority and
leadership of this illustrious legislative body in the area of foreign policy.
Your recommendation that H.R. 1960 be brought up for immediate consideration on the
House floor would do just that.
Thank you.
195
MORTON A. KLEIN:
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Morton A. Klein, the National President of the Zionist Organization of
Amcrjca, is an economist and portfolio manager who served in the Nixon, Ford
and Carter Administrations. He is also a consultant/biostatistician to the UCLA
School of Public Health and the Linus Pauling Institute of Science and Medicine
in Palo Alto, California, having worked closely with two-time Nobel Laureate
Linus Pauling. Mr. Klein has also worked as a lecturer in mathematics and
statistics at Temple University.
Mr. Klein is widely regarded as one of the leading Jewish activists in the
United States. The national Jewish weekly Forward recently named Mr. Klein as
one of the top five Jewish leaders in the United States today. His efforts on
Capitol Hill on behalf of America-Israel friendship, and his successful campaigns
against anti-Israel bias in textbooks, travel guides, universities and the media,
have been the subject of feature stories in numerous journals, including the
Philadelphia Inquirer, Jerusalem Report, Near East Report, and Hadassah
Magazine. Mr. Klein traveled to Germany and persuaded the publishers of
Baedeker's, the world's leading travel guide, to correct the many anti-Israel
errors in its guides to Jerusalem and Israel. His efforts also helped led to a
dramatic reduction in anti-Israel activity on the campus of Villanova University.
In recognition of his efforts, Mr. Klein has received numerous awards,
including Hadassah's Myrtle Wreath Award and the Ze'ev Jabotinsky Memorial
Award of the Jerusalem Reclamation Project. His scientific research on nutrition
and heart disease was cited by Discover Magazine as one of the Top 50 Scientific
Studies of 1992.
More than 250 of Mr. Klein's articles and letters have been published in
periodicals around the world, including the New York Times, New Yorker,
Commentary, the Washington Times, the Miami Herald, the Jerusalem Post, the
International Journal of Preventive Medicine, and the Journal of Epidemiology.
Mr. Klein has delivered more than 150 lectures at institutions including
Harvard University, Princeton University, the University of Pennsylvania,
Brandeis University, the National Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine,
the General Assembly of Jewish Federations meetings, B'nai B'rith Canada, the
American Jewish Press Association and the Rabbinical Council of America.
Mr. Klein is a child of Holocaust survivors, and was born in a Displaced
Persons Camp in Gunzberg, Germany. He is married to Rita, has one daughter (a
junior at Barnard College), and lives in a suburb of Philadelphia.
\
196
10
V. Recommendations Regarding the Stationing
of U.S. Troops on the Golan Heights
For the reasons enumerated above, the United States should declare that it
is not prepared to station its forces on the Golan Heights.
The ZOA also urges that further Congressional hearings be held, in order
to provide an opportunity for a fuller discussion of this important issue.
197
* American troops could become victims of terrorist attacks, including
kidnappings, by Hezbollah. Islamic Jihad, and the numerous terrorist groups that
are headquartered in southern Lebanon, which is directly adjacent to the Golan
Heights. When U.S. Marines were sent to Lebanon in 1983, in connection with
the Lebanon-Israel peace treaty, Hezbollah terrorists killed 271 of them.
* Stationing U.S. troops on the small Golan Heights is not comparable to
the U.S. troops that are now stationed in the Sinai, between Egypt and Israel.
The Golan is just 10 miles wide; the vast, sparsely-populated Sinai desert is over
100 miles wide. The Golan is very close to Arab terrorist bases; the Sinai is not.
And on the Golan, U.S. troops would be in the line of fire from Syria's army-
whereas the U.S. troops in the Sinai are hundreds of miles from Egypt's military
centers.
* If in the future, Syria undertook hostile and provocative military actions
in preparation for war against Israel, the Israelis might have no choice but to
launch a pre-emptive strike (as happened in the 1967 war). If this happened, the
U.S. troops would be in harm's way. Their presence could delay or deter Israel's
ability to take necessary military action.
* Syria has a long record of violating its international
agreements. For example, Syria has broken its pledge to remove its troops
from Lebanon, which was included in the 1978 Riyadh-Cairo accords, the 1982
Fez Declaration, and the 1989 Ta'if Accord. In 1976, Syria entered into an
agreement with Israel, known as the "Red Line Understanding," in which Syria
would not send missiles, aircraft, or more than one brigade of soldiers in to
Lebanon. Syria soon broke the agreement. Itamar Rabinovich (before he
became Israel's ambassador to the U.S.) wrote that Syria's behavior in Lebanon
was an "unequivocal violation" of the Red Line Understanding, and posed "a
serious threat" to Israeli security interests. (The War for Lebanon, p. 117)
Syria's record demonstrates that it cannot be relied upon to honor any new
agreement with Israel and the United States.
Eleven senior U.S. military experts recently conducted a study of this issue
for the Center for Security Policy, in Washington, D.C. They concluded that
"there is no mission or rationale for a U.S. peacekeeping force on the Golan that
would justify the resulting costs and risks." The authors of the study included
ret. U.S. Army General John Foss, who was responsible for U.S. forces in the
Sinai; three former members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gen. Al Gray,
USMC, Ret., Adm. Carl Trost, USN, Ret., and Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, USN, Ret.);
and five former Defense and State Department officials.
A recent study by Dr. Dore Gold of Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center
for Strategic Studies found that "the presence of a large American force on the
Golan Heights would be disadvantageous for Israel's security. "
A poll taken in November 1994 by the prestigious journal Middle East
Quarterly, edited by Dr. Daniel Pipes, found that 64.3% Americans oppose the
stationing of American troops on the Golan Heights (only 17% favor it).
198
March 1973; Michael Nadler, a student, murdered by axe-wielding PLO
terrorists (DFLP) on the Golan Heights in November 1975; the American
ambassador to Lebanon, Frances E. Meloy, and his economic counselor, Robert
O. Waring, murdered by PLO terrorists (PFLP) in Lebanon in 1976; Gail
Rubin, niece of U.S. Senator Abraham Ribicoff. murdered by PLO terrorists in
the Tel Aviv Highway massacre of March 1978; Serena Sussman, murdered in
the PLO bombing of a Jerusalem bus in December 1983; wheelchair-bound
tourist Leon Klinghoffer, shot to death by PLO terrorists (Palestine Liberation
Front) aboard the S.S. Achille Lauro in October J 985; and American tourist Gail
Klein, murdered in a PLO grenade attack at the Western Wall in Jerusalem, in
October 1986.
More recently, on April 9, 1995, American college student Alisa Flatow
was murdered by terrorists in PLO-controlled Gaza. When the Federal Bureau
of Investigation said that it wanted to send agents to investigate, PLO spokesman
Rashid Abu-Shibak announced that the PLO would not let the FBI do so. On
August 20, terrorists blew up a Jerusalem bus, murdering five passengers,
including Connecticut school teacher Joan Devanny. Two of the masterminds of
the bombing fled to PLO-controlled Jericho. The PLO has refused to extradite
them to Israel.
JJI. Recommendations Regarding U.S. Aid to the PLO
More than two years have passed since the signing of the peace accords, yet
the PLO is still violating virtually every aspect of the accords; the PLO has had
ample time to demonstrate that it sincerely wants to fulfill its commitments, yet it
has not done so.
At a time when the Clinton administration is pushing for the enactment of
strong anti-terror legislation, the United States should not be giving financial aid
to Arafat, who encourages terrorism with his "jihad, via deaths" speeches and
praises terrorists as "heroes."
The ZOA recommends that Congress suspend all U.S. aid to the PLO and
to the PLO's Palestinan Authority immediately. Aid should be resumed only
after Congress has determined that the PLO has fully complied, for a period of
not less than six months, with all of the commitments it made in the Israel-PLO
peace accords.
The ZOA also urges that further Congressional hearings be held, in order
to provide an opportunity for a fuller discussion of this important issue.
IV. U.S. Troops on the Golan Heights
Should American troops be stationed on the Golan Heights, as part of a
future peace treaty between Syria and Israel? Such a deployment would involve a
number of dangers.
199
British government investigation. Last year, Norway's attorney general and a
United Nations oversight committee began investigating the disappearance of a
$100,000 Norwegian grant for a PLO agricultural project. In December 1994,
the nonpartisan Israeli organization Peace Watch, which monitors Israeli and
PLO compliance with the peace accords, recently reported that $16-million in
international contributions that were supposed to go for humanitarian projects in
Gaza and Jericho was diverted to PLO military and propaganda activities in
Lebanon.
No wonder that, as Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), co-chair of the Peace
Accord Monitoring Group in the U.S. Senate, recently pointed out, increasing
numbers of American citizens look at the PLO's rule in Gaza —which has been
characterized by totalitarianism, corruption, human rights abuses, terrorism and
internecine violence— and "wonder why we should be pouring money into a
sinkhole of deepening chaos and disorder."
At the request of Congressman Gilman, the Government Accounting Office
(GAO) conducted an investigation to determine the extent of the PLO's financial
assets. The report was completed earlier this year, but has been stamped
"classified" by the Clinton administration and therefore has not been released to
the public.
A 1993 study by Great Britain's National Criminal Intelligence Service
concluded that the PLO has worldwide assets of $7-$10 billion and an annual
income of $1.5 - $2 billion. Even that estimate may be "a bit low," according to
Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld, the criminologist and author of Narcoterrorism (which
documents the link between Arab terrorist groups and the illegal narcotics
industry). If the GAO report determined that the PLO does indeed have
substantial sums of money at its disposal, American citizens will justifiably
wonder why they should contribute additional hundreds of millions of dollars to
Arafat.
Pressure must be put on Arafat and the PLO now to act in a peaceful and
civilized way, before they are given additional territory, because once they have
that territory they will have even less incentive to abide by the accords. As
Senators Liebcrman and Mack have stated (in a December 9, 1994 letter to
Secretary of State Warren Christopher), "So long as the PLO and Mr. Arafat are
not held to the commitments they have made, there will be no peace."
AMERICAN VICTIMS OF ARAB TERRORISM
Over the years, Arab terrorists have murdered numerous Americans,
including tourist Leo Holtz, murdered by PLO terrorists (Fatah and PFLP) near
Hebron; Barbara Ertle, murdered by PLO terrorists (PFLP) in an attack on a
busload of Christian pilgrims near Hebron in February 1 970; David Berger, an
Israeli- American, murdered in the PLO's massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972
Munich Olympics; the U.S. ambassador to Sudan, Cleo A. Noel, Jr., and a second
U.S. diplomat, G. Curtis Moore, murdered by PLO terrorists in Khartoum in
200
policemen." Arab dock workers —not unemployed beggars— "armed with long
boat-hooks ran through the streets impaling Jews on their weapons," while
"respectable-looking Arabs with well-ironed fezzes, polished shows, well-creased
pants and starched collars, rushed into [Jewish] stores and helped themselves to all
kinds of merchandise." Was other Arab violence, such as the 1929 massacre or
the thousands of attacks between 1936-1939, also because of poverty? Were the
Arab wars against Israel (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973) fought for economic reasons?
If the poverty in Gaza is the root of violence, one might ask, why was there
no violent mass uprising in Gaza during the years 1949-1967, when Egypt
occupied the area? The Arabs in Gaza were impoverished during the period of
Israeli administration, 1967-1994, yet the intifada violence did not begin until
1987, after twenty years of Israeli rule. There was no sudden increase in poverty
that led to the intifada. Indeed, the United Nations Environmental Programme
has cited Israel for bringing about numerous social improvements in Gaza and the
other territories during the years of its administration, (including a drastically
lower infant mortality rate, increased longevity, an improved water supply,
electricity and dramatic increase in a number of material possessions (such as
appliances and other goods).
Ironically, one of the key ingredients in the intifada was the emergence of a
generation of radical young Arab nationalists, many of them university-educated
(Israel built six universities, and sixteen other institutions of higher education, in
the territories) and relatively well-to-do, who organized mass violence for
ideological, not economic, reasons. Furthermore, as Prof. Perlmutter points out,
the leadership of the Hamas fundamentalist movement today "is made up of
modern middle- and upper-middle class professionals, of journalists, lawyers,
engineers and doctors." Indeed, news accounts of the 400 Hamas leaders who
were temporarily deported to Lebanon in 1992-1993, described the deportees as
well-educated professionals. And the Hamas suicide bomber who recently killed
three Israelis in the Gaza Strip was reported to have come from an affluent, well-
educated family. Building factories or hospitals will not put an end to hatred of
Israel. Devoted to ideologies of extreme Arab nationalism (the PLO factions) or
extremist Islam (Hamas), they reject the concept of a sovereign non-Muslim state
in the Muslim Middle East,
Money is not the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, because lack of
money was never the problem. To paraphrase the Democratic Party strategist
James Carville, it's not the economy, stupid.
PLO'S MISUSE OF INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS
There is good reason to be concerned about how the PLO will use the
foreign donations that it receives. Britain's Overseas Development Agency sent
$5-million to pay the salaries of 9,000 PLO policemen in 1994, with specific
instructions that none of the money be given to Arafat's plain-clothes "preventive
security forces"-yet more than $500,000 was given to those forces, prompting a
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Samahadana, who is wanted by Israel for his role in the killing and wounding of
15 Israelis.
THE STATE DEPARTMENT: WHITEWASHING THE PLO
Under existing legislation, the President must certify PLO compliance
before aid can be sent. He bases his decision on reports prepared every six
months by the State Department. These reports have distorted, ignored or
minimized many PLO violations, and have been strongly criticized by leading
Jewish organizations, including the ZOA and AIPAC, the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee. The most recent report, dated June 1, 1995, was described
by U.S. Congressman Ben Gilman (R-NY), chair of the House International
Relations Committee, as a "whitewash." Israel's respected English-language daily
newspaper, the Jerusalem Post, also called it a "whitewash."
WILL U.S. MONEY BRING PEACE?
Proponents of U.S. aid to the PLO maintain that when the Palestinian
Arabs in the self-rule areas begin to "enjoy the fruits of peace," they will support
peaceful coexistence with Israel. Is this argument valid? Is poverty the real
threat to Middle East peace? Professor Amos Perlmutter, of American
University, doesn't think so. Perlmutter, a professor of political science and
sociology and editor of the prestigious Journal of Strategic Studies, recently
wrote that "The real source of conflict in the Gaza is not poverty or the horrible
economy. ..The real problem and issue is the rise of Hamas, which is a radical,
nationalist and decidedly rejectionist movement. ..dedicated to the destruction of
the peace and the eventual formation of Complete Palestine [in place of Israel]."
A recent editorial in the Jerusalem Post likewise pointed out that "there is
no reason to believe that money would. ..persuade Palestinians to coexist with
Israel.,. not all problems can be solved with money... Americans are particularly
aware of the limitations of financial aid in resolving social and political problems.
Throwing staggering amounts of government and private funds at inner-city
slums, the drug problem and affirmative action for minorities had done little to
ameliorate intractable problems. It is even less likely that the Arab-Israeli
conflict can be reduced to materialist terms. The intolerance in the Arab world
for Israel's existence does not stem from economic hardship. It is mostly
religiously and nationalistically inspired."
The historical record certainly seems to support the view that Arab
extremist ideology, rather than poverty, is at the core of the Arab-Jewish
conflict. During the 1920s and 1930s, for example, Jewish immigration to
Palestine brought the country a variety of economic improvements, including
new jobs for many Arabs— yet there were repeated Arab pogroms against the
Jews. Nor were the pogromists necessarily the most impoverished of the Arabs.
Accounts of the 1921 Arab pogrom in Jaffa, for example, described the violence
as having been initiated by "a howling horde led by uniformed [Arab]
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But Arafat has not done so. Instead, he has made numerous speeches
inciting violence against Israel. For example, in May 1994, Arafat urged a
Muslim audience in South Africa to take part in a "jihad" [Islamic holy war]
against Israel. Arafat has repeatedly publicly praised the violent Palestinian Arab
intifada and said that it must "continue, continue, continue." He has described the
imprisoned leader of the Hamas terrorists. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, as "brother
Yassin" and called for his release from jail. On November 15, 1994, in a speech
in Gaza, Arafat referred to Israel as "the Zionist enemy" and described the peace
accords as the first phase in the PLO's traditional "Strategy of Phases" for
destroying Israel step by step. On November 21, 1994, Arafat vowed to a Gaza
audience that "this Palestinian people will continue their struggle and iihad." He
told a Gaza audience on January 3, 1995 that "we have the weapon of faith, the
weapon of martyrdom, the weapon of jihad." More recently, Arafat declared in
a speech m Gaza on June 19, 1995: "The commitment still stands, and the oath is
still valid: that we will continue this long iihad. this difficult jihad, this arduous
jihad, via deaths, via battles." The June 19 videotape also shows that Arafat
heaped praise on Abir Wahaydi and Dalai Magribi, two female Arab terrorists,
calling them "heroes" and "stars." Of Magribi, a leader of the 1978 Tel Aviv
Highway massacre of 37 Israeli bus passengers, Arafat said: "She commanded the
group that established the first Palestinian republic in [that] bus. This is a
Palestinian woman... the woman we are proud of."
Failing to Extradite Terrorists. According to the peace accords, the
PLO must honor requests by Israel for the extradition of terrorists who have
taken refuge in the Gaza and Jericho self-rule areas. Yet the PLO has ignored
Israel's requests for the extradition of fifteen Arab terrorists.
Refusing to Postpone Sovereignty Issues. According to the accords,
issues concerning sovereignty over the administered territories are to be
postponed until the 1996 "final status" negotiations between Israel and the PLO.
Yet the PLO continues to use stationery with the phrase "State of Palestine" and
refers to Arafat as "President of Palestine." The map on the PLO stationery
labels all of Israel as "Palestine." At the United Nations, Farouk Kaddoumi is
routinely introduced as "Foreign Minister of the State of Palestine."
Failing to Respect Human Rights. According to the accords, the
PLO's Palestinian Authority in Gaza and Jericho must "adhere to internationally-
accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law." Yet Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Israeli human rights group
B'Tselem have documented numerous cases of PLO policemen torturing Arab
prisoners. The PLO has also repeatedly shut down Arab newspapers that have
failed to toe the Arafat line.
Hiring Former Terrorists As PLO Policemen. According to the
accords, the PLO police force is not to include terrorists. But a number of
fugitive terrorists have been hired as PLO policemen, including Yasser Abu
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attacks, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).
Failing to "Discipline" Terrorists. The peace accords require Arafat
to "discipline" -that is, punish-- any PLO members who violate the pledge to halt
terrorism. This is intended to deter terrorism both by making terrorists pay a
price for their deeds and sending a message to the broader Palestinian Arab
community about the unacceptability of violence. There are a variety of punitive
measures Arafat could take. For example, if individual members of Arafat's
Fatah faction of the PLO commit terrorism on their own, they could be expelled
from Fatah. As for PLO factions that openly reject the peace accords and
continue to practice terrorism, such as the DFLP and the PFLP, they could be
expelled from the PLO altogether. But Arafat has taken no "disciplinary" steps
against any of them.
Ironically, the Clinton administration's 1994 anti-terrorism directive
prohibiting Americans from contributing to terrorist groups included the DFLP
and PFLP on its official list of terrorist groups. Yet the administration itself is
still sending funds to the PLO, even though Arafat and the PLO refuse to expel
these terrorist groups from its ranks.
Failing to Condemn Terrorism. Of the more than 300 Arab terrorist
attacks (including more than 200 murders) that took place during the first two
years following the White House signing, Arafat has explicitly condemned only
three.
Failing to Change the PLO National Covenant, Which Calls for
Israel's Destruction. The accords oblige Arafat to "submit the [PLO
Covenant] to the Palestinian National Council [PNC] for.. .the necessary changes"
so that the articles of the Covenant no longer "deny Israel's right to exist" or urge
violence against Israel. This means substantially altering, or entirely deleting, 30
of the 33 articles of the Covenant. Yet Arafat has taken no steps in this direction.
Indeed, Radio Monte Carlo has reported that on August 10, 1994, Arafat sent a
message to PLO delegations in Arab countries, assuring them that "I will never
give my hand to the annulment of one paragraph of the Palestinian National
Covenant." On August 20, 1994 the Central Committee of Arafat's Fatah wing
declared the Covenant will not be changed before Israel recognizes the
establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
Continuing to Encourage Terrorism and Praising Terrorists.
According to the peace agreement, Arafat must make speeches urging Arab
audiences to "reject terrorism and violence." Israel's leaders insisted that the
peace accords include this requirement because such speeches by Arafat would
demonstrate that he and the PLO have sincerely transformed themselves from
being a terrorist--and because such speeches could influence grassroots
Palestinian Arabs to change, too. They could begin to change the atmosphere and
create a new moral tone among the Palestinian Arabs; they would send a loud and
clear message to the Arab world that terrorism is immoral and must cease.
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II. Why the $500-Million in U.S. Aid to the PLO
Should Be Suspended
Because of our special interest in the prospects for peace between Israel and its
Arab neighbors, we have assumed the task of monitoring the PLO's compliance
with the Israel-PLO peace accords. We are the only American organization that
does so. Our researchers carefully track the PLO's actions and statements, and
provide Congressional leaders with weekly reports on the PLO's violations of the
accords. We hope that this information will help Congress in formulating
American policy towards the PLO, including the question of U.S. aid to the PLO.
In late 1993, President Clinton pledged to give the PLO $500-million to
help set up its self-rule regime in Gaza and Jericho. Expecting the PLO to
sincerely transform itself from the terrorist organization that it always was, the
U.S. Congress temporarily waived existing legislative restrictions on American
aid to the PLO. (The restrictions had originally been imposed due to previous
PLO terrorism against Israelis, Americans, and others). But the PLO's behavior
since the White House signing has convinced many Members of Congress that the
PLO has not really changed, after all.
PLO VIOLATIONS: A SUMMARY
Failing to Take Serious Steps Against Terrorism. The peace
accords require the PLO to take "all measures necessary" to prevent terrorism
against Israel. It has not done so.
* Terrorists Have Not Been Disarmed. The PLO announced a May 11
deadline for the handing in of weapons. Virtually none were handed in, but the
PLO has not confiscated them. The New York Times reported on May 20 that
"the deadline came and went without any visible response by the Palestinian
security forces. There have been no sweeps of neighborhoods to fund unlicensed
weapons or to disarm Muslim militants, and Palestinians who missed the deadline
for licensing their guns have not been punished."
* Terrorist Training Camps Have Not Been Shut Down. Hamas members
captured by Israel in early June revealed that their training facilities in Gaza are
still functioning.
* Terrorist Organizations Have Not Been Outlawed. No legal action has
been taken by the PLO to outlaw Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or similar groups.
* The PLO Has Friendly Relations with the Terrorists. The PLO has
initiated negotiations to implement a "reconciliation" with Hamas. In Hebron,
Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO teamed up with Hamas to run a joint list in
recent local elections. Talks are also underway to bring about a reconciliation
between Fatah and two PLO factions that have engaged in numerous terrorist
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Testimony Before the
House International Relations Committee
- September 20, 1995 -
by Morton A. Klein,
National President of the Zionist Organization of America,
Regarding the ZOA's Opposition to $500-million in U.S. Aid to
the PLO, the ZOA's Opposition to the Stationing of U.S.
Troops on the Golan Heights, and the ZOA's Other Concerns
About the Middle East Peace Process
Note; Morton A. Klein is the National President of the Zionist
Organization of America. More than 250 of his articles and letters about Israel
and the Middle East have been published in the New York Times, Commentary
and other prominent publications around the world. He has lectured about Israel
at Harvard , Princeton, the University of Pennsylvania and elsewhere. He is an
economist, and served in the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations. He has
received numerous honors in recognition of his work on behalf of America-Israel
friendship.
I. Introduction
The Zionist Organization of America is the oldest, and one of the largest, pro-
Israel organizations in the United States. Founded in 1897 to support the re-
establishment of a Jewish State in the ancient Land of Israel, its presidents have
included such illustrious Jewish leaders as Supreme Court Justice Louis D.
Brandeis, Rabbi Stephen Wise and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver. The ZOA was
instrumental in mobilizing the support of the U.S. government. Congress, and the
American public for the creation of Israel in 1948. With a national membership
of over 50,000 and active chapters throughout the U.S., the ZOA today works to
strengthen American-Israeli relations, through educational activities, public
affairs programs, support for legislation on Capitol Hill to strengthen America-
Isruel relations, and by combating anti-Israel bias in the media, textbooks, travel
guides, and on campuses. The ZOA also sponsors important educational and
cultural programs in Israel. ZOA House is the premier cultural center in Tel
Aviv; the ZOA's Kfar Silver school, on a 500-acre campus near Ashkelon,
provides education and vocational training for more than 1,000 new Jewish
immigrants and others; the ZOA's youth division, Masada, sends more than 800
young Jews to visit Israel each year.
206
STATEMENT OF
RICHARD A. HELLMAN,
PRESIDENT OF
THE CHRISTIANS' ISRAEL PUBLIC ACTION CAMPAIGN
(CIPAC)
BEFORE THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
Thank you, Chairman Gilman, and members of this
distinguished Committee, for the opportunity to present testimony to
you. I am Richard A. Hellman, President of CIPAC, the Christians'
Israel Public Action Campaign, which was founded over six years ago
to organize and inform the Christian community in the U.S. on behalf
of sound laws and policy for Israel.
Mr. Chairman and Committee Members: As I will detail for
you today, the Middle East peace process is badly flawed. The
recent manuevers of the negotiators have been marked by abject
failure in turns of any real progress toward peace and security for
Israelis, Palestinian Arabs or other participants. In fact the reports
of the demise of the peace process may not be exaggerated. Thus I
urge you and your colleagues in the leadership and membership of
the House and the Senate to exercise much more oversight and exert
much more leadership in the policy formulation and strategy that
govern the United States negotiators involved in the peace process.
I am sure that this is within your constitutional mandate and that it
is imperative if we are to avoid major mistakes that will be costly in
terms not only of U.S. foreign expenditures but also of U.S. troop
losses and destabilization of the Middle East.
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First, by way of background, I wish to note that we are the
only Christian organization registered to lobby on important issues
before Congress and the Administration affecting the U.S. -Israel
relationship. We also are the only registered lobby that takes a
biblical stance on behalf of the whole Land of Israel and the rights of
the Jewish People to live in peace and safety wherever they wish,
including Judea, Samaria, the Golan Heights, Gaza, and all of
Jerusalem. As such CIPAC represents the views of some 70 million
Bible-believing Christians and many biblically oriented Jews as well.
We work from the perspective that U.S. support for and close
relations with Israel are not just a "Jewish issue", but one that
concerns Christians and indeed all Americans as well.
CIPAC is a national membership organization of American
citizens who believe that a strong U.S. -Israel relationship is in
America's best interest. We believe that America as a nation is
blessed when we bless Israel and her People, in accordance with
Genesis 12:3. Beyond this expression of our faith, we also are
convinced that there exist many other compelling reasons for
maintaining a strong bond between our country and the nation of
Israel. Israel is a strategic and faithful ally in an unstable and
dangerous region. The people of Israel share in common with us the
moral and ethical values of the Judeo-Christian tradition, as
evidenced by its democratic institutions and its pursuit of justice and
the rule of law. Israel is a valuable partner in such areas as trade
and commerce, research and development, intelligence and security,
and many other areas. And Israel shares with this nation, perhaps
more than any other nation on earth, the dream and destiny of being
a refuge and haven for persecuted peoples around the globe.
On a personal note I was privileged to live and work in Israel,
with my wife and children for almost seven years and have been an
active student of Middle East affairs and frequent traveler to that
region for a total of over nineteen years.
To give credit where credit is due, we applaud the peace
treaty between Israel and Jordan. This builds upon the modus
vivendi that developed between the countries over many years, and
is buttressed by the geographical and military realities on the
ground. Here where nations of good will seek peace in an open,
honest, fashion, the peoples of both may profit greatly in every way.
In fact this peace appears warmer and more productive already
than that which we all have supported between Israel and Egypt. I
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well recall Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin quoting from the
Scriptures "Blessed are the peacemakers" when the Camp David
accords were signed. As residents of Jerusalem at that time, my
family and I thrilled to the fact that we were witnesses to the
fulfillment of our dreams and aspirations as we were among those
who were privileged to "pray for the peace of Jerusalem" on site!
Today, however, while the Christian and Jewish members of
CIPAC nationwide and those of us in Washington continue to pray for
peace, we are appalled by the almost 200 deaths, the injuries and the
destruction caused by the torrent of terrorism unleashed upon Israel
since the signing of the Oslo accords on the White House lawn a little
more than two years ago and the equally abhorent Arab-on-Arab
violence and abuse of rights which are endemic in the areas
abandoned by Israel to Chairman Arafat's secret police and military
forces.
Our members and friends of CIPAC across America denounce
the failure of Arafat to comply with his agreement, witnessed on the
White House lawn by our President and some 3,000 others, to initiate
changes to the Palestinian national covenant to delete the provisions
calling for Israel's destruction. If this were not bad enough, we also
witness mild, pro forma, public remonstrances against terror in
stark contrast to his inability and unwillingness to combat it
effectively and, most obscene of all, his repeated comments to Arab
and Islamic audiences which actually incite terror and applaud and
affirm the " heros and martyrs" who perpetrate the indiscriminate,
wanton, death, injury and destruction of Israelis, Arabs and even
Americans by bus bombings and other heinous acts.
All this in the name of Jihad, or Holy War, an oxymoron if
there ever was one, and an abomination to any true believer in a just
and loving God, regardless of religion!
How can any U.S. public figure greet and applaud such a vile
character as Arafat, much less vouch for his good will or even
consider giving him any more U.S. tax dollars in foreign aid.?
And regarding foreign aid, I wish to applaud you, Mr.
Chairman, for requesting the GAO Study of the finances of the PLO
and Arafat as recommended by CIPAC a year and a half ago ,
together with a second, more recent, GAO enquiry regarding the
infamous PLO letters which expose Arafat and the PLO's persistent,
ingrained, pattern of political payoffs, diversion, fraud, waste and
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abuse of foreign aid to obtain and maintain exclusive power, all
masked by a PR Circus and official and media complicity in cover-up.
Some public figures are straining credulity and violating
common sense by trying to give these Arafat and his associates
another chance at the U.S. foreign aid trough! I ask any such dupes
or unwitting accomplices to PLO malfeasance simply: How can you
even consider it?
If the current drive by the Administration and even some in
Congress to paper over the failed peace process with more U.S.
foreign aid to Arafat were not enough, we also are treated to the
spectacle of a basically decent but misguided Secretary of State
preparing to shame our country once again by running after Hafez
Al Assad, the brutal dictator who had the temerity and gall to insult
his boss (and our President) publicly in Damascus just last December,
to lure him back into probably fruitless, and possibly dangerous,
talks with Israel - dangerous to Israel's legitimate rights and indeed
its national security. And dangerous to the U.S. treasury in terms of
the "price for peace", i.e. the conventional bribes to Arab dictators
and their friends to accept peace ( as if peace were not valuable to
their long-suffering people in its own right). Yes! Massive
U.S.foreign aid for Assad, not because Syria needs it but to make sure
Assad gets as rich and prestigious an agreement as Egypt did for
making peace. And more aid for Israel to compensate for the loss of
the presently working security arrangements on the Golan and
Mount Hermon. But this is not the worst of it. In Administration
plans at the Pentagon, State Department, and other offices are
detailed scenarios for dangerous U.S. commitments to place U.S.
troops in harm's way as peacemakers or peacemakers on the Golan
Heights.
All this to appease an Arab dictator and help him obtain
territory which he lost in an aggressive war, failed to hold after a
later sneak attack, and to which he never had a legitimate legal or
historic right to begin with.
Hardly ever outdone in their appeasement of Arab dictators,
except perhaps by their European colleagues, some State Department
Middle East experts in the peace negotiations also are reliably
reported (without official denial) to be planning to leave Assad of
Syria in continued brutal occupation of once-peaceful and democratic
Lebanon, and to give Syria a quick and easy exit from its prominent
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place on State's lists of nations that sponsor terrorism, violate human
rights, traffic in the international narcotics trade, counterfeit our U.S.
currency massively and more. Even by historic standards, this will
give cynical, realpolitik, diplomacy a bad name if the Congress lets
this charade of misguided statecraft continue without raising a loud
and principled cry of outrage. Maybe President Clinton needs a
foreign policy feather in his cap, but this one will give a major
headache not only to the nations and peoples immediately involved
but also to the U.S. and the world by destabilizing Israel and
whetting Assad's appetite for the next moves toward his goal of a
greater Syria embracing most of his neighbors. Anyone who thinks
Assad just wants the Golan and that this wolf then will become a
peaceful lamb, probably would have believed that Hitler would be
satisfied with the Sudetenland. Even if we need to talk to unsavory
characters to make peace, I assure you from experience in the
Middle East that no smart buyer runs after a merchant to shower
him with coccessions. Nor should we run after Assad, who lost his
Soviet patrons some years ago and only remains a serious danger to
peace because the State Department chooses to whitewash his record
when in fact his past aggression and current military purchases of
sophisticated conventional and non-conventional weaponry and
dual-use technology fully justify no less than the containment and
embargoes which we impose upon such other outlaw states as Iran,
Iraq, and Libya.
Let us make no mistake. Shortsighted, expedient, policies and
actions based on misjudgments of the real intentions of authoritarian
rulers usually have severe, if not catastrophic, adverse consequences
for world peace, whether it be from a Saddam Hussein or a Hafez Al
Assad.
If the willful U.S. decision to overlook the record and candidly
declared intentions of Arafat, not once, but repeatedly over a span of
decades, has cost the lives of hundreds (conservatively calculated)
and now hundreds of millions of dollars in squandered U.S, foreign
aid - think for a moment of the likely consequences for the Middle
East and the world if we foolishly appease Assad in the ways I have
outlined. He (or his successors) likely will decide to use their vast
military might, and new strategic advantage on the Golan and in
Lebanon, to assault Israel, Jordan, or both with massive pre-emptive
strikes using missiles with non-conventional warheads. While
trusting Arafat has cost hundreds of lives, appeasing Assad could
cost thousands, or tens or hundreds of thousands, of Israeli, Arab and
even American lives.
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For these reasons I applaud the Senate staffers and their
Chairman who authorized them to tell a top Syiian official that
Congress is not going to endorse, and authorize payment for, a Camp
David-type deal in which Assad would get aid and trade and a
whitewash of his past record while holding on to Lebanon. Even if
this was, as reported, the real reason why the Syrians reneged on
their promise to restart negotiations last month - or even should it
produce the final demise of this present peace process, I still would
commend such a reality check as the negotiating model that you
should urge upon our friends in Foggy Bottom , for the good of all
involved and for the cause of real peace in the Middle East.
Lest any confusion be created by these strong statements, let
me assure you that we fervently hope and pray for, and support,
every legitimate initiative for real peace. But the words of the
Prophet Jeremiah haunt us with their relevance to the current
Middle East and particularly those arenas I have described ; " They
have healed also the hurt of my people slightly, saying, Peace, peace;
when there is no peace." (Jer. 6:14). In the New Testament the
warning is framed: " For when they shall say, Peace and safety; then
sudden destruction comes upon them, as travail upon a woman with
child; and they shall not escape." (1 Thess. 5:3).
I have been asked why I believe the peace process may be all
but dead for now , and what implications there are for America in
this scenario. Frankly I am convinced that the exaggerated
expectations of Arafat and Assad cannot be met by the negotiators
currently facing them across the table, in no small measure because
the Congress is disinclined to reward the meager efforts of these two
with the foreign aid, concessions, and other perquisites alluded to
above. Is this a tragedy? Only for the bruised egos of various
senior negotiators with heavy investments in the quest for the holy
grail of a comprehensive Middle East peace. But they will, I trust, get
over it, or better yet, return with tougher-minded, more realistic and
productive objectives for the peace and security of their nations,
including the U.S.
For the sake of the far more important objectives of the peace
and security and wellbeing of Israel And her neighbors and their
longsuffering populations, and for the U.S. interest in Mid-East peace,
I frankly will shed no tears for this peace process. While some
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lowhanging fruit was picked from the peace process tree early on in
the case of the Jordan-Israel pact, the multilateral talks on a range of
issues, and the general loosening of bars to regional trade, the
remaining issues have been marked either by thin interim
agreements that avoid or defer the real issues in the case of Israel
and the Palestinian Arabs, or by potentially destabilizing gambles in
the case of Israel and Syria, not to mention the shameful silence and
doubletalk masking the sell-out of Lebanon. The slight downside
risk of a possible unraveling of such good results as the Israel-Jordan
peace resulting from Syrian displeasure and troublemaking - a
corollary of the axiom that the Arab world "cannot make peace
without Syria" - is mitigated, if not eliminated, by the new world
realities that most nations, including Syria, have witnessed America's
readiness to defend Kuwait, Jordan, etc., and more positively, are
interested in a good partnership with the U.S.
Does this mean we stop working for Mid -East peace, and if not,
what is the most viable alternative to the current process? No, we
cannot stop planning and working for Mid-East peace, but a breather
is needed. Instead of redoubling our efforts after apparently
disregarding the lack of coherence of our various efforts and the
absence of results, it probably is time to draw back and reconsider
the issues, hopefully with the help of a new joint Congressional-
Executive Branch Commission to determine how U.S. national
interests can best be served. Perhaps such radical ideas as "peace
through strength" and "peace for peace" could be considered as the
bases for any revived telks.
Of course, none of my comments are intended to be critical of
Israel or to offer gratuitous advice to that nation and its
democratically elected government. We appreciate the fact that
Israel shares our love of democracy and respects the rights of its
people to work for peace and security through its elected officials.
But America has a large and potentially growing investment in Israel
and the Middle East which must be reviewed continually in light of
changing circumstances and perceived national interests, not to
mention such special interests as that of American Christians and
Jews to visit holy sites and worship freely despite changes in political
administration, e.g. in Judea, Samaria, Gaza, and potentially the Golan
and even Jerusalem. While CIPAC does not wish to raise problems
where they are not widespread or to exaggerate those that may
arise, already security problems have in fact created a real or
perceived reluctance of tour guides in the Holy Land to take tourists
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and pilgrims to sites and areas which once posed no problem
whatsoever.
By way of reminder, CIPAC has been uniquely effective as a
pro-Israel lobby in leading or initiating action for the GAO study of
the PLO finances, a prudent maintenance of the barriers to foreign
aid for the PLO with carefully controlled temporary waivers, the
release of the Pentagon's Rand Corporation study of potentially
dangerous deployments of U.S. troops on the Golan as effected by the
Nickles Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act for this year,
an immediate relocation of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem (by
legislative action as required) and the freeing of Lebanon in any U.S.
approved peace agreement involving Syria, among other issues. Nor
have we forgotten the more particular campaigns to free the Israeli
POW'S/MIA'S as a first priority and to effect the release of the last
prisoner of the Cold War, Jonathan Pollard, to go home to Israel and
fulfill his obligation as an Orthodox Jew, as he explained was his
heart's desire when we met.
If I may, Mr, Chairman, I would like to wrap up my last
recommendations to you and the Committee Members briefly, with
liberty to submit supporting materials, tapes , etc, for the record.
Thus with your leave, I recommend that you and your colleagues:
*Reject any extension of authority for President Clinton to grant
further waivers to the prohibition on foreign aid to the PLO or its
associated entities. As explained above and by many other witnesses
today, Yasser Arafat and the PLO have violated every material term
of their agreements with the U.S. and Israel, refuse to spend their
own ill-gotten billions of dollars as documented by the GAO study
you commissioned, did not even cooperate with the GAO, have a
record of diversion, waste, fraud, abuse, mismanagement, and
inadequate accounting regarding foreign aid they recxeive directly,
continue to promote and encourage terror, rather than controlling it
as promised. I wish to emphasize that we have no objection to
extension of such other waiver provisions of MEPFA as, for example,
that permitting negotiations with the PLO, for example., under
appropriate terms and conditions as suggested .in the bills of
Representative Forbes and Senator D'Amato. And any aid the
Palestinian People need for humanitarian or development purposes
can continue to be allocated on a project basis through such reliable
third parties as the World Bank and other MDB's or CARE, ANERA,
World Vision or other PVO's, with customary safeguards. Thus no
214
innocent persons need suffer for Arafat's inability or unwillingness
to govern adequately as other aid recipients do;
♦Demand immediate agreement from the CIA or other agencies
to release the basic findings of the GAO study, i.e, what are the
general ranges of PLO assets and annual income, with an estimation
of the general extent to which Arafat and the PLO spend their own
money on their own people, but without any identification or
compromise of sources. Now, can someone tell me what possible U.S.
national security interest could provide a legitimate reason for not
releasing such elementary data, when even the British National
Criminal Intelligence service has published such data openly in
unclassified form? Otherwise this looks, sounds and smells like a
coverup to conceal the State Department's dealings with and rosy
evaluations of the PLO and its leaders.;
♦Question the GAO closely in detail regarding the extent of
cooperation in the GAO studies of the PLO by the Executive Branch,
British NCIS, the PLO itself, and other foreign sources, and any actual
or suspected U.S. interference with any of the foregoing sources'
or other enquiries as has been rumored.
♦Refuse to act on extension of MEPFA until the above steps are
completed and British, German and other foreign sources called to
testify to get to the bottom of the questions concerning PLO finances;
♦Call for complete hearings on all suggested scenarios for
deployment of U.S. troops on the Golan as part of any Israel-Syria
peace agreement, in recognition of the fact that this question is no
longer "premature" and the public and Congress need to know
beforehand for a change; and finally
♦Send a clear signal, by way of law or resolution that the
Congress intends that Lebanon be freed of Syrian occupation in any
ageement that the U.S. endorses, supports, or helps to fund; and of
course, hold hearings soon on all pending bills to direct the relocation
of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem. In fact we believe this can be done
much more quickly, in time for the 3,000th Anniversary of the
Jewish presence in Jerusalem next year, since construction of a new
building really is not critical to where our Ambassador works or
conducts business with the government of Israel. This matter has
been delayed too long already.
As a final note I wish to state for the record that none of our
positions, many of which are unique and contrary to the conventional
wisdom of the peace process, have any connection to, or origin in,
any political party or faction in the U.S. or Israel, but in fact have
215
their source in the Bible, in cherished U.S. principles and values, in
that rare commodity, common sense, or some combination thereof.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, it is my great pleasure to wish you, your
colleagues, the Jewish People, and especially Israel and her People a
happy, prosperous and peaceful "Shana Tova", a most Happy New
Year 5756; may it bring real peace to Israel and her neighbors, not a
false peace and renewed clouds of impending war.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
10
216
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Herbert Zweibon. Chairman
Morris Sorkower
Emanuel Epstein
Richard Hellman, Esq
Pro! Ench Isaac
Prof Rael Jean Isaac
Ruth King
AMERICANS FOR A SAFE ISRAEL
147 EAST 76th STREET
NEW YORK. NY. 10021
Ron KraviU. Esq.
Prof Marvin Maurer
William Mehlman
Aio* Rosa
George Rubin
Elian J Singer
Inez Weissman
Rabbi Julian M White
Jerry Zemck
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
Herbert Zweibon
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Hon. Robert A Borski
Charles Brooks
Hon Robert K. Dornan
Rev Frank Eiklor
Lt Gen. Daniel O. Graham (Ret.)
Carl Henry
Leonard Horwln
Steven S Jacobs
Col. Irving Kett (Ret.)
Dr. David Lewis
E E Ed McAteer
Bernard Smith
Deborah Hart Strober
Gerald Strober
Harry Taubenleid
ACADEMIC ADVISORY BOARD
Prol. Howard Adelson
Prof Edward Alexander
Prof Sidney Baldwin
Prof. Sami Beraha
Prof Albert Blausteln
Prof. Norman Chigier
|2I2) 628-9400
FAX: |2I2) 988-4065
Testimony of
Herbert Zweibon, Chairman
Americans for A Safe Israel
International Relations Committee
Hearings on the Middle East Peace Process
September 20, 1995
Americans for A Safe Israel (AFSI) thanks the members of the International
Relations committee for permitting it to submit this written testimony. We appreciate the
concern with which the committee has followed the Arab-Israeli agreements and its
support for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship. Founded in 1971, Americans for A Safe
Israel views the retention of Judea and Samaria, Gaza, and the Golan Heights as vital
to Israel s survival and its continuance as a strategic asset to the West. To abandon
territory won in wars forced on it would make it vulnerable once again to renewed
subversion and attack not only by hostile Arabs in Judea and Samaria but unstable Arab
regimes.
Prol Celia Heller
Prol- Joakim Isaacs
Prol H. David Kirk
Prof Shoshana Klebanoff
Prol. Gerhard Levy
Prol Robert Loewenberg
NATIONAL COUNCIL
Jim Bernstein. Esq-
Lawrence Black
Boris Bresler
Herb Bun
Rabbi Hiliei A Cohen
Michael C. Oallen. Esq
Dr Fred E Ehrlich
Elsa Elkln
Howard Epstein
Mitchell Flnkel
Or. Howard Garber
Herbert Gordon
Jacob Greenberg
Kenneth Gross
Jacob Helrwell
Or. David Herman
Bunny Horowitz
Isaac kaplowitz
Alan Karo
Helena Klein
Fabian Kolkar
Rabbi Herzl Kranz
Jack D. Lauber
David Luowick
Eugene Levine
Mae L. Lobel
Dr. Ivan Mauer
Cherna Moskowltz
Dr Kenneth Mulkner
Or William Perl
Leon Penswetg. Esg
Larry S. Pollak. Esq.
Oscar Reinhold
Or Richard H Rolnick
Norbert Rosenthal
Raphael Rolhslem
Leo Samet. Esq.
Bernard Shapiro
Saul Singer
Lucille Weinberg
Roberta Welaa
Jeff Wilson
Nathan Workowltz
It has fallen to Americans for A Safe Israel to declare what many should have said who
came before you: "The emperor has no clothes."
This is a hollow peace.
Remarkably, to say this is taboo. Those that dare question the policies of the current
Israeli government are demonized, dismissed as some kind of "lunatic fringe,"
"extremists," and "enemies of peace." Even American Jewish leaders who are aware that
the misnamed peace process is leading to disaster will not oppose it outright, fearing that
they will lose "credibility" by doing so. Using the word "peace" to describe the Arab-
Israeli agreements has effectively stifled debate and even any rational discussion of the
situation.
Imagine what would have happened had Churchill not dared to criticize the Munich
agreements. He would not have been chosen to lead his people to safety. Indeed, by
attacking Neville Chamberlain's policy, Churchill gained credibility.
It is appropriate to compare the Rabin-Arafat accords and the Munich agreement. In both
cases, hope replaces rational thought. Confronted with the insatiable demands of an
adversary, weak-willed leaders offer partial fulfillment of those demands in the hope of
appeasing the opponent.
The mere fact that compliance has become such a key issue demonstrates how one-sided
the agreements are. It takes two to fulfill a contract. If all the concessions come from
the Israelis and nothing from the Arabs, what other result can there be but bloody conflict
as Israel becomes progressively weaker? Even the PLO covenant calling for the
217
destruction of the State of Israel has remained in effect. It is ironic that while the PLO
covenant is treated as holy, God's covenant with the Jewish people is disregarded.
Nothing better illustrates the chasm between Israel's leaders and the Arab world than the
Arab interpretation of Shimon Peres's The New Middle East. Peres was the "architect"
of the Oslo accords and in this book he outlines the vision that has led him to make the
far-reaching concessions involved in those agreements. The book envisions Israel as part
of a Middle Eastern Benelux, describing a future of harmony and cooperation on
everything from water development to security arrangements. Peres's total
incomprehension of his Arab neighbors was underlined when the book was published by
the Egyptian government-owned Al Ahram press. The introduction explains the
importance of the book for Arab readers: "When The Protocols of the Elders of Zion were
discovered 200 years ago and published in several languages including Arabic, the
international Zionist apparatus tried to deny the existence of the conspiracy, and claimed
it was a fabrication. But now Shimon Peres produces irrefutable proof of their
truthfulness. His book confirms in no uncertain terms that The Protocols are genuine.
Peres's book is nothing but an additional step toward implementation of the dangerous
plots." As Jerusalem Post editor David Bar-Illan pointed out, for the Arabs, Peres's
journey on a pink cloud into Utopia is proof of Israel's sinister plot to take economic
control of the Arab world.
Peres's world, though an illusion, will have real and dire consequences for the Jewish
people. This so-called peace process can only lead to a dismembered, disheartened and
demoralized Israel, incapable of defending itself against the newly created terrorist state
it has helped arm and the surrounding Arab states that are still bent on its destruction.
The Middle East has not changed. Nothing the Israeli government promised has
materialized; everything the opponents of its policies warned would happen, has
happened.
Yet the United States continues to encourage more Israeli concessions, acting as a
facilitator in the "peace process." American involvement goes beyond financial pledges
to the PLO. The Administration has been involved in formulating agreements, conducting
"shuttle" diplomacy and keeping the negotiators at the table. It is intent on brokering an
Israeli retreat on the Golan, this one likely to endanger American soldiers commandeered
as "peacekeepers."
It is not in America's interest to weaken a loyal ally and contribute to the destabilization
of the Middle East. The American government should not be party to a process that
appeases terrorism. Nor should it support a process that separates the Jewish people from
its patrimony. There is one honorable course for the United States - to remove itself as
a key player in negotiations that render Israel dependent on the "goodwill" of its Arab
neighbors.
If one thing is crystal clear, it is that the current "peace process" will not bring peace to
the Middle East.
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218
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TESTIMONY BY GAIL PRESSBERG
DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR ISRAELI PEACE AND SECURITY',
AMERICANS FOR PEACE NOW
TO THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
Two years ago, the Declaration of Principles signed at The White House
by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and TLO leader Yasser Arafat began a
three-year period in which disengagement arrangements and peace are to be
negotiated and implemented in transitional stages.
Given the protracted nature of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
there have been difficulties in implementing this process, including
unacceptable acts of terrorism.
To deal with this issue, the Clinton Administration has successfully used
the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act to pressure PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat to improve the PLO's compliance records regarding agreements Arafat
made with Israel. Compliance issues have been raised with the PLO on a
regular basis by U.S. officials meeting directly with Arafat including Vice
President Al Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Special Middle East
Negotiator Dennis Ross, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau and U.S.
Consul General Edward Abington.
The compliance legislation and Clinton Administration efforts to get the PLO
to comply, have yielded the following positive results:1
1. PLO elements loyal to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat have fully
adhered to Arafat's commitment that the PLO would forsake terrorism.
2. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat has publicly condemned terrorist
Board of Advisor,
'This list was obtained as a result of discussions with Israeli officials.
219
attacks.
3. In several public statements Arafat has acknowledged his awareness of the
importance of security to Israelis and has restated his commitment to the peace
process in order to peacefully resolve the Palestinians conflict with Israel.
4. In April 1995, Hamas and Islamic Jihad members were not only arrested but were
actually tried and convicted by Palestinian courts. The Palestinian Security Court has
sentenced eighteen Palestinians who were convicted on charges related to terrorism.
On August 28, 1995, the Palestinian police arrested a terrorist who was on his way to
carry out a suicide attack at the Central Bus Station in Jerusalem.
5. In meetings in Taba, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt and Jordan
signed a declaration which supports "all efforts to end the boycott of Israel." PLO
negotiator Nabil Shaath signed the declaration on behalf of the Palestinian
Authority.
6. While the Palestinian Covenant has not been amended, Ha'aretz (often referred to
as The New York Times of Israel) reported that Arafat pledged to make amending the
covenant part of his electoral platform and that a newly elected Palestinian Council
would revoke those parts of the covenant that contradict the Declaration of Principles
signed by Israel and the PLO on September 13, 1993.
7. The Palestinian Authority has also undertaken joint security patrols with Israel.
The intelligence service of the Palestinian Authority regularly cooperates with Israeli
security forces in order to combat terror.
In order to prevent acts of terror the PLO must continue to demonstrate that it has
developed the intelligence capability to deter terrorist groups. In addition, the Palestinian
Authority's arrest, trial and sentencing of suspects is a recent phenomenon. It is important to
monitor the Palestinian Authority's resolve in this matter. Therefore, an extension of the
current legislation should be voted by Congress that requires Arafat to accomplish these
goals.
Continued U.S. diplomatic and financial support is critical in order to
strengthen the Palestinian Authority, enhance its capacity to defeat terrorist groups, and
marshal international funds. In order to combat the influence of organizations who oppose
the peace process, the U.S. must be a leader in the multinational effort to build a sorely-
needed economic infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. Indeed, Israeli intelligence has concluded
that the effect of a cut-off in aid would be an increase in terrorism. In order to assume the
mantle of leadership in this effort, the U.S. must be able to negotiate with PLO leaders and
fund projects related to the Palestinian Authority.
Israel's interests in this area were recently articulated by Israeli Ambassador Itamar
Rabinovich (Near East Report. April 24, 1995):
220
"The U.S. and Israel share the view that economic progress - for which the
international aid is essential - will reinforce the pragmatic elements in Gaza and Jericho, and,
conversely, that stagnation and poverty will play into the hands of groups like Hamas and
Islamic Jihad.
"As for the implementation by the Palestinians of the commitments they have
undertaken, the Government of Israel has played, and will continue to play, the primary role
in ensuring it, both through its ongoing contacts with the Palestinian Authority and through
the continuing negotiation on the transition to the next phase of the agreement."
Conclusion
The Middle East Peace Facilitation Act has served three purposes vital to U.S.
interests in the Middle East. First, it has served as a vehicle for pressuring the PLO and
Palestinian Authority to comply with agreements it signed with Israel. Second, it has enabled
the U.S. to play a role in fighting the roots of extremism by providing the funding for
economic development and to train and equip the nascent Palestinian police force. Third, it is
necessary for the Palestinian population to experience the tangible benefits of peace. While
the Palestinians have not yet achieved the critical goal of stopping acts of terror, the Clinton
Administration has successfully used the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act to demonstrate to
the PLO that continued U.S. diplomatic and financial support is dependent on a trajectory of
improvement in Palestinian efforts to thwart acts of terror.
Congress should promptly support Senate Bill 1064 - without amendment - The
Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995, introduced by Senators Helms and Pell.
221
l COMMISSION
ABRAHAM M fOXMAN
'Anb-Oefemabon lea^te "
KENNETH | BLM.KIN
SEYMOUR CRAUBARD
MAXWELL E CREEN8ERC
MEYER EISENBERC
THOMAS HOMBURCER
LESTER POLLACK
STATEMENT OF THE
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
TO THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
HEARINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
SEPTEMBER 20, 1995
DOROTHY BINSTOCK
RUDY BOSCHW1T2
EDGAR M. BRONFMAN
MAXWELL DANE
CERI M JOSEPH
PHILIP M KLUTZNrCX
PHILIP KRUPP
SAMUEL H MILLER
BERNARD D M1NTZ
Nal>onal Executive Commmn
Natronal Executive Ot— ttl
DAVID A. ROSE
SYONEY JARXOW
CHARLES COLDRINC
MOEKUDUR
IRVING SHAPIRO
Aasftant SeoetvY
LAWRENCE ATLER
SIDNEY CLEAREIELD
KENNETH 1ACOBSON
».l Rights
'FREY P SJ
In no uncertain terms, the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles
in 1993 was a historic breakthrough in the long and difficult search for Arab-Israeli
peace and reconciliation. For Israel, the agreement reflected the depth of its
commitment to reaching peace with its Palestinian neighbors. For the PLO, it
represented a radical break with its longstanding policies of violence and rejection.
For both parties, the agreement initiated a long and arduous negotiating process
aimed at mutually determining the future status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The peace process, while fraught with difficult issues and efforts by extremists
to stop it, represents an enormous diplomatic success for Israel and the U.S.
58 countries have established diplomatic relations with Israel since the peace
process began. The Israel-Palestinian accord has boosted progress in other bilateral
areas, as well. Chief among them has been the Israel- Jordan peace agreement which
ushered in a new era in regional cooperation. The potential now exists for regional
stability.
Since the signing of the DOP and the Cairo agreement, as the agreements
were translated into facts on the ground, and the path was paved for Palestinian
autonomy in and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, extremists have tried to
derail the process using brutal means. Renegade violence, whoever the perpetrator,
is never legitimate and undermines the genuine efforts on both sides.
Peace in this context is not an overnight phenomenon Enmity developed over
more than a century takes time to transform. During this time, it is important to
provide strong U.S. support for Israel's quest for peace while requiring the PLO to
adhere to its commitments to halt terrorism.
BOBBIE ARBESFELO
AMrtttnl to the NMtavil Owelty
MARK D MEDIN
Marketing and Gxnmuncatiom
MARK A EDELMAN
Sn"mOI
Security is the sine qua non of the process. In order for the Israeli public to
feel confident that their security interests are being protected, pressing for Palestinian
compliance with commitments is essential. Over the long term, continued movement
toward coexistence in the region is the best defense against terrorism.
Ceneral Counsel
JUSTIN |. FINCER
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. 823 United Nations Plaza. New York, NY 10017 (212) 490-2525 FAX (212) 867-0779
222
STATEMENT OF THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
PAGE TWO
At the same time, regardless of how we assess Palestinian performance in combatting
terrorism, the fact of the newly formed Israeli-Palestinian partnership in this fight — including joint
security patrols and other joint antiterrorism initiatives — and shared commitment to peace is historic
and represents a victory for the diplomatic process in and of itself.
Israel has called upon the United States and the international community to assist the fledgling
Palestinian Authority (PA) based on its assessment that international support is critical to the ability
of the PA to sustain itself. Israel entered into a partnership on the basis of three fundamental
commitments made by the PLO:
— Acceptance of Israel's right to exist in peace and security
— Acceptance of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338
— Renunciation of and commitment to combat terrorism
Since that time, through the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act, the U.S. Congress has been
resolute in requiring the PLO to take meaningful steps to comply with its commitments. ADL
supports enactment of the 1995 Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA1. Through MEPFA,
the U.S. sends a strong message that the PLO must fully and meaningfully adhere to its commitments
if it hopes to continue to receive U.S. assistance.
We acknowledge and welcome the PA's recent increased resolve and concrete actions in the
area of combatting terrorism on the ground. More needs to be done. The Palestinian Covenant
remains unamended and Islamic militants still operate with relative freedom. We continue to urge
the PA to use all available means to rein in radicals who are engaging in a brutal campaign of violence
against Israeli citizens and who seek the destruction of the State of Israel.
The Arab-Israeli peace process remains a major U.S. foreign policy goal. Congress's role in
promoting reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians by pressing for compliance with
agreements and supporting continued negotiations is indispensable in the larger strategy of alleviating
terror and extremism in the Middle East.
m
223
FOREIGN POLICY
NUMBER 100 FALL 1995
The Path to Peace
by Robert Satloff
In October 1991, in a royal palace in Madrid, a dour, monosyl-
labic Israeli prime minister sat across a great, rectangular table
from second-tier representatives of the Palestinian people,
whose own organizational leadership was banished from the
proceedings because of its reliance on terrorism as policy. To-
day, the two principals, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (plo), are formally bound by a contractual agreement witnessed
by the United States and Russia to settle all disputes peacefully and
to negotiate the end of their century-old conflict by determining the
"final status" of the West Bank and Gaza and other critical issues.
Seated near the Palestinian representative in Madrid was the for-
eign minister of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, whose soldiers —
then (and perhaps still) the finest in the Arab world — were the first
to cross the Jordan River on May 15, 1948, to take up arms against
the fledgling Jewish state. Today, Israel and Jordan are at peace, hav-
ing negotiated a remarkably creative treaty that not only ends 46
years of war but sketches a blueprint for a warm web of political, eco-
nomic, and human relationships.
Also at that table was the foreign minister of Syria, a country that
earned its spot on the U.S. government's list of terror-supporting
states both for its direct role in terrorism and for its sponsorship and
sufferance of Palestinian, Lebanese, Armenian, Turkish, and other
terrorist groups. Though miffed that lesser Arab brethren brokered
their own separate agreements with Israel, Syrian representatives —
including the chief of staff of the Syrian armed forces, a lofty posi-
tion in a military dictatorship — are today quietly negotiating with
their Israeli counterparts on aspects of a peace treaty that is hailed
ROBERT SATLOFF is executive director of The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy.
224
by supporters (and detractors) as a potential "peace to end all wars"
in the Middle East.
Overall, the diplomatic record since Madrid is resoundingly pos-
itive. For that, the Bush and Clinton administrations, which have
been the principal sponsors of the peace process, deserve wide ac-
claim. The speed of change has been so rapid — Gaza-Jericho, the
"handshake" on the White House lawn, multilaterals, London talks,
Washington Declaration, Wadi al 'Arabah, Casablanca, military-to-
military talks — that the novel has become ho-hum. That, however,
does not make the change any less significant.
In historical terms, the greatest achievement of the Madrid
process is to have bolstered a dynamic change in Arab-Israeli rela-
tions from conflict to negotiation to, in some hopeful areas, recog-
nition of mutual interests. For most observers, the operative issue to-
day is not the imminence of Arab-Israeli war but the battle being
waged on many fronts between the region's moderate forces — Arab,
Israeli, and Turkish — and their reactionary, atavistic nemeses, both
secular and religious. After a half century of simmering intercom-
munal conflict in what was once Mandatory Palestine and a quarter
century of interstate conflict that spanned a far wider arena, the last
two decades have witnessed a slow but consistent process of peace-
making, both within societies and between states and peoples. In this
process, most Arab leaders (and, to an alarmingly lesser degree, their
peoples) have come to terms with Israel's strength, resilience, and
permanence; Palestinians have gained recognition of nationhood
from everyone that matters (most importantly, Israel); and Israelis,
now able to flit about the region from Marrakech to Manama, feel
more secure to do business in Milan and Manila. Through it all, the
win-win process of peacemaking has come to supplant the zero-sum
process of warfare, which the Arabs clearly lost but from which Is-
rael could not gain.
Against this litany of good news stand two unhappy realities. First,
as the fate of the 1983 peace accord between Israel and Lebanon
shows, the peace process is neither irreversible nor irrevocable. The
post-Gulf war successes of Madrid, Oslo, Wadi al 'Arabah, et al.,
were made possible by the historic confluence of American domi-
nance, Soviet irrelevance, Israeli strength, Palestinian disillusion-
ment, and a general sense of realism and pragmatism that took hold
in the Arab world. As those ingredients shift, the process changes,
225
and the ability of those achievements to survive future tests, such as
succession crises, will change, too.
Second, because the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a systemic phe-
nomenon, in which the ideological, economic, social, cultural, po-
litical, and military energies of states, nations, and peoples were com-
mitted (both voluntarily and through force majeure) to "the struggle,"
ending the conflict will require decades of effort and perhaps even
generational change. It is important to recall that on just the diplo-
matic level, nearly 10 years were needed — from the Kilometer 101
talks in 1973 to the final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in 1982 —
to create peace between Egypt and Israel; Syria and Israel began a ne-
gotiating process at about the same time, but they remain far from
signing, let alone implementing, a peace accord. To the dismay of
diplomats, the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict is not just one shuttle
mission, one secret negotiation, or one signing ceremony away. In
fact, Uday Hussein, the son of the leader of the Arab state most re-
cently to attack Israel, could still in June 1995 editorialize in his
Baghdad newspaper Babil that the Arabs need to improve upon
Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser's exhortation to throw the Jews
into the sea because some of them might still swim to safety.
American Interests
For the United States, helping to achieve Arab-Israeli peace re-
mains a vital national security policy, even though the region
is no longer a setting for potential superpower confrontation —
a main reason for Washington's devotion to peacemaking in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In the late 1990s, Arab-Israeli peace is a key
element in maintaining America's two overriding interests in the Mid-
dle East: the safety and survival of Israel and secure, unhindered ac-
cess to the region's oil and gas at reasonable prices.
For the former U.S. interest, the relevance is obvious; for the lat-
ter, the impact of peace is more complicated but no less direct. Do-
mestically, peace would permit America's friends to devote a greater
share of their nations' resources to solving economic and social prob-
lems, denying radicals fertile ground for propagandizing and prosely-
tizing at home. Regionally, peace would deprive troublemakers like
Saddam Hussein the "wedge issue" of Palestine to make mischief in
the region and would permit Arabs, Israelis, and Westerners to focus
226
their energies on the two challenges to regional stability that threaten
them — the secular radicalism of Iraq and the religious militancy of
Iran. What makes the potential payoff of peace so great for the
United States is that it would affirm a strategic consensus between
America and all of its regional allies.
Recognizing the two unhappy realities of the peace process — that
past achievements are not necessarily irreversible and that future suc-
cesses may take considerable time — the Clinton administration faces
steep challenges between now and November 1996. The Israel-PLO
accord of September 1993, a breakthrough of seismic proportions,
risks succumbing to popular disenchantment on both sides owing to
a sinister cycle of terrorism, retribution, deprivation, disillusion, and
more terrorism. The Jordan-Israel peace treaty of October 1994, an-
other signal achievement, risks settling into an unfulfilling "peace of
the elites," because the Jordanian man-in-the-street (or soldier-in-
the-barracks) has yet to benefit from its trickle-down effects. The
Egypt-Israel peace of March 1979, foundation for the peace process,
risks eroding as an array of issues — from Egypt's criticism o{ Israel's
nuclear policy to competition for dwindling U.S. aid dollars — divides
these pioneers in peacemaking. The multilateral peace process, a lit-
tle-known but innovative series of experts' discussions on transna-
tional issues (e.g., water resources, environment, economic develop-
ment, refugees, arms control, and regional security), risks atrophying
without the political commitment of the region's leaders. The process
of Israel's political and economic integration into the Middle East,
heralded by diplomatic openings throughout North Africa (except
Libya) and the Arab Gulf, risks slowing without having achieved an
end to the Arab boycott of Israel.
On top of all this, the Clinton administration has made the
achievement of an Israel-Syria peace agreement one of its highest pri-
orities. This reflects both the wish of the Israeli government, whose
relations with the United States are at a historic high after the quar-
rels of the George Bush- Yitzhak Shamir years, and the predilection
of Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and the lat-
ter's "peace team." The reason for this situation is simple: Peace with
Syria, it is argued, would have implications far beyond a straightfor-
ward bilateral agreement. Reconciliation between "the beating heart
of Arab nationalism" on the one hand and the "Zionist entity" on
the other would constitute the keystone to what is termed "compre-
227
hensive peace." Comprehensive peace means ending the Arab con-
flict on Israel's borders, committing Damascus to cut off Hizbollah
and other- terrorist groups, giving the "green light" for an Israel-
Lebanon peace agreement, and removing all obstacles to Israel's nor-
malization with the wider Arab world. For the United States and Is-
rael, the attainment of a comprehensive peace would confirm the
wisdom of strategic cooperation in the peace process and would usher
in a truly "new Middle East."
With so much at stake, neither Washington nor Jerusalem has
been shy about pursuing peace with Syria. Israel, for example, has put
aside its preference for direct talks, accepting what Israel's chief ne-
gotiator has termed "trilateral negotiation" (with Washington as the
third party), and it has not required Syria to end its support for anti-
Israel (e.g., Hizbollah) terrorism as a precondition of formal bar-
gaining. On the American side, its interest in an Israel-Syria peace
is such that Christopher has visited Syria 19 times on 12 trips to the
Middle East in just 30 months. (By contrast, he has visited America's
troubled neighbor Mexico only once.) These exertions notwith-
standing, Israel-Syria negotiations move at a glacial pace. After more
than three and one-half years of talks, the two sides are only now be-
ginning serious bargaining on the core issue of security. Even this ten-
tative step forward first required agreement to postpone talks on
three other critical items — the extent of Israel's territorial with-
drawal, the parameters of normalization, and the timetable for im-
plementing a peace accord. Should the Syrians be truly committed
to an agreement, finalizing it will take time, even if its contours ap-
pear clear.
Steps Toward Peace
Both Americans and Israelis go to the polls in 1996, and some-
time in the first half of that year electoral politics will intrude
on the peace process, making progress less likely. With so much
in the peace process uncertain, there is much to do and little time.
For the United States, this needs to be a period of shoring up past
achievements and working toward new ones. To meet that challenge,
U.S. diplomats should return to first principles that have been honed
from nearly 30 years of peacemaking efforts. First, secure an environ-
ment in which Arabs and Israelis can settle their disputes through nego-
228
tiation. In practical terms, this approach involves proactive, ongoing
efforts to insulate the peace process from its enemies — Iraq, Iran, and
transnational terrorism. Madrid happened because of U.S. leadership
in the Gulf war; without that leadership, and without the continued
deterrence of the region's radical forces, the chances for further
progress toward Arab-Israeli peace are slim.
Second, reduce the risks of peacemaking for those who contemplate
compromise and support the courage of those who opt for it. Four simul-
taneous efforts are necessary to the realization of this principle:
► Continue to work in partnership with Israel. The strength of
the U.S. -Israeli relationship is critical to helping Israelis
persevere with the peace process in the face of suicide car
bombs and katyusha rocket attacks, demands to cede strategic
territory in exchange for promises of peace, and harangues over
Israel's strategic deterrent.
► Redouble efforts to promote international aid and investment in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a way to bolster popular
support for the pro-Oslo Palestinian leadership while taking a
firm stand against backsliding, mismanagement of aid funds, and
sufferance of terrorism. Although the Israel-PLO negotiations
are largely a bilateral affair, the United States must try to ensure
that the Palestinian Authority (PA) does not wither on the
vine (as many Arab parties seem willing to permit) while at the
same time insisting that the PA not receive a "free pass" when it
comes to meeting its contractual commitments.
► Remove the issue of Jordanian debt relief from White
House-congressional feuding and find low-cost ways (such as
excess defense articles, corporate trade missions, and increased
funding for International Military Education and Training
(imet)) to help Jordanians realize the benefits of peace. Failing
to find some support for Jordan's peacemaking efforts would be
not only penny-wise and pound-foolish as far as the Jordanians
are concerned, but it would send negative signals to Damascus
and elsewhere about America's resolve in support of
peacemakers.
► Broaden ongoing dialogue with Egypt to ensure that the special
U.S.-Egyptian relationship remains on firm footing as Egyptians
contemplate a Middle East in which they are no longer the only
state at peace with Israel. A stable Egypt is the linchpin of a
229
stable Middle East. It is especially important to talk early,
seriously, and creatively with Egypt about ways to bolster
U.S.-Egyptian strategic ties and the future of the U.S. economic
assistance package.
Third, with Syria, be prepared. Having engineered direct negotia-
tions at a high level — the two sides' chiefs of staff — the United States
should let the negotiations take their course, injecting itself into the
process only when both needed and asked by the two sides. This
means that the United States should be prepared at the highest level
to act as an honest broker should Israel and Syria together seek U.S.
mediation; to serve in a limited role as monitor should they together
seek U.S. help in implementing terms of a future agreement; and to
press U.S. demands on Syria regarding terrorism, proliferation, nar-
cotics, counterfeiting, Lebanon, and human rights lest they be lost in
the festivities accompanying an Israel-Syria breakthrough. (A
"mechanism" established by Presidents Clinton and Hafez al- Assad
in January 1994 to address these concerns died an early death.) Strik-
ing the proper pose between advancing U.S. interests in Israeli-Syr-
ian peace and protecting U.S. concerns about the troubled U.S.-Syr-
ian relationship is a difficult balance, only somewhat eased by Syria's
own desire for improved ties with Washington.
Finally, maintain perspective , composure, and momentum. Like the
stock market, the peace process is on a historically upward slope, but
that does not mean it is immune from great shocks. From outside the
process, terrorism (Beit Lid, Afula, Hebron), assassination plots
(Hosni Mubarak, Yasir Arafat), and coup attempts (King Hussein,
Sultan Qaboos of Oman) can all be expected. Inside the process,
progress toward "final status" arrangements will itself produce intense
and divisive disputes over sensitive issues, not least of which is
Jerusalem. Through it all, America's role is to help its friends and part-
ners work toward agreements that promote stability, satisfy their basic
requirements, and terminate sources of future conflict.
Burdened with daunting challenges to safeguarding past achieve-
ments and substantial obstacles to finding future breakthroughs, the
Arab-Israeli peace process faces a difficult time ahead. For the Clin-
ton administration, which has invested so much to see still so much
left undone, solace should come in knowing that this will not be the
first, the only, or the most troubled period in a historic process that is
still unfolding.
230
PEACE AT RISK
by Dr. James Zogby
President
Arab American Institute
November 21, 1994
The peace process, despite the great hopes
that it engendered and its much celebrated
achievements and despite the fact that Israelis and
Palestinians may soon sign yet another agreement,
is at an impasse. It is an impasse rather than a
collapse because some aspects of the process are
irreversible. Instead of moving forward, the Israeli-
Palestinian relationship has, to all appearances,
entered a new stasis — and within that stasis the
dynamic is a downward spiral.
And in this situation the Palestinians are
the big losers, victims once again of the asymmetry
of power that has marked their entire political
history.
There is a great deal of irony in all of this,
since it was the Palestinians signing of a
Declaration of Principles with Israel in 1993 which
opened the door and made possible the progress
achieved thus far: the Israel- Jordan peace
agreement, movement toward ending the Arab
boycott of Israel, the expansion of Israel's relations
with Muslim nations from 2 to 14, and the historic
Middle East economic summit in Casablanca and
the one to come in Amman.
And yet, with world attention focused on
those developments, the Israeli-Palestinian
relationship itself has deteriorated. It is as if energy
has been mobilized toward constructing the 5th and
6th floors of a building whose foundations are
unfinished and even crumbling. Or, to return to the
original metaphor, Palestinians opened the door to a
new Middle East, held it open for others but have
not been permitted to enter themselves.
The centerpiece of the Israel-Palestinian
Declaration of Principles was its "mutual
recognition" of two peoples with equal rights. In
the preamble to the agreement, Israel and the PLO
to:
"recognize their mutual legitimate and
political rights, and strive to live in
peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity
and security and achieve a just, lasting and
comprehensive peace settlement and
historic reconciliation...."
The implementation of these mutual rights
was to be phased with each phase designed to create
the confidence to enables the parties to move
forward to the next phase.
Israelis expected that the process would
create greater security and regional acceptance of
their state, while Palestinians expected that the
process would yield economic prosperity and
implementation of their political rights to an
independent state.
But upon entering into negotiations to
implement the Declaration of Principles, the
Palestinians discovered that the government of
Israel lacked the political strength to apply
"mutuality" as spelled out in the agreement. The
optimism of the Palestinian negotiators was crushec"
as the Israelis continued to squeeze the Palestinians
to accept less and less at each stage of the talks.
Nabil Shaath, for example, projected that
the process would work despite the objections of a
strong Palestinian opposition. He described how as
peace expanded, Palestinians would receive the
expanded benefits of peace. Opposition would
dissipate and those who used violence to subvert the
peace would be isolated by the larger community
that would be invested in the fruits of peace. The
strength of the Palestinian Authority and the
strength of the peace process itself depended upon
the ability to change Palestinian daily life and move
Palestinians from a state of oppressive occupation to
real freedom.
In this view, the Israeli quest for security
and recognition is intrinsically linked with the
Palestinian quest for prosperity and peace — they
are two sides of the same coin. To the extent that
Israel continues to control the process, to impose
humiliating conditions on the Palestinian Authority,
and to dominate daily life in the West Bank and
Jerusalem — to that same extent will the Palestinian
authority and the peace process itself lose
legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinians. And to
that same extent, Israelis will not achieve the
security they long for, as Palestinian militants will
continue to strike out against them and be
supported by a frustrated and alienated Palestinian
231
constituency.
Its is now one year since the September
13th signing, and the fruits of peace are too few to
maintain momentum for the process in a Palestinian
population sill losing its rights.
— Gaza still has 60% unemployment and
open sewers.
Even the few thousand Palestinians who
worked for poverty- level wages as day
laborers in Israel have been repeatedly
denied access to jobs — jobs made
necessary by an Israeli policy of de-
development of the West Bank and Gaza
economies during its 27 years of
occupation.
— Israel has failed to offer even a
minimum of confidence-building gestures
to the Palestinians. And the Israelis
continue to exercise control over too many
areas of activity, which promotes a lack of
public confidence in the independence of
the Palestinian Authority.
— Israeli settlement-building continues
unabated. Rabin's Labor government,
while pledging an end to all settlement
construction as a condition of receiving
U.S. loan guarantees, has, during the past
two years, either completed or started
construction on roughly 30,000 new
housing units in the West Bank and Gaza
and in the "annexed" area around East
Jerusalem. And with this construction
comes new roads and expanded
infrastructure.
— East Jerusalem, the religious, cultural,
economic and welfare center of Palestinian
life has been virtually cut off from the rest
of Palestinian society.
— The process leading to Palestinian
elections has been repeatedly delayed.
While elections are necessary for the
legitimacy of the process and the
Palestinian Authority, Israel's concerns
have once again won out, quite simply
because they have the power to set the time
and terms of the process.
— And finally, donor funds — so vital for
building infrastructure, creating jobs, and
inspiring hope in the peace process — have
simply not materialized on the scale needed
to jumpstart the process of moving
forward. And so, instead of being
strengthened, the process was weakened.
The problem today is not only these delays
and the tragic and condemnable acts of extremist
violence that take innocent lives. The defining
problem is that both Palestinians and Israelis have
lost the hope they once had that real peace is
possible.
Israelis may feel today more accepted in
the broader Middle East, they can travel to Petra or
Casablanca and attend conferences in other Arab
capitals. But now they fear getting on a bus to go
to the local market An implied potential external
threat has been replaced by a real internal threat
And Palestinians see their once-raised expectations
dashed, and a once-revered leadership undermined
and, at times, humiliated.
This is new stasis — an unraveling of hope
and an expansion of anger and cynicism in both
Israeli and Palestinian societies.
The question that now remains to be asked
is, has there already been too much erosion for the
peace process to be salvaged? Or has the region
merely moved from one stage of conflict to another,
without the just resolution that so many hoped for?
The solution applies a counterintuitive
logic to the problem. For Israel to be more secure
and for peace to be won, it must take greater risks
and surrender more rights and power to the
Palestinians. Steps should be taken to rapidly
implement the Declaration of Principles and invest
the Palestinians in the process and in their
leadership. Elections and Israeli withdrawal from
Palestinian population centers should take place as
soon as possible and without any more conditions
being imposed.
It is not enough for Palestinians to be
reduced to administering the occupation — they
must be given freedom, and only Israel can give
that And economic investment must be
accelerated, with the international community
adopting a sense of urgency in this regard.
For only when Palestinians experience
freedom, the benefits of peace and thehope that
justice will be done can their support for the peace
process and their leadership be restored. Only then
can the Palestine National Authority act with
legitimacy to establish order, and only then will
Israelis achieve the security they hoped peace would
bring.
232
$
NEWS RELEASE
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
Jacob & Llbby Goodman ZOA House 4 East 34th Street, New York, NY 10016
Telephone: 212-481-1500 Fax: 212-481-1515
September 13, 1995 Contact i Morton Klein, (212) 481-1500
Attn: NEWS EDITOR
NEW POLL SHOWS MAJORITY OF U.S. JEWS
OPPOSE U.S. AID TO PLO AND DISTRUST ARAFAT
NEW YORK- The latest survey by the American Jewish Committee
shows that the majority of American Jews oppose further U.S. aid to the
PLO and distrust Yasir Arafat. Officials of the Zionist Organization of
America (ZOA) are meeting with leading Members of Congress this week to
discuss the new poll and other issues concerning U.S. aid to the PLO.
The AJCommittee poll, released on September 12, 1995, found:
* 63% of U.S. Jews oppose further American "economic aid to the
Palestinians." (Just 30% support it.)
* 71% of U.S. Jews say that Arafat and the PLO cannot be "relied
upon to honor agreements and refrain from terrorism. " (Only 17% think
they are reliable. )
* 56% of U.S. Jews believe that "the goal of the Arabs is not the
return of occupied territories, but rather the destruction of Israel."
(37% do not believe that.)
* 91% of U.S. Jews say "the PLO is not doing enough to control
terrorist activities against Israel."
The poll results are similar to those of the Luntz Poll which was
taken in May 1995. Luntz found that 62% of U.S. Jews distrust Arafat,
and 56% said the Israel-PLO peace accords have failed. A Luntz Poll of
the entire American public, also in May 1995, found that 78% of
Americans oppose giving further aid to the PLO until the PLO keeps its
commitments and expels terrorists from Gaza and Jericho.
"These polls show that American Jews are losing confidence that
these peace agreements will bring real peace, " said Morton A. Klein, ZOA
National President. "The clear majority of both American Jews and
Americans in general are opposed to giving hundreds of millions of
dollars to Arafat, who encourages terrorism by continuing his 'jihad,
via deaths' speeches and by praising terrorists as 'heroes', who is
violating virtually all aspects of the accords, and who is
misappropriating funds donated from around the world. "
"The U.S. Congress, which is now considering the issue of
further U.S. aid to the PLO, should take into consideration the fact
that the overwhelming majority of Americans, and the overwhelming
majority of American Jews, clearly do not want their tax dollars
being sent to Arafat and the PLO, " Klein said.
&
233
NEWS RELEASE
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
Jacob & Llbby Goodman ZOA House 4 East 34th Street. New York, NY 10016
Telephone: 212-481-1500 Fax: 212-481-1515
August 21, 1995 Contact: Morton Klein, (212) 481-1500
Attn: NEWS EDITOR
American Woman Killed in
Jerusalem Arab Bus Bombing
ZOA: U.S. AID TO PLO MUST BE CONDITIONED ON
PLO PURSUING TERRORISTS WHO KILLED AMERICANS
NEW YORK- In response to the murder of an American woman in
today's Jerusalem bus bombing (in which 5 people were killed and over
100 wounded) , the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) is urging
Congress to withhold the planned $500-million in U.S. aid to the PLO
unless the PLO makes an all-out effort to apprehend Arab terrorists who
have killed or injured American citizens, and pays compensation to the
victims' families.
"The U.S. should not be giving the PLO $500-million in taxpayers'
money unless the PLO is actively attempting to catch and extradite Arab
terrorists who have been involved in attacks on Americans, and pays
compensation to the families of Americans who were killed by PLO members
in the past," said ZOA National President Morton A. Klein.
Klein noted that when an American student, Alissa Flatow, was
murdered by Arab terrorists in the PLO-controlled Gaza Strip in April
1995, Rashid Abu-Shibak, deputy commander of the PLO security services,
announced that the PLO would not allow agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to investigate the killing (as reported on Israel Radio,
April 13, 1995) .
The Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPPA) , which sets
conditions for U.S. aid to the PLO, was temporarily renewed until
September 30, 1995. The draft of MEPFA which is currently being
circulated, and will be taken up in September,
does not contain any provisions regarding U.S. victims of Arab
terrorism. By contrast, two other bills regarding aid to the PLO, the
Engel-Saxton bill and the D' Amato-Forbes bill, would condition funding
to the PLO on the PLO ' s pursuit of terrorists who have attacked
Americans, and would require the PLO to pay compensation to the victims
of PLO attacks.
"We are calling on Senators Jesse Helms and Claiborne Pell, co-
chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to revise their bill
to incorporate this vital provision concerning American victims of Arab
terrorism," the ZOA President said. "It is a moral outrage that the PLO
receives U.S. aid while it is refusing to lift a finger to catch those
who have murdered Americans, refusing to pay compensation to the
families of the victims, and violating virtually every one of its
obligations in the Israel-PLO peace accords."
234
NEWS RELEASE
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
Jacob & Llbby Goodman ZOA House 4 East 34th Street, New York, NY 10016
Telephone: 212-481-1500 Fax: 212-481-1515
May 12, 1995 Contact: Morton Klein, (212) 481-1500
Attn: NEWS EDITOR
CIA DIRECTOR GAVE SENATE ERRONEOUS
INFORMATION ON TERRORISM BY PLO FACTIONS
NEW YORK- The Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
recently made erroneous statements to a Senate committee about terrorism
committed by factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) .
said Morton A. Klein. National President of the Zionist Organization of
America (ZOA) .
In recent written testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee,
CIA Acting Director William Studeman erroneously claimed that the PLO
has not carried out any attacks since the signing of the Israel -PLO
peace accords. Studeman also erroneously claimed that some of the PLO
factions which are still engaging in terrorism "renounced their
membership" in the PLO two years ago.
(Studeman was replying to questions that were submitted to him by
the Committee in writing, following his testimony to the Committee in
January. He gave his reply in March; it was only recently
declassified. )
"William Studeman 's erroneous testimony to the U.S. Senate
concerning PLO terrorism may reflect the administration's strategy of
whitewashing PLO terrorism and other major PLO violations of the PLO's
obligations under the peace accords, so that the PLO will qualify for
U.S. aid," ZOA President Klein said. "The State Department has used
similar tactics in its first three biannual reports on PLO violations.
Congress and the American public deserve to hear the full truth about
the PLO's behavior, and if the CIA and the State Department cannot be
relied upon to provide it, then Congress may have no choice but to
assume a more prominent role in monitoring PLO violations--for example,
by establishing a bipartisan subcommittee, under the aegis of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations
Committee, to provide its own biannual reports to the President
concerning PLO violations."
According to a transcript of the statements obtained by the Jewish
Continued on pass 2
235
Page 2
Telegraphic Agency, Studeman was asked by Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) ,
the committee chair, and Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NB) , "Is there any
evidence suggesting that the PLO is still involved in terrorist
activities?" Studeman replied:
"We have no evidence that any PLO group has engaged in acts of
terrorism since Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles
in September 1993, and Arafat reiterated his 1988 renunciation of
terrorism. Since September 1993, Palestinian terrorism including that
perpetrated by Islamic extremist groups such as Hamas, has been confined
to splinter groups beyond Arafat's control. The Popular and Democratic
Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP and DFLP) , which have never
been directed by Arafat, renounced their membership in the PLO in
September 1993 to protest the Gaza-Jericho accord and have conducted
several attacks inside the Territories over the past year.'
"The truth is that Yasser Arafat's own Fatah faction of the PLO
continued to engage in terrorism against Jews and Arabs after the
signing of the accords," said ZOA President Klein. "Since Septemoer
1993, Fatah has carried out at least 63 terrorist attacks, in which 25
people were killed and 22 injured. "
Other PLO factions, such as the DFLP and the PFLP, have also
continued to engage in terrorism. Klein noted that the DFLP and the
PFLP have not committed merely "several attacks," as Studeman claimed.
but in fact since September 1993, the PFLP has carried out at least 14
attacks (leaving 5 dead and 8 wounded) and the DFLP has carried out at
least 14 attacks (leaving 10 dead and 12 wounded) .
[For a complete list, with details, of the attacks by Fatah, the
DFLP and the PFLP, please call 212-481-1500.]
Klein noted that there is no evidence that the DFLP or PFLP ever
"renounced their membership" in the PLO, as Studeman claimed. On the
contrary, Klein noted, as recently as April 22, 1995 PLO spokesman and
Finance Minister Mohammed Nashashibi publicly referred to the fact that
Yasser Arafat has been holding "serious and promising talks with
factions of the PLO, including the DFLP, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, and the Arab Liberation Front." (Jerusalem
Post, April 23, 1995)
Klein said Studeman' s claim that there has been "no PLO terrorism"
since the signing of the accords "is particularly ironic in view of the
fact that the State Department's own June 1994 and December 1994 reports
on PLO compliance mentioned a number of the Fatah attacks and attacks by
other PLO factions." (see Annex I. pp. 1-3 of the June 1994 report; and
pp 5-6 of the December 1994 report.) Klein added: "One would have
thought that before testifying about PLO behavior, the Acting Director
of the CIA would have read the State Department's reports on the
subject . "
With regard to Studeman 's reference to Arafat's "1988 renunciation
of terrorism" (which was made only in exchange for a dialogue with the
U.S.), Klein pointed out that shortly after Arafat's 1988 statement, PLO
terrorism resumed. Indeed, the U.S. later broke off its dialogue with
the PLO. because Arafat refused to condemn an attempted terrorist attack
on Tel Aviv beachgoers by a PLO member-organization.
236
A] Congress
American Jewish Congress
Stephen Wise Congress House
IS East »4th Street
Nt— York. NY 10028-0458
212 079 aSOO • F» 212 249 3672
September 20, 1995
The Honorable Benjamin Gilman
Chair, House International Relations Committee
United States House of Representatives
2449 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Via Fax to 202/225-2035
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for the invitation to include our comments as part of the Hearing
Record for today's hearing on issues relating to the Middle East Peace Process. This
brief letter will serve to underscore our deep support for that process, for the
leadership of Prime Minister Rabin, and for Middle East Peace Facilitation Act
(MEPFA) which would help to ensure the steady advancement of this much needed
process.
This is a critical moment in the Middle East peace process. Israel and the
Palestinians are completing negotiations on implementation of the historic second
stage of the Declaration of Principles. The talks between Israel and Syria continue.
Israel and Jordan plan for an unprecedented joint airport With these talks comes the
hope for peace, peace at long last.
Yet, the continuation of this important -- and fragile - process hinges on the
outside assistance of facilitators, especially the United States. Only political support,
backed up by financial help, can ensure that these talks, and the results they have
already produced, will continue. That is why MEPFA is indispensable, and why ail
who truly desire peace must support its timely renewal.
The American Jewish Congress expresses its full support for the government of
Israel as it carefully pursues difficult negotiations while being subjected to increasingly
strident criticism by opponents of the peace process both in Israel and here in the
United States. Supporters of the peace process must raise their voices so that they
are heard, and are not drowned out by discordant shouts of disapproval.
Today's hearing will reflect a difference of opinion in the American Jewish
community. But lack of unanimity is not the same as lack of consensus, and we are
confident that those who oppose the peace process are a small minority, however
vocal they may be. That is one reason why we have associated ourselves with the
testimony which our sister agency, the American Jewish Committee, is presenting this
morning. Let there be no mistake -- the vast majority of American Jews support the
government of Israel in its quest for peace
237
The Honorable Benjamin Gilman Page Two
September 20, 1995
Despite the implications that the failure of the negotiations would have for the
future of Israel and its people, the fact is that a loud and fervently motivated segment
of Jewish society will not accept any peace agreement that includes territorial
concessions, unfortunately, without territorial concessions there can be no peace
agreement. Of equal importance, it must be recognized that security considerations
have been, and remain, at the core of the Israeli government's concerns as it
negotiates.
We urge you to bear these concerns in mind as you consider MEPFA and
related issues.
Respectfully,
*9o/w«^&W fhkf&MJvVK.
David V Kahn Phil Baum
President Executive Director
c:wpwin\gilman 1 .let
238
MADAltAH 50 WIST II STMIT TUIPMONI POUNBID IT
tKIWOMINS NIWTPUCITT aia.31l.T9aa HINRIITTA f IOID
ZIONIST NEWTORR f*» IN 1912
organisation 10019 iiiimmi
OF AMIRICA. INC.
September 20, 1995
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman, International Relations Committee
The House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
FAX: (202) 225-2035
Dear Chairman Gilman,
Since we were unable to be attendant and offer verbal testimony at the International
Relations Committee hearings on the Middle East peace process, we would like to present
to you and the committee a brief outline of our organization's position on this and other
related issues.
As you know, Hadassah, The Women's Zionist Organization of America, is the largest
Jewish organization in the United States. We support and administer world-reknown
medical and educational facilities in Israel, and provide an array of educational,
community service and public affairs programs for our members across the United States.
It goes without saying that Hadassah and its members feels closely connected to the
people of Israel and have many hopes and concerns about the current peace process. While
there is a variety of opinions among the vast membership of our organization, 2,500
delegates to our just concluded National Convention held in Jerusalem in August,
representing our 385,000 members nationwide, overwhelmingly approved a resolution
expressing Hadassah' s "wholehearted support for the government and people of Israel for
their bold and determined pursuit of peace, security and economic stability for Israel and
for all the peoples and states in the Middle East."
We believe that the United States and Israel share fundamental interests in the post-Cold
War Middle East: a common commitment to promoting democracy, pursuing the peace
process; and countering Arab and Islamic extremists opposed to peace and regional
reconciliation. We are convinced that American foreign assistance provides Israel with
the confidence and military deterrence necessary for taking the enormous risks it has in
order to pursue a lasting and secure peace with its Arab neighbors. That is why we
support the continuation of current levels of aid to Israel and to other participants in the
peace process.
239
In this regard, we also support extension of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act
(MEPFA), particularly the version of the legislation introduced by Senators Jesse Helms
and Claiborne Pell. As you know, the Helms-Pell proposal, which has received strong
bipartisan support in Congress and the backing of the Administration, also strengthens
MEPFA wth provisions pressing the PLO toward full compliance with all of its
obligations and commitments in its agreements with Israel. This includes measures that
must be taken to combat terrorism and to remove, within a reasonable time following the
election of a Palestinian Council, sections of the PLO Covenant calling for Israel's
destruction. We believe that adoption of this legislation will help pave the way for further
progress in the peace process.
We thank you for the opportunity to present our views and the position of our organization
as you and the committee deliberate on these issues of vital interest to our country and of
deep concern to the members of our community.
Sincerely,
MarlenePost Beth Wohlgelemter <0
National President Executive Director
240
104th CONGRESS
1st Session
h. R. I960
To govern relations between the United Slates and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), to enforce PLO compliance with standards of inter-
national conduct, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Juke 29, 1993
Mr FORBES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Commit-
tee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on
Banking and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently deter-
mined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions
as faU within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
A BILL
To govern relations between the United States and the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization (PLO), to enforce PLO
compliance with standards of international conduct, and
for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Middle East Peace
5 Compliance Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
7 For the purposes of this Act —
241
2
1 (1) the term "Palestine Liberation Organization
2 (PLO)" snail be defined as a membership organ iza-
3 tion encompassing all constituent groups that belong
4 to the Palestine National Council and all individuals
5 that have or continue to publicly demonstrate their
6 allegiance to the Palestine Liberation Organization,
7 or receive funds, directly or indirectly from sources
8 controlled by the PLO. Its legal status is defined by
9 United States law pursuant to title X of Public Law
10 100-204, section 1002;
11 (2) for the purpose of this section, the term
12 "foreign assistance" shall be the same as that used
13 under section 634(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act
14 of 1961 (Public Law 87-195); and
15 {3) the term "Palestinian Authority" shall be
16 defined as the administrative entity established in
17 the self-rule areas of Gaza and the West Bank in ac-
1 8 cordance with the Declaration of Principles signed in
19 Washington, DC. September 13, 1993, between Is-
20 rael and the Palestine Liberation Organization
21 (PLO).
22 SEC. 3. POLICY.
23 It is the policy and interest of the United States —
24 (1) to contribute to the advancement of peace
25 and security in the Middle Kast by supporting ef-
242
3
1 forts by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organi-
2 xation (PLO) to reach a nonviolent resolution of
3 their conflict under the terms of the Declaration of
4 Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangement
5 signed in Washington, DC, September 13, 1993;
6 (2) to ensure that both Israel and the PLO
7 fully and meaningfully comply with the terms and
8 conditions of all agreements made between them;
9 (3) to demonstrate firm, consistent, and unam-
10 biguous opposition to terrorism by insisting that Is-
1 1 rael and the Palestine Liberation Organization take
12 significant, material, and timely steps to preempt
13 tourist attacks;
14 (4) to ensure that the Palestinian Authority
15 fully accounts for basic human needs and infrastruc-
16 ture development funds expended by the United
17 States in Gaza and Jericho in accordance with
1 8 standard commercial principles and practices;
19 (5) to ensure that Israel and the Palestine Lib-
20 eration Organization cooperate fully with United
21 States law enforcement agencies to apprehend, pros-
22 ecnte, and convict all individuals involved in the
23 criminal injury rr death of United States citizens or
24 the willful damaging of United States property;
243
4
1 (6) to hold the PLO and its administrative au-
2 thority in Gaza and Jericho accountable for unlawful
3 acts carried out within its jurisdiction or emanating
4 from territory under its administrative control;
5 (7) to ensure that all recipients of United
6 States foreign assistance evidence a clear comrait-
7 ment to democracy, justice, and the rule of law and
8 conform to established standards of financial man-
9 agement and accountability; and
10 (8) to contribute to the long-term security, sta-
11 bility, and economic health of the State of Israel
12 through the maintenance of close bilateral ties and,
13 to the greatest extent possible, to provide such levels
14 of assistance to Israel as are necessary and suffi-
15 cient to achieve these objectives, irrespective of the
16 success or failure of the agreements between Israel
17 and the PLO.
18 SEC. 4. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS.
19 (a) Pursuant to the commitments between Israel and
20 the PLO described in section 6 of this Act, the Congress
21 makes the following findings:
22 (1) After decades of conflict, Israel and the
23 PLO have entered a new era which presents an his-
24 boric opportunity for peaceful coexistence and a sta-
">S hT*> Homf\f.r»tin fiitnrp fr»r frh^msHves and the region.
244
1 (2) The basis for this new relationship between
2 Israel and the PLO is the set of agreements to
3 which both parties are signatories and which ema-
4 nate from the Declaration of Principles on Interim
5 Self-Government Arrangements, signed in Washing-
6 ton, D.C., on September 13, 1993.
7 (3) The United States agrees to serve as a
8 partner in the effort to bring about a lasting rec-
9 onciliation and understanding between Israel and the
10 PLO.
11 (4) The United States recognizes all of the
12 agreements referred to in section 6 of this Act are
13 legally binding on Israel and the PLO, that they
14 were entered into freely and in good faith and that
15 Israel and the PLO are committed to their complete
16 fulfillment.
17 (5) The United States is relying upon Israel
18 and the PLO to honor their commitments to elected
19 representatives and officials of the United States
20 Government prior to and following the signing of the
21 Declaration of Principles, including the promise of
22 the PLO to halt terrorism emanating from areas
23 under its control.
24 (6) The United States is committed to provid-
25 ing funding for infrastructure development and basic
245
6
1 human needs in Gaza and Jericho, but not through
2 any institution or entity of the PLO or the Palestin-
3 ian Authority and only where Israel and the PliO
4 have demonstrated that they have taken substantial,
5 timely, and meaningful steps toward full compliance
6 under their respective agreements.
7 (7) The United States is resolute in its deter-
8 mination to ensure that in providing assistance to
9 Palestinians living under the administrative control
10 of the Palestinian Authority or elsewhere, the bene-
1 1 ficiaries of such assistance shall be held to the same
12 standard of financial accountability and manage-
13 ment control as any other recipient of United States
14 foreign assistance.
15 {8) Since the signing of the Declaration of
16 Principles, the United States has had sufficient time
17 to evaluate the sincerity, commitment, and effective-
18 ness with which Israel and the PLO have complied
1 9 with both the spirit and the letter of the joint agree-
20 ments to which they are signatories.
21 (b) Determinations. — Therefore, the Congress de-
22 termines the following:
23 (1) The PLO continues to demonstrate wide-
24 spread and systematic disregard for both the spirit
25 and the letter of the understandings reached in a
246
7
1 succession of agreements between it and the State of
2 Israel.
3 (2) Information provided by the President on
4 the compliance of the PLO with its agreements is
5 often ambiguous, insufficient, at variance with the
6 assessments of independent monitoring groups and
7 falls short of the standard? of accountability ex-
8 pected of other recipients of United States foreign
9 assistance.
10 (3) The PLO specifically has failed to take sub-
11 stantial, timely, and meaningful steps to fulfill its
12 legal obligations in the following areas:
13 (A) AMBNDINO THE PLO COVENANT. — In
14 violation of commitments made by the PLO in
15 the letter of September 9, 1993, between the
16 PLO leader and the Prime Minister of Israel,
17 1993, the PLO has failed to repeal the provi-
18 sions of its charter which declare Israel to be il-
19 legitimate and call for its elimination through
20 armed struggle.
21 (B) Preventing terrorism. — In viola-
22 tion of the terms agreed to in the Gaza-Jericho
23 Agreement, annex III, article I, section 5 and
24 the letters of September 9, 1993, between the
25 PLO leadrr and the Prime Minister of Israel
247
8
1 and between the PLO leader and the Foreign
2 Minister of Norway, the PLO has not legally
3 banned terrorist organizations such as Hamas
4 and Islamic Jihad and has done little to dis
5 eipline them. In the 19 months before the Dec-
6 laration of Principles there were 318 casualties
7 from terrorism in Israel and the territories {68
8 people were killed and 250 injured). This is in
9 contrast to the 19 months following the signing
10 of the Declaration of Principles, there were 651
1 1 casualties from terrorism in Israel and the ter-
12 ritories (134 people were killed and 517 in-
13 jured), an increase of nearly 100 percent.
14 (C) Prosecuting terrorists. — In viola-
1 5 tion of the terras agreed to in the Gaza- Jericho
16 Agreement, annex III, article I, section 5 and
17 the letters of September 9, 1993, between the
18 PLO leader and the Prime Minister of Israel
19 and between the PLO leader and the Foreign
20 Minister of Norway, the PLO has failed to in-
21 vestigate terrorist incidents, prosecute terrorists
22 according to the rule of law, or ensure that the
23 sentences imposed for terrorist acts are more
24 than perfunctory. The PLO repeatedly has de-
25 clared that it considers terrorist organizations
248
9
1 such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad as legitimate
2 opposition groups with whom they are prepared
3 to conduct a dialog. The PLO has not legally
4 banned extremist organizations and instead,
5 employs llamas sympathizers in its administra-
6 tion in Gaza.
7 (D) Preventing incitement to vio-
8 LENCE. — In violation of the terms agreed to in
9 the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, article XII, para-
10 graph 1 and the letters of September 9, 1993,
11 between the PLO leader and the Prime Min-
12 ister of Israel and between the PLO leader and
13 the Foreign Minister of Norway, PLO officials
14 continue to advocate holy war (jihad) against
15 Israel, glorify suicide bombers, lend support and
16 comfort to terrorist groups, and issue propa-
17 ganda delegitimizing Israeli sovereignty even
18 within its pre- 1967 borders.
19 (E) Barring unauthorized forces. —
20 In violation of the terms agreed to in the Gaza-
21 Jericho Agreement, article IX, section 2, the
22 PLO continues to permit illegal military -and
23 paramilitary groups to conduct terrorist oper-
24 ations against Israel from administrative areas
25 under its control.
249
10
1 (P) Confiscating unauthorized weap-
2 ONS. — In violation of the terms agreed to in the
3 Gaza-Jericho Agreement, annex I, article VIII,
4 section 8, the PLC) has failed to fulfil] its com
5 mitment made to the United States Vice Presi-
6 dent on March 24, 1995, to take significant
7 steps to disarm military and paramilitary
8 groups under its administrative control, to ii-
9 cense weapons, or to substantially enforce, by
10 judicial means, individual violations.
11 (G) Excluding terrorists from secu-
12 rity services. — In violation of the terms
13 agreed to in the Gaza- Jericho Agreement,
14 annex I, article III, section 4(b), the PLO con-
15 tinues to employ policemen who have been con-
16 victed of serious crimes.
17 (H) Extraditing terrorists — In viola-
18 tion of the terms agreed to in annex III, article
19 II, section 7, the PLO consistently refuses to
20 extradite individuals suspected in terrorist
21 crimes against Israeli citizens and has not com-
22 plied with earlier demands of the United States
23 Government to extradite individuals suspected
24 of crimes against Americans to the United
25 States.
250
11
1 (I) Prohibiting the ixjcation ok insti-
2 TUTIONS OP THK PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
3 OUTSIDE OF GAZA AND JERICHO. — Under arti-
4 cle V of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Pal-
5 estinian Authority has attempted to extend its
6 authority beyond the boundaries of Gaza and
7 Jericho. It has failed to live up to its commit-
8 ment not to operate offices in Jerusalem and
9 has opened at least 7 institutions in and around
10 the city.
11 (J) Facilitating the release op is-
12 rakli pows/mias. — The PLO has failed to pro-
13 vide Israel with information it possesses on the
14 condition and possible whereabouts of at least
15 one Israeli MIA.
16 (K) Avoiding and punishing the illb-
17 gal transfer op funds. — In violation of the
18 spirit of the Gaza- Jericho Agreement and
19 standard international principles and practices
20 of financial accountability, administrative au-
21 thorities in Gaza have diverted substantial
22 amounts of development assistance to activities
23 of the PLO both inside and outside of Gaza and
24 Jericho.
251
12
1 (L) Preventing infiltrations. — In vio-
2 lation of the terms agreed to in the Gaza-Jeri-
3 eho Agreement, article IV(2)(c), the Palestinian
4 Police authorities has failed to halt infiltrations
5 from Egypt to Gaza and from Gaza to Israel.
6 SEC. 6. GENERAL RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE.
7 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the fol-
8 lowing restrictions shall apply with regard to all assistance
9 provided by the United States and intended to benefit Pal-
ID estinians living in areas controlled by the PI/) or the Pal-
1 1 estinian Authority:
12 < 1) All funds made available to areas under the
13 administrative control of the Palestinian Authority
1 4 shall be provided only through agencies or entities of
15 the United States Government or private voluntary
16 organizations designated by the Secretary of State
17 and registered in the United States: Provided, That
18 no funds shall be obligated or expended for any
19 projects or activities of the Palestinian Authority in
20 Jerusalem or that benefit Palestinians living in
21 Jerusalem.
22 (2) Under no circumstances and notwithstand-
23 ing any other provision of law, none of the funds au-
24 thorized or appropriated under this or any other Act
25 shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to ben-
252
13
1 efit the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), its
2 agents, entities, projects, programs, institutions, or
3 activities under its control, or directly or indirectly,
4 to benefit the operation of the Palestinian Authority
5 in Gaza, Jericho, or any other area it may control.
6 (3) Funds authorized or appropriated under
7 this or any other Act shall only be made available
8 for humanitarian assistance, economic development,
9 and basic human needs infrastructure projects or ac-
10 tivitics which directly benefit Palestinians in areas
11 under the administrative control of the Palestinian
12 Authority.
13 (4) The total amount of United States assist-
14 ance benefiting the Palestinians resident in areas
15 under the administrative control of the PLO and the
16 Palestinian Authority for any single year shall not
17 exceed the largest total contribution by a member of
18 the Arab League to the Palestinian Authority in the
19 previous full calendar year.
20 (5) None of the funds authorized or appro-
21 priated under this or any other Act shall be made
22 available to benefit, directly or indirectly, Palestin-
23 ians living under the administrative control of the
24 Palestinian Authority until the PLO substantially,
253
14
1 materially, and in a timely fashion complies with the
2 provisions of section 7 of this Act.
3 (6) No funds made available by this or any
4 other Act and intended to benefit Palestinians living
5 in areas controlled by the PLO or the Palestinian
6 Authority shall be used for the purchase, lease, or
7 acquisition by any means of lethal equipment, sup-
8 plies, or infrastructure to support that equipment or
9 its use in military or paramilitary operations or
10 training.
11 (7) No funds shall be made available under this
12 or any other Act to benefit Palestinians living in
13 areas controlled by the PLO or the Palestinian Au-
14 thority should the PLO conclude a formal or infor-
15 mal arrangement with J lamas, Islamic Jihad, or any
16 other group practicing or supporting terrorism under
17 which the terrorist activities of these groups, either
18 inside or outside of Gaza and Jericho, will be al-
19 lowed to continue or be tolerated in any respect.
20 (8) As set forth in section 585 of the Foreign
21 Operations, Export Financing, and Related Pro-
22 grams 1995 Appropriations and 1994 Supplemental
23 Appropriations Act (Public Law 103-306):
24 (A) None of the funds made available
25 under this or any other Act shall be obligated
21-733 0-96-9
254
15
1 or expended to create in any part of Jerusalem
2 a new office of any department or agency of the
3 United States Government for the purpose of
4 conducting official United States Government
5 business with the Palestinian Authority over
6 Gaza and Jericho or any successor Palestinian
7 governing entity provided for in the Israel -PLO
8 Declaration of Principles: Provided, That this
9 restriction shall not apply to the acquisition of
10 additional space for the existing Consulate Gen-
1 1 eral in Jerusalem.
12 (B) Meetings between officers and employ-
13 ees of the United States and officials of the
14 Palestinian Authority, or any successor Pal-
15 estinian governing entity provided for in the Is-
16 rael-PLO Declaration of Principles, for the pur-
17 pose of conducting official United States Gov-
18 ernment business with such authority should
19 continue to take place in locations other than
20 Jerusalem. As has been true in the past, offi-
21 cers and employees of the United States Gov-
22 ernment may continue to meet in Jerusalem on
23 other subjects with Palestinians (including
24 those who now occupy positions in the Palestin-
255
16
1 ian Authority), have social contacts, and have
2 incidental discussions.
3 {9) No funds made available under this or any
4 other Act shall be used to benefit any individual who
5 has directly participated in, or conspired in, or was
6 an accessory to, the planning or execution of a tcr-
7 rorist activity which resulted in the death, injury or
8 kidnaping of an American citizen.
9 SEC. 6. PLO-ISRAEL COMMITMENTS DESCRIBED.
10 The commitments referred to under this Act and rec-
1 1 ognized by the United States are the legally binding com-
12 mitments made by the Palestine Liberation Organization
1 3 and Israel in the following declarations;
14 (1) The PLO letter of September 9, 1993, to
15 the Prime Minister of Israel.
16 (2) The PLO letter of September 9, 1993, to
1 7 the Foreign Minister of Norway.
18 (3) The Declaration of Principles on Interim
19 Self-Government Arrangements signed in W&shing-
20 ton, DC. on September 13, 1993
21 (4) The Agreement between Israel and the PLO
22 signed in Cairo on May 4, 1 994.
23 (5) The Joint Communique between Israel and
24 the PLO issued at Blair House, in Washington,
25 DC. Kobmarv 12, 199:")
256
17
1 SBC. 7. REQUIREMENTS FOB THE TRANSFER OF FUNDS.
2 In General. — Notwithstanding any other provision
3 of law, none of the funds authorized or appropriated under
4 this or any other Act shall be made available, directly or
5 indirectly, to benefit Palestinians living under the adminis-
6 trative control of the PLO or the Palestinian Authority
7 in Gaza, Jericho or any other area it may control, until
8 the following requirements set forth in this section are
9 fully met and certified to Congress by the President of
10 the United States.
11 (1) Substantial, material and timely com-
12 PLIANCE. — That the PLO and the Palestinian Au
13 thority have made substantial, material and timely
14 progress in meeting their legal obligations as set
15 forth in the agreements between the PLO and Israel
16 and as enumerated in section 6 of this Act. The
17 President snail submit to the relevant congressional
IS committees a quarterly report that —
19 (A) comprehensively evaluates the compli-
20 ance record of the PLO according to each spe-
21 cifie commitment set forth in its agreements
22 with Israel;
23 (B) establishes, as appropriate, both objec-
24 tive and subjective measures to assess PLO
25 compliance; and
257
18
1 (C) measures PIX) compliance against
2 each previous quarterly assessment and dem-
3 onstrates significant and continual improvement
4 each quarter.
5 (2) Financial accountability. — Sixty days
6 following the enactment of this Act and every 180
7 days thereafter, the President of the United States
8 shall submit to the relevant congressional commit-
9 tees a financial audit carried out by the General Ae-
10 counting Office (GAO), which provides a full ac-
1 1 counting of all United States assistance which bene-
12 fits, directly or indirectly, the projects, programs or
13 activities of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, Jeri-
14 cho or any other area it may control, since Septem-
15 ber 13, 1993, including, but not limited to, the fol-
16 lowing) —
17 (A) the obligation and disbursal of all
18 funds, by project, activity, and date, as well as
19 by prime contractor, all subcontractors, and
20 their countries) of origin;
21 (B) the organization s) or individual(s) re-
22 sponsible for the receipt and obligation of U.S.
23 assistance;
24 (C) the amount of both private and inter-
25 national donor funds that benefit the PLO or
258
19
1 the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, Jericho or
2 any other area it may control, and to which tfoe
3 United States may he a contributor; and
4 (D) the ultimate beneficiaries of the assist -
5 ance.
6 (3) Report on the possible misuse of
7 FUNDS. — Pursuant to section 7(a), the President
8 shall also provide the relevant congressional commit-
9 tees with a comprehensive accounting of all United
10 States and International donor funds, credits, guar-
11 antees, insurance, in-kind assistance and other re-
12 source transfers to the PLO, the Palestinian Author
13 ity or other associated entities under their control
14 which the General Accounting Office believes may
1 5 have been misused, diverted or illegally converted for
16 purposes other than those originally intended by the
17 donors and shall include a discussion of —
18 (A) the possible reasons for the diversion
19 of resources and the likely use toward which
20 they were put;
21 (B) the manner and mechanism(s) by
22 which the resources were misdirected;
23 (C) the person(s) and institution likely re-
24 sponsible for the misdirection of the resources;
25 and
259
20
1 (D) the efforts being made by the Palestin-
2 ian Authority, the President and the inter-
3 national community to account for and recover
4 the misdirected resources.
5 (4) Penalties and deductions. — Not less
6 than thirty (30) days following the issuance to Con-
7 gress of the findings set forth in section 7(2) the
8 President shall deduct one dollar from the amount
9 of funds or other resources appropriated to benefit
10 Palestinians living in areas controlled by the Pal-
1 1 estinian Authority for each dollar which the General
12 Accounting Office is able to demonstrate may have
13 been diverted by Palestinians for purposes other
1 4 than what they were originally intended.
15 . (5) Accountability for past terrorism. —
16 The President shall certify to the relevant congres-
17 sional committees that the Palestine Liberation Or-
18 ganization has taken substantial, material and time-
19 ly steps to provide information to United States law
20 enforcement agencies leading to the arrest and ex-
21 tradition to the United States for prosecution of in-
22 dividuals connected directly or indirectly with the
23 Palestine Liberation Organization and alleged to
24 have been responsible for terrorist attacks on Amer-
260
21
1 ican citizens or property since 1964 to include, but
2 not be limited to, the kidnapping, or murders of —
3 (A) David Berger, in Munich, Germany,
4 September, 1972;
5 (B) Clco A. Noel, Jr , United States Am-
6 bassador to the Sudan, and G. Curtis Moore,
7 U.S. Diplomat, in Khartoum, March 2, 1973;
8 (C) Gail Rubin, in Israel, March 11, 1978;
9 (D) Leon Klinghoffer on the cruise ship
10 Achillc Lauro, October 8, 1985; and
11 (E) Gail Klein, in Jerusalem, October 15,
12 1986.
13 (6) Report to the congress. — Pursuant to
14 subsection (B) of this section, the President shall re-
15 port to the relevant congressional committees, in
16 both classified and unclassified form, no later than
17 September 1, 1995, and every 180 days thereafter,
18 on —
19 (A) the name, date, location, and cir-
20 cumstance of all Americans alleged to have been
21 killed or injured, directly or indirectly, by mem-
22 bers, agents, supporters or surrogates of the
23 Palestine Liberation Organization from 1964 to
24 the present;
261 ;
22
(
1 (B) the name, date, precise location, and
2 circumstance of all violent incidents against Is
3 raelis or others by any terrorist group, organi-
4 zation, entity or individual operating in Israel
5 or the territories controlled by Israel or the
6 PLO and to indicate —
7 (i) where the violent incident was
8 planned, organized and launched;
9 (ii) how and through what means the
10 violent incident was funded;
1 1 (iii) the source and type of any lethal
12 equipment used in any violent incident;
13 and
14 (iv) whether the United States has
15 been able to independently confirm infor-
16 mation provided by either Israel or the
17 PIX) regarding violent incidents reported
18 under this subsection.
19 (C) the status of all warrants issued by
20 United States law enforcement agencies,
21 Interpol, or other international police authori-
22 ties, for the arrest of members of the Palestine
23 Liberation Organization, to include, but not be
24 limited to, the name of the individual, the date
25 and nature of the crime alleged to have been
262
v
v
23
1 committed, the statute under which prosecution
2 is being sought, and the level and nature of the
3 cooperation provided by the Palestine Libera-
4 tion Organization in the apprehension, prosecu-
5 tion and conviction of this individual (s);
6 (D) the disposition of all past and current
7 investigations into the criminal activities of the
. 8 Palestine Liberation Organization as well as the
9 warrants for the arrest of alleged members of
10 the Palestine Liberation Organization that have
11 been revoked or suspended by agencies or enti-
12 ties of the United States Government since
13 1964 and reason for the revocation or suspen-
14 sion; and
15 <E) the name of any individual who cur-
16 rently serves as an official or agent of the Pal-
17 estine Liberation Organization or the Palcstin-
1 8 ian Authority who at any time has been subject
19 to a United States or international arrest war-
20 rant or has been placed on a United States
21 Government "watch list."
22 (7) Matters to be considered. — In deter-
23 mining whether to make the certification required by
24 subsection (4) of this section with respect to the
25 PLO, the President shall also consider and report,
263
24
1 in both classified and unclassified form, to the rel-
2 evant congressional committees the following:
3 (A) Have the actions of the PLO resulted
4 in the maximum reductions in terrorism carried
5 out by members or affiliates of the PLO? Has
6 the PLO leadership publicly, in Arabic, English
7 and Hebrew, and using all major print and elec-
8 tronic media outlets, strongly condemned acts
9 of terrorism against Israel and the West when
10 they occur?
1 1 (B) Has the PLO taken legal and law en-
12 forcement measures to enforce in areas under
13 its administrative control, to the maximum ex-
14 tent possible, the elimination of terrorist acts
15 and the suppression of criminal elements re-
16 sponsible for terrorism as evidenced by the sei-
17 zure of illegal weapons, the closure of offices
1 8 and training areas belonging to terrorist organi-
19 zations and the arrest and prosecution of viola-
20 tors involved in the incitement, recruitment,
21 training, planning, or conduct of terrorist oper-
22 ations affecting the United States, Israel or
23 other countries!
24 (C) Has the PLO taken the legal and law
25 enforcement steps necessary to eliminate, to the
264
25
1 maximum extent possible, the laundering of
2 profits derived from smuggling, narcotics traf-
3 ticking, illegal weapons transactions or other
4 criminal activity as evidenced by the enactment
5 and enforcement by the PLO of laws prohibit-
6 ing such conduct?
7 (D) Has the PLO taken the legal and law
8 enforcement steps necessary to eliminate, to the
9 maximum extent possible, bribery and other
10 forms of public corruption which facilitate the
11 execution of terrorist acts or which discourage
12 the investigation and prosecution of such acts,
13 as evidenced by the enactment and enforcement
14 of laws prohibiting such conduct?
15 (E) Has the PLO, as a matter of policy or
16 practice, encouraged or facilitated the continued
17 sponsorship of terrorist acts?
18 (P) Does any senior official of the PIjO
19 engage in, encourage, or facilitate the incite-
20 ment, recruitment, training, planning, or con-
21 duct of terrorist operations affecting the United
22 States, Israel or other states or condone other
23 internationally recognized criminal activity?
24 (G) Has the PLO investigated aggressively
25 all cases in which any citizen of the United
265
26
1 States or member of the United States Govern-
2 ment has been the victim, since 1964, of acts
3 or threats of violence, inflicted by or with the
4 complicity of any agent of the PLO or any po-
5 litica) subdivision or supporter thereof, and en-
6 ergetically sought to bring the perpetrators of
7 such offense or offenses to justice?
8 (H) Having been requested to do so by the
9 United States Government, does the PLO fail
10 to provide reasonable cooperation to lawful ac-
11 tivities of United States law enforcement
12 agents, including the refusal of permission to
13 such agents engaged in counter-terrorism to
14 pursue suspected terrorists or other criminal
15 elements that may support terrorist activities
16 into areas or facilities it controls?
17 (I) Has the PLO or its administrative au-
18 thority in Gaza and Jericho adopted legal codes
19 in order to enable law enforcement officials to
20 move more effectively against terrorists, the
21 supporters of terrorism and other related crimi-
22 nal elements, such as effective conspiracy laws
23 and asset seizure laws?
24 (J) Has the PIA) expeditiously processed
25 United States, Israeli, or other countries' extra-
266
27
1 dition requests relating to terrorism, narcotics
2 trafficking or other criminal offenses!
3 (K) Has the PLO refused to protect or
4 given haven to any known terrorist, drug traf-
5 ficker or other accused or convicted of a serious
6 criminal offense, and has it expeditiously proc-
7 essed extradition requests relating to acts of
8 terrorism or narcotics trafficking made by other
9 countries?
10 (L) Has the PLO cooperated, both publicly
11 and privately, with efforts undertaken by the
12 President of the United States to end the Arab
13 League boycott of Israel and if so, to what ex-
1 4 tent and to what practical effect*
15 (8) Victims of terrorism compensation. —
16 Pursuant to section 5570 of Public Law 99-399 no
17 funds shall be made available to benefit the PLO,
18 the Palestinian Authority, or any person or entity
19 under its control until the President certifies to the
20 relevant congressional committees that full and fair
21 compensation is provided by the Palestine Liberation
22 Organization to United States victims of PLO ter-
23 rorism after abjudication in a United States couit of
24 law.
267
28
1 (9) Preemption of terrorism. — The Presi-
2 dent shall make available to Israel, equipment for
3 the state-of-the-art security examination of cargo
4 containers and vehicles: Provided, That this equip-
5 ment shall include automated, nonintrusive inspec-
6 tion technology, or technologies, for the direct detec-
7 tion and chemical elemental identification of eontra-
8 band. Provided further, That some of this equipment
9 may be in the form of technology in the advanced
10 stages of development and suitable for field testing
1 1 and evaluation: Provided further, That not less than
12 $40,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated in fis-
13 cal year 1996 for the purposes set forth in this sec-
14 tion from the funds made available by the United
15 States to support the agreements between Israel and
16 the PLO: Provided further, That the President shall
17 negotiate the transfer of this technology no later
18 than September 30, 1995, and prior to the obliga-
19 tion of not more than $50,000,000 in United States
20 funds to benefit Palestinians living in Gaza, Jericho,
21 or any additional territories which might be adminis-
22 tered by the PLO: Provided farther, That it is the
23 purpose of this section to enable the United States
24 to support efforts by both Israel and the PLO to
25 meet their compliance obligations and —
268
29
1 (A) to assist them in combating terrorism;
2 (B) to assist them in combating narcotics
3 smuggling and other contraband smuggling;
4 and
5 (C) to assist them in ensuring proper
6 manifesting and customs regulation compliance
7 and revenue collection.
8 (10) Review of legislation. — Prior to the
9 disbursement of any funds authorized under this or
10 any other Act for the benefit of the PLO, the Pal-
11 estinian Authority or any of its constituencies, ac-
12 li vi ties or projects, the President shall carry out,
13 and report to the relevant congressional committees,
14 a thorough review of pertinent legislation affecting
15 the status of the PLO to include, but not be limited
16 to, title X of Public Law 100-204 and shall rec-
17 ommend to Congress modifications consistent with
18 United States policy toward countering terrorism
19 and promoting peace in the Middle East.
20 (11) Presidential disclosure. — No later
21 than 60 days following the enactment of this Act,
22 the President shall disclose in a classified maimer to
23 the relevant congressional committees, the substance
24 of any secret agreements, understandings, or prom-
25 ises, either formal or informal, between the United
269
30
1 States and Israel, and the United States and the
2 PLO, connected with the implementation of the Dec-
3 laration of Principles, that —
4 (A) commits the United States to any
5 course of action in its foreign, diplomatic or se-
6 curity policies;
7 (B) commits the United States to provide
8 funds or other forms of assistance for particu-
9 lar projects or activities;
10 (C) provides assurances to particular indi-
11 vi duals who may or may not be targets of a
12 United States or international criminal inves-
13 tigation; and
14 (D) extends to particular individuals the
15 promise of protection or safety should future
16 circumstances warrant it.
17 (12) Provisions that may be suspended. —
18 Subject to the requirements of section 7 and the
19 prior approval of the Chairmen of the relevant com-
20 mittees of the Congress of the United States the
21 President may suspend only the following provisions
22 of law for a period not to extend beyond May 31,
23 19%:
24 (A) Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance
25 Act of 1961 (22 I'.SIC. 2227) as it applies with
270
31
1 respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization
2 or entities associated with it.
3 (B) Section 114 of the Department of
4 State Authorization Act, fiscal years 1984 and
5 1985 (22 US.C. 287e note) as it applies with
6 respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization
7 or entities associated with it.
8 (C) Section 1003 of the Foreign Relations
9 Authorization Act, fiscal years 1988 and 1989
10 (22 U.S.C. 5202).
11 <D) Section 37 of the Bretton Woods
12 Agreement Act (22 U.S.C. 286w) as it applies
13 to the granting to the Palestine Liberation Or-
14 ganization of observer status or other official
15 status at any meeting sponsored by or associ-
16 ated with the International Monetary Fund. As
17 used in this paragraph, the term "other official
18 status" does not include membership in the
19 Internationa) Monetary Fund.
20 SEC. 8. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE.
21 (a) Within thirty (30) days of the enactment of this
22 Act, the President shall request that both the Palestine
23 Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority
24 provide to the United States, comprehensive financial
25 statements of their assets and income for the prior year:
271
32
1 Provided, That in addition to these statements, the Presi-
2 dent shall certify to the Congress that —
3 (1) the United States Government has no
4 knowledge or information as to other further assets
5 or income of the Palestine Liberation Organization
6 or Palestinian Authority; and
7 (2) the Palestine Liberation Organization and
8 Palestinian Authority are spending and investing
9 substantially all of their respective assets and in
10 come for the welfare and benefit of the Palestinian
11 people in the areas administered by the Palestinian
12 Authority and for purposes related exclusively to the
13 duties and functions of the Palestinian Authority as
14 authorized under agreements between Israel and the
15 PLO
16 (b) No funds shall be obligated or expended for the
17 benefit of the Palestinian people in areas administered by
18 the Palestinian Authority until the President has delivered
19 to the relevant congressional committees the information
20 required in section 8{a).
21 (c) The President shall report to the relevant congres-
22 siona) committees, in both classified and unclassified form,
23 no later than September lt 1995, and every 180 days
24 thereafter, on all assistance provided by the international
25 community to the PLO and the Palestinian Authority, or
272
33
1 an}' affiliated organization or entity, both directly and in-
2 directly, to include —
3 (1) the amount of such assistance, by project,
4 and whether the assistance is provided in cash or in
5 kind;
6 (2) the organization or entity through which the
7 international assistance is disbursed;
8 (3) the use(s), by project, to which the inter-
9 national assistance is being put; and
10 (4) the ultimate beneficiaries of the assistance.
1 1 SEC. 9. PROHIBITION ON FORMAL DIPLOMATIC REPRESEN-
12 TATTON.
13 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
14 President of the United States shall make no commit
15 ments and shall provide no funds for the obligation or ex-
16 penditure, for any activity leading to the establishment,
17 on either a temporary or permanent basis, of any United
18 States diplomatic post, to include an embassy, consulate
19 or interest section in any territory under the administra-
20 tive control of the PLO or the Palestinian Authority.
21 8EC. 10. RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
22 DEFINED.
23 As used in this Act, the term "relevant congressional
24 committees" means —
273
34
1 (1) the Committee on Internationa! Relations,
2 the Committee on Banking and Financial Services,
3 and the Committee on Appropriations of the House
4 of Representatives; and
5 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
6 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
7 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
8 SEC. 11. TERM OP THIS ACT.
9 This Act shall become effective upon the day of enact-
10 ment and expire no earlier than May 31, 1996, unless
1 1 amended.
O
274
IDF Judge Advocate-General Headquarters
Assistant to the Judge Advocate-General for International Law
13 December 1994
Subject: Concatenation of Palestinian Violations
1. The following is a concatenation of Palestinian violations and
deviations [from signed agreements], based on documents made available to
us from the Office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the
Territories, the Coordination and Control Administration Office in the
Territories, and the IDF Intelligence Branch, as well as facts and figures taken
out of documents regularly received by us.
Alongside every violation or deviation appears a short legal analysis
which notes the relevant directives in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement
(henceforth 'the agreement') in relation to which the violation or deviation
occurred.
2. It should be noted that this list does not pretend to include every
violation committed by the Palestinian Authority (PA) or its personnel.
Violations which appeared to be particularly esoteric were not included;
similarly, we did not include violations which occurred in very specific
circumstances — mostly, those which occurred in the months May-June, when
the transfer of authority took place and before the other party had even an
initial opportunity to organize itself (the violations we are speaking of here
mainly involved irregular behaviour on the part of Palestinian policemen).
In addition, we did not receive information on economic violations
from the Ministry of Finance, and the details on violations in this sphere
included in this document are based on the figures of the Office of the
Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. Similarly, we did
not receive a list of violations in the sphere of foreign affairs from the
Foreign Ministry, and the details on violations in this field are mainly based
on IDF Intelligence documents and on regular reports and correspondences
on the subject maintained by our office in the course of our work. We
275
presume that in these fields there are additional violations and deviations
from the agreement which we do not know of.
Security Related Violations
3. Details on these violations is mainly based on a concatenation of
violations prepared by the Coordination and Control Administration Office
in the Territories and on material included in his letter (attached is his letter
and material included in it) in addition to the IDF Intelligence Branch report.
Subjects which were raised in the framework of the [Joint Israeli-Palestinian]
Legal Committee were also included.
4. Requests for the transfer of suspects have elicited no answer from the
PA— two requests for the transfer of the following suspects were submitted to
the PA: the killers of Uri Megidish (first requested on 29 September 1994) and
the killers of Gil Revah and Shlomo Kappah in Ramie (first requested on 28
August 1994). These requests have yet to be answered. In addition, a non-
formal verbal request was made for the transfer of suspects involved in the
an attack on an Israeli in Kfar Yama.
Legal Analysis — Article II (7) of Annex HI to the agreement establishes
that Israel is entitled to request that the PA arrest and transfer to its authority
a person suspected of committing a crime falling under Israeli jurisdiction, as
long as the crime carries a penalty of at least seven years' imprisonment and
as long as the arrest warrant accompanying the request for transfer was issued
on the basis of the Attorney-General's recommendation. According to sub-
clause (f), a party receiving such a request must arrest the suspect and transfer
him to the custody of the requesting party.
5. The Handling of Terror Acts Perpetrated Against Israel and Israelis—
the question of whether the PA is living up to its commitments to take action
to prevent terror acts against the State of Israel is a question of judgement and
requires the taking of a political stand as to what the PA is expected to do in
this matter.
With respect to the investigation of terror acts, once again it is a
question of judgement as to what extent the investigations that have been
carried out were handled in a serious manner.
A separate question relates to reporting on investigations that are
under way. The PA has not reported [to Israel] on investigations [it has carried
out]. A formal request to receive updates on the status of investigations in the
matters of four incidents in which Israelis were killed and injured in the Gaza
Strip was submitted to the PA in the framework of a meeting of the Legal
Committee on 27 November 1994.
Legal Analysis — Article XVIII of the agreement establishes that both
sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism,
crime and hostilities directed against each other, and shall take legal measures
276
against offenders. It especially stresses that the PA shall act to prevent hostile
acts directed against the Settlements.
Article I (5) of Annex III establishes that with respect to crimes
committed within the territory of the Palestinian Authority, the PA shall take
measures to investigate and prosecute suspects, and shall report to Israel on
the result of the investigation and any legal proceedings.
6. Non-compliance With the Commitment to Prevent Acts of Incitement
Against Israel — there have been many incidents of wild incitement against
Israel in which the PA has not taken action in order to intervene and prevent
their occurrence.
Legal Analysis — Article XII of the agreement establishes that Israel and
the PA shall prevent acts of hostile propaganda against each other and shall
take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups
or individuals within their jurisdiction.
7. Submission of Lists of Policemen — the PA has yet to submit to Israel
the list of the names of policemen who were recruited from amongst the
residents of the Gaza Strip and Jericho.
Legal Analysis — Article HI (4) (b) of Annex I states that the list of
Palestinians recruited to the Palestinian Police, whether locally or from
abroad, shall be agreed on by both sides.
8. Arrests of Israeli Citizens — there have been reports of a number of
incidents in which Israelis have been arrested by the Palestinian Police. A list
of 13 such incidents was submitted to the PA in the Joint Legal Committee
meeting of 27 November 1994.
Legal Analysis — Article Vm (4) (b) of Annex I establishes that Israelis
shall not be arrested by Palestinian policemen under any circumstances. The
Palestinian Police may only stop an Israeli suspected of committing a crime
and detain him in place until an Israeli official or joint patrol arrives on the
scene. A similar directive appears in Article II of Annex HI.
9. Delays of Israeli-licensed Vehicles in the Territory of the Palestinian
Authority — no details on concrete incidents have been given to us (IDF
Intelligence Branch reports contain a number of examples, including cases in
which vehicles were flying Israeli flags and ordered to remove them).
Legal Analysis — Article VITJ (4) (a) of Annex I establishes that Israeli-
licensed vehicles traveling in the territory of the PA may be stopped by the
Palestinian Police for the inspection of licences and identifying documents.
The Palestinian Police may not delay an Israeli vehicle for any other reason.
Article II (2) (d) of Annex ITJ establishes that the PA may take steps to detain
an Israeli-licensed vehicle if it was involved in the perpetration of a crime of
if it poses an immediate danger to public health or security. In such cases the
PA must immediately inform Israel of the incident.
277
10. Delays of Israeli Security Forces at Checkposts — the frequency of this
phenomenon, according to Coordination and Control Administration Office
in the Territories, has been decreasing.
Legal Analysis — Article VIII (6) of Annex I establishes that the
Palestinian Police may not under any circumstances ,stop or detain
uniformed members of the Israeli military forces, as well as vehicles
belonging to the Israeli military forces. Article II (4) of the agreement includes
in its definition of "Israeli military forces" the Israel Police as well as other
Israeli security forces.
11. Movement of Palestinian Police through 'Blue Areas' — there have
been incidents in which Palestinian Police have traveled within the
boundaries of the Settlements, without prior coordination with Israel.
According to figures provided by the Coordination and Control
Administration Office in the Territories, there is a decreasing trend in the
frequency of this violation. (According to an IDF Intelligence Branch report,
there was an attempt by Palestinian Policemen to make contact with
collaborators in Kfar Denia)
Legal Analysis — Article V of the agreement establishes that the
territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority does not extend to Israeli
Settlements and Israeli military installations. Article HI (1) (a) of Annex I
establishes that the Palestinian Police is responsible for public order and
internal security only in those territories given over to the territorial
jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority and must act accordingly. From
other directives appearing in the agreement it can clearly be understood that
Palestinian Police on duty may not enter Israeli Settlements of Military
installations.
12. Independent Palestinian Police Activity on the Lateral Roads — the
Palestinian Police has executed independent activities on the Lateral Road,
outside of the framework of the Joint Patrols. Again, this violation occurred
frequently mainly in the initial period after the transfer of authority, but it
does still occur.
Legal Analysis — Article IV (7) of Annex I establishes that the Lateral
Roads shall be under the responsibility of Israel, which is entitled to execute
independent activities on them, alongside Joint Patrols led by an Israeli
vehicle. Accordingly, independent Palestinian activities are prohibited on
these roads.
13. Palestinian Police in Camouflaged Fatigues — members of the
Palestinian Police have been seen in movement while dressed in
camouflaged fatigues sewn in the West Bank.
Legal Analysis — Article m (5) (b) (5) of Annex I establishes that the
Palestinian Police shall posses distinctive uniforms. According to what we
have been told, in the framework of the Joint Security Committee
discussions, it was agreed that Palestinian Police shall wear only uniforms of
278
particular colours and it was also established, in any event, that their
movement in camouflaged fatigues shall be prohibited.
14. Movement of Members of the Palestinian Police Without Permits —
there have been incidents in which members of the Palestinian Police have
traveled from Jericho to the Gaza Strip (via Israel and the West Bank)
without permits.
Legal Analysis — Article m (1) (b) of Annex I establishes that the
movement of Palestinian Police between Jericho and the Gaza Strip will be
conducted in accordance with Article IX of the same Annex. Article IX (2)
establishes that a travel permit or permit for entry into Israeli is required as a
condition for use of the safe passage roads [between Jericho and the Gaza
Strip]. Currently, the arrangements for safe passage have not yet been put in
force, and therefore the usual rules requiring an entry permit to Israel (not a
travel permit from one zone to another) apply.
As to movement in the West Bank, residents of Jericho may freely
move within the West Bank (subject to the laws in force in the West Bank,
such as the requirement to carry identifying documents), but Palestinian
police may not operate in the West Bank, and therefore Palestinian Police in
uniform may not travel there.
15. Palestinian Police Driving Stolen Vehicles — members of the
Palestinian Police have been spotted driving stolen vehicles.
Legal Analysis — Such activity by the Palestinian Police stands in
contradiction to the spirit of the agreement and the very idea behind the
creation of the Palestinian Police Force. In particular, the following articles
may be noted: Article XII (2) of the agreement establishes that Israel and the
PA will cooperate in combating criminal activities, including offenses related
to vehicles; Article III (2) of Annex I establishes that, amongst the tasks of the
Palestinian Police, are the prevention of crime; and Article II (1) of Annex m
establishes that the Palestinian Police and the Israeli Police will cooperate and
assist one another in criminal matters.
16. Use of Weapons Belonging to the Palestinian Police In the Course of a
Terrorist Attack in Jerusalem — in the course of a terrorist attack in Jerusalem
on 9 October 1994, use was made of a Kalashnikov rifle belonging to the
Palestinian Police, which entered the country through the Allenby Bridge for
use by the Palestinian Police. The issue was first brought up with the
Palestinians on 11 October 1994.
Legal Analysis — Article IX of the agreement establishes that the
provisions regarding the structure of the Palestinian Police, including its
weaponry, is set out in detail in Annex I. Indeed, Annex I, in Article m (5)
establishes in detail the types and numbers of weapons which are permitted
to be used by the Palestinian Police. It is clear that weapons which have been
permitted to enter the territory under this article are to be used only by the
police and any other use is a violation of the agreement. Despite this, it must
279
be noted that the burden is on us to prove that the police weapon was
knowingly delivered to the terrorists. If all that is involved here is negligence
it will be difficult for us to press claims against them (see the issue of weapons
stolen from the IDF mentioned in paragraph 6 above). In such cases all that
can be done is to request that they investigate what occurred.
Other relevant directives appear in Article IX (3) of the agreement and
Article VHI (3) of Annex I which establishes that private individuals are
prohibited from bearing arms and that each side is charged with enforcing
this prohibition.
17. Subpeoning of Witnesses for Testimony in Court — the PA was sent a
letter on 28 September 1994, in which it was requested to prepare subpoenas
for witnesses residing in Gaza whose testimony is required in legal
proceedings in the Military Court in Erez and the Military Court of the IDF
Southern Command. The requests were not responded to.
Legal Analysis — Article II (9) of Annex HI establishes that when a
subpoena calling a witness to testify has been issued by an Israeli court
relating to a person located in the territories of the PA, such person shall be
located by the PA, which will be responsible for seeing that the subpoena be
enforced by the Palestinian Police.
18. Released Prisoners in the Jericho Area and Gaza Who Leave For the
West Bank — a number of prisoners who were released on condition that they
remain in the Jericho Area, as well as prisoners transferred to prison in Gaza,
have been caught moving about the West Bank, without a permit to do so.
Among those transferred to the Gaza Strip were a number of prisoners who
received a pardon from the Palestinian Chairman. One of the prisoners even
claimed that he was recruited into the ranks of the Palestinian Intelligence
services and was even armed by them.
Legal Analysis — Article XX (1) of the agreement establishes that
prisoners turned over to the PA in the framework of the confidence building
measures shall be obliged to remain in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area for
the remainder of their sentence. Therefore, the granting of legitimacy to the
passage of such released prisoners to the West Bank (or even pretending
ignorance in the matter) on the part of the PA stands in contravention to the
agreement.
The recruitment of a former prisoner to the Palestinian Intelligence
service stands in contravention to the directives of Article HI (4) (b) of Annex
I, according to which the list of Palestinians recruited shall be agreed on by
both sides and the employment of those who have been convicted of serious
crimes will be immediately terminated.
19. Non-compliance With the Requirement to Prevent Infiltrations into
Israel and Egypt — there is a definite phenomenon of infiltrators crossing the
border between Egypt and Gaza and similarly of infiltrators from Gaza to
Israel.
280
Legal Analysis — In all aspects relating to infiltrations into Israel
through the Green Line, Article IV (2) (c) of Annex I establishes that the
Palestinian Police will enforce measures aimed at preventing infiltrations.
As for infiltrations to Egypt, the PA is generally committed to
preventing criminal acts.
20. Deviations from the Agreement Regarding Maritime Activity — there
have been cases in which Palestinian ships have deviated from the zones set
aside for their navigation rights (Zones K and M), with the Palestinian
Coastal Police taking no action to prevent such activity. In addition, there
have been incidents in which the Palestinian Police have themselves
deviated from the navigation range permitted them in Zone L.
Legal Analysis — Article XI (1) of Annex I establishes the extent of
Maritime Activity Zones and determines that in Zones K and M navigation
will be restricted solely to activity of the Israel Navy (Clause (a) (1) (c)) and
that the navigation of vessels in Zone L shall be subject to various restrictions
(Clause (2) (b) (1)).
Article XI (2) of the Annex establishes that the Palestinian Coastal
Police may function in Zone L up to a distance of 6 nautical miles from the
coast. In special cases, it may also exercise control in an additional area up to
the limit of 12 nautical miles from the coastline.
21. Weapons in the Possession of Civilians — this issue was raised in the
report of the Coordination and Control Administration Office in the
Territories. From various reports we have learned that the PA is not taking
action to disarm Palestinian civilians, even when such civilians walk around
with their weapons on them in a non-concealed manner.
Recently it has been made known to us that the PA has issued licences
permitting residents to bear arms, but, it appears, this licensing was not
coordinated with Israel.
Legal Analysis — Article VEH (8) of Annex I establishes that each side
shall enforce upon civilians subject to it authority a prohibition on possession
or carrying weapons without a licence. Clause (3) of Article VEH (8) permits
the PA to grant licences for the possession of pistols for civilian use, but
restricts such licences only to those which will be agreed upon in the Joinst
Security Committee.
22. Abuse of Collaborators — this subject was raised in the report of the
Coordination and Control Administration Office in the Territories. From
various reports it transpires that the PA has been arresting individuals
suspected of collaboration and interrogating them, and there were even cases
in which they were brutalized.
Legal Analysis — Article XX (4) of the agreement establishes that the
Palestinian side commits itself to solving the problem of those Palestinians
who were in contact with the Israeli authorities. Until an agreed solution is
found, the Palestinian side undertakes not to prosecute these Palestinians or
281
to harm them in any way. Arbitrary arrests and demeaning and painful
interrogations are in contravention to the commitment not to harm
collaborators.
23. From the IDF Intelligence Branch report a number of additional issues
relating to security violations are mentioned, as briefly reviewed here:
a. Incidents in which Palestinian Police aimed their weapons at Israelis,
cocked their rifles and at times even shot in their direction. Legal Analysis —
The Palestinian Police have no authority to arrest Israelis, as explained above,
and therefore they have no authority to take measures aimed at capturing
suspects. In addition, Article VHI (9) (c) of Annex I establishes that the use of
firearms is permitted only in incidents constituting a danger to life or
property and then only as a last resort after all attempts at controlling the act
or the incident in other ways have failed.
b. Incidents in which vehicles belonging to the Palestinian Police have
broken through IDF checkpoints in the Jericho Area. Legal Analysis —
According to the agreement the PA has no authority to act outside the
boundaries of Gaza and Jericho, and therefore Palestinian Police are not
permitted to enter the West Bank in uniform or in official police vehicles.
Within the West Bank, the IDF has full security authority, including the
authority to establish roadblocks and stop vehicles, and members of the
Palestinian Police must comply with the soldiers' directives in the same
manner as any other persons in the area.
c. An incident in which a vehicle belonging to the Palestinian Police
traveled from Jericho to Auja without an accompaniment.
Legal Analysis — Article V (1) of Annex I clarifies that Route 90, which
crosses Auja, is under Israeli authority. This is also applicable with respect to
that [part of] road leading from the Jericho Area to Auja. Therefore, the
Palestinian Police has no authority whatsoever to travel along this road.
General Violations
24. The details mentioned here are based on the report of the Coordination
and Control Administration Office in the Territories, on reports issued by the
IDF Intelligence Branch and also on documents which have arrived at our
office, dealing with various topics.
25. Activities of PA Agents in the West Bank (in Matters Which Have Not
Yet Been Transferred to the Authority of the PA) — there are numerous
examples of such violations, in the civilian sphere as well as the security
sphere.
282
These activities are particularly prominent in the sphere of local
authority. The person in charge of local authorities for the PA, Saeb Areikat,
directly operates in the West Bank, for example by changing the status of local
councils, issuing orders to the heads of local councils, calling on residents of
the West Bank to approach the offices of the PA for various services, etc.
An additional sphere in which there is continuous and prominent
activity is the operation of agents of the Palestinian Preventive Security
Apparatus, headed by Jibril Rajoub, who move about the West Bank and
issue direct orders to people there.
In addition, there have been incidents in other spheres in which
authority has been extended [by the PA] to the West Bank, such as the issuing
of licences to businesses operating there. It is also known that in a number of
incidents offices of the PA have been opened in the West Bank, such as
branches of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the Ministry of
Information in Ramallah, etc.
Beyond the above mentioned, there are activities which are less active
and are expressed by the demonstrative presence of PA officials in the West
Bank, such as in tours, working meetings, lectures and attendance at
ceremonies.
Legal Analysis — Article V of the agreement limits the authority of the
PA to the boundaries of Gaza and Jericho, and neither the PA nor its officials
have authority to act outside these boundaries.
The Agreement on The Preparatory Transfer of Authority in the West
Bank (henceforth — the West Bank Agreement) establishes in a detailed
manner the authorities transferred to the PA in each relevant sphere and also
establishes that the Military Administration and the Civilian Administration
will continue to implement their authorities in spheres which have not been
transferred (Article VI (5)).
26. Activities of the PA in Jerusalem or in Connection to Jerusalem — this
issue requires additional inspection with the Foreign Ministry given the lack
of clarification with regard to various agreements in this subject.
Legal Analysis — As stated above, the PA may not extend its authority
outside the areas given over to its responsibility. In the matter of Jerusalem, it
was specifically established in the Declaration of Principles and the West Bank
Agreement that the PA has no authority with respect to Jerusalem (see
above).
27. Ignoring Laws and Regulations from the Period of Israeli Rule — the
newspaper 'Al-Kuds' published an announcement according to which [legal
officials] are to ignore all laws passed since 5 June 1967. The announcement
was worded in such a way that it can be understood to apply to the West Bank
as well. In practice, since the announcement there have been a number of
public expressions [by Palestinians] which indicate that the officials of the PA
are ignoring security legislation.
283
10
Legal Analysis — Article VII (9) of the agreement establishes that
legislation that was in force in Gaza and Jericho on the date of the signing of
the agreement will remain in force until such time as it is changed or
amended in accordance with the agreement, that is, after such changes have
been approved by the Joint Legislative Subcommittee.
28. Legislation Passed Without Being Submitted for Approval — from
various reports it transpires that the PA has been issuing new laws, in
various spheres, which have not been submitted for approval by the Joint
Legislative Subcommittee. The Palestinians claim that they have only issued
drafts of laws and have not yet publicized final legislative decisions, but from
a report issued by the Advisor for Arab Affairs in the West Bank it transpires
that recently the first volume of the Official Gazette of the PA has been
published, including within it legislation and organizational directives issued
by the Chairman of the PA. In addition, it is known to us that, in various
spheres, the Palestinians are operating according to laws which are different
from the laws which were in force on the eve of the transfer of authority. It
follows that one of the following two possibilities is true — either new
legislation has been issued without having been submitted for approval by
the Legislative Subcommittee, or there is a willful ignorance of the existing
legislation, as stated in Paragraph 27 above. For example, a district court has
been established in the Jericho Area, and the Jericho court is formally
subordinate to the Supreme Court in Gaza. Such [an administrative] act
requires an amendment in [the existing] legislation.
Legal Analysis — Article VII of the agreement establishes that the PA
will submit its own primary and secondary legislation to a Joint Legal
Subcommittee as a condition for the legislation's coming into force.
29. Changes in the Composition of the PA Without an Exchange of
Letters — it known that there have been a number of changes in the
composition of the PA which have not been formally announced to Israel.
For example, the appointment of Hassan Tahboub as responsible for the
Office of Religious Affairs and the termination of the appointment of Faisal
Husseini (as per his testimony).
Legal Analysis — Article IV (3) of the agreement establishes that changes
in the composition of the PA will be effected via the exchange of letters
between the PA and the government of Israel.
30. The Issuance of Documents by the PA Bearing the Title "The
Palestinian National Authority" — the PA has been using the title "The
Palestinian National Authority" on various occasions, in formal letters,
forms, etc. From reports issued by the IDF Intelligence Branch it transpires
that the use of such a title has been used even in an international agreement
signed by the PLO (with UNESCO), and that, in addition, the (non-official)
Arabic version of the same agreement bore the words 'State of Palestine'.
284
12
With regard to Jerusalem, it was explicitly stated in the Declaration of
Principles, in a comment on the transfer of authority in Article VI, that the
PA has no authority with respect to the affairs of Jerusalem. A directive in
this spirit appears in Article HI (2) of the West Bank Agreement.
Religious affairs on the West Bank have not yet been transferred to the
PA and therefore its representatives have no authority, as such, in this sphere
in the West Bank. There is, however, some difficulty [in determining this]
when the actions are taken by a body 'wearing two hats' — as part of the PA
and as the Supreme Islamic Council.
34. The Printing of Passports Differing from What Was Agreed Upon — the
PA has ordered from a German printing house the printing of passports
whose format differs from what was agreed upon in the agreement, including
special passports for VEPs and service passports.
Legal Analysis — Article II (b) (27) (0 of Annex II to the agreement
permits the printing of Palestinian passports, whose format is established in
detail in section C of the annex. Deviations from the agreed format and the
preparation of special passports are violations. It should be noted that the
issuance of service passports can be seen as the execution of powers in the
sphere of foreign affairs, in contravention to the directives of Article VI (2) (a)
of the agreement which establishes that the PA shall not have powers in the
sphere of foreign relations.
35. The Forging of Documents for the Purpose of Entering into Israel —
there is a wide phenomenon of forging documents (such as labour court
subpoenas, medical and hospital documents) for the purpose of entering into
Israel, as well as the forging of driver licences, insurance papers etc. The PA is
not combating this phenomenon of forgeries. In addition, there are incidents
in which employees of the PA are themselves involved in the forging of
documents (for example, there is an incident in which the names of students
which appeared on lists approved for entry into Israel were changed).
Legal Analysis — There is no specific directive in the agreement with
regard to forgeries, but it is clear that a criminal act is involved in the act of
forgery, and there are clauses requiring the PA to assist Israel in combating
crime (such as Article XII (2) of the agreement) as detailed above.
When the forgeries are committed by the PA there is a lack of good
faith in the implementation of the agreement and such forgeries are in
contravention of the spirit and goals of the agreement, which are aimed at
building trust and confidence between the two sides (see, for example, the
preamble to the agreement and Articles XII and XX).
36. Lack of Supervision and Enforcement With Regard to Illegal
Construction — within the boundaries of the PA buildings are being
constructed in contravention to the building and construction codes
established by the agreement.
285
ii
Legal Analysis — In the Declaration of Principles, in Annex n, it was
established that a 'Palestinian Authority' shall be established in Gaza and
Jericho. The PA was established under Article III of the agreement, bearing
that [exact] title [i.e. 'Palestinian Authority']. There is no basis for the use of
the title 'Palestinian National Authority' and such use is a form of violation
of the agreement. The use of the title 'State of Palestine' stands in
contradiction to the Declaration of Principles (see Article I of the DOP). From
agreements which have been signed in the wake of the DOP it is clear that the
[Palestinian] entity which has been established is not a state but a self-ruling
authority for the interim period, and that the use of terms such as "Palestine"
instead of 'the Palestinian Self-Rule' or 'the Palestinian Authority' is
prohibited.
31. An Attempt to Establish a Municipal Guard in Nablus — the PA has
attempted to establish a Municipal Guard in Nablus, after members of the
Guard underwent a training course in Jericho under the auspices of the
Palestinian Police. The establishment of such a guard was not coordinated
with the Civilian Administration on the West Bank and there was no
coordination with our office.
Legal Analysis — As detailed above, the PA has no authorities
whatsoever in the security sphere in the West Bank. In addition, no
authorities in the municipal sphere have been transferred to the PA, so that
there is not even an ostensible basis for the establishment of such a Guard by
the PA. The establishment of a Guard in Nablus also constitutes in and of
itself a violation of the laws of the West Bank.
Violations in the Civilian Sphere
32. Details on the violations mentioned in this section are mainly based
on a concatenation [of such violations] prepared by the Coordinator of
Government Activities in the Territories.
33. Responsibility for Wakf (Islamic Religious) Affairs in Jerusalem and the
West Bank — the person responsible for the Office of Religious Affairs in the
PA announced, in the capacity of his title as Chairman of the Supreme
Islamic Council, that his office is now responsible for the holy sites of
Jerusalem. In addition, the same person (who designates himself as "the
Minister of Religious Affairs) has taken upon himself responsibility with
regard to the Wakf (Islamic Religious System) in the West Bank (following
the Jordanian announcement that it no longer has any connection to the
Wakf) and the Wakf in Jerusalem (in parallel to the Jordanian claims [on the
Jerusalem Wakf]).
Legal Analysis — Article V of the agreement limits the jurisdiction of
the PA to the boundaries of Gaza and Jericho and neither the PA nor its
officials have any authority to operate outside these boundaries.
ii nnn r\
286
13
Legal Analysis — Article VI of Annex I establishes the various
limitations on planning and construction in the vicinity of the Green Line
and Lateral Roads. The absence of enforcement by the PA and the resultant
deviations from this article are violations of the agreement.
37. The Construction of a Temporary Port in Gaza Without
Coordination — the PA has begun constructing a harbour which is to serve as
a temporary port, without coordinating the matter [with Israel] and without
submitting appropriate plans for discussion in the Joint Construction and
Building Committee.
Legal Analysis— Article XI (4) of Annex I establishes that the
construction of a port in Gaza will be agreed upon in negotiations between
the two sides, and from this it is clear that the PA is prohibited from
constructing one independently. In addition, the PA has not submitted to
Israel a copy of the construction plans for the port, in contravention to the
directives of Article II (b) (32) of Annex II, which deals with building and
construction.
38. The Distribution of Stamps In Contravention to the Agreement — the
PA has distributed stamps in Gaza which contain nationalistic symbols,
including the words "Palestine" and with a price listed in "mils"1.
Legal Analysis— Article II (b) 26 (b) of Annex II establishes directives
with respect to the appearance and format of Palestinian stamps. According to
the article, the word "Palestine" will not appear on the stamp, only
"Palestinian Authority", and nationalistic symbols are not to appear. In
addition, the price listed on the stamps must be in the legal tender of the
territory. The 'mil' is not legal tender, according to Article IV (10) of Annex
IV.
39. Lack of Submission of Land Registry Records to the Relevant Israeli
Authorities — the PA has not submitted to the relevant Israeli authorities the
original Land Registry Records which relate to land within Israeli Settlements
and Military Installations. It should be noted that a request for the return of
these records was turned down by the PA, which claimed that, among other
reasons, it was not required to return these records under the agreement.
Legal Analysis— Article II (B) (22) of Annex II establishes that the PA
will receive authority over land registration, except for the land registration
in Israeli Settlements and Military Installations. Article II (A) (2) establishes
that all records and documents necessary for the functioning of the PA be
turned over to it. Parts of the land registry documentation touching upon
lands which remained in Israel's jurisdiction were not supposed to have been
transferred to the PA, but given that they were transferred, for technical
reasons, the refusal of the PA to return them indicates a lack of good faith in
1 Translator's note: 'mil' is a currency formerly in use in British Mandate Palestine
287
14
the implementation of the agreement, even though there is no violation of
an explicit directive in the agreement.
40. Non-payment of Water Supply Costs to the 'Mekorot' Corp. — water
supply costs have not yet been paid to Mekorot.
Legal Analysis — Article n (B) (31) (e) of Annex II establishes that the PA
shall pay Mekorot for the cost of the water supplied from Israel and for the
real expenses incurred in supplying water to the Palestinian Authority. Non-
payment of these expenses is a violation of this article.
41. Exporting of Defective Agricultural Products from Gaza to Israel — the
PA has not executed proper veterinary supervision over agricultural products
exported from Gaza to Israel and as a result rotten eggs, vegetables which had
been irrigated with sewage water, etc., have been exported.
Legal Analysis — Article VIE (2) to Annex VI establishes that the
veterinary and plant protection services of each side will be responsible for
controlling animal health, animal products and plants and parts thereof, in
their respective jurisdictions. Article VIH (3) establishes that these official
services will take all measures to reach equivalent and compatible standards
between Israel and the Territories and will make arrangements to prevent the
spread of plant and animal pests and diseases. In the veterinary sphere there
are additional directives limiting the passage from the PA to Israel of
deliveries of animals and their products (including eggs) without permits
which assert that they meet necessary veterinary standards.
42. Counterfeit Israeli Products in Gaza — soaps and deodorants [falsely]
bearing the label "Neka 7", which were produced in Gaza, have been
uncovered.
Legal Analysis — Article IX (4) of Annex rv, dealing with industrial
matters, establishes that the two sides will cooperate in preventing 'deceptive
practices'. Article IX (3) establishes that each side will do its best to avoid
damage to the industry of the other side.
43. A Palestinian Fund for Road Accident Victims Compensation Has Not
Yet Been Established —
Legal Analysis — Article XI (2) (a) of Annex IV establishes that the PA
will establish such a fund for the compensation of road accident victims who
are not covered by insurance for bodily injury.
44. The Issuance of International Driver Licences — the PA has issued
international driver licences in contravention to the agreement which states
that such licences may only be issued by the Israel Automobile Association. In
addition, the licence bears the title 'Palestine'.
Legal Analysis — The Israel Transport Ministry's position is that the
issuance of international licences is an act which falls under the sphere of
international relations and therefore the PA is prohibited from doing so
288
15
under Article VI (2) (a) of the agreement which establishes that the PA will
not have any powers in foreign relations.
As for the use of the title 'Palestine' — see above Paragraph 41.
45. Issuance of New Automobile Licence Plates — the PA has issued new
automobile licence plates without updating the Israeli Transport Ministry.
Legal Analysis — At the conclusion of discussions held by the
Subcommittee on Transport the form and appearance of automobile licence
plates for vehicles in the PA was agreed upon and it was established that if the
PA wants to add an additional type of licence plate the matter must be
coordinated in the framework of the Subcommittee.
Violations in the Sphere of Foreign Relations
46. The details on these violations are based on a report prepared by the
IDF Intelligence Branch.
47. The appointment of Zuhadi Al Kidra as the PA representative in Egypt,
in addition to his title as PLO representative there.
Legal Analysis — Article VI (2) (a) of the agreement establishes that the
PA will not have any powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign
relations. Exceptions to this refer solely to [activities permitted to] the PLO, as
opposed to the PA.
48. Morocco has opened a 'liaison office' in Gaza. Its representative
submitted a letter of credentials' to Arafat .
Legal Analysis — Article VI (2) (c) of the agreement establishes that a
representative office of a foreign nation may be opened in the territory of the
PA, for the purpose of implementing agreements which the PLO has signed
in the name of the PA with that nation, in accordance with clause (b) of the
Article VI (2). In this case, there is no such agreement which the above
mentioned office is to implement. Therefore, its existence is a form of
violation.
49. The PLO Representative in Moscow signed a protocol on security
cooperation with Russia, in the name of the PA. According to the protocol the
Russian Defence Ministry is to provide security training to teams of
Palestinians.
Legal Analysis — Article VI (2) (b) of the agreement establishes various
categories of types of international agreements which the PLO is permitted to
sign for the PA. Security cooperation agreements are not listed in this clause
[as being permissible].
50. 'Palestine' has joined the International Airport Council. It appears that
this refers to the PA joining the council.
289
16
Legal Analysis — As stated, the PA has no powers in the sphere of
foreign relations. As for the PLO, joining [an international body] is not one of
the foreign relations tasks that it is entitled to implement for the PA.
In addition, from Article XII of Annex I, which deals with airspace
issues, it is clear that there was no intention of permitting the PA to join the
ICAO (International Civilian Aviation Organization), since all activity
involving the ICAO must handled by either Israel or another member state.
(See clauses 5 and 10 of Article XII). We can conclude from this that the PA
has no authority to join any other international aviation organization.
Conclusion
51. The detailed listing of violations brought forward in this document is,
one the one hand, not meant to be exhaustive of all violations committed by
the PA, whether knowingly or not, and on the other hand is not limited
solely to substantial and fundamental violations which justify their being
discussed at the highest levels.
The goal of this document is to present in a concentrated manner all
the fundamental violations which have occurred since the agreement went
into effect, except for those violations which had been stopped or corrected by
the time of the writing of this document. This document can form the basis
for other documents on the subject of violations, in various categories and in
greater or lesser generality, depending on the subject matter and the needs of
the documents' composers.
52. It should be noted that if there are those who would want to use this
document as the basis for discussions with the Palestinians, we would
recommend that the Israeli side be backed up with detailed documents which
include figures and examples of violations, in order to be prepared to answer
Palestinian charges that these are empty claims, and in order to prevent them
from 'returning the ball to our court'.
53. As for the continued handling of violations in the future, it appears
that there is a need for the formation of a body that can monitor all the
violations on a continual basis, as well as a need to decide who will be
empowered to decide how to deal with the violations.
David Yahav, Col.
Assistant to the Judge Advocate General
for International Law
290
0«U 2?/WM T«n«: 14:M:M Fagf 1 el 2
For Immediate Release
THR PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY • MINISTRY OP INFORMATION
Ramellah. September 23. 19&5
The Amencan decision to extend financial assistance to the Palestinian National
Authority contradicts any accepted practice. 1 his decision that was taken while
handcuffed with the heavy chains of conditions. It is provocative and insulting to the
Palestinian national feelings. The decision is a flagrant intrusion in internal Palestinian
matters. There Is no doubt that this decision has aroused the envy of the majority of
Knesset members from the far and extreme right because their colleagues in the
American Congress have set a record for themselves In the competition of hatred
towards the Palestinian people, its leadership and its national rights.
The American Congress has placed at the very heart of its conditions the closing of
Palestinian institutions In Jerusalem and the cessation of support by the Palestine v
National Authority for these institutions This exposes the true face of American policy
towards the Holy City, a policy that supports and assists further Jewish occupation of
Jerusalem, its annexation to Israel and It further confirms Israel's claims that Jerusalem
is Its united, everlasting capital This stance Is a natural extension of the American veto
in the United Nations which stood in the way of the Security Council's decision to call
for a haft to the confiscation of land and settlement In the Arab cfry]of Jerusalem] The
question that must [now] be asked is how does the Congress allow Itself to call for the
closure of Institutions that emerged from the vital needs of the Jerusalemrte
community How does Congress allow Itself to oct in a racist manner towards the
Palestinian people by denying It the simplest right to civil Institutions
The institutions, that were established by the Palestinian people and protected by them
and have never ceased to be protected by them, are one of the fruits of the long
struggle of the Palestinian people. This is one of their basic rights which thoy did not
borrow from anyone and will not negotiate or bargain for them with anybody. They
cannot be considered as merchandise by the American Congress that may think thoy
can be paid for. Therefore, their offer is rejected by the Palestinian National Authority
both in its details and its totality. It would be more suitable for the members of the
American Congress to know well that the Palestinian institutions and rights are not foi
sate or exchange for all the funds in the entire American Treasury.
The bounds have been overstepped above and beyond meosure. The American
Congress has relinquished the American role as a sponsor of the OOP and declared rts
absoluto partiality In the Interest of the worst and most damaging of Israeli
interpretations, by rushing ahead more than the Israelis themselves have done when
they (members of Congress] demanded the cancelling of some articles in the
Palestinian National charter and when they demanded Palestinian co-operation with
Israel In surrendering wanted Palestinian citizens to It despite the fact that this demand
violates the signed agreements between the PLO and the government of Israel
According to all criteria, this is a c'ieai lelinquishment of the supposed US rote as a
neut:al sponsor. This hostile policy to the Palestinian National Authority and the
291
M«: 21/S/M TMw: H:0t:S7 Pag* 2 of 2
Palestinian people will only present additional hardships to the building of the Palestine
National Authority at a lime when it was expected that the United States was to fill a
role of support to the process rather than hinder or complicate it so as to lead to its ruin.
The conditions that the American Congress demanded will not find anyone to respond
to them The members of Congress, who do not respect international legitimacy, will
not need to wait six long months because the Palestinian people will not barter their
rights (or all the money In the world.
292
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Cairo, June 9, 1974
The Palestinian National Council:
On the basis of the Palestinian National Charter and the Political
Programme drawn up at the eleventh session, held from January 6-12,
1973; and from its belief that it is impossible for a permanent and just
peace to be established in the area unless our Palestinian people
recover all their national rights and, first and foremost, their rights
to return and to self-determination on the whole of the soil of their
homeland; and in the light of a study of the new political circumstances
that have come into existence in the period between the Council's last
and present sessions, resolves the following:
1. To reaffirm the Palestine Liberation Organization's previous attitude
to Resolution 242, which obliterates the national right of our people
and deals with the cause of our people as a problem of refugees. The
Council therefore refuses to have anything to do with this resolution at
any level, Arab or international, including the Geneva Conference.
2. The Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and
foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to
establish the independent combatant national authority for the people
over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated. This will
require further changes being effected in the balance of power in favour
of our people and their struggle.
3. The Liberation Organization will struggle against any proposal for a
Palestinian entity the price of which is recognition, peace, secure
frontiers, renunciation of national rights and the deprival of our
people of their right to return and their right to self-determination on
the soil of their homeland.
4. Any step taken towards liberation is a step towards the realization
of the Liberation Organization's strategy of establishing the democratic
Palestinian state specified in the resolutions of previous Palestinian
National Councils.
5. Struggle along with the Jordanian national forces to establish a
Jordanian-Palestinian national front whose aim will be to set up in
Jordan a democratic national authority in close contact with the
Palestinian entity that is established through the struggle.
295
6. The Liberation Organization will struggle to establish unity in
struggle between the two peoples and between all the forces of the Arab
liberation movement that are in agreement on this programme.
7. In the light of this programme, the Liberation Organization will
struggle to strengthen national unity and to raise it to the level where
it will be able to perform its national duties and tasks.
S. Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will
strive to achieve a union of the confrontation countries, with the aim
of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory, and as a step
along the road to comprehensive Arab unity.
9. The Liberation Organization will strive to strengthen its solidarity
with the socialist countries, and with forces of liberation and progress
throughout the world, with the aim of frustration all the schemes of
Zionism, reaction and imperialism.
10. In light of this programme, the leadership of the revolution will
determine the tactics which will serve and make possible the realization
of these objectives.
The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization will
make every effort to implement this programme, and should a situation
arise affecting the destiny and the future of the Palestinian people,
the National Assembly will be convened in extraordinary session.
2%
Clinton Claps Secret Cover
On Report on PLO Finances
I /mg- Awaited GAO Study Too Hot to Publish
FORWARD STAFF
WASHINGTON — President Clin-
ton has clapped a stamp of secrecy
on a report on the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization's financial state
that was completed last month by
the General Accounting Office, the
Forward has learned, and the strug-
gle to find out what the GAO discov-
ered is quietly emerging as a new
issue in the battle over sending tax-
payer dollars to the Palestinian
Clinton Seals Report on PLO
Continued from Page 1
tied; however, Washington sources
say that any government depart-
ment or agency that provided infor-
mation to the GAO could have asked
for such a classification.
The GAO investigation was under-
taken to answer several basic ques-
tions: What are the PLO's total assets;
what is its annual income; and to
what extent are Mr. Arafat and the
Palestine Authority investing the
organization's money in their own
people's welfare? The Clinton admin-
istration has earmarked some $500
million over the next five years to
help Mr. Arafat promote stability in
the territories. Congressional watch-
dogs, however, are concerned that
American taxpayer dollars are being
wasted or even abused by the PLO
Opponents of the aid are also
charging that several administration
departments and agencies — includ-
ing the State Department and the
Central Intelligence Agency — were
less than forthcoming with the GAO
during its audit "The administration
did everything it could in order to
sabotage this investigation," says
Rachel Ehrenfeld, an expert on
international money-laundering.
Change of Heart
Ms. Ehrenfeld says, for example,
that an investigator for the GAO was
dispatched to London last fall to
meet with representatives of the
British National Criminal Intelli-
gence Service. A recent report by the
NCIS concluded that the PLO had
between $8 billion and $10 billion in
hidden assets in 1993, with annual
income of between $1.5 billion and
$2 billion. After initially being told
that he would have cooperation from
the British, the GAO auditor found
the NCIS reluctant to provide him
with information. The change of
heart, according to Ms. Ehrenfeld,
came only after the GAO notified the
State Department that it was send-
ing a man to London. A spokesman
for the State Department wasn't
immediately available to comment.
The Christians' Israel Public
Action Committee is also calling for
the release of the GAO report and
congressional hearings on the issue
— before Congress goes on recess in
August. "The Clinton administration
is covering up for Arafat," says
Richard Hellman, president of
Cipac, a right-of-center group.
Mr. Oilman, the congressman who
requested the GAO audit, wasn't
available to comment on the admin-
istration's handling of the report.
Some hawks are charging that the
language of his initial request was
too mild. "It could have been written
with stronger language which would
have given the GAO more authori-
ty," says Ms. Ehrenfeld, who adds
that GAO agents did not have the
power to subpoena witnesses.
"Gilman was under a lot of pressure
not to ask for the investigation and
he was under even more pressure
when he did ask for it," she says.
If the GAO report is not made pub-
lic soon, it may be too late to enter
into the debate over PLO funding.
The Senate is expected to consider
the Foreign Aid Authorization bill
next week, and, according to a source
inside the Senate, under one of the
scenarios now being contemplated,
the GOP would agree to extend aid to
the PLO for another year as long as
Mr. Clinton agrees not to veto its pro-
posed reorganization of the State
Department
"When this government wanted to
know where Ferdinand Marcos got
his ill-gotten gains, we found out,"
says Mr. Fishbein. "Why is it that in
the case of the PLO we're covering
up? The American people have a
right to know."
Authority headed by Yasser Arafat
The probe into the PLO's income,
assets and expenditures, which the
GAO confirmed is classified, was ini-
tiated late last year at the request of
Rep. Benjamin Gilman, a Rockland
County, N.Y., Republican and chair-
man of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee. The eagerly awaited
investigation was intended to shed
light on the PLO's bank accounts and
books, which have heretofore
remained shrouded in mystery
despite Mr. Arafat's repeated claims
of being short of funds.
Critics Cry Coverup
The move to seal the document
comes at a critical time in the debate
over American funding of the PLO.
The legislation that allows Mr. Clin-
ton to disburse tax dollars to the
Palestine Authority, the PLO's gov-
erning body, expired at the end of
last month and was extended until
mid-August pending further debate
in Congress. For Mr. Clinton, who
considers the aid crucral to the peace
process, a cornerstone of his foreign
policy, a report critical of the PLO's
spending habits could spell trouble
— even as the White House gears up
to host the signing of the second
phase of the Israeli-Palestinian
peace accord later this month.
Critics of PLO aid say the adminis-
tration's decision to keep the docu-
ment out of the public's hands
smacks of a coverup. "As far as Tm
concerned, the fact that this is being
kept a secret is an indictment of the
administration," says Rand Fish-
bein, who is a former top aide to Sen-
ator Inouye, a Democrat from
Hawaii, and is the author of Senator
D'Amato's recently proposed bill
intended to crack down on American
aid to the PLO. "Are they such apol-
ogists for the PLO that they can't
make this public? What is the admin-
istration trying to hide?"
It's not clear exactly who request-
ed that the report be deemed classi-
Please turn to Page 5
Forward
Juiy14,1895
FOUNDED APRIL 22, 18S7
Votuma LXXXXVUII
No. 31,03*
297
The End of Zionism
and the Last Israeli
By Yoram Hazony
The agreement Israeli prime minister Yitzhak
Rabin and FLO chairman Yaiir Arafat signed
to a choru* of hounnaa last week it principally
concerned with the material assets Israel is handing
over to the Palestinians: military installations, strate-
gic terrain, water.
But with the Rabin government readying the
transfer of authority in ancient Jewish tides such as
Hebron, Bethlehem, and Shiloh — and the opening of
negotiations over Jerusalem itself a few months from
now — it is becoming dear
that the diplomats' scalpel
has reached cultural bone.
Two years have passed since
Israel signed the 1993 Oslo
accord with Ararat But with
the relinquishment of
Hebron, the final resting
place of the Hebrew patri-
archs, by the stroke of a pen,
Israelis arc only now becom-
ing aware of the most painful
ramifications of the deal cut
with Ante — the ones which
cannot be quantified by negotiators and military men.
Witness a recent exchange between two prominent
columnists, both identified with the left, in the presti-
gious Israeli daily Ha'ana. "In their wont night-
mares,'' wrote Yoel Marcus, perhaps Israel's moat
rcapecaad columnist and a long-time supporter of
Rabin's governing Labor party, 'neither Yitzhak
Rabin nor Shimon Peres could have imagined himself
twenty-five years ago as die architect of a government
that would take Israel back to its pre- 1967 borders. But
this is exactly what they arc doing."
Marcus asked Israelis to "leave for a moment the
preoccupation with the headlines of the hour," and
consider "the nalfy dramatic revolution taking pbet*
The reason the Golan Heights, Bethlehem, and
Jerusalem could be put on the negotia ring block by the
Labor government without pandemonium in the
YMWft Hew*/ It aV Dim** eftht ShaUm Cmttr-Nttioml
Policy Institute tnjmutkm.
streets is the near-total collapse of the Jewish national-
ist ideology that built the sate. "Our people has long
since tired of bearing Zionism on in shoulders genera-
tion after generation," Marcus observed. "While the
Arabs have remained faithful to their ideology of the
holiness of the land . . . Israel is ready lightly to with-
draw from the lands that were the cradle of Judaism,"
in exchange for "personal safety and a 'normal' life."
Marcus's piece was gleefully parried by his col-
league uHa'ana, Gidon Samct. "Thanks be to God,"
Samet cheered; the agree-
ment with Arafat "has bro-
ken down the ingredient that
was the cement in the wall of
our old national identity.1'
According to Sarnet, the dis-
integration of the cultural
wall that had kept the con-
flict with the PLO alive sig-
nals a new Israeli openness
to world culture, from pubs
to pasta: "Madonna and Big
| Macs are only the moat
peripheral of examples of . . .
a 'normalncas' which means, among other things, the
end of the terrible fear of everything that is foreign
and strange . . . . Only those trapped in the old way of
■hinting will not recognize the benefits.*
It is not coincidental that both articles focused on
"nonnalneas" (wrmalm in Hebrew), an old Jewish
code-word meaning "like the Gentiles." "Normal"
people, so the argument goes, do not live in fear of
being blown up on buses. They do not hold grudges
over crimes committed years ago, and they do not
spend their time fighting over real or imagined burial
places of real or imagined ancestors. They go to pubs
and eat pasta.
The debate over the mxmalivt supposedly ushered
in by Oslo underscore* what has become evident to
Israelis of all penuaaions in recent months: that Oslo
was not, like the peace agreements with Egypt and Jor-
dan, a strictly political achievement whose desirability
can be judged in terms of guns and batter. For "the
handshake," as the deal with Arafat it known, sought
^fiffi: !
OcToaiat.lW
TM WtEXU aTAKDAXD / 29
298
to achieve the heart's desire of "normal" Israelis by
renouncing precisely those emotional assets which
show many "JemMT Israelis to lead meaningful lives.
And on th* hecb of thit realizsuon ha* come a sec-
ond, the recognition that the Jewish ttate is sliding
headlong into a bitter cultural civil war. Israel is
realigning into two camps: those for whom forgetting
about Arafat* s murderous past and giving him what he
wants means achieving an exhilarating liberation; and
those for whom these concessiont mean abandoning
the entire purpose of the Jewish state in the first
place— a calamity of unfathomable proportions.
Zionism is Jewish nationalism — the belief that
there should be a Jewish
nation-state in the land of
Israel. Few people today rec-
ognize what en abomination
ibis idea was to Jewish intel-
lectuals when it was formally
constituted as a political
organization in 1897. Of the
great Jewish thinkers, virtu-
ally none could stomach the
idea. Hermann Cohen, Frans
Rosenrweig, Martin Buber,
Hsim Solovchchik, and the
Hasidic rabbet of both
Lubevicch and Satmar— all rejected ^ril'tri fc, much
the same reason: They believed the Jewish people was
essentially s thing of the spirit The creation of a state,
which parfocce meant a Judaism of tanks and exple-
tives, of politics and intrigue, of bureaucracy and capi-
tal— in short, the tmpontrnunt of Judaism — would
mean the end of Judaism as a philosophy, an ideal, a
faith.
What took the teeth out of the anti-Zionism of the
Jewish left and right was the Holocaust In the wake of
the most fearsome possible demonstration of the evil
of Jewish powcriessness, the anti-Zionism of all camps
became an embarrassment The pugnacious little
fighters of Palestine, lashing out at the British enemy
and Arab marauders, became the heroes of the Jewish
people. By the time Jewish toughs like David Ben-
Gurioo and Menachem Begin had — ««gH to bomb
the British off their baefca, the state they had founded
had really become the scats of virtually the entire Jew-
ish people. After the gas chambers, almost every Jew
everywhere becaana a Zionist, a belie*** in the necessi-
ty and obligation of Jewish power.
Yet Jewish and even Israeli intellectuals never real-
ly reconciled themselves to the Jewish empowerment
entailed in the creation of a Jewish nation- state. The
Tery desirability of the Israeli War of Independence in
194J was caustically challenged in the writings of S.
Yizhar, perhaps the most prominent writer of the
nation's early years. And by the 1960s, Israeli acade-
mia, itself founded by tntj-nationaliso such aa Buber
and Yehuda Magnes, had begun to spawn an entire
generation of literary figures whose point of departure
was the rejection of Jewish nationalism.
The most famous novel by the nation's most
famous novelist, Amos Ox's My MiehatU portrays
Jerusalem — the very symbol of the Jewish national
revival — as a dry ofbrooding insanity and iUncaa. AJL
Yehoshua*s story "Before the Forest" has a young Jew
joining forces with an Arab to burn down the "Zion-
ist" forest planted on the
ruins of an Arab village. In
Tfu Loot, Ychoehua's best-
known novel, the hero
deserts his Army unit in
mid-battle, and a high school
girl from • well-to-do family
finds comfort in the arms of
an Arab.
O'hj^f enaex90ai thrnvr of
Israeli literature arc much
the same: the escape from
Israeli the destruction of
Israel; death (by decay;
rather than struggle); the Israel Defense Forces as con-
centration camp, pigsty, whorehouse; and the ideal of
disempowennest represented by the Holocaust—
which, as novelist Moshe Shamir has observed, "is
becoming the common homeland of the Jews, their
promised land."
While literary figures have long led the effort to
create a poet-Zioaisi consciousness in Israel, acade-
mics have been even more ferocious. The 1967 Six
Day War immediately inspired attacks by opponents
of nationalism such as Yishayahu Leibowiu, who
claimed that Israel was undergoing Naztfication, used
the term "Judeo-Nssi" to describe the Israeli armed
forces, and said the nation would soon set up conccn-
trarion camps. In the last two decades, these seemingly
bcyead-the-pale expressions of hatred far Zionist pow-
er have paved the way far a more "scientific" delcgit-
imirttinn of the Jewish tuts by historians, sociolo-
gists, and Journalises nJfrriiyj more acceptable versions
of the same themes. Zionism was a colonialist move-
ment, said Uan Fapo. It forcibly expelled the Arab
refugees from their homes in 194a, said Benny Morris.
It fabricated a false connection between the Jews and
the land, said Boas Evron. It used the Holocaust to
30/TlwWizxuSTW«tuuu>
9.1993
299
advance its political end*, laid Tom Segcv. And »o on.
There arc certainly element* of truth in some of
the allegation* raised. The reality of power and espe-
cially of power wielded in desperation, as Zionist pow-
er ha* been — is thai fa inevitably has it* seamier side
But instead of contributing to a new balance in Israeli
historiography, the new academics have waged what
amounts to a scorched-earth campaign against the
put. They nave joined novelise*, poet*, and arrjau in a
wholesale effort to wreck the basic faith of the Israeli
public in in own history.
As the novelisi Aharon Mcgcd, a veteran member
of the Labor movement, described the rite of post-
Zionism among Israeli intellectual*: "For two or three
decade* now, several hundred of our society'* 'best,'
men of the pen and of the
ipirit. . have been working
tlngle-tnindedly and without
respite to preach and prove
that our cause i* not just:
Not only that fa ha* been
unjust since the Six Day War
and the 'occupation'. . .and
not only tincc the founding
of the rote in 1948. ..but
*lnce roe beginnings of Zion-
ist settlement at the end of
the last century."
In light of this assault,
every value invoked in building the Jewish rate — the
ingathering of the exiles, the redemption of a neglect-
ed land, the purity of arms used in self-defense — is
repainted as the product of ignorance, hypocrisy, and
cynicism, as is the Jewish rate itself. "Poet-Zionism"
become* the only belief acceptable to an "enlightened"
individual.
By now, post-Zionist truths have become so self-
evident as to constitute an Israeli "political correct-
ness," Justifying — let no one be surprised— the censor-
(hip of opposing views. The most notorious example is
that of Maya Kagajukaya, a razor-wined literary critic
and a well-known personality in the Israeli Russian-
language press. After her immigration to Israel,
Kaganskaya was for a brief while a prominent person-
ality in Hebrew literary circles. But her career as an
Israeli intellectual came to an end on July 24, 1992,
when a translator named Nili Minki accused her in
Ha'artn of harboring hitherto concealed narionslitt
Minki quoted from a piece of Kaginiksya'*, writ-
ten in Russian, which compared Israeli socialism to
Soviet communism, ridiculed the firmer-proletarian
ism of Israeli fashion, bristled against the social-con-
trol methods of kibbutz society, and argued that the
Israeli left can no longer be considered Zionist, Hav-
ing thus "discovered" Kaganskaya's views, Mirski
went on to accuse her of a "complete inability to
understand the Israeli reality" and a "capricious and
burning hatred" of the left -cultural clique, which had
ihowered her with honor* "the will probably be sorry
to give up."
In the three year* *incc the appearance of Mirski "i
handiwork, Kaganskaya ha* been erased from the
Israeli literary establishment Not a single essay of
hers ha* appeared in Hebrew. She has been blacklisted
by the cultural media and talons. She returned to the
land of her forefathers — there to become a despised
Jewish dissident.
Few Israeli politicians
would or could openly
admit to being pott-Zionists.
They could still lose a lot of
votes that way. But this does
not mean that Israeli policy-
making has remained
immune to the intellectual
assault on Zionism.
With the- disappearance
from public life of Zionism'*
founding fathers — Labor'*
Ben-Gunon died in 1973, and Likud'* Begin ceased
all public activity in 1983 — both major political parties
began to drift. In the absence of a countervailing na-
tionalist intellectual movement, the nationalist agenda
of the Labor party (which ruled the country for three
decade* from Israel's founding until the late 1970s) has
been rapidly eviscerated. In in place: a menu of post-
Zionist concepts resembling the wotidview of the
European "New I .eft- (think of John Lennon). A less
pronounced shift in the same direction has been cak-
ing place in the more right-wing Likud.
The victory of the Labor party in June 1992 there-
fore marked no return to the fufl-throtted, proud, and
aggressive Labor Zionism of 20 yean ago. Indeed, the
"Labor" half of the formula had been rtcsn ted defrcto
at a party convention that year, which discarded the
red banner of Socialism and even the Socialist anthem,
the IfutmaatmaU, which had been warbled by Labor
Zionists for seven decade* or more. And as the policies
of the Rabin government have unfolded, it has become
clear that the "Zionist* half ha* fared no better. Virtu-
ally every area of government policy hat been quietly
redirected to dismantling the Jewish national charac-
ter of the rate.
•,1995
TBa Wtasojr Stocoasd / 31
300
For rxamplr, Unci's school! have been subjected
to two decades of progressive dilution of Jewish sub-
Iccts such ss Bible, Talmud, sad Jewish history. But
the new Leber government outdid its predecessors by
installing Sbukunh Atoni, of its most radical anti-reli-
gious fringe, as minuter of education. In this post,
Aloni declared traditional Jewish dietary laws unnec-
essary, attacked school trips to Auschwitz for stirring
up "nationalist" sentiment among the students, and
insisted that iifcrcncts 10 God be eliminated from
armed forces memorial services. The educational
activities of the deputy minister, Miens Goldman,
have included calling for a change in the text of the
national anthem, Haakta, "in order to give expression
to citizen* who are not Jews"; advocating that the
poetry of Tewfik Ziyad, an
Arab nationalist and anti-
Zionist, be taught "next to
the poetry" of modern
Hebrew bard Chaim Bialik;
sad ordering s purge of reli-
gious teachers in the min-
istry's school system.
The ministry's appointee
as chairman of the Commit-
tee far History Curriculum
Reform is Moshe Zimmer-
menn, who has used media
interviews to compare ortho-
dox Jewish children to Hitler Youth, the Bible to Mass
Kamff, and the armed forces to die SS. Says Zunmer-
mann, "Learning about the Jewish people and the
State of Israel appears in the [new educational] pro-
gram, but certainly not as a subject of primary impor-
A similar trend is in evidence at the Defense Min-
Istry, which has recently approved a new code of ethics
for the armed forces called T\* Spin cfttu IDF— "the
moral and normative identity card of the bract
Defense Forces. . according to which every
soldier. . .educates himself and bis fellows. * The new
code is a showcase of post-Zionist virtue, touting the
importance of defending "democracy*' against all pos-
sible menace. Yet nowhere in its 11 "values'' and 94
"basic principles" ones it refer to the Jewish sate, the
Jewish people, the Jewish tradition, or the land of
Israel.
So ubiquitous arc efforts to ckjudaixc the Israeli
government that It it often hard to read the papers
without thiakia« it all a leke. Shordy after tha 1992
elections, in which Labor had pledged to stop spend-
ing money to build highways in the Wen Bank "for
the benefit of the settlers," Housing Ministry Direc-
tor-General Arych Misrehi announced a sew plan in
which highways would be built anyway— so product!
from Syria. Saudi Arabia, and Jordan would be able to
arrive in the port cities of Haifa and Ashdod once
peace is at hand.
The new Ministry of Tourism has determined ha
focus to be encouraging tourists from Islamic coun-
tries. The Ministry of Religious Affairs rseendy pro-
mulgated new guidelines for the disbursement of
funds that give preference to groups encouraging
meetings between Jewish and Moslem youth, "secu-
lar" groups using "multi-media and games" to pro-
mote Judaism, and organisations promoting Moslem
pilgrimage io Mecca. Even m seemingly benign an
agency as the Parka Authority has called for catting
the nation's birth rate to scro
and, tf astsBSsentJI ■m*iiH»«g
the law giving any diaspora
Jew jaansauaent dtiaenship if
neimmjgjBiii **' to protect
the national parks, of course.
Tha Jewish Agency, s
quasi-governmental body
ostensibly responsible for
Jewish Immigration, has
begun testing foreign Jews to
determine whether they are
"fir" to immigrate to Israel
to new head, Avium Burg,
has been one of the leading advocates of revising
Israeli law to "separate religion and state." He has
insisted that efforts to find "lost" Jewish tribes and
bring them to Israel "must be frustrated every step ot
the way," and declared Yishayaho Leibowia (of
"Judeo-Naxi" fame) to be bis "moral compass." Burg's
advisers, Halm Bcn-Sbacfaar and Arik Cannon, have
developed a plan whereby the Zionist movement
would drop its focus on Jewish immigrstion and con-
cern itself with distributing "plnralamV" Jewish mate-
rial over the Internet
The National Insurance Instiom is likewise phas-
ing out its long-standing system of family benefiu for
dtisens who have served in the armed forms in
order » prevent discrimination against the majority of
Arab dozens who choose not to serve. Meanwhile, the
Supreme Court's new chief justice, Aharon Bersk, has
artkulatsd a doctrine under which the belie* of "the
enlightened public in Israel* will be the benchmark
against which Israeli law it interpreted (these beliefs
have proved to include court-ordered hiring quota,
and gay families).
Bur nowhere Is the strange fruit of post-Zionist
policy more in evidence than in tha Foreign Ministry,
32/
OercaavfclfM
301
which has came to be a kind of foreign ministry not
for the Jewish state, but for the entire Middle East.
Among the consequences U that a chief responsibility
of Israeli diplomats has become rundraising for Arab
regimes — based on the principle that they will become
peaceable if they are plied with ever-higher levels of
aid. Thus, in the judgment of former deputy foreign
minister Yossi Bcilin, while Israel is "a wealthy coun-
try" needing no donations from abroad, Jewish philan-
thropic organizations hare an "obligation" to provide
assistance to the PLO and Jordan. Ministry Director-
General Uri Savir claims thai "anyone who objects to
American aid to the PLO has no right to be called a
friend of land." Aid for Syria, too, has become an aim
of Israeli policy.
As for more traditional
Israeli foreign policy goals,
like explaining the needs and
interests of the Jewish state,
Foreign Minister Peres haa
ordered the closing of the
Foreign Ministry's Informa-
tion Department because "if
you have good policy, you do
not need public relations,"
Sites such as the Golan
Heights and Masada that
connote Israeli nationalism
and strength have been
removed from the schedules of visiting dignitaries
(while the Holocaust memorial remains sacrosanct).
For ambassadors, the new Foreign Ministry has select-
ed post-nationalists such as Gad Ys'acobi at the United
Nations (There is no such thing as Jewish land") and
Shimon Shamir in Jordan ("When we celebrate our
independence day, it is always incumbent upon us to
remember that our holiday is a day of destruction for
another people").
The strategic aims of Israeli foreign policy? Again,
Yossi Bcilin: Israel should become "a country involved
in resolving other people's conflicts, (and] providing
officials for the U .N., including U.N. secretary-gener-
als,.. ." Foreign Minister Shimon Peres: "There can
be no doubt that Israel's nest goal should be to become
a member of the Arab League."
Thus have the United Nations and the Arab
League become the highest concerns of a post-Zionist
foreign policy. The existence and welfare of the Jewish
soma haa become too parochial a rauam d'bat for Israeli
leaders.
Zionism was predicated on the idea that the land of
Israel is the historic inheritance of only one peo-
ple, the Jews; that this right was recognized under
international law by the League of Nations In 1920;
and that the Arabs, having secured self-expression in
20 Arab national states, do not need one more. It was
such a Jewish-nationalist view that guided Ben-Guri-
on, who insisted that: "No Jew has the right to relin-
quish the right of the Jewish nation to the land of
Israel . . . Even the whole Jewish people alive today
has no authority to relinquish any part whatsoever of
the land. This is a right of the Jewish nation in all its
generations — a right which may not be forfeited under
any condition"
Nothing could be farther from these original Zion-
ist premises than the Oslo agreement, in which the
government of Israel and the PLO agree to recognize
"their mutual legitimate »"^
political rights" — a phrase
usually glossed over aa
though it merely acts op
Israeli concessions in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.
But considering that all
previous Israeli governments
had claimed the land aa the
legitimate right of the Jewish
people alone, conceding the
"mutual legitimate rights* of
Jews and Arabs to the land is
a step pregnant with mean-
ing not only for Hebron and Jerusalem, but for Haifa
and Tel Aviv as well. To claim that the United States
and Mexico have "mutual legitimate and political
rights* to Texas is a way of saying that no part of Texas
belongs rightfully and solely to America. Similarly, in
creating an equivalence between Jewish and Arab
rights, Oslo proposes that the Jews give pp soma of the
land to the PLO — but on the strength of equivalent
Arab "rights" to afl of it.
Which cuts to the heart of why Oslo haa created
such a sandstorm of opprobrium and honor in brad:
The recognition of such an Arab national right to the
land of Israel is a flagrantly post-Zionist proposition, It
means that the PLCs carnival of carnage spanning
three decades was a perhaps distasteful but neverthe-
less putifisd war of resistance. By the same token, all
the Uvea lost in pursuing Zionism — from the draining
of the malarial swamps to the raid on Entebbe— were
in the service of a morally questionable and perhaps
even illegitimate enterprise. For under this rendering
of history, die land never really belonged to the Jews.
One would like to believe these implications of the
Oslo agreement were unintended, the product of
diplomatic expedirncr Unfortunately for this suppoai-
OCTOmsxf.lWS
Tub Waaxur Stmcmbo / 33
302
rion, Shimon Pares has written ■ book —pHf'tig the
ideological underpinnings ot <** agreement la detail.
la Tkt S*xd MidA* Ban, Peres rejects ibc entire con-
cept of the nations] tote, arguing that wherever ""par-
tieularist nsaJonanatn, . Jm staked a claim, the aocial
order has been subvened and hostility and violence
have taken root." It waa Jewish and Arab nationalism,
says Ftrca, that caused die Arab-Israeli wars, aad the
only solution is to leave these nationalisms behind,
forging what he calls aa "ultrsnstional" entity encom-
passing the entire Middle East, with a common Arab-
Jewish government, army, aad economy.
If Arabs aad Jews are to give up their w,"*"'tfl<«nif
aad live in sueh a New Middle East, what would be
their identity? Peres is unequivocal: "One day our self-
awaraaess aad personal iden-
tity will be baaed on this new
reality aad we will find that
we have stepped outside the
national arena." True, "peo-
ple are not yet ready to
accept an ultranatioaal iden-
tity," but he nevertheless
believes that gradually "a
new type of citizenship is
rarrhmg on, with a aew per-
sonal identity. . . . Particular
ist nationalism is fading and
the idea of • 'citizen of the
world- ts taking hold-
It waa therefore no coincidence that the agreement
with the PLO waa drafted without consulting the
Israeli military. Oslo was baaed oa a presumed "aew
reality"— one in which both tkasatm and Arab
aarJoaalism arc "fading," aad the location of the
defease borders is irrelevant, because the ead of
aarionalrsm means the end of war.
But it k also dear from Perert hoped-for "new per-
sonal identity" that the end of nationalism may —
the end of the Jewish people in Israel, sewelL
The Jewish state is first aad foremost a political
idea. Armks may menace it phvsscaOy, but It is oa
the level of ideas than the gravest threats are registered.
The Soviet Union was perhaps the num powerful state
in the world militarily, but it fall in IM9 because (to
borrow from Oidon Samet) "the ingredient that was
the cement in the wall of the old national identity"
hsd long since broken down.
Israel is in the midst of an Ideological dlauucgra-
tfoa Whose auapainidc aad meaning defy comprehen-
sion. In most prominent political aad cultural figures
speak about the absorption of the country into the
Arab League, compere the Israeli armed forces to
Nazis, "■wHiT" as illegitimate the awdoJMl movement
which founded the ante, and arc preparing to open
negotiations over the capital dry, Jerusalem.
The Jew ish state is poorly equipped to cope with
such s crisis. The Labor Zionists who built the state
wished to flee the resist of ideas in which the Jews had
been immersed for millennia, aad build something
powerful and real, something physical. They built
farms and ketones and fighter planes, among the best
in the world. But they did not recognize the need to
build the ads* of the Jewish state in the minds of the
people. The result is that, today, with the Zionist idea
being expunged before their very eyes, most cannot
even see what is happening. The factories and the
fighter planes look fine.
la most countries, the
role of defending the idea of
thenariosi — the preservation
and rtii inning of its her-
itage, in texts and holy
places, and the wisdoms aad
social crafts which its people
have acquired — belongs to
political coaaervudves. But
Israel has never had an orga-
nized aeafhjasj consnrarjsm.
What passes for a "national
camp" in Israel, Likud and
its sister parries, has no Tradition of iateUeauai dis-
course m speak of It has no colleges, no serious think
tanks or publishing houses, no newspapers or broad-
casting. Nothing like ths writings of Smith, Burke, or
Hayek has ever been set down in Hebrew, or even
translated; Israel's founding fathers translated Man.
This means that, in spite of all the hardware pro-
cured over the bat SO years, the Jewish state will have
to wage and win in next wax, the war of ideas, out-
gunned again. Hat in this fight Israel's Jewish aatioaal-
istt hare a hidden advantage: No people gives up its
identity and lift-meaning too easily, least of all the
Jews. Indeed, it is hut such conditions of intellectual
wUderaesa and danger which bring the most creative
aad powerful aspects of the national character to the
fare.
Consigned to political opposrdoo for the first time,
Zionism has now become a <i oiiasn * ausm But fust as it
was the mate of annihilation that ooght the Jews the
need for physical defrnsrs, it may be that this brush
with sskcOogseas decay waa steaded far the Jews to learn
me importance of dm aattrmalidra and of fhc politi-
cal oramnvdam which protects it— fee the survival of
even a normal people, e
34 / Tan Waaxur Stsmoasp
MtW
303
Embargo: Until Thursday. 24 August 1995,
10:00 a.m. (Israeli tima)
Jerusalem, August 1995
NEITHER LAW NOR JUSTICE
EXTRA-JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT, ABDUCTION,
UNLAWFUL ARREST, AND TORTURE OF
PALESTINIAN RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK BY THE
PALESTINIAN PREVENTIVE SECURITY SERVICE
D%3
• / •
BTSELEM
The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights
In the Occupied Territories
304
- 9 -
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE PSS
"The single factor on* must obey Is law and justice, including
the principles of protecting human rights and ensuring the
right of the opposition to express its opinions, while
respecting the institutions of the National Authority."
Glbril Rajoub, Head of the Preventive Security Service in the
West Bank*
B'Tselem research shows that the policing activities of the PSS
throughout the West Bank are conducted in a manner that severely
violates basic human rights. Residents are arrested without arrest
warrants, held in detention for lengthy periods without an indictment
being filed against them, and tortured during interrogations. The
methods of torture used by the PSS include, among others, severe
beatings, painful tying-up. sleep deprivation, threats, and
humiliation.
The following is a list of persons who gave testimonies to B'Tselem.
The full names and places of residences of all of those who testified
are on file at B'Tselem. Most are not published at their request
because they fear PSS reaction.
305
- IX -
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306
- 12 -
All ware arrested without a warrant and those who were detained
were not brought before a judge to extend the detention period.
No indictment was filed against those released, and they were not
prosecuted.
As far as B'Tselem knows, the PSS did not initiate legal proceedings
against any PSS agents for the human rights violations described
above.
How the PSS violates human rights is demonstrated by the case of
Muhammad Nabil Omar Fakher a-Din, resident of Nablus, aged 45.
He states that members of the PSS seized him, and that he was beaten
and shot in the legs by Ahmad Tabuk, an agent of the PSS in Nablus.
Palestinian residents from Nablus told B'Tselem that as a result
of this and other cases, Gibril Rajoub summoned Tabuk and several
of his men to Jericho, but took no measures against them. They
were not arrested, and they returned to Nablus about a week later.
The residents indicated that Tabuk is currently operating in Nablus
as a PSS agent, working out of the same office as previously.
l. Extra-judicial Punishment
Testimonies gathered by B'Tselem show that PSS agents occasionally
shoot the legs of persons suspected of committing various crimes,
or beat them. Usually, the persons are suspected of sexual crimes
or what the PSS members consider to be crimes of immorality, such
as having sexual relations outside of marriage. The PSS agents
act without warning, and without attempting to arrest the person
or determine his guilt.
A.J. testified:
On 23 May 1995, about 12:15 p.m., I was on my way home from
work. When I approached the movie theater in the center of
Jenin, shots were fired at me. The bullets hit my legs - four
bullets in the left leg, and three in the right. I fell to
the ground. I saw the fellow who shot me. X know him; his
name is Muhammad Suleiman Ahmad Tazazah. He lives in Kabatiyah
and is a member of the PSS. After I fell down, he kicked and
cursed ma.
Muhammad Navil Omar a-Din testified:
(They) began to beat me with sticks. As they were beating
me, I was able to push Ahmad Tabuk. He went berserk and started
screaming at me - for pushing him - and he took his pistol
and started to shoot me in the knees and feet. I don't remember
if he shot six or seven times.
307
- 13 -
These acts constitute extra-judicial punishment, which is a flagrant
human rights violation. During the Intifada, this method, extra-
judicial punishment by shooting a person's legs, was one of the
methods used by members of Palestinian organizations against
individuals suspected of collaboration with the Israeli
authorities."
2. Unlawful Detention
"They (PSS agents) have no authority to detain persons or
use weapons. They have no authority to interrogate persons
with force; they are prohibited from using force
altogether." Jamal A-Shubai, Fatah, in charge of the
southern West Bank region11
a. The Arrest Procedure
Testimonies given to B'Taelem indicate that PSS agents arrest persons
without presenting an arrest warrant, identification card or any
other document. In some of instances, individuals are forcefully
taken from their home to Jericho or another place in the West Bank.
In other instances, the PSS informed the person verbally that he
was to go to PSS offices in Jericho or a place near his home..
They frequently did not mention that he was suspected of any crime,
claiming only that they wanted to clarify something with him.
The father of F.D. stated:
On 1 June 1995, six young men arrived in a car with Ramallah
license plates. They came to my house and asked about F. I
asked them why they want him. They said that they understand
that he has a house, and that he had an argument with his
neighbors about the path leading to it. They said they are
from Fatah, and that they want to take him to the office to
resolve the problem and help him. I refused to let F. go with
them to Ramallah, but he came out of the room and said that
he would go. I told him not to do it, but he did not listen
to me, and he got into the car. He did not return that day.
10 See B'Tselem, Collaborators in the Occupied Territories:
Human Rights Abuses and Violations, Jerusalem, January, 1994, pp.
136-138.
u Uri Nir, "The Persuaders Came to Town" , Ha'aretz, 11 October
1994.
308
- n -
The following day, 2 June 1995, I went with a few others to
the PLO office in Ramallah, where I asked about F. They told
me to go to the Preventive Security Service office and ask
there. One of the men with me said that he knew the office.
We went there, where I saw several of the fellows who had
come to my home and had taken F. I asked them where he was.
They answered that he had been sent to Jericho.
In his testimony to B'Tselem, A.D. stated:
When I got to the olive fields, about a kilometer from my
home, a masked man came out from behind the olive trees, jumped
me and grabbed me by the throat. He had a knife in his other
hand. He dragged me towards the trees, where two other masked
persons were waiting. The two tied my hands behind me with
cloth, blindfolded me and pushed a piece of cloth into my
mouth. They demanded my identity card, and I gave it to
them.... They said they were from the Preventive Security
Service, and accused me of selling drugs and weapons...
M.D. stated in his testimony:
At 5:00 a.m. on 21 May, M. [a PSS agent] came to my house.
He woke me up and told me to get dressed so that he could
take me to Jericho. M. took me from my uncle's house ...
put me into my father-in-law's car.. . They drove to Jericho,
where they dropped me off at the entrance to the Preventive
Security Service building. They left me and went away.
b. Prevention of Legal Representation
"I heard from PSS personnel that there is no such thing as
retaining an attorney." M.Y., in his testimony to B'Tselem
fieldworker, Bassem 'Eid.
The right of a detainee to be represented by legal counsel and
to meet regularly with his attorney is fundamental and is intended
to ensure his rights. Detainees have no links with the outside
world, hence a meeting with an attorney helps them understand their
legal status and the legal alternatives available to them, and
to complain if interrogators have exert unlawful pressure and treat
them violently.
None of those who gave testimony had received had legal
representation. B'Tselem learned that for various reasons, primarily
because of the refusal of the PA in Jericho to allow proper legal
representation for detainees, attorneys in the West Bank refrained
from representing West Bank residents arrested by the PA.
309
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M.Y. testified:
In the 43 days I was detained, I did not ses any lawyer vit
prisoners.
The father of f.D. testified:
F, told me not to bring a lawyer since Jericho has no courts,
and a lawyer wouldn't, therefore, do him any good. So to this
day, I did not get him a lawyer.
Testimony of Attorney N.T., given to Bassem 'Sid on 10
August 1995
The relatives of the S. brothers came to my office in Nablus
and requested that I represent the brothers, as they were
accused of murder.
On 26 April 1995, I contacted PSS headquarters in Jericho.
X requested permission from the prosecutor to meet with my
clients, but he refused, stating that the investigation has
not yet been completed, and that I could not, therefore,
meet them at that time. He told me to contact him again on
1 May.
On 1 May, I contacted him, and he agreed to bring the
detainees to his room provided that I only request them to
sign a power of attorney and that I don't speak with them at
all. I agreed, and the detainees came into the room. I had
them sign the power of attorney, and then I asked one of
them, the one the family had said limps, how his leg was.
The prosecutor immediately stood up and said Z was forbidden
to ask any questions. He shouted for a soldier, who took the
detainees back to the prison.
The family requested that Z stop handling the case since Z
was not allowed to meet with my clients.
c. Lack of Judicial Review
International law stipulates that restricting a person's liberty
must be subject to effective review by judicial authority. A
reasonable time after his arrest, a detainee must be brought before
a judge so thet he can determine whether denying liberty to the
detainee, who is presumed innocent, is justified in light of the
prima facie evidence against him.
310
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The testimonies gathered by B'Teelem indicate that detainees are
held in Jericho for extended periods without any judicial scrutiny,
and without giving them an opportunity to appeal their arrest or
the conditions under which they are being held.
The father of F.D. stated in his testimony:
47 days have already passed since he was arrested, but he
has not yet been brought before a judge.
The father of I. S. testified:
My son, I., was released on 30 July; during the entire period
of his incarceration [he was arrested on 5 April 1995], he
was never brought before a judge for a hearing or to extend
the detention.
d. Prohibition of Periodic Family Visitation
International law recognizes the right of detainees to meet with
their families. Family visits allow detainees to maintain contact
with the world outside the prison and to ensure that someone will
act to protect their rights.
PSS personnel do not permit periodic family visits to detainees;
they do not even notify families that their relatives have been
arrested or where they are being held.
The father of F.D. testified:
Ten days passed and we did not hear anything about him, so
I decided to rent a car and go to Jericho with my wife, my
children, and F. 's wife. . . We rented a car for NIS 100, bought
gifts for another NIS 100, took clothes, and went to Jericho.
We went to the police station and asked about F. The police
asked if he was a criminal or a security detainee. I said
that I did not know the charges against him. An officer went
with us in our car to the PSS in Jericho and checked if F.
was there. They said he was. The officer said that his family
had arrived for a visit, but he was told that F. was not
allowed to receive visitors. I got involved and said that
the whole family had come to visit, that we had spent lots
of money to get there, and that they should at least let us
look at him through the bars of his cell. The PSS man refused.
We went home without seeing F.
Only on 30 June 1995, a month after his arrest, was F.'s family
allowed to visit him.
s.D. was detained for 24 days. On the fifth day of his detention,
his cousin asked the PSS in Jericho to allow his family to visit
him, but his request was denied. His family was allowed to visit
him only 11 days after his arrest.
311
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3. Torture and Ill-Treatment during Interrogation
"I confessed to all the crimes that had taken place in the
village. When I denied something, they brought plastic cups,
took off my shirt, and began to melt the plastic on my body,
mostly on my back. They plucked hairs from my chest and my
mustache. I began to confess to more and more things. They
alleged that I had killed my father, and I confessed."
M.D., in his testimony to B'Tselem fieldworker, Bassem 'Eid
The testimonies given to B'Tselem indicate that, when interrogating
suspects, PSS personnel torture and humiliate. Some of their
techniques resemble those used in Israeli CSS interrogation
facilities; like their Israeli counterparts, PSS interrogators
beat detainees, bind them painfully for lengthy periods of time,
deprive them of sleep, cover their head with a sack, and insult
and humiliate them. Some of the testimonies mentioned other torture
techniques, like dripping molten plastic on their bodies, forcing
them to undress, or hanging them by their feet. Iman Shihab, the
only woman among those who gave testimonies for this report,
mentioned sexual abuse, which included pulling her nipples with
pincers.
a. Beatings, tvlno-up. and other forms of physical abuse
Several of the interviewees reported that they were severely beaten
with sticks and rubber hoses, and were punched and kicked. For
some, the beatings lasted for several hours, the interrogators
taking turns. In some cases, the interrogators beat detainees after
forcing them to undress, and poured water on them. Other techniques
used included dripping molten plastic on their bodies and forcing
them to stand in painful positions for long periods.
All the testimonies indicate that at one stage or another of the
interrogation, they were tied-up for many hours. Some were tied
immediately upon arrival at the prison in Jericho in the position
known as "shabah"." Detainees are held in this position for hours
and sometimes days, their head covered with a sack.
11 This tying technique is known to human rights organisations
from GSS interrogations. The detainee's hands are tied behind him
and to a pipe or pole affixed to the wall or ceiling, sometimes
very high. The detainee often has difficulty standing on his feet,
which are also tied. See B'Tselem, Interrogation of Palestinians
during the intifada: Ill-Treatment, {"Moderate Physical Pressure"
or Torture?, March, 1991, pp. 62-67.
312
- X8
Iman Shihab testified:
Abu Arajad arrived and took me to another room, where he tied
my hands behind me and sprayed me with tear gas from a
canister. Z felt burns all over my body. I started to scream
in pain. Z begged for mercy. He started to melt candles on
my body while telling me to confess to the allegations. I
said: "I am a collaborator, Z committed crimes of immorality,
Z had sex - just leave me alone." He told me that he wanted
me to confess of my own free will, and not because of the
torture. I swore by God that none of the allegations were
true. That went on until evening. Twice during the
interrogation Abu Amjad pulled the nipples of my breasts with
pincers.
Z.I. testified:
They tied my legs with rope, and tied the rope to a piece
of wood on the ceiling, so that Z was hanging upside down.
They started to beat me on the head with a black wooden stick.
That continued from midnight until 4 in the morning. . .
A.F. was beaten several times:
One of the interrogators stood behind me, and the other was
in front. The one in the back started to beat me with a rubber
hose, and the other punched and kicked me. This lasted until
about 2:00 in the morning. They took turns beating me....
A rubber hose was lying on the ground. They sprayed water
on me and beat me with the rubber hose. That lasted about
20 minutes. . . . They brought bottles of water. One hit me with
a rubber hose and the other sprayed me with water. That went
on for about an hour.
M.Y. testified:
They told me to stand and spread my legs as far as possible.
I spread my legs as much as I could. They brought a piece
of wood and placed it lengthwise between my legs. The wood
had rope at each end, and they tied the rope to my legs, and
left me like that for about an hour. Then they moved the wood,
and Z stayed there with my hands tied until morning....
The interrogator sat me down on the chair, its back being
to my side. The others in the room told me to lower my head
backwards to the floor. A couple of them pulled my knees
downwards so that my back was on the chair and my head lower.
One of them sat on my knees and another grabbed my shoulders
and pushed my head down hard. That went on for about ten
minutes. Then they told me to get up. Z said that I couldn't.
They grabbed me by the shoulders and took me back to the
detention room.
313
- i» -
M.D. stated:
He began to beat m« with his hands and a stick that was in
the room. H« beat ma mostly in the mouth, the shoulders, and
stomach. That lasted from 5:00 p.m. to 4:30 the following
morning. The interrogator would come and go. Two others also
came in during that time and beat me with their hands. The
interrogator who came back later kicked me in the groin. Each
of the other two grabbed me with one hand, and with the other
punched me in the face.... Two hours later they took me to
another room. . . I sensed that more than one was beating my
hands and legs with a stick. I confessed to things I had done
and had not done.
Threads and Insult*
I "He put a pistol to my head and said that he had killed 50
I men, and that I would be number 51." I.I., in his testimony
| to B'Tselem fieldworker, Bassem 'Bid fl
All persons who had been interrogated and testified for this report
said that they had been threatened and humiliated during the
interrogations. In several cases, the interrogators threatened
their, or their relatives', lives. The interrogators also told
them they would torture them more severely or that their detention
would be extended. In one case, they threatened to try the detainee
before a military court in Gaza." The interrogators also threatened
the detainees that if they relate what had taken place during the
interrogations, they would distribute their confessions, obtained
through torture, in their communities so as to endanger them.
In many instances, interrogators humiliated detainees by directing
sexual insults to their female relatives. In addition to verbal
insults, interrogators also used physical humiliation, like
undressing the detainees, spitting in their faces, or serving them
urine to drink.
" In April, 1995, the State Security Court in Gaza, established
by the Palestinian Authority, began to try persons accused of
security crimes. According to Amnesty International, the trials
in these courts are exceedingly unfair and violate the minimal
standards of international law. See Amnesty International, Trial
at Midnight: Secret, Summary, Unfair Trials in Gaza, June, 1993.
314
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I.I. related:
I was questioned by three interrogators... They asked me if
Z was a collaborator. I said no. Mahmud 'Abaci [one of the
interrogators] told me: "We will kill you like we killed your
uncle,14 and you will die a month from now". . . . Then a fellow
named Abu Al-'Az entered and said to Jamal: "If he dies, throw
him behind the wall and say that he committed suicide"....
Mahmud Abasi took me, in a white jeep, to the Jericho
barricade. Along the way, he told me. . . "We' 11 have your wife
working as a prostitute."
S.D. stated that:
Jamal [the interrogator) grabbed the pistol and started to
chase me, and said: "If you don't tell the truth, I'll empty
the magazine into your head".... The jailer returned after
a while and told ma that I have until 11:00 p.m. to confess.
If I do not, he said, they will take me to the room with the
electricity. He said: "Ask your friend about that room, if
electricity doesn't work, there are other means, like having
you sit on bottles."
Iman Shihab testified:
About an hour later, Abu Amjad came back. He untied my hands
and ordered me to undress. I screamed and refused. He said:
"If you don't take your clothes off, we'll do it for you."
I took off my pants, blouse, end shoes, and stood there in
my underwear. . . . They said: "Why don't you confess? Many have
already confessed while sitting on this chair. We are going
to go away now, and we'll come back in an hour. We'll bring
you a piece of paper, and you'll write your confession. If
not, we'll take you to the top of the mountain, and you don't
know what will happen to you there. We'll put out an
announcement that you are a collaborator and will distribute
it where you live."'*
M.Y. stated in his testimony:
They told me I was going to be released, but they ordered
me not to say anything about the interrogation. They said
that if I did, the torture would be even worse the next time.
14 His uncle was killed in August of 1994 by masked persons
on the suspicion that ha was a collaborator with Israel.
" During the Intifada, many Palestinians were injured by other
Palestinians following rumors that they had collaborated with the
Israeli authorities. See B'Tselem, Collaborators in the occupied
Territories! Human Rights Abuses and Violations, January, 1994.
315
- 2X -
A.F. •tat**:
They untied my hands and legs and ordered me to drop my
pajamas. I was left standing in my underpants.... Then they
took me into the room and had me put my pajamas on.... The
guy who put the gun to my head came into the room and said:
"you don't want to talk, so you can stay here." He started
to write something, and then said: "I am writing your
confession, and I'll send it to Headquarters." He wrote: "I,
A.F. admit that I have been working for the Shabak [CSS] since
1982" (at which time I was 14).... We went into one of the
rooms, where they tied me to a window. One of them said: "Here
is where we are going to finish you off".... Then they took
me to the roof and said: "We are going to throw you over the
side."
c. Sleep peprlva.tlpn
In some of the cases, PSS interrogators used various means to prevent
the detainees from sleeping: painful tying-up night and day,
imprisonment in a small cell in which one cannot lie down or sit
comfortably, and regular deliberate disturbances by workers in
the facility. The testimonies show that some of the Interrogations
lasted several hours, throughout the night and the following day.
1. 1., who was detained for eight days, stated that throughout that
period, he was able to sleep only three hours. A.F. was interrogated
non-stop for three days.
S.D., who was jailed three days in a bathroom, testified:
The interrogator. . . hooded me and ordered me to stand on one
leg. This continued for three consecutive days. . . . Every five
minutes the door opened so they could make sure I was standing
on one leg.
d. Prevention of Medical Treatment
The testimonies show that detainees requiring medical care following
brutal interrogation, or for any other reason, remain untreated.
Several people who testified claimed that the PSS does rot allow
the Red Cross to meet with, and medically examine, detainees. In
cases where meetings with the Red Cross are allowed with detainees
who had been injured during the interrogation, the detainees are
warned not to tell the Red Cross visitors about their health
condition.
316
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S.D. stated:
My friends, from a Christian family, requested that the Re
Cross visit me, and they came, but before they arrived, Jama
told me Red Cross personnel had come to visit me with ;
physician, and that I should not sey anything about the
beatings I had received. When the Red Cross people arrived,
I did not let the physician examine me, and I said I was
perfectly healthy. The physician saw signs of beatings and
swellings on my face, and began to ask questions, but I only
cried. I was in a terrible emotional state.
A.S.'s father said:
A few days after they were arrested, I heard from some members
of the Palestinian Military Police that my children were
severely tortured by the PSS. A couple of days later my wife
went to Jericho to visit my injured son. . . she requested that
the Red Cross give him medical treatment, but the interrogator
said: "We don't recognize the Red Cross or human rights
organizations."
A.S. testified:
They pulled me with this hand, which had 11 stitches in it
(he was wounded before the arrest). I also had medications
I was taking, but thoy took them from me when I got to Jericho.
Whenever I asked for them, they said: "After you confess."
317
Appendix B
NCIS
BRIEFING PAPER
AI^ OUTLINE ASSESSMENT
OF THE THREAT AND IMPACT BY
ORGANISED/ENTERPRISE CRIME
UPON UNITED KINGDOM INTERESTS
NATIONAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
LONDON HEADQUARTERS, PO BOX 8000
LONDON SEU5EN
318
Appendix B 111
THE PROVISIONAL IRA
The Provisional Irish Republican Army was formed m 1970. It sees publicity
as a key means of furthering its aims of a unified Ireland with a 32-couoty
socialist administration and so has concentrated many of its attacks on London
where it is guaranteed the most attention It favours attacks on poorly defended
'soft' targets connected with the military and political establishments However
recent events demonstrate it is directing its attention to disrupt the economic
infrastructure, particularly by bombing outrages in the City. This could already
be a prelude to activity witnessed in the Province, where failure to pay
"protection money' can result in bomb attacks.
Most of their money does indeed come from racketeering, extortion and bank
robberies. Only a small proportion (less than £100,000 a year) comes from
sympathizers at home and in the US. Income tax. fraud in the construction
industry is also a good source.
Much of this money, coupled with the risk of infiltration, finds its way into UK
institutions. Any suspicions in this area must be reported to the Financial Desk
of the National Criminal Intelligence Service, who will treat the matter
sensitively.
THE ANIMAL LIBERATION FRONT
The UK based ALF is a highly motivated and efficient organization dealing
with an emotive issue. Their attacks are on a wide range of establishments and
businesses which have connections with food, animal products, or are suspected
of using animals in testing. They have recently switched to attacking people
connected in some way in this industry. This has included car bombs and
incendiary devices
MIDDLE EAST TERRORIST GROUTS AND STATES
The conglnneraffan nf Pajeatinian movememi g^n i£g umbrella of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are the richest of all terrorist groups.
It is estimated that they have worldwideauets approacning RPI0 billion \J$
and an annual income of about $1.5-2 billion US. Whilst the target of their
attention remains Israel and Israeli interests, their activity frequently turns to
European cities and London has not escaped various outrages, often financed
and assisted by maverick states and factions such as Libya and Iraq. The
current situation indicates that this will continue and that the fraud centres of
319
278 Appendix B
London and Frankfort are ironically apt only targets , but axe used to handle the
resources or these groups.
COUNTERFEIT CURRENCY
The United Kingdom's National ^entral Office for the Suppression of
Counterfeit Currency was formed as a result of Article 12 of the Geneva
Convention 1929.
The Convention states:
in every country, within the ! frame work of its domestic law,
investigations on the subject of counterfeiting should be organized by a
central office.
This central office should be in close contact:
(a) with the institutions: issuing currency;
j i
(b) with the police authorities within the country;
(c) with the central offices ofj other countries.
It should centralize, in each country, all information of a nature to
facilitate the investigation, prevention and punishment of counterfeiting
currency.
Until August 1990, the counterfeit problem in the United Kingdom was of little
significance. What little counterfeit currency that was seen, was not UK
sterling. The majority of counterfeit currency operations and intelligence at that
time related to the USA dollar. Sipce then, however, there has been a large
increase in counterfeit currency within the UK. This increase has been across
the whole range of currencies.
Modern printing techniques mean thai counterfeiting is now available to a much
larger group of criminals and many have been tempted to have a go. Colour
copier machines are now widely available in offices throughout the UK and
there has been a corresponding rite jn counterfeits produced on these machines,
although they have not replaced traditional methods. However the quality of
320
\ NCIS
ORGANISED CRIME UNIT
AN OUTLINE ASSESSMENT
OF THE THREAT AND IMPACT BY
ORGANISED/ENTERPRISE CRIME
UPON UNITED KINGDOM INTERESTS
SECOND BRIEFING - FEBRUARY 1994
NATIONAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
LONDON HEADQUARTERS, PO BOX 8000
LONDON SEU SEN
21 733 475
321
INDEX TO PAPERS
PAGES NOS
UK OVERVIEW 1-3
FRAUD AND MONEY LAUNDERING 4-5
GLOBAL DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ITS EFFECT ON THE UK 6-9
TRIAD GROUPS 10-11
ITALIAN MAFIA 12-14
CRIMINAL GROUPS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 15-17
THE THREAT OF JAMAICAN CRIMINALS IN THE UK 18-19
BIKER GROUPS 20-21
TURKISH GROUPS 22-23
CRIMINAL ACQUISITION AND USE OF FIREARMS 24-25
CRIMINAL MISUSE OF TRAVEL DOCUMENTS 26
X^ TERRORISM 27-28
COUNTERFEIT CURRENCY 29-30
CRIMINAL INFILTRATION INTO THE TOXIC WASTE INDUSTRY 31-23
ISRAELI ORGANISED CRIME 33-34
CASINOS AND GAMING 35-37
21-733 O - Qfi - 15
322
socialist administration and so has concentrated many of its attacks on London
where it is guaranteed the most attention. It favours attacks on poorly
defended 'soft* targets connected with the military and political establishments.
However recent events demonstrate it is directing its attention to disrupt the
economic infrastructure, particularly by bombing outrages in the City. This
could already be a prelude to activity witnessed in the Province, where failure
to pay 'protection money* can result in bomb attacks.
Most of their money does indeed come from racketeering, extortion and bank
robberies. Only a small proportion (less than £100,000 a year) comes from
sympathizers at home and in the US. ' Income tax fraud in the construction
industry is also a good source. ; I
Much of this money, coupled with the rijsk of infiltration, finds its way into UK
institutions. Any suspicions in this area must be reported to the Financial Desk
of the National Criminal Intelligence1 i Service, who will treat the matter
sensitively. I j
THE ANIMAL LIBERATION FRONT
'. ji
The UK based ALF is a highly motivated and efficient organisation dealing
with an emotive issue. Their attacks 'are on a wide range of establishments
and businesses which have connections with food, animal products, or are
suspected of using animals in testing. They have recently switched to attacking
people connected in some way in this industry. This has included car bombs
and incendiary devices. !
MIDDLE EAST TERRORIST GROUPS AND STATES
i ,!
A conglomeration of Palestinian movements constitutes the richest of all
terrorist groups. Despite denials to the contrary , it is estimated that they have
world wide assets approaching $8 - l'Oj billion US and an annual income of
about $1.5 - 2 billion US. Whilst the target of their attention has been Israel
and Israeli interests, their activity has frequently turned to European cities and
London has not escaped various outrages, often financed and assisted by
maverick states and factions such as Libya and Iraq. The current situation
indicates that the financial centres of London and Frankfurt are ironically not
only targets, but are used to handle the i resources of these groups.
323
THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COVENANT
(Al-Mihaq Al-Watani Al-Filastini)
ARTICLE 1
Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people and an integral part of the great Arab
homeland, and the people of Palestine is a part of the Arab Nation.
ARTICLE 2
Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British Mandate is an integral regional
unit
ARTICLE 3
The Palestinian Arab people possesses the legal right to its homeland, and when the liberation of
its homeland is completed it will exercise self-determination solely according to its own will and choice.
ARTICLE 4
The Palestinian personality is an innate, persistent characteristic that does not disappear, and it is
transferred from fathers to sons. The Zionist occupation, and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people
as a result of the disasters which came over it, do not deprive it of its Palestinian personality and
affiliation and do not nullify them.
ARTICLE 5
The Palestinians are the Arab citizens who were living permanently in Palestine until 1947,
whether they were expelled from there or remained. Whoever is born to a Palestinian Arab father after
this date, within Palestine or outside it, is a Palestinian.
ARTICLE 6
Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be
considered Palestinians.
ARTICLE 7
The Palestinian affiliation and the material, spiritual and historical tie with Palestine are permanent
realities. The upbringing of the Palestinian individual in an Arab and revolutionary fashion, the
undertaking of all means of forging consciousness and training the Palestinian, in order to acquaint him
profoundly with his homeland, spiritually and materially, and preparing him for the conflict and the armed
struggle, as well as for the sacrifice of his property and his life to restore his homeland, until the liberation
- all this is a national duty.
ARTICLE 8
The phase in which the people of Palestine is living is that of the national (Watani) struggle for
the liberation of Palestine. Therefore, the contradictions among the Palestinian national forces are of a
secondary order which must be suspended in the interest of the fundamental contradiction between
Zionism and colonialism on the one side and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis, the
Palestinian masses, whether in the homeland or in places of exile (Mahajir), organizations and individuals,
comprise one national front which acts to restore Palestine and liberate it through armed struggle.
ARTICLE 9
Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and is therefore a strategy and not tactics.
The Palestinian Arab people affirms its absolute resolution and abiding determination to pursue the armed
324
struggle and to march forward toward the armed popular revolution, to liberate its homeland and return
to it, [to maintain] its right to a natural life in it, and to exercise its right of self-determination in it and
sovereignty over it.
ARTICLE 10
Fedayeen action forms the nucleus of the popular Palestinian war of liberation. This demands its
promotion, extension and protection, and the mobilization of all the mass and scientific capacities of the
Palestinians, their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution, and cohesion in the
national (Watani) struggle among the various groups of the people of Palestine, and between them and
the Arab masses, to guarantee the continuation of the revolution, its advancement and victory.
ARTICLE 11
The Palestinians will have three mottoes: National (Walaniyya) unity, national (Qawmiyya)
mobilization and liberation.
ARTICLE 12
The Palestinian Arab people believes in Arab unity. In order to fulfill its role in realizing this,
it must preserve, in this phase of its national (Watani) struggle, its Palestinian personality and the
constituents thereof increase consciousness -of its existence and resist any plan that tends to disintegrate
or weaken it
ARTICLE 13
Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary aims. Each one paves the way
for realization of the other. Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine, and the liberation of Palestine
leads to Arab unity. Working for both goes hand in hand.
ARTICLE 14
The destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the very Arab existence, depends upon the destiny of the
Palestine issue. The endeavor and effort of the Arab nation to liberate Palestine follows from this
connection. The people of Palestine assumes its vanguard role in realizing this sacred national (Qawmt)
aim.
ARTICLE 15
The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national (Qawmi) duty to repulse the
Zionist, imperialist invasion from the great Arab homeland and to purge the Zionist presence from
Palestine. Its full responsibilities fall upon the Arab nation, peoples and governments, with the Palestinian
Arab people at their head.
For this purpose, the Arab nation must mobilize its military, human, material and spiritual
capabilities to participate actively with the people of Palestine. They must, especially in the present stage
of armed Palestinian revolution, grant and offer the people of Palestine all possible help and every material
and human support, and afford it every sure means and opportunity enabling it to continue to assume its
vanguard role in pursuing its armed revolution until the liberation of its homeland.
ARTICLE 16
The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual viewpoint, will prepare an atmosphere of tranquility
and peace for the Holy Land, in the shade of which all the holy places will be safeguarded, and freedom
of worship and visitation to all will be guaranteed, without distinction or discrimination of race, color,
language or religion. For this reason, the people of Palestine looks to the support of all the spiritual forces
in the world.
325
ARTICLE 17
The liberation of Palestine, from a human viewpoint, will restore to the Palestinian man his
dignity, glory and freedom. For this, the Palestinian Arab people looks to the support of those in the
world who believe in the dignity and freedom of man.
ARTICLE 18
The liberation of Palestine, from an international viewpoint, is a defensive act necessitated by the
requirements of self-defense. For this reason, the people of Palestine, desiring to befriend all peoples,
looks to the support of the states which love freedom, justice and peace in restoring the legal situation to
Palestine, establishing security and peace in its territory, and enabling its people to exercise national
(Wataniyya) sovereignty and national (Qawmiyya) freedom.
ARTICLE 19
The partitioning of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel is fundamentally null and
void, whatever time has elapsed, because it was contrary to the wish of the people of Palestine and its
natural right to its homeland, and contradicts the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,
the first of which is the right of self-determination.
ARTICLE 20
The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate Document, and what has been based upon them are
considered null and void. The claim of a historical or spiritual tie between Jews and Palestine does not
tally with historical realities nor with the constituents of statehood in their true sense. Judaism, in its
character as a religion of revelation, is not a nationality with an independent existence. Likewise, the Jews
are not one people with an independent personality. They are rather citizens of the states to which they
belong.
ARTICLE 21
The Palestinian Arab people, in expressing itself through the armed Palestinian revolution, rejects
every solution that is a substitute for a complete liberation of Palestine, and rejects all plans that aim at
the settlement of the Palestine issue or its internationalization.
ARTICLE 22
Zionism is a political movement organically related to world imperialism and hostile to all
movements of liberation and progress in the world. It is a racist and fanatical movement in its formation;
aggressive, expansionist and colonialist in its aims; and Fascist and Nazi in its means. Israel is the tool
of the Zionist movement and a human and geographical base for world imperialism. It is a concentration
and jumping-off point for imperialism in the heart of the Arab homeland, to strike at the hopes of the Arab
nation for liberation, unity and progress.
Israel is a constant threat to peace in the Middle East and the entire world. Since the liberation
of Palestine will liquidate the Zionist and imperialist presence and bring about the stabilization of peace
in the Middle East, the people of Palestine looks to the support of all liberal men of the world and all the
forces of good progress and peace; and implores all of them, regardless of their different leanings and
orientations, to offer all help and support to the people of Palestine in its just and legal struggle to liberate
its homeland.
ARTICLE 23
The demands of security and peace and the requirements of truth and justice oblige all states that
preserve friendly relations among peoples and maintain the loyalty of citizens to their homelands to
consider Zionism an illegitimate movement and to prohibit its existence and activity.
326
ARTICLE 24
The Palestinian Arab people believes in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-
determination, human dignity and the right of peoples to exercise them.
ARTICLE 25
To realize the aims of this Covenant and its principles the Palestine Liberation Organization will
undertake its full role in liberating Palestine.
ARTICLE 26
The Palestine Liberation Organization, which represents the forces of the Palestinian revolution,
is responsible for the movement of the Palestinian Arab people in its struggle to restore its homeland,
liberate it, return to it and exercise the right of self-determination in it This responsibility extends to all
military, political and financial matters, and all else that the Palestine issue requires in the Arab and
international spheres.
ARTICLE 27
The Palestine Liberation Organization will cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its
capacities, and will maintain neutrality in their mutual relations in the light of, and on the basis of, the
requirements of the battle of liberation, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.
ARTICLE 28
The Palestinian Arab people insists upon the originality and independence of its national
(Wataniyya) revolution and rejects every manner of interference, guardianship and subordination.
ARTICLE 29
The Palestinian Arab people possesses the prior and original right in liberating and restoring its
homeland and will define its position with reference to all states and powers on the basis of their positions
with reference to the issue [of Palestine] and the extent of their support for [the Palestinian Arab people]
in its revolution to realize its aims.
ARTICLE 30
The fighters and bearers of arms in the battle of liberation are the nucleus of the Popular Army,
which will be the protecting arm of the Palestinian Arab people.
ARTICLE 31
This organization shall have a flag, oath and anthem, all of which will be determined in
accordance with a special system.
ARTICLE 32
To this Covenant is attached a law known as the Fundamental Law of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, in which is determined the manner of the organization's formation, its committees,
institutions, the special functions of every one of them and all the requisite duties associated with them
in accordance with the Covenant
ARTICLE 33
This Covenant cannot be amended except by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the
National Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization in a special session called for this purpose.
ALFONSE M 0 AMATO
NEW TORX
327
Idnited States Senate
WASHINGTON. DC 205 10-3202
June 12, 1995
Dear Colleague:
I am writing to ask for your support and co-sponsorship of the Middle East Peace
Compliance Act of 1995.
This Act is intended to bolster peace in the Middle East by making any U.S. assistance to the
Palestinians in Gaza and Jericho contingent upon the strict compliance of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) with both the letter and spirit of the commitments it has made
since the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP).
I believe that the U.S. has a national security interest in the promotion of peace and
stability in the Middle East. A secure, lasting and verifiable peace benefits the United States, the
Palestinians, and the closest U.S. ally in the region, Israel.
It is the purpose of this legislation to ensure that the chance for peace in the Middle East is
strengthened through the strict adherence by the PLO to the succession of legally binding
commitments made pursuant to the Declaration of Principles as well as subsequent pledges to the
President and Vice-President of the United States.
The Administration is seeking authority from Congress which would permit the President to
provide the balance of $500 million in U.S. assistance to the Palestinian Authority. It is our
strong belief that it may do so even without substantial PLO compliance with its commitments
and without effective U.S. Government oversight.
The Middle East Peace Compliance Act of 1995 would grant temporary authority to the
President to waive certain provisions of U.S. law which currently prohibit U.S. assistance from
supporting activities of the PLO. The Act would replace the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act
of 1993, as amended, which is set to expire at the end of this month.
Key provisions of the new Compliance Act would:
* Require that U.S. assistance be used only for humanitarian projects to benefit Palestinians
living under the control of the Palestinian Authority. All assistance must be channeled only
through U.S. Government agencies or private voluntary organizations (PVO's);
* Condition any U.S. assistance to the Palestinians living in Gaza and Jericho upon full
financial and managerial accountability;
328
* Require the President to certify that no aid will go to individuals suspected of having
harmed American citizens, while requiring that the PLO assist in the apprehension of, and
extradition to the U.S., of all such individuals now, or previously under its control;
* Direct the President to provide specific counter-terrorism technology and technical
assistance to Israel; and
* Require that the PLO pay compensation to U.S. victims of terrorism committed with PLO
support and under its direction.
While Israel has made strenuous efforts to live up to its commitments under the DoP, the
PLO has not. I believe that under these circumstances, the PLO should not be rewarded with
U.S. assistance. Its flagrant violations of both the DoP and its pledges to U.S. Government
officials, as well as its apparent unwillingness, or inability, to meet even the most minimal
standards of compliance, should make the PLO and the Palestinian Authority ineligible to
receive U.S. support. Only a significant change in the level of compliance, as detailed in the
Middle East Peace Compliance Act of 199S, would qualify the Palestinian Authority to obtain
further U.S. assistance.
Indeed, since the signing of the DoP, there have been 651 casualties due to terrorism in
Israel, more the twice the number killed and injured during a similar period prior to the signing.
Once again, in order to ensure that only PLO compliance, not terrorism, is rewarded with
American dollars, we ask that you support our efforts to seek the swift enactment of the Middle
East Peace Compliance Act of 1995 and hope that you will consider becoming a co-sponsor of
this vitally important legislation.
If you wish to co-sponsor this legislation, please contact Gregg Rickman of my staff at
x 4-8358 for additional information to or join as a co-sponsor to the Middle East Compliance Act
of 1995.
Sincerely,
Qtfru 9&«J5
Alfonse M. D'Amato
United States Senator
AMD:gjr
329
Y2%- 01WS
PEACE WATCH W^J 017BO B30
fam gaJBMfi • 17 October 1995
Report on Financial Issues Facing PA and Donors Reveals Erosion of
Standards for PA's Economic Decisionmaking and Accountability
A number of to initial demands made by lbs doner nations that ftaandal decisions of to Pukaduam
Autbority(PA)bom^ootoUiUofeconooik:coo«lA3ilkw
or abandoned bi recent roomhs. according *» ■ *"*■» Watch report released axiny, oo to eve tf to donors'
to be bcM Id hdi on 11-19 October.
Accadbig to to noon, to Palestinian Bcooonric Council for Devtkprnant«ndB«ooniaao»aa
(PBCDAR), which was established according to crueria art by to World Bank and to cbnw aalkaiL san been
reduced to ■ ihadow of its Intended role PECDAR m supposed to dlsham hundreds of nllloM in
dollars In tn« last two years oa iarrattrectare development, whereas callaiataa lor the total
ecteaBy spent ruga oety fwn $18 million to MO million. PBCDAR/s rain In disbuxsiag money
hen to World Bank's Hobt Pond tat P A operating expenses wfll be axnsienedtotoPAsMiiu^efFanmca,
beaded by Mohammad NashasaibL It was also reported this menm tot to PA plena to srt u*M sw Pasestisian
BeenonfcCraudl,wafchwiUotooYere^
The Wodd Bank1! HolttFiavl nu encoumered otor dlfflcuulet bj rceentiaonto AfttntawofBaropan
nations now cootribw money Tor the PA'« operating expenses cU/eelly to P A nibiflriM, and Wcrid Bank offldUU
no longar racal ve cooipbia reports of ihaaa aansfen. Doe hi part to pre*len« rt to Hcto Fund, to PA took out
afcowOOrnmkm in loans from Palesdiu^
to Hoist Rind has subsequently forwarded to money, to PA har, n« prepaid to toen to to banks.
At to meeting to be held in Paris asmorrow and Thursday, 18-19C<tot«.orxaf toprtocif^bmmstofce
discassod is to special "potiee fund," whfch channels to dorwnauona'cooliftutkwvlaW^WAtonayBsLBto
of to Palestinian Police. In tight of the planned expansion of Palestinian ■ecnrUj fortes In the
wake of the Oslo 3 accords, Palestinian economic sonrccs told Pence Watch that the PA plana
to ask for an increase of $15 allien a month In the donors' subsidies for police salaries. A
more optimistic view presented to Peace Welch by otor pcnn» indkUted the PA"i bud^ wwld urn firo $444
million in 1995 10 $590 million in 1996, but tot to operating deficit which to donor oatloos would hava to co«r
would shrink due lo higher estimated receipts Ctora taxes.
A»>»e<iUU»M««wr»<>^i>fc»dt^Ma.a»ns%ibioe^uaa»MW><4«ei»«>»tAtiMe^*»«Wq«w
Bank/PBCDAR report on this subject obtained by Peace Watch, TndusJrWBltab«artdBMbli^
Private Sector Development lor to We* Bank and Gaza." tor*oJcawMcostai»ttIof WMe^Ulo^ofwelcb
pnvaiettvostxs arc cj^im 10 pmmsvua Bullion, ine concw- ratiocs wa ami toiu «o« Wcalfl Bank S37 rnillk»,
and to PA $83 mufiun, to heict mostly h to form of real estate. The projea fc c<^ held uo, emce^ ctor
reason*, by objectioni from PA minisen Including Arafat, endtyrelucur^cntoparttf PsJesitasantav
P« oopia of *« neon, « fe. '-MliWl eculW, till MoU tnbori » (QZ) M7T24, or »U b»cpor, 2946W. tM9fT
eras j»i« jopo .oremzn frs nw trveri' ,24 snip put
Wl»BsnSt.JensMUMeit24T»l;(0a)«lT726P«:(CO)6333»
330
A second issue expected to be discussed in Paris is the industrial parks project
According to a World Bank/PECDAR report on this subject obtained by Peace
Watch, "Industrial Estates and Enabling Environment for Private Sector
Development for the West Bank and Gaza," the project will cost a total of $920
million, of which private invartors are expected to put in $705 million, the donor
nations $95 million, the World Bank $37 million, and the PA $83 million, the latter
mostly in the form of real estate. The project is being held up, among other reasons,
by objections from PA minister! including Arafat, and by reluctance on the part of
Palestinian inv«
ffer asfto* at the report, or for additional details, call Moti Inbari at (02) 617726, or via beeper, 294666,
331
PEACE
WATCH
REPORT
Economic Issues
Facing the Palestinian Authority
and the Donor Nations
ISSUED OCTOBER 17, 1995
332
PEACE WATCH
An independent non-partisan organization monitoring the implementation
of the agreements signed by Israel and the PLO.
Board of Directors
Natan Sharansky, Prof. Aviezer Ravitslcy, Rabbi Shlomo Riskin, Rabbi Yoel Bin-Nun, Prof. Aharon Klieman,
Prof. Gavriel Moked, Aryeh Nehamkin, Dan Schueftan, Elisha Shapira, Mookie Tsur
Executive Director
Dan Polisar
Report Authors
Pinhas Inbari, Ziv Hellman
Report Editing and Translation
Dan Polisar, Joshua Schwarcz, Tamir Sorek
Peace Watch Staff
Yakov Avram, Michael Freund, Ziv Hellman, Eli Hirsch, Moti Inbari,
Pinhas Inbari, Bob Lang, Arnon Regular, Joshua Schwarcz, Tamir Sorek
Layout and Design:
i^yfrgaman Communications
PEACE WATCH
24 Ibn Ezra Street
Jerusalem, 92424, Israel
Tel: 972-2-617726
Fax: 972-2-633326
e-mail: peace@actcom.co.il
Copyright © 1995 by Peace Watch. All rights reserved.
333
CONTENTS
Introduction 3
1. Significant Recent Developments 5
The Two Principal Schools of Thought 5
The Decline of the World Bank/US Position 7
Conclusion 1 1
2. Issues to be Addressed by the Donor Conference in Paris 13
A. Addressing differences between the US and European positions
on priorities for development 13
B. The Industrial Parks Project 15
C. The Palestinian Authority Budget Deficit 19
D. The Effects of the Israeli Closure 22
INTRODUCTION
The "Oslo euphoria" that swept through much of the world in the days immediately following
the signing of the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel in September 1993
found its economic expression in the first "donor nation conference" which was held in Wash-
ington on 1 October 1993. At that inaugural conference, at Israel's urging and under the
leadership of the US, the major industrial nations of the world pledged to grant or loan the
soon-to-be created Palestinian Authority (PA) a total of $2.4 billion over five years. This mon-
etary assistance was meant to provide the PA with the money to finance a major infrastructure
campaign in the territories, with the goal of creating a rapidly growing economy which, together
with other anticipated "fruits of peace," would bring the Palestinian population squarely behind
a reconciliation with Israel.
Now, two years later, the donor nations are holding a conference on 18-19 October 1995 in
Paris to discuss the future of financial assistance to the PA, in light of the extension of Palestinian
autonomy to the West Bank. The present moment is therefore an appropriate time to assess the
state of the aid effort to the Palestinians to date, and to analyze what the central issues are which
will shape this conference and the aid effort expected to come from it.
Peace Watch, as part of its mandate to monitor the implementation of the accords between Israel
and the PLO. has published comprehensive reports on the financial condition of the Palestinian
Authority in November 1994 and March 1995, as well as a number of updates. These reports
placed special emphasis on the evolution of the competing conceptions which various donor
nations and organizations developed regarding the disbursement of financial assistance to the
Palestinian Authority, as well as on the different schools of thought among Palestinian political
figures and economists. The reports analyzed the conflicts which developed, and the effects they
335
Peace Watch Report, October 17, 1995
had on the financial situation of the PA, the failure of the full aid package to arrive, and the
abandonment of many of the initial goals.
This report continues along similar lines of analysis. Chapter One describes the two principal
schools of thought, and explains how in the last several months the view shared by Yasser Arafat,
a number of ministers in the Palestinian Authority, and several key European nations has gained
the upper hand against the competing conception of the World Bank, the US, and the Palestin-
ian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR). Chapter Two de-
scribes the major issues facing the donor nations as they meet in Paris.
This report is based on material collected from highly-placed sources in the Palestinian Author-
ity, Israel, and among the donor nations, from careful monitoring of press reports which have
appeared in Palestinian papers, from World Bank publications, and from published and unpub-
lished documents.
336
CHAPTER ONE
SIGNIFICANT RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Several of the key assumptions underlining the October 1993 donors' conference have not been
realized in the intervening two years. Although there are numerous disputes concerning the
details, there is wide agreement concerning two points: not all of the money which was pledged
was given; and the overwhelming majority of the money which was received has been used for
meeting the operating expenses of the Palestinian Authority and its police force, rather than for
infrastructure and development.
One of the central claims of this report, which is not yet accepted by all observers, concerns a
third key development: the goal of establishing a system of donations and investments which
would operate according to economic considerations has essentially been abandoned, and
accountability and transparency are playing a decreasingly significant role. Understanding all
three of these points requires a brief analysis of the two major schools of thought.
The two principal schools of thought
The United States and the World Bank, who took the initial lead in the donation effort, empha-
sized their political and economic views in shaping donation policy. They supported private
enterprise over massive government projects and demanded the establishment of organizations
composed of professional economists to oversee the disbursement of donor funds in accordance
337
Peace Watch Report, October 17, 1995
with high standards of "transparency and accountability." Out of concern that PLO and PA
Chairman Yasser Arafat would divert donor funds to further his political aims rather than make
use of the money for economic development, the World Bank and the US insisted on the
establishment of PECDAR, the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Recon-
struction, a professional body that would ensure "transparency and accountability." Under their
conception, PECDAR was to become the principal economic address in the Palestinian Author-
ity, handling the disbursement of the foreign donations, running major infrastructure projects,
and assisting international investors interested in identifying Palestinian enterprises for invest-
ment purposes.
Even before PECDAR s establishment in November 1993, a comprehensive five-year plan for
the development of the Palestinian economy was prepared by a team of prominent Palestinian
economists headed by Dr. Yusuf Sayegh. The plan called for relatively liberal and decentralized
PA economic policies, and received World Bank backing. PECDAR's Operational Management
Team was headed by Abu Alaa, who supported the basic approach of the US and the World
Bank, and who later became the Palestinian Minister of Economics as well. Under his direction,
PECDAR attempted to carve out a role for itself largely independent of the other ministries in
the PA and of Yasser Arafat.
PECDAR received an additional boost in June 1994 with the creation of the World Bank's Hoist
Fund, whose purpose was to assist the PA in meeting its operating expenses. The Hoist Fund
collects funds from the donor nations and passes them on to PECDAR, which then disburses
them to pay the salaries of PA employees. Although the initial donor nation pledges were
intended to cover infrastructure and development, the Hoist Fund was established at the urging
of Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres after it became apparent that the PA would not be
capable of covering its operating expenses through tax revenues, and would need foreign assis-
tance in closing a very large budget deficit. A separate "Police Fund" was established through the
United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) to pay the salaries of Palestinian policemen.
The semi-independence of PECDAR from the PLO and the PA provoked efforts to limit and
neutralize its authority, chiefly from Yasser Arafat and from Nabil Shaath, the PA Minister of
International Cooperation and Planning. Arafat complained repeatedly about having to answer
to Western demands of accountability, which he said was a demeaning limitation of his author-
338
Economic Issues Facing tho Palestinian Authority and the Donor Nations
ity. In addition, Arafat preferred large-scale projects which created symbols of Palestinian
sovereignty over the less ambitious, private enterprise projects backed by the US and the World
Bank. After substantial efforts, Arafat and Sha'ath persuaded many of the European nations to
back them in setting priorities and disbursement channels different from those of the World
Bank.
Over the past two years, two competing "conceptual camps" have emerged. The US, the World
Bank, Abu Alaa and PECDAR have a joint concept on the disbursement of monetary aid to the
Palestinian Authority. On the other side, Yasser Arafat, Nabil Sha'ath, Palestinian Finance
Minister Muhammad Nashashibi, and European nations, compose the opposing camp. For the
purposes of this report, "European nations" refers to the leading members of the EU, such as
France, Germany and Italy. The UK has generally followed the lead of the US, and the Scandi-
navian nations have their own separate approach.
The decline of the World Bank/US position
In this struggle, the US and the World Bank have in effect yielded to the competing side.
World Bank officials have officially denied the correctness of this assessment, but sources within
the World Bank and the PA have confirmed it in not-for-attribution conversations with Peace
Watch. The assessment is also supported by four recent developments, as detailed below.
/. Reduced Role far PECDAR
PECDAR has effectively been reduced to a shadow of its intended role and position. Accord-
ing to Nabil A-Shariff, deputy director of PECDAR, quoted in an article which recently ap-
peared in Al-Quds, PECDAR has financed a total of only $18 million in projects since its
inception.1 It should be noted that this figure relates only to projects contracted and managed by
PECDAR, and not money that was funneled through PECDAR, such as Hoist Fund transfers.
Other high ranking Palestinian sources contradict this and claim that the correct total is over
560 million.
' Al-Quds. 8 October 1995. page 4.
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Peace Watch Report, October 17, 1995
In any event, either figure is a small sum of money relative to initial expectations, and under-
scores the extent to which PECDAR has been neutralized as a force in Palestinian economics.
The projects currently being managed by PECDAR include: public cleaning projects in Gaza,
public gardening, material and manpower supplies to municipalities, school and hospital
maintenance, and sidewalk construction. Even PECDAR officials quoted by Al-Quds admit that
some of these projects are "make-work" in intent — i.e., they add little to the development of the
local economy, and aim primarily to keep down unemployment rates.2
Yusuf Sayegh's long-term plans have been permanendy shelved, and Arafat has consistently
blocked attempts to grant Dr. Sayegh the role of director of PECDAR Instead, Arafat has placed
Nabil Shaath on PECDAR's Board of Directors. According to Palestinian economic sources,
World Bank and PA representatives agreed in July 1995 to a proposal put forward by Yasser
Arafat that in the near future money disbursed by the Hoist Fund would be handled by
Nashashibi s Ministry of Finance, rather than PECDAR, as was the past custom. This is an
additional reduction in PECDAR's status, and indicates a retreat from past donor demands that
standards of transparency and accountability be maintained, since they argued that keeping
PECDAR involved in disbursements was the best method to insure that such standards would
be met. High-ranking officials in the World Bank, it should be stressed, have vehemently denied
this report. Hoist Fund and World Bank officials argue further that "PECDAR was meant to be
a temporary organization all along, until the PA's ministries proved established enough to take
on its roles" — although these officials deny that the transition away from PECDAR has already
occurred.3
Significantly, there were no PECDAR representatives in the recent preparatory donor conference
held in Washington, DC. In contrast to past sessions, Nabil Shaath was also noteworthy in his
absence. Instead, those attending on the Palestinian side were Yasser Arafat and Muhammad
Nashashibi.
'AJ-QuJt. 8 October 1995. page 4.
' Peace Watch interview with World Bank sources on 1 5 September 1995.
340
Economic Issues Facing the Palestinian Authority and the Donor Nations
2. Establishment of a Palestinian Economic Council
In a recent development, according to AI-Quds, the PA announced on 9 October 1995 its intent
to establish a new Palestinian Economic Council. This seems to confirm reports of the imminent
demise of PECDAR Abu Alaa is officially named as the director of the new council, but he is
directly subordinate to Yasser Arafat, in contrast to the partial independence he enjoyed at
PECDAR. According to Al-Quds, PA officials openly admit that political considerations will be
taken into account in the new council's activities, in accordance with Yasser Arafat's discretion.4
3. Problems at the Hoist Fund
Palestinian economic sources have told Peace Watch that some European nations have stopped
donating money to the Hoist Fund, and are donating money directly to the ministries of the
Palestinian Authority without going through either the World Bank or UN agencies. The
Europeans also insist that more money go to investment projects rather than towards operating
expenses. Senior World Bank officials have told Peace Watch that they no longer receive
complete reports on direct European monetary transfers to PA ministries, which effectively
means that there is no one body which can coordinate or control such monetary assistance. In
contrast, the US is still committed to supporting PA operating expenses. It is hoped by the US
that Saudi Arabia can make up for some of the lost European donations to the Hoist Fund.
Saudi Arabia has emerged lately, at least on paper, as an increasingly important player among the
donor nations. In addition to supplying major funds to the Hoist Fund, Saudi Arabia has
pledged to be the lead donor in covering the salaries of the Palestinian Police Force, alongside
Norway and Denmark, via a special fund managed by UNRWA. However, Peace Watch has
learned that the Saudis have not been giving the full sum of money pledged to cover police
salaries since April 1995, which has caused difficulties with the payment of these salaries. The
Netherlands has been called in to make up the difference in the meanwhile.
Odin Knudsen, director of the World Bank, has invested substantial efforts in strengthening the
tics between the Hoist Fund and the Gulf states, conducting a comprehensive tour of Saudi
*Al-Qiub, 10 October 1995. page 3.
341
Peace Watch Report, October 17, 1995
Arabia and the Gulf states in September 1995. The US has also been trying to persuade the
Saudis to release a fund, estimated to be as high as $200 million, which had been raised by Faisal
Al-Husseini last year, for the most part to support Palestinian projects in Jerusalem. The fund
was frozen at Arafat's insistence, and none of the money has been disbursed. The Americans are
in favor of the frozen money being granted to the PA, but the Saudis are apparently still demur-
ring over the matter. In the meantime, the "Jerusalem Fund" money is frozen in an account in
the Islamic Bank in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia.
As revealed in previous Peace Watch releases, according to Palestinian economic sources, the
Hoist Fund was temporarily frozen during part of the month of June due to the PA's insistence
that PECDAR no longer be responsible for the disbursement of its funds. This was denied by
high-ranking officials in the World Bank, but reconfirmed by Peace Watch via its sources. The
Hoist Fund's operations are dependent on a formal agreement between the PLO and the World
Bank, and the fund could not be fully operated in June because the renewal of the agreement
was delayed.
During this time, some of the salaries paid by the PA to its employees were covered by about
$30 million in loans that the PA took from Palestinian and Jordanian-owned banks in the West
Bank, according to banking sources in the West Bank. It was only after the World Bank agreed
in principle that Muhammad Nashashibi's Finance Ministry take over PECDAR s role that the
fund was reactivated, and June payments, which had been in arrears, were covered. The PA, it
should be noted, has not yet repaid the loans it initially took to pay the salaries that were
eventually covered by Hoist Fund payments, and it is unclear to what use the loan money has
been put in the meanwhile. Banking sources have told Peace Watch that the PA has indicated it
will "repay" the loans by reducing future tax levies on the banks by the amount of the loans.
Palestinian economists have privately expressed doubts to Peace Watch over whether the Finance
Ministry is properly organized to take on the task of disbursing Hoist Fund transfers. Represen-
tatives of the International Monetary Fund have been working intensively with staff members of
the Finance Ministry to prepare them for their new responsibilities. It is not clear whether the
IMF and World Bank are yet satisfied with the progress made.
Following the decision last June to transfer responsibility for Hoist Fund disbursements from
PECDAR to Muhammad Nashashibi's Ministry of Finance, it was also agreed, at the insistence
10
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Economic Issues Facing the Palestinian Authority and the Donor Nations
of the donor nations, that the Finance Ministry and the Hoist Fund would undergo an audit
managed by the international accounting firm Touche- Ross-Saba. Tbe delay in waiting for the
completion of this audit is one reason among many that the transfer of responsibility for Hoist
Fund disbursement is being held up.
4. Shift Away From Private Enterprise to Large-Scale Projects
Grandiose projects, such as the construction of a port in Gaza City, are being given serious
consideration by the donor nations, and arc even gathering the interest of the US. This is a
significant shift, because the US and World Bank were long opposed to such projects, consider-
ing them to be less desirable than channeling assistance to smaller private enterprises. Dennis
Ross, the US State Department official coordinating Middle East peace efforts, told the Israeli
daily Ha'aretz on 27 September 1995 that with respect to the Palestinian economy: "The donor
nations have learned a lesson.... The experience we gained over the past year and a half served to
improve our understanding as to the best use of the money ... instead of concentrating on small
projects, we will deal from now on mainly in large projects."5 It is also noteworthy that Nabil
Shaath is the main political patron of the port project, which is competing for attention and
funds with another proposed project, the industrial parks initiative, patronized by Abu Alaa.
Conclusion
In the months leading up to the October 18-19 meeting of the donor nations in Paris, there has
been an erosion, though not a collapse, of the positions which have been championed by the
United States, the World Bank, and the Palestinian economists and politicians involved in
PECDAR. This erosion, as detailed above, has been expressed in a number of areas. As the next
chapter makes clear, however, a number of points of dispute remain between the two competing
camps, and the addressing of these issues is likely to play a prominent role in the Paris confer-
ence.
' Ht'trrtz, 28 September 1993. page A3.
11
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CHAPTER TWO
ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED
BY THE DONOR
CONFERENCE IN PARIS
A. Addressing differences
between the US and European positions
on priorities for development
The upcoming donor conference in Paris is expected to be only the first of a series of three
conferences, all to be held in Paris. In addition to the October conference, which begins tomor-
row, further conferences are scheduled for November and December of this year, according to
Palestinian economic sources.
In preparation for the October 18-19 conference in Paris, officially entided the conference of
"the Consultative Group-CG," the "Ad-Hoc Liaison Commktee-AHLC" of the donor nations
held a conference in Washington, DC. immediately after the signing of the Oslo 2 agreement on
28 September 1995. The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee is a smaller forum of representatives of the
donor nations, which meets more frequently than the full plenum of the Consul tive Group.
Although the Ad Hoc Committee only debates issues and does not make formal decisions, its
sessions serve as important indicators of the thinking of the larger group.
On the basis of the AHLC conference in Washington, it appears likely that the rift between the
two camps will continue to play a major role in the Paris deliberations. Although the World
13
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Poace Watch Report, October 17, 1995
Bank, as noted in Chapter One, has partially conceded to Arafat's point of view on the concep-
tual level, there arc still differences of opinion in at least two respects. First, the US issued a
statement re-affirming its commitment to both the general "donor group goal" of assisting the
PA with $2.4 billion in aid over five years, and the specific US promise of $500 million. The
Europeans pointedly refrained from joining in such a statement. The Clinton Administration
has asked that the Europeans be made aware that Congressional support for foreign aid to the
PA, which is currently a subject of debate, will waver further if Congressional members sense
that the US is being asked to bear more of a relative burden than it originally undertook
Second, US hopes that the Europeans would adopt a number of World Bank development
initiatives were not realized, with the Europeans sticking to plans of their own. The World
Bank's projects are an updated version of EIP (Emergency Implementation Program), a set of
projects initially composed in the winter and spring of 1995, which was further divided into
EAP (Emergency Assistance Program) and ERP (Emergency Rehabilitation Program), the latter
of which was slated to provide $128 million for what the World Bank felt were most urgently
needed projects such as roads, schools, hospitals and water supplies. Some new emphases have
been added, particularly on developing tourism in the Middle East. Indeed, on 29 September
1995, an agreement was reached among various panics to form a new Middle East/Mediterra-
nean Travel and Tourism Association.
According to an Al-Quds article which appeared on 24 September 1995, among other projects to
be discussed at the conference are: (1) water supply projects, particularly desalination programs
and water pipe supply and maintenance; (2) independent electric power provision for the PA;
(3) waste disposal projects; (4) road construction and maintenance, especially Route 4 in the
Gaza Strip; (5) construction of a large public port along the seashore in Gaza; (6) establishment
of industrial parks; (7) assistance to Palestinian municipalities; (8) encouraging banking in the
PA; (9) projects to encourage Palestinian economic experts living abroad to assist in efforts to
develop the PAs economy.
Yasser Arafat listed his preferred projects during the AHLC meeting, indicating that the Palestin-
ians view the construction of sea and air ports in Gaza, industrial parks, an independent Pales-
tinian electricity grid, water development and housing development as their top priorities.
14
345
Economic Issues Facing the Palestinian Authority and the Donor Nations
Regarding one European-backed project, the sea port in Gaza, American opposition seems to
have disappeared for the most part. The idea of constructing a sea port in Gaza has long been
favored by Arafat, in large part because the symbolism of sovereignty and independence that
would come with such a port is attractive. The US and World Bank have in the past been
opposed, considering it an expensive project which would not grant as much economic benefit
as other projects.
Lately, however, the US has come around to agreeing with the importance of such a project, in
part because of Palestinian claims that an independent Palestinian outlet for exports is necessary
in light of the frequent Israeli closures of the Gaza Strip. There arc indications that the US might
even ask that American firms be involved as contractors in the project.
With a US green light in place, feasibility studies have been executed regarding the construction
of the port, and some European contractors have been lined up, including the firms of Balast
Nipam, Spie Batingolls, and Hochtip. An initial budget, covering only the first stage of studies,
preparatory work, and initial groundbreaking, has been set at $72 million. On 29 September
1995, a meeting was held involving the major players in the project, representing Germany, the
Netherlands, France, several European banks, and the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and
International Cooperation. According to Ali Shaath, chairman of the project, groundbreaking
could take place as early as next March.6
B. The industrial parks project
An American-backed project almost certain to be discussed in Paris is the industrial parks. Until
now, the sea port in Gaza, backed by Nabil Shaath, and the establishment of "industrial parks,"
pushed by Abu Alaa, have been viewed as mutually exclusive projects, with the expectation being
that one or the other would be adopted. Although American opposition to the Gaza sea port has
effectively been dropped, the projects are still likely to compete for the same resources. By way of
example, there are two competing plans to invest resources in repaving roads around the pro-
*MKh*j*tM]sitti, 29 September 1995. page 3.
15
346
Peace Watch Report, October 17, 1995
posed site of the Gaza sea port, or to reactivate the old railroad line between the Israeli port town
of Ashdod and the Gaza Strip. Paving roads around the port would make the construction of the
port itself more viable, while reactivating the rail line could obviate the need for such a port,
since Palestinian import and export needs, the latter stemming from Gaza-based industrial parks,
could be served by the rail link with the Ashdod port.
The need to divide resources between the Gaza sea port and the industrial parks is among the
many reasons, some of which are detailed at the end of this section, why the industrial parks
project is likely to encounter opposition in Paris.
A report on industrial parks, entitled "Industrial Estates and Enabling Environment For Private
Sector Development For The West Bank And Gaza,° has been composed by the World Bank
with the assistance of PECDAR. The report details the need for industrial parks, and sets out
their general structure. The idea behind them is that the parks will be "islands" of stability and
trade within the PA, unaffected by security and economic conditions outside themselves. The
report foresees the potential employment of between 20,000 and 100,000 persons in the indus-
trial parks.
Three types of industrial parks are envisioned: "border estates," located on the border between
Palestinian areas and Israel, "local estates" located entirely in Palestinian territory, and smaller
"municipal industrial complex workshops" in cities.
The border estates would be built on large tracts of land abutting Israel, effectively creating a free
trade zone between Israel and the PA. The idea behind this is to enable joint Israeli-Palestinian
ventures to operate in an environment where Israelis and Palestinians could work together with
minimal concerns about physical security. An important component of the planning is that
security forces other than the Palestinian police would be responsible for security in these estates,
in order to allay Israeli fears. In addition, maximal conditions of freedom of movement will have
to be ensured. The border estates would be export-oriented, but involve many Israeli and
Palestinian subcontractors.
Local estates would concentrate on producing for the internal Palestinian markets, and would be
smaller than the border estates. Municipal industrial complexes would be built on municipal
land and meant for small workshops and light industries.
16
347
Economic Issues Facing the Palestinian Authority and the Donor Nations
Particular emphasis is placed on the industrial park to be situated in Jenin, a city in the northern
West Bank. Jenin is located 40 kilometers from the international sea port in Haifa and 30
kilometers from the Jordanian border, making it an ideal spot for three-way Israeli, Palestinian
and Jordanian export-oriented operations. In anticipation of the construction of an industrial
park in Jenin, enterprising investors, including Jordanians, have already purchased tracts of land
in Jenin. The Jordan Bank and the Islamic Bank have expressed interest in the Jenin project and
have agreed to raise $80 million in investments to that end.
The main border estate in the Gaza Strip would be located in Karnei. PAOICO, a Palestinian-
owned company with ties to Abu Alaa, is slated to be the main contractor involved in the
project. An alternative site for a border estate could be the Erez checkpoint. A Karnei industrial
park would likely be tied to any future Gazan port, while a park at the Erez checkpoint would
naturally be inclined to make use of the Israeli port at Ashdod.
The "Estates" report cites two conditions for the success of the project: the establishment of an
autonomous directorate for the industrial parks, and the provision of guarantees and incentives
for investors. The report also details solutions for these two problems, as follows.
An independent directorate called PIEA (the Palestinian Industrial Estates Authority) is envi-
sioned. The independence of the directorate is important in order to guarantee investors that
economic considerations rather than political ones play the major role in the industrial parks,
with dear and stable rules established by PIEA.
As an extra "insurance policy," the establishment of MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency) is also envisioned, to ensure that proper conditions exist to protect investors from large
losses. According to a poll conducted by the World Bank among potential investors in the PA,
the main subjects of anxiety investors indicate are: administrative corruption, personal security,
political considerations crowding out economic ones and taxation issues. PIEA and MIGA are
meant to reduce these anxieties. Particular emphasis would be placed on ensuring that the
industrial parks enjoy substantial VAT and customs reductions.
Initial outlays, for the establishment of parks in Jenin and Karnei, as well as a park in Nablus, are
estimated at $200 million. Total costs for the establishment of nine border estates and six local
17
348
Peace Watch Report, October 17,1 995
estates would run to $920 million. Initial start-up funds would be divided as follows:
$20 million from donor nations; $10 million from the World Bank; $150 million in private
capital; and $20 million from the Palestinian Authority, mostly in the form of real estate. For the
full plan, the division is planned as follows: donors, $95 million; World Bank, $37 million;
private capital investments, $705 million; and the PA, $83 million, again mostly in real estate.
Israel will obviously also be required to be heavily involved in coordinating funding and plan-
ning.
Despite the World Bank's optimism and the strong backing given to the project by Israel and the
US, Peace Watch sources report that the industrial parks project is likely to run into serious
opposition from within the PA itself, which will impact on the chances of its being adopted in
Paris. This opposition has a number of sources, and rationales.
Establishing zones in which substantial tax and customs reductions are granted to large indus-
trial concerns is unpopular among many governmental decisionmakers, who fear the loss of
revenue. Placing security in parks located within the PA in the hands of security forces indepen-
dent of the Palestinian police is likewise problematic for the PA, as it impinges on sovereignty.
Finally, an independent PIEA, managed by Abu Alaa, would run into the same constellation of
opposing forces which have nearly succeeded in scuttling PECDAR. Sources within the PA
indicate that only a serious show of political muscle by the US can ensure that the World Bank's
industrial parks project be implemented in accordance with plans.
An additional problem with the industrial parks project is that they are slated to be funded in
large part by private investors — $705 million out of $920 million, according to the report cited
above. For this money to be raised, Palestinian investors would almost certainly have to play a
major role, and to date they have shown reluctance to do so. Foreign investors, as well as govern-
ments, are likely to follow the lead of the Palestinian investors, and will be loathe to commit
funds if the Palestinians themselves are not forthcoming.
Relations between Palestinian investors and Arafat have in general been strained, because of the
businessmen's complaints that Arafat has not been doing enough to encourage a climate of
investment in the PA. They are generally in favor of World Bank standards of economic opera-
tions, and at a minimum insist that the PA pass orderly legislation regulating trade and capital
18
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Economic Issues Facing the Palestinian Authority and the Donor Nations
investment practices, along Western standards, for their own protection under the law. A
meeting held between Palestinian businessmen and Arafat in May 1995 in Amman, Jordan did
not go well, as the businessmen pressed Arafat to pass a law for the encouragement of invest-
ments that will answer their needs. Arafat pointed to difficulties he faced with the donor nations
and the World Bank in asking for their patience.
A special committee to follow-up on what was said at the meeting was established, including
Abd Ai-Majid Shuman, the owner of the Arab Bank, Munir Al Masri, Hasib Al Masri (of
PAOICO), Faisal Al-Husseini, Abu Alaa, Mahmoud Zuhadi, and Muhammad Nashashibi. A
draft law for the encouragement of investment has been composed, but it has not yet been
passed by the PA. There have been recent signs of a reconciliation between Arafat and an
important contingent of businessmen from Nablus, who are hoping that the industrial parks
project takes off, although it is still too early to be able to ascertain what consequences will flow
from this. According to Palestinian sources, PADICO, a leading Palestinian investment corpora-
tion, is now inclined to cooperate with Arafat and is interested in participating in ventures such
as the industrial park in Karnei, housing projects, electric power production and telecommunica-
tions ventures.
According to Palestinian economic sources, discussions on implementing the fust planned
industrial park projects, in Karnei, are currently being conducted between Abu Alaa and Uri
Savir, the Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Israeli sources indicate, however, that
the industrial parks project is not proceeding at full speed.
C. The Palestinian Authority budget deficit
An additional topic of discussion at the donor nation conference will be the continuation of
donor nation subsidies for the Palestinian Authority budget, and in particular the role that the
Hoist Fund will play in 1996. The PA is not expected to present a full 1996 budget proposal at
the CG conference in Paris, because it is understood that the issue of the PA's tax collection is
currently in flux as the PA prepares to take greatly expanded responsibilities in the West Bank. A
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350
3 9999 05983 868 8
Peace Watch Report, October 17, 1995
preliminary draft outlining expected expenses and revenues has been circulated among partici-
pants in the preliminary consultations held in Gaza in the week preceding the CG conference,
according to Palestinian economic sources. The donor nations do, however, expect a full budget
PA 1996 proposal sometime in November of 1995.
According to figures supplied by the PA Ministry of Finance and the World Bank, the PAs
expenses for 1995 will total some $444 million, balanced by only $216 million in direct rev-
enues, leaving a budget deficit of $228 million which requires subsidy. World Bank officials
insist, however, that despite this deficit the PA has proved capable of working within the bounds
of a set budget, and has increased the efficiency of its tax collection in the West Bank. They
point to initial expectations of total tax revenues of $1 12 million in 1995, which have been
revised upwards to $164 million, including taxes collected by Israel from Palestinian workers in
Israel, which have been regularly transferred to the PA in accordance with Israeli-Palestinian
agreements. The official statement of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee summary of its 28 Sep-
tember 1995 meeting also stated that "the AHLC was favorably impressed with the efforts by the
Palestinian Authority at revenue collection."
In contrast to this optimism, it should be noted that Peace Watch sources in the Gaza Strip
indicate that tax collection there has actually decreased drastically, and is down to only some
$300,000 per month, as compared to an estimated $1 million quoted in a report issued by Peace
Watch in March 1995. Most of this income tax revenue is apparently taken from the salaries of
PA employees, and not from private businesses. These sources express concern that reliance on
West Bank tax revenues to the virtual exclusion of the Gaza Strip could potentially lead to
political strains in the West Bank.
For 1996, however, the PAs budget is expected to grow rapidly due to the expansion of its role
into major segments of the West Bank. The PA has had responsibility for health and education
expenses in the West Bank since late 1994, which are the most resource-intensive areas of civilian
control, and this responsibility is already reflected in the 1995 budget. The addition of thou-
sands of policemen and extensive equipment to the West Bank will constitute the most signifi-
cant addition to the 1996 budget, since most of the redeployment of troops is expected by the
end of 1995.
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Economic Issues Facing the Palestinian Authority and the Donor Nations
Tax revenues are expected to climb, as well, since although the PA has had responsibility for
direct taxation in the West Bank since 1 December 1994, it should now be able to increase
revenues there as the deployment of Palestinian police in the major cities of the West Bank
increases its effectiveness.
Overall, however, it is likely that the increase in spending will outstrip the anticipated rise in tax
revenues. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher said in an official statement released after
the last AHLC meeting in Washington that the IMF is already preparing plans for the additional
resources needed in 1996. Peace Watch has learned that the PA is planning to ask the donor
nations to increase by $15 million a month their subsidy of Palestinian police salaries, over
and above the current coverage of salaries provided by the donors. The increase in salaries is
meant to enable the PA police force to expand by 21,000 employees. The Gaza-Jericho Agree-
ment of 4 May 1994 permitted the PA to maintain a force of 9,000, whereas the interim agree-
ment of 28 September 1995 permits a total PA police force of 30,000. (It should be noted,
however, that in practice, the PA deployed at least 18,000 policemen even before the interim
agreement was signed). In addition, the PA will ask for large grants of equipment for its
growing police force, especially for motor vehicles and a fleet of police helicopters.
A contrasting view presented to Peace Watch by Palestinian economic sources reported that first
estimates indicate the 1996 PA budget will involve around $590 million in expenditures and
$515 million in total revenues, leaving a deficit of only $75 million if the most optimistic
expectations of West Bank taxation revenues (including VAT transfers from Israel) are met.
Indeed, one Palestinian economic source indicated to Peace Watch that there is talk among the
parties involved in financial aid to the PA to effect a gradual change in the mechanism of aid
disbursement. Instead of collecting all of the donor moneys in the hands of the World Bank to
be disbursed to cover PA recurrent costs via the World Bank's subsidiary funds, individual donor
states will grant money on a bilateral basis directly to PA ministries, which would then make use
of it to support private sector initiatives. Full implementation of these plans would involve
closing down the Hoist Fund in 1996 and phasing out the special "police salary fund" as well,
which would not please some elements in the PA, including Arafat. However, all of this is
tentative, and is dependent on the PA actually meeting the optimistic goal of collecting over
(
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Peace Watch Report, October 17, 1995
$500 million in revenues. It should be noted that this would require the Palestinian Authority to
collect about twice as much in taxes as the Israeli Civil Administration in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip ever did.
D. The effects of the Israeli closure
Palestinian sources in the Gaza Strip have informed Peace Watch that the deleterious economic
effects of the Israeli closures of the territories will also be a topic of discussion at the Paris
conference. These sources indicate that they have succeeded in persuading the donor nations to
treat the issue seriously.
The Palestinians in particular complained to the donor nations that they were unable to obtain
an Israeli agreement to include concrete promises to ease the closure in the Oslo 2 agreement.
According to the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, the donor nations, especially the US, Japan, Norway and
the EU nations, have already begun raising the issue with Israel, at preparatory meetings leading
to the Paris conference, and have expressed concern that continued closure would strangle all
expectations for economic growth in the PA, which they term "the cornerstone of progress in the
peace process.'' The Worid Bank's Odin Knudsen and Terje Larsen, who coordinates the UN's
economic programs for Palestinians, also personally expressed their disappointment with the
continued closure.
Although the closure has not significantly reduced the flow of goods into the Gaza Strip, it has
seriously hurt export-oriented industries, especially the garment industry, which is the second
largest employer in the Gaza Strip.7
' Hatrtu, 15 October 1995. page A3.
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