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Cover: Red Beach, Camp Pendleton 

(Photo by CWO2 Charles Crow, 
1 st Marine Division/Combat Camera) 



MILITARY GEOGRAPHY 

FOR PROFESSIONALS AND THE PUBLIC 



To Professor Samuel Van Valkenburg 
and Swift: 

He stimulated my interest in military geography way back in 1 950; 

she was his private secretary, 
who abandoned civilian life to become my Army bride. 



MILITARY 
GEOGRAPHY 

FOR PROFESSIONALS AMD 

THE PUBLIC 



John M. Collins 



1998 




National Defense University Press 
Washington, DC 



The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a major component of the National Defense University 
(NDU), which operates under the supervision of the President of NDU. It conducts strategic studies for the 
Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified commanders in chief; supports national 
strategic components of NDU academic programs; and provides outreach to other governmental agencies and 
the broader national security community. 

The Publication Directorate of INSS publishes books, monographs, reports, and occasional papers on 
national security strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy through NDU Press that reflect the 
output of NDU research and academic programs. In addition, it produces the INSS Strategic Assessment and 
other work approved by the President of NDU, as well as Joint Force Quarterly, a professional military journal 
published for the Chairman. 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 
authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Defense University, the Department 
of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. 

Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source 
credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews. 

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, 
call (202) 512-1 800 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC 20402. 

Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data 

Collins, John M., 1921- 

Military Geography for Professionals and the Public / John M. Collins 

p. cm. 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 
ISBN 1-57906-002-1 
1 . Military geography. I. Title. 
UA990.C554 1997 

355.47 dc21 - 97-34721 

OP 



First Printing, March 1998 



VIII 



CONTENTS 



FOREWORD XVII 

PREFACE by John W. Vessey, Jr XIX 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XXI 

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION XXIII 

1 . OVERVIEW 3 

Military Considerations 3 

Regional Quirks 5 

Avoidable Abuses 7 

Analytical Techniques 8 

PART ONE: 
PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 

2. SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS 11 

Location 11 

Size 17 

Shape 18 

3. LAY OF THE LAND 27 

Land Forms 27 

Rivers and Reservoirs 32 

Geology and Soils 36 

Vegetation 39 

4. OCEANS AND SEASHORES 47 

Sea Water Attributes 47 

Sea Surface Behavior 49 

Marine Topography 55 

Representative Naval Ramifications 59 

5. EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 69 

Atmospheric Phenomena 69 

Climatology for Military Strategists 79 

Meteorology for Military Operators 80 

6. REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 93 

Frigid Flatlands 93 

Frigid Seas 98 

Mountainous Regions 1 02 

Arid Regions 1 09 



Tropical Rain Forests 115 

Wetlands 121 

Coastlands and Small Seas 126 

7. INNER AND OUTER SPACE 137 

Space Compared with Land and Sea 137 

Region I: Aerospace Interfaces 139 

Region II: Circumterrestrial Space 1 43 

Region III: Moon and Environs 1 44 

Region IV: Outer Envelope 1 46 

Tips for Military Space Planners 1 46 

8. NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS 1 53 

Sources and Shortages 153 

Compensatory Programs 158 

Resource Deprivation 159 

PART TWO: 
CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 

9. POPULATIONS 1 77 

Demography 1 78 

Physical Attributes 1 80 

Cultural Characteristics 1 82 

Current Attitudes 1 87 

National Personalities 1 88 

Cross-Cultural Skills 1 89 

1 0. URBANIZATION 1 95 

Sites and Structures 1 96 

Urban Sprawl 1 98 

Conventional Urban Combat 1 99 

Unconventional Urban Combat 204 

Conventional Urban Bombardment 206 

Urban Centers and Nuclear Strategy 208 

Overall Urban Vulnerabilities 209 

1 1 . LINES OF COMMUNICATION 215 

Roads 215 

Railroads 223 

Military Airports 228 

Seaports and Harbors 232 

Spaceports and Flight Paths 236 

Inland Waterways '. 238 

Pipelines 240 

12. MILITARY BASES 245 

U.S. Home Bases 245 

U.S. Cold War Bases Abroad 246 

Post-Cold War Retrenchment . . 261 



13. FORTRESSES AND FIELD FORTIFICATIONS 267 

Precedents and Prognoses 267 

Fortified Points 268 

Fortified Lines 270 

Offensive Fortifications 271 

Fortifications in the Nuclear Age 272 

Citadels Versus CW and BW Weapons 273 

PART THREE: 
POLITICAL-MILITARY GEOGRAPHY 

14. MILITARY SERVICE PREDILECTIONS 277 

Diversified Viewpoints 277 

Integrated and Updated Views 283 

1 5. GEOPOLITICAL FRICTION 285 

Territorial Limits 285 

Strategic Friction 287 

Economic Friction 291 

Cultural Friction 293 

Environmental Friction 297 

1 6. MILITARY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY 307 

Global Subdivisions 307 

Regional Areas of Responsibility 311 

Useful Insights 318 

Theater and Tactical AORs 318 

PART FOUR: 
AREA ANALYSES 

1 7. FORMAT FOR AREA ANALYSIS 339 

Geographical Data Bases 339 

Military Missions 341 

Military Implications 341 

Effects on Courses of Action 344 

1 8. OPERATION NEPTUNE "347 

Selection of the Lodgment Area 347 

Description of the Lodgment Area 349 

Assessments of the Lodgment Area 355 

Effects on Allied Courses of Action 361 

Wrap-Up 364 

1 9. OPERATION PLAN EL PASO 367 

The Ho Chi Minh Trail 367 

Mission Planning 377 

Logistical Limitations Within Vietnam 380 

Logistical Shortcomings Inside Laos 382 

Wrap-Up 383 

20. FINAL REFLECTIONS . 387 



APPENDIX A: Acronyms and Abbreviations 389 

APPENDIX B: Glossary of Geographical Terms 391 

APPENDIX C: A Basic Geographic Library 407 

INDEX 41 7 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 437 

FIGURES 

1 . Land Forms Displayed Schematically 28 

2. Elevation and Local Relief 29 

3. Slopes and Gradients 30 

4. Line-of-Sight and High-Angle Trajectories 31 

5. Selected Stream Characteristics 33 

6. Water Tables, Aquifers, and Wells 36 

7. Sea Water Stratification 49 

8. Lunar and Solar Influences on Tides 52 

9. Ocean Wave Motions and Measurements 53 

1 0. Conditions Conducive to Surf 53 

11. A Typical Beach Profile 56 

1 2. Plimsoll Line Markings 60 

13. Effects of Wave Action on Ship Stability 61 

1 4. Land and Sea Breeze Regimes 72 

1 5. Cloud Types Depicted 76 

1 6. Cloud Ceilings Related to Terrain 77 

1 7. Anatomy of a Thunderstorm 78 

1 8. Nuclear Fallout Related to Wind 86 

1 9. Conditions Conducive to Avalanches 1 08 

20. Typical Coastal Topography 127 

21 . Shallow Water Antisubmarine Warfare Suites 130 

22. Aerospace Interfaces ,1 40 

23. Gravity Versus Space Vehicle Velocity 1 42 

24. Earthly and Lunar Gravity Wells 1 45 

25. Electromagnetic Pulse Propagation 1 48 

26. U.S. and Soviet Mineral and Metal Imports 156 

27. Oil Fields and Facilities 1 64 

28. Present and Projected World Populations 1 79 

29. Assorted Street Systems 1 98 

30. Three Layers of Urban Obstacles 202 

31. Highway and Byway Attributes 217 

32. Bridge Types Depicted 219 

33. Bridge Superstructures and Substructures 220 

34. Traditional Rail Yard Facilities 227 

35. Airfield Construction Stages 231 

36. Typical Naval Port Facilities 233 

37. Wharf and Pier Configurations 234 

38. Offensive Force Boundaries 320 

39. Exits Inland from Omaha Beach 359 

40. Monsoonal Regimes at Tchepone, Khe Sanh, and Da Nang 375 



XII 



MAPS 

1 . Selected Russian Naval Bases 12 

2. Bottlenecks That Inhibit the Russian Navy 13 

3. Mao's Long March 19 

4. The Battle of the Bulge 21 

5. Operation Market Garden 22 

6. Beleaguered Berlin 23 

7. Regional Vegetation 40 

8. Ocean Currents 51 

9. Crucial Naval Choke Points During the Cold War 58 

1 0. Beaches and Approaches at Inchon 63 

1 1 . Regional Climates Depicted 81 

1 2. Frigid Flatlands 94 

13. Iceberg Routes to the North Atlantic 101 

1 4. The "Murmansk Run" 1 02 

1 5. The Arctic Ocean and Peripheral Seas 1 03 

1 6. Major Mountainous Regions 1 04 

1 7. The Himalayan Hump 1 07 

1 8. Arid Regions 110 

19. Tropical Rain Forests 117 

20. The Kokoda Trail and Shaggy Ridge 119 

21 . The Pripet Swamp and Its Offshoots 1 23 

22. The Mekong Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone 1 24 

23. The Earth-Moon System 138 

24. Cislunar Space 1 45 

25. Japanese Territorial Holdings in 1 942 1 60 

26. Saudi Arabian Oil Fields and Facilities 1 63 

27. Profile of the Burma Road 222 

28. The Trans-Siberian Railroad and Baikal-Amur Magistral 228 

29. U.S. and Soviet Space Launch Sites and Control Centers 237 

30. Earth Support Satellite Orbits 239 

31 . Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) 249 

32. U.S. Cold War Arctic Outposts (1 960s) 250 

33. U.S. Cold War Bases in Great Britain (1 979) 251 

34. U.S. Cold War Bases in France (1 966) 255 

35. U.S. Cold War Bases in West Germany (1 979) 256 

36. U.S. Cold War Bases in Iberia (1 979) 257 

37. U.S. Cold War Bases in Italy (1 979) 258 

38. U.S. Cold War Bases in Greece and Turkey (1 979) 259 

39. U.S. Cold War Bases in the Philippines (1 979) 262 

40. U.S. Cold War Bases in Japan and Korea (1 979) 263 

41 . The World According to Mackinder (1 904 and 1 91 9) 279 

42. U.S. and Allied Encirclement of the Soviet Union 281 

43. De Seversky's View of the Globe 282 

44. Soviet Buffers in Central Europe 289 

45. Chinese Border Disputes 290 

46. The Spratly Islands 292 

47. Territorial Claims in Antarctica 294 

48. The Horn of Africa 295 

49. Boundary Disputes in Jammu and Kashmir 297 

XIII 



50. U.S. Cold War Areas of Responsibility 310 

51 . NATO's Basic Areas of Responsibility 312 

52. AFCENT Areas of Responsibility 314 

53. Pacific Ocean Area and Southwest Pacific Area 316 

54. Amphibious Boundaries at Tarawa 322 

55. Route Packages in North Vietnam 324 

56. Soviet Core Areas 342 

57. Potential Lodgments in Western Europe 348 

58. Natural Regions in Northwestern Normandy 350 

59. Drainage Patterns in Northwestern Normandy 351 

60. Utah, Omaha, Cold, Juno, and Sword Beaches 352 

61 . Cross-Channel Routes from England to Normandy 358 

62. U.S. Expeditionary Airfields in Manche and Calvados 363 

63. The Ho Chi Minh Trail 369 

64. The Laotian Panhandle at Midpoint 370 

65. Monsoonal Regimes in South Vietnam and Laos 376 

66. OPLAN El Paso's Tactical Area of Responsibility 379 

67. Supply Requirements Associated with OPLAN El Paso 380 

TABLES 

1 . Geographic Factors 4 

2. Land Forms Listed 28 

3. Selected Soil Characteristics 37 

4. Beaufort Wind Scale Related to Sea States 54 

5. Beaufort Scale Related to Surface Winds Ashore 71 

6. Militarily Important Temperature Statistics 72 

7. Wind Chill Factors 73 

8. Fog Linked to Visibility 74 

9. Cloud Classifications 75 

1 0. Regional Climates Described '82 

1 1 . One Dozen Militarily Useful Minerals and Metals 1 54 

1 2. Crude Oil Producers and Proven Reserves 157 

13. Military Dead and Missing, World Wars I and II 1 78 

1 4. Causes of U.S. Wartime Casualties 181 

1 5. Representative Racial, Ethnic, and Tribal Relationships 1 83 

1 6. Ten Leading Languages (1 990s) 1 85 

1 7. Linguistic Clutter in the Caucasus 1 85 

1 8. Principal Religions and Selected Denominations . . . 1 86 

1 9. Variable Town and City Components 1 97 

20. Present and Projected Megalopoli 1 99 

21 . U.S. Military Aircraft Runway Length Calculations 229 

22. Advantages Available from the Panama Canal 241 

23. U.S. Cold War Collective Security Pacts 248 

24. Typical Trouble Spots, Mid-1 990s 288 

25. Area Analysis Format 340 

26. Selected Climatic Statistics for Manche and Calvados 354 

27. Populated Places in Manche and Calvados 355 

28. U.S. Expeditionary Airfields in Manche and Calvados 363 

29. Transportation on the Ho Chi Minh Trail 368 



XIV 



30. OPLAN El Paso Airfields 373 

31 . OPLAN El Paso Road Opening Schedules 382 

32. Schedules for Dual-Laning Route 9 in Laos 383 



PHOTOGRAPHS 

Amphibious Troops Cross a Coral Reef 1 68 

A Typical Tidewater Swamp 1 68 

Vehicle Mired in Mud 1 69 

Elephant Grass 1 69 

Monastery Atop Monte Cassino 1 70 

Switchback Curves on the Burma Road 171 

Mobility in Mountains 1 72 

Rhine River Bridge at Remagen 1 72 

Perfume River Bridge at Hue 1 73 

Wicked Weather at Changjin Reservoir 1 73 

Warm Weather Aids Medics 1 73 

Clouds West of Khe Sanh 1 74 

Rough Weather vs. Resupply at Sea 1 74 

Submarine Surfaces Through Arctic Ice 1 75 

"Follow the Leader" Through Antarctic Ice 1 75 

Frozen Salt Spray on an Icebreaker 1 76 

Water Distribution in the Desert 1 76 

Oil Fires in the Kuwaiti Desert 329 

Transferring Supplies over Perilous Routes 329 

The Berlin Airlift 330 

Rock Quarries Facilitate Military Construction 330 

An Expeditionary Airstrip 330 

A Typical Jungle Helipad 331 

The Consequences of Urban Combat 332 

Industrial Bomb Damage 333 

Siegfried Line Fortifications 334 

Cobblestones on Utah Beach 334 

Hedgerows Hamper Tanks 334 

The Banghiang River at Tchepone 335 

Mulberry "A" Before and After Demolishment 336 

A Typical Bypass and Ford in Laos 337 

Refurbishing Route 9 337 

The Abandoned Airfield at Ban Houei Sane . 338 



XV 



This book will arguably become the most comprehensive treatment of military geography in 
print. The author presents a sweeping, sophisticated interpretation of the term "geography/' 
covering not just the lay of the land, but the human beings who live on the land, change it, 
and are shaped by it. He relates virtually every aspect oT the physical world we live in to 
every imaginable endeavor in the military realm, from reading a tactical map to conducting 
a major campaign in some far-flung corner of the Earth. He considers military operations in 
every geographical environment, while taking into account ever-changing strategies, tactics, 
and technologies on all levels. He enriches his text with many practical examples that span 
recorded history. Finally, he writes in plain, direct language to reach the widest possible 
audience. 

The dearth of consolidated studies on the discipline of military geography came to John 
Collins' attention early in his long and distinguished career as a soldier and scholar. Thus he 
began and kept up an interest in the subject for more than 40 years, amassing voluminous 
files on the subject. Finally afforded the opportunity to research and write on his avocation 
at the National Defense University, he spent 2 years as a Visiting Fellow, tapping not only his 
own wealth of data and experience but a wide variety of well-informed opinions on every 
facet of military geography. 

The resultant volume, the culmination of a life-long career, fills a gap in the professional 
and technical literature. The National Defense University is pleased to have hosted John 
Collins and to publish his work. No other book, to our knowledge, marries military art with 
that of the geographer so deftly and completely. The volume seems destined to meet its 
stated purposes for years to come, namely, to provide a textbook for students, a handbook 
for military professionals, and an enlightening survey for any appreciative lay reader. 



RICHARD A. CHILCOAT 
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army 
President, National Defense University 



XVII 



PREFACE 



A major American news magazine in the spring of 1 997 included an article about the effects 
of new technology on national defense. It observed that "In future wars, knowledge may be 
more important than terrain/' but geography still exerts enormous influence on military 
operations, war, and security as it has throughout history. Great commanders, past and 
present, understand that topography, weather, and climate not only affect strategies but battle 
and support plans. History in fact is replete with enormous penalties incurred by those who 
paid too little attention to geographic factors. 

Military commanders in the "Information Age" will surely receive data more rapidly and 
consequently know more than their predecessors about battlefield situations. Information 
technologies may help military planners and operators better understand geographic factors 
they may even disprove Clausewitz's contention that "most intelligence is false" but other 
words he wrote on that subject are likely to endure: "geography and the character of the 
ground bear a close and ever-present relation to warfare. They have a decisive influence on 
the engagement, both as to its course and to its planning and execution." 

Geographic influences were omnipresent during my service as an enlisted soldier in the 
Tunisian desert fighting of 1 942-43, as a junior officer in the Italian mountains 1 943-45, and 
many years later (1 966-67) as a battalion commander in the totally different terrain of the 
War Zone C jungles in Vietnam. Those experiences, which were very personal, had a great 
deal to do with the health and comfort of my comrades and myself; they affected our casualty 
rates and often posed more formidable challenges than the enemies we faced. I often 
wondered if we were "victims" of geography or "victims" of the higher command's 
appreciation for geography. 

Those early lessons from geography's "school of hard knocks" were helpful later, when 
I held positions of greater authority for planning and directing military operations in widely 
varied geographic circumstances, first as a new brigadier in Laos in 1972-73, then as 
Commander of the United Nations Command in Korea, 1 976-79, and finally as Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A lot of work and study nevertheless was required by me and my 
staff officers before we could satisfactorily integrate geography's influence on land, sea, and 
air operations. Despite our efforts, I suspect that many of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, 
Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who implemented our plans sometimes felt "victimized" by 
geography or our lack of appreciation for it, just as I felt so many years earlier. 

The Armed Forces of the United States have been, and will continue to be, committed to 
every conceivable type of military operation in every conceivable geographic environment. 
Whether for war-fighting, war-preventing, or peacekeeping operations, they must prepare to 
excel wherever they are sent all too commonly on short notice. Military Geography for 
Professionals and the Public, a textbook and handbook written in simple, straightforward 

XIX 



terms that tie relevant factors together in a fashion understandable to lay readers as well as 
the uniformed professionals of all military services, is a rare, if not unique, survey of 
relationships between geography and military affairs. It ought to be required reading for 
policymakers, military planners, commanders, and staff officers at all levels. It also will be 
a very useful reference for political leaders, educators, members of the news media, and 
concerned citizens in the 'Information age." I wish it had been in my knapsack for the past 
55 years. 



JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. 

General, U.S. Army (Ret.) 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 982-1 985 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This book is my legacy to the U.S. military education system that has done so much for me 
since 1942, from basic courses through the Army Command and General Staff College, the 
Armed Forces Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the National War 
College. It helped me expand my professional horizons for 55 years and has kept me 
gainfully employed since retirement on January 3, 1 996. 

General John M. Shalikashvili, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arranged a perch 
for me at National Defense University (NDU), the perfect place to research and write a book 
about military geography or any other subject related to the profession of arms. "Hard core" 
contacts with extensive practical experience and assorted persuasions thereafter answered 
countless spot requests for information, helped me overcome mental blocks, and rigorously 
reviewed the first draft chapter-by-chapter during the gestation period. 

Two retired Army four-star generals merit special mention in that regard: General 
Frederick J. Kroesen identified the need for "Key Points" at the end of each chapter; General 
Robert C. Kingston, the first Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, became the 
world's highest ranking research assistant. Lieutenant General William H. Ginn, Jr., U.S. Air 
Force (Ret), scrubbed bits about military air operations. 

Army Colonel James H. Kurtz and Navy Captain John W. McGillvray, both former 
division chiefs in the Joint Staffs Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), furnished a 
landslide of facts, opinions, anecdotes, and source materials on almost every subject. 
Colonel Bill Allen represented the U.S. Army War College. Retired Army Major General John 
Murray, a life-long transportation specialist, and Herb Longhelt, Deputy Chief Engineer for 
AMTRAC, sharpened my views about lines of communication. Dr. Ed Whitman, who works 
for the Oceanographer of the Navy, helped a whole lot within his field. Colonel "Westy" 
Westenhoff, then assigned to the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, 
Scot Crerar at Betac Corporation, retired Army Colonel Chester B. McCoid (my boss long ago 
in the 82 nd Airborne Division), and Patrick O'Sullivan, a professor who emphasizes military 
geography, likewise made me think. So did my son Sean Kevin, whose doctorate in 
aeronautical and astronautical engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
underpinned much of Chapter 7 (Inner and Outer Space). 

Ed Bruner, Steve Bowman, Bob Goldich, Clyde Mark, and George Siehl, all former 
colleagues from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), brought broad, in-depth 
knowledge to bear from start to finish. Other former CRS colleagues with specialized 
expertise included Bob Bamberger (petroleum); Marjorie Browne (law of the sea); Ray 
Copson (Africa); Rich Cronin and Barbara LePoer (India and Pakistan); Ida Eustis (legal 
matters); Susan Fletcher (environmental problems); Rick Greenwood (minerals and metals); 
Dick Grimmett (U.S. overseas bases); Dianne Rennack and Barbara Hennix (finders of the 

XXI 



unfindable); Shirley Kan (China); Julie Kim (former Warsaw Pact countries and former 
Yugoslavia); Jon Medalia (strategic nuclear capabilities); Al Prados (Middle East); Rinn-Sup 
Shinn (Korea); Stan Sloan (NATO); Marsha Smith (space); Bob Sutter and Kerry Dumbaugh 
(East Asia). 

Nine members of the Campaign Planning Group, U.S. Army Vietnam in 1967-1968 
painstakingly pieced together input for Chapter 1 9 (Operation Plan El Paso): Army Lieutenant 
Colonels Dominic Canestra, the Deputy Chief; Robert Duvall (Army aviation), Robert 
Rufsvold, who was wounded in action on an aerial reconnaissance mission during December 
1 967 (engineering); David Hutchison, his replacement; and Reed Schultz (operations); Army 
Majors Bert Esworthy (intelligence) and George Pitts (land transportation); Air Force Majors 
John Pohle (weather) and Edward Reed (tactical airlift). 

The National Defense University library reference staff provided peerless support. None 
could have been more knowledgeable; all repeatedly stopped whatever they were doing to 
help. I therefore owe great gratitude to Sarah Mikel, the Director, Ann Parham, Chief of the 
Research and Information Services Division, Robert Adamshick, Bonnie Dziedzic (who 
helped a lot with maps), Jeanmarie Faison, Howard Hume (who met me many weekday 
mornings before 0600), Jane Johnson, Benard Strong, Bruce Thornlow (who assisted on many 
Saturday mornings), and Carolyn Turner. 

Colonel James V. Dugar, ANG, President of the NDU Foundation, and Colonel Thomas 
E. Gallagher, USA (Ret.), his Executive Director, admirably administered funds that the Smith 
Richardson Foundation donated to convert draft maps and figures into professional products 
at Art Services, Inc., where Andy Hemstreet skillfully responded to all requests. Jim Peters, 
who is Production Coordinator for Joint Force Quarterly, helped me assemble suitable 
photographs. So did Fred Rainbow at the U.S. Naval Institute and Colonel Tom Vossler, who 
oversees the U.S. Army Military History Institute. Fred Kiley ensured that Military Geography 
for Professionals and the Public enjoyed a high priority at the onset; and Robert A. Silano, his 
successor as Director of Publications, brought the project to completion and planned the 
book's launch. George Maerz and the staff of NDU Press contributed at various stages to the 
editorial process. 

Swift, my versatile bride, performed every administrative, logistical, and fiscal task for the 
Collins household while I struggled to finish this project, which never would have reached 
fruition without her help. Finally, I recognize the index finger of my right hand, the nail of 
which was driven into my wrist before it finished hunt-and-peck typing the entire draft, 
because I was quite unfamiliar with any computer. 



JOHN M. COLLINS 
Alexandria, Virginia 
March 1998 



MJTHOR'S INTRODUCTION 



When a Chief of the Imperial General Staff wrote that he had ''never had time to study the 
details of military [geography]" . . . it was as if the President of the Royal College of Surgeons 
said he never had time to study anatomy, or do any dissection. 

B. H. Liddell Hart 
Thoughts on War 



NO SAVANT EVER TAUGHT MILITARY GEOGRAPHY TO PERSIAN MONARCHS CYRUS, CAMBYSES, DARIUS, AND 

Xerxes, who assembled the world's first sprawling empire that by 480 B. C. stretched from 
the Indus River to the Aegean Sea. Teenage Alexander learned a lot at Aristotle's knee before 
he conquered even larger territories 1 50 years later, but military geography was not one of 
his tutor's strong points. Ghenghis Khan, whose Golden Horde rode roughshod across 
Eurasia in the 13th century A. D., established the record for seizing real estate by force of 
arms without resort to any book about military geography in his saddlebags. 

Modern warfare, however, is so complex that commanders at every level must 
consistently manipulate geographic influences advantageously to gain a decisive edge. Most 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines unfortunately learn painful lessons mainly from the 
school of hard knocks, because few schools and colleges conduct courses in military 
geography, none confers a degree, instructional materials seldom emphasize fundamentals, 
and most service manuals have tunnel vision. The four-volume bibliography compiled at 
West Point, which is 4 inches thick and totals several thousand citations on 1,059 pages, 
addresses an admirable scope but is minimally useful to most uniformed practitioners of 
military art, their civilian supervisors, concerned citizens, and members of the news media, 
because many of them lack easy access to the sources cited while others are too busy to 
bother. 

My contacts in the Pentagon and Congress were bemused when I began to write this 
book, because they had never heard of a discipline called "military geography." That reaction 
came as no surprise; after all, members of the Association of American Geographers at their 
92 nd annual meeting in April 1 996 debated heatedly before they finally decided to establish 
a military geography specialty group. This consolidated guide, designed to fill undesirable 
gaps, has a threefold purpose: 

To provide a textbook for academic use 

To provide a handbook for use by political-military professionals 

To enhance public appreciation for the impact of geography on military affairs. 



XXIII 



Parts One and Two, both of which are primers, view physical and cultural geography 
from military perspectives. Part Three probes the influence of political-military geography 
on service roles and missions, geographic causes of conflict, and complex factors that affect 
military areas of responsibility. Part Four describes analytical techniques that relate 
geography to sensible courses of military action, then puts principles into practice with two 
dissimilar case studies one emphasizes geographic influences on combat operations, while 
the other stresses logistics. Each chapter terminates with key points, which final reflections 
reinforce and relate to time-tested Principles of War. 

The text at no time tells readers what to think. It simply tells them how, in jargon-free 
terms that disregard technical details (neither British Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig nor 
corporals who led his squads through Flanders fields in 1917 cared a whit whether 
Passchendaele Ridge was a product of tectonic upheaval or glacial depositions). Concise 
historical examples and the probable influence of technological trends help illuminate past, 
present, and future relationships between geography and military affairs. Notes at the end 
of each chapter encourage students of the subject to pursue topics of particular interest in 
greater breadth and depth. Maps and figures are plentiful throughout, but readers 
nevertheless should keep a world atlas handy. 

Military Geography for Professionals and the Public, which considers every form of 
warfare and every military service at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, is intended for 
audiences abroad as well as in the United States, and therefore is generally couched in 
generic terms. Consequently, its contents should be almost as sound at the end of the 21 st 
century as at the beginning, regardless of political, military, economic, social, scientific, 
technological, and other changes in this volatile world that inevitably will occur during the 
next ten decades. 



( MILITARY GEOGRAPHY 

FOR PROFESSIONALS AND THE PUBLIC 



OVERVIEW 




When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant . . . 
factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, 
standards all were at my finger-ends. 

T. E. Lawrence 
Letter to B.H. Liddell Hart, June 1 933 

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY DEFINES GEOGRAPHY AS "A SCIENCE THAT DEALS WITH 

the Earth and its life; especially the description of land, sea, air, and the distribution of plant 
and animal life including man and his industries with reference to the mutual relations of 
these diverse elements." The next edition likely will add space to the list. Geography 
consequently embraces a spectrum of physical and social sciences from agronomy to 
zoology. In simple terms, it describes what the environment is like at any given place and 
time. 

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS 

Military geography, one of several subsets within those broad confines, concentrates on the 
influence of physical and cultural environments over political-military policies, plans, 
programs, and combat/support operations of all types in global, regional, and local contexts. 
Key factors displayed in table 1 directly (sometimes decisively) affect the full range of military 
activities: strategies, tactics, and doctrines; command, control, and organizational structures; 
the optimum mix of land, sea, air, and space forces; intelligence collection; targeting; 
research and development; the procurement and allocation of weapons, equipment, and 
clothing; plus supply, maintenance, construction, medical support, education, and training. 1 

PHYSICAL FACTORS 

Spatial relationships, arguably the most fundamental of all geographic factors, concern the 
location, size, and shape of land areas, together with the presence and configuration of 
intervening waters. Relative positions and modes of transportation determine transit times 
between any two sites. Total length, width, and area determine the amount of maneuver 
room available and the relative security or vulnerability of key points within any piece of 
militarily important property. 

Land forms constitute the stage whereon military pageants play ashore. Relief, drainage 
patterns, geology, and soils are pertinent topics. High-level strategists, airmen, and 
astronauts see mountains and valleys, plateaus and lowland plains. Frontline soldiers, who 






deal with details instead of big pictures, have vastly different viewpoints hummocks, gullies, 
river banks and bottoms loom large from their foreshortened perspectives. Bill Mauldin put 
it best in his book Up Front when dogface Willie sitting in a shell crater said to Joe, "Th' hell 
this ain't the most important hole in th' world. I'm in it." 2 

Table 1 . Geographic Factors 



Physical Factors 



Spatial Relationships 
Topography and Drainage 
Geology and Soils 
Vegetation 

Oceans and Seashores 
Weather and Climate 
Daylight and Darkness 
Gravity and Magnetism 



Cultural Factors 



Racial and Ethnic Roots 
Population Patterns 
Social Structures 
Languages and Religions 
Industries and Land Use 
Transportation Networks 
Telecommunications 
Military Installations 



Natural vegetation varies from lush to nearly nonexistent. Treeless tundra, the coniferous 
taiga that blankets much of Siberia, tropical rain forests, elephant grass, scrub, and cacti 
create drastically different military environments. Bonneville's salt encrusted flats and 
Okefenokee Swamp both are basically horizontal, but the former is bare while the latter is 
luxuriant. The Sahara Desert, sere except for widely scattered oases, bears scant resemblance 
to the densely wooded Arakan Range in Burma, where the height and spacing of trees, trunk 
diameters, stem densities, foliage, and duff (rotting materials on the floor) are cogent military 
considerations. 

Mariners properly contend that the importance of oceans is almost impossible to 
overstate, since water covers almost three-fourths of the Earth's surface the Pacific Ocean 
alone exceeds the area of all continents and islands combined. Seas and large lakes, typified 
by the Caribbean, Caspian, and Mediterranean, separate or subdivide major land masses. 
Waves, tides, currents, water temperatures, and salinity everywhere limit options open to 
surface ships and submarines. Straits, channels, reefs, and other topographical features do 
likewise along littorals. 

Earth's atmosphere envelops armed forces everywhere aloft, ashore, and afloat. 
Temperatures, precipitation in the form of rain, hail, ice, sleet, or snow, winds, and relative 
humidity, along with daylight and darkness, command close attention because they strongly 
affect the timing, conduct, and support of peacetime and combat operations. Stiff penalties 
accompany failure to heed their implications. History has repeatedly witnessed armies mired 
in mud axle-deep to a ferris wheel, fleets blown off course like the ill-fated Spanish Armada, 
and bombers as flightless as goonie birds, grounded by gales or fog. 

Inner and outer space constitutes a fourth distinctive geographic medium, along with 
land, sea, and air. Only a tiny fraction thus far has been exploited for military purposes, but 
operations farther afield for many imaginative purposes are conceivable within a relatively 
short time frame. 



OVERVIEW 



CULTURAL FACTORS 

People top the list of cultural considerations that deserve close attention for political-military 
reasons. Census statistics reveal population size, distribution, age groups, the percentage of 
males compared with females, and urban versus rural densities. Other militarily important 
characteristics include native intelligence, languages, dialects, literacy, customs, beliefs, 
patriotism, attitudes toward "outsiders" (indifference, respect, resentment, hostility), 
discipline, morale, temperament (passive or aggressive), and the prevalence of endemic 
diseases. Virgil singled out the will to win with these words in his Eclogues VII 2,000 years 
ago: "It never troubles the wolf how many the sheep be." 

Relations among racial, ethnic, tribal, and religious groups merit special attention, 
because alienation often leads to armed conflict. Immense psychological significance attends 
some cultural icons, such as shrines, national cemeteries, other hallowed ground, even entire 
cities. A former Commanding General of NATO's Central Army Group repeatedly told his 
subordinates, "If we go to war against the Warsaw Pact tomorrow we can't allow the first 
day's headline to read 'Nurnberg Falls/ because the blow to allied morale would be 
devastating." 

Natural resources, land use, and industries, which underpin combat capabilities and the 
staying power of friends as well as foes, contribute essentially to national security. Food is 
the irreducible foundation, followed by raw materials and facilities for converting them to 
usable goods. Basic ingredients feature, but by no means are confined to, agriculture, animal 
husbandry, and fisheries; minerals and metals; petroleum, electrical, and nuclear power; 
water supplies; manufacturing plants; stone, brick, concrete, lumber, and other construction 
staples. Only a few nations now possess the economic potential for great military power. 
None is wholly self-sufficient, thus external sources of sustenance and degrees of control over 
them are geographically consequential. 

Transportation networks expedite or impede abilities of statesmen and military 
commanders to employ armed forces intercontinentally, regionally, or locally. Roads, 
railways, inland waterways, airfields, and seaports, conveniently located in proper 
combinations, enable formations of requisite size and type to reach objective areas promptly 
from distant staging bases, then maneuver effectively. Land, sea, and air lanes that hamper 
abilities to do so raise the cost of mission accomplishment in terms of time, lives, and money 
expended. Severe deficiencies may even render requisite military actions infeasible because, 
as wags are wont to say, "You can't get there from here." 

Telecommunication systems (radio, television, telephone, telegraph, space 
communication satellites, the internet, and submarine cables) facilitate integrated action by 
uniservice, joint, and multinational armed forces. The type, attributes, and geographic 
distribution of military and civilian fixed-plant facilities in foreign countries accordingly 
interest commanders and staffs who hope to use those assets and deny them to enemies. 
Central offices, substations, transmission lines, repeaters, transfer points, alternative routings, 
redundant capabilities, power sources, and maintenance installations are prime concerns. 

REGIONAL QUIRKS 

Geographic regions on Earth and in space are reasonably homogeneous areas containing 
distinctive topography, climate, vegetation, and cultural features (or lack thereof) that exert 



OVERVIEW 



relatively uniform effects on military policies, plans, programs, and operations. Several 
classification systems are in competition. One accentuates surface configurations that may 
be hilly or horizontal, smooth or serrated, on land or under the sea. Others attach climatic 
labels: arctic, subarctic, temperate, and tropical or cold-wet, cold-dry, hot-wet, hot-dry, each 
accompanied by distinctive fauna and flora. 3 

Geographic regions suitable for military operations sometimes are stacked vertically. 
Hannibal's army and elephant train traversed cultivated fields at low elevations before they 
climbed through deciduous forests, a band of evergreens, meadows above the tree line, and 
expanses of bare rock when they navigated the Alps en route from Gaul to Italia as winter 
approached in 218 B.C. Temperature gradients were as steep as the slopes, mild near the 
base but frigid in the Col de la Traversette Pass at 10,000 feet (3,050 meters), where winds 
were wild and snow already lay deep. The entire entourage, being unacclimated, must have 
gasped for breath from exertions in thin air near the top. 4 Spacecraft crews become familiar 
with five geographic regions stacked one above the other as they fly through the troposphere, 
stratosphere, mesosphere, thermosphere, and exosphere en route to circumterrestrial space 
about 60 miles (95 kilometers) above Earth, where aerodynamic drag and frictional heat lose 
most of their significance. 5 

Armed forces expressly prepared for employment in any given environment normally 
function less well elsewhere until they complete time-consuming and costly transitions. They 
must become familiar with new topography, climatic conditions, and social systems, modify 
their techniques, then tailor weapons, equipment, clothing, and supplies to suit the situation. 
Formations optimized for warfare in rain forests prepare to cope with heat, humidity, leaches, 
and insects. Dehydration and tropical diseases may cause more casualties than enemy 
ammunition if troops fail to take proper precautions. Poorly maintained weapons malfunction 
from rust and molds. Foot soldiers in lightweight uniforms that blend well with surroundings 
take precedence over tanks and trucks, aerial reconnaissance is severely restricted, small unit 
tactics predominate. Formations optimized for cold climes in contrast require white parkas, 
mittens, and insulated boots; lined sleeping bags; skis, snowshoes, snowmobiles, and sleds; 
tents with stoves; antifreezes; low-viscosity lubricants; hot meals with high caloric contents; 
and retraining. 6 

Navies fully prepared for "blue water" warfare must modify modi operand! along 
continental shelves, where adversaries ashore as well as afloat can take advantage of short 
flight times for aircraft and antiship missiles to strike with minimum warning. Mines, 
minisubmarines, and "frogmen" are other potential menaces. Maneuver room along littorals 
is often limited. Sensors and communication systems able to work effectively in coastal 
waters must supplement or replace those designed for use in, on, or over deep seas. 
Differentiation of friends from foes poses complex problems where civilian and military air 
and sea traffic mingle. 7 

Military regions and political boundaries seldom coincide. Most nations consequently 
contain two or more geographic subdivisions that complicate planning, preparations, and 
operations, jungles and swamps by no means blanket Vietnam; the Pleiku Plateau, for 
example, is made to order for armor. Austria is by no means all alpine. Cultural factors often 
introduce militarily important inconsistencies within regions that are topographically and 
climatically coherent. Saudi Arabia harbors urban oases in an otherwise nearly empty nation 



OVERVIEW 



that is everywhere arid and displays only a handful of prominent physiographic features other 
than mountains along the Red Sea coast. 

AVOIDABLE ABUSES 

Policymakers, strategists, and tacticians can expect unpleasant surprises whenever they 
overlook the fact that many geographic factors fluctuate in response to seasonal, cyclical, or 
random change. Nuclear combat, however restrained, could instantaneously turn urban 
battlefields into rubble, transitions from night to day alter radio propagation characteristics, 
and sunspots periodically cause high frequency blackouts. Viet Cong sanctuaries lost much 
of their utility when defoliants reduced concealment. Ice transforms unbridgeable bodies of 
water into arterial highways (trains have crossed bits of the Baltic Sea in wintertime), and 
wheels are welcome in frozen fens. Forces oriented north to south often find themselves in 
topographically different worlds than those facing east to west, while switches from defense 
to attack may cause obstacles to loom where protective barriers stood before. Streams that 
flood without warning can frustrate even the best laid plans, as U.S. Army engineers in Bosnia 
discovered in December 1995, when it took a week longer than anticipated to build a 
pontoon bridge over the raging Sava River, suddenly swollen by melting snow. Rising waters 
inundated adjacent tent cities occupied by troops waiting to cross from Croatia to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. Casualties were confined to those caused by dampness coupled with bone- 
chilling weather, but only because the tactical situation was benign. 8 

History is replete with prominent commanders who sorrowfully assumed that enemy area 
analyses would mimic their own. New Carthage fell to Rome's Scipio Africanus during the 
Second Punic War when his vanguard waded a lagoon at low water to reach and scale a city 
wall that Hannibal's brother, Mago, fecklessly left unprotected. 9 British General Wolfe's 
forces captured Quebec in 1 759 after they climbed cliffs that the French defender, Marquis 
de Montcalm, guarded too lightly. 10 Japanese columns landed on the Malay Peninsula well 
north of Singapore in December 1941, then penetrated presumably impassable mangrove 
swamps to reach the city, which fell the following February, partly because the heavy artillery 
of British defenders all pointed seaward. 11 German Panzers poured through the Ardennes 
almost unopposed in May 1940, after Marshal Henri Petain proclaimed that forest 
"impenetrable," and did so again during the Battle of the Bulge in 1944, because U.S. 
strategists learned little from Petain's lesson. 12 

Leaders who flunk elementary map reading courses or lack much feel for clime and 
terrain are prone to make geographic miscalculations. General Henri Navarre unwisely 
staked the future of France in Asia on the defense of indefensible Dien Bien Phu (1 954), an 
isolated Indochinese basin that was far from the nearest support base, was sustainable only 
by air, and was dominated by forbidding terrain. 13 Ill-fated operations at the Bay of Pigs (April 
1 961 ) caused repercussions that reached the White House when incompetent U.S. planners 
put anti-Castro "freedom fighters" ashore in an alligator-filled marsh that had only one major 
route inland. 14 

It is worth remembering that human factors often may be more cogent than physical 
geography. Che Guevara, once a guru on guerrilla warfare, almost literally committed 
suicide in Bolivia, largely because he misread the cultural context. What logic could explain 
"an Argentinian out of Cuba by way of the Congo in the wilds of the Bolivian jungles 



OVERVIEW 



memorizing the verbs of the wrong Indian language in order to convert a people, already 
possessing land, whose vision for endless centuries had turned inward?" 1 ' Far from being a 
fish in a sea of people, as revolutionary warriors advocated, he was a fish out of water. He 
paid with his life for geographic ignorance. 

ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 

Geographic factors become fully significant politically and militarily only when related to 
probable effects on friendly and enemy courses of action and assigned missions (attack, 
defend, delay, withdraw, and so on) during nuclear, conventional, and unconventional 
conflicts as well as operations other than war typified by shows of force, humanitarian 
assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, search and rescue, counternarcotics, and 
counterterrorism. Analyses also vary with forces available (combat and support, land, sea, 
air, amphibious, and space). Countless questions require answers, as the following samples 
illustrate: 

What offensive strategies and tactics would be most advisable in terrain that favors 
defenders? 

How far and fast would radioactive fallout from a 2-kiloton nuclear surface burst drift 
and how wide an area would it afflict? 

Do land forms and vegetation in adjacent countries conceal sanctuaries into which 
enemy forces retreat to recuperate, then return to the fray? 

What area would be submerged for how long if bombers destroyed a large dam on 
the River Styx? 

Would sea states, tides, and currents help or hinder combat swimmers and their 
delivery vehicles? 

Will fog preclude proposed use of night vision devices, battlefield illumination, lasers, 
and thermal sights? 

How much heavy traffic will the only major highway bear between rear area bases 
and the combat zone? 

What colors and symbols should psychological operations leaflets avoid because 
superstitious recipients consider them unlucky? 

Is the water table too high or the soil too friable for troops to dig foxholes? 

Will starving refugees welcome U.S. Meals-Ready-to-Eat or will some contents offend 
cultural beliefs? 

A convenient framework for area analyses fortunately is available. Mnemonic devices 
line up war fighting factors to form the acronym COCOA: 

Critical Terrain 

Obstacles 

Cover and Concealment 

Observation and Fields of Fire 

Avenues of Approach 



OVERVIEW 



Others prefer OCOKA, in which the K stands for key terrain. Neither sequence seems 
logical, but all five considerations in either case stand ready for inspection. The area analysis 
format also addresses geographic effects on logistics, civil affairs, and other relevant matters 
before,ceJating the whole lot first to options that enemies might adopt, then to friendly 
courses of action. 

Such analyses are perishable. Astute users employ them posthaste or update periodically 
to guarantee that facts, assumptions, interpretations, and findings remain valid with regard 
to environmental conditions and ongoing events. Inconsistencies send them back to their 
drawing boards. 

One U.S. four-star officer, after reading the foregoing in first draft, said, "I need to know 
how the rest of this book will serve as a practical guide." His request was easy to answer. 
Armed combat and military operations other than war may be games that anyone can play, 
but they are not games that just anyone can play well. Only gifted participants win prizes. 
Long experience indicates that, all else being equal, military practitioners and their civilian 
supervisors who purposefully make geography work for them are winners more often than 
not, whereas those who lack sound appreciation for the significance of geography succeed 
only by accident. There are no hard and fast rules that impose stiff fines for infractions, and 
universally applicable " school solutions" are scarce, but topic headings and historical 
examples in each succeeding chapter of this treatise could serve as intellectual checklists and 
tools to help readers arrive at sound judgments, provided they recognize that no two 
situations are precisely alike. 

MOTES 

1 . Additional overviews are available in Patrick O'Sullivan, Terrain and Tactics (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991); C. Peltier and G. Etzel Pearcy, Military Geography (New York: D. Van 
Nostrand, 1966); Sir Edward S. May, An Introduction to Military Geography (London: Hugh Rees, 
1909). 

2. Bill Mauldin, Up Front (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing, 1 945), 20. 

3. H. M. Forde, "An Introduction to Military Geography, Part I," Military Review 28, no. 1 1 
(February 1 949): 30-36; "An Introduction to Military Geography, Part II," Military Review 28, no. 1 2 
(March 1949): 55-62; Louis C. Peltier, "The Potential of Military Geography," The Professional 
Geographer 1 3, no. 6 (November 1 961 ). 

4. Gavin de Beer, Alps and Elephants (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1 956). 

5. Curtis D. Cochran, Dennis M. Gorman, and Joseph D. Dumoulin, eds., Space Handbook 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, January 1985), 1-3 and 1-4; G. Harry Stine, 
Handbook for Space Colonists (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1 985), 47-63. 

6. Field Manual (FM) 90-5, Jungle Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, August 1 6, 
1 982); FM 31-70, Basic Cold Weather Manual (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, April 1 968). 

7. Ronald O'Rourke, "The Future of the U.S. Navy," in Fifty Years of Canada-United States 
Defense Cooperation, eds. Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel (Lewiston, ME: Edwin Mellen Press, 
1992), 318-320, and briefing slides from a seminar, "Naval Force Structure Planning: New 
Environment, Old Habits of Thought" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 21, 
1993), presentation by Ronald O'Rourke. 

8. Dennis Steele, "Spanning the Sava," Army 46, no. 2 (February 1 996): 1 6-1 9. 

9. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 
1992), 20-43. 



OVERVIEW 



1 0. J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 2 (New York: Funk and Wagnals, 
1955), 258-268. 

1 1 . Noel Barber, A Sinister Twilight:The Fall of Singapore (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1 968). 

12. Alistair Home, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Co., 1 969), 
192, 195-198, 211-212, 235-239, 244-268; John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1969). 

13. Bernard Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1 966). 

1 4. Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 979). 

1 5. Daniel James, ed v The Complete Bolivian Diaries of Che Guevara and Other Captured 
Documents (New York: Stein and Day, 1 969); the quotation is from J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of 
the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971 ), 240. 



10 OVERVIEW 



PART ONE* 
PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 

2. SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS 



Space is the integrating factor in geography just as time is for history. 

Lucille Carlson 
Geography and World Politics 



THE LOCATION, SIZE, AND SHAPE OF LAND MASSES AND LARGE BODIES OF WATER HAVE INFLUENCED TO 

great degrees the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of armed forces since the Stone 
Age. It seems safe to predict that the pertinence of spatial relationships will remain 
undiminished indefinitely. 1 

LOCATION 

Archimedes, elaborating about the value of levers more than two millenia ago, asserted, 
"Give me a place to stand and I will move the Earth/' Favorable geographic locations confer 
militarily advantageous leverage, while poor positions foster insecurity. 

ACCESS TO OCEANS 

No nation that lacks access to any ocean has ever been able to project military power 
globally. The United States, blessed since 1 848 with sheltered ports on ice-free coasts that 
open on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and on every continent, can deploy military power 
rapidly from one theater to another. No other world power currently enjoys comparable 
freedom of action. Russia, which fronts on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans, boasts 
the world's longest coastline, but its fleets are bottled up in ports that lack convenient outlets 
to blue water and are ice-bound every winter, except for bases in the Black Sea and near 
Norway's North Cape, where the Gulf Stream warms frigid waters (maps 1 and 2). 2 

Ocean front property, however, does not ipso facto indicate good prospects for sea-going 
commerce and mighty navies. Unobstructed approaches, sheltered harbors, and convenient 



11 



Map 1 . Selected Russian Naval Bases 




12 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 2. Bottlenecks That Inhibit the Russian Navy 

North Atlantic Choke Points 




North Pacific Choke Points 



RUSSIA 




i? Ocean 



SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS 



13 



connections with the hinterland must complement maritime locales. Capabilities diminish 
to some degree if even one of those attributes is deficient or absent. 

SECURE LOCATIONS 

Secure locations physically separate friends from foes. The British Isles, only 22 miles (35 
kilometers) west of continental Europe, last saw successful invaders when William the 
Conqueror defeated King Harold at Hastings in 1066. Hitler's cross-channel attack plan 
code-named Operation Sea Lion aborted in September 1 940. 3 Japan has never been stormed 
by outsiders. The continental United States has seen no hostile forces on its soil since the 
War of 1812, when British troops burned the White House and Capitol, bombarded Fort 
McHenry in Baltimore, and unsuccessfully sought to sack New Orleans. Canada and Mexico 
have been friends of the United States for more than a century. No nation now has sufficient 
amphibious assault capabilities to bridge the watery miles that isolate America from its 
enemies, then seize a foothold on defended U.S. shores. Spaced-based weapons, long-range 
aircraft, missiles, and transnational terrorists consequently pose the only potentially serious 
external threats by armed adversaries. 

Buffer zones make admirable shields. Joseph Stalin swallowed six European countries in 
the mid-1 940s (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria), 
then rang down an Iron Curtain. Those so-called "satellite states" separated forces in 
NATO's center sector from the nearest Soviet border by several hundred miles. Demilitarized 
zones (DMZs) provide variable degrees of protection, depending in large part on geographic 
circumstances. Incursions across the Korean DMZ, for example, have been restricted to hit- 
and-run raids since 1 953, partly because no overland bypasses are available on that narrow 
peninsula, whereas enemy troops and supplies consistently circumvented the barrier between 
North and South Vietnam via the open flank in Laos. 

Armed forces that do battle on more than one front at a time must overcome serious 
strategic, tactical, and logistical problems or risk defeat. Israel found satisfactory solutions 
during two wars with Egypt and Syria, first in 1 967 and again in 1 973, 4 but German forces 
that saw combat on Eastern and Western Fronts during World War I, then on four fronts 
counting North Africa and Italy during World War II, were spread too thinly during both 
conflicts and both times they lost. Soviet leaders for that reason understandably feared the 
possibility of simultaneous wars with NATO and China after the Sino-Soviet split in the early 
1 960s. 5 

TIME-DISTANCE FACTORS 

Time, distance, and modes of transportation not only determine how fast armed forces can 
move from one place to another but influence abilities to perform most effectively 
immediately upon arrival. Well-conditioned rifle companies take longer to march 20 miles 
(32 kilometers) at 2.5 miles per hour (4 kph) than airmobile troops in huge transport aircraft 
take to cross the Atlantic Ocean, yet the "grunts" may arrive more eager to fight, because jet 
lag accompanied by fatigue, digestive disorders, and reduced proficiency commonly afflicts 
flight crews and passengers who swoosh rapidly through several time zones and thereby 
disrupt their "metabolic clocks" (24-hour circadian rhythms). 6 

Great distances between home bases and operational areas reduce opportunities for 
timely employment of military power in emergencies. Lengthy lines of supply and 



1 4 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



communication increase requirements for long-haul transportation and, if vulnerable to 
enemy interdiction, make users divert combat forces to protect them. U.S. and British naval 
surface combatants, for example, had to escort merchant ships and troop convoys from the 
U.S. east coast and the Gulf of Mexico to Great Britain and the Soviet Union during World 
War II, while shore-based antisubmarine warfare aircraft conducted search and destroy 
patrols at both ends and from Iceland. 7 

Forward deployments on friendly territory, best typified by globally distributed U.S. bases 
and facilities, alleviate but cannot eliminate quick-reaction problems, because requirements 
may arise in locations where no concentrations exist. Most of the half million U.S. forces that 
helped drive Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 were stationed in the United States and Germany 
when that crisis erupted. Equipment and supplies prepositioned at Diego Garcia in the 
middle of the Indian Ocean were more than 2,000 miles from transfer points in the Persian 
Gulf, where custodians issued them to personnel airlifted from far distant bases. 8 

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was consistently well situated during the 
Cold War. NATO's armed forces watched impotently while Soviet troops crushed the 1 956 
uprising in Hungary, partly because their access routes ran through Communist 
Czechoslovakia and neutral Austria, whereas the Soviets were in position to generate great 
combat power rapidly and sustain it over short, internal lines under their control. 9 Nikita 
Khruschchev conversely backed down during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, partly 
because most Soviet armed forces were remote from the Caribbean. 10 Like his predecessors 
and successors, he furnished money, materiel, and ideological assistance to pro-Communist 
regimes in distant places, but avoided large-scale military involvement for similar reasons. 
Mutual force reductions in Europe, an arms-control goal established well before the Cold War 
wound down, succeeded in 1990 only after negotiators overcame critics who correctly 
claimed that Soviet forces could withdraw a few hundred miles overland, then return on short 
notice if relations soured, whereas U.S. counterparts would have to be airlifted and sealifted 
from remote bases. 11 

Distance may also discombobulate alliances. Japan concluded a security pact with 
Germany in November 1 940, but that aggressive pair never were able to form a combined 
high command, seldom coordinated policies, plans, or programs, never shared bases, and 
never conducted mutually supporting operations in widely separated theaters that at their 
zenith remained more than 3,500 straight-line miles (5,630 kilometers) apart. 

DOMINANT GEOGRAPHICAL POSITIONS 

Dominant geographical locations anywhere on Earth or in space best enable occupants to 
achieve present or anticipated objectives of any kind. The most desirable positions may be 
as large as a country or as small as spots plotted on large-scale tactical maps. The leverage 
available from any given point or area usually varies with missions, situations, forces on tap, 
terrain, available time, and political restrictions. Attackers and defenders view each site from 
different perspectives. So do armies, navies, and air forces which strive to gain geographic 
advantage for themselves and deny it to adversaries. 

Strategic, operational, and tactical positions take many forms and serve many purposes. 
Great Britain originally acquired Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Suez, Aden, and Socotra to help 
protect lifelines of empire to the Middle East and South Asia. The Soviets, with transitory 
success, sought influence and footholds along the Horn of Africa and in India from which 



SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS 15 



they could threaten sea lines of communication that linked the United States and its allies 
with petroleum producers astride the Persian Gulf. The North American Air Defense 
Command (NORAD) in the early 1960s draped 81 Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations 
across the arctic from the Aleutians to the Atlantic as safeguards against a Soviet surprise air 
attack over the North Pole. A generous group of gap-filler radars and picket ships augmented 
the Mid-Canada and Pine Tree Lines farther south. Three huge Ballistic Missile Early Warning 
Sites ( BMEWS) located in Clear, Alaska, Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales Moor, England 
kept a sharp lookout for Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) shots, with assistance 
from surveillance satellites that scanned for submarine-launched ballistic missiles as well as 
ICBMs. 12 

Appropriately located islands often make ideal stepping stones. Propeller-driven transport 
aircraft that spanned the Pacific during the Korean War hopped from Travis AFB near San 
Francisco to Honolulu, Midway, and Wake Island (which looked like a postage stamp from 
the air), then on to Tokyo. Flights over the Atlantic at that time called at Goose Bay, Labrador 
and Keflavik, Iceland. U.S. weapons, equipment, and supplies bound for Tel Aviv during the 
1973 Arab-Israeli conflict arrived rapidly only because Portugal granted refueling rights in 
the Azores. 

POLITICAL INHIBITIONS 

Manmade boundaries, which are merely lines on maps, impose political obstacles that 
sometimes inhibit military operations as much as physical barriers when allies or neutrals 
forbid the armed forces of outsiders to violate their land or territorial waters. Transgressors 
who nevertheless choose to do so may pay political, economic, or military prices, the nature 
and intensity of which are not always obvious beforehand. 

High stakes coupled with low risks in relation to likely gains encourage aggressors to 
ignore political boundaries. Hitler clearly felt free to ride roughshod over neutral Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands on his way to France in 1 940. Low stakes coupled with 
high risks in relation to likely gains contrariwise encourage caution. British-based U.S. 
bombers on April 1 5, 1 986, made long dog-legs over the Bay of Biscay and back through 
Gibraltar en route to hit Tripoli and Benghazi because the French Government denied them 
overflight rights when President Ronald Reagan directed retaliation for a Libyan-backed 
terrorist attack in Berlin. 12 

Privileged sanctuaries behind sacrosanct boundaries, which permit adversaries to fight 
when they wish and then run away, also impose political inhibitions, although such asylums 
seem to survive only if probable penalties for disturbing them surpass potential benefits. 
Manchuria comprised such a shelter throughout the Korean War, first as a Chinese supply 
base for North Korea, then as a haven for defeated North Korean troops who fled across the 
Yalu River on floating footbridges and, after October, 1 950, as a springboard for Chinese 
Communist offensives. The U.N. Command could have lanced that boil if so directed but 
declined to do so for fear that such action would precipitate "the wrong war, at the wrong 
place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy." ' Communist sanctuaries inside 
Cambodia fared less well after President Nixon authorized U. S. armed forces to conduct 
cross-border raids in 1 970 and again in 1 971 . 1S The United States maintained sanctuaries 
in japan, Okinawa, Thailand, and the Philippines throughout the Vietnam War, although 
many observers overlooked that fact. 



1 6 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



SIZE 

The square miles or square kilometers encompassed by any operational area furnish room 
for armed forces to maneuver offensively or defensively and to disperse command centers, 
military formations, ports, airfields, logistic installations, and other static or mobile targets. 
Total size, however, is only one relevant criterion. Usable space is equally important. 

LARGE AREA AS AN OFFENSIVE ASSET 

Areas that are large in proportion to forces employed therein offer a greater range of offensive 
options and facilitate greater freedom of action than crowded spaces afford. Envelopments 
and turning movements become feasible on the ground, whereas cramped quarters 
commonly compel frontal assaults accompanied by increased casualties (picture assault 
forces trying to puncture enemy defenses from exposed positions on beachheads or 
bridgeheads). The U.S. 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment established a world's record for 
microsized regimental drop zones (DZs) in February 1945, when it leaped onto Corregidor: 
the larger DZ had been a parade ground that measured 325 by 250 yards (297 by 229 
meters), the smaller was once a nine-hole golf course, and both were bounded on the south 
by a cliff. Each C-47 transport completed multiple passes that lasted 6 seconds apiece, barely 
long enough for jumpmasters to push eight paratroopers out the door. 16 

Offensive naval flotillas as well as land forces need a lot of maneuver room in this high- 
tech age, which renders close combat excessively risky. No modern admiral, for example, 
would be enthusiastic about battle in closed bodies of water such as Salamis, where 
Themistocles defeated the Persian Navy in 480 B.C., Aboukir Bay, where Lord Nelson blasted 
Napoleon Bonaparte's fleet to win the Battle of the Nile in 1 798, or Lake Erie, where Captain 
Oliver Hazard Perry beat the British in 1 813, then announced, " We have met the enemy and 
they are ours!" 

LARGE AREA AS A DEFENSIVE ASSET 

Defenders on land and at sea prefer arenas that contain enough room to maneuver laterally 
and in depth, trade space for time if necessary, then regroup, reinforce, and redeploy for 
offensive action when enemy spearheads at the end of extended supply lines lose 
momentum. Tiny Luxembourg plays poor games of cat and mouse, whereas Tsarist Russia 
used defenses-in-depth to frustrate Napoleonic invaders, who briefly occupied and burned 
Mosow in 1 81 2 but fell back under pressure when winter approached. Retreat, coupled with 
scorched earth policies, paid off for the Soviet Union after Hitler launched Operation 
Barbarossa in June 1 941 . Communist defenders ceded ground grudgingly, left communes 
in ruins, torched crops, and systematically shifted essential industries from war zones to 
interior sites desperate workers dismantled nearly a quarter of the nation's manufacturing 
capacity and carted it east of the Ural Mountains before temporarily victorious Germans 
overran the rest. 17 

Evasion and escape artists in most countries envy the vast space available to Nez Perce 
Chief Joseph, who led 300 warriors along with 400 women and children on a 4-month trek 
that totaled nearly 2,000 miles (3,220 kilometers) through parts of Oregon, Idaho, Wyoming, 
and Montana before the U.S. Army finally brought his starving tribe to bay in October, 
1 877. 18 Mao Zedong's classic Long March (map 3), in much the same mold, departed his 
base camp with about 100,000 men in October 1 934. Six thousand miles (9,655 kilometers) 

SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS 17 



and 366 days later 20,000 survivors slipped into northern Shaanxi Province, short on 
provisions but long on professional pride, after leading Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang troops 
on a roundabout chase through half of China. 19 

Open water can add great depth to holdings on land, as Japan demonstrated during 
World War II. Its four home islands cover an area approximately equal to North and South 
Dakota, but outpost lines that ran from the Aleutian Islands through Pacific Trust Territories, 
New Hebrides, the Solomon Islands, and the Netherlands East Indies afforded several million 
more square miles within which to conduct delaying actions (see map 25, page 160). 

Finally, it is worth emphasizing that any nation may brandish nuclear weapons for 
deterrent purposes, but policies that contemplate even limited use against similarly armed 
opponents appear excessively imprudent for all save those that possess a redundant 
(preferably well- protected) power base. Only a few very large countries fit that description. 
Most of the remainder, which concentrate likely targets in a handful of cities or in the capital, 
could not survive small-scale nuclear attacks. 

LARGE AREA AS A MILITARY LIABILITY 

Large operational areas sometimes are mixed blessings. Continent-sized Australia, which 
concentrates most elements of political, economic, and military power along its periphery, 
is fortunate that potential targets are mainly on its southern shores far from potential enemies. 
Canada's principal assets, which hug the United States, are safe because those two countries 
remain partners. The capital cities and other "crown jewels" of many medium-sized states, 
however, run high risks. Saudi Arabia and Syria typify largely empty lands wherein core 
assets are close to insecure borders, while Seoul, Korea is barely 25 straight-line miles (40 
kilometers) south of the demilitarized zone that separates it from sworn enemies. 

Gigantic size clearly can be a military liability rather than an asset. Territorial infinity was 
illusionary in the U.S.S.R., a colossus that spanned 7,000 miles (1 1 ,230 kilometers) and nine 
time zones between the Baltic Sea and Bering Strait. Approximately 80 percent of the 
population, along with a high proportion of industrial capacity, were west of the Ural 
Mountains when Nazi Germany invaded. Connections between European Russi'a and the 
Soviet Far East depended almost entirely on the ribbonlike Trans-Siberian Railroad, a 
condition that compelled Soviet Armed Forces to operate in two widely separated and only 
slightly synchronized theaters. Long Soviet boundaries were so hard to defend and 
recalcitrants so hard to control throughout the Cold War that heavily armed Border Guards 
and Internal Security Troops peaked in the 1980s at a combined personnel strength that 
approximated 600,000 (more than most national armies). 20 Other huge nations, such as 
China and India, have experienced similar internal problems. 

SHAPE 

Favorable configurations generally confer military advantages, whereas awkward shapes do 
not. A circle with prized possessions dispersed well back from its rim would be perfect. 
Some countries or operational areas approach that ideal, but a good many are elongated, 
discontinuous, or fragmented. 21 



i 



1 8 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 3. Mao's Long March 



Approximate route 
of the Red Army 

100 200 Miles 

1 i I i I 
I I I I I I I 

100 200 300 Kilometers 



MONGOLIAN 
PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC 



MANCHURIA 



Communist area 
in 1936 



Yellow 
Sea 



\ rl 9 hungki ? 



East 

China 

Sea 



Communist area 
in 1934 



Hong Kong 



INDO-CHINA 




FORMOSA 



South China Sea 



HAINAN 



Adapted from Robert Payne, Portrait of a Revolutionary: Mao Tse-Tung (London: Abeland-Schuman, 1961), 150. 



SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS 



19 



ELONGATED SHAPES 

Spindly Chile, 2,650 miles long and nowhere more than 250 miles wide (4,265 by 400 
kilometers), is lucky, because the towering Andes Mountains guard most of its land borders. 
Israel, in contrast, had a waistline only 8 miles wide (<13 kilometers) before it seized and 
retained West Bank territories during the 1 967 war the Mediterranean was a 3-hour march 
for Jordanian foot troops, 1 5 minutes in medium tanks, and less than artillery range from the 
nearest enemy positions. Opportunities to trade space for time were nil. President Charles 
de Gaulle greatly increased NATO's military vulnerability when he evicted its armed forces 
from France in 1967; his action crammed U.S. combat and support formations into the 
narrowest part of West Germany where that nation is barely 150 miles wide (240 
kilometers). 22 

Military salients, a less exaggerated form of elongation, extend into enemy territory. 
Problems accompany those that penetrate deeply whenever hostile armed forces remain 
strong enough to hit one or both flanks. Iraqi divisions that captured Kuwait in 1990, for 
example, were dangerously exposed. General Colin L. Powell publicly announced, "Our 
strategy in going after this army is very simple. First we are going to cut it off, and then we 
are going to kill it." 23 Allied counteroffensives during the Battle of the Bulge (December 1 6, 
1944 to mid-January 1945) similarly pinched a German salient that, at its zenith, drove a 
wedge almost 50 miles (80 kilometers) into Belgium, as map 4 depicts. 24 

Peninsulas, unlike salients, tend to isolate conflicts. Allied campaigners obtained positive 
results in Italy, a "sideshow" theater, where economy of force operations in 1943-1945 
pinned down many German divisions that otherwise might have bolstered the Atlantic Wall 
or have reinforced German defensive capabilities in Normandy after Anglo-American armed 
forces landed. Armed combat lasted three years in Korea (1 950-1 953) without spreading to 
the mainland. Defensive actions against superior foes on peninsulas from which there is no 
escape, however, seldom have happy endings, as U.S. forces in the Philippines found after 
Japanese invaders backed them onto minuscule Bataan Peninsula hard by Manila Bay. A 90- 
mile "Death March" followed their surrender on April 9, 1 942. 25 

DISCONTINUOUS SHAPES 

Discontinuous shapes of military significance come in assorted sizes and degrees of 
permanence. The smallest are parachute drop zones and helicopter landing zones in enemy 
territory. None can survive long unless it is reinforced rapidly, friendly forces advancing 
overland link up expeditiously, or surrounded units withdraw. Operation Market Garden 
decisively demonstrated that point in September 1944, when two U.S. and one British 
airborne divisions strove to secure five bridges over large rivers and canals in Holland so 
armored columns could scoot 64 miles (103 kilometers) up a narrow corridor, cross the 
Rhine at Arnhem, outflank the Siegfried Line, then head for the Ruhr, which was Nazi 
Germany's industrial heartland (map 5). British Lieutenant General Frederick (Boy) 
Browning, who feared that the plan was overly ambitious, said to Field Marshal Bernard 
Montgomery, its architect, "I think we might be going a bridge too far." He was right. The 
British 1st Airborne Division held out heroically at Arnhem for 10 days waiting in vain for a 
linkup, then disintegrated. Fewer than one-fourth of its 10,000 men made it safely back 
across the Rhine; the rest were killed, captured, or missing. 26 



20 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 4. The Battle of the Bulge 



10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80km. 

ii 



-; Aachen 

*"*'! *::x : :::x3E:x : :i:x : :x:x : :::x : 



10 20 30 

BELGIUM 




FRAN 

i 

Mezieres 



Arlon\ LUXEMBOURG 



THE ARDENNES 

MAXIMUM GERMAN PENETRATION 



I A ffsyyX'XvXvX'Xv 

I Luxembourg fM^^^^ 

-***< jWS 

^N ^^\^liiSil?i 



Forward bases and facilities, which are semipermanent enclaves on foreign soil, constitute 
a second subcategory under the rubric of disconnected shapes. Those in enemy territory, 
such as the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, Cuba, and (from time to time) the Panama Canal 
Zone, are noteworthy because they demand stringent security. Exclaves on a grander scale 
primarily are political entities that frequently become flash points. Adolf Hitler, who 
hungered for East Prussia, which the Treaty of Versailles had separated from Germany proper 
in 1920, first requested from Poland (but never received) a connecting corridor through the 
free city of Danzig, then reclaimed those lands and much more by force of arms in 
September, 1939. Pakistan comprised east and west sectors 1,000 land miles apart (1,610 
kilometers) from 1947 until 1971 when East Pakistan, with Indian assistance, gained 
independence as Bangladesh after a bloody civil war. Beleaguered Berlin (map 6), a Free 
World exclave and potential powder keg 100 miles (1 60 kilometers) east of the Iron Curtain, 
had huge symbolic as well as practical importance. Its position was tactically untenable, 
because Soviet and East German forces could seal off or swallow the city at their pleasure if 



SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS 



21 



Map 5. Operation Market Garden 



1BRIT 
AIRBORNE DIV 



XXX 
Corps vill 
II Corps 

2nd ARMY 




22 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 6. Beleagured Berlin 



EAST BERLIN/ 

RkOW I AREA: 154 sq. mi. / 




SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS 



23 



willing to risk a nuclear war. Only the massive Berlin Airlift kept the population alive during 
a prolonged blockade that lasted from June 1 948 until May 1 949. 27 

FRAGMENTED SHAPES 

Fragmented shapes mainly pertain to island nations such as Japan and the Philippines, which 
are open to defeat in detail. Indonesia, the most noteworthy, consists of several thousand 
islands, many uninhabited, that festoon off the coast of Southeast Asia for 3,000 miles (4,825 
kilometers), a distance comparable to that between the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts. 
Isolation discourages coordinated offensive or defensive military campaigns in widely 
separated places and, in some cases (such as Timor), encourages separatist movements. 



KEY POINTS 

The location, size, and shape of land masses and large bodies of water strongly 
influence military capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities. 

No nation that lacks access to any ocean has ever been able to project great military 
power globally. 

Geographical isolation offers countries considerable protection against invasion. 

Even very large armed forces that battle strong adversaries on more than one front may 
be seriously disadvantaged. 

Time, distance, and modes of transportation determine how rapidly armed forces can 
respond to remotely- located contingencies. 

Armed forces spread thinly throughout large countries and operational areas are 
offensively and defensively disadvantaged. 

Armed forces deployed throughout archipelagos and other discontinuous operational 
areas may be subject to defeat in detail. 



MOTES 

1 . Many political geography textbooks discuss spatial relationships in an international context. 
See, for example, Paul Buckholts, Political Geography (New York: Ronald Press, 1966), 73-93, and 
Lucille Carlson, Geography and World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1958), 24-39. 

2. Russia's maritime deficiencies following the demise of the U.S.S.R. duplicate those that 
confronted the Soviet Navy. See John M. Collins, The U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and 
Capabilities, 1960-1980 (Washington, DC: McGraw-Hill Publications, 1980), 239-244. 

3. J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 1 (New York: Funk and Wagnals, 
1 955), 360-384; Peter Fleming, Operation Sea Lion (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 957). 

4. Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1992). 

5. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1 962). 

6. Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), 
chapter 5; Richard D. Lee, "Metabolic Clock," Aerospace Safety Review 3, no. 3 (Winter 1 966): 3-5. 



24 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



7. The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the Army H.H. 
Arnold, and Fleet Admiral Ernest). King (New York: J. B. Lippincott., 1947), 557-563; Barry Pitt, The 
Battle of the Atlantic (New York: Time-Life Books, 1 977). 

8. Leonard Bushkoff, "Hungary (October-November 1956)," in Challenge and Response in 
International Conflict, vol. 2, The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, eds. Doris M. Condit, 
Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, American 
University, March 1967), 529-578. 

9. Peter David, Triumph in the Desert (New York: Random House, 1 991 ). 

10. James A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1 992); Robert Smith Thompson, The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy 
and the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections 
on the Cuban Missile Crisis, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989). 

11. Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace 
(Washington: February 9, 1972), 177; Mark M. Lowenthal, The CFE Treaty: Verification and 
Compliance Issues, Issue Brief 91009 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1991). 

12. Collins, 159-167. 

13. For background, see Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War: An Era of Violent Peace, 1975- 
1986 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1 988), 1 69-1 89, 383-441 . 

14. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1 969), 1 9, 82, 1 83, 200, 21 7, 291 -292, 296. The quotation is by General of the 
Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is reproduced in testimony before 
the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations on The Military Situation in the Far 
East, 82 d Congress, 1 st sess., part 2, May 15, 1951, 732, 753. 

1 5. Keith William Nolan, Into Cambodia: Spring Campaign, Summer Offensive, 1970 (Novato, 
CA: Presidio Press, 1 990). 

1 6. Gerard M. Devlin, Back to Corregidor (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1 992); see especially 
37-39,44-61, 76-85. 

1 7. Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945 (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1 964), 1 44- 
260. 

1 8. S.L.A. Marshall, Crimsoned Prairie (New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1 972), 1 91 -237. 

1 9. Robert Payne, Portrait of Revolutionary: Mao Tse-Tung (New York: Ablard-Schuman, 1 961 ), 
chapter 6. 

20. James T. Reitz, "The Soviet Security Troops: The Kremlin's Other Armies," in part 5, Soviet 
Union: What Lies Ahead? vol. 6, Studies in Communist Affairs (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1985), 549-580. 

21 . See, for example, Buckholts, Political Geography, 73-78. 

22. Gordon A. Moon, II, "Invasion in Reverse," Army 17, no. 2 (February 1967): 24-30 and 
"Uncertain Future," March 1967, 38-42. 

23. Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 
1995), 509-510. 

24. John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1969). 

25. John W. Whitman, Bataan Our Last Ditch (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990); John 
Tolland, But Not in Shame: The Six Months After Pearl Harbor (New York: Random House, 1 961 ), 
265-366. 

26. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 974). 

27. Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Airlift (New York: Athenium Press, 1 988); James M. Schick, 
The Berlin Crisis,1958-1962 (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). 



SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS 25 



3, LAY OF THE LAND 



In peace, soldiers must learn the nature of the land, how steep the mountains are, how the 
valleys debouch, where the plains lie, and understand the nature of rivers and swamps then 
by means of the knowledge and experience gained in one locality, one can easily understand 
any other. 

Niccolo Machiavelli 
Discorsi 



A U.S. ARMY MAJOR GENERAL WHO ADDRESSED THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE DURING THE COLD WAR DECLARED 

without cracking a smile, "Young men of all services must learn terrain or learn Russian." No 
one will ever know for sure whether he overstated his case, because the United States and 
the Soviet Union never went to war with each other, but the lay of the land was militarily 
important long before Rennaissance Man Machiavelli made his pronouncement more than 
500 years ago and likely will remain so. 

LAND FORMS 

Land forms comprise the foundation upon which all other terrestrial features are 
superimposed (figure 1 is illustrative). 1 They occupy three militarily significant categories, 
which table 2 lists with the highest, largest, or deepest first. High ground, level land, and 
depressions each uniquely influence the abilities of air and ground forces to maneuver freely, 
locate targets, deliver firepower effectively, conduct non-combat operations, coordinate 
actions, and furnish essential support at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

HIGH GROUND 

"Mountains" and "hills" are imprecise terms, the definitions of which depend on 
circumstantial interpretations. High spots in southern India's Palmi Hills are equal in 
elevation to those of the U.S. Appalachian Mountains which, in turn, are small compared 
with the Alps or Andes. Some summits are saw-toothed, others are smooth. Little correlation 
may be evident between total elevation, measured from mean sea level to any point on land, 
and local relief, which measures topographic features from base to top (figure 2). Pike's Peak 
in Colorado, for example, is 4,000 feet (1,220 meters) higher than the loftiest pinnacle along 
Lebanon's coastal range, yet local relief is less because its climb begins more than a mile 
above sea level. Airmen, who set their altimeters according to elevation, view local relief 



Figure 1 . Land Forms Displayed Schematically 



Pass Topographical 

or crest Skyline Saddle Steep 

gap 



Clearing p ea k 



Small 

valley 

or 

draw 






Ravine 

or 
Evergreens gully 




Table 2. Land Forms Listed 



/-//g/i Ground 


Relatively Level Land 


Depressions 


Mountains 
Hills 


Plains 
Plateaus 


Valleys 
Basins 


Hummocks 
Cliffs 
Bluffs 


Mesa Tops 
Butte Tops 


Canyons 
Gorges 
Ravines 






Caverns 






Caves 






Craters 



from different perspectives than land forces, whose front-line troops may consider hummocks 
to be high ground. Gradients, which measure how rapidly the ground rises or falls vertically 
over given horizontal distances, generally are expressed as plus or minus percentage figures, 
depending on direction of movement (figure 3 shows a +23 percent ascending grade from 
A to B and -23 percent descending from B to A). 

Very steep slopes severely limit military flexibility. Helicopter pilots, for example, must 
take care that rotor blades don't hit the ground on the uphill side while they hover or 
decapitate troops when they debark and ensure that the skids will hold instead of sliding 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Figure 2. Elevation and Local Relief 



1000'i 

Local 

Relief 




High Tide 
Mean Sea Level Datum Plane 



downhill if they have to land. The proficiency with which ground forces negotiate steep 
terrain depends on professional skills, types of transportation, and loads. Mountaineers can 
scale walls that would stop standard infantry; tracked vehicles can negotiate steeper ground 
than trucks; railway locomotives can tow longer trains up sharper grades if flatcars are laden 
with tents instead of tanks. Aerial observers and high-flying bombers are hard pressed to 
identify and hit targets concealed by rugged terrain where closely-spaced ridges make close 
air support a perilous proposition even in perfect weather. 

Points and areas on bare slopes are visible from the top to the bottom of any hill only if 
the topographical crest (the highest elevation) and the military crest (the highest point from 
which terrain all the way to the base is visible) happen to coincide. Convex slopes and other 
surface irregularities commonly create "blind spots" masks or defilades in military 
parlance that protect enemy positions from flat-trajectory weapons, such as rifles and 
machine guns (see figure 4). Terrain masks also degrade the performance of Very High 
Frequency (VHP) radios, which likewise depend on line-of-sight. Surface-to-surface missile 
and field artillery batteries emplaced along steep, narrow valleys cannot elevate launchers 
or tubes high enough to clear nearby crests. 

RELATIVELY LEVEL LAND 

Flat to rolling surfaces include relatively small mesas and buttes as well as the gargantuan 
U.S. Great Plains, Russian steppes, and high plateaus such as the Tibetan Tableland, which, 
at 1 6,000 feet (4,875 meters), is higher than most mountains. Slopes nowhere exceed 5-1 5 
degrees on large plains and plateaus, except for isolated protuberances that rise abruptly 
above otherwise horizontal terrain. 



LAY OF THE LAND 



29 



Figure 3. Slopes and Gradients 



210 



220 



230 



240 




+23% grade A to B 
-23% grade B to A 



Relatively level lands throughout history have witnessed major military operations. One 
of the first confrontations between pastoral and agricultural societies occurred in the 18th 
century B.C, when Hyksos horsemen overran Lower Egypt, which, then as now, mainly 
occupied the Nile Delta. Roman luminaries Actius and Theodoric stopped Attila the Hun 
on the Mauriac Plain near what now is Chalons-sur-Marne, France, in 451 A.D. Charles 
Martel, a Frank, defeated Moorish invaders in the Loire Valley close by Tours (732 A.D.) to 
stem the Islamic tidal wave that was sweeping northward from Africa. Washington defeated 
Cornwallis on rolling lands around Yorktown, Virginia, in 1781 and thereby assured eventual 
victory for the infant United States, while Napoleon met Wellington and his Waterloo on 
Belgian lowlands in 1 81 5. 2 It should come as no surprise that the most expansive military 
campaigns in modern times took place on vast Soviet flatlands that allow gigantic armed 
forces to maneuver fluidly and conduct air-land combat on a grand scale. Operation 
Zitadelle, the epic clash at Kursk, reportedly culminated in 70,000 Germans killed or 
wounded (not counting captured or missing in action) and the destruction of 3,000 tanks, 
1,400 aircraft, 1,000 artillery pieces, and 5,000 trucks. Soviet loses in that largest of all 
armored battles were only slightly less/ 

TOPOGRAPHICAL DEPRESSIONS 

Canyons and gorges make awesome obstacles, but are fewer than caverns and caves, which 
come in many sizes and serve many military purposes. Mao's strategic concepts, for 
example, took shape in a Shaanxi cave where he had ample time for reflection after the Long 
March. Natural shelters, perhaps further hollowed out and refined, need not be nearly as 
large as the cliff side cavity that hid the fictional Guns of Navaronne. Tenacious Japanese 
troops on Peleliu, Saipan, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and other contested Pacific islands that were 



30 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Figure 4. Line-of-Sight and High-Angle Trajectories 



Military 
Crest 



Topographical 
Crest 



Lines of Sight 



Sight 
Defilade 



B 




Convex 
Slope 



Dotted line is the highest angle of fire for artillery 



honeycombed with comparatively small caves made U.S. forces root them out at the expense 
of frightful casualties on both sides, because air strikes and heavy naval artillery left those 
sanctuaries virtually intact. 4 Yugloslav guerrillas who took refuge in caverns and caves from 
1 941 through 1 944 gave fits to a sizable number of German divisions that might have been 
profitably employed on other fronts. 5 Weapons, equipment, and supplies stockpiled deeply 
beneath bedrock generally are safe from direct hits by conventional bombardment. 
Subterranean facilities used by enemies to store nuclear, biological, or chemical munitions 
cause concern for identical reasons, because actions to neutralize them by frontal assaults 
would be costly and outcomes uncertain. An 1 1 -man sabotage team, following surreptitiously 
acquired floor plans, hit Hitler's heavy water plant at Vermork, Norway, and with one small 
explosion crippled Nazi Germany's nuclear weapons program, 6 but that spectacular 
achievement has proved to be an exception instead of a rule. 

Basins surrounded by steep terrain expose forces on the bottom to murderous fire if 
opponents occupy commanding heights, as French paratroopers in Vietnam found at Dien 
Bien Phu (1 954) and U.S. Marines discovered at Khe Sanh during the next decade (1 967- 
1 968). Alfred, Lord Tennyson immortalized the Charge of the Light Brigade during the battle 
of Balaclava in 1 853 with these heart-wrenching words: 

Cannon to the right of them, 
Cannon to the left of them, 
Cannon in front of them 
Volley'd and thunder'd . . . 
Into the jaws of death, 



LAY OF THE LAND 



31 



Into the mouth of hell 
Rode the six hundred. 

Shocked onlookers became so hushed when the Light Brigade entered the "Valley of Death" 
that the jingle of bits and accouterments could clearly be heard. Twenty minutes later almost 
250 men and twice that many horses were dead. 7 

RIVERS AND RESERVOIRS 

Fast-moving offensive ground forces that lack sufficient air assault capabilities must swim, 
ford, ferry across, or build bridges over large streams without breaking stride or forfeit forward 
momentum while defenders on the far bank hold in place. 8 All military services routinely 
require adequate water for drinking, cooking, and sanitation, plus special purposes such as 
decontamination during chemical combat. Drainage systems, river crossing sites, and 
militarily useful reservoirs thus are relevant topics. (Chapter 1 1 covers inland waterways.) 

DRAINAGE SYSTEMS 

Drainage systems generally are shaped like asymmetrical trees, each branch of which empties 
its contents into a larger stream until the biggest tributaries connect with the trunk. Immense 
systems such as the Amazon and Mississippi funnel runoff from several million square miles, 
while minor systems service much smaller areas. Great rivers that arise and remain in well- 
watered regions have many tributaries. Streams 30 to 60 feet wide (9 to 18 meters), for 
example, lace Western Europe every 6 miles (9+ kilometers) or so, while rivers up to 300 feet 
across occur on the average at 30-mile intervals. Relatively few branches in contrast feed the 
Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile, which arise where water is plentiful but traverse dry lands 
thereafter. 9 

Militarily important riverine characteristics begin with widths, measured in feet, yards, or 
meters from bank to bank, and with depths which indicate the distance from surface to 
bottom (figure 5). Current velocities, usually stated in feet or meters per second, depend 
primarily on the steepness of the stream bed. Twenty-five to 30 feet (7-9 meters) per second 
or 1 7 to 20 miles an hour is considered quite fast, whereas 1 or 2 feet per second or less is 
sluggish. The deepest, fastest flow normally follows the main channel well above the bottom, 
because stream banks and beds function as friction brakes. Currents accelerate along outside 
curves, where they figuratively play "crack the whip." 

Widths, depths, velocities, and volumes measured in cubic feet, yards, or meters past 
particular points are by no means constant. Military planners and operators anticipate 
seasonal fluctuations, typified by annual inundations along the Nile Valley, and are fully 
aware that tidal rivers rise and fall twice daily in response to lunar cycles. Not all destructive 
floods, however, are predictable nor are they all from natural causes: Germans defenders in 
Novemberl 944 blew dams on the Roer River at Schmidt to delay advancing Allied armies; 
Chinese "volunteers" at Hwachon Reservoir in Korea (1 951 ) threatened to release a wall of 
water that could have washed away command posts, supply dumps, and bridges and split 
U.S. IX Corps. 10 

Sand bars, mud banks, and rock outcroppings impose natural obstacles close to shore, 
especially along outside curves. Floating debris and ice floes in stream can be destructive 



32 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Figure 5. Selected Stream Characteristics 





= Approach Elevation 
= Approach Distance 
Slope in Percent of Approach = 
4a /4b x100 



1 . The width of stream bed 'from bank to bank. 

2. The actual width of the wafer measured at normal stage. In addition, maximum width 2a and minimum 
width 2b are estimated, based on local observations or records of high water and low water, and then 
recorded. 

3. The actual depth of the stream at normal water level. 

3a. Estimated maximum water depth based on local observations or records. 
3b. Estimated minimum water depth based on local observations or records. 

4. The slope of the approaches is the slope of the stream banks through which the approach roads are cut. 



LAY OF THE LAND 



33 



to river craft and bridges, but solid ice is beneficial when thick enough to bear the weight of 
troops, trucks, and tanks. 

CROSSING SITES 

River crossings at many places on broad fronts minimize enemy abilities to concentrate 
decisive defensive power against vulnerable targets, perhaps employing weapons of mass 
destruction. Ideal locations exhibit the following attributes: 11 

Good roads closely parallel the river so that offensive forces can easily reach the best 
crossing sites. 

Well-protected areas are ample to hold follow-on forces waiting to reinforce assault 
waves. 

Easily negotiable slopes lead to water on the near shore and to land on the far side. 

Narrows facilitate fast assault crossings, round trips by rafts and ferries that support 
subsequent buildups, and combat bridge construction. 

Current velocities less than 5 feet per second (3.5 miles per hour) limit down-stream 
drift. 

Fording sites are consistently shallow, their bottoms are firm enough to bear heavy 
traffic, and selected routes are free from militarily significant obstacles. 

Unfordable streams are consistently deep enough to float swimming vehicles, 
inflatable boats, rafts, and ferries. 

Rapids, shoals, sandbars, snags, debris, and icy obstructions are conspicuously absent. 

Conveniently located islands that act as stepping stones reduce combat bridging 
requirements. 

The best crossing sites unfortunately are apt to be staunchly defended and actual 
conditions seldom are ideal. German panzer divisions in Russia during World War II, for 
example, frequently found that marshy lowlands abutted both banks of large streams, floods 
loaded with sediment clogged inboard engines, ice floes each spring bombarded expedient 
bridges, and vehicles became toboggans on moderate slopes after torrential summer rains. 12 
Skilled tacticians nevertheless overcame such adversities and learned that landings at 
unexpected spots improve prospects for low-cost success. 

WATER SUPPLIES 

Large armed forces demand enormous quantities of water in peacetime as well as war, 
whether active or passive, at fixed installations or in the field. Requirements are most 
difficult to satisfy in arid regions, especially when division-sized ground elements and air 
wings move frequently. Drinking water must be palatable (color, odor, and taste all count) 
and be unpolluted by pathogenic bacteria that spread contagious diseases such as typhoid 
fever, cholera, and amoebic dysentery. Time-consuming and expensive purification processes 
become obligatory when water for use as coolants is corrosive. Surface and subsurface 
sources are complementary, because neither suffices under all conditions. Both contribute 
supplies that differ quantitatively as well as qualitatively from time-to-time and place-to-place 
with varying degrees of convenience. 13 



34 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Surface Water. Rivers, lakes, and some inland seas are large sources of fresh water on 
Earth's surface. Lesser repositories include ponds, small streams, and springs. Some sources 
are consistently reliable, whereas floods and droughts elsewhere seasonably reduce usable 
water supplies below required amounts. Unpredictable depletions caused by nature or enemy 
actions may do likewise with little or no notice. Prudent commanders consequently try to 
identify alternative sources before water crises occur. 

Perennial flows of sweet, cool spring water usually are low in organic impurities but tend 
to be widely scattered, high in mineral content, and output seldom is enough to satisfy large 
military formations which most often must establish, operate, and maintain water supply 
points at locations that are easily accessible and facilitate distribution by road. Large 
quantities of good quality surface water are commonly available on plains and plateaus 
where rainfall annually exceeds 25 inches (60 centimeters), but ample sources are hard to 
find in mountains where runoff starts, in frigid climes where sources are ice-bound many 
months each year, in the tropics where pollution frequently is rampant, and near small towns 
and urban centers where raw or incompletely treated sewage and toxic chemicals sometimes 
contaminate running water and reservoirs. 

Naval vessels and some coastal countries distill brine to produce fresh water. The world's 
largest desal in ization plant, located in Saudi Arabia, siphons more than 5 million gallons per 
day from the Persian Gulf (nearly 1 9 million liters) and, after purification, pipes fresh water 
as far inland as Riyadh. Allied missile defense batteries took special precautions to protect 
that facility against Iraqi Scud attacks during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 
1 990-1 991 . M The U.S. Marine garrison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which is isolated from the 
rest of Oriente Province by minefields and other man-made obstacles, routinely requires 
about 1 .2 million gallons (4.5 million liters) of desalinated sea water per month. Surplus 
capacity and barges, plus 15 million gallons in storage, made it possible to accommodate 
55,000 Cuban and Haitian refugees who inflated peak consumption to more than 73 million 
gallons in October 1995 (27.6 million liters). 15 

Subsurface Water. Not all precipitation and melt water empties directly into surface 
drainage systems. A good deal seeps into subterranean reservoirs instead. How much 
depends on total accumulations, slopes, soil compositions, and the permeability of 
underlying rocks. Moisture first percolates through an aerated zone that alternately dampens 
and dries, then reaches the water table, a saturated layer of variable thickness and depths that 
may be shallow or deep (figure 6). Some water continues to trickle down through cracks 
and crannies until contained by aquifers encased in nearly impervious rock formations. 
Artesian springs that rise to the surface under hydrostatic pressures along fissures and fault 
lines are little affected by seasonal fluctuations or by pollution, but often are too mineralized 
for human consumption or cooling systems. Relatively shallow wells sunk into the water 
table generally are preferable with two prominent exceptions: well water along littorals tends 
to be brackish; supplies drawn from arctic sources above permafrost are only briefly 
productive each year. 1b 

Mobile ground forces seldom sit still long enough to tap subsurface reservoirs, but ports, 
airfields, supply depots, major maintenance shops, and other static installations frequently 
benefit. So do Civil Affairs well-digging teams whose humanitarian mission is to improve the 
quality of life for impoverished people. Subterranean repositories furnish the only reliable 
source of water inland wherever lands are parched, a fact of particular importance when 



ww^;.^ 



LAY OF THE LAND 35 



Figure 6. Water Tables, Acquifers, and Wells 



Permeable: Aquifer 




summer heat heightens routine requirements and demands soar under stressful conditions. 
Conservative estimates, for example, indicate that it would take approximately 200,000 
gallons of wash water to decontaminate the personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities 
(such as aid stations and field hospitals) of just one U.S. Army or Marine division hard hit by 
persistent chemical warfare (CW) agents. 17 That would be a tall order even if fire hydrants 
were handy, and perhaps impossible in the desert, where the employment of CW munitions 
could entail unconscionable risks for both sides if reprisals in kind drenched aggressors. 

GEOLOGY AMD SOILS 

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates from the highest to the lowest echelons of every armed 
service need to know how geology and soils affect combat and support operations, but most 
are bored to tears by those technical subjects. This brief section, which seeks to stimulate 
interest, first characterizes Earth's mantle, then explains important military implications in 
simple terms. 

SURFACE CHARACTERISTICS 

Soil covers Earth's land surface in layers that vary from several hundred feet thick on some 
alluvial plains to an inch or so on steep mountain slopes. Various grades of gravel, sand, silt, 
and clay, classified in descending order of particle size, occasionally appear in pure form but 
more often in a mix (silty gravel, sandy clay, and so on), each with distinctive properties such 
as texture, compactness, porosity, and consistency that affect military utility (table 3). 18 



36 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Table 3. Selected Soil Characteristics 



Dry 


Predominantly 
Gravel 


Predominantly 
Sand 


Predominantly 
Silt 


Predominantly 
Clay 


Solid 
Stable 


Loose 
Unstable 


Compact 
Dusty 


Hard 
Dusty 


Wet 


Solid 
Stable 


Compact 
Stable 


Spongy 
Slippery 
Dries Fast 


Sticky 
Slippery 
Dries Slowly 


Frost 


Unaffected 


Unaffected 


Heaves 


Heaves 



Gravel consists of coarse and smooth rocks, rounded or angular, that range from about 
1/4 inch to 3 inches (2.5 to 7.6 centimeters) in diameter and are unaffected by weather 
conditions. Smaller grains constitute sand, which is unconsolidated when dry yet compact 
when wet. Dry silt is finer still, but solid except for the surface, which raises dust clouds 
under windy conditions, whereas wet silt constitutes soft, slippery mud until sunshine, 
warmth, or wind re-solidify it. Plasticity and adhesiveness are salient characteristics of 
microscopic (almost poreless) clay particles, which are hard and often brittle when dry. Clay 
sheds water well but, once saturated, combines the worst attributes of slime and glue. Clay 
also takes a long time to dry and, like silt, heaves in response to alternating freezes and thaws. 
Combinations modify each basic soil type, depending on the mix. 

Top soils heavy in humus (decomposed vegetation ) are several feet thick in peat bogs, 
somewhat less in marshes and meadows. Humus invariably is thin in deserts where scanty 
precipitation supports little plant life, in the arctic where cold retards decay, and wherever 
tropical heat and humidity disintegrate organic waste. 

Bedrock beneath all soil sometimes lies at or near the surface, but often is deeply buried. 
Structures (laminated or solid), textures (coarse or smooth), and fracture patterns (clean or 
jagged breaks) are notable attributes. "Rock of Ages" like granites and quartzites are 
exceedingly hard, but all conglomerates, sandstones, siltstones, even splintery shales are 
more durable than their basic constituents, which were gravel, sand, silt, and clay before 
being cemented together under great pressures. Calcium-rich limestones range from very 
hard construction material to very soft chalk, the latter typified by the white cliffs of Dover. 19 

CROSS-COUNTRY TRAFFICABILITY 

Load-bearing capacities, traction, and stability despite sustained use characterize the abilities 
of particular soils to tolerate traffic by wheeled and tracked vehicles as light as snowmobiles 
and as heavy as tractor-trailers or tanks. Cross-country mobility over gravelly ground is 
consistently feasible, whereas bogs and swamps are impassable to all but small amphibians. 
Off-the-road movement, however, most often depends on weather conditions. Frozen fields 
generally are conducive. So are dry soils other than sand, which in its loose state 
immobilizes trucks that lack low-pressure tires. Saturated silt, in contrast, churns into soft 
mud after the first few vehicles pass, faster than usual when loosened by cultivation. Wet 
clay is worse: deep ruts rapidly appear; stickiness gums drive trains, degrades speed, and 



LAY OF THE LAND 



37 



complicates steering; modest inclines become too slippery to climb; and after soaking rains 
tanks and armored fighting vehicles slide down slopes like Olympic-class luges. 20 

Terrain strewn with boulders also inhibits free movement, as British Brigadier John Bagot 
Glubb discovered in 1931, when he took an Arab Legion patrol into Trans-Jordan's 
panhandle to suppress rambunctious Bedouins. Blocks of black lava so littered the landscape 
that progress on horseback was painfully slow and dismounted legionnaires took 1 days to 
clear a path that was barely wide enough for a column of trucks to proceed 6 miles (9.6 
kilometers), then turn around. 21 

WEAPON PERFORMANCE 

Soil conditions and rock affect the performance of many conventional weapons and delivery 
vehicles. Rocky outcroppings and gravel magnify the lethal radius of conventional munitions, 
which ricochet on impact and scatter stone splinters like shrapnel, whereas mushy soil 
smothers high explosives that burrow before they detonate. Even light artillery pieces leave 
fairly heavy "footprints" in saturated earth, a peculiarity that limits (sometimes eliminates) 
desirable firing positions. Gunners struggled to keep towed artillery pieces on targets when 
they worked at or near maximum tube elevations on wet ground in Vietnam where it didn't 
take many rounds to drive 155-mm howitzer trails so deeply into the mire that recoil 
mechanisms malfunctioned. Each piece consequently had to be shifted several times each 
night, a grueling proposition that caused trucks to snap winch cables when soil suction 
exceeded their capacities. Howitzer trails proved impossible to seat permanently at lower 
angles of fire, which caused whole batteries to slide after one or two volleys. No amount of 
shoring solved those problems, but resourceful artillerymen in the Mekong Delta improvised 
long-legged heliborne platforms that rested on solid foundations that gave their guns 
acceptable stability. 

Surface conditions likewise amplify or mute nuclear weapon effects. The diameters and 
depths of craters are less when soil is dry than when soaked, nuclear shock wave,s transmitted 
through wet clay are perhaps 50 times more powerful than those through loose sand, and the 
intensities as well as decay rates of nuclear radiation reflect soil compositions and densities. 
Research and development specialists at underground test sites use related data to determine 
how deeply they must bury nuclear devices of specified yields to prevent radiation from 
venting in open air. Massive beds of volcanic ash called "tuff" seem best. 22 

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS 

Engineers whose mission is to build, repair, and maintain military roads, airstrips, vehicle 
parks, bridge foundations, and field fortifications routinely use bulldozers, front loaders, 
dump trucks, and shovels to scoop, prepare, and redeposit surface soils. Some materials, 
however, are much better suited than others for such purposes.. 

Excavations in granite and other hard rock require demolitions and power tools, whereas 
most sandstones, limestones, and shales are easier to extract, provided the earthen 
overburden allows easy access. Amalgams of gravel with silt or sand make good material for 
fill, stable embankments, and foundations, but no mix of silt or clay is suitable for aircraft 
runways, taxi strips, or road surfaces, even with palliatives to keep dust down during dry 
seasons. Weathered basalt, which forms a hard crust when dry but develops deep ruts after 
rains, also is undesirable. 23 Laterite, a common deposit in tropical alluviums, was the 



38 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



construction material of choice for main supply routes and C-130-capable airfields in 
Vietnam, because its iron and aluminum oxide concretions harden irreversibly and withstand 
tremendous abuse. Peneprime, oil, or some other asphaltic compound waterproofed and 
controlled dust. 24 

VEGETATION 

Paleolithic foot soldiers armed with stone axes and wooden clubs discovered that dense 
vegetation limits land mobility and observation to front, flanks, and rear. Problems multiplied 
when warriors began to employ "standoff" weapons that required clear fields of fire (spears, 
javelins, slingshots, bows and arrows), formed cavalry squadrons, and devised "mechanized" 
modes of transportation (mainly horse-drawn chariots). Technological innovations that 
include armor, aircraft, and thermonuclear weapons have profoundly altered the significance 
of vegetative cover since then, but none has neutralized its effects. Bare ground still favors 
offensive forces; forests still favor defense. 

GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION 

Arctic and Antarctic barrens girdle the globe around the North and South Poles, but the Earth 
is covered thickly or sparsely with some sort of vegetation in most other places (map 7). 25 
Several distinctive belts, one below the other from high to low latitudes, are observable in 
the Northern Hemisphere where huge land masses predominate. 

Tundra, a bleak zone that begins where perpetual ice caps terminate, supports a mat of 
mosses, lichens, summer flowers, and a few grotesquely twisted dwarf trees that hug the 
ground. A great band of evergreens, commonly called the "taiga," replaces tundra somewhat 
farther south in response to a longer growing season. Spruce, pine, hemlock, and fir forests 
intermingled with deciduous birch, alders, larch, and willow trees sweep across subarctic 
Alaska, Canada, European Russia, and Siberia. Moss-covered swamps cover level, poorly 
drained lands. 

Broadleaf woodlands, once typified by Sherwood Forest in England, Germany's 
Schwartzwald (Black Forest), and the northern United States east of the Mississippi River, 
replace the taiga in middle latitudes (some say a squirrel could cross the State of Pennsylvania 
in colonial times without touching ground). Cultivated fields and pastures, however, have 
long since supplanted primeval stands of oak, ash, maple, hickory, elm, walnut, and beech 
trees. Natural grasslands originally covered much of mid-western Canada and the United 
States as well as Eurasian steppes from Ukraine to the Orient, where the climate is too dry 
for trees. A good deal of that land also is agricultural today. 

Mediterranean borders, southern California, central Chile, and South Africa's Cape 
Province furnish conditions conducive to squat cork oaks, olive trees, vineyards, and scrubs 
that prefer cool, wet winters and long summer droughts. Prickly, leathery-leaved plants such 
as cacti, mesquite, creosote bushes, and chaparral favor deserts and their fringes that are 
more or less centered along the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn. Neither of those 
discontinuous strips dips closer to the Equator than 1 5 degrees or much farther away than 40, 
but individual deserts very considerably. The 3.5-million-square-mile Sahara (6.3 million 
square kilometers) occupies almost as much space as all 50 United States, and the Great 
Australian Desert constitutes almost half of its parent continent, whereas the Lut Desert in 



LAY OF THE LAND 39 



Map 7. Regional Vegetation 




Source: U.S. Dept. Agriculture Yearbook, 1941, "Climate and Man." Aitoff's equal-area projection 
adapted by V.C. Finch. 



40 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Iran, at 1 55,000 square miles (401,000 square kilometers), is relatively small. Some stretches 
of sand and bare stone are devoid of vegetation, although even the driest soils by and large 
support some struggling plant life. 

Tropical forests ring the world at its midriff, most notably in the Amazon Basin, West- 
Central Africa, parts of India, Southeast Asia, Indonesia, and nearby Pacific Islands where 
abundant rainfall and an endless growing season encourage exuberant vegetation, jungle 
giants that include teak, mahogany, and ebony trees commonly form double, triple, even 
quadruple canopies that exclude sunshine from forest floors. Undergrowth, contrary to 
popular misconception, is dense only where light filters through. Mangrove thickets that 
straddle the Equator flourish best along salt water coasts, but those botanical flying buttresses 
take root as far upstream as tidal influences are felt. 

Vegetation varies with altitude as well as latitude. Each 1,000-foot ascent (305 meters) 
is roughly equivalent to a trip 300 miles (480 kilometers) north or south of the Equator. Sage 
brush and short grass, for example, greet back-packers at the eastern base of the Colorado 
Rockies a mile above sea level. Routes to the top enter woods with widely-spaced ponderosa 
pines, then thick stands of Douglas fir before they reach the timber line at about 1 1 ,500 feet 
(3,500 meters). Landscapes thereafter consist of alpine pastures, then a crust of lichens well 
below wind-swept peaks where the environment is too hostile for the hardiest plants. 

OPERATIONAL IMPORTANCE 

Each type of vegetation significantly influences military operations in unique ways. Varieties 
that are offensively advantageous almost always frustrate defense and vice versa, as the 
following vignettes indicate. 

Forests. Fairy tales fantasize about ogres who wait for unwary travelers in gloomy forests. 
Legitimate terrors confront warriors in dark woods, where armed forces battle like blindfolded 
boxers who cannot see their opponents, small-unit actions by foot troops predominate, 
control is uncertain, and fluid maneuvers are infeasible. State-of-the-art technologies confer 
few advantages regardless of the day and age: 

Vehicles of any kind are virtually useless, except on beaten paths. 
Tree trunks deflect flat-trajectory projectiles. 

Nuclear blasts that topple timber could create impassable abatis that benefit nobody. 
Tanks can bulldoze small trees, but the vegetative pileups impede or stop progress. 
The lethal radius of conventional bombs and artillery shells is much less than in open 
terrain, although the "bonus" effect of flying wood splinters can be considerable. 

Hand grenades bounce aimlessly unless rolled at short ranges that sometimes 
endanger the senders. 

Napalm burns out rapidly in moist greenery; flares illuminate very little; and dense 
foliage deadens radio communications. 

Winners and losers are hard to predict when combat takes place in forests. Publius 
Quintilius Varus lost three well-armed, well-trained Roman legions when beset by teutonic 
barbarians near what now is Munster during the battle of Teutoburgerwald in 9 A.D. He and 
his senior henchmen committed suicide to avoid capture after that defeat, while survivors 
were crucified, buried alive, or sacrificed to pagan gods. Caesar Augustus shaped the political 



LAY OF THE LAND 41 



outline of Europe in many respects when, as a result, he abandoned plans to colonize lands 
that have become Germany. 26 Forest campaigns ever since have often been costly to 
belligerents on both sides. Wilderness (U.S. Civil War, May 1864), Belleau Wood and 
Argonne Forest (World War I), Guadalcanal, Burma, and New Guinea (World War II), 
Vietnam, and Laos typify a few among many unhappy experiences that involved the United 
States. 

Scantily Clad Landscapes. Brush, high grass, tall crops typified by sorghum and corn 
(maize), orchards, and widely spaced plantation trees do little to limit aerial or spaceborne 
sensors and weapon systems. Such vegetation hinders vehicular movement very little, but it 
slows foot soldiers, reduces their visibility, and restricts fields of fire for land-based line-of- 
sight weapons. Wire-guided missiles that require clear ground between gunners and targets 
are useless in thickets and other entanglements. Dense herbage deflects thermal radiation 
caused by nuclear blasts, yet amplifies the persistence of chemical warfare agents. Immense 
steppes sparingly carpeted with short grass and deserts devoid of vegetation afford little cover 
or concealment for armed forces or military installations, but favor long-range observation 
and clear fields of fire. Air superiority and technological prowess count a lot under those 
conditions, as Iraq's President Saddam Hussein discovered during Operation Desert Storm 
(1991), which took place on the geographic equivalent of a sand-colored pool table. His 
army, which was tactically and technologically deficient, lacked an air umbrella. Allied 
forces, aided by satellite intelligence, thus were able to bombard and maneuver at will while 
Iraqi formations risked destruction whether they moved or stayed still. One U.S. Marine 
Corps pilot quipped, "It was like being in the Super Bowl, but the other team didn't show 
up." 27 

MILITARY MODIFICATIONS 

Military men have long sought to modify vegetative cover whenever it interferes with 
observation, fire lanes, cross-country trafficability, or affords adversaries convenient ambush 
sites. Roman legionaires in hostile territory often stripped brush and trees 'a bow-shot 
distance on both sides of dangerous roads. Clearing processes eliminate offensive verdure, 
while grubbing removes roots and stumps. Techniques employed depend on the type and 
thickness of vegetation, the acreage involved, perceived urgency, troops on hand, and 
available implements that range from heavy engineer equipment to hand tools. 

Land Clearing. Bulldozers, which are used for most large-scale land clearing operations, 
can upend small trees and stumps up to 6 inches in diameter (15 centimeters), tree dozers 
(commonly called "Rome plows") shear off somewhat larger trunks at ground level, leaving 
chain saws to fell timber of almost unlimited diameters and cut forest giants into manageable 
segments. Tractor-mounted units pull stumps; rippers reduce root systems; and graders 
windrow debris for disposal. Carefully controlled brush fires sometimes assist. Explosives 
occasionally may prove indispensable, but it takes additional time and energy to fill resultant 
craters. 28 

U.S. Army engineers in Vietnam used 30 bulldozers and Rome plows per team to remove 
dense vegetation around base camp perimeters, enemy infiltration routes, and potential 
ambush sites. Each team could create a helicopter landing zone in a matter of minutes or 
clear 1 50 to 250 forested acres a day on reasonably level terrain, although rough ground and 
thick secondary growth reduced output by half. Amphibious tree crushers, which weighed 



42 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



in at 97 tons, could churn through bogs and hack out wide swaths on dry land at a steady 3 
miles (4 kilometers) an hour, but welders and radiator repairmen had to work round-the- 
clock on all vehicles to patch up punctured cooling systems and replace hydraulic lines that 
heavy brush ripped off. 29 

Defoliation. The U.S. Air Force, with permission from the Republic of Vietnam, began 
to spray chemical defoliants over the Cau Mau Peninsula in the Mekong Delta during 1 962. 
That practice spread to the Rung Sat Special Zone, a mangrove swamp along shipping 
channels into Saigon, then countrywide, including the southern half of the demilitarized 
zone. Herbicides thus deposited produced desired results, but accompanying ecological and 
health problems sparked controversies that remained unresolved decades after the last load 
was released. 30 



KEY POINTS 

High ground, level land, valleys, and depressions each influence armies and air forces 
in unique ways. 

The proficiency with which ground forces can negotiate steep terrain depends on 
professional skills, types of transportation, and loads. 

Rugged topography drastically reduces observation, the value of flat-trajectory weapons, 
and line-of-sight communication systems performance. 

Ground forces find dominant terrain advantageous despite the proliferation of high- 
technology sensors and weapon systems. 

Combat assaults across broad streams in hostile territory demand suitable sites, plus 
special tactics, techniques, equipment, and training. 

Surface materials strongly influence the lethality of nuclear as well as conventional 
explosives, cross-country movement by motor vehicles, and military construction 
capabilities. 

Dense vegetation benefits defensive operations, whereas sparsely covered, level terrain 
favors offensive maneuvers. 

Armed forces in the field must be able to tap, purify, store, and distribute water supplies 
in adequate quantities for assorted purposes even in arid climes. 



NOTES 

1 . Norman A. E. Hinds, Ceomorphology: The Evolution of the Landscape (New York: Prentice- 
Hall, 1 943); Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography, 2 d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1 963), 
part 4, Land Forms. 

2. R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3,500 
B.C. to the Present, 4 th ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1 993), a monumental work of 1 ,654 pages. 

3. Ibid., 1203; Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, Army 
Historical Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1 968), chapter 
VII, "Operation Zitadelle." 

4. Henry L. Shaw, Jr., et at., Central Pacific Drive, History of Marine Corps Operations in World 
War II, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, 1966) (see page 680 for 
pertinent pages); George W. Garand and Thurman R. Strobridge, vol. 4, Western Pacific 
Opera tions, 1971 (see page 843 for pertinent pages); Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last 



LAY OF THE LAND 43 



Battle, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 
1 984) (see page 51 5 for pertinent pages). 

5. Earl F. Ziemke, "Yugoslavia 1941-1944," in Challenge and Response in International 
Conflict, eds. Doris M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al., vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Center for 
Research in Social Systems, American University, March 1967), 321-351; Antiguerrilla Operations 
in the Balkans (1941-1944), DA Pamphlet 20-243 (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, August 
1954). 

6. Dan Kurtzman, Blood and Water: Sabotaging Hitler's Bomb (New York: Henry Holt, 1 997). 

7. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, The Charge of the Light Brigade, 1 854, Stanza 3. For elaboration, 
read Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1 954), especially 1 97-249. 

8. Carl von Clausewitz addressed the military significance of river lines early in the 19 th 
century. See On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 433-446, 532-534. 

9. Leon Bertin, Larousse Encyclopedia of the Earth, 2 cl ed. (New York: Prometheus Press, 1 965), 
68-91; Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography, chapter 23. 

1 0. Edward G. Miller, A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hurtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams 
(Texas Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1995); Martin Blumenson, "The Rangers at Hwachon Dam," 
Army, no. 3 (December 1967): 36-53. See also, "Look for Safer Crossing Places," Army Digest 25 
(March 1970): 1. 

11. For overviews, refer to Field Manual 90-1 3/Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-26: River Crossing 
Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army and Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, September 
30, 1992), especially chapters 2 and 7; FM 5-36: Route Reconnaissance and Classification 
(Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, March 1988), 2-36 through 2-47; Charles Huie, "Soviet Army 
Bids for River Crossing Mobility/' Army 1 8 (December 1 968): 41 -44 

12. DA Pamphlet 20-290: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign (Washington, DC: Dept. of 
the Army, July 1951, 16-27. 

13. FM 30-1 0: Terrain Analysis (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, March 27, 1 972, 1 27-1 30 
(superseded by FM 5-33, same title, July 1 990, but contains more detailed information about water 
supplies). 

1 4. Arthur P. Clark et al., ed., ARAMCO and Its World: Arabia and the Middle-fast, rev. ed. 
(Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabian Oil Co. ,1995), 166; Abdulaziz Al-Sweel, ed., Saudi Arabia: 
A Kingdom in Transition (Washington, DC: Saudi Arabian Cultural Ministry to the United States, 
1995). 

15. Mark Sullivan, specialist in Latin American Affairs, interview by author, Congressional 
Research Service, March 21, 1996, Washington, DC; correspondence from Plans Division, U.S. 
Marine Corps, March 29, 1 996. 

1 6. FM 5-484: Navy Facilities Engineering Command Pamphlet P-1065, and Air Force Manual 
32-1 072: Multiservice Procedures for Well-Drilling Operations (Washington, DC: Depts. of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force, March 8, 1 994). 

1 7. Conversations with Army chemical warfare specialists in February 1 996. 

1 8. FM 30-1 0: Terrain Analysis, 82-83, 1 45; FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis (Washington, DC: Dept. 
of the Army, July 1 990), 1 -4 and 1 -5. 

1 9. Technical Manual 5-545: Geology (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, July 1 971 ), chapter 
2; Chester R. Longwell, Adolph Knopf, and Richard F. Flint, Outlines of Physical Geology, 2 d ed. 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1 946), 24-42. 

20. Daniel O. Graham, Jr., "Soils and Slopes," Armor (September-October 1 977): 41-44; FM 
30-1 0: Terrain Analysis, 80-82,1 42-1 47. 

21 . John Bagot Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion (London, Hoddler and Stoughton, 1 952), 
106-109. 



44 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



22. Samuel Glasstone, ed., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, DA Pamphlet 39-3 (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, February 1964), 267-27, 289-296, 300-301; FM 30-10: Terrain 
Analysis, 82-83. 

23. Working papers, Combat Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), 1 968; James A. Wilson, Jr., 
"The Fourth Dimension of Terrain," Military Review 26, no. 6 (September 1946): 52-53; Glenn R. 
Locke, "Dust," U.S. Army Aviation Digest (August 1970): 34-35. 

24. Laterite and Its Engineering Properties: A Geology/Soils Survey, Combat Intelligence Center 
Vietnam, March 1 0, 1 967, 1,3, 5,7. 

25. Peter Farb, The Forest, rev. ed. (New York: Time-Life Books, 1969), 57-80, and A. Starker 
Leopold, In the Desert of the Earth (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Janonovich, 1961), 9-15, 53-67. 

26. J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 1 (New York: Funk and Wagnals, 
1955), chapters. 

27. Williamson Murray, Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 2, Operations and Effects and 
Effectiveness (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993); Frank N. Schubert and Theresa 
L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995). 
The quotation is from "Stray Voltage," Armed Forces Journal (March 1 991): 58. 

28. FM 5-430-00.1 /Air Force Joint Pamphlet 32-801 3, vol. 1 : Planning and Design of Roads, 
Airfields, and Heliports in the Theater of Operations Road Design (Washington, DC: Dept. of the 
Army and Dept. of the Air Force, August 26, 1 994), chapter 4. 

29. Robert R. Ploger, " 'Different' War Same Old Ingenuity," Army 1 8, no. 9 (September 1 968): 
71-72; Joseph M. Kiernan, "Combat Engineers in the Iron Triangle," Army 1 7, no. 6 (June 1 967): 42- 
45; Richard Duke, "Rooting Out Charlie," Army Digest (November 1 967): 56; "Tree Eater Tested in 
Vietnam," Army Digest (December 1 967): 1 4. 

30. Arthur F. McConnell, Jr., "Mission: Ranch Hand," Air University Review 21 , no. 2 (January- 
February 1970): 89-94; Veterans and Agent Orange: Health Effects of Herbicides Used in Vietnam, 
Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Science (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 
1 994); "Agent Orange Linked to Diabetes," Army Times, May 1 9, 1 997, 2. 



LAY OF THE LAND 45 



OCEANS AND SEASHORES 

i&&S^^ 



Our planet has the wrong name. Our ancestors named it Earth, after the land they found all 
around them. . . . If the ancients had known what the earth is really like they undoubtedly 
would have named it Ocean after the tremendous areas of water that cover 70.8 percent of 
its surface. 

Leonard Engel 
The Sea 



GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, SPEAKING AS CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY IN 1943, REVEALED, "MY MILITARY 

education and experience in the First World War [was] based on roads, rivers, and railroads. 
During the past two years, however, I have been acquiring an education based on oceans 
and I've had to learn all over again/' 1 That made him a member of a very large club whose 
membership has not diminished. 

Oceanography emerged as a distinctive field of military study in 1 855, when U.S. Navy 
Lieutenant Matthew F. Maury published the first treatise on that subject, The Physical 
Geography of the Sea. 2 Findings since then have affected every naval activity from ship 
design to employment practices above, below, and on open waters of the Atlantic, Pacific, 
Indian, Arctic, and Antarctic Oceans, as well as along their littorals. 

SEA WATER ATTRIBUTES 

Water is one of the few substances on Earth that exists in solid, vaporous, and fluid forms, 
although most remains liquid. Four basic attributes of sea water are militarily important: 
salinity, density, stratification from surface to sea bottom, and permeability to light and sound 
All four are interconnected. 3 

SALINITY 

Sea water, best described as brine, is not uniformly salty. The proportion of sodium chloride 
and other chemicals in solution determines salinity which, as a rule, is highest in the Horse 
Latitudes, which straddle 30 degrees north and 30 degrees south where dry winds encourage 
evaporation; less in the Doldrums astride Earth's Equator, where rainfall is abundant; and 
least near both poles, where melting glaciers and pack ice provide a stream of fresh water. 
Large river systems like the Amazon, Congo, and Mississippi also dilute the salt contents far 
offshore. Air temperatures and terrestrial streams condition the salinity of relatively small 






inland seas that directly or indirectly connect with oceans, as exemplified by the cool Baltic 
Sea (especially the Gulf of Bothnia near Finland), which is abnormally fresh, while the Red 
Sea in a torrid zone is exceptionally salty. Few major rivers feed the brackish Mediterranean, 
whereas the Danube, Dneister, Dneiper, and Don empty into the Black Sea. 

DENSITY 

High salinity increases the density (weight and mass) of sea water. So do water temperatures 
down to the freezing point, which approximates 28.5 F (-2 C). Surface temperatures, which 
average about 80 F (26.7 C) near the Equator, generally decrease 0.5 F with every degree 
of latitude north or south, but many anomalies obtain. Thermometers dipped in the Persian 
Gulf, for example, commonly register as much as 85 F (29 C), somewhat warmer than open 
waters around Diego Garcia 2,000 miles to the south. Pressures, which also contribute to 
water density, increase about 2 pounds per square foot for every 100 feet (30 meters) of 
descent until the weight of waters above exerts an astonishing 1 5 tons per square inch in the 
abyss. 

STRATIFICATION 

A much simplified representation of sea water reveals three remarkably different horizontal 
laminations between the ocean surface and the floor. Layer One, a watery mix well stirred 
by wind and waves, covers the top few hundred feet in temperate climes up to 50 degrees 
north and 50 degrees south latitude, although a thinner cover of warm, light water prevails 
in the tropics. Temperatures and salinity plummet in Layer Two, a thermocline where 
densities increase correspondingly until they stabilize at a depth of 5,000 to 6,000 feet (2,000 
or so meters). The coldest, saltiest, and therefore the heaviest waters little influenced by 
seasonal change lie in Layer Three below, because the intervening thermocline acts as a 
barrier between top and bottom. A modified pattern exists near both poles, where cold water 
and low salinity dominate on the surface as well as the seabed and the absence of a 
permanent thermocline allows upwelling from ocean depths, as figure 7 indicates. 

PERMEABILITY 

Few electromagnetic emanations can penetrate sea water at great depths. Extremely low 
frequency (ELF) radios, the principal exception, take 1 5 minutes or more to transmit a three- 
letter message, which means that some other mode must be found to keep submarine crews 
abreast of football, baseball, and basketball scores. The limit of visible light is slightly more 
than 600 feet (200 meters) under ideal conditions, but plankton, organic debris, silt, and 
other suspended materials commonly reduce illumination to 50 feet (1 5 meters) or less along 
coastlines. Radar, infrared, and most radio signals rebound from the surface. 

Sounds, in sharp contrast, may transmit thousands of miles under water, but directions 
and intensities depend on available power, geographic locations, seasonal variations, and 
time of day. Inorganic particles, schools of fish, gas bubbles, ship traffic, and offshore drilling 
scatter or absorb signals. Sounds that travel swiftly along any given duct may bounce about 
when they try to cross boundaries between the three horizontal sea water layers or penetrate 
upwelling water columns and may bend or refract as much as 15 degrees toward more 
favorable channels. Shadow zones that exclude sounds and convergence zones where 
amplifications occur further complicate sound propagation. 4 



48 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Figure 7. Sea Wafer Stratification 



Greenland 

North 
6 
Surface 



i 
Layer o| 



Antarctica 



Layfer One 



Layer Two 
Main Thermocline 



Layer Three 
Cold and Dense 




Not to Scale 



SEA SURFACE BEHAVIOR 

The uppermost layer of sea water is eternally dynamic in response to Earth's rotation, the pull 
of sun and moon, winds, water densities, temperatures, seismic activities, and geomagnetic 
influences. Currents, tides, waves, swell, and sea ice are manifestations of intense interest 
to military mariners and civilian policymakers who plan, prepare for, conduct, or depend 
upon naval operations. 5 

CURRENTS 

Ocean currents, unlike waves and tides, transfer sea water long distances in endless 
redistribution cycles. Together with prevailing winds, they carried Christopher Columbus and 
his flagship the Santa Maria across the Atlantic from Europe to the New World in 1 492 and 
took Thor Heyerdahl and the Kon-Tiki on a grand ride from Peru to the South Pacific 
archipelago of Tuamotu in 1947. Most naval operations have taken place in the Northern 
Hemisphere since Greece defeated a Persian fleet at Salamis during the Pelopponesian War 
in 480 B.C, fa but currents south of the Equator may become militarily important when least 
expected. 

Temperature differentials set up primary circulation patterns with light, warm waters near 
the surface floating poleward in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, while cold, salty 
waters head toward the Equator through the abyss. The direction of movement, or "set," is 
the course currents steer, whereas current velocities constitute "drift." Prevailing winds, 
which push surface water before them, start to shape a circular pattern. Earth's rotation 
deflects currents clockwise north of the Equator and counterclockwise to the south, with three 
prominent exceptions: Equatorial currents set almost due west; an underlying countercurrent 



OCEANS AND SEASHORES 



49 



sets in the opposite direction; and the Antarctic Circumpolar Current takes an easterly course 
around the globe unobstructed by any large land masses (map 8). 

Relatively fast, narrow currents parallel the western rim of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian 
Oceans, whereas counterparts off east coasts are comparatively wide, shallow, and slow. The 
Gulf Stream, which is 50 miles wide (80 kilometers) and 1,500 feet deep (457 meters) near 
Miami, FL, drifts northward at 3 to 4 nautical miles an hour. The North Atlantic Drift, a 
prolongation of the Gulf Stream, spreads abnormally warm water north of the Arctic Circle 
past Spitzbergen and the ice-free Russian port of Murmansk until it touches Novaya Zemlya 
in much diluted form. Solid coastlines prevent any drift on such a scale in the North Pacific, 
but the cold Kamchatka Current, like the Labrador and Greenland Currents which also 
originate in polar regions, creates billowing fog banks on its way south when it collides with 
warm water headed north. 

TIDES 

Tides rock the oceans daily, about 12.5 hours apart, in response to gravitational tugs 
primarily by the moon. Spring tides about 20 percent greater than average arise twice a 
month when the sun reinforces lunar pull at the time of new and full moons and the Earth, 
moon, and sun are directly in line. Neap tides about 20 percent below average occur when 
the sun offsets the moon's pull at the time of lunar first and third quarters and the sun and 
moon are at right angles (figure 8 ). 

Elaborate tables forecast daily tides for principal ports, beaches, and many lesser locales. 
Calculations are complex, because high and low waters everywhere arrive about 50 minutes 
later each day, while high and low water readings persist longer than rise and fall. 
Successive tides for specific spots north and south of the Equator are unequal, although 
alternate levels are identical. That phenomenon, oddly enough, disappears twice a month 
when the moon passes over the Equator. Tides register 1 5 to 20 percent higher than normal 
once a month when lunar orbits bring the moon closest to Earth (at perigee) and about 20 
percent below normal once a month when the moon is farthest away (at apogee). Extreme 
heights occur when perigee and spring tides coincide. Tidal ranges also differ from place 
to place. The rise and fall of a foot or less is common along some straight line or sheltered 
coasts, but 50 feet (15 meters) have been recorded in New Brunswick's Bay of Fundy, a 
funnel-shaped basin that confines incoming slosh and rockets a 4-foot wall of water up 
narrow inlets at 1 to 1 5 miles an hour (1 6 to 24 kilometers per hour). 

WAVES 

Waves, unlike currents and tides, are whipped up entirely by winds. When winds abate, 
long, low, parallel waves called swell continue indefinitely, but transfer very little water from 
one place to another (figure 9 shows a bobbing cork that ascends each approaching wave, 
then slides down the reverse slope without moving far from its point of origin.) The vertical 
distance between the crest and trough determines wave height, the distance between 
successive peaks or depressions determines wave length, the speed at which each wave 
advances determines its velocity expressed in feet per second or nautical miles per hour, and 
the time it takes one crest to succeed another determines the wave period. Wave trains 
occasionally appear as parallel crests and troughs, but those driven by stiff breezes often 



50 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 8. Ocean Currents 




OCEANS AND SEASHORES 



51 



Figure 8. Lunar and Solar Influences on Tides 




Sun, moon and Earth 
form a right angle. 
Neap tides result. 



Sun, moon and Earth 
are in line. 
Spring tides result. 



Adapted from Leonard Engel, The Sea. 

overtake, pass, or overwhelm each other to form a choppy sea checkered with foam (table 
4 connects wind velocities with sea states). Waves grow largest in deep water when lashed 
by strong steady winds over long distances a "fetch" of 500 to 1,000 miles (800 to 1,600 
kilometers) or more. Those generated in large bays never exceed a few feet no matter how 
hard the wind blows, whereas hurricanes and typhoons over open oceans develop 
superwaves that routinely top 50 feet (1 5 meters). A watch officer on the U.S. Navy tanker 
Ramapo en route from Manila to San Diego on February 7, 1 933, reportedly saw a great sea 
rising astern "at a level above the mainmast crow's nest/' and calculated its height at a record 
112 feet (34 meters). 7 

Ocean waves and swell begin to slow when they reach shallow water that is about half 
as deep as the distance between crests (figure 1 0). Bottom drag then reduces spacing between 
waves, which rapidly increase in height and steepness until crests roll forward as breakers 
that pound cliffs or wash sheets of brine over flat shores where some seeps in while the rest 
pours back. Longshore currents slip sideways when waves strike coasts at sharp angles. 

ICEBERGS AND FLOES 

Icebergs can cripple or sink surface ships and submarines whose skippers are unwary, as 
passengers and crew of the Titanic discovered on a clear, calm night in April 1 91 2, when that 
"unsinkable" luxury liner took a one-way trip to Davy Jones' locker. Glacial tongues of 



52 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Figure 9. Ocean Wave Motions and Measurements 





Still-wate_r_Level 
Trough 








Crest 



Trough 





Direction of Wave Travel 




Adapted from Leonard Engel, The Sea. 



Figure 1 0. Conditions Conducive to Surf 



Beach 



Land 



Plan view of wave crests 



Wave height increasing; 

, ,ii 

length decreasing. 



Continental Shelf 



Wave length 
in deep water 

L 




OCEANS AND SEASHORES 



53 



Table 4. Beaufort Wind Scale Related to Sea States 



Beaufort 
Number 


H//nd 
Type 


Wind 
Speed 
(knots) 


Sea 
Surface 


Wave 
Height 

(feet) 


Sea 
State 





Calm 


<1 


Mirrorlike 





1 


1 


Light Airs 


1-3 


Ripples 


<1 


1 


2 


Light Breeze 


4-6 


Wavelets 


1-2 


1 


3 


Gentle Breeze 


7-10 


Scattered Whitecaps 


2-3 


2 


4 


Moderate Breeze 


11-16 


Many Whitecaps 


4.5 


3 


5 


Fresh Breeze 


17-21 


Moderate Waves 


6 


4 


6 


Strong Breeze 


22-27 


Large Waves Develop 


12 


5 


7 


Moderate Gale 


28-33 


White Foam Begins 


16 


6 


8 


Fresh Gale 


34-40 


Foam Streaks 


24 


6 


9 


Strong Gale 


41-47 


Seas Roll 


30 


6 


10 


Whole Gale 


48-55 


Heavy Seas, Hanging 
Crests 


40 


7 


11 


Storm 


56-64 


Medium Ships Lost 
Behind Huge Waves 


50 


8 


12 


Hurricane 


>64 


Great Danger 


>50 


8 



Greenland's gigantic ice cap are the source of most icebergs in the North Atlantic. Huge 
blocks with sharp peaks and jagged bellies break off in springtime, a process called "calving," 
then drift southward with ocean currents. Icebergs float, because ice is less dense than sea 
water, but about nine-tenths of their mass are concealed. Many tower 250 feet (76 meters) 
or more above the surface and spread a quarter of a mile (400 meters) or so below. Titanic's 
catastrophe occurred at 41 46' North Latitude, on a line with Madrid, Spain, although most 
icebergs in the Atlantic melt before they float that far south. Fewer bergs appear in the North 
Pacific, because "breeding" grounds are restricted, but those that break off the Antarctic ice 
shelf are immense, numerous, and drift farther toward the Equator than those from 
Greenland. Associated hazards, however, are less owing to lighter seagoing traffic. 

Pack ice, which perennially covers most of the Arctic Ocean, produces flat-topped, steep- 
sided, tabular floes of which all proceed independently before dominant winds with narrow 



54 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



strips of water known as 'leads" in between. Some such floes are sufficiently large and 
smooth enough to accommodate medium-range cargo aircraft equipped with skis while 
others, buckled together by vagrant winds, feature rough surfaces that impede foot travel. 
Truckers at Thule Air Base, Greenland regularly drive across North Star Bay from late autumn 
until late spring on sea ice, which freezes 5 to 10 feet thick (2 to 3 meters) and thaws 
annually on the fringe of the permanent ice pack. Most floes that separate from Antarctic ice 
shelves in summer are much larger than any counterparts in the Northern Hemisphere; many 
are miles wide and 2,000 feet (600 meters) or so thick, with spectacular cliffs that tower 200 
to 300 feet (60 to 90 meters) above the water. 

MARINE TOPOGRAPHY 

Marine topography above and below any ocean includes continental shelves, continental 
slopes, islands, and the abyss. Amphibious forces are essentially concerned with littorals, 
especially beaches, their seaward approaches, and straits, whereas "blue water" sailors factor 
in mountain ranges, troughs, and plains concealed under the seas. 8 

BEACHES AMD APPROACHES 

Beaches, which start at the shoreline and extend inland to the first marked change in 
topography, come in all sizes, shapes, colors, and descriptions. Those found along low-lying 
coasts generally are wide, long, and continuous, while others are interrupted by headlands, 
are confined to tiny strips by towering cliffs, or are displaced completely where mountains 
meet the sea. Vacationers prefer broad expanses of soft, white sand, but beaches are black 
on infamous Iwo jima and some places along the Kona coast of Hawaii. Narrow strands at 
Nice, France, and other ritzy resorts on the Cote d'Azur are strewn with pebbles, 
cobblestones, and boulders. Mud deposits are by no means unusual. 

Militarily useful beach studies address offshore conditions and exits inland, with particular 
attention to water depths, bottom gradients, obstructions, tides, currents, surf, and dominant 
terrain ashore (figure 1 1). Lengths must be adequate for amphibious forces of appropriate 
size, normally a battalion landing team, although tactical situations may demand larger or 
smaller formations. Task force commanders regularly subdivide very long beaches into 
segments code-named, for example, Red, White, and Blue, even Red 1, Red 2, Red 3 if 
necessary. Widths should afford ample room for essential command/control and logistical 
shore parties on dry ground above the high water mark. Beyond that, beaches ideally display 
the following characteristics: 

Water offshore is deep enough for transport ships to operate as near the beach as 
tactical situations prudently allow. 

Final approaches are free of sandbars, banks, shoals, reefs, offshore islands, rocky 
outcroppings, and other obstacles.. 

Channel configurations discourage mining. 

Beach gradients allow amphibious landing ships and craft to discharge troops and 
loads on dry ground near the high water mark. 

The sea bottom and beach both are firm enough to support wheeled and tracked 
vehicles where dry landings are infeasible. 



OCEANS AND SEASHORES 55 



Adequate landing zones are available ashore for helicopters. 

Defenders lack dominating terrain that overlooks landing beaches. 

Multiple exits of ample capacity lead from the beach to initial military objectives 
inland. 



Figure 1 1 . A Typical Beach Profile 



Sea Apprc 
Offshore -* 






9 Coastal 




E 


each width a 




terrain 
exits 

^nes^ 
. J'lilT- 

ctreme limit 
storm wave 
action 
frequently 
reached) 

an low water, 
The word 
lie datums. 






.c 
"35 

P" 
1 


1 

High-water ! 
shoreline 


Zone of 
normal 
wave wash 
above 
water level 
(variable) 


Beach width at high water 
(minimum), (normally dry) 

Berm Crest 
/ yBerm 


/^ ^*ri 


\ 

Limit of normal wave action of 
(high water) 

ach gradient 
H.W. zone (influenced 
ally by wave action) 

jsually based on mean values, such as me 
3an sea level, mean low water springs, etc. 
s a general reference to various hydrograp 


mSm 






^tpw w^fef^itum) 1 eve 1 ~ ~ : B. rS '(Low ti <$& 


p^ ^ 


Z : :-:-::-<:'.-$:+ 

. . : ; ' ;; '; 

> 


^$^^ " Low-water to in 
;^tm>m**is*r \ high-water gr 
r : x^x>iii* "^ l " \ beach gradient 
>-*^ Average nearshore 
\ bottom slope 
Vprx. 30 ft. or 10m depth SHSSS 
datum used in this figure 



Seaward approaches generally are gentle wherever shores are sandy and flat, whereas 
rocky coastlines tend to drop off more sharply. Beaches backed by high ground almost 
always abut deep water, but those at the base of cliffs habitually are littered with boulders 
visible only at low tide, if at all. Trucks fight for traction in dry, shifting sands on level shores; 
pebble and cobblestone beaches bear heavy loads, but roll so freely that tanks and other 
tracked vehicles slide; mud beaches often seem bottomless. Damp sand, in contrast, provides 
the best surface for amphibious operations. Dunes formed from fine to medium-sized wind- 
blown sand rarely rise more than 20 to 1 00 feet (5 to 30 meters) above high water, although 
some measure three times that high. Those that are even partly covered with vegetation are 
relatively firm and therefore traffickable. So are low ridges that storms create when they wash 
debris and driftwood ashore. Broad coastal plains behind beaches afford ample maneuver 
room and alternative avenues inland, provided the footing is solid, but boundaries that troops 
on the ground can easily find are hard to draw. Featureless terrain also affords few prominent 
registration points for artillery or naval gunfire, and flanks remain open. Rough topography 
alleviates some of those problems, but may restrict access to the hinterland. 9 

On-the-spot reconnaissance, which calls for clandestine infiltration and exfiltration 
capabilities along with a lengthy list of specialized skills, 10 is performed whenever possible 
to ascertain precise characteristics of beaches, approaches, and exits before amphibious 
commanders approve landing plans. Superbly trained Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams equipped 



56 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



with state-of-the-art technologies most often implement such missions for the U.S. 
Department of Defense. Enemy armed forces are not their only adversaries dense sea weed, 
sharks, barracudas, venomous sea snakes, and various fish with poisonous spines await the 
unwary under water. 11 

STRAITS AND OTHER NAVAL MARROWS 

Control over key straits and other natural or manmade narrows has been a basic military 
objective since naval warfare came into vogue well over two millennia ago, because 
unfriendly armed forces on one or both sides of any naval choke point may try to deny free 
passage to opponents. 12 Several such bottlenecks have made bold headlines in the 20th 
century (map 9). The Panama and Suez Canals, Gibraltar, the Red Sea's southern gate at 
Bab-el-Mandeb, the strait that separates Taiwan from mainland China, and the Strait of 
Hormuz astride sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to and from Persian Gulf oil producers 
are among those that have been (or still are) bones of contention. 

The British Commonwealth expended 250,000 men in unsuccessful attempts to wrest the 
Dardanelles from the Ottoman Empire during World War I; Turkish casualties were 
comparable. 13 Chechen separatists seized a ferry in the Black Sea eighty years later and 
threatened to blow it up in the Bosporus if Russian President Boris Yeltsin refused to lift a 
siege in their homeland. 14 Inspiration for that audacious act may have come from former 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who ordered subordinates to load ships with 
cement, then sink them in the Suez Canal during the 1 967 Arab-Israeli war. Results from his 
standpoint were rewarding: the main channel remained closed until 1975. 15 

Choke points identified on map 9 helped shape U.S. and Soviet military strategy 
throughout the Cold War. Hunts for lone Red Octobers' 6 were commonplace until the Soviet 
Union armed its strategic nuclear submarines with long-range ballistic missiles that could 
attack targets from sanctuaries close to Russian coasts. Those in the Northern Fleet took cover 
in the Barents Sea beyond the Greenland-Iceland-Norway (C-I-N) Gaps. Counterparts with 
the Soviet Pacific Fleet hid in the Okhotsk bastion. Advantages, however, were by no means 
one sided. Soviet attack submarines and surface ships could not reach the Atlantic Ocean en 
masse without a fight, because NATO navies and shore-based aircraft blocked the G-I-N 
Gaps. Soviet Baltic and Black Sea Fleets were respectively bottled up by the Danish and 
Turkish Straits, which remained in NATO's hands. Occupants of the Kremlin consistently 
sought (but never were able) to neutralize Japan, use adjacent straits to reach open water, and 
close them to the U.S. Navy, which would have frustrated emergency efforts to reinforce and 
resupply U.N. forces in the Republic of Korea. 17 

CONTINENTAL SHELVES AMD SLOPES 

Continental shelves lie between low tide and depths of 500 to 600 feet (85 to 1 00 fathoms). 
They include shallow embayments and inland seas such as the Gulf of Mexico, Hudson Bay, 
the Yellow Sea, Black Sea, and the Baltic. Regions rich in food fish, oil, and mineral deposits 
stimulate intense economic competition, often with military overtones, because some 
countries press extravagant territorial claims up to 200 miles (325 kilometers) that 
international conventions have not yet negated. 



OCEANS AND SEASHORES 57 



Map 9. Crucial Naval Choke Points During the Cold War 




58 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Shelf widths range from 800 miles (1,300 kilometers) under arctic ice north of Siberia to 
narrow (even nonexistent) strips where rough terrain crowds the coast or swift currents keep 
sheves from forming. Most shelves are undulating plains, but low spots and protuberances 
are common. The Aleutian Islands festoon across the North Pacific for 1,000 miles (1,600 
kilometers), while the Indonesian Archipelago stretches more than twice that far. Fringing 
reefs, which are coral formations attached to shore, often form in tropical climes. Like barrier 
reefs farther out on the shelf, they are partly submerged, parallel to the coast, and frequently 
block easy access from high seas to the beach, even for flat-bottomed boats. Continental 
slopes 10 to 20 miles wide (1 6-32 kilometers) begin where shelves leave off, then plunge at 
sharp angles until they reach the bottom which is miles below sea level in some locales. The 
most spectacular dropoff on Earth is located along the coast of Chile, where more than 8 
vertical miles (1 3 kilometers) separate the Andean peak of Cerro Aconcaqua from the deepest 
spot in the Peru-Chile Trench fewer than 250 horizontal miles (400 kilometers) away. 
Undersea avalanches of stone and soupy silt occasionally race at express train speed down 
submerged gorges and canyons that characteristically cut into continental slopes. 18 

THE ABYSS AMD ABOVE 

Cold, dark abyssal plains covered with a thick carpet of sediments under tremendous pressure 
lie 1 5,000 to 20,000 feet (4,570-6,095 meters) below sea level. Not all of the ocean floor, 
however, is level. Challenger Deep, south of Guam, the most awesome of many trenches, 
could swallow Mount Everest without a trace. The world's longest mountain chain, known 
as the Mid-Ocean Ridge, winds through the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans for 40,000 
miles (64,375 kilometers) at elevations that average 5,000 to 6,000 feet (1,525-18,285 
meters). Those eminances break the surface only in Iceland, but volcanic seamounts project 
above water in Hawaii, the Azores, and 10,000 other places large and small. Low-lying 
atolls that feature coral reefs around quiet lagoons are widely distributed in warm Pacific 
waters. Breaks in such reefs afford the only convenient avenues of arrival and departure 
when flats are exposed at low tide. 

REPRESENTATIVE NAVAL RAMIFICATIONS 

The oceans, their contents, underwater topography, and shorelines shape naval plans, 
programs, and operations on, above, and below the surface along the littoral as well as on 
high seas. This synopsis singles out three ramifications: ship designs; amphibious landings; 
submarine and antisubmarine warfare. 

SURFACE SHI? AMD SUBMARINE DESIGNS 

Flotation, buoyancy, stability, and speed were essential properties of every man-of-war in 
olden times and will remain so eternally. Seaworthiness in the presence of ocean waves, 
swell, and buffeting winds was relatively easy to attain when wooden warships were 
fashionable, but design problems have multiplied and magnified manyfold since the first two 
steam-driven ironclads, the Federal ship USS Monitor and the Confederate ship CSS Virginia 
(originally christened the Merrimac) did battle inconclusively on March 9, 1862, in 
Chesapeake Bay. 19 



K^-^ttm : am : m : ttffi^ 



OCEANS AND SEASHORES 59 



Hull dimensions, shapes, volumes, weights, and centers of gravity must be in proper 
proportion; performance suffers if even one of those factors is out of kilter. Surface ships float 
only if the submerged hull displaces a weight of water equal to the vessel's total weight, 
including crew, weapons, munitions, water, fuel, and other stores. Plimsoll lines drawn on 
cargo ships at the maximum allowable draft indicate whether they are safely loaded in tepid 
sea water of average salinity. Subsidiary marks account for difference in water densities, 
because ships ride higher or lower regardless of load when water temperatures and salt 
contents change (figure 1 2). 



Figure 12. Plimsoll Line Markings 



Deck Line 
TF 



Summer 
Freeboard 




W 



WNA 



TF - Tropical fresh water 

F - Fresh water 

T - Tropical sea water 

S - Summer, sea water 
W - Winter, sea water 

WNA - Winter, North Atlantic, for 

vessels under 330 ft. in length 

LR - These letters indicate the 

registration society, in this case 
Lloyd's Register 



Ships underway tip up, down, and sideways around the center of flotation, which seldom 
coincides with centers of gravity or buoyancy. Stable hull shapes thus are the Holy Grail of 
every naval architect, because waves and winds not only make warships surge, sway, heave, 
roll, pitch, and yaw in heavy seas (figure 13), but introduce great structural stress. Ice that 
forms on upper decks during freezing weather also degrades stability to such an extent that 
poorly designed ships respond sluggishly, founder, or sink. 

Surface ships must be sturdy enough to withstand slamming when flat-plated bows meet 
huge waves at acute angles. Forward momentum stops momentarily, the ship shudders, and 
vibrations from stem to stern adversely affect weapons systems. So do extreme rolling and 
pitching. Walls of water can damage deck-mounted equipment, wave crests that scatter 
electronic signals sometimes cause spurious echoes to appear on radar screens, fixed-wing 
and helicopter operations become impossible, and underway replenishment must be deferred 
regardless of need. Instability induced by winds and waves moreover may encourage motion 
sickness among the hardiest crew members and passengers when really foul weather strikes- 
Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, a legendary U.S. Marine, turned green in 1 950 when the 
tail end of a typhoon rocked the ship upon which he was embarked. Mental acuity and 
manual dexterity suffer so greatly at such times that simple tasks become difficult. Designers 
consequently locate operations and control centers as well as quarters amidships, where 
turbulence is least pronounced. 



60 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Figure 1 3. Effects of Wave Action on Ship Stability 




Surge 



Heave or Sag 



Translation 


AXIS 


EFFECT 


DIRECTION 


Along x 
Along y 
Along z 


Surge 
Sway 
Heave 


Forwards 
To Port 
Downwards 




About x 


Roll 


Port Side Down 


Rotation 


About y 
About z 


Pitch 
Yaw 


Bow Up 
Bow to Port 



Adapted from P. G. Gates and N. M. Lynn, Ships, Submarines, and the Sea (New York: Brassey's 
(UK), 1990), 67 



Submarines constitute a separate case, for they must sink or remain neutrally buoyant at 
required levels beneath the sea. Excessive buoyancy in fact would prevent rapid submersion 
in emergency. Crewmen pump water into ballast tanks to dive, pump part of it out to slow 
or terminate descent, and restore compressed air when they want to rise. Tanks fore and aft 
maintain submarines on an even keel, which is particularly important when they employ 
weapon systems or loiter at periscope depth where waters often are turbulent. Compromise 
designs are required to ensure effective performance, because streamlined shapes that are 
well suited under water are less efficient on the surface. 

The corrosive effects of sea water and salt air on surface ships and submarines are 
pervasive and pernicious, the curse of every "swabbie" who spent most of his or her first 
cruise chipping paint. Superstructures and immersed hulls are under ceaseless attack. 
Unsightliness is the least serious problem, because metals eventually lose strength, electrical 
shorts occur, bolts seize up, and accretions on launch tracks cause missiles to malfunction 
if untended for long. Not even stainless steel is immune, so the search for antidotes and rust- 
resistant materials continues. 

Sea weeds that foul screws and barnacles that encrust keels along with immersed 
instruments (such as surveillance devices) can be just as destructive as rust. Antifouling 
paints that slowly leach copper, tin, or mercury into sea water are somewhat protective, but 



OCEANS AND SEASHORES 



61 



their poisonous emissions are envionmentally inadvisable and hazardous to handlers. 
Frequent repainting with less objectionable substances must suffice until acceptable 
substitutes such as co-polymers become widely available. 

AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS 

Amphibious warriors who wait for picture perfect beaches and approaches are apt to miss 
golden opportunities, while those who take calculated risks after making sound terrain 
analyses sometimes reap rich rewards. Island hoppers in the Pacific during World War II, for 
example, took fewer than 3 years to leapfrog from Guadalcanal (August 1 942) to Okinawa 
(March 1 945), even though Japanese resistance was tenacious and precious few landings took 
place under ideal conditions. 20 

Two Contrasting Outcomes. British commandos armed with accurate descriptions of the 
German Navy stronghold at St. Nazaire, France conducted an amphibious raid in March 
1942 and, against all odds, destroyed the only dry dock large enough to accommodate 
Hitler's superbattleship Tirpitz. The cost was high (five participants won Victoria Crosses for 
their valor), but ends and means were well matched. The Tirpitz, denied a home port, 
headed for Norway where British mini-submarines damaged it badly in 1943 before the 
Royal Air Force sank it in 1 944 with a bevy of 6,000-pound bombs. 21 The bloodletting at 
Tarawa in November 1 943 was less well planned and U.S. troops were less well equipped. 
More than 3,000 Marines were killed or wounded, partly because terrain intelligence was 
deficient. Armored amphibious tractors, the only available vehicles or landing craft able to 
cross that atoll's coral reef, were sufficient only for the first three waves, so follow-on forces 
had to wade 400-500 yards (350-450 meters) under withering fire before they reached dry 
land. The assault succeeded after 3 vicious days, but the value of that victory still provokes 
disputes. 22 

The Inchon Landings. Landings at Inchon, Korea, in September 1950 (map 10), 
conceived by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and conducted mainly by U.S. 
Marines, capitalized on surprise to achieve success with few casualties on either side even 
though, as one staff officer later revealed, "We drew up a list of every natural and geographic 
handicap and Inchon had 'em all": 23 

The tidal range is tremendous. 

Low water exposes extensive mud flats. 

Only one narrow channel led to the landing areas. 

A fortified island blocked the final approach. 

No beaches were worthy of the name. 

A high sea wall separated all landing sites from the city. 

The mission was to outflank North Korean invaders and relieve pressures on forces in 
the Pusan Perimeter, which was in danger of collapse. General MacArthur and his assistants 
seriously considered three alternatives in August 1950. Wonson, well north of the 38 th 
Parallel on the east coast, seemed a bit ambitious. Kunsan, well to the south on the west 
coast, seemed overly conservative. MacArthur elected Inchon despite objections by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 24 primarily because his main political aim was to free Seoul by the end 
of September. 



MKMK..V. v .>::- :.:.:.:.:.V.:.M.X.^.:.:J.:.X.-.-.:: ;,;.:-::;.>:;:.;;:-: -.-.;.--,... : . v. : . .- . x .v.9h!.w.;.v.w.;hw^ 

62 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 1 0. Beaches and Approaches at Inchon 



Mud Flats 



Sept. 15, 1950 



[NCHON 



0730 Mrs. , , 

Sept. 15, 1950 y Industrial 
Area 



Areas within dashed lines were 
the built-up districts of Inchon 



1930 Mrs. 
Sept. 15, 1950 




BLUE 
BEACH 

2 
(YELLOW) 



Mud Flats 



OCEANS AND SEASHORES 



63 



Geographic obstacles indeed were daunting. Outdated U.S. and Japanese tide tables 
differed significantly, but generally agreed that water would be deep enough to float landing 
ships, tank (LSTs), with a draft of 29 feet (9 meters) only on September 1 5 th , soon after sunrise 
and again at dusk, for periods that approximated 3 hours apiece. Schedules consequently 
called for the assault elements of two Marine regiments to debark 1 2 hours apart, with no 
possibility of reinforcement for first waves in the interim. Ships unable to unload troops, 
equipment, and supplies in that short time would be immobilized by wide, gooey mud flats 
that looked like solidifying chocolate but smelled like fecal matter. 

LSTs and assault transports had to feel their way through tricky channels in dim light, a 
doubly difficult task because none at that time mounted technologically advanced 
navigational gear. Currents ran 6 to 8 knots (almost 1 miles per hour) when tides flowed 
in and out, close to the speed of available landing craft, which struggled upstream. Naval 
gunfire support ships had to anchor in the channel or be swept away, which made them 
sitting ducks for enemy artillery batteries ashore. Final approaches were so narrow there was 
little room to maneuver or turn around, passages were easy to mine, and one disabled ship 
would have blocked passage to or from final destinations. Fortunately for the amphibious task 
force, hostile artillery fire was desultory, no mines were found, and no ships were disabled. 

Wolmi Do, a small fortified island connected to the mainland by a mile-long causeway, 
had to be taken on the morning tide before any ships could enter, because it dominated the 
harbor and waterfront in every direction. Inchon's beaches, code named Red, Green, and 
Blue from north to south, were small, separated from each other, bounded on the seaward 
side by mud flats at low tide, and backed by some combination of salt pans, piers, industrial 
congestion, and sea walls that had to be scaled with ladders. Two typhoons on a collision 
course with ports of embarkation in Japan as well as objective areas made matters worse. 

Shrewd scheduling nevertheless enabled the invasion fleet to avoid the full brunt of both 
typhoons and catch North Korean foes flat-footed: late on D-Day General MacArthur told the 
JCS, "Our losses are light [21 killed, 174 wounded]/' and U.N. Command Cpmmunique 
Number 9 announced that Seoul was recaptured on September 26, 1 950, slightly ahead of 
schedule. 25 Inchon, despite geographic adversities, in short became the "jackpot spot," as 
Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, the Task Force Commander, predicted and remains a classic 
case study of strategic as well as tactical surprise at the U.S. Marine Corps' Amphibious 
Warfare School in Quantico, Virginia. 

SUBMARINE AMD ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE 

The first recorded use of submarines as a weapon system occurred during the American 
Revolution when the Turtle, a one-man model with a hand-operated screw propeller, 
unsuccessfully sought to sink HMS Eagle, a British man-of-war, in New York harbor. The six- 
man Hunley flying a Confederate flag and armed with one torpedo attached to the bow, 
rammed and sank the Housatonic, a Federal corvette that was blockading Charleston, South 
Carolina, in 1864. German U-boats equipped with diesel engines, storage batteries, and self- 
propelled torpedoes implemented a "sink on sight" campaign in 1 91 5 that eventually sent 
hundreds of Allied ships to the bottom, including the Cunard ocean liner Lusitania with 1,1 98 
men, women, and children aboard. Submarines and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces 
have played increasingly sophisticated games of hide-and-seek ever since in a unique 
geographic medium. 



64 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Submarines. The ambition of every submarine skipper is to remain undetected on patrol 
and accomplish assigned missions unscathed. They can achieve those aspirations only if able 
to deceive enemy snoopers positioned to pick up the trail when they leave port, then 
disappear without a trace. Long-range missile submarines that maintain solitary vigils far 
from their targets are more difficult to find than those that must approach within torpedo 
range, but all submarines in motion emit energy signals, cause thermal disruptions, leave 
biological tracks of dying microorganisms in their turbulent wake, and disturb ultraviolet 
radiations in the sea. Nuclear-powered submarines ingest salt water to cool reactors, then 
discharge warm residue that rises to the surface where it leaves "thermal scars." Large 
submarines that maneuver at high speeds leave the most obvious "signatures." 26 

Immersion in the ocean inhibits the ability of the almost "silent service" to exchange 
information with and receive instructions from far distant headquarters. Transmission modes 
that trail antennae on the surface are dead giveaways if observers are nearby; one captain 
who cautiously raised his periscope discovered a flock of sea gulls riding behind him as he 
crisscrossed an enemy convoy. One alternative is to float expendable buoys that can send 
preprogrammed "burst" messages with a wide choice of frequencies before they self-destruct. 
All options, however, are susceptible to intercepts that are traceable back to the source. 
Submarines can receive Very Low Frequency (VLF) traffic on set schedules at ranges that 
exceed 1,000 miles (1,650 kilometers) or more, provided they interrupt activities in the deep 
and reposition near the surface. Repeat broadcasts that give captains more than one chance 
to make contact foster operational flexibility, but the narrow VLF band is congested, 
transmissions are no faster than telegraphy, reciprocal communications are impossible, and 
senders cannot verify whether addressees received their messages. 27 Extremely Low 
Frequency (ELF) radios, in contrast, can send strong signals to deeply submerged submarines 
almost anywhere around the world. The huge installations required, however, are costly and 
vulnerable, procedures are ponderous, and critics oppose any such project on political, 
social, and environmental grounds. 28 

Antisubmarine (ASW) Forces. ASW forces are by no means assured victory in their 
deadly game of hide and seek, despite the vast array of surveillance and weapon systems at 
their disposal. Not many optimists predict that science and technology will soon render 
oceans transparent, no matter how much money responsible officials devote to research and 
development (R&D). Acoustical sensors are most popular among many specialists who 
consider alternatives "unsound," but even those who pursue the full spectrum of possibilities 
encounter mind-boggling obstacles. Acoustical devices, which are particularly useful for 
long-range detection, must be submerged, remain stationary, or move slowly through the 
water lest hydrodynamic noises drown out incoming sounds that make it hard to differentiate 
legitimate indications from distractions. Ducted sounds travel great horizontal distances in 
salt water with little attenuation other than spreading and absorption, but bending and 
refraction distort signals if sensors are located in one layer and submarines in another where 
temperature, salinity, and pressure are quite different. 29 

Short-range acoustic and nonacoustic surveillance devices narrow the search after long- 
range lookouts locate enemy submarines within a radius of 50 square miles (130 square 
kilometers) or so. Many complementary systems commonly conduct the search while 
computers record every action and skilled analysts interpret results. Aircraft may drop dozens 
of sonobuoys to listen at various depths, perhaps along with submersible thermometers 



OCEANS AND SEASHORES 65 



(bathographs) to test the temperature of local water layers and estimate the quarry's likely 
depth. Magnetic anomaly detectors search for distortions that submarines make in Earth's 
magnetic field. Other equipment tries to spot electrical aberrations, bioluminescence, 
leaking lubricants, radioactive trace elements, and so-called "Kelvin wakes" that reach the 
surface. 30 

All ASW systems now deployed or on drawing boards nevertheless have serious 
limitations. No current combination can overcome all geographic obstacles. Oceans, 
according to most well-informed opinion, thus seem likely to remain opaque pending major 
technological breakthroughs that few pundits predict at any early date. 



;<EY POINTS 

The characteristics of salt water influence every naval activity from ship design to 
employment practices above, on, and beneath the surface of oceans and contiguous seas. 

Radar, visible light, infrared, and short-wave radio signals rebound from ocean and sea 
surfaces, whereas sound transmits well in water. 

Currents, tides, waves, swell, and sea ice strongly influence naval plans, programs, and 
operations. 

Beach characteristics and approaches, thereto are primary concerns of amphibious forces 
and of logisticians whenever they must accomplish assigned missions without access to port 
facilities. 

Straits and other choke points adjacent to important sea lines of communication often 
are the objectives of military plans and operations designed to close them or keep them 
open. 

Naval architects constantly struggle to overcome the pernicious effects of salt water, 
heavy seas, and ice under conditions that civilian ships seldom experience. 

Submarine and antisubmarine warfare transpire in a unique environment that demands 
intimate oceanographic knowledge in addition to that required of surface sailors. 



MOTES 

1 . Robert Debs Heinl, jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: U.S. 
Naval Institute, 1966), 289. 

2. Matthew F. Maury, The Physical Geography of the Sea (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1 855). For subsequent elaboration, see Benjamin Dutton and Elbert S. Maloney, Dutton's Navigation 
and Piloting, 14 th ed. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1985); Rhodes W. Fairbridge, The 
Encyclopedia of Oceanography (New York: Reinhold, 1979). 

3. For sea water attributes, see Harold V. Thurman, Introductory Oceanography, 2 d ed. 
(Columbus, OH: Charles E Merrill, 1978), 25-46; Richard A. Davis, Jr., Principles of Oceanography 
(Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1972), 69-73,134-181; P. J. Gates and N. M. Lynn, Ships, 
Submarines, and the Sea (London: Brassey's, 1 990), 1 8-24, 85-89; William L. Donn, Meteorology 
With Marine Applications (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1 946), 384-386; Leonard Engel, The Sea (New 
York: Time-Life Books, 1969), 10-12, 79-80. 



66 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



4. P. J. Gates and N. M. Lynn, Ships, Submarines, and the Sea, 1 32-1 33; Donald C. Daniel, 
"Antisubmarine Warfare in the Nuclear Age," Orbis 28, no. 3 (Fall 1 984): 530-533. 

5. For sea surface behavior, see Davis, Jr., Principles of Oceanography, 74-133; Thurman, 
Introduction to Oceanography, 1 83-272; Donn, Meteorology With Marine Applications, 396-408; 
Gates and Lynn, Ships, Submarines, and the Sea, 85-106; Engel, The Sea, 77-78, 88-92. 

6. J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 1 (New York: Funk and Wagnals, 
1955), chapter 1. 

7. The quotation is from Engel, The Sea, 89. 

8. For marine topography, see Davis, Jr., Principles of Oceanography, 1 9-40, 289-377; Harold 
V. Thurman, Introductory Oceanography, 65-102, 139-156. 

9. FM 30-1 0: Terrain Analysis (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, March 27, 1 972, 73-80, 
1 26, 1 39, 1 41 (superseded by FM 5-33, same title, July 1 990, but the earlier edition contains more 
detailed information about beaches and approaches). 

1 0. Orr Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Water: The Untold Story of Navy SEALs (Novato, CA: Presidio 
Press, 1992); parts of several chapters address beach reconnaissance missions. 

11. Engel, The Sea, 34-35, 131-143. 

1 2. Selected straits are described in A/Con/I 3/1 6: Preparatory Paper for Conference on Law of 
the Sea (New York: United Nations, 1 957); Sovereignty of the Sea (Washington, DC: Dept. of State, 
1965). For one regional analysis, see John H. Noer with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime 
Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press in 
cooperation with the Center for Naval Analyses,1 996). 

13. Alan Moorehead, Callipoli (New York: Harper, 1 956). 

1 4. Kelly Couturier, "Pro-Chechen Gunmen Seize Ferry," Washington Post, January 1 7, 1 996, 
A1, A20. 

1 5. Suez Canal Salvage Operations in 1974 (Washington, DC: prepared for Dept. of the Navy 
by Booz, Allen and Hamilton and Sea Salvage, Inc., 1975). 

1 6. Tom Clancy, The Hunt for Red October (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1 984). 
1 7. John M. Collins, The U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985 (Washington, DC: Pergamon- 

Brassey's, 1985), 145-151. 

18. Charles H. Sinex and Robert S. Winokur, "Environmental Factors Affecting Military 
Operations in the Littoral Battlespace," Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 14, no. 2 (1993). 

1 9. The section on ship design relies mainly on P. J. Gates and N. M. Lynn, Ships, Submarines, 
and the Sea, 24-46, 65-84. 

20. Alfred Vagts, Landing Operations from Antiquity to 1945 (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service 
Publishing Co., 1946); Joseph H. Alexander and Merrill L. Bartlett, Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: 
Amphibious Warfare 1945-1991 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1995); Theodore L. 
Garchel, At the Water's Edge: Defending Against Modern Amphibious Assault (Annapolis, MD: U.S. 
Naval Institute Press, 1996). 

21 . C. E. Lucas Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All (Boston: Little, Brown, 1 960); Leonce Peillard, 
Sink the Tirpitz! (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1 968). 

22. Joseph H. Alexander, Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa (Annapolis, MD: U.S. 
Naval Institute Press, 1995). 

23. Walt Sheldon, Hell or High Water (New York: Macmillan, 1968); Robert Debs Heinl, 
Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1 968), 18-121. 

24. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1969), 114-137. 

25. Ibid., 155, contains General MacArthur's quotation. See also T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind 
of War (New York: Macmillan, 1 963), chapter 1 5. 

26. Daniel, "Antisubmarine Warfare in the Nuclear Age," 528, 535-540. 



w - w ---' J ^" M w ' e s^^ 

OCEANS AND SEASHORES 67 



27. W. T. T. Packingham, "The Command and Control of Submarine Operations/' Naval Forces 
6, no 2 (Spring 1985): 50-53; Robert J. Carlin, "Communicating with the Silent Service/' U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings 107, no. 12 (December 1981): 75-78. 

28. "ELF Communications System Isn't Needed, Might Not Work, GAO Says," /Aerospace Daily, 
March 22, 1979, 107 (cites GAO classified report, The Navy's Strategic Communications System, 
PSAD-79-48); Seafarer ELF Communications System Final Evaluation Impact Statement for Site 
Selection and Test Operation (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Navy, December 1977). 

29. Robert S. Winokur and Craig E. Dorman, "Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval 
Oceanography," Oceanus 33, no. 4 (Winter 1 990/91 ): 20-30; Oceanography and Underwater Sound 
for Naval Applications (Washington, Oceanographic Analysis Division, Marine Sciences Dept., U.S. 
Naval Oceanographic Office, October 1 965); Daniel, "Antisubmarine Warfare in the Nuclear Age," 
530-533; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Cold War in the Ocean Depths," High Technology (July 1 985): 29-35. 

30. Tom Stefanick, "The Nonacoustic Detection of Submarines," Scientific American 258, no. 
3 (March 1988): 41-47; Paul Seully-Power and Robert F. Stevenson, "Swallowing the Transparency 
Pill," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 1 1 3, no. 1 2 (December 1 987): 1 50-1 52; Thomas B. Allen and 
Norman Polmar, "The Silent Chase," New York Times Magazine, January 1, 1984, 13-17, 26-27; 
Daniel, "Antisubmarine Warfare in the Nuclear Age," 535-545. 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



5, EARTH'S ATMOSFHIRE 



Neither snow, nor rain, nor heat, nor gloom of night stays these couriers from 
the swift completion of their appointed rounds. 

Motto of the U.S. Postal Service, 
adapted from Herodotus 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE, LIKE LANE) AND SEA, IS A DISTINCTIVE GEOGRAPHIC MEDIUM. ARMED FORCES THAT 

operate therein must perform a much wider range of missions in foul weather than civil 
servants who deliver letters and packages. General George S. Patton, Jr., resorted to prayer 
during the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, when God seemed to be giving all the 
breaks to his opponents. "Sir," he beseeched, "this is Patton talking. The last fourteen days 
have been straight hell. Rain, snow, more rain, more snow and I'm beginning to wonder 
what's going on in your headquarters. Whose side are You on, anyway? ... I am not going 
to ask for the impossible ... all I request is four days of clear weather ... so that my fighter- 
bombers can bomb and strafe, so that my reconnaissance may pick out targets for my 
magnificent artillery. Give me four days to dry out this blasted mud/' 1 Whether God granted 
his request is debatable, but good weather broke the following day, Allied air power tipped 
the balance favorably, the German drive stalled, and Allied ground forces resumed the 
offensive. 2 

Commanders, however, cannot consistently count on prayers to manipulate atmospheric 
phenomena. Long-range planners find climatological surveys more reliable, while military 
operators, who take shorter views, lean heavily on meteorological observations that must be 
timely, accurate, and tailored to specific circumstances. Results, for good or ill, influence 
military strategies, tactics, force development, task organizations, readiness, morale, and 
performance. 

ATMOSPHERIC PHENOMENA 

Half of Earth's atmosphere lies between sea level and 15,000 feet (4,500 meters). The next 
20,000 feet or so (6,000 meters) contains half of the remainder. Most militarily significant 
atmospheric phenomena develop within that envelope or along its periphery: barometric 
pressures, winds, air currents, temperatures, humidity, fog, clouds, precipitation, and storms. 3 



69 



BAROMETRIC PRESSURE 

International authorities define "normal" atmospheric pressure as 14.7 pounds per square 
inch at mean sea level 45 degrees north and south of the Equator (29.2 inches or 1013.2 
millibars on standard barometers). Irregular heating of Earth's surface, however, causes 
significant deviations. Relatively high pressures permanently surround both poles, where the 
air always is cold and dense; relatively low pressures predominate in the tropics, where the 
air always is warm and light; and alternating pockets of high and low pressure that give 
forecasters fits travel from west to east in middle latitudes, where variable temperatures 
prevail. Exceptions to the rule are plentiful, but clear skies usually accompany high pressure 
domes, whereas depressions presage poor weather. Atmospheric pressures everywhere 
decrease with altitude, since the air becomes progressively thinner. Barometric pressures are 
one-thirtieth less at 900 feet (275 meters) than at sea level, one-thirtieth less at 1 ,800 feet than 
at 900 feet, and so on. 

WINDS AND AIR CURRENTS 

Surface winds blow from high toward low pressure like water flows down hill, fastest where 
gradients are steep because great pressure changes occur over short distances, slowest where 
slopes are gradual because slight changes transpire over long distances. Winds as a rule are 
steadier and stronger over open water than over level land, where surface friction not only 
limits velocities but produces distinctive effects (see table 4 on page 54 and table 5 on page 
71 for comparative consequences at sea and ashore). Gusts that fluctuate 1 knots or more 
between minimum and maximum velocities create horizontal turbulence that changes 
direction erratically and becomes "bumpier" up to about 1,500 feet (450 meters), after which 
the influence of surface friction is noticeably less pronounced. 

Surface winds are individualistic. Light air, for example, flows up slopes on warm days, 
whereas cool air drains downhill after dark. Sea breezes blow toward locally low pressure 
systems that develop during daylight hours, then face about when night falls because land 
heats and cools faster than water (figure 14). Monsoonal winds that visit southern Asia 
reverse their fields seasonally rather than daily for similar reasons. Local winds that bear such 
exotic names as Bora, Buran, Chinook, El Nino, Fohn, Khamsin, Mistral, Santa Ana, Shamal, 
and Sirocco blow hot and cold, wet and dry, in various locales and various combinations. 
Hurricanes, typhoons, and winds that funnel through mountain passes or roar off Greenland's 
ice cap commonly atttain terrifying speeds. 

Winds aloft are notably different. Turbulence due to surface friction disappears, but see- 
saw effects from powerful up-down drafts perpendicular to the main airflow often make 
aircraft unmanageable. Intense shearing also can occur along boundaries between strong 
currents that sometimes race in opposite directions above and below one another. Two 
serpentine jet streams, one in the Northern Hemisphere and a twin in the south, alternately 
loop toward the Equator and the poles at altitudes that vary from 30,000 to 40,000 feet 
(9,000 to 1 2,000 meters). Military air crews headed from west to east in middle latitudes take 
advantage of tail winds therein that reach 160 knots during winter months (90-100 knots 
when weather is warm) and avoid bucking head winds on return trips. 



70 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Table 5. Beaufort Scale Related to Surface Winds Ashore 



Beaufort Wind 
Number Type 


Wind 

Speed 
(knots) 


Situation Ashore 


Calm 


<1 


Smoke rises vertically 


1 Light Airs 


1-3 


Smoke shows wind direction 


2 Light Breeze 


4-6 


Wind vanes move, wind felt on 
face, leaves rustle 


3 Gentle 
Breeze 


7-10 


Leaves and twigs sway; light flags 
flap 


4 Moderate 
Breeze 


11-16 


Dust and loose paper blow; 
small branches sway 


5 Fresh Breeze 


17-21 


Small trees in leaf sway; wavelets 
on inland waters 


6 Strong Breeze 


22-27 


Branches sway; umbrellas blow 


7 Moderate 
Gale 


28-33 


Whole trees sway; walking 
against wind takes effort 


8 Fresh Gale 


34-40 


Twigs snap off trees; progress 
generally impeded 


9 Strong Gale 


41-47 


Slight structural damage; roof 
slates removed 


10 Whole Gale 


48-55 


Trees uprooted; considerable 
damage 


1 1 Storm 


56-64 


Widespread damage 


12 Hurricane 


>64 


Devastation 



TEMPERATURE 

Air temperatures near Earth's surface usually are measured in degrees Fahrenheit ( (> F) or 
degrees Celsius (C), but upper atmosphere reports always cite Celsius. Military commanders 
and staffs express special interest in mean daily maximum and minimum temperatures as well 
as temperature extremes, which indicate the hottest and coldest weather that armed forces 
might encounter in any given month (table 6). The number of days below freezing is 
important in some operational areas, especially when coupled with wind chill factors 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 



71 



(table 7], which indicate the combined effects of low temperatures and circulating air on 
exposed human flesh, taking "true" wind speeds into account. Personnel riding in open 
vehicles at 20 miles (32 kilometers) per hour, for example, experience the equivalent of a 30 
mph (48 kph) buffeting if they buck 10 mph head winds. Back blasts by propeller-driven 
aircraft can give ground crews a bad case of ague long before thermometer readings dip 
below freezing, so alert commanders take appropriate precautions. Local inversions make 
cold, heavy air drain down steep slopes, but air temperatures as a rule decrease 3.5 F with 
every 1,000-foot (300-meter) increase in elevation above sea level. Readings drop at that rate 
up to 35,000 feet (10,670 meters) or so, where Fahrenheit thermometers generally register 
between -60 F and -65 F, then remain more or less constant up to an average altitude of 
120,000 feet (36,575 meters), beyond the limit of most military aircraft. 

Figure 1 4. Land and Sea Breeze Regimes 



Low Pressure 





Land 
Warms During 
Daylight 



High Pressure 
Sea Breeze 



Ocean Surface 



High Pressure 



*** * 




Low Pressure 




Land 
Cools After 
Dark 



Adapted from William L. Donn, Meteorology with Marine Applications. 



Table 6. Militarily Important Temperature Statistics 
(A typical table in degrees Fahrenheit) 



Categories 


Jan 


Feb 


Mar 


Apr 


May 


Jun 


Jul 


Aug 


5ep 


Oct 


Nov 


Dec 


Mean Daily Max 


22 


32 


49 


60 


75 


92 


98 


96 


83 


64 


43 


33 


Extreme Max 


45 


48 


60 


78 


92 


98 


106 


104 


92 


70 


60 


48 


Mean Daily Min 


2 


10 


29 


40 


55 


72 


78 


80 


63 


44 


24 


12 


Extreme Min 


-28 


-22 


-2 


15 


28 


53 


55 


55 


26 


14 


-2 


-13 


Days Min 32 U F 
or Less 


31 


28 


23 


5 


2 











4 


14 


24 


27 



72 



iaas*aiaa*aa^:aa^^ 

PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Table?. Wind Chill Factors 



What the Thermometer Reads (degrees F) 


WIND 
SPEED 
MPH 


50 


40 


30 


20 


10 





-10 


-20 


-30 


^0 


-50 


-60 


Equivalent Effects on Exposed Flesh 


CALM 


50 


40 


30 


20 


10 





-10 


- 2 > 


''-30 


-40 


-50 


-60 


5 


48 


37 


27 


16 


6 


>D 


-15, 


^26 


-36 


-47 


-57 


-68 


10 


40 


28 


16 


4 


-9 


- 2 > 


^33 


^6 


-58 


-70^ 


^Q3 


_QC 

%y*j 


15 


36 


22 


9 


-5 


- 1 > 


^36 


-45 


-58 


-72, 


X#5 


-99 


-112 


20 


32 


18 


8 


-10 


^25 


-39 


-53 


-67, 


""^82 


-96 


-110 


-121 


25 


30 


16 





-15 


-29 


-44 


-59 


^74 


-68 


-104 


-118 


-133 


30 


28 


13 


-2 


-18 


-33 


-48 


-63 


-79 


-94 


-109 


-125 


-140 


35 


27 


11 


-4 


-20 


-35 


-49 


-67 


-82 


-98 


-113 


-129 


-145 


40 


26 


10 


-6 


-21 


-37 


-53 


-69 


-85 


-100 


-116 


-137 


-148 


Little danger of freezing 
exposed flesh 


Danger of freezing 
exposed flesh 


Great danger of freezing 
exposed flesh 



RELATIVE HUMIDITY 

"It's not the heat, it's the humidity," is an age-old adage, but those two atmospheric elements 
in fact are inseparable. Absolute humidity, defined as the volume of water vapor in a cubic 
foot or cubic meter of air, varies from nearly nil in deserts to four or five percent in some 
soggy climes. Relative humidity is the percentage of vapor present compared with the 
maximum amount possible, which is greatest in warm air. Saturation (100 percent relative 
humidity) occurs when contents and capacities become equal. Condensation from gaseous 
to liquid or solid states follows further cooling. Water droplets (dew) or ice crystals (frost) 
then form in the air or on Earth's surface, often between dusk and dawn. 

Most humans find conditions acceptable when thermometers register 90 F (32 C), as 
long as relative humidity stands, say, at 20 percent, but that same temperature produces a 
sweat box when water vapor in the air reaches 60 percent or more, because neither 
precipitation nor perspiration evaporates rapidly in such environments and bodies cool 
slowly unless wafted by breeze. Damp cold also is debilitating. Bone-chilling winds and wet 
weather made life miserable for U.S. and Japanese Armed Forces who contested control of 
the Aleutian Islands during World War II and more recently discomfited British and Argentine 
troops who battled to determine sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas. 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 



73 



CLOUDS AMD FOG 

Clouds and fog are distinctive forms of condensation that consist of minute water particles 
suspended in air. Clouds remain aloft whereas fog hugs the surface, but the two are 
indistinguishable whenever low-lying clouds touch land or water and both obscurants limit 
visibility in various degrees regardless of their origin. 

Fog. Ground fog, which most often develops on cool, calm, clear nights, appears first and 
becomes densest in depressions, then "burns off" after sunrise as soon as winds pick up and 
temperatures rise above the dew point (1 00 percent relative humidity). Poor visibility often 
causes nighttime traffic control problems in harbors surrounded by hills, because the 
atmosphere there is so close to saturation that contact with cool air above causes 
condensation. Industrial smoke and other manmade airborne pollutants convert fog into 
smog near many cities. (Table 8 displays maximum distances at which military personnel 
with 20-20 vision can identify prominent objects.) 

Thin maritime fog, called "arctic smoke," forms in the far north and south when vapors 
rising from relatively warm water meet cold air, but perhaps four-fifths of all dense fogs at sea 
are found in middle latitudes where warm air collides with cool water. Light winds of 5 to 
1 knots, which are strong enough to distribute but not disperse suspended vapors, help build 
huge fog banks off Newfoundland's coast where the Gulf Stream and the Labrador Current 
intersect. "Pea soup" fog occasionally blankets the British Isles and parts of Northwestern 
Europe in wintertime, when warm, wet air overrides cold land. 

Table 8. Fog Linked to Visibility 



Fog Classification Maximum Visibility 



Dense Fog 50 yards (45 meters) 

Thick Fog 200 yards (1 80 meters) 

Fog 500 yards (450 meters) ,3 

Moderate Fog 0.5 nautical miles (0.9 kilometers) 

Thin Fog 1 nautical mile (1.8 kilometers) 



Clouds. Three elemental cloud types are recognizable: cirrus and stratus, which spread 
horizontally; cumulus clouds, which develop vertically (table 9 and figure 15 ). All others 
are modifications. Wispy cirrus clouds composed of ice crystals habitually occupy thin, dry 
air above 20,000 feet (6,000 meters), whereas stratus clouds spread sheets across all or most 
of the sky far below. Fluffy, flat-bottomed cumulus clouds in contrast sometimes tower 
30,000 feet (9,150 meters) or more from base to top. The prefix "alto" accompanies all 
middle level clouds, while "nimbus" Latin for rain designates turbulent storm clouds, 
including anvil-shaped cumulonimbus thunderheads that aviators try to avoid. 

Cloud cover, expressed as scattered (1/8 th to 4/8 ths ), broken (5/8 ths to 7/8 ths ), and overcast 
8/8 th ), determines vertical visibility. One tier may tell the whole tale, but scattered or broken 
clouds on two or more levels also cause overcast conditions. The lowest cloud bases 
determine ceilings, which range from zero to unlimited and differ significantly from place to 
place over hilly terrain (figure 1 6). 



74 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Table 9. Cloud Classifications 



Horizontal Development 


Vertical 
Development 


High Clouds 
(> 20,000 feet) 
(>6,000 meters) 


Middle Clouds 
(7,000-20,000 feet) 
(2,000-6,000 meters) 


Low Clouds 
(<7,000 feet) 
(<2,000 meters) 


Cumulus 
Cumulonimbus 


Cirrus 
Cirrostratus 
Cirrocumulus 


Altostratus 
Altocumulus 


Stratus 
Nimbostratus 
Stratocumulus 



PRECIPITATION 

Steady, intermittent, and showery precipitation from clouds strike Earth as rain, sleet, snow, 
hail, or glaze, sometimes in combinations, the mixture of which depends primarily on air 
and surface temperatures. Intensities range from drizzles to downpours, with total 
accumulations characterized as a trace, light, medium, and heavy. One inch of rain (2.5 
centimeters) normally is equivalent to 10 inches of snow (25 centimeters). There are no 
comparable conversion factors for sleet or hail, which sometimes pile several inches deep, 
or for glaze that turns turnpikes and ship decks into impromptu ice skating rinks. Monthly 
and annual averages mean little unless precipitation is evenly distributed. Military 
commanders and staffs need to know whether three inches of rain in April spreads over most 
of that month or generally arrives as a "gully washer" (comedians chortle about the 
statistician who drowned while crossing a normally dry stream). 

STORMS 

Tropical cyclones (hurricanes, typhoons) and frontal systems that form along the boundary 
between warm and cold air masses in middle latitudes feature low pressures, high winds, 
overcast skies, low ceilings, poor visibility, and precipitation that varies from trickles to 
torrents. The most violent storms usually pass in a few hours (even minutes), while others 
linger for days. Tornadoes that hop, skip, and jump erratically are by far the most furious, but 
rarely affect military operations and exert little or no influence over plans and programs 
because they are short-lived, localized, and unpredictable. Tropical cyclones, typified by 
devastating winds that circle around a calm core (the eye), only occasionally imperil ships 
at sea and military installations on or near seacoasts, but thunderstorms that bring gusty, 
shearing, shifty winds along the front, hazardous up-down drafts, hailstones, heavy rain, and 
destructive electrical discharges regularly occur over land and water (figure 1 7). Towering 
cumulonimbus thunderheads, which sometimes measure more than 5 miles high, 20 miles 
wide, and 60 miles long (8 x 32 x 96 kilometers), pose serious impediments to military 
aircraft in pursuit of critical wartime missions. 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 



75 



Figure 15. Cloud Types Depicted 



8,000 M - 
25,000 FT - 

7,000 M - 



20,000 FT 
6,000 M 



5,000 M 
15,000 FT 



4,000 M - 




10,000 FT 
3,000 M 



2,000 M - 
5,000 FT - 

1.000M- 



altdcumulus 



dtt.Qstratgs 



0- 




76 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Figure 1 6. Cloud Ceilings Related to Terrain 




Kham Due 
1200ft. 



Hau Due 
500ft. 



Chu Lai 
6ft. 



NATURAL LIGHT LEVELS 

Sunshine, moonlight, and starlight are the main sources of natural illumination, which is 
measured in footcandles (fc). The sun at its zenith, unfiltered by clouds or fog, lights flat 
surfaces on Earth at about 10,000 fc compared with 0.02 fc for full moons under similar 
conditions (sufficient light for steady reading averages about 10 footcandles). 

Daylight and darkness are not atmospheric phenomena, but staff weather officers 
routinely furnish military commanders with a wide range of light data for particular times and 
places. Relevant information includes sunrise, sunset, periods of morning and evening 
twilight, moon rise, moon set, lunar phases, and times that night vision devices would prove 
most useful. Four types of twilight, each with important military implications, are recognized 
universally: 

Astronomical twilight, which persists as long as any detectable glow remains in the 
sky, starts in the morning when the sun is 18 below the horizon, lasts until sunup, 
reappears after sundown, then remains until dark. 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 



77 



Figure 1 7. Anatomy of a Thunderstorm 



" * ' " *t'vV* */ * *^ ." ' I*, , 



*T !*.*> r-' /'- ''t-.\- ' 
/inlfant ^1;^^<fc^&| 
%^lM&(^^^ 
^SSJS GOwndi? 



SSs^Vtf^.V.: A 



*^ ;p%wo'/J Cfflri 

<' ". '/llfHhi 'in i H' I! i. 1 1 




Adapted from Guy Murchie, Song of frte S/ry 



The beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) occurs before sunup when the sun 
is between the horizon and 1 2 below, at which times large silhouettes are distinguishable 
and stars that serve navigational purposes are visible in clear weather. 

The end of evening nautical twilight (EENT) occurs after sundown when the sun is 
between the horizon and 12 below. 

Normal outdoor activities are feasible without artificial light during civil twilight, when 
the sun is between the horizon and 6 below at dawn and again at dusk. 4 

Levels of natural illumination vary according to latitude and seasons of the year. Civil 
twilight during spring and autumn equinoxes, for example, lasts twice as long at 60 north 
or south as it does at the Equator. Regions near the North Pole experience 7 weeks of 
astronomical twilight from mid-September to mid-November, and 7 more weeks from mid- 
January to mid-March. Perpetual darkness prevails in the dead of winter, perpetual daylight 
during summertime in the "Land of the Midnight Sun" (Antarctica encounters analogous 
regimes in reverse order). The U.S. .Naval Observatory in Washington, DC, annually updates 
and publishes a wide selection of light data for each day, together with conversion factors 
that enable users to tailor additional calculations that meet individualistic requirements. 5 



78 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



CLIMATOLOGY FOR MILITARY STRATEGISTS 

Climatologists compile atmospheric statistics that disclose global and regional patterns. 
Displays that highlight daily-monthly-annual means and extremes become progressively 
more dependable, provided qualified observers compile specified information for particular 
places over periods that span several decades. Interpolations must supplement or supplant 
facts when they do not. 6 

Strategic planners and programmers, who focus their attention on next month, next year, 
or the indefinite future, are the principal beneficiaries of climatology, which is most 
important for armed forces that must prepare to implement missions in unfamiliar territory. 
Specialized studies not only help high-level contingency planners determine whether 
weapons, equipment, supplies, clothing, and other resources are well suited for operations 
within regions where military responsibilities might arise on short notice, but they indicate 
what research, development, test, evaluation, and acquisition programs would best bridge 
gaps between requirements and capabilities. Theater-level campaign planners, force 
developers, and resource allocators likewise rely on climatic assessments. General William 
C. Westmoreland, in his capacity as Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam, for example, annually approved a series of so-called "monsoon plans'' that took wet 
and dry seasons into account on each side of Vietnam's mountain backbone. When the 
Northeast Monsoon turns coastal plains to quagmires from mid-October until early March 
Laos and Cambodia are dry. When the Southwest Monsoon takes over from May to 
September that regime reverses. 7 

CLIMATOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATIONS 

Every climatological classification is flawed in some respects, whether it emphasizes 
precipitation (arid, semi-arid, moderate, humid, wet), temperature (cold, tepid, warm, hot), 
or other atmospheric phenomena. Characteristically warm climes that exclude identifiable 
winters, cold regions that exclude identifiable summers, and intermediate climates identified 
by four seasons are much too broad for practical military applications. The "Torrid Zone" 
isn't uniformly hot (highlands in Kenya and Ecuador, which straddle the Equator, are 
delightfully cool). "Frigid Zones" poleward of the Arctic and Antarctic Circles aren't 
uniformly cold (Verkhoyansk and Omyakyon in northeastern Siberia are frozen solid in 
winter but swelter in summer). "Temperate Zones" are neither climatically moderate nor 
uniform. Classifications that focus on seasonal or annual precipitation at the expense of 
temperatures are equally faulty, because they fail to account for evaporation, which heat 
encourages Basra, in the Iraqi desert, is notably drier than Russia's Kola coast 1,000 miles 
(1,600 kilometers) north of Moscow, which receives essentially the same amount of moisture 
but retains more of it. Most climatic maps moreover limit coverage to land and show sharp 
boundaries, whereas distinctive patterns appear over oceans and intersections between 
climatic regions generally are gradual. 8 

MILITARILY USEFUL COMPROMISES 

Three basic climatic groupings with several subdivisions apiece serve most military purposes 
reasonably well, whether forces are aloft, ashore, or afloat: low latitude climates controlled 
by equatorial and tropical air masses; middle latitude climates controlled by tropical and 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 79 



polar air masses; high latitude climates controlled by polar and arctic air masses. Highlands 
create temperature and precipitation anomalies in each case (map 11 and table 10 
elaborate). 9 

METEOROLOGY FOR MILITARY OPERATORS 

Military commanders who seek to make capricious weather work for rather than against 
them require timely, relevant information about current meteorological conditions and 
anticipated developments within respective areas of responsibility. Staff weather officers 
armed with the best available information peer into the immediate future, evaluate variables, 
identify apparent trends, apply past experience, then predict meteorological events at 
particular places for specified periods of time. 10 Their prognoses seldom cover more than 
a week (typically 1 or 2 days), because the reliability of longer outlooks remains spotty 
despite the proliferation of reporting stations and assistance from technologically advanced 
sensors on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. 11 

IMPACT ON CONVENTIONAL LAND WARFARE 

General George Washington capitalized on surprise when he deliberately picked a stormy 
Christmas night in 1 776 to cross the ice-caked Delaware River, despite roiling waters and 
high winds that drenched his 2,400 half-starved, threadbare troops with cold rain, wet snow, 
and hail. He landed early next morning near Trenton, New Jersey, caught the Hessian 
garrison off guard, then trounced them in little more than an hour at the expense of four 
American wounded. 12 Mother Nature, however, punishes imprudent commanders who 
arrogantly or ignorantly disregard weather. Generalissimo Joseph Stalin learned hard lessons 
when he ordered poorly acclimated and equipped Soviet Armed Forces to invade Finland on 
November 30, 1 939, after one of the worst winters on record had already begun. Skillful 
Finnish troops, who anticipated trouble and were well prepared for frigid land warfare, 
inflicted 10-to-1 casualties on Soviet adversaries before they were overwhelmed by sheer 
weight of numbers in mid-March, 1 940. 13 

Trafficability. Information about the possible impact of precipitation and temperature on 
trafficability deserves a high priority, because ground forces cannot maneuver effectively 
when the footing is unfriendly. They move fast across open terrain that is frozen solid 
(dashing French cavalry captured a complete Dutch fleet at the Texel roadstead, including 
its embarrassed admiral, when thick ice unexpectedly covered the Zuider Zee in 1 795 14 ), but 
mud stalls men and machines. British artillery barrages before the Third Battle of Ypres in 
1 91 7 destroyed the drainage system during incessant rains and pocked the battlefield with 
more than four million new water-filled craters that made rapid progress impossible. 15 
German tank and truck columns stranded in muck on Soviet steppes during the next World 
War were cemented in place like Greek friezes when thermometers dipped below freezing 
after dark. Mud made a mess in mountainous territory as well as on level land during that 
same time frame, witness U.S. forces in Italy, where men and pack mules skidded up and 
down slippery trails that four-wheel drive vehicles never could negotiate. 16 



80 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 1 1 . Regional Climates Depicted 




Source: Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography, 2d ed, 1963, p.192 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 



81 



Table 1 0. Regional Climates Described 



Designations 


Descriptions 


1 . Low Latitude Climates 


a. Rain Forests 
(10 North [20 in Asia] to 


Uniformly warm; heavy rainfall 


1 South) 




b. Tradewind Littorals 
(10 to 25 North and South) 


Uniformly warm; seasonally heavy rainfall on narrow east coast 
strips 


c. Tropical Deserts and Steppes 
(1 5 to 35 North and South) 


High maximum temperatures; arid or semi-arid 


d. West Coast Deserts 
(1 5 to 30 North and South) 


Very dry; relatively cool; limited to narrow coastal strips 


e. Tropical Savannas 
(5 to 25 North and South) 


Warm; wet season when sun is high; dry season when sun is low 


2. Middle Latitude Climates 


a. Humid Sub-Tropical 
(20 to 3 5 North and South) 


Cool winters and warm, humid summers on the east side of 
continents; frequent rain 


b. Temperate West Coasts 
(40 to 60 North and South) 


Cool; cloudy; humid; rainy, with winter maximums 


c. Mediterranean 
(30 to 45 North and South) 


Moderate temperatures; wet winters; dry summers 


d. Interior Deserts and Steppes 
(35 to 50 North and South) 


Arid; cold winters; hot summers 


e. Continental Centers and 
Eastern Sectors 
(3 5 to 60 North) 


Ample precipitation; cold winters; hot summers; variable weather; 
frequent fronts 


3. High Latitude Climates 


a. Subarctic 
(5 5 to 70 North) 


Low precipitation; fairly moist; long, cold winters; short, cool 
summers; huge temperature range 


b. Tundra 
(North of 55 N, South of 50 S) 


Damp cold; no warm season; moderate temperature range 


c. Icecaps 
(Polar Regions; Greenland) 


Dry; no monthly temperature above freezing 


Mountains and Plateaus 


Cool or cold above 5,000 feet (1,500 meters); wet or dry depending 




on location 



82 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Weapon Performance. Atmospheric phenomena significantly affect the performance of 
weapon systems and munitions. Pressure changes and relative humidity alter barometric 
fusing and arming calculations, dense air reduces maximum effective ranges, gusty 
crosswinds near Earth's surface make free rockets and guided missiles wobble erratically, 
while winds aloft influence ballistic trajectories. Rain-soaked soils deaden artillery rounds, 
but frozen ground increases fragmentation from contact-fused shells. Dense fog, which 
degrades visual surveillance and target acquisition capabilities, also makes life difficult for 
forward observers, whose mission is to adjust artillery fire. Line-of-sight weapons, such as 
tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) antitank missiles, are worthless where 
visibility is very limited. Exhaust plumes that follow TOWs moreover form ice fog in cold, 
damp air, which conceals targets from gunners even on clear days, and reveals firing 
positions to enemy sharpshooters. Scorching heat makes armored vehicles too hot to touch 
without gloves, reduces sustained rates of fire for automatic weapons, artillery, and tank guns, 
and renders white phosphorus ammunition unstable. 17 Brutal cold has quite different effects, 
as U.S. Marines discovered in subzero combat around North Korea's Changjin Reservoir 
(December 1 950), where mortar base plates broke on the rock hard ground and hand 
grenades became unpopular, because users who removed mittens to pull the pin suffered 
frostbitten fingers if they held the cold metal for more than a moment. 18 

IMPACT OH CONVENTIONAL SURFACE NAVAL WARFARE 

Winds, towering seas, and frigid temperatures influence naval operations more than any other 
atmospheric factors. Results sometimes are favorable a kamikase ("Divine Wind") saved 
Japan from invasion by a Mongol fleet in the 13th century, and Britain benefited when storms 
dispersed the Spanish Armada in 1 588 but foul weather at sea is seldom welcome. 

Aircraft Carriers. Large aircraft carriers are less affected than their escorts by heavy seas, 
but even so may roll nine degrees or more when their flight decks are exposed to strong 
winds. Small wonder, therefore, that U.S. carrier battle groups plying back and forth between 
Bosnia and Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia, in August 1 995 took special pains to bypass three 
hurricanes that then were active in the Atlantic Ocean. Less than gale force winds demand 
additional tie downs for fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, repositioning becomes a complex 
proposition when decks are slick, and fighters may not be able to spread folding wings until 
they reach catapults. Underway replenishment, always a delicate business, becomes 
additionally hazardous in rough weather, when waves may wash away loads suspended on 
transfer lines and cargo handling on deck becomes infinitely more difficult. Foul weather 
procedures consequently emphasize smaller than normal loads, longer than normal transfer 
times, and greater than normal distances between support ships and recipients to prevent 
collisions. 19 

Other Surface Ships. Persistent heavy weather endangers surface ship stability, buoyancy, 
power, and structural integrity. Experienced helmsmen have a hard time maintaining course 
when beset by sharp pitching, swaying, surging, yawing, and heaving, but repeated wide- 
angle rolls from starboard to port and back again are exceptionally dangerous, because most 
surface combatants and support ships may capsize if efforts to restore stability fail. Conditions 
are worst when ships steer a course that parallels the storm path and their roll period (9 to 
10 seconds for a typical destroyer) coincides with the period between wave peaks and 
troughs. Paths perpendicular to the onrushing sea minimize roll but maximize pitch, which 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 83 



alternately causes bows to slam and propellers to beat thin air at high speeds while the 
whole ship shudders. Nonnuclear ships maintain the lowest possible center of gravity 
primarily by replacing consumed fuel with salt water ballast, which maintains low-level 
weight and prevents partially filled tanks from sloshing. All savvy captains position heavy 
loads below deck to the greatest practicable extent, and engineers take special pains to 
maintain propulsive power, because wallowing ships are helpless. 20 

Thick layers of ice can quickly form on decks, sides, superstructures, hatches, masts, 
rigging, exposed machinery, antennas, and weapon systems when salt spray hits ship surfaces 
at subfreezing temperatures. Two feet or more totaling several hundred tons may accumulate 
within 24 hours in very cold climes, depending on wind velocities and wave heights. 
Seaworthiness and combat effectiveness then suffer from top heaviness and increased wind 



resistance. 21 



Small Craft and Boats. Amphibious landing craft and naval special operations boats are 
especially sensitive to wind, waves, and surf. Cyclone class patrol boats, the most seaworthy 
vessels currently available to U.S. SEALs, are fully functional through Sea State 5 (winds 22 
to 27 knots, waves 10 to 12 feet, or 3 to 4 meters, high), but struggle to survive stronger 
storms. 22 Personnel transfers from seagoing "buses" to small boats are tricky under perfect 
conditions and fearful when they are not. One SEAL team aboard a slam-dunking tugboat 
on a training exercise in the frigid North Sea first fought to keep its six Boston whalers from 
washing overboard, then watched 50-knot winds flip three of them like flapjacks when they 
were lowered into foaming water. Forty-two heavily laden shooters had to time the swells, 
leap toward the boats, and pray they wouldn't be crushed or chewed by propel lors. 23 

IMPACT OH CONVENTIONAL AIR WARFARE 

Military aviators almost everywhere in peacetime must comply with visual and instrument 
flight regulations (VFR, IFR). VFR I imitations for land-based, fixed-wing U.S. military aircraft 
generally prescribe a ceiling of at least 1,200 feet (365 meters), visibility of 3, statute miles 
(4.8 kilometers) at destinations as well as departure airfields, and minimum distances above, 
below, and around clouds en route. Lower ceilings or poorer visibility obligate pilots to file 
IFR flight plans. 24 VFR for land-based helicopters are more lenient. 25 U.S. aircraft carrier 
captains, who generally determine whether weather is agreeable for takeoffs and landings, 
consider prospects for successful recovery at suitable bases ashore as well as aboard the 
mother ship. 26 All armed forces shelve peacetime restrictions when combat or other high 
priority operations commence, because assigned missions then take precedence over safety. 

Clouds and Fog. U.S. bomber crews during World War II fought weather along with 
Japanese adversaries on Umnak Island in the Aleutians, where fog was so dense that crew 
members poked their heads out of open windows to help pilots stay on taxi strips and steer 
straight courses down runways. 27 Bad weather all the way from air bases in England to drop 
and landing zones in Holland during Operation Market Garden on September 19, 1944, 
turned the third wave into a disaster fewer than half of the troop transports and gliders laden 
with desperately needed reinforcements and supplies found their way through the "soup" to 
intended destinations. 28 

Technological improvements make life much easier for modern airmen, but "socked in" 
airports and low ceilings still ground them occasionally regardless of pressing requirements, 
and low ceilings sometimes obscure approaches to target areas. U.S. and allied troops at 



84 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



highland outposts in Vietnam, for example, lacked close air support (CAS), assistance from 
gunships, and aerial resupply for all or most of many days during rainy seasons. High- 
performance, fixed-wing CAS aircraft at such times were limited to low-level, low-angle 
avenues that maximized their exposure to enemy air defense weapons and small arms (see 
chapter 19 for weather details in Vietnam and Laos). NATO more recently canceled or 
diverted nearly 360 military airlift missions in mid-December 1995, thereby delaying its 
initial buildup in Bosnia for more than a week. 29 

Barometric Pressures. All aviators set altimeters to reflect barometric pressure at 
departure airfields before they take off and update readings before they land so they always 
know how high they are above land or water. Accurate indications are most important for 
military airmen whose missions demand low-level or nap-of-the-earth flights through 
mountainous terrain under blacked out or murky weather conditions. Barometric pressures, 
together with temperatures and humidity, determine air density, which limits the ability of 
any given type aircraft to get off the ground with any given load and thereafter perform 
effectively. Heavy air that is common on cold days at sea level provides the best possible lift, 
but density decreases when thermometers climb. Altitude thins Earth's atmosphere so rapidly 
that regulations require U.S. military air crews to use supplemental oxygen when cabin 
altitude exceeds 10,000 feet (3,050 meters), 30 although SS Hauptsturmfuhrer (Captain) Otto 
Skorzeny proved that fantastic feats are possible in thin air when he landed 1 2 gliders atop 
Italy's boulder-strewn Gran Sasso Mountain in 1943, snatched Benito Mussolini from his 
Italian custodians, and whisked him away in a light airplane. 31 Lieutenant Colonel Maden 
of the Nepalese Army conducted the world's highest helicopter rescue on May 13, 1996, 
when he plucked two half frozen survivors off Mount Everest at 1 9,200 feet (5,850 meters), 
then flew them to a hospital in Katmandu. 32 

Winds. Wind velocities and vectors strongly affect military air operations in many ways 
that civilian fliers seldom experience. Expeditionary airfield users cannot switch runways 
every time strong crosswinds develop because they possess only one runway, so prevailing 
winds dictate the orientation of these fields. No ocean liner or cruise ship ever deliberately 
heads toward a storm, as carrier commanding officers often do in search of sufficient "wind 
over deck" (20 sustained knots or more) to launch and recover fixed-wing aircraft. 
Psychological operations (PSYOP) leaflets are worthless when winds blow in the wrong 
direction. 33 Paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division had to accomplish their missions 
in July 1 943 despite 35-mile-an-hour winds that scattered them across Sicily and slammed 
them against stone walls in the dead of night. 33 Efforts to rescue U.S. hostages that Iranian 
radicals held in Teheran (1 980) failed when three of the eight mission-essential helicopters 
aborted, one because wind-blown dust storms turned it back. 34 

IMPACT ON NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WARFARE 

Nuclear weapons respond to weather in several ways, of which winds on the surface and 
aloft perhaps are most important. Chemical and biological warfare (CW, BW) agents are 
sensitive to several atmospheric phenomena under somewhat different conditions. 

Nuclear Weapons. Low air bursts beneath clouds amplify thermal radiation by reflection, 
whereas heat from bursts above cloud blankets bounces back into space. Heavy 
precipitation raises the temperature at which thermal radiation will ignite given materials and 
reduces the spread of secondary fires. Detonations after dark increase the range at which 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 85 



flashes from nuclear explosions blind unprotected viewers. Blasts on, beneath, or at low 
altitudes above Earth's surface suck enormous amounts of debris up the stems of mushroom 
clouds that drift downwind. The heaviest, most contaminated chaff falls back near ground 
zero within a few minutes, but winds aloft waft a deadly mist hundreds or thousands of miles. 
The size, shape, and potency of resultant radioactive fallout patterns differ with wind speeds 
and directions, because terrain shadows, crosswinds, and local precipitation sometimes 
create hot spots and skip zones within each fan. Fallout from one test conducted atop a tower 
in Nevada, for example, drifted northeast and retained strong radioactive concentrations 
around ground zero, while a second test from the same tower on a different date featured a 
"furnace" that was seven times hotter than its immediate surroundings 60 miles (95 
kilometers) northwest of the test (figure 18). Such erratic results are hard to predict even 
under ideal conditions. 35 



Figure 1 8. Nuclear Fallout Related to Wind 



BOLTZMANN 
12 kilotons 
NEVADA 
28 May 57 
Burst at 500 ft. 



1MR/HR 




t 

N 



Test 

40 miles sjte 

60 Kilometers 



TURK 
43 kilotons 
NEVADA 
7 March 55 
Burst at 500 ft. 



1MR/HR 




t 

N 



1000 



40 miles 

60 Kilometers 



Dose Rate in Milliroentgens Per Hour 

12 Hours After Detonation 
I 



Biological Warfare Agents. Biological warfare agents conceivably could create 
international chaos on a grand scale by infecting enemy armed forces, civilian populations, 
livestock, and crops en masse. Small laboratories can generate BW products so quickly in 
militarily significant quantities that refrigerated storage facilities no longer are necessary, but 
microbiol pathogens and toxins as a rule last only a few hours when exposed to high 
temperatures and low humidity inside bombs, missile warheads, spray tanks, and artillery 
shells. Some biological munitions, inherently unstable, can neither tolerate sharp strains 
associated with projectile flights nor stand direct sunlight. 3 ' 1 

Chemical Warfare Agents. Chemical warfare agents, in sharp contrast, thrive under 
weather conditions that biological weapons cannot tolerate. Heat and humidity help rather 
than hinder. Mustard and lewisite are particularly effective in hot weather, because 



86 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



perspiration promotes blisters. Protective clothing, masks, and gas-proof shelters are the best 
insurance against CW weapons of any kind, but fatigue followed by heat prostration afflicts 
personnel who "button up" very long in warm climes, while air conditioned facilities that 
lack fool-proof filters become death traps. Persistent agents laid down as liquids last longer 
than aerosols and are less sensitive to vagrant winds, so chemical warfare specialists advise 
commanders to initiate vapor attacks when breezes blow in the right direction between three 
and seven knots, to avoid rainy days, and to wait for temperature inversions that trap agents 
in the lowest layer of air. 37 

IMPACT ON ELECTRO-OPTICAL OPERATIONS 

Active and passive electro-optical (E-O) systems include image intensifies, typified by night 
vision goggles; infrared devices, such as night sights; laser designators, some of which assist 
"smart" munitions; and low- light- level television sets able to "see" in the dark. Research and 
development laboratories are rapidly expanding and improving existing inventories. 

Adverse Atmospheric Influences. Windblown dust, fog, haze, high humidity, clouds, and 
precipitation degrade or defeat all E-O systems that gather visible light. Long wave lengths 
are less affected than short waves, although resolution is fuzzier. Atmospheric refraction, 
often less obvious than a mirage, can make targets seem to move (even disappear) in 
shimmering surface air and otherwise reduce electro-optical effectiveness. Heat is the most 
common cause of that phenomenon, but similar distortions sometimes appear above snow- 
covered ground when temperatures are well below freezing. Infrared and millimeter wave 
sensors, which depend on thermal contrasts to differentiate targets from backgrounds (warm 
engines, for example, concealed in cool woods), cannot discriminate as well as users would 
like when winds, rain, snow, or insulating clouds make temperature differences 
indistinguishable, so experimental programs continue apace. 38 

Inadequate Light. Military operations in the past typically were timed to begin just before 
dawn, then continue in daylight, because few armed forces were well prepared for armed 
combat after dark. Light enhancement tools may some day enable soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
and marines to "own the night," but research and development technicians first must solve 
several weather-related problems. Too much light sometimes defeats night vision devices on 
relatively clear nights when the moon is full or nearly so, because amplifications so saturate 
viewing areas that light and dark almost merge. Too little light may be available on overcast 
nights that conceal starlight when the moon is dark or down. Most night vision implements 
now on the market are miniaturized compared with predecessors even a few years ago, yet 
remain too bulky for facile employment by foot troops. Research and development goals 
accordingly concentrate on sharper resolution, better depth perception, longer range, 
stereoscopic capabilities, smaller size, reduced weight, and greater overall versatility. 39 

IMPACT ON DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS 

Directed energy weapons, which attack at the speed of light, occupy two basic categories. 
Electromagnetic beams embrace high-energy lasers (HEL) and high-powered microwaves 
(HPM). Particle beams include charged particle beams (CPB) and neutal partical beams 
(NPB). 

Electromagnetic Beams. Atmosphere interferes with electromagnetic beams in at least 
four important ways:' 



.40 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 87 



Scatter occurs when beams strike clouds, fog, invisible vapors, dust, smoke, and other 
matter buoyed by air. 

Absorption occurs simultaneously for similar reasons. 

Blooming occurs when heated air makes beams expand and splay. 

Turbulence occurs when up-down drafts, cross currents, heat waves, and other 
atmospheric phenomena disrupt beams, the efficiency of which may fall by a factor of 
1 00 to 300 within a few miles 

Particle Beams. Particle beams differ from lasers in that they project a stream of highly 
energetic electrons, protons, neutrons, hydrogen atoms, or ions rather than radiant photons. 
Charged particle beams propagate well in Earth's atmosphere regardless of weather, but 
ranges at this writing are strictly limited. Weather is irrelevant with regard to neutral particle 
beams, which propagate only in the vacuum of space. 41 

IMPACT ON MILITARY PERSONNEL 

Military men and women exposed daily to the elements cannot decide whether extreme heat 
or extreme cold is worse, but informal polls put one or both of those abominations at the 
bottom of almost everybody's list, regardless of individual tolerances, physical conditioning, 
and degrees of acclimatization. Cold coupled with bitter winds and heat coupled with high 
humidity are the worst weather combinations by consensus. 

Cruel Cold. Dry cold below freezing encourages frostbite among poorly clothed and 
trained personnel. German Armed Forces in Russia suffered 100,000 casualties from that 
cause during the winter of 1941-1942, of which 15,000 required amputations. Human 
breath turned to icicles in that brutal cold, eyelids froze together, flesh that touched metal 
cold-welded, gasoline accidentally sprayed on bare skin raised blisters the size of golf balls, 
butchers' axes rebounded like boomerangs from horse meat as solid as stone, and cooks 
sliced butter with saws. Dehydration, contrary to popular misconceptions, can be prevalent 
in frigid weather when personnel exhale bodily moisture with every breath. Low 
temperatures, which inhibit clotting, cause wounds to bleed more freely, and severe shock 
due to slow circulation sets in early unless treated expeditiously. U.S. medics armed with 
morphine for that purpose once kept syringes in their armpits so they would be warm enough 
to work when needed. High-Altitude High-Opening (HAHO) parachutists who exit aircraft 
in subzero temperatures experience extreme chill when they free-fall for 30 minutes or more 
at a terminal velocity of 120 miles per hour (193 kph). Survival often becomes the only 
practicable objective of forces on the ground when wind chill factors plummet far below 
freezing. 42 

Wet cold is even more debilitating in some respects. Crippling trench foot, a classic 
casualty producer, is caused by prolonged immersion of lower legs and feet at temperatures 
a bit above freezing. Prominent symptoms begin with numbness, followed by swelling, 
terrible pain and, in untreated cases, gangrene. During World War II, in the European 
Theater of Operations, trench foot assumed epidemic proportions among U.S. combat 
infantrymen who for days on end waded rather than marched through chilly muck, lived in 
water-filled foxholes, and lacked access to shelter or dry shoes and socks. More than 45,000 
of them filled field hospitals to overflowing between November 1 944 and February 1 945, a 
loss equivalent to the front-line rifle strength of 10 divisions. 43 



"-*- : -- ------ '- - ' - '- : - : - : : x : : x : : : : r-v.:.^^ 

88 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Oppressive Heat. Armed forces in enervating heat face a different set of difficulties. 
Water consumption soars to prevent dehydration, since exertions over an 8-hour period in 
1 00 F (38 C) heat demand about 1 5 quarts a day (1 4 liters). Logisticians in the desert are 
hard pressed to supply huge loads, which amount to 30 pounds per person, or 270 tons for 
an 18,000-man U.S. armored division. Heat coupled with high humidity saps strength more 
quickly, especially when military personnel wear flak jackets or don protective clothing in 
anticipation of enemy chemical warfare attacks. 44 Myriad other matters attract concerted 
attention. Food handlers, for example, fight a ceaseless war against bacteria that contaminate 
un refrigerated perishables in mobile kitchens lacking modern amenities. The rate of gum 
accumulations in stored gasoline quadruples with each 20 F increase in temperature, which 
clogs filters and lowers octane ratings when forces deplete stockpiles slowly. 

Hypothermia occurs when human body temperature drops below normal (98.6 F), 
whether surroundings be cold, cool, or warm individuals can become hypothermic in 80 
F (26.7 C) water if immersed too long. The first visible signs may be uncontrollable 
shivering and impaired abilities to accomplish simple tasks. Sluggishness and amnesia 
appear next if body temperature continues to drop, then shivering ceases, stupor sets in, and 
respiration slows. Heart failure, internal bleeding, and death occur below about 78 F (25.6 
C) unless warmth, dry clothing, and perhaps stimulants reverse that process in time. 45 
Combat swimmers in seas between 60 and 40 F wear wet suits that trap a thin layer of warm 
water next to their skin (synthetics that "breathe" better than rubber are preferred materials). 
Watertight dry suits over thermal underwear are essential in colder water. 46 



KEY POINTS 

Weather and climate influence almost every military activity on land, at sea, and in the 
air during peacetime as well as war. 

Military strategists and long-range planners rely on climatological statistics that observers 
in many locations around the world have collected over periods that usually span many 
years. 

Military tacticians and short-range planners rely primarily on current weather forecasts 
that seldom peer more than a few days into the future. 

All atmospheric phenomena and ambient light levels influence operations by all military 
services in various ways and differing degrees 

Extremely hot and cold temperatures, high humidity, water-logged soils, and snow- 
covered terrain impose critical constraints upon ground forces. 

High winds, stormy seas, extremely cold temperatures, and sea ice impose critical 
constraints upon surface navies. 

Low cloud ceilings, low visibility, winds, air currents, and barometric pressures impose 
critical constraints upon land-based and naval air operations. 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 89 



1 . Carlo d'Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: Harper Collins, 1 995), 685-688. 

2. John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1 969), 375-430. 

3. William L. Donn, Meteorology With Marine Applications, 1 st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1946); Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography, 2 d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), 
chapters 7, 8, 1 0, 1 1 ; Guy Murchie, Song of the Sky (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1 954). 

4. Physical Geography, 76-78; Field Manual 34-81 -1 : Battlefield Weather Effects (Washington, 
DC: Dept. of the Army, December 23, 1 992), 2-4, 3-6, 3-7, G1 0, G1 2, G1 6. 

5. The Air Almanac (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, issued annually). 

6. FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis (Washington: Dept. of the Army, July 1 990), B-1 , B-2; FM 34-81 - 
1 : Battlefield Weather Effects, 2-7; Air Force Doctrine Document 45: Aerospace Weather Operations 
(Washington, DC: Dept. of the Air Force, August 31 , 1 994), 2-4. 

7. Author's recollections as Chief, Campaign Planning Group, U.S. Army, Vietnam, 1 967-1 968; 
Harlan G. Koch, "Monsoons and Military Operations," Military Review 45, no. 6 (June 1 965): 25-34. 

8 . Physical Geography, 182-188. 

9. Ibid., 1 88-1 93; 1 94-255 elaborate region by region. 

10. For representative guidelines, see Joint Pub 3-59: Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and 
Oceanographic Support (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 
22, 1993) and Air Force Doctrine Document 45: Aerospace Weather. Historical background is 
available in John F. Fuller, Thor's Legions: Weather Support to the U.S. Air Force and Army, 1937- 
1987 (Boston, MA: American Meteorological Society, 1 990). 

1 1 . William J. Cook, "Ahead of the Weather," U.S. News and World Report, April 29, 1 996, 55- 
57; Kevin McManus, "Data from Weather-Observing System Sometimes All Wet," Washington Post, 
January 22, 1996, A3. 

12. Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1 952), 91 -304. 

13. Allen F. Chew, "Beating the Russians in the Snow: The Finns and the Russians, 1940," 
Military Review 60, no. 6 (June 1980): 38-47, and Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case 
Studies, Leavenworth Papers No. 5 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, Combat Studies Institute, December 1981), 17-30. 

1 4. Samuel van Valkenburg, ed v America at War: A Geographical Analysis (New Yo'rk: Prentice- 
Hall, 1942), 103. 

15. Leon Wolff, In Flanders Fields: The 1917 Campaign (New York: Viking Press, 1958), 
especially xii, 81 -87, chapters 9 and 1 3. 

16. The Winter Line, American Forces in Action Series (Washington, DC: Historical Division, 
U.S. War Dept., June 1 4, 1 945), 5, 1 5, 88, 90. 

1 7. FM 34-81 -1 : Battlefield Weather Effects, appendices B-D, H, J. 

1 8. S. L. A. Marshall, Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, Winter 1950-51 (Chevy 
Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1 951 ), 21 , 94, 101. 

1 9. U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships (Washington, DC: Chief of Naval 
Operations, Surface Ship Survivability Office, OP 03C2, May 1 988), 2-9 to 2-1 1 , 6-5-6-7, 6-1 0, 7-1 , 
8-1 to 8-4. 

20. Ibid., 8-1 to 8-4 

21. Ibid., 2-1 and 2-2, 2-4, 7-1. - 

22. "Special Boat Section," Naval Special Warfare Command Fact File (Coronado, CA: January 
1 993); What Is Naval Special Warfare?, undated (1 993), 8, 1 1 , 25-28, 30-37. 

23. Richard Marcinko, Rogue Warrior (New York: Pocket Books, 1 992), 250-254. 

24. Air Force Instruction 1 1 -206: General Flight Rules (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Air Force, 
July 25, 1 994), chapters 7-8; OPNAV Instruction 371 0.7Q: NATOPS General Flight and Operating 
Instructions (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, May 1 , 1 995), 5.1 0-5.1 5; 



90 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Army Regulation 95-1 : Flight Regulations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, May 30, 1 990), 9-10, 
21-23. 

25. For weather effects on helicopter operations, see Aviation Weather, 1 6 student handouts 
2/5/9/9E-0525-23 (Fort Rucker, AL: U.S. Army Aviation Center, 1995). 

26. NAVAIR 00-80T-105:CVNATOPS Manual (Washington, DC: Naval Air Systems Command, 
December , 1 985), 5-1 8 and 5-1 9; Steve York, Meteorological and Sea Surface Effect Upon Naval 
Aviation, memorandum to the author, June 1 996. 

27. Brian Carfield, The Thousand Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday, 1969), 114. 

28. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 974), 41 6-41 8. 

29. Warfighting and Weather: Bosnia 1995, a briefing slide (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Director, Air Force Weather Service, undated, 1996); "Fog Again Prevents U.S. Forces From Reaching 
Tulza," Washington Post, December 1 8, 1995, 16. 

30. Air Force Instruction 1 1 -206, 1 6; OPNAV Instruction 371 0.7Q, 8-4. 

31 . Glenn B. Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler's Commando (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1 981 ), 29-45. 

32. Jerry Adler and Rod Nordland, "High Risk," Newsweek, May 27, 1 996, 55, 57. 

33. John R. Galvin, Air Assault (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1969), 97-110. 

34. Rescue Mission Report (The Holloway Report) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff Special 
Review Group, 1 980), 9-1 0, 38-45; James H. Kyle, The Guts to Try (New York: Orion, 1 990), 246- 
255; Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1985), 
67-75. 

35. DA Pamphlet 39-3: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, February 1964), 436-488. 

36. Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Office of 
Technology Assessment, December 1993), 103, 105; The Problem of Chemical and Biological 
Warfare, vol. 2, CB Weapons Today (New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
1 973), 37-48, 61 -72; Terrance and Kathleen White, "Biological Weapons: How Big Is the Threat?" 
International Defense Review, August 1990, 843, 845. 

37. FM 21-40: Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Defense (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 
October 15, 1977), chapters 1 and 5; ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Technical Publication PL-2 
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Yards and Docks, Dept. of the Navy, April 1960), chapters 2-4. 

38. FM 34-81 -1 : Battlefield Weather Effects, appendix F. 

39. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Owning the Night," and John G. Roos, "Generation Gap," Armed 
Forces Journal International (May 1996): 40, 43-45; Robert G. McClintic, "Rolling Back the Night," 
Army 1 9, no. 8 (August 1 969): 28-35. 

40. Kosta Tsipis, "Laser Weapons," Scientific American (December 1 981 ): 54-57. 

41 . "Report to the APS of the Study Group on Science and Technology of Directed Energy 
Weapons: Executive Summary and Major Conclusions," Physics Today (May 1987): S-8, S-10. 

42. FM 34-81 -1 : Battlefield Weather Effects, L-1 through L-3; U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook 
for Surface Ships, 9-2, 10-1,1 0-6, 1 0-7. 

43. Graham A. Cosmas and Albert E. Cowdrey, Medical Service in the European Theater of 
Operations, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 
1 992), 488-496; U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships, 9-2, 1 0-6. 

44. FM 34-81 -1 : Battlefield Weather Effects, L-3 through L-6. 

45. U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships, 9-1 , 1 0-4 and 1 0-5. 

46. Peter B. Bennett and David H. Elliott, eds., The Physiology and Medicine of Diving, 4 th ed. 
(Philadelphia, PA: W. B. Saunders), 302-341 . 



EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE 91 



6, REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 



Den Brer Rabbit talk mighty 'umble. "I don't keer w'at you do wid me, Brer Fox, " sezee, "so 
you don't fling me in dat briar-patch. Roas' me, Brer Fox, " sezee, "but don't fling me in dat 
briar patch, " sezee. 

Joel Chandler Harris, 

"The Briar Patch/' Uncle Remus: 

His Songs and His Sayings 



READINESS TO ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED MISSIONS WHEREVER AND WHENEVER REQUIRED HAS BEEN AN 

imperative military objective since time immemorial. Preparations, however, must suit 
situations, because neither man nor beast can be equally well prepared for every eventuality. 
Brer Rabbit, "bred and bawn in a briar-patch," knew he could out-fox Brer Fox in the 
brambles, but was bound to lose on bare ground. Military machines tailored to suit any given 
situation on land, at sea, in the air, or in space similarly function most effectively in disparate 
environments only after they satisfactorily modify strategies, tactics, techniques, weaponry, 
equipment, clothing, and supplies. 

Wise commanders, well aware that every geographical area of responsibility (AOR) 
possesses unique spatial relationships, topography, oceanographic characteristics, weather, 
and climate, honor the Principle of Regional Peculiarity, which posits, "Armed forces perform 
best when organized, equipped, and trained to accomplish particular missions in particular 
geographic locales/' 1 The following discourse, which incorporates considerations covered 
in chapters 1 through 5, addresses seven distinctive regions that affect military operations in 
markedly different ways: frigid flatlands; frigid seas; mountains; deserts; forests; wetlands; and 
coastal waters. 



FRIGID FLATLANDS 

Most military activities on polar ice caps thus far have been confined to scientific 
investigations such as those at Camp Century, near Thule, Greenland, and Little America in 
Antarctica. 2 There is no evidence that competition for potentially valuable resources beneath 
those wastelands will soon culminate in armed combat, but perennially and seasonably 
frigid flatlands that extend as far south as the northern United States, much of European 
Russia, and central Siberia have seen vicious wars in the past and likely will again (map 1 2). 3 



^ 

93 



Map 1 2. Frigid Flatlands 




PERSONAL SURVIVAL 

Military manuals and commanders invariably emphasize mission accomplishment, but 
subordinates exposed to killing cold often put personal survival first. Robert W. Service noted 
one offbeat technique in his poem about Sam McGee, a poorly acclimated prospector who 
begged to be cremated just before he succumbed on a frigid night in Alaska: 

And there sat Sam, looking cool and calm, in the 

heart of the furnace roar. 
And he wore a smile you could see a mile, and 

he said, "Please close that door. 
It's fine in here, but I greatly fear you'll let in 

the cold and storm- 
Since I left Plumtree down in Tennessee, it's 

the first time I've been warm." 4 

Real world warriors unfortunately find Sam McGee' s solution an unsatisfactory way to 
prevent disabling frostbite, hypothermia, dehydration, and cold-related diseases such as 
influenza in regions so frigid that spit crackles before it hits the ground and human flesh 
freezes in less than a minute after exposure to cruel winds. Practical measures then become 
crucially important to combat forces and logistical troops alike. 5 

Arbitrary cold weather uniform regulations are inadvisable, because metabolisms differ 
and co Id- wet/cold-dry requirements are dissimilar in some respects, but six or seven layers 
of clothing that are relatively light, loose, wind resistant, waterproof, and warm are preferable 



94 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



to one or two heavy garments in any case. Typical articles include long underwear, a woolen 
shirt and trousers, quilted coat and trouser liners, wind-breaker jacket and trousers, a pile cap 
with earflaps, a fluffy face mask, a parka liner, and parka. Cushion-sole socks, vapor boots 
(best for use with skis, snow shoes, and by troops in static positions), mukluks, gloves 
(preferably mittens), and a white camouflage suit round out each individual's wardrobe. 
Body armor adds bulk and weight, but goggles or other protection against snow blindness do 
not. 

Combat and support troops engaged in strenuous activities must guard against 
overdressing, which can be just as injurious as overexposure if excessive perspiration leads 
to exhaustion or evaporation causes bodies to cool too rapidly. Experienced personnel 
consequently unbutton, unzip, or shed clothing to ensure proper ventilation whenever 
necessary. Chemical warfare in cold climes poses two special risks: impervious protective 
shells, which must be baggy enough to slip over all other layers, are virtually impossible to 
vent; rubber masks cannot be worn over beards, remain pliable enough to ensure an air-tight 
fit only when warm, and encourage frostbitten faces in any cases. b 

Shelter. Shelters frequently spell the difference between life and death in frigid regions. 
Not many troops are as fortunate as U.S. peacekeepers in Bosnia, who soon after arrival were 
able to rotate between the field and elaborate modules where they warmed themselves 
during the winter of 1 995-96, enjoyed hot meals, laundered dirty uniforms, slept on cots, and 
relaxed for 3 days at a time until the next batch of 550 arrived at one of six such "cities." 7 
Most military personnel in wintry areas of operation instead occupy small-to-medium-sized 
tents. Unlike Ringling Brothers, Barnum, and Bailey Circus, which formerly used elephants 
to help roustabouts erect and strike Big Tops, they must unfurl heavy canvas stiff with cold 
(usually in the dark), try to drive tent pegs into tundra frozen harder than bricks (perhaps 
aided by explosives), build snow walls to ward off howling winds, then chop out before they 
displace. Base camps generally boast wooden floors, while warm sleeping bags atop air 
mattresses or other insulating materials are obligatory on bare ground. Troops in the open 
occasionally construct expedient shelters such as igloos and snow caves, which insulate as 
well as rock wool or fiber glass, but truck cabs and armored vehicles make poor bedrooms, 
because carbon monoxide is an ever present danger, and cold, hard surfaces rob sleepers of 
warmth. 8 

Food and Water. Generous, lightweight, well-balanced, nutritious, and preferably warm 
rations are essential in very cold weather, especially for troops engaged in strenuous 
activities. The U.S. Army sets 4,500 calories per day as a goal, although Finnish counterparts 
with greater practical experience recommend 6,000. Sweets make excellent instant-energy 
snacks between regular meals. Commanders and cooks must constantly bear in mind that 
food not in well-insulated containers will freeze in transit between kitchens and consumers. 
Each individual moreover requires 4 to 6 quarts (liters) of drinking water per day to prevent 
dehydration in cold weather, although adequate sources are difficult to tap when streams turn 
to ice. Five-gallon (1 8-liter) cans as well as canteens freeze fast in subzero temperatures, even 
when first filled with hot water. Problems compound when logisticians factor in water for 
hygienic purposes, not to mention huge amounts needed to decontaminate units hit by 
persistent chemical warfare agents. 9 

Leadership. Physical fitness, acclimatization, and training may prepare military men and 
women for cold weather warfare, but ample food, proper clothing, and adequate shelter 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 95 



cannot sustain them if a sizable percentage, bundled from head to foot against the cold, 
nearly deaf and blinded by parka hoods, begin to hibernate. Strong junior officers and 
noncommissioned officers then become truly indispensable, for units can disintegrate and 
missions fail under such conditions. 

MATERIEL MAINTENANCE 

Big maintenance problems begin to develop at about -1 0F (-23 C) and intensify with every 
degree that thermometers drop thereafter: 

Lubricants stiffen. 

Metals lose tensile strength. 

Rubber loses plasticity. 

Plastics and ceramics become less ductile. 

Battery efficiencies decrease dramatically. 

Fuels vaporize incompletely. 

Glass cracks when suddenly heated. 

Seals are subject to failure. 

Static electricity increases. 

Gauges and dials stick. 

Combustion engines are hard to start, partly because battery output at best is far below 
normal (practically zero at -40 F and -40 C). Tires inflated in garages at moderate 
temperatures slip on rims and rip off valve stems when trucks drive out the door into extreme 
cold. The value of collapsible fuel bladders is dubious below about -20 F (-29 C), cold- 
soaked connectors, control knobs, and electrical contacts are hard to assemble and repair, 
and fiberglass water trailers freeze because they cannot tolerate immersion heaters. 
Flammable fuels are apt to erupt unless motor vehicles and tent stoves are properly grounded. 
Maintenance man-hours required to cope with such problems balloon in the absence of 
heated facilities. More of almost everything is needed: more mechanics, more battery 
chargers, more replacement parts, more fuel. Different oils and greases also are required. 10 

Cold weather increases aircraft maintenance difficulties by at least one order of 
magnitude, greater in the absence of overhaul hangars. De-icing is crucially important, 
because even a thin coating on air foils can be fatal. Eight F-84 fighters, for example, crashed 
shortly after take-off in the early 1950s, because ice that blocked jet intakes caused their 
engines to explode. 11 

MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT 

Whether frigid flatlands favor offense or defense is subject to conjecture. Forces on the attack 
benefit from blowing snow, which facilitates surprise but makes land navigation difficult for 
troops that lack Global Positioning System (GPS) assistance. Defenders in static observation 
posts benefit from blizzards that cover tracks and camouflage positions, but generally suffer 
more cold casualties than offensive forces on patrol. Brilliant thermal contrasts caused by hot 
objects against cold backgrounds such as moving vehicles and heated tents may benefit 
one side, both, or neither. Blankets of snow that reflect moonlight, starlight, and the Aurora 



96 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Borealis on long winter nights illuminate friend and foe alike. Cold weather limitations on 
mobility and logistics, which elementally influence mission accomplishment, are amplified 
below. 

Overland Mobility. Infantrymen, who regularly log about 3 miles an hour on level to 
rolling terrain, struggle through knee-deep snow and come to a standstill when drifts are 
sticky or much deeper, whereas heavily laden military skiers, tutored by skilled instructors 
during long periods of intensive training, glide over such surfaces. Snowshoeing is less 
glamorous, slower, and requires greater exertion, but most troops can learn all they need to 
know in an hour or so. Trailbreakers normally leave early to blaze the way and, when 
necessary, navigate for the main body through trackless territory where few topographic 
features make prominent landmarks (hi-tech global positioning devices tell troops where they 
are but not how to set true courses). 12 

Any tendency for armed forces to be roadbound degrades military capabilities at every 
level, because frigid flatlands combine wretched cross-country trafficability with exceedingly 
sparse transportation networks. All-wheel drive trucks as a rule bog down when snows on 
roads measure more than one-third of wheel diameters, stall in line waiting for plows to clear 
the way through deep drifts, and cannot easily traverse tundra or muskeg even when the land 
is bare. Track-laying vehicles, which are better able to negotiate rough ground, lose traction 
when snows are much deeper than their ground clearance. Tank drivers who repeatedly rock 
back and forth trying to break through put power plants, drive trains, and sprockets under 
great stress and make it difficult for recovery crews to set them free if they finally go belly up. 
The utility of tractor-drawn cargo sleds, snowmobiles, air-cushion vehicles, and other special 
purpose transports skyrockets under such conditions, 13 but frozen lakes and streams make 
safe routes if load-bearing capacities are sufficient for vehicles of particular weights and 
drivers proceed single file at specified intervals. Soviet forces during the winter of 1 941 -42, 
for example, delivered substantial supplies to starving Leningrad via the "Road of Life" across 
Lake Ladoga, despite intense German artillery fire and aerial bombardment. 14 

Air Power. Frigid flatlands are sparsely settled except along the southern fringe. That 
geographic fact magnifies needs to gain and retain air superiority as soon as possible, so that 
air combat forces can conduct reconnaissance, deep-strike, and close-support missions while 
air mobility forces deploy, redeploy, supply, evacuate, and otherwise support troops on the 
ground. Frozen lakes and streams make extemporaneous airfields for lightly laden ski planes 
ifter engineers smooth out rough spots and helicopters enjoy large latitude in their choice 
of landing zones, but fighter, attack, bomber, and airlift squadrons that lack very short or 
vertical takeoff and landing (VSTOL, VTOL) capabilities require hard-surfaced runways. 

Military air operations always are iffy in wintry weather, which often poses worse hazards 
than armed enemies. Improperly insulated buildings, black-topped runways, taxi strips, and 
parking areas collapse if they absorb enough sunshine to melt underlying permafrost. Low 
ceilings, ice fog, and snow storms may prevent takeoffs or landings for several consecutive 
days, while wind-driven drifts close airports unless cleared repeatedly. Sensible commanders 
suspend close air support missions when "whiteouts" drastically reduce horizontal visibility 
and "grayouts" distort depth perception during prolonged periods of morning and evening 
twilight. 15 Heliborne and parachute assaults are numbing propositions in subzero weather, 
as members of the U.S. 504 th Parachute Infantry Regiment discovered in February 1954 
during Operation Arctic Night near Thule, Greenland, when thermometers read -35 F (-37 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 97 



C), the airspeed was 130 knots, and the prop blast that hit them as they leaped through wide 
open doors was far colder than conventional wind-chill charts ever register (table 7, page 73). 
Only strict discipline and thoughtful preparations prevented jump injuries and cold 
casulaties 16 

Supply. Cold clime logistical loads expand prodigiously in response to requirements for 
more of almost everything from rations, clothing, tents, water heaters, and stoves to 
whitewash, snow plows, antifreeze, batteries, repair parts, construction materials, and 
specialized accouterments such as snow shoes and skis. Armed forces in wintry weather 
burn fuel at outrageous rates. Motor vehicles churning through snow, for example, consume 
perhaps 25 percent more than on solid ground. It takes 1 gallons (38 liters) of diesel per day 
to keep a 10-man squad tent habitable when thermometers register -20 F (-29 Q. 
Additional petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) supplies are needed to keep distributors in 
business. Small wonder, therefore, that centralized logistic facilities, including field kitchens 
(the main source of warm meals for ground combat forces), often become tempting targets 
in frigid flatlands. 17 

FRIGID SEAS 

Fierce seafarers dressed in wild animal skins were familiar with frigid seas long before Viking 
raiders invaded Ireland in the 6th century A.D. Naval interests in the North Atlantic, North 
Pacific, and Arctic Oceans, which intensified sharply during World War II, remained strong 
throughout the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (1 946-1 989) and 
likely will continue to do so, because all three are strategically located. 

SURFACE OPERATIONS 

The subfreezing weather that creates frigid seas confines surface combatants, support ships, 
and merchantmen inside ice-clogged harbors much of the year unless icebreakers clear the 
way to open water. All crews, ships, and embarked aircraft experience many of the problems 
that afflict armed forces ashore and endure additional hardships that are uniquely naval. 

Icebreakers. No nation has greater need for icebreakers than Russia, where only the 
Black Sea Fleet enjoys ice-free ports (map 1 on page 1 2 and map 8 on page 51 ). The Gulf of 
Finland often freezes 3-feet (1 -meter) thick at Saint Petersburg and Kronstadt, which is home 
port for the Baltic Fleet. The Northern Fleet, ensconced near the Norwegian frontier where 
the Gulf Stream slightly warms the Barents Sea, is situated more favorably but still relies on 
icebreakers, as do ships of Russia's Pacific Fleet as far south as Vladivostok, where assistance 
is essential from November through March as a minimum. No naval base save 
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, washed by the relatively tepid Kurishio Current, has easy access 
to the ocean. 

Russians since the late 19th century consequently have specialized in icebreakers, which 
not only unclog their ports during brutal winters but drive wedges between floes on high seas, 
locate leads in polar ice, widen such channels for ships that follow in trail, and otherwise 
facilitate naval operations. Icebreakers of all countries characteristically are stubby enough 
to maneuver in close quarters and feature broad beams designed to cut wide swaths, enough 
horsepower to slice paths where required without repeated ramming, cutaway bows that ride 
over ice instead of hitting it head on, and reinforced hulls flared to lift the ship under pressure 
rather than let it be crushed. Huge fuel expenditures in regions where underway 



98 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



i replenishment may be impossible led the Soviet Union in 1 957 to develop and deploy the 
Lenin, the world's first nuclear-powered icebreaker expressly designed to bull its way through 
ice fields more than 6 feet (2 meters) thick and remain self-sufficient for more than a year. 18 
Housekeeping Problems and Responses. Surface ships and crews that cannot cope well 
with freezing temperatures, wild winds, and towering waves can anticipate cruel treatment. 
Routine preparations in many respects parallel those of armed forces in dank arctic regions 
ashore: protective clothing to shield wearers against cold weather; rations with high caloric 
contents; warm quarters; winterized weapons and equipment; specialized supplies; and 
preventive maintenance precautions. 19 Housekeeping problems peculiar to life aboard naval 
ships nevertheless are evident. 

Cramped compartments put storage space for cold weather gear at a premium, especially 
on board small surface combatants such as destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. It takes about 
1 cubic foot, for example, to stow the layered winter clothing of each individual, twice that 
much for one-piece exposure suits. Galleys generally must find room for 1 percent more 
food than they stock in warmer climes. Bulky drums of antifreeze, ice preventives, de-icing 
chemicals, and heavy bags of sand soak up precious space. So do additional repair parts 
needed to compensate for abnormally rapid expenditures as a direct result of severe weather. 
Commanders also must accommodate many awkwardly dimensioned implements, lash down 
impedimenta that does not fit in lockers, and assure easy access to stocks in greatest demand. 
What to take and what to leave behind involves painful tradeoffs. 20 

Frozen salt water spray, unknown inland, can cover decks, bulkheads, superstructures, 
air intakes, hatches, masts, rigging, exposed machinery, antennas, and weapon systems with 
thick layers of ice that increase displacement, decrease freeboard, degrade combat 
capabilities and, if not countered in time, endanger ship stability. Rock salt, calcium 
chloride, ethylene glycol, ethanol, urea, and other materials that depress the freezing point 
of sea water cause ice to melt at temperatures well below 28.5 F (2 C), but caution is 
advisable, because all mingle good and bad attributes. Urea emits ammonia gas and is not 
as efficient as salts pound per pound, but is less corrosive. Ethylene glycol, which works 
better than most substitutes at temperatures as low as 5 F (-1 5 C), is expensive and creates 
slippery surfaces. The Law of Diminishing Returns consequently determines which 
applications would be most cost effective and simultaneously least detrimental. 21 

Hazards Underway. Surface ships underway in arctic and antarctic waters even during 
summer months face hazards that no other regions duplicate. Tremendous waves on July 1 8, 
1 942, not only dumped water down the air intakes of rolling destroyers between Kodiak, 
Jaska, and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands but induced seasickness to such an extent that 
"vomit clung to every surface." Shipmates on the heavy cruiser Indianapolis, who almost 
immediately rescued a man overboard, discovered that hypothermia already had killed him. 
Sister ships curtsied past each other in dense fog until two blinded destroyers finally collided, 
then a third rammed a fourth, whereupon the task force returned to port without firing a 
;hot. 22 

Perpetual ice packs cover the Arctic Ocean between 90 and 80 or so north latitude, but 
the irregularly shaped Marginal Ice Zone (MIZ) that forms farther south each winter 
sometimes extends fingers as far as Newfoundland and the Sea of Japan. Surface ships that 
venture into the mushy forward edge of the MIZ without icebreaker assistance may damage 
screws and rudders, while those that proceed too far risk major hull damage or could be 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 99 



immobilized until rescuers arrive. Floes that vary from a few feet to several miles in width 
habitually break off from the MIZ and float south, accompanied in the North Atlantic by 
icebergs that primarily originate in Greenland, Baffin Island, and Svalbard. 23 

Allied convoys that carried U.S. Lend-lease supplies from Iceland to arctic ports in the 
Soviet Union dodged those floating obstacles as well as enemy armed forces during World 
War II (maps 1 3 and 1 4). Crews on the so-called "Murmansk Run" were tethered by life lines 
to hawsers that stretched from bow to stern on each pitching ship. Tanks, locomotives, 
trucks, and crated aircraft had to be winched back into place repeatedly after wrenching 
motions broke their bonds. Convoy PQ-13, which left Reykjavik in March 1942, first met 
1 00-mile-per-hour winds that scattered 1 9 of its cargo ships and 9 escorts over 1 50 miles of 
the Barents Sea, then came under relentless German bomber and submarine attacks. Many 
crewmen perished in the frigid waters or suffered from severe frostbite before 11 of 35 
transports finally completed that traumatic voyage in~July (three ships survived because 
whitewash and bedding sheets helped them blend with ice floes). 24 

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 

The search for a Northeast Passage that skirted Siberia from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean 
started in the 16th century with four fearless navigators: Hugh Willoughby, Richard 
Chancellor, Stephen Burrough, and Willem Barents. Four more failed to find a Northwest 
Passage along what currently is Canada's arctic frontier (Giovanni da Verrazano, Sir Martin 
Frobisher, John Davis, and Henry Hudson). Baron Nils Nordenskiold finally made the trip 
from west to east in 1 878-1 879 and Roald Amundson took a 3-year trek from east to west 
between 1904 and 1906, 25 but we now know that no militarily reliable arctic route for 
surface ships exists in either direction, even in summer with the aid of icebreakers. 

Naval operations beneath ice-filled seas nevertheless have been feasible since the U.S. 
nuclear-powered attack submarine Nautilus (SSN-571), equipped with special sonar and 
navigational gear, crossed under the polar ice pack en route from Seattle, Washington, to the 
Atlantic Ocean in August .1 958. 2b The Skate (SSN-578), with a hardened sail and other novel 
features, surfaced though heavy ice the following year (map 1 5). 

Soviet ballistic missile submarines occupied bastions beneath the Barents Sea and the Sea 
of Okhotsk late in the Cold War, but naval strategists and tacticians believe that cat-and- 
mouse competition could spread to other peripheral seas in Marginal Ice Zones south of the 
Arctic Ocean. Oceanographers, who are amassing detailed intelligence concerning 
bathymetry, topographic characteristics, water densities, bio-acoustics, sound transition, and 
ambient noise, conclude that the floating canopy of sea ice, which measures from 1 to more 
than 100 feet (30 meters) thick, is rock hard on top, has the consistency of cheap concrete 
below, is a dynamic mass under constant thermal stress, and moves sluggishly in predictable 
directions under the influence of currents and prevailing winds. Underneath, it constitutes 
an upside down world of bad lands, buttes, blocks, ridges, spires, hills, dales, planes, open 
cracks, lakes, and massive imprisoned icebergs, all superimposed above a similar landscape 
that shapes the floor. 27 Submarines able to operate most effectively in that complex 
environment could safely ignore high speed and deep submergence abilities but need an 
array of sophisticated navigation and target acquisition/tracking sensors that scan 360 degrees 
front and rear, left and right, above and below. Reliable ways to surface through solid ice 
also seem obligatory, because crews otherwise would perish if air supplies failed for any 

OTffliMMMMMtiffltiMM^^ 



1 00 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 1 3. Iceberg Routes to the North Atlantic 



\ V 



\ \ \ \ 



GREENLAND 



NO SIGNIFICANT 

OCCURENCE OF BERG 

CALVING 61 N TO 6830'N 



BAFFIN 
ISLAND 



SON&RE STROMFJORD 



MANY SMALL BERGS 

CALVED IN FJORDS 

SOUTH OF 61 N 



LABRADOR 
(NEWFOUNDLAND) 



GENERAL DRIFT PATTERN 
OF ICEBERGS 



DRIFT PATTERN IN REGION 
OF HEAVIEST CALVING 



MAJOR DRIFT PATTERN 
SECONDARY DRIFT PATTERN 



NEWFOUNDLAND 




REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 



101 



Map 14. The "Murmansk Run' 



^y 



Arkhangelsk 



m y- 





St. Petersburg 
(Leningrad) 



l^M^M^M^ 

"' Bllililpl'i 

^M-tiortJ& 

>S:;:x:S:^S^ifl:>;x 



RUSSIA 



Moscow 



reason. Combat could be likened to jungle warfare in at least one respect: heavily armed 
defenders could silently wait until adversaries creeping through the clutter come within 
reach, then trigger ambushes. The quest for offensive countermeasures consequently 
emphasizes stealthiness and abilities to differentiate friends from foes quickly at close 
quarters. Some authorities also believe that stubby, ellipsoidal submarines should replace 
long, cigar-shaped models that cannot maneuver well in tight spaces. 28 

MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS 

Imposing mountains that girdle the Pacific Basin and cut across Eurasia, together with high 
hills on every continent save Australia, constitute almost half of Earth's surface above sea 
level (map 1 6). All ranges, chains, and Cordilleras large and small feature compartmented 
topography, steep gradients, and few high speed avenues, but latitudes, elevations, shapes, 
soils, hydrology, vegetation, and climate nevertheless produce distinctive variations. 2 '' Snow- 
covered European Alps are quite unlike the relatively low but rugged Sierra Maestras that 
harbored Fidel Castro and his revolutionary band before they overthrew Cuban dictator 
Fulgencio Batista in 1959. 30 Sere spires in the Sahara and neighboring Sinai only faintly 
resemble forested slopes in rain-drenched Vietnam. The military implications of mountainous 
regions moreover are controversial, because tactical advantages sometimes become strategic 
liabilities, and vice versa. 



102 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 15. The Arctic Ocean and Peripheral Seas 




w 

m 



COMMON DENOMINATORS 

Environmental adversity overcome only by special skills characterizes all mountains, 
regardless of their configuration or locale. Armed forces that are superlatively prepared for 
operations on flatlands often do poorly until they adjust. 

Environmental Adversity. British Field Marshal the Viscount Slim once ruefully observed 
that senior military planners who plot distances and calculate movement times on small-scale 
maps cannot appreciate what impediments mountains impose. "To do that/' he opined, "you 
must scramble up the precipitous slopes and slide down the other side, endlessly, as if you 
were walking along the teeth of a saw/' 3 

Movement indeed is difficult in mountainous terrain where obstacles abound, defiles limit 
aneuver room, and armed forces perched above are well positioned to dominate opponents 
below. Motorized conveyances as a rule are confined to roads that, with few exceptions, are 
rudimentary, narrow, and poorly constructed, with steep shoulders, switchback curves, 
numerous bridges (many of them flimsy), tunnels, trestles, and culverts, all of which restrict 
traffic flow and invite enemy interdiction. One disabled tank or truck, even a jackknifed 
trailer, could immobilize an entire column under such conditions. Steep slopes stymie 
wheeled vehicles and discourage tanks which may stall, slide, throw a track on loose gravel, 
or topple sideways if driven on too sharp a slant. Cross-country trafficability consequently is 
confined to foot troops and pack animals in the worst areas. Air mobility is a welcome 
supplement when weather permits, but is unreliable because thick fog or strong winds 
accompanied by severe turbulence often intervene unexpectedly and disrupt flight operations 
for prolonged periods. 32 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 



103 



Map 1 6. Major Mountainous Regions 




Mountain weather, typified by meteorological anomalies such as temperature inversions, 
capricious winds, and sudden squalls, adversely affects foot sloggers as well as aircraft. 
Intense solar radiation causes valley thermometers to rise swiftly after sunup wherever the 
atmosphere is pollution free and drop after dark as soon as heavy, chilled air drains 
downslope. Daytime temperatures may vary as much as 40 or 50 F (20 or 25 C) between 
sun and shadeat high altitudes. Leeward locations are sheltered from winds, which elsewhere 
sweep across exposed mountainsides and accelerate through constricted passes that act as 
amplifiers. Appropriate uniforms thus depend in large part on particular places and times of 
day troops clad for early morning climbs in cold climates frequently become too warm well 
before noon. 33 

Usable space for airstrips, heavy weapons, and logistic installations usually is scarce, 
cramped, and vulnerable. The airport that serves Sarajevo in former Yugoslavia remained 
open for U.N. humanitarian relief flights in the early 1 990s only at the pleasure of Bosnian 
Serbs, who held commanding high ground until all belligerents accepted the Dayton Accords 
in November 1 995 and NATO deployed powerful peacekeeping forces. 34 Helicopters can 
deposit and provision light artillery batteries in advantageous locations that otherwise would 
be inaccessible, but self-propelled and heavy, towed howitzers seldom stray far from main 
roads along valley floors, which makes it hard for them to hit reverse slopes whenever angles 
of fire are excessively high. Forward observers moreover find that artillery directed against 



104 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 




ridgelines and narrow valleys is difficult to adjust, because slight increases or decreases in 
tube elevation result in wasted rounds that overshoot or land short, perhaps among friendly 
troops. 35 

Special Skills. Requirements for rock climbers who can lug 1 00-pound rucksacks up 90- 
degree angles are limited, because military operations infrequently take place on 
mountainous terrain that demands esoteric techniques. Urgent needs, however, sometimes 
arise, which was the case in December 1943, when 600 U.S. and Canadian riflemen of the 
1 st Special Service Force (the "Devil's Brigade") scaled a 1 ,000-foot (305-meter) cliff that was 
almost perpendicular, then surprised and defeated German defenders atop Monte la Difensa 
near Cassino, Italy. A battalion of the U.S. 10 th Mountain Division equipped with pitons and 
ropes topped that feat 4 months later when they worked their way up the 3,000-foot, very 
nearly vertical, ice-glazed face of Riva Ridge in the northern Apennines with similar results. 36 

The value of large, technologically superior ground forces is less than on level land, 
where they can maneuver fluidly and bring tremendous firepower to bear. Most combat 
missions instead emphasize decentralized small unit actions by subordinate elements of 
standard infantry battalions. Success depends primarily on skilled junior leaders and self- 
eliant foot soldiers who are superbly conditioned and well schooled in the fundamentals of 
ountain warfare (untutored gunners shooting down hill, for example, tend to aim high, 
hile firing up hill has the opposite effect until training corrects those faults). Land 
navigation, scouting, patrolling, cover, concealment, survival, escape and evasion are topics 
that deserve close attention. So does local security, given the fact that mountains have been 
the natural habitat of guerrillas since human beings began to keep records. Dispersed 
command posts, airstrips, and logistic facilities necessarily located at wide spots along well- 
traveled roads make lucrative targets. 37 

Standard infantry divisions tailored for mountain warfare generally replace a good deal 
of heavy equipment with lighter loads that are easily transportable. They also add engineers 
to construct, improve, and maintain roads, trails, airfields, helicopter landing zones, and 
logistical tramways, install obstacles, and prepare field fortifications. Space satellites or 
multichannel relay stations airlifted to perches from which they have long-range views as a 
rule must retransmit FM radio messages that otherwise could not reach intended recipients 
because topographical features block line-of-sight paths. Strenuous activities moreover 
increase requirements for food and water; heavy reliance on helicopters expends aviation fuel 
at abnormally rapid rates; and rough usage calls for unusually large reserves of clothing and 
repair parts, of which tires, tie rods, transmissions, brake shoes, armored vehicle tracks, fuel 
pumps, and winch parts are typical. 38 

Bridges, tunnels, other transportation bottlenecks, and enemy traffic on narrow mountain 
roads are ideal interdiction targets for tactical aircraft armed with precision-guided munitions, 
providing weather permits. Close-air-support (CAS) sorties in tight terrain conversely are 
difficult to control, and crews may run fatal risks if hostile forces seed the most favorable 
approaches with a profusion of air defense weapons that are cleverly concealed and perhaps 
protected by bedrock. Low-level flights by high-performance fixed-wing aircraft and 
unmanned aerial vehicles almost always must follow constricted corridors that expose them 
to enemy weapons on both flanks. 30 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 105 



ENVIRONMENTAL DIVERSITY 

Massive mountains in many respects are very different than high hills, despite the common 
characteristics and interchangeable skills just discussed. Geographical phenomena associated 
with ever thinner air and colder temperatures at high altitudes are militarily more important 
than topographical distinctions. 

Rarefied Atmosphere. The Rockies, Andes, and the awesome Karakorum-Himalayan wall 
that separates China from the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent typify massive mountain chains. 
Nearly 150 peaks top 1 0,000 feet (3,000 meters): 45 in Asia, 33 in the United States, 25 in 
Latin America, 16 in Europe, and 12 in Africa. Antarctica, Greenland, and Oceana contain 
the remainder. Mount Everest, Godwin Austin (K2), and 1 4 other giants that exceed 25,000 
feet (7,600 meters) all dwarf imposing Mont Blanc, the loftiest spot in the Alps at a mere 
1 5,781 feet (4,810 meters). Those figures are significant, because rarefied atmosphere poses 
potentially life threatening problems for land forces transferred on short notice from near sea 
level to elevations much above 10,000 feet. Difficulties increase almost logarithmically 
between 10,000 and 20,000 feet, as 1 6th-century Spanish conquistadors discovered during 
their search for El Dorado on the Peruvian altiplano and as Indian troops reconfirmed in 
1 962, when they rushed from low-lying garrisons to block Chinese intruders knocking at their 
Himalayan door. 40 

Oxygen deprivation, clinically called hypoxia, causes almost all persons in such situations 
to suffer for several days from headaches, shortness of breath, pounding heartbeats, dizziness, 
nausea, fatigue, loss of appetite, and depression. Severe cases may lead to pulmonary 
congestion or cerebral edema, both of which culminate in early death if medics fail to 
evacuate stricken soldiers immediately to lower elevations (2,000 feet/600 meters or less) 
where they can rest, recuperate, and receive supplemental oxygen. Labored breathing in 
thin, dry air not only hastens dehydration but dangerously reduces the water content of 
human blood (from 15 to 50 percent in extreme cases) unless troops regularly replenish 
exhaled fluids. The rapid buildup of red cells at high altitudes encourages frostbite and 
hypothermia, because thickened blood becomes sluggish, especially in hands and feet. 

Even moderate "mountain sickness" inhibits sudden bursts of energy, such as lobbing 
hand grenades and heaving heavy gear onto truck beds. Such symptoms usually fade within 
a few days, but night vision disorders persist for weeks and it normally takes months before 
troops can fully perform duties that demand prolonged exertion or concerted attention to 
detail. Staged ascents that permit 2 to 4 weeks training at intermediate levels en route to 
higher elevations can alleviate if not eliminate most disabilities, but fast-breaking 
contingencies seldom allow such luxuries. The side that acclimatizes first thus enjoys great 
advantage. 4 ' 

Rarefied atmosphere also impairs the performance of air-breathing engines, which, like 
human beings, gasp for oxygen. Trucks overheat and lose 10 to 25 percent of rated 
horsepower at elevations above 7,000 feet (1,800 meters). Poorer than usual acceleration 
and grade-climbing capacities are among the most noticeable consequences. Fixed-wing 
aircraft need longer runways to take off and land with given loads, while helicopters struggle 
to get off the ground with gross weights they could easily lift at sea level. Smart crew chiefs, 
loadmasters, and others who calculate density altitudes therefore allow healthy margins for 
error at destinations as well as points of departure and, if necessary, plan two trips instead of 
one to prevent avoidable accidents. Pilots flying through thin air moreover must constantly 



1 06 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



be alert for vicious air currents and winds that variously blow down slopes after dark, reverse 
course after daybreak, curl over crests, bounce off valley walls, drop aircraft a thousand feet 
or more (300+ meters) in unpredictable down drafts, and whiplash them without warning. 42 
Nap-of-the-earth missions designed to avoid enemy air defense guns and missiles are 
extremely dangerous in mountainous terrain, especially at night under blackout conditions, 
but high-level flights can be equally hazardous. U.S. crews who repeatedly flew heavily 
laden transports 500 treacherous miles over the Himalayan "Hump" from India to China with 
supplies for Chiang Kai-shek, then back again through stormy skies, accomplished logistical 
miracles during World War II (map 1 7). 43 



Map 1 7. The Himalayan Hump 



100 200 Miles 

<p S I I ' 

100 200 300 Kilometers 




H ' V I, 

JoMandalay "j^J ^ \^ *l 



B U R M 




^^/ 



Avalanches. Massive avalanches pose additional dangers wherever deep snows cover steep 
mountains at high elevations (at least 40,000 Austrian and Italian alpine troops were buried 
ilive in Tyrolian territory during World War I, one-fourth of them on 2 terrible days in 1 91 6). 
"he worst avalanches occur on convex slopes, where successive layers of snow come under 
increasing tension until they fracture at the sharpest point on the curve (figure 1 9). 44 Slides 
itart spontaneously when snow banks collapse under their own weight, when rising 
temperatures weaken bonds, and when falling temperatures increase brittleness. Shearing 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 



107 



actions by skis, even snow dropping out of trees, can start the process. Long-range vibrations 
from thunder, sonic booms, explosions, moving vehicles, even the sound of human voices 
can loosen tons of snow that accelerate almost instantaneously from to 60 miles an hour 
or more (1 00 kph) and pulverize everything in their path as they roar down gullies devoid of 
vegetation. Accurate forecasts are not yet possible, so wise commanders avoid suspicious 
spots to the extent possible consistent with their missions, preferably with assistance from 
residents whose first-hand knowledge of local avalanches dates back many years. 



Figure 19. Conditions Conducive to Avalanches 



Probable Line of Fracture 
(Poor Anchorage) 



Steepest Part 
of Slope 




THE RELATIVE VALUE OF VERY HIGH GROUND 

Alexander the Great crossed and re-crossed Central Asia's Hindu Kush circa 329 B.C. through 
wind-swept, snow-covered mountain passes at altitudes between 10,000 and 1 1,000 feet 
(3,050 and 3,350 meters). Hannibal led armed forces over Europe's high Alps from west to 
east five centuries later, followed by Julius Caesar going in the opposite direction on his way 
to Gaul, but those famous warriors, like predecessors and successors ever since, won their 
most decisive victories at moderate elevations. 44 There is no evidence that innovative tactics 
or technologies will substantially increase the relative value of very high ground any time 
soon. 



108 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



DEFENSIVE CREDITS 

Mountainous terrain opens opportunities for numerically inferior but disciplined troops to 
establish defensive positions-in-depth with interlocking fields of fire, take advantage of 
abundant natural obstacles that are difficult to breach, blast field fortifications into bedrock, 
destroy bridges on high-speed enemy approaches, litter other routes with land mines, locate 
tanks and artillery in defilade, implement deception plans, and stockpile supplies 
conveniently. Offensive formations, less familiar with local terrain features, often attack 
across ground devoid of cover and so steep that foxhole digging is impossible. Multiple 
columns that proceed along parallel corridors seldom are mutually supporting, since they can 
neither see nor communicate effectively with each other and, if defenders have chosen 
positions wisely, must assault up hill. 

Celtic, Roman, Burgundian, barbarian, Austrian, Swedish, French, and Prussian warriors 
all failed to defeat defenders in the Vosges Mountains, which seldom exceed 4,000 feet 
(1,220 meters). The U.S. Seventh Army, assisted by strong air power, slugged it out on that 
ancient battleground with German Army Group G from mid-October 1 944 until mid-January 
1 945 before it became the first armed force in history to break through the Vosges against 
determined opposition. 46 Dogged Axis defenders who manned the Winter Line that ran 
across Italy from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Adriatic blocked Allied routes to Rome for 7 
months, between November 1 943 and May 1 944. Monte Cassino, the most publicized cork 
in that bottle, is barely 1,700 feet high (520 meters), but tough German paratroopers 
ensconced on top resisted long after February 1 5th, when U.S. bombers pulverized the abbey 
on its summit with 600 tons of bombs. 47 Stalemated front lines see-sawed back and forth 
along Korea's mountainous spine for 2Vz years to gain dubious tactical advantage from early 
1 951 until July 27, 1 953, when both sides signed a cease-fire agreement. 48 

DEFENSIVE DEBITS 

Carl von Clausewitz, in his great tome On War, justifiably called defensive combat in 
mountainous terrain "a true refuge for the weak for those no longer able to seek an absolute 
decision/' 4 Belligerents who deliberately elect that form of conflict may buy time with 
which to reinforce and refurbish, then resume the offensive, but can "win" in place only if 
rivals quit first because costs have become too high. The best they can do otherwise is defer 
eventual defeat. 

ARID REGIONS 

The Cradle of Western Civilization, which always has been largely arid aside from the Fertile 
Crescent that links the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates Valleys via the Levant, saw the earliest 
recorded warfare. Sumerian, Akkadian, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Egyptian armies came 
first, followed by Persians, Macedonians, Parthians, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders, Turks, French, 
British, Americans, and Israelis, among others. Joshua, Ramases, Sargon, Ashurbanipal, 
Darius, Alexander, Khalid, Tamerlane, Allenby, and Lawrence of Arabia were a few among 
many who won military fame as desert warriors in that cockpit. 50 Deserts around the world 
remain hotbeds of armed combat (map 1 8). 



mmMMw J .VAv.v.v.^v.v/.v^ w ^ 

REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 109 



Map 1 8. Arid Regions 




All deserts are sun seared, wind scoured, and dry (average annual rainfall as a rule is less 
than 10 inches/25 centimeters), but great diversity nevertheless is evident. Some arid lands 
are immense, others are small by comparison; linear dimensions, elevations, relative 
humidity, and distance from sea water vary considerably; topographical features run the full 
range from monotonous plains to spectacular peaks. Three and a half million square miles 
of Sahara Desert stretch from east to west across all or part of 10 North African countries, 
while the lanky Atacama, which runs from north to south in Chile, measures more than half 
as long but covers only 4 percent as much area. Death Valley, California, the lowest point 
in North America at -86 feet (-30 meters) is blistering hot in summer, whereas Mongolia's 
Gobi Desert on an interior plateau far above sea level is bitterly cold when winter winds 
blow in from Siberia. Most desert air is uncommonly dry, but high humidity turns Persian 
Gulf and Red Sea coasts into sweat boxes. Stony ground, contrary to popular misconceptions, 
is more common than humongous sand dunes, such as those in Saudi Arabia's Rub al Khali 
and southern Chad. 51 

CLIMATIC ECCENTRICITIES 

Climatic eccentricities such as irregular rainfall, intemperate heat, and gale force winds even 
so characterize deserts the world over. Military personnel consequently require special 
equipment, training, and acclimatization 



110 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Irregular Rainfall. Unpredictable c loudbursts habitually replace prolonged, gentle, 
widespread rains that bless most well-watered regions. Downpours dump double or triple 
the average annual amount of precipitation in an hour or two, sink into sand or run off hard 
surfaces, provide brief respites from drought, then leave the land as barren as before. Dakla 
Oasis, located due west of Luxor, Egypt, is not atypical: it once went more than a decade 
without a drop of rain, although its yearly quota is about five inches (13 centimeters). 
Raging torrents without warning fill desiccated stream beds to overflowing, then sweep away 
bridges, buildings, military bivouacs, and other impedimenta that rashly block their paths. 
Roiling waters in southeast Tunisia turned Wadi Zigzaou into an impromptu moat that Field 
Marshal Bernard Montgomery's armored columns failed to breach on March 20, 1 943. Four 
Valentine tanks crossed after British sappers paved the bottom with bundles of brush, but the 
next tank in line sank up to its turret in muck. 52 

Intemperate Heat. Oven-like summers generally prevail, even in parts of the Gobi Desert 
and China's Taklimakan where mean winter temperatures remain below freezing for several 
months each year. Thermometers that commonly hover around 120 F (48 C) in mid- 
afternoon are "mild" compared with sand temperatures, which may exceed 165 F (73 C). 
The crew compartments of heavily armored vehicles that lack air conditioning can become 
unbearable, while thin-skinned truck cabs heat up faster and reach even higher 
temperatures 185 F (84 C) is not exceptional. Those figures are significant, because 
1 20 F is the threshold of human pain and readings as low as 1 40 F (60 C) may cause first- 
degree burns. 

Most British and German troops in the North African desert during World War II wore 
short-sleeved shirts and short pants or stripped to the waist, although clothing that provides 
better coverage not only prevents sunburn and sand blasting by violent winds but serves as 
a coolant when sweat-soaked. Savvy aircraft and vehicle mechanics also wear gloves. 
Aircraft payloads plummet in excessive heat, which reduces lift capacities, while sensitive 
computers, sensors, communications equipment, and other electronics malfunction. Batteries 
hold their charge less efficiently (one U.S. armored division requires 3,660 batteries to keep 
327 Abrams tanks and 283 Bradley fighting vehicles rolling, not to mention many additional 
tracked vehicles and trucks that swell the total severalfold). Bombs and missile warheads as 
well as artillery and tank ammunition are best stored in open pits protected by double sun 
screens, perishable food spoils quickly, and un refrigerated water left unattended in the sun 
becomes unpalatable before it vaporizes. Hot nights and high humidity on the order of 90 
to 1 00 percent make duty eternally hard to endure along some sea coasts, even for well- 
acclimated troops, but temperatures inland may drop 70 F (21 C) or more after dark. Armed 
forces skilled at night fighting thus enjoy a sharp edge. 53 

Gale Force Winds. Destructive gales that blow for days at a time also are desert 
trademarks. Windblown sand, powerful enough to amputate unprotected telephone poles 
over time, impartially abrades everything in its path for a few feet above ground level while 
towering clouds of silt as fine as talcum powder blacken the sky, inflame eyes, and make 
troops wish for respirators. Sand and dust storms together reduce visibility to near zero, 
infiltrate tents, jam weapons, clog machines, pit optical devices, contaminate food and drink, 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 111 



and generate enough electricity to drive magnetic compasses crazy (explosives apparently 
detonated at an ammunition dump near Tobruk, Libya, in 1942). Grit additionally blankets 
stockpiles, shortens the life span of equipment despite preventive measures, increases logistic 
loads commensurately, and otherwise makes life miserable for man and beast. Military 
operations slow, sometimes stop, during the worst wind storms. 54 

Acclimatization Problems. Most military personnel in fit condition take about 2 weeks 
to acclimate, but may never reach peak performance in oppressive heat. Commanders 
consequently schedule strenuous activities during the coolest parts of each day and allow 
longer than usual rest periods, consistent with mission accomplishment. Personal hygiene 
and sanitation problems moreover can become unmanageable unless troops practice 
prophylactic medicine, which is easier said than done. (Members of Field Marshal Rommel's 
Afrika Korps sometimes scrubbed sweaty uniforms with sand to keep them from rotting.) 
Prickly heat, which upsets sweating mechanisms, encourages heat prostration, while dirt and 
insect bites turn minor scratches into running sores unless treated promptly. Flies feed on 
garbage, human feces, and dead bodies that burst under the hot sun, batten in food and open 
wounds, then spread diseases such as dysentery, diarrhea, and other intestinal disorders. 
Latrines are crucially important, but shifting sands fill slit trenches almost as fast as they can 
be dug in some regions, whereas rocky ground elsewhere makes excavations impossible 
without explosives. 55 

WATER REQUIREMENTS 

Water for drinking, cooking, bathing, laundry, use in military hospitals, and assorted other 
purposes is a priceless commodity in arid regions, more precious than any other natural 
resource, including petroleum. Sources, repositories, purification facilities, desalinization 
plants, tank trucks, water pipelines, and associated assets accordingly constitute prime 
military targets. 

Supplies. Large, reliable sources are limited to a few bodies of fresh water and perennial 
rivers, such as the Colorado, Tigris, Euphrates, Indus, and Nile, which survive high 
evaporation rates only because far distant watersheds feed them copiously and consistently. 
Smaller streams run dry several months each year. Once famous oases such as Kashgar, 
Yarkand, and Khotan, which Marco Polo visited along Central Asia's Silk Route on his way 
to Cathay in the year 1 272, are barely able to supply current civilian populations. Neither 
they nor ribbon-like counterparts that stretch for miles across the otherwise waterless Sahara 
could long support large-scale military operations. (Lieutenant General Gus Pagonis, the 
chief logistician during U.S. and allied operations against Iraq in 1 990-1 991 , was appalled 
to find that XVIII Airborne Corps alone would need billions of gallons over the first few 
months. 56 ) Easily accessible reservoirs that lie beneath dry stream beds and some alluvial fans 
cannot supply such quantities. 

Drilling for water in open wastelands is at least as chancy as sinking wildcat oil wells, 
because precise locations are problematic, the most promising sumps often lie 500 to 800 
feet (1 50-250 meters) below the surface, some are brackish, and extraction in many cases 
would require high capacity pumps. Prudent users purify water regardless of its source to 
remove disease-bearing bacteria and minerals that might calcify inside military machines. 



112 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Major armed forces in arid regions as a direct result often must import or desalinate most 
water supplies. 57 

Demands. Water rationing, once a popular but ill-conceived part of the acclimatization 
process, has been discredited because performance suffers and dehydration poses ever 
present dangers. Sweat evaporates so rapidly in dry desert heat that humans commonly lose 
about 1 pint of water per hour even at rest, yet never notice adverse effects or feel thirsty until 
the deficit reaches four times that amount (2 quarts, or 2 liters), by which time heat 
prostration may be imminent. Heavy exertion requires much greater intake, but Rommel's 
Afrika Korps in the summer of 1 942 carried only 1 5 quarts per day for trucks and tanks as 
well as personnel. His parched troops made every drop count, yet still ran dry during one 
offensive and survived only because they captured British water supplies. 58 U.S. military 
personnel in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who were much better endowed logistically, 
consumed approximately 11 gallons per day (42 liters), plus 10 to 12 gallons more per 
vehicle. Refrigerated vans kept a good deal of it palatable despite intense desert heat. 59 

FIREPOWER AMD MANEUVER 

Alan Moorehead, an Australian journalist during World War II, once compared combat on 
flat desert floors to warfare at sea, because both environments lack distinctive landmarks. 
Massive land forces, like opposing flotillas, can maneuver at will for favorable positions, 
remain over the horizon until they make contact, and concentrate on enemy forces rather 
than key terrain, except for occasional struggles to control transportation bottlenecks such as 
Kasserine Pass in Tunisia. 60 

Conventional Operations. Mounted operations that marked desert warfare before the 
advent of saddles and stirrups have done so ever since. 61 Motorized British forces, for 
example, took just 3 days to destroy three Italian divisions and capture 39,000 foot soldiers 
outside Sidi Barrani, Egypt in December 1 940. 62 Iraqi troops who dug in after they invaded 
Kuwait 50 years later took a worse walloping, first from coalition aircraft that severed all links 
with their homeland and pulverized static positions, then from airmobile, armored, and 
mechanized divisions that used vertical and horizontal envelopments to great advantage 
during the 1 00-hour ground phase of a 6-week war. 63 The victors in both cases suffered few 
casualties compared with the vanquished. 

Land transportation of all types must detour around steep slopes and deep gullies as well 
as huge dunes, such as those that sprawl across southern Iran, the Sahara Desert's Great 
Western Erg, and Saudi Arabia's Empty Quarter. Soft sand, sharp rocks, and thorns as thick 
as thumbs inhibit cross-country movement by trucks, especially those that tow trailers (the 
1 st Brigade of the Saudi Arabian National Guard unhappily suffered 161 flat tires when it 
moved from Riyadh to blocking positions in August 1990). Tracked vehicles, however, can 
more easily traverse the gravelly plains, stony pavements, and stretches of shallow sand that 
characterize most deserts. 

Level to rolling desert landscapes, virtually devoid of vegetation, afford fine fields of fire 
for flat trajectory weapons, which usually are employable at maximum ranges. Skilled 
weather officers in possession of technologically advanced techniques can help air crews and 
ground-based gunners employ infrared sensors and lasers despite heat, haze, and dust by 
predicting which side of particular targets will be hottest at particular times each day. They 
also can calculate "thermal crossover" times that tell when the contrast between targets and 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 113 



surrounding territory will be greatest and least, given the thermal properties of various 
materials. Metals, for example, heat and cool quickly, whereas asphalt heats slowly and stays 
hot a long time. Aerial observers, who claim clear views as far as naked eyes and sensors can 
see, find it easy to identify many stationary targets and can track low-flying helicopters as 
well as vehicular columns, both of which reflect light from wind screens and raise telltale 
clouds of dust. Great visibility also facilitates the use of air-to-ground missiles from positions 
beyond the reach of enemy air defense weapons. The side able to establish air superiority 
early consequently gains a decided edge. 65 

The monotonously beige color of most desert soil nevertheless makes it difficult to 
distinguish different elevations, except during early morning and evening hours when terrain 
features cast long shadows. Ground-level observation in fact often is better on clear nights 
than at mid-day, when glare is intense, bright sunlight blinds all who face in its direction, and 
shimmering mirages not only distort depth perception but make images seem to float. Radar 
altimeters help pilots and navigators when the sun is high and on bright moonlit nights. 66 

Special Operations. Special operations forces can function independently or complement 
conventional formations in arid regions despite the presence of enemy air power and the 
paucity of vegetation. British Colonel David Stirling's nascent Special Air Service (SAS), 
assisted at times by the Long Range Desert Group, which excelled at reconnaissance, ran 
rampant in the northern Sahara between November 1 941 and January 1 943, often 1 00 miles 
or so behind hostile lines, where they destroyed aircraft on the ground, blew up motor pools, 
detonated ammunition stocks, set fire to petrol dumps, hijacked vehicles, mined roads, and 
derailed trains. 67 Nineteenth century guerrillas in Afghanistan gave British troops headaches, 
and their descendants so plagued technologically superior Soviet invaders in the 20th century 
that the Kremlin finally quit to preclude unacceptable losses in money, military manpower, 
and materiel after 1 frustrating years, from 1 980 to 1 989. 68 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations. Peacetime tests in lieu of practical 
experience suggest that nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons employed against 
troops widely dispersed in the desert would be less potent than usual in some respects and 
more dangerous in other regards. Overall usefulness would depend mainly on climatic 
patterns, local weather conditions, and topographic configurations. 

The radius of heavy damage from nuclear detonations on level to rolling terrain likely 
would be shorter than in cool climes, because heat reduces static overpressures that give 
shock waves their punch. Troops in gullies or foxholes and weapon systems protected by 
revetments consequently would be somewhat safer than on frigid flatlands. Less powerful 
blast effects rocketing through light desert air, however, could disable distant thin-skinned 
targets such as aircraft parked in the open, while thermal radiation and dazzle concurrently 
burned and blinded exposed personnel. The direction and duration of radioactive fallout 
from gigantic dust clouds would depend on the erratic behavior of desert winds and turbulent 
currents. 69 

High concentrations of toxic chemical warfare munitions designed to inflict mass 
casualties would be required whenever desert heat is intense, because sizzling temperatures, 
strong winds, and unstable air masses dissipate vapors and evaporate liquids rapidly. 
Perspiring personnel who shed protective clothing prematurely nevertheless would be 
extremely vulnerable to lethal and incapacitating agents that attain maximum effectiveness 
on sweaty skin. Even bogus threats and false alarms can undercut enemy capabilities if they 



114 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



make troops don impermeable gear repeatedly, perhaps for lengthy periods. Masks impair 
breathing and muffle oral communications, protective gloves degrade tactile dexterity, 
poreless suits act as portable saunas, time to accomplish routine tasks expands, and fatigue 
sets in fast. Bright sunlight, dry air, and heat would limit biological warfare aerosols to very 
small areas, provided they survived storage, but commanders and key subordinates at every 
level should take positive steps to prevent enemies from polluting water supplies, because 
deprivation could be disastrous. 70 

LOGISTICAL STRAINS 

Arid regions that facilitate maneuver warfare on a grand scale may be a tactician's dream, but 
vast deserts that are hot, dusty, hard scrabble, and devoid of militarily useful resources give 
logisticians nightmares. Most supplies must be imported, consumption rates soar, 
maintenance requirements multiply, and extended mobile operations strain distribution 
systems. Troubles burgeon as distances from support bases increase. Painful consequences 
ensue whenever combat forces stall because rates of advance and other maneuvers outstrip 
logistical capabilities. 

Fleets of fuel tankers must make repeated round trips between supply points and 
customers, because long-distance, cross-country motoring over sand, loose gravel, and other 
surfaces that afford poor traction greatly decreases the gas mileage obtainable from wheeled 
and tracked vehicles. High mileage accrued in hot weather on rough terrain mainly in low 
gears moreover is hard on engines, radiators, springs, shock absorbers, transmissions, 
batteries, tank tracks, tires, and drivers. Constant vibrations crack and break metal. Gaskets 
and fan belts wear out quickly. Grit grinds assorted parts subject to friction, such as ignitions, 
brake shoes, bushings, bearings, water pumps, and carburetors, as well as microphones, 
switches, and circuit breakers. Air, fuel, and oil filters demand daily servicing and frequent 
replacement. Similar supply and maintenance problems afflict all other types of military 
materiel, as U.S. Lieutenant General Gus Pagonis graphically described after Operation 
Desert Storm in his unofficial report entitled Moving Mountains 7 ^ 

TROPICAL RAIN FORESTS 

Tropical rain forests, which never are neutral, favor well-prepared forces and penalize 
military leaders who fail to understand that: 

Small unit actions predominate. 

Overland movement invariably is slow and laborious. 

Troops mounted on horseback and motor vehicles are less mobile than foot soldiers. 

Natural drop zones, landing zones, and potential airstrips are small and scarce. 

Visibility and fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons are severely limited. 

Land navigation requires specialized techniques. 

Tanks, artillery, other heavy weapons, and close air support aircraft are inhibited. 

Command, control, communications, and logistics are especially difficult. 

Special operations forces and defenders enjoy distinctive advantages. 

Quantitative and technological superiority count less than adaptability. 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 115 



A 1 941 pamphlet, Read This Alone and The War Can Be Won, indoctrinated Japanese 
divisions drawn from frigid Manchuria for duty in steamy Malaya and Singapore, where they 
quickly defeated untutored British defenders and their Indian allies. Analogous U.S. 
documents at that time conversely slighted jungle warfare or received scant attention from 
America's senior military officials. The U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual (1940), 
predicated on long service in Haiti (1 91 5-1 934), the Dominican Republic (1 91 6-1 924), and 
Nicaragua (1 926-1 933), was only marginally related to combat in tropical rain forests, and 
in any event, most Marines on the eve of World War II found amphibious operations a far 
more entertaining topic. The U.S. Army largely ignored Field Manual 3 1-20: Jungle Warfare, 
which reached a very restricted audience after distribution in December 1 941 . Commanders 
as well as rank and file in both services accordingly received on-the-job training under trying 
conditions. 72 

JUNGLE WARFARE SETTINGS 

Copious, year-round precipitation, torrid temperatures, and high humidity combine to create 
rain forests, which are dense, dripping, dank, and dark (map 1 9). Rain gauges often record 
as much as 7 inches a day (1 7.8 centimeters) in Bougainville in the Solomon Islands, but this 
may seem moderate compared with nearby New Britain, where monsoonal deluges 
sometimes dump more than double that amount. Lieutenant General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, 
the senior American commander in Burma during World War II, noted in 1944, 'The 'dry 
season' in this country is a joke . . . We have had rain in December, 1 2 days in January, 1 8 
in February, 1 in March, 1 in April, and now it's really going to rain." He was right; the 
summer monsoon started on May 1 st . Wall-to-wall foliage, always in full leaf, blocks any 
breeze, while rain forest floors turn into noxious mush. 73 

Virgin rain forests, such as most of those in the Amazon Basin and equatorial Africa, 
consist mainly of mature trees (the largest tower 200 feet/60 meters or more), the spreading 
branches of which interlock to form three or four overarching canopies high-above huge 
boles. Undergrowth is sparse, because little or no sunlight reaches the forest floor, although 
a latticework of giant lianas, some at least a foot thick, festoons from great heights to the 
bottom. Secondary jungles that sprout wherever nature or humans have cleared the land 
feature luxuriant undergrowth in the form of saplings, thickets, thorny vines, and ferns. Some 
species of bamboo that must be akin to Jack's beanstalk grow 3 feet (1 meter) a day and 
ultimately tower more than 1 00 feet. Dense stands of razor-sharp kunai grass taller than most 
men frequently cover open spaces not occupied by rice paddies, small farms, or park-like 
plantations where well-spaced rubber and coconut trees are planted in neatly kept rows. 74 

The world's largest rain forest lies on level to rolling terrain astride the Equator in South 
America from the foothills of the Andes to the Atlantic Ocean. Most African jungles also rise 
above lowlands, but jungle shrouded mountains cover Central America, some Caribbean 
islands, India's west coast, most of southeast Asia, and archipelagos that stretch from Sumatra 
to Tahiti. Great environmental diversity is evident. Guadalcanal, for example, mingles plains, 
foothills, and mountains with varied vegetation that includes grassy patches, coconut groves, 
and forbidding jungles, whereas the tiny island of Tulagi, just 1 7 miles away across Sealark 
Channel, is a homogeneously wooded hill mass. New Guinea, which after Greenland is the 
second largest island on this globe, grows tropical rain forests on awesome slopes. 






116 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Oppressive heat and humidity prevail there during daylight hours, but penetrating cold sets 
in after dark at high altitudes. 75 

CLOSE COMBAT 

Infantry squads, platoons, and companies grope slowly through jungles at reduced distances 
between elements with little or no direct assistance from adjacent units, because visual 
contact and natural fields of fire for flat-trajectory weapons seldom exceed a few yards 
(meters). Vehicles are road-bound with rare exceptions. Tense searches that culminate in 
fleeting fire-fights at point-blank range characterize up close and personal combat. Thomas 
Hobbes, in his 1651 treatise, Leviathan, inadvertently described the "solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short" life of many jungle warriors who experience "continual fear and danger 
of violent death." Armed conflict under such circumstances emphasizes needs for simple, 
centralized plans, standing operating procedures (SOPs) that anticipate unexpected 
contingencies, decentralized execution, and, above all, astute junior leaders. 



Map 1 9. Tropical Rain Forests 



:::::&: 




8 


Tropical 
Rainforests 







Emphasis on Sixth Sense. Wrap-around rain forests intensify latent tendencies toward 
claustrophobia and paranoia, since belligerents can neither see nor hear well under best case 
conditions. Visibility is so limited, even by aerial observers and surveillance satellites, that 
cleverly concealed enemy fortifications are hard to spot. Thermal imagers work reasonably 
well despite thick foliage, but light amplification devices, infrared sensors, and radar are less 
effective. Wet vegetation also muffles sound, as Merrill's Marauders discovered when they 
hacked their way through rock-hard bamboo thickets in Burma they made a racket like 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 



117 



spike-driving gandy dancers building a railroad, but men in the rear heard nothing. Dangers 
from "fratricide" are ever present, especially during pitch black nights filled with weird noises 
that prompt trigger-happy neophytes to shoot at every moving shadow until they become 
accustomed. The sound of jingling dog tags, rifle safeties snapping open, and bolts slamming 
shut nevertheless sends audible warnings at short-range. Frightened birds and wild animals 
that suddenly screech or fall silent may also indicate enemy activity. Senses of smell and 
touch can occasionally supplement or supplant sight and sound: shaving lotion, scented 
soap, insect repellent, cigarette smoke, and other non-indigenous aromas literally are dead 
giveaways; point men on patrol use fingers and twigs to feel cautiously for trip wires. Foot 
sloggers gifted with intuitive powers of perception called Sixth Sense enhance survival 
prospects for comrades as well as themselves. 76 

Land Navigation. Knotty land navigation problems persist, even when assisted by Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS). Military maps are much better than in 1 942, when U.S. Marines 
at Guadalcanal found that Mount Austen, one of their immediate objectives, was situated 
several miles rather than a few hundred yards behind the beach, but important shortcomings 
persist, partly because cameras aloft infrequently see the forest floor. Jungles moreover 
rapidly reclaim little used roads, rail lines, and other landmarks that appear prominently on 
outdated maps. Newcomers thus do well to emulate Merrill's Marauders who, whenever 
possible, employed Kachin guides to lead them through Burmese jungles, because they knew 
every wrinkle in their home territories. Australian-recruited "coastwatchers" performed 
admirably as scouts, porters, and spies throughout the Solomon Islands with such success that 
U.S. Admiral William F. (Bull) Halsey claimed that they "saved Guadalcanal and 
Guadalcanal saved the Pacific/' The United States and Australia both decorated one such 
hero, Jacob Vouza by name, who later was knighted. 77 

Overland Movement. Overland travel in jungles averages about Vi mile an hour where 
the going is good and V2 mile a day where it is not, unless troops follow well-trodden trails 
that invite adversaries to install mines, booby traps, road blocks, and ambushes. Command, 
control, and communication (C 3 ) problems are particularly difficult in thick secondary 
growth, which weakens HF/VHF radio transmissions, makes wire circuits hard to install (not 
to mention maintain), invalidates most visual signals, and makes surface messenger service 
both risky and slow. Air mobility is unreliable, because local weather is uncooperative, 
adversaries often cover the best helicopter landing zones (LZs), which are scarce and small, 
and LZ construction from scratch in double, triple, or quadruple canopy rain forests is a 
costly, time-consuming process without assistance from explosives. 

The infamous Kokoda Track, still the only passable land route over the Owen Stanley 
Mountains between Port Moresby and Buna in Papua, New Guinea, saw extensive jungle 
warfare under aggrieved conditions during World War II (map 20). Australian, Japanese, then 
U.S. troops, drenched daily by rainfall that measured as much as an inch (2.5 centimeters) 
in 5 minutes, engaged in savage struggles over vertical terrain where maneuver room was 
virtually zero. The Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) atop razor-backed Shaggy Ridge 
sometimes consisted of one Australian rifleman sniping at one Japanese counterpart while 
everyone else waited in line. Haggard heroes who clawed their way single file from one 
precarious perch to another through a tunnel of trees say the jagged Finisterre Range farther 



east was worse. 78 



v.v.i^.vsa J .v.v v.- 



118 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Guerrillas and Undergrounds. Dian Fossey, author of the celebrated book, Gorillas in the 
Mist, might have written a sequel entitled Guerrillas in the Mist if poachers hadn't cut her life 
short, because jungle fringes offer ideal bases of operations for irregular forces, provided 
undergrounds in nearby communities help recruit, indoctrinate, and train personnel, raise 
funds, furnish information, provide supplies, and otherwise support rebel causes. Guerrillas 
who sally forth from and return to rain forests have repeatedly given pursuers fits with raids, 
ambushes, and acts of sabotage in tropical parts of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. 79 

HEAVY FIREPOWER 

Heavy, accurately aimed firepower delivered by aircraft, artillery, and tanks is almost an 
oxymoron wherever tropical rain forests rise from flatlands. Fire support in jungle covered 
mountains is even less effective. 



Map 29. The Kokoda Trail and Shaggy Ridge 






FRTHEAST 
\N GUINEA 

H Rii'e .\ 

^-^ *. <* ^v 

Lae 



Finisterre Range 
and Shaggy Ridge 



\ Wandumii 
Wau 



rbriand Ilands 






Allied forces 
Japanese forces 



10 20 30 40 50 Miles 



20 40 60 80 Kilometers 




Adapted from Rafael Steinberg, Island Fighting. 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 



119 



Carpet bombing directed against sprawling targets concealed in rain forests inflicts 
psychological as well as physical casualties when bombardiers hit the right spot, but military 
benefits often are poor compared with ecological devastation and wasteful expenditures of 
ordnance. Aerial interdiction strikes against enemy supply lines that lead through jungles also 
demand huge efforts in return for modest results (see chapter 1 9, which discusses attempts 
to stop traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail). Fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter gunships 
equipped with sophisticated target acquisition devices such as laser designators frquently fly 
close support missions for friendly troops in contact with enemy forces under dense foliage, 
but the danger of "fratricide" is great. 

Artillery units often are vulnerable to hit-and-run raids as well as counterbattery attacks, 
because suitable firing positions along scarce roads and trails rule out "shoot and scoot" 
tactics. Time-delay fuses that let munitions penetrate canopies before they detonate are 
preferable to proximity, mechanical, and electronic fuses that trigger harmless explosions 
among lofty branches. The range and direction of artillery fire moreover are difficult to 
adjust aerial spotters can tell where rounds strike treetops, but seldom see targets on the 
ground, while land-based forward observers, who depend on sound instead of sight to 
calculate corrections, are disadvantaged given the short distance that noises are audible in 
jungles. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) maintained only one armored 
cavalry regiment and no armored or mechanized divisions on its trooplist, essentially because 
opportunities to employ tanks in jungles and swamps generally are confined to clearings, 
plantations, and improved trails. 80 

Astute commanders, however, occasionally can make good use of artillery and tanks 
despite restrictions just delineated. Lieutenant General Slim, the senior British commander 
in Burma during World War II, concluded that "tanks can be used in almost any country 
except swamp." He used them to engage enemy strong points with infantrymen "riding 
shotgun," as did U.S. Army and Marine counterparts who conducted island-hopping 
campaigns in the South Pacific. 81 Vietnamese divisions under General Vo Nguyen Giap 
manhandled artillery, other heavy weapons, and perhaps 8,000 tons of supplies many miles 
over mountains and through presumably impenetrable jungles, established firing positions 
on high ground that dominated Dien Bien Phu, then dealt defenders a decisive defeat that 
drove France from Indochina. 82 

STAYING POWER 

Staying power, a key requirement during protracted conflicts, is elusive in rain forests where 
ammunition, uniforms, maps, rations, medical supplies, and all other military materiel not 
safeguarded or immediately consumed are subject to rotting and rust. Maintenance problems 
coupled with the paucity of supply routes makes replenishment a laborious process. 
Debilitating diseases, medical evacuation (medevac) difficulties, and rapid rates of decay 
make life miserable for all concerned, including casualties, litter bearers, burial details, and 
graves registration personnel. 

Maintenance and Replenishment. Jungle logisticians work under demanding conditions, 
because roads, trails, inland waterways, drop zones, landing zones, and fixed-wing airstrips 
suitable for large-scale supply and evacuation purposes not only are scarce but are hard to 
secure and maintain. Check points, roving patrols, convoy escorts, mine clearance crews, 



1 20 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



and engineering gangs soak up personnel like sponges. Pack mules and porters often are the 
best (sometimes the only) reliable means of transportation. Allied forces on the Kokoda Track 
in New Guinea in fact employed more than 10,000 barefoot Papuans, who lugged 
backbreaking loads over the Owen Stanley Mountains. Costs and times required to construct 
new land lines increase dramatically with distance it took 28,000 combat service support 
troops, 35,000 indigenous laborers, $150 million in World War II dollars, and 2 years to 
build the 1,100-mile (1,770-kilometer) road that led across Burma from Ledo in Assam to 
Kunming in China. That primitive avenue, which traversed jungles, gorges, rapids, and 21 
closely spaced hairpin turns along one short stretch, was hardly an arterial highway but 
qualified as an engineering masterpiece nonetheless (see chapter 1 1 for details). 83 

Medical Miseries, jungles are filled with animate and inanimate objects that bite, sting, 
and stick, a host of microorganisms that are harmful to humans, fungus infections that troops 
affectionately call "jungle rot/' and steamy atmosphere that encourages profuse perspiration, 
body rashes, and heat exhaustion. Many tropical maladies traceable to insects include 
dengue fever, scrub typhus, and allergic reactions to bee stings. More casualties could be 
traced to malaria than to hostile fire during World War II campaigns in the South Pacific. 
Blood-sucking leeches, whose saliva contains an anticoagulant, leave sores that turn into 
ulcers unless properly treated. Typhoid fever, cholera, hepatitis, diarrhea, and amoebic 
dysentery thrive in contaminated food and water. Immunizations and scrupulous field 
sanitation practices can dramatically reduce most resultant nonbattle casualties which, like 
nonwalking wounded, must be evacuated to aid stations or hospitals. Patients and medical 
personnel both prefer air medevac whenever feasible, because stretcher bearers struggle 
through jungles, even for a few hundred yards. 84 

Cadavers don't last long in the heat and high humidity of tropical rain forests, whether 
they lie in the open or occupy shallow graves. The pervasive stench of putrefying flesh, as 
one veteran put it, "sticks to your . . . eyebrows, your gum line and the balls of you feet" 
before flies, ants, maggots, beetles, birds, and animals pick all bones clean. Personnel whose 
primary job is to retrieve remains face a revolting task. Positive identification of corpses that 
lack dog tags frequently awaits confirmation from dental records, skeletal scars, or DMA 
samples. 8 

WETLANDS 

Wetlands, which strongly compete for the title "Least Trafficable Terrain," are saturated with 
and partially, completely, perennially or intermittently inundated by salty, brackish, or fresh 
water. Some are collocated with dense forests, others lie on open lands at high and low 
elevations in almost every clime including deserts, where they occasionally parallel streams 
and permeate river deltas. The generic term "swamp" subsumes wet woodlands; marshes 
feature tall grass, rushes, reeds, and cattails; bogs comprise spongy, poorly-drained soils 
variously covered with sedges, heath, mosses, lichens, and other stunted plants. 

SEASONAL SWAMPS 

The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1 939-40 is the only large-scale armed conflict ever fought 
on the tundra or in the taiga (Russian for "swamp forests"), which overlie most of the frigid 
flatlands in Canada, European Russia, and Siberia (map 12, page 94). Wetland warfare in 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 121 



those sparsely settled, geographically forbidding regions could never last long in any case, 
because summers are short and moisture-soaked soil is frozen solid most of each year. 

Seasonal swamps are militarily more significant in poorly drained regions a bit farther 
south, where summers are longer and warm weather is wetter. Brigadier General Francis 
Marion made a name for himself as the "Swamp Fox" when his guerrilla bands ran British 
redcoats ragged in the Carolinas during the American Revolution, then disappeared into 
sodden sanctuaries. 86 The Pripet Swamp, currently located in parts of Belarus, Ukraine, and 
European Russia, has channelized mass migrations and military operations for centuries. That 
formidable morass, which intersperses dense woods with countless ponds, moors, 
treacherous meadows, and shifting streams, extends 300 miles (480 kilometers) west to east 
and 140 miles (225 kilometers) north to south astride the Pripet Rivier, not counting two 
discontinuous offshoots that lead to Lakes Peipus and Lagoda near the Gulf of Finland (map 
21 ). The entire complex expands twice a year, once in springtime when melting snows raise 
water levels and rivers overflow, again in the fall for about 4 weeks from the onset of autumn 
rains until the first hard frost. Permanent inhabitants are scarce, except along the fringe and 
in a few local centers such as Pinsk. 

Cross-country movement is slow for foot soldiers and impossible for motor vehicles in 
most places. Roads in the region are widely spaced, mainly unimproved, largely of local 
importance, and, like all rivers save the Pripet, run north-south at right angles to 
topographical corridors between Russia and Poland. Many lanes are so narrow that military 
vehicle columns can neither detour nor turn around. German engineer troops during World 
War II used readily available logs to build mile after mile of "corduroy" roads in the absence 
of gravel and stone trucks, tanks, and kidneys suffered incessant concussions as convoys 
bumped along at 5 miles per hour, but there was no better way to breach swampy 
obstacles. 87 

The Pripet Swamp, which created a great gap between German Army Group Center and 
Army Group North soon after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, made it 
impossible for large military formations to conduct mutually supporting operations. Attempts 
to bypass such extensive wetlands proved perilous, because outflanked Soviet stay-behind 
forces and partisans pounced on logistical troops as soon as German spearheads 
disappeared. 88 Commanders and staffs committed to combat in other high-latitude swamps 
should anticipate similar problems. 

PERENNIAL SWAMPS 

Perennial swamps, all in the tropics or subtropical lands, share many characteristics with 
seasonal wetlands but never freeze, are refilled constantly, and tend to be deep. Three 
distinctive categories with significantly different military implications are discernible: 
Category One emphasizes grassy wilderness; Category Two mingles rice paddies and 
plantations with primeval swamps; Category Three features tidewater forests. 

Category One: Grassy Wilderrress. The Everglades have seen more warfare than any 
other wetlands in Category One. That immense marsh, between Lake Okeechobee and the 
tip of Florida, is 40 miles wide (65 kilometers) and more than 100 miles long (160 
kilometers). Head-high saw grass and other aquatic plants emerge from an alligator-infested 
solution of water and muck that seems almost bottomless in some places. Moss-draped 



122 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 21 . The Pripet Swamp and Its Offshoots 




Stalinogorsk 



toeni 






igsbeip 

( 

^ 

WarsavA Bres^^g 
: if* 

^ 



Kursk 



V^ JK 

Visti^X --^"^ 



/^< 





Odessa 



YAILA 
MTS 




Belgrad 



arest 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 



123 



gumbo limbo, strangler fig, bald cypress, mahogany, and eight species of palm trees in 
assorted combinations adorn dry ground, which is at a premium. 

General Andrew Jackson defeated, but did not demoralize, Seminole Indians under Billy 
Bowlegs in 1817-18. Superb guerrilla warriors simply melted into marshlands that then 
covered more than 3 million acres. Chief Osceola, who resisted subsequent U.S. efforts to 
resettle his tribe west of the Mississippi River, played tag in the Everglades with U.S. Army 
troops for 8 exasperating years (1 835-42) during the Second Seminole War. Inconclusive 
operations not only cost the United States more lives and money than any other counter- 
Indian campaign but left several hundred recalcitrant tribesmen in control of ancestral lands. 
The U.S. Government paid them to move after the Third Seminole War (1 855-58) failed to 
root them out, but a few resisted until 1 934, 1 1 7 years after General Jackson entered the 
Everglades. 89 

"Scorched earth" programs took precedence over search and destroy missions in the early 
1 990s, when Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein sought to exterminate, control, or chase Muslim 
Shiite "Marsh Arabs" from their homeland at the head of the Persian Gulf, along with army 
deserters and additional dissidents. Actions to drain the swamps and divert the Tigris- 
Euphrates Rivers drastically reduced water levels, increased pollution-related diseases, and 
disrupted age-old life styles. Iraqi troops then set widespread grass fires. Those 
compassionless steps coupled with aerial bombardments and artillery barrages quickly 
depleted the despised populations. 90 



Map 22. The Mekong Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone 




Gulf of 
Thailand 



124 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Category Two: Paddies, Plantations, and Primeval Swamps. No region represents 
Category Two more ably than the Mekong Delta, where regular and irregular armed forces 
battled from 1945 until 1975 to control its overflowing rice bowl and huge population. That 
strategically crucial property, bounded by the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea, 
spreads 1 6,000 square miles or so (40,000 square kilometers) southwest of Saigon, which 
later became Ho Chi Minh City (map 22). 

About one-third of those flatlands are unreclaimed jungles or marshes, such as the Plain 
of Reeds, a sprawling prairie west of Ho Chi Minh City that is waterlogged during the wet 
season but dry enough to burn when rain-bearing winter monsoons stop blowing. Many 
vulnerable bridges and ferry sites mark Route 4, the only hard surface road to Ca Mau via 
Can Tho and other agricultural centers. The best of the rest are mainly paths of convenience 
rather than militarily useful lines of communication. Cross-country movement is laborious 
for foot troops and, in many places, impossible for vehicles even during the dry season. 
Wall-to-wall settlements and farmlands on scanty high land leave little room for airfields and 
permanent helicopter pads. 91 The scarcity of suitable materials moreover makes construction 
an expensive and time-consuming process. It took U.S. Army Engineers 6 months and 
approximately $20 million to dredge and deposit 5,295 cubic yards (4,045 cubic meters) of 
sand per acre over a 600-acre artificial island, erect buildings on site, and provide essential 
amenities in 1 967 for a brigade-sized Mobile Afloat Force near My Tho. 92 

Swamp-style riverine warfare, a specialized form of amphibious operations, became a fine 
art in that watery environment dominated by more than 4,000 miles (6,400 kilometers) of 
navigable rivers and streams. "Brown water" sailors emulated Commodore Daniel T. 
Patterson, who established a U.S. precedent during the War of 1 812 when his gunboats in 
Mississippi River bayous briefly delayed British redcoats on their way to New Orleans. The 
U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps employed more advanced techniques and a "mosquito 
fleet" of schooners, flat-bottom boats, bateaux, and canoes in the Everglades a few years later; 
20th-century successors in Nicaraguan and Philippine wetlands produced additional 
refinements. 93 

U.S. riverine forces in the Mekong delta, who had superior technologies at their disposal, 
devised innovative concepts, doctrines, tactics, organizations, weapons, equipment, and 
modes of transportation. Their flotillas contained a motley assortment of "pocket battleships," 
amphibious landing craft, armored troop carriers, mine sweepers, air-cushion vehicles, patrol 
boats, and rubber rafts, all well-adapted for warfare in shallow waters where tight turns, 
islands, sand bars, swamp grass, fish traps, low bridges, mines, and enemy-installed obstacles 
restricted maneuvers. Support forces afloat provided command, control, and integrating 
communications, air-conditioned barrack ships replete with sick bays, surgery wards, and 
water purification plants, plus supply, maintenance, repair, and salvage facilities. Web- 
footed infantrymen fervently wished for man-portable bridges, individual water wings, and 
similar amenities that were nonexistent or in short supply, but they benefited from flexible 
tactics that creative thinkers concocted explicitly for close combat where stream banks were 
slick as well as steep and adversaries concealed in dense vegetation could see and hear 
assault troops well before they arrived. 94 

Category Three: Tidewater Forests. Veterans of combat in tidal forests near Buna on 
Papua New Guinea's Coral Sea coast recall towering trees that made it impossible to see the 
sun during daylight hours or the stars at night. Creeks constituted tunnels through mangrove 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 125 



swamps where gnarled buttress roots rose from black, sucking mud, and Japanese machine 
gun nests concealed in those natural abatis seemingly blocked every route. 95 

Vietnam veterans believe the Rung Sat Special Zone, a tidewater forest in the northeast 
corner of the Mekong Delta (map 22), made Buna and other wetlands look like picnic 
grounds. High tides there, which run as fast as 8 knots, raise and lower water levels as much 
as 16 feet (5 meters), drastically change channel directions and depths, and inundate most 
"dry" land twice daily. Mangrove and banyan trees protrude from brackish, polluted waters 
that, give or take a couple of percentage points, cover eight-tenths of the Zone. Nipa palms, 
brambles, brush, and serrated grass adorn hundreds of small islands, few of which were 
cultivated or inhabited. Boat crews along with U.S. and South Vietnamese troops ashore 
were constantly subject to ambush, because chemical defoliants, liberally applied, failed to 
dislodge insurgents or significantly disrupt their activities. Leeches couldn't tolerate such 
salty water, but that was about the only good news insects swarmed; tight-tolerance 
weapons, ammunition powder trains, and primer cords often malfunctioned; mortar base 
plates sank in soggy soil unless they rested on sandbags; foxholes and bunkers turned into 
outdoor bath tubs. American soldiers and SEALs sloshing around in that dank region led such 
debilitating lives that medics recommended, and policymakers approved, repeated returns 
to dry ground after no more than 48 to 72 hours, lest foot infections, jungle rot, strain, and 
fatigue dangerously reduce proficiency. Rung Sat missions continued nonetheless, because 
the main commercial shipping channel and military supply line between Saigon and the sea 
ran through that region, along with other major waterways of local importance. Severe 
consequences would have ensued if U.S. Armed Forces and their allies had allowed Viet 
Cong insurgents to stop traffic. 96 

COASTIANDS AND SMALL SEAS 

Naval conflicts began in coastal waters and small seas when organized warfare was in its 
infancy. Combatant ships subsequently ranged far and wide but, for technological and 
tactical reasons, conflicts occurred fairly close to shore until World War I. Carrier battle 
groups, attack submarines, and antisubmarine warfare forces during World War II conducted 
"blue water" campaigns on a grand scale never seen before or since. The United States Navy 
thereafter reigned supreme on the high seas until Soviet adversaries under the guidance of 
Fleet Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov began to challenge U.S. preeminence in the mid-1960s. 
The Cold War, however, wound down a quarter of a century later without a shot fired in 
anger at sea and most observers at this writing generally agree that naval conflicts far from 
land seem a remote possibility for the foreseeable future. Naval strategists in countries large 
and small accordingly concentrate once again on littorals and small seas, where problems 
not only are different from those they must solve in mid-ocean but are infinitely more 
complex than those that predecessors faced a few years ago. 

LITTORALS AMD SMALL SEAS DELINEATED 

Webster's Dictionary defines littorals as "the shore zone between high and low water marks," 
whereas the United States Navy and Marine Corps, perhaps playing interservice politics, see 
a much broader region that reaches from the "open ocean" (undefined) to the shore, thence 
overland 650 nautical miles (1,200 kilometers). 97 This document, in search of a realistic 
compromise, addresses littorals that extend seaward from the shoreline no more than 100 



MK.v. .:.s^Av. 



1 26 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



nautical miles (185 kilometers) and an equal distance inland, which affords enough depth 
in each direction to stage, conduct, and support coastal operations, including amphibious 
assaults. 

The Adriatic, Aegean, Black, and Red Seas, Bo Hai and Korea Bay (northwest and 
northeast arms of the Yellow Sea), and the Persian Gulf typify small seas, the centers of which 
lie less than or little more than 100 miles from land. The Baltic, Bismarck, Caribbean, Coral, 
North, Mediterranean, and South China Seas, the Gulf of Mexico, the Seas of Japan and 
Okhotsk, and comparable oceanic offshoots are too large to qualify. 

TYPICAL COASTAL TOPOGRAPHY 

Littorals and small seas invariably include seashores, offshore approaches, and exits inland. 
The geographic features in each environment are strikingly different and infinitely more 
numerous than those associated with "blue water" (figure 20). 98 

Figure 20. Typical Coastal Topography 




BHB = bayhead beach 
BHD = bayhead delta 
BMB = bay-mouth bar 
BSB = bayside beach 
CB = cuspate bar 
CD = cuspate delta 



CH = cliffed headland 
CS = complex spit 
CT = complex tombolo 
DT = double tombolo 
HB = headland beach 
I = inlet 



L = lagoon 

LB = looped bar 

MBB = mid-bay bar 

RS = recurved spit 

S = spit 

T = tombolo 



Adapted from Arthur N. Strahlen, Physical Geography, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), 419 

Offshore Approaches. 

Hydrodynamic conditions: tidal range great or slight; cross-currents and surf weak or 
strong; distance between low and high water marks measured in 10s or 100s of yards 
(meters) 

Water temperatures and salinity: stable or unstable 

Inshore sea bottoms: level or incised, gentle or steep, soft or solid 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 



127 



Channels: few or many, deep or shallow, wide or narrow, well or poorly marked 

Assorted obstacles: sand bars, spits, hooks, mud flats, shoals, reefs, tombolos (natural 
causeways), lagoons, seasonal ice, sea weeds, ship wrecks, and trash 

Ambient noise: loud or muted; localized or universal; sounds caused by ships, 
recreational boats, fish, and fowl. 

Seashores. 

Beaches: wide or narrow, short or long, sand, shingle, or mud 

Trafficability: good or poor 

Human habitation: dense, sparse, or absent 

Harbor and port facilities: many or few; antiquated or modern. 

Exits Inland. 

Natural obstacles: cliffs, terraces, promontories, pinnacles, grottoes, caves, and 
caverns; sand dunes, marshes, swamps, and forests 

Cities, towns, villages, and isolated dwellings: large or small, many or few, flimsy or 
solid construction 

Roads and railways: many or few; high or low capacity; unobstructed or bottlenecked 

Airfields and landing zones: large or small, conveniently or inconveniently located, 
few or many modern facilities. 

SELF-PRESERVATION PROBLEMS 

Self-preservation takes precedence over other naval missions whenever hostile armed forces 
convert littorals into combat zones, because enemy guns and guided missiles aloft, afloat, 
and concealed ashore expose slow-moving surface ships to high-density, high-intensity, 
short-range surprise attacks (grottos and caves make grand hiding places). Assorted surface 
combatants, amphibious ships, cargo/troop transports, oil tankers, and auxiliaries in cramped 
quarters all make tempting targets. Egyptian Styx surface-to-surface antiship missiles that were 
primitive by modern standards set a precedent during the 1 967 Arab-Israeli War when they 
sank the Israeli destroyer Eilath in shallow water. Moored and floating mines, the "weapons 
that wait," are cost effective as well as devastating. Italian frogmen, for example, 
surreptitiously planted limpet mines that put two British battleships on the harbor bed outside 
Alexandria, Egypt, in 1 941 . Fifty years later the U.S. Navy spent $17 million and 2 months 
to repair the billion-dollar Aegis guided missile cruiser Princeton after it rammed one Iraqi 
mine worth about $3,500." 

Littoral warriors who lack split-second reflexes and state-of-the-art computers are out of 
luck, because reaction times often are measured in a minute or two at most. Subsonic, sea- 
skimming cruise missiles flying 600 miles per hour (965 kph) hit targets 25 miles (40 
kilometers) away 150 seconds after launch. Half that time likely elapses before missile 
defense crews can detect hostile projectiles with head-on radar cross-sections roughly 
equivalent in size to cormorants, leaving 75 seconds in which to confirm threats, track them, 
compute altitudes, ranges, and velocities, then fire. Saturation attacks, supersonic missiles, 
enemy evasive actions, false images caused by coastal clutter, and restrictive rules of 
engagement designed to safeguard friendly forces and neutrals are further complications. 10 



1 28 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Effective countermeasures are hard to conceive. Stealthy ship designs could reduce visual, 
acoustic, electronic, infrared, and radar "signatures," but skeptics contend that such 
advantages would be far from foolproof, because laws of physics make it impossible for large 
surface combatants to "disappear" within small search areas. Budgetary constraints probably 
limit applications to a few high-value surface combatants other than huge aircraft carriers, 
which would be very costly to convert. 101 Some students of littoral warfare consequently are 
convinced that submarines able to sit quietly on muddy sea bottoms and maneuver well in 
shallow water may be the most effective countermeasures, because adversaries that lack an 
astonishing array of ASW sensors and weapon systems would be hard pressed to find them 
and finish them off (figure 21). Others advocate an influx of fast boats. 102 

POWER PROJECTION PROBLEMS 

Power projection missions along littorals and in small seas prominently feature sea control 
and amphibious assaults. Shallow water mines figure positively in the first instance and 
negatively in the second. 

Shallow Water Sea Control. Sea control in some respects is more difficult to achieve 
along littorals than on open oceans, because enemy forces can bring land-based as well as 
naval combat power to bear. Shallow waters, however, simplify the accomplishment of less 
demanding sea denial missions, which seek to suppress enemy maritime commerce and limit 
options open to enemy naval commanders. 

Blockades customarily are considered acts of war under international law, but they also 
are the most economical way to bottle up opposing navies and merchant marines in port, 
prevent enemy ships at sea from returning for rest, recuperation, maintenance, and 
replenishment, seal off seaborne support by sympathizers, and generally deny foes freedom 
of the seas. Cordons sanitaire that employ men-of-war to deter, deflect, stop, board, search, 
seize, or sink blockade runners expose implementing crews to considerable risk. A cheaper, 
equally or more effective technique relies on bottom, floating, or tethered mines that 
variously activate on command, on contact, or in response to magnetic, acoustic, or pressure 
stimuli. They are easy to install and hard to avoid in coastal channels, but only if seeded en 
masse. Mines that Iran deposited piecemeal in the Persian Gulf to impede petroleum tankers 
and their escorts (1987-88) therefore proved to be more of a nuisance than a menace, 
whereas traffic into and out of Haiphong harbor ceased for 1 months after U.S. carrier-based 
aircraft laid 8,000 influence mines across its entrance in April 1972. ' 

Transit from Sea to Shore. The transit from ships onto heavily defended shores is a 
traumatic experience in large part because geographic features favor defenders and oppose 
waterborne assault forces who must fight rough surf, long-shore currents, and occasionally 
strong winds on their way to designated beaches over routes devoid of natural cover or 
concealment. Mine hunters and mine sweepers whose dangerous duty is to detect, mark, and 
clear lanes through the "foam zone" need one set of implements for use where shifting sands 
or soft mud bury bottom mines, another set where sediments suspended in breaking waves 
act as obscurants, and yet another where rocky approaches cause sonar signals to bounce 
about. Some naval inventories already include sizable helicopter fleets and a few ship-to- 
shore vehicles that ride on or above rather than in the water, but unmanned submersibles and 
remote control systems that eventually may be able to elude shallow water mines are still in 
early stages of development. 1 



104 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 129 



Figure 21 . Shallow Water Antisubmarine Warfare Suites 



w o> c c o jS 

llflll 1 

IX 




Source: Nathaniel French Caldwell, "Are We Shortchanging ASW?," Armed Forces Journal, July 1996, p 25. 



130 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



KEY POINTS 

Every geographical region displays singular characteristics that demand specialized 
military plans, operations, and programs. 

Armed forces that are organized, equipped, and trained to function in any given 
geographical environment perform less well elsewhere until they complete essential 
adjustments. 

Preparations can be complex, costly, and time-consuming, because each of the seven 
distinctive regions described herein contains subdivisions such as hot-wet, hot-dry, cold- 
wet, cold-dry, sandy deserts, rocky deserts, and so on. 

Each region requires tailored strategies, tactics, and techniques. 

Each region uniquely influences the capabilities of military personnel, weapons, 
munitions, and telecommunication systems. 

Each region uniquely influences requirements for food, clothing, shelter, maintenance, 
and medical support. 



MOTES 

1 . Nine Principles of Preparedness are available in John M. Collins, Military Preparedness: 
Principles Compared with U.S. Practices, Report No. 94-48 S (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, January 21 , 1 994), 41 -49. 

2. Charles M. Daugherty, City Under the Ice: The Story of Camp Century (New York: 
Macmillan, 1963); Trevor Hatherton, ed., Antarctica (New York: Praeger, 1965), references to Little 
America 1 , 2, 3, and 4: 35-39, 68-69, 91 , 1 93, 205-206, 211-216, 233-235, 248-249, 280, 443, 
469, 474-478, 484-486, 501 . 

3. For a few historical examples, see A. W. Abbott, "Lapland 1918-19, The British Army's 
Farthest North," Army Quarterly 84 (1962): 236-243; Charles S. Stevenson, 'The 40-Below-Zero 
Campaign" [U.S. forces in European Russia and Eastern Siberia, 1918-19201, Army 19, no. 2 
(February 1 969): 49-50; Charles O. Lerche, Jr., "Norway (1 940-1 945)," in Challenge and Response 
in Internal Conflict, vol. 2, The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, eds. D. M. Condit, Bert H. 
Cooper, Jr., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University, 
March), 225-249; Alex Bruckner, "Attack in the Tundra," Military Review 36, no. 1 (April 1 956): 98- 
109. 

4. Robert W. Service, "The Cremation of Sam McGee," in The Spell of the Yukon (New York: 
Dodd Mead and Co. 1 907), 66. 

5. Personal survival problems are described in The Arctic Basin, coordinated by John E. Slater, 
(Centerville, MD: Tidewater Publishing for The Arctic Institute of America, 1963), 278-289; FM31- 
70: Basic Cold Weather Manual (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, April 1 968, 43-50; Robert D. 
Cheney, "Cold Weather Medicine: An Ounce of Prevention," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1 981 , 
43, 44-45, 47. 

6. FM 31-70: Basic Cold Weather Manual, chap. 2 and appendix E; Carl W. Riester, "Cold 
Weather Operations," Special Warfare, January 1 994, 9-10. 

7. Rowan Scarborough, "High-Tech Clothing Gives GIs Weather Protection," Washington 
Times, December 28, 1 995, 1 . 

8. FM 31-70: Basic Cold Weather Manual, 1 6-1 7, 22-27, 29-35. 

9. Ibid., 36-39, 42-43; Jonathan D. Thompson, "Infantry Company Operations in an Extremely 
Cold Environment," Infantry (September-October 1 995): 31-32; "Cold Weather Operations," part 2, 
Infantry (November-December 1 980): 29. 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 131 



1 0. FM 9-209/Technical Order 36-1 -40: Operation and Maintenance of Equipment in Cold 
Weather (0 to -60) (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army and Dept. of the Air Force, August 1 0, 
1 989, 1 -2 through 1 -5, 1 -7 through 1 -9, 5-1 and 5-2, 6-1 through 6-4; FM 31-70: Basic Cold Weather 
Manual, 1 77; "Cold Weather Operations," part 3, Infantry (January-February 1 981 ): 23-24. 

1 1 . Guy Murchie, Song of the Sky (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1 954), 238. 

12. FM 31-70: Basic Cold Weather Manual, chapter 4, plus 105-115 and appendix C; 
Thompson, "Infantry Company Operations in an Extremely Cold Environment," 29-31 . 

13. FM 31-70: Basic Cold Weather Manual, 115-121; Francis King, "Cold Weather Warfare: 
What Will Happen?," Military Review 57, no. 11 (November 1977): 86, 92; "Cold Weather 
Operations," part 3, Infantry, 24, 25. 

1 4. William P. Baxter, "Soviet Norms for Driving Tanks," Military Review 60, no. 9 (September 
1980): 5-8; Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945 (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1964), 321-335. 

1 5. Guy Murchie, Song of the Sky, 233-234, 238-239; Francis King, "Cold Weather Warfare: 
What Would Happen?," 87, 90-91; Lewis E. Link, "Cold Regions Impacts on Army Operations," 
Readings in Military Geography, vol. 1 , Tactical (West Point, NY: Dept. of Geography, U.S. Military 
Academy, 1990), 80,82. 

1 6. Rudolph M. Tamez, who was Operations Officer for the composite battalion of the 504 th 
Parachute Infantry Regiment that participated in Operation Arctic Night. 

1 7. John C. Scharfen, "Cold Weather Training: the Absolute Necessity." Marine Corps Gazette, 
February 1981, 66, 67, 68, 69; Francis King, "Cold Weather Warfare: What Would Happen?" 87, 
90; The Arctic Basin, 237-249, 263-277. 

1 8. Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 1 2, 1 962, 41 -42. 

1 9. U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships (Washington, DC: Chief of Naval 
Operations, Surface Ship Survivability Office (OP O3C2), May 1 988), 2-2, 2-3, 2-1 2, 3-1 , 3-8 and 
3-9, chap. 5, appendices B, D, F. 

20. Ibid., 2-8, 3-7. 

21. Ibid., chapters 2 and 3. 

22. Brian Garfield, The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), 119-120. 

23. Thomas B. Curtain, Norbert Untersteiner, and Thomas Callahan, "Arctic Oceanography", 
Oceanus (Winter 1 990/91 ): 58-66; U.S. Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships, 4-4 through 4-1 0, 
6-5 and 6-6. 

24. Barrie Pitt, The Battle of the Atlantic (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1 977), 1 57-1 59, and 
John R. Elting, Battles for Scandinavia (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1981), 146-148. 

25. John R. Hale, Age of Exploration (New York: Time Inc., 1966), 101-102, 1 18-126; William 
D. Smith, Northwest Passage (New York: American Heritage Press); Constantine Krypton, The 
Northern Sea Route and The Economy of the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1956). 

26. William R. Anderson with Clay Blair, Jr., Nautilus 90 North (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: TAB 
Books, 1959), 212-239. 

27. Waldo K. Lyon, "Submarine Combat in the Ice," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 1 1 8, no. 
2 (February 1 992): 33-40; U.S. Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships, 1 -6. 

28. Ibid., 38-39; H. A. Jackson et al., "Bottom Bounce Array Sonar Submarines," American 
Society of Naval Engineers Journal (September 1 989): 59. 

29. Lorus J. and Margery Milne, The Mountains, Time-Life Nature Library, rev. ed. (New York: 
Time Inc., 1967); FM 90-6: Mountain Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, June 30, 
1980, l-ii, 1-1 through 1-3, and appendix G 

30. John Heins, "Cuba (1 953-1 959)," in Challenge and Response in International Conflict, vol. 
3, The Experience in Africa and Latin America, eds. D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al. 
(Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Studies, American University, April 1968), 435-461. 



1 32 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



31 . Field-Marshal Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory (New York: David McKay, 1961), 6. 

32. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, 1 -1 4 and 1 -1 5, 3-2, 3-3, D-1 , D-3; Morgan B. Heasley, 
"Mountain Operations in Winter," Military Review 32, no. 6 (June 1 952): 1 0, 1 1 , 1 2, 1 4, 1 5, 1 6. 

33. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, 1 -6 through 1 -8. 

34. Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel, Bosnia Former Yugoslavia and U. 5. Policy, Issue Brief 
91089 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 23, 1996), updated periodically. 

35. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, 4-1 , 5-2, 5-3; Heasley, "Mountain Operations in Winter," 
14, 15. 

36. Robert Wallace, The Italian Campaign (New York: Time-Life Books, 1 978), 1 08-1 09, 1 84- 
1 85. For military mountaineering equipment and techniques, see FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, 
B-4, B-5, B-7, and appendix C. 

37. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, chapter 2. Challenge and Response in International Conflict 
addresses 20th-century mountain operations by irregular forces: vol. 1, The Experience in Asia, 
February 1 968, Burma (1 942-1 945), Indonesia (1 946-1 948), Jammu and Kashmir (1 947-1 949), Korea 
(1948-1954), Tibet (1951-1960); vol. 2, The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, March 
1 967,Greece (1 942-1 949), Italy (1 943-1 945), Norway (1 940-1 945), Yugoslavia (1 941 -1 944); vol. 
3, The Experience in Africa and Latin America, April 1 968, Ethiopia (1 937-1 941 ), Nicaragua (1 927- 
1 933), Colombia (1 948-1 58); Supplement, September 1 968, Dominican Republic (1 91 6-1 924), Haiti 
(1 91 8-1 920, 1 958-1 964), Laos (1 959-1 962). 

38. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, 4-8 through 5-5. 

39. Ibid., 4-5, 4-6, and appendix D. 

40. Neville C. A. Maxwell, India's China War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1 970). 

41. Wayne O. Evans and James E. Hansen, "Troop Performance at High Altitudes," Army 
(February 1966): 55-58; James R. Pulver, "Fight Against Mountain Sickness," Army Digest (June 
1970): 45-46; FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, 1-9, 5-6 through 5-9. 

42. DA Pamphlet 95-8: Mountain Flying Sense (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 1 962); 
Will F. Thompson, "Airmobile Warfare in the Mountains," Military Review 50, no. 7 (July 1 970): 57- 
62; FM 90-6: Mountain Warfare, 1-15. 

43. William H. Tunner, Over the Hump (Washington, DC: Office of the Air Force Historian, 
1 985); Otha Cleo Spencer, Flying the Hump: Memories of an Air War (College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M Press, 1992); and Don Moser, China-Burma-India, "Vaulting the Himalayas" (Alexandria, VA: 
Time-Life Books, 1978), 78-91 . 

44. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, appendix F. 

45. See, for example, John Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1 980), which covers 2,400 years from 1 ,600 B.C. to 800 A.D. 

46. Keith E. Bonn, When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 
1944-January 1945 (St. Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1994). 

47. Wallace, The Italian Campaign, 100-117, 130-145, 151-164. 

48. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1 85-225; and T. R. 
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: Macmillan, 1 963), 478-645. 

49. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 417-432, 537-539. The quotation is on 427. 

50. For overviews of wars in the Cradle of Western Civilization, see Yigal Yadin, The Art of 
Warfare in Biblical Lands (Norwich, England: Jarrold and Sons, International Publishing, 1963); a 
broader view of combat in arid regions is contained in Bryan Perrett, Desert Warfare: From Its Roman 
Origins to the Gulf Conflict (New York: Sterling Publishing, 1988. 

51 . A. Starker Leopold, The Desert, Life Nature Library (New York: Time-Life Books, 1 961 ); FM 
90-3/Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-27: Desert Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 
August 1 9, 1 977), 2-3 through 2-5 and appendix A. 



s&m&mwxv^q^^ 

REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 133 



52. Richard Collier, The War in the Desert (New York: Time-Life Books,1977) ; 171-172; 
Leopold, The Desert, 101-102, 105, 108-109; FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-7. 

53. Winning in the Desert, Newsletter No. 90-7, Special Edition (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. 
Army Combined Arms Training Activity, Center for Lessons Learned, August 1 990), 12,21; Kendall 
L. Peterson, "Automotive Testing in the Desert," Military Review 50, no. 1 1 (November 1 970): 56-61 ; 
William G. ("Gus") Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Persian 
Gulf War (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 86, 96; Leopold, The Desert, 13-14; 
FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-21 and 2-22. 

54. Collier, The War in the Desert, 50, 52-53; Glenn R. Locke, "Dust," U.S. Army Aviation 
Digest (August 1970): 34-35. 

55. FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-20, 2-22 and 2-23; Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 86; 
Infantry, July-August 1 981 , 1 68-1 69. 

56. Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 108. 

57. FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-9 and 2-1 0, 4-20; Leopold, The Desert, 31 , 1 02, 1 46-1 50. 

58. Richard Collier, The War in the Desert, 54. 

59. FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-15 through 2-18, 5-9, 5-10, F-6, appendix G; Pagonis, 
Moving Mountains, 96, 205; Leopold, The Desert, 32, 128. 

60. Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1967); Moorehead's 
analogy is quoted in Collier, The War in the Desert, 21 . 

61 . Fluid maneuvering throughout history is typified in Sir John Bagot Glubb, The Great Arab 
Conquests (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Leo de Hartog, Genghis Khan: Conqueror of 
the World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1 989),78-1 48; T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New 
York: Dell Publishing, 1962); Edgar O'Ballance, Afghan Wars 1839-1992 (New York: Brassey's, 
1 993); Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office 
of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1 993). 

62. Collier, The War in the Desert, 1 2-29. 

63. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. I-5, Eliot A. Cohen, Director (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1993); Frank N. Schubert and Theresa Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1 995). 

64. Leopold, The Desert, 1 8-1 9, 32, 34; Winning in the Desert, 1 6-1 7. ^ 

65. William Matthews, "Forecaster Helps Pilots Find Targets," Air Force Times, July 1, 1996, 
1 6; FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-8, 4-4 and 4-5; Winning in the Desert, 1 8, 23; "The Desert: Its 
Effect on Soldiers," part 2, Infantry (September-October 1 981 ): 31 . 

66. Ibid. 

67. Virginia Cowles, The Phantom Major (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1 958). 

68. Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria's Little Wars (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Charles 
Miller, Khyber, British India's Northwest Frontier: The Story of an Imperial Migraine (New York: 
Macmillan, 1977); David C. Isby, War in a Distant Country: Afghanistan Invasion and Resistance 
(London: Arms and Armor, 1989). 

69. FM 90-3: Desert Operations, appendix D. 

70. Ibid. 

71. Pagonis, Moving Mountains; Winning in the Desert, 12-13, 16-20; FM 90-3: Desert 
Operations, 2-20 through 2-25, 5-1 , 5-6 through 5-1 1 . 

72. Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore: The Japanese Version (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960), 
appendix 1; U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1 940); FM 31-20: Basic Field Manual, Jungle Warfare (Washington: U.S. War Department, December 
1941). 

73. Eric Bergerud, Touched With Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific (New York: Viking, 
1 996), 62-68; Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers (New York: Schocken Books, 1 972), 293. 



JMMyMMMMMMMMMMMi^^ 

1 34 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



74. FM 90-5: Jungle Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, August 1 6, 1 982), 1 -3 
through 1-6. 

75. John. L. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign (Washington, DC: Historical Division, 
Hqtrs., U.S. Maine Corps, 1949), 15-17; Bergerud, Touched With Fire, 69-83. 

76. FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, 5-2 through 5-4, 5-10, 5-15: Winning in the Jungle (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 1995), 
1-1, I-5, I-8, II-2, III-2 through III-4, III-8. 

77. Rafael Steinberg, Island Fighting (New York: Time-Life Books, 1 978), 20, 38-45 (Admiral 
Halsey is cited on 38); FM 90-5: Jungle Warfare, 5-6, 5-14, appendix B (Navigation and Tracking); 
Winning in the Jungle, I-2; Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, 1 6. 

78. Steinberg, Island Fighting, 46-71, 82, 134-136; Bergerud, Touched With Fire, 80-84; 
Winning in the Jungle, I-2 through I-5, I-9; FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, appendix C. 

79. Ian Henderson, Man Hunt in Kenya, with Philip Goodhart, portrays counterinsurgency 
problems in jungle-like terrain (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1 958). See also Challenge and 
Response in International Conflict, vol. 1 , Philippines (1 899-1 902, 1 942-1 945, 1 946-1 954), Burma 
(1 942-1 945), Malaya (1 942-1 945, 1 948-1 960), Indochina and South Vietnam (1 946-1 954, 1 956- 
1 963), Indonesia (1 946-1 949, 1 958-1 961 ); vol. 3, Nicaragua (1 927-1 933), Madagascar (1 947-1 948), 
Portuguese Guinea (1 959-1 965); Supplement, Dominican Republic (1 91 6-1 924), Haiti (1 91 8-1 920, 
1958-1964), Laos (1959-1 962). 

80. FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, 6-5 through 6-1 7 and appendix I, Adjustment of Fire by Sound; 
Winning in the Jungle, 1-14 through 1-17. 

81 . Field-Marshal Viscount Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 1 1 9-200, 275. 

82. Bernard Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1 958). 

83. FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, chapter 7 ', Combat Service Support; Don Moser, China-Burma- 
India (New York: Time-Life Books, 1 978), 1 96-203; Steinberg, Island Fighting, 64-67. 

84. FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, 2-2 through 2-8; Bergerud, Touched With Fire, 90-1 01 , 452- 
467. 

85. Bergerud, Touched With Fire, 72, 84, 85,86, 41 8, 420, 467-468. 

86. W. Gilmore Simms, The Life of Francis Marion (New York: H. G. Langley, 1 844). 

87. Former German generals and staff officers prepared four pamphlets for publication by Dept. 
of the Army in Washington, DC: DA Pamphlet 20-201 , Military Improvisations During the Russian 
Campaign, August 1951, 53-55; DA Pamphlet 20-231, Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps, July 
1951, 1-3, 5, 7-8, 13, 32-33; DA Pamplet 20-290, Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign, July 
1951, 30, 38; DA Pamphlet 20-291, Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia, February 
1952,29, 49, 50. 

88. Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps (all); Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign, 28- 
45; Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia, 29-35, 49-55. 

89. David and Jeanne Heidler, Old Hickory's War: Andrew Jackson and the Quest for Empire 
(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996); John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole 
War, 1835-1842 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1 967); Soldiers of Florida in the Indian, 
Civil, and Spanish American Wars (Tallahassee, FL: Board of State Institutions, undated). 

90. Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Marsh Arabs and U.S. Policy, Report No. 94-320F (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, April 13,1994); "Once a Wetland, Now a Desert," Boston 
Globe, September 8, 1 994, 20. 

91 . William B. Fulton, Riverine Operations, 7966-7969 (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 
1985,17-19. 

92. Ibid., 47-49, 57-58, 68-71; Engineering Concepts for Construction in the Mekong Delta 
Region of the Republic of Vietnam, U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam (Provisional), undated 



REGIONAL PECULIARITIES 135 



(1967). James H. Nash, Special Projects, Engineering Division, U.S. Army Vietnam Engineer Section, 
orally furnished Dong Tarn cost figures in 1 968. 

93. Richard M. Meyer, "The Ground-Sea Team in River Warfare," Military Review 46, no. 9 
(September 1966): 54-61. 

94. Fulton, Riverine Operations, 21 , 26-67, 89-1 02; FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, appendix D; 
John B. Spore, "Floating Assault Force: Scourge of the Mekong Delta," Army (February 1958): 28-32; 
"Paths Across the Mekong" and "Monsters That Float on Air," Army Gune 1 968): 72-73, 80-81 ; John 
W. Baker and Lee C. Dickson, "Army Forces in Riverine Operations," Military Review 47, no. 8 
(August 1967): 64-74. 

95. Jay Luvaas, "Buna, 19 November 1942-2 January 1943," in America's First Battles, eds. 
Charles E. Heller and William A Stofft (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1986), 201, 209- 
210; Bergerud, Touched With Fire, 73-74. 

96. S. L. A. Marshall, Ambush (New York: Cowles,1 969), 1 86-1 99; Area Wide Analysis of the 
Rung Sat Special Zone, U.S. Army Vietnam, undated (1 967), twenty-one 2-1 x 26-inch sheets of text, 
maps, and photographs; recollections of Edwin W. Chamberlain, Jr., a Rung Sat veteran, July 10, 
1969. 

97. ... From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21 st Century (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Navy, September 1 992), 6. 

98. Charles H. Sinex and Robert S. Winokur, "Environmental Factors Affecting Military 
Operations in the Littoral Battlespace," Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 1 4, no. 2 (1 993): 1 1 2- 
1 24; Charles W. Koburger, Jr. Narrow Seas, Small Navies, and Fat Merchantmen (New York: Praeger, 
1990), 137-145. 

99. For some cost-benefit figures, see George R. Worthington, "Combat Craft Have a Role in 
Littoral Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 120, no. 8 (August 1994): 24-25. 

100. John W. McGillvray, Jr. "Stealth Technology in Surface Warships," Naval War College 
Review 47, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 29-30; Yedidia "Did!" Ya'ari, "The Littoral Arena: A Word of 
Caution," Naval War College Review 48, no. 2 (Spring 1 995): 9, 1 0, 1 2, 1 7; Ronald O'Rourke, Navy 
DD-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, Report No. 94-343 F 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 25, 1994), 25-26. 

101. McGillvray, "Stealth Technology in Surface Warships," 33-39; Ya'ari, "The Littoral Region," 
14. 

102. Norman Friedman, "Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare: Not As Easy As It Sounds," 
International Defense Review (June 1 995): 53-57; Worthington, "Combatant Craft Have a Role in 
Littoral Warfare." 

1 03 . Koburger, Jr., Narrow Seas, Small Navies, and Fat Merchantmen, 43-44, 46-48, 69, 89-90, 
107, 112-113; Maurice Griffiths, The Hidden Menace (Greenwich, CT: Conway Maritime Press, 
1981), 127. 

1 04. Arthur P. Brill, Jr., "The Last Twenty Feet," Sea Power (November 1 995): 43-46; Sinox and 
Winokur, "Environmental Factors Affecting Military Operations in the Littoral Battlespace," 114, 115- 
117, 121. 



1 36 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



7, INNER AMD OUTER SPAC 



Icarus was a brave boy, 
feathered wings his pride and joy. 
He flew high and had fun 
'til he neared the hot sun, 
which melted his fragile toy. 

Anonymous 
The First Space Flight 
A Cautionary Limerick 



MILITARY SPACE FORCES, UNLIKE MYTHOLOGICAL ICARUS WHO FLEW TOO CLOSE TO THE SUN, CURRENTLY 

confine their activities to inner space, where they perform crucially important 
reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, tracking, communications, navigational, 
meteorological, missile warning, and verification missions in a medium quite different than 
land, sea, or air. 1 Combat operations eventually may occur 2 but interplanetary warfare seems 
far in the future for political, economic, military, and technical reasons. Round trips to Mars, 
for example, would take 2 or 3 years. The following discussions therefore concentrate on 
four distinctive regions within the Earth-Moon System: Aerospace Interfaces, Circumterrestrial 
or Inner Space, the Moon and Its Environs, and an amorphous Outer Envelope, beyond 
which outer space begins (map 23). 

SPACE COMPARED WITH LAND AND SEA 

Air, water, weather, climate, and vegetation within the Earth-Moon System are exclusively 
indigenous to this planet. 3 Land forms and natural resources are restricted to the Earth, 
Moon, and asteroids. Cosmic radiation, solar winds, micrometeorites, and negligible or 
neutralized gravity are unique properties of space. Near vacuum is present everywhere 
except on Earth and vicinity. 

Space and the seas are superficially similar, but differences are dramatic: 

Continents bound all five oceans, which are liquid and almost opaque, whereas space 
has no shape and little substance. 

Earth's curvature limits sea surface visibility to line-of-sight, whereas visibility as well 
as maneuver room are virtually limitless in space. 






137 



Map 23. The Earth-Moon System 









Region IV / 

Outer Envelope / 



Region II 
Circumterrestrial 



Region I 
Earth and 
Atmosphere 



Region III 
Moon and 
\ Environs 
\ 



\ 



\ 



Region IV 
Outer Envelope 




(1000 miles) 
SCALE 



Distance in Miles 



From Earth 



From Moon 



Region I 



IV 
Lunar Orbit 



Surface to 60 
60 to 50,000 
50,000 to 240,000 
240,000to 480,000 
240,000 



L1 45,000 

L2 42,000 

L3 480,000 

L4 60 ahead of moon 

L5 60 behind moon 



NOTE: Regions I, II, and IV are globe-shaped. Region III is like a quarter slice of pie, with little depth 
in comparison. L1 through L5 are lunar libration points. 



138 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Acoustics, an antisubmarine warfare staple, play no part in space, because sound 
cannot survive in a vacuum. 

Space welcomes electromagnetic radiation, whereas water is practically impervious 
to radio and radar waves. 

Day-night cycles and shock waves, which are prevalent everywhere on Earth, are 
nonexistent in space. 

Atmospheric phenomena and salt water interfere with light and focused energy rays 
on Earth, but neither refract in space. 

Space moreover has no north, east, south, or west to designate locations and directions. 
A nonrotating celestial sphere of infinite radius, with its center at Earth's core, is the reference 
frame. Declination, the astronomical analog of latitude, is the angular distance north or 
south of the celestial equator, right ascension is the counterpart of longitude, and the 
constellation Aries, against which spectators on Earth see the sun when it crosses Earth's 
Equator in springtime, defines the prime meridian. Angular positions in space are measured 
from that celestial counterpart of Greenwich Observatory. 

Distances in space are meaningful mainly in terms of time. Merchant ships en route from 
the U.S. Pacific coast to the Persian Gulf typically take about a month to sail 1 2,000 nautical 
miles (22,240 kilometers). Apollo 1 1 flew to the Moon, 20 times as far, in slightly more than 
3 days. Real time communications, transmitted at 1 86,000 miles per second (the speed of 
light on Earth and in space) are possible despite great distances the delay between Earth and 
Moon amounts to about 1 second. 



REGION h AEROSPACE INTERFACES 

Four geographic factors in Region I influence transits to and from space: atmosphere and 
gravity, together with Earth's rotation and inclination. Some effects are militarily adverse, 
whereas others are advantageous. 

ATMOSPHERE 

Half of Earth's atmosphere is located less than 3 miles above sea level (4.6 kilometers), in the 
bottom of the troposphere (figure 22). 4 Most humans need supplemental oxygen to sustain 
efficient performance well before they reach that elevation. Pressurized suits or cabins 
become obligatory at about 9 miles, because crew members, unable to expel carbon dioxide 
and water vapor from their lungs unassisted, otherwise would suffocate. Their blood literally 
would boil above 12 miles in the absence of such protection. Military aircraft and space 
vehicles depend on pure air produced in a sealed environment after they approach altitudes 
that approximate 1 5 miles, where heat transfer is excessive and poisonous ozone is present. 
Turbojet engines refuse to function much above 20 miles; ramjets sputter and stop when 
altimeters register 28 miles (45 kilometers); rockets are required beyond that point. 

High winds, extreme turbulence, lightning, and ice often cause launch and landing 
delays, even for remotely-piloted aircraft and unmanned space vehicles on tight military 
schedules. The top-heavy U.S. piggyback space shuttle, which often transports sensitive 
cargo for the U.S. Department of Defense, might capsize if it tried to take off 



INNER AND OUTER SPACE 139 



Figure 22. Aerospace Interfaces 



UWERS 



STATUTE 
MILES 



Hard Vacuum 



Exosphere 



1200 
1000 



-Aerodynamic Drag Still Determines Orbit Life 



-300 



200 



Thermosphere 



100 



60 



REGION II 



1200 
1000 



300 



200 



Magnetosphere 



.REGION 
Ends Where 



..-.. . tnas wnere 
.* . '^ functional Heat Strongly Affects Reentry"-^ 
.'.'.." ** Astronaut Wings Authorized 




100 



Ionosphere 



NOTE: Alt altitudes are approximate. Latitudes, seasons, and solar activities cause significant deviations. 



140 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



when crosswinds exceed the currently permissible 1 5 miles per hour (24 kph). Thunderbolts, 
such as the one that destroyed a U.S. Atlas-Centaur rocket laden with a multimillion dollar 
communications satellite in March 1 987, pose similar hazards. 

Spacecraft must overcome strong aerodynamic drag immediately after launch, but 
resistance becomes progressively weaker as they rise through the troposphere, because 
thinner air bears down with less pressure and the amount of fuel expended lightens the load 
they must lift. They break free for practical purposes where the mesosphere and 
thermosphere merge at an altitude that averages about 60 miles (95 kilometers). Frictional 
heat consumes space vehicles of all kinds when they reenter Earth's atmosphere at high 
velocities unless a shield protects exteriors and insulation keeps crews (if any) and other 
contents acceptably cool. Apollo command modules returning from the Moon, for example, 
had to offset 5,000 "F (1 ,900 C), four times that of blast furnaces. 

Friction nevertheless exerts some positive effects. Aerodynamic drag at the interface 
where atmosphere and space imperceptibly merge can act as a brake or alter orbit 
configurations without burning fuel, provided computers calculate reentry angles correctly. 
Spacecraft skip or bounce back erratically when trajectories are too shallow and incineration 
results when they are too steep, but reentry windows as a rule open wider for powered 
vehicles than for those that glide. 

GRAVITY 

Propulsion systems must be powerful enough to boost military spacecraft into orbit, despite 
atmospheric drag and gravity (g), which keeps objects on Earth without an anchor and pulls 
unsupported bodies from atmosphere or space toward the surface. 5 Astronauts and payloads 
both experience enormous stress during vertical liftoffs, because net force, acceleration, and 
velocity all increase rapidly when engines consume propellants (about 90 percent of the 
original weight) and expel mass in the form of exhaust. Gravitational attraction decreases 
with altitude, but is still 1 full g at 100 miles (160 kilometers), well beyond the upper 
boundary of Region I. 

Spacecraft in orbit maintain constant speeds that are little affected by atmospheric drag 
or gravity. Those that follow circular paths fall the same distance every second that Earth's 
curved surface seems to recede and thus stay in proper position, aided only by minor 
adjustments to prevent drifting (figure 23). Braking enables them to attain lower orbits or 
return to Earth, whereas additional energy propels them farther out. All spacecraft and 
contents not battened down become "weightless" unless slow rotations create artificial 
gravity, because they free fall constantly at the same rate. 

ROTATION AMD INCLINATION 

The entire Earth-Moon System, with its center of mass 1,000 miles beneath Earth's surface, 
completes one elliptical orbit around the sun every 365.25 days at a mean linear velocity 
of 666,000 miles per hour (1+ million kph)/ 1 The Earth, tipped on its axis 23 degrees 27 
minutes with respect to that orbit, rotates (spins) west to east 1,040 miles per hour at the 
Equator (1 ,675 kph), half as fast at the 60 th parallels, and remains stationary only at the North 
and South Poles. One complete turn equals one day. Military spacecraft launched due east 
get a flying start from Earth's rotation, which makes it easier to attain orbital velocities. 
Benefits are greatest for vehicles near the Equator and progressively less toward each pole, 



INNER AND OUTER SPACE 141 



Figure 23. Gravity Versus Space Vehicle Velocity 




Path A: Suborbital; vehicle velocity too slow 
to overcome gravity. 

Path B: Earth orbit; vehicle velocity and 
gravity equal. 

Path C: Escape; vehicle velocity overcomes 
gravity pull. 



5 mi. 




The Earth's curvature, on the average, dips 16 feet in a little less than 5 miles. Spacecraft circling the globe 
fall that same distance in the first second, wherever gravitational pull is 1g. A velocity of 5 miles per second 
(18,000 mph) therefore produces perpetual orbit, unless perturbations prohibit. The 100-mile altitude displayed 
is exemplary. It could be higher or lower, as long as gravity is about 1g. 



where advantages are nil. Rotation neither assists nor resists launches that point 
north or south. 

Orbital altitudes determine the time it takes to complete one circuit around Earth. The 
period is 90 minutes for circular orbits at 1 25 miles (200 kilometers), less at lower altitudes, 
and longer higher up where paths are lengthy and less velocity is needed to counteract 
gravity. The period of elliptical orbits averages the nearest and farthest distances from Earth. 
Spacecraft achieve geosynchronous orbits at a mean altitude of 22,300 miles (35,885 
kilometers), where their 24-hour flight around the world corresponds precisely with the time 
it takes Earth to rotate once on its axis. Geosynchronous orbits that are circular and 



142 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



equatorial are called geostationary, because they seemingly hover over a single spot, while 
other Earth orbits make figure eights from center lines over the Equator. Sun synchronous 
orbits pass over prescribed spots at the same local time every day, come winter, summer, 
spring, or fall. Such options are useful for many military purposes, especially intelligence 
collection and communications. 

REGION M; QRCUMTERRESTRIAL SPACE 

Circumterrestrial or inner space, as defined herein, 7 is a harsh region that begins about 60 
miles above Earth, where aerodynamic drag and frictional heat lose most of their significance. 
Asteroids and meteoroids that weigh many tons hurtle through the void at 30,000 to 1 60,000 
miles per hour. Catastrophic collisions with spacecraft seem improbable, although manmade 
"trash" is potentially troublesome and high-speed particles that pepper capsules and space 
suits over long periods not only pit optical lenses but chip temperature control surfaces. The 
latter are particularly important, because surface temperatures of objects in the thermosphere 
sometimes exceed 2,500 F (1,400 C). Sunlit sides anywhere in circumterrestrial space 
figuratively fry, while shady sides freeze, unless reflectors and insulating shields protect them. 
Moreover, systems must be designed to expel excessive heat generated on board. 

Space, which lies beyond "the wild blue yonder," is absolutely black because light cannot 
scatter in very thin air or hard vacuums. Total silence also prevails, and there are no shock 
waves or sonic booms, regardless of vehicle velocities. Earth's gravity, in combination with 
other perturbations such as solar winds, electromagnetic forces, and lunisolar gravitation 
above geosynchronous levels, radically warps spacecraft orbits over time unless corrected. 
"Cold welding" can occur if metals touch accidentally, because no film of air separates 
exposed surfaces, while structures that are frigid on one side and torrid on the other undergo 
great stress. 

X-rays, ultraviolet light, and infrared flood the ionosphere and magnetosphere. Two Van 
Allen radiation belts, separated by a low-density slot, girdle the globe with magnetic fields 
between latitudes 45 degrees north and south. The inner belt begins between 250 and 750 
miles above Earth and tapers off at about 6,200 miles. The outer belt expires at 37,000 to 
52,000 miles, depending on solar activity. Adequate shielding, coupled with prudent flight 
planning that reduces time in the most dangerous zones, is the best way to avoid overdoses 
and electronic disruptions that could interfere with important military missions. 

Cosmic rays beyond the Van Allen belts pose additional problems. Sporadic solar flares 
cause proton storms that project high-energy, high-charge, high-density, long-range flux a 
million times more powerful than particles in routine solar winds. Less potent doses can 
damage or destroy human cells, including components of the central nervous system, cause 
communication blackouts, and discombobulate poorly protected guidance systems. 
Forecasts that defer flights or recall them in time to avoid solar flares consequently 
are crucial. 



INNER AND OUTER SPACE 143 



REGION III: MOON AND ENVIRONS 

The voyage from Earth to the Moon averages 240,000 miles (386,000 kilometers) of cislunar 
space that is environmentally much the same as circumterrestrial space above the Van Allen 
belts (map 24). Lunar attributes and the significance of lunar libration points, however, merit 
special mention. 

EARTHLY AMD LUNAR GRAVITY WELLS 

Military space forces at the bottom of Earth's "gravity well" need immense energy to leave 
launch pads and climb quickly into space. Adversaries at the top, in positions analogous to 
"high ground," have far greater maneuver room and freedom of action. Put simply, it is 
easier to drop objects down a well than to throw them out. Gravitational pull on the Moon 
is one-sixth as strong and related launch problems consequently are miniscule in comparison, 
as figure 24 shows. 8 

LUNAR TERRAIN 

The Moon's square mileage is essentially the same as Africa's. The diameter at its Equator is 
2,160 miles (3,475 kilometers), a little more than one-fourth that of Planet Earth. That bleak 
orb rotates once on its axis in 27.3 days, the same time it takes to complete one revolution 
around our world, so lunar days and nights each last 2 weeks, and the Moon eternally 
presents the same face to observers on Earth. Temperatures at a depth of 3 feet or so 
consistently register about -46 F, but sunlit equatorial surfaces sizzle well above the boiling 
point on Earth, 21 2 F (86 C), and dip below -245 F (-1 04 C) after dark. 9 

Lunar terrain, devoid of atmosphere, vegetation, and water (except perhaps for ice at the 
poles), features rough highlands on the far side, while huge shallow saucers predominate on 
the side we see Galileo called them maria, because they looked like seas through his 
telescope. Ridges and canyons known as rilles cross-hatch to form a lunar grid. Bowl-shaped 
craters, some of which have extremely steep sides, boulders, blocks, dimples, and hummocky 
debris make smooth topography hard to find. Lunar dust, called fines, mantles most of the 
level land, but abundant natural resources such as iron, titanium, aluminum, manganese, 
calcium, and silicon lie just beneath the surface. Construction materials also are accessible. 

Map makers and armed forces lack any criterion comparable to sea level from which to 
define elevations and depths. Each molehill and mountain therefore must be measured from 
base to crest, each canyon and crater from top to bottom. Pike's Peak in the Colorado 
Rockies would loom slightly less than 9,000 feet instead of 14,110 if calculated in that 
fashion, because its base is more than a mile above sea level. 

LUNAR LIBRATION POINTS 

Five so-called lunar libration points are not points at all, but three-dimensional positions in 
space, shaped somewhat like kidney beans 10,000 miles (1 6,000 kilometers) long (map 24). 10 
Spacecraft theoretically could linger there indefinitely without expending much fuel if 
calculations are correct, because Earthly and lunar gravitational fields seem to cancel each 
other. Mathematical models and computer simulations conclude that free-floating objects at 
semistable L1 through L3, on a line with Earth and Moon, would gradually wander away, 
while substances at stable L4 and L5, which are 60 degrees ahead and behind the Moon in 



1 44 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 24. Cislunar Space 



(Three-Dimensional Perspective) 



L3 







L1 



Cislunar 
space 



X 

L5 



L2 

X 



L2 
y'Moon 



Sun 



Distance in Miles 


From Earth 


Lunar Orbit 


240,000 


From Moon 


L1 


45,000 




L2 


42,000 




L3 


480,000 




L4 


60 ahead of moon 




L5 


60 behind moon 



Figure 24. Earthly and Lunar Gravity Wells 



(Not to scale) 


Distance ' 
in Miles 

239,750 

i 


Energy ***N x x L4 %f L5 

required \ t Moon 

\ ' 

1 
40% | 

j ! 

^T"^i i no 


250 


; 60% ^ 


Earth 

Low earth orbits, near the bottom of Earth's gravity well in terms of distance (60-250 miles), are more than half 
way up in terms of energy required to reach that altitude. Spacecraft velocity must be about 4.5 miles per 
second (mps) to attain LEO. A mere 2.4 mps more is enough to reach the top, nearly 240,000 miles higher. 



INNER AND OUTER SPACE 



145 



its orbit, would resist drift more vigorously and thus remain in the general region. Those 
hypotheses, however, have not yet been verified. There are no known counterparts of the 
Trojan Asteroids that inhabit areas similar to L4 and L5 along Jupiter's orbit, nor have captive 
particle clouds been proven. 

REGION IV* OUTER ENVELOPE 

Region IV, which radiates from Earth in all directions, shares most characteristics of cislunar 
space. Its immense volume affords valuable maneuver room devoid of sizable matter, except 
for small asteroids (some rich in raw materials) that cross Earth's orbit. Region IV terminates 
at twice the distance to the Moon, beyond which solar and other planetary influences 
dominate. 

TIPS FOR MILITARY SPACE PLANNERS 
ORBITAL OPTIONS 

Orbital options, which are virtually limitless, hypothetical ly could connect all points in the 
Earth-Moon System, but atmospheric interfaces, gravity, and radiation in fact confine 
flexibility. 11 Aerodynamic drag and gravitational pull rule out high-speed Earth-to-space 
launches with currently envisioned vehicles, even in perfect weather. Enemy land-based 
defenses may straddle well-known launch trajectories that take advantage of Earth's rotation. 
Routes in space are relatively easy for opponents to predict, sharp altitude and inclination 
changes are costly to make in terms of fuel and time, and even minor deviations demand 
fine-tuned activation by auxiliary thrusters. Loop-the-loops, barrel rolls, violent evasive 
actions, and other flamboyant tactics popularized in movies like Star Wars will remain 
science fiction until technologists develop new ways to maneuver in a vacuum. Polar orbits 
could bypass both Van Allen radiation belts, which further restrict the choice of routes for 
manned flights, but in so doing would encounter parts of the magnetosphere that serve as 
funnels for intermittent solar flares that could cripple military operations in the absence of 
better shielding than currently is available. Reentry angles that avoid excessive frictional heat 
when spacecraft hit Earth's atmosphere also canalize approaches, and thereby reduce 
prospects for strategic or tactical surprise. 

STRATEGIC LOCATIONS IN SPACE 

A few fixed orbits confer valuable advantages in space. Three geostationary communications 
satellites positioned equidistantly around the circular track that runs 22,300 miles (35,885 
kilometers) above our Equator can receive signals from, and relay them to, any place on Earth 
except the poles. Reconnaissance and surveillance satellites that make north-south great 
circles around the world sooner or later get a good look at every place on this globe. 

All five lunar libration points constitute strategic locations in space. L1 , the lowest energy 
transfer site for 230 million mile trips between Earth and Mars, could be fitted with military 
facilities as well as the "motel/gas station/warehouse/restaurant/garage" that the U.S. National 
Commission on Space once envisaged. 12 L2 is a potentially important clandestine assembly 
area, since cislunar and Earth-based sentinels cannot see it. L3 could become a semi-stable 
staging base for military operations directed against Earth or spacecraft in orbit around it 
Nature, however, has reserved decisive advantages for L4 and L5, the two stable libration 






1 46 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



points, which theoretically could dominate Earth and Moon because they look down both 
gravity wells. No other location is equally commanding. 

Occupying armed forces would possess great strategic leverage with which to mount 
operations from the Moon. Offensive and defensive warfare on the Moon, however, would 
be a catch-as-catch-can proposition until technologists produce the equivalent of a Global 
Positioning System (GPS) for lunar use or cartographers develop large-scale maps that identify 
precise elevations and include a military grid upon which to plot ranges and pinpoint 
positions. 

WEAPON EFFECTS 

Geographic influences on nuclear, directed energy, chemical, biological, and conventional 
weapon effects are far-reaching and fundamental. Atmospheric interfaces, gravity, and 
vacuum are the most important factors. 

Nuclear Weapon Effects. Nuclear weapons detonated in Earth's atmosphere create shock 
waves, violent winds, and intense heat that inflict severe damage and casualties well beyond 
ground zero. 13 No such effects would occur in space, because winds never blow in a 
vacuum, shock waves cannot develop where no air, water, or soil resists compression, and 
neither fireballs nor superheated atmosphere could develop more than 65 miles (105 
kilometers) above Earth's surface. Consequently, it would take direct hits or near misses to 
achieve required results with nuclear blast and thermal radiation. 

Initial nuclear radiation from beta particles and gamma rays would radically alter the 
ionosphere, warp or weaken radio and radar waves, and cause lengthy high frequency (HF) 
blackouts over vast areas on Earth (the megaton-range TEAK test shot, detonated in the 
mesosphere over Johnson Island on August 1, 1958, degraded HF radio traffic for several 
thousand miles in every direction from shortly after midnight until sunrise). X-rays, which 
Earth's atmosphere absorbs within a few feet, travel thousands of miles at the speed of light 
in space. Strong doses can peel spacecraft skins and destroy delicate mechanisms. 
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP), widespread and potentially paralyzing to electronics on land, 
at sea, or in the air, would occur if a cascade of gamma rays from any high altitude nuclear 
explosion collided with Earth's upper atmosphere (figure 25). A prodigious surge that peaks 
100 times faster than lightning would bolt toward ground, then attack unshielded 
electronics. Solid state circuitry would be especially vulnerable, because miniature 
components cannot tolerate high currents and immense voltages able to melt semiconductors 
would instantaneously turn sophisticated systems into trash. 

Directed Energy Weapon Effects. Directed energy weapons, if and when perfected, will 
project energy at or near the speed of light over great distances, but none now under serious 
consideration could perform equally well on Earth and in space. Problems consequently 
will arise if they try to cross the interface. 14 

Space is a nearly perfect environment for high-energy lasers, because light propagates 
unimpeded in a vacuum. Power output is the principal range limitation. Diffraction is 
significant over long distances, but is controllable. High-powered microwave weapons in 
experimental stages reportedly would work well in space, but break down dielectrically in 
atmosphere at relatively low energy levels, which would fatally impair space-to- Earth or 
Earth-to-space lethality. Particle beams suffer from similar shortcomings, because charged 
particles propagate well only in Earth's atmosphere and neutral particles only in a vacuum. 



"""'^^ 



INNER AND OUTER SPACE 147 



The boundary between will remain a barrier to both unless scientists and technologists 
facilitate better conduction. Vehicles designed to survive intense reentry heat, however, 
would be vulnerable in space, where charged particle beams could penetrate hardened 
exteriors without burning a hole, then successfully attack components, propellants, and 
explosives not specifically protected. 

Figure 25. Electromagnetic Pulse Propaga tion 



HAB 



Gamma energy is converted, 
through compton recoil 
electrons, to a downward- 
moving electromagnetic wave. 



Mean altitude 25-30 
miles; up to 50 miles 
thick 



affect all soft systems 
and air within 1000s 




Chemical and Biological Weapon Effects. Self-contained biospheres in space afford a 
superlative environment for chemical and biological warfare compared with Earth, where 
weather and terrain virtually dictate delivery times, places, and techniques. 15 Most spacecraft 
and installations on the Moon, which must rely on closed-circuit life support systems that 
continuously recirculate air and recycle water, are conceivable targets for special operations 
forces armed with colorless, odorless, lethal, or incapacitating agents that would be almost 
impossible to spot before symptoms appear. Cumbersome masks and suits could protect 
individuals only if worn constantly. Sanctuaries comparable to the toxic-free citadels that eat 
up precious room on some ships would be infeasible for most spacecraft and safeguard only 
a few selected personnel. Any vehicle or structure victimized by persistent chemicals 
probably would become permanently uninhabitable, because vast quantities of water and 
solvents required for decontamination would be unavailable. 

Conventional Weapon Effects. Tanks, cruise missiles, and other systems with "air- 
breathing" engines would be inoperative on the Moon's airless surface. 16 Alternatives 
currently under exploration include battery-powered motors and rocket-propelled engines 



148 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



that oxidize fuel on board. Newton's Third Law of Motion (to every action there is an equal 
and opposite reaction) establishes requirements for recoilless weapony in the vacuum of 
space, because blast otherwise would propel spaceborne firing platforms backward with 
momentum equal to that of the ammunition in flight. Newton's First Law of Motion (bodies 
in motion move in a straight line until another force intervenes) would basically regulate 
projectile trajectories on the Moon, where velocity and low lunar gravity unopposed by 
atmospheric drag make "fire-and-forget" systems attractive. Conventional explosives would 
have to hit targets directly or detonate nearby, because no shock waves amplify blast effects 
in a vacuum, but even bird shot-size fragments could easily puncture the thin walls of 
pressurized lunar facilities built to repel nothing much larger than micrometeoroids. 

PERSONNEL PROFICIENCY 

Humans in space need support systems that not only provide air, food, and water but 
regulate temperatures, humidity, pressures, light, noise, vibrations, and radiation. Such 
requirements would be difficult to satisfy for armed forces on extended deployments. 17 

Subsistence and Sanitation. A one-month supply of oxygen, food, and drinking water just 
for a crew of three amounts to more than a ton stored at the expense of precious propel lant 
and military payloads. Each crew member in turn would deposit an equal amount of waste 
in the form of feces, urine, perspiration, internal gases, carbon dioxide, and other exhalation 
vapors that could quickly reach toxic proportions in a sealed capsule unless quelled, 
expelled, or sterilized. Life support systems currently dump or stow organic waste on short 
missions, but such practices do little to alleviate long-term resupply problems. High-priority 
research projects consequently emphasize alternative techniques. 

Radiation Risks. Military space forces would enter a perilous realm of radiant energy as 
soon as they leave Earth's protective atmosphere. Risks would be least in low Earth orbits but 
rise rapidly in the Van Allen belts and beyond, where high-energy, high-charge cosmic flux 
poses persistent hazards, while solar flares and other eruptions on the sun, always of concern, 
reach peak intensities every eleven years. Human central nervous, blood, digestive, and 
reproductive systems are particularly vulnerable to such radiation, which assaults 
reproductive cells. Delayed effects that could include leukemia, solid tumors, cataracts, and 
infertility might retard military recruitment and retention programs. Flight plans that limit 
time in the Van Allen belts and forecasts that warn of acute solar activity would reduce 
military flexibility along with radiation dangers, but permissible exposure may have to fit on 
a sliding scale, because personnel under age 35 apparently can tolerate higher levels and 
recuperate more quickly than older persons, who seem better able to withstand moderate 
overloads for longer periods. 

Motion Sickness and Weightlessness. Motion sickness, somewhat like an aggravated form 
of sea sickness, afflicts about half of all space travelers whose responses to medical 
suppressants are unpredictable. It conceivably might undermine mission proficiency enough 
during the first few days of each flight to mark the difference between military success and 
failure, depending on which crew members suffer worst from symptoms that variously 
include drowsiness, indifference, and severe vomiting. 

Weightlessness impairs response times, precision movements, and the work capacities of 
the best-trained, best-conditioned spacecraft crews. Dehydration occurs when the brain tells 
bodily organs to discharge fluids that pool in the chest. Blood, which thereafter thickens and 



INNER AND OUTER SPACE 149 



flows less freely, supplies needy tissues with smaller than usual amounts of fresh nutrients and 
oxygen. Reduced abilities to exercise in turn cause muscles to lose mass and tone. Evidence 
so far suggests that most physically fit humans tolerate weightlessness reasonably well and 
recover completely after they return to a 1-g environment, although irreversible bone 
demineralization may be a significant exception. Artificial gravity may some day alleviate 
or eliminate the most debilitating aspects of weightlessness in large, slowly rotating space 
stations, but not in small, tactical space vehicles. 

Group Proficiency. "Cabin fever" might affect teamwork adversely during very long 
military deployments, unless commanders took positive steps to limit and control 
psychological stresses caused by close confinement in space vehicles where the absence of 
identifiable days and nights deranges work-rest schedules like jet lag magnified many times. 
Manifestations range from emotional instability, fatigue, and short attention spans to impaired 
vital functions such as heartbeat, pulse, brain activity, body temperature, and metabolism. 
Some individuals perform best before breakfast, others after supper. Optimum unit efficiency 
therefore is possible only if crews contain a beneficial mix of biorhythms and schedules 
assign each member duties during his or her period of peak proficiency, because many 
military tasks make it impossible for all to work and relax simultaneously. 



KEY POINTS 

The term "aerospace" is a misnomer, because air and space are distinctively different 
geographic mediums. 

Military space activities currently are confined to unmanned reconnaissance, 
surveillance, target acquisition, tracking, communications, navigational, meteorological, 
missile warning, and arms control missions in support of armed forces on Earth. 

Many items needed to mount and sustain large-scale, extended military operations on 
the Moon and elsewhere in space remain to be invented, but could soon become 
technologically feasible. 

Few strategies, tactics, organizations, weapon systems, equipment, and little training 
designed for use by armed forces on Earth would be suitable for military operations in space. 

Orbital options will remain predictable until technologists devise innovative ways to 
maneuver spacecraft in a vacuum. 

The Moon, lunar libration points L-4 and L-5, and the geostationary orbital path above 
Earth's Equator are strategic locations within the Earth-Moon System. 

Military space operations of any kind will demand extensive Earth-based command, 
control, communications, logistical, and administrative support for the foreseeable future. 



1 50 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



MOTES 

1 . Chapter 7 modifies the text and consolidates source notes in John M. Collins, Military Space 
Forces: The Next Fifty Years (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 1 2, 1 989), 
especially 3-36, reprinted by Pergamon-Brassey's, same title, 1989, 5-39. 

2. William B. Scott, "Pentagon Considers Space As a New Area of Responsibility," Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, March 24, 1 997, 54. For war fighting in and from space, see G. Harry 
Stine, Confrontation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981); Daniel O. Graham, High 
Frontier (Washington, DC: High Frontier, 1982). 

3. Curtis D. Cochran, Dennis M. Gorman, and Joseph D. Dumoulin, eds., Space Handbook 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, January 1985), 2-27 through 2-29. 

4. Ibid., 1 -3, 1 -4, chap. 8, and appendix A; G. Harry Stine, Handbook for Space Colonists 
(Holt, Rinehart and Winston,1 985), 47-79; Robert G. Fleagle, "Atmosphere," Encyclopedia 
Americana (International Edition, 1978). 

5. 5pace Handbook, 3-1 through 3-12; William M. Kaula, "Earth, the Gravitational Field of," 
and Jesse M. Beams, "Gravitation," in New Encyclopedia Britannica, 1 5 th ed.; Handbook for Space 
Colonists, 81-95. 

6. Frederick C. Durant," Space Exploration," New Encyclopedia Britannica; David Baker, The 
Shape of Wars to Come (New York: Stein and Day, 1 982), 35-39. 

7. Space Handbook, 1-5 through 1-14 passim, 2-41 through 2-47, and chapter 7; Isaac 
Asimov, "Sound" and N. C. Gerson, "Van Allen Radiation Belts," in Encyclopedia Americana. 

8. Confrontation in Space, 56-58, 86; Pioneering the Space Frontier: Report of the National 
Commission on Space (New York: Bantam Books, 1 986), 60-61 . 

9. Gilbert Fielder, "Moon," and Victor G. Szebehely, "Mechanics, Celestrial," New 
Encyclopedia Britannica; James D. Burke, "Moon," Encyclopedia Americana. 

10. Pioneering the Space Frontier, 131-132; Gerard K. O'Neill, The High Frontier: Human 
Colonies in Space (New York: Morrow, 1 977), 1 28-1 30. 

11. Ashton B. Carter, "Satellites and Anti-Satellites," International Security 10, no. 4 (Spring 
1 986): 48-66; Robert B. Giffen, U.S. Space System Survivability: Strategic Alternatives for the 1990s 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,1982), 6-8,12; Space Handbook, 2-37 through 
2-40. 

12. Pioneering the Space Frontier, 1 33-13. 

13. Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3 d ed. 
(Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense and Dept. of Energy, 1977). 

1 4. Dietrich Schroder, Directed Energy Weapons and Strategic Defense: A Primer, Adelphi Paper 
221 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer, 1987); Space Handbook, 9-1 
through 9-21, 9-25 through 9-42, 9-50, 9-51, 9-54. 

15. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, August 1993); The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, vol. 
2, CB Weapons Today (New York: Stockholm International Peace Institute, 1 973), 37-43, 61 -72; FM 
21-40: NBC Defense (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, October 14,1977), chapter 5 and 
appendix B. 

1 6. Confrontation in Space, 78-80, 95-6; O'Neill, The High Frontier, 138-1 40. 

17. Roy L. DeHart, ed., Fundamentals of Aerospace Medicine (Philadelphia, PA: Leas and 
Febiger, 1985); Arnold E. Nicogossian and James F. Parker, Jr., Space Psychology and Medicine 
(Washington, DC: National Aeronautical and Space Agency, 1982). 



INNER AND OUTER SPACE 151 



8, NATURAL RESOURCES AMD 
RAW MATERIALS 



In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth 
was without form, and void. . . . And Cod said, "Let the waters under 
the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land 
appear": and it was so. And Cod called the dry land Earth; and the 
gathering together of the waters called he Seas; and God saw that it 
was good. 

Genesis 1 :1 



GOD CREATED EVERYTHING FROM NOTHING IN THE BEGINNING, ACCORDING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT. 

Everything since then has been created from something. Natural resources are the basic 
ingredients of all raw materials which, in turn, are the building blocks of all finished 
products, including military arms, equipment, and supplies. Sources, shortages, and 
compensatory programs are relevant to every nation. So are vulnerabilities to economic 
warfare and armed interdiction. 



SOURCES AMD SHORTAGES 

The world community is divided inequitably into "have" and "have not" nations with regard 
to natural resources and raw materials. Even the best endowed countries suffer deficiencies 
that adversely affect military capabilities, but the criticality of any given shortage depends on 
the technological sophistication of armed forces in question, expansion and replenishment 
requirements, relationships with foreign suppliers, alternative providers, and the security of 
long-haul transportation lanes between sources and consumers. 

MINERALS AMD METALS 

More than 90 minerals, metals, and materials are critically useful for military purposes. 1 
Relative importance depends on present and projected needs, but iron plus the dozen items 
listed on table 1 1 possess properties that are universally in demand. Most of them form 
ferrous and/or nonferrous alloys of great utility. 



153 



Table 1 1 . One Dozen Militarily Useful Minerals and Metals 



Minerals and Metals 



Representative Properties 



Typical Military Products 



Bauxite 
(Aluminum) 

Chromium 



Cobalt 
Columbium 

Copper 

Manganese 

Nickel 

Platinum 

Tantalum 

Titanium 

Tungsten 

Uranium 



Light Weight 
Castability 

Corrosion Resistance 
Oxidation Resistance 

Heat Resistance 
Abrasion Resistance 

Malleability 
Acid Resistance 

Malleability 
Ductility 




Corrosion Resistance 
Hardness 

Catalytic Abilities 
High Melting Point 

Corrosion Resistance 
Acid Resistance 

High Strength 
Light Weight 

Heat Resistance 
Hardness 

Radioactivity 



Aircraft Frames 
Hydraulic Cylinders 

Gun tubes 
Landing Gear 

Jet Engine Alloys 
Cutting Tools 

Petroleum Tankers 
Jet Engines 

Electric Wiring 
Cartridge Brass 

Ship Propellers 
Torpedoes 

Electroplated Aircraft Parts 
Axles, Gears, Valves, Rods 

High Octane Fuels 
Electronics 

Armor Penetrators 
Electronics 

Armor Plate 
Space Capsules 

Spark Plugs 
Electrical Contacts 

Nuclear-Powered Naval Ships 
Nuclear Weapons 



IMPORTANT PROPERTIES 

Hardness, toughness, and lightness of weight are highly valued properties. Aluminum, which 
weighs one-third less than steel, is a mainstay of military aircraft manufacturers. Like stainless 
steel, which amalgamates iron with chromium, it resists corrosion. Manganese is among the 
most important of all metallic elements, because no other substance so effectively controls 
oxidation and sulfur content during steel production processes. Manganese also strengthens 
iron alloys, helps aluminum ward off rust, and combines with copper or nickel to make 
marine propellers, fittings, gears, and bearings that wear well in salt water. Copper 



154 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



additionally is in demand for telecommunication wires of great tensile strength and high 
conductivity, while nickel alloys make first-class electroplated aircraft parts and air frames. 
Cobalt alloys tolerate high temperatures that jet engines generate and furnish the metal matrix 
for carbides in cutting tools, bulldozers, shovels, and scrapers that must keep sharp edges 
despite abrasion. High strength-to-weight ratios make titanium useful for space capsule skins, 
aircraft fire walls, jet engine components, and landing gears. Super hard tungsten, which 
boasts the highest melting point of any metal (6,1 70 F, 3,410 C), is the basic constituent of 
tenacious steel alloys, spark plugs, and electrical contact points. 2 

Properties in addition to or other than hardness and toughness make several minerals and 
metals quite valuable. Scarce platinum, noted for extraordinary catalytic activity and high 
melting points, not only raises octane ratings during petroleum refinement but makes 
sensitive electronic relay switches. Versatile tantalium, which resists corrosion more 
effectively than platinum, is the basic ingredient of many electronic components and, in 
oxide form, mingles with other materials that make sharp aerial camera lenses. Acid-resistant 
columbium alloys are ideal for gasoline and oil tankers. 3 Radioactive uranium, in a class by 
itself, fuels reactors that furnish nuclear power for high-performance naval surface ships and 
submarines. Nuclear bombs, missile warheads, and demolitions all contain highly enriched 
isotope U-235 or weapon-grade plutonium at their core. 4 

IMPORTANT SUPPLY PROBLEMS 

Comparative U.S. and Soviet sources of supply and shortages in the mid-1 980s graphically 
illustrate relative strengths and weaknesses when competition between those two 
superpowers was at its zenith (figure 26). Both nations had sufficient uranium for military 
purposes, but the United States was far from self-sufficient in many other respects. Widely 
scattered suppliers provided 90 percent or more of nine important minerals and metals that 
included bauxite, cobalt, columbium, manganese, and tantalum. Chromium, nickel, and 
platinum imports exceeded 75 percent. 5 Major U.S. allies in NATO Europe and the Far East 
were worse off. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, relied entirely on outsiders 
for 1 6 industrial minerals, while japan drew on distant sources for nine-tenths of its total 
mineral needs/ 1 The Soviet Union, in contrast, was reasonably well off, because Warsaw Pact 
partners supplied most demands. Flourspar, bauxite, tin, silver, and tungsten were the only 
commodities available solely or in large part from sworn enemies or countries whose 
assistance was by no means assured. 7 Moscow in fact exported large amounts of titanium 
in exchange for hard cash until Alfa class attack submarine hulls consumed so much of that 
metal that shipments ceased. 

Bureaucratic bungling and technological obsolescence nevertheless reduced Soviet 
advantages considerably. Vast reserves, depleted at abnormally rapid rates, not only were 
(and still are) far removed from industrial centers but underlay harsh climatic regions that 
made extraction expensive. Molybdenum from Noril'sk, above the Arctic Circle in central 
Siberia, traveled more than 4,000 miles (6,435 kilometers) by river, road, and rail to reach 
metallurgical furnaces in Donetsk 600 miles (965 kilometers) farther than the land route 
from Miami, Florida, to Seattle, Washington. Norsk, an immense mining complex near 
northeastern Siberia's "Cold Pole," was even more isolated. 



NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS 1 55 



Figure 26. U.S. and Soviet Mineral and Metal Imports 
(Mid-1980s) 



MINERALS AND 
METALS 


NET IMPORT RELIANCE AS A PERCENT MAJOR FOREIGN 
OF APPARENT CONSUMPTION SOURCES 


UNITED STATES 

Columbium 
Diamond (industrial stones) 
Graphite (natural) 
Mica (sheet) 
Strontium 
Manganese 
Bauxite & Alumina 
Cobalt 
Tantalum 
Chromium 
Fluorspar 
Platinum-group metals 
Nickel 
Asbestos 
Tin 
Potash 
Cadmium 
Silver 
Zinc 
Barite 
Selenium 
Tungsten 
Antimony 
Gold 
Mercury 
Gypsum 
Iron Ore 
Iron & Steel 
Silicon 
Vanadium 
Nitrogen (fixed) 
Copper 

SOVIET UNION 

Fluorspar 
Barite 
Cobalt 
Bauxite & Alumina 
Tin 
Silver 
Tungsten 
Antimony 
Molybdenum 




100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
99 
97 
91 
90 
88 
87 
85 
75 
74 
72 
71 
69 
59 
53 


%, 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
I I I I 




Brazil, Canada, Thailand 
Rep. of South Africa, Zaire, Belg.,-Lux., U.K. 
Mexico, Rep. of Korea, Madagascar, China 
India, Brazil, Madagascar 
Mexico 
Rep. of South Africa, France, Gabon, Brazil 
Australia, Jamaica, Guinea, Suriname 
Zaire, Zambia, Belg.,-Lux., Finland 
Thailand, Canada, Malaysia, Brazil 
Rep. of South Africa, U.S.S.R., Philippines, Turkey 
Mexico, Rep. of South Africa, Italy, Spain 
Rep. of South Africa, U.S.S.R., U.K. 














mmmmmmmmmm 


mmmmmmmwm 


wmmmmmmmm 


mmmmmmmmm 


iijjjj^ijii^teij^i 




m^mmmmm 


Canada, Norway, Botswana, Australia 
Canada, Rep. of South Africa 
Malaysia, Thailand, Bolivia, Indonesia 
Canada, Israel 
Canada, Australia, Mexico, Rep. of Korea 
Canada, Mexico, U.K. 
Canada, Peru, Mexico, Spain 
China, Peru, Chile, Morocco 
Canada, Japan, Fed. Rep. of Germany 
Canada, Bolivia, China, Thailand 
Rep. of South Africa, Bolivia, China, France 
Canada, U.S.S.R., Switzerland 
Spain, Japan, Italy, Algeria 
Canada, Mexico, Spain 
Canada, Venezuela, Brazil, Liberia 
Europe, Japan, Canada 
Canada, Norway, Brazil, Rep. of South Africa 
Rep. of South Africa, Chile, Canada 
U.S.S.R., Canada, Mexico, Trinidad & Tobago 
Chile, Canada, Peru, Zambia 


mmmm^mm\ 


mmmmmmm 


mmmmmmm 


mmmmmmm 


mmmmmmm 


mmmm-mm 


52 
50 
48 

45 
43 
43 
36 
36 
22 
20 
14 
9 
7 



51 
50 


mmm^m 


mmm^mm 


mmmmm 


mmmmm 


mmmmm 


m^mmmi 


mmmm 


mmmm 


MM 


Hi 


m 


1 


1 




i i i i 

/o 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 




China, Mongolia, Thailand 
Bulgaria, North Korea, Yugoslavia 
Cuba 
Guinea, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Yugoslavia 
Malaysia, Singapore, U.K. 
Canada, France, Switzerland 
China, Mongolia 
Yugoslavia 
Mongolia 




42 
39 
24 
18 
14 
10 
8 




mmmm 






111 


m 


m 


m 




iiii 

'/o 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 



156 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



PETROLEUM 

Petroleum in various forms currently propels most aircraft, ships, tanks, trucks, and other 
military machines. Countries and cartels that produce crude oil and possess large proven 
reserves thus can exert strong political and economic leverage, particularly if they ship 
refined products as well. Table 1 2 lists oil owners who pumped more than 1 ,000 barrels per 
day from subterranean reservoirs that contained more than 8 billion barrels in 1990, when 
Iraq occupied Kuwait and threatened to overrun Saudi Arabia. 

It is easy to understand why the Persian Gulf War caused shudders throughout the 
industrialized world: Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
furnished more than half of Japan's petroleum imports, almost one-fifth of Western Europe's 
requirements, and enough to satisfy well over one-tenth of stated U.S. needs. Not all was 
replaceable from other sources, and most crude oil from other countries was somewhat 
heavier. The latter fact was significant, because Saddam Hussein's takeover coupled with a 
retaliatory embargo denied former recipients access to several sophisticated Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
refineries that specialized in such light products as gasoline, jet fuel, and distillate fuel oil. 8 
Intolerable situations, in short, demanded strong counteractions. 

Table 1 2. Crude Oil Producers and Proven Reserves 

(1990) 



Country 


Barrels per 
Day 
(thousands) 


Percent of 
World 
Production 


Proven Reserves 
(billions of 
barrels) 


Soviet Union 


12,475 


19.6 


58.4 


United States 


9,175 


14.4 


34.1 


Saudi Arabia 


5,260 


8.3 


255.0 


Mexico 


2,875 


4.5 


56.4 


Iran 


2,865 


4.5 


92.9 


Iraq 


2,825 


4.4 


100 


China 


2,790 


4.4 


24.0 


United Arab Emirates 


2,070 


3.3 


98.1 


Venezuela 


1,980 


3.1 


58.5 


United Kingdom 


1,905 


3.0 


4.4 


Canada 


1,725 


2.7 


8.3 


Nigeria 


1,605 


2.5 


16.0 


Kuwait 


1,600 


2.5 


94.5 


Norway 


1,530 


2.4 


11.6 


Indonesia 


1,395 


2.2 


8.2 


Algeria 


1,170 


1.8 


9.2 


Libya 


1,145 


1.8 


22.8 



NATURAL RUBBER 

The U.S. Army and Navy Munitions Board listed natural rubber as a strategic and critical 
material as of January 30, 1 940, with good reason: every military service on the Axis as well 
as the Allied side was heavily dependent on sources concentrated in southern Asia from India 



NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS 



157 



and Ceylon to Indonesia and Indochina. U.S. imports from the Far East increased at such a 
frenzied pace after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor that virtually all readily available supplies 
had been shipped before British Armed Forces in Singapore surrendered on February 15, 
1 942. Attention thereafter turned to rubber plantations in Liberia, along with underdeveloped 
stands in Central and South America, none of which proved adequate. 9 

COMPENSATORY PROGRAMS 

Several avenues short of military operations to seize supplies are open to nations that need 
more natural resources than they possess. Recycling and conservation reduce import 
requirements; stockpiles hedge against shortages if crises should arise; synthetics and 
substitutes sometimes relieve nature's stinginess or render it irrelevant. Strong countries, 
however, may also choose to take what they want by force of arms. 

STRATEGIC STOCKPILES 

U.S. national stockpile programs started in 1939, but domestic politics, special interest 
groups, inconsistent policies, and costs made efficient administration almost impossible for 
the first 40 years. Backup supply goals slumped from 5 years to 1 during the 1 970s. Congress 
then passed the Strategic and Critical Minerals Stockpiling Act of 1 979 which, among other 
provisions, earmarked reserves specifically for national defense contingencies and prescribed 
selected items "sufficient to sustain the United States for a period of not less than 3 years in 
the event of a national emegency." 1 Proper management concurrently became a pressing 
mission, because U.S. stockpiles at that time were rife with wasteful excess, especially silver 
and tin, which tied up several billion dollars that could have been put to better use. Some 
reserves had lolled in the inventory for so long that original rationales were invalid. Bauxite, 
chromium, manganese, and other ores would have been more readily usable if converted to 
primary metals and alloys. 11 The moral is clear: untended stockpiles are apt to disappoint 
when owners need them most. 

Congress further established the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve after a brief Arab oil 
embargo from mid-October1973 to mid-March 1974 showed how susceptible the United 
States and many other nations were to what Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger called 
possible "strangulation of the industrialized world/' 12 Caverns in Texas and Louisiana 
contained more than 580 million barrels when Iraq overran Kuwait 1 7 years later, but all was 
crude oil that required refining before it could fuel armed forces or defense industries. 13 
Fortunately, very little had to be withdrawn, because Saudi Arabia increased its production 
considerably as long as the crisis lasted. 

SYNTHETICS AMD SUBSTITUTES 

Neither synthetics nor substitutes currently can replace petroleum as a fuel and lubricant for 
most military purposes. Nuclear reactors currently propel selected surface ships and 
submarines, but serious attempts to produce nuclear-powered aircraft ceased several decades 
ago. Navies early in the 21st century likely will still rely mainly on fossil fuels, military motor 
vehicles will still burn gasoline or diesel, oil and lubricants likely will remain in demand. 
Manmade materials, however, already supplement or supplant natural rubber and many 
mineral resources. 






1 58 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Recycled rubber was prized in the United States after Japan seized or blocked access to 
all plantations in Southeast Asia during World War II. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in June 
1 942 asked patriotic Americans to turn in "old tires, old rubber raincoats, old garden hose, 
rubber shoes, bathing caps, gloves." A carload of chorus girls in New York City donated 
girdles as their contribution to 450,000 tons of scrap rubber collected during the next month, 
but most submissions had previously been reclaimed at least once and proved unsuitable for 
further processing. Synthetics, however, sufficed. Fifty-one new factories produced 800,000 
tons annually by 1 944, an output roughly equivalent to the harvest from 1 50 million rubber 
trees. 14 

All manmade materials, like natural minerals and metals, possess weaknesses as well as 
strengths, but many prospects appear promising. Experimental composites, alloys, and fibers 
that possess revolutionary properties are becoming ever more important. Some are stronger, 
lighter, and more durable than the best steel. 15 Carbon-carbon polymers can tolerate 
temperatures up to 3,000 F (1,650 C) without expanding or weakening significantly. 16 
Super-hard ceramics mold readily into complex shapes. The search for superconductor 
materials that can function at room temperatures without constant bathing in costly liquid 
helium may benefit fairly soon from ceramics mixed primarily with off-the-shelf bismuth and 
thallium (a metal used in rat poison) rather than expensive rare-earth metals like lanthanum, 
strontium, yttrium, and barium. 17 Halide glass fibers, which are far superior to copper wires, 
combine immunity to electromagnetic interference with great tensile strength. 

RESOURCE DEPRIVATION 

Resource deprivation occurs whenever requirements exceed stocks on hand plus readily 
available replenishments and resultant problems can be excruciating if sources dry up at 
inopportune moments. Two dissimilar cases are instructive in both regards: retaliatory 
resource warfare in East Asia and the Pacific between 1941 and 1945 destroyed Japan's 
abilities to project military power far beyond her borders well before atomic bombs hit 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki; anticipatory operations by a U.S. -led coalition in 1990-1991 
relieved widespread anxieties that renegade Iraqi President Saddam Hussein might use ill- 
gotten Persian Gulf petroleum as an economic weapon against opponents whose livelihood 
depends on that resource. 

RESOURCE WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN 

Japan in the early 1930s consisted of four mountainous islands, crowding more than 70 
million people onto less arable land than the State of Iowa then contained, and the 
population was increasing at the rate of one million each year. Scarce natural resources 
made industrial progress expensive and restricted military capabilities, partly because 
foreigners supplied most minerals and all petroleum at higher prices than self-sufficient 
competitors paid, and partly because shipping costs were considerable. 

Remedial Measures. Japan began to augment home-grown resources in 1910 when it 
acquired Korea, which opened access to hydroelectric power along with rich deposits of 
coal, iron ore, and other minerals. The Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands, German 
possessions that the League of Nations mandated to Japan after World War I, brought 
phosphates and phosphorite. The 1 931 march into Manchuria, followed shortly by suzerainty 



NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS 1 59 



over northern China and bits of the littoral from Shanghai as far south as Hainan Island, 
netted more iron ore, coking coal, some tin, and aluminous shale. 18 

Tokyo's quest for natural resources received its first serious setback in September 1 940, 
when Japan signed a tripartite pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. President Roosevelt 
in response embargoed U.S. scrap metal and petroleum shipments to Japan, then froze all 
Japanese assets in the United States 10 months later after troops flying the Rising Sun flag 
swarmed over Indochina with Vichy French acquiescence. The British and Dutch 
Governments soon imposed similar sanctions. 19 Those body blows hurt, because some 
Japanese stockpiles, including oil, were sufficient for little more than a year, others for less. 
Resource deprivation hence dictated Japanese strategy to a high degree. The mission in 
December 1941 was to grab what they needed, throw a cordon around the gains, and 
tenaciously hang onto territory that map 25 depicts. 20 

Map 25. Japanese Territorial Holdings in 1942 



iSSffiBSteiSx'S.:;:;: ; 

XxXxXxXxX/TxXix;:^ 

S/i^iTi/xx 
:-y-'-'-x-'-^>>M7S/C4:'x';-x'x''^:v;';-x-:-: 

/>:' " ;-''-: :, : ;>*; ':-:-:-^^x-:-:T'T f ;-:'x':-x : 




Additional 

Conquests 

1931-1941 




Japanese 

Controlled, 

1931 



Indian Ocean 



Adapted from Arthur Zich, The Rising Sun. 



Ruinous Results. Japan initially enjoyed great gains. Burma, Malaya, and Siam provided 
bauxite, cobalt, tungsten, and tin. Southeast Asian plantations were lucrative sources of 
rubber, New Caledonia contributed nickel, and the Philippines furnished chromium. Oil 



160 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



from Tarakan in northeast Borneo, Banjermasin farther south, and Palembang in Sumatra 
lubricated Japanese machines after bloody but brief fights. Dutch Shell employees torched 
some facilities and British General Harold Alexander did likewise to 1 50 million gallons of 
Burmah Oil Company products outside Rangoon, but most installations remained intact, and 
Japanese technicians restored capacities so rapidly that output exceeded expectations within 
a few months. 21 

Japan nevertheless died the Death of a Thousand Cuts, beaten by a U.S. naval and air 
blockade that devastated its fragile economy. Submarines sank merchant transports faster 
than Japanese shipyards could build them. Cargoes increasingly substituted salt, soy beans, 
and cereals for the sinews of war. Aircraft industries, strapped for minerals, metals, and coal, 
turned out fewer airframes, engines, motor mounts, landing gears, and fittings of such poor 
quality that performance fell sharply while accident rates rose. Petroleum tanker losses, 
which exceeded 750,000 tons in 1944, outstripped construction. The octane ratings of 
aviation fuel dropped dramatically (some batches were alcohol blends), pilot training was 
cut to 30 hours in 1 944 (less than half the previous allocation), and formations played follow- 
the-leader after navigation schools closed. Kamikaze flights became popular, partly because 
one-way missions cut gasoline consumption in half. Japanese fleets, which required 
prodigious amounts of petroleum, were in even worse shape. Several major surface 
combatants were confined to home ports, only one battleship had enough fuel to help defend 
Okinawa in March 1945, and U.S. aircraft sank or heavily damaged at dockside four "sitting 
duck" battleships, three aircraft carriers, and two heavy cruisers during final months of the 
war. 22 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey summarized overall results as follows: 
"The insufficiency of Japan's war economy was the underlying cause of her defeat. Before the 
air attacks against [Japanese] cities began, war production had been steadily declining 
because of the ever-increasing shortages of raw materials... This resulted in a growing margin 
of unused plant capacity. Thus, even substantial bomb damage to plant structures and 
equipment frequently had little, if any effect on actual production/' 23 Resource warriors had 
already wreaked such havoc that direct assaults merely administered a coup de grace. 

RESOURCE WARFARE BY IRAQ 

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in January 1991 unleashed an immense oil spill (100,000 
barrels a day) at the head of the Persian Gulf, apparently to foul potential invasion beaches 
and forestall U.S. amphibious landings. Currents shortly carried slicks all the way to the Strait 
of Hormuz, with environmentally disastrous consequences. 24 His henchmen later set 650 
Kuwaiti oil wells afire when Iraqi Armed Forces withdrew in February 1991, perhaps to 
ensure that Saddam's opponents could take less comfort from his defeat and reap fewer early 
financial benefits. Sixteen international fire fighting companies and 10,000 men worked 
round-the-clock for more than 8 months to extinguish those flames at a cost of about $1 
billion (much faster than first predicted), while estimates placed reclamation and 
reconstruction costs at twenty times that figure. 25 

Saudi Arabian Petroleum Facilities. Possibilities for infinitely greater mischief were 
present in Saudi Arabia, which Saddam Hussein might have seized had that nation remained 
undefended by a formidable coalition. Petroleum-dependent nations everywhere would have 
been at his mercy as long as he controlled so much productive capacity and exploited it for 
his own purposes. 






NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS 1 61 



Outsized Saudi Arabian petroleum infrastructure would have been hard to replace if 
badly damaged or destroyed. The main complex sprawls over an area 350 by 250 
miles 5,630 by 3,220 kilometers (map 26), and many wells lie under water along the 
Persian Gulf littoral. Extraction, collection, processing, and distribution systems illustrated 
schematically in figure 27 contain many one-of-a-kind components that would be hard to 
replace: 50 gigantic gas-oil separators; many huge pumping stations (2 million barrels each 
per day); the world's biggest water injection plants (400 million cubic feet daily for the 
Abqaiq field alone); the world's biggest storage tanks, 72 feet high, 352 feet in diameter, 
capacity 1 .25 million barrels apiece; the biggest oil port; a monster desalinization plant. Drill 
pipes, casings, tubing, bits, blowout preventers, valves, pressure gauges, engines, and 
compressors plus indispensable starches, caustic sodas, alcohols, organic chemicals, and 
construction steels would be instantaneously insufficient if enemies sabotaged major 
elements. Shipping requirements would strain oceangoing transports. 26 

Sabotage Potential. Ballistic missile defense systems available to the allied coalition in 
1 991 might best be described as "porous," but Iraqi Scuds were too inaccurate to do much 
damage except by chance, and the Iraqi Air Force was too timid to cause serious concerns. 
Opportunities for sabotage on a grand scale, however, would have been wide open to Iraqi 
ground forces before they abandoned positions in Saudi Arabia, provided personnel in charge 
possessed sufficient expertise. Wells, pipelines, pumping stations, power plants, storage 
tanks, refineries, and loading facilities all were vulnerable in varying degrees. 

It would be easy to punch holes in welded steel pipelines half an inch or so thick, 
although oil field workers could repair punctures with relative ease even if demolition experts 
tore great gaps. Heavy crude oil would be hard to ignite in giant storage tanks with walls 1 .7 
inches (4.3 centimeters) thick at the base, because shaped charges would sputter in the thick 
liquid. Flares would shoot from containers full of high-octane fuel, but distances between 
tanks would confine spreads even if saboteurs found ways to kindle full-fledged fires. 

Demolition specialists who concentrate on separators, stabilizers, power packs, and 
pumping stations conversely could produce paralytic effects. Free-flowing Saudi wells, like 
those in Kuwait, are extremely flammable. Fires in offshore facilities would be especially 
fearsome. It took 1 36 days to smother flames at just one Shell Oil platform off Louisiana's 
coast after 1 1 wells blew in 1 970. Sixteen private companies and three U.S. Government 
agencies committed 650 men to fight another offshore fire at Bay Marchand. Two barges 
sprayed sea water on the platform superstructure to keep it from melting. Five mobile drilling 
rigs, two "jack-up" rigs, and eleven mud barges working in concert sank new shafts, pumped 
water into the producing layer to prevent subterranean oil reservoirs from feeding fires, and 
then blocked burning wells with mud. A derrick barge with a 500-ton crane cleared 3,000 
tons of debris before new well heads could be connected to new platforms. A special shore- 
based control center replete with communications, power sources, fuel supplies, a helipad, 
seaplane dock, and living quarters was constructed to accommodate supervisors. 27 

Additional difficulties would develop in Saudi Arabia if prevailing Persian Gulf winds 
swept burning oil slicks south from Berri to port facilities at juaymah and Ras Tanura, where 
explosions could level installations ashore, just one supertanker laden with gasoline or 
naphtha would have devastating effects (70 tons of liquefied natural gas destroyed 80 square 
blocks in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1945; the contents of a 100,000-gallon tanker would be 
catastrophic in comparison). 28 



1 62 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Map 26. Saudi Arabian Oil Fields and Facilities 



\ 



\ 



JURAYBI'AT 

ft Nariya 

ABU HADRIYA 



KHURSANIY 
FADHILI 



SAUDI 



ARABIA 



QATAR 

Umm Bab 



HARMALIYAH 



LEGEND 

Saudi Core 
Other Fields 
Refinery 
Stabilizer 
Gas-Oil Separator 
Pump Station 
Marine Terminal 



Pipeline 

& Gas Injection 
Water Injection 
Storage 

Central Electric 
Power 



10 20 30 40 50 

1 i i i i i 




} SAUDI IBlLxSl 

I ARABIA^Mi / T\ 




NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS 



163 



Figure 27. Oil Fields and Facilities 




164 



PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



Niccolo Machiavelli explained the problem nicely in The Prince (1514 A.D.): "One must 
never allow disorder to continue so as to escape a war. One does not escape. The war is 
merely postponed to one's disadvantage." The Allied coalition that blocked Iraqi Armed 
Forces at the Kuwaiti border in August 1 990, then drove them out the following February, 
performed an internationally valuable service when seen from that perspective. The price 
in lives lost and money expended was minuscule compared with penalties that might have 
been paid if Saddam Hussein had launched a ruthless resource war while withdrawing under 
pressure from Saudi Arabia. 



KEY POINTS 

National interests in natural resources and raw materials shape international 
relationships, incur enmities, and underpin defense industries without which armed forces 
could not function. 

Competition for some commodities is intense, because few countries are entirely self- 
sufficient. 

Prudent national leaders therefore seek to establish strong ties with foreign suppliers, 
safeguard essential supply routes, and stockpile reserves for use in emergencies. 

How much of what each country needs depends on the technological sophistication of 
its armed forces, together with present and projected requirements. 

Sensible degrees of reliance on foreign providers depend on international relationships 
at any given moment, alternative sources, and the security of shipping lines. 

Stockpiles should emphasize resources and raw materials in order of importance. Steel 
production, for example, will demand manganese and coking coal until technologists 
identify substitutes or devise different methods. 

Poorly attended stockpiles deteriorate rapidly and soon become obsolescent unless 
supervisors recorrelate them with changing requirements at realistic intervals. 

Continued reliance on fossil fuels, for which no suitable substitutes now are available, 
leaves industrialized nations and their armed forces vulnerable to devastating resource 
deprivation. 

Synthetic materials are rapidly altering the value of many other natural resources. 

Resource warfare can threaten modern societies and damage military capabilities just 
as surely as nuclear weapons. 



MOTES 

1 . Alfred R. Greenwood, On Issues Relating to the National Defense Stockpile, briefing before 
the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 8, 1 994, Attachments 
2-4. 

2. Ewan W. Anderson, Strategic Minerals: The Geopolitical Problems for the United States (New 
York: Praeger, 1988); Marc D. Lax, Selected Strategic Minerals:The Impending Crisis (New York: 
University of America Press, 1 992). 

3. Ibid. 

4. Congress, House, Joint Committee Print, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, 99 th Congress, 1 st 
sess., August 1985, 299-499; Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1993), 33, 35-36, and Technologies 



NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS 1 65 



Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 
1993), 131, 147-148. 

5. Alfred R. Greenwood, The Availability of Strategic and Critical Minerals for the United States 
Economy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 1 6, 1983). U.S. updates are 
contained in Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1996 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the 
Interior, Geological Survey and Bureau of Mines). See also Kent Hughes Butts, Strategic Minerals in 
the New World Order (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
November 30, 1993). 

6. Michael Shafer, "Mineral Myths," Foreign Policy, no. 47 (Summer 1 982): 1 54-1 71 . 

7. Greenwood, The Availability of Strategic and Critical Minerals, 6, 7. 

8. Joseph P. Riva, Petroleum Status of the Western Persian Gulf, Report No. 90-378 SPR, 
November 1 3, 1 990, and Bernard A. Gelb and Dario Scuka, Oil Flows, World Reserves, and the Iraq- 
Kuwait Situation, Report No. 90-374E, August 7, 1990 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service). 

9. Yuan-li Wu, Economic Warfare (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1 952), 277-280. 

1 0. Greenwood, The Availability of Strategic and Critical Minerals, 1 4-1 8. 

1 1 . Ibid. U.S. updates are contained in Inventory of Stockpile Material (LZ-1), Defense National 
Stockpile Center, September 30, 1996; Greenwood, On Issues Relating to the National Defense 
Stockpile, March 8, 1994. 

1 2. "Exclusive Interview by Business Week, December 23, 1 974," Department of State Bulletin, 
January 27, 1975, 101. 

13. Robert Bamberger, The Strategic Petroleum Reserve, IB87050 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, August 14, 1990). 

1 4. Ronald H. Bailey, The Home Front: USA (New York: Time-Life Books, 1 977), 84. 

1 5. Advanced Materials by Design (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1 988). 

1 6. Howard G. Maahs, "Carbon-Carbon Composites," World & I, June 1 989. 

1 7. Commercializing High-Temperature Superconductivity (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, June 1988). 

1 8. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBSj, with intro. by David Maclssac, vol. 8, 
The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy (New York: Garland Publishing, 1976), 
chapter I; Arthur Zich, The Rising Sun (New York: Time-Life Books, 1 977), 1 8-27. 

1 9. Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis, MS: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1 949), chapter 3. 

20. Ibid; Zich, The Rising Sun, 119-1 29. 

21 . Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, chapter 4. 

22. USSBS, vol. 9, The Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy, Summary, v-vi. 

23. "Huge Oil Spill Fouls Persian Gulf," Facts on File Yearbook 7997, Indexed Record of World 
Events, vol. 51 (New York: Facts on File, January 31, 1991), 57-58, 92-93; M. Lynne Corn, Persian 
Gulf Oil Spills and the Biology of the Persian Gulf, Report No. 91-123 ENR (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, January 30, 1991). 

24. Jennifer Parmalee, "Kuwaiti Emir Snuffs Out Last Iraqi-Lit Oil Fire," Washington Post, 
November 7, 1991, 1. 

25. Congress, House, Oil Fields As Military Objectives, prepared for the Special Subcommittee 
on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations by the Congressional Research Service, 
94 th Congress, 1 st sess., August 21,1 975, 1 7, 71 ; Ismail I. Nawwab et al., eds., ARAMCO and Its 
Wor/of(Dhahran, Saudi Arabia:1980), 214-217. 

26. Oil Fields As Military Objectives, 45, 70. 



1 66 PART ONE: PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 



27. "How Shell Rejuvenated Fire-Damaged Bay Marchand Wells" Ocean Industry (October 
1973): 47-50; R. F. Nelson, "The Bay Marchand Fire/' Journal of Petroleum Technology (March 
1972): 225-249. 

28. Oil Fields As Military Objectives, 1 7 ', 44-46, 69-71 . 






NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS 



167 





Top: Amphibious assault troops wade across a coral reef through hip deep water on their way to Yellow Beach 
Two on Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands. All eyes face right, where a Japanese machine gun has just opened 
fire. Smoke rises from oil storage tanks ignited by naval gunfire (U.S. Army photograh). 
Bottom: Gnarled tree roots above ground and under fetid black water typify tidewater swamps, where 
observation and fields of fire extend a few feet at most in any direction. Close combat by foot troops is a nerve- 
wracking proposition under such conditions (U.S. Army photograph). 



168 





Top: Deep, sticky mud that acts like a suction cup turns unsurfaced roads into quagmires during rainy seasons 
and precludes cross-country movement by motor vehicles. Frozen mud can cement truck convoys in place like 
Creek friezes (U.S. Army photograph). 

Bottom: Wary, well-dispersed troops look for enemy ambush sites as they advance along a tropical road that 
runs between thick stands of "elephant grass," which excludes the slightest breeze, is stifling hot, and restricts 
observation to less than one arm's length (U.S. Marine Corps photograph). 



169 




T; > 

* *.- f * 



fi 



J~ at 1 wr' 
J^P 
ffi 
an? 




The small castle in the foreground and the 1 ,400-year-old Benedictine monastery on the skyline both offered 
fine observation posts and defensive positions during the battle for Cassino, Italy, early in 1945. German 
paratroopers, who avoided the abbey until Allied bombers blasted it flat, fought tenaciously in the debris below 
(U.S. Army photographs). 



170 




A truck convoy on the Burma Road above the Salween River gorge creeps around 2 1 switchback curves with 
slippery surfaces, precipitous slopes on both sides, and no guard rails. Men, mules, and motor vehicles 
sometimes slipped into the abyss (U.S. Army photograph). 



171 




Manpower and mules must replace motor vehicles wherever rude tracks and trails supplant roads, unless 
helicopters are available. Heavy mortar crews like the one depicted found the going difficult whether they 
moved up or down steep slopes in Italy's Apennine Mountains (U.S. Army photograph). 




The bridge over the Rhine River at Remagen became the most important piece of property in Western Europe 
when German demolition teams failed to destroy it completely before U.S. troops raced across on March 7, 
1 945. The tenuous bridgehead that they seized initially expanded for 1 days before the weakened structure 
collapsed (U.S. Army photograph). 



172 




The pontoon bridge in the foreground 
supported foot traffic after Viet Cong 
sappers during the Tet offensive of 
February 1968 dropped the sturdy steel 
truss that spanned the Perfume River at 
Hue, but motor vehicles and trains could 
no longer cross (U.S. Marine Corps 
photograph). 



Subzero weather and wicked winds near 
North Korea's Changjin Reservoir made 
life miserable for U.S. Marines, the Army's 
32d Infantry Regiment, and British Royal 
Marine Commandos in mortal combat 
with Chinese Communist "volunteers" 
who streamed south from Manchuria in 
November 1950 (U.S. Marine Corps 
photograph). 





Front line medics find it much easier to 
treat stretcher cases while the weather is 
warm and dry than in winter, when 
freezing rain and wet snow soak casualties 
who lie in the open. Hypothermia, which 
is common under such conditions, can kill 
almost as fast and just as surely as lethal 
weapons (U.S. Army photograph). 



173 






Top: Close air support is a sporty proposition when valleys experience clear weather while heavy clouds 
shroud hilltops, a condition that commonly prevails between Vietnam and the Laotian panhandle near Khe 
Sanh. Route 9 runs diagonally from left to right along the valley floor in this photograph (U.S. Marine Corps 
photograph). 

Bottom: Underway replenishment is a complex task even under placid conditions. Skilled destroyer skippers 
and crews are required to transfer supplies safely during stormy weather, when roiling water washes across 
rolling, pitching decks, slams against bulkheads, creates instability that magnifies every cargo-handling 
problem, and increases risks of collision (U.S. Navy photograph). 



174 






Top: Submarines under arctic ice packs that often are 1 feet (3+ meters) thick must surface before they can 
safely launch ballistic or cruise missiles. They also must be able to break through in emergency, because crews 
otherwise would suffocate if air supplies failed for any reason (U.S. Navy photograph). 
Bottom: A string of ships play "follow the leader" through a narrow lead in Antarctic ice so that only one has 
to force its way. Opportunities to do so near either pole are limited to short summer seasons, because pack ice 
is frozen solid most of each year (U.S. Navy Photograph). 



175 




Top: Heavy coatings of thickly frozen salt water spray can block air intakes and add tons to ship bulkheads, 
superstructures, hatches, masts, rigging, exposed machinery, antennas, and weapon systems. Results reduce 
the operational capabilities and endanger the stability of ice breakers (shown) as well as surface combatants 
and transports in the absence of effective countermeasures (U.S. Navy photograph). 

Bottom: Water always is the staff of life during military operations in deserts. U.S. troops that deployed to Egypt 
during Exercise Bright Star in 1985 reconfirmed that flexible hoses can transfer large quantities over long 
distances faster and more cost-effectively than fleets of tanker trucks (U.S. Army photograph). 



176 



PART TWO? 
CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 

POPULATIONS 



There is the so-called theory of "weapons mean everything/' . . . Weapons are an important 
factor in war, but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that counts. The contest 
of forces is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also one of the power and 
morale of humans. 

Mao Zedong 
On Protracted War 

MAO'S REMARKS WERE NOT RESTRICTED TO UNIFORMED COMRADES WHO, IN 1935, COMPLETED THE LONG 

March from Jiangxi Province to the Shaanxi caves near Bao'an (map 3, page 1 9). He also 
meant the Chinese people, peasantry in particular, whose sturdy stock was his primary source 
of strength. Mao still planned to "drown [invaders] in a hostile human sea" even after the 
nuclear-armed Soviet Union turned against him a quarter-century later, steadfast in his belief 
that "modern long-range weapons, including atomic bombs/' would be "helpless and 
ineffective" in any protracted war when opposed by industrially backward but ideologically 
indoctrinated masses who were not afraid to die for their homeland. 1 

Soviet leaders never put Mao's premise to the test, but most authorities generally agree 
that the human element in military affairs is huge. Strategists and tacticians who concoct 
plans and conduct operations in the absence of sound knowledge concerning the 
demographics, cultural characteristics, and social structures of coalition partners as well as 
opponents are on shaky ground. Sun Tzu, who was Mao's mentor many times removed 
(circa 500 B.C.), took that contention one step further: "Know the enemy and know yourself," 
he counseled, "in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the 
enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of 
your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril." 2 Population patterns, 
the racial-ethnic-tribal mix, languages, religions, customs, tempers, attitudes, and loyalties 
are everywhere important. 



177 



DEMOGRAPHY 

Demography deals with the size, density, geographic distribution, composition, and other 
vital statistics of populations the world over. Military practitioners concentrate on 
demographic conditions that influence current plans, programs, and operations. Birth rates, 
life expectancies, the practice of polygamy, and percentages of married persons, for example, 
are less important than sex and age profiles that determine the number of individuals eligible 
for military service and the size of local labor pools. Relationships between minorities and 
majorities are more important than relative percentages of the population that each 
represents. 

PERTINENT HEAD COUNTS 

Approximately 5.8 billion people populated Planet Earth in 1997, of which four-fifths lived 
in the least developed countries (figure 28). China and India alone contributed two billion, 
while the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Europe, and Central Asian states that belonged to the 
former Soviet Union divided most of the remainder. Populations in the poorest regions will 
expand disproportionately before the year 2025, most of them in Asia and Africa, if 
projections prove correct, which is by no means a foregone conclusion considering the 
unpredictable impact of AIDS, widespread starvation, and wars. 3 

Militarily important statistics include total populations in any given country, the number 
of men and women of military age (generally ages 1 5 to 49), and percentages that are fit for 
active service. Israel (population 5.7 million, of which 1 5 percent are Palestinians 4 ) cannot 
maintain large active forces in "peacetime," must mobilize reserves from the civilian work 
force to meet military emergencies, could ill afford extensive casualties, and would face 
economic collapse in a protracted war of attrition. Armed services fed by much larger 
societies are better able to replenish heavy losses before they become combat ineffective, 
as several major powers demonstrated during two World Wars in the 20th century. Even the 
winners, however, paid a higher price than table 1 3 reflects, because figures therein exclude 
civilian casualties, military personnel rendered permanently ill or disabled, horrendous 
Chinese losses from 1 937 through 1 941 , and incalculable deprivation of latent talent. 5 

Table 1 3. Military Dead and Missing, World Wars I and II 





WWI 


WWII 


Total 


Russia/USSR 


2,760,000 


7,500,000 


10,260,000 


Germany 


1,610,000 


2,800,000 


4,410,000 


China 


N/A 


2,000,000 


2,000,000 


France 


1,428,000 


247,000 


1,675,000 


Japan 


N/A 


1,500,000 


1,500,000 


British Commonwealth 


911,000 


305,000 


1,216,000 


United States 


107,000 


407,000 


514,000 



DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS 

A few favored nations ideally distribute many cities, towns, and villages over large land 
masses and keep a high percentage well removed from unfriendly frontiers. Countries cursed 



178 



PART TWO: CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 



Figure 28. Present and Projected World Populations 



1990, 
5,280 



POPULATION MOMENTUM 

By 2050, 9.8 billion people will inhabit Earth, an increase of 73 percent from the current 5.7 
billion. The population of developing countries is expected to grow by 80 million people each 
year, on average, doubling by about 2050. Africa alone will almost triple its current population 
by 2050. While the growth rate is declining almost everywhere, the population increase 
continues, reflecting high birth rates in past decades. 



POPULATION CLOCK 

Number of births per minute, 1996 
Developed countries 
Developing countries 



240 




FUTURE POPULATION GROWTH 

|~~3 Population in 1996 ( *~ 
~| Projections for 2050 ^ 




1990 
5,280 



S^-- 



Oceania* 
v 29 46 

million million 



Oceania includes Australia, New Zealand ^ /p 

and Pacific islands 



DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD POPULATION BY CONTINENT 



1990 



2050 



Americas 
13.6% 

Africa 
11.9% 

Europe 
13.7% 

Oceania 0.5% 



POPULATION EXPLOSION 

World population in selected years, In millions 





Americas 
12.5% 

Africa 
21.8% 

Europe 
6.8% 

Oceania 0.5% 



2100 




Americas 
11.6% 

Africa 
24.1% 

Europe 
6.5% 
Oceania 0.4% 



1950 
2,500, 



1900 
1,625. 



1800 
900 



A.D. 1 
170 



500 
190 



1000 
265 



1600 610 
1500 545 |L 

Mil 



SOURCES: Population Reference Bureau, World Bank "World Population Projections" 



By Dita Smith and Laura Stanton-The Washington Post 



POPULATIONS 



179 



with population patterns that afford fewer safeguards are more vulnerable to invasion unless 
blessed with benign neighbors (as Canada is) or topographic barriers (such as those that 
shelter Switzerland). Russia's territory, for example, is immense, but its people are 
predominantly located on flatlands west of the Ural Mountains in positions that have been 
overrun repeatedly. Syria, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran are even 
more vulnerable, because most residents occupy capital cities Damascus, Tel Aviv, Amman, 
Cairo, Riyadh, Kuwait City, Baghdad, and Teheran plus a sprinkling of other centers such 
as Hama, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Jiddah, Basra, Meshed, and Isphahan. Even one well-placed 
tactical nuclear weapon delivered by an aircraft, missile, motor vehicle, or other means might 
instantaneously put any of those countries politically, economically, and militarily out of 
commission. No amount of dispersion could provide any nation with complete protection 
against such attacks, but population patterns that require enemy marksmen to hit many 
targets instead of one or two increase the costs of aggression and reduce dangers that 
accompany excessive concentration. 

POPULATION DENSITIES 

Overpopulation can lead to armed conflict if pressures cause intolerable spillovers or internal 
combustion. Real or imagined inabilities to support preferred life styles often act as catalysts, 
as Adolph Hitler confirmed early in World War II when he seized Slavic lands partly to satisfy 
Germany's alleged need for Lebensraum (literally "living space"). Japan invaded Manchuria 
in 1 937 and later established a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere for much the same 
reason. 6 Spontaneous overflows may inadvertently instigate strife that no one intended, 
which happened in 1971 when nine million refugees from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) 
flooded into already overcrowded India to escape massacres by West Pakistanis and thereby 
precipitated a brief three-way war. Population pressures also can cause or contribute to civil 
wars contained within national borders. Prominent observers of Burundi, for example, 
contend that wholesale slaughters in that country twice occurred because too little room 
exacerbated political and class rivalries between the Tutsi and Hutu tribes, first in 1 972 and 
again in the 1990s. 7 

PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

National and regional populations consist of individuals who differ considerably with regard 
to strength, endurance, hardiness, and health. Military commanders and staffs function most 
effectively only if they fully understand the collective implications of such characteristics, 
which may be positive, negative, or neutral. 

COMPARATIVE PHYSIQUES 

Not many militarily significant physical attributes distinguish one people from another. 
Heavily built, lightly built, and moderately built men and women perform equally well 
under most circumstances, whether they are tall or short, dark or light skinned, blond, 
brunette, or red-headed, given proper equipment, equal training, and periods of 
acclimatization when shifted from familiar to unfamiliar geographic regions. Two exceptions 
seem to stand out. 

Military personnel whose skin or hair color is different than those of opponents find it 
difficult to operate behind enemy lines if the civilian population is hostile and, if caught and 



180 PART TWO: CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 



incarcerated, rarely elude recapture. Every U.S. prisoner of war (ROW) who slipped out of 
a North Korean stockade between 1 950 and 1 953 was apprehended, as was every fugitive 
from a permanent camp in North Vietnam (1 965-1 972), partly because black and white faces 
were conspicuous in hostile territory. Only one made it home from Laos and very few 
escaped from Viet Cong cages in Communist-controlled territory within South Vietnam. 8 

Operations at very high altitudes comprise the second exception. Lowlanders seldom 
(some say never) seem to attain the same stamina in rarefied atmosphere as mountaineers 
born and raised above the tree line, no matter how long they remain. 9 Few battles, however, 
have been fought at extreme elevations since Francisco Pizarro defeated the Incan Emperor 
Atahualpa early in the 16th century and Peruvians ousted Spanish forces 300 years later. 
Chinese regulars and Tibetan resistance groups clashed sporadically in the 1950s before 
Beijing crushed a hopeless revolt. 10 Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani troops have periodically 
skirmished along Himalayan heights since then, most notably over control of jammu and 
Kashmir, but never have conducted sustained campaigns despite repeated threats to do so. 11 

Troops that descend from lofty homelands to do battle near sea level experience no 
adverse effects, if the legendary Gurkha Rifles of Nepal are anywhere near typical. They have 
served the British Crown well since 1 81 7 under every geographic condition from steaming 
jungles to the frigid Falkland Islands. 12 

PUBLIC HEALTH 

Poor public health conditions and endemic diseases can undercut military capabilities just 
as surely as enemy actions. Potentially fatal maladies such as malaria, typhoid fever, typhus, 
cholera, plague, and influenza, together with nonlethal miseries that drastically reduce 
proficiency, have taken a terrible toll on armed forces throughout history. Serious problems 
remain despite intensive and extensive searches for solutions, as U.S. statistics from World 
War II, Korea, and Vietnam illustrate: 13 



Table 1 4. Causes of U.S. Wartime Casualties 



World Warll (1944) 


Combat Casualties 


Noncombat 
Casualties 


Disease Casualties 


% 


% 


% 


Europe 
Southwest Pacific 


23 
5 


10 
12 


67 
83 


China-Burma 


2 


8 


90 


Korea (1950) 


8 


17 


75 


Vietnam (1 969) 


19 


14 


67 



POPULATIONS 181 



U.S. medical intelligence specialists catalog diseases in 1 40 countries according to short 
(less than 15 days) and long incubation periods. Anthrax, AIDS, and ebola are relatively 
recent additions to an already long list that runs from African trypanosomiasis (sleeping 
sickness) to yaws and yellow fever. Acute respiratory diseases as well as penicillin-resistant 
strains of syphilis and gonorrhea are rampant worldwide. Mosquito-borne Rift Valley fever, 
tick-borne hemorrhagic fever, and leishmaniasis, a parasitic disease deposited by sand flies, 
are a few among many tropical afflictions. 14 Countermeasures emphasize immunizations 
and sanitation, with particular attention to purified water for drinking, cooking, shower 
facilities, even field laundries; vermin-free kitchens, chow lines, and living quarters; 
disinfected latrines; periodic "debusing" whenever appropriate; insect and rodent control; 
and proper waste disposal. 

CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 

Some large populations are nearly homogeneous, but most mingle majorities and minorities 
with assorted languages, religions, traditions, customs, mores, likes, dislikes, and lifestyles 
that create internal or international tensions. Former Yugoslavia, for example, is a crazy quilt 
of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural animosities. Serbs, who are Orthodox Christians, 
and Roman Catholic Croats are the most prominent entities, followed by Slovenes, Slavic 
Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, and perhaps 15 smaller groups. Serbo-Croatian is 
considered one language, although Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet while Croats prefer Latin 
letters. Slovene and Macedonian are two other official tongues. 15 

MAJORITIES AMD MINORITIES 

Heterogeneous nations generally contain genetically dissimilar racial stocks and culturally 
distinct ethnic groups that sometimes subdivide into clans or tribes. Table 15 displays 
representative relationships that commonly are complex. Racial, ethnic, and tribal factions 
that enjoy a marked quantitative majority do not necessarily dominate, as relatively few 
European colonists long demonstrated in heavily populated Asian and African countries. 
Minorities may mesh well (witness the former U.S. "melting pot") or be anathematized 
(witness the former pogroms against Jews in Europe). Military strategists and tacticians should 
study racial, ethnic, and tribal connections in assigned areas of responsibility, because root 
causes of conflict, potentials for escalation, countermeasures, and probabilities of success are 
situationally specific from place to place and case to case. 16 Racial tensions, for instance, 
precipitated irreconcilable troubles in Black Africa as long as whites held the upper hand, 
while religious and cultural factors presently predominate in Bosnia, where all belligerents 
are essentially Slavic, and in the Middle East where Arabs as well as Israelis are Semitic. 

Three waves of racial, ethnic, and tribal conflict have caused incalculable suffering in the 
20th century. The first onslaught began shortly before, accompanied, and followed World 
War I, when Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rulers lost control. Atrocities against "starving 
Armenians" were among the most terrible. 17 An anticolonial wave washed across southern 
Asia and almost all of Africa in the wake of World War II. The third wave hit the Third World 
wherever weak replacement governments seemed vulnerable or strong ones were repressive. 
The bloodletting in Biafra (southeastern Nigeria) that pitted powerful Fulani and Hausa tribes 
against the Ibo minority between 1 967 and 1 970 took more than a million lives and briefly 
made banner headlines, 18 as did genocidal operations that the Khmer Rouge 



1 82 PART TWO: CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 



Table 1 5. Representative Racial, Ethnic, and Tribal Relationships 



Caucasoid 


Mongoloid 


Amerind 


Negroid 


Australoid 


Nordic 


Chinese 


Indians of 


Bantu 


Melanesian 


Teutonic 
Gaelic 
Celtic 
Slavic 


Japanese 
Korean 
Filipino 
Indonesian 


North America 
Meso- America 
South America 
Aleuts 


Nilotic 
Bushmen 
Hottentot 


Micronesian 
Polynesian 
Aborigine 


Semitic 
Mediterranean 


Malayan 
Inuit 









Race 



Caucasoid 



Amerind 



Ethnic Croups 



Russian 

Belorussian 

Ukrainian 

Polish 

Czech 

Slovak 

Croat 

Serb 

Macedonian 

Bulgarian 

Arctic, Sub-Arctic 
Northwest Pacific 
West, Southwest 
Intermountain, Plateau 
Eastern Woodlands 
Southeast 
Plains 



Tribes 



N/A 



Arapaho 
Blackfoot 
Comanche 
Shoshone 
Dakota Sioux 



conducted against city dwellers in Cambodia (1 975-1 979). 19 Former Yugoslavia caught fire 
a few years after Tito's death, largely because successors were unable to keep the lid on 
ancient animosities. Other collisions traceable to racial, ethnic, or tribal rivalries have 
occurred since 1990 in hot spots such as Peru, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Liberia. 
Motivations include communal violence, various abuses, secessionist movements, 
irredentism, actions to retrieve lost territory, and hypersensitivity, often in combination. 20 

LANGUAGES 

Linguistic cohesion tends to solidify societies whereas fragmentation pulls them apart. Small 
wonder, therefore, that inability to communicate effectively often leads to armed conflict. 
Nine language families currently exist: Indo-European (Slavic, Germanic, Romance, Iranic, 



POPULATIONS 



183 



Indie); Hamito-Semetic; Altai; Niger-Congo; Malayo-Polynesian; Uraic; Sino-Tibetan; Austro- 
Asiatic; and a miscellaneous family that includes Aborigine, Amerind, Dravidian, Eskimoan, 
Khoisan, Nilo-Saharan, Paleosiberian, Papuan, and Tai. Perhaps 6,000 tongues were 
recognizable at the end of the 20th century, of which only a dozen boasted more than a 
hundred million speakers (table 16). 21 

Many lesser languages at that time numbered a few million to a few thousand adherents 
(a few hundred for some primitive tribes), sometimes clustered so tightly that they form 
"shatter zones" similar to the Caucasus, where 51 languages persist in an area roughly the 
size of Florida (table 1 7). 22 Russian troops deployed to keep that volatile region under control 
found it hard to communicate effectively with the local populace. Native Americans (mainly 
Navaho "Code Talkers") transmitted messages in their arcane languages during World War 
II, confusing enemy cryptologists, to whom Amerind variants were unfamiliar. 23 

Armed forces deployed in foreign countries must be able to participate in peacetime 
training with indigenous troops, interrogate prisoners of war, eavesdrop electronically on 
enemies, communicate with refugees, and interact with coalition partners. U.S. Special 
Forces reasonably fluent in Arabic accompanied more than 100 Middle Eastern formations 
during the Persian Gulf War of 1 991 to facilitate coordination with English speaking units on 
their flanks, arrange U.S. artillery and air strikes, and reduce the likelihood of casualties from 
"friendly fire." 24 Textbook command of any language seldom is sufficient, because dialects, 
slang, local idioms, and argot abound, along with arcane military lingo. Figures of speech 
moreover are subject to frequent change few in the United States still refer to marijuana as 
"grass" or police as "pigs," although "flower children" and "hippies" found both terms 
fashionable in the 1 960s. Pidgin, which is popular in the South Pacific, rules out all but the 
most rudimentary conversations. Military "visitors" in foreign lands find reading and writing 
less important than spoken words wherever most people are illiterate or semi I iterate. 

U.S. citizens as a rule are reluctant linguists, partly because many officials, shop keepers, 
and hotel employees in foreign lands understand English, which additionally is the official 
language of NATO and air traffic controllers everywhere. Needs for expertise in Native 
American tongues are next to negligible throughout Latin America, where most people speak 
Spanish, except for Brazil where Portuguese takes precedence although Quechua, which 
is common in Columbia, Peru, and Equador comes in handy for armed forces engaged in 
counternarcotics operations. 

Proficiency in foreign languages nevertheless is useful in most places. U.S. Central 
Command currently covers 16 countries in northeast Africa and southwest Asia, plus 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, Pashtu, Dari, Amharic, Somali, and 
Swahili prevail. U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility, which embraces East Asia, 
most of the Indian subcontinent, Australia, and adjacent islands, contains 30 million people 
who speak 18 main languages and countless dialects. Strict priorities based on the best 
possible requirement forecasts are essential, because no command could possibly muster 
enough well-qualified linguists for every occasion (only 1 6 U.S. military linguists on active 
duty had studied Iraqi dialects before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990). Somali 
speakers were in such short supply when Operation Restore Hope erupted in December 
1992 that warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed's son, a U.S. Marine corporal, served as a 
translator until his presence became impolitic. Foreign language specialists, produced at 
great expense in time and money, consequently should be considered prized possessions. 25 



1 84 PART TWO: CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 



Table 1 6. Ten Leading Languages (1990s) 



Family 


Language 


Millions 


Concentrations 


Sino-Tibetan 


Mandarin Chinese 


806 


China, Taiwan, Singapore 


Indo-European 


English 


426 


United States, British Common- 








wealth, former British colonies 


Indo-European 


Hindi 


313 


Northern India 


Indo-European 


Spanish 


308 


Spain, most of Latin America, 








Southwest United States 


Indo-European 


Russian 


210 


Former Soviet Union 


Hamito-Semitic 


Arabic 


182 


Mid East, North Africa 


Indo-European 


Bengali 


175 


Bangladesh, Eastern India 


Indo-European 


Portuguese 


166 


Portugal, Brazil, 


Malayo-Polynesian 


Indonesian 


132 


Angola, Mozambique, 








Indonesia 


Altaic 


Japanese 


123 


Japan 


Indo-European 


German 


118 


Germany, Austria, 








Switzerland, Luxembourg, 








France, Northern Italy 


Indo-European 


French 


115 


France, Belgium, Switzerland, 








Quebec, New Brunswick, 








former French and Belgian 








colonies 



Source: L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza, ed, The History and Geography of Human C.enes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 162. 



Table 1 7. Linguistic Clutter in the Caucasus 



Abaza 


Bagvalai 


Ginukh 


Kubachi 


Russian 


Abkhaz 


Balkar 


Godoberi 


Kumyk 


Svan 


Adygey 


Batsbi 


Greek 


Kryz 


Tabasaran 


Agul 


Bezhita 


Hunzib 


Kurdish 


Talysh 


Akhwakh 


Botlikh 


Ingush 


Lak 


Tat 


Andi 


Budukh 


Karadray 


Lezgi 


Tindi 


Arc hi 


Chamalai 


Karata 


Mingrelian 


Tsakhursez 


Armenian 


Chechen 


Khaidaq 


Nogay 


Turkmen 


Avar 


Dargwa 


Khinalug 


Ossetian 


Udi 


Azerbaijan 


Georgian 


Khwarshi 


Rutul 


Ukranian 



RELIGIONS 

Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, which first appeared in that sequence, constitute "global 
religions" whose adherents spread far beyond their original regions. Buddhism, Taoism, 
Confucianism, and Shinto are confined largely to East Asia, Hindus and Sikhs concentrate in 
India, and various traditional religions (ancestor worship, animism, shamanism, and voodoo) 
are most prominent among Haitians and in Black Africa (table 1 8). 2(5 



POPULATIONS 



185 



Table 1 8. Principal Religions and Selected Denominations 



Christianity 
(1.7 billion) 


Islam 
(1+ billion) 


Judaism 
(13 million) 


Roman Catholic 
Orthodox 
Protestant 


Sunni 
Shiite 


Orthodox 
Reform 
Conservative 




Mainly East Asian Religions 


Mainly Indian Religions 


Traditional 
Religions 


Buddhism 
(300 million) 

Taoism 
Confucianism 
Shinto 


Hinduism 
(700 million) 

Sikh 
(1 6 million) 


Ancestor Worship 
Animism 
Shamanism 
Voodoo 



Every religion tends to unify its followers, whereas "we against the world" syndromes tend 
to tear societies apart whenever they pit gentiles against Jews, Muslims against infidels, 
Christians against pagans, and "true believers" against agnostics. 27 Religious conflicts in fact 
can be incredibly cruel. Christian Crusaders between 1 095 and 1 270 were just as merciless 
toward nonconformists close to home as they were toward Muslims in the Holy Land. When 
Simon IV de Montfort asked the emissary of Pope Innocent III how he might identify heretics 
in the French city of Beziers the response was, "Kill them all. God will know his own/' 28 The 
Thirty Years' War, which devastated Western Europe between 1 61 8 and 1 648, began as a 
Roman Catholic backlash against the Protestant Reformation in Germany. 29 Christian officers 
employed by the British East India Company in Bengal precipitated the Sepoy Mutiny of 1 857 
through failure to respect religious taboos newly issued Enfield rifles furnished the catalyst, 
because indigenous troops had to bite paper cartridges that allegedly were greased with fat 
from cattle, which Hindus consider sacred, and fat from swine, which Muslims consider 
unclean. 30 British General Charles "Chinese" Gordon later crushed the theocratic Taiping 
Rebellion in China, but not before 20 million people perished between 1850 and 1864. 
Sudanese dervishes devoted to Muhammad Ahmad Ibn Assayyid, a self-proclaimed Mahdi 
(messiah) who sought to "purify" Islam, inflicted widespread casualties and slew Gordon two 
decades later before reinforcements reconquered Khartoum. 31 

One need not delve so deeply into the past to discover religious atrocities with profound 
military implications: 32 

Peacekeepers must separate Christian Greeks from Islamic Turks on Cyprus, Jews from 
Muslims in the Sinai, and Muslims from Christians in Bosnia. 

Christian Armenians and Azerbaijani Muslims cannot seem to coexist in the Caucasus. 

Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils in Sri Lanka profess little interest in peace. 



186 



PART TWO: CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 



Interdenominational disputes spill blood by the barrel in Northern Ireland, where 
Catholics and Protestants are at each other's throats, and in Iraq where President Saddam 
Hussein prompts the Sunni majority to slaughter Shiite minorities. 

Religious warfare repeatedly desecrates hallowed grounds: hundreds have perished 
at the Sikh's Golden Temple in the Punjab; rioting at the temple where Rama reportedly 
was born left 2,000 Hindus and Muslims dead in 1 992; and jews battled Palestinians on 
Jerusalem's Temple Mount in 1 996. 

Military commanders and staffs who overlook religious traditions and temperaments risk 
wrong moves in at least two regards. First, they may inadvertently offend friends and neutrals 
who might mistakenly interpret their behavior as intentional disrespect (U.S. troops in Saudi 
Arabia abstain from alcoholic beverages because Islam forbids imbibement). Second, they 
may miss opportunities to exploit religious practices. Egyptian troops, for example, caught 
Israeli defenders flatfooted when they crossed the Suez Canal in 1 973, because the attack not 
only coincided with Yom Kippur, a Jewish high holy day, but occurred during the month of 
Ramadan, which Muslims normally reserve for fasting and prayer. 33 North Vietnamese 
soldiers and their Viet Cong accomplices took similar advantage the following year when 
they triggered the Tet offensive while lunar New Year festivities with religious overtones were 
in full swing south of the demilitarized zone. 34 

CURRENT ATTITUDES 

Moods of the masses play a pivotal role in political-military affairs, regardless of the size, 
distribution, density, and cultural characteristics of any population. Loyalties, morale, 
temperaments of the moment (aggressive, pacific, neutral, apathetic), discipline, laws, ethics, 
and values all are relevant. 

LOYALTIES 

Armed forces that hope to influence friendly, enemy, or neutral populations favorably in 
peacetime as well as war must understand where primary loyalties lie, because nations, 
regions, races, religious preferences, ethnic groups, tribes, political parties, social castes, and 
other affiliations may stake first claim when interests conflict and the chips are down. 
Communism currently dominates in North Korea, Canadians of French extraction cling to 
their ethnic heritage, and Somalis coalesce around clans. Predilections, moreover, may 
change over time. Stephen Decatur's stirring words, "Our country . . . may she always be 
right; but our country right or wrong" currently resonate less in the United States than they 
did when delivered in 1 81 6. Allegiances, in short, strongly condition popular responses to 
external stimuli and strengthen tendencies to solidify or crack under pressure. 

MORALE 

General George C. Marshall, speaking at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, on June 
1 5, 1 941 , described public morale as 

a state of mind. It is steadfastness, courage and hope. It is confidence and zeal and loyalty. 
It is elan, esprit de corps, and determination. It is staying power, the spirit which endures 



POPULATIONS 187 



to the end the will to win. With it, all things are possible, without it everything else, 
planning, preparation, production count for naught. 

Leadership, discipline, community ties, and group self-respect commonly buttress morale. 
So can pain and privation coupled with steadfast belief in a worthy cause, provided they 
encourage civilians as well as uniformed personnel to produce more, consume less, and 
stand fast in desperate situations. That happened during the Battle of Britain in 1 940, later 
in Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Berlin, and later still in heavily populated parts of Vietnam, 
where courage persisted despite a rain of bombs. Fascist Italy, in contrast, capitulated early 
in World War II because the urge to compete expired. 35 

Moods of the masses may be consistent or vacillate from liberal to conservative, hawkish 
to dovish, idealistic to realistic, rational to irrational. Shifting opinions sometimes create a 
pendulum effect similar to that experienced by the United States during the Vietnam War: 
indifference in the early 1960s; avid involvement in the mid-1960s; disillusionment in the 
late 1960s; and return to indifference after the last U.S. ground forces withdrew in 1972. 
Political-military leaders attuned to such trends are best able to exploit resultant enemy 
weaknesses and limit their own vulnerabilities. 

MORAL AMD LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 

Legal, ethical, and moral codes of conduct designed to limit the way armed forces wage war 
were nearly nonexistent in olden times, when life belonged to the meat eaters. Every man, 
woman, and child, male or female, young or old, combatant or bystander who owed 
allegiance to or merely resided in rival territory was an enemy to be eradicated. Triumphant 
troops commonly slaughtered prisoners of war or sold them into slavery. Entire civilizations 
disappeared. Bloodthirsty Assyrians under Sennacherib obliterated Babylon in 689 B.C. 
Medes and Chaldeans shortly thereafter sacked Ninevah, the Assyrian capital, and sowed the 
site with salt. 

Tighter ground rules apply today. Most nations, in principle if not in practice, approve 
controls contained in two Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), as well as the Geneva 
Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949, which, taken together, distinguish between 
uniformed combatants and bystanders, proscribe inhumane techniques, and prescribe 
humane treatment of POWs. 3b Dictators, firm in their conviction that might makes right, 
routinely match ends with military means as they see fit without much regard for legality, but 
leaders in free societies seldom can conduct sizable military operations for any purpose 
without the consent or passive acquiescence of people they represent. Fingers on the public 
pulse at home and abroad consequently can furnish useful clues concerning courses of action 
that either or both sides might adopt or discard. 

NATIONAL PERSONALITIES 

Political scientists eternally debate degrees to which (even whether) any nation possesses a 
collective "personality" that military planners and operators can safely include in their 
calculations. Disputants might well apply similar arguments to large racial and ethnic groups 
within any given society. 



188 PART TWO: CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 



One school of thought insists that national personalities not only set peoples apart and 
condition the way they behave but strongly resist change. Patience, stoicism, and dogmatic 
devotion to the homeland, for example, remained dominant Russian attributes despite huge 
upheavals that wracked national institutions and values at every level of life after Communist 
dictators replaced tsars in 1917 and again after glasnost (openness) and perestroika 
(restructuring) programs started to transform that closed society in the late 1980s. 
Cambodians as a society consider themselves to be warriors, whereas Lowland Laotians, their 
next door neighbors, are gentle; many in mortal combat seek to scare off enemy spirits with 
near misses rather than shots aimed to kill. Disciples of this school, who contend that nearly 
every nation displays equally distinctive characteristics, see Germans as group-oriented, 
industrious, disciplined, and amenable to governmental authority while U.S. citizenry, in 
contrast, is individualistic, innovative, violent, generous, gullible, and protective of personal 
rights. 37 

A second school scoffs at these generalizations as stereotypes, challenges the permanence 
of national personality traits, and cites historical examples to support its contentions. 38 The 
German General Staff, headed by Prussian generals who prided themselves on "a genius for 
war" for 200 years, disappeared after World War II. 39 Japan, which long honored Bushido 
(the way of Samurai warriors), still subscribes to a 1946 Constitution that renounces war 
forever. 40 U.S. sentiments switched from isolationism in the 1930s to international 
involvement the following decade and have remained so ever since. Consistency, in short, 
is less characteristic than change, according to skeptics. 

Spokespersons for school three see a middle ground. Different peoples, they assert, do 
"tend to be more like each other than they are like members of any other nation," members 
of a given culture do "tend to respond in similar ways," cultural pressures will "impose a 
more or less common direction on individual differences and mitigate them to some extent," 
and "large areas of near uniformity" will emerge. 41 Thoughtful statesmen and military 
commanders who seek to reconcile ambiguities tread carefully, because none of those 
three schools seems entirely correct or erroneous. 

CROSS-CULTURAL SKILLS 

Military personnel who work closely with counterparts in foreign countries must be familiar 
with local folkways and possess cross-cultural communication skills that include reasonable 
fluency in prevalent languages and dialects, plus reading and writing abilities wherever their 
contacts are literate. 

FAMILIARITY WITH FOLKWAYS 

Familiarity with folkways takes precedence over familiarity with foreign languages. Cogent 
considerations cover a broad spectrum that includes traditions, customs, values, motivations, 
hopes, fears, and taboos; religious beliefs; rites, rituals, and holidays; manners and 
mannerisms; behavior; social hierarchies; lines of authority; relationships between men and 
women; moral codes and sexual mores; work ethics, competition versus cooperation, and 
punctuality; views about bribes and official corruption; and dietary regimes. 42 

Dealings with unfamiliar cultures demand patience, self-control, abilities to cope with 
frustration, and tolerance for unfamiliar ways of life. An excerpt from instructions in Saudi 



POPULATIONS 189 



Arabia: A Soldier's Guide, which the United States Army issued to troops during Operation 
Desert Storm, illustrates items that, properly modified, might apply almost anywhere: 

Greetings 

DO 

Shake hands when you meet and leave Arab men 

Rise to show respect when an esteemed person enters the room 

Feel free to return a hug or a kiss on the cheek initiated by an Arab man 

Working with Arabs 

DO- 

Train officers and enlisted men separately if possible 
Refer any serious problems to an Arab leader 
DON'T- 

Criticize an Arab. Give corrective guidance privately and positively, if required 

Overpraise an Arab in front of others 

Lose your temper 

Expect Arabs to be punctual for administrative meetings 

Conversation 

DO 

Open conversation with small talk (How are you? How is your family?) 

Talk to Arabs as equals; avoid arguments; maintain eye contact 

Look for subtle meanings, since Arabs often answer questions indirectly 
DON'T- 

Initiate talk about politics, religion, or ask questions about female family members 

Patronize or talk down to an Arab 

Move away from an Arab who stands very close to you during conversation 

Point the soles of your feet at an Arab when you are sitting with him (it is insulting). 43 

FOREIGN AREA SPECIALISTS 

Senior military staffs, attaches, foreign liaison cells, teams that train troops in foreign 
countries, psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, and civil affairs units all require foreign 
area specialists, because none can perform assigned missions most professionally without full 
appreciation for cultural contexts. 

Military instructors, advisers, and mobile training teams, who need to know about foreign 
political peculiarities, pecking orders, and "eccentric" social practices, find that no amount 
of schooling and second-hand accounts can prepare them as well as onsite assignments. 
There is, in fact, no substitute for close association with people on the spot, where local 
leaders and the led possess assorted personalities, pursue personal or group agendas, and 
often as not live in separate worlds, segregated by rank, age, sex, color, education, and class 
barriers. 

PSYOP specialists seek to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of 
friends, neutrals, and enemies in ways that assist the accomplishment of national, 
international, or intranational objectives before, during, and after hostilities. They must 
master many political, economic, cultural, and topical subjects before they can tailor 
campaigns, themes, and messages that muster and maintain the attention of any given group 
and refute countermeasures, because each foreign audience has different interests, 



1 90 PART TWO: CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 



predispositions, vulnerabilities, and susceptibilities to various persuasions. Otherwise, they 
could only guess what pictures and colors on PSYOP leaflets might appeal to particular 
audiences and which would repel or be received derisively. 4 ^ 

Civil Affairs (CA) forces also covet cross-cultural skills, without which they cannot most 
competently arrange the acquisition of indigenous labor, transportation, communications, 
supplies, other resources, and miscellaneous services for use by armed forces in foreign lands; 
minimize civilian interference with military operations (refugee control is one related 
concern); help military commanders fulfill legal/moral obligations to civilians within assigned 
areas of responsibility; and, as directed, exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority 
in occupied territories. U.S. CA units, in collaboration with Arab counterparts, performed 
most of those missions when they directed the delivery of emergency food, water, and 
medical supplies to Kuwait City on liberation day in 1991, then helped the Government of 
Kuwait restore health, sanitation, transportation, and electrical facilities, repair utilities, 
reestablish police forces, and extinguish fires in neighboring oil fields. 45 

FAMILIARITY WITH FOREIGN LANGUAGES 

Culturally attuned foreign area specialists need a reasonable command of the language(s) and 
dialect(s) prevalent where they perform. They sometimes can rely on a substitute tongue such 
as English, French, or pidgin, but abilities to communicate in the local vernacular gain much 
greater respect (a senior Japanese official once said to the author, "I expect to speak English 
when I'm in the United States, but I'm outraged when I must speak English to U.S. emissaries 
in my own country"). Conversational fluency moreover expands contacts immeasurably 
among citizens who are not bilingual. Face-to-face communications are most effective if 
presenters have a good feel for preferred tones of voice, emphases, inflections, and delivery 
speeds. Appropriate facial expressions and gestures also differ considerably from culture to 
culture. Americans who form a circle with thumb and forefinger, for example, signal "OK," 
whereas Greeks consider that gesture impolite and Brazilians believe it is obscene. The same 
sign signifies money in Japan and zero in France. 46 

Foreign area specialists who lack linguistic skills must employ interpreters, even though 
that practice is less than completely satisfactory under best case circumstances. Cockneys, 
Scots, Cajuns, and Connecticut Yankees all speak English, but unique accents, regional 
dialects, and colloquialisms make it hard for them to understand each other. Problems 
compound when messages filter through the minds, value systems, and lips of third parties 
who may have ulterior motives and hidden agendas. Interpreters cannot transmit meanings 
along with words unless their competence includes military jargon and technical terms as 
well as local patois. Those with impeccable linguistic credentials moreover must conform 
well with cultural prejudices and caste systems, lest audiences pay more attention to who he 
or she is rather than what is said. Women, for example, make poor choices in societies where 
their status is low. Enlisted interpreters offend military officers in many countries, while 
commissioned interpreters tend to intimidate enlisted trainees and thereby impede learning 
processes. 47 

Finally, it seems worth noting that foreign area specialists who can read and write as well 
as speak local languages learn much more about cultures and current events than those who 
cannot. Their capabilities and usefulness to assigned commands increase commensurately. 



POPULATIONS 191 



KEY POINTS 

"Know your enemy and know yourself is a military imperative, not a military 
cliche. Sun Tzu might have added, "Know your friends and coalition partners" as well. 

Racial, ethnic, religious, and tribal animosities often cause wars and resist 
peacemaking efforts. 

Demographers predict population explosions in underdeveloped regions where 
overcrowding already creates dangerous unrest. 

Diseases can cause more casualties than combat actions unless armed forces are 
immunized appropriately and emphasize sanitation, especially in the tropics. 

Military plans and operations consequently benefit immensely from advice and 
assistance concerning population patterns, languages, religious preferences, cultures, 
customs, and social structures in present or projected areas of operation. 

Commanders and staffs in search of "force multipliers" should seek foreign area 
specialists who possess cross-cultural skills that are strategically and tactically valuable 
across the complete spectrum from peacetime to full-scale war. 



1. Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954-1956); Ralph L. 
Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrine," Asian Survey (April 1968): 240-243. 

2. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University 
Press,1963), 84. 

3. "What on Earth," Washington Post, July 20, 1 996, A21 . 

4. Population Statistics (Tel Aviv, Israel: Central Bureau of Statistics, Israeli Foreign Ministry, 
September 11,1 996). 

5. Willard Waller, ed., War in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1 940), 92- 
93; A Military History of World War II, T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, eds,, Operations 
in the European Theaters, vol. 1 (West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, 1 953), 669. 

6. Edward Meade Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli 
to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), 388-400, 408, 506; John Tolland, The 
Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1 970), 3-53; 
Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), 4-5,100-101, 169-170, 449. 

7. Charles A. Webster, Population Growth: Major Threat to the Next Generation of Peace, 
(Washington, DC: Strategic Research Group, National War College, June 11,1 973), 1 -7. 

8. Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One (New York: W. W. Norton, 1 959), 1 5-1 6; official 
statistics, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, furnished telephonically, September 25, 1996. 

9. Wayne O. Evans and James E. Hansen, "Troop Performance at High Altitudes," Army 
(February 1966): 55-58. 

10. Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist 
State (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1 989). 

1 1 . Richard F. Cronin and Barbara Ann LePoer, The Kashmir Dispute: Historical Background to 
the Current Struggle, Report No. 91-563F9 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 
1991). 

12. P. Choudhuri, 9 Gurkha Rifles: A Regimental History, 1817-1947 (New Delhi, India: Vision 
Books, 1984); Bryon Farwell, The Gurkhas (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984). 

1 3. Disease Threats in the Middle East: Preventive Strategies for the 10 1 st Airborne Division (Air 
Assault) (Fort Campbell, KY: 101 st Airborne Division Preventive Medicine Activity, 1982), 1; L. 



1 92 PART TWO: CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 



Dudley Stamp, The Geography of Life and Death (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1 964), 
especially chapters I-V. 

14. Disease and Environmental Alert Reports (Washington, DC: Armed Forces Medical 
Intelligence Center and Defense Intelligence Agency, March 1992); Kenneth F. Kiple, ed., The 
Cambridge World History of Human Disease (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Robert 
Parsons, 'Tracking Down Tropical Diseases," Army Digest (June 1970): 42-44; B. Denise Hawkins, 
"Plan OK'd to Give Troops Anthrax Shots," Army Times, October 21,1 996, 8. 

1 5. Charles Sudetic, "The Society and Its Environment," in Yugoslavia: A Country Study, 3 d ed., 
ed. Glenn E. Curtis (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992), 69-88. 

16. Ted Robert Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare and the Changing Priorities of Global Security," 
Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 1990): 82-98. 

1 7. Gerard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, The Armenians from Genocide to Resistance (Totowa, 
NJ:Zed, 1984). 

1 8. John ]. Stremlau, The Internal Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1977). 

19. Niyan Chanda, Brother Enemy (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986). 

20. William A. Stofft and Gary L. Guertner, Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for the Army of the 
Future (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, March 1 4, 1 994), 1 -1 0. 

21 . L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza et al., eds., The History and Geography of Human Genes (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1 994), 1 60-1 64; Bernard Comrie, "Language," Microsoft Encarta 97 
Encyclopedia. 

22. Mike Edwards, "The Fractured Caucasus," National Geographic (February 1 996): 1 30-131 . 

23. Margaret T. Bixler, Winds of Freedom: The Story of the Navaho Code Talkers of World War 
II (New York: Two Bytes Publishing Co., 1 992). 

24. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Dept. of 
Defense, 1992), 20-21; David Evans, "An Impressive Yet Troubling Marine on Duty in Somalia," 
Chicago Tribune, January 8, 1993, 23. 

25. John M. Collins, Special Operations Forces: An Assessment (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 1994), 85, 88, 89, 129-130. 

26. Edward Geoffrey Parrinder, World Religions: From Ancient History to the Present (New York: 
Facts on File, 1984); Niels Christian Nielsen, Religions of the World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1983; updated by Alan Wilson Watts, "Religion," Microsoft Encarta 96 Encyclopedia. 

27. Henry O. Thompson, World Religions in Peace and War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co., 
1988). 

28. Terry Jones and Alan Ereira, Crusades (New York: Facts on File, 1 995); Amin Maalouf, The 
Crusades Through Arab Eyes, trans. Jon Rothchild (New York: Schocken Books, 1984). 

29. Geoffrey Parker, ed., The Thirty Years' War (New York: Military Heritage Press, 1987). 

30. Christopher Hibbert, The Great MutiNew York: India 1857 (London: Allan Lane, 1 978). 

31 . Charles Chenevix Trench, The Road to Khartoum: A Life of General Charles Gordon (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1979). 

32. James A. Haught, Holy Hatred: Religious Conflicts of the 1990s (Amherst, New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1995); Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York: 
Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1985); Barton Gellman, "Palestinians, Israeli Police Battle on 
Sacred Ground," Washington Post, September 28, 1996, 1, A22. 

33. Saad Shazly, The Crossing of Suez (San Francisco, CA: American Mideast Research, 1980). 

34. Don Oberdorfer, Tet (New York: Da Capo Press, 1 984). 

35. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4 th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1 967), 
1 29-1 31 ; A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2 d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1 968), 1 84-1 89. 



POPULATIONS 193 



36. See especially Hague Convention No. IV: International Convention Concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, October 1 8, 1 907; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, October 12,1 949. 

37. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1 22-1 29. 

38. Organski, World Politics, 87-91; Thomas L. Hartshorne, The Distorted Image: Changing 
Conceptions of the American Character (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1968), 1-14. 

39. Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977). 

40. William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacAnhur, 1880-1964 (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1978), 498-501. 

41 . Hartshorne, The Distorted Image, 8. 

42. Interpretive Country Study: Student Outline 5342 (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Civil Affairs Dept., May 1987; Cross Cultural 
Communications: Lesson Outline 3148 (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 
Center and School, March 1 990). 

43. Saudi Arabia: A Soldier's Guide (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, Public Affairs Office, 
undated) (September 1 990), 12-29. 

44. Joint Pub 3-53: Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 31, 1993), 1-1, V-2, V-5; FM 33-1 : Psychological Operations 
(Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, February 1 8, 1 993). The August 31,1 979, edition of FM 33-1 
is more useful in some respects. See especially chapters 5, 9,and 13. 

45. FM 41 -1 0: Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, January 11,1 993). 
The October 20, 1969, edition is more useful in some respects. See especially chapter 2 and 
appendices E, J. 

46. Sidney Shachnow, "Intercultural Communication: The Need for Conceptual Skills," Special 
Warfare (February 1993): 20-22; Interpersonal Psychological Operations: Lesson Outline and 
Summary Sheet 3906 (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 
School, March 1987), LO-2, LO-4, SS-1 through SS-3. 

47. Field Circular 21-852: Teaching Through Interpreters (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, January 1 984); Utilization of Interpreters: Lesson 
Outline 5842 (Fort Bragg, NC: 3d Battalion, Civil Affairs Company, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy 
Special Warfare Center and School, January 1 990). 



1 94 PART TWO: CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 



URBANIZATION 



No straw for him, no twigs or sticks, 
this pig had built his house of BRICKS. 
"You'll not get me!" the piggy cried. 
"I'll blow you down!" the Wolf replied. 
"You'll need, " Pig said, "a lot of puff, 
and I don't think you've got enough." 
Wolf huffed and puffed and blew and blew, 
the house stayed up as good as new. 
"If I can 't blow it down, " Wolf said, 
"I'll have to blow it up instead. " 

Roald Dahl 
Revolting Rhymes 



THE FOREGOING PARODY OF THE THREE LITTLE PICS, WHO RESPECTIVELY BUILT THEIR HOUSES OF STRAW, 

sticks, and bricks, applies to urban combat on a grander scale. Some hamlets, villages, 
towns, and cities are more difficult to seize and secure than others if inhabitants strongly 
resist, but modern munitions can quickly reduce the best built settlements to rubble. Rational 
reasons to blow cities up or down, however, have been scarce for 2,500 years, since Sun Tzu 
proclaimed that, 'The worst policy is to attack cities/' 1 Aggressors who do so deprive 
themselves of valuable assets, defenders who do so destroy precious possessions, and well- 
meaning friends who do so wound their allies. The anonymous U.S. Army major who 
blurted, "It became necessary to destroy the town [of Ben Tre, South Vietnam] to save it" 
spouted nonsense. 2 Urban combat moreover disrupts unit cohesion, complicates control, 
blunts offensive momentum, and causes casualties to soar on both sides. 

Most military doctrines the world over consequently advise land force commanders to 
isolate or bypass built-up areas, but the subjugation of political, industrial, commercial, 
transportation, and communication centers even so may sometimes decisively affect the 
outcome of battles, campaigns, even wars. Military commanders in such events face an 
endless variety of structures and facilities the seizure or control of which demands esoteric 
plans, programs, and procedures, since no two cities are quite alike. Urbanization moreover 
plays an imperative part in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations as well as deterrent 
strategies that hold cities hostage 3 and war fighting strategies that seek to break the will of 
stubborn enemies by bombing them back into the Stone Age. 4 



195 



SITES AMD STRUCTURES 

Urbanization, for purposes of this appraisal, connotes plots of land where population 
densities equal or exceed 1,000 persons per square mile (about 3 square kilometers) and 
buildings average at least one on every 2 acres. That definition embraces small towns and 
suburbia as well as cities of assorted sizes and shapes, close together or widely separated, 
superimposed upon flat, rolling, or rough topography. The mixture of manmade and natural 
features generally is more complex than sparsely inhabited deserts, swamps, and jungles, 
which contain fewer distinctive terrain features. 

TOWN AND CITY CONFIGURATIONS 

Some towns and cities emphasize governmental affairs, physical security, industries, 
commerce, business, or services, while others accommodate two or more primary functions. 
Every agglomeration is uniquely configured with regard to horizontal and vertical 
dimensions, structures, building materials, street patterns, access routes, bypasses, parks, 
recreational facilities, rural enclaves in otherwise urban settings, and undeveloped lands 
(table 1 9). Original layouts occasionally remain intact over long periods of time but often 
expand willy-nilly in response to new needs. Urban centers in North America and Western 
Europe toward the end of the 20th century, for example, tend toward lower average 
population densities per square mile as municipalities expand, more freestanding 
construction as opposed to solid blocks, greater use of glass, fewer buildings with basements, 
and a dearth of subways in suburbia where private automobiles abound. 5 

Urban environments consequently differ drastically in several militarily relevant respects. 
Castles, cathedrals and solid medieval buildings flush with narrow, crooked streets mark the 
midst of many European cities, whereas downtown Washington, DC, features construction 
astride a wide, rectangular mall that runs for 3 miles (5 kilometers) from Capitol Hill to the 
Lincoln Memorial. Affluent suburbanites sometimes encircle metropoli loaded with slums, 
shantytowns elsewhere surround prosperous inner cities, and the rich mayhap'mingle with 
poor. Building designs and materials reflect urban functions, available resources, climatic 
conditions, and cultural proclivities. Construction in heavily forested parts of frigid Siberia 
favors lumber, easily obtained adobe is popular in relatively warm, arid regions, and 
structures elsewhere variously emphasize reeds, sod, reinforced concrete, or stone. Assorted 
street patterns also are observable (figure 29). Main thoroughfares run the gamut from 
unpaved threadneedle alleys to broad, hard-surfaced avenues abutted by open spaces that 
not only permit two-way traffic several lanes abreast but allow off-the-road vehicular 
movement. 6 

UTILITIES, FACILITIES, AND SERVICES 

Modern towns and cities could not perform major functions or sustain present standards of 
living without lights, power, electricity, food, and potable water, together with supply, 
storage, distribution, maintenance, and waste disposal systems. Community life would slow 
to a crawl or stop if denied public transportation, police, fire departments, hospitals, 
telephones, and news media (newspapers, radio, television). 



196 



PART TWO: CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 



Table 1 9. Variable Town and City Components 



Functions 


Building 
Construction 


Street 
Characteristics 


Utilities, 
Facilities 


Access Routes 


Governmental 
Industrial 
Commercial 
Transportation 
Educational 


Single Story 
Multistory 
High Rise 

Brick 


Wide 
Narrow 
Straight 
Winding 


Electricity 
Gas 
Food, Water 
Waste Disposal 


Roads 
Railways 
Airports 
Seaports 


Residential 


Stone 
Wood 
Metal 


Paved 
Unpaved 


Telephones 
Newspapers 
Radios 






Adobe 


Radial 


Televisions 






Class 
Co