The military obligation of citizenship

THE MILITARY OBLIGATION
OF CITIZENSHIP

BY

LEONARD WOOD

Major-General United States Army

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1915

Copyright, 1915, by
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Published November, 1915

INTRODUCTION

When General Wood delivered his ad-
dress in Princeton April 15, 1915, on the
subject of "The Policy of the United
States in Raising and Maintaining Ar-
mies," many of us felt that his words
should have a wider circulation; hence this
volume.

To the Princeton address have been
added two other addresses by General
Wood. The first, "The Military Obliga-
tion of Citizenship" was delivered at the
Lake Mohonk Conference, May 20, 1915.
The second, "The Civil Obligation of the
Army," was delivered at St. Paul's
School, June 15, 1915. These addresses are
here reprinted as they appeared in the
press.

iii

324981

iv INTRODUCTION

It is eminently proper that the Ameri-
can people should give especial considera-
tion to the opinion of General Wood on
the subject of military preparedness. We
should listen to him with particular defer-
ence because of his intimate knowledge of
our army, its strength and its weakness,
and because in the event of war he is the
one upon whom would rest the heaviest
weight of responsibility to defend our
homes against the attack of an invading
enemy. General Wood is a soldier, and
yet a man of peace. He hates militarism
but believes in a reasonable preparedness
and naturally shrinks from the task of lead-
ing forth the devoted but inexperienced
young men of our land to be slaughtered
like cattle at the hands of experienced and
seasoned troops. He desires to maintain
peace with honor, but would not sacrifice
honor merely for the sake of a comfortable
ease and security of peace. He is deeply

INTRODUCTION v

sensible of the fact that no amount of pa-
triotic enthusiasm will compensate for the
lack of military knowledge, and that in the
time of peril the ability to meet the crisis
is not born of the crisis itself, but its be-
ginning and development must antedate
the occasion when the crucial test is to be
met and withstood, and that the easy going
and popular idea that when the emergency
comes unknown resources will be discov-
ered and extraordinary powers suddenly
evoked, is a fallacy as silly as it is false,
and that it is disastrous to attempt to learn
the art of war in the midst of war itself,
because war is the time for action, not for
education.

General Wood commands our attention
because he himself has done more than
merely talk and write on this subject. He
has begun the work of general military
education through the summer camps, and
has attempted with extraordinary success

vl INTRODUCTION

this intensive training of our young men
in military theory and practice.

In all the pursuits of professional and
business life we have formed the habit of
seeking expert knowledge. General
Wood possesses this knowledge. It is
available in this volume. Our voters and
legislators alike should seek the light
where it is shining. It does not require
an extraordinary amount of wisdom for
a man to profit by his own mistakes. It
is, however, the supreme test of wisdom
and the proof of its presence and power
when a man is capable of profiting by the
mistakes of others. The same is true not
only of the individual, but of any particu-
lar generation of people. It is difficult
for those who live in the present to under-
stand and profit by the mistakes of the
generations before them. That generation
is indeed wise that can so interpret the
history of the past as to realize the signifi-

INTRODUCTION vii

cance of disastrous mistakes due to ignor-
ance and indifference and thereby avoid a
like disaster in its own day.

Let us as a nation learn the lesson of
our own foolishness so that we may not
multiply the mistakes or repeat the folly
of those who have gone before us.

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

Princeton, N. J.
November 3, 1915

CONTENTS

I. The Policy of the United States
in Raising and Maintaining
Armies 1

II. The Military Obligation of Citi-
zenship 40

III. The Civil Obligation of the

Army 50

THE POLICY OF THE UNITED

STATES IN RAISING AND

MAINTAINING ARMIES

The people of the United States are sin-
gularly lacking in information concerning
both the military history of their country
and its military policy. Students in school
and college as a rule receive entirely er-
roneous ideas on both of these subjects.
The average young man, unless he has
really made a study of the country's his-
tory, is firmly convinced that the Revolu-
tionary War was characterized throughout
by the highest quality of patriotism and
devotion to the best interests of the coun-
try on the part of the people as a whole.

2 RAISING AND

He is not at all familiar with the desperate
struggle which was made by Washington,
various Colonial assemblies and the Con-
federation of Colonies, to keep in the field
even a small force of troops. He hears
very little of the bickerings, mutinies, de-
sertions and frequent changes of personnel
which made the war a difficult one to con-
duct and served to bring out into strong
relief the remarkable qualities of Wash-
ington— those qualities of patience, good
judgment, discretion and again patience,
and more patience, which made it possible
for him to hold the illy-equipped, disjointed
and discordant elements together, and to
have always available some kind of a fight-
ing force, although seldom an effective
one.

We have as a nation neglected the
lessons of past wars, and have learned
little from the example of the great mili-
tary nations, and, as Emory Upton truth-

MAINTAINING ARMIES 3

fully says: "Our general policy has fol-
lowed closely that of China." Perhaps
this statement may be somewhat extreme
in all which applies to conditions up to the
end of the Civil War, but it is not in any
way extreme when applied to conditions
which exist today. The great nations
with policies to uphold and interests to
defend have made what they believe to be
adequate military preparation.

The United States has been drifting for
years. No real military preparations of
an adequate character have been made.
Military preparedness means the organi-
zation of all the resources of a nation —
men, material and money — so that the full
power of the nation may be promptly
applied and continued at maximum
strength for a considerable period of time.
War today, when initiated by a country
prepared for war, comes with great sud-
denness, because all preparations have

4 RAISING AND

been made in advance; plans have been
worked out to the last detail, organization
completed and reserve supplies purchased
and assembled long in advance and the
whole force of the mighty machine can be
applied in a very brief period of time at
any designated point.

Back of the machine itself is the railroad
service, so organized as to be turned over
immediately to the military authorities.
Back of this come the civil hospitals, the
bakeries, and the supply departments of
all sorts, each with its responsibility fixed
in case of operations within its area, or in
case of a demand for supplies in other sec-
tions of the theatre of war. The capacity
of every ship is known, and plans com-
pleted for her use as a troop ship, and
when war threatens, the whereabouts of
the shipping is closely watched, and
ships are assembled quietly to meet any
demand which may be required for over-

MAINTAINING ARMIES 5

sea operations. These are but an outline
of what is meant by military preparedness.

Mere numbers of men and undevel-
oped military resources are of little value.
It has been well said that in the sudden
onrush of modern war, undeveloped mili-
tary resources are of no more use than an
undeveloped gold mine in Alaska would
be in a panic on Wall Street. The com-
parison is not overdrawn. You must re-
member, all of you, that this country has
never yet engaged in war with a first-class
Power prepared for war.

You must remember also that once sea
power is lost or held in check an enormous
force can be landed on these shores within
a month — a force sufficient to go where it
will and to hold whatever it desires to hold.

Why have we failed to make adequate
preparation ? Partly because of ignorance
of the true facts concerning our utter un-
preparedness, and partly due to a conceit

6 RAISING AND

fostered by the average Fourth of July
orator and politician, through statements
to the effect that we possess peculiar and
remarkable military characteristics which
make our soldiers trained and efficient
without preparation, and as good as
equally brave and equally sound men of
other countries who have spent years in
training. Again there is the curious An-
glo-Saxon prejudice against a large
standing army and the feeling that it is
always a menace to civil liberty.

In our past wars we were not confronted
by great nations with highly organized
military machines; steam navigation had
not appeared; our possible enemies were
without standing armies of any size, and
lacked entirely that complete military or-
ganization which characterizes them today.
It took a long time to get troops together
and prepare supplies for them, and a con-
siderable period of time to cross the ocean.

MAINTAINING ARMIES 7

Our forefathers had more time to prepare.
Then, again, they were more familiar with
the use of arms ; weapons were of a simple
type; they could be made quickly, and
instruction in their use was a relatively
simple matter.

Now highly organized military estab-
lishments are the rule among our possible
antagonists. Rapid steam transportation
in vast amount is available. The arms of
war are extremely complicated and costly :
it takes a long time to make them and a
long time to instruct soldiers in their use.
In other words, today everything is in
favor of the prepared aggressor and
everything against the unready pacific
nation.

The blow comes more quickly and with
greater force, and it is not possible to
provide even a semblance of protection
against it unless wise measures have been
taken long in advance.

8 RAISING AND

Since the foundation of the Republic,
war has existed as follows :

Revolutionary War 7 years

War of 1812-14 2j years

Mexican War 2 years

Florida War 7 years

Civil War 4 years

War with Spain and Philippine

Rebellion 2 years

Not to mention numerous Indian wars
and internal disturbances requiring the
use of troops.

We have struggled through these wars
and have emerged generally successfully,
but in none of them has there been any evi-
dence of well-thought-out preparations or
the application of a sound military policy.
Our people remember only the success and
forget entirely the great and unnecessary
cost in blood and treasure in which our de-
fective method of conducting these wars
resulted. By faulty methods I mean that

MAINTAINING ARMIES 9

we have generally conducted war as a con-
federacy instead of as a nation. We have
permitted altogether too much interference
by States. Too many officers have been ap-
pointed by the Governors of States. New
regiments have been raised oftentimes in
order that new officers might be appointed
and political patronage increased, where-
as the old regiments should have been
filled up, as they had acquired experience,
some traditions and esprit, and were much
more valuable than new regiments. This
is seen in the Civil War in case of the Wis-
consin organizations. Wisconsin had the
good sense to veteranize her regiments,
and the result is seen when one remembers
the term "Iron Brigade" applied to a
Wisconsin brigade.

Then again we have had frequently the
intervention of civilians, either through the
activities of the Secretary of War or of
the civil arms of the Government. There

10 RAISING AND

has been a general lack of a sense of in-
dividual responsibility for military ser-
vice. Reliance on volunteer enlistments
has continued, and has been one of the
gravest sources of danger to the Republic.
The experience of the Revolution should
have taught us that it is not safe in a real
war to depend upon volunteers. There is
an enthusiastic response by a certain pro-
portion of the best element in the early
days of war, but this response cannot be
counted upon to continue throughout a
long war involving severe strains upon the
population, nor is it right or just to throw
the burden of military service upon a por-
tion of the population. It is a universal
obligation and the country will never be
secure or safe until it is recognized as such
and measures are taken to develop mili-
tary preparation on a basis of universal
military obligation.

To return to the Revolution, in 1774

...• .• i

v.: •....

pel

MAINTAINING ARMIES 11

Massachusetts Colony assembled a provi-
sional congress, and began preparations
for a conflict with Great Britain. It took
steps to organize a militia and to appoint
officers. The movement was continued
through the year 1775, and provision was
made that a portion of the militia should
be Minute Men — men who would hold
themselves ready to respond immediately
to call. This was the condition when the
fight at Lexington occurred. Men were
commissioned as officers largely in accor-
dance with the number of men they raised.
It was a most vicious practice, and one
which has persisted until recent times.
Popular men, regardless of their military
qualifications or fitness, were appointed
to commands which they were entirely un-
fitted to exercise.

In May, 1775, the Continental Con-
gress met (this was about three weeks
after the battle of Lexington). It as-

12 RAISING AND

sumed immediately the functions of civil
government, but being without authority
to levy taxes or to raise revenue, it was
empowered to emit bills of credit, their
redemption being secured by the promise
of the twelve Colonies. This limitation
upon its financial power almost neutralized
its power to create and support armies.
The conduct of the Revolutionary War
would have been very different had the
Continental Congress had the power to
employ the entire financial and military
resources of the people. This Congress
authorized the formation of ten companies
of riflemen, and these companies were
really the beginning of the Continental
Army. They were raised from Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia and Maryland. The term
of enlistment was fixed at one year. There
was great enthusiasm, and the twelve
companies reported within sixty days. As
was natural the men composing these com-

MAINTAINING ARMIES 13

panics were among the best. The really
best men are those who first rush to the
colors.

These riflemen were the nucleus of the
army which finally achieved our indepen-
dence, and maintained a high reputation
throughout the war. The term of enlist-
ment, however, was short, and here we en-
counter one of the great difficulties which
confronted Washington and all others
throughout the Revolution; namely, the
question of short enlistments. Men were
barely trained before they left the service
to be replaced by others untrained and, of
course, unequipped and generally demand-
ing new uniforms and equipment. Shortly
after the authorization of these companies
of riflemen Congress authorized twenty-
six additional regiments to be raised by
the different colonies — sixteen by Mas-
sachusetts. Blank commissions were sent
to Washington. With the arrival of these

14 RAISING AND

blank commissions Washington's troubles
and difficulties were greatly augmented.
A tremendous struggle followed. States
attempted to secure an undue proportion
for their own contingents.

Washington's letters at this time speak
of corruption, lack of patriotism, slow en-
listments, and indicate a condition which
would have appalled any but one with a
stout heart and determined character.

About this time appeared the question
of "bounty" — one of the most dangerous
and pernicious methods of securing men.
Washington was already deeply im-
pressed with the danger of short enlist-
ments and the unreliability of the Militia.
He was also alarmed at the general and
widespread evil of desertion. Volunteer-
ing had already become slow. Washington
recommended coercive measures to the
General Court of Massachusetts and
urged — indeed almost prayed — Congress

MAINTAINING ARMIES 15

to establish enlistments for the war. He
already saw clearly that the volunteer sys-
tem was a failure, that it was full of grave
dangers and that the war could not be suc-
cessfully conducted by untrained men led
by inefficient officers.

It was during this year — thanks largely
to the efforts of Washington — that the
Continental Army reached its maximum
strength — the greatest that it had during
the struggle. At its maximum it totaled
in round numbers 89,000 men, of whom
49,000 were Continentals and 42,000 Mili-
tia. Dictatorial powers were given to
Washington to raise troops in any of the
Colonies, seize supplies and compel accep-
tance of colonial bills; from all of which
it is clearly evident that had we been op-
posed by a vigorous, well organized enemy
our capacity for resistance would have
been comparatively slight.

The British campaign was not pushed

16 RAISING AND

with great energy. From the high water
mark of 89,000 the Continental Army
shrunk year by year. In 1777 the total was
69,000; in 1778 it had dwindled to 51,000,
and such was the condition of the diffi-
culty as to enlistments that the enlist-
ment of negro slaves was authorized by
Rhode Island — these slaves to become free
on enlistment.

Congress recommended to the States
the employment of the draft. These con-
ditions grew worse in 1779. Bounties had
to be greatly increased and the total maxi-
mum force shrunk to 44,000. In 1780 the
same general difficulties continued. The
proportion of Continentals to Militia had
increased. The grand total was about
43,000, of whom a very considerable num-
ber were Militia enlisted for short periods.
In 1781 (the last year which was charac-
terized by active fighting), the army had
dwindled to a total of a little over 29,000

MAINTAINING ARMIES 17

men ; mutiny took place among the troops
of the Pennsylvania line, and the general
condition was chaotic. Had we been con-
fronted by a well organized enemy and a
vigorous campaign waged against us,
it is not difficult to foresee what the
outcome must have been. Bounties had
increased enormously, and discipline was
poor among the newly raised troops.

No one who has studied carefully the
situation during the last two years of the
Revolutionary War can fail to appreciate
the tremendous value of the aid which was
furnished us by France. It was of vital
importance and came at a most critical
time. The haphazard policy followed
throughout the Revolution cost tremen-
dously in life and treasure. Years after
the war General Lee (known as Light-
Horse Harry Lee) characterized our mili-
tary policy as follows:

"While I record with delight facts

18 RAISING AND

which maintain our native and national
courage, I feel a horror lest demagogues
who flourish in a representative system of
government (the best when virtue rules,
the wit of man can devise) shall avail
themselves of the occasional testimony to
produce a great result. Convinced as I am
that a government is the murderer of its
citizens which sends them to the field unin-
formed and untaught, where they are to
meet men of the same age and strength,
mechanized by education and discipline
for battle, I cannot withhold my denuncia-
tion of its wickedness and folly."

Washington's criticism of our military
policy was none the less strong. He says :

"Had we formed a permanent army in
the beginning, which, by the continuance
of the same men in service, had been capa-
ble of discipline, we should never have had
to retreat with a handful of men across the
Delaware in 1776 trembling for the fate

o

0

ls

MAINTAINING ARMIES 19

of America, which nothing but the infatu-
ation of the enemy could have saved. . . .
We should not have been the greatest part
of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted
for our safety to their inactivity, enduring
frequently the mortification of seeing in-
viting opportunities to ruin them pass un-
improved for want of a force which the
country was completely able to afford, and
of seeing the country ravaged, our towns
burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused,
murdered, with impunity from the same
cause. . . . There is every reason to be-
lieve that the war has been protracted on
this account," etc.

The total number of Regulars engaged
during the war was 237,731; the total
Militia about 164,000 — roughly a total of
395,000 troops. Our maximum was in
1776, when we had 89,000, and it dwindled
to a little over 29,000 in 1781. In 1776 the
British had 20,171, and in 1781 they had

20 RAISING AND

42,000. In other words, Great Britain,
sluggishly as she conducted the war, was,
nevertheless growing stronger, and had it
not been for the invaluable assistance of
France, it is not improbable that the war
might have gone against us.

Our people soon forgot the lessons of
this war, remembering only that we came
out of it successfully. The war was ren-
dered unnecessarily long and expensive,
both in men and money, by the total lack
of experience of our statesmen in military
matters. Our efficiency was undermined by
short enlistments and the failure to recog-
nize the danger of dependence on Volun-
teers ; also by ignorance of the fact that the
bounty cannot be depended upon in a long
war and failure to appreciate the fact that
troops are reliable only when they are com-
manded by well trained officers who have
at least received reasonable training and
discipline.

MAINTAINING ARMIES 21

Shortly after the close of the war the
Army was practically disbanded, except
Battery F (known as the "Alexander
Hamilton Battery"). This battery has
continued in our service since the Revolu-
tion and is now Battery F of the 4th
Artillery.

Little was apparently learned from the
Revolution.

There were reorganizations of the Army
in 1790, 1791 and 1792, which resulted fi-
nally in an army of 5,500 men. The whole
policy, however, was rather haphazard.
There was no system worthy of the name
for increasing the Army, and no reserve
of trained officers; in fact, the mistakes
of the Revolution had apparently been
forgotten.

In 1792 Baron Steuben, who had been
of great value to the Colonies as an or-
ganizer and instructor of troops, recom-
mended that the Army be organized as a

22 RAISING AND

legion, and the Secretary of War (General
Knox) was so impressed with the idea that
he proposed to apply the same organiza-
tion to the Militia, dividing it into three
bodies, designated as the Advance, Main
and Reserve corps — first, the Advance
Corps, to consist of men from 18 to 20
years of age, inclusive — second, the Main
Corps, consisting of men from 21 to 45
years of age, inclusive — third, all men
from 45 to 60 years of age, inclusive.
All members of the Advance Corps under
20 were to receive military instruction for
30 days at annual camps.

Other young men of the Advance
Corps were required to be present at least
ten days of these encampments. The
members of the Main Corps were to re-
ceive four days' instruction per year.

Here we find many years in advance of
its application in Europe the idea of a
nation in arms ; in other words, an endorse-

MAINTAINING ARMIES 23

ment of the policy recommended by Jef-
ferson : namely, that we must classify and
train all our male citizens. In fact, as one
studies the papers of the early Presidents,
it is evident everywhere that they had in
mind the "nation in arms" idea when they
spoke of "our main reliance being the
Militia," the Militia including, as it did,
all men between the ages of 18 and 45. It
was the clear intent of the founders of the
Republic that all our citizens from 18 to
45 should be trained to such an extent as
to make them efficient soldiers.

The legionary organization was adopted
for the Army itself, but was never ex-
tended to the Militia, nor were the classifi-
cation and training put in operation.

From the small size and rather tempor-
ary character of the regular Military es-
tablishment, it is plain that the intention
was to depend principally upon a trained
Militia, and had this idea been put in oper-

24 RAISING AND

ation through an effective system of
training, we should have been far better
prepared for our subsequent wars, and
eventually have adopted a sound military
policy, characterized by an appreciation
of the necessity of training men and pre-
paring reserves of men and material in
advance.

From 1792 reorganizations and shake-
ups in the Army continued. The year
1805 was signalized by a very important
event in our military history; namely, the
establishment at West Point, which was
done principally on the recommendation
of Alexander Hamilton.

In 1812 the Army was increased in view
of the coming war with England. At the
commencement of this war the Army con-
sisted of 6,744 men. It was increased in
June to twenty-five regiments of Infan-
try, four Artillery, two of Dragoons
and one of Riflemen — a total of 36,700.

MAINTAINING ARMIES 25

It was proposed to raise 30,000 Volun-
teers.

The war with England began on June
18, 1812. The enemy had a relatively
small force of regular troops in Canada —
about 4,500 effectives. Our standing army
was a little less than 7,000 men. The same
old haphazard policy which had charac-
terized the conduct of military matters in
the Revolution was continued. Officers
who could raise men were given commis-
sions. The Governors of some of the
States refused to furnish Militia. The dif-
ficulties of a confederacy conducting effec-
tive military operations were illustrated.
Again the Militia demonstrated its entire
unreliability. This war, from the stand-
point of military inefficiency, was the least
creditable of our wars ; in fact, taken as a
whole, it was highly discreditable to us on
land, and while we had many brilliant in-
dividual ship actions at sea, at the end

26 RAISING AND

of the war our Navy was practically
under blockade, and our commerce almost
destroyed.

On land, with the exception of a minor
victory on the Thames, and a creditable
action at Lundy's Lane, where the Regu-
lars covered themselves with glory, and the
victory at New Orleans (fought after the
war), our military operations cannot be
regarded with any degree of satisfaction.
In a word, they were discreditable to us.
Washington was captured by a force much
less in numbers than that of the defenders
— with a loss on our side of only eight
killed and eleven wounded.

We put into this war 527,000 men. Of
this number approximately 33,481 were
officers. The largest number of British
regular troops which were on the continent
at any one time during this war was ap-
proximately 16,800. In cooperation with
them were some thousands of Militia and

MAINTAINING ARMIES 37

Indians. These, however, constituted a
very small force in comparison with the
number which we put into the field.

These figures bring out very forcibly
the necessity of training a large body of
officers in advance of war. Especially is
this important if we are to depend in any
way upon Volunteers.

The lessons of the war are so clear that
it seems hardly necessary to state that it
was a repetition in the gravest form of
many of the blunders of the Revolution,
which had only too often their origin in
defective military legislation and lack of
preparation, making it possible, as Upton
puts it, that "less than 5,000 men for a
period of two years brought war and devas-
tation into our territory and successfully
withstood the misapplied power of seven
millions of people."

Shortly after the war the Army was re-
duced to 10,000. In 1817 came the Semi-

28 RAISING AND

nole War and the same haphazard policy
through enlistments of many different
men. New arms, new equipments, waste
of money and waste of life — the same pol-
icy runs through the Indian wars in which
we were engaged in subsequent years.

During the Seminole and Creek Wars
relatively enormous forces of troops were
employed in comparison with the small
force of Indians who opposed us. The
cost in blood, life and treasure was un-
necessarily great. The whole conduct of
the war spelt poor organization and lack
of intelligent military policy.

In 1838 the Army was increased to
about 12,500. In 1842 it was again re-
duced to 8,600. In 1846 the rumble of the
approaching Mexican war was heard, and
there was a gradual increase in the Army.
During that war it was increased to about
39,000 Regulars. At the end of the war it
was again reduced to 10,300. There was

MAINTAINING ARMIES 29

a serious effort made during this war to
increase the enlistment period and to fix it
at a minimum of twelve months, or for the
war. The total number of men employed
during this war was 104,000. It was a
brilliantly successful war, and to quote
again from Upton, who is almost the sole
authority from which we draw accurate
data concerning our wars :

"Successes so brilliant would appar-
ently denote the perfection of military
policy, but, paradoxical as it may seem,
official documents establish the fact that
they were achieved under the very same
system of laws and executive orders which
in the preceding foreign war had led to a
series of disasters culminating in the cap-
ture and destruction of our capital.

"The explanation of this paradox is to
be found partly in the difference of char-
acter of our adversaries, but more espe-
cially in the quality of the Regular Army,

30 RAISING AND

with which we began the two wars. For
the Mexican War, as for the War of 1812,
the Government had ample time to
prepare."

This quotation covers the situation very
well. Our enemy was not a well prepared
enemy, and the scene of action was so dis-
tant from the source from which troops
were drawn that the troops were in hand
for a long enough period to get them into
fairly effective shape. There was an ex-
ceptionally efficient body of regular
officers.

Again there was a relatively small force
of militia employed — only 12,500 out of a
force of 104,000 as compared with 458,000
out of a force of 521,000 in the War of
1812.

We now come to the great Civil War.
Our population was nearly 31,000,000.
We had a small regular army scattered
over a vast area. It numbered a little

MAINTAINING ARMIES 31

over 16,000 men. Some of it was west of
the Mississippi; in fact, it was scattered
from the Canadian border to the Mexican
frontier, and drawn out in a thin line along
our western frontier. We were unpre-
pared as usual. Fortunately the seceding
States were equally unprepared, and it was
a case of two nations entering into war,
both unprepared, and each having to de-
velop its military resources in the way of
men and material as the war went on.
There is no doubt whatever in the mind of
any intelligent student of military matters
that had either side possessed a well
organized and well disciplined force of
50,000 men, that that side would have
occupied the other's capital almost imme-
diately.

Dependence was placed upon both Mili-
tia and Volunteers. The Militia was un-
satisfactory, as has generally been the case.
The conduct of Governors was too often

32 RAISING AND

characterized by party affiliations. The
political aspects of the war are too well
known to require discussion.

The main dependence of the country
was placed upon the Volunteers. This
was true of both North and South, and in
each instance it was necessary to go to the
draft. The cost in blood and treasure was
tremendous. Out of this military chaos
eventually came two splendid armies — ar-
mies, however, created at tremendous cost.

The old policy was adopted — first Mi-
litia and Volunteers, followed by the draft,
bounties with their attendant evils, wide-
spread desertion, bounty jumping, etc.
Fortunately it was a struggle amongst
ourselves. Had the country as a whole
been attacked by a well organized nation
of equal population, but with fully devel-
oped military resources, we could have
looked for but one result. The lessons of
all the above referred to wars point out

MAINTAINING ARMIES 33

very clearly to what our weakness has been
due, namely, first — the lack of any ade-
quate military preparation, second — de-
pendence upon an unsound military policy,
as indicated by the maintenance of an in-
adequate Regular Army and dependence
upon Militia and Volunteers; also failure
to avail ourselves of the full military
strength of the nation.

Again quoting Upton: "Any Govern-
ment which foregoes its rights to compul-
sory military service becomes more and
more enslaved by depending solely upon
voluntary military service, induced by gifts
of money, land and clothing."

The voluntary system failed us in the
past, and will fail us in the future. It is
uncertain in operation, prevents organ-
ized preparation, tends to destroy that
individual sense of obligation for military
service which should be found in every citi-
zen, costs excessively in life and treasure,

34 RAISING AND

and does not permit that condition of pre-
paredness which must exist if we are to
wage war successfully with any great
power prepared for war. The question
is : What shall we do to adequately pre-
pare ourselves for war, without establish-
ing a huge standing army or bringing
about a condition which might be described
as one of militarism, which term, as I use
it, means the condition under which the
military forces of a nation demand and
secure special recognition, both socially
and officially, and exercise an undue influ-
ence in the conduct of the civil affairs of
the government, both at home and abroad.
In other words, a condition which may be
described as one under which the military
element dominates the nation's policy.
Nothing could be more unfortunate than
the establishment of such a condition in
this country or elsewhere, so far as devel-
opment on normal lines is concerned.

MAINTAINING ARMIES 35

However, a condition of thorough pre-
paredness can be established without creat-
ing a condition of militarism. Switzerland
is an illustration of this possibility. Here
we have a country noted for its patriotism,
distinguished for conservatism and good
government, with a people noted for intel-
ligence, industry and good conduct, yet
every man who is physically fit has,
with few exceptions, received a sufficient
amount of military training to fit him to
be an efficient soldier.

It has been accomplished in great part
during his school period, and at camps of
instruction during his youth, and so thor-
ough and complete is the system that at
the end of his school and other training
received during this period it is only neces-
sary to give him from two to three months
intensive training in camp, according to
the arm in which he is to serve, to fit him
for the final discharge of his duties. The

36 RAISING AND

training for officers is, of course, extended
over longer periods, but all of this training
is accomplished without any interference
worthy of consideration with the youth's
educational and industrial career. In fact,
he is better physically, morally and better
as a citizen, because of his training. He
has learned to respect the flag of his coun-
try and to have a proper regard for the
rights of others, and he has had built up in
him an appreciation of his obligation to
serve the country in time of war. He rea-
lizes that this is a tax on which all others
depend, and on the payment of which in
good faith the life of the nation itself rests.
Australia has inaugurated a somewhat
similar system, having in view the same
general purpose; namely, the preparation
of every male who is physically fit for mili-
tary duty. Our situation, of course, differs
from that of Switzerland, because we must
maintain at all times a standing army ade-

MAINTAINING ARMIES 37

quate for the peace needs of the nation. By
this I mean the garrison of the Panama
Canal, Alaska and the oversea possessions ;
also a force within continental United
States adequate to meet the needs of the
country in the way of furnishing garrisons
for the sea coast defenses and a sufficient
mobile force to control internal disorders
or to provide an expeditionary force for
minor operations, such as those incident
to the recent occupation of Cuba or Vera
Cruz.

The Swiss system costs about $6,500,000
a year. There can be no question of its
benefit to the people from an economic
standpoint, as well as from a military
standpoint. The influence in bettering
citizenship is shown in the criminal rate of
Switzerland, which is only a small fraction
of our own. We must adopt a system
based on these general lines if we are ever
to be efficiently prepared for war or,

38 RAISING AND

better said, prepared against war, for our
preparation is really an insurance against
war rather than an incentive to it. Do not
place any dependence upon the statements
of these charlatans who speak of a million
men flocking to arms between sun and sun,
but remember when you hear fallacies of
this sort the words of old Light-Horse
Harry Lee, which are as true today as
they were when they were uttered. We
must preserve our ideals, strive for world
peace, and do what we can to build up the
adjustment of international difficulties
through arbitration, but we must not fail
to give due heed to the conditions under
which we live. Whatever we may hope for
in the way of universal peace does not jus-
tify us in disregarding the conditions
which surround us today. If we want to
hand down to our children the heritage
which has come to us from our fathers, we
must not place confidence in idle boasting

MAINTAINING ARMIES 39

but give serious heed to well thought out
preparation and adopt a policy for the fu-
ture with reference to our military estab-
lishment very different from that which
has existed in the past. We can do this
without violating our ideals. If I were to
state such a military policy I would say,
briefly, have an Army sufficient for the
peace needs of the nation, a good Militia,
an adequate Navy, and behind them the
largest possible number of men trained to
be efficient soldiers if needed, but in time
of peace following their ordinary civil oc-
cupations— ready to come when wanted.
A country so prepared will have the lar-
gest possible measure of peace.

II

THE MILITARY OBLIGATION
OF CITIZENSHIP

I always have impressed upon me at
meetings of this kind the evident failure
on the part of members of the conference
to appreciate the position of officers of the
Army and Navy with reference to the mil-
itary situation. The officers of the Army
and Navy are the professional servants of
the Government in matters pertaining to
the military establishment, and its agents
in the conduct of military operations when
such become necessary. They do not ini-
tiate wars. You are mostly business men
engaged in trade and commerce. Nine-
tenths of all wars have their origin directly

40

OF CITIZENSHIP 41

or indirectly in issues arising out of trade.
You the people make war ; the Government
declares it; and we, the officers of the
Army and Navy, are charged with the re-
sponsibility of terminating it with such
means and implements as you may give us.

Being more or less familiar with the re-
quirements of the military situation, we
naturally try to impress upon you the
necessity of a reasonable degree of pre-
paredness, both in the way of personnel,
proper organization and material re-
sources. We realize far more fully than
vou how necessary organized preparation
is, especially in these days when our possi-
ble opponents are so thoroughly equipped
and entirely ready for military activity.

There is a tendency at all these confer-
ences to invoke the advice of Washington,
Jefferson, Adams and other of our presi-
dents and statesmen, given in the past to
our countrymen on many matters, but I

42 MILITARY OBLIGATION

have heard no reference this year or last as
to their advice on the question of military
preparedness. You all, of course, know
how earnestly Washington, Jefferson,
Adams and many others urged upon our
people the vital importance of prepared-
ness as the best means of preventing war.
Washington frequently urges this upon
the attention of our people, as does Jef-
ferson in messages and in his letters to
Monroe. Adams states it tersely to the
effect that it is the only means by which
we can preserve peace. The soundness
and correctness of this advice is apparent
to all soldiers and it has been again and
again brought to the attention of our peo-
ple. Light-Horse Harry Lee, of the Rev-
olution, said:

"Convinced as I am that a government
is the murderer of its citizens which sends
them to the field uninformed and un-
taught, where they are to meet men of the

OF CITIZENSHIP 43

same age and strength, mechanized by ed-
ucation and discipline for battle, I cannot
withhold my denunciation of its wicked-
ness and folly."

Those words were absolutely true at the
time they were uttered and they are
equally true today, and I want to impress
upon you who know so little of war, that
those of us whose business it is to know
something of it and the requirements in the
way of preparation, are most deeply con-
cerned, not only from the standpoint of
military efficiency, but also on the broad
general grounds of common humanity, in
establishing a system under which our
young men may receive that degree of
training which will better fit them to
discharge with a reasonable degree of
efficiency their duties as soldiers in the
defence of the country in case they are
needed and thereby tend to reduce to the
lowest possible terms the cost in blood and

44 MILITARY OBLIGATION

treasure and to make such expenditure as
is inevitable, efficient and of value, instead
of wasting precious lives without avail.
Our President in his last message states:

"It will be right enough, right Ameri-
can policy, based upon our accustomed
principles and practices, to provide a sys-
tem by which every citizen who will volun-
teer for the training may be made familiar
with the use of modern arms, the rudi-
ments of drill and maneuver, and the
maintenance and sanitation of camps."

There are several things which have ren-
dered preparedness necessary to a greater
extent than ever before; the first is the
great improvement in transportation. In
the days when Washington, Jefferson and
Adams were urging upon us the necessity
of preparedness, our possible enemies were
without anything like the military estab-
lishment of the great powers of today.
Transportation over the sea was by sailing

OF CITIZENSHIP 45

ship, and was slow and very difficult, and
consequently considerable time was given
for preparation. Indeed, there is no de-
partment connected with military prepar-
edness in which there has been a greater
advance than in means of transportation.
There has also been a great advance made
in the power and efficiency of weapons.
They have become more complex, many
of them are very intricate machines which
require a great degree of skill in their
handling, with resulting long period of
instruction on the part of the personnel.
The advance in weapons is quite as notable
as that in transportation, and the weapon
of today is as far ahead of the weapon in
the times of Washington as is the vesti-
bule train ahead of the cart of those days.
In other words on one side we have a
greatly increased condition of prepared-
ness and greatly shortened period of ap-
proach through betterment in the means

46 MILITARY OBLIGATION

of transportation, and on the other hand
we have consequently a shortened period
to get ready combined with the necessity
of familiarizing ourselves not with the sim-
ple weapons of our fathers but with the
complex and intricate weapons of today
requiring a high degree of skill in their
use; the unprepared, unready defense
labors under greater embarrassments than
ever and the prepared aggressor has more
in his favor than ever before.

The officers of the Army and Navy are
as I have said not the persons who make
wars, their task is to conduct them as effi-
ciently as possible, and by efficiently I
mean not only efficiency in the ordinary
sense of the term but efficiency in all which
pertains to the saving of life. We do not
want to see the youth of this country sent
to arms untrained and unready to meet
equally good men who are trained and
ready and while we may all earnestly hope

OF CITIZENSHIP 47

that war will be no more, we are convinced
that for the present at least such is not the
case. We must judge the future largely
by the past and however earnestly we may
hope to avoid war there is nothing in the
history of the past or the events of the pres-
ent or the promises of the future which
justifies the assumption that we shall not
be again confronted by war, and those of
us who know what war means want you
to approve those moderate, reasonable and
necessary measures which will tend in the
first place to prevent war, and in case it
is unavoidable will tend to make it as short
and as little costly in blood and treasure
as possible.

If you were living under conditions
which rendered it necessary for your boys
and men to furnish the crews for the life
boat service you would see to it that they
knew how to row and swim so that they
would be prepared for the dangers of the

48 MILITARY OBLIGATION

work which you knew would some day
come to them and if any one pressed un-
trained boys into such service you would
say that it was little short of murder. This
is what Light-Horse Harry Lee said with
reference to the untrained troops of the
Revolution, and it is what those of us who
know something of war and of the neces-
sary preparation therefor say will be the
case if the youth of this country are again
sent into war unprepared to efficiently dis-
charge their duties. We are working not
for war, but for preparation in the first
place against it and in the second place
for preparation which if it comes will ren-
der it as short and bloodless as possible.
While cherishing our ideals and hopes for
the future and continuing our efforts to
bring about desired results in the way of
world peace, we must not be misled or un-
mindful of the actual conditions which sur-
round us today and will surround us for

OF CITIZENSHIP 49

an indefinite period of time; in other
words, we can not without jeopardizing
the best interests of our country fail to
make proper preparations against possible
war; such preparations will exert the lar-
gest measure of influence for peace, and in
case war is forced upon us, will enable us
to conduct it with the least possible ex-
penditure of blood and treasure.

Ill

THE CIVIL OBLIGATION OF
THE ARMY

It is always an inspiration to meet a
body of enthusiastic youngsters who have
the world ahead of them, and if one can do
anything to make more clear the respon-
sibilities and obligations which confront
them and suggest a way to meet and over-
come them, it is a duty which should be
performed. What I wish to say to you may
sound a bit harsh and inject an element
of seriousness into this occasion which will
tend a little to take from it the spirit of
joyousness. I am going to say something
to you about your obligations to the coun-
try as soldiers, for you come of the stock

50

OF THE ARMY 51

and represent a class whose responsibility
to the country in time of war has always
been generous.

I noticed today your fine soldiers' mon-
ument, erected in honor of the graduates
of the school who gave their lives in the
nation's service in the Spanish War.
Among them are the names of men of my
regiment. The response of these men is
indicative of the response which is going
to be made by men of their kind in the fu-
ture. You are going to respond whether
you are trained or not. What I want to
bring home to you is that to be a really good
citizen of a republic which is dependent
upon its citizen army you must be not only
willing but prepared, and I want to say
to the parents and friends assembled here
tonight that they must remember that
these youngsters are going to respond to
the call of the country whether they wish
it or not; that it is a duty which the great

52 CIVIL OBLIGATION

majority of right minded boys will not at-
tempt to shirk, and the question I want to
ask them is — Are they going to send these
boys to us prepared to be efficient soldiers
or are they going to send them to us un-
trained and unprepared to make such sac-
rifice as they may have to make effective?

This subject was brought home to me
very forcibly the other day by a letter re-
ceived from a friend in the West, who had
just lost his boy in the battle at Ypres.
He said:

"You remember the last time we met
that I told you of my 17-year-old boy at
school in England. Well, he left school
and went into the Home Defense force,
but this was not enough, and he trans-
ferred and joined a regiment at the front
— one of the new regiments — and was
killed at Ypres. It was sad enough and
hard enough to lose the boy, but I shall
never be able to get rid of the feeling that

OF THE ARMY 53

neither he nor his mates had a sporting
chance; they were unprepared and un-
trained."

Before going into the details of this sub-
ject I want to impress one fact upon you,
and that is that our country has never yet
in its entire history met single handed a
first-class country prepared for war. The
shrinkage in enlistments and steady dimi-
nution in the strength of our military
establishment during our struggle for
independence points out clearly and con-
clusively to any fair-minded person the
invaluable assistance of France in the
Revolution. In the War of 1812-1814 we
were, from a military standpoint, a minor
issue, for Great Britain was engaged in
that tremendous struggle with Napoleon
— a struggle which required the great bulk
of her forces on sea and land and pro-
hibited her from concentrating her efforts
upon the war in America.

54 CIVIL OBLIGATION

The question is — Shall we drift on, re-
gardless of the teachings of history, mak-
ing no adequate preparation for the
possibilities of the hour, or shall we take
heed from the experiences of the past, not
only of our own country, but of all lands
since history was written, which is, that
preparedness is the best insurance against
war, or shall we accept as our guide for
the future the theory of those deluded peo-
ple who tell us that wars are over and that
this is the last great war, forgetful of the
fact that these same people, or people of
the same type of intelligence, announced
that the Russo-Japanese War was the last
war, then that the Balkan War was the
last war? The answer is no. We must
judge the future by the past and make
wise preparation to protect and safeguard
those rights which our forefathers handed
down to us. It seems to me that no right-
minded person can hesitate in deciding

OF THE ARMY 55

which is the path of wisdom and which is
the path of folly.

We do not want war, but we must not
forget that there is many a peace which is
infinitely worse than war, such as a peace
which results from failure to do our clear
duty to fight for what we believe is right
or to support our honest convictions. We
in this country do not want a large stand-
ing army, nor do we desire anything which
savors of militarism. We do need and
those who are intelligent enough to appre-
ciate the situation want, an adequate army.
By this I mean an army sufficient for the
peace needs of the nation, which means the
garrisoning of the Philippines, Panama,
Hawaii, Alaska and Porto Rico, together
with such force in the United States as will
be sufficient for an expeditionary force,
such as we sent to Cuba, or to deal with
internal disorders which neither the police
nor militia may be adequate to control.

56 CIVIL OBLIGATION

We must have an adequate navy, sufficient
to perform a navy's function — on one
ocean in any case, and, if we are wise, on
both oceans. Both the army and navy
must be supported by adequate reserves —
the navy with a reserve strong enough to
completely man the second line ships or-
dinarily out of commission and the many
supply ships and auxiliary ships which
must be put into commission in time of
war, and in addition men enough to make
good the losses of the first six months of
war. We must also have a good Militia
with reserves, under a large measure of
federal control — a Militia whose response
to the calls of the nation will be prompt
and certain — one which will come well
trained and well equipped. This can only
be accomplished through the Federal Gov-
ernment fixing the standards and exercis-
ing the necessary power of inspection.
Unless this can be done the Militia cannot

OF THE ARMY 57

be considered a dependable force. Back
of it is that great force of citizen soldiers,
ordinarily known as volunteers — a force
which must be trained in time of peace, in
order to be promptly available in time of
war. In any case the officers of this force
must be provided in time of peace and
their provision must include thorough, sys-
tematic training.

We cannot depend upon volunteers in
future wars, as we have in past wars, for
the simple reason that the onrush of a
modern war is so sudden and all our possi-
ble antagonists, concerning whom we need
have any serious apprehension, are so
thoroughly prepared that there will be no
time to train volunteers, and certainly no
time to train officers. Washington and
the officers of his time were convinced of
the folly of depending upon volunteers.
They come with a rush from the best of
the population during the early stages of

58 CIVIL OBLIGATION

war, but their enthusiasm soon passes
away and the bounty and the draft follow.
In the Revolution our greatest force was,
in 1776, about 89,000 men. It dwindled
year by year so that in 1781 we had in the
field only a little over 29,000 men, and this
notwithstanding large bounties of money
and land and the strongest efforts on the
part of individuals and Colonial assem-
blies. The same thing took place in the
War of 1812-1814. Men came for a short
time, but new men had to take their places ;
527,000 different men were in the field
during this war. Of this number some-
thing over 33,000 were officers.

The frequent change of personnel re-
sulted in demoralization and inefficiency.
It was again attempted through the
bounty to produce effects which should
have been produced by patriotism. In the
Revolution, which was really the birth
struggle of the nation, the falling off in

OF THE ARMY 59

volunteering is worthy of the most serious
consideration, as is the chaotic condition
which resulted from the working of the
same system in the War of 1812-1814.
This war on land was highly discreditable
to us. With the exception of a drawn
battle at Lundy's Lane and an unimpor-
tant victory on the Thames, our land
operations were not only disastrous, but
generally highly discreditable. We aban-
doned Washington to a force of only
about six per cent of that of the defenders,
with a loss on our side of eight killed and
eleven wounded. The greatest force of
regulars which England had in this coun-
try at any time during the war was a little
over 16,800. There was, of course, a con-
siderable number of Indians and Militia,
but this combined force was only a small
fraction of our numerically great force.
At the battle of New Orleans (fought
after the war) we won a highly creditable

60 CIVIL OBLIGATION

victory. Our troops were well handled
and the enemy attempted the impossible.
Moreover, the bulk of the men who com-
posed Jackson's army were expert with
the rifle.

On the water we had many highly cred-
itable individual ship actions and some
creditable fleet actions, but generally
speaking, on the high seas our commerce
was destroyed and our gallant but small
navy bottled up.

In the Civil War we of necessity con-
tinued the volunteer system, no general
policy looking to military efficiency having
been inaugurated, and the two armies,
each undisciplined and untrained, learned
the game of war together, and after sev-
eral years were moulded into excellent
fighting machines. In this war, as in pre-
ceding wars, the volunteer system failed
absolutely, and both the North and the
South had to go to the draft and every

OF THE ARMY 61

attendant evil of the bounty system,
with its accompanying desertions, bounty
jumping, etc., which tended to demoralize
the public conscience in all which pertained
to the sacredness of the military obligation.
The number of desertions was enormous.
Charles Francis Adams places it as high
as 523,000 out of a total enlistment in the
northern armies of something over 2,700,-
000, or nearly one in five.

In the Mexican War we met an unpre-
pared and rather ineffective enemy and the
theater of war was so remote that our men
were in hand long enough to get them into
reasonably good shape, at least to meet an
enemy of the type which confronted us.
We had, moreover, an unusually able body
of officers, many of whom distinguished
themselves greatly in the Civil War; but
again, as in all our wars, had we met a pre-
pared and efficient enemy the system
would have been our undoing.

62 CIVIL OBLIGATION

You must never for a moment accept
the very common idea, brought into being
largely by the politicians and the Fourth
of July orator, that we as a nation have
peculiar military ability and that without
thorough training we can meet equally
good men who have been well trained.

The cowardly abandonment of our cap-
ital almost without loss on our part shows
how unsafe it is to trust untrained troops
in combat with well-organized, well-disci-
plined troops. You must remember also
that this particular action occurred almost
within a generation of the Revolutionary
War, and that the men who made up the
force defending Washington were drawn
from sections which produced many of the
best troops of the Revolution. Old Light-
Horse Harry Lee summed the situation as
follows :

"That government is a murderer of its
citizens which sends them to the field un-

OF THE ARMY 63

informed and untaught, where they are to
meet men of the same age and strength,
mechanized by education and discipline for
battle."

Those words are just as true and just
as applicable today as they were when they
were uttered. We are no longer an Anglo-
Saxon race, but a very mixed one. Blood
strains from all parts of Europe run
through out people, and their influence is
felt in the descendants of the new-comers.
Everything indicates the necessity today,
more than ever before, of thorough prepar-
ation. Now, while we do not desire a large
standing army, we must have the kind of
army and an army of the strength referred
to above. We must have also a great body
of 35,000 or 40,000 reserve officers trained
and ready to serve as officers of volunteers.
We must have a sound military system —
one which tends to produce in the heart of
every boy the consciousness of the fact that

64 CIVIL OBLIGATION

he is one of the defenders of the country
and impels him to make the necessary
preparation.

The military systems of Switzerland or
Australia appeal to me very strongly as
models which we could follow to our ad-
vantage in all which pertains to military
training. Switzerland has had her system
in operation long enough to make its appli-
cation general, and as a result, while a
peaceful, orderly country, she stands al-
ways ready to defend her rights and to
guard her territory. She is absolutely free
from all indication of militarism, as ordi-
narily understood, and yet every man in
Switzerland who is physically fit has re-
ceived a sufficient amount of training to
make him an effective and efficient soldier ;
that this has served to benefit and uplift
the people is conclusively shown by her low
criminal rate, which is only a fraction of
ours, and by the admitted conservatism of

OF THE ARMY 65

her people, their law-abiding habits, their
patriotism and their respect for the rights
of others. Contrast her position of today
with that of another small European coun-
try, which, unlike her, had not made due
preparation. In both Switzerland and
Australia a large amount of instruction is
given through public schools or during the
school period of the youth — so much, in-
deed, that only two or three months of in-
tensive training in camp are necessary to
complete the training of the soldier. The
officers take a longer and more intensive
course, but the system in both countries is
worked out so that there is practically no
interference with the industrial or educa-
tional careers of those under training.

As I have said before, there has been
little or no interest in this country in this
great question of military training. There
has been a general haphazard policy and
a blind dependence upon volunteers; in

66 CIVIL OBLIGATION

other words, a dependence upon someone
else doing one's work. It is an illogical
system. There is no reason why one group
of the population should assume that an-
other group is going to voluntarily per-
form their military duties. The obliga-
tion to military service is universal. It is
a tax upon which all others depend, and a
nation which fails to recognize this pre-
pares its own downfall. This general
training can all be effected as has been
done in Switzerland and Australia, with-
out a trace of militarism, without any
departure from ideals, and with a great
resulting improvement in the morals,
physique and character of our youth. In
Switzerland and Australia the training of
young boys is principally of a calisthenic
character. Later they pass to rifle shoot-
ing and military formations. The final
finish is put upon them in training at the
camps which immediately precede their

OF THE ARMY 67

entry into the first line of the country's
defense.

You must not think that war is one
bf the great destroyers of human life.
It does take many lives, but it is among the
lesser causes of loss of life. Our indus-
trial casualties, not deaths necessarily, but
casualties of all kinds, amount to some-
thing over 450,000 a year. Of these, about
78,000 or 79,000 result fatally — a loss
rather exceeding the average loss of life of
two years of the Civil War. Most of these
accidents are preventable. The public in-
terest in life saving is not sufficiently keen
to insist on adequate legislation to this
end. The losses in the war are more
dramatic, more startling, but the lives lost
in every day work in the struggle for exist-
ence exceed them vastly in number and run
on without ceasing, both during peace and
war.

The following is a little illustration of

68 CIVIL OBLIGATION

the case of our own country, namely, in
ten peaceful Fourths of July (the last
July 4, 1910), approximately 1,800 per-
sons were killed and something over 35,000
wounded in celebrating the success of a
war which ended nearly 130 years before.
The number killed equals the number
killed in battle or who died of wounds in
the Spanish-American War, the Philip-
pine rebellion and the Indian wars of a
number of years preceding. The wounded
of these ten peaceful days aggregate seven
and a half times the wounded of all these
wars. I tell you these things not to prove
that war is any less dreadful, or that you
should strive less to avoid it, but simply to
present to you the truth with reference to
the causes which bring about loss of life.
Do not give up your ideals. Strive for
universal peace, but while striving do not
forget the conditions under which you are
living, and, however much you may hope

OF THE ARMY 69

to obtain a condition of world peace, re-
member that there is no evidence of it to-
day and that if we want to preserve the
institutions which have been handed down
to us we must be ready to defend them or,
as Lord Roberts said:

"Strive to stir up, to foster and develop
the manly and more patriotic spirit in the
nation — a spirit which will induce our
youth to realize that they must be not only
ready but prepared to guard the heritage
handed down to them."

Abandon the theory of chance and adopt
that of probability in making wise provi-
sions for peace through preparedness for
war.

You hear a great deal about the destruc-
tive work of the soldier. I am going to
say just a word with reference to his con-
structive and life saving work, which has
really been his principal function since the
close of the Spanish- American War, and

70 CIVIL OBLIGATION

indeed it was one of his principal activities
during that war. Starting with Porto
Rico, we find that, principally due to the
efforts of a medical officer of the army, Dr.
Bailey K. Ashford, tropical anemia, or
hookworm disease, as it is ordinarily called,
has been about eliminated. Not only was
this discovery of value in Porto Rico, but it
was made use of throughout our own
southern states, with a result of revitaliz-
ing and reenergizing hundreds of thous-
ands of people afflicted with this disease.
The annual death rate in Porto Rico alone
was reduced by a number exceeding the
total number of men killed during the
Spanish- American War, and a recent in-
quiry made of all planters in the island
with reference to their workers indicates
that, in their opinion, the average increase
in efficiency is 60 per cent — & truly start-
ling figure, and one which illustrates very
well the far-reaching and wonderful effects

OF THE ARMY 71

of sanitary measures and preventative
medicine.

Passing on to Cuba, here we have the
wonderful discovery of Major Walter
Reed and his associates, Carroll and
Lezear, which resulted in discovering the
method of transmission of yellow fever
and the means of controlling it, and the
eventual elimination of that dread disease
not only from Cuba, but from all the
American troops, with the resulting sav-
ing in life, which runs into many thous-
ands each year, and a saving in money so
vast that it is difficult to estimate it; for
the days of yellow fever, with the conse-
quent quarantine, which tied up the move-
ment of men and materials throughout
the entire South, limited the movements
of ships coming from yellow fever coun-
tries, and the costly disinfection, resulted
in an expenditure running into hundreds
of millions. Indeed, it is safe to say that

72 CIVIL OBLIGATION

the saving from yellow fever alone every
year in life and money has exceeded the
cost in each of the Spanish- American War
and the Philippine rebellion.

In the Philippines splendid sanitary
work has been done by the army and later
by the civil government. Berri berri, one
of the most dreaded of the eastern diseases,
has been done away with. Malaria has
been brought under control. Infant mor-
tality has been halved. Most of this latter
work has been done under the civil govern-
ment, but the foundations were laid by the
medical officers of the army who at first
had charge of the work. In Panama we
see the direct effect of this work in the
completion of the Panama Canal. This
great and splendid piece of engineering,
remarkable as it is from an engineering
standpoint, and conducted with wonderful
efficiency by General Goethals and his as-
sistants, could not have been built had it

OF THE ARMY 73

not been for the application by General
Gorgas of the results of the sanitary dis-
coveries made in Cuba which made it pos-
sible to carry on this great work under
conditions of health which equalled those
anywhere in the United States. It may be
truly said without taking one atom of
credit from the engineers that this great
work was built on a sanitary foundation.
Had we not got rid of yellow fever and
learned to control malaria, the death rate
would have been so heavy that the work
could only have resulted in our hands as
it did in the hands of the French, for noth-
ing demoralizes working forces more
effectively than great epidemics. They
are worse than battles in some ways.

The mobilization on the Mexican fron-
tier has not been without its great and
lasting benefits. It enabled us, because of
the prevalence of typhoid in the Mexican
villages and along the Rio Grande, to in-

74 CIVIL OBLIGATION

sist upon general typhoid inoculation of
officers and men, and the result has been
the removal of typhoid from the army.
Last year there were 100,000 men scat-
tered from Tientsin to Panama, through
the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines,
from Alaska to Porto Rico, as well as
all over the United States, and there was
not a single death among them from
typhoid. When one remembers thous-
ands of cases in the camps of the Spanish-
American War, the importance of this
discovery is appreciated. The general
application was made possible only by the
mobilization of troops and in the strug-
gle to protect them. So it was with the
discovery concerning yellow fever and the
elaboration of the methods employed in
controlling malaria. The results of these
discoveries are now all of general appli-
cation, not only to the population in our
own country, but to the population of all

OF THE ARMY 75

countries in and bordering on the Ameri-
can tropics, as well as in the insular pos-
sessions. Not only were great sanitary
results secured through the military arms
of the government, but it should be remem-
bered also that it, the military arm,
established and maintained a civil govern-
ment in Porto Rico, Cuba and the Philip-
pines, and conducted these governments
with great success — in Cuba up to the
point of the transfer to the Cuban people
of a completely organized republic, and in
Porto Rico until the transfer to the Amer-
ican civil government; likewise in the
Philippines the military authorities were
in full charge during the most trying per-
iod and turned over to the civil commission
which followed them a well-organized
government and a well-filled treasury.

I tell you all this in order that you may
understand more fully what the real work
of the army has been — that its life saving

76 CIVIL OBLIGATION

has counterbalanced scores of times its
work as a destructive force, if one may
apply the term "destructive forces" to a
force used to terminate intolerable condi-
tions and to establish humane, just and
equitable governments among dependent
people.

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